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From Poland to Tenedos

**The Project of Using the Teutonic Order in the Fight against the Turks
after the Fall of Constantinople**

The research into the relations between Byzantium and Central Europe have been gaining momentum lately. As far as Poland is concerned it seems essential to complete Halecki's important text on Byzantium and Poland.¹ In spite of his/her attempt of objectivity, the Byzantinist necessarily becomes a Byzantine ally. Whatever the facts, we must put aside the patriotic favouritism connected with Byzantium and Poland respectively.

The fall of Constantinople was beneficial for Poland and its King Casimir the Jagiellonian. It distracted the Pope's attention from the Prussian cause and the Teutonic Order which had been supported by the Papacy. Rome focussed its attention on Eastern Europe, where the Turkish territorial expansion started to loom large. So as to gain advantage from the solution of the Prussian problem, the Polish diplomacy suggested that the Teutonic Order should be transferred on to the isle of Tenedos. However fantastic the idea might seem, it becomes a handy pretext for exploring the relations between Poland and South-Eastern Europe, including the remnants of the Byzantine state.

The fate of this political project has never been studied in the western literature. Neither do we know who its author was. As for Polish sources, Długosz is the only chronicler to mention this fact. Some contemporary Polish

1 O. HALECKI, *La Pologne et La Empire Byzantin*, *Byzantion* 7 (1932) 41-67. G. Prinzing and M. Salamon have already started to do it. See: G. PRINZING, *Bizantyńskie aspekty średniowiecznej historii Polski*, (*Byzantine Aspects of Polish Medieval History*), Poznań 1994 (= *Xenia Posnaniensia* 5 [1994]); M. SALAMON, »Amicus« or »hostis«? Boleslav the Valiant and Byzantium, in: *Byzantium and Its Neighbours. From the Mid-9th till the 12th Centuries. Papers Read at the Byzantinological Symposium, Bechyně 1990*, ed. V. VAVŘINEK, Praha 1993 = *Byzantinoslavica* 54 (1993) 114-120.

historians briefly refer to the question without solving it. Halecki ignores it completely.

In 1453 Casimir IV was 26 years old. He had been reigning for six years. Unlike his brother Vladislav III, King of Poland and Hungary, Casimir does not seem to have received adequate education.² This does not imply however that he did not pay any attention to the fall of Constantinople. As a child he was much more bright than his brother, therefore thorough education was neglected in his case. He was brought up to be a tough calculating man who did not share the humanistic emotion over the fall of the Second Rome.³ Consequently, he did not lose his head for Byzantium as his brother Vladislav III had literally done. Therefore it would be very difficult to agree with a contemporary historian⁴ who claims that the general mourning became a fact in Poland after the fall of Constantinople. Only Długosz and some annalists spared a tear or two on this tragedy, but especially Długosz wrote about it

2 For the data concerning Casimir IV the Jagiellonian see: M. BISKUP/K. GÓRSKI, Kazimierz Jagiellończyk. Zbiór studiów o Polsce drugiej połowy XV wieku (Casimir the Jagiellonian. Studies on Poland of the Second half of the 15th Century), Warszawa 1987. Casimir was a brother of Vladislav III, killed in the battle of Varna.

3 This does not mean that he did not appreciate the humanists. His interests are reflected in the correspondence with Lorenzo de Medici (addressed as Magnificus Laurentius de Medici, amicus meus observantissimus) and in the fact, that the royal sons were educated by humanists: Philip Bounacorsi, called Callimachus, among others. See: J. SKOCZEK, Wychowanie Jagiellonów (The Education of the Jagiellons), Lwów 1932, 10. Incidentally, it is worth noting that Poland was perceived as a country similar to Byzantium. The evidence for that can be found in the fact that a certain Demetrios from Constantinople was recommended to the Polish ruler at the Council in Basel in 1439. Its participants said that the Polish Kingdom was »quite close, to the Greek lands«. This is why the study of Greek in the Academy in Cracow was considered important. It was supported by Zbigniew of Oleśnica, then the bishop of Cracow. J. SKOCZEK, Stosunki kulturalne Polski z Zachodem w XV w. (The Cultural Relations between Poland and the West in the 15th Century), Lwów 1938, 60; HALECKI, La Pologne (see note 1), 60; PRINZING, Biz. aspekty (see note 1), 23.

4 A. F. GRABSKI, Polska w opiniach Europy Zachodniej w XIV-XV w. (Poland under Western Eyes in the 14th -15th Centuries), Warszawa 1968, 445.

after considerable time.⁵ The King himself learned about the fall of Constantinople in September 1453 while his envoys were staying in Moldavia.⁶

The fall of the Byzantine capital did not signify the end of Byzantium. The Palaiologoi had still been ruling in the Peloponnese (till 1460) whereas their allies, the Gattilusio were still living on Lesbos.⁷ Before the Turks attacked Negroponte in 1470 even the Venetians hoped to maintain their commercial prosperity in the Aegean World.⁸ The Byzantine-Latin community was still existing as something to fight for. Since 1453 the Pope's attention had concentrated on the East. Also the German-Roman Emperor Frederick III who had been ruling since 1440 showed interest in this matter. However, he was a hopelessly weak personality. If anyone was able to lend a hand to the vanishing Byzantine Empire without the capital, it was certainly the Pope.

In the meantime in February 1454 an insurrection broke out in Prussia. The inhabitants, ruled by the Teutonic Order turned to the Polish King for

5 Jan Długosz (Joannes Dlugossius), *Historia Polonica*, lib. XII, vol. V, ed. A. PRZEŹDZIECKI, Cracoviae 1878, 142-145.

6 Z. KIEREŚ, Zagadnienia konfliktu polsko-tureckiego w drugiej połowie XV w. Kwestia czarnomorska w okresie rządów Kazimierza Jagiellończyka (do 1484), (The Problem of the Polish-Turkish Conflict in the Second Half of the 15th Century. Casimir the Jagiellonian in the Face of Turkish Expansion in the Black Sea) *Śląskie Studia Historyczne* 3 (1977) 40. Voivod Alexander promised to pay homage to Poland. It took place in September 1453 and then the royal envoys were informed about the fall of Constantinople. Poland consolidated its influence in Moldavia as a result of agreement with the voivod Stefan in 1459.

7 D. ZAKYTHINOS, *Le despote grec de Morée 1261-1460*, t. I, Histoire politique, Paris 1932, 241-284. The conflict between two brothers: Thomas and Demetrios Palaiologoi was tragic for Peloponnese. Lesbos was captured in 1462. The event had been preceded by the fratricidal fight between Nicolò and Domenico Gattilusio which encouraged the Turkish invasion. Cf. W. MILLER, The Gattilusj of Lesbos (1355-1462), *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 22 (1913) 435-442.

8 The sack of Negroponte was Mehmed II's prestigious victory. The news that the island was seized resulted in despair and hysteria among the inhabitants of Venice who realised that they had lost one of the most important sites in the Levant. Cf. F. BABINGER, *Z dziejów imperium Osmanów. Sultan Mehmed Zdobywca i jego czasy.* (Mehmed der Eroberer und seine Zeit), trans. T. Zabłudowski, Warszawa 1977, 284-288.

assistance.⁹ The Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire immediately took the side of the Teutonic Order.¹⁰ But Casimir agreed to incorporate Prussia into Poland on the grounds that a major part of this territory had previously belonged to the Polish State. Not wanting to incur the displeasure of the Papacy and the German-Roman Emperor, Poland promised to take part in the campaign against Turkey by invading the Tartars.¹¹ Lutek from Brzezie, Polish chancellor and actual instigator of foreign policy took a stand on that matter during the Regensburg Imperial Diet.¹² Lutek had also carried out on his diplomatic activities in Rome where the Teutonic prosecutor Jodok Hohenstein attempted to undermine Polish strategy.¹³ In this context Lutek put a special emphasis on the Polish contribution to the defense of Christendom. He had Vladislav III in mind. The German influences managed to gain advantage at Regensburg. The Emperor demanded that Poland should give up its Prussian project and join the crusade. Casimir rejected this claim and sent the envoys away.¹⁴ The

9 BISKUP/GÓRSKI, Kazimierz (as note 2), 186. Polish gentry and town's people organised the so called Prussian Association whose aim was to regain the delta of the Vistula River and to promote the Baltic trade there. The Grand Master of the Teutonic Order Ludwig von Erlichshausen made Emperor Frederick III declare the Association invalid in 1453, which gave rise to the uprising in the next year.

10 *Ibidem*, 189.

11 The promise was a bit of a stratagem. After the fall of the Golden Horde in the middle of the 15th century, the Tartars split up into independent khanates. The Crimean Khanate accepted the Turkish superiority only in 1475. In the period under consideration the dispersed Tartars did not pose a threat to Poland. There was no need to attack them. Therefore the Polish promise seems to have been a trick rather than a real political plan. The problem deserves a separate study.

12 B. JANISZEWSKA-MINCER, *Działalność polityczna Jana Lutka z Brzezia* (The Political Activity of Jan Lutek of Brzezie), *Zeszyty Naukowe WSP w Opolu Historia* 6 (1967) 65-66. Jan Lutek's diplomatic efficiency can be seen in the fact that he managed to persuade the Pope not to denounce the Prussian Association, even though the Teutonic Knights had been trying to influence Nicolas V against Poland. Having gained nothing in Rome, the Teutonic Order turned to Emperor Frederick III who had the Association abolished. In Regensburg Lutek skilfully emphasized the dangers Poland faced on the Teutonic and the Tartar side. The latter was a political red herring. The supposed attack on the Tartars was meant to prevent them from allying themselves with Mehmed II.

13 *Ibidem*, 67.

14 The embassy included the representatives of the Reich princes and of Philip the Good, involved in the preparation for the crusade.

King's diplomats pointed out that the Prussian territories had never been reigned by the Holy Emperor and now they should be subjected to the Polish Kingdom. This policy resulted in the outbreak of the 13 year war with the Teutonic Order and spoiled the relations between Poland and the Holy See. The Teutonic prosecutor brought about the faking of bulla which put an end to the Prussian Association connected with Poland.¹⁵ This was convergent with the policy of Calixtus III who had been trying to force Poland to join the crusade since 1457.¹⁶ The pressure indicates that Poland was highly valued as potential military ally. In fact the Polish State seemed to acquire the leadership in the crusading project.

After the death of the bishop of Varmia in Prussia, the Pope placed Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini on the bishop's throne.¹⁷ Aeneas had already made a spectacular political career. He had worked in Frederick III's chancellery since 1443.¹⁸ He was strongly anti-Polish and he denied Vladislav III all the success in his winter war with the Turks in 1443-1444.¹⁹ Poland could not be happy when Aeneas was elected the Pope as Pius II in 1458. The moment that he came to the throne Pius II was a supporter of the crusade against the Turks. He needed Poland for these plans, therefore he attempted to reconcile Casimir with his »beloved Son the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order and

15 On the subject of the war see: M. BISKUP, *Trzynastoletnia wojna z Zakonem Krzyżackim 1454-1466* (The Thirteen Year War against the Teutonic order), Warszawa 1967. Jodok took advantage of the new Pope Calixtus III's interest in the crusade and made him confirm the faked bulla of Nicolas V valid. The faked document dissolved the Prussian Association. The Polish diplomacy was not able to prevent it.

16 BISKUP/GÓRSKI, Kazimierz (as in note 2), 200. The King was not willing to dispatch envoys to the council in Rome concerning the matter. As a result the Association was excommunicated.

17 Casimir the Jagiellonian was opposed to it and demanded that Jan Lutek should be made bishop of that precarious diocese.

18 I. ZAREBSKI, *Stosunki Eneasza Sylwiusza z Polska i Polakami* (The Relations of Aeneas Sylvius with Poland and the Poles), Kraków 1939, 8-9.

19 Aeneas was indignant at the Polish influence in Hungary. He thought that the proper leader of the crusade would be Emperor Frederick III and not the Polish-Hungarian King. *Ibidem*, 11.

the Brethren». ²⁰ At the same time he conducted the policy in favour of the Teutonic Order and he offered a bishopric of Varmia to Paul Legendorf, ²¹ the ally of the Order. Under those circumstances Casimir did not hasten to swear obedience to the Pope. ²² He only decided to do that in the autumn 1459 when he sent Jakub of Sienna to the Congress at Mantua. ²³

At that time the Palaeologoi in the Peloponnese were trying to protect their possessions. However, the tragic thing was that instead of fighting the Turks they were fighting one another. While Demetrios favoured the Turks, Thomas looked forward to the Latin help. ²⁴ It was expressed in the fact that he sent the embassy to Mantua, but it is not known who acted as his representative there. ²⁵ What remains certain is that Pius promised Western assistance to Byzantine Peloponnese. In 1459 he did not take a definitely anti-Polish attitude. He waited for the King to give his consent to the raising of funds for the crusade. At that moment the King was so busy that he could not even turn up for his decoration with the Order of the Garter in Windsor. ²⁶

20 *Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti*, vol. III, ed. A. LEWICKI, Kraków 1894, 84-86. BISKUP, Trzynastoletnia (as in note 15), 557.

21 K. GÓRSKI, Legendorf Paweł, hr. Stango (1410 (1420)-1476), in: *Polski Słownik Biograficzny* (Polish Biographical Dictionary), vol. XVII, Wrocław-Warszawa 1972, 1-3; Legendorf took the side of Poland only after Poland's victorious war with the Teutonic Order.

22 BISKUP/GÓRSKI, Kazimierz (as in note 2), 202.

23 F. KIRYK, Jakub z Sienna 1413-1480, in: *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, vol. XV, 365. The Pope convened the huge assembly to Mantua so as to promote his plan of a gigantic crusade. He hoped for 88 thousand participants. On the Mantua assembly see: *Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova et Amplissima Collectio*, ed. J.D. MANSI et consortes, vol. 35, Paris 1902, 106-134. On the prepared crusade: N. HOUSSEY, *The Later Crusades 1274-1580*. From Lyon to Alcazar, Oxford 1992, 105-109.

24 D. ZAKYTHINOS, Le despotat (as in note 7), 262-274.

25 *Ibidem*, 262.

26 Cf. H. ZINS, Ze stosunków polsko-angielskich w połowie XV w. Sprawa Orderu Podwiazki dla Kazimierza Jagiellończyka (On the Polish-English Relations in the Middle of the 15th Century. The Question of the Order of the Garter for Casimir the Jagiellonian), *Zapiski Historyczne* 33 (1968), fasc. 1, 33-58. England was not involved in the anti-Turkish project which made it Poland's natural ally. In 1455 Casimir informed Henry VI that he had made Prussia obey the Polish rule. At the same time he asked the English King to extend his protection to the Polish citizens living in England. In his letters to Henry VI, Philip the Good and the Hanse Casimir stressed that the Prussian cities were

Jakub of Sienna spent the whole month travelling from Poland to Rome. He was accompanied by a magnificent cortege subsidized by the Polish clergy.²⁷ It is not known who else took part in the mission. The clothes and the caps with feathers worn by the delegates attracted the attention of Pius himself.²⁸ Jakub was not a mediocrity. He represented the educated Polish élite. He had studied in Rome and worked at the chancellery of Casimir IV. He was the nephew of Zbigniew of Oleśnica, the late bishop of Cracow.²⁹ Jakub loved the ancient writings and history and Pius regarded him a »vir doctus«.³⁰ Długosz comments on Jakub's speech in Mantua concerning the campaign for »Constantinopolis recuperari«.³¹ The phrasing indicated that at that time the fall of Constantinople was not considered a lost cause.

According to the research Jakub spoke in Mantua for the second time. This time he appeared in the company of Poland's permanent advocate in the Curia – Andrea of Santa Croce.³² Deploring the conflict between Poland and the Teutonic Order he suggested that the Order should be transferred on to

beyond the German-Roman Emperor's rule.

27 KIRYK, Jakub (as in note 23), l. cit., ZAREBSKI, Stosunki (as in note 18), 81. Aeneas appreciated the fact that Jakub of Sienna was the nephew of Zbigniew of Oleśnica. It was under Zbigniew's influence that Aeneas changed his attitude to Poland which he had earlier treated as uncouth country, where beer and not wine was served. (I. Zarebski, 77-80). Eminent benedictine monks may have taken part in Jakub's embassy. See: M. DERWICH, Benedyktynski klasztor Świętego Krzyża na Łysej Górze (Benedictine Monastery of the Holy Cross at the Bald Mount), Warszawa 1992, 478.

28 ZAREBSKI, Stosunki (as in note 18), 81.

29 After Zbigniew of Oleśnica's death, Jakub became the administrator of the diocese in Cracow. He was one of the richest prelates in Poland.

30 After: ZAREBSKI, Stosunki (as in note 18), 81.

31 DŁUGOSZ, Historia (as in note 5), 299: »Maximo insuper studio et cura preafati Iacobi de Senno regii nuntii laboratum et certatum est, ut Ordo Cruciferorum de Prussia penitus inde tolleretur, ne Reges catholicos, quibus confinabat, domestico bello involveret, et transferetur ad insulam Tenedon, ut illic, iuxta suae professionem regulae, militiae in barbaros vacans, Turcos bello lacesseret.«

32 BISKUP/GÓRSKI, Kazimierz (as in note 2), 202. After Lutek's initial success in Rome, the Teutonic Brothers proved to be more effective since they had secured the support of the cardinal-protector, whereas Poland could only afford advocates. Since 1455 Andrea de Santa Croce had been one of them. He won some cardinals over for the Polish cause, as for example the cardinal of Rouen Guillaume d'Estouteville, who was known to be a friend of Poland's. *Ibidem*, 225.

Tenedos so as to be closer to the infidel.³³ I have not found more detailed information on Andrew of Santa Croce. Was he, personally, the author of the project? Andrew gained the support of several cardinals for the Polish cause, but could it possibly mean the approval of the transfer of the Order on to Tenedos? Andrew had a brother, Honorius Tricarico, whose future cardinal's hat was the objective of Casimir's diplomatic efforts.³⁴ Consequently, there was a pro-Polish party in the Curia. A question arises whether Jakub set out for Mantua specifically with this goal in mind or whether he included the idea of Tenedos project in his speech on the spot. Who could have supported this project? The documents of the reunion edited by Mansi indicate that it included representatives of the Holy Empire, the Italian towns, Savoy, Burgundy etc.³⁵ None of these parties could be satisfied with the project. Whose idea was it then? Długosz ascribes it to Jakub, but did Jakub present this idea as his own? Understandably enough, the project provoked the response of the Teutonic prosecutor.³⁶ The Pope denounced Casimir's action in Prussia, which was meant to force the King to obey. Clearly, he did not want to give up Poland as an ally which stresses the Polish State's military assets.

But whose idea was it? It is known that even before Jakub arrived at Mantua the representatives of Hospitallers initiated the discussion on the possible fusion of their and the Teutonic Order.³⁷ They thought that the Teutonic Order was no longer necessary in Prussia as it fought against Christian Poland. The discussion was completely blocked by Hohenstein at the cardinals' meeting.³⁸ The rumour of the possible transfer of the Teutonic Order on to Tenedos is said to have appeared in a letter of the inhabitants of

33 Długosz claims that Jakub talked about Tenedos in Rome, however no mention of it can be found in *Codex epistolaris...*, 193-195. Still Jakub is known to have spoken twice on the matter in Mantua.

34 BISKUP/GÓRSKI, Kazimierz (as in note 2), 225. On Andrea de Santa Croce's speech see: *Matricularum Regni Poloniae Summaria contexterunt*, vol. V, p. II, ed. J. PŁOCHA, A. RYBARSKI, I. SUŁKOWSKA, Warszawa 1961, nr. 536.

35 *Sacrorum conciliorum* (as in note 23), 108-113.

36 BISKUP/GÓRSKI, Kazimierz (as in note 2), 202.

37 BISKUP, Trzynastoletnia (as in note 15), 558.

38 *Ibidem*

Marienburg in 1458.³⁹ Paul Legendorf, the Teutonic advocate and bishop of Varmia could not possibly be the author of the project, as is sometimes claimed.⁴⁰ The Pope himself had an idea of creating a new order of Our Lady of Bethlehem.⁴¹ The Order was to have been placed in Lemnos so as to fight against the Turks as Hospitallers did. The Hospitallers may have had a share in the project concerning Tenedos.⁴² Apart from Rhodes which was their headquarters, it would have been the next outpost for the fight with the Turks.

However Tenedos was hardly a no man's land. Prof. Nicol had already shown the history of Venetian-Genoese rivalry for the island.⁴³ Small in size, Tenedos had a very good location at the entry to the Straits of Dardanele. Anybody who wanted to get to the Marmara Sea and then to the Black Sea was bound to pass it. However, the idea of transferring the Teutonic Order from a huge state on the Baltic Sea on to the small island seems absurd. In all probability the idea was born in the course of the debates and it was to distract the Pope's attention from Poland. The possible transfer of the Teutonic Knights had already been considered in Poland, but it was connected with a

39 Rozbiór krytyczny *Annalium Poloniae* Jana Długosza z lat 1445-1480, (Critical Analysis of *Annales Poloniae*), vol. II, ed. S. GAWEDA, K. PIERADZKA, J. RADZISZEWSKA, supervised by J. DĄBROWSKI, Warszawa-Kraków 1965, 125.

40 *Regesta historico-diplomatica Ordinis S. Mariae Theutonicorum*, ed. E. JOACHIM, W. HUBATSCH, pars I, vol. 2 Göttingen 1950, 140 (nr 15375).

41 BABINGER, z dziejów (as in note 8), 177. The Order was to be found according to the Hospitallers model from the Isle of Rhodes. Its role was to protect the Greek waters against the Turks.

42 The Hospitallers tried to be independent of Mehmed II and to keep the influences on Cyprus. It cannot be doubted that the Teutonic Knights might have been very helpful as their allies in maintaining independence. The question is whether the protection of Christendom was really at stake or whether they thought about their own business. On Hospitallers at that time see: E. ROSSI, The Hospitallers of Rhodes 1421-1523, in: *A History of the Crusades* vol. III, The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries, ed. H. W. HAZARD, Madison/Wisconsin 1975, 321-322.

43 D.M. NICOL, *Byzantium and Venice. A Study in Diplomatic and Cultural Relations*, Cambridge 1988, 296-316. The strategic location of the island was noticed by a traveller Pero Tafur, who said that Tenedos boasted one of the finest harbours in that part of the world. He also made some others, less important remarks on the amount of rabbits and the destroyed vineyards. Cf. Pero Tafur, *Travels and Adventures 1435-1439*, trans. and ed. by M. LETTS, New York-London 1926, 113-114.

large part of Podole near the »pagan territories«.⁴⁴ This project was definitely more realistic but also without perspective.

In this context it does not seem essential to try to find out who first came up with the idea of Tenedos project. It played the role of an ephemeral political idea. All the parties involved were probably aware of its impossibility. Only Długosz expressed his delight for the idea as if he had not known the actual size of the island. But, on the other hand, whoever was the author of the Tenedos question, he should have been aware of the attractiveness of the island.

The documents suggested that not only Germans but also Venice must have been opposed to the project since Tenedos was an object of Venetian appetite. The Venetian Republic did not really want to get involved in the fight even though it agreed to participate in the crusade.⁴⁵ Was Jakub so unaware of the situation that he used somebody's territory as an argument?⁴⁶

As a result of Mantua meeting, the Papacy took side of the Teutonic Order against Poland.⁴⁷ Poland however was not going to yield to the pressure. It did not want to irritate the Turks whose political interest was convergent with Polish in Moldavia. Poland pressed for the solution of the conflict with Teutonic Order and the goal was achieved. In 1464 the Pope managed to bring together the armies ready for the crusade (without Polish official participation)

44 Lutek came up with the project during the negotiations in Sztum in 1458, but it was obviously rejected by the Teutonic Order. The reaction is not surprising. Cf. BISKUP/GÓRSKI, Kazimierz (as in note 2), 203.

45 F. THIRIET, *La Romanie vénitienne au Moyen Âge. Le développement et l'exploitation du domaine colonial vénitien (XII^e-XV^e siècles)*, Paris 1959, 387. BABINGER, *Z dziejów* (as in note 8), 181. Venice had mixed feelings about the crusade. On the one hand it was to provide the fleet on the other it was eager to see the failure of the project. It changed the attitude only after the outbreak of its own war with the Turks.

46 J. FRIEDERBERG, *Zatarg Polski z Rzymem w czasie wojny trzynastoletniej*, (Poland's Conflict with Rome during the Thirteen Year War), *Kwartalnik Historyczny* (1910) 427. The author calls the project concerning Tenedos exciting. Without analysing the problem he suggests that the idea was »born« in Italy, on the spot, and not in the royal chancellery in Cracow.

47 BISKUP/GÓRSKI, Kazimierz (as in note 2), 202. In 1460 the Pope excommunicated once again the Prussian Association and even the Polish King.

but he died of fever and the expedition did not set out.⁴⁸ Two years later Poland signed a peace treaty with the Teutonic Knights and gained an access to the Sea.⁴⁹ Poland was interested in the Baltic not in the Bosporos or the Aegean.

Nobody has gone into the Tenedos project in Polish research because it is not a subject in itself. Tenedos is but a keyhole through which we can have a glimpse of the Polish attitude to the fate of the Byzantine remnants. In my story the Peloponnese of Paleologoi has receded from view. And this agrees with the facts. For apart from Pius II⁵⁰ nobody really believed in the possibility of regaining Constantinople and the resurrection of the Byzantine spirit. In

48 Houssey, *Later Crusades* (as in note 23), 109. Having learnt about the Pope's death, Philip the Good withdrew his participation in the crusade. He died in 1467. His promise of the crusade was the empty word.

49 It was the peace treaty in Toruń in 1466. Poland regained the former Pomerania of Gdańsk, now called the Royal Prussia, the land of Chełmno and Michałowo, the bishopric of Varmia and the towns: Malbork (Marienburg) and Elbląg (Elbing). The remaining part of the Teutonic State, that is the Teutonic Prussia with the capital in Königsberg became the Polish fief. The cause was won. No wonder that nobody cared for the Byzantines lament then.

50 As long as Byzantium was there, Italy did not fear the Turks. Mehmed II however planned the invasion on the Apennine Peninsula. The Roman Curia was really afraid of the threat. Apart from Philip the Good, the Pope believed to be supported by David II Emperor of Trebizond, who was to conceive fantastic plans of expelling the Turks from Constantinople. Cf: A. BRYER, *Ludovico da Bologna and the Georgian and Anatolian Embassy of 1460-1461*, *Bedi Kartlissa* 19-20 (1965) 178-198; Repr. A. BRYER, *The Empire of Trebizond and the Pontos*, London 1980, art. X. The author quotes David II's supposed letter to Philip of Burgundy, faked in Italy: »Therefore, we are, ourselves ready: and we await your arrival against the infidel...which you, Latin Princes went to discuss in the Council of Mantua« (A. Bryer's translation). David's ally mentioned in the document is Uzun Hasan, Chieftain of the Tribe of the White Sheep. The Curia believed in this great mystification which is a separate problem.

the world of realistic politicians which included Polish King Casimir IV,⁵¹ this possibility was out of the question.

51 The King's political stand did not depend on the Byzantine cultural influences in the Eastern hinterland of Poland. It reminds us of Jagiello's fondness for orthodox art, which was not the same as the readiness to lend help to the Eastern Christians. The union of Churches was to be the condition of this assistance. Cf. PRINZING, *Byz. aspekty* (as in note 1), 20-21. The idea of involving Casimir the Jagiellonian in the project of regaining Constantinople from the Turks came up again in 1474. This time its proponent was Uzun Hasan, the main enemy of Mehmed II in Anatolia. He offered his daughter, born from the Trebizondian princess as a wife to one of Casimir's sons. The dowry was to be the Byzantine Empire!? It is interesting to speculate what size of the State he had in mind? Casimir IV was getting old but he remained a practical man and chose more reasonable matches for his children. One of Casimir's sons became a saint. This may not have happened if he had seen Uzun Hasan's daughter, who was probably as beautiful as her mother. Cf. J. DŁUGOSZ, *Historia* (as in note 5), 601-602. HALECKI, *La Pologne* (as in note 1), 66. Uzun's letter as the whole proposal might have been faked. Let us assume that it was genuine which was the assumption made by King Casimir. See: M. DĄBROWSKA, *Uzun Hasan's Project of Alliance with the Polish King 1474, Mélanges d'Histoire byzantine offerts à Oktawiusz Jurewicz à l'occasion de son soixante-dixième anniversaire* (= *Byzantina Lodziensia* III), Łódź 1998, 171-185.