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Eunomia or 'make love not war'?
Meidian personifications reconsidered*

Barbara E. Borg

Comments on vase paintings by the Meidias painter and his wider circle tend to read like this:

> Vase painting, as far as it was supposed to serve the living, usually did not have those serious concerns but directed its sense of the subjective, the personal, towards the sensual, the pleasant, and the decorative ... It is in accordance with this luxurious, feminine splendour that the subjects are regularly taken from an aphrodisian context ... It has to be asked which mental need these mythological idylls may satisfy. Are they the expression of a desperate search for a better dream world during the hard years of war, or do they display the hedonism and negligent carelessness of the Athenians who set off even to conquer Sicily?[1]

This judgement seems to be perfectly supported by a particular group of vases showing various female personifications,[2] often accompanying Aphrodite, who are typically united under the collective header of 'circle of Aphrodite', among these Paidia (Play), Himeros (Desire), Eudaimonia

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[1] Strocka 1975, 56.

[2] The term personification is, of course, hotly debated. In this paper, I will call any figure a personification whose name is also used as *nomen appellativum*, independently of whether it is considered a divine being or the poetic or rhetorical creation of an artist. It will become clear in the course of my argument that this definition of the term may not be perfect (since its derivation from *personificatio* implies a chronological or at least factual, technical primacy of the *appellativum*), but that there is no other shorthand for personifications in the above sense whose status or 'ontology' is the very subject of discussion and thus must not be involved in the definition.

(Happiness), Harmonia (Harmony), Eutychia (Good Fortune), Aponia (Freedom-from-toil), Hedylogos (Sweet Talk), Makaria (Blessedness), and Pothos (Yearning) (figs 14.1–7).[3] Still, it is not only because of these characters that scholars have interpreted the pictures as documents of playful, even frivolous superficiality but also because of the very fact that the figures are personifications (here: deliberate creations of the artist). Dieter Metzler, in his pertinent paper on these pictures, is particularly explicit, stating that the acceptance of the personifications as

> … simple creations of the artist's fantasy … liberates us from the duty of more intensive thinking [about them], but must, on the other hand, accept the blame for flat positivism.

In these pictures, he concludes, the

> … desire [that is the concepts embodied by the personifications] fades away into mere abstraction, the hollow dignity of which boasts about Euripidean lyricism and Gorgian detail, only to get lost in the precious superficialisation of its form.[4]

Salvation from this sort of accusation, on the other hand, may be sought in the claim that the personifications actually were not 'simple creations of the artist's fantasy' but divine beings. With this strategy, the focus of attention also shifts from the 'hedonistic' personifications to the more 'serious' figures of Eunomia (Good Order) and Eukleia (Good Repute), more or less neglected by the supporters of the first view, which appear quite often within the circle of Aphrodite. Most influentially, R. Hampe deduced from the vase paintings a common cult for Eunomia and Eukleia, firmly attested only for the imperial period, which in turn became the basis of the interpretation of the vase paintings.[5] For Hampe and his successors, the existence of a cult for Eunomia and Eukleia guaranteed both the sincerity of religious feelings towards them and their importance for the pictures, which by now ceased to be only superficial idylls. Metzler went even further, regarding Eunomia as the goddess of a political, anti-democratic ideal in a conservative constitution derived from Sparta. The rest of the personnel were forced into the frame of this concept, so that the images finally turned out to represent quite austere political 'ideologies'.[6]

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[3] A catalogue of fifteen vases belonging to that group is given as an appendix at the end of the paper. These pieces count among the most central examples for the phenomena studied here but are by no means the only ones. Numbers in the text refer to this catalogue.

[4] Metzler 1980, 75 and 81.

[5] Hampe 1955; Metzler 1980, 75: 'Hampe konnte vielmehr nachweisen [sic!], dass es sich bei beiden Gestalten keineswegs um sogenannte blasse Personifikationen späterer Zeit, sondern um alte attische Gottheiten handelt.'

[6] Metzler 1980; for a more detailed comment on his argument see Borg 2002.

In this paper, I shall argue (1) that a 'close reading' of single pictures will prove that their meanings are much more sophisticated then the first group of scholars will allow, and much less austere then the second permits; (2) that the meaning of the pictures is independent of whether we consider the personifications divine beings or conscious creations by the artist, and (3) that the 'ontology' of the figures was indeed quite unimportant in antiquity. Scholars have correctly pointed out that the actions of the figures are unspecific in so far as they do not characterize any single personification exclusively but are exchangeable both between various personifications and between these and anonymous figures. Thus, neither iconographies nor actions permit the identification of a figure without an inscription as a particular personification.[7]

On the other hand, the personifications are neither chosen randomly nor are they exchangeable at will, and, in fact, their actions are not entirely accidental either. They often establish a meaningful relationship between particular personifications. If, for example, on a fragment from Ullastret (no. 12, fig. 14.1), Dike (Justice) or Nike (Victory) – the reading is not entirely clear – steps up to Eukleia sitting on a rock to present her a necklace, or if, on a lid in Mainz (no. 7, fig. 14.2), Eukleia offers the seated Eunomia a box, then these gestures of giving and serving can well be transferred metaphorically to the personified concepts themselves: Justice – as well as victory – certainly contributes to good repute and a good reputation is a substantial contribution to good order. When, on a famous hydria in Florence,[8] Aphrodite races in a chariot drawn by Himeros and Pothos over an arbour where Phaon and Demonassa are seated, the symbolism is clear: sensual love is set in motion and driven by passion and desire (fig. 14.3). The same imagery, if somewhat restrained, was chosen for a pyxis in London (no. 6, fig. 14.4) where Aphrodite's chariot is drawn by Pothos and Hedylogos: here love's driving forces are yearning desire and sweet talking.

An overview of the personnel on the various vases will soon make it clear that the number and specific character of the 'hedonistic' personifications varies. The lids in Mainz (no. 7, fig. 14.2), Naples (no. 9) and Ullastret (no. 12, fig. 14.1) – as far as we can tell from the fragment – certainly show less playful concepts than some of the other vases collected in the catalogue. However, in many examples, the focus on the Aphrodisian and the erotic will be pretty obvious, so that it is not so much Aphrodite, Eros, or Himeros who appear to be in need of explanation, but Eunomia and Eukleia instead.

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[7] For a contrary view see Neils 1983. An exception to the rule is a Paidia on a Pyxis in New York (no. 10) balancing a stick on her index finger.

[8] Florenz, Museo Archeologico Nazionale 81947: *ARV²* 1312, 2 (Meidias Painter); *Para* 477; *Addenda* 361; Shapiro 1993, 67–8, 116–17, 129, 234, no. 17 figs. 21, 69, 80; Burn 1987, 40–44, M2 pls 27–9.

In many cases, Aphrodite is the central focus of the pictures, often given prominence by her seated position (fig. 14.5). Considering the goddess's primarily erotic and sexual domain, well established in literature, art and cult, it is hardly questionable that this same background also determines both the context of the painting's messages and the primary level of their reading.

In this context, the gardens shown by many of the pictures assemble all the erotic connotations associated with meadows and gardens in Greek literature since the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Of the personifications, Himeros and Pothos are least ambiguous even if – or indeed precisely if – we suspect the semantic impact of the omnipresent Eros to have deadened over time. On a London lekythos (no. 4, fig. 14.5), Peitho presenting a *kanoun* to Aphrodite does not necessarily hint at her subordinate role in cult but can also be understood in a metaphorical sense: *peitho*, a concept including all non-violent, verbal as well as non-verbal forms of persuasion and seduction, serves Aphrodite and *ta aphrodisia* as their essential and very own power of old.[9]

Similarly, Paidia may sometimes imply more than the careless joys of a child's game and acquire those ambiguities known from other erotic contexts where *paidia* and *paizein* designate various forms of erotic and/or sexual encounters.[10] This ambiguity is the key to the understanding of the names on a cup in Würzburg showing a satyr named Chorillos making love to a nymph named Paidia (fig. 14.6).[11] The scene is free from the rudeness and awkwardness of surprise attacks known from so many other encounters of satyrs and nymphs but is displayed as a very enjoyable action: they look deep into each other's eyes – by which *eros* is known to enter the mind of man – and her right arm reaches for his shoulder to stabilize the somewhat precarious balance of their encounter. In accordance with this atmosphere, her name referring to the act of love is equally appropriate as the one of the satyr, dancer. The verb *choreuo* designates dancing in a chorus as well as dancing for joy in a more general sense. In analogy to Aristophanes, *Lys.* 409, where the equivalent verb *orcheomai* is used as a euphemism for a sexual encounter,[12] we may consider whether the name of the satyr was not meant as a *double entendre* too.

The representation on a lekythos in Munich (no. 8, fig. 14.7), showing Himeros sitting on a swing pushed forward by Paidia, can be read as a more subtle variant of the same subject, approximately stating: 'Playful love sets

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[9] Buxton 1982 *passim*; Stafford 2000, 111–45.

[10] Henderson 1991, 157 no. 240 s.v. *paizein* with n.28; p. 249–50 no. 240.

[11] Würzburg, Martin-von-Wagner Museum L 492 = H 4633: *ARV²* 1512,18 (Jena Painter); *LIMC* III, 274 s. v. Chorillos (A. Kossatz-Deissmann); Paul-Zinserling 1994, 54–6 no. 5 pl. 22, 2. See also Smith (*infra* fig. 15.6).

[12] Henderson 1991, 41, 49, 125, no. 75.

passion and erotic desire in motion.' As a form of playing, even the motive
of swinging itself can be understood metaphorically, with the rhythmic
motion of rocking lending some additional graphic quality to the image.[13]

Against this background, the embracing of Paidia by Eunomia on the
London lekythos (no. 4, fig. 14.5) appears to be not just a tender gesture but
an image of the restriction of the potentially frolicsome game of love by good
order. At the same time, it gives an important hint for a more general
understanding of Eunomia and Eukleia in an aphrodisian and erotic context.
In the later fifth century, sexual encounters were a rather problematic field
of social contacts surrounded by specific values and behavioural ideals.
However, more recent studies have made it clear that sexuality was neither
problematic as something 'dirty' or 'defiling', nor did it belong exclusively to
the extramarital sphere of *hetairai*.[14] While notorious *topoi* about the
insatiability of female sexual desire may evoke strong suspicions of either
male dreams or nightmares, the success of the Aristophanic comedy
Lysistrata is hardly imaginable without the assumption that in real life too the
common marital relationship was to include a pleasurable sex life. Denial of
ta aphrodisia was rated as unnatural and even an act of *hybris*, and the art of
seduction and the pleasures of sexual love do not, as a matter of principle,
belong in the extramarital sphere, but, on the contrary, even according to –
or rather precisely according to – male ideology, they are a natural, healthy
and positive aspect of marriage for both partners, contributing to mutual
philia.[15]

The power of desire, however, was a matter of deep concern. The dangers
of irresistible erotic attraction and uncontrollable passion are evoked by
written texts of all genres. Thus, not to lose self-control was crucial for
personal mental health as well as for one's own reputation. In the case of
women, it also guaranteed conjugal faithfulness, which in turn was essential
for both the reputation of the husband and the legitimacy of the couple's
offspring.[16]

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[13] Henderson 1991, 49, 151 no. 205–06.

[14] From the vast literature on this subject see in particular Henderson 1991, 1–19. On the
following see also Cohen 1991; Calame 1992, 130–36; Hanson 1990.

[15] This is not to fall back into the other extreme and to idealize the situation of Athenian
women. Criticism of the potential misery deriving from the status of women intruded even into
tragedy (cf. e.g. Aischyl. *Suppl.*; Eur. *Med.* 230–51; Soph. *Tereus* fr. 524 Nauck), a genre primarily
meeting the expectations of a male audience. For our questions, it suffices to understand the
general, 'official' attitude towards female sexuality, since messages on vases which may have
been produced and/or donated on the occasion of marriage most probably range within this
spectrum.

[16] This is, of course, an extremely short and dull summary of an otherwise complicated and
much discussed subject. For more detailed accounts see e.g. Foucault 1984; important
qualifications to Foucault's views: Nussbaum 1986; Detel 1998; cf. also Dover 1978, 100–09;
Winkler 1990; Cohen 1991, 171–202 and *passim*; each with bibliography.

We may therefore understand the prevalence of both Eunomia and Eukleia as deriving from this concern about the potentially dangerous qualities of *eros* and *ta aphrodisia*. Eunomia can be conceived as propagating moderation in the enjoyment of sensual pleasures and thus is more or less equivalent to the concept of sophrosyne so central in fourth-century philosophical thought. Eukleia is both a demand for and a result of moderation in erotic passion and also contributes to the honourableness of the erotic relationship itself. She thus makes sense even without the supposition of a common cult with Eunomia.

We may conclude that the images assembling personifications like Eudaimonia and Makaria, Eutychia, Aponia, Peitho, and even Eros, Himeros, Pothos and Hedylogos do indeed present a sort of complement to the Dionysian worlds of Aristophanes, established, for example, by the protagonists of *Acharnae* and *Peace*, characterized not least by carefree enjoyment of any sensual pleasures. In general, such a way of life will surely have appealed to the Athenians during the Peloponnesian War. So far, prevailing interpretations of the paintings are not completely misleading, but imprecise and one-sided. Since these desires are potentially dangerous, outside of comedy provision must be taken to reduce this danger. Love, sex and good living may be enjoyed as positive parts of human life, not excessively but with moderation, integrated in a balanced system, and within the boundaries of personal health and good repute.[17]

Accordingly, one reading of the seemingly most inconsistent and problematic of our pictures, namely the one on the London pyxis (no. 6, fig. 14.4), may approximately be: sexual love is a central power (Aphrodite with her chariot as the most dominant element of the painting). Her driving forces are yearning desire (Pothos) and sweet talking (Hedylogos). Desire and passion (Himeros) contribute to happiness and good living (Eudaimonia). But only if the play of love (Paidia) remains within the boundaries of good order (Eunomia), pleasure, love and health (Hygieia) can coexist in harmony (Harmonia).[18]

Apparently, the vase paintings can be read as allegorical comments on the ideas and concepts personified and on the pleasures and limits of the *aphrodisia*. Contrary to common scholarly opinion, the pictures are anything but superficial and hollow even if on the one hand we accept the erotic and hedonistic elements and if on the other hand we disregard questions of cult and 'religious feelings'.

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[17] Cf. Eur., *Iph. A.* 543–57; Detel 1991, 9: 'es ist nicht ein Begrenzungs- und Beherrschungsmodell, das die antiken Autoren zur Eindämmung einer bedrohlichen sexuellen Dynamik vorschlagen, sondern das Modell einer souveränen Einbettung in den Gesamthaushalt der höheren und niederen Lüste, dessen Gleichgewicht und Optimierung ein konstitutiver Bestandteil ... des guten Lebens ist.'

[18] On the Meidian Hygieia, cf. Stafford 2000, 159–63.

These observations lead to my last point. Obviously, for the allegorical structure[19] of the representations as well as for the content of their messages it is irrelevant whether we understand the personifications as poetic fictions or divine beings: the moment we begin to reflect upon the representations the level of abstract meaning detaches from the pictorial one. Even Hampe and Metzler can escape this separation only as long as they believe in an exclusively intuitional understanding of the alleged meaning of the paintings. Any ancient viewer who consciously reflected on them would necessarily have become an allegorist – like the modern interpreters themselves.

This statement may, at first sight, seem surprising, particularly because it obscures the borderline between divinity and poetic fiction or rhetorical device, which modern scholarship tries so hard to establish. At the same time, in many cases the problems involved in these struggles are all too obvious and discussions often end in an *aporia* – at least where evolutionary models of the development of the human mind from myth to reason are put aside.[20] I would suggest, however, that in order to overcome this *aporia* the problem should not be treated as either a religious one or, in the case of texts, a linguistic one, as it most often has been, but within the wider context of debate about fictionality. Of course, it is not the right place here to review this very extensive debate in any detail. Instead, I would like just to sum up those positions that I find both most convincing and most relevant for the present topic.

The key argument is that in the archaic and classical periods (as, arguably, in antiquity in general), in contrast to modern times, the opposed categories of '(historical) fact' and 'fiction'[21] in many contexts are not relevant.[22] This is

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[19] By this I mean the existence of two (or more) levels of meaning, clearly distinguished and distinguishable from each other but interrelated more or less systematically, which require a discursive, rational mode of interpretation (not necessarily realized by the viewer or reader but becoming evident the moment he or she starts to reflect upon the act of interpretation). In the cases studied here the initial level would be that of human/divine figures handling certain objects, from which detaches a more theoretical level concerning the interrelationship between abstract concepts. I use the terms 'allegorist', 'allegorical interpretation', etc., for any case of interpretation coinciding with such a semantic structure. For a more detailed account of the terminology with further examples cf. Borg 2002.

[20] Time and again these models have been used to secure a divine status for early personifications – cf. Metzler's statement quoted above. On the critique of these models (but without special reference to personifications) see in particular Schmitt 1990; Williams 1993; Gill 1996; Buxton 1999; with respect to personifications and their images, see also Borg 2002 and Stafford 2000 (esp. 75–110, on Nemesis).

[21] As with all the crucial terms used here there is no definition of fiction generally agreed upon. I am following the definition by Petersen 1996, who understands fictional statements (Fiktionalaussagen) as opposed to statements about reality (Realaussagen, Wirklichkeitsaussagen): only the latter can be verified by comparing them to what is the case ('Bei Realaussagen kann ich durch (empirische) Überprüfung feststellen, ob etwas zu Recht

not to say that fictionality was a completely unknown concept. It was
recognized by Homer,[23] and by many poets and philosophers after him, but
except for particular cases it was no crucial category of thinking.[24] Most
often, it was not central to the truth status of a narrative, since this truth
status was usually constituted within ethical and moral categories and not
within those of factuality and historicity. It is exactly this circumstance that
can explain why even Plato could go so far as to promote, under certain
conditions, a *pseudos* as a legitimate – since most effective – way of
conveying the truth.[25] Correspondingly, even though myths, in the minds of
many people, had some sort of historicity in the sense that they were located
in the past, within certain limits they could be altered without any problems
to fit as *exempla* in particular situations or to suit the various purposes of
tragedians and other poets. Most notably, Stesichoros wrote his *Palinode*,
according to which not Helen but only an *eidolon* went to Troy, to
rehabilitate Helen and to correct the traditional story, which was not true

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oder nicht als Wirklichsein ausgesagt wurde. Das ist bei Fiktionalaussagen völlig anders. Denn
da sie kein Wirklichsein, sondern nur ein weiter nicht spezifiziertes Sein behaupten, habe ich
keinen Maßstab, an dem ich es überprüfen, d.h. die Richtigkeit der Fiktionalaussage feststellen
kann', 285). However, when Petersen goes on to say that therefore fictional statements are
direct to the truth and absolutely true ('Blosses Sein, unspezifisches ist-Sagen lässt sich
offensichtlich nicht überprüfen und ist deshalb unmittelbar und absolut wahr', ibid.), this may
be convincing to some of us but definitely not to the ancient Greeks as will become clear in the
following.

[22] The following argument is based on Gill 1993; cf. also Murray 1999.

[23] See in particular the invented autobiography as a Cretan prince Odysseus presents to
Penelope, commented on by Homer: 'While telling many *pseudea* he was making them similar
to real events' *Od.* 19, 203; Gill (1993, 70–1) points to the consequences for Homeric poetry
itself: 'if Odysseus can create "fictions", so, by implication, can Homer.' As a deliberate
falsehood the story is seen here as a sort of subcategory of fiction. Cf. also *Od.* 13.293–5; 14.462
ff.; Pucci 1987, 56–62; 98–109, with further comments.

[24] Of course, the very passages that talk about deliberately invented stories show that this
notion *can* be used to reinforce the claim for trustworthiness of a story either by disqualifying
certain stories by other poets (Hes. *Theog.* 22–35; cf. Gill 1993, 70 f.) or by deliberately
integrating lies and fictions in one's own story (cf. Pucci 1987, 99 who suggests that Odysseus'
fictions by implication 'function as the *Odyssey*'s ironic denials of its own "fiction" (mingling
truth and falsehood into a simulation of reality – *etuma*) and as evidence in favor of the *Odyssey*'s
real truth.'). But these claims – like all the other strategies to convince the listeners or readers
that the story told is true – are not based on any argument that we would accept as proof and,
indeed, did not eliminate suspicion about the truth status of poetry in antiquity itself; on this
last point cf. Pratt 1993, who tends to underestimate that in spite of this pertinent suspicion
there is a claim for truth in poetry, if not (necessarily) of a factual kind (cf. the review by K.
Morgan, *BMCR* 94.11.4).

[25] The correct translation of *pseudos* is much debated, but in any case it is clear from the
respective passages in Plato (and others) that the term designates some story, which is not true
on the level of historical fact. Thus the principle argument put forward by Gill 1993 still appears
valuable; cf. also Murray 1999, 251–2.

(*ouk etymos*).[26] According to Stephanus of Byzantium, the accusation against the first Euripidean Hippolytos tragedy was not that it was unfaithful to a factual 'reality' but that the characterisation and behaviour of the protagonist, Phaidra, was unacceptable in ethical terms (*aprepes kai katēgorias axion*).[27] For Plato, common myths were not dangerous because they do not represent a factual truth but because they tend to influence people by giving a bad example; they had to be banned from his ideal state even if they were factually true (Plat. *Tim.* 378a2). Thus, the value of those stories we call myths does not depend on whether people 'really believed in them' as historical facts but on whether the *model* or *concept* of reality the story creates is valuable.[28] The truth at stake here concerns a different level of reality from that of factual history.

These observations, I would argue, hold true not only for the stories about the protagonists, their actions, their characterization, etc., but also for their very existence. The meaningfulness and truth of a narrative or pictorial representation does not, or at least not necessarily, depend on the factual existence of the protagonists but on the belief that the characters and concepts embodied by them are existent and that their actions and mutual attitudes are both relevant and morally acceptable. Thus, the decision, so important for modern scholars, whether a certain expression is meant figuratively or 'literally', whether a *nomen* denotes a person or a thing, was obviously unimportant for much of antiquity – at least as long as the reading led to acceptable results. Only in a monotheistic religion can the statement that the name of (a) god was used merely figuratively be scandalous. For an ancient Greek, a narrative about the gods/'gods' only became a scandal if the behaviour of these gods/'gods' did not correspond to generally accepted moral ideas and concepts of reality. This is exactly why allegorical interpretation of myths could not only save the myths – and their poets – but also the gods themselves. It thus seems that for an ancient listener, reader or viewer the status of a personification with respect to her fictionality or divinity was not crucial as long as the overall message was appreciated.[29]

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[26] Plat. *Phaidr.* 243A; cf. Zagagi 1985, 65–9.

[27] Eur. *Hipp.* Hypothesis; Herter 1975, 133–7, with bibliography.

[28] Möllendorff 2000, 525; 530–31 with bibliography in n.78: 'nicht in der Fiktion als solcher, aber in dem Wirklichkeits*modell*, das sie vermittelt oder dessen Generierung durch den Leser sie steuert, muss die Gefahr der Lüge und des Betrugs gesehen werden' (emphasis added).

[29] This is in stark contrast to the view held by Snell and others who draw a dividing line between 'believers' and 'non-believers'; e.g., 'Für einen griechischen Dichter bezeichnet, solange er gläubig ist, solcher Name [here: Hephaest] etwas Wirkliches; dem nicht mehr Gläubigen wird er ein Stilmittel oder dient dem poetischen Spiel' (Snell 1946, 273; quoted with appreciation by Aellen 1993, 191 n.89). I would argue instead that a 'believer' may well both understand and appreciate an allegorical expression without becoming a 'non-believer'.

Alas, these considerations should not conceal a marked difference between ancient and modern personification allegory. This difference results from a fundamentally divergent way of perceiving both the world and the divine. In a society with gods as personalized forces and powers, on the one hand, by mentioning the gods these forces and powers are already implicit; on the other hand, a force or power that is felt to have some very intense presence can gain divine status at any time. From this it follows, first of all, that the fundamental meaning of personification allegories can be understood, like any narrative about the gods, without a conscious reflection about the abstract level, at least to the extent to which the levels are congruent. Secondly, it is not only impossible to distinguish categorically (certain) personifications from divine beings, and also not only unnecessary, but perhaps not even desirable since it is exactly this interface with the divine inherent in all personifications that is both an expression and a cause of their liveliness and their impression on the viewer (or reader). Conversely, that means: the more lively and immediate the representations, the more appealing and perhaps effective the allegory and its possible teaching may be. The vivacity of personifications and their actions, therefore, is no criterion for distinguishing between god and fictional being or between myth and allegory but, if at all, a criterion of the quality of a piece of art, whether allegorical or not.

Furthermore, the semantic ambiguity of pictorial representations leaves room for the inspiration of any single interpreter and bears a potential for meanings to be expressed only long-windedly – if at all – in abstract language. And finally, the generality of the messages expressed by an allegory permits their actualization in various contexts (cult, marriage, 'daily life' etc.). Thus, the notorious accusations directed at allegory charging it with the respective deficiencies of both art and science can also be reversed by seeing allegory as the combination of the respective virtues of the two, namely the imaginative power of art (potentially transgressing into the metaphysical sphere) and its appeal to emotion, and the lucidity and generality of the message. This indeed seems to have been the attitude of later theoreticians who praise and recommend allegory as an adornment of language, which, at the same time, condenses complex thoughts by its pointedness and gains the attention of the audience by its wit. Finally, taking into account the widely held opinion that pictures were, in the end, both more effective and more memorable than spoken language, the allegorical representations of the later fifth century seem to take advantage of all these convictions, long before the first theoreticians reflected on them and incorporated them into their mnemotechniques.[30]

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[30] Blum 1969, 164–71; Giuliani 1998, 127–36.

Appendix

1 Baltimore, Walters Art Gallery 48.205 (squat lekythos): *ARV²* 1330, 8 (Makaria Painter); Shapiro 1993, pp. 83, 88, 238 no. 32 fig. 36. 41 – EΥΤΥΧΙΑ, EΥNOMI, ΠAIΔIA, (after: J. Oakley, *CVA Baltimore 1, USA 28*, Baltimore, MD, 1992, pp. 35 ff. pl. 38. 1–3).

2 Kansas City, Nelson-Atkins Mus. 31.80 (white-ground squat lekythos): *ARV²* 1248, 8 (Eretria Painter); *Addenda* 353; Shapiro 1993, pp. 80–82, 181, 203, 237 no. 30 figs 33–4. 139. 164 – ANΘEIA, ΠE[I]ΘΩ, [sitting woman, name not preserved], KEΦHMOΣ, EΥNOMIA or APMONIA, ΠAIΔIA (after: A. Lezzi-Hafter, *Der Eretria-Maler*, Mainz, 1988, p. 344 no. 240; Shapiro 1993, 81 n.167 reads the third name as KEA ... MOΣ, others read Kephimos).

3 London, British Mus. 1867.5–8.1044 (E 222) (hydria from Nola): *ARV²* 1033, 66 (Polygnotos); Shapiro 1993, pp. 113 f., 243 no. 55 fig. 64 – IMEP[OΣ, ΠEIΘΩ (after: C.H. Smith, *Catalogue of the Greek and Etruscan Vases in the British Museum* III, London, 1896, pp. 172 f. no. E 222).

4 London, British Mus. 1856.5–12.15 (E 697) (squat Lekythos from Athens): *ARV²* 1324,45 (Manner of the Meidias Painter); *Para* 478; *Addenda* 364; Burn 1987, MM 74 pl. 20 a. b; Shapiro 1993, pp. 66 f., 83, 183, 203, 235 no. 21 figs 20, 35, 142, 163 – KΛEOΠATPA, EΥNOMIA, ΠAIΔIA, AΦPOΔITH [with Eros], ΠEIΘΩ, EΥΔAIMONIA (after: Smith, loc. cit., pp. 345 f. no. E 697).

5 London, British Mus. 1849.9–25.12 (E 698) (squat Lekythos from Ruvo): *ARV²* 1316 (Painter of the Carlsruhe Paris); *Addenda* 362; Burn 1987, P1 pl. 20 c. d; Shapiro 1993, pp. 63 f., 129, 234 no. 18 figs. 17, 84 – ΥΓIEIA, ΠANΔAIΣIA, [Eros], EΥΔAIMON[I]A, ΠOΛΥI ... OΣ, KAΛH (after: Smith, loc. cit., pp. 346 f. no. E 698); second last name read by Beazley, *ARV²* 1316, as ΠOΛΥKΛEΣ?.

6 London, British Mus. 1893.11–3.2 (E 775) (pyxis from Eretria): *ARV²* 1328, 92 (Manner of the Meidias Painter); *Addenda* 364; Burn 1987, MM 136 pl. 18, 19a; Shapiro 1993, pp. 66, 84, 109, 122, 129, 234, no. 19 figs 19, 37, 60, 76, 82 – ΥΓIEIA, EΥNOMIA, ΠAIΔIA, EΥΔAIMONIA, IMEPOΣ, APMONIA, KAΛH, AΦPOΔITH, ΠOΘOΣ und HΔΥΛOΓOΣ (after: Smith, loc. cit., pp. 367 f. no. E 775).

7 Mainz, Universität, Archäologisches Institut 118 (lekanis lid): *ARV²* 1327, 87 (Manner of the Meidias Painter); *Addenda* 364; Burn 1987, MM 128 pl. 21; Shapiro 1993, pp. 73 f. 236 no. 27 fig. 24 – E[Υ]KΛEIA, E[Υ]NOMI[A, [two anonymous women], ΠAΦIA [= Aphrodite], [anonymous] (after: E. Böhr, *CVA Mainz 2, Deutschland 63*, München, 1993, pp. 45–7 pl. 27).

8 Munich, Antikensammlung 2520 (squat lekythos): Shapiro 1993, pp. 119, 181, 244, no. 57 figs 73, 140 – ΠAIΔIA, IMEPOΣ (after: Roscher, ML III 1, S. 1251 f. drawing).

9 Naples, Mus. Arch. Naz. Stg. 316 (lekanis lid from Egnazia): *ARV²* 1327, 85 (Manner of the Meidias Painter); *Addenda* 364; Burn 1987, MM 126; Shapiro 1993, pp. 73, 109, 236 no. 26 figs. 23, 61 – APMONIA, EΥKΛEIA, EΥNOMIA, ΠANNΥXIΣ, AΦPOΔITH, KAΥMENH (after: H. Heydemann, *Die Vasensammlung des Museo Nazionale zu Neapel*, Berlin, 1872, pp. 708 f. no. 316).

10 New York, Metropolitan Mus. of Art 09.221.40 (pyxis): *ARV²* 1328, 99 (Manner of the Meidias Painter); *Para* 479; *Addenda* 364 f.; Burn 1987, MM 143; Shapiro 1993,

pp. 32 ff., 129, 181, 203, 230, no. 1 figs 1, 83, 141, 162 – ΠΕΙΘΩ, ΑΦ[Ρ]ΟΔΙΤΗ, ΗΓΠΕΙΑ, ΕΓ]ΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑ, ΠΑΙΔΙΑ, ΕΥΚΛΕ[Ι]Α, ΑΠΟΝΙΑ (after: G.M.A. Richter – L.F. Hall, *Red-Figured Athenian Vases in the Metropolitan Museum of Art*, New Haven/London/Oxford, 1936, pp. 202 ff. no. 161).

11 Reading, University, Mus. of Greek Archaeology 52.3.2 (squat Lekythos): *ARV²* 1330,7 (Makaria Painter); *Para* 479; Shapiro 1993, pp. 88, 116, 119, 172, 238 no. 33 figs 42, 68, 132 – ΕΓΤΓΧΙΑ, ΑΦΡΟΔΙΤΗ, ΙΜΕΡΟΣ, ΜΑΚ]ΑΡΙΑ (after: J.D. Beazley, 'Some Inscriptions on Vases: VII', *AJA* 61, 1957, p. 8 no. 22).

12 Ullastret, Mus. Monográphico 1486 (lekanis lid from Ullastret): Malluquer de Motes i Nicolau, J., – Picazo I Gurina, M., – Martin I Ortega, A., *CVA Ullastret 1*, *Spanien 5*, Barcelona, 1984, pp. 36 ff. pl. 34, 1; Burn 1987, MM 134 pl. 19b; Shapiro 1993, pp. 73 ff. 236 no. 28 fig. 25 – +PVZE (= Krusei), ONUMIA (=Eunomie), AIKE (=Niké), EUKAEA (=Eukleia) (after: *CVA*. Obviously some of the oddities of these transcriptions are due to a missing Greek font; most probably the inscriptions should read like: ΧΡΓΣΕ[ΙΣ, ΟΝΓΜΙΑ, [= Eunomia], ΛΙΚΕ [= Nike or Dike], ΕΓΚΛΕ[Ι]Α).

13 Formerly Athens, private collection (acorn lekythos from Athens): G. Körte, 'Eichelförmige Lekythos mit Goldschmuck aus Attika', *AZ* 37, 1879, pp. 95 ff.; Shapiro 1993, p. 242 no. 51 – ΑΡΜΟΝΙΑ, ΠΕΙΘΩ, ΥΓΙΕΙΑ, ΤΥΧΗ (after: Körte ebenda).

14 Formerly London, coll. Hope (hydria): Shapiro 1993, pp. 78. 235 no. 24 fig. 32 – anonymous woman, ΕΓΚΛΕ[Ι]Α and ΠΕΙΘΩ (after Shapiro 1993, fig. 32).

15 Formerly Paris, coll. Bauville (squat lekythos): *ARV²* 1326,67 (Manner of the Meidias Painter); Shapiro 1993, p. 84 ff. 237 no. 31 fig. 38 – [goddess sitting in front of altar, column with statue = Aphrodite?], Θ]ΑΛΕΙΑ und ΕΓΝΟΜΙΑ (after: Shapiro 1993, fig. 38).

Fig 14.1   Chryse, Eunomia, Nike or Dike, Eukleia.

Fig 14.2   Eukleia offers the seated Eunomia a box (top left).

Fig 14.3   Himeros and Pothos pull Aphrodite's chariot.

Fig 14.4.   (from left to right) Hygieia, Eunomia, Paidia, Eudaimonia,
Himeros, Harmonia (seated), Kale, Aphrodite, Pothos and Hedylogos.

Fig 14.5   (from left to right) Kleopatra, Eunomia, Paidia,
Aphrodite (Eros), Peitho, Eudaimonia.

Fig 14.6　Chorillos and Paidia.

Fig 14.7   Paidia pushes Himeros on a swing.