

**Regionalization and Institutionalization:
Dimensions of Multi-level Party System Change in India**

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my parents, Klaus-Dieter and Elisabeth Pehl without whose encouragement, support and love it would have never been started.

And it is dedicated to my wife Aruni whose belief, devotion and love saw it through to its completion.

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Table of Contents

List of Tables	6
List of Figures	7
List of Maps	8
Abbreviations	9
1. Introduction	11
1.1 The Study of Indian Politics	17
1.2 Region and Nation in the Study of Politics	19
1.2.1 Regionalization's relevance to politics generally	19
1.2.2 The debate about regionalization of politics in advanced Western democracies	22
1.3 The Design of the Study	24
2. Conceptual and Theoretical Aspects of the Study	27
2.1 Regionalization of Party Politics – Two Views	28
2.1.1 The Socio-structural Perspective	29
2.1.2 The Organizational-Institutional Perspective	31
2.2 The Importance of Party System Institutionalization	33
2.3 Terminology	38
2.3.1 Parties	38
2.3.2 Party Systems	40
2.3.3 Regionalization	40
2.3.4 Regional Parties	41
2.3.5 A Note on Alternative Terminology	44
2.3.6 Institutionalization	48
2.4 Regionalization in Indian Party and Electoral Politics: Relevance and Literature	51
2.5 Institutionalization in Indian Party and Electoral Politics: Relevance and Literature	55
2.6 Theoretical Framework of the Study	57
2.7 An Alternative Approach to Understanding Party Choice in Federal Systems	61
2.7.1 Rich Regions	63
2.7.2 Poor Regions	64
2.7.3 Empirical Implications	65
2.8 Subnational Comparison, Case Selection and Time Frame of the Study	67
2.8.1 Level of Analysis.	67
2.8.2 Case Selection.	70
2.8.3 Time Period.	71
3. The Institutional Framework and Socioeconomic Context of Multi-level Politics in India	74
3.1 India's Federal Political System	75
3.2 Evolution of Federalism: The Changing Nature of Center-State Relations	81
3.2.1 Historical Phases of Evolving Center-State-Relations	82
3.2.2 Fiscal Federalism and Center-State Relations	83
3.3 Linguistic Diversity Across Regions	86
3.4 Religious Diversity Across Regions	91
3.5 Economic and Developmental Diversity Across Regions	95

4. The Institutionalization of Party Systems	99
4.1 Conceptualizing and Hypothesizing Institutionalization	100
4.2 Data and Measurement	104
4.2.1 Partyness of Politics.	104
4.2.2 Organizational Continuity.	105
4.2.3 Rootedness.	107
4.3 System-level Perspectives	108
4.3.1 Partyness – The Role of Independents	108
4.3.2 Rootedness- Volatility	110
4.4 Individual-level Perspectives	112
4.4.1 Partyness – The Role of Trust	112
4.4.2 Rootedness – Assessing Individual-level Volatility	113
4.5 A Panorama of Party System Institutionalization: Four Cases	115
4.5.1 Background	115
4.5.2 Partyness – The Role of Trust and of Independents	122
4.5.3 Organizational Continuity	124
4.5.4 Rootedness – System-level Volatility	126
4.6 Discussion	127
5. The Regionalization of Party Systems	132
5.1 Regional Identity in the Mirror of Public Opinion	133
5.2 Measuring Regionalization of Party Politics	135
5.3 Regional Differences in Regionalization of Party and Electoral Politics	136
5.4 Hypotheses	139
5.4.1 Macro-level Hypotheses	139
5.4.2 Micro-level Hypotheses	142
5.5 Correlates of Regionalization of Elections: The Aggregate Picture	143
5.5.1 Data and Measurement	144
5.5.2 Analysis	144
5.6 Who Wants to Regionalize? A Profile of Regional Identity and Party Support	148
5.6.1 The Social Characteristics of Regional Party Supporters	148
5.6.2 The Views of Regional Party Supporters on Politics	152
5.6.3. One-way Ticket? The Compatibility of Regional and National Party Support	154
6. An Extension: The Consequences of Party System Change at the National Level	158
6.1 The Context of National Elections	160
6.2 Wagging the Dog: The Impact of Regional Parties at the National Level	164
6.3 Numerical Strength, Power and Influence of Parties in Coalitions	170
6.4 Power, Office and Government Formation Since 1998	175
6.4.1 The Twelfth Lok Sabha Period, 1998 to 1999	176
6.4.2 The Thirteenth Lok Sabha Period, 1999 to 2004	180
6.4.3 The Fourteenth Lok Sabha Period, 2004 to 2009	184
6.5 Summary	187
7. Conclusion	190
8. Appendices	194
9. Bibliography	208

List of Tables

Table 2.1: Party Age and Party System Institutionalization – A Conceptual Overview	49
Table 3.1: Constitutional Allocation of Important Legislative Competences	76
Table 3.2: Typology of Power-sharing Arrangements in Multi-level Systems	78
Table 3.3: Key Figures of Center-State Fiscal Relations	84
Table 3.4: Major Languages in India (Census of India 2001)	88
Table 3.5: States/UTs/NCTs and their Main Languages	89
Table 3.6: Religious Communities in India (Census of India 2001)	92
Table 3.7: Religious Diversity across Twenty-five Regions	93
Table 3.8: Economic and Developmental Diversity across India's States (2000-2001)	96
Table 4.1: Fragmentation and Institutionalization of Russian and British Party Systems	107
Table 4.2: Independent Candidates' Average Vote Shares in State Elections (1977-2000)	109
Table 4.3: Changes in Volatility across the Indian States	110
Table 4.4: Confidence in Political Parties and Other Institutions	112
Table 4.5: Vote Share of Independent Candidates and the Effective Number of Parties	124
Table 4.6: Electoral Availability in Four States (1980-2000)	126
Table 4.7: Inter-election Volatility in Four States	127
Table 4.8: Levels of Institutionalization across Four States	129
Table 5.1: Bivariate Correlations of the Non-national Vote	145
Table 5.2: Partial Correlations of the Non-national Vote	145
Table 5.3: Summary of Aggregate Findings	148
Table 5.4: Social Backgrounds of Regional Partisans	151
Table 5.5: Political Views of Regional Party Supporters	153
Table 5.6: The Relationship between First and Second Party Preference (1990)	155
Table 5.7: The Relationship between First and Second Party Preference (1995)	155
Table 5.8: The Relationship between First and Second Party Preference (2001)	155
Table 5.9: The Relationship between First and Second Party Preference (2006)	156
Table 5.10: The Relationship between First Party Preference and Party Aversion (1995)	156
Table 5.11: The Relationship between First Party Preference and Party Aversion (2001)	157
Table 5.12: The Relationship between First Party Preference and Party Aversion (2006)	157
Table 6.1: Turnout in the General Elections (1952-2004)	160
Table 6.2: Party-wise Breakdown of the 1977 General Election	161
Table 6.3: Electoral Success of the Indian National Congress (1952-2004)	162
Table 6.4: Main Competitors for Power in the General Elections (1952-2004)	162
Table 6.5: Index of Opposition Unity, Lok Sabha Elections 1962-1991	164
Table 6.6: Lok Sabha Elections: Vote/Seat Shares of <i>National</i> Parties (1952-2004)	167
Table 6.7: Seat Distribution and Banzhaf Values in the Sixth <i>Bundestag</i> (1969-1972)	172
Tab. 6.8: Lok Sabha Elections and Composition 1998-1999	178
Tab. 6.9: Lok Sabha Elections and Composition 1999-2004	181
Table 6.10: Lok Sabha Elections and Composition 2004-2009	185

List of Figures

Figure 1.1: Chief Ministerships by Type of Party Affiliation	14
Figure 1.2: Nations, Regions and Localities as Focal Points of Identification	20
Figure 1.3: Classification of Scholarship on Regionalization	23
Figure 2.1: Linking Regionalization to Social Change	34
Figure 2.2: Models of Party Competition	36
Figure 2.3: Types of Parties	43
Figure 2.4: National Parties in India (1977-99) According to Ziegfeld (2007) and Pehl	46
Figure 2.5: Theoretical Framework of Candidate-Party System Linkage	60
Figure 2.6: Possible Configurations of Decentralization and Equalization	62
Figure 3.1: Issue-overlap, Power-sharing, and Coordination of Action of Center and States	81
Figure 4.1: Dimensions of Party System Institutionalization – A Conceptual Map	102
Figure 4.2: Individual-level Volatility across 15 Indian States (1998-1999)	114
Figure 4.3: The Independent Vote Share in Four States (1977-1989)	122
Figure 4.4: The Independent Vote Share in Four States (1990-2000)	123
Figure 4.5: The Weighted Relative Age of Party Systems in Four States (1977-2000)	125
Figure 5.1: Territorial Frames of Belonging	134
Figure 5.2: Differences in Party Support by Regionalists (1990-2001)	154
Figure 6.1: Effective Number of Parties (N_{Seats}) in the Lok Sabha, 1952 to 2004	166
Figure 6.2: Vote/Seat Shares of Regional Parties and Absolute Number of Parties in Lok Sabha Elections	167

List of Maps

Map 3.1: Geographic Distribution of Indo-Aryan Languages in South Asia	87
Map 5.1: Distribution of Vote Shares for Regional Parties (1977-1989)	137
Map 5.2: Distribution of Vote Shares for Regional Parties (1990-2000)	138

Notation

$S_{jk} = \{a, \dots, n\}$	Set of possible alternative states a to n of reality characterized by j and k
P_i	Player i
p_i	Preference relationship (“preferred to”) of actor i
$a p_i n$	a is preferred to n
$u(n)$	Utility of outcome or state n

Abbreviations

AC	Arunachal Congress
AIADMK	All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
AGP	Asom Gana Parishad
AIFB	All India Forward Bloc
AITC	All India Trinamool Congress
BJD	Biju Janata Dal
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
BJS	Bharatiya Jan Sangh
BLD	Bharatiya Lok Dal
BSP	Bahujan Samaj Party
CPI	Communist Party of India
CPM	Communist Party of India (Marxist)
CPI(ML)(L)	Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)
DMK	Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
ECI	Election Commission of India
FPM	Federal Party of Manipur
GoI	Government of India
HVP	Haryana Vikas Party
INC	Indian National Congress
INLD	Indian National Lok Dal
JD	Janata Dal
JD(S)	Janata Dal (Secular)
JD(U)	Janata Dal (United)
JKN	Jammu & Kashmir National Conference
JKNPP	Jammu & Kashmir National Panthers Party
JKPDP	Jammu & Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party
JMM	Jharkhand Mukti Morcha
JNP	Janata Party
KEC	Kerala Congress
KEC(M)	Kerala Congress (M)
MAG	Maharashtrawadi Gomantak
MDMK	Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
MNF	Mizo National Front
MNF(N)	Mizo National Front (Nationalist)
MPP	Manipur People's Party
MSCP	Manipur State Congress Party
MUL	Muslim League Kerala State Committee
MZPC	Mizoram People's Conference
NCP	Nationalist Congress Party
NPF	Nagaland Peoples Front
PMK	Pattali Makkal Katchi
PPA	People's Party of Arunachal
PSI	Party System Institutionalization
PSP	Praja Socialist Party
RJD	Rashtriya Janata Dal
RLD	Rashtriya Lok Dal
RSP	Revolutionary Socialist Party
SAD	Shiromani Akali Dal
SAD(M)	Shiromani Akali Dal (Simranjit Singh Mann)

SDF	Sikkim Democratic Front
SHS	Shiv Sena
SOC	Socialist Party
SP	Samajwadi Party
SSP	Samyukta Socialist Party
TDP	Telugu Desam Party
TMC	Tamil Maanila Congress
UGDP	United Goans Democratic Party
UKKD	Uttarakhand Kranti Dal

Chapter One: Introduction

1. Introduction

“Sometimes the resolution of problems acquires an excessive political route. No political considerations based on regional and factional ideologies and loyalties can distort the national vision and sense of wider collective purpose.”

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, 2007

“The future lies with the coalition governments and regional parties are going to play major role in coalition governments. At the same time, regional parties have given better leadership and also fulfilled the aspirations of people. This is what is happening. This is because there are very strong regional leaders.”


Chandrababu Naidu (former Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh), 2007

There is hardly a phenomenon in Indian politics today, which has been as widely debated in journalistic as well as academic writing on India in the last one and a half decades as that of the increasing importance and influence of regional parties and the salience of regional identity at both the state as well as national levels of politics. This fact has been viewed on the one hand as a positive sign potentially indicating a deepening of the democratic process through an increased pluralism of political forces and on the other as a potential sign of increasing fragmentation of the Indian electorate and as a harbinger of increasingly unstable and complex dynamics of electoral competition, i.e. the deinstitutionalization of party politics, and subsequent government formation. The two quotations above illustrate these two sides of the debate. National leaders like Prime Minister Manmohan Singh naturally take a skeptical point of view toward the growth of regional parties. This view which sees regional political fragmentation as an obstacle to effective governance and a latent threat to political stability is

supported to some extent by studies pointing towards the potential negative consequences of party system fragmentation for a country's development and for its political stability. On the other side of the divide are the leaders of regional parties such as Chandrababu Naidu of the Telugu Desam Party (TDP), who portray themselves as rightful defenders of regional, caste or ethnic aspirations neglected by national parties. But leaders of other national parties, such as the Bharatiya Janata Party's Lal Krishna Advani have recently begun to acknowledge their legitimacy within India's political system. Advani was recently quoted as saying: "Every national party has an ambition. But arrangements of the kind we have made with the Akali Dal or the Janata Dal (U) or that we make with some other party — if they stabilize and endure, there is nothing wrong with it. Their interest is focused on the state and ours at the Centre — there is no contradiction, it is a complementary relationship" (The Telegraph/Calcutta, 24 April 2009).

The amount of scholarship devoted to this comparatively recent trend in Indian politics begs the question why there is such a strong academic interest in regionalization at different levels of the political system and why the Indian media have likewise been picking up on this theme. One possible explanation might be found in the prominence which regional political leaders have acquired in the running of State governments and in the reporting of politics in the various States. Especially in the second half of the 1990s and at the turn of the millennium the perception was that regional politicians and regional parties were becoming more important while national parties and politicians with a more all-Indian outlook were on the decline. A look at the distribution of the most visible and prestigious of political offices at the State level, the Chief Ministerships, may reveal how this perception came to be formed. Figure 1.1 below shows the percentage of chief ministerships held by representatives of regional parties and national parties, respectively.

Figure 1.1: Chief Ministerships by Type of Party Affiliation



Source: own calculation based on information about mid-year office-holders (for sources see Appendix D).

While in 1970, 1980 and 1990, only between 25 and 30 percent of chief ministers in the Indian States had belonged to regional parties and 75 percent were affiliated with national parties (as classified by the Election Commission of India), the share of regional party affiliates holding that office soared to 43 percent by 2000. Moreover, regionally-based politicians such as Chandrababu Naidu (Telugu Desam Party), Balasaheb Thackeray (Shiv Sena) and M. Karunanidhi (Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) had by that time become important constituent figures as power-brokers for the national-level coalition government, the National Democratic Alliance. It is undeniable and evident from this very crude indicator that parties which are active in only one or two States had by the 1990s come to play a much larger role overall in politics in India than they had thirty years earlier, although the change is often overstated for a variety of reasons. Some scholars and commentators have characterized this development towards greater regionalization as a threat to the stability of national and State politics, as well as to socio-economic development. Consequently, much of the press

reporting and scholarship since the late 1990s has emphasized the new regionalized character of politics in India in the post-Congress phase.¹ The fact that regional differentiation of political processes and actors in India is now the norm rather than the exception has also led to the realization on the part of scholarship that comparative research at the level of the States is the most fruitful undertaking in analyzing politics in India today. While there have been a number of more or less extensive studies focused on regional politics or specifically on the extent of the importance of regional parties, either at the State level (Sinha 2005) and at the national level (Chhibber/Kollman 2004), a more comprehensive comparative study analyzing both levels seems to be lacking to date. In analyzing this phenomenon at both levels, this study will contribute to an answer to a number of important questions in Indian politics today, namely:

- "What are the scope and extent of regionalization/regional differentiation of politics in the Indian States today and in the recent past?" (ch. 5);
- "What are likely determinants of this regionalization across the States?" (ch. 5);
- "Who are the supporters of such regional parties, how do they view their national and regional identities and politics in general?" (ch. 5)
- "In what form and to what extent has regionalization impacted at the national level of politics?" (ch. 6).

As such this study will contribute to two areas of research, namely electoral and party politics on the one hand and identity politics on the other. With regard to the area of identity politics, this study will study patterns of legitimacy beliefs regarding national and sub national institutions and citizens' attitudes towards regional and national frames of belonging, as well as the connection between those frames of belonging to one or more territorially defined identities and patterns of support for national and regional parties. With reference to electoral

¹ Many authors have stressed the importance of this trend, among others Butler/Lahiri/Roy (2007: 173), Yadav/Palshikar (2006: 73), Sridharan (2003: 135), Dasgupta (2002: 43-44), Wyatt (2001: 388), and Mitra/Singh (1999).

politics in India it will investigate the changing levels of success of regional and national political parties and the impact that these have had on the structures and processes of government formation at the national level. One aspect of this impact concerns the extent and nature of possible interactions between national and State-level processes and party system structures.

A second trend in Indian politics which has been much discussed in the academic as well as popular writing about Indian politics is that of a supposed deinstitutionalization of politics in general and of party politics in particular.² This study will address this phenomenon of different levels of institutionalization of party politics and party systems as a corollary and precondition for regionalization in chapter four, which asks how institutionalized the Indian party systems are. This concept refers, in that context, to a kind of de-regularization of politics. Frequently, this process is envisioned as comprised of a three-fold shift: from elected to unelected party leadership, from ideological political appeals to populist mobilization and from mainly conventional to unconventional and extra-constitutional participation (Price 2005; Kohli 1990). Given the pre-eminent position of the Congress Party during the first decades after India's independence, the level of institutionalization of Indian politics in general and party politics in particular crucially hinges on its relative position vis-à-vis other political forces in the country (Pye 1999; Candland 1997; Mitra 1994). Secondly, the level of political institutionalization generally, therefore, is also intimately connected to the institutionalization of party politics beyond only the Congress Party. Thus, the level of institutionalization is crucially tied to changes in patterns of party competition, including changes in support for different parties or different types of parties, the persistence of parties over time and the extent to which parties or individual candidates command support in the electorate. This link is a logical as well as an empirical nexus between the processes of

² For contributions to this body of literature see Kohli (1990), Rao (1988), Gupta (1996). For a discussion of the (de-)institutionalization and reconfiguration of national party politics, see Weiner (1987), Joshi/Desai (1978), Heath (2005), Pai (1997), Sridharan (1997), Gowda/Sridharan (2008), Candland (1997) and Chhibber (2005).

regionalization and institutionalization. A shift in support away from established national parties in a vast and diverse country such as India will inevitably mean an increased likelihood of growing support for upstart parties which will usually be regional rather than national in nature.

Before outlining the state of existing research and the theoretical framework employed in this study in chapter two, the question of how the stated research questions are important to politics and political science generally and in particular with reference to India merits attention.

1.1 The Study of Indian Politics

Since India's independence in 1947, the country's political system, problems and processes have been the subject of numerous studies undertaken in political science. Besides several others, four distinguishable themes which are in part also relevant to this study seem to stand out in particular. The first theme is that of the democratization of politics in India, the second is that of the political economy of development. Thirdly, a further focus has been the study of violent conflicts and their determinants, while the fourth one concerns the patterns and determinants of electoral and party politics.

With regard to the study of democratization, much of the scholarship has focused on the emergence and the historical roots of democratic politics in India, including class conflict, elite behavior and values (Manor 1990, Sarkar 2001, Baxter 1985). The existence of values regarding democratic institutions and processes has formed another important topic for study (Mitra/Singh 1999). Other studies have concentrated on the status of India's political system as a democracy (Heller 2000) and on its functioning (Ganguly 2007, Muni 1991). Yet others have emphasized the importance of institutional design and evolution (Rudolph/Rudolph 2001, Austin 1999, Lijphart 1996, Bhargava 1999) and the nexus between parties and political diversity (Adeney/Wyatt 2004) to the proper understanding of the overall trends in

the development of democracy in India since independence. This theme in research on Indian politics will be relevant to our understanding of regionalization since the levels of diversity vary from region to region. This obviously raises the issue of regional differentiation of the political landscape with reference to party-political phenomena. What will also be important to consider is the importance which increased support for regional rather than national parties might have as an indicator of growing dissatisfaction with the current democratic political system.

Another important theme, the political economy of development, has led to a number of studies focusing on regional variations in the socioeconomic development and their roots (Sinha 2005) as well as inquiries into inequalities between non-territorial social groups (Bardhan 2001). Another subject extensively studied within this overall topic has been the political economy of economic policy reforms (Jenkins 1999) as well as the nexus between democratic politics and poverty reduction (Varshney 2000a). Aspects of development and in particular regional differences in levels for development will enter this study as variables potentially explaining part of the variation in support for regional parties.

The third recurring topic in research on Indian politics has been the inquiry into the roots of violent social conflicts, such as communal or caste conflicts. Hindu-Muslim relations and their relationship to violent conflict have been particularly prominent in this line of work (see e.g. Varshney 2002). Caste conflicts have likewise been a much-discussed theme (Brass 1991, Jaffrelot 2003). The correlation of electoral competition and political violence has also been under investigation for some time (see for example Wilkinson 2004). Lastly, the relative prevalence and determinants of violent versus conventional participation in Indian politics forms a further important sub-theme within the study of conflicts in India (Kohli 1990, Mitra 2006). This strand of research will inform this inquiry insofar as we will treat ethnic diversity as one of the explanatory factors which might explain part of the variation in regional party support. Thus, the roots of violent social conflict as one form of rebellion against the existing

socio-political order are treated as potentially the same which fuel support for regional and regionalist parties and candidates.

The fourth major theme in the Study of Indian politics is that of party and electoral politics. The emergence, maintenance and decline of the political dominance of the Congress Party were one of the earliest and most persistent topics for research in the study of Indian politics (Kothari 1964, Heath/Yadav 1999, Candland 1997, Chhibber 2005). Caste and other cleavages and their connection to electoral and party politics have been another staple in political science research on India for decades (Buena De Mesquita 1978, Chhibber/Petrocik 1989, Vanderbok 1990, Yadav 1999, Hasan 1999, Chandra 2004, Shah 2004, Macmillan 2005). So also have been regional variations in patterns of electoral politics (Vora 2004, Varshney 2000b). An additional theme has been the implication of the structure (or lack thereof) of organized civil society on the consolidation of party and electoral politics (Chhibber 1999). This theme is quite clearly connected to this study of the regional differentiation and overall regionalization of party and electoral politics.

Especially the themes of cleavages and party politics, as well as the relationship between values and politics, both in their relation to regionalization and institutionalization of party and electoral politics will be at the heart of this study.

1.2 Region and Nation in the Study of Politics


1.2.1 Regionalization's relevance to politics generally

Regional parties were a relatively under-researched topic for a long time. Before outlining the reasoning behind undertaking an inquiry into the sources of regional party and candidate support, it seems warranted to ask whether an inquiry into the territorial characteristics of both party and identity politics today is a sensible line of investigation at all, especially given the oft-postulated de-territorialization of politics under the conditions of globalization. This begs the question whether or not territorial politics is on the decline and whether or not politics is

becoming increasingly transnational and less state-centered. While this argument may seem to question the general approach taken here, it still seems warranted to proceed in the on the assumption that a lot of politics is still local or regional. Both in India-related but also in cross-national research, it appears that regional political arenas, regional and local identities and sub-national political issues reappear more strongly again since the 1990s. Examples from European countries include the territorially and identity-based conflicts connected to the breakups of the Soviet Union and the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia as well as the (re-) emergence of regionalist parties in the European Union at all levels of political organization, local, regional, national and supranational.

The importance of sub-national territorial attachments is also borne out by opinion data on loyalty to different political territories. When reviewing the attachment which citizens feel to different territorial frames of belonging in cross-national perspective, it becomes clear that locality and region have strong appeal for large sections in a number of countries, as figure 1.2 (below) illustrates. This indicates that a closer examination of “territorial layers” of identity is warranted even today.

Figure 1.2: Nations, regions and localities as focal points of identification with territories



Source: World Values Survey, Third Wave (latest available data for each country). Question text: "To which of these geographical groups would you say you belong first of all? And the next? And which do you belong to least of all? First: 1 Locality 2 Region 3 Country 4 Continent 5 The world".

With the exception of Pakistan, in all other countries there are sizeable sections of society which feel that their primary loyalty belongs to some form of sub-national political territory and identity, either local or regional. Thus, the connection between peoples' attachments to sub-national territories, the design of the electoral system and party competition would seem to be a highly relevant link to study in a range of those countries.

In more recent years increasing decentralization and federalization of government in a number of advanced democratic systems have focused attention anew on the territorial nature of decision-making, political competition of parties and the role of citizens' attachments to particular territorially defined identities. A number of things regarding the importance of this rise of regional parties and regional political identities to prominence in politics across political systems seem obvious. The increase of the number of competitive parties, in particular the advent of smaller regionally-based parties which contest and win elections in only part of the country, has implications for the governability of countries. Such an increase can lead to greater complexity and necessitate greater coordination of actors to build majorities in national and regional legislatures. Consequently, one of the impacts which have been highlighted in recent studies is the relationship between the levels of regional party support and the stability of governments (Brancati 2005).

Quite conceivably, a "de-nationalization" of politics in multi-level systems of government can create the potential for a destabilization of political processes on account of new, less institutionalized entrant parties to the electoral game. As one consequence such a destabilization has been hypothesized to possibly lead to a shortening of the political time horizons of politicians and in consequence to the focusing on short-term personal rather than long-term strategic public interests. Thus, the importance of a growing regionalization of politics lies in large part in its impact on the process functions of political systems, i.e. on who makes politics, how it is made and what policies are adopted.

Another area on which this phenomenon is likely to impact is the change and stability of recruitment patterns of different relevant new and established parties upon the advent of new regionally-based parties in a political system. Additionally, it can be expected that such new parties with predominantly regional support bases, agendas and linkages to groups in society will likely have a shaping and questioning effect on the identity-related underpinnings of political competition in a multi-level system. In non-Western, post-colonial contexts, this can raise questions about issues of nation-building and a possible fragmentation or alternatively a composite nature of national political identities. Thus, the ties of such newly emerging regional parties to identity claims and structures will likewise be of great interest to scholars of political culture as they shape the system functions and input functions of politics. In how far institutional factors such as decentralization improve or worsen the level of conflict and secessionism is another focus of concern (Brancati 2006b)

To do this, chapter 2 (below) will outline the theoretical framework used in this study and the terms employed to conceptualize the theoretical links between candidates, parties, identities of voters, party systems and the consequences of the structure of competition between national and regional parties. Just like feelings of attachment to subunits of national states are not unique to the multi-level, multi-cultural political context of South Asian countries, the social scientific debate on this issue and that of its connection to political processes is not unique to that context either. Much of the literature on regional identities and regional and regionalist political parties has developed in connection with the study of Western political systems as the following section will demonstrate.

1.2.2 The debate about regionalization of politics in advanced Western democracies

A first distinct field of inquiry into the regionalization of politics concerns the role of regional versus national identities and attachments to different cultural and political spaces. In recent years a number of studies have investigated different layers of identity and attachments and

their respective roles vis-à-vis each other for cases such as the issue of being “English” in Great Britain (Jones 2004, Jones/McLeod 2004), a regionalized conception of French identity (Dimier 2004), and the coexistence of regional and regionalist tendencies with a pan-European public sphere in an era of European integration (Jolly 2007, Spektorowski 2003, Longo 2003).

Besides identity issues the impact of regional versus national political territory is also felt in the area of party and electoral politics in Western countries. Key questions, which are related to the territorial bases of politics, touch on the wider research on party politics, territorial politics in general, and regional parties and political processes within countries in particular. In the scholarship on the relationship of territorial characteristics of politics to parties and party competition, existing scholarship can be categorized according to two criteria: *levels of analysis* (national or subnational political systems) and *units of analysis* (parties or party systems). Additionally, a distinction can be made between single country studies and cross-national studies (small- or large-N). Figure 1.3 (below) illustrates the categorization along the aforementioned criteria.

Figure 1.3: Classification of Scholarship on Regionalization

		Unit of Analysis	
		Parties	Party Systems
Level of Analysis	National	a	b
	Subnational	d	c

Studies focusing on the studies of single or groups of national parties in multicultural settings often attempt to descriptively assess their relative electoral performance in regional as opposed to national elections. Studies in this tradition (d) include for example the investigation into the electoral strategies and success of national parties such as the Socialist Party in regional elections compared to national-level elections in Spain (Roller/van Houten

2003), the regionalization of support bases of support for national parties in Mexico (Baker 2009) or multiple national parties in various countries' subnational party systems (van Houten 2003). Another interest (a) centers on the support bases of national versus regional parties in different countries and on the strength of regional parties in national elections (Brancati 2006a). As a corollary to these themes the issue of the nature of regional parties as opposed to national parties is a much discussed topic in research. Lastly, ideologies and programmatic profiles of both types of parties play an important role in scholarship on the regionalization of party politics (Strmiska 2002). A second approach focuses on studying party systems instead of individual or groups of parties and in the case of multi-level systems the possible interaction of lower level and higher level party systems. At the national level (b), these studies deal with the impact of the regionalized structure of the party system on government stability (Brancati 2005), as well as with the local determinants of voting patterns and across types of parties (Morgenstern/Swindle 2005) and the influence of party system structures on the vote for secessionist parties (Sorens 2005). Finally, with regard to subnational party systems (c), one line of inquiry has addressed the connection between regional identity and the structure of regional party systems (Hepburn 2008). This study will touch upon some of these and related themes in the course of the theoretical elaboration of the research questions asked in chapter two. It is concerned with questions relating to (b) and (c). However, it will necessarily draw on ideas from (a) and (d) to explain the configuration of party systems.

1.3 The Design of the Study

In chapter two we will introduce the most important terms and concepts employed in order to establish a basic understanding of how this study proposes to deal with the terminological diversity in the literature on regional identity, regional parties and the institutionalization of parties and party systems. Chapter two will also provide a general overview of previous research and findings regarding the questions at hand, while also highlighting existing

theoretical blind spots and remaining puzzles in existing scholarship. Lastly, the same chapter will also lay out the theoretical frame for the study and critically evaluate the usefulness of studying party system change at the subnational level. Chapter three gives an introduction to the institutional set-up of Indian politics in the setting of its multi-level democracy. It also showcases the relative differences of social and economic diversity across India's States and their impact on politics. The fourth chapter will deal with the institutionalization of party politics in India. After a brief theoretical introduction to the debate on party and party system institutionalization (PSI) generally, the operationalization of the concept in this study and the hypotheses which will be evaluated are then discussed. This will be followed by an overview of the levels of institutionalization across India's states. Finally, chapter four will provide a discussion of the extent of and possible determinants of party system institutionalization based on aggregate-level data and based on individual-level data and through a case study analysis. Having established the importance of different levels of institutionalization of party politics in the previous chapter, in chapter five we will turn to the issue of regionalization of party politics and of identity. After an overview of theories on the importance and determinants of political identity, the operationalization of the key variables and the main hypotheses to be evaluated, the chapter will give a descriptive account of the extent of regionalization of identity and politics in India. The determinants of regional identity attachments and regional party support will be analyzed through individual-level data. An aggregate data analysis will also profile States and detail the characteristics common to those States where regional parties have been particularly successful or unsuccessful. Chapter six will present a study of one of the consequences of the regionalization of party politics as it presents itself at the national level of politics: the necessity to forge coalitions incorporating both national and regional parties in order to be able to form national governments. It will also evaluate the claim that regional parties have acquired disproportional power at the national level over the past two decades through analyzing government formation processes and the sharing of offices with

references to three case studies. Finally, chapter seven will summarize the main findings of this study and suggest additional questions and themes warranting further investigation.

Chapter Two:
Conceptual and Theoretical Aspects of This Study

2. Conceptual and Theoretical Aspects of the Study

This chapter outlines the main theoretical framework for understanding the differential appeals of national versus regional political parties in India. Based on assumptions about the perspectives of parties and candidates, as well as voters in single-member simple plurality (SMDP) voting systems, it is argued here, that in socio-economic conditions such as those in India messages based on local and regional networks of interdependence, identities and issues, rather than national issues, can be expected to dominate the mobilization efforts of parties. Chapter two also discusses in greater depth theories about regional/regionalist parties and party systems (in India as well as in comparative political research generally), and regional versus national identities. In this context, the chapter develops a theoretical perspective in contradistinction to previously conducted research into Indian national and State-level party systems, highlighting similarities as well as dissimilarities compared to those approaches. This chapter further introduces and problematizes key concepts used in this study, such as "regional party", "national party", "regionalization" and "subnationalism", as well as their operationalization in empirical research on politics in India.

2.1 Regionalization of Party Politics – Two Views

This section will briefly discuss two of the main perspectives on nationalization and regionalization of party politics before outlining some of the key terms used in the course of this study. These different perspectives are important as a background to the definition of terms used here because especially in terms of the idea of regionalization and regional parties, they inform the choice of terms and the advantages and disadvantages that this choice brings for the respective views. In principle, there are two views on the regionalization (or (de-)nationalization) of party politics, one focusing on socio-structural and another one focusing on organizational-institutional aspects of politics.

2.1.1 The Socio-structural Perspective

The socio-structural approach centers on two types of factors impacting the process of party emergence, party system stability and party system change. The first factor concerns cleavages, i.e. conflict fault lines within society based on individual or group characteristics that divide people into different “camps”. Early exponents of this view of party politics were Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967). From their theory of party systems and voter alignments it follows that regional party development marked an early phase in the development of Western party systems and that for regional parties to emerge a strong center-periphery cleavage would have to exist in society, i.e. a conflict between rural areas dominated by landed elites and urban industrial areas (1967: 10-11). That cleavage and the concomitant formation of regional parties constitute a potential (often temporary) challenge to the political integration of a given territory. This is particularly true when parties demand autonomy for particular groups or regions to the exclusion of larger national concerns. Another type of social conflict fault line impacting political processes is that of ethnicity with ethnic parties as the ostensible representatives of diverse ethnic groups. They are distinguished, in the eyes of their members, by a variety of cultural, racial or linguistic characteristics. Oftentimes, these parties will concentrate on running candidates mainly in one region of a larger country (Gunther and Diamond 2001: 23) because especially in less dynamic, primarily agricultural societies, important ethnic minorities tend to be concentrated in particular areas of the country to which these particularistic parties then appeal.³ While this type of mobilization and party system is mostly discussed with reference to developing countries, this appeal to ethno-regionalist sentiments also exists in scholarly debates about and mobilization strategies by parties regarding voters in Europe today (Tronconi 2006; Spektorowski 2003: 112; Strmiska 2002). The programmatic ethnicist appeals of parties like the Vlaams Belang in Belgium or the Lega Nord in Italy speak to this line of arguments (see

³ Chandra (2004) has shown the importance of ethnic parties and the relevance to particular regional contexts within countries for the case of India.

the examples in Appendix C). The other approach commonly found in the literature on the socio-structural underpinnings of regional differentiation of subnational party systems deals with economic differences across regions. Jones (2004) illustrates how regional economic planning structures can aid in catalyzing latent identities into mobilizational resources. In another vein, building on the idea that unequal development of subnational economies might influence the development of secessionist tendencies in people (instead of many see Hale 2000 for an overview of these debates), scholarship in this tradition claims that shifting strength from the economic core regions to other subnational peripheral economies might prompt new regional aspirations which can serve as a backdrop for political mobilization (Gourevitch 1979: 319; Hale 2000). Others (Hechter 1992; Mitra 1995) have argued that developmental disparities between rich and poor regions in conjunction with differences in the ethnic makeup of regions may paradoxically lead to regionalist or secessionist tendencies in the populace despite the fact that poor regions usually benefit from being part of a larger national economic (and political) market. Both views on the issue of secessionism could *mutatis mutandis* be extended to the reasoning about the generation of regionalist political parties. One might thus theorize that in regions which are economic laggards, regional parties might spring up more frequently hoping to exploit grievances based on a feeling of falling behind the rest of a country (or less frequently because people there have an incentive to retain influence at the national level through national parties). Conversely, another view might be that regions which are national leaders might see the more frequent creation of regionalist parties either out of a feeling of people there that they do not wield influence in federal politics proportional to their contribution to overall wealth, or out of a desire to secure greater autonomy or even independence in order to exercise greater control over the wealth generated in those richer regions (Sorens 2005). In sum, it can be argued, that for work based on these models, there is an assumption of a real and substantive difference between regional and

regionalist parties and other parties based on their issue concentrations, rhetoric and support groups.

Socio-structural explanations of regional party generation and success have both strengths and weaknesses. On the one hand there is greater variation in economic conditions across states and time and in social structures across states to help explain the varying fortunes of regional parties in different parts of the same country. This is not the case for within-country comparison with regard to institutions. Also, social and economic characteristics are also more easily measured than institutional variations. Among the weaknesses, however, we can count the difficulty in explaining relatively short-term fluctuations in support for regional and regionalist parties by recourse to social differences which are far more stable over time. Another question which this line of research often under-specifies is that of how political elites and parties decide which cleavage becomes emphasized and why it appears to them worth instrumentalizing. It is also not always clear which role, according to these models, the organizational capacities of parties, attitudes of voters, which are presumably much more amenable to change over time, and which role the media and structure of the political media establishment play in determining the relative importance of regional identities and issues (beyond economic grievances).

Some of these shortcomings are addressed by the scholarship which emphasizes organizational-institutional factors in explaining regional party creation and persistence.

2.1.2 The Organizational-Institutional Perspective

The second broad theoretical perspective on the proliferation of smaller regional and regionalist parties and the consequent differentiation of subnational party systems from each other and from the national level party system, places organizational aspects and institutional characteristics of politics at the heart of its explanatory models. These often more elite-based models focus to a greater extent than the previous literature on the characteristics of parties

and party elites as strategic actors and on the rules (institutions in the sense of North 1990), which structure the competition of parties for votes and power. It deals among other things with nationalization or regionalization as an issue of party aggregation (thus adopting a micro-level perspective from which to explain macro-level differences) and the institutional incentives which lead to higher or lower levels of aggregation. One institutionalist view (Filippov et al. 2004) deals with the influence of systems of government (presidentialism versus parliamentarism) on party aggregation. This view holds that presidential systems of government, due to the requirement of building electoral majorities for winning this highest office, incentivize the building of national parties which can ensure electoral victories in direct presidential elections. Another view (Brancati 2005) argues that within the category of parliamentary systems of government, countries with bicameral legislatures will likely see lower levels of party aggregation and the existence of more and possibly stronger regional parties since the second chambers, even or especially if indirectly elected by a state legislature as in the case of India, can offer regionally strong parties a way of influencing national policies without having to try and establish a national support base and winning legislative majorities in the lower chamber of the national legislature. A third argument often advanced is that plurality-based voting systems encourage the formation of cross-district formation of parties and actually encourage the formation of nationwide party platforms while list-based voting systems enable regional parties to capture seats in the national legislature by focusing on narrow, regionally concentrated support bases.

Another view synthesizes explanations based on economic, social and institutional factors. This perspective, applied to the Indian case by Sarangi (2005) following the theoretical work by Scholte (2000), holds that globalization and economic liberalization have eroded the capacity of states to steer some of the more important developments in society. This, in turn, reduces the incentives for parties to focus their mobilization efforts on a message emphasizing national policies related to economic growth. Instead it is suggested that they had greater


incentives to target regionalist and ethnicist sentiments (Sarangi 2005: 78). Organizationally, this view argues, this change would be underpinned by a decreasing reliance on traditional intermediary organizations like trade unions for mobilizational support and greater reliance on primordial groups such as caste and religious organizational networks (ibid.). We will argue below (2.6, 2.7) that economic wealth and along with it the timing of the formation of a national government composed of regional parties are crucial to the explanation of regionalization and institutionalization of politics in India. Hence, we stress the importance of both socio-economic factors as well as institutional factors in the explanation of regionalization.

2.2 The Importance of Party System Institutionalization

This study is based on the assumption that the relative level of regionalization of party politics is crucially linked to the level of institutionalization of parties and party systems. This assumption is not to imply that Chhibber and Kollman (2004) are wrong in their assessment of the incentive structure and the dynamics of changing party competition. Instead one of the underlying assumptions in this study is that incentives do indeed change over time. Secondly, we also assume that different regions in India may require different explanations. However, we also assume that the changes in the incentive structure in some regions have as much to do with variables related to the political process itself as they do with the changing structure of government in the form of increased decentralization as Chhibber and Kollman assume. Such changes in the process include, among others, changes in the frequency of breakups of political parties and in the frequency of successful campaigns of independent candidates. The following stylized model captures the essence of the idea that the level of the (de-)institutionalization of politics (such as the institutionalization of parties and party systems) constitutes one discernible nexus between characteristics of the social sphere (like changing

social structures and processes) and characteristics of the political sphere (as for example the regionalization or nationalization of party politics).

Figure 2.1: Linking Regionalization to Social Change



The relative institutionalization of party politics is conceptualized as influenced by the social sphere in the form changes or stability in the informational, demographic, economic and attitudinal context of society. It, in turn, influences and is influenced by the relative levels of regionalization, i.e. the regional differentiation party politics and the increasing support for regional rather than for national parties. “Informational context” refers to the way in which political news and information are disseminated in a society. Parties and individual candidates may find themselves in a context of relative monopolization or plurality of sources of information. Likewise, the types of outlets for information can have significant influence over the amount and type of political communication which takes place. Changes in the media landscape, such as among other things that from print media such as newspapers and political magazines to audiovisual media like radio or television and finally to the internet as a new type of delivery platform have profoundly changed party-society relations in many countries where they have occurred (Wolinetz 1988b: 312; Carson/Hood 2008; Nair 2003).

“Demographic context” incorporates characteristics of the populations in the States in which parties and candidates compete. These include features such as urbanization levels,

levels of migration (immigration, emigration), size of the population, age structure etc. When we recall the basis of the “Congress system” (close ties to local elites, vote banks etc.), it is relatively easy to see how changes in the demographic make-up of populations could break up the established patterns of institutionalization and also lead to a regionalization of party politics. To take but one example, it seems reasonable to assume that in more anonymous urban settings the traditional patterns of caste-based voting, common to more rural areas and an essential ingredient of Congress dominance, would be less regularized. Hence, more urbanized States might show less regularized voting behavior which opens up opportunities for newly emerging candidates and parties, thus also contributing to a possible regionalization of party competition. Other links are, of course, conceivable as well. Chapters four and five will deal with these in the respective theoretical overviews and reviews of working hypotheses.

The term “economic context” describes the characteristics of a States’ economy at the macro- as well as at the micro-level. It could be measured by reference to such traits as poverty levels, levels of income inequality, size of the economy and income per capita. People in poorer States might vote differently compared to voters in richer regions in order to protest against their perceived lower quality of life. Or voters in rich regions might want to vote for newly emerging protest parties because they feel exploited by the poorer regions within a country. Both ways of reasoning might lead voters to stray from established national parties to newer more regional political forces.

The concept of an “attitudinal context” defines the range of dispositions which voters share within the context of one particular region and which may well differ across various regions. These dispositions concern attachments to different levels of territorial political organization (locality, region, country etc.), attachments to specific political parties or the lack thereof, levels of national pride as well as levels of trust in different levels of government or in political parties. Parties have to take these attitudinal dispositions of voters into

consideration when tailoring their messages to specific audiences in the various regions. Depending on whether stark inter-regional differences exist or not, parties, which will almost always emerge out of a local or regional context rather than be national phenomena from the outset, will be able to repeat and adapt their message to render them competitive across different regions, or not.

On the basis of the linkage between institutionalization and regionalization as distinguishing characteristics, several models of party competition are conceivable. Figure 2.2 illustrates these below.

Figure 2.2: Models of Party Competition

	Predominant Political Forces			
		National	Mixed	Regional
Level of Institutionalization	High	I. Stable National Party Competition	II. Stable Mixed Party Competition	III. Stable Regional Party Competition
	Low	VI. Unstable National Party Competition	V. Unstable Mixed Party Competition	IV. Unstable Regional Party Competition

Stable party competition between mainly national parties is the first type (I). This type of competition can be found in States such as Gujarat today where the Indian National Congress and the BJP are the main competitors for votes in national and regional elections. The same type of competition exists in West Bengal between the Communist Party of India and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) in a government coalition and the Congress Party as the main opposition party. Though both communist parties have in recent years occasionally been classified down to State party status, both have almost always been national parties according to the classification used by the Election Commission of India. The national pattern also

prevails in Madhya Pradesh with the BJP and INC as the main competitors. The second type of competition (II) is constituted by stable competition between national and regional parties, such as is the case in Andhra Pradesh, where Telugu Desam Party and Indian National Congress compete, or as it has developed in Manipur with contests between the Congress and the BJP as national parties competing with MSCP and Manipur People's Party. Stable exclusively regional party-based party systems (type III) are a rarity in the early 1990s in India, but are found in Tamil Nadu (with the DMK and the AIADMK) where no national party has headed a State government since the 1970s. Type IV party systems show patterns in which predominantly regional political forces, such as regional parties or independent candidates, undergo frequent changes and are thus relatively less institutionalized. The case of Mizoram shows this, where initially independent candidates fared strongly initially, but were soon replaced by unstable regional parties, first by the PPC, then the Mizo National Front, to be followed by the MNF(N) and lately the MZPC. Meghalaya is another example of this phenomenon. On the other hand, Maharashtra is an example of shifting competition between national (INC, BJP) and regional parties (NCP, Shiv Sena) (type V), as is Arunachal Pradesh with a volatile competition between independents and first the Janata Party and the INC in the 1970s, then Arunachal Congress and PPA. The emergence and demise of the JD caused considerable change in the configuration of party competition in Rajasthan. Comparable developments are discernible in Bihar and Orissa, but with opposite effects. The breakup of the national Janata Dal into regional constituent successor parties has led to increased regionalization in those two states, moving party competition from type VI to type V competition, while Rajasthan moves from type VI closer to type I.

The extent to which there is a confluence or disjuncture of institutionalization and regionalization will depend on a number of factors which are in part immanent to the political system and in part determined by the social context in each State. As mentioned earlier, these different perspectives on the relative nationalization or regionalization of parties and party

systems in part guide the choice of terminology which each of those studies' follows. To clarify what will be understood by these and other terms, the following section will provide a summary of the most important terms and concepts.

2.3 Terminology

The following terms and concepts will guide the subsequent discussions on the regionalization and institutionalization of party politics in India. They are meant as working or nominal definitions rather than as real definitions aimed at accurately capturing reality. As such, they serve the very specific purpose of aiding the inquiry at hand rather than providing a general framework for the study of these and other issues in cross-national comparisons. Consequently, they should be seen as tools aiding in the structuring of our thinking about party politics rather than ends in themselves. The drawbacks as well as the advantages of this approach to conceptualization and terminology as well as possible alternatives to the framework used here are obvious and the following comments will address them in turn where necessary.

2.3.1 Parties

Numerous definitions have been advanced by equally numerous scholars for what we refer to in conventional shorthand as "political parties". As an example of earlier work in political sociology, Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 5) see in parties "alliances in conflicts over policies and value commitments within the larger body politic". It emphasizes the socio-structural dimension in societies ("parties in the electorate") and conflictual dynamics. However, it under-emphasizes the modes of conflict resolution and the specific nature of issues parties concern themselves with as opposed to other collective actors. Alan Ware echoes this sociological view of political parties to some extent. However, he also departs from it, saying that they are "bodies that intend to exercise some control over a state, and that its members are not simply the representatives of a single interest in society" (Ware 1987: 16). He thus

acknowledges that it would be simplistic to mechanistically equate parties with individual, somehow organic interests or cleavages in society. Schultze (2001:350) defines political parties as “groups of like-minded citizens united by the goal to implement common political ideals” (own translation). This is a relatively open definition which can consequently accommodate a variety of temporal, regional and functional settings. On the other hand, unlike most definitions, this one does not make any reference to the instruments which these groups use to advance their goals, in democratic systems, of course, most commonly elections. Carles Boix has defined parties as “vote-seeking and governing teams of candidates and parliamentarians” (2007: 500). This definition does incorporate implicitly the notion of elections to win office and governing as the most important and central activities of parties. However, Boix’s definition is similar to that of Giovanni Sartori (Sartori 1976: 64), who defined parties as “any political group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office.” It is also open to an inclusion of non-programmatic parties characteristically found in many non-Western political systems. Sartori’s view, while otherwise useful, seems to be too narrow in that he argues for restricting the study of parties to only those entities which are “relevant”, i.e. those which have an influence on actual government policy-making. Too narrow a definition would also not be desirable since it thus excludes nascent organizations (Pedersen 1982). Our working definition will understand parties to be groups of individuals (members, candidates, legislators), most often though not always united by common ideologies, identities or other modes of linkage with sections of the electorate, seeking to place candidates into public office through competitive (or non-competitive) elections. As will be highlighted later, in some instances independent candidates, i.e. candidates who are not affiliated with any political party when contesting elections, will be treated as “parties of one” (or proto-parties) for the sake of convention in the existing literature (see for example Chhibber/Kollman 2004), e.g. when

calculating the levels of fragmentation of political systems. Where this apparent inconsistency with the mentioned definition obtains, this will be highlighted and justified as appropriate.

2.3.2 Party Systems

It is a truism that much of politics is ever changing and much of the change is ephemeral (Niemi/Weisberg 2001: 371). What is true about politics more generally is equally true about party politics in particular. Similarly, just as not only party politics changes over time and across space, so do the common definitions (Nohlen 2004: 65). To us, the concept of a “party system” describes the salient characteristics of party competition, cooperation and other inter-party relationships, such as the absolute number of parties competing in a given political system, the relative strength of parties in terms of seats or votes, patterns of ideological distance between parties or groups of parties in systems where ideology is an important distinguishing feature.⁴ Thus, shifting the focus from parties to party systems allows one to move from analyzing organizational actors to analyzing structures or relationships between actors (Kitschelt 2007: 523). The emphasis on structures does not, however, imply an undue insistence on the invariant patterns of inter-party relations over time. Stability does not necessarily imply stagnation. Rather, party systems when properly understood, allow us to discern the relatively more enduring features and patterns in relationships, also across political systems, amid a sea of change and idiosyncrasy.

2.3.3 Regionalization

Contrary to the approaches discussed above (section 2.1), we will take “regionalization” (or “de-nationalization”) to refer to the process and current state of increasing (or decreasing as the case may be) levels of electoral support for regional/non-national parties and their

⁴ See Nohlen (2004:65) for an even more exhaustive list of elements that characterize party systems.

candidates. This process is most easily discernible from the vote shares which such candidates and parties receive in elections. Our understanding of regionalization or de-nationalization is therefore somewhat different from that of Jones and Mainwaring (2003) and Chhibber and Kollman (2004). They see nationalization (the logical pendant to regionalization) as a state of congruence between national structures of party competition and disaggregated structures of competition at the level of states or even districts. Since one of the main objectives of this study is to find out under which conditions small parties with mainly regional support bases receive votes in regional-level elections, a narrower and more specific definition such as those used in these other studies seems unduly restrictive.


2.3.4 Regional Parties

A variety of definitions for the term “regional party” have been proposed over time. Some studies simply do not explicitly address the issue of what exactly distinguishes regional from other parties at all (Jolly 2007). The studies which do address the distinction essentially fall into three camps: Those, which define “regional” as referring to the contraction of electoral support to a few regions, those looking to the types of issues advocated by parties and to whether they use regionalist rhetoric and concentrate on issues relevant only to specific regions of a country, and those which are characterized by both concentrated electoral support and regionalist ideology. Most studies use the concentration of electoral support in one or a few regions as a point of departure, thereby linking these parties to an essential element of their activities (elections) (van Houten 2001: 10; Ziegfeld 2007). Some studies based on party documents such as manifestos center their definitions (at least in part) on the issues advocated and on whether they are tailored to specific regions, or even overtly regionalist or even secessionist (e.g. Müller-Rommel 1998: 19). Empirical studies often combine the concentration of electoral support with issue concentration on regionally confined issues or a regionalist ideology, for example by defining regional parties as competing in one or more

regions of a country, but not in all, and as those parties, whose agendas focus on regional issues (Brancati 2005: 149-150). Demands by those types of “regional parties” include, though not exclusively, those for regional autonomy. By incorporating the issue orientations of parties into their definition, these studies acknowledge that the importance of the “regional dimension” transcends the realm of competition and the boundaries of decision-making power, which in this conception actually become an issue in themselves. Thus, the latter approach distinguishes between regional as “regionalized” parties, and regional as “regionalist” parties.

The approach taken here is somewhat closer to the first variant in relying on the extent to which parties are competing and are receiving support in elections, however, for a variety of reasons it departs in a very important way from it. The present study will employ the distinction between “national parties” and all other parties, as used by the Election Commission of India, laid out in the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968, as it applied from 1977 to 2000, the period of investigation. The diagram below situates our understanding of the term “regional party” in the context of the Election Commissions terminology.

Figure 2.3: Types of Parties in India (ECI Classification)



Source: Own visualization based on definitions in Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968 (as in force between 1977 and December 2000).

Hence, we will consider candidates of regional parties to be those candidates not affiliated with national parties as defined by the Election Commission of India. This means that national parties (the counterparts to the parties under consideration here) are by no means parties which contest elections in all States, which would be the requirement for example under Brancati's definition, but rather a special case of State parties, namely those State parties which have achieved recognition as such in four or more States.


2.3.5 A Note on Alternative Terminology

Alternative measures for classifying political parties and party systems as regionalized or nationalized have been proposed. Unfortunately, they are mostly not transferable to analyses of subnational elections since the top-down cross-national view taken by the studies in question have led them to employ national-level election data to classify subnational parties and party systems as regionalized/nationalized or not. However, for the present purposes it is the subnational elections and party systems, and not regional variations in national elections which are of interest and hence a classification based on national aggregate results could be misleading. Based on data from Indian national elections, Ziegfeld (2007) employs a normalized version of the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index to first calculate the relative dispersion of votes for each party across subnational districts (at the State level) to then calculate the average regionalization score of parties in the given party system, ranging from 0 to 1. He then chooses cut-off points to classify parties into the two categories "national" and "regional" (Ziegfeld 2007: 3). Thus, a regional party is a party which has a normalized Herfindahl score of 0.18 or higher. Semi-national parties have scores higher than 0.1 and less than 0.18, while national parties are defined as having a score lower than 0.1. Similar approaches, although primarily restricted to the analysis of entire party systems rather than individual parties, have been taken on the basis of indices rooted in the Gini coefficient (Bochsler 2005; Jones/Mainwaring 2003; Croissant/Schächter 2008).

There are clear disadvantages to the definition of regional parties (and in consequence regionalized party systems) as used in this study. One drawback of this context-dependent institutional definition is the low comparability of the detected levels of regionalization (measured here by vote shares of regional parties), since they depend on the present Indian definition of what regional parties are. This poses an impediment to the easy comparison of this study's findings to other cross-national studies' findings. Another problem is the fact that this notion of regional parties allows parties to change labels over time, thus allowing for relatively drastic changes in regionalization scores when a successful regional party is reclassified by the Election Commission as a national party in a subsequent election, thus moving its vote shares into that category's column. Over time, since 1968 the definition used by the Election Commission of India has also changed. After recent amendments in 2000 and 2005, according to the Symbols Order, parties looking to be classified as national parties now need to win six instead of four percent of the votes in four or more States, making for complicated re-classification if one wanted to extend this analysis beyond the year 2000. However, for the period under consideration here (1977 to 2000), the criteria remained constant. Since there are also advantages to this classification scheme into "national" and "non-national" (or "regional") parties, it will be used here. For example, since the research interest here is not whether national aggregate party systems mirror party systems based on disaggregated national level elections, but rather under which conditions parties which are primarily regionalized in their support bases contribute an increasingly large (or, conversely, a decreasing) share of votes in elections, the present definition seems sufficient. Other definitions relying on party ideologies for classification, such as speeches or manifestos, are impractical for this purpose in the Indian context due to a lack of availability of such documents for a sufficiently large number of India's many hundreds of present and historical parties. Additionally, with regard to the assessment of the level of regionalization, the present approach is, rightly or wrongly, more conservative than those of both van Houten or Brancati

and also Ziegfeld. Van Houten does not strictly employ a criterion related to ideology as necessary to define a party as “regional”, but rather contends that those parties are characterized by not contesting in all subnational units of a country (van Houten 2000: 8). For India, this would mean that all parties except the Indian National Congress are regional parties by those standards. Such a dichotomy which excludes all but one party from one of the categories seems less than helpful since this would in effect amount to a study of the determinants of the Congress vote more than anything else. Compared to Ziegfeld’s trichotomous classification of parties into regional and (semi-)national parties and the consequent results for the extent of the nationalization of the national party system in India over time (Ziegfeld 2007: 26) based on his normalized Herfindahl indicator, the present approach tends to overestimate the nationalization and underestimate the regionalization of the vote in national elections. Across national elections, fewer parties are usually classified by Ziegfeld as “national” compared to this study’s approach based on the criteria of the Election Commission of India. Ziegfeld’s approach yields vote shares for national parties approximately two-thirds of the approach used here, while the vote shares for non-national parties are about 1.5 times higher for Ziegfeld. Nevertheless, as figure 2.4 (below) shows, there is a high correlation between the vote shares classified as belonging to national parties according to the two approaches (r-square=0.98).

Figure 2.4: National Parties in India (1977-99) according to Ziegfeld (2007) and Pehl



While the criteria used by the Election Commission of India naturally have no roots in any empirical considerations, and may therefore seem somewhat arbitrarily chosen, such tradeoffs in terms of choosing cut-off points to determine which parties are sufficiently nationalized in their support bases to warrant labeling them “national parties” is by no means unique to the approach chosen here. Other studies, such as that of Ziegfeld (see the discussion above) also have to make such choices to come to a classification. The cut-off points are to some extent always arbitrary since the goal is to classify the cases, which are located on a continuum of degrees of nationalization into two or three mutually exclusive categories. Finding logical or convincing generally accepted standards is therefore always challenging. The approach of employing the Election Commission’s distinction on the other hand has the added advantage of connecting very closely with the established literature on regional parties and the regionalization of party politics generally in India, which also draws on the same distinction. Lastly, political actors, such as political parties or leaders actually see the classification of parties into national, regional and unrecognized parties as supremely important since it allows parties (depending on the respective classification) to monopolize election symbols on ballots within States or even nationally. In a country with forty percent illiterate people, this issue carries major importance for parties since these symbols are part of their “brand recognition” strategy to allow voters to find their preferred candidates on the ballot paper. Using this classification scheme thus provides the additional benefit of actually linking a social scientific term to the ground-level reality of the institutional framework of party competition within which the actual organization we intend to study work.⁵ Overall, therefore, the use of the ECI’s classification seems a sensible strategy to employ since the alternatives, as shown above, are much more labor intensive while not yielding vastly different results and since the official classification is actually meaningful not only to observers, but rather to the actors on the ground as well.

⁵ See Butler/Lahiri/Roy (1995) for an overview of cases and debates surrounding the issue of party labels and how much importance Indian parties attach to them and therefore to the official classification scheme.

2.3.6 Institutionalization

Since Huntington (1968) provided the first more comprehensive approach to defining and stating the importance of institutionalization as a dimension of party systems, a number of definitions have been provided. Most of the more recent studies (Mainwaring/Scully 1995; Kuenzi/Lambright 2001, 2005; Basedau/Stroh 2008; Croissant 2008) have taken a multi-dimensional approach to conceptualizing party and party system institutionalization. A variety of criteria have been proposed over time to distinguish institutionalized from non-institutionalized parties and party systems. Rose and Mackie (1988: 535), emphasizing mainly organizational continuity as evidenced from electoral data, propose calling those parties institutionalized which operate through cross-local organizational structures, run candidates in national elections and exhibit a sufficient level of continuity in doing this over successive electoral cycles. In an earlier formulation, Huntington (1968: 420-423) had focused on the adaptability of party organizations and systems as a key criterion of institutionalization of parties in rapidly changing societies. He contended that the older and stronger parties were, the more adaptable they and the party system would have to have been, and the higher the level of institutionalization would have to be. To assess this adaptability he classified party systems according to whether the average age of parties exceeded 30 years or not. Similarly, Mogens Pedersen (1982: 14) also emphasizes the importance of the age and lifespan of parties in the analysis of party system change. Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 5-14), in their now classic reformulation of earlier scholarship, define the term through recourse to five criteria: stability of party competition, stable roots of parties in society, stability in the ideological positioning of parties vis-à-vis each other, the publicly held belief that parties are legitimate and the development of sufficient organizational capacity by parties. Stability of competition is measured by Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 6) through analyzing volatility rates of parties and party systems, i.e. the rates of change in seat or vote shares of parties from one election to the next. Their study also proposes to track organizational capacity with reference to the

membership and available resources of parties. They also propose to take the vote share won by political parties which were founded before a certain date (in their case 1950) as indicative of the extent to which parties had formed stable roots in society by winning the more or less durable support of certain sections within society. A number of ways in which the age of parties can be used to measure the degree of institutionalization have been discussed. Table 2.1 (below) provides an overview of the different ways in which party age has been used to define the level of institutionalization of party systems.

Table 2.1: Party Age and Party System Institutionalization – A Conceptual Overview

<i>Parties Considered</i>	<i>Avg. Absolute Age</i>	<i>Avg. Age Relative to Independence</i>	<i>Age Relative to First Election</i>	<i>Percentage of Votes Won</i>
All (no cut-off)	Huntington 1968; Maguire 1983	Basedau/Stroh 2008	Basedau/Stroh 2008	
Top Vote Getters (2-5)	Kuenzi/Lambright 2001, 2005	n.a.	n.a.	
Parties Exceeding Certain Vote Shares	Mainwaring/Scully 1995; Croissant 2008; Kuenzi/Lambright 2001	n.a.	Schneider 2009	
Parties Founded by a Specific Year				Mainwaring/Scully 1995; Kuenzi/Lambright 2001, 2005

For the purpose of this inquiry, we will employ three dimensions to characterize levels of institutionalization. They will be introduced in greater detail in chapter four. Previous studies have in part used similar labels for different dimensions. Chapter four will discuss the divergence of this approach from previous approaches. The first dimension to our understanding of institutionalization is the “rootedness” of political parties, i.e. the development of stable roots of parties. Unlike previous studies we will understand this to mean the extent to which parties have acquired stable levels of support from particular support groups over time. This broad concept encompasses also issue areas which other studies have

subsumed under the label “stability of party competition”, such as electoral volatility, undoubtedly the result of changes in political support between two elections. The second dimension will be labeled “organizational continuity”. It encompasses characteristics of the party system which include the continued availability of particular parties or party-backed candidates over time as well as a new indicator measuring the weighted relative age of different party systems over time. We will specifically follow Schneider (2009), building in part on Huber, Kernell and Leoni (2005) and employ a modified age indicator to measure relative levels of institutionalization along this dimension over time. A third dimension we will investigate is that of “partyness” or *partisan penetration* of elections. It speaks to the importance of voters in SMDP electoral systems putting their faith in party-backed rather than in independent candidates and has two empirical prongs to it: Trust in parties as institutions and actual voting for party-less as opposed to party-affiliated candidates. This last dimension will in part be operationalized in the form of an indicator (vote share of independents) not as frequently used due to its comparative irrelevance in other SMDP electoral systems, which however is particularly useful for the comparative analysis of party systems in India. The relative infrequency of its use indicates the declining role of independent candidates versus party-backed candidates in simple plurality elections around the world. In most electoral systems independents over time register declining voter support. To the extent that the backing of successful candidates by political parties is empirically frequent and party-backed candidates outperform non-partisan candidates in elections, we will take this to indicate that party backing is increasingly necessary for electoral success and hence will take the penetration of elections by parties as indicative of an institutionalization of parties and the party system.

2.4 Regionalization in Indian Party and Electoral Politics: Relevance and Literature

The debate over the growing importance of regional parties in politics is intimately connected to the longstanding discourse on the nature of Indian national identity. As the more recent controversies surrounding issues such as the depiction of Indian history⁶ and the role of minorities in school textbooks as well as the conversion of tribals and other disadvantaged social groups to Christianity (Frykenberg 2003: 17-18) illustrate, identity issues are part and parcel of political discourse and mobilization by certain parties in India today. Some would also argue that regional identity is constitutive of Indian national identity as a whole (Mitra/Singh 1999; Linz/Stepan/Yadav 2007: 103). We will take up this argument again in chapter five when analyzing regional identity and party support. Astute observers such as Rajni Kothari (1970: 9-10) saw India's nation-building process as driven by two simultaneous trends: administrative-political re-structuring and the inter-penetration and growth of multiple power centers as well as new elites through a re-configuration of social and economic structures. The history of India's federalization and multi-cultural identity construction, of course, predates its independence from the British Empire (Rothermund 1995: 391-393). As much as India is home to multiple nationalities, it is home of multiple officially sanctioned types of nationalism (Nanda 2006: 59-60), a political-secular type at the national level and a more openly cultural type at the regional level. Interestingly, as a number of examples like that of the fruitless competition of the Akali Dal against a then-dominant Congress Party in the Punjab in the 1950s and 1960s indicate, one should be careful to note that the increased importance which regional variants of socio-political identities have played through the decades does not automatically translate into support by adherents of regional identities for regional or regionalist parties (see also Fickett 1971: 196-197). In the early decades, only the most militant Sikhs, but certainly not all Sikh voters placing importance on Sikh identity supported the Dal in Punjab elections (Jalal 1995: 170-171). This only changed after a change

⁶ See Jaffrelot (1998: 287) for an overview of the roots of this controversy.

in leadership in both the Akali Dal and Congress Party in the Punjab in the 1960s. Nevertheless, for better or worse, examples such as that of the Akali Dal and its militant regionalist supporters have shaped much of our thinking about the nexus between regional identity and regional party support. While we can not investigate this point further here, but chapter five will return to the issue of this seemingly natural nexus.

The scholarship on the growing importance of regional parties and regionalization of politics as a general trend in India has increased substantially since the mid-1990s. Nevertheless, regional party ascendance is not new, but rather part of an ongoing process of party system change in India since 1967 (Fickett 1971: 193). In the early phase of post-Independence politics India's party landscape was dominated by the Indian National Congress. This phase was characterized by the Congress Party's winning the largest vote shares and seat shares in both the national and State level elections. During this period, voters had no strong incentives to vote for opposition parties since in most districts the opposition candidates received significantly lower vote shares than most Congress candidates, making it unlikely that they would ever be elected. This division ensured that the Congress remained the winning party across the States throughout India, a characteristic of Indian politics which Riker (1982) attributed to the INC being a Condorcet winner, i.e. the second-most preferred party of many strategic voters as well as the first preference of many sincere voters. Talented politicians also had no incentives to run as opposition candidates since the status of the INC as the party of the freedom struggle and its effective political machines throughout the regions made running against Congress candidates a risky strategy. In consequence, opposition politicians frequently joined the Congress party between elections or even during election campaigns to avail themselves of this Congress advantage (Spiess/Pehl 2004). The fluidity of the party system increased significantly after the 1967 national and State elections. In the Lok Sabha elections of that year the Congress Party suffered losses in both seat and vote shares. In the State assembly elections of the same year, it lost power in seven of the eight States holding

elections that year. Most of the parties winning the State elections in 1967 were splinter factions of the Congress, however. These parties did not have a long history or distinctive support base or ideology.

In earlier decades the dominance of the Congress Party, which was challenged in 1967 for the first time, was seen in two different ways by comparative political scientists, almost as an oddity in the theorizing about parties and party systems (Pempel 1990) and about democracy and democratization (Vanhanen 1981). On the other hand, scholars specializing in the study of Indian politics came to accept the “Congress system” (Kothari 1964) as the prism with which and natural point of departure from which to analyze party politics in India. Changes in the configuration of party systems and electoral dynamics were consequently seen as aberrations from the norm of one-party dominance instead of natural trends in pluralist politics. This latter view also led to the emphasis on the decline of Congress dominance rather than on natural regional differentiation in party system development in an extremely heterogeneous social context. This theme of decline became the keyword for many subsequent studies on party system change in India at the national or State levels (Candland 1997; Chhibber 2005; Herring 1988; Manor 1978).

In recent years, however, there have also been numerous studies placing the development of party system regionalization and nationalization in a more firmly comparative context. Thus, the change and stability of the party system structure, in particular at the national level, have recently been discussed from the perspective of the comparative study of party politics. This has been done using insights from cleavage theory (Chhibber/Petrocik 1989: 207-208; Yadav/Palshikar 2006; Sridharan/Varshney 2001: 234-235). Patronage and clientelist linkages have also been drawn on to explain party-voter connections over time (Chandra 2004; Mitra 1991; Krishna 2002: 152-162). Lastly, as was mentioned before, candidates’ and parties’ institutional incentives to aggregate (or not) beyond certain territorial levels of electoral competition in order to win power and office through generating majorities in legislatures has

also been emphasized in previous research (Chhibber/Kollman 1998, 2004; Sridharan 2003). Three themes have pervaded these studies in terms of important changes to the configuration of Indian party systems: the already mentioned decline of the INC, the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party as an India-wide Hindu-nationalist alternative to the Congress Party, and the growth in number and strength of regional parties as alternatives to the national INC, BJP and the Left Front. The questions most often posed in this context are: Why no longer Congress and why the fragmentation into so many parties? One explanatory approach to answering this problem is advanced by Biplab Dasgupta (2002: 43) who essentially sees the genesis of so many regional parties as a direct reaction of voters to the over-centralization of government and of the Congress Party. This view is echoed somewhat differently by Christopher Candland (1997) who contends that through this negative trend within the Congress Party the traditional leadership structures and linkages with voters became weakened in the long-run. Chhibber and Kollman (2004) on the other hand see the springing up of so many regional parties as a strategic response to a new incentive structure due to decentralized governance after 1989 and essentially as a failure to aggregate beyond the district level. The activation of previously relatively dormant cleavages in North India and the consequent ethnification of party politics since the 1980s through the mobilization of lower caste voters have also been used frequently to account for the proliferation of small and regionally concentrated parties.⁷ Other possible explanations, which however have been comparatively less frequently used to explain regional party proliferation, can be derived from the literature on secessionism and uneven development. Given that some regions of India are developmentally well below the all-India average, one way in which this uneven socio-economic development might play out is through a resentment in poorer regions leading to the proliferation of parties purporting to work for the mitigation of this inequality. Alternatively, the literature on secessionism in multi-cultural societies suggests that the more advanced regions might seek to advance their

⁷ See Hasan 2002, Subramanian 2002, Chandra 2004, Gowda/Sridharan 2007, Brass 1997 (162-163) for accounts of the development of this new form of mobilization.

interests more forcefully feeling that poorer regions of the country are a drag on their development (Hale 2000). This, in turn might lead voters in those wealthier parts to vote for exclusionist and regionalist parties claiming to better be able to protect those regions' interests than national umbrella parties would. A final view is provided by those studies of party system change emphasizing modernization aspects such as urbanization, changes in technology and ways of communicating and disseminating information (for the role of media see Mair 1997: 106). Chapter five will take up some of the approaches once more when developing hypotheses regarding the determinants of regionalization of party support at the aggregate and individual level.

2.5 Institutionalization in Indian Party and Electoral Politics: Relevance and Literature

Studies about the institutionalization of the Indian party system and individual parties have focused on a number of dimensions. We already referred to the literature on the “Congress system” of one-party dominance. Apart from comprehensive assessments of the reasons for Congress dominance, studies have been conducted analyzing levels of volatility between national and State-level elections. Some of these studies have shown that aggregate volatility has declined remarkably over time (Betz 2005). This decline to single-digit levels of volatility in national elections is low even by the standards of European party systems which have in many cases even longer histories than that of India. The decline in aggregate volatility, at first glance, seems to suggest that there is growing stability in the support for political parties and in their competition with each other. However, these results are misleading to some extent, because the decline is somewhat an artificial construct because splinter parties were re-constituted at each election to calculate their vote shares as if they had not split or merged between elections (Betz 2008: 623). Other studies have analyzed seat-based volatility to investigate the extent of seat retention in Indian legislatures. This was particularly interesting since throughout the 1990s only around 50 percent of seats in the Lok Sabha were won by the

same party in two successive elections (Kumar 2004: 368). Throughout the 1990s, the INC's seat retention rate went down from 74 percent to 36 percent; the BJP's remained relatively solid between 51 and 63 percent, while the Left Front's also remained comparatively steady between 44 and 37 percent. More recently, the connection between electoral volatility and the fiscal health of States has been investigated as well (Chhibber/Nooruddin 2008). The results of this research suggest that States with more limited fiscal resources experience greater electoral volatility over time. The explanation advanced by Chhibber and Nooruddin is that fiscal resources allow State governments to absorb economic shocks and thus help incumbent parties stabilize their support over time unlike resource-strapped incumbents.

Another strand of scholarship, taking the idea of potentially contradictory pulls between aggregate volatility and individual-level volatility seriously (cf. Mair 1983) has focused on volatility in Indian electoral behavior at the level of the individual voter. Schneider (2009: 34) demonstrates the variation across States of the average level of partisanship from as low as 31.7 percent in Chhattisgarh in 2004 to 67.3 percent in Tripura. The stability in voting from one election to the next likewise varies enormously across States, from as low as 11 percent in Mizoram to 68.2 percent in Tripura, both interestingly neighboring States in India's northeast. With approximately 48 percent partisan attachment India is comparable to the median of the sample of West European and other OECD countries contained in Huber et al.'s comparative study of partisanship. Another study based on public opinion data by Oliver Heath (2005) showed relatively high individual-level levels of volatility in Haryana, Punjab and Tamil Nadu (50+ %), and relatively lower levels in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan (< 20%). Based on a controversial method of ecological inference from aggregate data based on a "most possible estimator", which is similar to "maximum likelihood estimation", Vanderbok (1990) estimates that, for the previous decades' national elections, only about 50 percent of voters across all States vote for the same party in two successive elections. Heath (2005: 190, 196) also shows that volatility in national elections declines with sharper polarization across States,

that volatility increases with a more fragmented party system context in which voters live and that volatility is significantly influenced, unsurprisingly, by party disappearance between two elections. We will deal with this and the other factors again in greater detail in chapter four. Overall, the tenor regarding the institutionalization of Indian politics and electoral behavior is fairly unanimous in emphasizing the discontinuities in party and candidate fortunes and vote choice. The other dimension of interest to us, the ratio of independent versus party-backed candidates in elections, has received less attention in comparison. We will outline the importance of these factors in greater detail in chapter four. One important school of thought on that importance and that of India's institutional setup for the relative levels of nationalization stresses the changing incentive structure for party aggregation due to increasing decentralization measures. This is the view taken by Chhibber and Kollman (2004).

2.6 Theoretical Framework of the Study

As mentioned before, one of the most important contributions to the debate has come from Pradeep Chhibber and his collaborators (Chhibber/Kollman 2004; Chhibber/Murali 2005).

The key questions which this line of work has asked are:


- Why does a country's (*national*) party system consist of national and/or regional parties?
- Which role does federal power-sharing play in structuring a national party system?

The rationale underlying it is the goal of exploring a cross-national puzzle (the structure of national party systems) by way of a small-n comparative and diachronic study, thus holding many institutional and social variables constant within each case, but providing variation across the macro-contexts (countries). Within each case however, quantitative data are gathered and analyzed statistically to test the overarching arguments. The argument they develop connects them to similar work done on the nationalization of electorates (see for

example Caramani 2004). According to Chhibber et al. (2004) the development of parties under a common label is a process central to the account of the formation of national electorates in North America and Europe. Following Cox (1997), and deviating from a cleavage-based theory of the emergence and stabilization of parties, the underlying theory in Chhibber's and Kollman's analysis explains inter-district coordination and the development of party labels by reference to the rules that structure the selection of executives and distribution of decision-making power. The nationalization (and by implication regionalization) of party and electoral politics, preliminarily defined as an increase in the support of national or regional parties coupled with the choice of regional party labels instead of national party labels by voters and elites, is conceptualized by Chhibber and Kollman (2004) and others as incentivized or disincentivized depending on the structure of the respective political system's setup. One of their most important assumptions is that party aggregation of district-level candidates across different regions into national parties is incentivized by a system of centralized spending and decision-making power (Chhibber/Kollman 2004: 72-73). They postulate that "[p]arty aggregation up to the national level occurs with the mutual reinforcement of these two functions. [...] national parties require these necessary conditions: national policy-making power by the parliament, and voters' having a stake in which policies are adopted. Party loyalties by both candidates and voters reinforce each other and line up neatly" (Chhibber/Kollman 2004: 73). Put simply, they posit that the voter's utility from voting for a national party (U_N) exceeds the utility from voting for a regional party (U_R) if the political power is concentrated in the national level government ($U_N > U_R$). Thus, they explain nationalization and de-nationalization as strategic responses to incentives provided by the location of authority at different levels of government. By comparison, this actor and strategy focus yields a more narrow argument than that in Caramani's study of nationalization of party systems in Western Europe (2004).

Instead of incorporating the role and changing nature of cleavages into their analysis, Chhibber and Kollman attempt to control for them. They focus on party system change over time within their cases. They are thus able to isolate the effects of changes in centralization while variation in the electoral system and social cleavages appears to be minimal. Using long-term district-level data on national elections from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and India they construct the fairly convincing argument that the ebb and flow of governmental authority in periods of centralization and “provincialization” explains temporal variations in party aggregation. When the national governments have more authority – including taxing and spending power, larger sizes of governments, wider constitutional competences and control over economic planning and the development of the economy – candidates will have an incentive to coordinate to influence policies by grouping under a common party label, and voters are more likely to support candidates with a national party label. On the other hand, “decentralization or provincialization creates the space for local or regional parties to form and survive” (2004: 172). Figure 2.5 maps the design of Chhibber and Kollman (2004) in the wider context of the study of multi-level party and electoral politics.

Figure 2.5: Theoretical Framework of Candidate-Party System Linkage:



Despite its solid and elegant construction, a number of issues remain outside the purview of Chhibber and Kollman's study. Their study addresses questions related to the incentive structure influencing the choice of regional versus national party labels in federal democratic polities (the logic of aggregation), the relative importance of different levels of politics for elites to compete at (the logic of contestation), as well as to the performance of regional and national parties in national-level elections (the logic of structuration). The logic of aggregation and contestation are particularly important for their theoretical framework explaining party formation and strategies. However, they restrict themselves to analyzing cross-national differences at the national level of electoral politics and party systems. This leaves several questions open for further investigation. What remains understudied in their framework, for example, is the regional variation of regional party participation, success and

maintenance at the subnational level of elections. Also, the extent to which there are regional differences in each of their observed national elections is measured across elections due to the composite nature of their indicator, but due to their specific research interests, the reasons for these differences remain relatively underdeveloped. This study seeks to rectify this to some extent by examining both the levels of elections as well as opinion about parties and identity simultaneously. Why, however, should we address the sub-national level of elections and party systems given the relatively convincing argument Chhibber and Kollman make based on the cross-national analysis? The following section addresses this important issue in more detail.

2.7 An Alternative Approach to Understanding Party Choice in Federal Systems

An important assumption of Chhibber and Kollman's (2004) study is that increased decentralization of power over decisions and spending provides incentives for both voters and elites to focus on subnational units as important arenas of political competition. In turn, this is supposed to further the use of regional rather than national party labels and lowers the incentives for the formation of cross-regional parties competing in multiple subunits and in national level elections. According to this view, the respective regionalization or nationalization of party systems (as observed in national elections) presents itself merely as an issue of failed party aggregation. This invites the question of whether this assumption holds equally across various regions within multicultural federal democratic countries or whether important boundary conditions impinge on this logic and determine the extent to which different regions' electorates respond in the expected manner to the incentives provided. This question also arises from the fact that Chhibber and Kollman assume that changes in the economy and its governance accompany and reinforce this trend in the political incentive structure. It would appear that considering the disparity in wealth across different regions

within a federal democratic country would be crucial to our understanding of such modifying boundary conditions. A simple stylization can illustrate this problématique.

Let $S_{DE} = \{a, b, c, d\}$ denote a set of four possible configurations of the allocation of power (decentralization) and fiscal equalization between a central government and regional governments. Political and administrative decentralization are taken to mean the allocation of substantial types and amounts of decision-making power to governments below the national level. Fiscal and economic equalization are understood to mean the deliberate attempt of governments to devise policies aiming at lessening gaps in economic development and financial resource wealth between various regions of a country, e.g. through economic planning and redistribution of revenues from richer to poorer subunits. Such equalization would therefore imply greater interference of the central government in regional affairs. For sake of simplicity, let us assume that two stylized scenarios are conceivable: political and administrative decentralization can or can not obtain and fiscal and economic equalization mechanisms can or can not obtain. The configurations are illustrated in a 2x2 format in table 2.6 (below).

Figure 2.6: Possible Configurations of Decentralization and Equalization

		Political and Administrative Decentralization	
		Yes	No
Fiscal and Economic Equalization	Yes	a	d
	No	b	c

It seems fairly reasonable assumption to make that voters in a genuinely democratic system generally would prefer political decentralization to be in place, since this would presumably enable stronger transparency and responsiveness of politicians who would be accountable to smaller constituencies compared to decision-makers far removed from local realities in a

national capital.⁸ It also stands to reason that political elites would prefer such a decentralized setup since this would downsize their constituencies which they have to groom for their own re-election and would minimize the need for them to deal with issues related to parts of the country which they do not know or care about. At this point, however, it seems reasonable to assume that views of voters as well as elites in rich and poor regions would diverge.

2.7.1 Rich Regions

It seems plausible that voters in a rich region of a country would prefer greater regional fiscal and economic policy autonomy since this would likely enable regional elites to keep wealth generated in the richer parts of the country within those regions instead of re-allocating that wealth to poorer parts of the country. Hence, they would in principle be more averse to fiscal and economic equalization lessening their relative advantages over poorer regions. Richer regions, unlike poor regions, stand to lose through a leveling of economic wealth differences on the one hand and are more likely to be able to meet the challenges of public goods provision on their own without the help of outside financial sources such as transfers from other States. We assume for voter i in rich regions that the following preference relations (P_i) regarding the outcomes hold:

1. $b P_i a$
2. $b P_i c$
3. $b P_i d$
4. $a P_i c$
5. $a P_i d$
6. $c P_i d$

The derived utilities from the different scenarios for voter i would be as follows: $u(a)=2$, $u(b)=3$, $u(c)=1$, $u(d)=0$. The consequence therefore is that voters in a rich region of a federal democratic country would prefer a combination of political and administrative decentralization with fiscal and economic autonomy over all other possible configurations, and would prefer a system with fiscal and economic equalization coupled with no political decentralization the least, i.e. to none of the other configurations. Expressed in terms of their

⁸ This theoretical assumption has some empirical support in the findings regarding trust in and allocation of responsibility to subnational level governments in India as well (cf. Chhibber/Nooruddin 2004; Mitra/Singh 1999).

respective utility (u) for a voter in a federal democratic political system, who is living in a rich region within a country the relations between different outcomes would be:

$$u(b) > u(a) > u(c) > u(d).$$

2.7.2 Poor Regions

Turning to voters in poor parts of a country, the utility calculus would conceivably look somewhat different. For a voter in such a region, especially in a region with a low overall level of socio-economic development and significant disparities between that region and other regions, the improvement of her material well-being would likely be the gravest concern regarding political issues. It is reasonable to assume that voter j in a poor region of the same country would also prefer decentralization to centralization for the above stated reasons. However, the same voter would prefer some sort of equalization mechanism to be in place which could mitigate the adverse effects she would experience on account of residing in a poor part of the country. Since wealth disparities would likely be the most important concern for this voter, we assume that given the choice between either political decentralization or fiscal and economic equalization, voter j would prefer the latter. We can thus assume the preference relations over the various possible outcome configurations to look as follows:

$$1. a P_j d \quad 2. a P_j b \quad 3. a P_j c \quad 4. d P_j b \quad 5. d P_j c \quad 6. b P_j c .$$

Therefore, $u(a)=3$, $u(b)=1$, $u(c)=0$ and $u(d)=2$. This preference relation is stylized in order to simplify the comparison between the alternative scenarios. It is not intended to suggest that since $u(c)=0$, voter j would derive no benefits from living in a system such as that of scenario c), or that her benefits from scenario b) would be worth exactly double those of scenario d). It is nevertheless intended to illustrate in a simplified fashion the overall preference relations and the ranking of utilities derived from these scenarios. In consequence, it is assumed that voter j would prefer a decentralized system with an equalization mechanism to any other

possible configuration and would prefer a system with no decentralization and no equalization to none. Expressed in terms of individual utility, the relations would look as follows:

$$u(a) > u(d) > u(b) > u(c).$$

2.7.3 Empirical Implications

There are a number of empirical implications based on our theoretical model of political choice in federal polities. For the Indian case, of course, not all of the scenarios contained in S_{DE} are historically realized. Instead, India's development is best characterized by a change from a system with political centralization and fiscal and economic equalization (scenario d) until the late 1980s to one with increased decentralization and much less fiscal and economic planning and equalization (scenario b) today. Thus for voters in rich States, the situation in terms of their preferences over decentralization and equalization has improved over time, while for a voter in a poor State, the overall situation has worsened. In pre-1990 India, voters and elites in rich States found themselves in the least preferred scenario and would conceivably be relatively unsatisfied with the institutional set-up and the consequences it produces. As such, voters as well as elites might conceivably be the most likely to look for alternative political options relative to the dominant Congress party and might turn to regional parties to advance their goals. In the post-1990 scenario, the configuration of decentralization combined with decreased equalization would actually be akin to the most preferred option for voters and elites in rich States, affording them greater political control over regional matters while decreasing the transfers to other poorer States and allowing for greater autonomy over regional economic planning and the fallout of increased growth. Voters and elites in poor States, on the other hand, find themselves in their second-most preferred situation with regard to decentralization and fiscal and economic equalization in the pre-1990 political system in India where the Finance and Planning Commissions ensured some measure of comparable development and when economic growth was sluggish across most of the States still. This

would suggest that the best strategy for these voters and elites to influence national politics where most of the important decisions were made at that time would be through national parties which wield influence at the Union level and can use their electoral leverage to influence redistribution in the interest of poor regions. For voters in poor regions the post-1990 configuration of Indian politics represents the second-least preferred scenario and would conceivably leave them less satisfied compared to before. In this situation, regional parties could conceivably seem to be an attractive option for dissatisfied voters, who are no longer convinced by the INC's claim to represent their best interests and for voters who feel their stake in national politics is decreasing with decreasing federal and cross-States transfers alleviating their local and regional problems.

At the same time, the fact that regional parties from the 1990s onwards play a much greater role in Union level politics as well suggests that voters also might vote for them in greater number irrespective of their regional economic and political contexts since the disincentives of voting for regional parties which wield no influence nationally are thus lessened. Overall, a number of expectations arise from this theoretical view of party choice in India's multi-level setting:

1. We expect a greater level of support for non-national parties and candidates after 1990 due to the already existing support for those in rich regions and newly arising support in poor regions,
2. We expect to see an greater presence of non-national parties and candidates in rich regions compared to poor ones prior to 1990,
3. We also expect to see a greater presence of non-national parties and candidates in poor States after 1990 compared to before 1990.

Chapter 5 will employ these expectations and other related ones as assumptions in testing hypotheses regarding the regionalization of party systems.

2.8 Subnational Comparison, Case Selection and Time Frame of the Study

As a final point to this preliminary conceptual outline of the study, the question why the subnational comparative method should be used to analyze party system characteristics, such as regionalization and institutionalization, merits a brief discussion, as well as which cases should be included and which time period seems appropriate for the study.

2.8.1 Level of Analysis.

Studies of the institutionalization and regionalization of party systems have so far mainly focused on cross-national comparisons of the levels of nationalization or institutionalization.⁹ Given the natural draw exerted by the successive waves of democratization in a multitude of countries following World War II, in the 1970s and in the late 1980s and early 1990s, especially the interest in the consequences of institutional design on process characteristics such as the consolidation and institutionalization of party politics in comparative perspective is not surprising and has produced many interesting and influential studies relevant to the Indian example as well. Nevertheless, the question of a “nationalization” or a “regionalization” equally naturally implies a possible focus on intra-state comparison of these phenomena. After all, the (dis-)aggregation and the (de-) institutionalization of patterns of voting behavior for parties or candidates and party organization are multi-level and multi-step processes, especially in federalized political systems. This somewhat logically implies the question of regional variations of these processes within countries after dealing with inter-country comparisons of national-level patterns, as many previous studies have done. A brief comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of the two types of comparative inquiry can help to establish some caveats relevant to this study.

A distinct advantage of the cross-national approach is the greater generalizeability of the findings to other national contexts since the findings are already derived from comparisons

⁹ See the literature review on the subjects in sections 2.3 and 2.4 for relevant examples from the cross-national literature.

across countries. The cross-national approach, when conducted within a large-N design, also allows quantitatively oriented researchers to incorporate more variables and hence allows them to make stronger statements about the relative causal importance of these variables than within-country designs at the regional, rather than the local level, where degrees of freedom issues can quickly occur. Despite these strong points, however, there are also clear disadvantages to the cross-national study of party politics. Often, data (on parties or otherwise) lack comparability across countries due to different methods of data collection and organization being employed by different national agencies or researchers. It is often also difficult to integrate longitudinal aspects into cross-sectional research designs due to the often extremely varied background of cases (countries) with regard to historical developments (Shalev 2002: 5; Tarrow 1996: 389). Conversely, holding certain factors constant to examine other causal variables' importance independently from these is much easier to accomplish in an intra-state comparison. Also, as was mentioned earlier, theories developed at the national level of comparison leave important blind spots and can have logical implications necessitating an analysis of intra-country dynamics (King/Keohane/Verba 1994: 30-31). These implications may or may not be easily testable cross-nationally. In this case, the assertion that decentralization brings new opportunities for States and State-level politicians and leads voters to place greater emphasis on State-level elections, logically begs the question whether this is true across all regional contexts in countries which undergo political and/or economic decentralization and differentiation. Subnational comparison therefore seems a plausible method of investigating the theoretical propositions of prior cross-national research developed at the national level further.

Although cross-national research thus seems to have some limitations, a premature focus only on regional-level dynamics could be equally detrimental. Trading the advantages of cross-national analysis of many countries for an analysis of comparatively few regions within a country quickly leads to problems of combining too many variables with too few cases

(degrees of freedom problem). Similarly, treating regions within countries as separate cases under investigation is also ridden with problems since (particularly in more centralized polities) regions are not truly independent of each other and hence cross-case correlation poses problems in the analysis (Snyder 2001: 95; King/Keohane/Verba 1994: 222). Finally, situating an inquiry at the subnational level between national and local politics further complicates the modeling of causal dynamics since both local and national factors will likely influence regional dynamics. On the other hand, subnational comparisons of party (system) institutionalization and regionalization offer a number of advantages compared to cross-national studies. Firstly, it is a truism that aggregates always obscure lower level relationships to some extent (Snyder 2001: 98), as the contrast between the views of Duverger's Law and Indian party politics based on national-level and constituency-level data shows (Duverger 1954; Chhibber/Murali 2006). Hence, breaking down the assertions regarding national patterns into their regional or even local constituent parts will always seem to be a worthwhile test of their validity. Subnational comparisons can aid us in increasing the visibility of the masked variation obscured by national aggregates. Furthermore, some countries, such as China, India and the United States, are internally so diverse and geographically so large that regional variation masked by national aggregates is likely to be even larger than in the cases of much smaller countries, all of which are usually treated as equally important cases due to the logic of cross-national research design. Another feature of more recent methodological debates, the triangulation or "mixed methods" design, is easier to accomplish and particularly likely to yield solid findings when applied to a single country since especially the qualitative part thrives on in-depth knowledge of a particular political context which is likely to be deeper the smaller the number of cases under investigation.¹⁰ Kohli (1987) has argued and Jenkins (2004: 3-4) has echoed this position, that such countries as India constitute quasi-laboratories in which comparisons across different regions can act almost ideally as

¹⁰ See Lin/Loftis (2005) for an overview of a variety of debates on the uses of mixed methods designs.

experiments played out by real world political actors, thus allowing for rather controlled environments in which such things as institutional, historical and developmental differences are greatly minimized between units of analysis when compared to cross-national comparisons.

While the specific methods used to analyze the pertinent questions regarding the institutionalization and regionalization of politics will be dealt with in the subsequent chapters, overall, subnational comparison seems to offer enough advantages and sufficient ways of dealing with its dangers to make this study a valuable case study contribution to the comparative literature concerning party and electoral politics in developing countries.

2.8.2 Case Selection.

This study will analyze party politics in 25 of India's 35 States and Union Territories, including Delhi. It will thus cover over 90 percent of India's total population. We have chosen to exclude two important cases from our analysis here. The first is the State of Jammu and Kashmir. As is well known, Jammu and Kashmir is part of the ongoing territorial dispute over the status of the territory of the former princely state of Kashmir between India and Pakistan. It is also a State with a special constitutional status in India and has been plagued by electoral corruption and intervention of the central government in State-level affairs since the first elections were held there. As such, for the period between 1977 and 2000 it does not seem advisable to include this case in the analysis since it merits separate treatment. Punjab has also been troubled with civil strife and in particular in the 1980s the neutrality of the elections merits doubt, not least because of the political violence between Akali supporters and the State and central governments which impeded regular democratic processes in the State for protracted periods of time. As such a meaningful comparison between pre-1990 elections and post-1990 elections in Punjab seems useless.

2.8.3 Time Period.

We choose to investigate the time period from 1977 to 2000. According to most analyses so far, 1977 marks an important turning point in Indian electoral and democratic history and thus forms the starting point of a new era in Indian party politics. In 1977 for the first time a party other than the Indian National Congress, namely the umbrella-like Janata Party, was able to win a majority of seats in the Lok Sabha and to form a national government. Also, 1977 marks the end of the authoritarian phase of emergency government under Indira Gandhi who had forced the Emergency in June of 1975. This experience helped to galvanize the opposition parties into a more united front in an attempt to oust the INC from power in 1977. We also choose to end our investigation in 2000 since three of the most important States in India underwent a territorial reorganization with the separation of Jharkhand, Uttaranchal and Chhattisgarh from Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh respectively. This reorganization marks the first important break in the configuration of politics since the 1970s. Contemporaneously with it came changes in the rules for the recognition of political parties (Nikolenyi 2008) and significant changes in the demographic composition of the now smaller States of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh which make a comparison especially of the socio-demographic factors influencing politics in India to the pre-2000 period difficult. As such the cut-off point of 2000 appears acceptable. A third temporal consideration in conducting this study is that of the division of the period from 1977 to 2000 into two separate phases, that from 1977 to 1989 and that from 1990 to 2000. As already alluded to above, India has undergone significant changes since the 1970s which have affected the conduct of politics in manifold and important ways. Three reasons make the division into these two time periods appear sensible. Most importantly, in 1989 a coalition of regional political parties, the National Front under the leadership of V.P. Singh won a sizeable share of votes and seat in the general elections and was able to form a government with the outside support of the BJP. This fundamentally altered the incentive structure for regional party leaders who no longer

had to aim at aggregating smaller parties to larger Congress-like parties in order to be able to have a say in national government. Regional allies such as the AGP from Assam, TDP from Andhra Pradesh and DMK of Tamil Nadu were now able to influence national policy making in a coalition with the Janata Dal, a newly formed umbrella party made up of mainly regionally based formerly independent parties under the new label. Secondly, 1989 is also the year in which for the last time the Prime Minister of India was a member of the Nehru-Gandhi family since Rajiv Gandhi was subsequently assassinated in 1991. Moreover, from 1990-91 onward, the financial situation of State governments worsened progressively throughout the 1990s (see chapter three below). The year 1989 seems an important breaking point also because in 1990, the V.P. Singh government announced its intention to implement the recommendations of the Mandal Commission (1978) regarding the necessity of reservations for disadvantaged social groups. On the one hand this move prompted a renewed era of opportunity for lower caste people to advance their own interests in a society where the odds against their social advancements were generally stacked against them, and on the other hand it allowed a party such as the BJP to use this pro-poor, pro-lower caste policy to shore up increased support among upper caste Hindus infuriated at this policy change. The importance of this nation-wide change in policy and the “silent revolution” (Jaffrelot 2003) which it sparked among the lower castes in North India can hardly be overstated. Lastly, it was in 1989 that the Bharatiya Janata Party made the first really significant gains in seat share at the national level with 86 seats, up from just two in the 1984 general elections. Lastly, splitting our investigative period into two time periods also seems sensible since in 1991, the Congress-led government of Prime Minister Rao initiated a significant restructuring of India’s governmental setup by introducing the Seventy-third Amendment Act (1992). This amendment to the constitution formalized village government and accelerated decentralization of decision-making in certain issue areas. Coupled with increased liberalization of the private and public sectors of the economy and a scaling back of planning since 1991, this is certainly

another major change occurring in the early 1990s. All in all, therefore, dividing our analysis into a pre-1990 and post-1990 phase makes sense.

Chapter three will now outline some of the pertinent institutional and socio-demographic features relevant to Indian politics and society without which any understanding of both would necessarily remain incomplete.

Chapter Three:
The Institutional Framework and Socioeconomic Context of
Multi-level Politics in India

3. The Institutional Framework and Socioeconomic Context of Multi-level Politics in India

In order to be able to understand the functioning of party politics and opinions about government as well as strategies of actors in the pursuit of power, acquiring an overview of the multi-level landscape of Indian politics is needed. This chapter will outline some of the central features of Indian government and politics within which candidates and parties operate and thus contextualize the process features within the salient structural framework of politics.

The institutional roots of India's federal political organization predate its independence by several decades. Both before, as well as during the colonial era, multiple centers of power had been in existence parallel to and competing with each other.¹¹ India's federal constitution has equipped national-level institutions with extraordinarily expansive powers. This design dates back to the reasoning of the drafters of the constitution which deemed a strong central government indispensable in the face of the prevailing political turmoil of the immediate pre- and post-independence period (Brass 1994). The basic structure of the political system is detailed in Appendix A.

3.1 India's Federal Political System

India's system of government is divided between the central level and the federal units (currently 28 States and seven Union Territories, including the National Capital Territory of Delhi).¹² While the States and the National Capital Territory enjoy considerable freedom in political decision-making, Union Territories are administered directly by the central

¹¹ For more detailed accounts of the history of the idea of "shared rule" and federalism in the Indian context, see for example Asher/Talbot (2006: 247-251), Bhattacharya (2005) or Rothermund (1995: 391-393).

¹² The difference between States and Union Territories is the stronger control exercised by the Union government over the, mostly comparatively small, Union Territories. Although some Union Territories have an elected assembly, the executive function is exercised by an appointed Governor and not an elected Chief Minister as would be the case in the *States*. Delhi was conferred a special status by amendment of the Indian Constitution in 1991, being jointly administered by the Union, the three local municipal corporations, and the elected NCT government as the National Capital Territory of Delhi. Jammu and Kashmir enjoys a special status among the States in accordance with Article 370 of the Constitution of India, in that it is guaranteed its own constitution and that Article 356 regarding the imposition of President's Rule does not apply to that State.

government through a Lieutenant-Governor. The Constitution of India provides for a relatively clear *vertical* division of powers between the central legislature (referred to in Indian usage as the Union government) and the State legislatures, both constituted through direct elections, respectively, in the Seventh Schedule (see Table 3.1 below). The Union controls the ‘Union list’ consisting of areas which involve inter-State relations, national security and foreign affairs. Subjects of primary interest to the regions, called the ‘State list’, encompassing law and order, culture and education, are under the jurisdiction of the states. The ‘Concurrent list’ contains subjects of overlapping interest like land reform, or issues related to the cultural or religious minorities where both center and state can make laws with the understanding that in case of conflict the central laws will take precedence. Subjects not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, called the residuary subjects, come under central legislation. Each list also mentions how the two governments can raise income through taxation. In case of a conflict of jurisdiction, the center or the State can move the Supreme Court to have the point of law in question authoritatively interpreted.

Table 3.1: Constitutional Allocation of Important Legislative Competences

Level	Competences	Enabling Provision
Center	Defense, Atomic Energy, Foreign Affairs, Citizenship, Transport Infrastructure, Currency, Postal Service, Banking/Insurance, Electoral Laws, Organization of the Supreme Court, Taxation in various areas, Natural Resources, Union Territory matters, Residual Competences	Art. 246 + Seventh Schedule (List I), Constitution of India
State	Public Order/Police, Public Health, Local Government, Agriculture, Water, Land, State Public Services, Taxes (on agricultural income, on land etc.)	Art. 246 + Seventh Schedule (List II), Constitution of India
Local	Economic Development, Social Justice (subject to State laws allocating powers of local self-government to village councils)	Art. 243 G + respective State legislation
Center + States (Concurrently)	Criminal Law/Criminal Procedure Law, Marriage and Divorce Law, Transfer of Non-agricultural Property, Civil and Commercial Law, Economic/Social/Family Planning	Art. 246 + Seventh Schedule (List III), Constitution of India

Source: Constitution of India and Basu (1985).

A number of formally constituted organizational units execute the responsibilities allocated to them under this constitutional framework, thus sharing power over the affairs of a political territory in two senses, namely having joint or competing powers over the same matters on the one hand, and having separate powers over separate matters on the other. Ideal typically, in a multi-level system of government, such as a federal political system, the sharing of powers of this kind can be conceived of as involving three types of sharing (in the sense of separation, but also fusion): vertical power-sharing, horizontal power-sharing, and transversal power-sharing. The term *vertical power-sharing* describes the allocation of certain issue areas and competences in decision-making to be handled by the central, subnational or the local level of government, denoting the division-aspect of the allocation of powers, rather than the fusion-aspect. Thus, the vertical division of powers is depicted in Table 3.1, allocating specific matters to either one of three levels of government. The term *horizontal power-sharing* describes the sharing of competences at the central and at the subnational levels between the branches of government, denoting the fusion- as well as the separation-aspect of sharing mechanisms, but also the sharing of powers between subunits in a federal political system in its separation and fusion variants. *Transversal power-sharing* refers to, among other things, a structural and processual sharing of powers between levels of government, be it that it involves in addition to the superior-level unit one or more or all lower-level units (such as the States in the Indian case) in its fusion-variant. The non-hierarchical and informal modes of joining levels and units through coordinating mechanisms are part of the phenomenon which has been described in another regional context as “political interlocking” (Scharpf) in cooperative federalism.¹³ These three types of sharing power involve, respectively, both hierarchical, as well as non-hierarchical modes of coordination of action, as represented in Table 3.2 below, and also both formal and informal institutions.

¹³ Scharpf (1976) has thus described the German political system as one of political interlocking (*Politikverflechtung*) between levels of federal government and separate units at the same level by virtue of more or less non-hierarchical and informal coordinating institutions.

Table 3.2: Typology of Power-sharing Arrangements in Multi-level Systems

Type	Mode of Coordination	Levels/Units Involved
Vertical	Non-hierarchical	Center-State levels State-Local levels
Horizontal	Non-hierarchical	Center (branches) States
Transversal	Hierarchical and Non-hierarchical	Center-State levels

Source: Authors' depiction. See also Mitra/Pehl (2010).

At the Union level, a tripartite sharing out of power, referred to here as a *horizontal* allocation of powers, allocates different functions of government to the executive (President and Council of Ministers/Prime Minister), the legislative (Union Parliament, consisting of *Lok Sabha* and *Rajiya Sabha*), and the judicial branches of government (Supreme Court of India), although there is significant overlap in personnel between the legislative and the executive branches, with the requirement being that the Prime Minister and all other Ministers must be Members of either House of Parliament or lose their office after a period of six months (Art. 75, Constitution of India). This division is mirrored to some extent at the State level with the institutions of Chief Ministers and their Cabinets, State legislatures (unicameral in most, bicameral in some States) and the respective High Courts (although High Courts apply Union, as well as State laws, and their organization is highly centralized).

Another set of units, such as the Finance Commission, the Inter-State Council, the Inter-State Tribunals, the National Development Council and a number of informal fora serve as bridging mechanisms between the levels of government and between States, thus enabling *transversal*, as well as *horizontal* power-sharing. The *Inter-State Council*, which was set up for the first time in accordance with Article 263 in 1990, is a body, which aims, though it does not have legislative or administrative powers, at enabling consultation between governments at the State level and at the Union level. It is constituted, according to the Presidential Order of 1990, under which it was set up, by the Prime Minister, Chief Ministers of States and of

those Union Territories which have Legislative Assemblies, Governors of States under President's Rule and eight Union Cabinet ministers.¹⁴ Although its primary function has to date been the debate on reforming Center-State relations, the Inter-State Council also functions as an important policy forum for informal discussions on other political issues affecting the States.


The *Finance Commission* is an organizational unit performing the task of giving recommendations to the President of India regarding the distribution of taxes between the Center and the States and between the States (Article 280, Section 1, Constitution of India). It is appointed regularly by the President of India every five years and consists of five members. Its importance in the process of regulating intergovernmental fiscal relations is enhanced by the fact that the recommendations, although not formally binding, have quasi-binding character, and by the fact that many of the most expensive tasks of government, such as social matters or public order are, directly or indirectly (through local government programs which are financed from State funds), State-level matters. This issue will be taken up once more in a later section. The *Inter-State Tribunals* are *ad hoc* bodies infrequently constituted under the Inter-State Water Disputes Act of 1956 in order to solve disputes over the use of water resources which cross the boundaries between States, such as rivers. In the past, these tribunals had been slow in their decision-making and ineffective in the area of implementation of decisions. With the Amendment Act of 2002, the period within which decisions now have to be reached has been shortened to a combined maximum of six years. Due to the increase in the need for and the depletion of freshwater resources on account of increasingly rapid agricultural and industrial expansion, as well as urbanization, and the more frequent disputes arising from inter-State competition for this resource, these bodies can be expected to acquire an increasing importance and visibility in the future.

¹⁴ Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi, <http://mha.nic.in/AR01CHP7.htm> (accessed on 12/04/2006).

Another institution which served informally as a mechanism for the coordination of political action between the central and subnational levels of government in the past was the *Indian National Congress* during the period of its electoral and administrative dominance.¹⁵ Through its internal processes of decision-making and channels of communication, this system facilitated coordination between the leading politicians at the center and in the regions until the second half of the 1960s, thus joining decision-making elites at the national and State levels and enabling some degree of *transversal power-sharing*. Figure 3.1 below illustrates the areas of issue-overlap in decision-making by the Union and the State governments and the location of the various formal and informal institutions and coordinating mechanisms serving as instruments of policy coordination.

¹⁵ See Kothari (1964) for the description of the ‘Congress system’ and its working until the mid-1960s.

Figure 3.1: Issue-overlap, Power-sharing, and Coordination of Action of Center and States



Source: Mitra/Pehl (2010).

3.2 Evolution of Federalism: The Changing Nature of Center-State Relations

The framers of the Indian constitution, as mentioned above, were keen on federalism as a functional instrument for the creation of an Indian nation and a strong, cohesive state (Brass 2000). The leading politicians of the immediate post-Independence state were besieged by threats to India's security both from outside and inside, and faced the challenge of development by having perceived and chosen centralized economic planning as an optimal method to reach that objective. Thus, both for constitutional and political reasons the institutionalization of a strong federalism in the Indian system appears to have been seriously

compromised from the outset. Nonetheless, the political process was able to adapt to this design and in many, though not all cases, mollify it when necessary to safeguard regional interests.

3.2.1 Historical Phases of Evolving Center-State-Relations

The first phase of federalization of the political process lasted from the time of Indian independence to the mid-1960s. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru took democracy seriously enough to face the enormously expanded Indian electorate (in 1951, in the first general election held, both to the national Parliament and the provincial Assemblies), providing for full and free participation in the election. The Indian National Congress, which had already embraced the federal principle back in the 1920s by organizing itself on the basis of Provincial Congress Committees based on linguistic regions, institutionalized the principle of consultation, accommodation and consensus through a delicate balancing of the factions within the 'Congress System'.¹⁶ It also practiced the co-optation of local and regional leaders into the national power structure,¹⁷ and the system of sending out Congress 'observers' from the center to mediate between warring factions in the provinces, thus simultaneously ensuring the legitimacy of the provincial power structure in running its own affairs, and the role of central mediation.

The second phase of development of Indian federalism began with the fourth general elections (1967), which drastically reduced the overwhelming strength of the Congress party in the national Parliament to a simple majority and saw nearly half of the states moving out of Congress control into the hands of opposition parties or coalitions, caused a radical change in the nature of center-state relations. No longer could an imperious Congress Prime Minister afford to 'dictate' benevolently to a loyal Congress Chief Minister. But, even as the tone became more contentious, the essential principles of accommodation and consultation held

¹⁶ See Kothari (1970).

¹⁷ See Lijphart (1996) for a theoretical exploration of this consociational strategy.

between the crucial 1967-69 period of transition. The Congress-dominated center started cohabiting with opposition parties at the regional level. The balance was lost once the Congress party split in 1969 and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi adopted the strategy of radical populist rhetoric and strong centralized personal leadership. In consequence, the regional accommodation, which had been possible by way of the internal federalization of the Congress party, was subsequently eroded. However, after the authoritarian interlude of 1975-1977, which, in both law and fact reduced India's federal system to a unitary state, the system reverted to the earlier stage of tenuous co-operation between the center and the States.

With the prolonged period of coalition governments at the center, the third phase in the federalization of Indian politics began at the end of the 1980s. Regional parties, such as the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam of Tamil Nadu, or the Rashtriya Janata Dal of Bihar, have asserted their interests more openly over the past one-and-a-half decades of coalition and minority governments. This increased assertion of regional parties also at the national level had forced even the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, which led the ruling coalition in the thirteenth Lok Sabha until 2004, to be solicitous in its, at least symbolic, adherence to the norms in center-state relations established by its predecessors, including hallowed principles of the Indian Union as the three-language formula which exists more on paper than in reality of educational planning, but is treated as sacrosanct by most political parties, in spite of its advocacy of Hindi as India's national language during the long years in the opposition.¹⁸

3.2.2 Fiscal Federalism and Center-State Relations

Another area in which relations between the center and the States have changed is that of the availability and allocation of fiscal resources. The process of resource allocation as it is relevant to the present discussion in this study involves two types of revenue, tax revenue and

¹⁸ See the telling quotation by the then president of the BJP, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, regarding this strategy of moving towards the middle of the political spectrum for the sake of recruiting coalition partners quoted in Arora (1999: 206, Fn 54).

transfers in the form of grants. Based on the levy, administration and accrual of revenue, total tax revenue can be divided into four types:

- Union taxes (levied, collected and retained by the center), such as corporation tax and customs duties,
- Joint taxes (levied and collected by the center, but may be shared with States), such as income tax and proceeds from Union excise duties,
- State taxes (levied and collected by the center, but appropriated by the States) like estate taxes, railway passenger and freight taxes, and consignment taxes,
- State duties (levied by the center but collected and retained by the States), such as State excise duties.¹⁹

In the area of borrowing, the Finance Commissions of India have traditionally been one of the most important institutions. Table 3.3 (below) highlights the dramatic shift which has occurred in terms of fiscal autonomy of Indian States. As column one indicates, during the four-and-a-half decades since the mid-1950s the States' ability to meet current expenditures through current revenue generation declined substantially.

Table 3.3: Key Figures of Center-State Fiscal Relations

<i>Time Period</i>	<i>Percent of States' Current Revenue to Current Expenditure (1)</i>	<i>Percent of States' Current Expenditure to Total Expenditure (2)</i>	<i>Center Revenue Surplus/Deficit to GDP (Ratio) (3)</i>	<i>States' Revenue Surplus/Deficit to GDP (Ratio) (4)</i>
1955-56	68.9	61.7	0.38	-0.41
1960-61	63.9	56.8	0.29	0.15
1965-66	63.5	53.3	1.16	-0.12
1970-71	60.6	53.9	0.36	-0.04
1975-76	70.4	47.6	1.07	1.14
1980-81	60.1	56.0	-0.54	0.63
1985-86	57.7	52.6	-2.00	0.20
1990-91	53.1	51.7	-3.26	-0.90
1995-96	58.6	55.8	-2.50	-0.74
2000-01 (RE)	48.7	57.1	-4.04	-2.38

(RE) refers to revised estimates regarding columns (1) and (2) only.

Source: (1) and (2) are reproduced based on Rao (2004: 9). (3) and (4) are based on Ministry of Finance, Government of India. Indian Public Finance Statistics, 2005-2006 (<http://finmin.nic.in/reports/IPFStat200506.pdf>, accessed 14 November 2008).

¹⁹ This ordering is taken from Rao (1999: 272).


What is also obvious from column two is that from 1990-1991, the last fiscal year before the comprehensive economic reforms which commenced in 1991, the ratio of State expenditures to total government expenditures has increased from 51.7 percent to 57.1 in 2000-2001. Both developments are a direct consequence of the increased decentralization of certain infrastructure-related policy areas to the State level and the greater burdens which this has imposed on the States. Consequently, while the central government's expenditures increased throughout the 1990s as well, they were outpaced by the rising State-level expenditures (Rao 2004: 9-10). As columns three and four illustrate, due to a number of parallel developments the fiscal health of both the central as well as the State governments declined substantially during the 1990s. While both the center's as well as the States' surplus/deficit to GDP ratio were still roughly comparable in the mid-1970s, the center's position worsened considerably since the 1980s. By the 1990s this development had caught up with the States. In 1990-1991, the States' ratio of revenue deficit to was still approximately one third that of the central government's. By 2000-2001 that ratio had worsened for the States and was now more than half that of the central government's. All these trends are all the more remarkable since the GDP at the all-India level (avg. growth rate: 5.58 percent) as well as for most States rose considerably throughout the 1990s after the introduction of market-oriented reforms in 1991. In consequence, States (as well as the central government) have had to increasingly rely on borrowing from the central government as well as private banks throughout the 1990s to finance ambitious modernization projects aimed at improving infrastructure crucial to economic growth and on improvements in social welfare (Rao 1999: 276-277). This has had the net effect of a pronounced vertical fiscal imbalance with increasing the dependency of States on central government transfers. Since States are increasingly under pressure to finance their expenditures through borrowing, this will increase the leverage of the central government over decision-making at the State level. Those States which are more dependent on central government transfers to meet their expenditure requirements will hence have a

heightened interest in having influence over the allocation of central government resources to different States. This links this debate problematically back to the argument already stated earlier as formulated by Chhibber and Kollman, who contend that decentralization will increase the incentives for focusing on regional government. The question which remains is that of the differentiated nature of incentives across the States. Any understanding of India's federal system, its historical origins and its contemporary functioning, however, would remain incomplete without considering the ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity of the socioeconomic context within which it operates and the relevance which that context has for the political process at the national and subnational levels. Each of these complexes will now briefly be examined in turn.

3.3 Linguistic Diversity across Regions

For the 1960s political landscape of India, Rajni Kothari described dynamics which one might subsume under the label "competing diversities". In his now classic study of India's political system (Kothari 1970) he emphasized the pan-Indian role of caste, religious, linguistic and to a lesser extent regional cleavages and their relevance to the political process. What Kothari anticipated as early as the 1970s has come to play out in a major way over the past decades in Indian politics. To accurately describe the political landscape today, a reformulated view also needs to also take into consideration the regional differences of the States' economies, caste relationships, public expenditure capacities and linguistic landscapes as well. As in the case of the other characteristics of demographic diversity, India's linguistic diversity is more akin to continental proportions than to those of a more familiar nation state (Berger 1995: 101). The language most commonly spoken in India, although not much outside the Northern part of the country, is Hindi, India's official language. Map 3.1 (below) illustrates the geographic extent of the area where Hindi (and its Rajasthani and Bihari variants) is the main language spoken.

Map 3.1: Geographic Distribution of Indo-Aryan Languages in South Asia



Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/1c/Indoarische_Sprachen.png.

Table 3.4 (below) shows the relative strength of the most important languages spoken in the Indian population, i.e. languages spoken by more than one percent of the total population. As was mentioned before, Hindi is the most widely spoken language in India, but a number of other languages also have a large number of native speakers. It becomes fairly obvious that no majority of Indian citizens speaks any single language.

Table 3.4: Major Languages in India (Census of India 2001)

<i>Language</i>	<i>No. of Speakers</i>	<i>% of Total Population</i>
Hindi	422,048,642	41.03
Bengali	83,369,769	8.11
Telugu	74,002,856	7.19
Marathi	71,936,894	6.99
Tamil	60,793,814	5.91
Urdu	51,536,111	5.01
Gujarati	46,091,617	4.48
Kannada	37,924,011	3.69
Malayalam	33,066,392	3.21
Oriya	33,017,446	3.21
Punjabi	29,102,477	2.83
Assamese	13,168,484	1.28
Maithili	12,179,122	1.18

As table 3.5 (below) indicates, many Indian States have quite different language profiles. The majority of the States' respective populations often speak languages other than Hindi or English, the country's official languages. This diversity in the main languages spoken in the different States is the result of successive reorganizations of territories along linguistic lines in the 1950s and 1960s.

Table 3.5: States/NCTs and their Main Languages

<i>State</i>	<i>Language(s)</i>
Andhra Pradesh	Telugu, Urdu
Arunachal Pradesh	Monpa
Assam	Assamese, Bengali
Bihar	Hindi
Goa	Konkani, Marathi
Gujarat	Gujarati
Haryana	Hindi
Himachal Pradesh	Hindi, Pahari
Jammu and Kashmir	Kashmiri, Urdu
Karnataka	Kannada
Kerala	Malayalam
Madhya Pradesh	Hindi
Maharashtra	Marathi
Manipur	Manipuri
Meghalaya	Khasi, Garo, English
Mizoram	Mizo, English
Nagaland	Naga, English
Orissa	Oriya
Punjab	Punjabi
Rajasthan	(Rajasthani), Hindi
Sikkim	Bhuta, Nepali, Lepcha
Tamil Nadu	Tamil
Tripura	Bengali, Kakbarak
Uttar Pradesh	Hindi, Urdu
West Bengal	Bengali
Delhi	Hindi

Source: Census of India, 2001.

The relevance of this linguistic diversity is fairly obvious. Language is relevant in the context of identity formation, social mobility of individuals, as a medium of communication and as a tool for political mobilization. It is commonly perceived as a tool for national integration, especially in countries where a majority of people adhere primarily to a cultural conception of nationhood. Language diversity has often been perceived to pose a challenge to national integration (see Mitra 2001), as the examples of Spain, Canada and Belgium can attest to. Similarly, conflicts over linguistic diversity and national identity have historically existed or continue to exist in France, Italy and the United States with its emergent debate over the use of Spanish, as the controversy over Samuel Huntington's provocative 2006 book *Who are We?* shows. Although India faces related controversies as well, the situation with regard to

linguistic diversity is nevertheless quite different (Kothari 1970). In India a multiplicity of languages exist with diverse scripts and the frequent occurrence of diglossia, the coexistence of a purer and a more dialectic version. Linguistic diversity and the problems it poses are an integral part of the discourses on identity. In particular, Hindu nationalist rhetoric like that of the Bharatiya Janata Party used to emphasize the importance of elevating Hindi to the status of a “national” language instead of a mere “official” language to further solidify national unity. In addition to other processes of language differentiation, a move towards the Sanskritization of the Hindi (Berger 1995), i.e. the elimination of loan words from non-Sanskritic languages such as Persian, and the reaction to the introduction of the Census of India and its requirement of self-identification of Indians as native speakers of a variety of languages have led to greater linguistic consciousness among the wider public in India. These developments and the view of a natural preeminence of Hindi among Indian languages in the early decades of the republic only fuelled the “official language problem” further (Brass 1994: 158). In the same vein, regional chauvinist political ideology emphasized regional identity through regional languages and, in the case of Tamil Nadu in particular, non-Brahminical Hinduism. A similar process was at work in Punjab before its partition in 1966 into the Sikh Punjab and Haryana with a Hindu majority. In India language presents a tool for social mobility granting or denying access to government employment in the public sector which requires either knowledge of English or a regional majority language (Brass 1994: 162). The linguistic diversity found across the Indian States often presents itself as an obstacle or complication in the process of mass communication. This is, of course, relevant to government, political parties and media outlets since it potentially limits the reach of their communication. To deal with these complexities, the Indian state has institutionalized a rule called the “Three-language formula” which mandates that in schools students should be taught three languages, the respective regional language, English and a modern language which is either not South Indian or North Indian, depending on the geographic location of the State.

More than sixty years after its independence, English still functions as an important link language in India especially among economic and political elites today. The reorganization process of federal States in the early decades according to language boundaries mentioned earlier created a fortuitous federation, especially since it was a unitary feature of the Indian constitution which made this reorganization possible without the consent of State governments (Ratnapala 1997: 131). Linguistic loyalties will be taken up again later as one of the possible factors driving differential levels of regional party success. The reasoning behind this is the idea that in States where Hindi is not the main language, e.g. in the South of India, the linguistic landscape as it presents itself in the population, but more importantly in the regional media, might structure the opportunities to emphasize the advocacy for increased respect of the central government for the distinct regional culture prevalent in that State as part of an electoral platform. Also, this effect might be even further enhanced in combination with a relatively low level of linguistic fragmentation in that non-Hindi speaking State. Chapter five will address this issue in greater detail in connection with the structuration of the regional media as a sounding board for regionalized political messages.

3.4 Religious Diversity across Regions

India is also extremely diverse in religious terms. This diversity has had a multitude of effects on the link between religion and politics throughout its long history. Table 3.6 (below) breaks down the composition of the Indian population along the most relevant religious lines.

Table 3.6: Religious Communities in India (Census of India 2001)

Religious Composition	Population *	(%)
Hindus	827,578,868	80.5
Muslims	138,188,240	13.4
Christians	24,080,016	2.3
Sikhs	19,215,730	1.9
Buddhists	7,955,207	0.8
Jains	4,225,053	0.4
Other Religions & Persuasions	6,639,626	0.6
Religion not stated	727,588	0.1
Total *	1,028,610,328	100.0

Note : * Excludes figures of Paomata, Mao Maram and Purul sub-districts of Senapati district of Manipur state.

One thing that requires emphasis is the fact that contrary to popular belief Hinduism is not a monolithic religious community or belief system but rather a considerably fragmented and localized group of sects and systems of belief and practice. Nevertheless, as the success of the BJP over the past two decades have shown, targeted political mobilization can and does benefit from an overarching consciousness of what being a Hindu as opposed to a member of any of the religious minorities means and that this Hindu-non-Hindu distinction can be politically linked to other cleavages to win ground-level political support (Jaffrelot 1998). Considerable variation in religious diversity exists across the Indian States as table 3.7 below indicates.

Table 3.7: Religious Diversity across Twenty-five Regions

<i>State</i>	<i>Largest Group (%)</i>	<i>Second Largest Group (%)</i>	<i>N_{REL}</i>
Andhra Pradesh	Hindu (89.01)	Muslim (8.09)	1.24848
Arunachal Pradesh	Hindu (34.60)	Christian (18.72)	4.78093
Assam	Hindu (64.89)	Muslim (30.92)	1.930479
Bihar	Hindu (79.63)	Muslim (15.87)	1.515181
Goa	Hindu (65.78)	Christian (26.68)	1.966091
Gujarat	Hindu (89.09)	Muslim (9.06)	1.246777
Haryana	Hindu (89.23)	Sikh (6.29)	1.512677
Himachal Pradesh	Hindu (95.43)	Muslim (1.97)	1.097213
Karnataka	Hindu (83.86)	Muslim (12.22)	1.391375
Kerala	Hindu (56.16)	Muslim (24.16)	2.423539
Madhya Pradesh	Hindu (92.06)	Muslim (5.24)	1.175984
Maharashtra	Hindu (80.37)	Muslim (10.60)	1.512677
Manipur	Hindu (46.01)	Christian (34.04)	2.931634
Meghalaya	Christian (70.25)	Hindu (13.27)	1.924823
Mizoram	Christian (86.97)	Buddhist (7.93)	1.308727
Nagaland	Christian (89.97)	Hindu (7.70)	1.226059
Orissa	Hindu (94.35)	Muslim (2.43)	1.121941
Pondicherry	Hindu (86.77)	Muslim (6.95)	1.313268
Rajasthan	Hindu (88.75)	Muslim (8.47)	1.25751
Sikkim	Hindu (60.93)	Buddhist (28.11)	2.196639
Tamil Nadu	Hindu (88.11)	Christian (6.07)	1.276985
Tripura	Hindu (85.62)	Muslim (7.95)	1.348676
Uttar Pradesh	Hindu (80.83)	Muslim (18.18)	1.456994
West Bengal	Hindu (72.47)	Muslim (25.24)	1.697748
Delhi	Hindu (83.82)	Muslim (7.16)	1.404166

Source: Census of India, 2001. N_{REL} was calculated on the basis of data in Census of India, 2001 as well. For the calculation of the effective number of religious groups (N_{REL}) see the explanation of ENP in footnote 24.

Some States like Jammu and Kashmir, the Punjab and some States in India's northeast have non-Hindu majority populations. Overall, Hindus represent the largest religious group in India, as seen above. The actual share of the population who is Hindu in the sample of States under investigation here varies from Manipur with 46.01 percent Hindus in 2001 at the lowest end of the spectrum to Himachal Pradesh with 95.43 percent at the highest end. Within our sample, the second largest group overall, Indian Muslims, range in their share from as low as 1.97 percent in Himachal Pradesh to as high as 30.92 percent in Assam. Purely in terms of abstract diversity without giving consideration to which religious groups make up the largest and next largest groups within a population, in our sample the ratio of the second-largest to

the largest group ranges from as low as 0.02 in almost homogenous Himachal Pradesh to as high as 0.74 in Manipur in India's Northeast. Generally, the diversity within our sample of States is greater in the smaller States on the Indian periphery than in the large Hindu-dominated States of the "Hindi-Hindu heartland". In addition to these differences in religious diversity, what is important to note are the differences across States in the traditional linkages between religion and rule. While much of pre-independence India was ruled either by Hindu princes or directly by the British colonial administration, in areas such as Hyderabad (now Andhra Pradesh) Muslim rulers held the political reigns for centuries. These differences complicate generalized statements about the nexus between religion and political cleavages as well as group dynamics across States. The variation in religious diversity levels and the nature of majority-minority relations have traditionally carried some weight in the interpretation of politics in India. This is not least due to the conventional view that the partition of British India into India and Pakistan was rooted in the conflicts between Hindu and Muslim political elites. The violence during the partition process with large numbers of deaths and large numbers of refugees on both sides of the India-Pakistan border accentuate this perception of the religious cleavage which remained important throughout the last decades in India. Nonetheless, considerable variation exists regarding the salience of the Hindu-Muslim or more broadly the Hindu-minority cleavage or antagonism (Varshney 1998: 5-7). Some regions remain overwhelmingly peaceful while others regularly witness ethno-religious conflict, including sometimes violent clashes. While for a long time Muslims were the primary target of anti-minority political mobilization efforts of some parties, Christians have more recently joined Muslims as that target. In one of the traditional centers of sectarian political conflict in India, Jammu and Kashmir, the trifurcation of the State into a Hindu-dominated part, a Muslim-dominated valley and a mixed area is frequently emphasized in the analyses of political dynamics there (Nanda 2006: 77). Yet, despite its large Hindu majority but because of the significance of its religious minorities, India, unlike Pakistan, opted for an

explicitly secular constitutional design which accorded equal status to all religious faiths and prohibited discrimination on the basis of religious affiliation. Despite this formal separation of the political institutions and religion, soon after independence linkages emerged between parties and followers of certain religious groups within the population. The Congress party for example traditionally enjoyed strong support among Muslims and Christians (Mitra/Singh 1999: 134-135). On the other hand the BJP due to its explicitly pro-Hindu platform enjoyed support almost exclusively from Hindus. The various *Dal* parties in the Punjab, for example the Akali Dal, the Shiromani Akali Dal and others, have their voter bases among Sikhs. We will return to the implications of these linkages between the religious affiliation and political opinion, behavior and cleavages in chapter five.

3.5 Economic and Developmental Diversity across Regions

As in the case of language and religion, the Indian States show a remarkable variation in their respective levels of economic development as well. Table 3.8 provides an overview of the different States' economic and developmental diversity at the beginning of the 21st century.

Table 3.8: Economic and Developmental Diversity across India's States (2000-2001)

<i>State</i>	<i>Poverty Rate (%)^a</i>	<i>Literacy Rate (%)^b</i>	<i>NSDP pc^c</i>
Andhra Pradesh	18.1	60.47	16622
Arunachal Pradesh	25.5	54.34	15003
Assam	27.4	63.25	12447
Bihar		47	
Goa	14.2	82.01	38989
Gujarat	19.5	69.14	17227
Haryana	18.0	67.91	24328
Himachal Pradesh	16.7	76.48	21824
Karnataka	28.0	66.64	17405
Kerala	18.8	90.86	19724
Madhya Pradesh			
Maharashtra	32.9	76.88	22151
Manipur	23.3	70.53	12157
Meghalaya	25.6	62.56	15200
Mizoram	17.3	88.8	16635
Nagaland	25.9	66.59	15746
Orissa	47.2	63.08	10211
Pondicherry	27.9	81.24	
Rajasthan	24.0	60.41	12840
Sikkim	27.9	68.81	15305
Tamil Nadu	27.1	73.45	20249
Tripura	26.2	73.19	14933
Uttar Pradesh			
West Bengal	28.7	68.64	16184
Delhi	14.7	81.67	39817
All India Average			16172

Sources: a. Government of India 2006; b. Government of India 2002; c. Government of India 2008. NSDP: Net State Domestic Product.

The economic leaders among the Indian States as measured by the net state domestic product are Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. This list gives one a handle on the strength of the largest economies among the subnational units. If one measures economic strength according to net state domestic product per capita the picture changes quite drastically. In that case, Goa, Delhi, Pondicherry, Haryana and Maharashtra constitute the top-5 States and Union Territories. On the other hand, if one were to measure socio-economic development by way of the literacy rate of the population, the leading entities would be Kerala, Mizoram, Goa, Delhi and Pondicherry. On some indicators which have a natural ceiling such as literacy, the gap between the lowest ranked States (Bihar, Arunachal

Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Uttar Pradesh) and the highest ranked States is slowly narrowing. Nevertheless a large gap between them remains. On other indicators (NSDP, NSDP per capita) the gap between leaders and laggards is actually widening over time. It is also remarkable that the best-performing States as far as development indicators are concerned (literacy, life expectancy) are not necessarily the economically most advanced and conversely that, as the case of Haryana shows, relatively well-to-do States are not always leaders in levels of social development. This suggests a gap between States in terms of their capability to transform economic wealth into improved living conditions for citizens, making this a highly policy relevant observation. It is also useful to remember the differences in the structures of the States' respective economies. In Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh wealth is generated mainly from modern industrial and service sectors of the economy. In States like Bihar and the Punjab on the other hand agriculture is the mainstay of the economy. The political relevance of these differences is readily apparent. In the poorest States (like Orissa, Bihar, Assam and Madhya Pradesh) poverty alleviation will be the most important concern of voters but especially also for policymakers (Dev 2002: 51-52), making economic growth, especially agricultural growth a priority concern for regional governments there. Also important will be, as in other parts of India, basic and advanced education infrastructure and the access to it as well as health infrastructure. In more advanced States like Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, the development of infrastructure supporting modern industries and the service sector, like the expansion of the capacity for power generation, road, railway, airport and sea port infrastructures, as well as expanding the infrastructure for advanced post-secondary education would be priority areas for State governments. With these different socioeconomic profiles also come different constraints on the various States (Dreze/Sen 2002: 168-170) and influence on and by the central government on process and policy dynamics in the respective States. As was shown above and will be taken up again in chapter five below, these differences in socioeconomic development would

have an impact on the incentive structure of voters and political elites across the States as to how big a stake they would have in either exercising control over governmental decisions made at the national or regional level, respectively. In the following chapter we will see some of the different socio-demographic profiles impacting levels of institutionalization of party politics.

Chapter Four:
The Institutionalization of Party Systems

4. The Institutionalization of Party Systems


The purpose of this chapter is to provide a descriptive and analytical overview of the multidimensional phenomenon of party system institutionalization and not so much to account for the determinants of party system institutionalization in India. The overarching goal is rather to show the interlinked character of the different dimensions of institutionalization processes as they unfold in Indian politics. As outlined briefly in chapter two, the institutionalization of party systems is in fact a multidimensional phenomenon. It involves individual and group-level phenomena and attitudinal as well as agency-related characteristics of politics. This chapter will first conceptualize this multi-dimensional and multi-level structure of institutionalization as it relates to party systems and detail the ways in which this study tackles the analysis empirically. It will then analyze the state of party system institutionalization in India at the level of national public opinion as well as at the level of State-specific electoral trends. The State-level analysis will provide an overview and analysis of most of the major States on the one hand and an in-depth look into four chosen cases in particular to illustrate commonalities and differences in these discernible trends. Due to issues regarding the availability of data we will assess the three dimensions only in so far as possible at the different levels of analysis (individual vs. system vs. case studies). In the last section of this chapter, the likely determinants of different levels of party system institutionalization will be analyzed for our four cases.

4.1 Conceptualizing and Hypothesizing Institutionalization

Many previous studies have operationalized “institutionalization” based on a multidimensional conceptual framework (Mainwaring/Scully 1995; Betz 2008; Kuenzi/Lambright 2001, 2005; Lindberg 2007). It is submitted here that at its core, party system institutionalization involves the belief in the legitimacy of parties as primary institutions of politics and as intermediaries between citizens and the state and other feature

related to the preeminence of parties in the electoral process (“partyiness”), “organizational continuity” in order to stabilize the tableau of electoral choices for voters and to guarantee the electoral availability of parties, and lastly the stability of political support (or “rootedness”) as a consequence of trust in parties generally and of the availability of known entities whose electoral cues (programmatic or otherwise) become routinized and known to voters over time. This study thus departs somewhat from previous studies’ terminology (notably Mainwaring/Scully 1995 and works drawing on them) in calling the characteristics concerned with the stability of parties’ existence “organizational continuity” instead of “stable roots” as do Mainwaring and Scully. They see age as a proxy for stable linkage between groups of voters and parties. However, it then seems more sensible to restrict the use of the idea of roots to that and related areas instead of conflating them with the issue of parties’ continued existence, the end of which might have nothing to do with a lack of connect between parties and voter but rather with intra-elite dynamics leading to party failure or with legal restrictions imposed on the party in question making its continued existence impossible. Figure 4.1 (below) illustrates the triangular relationship between trust, organizational continuity and stable support in the form of a tiled triangle with $n=2$.

Figure 4.1: Dimensions of Party System Institutionalization – A Conceptual Map



The interior triangle links partisanship, accountability of parties and the idea of linkage, i.e. the mechanism by which political parties over time create reliable support bases through providing tangible as well as intangible resources to their support groups as well as to the community at large. These three act as transmission belts linking the core dimensions of institutionalization to each other. Through organizational continuity party systems are able to foster trust in parties when they acquire a certain level of predictability and provide accountability allowing parties to acquire the necessary credibility as the “only game in town”. The continued existence of parties as organizations ensures a measure of name and personnel recognition which allows voters to associate merits and demerits with these organizations or the persons representing them. This possibility of allocating blame and merit for performance, either in office or in the opposition, and of enabling a measure of accountability of office holders to parties and through them to the public at large, will foster trust in parties as organizations or not over time, depending on the respective evaluations. Trust in political parties, on the other hand, can facilitate a stabilization of political support both in terms of numerical support levels for individual parties (volatility), but also in terms of

linking political parties to particular demographics (alignment). It can do so by channeling that generalized trust towards parties as institutions of politics into more concrete forms such as partisan attachments, which thrive on trust in a specific party or certain specific parties. When general trust in parties as institutions of political institutions exists, parties have the opportunity to form stable support bases through linkage mechanisms by offering ideological homes, programmatic goals and concrete patronage opportunities when they have access to office or financial resources. A considerable debate exists around the issue of whether established party systems can persist amid substantial re- or dealignment. Whereas Lipset and Rokkan (Lipset/Rokkan 1967) had still held that party systems in 1960s Europe were essentially frozen along certain cleavages, Dalton and Flanagan and many others (Flanagan/Dalton 1984; Pedersen 1979) had by the 1970s come to the conclusion that this state of affairs was rapidly changing and that support structures were (becoming) rather fluid and not frozen. The question is, of course, whether one needs to pre-suppose at all the necessity of stable support groups being aligned with certain parties to call a party system institutionalized. As far as parties on their own are concerned it is probably fair to say that at least initially such long-term stable alignment is not necessary and can be substituted by ad hoc coalitions of support groups. However, in the long run if a party wishes to persist and expand such stable links between the party and certain groups are helpful and necessary. Spatial models of party competition, such as Downs' median voter theorem (Downs 1957), suggest, of course, that the more a party expands the more its formerly distinctive profile in contrast to large established parties will be "banalized" and it will progressively look more and more similar to the "old comers". For party systems as a whole, however, we would submit that stable alignment is neither logically necessary nor sufficient for the semblance of institutionalization. At the aggregate level, stability can and often does mask individual-level volatility. Thus, the patterns of stable party competition for example do not on their own necessitate the close alignment of all parties with specific interests so long as there are some

groups at each election who will vote for the parties in question. Whatever the view of the necessity of stable alignment ultimately may be, the stability of these support bases and linkages presupposes, of course, a certain level of continuity among the competing parties with regard to their existence since that stability of alignment by definition takes time to establish. Constant reshuffles of leadership personnel, programmatic orientation or low organizational cohesion impede such stability from being established by making it difficult to link entities enduringly to support groups on account of party appearances and disappearances or party-switching of leadership personnel. All of these make it difficult for voters to develop lasting expectations from parties and their candidates or to at least identify certain parties with their own in-group whenever parties are based on ethnic headcounts rather than programs or ideologies (Chandra 2004). In the following section we will operationalize these dimensions and outline the sources for the different data used in this chapter.

4.2 Data and Measurement

We will use a number of indicators in the operationalization of our three core dimensions of party system institutionalization. The sources and codings for these indicators are contained in Appendix D.

4.2.1 Partyness of Politics

The first dimension to institutionalization concerns the extent to which the attitudinal context of politics is favorably disposed to the function of parties as intermediaries between citizens and the state and the extent to which this disposition is borne out in actual voting behavior which favors (certain) parties over non-party candidates (*partyness*). A favorable attitudinal context means that in general and more specific ways large sections of voters believe that parties are valuable institutions performing this linking function. Much of the writing about citizens' attitudes has centered on the attachments of citizens to particular political parties (or

the lack thereof) as a characteristic of party systems (Green et al. 2001; van Deth/Janssen 1994). More recently, studies have sought to link partisanship with levels of trust (Dalton/Weldon 2005, 2007; Mitra 2005), seeing higher levels of partisanship as indicative of and correlated with higher levels of trust in parties as institutions and thus linking the institutionalization of individual parties to the institutionalization of party politics more broadly through the idea of partisanship (Rose/Mackie 1988). For the purpose of this study, we will treat the confidence of citizens in parties as political institutions as an indicator of the relative legitimacy of parties in a party system. This is in line with other previous studies on party system institutionalization (Mainwaring/Scully 1995; Kuenzi/Lambright 2001). As such, the legitimacy of parties as a characteristic of institutionalized party systems will be measured by the question related to respondents' level of confidence in political parties from the four waves of World Values Surveys (see Appendix D for details). Secondly, we will assess at the macro-level in how far non-party candidates have been able to win votes. By definition, partyless or independent candidates represent an anti-party option in electoral politics and can thus safely be assumed to be indicative to some extent of the lack of institutionalization of a party system, since they are more than anything individual politicians without the usual ties that bind candidates to parties even in SMDP electoral systems.

4.2.2 Organizational Continuity.

We will analyze the level of organizational continuity in party politics for our four cases in two distinct ways. The first indicator "entry rate" describes the component labeled "electoral availability". This refers to the share of newly entrant parties (most often formed in the course of an election cycle), i.e. parties contesting a specific State assembly election while not having contested the last election at the same level in that State. A higher value on this indicator, which ranges logically from 0 to 1, would therefore signify a higher share of parties

competing which did not compete in the previous election, i.e. a lower level of institutionalization.

The second indicator we will use to measure the level of organizational continuity is that of the “weighted relative age” of a given party system i (WRA). The indicator is calculated as follows:

$$\sum_{i=1}^n (t_{ij} * V_{ij} / T_j) = WRA_i .$$

In the equation, t_{ij} stands for the time during which party i has been competing in State j , V_{ij} for the vote share of party i in State j , while T_j indicates the time during which this political territory (in our case the Indian States) has existed as a separate electoral arena without any major changes in its external boundaries or the extent of the franchise accorded to its population. In the present case, T_j counts the years since the founding of the respective State under investigation, with the exception of Andhra Pradesh (constituted under that name in 1956), where the year is assumed to be 1953, the year of the first State election in the new territory under a different name. This indicator is similar to, though not exactly the same as the one developed in Schneider’s study of partisanship in India (Schneider 2009) and it builds furthermore on Huber, Kernell and Leoni (2005) in that it also uses weights to discriminate against the undue influence of small and insignificant but long-established parties in assessing the level of institutionalization of a party system from this particular angle. Table 4.1 (below) illustrates the idea of the weighted relative age in the context of other party system characteristics. It becomes clear that the simple average relative age of parties in the respective country would give us quite a different numerical impression of the relative levels of institutionalization thus measured compared to the weighted relative age.

Table 4.1: Fragmentation and Institutionalization of Russian and British Party Systems

	<i>First Election</i>	<i>Current Election</i>	<i>Age of Political System</i>	<i>ENP</i>	<i>Avg. RA</i>	<i>WRA</i>
Russia	1993	2003	10	5.14	5.83	0.44
U.K.	1950	2005	55	3.59	26.38	0.79

A lot of the old but small parties in the U.K. drive up the value for the average relative age (the average age of parties divided by the age of the political system), making the UK appear to be many times as institutionalized as Russia. In Russia, which seems extremely fluid by that standard, the influence of the larger vote shares of parties established shortly before or after the first democratic legislative elections mitigates to some extent the still relatively short life span most parties had enjoyed so far until the year 2003. Thus, depending on which indicator one prefers, Russian party politics will still seem less institutionalized, but with the WRA, the gap to the U.K. seems less dramatic. Due to the work involved in measuring this indicator for all elections under investigation, we will do this only for the four case studies, thus limiting our investigation in that regard.

4.2.3 Rootedness.

The third dimension of party system institutionalization which we termed “rootedness” will be operationalized through the use of measures of volatility at the aggregate and individual level. At the aggregate level we will use the average rates of inter-election volatility (TNC, total net change) as developed by Mogens Pedersen (Pedersen 1979) to contrast volatility rates in the Indian State elections in the late 1970s with those of the late 1990s, both as averages across all States as well as individual values for the four States in our case studies. Secondly, we will briefly discuss the results of Oliver Heath’s study on individual-level volatility in the Indian States (Heath 2005), since the World Values Surveys do not contain questions relating to past voting behavior which would allow us to estimate the extent to which voters switch parties between two elections.

4.3 System-level Perspectives

4.3.1 Partyness – The Role of Independents

The first approach to evaluating institutionalization in this study is that of assessing the partyness of politics in India. At the macro-level this concerns the extent to which being backed by a political party is indispensable for candidates in winning support from voters or not. Winning support in this case does not mean winning seats, but rather convincing voters to give their votes to independent rather than party-affiliated candidates. One way of assessing this is by looking at the vote share of independent candidates in elections. Independent candidates can pose a challenge to institutionalization of party politics if and when they are an expression of distrust in established or new political parties and a desire to repudiate party-based politics despite the fact that party-based politics is the norm in a given political system. Common sense would dictate that over time, as voters become more acquainted with political parties and their goals and mobilization techniques, they would tend to prefer “known quantities” to unknown ones, i.e. party-backed candidates to independent candidates. This logic is based in the intuitive notion of voters that independent candidates are a) likely to not win the constituency they are running in and b) even if they win are not likely to be able to wield much influence in the legislature since they often stand on their own in a parliamentary system where so much depends on being able to be part of a majority coalition of legislators to bring about decisions in the form of policies or patronage. Table 4.2 (below) illustrates the levels of vote shares for independent candidates across India’s States. It shows that there is, particularly before 1990, considerable variation on this dimension.

Table 4.2: Independent Candidates' Average Vote Shares in State Elections (1977-2000)

<i>State</i>	<i>Vote, Pre-1990</i>	<i>Vote, Post-1990</i>	<i>Abs. Difference</i>	<i>% Difference</i>
Andhra Pradesh	20.22	6.72	-13.50	-66.77
Arunachal Pradesh	24.03	19.45	-4.58	-19.06
Assam	38.73	19.42	-19.31	-49.86
Bihar	17.86	14.53	-3.33	-18.65
Delhi	7.50	7.31	-0.19	-2.53
Goa	18.93	12.45	-6.48	-34.23
Gujarat	9.63	11.46	+1.83	+19.00
Haryana	24.57	15.37	-9.20	-37.44
Himachal Pradesh	14.54	6.68	-7.86	-54.06
Karnataka	10.14	10.83	+0.69	+6.80
Kerala	16.44	6.90	-9.54	-58.03
Madhya Pradesh	12.14	8.23	-3.91	-32.21
Maharashtra	13.19	15.57	+2.38	+18.04
Manipur	36.05	5.03	-31.02	-86.05
Meghalaya	22.30	16.72	-5.58	-25.02
Mizoram	34.21	16.60	-17.61	-51.48
Nagaland	22.36	34.78	+12.42	+55.55
Orissa	12.25	9.51	-2.74	-22.37
Pondicherry	7.71	9.12	+1.41	+18.29
Rajasthan	13.65	14.05	+0.40	+2.93
Sikkim	10.37	3.93	-6.44	-62.10
Tamil Nadu	7.05	2.67	-4.38	-62.13
Tripura	5.33	4.73	-0.60	-11.26
Uttar Pradesh	15.07	6.92	-8.15	-54.08
West Bengal	6.29	2.81	-3.48	-55.33
Average (unweighted)	16.82	11.27	--	-27.28

Source: Election Commission of India, Election reports in State Assembly Elections, various years.

Quite in line with our expectation that over time one should see a decline in the levels of support for independent candidates, in most States support for independents does decline between the two time periods. Notable exceptions to the rule are Gujarat, Maharashtra, Pondicherry and Nagaland which actually see increases in support for independents. The steepest absolute decline in support for independents occurs in Manipur, Assam and Mizoram. In terms of decline as a share of the original base value, Manipur, Andhra Pradesh, Sikkim and Tamil Nadu register the sharpest decline rates. Noteworthy is the fact that the top-5 States supportive of independents before 1990 and the top-4 after 1990 are all located in Northeast India, which underscores the often mentioned claim that the Northeast is somewhat apart from

regular Indian political trends. Overall, however, there is an average decline of support across States for independents by 27 percent over the two time periods which points to an ongoing process of institutionalization or increasing “partyiness” of elections in the States.

4.3.2 Rootedness - Volatility

As with the other indicators, the Indian States vary widely with regard to the rates of volatility between elections and with regard to the trends in these volatility rates over time as table 4.3 (below) shows. Prior to 1990, the highest volatility rates occur in Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, Gujarat, Delhi, Haryana and Nagaland. Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Bihar, Orissa and Meghalaya display the highest levels of electoral volatility immediately after 1990.

Table 4.3: Changes in Volatility across the Indian States

<i>State</i>	<i>TNC, Pre-1990</i>	<i>TNC, Post-1990</i>	<i>Abs. Difference</i>	<i>% Difference</i>
Andhra Pradesh	46.12	15.65	-30.47	-66.07
Arunachal Pradesh	72.46	62.11	-10.35	-14.28
Assam	--	--	--	--
Bihar	49.66	55.67	+6.01	+12.10
Delhi	54.36	19.45	-34.91	-64.22
Goa	45.99	19.14	-26.85	-58.38
Gujarat	56.69	9.58	-47.11	-83.10
Haryana	51.22	42.50	-8.72	-17.03
Himachal Pradesh	49.06	10.45	-38.61	-78.70
Karnataka	45.64	43.12	-2.52	-5.52
Kerala	28.49	12.01	-16.48	-57.85
Madhya Pradesh	49.78	4.50	-45.28	-90.96
Maharashtra	36.48	28.31	-8.17	-22.40
Manipur	30.68	52.43	+21.75	+70.89
Meghalaya	31.39	43.27	+11.88	+37.85
Mizoram	36.97	37.92	+0.95	+2.57
Nagaland	51.07	33.69	-17.38	-34.03
Orissa	47.67	43.36	-4.31	-9.04
Pondicherry	--	--	--	--
Rajasthan	46.37	11.74	-34.63	-74.68
Sikkim	84.36	17.16	-67.2	-79.66
Tamil Nadu	16.94	39.40	+22.46	+132.59
Tripura	20.20	6.69	-13.51	-66.88
Uttar Pradesh	50.66	19.15	-31.51	-62.20
West Bengal	21.56	7.61	-13.95	-64.70

Source: Election Commission of India, Election Reports on State Assembly Elections, various years. Pre-1990 refers to TNC for the first two elections between 1977 and 1989; post-1990 refers to the first two elections from 1990 to 2000. Independents were treated as a group instead of as individuals for the sake of simplicity.

Interestingly, most States' volatility rates decline after 1990 in line with our general expectation that with time, support should generally become more stabilized. There are differences across States though. The greatest absolute decreases in volatility are observable for Gujarat in the West, as well as Sikkim in the Northeast and for States in the "Hindi-Hindu heartland" of India's North (Madhya Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Delhi, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh). This consolidation of political support for parties (rootedness) in the North is explicable in view of the meteoric rise of the BJP in North India since the 1980s and before the advent and growth in importance of new smaller parties such as the BSP from the 1990s. To some extent the stark contrast in the North between the late 1970s and the early 1990s is also attributable to the anomalous situation of the Congress losses in the post-1977 elections after the end of Indira Gandhi's 19-month emergency government and the volatility-increasing rebound of the Congress Party from 1980 onwards. There are noticeable increases in volatility as well, however in Tamil Nadu and Bihar as well as in Manipur, Meghalaya and Mizoram in the Northeast. What stands out from this analysis is the fact that the Northeast seems to be a place with some discernible trends running counter to the national trend of declining volatility. In the Northeast, parties have found it difficult to survive over longer periods of time. Party labels change more frequently and independent candidates' stronger support is another indicator of the low level of institutionalization. Secondly, two types of trends exist simultaneously in the larger States of India. While the Northern heartland moves closer to more or less stable national party competition in the 1990s (only for the BSP to disturb this balance in the late 1990s), States like Bihar and Orissa see greater volatility after the breakup of the Janata Dal, a national party into several constituent regional parties. Thus, overall there is considerable variation in the volatility scores of the different States caused by the relatively strong role which independents play overall in the Northeastern States, the rise of a second national party competing with Congress in North-central India and due to the breakup of the former major third national party, the Janata Dal in the 1990s.

4.4 Individual-level Perspectives

4.4.1 Partyness – The Role of Trust

A second side to measuring partyness in a given political system is, as described above, the level of trust or confidence people have in parties (also as compared to other institutions). By focusing our attention on this we will be able to gauge in how far voters in general have really embraced parties as the primary mediators of political participation and interest articulation. Thus, if trust in political parties is high, we will see this as an indication that parties have successfully carved out a place for themselves in the minds of voters regarding the tableau of participatory avenues available to voters to achieve their political goals. Table 4.4 (below) outlines some of these trends in Indian public opinion.

Table 4.4: Confidence in Political Parties and Other Institutions

	1990	1995	2001	2006
Political Parties	53.0	39.4	28.1	37.0
Government	43.4	48.3	48.5	44.0
Parliament	65.1	53.4	41.6	46.9
Civil Service	71.0	53.2	37.9	38.2
Judicial System	62.8	66.8	n.a.	58.0

Source: World Values Surveys, Waves I to IV. For question wording see Appendix D.

It is fairly obvious that political parties in India, much like in many Western democracies (see for example Dalton/Weldon 2005), suffer from an inherently bad reputation even when compared to other political and administrative institutions. Compared to the image of parties which are often seen as self-interested and inherently biased, the judiciary in India enjoys a comparatively high regard in the minds of citizens. In fact, over time the confidence in political parties has actually declined, a trend which was only partly reversed in 2006. Overall, however, institutions dealing with political issues have suffered declining confidence throughout the 1990s and beyond, some more, some less so. Seen in that light, parties are not unique, although the level of confidence is quite low and reminiscent of the view of political parties frequently held by conservative critics of parliamentary democracy such as the older

George Washington, theorists like Carl Schmitt or Mahatma Gandhi himself, who saw parliamentary democracy and political parties increasingly critically throughout his life. Taken together with the results provided by deSouza, Palshikar and Yadav (2008) regarding support for democracy in India overall, it appears that Indian citizens take the shortcomings of political parties in their stride as a necessary corollary or “necessary evil” (Dalton/Weldon 2005) of democracy, which they generally support. Ostensibly non-partisan institutions like the Supreme Court, which during their more activist years have frequently reined in bad governance and thus neutralized some of the negative effects of party democracy, are not surprisingly held in higher esteem, as they are in Western democracies.

4.4.2 Rootedness – Assessing Individual-level Volatility

Individual-level volatility refers to the percentage of people stating in a survey that they changed their vote between two elections e_t and e_{t-1} . It is frequently, though neither logically nor empirically always, linked to aggregate level volatility in parties support as measure in vote shares over time. The figure below (cf. Heath 2005) illustrates the range of volatility scores across the different Indian States as measure through two national election studies in the late 1990s. The variation is quite noticeable. By European standards, the volatility scores are on average rather high, especially given the fact that the time between the first and the second election surveyed here was only one year.

Figure 4.2: Individual-level Volatility across 15 Indian States (1998-1999)

Total Volatility Rate (Level and Ranking):	
> 0.60:	1. Tamil Nadu
0.40 – 0.60:	2. Haryana
	3. Punjab
0.20 – 0.40:	4. Karnataka
	5. Maharashtra
	6. Orissa
	7. Bihar
	8. Assam
	9. Uttar Pradesh
	10. Andhra Pradesh
	11. Gujarat
< 0.20:	12. West Bengal
	13. Rajasthan
	14. Kerala
	15. Madhya Pradesh

Source: based on Heath 2005, p.182.

Three factors might help us understand better why individual-level volatility is comparatively high compared to many Western democracies. The first is the fact that, despite growing evidence that partisanship is growing slightly and has at least some relationship to voting behavior (Schneider 2009; Mitra 2005), overall partisan attachments are relatively weakly developed, which is one of the reasons why the organizers of the India component of the World Values Survey did not even find it necessary to include the customarily asked question regarding partisanship in their India-specific questionnaire so far. This low level of attachment falls in line with the comparatively low level of trust in parties in general as well. The second reason why volatility might well be as high as it is the effect of an “incumbency malus” or anti-incumbency effect which has been amply documented in previous studies (Uppal 2009; for a contrasting view see Kumar 2004). This *malus* disadvantages incumbents since a significant share of them is regularly voted out of office in State elections after just one term. This empirically established de facto term limit leads many legislators to focus on short-term pork barrel politics and the fulfillment of their own material needs instead of on

long term good governance. Since “pork”, however, is limited, a significant share of their potential voters will not benefit from it, rendering the incumbents’ chances for re-election doubtful again. Due to the large turnover of incumbents, voters will naturally find it problematic developing long-standing ties to parties since in India’s SMDP electoral system combined with an emphasis on ethnicized voting patterns (Chandra 2004), the link between candidate and voter is crucial to the formation of partisan attachments. The third reason for comparatively high volatility might be the continuous supply of new parties and candidates (in part a result of the politics of factionalism and a corollary to the anti-incumbency phenomenon). With permanent renewal of the tableau of political choices, voters face a continuous struggle to determine their preferred party or candidate if and when they do not automatically vote in line with their fellow caste members. We will return to the issue of “electoral availability” and its connection to party system institutionalization again below.

4.5 A Panorama of Party System Institutionalization: Four Cases

4.5.1 Background

Before examining more closely the state of party system institutionalization in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat and Karnataka, we will outline some pertinent trends and historical developments in the politics of each of these four States since the 1970s. This information will serve as background for our later comparative analysis of the determinants of levels of institutionalization in these regions.

Andhra Pradesh

Andhra Pradesh is a comparable “latecomer” in terms of statehood in the Indian Union. It became independent from Madras State (now Tamil Nadu) in the South of India in 1953 and was constituted in its current borders as Andhra Pradesh in 1956. This means, of course, that

it has a slightly shorter history as a political entity and less pre- and post-independence experience with democracy and parties since prior to Indian independence, Hyderabad state was ruled by a Muslim ruler, the Nizam of Hyderabad, without any form of party-political types of participation. Also, Andhra Pradesh is really a conglomerate of sub-regions (Telengana, Ryalseema and Andhra), some more arid than others and hence culturally somewhat different and economically distinguished from each other. Immediately after independence, Brahmins were initially powerful in Andhra politics in the 1950s and 1960s. However, kmmas and reddis (both middle caste, middle class and often landowner farmers) rose to prominence in Andhra Pradesh soon (Gray 1968: 403). Andhra Pradesh had one of the highest rates of government instability in India between 1967 and 1991 (Chhibber 1999: 122). Caste politics and Telengana secessionism transformed the region in the 1970s as these became dominant themes in politics. Even in the watershed 1977 general elections caste politics trumped class concerns as well as concern with the preservation of democracy against dictatorial rule, which was the theme pitched by the conservative opposition in the 1977 elections (The Statesman, "The Andhra Lineup", 6 March 1977). Ideology took a secondary role to tactical jockeying for seats between parties, e.g. through an alliance between CPI and CFD to make seat adjustments in order to avoid splitting the respective alliance vote (The Hindu, "Vengal Rao Asks CPI to Withdraw from Field", 11 March 1977). This did not happen however, and the opposition vote, though improved was once again divided among too many opposition candidates in most cases (The Hindu, "Andhra Pradesh: The Decisive Factor", 3 March 1977). The Congress Party preserved its preeminent position in that State, unlike in many other States that year which witnessed an overall decline of the INC, by capitalizing on the support of small peasant groups and dalits, girijans and Muslims (ibid.). In the early 1980s, a new party, the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) emerged as a leading regional contender, albeit without overly regionalist slogans. The TDP government merged policy with populism which was aimed at welfare measures and administrative reform and was largely

perceived by voters as being pro-poor and pro-peasant unlike the platform and record of the Congress Party (Srinivasulu 2007: 183-184). The explicit orientation of the TDP governments towards economic reform in the 1990s re-focused the debate in Andhra Pradesh from caste-related to policy-related issues and signaled a move from the film stardom-based populism of N.T. Rama Rao to Vankaiiah Naidu in the 1990s. Two group-level socio-demographic characteristics stand out in Andhra Pradesh and set it apart somewhat from other regions. The first is the high level of group fragmentation of the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and dalits into many distinct, but smaller groups (Harriss 1999: 3372). This impacts the extent to which lower caste alliances are able to dominate politics as the counterexample of several North Indian States, notably Uttar Pradesh, illustrate. Secondly, noteworthy are also the relatively sizeable share of Muslims and the experience of Muslim rule over a predominantly Hindu population. Muslims have traditionally favored the Congress party. As a consequence of all this, the INC has been able to hold on to some of its former glory in Andhra Pradesh unlike many other States. In A.P., however decimated it may be, the Congress has declined, but not as dramatically as elsewhere.

Bihar

Bihar is India's third-largest State and in many ways an important bellwether entity and a trendsetter in politics. Unfortunately for the people of Bihar, unlike in the 1950s, Bihar today is a trendsetter mainly in a negative sense. It is a laggard when it comes to good economic and social governance as well as overall development and it is also a State rife with high crime rates and a creeping criminalization of the political process and institutions (Mitra 2006: 103). Seen from the political angle, in recent decades the criminalization of politics has essentially contributed to the erosion of confidence in the democratic process and to an increase in extra-democratic forms of political participation, such as political violence. The Naxalite movement is a case in point along those lines. Bihar is second among India's major States only to Uttar

Pradesh between 1967 and 1991 in terms of its levels of cabinet instability (Chhibber 1999). Caste and identity politics in general are nowadays at the very forefront of the political debate in Bihar (Mitra 2006; Kumar 2007b: 207). In no small measure this trend toward a much greater emphasis of identity and self-respect issues of socially disadvantaged groups is associated with the name of Laloo Prasad Yadav, the undisputed leadership figure in the *Rashtriya Janata Dal* (RJD), a party which, like the Bahujan Samaj Party and the Samajwadi Party in North India has capitalized on the high caste-low caste divide over the years. Bihar can be divided into several sub regions and party support tends to vary widely between regions except in the case of the RJD which in recent years has emerged as a party with significant support across various sub regions within Bihar. More volatile are the support for the Congress party (concentrated in the Mithila, Magadh and Bhijpur regions) and the JD(U) (strongest in Tirhur, Mithila and Magadh) in the more recent 2004 Lok Sabha elections. The new multiparty constellation in Bihar politics is essentially a result of the breakup of the former Janata Dal in the 1990s which produced the cross-State JD(U) and the Bihar-based RJD. Another contributing factor was a sharp Congress decline under Indira and then Rajiv Gandhi in the 1980s (Blair 1993: 52) which essentially led to a disintegration of the INC's electoral machine in Bihar due to the neglect of organizational campaign infrastructure in favor of more overt populism to reach out to a broader audience. In the 1990s two additional circumstances exacerbated these already detrimental trends in Bihar for the Congress party. The first was the lukewarm reception by the INC leadership of the demands of tribal leaders for an independent State of Jharkhand carved out of Bihar (Fickett 1993: 89). The second one was the spillover of communal strife into Bihar from Uttar Pradesh between Hindus and Muslims in the early 1990s in the aftermath of the Ayodhya riots in 1991 and the way in which that antagonism was handled by the Congress leadership. Both factors worked against the INC and in favor of the two *Dals* in Bihar since both tribal and Muslim opinion leaders were ready at that time to re-think their political loyalties which had been with the Congress

party before. An aspect rather unique to Bihar in the minds of many observers is the fact that despite its poor performance on most development indicators, counter intuitively development issues and the satisfaction with the government's performance on these does not seem to be at the top of the priorities list mentioned by Biharis in surveys. On the contrary, caste and identity seem to trump material welfare in Bihar (Kumar 2007b: 219). The fact that the RJD government, which was overwhelmingly viewed as failing to deliver on development-related promises, was still able to win the Lok Sabha elections in Bihar in 2004 yet was trounced in the State Assembly elections of 2005, speaks to this ambiguity of voters in Bihar between hard policy and soft symbolic issues. Nonetheless, class or income does matter for voters in Bihar (Kumar 2007b). The poorer the voters surveyed were, the more favorable Laloo Yadav and his promises seemed to them. The same holds *mutatis mutandis* for Muslims as well. The merger of populist promises to the poor and the emphasis on demanding the respect owed to the downtrodden castes and classes on account of their numerical strength in Bihar seem to have been a successful campaign tactic for a long period of time now. The picture in Appendix C shows Laloo Yadav in a typical pose: Combining a rustic outfit with an elevated seating position when receiving (especially upper caste) visitors asking for guidance and favors. This style signals to his support groups that even as a lower caste man, Yadav will demand respect ("izzat") from members of higher-ranking caste groups, an idea unthinkable in politics, or daily life for that matter, fifty or a hundred years ago in Bihar. And it is also a relatively affordable signal to send to potential voters, as compared to the alternative of shoring up enough financial resources to finance an expensive election campaign based on doling out jobs and monetary favors to local powerbrokers willing to organize the vote of their respective group for a given candidate. In that sense Bihar is again at the forefront of this new electoral strategy in India's Northern region.

Gujarat

Gujarat, the home State of Mahatma Gandhi has been among the more successful States in terms of economic development over the past six decades. The State was an early developer by Indian standards and has bases in fishing, agriculture, chemical industry and shipbuilding. Politically, the State has remained relatively solidly within the camp of two-party national competition (type I) for most of the last decades. As far as governmental stability is concerned, the State enjoyed above average cabinet stability from 1967 to 1991 (Chhibber 1999: 122). Since then, however, Gujarat saw considerably more instability with numerous Chief Ministers entering and leaving office, often with terms of less than a year. In terms of support group configurations, it is notable that the Muslims' vote has increasingly become marginalized in the State. The Congress party depends on it, but it itself has been outperformed by the BJP for a number of years now, giving Muslims in the State not much actual leverage in politics. Unlike in some other Northern Indian States, the INC has not suffered progressively worse electoral results in recent years and even earlier, during the 1980s. In part this may well be due to the lasting impact of the transformation which the party underwent in the 1970s when the Congress leadership in Gujarat sought to build its KHAM (Kshatriya, harijan, adivasi, Muslim) coalition. This appeal to all socially disadvantaged groups in the State allowed the Congress to remain comparatively more successful in subsequent years at maintaining support, especially when compared to Uttar Pradesh or Bihar, in the face of the "silent revolution" from below, i.e. the increasing vocalness of the poor and uneducated masses. This responsiveness, however, was not only in rhetoric unlike in some other States like Bihar. It was also reflected in the changed recruitment patterns for party offices. When looking at the representation of different caste groups in the Legislative Assembly of Gujarat, Subrata Mitra found that as a whole, Congress MLAs were much more representative of the population as a whole in 1980 compared to 1967 (Mitra 1987: 157). The INC went from an upper middle caste party to one building heavily on lower caste strata,

while the other parties actually morphed into a much less representative group almost half of which are from the same upper middle caste background. Thus, in all the INC weathered the changes in the socio-demographic structure of power in Gujarati society and the new assertiveness of lower and scheduled castes better in Gujarat than in other States.

Karnataka


Karnataka has traditionally been a Congress party stronghold. In terms of cabinet stability between 1967 and 1991, Karnataka ranks sixth-lowest among major States (Chhibber 1999) with eight Chief Ministers alone during that period. Before the start of our investigative period, in 1971, the INC won all 27 seats in the elections to the Lok Sabha that year. Likewise, in the general elections of 1977, while the party lost seats in the Lok Sabha by a landslide, it held on in Karnataka (27 out of 28 seats). It did so in part by distancing itself from the central government which appeared tainted at the time due to the dictatorial excesses under Emergency rule (Manor 1978). Also helpful was the fact that the State government targeted poor and lower caste voters by instituting affirmative action measures such as access to public sector employment through quotas just before the general elections (*The Statesman*, “Concessions to the Backward”, 23 February 1977). In the 1970s the Congress-led Devraj Urs government instituted successful land reforms, a pressing issue all over India in rural areas, which bound poorer voters to the INC and led to rather positive performance-based pro-Congress voting in an environment where politicians were often voted into office based more on their unrealistic promises than an actual evaluation of incumbents’ and candidates’ past performance records. In Karnataka, unstable cabinets have been an issue from 1978 to 2000. In part this was due to the prevalence of factional in-fighting in the Congress party. Karnataka with ten Chief Ministers in 22 years set a near-record by Indian standards. While in the 1970s Congress still dominated the State’s party system this changed in the 1990s and the Janata Dal

and later, after a split, the BKD became the other main parties, together with the BJP and Congress making Karnataka a multiparty system today.

4.5.2 Partyness – The Role of Trust and of Independents


In the four chosen cases, there are no uniform trends regarding the performance of independents. In the initial period (1977 to 1989), Bihar shows above average support for independents. This trend persisted throughout the 1990s as tables 4.3 and 4.4 show.

Figure 4.3: The Independent Vote Share in Four States (1977-1989)



Source: Own calculation based on reports on electoral participation from the ECI over time and across States. See table 4.2 for original source material.

Figure 4.4: The Independent Vote Share in Four States (1990-2000):



Source: Own calculation based on reports on electoral participation from the ECI over time and across States. See table 4.2 for original source material.

In the case of Andhra Pradesh in the 1970s and 1980s, the high share of votes for independent candidates astonishes, but is easily explained. In 1983 prospective candidates for the not-yet registered Telugu Desam Party registered their candidacy to run in the upcoming State elections as independents and only later joined the Telugu Desam after its registration had been completed. It was that year 1983 which brought the Telugu Desam into the limelight in Andhra Pradesh politics. Similar circumstances may help explain the outlying elections in Gujarat in 1995. It would thus be easy to dismiss the vote for independent candidates as artificially inflated and thus irrelevant to our understanding of the level of party system institutionalization in these States. In so far as we do regard the distinction between candidates with and without a party label important, the fact that large numbers of candidates ran as independents and still won substantial shares of the vote, however, does indicate the

comparable irrelevance of party affiliation and hence points to a lower level of partyness in the electoral process.

Table 4.5: Vote Share of Independent Candidates and the Effective Number of Parties

<i>State</i>	<i>Vote, Pre-1990</i>	<i>Vote, Post-1990</i>	<i>ENP Pre-1990</i>	<i>ENP Post-1990</i>
Andhra Pradesh	20.22	6.72	4.508	2.895
Bihar	17.86	14.53	5.060	7.360
Gujarat	9.63	11.46	2.865	3.463
Karnataka	10.14	10.83	3.205	4.370
<i>Group Average</i>	<i>14.46</i>	<i>10.88</i>	<i>3.91</i>	<i>4.52</i>

Source: See table 4.2, own calculation.


As table 4.5 indicates there are differences between our cases both in terms of the vote for independents as well as the trend in that vote over time as well as cross-case and also in over-time differences in the level of fragmentation of the electoral landscape as measure through Laakso and Taagepera's measure (ENP). Just as Andhra Pradesh's independent vote share declined over time, so did the level of party system fragmentation (both are of course linked to some extent). For both Gujarat and Karnataka the trend points towards a greater or at least a stable role for independents as well as towards greater fragmentation over time. Bihar shows high levels of voting for independents as well as high levels of fragmentation over time. The converse trend in Bihar (decreased vote share of independents despite increased fragmentation) compared to the other three States is indicative to some extent of the particular dynamics in party politics of that State. While independents play a role in driving ENP in the other three States, while party organizational factors in the form of splits play a more important role for fragmentation in Bihar. All of these render party system institutionalization in Bihar in the near future doubtful.

4.5.3 Organizational Continuity

Turning to the issue of organizational continuity, we will examine first the weighted relative age of the four party systems in question. What is striking about figure 4.5 (below) is that on

average none of the four party systems appear more institutionalized than the very similar Russian national party system which had a comparatively short lifespan so far, high turnover of party labels and comparatively high fragmentation of the vote. The 1985 election in Gujarat and the 2000 election in Andhra Pradesh, however, come within reach of the 0.7-level which would make them comparable to the British party system's level of institutionalization in 2005.

Figure 4.5: The Weighted Relative Age of Party Systems in Four States (1977-2000)



Source: Own calculation based on reports on party electoral participation over time and across States. See table 4.2 for original source material.

By this standard of institutionalization, Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh stand out to some extent. Gujarat, with its continued two-party national competition between BJP and INC, is notable since it is the most institutionalized party system as measured in terms of its weighted relative age across the entire time period since 1977 (type I). Andhra Pradesh, with a national-regional configuration of party competition between TDP and Congress party (type II) is remarkable due to the almost unbroken trend of steadily increasing levels of institutionalization since its

low in 1983 at the advent of the newly founded and instantaneously successful Telugu Desam Party as represented by then-independent candidates, which deflated the WRA for that election year. Bihar a case of unstable national-regional mixed party competition (type V) is clearly the case with the lowest and still decreasing levels of institutionalization in terms of age of the party system. Another interesting aspect of party systems concerns the share of new parties competing in each election, i.e. the share of parties who did not run candidates in the previous election, but are doing so in the present election. Table 4.6 details this share or “entry rate” for each of the four States under investigation. An interesting counterintuitive finding is that although the share of new entities competing at an average election has gone up dramatically since the pre-1990 period in Gujarat, but at the same time, the WRA index has gone down. This essentially indicates that most of the new entities did not win sizeable vote shares in the first few elections after their first appearance in Gujarat and most likely died, much in line with Pedersen’s theoretical expectations (1982) typical of small parties’ performances. Karnataka, though still high, has the lowest entry rate over time, while Bihar, much as expected has the highest both before and after 1990.

Table 4.6: Electoral Availability in Four States (1980-2000)

<i>State</i>	<i>Entry Rate 1980-2000</i>	<i>Entry Rate Pre-1990</i>	<i>Entry Rate Post-1990</i>
Andhra Pradesh	38.56	33.90	45.55
Bihar	50.68	39.10	58.39
Gujarat	42.53	16.67	51.15
Karnataka	36.10	35.71	36.68
<i>Group Average</i>	--	<i>31.34</i>	<i>47.94</i>

Source: See table 4.2, own calculation.

4.5.4 Rootedness – System-level Volatility

The final dimension of PSI and our four cases concerns system-level volatility trends. Table 4.7 (below) shows the net inter-election volatility V_t (Pedersen 1982: 4) for two pairs of

elections respectively across the four States. Logically, V_i can range from 0 to 100. Empirically for the time period from 1948 to 1977 the average was 8.1% across 103 elections in 13 European countries (ibid.). For both time periods under investigation here only Gujarat shows a comparable pattern of vote stability. Andhra Pradesh shows a decline in volatility when we compare the two chosen electoral periods, while Karnataka, its neighbor, saw an equally impressive increase in volatility. As with most dimensions of party system institutionalization, Bihar comes in a clear last with close to or more than 50% volatility in both time periods and an actually upward rather than downward trend.

Table 4.7: Inter-election Volatility in Four States

<i>State</i>	<i>Volatility Pre-1990</i>	<i>Volatility Post-1990</i>
Andhra Pradesh (1978-83, 1994-99)	46.12	15.65
Bihar (1977-80, 1995-2000)	49.55	55.67
Gujarat (1983-85, 1995-98)	5.65	9.58
Karnataka (1978-83, 1994-99)	13.21	43.12
<i>Group Average</i>	<i>28.63</i>	<i>31.01</i>

Source: See table 4.2, own calculation.

As with the other indicators, no clear trend emerges from simply looking at this one dimension of institutionalization. Instead it seems that all three States look quite different from each other in terms of the level of institutionalization we find in each. In the following section we will discuss these findings from a comparative perspective to arrive at a clearer understanding of the cross-currents of relative institutionalization of party politics in India's States.

4.6 Discussion

From the overview of various indicators tapping the different dimensions of PSI (partyness – rootedness – organizational continuity) it has become clear that there are different trends throughout India and in individual States regarding the different dimensions of party system institutionalization.

On the one hand, trust in political parties declined substantially and rebounded only to a limited extent more recently, according to survey data, indicating either a certain frustration with party political processes or the performance of party government or a more general and deeper skepticism of parties as institutions. On the other hand, the logical alternative – party-less elections – seems no more popular as the overall decline in voting support for independent candidates shows. One might be able to reconcile these seemingly contradictory trends by assuming that part of the decline in trust expressed in the survey data is less systemic frustration or apathy toward politics, but rather very specific frustration about the failings of particular politicians which is couched in terms of skepticism towards parties which these politicians represent.

Secondly, there does not appear to be one good single explanation for the sometimes opposing trends of institutionalization and de-institutionalization of party politics as measured for example by the weighted relative age of party systems or the rate of entry of new parties into the electoral fray or the levels and trends in volatility between elections. Instead of seeking the magic bullet we need to be prepared to use multiple avenues to tackle PSI.

Taking stock of the levels of institutionalization in the group of four States over the different indicators, table 4.8 sums up the different dimensions of institutionalization. The institutionalization scores in column four are obtained by assigning a “0” on an indicator when a State displays an above average level on that indicator and “1” if it displays below average levels. This means that the higher the total institutionalization score is the higher is the level of institutionalization.

Table 4.8: Levels of Institutionalization Across Four States

<i>State</i>	<i>Independent Vote</i>	<i>WRA</i>	<i>Electoral Availability</i>	<i>Volatility</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Pre-1990:</i>					
Andhra Pradesh	0	1	0	0	1
Bihar	0	0	0	0	0
Gujarat	1	1	1	1	4
Karnataka	1	1	0	1	3
<i>Post-1990:</i>					
Andhra Pradesh	1	1	1	1	4
Bihar	0	0	0	0	0
Gujarat	0	1	0	1	2
Karnataka	1	0	1	0	2

Based on this scoring for the pre-1990 period, Gujarat has the highest overall level of institutionalization within this group, followed by Karnataka in second place, Andhra Pradesh in third with Bihar in fourth place. For the post-1990 phase, Andhra Pradesh leads the group with the highest level of institutionalization, followed by Karnataka, Gujarat and a distant Bihar in last place. Bihar's, but also Karnataka's comparatively less institutionalized party systems appear so, in no small measure in the second half of the 1990s because of the breakup of the Janata Dal into several new parties (among them the RJD and the Samata Party in Bihar). This split influenced our indicators heavily, e.g. the weighted relative age for Bihar in the 1990s and the volatility scores as well. Some might argue that volatility should be assessed not by looking at individual parties, but rather by looking at ideological groupings of parties instead and the inter-group volatility since it supposedly would not matter how many voters changed parties as long as the respective groupings remained relatively stable over time (Bartolini/Mair 1990). What has also been advocated is the treatment of splinter parties from the same precursor party as if they were still one party, in particular in countries where such fractures and mergers of parties are a frequent occurrence. For India, these views have also been advocated (see Betz 2008: 623 for example), but with the caveat that the groups to be investigated should be seen as loose alliances or fronts constituted more out of political

expediency than ideological cohesion. Looking at the party landscape in India in particular, but also other countries more broadly, this approach seems unconvincing. What we see in States like Bihar is an extremely fluid electoral arena in which numerous new party labels are frequently tried out and then abandoned, organizations such as the Janata Dal splinter across India and even into several new formations within Bihar in 1992, and voters voluntarily or because they have no alternative, choose to vote for a new party's candidate or for an independent at election time. To mask this fluidity by artificially re-constructing erstwhile existing parties out of new smaller and more parochial successors defeats the very purpose of an inquiry into the relative level of institutionalization of party politics. What research needs to do instead is to embrace the notion that these very splinterings of organizations are not coincidental or somehow irrelevant to our understanding of an otherwise stable political system. Instead, they are at the very core of an understanding of the relative importance (or not) of parties as autonomous intermediaries between voters and the leadership personnel of politics. This realization will enable us to understand that the relative lack of institutionalization of party politics is as much a function of the population and its lack of attachment to individual political parties and by extension to parties in general as it is a function of how parties which come and go in large numbers, which build ad hoc coalitions of voters based on caste groups and patronage of the day, and which splinter over incompatible personalities of party leaders, reinforce the trend away from a deeper institutionalization of parties and from their autonomy as organizations rather than as just electoral machines of individual candidates.

Lastly, the divergence of our four cases from overall national trends as well as their relative difference to each other should caution the student of Indian politics against adopting overly simplistic arguments which generalize in broad strokes across all of India's regions. This differentiation along the dimensions of PSI as well as that along the issue of regionalization of party politics as we shall see in chapter five underscore the idea that India's States have

become political arenas in their own right and that the intensive study of regional variations in political phenomena is a worthwhile undertaking.

Chapter Five:
The Regionalization of Party Systems

5. The Regionalization of Party Systems


This chapter provides a broad overview of a range of indicators of regionalization of State politics since the 1970s. It is firstly a descriptive account of the scope and the extent of the growing importance of regional political parties across India's States over time. It also provides an analysis of opinion data on the views on politics and a social profile of voters preferring regional rather than national parties in India.

5.1 Regional Identity in the Mirror of Public Opinion

Before assessing the regionalization of party politics a logical point of departure seems to be to assess the overall loyalty Indians feel towards different real or imagined communities they live in and the relative importance of regional and national identities, as well as loyalties to regional versus national parties in India on the basis of responses to a sample survey conducted in 1990, 1995 and 2001 as part of the World Values Survey project. This will later allow us to develop a profile of typical supporters of regional parties based on their personal backgrounds and also to assess the link between affinity to regional rather than national political parties and other characteristics of voters relevant to political life.

When studying regional political parties in Europe, the idea that regional parties are necessarily regionalist often underpins the approach to the subject (see chapter one for an overview of the relevant literature). In three waves of a global survey (see appendix D for details), respondents were asked about which entity they felt they belonged to first and foremost. Figure 5.1 charts the changes over time in the Indian responses to this question. What is remarkable is the surge in identification with local and regional rather than national identities in the mid-1990s and the relative reversal of this trend until 2001.

Figure 5.1: Territorial Frames of Belonging



This general trend in the direction of a closer attachment to subnational rather than national or supranational communities coincides with the period of unprecedented expansion of electoral success across the Indian States. This naturally begs the question whether these two trends are coincidental or whether a convergence exists between a general trend toward what Almond and Verba (1953) might have called “parochialism” and the message of regional political parties and their success in pitching this message to the Indian people in the 1990s.

The questions this chapter will seek to answer are as follows: To what extent have regional parties been able to win votes and seats across the Indian States? Which social, economic and political contextual factors have contributed to the increasing electoral support for and success of regional parties at the State level over time? Which characteristics distinguish supporters of regional parties from other people? Is the trend towards greater support of regional parties indicative of a fragmentation process in Indian society and public opinion which distinguishes supporters of regional parties from other partisans? Before answering these questions in turn, we should revisit the issue of measuring the phenomenon we have referred to as “regionalization”.

5.2 Measuring Regionalization of Party Politics

This analysis of regionalization as a phenomenon in Indian politics will have to have two broad perspectives: a macro and a micro perspective. As already stated in chapter two, we assume that processes of regularization (institutionalization) crucially link organizational and social factors in leading to higher or lower levels of regionalization of party politics. Unlike other studies (e.g. Basedau/Stroh 2008), we are not immediately concerned with the electoral successes of individual regional parties which are part of this manifestation of the phenomenon, since these successes are crucially influenced by the nature of India's single member district plurality (SMDP) voting system. We are also less concerned with the policy or other consequences which might be seen as indicative of the regionalization of politics in India. Rather, we are interested in a the question of why support has shifted increasingly toward regional political forces and away from national political parties and in whether this shift is part of a larger drift away from national political debates, concerns and attachments.

As outlined in chapter two, at the aggregate level we will take as our yardstick of "regionalization" one characteristic of the party systems under investigation, namely the combined relative strength of electoral support for candidates of national parties as defined by the Election Commission of India versus those of non-national parties and independents. Our real focus is, therefore, the electoral support for all "non-national" candidates. In order not to focus exclusively on the aggregate subnational perspective, we will also analyze the regionalization levels over time based on opinion data gathered on a variety of social and political issues. Thus, regionalization will be seen not only as a trend in actually observable behavior (voting), but also as one found in opinions voiced by voters in surveys. This combined approach will allow us to gain insights as to whether there are differences between supporters of national versus those of non-national parties and candidates. It will also allow us to see whether or not the respective characteristics have changed over time. This view should also yield insights into how far support for national parties and candidates and for non-



national parties and candidates are incompatible or not and what the determinants of such preferences might be. Before formulating some hypotheses to be tested, the following section will provide an overview of the extent of the regionalization and regional differentiation of politics across the Indian States.

5.3 Regional Differences in Regionalization of Party and Electoral Politics



One of the rationales for undertaking this study of regionalization and institutionalization was the notion that considerable regional differences exist between States and time periods in the development of Indian politics. Chapter three already outlined some of the differences in terms of socio-demographic variables which we will use in this chapter to analyze regionalization's underlying causes. Before doing so, however, it seems prudent to continue this inquiry first with a look at the extent of the regional differences or similarities in the levels of regionalization itself.

As figure 5.2 shows, the greatest levels of regionalization in the pre-1989 phase could be found in Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and a number of States in the Indian Northeast. The lowest levels could be found in Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, and Karnataka and, unsurprisingly for the capital, in New Delhi.

Map 5.1: Avg. Vote Shares for Non-national Parties and Candidates (1977-1989)



Map 5.2: Avg. Vote Shares for Non-national Parties and Candidates (1989-2001)



For the post-1989 period Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Sikkim, the Northeast and Haryana show high levels, while Karnataka, Tripura, Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh constitute the low end of the spectrum.

5.4 Hypotheses

Based on the literature on regional party proliferation and the general literature on partisanship and voter preferences, we can formulate a number of hypotheses for both the micro-level and the macro-level analyses. All of these will be discussed now in turn, beginning with the hypotheses regarding the aggregate level of electoral support for non-national candidates.

5.4.1 Macro-level Hypotheses

Due to the tendency of regionalist parties to adopt sons-of-the-soil type positions, migrants, especially economic migrants from other States can provide the convenient backdrop for regionalist messages. This may lead voters with isolationist views to support such regionalist forces. **H1:** *The greater the share of migrants the greater the support for regional parties.*

High levels of turnout indicate a mobilization of both moderate, less committed and partisan voters, while low turnout usually means that the more partisan voters carry greater weight since they tend to be equally likely to turn out to vote in high or low turnout elections (Müller-Rommel 1998). **H2:** *Low turnout correlates with high levels of support for regional parties.*

The logic behind assuming that populations with high shares of illiterates would lead to higher support for regional candidates lies in the assumption of modernization theorists like Verba Nie and Kim (Verba et al. 1978) that low educational attainment typically leads to a more localist outlook and less sophistication in evaluating political messages. This supposedly

benefits parties building their appeals principally on locally-gearred messages and networks such as regional parties, in particular regionalist parties, do. **H3:** *The higher the literate share of a State's population, the lower the share for non-national candidates (and parties).*

Other studies premise their accounts on the contention that relative deprivation will lead voters in poorer States to vote for regionalist or even secessionist parties in larger numbers. The reasoning behind this assumption is that disaffection with the way national parties are delivering on developmental or economic goals for a particular region might provide an opening for new non-national parties and candidates to capitalize on this fact and shore up political support. **H4a:** *The poorer the population of a State, the higher the vote shares of non-national candidates.*

As an alternative reasoning to hypothesis no. 4a, one might formulate an antithesis which states, based on the literature on secessionism (e.g. Hale 2000) and on our own model in chapter two, that it is known that political elites in richer regions of a country have incentives to adopt hard-line positions concentrating on the interests of the region they claim to represent. On the other hand, elites and voters in poorer regions have incentives to opt for conciliatory positions regarding center-state relations. This kind of environment would hence seem less conducive to the success of regional parties and candidates than that of a wealthy State. Consequently, one should expect to see more parties and candidates successfully competing which are regional in nature in those regions with above average levels of economic wealth. **H4b:** *The richer the population of a state, the higher the support for non-national candidates and parties.*

In chapter four we posited the link between levels of fragmentation, institutionalization and regionalization. If this link is theoretically sound, we should see an empirical link between

levels of fragmentation and the levels of support for non-national candidates and regional party candidates. **H5:** *The higher the levels of fragmentation the higher the levels of regionalization of elections.*

Assuming that established national parties benefit disproportionately from brand and name recognition of parties and candidates which are easier to achieve and maintain in the less anonymous and impersonal environments of urban areas, more urbanized States make for less ideal working conditions for national parties. Conversely, the less structured urban environments where ties of politicians to voters through caste or long-standing clientelist ties should open more opportunities for non-national candidates who are (at least initially) at a disadvantage compared to national party candidates in terms of social clout and patronage resources. **H6:** *The higher the level of urbanization, the higher the share of votes for non-national candidates or parties.*

In Indian States the media market in general and the newspaper market in particular, has undergone a fundamental transformation over the recent decades. The Indian market as a whole used to be dominated in the early post-independence decades by newspapers and magazines published in English or Hindi and to a much lesser extent a few of the other main regional languages. Since then, a multitude of new entrepreneurs have fundamentally altered the structure of the market and shifted it to one in which regional language media (of which Hindi could be considered one, as will be discussed subsequently) predominate in most States. This shift to more numerous and increasingly regional outlets will likely open up new opportunities for new regional political entrepreneurs to utilize the new greater availability of newspapers, intelligible even to voters who only speak and read the regional language, to get their more regional message out. **H7:** *The higher the share of regional language newspapers of all newspapers in the State, the higher is the share of support for non-national candidates.*

Previous theories of party competition and regionalization have stressed the importance of the relative levels of social heterogeneity for the level of regionalization of party politics (see chapter two). If the support for non-national or regional parties and candidates were indicative of some sort of disaffection with the larger national political community and of more or less overt regionalist tendencies, one would assume that regionally concentrated subpopulations would be more easily mobilized on the basis of such a message. Hence, greater social heterogeneity should in principle mitigate such mobilization by dividing regional subpopulations along caste, class or religious lines. **H8:** *The greater social heterogeneity of a State the lower the support for non-national candidates and parties.*

We also believe, based on the model developed in chapter two and on the implications drawn from it that the economic wealth of a region will affect regional party support in conjunction with time in the sense that elections after 1989, the watershed year in which a coalition of regional parties came to power in the central government, will produce different results compared to elections until 1989. We will thus control for economic wealth levels and split the analysis into two parts, of which one will cover the period until 1989 and the second one the period from then until 2000. In order to not only investigate possibly misleading aggregate relationships we will also use opinion data to test another set of hypotheses regarding support for regional parties.

5.4.2 Micro-level Hypotheses

At the individual level we will investigate the relationship between ages of respondents, assuming that if parochialism is a form of conservatism and parochialism leads to support for regional parties, older respondents should be more likely to be supporters of regional parties (H9). Secondly, we will test the idea that urbanization mitigates regionalism and thus support

for regional parties by creating a broader outlook on life in urban dwellers and minimizing parochial views on politics. Hence urban respondents should be less likely to support regional parties (H10). Thirdly, we will assess the notion that higher education leads to lower support for regional parties (H11) since more educated respondents would be more concerned with broader national issues than less educated respondents and would hence be less likely to favor regional parties who often are portrayed as concerned only with regional and local rural issues. Another issue we wish to explore is the proposition that lower class status makes respondents more likely to favor regional parties (H12) as lower class status in India is usually correlated with non-urban residence. The last proposition to be tested is that of a possible relationship of Hindu versus non-Hindu status being related to the propensity of supporting regional parties (H13). Conceivably, regional parties might be more sensitive to ethnic and religious minority concerns if they themselves prioritize group rights demands vis-à-vis the State or central government for example.

The following section will briefly detail the operationalization of the independent variables measuring regionalization and its determinants at the aggregate level and outline the sources from which the data on the variables were obtained before conducting the aggregate analysis. Section 5.6 will then do the same for the micro-level analysis.

5.5 Correlates of Regionalization of Elections: The Aggregate Picture

The question at hand is which of the characteristics of the Indian States as arenas of electoral politics are particularly conducive to a regionalization of elections in terms of the vote shares recorded for non-national candidates and the parties they represent. To answer this question at least partly, this section will measure the strength of the association of the vote shares received by all candidates not running on national party tickets and in a second step of those candidates running on regional party tickets in the State Assembly elections prior to and from

1990 onwards with a number of indicators operationalizing the concepts contained in hypotheses one through eight.

5.5.1 Data and Measurement

The respective sources for the data used in the aggregate data analysis are listed in the table in Appendix D. The dependent variables are the vote shares (in %) of candidates not running on national party labels (NNV) and secondly the partially overlapping vote shares of all candidates contesting explicitly under the labels of regional parties (RPV), i.e. NNV minus the vote share of independent candidates. Since we expect the effects to be conditioned by both time (pre-1990 versus post-1990) and economic wealth, we attempt to control for these two factors by a) splitting the analysis of the 1977 to 2000 period into two separate analyses, namely the pre-1990 and the post-1990 period (1990 and later), and b) by controlling for the level of economic development in the partial correlations. The economic control variable in the correlation is based on the dichotomous scoring of the States as above (“1”) or below (“0”) the period averages of States in terms of the per capita Net State Domestic Product at Factor Cost (constant prices, 1980-1989, 1990-2000). A description of the range and coding of the various independent variable-related indicators can be found in Appendix D.

5.5.2 Analysis

Tables 5.1 and 5.2 (below) detail the correlates of the support for all non-national candidates and regional party candidates in particular. Immediately, differences in the relationships between variables between the two time periods become visible in table 5.1. Both the vote shares of all non-national candidates as well as those of specifically regional party candidates seem to improve in State elections when turnout is particularly high throughout both time periods under investigation seeming to confound hypothesis 2.

Table 5.1: Bivariate Correlations of the Non-national Vote

	Pre-1990 (N=81)		Post-1990 (N=62)	
	<i>NNV</i>	<i>RPV</i>	<i>NNV</i>	<i>RPV</i>
Migrant Population (H1)	0.063	0.148	0.004	-0.007
Turnout (H2)	0.466**	0.414**	0.341**	0.292*
Literacy (H3)	0.244*	0.286**	0.200	0.240
Poverty (H4a/H4b)	-0.117	-0.025	-0.080 (N=58)	-0.078 (N=58)
ENP (H5)	0.301**	-0.032	0.325*	0.255
Urbanization (H6)	-0.041	0.075	0.068 (N=60)	0.104 (N=60)
Regional Media Strength (H7)	-0.486** (N=65)	-0.381** (N=65)	-0.338 (N=60)	-0.342 (N=60)
Hindi Media Strength (H7)	-0.255 (N=65)	-0.258 (N=65)	-0.254 (N=60)	-0.278* (N=60)
Religious Fragmentation (H8)	0.290**	0.202	0.035	-0.025

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 . *NNV*=Non-national vote share. *RPV*=Regional party vote share.

Table 5.2: Partial Correlations of the Non-national Vote (controlling for per capita economic wealth)

	Pre-1990 (N=61)		Post-1990 (N=51)	
	<i>NNV</i>	<i>RPV</i>	<i>NNV</i>	<i>RPV</i>
Migrant Population (H1)	0.011	0.053	-0.236	-0.267
Turnout (H2)	0.569***	0.493***	0.442**	0.389**
Literacy (H3)	0.399**	0.470***	-0.007	0.078
Poverty (H4a/H4b)	-0.104	0.035	0.011	0.005
ENP (H5)	0.392**	0.048	0.461**	0.381**
Urbanization (H6)	0.025	0.201	-0.184	-0.087
Regional Media Strength (H7)	-0.560***	-0.457***	-0.361**	-0.357**
Hindi Media Strength (H7)	-0.230	-0.225	-0.226	-0.277*
Religious Fragmentation (H8)	0.391**	0.204	0.117	0.033

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 . *NNV*=Non-national vote share. *RPV*=Regional party vote share.

On the other hand, according to the data in table 5.1, due to rather small and insignificant correlation coefficients, urbanization rates, shares of migrants and shares of poor people in the States' population seem unrelated to the strength of State-wide vote shares of non-national/regional party candidates throughout. On the other hand, the more literate the overall population of a States was between 1977 and 1989, the higher the vote shares for candidates who were not affiliated with national parties generally were in State elections during that time period. Although the association is not particularly strong, it stands out as one of the significant relationships which, however, disappears during the latter time period. At least for the vote shares of independents and regional party candidates taken together (NNV), the level of fragmentation of the party system based on the distribution of votes (ENP) is somewhat moderately and significantly related to it throughout both time periods.

Table 5.2 (above) shows us how the relationships between the variables change when we control for the levels of wealth in the States under investigation as our model from chapter two calls for. According to the partial correlation analysis, when controlling for below or above average per capita economic development, the poverty rates, urbanization rates and shares of inter-State migrants in the State population still do not appear to have any significant association with the support for non-national or regional party candidates in State elections during any of the two time periods, although interestingly share of migrants and urbanization rate change their signs between the time periods. Literacy, holding the level of economic development constant, has a significant association to both NNV and RPV during time period one. The same is true for religious fragmentation as a proxy for social heterogeneity and the broader non-national vote (NNV). According to this perspective, candidates not running on a national party ticket (NNV), or on a regional party ticket (RPV) fare particularly well between 1977 and 1989 in those States with literate and religiously fragmented populations. Both these findings contradict the hypotheses three and eight. On the other hand, turnout is clearly positively and significantly related to the level of support (NNV and RPV). This relationship

is significant and positive irrespective of the control for levels of per capita economic development which suggests that economic development does not impinge very much on it. The share of regional language newspapers in the total number of newspapers in the States is negatively and significantly associated with higher levels of NNV and RPV. In part, this association is enhanced because of the strength of Hindi language newspapers in the North as for example the weakening of the correlation between regional media strength and NNV and RPV in the post-1990 phase with partial correlation coefficients of -0.297 ($p < 0.05$) and -0.304 ($p < 0.05$), respectively, shows when controlling for the strength of Hindi newspapers in the States. This relationship is also stable irrespective of the control for level of per capita economic development, again suggesting that that variable only has a limited and merely enhancing effect on this relationship. Nevertheless, the fact that a greater share of regional language newspapers leads to lower vote shares (NNV and RPV) beyond the effect that Hindi language media have (the regional language in many North Indian States which are often dominated by INC and BJP, and earlier the then-national Janata Dal, national party competition), is somewhat surprising, given the well-established notion that cultural nationalism mediated by the media is supposed to have contributed to the success of regional parties particularly in the South and West of India. What is more expected is the fact that the fragmentation of the vote is positively and significantly associated with higher levels of NNV and RPV. Since there are only a limited number of national parties, and only two of them are truly national in their reach across most of the States, a fragmentation of the vote almost invariably means that regional party candidates and independent candidates must have received substantial shares of the vote in order for ENP to be driven higher. What is interesting to note about these aggregate data-based findings is the fact that even the relationships which turned out to be significant (and mostly running counter to the hypotheses postulated, except in the case of fragmentation levels), weaken between the first and second time periods, suggesting that these correlates are less appropriate in the post-1990 period for

understanding the support for non-national or more specifically regional party candidates during that time period.

In view of the results of the partial correlation analysis (controlling for levels of per capita economic development), table 5.3 (below) summarizes the findings regarding the preliminary validation or rejection of the macro-level hypotheses (H1 to H8).

Table 5.3: Summary of Aggregate Findings

Hypothesis	Pre-1990		Post-1990	
	<i>NNV</i>	<i>RPV</i>	<i>NNV</i>	<i>RPV</i>
1	-	-	-	-
2	A	A	A	A
3	A	A	-	-
4a	-	-	-	-
4b	-	-	-	-
5	+	-	+	+
6	-	-	-	-
7	A	A	A	A
8	A	-	-	-

“-“/”+” = hypothesis rejected/preliminarily validated based on the aggregate data; “A” = alternative hypothesis preliminarily validated.

We will now turn to the individual-level analysis and return in part to the aggregate data-based findings as part of the discussion of the results of the survey-based analysis to help us understand the connections between individual- and aggregate-level phenomena.

5.6 Who Wants to Regionalize? A Profile of Regional Identity and Party Support

5.6.1 The Social Characteristics of Regional Party Supporters

In table 5.4 (below) we can find a social profile of respondents who stated that they would vote for a regional party if elections were held the following weekend. For the 1990 data we find that as we expected older respondents were slightly more likely to name a regional party rather than a national party as their preference. This very small though significant effect however disappears in subsequent waves of the survey being conducted through the 1990s

and into the new millennium. Likewise, for the 1990 survey we see respondents from urban areas responding in smaller shares that they would vote for a regional party as opposed to their rural counterparts. Again, though, the effect size is already small in 1990 and in the 2001 and 2006 waves there is almost no noticeable effect anymore based on the residence of the respondents. As regards education, a similar picture holds. In the first wave of the survey, respondents with more education were slightly less likely to support regional parties than respondents with lower levels of education. Non-Hindus are consistently more likely to state that they would vote for a regional party. This is not surprising since often smaller, and thereby by definition regional parties are more likely to appeal to aggrieved sections of society on the one hand which might conceivably include especially Muslims and since secondly many national parties have become the playground of Hindu caste rivalries to an even greater extent than is the case in smaller regional parties. Upper class respondents are initially less likely to be in favour of regional party voting, but in subsequent surveys this distinction also becomes blurred and a clear relationship also eludes us. With regard to the social class self-placement variable there also seems no clear relationship to exit to regional party support. The only variable which is highly significant and has at least a moderate effect on support for regional parties in the first two waves of the WVS is the variable tapping the territorial loyalty or feelings of belonging. Respondents voicing an affinity foremost to a local entity like a city or a region are indeed more likely to be willing to vote for regional parties. But, again, the effect size is rather small and overall we have to say that our hypotheses, perhaps with the exception of that regarding territorial loyalty leading to regional party support can be discarded.

There is, however, an interesting finding in the social profiles of these regional party supporters, i.e. those who would vote for a regional party. And this finding concerns the time trend of change in these profiles. The fact that through the successive survey waves the potential voter for regional parties become less and less distinguishable begs the question of

whether this does not indeed support the idea that as regional parties expand their support bases throughout the 1990s, their support bases are becoming increasingly undistinguishable from those of other parties since these regional parties are trying to build more moderate, middle-of-the-road voter coalitions to win or maintain power in successive elections in the 1990s. This would be in line with ideas about parties trying to, and in the case of many regional parties in the 1990s successfully trying to win over new voters for their platforms by appealing to median-type voters instead of very distinct subsets of society. We will take this idea up again in section 5.6.3.

Table 5.4: Social Backgrounds of Regional Partisans (entries are percentages of respondents stating a preference for a regional party)

Variable	Category	1990	1995	2001	2006
Age Group	15-29 years	9.8	14.2	30.4	24.6
	30-49 years	12.8	15.6	25.8	24.1
	50 years and older	16.2	10.1	25.3	24.6
	Correlation	0.067 (p<0.05)			
Level of Urbanization	Up to 10,000	26.2	19.7	26.1	24.6
	10,001 to 50,000	12.9	20.1	30.0	25.5
	More than 50,000	11.9	6.6	27.2	20.7
	Correlation	0.086 (p<0.01)			
Level of Education	Lower	16.7	14.4	27.8	26.0
	Middle	11.0	14.9	27.9	23.8
	Upper	11.5	13.0	24.4	22.0
	Correlation	0.062 (p<.05)			
Social Class (subjective)	Lower class	n.a.	12.9	26.4	23.8
	Working class	n.a.	22.7	26.9	30.2
	Lower middle class	n.a.	16.1	28.5	21.3
	Upper middle class	n.a.	10.5	27.2	26.1
	Upper class	n.a.	0.8	14.3	17.3
Territorial Loyalty	Locality	8.5	14.6	24.4	n.a.
	Region	20.5	16.7	39.4	n.a.
	Country	12.9	9.1	26.9	n.a.
	Continent	7.7	0.0	22.2	n.a.
	World	6.7	0.0	20.4	n.a.
	Correlation	0.133 (p<.000)			
Religious Affiliation	Hindu	11.8	13.2	21.6	19.8
	Non-Hindu	16.8	20.6	32.6	30.2
	Correlation	0.045 (p<0.1)			

Correlation: Phi coefficient of association.

Therefore, it appears almost as if supporters of smaller regional parties do not have a very distinct social profile as opposed to supporters of national parties. Although the small effects which are discernible and are all significant do not contradict our hypotheses, the effect size is somewhat too small to really forcefully claim to have found our hypotheses vindicated.

5.6.2 The Views of Regional Party Supporters on Politics

In table 5.5 (below) we see the views of regional party voters on a range of issues. In 1995, when the regional electoral wave was in full swing, respondents who said they would vote for a regional party in the next election if one were held soon were also slightly more likely to voice negative rather than positive views on democracy. By 2006 this had changed, however, and they were likely to voice more positive views rather than negative views. As far as the idea is concerned that voting for regional parties is an expression of dissatisfaction with the politicians currently in office (protest vote), that notion can also be dispelled on the basis of the data shown below. In fact by 2001 voters satisfied with national office-holders were actually a little more likely to be regional party supporters compared to dissatisfied respondents. This could, however, have two reasons, either a) because they genuinely felt that there was nothing to complain about, or b) they realized that the representatives from the regional parties they were likely to support were actually by then sharing in national policy making which might either prompt them not to complain about them or to see national policies in a more positive light. Which one is the case, though, cannot be decided on the basis of the available data. As regards interest in politics, initially respondents less interested in politics are more likely to be supporters of regional parties than respondents who are interested in politics. This finding from the 1990 survey data seems to relate strongly to the finding that turnout was a variable strongly related to aggregate support levels for NNV and RPV in the previous section. It appears, then, that contrary to our initial hypothesis high turnout levels brought out even the least interested voters which might explain the positive overall association of turnout as well as lack of interest with regional party and non-national candidate support levels. Throughout the 1990s until 2006 a striking reversal took place and in 2006 those more interested in politics are actually more likely to be supporters of regional parties than those less interested in politics. Similarly, by 2006 those who thought politics was


important were more likely to be regional party voters than those who thought politics less important.

Table 5.5: Political Views of Regional Party Supporters (cell entries are row percentages of respondents stating a preference for a regional party)

Variable	Category	1990	1995	2001	2006
Support for Democracy	Very bad	n.a.	13.0	40.0	17.1
	Fairly bad	n.a.	27.3	24.6	24.4
	Fairly good	n.a.	10.5	30.9	23.7
	Very good	n.a.	18.0	26.3	26.4
Satisfaction with People in National Office	Very dissatisfied	n.a.	18.0	29.0	n.a.
	Fairly dissatisfied	n.a.	12.6	27.1	n.a.
	Fairly satisfied	n.a.	15.5	25.1	n.a.
	Very satisfied	n.a.	12.9	34.5	n.a.
Confidence in Political Parties	None at all	9.5	16.5	26.3	22.8
	Not very much	13.0	16.4	28.2	19.3
	Quite a lot	13.8	15.2	28.7	30.3
	A great deal	9.5	6.7	26.7	31.7
Interest in Politics	Not at all interested	15.7	11.8	30.8	19.3
	Not very interested	12.4	12.6	22.8	23.4
	Somewhat interested	12.0	16.3	26.5	24.8
	Very interested	6.9	22.4	31.2	35.0
Importance of Politics	Not at all important	10.7	11.0	29.0	17.8
	Not very important	13.1	17.2	29.0	25.4
	Rather important	14.3	14.1	28.3	30.2
	Very important	5.1	17.3	23.5	22.1

As Figure 5.4 (below) illustrates, survey respondents who state that they feel primarily drawn to local or regional identities, support national and regional parties in almost equal measure throughout the 1990s until 2001. This subverts the often-heard claim that loyalty to regional identity precludes support for national parties or vice versa.

Figure 5.2: Differences in Party Support by Regionalists (1990-2001)



Source: World Values Survey, 1990, 1995, 2001. See Appendix D for details on the wording of the question.

The data in the three figures contained in Appendix D (p. 203) clearly demonstrate the similarity in political views of national party and regional party supporters as well. In consequence, it seems that the often stated claim that the trend towards increased support for regional parties does not necessarily hail an era of erosion of democratic political norms or concern for politics as some, especially national party proponents, would have voters believe. The supporters of regional parties have quite the contrary found their place in the democratic political arena of India and are not likely to advocate secession, authoritarian leadership or intolerance towards other social groups in overwhelming numbers.

5.6.3. One-way Ticket? The Compatibility of Regional and National Party Support

One of the questions already touched upon is that regarding the incommensurability of support for regional and national parties. As tables 5.6 through 5.9 show, the answer to that question may necessitate different answers at different times. The most striking result is that regarding 1990. At that time, 87.9 percent of respondents stated that they had a preference for a national party. None of these named a regional party as their second choice. In 1990 there

was a perfect division between regional and national party supporters with cross-level first and second preferences existing. This clear-cut division disappeared throughout the 1990s, as table 5.6 and 5.7 show. 2001 saw a considerable level of compatibility of having a first preference for one type of party and a second preference for another type. 2006 saw a minor reversal of this trend, driven mainly by an increase in the absolute number and relative share of national party supporters who also prefer national parties as their second choice.

To some extent this points again to the change towards greater complementarity of regional and national political forces, identities and arenas. Research on the related topic of the compatibility of loyalties to regional versus national identities seems to point in a similar direction (Mitra/Singh 1999: 161).

Table 5.6: The Relationship between First and Second Party Preference (1990)

		<i>Second Party Preference</i>	
		National	Regional
First Party Preference	National	1469 87.9%	0 0%
	Regional	0 0%	202 12.1%

N=1671. $\chi^2=1671.0$ ($p < .000$).

Table 5.7: The Relationship between First and Second Party Preference (1995)

		<i>Second Party Preference</i>	
		National	Regional
First Party Preference	National	719 76.7%	99 10.6%
	Regional	98 10.4%	22 2.3%

N=938. $\chi^2=3.616$ ($p < .057$).

Table 5.8: The Relationship between First and Second Party Preference (2001)

		<i>Second Party Preference</i>	
		National	Regional
First Party Preference	National	548 48.6%	239 21.2%
	Regional	238 21.1%	102 9.1%

N=1127. $\chi^2=0.015$ ($p < .000$).

Table 5.9: The Relationship between First and Second Party Preference (2006)

		<i>Second Party Preference</i>	
		National	Regional
First Party Preference	National	872 58.5%	238 16.0%
	Regional	248 16.6%	133 8.9%

N=1491. $\chi^2=27.52$ ($p < .000$).

On the other hand, however, when asked which party they would never vote for, increasingly national party sympathizers state that they would never vote for a particular regional party. This trend continues to grow throughout the 1990s as tables 5.10 through 5.12 indicate. Likewise, sympathizers of regional parties increasingly state that they would never vote for a particular national party as we can see from the same tables. Does this indicate a growing polarization along the regional party-national party cleavage? The answer is “yes” and “no”. That the aversion between the camps is becoming more pronounced though not hostile is undeniable based on the data below. But, in 2006 it was also much more likely that the national party which a respondent preferred in State X would have to compete mainly with a regional party than it was in 1995. Hence it is also simply statistically more likely that the “other” party which a respondent would not vote for in a State is a regional party and hence the least preferred out of all parties would be a regional party. As such, this trend indicates more a natural response or quasi-normalization in the face of much greater visibility of regional parties in India today as compared to 15 years earlier.

Table 5.10: The Relationship between First Party Preference and Party Aversion (1995)

		<i>Party Aversion</i>	
		National	Regional
First Party Preference	National	454 62.5%	153 21.1%
	Regional	63 8.7%	56 7.7%

N=726. $\chi^2=23.177$ ($p < .000$).

Table 5.11: The Relationship between First Party Preference and Party Aversion (2001)

		<i>Party Aversion</i>	
		National	Regional
First Party Preference	National	327 47.0%	172 24.7%
	Regional	165 23.7%	32 4.6%

N=696. $\chi^2=22.643$ ($p < .000$).

Table 5.12: The Relationship between First Party Preference and Party Aversion (2006)

		<i>Party Aversion</i>	
		National	Regional
First Party Preference	National	431 39.7%	351 32.4%
	Regional	177 16.3%	126 11.6%

N=1085. $\chi^2=0.966$ ($p < .326$).

In sum, therefore, it seems that the supporters of regional parties are no inherent threat to the democratic process or culture of India, but rather a valuable addition to it since they have increasingly become more inclined to support democratic norms, as we saw above than in the early 1990s. Instead of a radicalization or balkanization of India indicated by the increasing levels of support for regional party/independent candidates at the aggregate level or by the greater support voiced for regional parties or greater concern for regional issues and institutions, it appears that regional parties and issues have been mainstreamed rather than opinion or behavior radicalized. The connection existing between turnout and NNV/RPV prior to 1990 and weakening after that, mirrored by the trends in political interest and its relation to regional party support voiced in the surveys after 1990 echo this process of a mainstreaming of regional parties and their candidates throughout the 1990s.

Chapter Six:

An Extension -

The Consequences of Party System Change at the National Level

6. An Extension: The Consequences of Party System Change at the National Level

Although this approach is not likely to be the only feasible one, any discussion about the consequences of shifting balances in the power configurations between political parties in parliamentary democracies on their respective bargaining positions for government offices will usefully depart from the point of the relative numerical strengths of parties in the legislature.

The influence of those regional parties now extends beyond the governments of those States in which they originate to the national level as well. The question of whether smaller, often regional parties or larger national parties are enjoying disproportionate influence over conflictual bargaining issues at the national level, such as portfolio allocation, has received comparatively less systematic treatment in the study of Indian party politics.²⁰ The goal of this article is to analyze and to illustrate the different dynamics which underlie the relative distribution of government offices in coalition and minority governments in a multi-party setting, such as that of India. Departing on this thematic trajectory, it will address the issue of whether formateur parties or regional parties benefit disproportionately from bargaining over the distribution of government office. Before commencing with that analysis a broader overview will provide the background of national-level party politics for an investigation of the questions relating to bargaining success over government office. This will be followed by a discussion of an index for measuring bargaining power based on numerical strength of legislative parties, the so-called Banzhaf index. After this, an analysis of three cases of coalition government since 1998 will yield insights into the extent to which smaller, often regional parties have been able in the recent past to utilize their new-found numerical strength at the national level to out bargain larger national parties in one of the most important issues at stake for any party, that of winning political office at the government level.

²⁰ See Nikolenyi (2004) and McMillan (2005) for a previous contribution on the issue of government formation and portfolio allocation in India.

6.1 The Context of National Elections

To understand the influence of different types of parties at the national level of government, the government formation process should be put in the context of parliamentary elections in Indian politics more generally. For the first two decades after independence in 1947, the INC dominated Indian politics in almost all regions of the country and at all levels of political participation (Kothari 1964; Spiess 2002). In 1967, the INC for the first time lost power at the State-level, when it lost its majorities in elections to eight State assemblies to a variety of coalitions, securing only a bare majority nationally in the general elections of the same year. In 1971, the Congress Party (I) secured a large majority of seats in the Lok Sabha, following the war with Pakistan over the secession of East-Pakistan (today's Bangladesh). Seen in the context of other general elections in India, the electoral result of 1977 is remarkable for a variety of reasons. As table 6.1 shows, the level of turnout had declined substantially between 1967 and 1971 before increasing equally substantially again to 60.5 percent in 1977, i.e. to a comparative level as in 1967.

Table 6.1: Turnout in the General Elections (1952-2004)

Election	'52	'57	'62	'67	'71	'77	'80	'84	'89	'91	'96	'98	'99	'04
Turnout	44.9	45.4	55.4	61.0	55.3	60.5	57.0	63.6	62.0	55.9	58.0	62.0	60.0	58.1

Sources: Election Commission of India, Statistical Reports on General Elections (various issues, www.eci.gov.in) and Mitra et al. (2001).

This fact should not disguise the considerable level of variation among the States in terms of turnout. Among the States and Union Territories (U.T.s), Kerala, Delhi, Haryana and Punjab had some of the highest turnout rates in 1977 (all over 70 percent). Others, such as Orissa in the East and Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya and Mizoram in the Northeast were among those with the lowest rates (24 to 49 percent) in 1977. Considerable variation in turnout rates persists to this day and is reflective to some extent of the individual character of the States as

political arenas in Indian politics. The all-India breakdown of results for the five national parties is shown in table 6.2 below.

Table 6.2: Party-wise Breakdown of the 1977 General Election

	INC	BLD	CPI	CPM	NCO	State Parties	Other Parties	Independents
All-India Vote Share (%)	34.52	41.32	2.82	4.29	1.72	8.80	1.03	5.50
All-India Seat Share (%)	28.41	54.43	1.29	4.06	0.55	9.04	0.55	1.66
All-India Success Rate (%)	31.30	72.84	7.69	41.51	15.79	57.65	4.29	0.74

Note: Success Rate refers to the percentage of party candidates who won their contests in their respective constituencies. See table 4 for abbreviations of party names.

Source: Election Commission of India. Statistical Reports on General Elections (Sixth General Election, www.eci.gov.in)

As table 6.3 (below) indicates, the INC suffered the single greatest loss in the share of votes it received nationwide and in the share of seats it was able to win in 1977. However, while the losses in vote share for the Congress are also clear and significant, the losses in terms of the seat share are staggering, the INC dropping from 68 percent of seats in 1971 to 28 percent of seats in 1977. Until 1977, the Congress had benefited almost exclusively from the distorting effect of the simple plurality electoral system by being able to cash in the reputation earned as the driving force behind the anti-colonial struggle, by being able to cast itself as a broad based catchall party, building its support on a diverse range of social groups, programmatically amorphous policy agendas and effective electoral machines covering all areas of the country. It was thus able to crowd out other smaller, ideologically more cohesive parties from the center of the political space and to relegate them to the status of ‘parties of pressure’ (Morris-Jones). In 1977, this distortive effect of the electoral system was turned against the INC for the first time, giving it a smaller seat than vote share at the aggregate national level. Equally remarkable is the fact that in the 1980 election the INC was again able to reverse this development, gaining 65.1 percent of all seats on the basis of a nationwide vote share of 42.7

percent. From the late 1980s onward, however, the INC has no longer been able to achieve comparable success regarding votes or seats at the national level.²¹

Table 6.3: Electoral Success of the Indian National Congress (1952-2004)

Election	'52	'57	'62	'67	'71	'77	'80	'84	'89	'91	'96	'98	'99	'04
Vote % (V)	45.0	47.8	44.7	40.8	43.7	34.5	42.7	48.0	39.5	36.5	28.8	25.9	28.3	26.5
Seat % (S)	74.4	75.1	73.1	54.4	68.0	28.4	65.1	76.6	36.3	42.7	25.8	26.0	33.5	26.7
S-V	29.4	27.3	28.4	13.6	24.3	-6.1	22.4	28.6	-3.2	6.2	-3.0	0.1	5.2	0.2

Sources: Election Commission of India, Statistical Reports on General Elections (various issues, www.eci.gov.in) and Mitra et al. (2001).

As table 6.4 indicates, the 1977 elections were the only elections since India's independence in which the INC, at the all-India level, did not win the largest vote share out of all parties competing. Instead, the Janata Party (competing under the label of one of its constituent parties, the BLD) outdid the Congress by almost seven percent.

Table 6.4: Main Competitors for Power in the General Elections (1952-2004)

Election	'52	'57	'62	'67	'71	'77	'80	'84	'89	'91	'96 ^c	'98 ^c	'99 ^c	'04
First ^b	INC	INC	INC	INC	INC	BLD	INC	INC	INC	INC	INC	INC	INC	INC
Second ^b	SOC	PSP	CPI	BJS	CPM	INC	JNP	BJP	JD	JD	BJP	BJP	BJP	BJP
F-S ^a	34.4	37.4	34.8	31.5	33.3	6.8	23.7	41.6	21.7	24.7	8.5	0.2	4.5	4.3

^a F-S refers to the difference in the national vote share of the *national* party winning the largest vote share ('first') and the runner-up *national* party ('second') (rounded figures). The official term "national party" refers to parties recognized by the Election Commission of India and competing in three states or more, i.e. only to the parties vying for more than regional influence.

^b INC = Indian National Congress (1971, 1980 INC-I); BLD = Bharatiya Lok Dal (Label used by the electoral coalition Janata Party in 1977);

^c Despite its largest vote share the INC captured fewer seats than its direct competitor and hence did not form the government after the 1996, 1998 and 1999 elections.

Sources: Election Commission of India, Statistical Reports on General Elections (various issues, www.eci.gov.in) and Mitra et al. (2001).

In the 1977 elections, and again in the 1990s, the gap in vote share between the two largest parties also narrowed considerably, demonstrating the almost equal status in electoral appeal of the two main competitors for political support at the national level in that election. Again,

²¹ For a detailed examination of the change of India's national party system refer to Chhibber/Kollman (2004).

this trend was sharply reversed in the 1980 elections, and subsequently it took until the mid-1990s for a more or less permanent two-party competition at the nationwide level between the center-left INC and the Bharatiya Janata Party on the nationalist right to emerge.

Significantly, also, the 1977 elections were the general elections at which the cohesiveness of the opposition in terms of 'opposition unity' (Butler/Lahiri/Roy 1997) was the greatest, as table 6.5 demonstrates below. The index (IOU), developed to measure unity (or fragmentation) of the vote of the opposition parties in a one-party-dominant situation, is calculated as follows:

$$\text{IOU} = \frac{\text{Vote share of the largest opposition party}}{\text{Sum of vote shares of all the opposition parties}} \times 100$$

The index, which was conceptualized primarily to analyze one-dominant party systems, captures visibly the effect of the fact that in 1977, several formerly independent, and often competing parties combined to form a single, loosely-bound umbrella party, the Janata Party (running under the label of one of its constituents, the Bharatiya Lok Dal/BLD)²². The constituent parties were: the Bharatiya Lok Dal led by Charan Singh, the Congress for Democracy led by Jagjivan Ram (an INC minister until just before the elections), the Bharatiya Jana Sangh led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the Swatantra Party and the Socialist Party. This enabled the pooling of organizational and financial resources of these different organizations to the advantage of that new party's candidates against Congress candidates. It also enabled those parties to select one most electable candidate from their ranks for each of

²² IOU is best used to analyze one-dominant-party systems, but does not tell us much when analyzing and comparing a number of changing party systems in which different parties won the elections at the previous time point. The index used in this analysis (ACUI, see Appendix II) instead, is inspired by but differs from IOU in that it measures the cohesion of the vote for anti-Congress parties rather than opposition parties (which would include the INC in some States in the 1977). This better captures the cohesion in the anti-Congress vote. In the special case of Tamil Nadu, where the INC had entered into arrangements with regional parties since 1971 to effect seat adjustments, the values for ACUI measure the total vote for the INC and its respective regional ally (DMK in 1971, AIADMK in 1977), which may explain this State's position as a statistical outlier.

the constituencies in which the Janata Party contested, based on an arithmetic of sharing out constituencies among the constituent parties, allocating 'safe seats' or 'likely wins' first. Additionally, the Janata Party engaged in seat adjustments with the Congress (O), led by Morarji Desai and the Communist Party of India (Marxist, CPM).

Table 6.5: Index of Opposition Unity, Lok Sabha Elections 1962-1991

	1962	1967	1971	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	Average
All-India	67	67	71	90	65	74	77	66	72

Source: Butler/Lahiri/Roy (1997: 164).

The effect of this unification of opposition parties under one party label, as well as of the seat adjustments to avoid many triangular candidate contests against the INC and the consequent fragmentation of the anti-Congress vote, will be further discussed below. The unification, however, seems inconceivable given an absence of the catalytic experience of the oppression of the opposition parties during the state of emergency from June 1975 to January 1977.

6.2 Wagging the Dog: The Impact of Regional Parties at the National Level

One of the consequences of the ascent of regional parties over the last three decades has been the slow erosion of national party preeminence in the national party system. This erosion has led regional parties to become viable if volatile coalition partners in national coalition governments between 1977 and 1979 and again after 1989 in a number of minority coalition cabinets. With the shift from the old "Congress system" to a competitive multi-party democracy at the regional, as well as at the national levels, the once dominant Indian National Congress (INC), has mostly become relegated from the dominant to a mere *formateur* status in the process of government formation after regional or national elections, like its main competitor, the center-right Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People's Party, BJP). The concomitant rise of regional parties needs to be seen in the context of this overall change of


the Indian party systems at the national and regional levels. Recent research (Ansolabehere et al. 2005) on coalition governments in Western Europe has shown that such *formateur* parties enjoy a significant advantage in the bargaining over government office allocation. The same research has found that parties' shares of cabinet posts in coalition governments are better predicted by their respective voting weights than by their shares of seats in the legislature. Whether this finding and others about the relationship between voting weights, seat shares and cabinet posts is consistent with dynamics found in the highly fragmented setting at the national level in India, will be the question which this article seeks to answer.

The fact that coalition governments are the norm and no longer the exception in Indian national as well as regional-level politics, is by now well known and documented in current research (Singh 2001; Sridharan 2003; Nikolenyi 2004). Likewise, the reasons for the shift from a system of one-party dominance of the Indian National Congress (INC) to a multi-party system with numerous regional parties have been discussed extensively (Chhibber 1999; Mitra/Singh 1999; Singh 2001; Palshikar 2003). As the erstwhile dominance of the Congress Party at both levels of party politics in India has declined rapidly in the past two decades, a trend towards an increased regionalization at the same levels has taken firm root. This trend and its effects are apparent in a number of characteristics of India's national and State party systems. Beginning with the formation of a number of non-Congress-led State governments in 1967, politics at the State level has over time, particularly since the 1980s, increasingly become an arena in its own right and is today somewhat separated from all-India dynamics, both as far as electoral behavior as well as public opinion are concerned (Mitra/Singh 1999).

At the Union level this coterminous decline of Congress dominance and a rise of regional parties can be seen in a number of indicators. When assessing the fragmentation of the national party system over time, it becomes obvious that the effective number of parties,

as measured by the Laakso-Taagepera index,²³ has increased significantly in the last 18 years (see figure 6.1 below).

Figure 6.1: Effective Number of Parties (N_{Seats}) in the Lok Sabha, 1952 to 2004



Source: Own calculation based on the Election Commission of India's *Election Reports* for various years (<http://eci.nic.in>, accessed February 2008).

As figure 6.1 shows, the number of parties which competed successfully remained around 1.8 (measured by seats; 4.3 when measured on the basis of votes) for a longer period in the 1950s and early 1960s in the lower house of the national parliament, the *Lok Sabha*.²⁴ This number increased noticeably in the last six national elections.²⁵ Secondly, the new-found importance of regional parties can be seen from the declining share of votes and seats in the national parliament which national parties have been able to win over time (see table 6.6 below).

²³ The index (N) is calculated based on the equation
$$N = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^n p_i^2}$$
. The p_i indicates the respective seat or vote

share of party i . Independents were counted as separate legislative parties with one member each. For critical evaluations of this measure see Dumont/Caulier (2003), Dunleavy/Boucek (2003), Diwakar (2005), Blau (2008).

²⁴ The difference between N_{seats} and N_{votes} is caused by the distorting influence of the simple plurality voting system employed in India.


²⁵ See the discussion in Chhibber/Kollman (2004: 39-47) about this phenomenon, who also point out that the higher effective number of parties at the national level masks the continuation of two-party competition in many of the district level electoral contests.

Table 6.6: Lok Sabha Elections: Vote/Seat Shares of *National* Parties and the Number of Parties (1952-2004)

Election Year	Seat Share (%)	Vote Share (%)	No. of Parties
1952	82.6	67.8	54
1957	85.2	73.0	15
1962	89.0	78.4	27
1967	84.6	76.3	25
1971	85.1	77.8	53
1977	88.7	84.6	34
1980	91.7	85.1	36
1984	85.4	77.8	35
1989	89.0	79.3	113
1991	89.5	80.8	145
1996	76.6	69.6	209
1998	71.2	68.0	176
1999	68.0	67.1	169
2004	67.5	63.1	230
2009	69.2	62.9	220

Sources: 1952 to 1998 are based on data from Butler, Lahiri und Roy (1997) and the Election Commission of India, cited in Mitra/Singh (1999), p.159. 1999 and 2004 were calculated on the basis of information from the Press Information Bureau of India. The results for 2009 are based on the Election Commission of India's website (<http://ecireresults.nic.in> , accessed May 15th). The number of parties refers to the raw total number of participating parties, both national *and* other parties, according to various issues of the Election Commissions *Election Reports*.

Figure 6.2: Vote/Seat Shares of National Parties and Absolute Number of Parties in Lok Sabha Elections



Source: see table 6.1.

Quite visibly, figure 6.2 (above) demonstrates that the weight of national parties has declined over time, more so, if one takes into account the specific notion of "national" and "regional" or State parties which here follows the definition of the Election Commission of India. Thus, a party is considered a national party if it wins at least six percent of the votes State-wide over successive elections in four or more States. If one measure parties' national or regional character by employing an indicator of the regional distribution of votes, most if not all Indian parties would look more like regional parties than national parties.²⁶

Beyond these numerical indicators of smaller regional parties' success in electoral contests, the trend towards a regionalization of politics are also apparent in the themes which have come to define campaigning and other forms of mobilization in the elections to national as well as regional legislatures. Increasingly, topics which do not necessarily have a direct connection to national level policymaking, such as poverty and development (which are State government domains), or topics which are specific to a certain region, like longstanding caste competition in Uttar Pradesh²⁷ or political issues concerning internal migration in Maharashtra, have become salient even in national elections. Examples such as the 1998 victory of the then-BJP newcomer candidate Ila Pant over the veteran INC politician N.D. Tiwari in the Nainital district of Uttar Pradesh in North India due to her vociferous support of the movement for the creation of a new State, Uttharakhand (separated from Uttar Pradesh in 2000 as Uttaranchal) and due to her husband's local electoral machine can serve to illustrate the new importance which local and regional issues have attained even in national elections. Similarly, the poor results of the respective governing parties of the State governments in Orissa, Maharashtra, Karnataka and Rajasthan underline how much the negative evaluation of

²⁶ See chapter 2 for a problematization of this and Ziegfeld (2008) for such a less context-sensitive definition based on a modified Herfindahl index of vote concentration. For the purpose of this limited inquiry, the definition of the Election Commission will suffice, since most previous research employs it and since the alternative based on the concentration of vote shares is not without its own disadvantages.

²⁷ See Chandra (2004) for a comparative assessment of mobilization of the caste cleavage.

regional governments can impact parties' performance in national elections. This is equally true for the impact of the Union government's evaluation impacting on results in State assembly elections.²⁸

On the other hand, this emphasis on a generally visible trend toward a regionalization of politics in India should not obscure the fact that local and regional issues have always been important in determining election outcomes at the district level (Bueno de Mesquita 1978). The Congress Party has always sought, especially during its time as the dominant party, like other parties to speak to local and regional issues to mobilize its support groups. While this has in the past sometimes led to the conclusion that Indian politics is almost exclusively concerned with local and regional issues and to the conclusion that the INC is united across regions by little more than a common name, a national leadership level and a common logo (Brass 1991: 164-165), mobilization patterns are slightly more complex than that. In reality, a candidate (especially the incumbent, who needs to take into account voters' as well as the party leadership's preferences) will have to offer a mixed array of promises on regional as well as local issues, while the challenger will likely be able to concentrate much more on mobilizing voters at the district level on the basis of local grievances. Thus, in India the trend of an increasing dominance of national over regional issues and the homogenization of parties and party systems most often associated with federally organized political systems, paradoxically seems to be absent or even reversed. The national and regional levels of government in India are increasingly coequal arenas of political articulation and mobilization, as well as entities which demand political loyalty and attention from citizens.²⁹

²⁸ For a brief discussion of both trends see Kumar (2003: 304-305).

²⁹ Refer to Mitra/Singh (1999: 155-156) for a treatment of nation and region as coequal evidenced in public opinion data.

6.3 Numerical Strength, Power and Influence of Parties in Coalitions

Intra-coalition bargaining is inextricably linked to the question of the distribution of power as well as influence in multiple dimensions. While a more detailed analysis of the concepts of power or influence would be desirable in this context, we will not attempt such an extensive discussion here in the interest of brevity and efficiency with regard to the empirical goal of analyzing Indian cases. Nevertheless, we will take political influence to be a wider concept which includes the concept of power as a more specific concept.³⁰ Political influence will not be understood as necessarily restricted to the interaction with others. Political power will be understood to mean the possible or actual change in decision outcomes, and therefore as a strictly relational concept (in view of collective decision-making) involving other actors. It therefore describes a subset of what is meant by political influence. Since this chapter deals with coalition politics, in particular with government formation and portfolio allocation in coalitions, the phenomenon of political power will primarily be understood to mean the capacity to change a non-winning into a winning coalition. Hence, political power rests with those actors who are capable of changing a group of legislative actors (irrespective of whether they are individual or collective actors), through joining that group, from a minority into a majority in a yes/no decision situation. Likewise, actors obviously are also powerful when they have the capability to reverse this process from a winning to a losing coalition (such as is the case in a vote of no confidence in the legislature as stipulated in Article 198 of the Rules of the Lok Sabha in conjunction with Article 75 (2) of the Constitution of India). It is clear that this is a nominal definition of power and influence respectively, and more importantly a definition of potential power since in reality, no tall actors possessing the said characteristics

³⁰ For a differing view consult Arts/Verschuren (1999: 413), who define political power in a Weberian tradition as the possibility of influencing political actors, and influence as the actual use of that capability. Such a distinction along the lines of a possibility of a certain action (here: the changing of the behavior of others) as opposed to its actualization, however, seems neither theoretically or logically necessary nor empirically warranted. Riker (1964: 342), on the other hand does not go as far as to distinguish clearly between power and influence in his analysis of different conceptions and operationalizations of power, although he does mention the fact that others had done so (for example March 1955).

are viable partners in all coalition configurations due to mutual ideological or personnel incompatibilities. However, in principle, an actor with such political power can influence decision-making processes in a legislative organ provided she is able to become a member of a winning coalition. Actors (such as individual legislators or legislative parties in the Lok Sabha for example), who are not a part of the actual coalition, thus only possess indirect power, which is, however, not based on their numerical strength in the current legislature but rather on the threat potential they may have by way of veto positions they might occupy in other institutions or the continuing competition for votes in future elections.

It will be shown below in how far smaller, regional parties in the three most recent legislative periods of the Lok Sabha (1998-1999, 1999-2004, 2004-2009) have been able to systematically win a larger share of government offices than a just allocation based on their share of seats in the government-supporting legislative coalition would warrant. In order to investigate this, a number of variables are identified, operationalized and calculated alongside a conventional index measuring power in yes/no decision-making processes, the so-called (normalized) Banzhaf index (Banzhaf 1965). This index has been used extensively to evaluate how bargaining power based on the numerical strength of political parties or individuals is distributed in a decision-making body such as a legislature. It determines the relative power in any situation by ascertaining in how many cases the vote of an actor would change a decision and compares that power to that of other actors in the same body.³¹

Despite the somewhat warranted reservations against the careless use of power indices in many contexts, some of which will be mentioned in connection with the evaluation of the actual results, a thus formalized inquiry into bargaining power has its legitimate use. Often it is a formalized index like the Banzhaf index which will illustrate why smaller parties in certain situations can have just as much threat potential in a government coalition as much

³¹ For a theoretical discussion of this index see Banzhaf (1965) and Taylor (1995: 78-80).

larger parties.³² Based on an admittedly simplifying real-world example this usefulness, especially for comparative studies can be understood relatively easily. The Banzhaf index for each actor P_i with a weight w_i from a set of actors $S=\{P_1, \dots, P_n\}$ is calculated as follows:

$$BI(P_i) = \frac{BP(P_i)}{\sum_{i=1}^n BP(P_i)}$$

$BP(P_i)$ denotes the number of winning coalitions in which P_i is critical, i.e. in which P_i 's leaving the coalition would turn it from a winning coalition into a losing coalition. This means that the quota which must be met for turning a losing into a winning coalition has to be more than half of the total weights w_i of all the parties P_i . In legislatures w_i equals the number of legislators united by the same party label. It therefore represents P_i 's bargaining power.³³ In 1969, the German Bundestag consisted of three parties (the fourth party with an overall national vote share of 4.3 percent, the NPD, failed to pass the electoral threshold of five percent), the Social Democrats (SPD), the Christian Democrats (CDU and CSU, who are treated as one legislative party) and the Free Democrats (FDP). Based on the above formula, the seat distribution and its conversion into the three parties' Banzhaf values are listed in table 6.7 below.

Table 6.7: Seat Distribution and Banzhaf Values in the Sixth *Bundestag* (1969-1972):

<i>Party:</i>	<i>CDU</i>	<i>SPD</i>	<i>FDP</i>
Seats	242	223	30
Normalized Banzhaf Value (%)	33.3	33.3	33.3

Note: The 22 indirectly elected delegates from West-Berlin are not included here.

In the example above, all parties are potential members in four winning coalitions, including an all party coalition, leading to a Banzhaf value of one third for each of the three parties.

³² For an application to the Israeli case see McGann/Moran (2005: 3-5).

³³ The overall possible winning coalitions in this example are $C1$ (CDU-SPD-FDP), $C2$ (CDU-SPD), $C3$ (CDU-FDP), $C4$ (SPD-FDP). However, in $C1$ none of the parties is individually critical, which leads to a BI of 2/6 or 33.3 for each of the three parties.

The use of formalized stylizations and models such as that underlying the Banzhaf index in the analysis of coalition governments entails a number of problems in the context of the Indian party system since these models are built on assumptions regarding the characteristics of political systems, which are even less realistic in the Indian context than in other countries. One such example is the unrestricted exchangeability of political support between parties by way of cohesive block voting of legislators in the legislature. Deep-seated antipathies of political actors vis-à-vis each other, such as that between the INC and the Bharatiya Janata Party are not considered in this model which lessens the proximity of the theoretical model to ground realities and might impact the applicability of any findings based on it. However, not all characteristics of these formal stylizations are meant to be entirely realistic.³⁴ Their worth, according to their proponents, lies in the prognostic capacity of the models. In how far the Banzhaf index can be used heuristically to understand the subsequent three Indian cases *ex post* will be the topic of the following sections.

For the purpose of the subsequent analysis we will follow a modified notion of the term advanced by Schüttemeyer (2002) and define coalitions as “temporary alliances of political actors with the aim of achieving common [and separate, author’s note] goals”. In parliamentary democracies these alliances often refer to the banding together of a number of parties (or individual legislators) which support a government in legislative voting. This can be the case for prolonged periods of time, when parties unite as a majority coalition and collaborate in government decision-making or in a minority coalition, which supports a government and is supported more or less *ad hoc* from the outside by other parties or legislators. This latter case best describes the situation in the three cases of Indian national coalitions which will be analyzed below. Members of a coalition often act under the stress of a conflict within their own preferences. They have to try and combine two requirements in

³⁴ For a successful application of a formal model to Indian coalition games and for a justification of that application, see Nikolenyi (2004), who, however, follows a different approach based on van Roozendaal (1992) which already integrates ideological positions into the model.

their actions: forging compromise with other parties/legislators and yet satisfying their own constituencies (Lupia/Strøm 2005).

In the subsequent analysis, the emphasis will be merely on one single aspect of coalition politics, namely that of the allocation of portfolios in the government or *office-seeking*. Other aspects of coalition dynamics, such as *policy-seeking* and the implementation of policy by administrative institutions have to be excluded from the analysis for the sake of brevity. Another aspect which is important in the context of Indian politics, but which has to be neglected here, is the relative importance of individual politicians compared to party organizations. In the Lok Sabha as well as in the State Assemblies many groupings exist which are splinter groups carved out of other existing parties and depend heavily on the personal charisma of individual leaders. As far as the present question of the disproportionate influence of regional parties in coalition politics at the national level is concerned, the linkages between these splinter parties and local (or regional) interests is of lesser concern. However, it would be reasonable to assume that there will be a difference between national and regional parties and between parties competing at the subnational level in party systems which are characterized by multi-party competition and those competing in two-party systems with regard to their office-seeking behavior at the national level. These differences due to electoral strategies will concern for example the types of offices or portfolios which certain parties strive for at the national level compared to those chosen by others. The linkage with local or regional interests will be even stronger in those highly fragmented party systems with small and personality-driven parties than is already the case in India anyway.³⁵

In the analysis of possible explanations for the portfolio allocation in the three Indian coalitions under investigation a modified version of office-seeking, or *instrumental office-seeking* will be taken up to stress that for different parties and their constituencies certain portfolios have a greater value than others (for example ministries which deal with locally

³⁵ See Chhibber/Nooruddin (2004) for a detailed study of the consequences of consequences of party competition on government policies in the Indian States.

concentrated branches of the economy or natural resources). This instrumental behavior and the individually different subjective values attached to offices especially by regional parties on the other hand has offered the larger parties INC and BJP the chance to compensate smaller parties in difficult bargaining situation. This principle of instrumental office-seeking therefore is particularly useful as a heuristic tool for understanding the actions of smaller, regional and personality-driven parties.

6.4 Power, Office and Government Formation Since 1998

Overall, there has been a visible trend towards a more diversified party system at both levels of government which plays out in campaign issues as much as in the electoral successes of explicitly regionally oriented parties in State as well as national elections. The minority governments at the Union level, led by the United Front, a coalition of regional parties, and supported from the outside by the Congress party, underscore the growing importance of smaller regional parties in Indian national politics. The regionalization of electoral campaigns in national and regional elections, as well as the growing importance of regional parties as evidenced in public opinion data have been discussed extensively (instead of many see Palshikar 2003). It is important, however, to assess how regional parties and their larger coalition partners have fared since the fall of the United Front government and the elections of 1998. It is far less clear in how far the growing electoral success of smaller parties has led to a significantly greater, and perhaps even disproportionate bargaining power vis-à-vis the formateur parties in the process of government formation. In the process of converting numerical strength into real influence distortions are likely on account of the different levels of skills in bargaining, the possibility of compensation through side payments in the form of satisfying a coalition partner's demands in an area unconnected with the issue at hand, or on account of the ideological distance of the parties involved. In a federally organized system,

such as that of India, the issue of a possible competition of smaller parties with the formateur parties in one of the federal units will have an impact on whether parties will actually form a coalition and on which terms. If such a competition is likely, as the case of the Congress party and the Communist Party of India (Marxist; CPIM) at the Union and State levels demonstrates, cooperation in a coalition or minority government at the Union level becomes more problematic.

The following sections outline the dynamics of government formation in the last three parliaments since 1998. The narratives take into account the seat shares in the legislature of the coalition partners and supporting legislative parties, their seat shares relative to the size of the coalition, as well as their bargaining power as measured by the Banzhaf index (see appendix for the method of calculation).

6.4.1 The Twelfth Lok Sabha Period, 1998 to 1999

The elections of 1998 produced a plurality of seats for the BJP. Together with parties in its pre-electoral coalition it was able to form a government under Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Table 6.8 (below) details the election outcome and the government composition in the twelfth Lok Sabha immediately after the formation of government. The composition of this government coalition, like in the case of the other government coalitions discussed later, changed in the course of its duration. For the purpose of assessing the relative success of formateur parties and smaller parties in bargaining over government office, however, these subsequent changes have no immediate bearing. The focus will lie on the bargaining processes directly following the three elections and on the distribution of cabinet and other ministerial posts.

The Bharatiya Janata Party won a plurality of seats in the general election 1998 and in consequence was asked to form a government after Prime Minister Vajpayee was sworn in. It

held 33.6 percent of the seats in parliament and its share of the total seats of the government-supporting coalition was 65.8 percent. Nevertheless, the party was able to claim 58.1 percent of all ministerial posts (cabinet ministers and ministers of state) in government. Of the more prestigious cabinet minister posts, the BJP was able to claim a share of 52 percent. Both are significantly higher than what would be expected based on bargaining models which center on assumptions about the underlying distribution of bargaining power as measured by the Banzhaf index. The value for the BJP in 1998 for this index was 34, indicating that the party held 34 percent of the bargaining power in the Lok Sabha. The formateur's share also included the prestigious post of Prime Minister, as in the cases of the other two governments to be discussed below, and other important ministries such as the Home, Industry, Labor, Energy, Finance and Textile ministries. On the other hand, those smaller regional parties which were formally included in the government coalition fared slightly better than what their seat shares in the legislature, in the total number of coalition supporters or what their Banzhaf values would have predicted. This is due to the fact that 24 members of parliament from five parties chose to informally lend their support to the coalition without joining the government. Especially the *All India Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam* (AIADMK) from Tamil Nadu under the leadership of J. Jayalalitha, the Bihar-based *Samata Party* of veteran union leader George Fernandes and the *Biju Janata Dal* (BJD) from Orissa were able to win office beyond what would have been expected.

Tab. 6.7: Lok Sabha Elections and Composition 1998-1999 (Only Government Supporting Parties at Time of Government Formation)

Party	Regional Party/ National Party	Vote Share (%) ^a	Seats ^a	Lok Sabha Seat Share (%)	Share in Total No. of Government Supporting Legislators (%) ^d	Banzhaf Index (%) ^b	No. of Ministries (Cabinet Mins./ Mins. of State)	Share of Cabinet Posts (%) ^c	Share of all Minister-level Posts (%) ^c
BJP	N	25,6	183	33,6	65,8	34,58	25 (11/14)	50,0	58,1
AIADMK	R	1,83	18	3,3	6,47	4,53	4 (2/2)	9,1	9,3
Samata Party	N	1,76	13	2,4	4,68	3,23	2 (2/0)	9,1	4,7
BJD	R	1,0	9	1,65	3,24	2,23	2 (1/1)	4,54	4,7
SAD	R	0,81	8	1,47	2,88	1,98	2 (1/1)	4,54	4,7
Shiv Sena	R	1,77	6	1,10	2,16	1,48	1 (0/1)	4,54	2,3
Independents	R	n.a.	4	0,73	1,44	0,99	3 (2/1)	9,1	7,0
PMK	R	0,42	4	0,73	1,44	0,99	1 (0/1)	-	2,3
Lok Shakti	R	0,7	3	0,55	1,08	0,74	1 (1/0)	4,54	2,3
TMC	R	1,4	3	0,55	1,08	0,74	1 (1/0)	4,54	2,3
Arunachal Congress	R	0,05	3	0,55	1,08	0,74	1 (0/1)	-	2,3
TDP	R	2,77	12	2,2	4,32	2,98	-	-	-
W.B. Trinamool Congress	R	2,42	7	1,28	2,52	1,73	-	-	-
MDMK	R	0,44	3	0,55	1,08	0,74	-	-	-
Janata Party	R	0,12	1	0,18	0,36	0,25	-	-	-
HVP	R	0,24	1	0,18	0,36	0,25	-	-	-
<i>As a comparison:</i> INC		25,85	141	25,87	--	10,22	--	--	--

Sources: a = Election Commission of India, *Statistical Reports, General Elections 1998*, Vol. I. Two members nominated by the President are included (BJP, Samata Party). Figures reflect the numbers immediately after the election. b = Calculated with the BPI Calculator, Dept. of Mathematics, Temple University. The four independent legislators supporting the coalition were counted as a group (Weight: 4), the other independent legislators were counted individually (Weight: 1), all other legislators who are sole representatives of a party were also weighted as groups of 1. c = Own calculation based on information on the *Council of Ministers in India Today*, 30.03.1998, p.11 (22 *Cabinet Ministers*, 21 *Ministers of State*). The office of the Prime Minister was included. d = Total number of government-supporting legislators: 278 (254 in a minority coalition, 24 informally).

All three of the mentioned coalition partners received a larger share than the conventional indicators would have lead one to expect (which is partly due to mathematical effects because each additional post adds an additional share to their share in posts which is not an integer value). Moreover, all three parties received control over ministries which were of particular strategic value for their respective leadership, Justice (AIADMK), Defense and Railways (Samata) and Steel and Mining (BJD). The Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD), which has its only stronghold in the mainly agriculturally-oriented State of Punjab, received an especially valuable office in the form of a combined ministry of Chemicals, Fertilizers and Food. The Hindu nationalist *Shiv Sena* with only one Ministry of State performed worse at winning office than its share in the number of coalition supporters, its relative ideological proximity to large sections in the BJP or its Banzhaf value would have predicted.

Overall, the BJP was able to claim a more than proportionate share of offices (cabinet and total number of ministries) when measured against its share of seats in the Lok Sabha and against its Banzhaf value. When compared to its share in the total number of members supporting the government formally and informally, however, it received a less adequate share (58.1 and 52 instead of 65.8 percent). In no small measure this underperformance must be attributed to the fact that after a failed attempt to put together a coalition government in 1996, the BJP had to be more accommodating if it wanted to succeed at government formation in 1998. While it thus had to compromise on the distribution of ministerial posts (for example by giving the AIADMK the additional Ministry of Justice portfolio), it was able to initially fend off key demands by smaller regional partners, such as those of the AIADMK to allow the small Janata Party of Subramaniam Swamy to join the government and to dismiss

the DMK-led State government of Tamil Nadu by invoking President's Rule in accordance with article 356 of the Indian constitution.³⁶

6.4.2 The Thirteenth Lok Sabha Period, 1999 to 2004

In 1999, the AIADMK left the coalition and in April of that year, Prime Minister Vajpayee lost in a vote of no confidence in the Lok Sabha which led to early elections.³⁷ As table 6.9 below demonstrates, the bargaining position and outcomes paradoxically improved for the BJP due to the early elections. Although the party's share of seats in the Lok Sabha (the largest of all parties) remained constant and its share in the legislative coalition even declined noticeably, its bargaining power as measured by its Banzhaf rating improved markedly due to the increased fragmentation of the parliament. The BJP was able to win 60 percent of cabinet posts and 68.7 percent of all ministerial posts with only 33.6 percent of seats in the Lok Sabha and 60.4 percent of seats in the legislative coalition. As in 1998, the President of India had invited the leader of the BJP's legislative party to form the government, which also led to its winning the office of Prime Minister for Atal Bihari Vajpayee again.

³⁶ For a description of the difficult negotiations over government formation, refer to *India Today* 16 March 1998, 23 March 1998 and 30 March 1998.

³⁷ See Kapur (2000: 195-96) for a description of the circumstances which led to the vote of no confidence and the AIADMK's exit from the government coalition.

Tab. 6.9: Lok Sabha Elections and Composition 1999-2004 (Only Government Supporting Parties at Time of Government Formation)

Party	Regional Party/ National Party	Vote Share (%) ^a	Seats ^a	Lok Sabha Seat Share (%)	Share in Total No. of Government Supporting Legislators (%) ^d	Banzhaf Index (%) ^b	No. of Ministries (Cabinet Mins./ Mins. of State)	Share of Cabinet Posts (%) ^c	Share of all Minister-level Posts (%) ^c
BJP	N	25,6	183	33,6	60,40	44,88	46 (15/31)	60,0	68,7
Janata Dal (U)	N	3,10	22	4,04	7,26	4,19	6 (4/2)	16,0	8,96
Shiv Sena	R	1,56	15	2,75	4,95	2,87	3 (2/1)	8,0	4,48
DMK	R	1,73	12	2,20	3,96	2,29	3 (2/1)	8,0	4,48
BJD	R	1,20	10	1,83	3,30	1,91	2 (1/1)	4,0	2,99
AITC	R	2,57	8	1,47	2,64	1,53	2 (1/1)	4,0	2,99
NCP	R	2,27	8	1,47	2,64	1,53	2 (0/2)	-	2,99
PMK	R	0,65	5	0,91	1,65	0,95	2 (0/2)	-	2,99
MDMK	R	0,44	4	0,73	1,32	0,76	1 (0/1)	-	1,49
TDP	R	3,65	29	5,32	9,57	5,51	-	-	-
INLD	R	0,55	5	0,91	1,65	0,95	-	-	-
SAD	R	0,69	2	0,37	0,66	0,38	-	-	-
<i>As a comparison:</i>		28,30	114	20,92	--	7,93	--	--	--
INC									

Sources: a = Election Commission of India, *Statistical Reports, General Elections 1998*, Vol. 1. Two members nominated by the President are included (BJP, JD(U)). Figures reflect the numbers immediately after the election. b = Calculated with the BPI Calculator, Dept. of Mathematics, Temple University, U.S.A. The six independent government-supporting legislators were counted as a group (weight: 6). The alternative approach of treating them as groups of one would not alter the results in a significant way. c = Own calculation based on information on the *Council of Ministers in India Today*, 25.10.1999, p.12 (25 *Cabinet Ministers*, 42 *Ministers of State*). The office of the Prime Minister was included although the report did not state this expressly. However, should this be an incorrect assumption, this would only reduce the BJP share further, thus not altering the substantive findings in a substantial way. Two portfolios (agriculture/labor) remained unfilled at the time of government formation. d = Total number of government-supporting legislators: 303 (267 in a minority coalition, 36 informally).

This more than proportionate level of success at winning office can likely be attributed to a number of factors. As in 1998, some parties pledged their support to the government without formally joining the portfolio coalition, but rather refusing to join on a more formal basis. Secondly, the BJP benefits from its role as the official formateur since it can outbid the Congress party in the formation and bargaining phase for minor party support by pointing to this official role assigned to it by the President and exert greater pressure than in 1998 on smaller parties by threatening to take up negotiations with other small parties in the event that they should not be willing to give in to the BJP's demands.³⁸ Another potential explanation may lie in the fact that empirically the bargaining over government office at the Union level in India is not a zero-sum game, but rather a variable sum game. Between the 1998 and 1999 government formations the total number of ministerial posts was increased from 43 to 67, mainly through the addition of Minister of State positions which were given to BJP legislators. But, despite this flexibility, it is still remarkable that the smaller partners in the legislative and portfolio coalitions did not demand a larger number of posts as well, but allowed the BJP to exercise its influence in such a one-sided way for its own benefit instead, which points again to the BJP's increased bargaining power after the 1999 elections. In contrast to the previous election, the Congress party was no viable alternative as a potential formateur of a government in 1999 due to its decreased share of seats in the Lok Sabha and its decreased Banzhaf bargaining power rating. While in 1998 the INC had still attempted to form a legislative coalition of its own to form a government, this was not the case in 1999 and the BJP was able, under the leadership of A.B. Vajpayee and L.K. Advani, to negotiate from a much stronger position and play out smaller parties against each other in the portfolio coalition. The contrast of the indicators for the BJP and the INC in table 4 (below) illustrates this situation.

³⁸ Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) have extensively discussed the types of advantages which the formateur enjoys in the government formation phase vis-à-vis other larger and smaller parties.

As in 1998, the BJP as the formateur was able to occupy the most important and prestigious ministerial posts, like those for Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Finance and Justice. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy in this context that the *Janata Dal* (United, JDU)/*Samata Party* under George Fernandes was successful at winning posts far in excess of what its share in the legislative coalition or its Banzhaf rating would have indicated. This discrepancy will remain puzzling as long as the surrounding circumstances of this merely structural view of relative power are not taken into account. During the negotiations the future members of the portfolio coalition had actually agreed on a formula for the allocation of portfolios (per six seats of each party in the portfolio coalition one Cabinet position would be allocated to that party, for each additional five seats one additional Minister of State office would be granted). In the case of the JDU, however, it became clear in the course of the negotiations that four out of its 22 legislators would demand a position in government (George Fernandes, Sharad Yadav, Nitish Kumar and Ram Vilas Paswan from Bihar).³⁹ When Fernandes offered to withdraw his candidature for a government office, this threatened to remove one of the most important interlocutors between the different coalition partners and one of the most visible politicians of the important North Indian State of Bihar from the inner circle of government. To avoid this, the other partners agreed to grant the JDU an additional post beyond what the prior compromise would have stipulated. This then prompted other small partners again to also demand an additional post for each of their parties, explaining their respective bargaining successes. Overall, however, the BJP was again able to retain the lion's share of ministerial positions, at the cabinet as well as at the subordinate levels.

³⁹ See *India Today* of 18 October 1999 and 25 October 1999 for a description of the difficult allocation process.

6.4.3 The Fourteenth Lok Sabha Period, 2004 to 2009

Since 2004 the Indian National Congress has been governing alongside other parties in the United Progressive Alliance with additional outside support from the Communist and some regional parties. Table 6.10 (below) shows the parties' position on the various indicators along with the BJP's ratings for comparison. Despite the INC's lower share of 50.1 percent of its legislative coalition's seats, in comparison with the BJP as the previous formateur, and its much lower Banzhaf value of 22, it was still able to win 65.5 percent of the Cabinet minister posts and 63.2 of all ministerial posts. Even when comparing the INC performance at winning office in 2004 to the improved performance of the BJP in 1999 (as compared to 1998), the INC's success is remarkable. With worse ratings on all of the seats, votes and power ratings, it was able to outperform the BJP at winning the more Cabinet ministries, while trading a larger share of those for a smaller share of all offices. The INC seems to have been able to pay off smaller parties in the coalition for their legislative support with less prestigious, less patronage-rich and less policy-relevant minister of state positions. This was possible since the portfolio coalition in 2004 was considerably smaller than in 1999. While the 1999 outside support made up 11.88 percent of the seats of the legislative coalition, the figure for 2004 was 22.13 percent. In effect, therefore, the INC was able to draw on outside support to a much larger extent and find other ways of compensating outside supporters without having to share the portfolios with them. Like the BJP since 1998, the INC was also able to have the most important portfolios allocated to it. Congress politicians held, among others, the home, finance, foreign affairs, energy and defense ministries, besides the office of the prime minister, held by Manmohan Singh.

Table 6.10: Lok Sabha Elections and Composition 2004-2009 (Only Government Supporting Parties at Time of Government Formation)

Party	Regional Party/ National Party	Vote Share (%) ^a	Seats ^a	Lok Sabha Seat Share (%)	Share in Total No. of Government Supporting Legislators (%) ^d	Banzhaf Index (%) ^b	No. of Ministries (Cabinet Mins./ Mins. of State)	Share of Cabinet Posts (%) ^c	Share of all Minister-level Posts (%) ^c
Indian National Congress	N	26,53	147	26,97	51,40	22,65	43 (19/24)	65,5	63,2
RJD	R	2,41	24	4,40	8,39	5,43	8 (2/6)	6,9	11,8
DMK	R	1,81	16	2,94	5,59	3,51	7 (3/4)	10,3	10,3
NCP	N	1,80	9	1,65	3,14	1,96	3 (1/2)	3,4	4,4
PMK	R	0,56	6	1,10	2,10	1,3	2 (1/1)	3,4	2,9
TRS	R	0,63	5	0,92	1,75	1,08	2 (1/1)	3,4	2,9
JMM	R	0,47	5	0,92	1,75	1,08	1 (1/0)	3,4	1,5
LJNSP	R	0,71	4	0,73	1,40	0,87	1 (1/0)	3,4	1,5
IUML	R	0,20	1	0,18	0,35	0,22	1 (0/1)	-	1,5
CPI(M)	N	5,66	43	7,89	15,03	10,72	-	-	-
CPI	N	1,41	10	1,83	3,50	2,18	-	-	-
MDMK	R	0,43	4	0,73	1,40	0,87	-	-	-
AIFB	R	0,35	3	0,55	1,05	0,65	-	-	-
RSP	R	0,43	3	0,55	1,05	0,65	-	-	-
Independents (CPI(M)-backed)	R	n.a.	1	0,18	0,35	0,22	-	-	-
KEC	R	0,09	1	0,18	0,35	0,22	-	-	-
JKPDP	R	0,07	1	0,18	0,35	0,22	-	-	-
AIMIM	R	0,11	1	0,18	0,35	0,22	-	-	-
RPI(A)	R	0,09	1	0,18	0,35	0,22	-	-	-
KC(J)	R	n.a.	1	0,18	0,35	0,22	-	-	-
<i>As a comparison:</i> BJP		22,16	138	25,32	--	18,74	--	--	--

Sources: a = Election Commission of India, *Statistical Reports, General Elections 2004*, Vol. I. Two nominated members were included (2 x INC). The numbers reflect the distribution after all districts had voted and been counted. b = Calculated with BPI Calculator, Dept. of Mathematics, Temple University, U.S.A.. Independent candidates were counted as groups with a weight of one. c = Own calculation based on information on the *Council of Ministers in India Today International*, 07.06.2004, p.23 (29 *Cabinet Ministers*, 39 *Ministers of State*). The Prime Minister was included. d = Total number of government-supporting legislators at the time of government formation: 286 (217 in a minority coalition, 69 informally); parties which later offered conditional support such as the BSP were not considered.

In return for the agreement to become a member in the legislative, but not the portfolio coalition, the Left Front (CPIM, CPI, RSP, AIFSB), among other things, successfully asked for its longstanding and experienced legislator Somnath Chatterjee to be elected Speaker of the Lok Sabha. This arrangement of a division into a portfolio coalition under the leadership of the INC and a larger legislative coalition in which the INC shares the leadership with the CPIM, also illustrates the growing importance of electoral competition at the subnational level for the building of coalitions at the Union level. The INC and the CPIM traditionally are competitors for votes and power especially in West Bengal. For the CPIM the role of outside supporter of Union governments has proved beneficial several times before, since it can influence policy formulation at the national level to benefit its key constituencies without having to take responsibility for shortcomings, thus allowing it to pursue a strategy of blame avoidance. Strategically, the continuation in power in the state of West Bengal is more important to the CPIM than a formal share in the portfolio coalition. At the same time through its inclusion in the legislative coalition it was able to exert pressure on the government to introduce the *National Rural Employment Guarantee Act*, which guarantees 100 days of paid work to each household in 200 rural districts in India, of which West Bengal's population was one of the key beneficiaries.

In 2004 the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), the main rival of the BJP-allied AIADMK in Tamil Nadu, benefitted disproportionately from the portfolio allocation. Despite its lower share of seats in the legislative coalition and its lower Banzhaf rating than the Rashtriya Janata Dal under the leadership of Laloo Prasad Yadav from Bihar, the DMK was able to win a higher share of the cabinet posts and the total number of ministries. Partly, this may be attributable to reasons of geographic proportionality since the North Indian parties, including the RJD, are generally overrepresented in the coalition, and the DMK succeeded at winning votes and seats for the UPA electoral coalition in the South. On the other hand, the RJD was able to win the patronage-rich railways portfolio for its most prominent member of

parliament, Laloo Yadav, who was initially seen as a burden for the coalition due to his notorious eccentricity and his controversial past as Chief Minister of Bihar, as well as the rural development portfolio, which is highly relevant for the party in its home base in rural Bihar.

The relatively new regional party *Jharkhand Mukti Morcha* (JMM) which has its base in the resource-rich state of Jharkhand which was carved out of Bihar in 2000, successfully bargained for the coal and mining portfolio for its leading legislator Shibu Soren. Simultaneously, the Telengana Rashtriya Samiti (TRS), the RJD and CPIM demanded special funding for West Bengal, Telengana in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, although these demands were thinly disguised as demands for a special fund for additional support of disadvantaged regions of India. Thus, while the portfolio coalition reflects only partially the relative strengths of regional representatives, the INC was able to place its own candidates in the most important offices. At the same time, smaller regional parties and the Communist allies were compensated through the allocation of strategically important portfolios or by the introduction of patronage-rich or programmatically important policies, such as welfare to work schemes benefitting in particular States like Bihar and West Bengal.

6.5 Summary

Despite the undeniable trend throughout recent decades towards an increased strength and growing importance of regional parties in Union politics, the respective numerically largest and, according to the formalized index criteria most powerful legislative party (BJP, then INC) has been able in two out of the three coalitions to actually form a coalition and to outperform regional and other national coalition partners in terms of the office allocation. It has also always been able to claim the most important portfolios for itself to document its claim to national preeminence.

The analysis undertaken here showed that smaller parties, which are regionally rooted and primarily based on regional identity and support have increased in importance in recent years. This is especially true in contrast to the first three decades of Union politics which were dominated by the Congress party. At the same time one should not make the mistake of confusing growing importance with a systematic disproportionately large influence of regional parties at the national level. The fact that regional parties have become indispensable at the national level as coalition partners does not necessarily imply that their clout in influencing national politics is excessively large. Judged by their seat share and their formal bargaining power in the Lok Sabha, the two main parties have been able (1998 and 1999 with minor qualifications) to claim a disproportionately large share of all offices for themselves. At the same time, they were able to claim the most important portfolios for themselves as well. The allocation of and striving for political office (office-seeking) as well as office patronage is not the only, and perhaps not even the most important goal for some parties for seeking power in the Lok Sabha. However, as a rough indicator for the relative power within a government coalition at the beginning of a legislative period the portfolio allocation in all three cases of minority coalitions in India since 1998 is a relatively useful indicator. In the course of the inquiry it has also become clear that heuristically, the probability-theory based Banzhaf index has only limited use for the three cases regarding any prognosis of expected portfolio allocations within a coalition. Its best use in our cases was as an indicator for the likelihood that a particular party would be able to form a coalition government. However, due to institutional constraints, other indicators, like the seat share of legislative parties could have been just as easily used for that purpose. The actual allocation within the BJP- and INC-led coalitions reflects the respective strength of the largest legislative party in the Lok Sabha according to the Banzhaf index. However, the respective party has been able to convert its numerical strength into strongly disproportionate portfolio allocations. A more reliable indicator for the conversion of numerical strength into portfolios is the respective share of

each legislative party in all government-supporting legislators. In the composition of government in 1999 this indicator is quite accurate. However, for 1998 and 2004 this is, again, the case only with some qualifications.

As a conclusion, therefore, it can be said that one of the key findings of comparative research on government formation holds in the Indian case as well. Due to the complexities of institutional design such as for example the prerogative of the largest party to normally act as the formateur, the largest party is still able to secure for itself power and influence (as measured by success in bargaining over office allocation). The power and influence of regional parties depends in no small measure, at least in the first phase of government formation and bargaining, on the bargaining skills of the respective parties' chief negotiators. For them their bargaining position is particularly problematic since they have relatively small individual shares in power as measured by the Banzhaf index and is since they often have to negotiate at the national level under the threat of being passed over for their main competitor regional parties at the subnational levels instead. Only in the course of a legislative period when all partners in a coalition have become used to the exercise of political power and have come to appreciate the spoils of office, the sometimes remarkable criticality of smaller regional parties can become evident, as in the case of the AIADMK, which toppled the first Vajpayee administration through a vote of no confidence in 1999.

The apparent difference between a numerically grounded and formally modeled arithmetic expected power calculus and actual power based on portfolio allocation and influence over cabinet and ministry policies holds three distinct lessons. The first is the context dependence and restricted prognostic quality of abstract models. At the same time it points to its usefulness (for example in the calculation of the likelihood of the successful coalition formation by certain parties in the Lok Sabha). Lastly, it highlights the importance of institutions and actor constellations for the actual observable conversion of numerical strength into real influence by regional parties and national parties in the Indian Union.

Chapter Seven:

Conclusion

7. Conclusion

In the course of this study we have seen a number of things related to the institutionalization and regionalization of party politics in India at the State and national levels. Some of the findings have been counterintuitive, others were mainly in line with established prior research. One of the myths this study was able to dispel was that regional parties wield undue influence in the government formation process at the national level since the advent of coalition governments there. The formateur parties BJP and INC are still able to outmaneuver smaller coalition partners or even keep them out of the portfolio coalition altogether buying their support through other side payments instead.

It was also possible to show that voters who prefer regional to national parties are by no means very different from mainstream voters in India in terms of their social profile. They are actually increasingly mainstream themselves. Also, their views on politics, in particular on democracy are not much different, if not more democratic in nature than those of their national party supporter countrymen. In addition to this insight we could also see that preferring one type of party as the first choice and another as a second choice was by no means impossible and in fact became increasingly prevalent among respondents in the survey throughout the 1990s. This corresponds largely also with the messages nowadays conveyed by regional and formerly regionalist political parties across India's States. As the excerpts from the election manifestos of the fairly typical regional parties, the AIADMK (All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, Tamil Nadu), the Uttarakhand Kranti Dal (UKD, Uttarakhand), and the Sikkimese Democratic Front (SDF, Sikkim) show (see Appendix C), their goals are by no means extremist or overly ethnicist in tone or content. To the contrary, they have actually rhetorically embraced the mainstream goals of the "good governance" debate, such as economic growth, technological and developmental progress, attracting investment and control of corruption. On the other hand, as the image of the then-BJP president L.K. Advani (App. C)

illustrates, nationalist imagery based on mythological symbols and caste identity has by no means been reserved for regionalist or parochialist parties in India at least since the arrival of the BJP and the Shiv Sena in the 1980s and 1990s.

In short, the study has illustrated that:

- Contrary to some of the literature on party system change in India, there is no uniform trend towards de-institutionalization across the States,
- Different types of de- or non-institutionalization are observable in different regions of India,
- Loyalists of regional and local rather than national political identity tend to support national and regional parties relatively equally,
- In terms of social characteristics (except for religion), voters' age, place of residence, level of education and social class become less and less predictive of support for regional parties,
- In terms of confidence of political parties, support for democracy, interest in politics and satisfaction with politicians, regional party supporters are likewise becoming increasingly indistinctive over time and are not at all extremist,
- Regional parties are still by and large numerically outmanoeuvred by larger national parties in terms of converting seats into offices in national government.


This study thus contrasts with some of the more exaggerated claims about the meteoric rise of regional parties and the regionalization and deinstitutionalization of parties and party systems in India on the one hand. On the other it was able to show that regional parties are indeed playing a more important role overall which is also a consequence of the fact that parties initially always start out as regional organizations rather than national ones, in particular in a large and diverse country as India. This finding is fairly diametrical to the claims by Caramani (2008: 337), for example, who states that India over time becomes more and more uniform in

its patterns of party competition, which is not borne out empirically, but also misinterprets the findings of Chhibber and Kollman (2004) in this regard, whose definition of nationalization and regionalization differs from that used in the present study and merely addresses the numerical aspects of regionalization in terms of national party systems mirroring sub-national ones in terms of the levels of fragmentation of party competition which is slightly different also from Caramani's operationalization of these ideas which implies a uniformity of the competing parties as well as similar levels of fragmentation of party systems. It has also become clear that institutionalization and regionalization are sometimes linked to each other, but that aspects of institutionalization (e.g. high levels of volatility) can persist despite the strong presence of national parties in sub-national party systems and that regionalized party systems do not always equal deinstitutionalized party systems. An investigation of relative levels of institutionalization can therefore only illuminate parts of the picture with regard to the regionalization of party politics in India. If nothing else, however, it is clear, that, contrary to Caramani's view, India's party landscape, in many ways (e.g. levels of institutionalization, regionalization and fragmentation) is not becoming more uniform, but more differentiated. This should ensure that the student of party systems and party system change will have enough material and puzzles to ponder for years to come and that the case of India will remain an interesting and important one to study in order to test theories of party system change and persistence.

8. Various Appendices

Appendix A:

Two-Level Structure of Appointment Powers and Accountability Indian Government



Source: own depiction.

Appendix B: A Profile of Indian States and Union Territories (arranged by population size)

Name	Capital	Type ^a	Year ^b	Population ('000) ^c	Area (km ²)	NSDP (Rs. Billion) ^d
Uttar Pradesh	Lucknow	State	1950	190,891	240,928	2412.0
Maharashtra	Mumbai	State	1950	106,894	307,713	3862.4
Bihar	Patna	State	1950	93,823	94,163	710.1
West Bengal	Kolkata	State	1950	87,869	88,752	2140.0
Andhra Pradesh	Hyderabad	State	1956	82,180	275,045	2106.6
Madhya Pradesh	Bhopal	State	1950	69,279	308,245	1031.3
Tamil Nadu	Chennai	State	1956	66,396	130,058	1945.3
Rajasthan	Jaipur	State	1956	64,641	342,239	1106.7
Karnataka	Bangalore	State	1956	57,399	191,791	1528.0
Gujarat	Gandhinagar	State	1960	56,408	196,024	1866.4
Orissa	Bhubaneswar	State	1950	39,899	155,707	671.0
Kerala	Thiruvananthapuram	State	1956	34,232	38,863	1025.1
Jharkhand	Ranchi	State	2000	30,010	79,714	555.1
Assam	Dispur	State	1950	29,929	78,438	525
Punjab	Chandigarh	State	1950	26,591	50,362	925.4
Haryana	Chandigarh	State	1966	23,772	44,212	898.6
Chhattisgarh	Raipur	State	2000	23,646	135,191	457.4
National Capital Territory of Delhi	Delhi	NCT	1992	17,076	1,483	978.4
Jammu and Kashmir	Srinagar/Jammu	State	1957	12,366	222,236	n.a.
Uttarakhand	Dehradun	State	2000	9,497	53,483	225.2
Himachal Pradesh	Shimla	State	1971	6,550	55,673	224.0
Tripura	Agartala	State	1972	3,510	10,486	83.8
Meghalaya	Shillong	State	1972	2,536	22,429	57.6
Manipur	Imphal	State	1972	2,627	22,327	51.2
Nagaland	Kohima	State	1963	2,187	16,579	n.a.
Goa	Panaji	State	1987	1,628	3,702	109.5
Arunachal Pradesh	Itanagar	State	1987	1,200	83,743	27.7
Puducherry	Pondicherry	UT	1963	1,074	479	51.5
Chandigarh	Chandigarh	UT	1966	1,063	114	94.3
Mizoram	Aizawl	State	1987	980	21,081	n.a.
Sikkim	Gangtok	State	1975	594	7,096	15.3
Andaman + Nicobar Islands	Port Blair	UT	1956	411	8,249	14.4
Dadra and Nagar Haveli	Silvassa	UT	1961	262	491	n.a.
Daman and Diu	Daman	UT	1987	188	112	n.a.
Lakshadweep	Kavaratti	UT	1956	69	32	n.a.

- a. Type refers to the current constitutionally defined status of the respective political territory as a state, Union Territory (UT), or the National Capital Territory (NCT).
- b. Year refers to the year in which the respective unit acquired its current status as a separate state, Union Territory or National Capital Territory, which may or may not coincide with its last territorial revision or name change.
- c. Population figures are the projected March 2008 figures based on an extrapolation of the 2001 Census of India and were taken from the Census of India website (http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/Projected_Population/Projected_population.aspx).
- d. NSDP is the 2005-2006 Net State Domestic Product at current prices and was taken from the Government of India's Union Budget and Economic Survey 2008-2009, <http://indiabudget.nic.in/es2007-08/chapt2008/tab17.pdf> (accessed May, 13th, 2009).

Appendix C: Party Advertisements and Manifestos


Portraits of Party Appeals:

Europe:



Source: www.vlaamsbelang.org

India:



Above: Picture of Laloo Prasad Yadav in "audience"



Above: Lal Krishna Adani posing as the mythical hero and deity Lord Rama from the epic Ramayana

Examples of Election Manifestos:

AIADMK (All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, Tamil Nadu)

Election 2006 (Source: http://www.electadmk.com/flash_news.php)

Title: “AIADMK Election manifesto, Released by Amma“

Some salient features of the manifesto

- 5 lakh IT Jobs in 5 years
- Opening a Engineering colleges equivalent to IIT Chennai in more then [sic!] 5 major cities of Tamilnadu
- Ensure Tamilnadu is a garden of peace
- Develop new technology for more growth
- Take the states economy to new heights
- Introduce more development schemes for people’s welfare
- Eradicate illiteracy
- Improve the lot of women
- Attracting foreign companies to invest in Tamilnadu
- Works towards prosperity of farmers, weavers, fishermen, students, government employees, teachers, workers and other sections of people.
- Control prices
- Snuff out communalism, extremism, and separatism
- Deal with inter-state issues in amicable manner “

Uttarakhand Kranti Dal (UKD, Uttarakhand)

Assembly Election 2007 (Source: Assembly Election 2007, mimeo)

“[...]

- We will return rights to the people over water, forests and land.
- We will oppose the recommendations of the Delimitation Commission.
- We will put a check on corruption and probe all scams.
- We will support universally accessible education for poor and rich alike.
- We will formulate effective policies on horticulture and agriculture.
- We oppose giving land in the Terai region to industrialists at cheap prices.
- We want to place emphasis on setting up industry in every district of the state.
- We are against residents of the state having to provide domicile certificates, rather we believe in acknowledging those who have had property here for the last 30 years as domiciles of the state.
- We want reservations for the poor among upper castes.
- We favour reserving 85 percent of jobs in industry in the state for the local people.
- We want to connect every part of the state down to the tehsil and block level with good roads to promote tourism. Rail and ropeway connections will also be promoted.
- We will establish 23 districts in the state for more effective governance closer to the people.
- We are also pained by the neglect of those who were part of the Uttarakhand movement. We promise to honour and appreciate this section of society. “

Sikkimese Democratic Front (Sikkim)

Election Manifesto (Source: 12th Lok Sabha Election, 1998, mimeo)

Title: "Our Vision : 2015"

- We shall make Sikkim as the best performing state
- We shall make Sikkim poverty-free state
- We shall make Sikkim a fully literate state
- We shall make Sikkim as a pollution-free and disease-free state of India
- We shall make Sikkim corruption free state
- We shall make Sikkim a total organic state
- We shall make Sikkim as the principal eco-tourism destination in South and South-east Asia
- We shall make Sikkim a cradle of traditional practices with modern institutions
- We shall make Sikkim as the zero unemployment zone of India
- We shall make Sikkim a biodiversity knowledge centre of eastern Himalayas
- We shall make Sikkim the best welfare state in the country
- We shall make Sikkim the land of opportunity
- We shall make Sikkim a producer state
- We shall make Sikkim the state of peace and security
- We shall make Sikkim naya and sukhi and a model state in the country
- We shall make Sikkim a society based on knowledge, science and technology,
- We shall transform Sikkim into an ideal state free from communal, anti-constitutional and other anti-national elements
- We shall mobilize Rs. 1000 crores revenue by 2015. Rural economy shall be made self-contained. This way, we shall make Sikkim into the most competitive and efficient mountain economy.
- We shall bring down the Infant Mortality Rate to less than 20.
- We shall endeavour to raise the net state domestic product to Rs. 2400 crores.
- We shall endeavour to raise the per capita income to Rs. 1 lakh.
- We shall achieve total literacy in the state.
- We shall ensure compulsory enrolment of children between 4-10 years of age in the schools.
- We shall set up 166 Community Information Centres in the state.
- We shall make Sikkim a zero poverty state.
- We shall focus on the initiation of second generation reforms.
- We shall allocate 80 per cent of the development fund for rural economy. This means all the rural sectors will be totally reoriented and reinvigorated."

Appendix D: Data Coding and Sources

NB: For a full description of the surveys see the World Values Survey organization website: www.worldvaluessurvey.org

Indicators	Coding/Range	Source
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL:		
Trust in Institutions (incl. Political Parties)	Question A (below); 0= not very much or no confidence at all; 1= a great deal or quite a lot of confidence	A) World Values Surveys, Four Waves (1990, 1995, 2001, 2006)
Support for Democracy	Question E (below); 1=Very Good, 2=Fairly Good, 3=Fairly Bad, 4=Very Bad	See A)
Political Interest	Question D (below); 1=Very/2=Somewhat/3=Not Very/4=Not at all interested (Question D below)	See A)
Loyalty to Geographic Area	Question H (below); 1=Locality, 2=Region, 3=Country, 4=Continent, 5=World	See A) without 2006
Educational Level	1=Lower, 2=Middle, 3=Upper	See A)
Age Level	1=15 to 29, 2=30 to 49, 3=50 and over years (Items: x003r2, V216>recoded)	See A)
Regional Party Preference (First)	0=National; 1=Regional (based on various political parties) (Question B below)	See A) (and B for classifications of parties)
Regional Party Preference (Second)	0=National; 1=Regional (based on various political parties) (Question C below)	See A) (and B for classifications of parties)
Party Aversion	0=National; 1=Regional (based on various political parties) (Question G below)	See A) (and B for classifications of parties)
AGGREGATE LEVEL:		
Vote Share for Non-national Parties and Candidates (REGPV)	0 to 1 (stand.)	B) Statistical Reports on State Assembly and General Elections, Election Commission of India, various years
Vote Share of Independents (VOTEIND)	0 to 1 (stand.)	See B)
Absolute (Raw) Number of Parties (ABSNP)	0 to ∞	See B)
Effective Number of Parties ENP)	ENP, Laakso-Taagepera (1 to ∞)	See B) (own calculation)
Relative Weighted Age of the Party System (WRA)	0 to 1	See B) (own calculation)
Religious Fragmentation of the Population (RELFrage)	N_{REL} , Laakso-Taagepera (1 to ∞)	D) Government of India, Census 2001, 1991, 1981, 1971, www.worldstatesmen.org , various websites of Indian States and political parties
Chief Ministerships by Party Affiliation	0 to 100 percent	See B)
Turnout (TURN)	0 to 1 (stand.)	C) Census of India, various years, linear interpolation
Urbanization Level (URBAN)	0 to 1 (stand.)	See C)
Literacy	0 to 1 (stand.)	D) Press in India, various volumes; linear interpolation
Share of Regional Language Newspapers (REGMED)	0 to 1 (stand.)	See D)
Share of Hindi Language Newspapers (HINDMED)	0 to 1 (stand.)	See D) (own calculation)
Nationalization of Newspapers (NATMED)	REGMED/NATMED (1 to ∞)	See D) (own calculation)
Share of Migrant Residents (MIG)	0 to 1 (stand.), out-of-State migrants	C) Census of India, various years, linear interpolation

World Values Survey – Four Waves (2006, 2001, 1995, 1990)

NB: For a full description of the surveys see the World Values Survey organization website: www.worldvaluessurvey.org

Questions:

A. I am going to name a few organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence (1), quite a lot of confidence (2), not very much confidence (3) or none at all (4)?

Response Item	2006	2001	1995	1990
The armed forces	V132	V148	E070	E070
The press	V133	V149	E072	E072
Television	V134	V150	E078	n.a.
Labor unions	V135	V151	E073	E073
The police	V136	V152	E074	E074
The courts	V137	n.a.	n.a.	E085
The government (in your nation's capital)	V138	V153	E079	E079
Political Parties	V139	V154	E080	E080
Parliament	V140	V155	E075	E075
The Civil service	V141	V156	E076	E076
Major companies	V142	V157	E081	E081

B. If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party on this list would you vote? Just call out the number on this card. If you are uncertain, which party appeals to you most?

Variable No.: 2006=V231 2001=V220 1995=E179 1990=V714

- 01 Party 1
- 02 Party 2
- 03 Party 3
- 04 etc.

C. And which party would be your second choice? If you are uncertain, which one appeals to you second most?

Variable No.: 2006=V232 2001=V221 1995=E179 1990=V715

- 01 Party 1
- 02 Party 2
- 03 Party 3
- 04 etc.

D. How interested would you say you are in politics? Are you (read out and code one answer):

Variable No.: 2006=V95 2001=E023 1995=V117 1990=V471

- 1 Very interested
- 2 Somewhat interested
- 3 Not very interested
- 4 Not at all interested

E. I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? "Democratic system"

Variable No.: 2006=V151 2001=117 1995=V157 1990=E117

- 1 Very good
- 2 Fairly Good
- 3 Fairly Bad
- 4 Very Bad

F. For each of the following, indicate how important it is in your life. Would you say it is: Politics

Variable No.: 2006=V7 2001=A004 1995=V7 1990=A004

- 1 Very important
- 2 Fairly important
- 3 Not very important
- 4 Not at all important

G. And is there a party that you would never vote for? Answer:

Variable No.: 2006=V133 2001=E182 1995=V212 1990=E182




- 01 Party 1
- 02 Party 2
- 03 Party 3
- 04 etc.

H. Which of the geographical groups would you say you belong to first of all?

Variable No.: 2001=G001 1995=V203 1990=G001

- 1 Locality
- 2 Region
- 3 Country
- 4 Continent
- 5 World

Average Responses:



Appendix E: Descriptive Statistics of Aggregate Data (State-level Elections)

1977 to 1989


	N	Range	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	S.D.
URBAN	81	86,47	5,70	92,17	24,0526	15,12358
ABSNP	81	40,00	1,00	41,00	9,0617	5,56405
REGPV	81	77,10	7,35	84,45	37,1630	23,30136
TURN	81	54,55	32,74	87,29	66,1264	12,13275
LIT	81	64,16	21,27	85,43	49,0558	14,60854
RELFrag	81	6,69	1,09	7,77	1,7677	1,19881
REGMED	65	77,50	10,00	87,50	55,7754	21,06722
HINDMED	65	87,50	2,50	90,00	42,2032	29,93521
NATMED	65	34,89	,11	35,00	2,9332	4,68716
MIG	81	45,14	1,36	46,50	8,8932	8,79833
POV	81	,49	,17	,66	,4233	,11176
INDVOTE	81	59,80	2,73	62,53	17,1243	12,50260
ENP	81	15,11	1,87	16,98	4,5546	2,40296

1990 to 2000


	N	Range	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	S.D.
URBAN	60	83,51	8,58	92,09	28,7477	17,78536
ENP	62	5,48	2,22	7,70	4,4184	1,44235
ABSNP	62	74,00	1,00	75,00	24,3387	16,39066
COMPETE	62	27,65	1,33	28,98	9,6923	6,01985
REGPV	62	79,63	7,39	87,02	36,7332	22,16483
TURN	62	43,02	48,51	91,53	69,5605	10,21836
LIT	62	52,54	37,80	90,34	61,5455	12,41777
RELFrag	62	5,12	1,09	6,21	1,7271	,98979
REGMED	60	90,72	7,74	98,46	64,9370	21,21336
HINDMED	60	96,34	2,63	98,97	44,9425	34,70660
NATMED	60	33,02	,31	33,33	3,6255	5,94768
MIG	62	40,25	,93	41,18	7,9714	8,64713
POV	58	,43	,14	,58	,3296	,09955
INDVOTE	62	47,69	1,58	49,27	11,2826	7,70352

Appendix F: Trends in Regionalization: Regional Party and Independents' Vote Shares


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







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


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Low:



Low (Continued):



9. Bibliography

Maps:

Dalet, Daniel. Website: http://d-maps.com/carte.php?lib=india_map&num_car=280&lang=en
(original, unmodified/blank version created by Daniel Dalet).

Images:

Page 197-I: http://www.metrojoint.com/photos23/joints_64698243_37118602_42519440.jpg

Page 197-II: <http://open.salon.com/blog/smithbarney/2008/12/15/files/advani00011229022055.jpg>

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