The popularity of books that confront Kant and Hegel to each other is on the rise. At least five such books have been published since 1983. They are not tailored any more according to the Kronerian (and Hegelian) model which asserts a development of thought “straight from Kant to Hegel.” Rather, they question whether the alternative ‘Kant or Hegel’ is relevant for the analysis of problems in the context of both thinkers. They try to consider as many aspects as possible in answering this question, and tend mostly to abstain from a definite decision in this issue. In other respects, however, the books are quite different from another, and in at least one respect, they mutually complement each other.

The book edited by Stephen Priest that is to be discussed here, is characterized by five features of its program:

By deciding certain issues, which are selected with respect to “perennial problems of Western philosophy”, it is intended that the relative strengths of Kant and Hegel be evaluated (preface).
Another goal is to examine objectively whose position concerning specific issues is supported by better arguments (1). Furthermore, it is to be examined whether Hegel presents Kant and the strategy of Kant’s argumentation adequately (e.g. 69f.).

The issues discussed here are supposed to cover most of the things in which both Kant and Hegel were interested (preface). The development of the Hegelian and/or Kantian position to those issues will largely be ignored.

The discussion of Hegel’s critique of Kant rests primarily on the main sources of our knowledge about Hegel’s discussion of Kant: the Kant-passages in “Faith and Knowledge”, in the “Lesser Logic” (#40 – 60), and in the “Lectures on the History of Philosophy.” In his “Introduction”, the editor gives a careful exposition of the contents of these passages.

The succession of the articles in this book parallels the succession of topics in Kant’s three critiques; internally, the articles conform to this order as well.

Corresponding to these features, the book begins with a treatise on space and time in Kant and Hegel (by Michael Inwood). It is the only article on a topic that belongs, in Hegel’s opinion (but not, however, in Kant’s), to philosophy of nature. Hence, this topic is primarily discussed from an epistemological point of view. The not very surprising result is that, all in all, there is more to be said in favor of Kant’s than of Hegel’s position, though Hegel’s positions and arguments must be regarded as not yet fully comprehended. Five treatises on topics whose discussions deal with Hegel’s comment on the Critique of Pure Reason follow: “Hegel’s Account of Kant’s Epistemology” (Graham Bird), “Categories and Things-in-Themselves” (Justus Hartnack), “Kantian Antimony and Hegelian Dialectic” (John Llewellyn), “Subjectivity and Objectivity” (Stephen Priest), and “The Idea of a Critique of Pure Reason” in the view of Kant and of Hegel (W.H. Walsh). Together with the last contribution (also by Professor Walsh), which discusses Hegel’s judgment on Kant’s philosophy in general, these articles constitute nearly two thirds of the text (without introduction and bibliography). Therefore, relatively little space remains for those papers that focus on topics in the other works by Kant, and on Hegel’s discussion of these topics. The papers deal with Hegel’s critique on Kant’s moral and political philosophy (T. O’Hagan), with aesthetics as regards Kant and Hegel (Patrick Gardiner), with teleology (David Lamb), with history from a philosophical perspective (Leon Pompa), and with politics and philosophy (Howard Williams). With the exception of the very interesting analyses by T. O’Hagan and Leon Pompa, the papers appear to be of lesser relevance in the investigation of reasons for or against Kant’s or Hegel’s conceptualizations and assertions than the papers in the epistemological group of topics.

Regrettably, both Kant’s theory of the aesthetic assessment of the sublime (which is important for the development of Hegel’s thought) and the Philosophy of Religion (touched upon in the “Introduction” only) fall victim to space restrictions (even though in comparison to other themes, the Philosophy of Religion contains particularly numerous references to Kant). But fortunately, the subjects that are addressed as topics in the book are discussed on a high level of sophistication. Therefore, many items that require further discussion can be determined quite precisely.
More important than the question of which authors hit the target and which of them, in my opinion, missed the point, are the tasks of clarifying what one can expect from this book concerning its goals and their execution, and of clarifying what problems in Hegel’s critique on Kant are not addressed. The book has its strengths in discussing those particular issues that Hegel himself emphasized within his presentations of Kant, that Hegel had a distinctly anti-Kantian position to, and that fit into the store of recognized topics of Western philosophy. For example, to the issues belongs the question of whether a convincing epistemology is possible if cognition is to be understood as instrument (71, 81ff., 122, 130f.) and if the existence of unknowable things in themselves is assumed (67, 77, 81–86, 110, 121–24, 132f.). Another example is the question of whether the antinomy of reason, evoked by its cosmological “use”, points to the direction of a Hegelian dialectics (88f.). Furthermore, the question of what the object of philosophical knowledge is belongs to these issues, as well as the converse question, what philosophical knowledge lastly is in itself.

Even if answers to the last two questions are possible in the context of Kantian and Hegelian philosophy, one must not expect that the goal of this volume requires it to give such answers. This is because Hegel, in the context of his presentation of Kant, did not clarify what needs to be said about these questions. Although Hegel’s critique on Kant (and occasionally his presentation of Kant, too) is guided by the intention of attempting to answer these questions, perhaps the frame of his Kant-presentation itself did not permit him to succeed. Therefore, the accurate observation that Hegel passes over Kant’s argumentative strategy (in his characterization of Kantian thoughts preceding his polemics—e.g. in the discussion of the transcendental apperception, or of the formality of the categorical imperative) has not established much. Furthermore, it needs to be examined whether there are reasons in the context of Hegel’s thoughts concerning reason and rationality that successfully defend his cause, although they do not vindicate Hegel’s violations of the rules governing a careful interpretation of Kant. The considerations required by this examination demand first, the confrontation of the Kantian and Hegelian designs of philosophical disciplines with each other, and second, the assessment of these designs (as elements of competing programs of a system of reason) in respect to their chances to be realized. However, the assessment of these designs by judging few particular issues is not possible in either Kant or Hegel, in particular, when the issues are restricted to recognized topics. For the Kantian and Hegelian designs transcend the limits of some particular isolated problems and have never found broad recognition in Western philosophy. Moreover, they remained so obscure that their recognition would have little value. (For example, who—after two hundred years of Kant scholarship and Kant reception—can tell us, what Kant means by rational knowledge out of concepts? Yet, Kant means his notion of philosophy to be defined by this expression! I think, as long as we are unable to say what Hegel tried to make of this Kantian notion of philosophy, and what reasons he employed in doing so, we will not really comprehend Hegel’s critique of Kant.) The applause deserved by the book discussed here ought not seduce us into the misconception that it be superfluous to attack the task alluded to here.

The book has some editorial idiosyncracies that a reviewer does not want to leave unmentioned. It contains only as yet unpublished contributions, apart from the two valuable treatises of the late Professor Walsh. Less praiseworthy are the circumstances that faultless phrases among the numerous German quotations in the book are apparently a matter of luck, and that in general no great care was taken in eliminating typographical errors. From a continental point of view, the bibliographical information leaves
something to be desired in several respects. For example, the list of editions of Hegel’s works, indicated with abbreviations and mentioned in the notes, neglects the only historical-critical edition of Hegel’s works (Gesammelte Werke, ed. im Auftrag der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft, Hamburg 1968ff.) which has already grown to a significant number of volumes. It also ignores the edition of Hegel’s lectures on the history of philosophy, which P. Garnier and W. Jaeschke made of the notes written down from Hegel’s lecture Winter semester 1825/26. (Part 4 has the title: Philosophie des Mittelalters und der neueren Zeit. Hamburg 1986). Among the references to secondary literature, one does not find the thematically related volume with lectures of the Stuttgart Hegel-Convention 1981 (Kant oder Hegel? Ueber Formen der Begrundung in der Philosophie, ed. D. Henrich. Stuttgart 1983), one also does not find a monograph by Andre Stanguennec (Hegel, critique de Kant. Paris 1985), which the title reveals as a French one-author counterpart to Priest’s collection.