

**Politics-Bureaucracy Relations, Governance and Development in  
Bangladesh: The Case of Local Government**

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## **Abstract**

A long-standing issue in politics and administration is how politicians and bureaucrats perceive themselves in their roles and relationships with their counterpart in the process of governance and development and which factors affect or configure the orientation or perception of the politicians and bureaucrats regarding politics-bureaucracy relationship in the political system. Like many other developed and developing countries, bureaucracy is the post-colonial reality of governance in Bangladesh. The elected politicians and non-elected official bureaucrats are the integral part of the administration in both the central and local government in Bangladesh. Probably the most elemental and theoretical debatable issue here is that - what will be the apt relationship between politicians and bureaucrats? And what are the relational effects on local governance and development?

Thus, this inquiry empirically investigates the views and perceptions of the elected politicians and official bureaucrats to politics-bureaucracy relations and its effects on governance and development of Bangladesh in the context of local governance and development following the survey and case study methods. This study endeavored to undertake a theory based empirical research to figure out the theoretical paradigmatic perspectives from the existing literature on politics-bureaucracy relationship and an attempt has been made to identify “dichotomy” and “mutuality” as the major two models of the theoretical perspective by discussing the key variations and effectual deficiencies among the existing models, providing the argument that existing theoretical models are not identical and their characteristics are overlapping with either dichotomy or mutuality. Consequently, it also wanted to propose a logical modification of the existing relationship models by explaining some underpinning variables which underpin the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in the process of governance.

This study tried to develop a prospective third model of politics-bureaucracy relations focusing the light on symbiotic relationship between politicians and bureaucrats that is argued in this thesis as an interface between dichotomous and mutual relation, and an essential precondition or rational choice model of politics-bureaucracy relations for proper local governance and development as the theoretical construct. The empirical data and observation reveals that the theoretical models that already been discussed in the theoretical and

conceptual framework cannot be found exactly in the context of politics-bureaucracy relations at the local government of Bangladesh. According to the perceptions of respondents and the empirical data, the relation is neither normatively dichotomous with political neutrality nor abundantly cohesive or mutual-interactive. However, some conditions of both dichotomy and mutuality are present in the relationship of local elected politicians and bureaucrats. In spite of that, empirical data reveals that the relation between local elected politicians and bureaucrats is conflicting and it is influenced by many components. The role perceptions and the patterns of relationships varies with the degree of social characteristics, alignment of interests, role perceptions, self-image and mutual interaction between local elected politicians and the official bureaucrats, which ultimately influence the level of local governance and development. The colonial and semi-colonial legacy, dominant attitude of the politicians and bureaucrats, politicization, distinctive self-image and mutual interaction are highly associated to the conflictual relationship.

Moreover, the increased fusion of the political and administrative roles of the bureaucracy has complicated the perceptions of the bureaucracy in Bangladesh. The results of the empirical observation and statistical analysis demonstrate that the relational perceptions of politicians and bureaucrats are almost opposite and bureaucrats trend to dominate local governance and development by marginalizing the local elected politicians and thus conflict occurred between them which ultimately affect local governance and development significantly. In this milieu, this research propose the symbiotic model of relation that would be the rational choice for proper governance and development as the necessary conditions of symbiotic model are existing in the perspective of politics-bureaucracy relations at the local government in Bangladesh.

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## **List of Abbreviations**

ACR	Annual Confidential Report
ADP	Annual Development Program
AL	Awami League
ASRC	Administrative and Services Reorganization Committee
BCS	Bangladesh Civil Service
BAKSAL	Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League
BNP	Bangladesh Nationalist Party
BPSC	Bangladesh Public Service Commission
CARR	Committee for Administrative Reorganization/Reform
CO	Circle Officer
CG	Caretaker Government
CEC	Chief Election Commission
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CSP	Civil Service of Pakistan
DC	Deputy Commissioner/District Commissioner
DO	District Officer
DM	District Megistrate
EC	Election Commission
EPCS	East Pakistan Civil Service
GPRB	Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh
GR	Government Relief
IAS	Indial Administrative Service
ICS	Indian Civil Service
IPS	Indian Police Service
JP	Jatiya Party
JRB	Jatiya Rakhi Bahani
JSD	Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal
KABIKHA	Kajer Binemoya Khaddo Kommosuchi
KABITA	Kajer Binemoya Thaka
LG	Local Government

LGD	Local Government Division
LGRD	Local Government and Rural Development
MP	Member of Parliament
MOPA	Ministry of Public Administration
NAP	National Awami Party
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPA	New Public Administration
NPM	New Public Management
PCJSS	Parbatya Chittagong Jana Sanghati Samiti
PSP	Police Service of Pakistan
SDO	Sub Divisional Officer
SES	Senior Executive Service
TC	Thana Council
TDC	Thana Development Committee
TR	Test Relief
TTDC	Thana Training and Development Committee
UCCA	Upazila Central Cooperative Association
UK	United Kingdom
UNO	Upazila Nirbahi Officer
UP	Union Parishad
USA	United States of America
UZP	Upazila Parishad
UZPC	Upazila Parishad Chairman
VGD	Vulnerable Group Development
VGf	Vulnerable Group Feeding

# Chapter – 1: Introduction

## 1.1 Background of the Study

The modern government runs by the two actors; elected politicians and appointed professional bureaucrats with an uneasy partnership. This uneasy partnership sometimes creates inevitable tensions and problematic relationship between them which is perhaps the distinctive puzzle of contemporary modern state (Aberbach *et al.*, 1981). Thus, the study of politics-bureaucracy relation<sup>1</sup> (both in the national and local government) is an essential and core theme of any study of politics and administration as Waldo (1987:91) said “nothing is more central in thinking about public administration than the nature and interrelations of politics and administration”. The nature of this relationship and the appropriate role of political leaders and administrators in the political and administrative process has been the subject of considerable debate throughout the history. Therefore, the cross-fertilization of knowledge on politics-bureaucracy relations and proliferation of ideas for striking a balance between them has been going on for centuries (Wilson, 1887; Farazmand, 2010; Salleh, 1992). The relationship between these two actors remains a central problem for responsive governance. This debate “expands and contracts, rises and falls, but never seems to go away” (Svara, 2006:121). In recent decades, the growing crisis in governance and the changes in the global context have tended to redefine the roles and relationships between politicians and bureaucrats in the process of policy, governance and development.<sup>2</sup> The relationship between politicians and bureaucrats effectively determines the nature of governance of the government and the overall development of a country. Since, by using the aura of legitimacy (which comes either from the people or from the legislature or by the legal structure of the organization) the administrative structure of the government of a polity in both the central

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<sup>1</sup> Throughout the present research the terms ‘politics-bureaucracy relation’ and ‘politics-administration relation’ will be used interchangeably, although classical and most of the other literatures explain this notion as ‘politics-administration relations’. This research intends to explain the term ‘politics-bureaucracy relations’. It seems that these two terms can be used synonymously as they are in common parlance.

<sup>2</sup>The world is now passing the time of ‘reinvention and globalization’. The government functions are more complex than even before. Most of the governments are passing a very hectic and challenging time for ensuring good governance and sustainable development, adopting new doctrines and public service mechanisms by pressure from international organizations or for the credibility for their governance. This global trend is reshaping the new structure of politics and bureaucracy.

and local level is consisted of two actors mainly; the politicians and the bureaucrats, although the political process is subject to influence and manipulation by a variety of individuals and institutions. Nevertheless, these two sets of actors play major role in the process of governance and development. It may even be argued that since the ancient time to present globalized age, they are the heart of the governance and development (Farazmand, 2009). These two actors are always inseparable and indispensable to each other. In order to establish successful democratic governance in true sense, a balance and effective symbiotic relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is crucial. As the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats has always been a central issue of governance. So, the degree of success or failure in governing process depends on the relation between politicians and bureaucrats. A good relationship between them strengthens the legitimacy of the governance, while a bad or conflictual relationship tends to undermine the legitimacy of the governance particularly and the government as a whole (Farazmand, 1997).

However, most of the literatures on this issue are extremely theoretical in nature. There is also infrequently discussed through empirical inquiry and numerous researches have explored the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats. But scholars have begun to reveal the ways by following a particular theoretical paradigm of politics-bureaucracy relationship. Therefore, this study will not follow a particular theoretical paradigm. Rather, this study intent to identify the existing major theoretical paradigms on politics-bureaucracy relationship and to explore the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in the context of local government of Bangladesh in light of the existing paradigms. It desires to use the insights from various theoretical approaches to politics-bureaucracy relations along with neo-institutional and rational choice theory, to test the existing paradigms and to pigeonhole the Bangladesh case. This research will draw the line on the basis of both theoretically and empirically. Eventually, the conceptual and empirical knowledge of this research could be tested and applied in the context of other developing countries in future.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

The relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is a classical problem of governance and administration, and it is a key question in political science and public administration that how are they related to each other (Svara, 2006a). While there is no doubt that bureaucratic predominance is perhaps the outstanding feature of modern society as Weber noted that “the

future belongs to bureaucratization”<sup>3</sup> but the discussion on politics-bureaucracy relations in the governing process is not a new phenomenon in the context of developed and developing countries. As the tensions between politicians and bureaucrats are inevitable and long standing in the history of politics and administration (Aberbach, *et al.*, 1981). We see a longitudinal journey to find out a way – how could be minimized this tension? How could be these two actors responsive to each other to create effective and stable governance? This journey is still unfinished. Since the days of Wilson and Weber the thesis of the politics-bureaucracy relations gained a heightened attention to the scholars of political science, public administration and sociology all over the world (Jacobsen, 2006; Yesilkagit & Thiel, 2008; Farazmand, 2010). Although it’s a long debated issue for centuries but the contemporary debate on the issue expanded prolific scholarship since after World War II, when attention has been accorded the phenomenon of political development explaining the role of bureaucracy in policy, governance and developmental process (LaPalombara, 1963; Riggs, 1963).

In the last three decades, many of the developed and monolithic government bureaucracies have been subject to processes of horizontal and vertical specialization. As a result, public tasks were shifted from the central government to many autonomous and local bodies (Jann and Dohler 2007; Whettenhal and Thynne 2010; Radaelli 2008; James, 2003). Thus, local government is functioning pervasively all over the world and bureaucracy is also working in the local level governance along with the elected local politicians. But the experience of many developing countries provides ample evidence that they are suffering from a breakdown in local and national bureaucracy (Alavi, 1972; Bhattacharya, 1979; Ahmed, 1980; Huque, 1988). Hence, one of the imperative problems confronting the modern state is to find out a way to strike a balance and symbiosis between the politicians and the bureaucrats; the two competing elites in the policy making, its implementation and overall governing process (Mitra, 2010; Aberbach *et al.*, 1981; Svara, 1999; Ahmed, 2009).

Bangladesh is not an exception of that. As a post-colonial structure of government, bureaucracy is an essential and integral part of the administration in Bangladesh. In many respect, bureaucrats are found to play more dominant role than the elected politicians in the

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<sup>3</sup> Max Weber writes this in a summation of his most impressive political essay ‘Parlament und Regierung in neugeordneten Deutschland’. For more explanation, See also, Scaff, L. C. (1973). Max Weber’s Politics and Political Education. *American Political Science Review*, 67 (1): 128-141.

administration, especially in the development policy making and governance process. And the relationship between them is not abundantly cohesive. Obviously, this is the general observation in regarding the central administration of Bangladesh.<sup>4</sup> But does it exist in the local government and administration in Bangladesh? This study aims to address this major problem and to find out the answer of the following questions with an empirical perspective of local government, especially in the case of Upazila Parishad (UZP) as a significant tier of the local government in Bangladesh.

### **1.3 Research Questions**

This research predominantly investigates the working relationships between the local elected politicians and appointed professional bureaucrats in the local government of Bangladesh. It explores the following questions: How do the local elected politicians and appointed official bureaucrats differ from each other? What factors determine the relationships between the local elected politicians and the appointed official local bureaucrats? How do they perceive each other? Who dominates the local policy structure and of governance? What are their dominant values? How are they related to each other? Is there any conflict between the two actors? What are the patters of conflict? How does the local development activities and governing process affect by the conflict? And do the local politicians' and bureaucrats' perceptions of and practices around the politics-bureaucracy relationship model differ from contemporary theoretical discourse?

### **1.4 Objectives of the Study**

This study aims to provide an in-depth empirical analysis of the current status of governing process and development in the present UZP in Bangladesh by discussing the relationships between local elected politicians and appointed official bureaucrats. In doing so, its focus is mainly on the local level government: more predominantly attention will be drawn on the

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<sup>4</sup> Present Bangladesh lies in the north eastern part of South Asia between 20° 34" and 26° 38" north latitude and 88° 01" and 92° 41" east longitude. The total area of the country is about 144,000 square kilometers. Administratively, the country is divided into 7 Divisions, These Divisions are divided into 64 Districts, Districts are divided into 489 Upazilas, and Upazilas are divided into 5400 Unions and Unions are divided into more than 68000 Villages. Once upon a time this Bangladesh was a part of British India named Bengal. It was a part of Pakistan when Pakistan emerged as an independent state in 1947, and then Bangladesh was known as East Pakistan. Since 1955 to before its independence in 1971, it was named East Bengal, and after independence, it is named Bangladesh.

selected UZP. This inquiry will also cover the colonial, Pakistan and Bangladesh period of politics-bureaucracy relations in the governance and developmental process. More particularly, the specific objectives of the study are:

- To Identify the variables which underpin the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats;
- To identify the dominant actor in the structure of governance and factors of domination;
- To identify the prototype of politics-bureaucracy relations in local government and how this relationship affect the governance and development; and
- To test the existing theoretical perspectives in the context of Bangladesh and Innovation a new approach to the study of politics-bureaucracy relations.

### **1.5 Review of Literature: Approaching the Problem in the State of the Art**

This section will provide an analysis of a review of relevant existing literatures on politics-bureaucracy relations. A review of relevant literature on different aspects of the research will provide a succinct summary of the century long scholarly debates on politics-bureaucracy relations, and also further justification of the study and lend a hand to construct the theoretical framework for conducting the study. This implies that there is a need to delineate the most relevant literature according to the research problem. It is notable that, a plenty of literature can be found in the context of politics-bureaucracy relations as we have already witnessed in the analysis that politics-bureaucracy relations has a debatable long standing history. If we want to incorporate all relevant literatures here, then it would be require a very lengthy bibliographic essay. Rather we will incorporate two kinds of literature for review in this inquiry. One is theoretically stimulating literatures on politics-bureaucracy relations and the other one is scholarly individual researches on the related issue which have been published in the scholarly journals and books as a part of the comparative analytical perspective. Consequently, the relevant literatures will be divided into four sections – accordance with the approach of classical, neo-classical, new public management, and emerging trend of politics-bureaucracy relations.

### 1.5.1 The Classical Outlook

Theoretically, politicians and bureaucrats are the servants of the entire nation.<sup>5</sup> Politicians are transitory and bureaucrats are undying forces to serve the people of the nation state. However, in real sense, ultimately they hold the decision power to allocation of values and resources in the society. From the very beginning of the political process, it is a major question what criteria should lead a society to allocate decision power to politicians or bureaucrats on different policy tasks? In general, policies are chosen and implemented by both elected representatives (politicians) and non-elected bureaucrats. The basic perception is that politician's choose or approaches the policies and bureaucrats overly execute them. On the basis of this philosophy of separation, the first classical discussion on politics-bureaucracy relations is originated. It was mostly known as 'politics-administration dichotomy' approach. This dichotomy model proposes a clear distinction between politics and administration. According to this approach, politics-bureaucracy relation is characterized by the principles of separate duties, based on trust. Politicians will approach the policy and bureaucrats will provide non-biased information and bureaucrats should respect the principle of political neutrality based on expertise, laws and ordinances. This approach or argument is to consider absolute control of bureaucracy by the elected politicians in representative democracy, where policy decisions are supposed to be made by the elected politicians and bureaucrats would simple implement the policy. The advocates of this approach are Woodrow Wilson, Max Weber, Goodnow, White, Willoughby, Finer, Mosher and many more. Most of the proponents of this approach are found in the discipline of political science (Farazmand, 1997). Aberbach and Rockman (1993:5) note that "analysis by political scientists effectively brought into question the conceptual and practical reality of the politics/administration dichotomy".

To provide any theoretical argumental discussion on politics-bureaucracy relations, we must go through the piece of Woodrow Wilson first, who had initiated formal discussion on politics-bureaucracy relation in the nineteenth century. Wilson's article (1887) "The Study of Administration" was the first classical literature where he attempted to build a theoretical foundation to conceptualization on politics-administration relationship. Although it was not cited for many years after publication, but it was an exemplar of a stream of reformist

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<sup>5</sup> Politicians and bureaucrats are the servants of the nation in that sense - as both of them are intended to serve the nation from their own and respective perspectives'.

thinking about government in the late nineteenth century and also consider as the founding theory of public administration (Raadschelders, 2002; Van Riper, 1983). On the other hand, Rosser (2010) claimed that Wilsonian thinking of public administration and politics-administration was determined by German sources. He argued that “the organic theories of Bluntschli and Stein informed Wilson’s ideas about the proper relationship between the political and administrative aspects of government” (Rosser, 2010:553). However, in that essay Wilson apprehended that- “the idea of the state is the conscience of administration—this is why there should be a science of administration which shall seek to straighten the paths of government—that administration should be separated from politics and policy concerns” (Wilson, 1887: 201). Wilson’s work provided a pin diet to those who concerned with analyzing the relationships between politicians and bureaucrats. At the core of the Wilsonian theory lays the argument that politics and administration (bureaucracy) belong to two different worlds, with one performing functions different from the other (Ahmed, 2009). His dictum was clear. In his own words:

The field of administration is a field of business. It is removed from the hurry and strife of politics. Administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions are not political questions. Although politics sets the tasks for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices...This discrimination between administration and politics is now happily, too obvious to need further discussion (Wilson, 1887; 209-211).

According to this classical view, the necessity to maintain political control by politicians over the bureaucracy and bureaucrats is indisputable for the non-elected career bureaucrats, if not controlled, they may pose a threat to political authority or democracy (Farazmand, 1997). This approach tends to promote a separation of politics from administration, leading to a dichotomous relationship between politicians and bureaucrats, the first being policy-makers and the second being policy implementers. To quote Wilson again in this regard, “the policy of government will have no trail of officialdom about it. It will not be the creation of permanent officials but of statesmen whose responsibility to public opinion will be direct and inevitable” (Wilson, 1887).

In twentieth century, the Wilsonian ideas were popularized by Frank J. Goodnow who was the first president of the American Political Science Association. In his book *Politics and Administration* (1900), Goodnow argued that there are two basic functions of government;

the expression of popular will and the execution of that will. The function of politics is to express the state's will with policies while the function of bureaucracy is to execute the state's will by execution of these policies (Goodnow, 1900: 9-13). Goodnow argued that certain aspects of administration are hampered by politics and should have been shielded from it. He also argued that- "political control over administrative functions is liable....to produces inefficient administration in that it makes administrative officers feel that what is demanded of them is not so much work that will improve their own department, as compliance with the behests of the political party" (Goodnow, 1900:83).

This Wilson-Goodnow theory of politics-administration dichotomy got special intellectual fervor in the 1920s-1930s after being publication of two other literatures of public administration by White (1926) and Willoughby (1927) respectively and thus developed an orthodox model of politics-bureaucracy relationship aiming 'political ends and administrative means'. The classical literature on bureaucracy does not ignore the problem but gives it attention. Long (1949) wrote about the role of power within bureaucracy. Max Weber, the father of the modern bureaucracy has also supported the view of dichotomous or separate approach which was initiated by Woodrow Wilson. Weber (1947) has advocated for a neutral and competent bureaucracy with a clear distinction between politics and administration. He also himself was ambivalent about the role of bureaucracy and expressed concern about the danger of 'over towering' bureaucracy in society (Weber, 1946). In 'Politik als Beruf' Weber draws a sharp line between politicians and bureaucrats.

According to his proper vocation, the genuine civil servant...should not engage in politics, but administer, above all impartially.... Hence, he shall precisely not do what the politician, the leader as well as his following, must always and necessarily do, namely, fight. For partisanship, fight, passions are stadium are the politician's element" (Weber, 1919/1968: 27-28: quoted from Overeem, 2005: 317).

Weber desired efficient, impartial and developed bureaucracy by controlled political leadership. He advised politicians to "resist any effort on the part of the bureaucrats to gain control" and warned that a nation "which believes that the conduct of the state affairs is a matter of 'administration' and that 'politics' is nothing but the part-time occupation of amateurs or a secondary tusk of bureaucrats might as well forget about playing a role in world affairs" (cited in Heady, 2001). So it can be said that whether attempts were made to take politics out of administration in the classical thinking, the main aim was always to render

administration impartial and outsider of political controversy. Stillman (1973:586) noted that Wilsonian apprehension was restoring more qualities to government insuring trustworthiness and efficiency keeping out the corrupting and politicizing influence of party organizations in the administrative affairs. He also supposed that Wilson raised a problem, yet failed to reach a clear-cut conclusion about the problem. Wilson's essay thus vacillates between the two poles of thought regarding the separability and inseparability of administration from politics providing an ample ground of argument to the next generation scholars. This classical outlook dominated the field of politics and administration up to 1940s and provided intellectual favor for scientific management and principles of administrative movements.<sup>6</sup>

### **1.5.2 The New-classical and NPA Thinking**

The wilsonian classic politics-bureaucracy dichotomous approach did not last long. The web was clear in the later part of 1930s that politics and administration could never be separated in any remotely fashion. This idea was initiated by Fritz Morstein Marx in his book *Elements of Public administration* (Henry, 1975:380). Afterward Marx (1957) has viewed the policy with the lens of political rationality and administrative rationality. Since the 1940s this approach has been attracted, rejected and seemingly destroyed (Svara, 1985:221). Therefore, after the Second World War and the Era of Administrative Movement, this classical politics-bureaucracy dichotomy approach came under severe challenge and criticized by the many contemporary researchers and practitioners (Waldo, 1948, 1984, 1987; Appleby, 1949; Martin, 1952; Simon, 1957). Consequently, the classical view of politics-administration dichotomy was rejected by the criticizers and they emphasized on bureaucratic involvement in governance and in the policy making role instead of dichotomy and control, especially under the New Public Administration (NPA) doctrine. The criticizers of classical approach also wanted to say that dichotomy model was not a direct innovational idea by founders (Wilson, Goodnow) but it is likely a transformation into the dichotomy by the writers of scientific management in the twenties and thirties. They also tried to bestow an argument that Wilsonian idea did not directly correspond to dichotomy (Rabin and Bowman, 1984; Svara, 1998, 1999). Somewhat it is diverged from earlier approach that was initiated by Wilson and Goodnow (Waldo, 1948; Appleby, 1949; Rabin and Bowman, 1984; Van Riper, 1984;

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<sup>6</sup> Scientific management and principles of administration is another theoretical paradigm in public administration but that paradigmatic perspective is not directly related to this research.

Caiden, 1984; Svara, 1998, 1999, 2001). Among the critics of classical approach Waldo was one of them and he was to some extent moderate. Although Svara (2008:46) claimed that Waldo was not a confirmed or clear-cut critic of dichotomy and classical approach. He did not reject the classical model directly. Rather he used a jargon of linguistic terms and citation from many writers to explain the relationship between politics and administration in his book *The Administrative State (1948)*. Cited by Friedrich, Waldo (1948:122) argued that “politics and administration are not two mutually exclusive boxes, but two closely linked aspects of the same processes”. He also supposed that politics and administration were differentiated by Wilson not in terms of principle, but in terms of division of labor and specialization. Also cited by Luther Gulick, Waldo (1948:124) said that-

The reason for separating politics from administration is not that their combination is a violation of a principle of government. The reason for insisting that the elected legislative and executive officials shall not interfere with the details of administration, and that the rank and file of the permanent administrators shall be permanent and skilled and shall not meddle with politics, is that this division of work makes use of specialization and appears to give better results than a system where such a differentiation does not exist.

But eventually Waldo disagreed with the idea of separation by saying that “classical Wilson-Goodnow theories are inadequate, because they emphasize separation, whereas in fact politics and administration are very intimately related. Since, we cannot administration out of politics, we should give attention to the interrelations of the two and that would be more realistic concept” (Waldo 1948:125). Simon (1957) also has supported the same view of joint venture of policy making by politicians and bureaucrats along with distinctive contributions where politicians find their principal justification as a procedure for the validation of value judgments. Martin (1952) held that on the basis of the philosophy of the classical approach a mechanistic concept of public administration was provided by the scientific management and resulting the administration separated severely from legislative body. Therefore, Paul Appleby, who made the first extensive criticism and systematic attack on the classical politic-bureaucracy dichotomy model in his book *Policy and Administration (1949)* and argued that public administration is policymaking – “policy and administration are treated together at every level” (1949:22). In his view, it is impossible to draw a meaningful institutional distinction between politics or policy and administration (cited from Overeem, 2005).

According to Appleby (1949:14) “in the field of government every kind and conception of value weighs on the political scale, and only political processes produce a reading. Public Administration must contribute to the weighing, and to do that means to function politically”. He also said that the participation of bureaucracy in policy making is normatively valid. Appleby’s this view was supported by many new thinkers in the later part and they were more interested to consider that keeping politics and administration apart is undesirable and the policy making and governance as a work of joint venture by politicians and bureaucrats with mutual-interaction (LaPalombara, 1963; Riggs, 1963, 1969; Self, 1972; Golembiewski, 1977; Aberbach, Putnam & Rockman, 1981; Caiden, 1984; Van Riper, 1984; Rabin & Bowman, 1984; Svava, 1985, 1998, 1999, 2001; Frederickson and Smith, 2003). LaPalombara (1963) observed that it is impossible to conceive such a separation between politics-bureaucracy in governance even in the most structurally differentiated political system. Riggs (1969:29-30) argued that-

According to the conventional views there is a clear demarcation between politicians and bureaucracy. In the classical literature, bureaucrats are thought of as administrator not politicians. Nevertheless, empirical studies clearly show the extensive involvement of American and other western bureaucrats, military and civil, in policy-making and power-holding.....The view which emerges from my analysis asserts, by contrast, that bureaucrats are always semiadministrators and semipoliticians.

He also said that “the myth of dichotomy between politics and administration has hampered the study of both the aspects as a coherent and unified process (Riggs, 2009:86). Thus, he proliferate the idea of mutual cooperation between politicians and bureaucrats for proper governance and development. Self (1972:152) identified the policy as the undeniable ‘grey area’ between politics and administration and he argued that a straightforward differentiation of political and bureaucratic roles is very difficult for several reasons. Rather it is better to fusion of political and administrative influence in governance. Christoph (1975) held that policy is nothing more than the political activity of civil servants. A pioneering comparative research on politics-bureaucracy relations was carried out by Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman (1981). In their book *Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies*, they considered bureaucracy as an active participant in the policy making process. But they said both of the politicians and bureaucrats participate in the policy making with the distinctive contributions in western democracies. Bureaucrats bring neutral expertise, facts and knowledge, whereas politicians bring political sensitivity, interests and values. They also

identified a four dimensional image of relationships between politicians and bureaucrats by mentioning that “the classical theories that excluded bureaucrats from any role in creating policy no longer fit reality, if ever they did” (1981:239). Interestingly, after twenty years, Aberbach and Rockman (2000) published a follow-up longitudinal study in the context of United States – *In the Web of Politics: Three Decades of the US Federal Executive* in 2000 and they changed their previous stand by observing that the separate roles aspect is becoming more prominent than the others. Van Riper (1984) argued that there was a kind of distance between politics and administration in the first half of the twentieth century and that was created by the classical literature. Caiden (1984) also has expressed the same view.

Svara (1985, 1998, 1999, 2001,) has criticized the classical politics-administration dichotomy ‘as a myth’ and ‘as an aberration’ and rejected it on empirical grounds and also attempt to reconceptualization of politics-administration dichotomy by providing an alternative model – “dichotomy-duality model” and later replace it providing the “complementarity model”<sup>7</sup> between politics and bureaucracy. As a result, the second approach or new-classical thinking that was born in the hands of post-Wilsonian thinkers get a semblance of gaiety and makes the opposite point and rejects the politics-bureaucracy dichotomy, arguing instead for a dual political as well as administrative role to the bureaucracy. This approach treats bureaucrats as integral parts of the policy process and interaction between politicians and bureaucrats, their degree of influence in policy making and their conflict or convergence in the process of governance in general (Potter, 1986).

This theoretical school claims that “the relationship between bureaucrats and politicians is mixed and interactive, fluid and integrative, not dichotomous or hierarchical” (Farazmand, 1997: xi). According to this approach, bureaucrats and politicians should and must work together, and their relationship should be cooperative, mutual-interactive – not adversarial, to promote efficient and effective administration and governance (Farazmand, 1997). This theoretical perspective dominates in the literature of politics and administration up to 1970s. After that it was also criticized and rejected by another school of thought – New Public Management (NPM).

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<sup>7</sup> More discussion of this complementarity model which is provided by James H. Svara has been included and discussed in the emerging trend.

### 1.5.3 New Public Management Thinking

As the theoretical doctrine, New Public Administration (NPA) improvised the legitimacy for dual political and administrative role of bureaucracy in the policy making, the same way New Public Management (NPM), another theoretical dogma, also revived the old question newly and return to dichotomy approach again claiming the autonomy of public organizations. The academics, practitioners and politicians who have considered the bureaucratic role in the governance as a threat to democracy, criticized the extensive role of bureaucracy in the policy making and in governance by following the NPM doctrines. After the 1970s to 1990s this NPM doctrine and its literature ruled the context of politics-bureaucracy relations and resulted in a continuous attack on bureaucracy through the world with emphasizing privatization, drastic down-sizing, decentralization, restructuring of the public sector and adaptation of more autonomy practice in the public organizations (Farazmand, 1997; Uveges & Keller, 1997). Although during the foundation, this new model had several names; Managerialism (Pollitt, 1993), New Public Management (Hood, 1991; 1998), Market based Public Administration (Lan and Rosenbloom, 1992), Reinventing Government (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), and the Post Bureaucratic Paradigm (Barzelay, 1992). Despite the differing names they all essentially describe the same phenomenon and now it has settled on the term 'New Public Management' (Hughes, 2003).

Meanwhile, by following the doctrine of NPM and Reinventing Government, significant changes have been taken place in managing public organizations what Hood (1998) calls the linguistic shift from 'public administration' to 'public management'. A plethora of literature and research findings have been proliferated considering autonomy and governance practice in the theoretical and empirical perspective (Rourke, 1976; Sanera, 1985; Wilson, 1989; Pollitt, 1990,1993; Hood, 1991; Lan and Rosenbloom, 1992; Barzelay, 1992; Carroll, 1995, Hughes, 2003; Verhoest, 2005; Verhoest *et al.*, 2004, 2010, 2011; Christensen, 2001, 2011; Christensen and laegreid, 2004, 2006, 2007; Majone, 1994; Maggetti, 2010; Pollitt *et al.*, 2004; Burnham, 2009; Laegreid *et al.*, 2011; Yesilkagit and Thiel, 2008). These literatures and researches have focused on the autonomy of public sector organizations through the light of politics-bureaucracy relations in general, and of different kinds of agencies and their performance on providing public services in particular by supporting the NPM perspective in the context of developed countries.

The classical dichotomous approach is supported by the New Public Management School, approaching separate duties with self-direction. By supporting this view Rourke (1976) argued that bureaucratic politics rather than party politics has become the dominant theatre of decision in the modern state. Therefore, Sanera (1985) has viewed as political entrepreneur to replace the bureaucratic entrepreneur. Wilson (1989) viewed that separate duties between politicians and bureaucrat enhance the competence to the both. Politicians are motivated by a “re-election goal” whereas bureaucrats are motivated by a “career concern”. That is, politicians want to be re-elected; bureaucrats instead want to improve their professional prospects in the public or private sector, and this motivates them to perform well whatever tasks they receive. Osborne and Gaebler (1992:23) stated that “we must change the basic incentives that drive our governments. We must turn bureaucratic institutions into entrepreneurial institutions, ready to kill off obsolete initiatives, willing to do more with less, eager to absorb new ideas”. One of the convinced and ardent advocates of NPM, Hughes (2003:256) observed that “the traditional model of administration is obsolete and has been effectively replaced by a new model of public management. This change represents a paradigm shift characterized by shift from administration to management, from bureaucracy to markets, and a more realistic view of the relationship between the political and administrative leadership”. Christensen and Laegreid (2001), hold that it is more efficient to separate political and administrative functions than integrated to achieve the economic development in the viewpoint of NPM. Common (1998) and Minogue (1998) observed that poor performance of public sector organizations, domineering bureaucracy, lack of accountability, corruption and people’s changing expectation have contributed to the emergence of the NPM.

To sum up, the thesis of the rise of autonomous agencyfication, better alternative forms of service delivery and government, decentralization, empowerment, customer satisfaction and better mechanisms of public accountability put forward mostly three decades back in response to the New Public Management. This approach claimed that, the scope and nature of governing process of government is diverse and larger in any sense. So, the establishment of autonomous public organizations along with privatization can ensure proper governance and development keeping politics-bureaucracy independently separate. According to this approach, political control of bureaucracy is questionable – as bureaucracy can adopt itself in any situation and can resist and control any change. Public choice theorists have also expressed the same view that bureaucracy always act in terms of self-interest. However, the

philosophical existence behind this approach is better performance, better governance and better public service. During the last three decades, public management has undergone substantial changes and this approach has created enormous interest on politics-bureaucracy relations in public sector organizations and governance in both developed and developing countries (Sarker, 2006). Although many empirical studies show that the performance of the NPM and autonomy practice is not fully satisfactory, because all developed countries did not respond equally and bureaucracy can never be absolutely free from political control and the performance of autonomous agencies are influenced by many de-facto factors – national culture and context.

#### **1.5.4 Emerging Inclination of Thinking**

Despite the enormous discussion on dichotomy and century long debate, some authors have endeavored to reconceptualization of the meaning of classical politics-bureaucracy dichotomy in the last few decades. Of course, this trend of reconceptualization of dichotomy has been started after the Second World War and then classical concept of dichotomy was rejected claiming as too rigid (Svara, 1999). In the beginning, they reconceptualized the classical politics-administration dichotomy as a policy-administration dichotomy (Overeem, 2005). But nowadays, it is reconceptualizing in many ways. As a result, we see an emerging trend of reconceptualization of dichotomy. Stillman (1973), Montjoy and Watson (1995), Svara (1985, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2006), Warner (2001), and Overeem (2005, 2006) are leading among the recent reconceptualizationist writers of dichotomy. Among them Overeem's arguments are different and to some extent defensive to classical dichotomy with matter-of-fact explanation. All of them (except Montjoy and Watson and Overeem) are interested to provide the argument that Wilson had just raised an intellectual question regarding "separability and inseparability of administration from politics" (Stillman, 1973:586) but did not directly mention the concept of dichotomy.

On the contrary, Montjoy and Watson (1995: 232-233) argue that- "the field of administration is a field of business. It is removed from the hurry and strife of politics. Administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics... Administrative questions are not political questions". Wilson's this statement certainly advocate the separation between politics and administration. But what does it mean actually in practice, it depends on

definitions of the key terms. According to their explanation, Wilson actually dealt with two different types of politics, one focused on partisanship and patronage, the other on policy making. Wilson clearly wished to separate patronage politics from administration – as he said “although politics sets the tasks for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices”. Rather, Goodnow’s clarification on this point offers a possible explanation for much of the confusion on the dichotomy. He used both ‘politics’ and ‘policy’ to refer to the expression of the popular will and ‘administration’ to refer to the execution of that will. This conceptualizing is undoubtedly confusing. Because, does politics mean patronage or does it mean policy making or are the three concepts indistinguishable? It is not clear.

Consequently, they endow with reinterpretation of the concept of dichotomy (reinterpreted dichotomy) offering two dichotomies – a conceptual dichotomy between policy and administration and an institutional dichotomy between politics and administration that permits a policymaking role for the manager and resists the forces of particularism. The dichotomy of politics and administration was intended as a behavioural prescription directed against contemporary practice of machine politics (Montjoy and Watson (1995:232)). They focus dichotomy as a professional standard, not as a description of actual behavior and also acknowledge the importance of this model. Warner (2001) reinterprets the dichotomy through the lens of John Stuart Mill’s theory of bureaucracy within representative government where bureaucratic competence is a necessary condition for a successful participatory polity. Yang and Holzer (2005) believed that the separation of administration from politics was necessary to emerge public administration as an autonomous field of study. Rutgers (2001) has tried to explain dichotomy as a logical contradiction with providing epistemological analysis of dichotomy. More recent attempt to reconceptualization of the politics-bureaucracy dichotomy has been done by Overeem (2005, 2006, 2012). Overeem (2012) in his research has tried to re-explore the concept of dichotomy from the historical and constitutional perspectives of American and European politico-administrative context.

Overeem (2005) starts reconceptualization to provide the argument that classical dichotomy has lost its political neutrality by the previous endeavors of many writer’s view ‘neutrality-without-dichotomy’ which were initiated after Second World War. Then he discusses the relationship between political neutrality and the politics-administration dichotomy from a conceptual and normative point of view with elaborations on the concept of ‘political neutrality’ and he contends that ‘political neutrality was central to the classical

conceptualizations of the politics-administration dichotomy' (Overeem, 2005:312). According to Overeem's (2005:318) explanation, 'post-war critics thought that the intention of classical dichotomy approach had been to keep administration not merely out of politics, but out of the making of policy as well.' To defend it he related the politics-administration dichotomy to the value of political neutrality for administrators, arguing that administrators should stay out of political controversies to be neutral administrators (Overeem, 2006:142). He argued that there is a distinction between two types of politics – 'partisan politics' and 'policy politics'. Public administrators cannot (and should not) be excluded from the kind of politics that is inherent to policy making, but they can (and should) be excluded from politics that has a more partisan character (Overeem, 2005: 318-322). Consequently, he draws a conclusion by saying that public administration contrasts with two dichotomies: politics-administration dichotomy, and policy-administration dichotomy. In accordance with the principle of political neutrality and the politics-administration dichotomy – public administration can have an involvement in the later, but not in the former (Overeem, 2005:321-322).

Another leading academic thinker on politics-bureaucracy relations is James H. Svara. His theoretical arguments and empirical findings are very influential and imperative in the literature of the last two decades. Svara (1985:221-222) starts with argument that politics-administration dichotomy model has been facing three pronged challenges; conceptual, empirical and normative, and he tries to reconceptualize the approach on the basis of empirical study in the case of elected politicians and non-elected bureaucrats of five cities in North Carolina State. He viewed 'policy as the mixture of efforts' by elected politicians and non-elected administrators with the domination of bureaucrats. Afterwards, he recognized politics-bureaucracy dichotomy 'as an aberration' and discarded it on empirical grounds (Svara, 1998). And then he redefines politics-bureaucracy dichotomy 'as a myth' and why this (myth of dichotomy) dichotomy approach has been persisted in the process of governance? In this question he found that 'a final reason for the persistence of the dichotomy idea is the absence of an alternative model' (Svara, 2001:177). Lastly he tried to reconceptualization of dichotomy in the context of local government – providing a long historical account and proposed the idea of 'complementarity model' as an alternative for the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats (Svara, 1999, 2001, 2006).

According to Svava (2001:179) “the complementarity model of politics and administration is based on the premise that elected officials and administrators join together in the common pursuit of sound governance. Complementarity entails separate parts, but parts that come together in a mutually supportive way.” He also said that-

Complementarity stresses interdependence along with distinct roles; compliance along with independence; respect for political control along with a commitment to share and implement policy in ways that promote the public interest; deference to elected incumbents along with adherence to the law and support for their electoral competition; and appreciation of politics along with support for professional standards” (Svava, 2001:179).

Thus, complementarity entails ongoing interaction, reciprocal influence and mutual difference between elected officials and administrators (Svava (1999, 2001). Svava’s this view of ‘complementarity’ is also supported by many recent empirical researches (Demir and Nyhan, 2008; Demir and Reddick, 2012; Feiock, Lee and Park, 2012).

Another emerging trend is political responsiveness, although it is prevailing from many decades in the political and governance process. But this approach gets special flavor in the context of US governance during the last tenure of the President George W. Bush. Political responsiveness model emphasize the close relationship between politicians and administrators with subordination of bureaucracy to politicians and dominance of political norms over administrative norms (Svava, 2006a). This approach is based on the conjecture that politicians always look for politically ‘responsive competent’ and oppose ‘neutral competence’ – that means politicians expect loyal bureaucracy as a means to their ends. Politicians increasingly expect a high degree of loyalty from their administrative subordinates (Svava, 2006a; Aberbach & Rockman, 1993, 2000; Rourke, 1992).

In this approach, politicians look ahead to the administrators who will not only follow their order but also sympathetic to their political ideology, belief and values along with their aims as a public officials. On the contrary, bureaucrats give less attention to their professional consideration, though some career bureaucrats are concerned about ‘neutral competence’ and ‘political uncertainty’ (Svava, 2006a). Eventually, either as a result of political pressure or in a supportive way they sacrifice their neutral competence to political responsiveness (Aberbach & Rackman, 1993). In this model, there is close political alignment of politicians and bureaucrats and it is reflected in the efforts of administrators to please their political

masters (Ejersbo & Svara, 2012). On the other hand, sometimes administrators also find their interest to provide such a support to the politicians by violating the norms and values of conventional bureaucracy. As a result, the quality of professional bureaucracy deteriorates and creates a puzzle within the bureaucracy. So the above extensive literature review reveals that research findings are not conclusive in the existing literature on politics-bureaucracy relations. And the issue is very dynamic in a dynamic world. Therefore, there is a still room to maneuver further research agenda in the field of politics-bureaucracy relations.

## **1.6 Rationale and Value of the Study**

Extensive literature review shows that a plethora of literature and research findings proliferate demonstrating a strong relationship between the politicians and bureaucrats in the theoretical perspective, but very few studies have been undertaken in the context of Bangladesh especially in the case of local government. Moreover, much of what has been written about Bangladesh is heavily slanted towards particular viewpoints and perspectives. Rashiduzzaman (1966) conducted research on politics and administration in the local council (especially on union council) in East Pakistan. Abedin (1973) has included Bangladesh in his research of local administration and politics in modernizing societies but his study did not cover real scenario of politics-bureaucracy relations in the local governance of Bangladesh as its main focus was on district administration during colonial and Pakistan period.

Ali (1982) has explored field administration in Bangladesh, but has concentrated on the role of distract officials in the process. Ali (1987); Huq et al (1987); Ahsan (2010) studied the coordination problems in local government and observed that inter-departmental rivalry and lack of mutual understanding, suspicion between officials and political leadership have made coordination problems in upazila administration. Haque (1988) studied politics and administration in Bangladesh based on the major local government reforms and participation problems in the case of gram sarker (village government). Ahmed (1993) in his research addressed the problem of decentralization and development, concerning the political economy of local government. Ahmed (2009) carried out his research in eighties on the role perceptions and relations of politicians and bureaucrats explaining its relations as policy actors. Panday (2009) explores coordination problems and its impact on policy implementation of urban local governance in Bangladesh.

The number of academic works on politics-bureaucracy relations in local government is still fewer as well as the limitations around knowledge production are acute, and these hamper understanding in different ways. In addition, an extensive literature review from theoretical and comparative perspective indicates that while the study of politics-bureaucracy relation has been addressed theoretically and in the context of policy making role of politicians and bureaucrats, but it has not been focused how does this relation influence and affect the governance and development? Similarly, many observers of development administration have also provided a general prescription for shared role between politicians and bureaucrats as ‘agents of change’ for the developing countries. But these development literatures did not identify the way and the content of relationships between politicians and bureaucrats which lead to effective governance and development. In this regard, Meier (1997:194) observed that “we have never recognized that the political branches of government had administrative components and that the real problem with the politics/administration dichotomy is that we only study part of the policy process...but it still yields an incomplete view of governance...there are no great normative theories about what the role of bureaucracy should be in governance.” It should be clearly specified the policy role and governance role of the two actors in the political system before determining the model of relationship between politics and bureaucracy which underpins the relationships.

Therefore, this study explores the politico-bureaucratic dynamics within the local government of Bangladesh, not only viewing the policy role but also explaining the governance role of politicians and bureaucrats. Particularly, emphasizing the politics-bureaucracy relationship and its impact on local governance and development. This study will explore the relationship between elected politicians and official civil bureaucrats, not military bureaucracy. Because, civilian bureaucracy is a professional institution which serves to democratically elected politicians, and politicians are responsible for the work of the civil bureaucracy. Although the military bureaucracy is also subject to political control but it is also a self-interested organization preoccupied with survival, budgetary growth, influence, and autonomy (Suleiman, 2005). Note that, the bureaucrats who belong to the higher stratum of the civil service are involved in policy making and the bureaucrats those belong to the medium or lower hierarchies are responsible for the delivery of services to the public in the local government. In Bangladesh, debates over administrative control of bureaucracy in local governments (especially in sub-district levels) are continuous and long standing. During the

colonial and Pakistan period and even after the independence of Bangladesh,<sup>8</sup> local government has not been exercised the real power in the domain of governance process. As a significant tier of the local government, UZP is a mid-way between the local and central government in Bangladesh. UZP is also a very important tier of politico-administrative nexus. More importantly, to carry out the government programmes UZP can play a crucial role like a bridge between local and national government. Local elected politicians and bureaucrats are an integral part of the governance and development policy process of the upazila administration. In real sense, the development of Bangladesh depends on the upazila administration. Simultaneously, the effective functioning of UZP depends on the mode of interaction between the sets of actors; elected politicians and official bureaucrats. Bureaucrats and politicians both need to be kept accountable with implicit incentives. As a significant tier of the local government the co-ordination between politicians and bureaucrats in the upazila administration is very important, at the same time, identification of the patterns of relationship between the two policy implementing actors is also very important. As though, the developmental role of politicians and bureaucrats are increasing gradually, but how they are approaching to each other as well as with the others actors in the governance process still remains a neglected field of academic inquiry.

Thus, this study intends to conduct an intensive and in-depth investigation on local governance in Bangladesh in light of the politicians and bureaucrats relations. This study will provide a real scenario of politics-bureaucracy relations and will explore intensive inquiry into the local government and eventually will add an extra pace to the policy makers of the third world countries like Bangladesh to enhance the vibrant local government and overall promoting local governance and sustainable development. This research will help accrue double-edged benefits: on the one hand, research will produce rich indigenous knowledge on politics-bureaucracy relations, local governance and development administration. On the other hand, knowledge so generated will benefit the government in better public management and enrich the teaching-learning process of politics and administration schools of the country as well as the findings of this study may guide the building or refinement of theoretical understanding on politics-bureaucracy relationship. Finally, knowledge gained or insufficiency of analysis from this study could provide any scope for further in-depth study in the future.

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<sup>8</sup> More extensive analysis has been drowned in the 4<sup>th</sup> chapter in the present research.

## **1.7 Limitations of the Study**

It is quite impossible to conduct any research without facing multifarious constraints. In that sense no study is free from deficiencies. In the field of social science, these deficiencies or limitations unenthusiastically influence and affect the study. The current study has also faced some limitations. However, an attempt has been made to fulfill the esteemed goals and desires of this study by overcoming those limitations. Nevertheless, the main limitations of the study can be discussed in the following lines: first, with vast theoretical pluralism, there has been no systematic debate on methodologies in public administration (Dhameja, 2003). But more serious debate and problem lies in the application of the western theories in the context of various regions. Like, orthodox classical dichotomy model of politics-administration by Wilson and Weber, value-fact dichotomy by post-behaviouralist theorists, neo institutional theory and contemporary NPM or network thinking, all are essentially applicable to the pluralist democracy. It is very difficult to apply these theories directly in the context of post-colonial developing countries. On the other hand, in the case of developing countries, where there are no indigenous theories to study bureaucracy or administration. Although dependency theory and development administration model claimed to be indigenous in its kind, and Riggs, Heady and others western scholars have developed a new model to the study of development administration but it has been criticized as ideological and Eurocentric (Dhameja, 2003). Of course, Peters (1992), noted that any research in bureaucracy ought to be based on the survey of bureaucrats, their attitudes, behavior, structure and outcomes, and it is subjected to be geographical and temporal analysis. Accordingly, Professor Mitra (2006) has suggested to applying the western theories in the post-colonial societies considering the indigenous context and culture of these societies.

Secondly, though a plethora of literature can be found on the theoretical framework of political role of public representative and on politics-bureaucracy relationship in the context of national government perspective, but in the context of local government perspective, especially on the role of public representative in the local government, existing literature is very inadequate. Thirdly, problems have been faced in the collection of data. Local people were very busy during the data collection schedule because of union parishad elections. Especially, local politicians and bureaucrats were then passing a very hectic time. On the other hand, they were till then in dilemmas and tension respecting their power and functions. By this time, they were not spontaneous in providing data during the interview. They

provided data very cautiously. Fourthly, another important problem was that, respondents provided their answer without realizing the comprehensiveness of the question. As a result, collection of perfect data was to some extent difficult by providing or introducing three sets of semi-structured interview questionnaire to elected politicians, bureaucrats and general peoples. Fifthly, this study required three sets of questionnaire; one is for local elected representatives, other one is for local government officials and another one is for the mass people. According it was maintained. But the problem faced during data tabulation and analysis. Lastly, the significant limitation is the sample size. On the basis of such a small size of sample, it is very difficult to make a generalization on the whole system of local government and the views and perceptions of the local citizens and examine the system of governance. But I had to complete the research on such a short sample size because of time dimensional and financial constraint.

## **1.8 Structure of the Thesis**

This study predominantly examines the relations between local elected politicians and appointed official bureaucrats and its effects on local governance and development in Bangladesh. Thus, it explores some research questions and hypotheses. In addressing this research question, this thesis is organized into nine chapters. In the first chapter, we outline the general introduction on politics-bureaucracy relations reviewing the literature and the state of the art emphasizing the value of this research in the literature of knowledge. The second chapter deals with analytical and theoretical framework spelling out the methodological design of the research which is the guiding principles of the research. Here we also provide conceptual illustration on politics-bureaucracy relations, governance and development theoretically and operationally. Chapter three deals with politics-bureaucracy relations in comparative perspectives emphasizing the context of politics-bureaucracy relations in ancient societies to modern western developed and developing countries, with special reference to United States of America (USA), United Kingdom (UK), Germany and France in the western context of developed countries and focusing the light on South Asia in the context of developing countries. Chapter four explores evolution, structure and process of governance from historical perspective in Bangladesh emphasizing politics-bureaucracy relations at the national and local government levels. It reveals that Bangladesh has a relatively a long experience and familiarity with bureaucracy and local government as a

development administration but an appropriate structure of local government is yet to be established in this country. As a post- colonial structure of government both in the national and local levels, bureaucracy is an essential, dominant and integral part of the government in Bangladesh. It is a tremendous institutional framework for central control over the local government. Historically local government is highly controlled by the central government. Debates over administrative control of bureaucracy in local governments are continuous and long standing. During the colonial and Pakistan period and even after the independence of Bangladesh, local government was not given the real power in the domain of governance process. From the British colonial age to date, central government has been controlling the local government by various mechanisms (mainly by central politicians and bureaucrats) and development is being limbo. Every successive regime in the different historical phases of their rule, keens to build up a support base for themselves in the bureaucracy and in the local government following the example of the previous regime. Chapter five examines the institutional and regulatory framework of the Upazila Parishad (UZP) in Bangladesh which is the main field of study area. Here we look at the legal constitutional status of local government and its nature of autonomy practice. In the chapter six, it deals with mostly underpinning variables which underpins relationship between politicians and bureaucrats. It tries to explore the variables that are most significant to the relationship configuration between the two change agents, identifying the variations in social background and origins of the politicians and bureaucrats. Chapter seven deals with the self-images and outlooks of both the local politicians and bureaucrats, and their interaction patters to identify the prototype of relationships. Chapter eight examines the models of relationship. Special efforts have been made to examine the degree of relationships that critically determine the success or failure of local governance and development. Finally, chapter nine pulls out the overall findings together, re-examine theoretical hypothesis and it figures out prospective model of symbiosis for the implication of effective local governance and development, minimizing the inevitable tensions between politicians and bureaucrats.

## **Chapter – 2: The Theoretical and Analytical Framework**


### **2.1 Introduction**

The main purpose of this chapter is to develop an analytical and a theoretical framework for analyzing politics-bureaucracy relations, governance and development in the context of local government of Bangladesh. My intention is to undertake a theory based empirical study of the politics-bureaucracy relations and its effects on local governance and development. In doing so, first of all, this chapter delineates with the analytical framework and conceptualization of the key terms to develop a theoretical model that is “consistent with conceptualization” (Demir and Nyhan, 2008:82). Then it develops theoretical hypothesis in order to explore, how the relations construct between local elected politicians and bureaucrats and whether it really matters for local governance. And finally, it deals with the methodological perspective from the existing literature of social sciences with particular reference to sociology, political science and public administration, to tap and rationalize the methodological approaches which applied in this research. Overall, this chapter includes theoretical and analytical framework for analysis, variable specification, conceptualization and operationalization of variables, research hypotheses along with its measurement indicators, research design and method of data collection and analysis.

### **2.2 Analytical Framework for the Study**

This inquiry is built upon a foundation of theoretical discussion underpins by empirical findings from local culture and context. Alongside the theoretical framework, that is developed based on the extensive literature review in the subsequent section, in this section the major theoretical discussion is focused on the key concepts for conceptualization and operationalization of variables. On the basis of this conceptualization and operationalization the data have been collected and the empirical findings are explained based upon original data, which have been collected from the field as a primary source. Therefore, this section deals with the operational and analytical framework of the inquiry. The operational and analytical framework for the research is presented in the figure 2.1.

**Figure 2.1:**  
**Analytical Framework and Measurement of the Study**



Source: By the researcher following Neuman (2003).

There are three inter linkage levels of this research; theoretical, operational and empirical which are shown in the above figure. In the theoretical level, it intends to bring together the theories of public administration and comparative analysis to explore the scholarships of theoretical paradigms in existing literatures on research issue on the basis of framing hypothetical causal relationships between dependent and independent variables. Then it provides conceptual definition of variables on the basis of theoretical discussion in the operational level and also endow with operational definition. After then it endeavors to maneuver the analytical framework in the empirical level by using empirical survey data collected from the local government (from Upazilas) and eventually research is reached in the desired stage on the basis of indicators and measurement by tested empirical hypothesis both using qualitative and quantitative arguments.

### **2.2.1 Conceptualization and Operationalization of Variables**

In social science, conceptualization or definitional problem of research terms is always a considerable issue. Nevertheless, conceptualization and operationalization of variables are very important to the analytical framework and research process. Indeed, achieving the theoretical and causal goals from the empirical fields would seem to be virtually impossible

unless its variables can be measured adequately (King *et al.*, 2004). Thus, to conceptualize and operationalize the variables, we will turn our attention to concentrate on five research terms, providing workable or operational definitions in this research. These are as follows; Politics, Bureaucracy, Relation, Governance and Development. Before defining politics-bureaucracy relation we should explain the two terms 'politics' and 'bureaucracy' here for comprehensive understanding for their relationships.

The term politics denotes many meanings to many minds. From the ancient Greek city-state to present modern nation state, we observe many definitional variations of the term politics. Notable thing is that there is not an academic consensus on the precise definition on politics. About 25<sup>th</sup> century before, Plato (in his famous literature *The Republic*) has provided a definition of politics by mentioning his education master Socrates as 'politics is a matter of thought and government is the concern of the wise'.<sup>9</sup> Aristotle defines politics as 'practical science' as it deals with making citizens happy. In his book *Politics* he states that city-state comes into being for the sake of life but politics exists for the sake of the good life. The good life or happiness is the proper end of the city-state recurs throughout the politics.<sup>10</sup>

Wilsonian idea about the politics can be found among some of his early scholarships. Wilson characterized politics as 'an experimental art' and as largely an affair of management and expediency. He also conceptualized politics 'a science whose very expositions are as deathless as life itself. It is the science of the life of man in society' (Ubertaccio and Cook, 2006:73-76). Max Weber (1946) defines politics as interests in the distribution, maintenance, or transfer of power or struggle of power. Lasswell (1950) defines politics as the process of allocating scarce values. In his words, 'politics is the process of who gets what, when and how'. Davis Easton (1965) also expresses the same view. He defines politics as 'an authoritatively allocation of values for a society'. *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary* defines politics as 'the activities involved in getting and using power in public life, and being able to influence decisions that affect a country or a society'.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> This definition is actually provided by Socrates. But he wrote nothing by himself. Because, he never thought that writing is to be necessary.

<sup>10</sup> See *The Politics* of Aristotle (III; VII) and also Aristotle's Political Theory, *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Access: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-politics/>

<sup>11</sup> See the *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary*:  
<http://oald8.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/dictionary/politics>

Overall, from the above discussion we can categorize the definition of politics as four broader perspectives: politics as the art of the government, politics as public affairs, politics as compromise and consensus, and politics as power and the distribution of resources. In summary, it can be said that politics is a power game and the politicians are the actors or players of that power game. In this research, we will consider politician as a person who is professionally involved in politics and elected by the people and hold an elected office in the local government. Consequently, another actor is also involved in this process that is bureaucracy which is termed “officialdom” by Weber (1947).

The term ‘bureaucracy’ is originated from French word ‘*bureaucratie*’ by combining French word ‘*bureau*’-means desk or office with Greek word ‘*kratos-cracy*’ means rule.<sup>12</sup> The term ‘bureaucracy’ was included in the English language dictionary in 1818 and in the later part of the century; its definition was expanded and popularized by the German Sociologist Max Weber with systematic analysis. *Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary* defines bureaucracy as ‘the system of official rules and ways of doing things that a government or organization has, especially when these seem to be too complicated.’<sup>13</sup> The common thinking about bureaucracy is as a monolith that operates according to its own rules, resists change, ignores outsiders, and stymies those who try to control it or hold it accountable (Ejersbo and Svara, 2012). As a result of complexities and controversies that surrounding the bureaucracy, it has come to mean different things to different people. Khan (2009:34) has rightly said that-

To a layman, it means the continuation of red tape, inefficiency, and abuse of power in the context of official-client relationships within an organization. To a sociologist, a bureaucratic organization is one that does not learn from its own mistakes and repeats them often because of its static and inflexible nature. To a political scientist, bureaucracy can mean a system of government where departmental officials at upper levels have their voices heard and given due consideration. To a student of organization, bureaucracy usually refers to the structure found in modern large organization with all the accompanying paraphernalia.

So the puzzle of bureaucratic definition is an observable fact in the literature. In this research, the concept of ‘bureaucracy’ will be viewed and conceptualized from the three dimensions. First, bureaucracy is as an antediluvian institution or state apparatus from the viewpoint of derivation or historical antecedent of bureaucracy. Second, bureaucracy is as an “ideal-type

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<sup>12</sup> See the *Merriam Webster Dictionary*: <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bureaucracy>

<sup>13</sup> See the *Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary*: <http://oald8.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/dictionary/bureaucracy>

or legal-rational” concept which is advocated by Max Weber. And the third, bureaucracy is as change agent of a modern organizational system of governance which has been developed overtime in the modern political system. Although the term bureaucracy was not coined and popularized until eighteenth century but the concept of bureaucracy based rule and administration is much older. Perhaps bureaucracy is one of the most enduring institutions of governance and administration that has survived several millennia. As Farazmand (2010:245) comments that “from the dawn of civilization to the present, political masters have come and gone, but none has been able to do away with bureaucracy.....bureaucracy has gained a historical reputation of resilience, instrumentality, and positive as well as negative organization of public governance and administration”.

As an ancient institution of government and administration bureaucracy has its roots in the deep past. The existence of ancient bureaucracy can be found from the different historical analysis (Hofmeyer, 1927; Sastri, 1956; Herson, 1957; Mattingly, 1957; Wittfoget, 1957; Beyer, 1959; Farazmand, 2009; and Subramaniam, 2009). In these literatures, ancient bureaucracy has been conceptualized as state apparatus of government and administration. Bureaucracy had been serving and playing a formidable role in the administration of great empires and civilization, namely Persian, Egyptian, Chinese, Roman, Prussian and Indian civilization<sup>14</sup> (Farazmand, 2009:1-3). The earliest origin of bureaucracy dates back to about 10,000 years beginning in ancient Susa and Sumer (which was ancient civilization and historical region in southern Mesopotamia and Babylonian) where an emergent class of scribes administered the harvest and allocated its spoils (Farazmand, 2009:2-3). In these early civilizations, bureaucracy was considered ‘as a state apparatus’ and they were involved in law and order maintenance, policy implementation of developmental and monumental works.

The process of bureaucratization has accelerated to a great extent with the advancement of civilization. Max Weber pointed out the important relationship between the emergence and the consolidation of the modern state with the advancement of bureaucracy by explaining the conditions of the development of money economy, the increasing size of the states and organizations, the impact of cultural, economic and technological development, and the technical superiority of bureaucracy over other forms of administration (cited in Khan,

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<sup>14</sup> It has been explained more comprehensively in the 3<sup>rd</sup> chapter of this research in the comparative perspectives.

2009:40). Many works of the German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920) remain a source of inspiration for the scholars and researchers in the social sciences. Bureaucracy is one of them. Weber was the founder of the systematic study of bureaucracy and his “ideal-type or legal-rational” bureaucracy is the most commonly used concept of bureaucracy in academic literatures. Interestingly, Weber disregarded the importance of ancient imperial bureaucracy saying that it is “patrimonial” and irrelevant to modern industrial world, although Weber assembled the thought of “ideal-type” concept from the strength and weakness of ancient bureaucracies (Subramaniam, 2009:53-63). However, Weber (1946,1947) has defined bureaucracy as the most efficient type of organization as a conceptual illustration of bureaucracy pointing out some strict principles, like fixed official rules, hierarchy and unity of command, division of labor and task specialization, fulltime office and filing record system, impersonality, and merit based staffing and promotion.<sup>15</sup>

Weber’s writing on bureaucracy is understood most appropriately as an examination of the characteristics of a system of domination (Weiss, 1983:243). In the Weberian interpretation of bureaucracy, two dominant themes are considerable. One is formal organizational entity and the other is domination or authority relationship (Weber, 1947:154-157). Thus, Weber endorses three types of dominations or authority; traditional, charismatic and legal-rational. To Max Weber, legal-rational is the superior among all types and it is the ‘officialdom’ or bureaucracy (Weber, 1947: 332). As bureaucracy is always ran by the formal and rational authority structure. Weber (1947:361) stated that bureaucratic authority is specifically rational in the sense of being bound discursively analyzable rules. In the “ideal-type” system envisaged by Weber, the professional bureaucrats “is only a single cog in an ever-moving mechanism which prescribes to him an essentially fixed route of march. The official is entrusted with specialized tasks and normally the mechanism cannot be put into motion or arrested by him, but only from the very top” (cited from Suleiman, 1974:156). In addition, according to Weber, bureaucratic position is even more significant for explaining the systematic crisis in leadership because bureaucracy is the consequences of constitutional relations (Scaff, 1973:134). Weberian concept of bureaucracy is criticized by many thinkers (Blau, 1955; Selznik, 1961; Crozier, 1964; Merton, 1968) for its overwhelming power and

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<sup>15</sup> For more comprehensive understanding on bureaucracy, see Weber, Max. (1946). ‘Bureaucracy’ in H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills, (eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, New York: Oxford University Press. Weber, Max. (1947). *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*. Translated by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Person. New York: Free Press. Weber, Max. (1978). *Economy and Society*, G. Roth and C. Wittich (eds.), Berkeley: University of California Press.

formal structure (closed-system) and neglecting informal human relationship in the process of governance. Their argument was that Weber made bureaucracy as a human analogue to the machine. In Weber's word "a lifeless machine is objectified mind" (Cited in Scaff, 1973:135). As a result, the modern concept of bureaucracy exists in the perspective criticizing Weberian mechanistic concept of bureaucracy.

In modern times, bureaucracy has become a dominant institution or an organizational system that is unavoidable. Mentioning the over domination and malfunctioning of bureaucracy in the process of governance, Thompson (1961:152) clarifies the concept of modern bureaucracy as 'bureau-pathology'. Friedrich (1963: 468-470) defines bureaucracy as a form of organization marked by hierarchy, specialization of roles, and a high level of competence displayed by incumbents trained to fill these roles (cited in Riggs, 1969). Crozier (1964:3) defines modern bureaucracy as 'government by bureau' that is 'government by departments of the state staffed by appointed and not elected functionaries, organized hierarchically, and dependent on a sovereign authority'. Lucius Wilmerding finds that bureaucrats are those who assist the political officers of the modern government in the formulation of policy and those who merely carry out orders, accumulate facts, or engage in research (cited in Waldo, 1948:94).

Borrowing the neologism from Thompson and symphonizing it with Weber's own phrase 'rational-legal' Riggs (1969) explains the concept of modern bureaucracy as 'bureau-rationality'. Eisenstadt (1967) regarded bureaucracy as a power group in rivalry with other groups including the sovereign (cited in Subramaniam, 2009:54). Albrow (1970) provides a definition of modern bureaucracy on the basis of some organization features and characterized by seven distinct attributes; bureaucracy as rational organization, bureaucracy as organizational inefficiency, bureaucracy as rule by officials, bureaucracy as public administration, bureaucracy as administration by officials, bureaucracy as the organization and bureaucracy as modern society (cited in Khan, 2009: 36-38). Overall, modern concept of bureaucracy refers to a large organizational or institutional system organized with systematically coordinating structure of work, process and normative values, rules and regulations as well as a mix of merit and patronage and record system (Blau and Meyer, 1971; Farazmand, 2010:246). Taking into account the above overall analysis, in this research, bureaucracy will be considered as an institutional structure in local governance that plays a vital role in policy formulation, implementation and delivering public services to the local

communities along with local elected politicians. Now the question is how are they related and where actual power lies in the modern state? And how do these two actors interact? The nature of relationships between politicians and bureaucrats is thus a key issue to explore the conceptualization. In regarding the first question, Weber emphasized “it lies neither in parliamentary speeches nor monarchical pronouncements, but necessarily and unavoidably in the hands of bureaucracy, since it is exercised through the daily routines of administration” (cited in Scaff, 1973:134). In *Parlament und Regierung in neugeordneten Deutschland* Weber explained the distinction of political and bureaucratic rule and also relationship between politicians and bureaucrats by using two contrasting terms ‘action’ and ‘vocation’. He termed bureaucratic rule as ‘action’ or official duties on the basis of set rules, on the other hand, political rule as ‘vocation’ or partial, motivated by power. Weber held that from the view point of politicians ‘bureaucracy is always irresponsible’ (Scaff, 1973:134) but in the real sense they are legitimate administrators.

On the other hand, if we want to identify why Weber emphasized bureaucracy again and again? And to comprehensive understanding of the bureaucratic disposition in the governance, then according to Weber the main problem lies with the political limitations. Weber identified some lacks of traditional and charismatic domination – incapacity as a politician and his inevitable lack of control over the political bureaucracy. But he was also concern about ‘overtowering’ power position of bureaucrats (Weber, 1946). This is why Weber desired efficient and developed bureaucracy by controlled political leadership. The politician, by virtue of his distinct qualities and by virtue of being an elected leadership, thus prescribes what the official must carry out. He advised politicians to “resist any effort on the part of the bureaucrats to gain control” and warned that a nation “which believes that the conduct of the state affairs is a matter of ‘administration’ and that ‘politics’ is nothing but the part-time occupation of amateurs or a secondary tusk of bureaucrats might as well forget about playing a role in world affairs” (cited in Heady, 2001:426). In this respect, Weber has advocated a ‘neutral competence’ bureaucracy with a clear distinction between politics and administration (Weber, 1947). Wilson (1887), Goodnow (1900) have also expressed the same view in the conceptual foundation of politics-bureaucracy relations. These classical thinkers have conceptualized the relationship between politics and administration on the basis of separate duties.

On the other hand, many writers such as Waldo (1948), Appleby (1949), Martin (1952), LaPalombara (1963), Riggs (1963, 1964, 1969), Self (1972), Campbell (1983), Caiden (1984), Van Riper (1984), Rabin & Bowman (1984), Polsby (1984), Svava (1998, 2001), and Peters (2001) have argued (from the theoretical point of view) that in the performance of governance role, a clear-cut division or separation between politicians and bureaucrats is neither possible nor wise. While several empirical studies like Putnam (1975), Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman (1981), Aberbach and Rockman (1988), Norton (1991), Montjoy and Watson (1995), Farazmand (1997), Svava (1999, 2002, 2006), Mouritzen and Svava (2002), and Overeem (2005, 2006) have yielded mixed results and tried to intermeshing between the above two models with some variational modeling in explaining politics-bureaucracy relations. Therefore, from the existing literatures on politics-bureaucracy relations, particularly combining the theoretical normative works and empirical research, four major theoretical models can be found for conceptual understanding of politics-bureaucracy relations. These are: dichotomy or separation model, Mutual-interaction or overlapping roles model, autonomy, and political responsiveness model.<sup>16</sup> In discussing politics-bureaucracy interaction Aberbach et. al, (1981) said – to understand the political limitations in the process of governance, how it may be changing and how strategies for influencing policy are affected, we need to know about the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats. Riggs (1963) stated that the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats may be examined from two sides: the effect of political weakness on administrative effectiveness and the consequences of bureaucratic expansion for the political system or in the governance. But the main aim of this research is not undermine any particular character neither politicians nor bureaucrats, rather governance is to be effective and feasible, balancing between these potentially conflicting actors is necessary, although it is an enduring challenge.

In any political system, bureaucracies and politicians are two folds; central and local. There is a tremendous link between these two hierarchies. They may constitute a paragon of skill and rationality to continue the government decisions in the implementation. Because in course of time local or field bureaucracies occupy the central positions after being promoted. At the same time, similar philosophy is applicable to the politicians. Local government is the playground for the politicians. They are also being promoted as a central leaders or policy maker after having the experience from the local government planning. So, whatever may be

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<sup>16</sup> See the more comprehensive explanation on these models in the theoretical perspectives.

the scope of analysis, either national or local government, the nature of relationships is a key issue to explore. Thus this research has focused on trying to understand conceptually and empirically the nature of the relationship (which is operationalized as mode of interaction) between local elected politicians and official bureaucrats and how this relation affects the local governance and development in Bangladesh.

On the other hand, the term governance and development also needs to be conceptualized accordingly. Although, governance and development are closely correlated as development cannot be sustained unless governance is fine and effective. But it depends on the politico-bureaucratic disposition, and three dimensional relationships among politicians, bureaucrats and the public. Thus this section intends to discuss the concept of governance and development in general, rather to enter into a review of the theory of governance and development. Therefore, it is required to clarify the two concepts first and then it is better to try to focus the light on the linkage between them. In recent times, the term ‘governance’ has caught such an attention of policymakers, academicians, development practitioners and international donor agencies that it has become an overworked term. Once the term ‘governance’ was conceptually underdeveloped, and now it is conceptually overdeveloped (Sobhan, 1993).

Thus the term ‘governance’ has become an interesting puzzling area for researchers as it is using in multidimensional perspectives and it has too many connotations and meanings. In comparative perspectives, governance does not convey the same meaning in everywhere. In fact, the meaning of governance depends on the culture, context and the level of analysis (Mitra, 2006). Since the early 1980s, governance has emerged as a popular vocabulary of development literature (Aminuzzaman, 2006). Professor Mitra (2006:4), Fritzen (2009:1-5) have identified the origins of governance since after Second World War and early 1970s in assessing the development and the contextual factors that have affected the development of governance debate. Whatever may be the debate on conceptual development of governance, the reality is that worldwide development of governance rhetoric is not accompanied by convergence in thinking, definitions and practices across nations. This is may be one reason as to why the concept of governance has been labeled as confusing, unclear and not precise (Pierre and Peters, 2000:14; Smouts, 1998:81; Senarclens, 1998:92). Moreover, recent NPM school of thought provides the concept of governance as “governance without government” (Peters & Pierre, 1998).

The concept of governance is multifaceted and cross-sectional. The term ‘governance’ is used in a variety of ways, suggesting a variety of meanings (Rhodes, 2001; Stoker, 1998), and governance is not a linear, irreversible phenomenon. It varies with time and space, culture and context of governing (Mitra, 2006; 2008). Its theoretical roots are also varied on the basis of disciplines and analytical discourse (Mitra, 2006:25) like public policy approach to governance and comparative politics approach. The public policy approach perceives governance as an interactive process and serves to understand the material context of the actors involved in the processes of interaction. On the other hand, the comparative politics approach renders the analysis of governance more contextually embedded (Chaudhuri, 2014).

If we simply mean governance as policy and process of governing then it is as old as human civilization. In fact, according to Plato, governance is integral to state-craft and the state is the human soul writ-large. The famous declaration of Plato “unless philosophers rule as kings, or those now called kings and chiefs genuinely and adequately philosophize....there is no rest from ills for the cities....nor, I think, for human kind”<sup>17</sup> reminds us the notion of governance. Thus, the central focus of governance is the human soul, whose ingredients manifest themselves in a variety of ways, effecting and affecting the contours and contents of state activities, channelized and shaped through the medium of governance (Narain and Arora, 2010:1). Governance is therefore a mechanism to exercise state’s power. Halfani et al., (1994:3) argued that the term governance is used first in the fourteenth century and it was used in two senses: first, as an action or method of governing and second, manner of governing (cited in Khan, 2006:19). In spite of divergence in conceptualization of governance, definitions were provided by many thinkers and researchers.

In general, governance denotes “how people are ruled, how the affairs of the state are administered and regulated” (Mills and Serageldin, 1991:304). Huntington (1968) defines governance by institutionalizations and orderly rule. Halfani *et al.*, (1994:4) have defined governance as “system of government concentrating on effective and accountable institutions, democratic principles and electoral process, representation and responsible structures of government, in order to ensure an open and legitimate relationship between civil society and the state” (cited in Aminuzzaman, 2006:12). World Bank (1992) defines

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<sup>17</sup>Quoted from The *Republic* of Plato. (1991). Translated by Allan Bloom, 2<sup>nd</sup>ed, New York: Basic Books, P-309.

governance as “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development”. In addition, World Bank has advanced the idea of governance as the manner of power exercise from the effectiveness of developmental perspective. The conceptual underpinnings of its expanded focus on both economic development and broader state effectiveness in promoting poverty reduction and corruption control (World Bank, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2004).

Kaufmann *et al.*, (2010:2) define governance as “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (a) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; (b) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and (c) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.” They also measured the worldwide governance by six indicators and shown the relation between governance and development (Kaufmann *et al.*, 2009:5). Therefore one particular way in governance analysis is development. It can be either economic or political development or can be both. But the question is whether governance and development have a two-way relationship or a mutually reinforcing relationship or to what extent governance affects development is an unsettled and debatable issue in the literature of political economy (Asaduzzaman, 2008; Islam, 2008). Although classical political economists including Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill recognized the importance of political institutions and effective governance for development (Knack, 2008:73). Till then the theory as well as the empirical analysis of the interrelations between governance and development remains a work in progress riddled with many unsettled questions (Islam, 2008:11).

Nevertheless, it can be said abhorrently that governance really does matter in the process of development and there are indicators that the manner of governance does influence the pace and character of development. But which elements of governance are important in which country depend on a host of factors (Asaduzzaman, 2008:4). May be the political and bureaucratic elitist behavior and their relations, local culture and context are exceedingly considerable one. In this regard, Professor Mitra identified a new approach of governance studies. He termed governance as a conceptual variable which is measurable in terms of qualitative and quantitative indicators (Mitra, 2006:3). Using the rational choice and the neo-institutional approach, he also measured the level of Indian governance by some qualitative and quantitative indicators in his research. Keeping in mind the above overall scenario it can


be said that governance is not only the affair of the government; it is an affair of many. Governance is not a directly observable fact and therefore, the discussions of governance often generate more rhetorical heat than empirical light. So, the concept of governance has many ramifications in its application to the politics and overall development of a country (Sobhan, 1993:1).

In this research, the concept of governance is to be used as a reflection of the politics-bureaucracy relations and the role of the UZP in giving direction to the development. More particularly, governance is considered and operationalized as the process and manner of power relationships among the authoritative actors – how power is exercised, how decisions are made on local public affairs and the interaction between institutions and public service stake holders. As Peters and Pierre (1998:232) hold “understanding governance – its direction, practices and outcomes – is largely a matter of observing and interpreting the process through which it evolves and what is the relative clout of the actors involved therein”. Thus, following the approach of Professor Mitra, this study approaches governance from a public policy and neo-institutional perspectives where governance is considered as a process of authority relationship to design, formulate and implementation of policies and discharge functions. On the other hand, development will be considered as a parameter of governance and as an ultimate outcome of governance. Overall, governance and development is measured by some indicators such as; (1) rule application, (2) collective decision and action, (3) accountability & transparency, (4) infrastructural development, and (5) public service delivery.

In order to explore the relations between politicians and bureaucrats and its influence on governance and development it is needed to identify the dependent and independent variables along with the operationalization. Although there is no hard and first rule to specify the dependent and independent variable in the social research but it is important to define how the researcher wants to operationalize the concepts. Nachmias and Nachmias (1996:56) provide the argument in this respect that “In real world, variables are neither dependent nor independent: the researcher decides how to view them, and that decision is based on the research objectives. An independent variable in one investigation may be a dependent variable in another, and the same research, working on different projects, may classify the same variables in different ways.”

**Figure-2.2:**

**Operationalization of Variables with Measurement Indicators**



**Source: by the Researcher**

Thus, the relationship between local elected politicians and local appointed official bureaucrats is necessarily a long-term proposition strong enough to withstand the occasional stress and strain. Consequently, in the first stage of this inquiry, the “relation” between local elected politicians and appointed official bureaucrats is considered as dependent variable, while the systemic and contextual variables which largely shape and affect the relationship are independent variables. On the other hand, as politics-bureaucracy relations influence the governance and development thus relation is to be considered as an independent variable in the second stage that has an explanatory power to determine the mode of interaction between politicians and bureaucrats in the process of governance and development. Therefore, by

following the rules of deductive reasoning, it can be said that governance and development varies with the models of relationship and relationship varies with the institutional and contextual factors. Figure 2.2 explains these specifying variables by intensity of inquiry. This research seems that these components shape or underpin the interaction between politicians and bureaucrats in any system of governance. In this study, relation refers to the mode of interaction between local elected politicians and appointed official local bureaucrats in the process of local governance and development. More implicitly, it depends on institutional structure, legal and regulatory framework, social background, politico-administrative values, role perceptions and performance, Political Neutrality and Competence, self-image and mutual interaction between the two actors. Furthermore, in order to explain the concepts more comprehensively, several theoretical hypotheses are formulated, and to evaluate these hypotheses, measurement indicators also have been adopted.

## **2.3 The Theoretical Framework**

Having discussed conceptual and operational definitions and analytical framework, then we can now turn to the discussion on the theoretical framework of the research in this section. The theoretical framework provides a structure or scope for empirical explanation. It consists of a set of concepts, variables and theoretical propositions, some of which are abstract while others are measurable empirically. As “social scientists are in agreement that one of the most important functions of empirical research is to contribute to the development and refinement of theory” (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996:35), thus, this section attempts to explore the major paradigms and theories in public administration, theories of politics-bureaucracy relations and how these theoretical models operate the present research along with its modification and propositions.

### **2.3.1 The Major Paradigms and Theories in Public Administration**

The theoretical paradigm shift is an observable fact in every aspect of science and social sciences. The concept of a “paradigm” developed by Thomas Kuhn to discover the knowledge in the natural sciences which refers to a set of universal accepted laws of nature in

science.<sup>18</sup> Thus, there is a growing tendency to every discipline to find out whether it has a paradigm of its own or not (Bellone, 1980). In this connection, as an interdisciplinary nature of the study, public administration is also concerned about its paradigm, although as a distinct discipline public administration has been suffering from identity crisis, and this identity crisis in public administration reflects “an expression of doubts about its nature and status in academe” as well as “in terms of lacking a specific and unique theoretical and methodological core” (Raadschelders, 2011:917-919). Moreover, public administration is concerned with government and administration based on administrative theory, which is indebted to political science, sociology, psychology, and economics for much of its conceptual foundation (Bellone, 1980). Nevertheless, many theoretical models and paradigms have developed in public administration after being a separate academic discipline. Frederickson (1980) presents five theoretical models of public administration as the lineage of “New Public Administration” that have been prevalent in the field before the development of a model of NPA. These are: the classic bureaucratic model, the neo-bureaucratic model, the institutional model, the human relations model, and the public choice model. And eventually Frederickson developed a new model of “New Public Administration” providing the values and the structural as well as managerial means of achieving them (Frederickson, 1980:33-51). He also listed “the theories and theorists associated with each model, its empirical focus, its characteristics, and the values it maximizes” (Bellone, 1980:28).

Therefore a simplified summary of the theoretical literature of comparative politics and comparative public administration reveals that two theoretical lines ‘structural-functionalism’ and ‘neo-institutionalism’ – what is often termed ‘mainline’ – has become mostly accepted as ground theory during recent decades. The first one “originated and elaborated by the sociologists such as Talcott Parsons, Marion Levy, and Robert Merton for the studies of whole societies, and later adopted by political scientists for the analysis of political systems” (Heady, 2001:9) and the second one is developed by both the political scientists and public administrationists. The basic analytical framework that has been provided by these two schools of thought is to some extent similar. Modest difference only in the application of approaches; whether the preferred approach is through structure or function? If we explain the main theme of Frederickson’s five theoretical models then it can be found that the

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<sup>18</sup> For comprehensive understanding of Paradigm see Kuhn, Thomas, (1970), *The Structure of Scientific Revolution*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

classical bureaucratic model stressed or emphasized on structural variables, whereas the neo-bureaucratic model emphasized on decision or action. On the other hand, institutional model emphasized on both the structure and function, and last two models emphasized on human relations in an organization and citizen's choices. Heady (2001:9) observed that "In the terminology of structural-functional analysis, structures are roughly synonymous with institutions and functions with activities. Structures or institutions perform functions or activities. The linkage between structures and functions cannot be broken, but priority can be given in analysis either to the structural or functional aspects of the total system." In this respect, functionalism has been questioned by a variety of neo-institutionalists. This is why, there is a growing tendency toward reversing this preference and focusing primarily on political structures and institutions by the institutionalism and neo-institutionalism (Heady, 2001). Keeping in mind of the centrality of the linkage between comparative politics and comparative public administration, this research follows structural-functionalism and neo-institutionalism as a ground theory. At the same time, multi-dimensional theoretical model – what has been developed in the perspective, combining the theories of public administration and comparative study on politics-bureaucracy relations, has been followed as a middle-range theory in this study. Now we will look for what are those theoretical models available in the literature for the study of politics-bureaucracy relationship in particular.


### **2.3.2 Theoretical Paradigms in the Study of Politics-Bureaucracy Relations**

Probably the most elemental and theoretical debatable issue for millennia to political scientists and public administrationists is that – what will be the apt relationships between the politicians and the bureaucrats? While the thinking and analysis is done by many political philosophers, thinkers and researchers on politics-bureaucracy relations provided a good theoretical framework or research paradigm, but one of the surprising consequences of the literature in the field is that the academic discussions on politics-bureaucracy relations are extremely asymmetrical and diversified as we already have witnessed from the literature review. In addition, less attention has been given to an understanding of how politics-bureaucracy relations affect the governance and development. Notwithstanding the theoretical divergence of perceptions and interpretation, this study intends to organize a theoretical and analytical framework for understanding the politics-bureaucracy relations by combining classical, new classical and contemporary views on politics-bureaucracy relations. As change agent, politicians and bureaucrats are the influential leading actors of governance

and development in any nation. Many scholars have identified this notion in the literature of political science and public administration. A plenty of theoretical literature and empirical research findings proliferate demonstrating a strong relationship between the politicians and bureaucrats in the theoretical perspective. But there is no absolute single approach or paradigm of studying politics-bureaucracy relations. May be the reasons are differentiable legal-institutional arrangement in the contextual factors, as well as the elitist group (politicians and bureaucrats) behavior is not same in everywhere, although there are some common characteristics. Since – as already stated that the academic discussion on politics-bureaucracy relation is asymmetrical and the discussions of the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats as well as other related issues are extremely varied and contain competing and contending tendencies or approaches (Farazmand, 1997).

**Figure -2.3**

**Paradigm shifts of politics-bureaucracy relationship**



Source: by the Researcher

Therefore, to analyze and to silhouette the understanding of the issue theoretically in the existing literature, the debate on theoretical approach or perspective can be kept apart in the following four theoretical paradigmatic perspectives that have been developed over the centuries on the politics-bureaucracy relations. From the existing literature on politics-bureaucracy relations (that has been reviewed in the first chapter) the following theoretical paradigms or approaches can be identified: (1) The Classical ‘Politics-Administration Dichotomy’ Approach; (2) The ‘Mutual-Interactive’ Approach; (3) New Public Management and ‘Return to Dichotomy/Autonomy’ Approach; and (4) The Emerging ‘Reconceptualization of Dichotomy, Complementarity and Political

Responsiveness' Approach. Each paradigm identifies a set of explanatory factors, and these theoretical perspectives will also form the theoretical framework for this research.

### **2.3.3 Theoretical Modification: How do the Theoretical Models operate for this Study?**

Keeping in mind the above overall theoretical perspectives in the existing literature on politics-bureaucracy relations, an attempt has been made to modify the theoretical perspectives in this section to build an adaptable theoretical framework for this research by discussing the key variations and effectual deficiencies among of the stated models. Although Svara (2006, 2006a) has attempted to provide a summary account of theoretical perspectives by explaining the level of control of administrators by elected officials. But my endeavor is from the different point of view. In this thesis, I wanted to propose a logical modification of the existing relationship models by explaining some underpinning variables theoretically and examining with empirical data which underpin the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in governance and in the policy making process.<sup>19</sup> In doing so, I have tried to consider the philosophical principles, composing factors, process of governance and effectual deficiencies of every existing theoretical models (which has been shown in the table 2.1) and overall underpinning variables which underpin the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in any political systems.

Therefore, from the existing literatures on politics-bureaucracy relations, particularly combining the theoretical normative works and empirical research, four major models can be found for understanding politics-bureaucracy relations. These are: dichotomy or separation model, Mutual-interaction or overlapping roles model, autonomy, and political responsiveness model (Svara, 2006a). Although there is no consistent approach in these relationship models (Lee, 2006) and these models do not focus on explanation of the behavior of individuals and organizations that public choice or normative institutionalist models do (Peters, 1999; Ejersbo and Svara 2012). That's why this study deals with individual behaviors of politicians and bureaucrats what they do as a policy and governance actors, and the local government institution as an organization. Moreover, these general models are just assumptions and it has incorporated in efforts to explain how bureaucrats are or can be interrelated to elected politicians in policy process not in governance.

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<sup>19</sup> As existing theoretical models on politics-bureaucracy relations emphasized mostly on policy making and implementation process and overlook governance question. Thus this research emphasizes both of them.

**Table 2.1**  
**The Theoretical Perspectives on Politics-Bureaucracy Relations**

<b>Theoretical Paradigms</b>	<b>Leading Proponents</b>	<b>Principles/Philosophy</b>	<b>Process of Governance</b>	<b>Effectual Deficiency</b>
<b>Paradigm-1: Dichotomy/ Separation</b>	Wilson, Max Weber, Goodnow, White, Willoughby, Finer, Mosher and many more	Separate Duties, Trust, Professional Competency, Merit Based, Political Neutrality	Politicians will approach policy and bureaucrats will implement, Political Control of Bureaucracy	Mechanistic concept, Weak Accountability, Dichotomy is unrealistic
<b>Paradigm-2: Mutual-Interaction</b>	Appleby, Waldo, Martin, Riggs, Pye, LaPalombara Eisenstadt, Long, Hecló, Self, Golembiewski Caiden, and many more	NPA, Policy joint venture, Politics and administration are very intimately related,	Mutuality/Reciprocal understanding between Politicians and Bureaucracy	Extensive role of bureaucracy, lack of accountability, Corruption, Poor Public Service
<b>Paradigm-3: Autonomy/Return to Dichotomy</b>	Hood, Pollitt, Osborne and Gaebler, Hughes, Carroll, Rosenbloom, Barzelay, Verhoest, Christensen, Laegreid and many more	NPM, Autonomy, Market Economy, Professionalism & Ethics, Decentralization, Empowerment, Customer Satisfaction, Reinventing Government, More public accountability	Policy role of Bureaucracy with separation, Restructuring, Downsizing, Agencification, Emphasizing Privatization, Drastic Decentralization,	Bureaucratic and Administrative Resistance/Inefficiency, De facto Autonomy, Controlled Performance
<b>Paradigm-4: Reconceptualization of Dichotomy, Complementarity/ Political Responsiveness</b>	Stillman, Svara, Moe, Montjoy, Watson, Warner, Overeem	Complementarity with separate duties, Politics-bureaucracy alignment Neutrality, Dominance of politics over administration,	Mutual understanding, Shared influence, Cooperation, Reciprocity	Overlapping roles, Alignment, Responsive to political master, Less competent


Source: Compiled by the researcher from the survey of existing literatures

In addition, it is very difficult to distinguish any particular model in any political system. The analysis of politics-bureaucracy relations from comparative perspective <sup>20</sup> reveals that if any particular model of relationship is dominant in a political system, at the same time some aspects of the other models are commonly found as well (Ejersbo and Svara, 2012). Nevertheless, each of the models has some central features that are important for understanding the roles and relationships of politicians and bureaucrats. More importantly, the thing is that these theoretical models are not identical, and their characteristics are overlapping either with dichotomy or with mutuality. That means, in real sense, the four models represent either of dichotomy or of mutuality and or both in one model. Thus, if we summarize the western scholars thinking regarding politicians and bureaucrat's relationship in the theoretical perspective in considering the philosophical principles, process of governance, characteristics and its relational effects, then we observe basically two models of relationships: one is dichotomous or separate role model and the other one is mutual-

<sup>20</sup> Please see the subsequent chapter in this research for more details for comparative analysis on politics-bureaucracy relations

interactive model. Thus, we can summarize or visualize the modified theoretical models of relationships from the existing literature as exhibited in the figure 2.4.

**Figure 2.4: Modified Politics-Bureaucracy Relations Model**



Source: By the Researcher


Therefore, in connection with the previous section, this section of the thesis endeavors to develop a workable analytical model of relationship along with explaining theories between politicians and bureaucrats as a part of the theoretical framework of this research. Since my major objective in this research is, to identify the patterns of relations between local elected politicians and the local official bureaucrats and its effects on local governance and development thus what determines the relation between them is the main focus. As it has often been argued that the politicians and the bureaucrats represent two distinct species. But we witnessed from the theoretical paradigm that the analytical contents of most of the approaches (of course with some exceptions) tend to ignore the two substantive facts that there is a significant level of differences between the politician and the bureaucrat in considering the speciestic or genetic character of the two actors in their governing style or process (Nalbandian, 2006) which can be termed “distinctive means” Svara (2006). Secondly, the politicians and the bureaucrats perform their roles and functions in a given environment, and to the extent that the environment is sometimes less than congenial, and often conflicting. It depends on the institutional structure and regulatory framework of the organization. If the organizational environment is good then the expected relationship between them is also to be good and the governance outcome (function) of the structure is satisfactory. As a result, there is a virtuous link between the theory of institutionalism and the politics-bureaucracy

relationship model. Interestingly, less attention has been given in terms of institutional and contextual conditions that construct the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in the existing approaches. Therefore, in this research I want to explore and emphasize the constructing factors which underpin the relationship between local politicians and bureaucrats along with identifying the speciestic (genetic) differences between the politicians and the bureaucrats keeping them as independent variable.

Thus, primarily the 'relation' between local elected politicians and official bureaucrats may be considered as dependent variable while 'governance and development' can also be considered as dependent variable, as governance and development depends on the mode of interaction and relations between the two actors. If we consider politics-bureaucracy 'relation' as dependent variable, then we also open up for the possibility that the 'relations' may vary and depends on some underpinning variables while governance and development depends on the models or patterns of the relationship which exist between the local elected politicians and the appointed official bureaucrats. Some prior researches examined the role and ideological orientations, professionalism, nature of political neutrality of bureaucrats, contingency and demographic factors, values, self-image and mutual attitudes of politicians and bureaucrats as construct factors or determining variables of the relations (Kothari and Roy, 1969; Bjorkman, 1979; Aberbach et al, 1981; Jacobsen, 2006; Svara 2006a; Demir and Nyhan, 2008; Demir and Reddick, 2012). Although they have identified different factors for developed and developing countries respectively that may shape the politics-administration relations. Nevertheless we need to develop two theoretical models for this research: (1) how does the relationship construct or what factors make differences between politicians and bureaucrats, and (2) how do the patterns of relationship models influence the governance and development?

**Figure-2.5**

**The Underpinning Variables of Politics-Bureaucracy Relationships**



Source: by the Researcher

Therefore, my endeavor will be from the different perspective of the previous researches and thus this research seems that some (demonstrates in the figure 2.5) systemic/organizational and contextual factors or underpinning variables underpin the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats. Here (figure 2.5) I have categorized the systemic/organizational and contextual variables into the two categories; general composing factors which factors make differences between them and model deciding factors. In general, the systemic or organizational factors: recruitment, training and motivation, politico-administrative culture, legitimacy and style of leadership, professionalism and specialized knowledge and Institutional structure as well as contextual factors: social background and role orientation,

policy formulation and implementation, regime types and ideology, politicization of bureaucracy and self-image and mutual interaction work as general pull input factors to shape the relationships between politicians and bureaucrats. These two kinds of factors go to a relationship configuring system box in a politico-bureaucratic system and refined in consolidation with the process of dioxide configuration and produce some important underpinning variables by the filtering process, which can be identified as relationship model deciding factors.

**Table 2.2:**

**The Theoretical Models of Relationship between Politicians and Bureaucrats with its Principal Characteristics and Governance Attributes**

<b>Theoretical Models</b>	<b>Principal Role Characteristics</b>	<b>Governance Attributes</b>
Dichotomy	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Separate Roles/Duties</li> <li>2. Political Neutrality</li> <li>3. Professional Competency</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Political Domination</li> <li>2. Democratic Accountability</li> <li>3. Both are Professionals</li> <li>4. Less Politicization</li> <li>5. Mechanistic Interaction</li> </ol>
Mutuality	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Overlapping Roles/Duties</li> <li>2. Political Involvement of Bureaucrats</li> <li>3. Political Responsiveness</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Mostly Bureaucratic Domination</li> <li>2. Joint Accountability</li> <li>3. Bureaucrats are Professional</li> <li>4. More Politicization</li> <li>5. Mutual Interaction</li> </ol>
Symbiosis	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Separate Roles/Duties with Complementarity</li> <li>2. Political Neutrality</li> <li>3. Mutual Respect with Self-Identity</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Mutual Domination</li> <li>2. Shared Accountability</li> <li>3. Both are Professional</li> <li>4. Less Politicization</li> <li>5. Shared and Balance Influence</li> </ol>

Source: By the Researcher

The model deciding factors that come out by the filtering process generates some decisive questions in the process of governance – like the question of domination (who will dominate – politicians or bureaucrats?), accountability (what will be their accountability?), professionalism (who is more professional? are they reverential to respective professions?), politicization (is politicization necessary?) and the self-image and mutual interaction (how do they perceive each other and is mutual trust existed between them?). In this connection, the relational model depends on how does the political system or legal-institutional framework of an institution controls or minimizes these questions. According to the logic of the theoretical models that have already developed and shown in the table 2.2, there are some principal conditions or characteristics and governance attributes of each and every model.

The relational model of politics-bureaucracy relationship can be explained using specific theory and can be identified by exploring the constructing factors and governance attributes in the institutional structure. If any local government institution follows the principles of separate Roles/Duties, Political Neutrality, Professional Competency, then the governance attributes will be Political Domination, Democratic Accountability, Both are Professionals, Less Politicization, Mechanistic Interaction and ultimately the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats would likely to be dichotomous, and both the actors will play the game with non-aligned nature of individual interests. This dichotomy model of relationship between politicians and bureaucrats and their effects on local governance and development can be explained by applying “principal-agent theory” where the elected politicians is considered as the principal and the bureaucrats as the agent. In the framework of principal-agent theory, the institution/s (principal) engages other people or institutional agent to perform the functions, deliver the public services on behalf of the principal to the agents by the process of power delegation. Of course, there is a substantial difference in the application of principal-agent theory in the context of comparative politics and comparative public administration and management (Lane, 2005; Lane, 2008).

In comparative politics, the principal-agent theory treats the population as the principal and the elected politicians or rulers as the agents of the people (Lane, 2008). On the other hand, in comparative public administration “the principal-agent theory looking upon public management as a *nexus of contracts* between principals and agents at various levels of government” (lane, 2005:4) and this contract held between politicians and the bureaucrats as principal-agent of the governance process. Thus, the principal-agent theory deals with how one group of actors (the principal) contracts with another set of actors (the agents) to get things done. According to the theory of principal-agent, the relationship between local elected politicians and official bureaucrats is considered as hierarchical and bureaucrats will be controlled by the elected representatives (Zhang and Lee, 2011). Interestingly, the basic problem of principal-agent theory is information asymmetry regarding the interests and actions of involving actors in the process of governance as elected politicians and official bureaucrats play the game with non-aligned nature of individual interests in the dichotomy relationship. For example, if agents in the governing process have different interests from their principals, and have better informational positions then it may provide dominant

position to the agents than the principals. Thus, these circumstances provide the scope of looking for further thinking on relational models and theories.

On the other hand, if the institutional system follows Overlapping Roles/Duties, Political Involvement of Bureaucrats, Political Responsiveness, then the governance attribute will be Mostly Bureaucratic Domination, Joint Accountability, Bureaucrats are more Professional, More Politicization, Mutual Interaction and ultimately it falls then into the second model and definitely relationship will be mutual-interactive, and then both the actors will play the game with aligned nature of individual interests. This model of relationship provides the scope of “cut off power” of elected representative and provides partnership with the bureaucrats in the process of governance and policy making. Some scholars of public administration want to explain this model of relationship between elected politicians and appointed bureaucrats by applying the “transaction cost theory” that originated from economics (Zhang and Lee, 2011). The transaction cost theory argues that overwhelming power position and “high-powered incentives of elected officials tend to produce dishonesty and opportunism in government” (Zhang and Lee, 2011:8). The same argument is applicable to the official bureaucrats and therefore some writers provide argument in favor of low-powered incentives to ensure effective local government, which ultimately provides the idea of balancing between elected representatives and bureaucrats in the process of governance. In that case, the third model (rational choice) would be recommended and that is symbiosis whose basic principles are Separate Roles/Duties with Complementarity, Political Neutrality, Mutual Respect with Self-Identity, where governance attribute will be Mutual Domination, Shared Accountability, Both are Professional, Less Politicization, Shared and Balance Influence. In sum, the symbiosis is neither dichotomy nor mutuality; it’s a fusion of the above two and this model of relationship can be explained by applying the theory of rational choice.<sup>21</sup> In this research, we want to apply these three models to explore which theoretical model fit into the local government of Bangladesh.

### **2.3.4 Research Hypotheses**

The hypothesis or proposition is a statement of relationship between two or more variables that is to be accepted or rejected by the empirical observation. The main objective of this

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<sup>21</sup> The concept of symbiotic relation and its conditions has been explained in the last part of the thesis as a prospective model of relationship between politicians and bureaucrats. At the same time the theory of rational choice and why the symbiosis is the rational choice and would be the balanced model in the relationship has also been explained in the last part of the dissertation elaborately.

study is to explore the relations between local elected politicians and bureaucrats in Bangladesh and how this relations influence the local governance and development. Thus, the general assumption is –distinctive social background and role orientation between the local elected politicians and bureaucrats influences to shape the relations between the two actors, and politics-bureaucracy relation is neither purely dichotomous nor mutual in the sense of political neutrality and responsiveness. Rather, the relationship between local elected politicians and bureaucrats is conflictual and ultimately this conflicting relation badly affects the level of local governance and development in Bangladesh. This proposition is derived from the conceptual and theoretical analysis. Moreover, along with the general assumption, this study is conducted on the basis of the following specific research hypotheses which have been formulated primarily on the basis of prior general knowledge on politics-bureaucracy relations in Bangladesh. These are:

H-1: The distinctive social background and role orientation between the local elected politicians and bureaucrats influences to shape the relations between the two actors, and politics-bureaucracy relation is neither purely dichotomous nor mutual in the sense of political neutrality and responsiveness.

The nature of the relationship between politics and bureaucracy is influenced by a wide range of underpinning variables. To explore the politics-bureaucracy relations, it may be more fruitful to investigate that underpinning variables. The theoretical perspectives and the researches in western democracies clearly show that the dynamics of politics-bureaucracy relationship and improved performance of government is dependent upon a several number of intervening variables such as social characteristics. As Suleiman (1974:158) noted that “the historical development of the bureaucracy, the ideological heterogeneity of the political leaders, the development of the political parties, the importance of patronage in the recruitment of the administrative elite, the timing of the introduction of the merit systems in recruitment – all of these factors have contributed to shaping the complex and shifting perception of roles which leads to complex and changing modes of behavior.”

Moreover, in the theoretical and analytical perspectives, it has been argued that the politicians and the bureaucrats represent two distinct species and there is a significant level of difference between them in considering the systemic or organizational and political dynamics of politics-bureaucracy relations. Therefore, to visualize the politics-bureaucracy relations,

process of governance and development in local government of Bangladesh, a theoretical hypothesis has also been set that “The distinctive social background and role orientation between the local elected politicians and bureaucrats influences to shape the relations between the two actors.” That means there is a significant level of difference between the politicians and bureaucrats in consideration of systemic/organizational factors and contextual factors that influence to shape the relations between the two actors. More explicitly, *if the social background and role perceptions that influence to shape the relations between the two actors are similar then the relationship is likely to be mutual or cooperative. Alternatively, if these characteristics are dissimilar then the relationship is likely to be dichotomous or conflicting.*

H-2: The patterns of relationships varies with the degree of social characteristics, alignment of interests, role perceptions, self-image and mutual interaction between local elected politicians and the official bureaucrats and thus the level of Local governance and development varies with the patterns of relationship.

Several empirical studies show that distinctive social background, alignment of interests, role perceptions, self-image and mutual interaction between local elected politicians and the official bureaucrats display different interaction patterns both at the central and the local government (Aberbach et al., 1981; Campbell, 1988; Svava, 1990; Ahmed, 2009). This different interaction patterns may influence the level of governance and development. Thus, how such factors influence the relationship model and the level of local governance and development remains a hypothetical question. The logical argument can be provided that when the local elected politicians and the local official bureaucrats work together with a shared and balanced relation then it can be assumed that the best practice of governance occurs that results a proper use of scarce resources for proper development. This theoretical proposition implies that, *if shared and mutual attitude prevails with high level of self-image between the local elected politicians and the appointed official bureaucrats then it enhances the level of local governance and development. Alternatively, conflict or fragmentation with distorted self-image between local elected politicians and appointed official bureaucrats reduces the level of local governance and development.*

H-3: The institutional structure of local government and regulatory framework of central government to control over the local government influence the relationship between local elected politicians and appointed official bureaucrats which ultimately affect the local governance and development.

This theoretical proposition implies that if the relation between them is shaped and controlled by the central government regulations then local bureaucrats are more important actors than the local elected politicians. A possible end result is that it will leave little avenue for local elected politicians than the local bureaucrats to make priorities and political decisions. Strong regulation may then improvise legal power in favor of local bureaucrats and they may use this power by overlooking the local politician's directions providing the argument that as the agent of the central government they should follow the rules and regulations outlined by the central government not the directions of the local elected politicians. Thus, local politicians feel that local bureaucrats are more powerful than the local elected politicians and therefore conflicting relations arise in the governing process of local government. Although Jacobsen (2001:1) argued that "politics and administration is today seen as two overlapping spheres" and this "overlapping between politics and administration also opens up for the possibility that there may be both conflict and co-operation between politicians and administrators". Moreover, in this respect the particular proposition is that, *if the local government institution (Upazila Parishad) is controlled by the regulations of central government then it will maneuver the scope for bureaucratic domination resulting conflictual relationship between the local elected politicians and the local official bureaucrats which ultimately affect the local governance and development.*

## **2.4 Theory and Methodology: Designing the Research Method**

In designing the methodological illustration for this research, it is necessary to discuss about the ontological and epistemological distinctions and similarities in qualitative and quantitative research design and methodology in the perspective of theories in social sciences, considering the different theoretical perspectives of social science research to provide a comprehensive understanding about how methodology will go for operation as the techniques or tools of social research.

### **2.4.1 The Theoretical and Methodological Debate in Social Science Research**

Throughout history, people have attempted to understand their environment and themselves and acquired knowledge in various ways (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996:3). The approaches of acquired knowledge can be visualized through acquaintance or through the description of the characteristics of certain things, by consciousness, perception and responsiveness, direct or intuitive judgment or derived judgment (Ghosh, 1992). Knowledge includes what we know about matters of fact as well as the principles and process of inference. Most of what we know is a matter of agreement and belief. Little of it is based on personal experience and discovery (Babbie, 2005:5). In contrast to knowing things through agreement, we can know them through direct experience - through observation. Then the question comes of scientific or social research.

The advanced learner's dictionary of current English (1952: 1069) lays down the meaning of research as "a careful investigation or inquiry especially through search for new facts in any branch of knowledge". Research has been called a "journey of adventure" (Miller and Crabtree, 1992:3). The word "Research" originated from the old French word "recherchier" that means to search again (Sufian, 2009:3). It means that the earlier research was not exhaustive and complete in the sense that, there is still room for further more improvement. In this connection, further researchers involve in research on that subject for knowledge construction more accurately. However, the term 'Research' refers to a systematic approach towards intellectually answering questions related to the knowable universe. Research can be defined as a specific and systematic search for pertinent information on a specific topic (Kothari, 1990:1). This systematic approach lays the theoretical framework.

Thus, social research is about knowing social things or social relations. The term 'Social' refers to the relation between and among persons, groups, institutions and larger environments. The study of any of these relationships, with an empirical rather than a philosophical orientation is called social research (Lin, 1976:1). Social research involves engaging with the social world. Blaikie (1993:4) defines it in terms of; exploring, describing, understanding, explaining, predicting, changing or evaluating some aspects of the social world. So, both the philosophical orientation and empirical observation is the indispensable fact for social research which provides the self-evidence to the social researchers in knowledge construction. This self-evidence enhances the theoretical framework and makes

paradigm. Social research is concerned with gathering data that can help us answering questions about various aspects of society and thus can enable us to understand society (Baily, 1982:3). Subsequently, social research is concerned with exploring, describing and explaining social phenomena involving human behaviour. Young (1975) noted that a social research is the systematic method of discovering new facts or verifying old facts, their sequences, interrelationships, causal explanation and the natural laws which govern them.

In this research we will explore politics-bureaucracy relations and also verify the existing theoretical paradigms in the field. Social Research is by no means an invention of the modern social scientists. Social research has been used extensively for more than 2000 years (Sarantacos, 1998:1). Systematic writings about the framework of social research can be dated back to the ancient Greeks. Greek philosophers such as Socrates, Plato and Aristotle provided a foundation of scientific social research and investigated the structure of society and the causes of social problems and produce very impressive accounts of social life and of society (Burton, 2000:6, Sarantacos, 1998:1). They carried out research at different levels, collected information on various social phenomena and interpreted their findings in a political and philosophical context (Sarantakos, 1998:1, Stergios, 1991). We found the 'inductive – deductive' view of how we obtained systematic knowledge by social research. More particularly, another signs of empirical research were shown even before Socrates. Thales, Anaximander, Xenophanes and others are the examples of a researcher who applied an empirical – rational framework to understand the world of their time. Instead of using the traditional explanation based on religious principles, beliefs and superstitions, they applied observational method that is called empirical scientific approach.

The work of Greek philosophers was pioneering in the development of methodologies in social science. Many of the methods of these philosophers what they used, are still employed by the modern researchers (Sarantacos, 1998:2). This methodological approach introduced by the Greek philosophers influenced researchers throughout Europe and become more profound, particularly during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the time of scientific revolution. The works of Aristotle and other Greek philosophers, from the classical period were translated from Greek into Latin and Arabic. In the middle age many researchers exhibited a strong interest and affirmed this method in scientific inquiry. Bacon, Descartes and Newton related it to the mathematical analysis. Descartes and Locke have identified three commonplaces for granted: nature was fixed and stable and to be known by principles of

understanding equally fixed, stable and universal; there was a dualism between mind and matter and finally, the criterion of knowledge (Cited in Hughes; 1987:9).

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries thoughtful research was undertaken by social researchers to discover regularities in social and economic phenomena. John Stuart Mill was more influenced by the Aristotelian method as a prominent example in the modern Europe. Mill argued that there were four primary inductive methods which could be used in social research. These were agreement, difference, concomitant variations and residues (cited in Smith, 2000:8). Mill argued that the process of inference and induction could lead us to deduce causal relations. Another pioneer of scientific social research is August Comte who introduced the term 'sociologie' in 1822 and launched an intellectual adventure (positivism) that is still unfolding today (cited in Babbie, 1995:41). Most importantly, Comte identified society as a phenomenon that can be studied scientifically. Before Comte there was no uniformity in the approaches and the methodology was used based on relativism, rationalism, empirical, speculative, metaphysical and theological thinking. Comte published his work on positive philosophy in 1830 and subsequently it became a worldwide movement when it announced that the age of 'speculation' and 'intuition' in philosophy was at an end (Morrison, 1995:24).

Comte argued that social investigators should not seek explanations of social problems in theological principles or metaphysical theories, but rather in society itself and in the structure of social relation. Comte separated his inquiry from religion. He felt that society could be studied and understood logically, rationally and scientifically, replacing religious belief with scientific objectivity, that sociology could be as scientific as biology or physics. In his optimism for the foundation and development of social sciences for the future, he coined the term positivism to describe this scientific approach (Babbie, 1995:42). After introduction of positivism it became the backbone of social sciences in the nineteenth century's methodological thinking. Social researcher employed scientific methods in the social sciences. Comte's law of three stages of positivism dramatically influenced the European societies and became a dominant scientific social method. Positivism is associated with many specific social theories. Best known is its linkage to the structural-functional, rational choice and exchange theory frameworks. This method prefers precise quantitative data and often uses experiments, surveys and statistics (Neuman, 2003:71). Positivism influenced to foundation of a new academic discipline like psychology. Wilhelm Wundt, for instance,

established in 1879 in Leipzig the first psychological laboratory. Scientific methods dominated the psychological thinking and research of that time (Sarantacos, 1998:3). Obviously, many versions of positivism can be observable in the later part of the century. Logical positivism was one of them.

A group of academics of the early twentieth century joined in this endeavor. Such as Max Weber, Rudolf Carnap, Hans Reichenbach, Bernard Russel, Ludwig Witkenstein and Karl Popper were the most influential logical positivists. They argued that logic and empirical evidence together provide the avenue for experiencing social reality. This is done through operationalization and verification (Sarantacos, 1998:4). Max Weber (2011) argued that social science is needed to study meaningful social action or social action with a purpose. Karl Popper was the most well-known philosopher who attacked the traditional view and established an alternative 'hypothetico-deductive method'. Popper holds that science and knowledge progress by advancing hypotheses, making deductions from them and using observations and experiments continually to test these deductions until they are falsified; then revising or changing the hypothesis to cope with this (Smith, 2000:9).

In the later part of twentieth century diverse schools of thought originated and positivism is criticized by the several schools of thought. Examples of such schools of thought are symbolic interactionism, phenomenology, philosophical hermeneutics and ethno-methodology. In this stage the domination of positivism and interpretive approach is time out and origins of another school of thought that is critical school though and it was launched by the Frankfurt school and the Marxian thought in the middle of nineteenth century.

Popper also criticized Marxism for its falsifications. Popper's views have also been criticized more directly by Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn in his famous writing *The Structure of Scientific Revolution* (1970) argued that though science is a problem solving activity but it cannot arrived at an absolute verifiable truth and here he has advanced a demarcation criterion between science and no-science. He also inspired to build up a pragmatic paradigm for social science. A compromise between the propositions of Popper and Kuhn was advanced by Imre Lakatos. Lakatos agree with Kuhn that Popper was wrong in emphasizing falsification as the demarcation criterion between science and non-science; but he wished to reject the relativism that kuhn was near to espousing. Lakatos sought for ways to keep Popper's idea of scientific progress, while retaining Kuhn's insights into how science actually changes (Lakatos, 1970).

In the modern school, we also observe structural-functional explanations of social phenomena. This type of explanation is based on an analogy between biology and sociology.

Feminist ideology, approaches of modernism, postmodernism and post structuralism are also leading approaches in social science which tries to describe the cause and effect view to study of social and natural science (Nashir Uddin and Hamiduzzaman, 2009). The basic similarities of all the patterns are searching the truth and application of empirical knowledge in social research operations. However, throughout the historical overview many varieties of theoretical approaches are found to be employed in social research. We can summarize this as the following:

**Table-2.3:  
The Major Paradigms and Theoretical Perspectives in Social Sciences**

<b>Classical School</b>	<b>Positivistic School</b>	<b>Interpretive School</b>	<b>Critical School</b>	<b>Modern School</b>
Inductive	Positivism	Phenomenology	Critical Sociology	Feminism
Deductive	Neopositivism	Hermeneutics	Conflict	Perspectivism
Realism	Methodological	Symbolic	Nomothetic	Structural-
	Positivism	Interactionalism	&Ideographic	functionalism
Idealism	Logical	Constructionism	Marxism	Modernism
	Positivism			
Empiricism		Psychoanalysis	Feminism	Post-modernism
		Ethnology		Post-structuralism
		Ethnography		Institutionalism
		Sociolinguistic		

Compiled by the researcher in according to Sarantacos (1998:33) and Neuman (2003:68-80).

#### **2.4.2 Research Design and Method of Data Collection**

In the earlier section, I have faced a philosophical and methodological problem in designing the theoretical and methodological illustration for this research. A research design is a guideline or a plan for proposed research work. There are three types of research design to conduct research in social science which include qualitative, quantitative and mixed approach. Apparently, qualitative and quantitative methods are mainly used to examine and understand the opinions of the respondents on social problems which make generalization about the problem and examine the relation among the variables used in research to test

theories, respectively, while both are considered in using mixed approach (Creswell, 2008). In addition, qualitative method is branded by using open-ended questionnaire in a small number of cases and to uncover facts about the social phenomena. On the other hand, quantitative method is highly scientific or mathematical, based on structured survey interviews using a predetermined closed-ended questionnaire in a huge number of cases with mathematical analysis. Nevertheless, there has been an interesting element of debate in the premises of social science research as to whether human behaviour can be subjected to scientific study using scientific method. In this debate we can find out two schools of thought – one those who directly oppose to consider social science research as a scientific research and applying scientific methods and paradigms to the study of social sciences. Other schools those who support the view that the scientific procedures, characteristics of natural science can be applied to social research. The proponents of this school try to furnish their arguments, infavouring the discussion of historical and philosophical theoretical view point of social research that we have already observed from the methodological debates in social sciences.

Therefore, diverse approaches with diverse theoretical backgrounds and different methods and techniques, all of which appear to be equally acceptable, equally valid and equally legitimate. All the approaches are tried to examine the truth and reality of the knowledge of the social world from different aspects. Thus, in the application of both qualitative and quantitative methodologies, there are two conceptual rigors – philosophical and procedural (Bevir, 2004; Dodge et al., 2005; Guba & Lincoln, 2005; Yanow, 2004). For philosophical rigor, researchers must show that their work sheds light on something of practical and theoretical importance in a manner that is reasonable, and procedurally researcher must clearly explain how he or she obtains, analyzes and reports data (Stout, 2013). The philosophical rigor of this study has already been discussed earlier in this chapter. In providing the procedural explanation of methodological implication; this study is conducted by following mixed approach, combining both qualitative and quantitative research design and methodology. Spicer (2010) advocates for this approach and balance between qualitative and quantitative approaches. Schatzman and Strauss (1973) termed this combining approach as ‘methodological pragmatism’.

To achieve the aims and goals of this study, survey and case study methods have been applied. This inquiry draws on case studies of Seven Upazila Parishads in Bangladesh by following field survey based on semi-structured questionnaire. As using questionnaire for

conducting social research is often regarded as an appropriate strategy when is required to collect standardized data for a considerable amount of targeted respondents from many different locations (Babbie, 1995). Thus, the study has been conducted by the two sources of data; primary and secondary. Primary data were collected from the respondents through direct interview by using semi-structured questionnaire (mixture of close-ended and open-ended). Along with the semi-structured questionnaire, the interviews were conducted in a conversational style and the discussions were frequently wide ranging during the discussion of qualitative open-ended questionnaire. The time schedule of each respondent was one to one and half hours. Respondents were representative categories in nature, the local elected politicians, government official bureaucrats and mass people. Sample selection process were quota and purposive. Total sample size was 280 from the selected seven Upazilas. Table 2.3 and 2.4 shows the distribution of the sample and the demographic characteristics of the respondents. The sample sizes that have been shown in the tables were uniform in character across the selected upazilas. It is tried to incorporate the respondent from all sphere of the social strata.

**Table 2.4:**  
**Sample Distribution**

Division	District	Upazila	Number and Categories of Sample			Total
			Politicians	Bureaucrats	General People	
Dhaka	Dhaka	Savar	10	10	20	40
Chitagong	Brahmonbaria	Nasirnagar	10	10	20	40
Rajshahi	Bogra	Shajahanpur	10	10	20	40
Khulna	Jehnaidah	Moheshpur	10	10	20	40
Sylhet	Sunamgonj	Sunamgonj Sadar	10	10	20	40
Barisal	Pirojpur	Pirojpur Sadar	10	10	20	40
Rangpur	Rangpur	Kaunia	10	10	20	40
Total			70	70	140	280

The demographic variables of the sample respondent also show the like representation. Secondary data and information were collected from the published books, journals, newspapers, articles and internet, which were related to the study. Thus, for the purpose of this study, many theoretical literatures have been reviewed relating to the research. The study area was the local government of Bangladesh (Upazila Parishad) which has been selected as the research field and unit of analysis. Also with the aim to classify predictor variables and build statistical models to explain the observed patterns of the relationship, the research

strategy involves a cross-sector comparison by explanatory qualitative and quantitative data analysis, primarily based on survey methodology (perceptual data) partially validated by document analysis (objective data). Thus despite the using of qualitative approach of data analysis, quantitative approach has also been followed to measure the relational effects on local governance and development.

**Table 2.5**  
**Demographic Variables of the Sample Respondents**

Variable	Category of the Sample Respondents							
	Politicians		Bureaucrats		Mass People		Total (No & %)	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
<b>Age Group</b>								
20-30	0	0.0	4	5.7	21	15.0	25	8.93
31-40	14	20.0	33	47.1	55	39.3	102	36.43
41-50	25	35.7	17	24.3	34	24.3	76	27.14
51-60	22	31.4	16	22.9	21	15.0	59	21.07
61+	9	12.9	0	0	9	6.4	18	6.43
Total	70	100	70	100	140	100	280	100
<b>Gender</b>								
Male	63	90	56	80	107	76.4	226	80.71
Female	7	10	14	20	33	23.6	54	19.29
Total	70	100	70	100	140	100	280	100
<b>Education Level</b>								
No Education	0	0	0	0	10	7.1	10	3.57
Below Secondary	14	20.0	0	0	37	26.4	77	27.5
Secondary	11	15.7	0	0	14	10	25	8.93
Higher Secondary	11	15.7	0	0	11	7.9	22	7.86
Graduate	25	35.7	15	21.4	37	26.4	77	27.5
Post Graduate	9	12.9	55	78.6	31	22.1	94	33.93
Total	70	100	70	100	140	100	280	100
<b>Occupation</b>								
Agriculture	9	12.9	0	0	20	14.3	29	10.36
Service	5	7.1	70	100	36	25.7	111	39.64
Business	27	38.6	0	0	24	17.1	51	18.21
Business and Politics	15	21.4	0	0	0	0	15	5.36
Teaching	3	4.3	0	0	24	17.1	27	9.64
Others	11	15.7	0	0	36	25.7	47	16.79
Total	70	100	70	100	140	100	280	100

Source: Field Survey

The comparative analyses of the findings with each other of demographic characteristics such as age, occupation, education and gender of the respondents of this study reveals a big gap among the respondents of three categories. Table 2.5 shows that, most of the local respondents 63.57% (politicians 55.7, bureaucrats 71.4 and general people 63.6 respectively

in their specific categories) belonged to the 31-50 age category. More particularly, 25 (8.93%) of the respondents were aged 20-30, 102 (36.43%), were aged 31-40, 76 (27.14%) were aged group 41-50, and the remainder were aged 51-80. The sample politicians and bureaucrats in the survey ranged from twenty to sixty plus of years of age. The minimum age for joining to the bureaucracy is 21 and get retired is 59 while to be elected as a representative the age limit is 25 and there is no age limit of politicians to get retirement from politics. Thus politicians are seemed to be more aged than bureaucrats. Similarly, education is one of the important factors that help a person acquire leadership roles in politics and administration. From the demographic data of the respondents contain in the same table shows that most of the respondents are educated in general. Nevertheless comparatively local bureaucrats are more educated than local politician.<sup>22</sup> Among the respondents of the seven Upazilas 10 (3.57%) respondents are uneducated, and all of them are general people. 77 (27.5%) are under secondary and 25 (8.93%) hold secondary education while 77 (27.5%) and 94 (33.93%) respondents are hold the graduate and post-graduate degree respectively. Among the graduates and post graduates degree holders 25 (35.7%) and 9(12.9%) are politicians while 15(21.4%) and 55(78.6%) are bureaucrats respectively.

The findings (based on demographic survey data) of this study reveal an important occupational shift in the background of the respondents; formerly agriculture would have been the dominant occupation with some other professions, but in the survey many respondents were involved in business, politics and services (both government and private). Table 2.5 shows that among the respondents only 29 (10.36%) were involved in agriculture whereas 51 (18.21%) in business. Although 111 (39.64%) respondents were in service but among them all 70 (100%) bureaucrats were in service while 5(7.1%) politicians were involved in service. Interestingly, most of the local politicians 27 (38.6%) were involved in business and 15 (21.4%) were involved in both business and politics. In considering gender category, 226 (80.71%) were male and 54 (19.29%) were female. Among the total politicians and bureaucrats 63 (90.0%) were male and 7 (10.0%) were female while 56 (80.0%) were male and 14 (20.0%) were female respectively. On the other hand, this proportion was 107 (76.4%) and 33 (23.6%) in the context of general people.

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<sup>22</sup> More comprehensive analysis on comparative study on social background of local elected politicians and bureaucrats has been shown in the empirical chapter six of this study.

## Research Ares are shown in the Map of Bangladesh



**Table 2.6:**  
**Research Design and Methodological Overview at a Glance**

Research Design.....	Mixed (Both Qualitative & Quantitative)
Research Method.....	Field Survey and Case Study
Research Strategy.....	Theoretical and Analytical Framework
Research Area.....	Local Government of Bangladesh (selected UZP)
Data Source.....	Primary and Secondary
Data Collection Method.....	Direct Interview by using Semi-Structured Questionnaire
Sampling Procedure.....	Purposive Categories
Data Analysis.....	Using both Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques

## 2.5 Conclusion

From the above theoretical discussion it can be said that politics-bureaucracy relation in public sector organizations has become a core concept for scholars and practitioners with an interest in public sector management and public administration. Scholars have attempted to describe and explain models of relations in different perspectives. In the academic discourse of political science and public administration, the issue of politics-bureaucracy relationships, their governance and performance, autonomy and control of such organizations are becoming quite popular as the focus of theoretical and empirical from different angles. One notable thing is that we observe the paradigm shifts of the theoretical perspectives on politics-bureaucracy relations. And scholars are frequently searching for proper paradigm using more theoretical or argumentative method rather than more extensive empirical inquiry.

Of course, some empirical studies on politics-bureaucracy relations are also observable. But the empirical evidence that underpins the narrative is by its very nature different understandings of politics-bureaucracy relations. In general, they found that politicians and bureaucrats play distinctive roles in a policy making process in western democracies. On the other hand, relations in developing countries did not shape in a certain character and still it is under construction by following different theoretical models, notes and suggestions. Another notable thing is that, throughout the last two centuries the process of bureaucratization in the administration has been significantly speeded up and now bureaucracy has become a dominant institution indeed. Once upon a time, the western scholars who embraced the bureaucratic domination in the administration now they are in doubt whether the rational type of bureaucracy is advisable for or striking a balance?

Keeping in mind the above overall scenario we have tried to figure out the theoretical paradigmatic perspectives from the existing literatures and an attempt has been made to modify of the theoretical perspective by discussing the key variations and effectual deficiencies among the existing models, providing the argument that these theoretical models are not identical and their characteristics are overlapping with either dichotomy or mutuality. We also wanted to propose a logical modification of the existing relationship models by explaining some underpinning variables which underpin the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in governance. In doing so, we have considered the philosophical principles, composing factors, process of governance and effectual deficiencies of every theoretical

perspectives and overall underpinning variables which underpin the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in any political systems. Finally, we proposed a prospective theoretical model of relationship – symbiosis – a specialized kind of relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in which each actor provides for the other the conditions necessary for its continued existence. This prospective model will be tested along with other two existing models by following the stated analytical framework in this research.

## **Chapter – 3: Politics-Bureaucracy Relations in Comparative Perspectives**

### **3.1 Introduction**

This chapter includes the analysis of politics-bureaucracy relations, governance and development from comparative perspectives. Although what short of lesson could be achieved from comparative discussion is a very speculative phenomenon (Caiden, 2013) but curiosity in comparative politics, and comparative administration lies for many reasons, and it improvises many varieties of questions, i.e. why one system is different from that of others? Which one is better and why? Besides, in order to see the bigger picture of politics-bureaucracy relations, and in understanding or analyzing a particular case from the broader perspective, comparison is a very useful in comparative politics and comparative public administration. It would be tempting to explore cross-national comparisons in some cases for fascinating insights into comparative politics and administration. In addition, regardless of the type of methods employed in social research, comparison is the very essence of the scientific method (Almond, 1965; Almond and Powell, 1966). While studies of individual cases may engender findings from own interest and values, but their theoretical significance and value can only be assessed in a comparative context. Thus, Rohr (1993:473) said “The purpose of comparative studies is to learn, not to imitate. One learns about one’s own country by studying other countries”. Moreover, without a comparative theoretical framework one cannot ascertain the theoretical and empirical specificities of the individual cases (Pierre, 1995).

Thus, this section includes the discussion on politics-bureaucracy relations in comparative perspective with three sub-sections. In the first sub-section, politics-bureaucracy relations in ancient societies: it includes the analysis on politics-bureaucracy relations in the administration of great empires and civilizations namely Persian, Egyptian, Chinese, Roman, and Indian civilization. In the second, politics-bureaucracy relations in western democracies: here attention and case focuses in the context of politics-bureaucracy relations in the USA, UK, France and Germany and thirdly, politics-bureaucracy relations in developing world perspectives; case focuses particularly on South Asia. This comparison will provide a

comprehensive understanding of politics-bureaucracy relations in different countries and also will provide the framework to analyze the Bangladesh case.

### **3.2 Politics-Bureaucracy Relations in Ancient Societies**

The history of bureaucratic role in governance and development along with political leadership is very old. As stated in the previous chapter that although the term ‘bureaucracy’ was not coined and popularized until eighteenth century but the concept of bureaucracy based rule and administration is much older. Perhaps, bureaucracy is one of the most enduring institutions of governance and administration that has survived several millennia (Farazmand, 2010). As an ancient institution of government and administration, bureaucracy has its root in the deep past. The existence of ancient bureaucracy can be found in the administration of great Empires and civilizations namely Persian, Egyptian, Chinese, Roman, Prussian and Indian civilization (Beyer, 1959; Farazmand, 2009). The Persian bureaucracy was the pioneering amongst the ancient bureaucracy. The earliest origin of Persian bureaucracy dates back to about 10,000 years beginning in ancient Susa and Sumer (which was ancient civilization and historical region in southern Mesopotamia and Babylonian) where an emergent class of scribes administered the harvest and allocated its spoils (Farazmand, 2009:2-3). The bureaucracy of the Persian Empire was a formidable institution of administration and governance with high expertise and prestige under the political control of the king or Emperor (Farazmand, 2009a).

The bureaucracy in Egypt records go back as far as the fourth millennium B. C. At this time Egypt’s government was best dynamic and bold in action and sophisticated in administration (Beyer, 1959). The Egyptian old Empire was essentially a unitary administrative system with the head of the king or Pharaoh. Theoretically, the king was a god as well as a political ruler, and all powers (legislative, executive and judicial) were vested in him (Beyer, 1959). There was a hierarchal system of bureaucracy under the king. All members of the bureaucracy were fulltime and paid employees with training and own promotion ladder. Roman imperial bureaucracy was also developed. It was structured with class lines. Roman bureaucracy was divided into three distinct divisions; upper division, intermediate division and lower division (Beyer, 1959). They were appointed by the Emperor and served during his pleasure.

An outstanding example of a traditional bureaucratic system was imperial China (Wittfoget, 1957). Chinese imperial bureaucracy was a great impression of bureaucratic structure with fixed role before thousands years ago. Chinese imperial government used to recruit talented persons as a bureaucrat for life time of service within the bureaucratic ranks (Herson, 1957). In China, the bureaucratic system has been in the place since, at least 200 BC, and has played a crucial role in the preservation of the empire (Das, 2013). Chinese imperial bureaucracy enjoyed the discretion of policy-making along with the provision of loyalty to the administrative system. Their functional spirit was the ideals and ethics and the responsibilities to the greater society as well, not only to the imperial government. But they used to work in an organized system of centralized direction and control of political leadership. As a result, the Chinese imperial bureaucracy was turned into an aristocracy of educated scholar-officials into supporting a centralized monarchy and the idea of a centralized state by following the Confucian thought (Subramaniam, 2009:59). Herson (1957:45-48) observed that the imperial civil service operated their function in a mixture of governmental absolutism and freedom from restraint. The Emperor acted almost exclusively upon the advice of the bureaucracy. Bureaucracy was merit based, nonbiased, truthful, and competence. Especially during the Qin Dynasty (221-207 BC) and Han Dynasty (202 BC-220 AD). They also exercised discretion within the boundary of imperial policy. Policy decision making was in upward approach – decisions made in the provinces to emperor and his councils. Tax collection, protection of empire, law and order and welfare activities were the major functions of imperial Chinese bureaucracy.

Like China, the Indian subcontinent had a long and rich bureaucratic administrative experience before being colonized (Caiden, 2013). The Indian legacy of bureaucracy has made a widespread contribution to modern public administration in the third world, mainly through the agency of the British Empire (Subramaniam, 2009). A strong legacy of bureaucracy in the ancient empire of Indian Subcontinent can be recorded during the *Mauryan* Empire. The structure and process of ancient Indian bureaucracy can be traced from the famous contemporary work - Kautilya's *Arthashastra* (Sastry, 1967). This source of Indian imperial bureaucracy exhibits the details of its administration, roles and functions of bureaucracy and the relationships between politics and administration. The administrative structure of the imperial administration was three tiers: Minister (*Mantrin or Mahamatra*), a council of Minister (*Mantri Parishad*) and Civil Servant or Bureaucracy (*Amatyas or Sachivas*) in a clear hierarchy and they were under the great Empire (Subramaniam, 2009).

The qualifications necessary in order to be appointed as a civil servant were: loyalty and integrity to the king or emperor. On the whole, During the *Mauryan* Empire, there was an elaborate system of bureaucracy and an array of offices, stretching from villages to the central departments manned by bureaucracy with specific duties and responsibilities (Das, 2013:5). This system was continued in the Delhi *Sultanate* and until *Mughal* Empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. During the *Sultanate* period, the bureaucrats were also selected on the basis of their loyalty to the ruler and were given them land grants for rendering their services, and they also exercised political, judicial and administrative powers. The *Mughal* rulers also followed the administrative system of *Sultanate*. But they controlled the bureaucracy by giving them land temporary basis and by transferring the civil servants from one place to another very frequently (Das, 2013). The bureaucrats, who were engaged in *Mughal* administration exploited and oppressed the people to satisfy their master. As a result, it was declined by anarchy when the British East India Company began its business in the Indian Subcontinent. That was initiated another history of Indian bureaucracy.

To sum up from the above analysis, it reveals that there was a similarity among the bureaucracy of the ancient empires and bureaucracy was an instrument and assisting force to the political leadership as Riggs (2009:86) comments “there are no doubts that originally rulers created bureaucracies to serve them as instruments of administration to implement their policies.” In those early civilizations, bureaucracy was considered “as a state apparatus” and overall they were involved in law and order maintenance, policy implementation of developmental and monumental works (Farazmand, 2009).

### **3.3. Politics-Bureaucracy Relations in Modern Western Democracies**

This section includes the analysis of politics-bureaucracy relations in western democracies. Although formulating general principles concerning politics and administration of western democracies may be difficult enough as the scholars and researchers contain different views over the relations between politics and bureaucracy in western democracies. Therefore, the case focus will be drowned in the context of the USA, UK, France and Germany keeping in mind the variables of politico-bureaucratic culture and values, policy domination, professionalism, politicization, and the process of governance.

### **3.3.1 Politics-Bureaucracy Relations in United States of America**

In the context of the USA, the civil service system is generally known as the “spoils system” deriving its name from the saying “to the victory belong the spoils”. U.S Bureaucracy survives with its presidential survival. Observing this character of U.S civil service, Mills (1959) wrote that-

“The civilian government of the United States never has had and does not now have a genuine bureaucracy.” He also noted that “There is no civil service career that is secure enough, there is no administrative corps that is permanent enough, to survive a change-over of political administration in the United States. Neither professional party politicians nor professional bureaucrats are now at the executive centers of decision. Those centers are occupied by the political directorate of the power elite (1959:237-241).

In 1989, Nation Commission on Public Service which is mostly known as the Volker Commission expressed the same concern that public service in the United States is “neither as attractive as it once was nor as effective in perceived needs” (cited in Suleiman, 2005:203). The politico-bureaucratic culture of USA reveals that the dominant executive position of the president has contributed tremendously to the ability of the chief executive to control bureaucracy and to use it to its advantages vis-à-vis the legislature (Farazmand, 1997a). This has had serious ramifications for the democratic process, for the legislative representative body has been weakened in favor of the presidency (Rosenbloom, 1993).

This is why, over the last few decades, many of the recent studies in the context of United States show that scholars are divided into two sharp divisions. One those who found clear evidence of political or Congressional influence over the bureaucracy and bureaucratic agencies (Moynihan and Roberts, 2010; Weingast and Moran, 1983; Moe, 1985; Scholz, 1991; Wood and Anderson, 1993). On the other hand, others however, found that politicians are inattentive to bureaucracy and the highest policy making body Congress neither wielded any influence on bureaucracy or use limited devices that it has (Dodd and Schoott, 1986; Eisner and Meier, 1990; Meier, 1997; Weaver and Longoria, 2002; Shipan, 2004). They put forward the idea that bureaucracy as a politically neutral state apparatus which merely implement the policies adopted by the elected politicians.

**Table 3.1:**  
**Administrative Ideas in the American Political Tradition**

	<b>Wilsonian Balance of Power</b>	<b>Madisonian Hierarchical</b>		<b>Wilsonian Balance of Power</b>	<b>Madisonian Hierarchical</b>
<b>Hamiltonian String- executive/ Top-down</b>	Strong executive Top-down accountability Hierarchical authority	Centered on non- bureaucratic institutions Focus on political power Top-down accountability	Hamiltonian String- executive/ Top-down	Traditional public administration Principle theory New public management NPR Downsizing Performance measurement Procurement reform	Bureaucratic politics Implementation Game theory Institutional choice Congressional/Presi dential dominance
<b>Jeffersonian Weak- executive/ Bottom-up</b>	Weak executive Bottom-up accountability Responsiveness to citizens	Centered on non- bureaucratic institutions Focus on local control Bottom-up responsiveness	Jeffersonian Weak- executive/ Bottom-up	NPR Employee empowerment Customer service	Network theory

Source: Adapted from Kettl (2000) with some modifications by the researcher

However, in the American context, there is a peculiar usage of the term bureaucracy. Only merit-based careerists – those with long term tenure – were seen as bureaucrats and politically neutral, whereas transients – holding public office for a limited period of time – were redefined as political appointees and hence not bureaucrats. This pattern has fundamental political and administrative consequences that lead to a highly dispersed pattern of bureaucratic politics (Riggs, 2009:99). Kettl (2000) studied the philosophical and theoretical history of American public administration and he found that the four influences – Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, Wilsonian, and Madisonian (shown in the table 3.1) – have become the bedrock of American public administration and these four traditions have formed the basic choices that face the American system. He also observed that these four recurring political values have shaped American public administration for a century and are likely to continue to do so in the twenty-first century (Kettl, 2000:28).

American politico-bureaucratic culture reveals that the US Constitution vests the President with extraordinary powers to appoint political executives, which Moe (1985a) termed

‘presidential politicization of bureaucracy’, at the same time merit-based competitive selection of bureaucracy based on the Legislative Act 1883, which is mostly known as ‘Pendleton Act’ and it was derived from the British reform experience between 1850 and 1870 (Van Riper, 1997). In the USA, the top of the bureaucratic pyramid is almost exclusively reserved for partisan appointments. It is estimated that the president has approximately three thousands political appointments to reshuffle his new office. This includes not only secretaries, under-secretaries, and assistant secretaries but numerous other appointments that fall under this category, including judges and ambassadors (Suleiman, 2005:217). Consequently, more or less every president emphasizes to appoint political appointees as ‘chief executive’ with a clearly defined separation/subordinate relationship between political executives and the career bureaucrats (Ingraham et al. 1995; Moynihan and Roberts, 2010). But all presidents did not respond to the same way and to the same degree as Nixon did, albeit not very successfully, or Reagan and Bush who did it very successfully (Suleiman, 2005). In the initial stage, competitive appointment was nearly 10% of all positions, whereas this rose to more than 85% by the early 1980s (Ali, 2004: 38).

Moreover, in 1978, the previous Act revised and the new Civil Service Act enhanced the opportunity of the government to appoint political appointees not only in the mid-level of bureaucracy but also in the Senior Executive Service (SES). As a result, “the total number of senior executives and presidential appointees grew from 451 in 1960 to 2393 in 1993, a 430 percent increase” (Light, 1995:7). The purposes of their appointment are to provide new policy directives and innovative approaches to public administration (Ingraham, 1987). But the career bureaucrats often see these political appointees as short-term and sometimes misguided members of the organization who do not have the ability to provide the long-term leadership necessary for significant policy change (Ingraham et al, 1995). In this regard, Carroll (1997) has identified three legal war fares on and over American government. The behavior of political and career bureaucrats is one of them.

As a result, a complex relationship prevails between the politicians and bureaucrats in the context of America. According to Aberbach and Rockman, (1988:607) “In the American case, the constitutional basis of hierarchical command is absent or, more properly, it is plural and thus potentially contradictory.” Constitutionally, American government is usually described as embodying a division of power, but in practice, it is more accurately described as “separated institutions sharing powers in functions” with politics and administration

(Aberbach et al, 1981:22). They also claimed that there is a balance and shared responsibility between politics and bureaucracy in American governance. For this reason, American political system does not allow enough power at any particular hand of neither politicians nor administrators. Svava (1999, 2001) has identified this process as an implicit model of complementarity of politics and administration. In Richard Nathan's words "it is the wonderfully animated, competitive, and open character of the American political system that distinguishes it among the democracies of the Western world" (sited in Aberbach and Rockman, 1988:607).

In recent study, Moynihan and Roberts, (2010); Aberbach and Rockman, (2006) find tighter political control over the federal bureaucracy and over politicized presidency during the Nixon administration to the tenure of president George W. Bush and the over influence of NPM. On the other hand, Weaver and Longoria (2002) explained the exercise of administrative discretion by bureaucracy in the policy process of USA. They assumed over power exercise of bureaucracy in USA as "the king can do no wrong to the administration can do no wrong." Meier (1997:196) noted that "our basic problem of governance is that the long running interplay between bureaucracy and expertise on one hand, and responsiveness and democracy (read electoral institutions) on the other hand, has swung too far in the direction of democracy." In this context of American democracy, he suggested to follow the Wilsonian spirit to find out a proper balance between the two in the case for more bureaucracy and less democracy.

Shipan (2004) observed the relationship between the elected politicians and the bureaucrats in the context of Congressional influence and oversight on policy making. He found that political bureaucracies make the overwhelming majority of public policy decisions in the United States and under certain conditions, the bureaucracy is responsive to the preferences of politicians and congressional influence, but under other conditions bureaucracy can act autonomously. He also found that for a variety of reasons like; competing demands, lack of time, and expertise politicians delegate their powers to bureaucracy. On the other hand, Riggs (2009a); Aberbach and Rockman, (2000; 2006) tried to intermesh between these two ideas. Riggs (2009a) has noted the US bureaucracy as "a semi-powered". He said that we need to understand four factors that affect the power position and the relations between politics and administration in America: (1) the creation of a nonpartisan professionalized career system,

(2) continuing reliance on politically appointed transients and nonpartisan consultants, (3) the influence of federalism, and (4) the impact of private enterprise as manifested in the use nongovernmental organizations to implement many public policies (Riggs, 2009a:157). Aberbach and Rockman (2000; 2006) have identified that both the politicians and bureaucrats participate in the policy making process with the distinctive contributions. Bureaucrats bring neutral expertise, facts and knowledge, whereas politicians bring political sensitivity, interests and values. They also noticed the clear influence of NPM in the present American context.

In recent study, Spicer (2010) has also identified the pattern of relationship between politics and administration in America as ‘balance between politics and bureaucracy’. Although Aberbach et al, (1981) have discovered the peculiar effects of American political institutions, which seem to blur the differences between politicians and bureaucrats that are so sharp in Europe. They noted that the mutual respect between politicians and bureaucrats, and a fairly clear sense of the division of labor are characteristic of Britain, which is complex in the US system. By contrast, the parliamentary systems of government have greater control over the executive and appear to be more representative and democratic than the dominant presidential systems (Farazmand, 1997a). To sum up, the bureaucracy is more powerful in the United States, but they are not autonomous as is the United Kingdom and other European countries.

### **3.3.2 Politics-Bureaucracy Relations in United Kingdom**

In the context of the UK, the development of bureaucracy and the relations between politicians and bureaucrats went through various institutional adaptations in different phases and it depends on a number of elements. A doctrine of ministerial responsibility and organizational arrangement of bureaucracy play crucial role in determining the relationship between ministers and bureaucracy (Steel, 1979). It is argued that attributes of permanency, merit based competitive selection and political neutrality is essentially a British creation. But before eighteenth century the structure of the British bureaucracy was amorphous and the appointment of bureaucracy depended on the pleasure of those in power (Das, 2013). Parris (1969) in this respect noted that “it was not permanent, it was not civil and it was not a service” (cited in Ali, 2004:32). Following the industrial revolution there was an expansion of government functions and rise of the organized party system as well as after the First World War, more specialist and generalist bureaucratic system were introduced into the governance.

The modern British civil service was created in the wake of the Northcote- Trevelyan blueprint in the late nineteenth century and it is appeared to exemplify the main features of dichotomy between the politicians and bureaucrats (Bulmer, 1988). Thus, for developed a culture of Whitehall model of relationship and the Whitehall model was shaped by the history of the British state, not by the abstract principles. That is why Drewry and Butcher (1991) have referred to the emergence of British bureaucracy as the constitutional bureaucracy. Therefore, we will discuss politics-bureaucracy relations in UK in the context of Whitehall model, its change and continuity. Because, scholars and practitioners have been studying Whitehall model, its' essential characteristics, and its evolution for decades, and the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in Britain, long stable and promoted around the world as the Whitehall model of how to link bureaucrats and politicians (Bulmer, 1988; Campbell & Wilson, 1995; Richards, 2008; Burnham and Pyper, 2008; Greer and Jarman, 2010).

Both structurally and geographically, the British political system is highly centralized and executive dominated, where many policy decisions are determined by the interaction between politicians and bureaucrats, although Whitehall departments do not share their powers with a regional or state tier of government (Bulmer, 1988). The British executive branch consists of two very different elements; career politicians and the career bureaucrats who share in the formulation and implementation of public policy. To understand the politics-bureaucracy relation in the Whitehall model one needs to understand the world of the politicians and the world of the bureaucrats and the interaction between the two, which is guided by certain principles and expectations that together constitute the Whitehall model (Campbell & Wilson, 1995:9). In the Whitehall model, elected politicians enjoy constitutional supremacy over the bureaucracy. But the British politicians are dependent to a quite extraordinary degree on permanent bureaucrats not only for policy advice and administrative support but for staff and political assistance.

This is why, Greer and Jarman (2010) studied Whitehall model in terms of a few basic characteristics, including lifetime employment, generalism, internal labour markets, political neutrality, and a relatively high degree of professional autonomy. At the same time, there are a number of characteristics of British bureaucracy that contribute to the distinctiveness of the Whitehall model. The Merit based competitive selection, permanency and political neutrality were the essentially major characteristics of British Whitehall model of bureaucracy. Although Richard Rose has noted that the Whitehall model demands not that civil servants be

non-political but that they be politically promiscuous (Rose, 1987) and Campbell & Wilson (1995) noted that there can be almost universal agreement that the British bureaucracy does not match the Weberian vision of a rationally organized hierarchy of expert and it is quite wrong to think that civil servants are separated from politics. However, it was a system in which bureaucracy recruited to give policy advice and political assistance to the politicians according to the British political context. In this model, the politicians were dependent on bureaucrats both for the policy advice and for the implementation of the policies. The Whitehall model has therefore rested on a very close partnership between politicians and bureaucrats. In this model politicians come and go but bureaucrats are unchanged and always been there. The British pattern of relations between politicians and bureaucrats – what we might call the “Whitehall Model”– the distinctive relationship between politicians and bureaucrats has also been of tremendous significance in the comparative perspective of bureaucratic management (Wilson and Barker, 2003). The Whitehall model was distinct and noticeably different from the practices of other countries. In this respect Wilson and Barker (2003:350) observed that –

British politicians relied more or less exclusively on higher civil servants for advice on the advantages and disadvantages of potential new policies and on how to implement them. British politicians had no cabinets on the French model, no team of officials openly allied with their party (as in Germany) or large numbers of political appointees occupying all high-level posts (as in the United States). Instead, British politicians forming a government after winning an election accepted that their closest advisers should be the civil servants who had worked for their opponents until Election Day. The system, of course, had its advantages. A newly elected government could set to work on its program immediately, rather than spending months constructing a new administration (as in the United States). Nonetheless, it was remarkable that politicians from ideologically distinctive parties should have accepted for so long relying so heavily on officials who had worked closely with their opponents.

However, in the last quarter of the twentieth century, this Whitehall model of relations witnessed considerable changes by following the report of the Fulton Committee in 1968, dissatisfactions of both the Conservative and the Labour governments, and the influence of academic criticisms by the writers of NPM school of thought. The prominent complain to the Whitehall model bureaucracy by the politicians was that the civil servants failed to provide necessary political assistance and it was inadequate to serve their political needs (Wilson and Barker, 2003).

On the other hand, many academic writings criticized the service delivery mechanisms of bureaucracy. Heclo and Wildavsky (1974) described both politicians and service bureaucrats alike as “political administrators”. Christoph (1975) observed that officials not only weigh rival interests but identify with some more than others in advising ministers. He has also argued that “higher British civil servants do not take an active role in partisan politics. Their identification with one party over others is sublimated, both by temperament and by requirements and etiquette of their calling. Thus, they seldom bring to their tasks the passions of the true believer (at least in traditional political terms), and they cannot be appealed too easily on the basis of fraternal ties.” Richard Rose (1974) has described bureaucracy in Britain as impartially partisan and he has criticized the conventional distinction between ministers who determine the ends and bureaucrats who find the means. These contemporary observations were congruent with the expectation of political leaderships and therefore, in the last three decades, considerable changes occurred in the British bureaucracy and the patterns of politics-bureaucracy relations. Thus the creation of autonomous agencies or agencification is the direct and dramatic change in the context of UK bureaucracy to carry out the policy decisions as well as the other significant change is the appointment of political executive. In this respect of political appointment Aberbach et al, (1981:17) observed that-

In 1964 Harold Wilson imported into the central administration a small but potentially significant number of partisan appointees who were neither career civil servants nor MPs. The government of Edward Heath that followed created the post of ‘political secretary’ to individual ministers and introduced a Central Policy Review Staff, peopled by numbers of what Americans would term “in-and-outers.” None of these experiments were judged wholly successful by their sponsors, but all are symptomatic of a need felt by both parties for a type of official who combines substantive expertise with political commitment.

As a result, the number and power of such political appointees have been increased in a considerable manner in the last couple of decades. While all ministers now have advisers who serve at their pleasure, advisers are particularly numerous and important at the center of government in the treasury and the Prime Minister’s Office (Wilson and Barker, 2003). The preceding discussion of changes in the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in Britain has necessarily created the tensions between these two actors in their role performance. However, Bulmer (1988) has evaluated (through the light of Aberbach *et al*, 1981 models) the development of politics-bureaucracy relations in the UK as the modern British civil service was created with the features of Image I: dichotomy between politics and administration, and by the beginning of the twentieth century, the politics-bureaucracy

relational model became much closer to Image II: facts/interests model where both politicians and bureaucrats participated in policy making with distinctive contributions. In the later part of twentieth century the validity of Image II came under challenge as a satisfactory model for contemporary criticisms. These contemporary observations are congruent with Image III at least, where both politicians and bureaucrats are engaged in policy making, and concerned with political issue. Image IV is a future development, in which the bureaucratic role is so imbued with politics that the Weberian distinction between politicians and bureaucrats virtually disappears.

The recent empirical study of Wilson and Barker (2003), Greer and Jarman (2010) in this respect exhibits the changing pattern of Whitehall model of relationship. But they also found that it had not produced the change that might have been expected. Still now bureaucratic participation in the policy and in the governance process is high and more than 70 percent of British higher civil servants are engaged with ministers giving advice on policy as a major part of their jobs, although both the Conservative and Labour governments are not fully happy with the bureaucratic performance in the last decade. In this regard, Wilson and Barker (2003) pointed out a view of Sir Richard Mottram, a permanent secretary who came up with a vivid simile to describe the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in Britain today:

There are some people in government, who do not think we are very good, who think we are an obstacle.... One of the things which I don't think ministers understand sufficiently clearly is that that [the civil service] is a fantastically loyal institution. I always compare it to a rather stupid dog that wants to do whatever its master wants and, above all, wants to be loved for doing it. I don't think ministers understand that (cited in Wilson and barker, 2003:370).

A recent series of inquiries was conducted by the British House of Lords Constitution Committee (2010) and the House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee (2007) on the relationships between politicians and bureaucrats. They also have identified a changing pattern of roles and relationship between ministers and civil service and suggested a more concrete definition of responsibilities between the two actors for avoiding the unnecessary conflicts. They also emphasized the importance of mutual trust in the changing pattern of roles and relationships between minister and civil service.

### **3.3.3 Politics-Bureaucracy Relations in France**

The development of the modern administrative system in France has taken place in the context of a political system marked by profound changes. Since 1789, France has been a constitutional monarchy three times, an empire twice, a semi-dictatorship once, and a republic five times (Heady, 2001:193). The traditional studies of public administration have stressed the unity and coherence of administrative action in France in contrast to the visibly divided administrative systems in Britain or the USA (Machin, 1979:67-73). In the case of France, the relationship between politics and administration since the beginning of the Third Republic can be discussed by different phases and characteristics. The first phase, between 1875 and 1940, functioned according to the Weberian principle of separation between politics and bureaucracy. The second phase, from 1945 to 1958, France Republic was characterized by the distinction between political and administrative domains. The third phase, from 1959 to the beginning of the 1990s, axiom the evolution of politics-administration relationship in the double sense of hybridization – the technocratization of politics and of the politicization of top administrative posts. And finally, since the 1990s, discussion of the politicization of the administration has given way to a new rhetoric of the state-in-crisis (Suleiman, 2005:229-230).

The French political system has been organized in different ways – from absolute monarchy to liberal democratic republics, passing through empires, constitutional monarchies, autocracies, and absolute republics in more than 200 years after the French Revolution. In the initial stage bureaucracy was ruled by Weberian principles (Elgie, 2004; Heady, 2001; Suleiman, 2005). The historical perspective suggests that although the debate on politics-bureaucracy relations figured out during the Third Republic but it has mostly centered on the last four decades. During this time, the administration not only continued to grow in larger size and scope but also became deeply involved in politics. Although the French system continues to create the expectation of strong leadership, but increasingly it contains the coordination of political actors, interaction of institutions, state-centred, presidentialized and highly centralized regime (Elgie, 2004). In comparison with the Britain and the United States – both of which have operated within a single constitutional system over a similar period of time, the contrast between the instability of the French constitutional system and the stability of British and American system is striking (Elgie, 2004). There is a common rhetorical perception that the State in France is very strong as Napoleon established a very strong

structure of French society and there is an assumption that the people who occupy the most important positions within the State are powerful political actors. But in practice, the French society would have taken a very different shape during the course of the nineteenth century (Suleiman, 1974) and the functioning of French political institutions is intimately associated with the strength of the state. “The strength of the French State is based on three elements: a normative belief in the appropriateness of State action; a wide range of State-certred organizations; and considerable evidence of State intervention. Thus, State power in France has both an ideational and an institutional foundation” (Elgie, 2004:71).

In France, civil servants or bureaucrats are appointed and promoted by highly competitive exam, although there are some political appointments in the higher levels. Since 1945, those wishing to enter into the senior administrative corps must pass through the *Ecole National d'Administration* (ENA), a notable public administration training school of the country. As a whole, the French civil service has the characteristics of a meritocracy rather than a spoils system and the organization the bureaucracy is characterized by a set of highly entrenched divisions (Rouban, 1995). There are three basic categories (it is known in France as ‘corps’) of bureaucrats: category A, B, C, and within each corps there are different grades of civil servants; within each grade there are different classes of civil servants; and within each class there are different echelons of civil servants (Elgie, 2004:132). As a result, the civil service system in France is very fragmented, extremely regimented, and hierarchical. The higher civil servants are known as *grands corps*.

The constitutional spirit and the republican tradition clearly indicate the distinction between politicians and bureaucrats in France. According to the constitutional spirit, as representatives of the people, politicians have the legitimacy to make policy decisions on behalf of the people. On the other hand, bureaucrats will act as the set of functionaries who should play a merely neutral role in the implement of the politician’s decisions. This distinction has been enshrined in the fundamental texts of the French political system for more than 200 years (Elgie, 2004).

But in practice, though this distinction is less clear than the constitutional situation would appear to indicate (Suleiman, 1984). Moreover, civil servants are allowed to join into the political parties and participate in their activities. At all levels, many civil servants play active roles in party politics, even though, they obtain leave to contest in the elections and if elected

to serve in the parliament. This is why, there is a long standing argument that France is a technocracy and it is ruled by the bureaucracy or the people who have bureaucratic background. However, the fear of technocracy is premised on the blurring of a fundamental theoretical distinction between the role of the politicians and the role of the bureaucrats. The latter must always be subordinate to the former, but each is endowed with special talents which the other does not possess. As Weber noted, “All too often the civil servant as a politician turns a cause that good in every sense into a ‘weak’ cause, through technically ‘weak’ pleading .... To weigh the effect of the word properly falls within the range of the lawyer’s task, but not at all into that of the civil servant.” (Weber, 1958:95). In this respect, Suleiman (1974:375) noted that-

The civil servant who replaces the politician is a specialist, guided by rational standards and hence oblivious to the political implications – the sense of responsibility of which Weber spoke so passionately – of his actions. The replacement of the politician by the civil servant gives rise, it is argued, to a technocracy which is seen as the rise to power of those who possess technical knowledge or ability, to the detriment of the traditional type of politician. The ultimate result, still a long way off, would mean government by technocrats.

Dogan (2005), however, argued differently and he noted political mistrust and the civil death of politicians is responsible for this. In any case, the French political system is the most centralized system among the advanced democracies. It is a hyper presidential system without counter-powers, without what in the United States is called “checks and balances” (Dogan, 2005). In the context of France, there is a plenty of evidence to support the idea that France is a technocracy and that the difference between politicians and bureaucrats is blurred. In the first quarter of the twentieth century Harold Laski observed the administrative syndicalism in France and in the 1950s Herbert Luethy wrote that “France is not ruled, but administered” by a group of civil servants who have seldom been affected by changes in regimes (cited in Suleiman, 1974:5-19). Elgie (2004:146-147) provides three arguments in this respect. First, there is no doubt that the French system creates an elite set of high trained administrators. Secondly, many of the country’s most senior politicians have a bureaucratic background in the higher civil service, and thirdly, the existence of Ministerial Cabinets which provides the scope to political appointment.

**Table 3.2:**  
**Distribution of Strength of Each Corps in the Cabinets (percent)**

	<b>1984</b>	<b>1989</b>	<b>1996</b>
Civil Administrator	55.7	54.7	42.2
Council of State	9.8	9.1	8.8
Court of Accounts	4.9	5.6	9.8
Prefectoral Corps	0.8	5.2	4.9
Finance Inspectorate	7.4	6.9	8.8

Source: Adapted from Suleiman, (2005:236)

As a result, since 1959, no less than 9 of the French 16 Prime Ministers have been member of the higher civil service *grands corps*. The same position is applicable to the Ministers. Between 1985 and 1997, 40 percent of central administration directors had an explicit political affiliation and nearly 20 percent among them passed through a ministerial cabinet (Suleiman, 2005). Averages of around 50 per cent of Ministers have had the background of higher civil service in the Fifth Republic. Moreover, 35 deputies and additional 40 deputies were the bureaucrats in the 1997-2002 legislatures (Elgie, 2004). In general, throughout the history of the Fifth Republic around 15 percent of deputies have had a civil service background (Rouban, 1998:66: cited in Elgie, 2004: 147). At the same time, ministerial political appointment has been raised dramatically. There were a total of no less than 861 cabinet members in the government as a whole in the early 1990s, whereas the average figure in the period 1984-96 was around 500 (Elgie, 2004:147). In the 2002 legislative elections, a quarter of the candidate for the National Assembly were bureaucrats, and more than 25 percent were elected (Suleiman, 2005). The fact is that bureaucrats have come to dominate in ministerial cabinets and governments by their political affiliations. Rouban' (1999) research exhibits the clear pattern of political affiliation. This is why, it is claimed that France is a technocracy.

**Table 3.3**

**Professional Background of Directors in Central Administration (percentage)**


	1984–85	1986–87	1988–89	1992	1993–94	Average population
A service within the same ministry	26.4	18.6	21.3	12.2	22.1	19.2
Cabinet	31.9	15.7	28.0	17.1	11.6	22.6
Public enterprise or agency	2.8	12.7	9.3	17.1	14.0	11.1
Private firm	5.6	8.8	5.3	0	5.8	4.9
Another corps	4.2	11.8	13.3	4.9	14.0	10.4
General inspection	0	1.0	1.3	0	5.8	2.1
Director in another ministry	8.3	2.9	5.3	12.2	4.7	7.8
<i>Grand corps</i> member	2.8	7.8	5.3	12.2	9.3	6.7
Director within the same ministry	5.6	2.9	1.3	9.8	2.3	3.7
Paris/IDF	0	7.8	0	0	5.8	2.3
Foreign service	12.5	9.8	9.3	14.6	4.7	9.2

Source: Adapted from Rouban, (1999:70)

Meanwhile, in the last three decades, the governance system has been changed and reformed. In recent times, French state has become less authoritative, less expansive, more responsive, and more multi-level, especially after the establishment of Fifth Republic. Although the political system is presidentialized in the sense that the President will exercise power, but in real sense, it is a semi-presidential system of government where a popularly elected fixed-term President exists along with a Prime Minister and Cabinet who are all responsible to the parliament (Elgie, 1999:13).

**Table 3.4**

**Decision-making process in French government system**



Source: Adapted from Elgie (2004:105)

As a result, the potential for state-centred policy has been reduced and many autonomous agencies and commissions have been created for ensuring public service by the influence of globalization, Europeanization and overall the thinking of NPM to protect the citizen's interest against the bureaucracy. But "While most other democratic societies have long recognized that both efficiency and democracy necessitated these kinds of measures, France has always been slower to move in this direction. This has often had more to do with politicians' conservatism, which derived from their unwillingness to cede any authority, as well as with civil servants who naturally distrusted the prying of elected officials"(Suleiman, 2005:172).

Even so, there is no doubt that the bureaucracy in France is extremely large and occupies an important position in the governance system as a whole and the whole administration is structured in rational pyramidal hierarchies with almost all formal powers in the hands of those at the top. Rouban (1999:67) comments that "the relationship between senior civil servants and politicians is certainly more ambiguous and closer in the 1990s than it was during the 1960s. The politicization of the senior civil service has been considerably strengthened, but senior civil servants still consider themselves as representing the permanence of the state, and they are still reluctant to talk freely about their political involvement." In France, the higher level bureaucrats help to shape political events and they are key political actors of the governance system to determine political outcomes which outline the idea that France is a 'technocracy' (Elgie, 2004:129).

Today the political parties, from the left to right, big business to small business, privileged class to unprivileged class, the intellectual to the students, all the French people are agreed that the bureaucracy plays a very decisive role in French life (Elgie, 2004). Bureaucracy not only control the massive administrative machine but they also occupy key positions at all levels of decision making in politics and in both public and private sectors of the country. This trend coupled with Napoleonic desire. He intended that, the bureaucracy that he created to be at once at the service of the state and the representative of the state (Suleiman, 1974). Overall, the operation of governance and administration in France and the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is very complex, because it is very difficult to identify the state activities in France which the state does not either totally control or markedly influence.

### **3.3.4 Politics-Bureaucracy Relations in Germany**

Among the western countries, politics-bureaucracy relation in Germany is very identical and the German tradition of the administrative state is exemplary like France. In reference to the 300 years' history of the modern German state, it has been said that this state was a creation of the continuous existence of the administration (Konig, 2000:47). The politico-bureaucratic history of the country reveals that Germany attained a form of national unity under Bismarck with the foundation of the German Empire in 1871 round Prussia, its historically dominant component (Southern, 1979; Wollmann, 2000). In the development of German bureaucracy, the influence of the Prussian model and the Hegelian, Weberian philosophy was notable (Page and Wright, 1999; Heady, 2001). Although critics of Max Weber sometimes argue that German modern bureaucratic 'legal-rational' state was not really an idealized construct but reflected rather closely the reality of the contemporary German state (Lehmbruch, 1996:40).

This logic is correct in one sense that the bureaucratic domination in the governance and policy process has been a long-standing record in Germany, and Prussia in particular, based on the organizational supremacy of the bureaucracy. This is why many western scholars – Robert Putnam is one of them – did not find the classical image of bureaucracy in Germany, which was propounded by Max Weber. German bureaucracy was practically deviated from Weberian concept of an instrumental bureaucracy, which merely implements loyally the decisions taken by the politicians. But this does not mean that German bureaucrats consider themselves partisan in a political sense (Mayntz and Derlien, 1989). It is became clear while the dominant position of bureaucracy was replaced by the new emerging political and business elites in the later part of the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, the modern professional bureaucracy was a Prussian creation and constitutes a historical tradition which has endured to the present day. In Germany, the modern state administered by a permanent civil service arose in the enlightened despotism of the eighteenth century. In the early nineteenth century, Prussia moved from monarchical tendency to bureaucratic absolutism. From then, strong bureaucracy came to in existence with permanency, incremental salary, automatic promotion, payment during illness and a pension. A strong competitive process followed in the process of selection of bureaucracy.

As a result, civil servants were regarded not as servants of the Crown but as servants of the state (Konig, 2000). By virtue of their service to the state, bureaucrats came to enjoy a special

position and they could not be dismissed except by a highly judicialised disciplinary procedure (Southern, 1979:110). During the German revival after the Second World War, Germany came into subsequent reunification in the framework of new style federalism by the Basic Law and the Federal Republic of Germany began life on 21 September 1949. Consequently, in the Soviet Zone, the German Democratic Republic was set up, and in the Western Occupation Zones, the West German state established in 1949 adapting three levels of government: national government at *Federal* level; state government at *Land* level; and local government within the *Laender* and Finally, in 1990, the two German States were united (Southern, 1979:107; Wollmann, 2000:2).

Now the legal source of government power is the Basic Law and the Basic Law pledges the state to uphold and maintain the traditional principles of the career civil service. The professional bureaucracy is made part of the new constitution and the specific characteristic of state bureaucracy is the exercise of power as a permanent function through the enforcement of public law (Konig, 2000). It followed that bureaucrats are the executing part of the authority of the state and they are engaged in a legal exercise. Therefore, in Germany, public administration came to be defined in terms of the state. This is why, in comparison with Anglo-German politico-administrative culture, Ridley (2000:134-135) noted that in Germany civil servants are officials of the state and exercise the state power. This relationship defines their status and authority that distinguishes them from others. On the other hand, British civil servants are servants of the Crown as 'concept of the state' does not recognize as a legal entity in England. As servants of the Crown they must serve its constitutional representatives, like ministers and bureaucrats have nothing to do in the determination of the national interest and that can be only done by the parliament and voters. But in Germany, bureaucrats have a personal responsibility for the common interest. In the question of accountability, German makes a distinction between political leadership and the administration which is overlap in English.

In the sense of politics and policy making, German administrative history reveals that the bureaucrats are not engaged in a purely executive function but the particular form of separation of powers doctrine that assumed in Germany placed an executive power to make law in the hands of bureaucracy. Policy formulation in Germany is very often the production of complex process of mutual accommodation of varieties actors; state, politicians and bureaucrats in a system of 'interlocking' (Lehmbruch, 1996) which Goetz (1999:148) termed

“parliamentarization, and federalization of the national policy processes”. However, there are some important peculiarities in bargaining of policy process. One of them is “in the system of executive federalism, the implementation of federal legislation has to a large degree remained the domain of the *Lander*. As a rule, the federal government has no hierarchical administrative authority over the *Lander* executives. Administrative coordination has to be obtained by negotiating between autonomous bureaucracies. In these relationships, in spite of the leading role of federal ministries in the drafting of rules, the *Lander* bureaucracies have a strong position because of their experience in field administration due to their role in implementation” (Lehmbruch, 1996:48). As a result, bureaucracy engaged in politics in the sense of policy making.

Although in Germany bureaucrats are allowed to be members of political parties, negotiate to the politicians of the alike lines to be appointed in the federal ministerial administration and they have always been free to engage in party politics and in principle, all enjoy the right to be elected to Federal, Land or local assemblies (Suleiman, 2005; Southern, 1979). Karl Deutsch and Lewis Edinger (1959) noted that the extent of the administrative elite’s influence over policy making has varied more or less inversely with the power of the political elite. In Germany, the influence of bureaucratic elite in policy making was practically eliminated only under the strong political leadership. However, the culture of bureaucrat bashing or attacks on the bureaucracy by the politicians remained more modest in Germany than Britain and the USA. In this regard, Suleiman (2005:133) observed that “They looked to their administrations to achieve savings, but they did not resort to Thatcher and Reagan-style bureaucrat-bashing”. Schroter and Wollmann noted that “the Federal Cabinet...has so far refrained from any type of bureaucrat-bashing that has become an integral part of the political rhetoric of many Anglo-American protagonists of public sector reform” (cited in the Suleiman, 2005:133). Whether the British and American politicians are very keen to change and reinvention their bureaucratic structures whereas German politicians are not seriously subscribing to a comprehensive reinvention, rather they are aiming at a paradigmatic shift with the existing machinery of government (Schroter, 2001).

German public administration has also faced numerous challenges in different times with the structural interventions by the occupying powers but did not affect the continuity of the administration. But the traditional image of the German state as powerful *Obrigkeitsstaat*

(state of authority) led by a bureaucratic hierarchy, top down authority relations which were an important feature of this system has been changing gradually.

**Table 3.5**

**Party Membership of Political Civil Servants and Subdivision Heads 1970-1987 (%)**

<i>Party</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>State Secretary</i>	<i>Division Head</i>	<i>Subdivision Head</i>
CDU/CSU	1987	61.5	47.2	17.8
	1981	0.0	8.9	10.0
	1972	0.0	13.6	13.0
	1970	-	10.3	11.1
SPD	1987	0.0	7.5	22.2
	1981	60.0	37.8	24.3
	1972	42.9	25.0	14.1
	1970	-	28.2	11.1
FDP	1987	7.7	9.4	8.9
	1981	0.0	13.3	11.4
	1972	42.9	2.3	3.5
	1970	-	0.0	2.2
Non-member	1987	30.8	35.8	51.1
	1981	40.0	40.0	54.3
	1972	14.3	59.1	69.4
	1970	-	61.5	75.5

Source: Adapted from Mayntz and Derlien (1989:388) and Suleiman (2005:261).

At the same time, during the last three-four decades increasing political appointment of political bureaucrats by the politicians has made the politics-bureaucracy relations complicated. In this regard, Goetz's and Suleiman's observations are very comprehensive. "Party politicization, parliamenarization, and federalization have had a profound impact on the senior civil service, affecting its relations to political authority, its cohesion, and the career paths, roles, and essential qualifications of higher officials" (Goetz, 1999:149). Suleiman (2005:259) observed that now "The debate concerning the relationship between politician and bureaucrats in Germany has centered mostly around two concepts. First, should the concept of politicization be understood as the growing importance of party affiliation over expertise or seniority for determining appointments to the higher civil service? If so, what effect does this have for the career patterns of civil servants? Second, should it be viewed as the consequence of hybridization, which refers to the blurring of the distinction between politicians and civil servants?"

Notable that, in Germany, there are two top positions of the federal bureaucracy – state secretaries and division heads, which is mostly known as political posts and political civil servants (*Politische Beamte*) are appointed there. Ministers hold the discretionary powers to remove the bureaucrats holding these posts by sending them into temporary retirement, keeping them as it is or new appointments. Utterly it depends on the whim of minister in office. As a result, near about 150 bureaucrats who occupy or wish to occupy for these posts maintain political affiliation, and their appointment depends on political patronage although it is a very old practice in Germany which makes close relationship between politicians and bureaucrats. However, recent data shows that the increasing rates of political appointment by the political leadership especially in 1969 SPD-led government, in 1982 CDU-led government and in 1998 SPD and the Greens led governments appointed 33%, 37.5% and 52.2% of political civil servants respectively. At the same time, party memberships of civil servants have been increased noticeably which evidence the hybridization of politico-bureaucratic governance, interchangeability of the two careers, and the convergence in role perceptions of politicians and bureaucrats in Germany (Mayntz and Derlien, 1989; Suleiman, 2005).

After 1990s, a changing of guiding ideas has been taking place in Germany. Although German researchers had thought that their bureaucracy was extremely efficient, they have recently been modifying that perception and had been taking increased interest in NPM and the New Managerialism (Muramatsu & Naschold, 1996). Although local government is using as a testing ground for the NPM reforms in Germany but the web of this reform is also touching to the federal government offering a lots of reform proposal for the federal administration. Nowadays the bureaucratic structure is being disputed and no longer retains the self-legitimization arising from its alleged superior effectiveness and efficiency. Politicians have taken over and are driving for public sector reforms under the banners of ‘administrative modernization’ and ‘lean state’ (Derlien, 2000:151)

From the above comparative analysis in the context of western democracies, one trend is almost patent that all political leaderships irrespective of countries – in countries with strong bureaucracies or controlled bureaucracies are keen to build their support base in the bureaucracy. Political leaders always want to appoint them on whom they can be relied, and want to make the bureaucracy responsive to their government. What is true in the American context is also true in the context of other countries like, Britain, France, and Germany.

However, difference is only on mode of interaction and in the approaching of governance. This is why Moe (1985) observed that political leaders always seek responsive competence, not neutral competence.

**Table 3.6**  
**Comparative Nature of Politics-Bureaucracy Relations in Western Democracies**

Comparative Variables	Modern Western Democracies (Countries)			
	USA	UK	France	Germany
Politico-Bureaucratic Culture and Values	Different	Different	Hybrid	Hybrid
Policy Domination	Shared	Shared	Shared	Shared
Professionalism	Moderate	More	More	More
Politicization	More	Less	More	Moderate
Accountability	Shared	Overlap	Shared	Distinctive
Process of Governance	Separate-Interactive	Align-Interactive	Shared-Interactive	Mutual-Interactive
Models of Relations	Complex Complementarity	Both of Dichotomy and Mutuality	Complex-Mutuality	Both of Dichotomy and Mutuality

Source: Compiled by the researcher

### 3.4 Politics-Bureaucracy Relations in Developing World Perspective

The discussion on politics-bureaucracy relations and their roles and responsibilities are discernible facts in the context of developing countries along with the developed countries. LaPalombara (1963) ed. Book, *Bureaucracy and Political Development* is the systematic classical literature on politics-bureaucracy relations in the developing world perspective. It explores the role of the bureaucracy in political and economic development. It also converse the role that bureaucracies can and do play in the various kind of transformations that the developing nations are experiencing from theoretical speculation to empirical case studies. Many observers and thinkers of bureaucracy in developing countries have noticed behavioral aberration reflecting societal culture of the countries studied. As Riggs (1964), introduced his ‘Ecological Sala Model’ where the bureaucratic behavior is traditional behind the facade of western institutions. LaPalombara (1963) observed that as an independent variable bureaucracy influences any kind of transformation in the developing countries in regard to social, economic or political context. One of the significance phenomenons in the context of

developing countries is the lack of balance relation between politicians and bureaucrats in the policy process. Riggs (1963) noted that political organs are weak in the developing countries which tends to civil-military bureaucracy domination in the political process and the extent of bureaucratic influence in politics is exceptionally high. He holds the idea that the imposition of political control over the bureaucracy is a difficult task. He also argued that “when the political arena is shifted the bureaucracies – a shift marked by the growing power are usually ominous for political stability, economic growth, administrative effectiveness, and democratic values. It seems important, therefore, to give serious attention to the relation between political and administrative development, to the question of how balanced growth takes place”. Riggs (1969) termed bureaucratic domination as ‘bureaucratism’ and noted that bureaucratism is not much seen in the western world, it is widely found in the new and developing countries. Therefore, he advised or supports the approach of politics-bureaucracy separation in the context of western or differentiated societies like United States but not in the context of traditional societies of developing countries by mentioning and theorizing the balanced and unbalanced polities. On the other hand, Huntington (1968) provided the opposite argument than that of Riggs. He agreed that lack of institutionalization inspires the civil-military bureaucrats to take over the political power and in this milieu; he suggested that maintaining firm political control over the bureaucracy is essential for nation building and achieving national developmental goals for developing nations.

Along with this two contrasting views, some other thinkers of developing world argued for blurred intermeshing. They suggest that the stopping of the development of bureaucracy will not be wise. Rather, bureaucracy can play an intermediary role to expedite the process of development, as the bureaucracy is most modernized agent, and as the political institutions take a long time to grow up in the developing world (Braibanti, 1969; Esman, 1967; Sigelman, 1972, 1974). So it can be said that with a very few exceptions of their arguments, almost all observers of development administration emphasized the need for active, professional and committed bureaucracy for developing countries, and provided a general prescription for balanced or shared role between politicians and bureaucrats as ‘agents of change’. But these development literatures did not identify the way and content of relationships between politicians and bureaucrats which lead to effective governance and development. In the last three decades many NPM writers have also been suggesting the same value that has been provided by Huntington. But it would not be an exaggerative statement that any single state cannot be found where the complete package of the NPM model has

been implemented or it is being considered for implementation in the developing world (Sarker, 2006). With these theoretical arguments and theorizing environment, developing countries have been shaping and reshaping, structuring and restructuring their civil service and administrative systems.

### **3.4.1 Politics-Bureaucracy Relations in South and Southeast Asia:**

Like many other developing countries, Malaysia,<sup>23</sup> India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh inherited a strong bureaucratic system from its colonial rulers. All five countries have the common heritage of a reputedly well-administered colonial system with powerful bureaucracy (Caiden, 2013). Modern Malaysian civil service had been established during the British colonial rule in carrying out the administrative functions of the government and after independence it has adapted new form with little change in the institutional arrangements under the political leadership (Tilman, 1964; Johan, 1984). In the inception, Malay, Chinese, and Indian origins were the proportionate representation in the Malayan bureaucracy. The most noteworthy transformation in the bureaucracy has been the replacement of national for expatriate personnel by following the process of Malayanization, which had been substantially completed by the early 1960s (Heady, 2001). Merit based selection and promotion by an autonomous public service commission, less politicization and uphold the expertise are the basic characteristics of Malaysian bureaucracy.

The working relation between politicians and bureaucrats in Malaysia is comparatively smooth than other developing countries. Many experts endow their views in this changing pattern of bureaucratic attitude as the contribution of bureaucrats. In this regard Tilman (1964) observed that may be the colonial attitude and environment that had in the administrative system was not working precisely but it was effectively serving the current needs of the society in the post independent Malaysia. Esman (1972) also praised to the Malaysian bureaucrats for maintaining their integrity, discipline, organizational coherence, and competent to provide public service and control activities. However, he suggested a major effort for administrative reform to meet development administration requirements. In this respect, Heady (2001:393) comments that “in a polity where communal pluralism is the basic reality, the dominant political party is compelled to rely on the relatively neutral

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<sup>23</sup> Malaysia has been included in the analysis because of similar colonial legacy of public administration like South Asia and many western thinkers of bureaucracy think that it has been benefited from public bureaucracies.

bureaucracy as a partner in keeping the system on going. Indeed, Esman goes so far as to claim that Malaya's senior officials "have been the indispensable steel frame which has held this precarious state together even when political processes failed". But after five decades, Lim (2009) noted that the Malaysian bureaucracy has played an important role in driving impressive development since its independence in 1957. Now it is facing two serious problems in terms of efficiency, equity and responsiveness. One is Malay domination in the bureaucracy and the other one is disproportionate share and executive dominance and control on the basis of so-called unbalanced thesis, although the bureaucracy is still working under the political leaderships.

In all the cases of South Asian countries, the inherited administrative pattern has been retained relatively intact after independence also. Same thing goes to the context of Indian<sup>24</sup> public administration. When India became independent, many things changed, but the basic framework of the administration continued. After sixty years of independence, Misra (2009) did not find any significant changes between ICS and IAS except the change of pay scales. He also comments that "relations between the political executive and the civil servant today leave a lot to be desired" (Misra, 2009: viii). The administrative system that was set up after independence of India was the product of British traditions and on the philosophy of the democratic welfare system (Dwivedi and Jain, 1985). Although India adapted a new form of Indian Administrative Service (IAS) after its independence but it was successor of the ICS, without breaking the British administrative traditions.

The orientation and the nature of the activities of the bureaucrats broadly followed the same pattern as in the colonial government (Das, 2013). May be it was the foresight of colonial ruler that the system which was installed by them would be continued in the future India. This is why, Kochanek (1975:45) has commended that during the British colonial period "a model of government evolved which was ultimately to be accepted as the structure of government for independent India" because the model of administration was established by the principle of merit bureaucracy, elitism and loyalty to its masters. He also has recommended that the bureaucracy "must be made more innovative, less subject to rapid expansion as a way of creating employment and must exercise self-restraint in its demands

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<sup>24</sup> Here politics-bureaucracy relations in Indian case will be focus mainly since the independence. Another endeavor to extensive analysis on colonial bureaucracy has been attempted in the 4<sup>th</sup> chapter of the present research.

for higher incomes” (Kochanek, 1975:137). But the Indian bureaucracy remains in the same positions. It is notable that during the independent movement, the ICS was considered as the instrument of colonial power and the Congress (first political party in Indian sub-continent) had all along declared that they would abolish the ICS and all that it stood for (Potter, 1986). But practically it did not happen. Moreover, it is evident that India adopted British administrative tradition constitutionally by the effort of Sardar Patel, one of the leading Congress leaders. “India was quick to place the successor Indian Administrative Service (IAS) on a secure legal footing thanks to the efforts of Sardar Patel. In a cabinet meeting in April 1948, he secured approval for constitutional protection for the ICS from a still reluctant Nehru. Sardar Patel launched a vigorous defence for the ICS in the legislature as well. He argued that it was impossible to run the country without a civil service and that Congress workers could not be an alternative for them” (Chaudry, 2011:24).

According to Potter (1986), that was a “political support” to the ICS species which would have been possible to survive them in the governance process in independent India. In this regard, “in 1964, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was asked what he considered to be his greatest failure as India’s Prime Minister. He said, ‘I could not change the administration, it is still a colonial administration” (Das, 2013:22; Potter, 1986:2). Of course, attempts from the political leadership to shake things up have been taken in different regimes but the result was not fruitful. The net result according to Tummala, “is that the civil servant not only remains greater entrenched but also threatened; hence very cautious” (cited in Heady, 2001, 392).

However, one notable tendency between Indian and western scholars to the discussion on bureaucracy and its roles and relations to its counterparts is that western scholars identified the Indian bureaucracy as an agent of modernization positively as to politics-bureaucracy relationship. On the other hand, most of the Indian scholars identified the role of bureaucracy from both the negative and positive side. Like, Heady (2001:389-393) identified “comparable working relationships between political leaders and professional bureaucrats, and established effective external controls over the bureaucracy.” in the Indian case. He also observed that both India and Malaysia have benefited from unusually advanced higher public bureaucracies. According to Heady “A cherished part of the political tradition in both India and Malaysia is that there should be a separation between the politicians who make policy and the administrators who carry them out. In practice, working relationships between the political leaders and the professional bureaucrats have generally conformed to the tradition,

and have proceeded smoothly, but with Malaysian bureaucrats playing a more active policy role than their Indian counterparts.” Of course not all western scholars i.e. Paul H. Appleby, an American observer, who was invited to India for research on bureaucracy after independence, pointed out that undoubtedly Indian bureaucracy is advanced but it was “designed to serve the relatively simple interests of an occupying power” was not adequate for an independent India, and required systematic improvement (cited in Palmer, 1961:132).

In this regard, Prof. Mitra (2010) has considered the colonial bureaucracy as ‘the steel frame of imperial rule’ and the IAS as the replication of the ICS, which still occupies the upper echelons of Indian administration. Although he mentioned some examples of ‘the collapse of the steel frame’ but still now without the help of bureaucracy the minister can do nothing, and without cooperation between politicians and bureaucrats the governance is being paralyzed. Caiden (2013:544) has commented that “Public bureaucracy has always been powerful, its performance surprisingly good under the circumstances, much decentralized, corrupt, somewhat mediocre at lower levels, defiant against reform, and with an impressive aristocratic dignified bearing.” These characteristics of Indian bureaucracy have opened up the gap between and among politicians, bureaucrats and public. Moreover, the civil servants in India including all India services enjoy protection under article 311 of the Indian constitution. This constitutional protection of IAS has made a sharp division between politicians and bureaucrats. This sharp division brought about an unresponsive and apathetic bureaucracy that has become more rigid and indifferent, riddled with casteism, and strictly adherent to the politics and administration (Caiden, 2013:544). Bhattacharya (1979:11) has recognized Indian bureaucracy as having the hang-over of the colonial era and as authoritarian in outlook and power monopolize.

Potter (1986) also endeavors a tremendous attempt to explore the nature of Indian political administrators in his research. He pursued his study in the field of Indian local and central bureaucracy from the time frame of 1919-1983 in Indian four states namely; Bihar, Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu and indeed on Indian Administrative Services (IAS) throughout India. He identified the colonial ICS tradition is prevailing and it is essentially persisted in the IAS, and it is remained important in the independent India. Professor Mitra (2006) has also expressed the same view. In his empirical study *The Puzzle of India's Governance* he explains “India as an exemplar of a post-colonial, rich-poor state-nation, where modern institutions are wrapped around a society of which many important segments

remains traditional....Her political institutions and process, bearing the complex legacies of English utilitarianism, colonial rule.....a general continuity in public policy” (Mitra, 2006:3-5). They (bureaucrats) often find themselves as blameless for everything that goes wrong and everything goes to the politicians and to the institutions or vis-à-vis which resulting the governance as scapegoat. Although the bureaucrats are under the system of control by the All India Services Rules, 1969, which provides the punitive powers i.e. suspension, censure, withholding of promotions, recovery from pay of any pecuniary loss caused to government or government controlled organization, withholding of increments of pay, reduction in rank, and compulsory retirement.

Nevertheless, the dual control (state and central government) of bureaucracy causes victimization for both the politicians and the bureaucrats by the blame game and mistrust. In this regard, Noronha (1976:74), a retired chief secretary commended that “Today the politician distrusts the IAS man.....He distrusts him because he belongs to an All India Services, whose loyalty must be more to the centre than to the state”. Sethuraman and Moorthy, (1992:75) observed a very outrageous nature of the relationships that “There has also been pressure from the political level for a committed bureaucracy which has been understood as commitment to the Constitution by the civil servants or commitment to the person in power or the party in power or the politicians in power.....Civil service functioned according to the desire of the political power....The trend is also perceptible of civil servants aligning with politicians resulting in vindictive action against those associated with the politicians who are no longer in power”.

Same thing goes to the case of local governance in India as well. After being studied the district administration in India, Palanithurai, *at el.*, (2006:3) observed that “the whole process of governance and appropriately colluded with the bureaucracy and ensured a system of governance for their own advantage...Though India got independence from the British the people could not get independence from the British administration as free India continued the British type of administration.” They also comment that the political elites could not intent to change this trend. May be this kind of administration is convenient to the political elites and it helped the politicians and bureaucrats to gain perfect understanding about the whole process of governance and development and to keep the people away from the process of governance and development. In the initial years after independence, the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats was one of mutual respect and understanding. But the trend of this

relationship has been change since the independence gradually. Sarkar (2010) studied the relations between the administrative personnel and the political (elected) members of the Zilla Parishad in West Bengal and found that the relations between the two actors could not be properly organized. As a result, governing the *panchayat* bodies are being seriously affected.

However, in subsequent decades, things have changed. At present India, there are two types of bureaucrats; one is indirectly politically involved (as the civil service conduct rules prohibit civil servants from active participation in political activities) who cultivate and seek political patronage from politicians, and the other one is comparably neutral. The former dominates the latter in the process of governance along with politicians. Because providing policy advice to the politicians is the most important function of the civil service in India. By this chance, former group of bureaucrats do not render policy suggestions professionally and impartially. Moreover, while the policy advice is rendered by some civil servants to the politicians is neither objective nor impartial, and more interestingly, political ministers also like these types of policy suggestion that fit into their short time political interests and avoids neutral competence. As a result, the policy bureaucrats provide and recommend policies that the ministers of the day want and a nexus has thus developed (emerging culture of collusion between politicians and bureaucrats) in between the politicians and the bureaucrats (Das, 2013; Maheshwari, 2005; Prasad, 2006).

On the other hand, the bureaucrats who want to fulfill his/her duty according to principle of law, they are to face conflict inevitably with their ministers, resulting punishment through transfers to unimportant posts and political bureaucrats those belong to the first category approach to the minister or ruling politicians and expedite this process of transfer. As a result, Subramanian (2004) first thesis – balance between politics and bureaucracy – is rare in present India. Of course, Subramanian (2009), himself has also agreed with this in his later book *GovernMint in India: An Inside View*. Therefore, the first instance reveals the Subramanian (2004) second thesis ‘the collapse of the steel frame’ and the later provides the puzzle of Indian governance where no conclusive or easy answer can be given or accepted either easily. Nevertheless after sixty years of independence, if we want to evaluate the roles and relations between politics and bureaucracy in India then we can see that nonetheless gradual decay of its elitism, the IAS has emerged as leviathan in India, preserving its all

apatite and cardinal values as it was, without loyalty to his masters as a whole due to the inability of political leaderships.

In the case of Sri Lanka, it can be said that it represents a variation among South Asian countries. Ceylon (present Sri Lanka) was made a Crown Colony in 1802, and till then to run the administration colonial bureaucracy was set up which was nucleus of administration and exercised autocratic power (Warnapala, 1974). Even some bureaucrats were members of the Executive Council to influence all aspects of executive policy. However after independence in 1948, the bureaucracy had been facing different changing environment. Warnapala (1974) has identified five different phases of Ceylon bureaucracy; during colonial time – a period of bureaucratic supremacy, transitional phase 1931-1947 – a period of bureaucratic adaptation, after independence – a period of bureaucratic responsiveness, after 1956 – a period of bureaucratic crisis and after 1973 – a period of bureaucratic pressure and response. Although Caiden (2013:545) has recognized Sri Lanka as ‘close to a failed state’ which is split among the ethnic groups, unstable, disrupted by internal crisis, and fearful of disintegration. But it was not always like this (Kumarasingham, 2013).

The politico-bureaucratic history of Sri Lanka reveals that as in the case of other South and Southeast Asian countries it became independence with the legacy of an ongoing British administrative system (Heady, 2001:380) where had comparatively favorable conditions for independence in comparison with other South Asian countries. Despite the huge percentile differences among the ethnic groups, there was no ethnic conflict or riots in Sri Lanka before and during independence as was in India (Kumarasingham, 2013; Radu, 2012). However, the political elites failed to integrate various actors because of majoritarian control strategy pursued by the political elites (Radu, 2012). Notable, Sri Lanka adopted a Westminster style of parliamentary government after her independence and bureaucracy have had helped to successful power transfer from the colonial ruler to the political leadership of the new nation state (Heady, 2001). Thus since independence in 1948 to the late sixes the alliance between political leadership and bureaucracy was a rememberable fact in Sri Lanka. Because both of them were came from urban background with western education. During over six decades since independence, Sri Lanka has succeeded in maintaining a pluralistic character, and a competitive political system, notwithstanding being a country of ethnic conflict which began in the 1980s and a violence conflicts and civil war that paralyzed the island for almost thirty

years. Expert says, shift from the orthodox British model to the mixed presidential-parliamentary system was at the root of arising ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka (Heady, 2001).

In present Sri Lanka, the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is determined by the classical model. Bureaucracy is fully controlled by the political authority. All the public sector bureaucracies are operating their function under control of political leadership maintaining good political relationships and the autonomy of the bureaucrats are limited. However, S Lalitha (2006:) has conducted a recent study on Sri Lankan bureaucracy and shown that after six decades of independence, it is still following the same procedures, rules and regulations in the public sector, and have undergone little change or in some cases no change, in spite of the first moving global trends. Moreover, the “political interference has been an epidemic in the field of the public service. The concept of accountability has been severely damaged by some political alignments, according to one official” (S Lalitha, 2006:231). As a result, he has suggested to immediate public sector reform in order to enhance effective governance and development in Sri Lanka.

In the case of Pakistan,<sup>25</sup> another state in South Asia, which was emerged as an independent state with strong colonial bureaucratic background, but the orientation toward action of Pakistan’s bureaucracy was not undergirded by the deep residual respect for extra-bureaucratic intellectual endeavor, while there was tradition of intellectuality in the bureaucracy as a part of the colonial civil service (Braibanti, 1966). After its inception, this country was depredated by many varieties of problems including integration crisis and with the repeated failure of the political leadership to assume their proper leadership role, the civil-military bureaucracies have held political power. Kennedy (1987:5) observed that “The political leaders are episodically replaced, but the power of the administrative system and the authority of the bulk of its officers is impervious’ to change.” On the other hand, Waseem (2007) observed bureaucratic paternalism in Pakistan and such paternalism has a direct relationship with the relative underdevelopment of political institutions in Pakistan. Since its birth, Pakistan has been governed mainly by the civil-military bureaucrats. After a short while of independence to till Musharraf regime, Pakistan has gone under military rule about four times and in its early stage “some erstwhile bureaucrats were able to occupy the political

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<sup>25</sup> Politics-bureaucracy relations in Pakistan will be focus mainly at present days. Another endeavor to extensive analysis on Pakistan bureaucracy has been attempted in the 4<sup>th</sup> chapter of the present research.

positions of Governor General and Prime Minister” (Kennedy, 1987). In fact Pakistan can be described as a bureaucratic state where the ruling elites brought with them the traditions, outlook, and attitudes typical of the bureaucrats and their sympathies were slanted more towards the bureaucracy than the political institutions (Kennedy, 1987). The pure grammar of politics-bureaucracy relationship is absent in Pakistan and thus Pakistan has failed to develop the relations which should exist between politics and bureaucracy in a political process. Caiden (2013:545) comments that “Pakistan has yet to succeed in nation building, as there are several different Pakistans.” Even after six decades of independence, the country had not been able to come out from the colonial bureaucracy and governance, where malfunction is the norm not the exception in the bureaucracy (Mahmood, 2009). Moreover, the major political components of governance are depredated by corruption. Even the political leaders, public bureaucracies are perceived to be highly corrupt by most of the people of Pakistan (Haque, 2001). In addition, poor public sector management, in some cases mismanagement, inefficiency, using excessive discretionary powers by the civil-military bureaucracy, overlapping of jurisdictions and ambiguity about the roles and relationships between politicians and bureaucrats are the basic features of governance that has weakened the government performance in Pakistan.

To sum up the comparative analysis experiencing from the developing world, it can be said that although the colonial administration itself created the bureaucratic apparatus for subject to political and administrative control within the dependent territory but the demand for economic development and modernization impinged directly on agriculture, industry, public health and education to segment of the bureaucracy. Subsequently, the role of bureaucracy in the governance is most often considered crucial for the achievement of economic development in developing countries by many western scholars. But research findings from many developing countries indicate that the dominant role of the bureaucratic elites is not adequate for economic development. Rather, their role is resulted segmented economic growth (Ahmed, 1980). In spite of extensive criticism from theoretical and empirical perspectives, bureaucracy is enhancing its power exclusively and deeply entrenched in almost all of the developing countries.

### 3.5 Conclusion

The above overall comparative analysis from different countries reveals that comparative analysis is valuable for not only pointing out to what makes for success in governance but also to what contributes to failure. History of bureaucracy reveals that the bureaucracy of ancient civilizations was the founding pillar of modern bureaucracy and the European and American states have adopted traditional bureaucracy newly with their own culture and context along with their economic system of advance capitalism and technology (Weber, 1947). All modern European states have inherited and learned from the ancient great civilizations and their administrative systems. American reformers also have considered the Ottoman and Chinese civil service systems as well as the French, German and British systems (Farazmand, 1997a; Rohr, 1993; Van Riper, 1997a).

However the notable thing is that, the bureaucracy which was once upon a time in a strong position such as Chinese, Egyptian, and Indian ancient bureaucracies that becomes weak in course of time and the bureaucracy which was comparatively weak becomes strong dramatically such as England, USA, Germany and France in considering their professionalism. In the ancient empires, bureaucracy was an instrument and assisting force to the political leadership and was considered as a state apparatus and overall they were involved in law and order maintenance, policy implementation of developmental and monumental works. Moreover, the history of the world bureaucracy reflects the changing role of public officials in different system of government. In the frame work of modern state, bureaucracy was coined in the eighteenth century to refer to a state dominated by appointed officials (Riggs, 2009). One notable thing in this respect is that the ancient imperial bureaucracy was liable to the king or emperor and they were the servants of the emperor and master of the public. But the scenario has little bit been changed, now the modern bureaucracy is the servants of the state or public and to some extent they are liable to the people's representatives although bureaucracy is always motivated by their self-interest and class structure.

Comparative analysis form different countries shows that politicians and bureaucrats play distinctive roles in policy making process in western democracies in general and the patterns of political and bureaucratic power relations are varied on the basis of political systems and different institutional practice (Aberbach and Rockman, 2006). Nevertheless, this cross-

national variation is observable for many other reasons, including constitutional provisions, development sequences, nature of politicization and party systems (Aberbach et al. 1981). In general, American bureaucrats are much more politicized ideologically and they play more political role than the European bureaucrats. Despite the formal separateness of the roles, the overlap between politicians and bureaucrats is in most respects larger in the US context than in European countries (Aberbach and Rockman, 1997).

The bureaucracy is more powerful in the United States, but they are structurally subordinate to politics and are not autonomous as is the United Kingdom and other European countries. Bureaucratic influence in the policy and governance process is higher in France and UK, while, the parliamentary and party politicians influence is little bit higher than bureaucracy in Germany in the European context (Aberbach et al. 1981; Aberbach and Rockman, 2006). On the other hand, the basic difference between developed and developing countries bureaucracy is that in the developed democracies bureaucracy has been developed over time following a natural process and political leadership helped to develop bureaucracy in some cases. But bureaucracy in developing or post-colonial countries has not been developed following a natural process. Rather it is developed by the colonial power for their administrative support, and after independence of these countries political leadership used this bureaucracy as state mechanism (Potter, 1986; Carino, 2001). Thus politics-bureaucracy relations in developing countries yet to shape in a certain character and still it is under construction by following different notes and suggestions, though they have a long experience of the administrative state.

# **Chapter – 4: Politics, Bureaucracy and Local Government in Bangladesh: Evolution, Structure and Process of Governance from Historical Perspective**

## **4.1 Introduction**

The principal concern of this chapter is to explain the evolution and development of politics, bureaucracy and local government exploring their roles and relationships in the process of governance and development in Bangladesh from historical perspective.<sup>26</sup> Thus, this chapter provides an overall brief history of politics-bureaucracy relations in governance and development of Bangladesh focusing the main light on four major variables; nature of political regimes or systems of governance, nature and institutional position of bureaucracy, nature of local government, and overall nature of the relationships between politicians and bureaucrats in governance and development. At the same time, it delineates the nature of political development, shift of regimes in the national level of government, and the role of politicians and bureaucrats in the overall governance system of the country. It begins by sketching the theories of local government, focusing the background history of bureaucracy, local government structure, and of politics-bureaucracy relations in Bangladesh from the pre-colonial period to present Bangladesh. This chronological approach helps to understand the mode of governance and the dynamics of politics-bureaucracy relations in Bangladesh.

## **4.2 The Theories of Local Government (LG)**

Local government is one of the universally recognized political and institutional arrangements within the framework of modern states, irrespective of geographical, ideological and political variations (Ahmed, 1993). The emergence of local government as a discrete governmental entity is the result of several interacting factors – historical, ideological and administrative (Siddiqui, 1992). The philosophical existence of local government is rooted in the deep past. Jean Jacques Rousseau considered local government as the training ground for upholding democratic culture. John Stuart Mill noted that the local government is

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<sup>26</sup> To know the politics-bureaucracy relations in Bangladesh, it requires covering a considerable amount of historical and political ground to identify the main themes.

the foundation of democracy (cited in Aminuzzaman, 2011). Alexis de Tocqueville during his visit to the USA discovered the importance of local citizens and their local government in keeping democracy afloat in that country (UN, 1996; Khan, 2009). In *Democracy in America*, Tocqueville distinguished the notion of local government under the names of townships, cities and countries (cited in Gannett, 2003).

As a result, the concept of local government is institutionally embedded in all of the advanced democracies around the nineteenth century. A complex system of local government emerged in England and Germany in 19<sup>th</sup> century (Wollmann, 2000; Steel, 1979). In France, a prefectural system of local government established with three levels of power decentralization i.e. communes, departments and regions during the Fifth Republic. Many new states of third world countries also have adopted local government systems according to their own culture and context by following the western model. In every case, local government is responsible for local governance, local planning, development and public services. Despite this universal acceptance and existence of local government all over the world, the role and functions, effectiveness and strength of local government differ substantially between the developed and developing countries.

As a result, in the last several decades, a number of theories – mostly based on western experience – have been developed through studying local government and administration. There are four existing major theoretical schools on local government, namely liberal democratic theory of local government, economic interpretation of local government, radical elite theory of local government, and Marxist interpretation of local government (Siddiqui, 2005). Liberal democratic theory provides the arguments that local government is essential for national democracy. Local government can integrate politicians, bureaucrats and local people providing political education, democratic values, experience of government and policy-making, voting practice and self-regulation from the grassroots' levels. Tocqueville, Mill, Laski, and Dahl are the main proponents of this school. The economic interpretation of local government entails that a local government should be organized according to the principles of public choice approach where local government will provide a diversity of goods and services assuming a diversity of individual needs, demands and preferences. Individuals are assumed to choose their place of residence, goods and services by comparing taxes and other expenses by their rational choice. On the other hand, radical elite theory endow with the argument that rational choice by the local people in the local government is

very difficult because state activities are always centralized and it is highly controlled by the monopoly of elite groups.

Nonetheless, local government deals with less important issues and even though here is also collusion of monopoly between national and local elites, because local elites who control local government need national political support vis-à-vis national elites need to be supported by an underpinning structure of regional and local elites. Thus the Neo-Marxist approach considers local government as a local state, autonomous instrument of class domination and the agent of power monopoly of the capitalism. Consequently, they developed the structural thesis, dual state thesis and dual role thesis for the local state. C. W. Mills, W. Domhoff, Cockburn, Wolfe, Saunders, Duncan and Goodwin are the leading proponents of the last two schools of thought.

Astonishingly, sometimes the theoretical and philosophical differences among the proponents complicate the scenario even more. It was observed in the case of British India. In 19<sup>th</sup> century, there were a two contrasting philosophical schools of thought in England – Utilitarianism and Rationalism – the Cornwallis and the Munro schools of thought (Abedin, 1973). The philosophical difference between these two schools of thought complicated and delayed the evolution process of modern local government in British India. In fact, Cornwallis endeavored to execute the similar pattern of local government in India that has been already set up in England based on the political philosophy of utilitarianism (Wickwar, 1970). On the other hand, Munro school was against the Cornwallis proposal. Their logic was that the same system that already installed for England would be completely unsuitable for South Asian society and would not have the same beneficial effects in British India as in Great Britain, because of their different social and political conditions (Abedin, 1973). They held that the Cornwallis system would destroy South Asian tradition and institutions. Rather, they favoured the continuation of Indian tradition. Finally, it was an intermeshing between the rationality and utility providing village *panchayat* as a symbol of self-government with powerful district administration by keeping strong bureaucratic control over the local government. This political and bureaucratic control over the local government had complicated the appropriate development and functionalism of the local government in Indian subcontinent which will be elaborately examined in this chapter afterward.

### **4.3 Evolution of LG, Bureaucracy, and Politics-Bureaucracy Relationships**

The anecdote of the evolution of political system, administration and local government system in Bangladesh is in many respects similar to that of India and Pakistan, as all these three countries shared a common indigenous culture and colonial legacy (Lewis, 2011). Once upon a time, these three states were under the *Buddhist* and the *Hindu* rulers, then the *Mughals* and other *Muslim* rulers, and after then the British colonial ruler named as British India (1747-1947). Lastly, in 1947, British India divided into two parts resulting two separate states namely India and Pakistan as a consequence of colonial rule. Bangladesh was integrated with Pakistan. But as a result of economic subjugation and over political domination by the West Pakistan then Bangladesh emerged as an independent nation state in 1971 by liberation war. Although a new state, Bangladesh is an old country with a long recorded history of several thousand years as a part of Indian Subcontinent. Politics, bureaucracy and local governments in one form or another have been in existence in the Indian Subcontinent for centuries. However, the evolution of bureaucracy, local government and the politics-bureaucracy relations in Bangladesh can be divided and discussed into the four boarder categories of historical development. These are ancient or pre-colonial period, colonial period, Pakistan period and Bangladesh period. The analysis of this chapter will be limited to the time frame of pre-colonial period up to present Bangladesh.

#### **4.3.1 Ancient or Pre-colonial Period: Village Self Republic**

For the history of growth and development of governance system, administration and local government in Bangladesh, we need to be dated back to ancient India. In ancient India, administrative system evolved with the king as the focal point as we already witnessed from the previous chapter. According to the “Rig Veda” ancient Indian Subcontinent was politically divided into numerous sovereign territory headed by local King or *Rajas*. Local people enjoyed administrative freedom in these kingdoms as the village was self-contained and autonomous in operation (Basham, 1954). The “Headmen” were official agent of administration in the village level, who were communicated and mediated with the central and village levels. In addition, “The legends of the Aryans speak of how administrative arrangements evolved in ancient India. The gods, at war with demons, were on the verge of defeat. In desperation, they got together and elected a king to lead them. The origins of the early Aryan administrative system may perhaps be traced to these legends” (Das, 2013:1).All

sources of Indian tradition, specially *Brahmanical, Buddhist, Jaina* literature, the *Arthashastra* of Kautilya and the *Manusamhita* show the existence of bureaucracy, representative bodies and local government system in Indian Subcontinent, though the forms of government was absolute monarchical during the ancient time of this region (Husain, 2007). *Gana, Sangha, Sreni, Puga, Vrata* etc, were the representative bodies of that time of ancient Indian. The numerous members of a sovereign *Gana* or *Sangha* interacted with each other as members of an assembly (Hasanuzzman, 2009).

Moreover, there is evidence of some forms of village self-government in the oldest Hindu religious writing; “the Rig Veda” written in approximately 1200 B.C. (Siddiqui 2005). Not only are they mentioned in Rig Veda, there is also definite evidence available of the existence of bureaucracy, village *Sabahas* (councils or assemblies) and *Gramins* (senior person of the village) until about 600 BC. Kautilya’s *Arthashastra* was the first classical ancient Indian treatise on public administration, economics, ethics and defense studies (Sabharwal and Berman, 2013) where Kautilya advised to his King *Chandragupta Maurya* as an adviser (namely Chanakya). Accordingly, Chandragupta Maurya, the founder of *Mauryan* Dynasty in ancient India had built up his kingdom on the basis of division of labor, administrative hierarchies, paid salaries and expertise. Yet loyalty to the King and trustworthiness was also important to be appointed in the bureaucracy in this time. According to this source *Mauryan* administration was the first bureaucratic administration in India. During the rule of King *Ashoka*, Indian governance was territorial based, and was divided into province or district and further more into villages (Sabharwal and Berman, 2013). In the earliest times, there may have been between sixth and nine centuries A.D. when the *Panchayat* system Self-governing village communities characterized by agrarian economies had existed in India and it was a live institution with a definite function in the village levels (Tinker, 1968).

These village bodies, which were called “the little republics” by Sir Charles Metcalfe (British Governor General 1835-36), were the lines of contact with higher authorities on matter affecting the villages. These were caste-ridden feudal structures. According to Khanna (1977), every village had a self-government body of its own. Control of the central government was marginal and they had adequate financial resources for the performance of their duties. Two varieties of self-government institutions, i.e. the *headman* and *Panchayats* appear to be operational in rural areas since early times. The headman was not an elected official but came from the most dominant family in the village. His importance was due to

two factors: all contacts, be it political or administrative, between the villagers and higher authorities had to be routed through him and he was involved in collection of taxes from the village. The *Panchayat* was an elected body with executive and judicial functions. But often the headman controlled the *Panchayat* (Khan, 2009; Siddiqui 2005).

During the *Sultanate* and the *Mughal* periods, the governance system was royally, based on Emperor or Sultan who was the focal point of governance and he had many assisting force to implement the imperial decisions. In this time, an organized and efficient system of administration and bureaucracy developed where the bureaucrats were appointed on the basis of their loyalty to the ruler and were given them land grants for rendering their services, and they also exercised political, judicial and administrative powers. They were directly under control of Sultan or Emperor. They were controlled by transferring from one place to another very frequently (Das, 2013). The land bureaucrats who engaged in Mughal period often exploited and oppressed the people to satisfy their master.

In the case of local government, during the Sultanate and the Mughal rule of India, the Panchayat system disappeared altogether. The Mughal rulers gave considerable importance to towns or urban governance and they contributed to the development of urban local government, as “the Mughals were essentially an urban people in India” in the words of Sir Jadunath Sarkar, and their most distinctive achievements in the sphere of local government were in urban administration (cited in Tinker, 1968:17). Each town included a number of wards or *Mohallas*. A *Mir Mahalla* was appointed to act as a spokesman for each *Mahalla*. The *Kotwal*, or Chief Executive Officer of the town, wielded wide-ranging powers including magisterial, police, fiscal and municipal power who united in his office the duties of a municipal chairman (Misra, 1970). He was assisted in performing his duties by two officials: a *Kazis* who were responsible for administration of justice and a *Mahatasibs/Mansabdars* who were assigned to prevent illegal practices (Thinker, 1968; Siddiqui, 2005).

The Mughals did not interfere to the ancient customs of village government. Rather “they incorporated the village into the administration as a unit for revenue and police purposes only” (Tinker, 1968:19). They maintained law and order in the village level by the “headman or muqaddam” as village officers and servants, who were accountable or answerable primarily to the panchayat. The Mughal system with all its novelties lacked mechanisms for participation by the citizens. It was nothing more than a top-down hierarchical administrative

system that was intended to be an extension of the central authority into the local areas and the relationship between Emperor and bureaucracy was patron-client relation. Because, the Mughal rulers controlled their civil servants in many ways, i.e. keeping them temporary in the positions, frequent transfer, and by surprised visit. There is a saying that of their 200 years of rule, the Mughal rulers spent almost 40 per cent of their time on tour to keep a watch over their civil servants (Das, 2013:10). At the eleventh of the Mughal rule this system disappeared very rapidly (Abedin, 1973) and meanwhile colonial power entered into Indian Subcontinent and frequent clash with the intrusive power had weaken this administrative system and even though it had completely broken down in some places of Indian subcontinent. Nonetheless, it was a great source of British colonial rulers to build a modern administrative system in Indian Subcontinent (Chon, 1961). Spear (1961:238) commended that “The British found the wreck of this system and admired it even in decay.” It served as the foundation upon which the British colonial rulers later built a modern administrative state in British India (Abedin, 1973).

#### **4.3.2 Colonial Period: Administrative State and the Foundation of Modern Bureaucracy and Local Government**

The present civil service system and local government of Bangladesh had its origin in the arrangement developed by the British colonial rulers, as India had been divided into three presidencies: Bengal, Madras and Bombay. During the colonial period, Bengal presidency was under the Governor-General of India, and it was divided into twenty four administrative districts. The Governor-General gained the assistance of a Lieutenant-General for Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, and District Collectors. Similarly, the District Collectors got administrative assistance from Deputy Collectors and Deputy Magistrates (Tepper, 1970:21). Overall, District Collectors were responsible to Lieutenant-General, Lieutenant-General was responsible to the Governor-General and the Governor-General was responsible to the Secretary of State for India in Whitehall and finally to the British Parliament. Thus a hierarchical administrative system was developed in British India as a system of governance. In 1765, after the formal settlement of East India Company in Indian Subcontinent, they recruited covenanted servants for their business purpose namely ‘writers’ as official bureaucrats whose job was mercantile in nature and the writers would move to other levels, i.e. factor, merchant, and president in course of time by promotion (Maheshwari, 2005; Das,

2013). The Company's appointed bureaucracy was labeled the "Covenanted Civil Service". The post was known as "covenant" and the employees who held such post came to be known as "covenanted servants" (Kennedy, 1987:19; Chaudry, 2011:5). To be appointed as a bureaucrat, it was necessary to get a nomination from a director of the East India Company, because nomination was the only basis of appointment in the covenanted civil service. In many respects, nominations were made on patronage and financial considerations. "A newspaper article in 1772 reported that posts of writers had been sold for 2,000 to 3,000 pounds each, and in 1783 there was an advertisement in a newspaper offering 1,000 guineas for a writer's place in Bengal" (Das, 2013:13). It became such a big economic scandal in England that lastly the British Parliament had to step in and passed the Charter Act of 1793, which required the directors of the company to take an oath that they will not make any nomination by gifts or money (Das, 2013). Besides, the Regulating Act of 1773 also provided more centralized administration and facilitated to set up a strong bureaucratic system by the leadership of Governor-General.

Lastly, in 1853, the British government decided to bring to an end of patronage system (was started in 1954) and open a competitive examination by a written entrance examination (Cohn, 1961). When the Act of 1853 was passed, a committee was appointed with the chair of Lord Macaulay to advice on the subjects for the examination and other related issues. The committee submitted its report in 1854 preferring Oxbridge (Oxford and Cambridge) education for recruiting candidates for the civil service. The Macaulay Committee Report provided the philosophical base for the Indian Civil Service (ICS). Lord Cornwallis (1786-93), the Governor-General of India, reorganized the civil service by the principles of professionalism, attractive salaries, merit based appointment, training, and promotion. Consequently, a Civil Service Commission was established in England and the first competitive examination was held in London in 1855. The selected ICS bureaucrats were trained in a tradition which was presumed to impart the virtues of Platonic guardianship according to Philip Mason (pseud. Philip Woodruff) that he has mentioned in his book *The Men Who Ruled India: The Guardians*. Lastly they were deployed in the districts and in the secretariats both at the provincial and central levels to maintain the imperial interest of the British in India and it was the inception of the administrative state in British India. Bureaucracy was the chief apparatus of rule, control and domination of India. Then bureaucracy was ruler not servants. Thus Philip Mason (Philip Woodruff) wrote the "The Men Who Ruled India" rather not writing "the men who served India".

**Table 4.1****Composition of Indian Civil Service and the Representation of Indians (1894-1935)**

Year (decade wise)	Total number of selected candidates	Number of Indians	Percentage
1894-1903	564	33	5.85
1904-1913	523	31	5.93
1914-1923	366	147	40.16
1924-1935	564	311	55.14

Source: Compiled by the researcher from Maheshwari (2005:31-32)

**Table 4.2****Educational Background of European ICS Officers (number and percent)**

University	Those who entered ICS in 1914 and before		Those who entered ICS after 1914	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Oxford	244	47	214	41
Cambridge	150	29	180	35
Scots University	68	13	40	8
Irish University	35	7	19	4
Others	20	4	46	9
None mentioned	4	1	17	3
Total	521	100	516	100

Source: Adapted from Potter (1986:71) with some modifications by the researcher

In this administrative setting, if we want to look back how the political class, and governance system is evolved in the British India then we can see that the foundation of the British colonial rule in Indian Subcontinent was a matter of great significance with resultant impact on political system and governmental process. Yet the administrative system that was developed during the British period in India was borrowed from the *Mughals* (Cohn, 1961). India was divided into provinces (*subas*), the provinces into districts (*sarkars*), and the districts into subdivisions (*parganas*) under the *Mughal* regimes. “The British not only borrowed heavily this Mughal structure of the system but to some extent took over the feeling tone of the Mughal administration – a mixture of great pomp and show, and combined benevolent and despotic intervention” (Cohn, 1961:8). Sir Jadunath Sarkar (1920) noted Indian scholar also observed the same thing before Chon and he identified similarities between the British administration and Mughal administrative setting in the territorial arrangement in India.

Nevertheless, the event of 1857 (mutiny of sepoys) promoted the British Government to directly take over the Indian administration in its own hand ending hundred years of East-India Company rule (1757-1857). As a result, in 1858, India came to be governed by the British parliament through a hierarchically organized bureaucratic channel, which is mostly known as the Viceregal System (Rashid, 2007). At the same time, multifaceted modernizing activities, spread of western education of colonial rule, promoted a new middle class background enlightened people in the Indian society who were seriously influenced by the Westminster type of representative government. Meanwhile, the Indian National Congress was founded in 1885, and demanding ICS examination should be held simultaneously in England and in India. There was a growing demand from the society also for Indianization in the administration. Finally, following the recommendations of the Aitchison Commission (1886) and the Islington Commission (1916) for the first time in 1922 the ICS examination was held in India. Till then the number of ICS officer from the Indian has been increased, and between 1924 to 1935 in this last decade of British rule total 564 candidates were selected for ICS whose 311 were Indian (for details see table 4.1).

In this administrative milieu, colonial rulers introduced parliamentary system of government in India in a gradual process. The process went on incrementally beginning with the Government of India Act, 1861 through 1892, 1909, 1919 to 1935 (Rashid, 2007). Under the government of India Act 1861, for the first time a legislature in embryo was created at the all-India centre and provinces such as Bengal, Punjab and the North-West frontier. By this Act, an attempt had been made to create a representative legislative council by the extension of the executive council of the Governor-General with the provision of 6 to 12 additional members (half of them non-officials, including both Europeans and Indians) would be nominated by the Governor-General. Thus in relation to his council the position of the Governor-General became considerably strengthened (Misra, 1970). In real sense, it was not a representative council or legislature. It was the safeguard of imperial interest. Because, members had no right to raise any question. The real powers were vested in the hands of Governor-General and the Governor.

Despite its many limitations, the Act is considered as the genesis of the legislative bodies in the Indian Subcontinent (Choudhury, 1963), and it increased little bit more legislative power than executive. Later the Act of 1892 increased the number of non-official Indian members (both central and provincial assemblies) who were nominated by the Governor-General upon

the recommendations of corporations, municipalities, universities, and so on (Mannan, 2005). Under the Act though the members of the legislatures were allowed discussions on the budget and different administrative matters, their right to criticism or voting was not granted. “There still remained an official majority on the councils and there was still no approach to a parliamentary system” (cited from Hasanuzzman, 2009:17). In the subsequent parts of the effort, the British government attempted to introduce British Parliamentary model in India by expanding the legislative body and its functions. We observed this effort in the Act of 1909 and 1919 which was mostly known as ‘Morley-Minto’ and ‘Montague-Chelmsford’ Reforms. Expansion of power and functions of the legislature and members, ‘separate electorates’ for the Muslims, budget analysis, criticize the budget and move proposals on any subject related to public interest were the distinguishing features of this Act.

But it did not fulfill the rising demand of Indians. Several attempts were made by the British government with the gradual development of the legislative council under the Act, 1919. “The introduction of the system of direct election, some kind of responsible government at the provincial level in the ‘transfer subject’ under what was called diarchy, and majority position of non-government members in both central and provincial legislatures were the most distinguishing features of the Act” (Rashid, 2007:72). Under the new Act, in Bengal elections were held four times: 1920-21, 1923, 1926 and 1929. However, the Government of India Act, 1935, replaced the diarchy in Indian provinces by providing a federal form of responsible parliamentary government enjoying autonomous sphere of functions. Mishra noted “that the secretariat, ministries, departments, tenure system, etc., are all established and nurtured by during the British regime, which is being continued even today”. It could be said that more or less this Act encouraged and provided some parliamentary devices for executive accountability to the legislature in a very restricted sense and created an urge for a sovereign parliament (Hakim, 1993). Alas! This had far reaching consequence because in the meantime in 1947, India was divided into two parts.

On the other hand, the history of local government in India reveals that colonial rulers had broken the traditional ruling systems and introduced a new system of local governance in British India. During almost two hundred years of British rule over the Indian subcontinent, a number of experiments were made with the local government system. All the experiments were intended to devise a system that would serve their imperial interest. One of the earliest attempts was the systematic extension of bureaucratic centralized administration to the local

levels. The British colonial administration that was imposed from the top in the Indian subcontinent concentrated on establishing a centralized and strong executive administration based on the paternalistic traditions of Indian society (Jamil, 2007). The major objective of the British in India was twofold: maximization of land revenue collection and maintenance of law and order. Naturally, the British as an imperial power had little understanding of, and interest in indigenous local self-governing institutions. As such, the favorable conditions to be effective local government were lacking, although the system of local government in India was supposedly adapted from the English model (Tinker, 1968).

Nonetheless, the history of modern day local government in Bangladesh started during the British colonial period in India. During that period, Bangladesh was the eastern part of the Indian province of Bengal. Like many other British colonies, the administrative system of Bengal and other parts of British India was centered on district level administrative system where district was the core administrative unit. Under the district, there were several subdivisions (sub-districts) consisting of a number of police stations locally known as *Thanas*. Below the Thana, there were the villages. District administration and sub-district administration were the heart of colonial administration which was ruled by the ICS bureaucrats namely District Officer<sup>27</sup> (DO) and Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) respectively. What a great deal of executive power they held can be measured by the observation of Philip Woodruff. He said “the district officer really was the father and mother of his people” (Woodruff, 1963:11). Morris-Jones also observed the same thing. He observed that the “concentration of powers in the hands of the district officer was so great and his sharing of these powers so rare and minimal that it was scarcely surprising that he should have been called the ‘*man-bap*’ (mother and father) of his area” Morris-Jones (1957:36). In the districts, even while overseeing the routine work of revenue collection and maintenance of law and order, they were inevitably engaged also in political work with local collaborators (Potter, 1986), especially with local Zamindars to whom DOs were heavily depended for revenue collection. The following table (table 4.3) provides the overall position for ICS in all levels of administrations in British India during 1919 and 1938. It reveals that from central to rural level of administrations were controlled by the ICS men.

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<sup>27</sup> Before 1960s this designation varied from region to region. DO was called either Deputy Commissioner or Collectorate or District Magistrate and Collector or Political Agent. After independence of Bangladesh the head of district administration is known as Deputy Commissioner. See also Abedin (1973).

**Table 4.3****The ICS Representation in the Different Levels of Location in 1919 and 1938**

Provinces	District Level		Judicial		Provincial level		Govt. of India		Totals	
	1919	1938	1919	1938	1919	1938	1919	1938	1919	1938
Assam	34	19	2	1	12	13	1	4	49	37
Bengal	70	81	29	34	45	42	16	20	160	177
Bihar and Orissa	50	59	13	15	28	27	14	10	105	111
Bombay and Sind	59	70	23	21	59	27	13	12	154	130
Central Provinces & Berar	36	36	7	10	19	17	18	12	80	75
Madras	80	78	23	19	37	45	10	17	150	159
Punjab	51	85	16	20	37	24	20	16	124	145
United Provinces	117	117	28	20	37	33	28	25	210	195
Totals	497	545	141	140	274	228	120	116	1032	1029
	(48%)	(53%)	(15%)	(14%)	(27%)	(22%)	(11%)	(11%)	(100%)	(100%)

Source: Adapted from Potter (1986:22) with some modifications by the researcher

The reorganization of local government in Indian subcontinent was initiated by Macaulay who had foreseen the new possibility of self-government in 1833, and it was reaffirmed by the Samuel Laing, the finance member of the government of India (Misra, 1970). Especially after the Orissa Famine of 1866, it was necessary to introduce the local organization for fund creates and to meet the developmental and relief activities by the created funds. Therefore, the first attempt by the colonial administration to reorganize the local government system was *The Bengal Municipal Act, 1884* for urban local government of Bengal, Orissa and Assam, and *The Bengal Village Chowkidai Act of 1870*.

The Act tried to revive and established *Panchayat* system with individuals (five members body) nominated by district collector with the sole purpose of levying and collecting *Chowkidari* tax for the maintenance of village watchmen and maintenance of law and order for four year terms, as the 1860's were a period of agrarian unrest (Tepper, 1970). If any member who were nominated for *Panchayats* refused to serve could be fined fifty rupees. As a result of the Act, the first local Government bodies appeared in rural Bengal. Though in 1870, the Village *Chowkidari* Act in Bengal established union *Panchayats* to collect tax to maintain *Chowkidars* (village police), but it was not popular with villagers as it lacked popular participation and representation. Thus, about two decades later, Lord Ripon noted the change in the development of Indian society and in a letter addressed to Gladstone

pleaded for the introduction of local self-government based on the philosophy of people's representation.

He wrote – we are going to open a new beginning and a new means of our administration “such measures will not only have an immediate effect in promoting gradually and safely the political education of the people, which I hold to be a great object of public policy, but will also pave the way for further advances in the same direction.....You will observe then that the question involved in the policy which I have been pursuing upon this subject of local self-government is a broad question of political principle” (cited in shortly from Misra, 1970:40-41). Lord Ripon's resolution of May 18, 1882 was important for two reasons: it set out general principles for development of local institutions in the future and provided the rationale behind functions of local bodies for popular political education. As Lord Ripon seemed local government “as an instrument of political and popular education”. At the same time, he also held that extreme bureaucratic control over the local government is the major impediment to achieve the goal (Tinker, 1968; Tepper, 1966). Thus, the resolution emphasized to having a two-thirds majority of non-officials (elected) members in all local bodies. Lastly, Lord Ripon's Resolution on local self-government laid the foundation of local self-government in rural India (Khan, 2009), even if the supporter of a “paternal administration” especially the provincial governments and district officers (ICS bureaucrats) were against and ignored this attempt who were responsible for putting them into practice (Tinker, 1968). The Ripon's resolution was passed in 1885 as *The Bengal Local Self-Government Act III of 1885*. The Bengal Local Self Government Act, 1885 provided a three-tier rural local government system at three different levels, district, sub-division and union, namely the *district board*, the *local board* (for sub-division) and the *union committee* (Blair, 1985; Westergaard & Alam 1995; Siddiqui, 2005).

The district board was made the principal unit of local self-government and the collector was the chair, who was exercising the real authority. District councils were called District Boards (later known as Zila Parishads in Bangladesh). Sub-divisional Boards were also constituted which was rather short-lived. District and sub-divisional boards were under official tutelage, whereas the Union Parishads were headed by elected representatives. Under the Act, the villages were grouped into unions for the first time (each consisting of around 15 villages). Members of the union committee and local board were elected by a restricted electorate and the district board members were indirectly elected. A local government council was

established at the union level known as the 'Union Board' (later known as 'Union Parishad'). However majority of members of these councils were nominated and that was dependent upon the district magistrate and therefore, the change was more formal than real (Tinker, 1968). This is why, "For more than three decades following the implementation of the Local Self-government Act of 1885, there was no serious move to redefine relations between the bureaucracy and local government" (Ahmed, 2009:34).

As a result, a Royal Commission on decentralization of power was appointed in 1907 and the commission submitted its report in 1909, with recommendations of decentralization and to associate Indians in the process of governance and administration (Siddiqui, 2005). In 1909, the Mortely-Minto Reforms were enacted but that was not accepted by all Indians. Lastly, *The Bengal Village Self-Government Act of 1919* was passed by following the Montague-Chelmsford Report in 1918. This Act provided three tiers of local government; District Board, local Board and Union Board. It also laid the foundation of local democracy and differentiation of political and bureaucratic roles (Ahmed, 2009). The Act abolished Chowkidari Panchayat and replaced the DO as the chairman of the District Board by an elected representative with the 'mandatory' provision of having two-thirds of non-officials (elected) in the above three levels of local government. As a "transferred" subject, local self-government was entirely the department of elected ministers, responsible to provincial legislatures, and Sir Surendra Nath Banerjea, the veteran Congress leader became the first Bengal Minister for local self-government (Tinker, 1968:129-130).

Whatsoever, notwithstanding many "limitations and other constraints, the 1919 Act provided the Indians with the first opportunity to practice Westminster type of parliamentary democracy in miniature" (Rashid, 2007:73) putting under popular control and the politicians made his advent in administration at the national and local levels of government after the introduction of the Montford Reforms in 1919, although the Act of 1919 provided specific safeguards to protect the civil servants from possible political harassment. For instance, no officer could be dismissed from service or their pay and allowances could not be stopped and eventually a system of governmental protection was given to the bureaucrats even when working in the sphere of transferred subjects and thus under the political master (Maheshwari, 2005:23). Nonetheless, this act provided power to formulate policy and to determine the general direction of the administration. Therefore, since 1919, the governing relations between politicians and bureaucrats became resembling an uneasy partnership,

when the Indian politicians were appointed as the Ministers at the provincial level under the Act of 1919. It was like “from paradise lost” to the ICS bureaucrats. The notion of serving under political leaderships was completely new to the ICS bureaucrats, because before then they were the agent of power monopoly. Although in the case of dispute between the minister and the secretary, the secretary could bypass the minister and act according to the orders from the governor of the province (Rahman, 2002). Even when the minister did want to make a decision in opposition to the ICS bureaucrat in the department, he was not always successful. Consequently, in the following few years, some of the ministers and even 345 ICS bureaucrats resigned from their posts in protest (Ahmad, 1964).

As a result, bureaucrats were horizontally involved in the governance and developmental works with elected representatives in central and provincial administration. This is why the ICS is termed as ‘the steel frame’ by the British Prime Minister Lloyd George,<sup>28</sup> though the social contacts of the bureaucracy to the mass people were weak and not expected level, because of their elitist behavior. The argument against such administrators essentially was that their background was not conducive to an attitude and temperament necessary for any level of development activities (Dwivedi and Jain, 1985). Because, during the colonial period, bureaucracy was the only institution that was already strong and well developed, not politics, and it has often adopted paternalistic attitudes toward citizen as well (Sabharwal and Berman, 2013).

Moreover, the characteristic behavior patterns of ICS bureaucrats were clearly political, even though they were rarely labeled them as such (Potter, 1986). Although they were involved in overseeing and organizing the implementation of decisions made by political leaders but they also made authoritative decisions by themselves as leaders within the state structure (Potter, 1986). Most importantly, the ICS bureaucrats were centrally involved in pursuing partisan objectives of colonial interest by mobilizing groups in society either support or restraint them who had different political orientations. In this regard, Potter (1986:36) has noted a very clear view of an ICS bureaucrat “our main responsibility was the maintenance of ‘Pax Britannica’...we were against Congress who were trying to chuck the British out of India and we tended to regard with favour those Indians whom we considered ‘loyal’, and with

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<sup>28</sup> Lloyd George used this term in his speech while he made address in the House of Commons in August, 1922. He said “I can see no period when they (the Indians) can dispense with the guidance and assistance of this small nucleus of the British Civil Service, of British Officials in India.....they are the steel frame of the whole structure”.

disfavour those whom we consider 'disloyal'." On the other hand, the Indian born bureaucrat was Indian in blood and colour, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals and intellect (Ahmad, 1964). This is why Woodruff (1963:11) had commented that "it is hard to believe that the impress of English ways of thinking will vanish altogether". As such the ultimate effect was that a relationship of mutual trust, cooperation and mutual understanding between the politicians and the bureaucrats failed to develop. Nonetheless, since 1919 up to 1947, and until settling the partition of India, British administration and particularly the ICS bureaucrats were under political pressure to a greater or lesser, depending on time and place throughout the India. As a result, once upon a time, "the ICS men became political instruments of political leaderships, whether they liked it or not" which Potter (1986:43) termed "this was not political interference; it was rather a new political context within which" political leaderships and the ICS bureaucrats had to operate the governance in India up to independence and even after independence of India.

#### **4.3.3 Pakistan Period: Military State – Civil and Military Bureaucracy Nexus**

After being partition of India, the ICS bureaucrats were disseminated between two independent states, India and Pakistan according to their choice (for British officers) and religion (for Indians origin of bureaucrats). But the history reveals that in the late 1946 to 1947 and up to settling the partition, there was a political turmoil and polarization in Indian politics and administration while Muslim League joined to the "Constituent Assembly-cum-interim government" (Potter, 1986). Muslim League joined to the interim government not to cooperate with Congress but to prevent Congress from tightening its hold on the administration and whole government machinery, and that was rather a silent signal to Muslim ICS bureaucrats to align them with the Muslim League and to discard the notions of a neutral civil service (Potter, 1986; Chaudry, 2011). In real sense, that was a very critical time and a 'state of confusion' for the ICS bureaucrats, because they were very worried about their future, as the political leaders both the Congress and Muslim League was very skeptical about the colonial bureaucracy. Finally, subsequent to the partitioning of the Indian Subcontinent in 1947, three options were presented before the ICS bureaucrats to choose one of the three alternatives for their future.

First, he might opt for service either in India or Pakistan without reduction in salary or rank and without loss of retirement privileges, which included pension benefits payable in sterling. The second alternative was to leave

service with a severance allowance equal to the officer's salary from 1947 to the normal retirement date (usually at age 60). The third possibility was to leave service and then re-enter by personal contract usually for a one- or two- year term, each contract negotiated separately between the officer and the government (Braibanti, 1963:366).

As a result, 95 of the 101 Muslim ICS-IPS bureaucrats in 1947 (shown in the table 4.5) opted for service in Pakistan, Hindu officers remained in India, of course one Christian officer opted for Pakistan who was appointed the Chief Justice of Pakistan later (Braibanti, 1963), and a number of British bureaucrats chose to stay on in Pakistan and India, some resigned from service and reentered on contractual basis, and some returned to Britain getting retirement.

**Table 4.4**  
**Communal Composition of ICS in 1936**

Communities	Number	Percentage
Europeans	618	60.53
Hindus	294	28.79
Muslims	65	6.37
Indian Christians	25	2.45
Domiciled Europeans and Anglo-Indians	2	0.19
Sikhs	6	0.59
Depressed Classes	1	0.10
Parsis	9	0.88
Others	1	0.10
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,020</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: Adapted from Maheshwari (2005:33)

**Table 4.5**  
**Communal Composition and Cadre Strength of ICS-IPS in Pakistan in 1947**

Cadre and Communities	Number	Percentage
Muslim ICS	83	53.0
Indian Christian ICS	1	0.6
British ICS	36	23.0
Muslim IPS	12	7.6
British IPS	14	8.8
War Service Candidates	11	7.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>157</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: Adapted from Braibanti (1963:367) with partial modifications by the researcher

Thus, Pakistan had not only inherited the powers of the British India but also its administrative machinery (Sayeed, 1968). The government of the newly created Pakistan maintained the system of ICS tradition administration inherited from British. New government of Pakistan installed old cadre system with only some modifications in the civil service of British India. Although there had been significant sentiment to utterly modify the colonial bureaucratic system, nevertheless the government of Pakistan was hardly in a position to do anything about it. Because, as Muslim had traditionally low representations in the ICS, and as Pakistan did not inherited enough trained bureaucrats to fill required post for the new state. Accordingly, partition left the institutions of the newly created state in a shambles (Kennedy, 1987).

This is why; the newly established Pakistan government had pressing concern to run the government rather than administrative reform. After independence, administration reorganized in the name of All Pakistan Services – combining Civil Service and the Police Service of Pakistan (CSP & PSP) and including other cadres as was in British India. The Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) was at the apex of the administrative structure in Pakistan. It was the predecessor of the ICS which was called “the lineal descendent of the ICS” (Kennedy, 1987:31). After independence of Pakistan, the CSP was formally encadred in 1950, and a number of officers had been admitted to the CSP from extra ICS ranks. Indeed of the total CSP cadre strength of 175 in 1950 including the new appointed officers that was started from 1948, while 94 were former ICS officers (Kennedy, 1987:32).

The recruitment of CSP was highly competitive, as it was in the ICS. There was an intensive training for fresh recruited cadres at the civil service academy. After training they were assigned to the fields of district administration, provincial secretariat, the judiciary, and the central secretariat. Promotion and transfer was based on merit, seniority and performance. The table 4.6 presents the new recruitment in the Pakistan civil service from 1948-1971 and the table 4.7 presents the total cadre strengths of the CSP (both ICS + CSP) in both West and East Pakistan from 1961 to 1971.

**Table 4.6****Number of New Recruitment CSP in Pakistan by Competitive Exam (1948-1971)**

Year (batch)	West Pakistan	East Pakistan	Total
1948	16	3	19
1949	12	9	21
1950	14	7	21
1951	8	4	12
1952	10	6	16
1953	10	5	15
1954	18	7	25
1955	13	6	19
1956	10	11	21
1957	13	6	19
1958	13	10	23
1959	14	12	26
1960	16	8	24
1961	12	11	23
1962	11	13	24
1963	18	9	27
1964	22	13	35
1965	15	15	30
1966	16	13	29
1967	7	13	20
1968	10	10	20
1969	8	12	20
1970	8	0	8
1971	7	0	7

Source: Compiled by the researcher using qualitative data from Chaudry (2011:344-352).

**Table 4.7****Total Strengths of the CSP in Pakistan (including former ICS+CSP 1961-1971)**

Year	Number
1961	366
1962	385
1963	410
1964	434
1965	461
1966	482
1967	501
1968	514
1969	522
1970	473
1971	483

Source: Compiled by the researcher from Kennedy (1987: 34).

In the above administrative arrangement, the political system that was instituted in Pakistan was very similar to that which functioned in British India. Since its inception, Pakistan developed a 'Viceregal System' (Sayeed, 1968) instead of a parliamentary one, and Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the main architect of Pakistan state chose to be the first Governor-General of Pakistan keeping all executive power in his hand after independence. During the British period, Governor-General was answerable to the Secretary of State for India in Whitehall and finally to British Parliament, but Jinnah was answerable to none – neither Constituent Assembly nor Legislature (Ahmed, 1980:28). Moreover, at the same time, Jinnah held 3 top posts – the Governor-General, the President of the Pakistan Muslim League and the President of the Constituent Assembly.

As a result, "Jinnah was poised at a critical juncture of the state machinery, from where he could legislate for almost everything within national boundaries" (Waseem, 2007:91). Of course, Alavi's argument in this respect was to some extent different. According to Alavi, Jinnah was an old and ailing man who was more a prisoner of high posts than their incumbent and the real power centralized in the hands of higher bureaucracy (cited in Waseem, 2007:91). He also had a very subterranean dependency on bureaucracy which could be observed from his address that has given towards bureaucracy at Government House in Peshawar, April 14, 1948, where he advised to the bureaucrats not to be influenced by the politicians and partisan politics. Nevertheless very interestingly, Jinnah was rather relied and dependent to the bureaucracy (Ali, 1983). Even though, he created a new post of 'Secretary General' in the government by the advice of a bureaucrat, Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, who was also appointed for this post to look after the whole administration of Pakistan, what ought to be done by the political leadership. Even though Ali could supersede ministers in policy decisions insofar as he enjoyed the confidence of both Jinnah and Liaqat. That is why, Professor Sayeed has claimed that Jinnah maintained secret bureaucratic channel thus the "weight of Jinnah's charisma was manipulated in favour of the administrative wing of the new state and against the non-bureaucratic institutions and individuals" (cited from Waseem, 2007:91).

As a nationalist leader and founder father of Pakistan, why Jinnah was overly dependent to the bureaucracy? Interestingly, in that case, there is a clear difference among the Pakistani scholars in their explanations. Alavi (1972) has seen it as the consequences of colonial rule. Jalal (1986) has seen it as a post-independent phenomenon, and Waseem (2007) has seen it as

the effect of administrative inexperience of political leadership and bureaucratic paternalism. Waseem (2007:59) observed that “in the case of the Muslim League, the political leadership had no experience of administration; it was, therefore, bound to seek bureaucratic protection for both their previously existing social status and the newly-acquired political role.” On the other hand, Professor Sayeed (1968), Ahmad (1964), Braibanti (1966), Kennedy (1987), and Chaudry (2011) have observed the bureaucratic role in Pakistan in the light of weak political structure, where bureaucracy was used as an instrument of control by the new political leadership, and it was difficult to dismantle the bureaucratic power by the political leaderships in Pakistan state. In addition, the bureaucracy in Pakistan was indeed more experienced in the art of governance than most of the politicians that resulted to rely on bureaucracy to run the administration (Ahmed, 1986).

Unfortunately, after the death of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, bureaucracy had also continued its dominant role with more stronger in the political process and governance by occupying all commanding posts in the political scene (Hasanuzzman, 1988). Even though, they had given legal or constitutional protection by the Constituent Assembly in 1954, and 1956, and 1962 constitutions (Ahmed, 1968). In this respect Sayeed (1968:259) observed that “Once administrators taste power, the appetite for it grows by what it is fed on. The machinery that was carried over from the British days largely rested on the Governor and the Central civil servants placed in the Provinces.” Ahmad (1964:239) had evaluated the bureaucratic power in the Pakistan state by saying that-

The ascendancy of the civil servants was also due to the poverty of leadership among politicians. Two civil servants were able to reach the position of the head of State. Two of them held the office of Prime Minister. Many others held the positions of ministers in the central and in the provincial governments, and a few became the chief ministers of certain provinces. The posts of provincial governors were ordinarily filled by civil servants.

On the other hand, Jahan (1972); Ahmed (1980), in their research has shown that after independence, the political elites who came to power in Pakistan were “oligarchic” in nature and they had a very narrow support base in the society. This is why; they liked to work keeping alliance with bureaucrats. Therefore, from 1947 to 1953 the Muslim League and the align bureaucrats dominated government and politics in both the central and provincial legislature of Pakistan including East Bengal Legislative Assembly. Beyond Jinnah and

Liaquat, four persons, Choudhary Mohammad Ali, Ghulam Mohammad, Iskandar Mirza and General Ayub whom Waseem (2007:139) termed 'gang of four' "freely operating on the chessboard of Pakistani politics." About two decades since independence, they carried out their dominating role by keeping group alignment. However the landslide electoral victory of Jukto Front in the Provincial Legislature thereby ending the monopoly of the Muslim League at least in the eastern part of the country. Unfortunately, it could not attain foothold and within a short span of time Pakistan had sunk in the lowest depth of degradation by 1958 military coup making room for a martial law government which represented a new alignment of politico-bureaucratic elites in Pakistani politics and administration, as if military intervention in politics thus became almost a structural feature of the bureaucratic polity of Pakistan (Rasiduzzman, 1967; Molla, 2000; Waseem, 2007). The political process thus moved towards the model of local government in the name of Basic Democracy under the overwhelming control of the civil-military bureaucracy in the process of governance and development. Though the military rule tried to civilianize by the 1962 constitution and appointing the civilian minister but the real power was always concentrated in the hands of civil-military bureaucracy in united Pakistan until 1971 (Ahmed, 1980).

In explaining the local government, during the formative years of Pakistan's existence, it started with the colonial style of local government and no significant change was noticed, though Cohn (1961) has identified a clearly Mughal pattern of administration and territorial divisions in Pakistan. Historically, there were four standards of local government in Pakistan (Braibanti, 1966). The first and oldest form was orthodox district administration which has essentially been autocratic rule with a strong touch of paternalism. The second was rural uplift or for rural development in the sub-district level which was also ruled by the bureaucracy. The third was local self-government in the village level legitimized by the law and formal structure with electoral mode. And these three standards were merged into a system by general Ayub Khan which was known as 'Basic Democracy' (Braibanti, 1966). Thus the major change in local government occurred by General Ayub Khan, who seized state power in 1958, introduced a system of local government known as Basic Democracy. The result was a symmetrical and hierarchal local government extending from the elected *Union Council* with primary local government and operational functions, through the *Thana Council* with review and coordinating functions and the *District Council* with both governance and coordinating functions and to the *Divisional Council* with review and coordination functions (Wheeler, 1967:2-3) It bore a clear resemblance of two layers, the

union councils and municipal committees of the British days (Khan 2009). The Basic Democracies Order, 1959 covered both urban and rural local government. It provided for four tiers: Divisional Council, District Council, Thana Council, and Union Council from vertical order from higher to lower hierarchies. In this system 80, 000 (40,000 for East Pakistan and 40,000 for West Pakistan) Basic Democrats were elected on the basis of direct adult franchise and they were only allowed to vote for the Presidential election. Yet Ayub claimed that it was an innovative way of democratic practice but in real sense, the concept of Basic Democracy lacked novelty an innovation. It was rather a politically motivated reform of military rule by which the regime tried to establish an institutional support base for itself at the local grassroots level. Thana administration during the Pakistan period was a new level of local government that was run by the Circle Officer. His primary responsibility was to guide the local bodies at the lower levels and to supervise the development activities.

Thana council was established under the direct supervision of the bureaucrats namely, Sub-divisional Officers (SDOs). However, the Thana council did not have the power of taxation, unlike district and union boards. Divisional and district council was also highly control and supervised by the bureaucracy, and a vast array of economic, developmental and social activities of the bureaucrats had marginalized the political leaderships in the rural areas. “This seriously undermined the role of the politician for he could neither put forward vigorously the interests of his constituents, nor was much patronage available to him” at the rural level (Sayeed, 1968:281). Moreover, one statement of Iskander Mirza made all things clear that how important was the local administration to the Pakistan government in the formative phase. He said “You cannot have old British system of Administration [and] at the same time allow politicians to meddle with the Civil Service. In the British system, the District Magistrate was the king-pin of administration. His authority was unquestioned. We have to restore that” (cited from the Chaudry, 2011:26). This statement of Iskander Mirza clearly reveals that why Jinnah adopted Governor-General System instead of Westminster style. During the colonial period, bureaucrats felt comfort to work under direct control of Governor rather than political leaders. This experience of bureaucracy influenced Pakistani system of governance after independence, as bureaucracy had overwhelming influence on Jinnah. Thus many scholars have also characterized Pakistan (1947-71) as an administrative state like British India. The introduction of Basic Democracy by the military regime had institutionalized the central politics into the local levels in the name of ‘Electoral College’ and it changed the nature of the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats (Abedin,

1973). For almost fourteen out of the twenty four years of the country's united existence, its policy administration process was dominated by a coalition of civil and military bureaucrats (Ahmed, 2002). Interestingly, it did not happen in India which was also become independent at the same time. In comparison with India, Chaudry (2011: xix) commends that "After 1947 the roles were reversed. While the successor of the ICS in India went about its role as a relatively apolitical institution, the CSP allied itself with the Pakistan Army, and between the two of them they ruled Pakistan to the exclusion of the politicians".

Since its independence, Pakistani political structure and institutions were weak and there was a clear political vacuum. This situation has enabled the civil-military bureaucracy to step in to fill the vacuum (Ahmad, 1964). This is why Professor K. B. Sayeed noted in the 1960s that "today in the government of Pakistan the civil servants often play an even more powerful role than that of their imperial predecessors. This ascent to power has been both steady and dramatic" (Sayeed, 1960:383). Moreover, the bureaucratic perception towards Pakistani politicians was not very positive and almost cent percent senior bureaucrats thought that the political leaders and the people were not yet ready to independence and therefore, the bureaucrats should look after the government and administration (Ahmad, 1964). Therefore, there were three major factors that affected the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in Pakistan after independence up to 1970. The first was the strong colonial bureaucracy with no sustained mutual working experience between politicians and bureaucracy. According to Morris-Jones this lack of mutual trust has been carried over the post-independence period. He also held that "it is a relic of the past when the civil service was an arm of that foreign administration which put in prison a large number of those who are now the leading politicians" (cited in Ahmad, 1964:126). Independence of Pakistan would not have been changed the political scenario in any significance manner. The second factor which influenced the relationship between the politicians and bureaucrats in united Pakistan was the relative superiority in personal ability and experience of the average bureaucrats over the average politicians (Ahmad, 1964; Chaudry, 2011).

As a result, the independence of Pakistan did not make any sense that it was different from bureaucratic control as so was in the colonial period. Waseem's comment is very applicable here in this respect "In the common parlance, the transfer of power had taken place between the two governments, the outgoing British government and the incoming Muslim League government. However, a closer look at the whole episode reveals that the actual transition

took place between the British Bureaucracy and the emergent Pakistani bureaucracy” (Waseem, 2007:135-36). The third and final reason was the instability of the political governments and the economic disparity among the different regions in Pakistan which influenced upon the relations between politics and bureaucracy in Pakistan. Braibanti (1966) has explained this reason more comprehensively.

Since its inception, west wing of Pakistan dominated east wing for unidentified reasons. Nevertheless, Braibanti (1966:48) has identified two reasons and the first one that was “The consequent closer identity of the Muslim of East Pakistan with the Hindu Bengali has given rise to a misconception in West Pakistan, namely, that East Pakistan is too friendly to India and therefore anti-Pakistan”. He held that “this was not a fair interpretation of the problem, because Muslim similarity with Hindu Bengali was essentially one of culture rather than of politics”. The relationships between central government and the East Pakistan had been degraded gradually for such many reasons.

According to Braibanti (1966), another more reason was historical. After formation of Pakistan, administration and politics were less stable, highly charged with turbulent emotion, and exceedingly fractious. For various historical reasons, Muslim Bengalis had always been underrepresented in government service, especially in the ICS. This problem was continued in the administration of new Pakistan state after partition. Only one Bengali was among the total 133 ICS-IPS officers available to Pakistan at partition (Braubanti, 1966:49). In addition, the appointment of Aziz Ahmed as chief secretary to the East Pakistan had created dissatisfaction among the Bengali bureaucrats which felt deprived at a lack of representation at higher levels of bureaucracy (Chaudry, 2011).

The top and middle positions in the East Pakistan Secretariat were filled by the old ICS and Panjab dominated bureaucrats (Zaheer, 1994). Table 4.6 and 4.8 clearly reveal that East Pakistan representation in the bureaucracy and other senior administrative posts were very marginal. In the new recruitment of CSP after independence, East Pakistan representation was only average 30 percent of total recruitment, even while East Pakistan held more than 50 percent of the total population of Pakistan. Same imbalance was in the military and economic sectors also. Bengali had only 5 percent representation in the total military bureaucracy in Pakistan (see table 4.9).

**Table 4.8**  
**East-West Representation in the Higher Ranks of the Central Secretariat, 1955**

Rank	East Pakistan	West Pakistan	East % of Total
Secretary	-	19	-
Joint Secretary	3	38	7.3
Deputy Secretary	10	123	7.5
Undersecretary	38	510	7.0

Source: Adapted from Jahan (1972:26)

**Table 4.9**  
**Military Elite in Pakistan, July 1955 (no of officers)**

Service	East Pakistan	West Pakistan
Army	14	894
Navy	7	593
Air Force	60	640

Source: Adapted from Jahan (1972:25)

On the other hand, economic policy was centralized and also dominated by the West Wing of Pakistan, as so in the politico-administrative sphere (Jahan, 1972). The economic disparity between the two wings was substantially high. Moreover, allocation of resources, foreign aid and development expenditure were disproportionately allocated between the two wings. The data from the following tables (table 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, 4.13) show the complete scenario of economic disparity between the East and West Pakistan.

**Table 4.10**  
**Disparity of Expenditure in East and West Pakistan (Rs. in crores)**

Period	East Pakistan				West Pakistan			
	Revenue Expenditure	Development Expenditure	Total	%	Revenue Expenditure	Development Expenditure	Total	%
1950-51 to 1954-55	171	100	271	20	720	400	1120	80
1954-55 to 1959-60	254	270	524	26	898	757	1655	74
1960-61 to 1964-65	434	970	1404	32	1284	2071	3355	68
1965-66 to 1969-70	648	1656	2304	36	2223	2970	5193	64

Source: Compiled by the researcher using data from Waseem (2007:265)

**Table 4.11**  
**Foreign Aid and Loans 1947-48 to June 30, 1960 (Rs. in crores)**

	East Pakistan		West Pakistan		Center		Total
	Amount	% of Total	Amount	% of Total	Amount	% of Total	Amount
Foreign Development Aid	93.89	17	335.22	62	113.03	21	542.14
U. S. Commodity Aid	129.00	30	262.00	64	18.00	6	409.00

Source: Adapted from Jahan (1972:35) with some modifications by the researcher

**Table 4.12**  
**Rate of Interregional Per Capita Disparity in GRP at 1959/60 Prices (Rs.)**

	Per Capita Gross Regional Product of East Pakistan	Per Capita Gross Regional Product of West Pakistan	East-West Disparity Ratio (%)
1949/50	287	345	1.19
1959/60	269	355	1.32
1969/70	314	504	1.61

Source: Adapted from Ahamed (2007:93).

**Table 4.13**  
**Inter-Wing Trade Imbalance (Rs. in crores)**

Year	East Pakistan to West Pakistan	West Pakistan to East Pakistan	West Pakistan's Net Gain
1959-60	36.10	54.26	18.16
1960-61	36.31	80.11	43.80
1961-62	40.07	83.19	43.12
1962-63	46.89	91.75	44.86
1963-64	51.07	84.42	33.35
1964-65	54.15	85.70	31.55
1965-66	65.18	120.86	55.68
1966-67	56.73	90.13	33.40

Source: Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, *The Budget in Brief 1967-68*, (Rawalpindi, 1967), P. 49.

In the post-independent period, a peculiar pattern of governing system emerged in Pakistan which was dominated by the bureaucracy under the banner of political leadership. This pattern of governance got an especial character of bureaucratic leviathan in the second decade, when military took over the power and it continued until 1970. Thus Pakistan became such a bureaucratic state where the “political elements who were new to power and who enjoyed political office practically in the pleasure of the higher bureaucracy” (Waseem, 2007:155). Even though, bureaucrats did not get punishment while they involved in the severe misconduct or economic corruptions. Bureaucratic accountability in the process of governance was far cry. The ratio of penalties (see table 4.14) to the bureaucrats and other government officials was very minimal and mostly it was limited in the compulsory retirement and warning only.

**Table 4.14**  
**Ratio of Penalties of Central and Provincial Government Servants in 1959 and 1960**

Penalty	Central Government				West Pakistan	East Pakistan	Grand Total
	Class 1	Class 2	Class 3	Total	All classes	All classes	All classes
Dismissal	4	14	110	128	214	254	596
Removal	0	0	0	0	242	60	302
Compulsory Retirement	71	68	547	686	0	877	1,563
Reduction in Rank	8	31	163	202	-	-	202
Special Report	25	88	362	475	-	-	475
Reduction in Increment	2	5	0	7	88	152	247
Warning	27	14	121	162	-	-	162
Displeasure	1	1	0	2	-	-	2
Total	138	221	1,303	1662	544	1,343	3,549

Source: Adapted from Braibanti (1966:293) with partial modifications by the researcher

Therefore, the economic and political development in the first two decades was steady but bureaucratic development was high. As it was like reverse of Hunting’s thesis. The key variables: coherence, adaptability, complexity and autonomy which have identified by Huntington (1965) for political development and institutionalization were appropriate for only the civil-military bureaucracy in Pakistan. The bureaucracy was “overdeveloped”. This is why; the proponents of balance growth thesis who were prominent for supporting bureaucratic role in the governance and developmental process in post-colonial societies, i.e. Pye, LaPalombara, and Riggs, ascribe the latter phenomenon directly to the bureaucracy’s

over development (cited in Waseem, 2007:165). During the Pakistan period, civil-military bureaucracy was the main weapon of domination along with socio-economic and cultural subjugation. The politico-administrative policies that pursued by the Pakistan state were characterized the extreme centralization. “The Bengali elite, especially the growing vernacular elite of East Bengal, was unhappy with this policy of political-administrative centralization” where Bengali were losing their rights gradually and “they were not even masters of their own house” (Jahan, 1972:29).

In the Pakistan state, the west dominated politicians and bureaucrats had developed such an interlocking relationship that was fulfilled solely the interest of west Pakistani dominant class, which resulted regional conflicts and ultimately led to the breakup of Pakistan (Ahmed, 1980; Jahan, 1972). Various disparities especially, economic disparity between two wing of Pakistan bred resentment and abhorrence to each other. Transfer of capital from east wing and establishment of industries in the west wing crippled economy of the east wing and made it an “internal colony” of the west wing (Jahan, 1972; Molla, 2000). Consequently, Bengalis demand for regional autonomy with economic emancipation.<sup>29</sup> When it was rejected by the Pakistan state, subsequently they raised the demand of full independence and it was also rejected by the west dominated elites.

Moreover, when Awami League (AL-the leading political party of the then East Pakistan) wanted to form the government after winning in the National Assembly election in 1970 with an absolute majority, then West Pakistan refused to transfer the power to the new elected government and launched the cowardly military attack on unarmed civilian Bengalis and following a bloody liberation war, finally Bengali got their independence in 1971 by winning in the liberation war and thus emerged a new nation state Bangladesh. Morris-Jones (1980) remarks that “some difficulties were inherent in the conception and birth of Pakistan” and “the cry “Joy Bangla” kills the Pakistan of 1947-71 reality to fulfill that of the 1940 dream” that resulted new nation Bangladesh.

#### **4.3.4 Bangladesh Period**

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<sup>29</sup> Since the formation of Pakistan Bengali were deprived by the West Pakistan in all spheres of governance and state affairs. As a result, they raised their demand for autonomy from the 1960s with 6 points movement and after a long struggle by the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman; lastly they crossed the river shading a legacy of blood for achieving their economic emancipation.

This section is essentially the continuation of the previous one with more emphasizing the role of politics, bureaucracy and local government in the process of local governance and development in independent Bangladesh. After emergence of Bangladesh as an independent nation state, it adopted colonial bureaucracy with introducing parliamentary forms of government as a system of governance by the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as the prime minister, keeping bureaucracy accountable under the political leadership. Consequently, bureaucrats started non-cooperation with the Mujib government. However in 1975, after a military coup d'état bureaucracy regained its position comprising the higher echelons of political power and emerged as dominant elites in the process of governance, and until 1990, civil-military bureaucracy held this position under military and quasi-presidential system. In 1991, Bangladesh reintroduced parliamentary government keeping bureaucracy under political leadership at least theoretically. On the other hand, since independence in 1971, a number of attempts have been made to build and rebuild the local government system in Bangladesh. Changes have been made from regime to regime in terms of the nomenclature of tiers of local government, but almost nothing was done to strengthen local governments. Therefore, the structure of the local government system has remained more or less unchanged keeping bureaucratic control with atypical exception in some cases. Thus, this section includes the analysis of politics-bureaucracy relations since after independence to present regime.

#### **4.3.4.1 The First Parliamentary Regime (1972-75): End of a Hope**

After independence of Bangladesh on December 16, 1971, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman – the main architect of Bangladesh liberation movement (the Father of the Nation who was mostly known as Sheikh Mujib) returned to the country on January 10, 1972, from the prison of Pakistan and turned his attention to the formation of government and framing of a constitution for the new born Bangladesh. It was easy for him to retain the presidential system of government or “vicerigal system” as was in Pakistan and concentrate all powers in his hands like Jinnah. But instead of doing this, he introduced a full-fledged parliamentary form of government (Chakrabarti, 1978; Ahmed, 1986). After assuming the office of Prime Minister, Sheikh Mujib declared to establish Bangladesh on the basis of aspiration of the people, and as a homogeneous society for all people that will be secular in character and free from all kinds of exploitation. New political leadership adopted a liberal democracy with a

socialistic orientation. Accordingly, The Bangladesh Constituent Assembly Order, which was promulgated on March 23, 1972, brought into existence a Constituent Assembly with 430 members who were earlier elected to the Pakistan National and Provincial Assembly in 1970 election. A 34 member Constitution Drafting Committee with Dr. Kamal Hossain as the chairman was set up on April 11, 1972. And finally, Bangladesh got a Constitution which was adopted by the Constituent Assembly on November 4, 1972, and came into effective on December 16, 1972. The constitution envisaged a Westminster type of parliamentary system reflecting the aspirations and wishes of the people. Then Sheikh Mujib turned his attention to state and institutions building and he advised to the bureaucracy to avoid their bureaucratic attitude and mentality as well as treat the people as their masters and treat themselves (bureaucrats) as servants of the people, as bureaucrats were felt themselves as the member of prestigious and privileged class usually “stands in a superior-inferior relationship to the people” (Abedin, 1973:53). In a public meeting Sheikh Mujib told that “I want the officials to eliminate malpractices and corruption from the soil of Bangladesh. There is no guarantee of your jobs. If someone is found guilty, he will be served with the notice – your services are no longer required” (cited in Ahmed, 1980:146). As a political leader he was skeptical on bureaucratic role in governance and he was confused whether the bureaucracy will provide fully supportive to the new nation state Bangladesh or not, as it was adopted in combination of the bureaucracy who were experienced with both the wings of Pakistan as a colonial species.<sup>30</sup> Thus he adopted colonial bureaucracy but imposing full political control of them.

The bureaucracy in independent Bangladesh was the lineal descendants of the ICS and CSP, containing their values and orientations that were developed in colonial structure. Therefore, like many other post-colonial societies, Bangladesh inherited an “overdeveloped” bureaucracy as a colonial legacy, and Bangladesh inherited the administrative set up that was developed in Pakistan and virtually that was a continuation of the system of the British period (Ahmed, 1980; Ahmed, 1986). The overdeveloped bureaucracy that inherited from Pakistan was a symbol of post-colonial states in the view of Hamza Alavi (Alavi, 1972) those who held the political power in the colonial structure, at the same time, their social background and education made them contemptuous of indigenous politicians (Zafarullah, 1994). However, during the independence, the higher bureaucratic elites were very small in number.

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<sup>30</sup> After the independence of Bangladesh, a large number of Pakistani bureaucrats went from Bangladesh to Pakistan and similarly, the senior and experienced Bengali bureaucrats who were working in the central government came back to Bangladesh. Administration was set up by combining both of them.

The bureaucrats holding the ranks of Secretary, Additional Secretary and Joint Secretary were 314 (Ahmed, 1980). In the total class 1, officials 180 members were of the erstwhile CSP and 724 members were of the former EPCS (Ahmed and Khan, 1990). The Public Service Commission (PSC) has been created as an autonomous body under the constitution for new recruitment keeping close cooperation with the Ministry of Establishment. But complex procedures have been laid down for recruitment examinations and it has not been held regularly. In addition, there were no specific rules, norms and values of selection and promotion of bureaucracy in the post-independence period. Moreover, political leadership initiated a new process of politicization in the bureaucracy to establish political control over the bureaucracy in the new state Bangladesh (Zafarullah, 1994).

Furthermore, post-independent civil servants were weak and fragmented. In the post-independent period of Bangladesh, the bureaucrats were divided into four groups or categories: first, bureaucrats who went into hiding under the Pakistani occupying army in Bangladesh; second, those who were working in exile government at Mujibnagar and India with provisional government of Bangladesh; third, those who were attending their duties cooperating with the occupation army in the east wing; and four, those who were working with the central government and remained stranded in west Pakistan during liberation war (Choudhury, 2004; Ahmed, 1980). The senior and more experience bureaucrats who were working with the central government and posted in east wing left in Pakistan after independent, and this senior posts were occupied by bureaucrats who had belonged to the former East Pakistan civil services. Bureaucrats worked against one another, as political patronage and participation in the war was the main criteria of promotion in to the upper hierarchies in the post-independent era. Moreover, many important administrative positions were held by persons who were not civil servants at all. Besides, just from the beginning of Bangladesh the bureaucracy, therefore, found it difficult to adjust to the changed set up in a parliamentary system of government where they were placed under the control of the political leadership (Jahan, 2005). Consequently, this political control generates many confusions and cleavages in the bureaucrats; sympathizers and supporters of the ruling party, collaborators and patriots, generalists and technocrats etc. (Jahan, 2005).

With the above political and administrative set up in the national level of government after independence of Bangladesh, a three-tier local government system, with District, Thana and Union continued on (Blair, 1985; Ali 1987). Immediately after independence, the government

promulgated Bangladesh President's Order No. 7 of 1972, by that Order, the name of the Union Council was changed to Union Panchayat and administrators were appointed to manage the affairs of the local government under the charge of Circle Officers and Thesilder – a lower revenue officer (Faizullah, 1987). Similarly the name of Thana Council was changed to Thana Development Committee while the District Council was named Zila Board or District Board placed under the control of Sub-divisional Officer (SDO) and Deputy Commissioner (DC) respectively. The provision of representative bodies at all levels of local government is preserved in the article 59 of the Constitution of Bangladesh. But, in practice, only the union level local government had an accurately representative character in 1973. Meanwhile, the government promulgated the Local Government Act 1973. The Act proposed a three-tier local government system with the Union Parishad (UP), Thana Training and Development Committee (TTDC) and the Zila Parishad. Again in 1973, Union Panchayat's name reverted to Union Parishad creating a new post of Vice-chairman along with Chairman. Elections of the Union Parishads were held in the same year but election for the other two levels did not take place. The important tiers of local government were still remained under the bureaucracy and it was utterly controlled by the bureaucracy, even if an emerging trend of influence on bureaucracy by the local politicians was noticeable of the then government party in some cases (Ahmed, 2009; Abedin, 1973). The most striving local government restructuring came on January 25, 1975 by the Presidential Order under BKSAL government, where all Sub-divisions were upgraded to districts with the introduction of the President-appointed District Governors in replacing DCs in the district level. However, the system did not eventually continued and was abolished in the same year by the military government.

On the other hand, politics-bureaucracy relations in post-independent Bangladesh reveals that the Awami League leadership tried to make the bureaucracy as a purely instrument of carrying out the decisions of the political leadership<sup>31</sup> who (bureaucrats) were the master of the people during the colonial and Pakistan period. The bureaucracy was in a strong position in the state structure of Pakistan. But it is notable that there was considerable difference between the political environment of Bangladesh and previous Pakistan. Unlike the position in Pakistan, the socio-economic and political environment of the newly independent Bangladesh was not favorable for the overriding position of the bureaucrats at the initial period of her statehood in Bangladesh, because of their coalition with the military rule during

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<sup>31</sup>It was like following the classical theoretical model of politics-bureaucracy dichotomy, where bureaucracy will simply implement the decisions of politicians under the political control.

Pakistan period (Choudhury, 2004; Ahmed, 1980). In the independent Bangladesh, the political leadership including Sheikh Mujib was highly critical about the bureaucrats denouncing their past elitist attitude, coalition with the army and aloofness from the mass people (Hasanuzzman, 1988). Despite the technical necessity of the bureaucratic experience and expertise, the first political regime led by AL (1972-75), a deliberate and overreact attempt was made to penalize the bureaucracy and attempted to establish political control over the bureaucracy (Zafarullah, 1994). As such after independence, many senior bureaucrats were removed or downgraded for alleged collaboration with Pakistani army during liberation war (Ahmed and Khan, 1990).

The whispered political control over the bureaucracy was introduced through various mechanisms. The Bangladesh Constitution of 1972 (Article 134-135) provided the exercise of strong control over the bureaucracy.<sup>32</sup> At the same time, the constitutional protection which the bureaucrats had enjoyed during the colonial and Pakistan period had cut out. The Administrative and Services Reorganization Committee (ASRC) was set up on March 15, 1972 to reshuffle the bureaucracy, and this Committee suggested some fundamental structural changes to the inherited bureaucracy with abolishing the elite cadre. In June 1972, President's Order No 9 (mostly known as PO-9) of the government of Bangladesh was promulgated which provided for the dismissal of any officer without any right to appeal. One of the provisions in that order was "where in the opinion of the government, the government servant is not required in the interest of Bangladesh, the ground may, notwithstanding anything contrary contained in any law for the time being in force or in the terms and conditions of service of such person, remove such person from service without assigning any reason there of". It further provided that "no claim, suit, prosecution and other legal proceeding shall lie against the government arising out of, or in respect of an order made, or action taken under the order" (cited from Choudhury, 2004:208).

This endeavor aiming at political control over the bureaucracy could not however be fully materialized by the regime because the political sector remained immature in handling the complex business of the state (Hasanuzzman, 1988:51) and faded when it was discovered the political intentions and motives. A parliamentary form of government was introduced and the

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<sup>32</sup> Article 134 of the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh provided that they (bureaucrats) "should hold office during the pleasure of the president" and Article 135 (3) states that "the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him in rank shall be final".

political elites became the supreme policy maker. An important trend of the first parliamentary regime was gradual control over the administration. An aspect of policy making activity found in almost every legislative setting is the legislative oversight of the executive. While the political elites established their supremacy over the bureaucracy but it was not effective. Among the members of Mujib Cabinet (1972-74) very limited numbers were professional politicians, and they lacked previous experience as ministers (Banu, 1981).

**Table 4.15**  
**Professional Background of Mujib Cabinet Members**

Profession	Number
Lawyer	13
Business executive	4
Joteder	1
Teacher	1
Labour	1
Military	1
Professional Politicians	2
Total	23

Source: Adapted from Rahman (1989:370)

There is no denying the fact that from a legal point of view the job security of the bureaucrats thereby, was substantially reduced in post-independent Bangladesh. One of the CSP officer said that “We do not go to office in the morning without seeing the newspaper. We make sure that we still have our jobs” (cited in Ahmed, 1980:147). Of course, there was ground of its kind of fear, as in January 1972, 53 senior civil servants were removed from office and from July to November 1974 over 300 government officials were dismissed under the PO-9 ( Ahmed, 1980). PO-9 was the controlling instrument of bureaucrats. But this endeavor faded when it was discovered the political intention and motives. The reduction of bureaucratic power and privileges make it subservient to the ruling party’s political will (Khan and Zafarullah, 1980).

The Charismatic leadership of domination which is termed by Weber is applicable to Sheikh Mujib. In any consideration of the nature of his leadership, he was a charismatic leader. Charismatic leader does not adhere to norms of rational decision making and therefore resists the tendency to bureaucratic administration. Each system of domination may be viewed as a total apparatus of authority since each system reflects the relationships between ruler,

administrative officials and groups or persons existing within the established order. The administrative organization of charismatic domination varies considerable in comparison with others forms of domination. Appointments of officials are not made on the basis of merit in a charismatic domination. Rather, leader selects the followers who commit themselves to serve the leader because of their beliefs in the leader’s powers (Morrison, 1995). The administrative staff of the charismatic leader has no appointed officials or a hierarchy of offices and its members are not technically trained (Weber, 1978). During the first parliamentary regime the government also made political appointment in many autonomous, business, and financial nationalized agencies.

**Table 4.16**  
**The Professional Background of the Political Appointees (1972-75)**

Profession	Number	Percentage
Professionals( Lawyer & Doctors	44	57.9
Generalists	25	32.8
Military Personnel	4	5.3
Private Business	3	4.0
Total	76	100

Source: Adapted from Rahman (1989:373).

Ultimately, political leadership has failed to effusive control over the bureaucracy in the post-independent period. Without political support and direction the bureaucracy can do very little even though civil servants should be ‘persons in the service of the republic’ signifying their political neutrality (Ali, 2007). Except Sheikh Mujib other political leaders were craving for lucrative business, not to the state affairs and administration. Consequently “the government gradually lost its grip and was unable to manifest its capability in facing the country’s grave crises of political instability, pervasive factionalism, deteriorating law and order situation and increasing economic problems and massive smuggling” Hasanuzzman, (1988:51). These multifarious crises led Sheikh Mujib to rely more and more on the bureaucrats in the aftermath. In this milieu, on 25 January 1975 when Mujib made BAKSAL and declared his ‘second revolution’ then outsized avenue for bureaucrats there. Thus, from the early days of 1975 the role of the bureaucratic elites became important. In most of the corporations, civil servants were appointed and the party nominees were remover, in the secretariat the former CSP officers were placed in key positions (Ahmed, 1980). Despite the political control and

factionalism within the service, the bureaucracy was serving the government with kept them low profile and was waiting for the appropriate time. Moreover, Mujib also antagonized the military bureaucracy by reducing military budget and by raising the Jatiya Rakhi Bahani (JRB, National Security Force) as a countervailing force (Maniruzzman, 1976). LaPalombara (1963:15) rightly pointed out “tension between political leaders and the bureaucrats of developing nations grow in large measure out of the recognition that bureaucrats are never passive instruments to be manipulated, at all, like inert pawns”. The case of first parliamentary regime has proved that point. Because after absorbing initial tension of the mild political control the bureaucracy suffered, the service slowly began to make efforts to assert its position (Choudhury, 2004). The bureaucracy reconsolidated its domination. The increasing participation of the bureaucracy in the state activities made them sensitive to political power and made them aware of the weakness of the regime and finally bureaucracy thus emerged as the ruling agent align with military through the bloody coup in 1975 and that was the end of a hope.

#### **4.3.4.2 Military Regimes (1975-90): Bureaucratization of Politics**

After the military intervention in politics in 1975, and subsequently, after few coups and counter coups, Major General Ziaur Rahman had emerged as the military ruler of the country who assumed the role of the President of Bangladesh. Major General Ziaur Rahman, the Chief of Staff of the Bangladesh Army, emerged as “strong man” and “de facto ruler” of Bangladesh. The constitution was abrogated and the Martial Law was declared in Bangladesh, simultaneously political party has been banned and the political activities have been suspended. This trend had continued until 1990, as from August 1975 to 1990, Bangladesh was ruled by the two consecutive military regimes – first, General Zia (1975-1981) and second, General Ershad (1981-1990). During the both military regimes, they had tried to shade their rule with civilian color by using various legitimization process and civilianization especially holding local and parliamentary elections and running the parliament (Rahman, 2002:53). Ziaur Rahman attempted to give his military regime a semblance of civilian character through the development of political institutions. The establishment of Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in 1978 with the chairmanship of Zia was an important effort in this regard (Hossain, 1988). So was done by the Ershad. The system of government was presidential and parliament was absolutely dysfunctional. Then the parliament was known as “rubberstamp parliament” and military ruled the state with the

help of the civil bureaucracy. Thus, military rulers especially, it was General Zia who followed a policy of balance between civil and military bureaucracy, and initiated the process of militarization of bureaucracy and bureaucratization of politics in Bangladesh by offering important posts and positions to the civil-military bureaucracy, even though involving retired military bureaucrats in politics and administration (Ahmed and Khan, 1990; Ahmed, 2004; Hossain, 1988) who also said “I will make politics difficult for the politicians”. This process was continued with more enthusiasm by Zia’s successor General Ershad until 1990.

During the military regimes the bureaucracy retrieved its pre-independence power and position in the state. Former CSP officers were most beneficiary group within the bureaucracy. However, General Zia continued new recruitment into the bureaucracy and reorganized bureaucracy brought into under a systematic shape especially, in the recruitment and selection process. An open competitive examination system was introduced in 1977 (Rahman, 2002). General Ershad also continued that merit based selection process, although the selection process was questionable during the Ershad regime. But BCS exams were being held almost regularly. On the other hand, promotion in the civil service was based on the political patronage rather than merit (Zafarullah, 1994).

**Table 4.17**

**Number of Political Bureaucrats in Bangladesh (recruited in Military Regimes)**

<i>Year</i>	<i>BCS Batch</i>	<i>Total Number of Cadre</i>	<i>Number of Admin Cadre</i>	<i>% of Admin Cadre of Total Cadre</i>
1983-84	2 <sup>nd</sup>	650	650	100
1988-89	9 <sup>th</sup>	-	50	-
1989-90	10 <sup>th</sup>	2121	155	7.30
1990-91	11 <sup>th</sup>	1166	222	19.03
1990-91	12 <sup>th*</sup>	40	0	-

Source: BPSC Annual Reports of different years and published results of BCS exam (1983-91). Note: 2<sup>nd</sup> BCS special for Administration (Magistrate) cadre, 12<sup>th</sup> BCS special for police cadre.

With the above mentioned political and administrative arrangements, the government of President Ziaur Rahman promulgated the Local Government Ordinance, 1976 that proposed to continue the same three tiers of local government as before. This ordinance provided for a Union Parishad (UP) at the union level, a Thana Parishad at the Thana level and a Zila Parishad at the district level keeping the provision of elections (Siddiqui, 2005). However, no

elections were held in the upper two levels – Zila Parishad and Thana Parishad. Similar to the previous government, only the Union Parishad elections were held and other two levels of local government were left under bureaucratic control. Moreover, a new Act was passed in 1980 to create another tier of local government at the village level called “Gram Sarker” (village government). It was just following the model of Basic Democracy, and the Gram Sarkers were used largely for political mobilization by the ruling party of President Ziaur Rahman (Faizullah, 1987). An empirical study on Gram Sarker by Huque (1988) revealed that it was politically motivated and real power remained in the hands of rural elites. As a result, it had low credibility which died with the death of its initiator President Ziaur Rahman in 1981 (Blair, 1985; Ali, 1987; Khan, 1987).

After Zia, General Ershad took over power through a coup in 1982. General Ershad tried to follow the same process and mechanisms of his predecessor General Zia in every sphere of the state activities after capturing the state power (Huque, 1994). Power decentralization was a process of civilianization of his military rule. In 1980s a major change was made in the local government and public administration by decentralizing the administration creating the Upazila Parishad (UZP) system to legitimize his rule and achieve mass support in the countryside. In this milieu, the philosophy of decentralization has played a high profile role in the context of development local government.<sup>33</sup> A major change was initiated in the local government system during the Ershad regime through the introduction of the Upazila Parishad and Upazila Administration Reorganization Ordinance in 1982. This Ordinance was followed by the Local Government (Union Parishad) Ordinance in 1983, the Local Government (Zila Parishad) Act in 1988 and the three Hill Districts Acts and Palli Act in 1989. Ershad regime introduced an administrative reform, and by this administrative reform, all Sub-divisions had been upgraded as districts and the Thanas have been upgraded as Upazilas (sub-districts).<sup>34</sup> Thus, three types of local government bodies, namely Union Parishad, Upazila Parishad and Zila Parishad were effective during this time. First two tiers were elected bodies and the Zila Parishad was controlled by the bureaucracy, as it was in the past.

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<sup>33</sup> The philosophy of decentralization started gaining momentum in Bangladesh during the 1980s, resulted a major change in local government of Bangladesh. It has been discussed elaborately in the next chapter.

<sup>34</sup> The Upazila Parishad is the main field of study of this research thus it has been separated and an attempt has been made to focus the light on Upazila Parishad elaborately in the next separate chapter.

The politics-bureaucracy relations during the military regimes reveal that after 1975, in fact, a strategic partnership between civil and military bureaucracy has been built in the process of governance. During both the military regimes, there were no political interference in the civil service as was with the AL government, rather it was a balance partnership between civil-military bureaucracy (Hossain, 1988). Thus a coalition developed between the civil and military bureaucracy due to the evident failure of the politicians in developing viable political institutions in Bangladesh (Huque and Rahman, 2003). This strategic partnership helped them to rule the country by using the state apparatus. Therefore, the theories of military intervention in politics that was developed in sixties in the context of developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America fit for Bangladesh case. Notable that many political and social scientists argued that the failure of political leaderships and lack of institutionalized political institutions (including culture) prepare the ground for civil-military bureaucracy domination in politics. In the military regimes, bureaucracy then exercised wide range of power derived from the autocratic régimes and civil-military bureaucracy has used to the institution building process and development planning. The implementation of such development projects were solely under controlled of bureaucracy. The crucial positions of the state organization, including the key policy making institutions and most important administrative positions including important ministries were occupied by the bureaucrats (Khan and Zafarullah, 1980; Alam, 1996,).

**Table 4.18**  
**Professional Background of Zia’s Advisory Council in 1975**

Category	Numbers
Ex- Civil Bureaucrats	3
Ex- Military Bureaucrats	3
Politicians	2
Educationists	4
Lawyers	1
Technocrats	4
Total	17

Source: Adapted from Alam (1996:46)

Moreover, a council of advisors to the president Zia had been formed where 90 percent of them were civil and military bureaucrats (Ahmed, 1980; Hossain, 1988). The social

background of the members of the advisory council of Zia (see table --) reveals that the civil-military bureaucrats and technocrats emerged as a new force in Bangladesh politics (Alam, 1996). The President's Order No. 9 of 1972 has been declared null and void. It was as if recuperate their lost power and glory, as in post-independence Bangladesh, bureaucracy "lost their *esprit de corps*; their morale was at a low ebb. But they have been able to regain their power and prestige since November, 1975" (Ahmed, 1980:180). In Ershar's military regime, he also appointed a council of advisor composing of ten civil-military bureaucrats, two technocrats and four lawyers (Huque and Rahman, 2003) following his predecessor Zia.

During this period, the bureaucrats were not only dominating in the central government but their domination was clearly noticeable also in the local government. Almost all of the divisional, district and sub-district levels of administrative post were held by the bureaucrats. In Bangladesh, the military governments both Zia and Ershad used the bureaucracy to implement their policies and programmes and recognized the administration at local level to make their support base in the local level (Zafarullah and Khan, 2005). During the military regimes, the over domination of civil-military bureaucrats in the governance and political process had rendered the politicians to play a secondary role in the process of governance and development. Finally, the fall of consecutive military rules (1975-1990 paved the way of Bangladesh entered into the democratic governance again.

#### **4.3.4.3 The Parliamentary Democratic Regimes (1991-2014)**

After a mass movement in 1990, General H. M. Ershad resigned and handed over power to a care-taker government led by the then Chief Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed in consent of all political parties for holding a free and fair national election within three months. Lastly, Chief Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed formed a care-taker (interim) government and held the election of Parliament on February 27, 1991. The election was contested and participated fully and freely by all political parties and alliances. About 75 political parties and 2,787 candidates contested in this election. Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) emerged as winning party with single majority (140 seats of 300) in the parliament. AL was relegated to the second position with a tally of 88 seats. BNP with the support of Jamat-e-Islami (18 seats) formed the government by the leadership of Khaleda Zia as Prime Minister. Bangladesh started its

journey with the parliamentary form of government yet again. This trend was expedited by the successive AL government when they formed the government in 1996 after about two decades. Meanwhile, following the process of trial and error, Bangladesh already experienced with five elected democratic regimes after re-introduction of parliamentary democracy in 1991. The two mainstream political parties, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Awami League (AL), are turning over the state power by rotation. Hence, it is notable that since 2001, a culture of alliance politics has been developed within the political parties in Bangladesh and thus in 2001, four party alliance came to the power and formed the government led by the BNP and later in 2008 Grand Alliance of 14 parties formed the government after winning in the election led by the AL. While this two parties faced a critical challenge under the military backed care-taker government led by Dr. Fakhruddin Ahmed (a retired bureaucrat) from 2006-2008 for creating an unusual situation by the then incumbent government, but it did not last long. Lastly, Bangladesh backed to the democratic governance by the parliamentary election in 2008. Till then to present the parliamentary democratic government is functioning in Bangladesh as a system of governance with some limitations.

In explaining the nature of bureaucracy after 90's one thing is clear that bureaucracy has been absolutely divided on party line either AL or BNP. Bureaucracy itself is beset with such factionalism. "As an institution it is on decay with waning elitism and esprit de corps" (Rahman, 2002:59). During the last five democratic regimes (1991-2014) politicization of administration and appointment of diehard party supporter bureaucrats in the crucial position in civil service and other important institutions have become an open secret, and even more the chairmen and members of constitutional bodies (including PSC) has been politically appointed. The recruitment and selection process in the Civil Service of Bangladesh is allegedly manipulated in favor of the candidates those who have political link with the ruling party (Rahman, 2002). However, the exams for Public Service and the recruitment in the civil service are being held regularly in the democratic regimes (see the table 4.19). The promotion in the civil service is also allegedly political. Mass promotion of the bureaucrats is being held within the civil service on the basis of political consideration in spite of lacking of post (see the table 4.20). In the last several regimes the bureaucrats those who got promotion had political affinity with the incumbent government. Thus, bureaucracy has lost its ideal character. Ideally (in a hierarchical administration) the number of bureaucrats will be less in the higher level of hierarchy than the lower level. But practically, it is reverse in Bangladesh. Table 4.20 reveals that the number of appointed senior and mid-level bureaucracy especially,

secretary, additional secretary, joint secretary and deputy secretary are apparently more than that of the sanctioned posts. On the other hand, the number of appointed post in the lower level of bureaucracy in the civil service is less than that of the sanctioned posts. Generally, field bureaucracy (assistant and senior assistant secretary) plays a very vital role in the implementation of government policies. Thus, more appointment in the lower level of bureaucracy is important and necessary than the higher levels. But at present strength of the ministry of public administration shows the opposite direction. Therefore, one former cabinet secretary commends that “now the administration in Bangladesh is trembling for overwhelming political promotions” (Prothom Alo, August 27, 2014).

**Table 4.19**  
**Number of Political Bureaucrats in Bangladesh (Recruited in Parliamentary Democratic Regimes 1991-2013)**

Year	BCS Batch	Total Number of Cadre	Number of Admin Cadre	% of Admin Cadre of Total Cadre
1991-92	13 <sup>th</sup>	1022	234	22.89
1992-93	14 <sup>th*</sup>	695	0	-
1993-94	15 <sup>th</sup>	3063	125	4.08
1994-95	16 <sup>th*</sup>	1373	0	-
1995-96	17 <sup>th</sup>	2206	-	-
1996-97	18 <sup>th</sup>	1757	-	-
1997-98	19 <sup>th</sup>	555	-	-
1998-99	20 <sup>th</sup>	2242	300	13.38
1999-00	21 <sup>st</sup>	1370	200	14.59
2000-01	22 <sup>nd</sup>	2335	300	12.84
2000-01	23 <sup>rd*</sup>	709	0	-
2002-03	24 <sup>th</sup>	5224	-	-
2004-05	25 <sup>th</sup>	2722	-	-
2005-06	26 <sup>th*</sup>	1063	0	-
2005-06	27 <sup>th</sup>	3239	289	8.92
2007-08	28 <sup>th</sup>	2190	192	8.76
2008-09	29 <sup>th</sup>	1722	194	11.25
2009-10	30 <sup>th</sup>	2367	287	12.12
2010-11	31 <sup>st</sup>	2072	239	11.53
2011-12	32 <sup>nd*</sup>	1680	0	-
2012-13	33 <sup>rd</sup>	8529	296	3.47

Source: Compiled by the author from BPSC Annual Reports of different years and published results of BCS exam (1991-2013). \*Note: 14<sup>th</sup>, 16<sup>th</sup>, 23<sup>rd</sup>, 26<sup>th</sup>, and 32<sup>nd</sup> BCS exams were special BCS for other cadres.

**Table 4.20****The Strength of the Ministry of Public Administration of Bangladesh (2014)**

<i>Designation</i>	<i>Regular Posts</i>	<i>Appointed Posts</i>	<i>OSD*</i>
Secretary	73	62	3
Additional Secretary	107	273	33
Join Secretary	430	919	118
Deputy Secretary	830	1295	73
Senior Assistant Secretary	1800	1560	35
Assistant Secretary	1890	1088	50

Source: Ministry of Public Administration 2014, \*OSD (officer on special duty) is a kind of political punishment.

In the last two decades of parliamentary democratic regimes, the nature of local government did not change in any significant manner. The structure and composition of rural local government was more or less similar both the regimes of BNP and AL. Only the exception was that BNP government reintroduced *Gram Sarker* (village government) but AL government abolished it. On the other hand, BNP government abolished the UZP system which was initiated by Ershad government but AL government reintroduced it. Finally, caretaker government reintroduces the Upazila system in 2008 as an important tier of local government in Bangladesh.

During the democratic regimes especially, since the reintroduction of parliamentary democracy in 1991 to present regime the bureaucracy has been controlling and regulating unsystematically following the philosophy of political control and putting political pressure to the bureaucrats. Interestingly, as the bureaucracy plays important role in the process of governance and development as well as in both the national and local elections, thus every political regime keens to build up their support based in the bureaucracy by the name of “our man” following the example of the previous regime, and the national politicians are more interested to achieve their short term political gain. Similarly, the bureaucracy of Bangladesh is also swimming with the same stream by capitalizing the nature of confrontational politics in Bangladesh. Although theoretically bureaucracy is apolitical and neutral, accountable and responsive to the politicians and to the people of the republic but in practice, they are rigid and unaccountable as they have an affinity for power, money, centralized authority, unequivocal loyalty and submissiveness to the politics and they apply this technique in every

alternative regimes. Sometimes they are more political than the politicians in some cases. Bureaucracy itself provokes politicians for politicization by making a list of opposite ideology people in the bureaucracy after a regime change and this is the present nature of politics-bureaucracy relations in the central government. Thus, Jamil (2007:32) explains politics-bureaucracy relations in the post 90s parliamentary regimes in Bangladesh by saying that-

With the transition of the country to democracy in 1991, the bureaucracy has also become highly politicized. Bureaucracy in Bangladesh is now caught in the tug-of-war between the major political parties, especially the party and their allies in power. Their transfer and posting to suitable locations and positions, their promotion, and career are now decided on the basis of their political loyalty. The process of manipulating the career of bureaucrats has also led to the division among bureaucrats along party lines.

As a result, throughout the last two decades the process of politicization of bureaucracy and bureaucratization of politics in administration has been significantly speeded up which was started by the military regimes. Consequently, bureaucracy has become a dominant institution indeed, although the efficiency, policy expertise and acceptance of Bangladesh's bureaucracy have degraded in a significant manner. In the last two decades of democratic governance, yet politicians are the leading forces of the governance but the dominant role plays the bureaucrats, as the major policies are initiated and passed on the hands of bureaucrats. Now they are directly or indirectly involved in partisan politics. Consequently, the organizational supremacy of the bureaucracy has been dismantled.

**Table 4.21**  
**Historical Evolution of Political Systems in Bangladesh**

Period	Under System
327 – 325 BC	Alexander's invasion of India and the reputation of Gangaridai (Bengal) as a mighty empire
317 – 232 BC	Mauryan Empire – Hindu Rule
323 BC – 78 AD	Principalities in Bengal – Small States
78 – 320 AD	Kushana Empire
320 AD – 544	Imperial Guptas – Hindu Rule
567 – 597	Kirti Barmon of Chalukya dynasty from Deccan invades Bengal San of Tibet attacks Bengal
581 – 600	King Shashanka of Bengal
605 – 637	Matasannaya in Northern Bengal Kharga dynasty in Vanga

650 – 750	Rath dynasty in Samatata Gaurh invaded by Strong San of Tibet
750 – 1155	Pala Golden Age – Buddhist Rule
1095 – 1223	Sena dynasty – Hindu Rule
1206 – 1576	Under various independent Muslim rulers
1576 – 1757	Under Mughal rule – Muslim rule
1757 – 1857	Under East India Company's rule
1857 – 1947	British rule
1947 – 1971	Pakistan's rule
1971 – to date	Under Independent Bangladesh
1971 – 1972	Temporary Presidential System (in exile & in Bangladesh)
1972 – 1973	Parliamentary Government (without any elected parliament)
1973 – 1975	First parliamentary government (directly elected)
1975 – 1991	Various military and presidential rule
1991 – to date	Re-introduction of parliamentary system

Source: Adapted from Muhith (1992:397)

#### 4.4 Conclusion

The preceding historical analysis has shown the evolution, structure and process of governance explaining the politics-bureaucracy relations in national and local government levels in different historical phases and regimes which Bangladesh has passed through. This historical analysis reveals that the presence of politics, bureaucracy, and local government is historically an unequivocal truth in Bangladesh as a part of Indian Subcontinent. All kinds of religious and indigenous literatures and even more literature by western scholars have also shown the existence of bureaucracy and effective local government in ancient Bangladesh. Nonetheless, British colonial administrator formed a new style of governance system (hierarchical administrative state) by breaking down the indigenous system of governance for their own colonial interest. Modern bureaucracy and local government was the direct effect of that endeavor. In colonial period, two outstanding features of colonial bureaucracy were its elitism and the loyalty to its colonial masters. This features of bureaucracy shaped the pattern of relationship between its colonial masters and bureaucracy, as direct political role by the politician was abundantly minimal during that period. In the British India, bureaucrats were both the policy makers and the main implementers as executive officials. Simultaneously, they held the power of developmental works both in the central and local government. During the British colonial period, although the modern local government system was grasp its

foundation but Indian subcontinent was virtually an administrative state because; in this period the entire administrative apparatus was controlled by the bureaucrats. All key posts in the central and provincial government and even in the district administration including magistracy were reserved for the bureaucrats. The local self-governments were kept in a state of impotence and were placed under the overriding control of the bureaucracy. Local government was dominated by the strong mid-level bureaucrats who belonged to the prestigious Indian Civil Service (ICS). In the colonial structure of the then local government was established in order to legitimize colonial domination through giving some semblance of self-rule at the local level (Siddiqui, 2005). Traditionally, the nature of local government was bureaucratic structure and dominated by the DO, DM, SDO, and COs, during the whole British period.

Likewise, apart from historical legacy, the organizational capacity, social dynamics and political patronization of founding leaders had contributed to grasp the strong position of bureaucracy in Pakistani political process and governance. During the Pakistan period, all tiers of local government except the union council were dominated by the bureaucrats. We observed extreme bureaucratization of local government in the Basic Democratic System in the Pakistan age. In both the colonial and Pakistan periods, local governance and development was under the general control of bureaucrats. Their principal responsibility was the collection of revenue from taxation of land, maintenance of law and order as well as monitoring the developmental works, and ultimately they were the father and mother of the local people and the agent of central political control to the local level. Even after forty three years of independence of Bangladesh, the similar trend and pattern is observable in the administration of Bangladesh as a whole. However, to what extent such administrative behavior has changed after adapting new code and regulatory framework at the local government is the subject of the following chapter.

## **Chapter – 5: Upazila Parishad (UZP) in Bangladesh: An Analysis of Institutional and Regulatory Framework**

### **5.1: Introduction**

From the analysis of historical background of local government in the preceding chapter, we have seen that local government bodies are performing its functions in Bangladesh from the ancient time. However, during the British colonial period it got a momentum under formalized and organized mechanism of governing the local people under the supervision and control of the central government. Local government was then “multifunctional in intent, bureaucratic in instigation and operation, and built upon British precedent from the colonial period” (Tepper, 1970:87) by its historical nature. In both the colonial and Pakistan periods, local governance and development was under the general control of bureaucrats. Their principle responsibility were the collection of revenue from taxation of land, maintenance of law and order as well as monitoring the developmental works, and ultimately they were the father and mother of the local people and the agent of central political control to the local level. After the independence of Bangladesh, local government bodies remained more or less the same nature – runs under the control of the central government regulations. Thus, this chapter examines the institutional structure of the UZP, emphasizing its legal and regulatory framework within which the different actors and the UZP are performing its functions.

### **5.2: Local Government in Bangladesh: Legal and Constitutional Framework**


Bangladesh is a unitary state with the constitutional provision for local government. The constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh clearly provided the guideline of local government system. Articles 9, 11, 59 and 60 of the constitution of Bangladesh are related to local government and its regulations. Article 9 of the constitution encourages establishing representative local government. Likewise, Article 11 provides that “the Republic shall be a democracy in which effective participation of the people through their elected representatives in administration at all levels shall be ensured” (GPRB, 1972). Article 59(1) stated, “Local

government in every administrative unit of the Republic shall be entrusted to bodies, composed of persons elected in accordance with law.” Article 59(2) stated, “Everybody such as is referred to in clause (1) shall subject to this constitution and any other law, perform within the appropriate administrative unit such functions as shall be prescribed by Act of Parliament, which may include functions relating to – a. administration and the work of public officers; b. the maintenance of public order; c. the preparation and implementation of plans relating to public services and economic development.”

Article 60 stated, “For the purpose of giving full effect to the provisions of article 59 parliament shall, by law , confer powers on the local government bodies referred to in that article, including power to impose taxes for local purposes, to prepare their budgets and to maintain funds.” The parliament is constitutionally responsible to formulate an effective, efficient and autonomous local government. According to Article 65(1) “there shall be a parliament MPs are vested with legislative power to formulate, modify various legislation to administering the country” on behalf of the people because “all powers of the Republic belong to the people” (Article 7(1)).

The above statements of constitutional provisions reveal that according to the spirit of constitution provisions the central government is responsible to establish autonomous local government ensuring local governance and development. Likely, The Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Co-operatives is the controlling authority of local government system in Bangladesh.

**Figure 5.1:**  
**Local Government System in Bangladesh:**



Source: (Ahmed, 2002; Barkat et al, 2015)

**Table 5.1:  
Governance Structure of Local Government in Bangladesh**

Tier	British Colonial Period	Ayub Regime	Mujib Regime		Zia Regime	Ershad Regime	Khaleda Regime	Hasina Regime	Representation Type
	1885-1947		1972-75	1975					
National	Parliament (1935)	Presidential/Parliament	Parliament	One Party BAKSAL Governor	Presidential	Presidential	Parliamentary	Parliamentary	Election
District	District Board (1885,1919)	District Council	Zilla Board	District Councillors	Zilla Parishad	Zilla Parishad	Zila Parishad	Zila Parishad	Ex-Officio Representation & Nomination
Sub-district	Local Board (1885)					Upazila		Upazila Parishad	Election, Nomination, Ex-Officio Nomination
Thana		Thana Council	Thana Development Committee	Thana Councillors	Thana Parishad				Ex-officio Members
					Thana Development Committee				
Union	Union Committee (1885), Union Board(1919)	Union Councils	Union Parishad		Union Parishad	Union Parishad	Union Parishad	Union Parishad	Election and Nomination
Village					Swanirvar Gram Sarkar(gs)	Palli Parishad		Village Parishad (proposed)	GS(consensus), PP(Adult Franchise)

Source: (Mannan, 2011; & Asaduzzaman, 2009)

Presently, local government system in Bangladesh runs under two strata: rural and urban institutions of local government. Rural local government consists of Zila Parishad at the top, Upazila Parishad at the middle, and Union Parishad at the bottom of hierarchy. On the other hand, urban local government institutions are Municipality and City Corporation. A different system followed for Chittagong Hill Tracts districts under the Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs. Local Government (Union Parishad Act, 2009) is the fundamental guideline and regulation for Union Parishad. Upazila Parishad Act 1998(Amended up to 2011) and the Upazila Parishad Manual 2013 is the legal constitutional, regulatory and operational guidelines for the present Upazila Parishad (See the Appendix). The Local Government (Paurashava) (Amendment) Act, 2010 is the law for structure, formation and functions of Paurashava. Different city corporation acts regulate the city corporations (Act passed for each corporation separately). In sum, three-tier rural local government exists in Bangladesh presently and among them UZP which is most important for its development potential.

### **5.3: Philosophy of Decentralization and Instate of Upazila Parishad in Bangladesh**

Disillusionment with the outcome of central planning and control of development activities from the center as well as growing awareness on the limitations of administering all developmental activities from the center gave birth to an increasing interest in decentralization in the second half of the last century (Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983: 10). Decentralization simply means shifting the responsibility to lower levels authority from higher or central level authority. Decentralization formulated and implemented as a means of development process (Hutchcroft, 2001; Dhal, 1996). Decentralization refers transfer of planning, decision making (administrative) from central to field administration (Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983). Conyers (1986) pointed transfer of authority from higher level to lower level government. Transfer can be classified into two types as, territorial authority from central to local and functional authority to an expertise department or local level institutions (Panday & Asaduzzaman, 2011). The dimensions of territorial and functional decentralizations become mutually inclusive with time (Ahmed, 1993). Scholars like Mawhood (1983), Rondinelli & Nellis (1986), Upholf (1985) are contributed to the classifications of decentralization. Cheema and Rondinelli (1983) identified deconcentration,

devolution, delegation, and privatization as form of decentralization which are accepted as appropriate theoretical and philosophical basis of decentralization (Ahmed, 1993).

**Table 5.2**  
**Decentralization from its Organizational Dimensions**

<b>Criteria Forms</b>	<b>Levels</b>	<b>Power and Functions</b>	<b>Whom</b>	<b>How</b>
Deconcentration	National to Sub-national	1.Administrative 2.Developmental	Field Officials	Executive order
Devolution	National to Sub-national	1.Developmental 2.Revenue Rising 3.Service Delivery 4.Political	1.Local bodies 2.Elected Representatives	Act/Ordinance
Delegation	Within old Govt. Agency or newly created Agency	1.Administrative 2.Technical 3.Promotional	1.Local Bodies 2.Special Authority 3.Field Agency	Act/Ordinance/Executive order
Privatization and Marketization	Power to group and Undefined unit and level	1.Production 2.Distribution 3.Service Delivery 4.Promotional 5.Developmental	1.NGO 2.Voluntary Association 3.Consumer	Grant/Aid and other incentives

Source: (Ahmed, 1993)

In order to cope with the decentralization, the local government institutions have been received immense importance and one of the transitions is a rapidly growing interest in decentralization of previously highly centralized governments. The recent research findings clearly demonstrate that strong local government can promote effectiveness of public administration in particular and governance in general (Cheema, 2007). Therefore, in the current discourse of governance and development, local government has been recognized as the best ground in which the mass people can learn the art of government, values of democracy and their responsibility through direct and indirect participation and experiences around them (Siddiqui 2005, Stoker 1996, Hye 2000, Blair 1981). In Bangladesh, decentralization of administration had been initiated soon after the independence by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman government through introducing Union Panchayet and Union Relief Committees in 1972 (Khan, 2009). These local institutions contributed to relief, reconstruction, and rehabilitation activities (Rahman, 2009). Under the regime of President Ziaur Rahman the Thana Development Committee (TDC) was introduced in 1978. The

Union Parishad chairmen were the ex-officio members of TDC with responsibilities of development activities (Siddique, 2005). A new local government system introduced in 1980 called Swanirvor Gram Sarkar (self-village government). It was formed to foster people's participation in development, although it was motivated by the intention of central government to earn political support from the grassroots (Rahman, 2012).

During the eighties, the concept of decentralization started gaining momentum in Bangladesh. One notable endeavor in this regard was formation of Upazila Parishad that was initiated by General Ershad in November 1982, as a part of the decentralization policy. Upazila Parishad (previously it was named Thana Council) which was made the nerve centre of local government and development. In response to the democratic decentralization, General Ershad government set up Upazila Parishad in 1982 which had initiated for democratizing local government as the core centre of decentralized development through autonomous local government. Notable that after assuming in state power General Ershad appointed a committee called the Committee for Administrative Reform and Reorganization (CARR) to look into the inadequacies of the then local government and to suggest measures for their modification (Ahmed, 2009). The committee identified a number of deficiencies, and recommended a number of measures for effective local government including democratic decentralization. The military government accepted the recommendations and promulgated a new local government ordinance (Upazila Parishad and Upazila Administration Reorganization) Ordinance 1982. Thus Upazila Parishad was established by the devolution of power. Article 4 of the Ordinance declared that the devolutionary parishad shall consist of – an elected chairman, representative members, three women members, official members and nominated members (GPRB, 1982). Government initiated Upazila Parishad to delegate and devolve administrative activities with authority of identification, planning and implementation of development projects to the root level people (GPRB, 1986).

Therefore, the Upazila administration turned into focal point of development activities (Siddique, 2005). The official bureaucrats were subservient to the elected chairman. The Members of Parliament (MPs) tried to share the authority of Upazila Parishad but they had no formal authority to control the Upazila administration during the first and second tenures (Rahman, 2012). However, following the collapse of the Ershad government in 1990, the Upazila Parishad was dissolved by the BNP government in 1991 who came to power through a free-fair election after the fall of military rule. At the very early stage of its tenure BNP

government took this policy decision to dissolve the UZP which was politically motivated decision and thus all other political parties condemned the decision of the BNP government (Ahmed, 2009). As a result, after nine years of plausibly successful implementation of Upazila Parishad system, it was abolished and central government took control over the UZP discharging its functions by the appointed official bureaucrats and local MPs.

Thus, the Upazila system which was introduced in 1982 following the decentralization policy was subsequently abolished by the then BNP government in 1991. During its five-year tenure, the BNP government could not provide an alternative democratic form of local government. When after another free and fair election held in 1996, the Bangladesh Awami League (AL) came to power, and they passed the Upazila Parishad Act in 1998 to revive Upazila Parishad although the bureaucracy and some MPs were not hospitable to the proposal for the revival of the UZP. But the AL government could not arrange the election because of lack of support from the MPs and political conflict (Rahman, 2010; Aminuzzaman, 2011).

Lastly, the issue of strengthening the local governments came up strongly during the two-years long Caretaker Government (CG) of Dr. Fakhruddin Ahmed and under pressure from the civil society the CG had to strengthened the local government system in 2008 creating two new posts of Upazila Vice Chairman (one is mandatory for the women) apart from the chairman through an Ordinance empowering the UZP a truly free and independent local government body directly elected by the people. The interim government of 2007-2008 introduced Local Government (Upazila Parishad) Ordinance 2008 and abolished the power of MPs as advisors. Under the new Ordinance, election was held in almost all the 482 UZPs of the country on January 22, 2009, in less than a month of the ninth parliamentary election, to elect chairman, vice chairmen and members of the UZPs. When all were set for functioning of the newly elected UZP as a free and independent local body with renewed vigor and enthusiasm, the old issue of power sharing among the local MPs, bureaucrats and UZP chairmen once again surfaced. The MPs in fear of losing control over the UZP activities forced the parliament to amend the UZP Ordinance. At least, 07 April 2009, Parliament passed the Upazila Parishad (Reintroduction of the Repealed Act Amendment) Act 2009, restoring powers of MPs over the councils and making the elected chairmen virtually powerless.

As a result, in November 8, 2009, the High Court asked the government why the provision of appointing the MPs as advisers to the UZP and their approval in the planning of development program should not be declared illegal. It also asked the government why the provision of keeping the Upazila Nirbahi Officers (UNO) presidents of standing committees instead of secretaries should not be declared illegal. As a result, the Act further amended in 2011, but the government passed the bill keeping the MPs as the advisors and the UNO the Parishad's principal executive officer vested with the power to look after financial matters. Thus, The UZP administrations in Bangladesh are in transition now with various conflicts among the politicians and bureaucrats and different agencies of local government in respect of policy implementation, authority and resources. The relations between public representatives and official bureaucrats at the Upazila level are strained, because a clear allocation of authority and congenial power relationships are lacks in the UZP (Rahman, 2013).

#### **5.4: Institutional and Regulatory Framework of Upazila Parishad**

Under the rural local government system, Upazila Parishad introduced in 1982 as central point of rural local development. The system was not continuing due to the political regime change and ideological differences among the political parties. The institutional and regulatory framework changes frequently according to the ideologies and mechanisms of central local relations. However, discontinuing Upazila Parishad system accelerated after the 2008 national election and the Upazila Parishad Act 1998 (Amended in 2009 and 2011) provide the fundamental structure of the UZP. This section deals with the institutional and regulatory framework of the UZP, emphasizing its functions, structure and composition.

##### **5.4.1: Structure and Composition of the Upazila Parishad**

Ershad lead Martial Law government constituted CARR (Committee for Administrative Reorganization/Reform) on April 1982, according to their recommendation the government executed Local Governemnt (Upazila Parishad and Upazila Administration Reorganization) Ordinance on 23<sup>rd</sup> October, 1982 (Siddique, 2005). According to this ordinance the structure and composition of the UZP included an elected chairman, representative members (all chairmen of the UPs), three nominated women members (from the residuals), official members (upazila office holder), chairman of the Upazila Central Cooperative Association (UCCA), and one nominated male member (competent to be a chairman of UZP). The

chairman of the council used to need to be elected by popular adult franchises. Nominated and ex-officio members had voting right at the UZP meeting. The chief executive officer UNO acts as chairman till election held (Siddique, 2005). According to this composition, the UZP functioned about two terms. However, present Upazila Parishad Act 1998 (amended up to 2011) provided the legal basis of UZP and its activities newly. Presently, the UZP consist of an elected chairman and two vice chairman (one must be female), chairman of union parishads and pourashava (if any), and elected female members (reserved) of unions and pourashovas. The chairman and vice chairmen must be elected according to popular mandate of general people. Legal entity of the Upazila Parishad needs to meet at least 75% elected members with any one chairman or vice-chairman whose name published in the government gazette. Committee system is an important tool for Upazila functions. The UNO (Upazila Nirbahi Officer) is the chief executive officer of Upazila Parishad. Till election the parishad headed by the UNO. The government officials could be participates in parishad's activities without voting power. The local MP has an advisory role over the Upazila Parishad (Upazila Parishad Manual, 2013). The act provided that the council will be formulated by elected and representatives members.

**Table 5.3**

**Comparison between 1982 Ordinance and 1998 Act (Amended up to 2011) of UZP**

<b>Areas</b>	<b>1982 Ordinance</b>	<b>1998 Act (Amended up to 2011)</b>
Elected Chairman	Yes (1)	Yes (1)
Elected vice chairman	No	Yes (1)
Elected vice chairman(Female)	No	Yes (1)
Specific Qualifications of Chairman	Yes	Yes
Specific Provisions for resign, remove	Yes	Yes
Representative Members	Yes (All)	Yes (All)
(UP/Municipality Chairmen)		
Representative Members (Female)	No	Yes (3)
Voting Power of Representative members	Yes	Yes
Nominated members(Male)	Yes (1)	No
Nominated members (Female)	Yes (3)	No
Nominated members (Other Category)	Yes (1=UCCA Chairman)	No
Voting Power of Nominated members	Yes	Not Applicable
Status of UNO	Chief Executive Officer	Chief Executive Officer
Ex-Officio Members	Yes	No
Voting power of government officials	No	No
MPs as Advisor	No	Yes
Tenure	5 Years	5 Years
Till Election Upazila Parishad Headed by	UNO	UNO
Empowered to levy taxes, rates, and fees	Yes	Yes
Grant Support from National Government	Yes	Yes
Specific activities	17	18
Main Focus	Local Development	Local Development

Source: Prepared by Researcher

The executive power will be vested in the hand of the council, it could be implemented through chairman, vice chairman, or any government officials, the decision will be treated as the decision of the council (Article: 26(1,2,3). According to the article 33(1) of the Act, UNO will be the chief executive officer of the council, as article 33(2) stated financial and other legal activities will be disposed by the UNO. Article 25, stated that MPs will be the advisors of the council according to the article 65(1) of the constitution. Therefore, it has some sharp differences in major areas of 1982 ordinance and the newly reintroduced Act, especially in composition and structure of the UZP which has been shown elaborately in the table 5.3.

#### 5.4.2: Roles and Functions of Elected Representatives and Bureaucrats

Roles and functions of the Upazila Parishad are being specified in the Upazila Parishad Act 1998 (Amended up to 2011). The primary responsibility of the UZP is to carry out functions needed for the overall development of the Upazila. Appendix 12 provides a list of functions that the Upazila can perform.

**Table 5.4**

#### **Major Roles and Functions of elected representatives and Bureaucrats**

<b>Areas</b>	<b>Elected Representatives</b>	<b>Bureaucrats</b>	<b>Both</b>	<b>Council</b>
Advisory Role	✓(MPs)	-	-	-
Communicate With the Government	✓(MPs)	-	-	✓
Executive Power	-	✓ (UNO)	-	-
Performance Appraisal (ACR writing)	-	✓ (UNO)	-	-
Financial Decision	-	✓ (UNO)	-	-
Disposal of Business	✓	✓	✓	✓
Appointment of Committee	-	-	-	✓
Agreement	-	-	-	✓
Appointment of Personnel	-	-	-	✓
Raising Fund	-	-	-	✓
Preparing Budget	-	✓	-	✓
Accountancy	-	-	-	✓
Development Planning	-	-	-	✓
Imposing Tax, Fees, etc	-	-	-	✓
Accountability of Chairman	-	-	-	✓
Preparing Guideline	-	-	-	✓
Preparing Citizen Charter	-	-	✓	✓
Using Advanced Technology	-	-	-	✓
Access to Information (According to information Act 2009)	✓	✓	✓	✓

Source: Compiled by the Researcher

Different categories of actors are involved in the governing process of the UZP; elected representatives and official bureaucrats are the major two parts among them. Elected representatives and bureaucrats are performing their assigned role and functions within the regulatory framework. Although the Upazila Parishad Act and Upazila Parishad Manual 2013 specify the roles and functions of the elected politicians and official bureaucrats however, an attempt has been made to identify major areas of roles and functions distributed among elected representatives, UNO, both of them and the council are as shown in table 5.4.

### **5.5: Elections and Democratic Practice in the UZP**

We witnessed from the previous analysis that as the intention of establishing the UZP was to move from bureaucracy to democracy and furthermore local government in Bangladesh established with the constitutional provision, thus the constitution guaranteed to have democratic local governments in all levels in which effective participation of the people shall be ensured through their elected representatives in governance and administration. This implies a form of representative democracy in which the right to exercise local government power is gained by success in regular and competitive elections. So, election is a process for representation of people's voice in decision making through representatives and it is the most widely accepted basis for legitimate representation. Elections are the central institution of local democracy. All the essential elements of democracy are present in democratic election. Elections are means of making political preferences by voting. Political preferences in a democratic society are expressed through the institutional mechanism of periodic elections. Thus, this legal-constitutional provision provides the sprite that participatory elections will be the best practice for the people's participation in the UZP.

Empirical data shows that as a means of democratic practice, election is being held regularly in UZP. First UZP election held in 1985 under the military government, the second Upazila election held in 1990 but the election of 1990 put down its validity due to abolition of UZP system in 1991. After reviving the UZP near about eighteen years, last two consecutive elections (third and fourth) held under AL government in 2009 and 2014. These elections have sharp impact on institutionalization of the UZP. The popularity of different political parties was reflected in the results of the UZP elections though the elections were not held in peaceful manner; especially the last four phases out of six phases of the fourth UZP election were marked by violence and anomalies. So, the proper reflection of the popularity of

different political parties is questionable. This study has made a comparison between third and fourth UZP elections on some specific grounds. Analysis of the UZP elections is given before making the comparison.

### First Upazila Election in 1985

First UZP election of 460 upazila held in two phases in 1985, a total number of 2351 candidates participated in the election. In the first phase, 251 UZP elections held on 16<sup>th</sup> May, and 207 UZP elections held on 20<sup>th</sup> May, in the second phase, where two candidates were elected unopposed (Ali, 1986).

**Table 5.5**  
**Political Participation in Upazila Election 1985**

Chairman Post	Awami League (AL) Supported Candidate	B.N.P. Supported Candidate	Janadal (Government Affiliated) Supported Candidate	<b>Note:</b> Many candidates participated as independent candidates with the argument that party affiliation is not guaranteed in local level elections.
Total	254	223	Uncounted	

Source: Ali, 1986

**Table 5.6**  
**Election Result Analysis of 1985**

Name of Party	No. of Upazila Won	%
Janadal	207	45.00
Awami League	53	11.52
BNP	34	7.39
JSD (Shahjahan-Rab)	19	4.13
Muslim League	8	1.74
BAKSAL	4	0.87
UPP	3	0.65
NAP (Muzaffar)	6	1.30
JSD (Mirza-Shahjahan)	2	0.43
Independents	124	26.96
Total	460	100.00

**Source:** Ali, 1986; The Ittefaq (A Bengali Daily), June 13, 1985

## **Violence and Anomalies in the UZP Election**

Opposition political parties did not accept the election positively, they feared that the election will built strong basis of the Military government. In this ground, *Jamat-e-Islam* organized a procession on 22<sup>nd</sup> April, 1885 against the election; supporters were injured and arrested by the police (Ali, 1986). During the election the police force fired in several locations and many people injured and one died; the army troops had to move to control the law and order situation (Ali, 1986).

## **Third UZP Election in 2009<sup>35</sup>**

The third upazila parishad election was held on January 22, 2009 in 479 Upazila Parishads. After 20 years of holding second upazila parishad election, the stage was set for holding the third upazila parishad election under the supervision of a most popular elected government (Government led by Awami League), and the nation was eager to see a free, fair and impartial election at the grassroots level. The Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) Dr. A. T. M. Shamsul Huda announced that the 3<sup>rd</sup> Upazila Parishad election will be held on January 22, 2009 in 481 upazilas across the country. But finally election was held in 479 upazilas.

## **Election Results and Analysis: Chairman and Vice-Chairman Posts**

The Awami League (AL) backed candidates fared better than those backed by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (B.N.P.) in the election held on January 22, 2009. In the high-voltage elections, held in 479 upazilas in a more or less peaceful manner and amid festivity, the AL-supported candidates won 313(66.17%) chairman posts while the pro-BNP candidates won 93(19.66%) chairman posts. Candidates backed by the Jamaat-e-Islami (Jamaat), a key ally of the BNP-led alliance, won 21(4.44%) chairman posts, Jatiya Party 21(4.44%), and rebels and other candidates 25(5.29%) chairman posts (Table- 5.7).

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<sup>35</sup> The empirical data on second UZP election was not available. Thus, it did not incorporate in the analysis.

**Table 5.7**  
**Election Results (2009) (Chairman Post)**

Chairman Post	Awami League (AL) Supported Candidate	B.N.P. Supported Candidate	Jataya Party Supported Candidate	Jamaat-e-Islami Supported Candidate	Others	Total	Voter Turnout
Total	313(66.17%)	93(19.66%)	21(4.44%)	21(4.44%)	25(5.29%)	473 out of 479, (473=100%)	67.69%

**Source:** The Daily Ittefaq - January 24, 2009.

**Table 5.8**  
**Election Results (2009) (Vice-Chairman Post)**

Vice Chairman Post	Awami League (AL) Supported Candidate	B.N.P. Supported Candidate	Jataya Party Supported Candidate	Jamaat-e-Islami (Jamaat) Supported Candidate	Others	Total
Male (M) and Female (F)	M-248 F-245	M-78 F-81	M-20 F-11	M-24 F-7	M-80 F-106	M-450 F-450
Total	493(54.78%)	159(17.67%)	31(3.44%)	31(3.44%)	186(20.67%)	900(100%)

**Source:** The Daily Prothom Alo - January 24, 2009 and January 25, 2009.

In the section of vice-chairman, like chairman posts the AL-backed candidates also fared better than those backed by the B.N.P. AL has got 248 male and 245 female and total 493(54.78%), B.N.P. has got 78 male and 81 female and total 159(17.67%), Jataya Party has got 20 male and 11 female and total 31(3.44%), Jamaat has got 24 male and 7 female and total 31(3.44%), and others have 80 male and 106 female and total 186(20.67%) vice-chairman posts out of 900 posts (450 male posts and 450 female posts- result was found from 450 upazilas) in 450 upazila parishads (Table-5.8). Voter turnout was 67.69% in this election.

### **Violence and Anomalies in the UZP election**

The incidence of violence and irregularities were seen in the third upazila parishad election. Snatching of ballot boxes and clashes between rival groups were marked in this election. Four people were killed and more than 200 were injured across the country. (The Daily

Ittefaq - January 24, 2009). There was also after election violence. (The Daily Prothom Alo - January 24, 2009).

#### **Fourth Upazila Parishad Election in 2014**

After the completion of 10th National Parliament Election on 5<sup>th</sup> January, 2014 in Bangladesh, The Election Commission (EC) concentrated on Upazila Parishad Election. The Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) Kazi Rakibuddin Ahmad announced that the 4<sup>th</sup> Upazila Parishad election will be started from February 19, 2014. Out of 487 upazila parishads across the country, elections to 97 upazilas will be held on February 19 and one on February 24 in the first phase, 117 on February 27 in the second phase while 83 on March 15 in the third phase. Earlier, the EC planned to hold all the upazila parishad elections in six phases and the last phase was supposed to be held on the first week of May. After that EC thinks to complete all the upazila parishad elections by March 31, 2014 in five phases. The EC plans to complete the elections immediately because it wants to avoid any possible trouble of rainy season. (p24news.wordpress.com). But finally it was held in six phases. Sixth phase was held on May 19, 2014. (The Daily Star- May 26, 2014).

#### **Election Results and Analysis: Chairman and Vice-Chairman Posts**

The BNP-backed candidates fared better than those backed by the Awami League (AL) in the first phase of the upazila polls on February 19, 2014. In the high-voltage elections, held in 97 upazilas in a mostly peaceful manner and amid festivity, the pro-BNP candidates won 42 chairman posts while the AL-supported ones bagged 34. Candidates backed by the Jamaat-e-Islami (Jamaat), a key ally of the BNP-led alliance, won 12 chairman posts, Jatiya Party 1, and rebels and other candidates 8. In first phase of polls B.N.P. has got 32 male and 38 female vice-chairman posts. AL has got 29 male and 37 female posts, Jatiya Party has got 3 male and 1 female posts and Jamaat has got 23 male and 10 female posts and others have 9 male and 11 female vice-chairman posts. Rebels of the AL and the BNP, who caused troubles for both the parties by refusing to quit the electoral race, couldn't do well in the first phase of the upazila polls. Voter turnout was 62.4% in the first phase. (Daily Prothom Alo- March 1, 2014).

The BNP has put up a better showing in the second phase of the upazila elections as well, widening its lead and dealing a blow to the ruling Awami League. In the polls to 115 upazilas on February 27, 2014 the BNP-blessed chairman candidates won in 51 upazilas and the AL-backed ones in 46. The candidates backed by the Jamaat-e-Islami won 8 chairman posts while candidates supported by the Jatiya Party, the main opposition in parliament, were able to secure only one. The candidates backed by regional political party Parbatya Chittagong Jana Sanghati Samiti (PCJSS) won two chairman posts, UPDF won one, and one went to an independent candidate. BNP rebels won two chairman posts, AL rebels one and PCJSS rebel one. (The Daily Star- February 28, 2014). In vice chairman posts in the second phase B.N.P. got 35 male and 66 female posts. AL has got 30 male and 32 female posts, Jatiya Party has got 2 male and 1 female posts and Jamaat has got 32 male and 9 female posts and others have 13 male and 6 female vice-chairman posts (see table 3 and 4). Voter turnout was 62.19% in the second phase. (Daily Prothom Alo- March 1, 2014).

The ruling Awami League has finally fought back in the third phase of upazila election, outshining its archrival BNP. The third phase election was held in 81 upazilas. The AL-backed candidates won 37 chairman posts while the BNP favourites 26. The election results in two upazilas were withheld, while that of one upazila was not available yet. Jamaat-e-Islami secured seven chairman posts. Liberal Democratic Party won in one upazila and PCJSS in two, but the Jatiya Party, the main opposition party in parliament, got none. The rebels who gave much pain to both the major parties performed badly again, as in the previous two phases, securing only four chairman posts. (The Daily Star- *March 16, 2014*). In the third phase B.N.P. got 18 male and 35 female vice-chairman posts. AL has got 27 male and 27 female posts, Jatiya Party has got 0 male and 0 female posts and Jamaat has got 23 male and 5 female posts and others have 8 male and 10 female vice-chairman posts (Table 5.9 and 5.10). Voter turnout was 64% in the third phase.

The Awami League has taken the lead from rival BNP in the chairman posts in the fourth phase of the upazila polls which was held on March 15, 2014 in 91 upazilas. AL-backed candidates secured 29 more chairman posts than their rival BNP-backed ones. They won 53 chairmen posts while their rivals supported by the BNP were able to win 24. Candidates backed by the Jamaat-e-Islami did well this time too. They won five chairman posts while contenders from the Jatiya Party, the main opposition in parliament, managed to secure one. A candidate backed by the Manju-led Jatiya Party for the first time won a chairman post in

the fourth phase. PCJSS, AL rebel and independent candidates won one chairman post each. (The Daily Star- *March 24, 2014*). In vice chairman posts in fourth phase B.N.P. got 16 male and 31 female posts. AL has got 36 male and 37 female posts, Jataya Party has got 1 male and 1 female posts and Jamaat has got 22 male and 5 female posts and others have 11 male and 14 female vice-chairman posts (Table 5.9 and 5.10). Voter turnout decreased in the fourth phase and it was 56.12%.

**Table 5.9**  
**Election Results (2014) (Chairman Post according to Party Strengths)**

Chairman Post	Awami League (AL) Supported Candidate	B.N.P. Supported Candidate	Jataya Party Supported Candidate	Jamaat-e-Islami Supported Candidate	Others	Total	Voter Turnout
First Phase	34	42	1	12	8	97 out of 98	62.4%
Second Phase	46	51	1	8	8	112 out of 115	62.19%
Third Phase	37	26	0	7	8	78 out of 81	64%
Fourth Phase	53	24	1	5	4	87 out of 91	56.12%
Fifth Phase	51	12	0	3	7	73 out of 73	61%
Sixth Phase	7	5	0	0	1	13 out of 13	59.47%
Total	228(49.57%)	160(34.78%)	3(0.65%)	35(7.61%)	36(7.83%)	460 out of 471, (460=100%)	

**Source:** Compiled by the researcher from the Newspapers.

**Table 5.10**  
**Election Results (2014) (Vice-Chairman Post according to Party Strengths)**

Vice Chairman Post	Awami League (AL) Supported Candidate	B.N.P. Supported Candidate	Jataya Party Supported Candidate	Jamaat-e-Islami (Jamaat) Supported Candidate	Others	Total
First Phase	*M-29 *F-37	M-32 F-38	M-3 F-1	M-23 F-10	M-9 F-11	M-96 out of 98 F-97 out of 98
Second Phase	M-30 F-32	M-35 F-66	M-2 F-1	M-32 F-9	M-13 F-6	M-112 out of 115 F-114 out of 115
Third Phase	M-27 F-27	M-18 F-35	M-0 F-0	M-23 F-5	M-8 F-10	M- 76 out of 81 F- 77 out of 81
Fourth Phase	M-36 F-37	M-16 F-31	M-1 F-1	M-22 F-5	M-11 F-14	M- 86 out of 91 F- 88 out of 91
Fifth Phase	M+F=83	M+F=18	M+F=1	M+F=21	M+F=18	M+F=141 out of 146
Total	338(38.11%)	289(32.58%)	10(1.13%)	150(16.91%)	100(11.27%)	887 out of 916, (887=100%)

**Source:** Compiled by the researcher from the Newspapers. \*M=Male and \*F=Female

*The fifth phase upazila parishad election was held on 31 March, 2014.* In the elections, marred by capture of polling centres and ballot-box stuffing, AL-supported candidates won 51 chairman posts while their rivals backed by the BNP secured just 12. Jamaat-favoured contenders won three chairman posts and Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti (PCJSS) runners two. Candidates supported by the Jatiya Party, the opposition in parliament, failed to win a single chairman post. AL rebels won three, BNP rebel one and an UPDF-backed candidate won one chairman post. In fifth phase, including male and female vice-chairman posts AL has got 83 posts, B.N.P. has got 18 posts, Jatiya Party has got 1 post, Jamaat has got 21 posts and others have 18 vice-chairman posts (Table 5.9 and 5.10). Voter turnout increased in the fifth phase compared to fourth phase and it was 61%.

The sixth phase election was held on *19 May, 2014 in 13 upazilas.* The ruling Awami League-backed chairman aspirants won in seven upazilas, while the BNP favourites came out victorious in five upazilas. One chairman post went to an Awami League rebel. (The Daily Star - *May 20, 2014*). Voter turnout was 59.47% in the sixth phase. (The Daily Star - *May 26, 2014*). Like chairman posts the BNP-backed candidates also fared better than those backed by the Awami League in the first phase of the upazila polls in vice chairman posts. In the second phase the BNP-backed candidates also took the lead from rival AL backed candidates in the vice-chairman posts. But in third, fourth and fifth and sixth phases AL has taken the lead from rival BNP in the vice-chairman posts. In every phase Jamaat backed candidates did well in the male vice-chairman posts. But they did not well in no phase in female vice-chairman posts.

After the first phase election, AL had taken all-out effort, including expulsion of rebel candidates and bagging their support, but it again lagged behind BNP in the second phase. Party lawmakers' interference in choosing candidates ignoring the grassroots, and deals between BNP and Jamaat were the key reasons behind ruling Awami League's defeat in the second-phase upazila elections. Although AL had earlier blamed its rebels for the defeat, it identifies the ties between BNP and Jamaat for the rival camp's success. (The Daily Star - *March 01, 2014*). The AL favourites had been trailing the BNP-backed candidates in the first two phases of the polls but they had closed the gap in the third and fourth phases, which too was marked by violence and anomalies. (The Daily Star- *March 24, 2014*). *Finally, in the fifth and the sixth phases it was seen that Al backed candidates reached the top position.*

It is seen upto the sixth phase that with the results of 460 out of 471 upazila parishads AL has got highest 228(49.57%), B.N.P. has got 160(34.78%), Jataya Party has got only 3(0.65%) and Jamaat has got 35(7.61%) and others have 36(7.83%) chairman posts. In vice-chairman posts, AL has got highest 338(38.11%) posts, B.N.P. has got 289(32.58%), Jataya Party has got 10(1.13%) and Jamaat has got 150(16.91%) and others have 100(11.27%) posts with the results of 887 out of 916 posts. Jamaat has done well in securing vice-chairman posts compared to chairman posts. Despite AL's vote rigging *and violence by B.N.P. and Jamaat*, B.N.P. retained lead in vice-chairman posts upto fourth phase.(The Daily Star-March 25, 2014).But finally in the fifth phase AL reached the top position in securing vice-chairman posts.

### **Violence and Anomalies**

Violence and anomalies have been increased phase by phase. In the first phase, anomalies were seen in 65 centres but this was a more or less peaceful election. In the second phase, anomalies were seen in 100 centres and 1 people was killed. In the third phase anomalies were seen in 200 centres (The Daily Prothom Alo-March 17, 2014). The third phase of the upazila elections saw violence deadlier than in the previous two phases, with at least two people were killed and more than 120 were injured across the country. A number of polling stations in around two dozens of the 81 upazilas that went to polls witnessed capturing of polling stations, stuffing and snatching of ballot boxes and clashes between rival groups and with law enforcers. (The Daily Star- March 16, 2014). The fourth phase of the upazila elections saw anomalies in 333 centres. (The Daily Prothom Alo-March 26, 2014). The polls on 23 March, 2014 had seen four deaths in four districts, major violence and snatching and burning of ballots in many areas, following which the EC had to countermand voting at 32 centres at 11 Upazilas. The fifth phase of the upazila polls concluded on 31 March, 2014 amid rigging and violence under the seemingly helpless watch of the law-enforcers. The incidence of violence and irregularities has progressively been on a rising curve, which reached the peak in the fifth phase.

The fifth phase saw capturing polling centres, driving away of voters and rival candidates' polling agents from polling booths and stuffing of ballot boxes with fake votes, and so on. (The Daily Star- April 02, 2014).More than 100 people were wounded in clashes between AL and BNP supporters in at least a dozen upazilas during the polling hours and 2 people were

killed. The Election Commission postponed polls at 19 centres in five upazilas following violence and irregularities. (*The Daily Star- April 01, 2014*). According to the Election Working Group (EWG) there was violence in 50% centres, 76% voters were warned by the political leaders for different reasons, 20% voters were deterred by the political leaders in casting their vote, 59% polling agent were turned out from the centres in fifth phase. (*The Daily Prothom Alo- April 03, 2014*). There was violence and anomalies in the sixth phase also though the election was held in few upazilas. The upazila chairman of Fulgaji in Feni district was killed. (*The Daily Prothom Alo- May 20, 2014*).

Although the ruling Awami League men were largely responsible for violence, supporters of the BNP and its ally Jamaat and even Jatiya Party were also locked in clashes at several polling centres. (*The Daily Star- March 16, 2014*). In this election most of the Hindu people faced trouble in casting their vote in different upazilas. (*The Daily Star- February 28, 2014*). The fact that instances of vote-rigging with attendant violence increased from the third phase of the polls to the fifth phase is also indicative of the ruling party's desperation to see its favourite candidates win by fair means or foul. (*The Daily Star- April 02, 2014*). The local administration and law enforcement agency largely failed to contain the violence and unlawful activities in the elections. The EC was silent about the anomalies and violence in the election until the deadliest anomalies and violence occurred in the third phase. Finally, the EC directed the army, police, RAB and Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) to prevent election violence. (*The Daily Prothom Alo- March 11, 2014*). But their direction was proved ineffective in the fourth and fifth phase's election. The EC by its brazen-faced complacency about the elections is only trying to defend the indefensible. (*The Daily Star- April 02, 2014*).

### **Comparison between Third (2009) and Fourth (2014) Upazila Parishad Election in Bangladesh**

The third and the fourth upazila parishad election can be compared on following grounds.

- i. The third upazila parishad election was held in a day whereas the fourth upazila parishad election was held in six phases in 6 different days.
- ii. In the third upazila parishad election AL won 66.17%, B.N.P. won 19.66%, JP won 4.44%, Jamaat won 4.44% and others won 5.29% chairman posts. On the other hand, in the fourth upazila parishad election AL won 49.57%, B.N.P. won 34.78%, JP won 0.65%, Jamaat won 7.61% and others won 7.83% chairman posts. (Table 1 and 3). So,

it is clear that the grand alliance or the parties who are in government are losing their popularity and the opponent parties' popularity is increasing.

- iii. In the third upazila parishad election AL won 54.78%, B.N.P. won 17.67%, JP won 3.44%, Jamaat won 3.44% and others won 20.67% vice-chairman posts. On the other hand, in the fourth upazila parishad election AL won 38.11%, B.N.P. won 32.58%, JP won 1.13%, Jamaat won 16.91% and others won 11.27% vice-chairman posts. (Table 2 and 4). This comparison also makes the same type of conclusion which was drawn for chairman post. It can be added that in the 1<sup>st</sup> year of the terms of 2009-2013, the Grand Alliance or Awami League had more popularity than the terms of January 2014-present. It should be included that Jamaat has less popularity among the women compared to other parties. (Table 2 and 4).
- iv. The average voter turnout of the six phases in upazila election 2014 was 60.86% and 64% was the highest turnout which was in the third phase. But the voter turnout in upazila election 2009 was 67.69%. This information indicates that the eagerness of the voter to cast their vote was higher in 2009 than that in 2014.
- v. In terms of violence and anomalies, it is seen that in the third upazila parishad election four people were killed and more than 200 were injured and there were complain for snatching of ballot boxes and vote rigging. But the fourth upazila parishad election saw violence deadlier than in the previous election (third upazila parishad election). More than 10 people were killed and many were injured during the six phases of election in 2014. This election saw capturing polling centres, driving away of voters and rival candidates' polling agents from polling booths and stuffing of ballot boxes with fake votes, and so on. Violence and anomalies have been increased phase by phase and the number of posts won by Awami League has been increased phase by phase. There was less violence and anomalies in the first two phases and the Awami League got less chairman and vice chairman posts than B.N.P. After that violence and anomalies were increased and the Awami League won more posts than B.N.P.

The continuity of the UZP election after every five years in Bangladesh is a good sign for democracy but the violence and anomalies are harmful for democracy. Though the UZP election does not cause any change in the central government, it just shows the popularity of the political parties in the local government. Nonetheless, the continuation of the UZP elections shows that at least the UZPs are institutionally structured and led by the elected representatives theoretically. Now we will turn our attention to examine the autonomy

practice of the UZP by analyzing the regulatory frameworks and the controlling mechanisms of the central government over the UZP.

## **5.6: Mechanisms of Central Control**

Like other local government institutions the UZP exercise the jurisdiction under the legislation. It means that local authority perform its activities under the provisions of the concerned Act and laws. The central government determined the legislation process for the local government system. The constitution of Bangladesh stated on autonomous local government but the local people's government controlled under central government. Siddique (2005) identified few pattern of control mechanism over the local government. Here, for the purpose of the analysis the patterns are being adopted for the UZP. The following analysis heavily based on siddique's (2005) analysis and adopted institutional, financial, and administrative controlling mechanisms which practiced by the central government to control over the local government in Bangladesh.

### **5.6.1: Institutional Control**

The government authorized according to the Upazila Act (1998) to determine or modify the territorial jurisdiction (size and boundaries) of the UZP system. It formulates the regulatory framework of structure and composition. This framework determines who will be head of the council, the number of members, categories of members and power and jurisdiction of the council members. Upazila elections held under the Election Commission (EC), which is an actor of central government mechanism. Centrally the election commission manifested the election administration of the UZP. Personnel are deputed from different cadre service of Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) for nation building departments at the Upazila level. Besides, the specific functions and jurisdiction of UZP the Act made it clear that any assigned work or guideline perform by the parishad according to the willingness of the central government. The regulatory authority Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives (MOLGRD&C) is an actor of central government, and generally headed by a powerful minister, who is a cabinet member as well as an elected Members of Parliament (MP). In these ways the central government controls the local government institutionally.

### **5.6.2: Financial Control**

The regulatory mechanism of the UZP clearly stated the source of income, areas of imposing tax, pattern of grants, loans. The government prescribes the scale and limit of all income sources and in any exception provisions to prior concern of LGD (siddique, 2005). Release of grants in phases according to the performance of development projects and other projects is being a strong tool of financial control. Along with these mechanism the central government have specific guideline and procedure on financial allocation, reallocation, accountancy maintain, and coordination among different strata of government. ADP is the biggest developmental budget of the government and the allocation of ADP share to the UZP distributed through the MOLGRD&C. It has specific procedure to maintain UZP fund including the salaries of chairman, vice chairman, remunerations of officials, daily expenses etc. Thus, financial control is the most important mechanism of central control to the local government.

### **5.6.3: Administrative Control**

The central government has the authority to review, amend, cancel, and postpone the provisions of regulatory mechanisms of the UZP. Moreover, central government deploys official bureaucrats to work in the UZP and these government official bureaucrats are directly controlled under the concerned ministry and they are directly responsible to the higher authority of their concern ministry not to the UZP. Besides, performances of the officials are being appraised by the UNO, who is an administration cadre under the Ministry of Public Administration (MOPA). Government oversees the functionaries of local government through inspection, reporting periodically, progress report, and field visiting. The government can remove the elected members of the council according to the provisions of dismissal or dissolution of the elected representatives of the UZP. In these mechanisms central government impose administrative control over the UZP.

### **5.6.4: Controlled by Central Local Relation Structure**

Central local relation in governance system of Bangladesh plays an influential political discretion over the local government control mechanism. Different stages of local government are being chosen to form local governing bodies as a development center based

on direct participation of the general people. Mechanism of formation, member inclusion, and jurisdictional context are being the subject of center and the decisions were changed simultaneously with the political regime change. Central local relation structure shapes, reshape, and hold the mechanical balance of power structure of local government. Core central government always is the superior authority of decision making and local bodies dependent on the relational structure. Moreover, central government controls the local government by the local Members of Parliament and allowing the development grant to them.

## **5.7: Conclusion**

The above analysis reveals that the introduction of the UZP focused on devolutionary development at the local level. Decentralization process centering the UZP at the core brings changes in legal institutional framework of central local relation. Ahmed (2009) identified three major areas of changes in legal institutional context. These three strata of changes revealed the politico-administrative relationships, inter role relationship among the bureaucrats, and changes of allocation of functions among the central and local administration. Theoretically, the intention of establishing the UZP was to move from bureaucracy to democracy. That means the elected representatives will authorize the development administration and governing the local people at local level and essentially it was the theme of devolutionary decentralization of the UZP system from sub-district concept.

Thus, the UZP accelerated the concept of people's administration at the local level to achieve and fostering effective local governance and development. Second, decentralized development policy initiatives at the upazila level changes the specialist generalist relations in inter bureaucratic relationships (Ahmed, 2009). Before the UZP system the official bureaucrats performed functions under a generalist Circle Officer (CO) in the sub-district level. From the British period, this tradition continued even in independent Bangladesh. Introduction of the UZP repealed the CO by UNO, who is also a generalist government official. The UNO is the chief executive official and the power to write the Annual Confidential Report (ACR) of the other official bureaucrats. No voting status of the official (specialist) participants on the UZP meeting makes them dependent on the council especially on chief executive official (UNO). Status of the specialist officials remains a subject of frequent change with the change of the UZP framework to perform the development activities

at the local level. In present structure the pattern of inter role relationship among the officials reveals a generalist dominant mechanism over the nation building specialist officials.

Third, two categories of functions perform by the UZP: retained and transferred (see the Appendix). Under the retained functions development planning of different term; building link road between different union parishad; optimal management of water resource; ensuring services like public health, nutrition and family planning; development of sanitation and ensuring the supply of pure drinking water; accelerating primary, secondary, and madrasa education; accelerating handy craft and small industry; supporting and coordinating co-operatives, private volunteer organizations; support to female, child, social welfare activities and youth, sports, cultural activities; initiate and implement program on agriculture, animal husbandry, fisheries, and forestry; maintain law and order; program for creating self-employment and poverty reduction; examine, coordinate, and provide support to union level development activities; promoting public awareness regarding child and female abuse; promoting public awareness regarding criminal activities; adopting program to protect the environment and performing government assigned work at any time.

Transferred departments are youth and sports; fisheries and livestock; health and family planning; female and child affairs; primary education; local government, rural development, and cooperatives; agriculture; disaster management; social welfare; and the establishment division (Ministry of Public Administration) through the maintenance of UNO and government officials. Collecting and managing financial resources as a means of imposing taxes, fees, tolls, levies etc at upazila level. Utilizing and managing the allotted fund from the Annual Development Program (ADP). ADP fund administered as a means of control by the government official on the other hand the parishad had control over 20% of ADP allocation (Ahmed, 2009). These are the expected outcome of the UZP. But in practice, what is happening in the governance structure of UZP in the existing institutional structure and who is dominating the governance? To address these questions, we will consider three dimensional analyses – nature and practice of central regulation, and functions or role performance and satisfaction of the actors involved in the UZP governing process by following these central regulations in the empirical level.

# **Chapter – 6: Politicians and Bureaucrats in Local Government: Analysis of Relationship Underpinning Variables**

## **6.1 Introduction**

In the first chapter of this thesis, we have set two major questions: how do the local elected politicians and appointed official bureaucrats differ from each other? And what factors determine the relationships between them? Accordingly, in the theoretical part of the thesis, a possible hypothetical answer of these questions has been explored providing the theoretical argument that, there is a substantial level of genetic difference between local elected politicians and official bureaucrats considering some systemic/organizational as well as contextual factors which influence to shape the relationships between local elected politicians and bureaucrats. Thus, the purpose of the subsequent two chapters is to explore how these variables work? And which variable construct the foundation of relationship more explicitly between politics and bureaucracy in the empirical perspective in the context of local government, special reference to the UZP of Bangladesh.

## **6.2 The Systemic or Organizational Factors**

### **6.2.1 Recruitment, Training and Motivation**

Recruitment, training and motivations are very important functions for any political and administrative or organizational system. This is the first and for most comprehensive obligation for organizational entity according to the organization theory. To make proper policy decisions and implementation of that policy effectively, every organization applies their best *modus operandi* to recruit, training and motivates their employees for organizational efficiency. In the political system, recruitment and retention of competent political leaders (politicians) and public employees (bureaucrats) is crucial in order to congregate the necessities of the country and smooth the advancement of the accomplishment of the objectives of the government. On the contrary, training is a process of involving a sequence of programmed behavior and facilitating the application of knowledge (Huque and Vyas, 2004). Although systematic and organized training is a recent phenomenon but it is not a new in the realm of public management. It is the product of eighteenth century. In the

organizational literature, Frederick Taylor in his book *The Principles of Scientific Management* (1911) introduced training as one of the organizational factors which contributes to the productivity and organizational performance. Baron (1981:88) observes training as “the systematic development of the attitude/knowledge/skill behavior pattern required by an individual in order to perform adequately a given task or job.” Shafritz (2001:306) defines “training is a tool; it is instruction in a myriad of forms and settings, in which both technical and conceptual knowledge and skills are imparted to employees, both non-managers and managers” (cited in Huque and Vyas, 2004:23. Huque and Vyas (2004:3) define “Training is a course of action that results in developing skills, behavior, awareness, understanding and ability in human resources, which helps in increasing the effectiveness of employees to work in their present government positions as well as prepares them for the prospective government.” Training also helps the employees to understand their responsibilities in the organization and justifies their attitudes and values towards the desired organization.

So the major functions of training are to socialize individuals into the organization and to help them develop appropriate expectations for role performance in their specific respective positions. Similarly, motivation is understood as the set of forces that cause people to behave in certain ways. Motivation is related to performance. The performance of a person depends on his/her ability backed by motivation.  $Performance = f(\text{ability} \times \text{motivation})$ . The ability or motivation alone cannot work well (Aswathappa, 2008). Where there is motivation backed ability, there is the good performance. To become successful, an organization must offer something to its employees that accelerate the ability of the employees to accomplish the given tasks efficiently.

However, if we apply these three concepts to the local elected politicians and official bureaucrats then we can find out mammoth differences between them in the context of recruitment, training and motivation. To know how the local politicians and bureaucrats are recruited in their respective political positions (as a member of political party – whatever may be the political party) and in the public service (bureaucratic positions) the respondents were asked a similar question about their recruitment process. The empirical data (which outlined in the table 6.1) shows that all the local elected politicians replied that they were involved in politics willingly, and motivated by their respective political party ideology and to maximize their self-interest. On the other hand, all the official bureaucrats are appointed in their service

position recruited by the central government by the competitive public examination, and they are deployed to deliver the services to the people at the local government.

**Table 6.1**

Recruitment of local politicians and bureaucrats

<i>Method of Recruitment</i>	<i>Politicians</i>		<i>Bureaucrats</i>	
	Frequency	Per cent	Frequency	Per cent
Willingly/Motivated by political ideology and self-interest	70	100	-	-
Recruited by competitive exam	-	-	70	100
Total	70	100	70	100

Source: Field Survey

The empirical data reveals that the recruitment process of politicians and bureaucrats are completely different. Simultaneously the respondents were also asked about their formal training that is “do you have any formal training?” To this question, all of the local politicians provided the answer that they don’t have any formal training as a member of the political party whereas all appointed local bureaucrats have at least foundation training as a government employees. Some of the bureaucrats have foreign training also. Rather than the difference between the politico-bureaucratic recruitment and training, several reasons can be found for the difference between the two categories of respondents in respect of their motivations. Although the motivational question was not included directly in the formal questionnaire because it is very sensitive issue for politicians and bureaucrats but I was interested to know the motivational difference between the two actors and while the interview and discussion with the respondents they were asked informally what factor motivated them either in politics or in government service?

Notable that, motivational question what were asked to the respondents did not follow the content and process theories of motivation. Yet we know there are two types of theories of motivation. These are the content and process theories of motivation. The content theory try to identify what motivates people at work, whereas the process theories are more concerned with the complex processes involved in work motivation (Luthans, 2005). The local elected politicians and bureaucrats were assured that their answer will be categorized by skipping their name to protect their anonymity. Thus the local politicians were asked simply “why you were involved in politics rather than to be a bureaucrat and what factors motivated you to be involved in politics?” The same question was asked to the respondent bureaucrats with opposite direction. The respondents data outlined in the following table 6.2.

**Table 6.2**

## Motivational Factors of Local Politicians and Bureaucrats

Motivation	Politicians		Bureaucrats	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Family tradition/pressure	5	7.14	18	25.71
To serve the people/Nation	35	50.00	21	30.00
For power and influence/prestige	14	20.00	12	17.14
Self-interest	16	22.86	6	8.57
Job security	-	-	13	18.57
Total	70	100	70	100

Source: Field Survey

The data from the table demonstrates that 5 (7.14) % local politicians provided the answer that they were motivated by the family tradition to be involved in politics. Either their father or grandfather or any other members of the family were involved in politics that is inspired them to be involved in politics and even though some of them were either elected chairman or member at the local council. One of the elected local politicians reported in this respect that-

I have involved in politics because of my family tradition. I am bearing the legacy of politics in my blood. My grandfather was an elected chairman during Pakistan period. My father was also an elected chairman and he held the post twenty years as a chairman. After being college graduate I have decided to be involved in business although I had affiliation with student politics during the college life. But after death of my father the local people gave me pressure to be involved in politics as I was born and brought up in a political family. Thus, I have involved in politics and now I am working as a general secretary of Bangladesh Awami League in my Upazila and as an elected chairman. I think political tradition of my family was the driving force and motivation factor in my case.

On the other hand 18 (25.71) % and 13 (18.57) % bureaucrats replied that they were involved in government service motivated by their family pressure and considering job security. In this respect, one bureaucrat reported that-

Before joining to the government service as a bureaucrat, I worked in a multinational company with high salary. But I was not satisfied with my job status and security. Because, it was not permanent position and it was renewable for every year. Thus, I was worried about my future. Moreover, my father was a government service holder. He always inspired me and sometimes gave me pressure to be a professional bureaucrat dropping private job and thus, after being resigned from the private job, I appeared in the Bangladesh Civil Service Examination.

Although after being university graduate I have been preparing for the BCS exam but I was not successful. Lastly at the end of my age limit, I became successful securing a position in the admin cadre of BCS exam. Now I can realize that it was a good decision and needed in the context of my family. Therefore, I am also giving pressure to my other two younger brothers to be professional bureaucrats in future as still they have scope.

The second factor was reported by the respondents “to serve the people/nation”. Among the respondent local politicians and bureaucrats 35 (50.00) % and 21 (30.00) % hold that they were involved in politics or in government service to serve the people/nation respectively. Both the elected politicians and local bureaucrats think that they are serving the people/nation though the way of their serving pattern might be different. Similarly motivation for power and influence/prestige and individual interest maximization are also observable facts in the different context which also signifies the motivational tools and content and process theories of motivation, specially Maslow’s need hierarchy theory. Motivational tools refer to the instruments that prompt individuals to action. There are two types of motivational tools. These are monetary and non-monetary tools or incentives. Monetary tools include salary, bonus etc. Non-monetary tools include promotion, recognition, job enrichment etc. (Khanka, 2007).

On the other hand, Maslow’s need hierarchy theory refers to the existence of hierarchy of needs. Once lower order needs are fulfilled, a person is motivated by higher order needs. Two-factor theory refers to the two distinct set of factors that affect motivation. These factors are hygiene and motivation factors. Alderfer said about three types of needs that are existence, relatedness and growth needs. McClelland argues that individuals are motivated by three types of needs that are need for achievement, need for power and need for affiliation (Aswathappa, 2008). According to the Vroom’s expectancy theory,  $\text{Force} = \text{Valence} \times \text{Expectancy}$ . Here, force is the strength of a person’s motivation, valence is the strength of an individual’s preference for an outcome, and expectancy is the probability that a particular action will lead to a desired outcome (Wehrich and Koontz, 2008). Equity theory explains that one’s motivation depends on one’s perceiving of equity or inequity. The empirical data reveals the theories of motivation. But difference is that, local politicians and bureaucrats are motivated by these factors inversely either consciously or subconsciously.

## 6.2.2 Politico-Administrative Culture and Values

We have observed in the earlier section that, there is a significant level of difference between local elected politicians and bureaucrats in their recruitment, training and motivation. This section deals with politico-bureaucratic culture which has special importance to the relationships among them. The concept of culture has become a tool in the study of organizations/institutions in the last several decades which include: attitudes, beliefs, values, norms, symbols, rituals and ceremonies. Politico-administrative culture refers to dominant norms and values that shape and influence politicians and bureaucrat's attitude, interpersonal relationships, behavior and performance in the process of governance and development (Jamil, 2007). The cultural theorists argue that everything is bonded by the culture and nothing is free from culture including institutions (Tayeb, 1988; Thompson et al. 1990). Although, Huntington (1968) noted that the failure of changing societies to sustain governance is not to their culture, but to the absence of strong, stable and resilient institutions whereas prof. Mitra (2006) emphasizes both of them. The behavior of organizational actors and the level of governance of an organization depend on the ability of the stakeholders to learn the rules of the organization and conduct their services according to those rules (Mitra, 2006). If we emphasize the rules of organization as a culture then it can be provide the argument that culture is an independent variable and it refers "what organization is" (Jamil, 2007). In that case, whatever may be actors involved in an organization their behavior is likely to be homogeneous and they will be worked with learned rules keeping them alike to the same norms, values and attitude with keeping away personal emotions and considerations. It reminds us the Weberian model of relationships – closed system, machine model or dehumanization (Weber, 1947).

On the other hand, if we consider human relation in the organization and treat culture as "what organization has" (Jamil, 2007) then culture can be treat as dependent variable and it depends on individual attitude and leadership traits. In that case, the organizational behavior and culture will be diverse according to their genetic character of the actors those are involved in the organization. Then the behavior of politicians and bureaucrats is likely to be different as it is very difficult "to find parallel forms of behavior between bureaucrats and politicians" (Aberbach et al. 1981:31) in considering the politico-administrative culture although they are involved in the same organizational or institutional structure. So, on the basis of cultural diversity of politicians and bureaucrats the argument can be provided that

culturally bureaucrats are procedure and rule oriented as they are value neutral. On the other hand, culturally politicians are development goal oriented as they are ideological and value-laden and they want to emphasize diffusive public interest what Almond and Verba called “subject political culture” (Almond and Verba, 1963:19). Taking into account the above theoretical arguments on the difference between politico-bureaucratic cultures, now we will provide empirical data to verify the argument.

### **6.2.3 Legitimacy and the Style of Leadership**

This section endeavors to identify the legitimacy and style of leadership of the political leaders’ vis-à-vis the bureaucracy that shapes the patterns of relationship between them. Legitimacy refers to the general acceptance of authority to rule. That means while the ruled believes that any particular authority which has acquired power legally and they have support to that particular authority then it provides legitimacy to the ruler. According to Lipset (1960:77) “legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society.”

Weber emphasized to outline the rudiments of the theory of legitimate domination in *Economy and Society*. Weber used the terms “domination” and “authority” interchangeably in his discussion and “both derive from the German term *herrschaft*, which indicates leadership, political authority and domination” (Morrison, 1995: 283). Weber has seen legitimacy as legal authority or domination within an “established order” to issue commands to others and expect them to obey. In essence, “by the term legitimacy Weber was referring to the extent to which officials, groups and individuals actively acknowledge the validity of the ruler in an established order, and the right of the ruler to issue commands” (cited from Morrison, 1995:283). Having established the importance of the concept of legitimacy Weber put forward three types of authority or domination: charismatic, traditional and rational-legal. Whatever may be the types of authority, legitimacy is the major concern and “without legitimacy and trust, it is difficult to obtain the economic and political resources necessary for the state to implement policies in a competent way” (Rothstein, 2012:407).

However, there is a substantial level of difference between the politicians and bureaucrats in the method of gaining legitimacy which may impact on their relations. Why legitimacy varies

between the two actors is simple. Unlike elected politicians, bureaucrats are neither voted in nor can be voted out of office (Rothstein, 2012:407). The legitimacy of the political leaders comes from the people by the process of elections. On the other hand, bureaucrats gain their legitimacy by the legal/constitutional process of the state structure and they are selected or appointed, not elected on the basis of technical qualifications (Weber, 1946). That means it comes either through the legal structure or from the people's verdict in modern society. Secondly, another difference between them is in the question of succession. The politicians come to the ruling position because of the leader's "gift of grace" or in an established order through the election or traditional norms of inherited right and they stay until a selective time. But the bureaucrats come to the ruling position by the selection or appearing in the competitive exam and in a manner of legal and constitutional process as agents and they stay in administrative position until their retirement.

Thus, politicians are transitory and bureaucrats are undying force in administration. Third difference involves in the output of the government. The politicians are committed to perform all functions within their tenure as they emphasize re-election goals and hold interests and values. Whereas, bureaucrats are committed to perform selective functions by priority basis as they emphasize and concern with career goals, red tape, patron-client interests and hold fact and knowledge (Aberbach et al, 1981). The fourth difference occurs in their leadership styles and traits, although there is no common argument as to what characteristics distinguish a political leader from a bureaucrat, what functions political leaders perform, and the effectiveness of their leadership styles. Nonetheless, if we consider Weberian classification of leadership traits then politicians belong to the charismatic and traditional dominations or leaderships while bureaucrats belong to the only rational-legal authority. On the other hand, bureaucrats always emphasize rational decision making and hierarchical order in rational-legal structure of domination. Whereas, politicians in contrast emphasize "a certain quality of an individual's personality which is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or exceptional powers and qualities" and non-hierarchical offices in a charismatic domination and "that the administrative staff of a charismatic leader does not consist of "officials" and least of all are its members technically trained" (*Economy and Society*, Pp. 241-243).

Similarly, the traditional domination emphasizes customs, rituals, hereditary process, and it patronage patrimonial and patriarchal forms of administration. Therefore, both charismatic

and traditional authority does not adhere to norms of rational decision making and thus resist bureaucratic development and administration (Morrison, 1995). These separate traits of leadership style of politicians and bureaucrats underpin the relationships between them. In this respect, to know the source of legitimacy of local elected politicians and appointed official bureaucrats and the style of their leadership in operation, they were asked – what are their strength and how do they prefer to work? To this question, all of the respondent political leaders provided the answer that peoples are the source of their power and they are the elected representatives of the people. Whatever they want to do in the governance structure of local government is related to the people’s interest and their needs in any fashion. Whereas, most of the bureaucrats think that they are the administrative agents of the central government and their source of legitimacy is legal framework of the central government and they are bound to follow the legal instructions of the administration. In this respect, one elected politician’ and one bureaucrat’ empirical observations are remarkable. During the in-depth interview, one elected chairman observed that-

I did not come here (present position) automatically. I have sacrificed last twenty years of my life for the local people and I have created my support base to the people those who sent me to this position as their representative. I can understand the pulse of my people. I understand what they want to me and what should I do. If I can do nothing for them then holding this position is just meaningless to me. As an elected representative of the local people, I am much more aware of the real needs of the people and what should be the most priority. The local bureaucrats do not have more clear idea than me. They are appointed for the time being and may be after two or three years they will be transferred to elsewhere from here. But I will be remained here either as an elected chairman or as a local political leader. But disgracefully they (bureaucrats) behave like that they are more aware than me to the local priorities. Why I am saying this because, at least four months ago, I had approved a project by the UZP meeting on a culvert which was very much important to implement before rainy season. Unfortunately, UNO did not disburse fund still today on the project by claiming that it was overestimated of the budgetary process, and he gave the opinion to re-estimate the budget. Moreover, most of the government officials in this upazila are similar. They think that they are the master of the people, not the public servants, and all should be done by following their directions and consent. They always show the complex rules and procedure of the government without thinking the urgent needs of the local people. Now you should realize what short of relationship is prevailing in the existing UZP system and between us.

While the interview with the UNO<sup>36</sup> of the concern upazila, I placed the above observation before to the UNO that claimed by the elected representative of the upazila to me during the

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<sup>36</sup> UNO (Upazila Nirbahi Officer) is the chief bureaucrat of the UZP and he is the disbursing officer of the fund. He also works as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) as well as agent of national government to the local government.

interview. In response to the above observation of the elected politician the reaction of the UNO was as follows:

I would say nobody should forget his existence and limitations. Both of us – elected representatives and government officials have legal rights and legitimacy to run the system. It does not mean that anybody can do whatever he or she likes. I admit that Upazila chairman has people' verdict to direct and govern the system, simultaneously I also have the same legal legitimacy to look after the matters that is provided by the legal authority of the central government. I am also to clarify about all my activities to the higher administrative authority and sometimes to the central political leaders. The same principle is applicable to all officers of the UZP. But the unfortunate part of our partnership in local government (especially in UZP) is that elected representatives try to do everything overnight without realizing the legal limitations and overlooking the rationality whereas, we are bound to follow the existing rules and regulations. Nonetheless, I would not disagree that we also try to do something beyond the rules and regulations but the approach and style is different, and it not once denying and delaying to the needs of the local people.

The above two empirical observations reveal that, the distinctions between local politicians and bureaucrats in their legitimacy and the style of leadership is clear and thus local bureaucrats emphasize the structural aspects of the relationship, and they are assumed to the legitimate authority and take the lead with legal power. Thus, even any changes in structural arrangements providing political control over the bureaucracy often fail to produce significant variation in the relationship pattern between them (Ahmed, 2009: 20).

#### **6.2.4 Professionalism and Specialized Knowledge**

Professionalism and specialized knowledge are important underpinning variables of politics-bureaucracy relationship. The issue of professionalism in the politics and bureaucracy has been capturing a central place in the discussion of modern public administration as administration runs by both politicians and bureaucrats. Patterns of relationship in administration between politicians and bureaucrats always had been a term of query in the sense of professionalism and expertise of knowledge. Near about one century back in 1918, toward the end of his notable career as a social theorist, Max Weber was asked by his students to speak on the political choices facing postwar Germany. In a long lecture Weber mentioned the emergence of professional politicians and professional bureaucrats. He had predicted that twentieth century politics would be dominated by career politicians and bureaucrats but that bureaucrats, with superior knowledge and experience, would tend to

dominate the politicians (Weber, 1958). Freidson (2001) sketched three alternative models of knowledge production to study the links between power and profession, first model refers specialized workers are controlled by informed and rational consumers who seek quality knowledge service at minimum cost; second model motivated by Max Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy; third model featured knowledge workers and high quality products (Picciotto, 2011). Kimbrough and Tado (1967) identified division of labor based on functional specialization and promotion and selection based on technical competence as important dimensions of bureaucracy among six dimensions. These models composing the importance of policy decisions to meet the consumers quality demands. Professional knowledge needs to make effective policy decisions. Special knowledge or expertise is an obvious means of decision making to assist wise choice among alternatives. These policy making decisions is an area of competition between politicians and bureaucrats. In this regard, Curtis (2002) stated that politicians and bureaucrats struggled to control over public policy making decisions in democratic and economically developed countries. Krogt (2007) pointed the importance of political primacy and professional discretion's compatibility in technical policy making. Anderson and Jakobsen (2013) pointed out that politicians can benefit by professional bureaucrats in policy area through greater expertise.

Above all theoretical arguments reveal that public policy decision needs professional and expertise knowledge. Professional knowledge and public policy decision making is the area of competition and combination between the politicians and bureaucrats. However, the major question is that, how we will define professionalism in politics and administration? Yet we have two identical options to define professional politicians according to Max Weber. Weber in his "Politics as a Vocation" (1958:84) defined professionalism in politics as "one (who) lives 'for' politics or one (who) lives 'off' politics." He determined professional politicians in two sense – "internal sense" and "economic sense". The politician "who lives 'for' politics makes politics his life" and he enjoys power position consciously or unconsciously as "self-feeling" and find the meaning of his life for this cause. On the other hand, the politician "who strives to make politics a permanent *source of income* lives 'off' politics as a vocation, whereas he who does not do this lives 'for' politics" (Weber, 1958:84). Eventually, Weber's observation was that professional politicians "must be economically independent of the income politics can bring him" and the professional politicians will not seek remuneration or salaries for his political activities. If it is not been the case then politicians would be corrupted and there would be no difference between politicians and salaried officials (Weber,

1958: 84-86). However, (Borchert, 2003:1-3) argued that historically, this has not always been the case of political professionalization and Weber also himself described very insightfully the changing process of political professionalization in western democracies where “traditional politicians – essentially local notables – who “lived for politics” were increasingly replaced by new-style politicians, party functionaries who “lived off politics”.....while the party bureaucrat did not become the archetype of a professional politician.” One respondent local elected politician’ and one official bureaucrat’ statement proves Weberian logic of political professionalization and differentiation of professional practice in local politics and administration in Bangladesh. One local elected politician reveals that-

Nobody knows what will happen tomorrow. As I can say about myself that I always had been hate to the politics from my young age. Thus after being university graduate I became a college teacher and I was involved in teaching profession ten years. As a local citizen of this area and college teacher, I had been involvement to the people of my Upazila in their joys and sorrows as per my ability. In 2009, when the government was planning to held the Upazila election then one of my colleagues suggest me to contest in the upcoming Upazila election as I had little bit popularity to the mass people of this Upazila. Then I thought how it is possible as I have no connection to any main stream political party? Lastly, I decided to contest in the election as an independent candidate by resigning from the teaching profession. Fortunately or unfortunately, there were more than two candidates of all main stream political parties in my Upazila. Therefore, I elected as chairman and after being elected then I involved in politics having a post of a major political party. Now I am a twenty four hours politicians and trying to provide service to the people.

From the above statement, we observed how a non-professional person turned to a professional politician does. On the other hand, one of the sample bureaucrats observed that-

I know why I am here. As a government official, we should follow the direction of the superior authority and we are always bound by the professional code of conduct. According to our professional code of conduct, it is totally forbidden to be involved in partisan politics as a bureaucrat, although there is a contentious alleged to bureaucratic involvement in politics indirectly whether they are in service. I will not go through that debate. But I would say, according to our job description, we are not allowed to do direct politics. However, we may involve in politics after retirement from the government service and there is a lot of example. But any involvement in partisan politics directly is impossible until we are in service.

Therefore, it reveals from the above two observations of local politician and bureaucrat that the nature of professionalism and its practice between politicians and bureaucrats are different. As Wilson (1989) viewed thatpoliticians are motivated by a “re-election goal”

whereas bureaucrats are motivated by a “career concern”. Politicians are transitory and bureaucrats are undying forces to serve the people of the state. Moreover, there is also a theoretical paradox in considering professionalism in bureaucracy. One view treats professionalism of bureaucracy as a threat to democracy and representative government, and other as a necessary condition for effective governance (Farazmand, 1997a:1). As a result, a sharp differentiation of professionalism between politics and bureaucracy always exist in the process where bureaucrats are more professional than the politicians in considering their policy expertise and knowledge – bureaucrats are more expert than politicians “who possess special knowledge and skills” (Demir and Nyhan, 2008:83). This segregate nature of professionalism and specialized knowledge determines the model of relationship between politicians and bureaucrats. Nonetheless, it can be said that more professional involvement in politics and administration reduces politics-administration conflict. That means more the experience in politics and administration less the conflict between them.<sup>37</sup>

### **6.2.5 Institutional Structure**

In the theoretical part of the thesis, we have already implied that the relationship between local elected politicians and bureaucrats can be viewed as an institutional perspective. That means what will be the apt relationship between the two actors is determined by the nature of institutional structure. Institutional structure is most important variable among the organizational or systemic factors. What will be the roles and relations between or among the actors those are involved in the organization explicitly depend on three important principles: philosophical principle of institutional structure, nature of services and autonomy practice. When an institution is built up following the Hierarchal-Subordination Model or the principles of classical Weberian-Wilsonian philosophy of separate duties then theoretically, “politicians are the hierarchal leaders of the administration, as well as employers for the administrators” (Jacobsen, 2001:8) thus results the dichotomous relationship between politicians and bureaucrats. On the other hand, when the institution is built up following the philosophy of overlapping roles then the relations is likely to be mutual. Secondly, the relations between politicians and bureaucrats depend on the nature of services provided by the particular institution. This implied that when the institution will be built up for providing “Prescriptive Service” then bureaucrats will dominate over the politicians. In contrast, in the

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<sup>37</sup> For more empirical evidence see the subsequent chapter of the thesis.

case of “Political Machine” politicians will dominate over the bureaucracy. Bjorkman, (1979) provides this kind of argument in the case of Indian local government and bureaucracy. He finds that as Indian Civil Services and Indian local government is established for prescriptive service thus it is dominated by the British minded bureaucracy. Consequently, different types of roles and relationships may emerge in the interaction of local politicians and bureaucrats (Bjorkman, 1979:10-12). The third factor is autonomy practice and the degree of central control over the local government. If the local government can purely exercise autonomy and free from central control then relations between elected representatives and bureaucrats is likely to be less conflicting than the central control institution. Therefore, the relations between local elected politicians and bureaucrats are influenced by institutional setting.

Historically, local government institutions of Bangladesh are controlled by the central government with various mechanisms and it is regulated by the central regulations, although legally and constitutionally local governments are supposed to be autonomous body. As we have already observed from the previous chapter that the central or national government authorized according to the Upazila Act (1998) to determine or modify the territorial jurisdiction (size and boundaries) of the UZP system. It formulates the regulatory framework of structure and composition. This framework determines who will be head of the council, the number of members, categories of members and power and jurisdiction of the council members. Personnel are deputed from different cadre service of Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) at the Upazila level. Besides, the specific functions and jurisdiction of the UZP the Act made it clear that any assigned work or guideline perform by the parishad according to the willingness of the central government. The regulatory authority Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives (MOLGRD&C) is an actor of central government, and generally headed by a powerful minister, who is a cabinet member as well as an elected Members of Parliament (MP). In these ways the central government controls the local government institutionally which ultimately affect the roles and relations between local politicians and bureaucrats.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> How far the institutional structure and the nature of central control influence the roles and relations between elected politicians and local official bureaucrats as well as the governance and development at the local level (especially in the UZP) has been elaborately explained by examining the hypothetical causal statement in the next chapter of the thesis on the basis of empirical data.

## 6.3. The Contextual Factors

### 6.3.1 Social Background and Role Orientation

Several empirical studies show that politicians and bureaucrats are belonged to two distinctive social classes and these distinctive social characteristics are associated with distinctive role perceptions and values. They provided the argument that distinctive social background and role perceptions of politicians and bureaucrats display different interaction patterns both at the central and the local government (Ahmad, 1964; Kothari and Roy, 1969; Bjorkman, 1979; Aberbach *et al.*, 1981; Campbell, 1988; Svara, 1990; Ahmed, 2009).<sup>39</sup> This different interaction patterns may influence the level of relationships.

Thus, how does the social background influence on the role orientation and the relationship between them remains a hypothetical question? We may explore this issue addressing the following questions – do they belong to two distinctive social classes? How do the social characteristics influence their roles and relations? In this regards, another important question is the identification of social background. That means how we will measure social background and on what basis? Therefore, in this research we identified a set of variables as social background such as age, gender, education, experience, family background, rural-urban status, parents' occupation and parents' income which were included as demographic variables in the questionnaire. In the literature, the elite composition is always shown a disproportionate representation of general people and of educated, high-status male dominated, particularly at the political and administrative hierarchy (Aberbach *et al.*, 1981:47). Moreover, general argument is that political and administrative elites are originated from different social origins.

Taking into account this argument in cognizance, it is may be more rigorous to become familiar with the social background (where they actually belong to the social strata) of local elected politicians and local bureaucrats before examining the role perceptions. Thus, first of all, we will try to address the question – do the local elected politicians and official bureaucrats belong to two distinctive social classes or not? This study covers only those politicians and bureaucrats who are serving at the local government as an elected

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<sup>39</sup> This research also seems that social background and role orientation is closely correlated. But how does the distinctive social characteristic is associated with distinctive role perceptions and values? Is there any correlation between them? Do the different role perceptions display different interaction patterns between politician and bureaucrats? All of these questions are examined comprehensively in the subsequent chapter of the thesis along with the normative role perceptions of the local elected politicians and bureaucrats.

representatives and appointed officials. Logical inferences drawn on the basis of descriptive statistics by comparing the demographic variables of the respondents' local politicians and bureaucrats.

### **Age of the Respondent Local Politicians and Bureaucrats**

Many empirical studies considered age an important demographic variable to clarify whether age differences have any significance influence on roles and relations between politicians and bureaucrats (Ahmed, 2009). In this research, the age difference between local elected politicians and bureaucrats has shown in a comparative perspective and then it has shown whether it has significance in role orientations and relations.

**Table 6.3**  
**Comparison between Politicians and Bureaucrats (By Age Group)**

<b>Age Group</b>	<b>Politicians</b>		<b>Bureaucrats</b>	
	<b>Number</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Percent</b>
20-30	0	0	4	5.7
31-40	14	20.0	33	47.1
41-50	25	35.7	17	24.3
51-60	22	31.4	16	22.9
61+	9	12.9	0	0
Total	70	100.0	70	100.0

Source: Field Survey

The sample politicians and bureaucrats in the survey of this study ranged from twenty to sixty plus years of age. Notable that, the minimum age of contesting in the election is 25 years for the politicians while the minimum age for joining to the government service or in bureaucracy is 21. On the other hand, there is no age limit for politicians to get retirement from politics whereas the retirement age for bureaucrats is 59. Table 6.3 shows that, in general, most of the respondents belonged to the 30-50 age category. More particularly, 47 (33.6%) sample respondents belonged to the age group 31-40, 42 (30%) sample respondents belonged to the age group 41-50, 38 (27.2%) sample respondents belonged to the age group 51-60. Rest of the respondents belonged to the 61-80 age category and they are all local politicians. On the other hand, the comparative account of their age shows that the minimum age of politicians is 33, maximum age is 79 and mean age is 49.79, whereas, the minimum

age of bureaucrats is 26, maximum age is 57 and mean age is 42.11 (see the appendix 2 for details). Overall, the comparative study of age between politicians and bureaucrats shows that local elected politicians are older than local official bureaucrats and they keep themselves involved in politics more days than the administrator. Now the question is – is there any significance correlation between age and roles and relations? This analysis attempts in the later part of this chapter not only by the age but also including all the demographic variables with the statistical analysis.

### **Gender of the Respondent Local Politicians and Bureaucrats**

In terms of gender, the sample respondents’ demographic data illustrate that the average male involvement and domination in politics and administration is more than female. Aberbach et al, (1981:47) state that “the world of power remains essentially a man’s world.” But in the case of Bangladesh the statement disproves because according to the Ordinance of the local government there are some post reserved for women and participation of women in local government is mandatory and it has been confirmed by the constitution. Unfortunately, they cannot enjoy such power and domination because of “iron law of andrarchy” in local politics. On the other hand, besides the merit, there are 10% reserved post in bureaucracy for women which empowered women in administration. Thus the data demonstrates 10% and 20% representation of female in politics and administration respectively. Mean score difference is 1.10 and 1.20 respectively.

**Table 6.4**  
**Comparison between Politicians and Bureaucrats (By Gender)**

<b>Gender</b>	<b>Politicians</b>		<b>Bureaucrats</b>	
	<b>Number</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Male	63	90.0	56	80.0
Female	7	10.0	14	20.0
Total	70	100.0	70	100.0

**Source: Field Survey**

### **Educational Level of the Respondents Local Politicians and Bureaucrats**

Studies of political and administrative elites in western and non-western societies have emphasized the important role of education (Suleiman, 1974). May be education is considered as one of the significant factors that help a person acquire leadership roles in politics and administration both in the central and local government. Education provides the

opportunities of proper understanding of the means how a person will think about the society and the social realities. Table 6.5 displays the educational attainments of the sample respondents. From the data of the respondents contain in the table 6.5 shows that most of the respondents are educated. However, their rate and levels are different. Among the respondent politicians 36 (51.4%) are belonged to the bellow secondary to higher secondary educational levels. On the other hand, 25 (35.7%) and 9 (12.9%) respondent local elected politicians are holding the graduate and post-graduate degree respectively while 15 (21.4%) and 55 (78.6%) local official bureaucrats are holding the graduate and post-graduate degree respectively. Thus, the empirical evidence and descriptive statistics reveals that bureaucrats are more educated than local elected politicians as their mean score and std. deviations are 3.06 with std. deviation 1.36 and 4.79 with std. deviation .413 respectively.

**Table 6.5**  
**Comparison between Politicians and Bureaucrats (By Education Level)**

Level of Education	Politicians		Bureaucrats	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
No Education	0	0	0	0
Below Secondary	14	20.0	0	0
Secondary Passed	11	15.7	0	0
Higher Secondary Passed	11	15.7	0	0
Graduate	25	35.7	15	21.4
Post Graduate	9	12.9	55	78.6
Total	70	100.0	70	100.0

Source: Field Survey

### **Occupation of the Respondent Local Politicians and Bureaucrats**

The occupational dimension of the respondents is considered as one of the important determinants of social origins. Occupation provides some distinct socio-economic milieu resulting in class identification. Belonging to a particular social class may be affects a person's cognitive role perceptions. In comparison to professional and occupational practice between local elected politicians and local official bureaucrats the findings of this study reveals that politicians are in involved in diverse occupation while the bureaucrats are involved only in government service. As a permanent staff of the government bureaucrats have no scope to be involved in other business rather than service whereas, local politicians are involved in many businesses. The important and new findings of this study is that while

previous study shown a particular occupation (e.g. agriculture) as dominant occupation in local politics however, this study reveals that “business” or “business along with politics” are now the dominant occupation in local politics. It reveals that local politicians are also “live off” politics and they may use politics as a mechanism of business. The same trend is observable in the case of national politics in Bangladesh where 90% Parliament Members (MPs) are businessman. During the Pakistan and even two- three decades ago the land lord farmer, professional doctors, lawyers and teachers were the dominant figures in local politics. The data from the table 6.6 reveals that tradition mode of politics is changing and they are replacing by the new emerging businessman in politics.

**Table 6.6**  
**Comparison between Politicians and Bureaucrats (By Occupation)**

Occupation	Politicians		Bureaucrats	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Agriculture	9	12.9	0	0
Service	5	7.1	70	100
Business	27	38.6	0	0
Business & Politics	15	21.4	0	0
Teaching	3	4.3	0	0
Others	11	15.7	0	0
Total	70	100.0	70	100

Source: Field Survey

### **Experience of the Respondent Local Politicians and Bureaucrats**

The career lines or experience in politics and administration is considerable factor for role perceptions and understanding. Whenever we examine the career lines or experience of local elected politicians and bureaucrats then two considerations had in mind: the political experience and job experience. We calculate job experience or length of service for bureaucrats and political experience for politicians. But the problem was that whenever we calculate the political experience of politicians and compare it to bureaucrats’ job experience then the aggregate result does not exhibit the real picture of experiential difference between them. It reveals local politicians are more experience than bureaucrats on average. On the other hand, if we calculate the experience of politicians as elected office holder then it exhibits another picture and in that case bureaucrats are more experience than local

politicians because more than fifty percent of the local politicians reported that they were elected for the first time and holding the office at local government. Thus, this dilemma demonstrates different result and correlation between them. In this respect one bureaucrat noted that “day by day we are getting less qualified administrator because most of the local politicians those who are elected as representatives and take the official position at the local government don’t have any previous experience in public sector and thus we have to spend more time for them to educate legislative procedures without giving the time to the administrative procedure.” However, it does not imply that local politicians have not any experience, and they are affected by the exposure of experience. They might have experience and skill in other social institutions.

**Table 6.7**  
**Comparison between Politicians and Bureaucrats (By Experience)**

Experience	Politicians		Bureaucrats	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
0-5	6	8.6	7	10.0
6-10	8	11.4	24	34.3
11-15	15	21.4	11	15.7
16-20	18	25.7	10	14.3
21-25	10	14.3	4	5.7
25+	13	18.6	14	20.0

Source: Field Survey

### **Family Background of the Respondent Local Politicians and Bureaucrats**

The general argument is that the socialization of a person dependent on the family background and peer groups, where he/she is born and brought up and also belonged to as an individual. Thus, the perception of a person who resides in the rural areas may be different to the person who living in the urban areas. But some demographic data of this research demonstrates that there is no great significant difference between politicians and bureaucrats particularly in the context of family background and rural urban exposure rather than parental occupational difference. Empirical data reveals that more or less the similar proportion of local politicians and bureaucrats are originated from the rural areas and this ratio is little bit higher than the urban elite exposure. Similarly, the same pattern is observable in the context of family background in respect of economic status which exhibits in the table 6.8. On the

other hand, if it is considered politicians and bureaucrats parents occupation and income as significant indicators of identifying social class or social origin then the sample respondents differ significantly from each other as most of the politicians' parents are involved in agriculture or in business whereas, bureaucrats' parents are in agriculture and service.<sup>40</sup> On the basis of parents occupation and yearly income status of the respondent data are presented in the table 6.8 which demonstrates that, 17 (24.3%) local politicians and 15 (21.4%) bureaucrats did not provide the data on parental income. The classification of the respondent parents' occupation has been categorized according to the data of the respondent reported during the interview. There was no scope for verify the data whether it was correct or not because, in the questionnaire the respondent politicians and bureaucrats had been asked to state the yearly incomes of their parents. In some cases while the respondent replied that their parents are died in that case they were asked to provide data on their parents' occupation and income when their parents were alive.

Interestingly, some politicians and bureaucrats did not supply the information of their parents' income while they said about the occupation. They also said that they have no information about their fathers' income or it is not possible for them to say exactly what the income of their parents was. Most important finding of this study is that the degree of socio-economic status does not vary between local elected politicians and bureaucrats, and bureaucracy has been declined from their elite status as Philip Woodruff described in his book *The Guardians* in reference to the family background and economic status. Thus, when we examine the social origins of them based on parental income then we get different picture: local politicians belonged to slightly high economic status than local bureaucrats. This would indicate a certain upward and downward mobility between colonial and Bangladeshi politics-bureaucracy that has taken place within the two categories in course of time. The empirical data on parental income reveals this finding (for descriptive statistical analysis see the appendix 2).<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Note that I did not segregate data into father's or mother's occupation and income because it was very complex to distinguished data on the basis of father's or mother's occupation and income as in most of the cases the mother of the respondents were not involved in any occupation rather than "household" activities and they were not involved in income generating position.

<sup>41</sup> More comprehensive empirical analysis on social background, role orientation and its effects on politics-bureaucracy relations have been shown in the next chapter of the thesis.

**Table 6.8**  
**Comparisons between Politicians and Bureaucrats (By Family Background, Parents Occupation and Income):**

<b>Family Background</b>	<b>Politicians</b>		<b>Bureaucrats</b>	
	<b>Number</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Lower Class	3	4.3	8	11.4
Middle Class	57	81.4	56	80.0
Higher class	10	14.3	6	8.6
Total	70	100.0	70	100.0
<b>Parents Occupation</b>				
Agriculture	50	71.4	19	27.1
Business	11	15.7	11	15.7
Service	8	11.4	34	48.6
Others	1	1.4	6	8.6
Total	70	100.0	70	100.0
<b>Parents Yearly Income</b>				
No Response	17	24.3	15	21.4
Below 50000	2	2.9	0	0
50000- Below 100000	5	7.1	7	10.0
100000-Below 200000	8	11.4	8	11.4
200000-Below 300000	19	27.1	26	37.1
300000+	19	27.1	14	20.0
Total	70	100.0	70	100.0

Source: Field Survey

### **6.3.2 Policy Formulation and Implementation**

During the literature review in the first chapter, we have observed that an important question is always associated with the politics-bureaucracy relation is concerning policy making and implementation. That means who makes policies and who implements - is always a debatable issue in the literature of politics and administration. Although scholars have focused exclusively in response to the question providing their argument and thus different school of thoughts have been raised. Like, the orthodox politics-administration dichotomy model, where politicians will approach the policy and bureaucrats will simply implement the policy and their relationship will be superior-subordinate controlled by the politicians. On the other hand, another school of thought provides mutuality or partnership model and focuses on the interconnectedness between politicians and bureaucrats in the policy process, where the relationship will be mutually exclusive between politicians and bureaucrats. Notwithstanding

these arguments and debate over the century, the question remains continued and challenging to the contemporary scholars and practitioners (Demir and Nyhan, 2008).

Therefore, several empirical researches in the context of Western and European local government identified bureaucrat's leadership role in the policy making and implementation process (Svara, 1985; Box, 1992; Montjoy and Watson, 1995; Nalbandian, 1990, 1999; Dunn and Legge, 2002, Jacobsen, 2001). Aberbach et al, (1981:24) observe that both the elected politicians and official bureaucrats are involved in the policy making process and governance "although they differ typically in the scope of their concerns and the specialization of their knowledge" and they identified four different images in their roles and relations. Some research suggested complementarity view with acknowledging the distinct perspectives of politicians and bureaucrats (Nalbandian, 1994, 2006, Svara, 2001) and some found that "political guidance had a low and nonsignificant impact on the planning ability of the public administrators" in the context of local government (Demir and Nyhan, 2008:92). Thus, the cross-national analysis shows that the characteristics and perspectives of politicians and bureaucrats vary on the basis of culture and context. Therefore, what has been described above can also be observed at the local government in Bangladesh. The imbalance that characterized conflictual relations between the politicians and bureaucrats at the national level could also be noticeable at the local level (Ahmed, 2009). Sometimes, local bureaucrats or officials are found to play more dominant role than the elected politicians in the local council specially in policy making and governance process though in reality, local government ordinance and constitutional spirit do not usually grant bureaucratic formal policy making role in the local government. In this respect one elected politician shared his observation during the interview that-

Local officials those who are working at the local government always hold the different understanding than ours in the policy making process. According to the ordinance, bureaucrats are supposed to implement the policy that will be passed by the council. Even though, they don't have any voting right when the bill passed in the council, but they always try to shape the policy by their own camouflaging understanding and denying the real interests of the people and they use their expertise knowledge for bias the policy making process. As a politician, we may have some lacking's in compare to their knowledge and expertise. It does not mean that we understand nothing. So, bureaucrats should respect us as representative of the people because we are here for them and to see their interests first.

For the same reason, local official bureaucrats also express the opposite view while they work with the local elected politicians. One bureaucrat's observation is notable here:

As a bureaucrat, we are like genii pigs or scapegoats. We are always to maintain two bosses: administrative hierarchal authority to whom we are directly accountable and the elected representatives. The nature and characteristics of these two strata are completely different. You know, we are deployed by the central government and authority. So we should see the interest of the central government at the same time the interest of the local people and representatives. As a bureaucrat it is very difficult to please everyone. The problem in the local policy making is that most of the elected representatives are lacked legislative and the policy process. Thus, they just order and sometimes seek help to us and as a bureaucrat we always try to identify what types of alternatives and options we have to frame a particular policy. The elected representatives choose the option which may be benefitted them. However, when we review the options to ensure the biasness then they alleged us and say we are doing something denying and against the interest of the people by disobeying the opinion of the elected representatives. On the other hand, if we do not provide proper guidance and suggestion then we have to clarify for that to the higher administrative authority. This is the dilemma between politicians and bureaucrats in the policy making of local government in Bangladesh.

In comparison, the empirical data shows that some bureaucrats take a strong position in favour or against the particular policy because of politics of policy making process and they direct the policy mechanisms.<sup>42</sup>As a result, the ascendancy of the bureaucracy in local government policy process is often considered to be one of the important factors leading to conflicts and the marginalization of local elected politicians' role. Of course, there are a lot of valid reasons for bureaucratic dominance in the local government. In considering knowledge and specialization, local politicians are often considered at a serious disadvantage vis-à-vis local bureaucrats. It is generally observed that bureaucrats are better educated than local politicians. They are also assumed to know more about the law, national policies outline, or determined by central government, local administrative capacity and possible solutions for problems (Ahmed, 2009). It therefore, reveals that what will be the pattern of relationship between them is determined by the mode of policy interaction between them.

### **6.3.3 Regime Types and Ideology**

The politics-bureaucracy relation depends on the type and nature of the regime in which the two actors perform their functions. Thus, the regime type and ideology are the considerable

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<sup>42</sup> More comprehensive analysis on domination in policy process and decisions on local governance have been furnished on the basis of empirical data in the subsequent chapter of the thesis.

variables in shaping politics-bureaucracy relationship in any administrative system. More explicitly, we witnessed from the theoretical analysis that bureaucrats are “value neutral” and politicians are “value laden and ideological” in the Weberian administrative system where bureaucracy is “rational or “ideal-type”. But in practice, especially in the context of developing countries like Bangladesh where both politicians and bureaucrats are ideological as they are involved in the politics of policy making and implementation.

On the other hand, the nature of the regime is a considerable factor: whether the democratic or military are in state political power. If the military bureaucracies are in state power then bureaucrats dominate over the politicians and in contrast, if the democratic regimes are in power then bureaucracy allies with the politicians as we have already observed this nature of politics-bureaucracy relations from the chapter four of the thesis. This tendency of national politics-bureaucracy relations negatively reflect at the local levels when the local elected politicians and bureaucrats are both involved in the politics of policy making process in the local council with holding different political ideology. In that case, different ideology between local elected politicians and official bureaucrats generate conflicting interest in the interest articulation and aggregation and thus, consensus on local development policy process and governance is usually difficult. In this respect, one elected politician noted that-

The problem of ideological difference and political regime is that, while all the local elected political leaders are directly involved in party politics at the local government of Bangladesh and they are either the supporter of the existing political regime or not, there this character of local bureaucracy is hidden or unexposed. However, the interesting fact is that bureaucrats are much more political than us but they are not directly involved in partisan politics.

This unexposed “ideological differences frequently divide them into hostile camps” (Kothari and Roy, 1969: 9) and sometimes this indirect political involvement of bureaucracy and ideological ambiguity violate the “rules of the game” then it is a threat to the whole system of governance in general and particular to the political regime.

#### **6.3.4 Politicization of Bureaucracy**

The term politicization is not new as a method of political control over the bureaucracy. The US Constitution vests the President with extraordinary powers to appoint political executives,

which Moe (1985a) termed presidential politicization of bureaucracy. As a result, more or less every president emphasizes to appoint political appointees as ‘chief executive’ with a clearly defined separation/subordinate relationship between political executives and the career bureaucrats (Ingraham et al. 1995; Moynihan and Roberts, 2010). Many observers and thinkers of bureaucracy in developing countries (LaPalombara, 1963; Riggs, 1963, 1964, 1969; Huntington, 1968) have noticed behavioral aberration reflecting societal culture of the developing countries studied and argued maintaining firm political control over the bureaucracy is essential for nation building and achieving national developmental goals for developing nations. Notwithstanding its increased political role, the western bureaucracy still remains structurally subordinate to politics but the political involvement of the bureaucracy in many third world countries appear to be exceptionally high along with politicization. At the same time, most of the discussion of public administration for the past several decades has been focused on political control over the bureaucracy and administrative reform claiming that public bureaucracies are the major barriers to policy change especially on the ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) that has emphasized the importance of effective management in controlling public programs and services. In this connection, may be an affordable and profitable level of politicization can play a pivotal role in fostering the democratization process (Rouban (2007; Carino,2001). Therefore, politicization is discernible fact in the discussion on politics-bureaucracy relations and their roles and responsibilities irrespective of developed and developing countries. However, the fact is that if politicization refers to such a situation where appointment, transfer, promotion and other career decisions of bureaucrats are dependent on political biasness and the will of the political masters and bureaucrats are involved in politics for achieving such a particular aims and goals then it creates interaction problem between politicians and bureaucrats. Thus, the nature and gravity of politicization also determines the model of relationship between politicians and bureaucrats and process of governance and development. We will examine this argument in the next chapter.

### **6.3.5 Self-image and Mutual Interaction**

The relationship between politicians and bureaucrats or between a minister and a secretary predominantly depends on mutual interaction and how they perceive themselves each other that we may call the self-image between them. The culture of mutual interaction or trust builds up based on convention and it takes long time. To promote institutional integrity an environment of mutual trust and respect is necessary. Any relationship means trust, mutual

respect, sharing of roles and responsibilities with an approved manner. American spoils system, British Whitehall model and German hybrid model of politics-bureaucracy relations are the best examples which are based on mutual trust. If the presidential selections of bureaucracy are right, trust and confidence grows automatically. Drewry and Butcher, (1991) have explained the importance of mutual trust between a minister and a civil servant providing an example of a relationship between a husband and a wife in a Victorian household in the context of Whitehall model. A recent series of inquiries was conducted by the British House of Lords Constitution Committee (2010) and the House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee (2007) on the politics-bureaucracy relationships. They also emphasized the importance of mutual interaction and trust in the changing pattern of roles and relationships between minister and civil service. So, there is no doubt that mutual trust is an important underpinning variable of politics-bureaucracy relation.

#### **6.4 The Factors which underpins the Relations most significantly**

It is true that the realm of the politicians and that of the bureaucrats differ in many respects. However, the nature of relationship between them depends on the above mentioned variables and we have tried to explore these variables with some empirical evidence to provide the answer to the question – how do the local elected politicians and appointed official bureaucrats differ from each other? Or how does the relationship construct and what factors make differences<sup>43</sup> between politicians and bureaucrats? As we indicated earlier that, the systemic/organizational and contextual factors influence to shape role perceptions and relations between local elected politicians and official bureaucrats because there is a substantial difference between politicians and bureaucrats in considering the systemic and contextual factors. Nonetheless, the theoretical understanding and the empirical observation by the statistical analysis reveals that, all variables are not equally important to shape the roles and relations between politicians and bureaucrats in the context of local government. Thus, to find out what factors determine the relationships most between them? To this question, this inquiry identified and selected *Social Background, Role Perceptions and Performance, Self-image and Mutual Interaction, and Institutional Structure* as most

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<sup>43</sup> For more comprehensive analysis see the subsequent three chapters of the thesis.

important relationship underpinning variables for more extensive empirical observation among the systemic and contextual variables.<sup>44</sup>

## 6.5 Conclusion

At the beginning of this chapter, we demonstrated two major questions: how do the local elected politicians and appointed official bureaucrats differ from each other? And what factors determine the relationships between them most? From the above discussion, we can summarize the answer of the above two questions and findings showing the itemed related differentiations between local elected politicians and bureaucrats as follows: the empirical data reveals that the recruitment process of politicians and bureaucrats are completely different. Recruitment, training and motivation of politicians and bureaucrats are different and it matters in their relations. Similarly, Politico-Administrative Culture is also different. Politicians are more ideological and bureaucrats are more rules oriented and their different culture influence on the relationship between them. Likely, Legitimacy and Style of Leadership is different and this difference impacts on their relationships.

On the other hand, bureaucrats are more professional and they hold specialized knowledge than local politicians. It signifies the relationships between them. Institutional structure is a significant underpinning variable for determining the relations, as politics-bureaucracy relations depends on the nature of autonomy practice and institutional structure. Social background and role orientation is to some extent different between them. It influences the relations and furthermore, relationships depend on the mediating nature of role in policy formulation and implementation. Likewise, Regime types and ideology are the important considerable variables of relationship and it is mostly applicable to the central government. Politicization of bureaucracy is also important underpinning variables of relationship between them which may sometimes display the negative relations between them. The relations between the local elected politicians and bureaucrats mostly depend on self-image and mutual interaction between them.

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<sup>44</sup> These variables have been identified and selected by applying a statistical technique of multiple correlations. In this section, we have just exposed the results of the statistical analysis with a very limited taxonomical analysis as it is discussed elaborately in the next chapter of the thesis.

Overall, the discussion of social background and comparing the social characteristics of the local elected politicians and bureaucrats, we find that there is a marked diversity as well as homogeneity in their social origins. In general, bureaucrats are likely to come from urban origins than local elected politicians. But empirical data present that both of them are originated and come from similar regional background and do not have significant difference. In comparison to general people both the local elected politicians and bureaucrats are elite. Politicians are inherited in politics professionally whereas bureaucrats are achieved to appear in their administrative position although both of them are originated from middle class family background in their economic status. However, local official bureaucrats are more educated than their counterpart. In comparison to each other, none of them are solely in an advantageous position and they are not exclusively mutual or alike in their social characteristics. Rather, both are in an advantageous position in different social conditions and some significant differences could be noticeable between them in their social origins. For example, local politicians are in advantageous position in considering their age, economic status vis-à-vis official bureaucrats. On the other hand, bureaucrats are in advantageous position in considering education, occupational status in both themselves as well as their parental occupation vis-à-vis local elected politicians. Therefore, it is necessary to explore the attitudinal and behavioral dimensions of their interaction to determine the prototype of relationships and thus, more empirical evidence is required to explore the ways in which these two set of actors view themselves, in their role perception and interact with each other in the pursuance of local governance and development.

# **Chapter – 7: Local Politicians and Bureaucrats: Exploring the Prototype of Relations**

## **7.1 Introduction**

In the preceding chapter, we have identified some important variables which underpin the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats. In this chapter, we will examine the influence of these variables to detect the prototype of relations between local elected politicians and bureaucrats. The main intention of the next two chapters is to examine the theoretical hypotheses that have been set in the chapter two. As we said earlier that, the role perceptions and the patterns of relationships varies with the degree of social characteristics, alignment of interests, role perceptions, self-image and mutual interaction between local elected politicians and the official bureaucrats, which ultimately influence the level of local governance and development and thus level of governance and development varies with the patterns of relationship. It is, therefore, necessary to address some attitudinal and behavioral questions: how does the social background influence the role perceptions? How do they perceive each other? How are they related to each other? We, therefore, begin the discussion with the first question and then gradually turn to undertake a detailed discussion of the concerns delineated above empirically.

## **7.2 Social Background, Role Perceptions and Relations**

During the discussion of social background and comparing the social characteristics of the local elected politicians and bureaucrats from the previous chapter, we find that there is a marked diversity as well as homogeneity in their social origins. In comparison to each other, neither the local elected politicians nor the local official bureaucrats are merely in an advantageous position, and they are not exclusively mutual or alike in their social characteristics. Somewhat, both are in an advantageous position in different social conditions and some significant differences could be noticeable between them in their social origins. In such a social conditions, we should explore more empirical evidence and way to look for – how do they perceive their roles? And how does the social background influence the role perceptions and relations between them or not?


### 7.2.1 Normative Role Perceptions of Politicians and Bureaucrats

Role perception, performance and decision making are very important part of politics and administration as defined in the literature. Role can be identified in two ways, expected role and performed role. As Davis (1948:90) notes, “how an individual actually performs in a given position, as distinct from how he is supposed to perform, we call a role”. The role is the manner in which a person actually carries out the decisions in keeping his position (Ahmed, 2009:90). It is the dynamic aspect of status or office and always influenced by factors other than the stipulation of the position itself. Aberbach *et al* (1981:87) provide more wide-ranging explanation of the role of politicians and bureaucrats arguing that politicians and bureaucrats each can play nine types of roles, that of: technician, advocate, trustee, legalist, broker, partisan, facilitator, policymaker, and ombudsman.

From the existing literature (Stilborn, 2012; Arblaster, 2002; Lilleker and Jackson, 2009; Rush, 2001; Pickles, 1971; Wahlke *et al.* 1962; Norton and Wood, 1990; Box, 1992; Norton (1994), four main roles can be identified from a normative viewpoint: delegate, trustee, partisan, and constituency service which can performed by the politicians and bureaucrats both in local and central governments (has been shown in the figure 7.1). However, to avoid the divergence of defining role in this study, the role has been operationalized as “the expected and performed duties and functions of the elected representatives and bureaucrats which are granted by the law.” Accordingly, to know the perceptions of local elected politicians and local official bureaucrats – to what extent a bureaucrat feels himself committed to bureaucratic norms and values and his attitude to democratically elected local politicians and public needs vis-à-vis to the politicians attitude to the bureaucrats, a series of questions were asked to the politicians and to the bureaucrats – question mostly basis on two dimensions, normative referents and role performance. The available response categories for each item were: Strongly Agree, Agree, Disagree and No Response. The respondent’ data are shown in the table (7.1).

**Figure 7.1**

**Roles and Functions of Elected Representatives and Bureaucrats in Theoretical Perspective**



Source: Researcher

**Table 7.1**

**Perceptions of Local Elected Politicians and Local Official Bureaucrats (N/%)**

Variables	Politicians Perceptions (N-70)				Bureaucrats Perceptions (N-70)				Total N=140
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	No Response	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	No Response	
Variable 1*	21 (30%)	49 (70%)	0	0	66 (94.3%)	4 (5.7%)	0	0	70 (100%)
Variable 2*	26 (37.1%)	44 (62.9%)	0	0	1 (1.4%)	47 (67.1%)	9 (12.9)	13 (18.6)	70 (100%)
Variable 3*	2 (2.9%)	34 (48.6%)	28 (40%)	6 (8.6%)	62 (88.6%)	7 (10%)	0	1 (1.4%)	70 (100%)
Variable 4*	30 (42.9%)	40 (57.1%)	0	0	0	9 (12.9%)	31 (44.3%)	30 (42.9%)	70 (100%)
Variable 5*	50 (71.4%)	19 (27.1%)	1 (1.4%)	0	0	63 (90%)	3 (4.3%)	4 (5.7%)	70 (100%)

Variable 1\*= Existing administrative rules and regulations should be given priority and should strictly followed. Variable 2\*= Local politicians and bureaucrats should apply particular judgement ignoring some rules and regulations to meet people’s needs and requirements. Variable 3\*= Whatever the practical needs, results and consequences, local bureaucrats should follow the directions of the superior authority. Variable 4\*= For the practical needs local bureaucrats should follow the recommendations of local elected politicians minimising the

administrative norms and values. Variable 5\* = Local politicians and bureaucrats should not take any decision which may displease each other.

The empirical data from the table 7.1 demonstrates that the politico-bureaucratic culture is enormously different and the absence of parallel behavior is substantially clear. As we observed earlier that culturally bureaucrats are procedure and rule oriented and politicians are development goal oriented and they want to emphasize diffusive public interest ignoring some rules and regulations. Empirical data proves the above statement and it reveals that local bureaucrats are more interested to follow the procedure of complex rules and regulations (66 (94.3) % strongly agree and 4 (5.7) % agree) as well as the direction of their superior authority ignoring whatever the practical needs and the directions of the local elected politicians although they acknowledge that local elected politicians and bureaucrats should not do anything which may displease each other. On the other hand, local politicians hold (30 (42.9) % strongly agree and 40 (57.1) % agree) that local bureaucrats should follow the recommendations of local elected politicians minimising some administrative norms and values for the practical needs and they – both the local elected politicians and bureaucrats hold that they should not take any decision which may displease each other. In sum, empirical data indicates that the politico-administrative culture is different and thus local bureaucrats consider them as the permanent agent of the central government and they emphasize rules and regulations more than the directions of the local elected politicians and the practical needs of the local people which ultimately plays a very significant role as underpinning variable to the determination of relationship between them and results conflicting relations between the two actors.

Moreover, to discover the more cognitive and normative role orientations of local elected politicians and bureaucrats, the respondents were asked a number of questions –for example: “The modern government runs by the two actors; elected politicians and appointed professional bureaucrats with an uneasy partnership. In this respect, how do you perceive your role as a politician or as an official bureaucrat?” And they were given the options of: A=Delegate Actor; B= Trustee Actor; C= Partisan Actor and D= Constituency Service. Similarly, another question was “Politics and administration brings together the political elements and bureaucratic elements. Do you think these two actors are characteristically separate and their roles and functions should be distinct?” The options were provided in three categories: A=Yes; B=No; C=No Response. Another question was “Where should be limited

the politicians or bureaucrats roles specifically?” Options were: A= Policy formulation; B= Policy Implementation; C= Governance and development; D= All of the above. Besides this normative role perceptual questions other questions were functional or performing role orientational.<sup>45</sup>

The respondent data is outlined below that was provided by the sample respondents in response to the above questions. The empirical data from the figure 7.2 reveals that the cognitive role perception of local elected politicians and bureaucrats are not clear and their perceptions are fragmented. Because, the ideal condition would be when the administrators or bureaucrats are perceived their roles as delegate or trustee actors (Box, 1992) and the elected representatives or politicians are perceived their roles as partisan actor or constituency service (Stilborn, 2012; Arblaster, 2002; Lilleker and Jackson, 2009; Rush, 2001; Pickles, 1971; Wahlke et al. 1962; Norton and Wood, 1990; Norton (1994).

However, the empirical data shows that 26 (37.1%) politicians and 32 (45.7%) bureaucrats perceived their roles as delegate actor while 6(8.6%) politicians and 13 (18.6%) bureaucrats hold their roles as trustee actor. On the other hand, 14 (20.0%) and 24 (34.3%) politicians and 3 (4.3% and 22 (31.4%) bureaucrats perceived their roles as partisan actor and constituency service respectively. In comparison to their cognitive role perceptions, bureaucrats are little bit clear in their perceptions than local politicians though they also hold confusing perceptions where 22 (31.4%) bureaucracy perceived their roles as constituency service. This measurement also derives from the attitudes that expressed the respondents during the survey interview in response to the answer to the role perceptual question.

Thus, it can be said that the perception might be guided by the attitude and the behaviour that has “an important bearing on the interaction” between politicians and bureaucrats. So, we should give more attention to their distinctive or specific role perceptions to identify the actual patterns as Kothari and Roy (1969: 33) provide the argument that “By role definition we mean what the actor himself thinks is required of his office.....occupies a particular positions.....What he expects from his own position and what he can actually do.” We, therefore, tried to know the distinctive and specific roles of local elected politicians and bureaucrats approaching the further two questions: “Politics and administration brings


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<sup>45</sup> For details see the survey questionnaire in the appendix 1-3 of the thesis.

together the political elements and bureaucratic elements. Do you think these two actors are characteristically separate and their roles and functions should be distinct?” And “Where should be limited the politicians or bureaucrats roles specifically?” The respondent opinions are presented in the 2-d bar diagram (figure 7.3) and table 7.2 respectively.

**Figure 7.2**


**Cognitive Role Perceptions of Local Politicians and Bureaucrats**



Source: Field Survey

**Figure 7.3**

**Distinctive Role Perceptions (Politicians' and Bureaucrats' Views)**



Source: Field Survey

**Table 7.2**  
**Specific Role Perceptions of Politicians and Bureaucrats**

Roles Categories	Specific Role Perceptions			
	Politicians' View		Bureaucrats' View	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Policy Formulation	19	27.1	2	2.9
Policy Implementation	4	5.7	39	55.7
Governance and Development	9	12.9	1	1.4
All of the above	38	54.3	27	38.6
No Response	0	0	1	1.4
Total	70	100.0	70	100.0

Source: Field Survey

The empirical data from the figure 7.3 demonstrates that almost all respondent politicians 69 (98.6%) and 62 (88.6%) bureaucrats think that the politicians and bureaucrats are separate actors and their roles and functions should be distinct. Among the sample respondents only 1 politician and 7 bureaucrats think that they are not characteristically separate as role actors in the process of governance. In this context, the third question arises – what should be their specific roles and function as they identify themselves as the distinct actors? Interestingly, the views of politicians and bureaucrats to this question contradict with the previous question. Table 7.2 exhibits the two actors' views and it shows that although 19 (27.1%) politicians and 39(55.7%) bureaucrats have chosen themselves as policy formulation and policy implementation actors respectively but they hold a hidden desire to be involved in all the activities of the local government while 38 (54.3%) politicians and 27 (38.6%) bureaucrats viewed “all of the above” is the spheres of their roles. The comparative analysis of politicians and bureaucrats views in the above three questions reveals that theoretically they believe that politics and administrations are separate and they should have separate roles and functions. But in practice, they have affinity to be involved in every aspect of the policy and governance process.<sup>46</sup>


<sup>46</sup>What does it mean exactly? Is it a puzzling perception or a symbiotic character of politicians and bureaucrats? To know the answer of this question, we should explore more empirical evidence in the subsequent analysis. Thus, to verify this normative role perception of politicians and bureaucrats and to identify the expected and performed role, they were asked further question and that data is presented in the next chapter while explaining the role performance on governance and development.

### 7.2.2 General People’s View on Politicians and Bureaucrats Roles

As we noted earlier that, general peoples are not directly involve in the process of governance. But according to the principles of principal-agent theory they are to be considered as stakeholder and principals as they elect their representatives to govern. In this connection, both politicians and bureaucrats are agents of the people. On the other hand, if the elected politicians are considered as principal then bureaucrats are the agents. So, it is very important to know how the general people views on their agents’ role. Thus, to verify the role perceptions of politicians and bureaucrats, we included 140 general people in the survey to know their perception on politicians and bureaucrats roles, as there is a maxim in Bengali that “Raja kemon, Proja Jemon!” (how the king is, as the citizens are?) Therefore, the similar questions were presented to the general people and their opinions are presented in the figure 7.4 and table 7.3 respectively.

**Figure 7.4**

**General People’s View on Politicians and Bureaucrats Roles**



Source: Field Survey

The empirical data from the figure 7.4 shows that most of the general people think that politicians and bureaucrats are characteristically separate and they should have separate roles and functions. On the other hand, what should be the specific roles of politicians and bureaucrats to this question; 43 (30.7%) and 85 (60.7%) respondents provided the answer that policy formulation is the major roles of politicians and policy implementation is the prime duties of bureaucrats. According to the viewpoint of general people, politicians are supposed to be involved in all activities of the options that were presented to them, and in comparison to bureaucratic involvement, it is little bit higher. It reveals that, to the identification of

specific roles of politicians and bureaucrats, general people have support towards the politicians and that they might be involve in all the activities while the main responsibility of the bureaucrats is likely to be the policy implementation although some respondents are supported bureaucratic involvement in all activities.

**Table 7.3**  
**General People’s View on Specific Role of Politicians and Bureaucrats**

Roles	General People’s View			
	Specific Role of Politicians		Specific Role of Bureaucrats	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Policy Formulation	43	30.7	2	1.4
Policy Implementation	2	1.4	85	60.7
Governance and Development	27	19.3	19	13.6
All of the above	48	34.3	15	10.7
No Response	20	14.3	19*	13.6
Total	140	100.0	140	100.0

Source: Field Survey

### 7.2.3 Social Background and Role Perceptions

From the analysis of previous chapter, we got a snapshot on social origins of local elected politicians and official bureaucrats and whether they belonged to two distinctive social classes or not. Accordingly, this section will be concerned with how far the social background is related to the role orientation. Although it is very difficult to measure the influence of social background on the role perceptions by the categorical data and nominal measurement as a whole thus, a factor analysis of multiple correlations has been attempted to factor loading and underlying the patterns as well as identify the relational variations by demographic variables. In factor analysis, principal components or factors are created that identify major clusters of variables. Therefore, in the table 7.4 shows the three different clusters of demographic factors from the correlation matrix. However, we did not give any specific name when three dimensions emerge from the statistical analysis of the demographic data (shown in the table 7.4). We have just categorized the dimensions showing the variations

and for measuring the weight. Furthermore, to know the association between social background and role perceptions the correlation results have been shown in the table 7.5.

**Table 7.4**  
**Principal Factor Analysis of Social Background (Varimax rotation with Kaiser Normalisation)**

Social Background	Factor Loadings		
	Demographic Factor-1 35.03%	Demographic Factor-2 18.26%	Demographic Factor-3 11.86%
Age	<b>0.91</b>	- 0.25	- 0.14
Age Group	<b>0.90</b>	0.24	- 0.12
Experience	<b>0.89</b>	0.08	- 0.11
Occupations	0.07	<b>0.67</b>	0.38
Family Background	- 0.18	<b>0.42</b>	0.42
Parents Income	- 0.48	<b>0.19</b>	- 0.06
Gender	- 0.07	- 0.20	<b>0.88</b>
Education	- 0.08	- 0.78	<b>0.18</b>
Parents Occupations	- 0.15	- 0.69	<b>0.18</b>

The result of correlation matrix shows that most of the variables are more or less either positively or negatively significant. Like, age has a significant positive relation with following existing rules and regulation by the respondents. This means according to any change in age they perceived that following existing rules and regulation is important one for political bureaucrats' roles and relations.

Consequently, it has significant negative relation with role perception, such as crucial role perception; apply particular judgment; following the direction of superior authority; following the direction of local elected politicians, and mutual decision making. It reveals that any change in age affect negatively on perception of these variables. On the other hand, gender has no significant effect on cognitive role perceptions though it is positively correlated with only the perception of following the direction of local elected politicians, which means female bureaucrats are shown to be obeying the direction of elected politicians more than the male bureaucrats. Similarly, education is positively significant with perception like crucial role perception, apply particular judgment, follow the direction of local elected politicians and negatively significant with following existing rules and regulation, following the direction of superior authority. Likewise, occupation is positively significant with perception like existing rules and regulation, following the direction of superior authority and

negatively significant with crucial role perception, apply particular judgment, follow the direction of local elected politicians, mutual decision making.

**Table 7.5**  
**Correlation between Demographic Variables and Role Perceptions**

	Variable 1	Variable2	Variable3	Variable4	Variable5	Variable6	Variable7	Variable8	Variable9
Age	-.0006	-.081	-.006	-.234**	.181*	-.193*	.334**	-.366**	-.300**
Age Group	-.024	-.104	-.011	-.215*	.188*	-.174*	.318**	-.347**	-.285**
Gender	.127	-.035	.041	.002	-.080	-.147	-.125	.169*	.113
Education	-.008	.110	-.072	.444**	-.433**	.346**	-.479**	.535**	.497**
Occupation	.141	-.160	.128	-.482**	.497**	-.386**	.540**	-.632**	-.494**
Experience	.078	.006	.022	-.073	.101	-.031	.191*	-.149	-.139
Family Background	-.035	.152	.108	-.181*	.205*	-.212*	.139	-.065	-.066
Parents Occupation	.048	-.027	-.092	.314**	-.283**	.198*	-.324**	.430**	.468**
Parents Yearly Income	-.043	-.026	.119	.059	.082	-.111	.016	-.002	-.066

\*Significant at the .05 level (2 tailed)

\*\*Significant at the .01 level (2 tailed)

N = 140

\*Variable 1= Role Evaluation, \*Variable 2= Distinctive Role Perception, \*Variable 3= Specific Role Perception, \*Variable 4= Crucial Role Perception, \*Variable 5= Following Existing Rules and Regulation \*Variable 6= Apply Particular Judgment, \*Variable 7= Follow the Direction of Superior Authority \*Variable 8= Follow the Direction of Local Elected Politicians, \*Variable 9= Mutual Decision Making. See also the questionnaire (Q-11-15) for details in the appendix 3 of the thesis.

Experience has slightly positive significance with following the direction of superior authority. Family background positively significant with perception on follow the existing rules and regulation and negatively significant with crucial role perception, particular judgment. Parents occupation positively correlated with perception like crucial role perception, apply particular judgment, follow the direction of local elected politicians and

negatively correlated with variables like follow existing rules and regulation and follow the direction of superior authority. Parents' yearly income has no correlation with role perception variables. In sum, the above analysis reveals that there is a correlation between social background and role orientation. But how far the social background and role orientation influence the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is a major considerable question.

Accordingly, to know the answer of the above questions and to shed the empirical light, a direct interview survey has been conducted with the three sets of different semi-structured questionnaire to the selected local politicians, bureaucrats and to the general people. The questionnaire to the politicians, bureaucrats and to the general people had some identical and some different questions. Note that, general people are not directly involved in the governing process of the UZP. Nonetheless, they have been included in the sample and interviewed to cross-check against the perceptions of local politicians and bureaucrats.

Therefore, the respondents (especially local politicians and bureaucrats those who are considered as the main actors and change agent of local government) were asked a similar question: for politicians the question was "How would you rate your relationship with the local official bureaucrats?" and for local bureaucrats the question was "How would you rate your relationship with the local elected politicians?" And they were given the options of: A= Very Good; B= Good; C= Fairly Good and D= Poor.<sup>47</sup> After the statistical procedure, relational factor score were generated and we attempted to identify most important factors as relationship underpinning variables. We have also identified those variables that are mostly correlated as well as set of variables that are uncorrelated and insignificant. The respondent' data is outlined in the table 7.6 by the correlation with the social background or demographic variables of local politicians and bureaucrats to measure the association.

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<sup>47</sup> It is therefore, notable here that, before the final interview survey we have pre-tested the questionnaire. During the pretest of questionnaire we learned that direct theoretical question on relational model would not generate any significant weight as the cognitive orientation of politicians and bureaucrats is not so high and even they don't have any theoretical idea about politics-bureaucracy relational model. Thus, during the final interview survey we changed the question by giving the above 4 options. But we were determined that we would categorize empirical data in the following categorical options: Very good= Symbiotic Relation; Good=Mutual Relation; Fairly Good=Dichotomous Relation; and Poor = Direct Conflicting, rather using the Likert Scale for measuring the relations.

**Table 7.6**

**Correlation between Demographic Variables and Politicians-Bureaucrats Relations**

<b>Demographic Variables</b>	<b>Politics-Bureaucracy Relations</b>
Age	.121*
Age Group	.102
Gender	-.062
Education Level	-.207*
Occupation	.172*
Experience	.001*
Family Background	-.034
Parents Occupation	-.070
Parents Yearly Income	.075

\*Significant at the .05 level (2 tailed)  
\*\*Significant at the .01 level (2 tailed)  
N = 140

The results of the empirical data from the table 7.6 show the patterns of relationships by the correlation analysis between politicians and bureaucrats relations and the demographic variables. Correlation result reveals that four demographic variables are significant among the demographic or social background variables of local elected politicians and bureaucrats. The first one is age and it is positively significant. That means when age of respondent' rise up then relation goes to be mutual equally. It implies that more the age, more the relation mutual. The second factor reveals negative significant correlation between educational levels and Politicians-Bureaucrats Relation, which means with the rising of education level the class of relation going down. That means when the education of politicians rise then relation shifts from the mutuality towards dichotomy. On the other hand, Occupation and experience has a positive significant correlation with Politicians and Bureaucrats Relation. Similarly, politics-bureaucracy relations depend on role perceptions which exhibited in the table 7.7.

**Table 7.7**

**Correlation between Role Perception and Politicians-Bureaucrats Relations**

<b>Role Perception Variables</b>	<b>Politicians-Bureaucrats Relation</b>
Role Perception	.214*
Distinct Role Perception	-.105
Specific Role Perception	-.098
Crucial Role Perception	-.249**
<b>Particular Areas of Role Perception</b>	
Following Existing Rules and Regulation	.081
Apply Particular Judgment	-.148
Follow the Direction of Superior Authority	.218**
Follow the Direction of Local Elected Politicians	-.303**
Mutual Decision Making	-.302**
*Significant at the .05 level (2 tailed)	
**Significant at the .01 level (2 tailed)	
N = 140	

Here, the table 7.7 shows the correlation analysis between Politicians-Bureaucrats Relation and Role Perception Variables. It reveals negative significant correlation between crucial role perception, following the direction of local elected politicians, and interestingly mutual decision making with Politicians-Bureaucrats Relation, which means with the rising of one of the indicator variables the class of relation will fall down. In contrast, a positive significant correlation found with role evaluation and following the direction of superior authority.

### **7.3. Self-Image and Mutual Interaction and Politics-Bureaucracy Relations**

As we mentioned in the previous chapter that relations between local elected politicians and bureaucrats overly depends on their self-image and mutual attitude. Therefore, it is a very important question – how do they perceive themselves as well as each other? In this context, lots of questions can be asked to them to know their perception towards each other. In this

research, the contact patterns, the politicians' orientation and perception towards bureaucrats and bureaucrats' orientation and perception towards local elected politicians as well as their behavioral patterns and mutual attitude to solution of a particular problem and adherence to rules and regulation has been examined empirically to identify the prototype of relationships. It is clearly noticeable that local politicians and bureaucrats are considered themselves as separate actors to their role perception although they hold the feeling of overlapping mind to be involved in all the activities of the local government that we observed from the previous discussion. This kind of "double decker mind" can be termed as "puzzling perception" and it improvise "agitational-interventionist conception" (Kothari and Roy, 1969:89) between the political and administrative functionaries. In the section of role orientation, we have discussed the cognitive role orientation of the two actors and how they perceive their role occupying a particular position. In this section, we will deal with the behavioral aspect of local elected politicians and bureaucrats as we are exploring the dimensions of relationship between them. Thus, we especially emphasized on their images and contact patterns along with their mutual perception in governance, as we have constructed theoretical proposition that, *if shared and mutual attitude prevails with high level of self-image between the local elected politicians and the appointed official bureaucrats then it enhances the level of local governance and development. Alternatively, conflict or fragmentation with distorted self-image between local elected politicians and appointed official bureaucrats reduces the level of local governance and development.*

### **7.3.1 Images and Outlooks**

Images and outlooks towards one another epitomize not only the upshot of appraisal a person makes of another but also affect his orientation towards the objective of his evaluation and sometimes images and outlooks towards one another reflect in their behavior to each other. And it also influences the relation between politicians and bureaucrats. During the interview, we were not only interested to explore the self-images of both the actors but also their counter images that have had one another. Thus, to explore the images and outlooks to one another, we included the attributive questions on impartiality, transparency, rigidity, superiority, personal image and interest, people's interest and efficiency in administrative procedure both in the case of politician and bureaucrats. Therefore, the first question was related to the image of bureaucracy and that was "The civil service is commonly considered as an institution with

neutral competence from political influence. What do you think about the bureaucracy of Bangladesh? The options were given of: A=Politically Neutral; B=Mixture of Competent and Incompetent; C=Politically Involve and Responsiveness; D= All of the above. The respondents' perception is outlined in the table 7.8.


**Table 7.8**  
**Respondents Opinions on Image of Bureaucracy**

Image Options	Image of Bureaucracy					
	Politicians' Views		Bureaucrats' Views		General Peoples' Views	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Politically Neutral	4	5.7	22	31.4	25	17.9
Mixture of Competent and Incompetent	18	25.7	6	8.6	7	5.0
Politically Involve and Responsiveness	15	21.4	6	8.6	34	24.3
All of the Above	33	47.1	36	51.4	74	52.9
Total	70	100.0	70	100.0	140	100.0

Source: Field Survey

Empirical data from the table 7.8 demonstrates that only 4 (5.7%) local elected politicians hold that bureaucrats are politically neutral while 22 (31.4%) bureaucrats and 25 (17.9%) general people provided data in favour of this option respectively. On the other hand, 33 (47.1%) politicians, 36 (51.4%) bureaucrats, and 74 (52.9%) general people provided the answer in favour of “all of the above” option respectively. That means bureaucrats in Bangladesh are not in their ideal position considering the political neutrality, and bureaucracy has lost its glorious image that was in the past and they are suffering from the crisis of “ideal-type” of image according to the views of politicians, general peoples and to some extent in their own perceptions, although it is copiously clear from the data that bureaucrats' perceptions on neutrality and self-image sharply difference from that local politicians and general people hold about them. Thus, to know the perceptions on hierarchical status between them the further question that was asked to them was “You know there are two actors; politicians and bureaucrats equally involve in governance. As an entity they are not equal. Of course one of them is superior. In your general consideration who is superior and why? The answer option of this question was open to the respondents of politicians, bureaucrats and general peoples. The empirical field data is presented in the figure 7.5.

**Figure 7.5**  
**Respondents' Opinions on Superiority (N=280)**



Source: Field Survey

The figure 7.5 shows that according to the opinions of sample respondents, politicians are superior to bureaucrats in their commanding positions. Among 280 respondents, 211 respondents provided the answer supporting the politicians as superior. Particularly, 61 politicians, 53 bureaucrats and 97 general peoples hold that politicians are superior to their general consideration among 70 sample politicians, 70 bureaucrats and 140 general peoples. On the other hand, total 38 respondents consider that bureaucrats are superior, and 31 respondents were refrained from providing any comments to the question. However, why politicians or bureaucrats are considered as superior? What are the reasons behind? To this question the sample respondents provided the following observations and reasons which are presented in the table 7.9. As the answer option was open thus respondents provided their perceptions in multi response category. During the data management process, we have categories the scattered data into the following ten categories manually. Data from the table 7.9 demonstrates that total 132 respondents provided the reason that politicians are superior in comparison to bureaucrats because of their representative character. It means as the politicians are directly elected by the people therefore, they are superior. Remarkable thing is that, there is a significant area of agreement among the respondent in this context where 34 politicians, 42 bureaucrats and 56 general peoples provided same reasons. Similarly, 12 politicians, 11 bureaucrats and 16 general peoples think that “as government is composed by the elected politicians either in local or central levels” thus politicians are superior. Others options are insignificant in considering the number. Nonetheless, it is important in the sense

that politicians diverse sharply in their superiority evaluation from that of bureaucrats. But politicians' evaluations are to some extent similar to general peoples. For example, 10 politicians and 9 general people hold that "As politicians hold overall responsibility of decisions" therefore, they are superior. On the other hand, the bureaucrats and the general peoples those who hold that bureaucrats are superior in the administrative hierarchy, they have considered the bureaucratic permanent position in administration, education, and tendency to conform rules and regulations in governance. In contrast, overall, 31 respondents are given no explanation why they consider either politicians or bureaucrats as superior.

**Table 7.9**

**The Reasons why politicians or bureaucrats are superior (Identified by the respondents)**

Respondent Opinions	Respondent Category (N=280)			Total
	Politicians	Bureaucrats	General People	
As politicians are elected representatives	34	42	56	132
As government is composed by the elected politicians	12	11	16	39
As politicians can use political power	-	-	12	12
As politicians hold overall responsibility of decisions	10	-	9	19
As politicians can use bureaucrats in their political interest and bureaucrats are controlled by the politics	5	-	4	9
As bureaucrats are permanent mechanism of state apparatus and they know how to work	1	1	6	8
As bureaucrats have no interest to be elected	-	2	2	4
As bureaucrats have tendency to conform the rules and regulation in governance	-	3	8	11
As bureaucrats are more educated and aware with administrative procedures, rules and regulations	2	2	11	15
No Explanation	6	9	16	31
Total	70	70	140	280

Source: Field Survey

Do these perceptions of politicians and bureaucrats reflect in their interaction in action? It's a million dollar question as we witnessed from the previous analysis that, although the structural model emphasizes hierarchical subordination of relationship between political and bureaucratic elements but it does not mean that the bureaucracy ultimately remains subservient to politics (Bijorkman, 1979). Thus, it is, therefore, necessary to consider their

behavioural aspects to specify the self-image and counter image between them to identify the real dimensions of the relationships which explored in the subsequent analysis.

### **7.3.2 Politicians' Perceptions to Politicians**

As we indicate in the earlier discussion that, if the rural change agents are hold the high level of self-images and outlooks between them with mutual attitude then local governance and development expedite more explicitly when that certain conditions are met in their relationships. Thus, the perception of each other is very much important to explore. Here we have reported the field data showing the self and mutual perceptions of the respondent's politicians, bureaucrats and general people separately to verify the perceptions of each category of respondents.<sup>48</sup> Let us first examine the politicians' perceptions to politicians which we may call "self-image" of politicians identified by the politician's. To examine the self-image of politicians the following question was asked: Following are some statements about politicians and bureaucrats. How far do you agree or disagree with the statements listed below? The responses of respondents' politicians are presented in the table 7.10. However, in this section, we have focused on the statement or viewpoints which reflect the self-image of politicians and others statement and viewpoints are examined in comparative perspective between politicians and bureaucrats' outlook and counter images. In this regard, the first instrumental focus was on administrative rules, regulations and procedures. It is abundantly clear from the empirical data that politicians are not much better acquainted with administrative procedures, rules and regulations and they have tendency to disregard to conform the rules and regulation in governance, where 38 (more than fifty percent of local politicians agree) and 12 (more than seventeen percent partially agree) with the statement by themselves. Likewise, they also agree that, as a politician they cannot act in a decisive manner because of various conflicting pressure on them. The number of agreement to this statement is 42 and it is almost sixty percent. Similarly, most of the politicians 49(70%) are disagreed that they work only in their self-interest. Rather they argued that they always care for the people's welfare not the interest of themselves. Furthermore, local elected politicians also argued that the door of their office is always open for all and they emphasize the people's need for most, although they are unable to solve all the problems of the local

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<sup>48</sup> Note that, we have included 14 items of viewpoints to examine the self and counter images of both politicians and bureaucrats, and the same questions were presented to the general people to know their perceptions to politics and bureaucracy. However, we have presented the numerical data in number, not in percentage, as the sample size was small and it was only 280.

peoples, as their power is very limited and they are not belonged to the higher strata of the political elite composition.

**Table 7.10**  
**Politicians Perceptions to Politicians (by Number=70)**

Viewpoints of Perceptions <sup>49</sup>	Agree	Partially Agree	Disagree
Politicians are not well acquainted with administrative procedures, rules and regulations	38	12	20
Politicians have tendency to disregard to conform the rules and regulation in governance	21	27	22
Politicians cannot act in a decisive manner because of various conflicting pressure on them	42	9	19
Politicians do not trust Bureaucrats	32	16	22
Politicians are generally cooperative with Bureaucrats	34	11	25
Politicians do not appreciate the viewpoints and the difficulties of Bureaucrats	45	9	16
Politicians are hostile to Bureaucrats	13	19	38
Politicians do nothing but create problem for the Bureaucrats	9	11	40
Politicians are corrupt	10	25	35
Politicians care for people's welfare	45	15	10
Politicians work only in their self-interest	8	13	49
Politicians are more transparent than Bureaucrats	51	9	10
Politicians entertain the people's complain most	58	5	7
Politicians help in making government policies realistic	35	15	20

Source: Field Survey

On the other hand, very limited number of local politicians 10 (14.28%) agree that they are corrupt. Although 25 (35.71%) politicians partially agree that they are corrupt and 35 (50%) disregard the statement in the sense of political corruption providing the disagreement with the statement. Thus, only the analysis of politician's perceptions to politicians does not reflect the full image of what politics is all about. It is therefore, necessary to examine the image of bureaucrats that perceived by the local elected politicians as their counterpart actor to ground the field of comparative analysis of their self and counter image vis-à-vis local elected politicians and official bureaucrats.

### 7.3.3 Politicians' Perceptions to Bureaucrats

<sup>49</sup> Some of these viewpoints have been borrowed from Mitra (2010); Kothari and Roy (1969), and some are conceived by the researcher.

In spite of the tremendous volume of research on politic-administration relationship in the last three decades, the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is a continuous puzzle in politics and administration and indeed, it carries significant implications in governance (Demir, 2009). Thus, exploring the attitudes of elected politicians to official bureaucrats is considered to be the building blocks of the relationship between local elected politicians and appointed professional bureaucrats (Nalbandin, 2004). In the previous section, we have discussed the perceptions of politicians' to politicians. In this section, we have delineated the discussion on politicians' perceptions to bureaucrats. Why the perception of political leader to bureaucrats is important? Because bureaucrats are agents of politicians and they are guided by the politicians as Weber (1947:314) said "He is subject to strict and systematic discipline and control in the conduct of the office."

Therefore, some popular perceptions or viewpoints were presented before the local elected politicians to provide their opinion which are presented in the table 7.11. The empirical data from the table 7.11 shows that 36 (51.42%) local politicians agree and 19 (27.14%) partially agree that bureaucrats are well acquainted with administrative procedures, rules and regulations. However, how far they have tendency to conform the rules and regulation in governance in this statement local politicians are little bit confused though 18 (25.71%) were agreed and 24 (34.28%) politicians were partially agree with the statement while 28 (40%) directly disagreed. But politicians were straightforward in providing the answer that bureaucrats are very rigid in their attitude and they do not listen to the advice of others. Thus the data on item three shows that 39 (55.71%), 15 (21.42%) and 16 (22.85%) local politicians were agree, partially agree and disagree respectively. The perception of politicians to bureaucrats reveals that though the bureaucrats are much more familiar with official rules and regulations but they do not conform always these rules and regulations to their dealings of business. Moreover, local politicians complained that local bureaucrats take part in local politics in most of the cases of development policy and programme as a counterpart of the politicians.

**Table 7.11**

**Politicians Perceptions to Bureaucrats (by Number=70)**

<b>Viewpoints of Perceptions</b> <sup>50</sup>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Partially</b>	<b>Disagree</b>
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<sup>50</sup> Some of these viewpoints have been borrowed from Mitra (2010); Kothari and Roy (1969), and some are conceived by the researcher.

		<b>Agree</b>	
Bureaucrats are well acquainted with administrative procedures, rules and regulations	36	19	15
Bureaucrats have tendency to conform the rules and regulation in governance	18	24	28
Bureaucrats are very rigid in their attitude and they do not listen to the advice of others	39	15	16
Bureaucrats distrust Politicians	36	10	24
Bureaucrats take part in local politics	45	5	20
Bureaucrats do not appreciate the viewpoints and the difficulties of local Politicians	37	12	21
Bureaucrats are inefficient	31	15	24
Bureaucrats work in the interest of ruling class	50	9	11
Bureaucrats are corrupt	25	16	29
Bureaucrats care for people's welfare	14	19	37
Bureaucrats work only in their self-interest	25	10	35
Bureaucrats are more transparent than Politicians	7	15	48
Bureaucrats entertain the people's complain most	18	12	40
Bureaucrats have a tendency to expand the departments and increase procedures instead of solving concrete problems	47	10	13

Source: Field Survey

The overall perceptions of politicians to bureaucrats that posed to us are – bureaucrats are in general corrupt, inefficient, not peoples' friendly, work for only in their self-interest and to serve the interest of central politicians and ruling class. Most importantly, according to the perception of politicians, the major image of bureaucrats that expose to us is bureaucrats have tendency to keep the problem alive rather to solve the problem concretely that arise in the process of governance until it is fulfill the keen interest of them. It is therefore, evident from the perceptions of politicians to bureaucrats that bureaucrats' behaviors are always guided by their superior administrative authority. In this milieu, we should look for the bureaucratic perception to themselves as well as to the politicians for more concrete evidence.

### **7.3.4 Bureaucrats' Perceptions to Bureaucrats**

From the previous two sections, observed the politicians' perceptions to themselves as well as to the bureaucrats and we got a handful of self-image and outlook what the politicians perceive. This section deals with the self-images and outlooks of bureaucrats as well as the outlooks towards the politicians that projected by the local official bureaucrats. To explore

the perceptions of bureaucrats similar set of question was asked to the local bureaucrats. The findings of normative evaluation of bureaucrats to themselves are presented in the table 7.12.

**Table 7.12**  
**Bureaucrats Perceptions to Bureaucrats (by Number=70)**

<b>Viewpoints of Perceptions</b> <sup>51</sup>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Partially Agree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>
Bureaucrats are well acquainted with administrative procedures, rules and regulations	56	11	3
Bureaucrats have tendency to conform the rules and regulation in governance	44	13	13
Bureaucrats are very rigid in their attitude and they do not listen to the advice of others	9	16	45
Bureaucrats distrust Politicians	15	16	39
Bureaucrats take part in local politics	12	17	41
Bureaucrats do not appreciate the viewpoints and the difficulties of local Politicians	7	15	48
Bureaucrats are inefficient	12	18	40
Bureaucrats work in the interest of ruling class	6	8	56
Bureaucrats are corrupt	12	11	57
Bureaucrats care for people's welfare	52	3	15
Bureaucrats work only in their self-interest	6	16	48
Bureaucrats are more transparent than Politicians	57	6	7
Bureaucrats entertain the people's complain most	49	7	14
Bureaucrats have a tendency to expand the departments and increase procedures instead of solving concrete problems	8	20	40

Source: Field Survey

The data from the table shows that bureaucrats have a tendency to evaluate themselves in much more favourable light than the local politicians. For example, data shows that 56 (80%) bureaucrats hold that they are well accustomed with administrative procedures, rules and regulations and 44(62.85%) bureaucrats agree with the statement that they have tendency to conform the rules and regulation in governance. On the other hand, only 9 (12.85%) agree, 16(22.85%) partially agree and 45 (64.28%) bureaucrats disagree with the statement that bureaucrats are very rigid in their attitude and they do not listen to the advice of others. Similarly, near about sixty percent of bureaucrats disagreed that they take part in local

<sup>51</sup> Some of these viewpoints have been borrowed from Mitra (2010) and Kothari and Roy (1969) and some are conceived by the researcher.

politics while others are agreed and partially agreed with the statement. Equally, 40 (57.14%) bureaucrats respectively disregard that they are inefficient and they have a tendency to expand the departments and increase procedures instead of solving concrete problems. Overall, bureaucrats are persuaded to rate themselves in a much more favourable light. They do not fully admit that that they are corrupt, inefficient and work in the interest of ruling class. Rather, they think that they always care for people’s welfare instead of their self-interest and personal benefit. Thus, the perceptions of bureaucrat are to themselves diverse sharply from the images of bureaucracy that identified by the politicians. Therefore, it is important to discuss the images and outlooks of politicians that perceived by the bureaucrats as counterpart of politicians.

### 7.3.5 Bureaucrats’ Perceptions to Politicians

According to the perceptions of politicians’ to bureaucrats, it is exposed that bureaucrats are more guided by their administrative mechanisms and to some extent it is evident that bureaucrats are merely confined by the “bureaucratic Redtapism”. It is therefore, necessary to explore – do the bureaucrats also conjure up equally the same view about local elected politicians? Thus, to know the perceptions of bureaucrats towards the local politicians the following statements presented before the bureaucrats to convey their opinion on the statements. The bureaucrats’ perceptions and outlooks are presented in the table 7.13. The empirical data from the table demonstrates the images and outlooks of politicians that perceived by the counterpart bureaucrats. Most of the bureaucrats are agree that political leaders have little knowledge and regard for administrative rules, regulations and procedures and 36 (51.42%) and 13 (18.57) bureaucrats respectively agree and partially agree that local Politicians have tendency to disregard to conform the rules and regulation in governance while 21 (30%) disagree with the statement. Likewise, bureaucrats express their opinion that local elected politicians do not try to understand the difficulties of bureaucrats and they just order to do any particular thing without realizing the real fact.

**Table 7.13**  
**Bureaucrats Perceptions to Politicians (by Number=70)**

Viewpoints of Perceptions	Agree	Partially Agree	Disagree
---------------------------	-------	-----------------	----------

Politicians are not well acquainted with administrative procedures, rules and regulations	42	18	10
Politicians have tendency to disregard to conform the rules and regulation in governance	36	13	21
Politicians cannot act in a decisive manner because of various conflicting pressure on them	30	21	19
Politicians do not trust Bureaucrats	28	17	25
Politicians are generally cooperative with Bureaucrats	15	25	30
Politicians do not appreciate the viewpoints and the difficulties of Bureaucrats	47	13	10
Politicians are hostile to Bureaucrats	18	24	28
Politicians do nothing but create problem for the Bureaucrats	24	19	27
Politicians are corrupt	17	27	26
Politicians care for people's welfare	15	17	38
Politicians work only in their self-interest	19	12	39
Politicians are more transparent than Bureaucrats	5	10	55
Politicians entertain the people's complain most	15	25	30
Politicians help in making government policies realistic	16	18	36

Source: Field Survey

This perception is confirmed by the fact that only 16 (22.85%) bureaucrats agree that politicians help in making government policies realistic whereas 36 (51.42%) bureaucrats disagree. It is likely evident the opposite view of politicians that perceived by the politicians to themselves. Interestingly, both politicians and bureaucrats are agreeing with the statement that politicians cannot act in a decisive manner because of various conflicting pressure on them. On the other hand, most of the bureaucrats disregard that politician's work in a transparent manner. Rather they create the problems for the bureaucrats to perform their governance functions in accurate manner. Overall, bureaucrat's perceptions and images towards politicians are not so high and impressive although they agreed that, it is not possible to discard the politicians from the process of local governance as they are elected representatives of the people. So, it is much better to explore the general people's perceptions to the images and outlooks of local elected politicians and bureaucrats to make the ground for three dimensional comparative analyses on the basis of empirical data from the each categories of sample.

### **7.3.6 General Peoples' Perceptions to Politicians and Bureaucrats**

In the previous two sections, we have examined the self-images and outlooks of both politicians and bureaucrats to each other. We also find abundant variation in the distribution of each other images and outlooks in many items that we presented before them. It is, therefore, of interest to examine the images and outlooks of local politicians and bureaucrats that perceived by the general peoples as they are the prime stakeholders or beneficiaries by both of the local politicians and the bureaucrats. Furthermore, it is also necessary to explore the views of general people's to draw the line of conclusion on the three dimensional comparison. Thus, the same question was asked to the general people to verify the self-images and outlooks of politicians and bureaucrats. The general people's responses are outlined in the table 7.14. The empirical data shows that in the first item of viewpoints general people favour the bureaucrats than politicians and they admit that bureaucrats are more aware with administrative rules, regulations and procedures than politicians. Yet, how far they have tendency to disregard to conform the rules and regulation in governance in this question 69 (49.28%) general peoples agree that local politicians have tendency to disregard to conform the rules and regulations and 55 (39.28%) partially agree with the statement and only 16 (11.42%) were disagree. In contrast, to the bureaucrats this proportions were 47(33.57%), 52 (37.14%) and 29 (20.71%) respectively. That means to the application of rules and regulations bureaucratic image is little bit higher than politicians to the general people. Similarly, most of the local people admit that politicians are always in multidimensional pressure and thus they cannot act in a decisive manner. Nonetheless, general people argued that politicians help in making government policies realistic because they are the real agents of the general people and they know the problems of the local people. General people express their views that both politicians and bureaucrats are worked for their self-interest but bureaucrats are more self-interested than politicians. Because bureaucrats are not come to the local people for vote and they are not accountable to them whereas politicians are come to the people for vote and thus they should think little bit about the welfare of the general people. But the general people think that both are corrupt and bureaucrats are more corrupt than politicians in their view.

**Table 7.14**

**General People’s Perceptions to Politicians and Bureaucrats (by Number=140)**

<b>Viewpoints of Perceptions to Politicians</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Partially Agree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Viewpoints of Perceptions to Bureaucrats</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Partially Agree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>
Politicians are not well acquainted with administrative procedures, rules and regulations	75	13	52	Bureaucrats are well acquainted with administrative procedures, rules and regulations	82	25	33
Politicians have tendency to disregard to conform the rules and regulation in governance	69	55	16	Bureaucrats have tendency to conform the rules and regulation in governance	47	52	29
Politicians cannot act in a decisive manner because of various conflicting pressure on them	87	18	35	Bureaucrats are very rigid in their attitude and they do not listen to the advice of others	57	41	42
Politicians do not trust Bureaucrats	25	58	57	Bureaucrats distrust Politicians	37	71	32
Politicians are generally cooperative with Bureaucrats	39	47	54	Bureaucrats take part in local politics	86	48	6
Politicians do not appreciate the viewpoints and the difficulties of Bureaucrats	45	75	20	Bureaucrats do not appreciate the viewpoints and the difficulties of local Politicians	65	52	23
Politicians are hostile to Bureaucrats	27	53	60	Bureaucrats are inefficient	28	63	49
Politicians do nothing but create problem for the Bureaucrats	26	39	75	Bureaucrats work in the interest of ruling class	95	25	20
Politicians are corrupt	89	35	16	Bureaucrats are corrupt	92	31	17
Politicians care for people’s welfare	35	77	28	Bureaucrats care for people’s welfare	27	38	75
Politicians work only in their self-interest	29	48	63	Bureaucrats work only in their self-interest	75	26	19
Politicians are more transparent than Bureaucrats	41	63	36	Bureaucrats are more transparent than Politicians	46	71	23
Politicians entertain the people’s complain most	124	12	4	Bureaucrats entertain the people’s complain most	14	6	120
Politicians help in making government policies realistic	85	21	34	Bureaucrats have a tendency to expand the departments and increase procedures instead of solving concrete problems	77	25	38

Source: Field Survey

### **7.3.7 Three Dimensional Comparisons of Images and Outlooks**

In this section of the thesis, we endeavor to develop a three dimensional comparison of the images and outlooks of politicians and bureaucrats on the basis of the previous discussion that we have already appeared and portrayed from the viewpoints of three categories of sample respondents. Thus, we can now pull together various perceptions, images and outlook in a meaningful pattern of comparison underlining them into the following attributive categories: rules and regulations, impartiality, superiority, competency, rigidity, self-interest, corruption, transparency, people's interest and mutual trust. In the context of administrative rules, regulations and procedures, normatively bureaucrats are tend to evaluate themselves in much more favourable light than the local elected politicians.

Interestingly, politicians themselves also admit their deficiencies in administrative rules and regulations. General peoples also think alike and in the similar fashion of politicians and bureaucrats. However, difference occurs in the application and conformation of these rules and regulation in practice. Then bureaucrats as well as general people are endowed with them (bureaucrats) in similar favourable light "as sticklers of rules" in governance but the politicians are not. Then the consideration arises on impartiality of bureaucracy. In this case, only 5.7% politicians, 31.4% bureaucrats and 17.9% general people respectively think that bureaucrats are impartial and politically neutral. But the empirical data shows that 45 (64.28%) politicians, 12 (17.14%) bureaucrats and 86 (61.42%) general people agree that bureaucrats take part in local politics. That means bureaucracy has tendency to disagree that they take part in local politics. However, there is a small but significant area of agreement irrespective of the categories of the respondent and that is all of the respondents consider elected politicians are superior in the administrative hierarchy as they are elected representatives of the people.

On the other hand, to evaluation of the self-image and counter image of the two actors in the context of competency, bureaucrats consider them as competent, as only 12 (17.14%) bureaucrats agree with the statement that "bureaucrats are inefficient" while 31 (44.28%) and 15(21.42%) politicians and 28(20%) and 63(45%) general people respectively agree and partially agree with the statement. Similarly, most of the local elected politicians and general people think

that bureaucrats are very rigid in their attitude and they do not listen to the advice of others while most of the bureaucrats are disagreed with those views of politicians and general peoples. In this regard, politicians and bureaucrats express their diverse and opposite views that politician' vis-à-vis bureaucrats do not appreciate the viewpoints and the difficulties of each other. In this respect, general people's view is like that both are correct as most of the general peoples are either agreed or partially agreed with two statements. There is, however, important to note one higher educated respondent general people's observation here:

You may think politicians and bureaucrats like oil and water. They work together but never mixed with one another. They always appeared to be a complaining actor against each other. This is why politicians do not appreciate the viewpoints and the difficulties of bureaucrats and bureaucrats disregard the viewpoints and the difficulties of local politicians. However, you can mix them properly if you are an efficient cooker. But it is always difficult in the context of conflicting interest driven society.

In the context of self-interest, both the politicians and bureaucrats (more than 70%) deny that they work only in their self-interest and to serve the interest of the ruling class. Rather both of them argue that they work for the welfare of the general people and to serve the nation. In this respect, one respondent politician's perception is remarkable here:

I would not disagree that as a politician we are apathy from our self-interest. But it is never been overlooking and disregarding the interest of the people those who are our master. As a politician, I know that I will have to go back to the people again and I will have to clarify my achievement and service what I have provided to my people during my tenure and they will judge me during the election. But the bureaucrats never think alike us because they are not elected and they do not have any headache whether peoples' interest are fulfilled or not. They will remain in their position either here or anywhere. Now as an academician you should measure who think about self-interest most.

However, the perceptions of general people on measuring the self-interest of politicians and bureaucrats exposed from the empirical data that bureaucrats are more self-interest maximizer than elected politicians (see the data in table 7.14). In this respect, during the interview I personally (beyond the question) asked to the several general people why they think that bureaucrats are more self-interested than politicians. The respondents replied similar to the politicians as noted above. Nevertheless, it is important to mention here one respondent opinion of Savar Upazila who was a retired school teacher:

I myself was a government service holder. I retired from my job near about one year. Since my retirement, I was loitering to every office related to my department to get my pension and service benefit. But I was unable to non-cooperation of the government officers of our department. I would not say why.....Lastly, I went to a political leader who was elected from my constituency and without any interest he helped me and I got my pension and others benefits accurately. This is why I think sometimes politicians work without self-interest.

On the other hand, in the question of corruption, local elected politicians believe that bureaucrats are more corrupt than that of politicians. In contrast, bureaucrats hold that they are not corrupt while 57 (81.42%) bureaucrats disagree that they are corrupt. Rather, they believe that politicians are more corrupt than bureaucrats. Notable that, none of them totally discarded the idea of corruption but the dominant tendency was to pass the blame to each other. However, general people believe that both are corrupt and more than sixty five percent general people agree with the statement. But according to the perception of general people bureaucrats are more corrupt than politicians. In this respect, one respondent comments that “The official bureaucrats are guided by the principle that is how to exploit the general people and extract money from them without giving proper service as a servant of the people.”

Overall, it is outward from the data that the perception of bureaucrats’ self-image diverges sharply from the image politicians hold about them and vis-à-vis. The similar tendency is observable in the context of transparency. Most of the bureaucrats think that politicians do nothing but create unnecessary problem for bureaucrats, and bureaucrats are more transparent than politicians. On the other hand, local politicians believe that they are more transparent than bureaucrats. However, general people think that bureaucrats are little bit more transparent than politicians as they are to maintain two bosses; elected politicians and their administrative hierarches. Thus, they cannot do whatever they want. Likewise, most of the local elected politicians believe that they emphasize people’s interest and entertain their complain most, than the official bureaucrats as bureaucrats have a tendency to expand the departments and increase procedures instead of solving concrete problems. On the contrary, bureaucrats do not admit with this statement. Rather they think that bureaucracy has goodwill of concrete problem solving as they are technically trained, and bureaucrats believe that they entertain people complain most, not the politicians. Yet, general people believe that bureaucrats always think about themselves

and their interest, not the interest of the people as only 14 (10%) general people agree with the statement that bureaucrats entertain the people's complain most. Rather, politicians entertain the people's complain most while 124 (88.57%) general people agree with the statement. In this respect, one poor and illiterate woman respondent's remark is notable here that I noted down during the interview to the general people. To quote the woman:

I am approximately seventy years old and widow woman. I have one son who is married and living in Dhaka city and lives off rickshaw pulling there. He doesn't look after me. I don't have any income. But I have a VGF (venerable group feeding) card and I get some rice every month. Thus I used to come to Upazila Parishad every month with one of my grandson as it is not so far from my village. Three months ago while the officer was distributing rice, he gave me 5 kg less. When my grandson told me this, then I was very angry and asked them why you gave me 5kg less? But they did not reply, rather said don't shout and go home. Then someone (I cannot recall the name) said to me go to "Boro Sir" (main bureaucrat) and make complain. According, I went to him with my grandson but I was not able to enter to the office of "Boro Sir" after trying two days. Then I went to Upazila Chairman and I saw his office is open for all and thus many people were there. I said to them I want to meet with chairman and someone helped me and I met with chairman. I told him about my incident. Then he managed everything and said you would come to me without going there. Since then in every month now I go to him directly without any hindrance which I did not get from "Boro Sir" (UNO).

The above statement of a respondent reveals that the access of mass people to the bureaucrats is not always easy. On the other hand, how far politicians and bureaucrats are hostile or is there any distrust between them? To this question, the images and outlooks that portrait to us from the empirical data is, there is a significant level of distrust between them and in most of the cases they think each other as hostile in the pursuance of governance and disposal of business. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the contact pattern and mutual interaction between them more exclusively to explore the real prototype of relations between them.

### **7.3.8 Contact Pattern and Mutual Interaction**

This section examines the ways of contact pattern and mutual interaction between local elected politicians and bureaucrats. Aberbach et al (1981:209) show that developmental programmes are affected and to some extent difficult, if the distinctive pattern of contact found between politicians and bureaucrats and "Theoretically, at least, one important difference between

bureaucrats and politicians concerns whom they meet and how often.” Thus, we asked a set of question to examine the contact pattern and mutual interaction between local elected politicians and bureaucrats. The findings reported in the tables 7.15 and 7.16 respectively. The first two questions were related to normative evaluation of interpersonal consultation between politicians and bureaucrats in local decision making and their mutual involvement in governance.

**Table 7.15**  
**Importance of Contact and Mutual Interaction between Politicians and Bureaucrats (by number and percent)**

Variables	Politicians' Perceptions (N-70)				Bureaucrats' Perceptions (N-70)				Total N=140
	Very Important	Important	Somewhat Important	Not so Important	Very Important	Important	Somewhat Important	Not so Important	
Importance of Consultation to each other	34 (48.6%)	33 (47.1%)	2 (2.9%)	1 (1.4%)	18 (25.7%)	46 (65.7%)	6 (8.6%)	-	70 (100%)
	Strongly Support	Support	Partially Support	Don't Support	Strongly Support	Support	Partially Support	Don't Support	
Both should have involvement in the daily business of governance	29 (41.4%)	38 (54.3%)	2 (2.9%)	1 (1.4%)	3 (4.3%)	40 (57.1%)	21 (30.0%)	6 (8.6%)	70 (100%)

**Table 7.16**  
**Contact Pattern and Mutual Interaction between Politicians and Bureaucrats (by number and percent)**

Variables	Politicians' Perceptions (N-70)				Bureaucrats' Perceptions (N-70)				Total N=140
	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	
Consultation to each other	9 (12.9%)	46 (65.7%)	14 (20.0%)	1 (1.4%)	8 (11.4%)	53 (75.7%)	8 (11.4%)	1 (1.4%)	70 (100%)
Come to help for each other	23 (32.9%)	31 (44.3%)	16 (22.9%)	-	23 (32.9%)	37 (52.9%)	10 (14.3%)	-	70 (100%)
Try to convince to agree with each other	2 (2.9%)	44 (62.9%)	20 (28.6%)	4 (5.7%)	3 (4.3%)	46 (65.7%)	18 (25.7%)	3 (4.3%)	70 (100%)
Misunderstanding and Disagreement to each other	2 (2.9%)	23 (32.9%)	33 (47.1%)	12 (17.1%)	1(1.4%)	27 (38.6%)	36 (51.4%)	6 (8.6%)	70 (100%)
Interference to each other's works	3 (4.3%)	34 (48.6%)	30 (42.9%)	3(4.3%)	1(1.4%)	38(54.3%)	27 (38.6%)	4 (5.7%)	70 (100%)
Pressure from each other	-	7 (10.0%)	41 (58.6%)	22 (31.4%)	3 (4.3%)	33 (47.1%)	24 (34.3%)	10 (14.3%)	70 (100%)

Source: Field Survey

How important to consultation between politicians and bureaucrats in local decision making? To this question, the empirical data reveals that there is agreement between local elected politicians and bureaucrats and they admit that consultation between the two actors is must in the pursuance of governance activities though there is significant level of difference between the two actors of the supportive levels. For example, while 48.6% politicians believe that consultation is very important then 25.7% bureaucrats thing that it is very important. Nonetheless, it is a positive sign to the governance that, at least, they admit that mutual interaction and consultation is important in governance. However, contradiction is found in the response to the second question. When the second question was asked: “As an elected representative and or an official bureaucrat both should have involvement in the daily business of governance. How do you support the statement? Then, 29(41.4%), and 38(54.3%) politicians respectively strongly support and support the statement while only 3(4.3%) bureaucrats strong support, and 40(57.1%) support the statement. On the other hand, the percentage of partially support to the politicians and bureaucrats is 2(2.9%) and 21(30%) respectively. So, the empirical data reveals that the mutual attitude among the bureaucrats is not so high. In this regard, one respondent bureaucrat’ observation is notable here. During the interview, when this question appeared to the bureaucrat then one bureaucrat said that-

I have objection and reservation to this question. Before providing the answer of this question, I would like to ask you to clarify what you want to know by this question exactly. If you want to know that elected representative and bureaucrat should work together as allies then I would support the statement. Otherwise, if you want to know that elected representative would always interfere and meddling to my sphere of responsibilities with the attitude of superior authority then I would not support the statement.

The above statement clearly reveals that bureaucratic attitude towards the local elected politicians is not so interactive. Most of the bureaucrats think that, they support the association of work of both politicians and bureaucrats if their (bureaucrats’) role performance is untrammelled by any way. This tendency or intention of bureaucracy improvises the autonomous model of relationship to some extent. We also got the same idea from the empirical data of their self-images and outlooks. However, politician’s perceptions and intentions do not expose the same idea. Rather, politicians are more unambiguous to their expression and to some extent they are ready to sacrifice their freedom of action in some cases, as they hold less technical expertise than

bureaucrats. Consequently, relational patters drive to one-way and then it turns to the bureaucratic domination.

**Table 7.17**  
**Correlation between Politicians-Bureaucrats Relation and Self Images and Outlooks**

<b>Self-Images and Outlooks</b>	<b>Politicians-Bureaucrats Relation</b>
Politicians are not well acquainted with administrative procedures, rules, and regulations	-.158**
Politicians have tendency to disregard to conform the rules and regulation in governance	.032
Politicians cannot act in a decisive manner because of various conflicting pressure on them	-.070
Politicians do not trust Bureaucrats	-.149*
Politicians are generally cooperative with Bureaucrats	-.090
Politicians do not appreciate the viewpoints and the difficulties of Bureaucrats	-.170**
Politicians are hostile to Bureaucrats	-.067
Politicians do nothing but problems to Bureaucrats	-.077
Politicians are corrupt	-.002
Politicians care for people's welfare	-.023
Politicians work only in their self interest	-.015
Politicians are more transparent than Bureaucrats	.063
Politicians entertain the people's complain most	.140*
Politicians help in making government policies realistic	-.018
Bureaucrats are well acquainted with administrative procedures, rules, and regulations	-.182**
Bureaucrats have tendency to conform the rules and regulation in governance	-.179**
Bureaucrats are very rigid in their attitude and they do not listen to the advice of others	-.031
Bureaucrats distrust politicians	-.026
Bureaucrats take part in local politics	.077
Bureaucrats do not appreciate the viewpoints and the difficulties of local politicians	.017
Bureaucrats are inefficient	-.009
Bureaucrats works in the interest of ruling class	.070
Bureaucrats are corrupt	.057
Bureaucrats care for people's welfare	-.175**
Bureaucrats work only in their self interest	.042
Bureaucrats are more transparent than politicians	-.123*
Bureaucrats entertain people's complain most	-.223**
Bureaucrats have tendency to expand the departments and increase procedures instead solving concrete problems	.019

\*Significant at the .05 level (2 tailed)

\*\*Significant at the .01 level (2 tailed)

N = 280

Source: Field Survey

However, here, the above table shows the correlation analysis between politicians-bureaucrats relation and self-image and outlooks variables. It reveals that in most of the cases, negative significant correlation found between perceiving images and politics-bureaucracy relation, which means with the rising of one of the indicator variables the class of relation will rise up and their perceptions to self and each other are not mutually exclusive.<sup>52</sup> To some extent, distorted images and outlooks are projected from the empirical data. However, to examine the contact patterns and mutual attitude towards each other, we asked more set of question. The findings are demonstrated in the table 7.16. The empirical data reveals that they do not consult frequently. The rate of mutual consultation is not in the satisfactory level. They consult each other sometimes and when it is overly necessary. The statistical results of these variables are not so significant (see the table 7.18). Maybe the attitudes probably cannot fully predict the contract patterns and mutuality that politicians and bureaucrats will have. That produces diverse interactive patterns to us. The empirical data shows that although both the politicians and bureaucrats seek help to each other but misunderstanding and disagreement occurred between them with interference to each other's works which influence negatively on the relational patterns between local elected politicians and official bureaucrats .

**Table 7.18**  
**Correlation between Politicians-Bureaucrats Relation and Mutual Attitude**

Mutual Attitude	Politicians-Bureaucrats Relation
Involvement of UZPC in daily business of Bureaucrats	-.216*
Importance of consultation between Politicians and Bureaucrats	.052
Misunderstanding and disagreement arise between UNO and UZPC	-.115
UNO and UZPC interfere in each other works	-.146
UNO and UZPC come to help each other	.210*
Pressure from each other	-.074
Ever try to convince each other	-.110
Do consults to each other	.146

\*Significant at the .05 level (2 tailed)  
 \*\*Significant at the .01 level (2 tailed)  
 N = 140

<sup>52</sup> See the subsequent chapter for more comprehensive understanding of the models of relations from empirical data.

**Table 7.19 (Model 1)**  
**Ordinal Logistic Regression of Relation Estimation by Social Background, Role Perceptions, and Self -Image and Mutual Interaction Variables**

Relation (Dependent)	Coef.	Std. Err.
<b>Social Background Variable</b>		
Age	.084**	.037
Education	-.266**	.204
Occupation	.043	.191
Experience	-.432**	.215
Family Background	-.380	.486
Parents Occupation	.067	.227
Parents Yearly Income	.099	.115
<b>Role Perception Variables</b>		
Role Evaluation	.471*	.168
Distinct Role Perception	.541	.788
Specific Role Perception	.110	.175
<b>Self-Image and Mutual Interaction Variables</b>		
V -1	-.716	.632
V-2	.557	.584
V-3	1.371**	.628
V-4	-1.311**	.643
V-5	-1.189**	.586
V-6	.115	.536
V-7	.542	.626
V-8	-.426	.669
V-9	-.084	.636
V-10	-.425	.766
V-11	.330	.659
V-12	.263	.553
V-13	.264	.491
V-14	.569	.675
	Number of observation = 140	Pseudo R2=0.1604
	Prob > chi2=0.0338	Log likelihood= - 99.771

**Note:** \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively for each variable. Coeff. = coefficient, Std. Err. = Standard Error

In the above table it shows Prob > chi2=0.0338 that means ordinal logistic regression of relation estimation model is significant as a whole. That means relation between the politicians and bureaucrats can be estimated through social background, role perception, and self-image and mutual interaction variables. The Pseudo R2=0.1604 indicates 16% variation can be explained through this model. Age, role evaluation and, V-2 of Self Image and Mutual Interaction Variables are significant and positively associated with relation

estimation. On the other hand, education, experience, V-4, and V-5 of self-image and mutual interaction variables are significant but negatively associated with relation estimation.

#### **7.4 Conclusion:**

From the above discussion, it is evident that the cognitive role perceptions of local elected politicians and bureaucrats are neither clear nor up to the mark. The comparative analysis of politicians and bureaucrats views reveals that theoretically they believe that politics and administration are separate, and they should have separate roles and functions. But in practice, they have intention to be involved in every aspect of the policy and governance processes, as both the politicians and bureaucrats identified all are the spheres of their boundary of activities. According to the viewpoint of general people, politicians are likely to be involved in all activities of the UZP as they are people's representatives, and in comparison to bureaucratic involvement, it is little bit higher. It reveals that, to identification of specific roles of politicians and bureaucrats, general people have support towards the politicians and that they might be involve in all the activities while the main responsibility of the bureaucrats is likely to be the policy implementation although some respondents are supported bureaucratic involvement in all activities.

The empirical data analysis reveals that there is a correlation between social background and role orientation as well as role orientation and relations. The empirical data demonstrates that the politico-bureaucratic culture is immensely different and the absence of parallel behavior is substantially clear. Thus local bureaucrats consider them as the permanent agent of the central government and they emphasize rules and regulations more than the directions of the local elected politicians and the practical needs of the local people which ultimately plays a very significant role as underpinning variable to the determination of relationship between them and results dichotomous relations between the two actors.

Similarly, empirical data reveals that the self-images and outlooks of politicians and bureaucrats are different that both of them hold about each other. Although respondents' opinions reveal that politicians are superior to the administrative hierarchy theoretically but in practice their contradictory views open up while they provided the perceptions to each other. According to the perceptions of politicians to bureaucrats, bureaucrats lost its impartial

character and neutrality and also its efficiency. But politicians admit that bureaucrats are more rules, regulations and procedures oriented than politicians and yet they display different opinions in practical application of these rules and regulations. Likewise, according to the perceptions of bureaucrats, they have not hold high image about politicians but they hold high self-image about themselves and they estimate themselves in much more favourable light than local elected politicians. Local politicians are more realistic in evaluating their self-image vis-à-vis bureaucrats.

Interestingly, the comparative analysis of their self-images and outlooks to each other reveals that both of them have tendency to blame and undermine each other and bureaucrats are in higher position in this case than their counterpart. This attitude and tendency to each other is verified by the statistical analysis of correlation and chi-square test. Most of the cases are produced significant results (See the appendix 5). Thus, the behavioural attitude which perceived by the politicians vis-à-vis bureaucrats do not project congenial image. Rather, it presents distorted image to each other. Overall, the role perceptions, social background and self-images to each other are not mutually exclusive, somewhat they are holding antagonistic or hostile attitude to each other in some cases which do not signify the mutual attitude towards each other. However, some differences are evident from the case variation and in the context of case dimension. The degree of mutual understanding is not similar to all UZP equally. In sum, the above empirical analysis and evidence clearly exhibit distorted images and lack of mutual attitude overall and thus results dichotomous relations between them by their attitudinal or behavioural data. Nevertheless, it does not exhibit how far this model is existing or how does this relation affect the local governance and development. It is therefore, necessary to test the theoretical model by the empirical data in the context of institutional and functional dimensions and that will be the main theme of the next chapter.

# Chapter – 8: Models of Relations and its Effect on Local Governance and Development: Institutional and Functional Dimensions

## 8.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, we examined role perceptions, self-images and outlooks as well as mutual perceptions towards each other of politicians and bureaucrats. We find that these behavioural variables are basic elements for constructing the prototype of relationships between local elected politicians and bureaucrats. However, it is not completely clear to us which model of relationship is prevailing to politicians and bureaucrats at the local level of government in Bangladesh, and how the relations affect the performance of local governance and development, as we got puzzling perceptions between the two actors of governance which overall signify the dichotomous relationship between them.

Therefore, the main purpose of this chapter is three folds: (1) to investigate the theoretical model which exist to the politics-bureaucracy relations at the local government in Bangladesh by approaching of the relational models that we have identified in the chapter two; (2) Does this relation affect local governance and development (examine the last half of the second proposition)? And (3) also to examine the third proposition: *if the local government institution (UZP) is controlled by the regulations of central government then it is maneuvered the scope for bureaucratic domination resulting conflictual relationship between the local elected politicians and the local official bureaucrats which ultimately affect the local governance and development.*

Moreover, we will emphasize to explore the answer to the following questions in the context of institutional and functional dimensions. Who dominates the local policy structure and of governance? What are their dominant values? Is there any conflict between the two actors? Why conflict occurs? What are the patters of conflict? And how does the local development activities and governing process affect by the conflicting relations? Accordingly, we, therefore, begin our discussion with explaining the theoretical models and then turn to

examine one by one with the empirical data. Note that, inferences have been built on the basis of both qualitative and quantitative analysis.

## **8.2 The Theoretical Models and its Governance Attributes**

In this section, we endeavor to revisit the theoretical models to examine the existing model of relationship that is prevailing to the politics-bureaucracy relations at the local government in Bangladesh.

### **8.2.1 Dichotomous Model of Relationship**

As said in the theoretical discussion that the relational model of politics-bureaucracy relationship can be explained using specific theory or model, and can be identified by exploring the constructing factors and governance attributes in the institutional structure. For example, if relational model is found dichotomous then the theoretical principal role characteristics are likely to be: condition (1) politicians and bureaucrats will play separate roles or duties. That means politicians will approach the policy and bureaucrats will simply implement or execute the policy. Condition (2) bureaucrats will be politically neutral, and condition (3) bureaucrats will be professionally competent. If local government institutions follow these principles then the governance attributes will be dominated by the elected politicians, accountability will be democratic, both politicians and bureaucrats are to be professionals, politicization is likely to be less, and their interaction might be mechanistic. In that case, both the actors will play the game with non-aligned nature of individual interests. This dichotomy model of relationship between politicians and bureaucrats and their effects on local governance and development can be explained by applying “principal-agent theory” where the elected politicians is considered as the principal and the bureaucrats as the agent.

### **8.2.2 Mutual-Interactive Model of Relationship**

On the other hand, if relational model is found mutual-interactive then the principal role characteristics are likely to be: condition (1) politicians and bureaucrats will play overlapping roles or duties. That means politicians and bureaucrats roles will be mutually exclusive and shared. Condition (2) bureaucrats will be politically involved or affiliated, and condition (3) bureaucrats will be politically responsive not professionally competent. If local government

institutions follow these principles then the governance attributes will be mostly dominated by the official bureaucrats, accountability will be joint but vague, bureaucrats are to be professionals, politicization is likely to be more, and their images or interaction might be reciprocal or mutual. In that case, both the actors will play the game with aligned nature of individual interests. This mutuality model of relationship between politicians and bureaucrats and their effects on local governance and development can be explained by applying the “transaction cost theory” and this model of relationship provides the scope of “cut off power” of elected representative and provides partnership with the bureaucrats in the process of governance and policy making.

### **8.2.3 Symbiotic Model of Relationship**

If the relational model does not signify any of the previous two or indistinguishable, then the symbiotic model of relationship would be possible and in that case, the principal role characteristics are likely to be: condition (1) politicians and bureaucrats will play separate roles or duties with complementarity. That means politicians and bureaucrats roles will be distinctive but shared. Condition (2) bureaucrats will not be politically involved or affiliated, and condition (3) politicians and bureaucrats will work with mutual respect and self-identity. It is a very vital question to public administration that, how it would be appeared in the administrative or political structure? “It would appear, then, that, in spite of the fact that administrators and politicians both occupy different role sectors and are supposed to work more or less independently of each other, there are numerous occasions for them to interact and influence each other’s behavior” (Kothari and Roy, 1969:11).

If local government institutions follow these principles then the governance attributes will be mutually dominated by both the elected politicians and official bureaucrats, accountability will be shared, both of them will be worked professionally, politicization is likely to be less, and their images or interaction might be reciprocal with shared and balanced influence. In that case, both the actors will play the game with not only aligned nature of their individual interests but also emphasizing the welfare of the general people. Note that, in a symbiotic model of relationship, politicians and bureaucrats should be restrained strictly from securing personal benefits or self-interest maximization. In sum, the symbiosis is neither dichotomy nor mutuality; it’s a fusion of the above two and this model of relationship can be explained


by applying the theory of rational choice. In this research, we want to apply these three models to explore which theoretical model fit into the local government of Bangladesh.

### 8.3 Exploring the Theoretical Model: The Gap between Theory and Practice

In the conceptual framework, we have discussed four dominant models on politics bureaucracy relations: dichotomy or separate model, mutual-interactive model, autonomy model, and political responsiveness model. In this section, we will explain the perceptions of local elected politicians and bureaucrats towards these theoretical models along with the cognitive orientations. In this respect, a number of questions were asked to the respondents, for example: “There are four dominant models of politics-bureaucracy relations in the existing literatures of political science and public administration. Which model is more effective in your consideration? The respondent data has outlined in below figure 8.1.

**Figure 8.1**

**Cognitive Orientation of Politicians and Bureaucrats on Theoretical Relational Models**



Source: Field Survey

The empirical data from the figure 8.1 demonstrates that whatever the levels of awareness about the theoretical models on roles and functions of the politicians and bureaucrats, the perception on relational model is to some extent similar. Because, the variations between the

two actors are not so high, except to the consideration of autonomy practice in general. When the respondents were asked the question, they replied that they don't have clear exposure or idea about the theoretical models on politics-bureaucracy relations. Nonetheless, interestingly, they have identified it rightly. As 14 (20.0%) respondent politicians provided the answer in support to the dichotomous or separate model as an effective model of relationship in governance while 11(15.7%) respondent bureaucrats identified the dichotomous or separate model as an effective model. The similar pattern is observable to the second model where 36(51.4%) politicians and 40(57.1%) bureaucrats hold that mutual-interactive model is much more effective to the congenial relation between politicians and bureaucrats. On the other hand, significant difference is found to the choice of autonomy and political responsiveness. The field data clearly shows that autonomy is much more favourable to bureaucrats than politicians. In contrast, political responsiveness is more favourable and effective in the consideration of local elected politicians. Overall, empirical data clearly reveals that both politicians and bureaucrats (51.4% and 57.1%) hold that mutual-interactive model is more effective for governance where politicians and bureaucrats can work together even if there is a tendency to uphold bureaucratic autonomy and political preference to both bureaucrats and politicians respectively.

However, the problem arise when the respondents were asked the second question on relational model and that was "Practically, which model you are following or maintaining in your professional life and why?" The answer options and logic were open to the respondents. Then the empirical data present that they were confused and their responses contradic with the answer to the previous question which are presented in the figure 8.2. Data reveals that most of the politicians and bureaucrats are unable to identify the relational pattern or model of relationships what are they maintaing to their counterpart exactly. In this regard, one politician' and one bureaucrat' opinions are very important to mention here. During the interview, one elected UZP chairman reported that:

It is very difficult to distinguish the patterns of relations that we are maintaining in our daily disposal of business. Because we conduct our business in the fashion that is favourable to both of us. However, it does not mean that the relation between us is very good and congenioul. Rather, it is a mixture of good and bad relation, as disagreement and misunderstanding occurred frequently between us. Nevertheless, it is not possible to categorize our relationship into a perticular model of relation what we are approaching to each other. Because, none of us are confined in a particular way to performe our roles and functions.


Similarly, one official bureaucrat (UNO) explained this problem in the following way:

You will not be able to contain the model of relationship that we are following or maintaining in our professional life in such a selective or categorical way. Because, as a bureaucrat, I never no the concept of this kind of relation or that kind of relation. Rather, I only know the elected politicians and bureaucrats are the integral part of the administration. It is not possible to discard this process in the governance. However, I would like to prefer that model of relationship where I would be able to maintain my political boss, at the same time the autonomy of my profession and then it does not matter to me in which model we are belonging to. As a bureaucrat, I have got training to think alike.

Most of the local politicians and bureaucrats identified the same reasons as mentioned above. However, some variations are also observable according to the logic of following a particular pattern or model of relationship. For example, some politicians and bureaucrats those who identified the dichotomous model of relationship, they argued that “it keeps and ensures professional independency between the two actors” whereas those who identified mutual-interactive model they said “it is very difficult to run the local governance without cooperation and mutual understanding between politicians and bureaucrats.” Someone said “we maintain cooperative relationship between us because to avoid unnecessary conflicts between us.”

**Figure 8.2**

**Model Maintaining by the Local Politicians and Bureaucrats in Professional life**



Source: Field Survey

However, the most striking fact is that, the comparative analysis of data from the two figures reveals that both the local politicians and bureaucrats hold confusing perceptions on politics-bureaucracy relational models. This puzzle was more clearly identified by the last question and the perceptions clearly show that there are significant levels of differences between the theoretical and practical perceptions of politicians and bureaucrats. Theoretically, most of the respondents believe that the model of mutual-interactive relation between politicians and bureaucrats is more effective in governance. But practically, they are unable to maintain this model of relationship with each other as most of them are not able to identify any particular model in their professional life. Therefore, to identify the real prototype of relations, the respondents especially local politicians and bureaucrats were asked a similar question: for politician the question was “How would you rate your relationship with the local official bureaucrats?” and for local bureaucrat the question was “How would you rate your relationship with the local elected politicians?” Similarly, general peoples were also asked the same question “How would you rate the relationship between local elected politicians and official bureaucrats?” And the respondents were given the options of: A= Very Good; B= Good; C= Fairly Good and D= Poor.

It is therefore, notable here that, as we learned that direct theoretical question on relational model would not generate any significant weight as the cognitive orientation of politicians and bureaucrats is not so high and even they don’t have any theoretical idea about politics-bureaucracy relational model. Thus, we were predetermined that we would categorize empirical data into the following categorical options: Very good=Symbiotic Relation; Good=Mutual Relation; Fairly Good=Dichotomous Relation; and Poor=Direct Antagonistic, rather using the Likert Scale to identify the patterns or model of relations as the main intention of this research was to test the theoretical relational model. The sample respondent’s responses are presented in the table 8.1.

**Table 8.1**  
**Respondent’s Views on Existing Relational Models**

Category of Respondent	Assessing Relational Models			Total
	Symbiotic	Mutual-interactive	Dichotomous	
Politicians	5(7.14%)	19(27.14%)	46(65.71%)	70(100%)
Bureaucrats	6(8.57%)	49(70.0%)	15(21.42%)	70(100%)
General People	7(5.0%)	52(37.1%)	81(57.9%)	140(100%)
Total	18(6.42%)	120(42.85%)	142(50.71%)	280(100%)


Source: Field Survey

In this thesis, we are trying to identify the prototype of relations in a very sophisticated manner following multi-dimensional analysis. Thus, we are exploring the new way and dimension frequently without drawing any final logical inference on the model of relations which existing at the local government in Bangladesh. This is why we yet to take any decision, even though the empirical evidence from the previous chapter on their (politicians and bureaucrats) attitudinal or behavioural data clearly exhibited to us a distorted images and lack of mutual attitude that results dichotomous relation between them. However, in this stage of the research and after verifying the theoretical models by the empirical data, we can now draw the line on the basis of applying the deductive logic that symbiotic model of relationship does not directly exist to the politics-bureaucracy relations in Bangladesh, as only 18(6.42%) respondents endorse in favour of this model. Similarly, poor relation is also identified by none of the categories of the respondents.

So, we can deduct these two models by following the ‘hypothetico-deductive method’. Then the relations are confined to the rest of the two categories of models. Thus, we will deal with the other two models: mutual-interactive and dichotomous for further discussion. It would be worth mentioning from the empirical data that “dichotomous” model is existed to the politics-bureaucracy relation in Bangladesh, although total 142(50.71%) respondents have rated this model as existing relationship. Rather, we should explore more evidence in this stage without taking any final logical decision. The main reasons are; first, we yet verified whether it meets or not the theoretical conditions and governance attributes of this two models by the empirical data. Second, total 120(42.85%) respondents have also acknowledged “mutual-interactive” as the relational model which is slightly marginal than the percentage of dichotomy. Third and finally, empirical data on relational models demonstrate the opposite views of politicians and bureaucrats which are presented in the figure 8.3.

**Figure 8.3**

**Politician's and Bureaucrat's Views on Dichotomy and Mutuality (by %)**



Source: Field Survey

The above figure shows that among the sample politicians 19(27.14%) and 46(65.71%) respectively think that the relation between politician and bureaucrat is mutual-interactive and dichotomous, while 49(70%) and 15(21.42%) bureaucrats respectively hold that perceptions. That means the relational perceptions of politicians and bureaucrats are almost opposite. Where the politicians perceive the relation is less mutual-interactive and more dichotomous while the bureaucrats think that it is more mutual-interactive and less dichotomous. In this circumstance, we should examine the principal conditions of both the models with its governance attributes to grasp the case of Bangladesh more evidently. For this, we should focus the light on the role performance of politicians and bureaucrats emphasizing the institutional and functional dimensions of the UZP functioning. At the same time, we should frame the ground to examine the third hypothesis as well from the governance perspective.

### **8.3.1 Role Performance, Neutrality, Competency and Relations**

With the previous analysis of this chapter and by addressing the legal and constitutional framework, philosophy of decentralization, establishment of UZP, comparison among different acts, ordinance of the UZP which determined the institutionalization and regulatory framework of UZP in the chapter five, we got a preliminary theoretical idea how the UZPs are functioning in Bangladesh. With the above institutional and contextual background of the UZP, the discussion in this section will shed the light on manner of role performance of politicians and bureaucrats to identify the model of relationship more explicitly. Notably,

analysis will be drowned on the basis of both qualitative and quantitative data. Accordingly, to know the perceptions on role performance more evidently, sample politicians were asked: “Would you please provide what kind of roles you are performing as an elected politician and what kinds of roles are performed by the bureaucrats at the UZP?” The same question was asked to the official bureaucrats. The answer options were open and multi-responses are counted. The elected politicians’ as well as official bureaucrats’ opinions to their performed roles by themselves and to their counterpart’s are presented in the following tables.

**Table 8.2**

**The Roles and Functions Performed by Elected Politicians at the UZP (Identified by the politicians in multi- responses of N=70)**

<b>Performed Roles and Functions</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
To know the demands and complains from the people and to mitigate them	86.4
Maintain law and order and doing local <i>shalish</i> (local justice)	82.1
Visiting and accomplishing different development activities and public services	78.7
Opening new project and pass these projects at the UZP meeting	73.5
Cannot play any significant role except presiding the meeting	69.2
Distribution of relief and visiting natural disaster affected areas	65.8
Attending at the different types social programmes	58.6
Others	45.0

Source: Field Survey

**Table 8.3**

**The Roles and Functions Performed by Elected Politicians at the UZP (Identified by the bureaucrats in multi- responses of N=70)**

<b>Performed Roles and Functions</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Attending and presiding at the UZP monthly coordination meeting	91.5
Selection and approval of project and pass these projects at the UZP meeting	84.3
Meditation with peoples, bureaucrats and others people’s representatives	81.4
Monitoring all activities of several departments at the UZP	70.8
To know the demands and complains from the people and to mitigate them	65.6
Distribution of relief and visiting natural disaster affected areas	64.9
Play decisive role in ADP implementation	62.7
They work as a bridge between local people and the national government	61.9
They do only that works which benefited them economically, not others	59.8
They play the role on how to make the UZP as a political office	56.5
Others	52.2

Source: Field Survey

**Table 8.4**

**The Roles and Functions Performed by Official Bureaucrats at the UZP (Identified by the bureaucrats in multi- responses of N=70)**

<b>Performed Roles and Functions</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Maintain law and order	88.5
Implement all kinds of governmental orders	86.3
Maintain all secretarial activities related to governmental decision	85.4
Monitoring and Implementation of all development activities	81.6
Maintain all activities according to the Acts and Ordinance of the UZP	77.5
Project planning and ADP Implementation	73.8
Distribution of relief and visiting natural disaster affected areas	69.9
Attending at the different types official meetings at district levels	67.5
To know the demands and complains from the people and to mitigate them	61.2
Others	56.2

Source: Field Survey

**Table 8.5**

**The Roles and Functions Performed by Official Bureaucrats at the UZP (Identified by the politicians in multi- responses of N=70)**

<b>Performed Roles and Functions</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Maintain law and order as well as Judicial activities	85.2
To coordinate the activities of various departments at the UZP	83.8
Maintain all secretarial activities of the UZP	81.7
Communicate with the central government offices and ministries	78.3
Monitoring and Implement of all developmental programmes	72.7
Distribution of relief and ADP implementation	66.6
Maintain governmental protocol	64.5
To know the demands and complains from the people and to mitigate them	42.3
Others	38.6

Source: Field Survey

According to the UZP Ordinance, Acts and Manual, the roles and functions of politicians and bureaucrats are separate.<sup>53</sup> It reveals that local elected politicians' and bureaucrats' roles are not mutually exclusive and shared at least theoretically, and the scope of overlapping roles is very limited. Thus, it implies that theoretically the roles of politicians and bureaucrats are determined by the dichotomous model not by the mutuality. However, in practice, it does not

<sup>53</sup> The UZP manual 2013 clearly shows that elected politicians and bureaucrats will perform distinctive roles and functions. There is no scope of overlapping according to this manual. See Pp-36-92.

exist in their role performance which reflects from the empirical data (see the tables 8.2 to 8.5). The empirical data reveals that both the elected politicians and bureaucrats are performing their roles as in an overlapping manner with bureaucratic domination. Thus, according to the performed roles of politicians and bureaucrats they are neither bonded with the relationship of dichotomy nor mutuality. It is very difficult to categories in a specific model on the basis of their performed roles. The empirical data from the previous and of this chapter, and also the statements of an elected chairman, and an official bureaucrat reveal the above observation. In this respect, it is therefore, important to illustrate the opinion that was perceived by one UZP Chairman and reported during interview and that was:

According to the Acts and Ordinance of the UZP, the UNO (UNO is the chief bureaucrat to the UZP) is to act as the secretary and to provide technical support and policy advice to me. But in practice, he acts as the main boss of the UZP and always exposes the tendency that he is here from central government to look over all matters and he is all in all of the UZP and I am just nobody here. Sometimes, he tries to make group with other departmental officers and stands against me as I could do nothing. He always tries doing everything by superseding me.

Accordingly, when I appeared to the UNO for interview of the same UZP and placed the complaint raised by the elected chairman then UNO said:

The objection that is raised by the chairman against me is not solely correct. I would not disagree that I do that sometimes. But you will have to realize that definitely there is a reason. According to the rules and regulations of the UZP, our roles and functions are different. But at the end of the day, I am to do everything. He does nothing without giving me the order. I am not here to obey the order only. I also have my own course of duties. I am the main disbursing officer of the UZP, so, I am to clarify for everything to the higher authority. Even though, he (chairman) cannot draw the salary without my approval. Thus, I can't understand where is the problem if I want to be involved in every aspect of the functioning of the UZP.

The above statements of politician and bureaucrat, empirical data, as well as personal observation on the role performance of the local elected politicians and bureaucrats at the UZP, it reveals that theoretically they are guided by the division of labour, but in practice, there are no rules of game on their roles and functions. Secondly, according to the logic of dichotomous relational model, bureaucrats will be politically neutral, and professionally competent. In contrast, according to the logic of mutual-interactive model, bureaucrats will be politically involved or affiliated, and politically responsive not professionally competent. However, the empirical data shows that local bureaucrats are neither politically neutral nor

politically responsive to the local elected politicians. Rather, bureaucrats are politically responsive to the central political leaders.

Furthermore, the bureaucracy of Bangladesh is suffering from the moral crisis in between political neutrality and political responsiveness. The empirical evidence reveals that over the last two decades the process of politicizations of bureaucracy and bureaucratization of politics in administration has been significantly speeded up. Consequently, efficiency, policy expertizes and organizational supremacy of bureaucracy has been dismantled and degraded (Rahman, 2014). As a result, according to the empirical data and the perceptions of local elected politicians and bureaucrats, the relationship between them is neither normatively dichotomous with political neutrality and competence nor abundantly cohesive or responsive to the political leaderships with mutuality. Rather, it is an open secret conflicting relation in between the above two actors with either political or bureaucratic domination (where whatever is possible). In this stage, we can explore more evidence from the governance, institutional and functional perspectives of their relationships.

In this respect, one possible hypothesis was that existing institutional structure of local government and regulatory framework of central government to control the local government influences the relationship between local elected politicians and the appointed official bureaucrats. More particularly, ***if the local government institution (UZP) is controlled by the regulations of central government then it is maneuvered the scope for bureaucratic domination resulting conflictual relationship between the local elected politicians and the local official bureaucrats.*** This theoretical proposition implies that if the relation between them is shaped and controlled by the central government regulations then local bureaucrats are more important actors than the local elected politicians in the course of action practically. Then a possible end result is that it will leave little avenue for local elected politicians than the local bureaucrats to make priorities and political decisions. Strong regulation may then improvise legal power in favour of local bureaucrats and they may use this power by overlooking the local politician's directions providing the argument that as the agent of the central government they should follow the rules and regulations outlined by the central government not the directions of the local elected politicians. Thus, local politicians feel that local bureaucrats are more powerful than the local elected politicians and therefore conflicting relations arise in the governing process of local government. Although Jacobsen (2001:1) argued that "politics and administration is today seen as two overlapping spheres"

and this “overlapping between politics and administration also opens up for the possibility that there may be both conflict and co-operation between politicians and administrators”.

In this section, an attempt has been made to test this hypothesis empirically by focusing the light on institutional and governance perspectives emphasizing the legal and regulatory framework, institutional structure of the UZP, Mechanisms of central control, and role performance and satisfactions of the actors involved in the governing process grounded by the empirical data which is collected from the field. More importantly, as the collected data were both of qualitative and quantitative nature, thus inferences drawn from them following the mixed approach.

## **8.4 Legal Institutional Changes after Introduction of UZP: Myth and Reality**

### **8.4.1 Central Control by the Central Regulations: Myth of Autonomy and Self-Rule**

As we witnessed from the previous analysis that the constitution of Bangladesh stated on autonomous local government but unfortunately, it is controlled by the central government. The central government imposes varieties of controlling mechanisms like institutional control, administrative control, financial control, and controlled by the central local relations. Like other local government institutions, UZP exercises the jurisdiction under the legislation. It means that local authority perform its activities under the provisions of the concerned Acts and laws which are allowed and directed by the central government. The central government determined the legislation process for the local government system providing several directives that is issued by the central government time to time. Thus, one of the interesting and notable things is that, how the actors (mainly the local elected politicians and the appointed official bureaucrats) of UZP will interact to each other and what will be their roles and relations are also determined by the central regulations, directives and control. With this contextual background, the issue here is whether the UZP will act as an organization to merely implement national government programmes at the local level or it will be a self-ruled local level institution in a real sense, as defined in the constitution of Bangladesh, under Articles 9, 59, and 60.

As the hypothesis was – if the UZP and the relation between elected local politicians and local official bureaucrats is shaped and controlled by the central government regulations then local bureaucrats are more important actors than the local elected politicians. Strong regulation may then improvise legal power in favour of local bureaucrats and they may use this power by overlooking the local politician’s directions providing the argument that as the agent of the central government they should follow the rules and regulations outlined by the central government not the directions of the local elected politicians. A probable end result is that it will leave little avenue for local elected politicians than the local bureaucrats to make priorities and political decisions in governance. Thus, local politicians feel that local bureaucrats are more powerful than the local elected politicians and therefore conflicting relations arise in the governing process of local government. To verify this argument empirically, the following questions need to be addressed: How do the existing rules and regulations determine the relations between politicians and bureaucrats? How do the local elected politicians and official bureaucrats react towards the central rules and regulations? Who is an important actor? Who exercises real power? And what is their level of satisfactions in the role performance?

We observe that The Upazila Parishad Act 1998 (amended in 2009 and 2011) provided the legal basis of UZP and its activities. The UZP, as we observed, is composed of elected representatives and appointed official bureaucrats, where UZP will exercise its executive power by an elected chairman, two vice-chairmen, and official bureaucrats will provide necessary technical and secretarial assistance to the elected representative to fulfill his duties. That means the Act provided that the council will be formulated by elected and representative members and it will be the ultimate powerful body to the local governance. But Article 26(1, 2, 3) of the Act provided a contradictory, conflicting and overlapping role for the elected politicians and the bureaucrats which stated that “The executive power will be vested in the hand of the council, it could be implemented through chairman, vice chairman, or any government officials, the decision will be treated as the decision of the council.” At the same time, Article 33(1, 2) of the Act provided that UNO will be the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the council and financial and other legal activities will be disposed by the UNO. As a result, it indicates the contradiction and vagueness of the central regulation by which the UZP is functioning and it creates conflicting interest between local elected representatives and the official bureaucrats. Furthermore, Article 24(2, 3) stated that the government officials those who will be transfer to the UZP for managing the transfer activities will be treated as


the employee of the central government and they will be liable to the central government and their Annual Confidential Report (ACR) will be written by the higher authority of the respective office. Moreover, Article 25 stated that MPs will be the advisors of the council according to the article 65(1) of the constitution.

Thus, the legal and regulatory framework of the UZP proves that local bureaucrats are the employees of central government and they are only deployed to discharge the functions of local government but they are not accountable to the elected representatives and to the UZP. Rather, they are accountable to the central government and the relations between local elected politicians and official bureaucrats are determined by the central regulations and the lacking of the straightforwardness of the law improvise the overlapping role which ultimately open up the opportunity to bureaucratic domination in the local governance.

Accordingly, to know the answer of the above questions and to shed the empirical light on the theoretical hypothesis, a direct interview survey has been conducted with the three sets of different semi-structured questionnaire to the selected local politicians, bureaucrats and to the general people. The questionnaire to the politicians, bureaucrats and to the general people had some identical and some different questions. Note that, general people are not directly involved in the governing process of the UZP. Nonetheless, they have been included in the sample and interviewed to cross-check against the perceptions of local politicians and bureaucrats. Therefore, to know the answer of the first question, the respondents (specially local politicians and bureaucrats those who are considered as the main actors and change agent of local government) were asked a question: “Do you think that the UZP and your roles and relations is controlled and guided by the central government regulation and how does this regulation impacts on the relation between local elected politicians and bureaucrats and overall local governance?” The respondent data is outlined below.

**Figure 8.4**

**Respondent Opinions on Central Control and Regulation (by Number)**



Source: Field Survey

The above figure demonstrates the local elected politicians and bureaucrat's views on central control of UZP by the central regulations. Among the 70 local elected politicians 65(92.86%) provided the answer "Yes" and hold that central government control local government by the central regulations and by providing time to time directives from the central government while 5(7.14%) provided the answer "No". On the other hand, among the 70 local official bureaucrats 58(82.86%) provided the answer "Yes" and 12(17.14%) provided the answer "No". The comparative analysis of data reveals that most of the local politicians and bureaucrats hold that functions of the UZP are controlled by the central government regulations including their relations. They said, what will be their roles and relations are determined by the central regulations. On the other hand, how does this regulation impacts on the relation between local elected politicians and bureaucrats and overall local governance? In this question, the answer option was open with multiple responses and the respondent data is outlined in the table 8.6.

The empirical data reveals that local elected politicians are more straightforward than the local bureaucrats in identification of central regulations' impacts on their relations and overall local governance. Bureaucrats are more technical than the politicians in providing the answer of the question. However, one significant finding in this regard is that at least 71.4% politicians and 55.3% bureaucrats agreed that the limitations of legal framework and ambiguity of central regulations often creates conflict of interest between local politicians and bureaucrats, and both of them (69.6% and 64.7% respectively) believed that central

politicians want to control over development activities of local government by these regulations which is a barrier of proper decisions and effective local governance and ultimately it is restrained the local government autonomy.

**Table 8.6**  
**Respondent Opinions on Impacts of Central Regulation (Multiple Responses)**

<b>Respondents' Opinions</b>	<b>Politicians (%)</b>	<b>Bureaucrats (%)</b>
It refutes or restrains local government autonomy	65.4	44.5
It is an attempt to keeping away local elected politicians from decisions making process	75.2	-
It is a barrier of proper decisions and effective local governance	68.6	52.3
It is an attempt to control over local government by the central bureaucracy because theoretically UZP is administered by the elected representatives but practically it is dominated by the bureaucrats	92.3	-
We are just following the rules and regulations outlined by the central government	45.8	86.5
By these regulations central politicians want to control over development activities of local government	69.6	64.7
Limitation of legal framework and ambiguity of central regulations often creates conflict of interest between local politicians and bureaucrats	71.4	55.3

Source: Field Survey

**Table 8.7**  
**Perceptions of Local Elected Politicians and Local Official Bureaucrats (N/%)**

<b>Governance Variables</b>	<b>Politicians Perceptions (N-70)</b>				<b>Bureaucrats Perceptions (N-70)</b>				<b>Total N=140</b>
	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>No Response</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>No Response</b>	
Variable 1*	21 (30%)	49 (70%)	0	0	66 (94.3%)	4 (5.7%)	0	0	70 (100%)
Variable 2*	26 (37.1%)	44 (62.9%)	0	0	1 (1.4%)	47 (67.1%)	9 (12.9)	13 (18.6)	70 (100%)
Variable 3*	2 (2.9%)	34 (48.6%)	28 (40%)	6 (8.6%)	62 (88.6%)	7 (10%)	0	1 (1.4%)	70 (100%)
Variable 4*	30 (42.9%)	40 (57.1%)	0	0	0	9 (12.9%)	31 (44.3%)	30 (42.9%)	70 (100%)
Variable 5*	50 (71.4%)	19 (27.1%)	1 (1.4%)	0	0	63 (90%)	3 (4.3%)	4 (5.7%)	70 (100%)

Variable 1\*= Existing administrative rules and regulations should be given priority and should strictly followed. Variable 2\*= Local politicians and bureaucrats should apply particular judgement ignoring some rules and regulations to meet people's needs and requirements. Variable 3\*= Whatever the practical needs, results and consequences, local bureaucrats should follow the directions of the superior authority. Variable 4\*= For the practical needs local bureaucrats should follow the recommendations of local elected politicians minimising the administrative norms and values. Variable 5\*= Local politicians and bureaucrats should not take any decision which may displease each other.

Most of the local elected politicians (92.3%) hold that it is an attempt to control over local government by the central bureaucracy because the UZP is administered by the elected representatives theoretically, but practically it is dominated by the bureaucrats. Local elected politicians complain that central government is aware about this but don't take any necessary actions. On the other hand, 86.5% bureaucrats said that they are just following the rules and regulations outlined by the central government and they have nothing to say in this regard. Overall empirical data reveals that the UZP is controlled by the central regulations along with the relations between local elected politicians and the bureaucrats. However, to know the perceptions of local elected politicians and local official bureaucrats on the importance of the central regulations and the practical needs to follow the directions of the local elected politicians, a series of questions were asked to the politicians and to the bureaucrats – question mostly basis on two dimensions, normative referents and role performance. The available response categories for each item were: Strongly Agree, Agree, Disagree and No Response. The respondent' data are shown in the following table.

**Table 8.8**  
**Important Component of Local Governance and Development**

Respondent Category	Important Component/Actor for Local Governance and Development					Total
	Local Politicians	Local Bureaucrats	Civil Society	All of the Above	No Reply	
Politicians	59(84.3)	1(1.4)	1(1.4)	9(12.9)	0(0)	70(100)
Bureaucrats	8(11.4)	14(20.0)	5(7.1)	42(60.0)	1(1.4)	70(100)
General People	61(43.6)	9(6.4)	9(6.4)	59(42.1)	2(1.4)	140(100)
Total	128(45.7)	24(8.5)	15(5.4)	110(39.3)	3(1.1)	280(100)

Source: Field Survey

As we indicated earlier that if the relation is guided and controlled by the central regulations then local bureaucrats will consider them as the agent of the central government and they will emphasize these rules and regulations more than the directions of the local elected politicians and the practical needs of the local people which ultimately results conflicting relations between the two actors. The empirical data did not disprove the argument. Thus, we find that local bureaucrats try to uphold the supremacy of bureaucratic rules and regulations without taking into account of local elected politicians directions in local governance. In most of the

cases, the empirical data from the table 8.7 demonstrate almost opposite perceptions among politicians and bureaucrats. The opposite perceptions between politicians and bureaucrats are also observable in the context of considering important actors in local governance.

The empirical data from the table 8.8 reveals that local bureaucrats are more technical than local politicians in providing their answer. While politicians directly claimed they are important actor of local governance then bureaucrats provided their opinion very consciously. According to the opinions of local bureaucrats, local politicians, local bureaucrats and civil society are equally important in local governance and they disregard the importance of local elected politicians in governance. But most of the general people think that local politicians are important actor for local governance. However, in practice, we observe the opposite direction in the operation of governance at the local government. In this regard, one elected Upazila Chairman reported that-

According to the spirit of the UZP and the rules and regulations, the bureaucrats are to act as the secretary and to provide technical support to me as I am the elected representative of the people of the Upazila. According to formal rules, UNO and the others official bureaucrats are subjected to work under the guidance and supervision of the Upazila chairman as they have been transferred to the UZP. But in practice, he acts as the main policy maker of the UZP and he tries to remind me that he is the main representative of the central government and always try to take decisions against me by maintaining good relation to local Member of Parliament (MP) of this constituency.

In this stage of the research, we are able to identify another new component of determining the relations between local elected politicians and bureaucrats and that is role of local MP in local governance. Now it is clear to us why local bureaucrats ignore local elected representatives, because bureaucrats always try to maintain their relations to higher authority. As local MPs are belonged to the higher strata of the political authority than local elected representatives and also they are the advisers of the UZP thus, bureaucrats maintain good relations to them, not the elected chairmen or others members of the council. Therefore, it opens up another avenue or dimensions to us for measuring the relation between the two actors. Later we will explore this item at the end of this chapter. Let us first examine the functioning of the UZP in the context of governance.

## 8.5 The Functioning of the UZP

As we noted in the chapter 5 that, the UZP is performing the functions on local governance and development on the basis of the directions and rules and regulations outlined by the central government. Basically, the UZPs are responsible for three categories of functions: regulatory, extractive (e.g., accumulation of local resources) and developmental as an important tiers of local government (Ahmed *et al.*, 2010). *The UZP Acts* and *Upazila Parishad Manual* provided the necessary guidelines and directions of how the decisions are to be taken and implemented. According to the formal rules, the UZP is to be composed of elected and nominated members and after being election of the UZP, the first meeting is to be held by the chair of UNO. Then he or she will hand over the charge to elected chairman and the subsequent meeting is to be held by the chairmanship of the elected chairman. Accordingly, the UZP has to meet once in every month and special meeting is allowed if necessary. However, the mandatory rule is that, all issues are to be resolved in the general meeting of the UZP or by its committees (Ahmed *et al.*, 2010). In this backdrop, we need to examine the five governance attributes in the institutional structure: domination, accountability, professionalism, politicization and mutual-interaction in governance.

Note that, meanwhile, we have already examined the three attributes; professionalism, politicization and mutual-interaction in the previous couple of chapters and find that bureaucrats are more professional than local elected politicians although bureaucratic professionalism has been degraded in a significant manner. Alike, bureaucracy also has lost its political neutrality and competency because of political affiliation and ensuring personal benefits from the politicians. However, they have behavioural asymmetry in their interaction patterns, and mutual-interaction lacks between them in a significant fashion. Thus, from the previous analysis on the basis of empirical data it can be said that, politicians and bureaucrats are holding the attributes of mutuality in the consideration of professionalism and politicization except the mutual-interaction. Therefore, relations between the two actors seem to be mixed up of dichotomy and mutuality theoretically. But in practice, it is seemed to be conflicting in nature. So, what relational model exactly exists in the context, it could be possible to confirm after examination of the other two attributes; domination and accountability.

### 8.5.1 Domination in Governance

Domination is an important componential consideration for shaping the relationship between politics and bureaucracy. The basic dictionary meaning of domination describes it as “the exercise of power or influence over someone or something, or the state of being so controlled” (Oxford Online Dictionaries, 2013). Domination and providing leadership is the essential task of the elected political and the state executive as it is the seat of authoritative power in society responsible for managing the business of the country (Hague *et. al.*, 1992). So, we do admit this or not, there is a hidden desire among the politicians and bureaucrats to dominate the political process. Subsequently, the first question that comes to the configuration process of relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is – who dominates the policy and governance process?

**Table 8.9**

**Politicians and Bureaucrats Perceptions on Domination in Governance**

<b>Actors Draws Agenda for UZP Meetings</b>	<b>Politicians</b>		<b>Bureaucrats</b>	
	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
UZP Chairman	19	27.1	5	7.1
UNO	23	32.9	25	35.7
Chairman & UNO together	8	11.4	10	14.3
Upazila Parishad	20	28.6	24	34.3
No Response	0	0	6	8.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Actors Draws Annual Budget for the UZP</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
UZP Chairman	8	11.4	4	5.7
UNO	24	34.3	17	24.3
Chairman & UNO together	8	11.4	11	15.7
Upazila Parishad	30	42.9	38	54.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Actors Lead the Major Policy Decisions of the Upazila</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
UZP Chairman	15	21.4	5	7.1
UNO	27	38.6	19	27.1
MP	3	4.3	0	0
By the Consensus of UZP	24	34.3	42	60.0
No Response	1	1.4	4	5.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Actors Draws the Decisions about UZP Staffs</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
UNO	53	75.7	32	45.7
UZP Chairman	2	2.9	3	4.3
Chairman & UNO together	2	2.9	11	15.7
UZP	13	18.6	24	34.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Field Survey

The answer of this question is very complex, although the classical and contemporary thinkers and researchers have exemplified the solutions in many ways, providing the theory of separation, mutuality, autonomy, and political responsiveness, which have already been discussed in the theoretical part of the thesis. Still the answer of this question is unsolved and complex, because, there are two contextual considerations of domination; policy and governance. Most of the academic writings on politics-bureaucracy relations are based on the context of policy domination. In this regard, classical thinkers provide dichotomy or separation, whereas the critics of dichotomy provide mutuality or interaction between politics and bureaucracy from the policy perspective. But there has been increasing concern in understanding and approaching relations between politicians and bureaucrats in western democracies and also nonwestern countries in the context of domination in governance perspective. Therefore, it should be clearly specified and minimized the question of domination in the process of governance in a particular institutional structure. Thus, to examine the patterns of domination at the local governance in Bangladesh, we have emphasized on four variables: agenda setting, annual budget formulation, major policy decision, and decisions about the UZP stuffs.

To know the perceptions of elected politicians and bureaucrats on the above issues we have asked a set of similar questions to politicians and bureaucrats. The sample respondents' opinions are presented in the table 8.9. First of all, we examine the agenda setting issue at the UZP. Although there is no clear reference how the agenda will be set out at the UZP, nonetheless, it is expected that the UZP chairman will set the agenda of the UZP meeting as the head of the council or parishad, and it has to be circulated among the members of the UZP at least seven days before of the UZP meeting. But empirical data reveals that, in practice, both of them and in some cases MPs are involved in agenda setting for the UZP meeting. Yet UNO enjoys enormous power in agenda setting than the elected political leaders in general. But many empirical researches suggest that mutual role performance in agenda setting "permits a broader range of skills, perspectives and experience to decision-making process" (Demir et al. 2015:81) between politicians and bureaucrats in local governance. However, in this respect, one elected chairman when he was giving the answer in favour of the local bureaucrat then I asked to that Chairman (of course while the informal discussion) "you are an elected chairman and according to the rules and regulations of the UZP you are supposed to be responsible to set the agenda for meeting but why you are mentioning the

name of UNO as the agenda setter for the UZP meeting?” Then he was laughing and replied that-

Whether I am doubtful that how much power I have as an elected chairman, then only agenda setting for the UZP meeting is just meaningless to me. Nevertheless, according to the rules of business, UNO can change any agenda if he thinks that is not important to be discussed in the UZP meeting. Even though, a copy of meeting minutes including the notice of meeting and agenda has to send to the MP and DC office after every meeting. Thus, it is rather better to do this by the UNO than me, as he is technically trained for doing this.

Similar trend is identified in the case of annual budget formulation of the UZP. According to the UZP Act and other directives, the UZP has to “prepare a budget in accordance with directives made by the government at least sixty days before the commencement of a new financial year and seek public opinion, comments and suggestion on it by attaching a copy of it in the notice board of the UZP. After fifteen days of public display, the UZP shall consider the comment and the suggestion of the public and approve the budget at least one month before the commencement of the next financial year. A copy of the budget is to be forwarded to the DC and the government” (Ahmed et al, 2010:39). This budget would be passing by the UZP meeting and later sanctioned and approved by the central government as it is or in a modified manner. In the case of budget making, most of the respondents think that it is made by the UNO and passed by the UZP. Elected politicians role is very limited here. Sometimes ad hoc arrangement is also observable in the absence of budget formulation. Likewise, in the other two cases, the most crucial role is performed by the UNO. Most of the policy decisions and decisions on others stuffs on the UZP are performed by the UNO.

The empirical data reveals that UNO is involved with each and every single function of the UZP. Moreover, overwhelming regulatory power of UNO made him as a counter part of the elected representatives. He acts as the principal staff officer to the UZP but unfortunately he is not accountable to the UZP. He is working like a prefectural agent of the central government to the local government. He also holds the power to supervise and coordination of the activities of the others department those who are serving to the UZP As a result, local bureaucrats are worked as self-interest maximizes and bureaucratic domination is predominantly apparent in the context of governance of the UZP. This domination of bureaucracy and overwhelming power position makes elected politicians unhappy to bureaucrats and when the both actors want to win in the “rules of games” then antagonistic

sentiment arise toward each other which encourages confliction relation between the two actors in local governance.

### **8.5.2 The Nature of Accountability**

Accountability is the key element of governance and also to shape the relationship between politics and bureaucracy. As Peters and Rockman (1996:viii) noted “the conflict between the responsibility of the civil service in the highest sense of protecting the interests and the accountability of the civil service to higher legal authority provides one of the fundamental tensions in modern democracies.” Subsequently, there is a sharp distinction between politicians and bureaucrats in regard to mode of operation and their accountability practice. Politicians are responsible or accountable to the general peoples or voters as they are motivated by re-election goal and bureaucrats are accountable to their political master or upper administrative hierarchies as they are motivated by career concern. Moreover, the basic difference between these two actors based on organizational characteristics is that, politicians are transitory and bureaucrats are undying and to some extent politicians characterized by the values of patrimonialism whereas, bureaucracy is by the rational-legal system.

Therefore, the nature of accountability is also different which determines mode of relationship. To verify these differences between political and bureaucratic accountability, the sample respondents were asked an open question “You know accountability is the key to governance. You are accountable to whom and how do you ensure your accountability?” To this question, most of the sample politicians replied that they are accountable to both the UZP and the people. In this respect, one elected politician said that “We are elected by the people for the time being. We are to maintain our accountability to them. At the same time, we can do nothing by passing the UZP.” On the other hand, most of the bureaucrats replied that they are accountable to their higher administrative authority and they are maintaining their accountability following the rules and regulations of the governance. In this respect, one bureaucrat said that “We are performing our roles and responsibilities according to the directives of central government, and following the rules and regulations. We are to clarify for any deviation from this to the central government as well as our higher administrative authority.” Therefore, empirical data provides ample evidence of distinction between political accountability and bureaucratic accountability. However, according to dichotomous and mutuality model of relations political and bureaucratic accountability will be democratic and

shared respectively. But the separate accountability of politicians and bureaucrats implies that it belongs to neither dichotomous nor mutual-interaction relational models.

## 8.6 Local Politicians and Bureaucrats: Conflict and Cooperation

As we stated earlier that, politicians and bureaucrats are an integral part of the governance and policy process of the administration. The relation between the two actors effectively determines the nature of the governance and the overall political development of a country, and the degree of success or failure in governing process depends on the relationship between them. However, we got a very puzzling perception on politics-bureaucracy relations in the context of local government of Bangladesh from the previous empirical analysis, although we have identified a particular pattern of conflicting relation with bureaucratic domination. But what finally emerged between them – conflict or cooperation is a very important query? Thus, this section seeks to explore the factors that influenced the conflicting relation between politicians and bureaucrats according to their own views. In doing so, there was an open ended question to the sample respondents “Is there any conflict between politicians and bureaucrats in this Upazila? And would you please say in which ground the most of the conflict occurs between local elected politician and bureaucrats?” The respondent’s opinions are presented in the tables 8.10 and 8.11 respectively.

**Table 8.10**

**Respondent’s Views on Conflict between Politicians and Bureaucrats (by N& %)**

Category of Respondent	Assessing Conflict in Relation			Total
	Yes	No	No Response	
Politicians	32(45.71%)	25(35.71%)	13(18.57%)	70(100%)
Bureaucrats	12(17.14%)	37(52.85%)	21(30.0%)	70(100%)
General People	44(31.4%)	35(25.0%)	61(43.6%)	140(100%)
Total	88(31.42%)	97(34.64%)	95(33.92%)	280(100%)

Source: Field Survey

To identify the conflict between local elected politicians and bureaucrats in the Upazila administration, the respondents were very shaky and they were confused too, as overall,

88(31.42%) respondents hold that conflict exist, 97(34.64%) respondents hold that there is no conflict and almost more than one third 95(33.92%) respondents were refrained from providing any answer either yes or no, they were in no response category. In particular, politicians are more unequivocal than bureaucrats; whether 45.71% politicians believe that conflict exist between them while 17.14% bureaucrats admit this. One important observation in this regard is that, there is a tendency to elude the real fact among the respondents. The empirical data reveals that, apparently, the conflict between local elected politicians and bureaucrats is less and the relation between them is amicable.

However, the reality is different. There is a perception among the three categories of respondent that the relation between them is not amicable in real sense. Tension and temptation of dominance exist between them. However, the respondents those who were silent in providing the answer, they also assumed that triangulation of conflict are existed in the Upazila among UZP Chairman, UNO and MPs, but for special reason they did not wanted to disclose their opinion directly. In this respect, one sample politician' and bureaucrat' remark is notable here: one politician said "as an elected representative of the people of the Upazila, it would be my discredit if I openly confess that there is existed conflict between us and then question would be raised on my managing capability. Thus, I have been refrained from providing any answer. I would be happy if you don't misunderstand me." One sample bureaucrat also thinks alike and he said that –

There is a proverb that always speaks the truth, but it is very difficult to maintain in the context of administration. Truly speaking, if I convey the real fact what is happened in our relationship then not only the relation between politicians and bureaucrats but also and even though our husband-wife relations would likely be broken. The relation is more difficult and complex that you may estimate. However, at the end of the day we try to reach a compromise, as neither the bureaucrats nor the politicians can survive without each other.

These two statements made it clear to us that, why a large number of respondents were refrained from providing any answer exactly. It was more clearly opened up when we asked another question "Why conflict occurs or what are the grounds of conflict? In this regard, the following grounds of conflict have been identified and categorized on the basis of respondent's opinion (only politicians' and bureaucrats' multi-responses opinions are counted) on conflict issues which are presented in the table 8.11.

**Table 8.11****Factors contribute to conflicting relationship between politicians and Bureaucrats**

<b>Respondent' Views on Grounds of Conflict</b>	<b>Politicians</b>	<b>Bureaucrats</b>
Budget allocation, project selection and implementation	85.6	78.5
Interference to each other's jurisdiction	85.2	75.0
When both the actors pursue their personal interest by practice of power and benefits	63.7	56.8
Vagueness of legal framework and issuing different directives in different times by the central government	91.4	25.7
Priority selection in development activities specially, GR, TR, VGD, VGF, KABIKHA, KABITA etc.	62.3	84.6
Lack of necessary experience and knowledge of politicians	58.2	86.1
Advisory Role of the Member of Parliament (MP)	69.8	62.7
Lack of understanding between politicians and bureaucrats	64.5	56.0
If don't trust each other	52.7	47.5
If problems are not discussed openly and regularly	68.9	63.4
Sense of ownership of the Upazila	82.4	55.3
In controlling of Upazila officers (specially ACR)	76.3	54.2
Duel rule of administration	78.7	27.5
Complain of autocratic attitude of UNO vis-à-vis UZP Chairman	68.5	62.4
Superiority complex	72.4	24.3
In the question of corruption and accountability	62.9	54.2
Improper and unexpected demand of politicians	24.0	70.5
Grouping among the officers of Upazila administration	61.8	21.2

Source: Field Survey

The respondents assessment or their perceptions on ground of conflict reveals that although they have a tendency to ignore the notion of conflict in the governance process of the UZP but in practice, there is an enormous reasons of conflict between local elected politicians and bureaucrats that is identified by themselves also. Interestingly, both the politicians and bureaucrats are preserving synonymous character in the identification of the ground of conflict in some cases and simultaneously antagonize in some cases. Thus, the two items at the top of the table 8.11 show that most of the politicians and bureaucrats believe that rigorous conflict arise in the context of budget allocation, project selection and implementation, as well as interference to each other's jurisdiction. Similar trend is observable in the context of when both the actors pursue their personal interest by practice of power and benefits, advisory role of the Member of Parliament (MP) and complain of autocratic attitude of UNO vis-à-vis UZP Chairman.

In contrast, disagreement is also observable in the ground of conflict in some cases. Like, most of the politicians think that serious conflict occur for the ambiguity of legal framework and issuing different directives in time to time by the central government but the bureaucrats seem this as lack of necessary experience and knowledge of politicians. On the other hand, politicians think that they own the UZP more than that of bureaucrats as they are the permanent inhabitation of there. Thus, in the question of sense of ownership of the Upazila conflict occur between them, although 55.3% bureaucrats also admit this case. Similarly, dual rule of administration and superiority complex of administrators are other important case of conflict according to the views of politicians. In this respect, one sample politician said that “According to the order of hierarchy, I belong to upper hierarchy than UNO. He is supposed to address me as “Sir” as administrative norms and values. However, he never addresses me as “Sir” rather; he addresses me as “Chairman Shaheb”. It seems that they always suffer from superiority complex as bureaucrat.” But administrators mostly ignore these arguments.

On the other hand, bureaucrats arise some reasons of conflict that are differed by the politicians. For example, 70.5% bureaucrats believe that improper and unexpected demand of politicians is one of the most important reasons of conflict between politicians and bureaucrats but only 24.0% politicians admit this argument. Same tendency is observable in the context of priority selection of developmental activities where local politicians want to lead that caused conflict with bureaucrats. In the ground of corruption, both are corrupt but there is a tendency to pass the buck on each other. In sum, the empirical evidence shows that the relations between local elected politicians and bureaucrats are not amicable as a whole in all sample areas with some exceptions. Indeed, bureaucrats often found politicians creating obstacles and interference to their jurisdictions. On the other hand, politicians found bureaucrats important barrier of their legitimate role performance as an elected representatives. This opposite sentiment of both the actors creates lots of logical ground of conflict between them which have been observed in the previous analysis. Interestingly, in this race of conflict bureaucrats use politicians against politicians. For example, local bureaucrats try to do everything bypassing and ignoring local elected politicians (UZP Chairman) maintaining good relations with central politicians like Member of Parliament (MP). As a result, triangulation of conflict exists at the UZP in the pursuance of governance and developmental activities. So, the role of MP is the most important factor of undermine the status of UZP chairman at the UZP.

## **8.7 Role of the Member of Parliament in Bangladesh: In Light of the Rules of Business and the Constitution of Bangladesh**

Two strata of analysis can be identified in the context of role of MPs at the local government: firstly, according to the legal-institutional provisions truly they have no authority or discretionary over the activities of the UZP, which is sharply contradictory with the constitutional provisions. On the other hand, the MPs have constitutional and legal jurisdiction to involving in the activities of his constituency area. Let us make it clear the real puzzle. Members of Parliament (MPs) are elected to represent the people. Part of their work as public representatives is done inside Parliament and part of it is done directly with citizens during constituency weeks. In Bangladesh, all Members of Parliament are elected by voters of the constituency. According to the Rules of Business, all members (except Ministers) will remain 'Private Members' and they do not hold personal office in the Parliament (GPRB, 2001). According to The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, 'there shall be a Parliament for Bangladesh (to be known as the House of the Nation) in which subject to the provisions of this Constitution, shall be vested the legislative powers of the Republic' (Article 65 (1)). According to Article 65(1), MPs are vested with legislative powers of the Republic and so their supreme obligation is to formulate, modify various legislations with a view to administering country in righteous ways following the peoples' aspiration as the Article 7(1) confirms that all powers in the Republic belong to the people.

The Constitution has rendered the Parliament a supreme honour considering MPs sensible and responsible citizens. For instance, Articles 78(1), 78(2), 78(3), 78(4) render the special immunity to MPs and they are not accountable to any court for their utterance in any parliamentary session. Unfortunately, in the past, many MPs misused this privilege and turned the Parliament into unprofessional and unethical discussion forum. To make the Parliament effective, Article 76 dictates for appointing Standing Committees of Parliament on different issues of public importance. These highly empowered committees should examine draft bills and other legislative proposals, review the enforcement of laws and monitor the activities of the concerned ministries.

The roles that most parliamentarians fulfill are often summarized as representative, legislator and scrutinizer of the government. The first refers to the fact that MPs have been elected to

parliament as representatives of their electorates. The second reflects what most people see as the central responsibility of an MP, to pass legislation, whether original or changes to existing acts. The third covers the scrutiny or oversight that parliamentarians are expected to exercise over the workings of the executive including the implementation of laws passed by the parliament. This function also extends to the support or criticism of proposals placed before parliament by the government and in the committee systems in the parliamentary government.

According to Article 59(1) the local government bodies in every administrative unit of the republic are the major actors of all sorts of local development works. The Parliament has something to do for the local government and this is also defined in the constitution. Article 60 has clearly defined, “..... Parliament shall, by law, confer powers on the local government bodies, including power to impose taxes for local purposes, to prepare their budgets and to maintain funds”. So the Parliament is constitutionally bound to provide the local government bodies with full autonomy. But in practically, MPs regularly attends in the Upazila Parishad meetings and takes dominant role in the policy making and governance. As a result, a variety of relationships can be found such as confluctual, collusion and subordination (Ahmed *et al.*, 2010).

### **8.7.1 Politics of Development and Decentralization: the way MPs were empowered in the Local Government**

After the independence of Bangladesh, the country has been ruled by six successive regimes (Panday and Asaduzzaman, 2011). The history reveals that every successive regime was keen to involve MPs in the local government. First regime (1972-1975), Awami League-led government in the very first year of its rule made several attempts to replace the traditional local leadership with the local rank and file of their party. In 1972, the government abolished the Pakistani union council system and formed "union panchayets" with government nominated members and also formed "Union Relief Committees". Lawmakers along with local party wings selected members for the two bodies that played a vital role in distributing relief materials and carrying out construction and rehabilitation work (Khan, 2000; Rahman, 1997; Sarker, 1997;). Therefore, legislators got great scope to consolidate their power by picking people loyal to them for the two bodies. The venture failed to serve the government's

purpose; rather it spoiled the government's image largely for widespread corruption of relief committees, contributing to Awami League-backed candidates' massive defeat in 1973 union council elections.

In 1975, the then Awami League government abolished the elected local government system and introduced a new system. A district governor then headed administration at the district level. BAKSAL was introduced and the traditional local government was supplanted by party machinery. Alongside members of the public service and members of BAKSAL, some lawmakers were also appointed as district governors who were empowered to control all government offices and departments at district level. The second regime (1975-1981) introduced four tiers local government after the military grabbed state power. Utilising local government bodies, military ruler Ziaur Rahman consolidated his power and formed the political party BNP. By the end of 1980, Zia introduced a new structure of rural institutions, Swanirvar Gram Sarkar (Self-Reliant village government) in 68,000 Bangladesh villages, marginalizing the union parishads. MPs took chairmanship of district and thana level Gram Sarkar Coordination Committees to ensure control over the rural areas (Huque, 1988). The then government claimed that Gram Sarkars were formed to ensure people's participation in the development process at the grassroots. But for the first time, politics was localized and institutionalized by it.

Grabbing state power in a military coup in 1982, General HM Ershad abolished the unpopular Gram Sarkar system and he introduced the upazila system following the decentralization policy in the third regime (1982-1990), which established command over local affairs in absence of MPs. A major change was initiated in the local government system through the introduction of the Local Government (Upazila Parishad and Upazila Administration Reorganization) Ordinance in 1982. The emergence of MPs through the third parliamentary election in 1986 triggered conflict between lawmakers and Upazila Parishad Chairmen. Irrespective of party affiliation, MPs were looking forward to cut the authority of Upazila, as they did not have formal control over local administration. Finally, Ershad-led government introduced Zilla Parishad Act in 1988 that made MPs chairmen of the District Parishads to coordinate all development activities under the districts (Ahmed, 2009).

After the fall of military rule three successive regimes have completed their tenure after restoration of democratic system. During its tenure, the government could not provide an

alternative democratic form of local government. Assuming office in 1991, BNP-led government abolished the upazila system and formed Thana Unnayan Samannay Committee at the upazila level to work as a coordinating and development body. After the restoration of parliamentary democracy in 1991 the Upazila system had been abolished and the presidential ordinance promulgated providing for the abolition of the UZP. This ordinance “empowered the central government to assume responsibilities for functions previously performed by the UZP” (Ahmed, 2009: 163). Moreover, Thana Development and Coordination Committee which introduced by Khaleda Zia government empowered the non-elected bureaucrats in state of local elected politicians. At the same time MPs were nominated advisors of the committee. The committee had responsibility to coordinate among Ups, ZPs, and thana administration to review development projects (Siddique, 2005).

MPs were made advisers to the bodies in the Upazilas under their respective constituencies. In 1996, Awami League came to power and they constituted a Local Government Commission and came up with a Report on Local Government Institutions Strengthening in May 1997. The Commission has recommended a four-tier local government structure including Gram/Palli (Village) Parishad, Union Parishad, Thana/Upazila Parishad and Zila (District) Parishad. Still now the three tiers of local government, Union Parishad, Upazila Parishad and Zila Parishad are prevailing in the local government structure of Bangladesh. Awami League government passed the upazila Act in 1998 (GOB, 1998). This decentralization journey obviously aim to more participation of local people through local institution building, like developing local leadership and accountable bureaucratic officials (Rahman, 2010). In 1998, the AL-led government revived the UZP by enacting a law that made MPs advisers to the UZP under their respective constituencies. Lastly, two-years long caretaker government restore the Upazila system in 2008 through an Ordinance empowering the UZP a truly free and independent local government body directly elected by the people and omitted the provision of the UZP act that made MPs advisers. Later, the present government reintroduced the repealed UZP Act of 1998 with provisions for making MPs advisers. In fact, the UNO, who is the secretary to the Parishads, running the UZP on the advice of MPs. This is how the elected chairman and the council remain ineffective and dependent to the UNO and MP. Thus, there were two questions to the respondents that “Who maintain good relation with local MP?” And “How do you assess the role of MP in the UZP?” The respondents’ data are outlined in the tables 8.12 and 8.13.

Overall empirical data reveals that UNO keep and maintain good relation to the MP more than that of UZP chairman. However, in particular, 57.1% elected politicians think that bureaucrats maintain good relations with local MP ignoring them. On the other hand, 55.7% bureaucrats think that UZPC maintain good relation with MP as a political colleague. Here we also observe the same blame game that was observed in the case of corruption. But general people specially those who have frequently contact to the UZP, hold that UNO maintain good relation with local MP than that of elected chairman of the UZP. However, to what extent of this kind of relations are expected or whether the role of MPs at the UZP are fostering or hindering the performance of the UZP is an important question. Thus, the second question was asked to the respondents and the empirical evidence shows that most of the local elected politicians and also general people think that the roles (shown in table 8.13 which they are now performing) of MPs at the UZP are not so important. But most of the bureaucrats hold that the UZP is bound to follow the order and obey the want of the local MP as he or she is the adviser of the UZP. Likewise, local MPs are felt more comfort to use the administrative power of UNO to implement development activities rather than elected UZPC even if, he is a man of the same political party. This advisory role of MP to the UZP is the main hindrance of effective local governance which expedites political as well as intra party conflict in local politics and administration in Bangladesh. It is, therefore, necessary to assess the effects of this conflicting relation on local governance and development more evidently.

**Table 8.12**  
**Actor who maintain good relation with MP (respondents' views)**

Respondent Category	Actors Maintain Good Relations with Local MP				Total
	UZPC	UNO	Both	No Reply	
Politicians	27(38.6)	40 (57.1)	3 (4.3)	0 (0)	70(100)
Bureaucrats	39 (55.7)	22 (31.4)	9 (12.9)	0 (0)	70(100)
General People	58 (41.4)	64 (45.7)	10 (7.1)	8 (5.7)	140(100)
Total	124 (44.3)	126 (45.0)	22 (7.9)	8 (2.9)	280(100)

Source: Field Survey

**Table 8.13**  
**Respondent Assessment of the Role of MP in the UZP (N=280)**

Roles	Role Assessment	
	Very Important	Not Important
Supervision on development project	124	156
Project selection and implementation	113	167
Preparation of budget of the UZP	105	175
Agenda setting and decision making in UZP meeting	110	170
Role on daily activities of the UZP	104	176
Role of the UZP tendering process	101	179
Selection of beneficiaries for social safety net programmes	98	182
Others	92	188

Source: Field Survey

## **8.8 Assessing the Relational Effects on Local Governance and Development**

Effective local governance and development is a constitutional as well as political priority of the government of Bangladesh. Nevertheless, every successive regime has continuously been failed to establish effective local governance in local levels. Now the question is – how does the local development activities and governing process affect by the conflicting relations? As we pointed out earlier in this study that, governance has considered and operationalized from the public policy perspective and as the process and manner of power relationships among the authoritative actors – how power is exercised, how decisions are made on local public affairs and the interaction between institutions and public service stake holders, and development as an outcome of governance. Consequently, apart from the analysis of the models of politics-bureaucracy relations, there is also an attempt in this study to explore the relational effects on local governance and development and thus, the two theoretical propositions or hypotheses were formulated relating to politics-bureaucracy relations, governance and development among the three theoretical propositions.

There are two separate parts of each of these propositions; relational, governance and developmental. Meanwhile, we have tried to explore the relational part of the propositions in the previous analysis and find distorted self-image and conflicting relationship, and the local

government institution (particularly UZP) is controlled by the regulations of central government which maneuver the scope for bureaucratic domination resulting conflictual relationship between the local elected politicians and the local official bureaucrats.

This study has tried to identify this pattern by applying both the qualitative and quantitative techniques on empirical data analysis emphasizing on principal role conditions and governance attributes of theoretical models. In this section, we have tried to explore the second part of the propositions – assessing the relational effects on local governance and development. Upholding the earlier conceptualization, local governance and development has measured by five indicators: (1) role performance and rule application, (2) collective decision and action, (3) accountability & transparency, (4) infrastructural development, and (5) public service delivery. Quantitative data have been explained using 4 points Likert Scale along with Ordinal Logistic Regression of Estimation (**Model 1-5**) based on five Indicators by Social Background, Role Perception, Self -Image and Mutual Interaction Variables. At the same time, normative or qualitative perceptions of the respondents are also considered on governance and development.

Let us first examine the normative perceptions of respondents on governance and development. To examine the respondent’s perceptions on governance and development, an open ended question was asked to all respondents, like “What do you mean by governance and development?” The respondents’ idea is outline bellow.

**Table 8.14**  
**Respondent’s Individual Ideas on Governance and Development (N=189)**

Respondent’ Ideas	Category of Respondents		
	Politicians	Bureaucrats	General Peoples
Governance means maintaining of law and order, and development means infrastructural and communicational development	19	6	27
Governance means rule of law, and development means poverty reduction, ensuring proper services to the peoples	11	10	15
Governance means the rule of the person who is likely to be good man and non-corrupt, and development means the construction of roads, bridges, culverts, schools, colleges and other institutions	9	7	12
Governance means to govern on the basis of existing rules and regulations, and development means to reach	-	13	7

the services to the people abruptly.			
Governance is planning, and development is implementation of that planning	-	4	-
Governance is allocation of resources, and development is proper use of that resources for betterment	6	-	-
Governance is the government which is established on the consent of the people, and development is satisfying of the demand of the people	4	-	5
Governance means impartial rule and justice, and development is the supply of necessary goods and services	-	-	5
Governance means accountable and transparent rule, and development is the outcome of that transparent rule	-	14	4
Others	-	-	11
<b>Total</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>86</b>

Source: Field Survey

The empirical data of this question reveals that 21 politicians, 16 bureaucrats and 54 general peoples have no clear idea on governance and development among the sample respondents, and thus they did not provide any answer to the question. On the other hand, the rest of the 189 respondents those who were provided their individual perceptions, understanding and opinions on the notion of governance and development are outlined in the table 8.14. The empirical data reveals that near about one third of the total respondents have no clear ideas on governance and development. The ratio of politicians, bureaucrats and general peoples of this category are 30%, 22.85% and 38.57% respectively. Moreover, there is a substantial difference among the respondents' perception of governance and development. Most of the politicians and general people hold that governance means maintaining of law and order, and development means infrastructural and communicational development. On the contrary, bureaucrats emphasize different aspects in defining governance and development. They overly concern to govern on the basis of existing rules and regulations, accountable and transparent rule in defining governance. And they define development as the outcome of that transparent rule and to reach the services to the people abruptly.

Whatever may be the perceptual difference on conceptual illustration of governance and development among the respondents, overall, application of existing rules and regulations, accountability and transparency are the major concern of governance, and infrastructural development and service delivery are the main concern of local development according to the

perceptions of the sample respondents. Thus, to measure the politico-bureaucratic conflicting relational effects on local governance and development there was a question to all categories of respondents that “You know the politico-bureaucratic conflicting relations have multidimensional impacts. How does the politico-bureaucratic conflict impact and how far do you agree with the statements on the following issues listed below?” The findings reported in the table 8.15. As we made the proposition that conflicting relation between local elected politicians and bureaucrats might affect the level of governance and development. Thus, for more clear understanding about the relational effects on local governance and development, we have categorized it into five variables and the mean scores of each of the items have been measured through a four-point Likert Scale.

Accordingly, the first variable or indicator deals with is the impact of conflicting relation on rule application and individual agent’s role performance; the second issue was related to collective decisions and actions that might be affected if always conflict occurs between politicians and bureaucrats; the third issue was concerned with accountability and transparency; the fourth and fifth issues were infrastructural development and public service delivery which have linked to politico-bureaucratic interface. The empirical data reveals that conflicting relations between politicians and bureaucrats affect the levels of local governance and development although there are some variations of assessment among the three categories of respondents. The highest negative effect of conflicting relation can be identified on rule application and role performance. That means rule application and individual agent’s role performance of elected politicians and bureaucrats are being hampered by the conflicting relations as overall 136(48.57%) and 85(30.36%) respondents of the total respondent strongly agree and agree with the statement respectively. The overall mean score shows the “strong effect” where the score is 2.15 and 1.02 standard deviation. Similar negative “strong effect” is also observable on collective decisions and actions. It reveals that if conflicts exist then collective decisions and actions are affected and to some extent impossible. But the quantitative data, specially, according to the statistical analysis of others three items demonstrate “moderate effect”. It reveals that, ensuring transparency and accountability, public service delivery, and infrastructural development are not impossible yet the relation is conflicting and as the relational effect is moderate on these variables. It would not be exaggeration that it’s an important finding which can be seen as the unexposed symbiotic condition of politics-bureaucracy relations in Bangladesh as a post-colonial state.

More explicitly, according to the survey data and opinions of respondents, in spite of conflicting relation between politicians and bureaucrats the development process of Bangladesh is being continued although the development process is being delayed but not denied and ensuring accountability and transparency is not impossible in this kind of relationship as “the countervailing forces generated in the process create a level playing field” (Mitra, 2010:458). However, the role actors’ as well as citizen’ satisfactions are important consideration to measure the governance and development functions of local government. In this respect, to be more specific, the respondents were asked a direct question “how far the condition of governance and development has been improved or not after activation of the UZP?” The respondents’ data are presented in the table 8.16.

**Table 8.15**

**Respondents' Assessment of the impacts of Conflicting Relation on Local Governance and Development**

Governance and Development Indicators	Respondent Category	Assessment the level of Impacts				Total N=280	Mean Score ( $\bar{x}$ )	Std. Deviation	P $\chi^2$ (Sig. L)
		Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Don't Know				
Rule application and individual agent's role performance is being hampered	Politician	34(48.57)	18(25.71)	12(17.14)	6(8.57)	70(100)	2.14	0.99	
	Bureaucrats	31(44.28)	23(32.86)	8(11.43)	8(11.43)	70(100)	2.10	1.01	
	General people	71(50.71)	44(31.43)	5(3.57)	20(14.29)	140(100)	2.19	1.04	
		<b>136(48.57)</b>	<b>85(30.36)</b>	<b>25(8.93)</b>	<b>34(12.14)</b>	<b>280(100)</b>	<b>2.15</b>	<b>1.02</b>	<b>.01</b>
Collective decisions and actions are impossible if always conflict occurs	Politicians	19(27.14)	27(38.57)	10(14.28)	14(20.00)	70(100)	1.73	1.08	
	Bureaucrats	25(35.71)	33(47.14)	12(17.14)	-(-)	70(100)	2.18	0.71	
	General people	55(39.29)	59(42.14)	10(7.14)	16(11.42)	140(100)	2.09	0.96	
		<b>99(35.36)</b>	<b>119(42.50)</b>	<b>32(11.43)</b>	<b>30(10.71)</b>	<b>280(100)</b>	<b>2.03</b>	<b>0.95</b>	<b>.01</b>
Ensuring accountability and transparency are almost impossible	Politicians	12(17.14)	17(24.28)	22(31.42)	19(27.14)	70(100)	1.31	1.06	
	Bureaucrats	11(15.71)	23(32.86)	27(38.57)	9(12.86)	70(100)	1.51	0.91	
	General people	27(19.29)	21(15.00)	60(42.86)	32(22.86)	140(100)	1.31	1.03	
		<b>50(17.86)</b>	<b>61(21.79)</b>	<b>109(38.93)</b>	<b>60(21.43)</b>	<b>280(100)</b>	<b>1.36</b>	<b>1.01</b>	<b>.01</b>
The infrastructural development is being delayed and denied	Politicians	32(45.71)	24(34.29)	14(20.00)	-(-)	70(100)	2.26	0.77	
	Bureaucrats	18(25.71)	21(30.00)	31(44.29)	-(-)	70(100)	1.81	0.82	
	General people	42(30.00)	65(46.43)	15(10.71)	18(12.86)	140(100)	1.94	0.96	
		<b>92(32.86)</b>	<b>110(39.29)</b>	<b>60(21.43)</b>	<b>18(6.43)</b>	<b>280(100)</b>	<b>1.99</b>	<b>0.90</b>	<b>.01</b>
Mostly affects the public service delivery	Politicians	23(32.86)	27(38.57)	20(28.57)	-(-)	70(100)	2.04	0.79	
	Bureaucrats	13(18.57)	28(40.00)	29(41.43)	-(-)	70(100)	1.77	0.75	
	General people	67(47.86)	32(22.86)	13(9.28)	28(20.00)	140(100)	1.99	1.18	
		<b>103(36.79)</b>	<b>87(31.07)</b>	<b>62(22.14)</b>	<b>28(10.00)</b>	<b>280(100)</b>	<b>1.95</b>	<b>0.99</b>	<b>.01</b>

Note: The mean score 3–2.01 suggesting “strong effect”, mean score 2.00–1.01 suggesting “moderate effect”, mean score 1.00–0.01 suggesting “weak effect”, and mean score 0–0 indicating “insignificant effect”

**Table 8.16****Respondent's Views on Present Condition of Governance and Development (N=280)**

<b>Respondent Category</b>	<b>Levels of Assessment</b>				<b>Total</b>
	Improved	Remain the Same	Deteriorated	Don't Know	
Politicians	36(51.4)	33 (47.1)	1(1.4)	0 (0)	70(100)
Bureaucrats	36 (51.4)	29(41.4)	1(1.4)	4(5.7)	70(100)
General People	71(50.7)	63(45.0)	3(2.1)	3(2.1)	140(100)
<b>Total</b>	<b>143(51.07)</b>	<b>125(44.64)</b>	<b>5(1.79)</b>	<b>7(2.5)</b>	<b>280(100)</b>

Source: Field Survey

The estimated overall governance status of the UZP apparently exhibits the improve status of governance and development nonetheless it does not demonstrate high status or impressive picture of governance as a whole. Furthermore, 143 (51.07%) respondents think that governance and development conditions of the UZP have been improved while 125(44.64%) respondents think that governance and developmental conditions of the UZP are remain in the same condition. In this circumstance, if we measure the level of governance and development by comparing the mean score then it also belonged to the middle range of the score where the calculated score is 2.74 whereas the standard deviation is .77.

The empirical data and the statistical calculation of the level of governance and development at the local level reveals that in spite of conflicting relation between local elected politicians and bureaucrats the levels of governance and development is being increased up. In this extraordinary condition and context of governance of Bangladesh, it is necessary to explore the performance and the satisfactions of the respondents. In addition, in this study, to assess the relational effects on local governance and development various activities has been taken into account. In this connection, the functioning or performance of the UZP and the level of satisfactions of the major stakeholders are also considered.

**Table 8.17****Respondents' Opinions on the Functioning of UZP and Degree of Satisfaction (by Number)**

Respondent Category	Levels of functioning				Degree of satisfaction				Total
	Good	Moderate	Not Good	No Reply	Satisfied	Partly Satisfied	Not Satisfied	No Reply	
Local Politicians	3	43	23	1	2	26	30	12	70
Local Bureaucrats	3	47	20	0	0	30	32	8	70
General People	5	68	63	4	6	32	50	52	140
Total	11	158	106	5	8	88	112	72	280

Source: Field Survey

Thus, the respondents were asked the questions on functioning of the UZP and of their satisfaction of functioning and service delivery mechanisms of the UPZ as an important tier of the local government of Bangladesh. The quantitative analysis of empirical data (table 8.17) clearly indicates that the performance of the UZP is moderate in considering the levels of functioning, and none of the stakeholders are fully satisfied. The mean score of the two items related to functioning and the levels of satisfactions are 2.31 and 2.24 while the standard deviations are .58 and .52 respectively which indicates overall the moderate levels of functioning of the UZP, and the satisfactions of the stakeholders (see the appendix for more data).

**Table: 8.18**

**Multiple Ordinal Logistic Regression of Governance and Development Estimation Based on Five indicators by Social Background, Role Perception, and Self Image and Mutual Interaction Variables**

Independent Variables	Model-1 (Dependent Indicator-1)		Model-2 (Dependent Indicator-2)		Model-3 (Dependent Indicator-3)		Model-4 (Dependent Indicator-4)		Model-5 (Dependent Indicator-5)	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
<b>Social Background Variable</b>										
Age	-.014	.049	-.076	.063	.024	.054	.082	.065	-.079	.108
Education	-.304**	.245	-.022	.315	.132	.297	-.253	.359	1.693**	.731
Occupation	-.941**	.310	-.293	.367	-.271	.329	.363	.344	.548	.605
Experience	-.129	.258	.582	.366	-.474	.326	-.228	.344	.455	.581
Family Background	-.814	.668	-.178	.732	-.030	.773	.153	1.041	2.653***	1.467
Parents Occupation	-.168	.291	.508	.393	-.207	.321	.360	.407	-.849	.722
Parents Yearly Income	-.044	.140	.066	.172	.002	.169	-.435**	.207	-.413	.445
<b>Role Perception Variables</b>										
Role Evaluation	-.148	.211	-.144	.260	.006	.233	-.208	.289	.484	.553
Distinct Role Perception	-1.993***	1.10	1.604	1.299	-2.557**	1.280	-2.143***	1.259	2.275	5.815
Specific Role Perception	.046	.218	-.096	.2828	.475***	.268	.0183	.287	-.346	.613
<b>Self-Image and Mutual Interaction Variables</b>										
V -1	.888	.750	1.113	1.022	3.328*	1.122	.287	.976	1.971	2.308
V-2	1.184***	.709	3.145*	1.227	2.111*	1.017	.939	.910	-2.673	1.964
V-3	.126	.676	.096	.956	.526	.9178	.457	.893	-2.317	2.356
V-4	2.653*	.880	.963	1.129	1.417	1.014	.051	.889	.658	1.823
V-5	-.323	.749	8.486*	2.590	4.289*	1.255	1.505***	.813	7.128**	2.864
V-6	.477	.587	1.595***	.837	-.243	.761	1.186	.942	-1.750	1.791
V-7	1.051	.968	3.272***	1.864	.399	.993	.688	.941	4.027	2.569
V-8	.182	1.002	.883	1.147	2.286	1.391	.375	1.046	4.145	5.102
V-9	-1.297	.925	-3.366**	1.631	2.827**	1.145	-.406	1.007	3.412	2.196
V-10	-.412	1.004	.843	1.494	-.198	1.239	.681	1.135	.385	1.929
V-11	1.481	1.110	4.439**	1.876	-.041	1.105	2.096***	1.110	-5.420	5.327
V-12	.862	.912	-3.775**	1.484	1.487***	.811	1.038	.981	.505	1.999
V-13	.392	.579	.408	.822	-1.368	.832	1.350	.783	3.730***	2.081
V-14	.557	.838	1.303	1.413	-2.094**	1.014	-.662	.964	4.041***	2.401
	N= 140	Prob > chi2= 0.00	N=140	Prob > chi2= 0.00	N =140	Prob > chi2= 0.00	N=140	Prob > chi2= 0.00	N =140	Prob > chi2= 0.00
	Pseudo R2= 0.6104	Log likelihood= -66.759973	Pseudo R2=0.7498	Log likelihood= -43.712058	Pseudo R2=0.7502	Log likelihood= -47.007733	Pseudo R2=0.7479	Log likelihood= -38.72425	Pseudo R2=0.8877	Log likelihood= -17.044254

**Note:** \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively for each variable. Coef. = Coefficient, Std. Err. = Standard Errors. **Indicator-1:** Rule application and individual agent’s role performance is being hampered. **Indicator-2:** Collective decisions and actions are impossible if always conflict occurs. **Indicator-3:** Ensuring accountability and transparency are almost impossible. **Indicator-4:** The infrastructural development is being delayed and denied. **Indicator-5:** Mostly affects the public service delivery.

### **Explanation of Models:**

In the above table it shows  $\text{Prob} > \chi^2=0.0000$  that means regression model is significant as a whole where some common characteristics or variables have been tested through politicians and bureaucrats perceptions. That means Indicator-1(rule application and individual agents' role performance) of Governance and Development can be estimated through social background, role perception, and self-image and mutual interaction variables. The Pseudo  $R^2= 0.6104$  indicates 61% variation can be explained through this model. Statistical Model 1 shows that two social background variables; education and occupation are negatively associated to rule application and role performance. The educational and occupational variations of politicians and bureaucrats are responsible for conflicting relation and rule application and role performance. Similarly, distinctive role perceptions of politicians and bureaucrats are negatively associated to politics-bureaucracy relations, governance and development. On the other hand, self-image and mutual interaction variables are significant and positively associated with relations, governance and development estimation. For example, opposite tendency<sup>54</sup> of politicians and bureaucrats to rules and regulations in governance and lack of mutual trust are positively associated. That means if both the actors are hold mistrust and opposite perceptions then, rule application and individual agents' role performance are being hampered equally. Overall, distinctive role perception, education and occupation of politicians and bureaucrats are significant and negatively associated and opposite role perception and mistrust to each other are positively associated with the estimation based on Indicator-1 and Model-1.

Model 2 shows  $\text{Prob} > \chi^2=0.0000$  that means model is significant as a whole and indicator-2 of governance and development can be estimated through social back ground, role perception, and self-image and mutual interaction variables. The Pseudo  $R^2=0.7498$  indicates 75% variation can be explained through this model. V-2, V-5, V-6, V-7, and V-11 of self-image and mutual interaction variables are significant and positively associated with governance and development estimation specially based on indicator-2. On the other hand, V-9 and V-12 are significant and negatively associated with the estimation of collective decisions and actions. Model 3 shows  $\text{Prob} > \chi^2=0.0000$  that means regression model is significant as a whole. That means Indicator-

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<sup>54</sup> Where politicians have tendency to disregard to conform the rules and regulation in governance vis-à-vis bureaucrats have tendency to conform the rules and regulation in governance.

3 of governance and development can be estimated through social background, role perception, and self-image and mutual interaction variables. The Pseudo R<sup>2</sup>=0.7502 indicates 75% variation can be explained through this model. Specific Role Perception and V-1, V-2, V-5, V-9, V-12 of self-image and mutual interaction variables are significant and positively associated with ensuring accountability and transparency for governance and development estimation. However, distinctive role perceptions of politicians and bureaucrats and V-14 are significant and negatively associated with the estimation based on Indicator-3.

Model 4 shows Prob > chi<sup>2</sup>=0.0000 that means regression model is significant as a whole. That means Indicator- 4 of governance and development can be estimated through social back ground, role perception, and self-image and mutual interaction variables. The Pseudo R<sup>2</sup>=0.7479 indicates 75% variation can be explained through this model. Self-image and mutual interaction variables especially cooperation and self-interest of politicians and bureaucrats are significant and positively associated with project implementation and infrastructural development for estimation of local governance and development. It indicates that if politicians and bureaucrats are cooperative and self-interested then local infrastructural development is expedited. On the other hand, distinct role perception and parents' yearly income are negatively associated with the estimation based on Indicator-4. Accordingly, Model 5 shows Prob > chi<sup>2</sup>=0.0000 that means our model is significant as a whole. That means Indicator-5 of governance and development can be estimated through social background, role perception, and self-image and mutual interaction variables. The Pseudo R<sup>2</sup>=0.8877 indicates 88% variation can be explained through this model. Education, Family Background, V-5, V-13 and V-14 of Self Image and Mutual Interaction Variables are significant and positively associated with governance and development estimation based on Indicator-5.

## **8.9 Case Dynamics: Explaining the Differences and Dominant Pattern**

Along with perusal of institutional and functional dimensions of relations, governance and development as a whole, this study intends to examine the case dynamics explaining the variations and dominant pattern of politics-bureaucracy relationship which ultimately has

considerable effects on local governance and development. Thus, this section seeks to explain the field variations or case dynamics of seven sample UZPs. Note that, during the interview survey, I was promise bound to the respondents especially to political leaders and to bureaucrats that the name of the respondents and Upazila would not be mentioned anywhere in the thesis whatever may be the nature and status of relations, governance and development. To keep my promise, I have categorized the sample seven Upazilas putting the code name as “A, B, C, D, E, F, and G”. Only I know which UZP belongs to which code. Thus, I have tabulated empirical data maintaining code of the UZP to identify the case dynamics or case variations of relations, governance and developmental conditions. The case dynamics of politics-bureaucracy relations among the seven UZP reveals that none of the particular dominant pattern is noticeable. In comparison to each other of the sample UZP, it is clearly found that, both the local politicians and bureaucrats are to some extent alike in their social characteristics. None of them are solely in an advantageous position but bureaucrats are in advantageous position in considering education, occupational status vis-à-vis local elected politicians. However, significant divergence and convergence are noticeable among the UZP in the context of comparative context. In particular case of UZP “A” and “B” which are different from others. In these two Upazila, both elected politicians and bureaucrats are educated and similarly concern about their roles and responsibilities and central politicians are more dominating than bureaucrats. Overall, comparative analysis of politicians and bureaucrats views in the role perception reveals that irrespective of Upazila theoretically most of the respondents believe that politics and administrations are separate and they should have separate roles and functions. But in practice, both the politicians and bureaucrats want to be involved in every aspect of the policy and governance process which influence their self-and mutual images and outlooks. As a result, none of the UZP found where the self-and mutual perceptions of politicians and bureaucrats are exclusively mutual or alike towards each other (see the appendix 7-11 for statistical data).

Nonetheless, the empirical data from the sample seven UZP reveals that both cases of conflict and cooperation can be found in the different context of the UZP. For example, two UZPs are found overly under conflicting relations between local elected politicians and bureaucrats like Upazila “A” and “B” whose governance and development condition are low and relational negative effect are high. In contrast, one Upazia is found where politics-bureaucracy relation is

mutual like Upazila “G” whose governance and development condition is high and relational negative effect is low. Others Upazilas are belonged to the category of both conflict and cooperation. The internal dynamics of the particular UZPs are very interesting. For example, in Upazila “A” and “B” the relations between local elected politicians and bureaucrats are conflicting although both the Upazilas are dominated by the elected politicians. The internal dynamics and empirical findings from this two Upazilas show that the governance and developmental roles of these Upazila are basically performed by the MP and UNO. In some cases, the domination of the MP is so strong that the others UZP members often turn out to be observer. Especially in those UZPs where the MP regularly attends in the meetings of the UZP and rigorously try to influence the local decision making process. For example at the UZP “A”

**Table 8.19**  
**Comparative Status of Politics-Bureaucracy Relations in Seven Sample UZPs**

<b>Upazilas (Code Name)</b>	<b>Social Characteristics</b>	<b>Self-image and Mutual Interaction</b>	<b>Domination</b>	<b>Nature of Relations</b>	<b>Governance and Development</b>	<b>Relational Effects (Negatively)</b>
A	Mostly Alike	Not exclusively mutual or alike	Political	Conflicting	Low	High
B	Mostly Alike	Not exclusively mutual or alike	Political	Conflicting	Low	High
C	Mostly Alike	Not exclusively mutual or alike	Bureaucratic	Mixture of conflict and cooperation	Moderate	Moderate
D	Mostly Alike	Not exclusively mutual or alike	Bureaucratic	Mixture of conflict and cooperation	Moderate	Moderate
E	Mostly Alike	Not exclusively mutual or alike	Bureaucratic	Mixture of conflict and cooperation	Moderate	Moderate
F	Mostly Alike	Not exclusively mutual or alike	Bureaucratic	Mixture of conflict and cooperation	Moderate	Moderate
G	Mostly Alike	Not exclusively mutual or alike	Bureaucratic	Mutual	High	Low

Source: Compiled by the Researcher

Thus, the Upazilas are running by the UNO maintaining and under political controlled of the MP, not the local elected chairman of the UZP. Therefore, conflicting relations between them is

affecting the performance of governance and development. On the other hand, in the Upazila “G” politics-bureaucracy relation is good and mutual because of elected chairman never interfere to the roles and responsibilities of the UNO and even though elected chairman never monitor how the UNO performing his roles and responsibilities does. Chairman always feels relaxed by handovering all the responsibilities to UNO and thus UNO is also happy and their relation is mutual. Therefore, the governance and developmental functions of this UZP are high and the relational negative effects are minimal. Empirical data reveals that five UZPs are governed by the domination of bureaucracy among the seven UZPs. In most of the cases politics-bureaucracy relations are mixture of conflict and cooperation and relational negative effect are moderate. This relational effect is measured on the performance of development project formulation and implementation and thus, to examine the case dynamics of the UZP, a qualitative comparative analysis has been shown in the table 8.19 on the basis of multi-dimensional quantitative data.

It has been considered the economic conditions of the sample UZP explaining the status of project implementation in different sectors and the revenue income and expenditure along with ADP implementation. Overall, one universal tendency of bureaucrats in all samples UZP is to behave according to the rules and regulations in some cases, and deny doing many things saying that the existing rules and regulations do not allow doing things in most of the cases. On the other hand, one general tendency of local elected politicians is to bring some unexpected demands to administrators and put the pressures on them for getting their demands fulfilled. If it is not possible then they give blame to the bureaucrats for everything which are undone. Neither the politicians nor the bureaucrats try to understand the concrete problems of each other and thus their relations are conflicting in most of the cases. Interestingly, in spite of the conflicting relations between local elected politicians and bureaucrats development is continued with moderate level at the local government in Bangladesh.

## **8.10 Conclusion**

We may conclude the analysis of this chapter by two contextual dimensions: first of all identifying or explaining the prevailing dominant model of relationship between local elected politicians and appointed official bureaucrats along with cognitive awareness of their theoretical

understanding of relational models and its effects on local governance and development. Secondly, by explaining the theoretical proposition that I have conjectured in the theoretical framework and how far empirical evidences support the thesis that if the local government institution (UZP) is controlled by the regulations of central government then it will maneuver the scope for bureaucratic domination resulting conflictual relationship between the local elected politicians and the local official bureaucrats which ultimately affect the local governance and development. In the theoretical part of this thesis, I have outlined three models of politics-bureaucracy relations: dichotomous, mutual-interactive and symbiotic. Accordingly, section 8.2 of this chapter recapitulates that discussion, showing the principal conditions or role characteristics and governance attributes of the theoretical models.

However, the empirical data, of course, that were collected from the seven sample UZPs did not support any particular model of relationships which could be dominant at the local level in Bangladesh. Moreover, the most striking fact was that, the empirical evidence reveals that the local politicians and bureaucrats hold confusing perceptions on politics-bureaucracy relational models. The perceptions clearly show that there are significant levels of differences between the theoretical and practical perceptions of politicians and bureaucrats in measuring their relationships. Theoretically most of the respondents believe that “mutual-interactive” model of relation between politicians and bureaucrats is more effective in governance. But practically, they are unable to maintain this model of relationship with each other as most of them are not able to identify any particular model what they are practicing in their professional life.

Empirical findings reveal that, the relational perceptions of politicians and bureaucrats are almost opposite. While the politicians perceive the relation is less mutual-interactive and more dichotomous (the percentage is 19(27.14%) and 46(65.71%) respectively) then the bureaucrats perceive that it is more mutual-interactive and less dichotomous (the percentage is 49(70%) 15 (21.42%) respectively). Consequently, there is no asymmetry of their thinking which influence to their individual role performance as governance actors and in their relations. Thus, elected politicians work as “figureheads” of the UZP and UNO performs as the “routinist” or chief executive official of the council and actually the most influential actor of UZP functionaries. On the other hand, MPs are the advisor of the council under his constituency. The role of MP affects

the politico-administrative relationship pattern in decision making and disposing business of UZP development activities. Representative member (UP chairman and nominated women members), other member (specialist at their field) and the working linkage among these members, UNO and UZP chairman determined through the mechanism of voting power and mandatory attendance at council meeting. Representative members have the right to vote in major policy decisions along with the decision of the chairman and the decision will appear as the decision of the council. Moreover, the central government imposes varieties of controlling mechanisms like institutional control, administrative control, financial control, and controlled by the central local relations. Even though, how the politicians and bureaucrats will interact and behave to each other and what will be their roles and relations are also determined by the central regulations, directives and control.

Therefore, the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is neither normatively dichotomous with political neutrality nor abundantly responsive to the politics and thus the theoretical models that we have discussed in the earlier cannot be found exactly in the context of politics-bureaucracy relations in Bangladesh. Rather, we find a special kind of conflicting relation between politicians and bureaucrats with bureaucratic domination from the empirical observation which has ultimately moderate level of negative effects on local governance and development. However, the comparative context of functioning and the case dynamics of the UZPs demonstrate that the information asymmetry regarding the interests and actions of involving actors in the process of governance as elected politicians and official bureaucrats play the game with both the aligned and non-aligned nature of individual interests. Thus, the conditions of both the dichotomous and mutual-interactive relations are existing in the perspective of politics-bureaucracy relations at the local government in Bangladesh which ultimately remind us the conditions of symbiotic relationship between politicians and bureaucrats where the relationship can be measured by the co-existence of politicians and bureaucrats “not just by competition or cooperation but by both competition and cooperation” (Mitra, 2010:458) and symbiosis could be the prospective or rational choice model of relationship between politicians and bureaucrats as neither the politicians nor the bureaucrats perceive their roles as subservient to each other. The last and subsequent chapter will deal with this prospective model of relationship along with the summary findings.

## **Chapter – 9: Summary and Conclusion**

### **9.1 Introduction**

Identification of the prototype of politics-bureaucracy relations and its effect on local governance and development was the lynchpin of this thesis which has been explored in the preceding chapters in the context of local government of Bangladesh. However, the main purpose of this concluding chapter is to summarize the core findings and to develop a prospective third model of politics-bureaucracy relation in the context of local government. In doing so, this chapter organizes into two sections. In the first section, I have restated the problem with summarizing the main findings. And in the final section, I have tried to develop a prospective third model of politics-bureaucracy relations focusing the light on symbiotic relationship between politicians and bureaucrats that I have argued in this thesis as an interface between dichotomous and mutual relation, and an essential precondition or rational choice model of politics-bureaucracy relations for proper local governance and development.

### **9.2 The Problem Restated and Summarizing the Main Findings**

The relation between politics and administration has been recognized as a classical problem in political science and public administration. It is a fascinating issue at any level of government (Svara, 2006). Thus, the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats has always been a central issue of governance and it “has been a subject of extensive research” in the literature of politics and administration (Demir *et al.*, 2015:79). However, this relationship has not always been without apprehension. Therefore, scholars have attempted to explore the patterns of relations from different perspectives. Consequently, we observe the paradigm shifts of the theoretical perspectives on politics-bureaucracy relations. Interestingly, scholars are frequently searching for proper paradigm using more theoretical or argumentive method along with empirical inquiry. But the empirical evidence that underpins the narrative is by its very nature different understandings of politics-bureaucracy relations. In general, we find major two paradigms of relations: dichotomy and mutuality in western democracies. On the other hand,

relations in developing countries did not shape in a certain character and still it is under construction by following different theoretical models, notes and suggestions. Another notable thing is that throughout the last two centuries the process of bureaucratization in the administration has been significantly speeded up and now bureaucracy has become a dominant institution indeed. Once upon a time, the western scholars who embraced the bureaucratic domination in the administration now, they are in doubt whether the rational type of bureaucracy is advisable for or striking a balance between politics and administration?

In the above overall contextual background of developed and developing countries, this research has focused on vexing to fathom the nature of the relationship between elected politicians and appointed official bureaucrats in the context of local government of Bangladesh both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, I have tried to figure out the theoretical paradigmatic perspectives of politicians and bureaucrats relationships from the existing literature. Attempt has been made to sophistication of the theoretical perspective by proposing a logical modification of the existing relationship models by explaining some underpinning variables which underpin the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in governance. In doing so, this research has considered the philosophical principles, composing factors, process of governance and effectual deficiencies of every theoretical perspective and overall underpinning variables which underpin the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in any political systems.

The historical and comparative analysis from different countries reveals that the bureaucracy of ancient civilizations was the founding pillar of modern bureaucracy. The western democratic states have adopted traditional bureaucracy newly with their own culture and context along with their economic system of advance capitalism and technology (Weber, 1947). In the ancient empires, bureaucracy was an instrument and assisting force to the political leadership. Then bureaucracy was considered as a state apparatus. Overall, they were involved in law and order maintenance, policy implementation of developmental and monumental works. However, one notable thing in this respect is that the ancient imperial bureaucracy was liable to the king or emperor and they were the servants of the emperor and master of the public.

Comparative analysis from different countries suggests that the patterns of political and bureaucratic power relations are varied on the basis of political systems and different institutional practice and in general politicians and bureaucrats play distinctive roles in policy making process in western democracies. Cross-national variation is observable for many other reasons, including constitutional provisions, development sequences, nature of politicization and party systems (Aberbach *et al.* 1981). In general, American bureaucrats are much more politicized ideologically and they play more political role than the European bureaucrats and the bureaucracy is more powerful in the United States, but they are structurally subordinate to politics and are not autonomous as is the United Kingdom and other European countries. However, bureaucracy in developing or post-colonial countries has not been developed following a natural process. Rather it is developed by the colonial power for their administrative support, and after independence of these countries political leadership used this bureaucracy as state mechanism (Potter, 1986; Carino, 2001). Thus, politics-bureaucracy relations in developing countries yet to shape in a certain character and still it is under construction by following different notes and suggestions, though they have a long experience of the administrative state.

Bangladesh is not exception to this. The historical analysis reveals that the presence of politics, bureaucracy, and local government is historically an unequivocal truth in Bangladesh as a part of Indian Subcontinent. Since the ancient period, the existence of bureaucracy and local government in Bangladesh has been functioning. Nonetheless, British colonial administrator formed a new style of governance system (hierarchical administrative state) by breaking down the indigenous system of governance for their own colonial interest. Modern bureaucracy and local government was the direct effect of that endeavour. In colonial period, two outstanding features of colonial bureaucracy were its elitism and the loyalty to its colonial masters. This features of bureaucracy shaped the pattern of relationship between its colonial masters and bureaucracy, as direct political role by the politician was abundantly minimal during that period. In British India, bureaucrats were both the policy makers and the main implementers as executive officials. Simultaneously, they held the power of developmental works both in the central and local government. During the British colonial period, although the modern local government system was grasp its foundation but Indian subcontinent was virtually an administrative state because; in this period the entire administrative apparatus was controlled by

the bureaucrats. All key posts in the central and provincial government and even in the district administration including magistracy were reserved for the bureaucrats. The local self-governments were kept in a state of impotence and were placed under the overriding control of the bureaucracy. Local government was dominated by the strong mid-level bureaucrats who belonged to the prestigious Indian Civil Service (ICS). In the colonial structure of the then local government was established in order to legitimize colonial domination through giving some semblance of self-rule at the local level (Siddiqui, 2005). Traditionally, the nature of local government was bureaucratic structure and dominated by the DO, DM, SDO, and COs, during the whole British period.

Similarly, apart from historical legacy, the organizational capacity, social dynamics and political patronization of founding leaders had contributed to grasp the strong position of bureaucracy in Pakistani political process and governance. During the Pakistan period, all tiers of local government except the union council were dominated by the bureaucrats. We observed extreme bureaucratization of local government in the Basic Democratic System in the Pakistan age. In both the colonial and Pakistan periods, local governance and development was under the general control of bureaucrats. Their principle responsibility was the collection of revenue from taxation of land, maintenance of law and order as well as monitoring the developmental works, and ultimately they were the sole authority of the local people and the agent of central political control to the local level.

After emergence of Bangladesh as an independent nation state in 1971, it adopted colonial bureaucracy with introducing parliamentary forms of government as a system of governance by the leadership of Sheikh Mujib keeping bureaucracy accountable under the political leadership. Thus, politics-bureaucracy relations in post-independent Bangladesh reveals that the Awami League leadership tried to make the bureaucracy as a purely instrument of carrying out the decisions of the political leadership who (bureaucrats) were the master of the people during the colonial and Pakistan period. It was like following the classical theoretical model of politics-bureaucracy dichotomy, where bureaucracy will simply implement the decisions of politicians under the political control. Consequently, bureaucrats started non-cooperation with the Mujib government and they were waiting for the future scope.

However, in 1975, bureaucrats got the opportunity and after a military coup d'état bureaucracy regained its position comprising the higher echelons of political power and emerged as dominant elites in the process of governance, and until 1990, civil-military bureaucracy held this position under military and quasi-presidential system. In 1991, Bangladesh reintroduced parliamentary government keeping bureaucracy under political leadership at least theoretically. As a result, throughout the last two decades the process of politicization of bureaucracy and bureaucratization of politics in administration has been significantly speeded up which was started by the military regimes. Consequently, bureaucracy has become a dominant institution indeed, although the efficiency, policy expertise and acceptance of Bangladesh's bureaucracy have degraded in a significant manner. In the last two decades of democratic governance, yet politicians are the leading forces of the governance but the dominant role plays the bureaucrats, as the major policies are initiated and passed on the hands of bureaucrats. Now they are directly or indirectly involved in partisan politics. Consequently the organizational supremacy of the bureaucracy has been dismantled.

Bangladesh has relatively a long experience and familiarity with local government as a development administration but an appropriate structure of local government is yet to be established in this country. Historically local government is highly controlled by the central government. During the colonial and Pakistan period and even after the independence of Bangladesh, local government has not been exercised the real power in the domain of governance process. From the British colonial age to date central government is controlling the local government by various mechanisms. Every successive regime in the different historical phases of their rule, keens to build up a support base for themselves in the local government following the example of the previous regime. However, since independence in 1971, a number of attempts have been made to build and rebuild the local government system in Bangladesh. Changes have been made from regime to regime in terms of the nomenclature of tiers of local government, but almost nothing was done to strengthen local governments. Therefore, the structure of the local government system has remained more or less unchanged keeping bureaucratic control with atypical exception in some cases. This study reveals that still today bureaucracy is in a quite strong position vis-à-vis other potential policy making institutions both

in the central and local government in Bangladesh. It has the expertise, the time, the stability and techniques required to be an effective policy maker in a modern age. As a result, bureaucracy is seen as leviathan seeking to increase its powers and operating as an integrated, monolithic institution. On the other hand, local elected politicians are gradually marginalized from the policy process and the role performance of local government in Bangladesh especially in the context of UZP although empirical evidence shows that their role perceptions are not properly clear and it is to some extent related to their social origins.

It is, therefore, necessary to re-examine the theoretical hypothesis that the elite composition is always shown a disproportionate representation of general people and of educated, high-status male dominated, particularly at the political and administrative hierarchy, and many empirical studies of developed and developing countries show that politicians and bureaucrats are belonged to two distinctive social classes and these distinctive social characteristics are associated with distinctive role perceptions and distinctive social background and role perceptions of politicians and bureaucrats display different interaction patterns both at the central and the local government (Ahmad, 1964; Kothari and Roy, 1969; Bjorkman, 1979; Aberbach et al., 1981; Campbell, 1988; Svava, 1990; Ahmed, 2009). However, the empirical evidence of this inquiry did not entirely disprove the above thesis, rather it is proved partially as the social background and comparative social characteristics of local elected politicians and bureaucrats clearly marked a diversity as well as homogeneity in their social origins. In comparison to each other, neither the local elected politicians nor the local official bureaucrats are merely in an advantageous position. In considering their family background, both of them are originated from middle class family background with similar pattern of rural-urban exposure (see the appendix). Nevertheless, they are not exclusively mutual or alike in their social characteristics. Somewhat, both are in an advantageous position in different social conditions and some significant differences could be noticeable between them in their social origins. But both the local elected politicians and bureaucrats are elite in comparison to general people and their role perceptions and interaction patterns are really matter in their roles and relations. Thus, it is partially proved from the previous empirical data analysis that *if the social background and role perceptions that influence to shape the relations between the two actors are similar then the relationship is likely to be*

*mutual or cooperative. Alternatively, if these characteristics are dissimilar then the relationship is likely to be dichotomous or conflicting.*

In the theoretical part of this thesis, I have outlined three models of politics-bureaucracy relations: dichotomous, mutual-interactive and symbiotic. Accordingly, section 8.2 of the eight chapters' recapitulates that discussion, showing the principal conditions or role characteristics and governance attributes of the theoretical models. However, the empirical data did not support any particular model of relationships which could be dominant at the local level in Bangladesh. Moreover, the most striking fact was that, the empirical evidence reveals that the local politicians and bureaucrats are holding confusing perceptions on politics-bureaucracy relational models. The perceptions clearly show that there are significant levels of differences between the theoretical and practical perceptions of politicians and bureaucrats in measuring their relationships. Theoretically, most of the respondents believe that "mutual-interactive" model of relation between politicians and bureaucrats is more effective in governance. But practically, they are unable to maintain this model of relationship with each other as most of them are not able to identify any particular model what they are practicing in their professional life.

As a result, empirical findings reveal that, the relational perceptions of politicians and bureaucrats are almost opposite. While the politicians perceive the relation is less mutual-interactive and more dichotomous (the percentage is 19(27.14%) and 46(65.71%) respectively) then the bureaucrats perceive that it is more mutual-interactive and less dichotomous (the percentage is 49(70%) 15 (21.42%) respectively). This research finds mixture of both dichotomous and mutual-interactive relations although it is evident from the empirical data that the cognitive role perceptions of local elected politicians and bureaucrats are neither clear nor up to the mark. Therefore, it is very difficult to identify the real prototype of relations. The comparative analysis of politicians and bureaucrats views reveals that theoretically they believe that politics and administration are separate, and they should have separate roles and functions. But in practice, they have intention to be involved in every aspect of the policy and governance processes, as both the politicians and bureaucrats have had identified all the activities are of their spheres. That is why the relation between politicians and bureaucrats is identified as neither purely dichotomous nor mutual-interactive in the sense of political neutrality and responsiveness.

The statistical analysis of empirical data reveals that there is a correlation between social background and role orientation as well as role orientation and relations. The empirical data demonstrates that the politico-bureaucratic culture is immensely different and the absence of parallel behavior is substantially clear. Thus local bureaucrats consider them as the permanent agent of the central government and they emphasize rules and regulations more than the directions of the local elected politicians and the practical needs of the local people which ultimately plays a very significant role as underpinning variable to the determination of relationship between them and results dichotomous or conflicting relations between the two actors.

As social background and role orientation is to some extent different and it influences the relations between them partially thus I had framed a different theoretical hypothesis to examine the relationships furthermore, depending on the mediating nature of role in policy formulation and implementation. More explicitly, the second theoretical proposition or conjecture was formulated on the basis of four independent indicators emphasizing on their self-images and outlooks to each other, and mutual-interactions. The specific hypothesis was *if shared and mutual attitude prevails with high level of self-image between the local elected politicians and the appointed official bureaucrats then it enhances the level of local governance and development. Alternatively, conflict or fragmentation with distorted self-image between local elected politicians and appointed official bureaucrats reduces the level of local governance and development.*

The empirical data from the case of seven UZPs of Bangladesh reveals that both the politicians and bureaucrats are holding different self-images and outlooks about themselves and to each other. Local elected politicians hold high image about them and consider themselves as superior in administrative sphere. But they hold low image on administrative procedures, rules and regulations and politicians cannot act in a decisive manner because of various conflicting pressure on them. In contrast, local official bureaucrats hold low images about themselves as they also admit that political leaderships are the ultimate superior and bureaucracy are now mixed up of both politically neutral and involved as well as both competent and incompetent.

However, they hold high self-image on them as they are well acquainted with administrative procedures, rules and regulations and they have tendency to conform the rules and regulation in governance. Although respondents' opinions reveal that politicians are superior to the administrative hierarchy theoretically but in practice their contradictory views open up while they provided the perceptions to each other. According to the perceptions of politicians toward bureaucrats, bureaucrats lost its impartial character and also its efficiency. But politicians admit that bureaucrats are more rules, regulations and procedures oriented than politicians and yet they display different opinions in practical application of these rules and regulations. Likewise, according to the perceptions of bureaucrats, they have not high image about politicians but they hold high self-image about themselves and they estimate themselves in much more favourable light than local elected politicians. Local politicians are more realistic in evaluating their self-image vis-à-vis bureaucrats.

Interestingly, the comparative analysis of their self-images and outlooks to each other reveals that both of them have tendency to blame and undermine each other and bureaucrats are in higher position in this case than their counterpart. This attitude and tendency to each other is verified by the statistical analysis of correlation and chi-square test. Most of the cases are produced significant results (see the appendix 8). Thus, the behavioural attitude which perceived by the politicians vis-à-vis bureaucrats do not project congenial image. Rather, it presents distorted image to each other. Overall, the role perceptions, social background and self-images to each other are not mutually exclusive, somewhat they are holding antagonistic or hostile attitude to each other in some cases which do not signify the mutual attitude towards each other. However, some differences are evident from the case variation and in the context of case dimension. The degree of mutual understanding is not similar to all UZP equally. The empirical analysis and evidence clearly exhibit distorted images and lack of mutual attitude overall and thus results dichotomous relations between them by their attitudinal or behavioural data. Nevertheless, it does not exhibit how far this model is existing or how does this relation affect the local governance and development. It is therefore, tested the theoretical model by the empirical data in the context of institutional and functional dimensions providing the third proposition or argument that *if the local government institution (UZP) is controlled by the regulations of central government then it is maneuvered the scope for bureaucratic domination*

*resulting conflictual relationship between the local elected politicians and the local official bureaucrats which ultimately affect the local governance and development.*

The empirical finding of this particular hypothesis reveals that there is no asymmetry of thinking and activities of local politicians and bureaucrats which influence to their individual role performance as governance actors and in their relations. Representative member (UP chairman and nominated women members), other member (specialist at their field) and the working linkage among these members, UNO and UZP chairman determined through the mechanism of voting power and mandatory attendance at council meeting. Representative members have the right to vote in major policy decisions along with the decision of the chairman and the decision will appear as the decision of the council. Thus, elected politicians work as “figureheads” of the UZP and UNO performs as the “routinist” or chief executive official of the council and actually the most influential actor of UZP functionaries.

Moreover, the central government imposes varieties of controlling mechanisms like institutional control, administrative control, financial control, and controlled by the central local relations. Even though, how the politicians and bureaucrats will interact and behave to each other and what will be their roles and relations are also determined by the central regulations, directives and control. Therefore, the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is neither normatively dichotomous with political neutrality nor abundantly responsive to the politics and thus the theoretical models that we have discussed in the earlier cannot be found exactly in the context of politics-bureaucracy relations in Bangladesh. Rather, we find a special kind of conflicting relation between politicians and bureaucrats with bureaucratic domination from the empirical observation which has ultimately negative effects on local governance and development.

In addition, recently implemented provision of mandatory advisory role of the Members of Parliament (MPs) at the UZP has complicated the scenario of the local government even further. MPs are the advisor of the council under his constituency. The role of MP affects the politico-administrative relationship pattern in decision making and disposing business of UZP development activities. The advisory role of MPs in the local government is to some extent, the interference by MPs in the local government affairs, particularly in development activities, which

has weakened the independence of local government. The MPs often dictate the development activities to be undertaken, most of the times without consulting with the local elected representatives or assessing actual needs. As per the new law, at least theoretically, the UZPs have lost their characteristics of local government bodies, since in the name of advice; the MPs are authorized to control the activities of the bodies along with appointed official bureaucrats.

This study reveals that central politicians and bureaucrats are playing contentious developmental role keeping them in the dominant position rather than local elected politicians in the local government. The coordination and working relations among the MPs, Upazila Chairmen and bureaucrats are conflictual. As a result, local government especially UZP has been facing triangulation of conflict among the MPs, local elected chairmen and bureaucrats with the role and power sharing issue. Thus, much of what has been described as underpinning variables in the theoretical part on politics-bureaucracy relations of this study can also be observed in local government. This study has also investigated the reasons and dimensions of conflict between local elected politicians and bureaucrats. The findings of the study reveal that reasons of conflict are many. The most important thing that the two actors are not only differs in background, training and motivation but also in their interest, role orientation and desire. On the whole, the perceptions of local government elected politicians and bureaucrats about their roles and responsibilities vis-à-vis each other are not very healthy and conducive to cooperative relations between the two as a whole. However, both of them believe that mutual relations between these two actors are very important for proper governance and development. Nonetheless, bureaucrats generally consider the local elected politicians as illiterate, backdated, arrogant and corrupt. On the contrary, local politicians consider bureaucrats as ineffective, public servant but alienated from people, power seeker and corrupt. Both actors feel that they only should have the final role in all important matters. Overall, finding shows that conflict occurs between the politicians and bureaucrats on the issue of sense of ownership of the upazila, interference to the other's jurisdiction, practice of power and benefits, budget allocation and benefits of stakeholder, priority selection in development activities specially, GR, TR, VGD, VGF, KABIKA, KABITA etc, in controlling of upazila officers (ACR), in the question of corruption and accountability, grouping among the officers of upazila administration.

However, the comparative context of functioning and the case dynamics of the UZPs demonstrate that the information asymmetry regarding the interests and actions of involving actors in the process of governance as elected politicians and official bureaucrats play the game with both the aligned and non-aligned nature of individual interests. Both the actors (local elected politicians and bureaucrats) admit that they are legitimate actors in local governance yet they feel that they are the only and solely owner of the upazila. How much power and amenities they will be entitled to is the question. Thus, the conditions of both the dichotomous and mutual-interactive relations are existing in the perspective of politics-bureaucracy relations at the local government in Bangladesh which ultimately remind us the conditions of symbiotic relationship between politicians and bureaucrats where the relationship can be measured by the co-existence of politicians and bureaucrats by both “competition and cooperation” and that could be the prospective or rational choice model of relationship between politicians and bureaucrats as neither the politicians nor the bureaucrats perceive their roles as subservient to each other. Thus, I have proposed a prospective theoretical model of relationship – symbiosis – a specialized kind of relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in which each actor provides for the other the conditions necessary for its continued existence. May be this prospective model will be tested by the further empirical research in future.

### **9.3 Prospective Theoretical Model: Symbiosis – A Fusion of Dichotomy and Mutuality**

As discussed in the theoretical model that, if the existing relational model does not signify any of the previous two (dichotomy or mutuality) in particular or if it is indistinguishable then the symbiotic model of relationship would be recommended. That means if the empirical evidence produce such a condition where none of the models of dichotomy or mutuality is predominate in the existing system then it improvise the common condition of both dichotomous and mutual relations which ultimately the conditions of symbiosis – a fusion of dichotomy and mutuality. As it is observed empirically that none of the models of relations is predominant in the context of Bangladesh, rather both the conditions of dichotomous and mutual-interactive models are prevailing together in practice. Thus, this research recommended that the symbiotic model of

relationship between politicians and bureaucrats would be possible for proper local governance in Bangladesh. Let us explained the logical argument of symbiotic relation first and then why it would be the rational choice model of relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in pursuance of proper governance and development.

The first and foremost important consideration on politics-bureaucracy relation is to identify or acknowledge the genetic differences between them. It has often been argued that the politicians and the bureaucrats represent two distinct species. However, the theoretical and analytical contents of most of the approaches tend to ignore the two substantive facts that there is a significant level of differences between the politician and the bureaucrat in considering the speciestic character of the two actors along with its social origins. But this study has got a very important example of genetic difference between politicians and bureaucrats from a respondent local politician during the interview while he was explaining the genetic difference between the politicians and bureaucrats using the example of oil and water. According to that respondent, “You may mix politicians and bureaucrats together for the time being.....Ultimately, they will be separated in course of their nature of action..... However, how far they will be belonged together it would be dependent on how much efficient cooker you are.” Similarly, Aberbach *et al.*, (1981:240) identify the differences between politicians and bureaucrats by “distinctive experience, distinctive views, and distinctive interests.” That means, from a top ranking academicians to a secondary school educated local politician, all are concern on the speciestic diversity between politicians and bureaucrats. So, concrete separation or purely mutual-interaction between politicians and bureaucrats is impossible. Rather, it is better to explore the third option by combining both dichotomy and mutuality in a hybrid approach.

Secondly, the politicians and bureaucrats operate roles and functions in a given environment and to the extent that the environment is sometimes less than congenial. If the organizational environment is good then the expected relationship between them and the outcome of the structure is satisfactory. Less attention has been given in terms of conditions that construct the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in the existing approaches. Therefore, this research wants to emphasize the constructing factors which underpin the relationship between

politicians and bureaucrats along with identifying the species differences between the politicians and the bureaucrats.

**Table 9.1**

**The Speciestic differences between the Politicians and the Bureaucrats**

<b>Politicians</b>	<b>Bureaucrats</b>
Politicians are deciding, value-laden, legislative, and civic culture tradition	Whereas, bureaucrats are implementing, value neutral/fact-laden, executive, and imperial tradition
Politicians are passionate, partisan, idealistic, and ideological	By contrast, bureaucrats are prudent, centrist, practical, and pragmatic
Politicians emphasize re-election goals, patronage, log-rolling, and individual interests as they hold interests and values	Whereas, bureaucrats emphasize and concern with career goals, red tape, and patron-client interests as they hold facts and knowledge
Politicians articulate broad, diffusive interests of unorganized individuals	On the other hand, bureaucrats mediate narrow, focused interests of organized clientele
The fundamental tendency of politicians is to turn all problems of administration into problems of politics	By contrast, the fundamental tendency of all bureaucrats is to turn all problems of politics into problems of administration
Politicians seek publicity, raise innovative issues and are stimulating to the policy	On the contrary, bureaucrats prefer darkness of the back room, resist innovations, manage incremental adjustments, and provide policy equilibrium
Politicians spend much of their time and energy on electoral and party affairs, mending fences, mapping tactics, meeting the media, and so on.	On the other hand, bureaucrats spend much of their time letting contracts, hiring subordinates, redrawing organizational charts, writing regulations, and so on.

Source: Compiled by the researcher from Aberbach *et al.*, (1981); Suleiman, (1974); Nalbandian, (2006).

Third and finally, as politicians and bureaucrats are not mutually exclusive characteristically and the solid separation of their roles and function as well as wholesome mutuality between politicians and bureaucrats is not possible, thus the distinctive roles and functions would be possible in a symbiotic relation where the elected politicians and official bureaucrats will perform their roles and functions with the principles of complementarity, political neutrality and mutual respect along with check and balance. Since, neither the politicians nor the bureaucrats perceive their roles as subservient to each other and the prospective theoretical model of symbiotic relationship is a fusion of dichotomy and mutuality and a specialized kind of relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in which each actor provides for the other the conditions necessary for its continued existence, where the relationship can be measured by the

co-existence of politicians and bureaucrats not just by competition or cooperation but by both competition and cooperation (Mitra, 2010) It is, therefore, necessary to examine some considerations in the context of symbiotic model of relationship. For example, the genetic differences between the two actors along with social origins; whether or not such a relationship allows for separate roles or duties maintaining the boundary of political neutrality; and whether the two actors are perceived themselves as subservient or mutual respect with self-identity.

Accordingly, from the classical to contemporary writings of politics-administration relations, we get a very impressive character of genetic diversity between politicians and bureaucrats as governance actors (see the table 9.1). These characteristics of politicians and bureaucrats are undeniable and not mutually exclusive to each other. As it is impossible to disregard these distinctive genetic characteristics of politicians and bureaucrats and thus overly mix up between the two actors minimizing these characteristics is also impossible. Therefore, in a symbiotic relation, we can impose some working conditions for both the politicians and bureaucrats. That means in a symbiotic relationship, both the politicians and bureaucrats will work together by keeping their genetic characteristics as it is, and separate roles and functions will be allowed to them with complementarity. In this regard, Svara (2006:1065) says, “It is useful to analyze political-administrative relations in terms of a model of complementarity in which two distinct and partially separated sets of officials come together to shape the governmental process.” According to Svara, complementarity model of relation is based on the ground that elected politicians and administrators are intermixed together in the common pursuit of sound governance, while at the same time maintaining distinction between the two. He also says that-

Complementarity stresses interdependence along with distinct roles; compliance along with independence; respect for political control along with a commitment to share and implement policy in ways that promote the public interest; deference to elected incumbents along with adherence to the law and support for their electoral competition; and appreciation of politics along with support for professional standards” (Svara, 2001:179).

Hence, my argument is that the model of symbiotic relationship is synonymous to the model of Svara’s “Complementarity” but the difference is that bureaucrats are kept to be under political control in a complementarity model of relationship whereas, in a symbiotic model of relationship, bureaucrats will be worked together with maintaining political neutrality.

Bureaucrats will be free from political control, and both the politicians and bureaucrats should be refrained from gaining any personal or group interests. However, in a symbiotic model of relationship, there might have a possibility to develop “a symbiotic relationship between the administrator and the politician which allows both to exploit each other for furthering his own or his group interest” and it does not “prevent the blurring of the boundary between the administrative and the leadership structures.....This often leads to favouritism and sacrifice of legal-rational standards of bureaucratic action” (Kothari and Roy, 1969:35). Therefore, in a symbiotic model of relationship, both the elected politicians and bureaucrats will be worked together with mutuality by preserving their self-identity on the basis of allotted and set rules but keeping them away from blurring their self or group interest. The more clear idea can be coined from Professor Mitra (2010:458) “The symbiosis of administrators and politicians is at its best when their co-existence is marked not just by competition but by *both competition and cooperation*, each agency jealously guarding its special areas, namely rules and representation, and reaching beyond its remit to help the other half of the structure of governance.” Now the question is why the symbiosis is the rational choice and would be the balanced model of the relationship?

As we have witnessed from the theoretical discussion that in a dichotomous model of relation both the actors (politician and bureaucrat) play the game with non-aligned nature of individual interests and in a mutual-interactive model of relation both the actors play the game with aligned nature of individual interests. Thus, governance is affected in both the models of relations and general people or stakeholders are ultimately deprived from proper service delivery. However, if the local government institutions follow the principles of symbiotic model of relationship then both the local elected politicians and bureaucrats will play the game by both competition and cooperation, as they should play the role with complementarity. The governance attributes will be mutually dominated by both the elected politicians and official bureaucrats, accountability will be shared, both of them will be worked professionally, politicization is likely to be less, and their images or interaction might be reciprocal with shared and balanced influence. In that case, both the actors will play the game with not only aligned nature of their individual interests but also emphasizing the welfare of the general people, as in a symbiotic model of relationship, politicians and bureaucrats should be restrained strictly from securing personal benefits or self-

interest maximization. Thus, the symbiotic model of relation can be the rational choice for Bangladesh as a post-colonial administrative state where both the elected politicians and appointed official bureaucrats want to play the role in governance and neither the politicians nor the bureaucrats perceive their roles as subservient to each other.

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# Appendices

## Appendix- 1: Survey Questionnaire for Local Elected Politicians

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### Research Title: Politics-Bureaucracy Relations, Governance and Development in Bangladesh: The Case of Local Government

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#### A. General Introduction to the Research Project:

The modern government runs by the two actors; elected politicians and appointed professional bureaucrats with an uneasy partnership. The study of politics-bureaucracy relation is an essential and core theme of any study of politics and administration as Waldo said ‘nothing is more central in thinking about public administration than the nature and interrelations of politics and administration’. It is an elemental and theoretically debatable question for millennia to social scientists, political scientists, revolutionary leaders and even administrators or practitioners that what will be the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in governance? Bangladesh is not an exception to this. Therefore, this research aims to explore the existing patterns of relations, tensions and its impact on governance and development in the case of local government. It is hoped that the results of this research will lead to explore new understanding on politics-bureaucracy relations.

#### B. Note to the Respondents:

I am conducting my doctoral studies at Heidelberg University, Germany on “Politics-Bureaucracy Relations, Governance and Development in Bangladesh: The Case of Local Government.” To carry out my research, I am conducting this survey. As a sample respondent you will be asked to complete some questions relating to your perception and personal experience. Your participation will be adding an extra value for my research. Your provided data will be used solely for academic purpose to write my PhD Dissertation. There is no known or expected risk associated with participation and providing data in this research. Moreover, you can also skip your name to protect your anonymity. To protect your privacy and confidentiality, I will be completely responsible. I need your kind cooperation.

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Researcher:

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## Interview Questions:

### A. Demographic Variables:

1. Name : \_\_\_\_\_
2. Age: \_\_\_\_\_
3. Gender: \_\_\_\_\_
4. Education Qualification: \_\_\_\_\_
5. Occupation : \_\_\_\_\_
6. Political Experience: \_\_\_\_\_
7. Family Background: \_\_\_\_\_
8. Parents Occupation: \_\_\_\_\_
9. Parents Yearly Income: \_\_\_\_\_
10. Recruitment and Training: \_\_\_\_\_

### B. Role Perceptions:

11. The modern government runs by the two actors; elected politicians and appointed professional bureaucrats with an uneasy partnership. In this respect, how do you evaluate your role as a politician?
  - A. Delegate Actor
  - B. Trustee Actor
  - C. Partisan Actor
  - D. Constituency Service
12. Politics and administration brings together the political elements and bureaucratic elements. Do you think these two actors are characteristically separate and their roles and functions should be distinct?
  - A. Yes
  - B. No
  - C. No Response
13. If the answer is yes then where should be limited the politicians roles?
  - A. Policy formulation
  - B. Policy Implementation
  - C. Governance and development
  - D. All of the above
14. Which component do you think crucial for ensuring local governance and development?
  - A. Local Politicians
  - B. Local Bureaucrats
  - C. Civil Society
  - D. All of the above

15. There are five statements here, how would you perceive and evaluate these statements in the possible course of action to run the system of governance as an important actor of local government.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	No Response
Existing administrative rules and regulations should be given priority and should strictly followed				
Local politicians and bureaucrats should apply particular judgement ignoring some rules and regulations to meet people's needs and requirements				
Whatever the practical needs, results and consequences, local bureaucrats should follow the directions of the superior authority				
For the practical needs local bureaucrats should follow the recommendations of local elected politicians minimising the administrative norms and values				
Local politicians and bureaucrats should not take any decision which may displease each other				

**C. Self-Image and Mutual Outlook:**

16. The civil service is commonly considered as an institution with neutral competence from political influence. What do you think about the bureaucracy of Bangladesh?

- A. Politically Neutral
- B. Mixture of Competent and Incompetent
- C. Politically Involve and Responsiveness
- D. All of the Above

17. You know there are two actors; politicians and bureaucrats equally involve in governance. As an entity they are not equal. Of course one of them is superior. In your general consideration who is superior and why?

- A. Politicians and why.....
- B. Bureaucrats and why.....

18. Following are some statements about politicians and bureaucrats. How far do you agree or disagree with the statements listed below.

Perceptions about Politicians	Agree	Partially Agree	Disagree
Politicians are not well acquainted with administrative procedures, rules and regulations			
Politicians have tendency to disregard to conform the rules and regulation in governance			
Politicians cannot act in a decisive manner because of various conflicting pressure on them			
Politicians do not trust Bureaucrats			
Politicians are generally cooperative with Bureaucrats			
Politicians do not appreciate the viewpoints and the difficulties of			

Bureaucrats			
Politicians are hostile to Bureaucrats			
Politicians do nothing but create problem for the Bureaucrats			
Politicians are corrupt			
Politicians care for people's welfare			
Politicians work only in their self-interest			
Politicians are more transparent than Bureaucrats			
Politicians entertain the people's complain most			
Politicians help in making government policies realistic			

<b>Perceptions about Bureaucrats</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Partially Agree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>
Bureaucrats are well acquainted with administrative procedures, rules and regulations			
Bureaucrats have tendency to conform the rules and regulation in governance			
Bureaucrats are very rigid in their attitude and they do not listen to the advice of others			
Bureaucrats distrust Politicians			
Bureaucrats take part in local politics			
Bureaucrats do not appreciate the viewpoints and the difficulties of local Politicians			
Bureaucrats are inefficient			
Bureaucrats work in the interest of ruling class			
Bureaucrats are corrupt			
Bureaucrats care for people's welfare			
Bureaucrats work only in their self-interest			
Bureaucrats are more transparent than Politicians			
Bureaucrats entertain the people's complain most			
Bureaucrats have a tendency to expand the departments and increase procedures instead of solving concrete problems			

19. Who entertains the citizen's interest and their complain most?

- A. UZP Chairman and UP Chairman (as politicians)
- B. UNO and other Officers (as bureaucrats)

20. Who is comparatively more transparent in his work?

- A. Politicians
- B. Bureaucrats

21. Would you say how important to consultation between politicians and bureaucrats in local decision making?

- A. Very Important
- B. Important
- C. Somewhat Important
- D. Not so Important

22. As an elected representative UZPC should have involvement in the daily business of bureaucrats. How do you support the statement?

- A. Strongly Support
- B. Support
- C. Partially Support
- D. Don't Support

23. Give your opinion in the following matrix questionnaire:

Questions	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
Do you feel the UNO understands the administrative rules and regulations?				
Does the UNO try to cooperate and conform to these rules and regulations?				
Does misunderstanding and disagreement arise between UNO and UZPC?				
Does UNO or UZPC interfere in each other works?				
Does UNO or UZPC come to seek help to each other?				
Do you feel/encounter any pressure from UNO?				
Does the UNO ever try to convince you to agree with him?				
Does the local MP attend UZP meetings?				
Are there ever disagreements between the MP and the UZPC				
How often UNO do consults to you?				

**D. Roles, Function and Relations:**

24. What is the condition of the activities of your Upazila?

- A. Good
- B. Moderate
- C. Not Good
- D. No Reply

25. You are an elected representative. Are you satisfied in the existing Upazila system?

- A. Satisfied
- B. Partial Satisfied
- C. Not Satisfied
- D. No Reply

26. Upazila Parishad monthly meetings held in every month. How do you assess the UZP meetings?

- A. Very Effective
- B. Effective
- C. Partially Effective
- D. Not Effective

27. Who draws up the agenda for UZP meetings?

- A. UZP Chairman
- B. UNO
- C. Chairman & UNO together
- D. Upazila Parishad

28. Who draws up the annual budget for the Upazila?

- A. UZP Chairman
- B. UNO
- C. Chairman & UNO together
- D. Upazila Parishad

29. Who leads the major policy decisions in this Upazila?

- A. UZP Chairman
- B. UNO
- C. MP
- D. By Consensus of UZP

30. Who draws up the decisions about the UZP staffs?

- A. UNO
- B. UZP Chairman
- C. Chairman & UNO together
- D. Upazila Parishad

31. Would you please provide what kind of roles you are performing now as an elected politician and the barriers of effective role performance?

- A. ....
- B. ....
- C. ....
- D. ....

32. What kind of roles are playing by the official bureaucrats?

- A. ....
- B. ....
- C. ....
- D. ....

33. There are four dominant models of politics-bureaucracy relations in the existing literatures of political science and public administration. Which model is more effective in your consideration?

- A. Dichotomy or Separate
- B. Mutual-Interactive
- C. Autonomy
- D. Political Responsiveness

34. Practically, which model you are following or maintaining in your professional life and why?

- A. ....
- B. ....
- C. ....
- D. ....

35. How would you rate your relationship with the UNO and others officials?

- A. Very Good
- B. Good
- C. Fairly Good
- D. Poor

36. Would you please explain what factors contribute to the relationship configuration either conflicting or cooperative?

- A. ....
- B. ....
- C. ....
- D. ....

37. Would you say in which grounds the most of the conflict occurs between politics and Bureaucracy?

- A. ....
- B. ....
- C. ....
- D. ....

38. Would you like to recommend any model what should be the ideal relation model between the politicians and bureaucrats and where they could be worked together?

- A. ....
- B. ....
- C. ....
- D. ....

39. Who maintains good relation with local MP?

- A. UNO
- B. UZPC
- C. Both
- D. No Reply

40. Do you get any instructions for developmental works from MP?

- A. Yes
- B. No

41. How do you assess the role of MP in the UZP? (Multiple answer acceptable)

- A. ....
- B. ....
- C. ....
- D. ....

**E. Governance and Development:**

42. What do you mean by Governance and Development?

- A. ....
- B. ....
- C. ....
- D. ....

43. You know accountability is the key to governance. You are accountable to whom and how do you ensure your individual accountability?

- A. ....
- B. ....
- C. ....
- D. ....

44. You know the politico-bureaucratic conflict has multidimensional impacts. How does this conflict impact on the following issues most and why?

<b>Impacts</b>	<b>SA</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>DA</b>	<b>DNK</b>
Rule application and individual agent's role performance is being hampered				
Collective decisions and actions are impossible if always conflict occurs				
Ensuring accountability and transparency are almost impossible				
The infrastructural development is being delayed and denied				
Mostly affects the public service delivery				

45. How is the present condition of governance and development of your Upazila after activation of UZP?

- A. Improved
- B. Remain the same
- C. Deteriorated
- D. Don't Know

46. What is the present condition of public service delivery mechanisms after activation of the UZP?

- A. Improved
- B. Remain the same
- C. Deteriorated
- D. Don't Know

47. How many development projects have been implemented in this tenure?

- A. Development Sector.....
- B. Agriculture Sector.....
- C. Education Sector.....
- D. Health Sector.....

48. What are the most crucial problems of governance and development in your UZP?

- A. ....
- B. ....
- C. ....
- D. ....

49. Would you like to recommend any suggestion as the abrupt solution?

- A. ....
- B. ....
- C. ....
- D. ....

50. Do you think that the UZP is controlled by the regulations of central government and how would you explain the impacts of central regulation on politics-bureaucracy relations?

- A. Yes .....
- B. No.....

## Appendix- 2: Survey Questionnaire for Bureaucrats

### Interview Questions:

#### A. Demographic Variables:

1. Name : \_\_\_\_\_
2. Age: \_\_\_\_\_
3. Gender: \_\_\_\_\_
4. Education Qualification: \_\_\_\_\_
5. Occupation (present post) : \_\_\_\_\_
6. Length of Service: \_\_\_\_\_
7. Family Background: \_\_\_\_\_
8. Parents Occupation: \_\_\_\_\_
9. Parents Yearly Income: \_\_\_\_\_
10. Recruitment and Training: \_\_\_\_\_

#### B. Role Perceptions:

11. The modern government runs by the two actors; elected politicians and appointed professional bureaucrats with an uneasy partnership. In this respect, how do you evaluate your role as a member of the bureaucracy?
  - A. Delegate Actor
  - B. Trustee Actor
  - C. Partisan Actor
  - D. Constituency Service
12. Politics and administration brings together the political elements and bureaucratic elements. Do you think these two actors are characteristically separate and their roles and functions should be distinct?
  - A. Yes
  - B. No
  - C. No Response
13. If the answer is yes then where should be limited the bureaucrats roles?
  - A. Policy formulation
  - B. Policy Implementation
  - C. Governance and development
  - D. All of the above
14. There are five statements here, how would you perceive and evaluate these statements in the possible course of action to run the system of governance as an important actor of local government.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	No Response
Existing administrative rules and regulations should be given priority and should strictly followed				
Local politicians and bureaucrats should apply particular judgement ignoring some rules and regulations to meet people's needs and requirements				
Whatever the practical needs, results and consequences, local bureaucrats should follow the directions of the superior authority				
For the practical needs local bureaucrats should follow the recommendations of local elected politicians minimising the administrative norms and values				
Local politicians and bureaucrats should not take any decision which may displease each other				

15. Which component do you think crucial for ensuring local governance and development?

- A. Local Politicians
- B. Local Bureaucrats
- C. Civil Society
- D. All of the above

**C. Self-Image and Mutual Outlook:**

16. The civil service is commonly considered as an institution with neutral competence from political influence. What do you think about the bureaucracy of Bangladesh?

- A. Politically Neutral
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Politicians are generally cooperative with Bureaucrats			
Politicians do not appreciate the viewpoints and the difficulties of Bureaucrats			
Politicians are hostile to Bureaucrats			
Politicians do nothing but create problem for the Bureaucrats			
Politicians are corrupt			
Politicians care for people's welfare			
Politicians work only in their self-interest			
Politicians are more transparent than Bureaucrats			
Politicians entertain the people's complain most			
Politicians help in making government policies realistic			

<b>Perceptions about Bureaucrats</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Partially Agree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>
Bureaucrats are well acquainted with administrative procedures, rules and regulations			
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Bureaucrats do not appreciate the viewpoints and the difficulties of local Politicians			
Bureaucrats are inefficient			
Bureaucrats work in the interest of ruling class			
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Bureaucrats are more transparent than Politicians			
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- C. Partially Support
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23. Give your opinion in the following matrix questionnaire:

Questions	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
Do you feel the UZPC and other politicians understand the administrative rules and regulations?				
Does the UZPC try to cooperate and conform to these rules and regulations?				
Does misunderstanding and disagreement arise between local bureaucrats and local politicians?				
Does UZCP or other political leaders interfere in your works?				
Does UPZC come to seek your help?				
Do you feel/encounter any pressure from UZPC and political side?				
Does the UZPC ever try to convince you to agree with him?				
Does the local MP attend UZP meetings?				
Are there ever disagreements between the MP and the UZPC				
How often UZPC do consults to you?				

**D. Roles, Function and Relations:**

24. What is the condition of the activities of your Upazila?

- A. Good
- B. Moderate
- C. Not Good
- D. No Reply

25. You are an official bureaucrats. Are you satisfied in the existing Upazila system?

- A. Satisfied
- B. Partial Satisfied
- C. Not Satisfied
- D. No Reply

26. Upazila Parishad monthly meetings held in every month. How do you assess the UZP meetings?

- A. Very Effective
- B. Effective
- C. Partially Effective
- D. Not Effective

27. Who draws up the agenda for UZP meetings?

- A. UZP Chairman
- B. UNO
- C. Chairman & UNO together
- D. Upazila Parishad

28. Who draws up the annual budget for the Upazila?

- A. UZP Chairman
- B. UNO
- C. Chairman & UNO together
- D. Upazila Parishad

29. Who leads the major policy decisions in this Upazila?

- A. UZP Chairman
- B. UNO
- C. MP
- D. By Consensus of UZP

30. Who draws up the decisions about the UZP staffs?

- A. UNO
- B. UZP Chairman
- C. Chairman & UNO together
- D. Upazila Parishad

31. Would you please provide what kind of roles you are performing now as an official bureaucrat?

- A. ....
- B. ....
- C. ....
- D. ....

32. What kind of roles are playing by the elected politician?

- A. ....
- B. ....
- C. ....
- D. ....

33. There are four dominant models of politics-bureaucracy relations in the existing literatures of political science and public administration. Which model is more effective in your consideration?

- A. Dichotomy or Separate
- B. Mutual-Interactive
- C. Autonomy
- D. Political Responsiveness

34. Practically, which model you are following or maintaining in your professional life and why?

- A. ....
- B. ....
- C. ....
- D. ....

35. How would you rate your relationship with the UZPC and other elected politicians?

- A. Very Good
- B. Good
- C. Fairly Good
- D. Poor

36. Would you please explain what factors influence to make good relationship?

- A. ....
- B. ....
- C. ....
- D. ....

37. What factors account for bad relationship?

- A. ....
- B. ....
- C. ....
- D. ....

38. Would you say in which grounds the most of the conflict occurs between politics and Bureaucracy?

- A. ....
- B. ....
- C. ....
- D. ....

39. Would you like to recommend any model what should be the ideal relation model between the politicians and bureaucrats and where they could be worked together?

- A. ....
- B. ....
- C. ....
- D. ....

40. Who maintains good relation with local MP?

- A. UNO
- B. UZPC
- C. Both
- D. No Reply

41. Do you get any instructions for developmental works from MP?

- A. Yes
- B. No

**E. Governance and Development:**

42. What do you mean by Governance and Development?

- A. ....
- B. ....
- C. ....
- D. ....

43. You know accountability is the key to governance. You are accountable to whom and how do you ensure your individual accountability?

- A. ....
- B. ....
- C. ....
- D. ....

44. You know the politico-bureaucratic conflict has multidimensional impacts. How does this conflict impact on the following issues most and why?

<b>Impacts</b>	<b>SA</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>DA</b>	<b>DNK</b>
Rule application and individual agent's role performance is being hampered				
Collective decisions and actions are impossible if always conflict occurs				
Ensuring accountability and transparency are almost impossible				
The infrastructural development is being delayed and denied				
Mostly affects the public service delivery				

45. How is the present condition of governance and development of your Upazila after activation of UZP?

- A. Improved
- B. Remain the same
- C. Deteriorated
- D. Don't Know

46. What is the present condition of public service delivery mechanisms after activation of the UZP?

- A. Improved
- B. Remain the same
- C. Deteriorated
- D. Don't Know

47. How many development projects have been implemented in this tenure?

- A. Development Sector.....
- B. Agriculture Sector.....
- C. Education Sector.....
- D. Health Sector.....

48. What are the most crucial problems of governance and development in your UZP?

- A. ....
- B. ....
- C. ....
- D. ....

49. Would you like to recommend any suggestion as the abrupt solution?

- A. ....
- B. ....
- C. ....
- D. ....

50. Do you think that the UZP is controlled by the regulations of central government and how would you explain the impacts of central regulation on politics-bureaucracy relations?

- A. Yes .....
- B. No.....

## Appendix- 3: Survey Questionnaire for General People

### Interview Questions:

1. Name : \_\_\_\_\_
2. Age: \_\_\_\_\_
3. Gender: \_\_\_\_\_
4. Education Qualification: \_\_\_\_\_
5. Occupation : \_\_\_\_\_
6. Yearly Income: \_\_\_\_\_
  
7. Politics and administration brings together the political elements and bureaucratic elements. Do you think these two actors are characteristically separate and their roles and functions should be distinct?
  - A. Yes
  - B. No
  - C. No Response
  
8. If the answer is yes then where should be limited the politicians roles?
  - A. Policy formulation
  - B. Policy Implementation
  - C. Governance and development
  - D. All of the above
  
9. Where should be limited the bureaucrats roles?
  - A. Policy formulation
  - B. Policy Implementation
  - C. Governance and development
  - D. All of the above
  
10. Which component do you think crucial for ensuring local governance and development?
  - A. Local Politicians
  - B. Local Bureaucrats
  - C. Civil Society
  - D. All of the above
  
11. The civil service is commonly considered as an institution with neutral competence from political influence. What do you think about the bureaucracy of Bangladesh?

- A. Politically Neutral
- B. Mixture of Competent Incompetent
- C. Politically Involve and Responsiveness
- D. All of the Above

12. You know there are two actors; politicians and bureaucrats equally involve in governance. As an entity they are not equal. Of course one of them is superior. In your general consideration who is superior and why?

- A. Politicians and why.....
- B. Bureaucrats and why.....
- C. No Comments

13. Who is comparatively more transparent in his work?

- A. Politicians
- B. Bureaucrats

14. You know politicians and bureaucrats are elected and appointed for public needs. Would you say who entertains the citizen's interest and complains most and you can access easily to whom?

- A. Local Elected Politicians
- B. Local Bureaucrats

15. As an elected representative UZPC should have involvement in the daily business of bureaucrats. How do you support the statement?

- A. Strongly Support
- B. Support
- C. Partially Support
- D. Don't Support

16. Following are some statements about politicians and bureaucrats. How far do you agree or disagree with the statements listed below.

<b>Perceptions about Politicians</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Partially Agree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>
Politicians are not well acquainted with administrative procedures, rules and regulations			
Politicians have tendency to disregard to conform the rules and regulation in governance			
Politicians cannot act in a decisive manner because of various conflicting pressure on them			
Politicians do not trust Bureaucrats			
Politicians are generally cooperative with Bureaucrats			

Politicians do not appreciate the viewpoints and the difficulties of Bureaucrats			
Politicians are hostile to Bureaucrats			
Politicians do nothing but create problem for the Bureaucrats			
Politicians are corrupt			
Politicians care for people's welfare			
Politicians work only in their self-interest			
Politicians are more transparent than Bureaucrats			
Politicians entertain the people's complain most			
Politicians help in making government policies realistic			

<b>Perceptions about Bureaucrats</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Partially Agree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>
Bureaucrats are well acquainted with administrative procedures, rules and regulations			
Bureaucrats have tendency to conform the rules and regulation in governance			
Bureaucrats are very rigid in their attitude and they do not listen to the advice of others			
Bureaucrats distrust Politicians			
Bureaucrats take part in local politics			
Bureaucrats do not appreciate the viewpoints and the difficulties of local Politicians			
Bureaucrats are inefficient			
Bureaucrats work in the interest of ruling class			
Bureaucrats are corrupt			
Bureaucrats care for people's welfare			
Bureaucrats work only in their self-interest			
Bureaucrats are more transparent than Politicians			
Bureaucrats entertain the people's complain most			
Bureaucrats have a tendency to expand the departments and increase procedures instead of solving concrete problems			

17. What is the circumstance of the activities of your Upazila?

- A. Good
- B. Moderate
- C. Not Good
- D. No Reply

18. How is the present situation of governance and development of your Upazila after activation of UZP?

- A. Improved
- B. Remain the same
- C. Deteriorated
- D. Don't Know

19. What is the present condition of public service delivery mechanisms after activation of the UZP?

- A. Improved
- B. Remain the same
- C. Deteriorated
- D. Don't Know

20. Are you satisfied to the manner in which politicians and bureaucrats are facilitating the public service?

- A. Satisfied
- B. Partial Satisfied
- C. Not Satisfied
- D. No Reply

21. What do you mean by Governance and Development?

- A. ....
- B. ....
- C. ....
- D. ....

22. You know accountability is the key to governance. The UZPC and UNO are accountable to whom?

- A. ....
- B. ....
- C. ....
- D. ....

23. What are the most crucial problems of governance and development in your UZP?

- A. ....
- B. ....
- C. ....
- D. ....

24. Would you like to recommend any suggestion as the abrupt solution?

- A. ....
- B. ....
- C. ....
- D. ....

25. How would you rate the relationship between local elected politicians and official bureaucrats?

- A. Very Good
- B. Good
- C. Fairly Good
- D. Poor

26. Is there any conflict between politicians and bureaucrats in this Upazila?

- A. Yes
- B. No
- C. No Response

27. Would you say in which grounds the most of the conflict occurs between politics and Bureaucracy?

- A. ....
- B. ....
- C. ....
- D. ....

28. You know the politico-bureaucratic conflict has multidimensional impacts. How does this conflict impact on the local governance and development?

<b>Impacts</b>	<b>SA</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>DA</b>	<b>DNK</b>
Rule application and individual agent's role performance is being hampered				
Collective decisions and actions are impossible if always conflict occurs				
Ensuring accountability and transparency are almost impossible				
The infrastructural development is being delayed and denied				
Mostly affects the public service delivery				

29. Who maintain good relation with the local MP?

- A. Upazila Chairman
- B. UNO
- C. Both
- D. No Reply

30. How do you assess the role of MP in the UZP?

- A. ....
- B. ....
- C. ....
- D. ....

## Appendix- 4: Demographic Characteristics of Studied Upazilas (2013)

Characteristics		Upazila						
		Kaunia	Moheshpur	Nasirnagar	Pirojpur sadar	Savar	Shajahanpur	Sunamgomj Sadar
Area(sqkm)	Total	147.64	417.85	294.36	166.81	280.12	221.69	290.71
	Land	144.54	410	282.23	140.14		220.47	267.71
	Reserve Forest	0	0	0	0		0	0
	Reverine Area	3.10	7.85	12.13	26.67		1.22	23
Population	Household	56263	79761	59024	38017		72685	49557
	Total Population (000)	228	332	309	163.47	1442.885	290	279.019
	Male(000)	113	166	151	80.704	769.117	150	139.561
	Female(000)	115	166	158	82.766	673.767	140	139.458
	Sex Ratio (Male/Female)	98	100	95	98	118	106	100
	Density (Per sqkm)	1543	796	1050	980	4948	1307	960
Administration	Municipality	1	1	0	1	1	0	1
	Ward	9	9	0	9	9	3	9
	Union	6	12	13	7	12	11	9
Agriculture	Permanent Cropped(Acre)	309	5376	4090	8537	-	396	466
Industry	Major Industry	68	108	85	17	1188	84	0
Major Occupation	Agriculture%	51.08	74.79	71.81	49.88	20.46	55.48	62.06
	Service%	5.30	2.71	2.82	1.87	28.74	10.98	5.01
	Industry%	2.86	-	0.60	1.54	2.82	1.37	0.85
	Commerce%	13.18	12	11.95	19.05	2.55	13.01	10.96
Education	Literacy %	41.9	44.8	34.9	70.3	58.2	57.7	38.8
	Male%	40.8	45.7	35.9	70.8	64.1	60.5	41.3
	Female%	39	43.8	34	69.8	51.1	54.7	36.2
Health	Government Health Complex	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Private Clinic	0	4	0	9	48	4	7
	Number of Physician	18	11	12	31	-	51	26
Transportation and Communication	Road(km)	652	263	415.91	240	1147	898	180
	Railway(km)	17	16	0	0	0	0	0
	Waterway(km)	7	45	70	42		0	45

## Appendix – 5: Average of Demographic Variables (Politicians)

Descriptive Statistics					
	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Age of the Respondents	70	33	79	49.79	9.653
Gender of the Respondents	70	1	2	1.10	.302
Education level of the Respondents	70	1	5	3.06	1.361
Occupation of the Respondents	70	1	6	3.44	1.490
Experience in Politics	70	1	6	3.81	1.526
Family Background of the Respondents	70	1	3	2.10	.422
Parents' Occupation of the Respondents	70	1	4	1.43	.753
Parents' Yearly Income	70	.00	5.00	2.9571	1.94441

## Average of Demographic Variables (Bureaucrats)

Descriptive Statistics					
	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Age of the Respondent	70	26	57	42.11	8.564
Education level of the Respondent	70	4	5	4.79	.413
Gender of the Respondent	70	1	2	1.20	.403
Occupation of the Respondents	70	1	1	1.00	.000
Length of Service	70	1	6	3.31	1.690
Family Background of the Respondents	70	1	3	1.97	.450
Parents Occupation of the Respondent	70	1	4	2.39	.982
Parents Yearly Income	70	.00	5.00	3.0286	1.80154

## Appendix – 6: Rural and Urban Upazila’s Demographic Characteristics (By Number)

	Rural Upazila								Urban Upazila					
	Kaunia		Shajahanpur		Maheshpur		Nasirnagar		Savar		Sunamgonj Sadar		Pirojpur Sadar	
	*P	*B	P	B	P	B	P	B	P	B	P	B	P	B
<b>Education</b>														
Bellow Secondary	2	0	4	0	3	0	0	0	1	0	4	0	0	0
Secondary Passed	2	0	1	0	4	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Higher Secondary Passed	3	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	1	0	4	0
Graduate	1	3	5	0	3	5	3	3	7	1	2	1	4	2
Post Graduate	2	7	0	10	0	5	2	7	2	9	2	9	1	8
<b>Occupation</b>														
Agriculture	4	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Service	0	10	0	10	0	10	0	10	0	1	5	10	0	10
Business	4	0	6	0	5	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	8	0
Business & Politics	0	0	3	0	1	0	5	0	6	0	0	0	0	0
Teaching	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0
Other	2	0	1	0	3	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
<b>Experience</b>														
0-5	0	1	2	1	0	1	2	1	0	1	2	2	0	0
6-10	0	3	2	4	1	4	0	2	1	3	2	4	1	4
11-15	1	1	4	5	3	0	1	1	2	2	2	1	2	1
16-20	5	3	0	0	5	4	1	0	4	2	1	0	2	1
21-25	0	0	2	0	1	0	1	3	2	0	2	0	2	1
25+	4	2	0	0	0	1	5	3	1	2	1	3	2	3
<b>Family Background</b>														
Lower Class	1	0	0	0	1	6	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0
Middle Class	8	9	4	8	9	4	8	10	9	8	9	9	10	8
Higher Class	1	1	6	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	1	0	2

\*P=Politicians, \*B=Bureaucrats

## Appendix – 7: Perceptual Survey Data of Respondents (N=280)

Politicians		Kaunia			Pirojpur			Sunamgonj			Nasirnagar			Moheshpur			Savar			Shajahanpur		
		A	PA	DA	A	PA	DA	A	PA	DA	A	PA	DA	A	PA	DA	A	PA	DA	A	PA	DA
V-1	Pl	5	2	3	5	2	3	7	0	3	5	3	2	4	2	4	6	2	2	6	1	3
	Br	6	2	2	7	3	0	5	4	1	7	2	1	6	3	1	6	1	3	5	3	2
	Gp	10	2	8	10	2	8	12	1	7	11	2	7	10	2	8	10	3	7	12	1	7
V-2	Pl	3	4	3	2	5	3	2	4	4	4	3	3	4	4	2	3	2	5	3	5	2
	Br	5	2	3	5	2	3	6	2	2	5	1	4	5	2	3	6	1	3	4	3	3
	Gp	9	7	4	8	8	4	10	10	0	11	7	2	11	7	2	10	8	2	10	8	2
V-3	Pl	6	1	3	5	1	4	8	1	1	7	1	2	5	1	4	6	2	2	5	2	3
	Br	6	2	2	5	4	1	4	3	3	5	2	3	3	4	3	3	3	4	4	3	3
	Gp	12	3	5	12	3	5	12	3	5	15	1	4	12	2	6	11	4	5	13	2	5
V-4	Pl	6	2	2	5	2	3	5	3	2	5	2	3	4	3	3	4	2	4	3	2	5
	Br	3	3	4	4	2	4	4	3	3	5	2	3	3	3	4	5	3	2	4	3	3
	Gp	4	8	8	4	8	8	4	9	7	3	7	10	5	7	8	2	10	8	3	9	8
V-5	Pl	6	2	2	4	2	4	4	1	5	4	2	4	5	2	3	5	1	4	6	1	3
	Br	2	3	5	3	2	5	2	5	3	3	4	3	1	4	5	2	3	5	2	4	4
	Gp	6	7	7	7	6	7	5	8	7	5	7	8	4	7	9	6	6	8	6	6	8
V-6	Pl	7	1	2	7	1	2	6	1	3	6	2	2	6	1	3	8	1	1	5	2	3
	Br	6	2	2	5	3	2	7	2	1	7	1	2	8	2	0	6	2	2	8	1	1
	Gp	5	12	3	6	11	3	6	11	3	6	12	2	7	9	4	8	10	2	7	10	3
V-7	Pl	2	3	5	2	3	5	1	3	6	2	3	5	1	3	6	3	1	6	2	3	5
	Br	3	3	4	4	4	2	2	4	4	2	4	4	3	2	5	2	4	4	2	3	5
	Gp	5	8	7	3	9	8	2	7	11	4	7	9	4	8	8	5	6	9	4	8	8
V-8	Pl	1	2	7	1	2	7	2	1	7	2	2	6	1	1	8	1	1	8	1	2	7
	Br	4	3	3	4	2	4	4	3	3	3	2	5	2	4	4	4	2	4	3	3	4
	Gp	4	6	10	5	2	13	4	6	10	3	6	11	5	4	11	2	8	10	3	7	10
V-9	Pl	2	2	6	1	3	6	1	5	4	1	4	5	1	4	5	2	4	4	2	3	5
	Br	2	3	5	2	4	4	3	5	2	3	3	4	2	4	4	3	4	3	2	4	4
	Gp	15	3	2	14	5	1	11	6	3	12	6	2	10	6	4	14	5	1	13	4	3
V-10	Pl	7	2	1	5	3	2	8	1	1	6	2	2	6	2	2	6	3	1	7	2	1
	Br	2	3	5	3	3	4	2	2	6	3	2	5	1	2	7	2	3	5	2	2	6
	Gp	5	12	3	7	9	4	4	13	3	6	11	3	3	10	7	4	12	4	6	10	4
V-11	Pl	1	3	6	1	2	7	1	2	7	2	2	6	1	2	7	1	1	8	1	1	8
	Br	3	2	5	3	2	5	3	2	5	2	2	6	3	1	6	3	1	6	2	2	6
	Gp	4	7	9	3	5	12	4	7	9	4	8	8	3	8	9	6	6	8	5	7	8
V-12	Pl	7	0	3	8	1	1	8	1	1	7	2	1	6	2	2	8	1	1	7	2	1
	Br	1	2	7	1	1	8	1	1	8	1	2	7	1	1	8	0	2	8	0	1	9
	Gp	6	9	5	6	5	9	6	8	6	7	11	2	5	10	5	5	10	5	6	10	4
V-13	Pl	9	1	0	7	1	2	8	1	1	9	0	1	7	1	2	8	1	1	10	0	0
	Br	2	3	5	3	4	3	3	4	3	2	3	5	2	2	2	1	3	6	2	4	4
	Gp	18	2	0	18	1	1	17	2	1	18	1	1	19	0	1	17	3	0	17	2	1
V-14	Pl	4	3	3	5	2	3	5	2	3	5	2	3	6	1	3	4	3	3	6	2	2
	Br	2	3	5	2	2	6	2	2	6	3	2	5	2	3	5	3	3	4	2	3	5
	Gp	12	3	5	13	3	4	12	4	4	10	2	8	11	3	6	14	2	4	13	4	3

Bureaucrats		Kaunia			Pirojpur			Sunamgonj			Nasirnagar			Moheshpur			Savar			Shajahanpur		
		A	PA	DA	A	PA	DA	A	PA	DA	A	PA	DA	A	PA	DA	A	PA	DA	A	PA	DA
V-1	Pl	3	5	2	4	4	2	5	2	3	6	2	2	5	2	3	7	2	1	6	2	2
	Br	8	2	0	9	1	0	8	2	0	7	2	1	9	1	0	8	2	0	7	1	2
	Gp	12	4	4	12	2	6	10	5	5	14	3	3	13	2	5	11	4	5	10	5	5
V-2	Pl	3	3	4	3	3	4	3	3	4	2	4	4	2	4	4	2	4	4	3	3	4
	Br	6	2	2	7	3	0	5	1	4	6	2	2	7	1	2	6	2	2	7	2	1
	Gp	7	8	5	4	7	9	7	8	5	7	7	6	8	7	5	8	7	5	6	8	6
V-3	Pl	6	3	1	6	1	3	6	2	2	7	2	1	5	2	3	4	3	3	5	2	3
	Br	1	2	7	1	1	8	1	2	7	1	4	5	2	2	6	1	2	7	2	3	5
	Gp	8	6	6	8	6	6	7	8	5	8	4	8	9	7	4	8	5	7	9	5	6
V-4	Pl	4	2	4	6	1	3	5	2	3	7	1	2	4	2	4	5	1	4	5	1	4
	Br	2	3	5	3	1	6	2	2	6	1	2	7	2	3	5	3	3	4	2	2	6
	Gp	6	10	4	6	10	4	4	9	7	6	12	2	6	11	3	4	10	6	5	9	6
V-5	Pl	6	1	3	7	0	3	7	0	3	8	1	1	5	1	4	6	1	3	7	1	2
	Br	1	3	6	2	2	6	2	3	5	2	2	6	2	2	6	2	2	6	1	3	6
	Gp	12	8	0	9	11	0	12	6	2	14	6	0	11	6	3	15	4	1	13	7	0
V-6	Pl	5	2	3	6	2	2	6	1	3	5	2	3	4	3	3	5	1	4	6	1	3
	Br	2	2	6	1	2	7	2	1	7	1	3	6	1	2	7	0	2	8	0	3	7
	Gp	10	8	2	10	6	4	10	6	4	8	10	2	9	8	3	9	7	4	9	7	4
V-7	Pl	5	1	4	4	2	4	5	2	3	4	3	3	3	3	4	6	2	2	4	2	4
	Br	1	3	6	2	2	6	3	3	4	1	2	7	1	2	7	3	2	5	1	4	5
	Gp	4	10	6	5	9	6	4	8	8	3	10	7	3	9	8	4	8	8	5	9	6
V-8	Pl	8	1	1	6	1	3	8	1	1	6	3	1	7	1	2	7	2	1	8	0	2
	Br	1	1	8	1	1	8	1	1	8	0	1	9	1	1	8	2	1	7	0	2	8
	Gp	14	5	1	15	5	0	14	3	3	12	4	4	15	2	3	13	3	4	12	3	5
V-9	Pl	2	3	5	4	1	5	4	2	4	5	1	4	3	4	3	3	2	5	4	3	3
	Br	2	1	7	2	2	6	2	1	7	1	1	8	2	2	6	1	2	7	2	2	6
	Gp	14	4	2	11	6	9	14	3	3	14	5	1	12	5	3	14	4	2	13	4	3
V-10	Pl	3	1	6	2	1	7	3	3	4	2	3	5	1	3	6	1	4	5	2	4	4
	Br	7	1	2	7	0	3	7	1	2	8	0	2	9	0	1	6	1	3	8	0	2
	Gp	4	5	11	3	7	10	5	6	9	3	5	12	5	5	10	4	4	12	3	6	11
V-11	Pl	3	2	5	3	2	5	5	1	4	3	1	6	4	1	5	3	2	5	4	1	5
	Br	1	3	6	1	1	8	1	3	6	1	2	7	1	2	7	1	2	7	0	3	7
	Gp	11	3	6	10	4	6	10	3	7	11	4	5	9	5	6	12	3	5	12	4	4
V-12	Pl	2	2	6	1	2	7	0	3	7	1	2	7	0	3	7	2	2	6	1	1	8
	Br	9	0	1	8	1	1	8	1	1	8	2	0	8	1	1	7	1	2	9	0	1
	Gp	7	10	3	8	11	1	6	9	5	7	9	4	7	9	4	5	12	3	6	11	3
V-13	Pl	2	1	7	3	1	6	3	2	5	4	1	5	2	2	6	2	2	6	2	3	5
	Br	8	1	1	6	2	2	4	3	3	8	0	2	8	0	2	8	0	2	7	1	2
	Gp	2	0	18	2	0	18	2	3	15	3	0	17	1	1	18	2	0	18	2	2	16
V-14	Pl	6	2	2	7	1	2	7	1	2	6	2	2	6	2	2	7	1	2	8	1	1
	Br	2	3	5	0	3	7	1	2	7	1	2	7	2	2	6	1	4	5	1	4	5
	Gp	12	3	5	11	4	5	12	3	5	10	3	7	10	3	7	11	5	4	11	4	5

## Appendix – 8: Survey Data on Self-image and Mutual Interaction

(N=280)

Variables	Sample	Responses			$(\bar{x})$	SD	P $\chi^2$
		A	PA	DA			
Politicians are not well acquainted with administrative procedures, rules, and regulations	Pl	38	12	20	2.257	.879	.01
	Br	42	18	10	2.457	.735	.01
	Gp	155	43	82	2.260	.883	.01
Politicians have tendency to disregard to conform the rules and regulation in governance	Pl	21	27	22	1.985	.789	Not Sig.
	Br	36	13	21	2.214	.882	.01
	Gp	126	94	59	2.310	1.414	.01
Politicians cannot act in a decisive manner because of various conflicting pressure on them	Pl	42	9	19	2.328	.880	.01
	Br	30	21	19	2.157	.827	Not Sig.
	Gp	159	48	73	2.307	.858	.01
Politicians do not trust Bureaucrats	Pl	32	16	22	2.142	.872	Not Sig.
	Br	28	19	23	2.071	.856	Not Sig.
	Gp	85	93	102	1.939	.816	Not Sig.
Politicians are generally cooperative with Bureaucrats	Pl	34	11	25	2.128	.915	.01
	Br	15	25	30	1.785	.778	Not Sig.
	Gp	88	83	109	1.925	.836	Not Sig.
Politicians do not appreciate the viewpoints and the difficulties of Bureaucrats	Pl	45	9	16	2.414	.842	.01
	Br	47	13	10	2.528	.736	.01
	Gp	137	97	46	2.325	.741	.01
Politicians are hostile to Bureaucrats	Pl	13	19	38	1.642	.780	.01
	Br	18	14	28	1.857	.803	Not Sig.
	Gp	58	96	126	1.757	.774	.01
Politicians do nothing but problems to Bureaucrats	Pl	9	11	50	1.414	.712	.01
	Br	24	19	27	1.957	.858	Not Sig.
	Gp	59	69	152	1.667	.803	.01
Politicians are corrupt	Pl	10	25	35	1.642	.723	.01
	Br	17	27	26	1.871	.778	Not Sig.
	Gp	116	87	77	2.139	.819	.01
Politicians care for people's welfare	Pl	45	15	10	2.500	.737	.01
	Br	15	17	38	1.671	.811	.01
	Gp	95	109	76	2.067	.779	Not Sig.
Politicians work only in their self interest	Pl	8	13	49	1.414	.691	.01
	Br	19	12	39	1.714	.870	.01
	Gp	56	73	151	1.660	.791	.01
Politicians are more transparent than Bureaucrats	Pl	51	9	10	2.585	.732	.01
	Br	5	10	55	1.285	.593	.01
	Gp	97	82	101	1.985	.842	Not Sig.
Politicians entertain the people's complain most	Pl	58	5	7	2.728	.635	.01
	Br	15	25	30	1.785	.778	Not Sig.

	Gp	197	41	42	2.553	.741	.01
Politicians help in making government policies realistic	Pl	35	15	20	2.214	.866	.01
	Br	16	18	36	1.714	.819	.01
	Gp	136	54	90	2.164	.884	.01

Variables	Sample	Responses			$(\bar{x})$	SD	P $\chi^2$
		A	PA	DA			
Bureaucrats are well acquainted with administrative procedures, rules, and regulations	Pl	36	19	15	2.300	.804	.01
	Br	56	11	3	2.757	.522	.01
	Gp	174	55	51	2.439	.782	.01
Bureaucrats have tendency to conform the rules and regulation in governance	Pl	18	24	28	1.857	.803	Not Sig.
	Br	44	13	13	2.442	.791	.01
	Gp	109	89	82	2.096	.821	Not Sig.
Bureaucrats are very rigid in their attitude and they do not listen to the advice of others	Pl	39	15	16	2.328	.829	.01
	Br	9	16	45	1.485	.717	.01
	Gp	105	72	103	2.007	.863	.01
Bureaucrats distrust politicians	Pl	36	10	24	2.171	.916	.01
	Br	15	16	39	1.657	.8144	.01
	Gp	88	97	95	1.975	.809	Not Sig.
Bureaucrats take part in local politics	Pl	46	5	19	2.385	.889	.01
	Br	12	17	41	1.585	.7707	.01
	Gp	144	70	66	2.278	.821	.01
Bureaucrats do not appreciate the viewpoints and the difficulties of local politicians	Pl	37	12	21	2.228	.887	.01
	Br	7	15	48	1.414	.670	.01
	Gp	109	79	92	2.060	.846	Not Sig.
Bureaucrats are inefficient	Pl	31	15	24	2.100	.887	Not Sig.
	Br	12	18	40	1.600	.768	.01
	Gp	71	96	113	1.850	.798	.01
Bureaucrats works in the interest of ruling class	Pl	50	9	11	2.557	.754	.01
	Br	6	8	56	1.285	.617	.01
	Gp	151	42	87	2.228	.894	.01
Bureaucrats are corrupt	Pl	25	16	29	1.942	.882	.01
	Br	12	11	47	1.500	.775	.01
	Gp	129	58	93	2.128	.882	.01
Bureaucrats care for people's welfare	Pl	14	19	37	1.671	.793	.01
	Br	52	3	15	2.528	.829	.01
	Gp	93	60	127	1.878	.879	.01
Bureaucrats work only in their self interest	Pl	25	10	35	1.857	.9213	.01
	Br	6	16	48	1.400	.646	.01
	Gp	106	52	122	1.942	.902	.01
Bureaucrats are more transparent than politicians	Pl	7	15	48	1.414	.670	.01
	Br	57	6	7	2.714	.640	.01
	Gp	110	92	78	2.114	.812	Not Sig.
Bureaucrats entertain people's complain most	Pl	18	12	40	1.685	.860	.01
	Br	49	7	14	2.500	.812	.01
	Gp	81	25	174	1.667	.896	.01
Bureaucrats have tendency to expand the departments and increase procedures instead solving concrete problems	Pl	47	10	13	2.485	.793	.01
	Br	8	20	42	1.514	.696	.01
	Gp	132	55	93	2.139	.887	.01

## Appendix- 9: General People’s Perception on Politicians and Bureaucrats (Average)

N=140	Mean	Std. Deviation
Politicians are not well acquainted with administrative procedures, rules, and regulations	2.16	.94
Politicians have tendency to disregard to conform the rules and regulation in governance	2.52	1.79
Politicians cannot act in a decisive manner because of various conflicting pressure on them	2.37	.86
Politicians do not trust Bureaucrats	1.77	.73
Politicians are generally cooperative with Bureaucrats	1.89	.81
Politicians do not appreciate the viewpoints and the difficulties of Bureaucrats	2.18	.66
Politicians are hostile to Bureaucrats	1.76	.75
Politicians do nothing but problems to Bureaucrats	1.65	.78
Politicians are corrupt	2.52	.69
Politicians care for people's welfare	2.05	.67
Politicians work only in their self interest	1.75	.78
Politicians are more transparent than Bureaucrats	2.04	.74
Politicians entertain the people's complain most	2.85	.45
Politicians help in making government policies realistic	2.36	.85

### General People’s Perception on Bureaucrats (Average)

N=140	Mean	Std. Deviation
Bureaucrats are well acquainted with administrative procedures, rules, and regulations	2.35	.84
Bureaucrats have tendency to conform the rules and regulation in governance	2.04	.79
Bureaucrats are very rigid in their attitude and they do not listen to the advice of	2.10	.84

others		
Bureaucrats distrust politicians	2.03	.70
Bureaucrats take part in local politics	2.57	.58
Bureaucrats do not appreciate the viewpoints and the difficulties of local politicians	2.30	.74
Bureaucrats are inefficient	1.85	.73
Bureaucrats works in the interest of ruling class	2.54	.73
Bureaucrats are corrupt	2.54	.70
Bureaucrats care for people's welfare	1.66	.78
Bureaucrats work only in their self interest	2.26	.87
Bureaucrats are more transparent than politicians	2.16	.69
Bureaucrats entertain people's complain most	1.24	.62
Bureaucrats have tendency to expand the departments and increase procedures instead solving concrete problems	2.28	.87

**Appendix- 10: Politicians and Bureaucrats Perceptions to each other  
(result counted N= 140)**

<b>Perceptions (N=140)</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Deviation</b>
Politicians are not well acquainted with administrative procedures, rules, and regulations	2.36	.81
Politicians have tendency to disregard to conform the rules and regulation in governance	2.10	.84
Politicians cannot act in a decisive manner because of various conflicting pressure on them	2.24	.86
Politicians do not trust Bureaucrats	2.10	.86
Politicians are generally cooperative with Bureaucrats	1.95	.86
Politicians do not appreciate the viewpoints and the difficulties of Bureaucrats	2.47	.79
Politicians are hostile to Bureaucrats	1.75	.80
Politicians do nothing but problems to Bureaucrats	1.69	.83
Politicians are corrupt	1.76	.76
Politicians care for people's welfare	2.09	.88
Politicians work only in their self interest	1.56	.80
Politicians are more transparent than Bureaucrats	1.94	.93
Politicians entertain the people's complain most	2.26	.85
Politicians help in making government policies realistic	1.96	.87
Bureaucrats are well acquainted with administrative procedures, rules, and regulations	2.53	.71
Bureaucrats have tendency to conform the rules and regulation in governance	2.15	.85
Bureaucrats are very rigid in their attitude and they do not listen to the advice of others	1.91	.88
Bureaucrats distrust politicians	1.91	.90
Bureaucrats take part in local politics	1.99	.92
Bureaucrats do not appreciate the viewpoints and the difficulties of local politicians	1.82	.88
Bureaucrats are inefficient	1.85	.86
Bureaucrats works in the interest of ruling class	1.92	.94
Bureaucrats are corrupt	1.72	.86
Bureaucrats care for people's welfare	2.10	.92
Bureaucrats work only in their self interest	1.63	.83
Bureaucrats are more transparent than politicians	2.06	.92
Bureaucrats entertain people's complain most	2.09	.93
Bureaucrats have tendency to expand the departments and increase procedures instead solving concrete problems	2.00	.89

## Appendix – 11: Total Respondents Perception on Politicians (result counted N=280)

N=280	Mean	Std. Deviation
Politicians are not well acquainted with administrative procedures, rules, and regulations	2.26	.88
Politicians have tendency to disregard to conform the rules and regulation in governance	2.31	1.41
Politicians cannot act in a decisive manner because of various conflicting pressure on them	2.31	.86
Politicians do not trust Bureaucrats	1.94	.82
Politicians are generally cooperative with Bureaucrats	1.93	.84
Politicians do not appreciate the viewpoints and the difficulties of Bureaucrats	2.33	.74
Politicians are hostile to Bureaucrats	1.76	.77
Politicians do nothing but problems to Bureaucrats	1.67	.80
Politicians are corrupt	2.14	.83
Politicians care for people's welfare	2.07	.78
Politicians work only in their self interest	1.66	.79
Politicians are more transparent than Bureaucrats	1.99	.84
Politicians entertain the people's complain most	2.55	.74
Politicians help in making government policies realistic	2.16	.88

### Total Respondents Perception on Bureaucrats

N=280	Mean	Std. Deviation
Bureaucrats are well acquainted with administrative procedures, rules, and regulations	2.44	.78
Bureaucrats have tendency to conform the rules and regulation in governance	2.10	.82
Bureaucrats are very rigid in their attitude and they do not listen to the advice of others	2.01	.86
Bureaucrats distrust politicians	1.96	.80
Bureaucrats take part in local politics	2.28	.82
Bureaucrats do not appreciate the viewpoints and the difficulties of local politicians	2.06	.84
Bureaucrats are inefficient	1.85	.80
Bureaucrats works in the interest of ruling class	2.23	.89
Bureaucrats are corrupt	2.13	.88
Bureaucrats care for people's welfare	1.88	.88
Bureaucrats work only in their self interest	1.94	.90
Bureaucrats are more transparent than politicians	2.11	.81
Bureaucrats entertain people's complain most	1.67	.90
Bureaucrats have tendency to expand the departments and increase procedures instead solving concrete problems	2.14	.88

## **Appendix – 12: List of functions of Upazila Parishad (UZP)**


1. Preparation of five- year and different time-specific development plans
2. Implementation, supervision and coordination of programmes and activities of various government departments transferred to the parishad
3. Construction, repair and maintenance of inter-union roads
4. Initiation and implementation of Upazila Parishad small irrigation projects to ensure optimal use of surface water in accordance with the government guidelines
5. Ensuring public health, nutrition and family planning services
6. Improvement of sanitation and drainage system and taking measures for supplying safe drinking water
  - a. Motivation and assistance for expansion of education at the Upazila level
  - b. Monitoring of activities of and giving assistance to the concerned institutions for improvement of quality of Secondary and Madrasha education
7. Taking measures for establishment and expansion of cottage and small industries
8. Giving assistance to and coordination of activities of cooperatives and non-government voluntary organizations
9. Implementation of and providing assistance to women, children, social welfare, youth, sports and cultural activities
10. Initiation and implementation of activities for improving agricultural, livestock, fisheries and forest resources
11. Review of activities of the police department along with improvement of law and order situation in the Upazila and sending reports to the higher authorities regularly
12. Initiation and implementation of self-motivated measures for creating self-employment and poverty reduction, and providing necessary assistance to the government in implementing related governmental programmes
13. Coordination and examination of and giving assistance to development programmes of Union Parishads
14. Taking various preventive measures including creating public awareness against committing crimes like oppression of women and children, etc.
15. Taking various preventive measures including creating public awareness against committing crimes such as violence, theft, robbery, smuggling, use of narcotics, etc.
16. Taking various measures including social forestation for preservation and development of environment
17. Other functions as assigned by the government from time to time

## **Appendix – 13: Charter of Duties of UNO**

1. Upazila Nirbahi Officer will help and advise the Upazila Parishad Chairman in the exercise of his executive power. He will present all proposals for expenditure and administrative decisions to the chairman for approval. He will exercise executive power of the Parishad if authorised by it.
2. He will provide secretarial support to the Upazila Parishad. As part of his official duty he will attend meetings of the Parishad and, if necessary, meetings of standing committees and participate in the discussion, but will not be able to vote.
3. He will convene the first meeting of the Upazila Parishad in accordance with the Rules. He can convene monthly meetings of the Parishad at the advice of the Chairman, and in case of emergency, call a special meeting of the Upazila Parishad of one-third of members of the Parishad give a requisition notice.
4. He will express his opinion on any issue included in the agenda and move each agenda in the Parishad meetings with his specific opinion.
5. He will communicate the decisions of the Parishad to the Local Government Division if he considers it necessary to inform the government.
6. He will inform the Local Government Division if any abnormal situation/issue arises in the Parishad.
7. He will assist the Parishad in the execution of its activities and the implementation of policies. He will take steps to execute the decisions of the Parishad. He will request the Parishad in writing to reconsider any of its decisions that he thinks has not been taken lawfully, and may affect peoples' life, health, and public security, if implemented. If the Parishad sticks to its decision that has already been taken, he will inform the government or prescribed authority about it with the knowledge of the Parishad Chairman. He will take necessary steps to implement the decision (s) if he does not receive any instruction from the government or the prescribed authority within 15 days.
8. He will perform the role of a coordinator in the discharge of function by officials transferred to the Upazila Parishad.
9. He will assist the Chairman in supervising all developmental and administrative activities at the Upazila level. He himself will be able to supervise developmental and administrative activities.
10. He will assist the Parishad in the formulation and implementation of an integrated development plan for the Upazila.
11. He will assess the justification of any expenditure in the light of the financial rules made for regulation of fund of the Parishad. He will maintain the records of the income and expenditure of the Parishad.

12. He will assist the Parishad in the preparation and approval of the annual budget of the Parishad. He will take measures to release funds for financing developmental and project expenditure after the approval of the budget.
13. He will maintain records of the progress of development projects and expenditure within the Upazila.
14. He will control the Parishad's own officers/employees under the guidance and control of the Chairman and take disciplinary actions against them. He along with the Chairman shall collectively discharge the responsibilities of the drawing and disbursement officer for the Parishad's own officers/employees.
15. He will accept and distribute relief during natural disasters under the guidance of the Parishad.
16. He will discharge responsibilities under laws framed by the Parishad.
17. As directed by the government he will send different reports to the government or other authorities.
18. He will ensure the application of government directives and bring it to the notice of the government if there is any lapse.

## Appendix- 14: Organizational Hierarchies and Functional Relationships in Bangladesh: From National Level to Local Level (Executive)



## Appendix – 15: Various Acts and Ordinances of UZP of Bangladesh

গণপ্রজাতন্ত্রী বাংলাদেশ সরকার  
আইন, বিচার ও সংসদ বিষয়ক মন্ত্রণালয়



উপজেলা পরিষদ আইন, ১৯৯৮  
(১৯৯৮ সনের ২৪ নং আইন)

[২০০৯ সনের ৩০ জুন পর্যন্ত সংশোধিত]

১৯৯৮ সনের ২৪ নং আইন  
উপজেলা পরিষদ আইন, ১৯৯৮

[৩রা ডিসেম্বর, ১৯৯৮]

## উপজেলা পরিষদ নামক স্থানীয় শাসন সংক্রান্ত প্রতিষ্ঠান স্থাপনকল্পে প্রণীত আইন

যেহেতু সংবিধানের ৫৯ অনুচ্ছেদ অনুসারে নির্বাচিত প্রতিনিধিগণের সমন্বয়ে উপজেলা পরিষদ নামক স্থানীয় শাসন সংক্রান্ত প্রতিষ্ঠান স্থাপন এবং আনুষঙ্গিক বিষয়াদি সম্পর্কে বিধান করা সমীচীন ও প্রয়োজনীয়;

সেহেতু এতদ্বারা নিম্নরূপ আইন করা হইল :-

১। সংক্ষিপ্ত শিরোনাম ও প্রবর্তন।- (১) এই আইন উপজেলা পরিষদ আইন, ১৯৯৮ নামে অভিহিত হইবে।

\*

(২) সরকার, সরকারী গেজেটে প্রজ্ঞাপন দ্বারা, যে তারিখ নির্ধারণ করিবে সেই তারিখে ইহা বলবৎ হইবে।

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২। সংজ্ঞা।- বিষয় বা প্রসংগের পরিপন্থী কোন কিছু না থাকিলে, এই আইনে-

১[(ক) “অস্থায়ী চেয়ারম্যান” অর্থ চেয়ারম্যানের অনুপস্থিতিতে দায়িত্ব পালনকারী ব্যক্তি;]

(খ) “ইউনিয়ন” এবং “ইউনিয়ন পরিষদ” অর্থ The Local Government (Union Parishad) Ordinance, 1983 (LI of 1983)-এর section 2-এর যথাক্রমে clauses (26) এবং (27) এ সংজ্ঞায়িত “Union” এবং “union Parishad”;

(গ) “ইউনিয়ন প্রতিনিধি” অর্থ ধারা ৬-(গ) তে উল্লিখিত ইউনিয়ন পরিষদ চেয়ারম্যান বা তাহার দায়িত্ব পালনকারী ব্যক্তি;

(ঘ) “উপজেলা” অর্থ ধারা ৩ -এর অধিনে ঘোষিত কোন উপজেলা;

(ঙ) “কর” বলিতে এই আইনের অধিনে আরোপণীয় বা আদায়যোগ্য কোন রেইট, টোল, ফিস, বা অনুরূপ অন্য কোন অর্থও ইহার অন্তর্ভুক্ত হইবে;

(চ) “চেয়ারম্যান” অর্থ পরিষদের চেয়ারম্যান;

(ছ) “তফসিল” অর্থ এই আইনের কোন তফসিল;

(জ) “পরিষদ” অর্থ এই আইনের বিধান অনুযায়ী গঠিত উপজেলা পরিষদ;

(ঝ) “প্রবিধান” অর্থ এই আইনের অধীন প্রণীত বিধান;

১[(ঞ) “পৌর প্রতিনিধি” অর্থ ধারা ৬ এর উপ-ধারা (১) এর দফা (ঘ) তে উল্লিখিত পৌরসভার মেয়র বা সাময়িকভাবে তাহার দায়িত্ব পালনকারী ব্যক্তি;]

(ট) “বিধি” অর্থ এই আইনের অধীন প্রণীত বিধি;

১[(ঠ) “ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান” অর্থ পরিষদের ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান;

(ড) “মহিলা সদস্য” অর্থ ধারা ৬ এর উপ-ধারা (১) এর দফা (ঙ) তে উল্লিখিত পরিষদের সংরক্ষিত আসনে নির্বাচিত মহিলা সদস্য;

(ঢ) “সদস্য” অর্থ পরিষদের চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যানসহ অন্য যে কোন সদস্য;

৩। উপজেলা ঘোষণা।- (১) এতদ্বারা প্রথমে তফসিলের তৃতীয় কলামে উল্লিখিত প্রত্যেক থানার এলাকাকে উক্ত কলামে উল্লিখিত নামের উপজেলা ঘোষণা করা হইল।

(২) এই আইন বলবৎ হইবার পর সরকার, সরকারী গেজেটে প্রজ্ঞাপনের মাধ্যমে কোন নির্দিষ্ট এলাকা সমন্বয়ে নূতন উপজেলা ঘোষণা করিতে পারিবে।

৪। উপজেলা প্রশাসনিক একাংশ ঘোষণা।- ধারা ৩ এর অধিনে ঘোষিত প্রত্যেকটি উপজেলাকে, সংবিধানের ১৫২(১) অনুচ্ছেদের সহিত পঠিতব্য ৫৯ অনুচ্ছেদের উদ্দেশ্য পূরণকল্পে, এতদ্বারা প্রজাতন্ত্রের প্রশাসনিক একাংশ বলিয়া ঘোষণা করা হইল।

৫। উপজেলা পরিষদ স্থাপন।- (১) এই আইন বলবৎ হইবার পর, যতশীঘ্র সম্ভব, প্রত্যেক উপজেলায় এই আইনের বিধান অনুযায়ী একটি উপজেলা স্থাপিত হইবে।

\* উপজেলা পরিষদ, (রহিত পুনঃপ্রচলন ও সংশোধন) আইন, ২০০৯ (২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন)-এর ধারা ২ উপজেলা পরিষদ আইন, ১৯৯৮ (১৯৯৮ সনের ২৪ নং আইন) পুনঃপ্রবর্তিত হিহা ৩০ জুন, ২০০৮ তারিখে কার্যকর হইয়াছে বলিয়া গণ্য হইবে।]

\*\*এস,আর,ও নং ১৫-আইন/৯৯, তারিখ, ২৭ জানুয়ারি, ১৯৯৯ইং দ্বারা ১লা ফেব্রুয়ারী, ১৯৯৯ ইং তারিখকে আইন বলবৎ করার তারিখ হিসাবে নির্ধারণ করিল।

১২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন এর ৩(ক) ধারা বলে দফা (ক) এর পরিবর্তে প্রতিস্থাপিত।

১২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন এর ৩(খ) ধারা বলে দফা (ঞ) এর পরিবর্তে প্রতিস্থাপিত।

১২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন এর ৩(গ) ধারা বলে দফা (ঠ) ও (ড) এর পরিবর্তে দফা (ঠ), (ড) ও (ঢ) প্রতিস্থাপিত।

(২) পরিষদ একটি সংবিধিবদ্ধ সংস্থা হইবে এবং ইহার স্থায়ী ধারাবাহিকতা ও একটি সাধারণ সীলমোহর থাকিবে এবং এই আইন ও বিধি সাপেক্ষে, ইহার স্থাবর অস্থাবর উভয় প্রকার সম্পত্তি অর্জন করার, অধিকার রাখার ও হস্তান্তর করার ক্ষমতা থাকিবে এবং ইহার নামে মামলা দায়ের করিতে পারিবে বা ইহার বিরুদ্ধে মামলা দায়ের করা যাইবে।

১৬। পরিষদের গঠন।- (১) এ আইনের বিধান অনুযায়ী নিম্নবর্ণিত ব্যক্তিগণ সমন্বয়ে উপজেলা গঠিত হইবে, যথাঃ-

(ক) চেয়ারম্যান;

(খ) দুইজন ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান, যাহার মধ্যে একজন মহিলা হইবেন;

(গ) উপজেলার এলাকাভুক্ত প্রত্যেক ইউনিয়ন পরিষদের চেয়ারম্যান বা সাময়িকভাবে চেয়ারম্যান হিসাবে দায়িত্ব পালনকারী ব্যক্তি;

(ঘ) উপজেলার এলাকাভুক্ত প্রত্যেক পৌরসভা, যদি থাকে, এর মেয়র বা সাময়িকভাবে মেয়রের দায়িত্ব পালনকারী ব্যক্তি; এবং

(ঙ) উপ-ধারা (৪) অনুযায়ী সংরক্ষিত আসনের মহিলা সদস্যগণ।

(২) উপ-ধারা (১) এ উল্লিখিত চেয়ারম্যান ও ভাইস চেয়ারম্যানগণ নির্বাচন কমিশন কর্তৃক প্রণীত ভোটার তালিকায় অন্তর্ভুক্ত ভোটারদের দ্বারা নির্বাচন কমিশন কর্তৃক নির্ধারিত সময়, স্থান ও পদ্ধতিতে গোপন ব্যালটের মাধ্যমে সরাসরি নির্বাচিত হইবেন।

(৩) কোন উপজেলার এলাকাভুক্ত কোন ইউনিয়ন পরিষদ বা পৌরসভা বাতিল হইবার কারণে উপ-ধারা (১) এর দফা (গ) ও (ঘ) এর অধীন উপজেলা পরিষদের সদস্য থাকিবেন না এবং এইরূপ সদস্য না থাকিলে উক্ত উপজেলা পরিষদ গঠনের বৈধতা ক্ষুণ্ণ হইবে না।

(৪) প্রত্যেক উপজেলার এলাকাভুক্ত ইউনিয়ন পরিষদ এবং পৌরসভা, যদি থাকে, এর মোট সংখ্যার এক-তৃতীয়াংশের সমসংখ্যক আসন, অতঃপর সংরক্ষিত আসন বলিয়া উল্লিখিত, মহিলাদের জন্য সংরক্ষিত থাকিবে, যাহারা উক্ত উপজেলার এলাকাভুক্ত ইউনিয়ন পরিষদ ও পৌরসভা, যদি থাকে, এর সংরক্ষিত আসনের মহিলা সদস্য বা কাউন্সিলরগণ কর্তৃক তাহাদের মধ্য হইতে নির্বাচিত হইবেনঃ

তবে শর্ত থাকে যে, এই ধারায় কোন কিছুই কোন মহিলাকে সংরক্ষিত আসন বহির্ভূত আসনে সরাসরি নির্বাচন করিবার অধিকারকে বারিত করিবেন না।

ব্যাখ্যা: এই উপ-ধারার অধীন সংরক্ষিত আসনে সংখ্যা নির্ধারণের ক্ষেত্রে, যদি উক্ত সংখ্যার ভগ্নাংশ থাকে এবং উক্ত ভগ্নাংশ অর্ধেক বা তদুর্ধ্ব হয়; তবে উহাকে পূর্ণ সংখ্যা বলিয়া গণ্য করিতে হইবে এবং যদি উক্ত ভগ্নাংশ অর্ধেকের কম হয়, তবে উহাকে উপেক্ষা করিতে হইবে।

(৫) উপ-ধারা (১) এর অধীন উপজেলা পরিষদ গঠিত হইবার পর উহার অধিক্ষেত্রের মধ্যে নূতন পৌরসভা কিংবা ইউনিয়ন পরিষদ গঠিত হইবার কারণে উপজেলা পরিষদের পরবর্তী নির্বাচন অনুষ্ঠান না হওয়া পর্যন্ত উপ-ধারা (৪) এ উল্লিখিত আসন সংখ্যার কোন পরিবর্তন ঘটবে না এবং এই কারণে বিদ্যমান উপজেলা পরিষদ গঠনের বৈধতা ক্ষুণ্ণ হইবে না।

(৬) উপ-ধারা (১) এর দফা (গ) ও (ঘ) তে উল্লিখিত ব্যক্তি এই আইনের অধীন পরিষদের সদস্য হিসাবে নির্বাচিত হইয়াছেন বলিয়া গণ্য হইবেন।

(৭) কোন পরিষদের চেয়ারম্যান ও ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান এর পদসহ শতকরা ৭৫ ভাগ সদস্যের নির্বাচন অনুষ্ঠিত হইলে এবং নির্বাচিত সদস্যগণের নাম সরকারী গেজেটে প্রকাশিত হইলে, পরিষদ, এই আইনের অন্যান্য বিধান সাপেক্ষে, যথাযথভাবে গঠিত হইয়াছে বলিয়া বিবেচিত হইবে।

ব্যাখ্যাঃ গঠিত পরিষদের মোট সদস্যদের (শতকরা ৭৫) পাঁচাত্তর শতাংশ নির্ধারণের ক্ষেত্রে ভগ্নাংশের উদ্ভব হইলে এবং তাহা দশমিক পাঁচ শূণ্য শতাংশের কম হইলে অগ্রাহ্য করিতে হইবে এবং দশমিক পাঁচ শূণ্য শতাংশ বা তার বেশী হইলে তাহা এক গণ্য করিতে হইবে।

৭। পরিষদের মেয়াদ।- ধারা ৫৩ এর বিধান সাপেক্ষে, পরিষদের মেয়াদ হইবে উহার প্রথম সভার তারিখ হইতে পাঁচ বৎসরঃ তবে শর্ত থাকে যে, উক্ত মেয়াদ শেষ হওয়া সত্ত্বেও নির্বাচিত নূতন পরিষদ উহার প্রথম সভায় মিলিত না হওয়া পর্যন্ত পরিষদ কার্য চালাইয়া যাইবে।

৮। ১। [চেয়ারম্যান ও ভাইস চেয়ারম্যানের] যোগ্যতা ও অযোগ্যতা।- (১) কোন ব্যক্তি উপ-ধারা (২) এর বিধান সাপেক্ষে, ১। [চেয়ারম্যান ও ভাইস চেয়ারম্যানের]\*\*\* নির্বাচিত হইবার যোগ্য হইবেন, যদি-

(ক) তিনি বাংলাদেশের নাগরিক হন;

(খ) তাহার বয়স ২৫ বৎসর পূর্ণ হয়; এবং

(গ) তিনি ধারা ১৯ এ উল্লিখিত ভোটার তালিকাভুক্ত হন।

<sup>১</sup>২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন এর ৪ ধারা বলে ধারা ৬-এর পরিবর্তে প্রতিস্থাপিত।

<sup>২</sup>২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন এর ৫(খ) ধারা বলে চেয়ারম্যান শব্দের পরিবর্তে প্রতিস্থাপিত।

<sup>৩</sup>২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন এর ৫(খ) ধারা বলে “চেয়ারম্যান” শব্দের পরিবর্তে প্রতিস্থাপিত।

<sup>৪</sup>১৯৯৯ সনের ২২ নং আইন এর ৪(ঘ) ধারা বলে “বা মহিলা সদস্য” শব্দগুলি বিলুপ্ত।

(২) কোন ব্যক্তি [চেয়ারম্যান ও ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান] নির্বাচিত হইবার এবং থাকিবার যোগ্য হইবেন না, যদি-

(ক) তিনি বাংলাদেশের নাগরিকত্ব পরিত্যাগ করেন বা হারান;

(খ) তাহাকে কোন আদালত অপ্রকৃতিস্থ বলিয়া ঘোষণা করেন;

(গ) তিনি দেউলিয়া ঘোষিত হইবার পর দায় হইতে অব্যাহতি লাভ না করিয়া থাকেন;

(ঘ) তিনি নৈতিকস্বলনজনিত কোন ফৌজদারী অপরাধে দোষী সাব্যস্ত হইয়া অন্যান্য দুই বৎসরের কারাদণ্ডে দণ্ডিত হন এবং তাহার মুক্তি লাভের পর পাঁচ বৎসরকাল অতিবাহিত না হইয়া থাকে;

(ঙ) তিনি প্রজাতন্ত্রের বা পরিষদের বা অন্য কোন স্থানীয় কর্তৃপক্ষের কোন কর্মে লাভজনক সার্বক্ষণিক পদে অধিষ্ঠিত থাকেন;

(চ) তিনি জাতীয় সংসদের সদস্য বা অন্য কোন স্থানীয় কর্তৃপক্ষের চেয়ারম্যান বা সদস্য হন বা থাকেন;

(ছ) তিনি পরিষদের কোন কাজ সম্পাদনের বা মালামাল সরবরাহের জন্য ঠিকাদার হন বা ইহার জন্য নিযুক্ত ঠিকাদার প্রতিষ্ঠানের অংশীদার হন বা পরিষদের কোন বিষয়ে তাহার কোন প্রকার আর্থিক স্বার্থ থাকে বা তিনি সরকার কর্তৃক নিযুক্ত অত্যাবশ্যিক কোন দ্রব্যের দোকানদার হন; অথবা

(জ) তাহার নিকট কোন ব্যাংক বা আর্থিক প্রতিষ্ঠান হইতে গৃহীত কোন ঋণ মেয়াদোত্তীর্ণ অবস্থায় অনাদায়ী থাকে।

ব্যাখ্যা।- এই উপ-ধারা উদ্দেশ্য পূরণকল্পে-

(ক) “ব্যাংক” অর্থ ব্যাংক কোম্পানী আইন, ১৯৯৪ (১৯৯৪ সনের ১৮ নং আইন) এর ধারা ২ (ড) তে সংজ্ঞায়িত ব্যাংক কোম্পানী;

(খ) “আর্থিক প্রতিষ্ঠান” অর্থ আর্থিক প্রতিষ্ঠান আইন, ১৯৯৩ (১৯৯৩ সনের ২৭ নং আইন) এর ধারা ২(খ) তে সংজ্ঞায়িত আর্থিক প্রতিষ্ঠান।

৯। [চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান] ও সদস্যগণের শপথ।- (১) [চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান] ও প্রত্যেক সদস্য তাহার কার্যভার গ্রহণের পূর্বে নিম্নলিখিত ফরমে সরকার কর্তৃক নির্ধারিত কোন ব্যক্তির সম্মুখে শপথ গ্রহণ বা ঘোষণা করিবেন এবং শপথপত্র বা ঘোষণাপত্র স্বাক্ষর দান করিবেন, যথা:-

শপথপত্র বা ঘোষণাপত্র

আমি.....পিতা/স্বামী.....

জেলা.....

উপজেলার চেয়ারম্যান/ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান/সদস্য নির্বাচিত হইয়া সশ্রদ্ধচিত্তে শপথ (বা দৃঢ়ভাবে ঘোষণা) করিতেছি যে, আমি ভীতি বা অনুগ্রহ, অনুরাগ বা বিরাগের বশবর্তী না হইয়া সকলের প্রতি আইন অনুযায়ী এবং সততা, নিষ্ঠা ও বিশ্বস্ততার সহিত আমার পদের দায়িত্ব ও কর্তব্য পালন করিব। আমি বাংলাদেশের প্রতি অকৃত্রিম বিশ্বাস ও আনুগত্য পোষণ করিব।

স্বাক্ষর”]

(২) [চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান] বা মহিলা সদস্য হিসাবে নির্বাচিত ব্যক্তিগণের নাম সরকারী গেজেটে প্রকাশিত হওয়ার ৩০ দিনের মধ্যে চেয়ারম্যানসহ সকল সদস্যের শপথ গ্রহণ বা ঘোষণার জন্য সরকার বা তৎকর্তৃক নির্ধারিত কর্তৃপক্ষ প্রয়োজনীয় ব্যবস্থা গ্রহণ করিবেন।

১০। সম্পত্তি সম্পর্কিত ঘোষণা।- [চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান] তাহার কার্যভার গ্রহণের পূর্বে তাহার এবং তাহার পরিবারের কোন সদস্যের স্বত্ব, দখল বা স্বার্থ আছে এই প্রকার যাবতীয় স্থাবর ও অস্থাবর সম্পত্তির একটি লিখিত বিবরণ সরকার কর্তৃক নির্ধারিত পদ্ধতিতে ও নির্ধারিত ব্যক্তির নিকট দাখিল করিবেন।

ব্যাখ্যা।- “পরিবারের সদস্য” বলিতে [চেয়ারম্যান ও ভাইস চেয়ারম্যানের] স্বামী বা স্ত্রী এবং তাহার সঙ্গে বসবাসকারী এবং তাহার উপর সম্পূর্ণভাবে নির্ভরশীল তাহার ছেলে-মেয়ে, পিতা-মাতা ও ভাই-বোনকে বুঝাইবে।

১১। [চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান] ও সদস্যগণের সুযোগ-সুবিধা।- [চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান] ও সদস্যগণের ছুটি এবং অন্যান্য সুযোগ-সুবিধা বিধি দ্বারা নির্ধারিত হইবে।

১২। [চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান] ও মহিলা সদস্যগণের পদত্যাগ।- (১) সরকারের উদ্দেশ্যে স্বাক্ষরযুক্ত পত্রযোগে [চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান ও মহিলা সদস্যগণ] স্বীয় পদ ত্যাগ করিতে পারিবেন।

(২) পদত্যাগ গৃহীত হইবার তারিখ হইতে পদত্যাগ কার্যকর হইবে এবং পদত্যাগকারীর পদ শূন্য হইবে।

<sup>১</sup>২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন এর ৫ (গ) ধারা বলে “চেয়ারম্যান” শব্দের পরিবর্তে প্রতিস্থাপিত।

<sup>২</sup>২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন এর ৬ (ক) ধারা বলে “চেয়ারম্যান” শব্দের পরিবর্তে প্রতিস্থাপিত।

<sup>৩</sup>২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন এর ৬ (খ) ধারা বলে “চেয়ারম্যান” শব্দের পরিবর্তে প্রতিস্থাপিত।

<sup>৪</sup>২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন এর ৬ (খ) ধারা বলে “শপথপত্র বা ঘোষণাপত্র ফরমের” পরিবর্তে প্রতিস্থাপিত।

<sup>৫</sup>২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন এর ৬ (গ) ধারা বলে “চেয়ারম্যান” শব্দের পরিবর্তে প্রতিস্থাপিত।

<sup>৬</sup>২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন এর ৭ (ক) ও (খ) ধারা বলে “চেয়ারম্যান” শব্দের পরিবর্তে প্রতিস্থাপিত।

<sup>৭</sup>২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন এর ৮ (ক) ও (খ) ধারা বলে “চেয়ারম্যান” শব্দের পরিবর্তে প্রতিস্থাপিত।

<sup>৮</sup>২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন এর ৯ (ক) ও (খ) ধারা বলে “চেয়ারম্যান” শব্দের পরিবর্তে প্রতিস্থাপিত।

১৩। <sup>১</sup>চেয়ারম্যান ইত্যাদির অপসারণ।- (১) <sup>১</sup>চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান বা মহিলা সদস্যসহ যে কোন সদস্য তাহার স্বীয় পদ হইতে অপসারণযোগ্য হইবেন, যদি তিনি-

(ক) যুক্তিসংগত কারণ ব্যতিরেকে পরিষদের পর পর তিনটি সভায় অনুপস্থিত থাকেন;

(খ) পরিষদ বা রাষ্ট্রের হানিকর কোন কাজে জড়িত থাকেন, অথবা দুর্নীতি বা অসদাচরণ বা নৈতিক স্বলনজনিত কোন অপরাধে দোষী সাব্যস্ত হইয়া দণ্ডপ্রাপ্ত হইয়া থাকেন;

(গ) তাহার দায়িত্ব পালন করিতে অস্বীকার করেন অথবা শারীরিক বা মানসিক অসমর্থের কারণে তাহার দায়িত্ব পালনে অক্ষম হন; অথবা

(ঘ) অসদাচরণ বা ক্ষমতার অপব্যবহারের দোষে দোষী হন অথবা পরিষদের কোন অর্থ বা সম্পত্তির কোন ক্ষতি সাধন বা উহার আত্মসাতের জন্য দায়ী হন।

ব্যাখ্যা।- এই উপ-ধারায় “অসদাচরণ” বলিতে ক্ষমতার অপব্যবহার, দুর্নীতি, স্বজনপ্রীতি ও ইচ্ছাকৃত কুশাসনও বুঝাইবে।

(২) <sup>১</sup>চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান বা কোন সদস্যকে উপ-ধারা (১) এ বর্ণিত কোন কারণে তাহার পদ হইতে অপসারণ করা হইবে না, যদি না বিধি অনুযায়ী তদুদ্দেশে আহূত পরিষদের বিশেষ সভায় মোট সদস্য সংখ্যার অনূন চার-পঞ্চমাংশ ভোটে তাহার অপসারণের পক্ষে প্রস্তাব গৃহীত এবং প্রস্তাবটি সম্পর্কে প্রয়োজনীয় তদন্তের পর উহা সরকার কর্তৃক অনুমোদিত হয়ঃ

তবে শর্ত থাকে যে, উক্তরূপ সিদ্ধান্ত গ্রহণের পূর্বে <sup>১</sup>চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান বা উক্ত সদস্যকে প্রস্তাবিত সিদ্ধান্তের বিরুদ্ধে কারণ দর্শাইবার জন্য যুক্তি সংগত সুযোগদান করিতে হইবে।

(৩) উপ-ধারা (২) অনুযায়ী গৃহীত প্রস্তাব সরকার কর্তৃক অনুমোদিত হইলে অনুমোদনের তারিখে <sup>১</sup>চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান বা উক্ত সদস্য তাহার পদ হইতে অপসারিত হইয়াছেন বলিয়া গণ্য হইবেন।

(৪) ধারা ৬ এর উপ-ধারা (১) এর দফা <sup>১</sup> (গ) ও (ঘ)] এর কোন সদস্য অপসারিত হইলে সংশ্লিষ্ট পৌরসভার কিংবা ইউনিয়ন পরিষদের প্যানেল চেয়ারম্যানদের মধ্য হইতে ক্রমানুসারে পরিষদের শূন্য পদে স্থলাভিষিক্ত হইবেন এবং তিনি এই আইনের অধীন নির্ধারিত হইয়াছেন বলিয়া গণ্য হইবেন।

(৫) এই আইনের অন্যান্য বিধানে যাহা কিছুই থাকুক না কেন, এই ধারা অনুযায়ী অপসারিত কোন ব্যক্তি পরিষদের অবশিষ্ট মেয়াদের জন্য পরিষদের <sup>১</sup> চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান বা মহিলা সদস্য পদে নির্বাচিত হইবার যোগ্য হইবেন না।

১৪। <sup>১</sup>চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান ও মহিলা সদস্য পদ শূন্য হওয়া।- (১) <sup>১</sup>চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান বা কোন মহিলা সদস্যের পদ শূন্য হইবে যদি-

(ক) তাহার নাম সরকারী গেজেটে প্রকাশিত হইবার তারিখ হইতে ত্রিশ দিনের মধ্যে তিনি ধারা ৯ এ নির্ধারিত শপথ গ্রহণ বা ঘোষণা করিতে ব্যর্থ হনঃ

তবে শর্ত থাকে যে, অনুরূপ মেয়াদ অতিবাহিত হওয়ার পূর্বে সরকার বা তৎকর্তৃক নির্ধারিত কর্তৃপক্ষ যথার্থ কারণে ইহা বর্ধিত করিতে পারিবে;

(খ) তিনি ধারা ৮ এর অধীনে তাহার পদে থাকার অযোগ্য হইয়া যান;

(গ) তিনি ধারা ১২ এর অধীনে তাহার পদ ত্যাগ করেন;

(ঘ) তিনি ধারা ১৩ এর অধীনে তাহার পদ হইতে অপসারিত হন;

(ঙ) তিনি ইউনিয়ন বা পৌর প্রতিনিধি বা মহিলা সদস্য হন, এবং সংশ্লিষ্ট ইউনিয়ন পরিষদ বা পৌরসভার চেয়ারম্যান বা সদস্য কমিশনার না থাকেন;

(চ) তিনি মৃত্যুবরণ করেন।

(২) <sup>১</sup>চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান বা কোন মহিলা সদস্যের পদ শূন্য হইলে, সরকার বিষয়টি অবিলম্বে সরকারী গেজেটে প্রকাশ করিবে।

<sup>১</sup>১৫। **অস্থায়ী চেয়ারম্যান ও প্যানেল-** (১) পরিষদ গঠিত হইবার পর প্রথম অনুষ্ঠিত সভার এক মাসের মধ্যে ভাইস চেয়ারম্যানগণ তাহাদের নিজেদের মধ্য হইতে অগ্রাধিকারক্রমে দুই সদস্যবিশিষ্ট একটি চেয়ারম্যানের প্যানেল নির্বাচিত করিবেন।

<sup>১</sup>২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন এর ১০ (ক) ধারা বলে “চেয়ারম্যান” শব্দের পরিবর্তে প্রতিস্থাপিত।

<sup>২</sup>২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন এর ১০ (খ), (গ) ও (ঙ), ১১ (ক), (খ) ও (গ) ধারা বলে “চেয়ারম্যান” শব্দের পরিবর্তে প্রতিস্থাপিত।

<sup>৩</sup>২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন এর ১০ (ঘ) ধারা বলে “(খ) ও (গ)” বন্ধনীগুলি ও বর্ণগুলির পরিবর্তে “(গ) ও (ঘ)” বন্ধনীগুলি ও বর্ণগুলি প্রতিস্থাপিত।

<sup>৪</sup>২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন এর ১২ ধারা বলে প্রতিস্থাপিত।

- (২) অনুপস্থিতি, অসুস্থতাহেতু বা অন্য যে কোন কারণে চেয়ারম্যান দায়িত্ব পালনে অসমর্থ হইলে তিনি পুনরায় স্বীয় দায়িত্ব পালনে সমর্থ না হওয়া পর্যন্ত চেয়ারম্যানের প্যানেল হইতে অগ্রাধিকারক্রমে একজন ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান, চেয়ারম্যানের দায়িত্ব পালন করিবেন।
- (৩) পদত্যাগ, অপসারণ, মৃত্যুজনিত অথবা অন্য যে কোন কারণে চেয়ারম্যানের পদ শূন্য হইলে নতুন চেয়ারম্যানের কার্যভার গ্রহণ না করা পর্যন্ত চেয়ারম্যানের প্যানেল হইতে অগ্রাধিকারক্রমে একজন ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান চেয়ারম্যানের দায়িত্ব পালন করিবেন।
- (৪) এই আইনের বিধান অনুযায়ী চেয়ারম্যানের প্যানেলভুক্ত ভাইস চেয়ারম্যানগণ অযোগ্য হইলে অথবা ব্যক্তিগত কারণে দায়িত্ব পালনে অসম্মতি জ্ঞাপন করিলে পরিষদের সিদ্ধান্তক্রমে সদস্যগণের মধ্য হইতে নতুন চেয়ারম্যানের প্যানেল তৈরী করা যাইবে।
- (৫) উপ-ধারা (১) ও (৪) অনুযায়ী চেয়ারম্যানের প্যানেল নির্বাচিত না হইলে সরকার প্রয়োজন অনুসারে চেয়ারম্যান প্যানেল তৈরী করিতে পারিবে।

**১৬। অকস্মিক পদ শূন্যতা পূরণ।-** পরিষদের মেয়াদ শেষ হইবার তারিখের-

(ক) একশত আশি দিন বা তদপেক্ষ বেশী সময় পূর্বে <sup>১</sup>[চেয়ারম্যান ও ভাইস চেয়ারম্যানের] পদ শূন্য হইলে;

(খ) নব্বই দিন বা তদপেক্ষ বেশী সময় পূর্বে কোন মহিলা সদস্যের পদ শূন্য হইলে;

<sup>২</sup>[পদটি শূন্য হওয়ার ষাট দিনের মধ্যে] বিধি অনুযায়ী অনুষ্ঠিত নির্বাচনের মাধ্যমে উক্ত শূন্য পদ পূরণ করিতে হইবে এবং যিনি উক্ত পদে নির্বাচিত হইবেন তিনি পরিষদের অবশিষ্ট মেয়াদের জন্য উক্ত পদে বহাল থাকিবেন।

**১৭। নির্বাচন অনুষ্ঠানের সময়।-** নিম্নবর্ণিত সময়ে <sup>৩</sup>[চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান] ও মহিলা সদস্যগণের নির্বাচন অনুষ্ঠিত হইবে, যথা-

<sup>৪</sup>[(ক) প্রথম তফসিলভুক্ত উপজেলা সমূহের ক্ষেত্রে, এই আইন বলবৎ হওয়ার পর তিনশত ত্রিশ দিনের মধ্যে;

তবে শর্ত থাকে যে, কোন দৈবদূর্বিপাকজনিত বা অন্যবিধ অনিবার্য কারণে উক্ত সময়সীমার মধ্যে প্রথম তফসিলভুক্ত কোন বিশেষ বা সকল উপজেলার ক্ষেত্রে, নির্বাচন অনুষ্ঠান সম্ভব না হলে নির্বাচন কমিশন সরকারি গেজেটে প্রজ্ঞাপন দ্বারা, উক্ত সময় সিমার পরে নির্বাচন অনুষ্ঠানের উদ্দেশ্যে এক বা একাধিক তারিখ নির্ধারণ করিতে পারিবে;।

(খ) ধারা ৩(২) অধীনে ঘোষিত নতুন উপজেলার ক্ষেত্রে, উক্তরূপ ঘোষণার একশত আশি দিনের মধ্যে;

(গ) পরিষদের মেয়াদ শেষ হওয়ার ক্ষেত্রে, উক্ত মেয়াদ শেষ হইবার তারিখের পূর্ববর্তী <sup>৫</sup>[একশত আশি] দিনের মধ্যে; এবং

(ঘ) পরিষদ ধারা ৫৩ এর অধীনে বাতিল হওয়ার ক্ষেত্রে, বাতিলাদেশ জারির অনধিক একশত বিশ দিনের মধ্যে।

**১৮। পরিষদের প্রথম সভা আহ্বান।-** ধারা ৯ এর অধীনে শপথ অনুষ্ঠানের পরবর্তী ত্রিশ দিনের মধ্যে পরিষদের প্রথম সভা বিধি দ্বারা নির্ধারিত ব্যক্তি আহ্বান করিবেন।

**১৯। ভোটার তালিকা ও ভোটাধিকার।-** জাতীয় সংসদের নির্বাচনের জন্য প্রস্তুতকৃত আপাততঃ বলবৎ ভোটার তালিকার যে অংশ সংশ্লিষ্ট উপজেলাভুক্ত এলাকা সংক্রান্ত, ভোটার তালিকার সেই অংশ-

<sup>৬</sup>[(ক) চেয়ারম্যান ও ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান নির্বাচনের জন্য ভোটার তালিকা হইবে; এবং

(খ) কোন ব্যক্তির নাম যে উপজেলার ভোটার তালিকায় আপাততঃ লিপিবদ্ধ থাকিবে, তিনি সেই উপজেলা পরিষদের চেয়ারম্যান ও ভাইস চেয়ারম্যানের নির্বাচনে ভোট প্রদান করিতে পারিবেন এবং চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান পদপ্রার্থী হইতে পারিবেন।]

**২০। নির্বাচন পরিচালনা।-** (১) সংবিধান অনুযায়ী গঠিত নির্বাচন কমিশন, অতঃপর নির্বাচন কমিশন বলিয়া উল্লিখিত, এই আইন ও বিধি অনুযায়ী <sup>৭</sup>[চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান] ও মহিলা সদস্যদের নির্বাচন অণুষ্ঠানও পরিচালনা করিবে।

(২) সরকার, সরকারী গেজেটে প্রজ্ঞাপন দ্বারা <sup>৮</sup>[চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান] ও মহিলা সদস্যদের নির্বাচনের জন্য বিধি প্রণয়ন করিবে এবং অনুরূপ বিধিতে নিম্নবর্ণিত সকল অথবা যে কোন বিষয়ে বিধান করা যাইবে যথাঃ

<sup>১</sup>২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন এর ১৩ ও ১৪ ধারা বলে “চেয়ারম্যান” শব্দের পরিবর্তে প্রতিস্থাপিত।

<sup>২</sup>১৯৯৯ সনের ২২ নং আইন এর ৫ ধারা বলে সন্নিবেশিত।

<sup>৩</sup>উপরোক্ত আইন এর ৬(ক) ধারা বলে দফা (ক) এর পরিবর্তে প্রতিস্থাপিত।

<sup>৪</sup>১৯৯৯ সনের ২২ নং আইন এর ৬(খ) ধারা বলে “ষাট” শব্দটির পরিবর্তে প্রতিস্থাপিত।।

<sup>৫</sup>২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন এর ১৫ ধারা বলে (ক) ও (খ) দফার পরিবর্তে প্রতিস্থাপিত।

<sup>৬</sup>২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন এর ১৬ (ক) ও (খ) ধারা বলে শব্দগুলি ও কমা প্রতিস্থাপিত।

- (ক) নির্বাচন পরিচালনার উদ্দেশ্যে রিটার্নিং অফিসার, সহকারী অফিসার, প্রিজাইডিং অফিসার, সহকারী প্রিজাইডিং অফিসার এবং পোলিং অফিসার নিয়োগ এবং তাহাদের ক্ষমতা ও দায়িত্ব;
- (খ) মহিলা সদস্য নির্বাচনের জন্য এলাকা নির্ধারণ, ভোটের তালিকা প্রণয়ন এবং মহিলা সদস্য নির্বাচন পদ্ধতি;
- (গ) প্রার্থী মনোনয়ন, মনোনয়নের ক্ষেত্রে আপত্তি এবং মনোনয়ন বাছাই;
- (ঘ) প্রার্থীগণ কর্তৃক প্রদেয় জামানত এবং উক্ত জামানত ফেরত প্রদান বা বাজেয়াপ্তকরণ;
- (ঙ) প্রার্থী পদ প্রত্যাহার;
- (ছ) প্রার্থীগণের এজেন্ট নিয়োগ;
- (জ) প্রতিদ্বন্দ্বিতা এবং বিনা প্রতিদ্বন্দ্বিতার ক্ষেত্রে নির্বাচন পদ্ধতি;
- (ঝ) ভোট গ্রহণের তালিকা, সময় ও স্থান এবং নির্বাচন পরিচালনা সংক্রান্ত অন্যান্য বিষয়;
- (ঝ) ভোট দানের পদ্ধতি;
- (ঞ) ব্যালট পেপার এবং নির্বাচন সংক্রান্ত অন্যান্য কাগজপত্রের হেফাজত ও বিলিভন্টন;
- (ট) যে অবস্থায় ভোট গ্রহণ স্থগিত করা যায় এবং পুনরায় ভোট গ্রহণ করা যায়;
- (ঠ) নির্বাচন ব্যয়;
- (ড) নির্বাচনে দুর্নীতিমূলক বা অবৈধ কার্যকলাপ ও অন্যান্য নির্বাচন অপরাধ এবং উহার দণ্ড;
- (ঢ) নির্বাচন বিরোধ, নির্বাচন ট্রাইব্যুনাল ও [নির্বাচন আপিল ট্রাইব্যুনাল গঠন], নির্বাচনী দরখাস্ত দায়ের, নির্বাচন বিরোধ নিষ্পত্তির ব্যাপারে উক্ত ট্রাইব্যুনালের ক্ষমতা ও অনুসরণীয় পদ্ধতিসহ আনুসংগিক বিষয়াদি; এবং
- (ণ) নির্বাচন সম্পর্কিত আনুসংগিক অন্যান্য বিষয়।
- (ত) উপ-ধারা (২) (ড) এর অধীন প্রণীত বিধিতে কারাদণ্ড, অর্ধদণ্ড বা উভয় বিধ দণ্ডের বিধান করা যাইবেতবে কারাদণ্ডের মেয়াদ <sup>১</sup> সাত বৎসরের<sup>২</sup> অধিক হইবে না।

২১। <sup>৩</sup> [চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান] ও মহিলা সদস্যগণের নির্বাচনের ফলাফল প্রকাশ।-<sup>৪</sup> [চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান] ও মহিলা সদস্য হিসাবে নির্বাচিত সকল ব্যক্তির নাম নির্বাচনের পর যথাশীঘ্র সম্ভব, নির্বাচন কমিশন সরকারি গেজেটে প্রকাশ করিবে।

২২। <sup>৫</sup> [চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান] ও সদস্যগণ কর্তৃক কার্যভার গ্রহণ।-<sup>৬</sup> [চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান] ও অন্যান্য সদস্যগণ পরিষদের সভায় প্রথম যে তারিখে যোগদান করিবেন সেই তারিখে তাহার স্বীয় পদের কার্যভার গ্রহণ করিয়াছেন বলিয়া গণ্য হইবে।

<sup>৭</sup> [২২ক। নির্বাচন বিরোধ, নির্বাচন ট্রাইব্যুনাল ইত্যাদি।- (১) এই আইনের অধীন কোন নির্বাচন বা নির্বাচনী কার্যক্রম সম্পর্কে নির্বাচন ট্রাইব্যুনাল ব্যতীত কোন আদালত বা অন্য কোন কর্তৃপক্ষের নিকট প্রশ্ন উত্থাপন করা যাইবে না।

(২) এই আইনের অধীন নির্বাচন সম্পর্কিত বিরোধ নিষ্পত্তির উদ্দেশ্যে নির্বাচন কমিশন, সাব-জজ পদমর্যাদার বিচার বিভাগীয় একজন কর্মকর্তা সমন্বয়ে প্রয়োজনীয় সংখ্যক নির্বাচন ট্রাইব্যুনাল এবং একজন জেলা জজ পদমর্যাদার বিচার বিভাগীয় কর্মকর্তা সমন্বয়ে প্রয়োজনীয় সংখ্যক নির্বাচন আপীল ট্রাইব্যুনাল গঠন করিতে পারিবে।

(৩) কোন নির্বাচনের জন্য মনোনীত প্রার্থী সেই নির্বাচনের কোন বিষয়ে প্রশ্ন উত্থাপন ও প্রতিকার প্রার্থনা করিয়া নির্বাচন ট্রাইব্যুনালে দরখাস্ত করিতে পারিবেন; অন্য কোন ব্যক্তি এইরূপ দরখাস্ত করিতে পারিবে না।

২২খ। নির্বাচন দরখাস্ত বা আপীল বদলীকরণের ক্ষমতা।- নির্বাচন কমিশন নিজ উদ্যোগে অথবা পক্ষগণের কোন এক পক্ষ কর্তৃক এতদুশ্যে পেশকৃত আবেদনের প্রেক্ষিতে যে কোন পর্যায়ে একটি নির্বাচনী দরখাস্ত এক নির্বাচন ট্রাইব্যুনাল হইতে অন্য ট্রাইব্যুনালে অথবা একটি আপীল ট্রাইব্যুনাল হইতে অপর একটি আপীল ট্রাইব্যুনালে বদলী করিতে পারিবে। এবং যে ট্রাইব্যুনালে বা আপীল ট্রাইব্যুনালে তাহা বদলী করা হয় সেই ট্রাইব্যুনালে বা আপীল ট্রাইব্যুনালে উক্ত দরখাস্ত বা আপীল যে পর্যায়ে বদলী করা হইয়াছে সেই পর্যায়ে হইতে উহার বিচারকার্য চালাইয়া যাইবে। তবে শর্ত থাকে যে, নির্বাচনী দরখাস্ত যে ট্রাইব্যুনালে বদলী করা হইয়াছে সেই ট্রাইব্যুনাল উপযুক্ত মনে করিলে ইতিপূর্বে পরীক্ষিত কোন সাক্ষী পুনরায় তলব বা পুনরায় পরীক্ষা করিতে পারিবে এবং অনুরূপভাবে আপীল ট্রাইব্যুনালও এই ক্ষমতা প্রয়োগ করিতে পারিবে।

২২গ। বিধি অনুযায়ী নির্বাচনী দরখাস্ত, আপীল নিষ্পত্তি ইত্যাদি।- নির্বাচনী দরখাস্তের পক্ষে, নির্বাচনী দরখাস্ত ও নির্বাচন আপীল দায়েরের পদ্ধতি, নির্বাচন ট্রাইব্যুনাল ও নির্বাচন আপীল ট্রাইব্যুনাল কর্তৃক নির্বাচন বিরোধ নিষ্পত্তির ব্যাপারে অনুসরণীয় পদ্ধতি, উক্ত ট্রাইব্যুনালসমূহের এখতিয়ার ও ক্ষমতা সংশ্লিষ্ট পক্ষকে প্রদেয় প্রতিকার এবং আনুসংগিক সকল বিষয় বিধি দ্বারা নির্ধারিত হইবে।

২৩। পরিষদের কার্যাবলী।- (১) দ্বিতীয় তফসিলে উল্লিখিত কার্যাবলী পরিষদের কার্যাবলী হইবে এবং পরিষদ উহার তহবিলের সংগতি অনুযায়ী এই কার্যাবলী সম্পাদন করিবে।

(২) সরকার প্রয়োজনবোধে পরিষদ ও অন্যান্য স্থানীয় কর্তৃপক্ষের কার্যাবলীর বিবরণ সুনির্দিষ্টকরণের জন্য সরকারী প্রজ্ঞাপন জারী করিয়া প্রয়োজনীয় নির্দেশ দিতে পারিবে।

<sup>১</sup> ১৯৯৯ সনের ২২ নং আইন এর ৭ ধারা বলে “নির্বাচন আপীল নিয়োগ” শব্দগুলি পরিবর্তে প্রতিস্থাপিত।

<sup>২</sup> উপরোক্ত আইন এর ৭(খ) ধারা বলে “দুই বৎসরের অধিক এবং অর্ধদণ্ডের পরিমাণ দশ হাজার টাকার” শব্দগুলি পরিবর্তে প্রতিস্থাপিত।

<sup>৩</sup> ২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন এর ১৭ ও ১৮ ধারাবলে শব্দগুলি ও কমা প্রতিস্থাপিত।

<sup>৪</sup> ১৯৯৯ সনের ২২নং আইন এর ২২ ধারাবলে সন্নিবেশিত।

২৪। সরকার ও পরিষদের কার্যবলী হস্তান্তর ইত্যাদি।- (১) এই আইন অথবা আপাততঃ বলবৎ অন্য কোন আইনে যাহা কিছুই থাকুকনা কেন, সরকার পরিষদের সম্মতিক্রমে,-

(ক) পরিষদ কর্তৃক পরিচালিত কোন প্রতিষ্ঠান বা কর্ম সরকারের ব্যবস্থাপনায় ও নিয়ন্ত্রণে; এবং

(খ) তৃতীয় তফসিলে বর্ণিত এবং সরকার কর্তৃক উপজেলা বা থানা এলাকায় পরিচালিত কোন প্রতিষ্ঠান বা কর্ম, উক্ত প্রতিষ্ঠান বা কর্মের সহিত সংশ্লিষ্ট কর্মকর্তা ও কর্মচারীগণ এবং আনুসংগিক বিষয়াদি পরিষদের ব্যবস্থাপনায় ও নিয়ন্ত্রণে;

হস্তান্তর করার নির্দেশ দিতে পারিবে।

(২) হস্তান্তরিত বিষয়ে দায়িত্ব পালনরত কর্মকর্তাদের বার্ষিক কার্যক্রম প্রতিবেদন (Annual Performance Report) পরিষদ কর্তৃক এবং তাহার বার্ষিক গোপনীয় প্রতিবেদন দপ্তরের উর্ধ্বতন কর্মকর্তা কর্তৃক লেখা হইবে।

(৩) উপজেলা পরিষদের কাছে সরকারের যে সকল বিষয়, সংশ্লিষ্ট বিষয়, সংশ্লিষ্ট দপ্তর ও তাহাদের কর্মকর্তা/কর্মচারী হস্তান্তর করা হইবে, নতুন প্রেক্ষিতে তাহাদের কার্যক্রম পর্যালোচনা ও উপদেশ প্রদান ও নির্দেশিকা জারির জন্য জাতীয় পর্যায়ে একটি উচ্চ ক্ষমতাসম্পন্ন কমিটি গঠন করা হইবে এবং কমিটির সামগ্রিক দায়িত্ব মন্ত্রিপরিষদ বিভাগের উপর ন্যস্ত থাকিবে।

২৫। পরিষদের উপদেষ্টা।- (১) গণপ্রজাতন্ত্রী বাংলাদেশের সংবিধানের অনুচ্ছেদ ৬৫-এর অধীন একক আঞ্চলিক এলাকা হইতে নির্বাচিত সংশ্লিষ্ট সংসদ-সদস্য পরিষদের উপদেষ্টা হইবেন এবং পরিষদ উপদেষ্টার পরামর্শ গ্রহণ করিবে।

(২) সরকারের সহিত কোন বিষয়ে পরিষদের যোগাযোগের ক্ষেত্রে পরিষদকে উক্ত বিষয়টি সংশ্লিষ্ট এলাকার সংসদ-সদস্যকে অবহিত রাখিতে হইবে।

২৬। নির্বাহী ক্ষমতা।- (১) এই আইনের অধীন যাবতীয় কার্যাবলী যথাযথভাবে সম্পাদনের জন্য প্রয়োজনীয় সবকিছু করিবার ক্ষমতা পরিষদের থাকিবে।

(২) পরিষদের নির্বাহী ক্ষমতা পরিষদের নিকট হইতে ক্ষমতাপ্রাপ্ত চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান, সদস্য বা অন্য কোন কর্মকর্তার মাধ্যমে প্রযুক্ত হইবে।

(৩) পরিষদের নির্বাহী বা অন্য কোন কার্য পরিষদের নামে গৃহীত হইয়াছে বলিয়া প্রকাশ করা হইবে এবং উহা বিধি দ্বারা নির্ধারিত পদ্ধতিতে প্রমাণীকৃত হইতে হইবে।

(২৭) কার্যবলী নিষ্পন্ন।- পরিষদের কার্যাবলী বিধি দ্বারা নির্ধারিত সীমার মধ্যে ও পদ্ধতিতে উহার সভায় বা কমিটিসমূহের সভায় অথবা উহার [চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান] সদস্য, কর্মকর্তা বা কর্মচারী কর্তৃক নিষ্পন্ন করা হইবে।

(২) পরিষদের সকল সভায় চেয়ারম্যান এবং তাহার অনুপস্থিতিতে স্থায়ী চেয়ারম্যান সভাপতিত্ব করিবেন।

(৩) পরিষদের কোন সদস্য পদ শূন্য রহিয়াছে বা উহার গঠনে কোন ত্রুটি রহিয়াছে কেবল এই কারণে কিংবা পরিষদের বৈঠকে উপস্থিত হইবার বা ভোটদানের বা অন্য কোন উপায়ে উহার কার্যধারায় অংশগ্রহণের অধিকার না থাকা সত্ত্বেও কোন ব্যক্তি অনুরূপ কার্য করিয়াছেন, কেবল এই কারণে পরিষদের কোন কার্য বা কার্যধারা অবৈধ হইবে না।

(৪) পরিষদ প্রত্যেক সভার কার্যবিবরণীর একটি করিয়া অনুলিপি সভা অনুষ্ঠিত হইবার তারিখের (চৌদ্দ) দিনের মধ্যে সরকারের [ও সংশ্লিষ্ট এলাকার সংসদ-সদস্যের] নিকট প্রেরণ করিতে হইবে।

২৮। পরিষদের সভার কর্মকর্তা ইত্যাদির উপস্থিতি।- (১) পরিষদের সভায় আলোচ্য বা নিষ্পত্তিযোগ্য কোন বিষয় সম্পর্কে মতামত প্রদান বা পরিষদকে অন্যবিধভাবে সহায়তা করার জন্য উপজেলা বা থানা পর্যায়ের সংশ্লিষ্ট কর্মকর্তা উপস্থিত থাকিবেন এবং আলোচনায় অংশ গ্রহণ করিতে ও তাহার মতামত ব্যক্ত করিতে পারিবেন, তবে তাহার কোন ভোটাধিকার থাকিবে না।

(২) পরিষদ প্রয়োজনবোধে যে কোন বিষয়ে মতামত প্রদানের উদ্দেশ্যে উহার সভায় যে কোন ব্যক্তিকে আমন্ত্রণ জানাইতে উপস্থিত থাকিবার এবং মতামত ব্যক্ত করিবার সুযোগ দিতে পারিবে।

২৯। কমিটি।- (১) পরিষদ উহার কাজের সহায়তার জন্য যে কোন সদস্য বা অন্য ব্যক্তির সমন্বয়ে প্রয়োজনীয় সংখ্যক কমিটি নিয়োগ করিতে পারিবে এবং উক্তরূপ কমিটির সদস্য সংখ্যা ও ইহার দায়িত্ব এবং কার্যধারা নির্ধারণ করিতে পারিবে;

তবে শর্ত থাকে যে, চেয়ারম্যান কোন স্থায়ী কমিটির সভাপতি হইতে পারিবেন না।

(২) পরিষদ নিম্নবর্ণিত বিষয়ে ১(এক) টি করিয়া স্থায়ী কমিটি গঠন করিবে:

(ক) আইন শৃঙ্খলা;

(খ) যোগাযোগ ও ভৌত অবকাঠামো উন্নয়ন;

(গ) কৃষি ও সেচ;

<sup>১</sup>২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন এর ১৯ ধারা বলে ধারা ২৫ এর পরিবর্তে প্রতিস্থাপিত।

<sup>২</sup> ২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন এর ২০ ধারা বলে উপ-ধারা ২ এর পরিবর্তে প্রতিস্থাপিত।

<sup>৩</sup>২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন এর ২১ ধারা বলে প্রতিস্থাপিত।

<sup>৪</sup>২০০৯ সনের ২৭নং আইন এর ২১(খ) ধারা বলে ধারা সন্নিবেশিত।

<sup>৫</sup>২০০৯ সনের ২৭নং আইন এর ২২ ধারা বলে ধারা ২৯ প্রতিস্থাপিত।

- (ঘ) শিক্ষা;
- (ঙ) স্বাস্থ্য ও পরিবার পরিকল্পনা;
- (চ) যুব ও ক্রীড়া উন্নয়ন;
- (ছ) মহিলা ও শিশু উন্নয়ন;
- (জ) সমাজকল্যাণ;
- (ঝ) ভূমি;
- (ঞ) মৎস্য ও পশুসম্পদ;
- (ট) পল্লী উন্নয়ন ও সমবায়;
- (ঠ) তথ্য ও সংস্কৃতি;
- (ড) বন ও পরিবেশ;
- (ঢ) বাজার মূল্য পর্যবেক্ষণ, মনিটরিং ও নিয়ন্ত্রণ।
- (৩) সংশ্লিষ্ট উপজেলা কর্মকর্তা এই ধারার অধীন গঠিত তদসংশ্লিষ্ট স্থায়ী কমিটির সদস্য-সচিব হইবে।
- (৪) স্থায়ী কমিটি ইহার কাজের সুবিধার্থে সংশ্লিষ্ট বিষয়ে বিশেষজ্ঞ কোন একজন ব্যক্তিকে কমিটির সদস্য হিসাবে অন্তর্ভুক্ত (co-opt) করিতে পারিবে।
- (৫) স্থায়ী কমিটির বৈঠকে সিদ্ধান্ত গ্রহণের ক্ষেত্রে কমিটিতে অন্তর্ভুক্ত (co-opt member) এবং সদস্য-সচিবের কোন ভোটাধিকার থাকিবে না।]

**৩০। চুক্তি।-** (১) পরিষদ কর্তৃক বা উহার পক্ষে সম্পাদিত সকল চুক্তি-

- (ক) লিখিত হইতে হইবে এবং পরিষদের নামে সম্পাদিত হইবে;
- (খ) বিধি অনুসারে সম্পাদিত হইতে হইবে।
- (২) কোন চুক্তি সম্পাদনের অব্যবহিত পরে অনুষ্ঠিত পরিষদের চেয়ারম্যান চুক্তিটি উপস্থাপন করিবেন এবং এই চুক্তির উপর সকল সদস্যের আলোচনার অধিকার থাকিবে।
- (৩) পরিষদ প্রস্তাবের মাধ্যমে বিভিন্ন ধরনের চুক্তি সম্পাদনের জন্য পদ্ধতি নির্ধারণ করিতে পারিবে এবং চেয়ারম্যান চুক্তি সম্পাদনের ব্যাপারে উক্ত প্রস্তাব অনুযায়ী কাজ করিবেন।
- (৪) এই ধারার খেলাপ সম্পাদিত কোন চুক্তির দায়িত্ব পরিষদের উপর বর্তাইবে না।

**৩১। নির্মাণ কাজ।-** সরকার, সরকারী গেজেটের মাধ্যমে, নিম্নবর্ণিত বিষয়ে সাধারণ নীতিমালা প্রণয়ন করিতে পারিবে, যথা :-

- (ক) পরিষদ কর্তৃক সম্পাদিতব্য সকল নির্মাণ কাজের পরিকল্পনা এবং আনুমানিক ব্যয়ের হিসাব প্রণয়ন;
- (খ) উক্ত পরিকল্পনা ও ব্যয় কোন কর্তৃপক্ষ কর্তৃক এবং কি শর্তে প্রযুক্তিগতভাবে এবং প্রশাসনিকভাবে অনুমোদিত হইবে, তাহা নির্ধারণ;
- (গ) উক্ত পরিকল্পনা ও ব্যয়ের হিসাব কাহার দ্বারা প্রণয়ন করা হইবে এবং উক্ত নির্মাণকাজ কাহার দ্বারা সম্পাদন করা হইবে, তাহা নির্ধারণ।

**৩২। নথিপত্র, প্রতিবেদন ইত্যাদি।-** পরিষদ-

- (ক) উহার কার্যাবলীর নথিপত্র সংরক্ষণ করিবে;
- (খ) বিধিতে উল্লিখিত বিষয়ের উপর সাময়িক প্রতিবেদন ও বিবরণী প্রণয়ন ও প্রকাশ করিবে;
- (গ) উহার কার্যাবলী সম্পর্কে তথ্য প্রকাশের জন্য প্রয়োজনীয় বা সরকার কর্তৃক সময় সময় নির্দেশিত অন্যান্য ব্যবস্থাও গ্রহণ করিতে পারিবে।
- ৩৩। পরিষদের সচিব।- উপজেলা নির্বাহী অফিসার পরিষদের সচিব হইবেন এবং তিনি পরিষদকে সাচিবিক সহায়তা প্রদান করিবেন।]

**৩৪। পরিষদের কর্মকর্তা ও কর্মচারী নিয়োগ।-** (১) পরিষদের কার্যাদি সুষ্ঠুভাবে সম্পাদনের নিমিত্ত পরিষদ সরকারের পূর্বনুমোদনক্রমে, বিভিন্ন শ্রেণীর কর্মকর্তা ও কর্মচারী পদে বিধি অনুযায়ী নিয়োগ করিতে পারিবে।

- (২) পরিষদ কর্তৃক নিয়োগযোগ্য কর্মকর্তা ও কর্মচারীদের চাকুরীর শর্তাদি বিধি দ্বারা নির্ধারিত হইবে।

**৩৫। পরিষদের তহবিল গঠন।-** (১) সংশ্লিষ্ট উপজেলার নাম সম্বলিত প্রত্যেক উপজেলা পরিষদের একটি তহবিল থাকিবে।

- (২) পরিষদের তহবিলে নিম্নলিখিত অর্থ জমা হইবে, যথা :-
- (ক) পরিষদ কর্তৃক ধার্যকৃত কর, রেইট, টোল, ফিস এবং অন্যান্য দাবী বাবদ প্রাপ্ত অর্থ;

২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন এর ২৩ ধারা বলে ধারা ৩৩ প্রতিস্থাপিত।

- (খ) পরিষদের উপর ন্যস্ত এবং তৎকর্তৃক পরিচালিত সকল সম্পত্তি হইতে প্রাপ্ত আয় বা মুনাফা;
- (গ) ধারা ২৪ এর অধীনে পরিষদের নিকট হস্তান্তরিত প্রতিষ্ঠান বা কর্ম পরিচালনাকারী জনবলের বেতন, ভাতা এবং এতদসংক্রান্ত অন্যান্য ব্যয় নির্বাহ বাবদ সরকার প্রদত্ত অর্থ;
- (ঘ) সরকার বা অন্যান্য কর্তৃপক্ষের অনুদান;
- (ঙ) কোন প্রতিষ্ঠান বা ব্যক্তি কর্তৃক প্রদত্ত অনুদান;
- (চ) পরিষদের অর্থ বিনিয়োগ হইতে মুনাফা;
- (ছ) পরিষদ কর্তৃক প্রাপ্ত অন্য কোন যে কোন অর্থ;
- (জ) পরিষদের তহবিলের উদ্ধৃত্ত অর্থ;
- (ঝ) সরকারের নির্দেশে পরিষদের উপর ন্যস্ত অন্যান্য আয়ের উৎস হইতে প্রাপ্ত অর্থ।

**৩৬। পরিষদের তহবিল সংরক্ষণ, বিনিয়োগ ও বিশেষ তহবিল।-** (১) পরিষদের তহবিলে জমাকৃত অর্থ কোন সরকারী ট্রেজারীতে বা সরকারী ট্রেজারীর কার্য পরিচালনাকারী কোন ব্যাংকে অথবা সরকার কর্তৃক নির্ধারিত অন্য কোন প্রকারে জমা রাখা হইবে।

- (২) পরিষদ উহার তহবিলের কিছু অংশ, যাহা বিধি দ্বারা নির্ধারিত হয় তাহা, বিধি দ্বারা নির্ধারিত পদ্ধতিতে ও খাতে বিনিয়োগ করিতে পারিবে।
- (৩) পরিষদ ইচ্ছা করিলে কোন বিশেষ উদ্দেশ্যে আলাদা তহবিল গঠন করিতে পারিবে এবং বিধি দ্বারা নির্ধারিত পদ্ধতিতে উক্ত তহবিল পরিচালনা করিবে।

**৩৭। পরিষদের তহবিলের প্রয়োগ।-** (১) পরিষদের তহবিলের অর্থ নিম্নলিখিত খাতে অগ্রাধিকারের ভিত্তিতে ব্যয় করা যাইবে, যথা :-

- প্রথমতঃ পরিষদের কর্মকর্তা ও কর্মচারীদের বেতন ও বাতা প্রদান;
- দ্বিতীয়তঃ এই আইনের অধীন পরিষদের তহবিলের উপর দায়মুক্ত ব্যয়;
- তৃতীয়তঃ এই আইন আপাততঃ বলবৎ অন্য কোন আইন দ্বারা ন্যস্ত পরিষদের সম্পাদন এবং কর্তব্য পালনের জন্য ব্যয়;
- চতুর্থতঃ সরকারের পূর্বনুমোদনক্রমে পরিষদ কর্তৃক ঘোষিত পরিষদের তহবিলের উপর দায়মুক্ত ব্যয়;
- পঞ্চমতঃ সরকার কর্তৃক ঘোষিত পরিষদের তহবিলের উপর দায়মুক্ত ব্যয়।

(২) পরিষদের তহবিলের উপর দায়মুক্ত ব্যয় নিম্নরূপ হইবে। যথা-

- (ক) পরিষদের চাকুরীতে নিয়োজিত কোন সরকারী কর্মচারীর জন্য দেয় অর্থ;
- (খ) কোন আদালত বা ট্রাইব্যুনাল কর্তৃক পরিষদের বিরুদ্ধে প্রদত্ত কোন ব্যয়, ডিক্রি বা রোয়েদাদ কার্যকর করিবার জন্য প্রয়োজনীয় অর্থ;
- (গ) সরকার কর্তৃক দায়মুক্ত বলিয়া নির্ধারিত অন্য যে কোন ব্যয়।

(৩) পরিষদের তহবিলের উপর দায়মুক্ত কোন ব্যয়ের খাতে যদি কোন অর্থ পরিশোধিত থাকে, তাহা হইলে যে ব্যক্তির হেফাজতে উক্ত তহবিল থাকিবে সে ব্যক্তিকে সরকার আদেশ দ্বারা উক্ত তহবিল হইতে, যতদূর সম্ভব, ঐ অর্থ পরিশোধ করিবার জন্য আদেশ দিতে পারিবে।

**৩৮। বাজেট।-** (১) প্রতি অর্থ বৎসর শুরু হইবার অন্ততঃ ষাট দিন পূর্বে পরিষদ উক্ত বৎসরের আয় ব্যয় সম্বলিত বিবরণী, অতঃপর বাজেট বলিয়া উল্লিখিত, সরকার প্রণীত নির্দেশিকা অনুযায়ী প্রণয়ন করিয়া উহার অনুলিপি পরিষদের নোটিশ বোর্ডে অন্ততঃ পনের দিনব্যাপী জনসাধারণের অবগতি, মন্তব্য ও পরামর্শের জন্য লটকাইয়া রাখিবে।

(২) উপ-ধারা (১) অনুসারে প্রদর্শিত বাজেট সম্পর্কে জনগণের মন্তব্য ও পরামর্শ বিবেচনাক্রমে পরিষদ সংশ্লিষ্ট অর্থ-বৎসর শুরু হওয়ার ত্রিশ দিন পূর্বে বাজেটটি অনুমোদন করিয়া উহার একটি অনুলিপি জেলা প্রশাসন ও সরকারের নিকট প্রেরণ করিবে।

(৩) কোন অর্থ-বৎসর শুরু হইবার পূর্বে পরিষদ উহার বাজেট অনুমোদন করিতে না পারিলে সরকার উক্ত বৎসরের জন্য একটি আয়-ব্যয় বিবরণী প্রস্তুত করাইয়া উহা প্রত্যয়ন করিবে এবং এইরূপ প্রত্যয়নকৃত বিবরণী পরিষদের অনুমোদিত বাজেট বলিয়া গণ্য হইবে।

(৪) উপ-ধারা (১) এর অধীনে বাজেটের অনুলিপি প্রাপ্তির পনের দিনের মধ্যে সরকার আদেশ দ্বারা বাজেটটি সংশোধন বাজেট করিতে পারিবে এবং অনুরূপ সংশোধিত বাজেটই পরিষদের অনুমোদিত বাজেট বলিয়া গণ্য হইবে।

(৫) কোন অর্থ-বৎসর শেষ হইবার পূর্বে যে কোন সময় সেই-অর্থ-বৎসরের জন্য, প্রয়োজন হইলে, পরিষদ একটি সংশোধিত বাজেট প্রণয়ন ও অনুমোদন করিতে পারিবে এবং উক্ত সংশোধিত বাজেটের ক্ষেত্রেও এই ধারার বিধানাবলী, যতদূর সম্ভব, প্রযোজ্য হইবে।

(৬) এই আইন মোতাবেক গঠিত পরিষদ প্রথমবার যে অর্থ-বৎসরে দায়িত্ব গ্রহণ করিবে সেই অর্থ বৎসরের বাজেট উক্ত দায়িত্বভার গ্রহণের পর অর্থ-বৎসরটির বাকী সময়ের জন্য প্রণীত হইবে এবং উক্ত বাজেটের ক্ষেত্রেও এই ধারার বিধানাবলী যতদূর সম্ভব প্রযোজ্য হইবে।

**৩৯। হিসাব।-** (১) পরিষদের আয়-ব্যয়ের হিসাব বিধি দ্বারা নির্ধারিত পদ্ধতিতে ও ফরমে রক্ষণ করা যাইবে।

(২) প্রতিটি অর্থ-বৎসর শেষ হইবার পর পরিষদ একটি বার্ষিক আয় ও ব্যয়ের হিসাব প্রস্তুত করিবে এবং পরবর্তী অর্থ-বৎসরের ৩১ শে ডিসেম্বরের মধ্যে উহা সরকারের নিকট প্রেরণ করিবে।

(৩) উক্ত বার্ষিক আয়-ব্যয়ের হিসাবের একটি অনুলিপি জনসাধারণের পরিদর্শনের জন্য পরিষদ কার্যালয়ের কোন প্রকাশ্য স্থানে স্থাপন করিতে হইবে এবং উক্ত হিসাব সম্পর্কে জনসাধারণের আপত্তি বা পরামর্শ পরিষদ বিবেচনা করিবে।

**(৪০) হিসাব নিরীক্ষা।-** (১) পরিষদের আয়-ব্যয়ের হিসাব বিধি দ্বারা নির্ধারিত পদ্ধতিতে ও বিধি দ্বারা নির্ধারিত কর্তৃপক্ষের দ্বারা নিরীক্ষিত হইবে।

(২) নিরীক্ষাকারী কর্তৃপক্ষ পরিষদের সকল হিসাব সংক্রান্ত যাবতীয় বহি ও অন্যান্য দলিল দেখিতে পারিবে এবং প্রয়োজনবোধে পরিষদের চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান] ও যে কোন সদস্য, কর্মকর্তা ও কর্মচারীকে জিজ্ঞাসাবাদ করিতে পারিবে।

(৩) হিসাব নিরীক্ষার পর নিরীক্ষাকারী কর্তৃপক্ষ সরকারের নিকট একটি নিরীক্ষা প্রতিবেদন পেশ করিবে এবং উহাতে, অন্যান্য বিষয়ের মধ্যে, নিম্নবর্ণিত বিষয়াদির উল্লেখ থাকিবে, যথা :-

(ক) অর্থ-আত্মসাৎ;

(খ) পরিষদের তহবিলের লোকসান, অপচয় এবং অপপ্রয়োগ;

(গ) হিসাব রক্ষণে অনিয়ম;

(ঘ) নিরীক্ষাকারী কর্তৃপক্ষের মতে যাহার প্রত্যক্ষ বা পরোক্ষভাবে উক্ত আত্মসাৎ, লোকসান, অপচয় অপপ্রয়োগ ও অনিয়মের জন্য দায়ী তাহাদের নাম।

**৪১। পরিষদের সম্পত্তি।-** (১) সরকার বিধি দ্বারা-

(ক) পরিষদের উপর বা উহার তত্ত্বাবধানে ন্যস্ত বা উহার মালিকানাধীন সম্পত্তির ব্যবস্থাপনা, রক্ষণাবেক্ষণ ও উন্নয়নের জন্য বিধান করিতে পারিবে।

(খ) উক্ত সম্পত্তির হস্তান্তরের নিয়ন্ত্রণ করিতে পারিবে।

(২) পরিষদ-

(ক) উহার মালিকানাধীন বা উহার উপর বা উহার তত্ত্বাবধানে ন্যস্ত যে কোন সম্পত্তির ব্যবস্থাপনা, রক্ষণাবেক্ষণ, পরিদর্শন ও উন্নয়ন সাধন করিতে পারিবে;

(খ) এই আইনের উদ্দেশ্য পূরণকল্পে উক্ত সম্পত্তি কাজে লাগাইতে পারিবে;

(গ) দান, বিক্রয়, বন্ধক, ইজারা বা বিনিময়ের মাধ্যমে বা অন্য কোন পন্থায় যে কোন সম্পত্তি অর্জন বা হস্তান্তর করিতে পারিবে।

**৪২। উন্নয়ন পরিকল্পনা।-** (১) পরিষদ উহার এখতিয়ারভুক্ত যে কোন বিষয়ে উহার তহবিলের সংগতি অনুযায়ী পাঁচসাল পরিকল্পনাসহ বিভিন্ন মেয়াদী উন্নয়ন পরিকল্পনা প্রস্তুত ও বাস্তবায়ন করিতে পারিবে এবং এইরূপ পরিকল্পনা প্রণয়নের ক্ষেত্রে পরিষদের এলাকাভুক্ত ইউনিয়ন পরিষদ বা উক্ত এলাকায় উন্নয়ন কর্মকাণ্ডে সক্রিয়ভাবে জড়িত বেসরকারী প্রতিষ্ঠানসমূহ বা কোন ব্যক্তি বিশেষের পরামর্শ বিবেচনা করিতে পারিবে।

(২) উক্ত পরিকল্পনায় নিম্নলিখিত বিষয়ের বিধান থাকিবে, যথা :-

(ক) কি পদ্ধতিতে পরিকল্পনায় অর্থ যোগান হইবে এবং ইহার তদারক ও বাস্তবায়ন হইবে;

(খ) কাহার দ্বারা পরিকল্পনা বাস্তবায়িত হইবে;

(গ) পরিকল্পনা সম্পর্কিত অন্যান্য প্রয়োজনীয় বিষয়।

(৩) পরিষদ উহার প্রতিটি উন্নয়ন পরিকল্পনার [বিষয়ে সংশ্লিষ্ট সংসদ-সদস্যের সুপারিশ গ্রহণপূর্বক] একটি অনুলিপি উহার বাস্তবায়নের পূর্বে সরকারের নিকট প্রেরণ করিবে এবং জনসাধারণের অবগতির জন্য পরিষদের বিবেচনায় যথাযথ পদ্ধতিতে প্রকাশ করিতে বা ক্ষেত্র বিশেষে তাহাদের মতামত বা পরামর্শ বিবেচনাক্রমে উক্ত পরিকল্পনা সম্পর্কে যথাযথ ব্যবস্থা গ্রহণ করিতে পারিবে।

**৪৩। পরিষদের নিকট চেয়ারম্যান ইত্যাদির দায়।-** পরিষদের [চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান] অথবা উহার কোন সদস্য, কর্মকর্তা বা কর্মচারী অথবা পরিষদ প্রশাসনের দায়িত্বপ্রাপ্ত বা পরিষদের পক্ষে কর্মরত কোন ব্যক্তির প্রত্যক্ষ গাফিলতি বা অসদাচরণের কারণে পরিষদের কোন অর্থ বা সম্পদের লোকসান, অপচয় বা অপপ্রয়োগ হইলে ইহার জন্য তিনি দায়ী থাকিবেন এবং বিধি দ্বারা নির্ধারিত পদ্ধতিতে সরকার তাহার এই দায়-দায়িত্ব নির্ধারণ করিবে এবং যে টাকার জন্য তাহাকে দায়ী করা হইবে সেই টাকা সরকারী দাবী (চাঁদঘরপ উবসধহফ) হিসাবে তাহার নিকট হইতে আদায় করা হইবে।

<sup>১</sup> ২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন এর ২৪ ধারা বলে প্রতিস্থাপিত।

<sup>২</sup> ২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন এর ২৫ ধারা বলে প্রতিস্থাপিত।

<sup>৩</sup> ২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন এর ২৬ ধারা বলে প্রতিস্থাপিত।

**৪৪। পরিষদ কর্তৃক আরোপণীয় কর ইত্যাদি।-** পরিষদ, সরকারের পূর্বানুমোদনক্রমে, চতুর্থ তফসিলে উল্লিখিত সকল অথবা যে কোন কর, রেইট, টোল এবং ফিস বিধি দ্বারা নির্ধারিত পদ্ধতিতে আরোপ করিতে পারিবে।

**৪৫। কর সম্পর্কিত প্রজ্ঞাপন ইত্যাদি।-** (১) পরিষদ কর্তৃক আরোপিত সকল কর, রেইট, টোল এবং ফিস বিধি দ্বারা নির্ধারিত পদ্ধতিতে প্রজ্ঞাপিত হইবে এবং সরকার ভিন্নরূপ নির্দেশ না দিলে উক্ত আরোপের বিষয়াটি আরোপের পূর্বে প্রকাশ করিতে হইবে।

(২) কোন কর, টোল, রেইট বা ফিস আরোপের বা উহার পরিবর্তনের কোন প্রস্তাব অনুমোদিত হইলে সরকার যে তারিখ নির্ধারণ করিবে সেই তারিখে উহা কার্যকর হইবে।

**৪৬। কর সংক্রান্ত দায়।-** কোন ব্যক্তি বা জিনিষ পত্রের উপর কর, রেইট, টোল বা ফিস আরোপ করা যাইবে কিনা উহা নির্ধারণের প্রয়োজনে পরিষদ, নোটিশের মাধ্যমে, সংশ্লিষ্ট ব্যক্তিকে প্রয়োজনীয় তথ্য সরবরাহ করিতে বা দলিরপত্র, হিসাব বহি বা জিনিসপত্র হাজির করিবার নির্দেশ দিতে পারিবে।

**৪৭। কর আদায়।-** (১) এই আইনে ভিন্নরূপ বিধান না থাকিলে, পরিষদের সকল কর, রেইট, টোল এবং ফিস বিধি দ্বারা নির্ধারিত ব্যক্তির দ্বারা এবং পদ্ধতিতে আদায় করা হইবে।

(২) পরিষদের প্রাপ্য অনাদায়ী সকল প্রকার কর, রেইট, টোল, ফিস এবং অন্যান্য অর্থ সরকারী দাবী (Public Demand) হিসাবে আদায়যোগ্য হইবে।

**৪৮। কর ইত্যাদি নির্ধারণের বিরুদ্ধে আপত্তি।-** বিধি দ্বারা নির্ধারিত কর্তৃপক্ষের নিকট ও বিধি দ্বারা নির্ধারিত পন্থায় এবং সময়ের মধ্যে পেশকৃত লিখিত দরখাস্ত ছাড়া অন্য পন্থায় এই আইনের অধীন ধার্যকৃত কোন কর, রেইট, টোল বা ফিস বা এতদসংক্রান্ত কোন সম্পত্তির মূল্যায়ন অথবা কোন ব্যক্তির উহা প্রদানের দায়িত্ব সম্পর্কে কোন আপত্তি উত্থাপন করা যাইবে না।

**৪৯। কর বিধি।-** (১) পরিষদ কর্তৃক ধার্যকৃত সকল কর, রেইট, টোল বা ফিস এবং অন্যান্য দাবী বিধি দ্বারা নির্ধারিত পদ্ধতিতে ধার্য, আরোপ এবং নিয়ন্ত্রণ করা যাইবে।

(২) এই ধারায় উল্লিখিত বিষয় সম্পর্কিত বিধি অন্যান্য বিষয়ের মধ্যে করদাতাদের করণীয় এবং কর ধার্যকারী ও আদায়কারী কর্মকর্তা ও অন্যান্য কর্তৃপক্ষের ক্ষমতা ও দায়িত্ব সম্পর্কে বিধান থাকিবে।

**৫০। পরিষদের উপর তত্ত্বাবধান।-** এই আইনের উদ্দেশ্যের সহিত পরিষদের কার্যকলাপের সামঞ্জস্য সাধনের নিশ্চয়তা বিধানকল্পে সরকার পরিষদের উপর সাধারণ তত্ত্বাবধান ও নিয়ন্ত্রণ ক্ষমতা প্রয়োগ করিবে।

**৫১। পরিষদের কার্যাবলীর উপর নিয়ন্ত্রণ।-** (১) সরকার যদি এইরূপ অভিমত পোষণ করে যে, পরিষদ কর্তৃক বা পরিষদের পক্ষে কৃত বা প্রস্তাবিত কোন কাজকর্ম আইনের সহিত সংগতিপূর্ণ নহে অথবা জনস্বার্থের পরিপন্থী, তাহা হইলে সরকার আদেশ দ্বারা-

(ক) পরিষদের উক্ত কার্যক্রম বাতিল করিতে পারিবে;

(খ) পরিষদ কর্তৃক গৃহীত কোন প্রস্তাব অথবা প্রদত্ত কোন আদেশের বাস্তবায়ন সাময়িকভাবে স্থগিত করিতে পারিবে;

(গ) প্রস্তাবিত কোন কাজকর্ম সম্পাদন নিষিদ্ধ করিতে পারিবে;

(ঘ) পরিষদকে আদেশে উল্লিখিত কোন কাজ করিবার নির্দেশ দিতে পারিবে।

(২) উপ-ধারা (১) এর অধীনে কোন আদেশ প্রদত্ত হইলে পরিষদ আদেশ প্রাপ্তির ত্রিশ দিনের মধ্যে উহা পুনঃ বিবেচনার জন্য সরকার আবেদন করিতে পারিবে।

(৩) উক্ত আবেদন প্রাপ্তির ত্রিশ দিনের মধ্যে সরকার উক্ত আদেশটি হয় বহাল রাখিবে নতুবা সংশোধন অথবা বাতিল করিবে এবং উক্ত সময়ের মধ্যে পরিষদকে উহা অবহিত করিবে।

(৪) যদি কোন কারণে উল্লিখিত সময়ের মধ্যে সরকার উক্ত আদেশ বহাল অথবা সংশোধন না করে তাহা হইলে উহা বাতিল বলিয়া গণ্য হইবে।

**৫২। পরিষদের বিষয়াবলী সম্পর্কে তদন্ত।-** (১) সরকার, সেচ্ছায় অথবা কোন ব্যক্তির আবেদনের ভিত্তিতে, পরিষদের বিষয়াবলী সাধারণভাবে অথবা তৎসম্পর্কিত কোন বিশেষ ব্যাপার সম্বন্ধে তদন্ত করিবার জন্য কোন কর্মকর্তাকে ক্ষমতা প্রদান করিতে পারিবে এবং উক্ত তদন্তের রিপোর্টের পরিপ্রেক্ষিতে গৃহীতব্য প্রয়োজনীয় প্রতিকারমূলক ব্যবস্থা গ্রহণ করিবার জন্যও নির্দেশ দিতে পারিবে।

(২) উক্ত তদন্তকারী কর্মকর্তা তদন্তের প্রয়োজনে সামান্য গ্রহণ এবং সাক্ষীর উপস্থিতি ও দলিল উপস্থাপন নিশ্চিতকরণের জন্য Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908) এর অধীন এতদসংক্রান্ত বিষয়ে দেওয়ানী আদালতের যে ক্ষমতা আছে সেই ক্ষমতা প্রয়োগ করিতে পারিবে।

**৫৩। পরিষদ বাতিলকরণ।-** (১) যদি প্রয়োজনীয় তদন্তের পর সরকার এইরূপ অভিমত পোষণ করে যে, পরিষদ-  
(ক) উহার দায়িত্ব পালনে অসমর্থ অথবা ক্রমাগতভাবে উহার দায়িত্ব পালনে ব্যর্থ হইয়াছে;

(খ) উহার প্রশাসনিক ও আর্থিক দায়িত্ব পালনে অসমর্থ;

(গ) সাধারণতঃ এমন কাজ করে যাহা জনস্বার্থ বিরোধী;

(ঘ) অন্য কোন ভাবে উহার ক্ষমতার সীমা লংঘন বা ক্ষমতার অপব্যবহার করিয়াছে বা করিতেছে; তাহা হইলে সরকার, সরকারী গেজেটে প্রকাশিত আদেশ দ্বারা, পরিষদকে বাতিল করিতে পারিবে।

তবে শর্ত থাকে যে, উক্ত আদেশ প্রদানের পূর্বে পরিষদের সদস্যগণকে প্রস্তাবিত বাতিলকরণের বিরুদ্ধে কারণ দর্শানোর সুযোগ দিতে হইবে।

(২) উপ-ধারা (১) এর অধীন কোন আদেশ প্রকাশিত হইলে-

(ক) পরিষদের চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান ও অন্যান্য সদস্যগণ তাহাদের পদে বহাল থাকিবেন না;

(খ) বাতিল থাকাকালীন সময়ে পরিষদের যাবতীয় দায়িত্ব সরকার কর্তৃক নিয়োজিত কোন ব্যক্তি বা কর্তৃপক্ষ পালন করিবে।

(৩) বাতিলাদেশ সরকারী গেজেটে জারীর একশত বিশ দিনের মধ্যে এই আইন ও বিধি মোতাবেক পরিষদ পুনর্গঠিত হইবে।

**৫৪। যুক্ত কমিটি।-** পরিষদ অন্য কোন স্থানীয় কর্তৃপক্ষের সহিত একত্রে উহাদের সাধারণ স্বার্থ-সংশ্লিষ্ট কোন বিষয়ের জন্য যুক্ত কমিটি গঠন করিতে পারিবে এবং অনুরূপ কমিটিকে উহার যে কোন ক্ষমতা প্রদান করিতে পারিবে।

**৫৫। পরিষদ ও অন্য কোন স্থানীয় কর্তৃপক্ষের বিরোধ।-** পরিষদ এবং অন্য কোন স্থানীয় কর্তৃপক্ষের মধ্যে কোন বিরোধ দেখা দিলে বিরোধীয় বিষয়টি নিষ্পত্তির জন্য সরকারের নিকট প্রেরিত হইবে এবং এই ব্যাপারে সরকারের সিদ্ধান্ত চূড়ান্ত হইবে।

**৫৬। অপরাধ।-** পঞ্চম তফসিলে বর্ণিত কোন করণীয় কাজ না করা এবং করণীয় নয় এই প্রকার কাজ করা এই আইনের অধীন দণ্ডনীয় অপরাধ হইবে।

**৫৭। দণ্ড।-** এই আইনের অধীন কোন অপরাধের জন্য অনধিক পাঁচ হাজার টাকা জরিমানা করা যাইবে এবং এই অপরাধ যদি অনবরতভাবে ঘটিয়ে থাকে, তাহা হইলে প্রথম দিনের অপরাধের পর পরবর্তী প্রত্যেক দিনের জন্য অপরাধীকে অতিরিক্ত অনধিক পাঁচশত টাকা পর্যন্ত জরিমানা করা যাইবে।

**৫৮। অপরাধ আমলে নেওয়া।-** চেয়ারম্যান বা পরিষদ হইতে ক্ষমতাপ্রাপ্ত কোন ব্যক্তির লিখিত অভিযোগ ছাড়া কোন আদালত এই আইনের অধীন কোন অপরাধ বিচারের জন্য আমলে লইতে পারিবেন না।

**৫৯। অভিযোগ প্রত্যাহার ও আপোষ নিষ্পত্তি।-** চেয়ারম্যান বা এতদুদ্দেশ্যে পরিষদ হইতে ক্ষমতাপ্রাপ্ত কোন ব্যক্তি এই আইনের অধীন অপরাধ সংক্রান্ত কোন অভিযোগ প্রত্যাহার বা অভিযুক্ত ব্যক্তির সহিত আপোষ নিষ্পত্তি করিতে পারিবেন।

**৬০। অবৈধ অনুপ্রবেশ বা অবস্থান।-** (১) জনপথ ও সর্বসাধারণের ব্যবহার্য কোন স্থানে কোন ব্যক্তি কোন প্রকারে অবৈধ অনুপ্রবেশ করিবেন না। ব্যাখ্যা।- এই ধারার উদ্দেশ্য পূরণকল্পে কোন ব্যক্তির অবৈধ অনুপ্রবেশ বলিতে তাহার নিয়ন্ত্রণাধীন বা তাহার তত্ত্বাবধানে রহিয়াছে এমন কোন ব্যক্তি বা জীব-জন্তুর অনুপ্রবেশ বা কোন বস্তু বা কাঠামোর অবস্থানও অন্তর্ভুক্ত হইবে।

(২) পরিষদের নিয়ন্ত্রনভুক্ত বা এখতিয়ারধীন জনপথে বা স্থানে উক্তরূপ অবৈধ অনুপ্রবেশ করিলে পরিষদ নোটিশ দ্বারা নির্ধারিত সময়ের মধ্যে উক্ত ব্যক্তিকে তাহার অবৈধ কার্যকলাপ বন্ধ করিবার জন্য নির্দেশ দিতে পারিবে এবং উক্ত সময়ের মধ্যে যদি তিনি এই নির্দেশ মান্য না করেন তাহা হইলে পরিষদ অবৈধ অনুপ্রবেশ বন্ধ করিবার জন্য যথাযথ ব্যবস্থা গ্রহণ করিতে পারিবে এবং উক্তরূপ ব্যবস্থা গ্রহণের ফলে অবৈধ অনুপ্রবেশকারী কোন প্রকার ক্ষতিগ্রস্ত হইলে সেইজন্য তাহাকে কোন ক্ষতিপূরণ দেওয়া হইবে না।

(৩) অবৈধ অনুপ্রবেশ বন্ধ করার প্রয়োজনে গৃহীত ব্যবস্থার জন্য যে ব্যয় হইবে তাহা উক্ত অনুপ্রবেশকারীর উপর এই আইনের অধীন কার্যকর বলিয়া গণ্য হইবে।

**৬১। আপীল।-** এই আইন বা কোন বিধি বা প্রবিধানের অধীনে পরিষদ বা উহার চেয়ারম্যান অথবা পরিষদের বা চেয়ারম্যানের নিকট হইতে ক্ষমতাপ্রাপ্ত কোন ব্যক্তির কোন আদেশের দ্বারা কোন ব্যক্তি সংক্ষুব্ধ হইলে তিনি উক্ত আদেশ প্রদানের ত্রিশ দিনের মধ্যে সরকারের নিকট বা সরকার কর্তৃক নির্ধারিত কর্তৃপক্ষের নিকট উহার বিরুদ্ধে আপীল করিতে পারিবেন এবং এই আপীলের উপর সরকারের বা উক্ত কর্তৃপক্ষের সিদ্ধান্ত চূড়ান্ত হইবে।

**৬২। পরিষদ ও সরকারের কার্যাবলীর সমন্বয় সম্পর্কে আদেশ।-** সরকার প্রয়োজন হইলে আদেশ দ্বারা পরিষদ এবং সরকারী কর্তৃপক্ষের কার্যাবলীর মধ্যে কাজের সমন্বয়ে করিতে পারিবে।

৬৩। বিধি প্রণয়নের ক্ষমতা।- (১) এই আইনের উদ্দেশ্য পূরণকল্পে সরকার, সরকারী গেজেটে প্রজ্ঞাপন দ্বারা বিধি প্রণয়ন করিতে পারিবে।

২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন এর ২৭ ধারা বলে প্রতিস্থাপিত।

(২) বিশেষ করিয়া এবং উপরিউক্ত ক্ষমতার সামগ্রিকতাকে ক্ষুণ্ণ না করিয়া, অনুরূপ বিধিতে নিম্নবর্ণিত সকল অথবা যে কোন বিষয়ে বিধান করা যাইবে, যথা :-

- (ক) চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান ও মহিলা সদস্য নির্বাচন ও তৎসংক্রান্ত কার্যাবলী;
- (খ) নির্বাচন বিরোধ, নির্বাচন ট্রাইব্যুনাল নিয়োগ ও উহাদের ক্ষমতা, নির্বাচনী দরখাস্ত দাখিল এবং নির্বাচন বিরোধ নিষ্পত্তি সংক্রান্ত বিষয়াদি;
- (গ) চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান ও সদস্যগণের ক্ষমতা ও কার্যাবলী;
- (ঘ) পরিষদের পক্ষে চুক্তি সম্পাদনের বিধানাবলী;
- (ঙ) পরিষদের কার্যক্রম বাস্তবায়নের বিধানাবলী;
- (চ) পরিষদের রেকর্ডপত্র, প্রতিবেদন ইত্যাদি রক্ষণাবেক্ষণ ও প্রকাশনা সংক্রান্ত;
- (ছ) পরিষদের কর্মকর্তা ও কর্মচারীদের নিয়োগ ও চাকুরীর শর্তাবলী সংক্রান্ত বিষয়;
- (জ) পরিষদের তহবিল রক্ষণ পরিচালনা, নিয়ন্ত্রন, বিনিয়োগ;
- (ঝ) হিসাব নিরীক্ষা সংক্রান্ত বিষয়াদি;
- (ঞ) পরিষদের সম্পত্তি রক্ষণাবেক্ষণ, পরিচালনা সংক্রান্ত বিষয়াদি;
- (ট) নির্মাণ কাজ এবং উন্নয়ন পরিকল্পনা প্রণয়ন ও বাস্তবায়ন সংক্রান্ত বিষয়াদি;
- (ঠ) পরিষদের সম্পত্তি রক্ষণাবেক্ষণের জন্য কর্মকর্তা ও কর্মচারীদের আচরণ সংক্রান্ত বিষয়;
- (ড) কর সংক্রান্ত বিষয়;
- (ঢ) পরিষদের আদেশের বিরুদ্ধে আপীল সংক্রান্ত বিষয়;
- (ণ) বিশেষ সভা আহ্বান এবং চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান বা অন্য কোন সদস্য সংক্রান্ত অপসারণের বিষয়;
- (ত) বাজেট প্রণয়ন ও অনুমোদন সংক্রান্ত বিষয়াবলী;
- (থ) এই আইনের বিধানাবলী পালনের জন্য সম্পৃক্ত অন্যান্য বিষয়াদি।

(৬৪) প্রবিধান প্রণয়নের ক্ষমতা।- (১) এই আইনের উদ্দেশ্য পূরণকল্পে পরিষদ, সরকারের পূর্বানুমোদনক্রমে, এই আইনের বা কোন বিধির সহিত অসামঞ্জস্য না হয় এইরূপ প্রবিধান প্রণয়ন করিতে পারিবে।

(২) বিশেষ করিয়া এবং উপরি-উক্ত ক্ষমতার সামগ্রিকতাকে ক্ষুণ্ণ না করিয়া, অনুরূপ প্রতিবিধান নিম্নরূপ সকল অথবা যে কোন বিষয়ে বিধান করা যাইবে, যথা :-

- (ক) পরিষদের কার্যাবলী পরিচালনা;
- (খ) পরিষদের সভার কোরাম নির্ধারণ;
- (গ) পরিষদের সভায় প্রশ্ন উত্থাপন;
- (ঘ) পরিষদের সভা আহ্বান;
- (ঙ) পরিষদের সভার কার্যবিবরণী লিখন;
- (চ) পরিষদের সভায় গৃহীত প্রস্তাবের বাস্তবায়ন;
- (ছ) সাধারণ সীলমোহরের হেফাজত ও ব্যবহার;
- (জ) পরিষদের কোন কর্মকর্তাকে চেয়ারম্যানের ক্ষমতা অর্পণ;
- (ঝ) পরিষদের অফিসের বিভাগ ও শাখা গঠন এবং উহাদের কাজের পরিধি নির্ধারণ;
- (ঞ) কার্যনির্বাহী সংক্রান্ত যাবতীয় বিষয়;
- (ট) এই আইনের অধীন প্রবিধান দ্বারা নিয়ন্ত্রন করিতে হইবে বা করা যাইবে এইরূপ যে কোন বিষয়।
- (ঠ) পরিষদের বিবেচনায় যে প্রকারে প্রকাশ করিলে কোন প্রবিধান সম্পর্কে জনসাধারণ ভালভাবে অবহিত হইতে পারিবে সেই প্রকারে প্রত্যেক প্রবিধান প্রকাশ করিতে পারিবে।
- (৪) সরকার নমুনা প্রবিধান প্রণয়ন করিতে পারিবে এবং এইরূপ কোন নমুনা প্রণীত হইলে পরিষদ উহা অনুসরণ করিবে।

৬৫। সরকার কর্তৃক ক্ষমতা অর্পণ।- সরকারের এই আইনের অধীন ইহার সকল অথবা যে কোন ক্ষমতা সরকারী গেজেটে প্রজ্ঞাপন দ্বারা, যে কোন ব্যক্তি বা কর্তৃপক্ষকে অর্পণ করিতে পারিবে।

৬৬। পরিষদের পক্ষে ও বিপক্ষে মামলা।- (১) পরিষদের বিরুদ্ধে বা পরিষদ সংক্রান্ত কোন কাজের সূত্রে উহার কোন সদস্য বা কর্মকর্তা বা কর্মচারীর বিরুদ্ধে মামলা দায়ের করিতে হইলে মামলা দায়ের করিতে ইচ্ছুক ব্যক্তিকে মামলার কারণ এবং বাদীর নাম ও ঠিকানা উল্লেখ করিয়া একটি নোটিশ-

(ক) পরিষদের ক্ষেত্রে, পরিষদের কার্যালয়ে প্রদান করিতে হইবে বা পৌছাইয়া দিতে হইবে;

<sup>১</sup>২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন এর ২৮ (ক) ও (খ) ধারা বলে প্রতিস্থাপিত।

<sup>২</sup>২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন এর ২৮ (গ) ধারা বলে প্রতিস্থাপিত।

(খ) অন্যান্য ক্ষেত্রে, সংশ্লিষ্ট সদস্য, কর্মকর্তা কর্মচারীর নিকট ব্যক্তিগতভাবে বা তাহার অফিস বা বাসস্থানে প্রদান করিতে হইবে বা পৌছাইয়া দিতে হইবে।

(২) উক্ত নোটিশ প্রদান বা পৌছানোর পর ত্রিশ দিন অতিবাহিত না হওয়া পর্যন্ত কোন মামলা দায়ের করা যাইবে না, এবং মামলার আরজীতে উক্ত নোটিশ প্রদান করা বা পৌছানো হইয়াছে কিনা উহার উল্লেখ থাকিতে হইবে।

**৬৭। নোটিশ এবং উহা জারীকরণ।-** (১) এই আইন, বিধি বা প্রবিধান পালনের জন্য কোন কাজ করা বা না করা হইতে বিরত থাকা যদি কোন ব্যক্তির কর্তব্য হয় তাহা হইলে কোন সময়ের মধ্যে ইহা করিতে হইবে বা ইহা করা হইতে বিরত থাকিতে হইবে তাহা উল্লেখ করিয়া তাহার উপর একটি নোটিশ জারী করিতে হইবে।

(২) এই আইনের অধীন প্রদেয় কোন নোটিশ গঠনগত ত্রুটির কারণে অবৈধ হইবে না।

(৩) ভিন্নরূপ কোন বিধান না থাকিলে এই আইনের অধীন প্রদেয় সকল নোটিশ উহার প্রাপককে হাতে হাতে প্রদান করিয়া অথবা তাহার নিকট ডাকযোগে প্রেরণ করিয়া বা তাহার বাসস্থান বা কর্মস্থলের কোন বিশিষ্ট স্থানে আঁটিয়া দিয়া জারী করিতে হইবে।

(৪) যে নোটিশ সর্বসাধারণের জন্য তাহা পরিষদ কর্তৃকনির্ধারিত কোন প্রকাশ্য স্থানে আঁটিয়া দিয়া জারী করা হইলে উহা যথাযথভাবে জারী হইয়াছে বলিয়া গণ্য হইবে।

**৬৮। প্রকাশ্য রেকর্ড।-** এই আইনের অধীন প্রস্তুতকৃত এবং সংরক্ষিত যাবতীয় রেকর্ড এবং রেজিস্ট্রী Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872) তে যে অর্থে প্রকাশ্য রেকর্ড (public document) অভিব্যক্তিটি ব্যবহৃত হইয়াছে সেই অর্থে প্রকাশ্য রেকর্ড (Public document) বলিয়া গণ্য হইবে এবং বিপরীত প্রমানিত না হইলে, উহাকে বিশুদ্ধ রেকর্ড বা রেজিস্ট্রী বলিয়া গণ্য করিতে হইবে।

**৬৯। পরিষদের [চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান] সদস্য ইত্যাদি জনসেবক (চঁনষরপ ঝবথখহঃ) গণ্য হইবেন।-** পরিষদের [চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান] ও উহার অন্যান্য সদস্য এবং উহার কর্মকর্তা ও কর্মচারীগণ এবং পরিষদের পক্ষে কাজ করার জন্য যথাযথভাবে ক্ষমতাপ্রাপ্ত অন্যান্য ব্যক্তি Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) এর Section 21এ যে অর্থে জনসেবক (Public Servant) অভিব্যক্তিটি ব্যবহৃত হইয়াছে সেই অর্থে জনসেবক (Public Servant) বলিয়া গণ্য হইবেন।

**৭০। সরল বিশ্বাসে কৃত কাজকর্ম রক্ষণ।-** এই আইন, বিধি বা প্রবিধান এর অধীন সরল বিশ্বাসে কৃত কোন কাজের ফলে কোন ব্যক্তি ক্ষতিগ্রস্ত হইলে বা তাহার ক্ষতিগ্রস্ত হইবার সম্ভাবনা থাকিলে তজ্জন্য সরকার, পরিষদ বা উহাদের নিকট হইতে ক্ষমতাপ্রাপ্ত কোন ব্যক্তির বিরুদ্ধে কোন দেওয়ানী বা ফৌজদারী মামলা বা অন্য কোন আইনগত কার্যক্রম গ্রহণ করা যাইবে না।

**৭১। নির্ধারিত পদ্ধতিতে কতিপয় বিষয়ের নিষ্পত্তি।-** এই আইনে কোন কিছু করিবার জন্য বিধান থাকা সত্ত্বেও যদি উহা কোন কর্তৃপক্ষ কর্তৃক বা কি পদ্ধতিতে করা হইবে তৎসম্পর্কে কোন বিধান না থাকে তাহা হইলে উক্ত কাজ সরকার কর্তৃক সরকারী গেজেটে প্রকাশিত আদেশ অনুসারে সম্পন্ন করা হইবে।

**৭২। অসুবিধা দূরীকরণ।-** এই আইনের বিধানাবলী কার্যকর করিবার ক্ষেত্রে উক্ত বিধানে কোন অস্পষ্টতার কারণে অসুবিধা দেখা দিলে সরকার উক্ত অসুবিধা দূরীকরণার্থে সরকারী গেজেটে প্রকাশিত আদেশ দ্বারা প্রয়োজনীয় যে কোন ব্যবস্থা গ্রহণ করিতে পারিবে।

প্রথম তফসিল

[ধারা ৩(১) দ্রষ্টব্য]

প্রথম উপজেলাসমূহের তালিকা

জেলা নাম	ক্রমিক নং	উপজেলা	জেলা নাম	ক্রমিক নং	উপজেলা	জেলা নাম	ক্রমিক নং	উপজেলা
০১ পঞ্চগড়	১	আটোয়ারী	০৮ গাইবান্ধা	৪৪	চিলমারী	১৩ রাজশাহী	৮৭	মহাদেবপুর
	২	তেতুলিয়া		৪৫	ফুলবাড়ী		৮৮	নওগাঁ সদর
	৩	বোদা		৪৬	রাজিবপুর		৮৯	নিয়ামতপুর
	৪	দেবীগঞ্জ		৪৭	রৌমারী		৯০	পত্নীতলা
০২ ঠাকুরগাঁও	৫	পঞ্চগড় সদর		৪৮	কুড়িগ্রাম সদর		৯১	রানী নগর
	৬	বালিয়া ডাঙ্গা		৪৯	নাগেশ্বরী		৯২	বাগমারা
	৭	হরিপুর		৫০	রাজারহাট		৯৩	মোহনপুর
	৮	রাণীশংকাইল		৫১	উলিপুর		৯৪	পবা
০৩ দিনাজপুর	৯	পীরগঞ্জ		৫২	ফুলছড়ি		৯৫	পুঠিয়া
	১০	ঠাকুরগাঁও সদর		৫৩	গাইবান্ধা সদর		৯৬	তানোর
	১১	বিরামপুর	৫৪	পলাশবাড়ী	৯৭	বাঘা		
	১২	বীরগঞ্জ	৫৫	সাঘাটা	৯৮	চারঘাট		
	১৩	বোচাগঞ্জ	৫৬	গোবিন্দগঞ্জ	৯৯	দুর্গাপুর		
	১৪	চিরির বন্দর	৫৭	সাদুল্লাপুর	১০০	গোদাবাড়ী		
	১৫	ঘোড়াঘাট	৫৮	সুন্দরগঞ্জ	১০১	বাগতিপাড়া		
	১৬	ফুলবাড়ী	৫৯	আক্কেলপুর	১০২	গুরুদাশপুর		
	১৭	বিরল	৬০	পাঁচবিবি	১০৩	নাটোর সদর		
	১৮	দিনাজপুর সদর	৬১	জয়পুরহাট সদর	১০৪	বড়াইগ্রাম		
০৪ নীলফামারী	১৯	হাকিমপুর	৬২	কালাই	১০৫	লালপুর		
	২০	কাহারোল	৬৩	ক্ষেতলাল	১০৬	সিংড়া		
	২১	খানসামা	৬৪	আদমদিঘী	১০৭	কামারখন্দ		
	২২	নবাবগঞ্জ	৬৫	ধুনট	১০৮	রায়গঞ্জ		
	২৩	পার্বতীপুর	৬৬	নন্দীগ্রাম	১০৯	শাহাজাদপুর		
	২৪	ডিমলা	৬৭	সাকিয়াকান্দি	১১০	সিরাজগঞ্জ সদর		
	২৫	ডোমার	৬৮	সোনাতলা	১১১	উল্লাপাড়া		
	২৬	নীলফামারী সদর	৬৯	উগুড়া সদর	১১২	বেলকুচি		
	২৭	জলঢাকা	৭০	দুপচাঁচিয়া	১১৩	চৌহালী		
	২৮	কিশোরগঞ্জ	৭১	গাবতলী	১১৪	কাজিপুর		
০৫ লালমনিরহাট	২৯	সৈয়দপুর	৭২	কাহালু	১১৫	তাড়াশ		
	৩০	হাতীবান্ধা	৭৩	শিবগঞ্জ	১১৬	বেড়া		
	৩১	কালীগঞ্জ	৭৪	শেরপুর	১১৭	উরিদপুর		
	৩২	পাটগ্রাম	৭৫	শাজাহানপুর	১১৮	ঈশ্বরদী		
০৬ রংপুর	৩৩	আদিতমারী	৭৬	নওয়াবগঞ্জ সদর	১১৯	পাবনা সদর		
	৩৪	লালমনিরহাট সদর	৭৭	নাচোল	১২০	সাঁথিয়া		
	৩৫	গঙ্গাচড়া	৭৮	শিবগঞ্জ	১২১	আটঘরিয়া		
	৩৬	কাউনিয়া	৭৯	ভোলাহাট	১২২	ভাঙ্গুড়া		
	৩৭	পীরগাছা	৮০	গোমস্তাপুর	১২৩	চাটমোহর		
	৩৮	রংপুর সদর	৮১	আত্রাই	১২৪	সুজানগর		
	৩৯	বদরগঞ্জ	৮২	বদলগাছী	১২৫	গাংনী		
	৪০	মিঠাপুকুর	৮৩	ধামাইরহাট	১২৬	মেহেরপুর সদর		
	৪১	পীরগঞ্জ	৮৪	মান্দা	১২৭	মুজিবনগর		
	৪২	তারাগঞ্জ	৮৫	পোরশা	১২৮	ভেড়ামারা		
০৭ কুড়িগ্রাম	৪৩	ভুরংগামারী	৮৬	সাপাহার	১২৯	দৌলতপুর		

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২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন-এর ৩১ ধারা বলে “প্রথম তফসিলের” পরিবর্তে প্রতিস্থাপিত।

জেলার নাম	ক্রমিক নং	উপজেলা	জেলার নাম	ক্রমিক নং	উপজেলা	জেলার নাম	ক্রমিক নং	উপজেলা
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১৯ চুয়াডাংগা	১৩০	মিরপুর	২৭ বরগুনা	১৭৯	আশাশুনি	৩৪ সিলেট	২২৮	তাহেরপুর			
	১৩১	খোকসা		১৮০	দেবহাটা		২২৯	দিরাই			
	১৩২	কুমারখালী		১৮১	কলারোয়া		২৩০	জামালগঞ্জ			
	১৩৩	কুষ্টিয়া সদর		১৮২	সাতক্ষীরা সদর		২৩১	জগন্নাথপুর			
	১৩৪	আলমডাঙ্গা		১৮৩	তালা		২৩২	সুনামগঞ্জ সদর			
	১৩৫	চুয়াডাংগা সদর		১৮৪	আমতলী		২৩৩	শাল্লা			
	১৩৬	দামুরহুদা		১৮৫	বরগুনা সদর		২৩৪	দক্ষিণ সুনামগঞ্জ			
	১৩৭	জীবননগর		১৮৬	পাথরঘাটা		২৩৫	বিয়ানী বাজার			
	২০ বিনাইদহ	১৩৮		কালীগঞ্জ	২৮ পটুয়াখালী		১৮৭	বেতাগী	৩৫ মৌলভী বাজার	২৩৬	কোম্পানীগঞ্জ
		১৩৯		কোটচাঁদপুর			১৮৮	বামনা		২৩৭	গোলাপগঞ্জ
১৪০		মহেশপুর	১৮৯	বাউফল		২৩৮	গোয়াইনঘাট				
১৪১		হরিণাকুন্ড	১৯০	মির্জাগঞ্জ		২৩৯	জৈন্তাপুর				
১৪২		বিনাইদাহ সদর	১৯১	পটুয়াখালী সদর		২৪০	কানাইঘাট				
১৪৩		শৈলকুপা	১৯২	দশমিনা		২৪১	জকিগঞ্জ				
২১ যশোর		১৪৪	চৌগাছা	২৯ ভোলা		১৯৩	গলাচিপা	৩৬ হবিগঞ্জ		২৪২	বালাগঞ্জ
		১৪৫	যশোর সদর			১৯৪	কলাপাড়া			২৪৩	বিশ্বনাথ
		১৪৬	বিকরগাছা			১৯৫	দুমকি			২৪৪	ফেঞ্চুগঞ্জ
		১৪৭	শারশা			১৯৬	চরফ্যাসন			২৪৫	সিলেট সদর
	১৪৮	অভয়নগর	১৯৭		লালমোহন	২৪৬	দক্ষিণ সুরমা				
	১৪৯	বাঘারপাড়া	১৯৮		মনপুরা	২৪৭	কমলগঞ্জ				
	২২ মাগুরা	১৫০	কেশবপুর		৩০ বরিশাল	১৯৯	তজুমদ্দিন		৩৭ বি-বাড়িয়া	২৪৮	মৌলভীবাজারসদর
		১৫১	মনিরামপুর			২০০	ভোলা সদর			২৪৯	রাজনগর
		১৫২	মোহাম্মাদপুর			২০১	বোরহান উদ্দিন			২৫০	বড়লেখা
		১৫৩	শালিখা			২০২	দৌলতখান			২৫১	কুলাউড়া
১৫৪		মাগুরা সদর	২০৩	আগৈলঝাড়া		২৫২	শ্রীমঙ্গল				
১৫৫		শ্রীপুর	২০৪	বরিশাল সদর		২৫৩	জুরি				
২৩ নড়াইল		১৫৬	লোহাগড়া	৩১ ঝালকাঠি		২০৫	বাবুগঞ্জ	৩৮ কুমিল্লা		২৫৪	আজমিরীগঞ্জ
		১৫৭	কালিয়া			২০৬	গৌরনদী			২৫৫	বানিয়াচং
		১৫৮	নড়াইল সদর			২০৭	উজিরপুর			২৫৬	লাখাই
		১৫৯	বাগেরহাট সদর			২০৮	হিজলা			২৫৭	নবীগঞ্জ
	১৬০	চিতলমারী	২০৯		বাকেরগঞ্জ	২৫৮	হবিগঞ্জ সদর				
	১৬১	ফকিরহাট	২১০		মেহেদীগঞ্জ	২৫৯	বাহুবল				
	১৬২	কচুয়া	২১১		মুলাদী	২৬০	চুনারুঘাট				
	১৬৩	মোল্লাহাট	২১২		বানালীপাড়া	২৬১	মাধবপুর				
	১৬৪	মোংলা	২১৩		ঝালকাঠি সদর	২৬২	বাঞ্চগরামপুর				
	২৪ বাগেরহাট	১৬৫	মোড়লগঞ্জ		৩২ পিরোজপুর	২১৪	রাজাপুর		৩৯ মুরাদনগর	২৬৩	নাছিরনগর
১৬৬		রামপাল	২১৫	কাঠালিয়া		২৬৪	নবীনগর				
১৬৭		শরণখোলা	২১৬	নলছিটি		২৬৫	সরাইল				
১৬৮		দীঘলিয়া	২১৭	ভান্ডারিয়া		২৬৬	বি-বাড়িয়া সদর				
১৬৯		ফুলতলা	২১৮	মঠবাড়িয়া		২৬৭	আখাউড়া				
১৭০		রূপসা	২১৯	পিরোজপুর সদর		২৬৮	কসবা				
১৭১		তেরখাদা	২২০	কাউখালি		২৬৯	আসুগঞ্জ				
১৭২		বটিয়াঘাটা	২২১	নাজিরপুর		২৭০	রুড়িচং				
১৭৩		দাকোপ	২২২	নেছারাবাদ		২৭১	চান্দিনা				
২৫ খুলনা		১৭৪	ডুমুরিয়া	৩৩ সুনামগঞ্জ		২২৩	জিয়ানগর	৪০ সিলেট		২৭২	দাউদকান্দি
	১৭৫	কয়রা	২২৪		বিশ্বম্ভপুর	২৭৩	দেবীদ্বার				
	১৭৬	পাইকগাছা	২২৫		ছাতক	২৭৪	হোমনা				
	১৭৭	কালীগঞ্জ	২২৬		ধর্মপাশা	২৭৫	মুরাদনগর				
	১৭৮	শ্যামনগর	২২৭		দোয়ারাবাজার						

জেলার নাম	ক্রমিক নং	উপজেলা	জেলার নাম	ক্রমিক নং	উপজেলা	জেলার নাম	ক্রমিক নং	উপজেলা
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৩৯ চাঁদপুর	২৭৬	বরুড়া	৪৪ কক্সবাজার	৩২৩	মিরশ্বরহাই	৪৯ জামালপুর	৩৭০	দেলদুয়ার
	২৭৭	ব্রাহ্মণপাড়া		৩২৪	রাসুনীয়া		৩৭১	বাসাইল
	২৭৮	চৌদ্দগ্রাম		৩২৫	রাউজান		৩৭২	ধনবাড়ী
	২৭৯	কুমিল্লা সদর		৩২৬	সন্দ্বীপ		৩৭৩	বক্সীগঞ্জ
	২৮০	লাকসাম		৩২৭	সীতাকুন্ড		৩৭৪	দেওয়ানগঞ্জ
	২৮১	লাঙ্গলকোট		৩২৮	চকরিয়া		৩৭৫	ইসলামপুর
	২৮২	মেঘনা		৩২৯	টেকনাফ		৩৭৬	মাদারগঞ্জ
	২৮৩	তিতাস		৩৩০	উখিয়া		৩৭৭	জামালপুর সদর
	২৮৪	মনহরগঞ্জ		৩৩১	রামু		৩৭৮	সরিষাবাড়ী
	২৮৫	কুমিল্লাসদরদক্ষিণ		৩৩২	কক্সবাজার সদর		৩৭৯	মেলান্দহ
৪০ ফেনী	২৮৬	ফরিদগঞ্জ	৪৫ খাগড়াছড়ি	৩৩৩	কুতুবদিয়া	৫০ শেরপুর	৩৮০	বিনাইগাতী
	২৮৭	হাইমচর		৩৩৪	মহেশখালী		৩৮১	নালিতাবাড়ী
	২৮৮	কচুয়া		৩৩৫	পেকুয়া		৩৮২	শ্রীবর্দি
	২৮৯	শাহরাস্তি		৩৩৬	দিঘীনালা		৩৮৩	নকলা
	২৯০	চাঁদপুর সদর		৩৩৭	খাগড়াছড়ি সদর		৩৮৪	শেরপুর সদর
	২৯১	হাজীগঞ্জ		৩৩৮	লক্ষীছড়ি		৩৮৫	ভালুকা
	২৯২	মতলব		৩৩৯	মহালছড়ি		৩৮৬	ফুলবাড়িয়া
	২৯৩	মতলব (উত্তর)		৩৪০	মানিকছড়ি		৩৮৭	গফরগাঁও
	২৯৪	ছাগলনাইয়া		৩৪১	মাটিরাসা		৩৮৮	ময়মনসিংহ সদর
	২৯৫	পশুরাম		৩৪২	পানছড়ি		৩৮৯	মুক্তাগাছা
৪১ নোয়াখালী	২৯৬	সোনাজী	৪৬ রাঙ্গামাটি	৩৪৩	রামগড়	৫১ ময়মনসিংহ	৩৯০	ত্রিশাল
	২৯৭	দাগনভূঞা		৩৪৪	বরকল		৩৯১	গৌরীপুর
	২৯৮	ফেনী সদর		৩৪৫	বাঘাইছড়ি		৩৯২	হালুয়াঘাট
	২৯৯	ফুলগাজী		৩৪৬	বিলাইছড়ি		৩৯৩	ইশ্বরগঞ্জ
	৩০০	চাটখিল		৩৪৭	জুরাইছড়ি		৩৯৪	নান্দাইল
	৩০১	কোম্পানীগঞ্জ		৩৪৮	কাপ্তাই		৩৯৫	ধোপাউড়া
	৩০২	হাতিয়া		৩৪৯	কাউখালী		৩৯৬	ফুলপুর
	৩০৩	সেনবাগ		৩৫০	লংগদু		৩৯৭	বারহাট্টা
	৩০৪	বেগমগঞ্জ		৩৫১	নানিয়ারচর		৩৯৮	খালিয়ানুরি
	৩০৫	নোয়াখালী সদর		৩৫২	রাজস্থলী		৩৯৯	কলমাকান্দা
৪২ লক্ষীপুর	৩০৬	সোনাইমুড়ি	৪৭ বান্দরবন	৩৫৩	রাঙ্গামাটি সদর	৫২ নেত্রকোনা	৪০০	মদন
	৩০৭	সুবর্ণচর		৩৫৪	আলীকদম		৪০১	মোহনগঞ্জ
	৩০৮	কবিরহাট		৩৫৫	বান্দরবন সদর		৪০২	আটপাড়া
	৩০৯	রায়পুর		৩৫৬	লামা		৪০৩	দুর্গাপুর
	৩১০	রামগতি		৩৫৭	নাইক্ষ্যংছড়ি		৪০৪	কেন্দুয়া
	৩১১	রামগঞ্জ		৩৫৮	রোয়াংছড়ি		৪০৫	নেত্রকোনা সদর
	৩১২	লক্ষীপুর সদর		৩৫৯	রুমা		৪০৬	পূর্বধলা
	৩১৩	কমলনগর		৩৬০	থানাচি		৪০৭	হোসেনপুর
	৩১৪	আনোয়ারা		৩৬১	গোপালপুর		৪০৮	ইটনা
	৩১৫	বাঁশখালী		৩৬২	কালিহাতী		৪০৯	করিমগঞ্জ
৪৩ চট্টগ্রাম	৩১৬	বোয়ালখালী	৪৮ টাংগাইল	৩৬৩	মধুপুর	৫৩ কিশোরগঞ্জ	৪১০	কিশোরগঞ্জ সদর
	৩১৭	চন্দনাইশ		৩৬৪	টাংগাইল সদর		৪১১	মিঠামইন
	৩১৮	লোহাগাড়া		৩৬৫	ভূয়াপুর		৪১২	পাকুন্দিয়া
	৩১৯	পটিয়া		৩৬৬	ঘাটাইল		৪১৩	তড়াইল
	৩২০	সাতকানিয়া		৩৬৭	মির্জাপুর		৪১৪	অষ্টগ্রাম
	৩২১	ফটিকছড়ি		৩৬৮	নাগরপুর		৪১৫	বাজিতপুর
	৩২২	হাটহাজারী		৩৬৯	সখিপুর		৪১৬	ভৈরববাজার

জেলার নাম	ক্রমিক নং	উপজেলা	জেলার নাম	ক্রমিক নং	উপজেলা	জেলার নাম	ক্রমিক নং	উপজেলা
৫৪ মানিকগঞ্জ	৪১৭	কুলিয়ারচর	৫৮ নরসিংদী	৪৪০	শ্রীপুর	৬২ গোপালগঞ্জ	৪৬৩	আলফাডাঙ্গা
	৪১৮	কটিয়াদি		৪৪১	কালিগঞ্জ		৪৬৪	বোয়ালমারী
	৪১৯	নিকলী		৪৪২	কাপাসিয়া		৪৬৫	মধুখালী
	৪২০	হরিরামপুর		৪৪৩	নরসিংদী সদর		৪৬৬	সালথা
	৪২১	মানিকগঞ্জ সদর		৪৪৪	ভেলাবো		৪৬৭	কাশিয়ানী
	৪২২	সিংগাইর		৪৪৫	রায়পুরা		৪৬৮	মকসুদপুর
	৪২৩	দৌলতপুর		৪৪৬	মনোহরদি		৪৬৯	গোপালগঞ্জ সদর
	৪২৪	ঘিওর		৪৪৭	পলাশ		৪৭০	কোটালী পাড়া
	৪২৫	সাতুরিয়া		৪৪৮	শিবপুর		৪৭১	টুঙ্গীপাড়া
	৪২৬	শিবালয়		৪৪৯	আড়াইহাজার		৪৭২	রাজৈর
৫৫ মুন্সিগঞ্জ	৪২৭	লৌহজং	৫৯ নারায়ণগঞ্জ	৪৫০	সোনারগাঁও	৬৩ মাদারীপুর	৪৭৩	শিবচর
	৪২৮	সিরাজদিখান		৪৫১	রূপগঞ্জ		৪৭৪	কালকিনি
	৪২৯	শ্রীনগর		৪৫২	বন্দর		৪৭৫	মাদারীপুর সদর
	৪৩০	গজারিয়া		৪৫৩	নারায়নগঞ্জ	৬৪ শরীয়তপুর	৪৭৬	নাড়িয়া
	৪৩১	মুন্সিগঞ্জ সদর	৬০ রাজবাড়ী	৪৫৪	সদর		৪৭৭	শরীয়তপুর সদর
৫৬ ঢাকা	৪৩২	টঙ্গীবাড়ী		৪৫৫	গোয়ালন্দ		৪৭৮	জাজিরা
	৪৩৩	ধামরাই		৪৫৬	রাজবাড়ী সদর		৪৭৯	ভেদরগঞ্জ
	৪৩৪	কেরানীগঞ্জ		৪৫৭	বালিয়াকান্দি		৪৮০	ডামুড়া
	৪৩৫	সাভার	৬১ ফরিদপুর	৪৫৮	পাংসা		৪৮১	গোসাইরহাট।
	৪৩৬	দোহার		৪৫৯	ভাংগা			
৫৭ গাজীপুর	৪৩৭	নওয়াবগঞ্জ		৪৬০	চরভদ্রাসন			
	৪৩৮	গাজীপুর সদর		৪৬১	নগরকান্দা			
	৪৩৯	কালিয়াকৈর		৪৬২	ফরিদপুর সদর			

## দ্বিতীয় তফসিল

[ধারা ২৩ দ্রষ্টব্য]

উপজেলা পরিষদের কার্যাবলী

- ১। পাঁচসালা ও বিভিন্ন মেয়াদী উন্নয়ন পরিকল্পনা তৈরী করা।
- ২। পরিষদের নিকট হস্তান্তরিত বিভিন্ন সরকারী দপ্তরের কর্মসূচী বাস্তবায়ন এবং উক্ত দপ্তরের কাজকর্মসমূহের তত্ত্বাবধান এবং সমন্বয় করা।
- ৩। আন্তঃইউনিয়ন সংযোগকারী রাস্তা নির্মাণ, মেরামত ও রক্ষণাবেক্ষণ করা।
- ৪। ভূ-উপরিষ্ক পানি সম্পদের সর্বোত্তম ব্যবহার নিশ্চিত করিবার জন্য সরকারের নির্দেশনা অনুসারে উপজেলা পরিষদ ক্ষুদ্র সেচ প্রকল্প গ্রহণ ও বাস্তবায়ন।
- ৫। জনস্বাস্থ্য, পুষ্টি ও পরিবার পরিকল্পনা সেবা নিশ্চিতকরণ।
- ৬। স্যানিটেশন ও পয়ঃনিষ্কাশন ব্যবস্থার উন্নতি সাধন এবং সুপেয় পানীয় জলের সরবরাহের ব্যবস্থা গ্রহণ।
- ৭। (ক) উপজেলা পর্যায়ে শিক্ষা প্রসারের জন্য উদ্বুদ্ধকরণ এবং সহায়তা প্রদান।  
(খ) মাধ্যমিক শিক্ষা এবং মাদ্রাসা শিক্ষা কার্যক্রমের মান উন্নয়নের লক্ষ্যে সংশ্লিষ্ট প্রতিষ্ঠানগুলির কার্যক্রম তদারকী ও উহাদিগকে সহায়তা প্রদান।
- ৮। কুটির ও ক্ষুদ্র শিল্প স্থাপন ও বিকাশের লক্ষ্যে কার্যক্রম গ্রহণ।
- ৯। সমবায় সমিতি ও বেসরকারি স্বেচ্ছাসেবী প্রতিষ্ঠানের কাজে সহায়তা প্রদান এবং উহাদের কাজে সমন্বয় সাধন।
- ১০। মহিলা, শিশু, সমাজকল্যাণ এবং যুব, ক্রীড়া ও সাংস্কৃতিক কার্যক্রমে সহায়তা প্রদান এবং বাস্তবায়ন করা।
- ১১। কৃষি, গবাদি পশু, মৎস এবং বনজ সম্পদ উন্নয়নে কার্যক্রম গ্রহণ ও বাস্তবায়ন।
- ১২। উপজেলায় আইন-শৃঙ্খলা পরিস্থিতির উন্নয়নসহ পুলিশ বিভাগের কার্যক্রম আলোচনা এবং নিয়মিতভাবে উর্ধ্বতন কর্তৃপক্ষের নিকট প্রতিবেদন প্রেরণ।
- ১৩। আত্মকর্মসংস্থান সৃষ্টি এবং দারিদ্র বিমোচনের জন্য নিজ উদ্যোগে কর্মসূচি গ্রহণ, বাস্তবায়ন এবং এতদসম্পর্কে সরকারী কর্মসূচি বাস্তবায়নে সরকারকে প্রয়োজনীয় সহায়তা প্রদান।
- ১৪। ইউনিয়ন পরিষদের উন্নয়ন কার্যক্রমের সমন্বয় সাধন ও পরীক্ষণ এবং প্রয়োজনীয় সহায়তা প্রদান।
- ১৫। নারী ও শিশু নির্যাতন ইত্যাদি অপরাধ সংগঠিত হওয়ার বিরুদ্ধে জনমত সৃষ্টিসহ অন্যান্য প্রতিরোধমূলক কার্যক্রম গ্রহণ।
- ১৬। সন্ত্রাস, চুরি, ডাকাতি, চোরাচালন, মাদক দ্রব্য ব্যবহার ইত্যাদি অপরাধ সংগঠিত হওয়ার বিরুদ্ধে জনমত সৃষ্টিসহ অন্যান্য প্রতিরোধমূলক কার্যক্রম গ্রহণ।
- ১৭। পরিবেশ সংরক্ষণ ও উন্নয়নের লক্ষ্যে সামাজিক বনায়নসহ অন্যান্য কার্যক্রম গ্রহণ।
- ১৮। সরকার কর্তৃক সময়ে সময়ে প্রদত্ত অন্যান্য কার্যাবলী।

**তৃতীয় তফসিল**  
[ধারা ২৪ দ্রষ্টব্য]

সরকার কর্তৃক উপজেলা পরিষদের নিকট হস্তান্তরযোগ্য প্রতিষ্ঠান ও কর্মের তালিকা

ক্রমিক নং	মন্ত্রণালয়/বিভাগের নাম	উপজেলা পরিষদের নিকট ন্যস্তকৃত সরকারের বিষয় অথবা দপ্তর
১।	যুব ও ক্রীড়া মন্ত্রণালয়	যুব উন্নয়ন অধিদপ্তর এর অধীনস্থ থানা যুব উন্নয়ন কর্মকর্তা, কর্মচারী এবং জনবল।
২।	সংস্থাপন মন্ত্রণালয়	উপজেলা নির্বাহী কর্মকর্তা ও তাহার অধীনস্থ কর্মচারীগণ ও তাদের কার্যাবলী।
৩।	মৎস ও পশুসম্পদ মন্ত্রণালয়	(১) মৎস অধিদপ্তরের অধীনস্থ থানা মৎস কর্মকর্তা ও তাঁর অধীনস্থ কর্মচারী; এবং (২) পশুসম্পদ অধিদপ্তরের অধীনস্থ থানা পশুসম্পদ কর্মকর্তা ও তাহার অধীনস্থ কর্মচারী এবং তাদের কার্যক্রম।
৪।	স্বাস্থ্য ও পরিবার কল্যাণ মন্ত্রণালয়	স্বাস্থ্য ও পরিবার পরিকল্পনা মন্ত্রণালয়ের অধীনস্থ থানা স্বাস্থ্য ও পরিবার পরিকল্পনা কর্মকর্তা ও তাঁর অধীনস্থ কর্মকর্তা/কর্মচারী, থানা পরিবার পরিকল্পনা কর্মকর্তা, স্বাস্থ্য অধিদপ্তরের নিয়ন্ত্রণাধীন থানা স্বাস্থ্য কম্প্লেক্স এবং অন্যান্য সংশ্লিষ্ট কার্যাবলী।
৫।	মহিলা ও শিশু বিষয় মন্ত্রণালয়	মহিলা অধিদপ্তরের অধীনস্থ থানা মহিলা বিষয়ক কর্মকর্তা ও তাঁর অধীনস্থ কর্মকর্তা/কর্মচারী এবং তাদের কার্যক্রম।
৬।	প্রাথমিক শিক্ষা বিভাগ	প্রাথমিক শিক্ষা অধিদপ্তরের থানা প্রাথমিক শিক্ষা কর্মকর্তা ও তাঁর অধীনস্থ কর্মচারীগণ।
৭।	স্থানীয় সরকার, পল্লী উন্নয়ন ও সমবায় মন্ত্রণালয়	(১) স্থানীয় সরকার প্রকৌশল অধিদপ্তরের অধীনস্থ থানা ইঞ্জিনিয়ার ও তাহার অধীনস্থ কর্মকর্তা/কর্মচারী এবং তাদের কার্যাবলী। (২) জনস্বাস্থ্য প্রকৌশল অধিদপ্তরের অধীনস্থ থানা পর্যায়ে উপ-সহকারী প্রকৌশলী ও তাঁর অধীনস্থ কর্মচারী ও তাদের কার্যাবলী।
৮।	কৃষি মন্ত্রণালয়	কৃষি সম্প্রসারণ অধিদপ্তরের অধীনস্থ থানা কৃষি কর্মকর্তা ও তাঁর অধীনস্থ কর্মকর্তা/কর্মচারী এবং তাদের কার্যাবলী।
৯।	দুর্যোগ ব্যবস্থাপনা ও ত্রাণ মন্ত্রণালয়	ত্রাণ ও পুনর্বাসন অধিদপ্তরের আওতাধীন থানা পর্যায়ে প্রকল্প বাস্তবায়ন কর্মকর্তা (PIO) ও তাঁর অধীনস্থ কর্মচারীগণ ও তাদের কার্যাবলী।
১০।	সমাজকল্যাণ মন্ত্রণালয়	সমাজসেবা অধিদপ্তরের অধীনস্থ থানা সমাজসেবা কর্মকর্তা ও তাঁর অধীনস্থ কর্মচারী ও তাদের কার্যাবলী।

## চতুর্থ তফসিল

[ধারা ৪৪ দ্রষ্টব্য]

উপজেলা পরিষদ কর্তৃক আরোপনীয় কর, রেইট, টোল, ফিস এবং অন্যান্য সূত্র হইতে প্রাপ্ত আয়

- ১। উপজেলার আওতাভুক্ত এলাকায় অবস্থিত সরকার কর্তৃক নির্ধারিত হাট-বাজার, হস্তান্তরিত জলমহাল ও ফেরীঘাট হইতে ইজারালব্ধ আয়।
- ২। যে সকল উপজেলায় পৌরসভা গঠিত হয় নাই সেখানে সীমানা নির্ধারণ পূর্বক উক্ত সীমানা, অতঃপর থানা সদর বলিয়া উল্লিখিত, এর মধ্যে অবস্থিত ব্যবসা-বানিজ্য প্রতিষ্ঠান ও শিল্প কারখানার উপর ধার্যকৃত কর।
- ৩। (ক) যে সকল উপজেলায় পৌরসভা নাই সেখানে থানা সদরে অবস্থিত সিনেমার উপর কর।  
(খ) নাটক, থিয়েটার ও যাত্রার উপর করের অংশ বিশেষ, যাহা বিধি দ্বারা নির্ধারিত হয়।
- ৪। রাস্তা আলোকিতকরণের উপর ধার্যকৃত কর।
- ৫। বেসরকারীভাবে আয়োজিত মেলা, প্রদশনী ও বিনোদনমূলক অনুষ্ঠানের উপর ধার্যকৃত ফি।
- ৬। ইউনিয়ন পরিষদের নির্ধারিত খাত এবং সংশ্লিষ্ট উপজেলার আওতা বহির্ভূত খাত ব্যতীত বিভিন্ন ব্যবসা, বৃত্তি ও পেশার উপর পরিষদ কর্তৃক প্রদত্ত লাইসেন্স ও পারমিটের উপর ধার্যকৃত ফি।
- ৭। পরিষদ কর্তৃক পদন্ত সেবার উপর ধার্যকৃত ফিস ইত্যাদি।
- ৮। উপজেলা এলাকাভুক্ত সম্পত্তি হস্তান্তর বাবদ আদায়কৃত রেজিস্ট্রেশন ফিসের ১% এবং আদায়কৃত ভূমি উন্নয়ন করের ২% অংশ।
- ৯। সরকার কর্তৃক সময়ে সময়ে নির্দেশিত অন্য কোন খাতের উপর আরোপিত কর, রেইট, টোল ফিস বা অন্য কোন উৎস হইতে অর্জিত আয়।

## পঞ্চম তফসিল

(এই আইনের অধীনে অপরাধসমূহ)

- ১। উপজেলা পরিষদ কর্তৃক আইনগতভাবে ধার্যকৃত কর, টোল, রেইট, ফিস ইত্যাদি ফাঁকি দেওয়া।
- ২। এই আইন, বিধি বা প্রবিধানের অধীন যে সকল বিষয়ে উপজেলা পরিষদ তথ্য চাহিতে পারে সেই সকল বিষয়ে উপজেলা পরিষদের তলব অনুযায়ী তথ্য সরবরাহের ব্যর্থতা বা ভুল তথ্য সরবরাহ।
- ৩। এই আইন, বিধি বা প্রবিধানের বিধান অনুযায়ী যে কার্যের জন্য লাইসেন্স বা অনুমতি প্রয়োজন হয় সে কার্য বিনা লাইসেন্সে বা বিনা অনুমতিতে সম্পাদন।
- ৪। এই আইন, বিধি বা প্রবিধানের বিধানাবলী লংঘন বা উহার অধীন জারীকৃত নির্দেশ বা ঘোষণার লংঘন।



অতিরিক্ত সংখ্যা  
কর্তৃপক্ষ কর্তৃক প্রকাশিত

বৃহস্পতিবার, ডিসেম্বর ১, ২০১১

বাংলাদেশ জাতীয় সংসদ

ঢাকা, ১ ডিসেম্বর ২০১১/১৭ অগ্রহায়ণ ১৪১৮

সংসদ কর্তৃক গৃহীত নিম্নলিখিত আইনটি ১ ডিসেম্বর ২০১১/১৭ অগ্রহায়ণ ১৪১৮ তারিখে রাষ্ট্রপতির সম্মতিলাভ করিয়াছে এবং এতদ্বারা এই আইনটি সর্বসাধারণের অবগতির জন্য প্রকাশ করা যাইতেছে :-

২০১১ সনের ২১ নং আইন

উপজেলা পরিষদ আইন, ১৯৯৮ এর অধিকতর সংশোধনকল্পে প্রণীত আইন

যেহেতু নিম্নবর্ণিত উদ্দেশ্যসমূহ পূরণকল্পে উপজেলা পরিষদ আইন, ১৯৯৮ (১৯৯৮ সনের ২৪ নং আইন) এর অধিকতর সংশোধন সমীচীন ও প্রয়োজনীয়;

সেহেতু এতদ্বারা নিম্নরূপ আইন করা হইল :-

১। সংক্ষিপ্ত শিরোনাম ও প্রবর্তন।- (১) এই আইন উপজেলা পরিষদ (সংশোধন) আইন, ২০১১ নামে অভিহিত হইবে।

(৩) ইহা অবিলম্বে কার্যকর হইবে।

২। ১৯৯৮ সনের ২৪ নং আইন এর ধারা ৬ এর সংশোধন।- উপজেলা পরিষদ আইন, ১৯৯৮ (১৯৯৮ সনের ২৪ নং আইন), অতঃপর উক্ত আইন বলিয়া উল্লিখিত, এর ধারা ৬ এর-

(ক) উপ-ধারা (৭) এর পরিবর্তে নিম্নরূপ উপ-ধারা (৭) প্রতিস্থাপিত হইবে, যথা :-

“(৭) কোন পরিষদের চেয়ারম্যান ও দুইজন ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান এই তিনটি পদের মধ্যে যে কোন একটি পদসহ শতকরা ৭৫ ভাগ সদস্যের নির্বাচন অনুষ্ঠিত হইলে এবং নির্বাচিত সদস্যগণের নাম সরকারি গেজেটে প্রকাশিত হইলে, পরিষদ, এই আইনের অন্যান্য বিধান সাপেক্ষে, যথাযথভাবে গঠিত হইয়াছে বলিয়া বিবেচিত হইবে;” এবং

(খ) উপ-ধারা (৭) এর পর নিম্নরূপ উপ-ধারা (৮) সন্নিবেশিত হইবে, যথা :-

“(৮) উপ-ধারা (৭) এর বিধান অনুসারে পরিষদ যথাযথভাবে গঠিত না হওয়া পর্যন্ত অথবা ধারা ১৪ এর বিধান অনুসারে একই সময়ে চেয়ারম্যান ও দুইজন ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান এই তিনটি পদই শূন্য হইলে বা থাকিলে পরিষদের যাবতীয় দায়িত্ব সরকার কর্তৃক নিয়োজিত ব্যক্তি বা কর্তৃপক্ষ সরকার কর্তৃক নির্ধারিত পদ্ধতিতে পালন করিবে।”।

৩। ১৯৯৮ সনের ২৪ নং আইন এর ধারা ৮ এর প্রতিস্থাপন।- উক্ত আইন এর ধারা ৮ এর পরিবর্তে নিম্নরূপ ধারা ৮ প্রতিস্থাপন হইবে, যথা :-

“৮। চেয়ারম্যান ও ভাইস চেয়ারম্যানের যোগ্যতা ও অযোগ্যতা।- (১) কোন ব্যক্তি উপ-ধারা (২) এর বিধান সাপেক্ষে, চেয়ারম্যান ও ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান নির্বাচিত হইবার যোগ্য হইবেন, যদি -

- (ক) তিনি বাংলাদেশের নাগরিক হন;
- (খ) তাঁহার বয়স পঁচিশ বৎসর পূর্ণ হয়; এবং
- (গ) তিনি ধারা ১৯ এ উল্লিখিত ভোটার তালিকাভুক্ত হন।

(২) কোন ব্যক্তি চেয়ারম্যান ও ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান নির্বাচিত হইবার এবং থাকিবার যোগ্য হইবেন না, যদি তিনি-

- (ক) বাংলাদেশের নাগরিকত্ব পরিত্যাগ করেন বা হারান;
- (খ) কোন উপযুক্ত আদালত কর্তৃক অপ্রকৃতিস্থ বলিয়া ঘোষিত হন;
- (গ) দেউলিয়া ঘোষিত হন এবং দেউলিয়া ঘোষিত হইবার পর দায় হইতে অব্যাহতি লাভ না করিয়া থাকেন;
- (ঘ) কোন নৈতিক ঞ্জনজনিত ফৌজদারি অপরাধে দোষী সাব্যস্ত হইয়া অন্যান্য দুই বৎসর কারাদণ্ডে দণ্ডিত হন এবং তাঁহার মুক্তি লাভের পর পাঁচ বৎসর অতিবাহিত না হইয়া থাকে;
- (ঙ) প্রজাতন্ত্রের বা পরিষদের অন্য কোন স্থানীয় কর্তৃপক্ষের কোন লাভজনক পদে সার্বক্ষণিক অধিষ্ঠিত থাকেন;
- (চ) তিনি জাতীয় সংসদে সদস্য বা অন্য কোন স্থানীয় কর্তৃপক্ষের চেয়ারম্যান বা সদস্য হন বা থাকেন;
- (ছ) কোন বিদেশী রাষ্ট্র হইতে অনুদান বা তহবিল গ্রহণ করে এইরূপ বেসরকারী সংস্থার প্রধান নির্বাহী পদ হইতে পদত্যাগ বা অবসর গ্রহণ বা পদচ্যুতির পর এক বৎসর অতিবাহিত হইয়া থাকেন;
- (জ) কোন সমবায় সমিতি এবং সরকারের মধ্যে সম্পাদিত চুক্তি ব্যতীত, সংশ্লিষ্ট উপজেলা এলাকায় সরকারকে পণ্য সরবরাহ করিবার জন্য বা সরকার কর্তৃক গৃহীত কোন চুক্তির বাস্তবায়ন বা সেবা কার্যক্রম সম্পাদনের জন্য, তাঁহার নিজ নামে বা তাঁহার ট্রাস্টি হিসাবে কোন ব্যক্তি বা ব্যক্তিবর্গের না বা তাঁর সুবিধার্থে বা তাঁহার উপলক্ষে বা কোন হিন্দু যৌথ পরিবারের সদস্য হিসাবে তাঁহার কোন অংশ বা স্বার্থ আছে এইরূপ চুক্তিতে আবদ্ধ হইয়া থাকেন;

ব্যাখ্যা।- উপরি-উক্ত দফা (জ) এর উল্লিখিত অযোগ্যতা কোন ব্যক্তির ক্ষেত্রে প্রযোজ্য হইবে না যেই ক্ষেত্রে-

(অ) চুক্তিতে অংশ বা স্বার্থ তাঁহার উত্তরাধিকারসূত্রে বা উইলসূত্রে প্রাপক, নির্বাহক বা ব্যবস্থাপক হিসাবে হস্তান্তরিত হয়, যদি না উহা হস্তান্তরিত হইবার পর ছয় মাস অতিবাহিত হয়; অথবা

(আ) কোম্পানী আইন, ১৯৯৪ (১৯৯৪ সনের ১৮ নং আইন) এ সংজ্ঞায়িত কোন পাবলিক কোম্পানির দ্বারা বা পক্ষে চুক্তি সম্পাদিত হইয়াছে যাহার তিনি একজন শেয়ারহোল্ডার মাত্র, তবে উহার অধীন তিনি কোন লাভজনক পদে অধিষ্ঠিত পরিচালকও নহেন ম্যানেজিং এজেন্টও নহেন; অথবা

(ই) তিনি কোন যৌথ হিন্দু পরিবারের সদস্য হিসাবে চুক্তিটিতে তাঁহার অংশ বা স্বার্থ নাই এইরূপ কোন স্বতন্ত্র ব্যবসা পরিচালনাকালে পরিবারের অন্য কোন সদস্য কর্তৃক চুক্তি সম্পাদিত হইয়া থাকে;

(ঝ) তাহার পরিবারের কোন সদস্য সংশ্লিষ্ট উপজেলার কার্য সম্পাদনে বা মালামাল সরবরাহের জন্য ঠিকাদার নিযুক্ত হন বা ইহার জন্য নিযুক্ত ঠিকাদারী প্রতিষ্ঠানের অংশীদার হন বা উপজেলার কোন বিষয়ে তাঁহার কোন প্রকার আর্থিক স্বার্থ থাকে;

ব্যাখ্যা।- দফা (ঝ) এর উদ্দেশ্য সাধনকল্পে “পরিবার” অর্থে সংশ্লিষ্ট ব্যক্তির উপর নির্ভরশীল তাহার পিতা, মাতা, ভাই, বোন, স্ত্রী, পুত্র ও কন্যাকে বুঝাইবে।

(ঞ) মনোনয়নপত্র জমা দেওয়ার তারিখে কোন ব্যাংক বা আর্থিক প্রতিষ্ঠান হইতে গৃহীত কোন ঋণ মেয়াদোত্তীর্ণ অবস্থায় অনাদায়ী রাখেন ; তবে শর্ত থাকে যে, কোন ব্যাংক বা আর্থিক প্রতিষ্ঠান হইতে গৃহীত নিজস্ব বসবাসের নিমিত্ত গৃহ-নির্মাণ অথবা ক্ষুদ্র কৃষি ঋণ ইহার আওতাভুক্ত হইবে না;

(ট) এমন কোন কোম্পানির পরিচালক বা ফার্মের অংশীদার হন যাহার কোন ব্যাংক বা আর্থিক প্রতিষ্ঠান হইতে গৃহীত কোন ঋণ বা উহার কোন কিস্তি, মনোনয়নপত্র জমা দেওয়ার তারিখে পরিশোধে খেলাপী হইয়াছেন;

ব্যাখ্যা।- উপরি-উক্ত দফা (ঞ) ও (ট) এর উদ্দেশ্য সাধনকল্পে “খেরাপী” অর্থ ঋণ গ্রহীতা ছাড়াও যিনি বা যাহাদের স্বার্থ সংশ্লিষ্ট কোম্পানী বা ফার্ম Banker’s Book of Account এ ঋণ খেলাপী হিসাবে চিহ্নিত আছে তাঁহাদেরকেও বুঝাইবে।

(ঠ) পরিষদের নিকট হইতে কোন ঋণ গ্রহণ করেন এবং তাহা অনাদায়ী থাকে;

(ড) সরকার কর্তৃক নিয়োগকৃত নিরীক্ষকের প্রতিবেদন অনুযায়ী নির্ধারিত দায়কৃত অর্থ পরিষদকে পরিশোধ না করিয়া থাকেন;

(ঢ) কোন সরকারি বা আধা-সরকারি দপ্তর, কোন সংবিধিবদ্ধ সরকারি কর্তৃপক্ষ, স্বায়ত্তশাসিত সংস্থা, স্থানীয় কর্তৃপক্ষ, সমবায় সমিতি বা প্রতিরক্ষা কর্ম বিভাগের চাকুরী হইতে নৈতিক স্বলন, দুর্নীতি, অসদাচরন ইত্যাদি অপরাধে দোষী সাব্যস্ত হইয়া চাকুরীচ্যুত, অপসারিত বা

বাধ্যতামূলক অবসরপ্রাপ্ত হইয়াছেন এবং তাঁহার এইরূপ চাকুরীচ্যুতি, অপসারণ বা বাধ্যতামূলক অবসরের পর পাঁচ বৎসর কাল অতিক্রান্ত না হইয়া থাকে;

(গ) উপজেলা পরিষদের তহবিল তসরফের কারণে দন্ডপ্রাপ্ত হন;

(ত) বিগত পাঁচ বৎসরের মধ্যে যে কোন সময়ে দন্ডবিধির ধারা ১৮৯, ১৯২, ২১৩, ৩৩২, ৩৩৩ ও ৩৫৩ এর অধীন দোষী সাব্যস্ত হইয়া সাজাপ্রাপ্ত হন;

(থ) জাতীয় বা আন্তর্জাতিক আদালত ট্রাইব্যুনাল কর্তৃক যুদ্ধাপরাধী হিসাবে দোষী সাব্যস্ত হন;

(দ) কোন আদালত কর্তৃক ফেরারী আসামী হিসাবে ঘোষিত হন।

(৩) প্রত্যেক উপজেলা পরিষদ চেয়ারম্যান ও ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান প্রার্থী মনোনয়নপত্র দাখিলের সময় এই মর্মে একটি হলফনামা দাখিল করিবেন যে, উপ-ধারা (২) এর অধীন তিনি উপজেলা পরিষদের চেয়ারম্যান ও ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান নির্বাচনের অযোগ্য নহেন।”।

৪। ১৯৯৮ সনের ২৪ নং আইন এর ধারা ৯ এর সংশোধন।- উক্ত আইন এর ধারা ৯ এর উপ-ধারা (২) এর পরিবর্তে নিম্নরূপ উপ-ধারা (২) প্রতিস্থাপিত হইবে, যথা :-

“(২) চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান বা মহিলা সদস্য হিসাবে নির্বাচিত ব্যক্তিগণের নাম সরকারি গেজেটে প্রকাশিত হওয়ার ৩০ (ত্রিশ) দিনের মধ্যে চেয়ারম্যানসহ সকল সদস্যের শপথ গ্রহণ বা ঘোষণার জন্য সরকার বা তদকর্তৃক নির্ধারিত কর্তৃপক্ষ প্রয়োজনীয় ব্যবস্থা গ্রহণ করিবেন ; তবে শর্ত থাকে যে, যথাযথ কারণ বিদ্যমান থাকার ক্ষেত্রে সরকার বা তদকর্তৃক নির্ধারিত কর্তৃপক্ষ উল্লিখিত মেয়াদ অতিবাহিত হইবার পর মেয়াদ বর্ধিত করিতে পারিবে, তবে এইরূপ বর্ধিত মেয়াদ উল্লিখিত গেজেট বিজ্ঞপ্তি প্রকাশিত হওয়ার তারিখ হইতে কোনক্রমেই নব্বই দিন অতিক্রম করিবে না।”।

৫। ১৯৯৮ সনের ২৪ নং আইন এর ধারা ১৩ এর প্রতিস্থাপন।- উক্ত আইন এর ধারা ১৩ এর পরিবর্তে নিম্নরূপ ধারা ১৩ প্রতিস্থাপিত হইবে, যথা :-

“১৩। চেয়ারম্যান ইত্যাদির অপসারণ।- (১) চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান বা মহিলা সদস্যসহ যে কোন সদস্য তাঁহার স্বীয় পদ হইতে অপসারণযোগ্য হইবেন, যদি তিনি-

(ক) যুক্তিসঙ্গত কারণ ব্যতিরেকে পরিষদের পর পর তিনটি সভায় অনুপস্থিত থাকেন;

(খ) পরিষদ বা রাষ্ট্রের স্বার্থের হানিকর কোন কার্যকলাপে জড়িত থাকেন অথবা নৈতিক স্বলনজনিত অপরাধে আদালত কর্তৃক দন্ডপ্রাপ্ত হন;

(গ) অসদাচরন, দুর্নীতি বা ক্ষমতার অপব্যবহারের দায়ে দোষী সাব্যস্ত হন অথবা পরিষদের কোন অর্থ বা সম্পত্তির ক্ষতি সাধন বা উহার আত্মসাতের বা অপপ্রয়োগের জন্য দায়ী হন;

(ঘ) তাঁহার দায়িত্ব পালন করিতে অস্বীকার করেন অথবা শারীরিক বা মানসিক অসামর্থের কারণে তাঁহার দায়িত্ব পালনে অক্ষম হন;

(ঙ) নির্বাচনের পর ধারা ৮ (২) অনুযায়ী নির্বাচনের অযোগ্য ছিলেন মর্মে প্রমানিত হন;

(চ) বার্ষিক ১২ (বার) টি মাসিক সভার মধ্যে ন্যূনতম ৯ (নয়) টি সভায় গ্রহণযোগ্য কারণ ব্যতিরেকে যোগদান করিতে যোগদান করিতে ব্যর্থ হন;

[ব্যাখ্যা।- (অ) এই উপ-ধারায় বর্ণিত ‘অসদাচরন’ বলিতে ক্ষমতার অপব্যবহার, ধারা ১০ অনুযায়ী সম্পত্তি সম্পর্কিত ঘোষণা প্রদান না করা কিংবা অসত্য হলফনামা দাখিল করা, আইন ও বিধির পরিপন্থী কার্য কলাপ, দুর্নীতি, অসদুপায়ে ব্যক্তিগত সুবিধা গ্রহণ, পক্ষপাতিত্ব, স্বজনপ্রীতি, ইচ্ছাকৃত অপশাসন, ইত্যাদি বুঝাইবে।

(আ) এই উপ-ধারায় বর্ণিত ‘নৈতিক স্বলনজনিত অপরাধ’ বলিতে দন্ডবিধিতে সংজ্ঞায়িত চাঁদাবাজি, চুরি, দস্যুতা, ডাকাতি, ছিনতাই, সম্পত্তি আত্মসাৎ, বিশ্বাস ভংগ, ধর্ষণ, হত্যা, খুন এবং Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Act. II of 1947) এ সংজ্ঞায়িত ‘Criminal misconduct’ ইত্যাদি বুঝাইবে।]

(২) সরকার, সরকারি গেজেট প্রজ্ঞাপন দ্বারা উপ-ধারা (১) এ বর্ণিত কারণে চেয়ারম্যান বা ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান বা মহিলা সদস্য বা যে কোন সদস্যকে অপসারণ করিতে পারিবে ;

তবে শর্ত থাকে যে, অপসারণের সিদ্ধান্ত চূড়ান্ত করিবার পূর্বে, বিধি দ্বারা নির্ধারিত পদ্ধতিতে, তদন্ত করিতে ও অভিযুক্তকে আত্মপক্ষসমর্থনের সুযোগ দিতে হইবে।

(৩) একজন চেয়ারম্যান বা ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান বা মহিলা সদস্য বা যে কোন সদস্য উপ-ধারা (২) অনুসারে সরকার কর্তৃক আদেশ প্রদানের পর তাৎক্ষণিকভাবে অপসারিত হইবেন।

(৪) চেয়ারম্যান বা ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান বা মহিলা সদস্য বা যে কোন সদস্যকে উপ-ধারা (২) অনুযায়ী তাঁহার পদ হইতে অপসারণ করা হইলে, উক্ত অপসারণ আদেশের তারিখ হইতে ত্রিশ দিনের মধ্যে তিনি সরকারের নিকট উক্ত আদেশ পুনর্বিবেচনার জন্য আবেদন করিতে পারিবেন।

(৫) উপ-ধারা (৪) এর অধীন পুনর্বিবেচনার জন্য আবেদন করা হইলে উহা নিষ্পত্তি না হওয়া পর্যন্ত উপ-ধারা (২) এ পদত অপসারণ আদেশটি স্থগিত রাখিতে পারিবেন এবং আবেদনকারীকে বক্তব্য উপস্থাপনের সুযোগ প্রদানের পর উক্ত আদেশটি পরিবর্তন, বাতিল বা বহাল রাখিতে পারিবেন।

(৬) উপ-ধার (৫) এর অধীন সরকার কর্তৃক প্রদত্ত আদেশ চূড়ান্ত বলিয়া গণ্য হইবে।

(৭) এই আইনের অন্যান্য বিধানে যাহা কিছুই থাকুক না কেন, এই ধারা অনুযায়ী অপসারিত কোন ব্যক্তি কোন পদে অবশিষ্ট মেয়াদের জন্য নির্বাচিত হইবার যোগ্য হইবেন না।”।

৬। ১৯৯৮ সনের ২৪ নং আইন এর ধারা ১৩ এর পর নতুন ধারা ১৩ক, ১৩খ ও ১৩গ এর সন্নিবেশ।- উক্ত আইন এর ধারা ১৩ এর পর নিম্নরূপ নতুন ধারা ১৩ক, ১৩খ ও ১৩গ সন্নিবেশ হইবে, যথাঃ-

“১৩ক। অনাস্থা প্রস্তাব।- (১) এ আইনের কোন বিধান লংঘন বা গুরুতর অসদাচরণের অভিযোগে বা শারীরিক বা মানসিক অসামর্থ্যের কারণে পরিষদের চেয়ারম্যান বা ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান বা মহিলা সদস্য বা যে কোন সদস্যের বিরুদ্ধে অনাস্থা প্রস্তাব আনয়ন করা যাইবে।

(২) উপ-ধারা (১)- অনুযায়ী অনাস্থা প্রস্তাব পরিষদের চার-পঞ্চমাংশ সদস্যের স্বাক্ষরে লিখিতভাবে সংশ্লিষ্ট বিভাগীয় কমিশনারের নিকট দাখিল করিতে হইবে।

(৩) অনাস্থা প্রস্তাব প্রাপ্তির পর বিভাগীয় কমিশনার অভিযোগের বিষয় সম্পর্কে তদন্ত করিবার উদ্দেশ্যে পনের কার্যদিবসের মধ্যে অতিরিক্ত বিভাগীয় কমিশনারকে তদন্ত কর্মকর্তা নিয়োগ করিবেন এবং উক্ত কর্মকর্তা অভিযোগসমূহের বিষয়ে বক্তব্য প্রদানের জন্য দশ কার্যদিবসের সময় প্রদান করিয়া অভিযুক্ত চেয়ারম্যান বা ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান বা মহিলা সদস্য বা অন্য কোন সদস্যকে কারণ দর্শানোর নোটিশ দিবেন।

(৪) উপ-ধারা (৩) এর অধীন প্রদত্ত কারণ দর্শানোর জবাব সন্তোষজনক বিবেচিত না হইলে তদন্ত কর্মকর্তা জবাব প্রাপ্তির অনধিক ত্রিশ কার্যদিবসের মধ্যে অনাস্থা প্রস্তাবে যে সকল অভিযোগের বর্ণনা করা হইয়াছে, সে সকল অভিযোগ তদন্ত করিবেন।

(৫) উপ-ধারা (৪) অনুযায়ী তদন্ত করিবার পর সংশ্লিষ্ট অভিযোগের সত্যতা প্রমানিত হইলে তদন্ত কর্মকর্তা অনধিক পনের কার্যদিবসের মধ্যে অভিযুক্ত চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান বা মহিলা সদস্য বা অন্য কোন সদস্যসহ জোটাদিকার সম্পন্ন সংশ্লিষ্ট সকল সদস্যের নিকট সভার নোটিশ প্রেরণ নিশ্চিতকরণপূর্বক পরিষদের বিশেষ সভা আহ্বান করিবেন।

(৬) চেয়ারম্যানের বিরুদ্ধে অনাস্থা প্রস্তাবের ক্ষেত্রে প্যানেল চেয়ারম্যান (ক্রমানুসারে) এবং কোন ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান বা মহিলা সদস্যের বিরুদ্ধে অনাস্থা প্রস্তাবের ক্ষেত্রে পরিষদের চেয়ারম্যান সভায় সভাপতিত্ব করিবেন :

তবে শর্ত থাকে যে, চেয়ারম্যান বা প্যানেল চেয়ারম্যানের অনুপস্থিতিতে উপস্থিত সদস্যগণের মধ্য হইতে যে কোন একজন সদস্যকে ঐকমত্যের ভিত্তিতে সভাপতি নির্বাচিত করা যাইবে।

(৭) উপ-ধারা (৩) অনুযায়ী নিযুক্ত তদন্ত কর্মকর্তা সভায় একজন পর্যবেক্ষক হিসাবে উপস্থিত থাকিবেন।

(৮) পরিষদের মোট সদস্য সংখ্যার চার-পঞ্চমাংশ সদস্য সমন্বয়ে সভার কোরাম গঠিত হইবে।

(৯) উপ-ধারা (১) এর উদ্দেশ্যে আহ্বত সভা কোরাম বা নিয়ন্ত্রন বহির্ভূত কোন কারণ ব্যতিরেকে স্থগিত করা যাইবে না এবং সভা আরম্ভ হইবার তিন ঘণ্টার মধ্যে উন্মুক্ত আলোচনার মাধ্যমে সিদ্ধান্ত গ্রহণ সম্ভব না হইলে অনাস্থা প্রস্তাবটির উপর গোপন ব্যালটের মাধ্যমে ভোট গ্রহণ করিতে হইবে।

(১০) সভার সভাপতি অনাস্থা প্রস্তাবের পক্ষে বা বিপক্ষে কোন প্রকাশ্য মতামত প্রকাশ করিবেন না, তবে তিনি ব্যালটের মাধ্যমে উপ-ধারা (৯) অনুযায়ী ভোট প্রদান করিতে পারিবেন, কিন্তু তিনি নির্ণায়ক বা দ্বিতীয় ভোট প্রদান করিতে পারিবেন না।

(১১) অনাস্থা প্রস্তাবটি পরিষদের কমপক্ষে চার-পঞ্চমাংশ সদস্য কর্তৃক ভোটে গৃহীত হইতে হইবে।

(১২) উপ-ধারা (৩) অনুযায়ী নিযুক্ত তদন্ত কর্মকর্তা সভা শেষ হইবার পর অনাস্থা প্রস্তাবের কপি, ব্যালট পেপার, ভোটের ফলাফলসহ সভার কার্যবিবরণী প্রস্তুত করিয়া আনুষঙ্গিক কাগজপত্র সরকারের নিকট প্রেরণ করিবেন।

(১৩) সরকার উপযুক্ত বিবেচনা করিলে অনাস্থা প্রস্তাব অনুমোদন অথবা অননুমোদন করিবে। এই ক্ষেত্রে সরকারের সিদ্ধান্ত চূড়ান্ত বলিয়া গণ্য হইবে এবং সরকার কর্তৃক অনাস্থা প্রস্তাবটি অনুমোদিত হইলে সংশ্লিষ্ট চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান, মহিলা সদস্য বা অন্য কোন সদস্যের আসনটি সরকার গেজেট প্রজ্ঞাপন দ্বারা শূন্য বলিয়া ঘোষণা করিবে।

(১৪) অনাস্থা প্রস্তাবটি প্রয়োজনীয় সংখ্যক ভোটে গৃহীত না হইলে অথবা কোরামের অভাবে সভা অনুষ্ঠিত না হইলে উক্ত তারিখের পর ছয় মাস অতিক্রম না হওয়া পর্যন্ত সংশ্লিষ্ট চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান, মহিলা সদস্যের বিরুদ্ধে অনুরূপ কোন অনাস্থা প্রস্তাব আনয়ন করা যাইবে না।

(১৫) পরিষদের কোন চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান বা মহিলা সদস্য বা অন্য কোন সদস্য দায়িত্বভার গ্রহণের ছয় মাসের মধ্যে তাহার বিরুদ্ধে অনাস্থা প্রস্তাব আনয়ন করা যাইবে না।

**১৩খ। চেয়ারম্যান বা ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান বা মহিলা সদস্যগণের বা অন্যান্য সদস্যগণের সাময়িক বরখাস্ত করণ।-** (১) যেই ক্ষেত্রে কোন পরিষদের চেয়ারম্যান বা ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান বা মহিলা সদস্যের বিরুদ্ধে দ্বারা ১৩ অনুসারে অপসারণের জন্য কার্যক্রম আরম্ভ করা হইয়াছে অথবা উপযুক্ত আদালত কর্তৃক কোন ফৌজদারি মামলায় অভিযোগপত্র গৃহীত হইয়াছে সেই ক্ষেত্রে সরকারের বিবেচনায় উক্ত চেয়ারম্যান বা ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান বা মহিলা সদস্য বা অন্য কোন সদস্য কর্তৃক ক্ষমতা প্রয়োগ জনস্বার্থের পরিপন্থী হইলে, সরকার লিখিত আদেশের মাধ্যমে চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান, বা মহিলা সদস্য বা অন্য কোন সদস্যকে সাময়িকভাবে বরখাস্ত করিতে পারবে।

(২) উপ-ধারা (১) এর অধীন চেয়ারম্যানকে সাময়িকভাবে বরখাস্তের আদেশ প্রদান করা হইলে আদেশ প্রাপ্তির তিন দিনের মধ্যে সংশ্লিষ্ট চেয়ারম্যান ধারা ১৫ এর বিধানমতে নির্বাচিত প্যানেল চেয়ারম্যানের নিকট দায়িত্ব হস্তান্তর করিবেন এবং উক্ত প্যানেল চেয়ারম্যান সাময়িক বরখাস্তকৃত চেয়ারম্যানের বিরুদ্ধে আনীত কার্যক্রম শেষ না হওয়া পর্যন্ত অথবা চেয়ারম্যান অপসারিত হইলে তাঁহার স্থলে নতুন চেয়ারম্যান নির্বাচিত না হওয়া পর্যন্ত দায়িত্ব পালন করিবেন।

(৩) উপ-ধারা (১) এর অধীন উপজেলা পরিষদের কোন ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান বা মহিলা সদস্যকে সাময়িকভাবে বরখাস্তের আদেশ প্রদান করা হইলে উক্ত ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান বা মহিলা সদস্যের বিরুদ্ধে আনীত কার্যক্রম শেষ না হওয়া পর্যন্ত অথবা উক্ত ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান বা মহিলা সদস্য অপসারিত হইলে তাঁহার স্থলে নতুন ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান বা মহিলা সদস্য নির্বাচিত না হওয়া পর্যন্ত পরিষদের সিদ্ধান্তক্রমে অপর একজন ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান বা মহিলা সদস্য উক্ত দায়িত্ব পালন করিবেন।

**১৩গ। সদস্যপদ পুনর্বহাল।-** উপজেলা পরিষদের কোন নির্বাচিত চেয়ারম্যান বা ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান বা মহিলা সদস্য বা অন্য কোন সদস্য এই আইনের বিধান অনুযায়ী অপসারিত হইয়া সদস্যপদ হারাইবার পর সরকার কর্তৃক পুনর্বিবেচনার পর উক্তরূপ অপসারণ আদেশ, বাতিল বা প্রত্যাহার হইলে, তাঁহার সদস্যপদ পুনর্বহাল হইবে এবং তিনি অবশিষ্ট মেয়াদের জন্য স্বপক্ষে পুনর্বহাল হইবেন।”।

**৭। ১৯৯৮ সনের ২৪ নং আইন এর ধারা ১৪ এর প্রতিস্থাপন।-** উক্ত আইনের ধারা ১৪ এর পরিবর্তে নিম্নরূপ ধারা ১৪ প্রতিস্থাপিত হইবে, যথা :-

“১৪। চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান ও মহিলা সদস্য ও সদস্য পদ শূন্য হওয়া, ইত্যাদি।-

(১) চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান ও কোন মহিলা সদস্যের পদ শূন্য হইবে, যদি তিনি-

(ক) ধারা ৯ (২) এ নির্ধারিত বা বর্ধিত সময়সীমার মধ্যে উক্ত ধারায় নির্ধারিত শপথ গ্রহণ বা ঘোষণা করিতে ব্যর্থ হন; বা

(খ) ধারা ৮ এর অধীন তাঁহার পদে থাকার অযোগ্য হইয়া যান; বা

(গ) ধারা ১২ এর অধীন তাঁহার পদ ত্যাগ করেন; বা

(ঘ) ধারা ১৩ এর অধীন তাঁহার পদ হইতে অপসারিত হন; বা

(ঙ) ধারা ১৩ক অনুযায়ী তাঁহার বিরুদ্ধে সরকার কর্তৃক অনাস্থা প্রস্তাব অনুমোদন করা হয়; বা

(চ) মৃত্যুবরণ করেন।

(২) কোন ব্যক্তি যদি ইউনিয়ন পরিষদ বা পৌর প্রতিনিধি বা মহিলা সদস্য হন, এবং সংশ্লিষ্ট ইউনিয়ন পরিষদ বা পৌরসভার চেয়ারম্যান বা মেয়র বা সদস্য বা কাউন্সিলর না থাকেন তাহা হইলে পরিষদে তাহার সদস্য পদ শূন্য হইবে।”।

**৮। ১৯৯৮ সনের ২৪ নং আইন এর ধারা ১৬ এর প্রতিস্থাপন।-** উক্ত আইন এর ধারা ১৬ এর পরিবর্তে নিম্নরূপ ধারা ১৬ প্রতিস্থাপিত হইবে, যথা :-

“১৬। আকস্মিক পদশূন্যতা পূরণ।- পরিষদের মেয়াদ শেষ হইবার তারিখের-

(ক) একশত আশি দিন বা তদপেক্ষা বেশি সময় পূর্বে চেয়ারম্যান এবং ভাইস চেয়ারম্যানের পদ শূন্য হইলে; বা

(খ) একশত বিশ দিন বা তদপেক্ষা বেশী সময় পূর্বে কোন মহিলা সদস্যের পদ শূন্য হইলে,

উক্ত পদটি শূন্য হওয়ার নব্বই দিনের মধ্যে বিধি অনুযায়ী অনুষ্ঠিত নির্বাচনের মাধ্যমে উক্ত শূন্য পদ পূরণ করিতে হইবে এবং যিনি উক্ত পদে নির্বাচিত হইবেন তিনি পরিষদের অবশিষ্ট মেয়াদের জন্য উক্ত পদে বহাল থাকিবেন।”।

৯। ১৯৯৮ সনের ২৪ নং আইন এর ধারা ২০ এর সংশোধন।- উক্ত আইন এর ধারা ২০ এর-

- (ক) উপ-ধারা (১) এ উল্লিখিত “নির্বাচন অনুষ্ঠান ও পরিচালনা করিবে” শব্দগুলির পরিবর্তে “নির্বাচন পরিচালনা করিবে” শব্দগুলি প্রতিস্থাপিত হইবে;
- (খ) উপ-ধারা (২) তে উল্লিখিত “সরকার” শব্দের পরিবর্তে “নির্বাচন কমিশন” শব্দ প্রতিস্থাপিত হইবে;
- (গ) উপ-ধারা (২) (ক) তে উল্লিখিত “সহকারী অফিসার” শব্দগুলির পরিবর্তে “সহকারী রিটানিং অফিসার” শব্দগুলি প্রতিস্থাপিত হইবে; এবং
- (ঘ) উপ-ধারা (২) এর দফা (গ) এর পরিবর্তে নিম্নরূপ দফা (গ) প্রতিস্থাপিত হইবে, যথা :

“(গ) প্রার্থী মনোনয়ন, মনোনয়নের ক্ষেত্রে হলফনামা দাখিল, মনোনয়নের ক্ষেত্রে আপত্তি এবং মনোনয়নপত্র বাছাই;”।

১০। ১৯৯৮ সনের ২৪ নং আইন এর ধারা ২৪ এর সংশোধন।- উক্ত আইন এর ধারা ২৪ এর-

- (ক) উপ-ধারা (১) এর পরিবর্তে নিম্নরূপ উপ-ধারা (১) প্রতিস্থাপিত হইবে, যথা :-
- “(১) এ আইন অথবা আপাততঃ বলবৎ অন্য কোন আইনে যাহা কিছুই থাকুক না কেন, সরকার, উপ-ধারা (৩) অনুযায়ী গঠিত কমিটির পরামর্শক্রমে,-
- (ক) পরিষদে ন্যস্ত কোন প্রতিষ্ঠান বা কর্ম সরকারের ব্যবস্থাপনায় ও নিয়ন্ত্রণে; এবং
- (খ) তৃতীয় তফসিলে বর্ণিত বা তৃতীয় তফসিলে বহির্ভূত এবং সরকার কর্তৃক সংশ্লিষ্ট উপজেলা এলাকায় পরিচালিত কোন প্রতিষ্ঠান বা কর্ম, উক্ত প্রতিষ্ঠান বা কর্মের সহিত সংশ্লিষ্ট কর্মকর্তা কর্মচারীগণ এবং আনুষংগিক বিষয়াদি পরিষদের ব্যবস্থাপনায় ও নিয়ন্ত্রণে, হস্তান্তর করিবার নির্দেশ দিতে পারিবে।”।
- (খ) উপ-ধারা (২) এ উল্লিখিত “পরিষদ” শব্দটির পরিবর্তে “চেয়ারম্যান” শব্দটি প্রতিস্থাপিত হইবে।

১১। ১৯৯৮ সনের ২৪ নং আইন এর ধারা ২৬ এর সংশোধন।- উক্ত আইন এর ধারা ২৬ এর উপ-ধারা (২) এর পরিবর্তে নিম্নরূপ উপ-ধারা (২) প্রতিস্থাপিত হইবে, যথা :-

- (২) এ আইন বা তদবীন প্রণীত বিধিতে ভিন্নরূপ বিধান না থাকিলে পরিষদের নির্বাহী ক্ষমতা চেয়ারম্যানের উপর ন্যস্ত হইবে ; তবে শর্ত থাকে যে. পরিষদ ইহার সকল বা যে কোন নির্বাহী ক্ষমতা প্রয়োগ করিবার জন্য কোন ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান বা সদস্য বা কোন কর্মকর্তাকে ক্ষমতা প্রদান করিতে পারিবে।

১২। ১৯৯৮ সনের ২৪ নং আইন এর ধারা ২৯ এর সংশোধন।- উক্ত আইন এর ধারা ২৯ এর পরিবর্তে নিম্নরূপ ধারা ২৯ প্রতিস্থাপিত হইবে, যথা :-

২৯। কমিটি গঠন ইত্যাদি।- (১) পরিষদ উহার কার্যাবলী সুচারুরূপে সম্পাদন করিবার জন্য পরিষদ গঠিত হইবার পর ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান বা সদস্য বা মহিলা সদস্যগণ সমন্বয়ে নিম্নবর্ণিত বিষয়াদির প্রত্যেকটি সম্পর্কে একটি করিয়া কমিটি গঠন করিবে, যাহার মেয়াদ সর্বোচ্চ দুই বৎসর ছয় মাস হইবে, যথা:-

- (ক) আইন-শৃঙ্খলা;
- (খ) যোগাযোগ ও ভৌত অবকাঠামো উন্নয়ন;
- (গ) কৃষি ও সেচ;
- (ঘ) মাধ্যমিক ও মাদ্রাসা শিক্ষা;
- (ঙ) প্রাথমিক ও গণশিক্ষা;
- (চ) স্বাস্থ্য ও পরিবার কল্যাণ;
- (ছ) যুব ও ক্রীড়া উন্নয়ন;
- (জ) মহিলা ও শিশু উন্নয়ন;
- (ঝ) সমাজকল্যাণ;

- (এ) মুক্তিযোদ্ধা;  
 (ট) মৎস ও প্রাণিসম্পদ;  
 (ঠ) পল্লী উন্নয়ন ও সমবায়;  
 (ড) সংস্কৃতি;  
 (ঢ) পরিবেশ ও বন;  
 (ণ) বাজার মূল্য পর্যবেক্ষণ, মনিটরিং ও নিয়ন্ত্রণ;  
 (ত) অর্থ, বাজেট, পরিকল্পনা ও স্থানীয় সম্পদ আহরণ;  
 (থ) জনস্বাস্থ্য, স্যানিটেশন ও বিশুদ্ধ পানি সরবরাহ।  
 (২) পরিষদের ভাইস চেয়ারম্যানের মধ্য হতে কমিটির সভাপতি নির্বাচিত হবেন।  
 (৩) সংশ্লিষ্ট বিভাগের উপজেলা অফিসার এই ধারার অধীন গঠিত কমিটির সদস্য-সচিব হইবেন এবং পরিষদে হস্তান্তরিত নয় এমন বিষয় সম্পর্কিত কমিটির সদস্য-সচিব হিসাবে একজন কর্মকর্তাকে উপজেলা পরিষদ নির্ধারণ করিবে।  
 (৪) কমিটি অন্যান্য ৫ (পাঁচ) জন এবং অনূর্ধ্ব ৭ (সাত) জন সদস্য সমন্বয়ে গঠিত হইবে এবং কমিটি, প্রয়োজনবোধে সংশ্লিষ্ট বিষয়ে অভিজ্ঞ কোন ব্যক্তিকে সদস্য হিসাবে অন্তর্ভুক্ত (ঈড়-ড়ঃ) করিতে পারিবে।

(৫) কমিটির সভায় সিদ্ধান্ত গ্রহণের ক্ষেত্রে কমিটিতে অন্তর্ভুক্ত সদস্য (Co-opt member) এবং সদস্য-সচিবের কোন ভোটাধিকার থাকিবে না।

(৬) প্রত্যেক কমিটির সভা প্রতি দুই মাসে অন্যান্য একবার অনুষ্ঠিত হইবে।

(৭) নিম্নলিখিত কারণে পরিষদ কোন কমিটি ভাঙ্গিয়া দিতে পারিবে, যথাঃ

(ক) উপ-ধারা (৬) অনুযায়ী নিয়মিত সভা অনুষ্ঠানে ব্যর্থ হইলে; এবং

(খ) এই আইন বা তদধীন প্রণীত বিধির বিধান বহির্ভূত কোন সিদ্ধান্ত গ্রহণ করিলে বা কাজ করিলে।

১৩। ১৯৯৮ সনের ২৪ নং আইন এর ধারা ৩০ এর সংশোধন।- উক্ত আইন এর ধারা ৩০ এর উপ-ধারা (২) তে উল্লিখিত “পরিষদের চেয়ারম্যান” শব্দগুলির পরিবর্তে “পরিষদের সভায় চেয়ারম্যান” শব্দগুলি প্রতিস্থাপিত হইবে।

১৪। ১৯৯৮ সনের ২৪ নং আইন এর ধারা ৩৩ এর সংশোধন।- উক্ত আইন এর ধারা ৩৩ এর পরিবর্তে নিম্নরূপ ধারা ৩৩ প্রতিস্থাপিত হইবে, যথা ঃ-

“৩৩। পরিষদের মূখ্য নির্বাহী কর্মকর্তা।- (১) উপজেলা নির্বাহী অফিসার পরিষদের মূখ্য নির্বাহী কর্মকর্তা হইবেন এবং তিনি পরিষদকে সাচিবিক সহায়তা প্রদান করিবেন।

(২) পরিষদের সিদ্ধান্ত বাস্তবায়ন, আর্থিক শৃংখলা প্রতিপালন এবং বিধি দ্বারা নির্ধারিত অন্যান্য কার্যাবলী পরিষদের মূখ্য নির্বাহী কর্মকর্তা সম্পাদন করিবেন।”।

১৫। ১৯৯৮ সনের ২৪ নং আইন এর ধারা ৩৪ এর সংশোধন।- উক্ত আইন এর ধারা ৩৪ এর উপ-ধারা (২) এর পর নিম্নরূপ নতুন উপ-ধারা (৩) সংযোজিত হইবে, যথা ঃ-

“(৩) উপ-ধারা (১) ও (২) এ যাহা কিছুই থাকুক না কেন, প্রত্যেক উপজেলা পরিষদের একজন সহকারী হিসাবরক্ষণ কর্মকর্তা থাকিবেন, যিনি সরকার বা সরকার কর্তৃক নির্ধারিত কোন কর্তৃপক্ষের মাধ্যমে নিযুক্ত হইবেন।”

১৬। ১৯৯৮ সনের ২৪ নং আইন এর ধারা ৪১ এর সংশোধন।- উক্ত আইন এর ধারা ৪১ এর উপ-ধারা (২) এর দফা (গ) এর পরিবর্তে নিম্নরূপ দফা (গ) প্রতিস্থাপিত হইবে, যথা ঃ-

“(গ) সরকারের পূর্বানুমোদনক্রমে দান, বিক্রয়, বন্ধক, ইজারা বা বিনিময়ের মাধ্যমে বা অন্য কোন পন্থায় যে কোন সম্পত্তি অর্জন বা হস্তান্তর করিতে পারিবে।”।

১৭। ১৯৯৮ সনের ২৪ নং আইন এর ধারা ৫১ এর সংশোধন।- উক্ত আইন এর ধারা ৫১ এর উপ-ধারা (২) তে উল্লিখিত “সরকার আবেদন” শব্দগুলির পরিবর্তে “সরকারের নিকট আবেদন” শব্দগুলি প্রতিস্থাপিত হইবে।

১৮। ১৯৯৮ সনের ২৪ নং আইন এর ধারা ৬৩ এর সংশোধন।- উক্ত আইন এর ধারা ৬৩ এর উপ-ধারা (২) এর-

(ক) দফা (ক) ও (খ) বিলুপ্ত হইবে; এবং

(খ) উপ-ধারা (২) এর পর নিম্নরূপ নতুন উপ-ধারা সংযোজিত হইবে, যথাঃ-

“(৩) নির্বাচন কমিশন নিম্নবর্ণিত বিষয়ে সরকারি গেজেটে প্রজ্ঞাপন দ্বারা, বিধি প্রণয়ন করিতে পারিবে, যথাঃ-

(ক) চেয়ারম্যান, ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান ও মহিলা সদস্য নির্বাচন ও তৎসংক্রান্ত কার্যাবলী;

(খ) নির্বাচন ট্রাইব্যুনাল ও আপীল ট্রাইব্যুনাল নিয়োগ, উহাদের ক্ষমতা, নির্বাচনী দরখাস্ত দাখিল এবং নির্বাচনী বিরোধ নিষ্পত্তি সংক্রান্ত বিষয়াদি।”।

১৯। ১৯৯৮ সনের ২৪ নং আইন এর ধারা ৬৭ এর সংশোধন।- উক্ত আইন এর ধারা ৬৭ এর উপ-ধারা (৩) এ উল্লিখিত “ডাকযোগে প্রেরণ করিয়া বা তাহার বাসস্থান বা” শব্দগুলির পরিবর্তে “ডাকযোগে প্রেরণ করিয়া অথবা তাহার পরিবারের কোন সদস্যকে প্রদান করিয়া বা তাহার বাসস্থান বা” শব্দগুলি প্রতিস্থাপিত হইবে।

২০। ১৯৯৮ সনের ২৪ নং আইন এর ধারা ৬৮ এর পর নতুন ধারা ৬৮ক, ৬৮খ ও ৬৮গ এর সংযোজন।- উক্ত আইন এর ধারা ৬৮ এর পর নিম্নরূপ তিনটি নতুন ধারা যথাক্রমে ৬৮ক, ৬৮খ ও ৬৮গ সংযোজিত হইবে, যথা :-

“৬৮ক। নাগরিক সনদ প্রকাশ।- (১) এই আইনের অধীন গঠিত প্রতিটি উপজেলা নির্ধারিত পদ্ধতি অনুসরণপূর্বক বিভিন্ন প্রকারের নাগরিক সেবা প্রদানের বিবরণ, সেবা প্রদানের শর্তসমূহ এবং নির্দিষ্ট সময়সীমার মধ্যে সেবা প্রদান নিশ্চিত করিবার বিবরণ প্রকাশ করিবে যাহা নাগরিক সনদ (Citizen Charter) বলিয়া অভিহিত হইবে।

(২) সরকার পরিষদের জন্য আদর্শ নাগরিক সনদ সংক্রান্ত নির্দেশিকা প্রণয়ন করিবে।

(৩) নাগরিক সনদ সংক্রান্ত নির্দেশিকা প্রণয়নে নিম্নবর্ণিত বিষয়সহ অন্যান্য বিষয় অন্তর্ভুক্ত থাকিবে, যথা :-

(ক) পরিষদ প্রদত্ত প্রতিটি সেবার নির্ভুল ও স্বচ্ছ বিবরণ;

(খ) পরিষদ প্রদত্ত সেবা সমূহের মূল্য;

(গ) সেবা গ্রহণ ও দাবি সংক্রান্ত যোগ্যতা ও প্রক্রিয়া;

(ঘ) সেবা প্রদানের নির্দিষ্ট সময়সীমা;

(ঙ) সেবা সংক্রান্ত বিষয়ে নাগরিকদের দায়িত্ব;

(চ) সেবা প্রদানের নিশ্চয়তা;

(ছ) সেবা প্রদান সংক্রান্ত অভিযোগ নিষ্পত্তির প্রক্রিয়া।

৬৮খ। উন্নততর তথ্য প্রযুক্তির ব্যবহার ও সুশাসন।- (১) প্রত্যেক উপজেলা পরিষদ সুশাসন নিশ্চিত করিবার লক্ষ্যে নির্দিষ্ট সময়সীমার মধ্যে উন্নততর তথ্য প্রযুক্তি ব্যবহার করিবে।

(২) উপ-ধারা (১) এর উদ্দেশ্য পূরণকল্পে সরকার আর্থিক ও কারিগরি সাহায্যসহ অন্যান্য সহায়তা প্রদান করিবে।

(৩) উপজেলা পরিষদ নাগরিক সনদে বর্ণিত আধুনিক সেবা সংক্রান্ত বিষয়সহ সরকারীভাবে প্রদত্ত সকল সেবার বিবরণ উন্নততর তথ্য প্রযুক্তির মাধ্যমে নাগরিকদের জ্ঞাত করিবার ব্যবস্থা করিবে।

৬৮গ। তথ্য প্রাপ্তির অধিকার।- (১) তথ্য অধিকার আইন, ২০০৯ (২০০৯ সনের ২০ নং আইন) এর বিধানাবলী সাপেক্ষে, বাংলাদেশের যে কোন নাগরিকের উপজেলা সংক্রান্ত যে কোন তথ্য, নির্ধারিত পদ্ধতিতে, প্রাপ্তির অধিকার থাকিবে।

(২) সরকার, সাধারণ বা বিশেষ আদেশ দ্বারা, এলাকার জনসাধারণের নিকট সরবরাহ যোগ্য তথ্যাদির একটি তালিকা প্রকাশের জন্য উপজেলা পরিষদকে আদেশ প্রদান করিতে পারিবে।”।

২১। ১৯৯৮ সনের ২৪ নং আইন এর দ্বিতীয় তফসিলের সংশোধন।- উক্ত আইন এর দ্বিতীয় তফসিলের ক্রমিক (১২) এ উল্লিখিত “নিকট” শব্দটির পরে “চেয়ারম্যান কর্তৃক” শব্দটি সন্নিবেশিত হইবে।

২২। ১৯৯৮ সনের ২৪ নং আইন এর তৃতীয় তফসিল এর সংশোধন।- উক্ত আইন এর তৃতীয় তফসিল এর-

(ক) শিরোনামে উল্লিখিত “হস্তান্তরযোগ্য” শব্দটির পরিবর্তে “হস্তান্তরিত” শব্দটি প্রতিস্থাপিত হইবে;

(খ) উক্ত তফসিলের বিভিন্ন স্থানে উল্লিখিত “থানা” শব্দটির পরিবর্তে, সর্বত্র “উপজেলা” শব্দটি প্রতিস্থাপিত হইবে;

(গ) ক্রমিক ৩ এ উল্লিখিত “মৎস ও পশুসম্পদ” শব্দগুলির পরিবর্তে “মৎস ও প্রাণিসম্পদ” শব্দগুলি প্রতিস্থাপিত হইবে;

(ঘ) ক্রমিক ৬ এর পরিবর্তে নিম্নরূপ ক্রমিক ৬ প্রতিস্থাপিত হইবে, যথা :-

“৬। প্রাথমিক ও গণশিক্ষা মন্ত্রণালয় প্রাথমিক শিক্ষা অধিদপ্তরের অধীনস্থ উপজেলা শিক্ষা কর্মকর্তা/তাঁর অধীনস্থ কর্মচারীগণ এবং তাদের কার্যাবলী।”;

(ঙ) ক্রমিক ৭ এর -

(অ) উপ ক্রমিক (১) এ উল্লিখিত “ইঞ্জিনিয়ার” শব্দটির পরিবর্তে “প্রকৌশলী” শব্দটি প্রতিস্থাপিত হইবে;

(আ) উপ ক্রমিক (২) এ উল্লিখিত “উপ-সহকারী” শব্দটির পরিবর্তে “সহকারী/উপ-সহকারী” শব্দগুলি ও চিহ্ন প্রতিস্থাপিত হইবে;

(ই) উপ ক্রমিক (২) এর পর নিম্নরূপ নতুন উপ-ক্রমিক (৩) ও (৪) সংযোজিত হইবে, যথা :-

“(৩) বাংলাদেশ পল্লী উন্নয়ন বোর্ডের অধীনস্থ উপজেলা পল্লী উন্নয়ন কর্মকর্তা ও তাঁর অধীনস্থ কর্মকর্তা/কর্মচারী এবং তাদের কার্যাবলী।

(৪) সমবায় অধিদপ্তরের অধীনস্থ উপজেলা সমবায় কর্মকর্তা ও তাঁর অধীনস্থ কর্মকর্তা/কর্মচারী এবং তাদের কার্যাবলী।”;

(চ) ক্রমিক ১০ এর পর নিম্নরূপ নতুন ক্রমিক ১১ ও ১২ সংযোজিত হইবে, যথা :-

“১১। শিক্ষা মন্ত্রণালয়

মাধ্যমিক ও উচ্চ শিক্ষা অধিদপ্তরের অধীনস্থ উপজেলা মাধ্যমিক শিক্ষা (মাধ্যমিক শিক্ষা, কারিগরি শিক্ষা ও মাদ্রাসা শিক্ষা) কর্মকর্তা/কর্মচারী এবং তাদের কার্যাবলী।

১২। পরিবেশ ও বন মন্ত্রণালয়

পরিবেশ অধিদপ্তর ও বন অধিদপ্তরের অধীনস্থ উপজেলা কর্মকর্তা/কর্মচারী এবং তাদের কার্যাবলী।”

২৩। ১৯৯৮ সনের ২৪ নং আইন এর চতুর্থ তফসিল এর সংশোধন।- উক্ত আইন এর চতুর্থ তফসিলের ক্রমিক ৮ এ উল্লিখিত “উপজেলা এলাকাভুক্ত সম্পত্তি হস্তান্তর বাবদ আদায়কৃত রেজিস্ট্রেশন ফিসের” শব্দগুলির পরিবর্তে “উপজেলা এলাকাভুক্ত স্থাবর সম্পত্তি হস্তান্তর কর বাবদ আয়ের” শব্দগুলি প্রতিস্থাপিত হইবে।

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আব্দুর রশিদ (উপ-সচিব), উপ-পরিচালক, বাংলাদেশ ফরম ও প্রকাশনা অফিস,

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স্থানীয় সরকার বিভাগ

উপজেলা-২ শাখা

প্রজ্ঞাপন

তারিখ : ২২.৩.২০১০ইং/ ৮.১২.১৪১৬বাং

এস.আর.ও নং-৮৫ আইন/২০১০। উপজেলা পরিষদ আইন, ১৯৯৮ (১৯৯৮ সনের ২৪ নং আইন) এর ধারা ৬৩ এ প্রদত্ত ক্ষমতাবলে সরকার নিম্নরূপ বিধিমালা প্রণয়ন করিল, যথাঃ-

১। সংক্ষিপ্ত শিরোনাম। - (১) এই বিধিমালা উপজেলা পরিষদের চেয়ারম্যান ও ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান (দায়িত্ব, কর্তব্য ও আর্থিক সুবিধা) বিধিমালা, ২০১০ নামে অভিহিত হইবে।

২। সংজ্ঞা।- বিষয় বা প্রসঙ্গের পরিপন্থি কিছু না থাকিলে, এই বিধিমালায়-

- (১) ‘আইন’ অর্থ উপজেলা পরিষদ আইন, ১৯৯৮ (১৯৯৮ সনের ২৪ নং আইন) (২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন দ্বারা পুনঃপ্রচলিত ও সংশোধিত);
- (২) ‘চেয়ারম্যান’ অর্থ উপজেলা পরিষদের চেয়ারম্যান;
- (৩) ‘ধারা’ অর্থ উপজেলা পরিষদ আইন, ১৯৯৮ এর কোন ধারা;
- (৪) ‘পরিষদ’ অর্থ উপজেলা পরিষদ আইন, ১৯৯৮ (১৯৯৮ সনের ২৪ নং আইন) (২০০৯ সনের ২৭ নং আইন দ্বারা পুনঃপ্রচলিত ও সংশোধিত) এর ধারা ৬ অনুযায়ী গঠিত উপজেলা পরিষদ;
- (৫) ‘ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান’ অর্থ আইনের ধারা ৬ এর উপ-ধারা (১) এর দফা (খ) তে বর্ণিত উপজেলা পরিষদের ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান।

৩। উপজেলা পরিষদের চেয়ারম্যানের দায়িত্ব ও কর্তব্য।- আইনের বিধানাবলীকে ক্ষুণ্ণ না করিয়া চেয়ারম্যান নিম্নবর্ণিত দায়িত্ব ও কর্তব্য পালন করিবে, যথাঃ-

- (১) পরিষদের দৈনন্দিন প্রশাসনিক কাজ পরিচালনা করিবেন;
- (২) পরিষদের সকল সভায় সভাপতিত্ব করিবেন এবং উহাতে গৃহীত সিদ্ধান্ত বাস্তবায়নের লক্ষ্যে যথাযথ ব্যবস্থা গ্রহণ করিবেন;
- (৩) পরিষদের কর্মকর্তা কর্মচারীদের তত্ত্বাবধান করিবেন;
- (৪) পরিষদে ন্যস্তকৃত বা প্রেষণে নিযুক্ত কর্মকর্তা-কর্মচারী ব্যতীত, পরিষদের কর্মকর্তা-কর্মচারী নিয়োগ ও তাহাদের বিরুদ্ধে, প্রয়োজনে, শৃঙ্খলামূলক ব্যবস্থা গ্রহণ করিতে পারিবেন;
- (৫) পরিষদের বিভিন্ন কার্যাবলী সংক্রান্ত প্রস্তাব এবং প্রকল্প, পরিষদের পক্ষে, প্রস্তুত করিবার লক্ষ্যে পদক্ষেপ গ্রহণ করিবেন;

- (৬) ধারা ৩ এর অধীন ঘোষিত উপজেলা সংক্রান্ত যাবতীয় তথ্যাদি সংরক্ষণ করিবেন;
- (৭) ধারা ৩০ এর বিধান সাপেক্ষে পরিষদের নামে সম্পাদিত সকল চুক্তি স্বাক্ষর করিবেন এবং একই ধারার উপ-ধারা (২) এবং (৩) এর বিধার অনুসারে যথাযথ ব্যবস্থা গ্রহণ করিবেন;
- (৮) ধারা ৪৪ এবং চতুর্থ তফসিল এর ক্রমিক ৬ এর বিধান সাপেক্ষে পরিষদের আওতাধীন বিভিন্ন ব্যবসা, বৃত্তি ও পেশার উপর পরিষদ কর্তৃক প্রদেয় লাইসেন্স ও পারমিট ইস্যু করিবেন;
- (৯) ধারা ৪৯ এবং পঞ্চম তফসিলের বিধান সাপেক্ষে এই আইনের অধীন অপরাধ সংক্রান্ত কোন অভিযোগ প্রত্যাহার বা অভিযুক্ত ব্যক্তির সহিত আপোষ নিষ্পত্তির লক্ষ্যে আইনানুগ ব্যবস্থা গ্রহণ করিবেন;
- (১০) ধারা ৬৫ এর বিধান সাপেক্ষে সরকার কর্তৃক, সময় সময় অর্পিত সকল বা যে কোন কার্য সম্পাদন করিবেন;
- (১১) ধারা ৬৬ এর বিধান বাস্তবায়নের লক্ষ্যে পরিষদের পক্ষে মামলা দায়ের এবং পরিচালনা করিবার লক্ষ্যে যথাযথ ব্যবস্থা গ্রহণ করিবেন;
- (১২) আইনের দ্বিতীয় তফসিলে নির্ধারিত পরিষদের কার্যাবলী বাস্তবায়ন, বাস্তবায়িত ও বাস্তবায়নাধীন কার্যাদির অগ্রগতি পর্যালোচনা এবং ভাইস চেয়ারম্যানদের উপর ন্যস্তকৃত দায়িত্ব তদারকি ও মনিটর করিবেন;
- (১৩) এই আইনের অধীনে তাহার উপর অর্পিত সকল বা যে কোন দায়িত্ব পালন করিবেন।

৪। উপজেলা পরিষদের ভাইস চেয়ারম্যানের দায়িত্ব ও কর্তব্য।- আইনের বিধানাবলীকে ক্ষুণ্ণ না করিয়া ভাইস চেয়ারম্যানের দায়িত্ব ও কর্তব্য হবে নিম্নরূপ, যথাঃ-

- (১) পরিষদ কর্তৃক ক্ষমতাপ্রাপ্ত হইয়া এক বা একাধিক স্থায়ী কমিটির সভাপতি হিসাবে দায়িত্ব পালন করিবেন এবং সংশ্লিষ্ট স্থায়ী কমিটির সিদ্ধান্ত বাস্তবায়নের লক্ষ্যে যথাযথ ব্যবস্থা গ্রহণ করিবেন।
- (২) ধারা ১৫ এর উপধারা (৩) এর বিধান সাপেক্ষে চেয়ারম্যানের অনুপস্থিতিতে পরিষদের অস্থায়ী চেয়ারম্যান হিসেবে দায়িত্ব পালন করিবেন;
- (৩) আইনের দ্বিতীয় তফসিলে নির্ধারিত বিভিন্ন দায়িত্ব ও কার্যাবলীর মধ্য হইতে পরিষদের নিকট, সময়ে সময়ে, নিম্নবর্ণিত বিষয়ে প্রয়োজনীয় প্রস্তাব পেশ বা, ক্ষেত্রমত, সুপারিশ প্রদান করিবেন, যথাঃ-
  - (ক) উপজেলা পর্যায়ে শিক্ষা প্রসারের জন্য জনগণকে উদ্বুদ্ধকরণ এবং উচ্চ শিক্ষা বিষয়ক কর্মসূচিতে সহায়তা প্রদান বিষয়ক;
  - (খ) মাধ্যমিক শিক্ষা এবং মাদ্রাসা শিক্ষা কার্যক্রমের মান উন্নয়নের লক্ষ্যে সংশ্লিষ্ট প্রতিষ্ঠানগুলির কার্যক্রম তদারকী ও উহাদিগকে সহায়তা প্রদান বিষয়ক;
  - (গ) আন্তঃইউনিয়ন সংযোগকারী রাস্তা নির্মাণ, মেরামত ও রক্ষণাবেক্ষণ সংক্রান্ত;
  - (ঘ) ভূ-উপরিস্থ পানি সম্পদের সর্বোত্তম ব্যবহার নিশ্চিত করিবার জন্য, সরকারের নির্দেশনা অনুসারে, পরিষদে ক্ষুদ্র সেচ প্রকল্প গ্রহণ ও বাস্তবায়ন সংক্রান্ত;
  - (ঙ) সন্ত্রাস, জঙ্গিবাদ, চুরি, ডাকাতি, চোরাচালন, মাদকদ্রব্য ব্যবহার ইত্যাদি অপরাধ সংগঠিত হওয়ার বিরুদ্ধে জনমত সৃষ্টিসহ অন্যান্য প্রতিরোধ সংক্রান্ত কার্যক্রম গ্রহণ সংক্রান্ত;
  - (চ) পরিবেশ সংরক্ষণ ও উন্নয়নের লক্ষ্যে সামাজিক বনায়নসহ অন্যান্য কার্যক্রম গ্রহণ সংক্রান্ত;
  - (ছ) যুব, ক্রীড়া ও সাংস্কৃতিক কার্যক্রমের ব্যাপক প্রসার এবং বাস্তবায়নের লক্ষ্যে প্রয়োজনীয় সহায়তা প্রদান সংক্রান্ত;
  - (জ) কৃষি ও বনজ সম্পদ উন্নয়নে কার্যক্রম গ্রহণ ও বাস্তবায়ন সংক্রান্ত;
  - (ঝ) সরকার বা, ক্ষেত্রমত, চেয়ারম্যান কর্তৃক সুনির্দিষ্টভাবে তাহার উপর অর্পিত দায়িত্ব ও কার্যাবলী নিষ্পন্নকরণ সংক্রান্ত।

৫। উপজেলা পরিষদের মহিলা ভাইস চেয়ারম্যানের দায়িত্ব ও কর্তব্য।- আইনের বিধানাবলীকে ক্ষুণ্ণ না করিয়া মহিলা ভাইস চেয়ারম্যানের দায়িত্ব ও কর্তব্য হবে নিম্নরূপ, যথাঃ-

- (১) পরিষদ কর্তৃক ক্ষমতাপ্রাপ্ত হইয়া এক বা একাধিক স্থায়ী কমিটির সভাপতি হিসাবে দায়িত্ব পালন করিবেন এবং সংশ্লিষ্ট স্থায়ী কমিটির সিদ্ধান্ত বাস্তবায়নের লক্ষ্যে যথাযথ ব্যবস্থা গ্রহণ করিবেন।
- (২) ধারা ১৫ এর উপধারা (৩) এর বিধান সাপেক্ষে চেয়ারম্যানের অনুপস্থিতিতে পরিষদের অস্থায়ী চেয়ারম্যান হিসেবে দায়িত্ব পালন করিবেন;

- (৩) আইনের দ্বিতীয় তফসিলে নির্ধারিত বিভিন্ন দায়িত্ব ও কার্যাবলীর মধ্য হইতে পরিষদের নিকট, সময়ে সময়ে, নিম্নবর্ণিত বিষয়ে প্রয়োজনীয় প্রস্তাব বা, ক্ষেত্রমত, সুপারিশ প্রদান করিবেন, যথাঃ-
- (ক) স্বাস্থ্য, পুষ্টি, পরিবার পরিকল্পনা ও মাতৃমঙ্গল সেবা নিশ্চিতকরণের লক্ষ্যে করণীয় ব্যবস্থাাদি সম্পর্কিত;
- (খ) স্যানিটেশন ও পয়ঃনিষ্কাশন ব্যবস্থাাদির উন্নতি সাধন এবং সুপেয় পানীয় জলের সরবরাহ ব্যবস্থা সংক্রান্ত;
- (গ) মহিলা ও শিশুদের সার্বিক অবস্থা উন্নয়নের লক্ষ্যে করণীয় ব্যবস্থা চিহ্নিতকরণসহ প্রয়োজনীয় সহায়তা প্রদান এবং বাস্তবায়ন;
- (ঘ) কুটির ও ক্ষুদ্র শিল্প স্থাপন ও বিকাশের লক্ষ্যে উন্নয়ন প্রকল্প গ্রহণ সংক্রান্ত;
- (ঙ) আত্ম কর্মসংস্থান সৃষ্টি এবং দারিদ্র বিমোচনের জন্য নিজ উদ্যোগে কর্মসূচি গ্রহণ, বাস্তবায়ন এবং এতদসম্পর্কে সরকারী কর্মসূচি বাস্তবায়নে সরকারকে সার্বিক সহায়তা প্রদান সম্পর্কিত;
- (চ) নারী ও শিশু নির্যাতন, যৌতক ও বাল্য বিবাহ, ইত্যাদি রোধকল্পে ইহার বিরূপ প্রতিক্রিয়া সম্পর্কে জনমত সৃষ্টিসহ অন্যান্য প্রতিরোধমূলক কার্যক্রম গ্রহণ সংক্রান্ত;
- (ছ) গবাদি পশু এবং মৎস্য সম্পদ উন্নয়নে কার্যক্রম গ্রহণ ও বাস্তবায়ন সংক্রান্ত;
- (জ) সমবায় সমিতি ও বেসরকারি স্বেচ্ছাসেবী প্রতিষ্ঠানের কাজ তদারকী করাসহ উহাতে সহায়তা প্রদান এবং উহাদের কাজে সমন্বয় সাধন সংক্রান্ত;
- (ঝ) সমাজ কল্যাণ ও জনহিতকরমূলক কর্মকাণ্ডে অংশগ্রহণসহ উক্ত কর্মকাণ্ড বাস্তবায়নকল্পে করণীয় ব্যবস্থাাদি চিহ্নিতকরণ সংক্রান্ত;

৬। উপজেলা পরিষদের চেয়ারম্যান ও ভাইস চেয়ারম্যানের প্রাপ্য আর্থিক সুবিধাদি।- (১) চেয়ারম্যান ও ভাইস চেয়ারম্যানের আর্থিক সুবিধাদি হইবে নিম্নরূপ, যথাঃ-

(ক) সম্মানী ভাতাঃ-

(অ) চেয়ারম্যান ও ভাইস চেয়ারম্যানের মাসিক সম্মানী ভাতার হার হইবে নিম্নরূপ, যথাঃ-

পদের নাম	সম্মানীর পরিমাণ (অঙ্ক/ কথায়)
চেয়ারম্যান	১০,০০০/- (দশ হাজার টাকা মাত্র)
ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান	৭,৫০০/- (সাত হাজার পাঁচশত টাকা মাত্র)

(আ) চেয়ারম্যান বা কোন ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান ফৌজদারী অপরাধে অভিযুক্ত হইলে, এতদসম্পর্কিত আইনের বিধানাবলী সাপেক্ষে, তিনি উক্ত সময়ের সম্মানী ভাতা উত্তোলন করিতে পারিবেন নাঃ

তবে শর্ত থাকে যে, চেয়ারম্যান ও ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান তাহার বিরুদ্ধে আনীত অভিযোগ হইতে অব্যাহতি পাইলে বা বেকসুর খালাসপ্রাপ্ত হইলে তিনি সমুদয় অর্থ বকেয়া হিসেবে উত্তোলন করিতে পারিবেন।

(খ) ভ্রমণ ভাতাঃ

চেয়ারম্যান ও ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান সরকারের প্রথম শ্রেণীর কর্মকর্তার জন্য প্রযোজ্য বিধি-বিধান অনুসরণক্রমে সরকার নির্ধারিত হারে ভ্রমণ ভাতা প্রাপ্য হইবেন।

(গ) কার্যভার ভাতাঃ-

চেয়ারম্যানের অনুপস্থিতির কারণে অস্থায়ী চেয়ারম্যান দায়িত্ব ভাতা হিসেবে প্রথম ছয় মাসের জন্য মাসিক ১০০০/- (এক হাজার) টাকা হারে এবং পরবর্তী সময়ের জন্য মাসিক ৫০০/- (পাঁচশত) টাকা হারে কার্যভার ভাতা প্রাপ্য হইবেনঃ

তবে শর্ত থাকে যে, তাঁহার দায়িত্বকাল ১ (এক) মাসের অধিক না হইলে তিনি কার্যভার ভাতা প্রাপ্য হইবেন না।

(২) সরকার, অর্থ মন্ত্রণালয়ের সম্মতি সাপেক্ষে, সময়ে সময়ে, সরকারী আদেশ দ্বারা উপ-বিধি (১) এ বর্ণিত মাসিক সম্মানী ভাতা ও কার্যভার ভাতার পরিমাণ হ্রাস বা বৃদ্ধি করিতে পারিবে।

(৭) চেয়ারম্যান ও ভাইস চেয়ারম্যানের প্রাপ্য আর্থিক সুবিধাদির ব্যয় নির্বাহ।- (১) বিধি ৬ এ উল্লেখিত চেয়ারম্যান ও ভাইস চেয়ারম্যানের প্রাপ্য আর্থিক সুবিধাদি সংশ্লিষ্ট উপজেলা পরিষদের রাজস্ব তহবিল হইতে নির্বাহ করা হইবে।

(৮) বিশেষ বিধান।- চেয়ারম্যান ও ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান নির্বাচন পরবর্তী কার্যভার গ্রহণের তারিখ হইতে, পরিষদের রাজস্ব তহবিলে অর্থ থাকা সাপেক্ষে, এই বিধিমালা কার্যকর হইবার তারিখ পর্যন্ত বিধি ৬ নির্ধারিত হারে সম্মানী ভাতা বকেয়া হিসেবে উত্তোলন করিতে পারিবেন।

(৯) রহিতকরণ ও হেফাজত।- (১) এই বিধিমালা প্রবর্তনের সংগে সংগে ইতিপূর্বে জারিকৃত এতদসংক্রান্ত বিধি, পরিপত্র এবং নির্দেশনাসমূহ, যদি থাকে, রহিত বলিয়া গণ্য হইবে।

(২) উক্তরূপ রহিতকরণ স্বত্বেও রহিতকৃত বিধি, পরিপত্র বা নির্দেশনার আলোকে চেয়ারম্যান ও ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান কর্তৃক কোন কার্যাদি সম্পন্ন করা হইলে বা কোন দায়িত্ব বা কোন কর্তব্য পালন করা হইলে উহা এই বিধিমালার অধীনকৃত বা সম্পাদিত হইয়াছে বলিয়া গণ্য হইবে।

রাষ্ট্রপতির আদেশক্রমে

(মনজুর হোসেন)  
সচিব

রেজিস্টার্ড নং ডি এ-১



অতিরিক্ত সংখ্যা  
কর্তৃপক্ষ কর্তৃক প্রকাশিত

সোমবার, মে ২১, ২০১২

গণপ্রজাতন্ত্রী বাংলাদেশ সরকার  
স্থানীয় সরকার, পল্লী উন্নয়ন ও সমবায় মন্ত্রণালয়  
স্থানীয় সরকার বিভাগ  
উপজেলা-২ শাখা  
প্রজ্ঞাপন

তারিখ : ২২.৩.২০১০ইং চ.১২.১৪১৬বাং

এস.আর.ও নং-১২৮ আইন/২০১২। উপজেলা পরিষদ আইন, ১৯৯৮ (১৯৯৮ সনের ২৪ নং আইন) এর ধারা ৬৩ এ প্রদত্ত ক্ষমতাবলে সরকার উপজেলা পরিষদ চেয়ারম্যান ও ভাইস চেয়ারম্যান (দায়িত্ব কর্তব্য ও আর্থিক সুবিধা) বিধিমালা, ২০১০ এর নিম্নরূপ সংশোধন করিল, যথাঃ-

উপরি-উক্ত বিধিমালার বিধি ৬ এর উপ-বিধি (১) এর দফা (ক) এর উপ-দফা (অ) এর পরিবর্তে নিম্নরূপ উপ-দফা (অ) পতিস্থাপিত হইবে, যথাঃ-

(অ) চেয়ারম্যান ও ভাইস চেয়ারম্যানের মাসিক সম্মানী ভাতার হার হইবে নিম্নরূপ, যথাঃ-

পদের নাম	সম্মানীর পরিমাণ (অক্ষ/ কথায়)
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চেয়ারম্যান	২০,৫০০/- (বিশ হাজার পাঁচশত টাকা মাত্র)
ডাইস চেয়ারম্যান	১৪,৫০০/- (চৌদ্দ হাজার পাঁচশত টাকা মাত্র)

২। ইহা অবিলম্বে কার্যকর হইবে।

রাষ্ট্রপতির আদেশক্রমে  
আবু আলম মোঃ শহিদ খান  
সচিব

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মোঃ আবুল বারিক (উপ-সচিব), উপ-পরিচালক, বাংলাদেশ সরকারী মুদ্রাণালয়, ঢাকা কর্তৃক মুদ্রিত।  
আব্দুর রশিদ (উপ-সচিব), উপ-পরিচালক, বাংলাদেশ ফরম ও প্রকাশনা অফিস,  
তেজগাঁও, ঢাকা কর্তৃক প্রকাশিত। web site: [www.bgpress.gov.bd](http://www.bgpress.gov.bd)