

# **The North-South divide in Europe: an economic anomaly or more of an existential question?**

## **Introduction**

The recent bailout attempts have been putting Europeans through their paces. True, in view of a ‘Grexit’ recipe which could endanger the future of the Union, the Eurozone managed to remain intact. The likelihood of making concessions to Athens, for instance debt cancellation, was fraught with a bigger danger, as it was capable of irritating other fragile economies where the nationals were told to have no better choice than the northern prescription of austerity measures (*The Economist* 2015). More so than anything else, however, the public standoff between Greece and the rest of the 19-country currency zone hinted at an intriguing cleft beneath the surface.

The mutual accusations reaching off limits between the media, politicians and intellectuals were not evocative of an old East-West distinction, as formerly practised throughout the last enlargement process, for instance.<sup>1</sup> The historical animosities cited copiously in recent times pertained to the North-South axis for the most part, with the Member States holding disproportionate institutional competences on both sides. Recent economic indicators explain why. To the statistics reviewing the first quarter of 2015, the top six unemployment rates came from Greece (25.6 %), Spain (22.5 %), Cyprus(16%), Croatia (15.8%), Portugal (13.2%) and Italy (12.4%), all of which are cases from the Union’s southern members, with their scores way above the EU-28 average of 9.8% (European Commission 2015b). Regardless of the enormous share of youth unemployment in these figures –over 50% in Greece and Spain - the early 2015 figures showed additionally that the highest rates of government debt to GDP were as of the end of 2014 exclusive to the southern members again, with 177.1% of Greece, 132.1% of Italy and 130.2% of Portugal at the top (European Commission 2015a).

Granted, these were alarming rates for a lopsided EU economy, the issue is yet not about production/consumption of goods and services only. To the latest public opinion surveys comparing perceptions of shared values across the EU (EB 69 and 77), the number of respondents believing in Member States’ proximity declined the most in Portugal (by 23%),

---

<sup>1</sup> To illustrate, Germany’s top political executives were depicted time and again as Nazi officers in several Greek papers for allegedly playing the main part in the crisis. The response in the German press was again one of stereotyped thinking: Greeks were the lazybones in Europe (Wearden 2015), in fact members of the third-world.

Slovenia (18%), Spain (18%), Cyprus (16%) and Greece (15%) (European Commission 2012). Added to that, the highest feelings of dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in the European Union were expressed in Greece (72%), Portugal (66%), Cyprus (61%), Italy (59%) and Spain (52%), where citizens declared to hold in a parallel vein the lowest level of trust for EU institutions lately (European Commission 2014).

To be fair, the growing lack of faith in authorities across the South is not reserved for the EU institutions only. The countries where trust in the regional/local authorities declined at most were Spain (24%), Croatia (23%), Greece (21%) and Italy (13%) (ibid.). In close connection, the voter preferences in the South shifted towards ‘anti-system’ political parties on the left wing, while citizens in the North allied themselves increasingly with parties to the right. With these explicit symptoms in mind, one could certainly argue for a rise of polarisation as to how citizens conceive of the European Union in its two regions.

The North-South divide in political science is essentially attributable to theories sorting structural positions like ‘core’, ‘semi-periphery’ and ‘periphery’ in the world system (Wallerstein 1984; Amin et al. 1990). Despite approaches questioning the validity of the term, due to transformation of the global economy (Eckl and Weber 2007) which required reconceptualisation of global inequalities not via status of development but reclassification of the Third World (Therien 1999; Escobar 2004; McFarlane 2006) or class (Newell 2005; Barnett 2007), the North-South divide is almost always associated with the major paradigms of political economy to distinguish, broadly speaking, the rich and developed countries in the North from the poor and underdeveloped countries in the South. A categorisation of this sort could in fact be too facile for there are developing/underdeveloped countries in the Northern hemisphere like those across the Balkans, just as there are in the South a better-off cluster including New Zealand and Australia. Such inconsistencies notwithstanding, the divide is today largely consulted as a shorthand to refer to distribution of wealth/poverty or political/economic decision-making capacities across the globe (Smith et al. 2014).

The latter-mentioned principle applies to the EU context quite fittingly. Regardless of a wide array of small and big countries with varying levels of economic and/or political development, the North-South divide is here also used as a point of reference to describe wealth distribution as well as how political/economic decision-making capacities are dealt out across a Union of 28 members. In essence, this benchmarking has its origin as “a particularly

salient feature of the European political space in the EU-15 period” (Thomson 2011, p. 74). A number of studies probing into the mode of operation in the EC/EU Councils over that period unveiled numerous occasions where the northern and southern Member States mingled rather amongst themselves (Beyers and Dierickx 1998; Elgström 2003; Naurin and Lindahl 2008; Kaeding and Selck 2005). To some, this formation was somewhat obscured by the 2004/2007 enlargement waves (Köhler and Begega 2007; Huber et al. 2015). Nonetheless, a series of empirical data measuring the post-2004 period of the Council meetings concluded that the old cooperation pattern was still in order, that is, the new Member States coalesced either with the old members in the north or those in the south (Thomson 2011; Veen 2011), which was a tendency to put the East-West demarcation on the backburner.

Besides being a convenient shorthand for the fundamentals of economic order, the North-South split has also served as a yardstick to flesh out the EU’s oft-critiqued ‘normative’ foreign policy. The so-called ‘Barcelona Process’ following the 1995 Euro–Mediterranean Partnership was for instance a source of inspiration for scholarship to discuss how a host of historical patterns in the South stimulated discursive practices to launch a Mediterranean identity (Gillespie 1999; Bicchi 2006; Pace 2007). There were, other than that, publications in reference to politics/policies of environment (La Spina and Sciortino 1993; Yearley et al. 1994; Pridham and Cini 1994; Börzel 2000; Eder and Kousis 2000), immigration and asylum (Castles 2004; Finotelli and Sciortino 2009; Bommers and Sciortino 2011) as well as social policies (Leibfried 1993; Guillén and Matsaganis 2000; Ferrera 2005) chiefly arguing that it was more often than not the southern Member States who dragged their heels when it came to adopting a common framework.

That being said, demarcations around the EU’s North-South axis have to date been largely informed by unequal economic capabilities, given the asymmetrical distribution of wealth across Europe. Despite a long record of regional schemes, such as cohesion policies adopted to iron out structural differences (Ederveen et al. 2006; Hagen and Mohl 2009; Baun and Marek 2014), their effectiveness has usually been discredited. This became even more so evident with the recent Eurozone crisis, as it featured far more adverse effects in the EU’s emerging economies (EMEs), where the strongest fiscal contractions belonged to countries in the South (Gligorov et al. 2012; Landesmann 2013).

### **Aim, scope and methodology**

In view of the growing poverty divide between the Eurozone's northern and southern members recently (European Commission 2014), its implications for a permanent split between citizens of the two regions deserve critical scrutiny. To contribute empirical data to that end, this study set out to probe into EU citizens' views of each other by carrying out a survey in two northern EU members, namely Germany and the Netherlands, from 15 March to 30 April 2015. The selection of the two lands is based on their leading roles during the Greek bailout talks recently, which with their huge trade surpluses appeared to be the staunch advocates of austerity measures in the single-currency zone (*The Telegraph* 2015). The term 'northern EU Member States' was taken here to cover EU members to the north (and west) of Europe, including Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Germany, France and the UK, while the southern European states were essentially typified by Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain (GIPS), as the four major members to the south of the Union (Landesmann *ibid.*).

Given the recent debt crisis which provoked far-reaching debates not only about the fate of the Eurozone but also the solidarity of EU countries, there were serious concerns over a growing resentment between citizens of the EU's northern and southern Member States. A growth of reserved feelings as such is taken to deny the hypothetical argument in what may be called the null-hypothesis ( $h_0$ ) in this study. Accordingly, Member State citizens residing in the two regions would not necessarily hold wariness toward each other:

$h_0$ : There are at present no significant signs of resentment between the northern and southern Member State citizens.

The alternative hypothesis would obviously argue the other way around:

$h_a$ : There are at present significant signs of resentment between citizens of the northern and southern Member States.

To test the null hypothesis above, with the assumption that it is true, a questionnaire was devised for use as part of household interviews in Germany and the Netherlands. It consisted of closed questions inquiring about how Europe/European Union was conceived of by citizens of the northern and southern Member States and, more importantly, how these two sides viewed each other in the wake of the recent Eurozone crisis. Six questions were formulated to

investigate the subject matter: (1) The recent Eurozone crisis mirrors a permanent divide between the north and south of the EU; (2) The northern EU Member States' support for more tax increases and spending cuts in the southern EU Member States damage European solidarity; (3) The Member States in the north and south are very similar in terms of their commitment to the European Union; (4) The European Union would be better off without weak economies like southern Member States; (5) I am not prejudiced against nationals from southern EU Member States in this country; and (6) The cultural, social, economic or political practices of southern Europeans do not fit into the way of living in this country.

For these six questions, a scale of six choices of responses was readily composed: 'I strongly agree', 'I agree', 'I disagree', 'I strongly disagree', 'I neither agree nor disagree' and 'I do not know/I do not want to answer'. Out of these six options were three main feedback categories intended: agreement (as framed through 'I strongly agree' and 'I agree'), disagreement ('I disagree' and 'I strongly disagree') and other responses ('I neither agree nor disagree' and 'I do not know/I do not want to answer'). Ultimately, before a thorough data analysis, the six choices of responses were reduced to three, according to which the responses 'I strongly agree' and 'I agree' were grouped under 'agreement'; 'I disagree' and 'I strongly disagree' under 'disagreement' and the rest under 'other'.

The investigated areas briefed above demanded responses of categorical and non-numerical data. A fitting statistical method of analysis to test the null-hypothesis in accordance was taken to be Pearson's chi-square test of independence. The level of significance employed between significant and non-significant findings to that effect was 5%, where  $p < 0.05$ .

## **Research design**

For the target population of 120 participants, the estimated response rate was 60%. The number of household lists taken as samples was duly increased, which demanded 80 more addresses to be visited, adding up to 200 altogether (counted through  $100 \times 120 / 60$ ). The survey was carried out in Berlin and Amsterdam, the capital cities of the selected countries, in consideration of the residents' demographic distribution, as informed by NUTS 2010/EU-27 (European Commission 2011). The primary sampling units (PSU) in each city were located by taking into account where the resident populations were mostly diversified. These were identified in Berlin as Neukölln and in Amsterdam as Geuzenveld-Slotermeer. The selection of research participants in these districts was systematic: for the private household, every third

apartment/house number in the two randomly chosen streets of these districts; for the identification of research participants in the households, the first person in alphabetical order.

A pre-notification letter was sent to the 200 potential participants in each selected capital city. Even if the intended 120 interviews could be obtained earlier, all precontacted addresses were visited as a matter of courtesy. Some of the potential respondents turned out to be away on the visiting days, while others declined to participate in the survey or were unable to qualify for taking part due to illness, underage etc. The overall target population was chosen from the first 120 of the successfully interviewed samples in total.

The sampling was based on random selection and assignment, in compliance with cluster/area sampling. Accordingly, half of the participants (60) were to hold the citizenship of Germany or the Netherlands, depending on where the interview was carried out, while the other half (60) needed to be the nationals of Greece, Italy, Portugal or Spain, as the core countries representing the EU's South in the two hosting countries. For maximisation of responses and interaction with the participants in the most natural way possible, native speakers with interviewing experiences accompanied the surveys. The preset sample profile necessitated choosing only one resident person from each of the private household visited, falling into one of the three age groups: adolescents (aged between 15-17), young adults (18-29) and adults (30 and above). Due to their varying institutional services, a uniform pick of sampling frames was not feasible across the participating countries. The sampling frame used in Germany was informed by the Statistical Offices at the municipal level, which in the Netherlands was drawn from the PTT (postal delivery points). The resources in both countries proved to be reliable, owing to their frequent updates and wide coverages.

For optimisation of the interviews, the 'back-translation' technique was employed. Often used in Eurobarometer public opinion surveys, this procedure was indeed a measure taken in case the target household could not demonstrate an adequate level of English proficiency, which would require responding to the questionnaire items (most probably) in the native languages. To that end, a professional translator changed the questionnaire into the target language, depending on the target household's profile. This text was then changed by another professional translator back into English, without having seen the original questionnaire. Comparison, and if needed modification, of the wording in both versions were ultimately

made in order to ensure quality during translation in German, Dutch, Greek, Spanish, Portuguese and Italian, as the official languages of the participating samples.

## Findings

### Germany

Of the 200 addresses to which the prenotification letters were sent, 125 private households were interviewed successfully. On 12 visiting days in total, 23 of the precontacted potential participants refused to take part in the survey, 38 of them were found to be away and 14 others ill, too young, old or otherwise to be able to respond. This amounted overall to a response rate of 62.5%.

The three age groups of the 120 survey respondents were represented in Germany by 28 adolescents, 40 young adults and 52 adults, amounting to 64 males and 56 females. Those who turned to hold a higher level of education here, that is, a tertiary degree from a vocational school or university (including that of a post-graduate/doctorate) were 87, while 33 participants reported as the rest to have a secondary or a lower degree of education. The number of the unemployed out of a total 120 participants in Germany was 24.

When reviewed in terms of citizenship, these counts demonstrated that the distribution of Germans and GIPS citizens was largely divergent. The participants from GIPS turned out to be older than those of the nationals, who, compared to the former, were represented by a wider population of females. Likewise, as regards education, the number of GIPS participants who declared to hold higher degrees at the tertiary level was 49, by comparison to 38 German citizens with reportedly similar degrees. Finally, the ratio of the unemployed between the two groups was twice as big (8 jobless counts of GIPS citizens versus 16 of the German participants):

Table 1: Survey participants according to age, gender, level of education and status of employment in Germany (n total: 120, n German citizens: 60 + n GIPS citizens: 60)

Citizenship	Age groups			Gender		Level of education		Status of employment		Total
	Adolescents	Young adults	Adults	Male	Female	Secondary or lower	Tertiary	Employed	Unemployed	

German citizens	20	22	18	26	34	22	38	44	16	60
GIPS citizens	8	18	34	38	22	11	49	52	8	60
Total	28	40	52	64	56	33	87	96	24	120

The interviews in Germany brought out fairly disparate findings. While these were by no means close to the mean, as the high standard deviations came to indicate, there was not much evidence for similar patterns shared by the two sample groups:

Table 2: Distribution of responses on a six-category scale in Germany

Questions	German citizens								GIPS citizens							
	I strongly agree	I agree	I do not agree	I strongly disagree	I neither agree nor disagree	I do not know/I do not want to answer	Mean	Standard deviation	I strongly agree	I agree	I do not agree	I strongly disagree	I neither agree nor disagree	I do not know/I do not want to answer	Mean	Standard deviation
1. The recent Eurozone crisis mirrors a permanent divide between the north and south of the EU*	20	29	2	1	3	5	10	11,66	10	28	5	3	6	8	10	9,14
2. The northern EU Member States' support for more tax increases and spending cuts in the southern EU Member States damage European solidarity	2	9	8	31	4	6	10	10,60	10	20	11	8	8	3	10	5,62
3. The Member States in the north and south are very similar in terms of their commitment to the European Union	8	13	22	10	4	3	10	6,96	4	2	17	25	5	7	10	9,03
4. The European Union would be better off without weak economies like southern Member States	17	11	9	3	8	12	10	4,65	6	5	15	18	8	8	10	5,25
5. I am not	10	20	11	7	7	5	10	5,37	8	4	27	12	4	5	10	8,88



prejudiced against nationals from southern EU Member States in this country																
6. The cultural, social, economic or political practices of southern Europeans do not fit into the way of living in this country	7	22	8	6	10	7	10	6,03	7	7	10	17	11	8	10	3,79

\* The survey participants were briefly reminded that the EU Member States in the north (or northern EU Member States) covered Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Germany, France and the UK while those in the south (or southern Member States) were limited to Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain.

As previously mentioned, the responses obtained throughout the interviews were essentially meant to disclose three general feedback categories in the end: agreement, disagreement and other responses suggesting abstention, failure and/or refusal to provide answers. In interpreting the patterns on the six-response scale above ('I strongly agree', 'I agree', 'I disagree', 'I strongly disagree', 'I neither agree nor disagree' and 'I do not know/I do not want to answer'), for this reason, an abridged form of three categories was reconsidered under 'agreement' (representing 'I strongly agree' and 'I agree'), 'disagreement' ('I disagree' and 'I strongly disagree') and 'other' (standing for the remaining choices symbolising abstention/no response):

Table 3: Responses in Germany (abridged)

Questions	Categories	German citizens	GIPS citizens	Total
1. The recent Eurozone crisis mirrors a permanent divide between the north and south of the EU	Agreement	49	36	85
	Disagreement	3	8	11
	Other	8	16	24
	Total	60	60	120
2. The northern EU Member States' support for more tax increases and spending cuts in the southern EU Member States damage European solidarity	Agreement	11	30	41
	Disagreement	39	19	58
	Other	10	11	21
	Total	60	60	120
3. The Member States in the north and south are very similar in terms of their commitment to the European Union	Agreement	21	6	27
	Disagreement	32	42	74
	Other	7	12	19
	Total	60	60	120
4. The European Union would be better off without weak economies like southern Member States	Agreement	28	11	39
	Disagreement	12	33	45
	Other	20	16	36
	Total	60	60	120

5. I am not prejudiced against nationals from northern EU Member States in this country	Agreement	30	12	42
	Disagreement	18	39	57
	Other	12	9	21
	Total	60	60	120
6. The cultural, social, economic or political practices of northern Europeans do not fit into the way of living in this country	Agreement	29	14	43
	Disagreement	14	27	41
	Other	17	19	36
	Total	60	60	120

Based on a reduced form, the responses to all questions revealed a high level of divergence between the two sample groups' preferences. The most similar patterns of responses concerned the first question (on consideration of the recent Eurozone crisis to be a permanent divide between the EU's North and South) where the German citizens' tendency proved to be much higher than that of the GIPS citizens, although the choices of agreement outweighed those of disagreement, abstention or neutrality on both sides (49 vs 36). The second question's inquiry about whether or not the northern EU Member States' support for further austerity measures had negative implications for European solidarity (where the German respondents' 11 choices of agreement and 39 of disagreement were somewhat counterbalanced by the GIPS citizens' 30 of agreement and 19 of disagreement) and the fourth question's investigation of a European Union without weak economies like southern Member States on the other side (to which the German participants returned with 28 choices of agreement and 39 of disagreement versus 11 choices of agreement and 33 of disagreement belonging to the participants from GIPS) were indeed where the split was most obvious to observe. Likewise, prejudice against southern EU nationals in Germany, as tackled by the fifth question, similarities between the North and South in terms of their commitment to the EU (as explored by the third question) and the sixth question's inquiry about their cultural, social, economic or political practices' compatibility with those of Germans disclosed equally significant accounts of divergence between the respondents of the two regions.

Before carrying out the statistical analysis on the basis of the observed frequencies above, the expected counts were calculated according to 'row total x column total / grand total' (as marked by the 3x4 shaded grids in Table 3). The test statistic performed according to ' $\chi^2 = \sum (\text{observed counts} - \text{expected counts})^2 / \text{expected counts}$ ' generated the P-values below, given the 5% level of significance and 2 degrees of freedom (as identified by 'number of rows - 1 x number of columns - 1'):

Table 4: P-values according to observed and expected counts of responses in Germany

Questions	Categories	German citizens		GIPS citizens		P-values
		Observed counts	Expected counts	Observed counts	Expected counts	
1. The recent Eurozone crisis mirrors a permanent divide between the north and south of the EU	Agreement	49	42,5	36	42,5	0,0313
	Disagreement	3	5,5	8	5,5	
	Other	8	12	16	12	
2. The northern EU Member States' support for more tax increases and spending cuts in the southern EU Member States damage European solidarity	Agreement	11	20,5	30	20,5	0,0004
	Disagreement	39	29	19	29	
	Other	10	10,5	11	10,5	
3. The Member States in the north and south are very similar in terms of their commitment to the European Union	Agreement	21	13,5	6	13,5	0,0041
	Disagreement	32	37	42	37	
	Other	7	9,5	12	9,5	
4. The European Union would be better off without weak economies like southern Member States	Agreement	28	19,5	11	19,5	0,0001
	Disagreement	12	22,5	33	22,5	
	Other	20	18	16	18	
5. I am not prejudiced against nationals from southern EU Member States in this country	Agreement	30	21	12	21	0,0004
	Disagreement	18	28,5	39	28,5	
	Other	12	10,5	9	10,5	
6. The cultural, social, economic or political practices of southern Europeans do not fit into the way of living in this country	Agreement	29	21,5	14	21,5	0,0088
	Disagreement	14	20,5	27	20,5	
	Other	17	18	19	18	

## The Netherlands

Following Germany, the second leg of the survey was conducted in the Netherlands. For the 200 addresses to be called on in total (as prenotified by letters to reach the target population of 120, given the 60% preestimated response rate), 121 visits were fruitful. It took 10 days to complete the intended visiting plan, which drew to a close with 33 of the precontacted potential participants as missing, 24 of them refusing to take part in the survey and 22 others being recorded as ill, too young, old or otherwise to be able to respond. This amounted overall to a response rate of 60.5%.

The 120 participants in the Netherlands were made up of 25 adolescents, 49 young adults and 46 adults, amounting to 56 males and 64 females. Of these, 84 were holding degrees from tertiary level schools as opposed to 36 who had a high school degree at the most. The ratio of the employed to the unemployed in these was around 3 to 1, represented by 91 and 29 participants, to be precise.

When considered on the basis of citizenship, these counts revealed that the age groups did not show much of a difference. Yet, the same could not be said of gender. The level of education amongst GIPS citizens was much higher: 47 of them reported to have a degree from a vocational school/university as opposed to 37 participants representing the Dutch citizens in the same way. Similarly, the ratio of the employed between the two groups was about 4 to 5 in favour of the GIPS citizens (41 to 50 counts):

Table 5: Survey participants according to age, gender, level of education and status of employment in the Netherlands

Citizenship	Age groups			Gender		Level of education		Status of employment		Total
	Adolescents	Young adults	Adults	Male	Female	Secondary or lower	Tertiary	Employed	Unemployed	
Dutch citizens	14	26	20	22	38	23	37	41	19	60
GIPS citizens	11	23	26	34	26	13	47	50	10	60
Total	25	49	46	56	64	36	84	91	29	120

Against this background of sample profiles, the Dutch leg of the survey brought out largely dissimilar findings between the two groups of respondents. The values of standard deviations proved to be similarly high for both groups, yet their responses of agreement/disagreement were not really alike:

Table 6: Distribution of responses on a six-category scale in the Netherlands (n total: 120, n Dutch citizens: 60 + n GIPS citizens: 60)

Questions	Dutch citizens								GIPS citizens							
	I strongly agree	I agree	I do not agree	I strongly disagree	I neither agree nor disagree	I do not know/I do not want to answer	Mean	Standard deviation	I strongly agree	I agree	I do not agree	I strongly disagree	I neither agree nor disagree	I do not know/I do not want to answer	Mean	Standard deviation
1. The recent Eurozone crisis	17	27	2	2	5	7	10	10,00	12	18	10	9	6	5	10	4,69

mirrors a permanent divide between the north and south of the EU*																
2. The northern EU Member States' support for more tax increases and spending cuts in the southern EU Member States damage European solidarity	5	7	25	11	5	7	10	7,67	10	20	12	7	4	7	10	5,62
3. The Member States in the north and south are very similar in terms of their commitment to the European Union	12	11	18	12	3	4	10	5,62	2	2	20	22	10	4	10	9,03
4. The European Union would be better off without weak economies like southern Member States	9	9	7	8	17	10	10	3,58	5	11	16	12	10	6	10	4,05
5. I am not prejudiced against nationals from southern EU Member States in this country	15	13	10	10	8	4	10	3,85	7	7	20	17	7	2	10	6,93
6. The cultural, social, economic or political practices of southern Europeans do not fit into the way of living in this country	12	15	6	6	9	12	10	3,63	9	11	10	15	8	7	10	2,83

\* Like in Germany, the survey participants in the Netherlands were also briefly reminded that the EU Member States in the north (or northern EU Member States) covered Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Germany, France and the UK while those in the south (or southern Member States) were limited to Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain.

As performed in the German case, the above-given distribution on a scale of six categories of responses was eventually reconsidered in the Dutch leg on the basis of three categories only, signifying choices of agreement, disagreement and the others:

Table 7: Responses in the Netherlands (abridged)

Questions	Categories	Dutch citizens	GIPS citizens	Total
1. The recent Eurozone crisis mirrors a permanent divide between the north and south of the EU	Agreement	44	30	74
	Disagreement	4	19	23
	Other	12	11	23
	Total	60	60	120
2. The northern EU Member States' support for more tax increases	Agreement	12	30	42

and spending cuts in the southern EU Member States damage European solidarity	Disagreement	36	19	55
	Other	12	11	23
	Total	60	60	120
3. The Member States in the north and south are very similar in terms of their commitment to the European Union	Agreement	23	4	27
	Disagreement	30	42	72
	Other	7	14	21
	Total	60	60	120
4. The European Union would be better off without weak economies like southern Member States	Agreement	18	16	34
	Disagreement	15	28	43
	Other	27	16	43
	Total	60	60	120
5. I am not prejudiced against nationals from northern EU Member States in this country	Agreement	28	14	42
	Disagreement	20	37	57
	Other	12	9	21
	Total	60	60	120
6. The cultural, social, economic or political practices of northern Europeans do not fit into the way of living in this country	Agreement	27	20	47
	Disagreement	12	25	37
	Other	21	15	36
	Total	60	60	120

A quick browse across the abridged table manifests a predominant divide between the two sample groups' preferences. The most similar pattern observed here concerned the fourth question, inquiring about whether or not the European Union would be better off without weak economies like southern EU members. To that, both sample groups agreed with close frequencies (18 by the Dutch and 16 GIPS citizens), although their choices of disagreement differed in broad terms (28 responses by GIPS citizens vs 15 by the Dutch). The responses to whether or not the recent Eurozone crisis marked a permanent divide between the EU's North and South (as inquired by the first question) and the fifth question's probe into prejudice against southern EU nationals in the Netherlands did not really exhibit similar tendencies between the sample groups (44 and 28 choices of agreement and 4 and 20 of disagreement by the Dutch respondents as opposed to 30 and 14 of agreement and 19 and 37 of disagreement by the GIPS citizens). Given the counts of their preferences, though, the Dutch and GIPS citizens differed at most in matters concerning the northern EU Member States' support for more austerity measures in the southern EU Member States and its consequences for European solidarity and similarity of Member States in terms of their commitment to the European Union, as investigated by way of the second and third questions (with 12 and 23 counts of agreement by the Dutch versus 30 and 4 by GIPS citizens, respectively). Finally, the sixth question on compliance of southern EU nationals' cultural, social and political practices with those of the Dutch revealed also a marked split between the Dutch and GIPS samples.

While the choices of agreement indicated a relatively narrower margin here (compared to 27 Dutch citizens who stated that the southern Europeans did not comply with the Dutch way of life, the number of GIPS citizens who responded in the same was 20), the two groups' preferences for disagreement were not at all close to each other: 12 Dutch vs 25 GIPS citizens did not agree on the investigated lack of compliance between the two sides.

Following the calculation of the expected counts on the basis of the observed frequencies above, the test statistic in the Netherlands introduced the P-values below:

Table 8: P-values according to observed and expected counts of responses in the Netherlands

Questions	Categories	Dutch citizens		GIPS citizens		P-values
		Observed counts	Expected counts	Observed counts	Expected counts	
1. The recent Eurozone crisis mirrors a permanent divide between the north and south of the EU	Agreement	44	37	30	37	0,0020
	Disagreement	4	11,5	19	11,5	
	Other	12	11,5	11	11,5	
2. The northern EU Member States' support for more tax increases and spending cuts in the southern EU Member States damage European solidarity	Agreement	12	21	30	21	0,0015
	Disagreement	36	27,5	19	27,5	
	Other	12	11,5	11	11,5	
3. The Member States in the north and south are very similar in terms of their commitment to the European Union	Agreement	23	13,5	4	13,5	0,0001
	Disagreement	30	36	42	36	
	Other	7	10,5	14	10,5	
4. The European Union would be better off without weak economies like southern Member States	Agreement	18	17	16	17	0,0324
	Disagreement	15	21,5	28	21,5	
	Other	27	21,5	16	21,5	
5. I am not prejudiced against nationals from southern EU Member States in this country	Agreement	28	21	14	21	0,0062
	Disagreement	20	28,5	37	28,5	
	Other	12	10,5	9	10,5	
6. The cultural, social, economic or political practices of southern Europeans do not fit into the way of living in this country	Agreement	27	23,5	20	23,5	0,0367
	Disagreement	12	18,5	25	18,5	
	Other	21	18	15	18	

## Comparative assessment and discussion

The EU's oft-cited North-South divide was explored in this study at the level of public opinion. The research scope was limited for this purpose to the mutual perceptions of northern and southern Member State citizens, as investigated through a string of closed questions. While the use of closed questions offered convenience of time and data quantification, there might have been more complex attitudes/opinions the participants failed to voice as a result of the chosen method of inquiry, given constraints over their responses by way of six questions

on a scale of readily-summarised six choices only. Put differently, it may be the case that some issues were covered at the expense of others by this way, leaving the depth of analysis somewhat uneven.

That being said, breaking down the research scope on the basis of survey questions, one could track down the essentials of current debates surrounding the divide between the EU's northern and southern members. The questions were formulated in close association with the recent Eurozone crisis, even if some like the first, second and fourth questions made more direct references than the others such as the sixth question, which expanded the economic roots of the friction into the cultural, social and political areas. The third question sought to understand in a similar vein whether or not an obvious level of proximity was perceivable between the northern and southern Member States as far as their commitments to the Union were concerned. And the fifth question aimed to refute/confirm the existence of prejudice between citizens of the two sides, although these might not necessarily be based on personal experiences.

Before making a conclusive analysis of the findings on the basis of these questions, one needs to remember that neither the nationals of the host countries nor those from GIPS were one of a kind. Barring the ethnocultural disparities held in all likelihood, nevertheless, the responses from the northern and southern EU Member State citizens in the study appeared to be fairly coherent within each sample group. Cross-comparison of samples, that is, comparison of GIPS citizens' responses in Germany and the Netherlands on one side and those of the nationals on the other revealed relatively intercompatible patterns, albeit with a few exceptions concerning the GIPS nationals' responses to the first and second questions in Germany, which could differ from those of the Dutch nationals in the Netherlands as many as 8 counts of agreement and 11 of disagreement. Likewise, on the side of nationals, responses to the first question by GIPS citizens brought out 5 more counts of agreement in Germany than those in the Netherlands:

Table 9: Cross-comparison of sample group responses in Germany and the Netherlands

Questions	Categories	Sample groups			
		German nationals in Germany	Dutch nationals in the Netherlands	GIPS citizens in Germany	GIPS citizens in the Netherlands
1. The recent Eurozone crisis mirrors a	Agreement	49	44	38	30



permanent divide between the north and south of the EU	Disagreement	3	4	8	19
	Other	8	12	14	11
	Total	60	60	60	60
2. The northern EU Member States' support for more tax increases and spending cuts in the southern EU Member States damage European solidarity	Agreement	11	12	22	30
	Disagreement	39	36	19	19
	Other	10	12	19	11
	Total	60	60	60	60
3. The Member States in the north and south are very similar in terms of their commitment to the European Union	Agreement	21	23	6	4
	Disagreement	32	30	42	42
	Other	7	7	12	14
	Total	60	60	60	60
4. The European Union would be better off without weak economies like southern Member States	Agreement	16	18	21	16
	Disagreement	17	15	26	28
	Other	27	27	13	16
	Total	60	60	60	60
5. I am not prejudiced against nationals from northern EU Member States in this country	Agreement	30	28	12	14
	Disagreement	18	20	39	37
	Other	12	12	9	9
	Total	60	60	60	60
6. The cultural, social, economic or political practices of northern Europeans do not fit into the way of living in this country	Agreement	29	27	14	20
	Disagreement	14	12	27	25
	Other	17	21	19	15
	Total	60	60	60	60

Though not used as selection criteria for the sampling of the survey, the age group, gender, level of education and status of employment of participants in Germany and the Netherlands were at relative variance with each other. For nationals, the younger contribution was recorded in Germany (with 20 adolescents and 22 young adults), where the number of the employed (44 counts) and those with a degree from a tertiary level school (38 out of 60 participants) turned out to be again higher than those in the Netherlands. The older participants came out in the Netherlands (with 20 counts of adults), where female participation (38 vs 22 males) outscored that in Germany (with 34 female and 26 male respondents). As for GIPS nationals, the younger representation was observed in the Netherlands (with 11 adolescents and 23 young adults), while the older participation took place in Germany (with 34 adults). The female participation concerning the non-nationals was broader in the Netherlands (with 26 counts) than in Germany (with 22 female respondents). The level of education in Germany was slightly higher (with 49 participants holding a degree from a university/vocational school), by comparison to the 47 counts in the Netherlands, where the number of the employed was somewhat lower than that in Germany (50 to 52 counts).

Overall, bringing the two sample groups (nationals and GIPS citizens) together, majority of the participants were represented by the adults (98 out of 240 samples in grand total), the employed (187 versus 53 reportedly jobless) and the respondents with higher degrees of education outnumbering those of secondary or lower level more than twice as many (171 to 69). It turned out as a matter of coincidence that the overall numbers of participating males and females in the survey were exactly the same (120 each), despite the diametrically opposite entries on both sides (48 males and 72 females of nationals versus 72 males and 48 females of GIPS citizens). Last, one needs to note that the counts of GIPS citizens' employment rates came about as fairly decent figures when compared to data applying to the nationals (with 52 to 44 counts in Germany and 50 to 41 in the Netherlands):

Table 10: Cross-comparison of sample profiles according to age, gender, level of education and employment status in Germany and the Netherlands

Citizenship	Member States	Age groups			Gender		Level of education		Status of employment		Total
		Adolescents	Young adults	Adults	Male	Female	Secondary or lower	Tertiary	Employed	Unemployed	
Own nationals	Germany	20	22	18	26	34	22	38	44	16	60
	Netherlands	14	26	20	22	38	23	37	41	19	60
	Total	34	48	38	48	72	45	75	85	35	120
GIPS nationals	Germany	8	18	34	38	22	11	49	52	8	60
	Netherlands	11	23	26	34	26	13	47	50	10	60
	Total	19	41	60	72	48	24	96	102	18	120
Grand Total		53	89	98	120	120	69	171	187	53	240

The null hypothesis which this study set out to test envisaged no significant signs of resentment between the northern and southern Member State citizens at present. The findings in both selected cases were in denial of this presumption, though. The variations between the nationals from the EU's northern and the southern regions were accordingly distinct in great measures to the extent that they responded to the six questionnaire items during the survey interviews.

To be able to conclude that the survey findings suggest failure to reject the null hypothesis, the test statistics performed in accordance with Pearson's chi-square test of independence had to reveal statistically insignificant values as far the differences between the German/Dutch

nationals on one side and the GIPS citizens on the other were concerned. Given the 5% level of significance, this meant, the preset  $\alpha:0.05$  alpha level was by no means to be overreached. The P-values calculated separately for each of the six questionnaire items in the selected cases appeared, however, as follows:

Table 11: Comparison of P-values in Germany and the Netherlands

Questions	P-values	
	Germany	Netherlands
1. The recent Eurozone crisis mirrors a permanent divide between the north and south of the EU	0,0313	0,0020
2. The northern EU members' support for more tax increases and spending cuts in the southern EU members damage the ideals of European solidarity	0,0004	0,0015
3. The Member States in the north and south are very similar in terms of their commitment to the European Union	0,0041	0,0001
4. The European Union would be better off without weak economies like southern Member States	0,0001	0,0324
5. I am not prejudiced against nationals from southern EU Member States in this country	0,0004	0,0062
6. The cultural, social, economic or political practices of southern Europeans do not fit into the way of living in this country	0,0088	0,0367

With variations from one country to the other, these values are by no means above the alpha level, in fact fairly close to the probability level of 0. As it appeared in most cases, apart from both sample groups' responses to the fourth question inquiring about an EU without weak southern economies as well as preferences of the GIPS citizens to the last question on their compatibility with the German/Dutch ways of living, the two sets of participants tended to opt for fairly different choices across the given response scale. All in one, the self-evident split between the northern and southern EU member citizens' perceptions of one another as such demand that the null hypothesis be rejected.

It should be noted that these findings are based on a small-scale study, limited largely by its time span and sample size, and might not be adequate to conclude that there is now an enduring divide between citizens of the two regions. Still, they obviously suggest that the roots of distantiation are not merely economic, as the recent Eurozone crisis appeared to put forward at first glance, but in fact come about as deep-seated sociocultural and political prejudices of history. From the Northern side, the latest Southern woes are little more than a

consequence of self-inflicted failures. Accordingly, the political/societal consensus around robust policy-making structures in the North are unequivocally at odds with the South's clientelist frame of mind, which is why economic reforms in the latter can hardly ever reach their intended goals (Tassinari 2014).

The cleavage between the North and South in Europe is to many a manifestation of historical contradistinctions, such as the varying work ethic or religion in the two regions. That the densely Protestant North differs from the largely Catholic and Orthodox South –inspired significantly by Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*- explains to this understanding why capitalism emanated from the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands to scale up further by dint of industrialisation and modernisation. The chief characteristic defining these historical keystones was for the most part individualism, the southern equivalent of which was delineated by a collective logic. In a parallel vein, some authors claimed that economies in the Northern Member States prospered far better also because of their earlier generation of the human capital crucial to economy (Becker and Woessmann 2009). As of the end of 19th century, accordingly, the acquisitions of the Reformation became manifest particularly in Prussia to lead to not only higher economic prosperity but also to better education.

From the Southerners' perspective, on the other side, most of these judgments labeling them 'incompetent', 'profligate' or 'lazy' carry the traces of old stereotypes (Murdock and Gripsrud 2015). To the latest OECD statistics (2014), for instance, Greeks work far more hours than citizens of the northern EU lands. The mismatch between the two regions would then -at least for the moment- not necessarily stem from the work-shy or rule-bending peoples of the South but instead be an issue of productivity and/or competitiveness. Whether instances of myth, misinformation or bias, nonetheless, it is not an easy task to dislodge such preconceptions when the current political indicators validate patterns of nepotism and corruption in the EU's Southern members, which by comparison to those in the North prove to be significantly higher (Koch 2014).

## **Conclusion**

The bailout negotiations over the future of Greece in the Eurozone came to demonstrate how variant the levels of institutional competences between the EU's northern and southern members could be. To be fair, in the absence of a fiscal union with strongly-built stabilising

mechanisms (Lucarelli 2012; Müller 2012), where several Member States had constantly been displaying uneven growth and exporting capacities, deficits and government debts to GDP, the latest crisis was a ‘chronicle of a crisis foretold’ (Garton Ash 2012). Regardless of the fact that a setback of this magnitude was under these circumstances inescapable, the resentment between the Northern and Southern members intensified lately. Hardly a day went by - particularly in the past two years- without the ‘family members’ throwing accusations as to who was responsible for the biggest debt problem in the EU history. In parallel, as this study came to reveal, there arose significant signs of distantiation between citizens of the two regions. As a matter of fact, the growing split between the better-off North and the crisis-prone South as such echoed once again loud and clear the EU’s long-standing legitimacy problem.

Against a long background of the elite-driven European integration process, whereby preferences of citizens were often shoved on the back burner (Moravcsik 2002), Europe’s chronic democratic deficits revived anew with the Eurozone crisis, amidst debates of putting the single-currency zone’s interests before those of its constituent members. While this latter motive came across as intrusion upon national policy-making<sup>2</sup>, with no mounting evidence of a common political identity in sight, the federalists’ hope for a European ‘demos’ sprang to life by anti-European movements (Peet and Guardia 2014).

The anti-EU/anti-Euro left and right-wing political parties have actually been gaining ground in both northern and southern Members. Yet, the rise of ideological divisions in the latter economies have more potential to declare a divorce from the Union. The developments in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain are therefore under closer scrutiny, for these could be far more devastating than in, say, Germany, the Netherlands, France or the UK, which were not really ravaged by the recent economic crisis as much as the former, but still are home to the biggest populist parties in Europe. A host of ‘Tea Party’ movements such as the Pegida and Afd in Germany, the Dutch Freedom Party in the Netherlands, the National Front in France and UKIP in Britain are now all but just a few ultra-nationalists on the fringes, some of which polled as high as 20 percent in the latest national elections. The common thread to these movements is the anti-immigration discourse. As the non-competitive economies in the periphery -be they from within or without the EU- exported to these lands far more migrants than before, the political fault-lines took a turn for the extremists in the latter. And next up on

---

<sup>2</sup> The bailout plans required ‘co-management’ of the Greek economy with ‘foreign’ stakeholders (the so-called ‘Troika’, i.e. the European Commission, International Monetary Fund and European Central Bank).

the front burner is the UK, which with increasing campaigns against free movement of workers will in the coming days decide to stay/leave out the EU.

What is somewhat paradoxical about the European scene today is that there are certain countries who seek to join the EU, attracted by its seemingly working systems of democracy, rule of law and human rights, despite controversy over their European background, while a growing sense of disappointment has been spreading in several Member States to overshadow their future in the Union. It goes without saying that the recent debt crisis has highlighted a defective financial system in the Eurozone. With ethnocentrism and national flag-waving reaching a peak these days, however, its implications go far beyond the single-currency zone. As the Union expanded gradually and yet could not overcome its most ‘existential’ challenge, i.e. coming up with an emphatic, all-embracing and cohesive identity for being ‘united in diversity’, it is far from elusory why “Southerners complain about ‘rich and greedy’ Northerners, and Northerners rue their connections to ‘lazy and profligate’ Southerners” (Espada 2012, p. 15). And in all likelihood, the reopened wounds between the two regions will remain for good.

## References

- Amin, S. et al. 1990. *Transforming the Revolution: Social Movements and the World-System*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Bicchi, F. 2006. Our size fits all. Normative power Europe and the Mediterranean. *Journal of European Public Policy* 13(2), pp. 286-303.
- Barnett, J. 2007. The geopolitics of climate change. *Geography Compass* 1(6), pp. 1361-1375.
- Baun, M. and Marek, D. 2014. *Cohesion Policy in the European Union*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Becker, S.O. and Woessmann, L. 2009. Was Weber Wrong? A Human Capital Theory of Protestant Economic History. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 124 (2), pp. 531-596.
- Beyers, J. and Dierickx, G. 1998. The Working Groups of the Council of the European Union: Supranational or Intergovernmental Negotiations? *Journal of Common Market Studies* 36(3), pp. 289-317.
- Bommes, M. and Sciortino, G. eds. 2011. *Foggy Social Structures: Irregular Migration, Informal Economy and Welfare Regimes*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Börzel, T.A. 2000. Why there is no Southern Problem. On Environmental Leader and Laggards in the EU. *Journal of European Public Policy* 7(1), pp. 141-162.

- Castles, S. 2004. Why Migration Policies Fail. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 27(2), pp. 205-227.
- Eder, K. and Kousis, M. eds. 2000. *Environmental Politics in Southern Europe: Actors, Institutions and Discourses in a Europeanizing Society*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- Ederveen, S. et al. 2006. Fertile Soil for EU funds? A Panel Data Analysis of the Conditional Effectiveness of European Cohesion Policy. *Kyklos* 59(1), pp. 17-42.
- Elgström, O. 2003. Introduction. In: Elgström, O. ed. *European Union Council Presidencies: A Comparative Perspective*. London: Routledge, pp. 1-17.
- Escobar, A. 2004. Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality and Anti-globalisation Social Movements. *Third World Quarterly* 25(1), 207-230.
- Espada, J.C. 2012. The Sources of Extremism. *Journal of Democracy* 23(4), pp.15-22.
- European Commission. 2015a. Eurostat: General government gross debt, annual data, 2014. Available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=teina225&plugin=1> [Accessed: 22 May 2015].
- European Commission. 2015b. *Eurostat: unemployment rates, seasonally adjusted, May 2015*. Available at: [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Unemployment\\_rates,\\_seasonally\\_adjusted,\\_May\\_2015.png](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Unemployment_rates,_seasonally_adjusted,_May_2015.png) [Accessed: 22 May 2015].
- European Commission. 2014. *Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2013*. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- European Commission. 2014. *Special Eurobarometer 415: Europeans in 2014, July 2014*. Available at: [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs\\_415\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_415_en.pdf) [Accessed: 21 May 2015].
- European Commission. 2012. *Standard Eurobarometer 77: The Values of Europeans, May 2012*. Available at: [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb77/eb77\\_value\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb77/eb77_value_en.pdf) [Accessed: 14 May 2015].
- European Communities. 1973. *Bulletin of the European Communities No 12. Declaration on European Identity*. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- Ferrera, M. 2005. Welfares States and Social Safety Nets in Southern Europe: An Introduction. In: Ferrera, M. ed. *Welfare State Reform in Southern Europe. Fighting against Poverty and Social Exclusion in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece*. London: Routledge, 1-32.
- Garton Ash, T. 2012. The Crisis of Europe: How the Union Came Together and Why It's Falling Apart. *Foreign Affairs* 91(5), pp. 2-15.
- Gillespie, R. 1999. *Spain and the Mediterranean: Developing a European Policy Towards the South*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Gligorov, V. et al. 2012. *New Divide(s) in Europe?* Current Analyses and Forecasts No. 9. Vienna: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, WIIW.
- Guillén, A.M. and Matsaganis, M. 2000. Testing the ‘Social Dumping’ Hypothesis in Southern Europe: Welfare Policies in Greece and Spain during the last 20 Years. *Journal of European Social Policy* 10(2), pp. 120-145.
- Hagen, T. and Mohl, P. 2009. *How Does EU Cohesion Policy Work? Evaluating its Effects on Fiscal Outcome Variables*. ZEW Discussion Paper, No. 09-051.
- Huber, P. et al. eds. 2015. *Competitiveness, Social Inclusion and Sustainability in a Diverse European Union*. Berlin: Springer.
- Koch, A. (2014). Europe, Central Asia and the State of Corruption in 2014: The Gold Standard? *Transparency International*, December 2014. Available at: <http://blog.transparency.org/2014/12/03/europe-central-asia-and-the-state-of-corruption-in-2014-the-gold-standard/> [Accessed: 15 June 2015].
- La Spina, A. and Sciortino, G. 1993. Common Agenda, Southern Rules: European Integration and Environmental Change in the Mediterranean States. In: Liefferink, J.D., Lowe, P.D. and Mold, A.P.J. eds. *European Integration and Environmental Policy*. London: Belhaven Press, pp. 217-236.
- Landesmann, M. 2013. *The New North–South Divide in Europe: Can the European Convergence Model be Resuscitated?* Monthly Report, No. 1. Vienna: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, WIIW, pp. 3–14.
- Leibfried, S. 1993. Toward a European Welfare State? In: Jones, C. ed. *New Perspectives on the Welfare State in Europe*. London: Routledge, pp. 133–156.
- Lucarelli, B. 2012. German Neomercantilism and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. *Journal of Post Keynesian Economics* 34(2), pp. 205-224.
- McFarlane, C. 2006. Crossing Borders: Development, Learning and the North-South Divide. *Third World Quarterly* 27(8), pp. 1413-1437.
- Moravcsik, A. 2002. In Defence of the ‘Democratic Deficit’. Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40(4), pp. 603-624.
- Murdock G, and Gripsrud J. eds. 2015. *Money Talks: Media, Markets, Crisis*. London: Intellect.
- Müller, J.W. 2012. Europe’s Perfect Storm: The Political and Economic Consequences of the Eurocrisis. *Dissent* 59(4), pp. 47-53.
- Naurin, D. and Lindahl, R. 2008. East-North-South: Coalition-Building in the Council before and after Enlargement. In Naurin, D. and Wallace, H. eds. *Unveiling the Council of the European Union: Games Governments Play in Brussels*. London: Macmillan, pp. 64-80.



- Newell, P. 2005. Race, Class and the Global Politics of Environmental Inequality. *Global Environmental Politics* 5(3), pp. 70-94.
- OECD. 2014. Average annual hours actually worked per worker. Paris: OECD. Available at: <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=ANHRS> [Accessed: 12 June 2015].
- Owen, D.B. 1962. *Handbook of Statistics Tables*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Pace, M. 2007. Norm Shifting from EMP to ENP. The EU As a Norm Entrepreneur in the South? *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 20(4), pp. 659-675.
- Peet, J. and La Guardia, A. 2014. *Unhappy Union: How the Euro Crisis -and Europe- Can be Fixed*. London: The Economist.
- Pridham, G. and Cini, M. 1994. Enforcing Environmental Standards in the European Union: Is There a Southern Problem? In: Faure, M., Vervaele, J. and Waele, A. eds. *Environmental Standards in the EU in an Interdisciplinary Framework*. Antwerp: Maklu, pp. 251-277.
- Sciortino, G. 1999. Planning in the Dark: the Evolution of Italian Immigration Control. In: Brochmann, G. and Hammar, T. eds. *Mechanisms of Immigration Control. A Comparative Analysis of European Regulation Policies*. Oxford: Berg, pp. 233-260.
- Smith, R. et al. 2013. *International Political Economy in the 21st Century: Contemporary Issues and Analysis*. New York: Routledge .
- Tassinari, F. 2014. The Crystal Curtain: A Postscript on Europe's North-South Divide. *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs* 49(3), pp. 118-131.
- The Economist*. 2015. Europe's fault lines. 7 February 2015. Available at: <http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21642209-even-sorting-out-greeces-debts-may-not-be-enough-repair-euro-europes-fault-lines> [Accessed: 24 June 2015]
- The Telegraph*. 2015. Germany's record trade surplus is a bigger threat to euro than Greece, , May 5, 2015. Available at: [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ambroseevans\\_pritchard/11584031/Germanys-record-trade-surplus-is-a-bigger-threat-to-euro-than-Greece.html](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ambroseevans_pritchard/11584031/Germanys-record-trade-surplus-is-a-bigger-threat-to-euro-than-Greece.html) [Accessed: 11 June 2015].
- Therien, J.-P. 1999. Beyond the North-South Divide: the Two Tales of World Poverty. *Third World Quarterly* 20(4), pp. 723-742.
- Thomson, R. 2011. *Resolving Controversy in the European Union: Legislative Decision-Making Before and After Enlargement*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Veen, T. 2011. *The Political Economy of Collective Decision-Making: Conflicts and Coalitions in the Council of the European Union*. Berlin: Springer.
- Wallerstein, I. 1984. *The Politics of the World-Economy: The States, the Movements and the Civilizations*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Weber, M. 1905. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. New York: Scribners.

Yearley, S. et al. 1994. Environmental Policy and Peripheral Regions of the European Union: An Introduction. *Regional Politics and Policy* 4(1), Special Issue, pp. 1-21.