Political Theories of Narcissism
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Towards the Self-Reflection of Knowledge and Politics from the Psychoanalytic Perspectives of Erich Fromm and Shōzō Fujita

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INTRODUCTION

The Functions of Theory in Our Times

The act of self-reflection that ‘changes a life’ is a movement of emancipation (Habermas 1987: 212).

One of the Jürgen Habermas’s early, key concerns was to demonstrate that human interests precede knowledge (‘knowledge-constitutive interests’) (e.g. 1987: 69, 189, 198, 211, 289). As Peter Dews puts it, ‘Habermas’s strategy in this book [Knowledge and Human Interests (1968)] is to show that the basic conceptual structures of human knowledge are determined by interests which are deeply anchored in the social existence of human beings as such’ (1999: 7). This means precisely that Habermas aimed to uphold social theory based on the ‘emancipatory cognitive interest’ by differentiating it from positivism, pragmatism, historicism and hermeneutics based on the ‘technical and practical cognitive interests’ (1987: e.g. 198), taking over the core intellectual tradition of Critical Theory. In fact, this implies that Habermas declared that he inherited Max Horkheimer’s early position represented by ‘Traditional and Critical Theory’ (1937), which had contended that ‘the self-knowledge of present-day man is not a mathematical knowledge of nature which claims to be the eternal Logos, but a critical theory of society as it is, a theory dominated at every turn by a concern for reasonable conditions of life’ (2002b: 198-9).

It is important to note, however, that Horkheimer did not completely reject the raison d’être of traditional theories, while the intention of his above article was to criticise their theoretical tendency as harmful to our ‘mind’ (2002b: 223). On this view, rather, what he stresses is as follows:
Today . . . in the transition from the present form of society to a future one mankind will for the first time be a conscious subject and actively determine its own way of life. There is still need of a conscious reconstruction of economic relationships. Indiscriminate hostility to theory, therefore, is a hindrance today. Unless there is continued theoretical effort, in the interest of a rationally organized future society, to shed critical light on present-day society and to interpret it in the light of traditional theories elaborated in the special sciences, the ground is taken from under the hope of radically improving human existence (2002b: 233).

Horkheimer is a direct heir of Hegel in the sense that he attempts to lead theory to perform its functions in the way of 'seek[ing] autonomy or man’s control over his own life no less than over nature' for 'recogniz[ing] this same tendency as a force operative in history' (2002b: 223). In this respect, he is in favour of dialectic, taking the view that theory undergoes not only a 'logical process' but also a 'concrete historical one' (2002b: 211). In Horkheimer’s view, ‘both the subject and the role of thought are changed’ by enabling theory to fulfil the theoretical function of dialectic (2002b: 211). Only Critical Theory distinguished from every traditional theory, he highlights, can undertake these theoretical and historical tasks.

What, then, did Habermas primarily intend by introducing psychoanalysis in his early work? As Dews says, it was to defend a “transcendental deduction” of the emancipatory interest, showing that psychoanalytic therapy aims at patients' ‘self-reflection’ and ‘emancipation’ by distinguishing psychoanalysis from ‘causal-explanatory and hermeneutic (interpretive) knowledge’ (1999: 8-9). Dews, referring to Karl-Otto Apel, defines the two significations of ‘self-reflection’ in Habermas’s sense, which had first been suggested by Apel, and which was later accepted by Habermas: first, it ‘involves the explanation of the universal conditions of forms of knowledge and practice in general – for example, the identification of the cognitive interests’; second, it ‘takes the form of a breaking down of the specific constraints and barriers to self-knowledge which have marred an individual life history (as in psychoanalysis), or possibly a collective history (as in the critique of ideology)’ (1999: 10; emphases added). With regard to this crucial point, Dews reminds us of Habermas’s two distinct forms of self-reflection, which were clarified in ‘A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests’ (1971): ‘critique’ (Kritik) and ‘reconstruction’ (Nachkonstruktion) (1999: 11). On this view, Habermas defended the former by comparing it with the latter, dividing them up into three meanings: first, critique is ‘brought to bear on objects of experience whose pseudo-objectivity is to be revealed, whereas reconstructions are based on “objective” data such as sentences, actions, cognitive insights, etc.’; second, critique ‘is brought to bear on something particular – concretely speaking, on the particular self-formative process of an ego, or group, identity – whereas reconstructions try to understand anonymous systems of rules’; and
third, critique ‘is characterized by its ability to make unconscious elements conscious in a way which has practical consequences’, and it ‘changes the determinants of false consciousness, whereas reconstructions explicate correct knowhow . . . without involving practical consequences’ (1987: 378). From the perspective of his sense of critique, it is evident that Habermas’s social theory is based on the above second form of self-reflection. That is to say, it is not causal-explanation-oriented nor interpretation-oriented but emancipation-oriented theory. In other words, his social theory aims to reveal ‘pseudo-objectivity’, to clarify the ‘particular self-formative process of identity’, and to bring an unconscious state to consciousness for altering the ‘determinants of false consciousness’; these tasks are the exact functions of critique. If Habermas’s early position is still relevant, then I have a strong reason to adhere to the tradition of Critical Theory which has concerned itself with the realisation of self-reflection and emancipation by way of critique, that is with the achievement of Mündigkeit.

Main research topics

My research re-introduces two social and political thinkers, Erich Fromm (1900-80) and Shōzō Fujita (1927-2003). It would seem that there is no need to go into any detail about the former. He has been generally regarded as a German-American social psychologist who integrated Marx’s historical materialism with Freud’s instinct theory by way of Weberian sociology. The latter is most commonly regarded as a Japanese political thinker who focused on the study of the Tennō system (Tennōsei) as a Japanese system of government. As we shall see later, it appears that Fromm and Fujita share no link, in the sense of different disciplines and historical backgrounds. Despite these clear differences, however, their academic works have much in common in some respects. First, they both concern themselves with psychoanalytic theory with a focus on the concept of ‘narcissism’ in the social range. Second, they are both in favour of some important theoretical tools and components of philosophy, such as ‘dialectic’ and ‘immanent critique’. Third, they warn against the contemporary tendency and attitude to be indifferent to others and things that do not concern oneself and to exploit others to one’s own advantage in terms of one’s unconscious narcissistic state of mind. Perhaps the first and third common viewpoints are profoundly associated with their contemporaneousness, as both lived chiefly in the twentieth century. In other words, their standpoints are concerned with contemporary phenomena widely seen in many industrialised societies, and it is therefore quite natural that both theorists should lay stress on these two perspectives, particularly taking account of their academic foundations. Apart from these two examples of common grounds, it should be noted that the second common
point of view is also related to their similar academic backgrounds. Roughly speaking, both Fromm and Fujita absorbed their intellectual knowledge primarily from Hegel, Marx and Freud. From this perspective, it is not surprising that they have similar theoretical ingredients. In this respect, it is even possible to believe that they are exact heirs of traditional Critical Theory in favour of the task of achieving Mündigkeit, even though many scholars are opposed to this view of their works despite Fromm’s early contributions to the Institute for Social Research and Fujita’s theoretical components capturing the essence of critique.

Having said that, my research shines a light not only on their positive theoretical conventions but also on the common negative ingredients in their theories of narcissism. Both their standpoints regard narcissism as a major hindrance to social life. For this reason, we have considerable difficulty in dealing with the problem and therefore in curing the disease by applying their social and political theories due to the fact that narcissism is one of the most fundamental human needs. For the purpose of surmounting this theoretical aporia, I introduce Heinz Kohut’s psychoanalytic theory, which is in favour of and accepts the desire and existence of narcissism concerning human nature. On the basis of his stance on narcissism, as we shall see below, my research examines how we perceive and experience our democratic life.

Notes

1 Although Shapiro’s translation employs the term ‘criticism’, for this word I follow Dews’s interpretation of the German Kritik (1999: 11).
2 This term can be translated with the English ‘maturity’. According to Dews, it ‘is often translated as “autonomy” and “responsibility”’ (1999: 9).
3 My research regards narcissism not simply as man’s personality traits or attributes but rather as man’s need.
Part I

Methodology
The future of humanity depends on the existence today of the critical attitude, which of course contains within it elements from traditional theories and from our declining culture generally (Horkheimer 2002b: 242).

In the first part, primarily I will critically reflect on the methodology of political theory. The necessity of carrying out this task is explained by the fact that laying the foundations of the discipline are one of the primary aims of my research, in addition to an exploration of the two political thoughts and the introduction of the psychoanalytic concept of narcissism, as mentioned before, and it would seem that, for that purpose, it is necessary to tackle to a certain extent some important methodological issues of political theory, and to identify some possible functions of the discipline. In this part, most importantly, I want to clarify what contemporary society expects of ‘theory’ through the above investigations. For performing this task, I will first consider methods my research applies and relies on, next conduct a brief survey of methodological issues of political theory, and finally identify the relevance of the discipline. With respect to some primary methodological issues of the discipline, I have given a detailed description of what political theory needs for its own disciplinary development, apart from the main subject of my research (Appendix 1: ‘Political Theory as an Academic Discipline’).
CHAPTER 1

How to Conduct Research

1. The Theme of Narcissism:
   Between Political Theory and Psychoanalysis

As we shall see later, issues connecting politics with psychology or psychoanalysis have been raised primarily in the field of political psychology – they have provided the standpoint that tries to see political phenomena by applying psychological or psychoanalytic theories, and this task has been undertaken by psychologists (see Ch. 3, s. 2). The theme of narcissism, however, has rather been tackled almost exclusively in the field of psychoanalysis. Presumably, this is because, despite the fact that the concept is derived from the Greek myth, ‘Narcissus story’, and that it began with the description of man’s sexual condition, since Sigmund Freud first gave a systematic psychoanalytic account of the notion in his ‘On Narcissism’ (1914), primarily his followers have developed it into a more psychoanalytically rigid concept meaning a personality trait and a personality disorder (see App. 2).

Narcissism in the social sciences

Having said that, as we will see later, the subject has also been introduced to social studies and addressed by major scholars in the humanities and social sciences, amongst them Erich Fromm, Theodor W. Adorno, Charles Taylor and Richard Sennett. On the whole, their common intention of adopting the term narcissism to their research is to tackle social problems containing pathological phenomena which have come into existence specifically in contemporary society. In particular, Fromm as a social theorist and a psychoanalyst raised the
significant issue of ‘social narcissism’ (or ‘group narcissism’) particularly in terms of extreme forms of politics such as fascism by elaborating the concept which had been regarded merely as an individual phenomenon (1964: ch. 4; also see Ch. 4, s. 1 and Ch. 6, s. 3).¹ The Japanese political thinker Shōzō Fujita also tackled a similar issue to Fromm’s, specifically in terms of the ‘society of the Tennō system’ (Tennōsei shakai) and ‘totalitarianism’ (zentaishugi), as we can see his discussion of the topic particularly in his writings ‘Narushizumu kara no dakkyaku’ (To Break Free from Narcissism) (1983) and ‘Anraku e no zentaishugi’ (Totalitarianism to Unruffled Ease) (1985) (e.g. 1997e; also see Ch. 5, ss. 1-5 below). Seemingly, however, no one has so far tried to largely address the theme of so-called ‘social narcissism’ with the exception of the above two theorists.

**Political theory and psychoanalysis**

Themes connecting political theory with psychoanalysis have been undertaken primarily by Cornelius Castoriadis, Ernesto Laclau, Slavoj Žižek, Axel Honneth, James M. Glass, C. Fred Alford, José Brunner and Joel Whitebook, in addition to the theorists noted above.² It would seem that, while their works draw inspiration primarily from the leading figures of the Frankfurt School, such as Horkheimer, Adorno and Herbert Marcuse, Castoriadis, Žižek and Laclau are under the strong influence of Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalysis in particular. Amongst others, Glass’s *Psychosis and Power: Threats to Democracy in the Self and the Group* (1995) and Brunner’s *Freud and the Politics of Psychoanalysis* (2001) can be regarded as representative works in this subject which deal with the significant issue of applying Freud’s psychoanalysis directly to topics of political theory. Recently, Lene Auestad’s *Psychoanalysis and Politics: Exclusion and the Politics of Representation* (ed., 2012), for example, reconsiders social hatred from the perspective of Freud’s theory of narcissism, and also addresses a variety of political issues such as Islamism and xenophobia, racism and Nazism, and colonialism, postcolonialism and hospitality, from some other psychoanalytic perspectives. Also, Yannis Sravrakakis’s *The Lacanian Left: Psychoanalysis, Theory, and Politics* (2007) significantly argues how Lacanian psychoanalysis functions in political theory in relation to democracy.

It seems to me, however, that the theme linking political theory and psychoanalysis is still underdeveloped in the sense that seemingly there are not any systematic and structured analytic devices specific to its subject, while certain psychoanalytic methods and approaches, such as Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytic theories, respectively separately exist. In this respect, it should be noted that it is necessary to come up with some specific approaches for tack-
ling issues lying between both academic fields, and for enabling us to approach them from both sides at the same time.

**Narcissism in political theory**

To what extent, then, should my research be involved in research into the psychoanalytic topic of narcissism in respect of the disciplinary framework? No doubt, it particularly concerns the theory of recognition and also some other important theoretical schemes, such as identity, toleration, morality and ethics, lying between political theory and social theory. Moreover, it concerns some existential forms of social norms, especially how they are directly associated with individual personality and psychology, and vice versa, and how they involve laying individual psychological foundations, and vice versa. The theoretical framework of a social and political theory of narcissism my research puts forward will contribute to finding new ways of understanding and dealing with issues particularly concerning the contemporary form of society and individuals.

As noted above, although certain scholars in the realm of political theory have tackled psychoanalytic, political issues, the many have nevertheless been careless about the topic of narcissism in general in the academic field and in some relevant fields after the two theorists dealt to a large extent with it – thus, they have resulted in disrespecting Fromm’s and Fujita’s theories of narcissism, needless to say. In fact, no one has been intensely interested in narcissism in a social range thereafter, as far as my survey is concerned. Not surprisingly, this means that those theories have not yet been developed, as opposed to their other theories. In this respect, it is worthwhile to re-introduce both theorists, who share the same perspective of ‘social narcissism’, focusing on their theories of narcissism and referencing psychoanalysis.3

2. Research Methods

**Methods**

Next, I want to clarify how to conduct research. First of all, it is important to make it clear that my research is essentially based on the methodological standpoint that political theory is ‘the theoretical activity that is concerned about politics, that is conscious of politics, that publicly participates in politics, and that actually changes politics’, as we shall see in the next chapter (see Ch. 2, p. 20
below). In my view, political theory does devote itself not only to understanding and providing a new way of understanding a thinker’s text but also to being concerned with and theoretically and actually participating in politics; that is, my research is not satisfied only with dealing with some issues of a thinker and his work, but rather it aims to see them in order to consider and tackle actual political issues – from this perspective, it is expected that the vocation of political theory is to try to affect actual politics in a direct fashion. Through my research, I take this position and want to be an ‘epic theorist’ who tries to be involved in politics on the basis of his public concern, and a ‘political actor’ who regards himself as one essentially involved in politics, as much as possible (see Ch. 2, s. 2).

On the basis of the above stance, second, I want to suggest that the focus throughout will be on the philosophical and psychoanalytic concepts of ‘self’ and ‘other’. Actually, as we shall see later, the notion of narcissism means an essential need of human beings, on the one hand, and it means a psychological distance between the self and others, on the other. From the perspective of the concept, one’s relationship with others and its quality are determined specifically in accordance with a degree of the distance. To put it differently, it gives some significant criteria for seeing them. This method, then, will lead me to provide those criteria and a new way of seeing politics in terms of the idea, and moreover, to prepare to find and tackle its problems from some different perspectives, particularly through critically examining two political theories caring about the concept of narcissism.

And third, my research refers to Heinz Kohut’s psychoanalytic theory, which is expected to contribute to giving a new way of understanding politics. His psychology focuses on the self, and devotes itself to seeing that psychological structure – in this respect, it tries to grasp human beings in terms of the self, and thus, it is called ‘self psychology’. I am sure that his psychoanalysis will shed new light on some difficulties in contemporary politics on the grounds that it has great possibilities for helping to find some solutions to a theoretical impasse both Fromm and Fujita reached.

**Research framework and structure**

The first part discusses some methodological issues of political theory. Chapter 2 attempts to define some possible tasks and functions of political theory. It identifies what the discipline deals with, focusing on the meanings of ‘political’ and ‘theory’; from this perspective, I seek what theory ought to be. Here I can discover what political theory is, and how and why it exists. This part shows, most importantly, identifies the functions of political theory.
Methodology

The second part lays the philosophical-anthropological foundation for my research, applying Kohut’s self psychology, which stresses the raison d’être of the ‘self’. In his psychoanalytic theory, all individuals come into being as narcissistic selves whose needs must be satisfied by others. Their selves are extremely vulnerable to psychological damage, and are therefore required to care about each other. This view of the individual explains why we are by nature oriented towards establishing intersubjective interpersonal relationships; otherwise, we lose the raison d’être of both the self and the other. Chapter 3 develops the methodological device of the ‘psychoanalytic self-other relationship’, in which individuals are not affected by power nor sui generis social facts; that is, they can break free from any social frameworks. The individual who has become the self can thereby freely communicate with others in his respective interpersonal relationships with them. Chapter 4 shows how narcissism is associated with politics, shining a light on Fromm’s and Kohut’s theories of narcissism.

The third part, regarded as the main part in my research, concerns some social and political issues regarding the discipline of political theory. It raises two thinkers, Fromm and Fujita, both of whom are potentially regarded as political theorists. In fact, their theories have great possibilities for gaining clues necessary to find solutions to the core contemporary social and political problems that cause a mental disease of society. According to their view, our society is the world in which we have lost experience (Fujita 1997d: 17, 188-91; 1997e: 15), that is to say, the ‘other’ (tasha) is dead, and in which ‘man is dead’ (Fromm 1956: 74, 360). In this place, the other comes into being as a simple means of fulfilling the needs of the self. The sole remedy for this disease, found throughout contemporary society, which both theorists provide, is to overcome narcissism by facing our respective narcissistic needs as a major hindrance to healthy politics. In this way, basically, they reject the intrinsic human need of narcissism, and both their theories thereby fall into moral and ethical theories. To be sure, it seems that we have lost all cures to the disease that can be obtained from their political theories. I emphasise, however, that it is not beyond the realm of possibility to treat ‘social narcissism’, as Fromm calls it (1964: ch. 4). A possible effective way of achieving this objective is to apply Kohut’s psychoanalytic theory, which tries to respond to the demands of the narcissistic self as a matter of first priority. From this perspective, the raison d’être of politics is to help the self to escape suffering. From Kohut’s psychoanalytic viewpoint, however, it is understood that narcissism is the state of the self who has not yet glued himself to others. This view, most importantly, enables us to see that narcissism is by no means an obstacle to both the self and politics, and that the task of politics is exactly to glue the self onto the other.
I arrive at the provocative conclusion that the primary functions of political theory are to prevent the unconscious violence, which is hidden beneath the injured self, from leading itself to repress and depress the self and the other and to establish intersubjective relationships.

Every chapter is designed to be to a certain extent independent of the others, and it is therefore possible to read them individually. Readers are expected to begin reading in accordance with their respective concerns. It is more useful, however, to read in front-to-back order. My research is directed towards the self-reflection of knowledge and politics in the precise early Habermas’s sense. What we can do in current disciplinary and social conditions is definitely not to draw attention to epidemic theories and topics, but to reflect upon our society and existence, and to try to find an effective solution for overcoming the current difficult situation through disciplinary endeavour. In this respect, it must be stressed that whether it is of value to raise an obsolete and forgotten theory from the ashes depends heavily upon one’s capacity for imagination.

Notes

1 It should be noted that he used and gave a systematic account of the term narcissism to his social studies at the latest in his work Man for himself: An Inquiry into the Psychology of Ethics (1947).

2 In this subject, e.g. the Journals Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society and The Journal of Psycho-Social Studies can serve as a useful reference for understanding and developing the topic.

3 With regard to research on the respective theorists, I will refer to preceding works on them in Chapters 5 and 6.
CHAPTER 2

The Contemporary Relevance of Political Theory

You must take responsibility to bring explosion-affected persons (hibakusha) happiness and meaning (Ernest J. Sternglass).¹

1. Problems

Political theorists are often silent on questions of method and approach. While scholars in other branches of political and social sciences expend great energy debating the right way to conduct research . . . political theorists generally spend little time addressing questions of ‘how’ and ‘why’ in their work. Instead, they dive straight into their analysis, turning immediately to the task at hand . . . (Leopold and Stears 2008b: 1).²

The above statement clearly denotes a lack of methodological reflection in the academic discipline of political theory.³ This view seems appropriate in the sense that other political theorists also highlight the fact, offering solid evidence of it.⁴ As David Leopold and Marc Stears put it, ‘the study of methods and approaches . . . might reveal crucial insights into the nature, point, and purpose of the discipline itself’ (2008b: 3). In this sense, it is no doubt particularly important for every academic discipline to tackle their respective methodological issues and to try to develop their own methods and approaches. From this perspective, it might seem necessary that, similarly, political theory should deal with the issues of how and why. However, it is not simple to address them in the discipline: first, because of its disciplinary characteristics – e.g. ‘interdisciplinary’ and ‘cross-disciplinary’ characters (Dryzek et al. 2006b: 6, 34); second, because we can presume that political theory still remains underdeveloped – e.g. the exp-
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pression of ‘unapologetically mongrel sub-discipline’ describes the fact (Dryzek et al. 2006b: 5; emphases added).

How should we consider these troublesome problems besetting political theory? It seems to me that Daniel McDermott’s methodological view of political theory is relevant to a better understanding of these issues: ‘Analytical political philosophy is a complement to social science’ (2008: 11). In addition, John S. Dryzek et al. illuminate the importance of the methodological role of political theory in terms of the ‘philosophy of social science’ as follows: ‘political theorists are in an especially good position to mediate between the philosophy of social science on the one hand, and particular methods on the other’ (2006b: 28). From these perspectives, political theory is intrinsically required to fulfil a sub-disciplinary role of the social sciences, and it can be validly argued that political theory itself is an approach to the social sciences. In short, taking account of the complementary and sub-disciplinary functions of political theory, it may rather be expected to play a predominantly methodological role.

Most importantly, the purpose of this part is to specify the role of political theory for finding core clues as to how to address issues of political theory. The aim of this survey is rather to dive into an exploration of what methods and approaches are more relevant to contemporary political theory. This examination therefore aims primarily to contribute to laying the foundations of the methodology of political theory.

2. What Is Political Theory?

As is well known, the explicit awareness of the phenomenon of politics began with the polis in ancient Greece, and politics, in this sense, originally meant the matters of the polis and the polis itself: ta politika (e.g. Heyking 2008: 319; Patzelt 2007: 20; Schultz 2010: 746; Vincent 1997: 6). Thereafter, however, the concept of politics has been provided in a variety of ways – e.g. as can be seen from Elizabeth Frazer’s discussion (Frazer 2008). While nowadays we can see the plurality of the notion, in this respect, as seen from the political view of ‘social action’ the definition of politics relies heavily upon what component of politics one lays stress on (on this concept, see, e.g. Druwe 1987).5

On the other hand, politics as an academic discipline has its origin in politikē epistēmē, rigorous knowledge concerning ta politika (e.g. Berg-Schlosser and Stammen 2003: 6-7; Patzelt 2007: 20). In addition, politics (hē politikē) in the polis, which is characteristically seen in Aristotle, was identical to philosophia politikē (political philosophy); the latter term equivalent to the former is in fact emp-
loyed by Aristotle himself in his *Politics* (Aristotle 1988: III. 12, 1282b23). In this sense, it can be validly argued that politics began with political philosophy. However, it is noted that the discipline of politics has transformed its own characteristics as a result of aspirations for natural science-based systematic *scientific* research especially since the twentieth century: from politics to political *science* – in this respect, the radical transformation of politics is a relatively recent event (e.g. Barrow 2008). Interestingly, despite the fact that this radical shift away to scientific studies had come to its climax with David Easton in the 1950s, the direction was later completely rejected by Easton himself. The academic discipline has to a large extent modified its own style thereafter as exemplified by the appearance of John Rawls’s *A Theory of Justice* (1971): the perceptible change in the disciplinary value that politics should be involved in *value* judgements. In this respect, it can be argued that Rawls’s work responds largely to Easton’s demands that political science should contribute to society, that it ought to include value judgements, and that political scientists must take responsibility for their behaviour.

**What kind of theoretical activity is political theory?**

What can we find out with respect to the *activity* of engaging in political theory from these perspectives? As far as the Japanese scholar of politics Masao Maruyama’s discussion is concerned, for example, the disciplinary activity of political theory is also a ‘political action’ (*seijiteki jissen*) (1969c: 238; [1995c: 149]) – on him, see App. 1, s. 4.6 According to him, in the ‘political world’ (*seijiteki sekai*) even ‘strict neutrality’ (*gensei chūritsu*) denotes a political stance (1969c: 238; [1995c: 149]). For Maruyama, in this sense, even the task of carrying out an academic study is coloured by politics – in my view, nonetheless, everything is not completely eroded by politics in the place, and non-political space somewhat remains.7 In these respects, scholars also become political actors through their academic works. From this perspective, the task of political theory must turn into one which is somewhat different from something we know.

**Political theory**

I hypothesise that it will be much better to rely upon the term ‘theory’ of the discipline’s name of political theory for identifying some functions and roles of the discipline. In my view, the term theory has a *revolutionary* sense in comparison with the term philosophy (see App. 1, pp. 211-3). According to Sheldon Wolin, the former arose not as an intellectual activity but as a response to *real* problems which resulted in classic theory (1968a: 320). He provides an account
of its meaning with another expression as follows: ‘Many of the great theories of the past arose in response to a crisis in the world, not in the community of theorists’ (1968b: 147; emphases added). In addition, Wolin points up the implications of theory as follows:

Throughout the history of Western political theory we find that most of the major theories have been produced during times of crisis, rarely during periods of normalcy. This phenomenon suggests that the major theories resemble ‘extraordinary science’: they are produced when the operative political paradigm is encountering, not puzzles, but profound anomalies. Further, the major theories exhibit the same feature of extraordinary science: they seek to discredit the existing operative paradigm (1968b: 151; emphasis added).

Furthermore, he adds that the difference between ‘behavioural theory’ and ‘traditional theory’ is equivalent to the distinction between ‘normal science’ and ‘extraordinary science’, and therefore that the latter theory has much interest in ‘possible world’ and ‘jeopardises’ the existing paradigm (1968b: 152). Wolin lays stress on ‘traditional theory’ performing the function of changing the status quo.

(a) Two intentions of studying political theory

At this point I want to identify some possible functions of political theory. Here my enquiry is what we are doing and intending by engaging in political theory. In order to make this issue easier, I want to raise the following question: What is one doing when carrying out research on Rawls’s political theory? To put it another way, my question is whether (a) he is thereby intending to theoretically take part in actual politics by putting forward his political theory on the basis of Rawls’s theory, or whether (b) he is thereby merely studying Rawls’s political theory. What does it mean when his action is identified as the latter? Here we should consider the possible difference between political theory and the history of political thought (see App. 1, pp. 213-20). There is a handy tip for considering this issue; to examine what the ends of his action are.

For Quentin Skinner, for example, the aim of his studies is to gain an accurate understanding of the history of an idea, that is to identify the meaning of an utterance and a thinker’s text (see, e.g. 1988a). My stance is that, while this action signifies the study of the history of political thought, it does by no means signify the study of political theory so long as it is the intention of his studies as noted above, because the latter discipline draws attention to our politics, and its end is therefore not to give a precise description of history but to see and take part in actual politics from a disciplinary perspective, despite the fact that the study of political theory often employs the method of history. In short, answer
(b) noted above is provided with the possible view that, when one intends to either gain a full understanding of Rawls’s theory or offer a new way of understanding it, ironically he does not take part in the activity of studying political theory even if he intends to conduct research into Rawls’s political theory; in this case, his intention is rather to study Rawls’s political theory in the sense that his action of studying does not aim at engaging in politics but at understanding Rawls’s texts written in the past. While I highlight the difference between interest in the present and past, it is of course impossible to completely distinguish between their intentions so long as Rawls’s texts raise actual political issues; they therefore involve one dealing with real political topics regardless of whether or not he is aware of this fact. Rather, it seems that in the case of answer (b) one mostly aims solely at understanding a text. On this view, the following luminous description of the meanings of answers (a) and (b) sheds light on my enquiry here:

Articles like ‘Constitutionalism in Habermas’, for example, or ‘Locke on Constitutional Government’, clarify problems of constitutionalism in only the most remote and mediated way, typically devoting most of their energy to a critique of the existing exegetical literature, presenting some textual commentary of their own, and offering little direct insight into substantive political concerns. While there is surely nothing wrong with such inquiries, they need to be linked to the project of understanding constitutionalism, not simply the project of understanding Habermas and/or Locke (Isaac 1995: 646; emphases added).

While this famous statement concerning the meanings of the two answers might seem to provide nothing new for us, we are nonetheless still not familiar with a way of understanding the activity of engaging in political theory as seen from answer (a), but instead, in answer (b) we can see our familiar political theory that pays attention only to ‘a critique of the existing exegetical literature, presenting some textual commentary of their own, and offering little direct insight into substantive political concern’, which Jeffrey C. Isaac problematically highlights – on this view, he says that political theorists are ‘strangely silent’. From his perspective, studying political theory can mean the definitely conscious theoretical action that we devote our attention to tackling issues of actual politics in favour of answer (a), as opposed to a way of studying in favour of answer (b), although he approves of the significance of absorbing existing political theories; political theory requires the definite consciousness that theoretically participates in politics. From Maruyama’s perspective, this is explained by saying that we are required to be ‘political actors’ by means of such a theoretical action.
(b) Epic theorist

We now turn to Wolin’s discussion concerning theory. In Wolin’s view, as we saw above, theory fulfils a function in changing the status quo. In this respect, it should be noted that his stance on theory is basically linked to his famous concept of ‘epic theorist’ who has particular interest in establishing a new political theory as his vocation (1969: 1078). Here I strongly wish to quote enormously important sentences which present the theoretical essence of the magnificent concept:

they [epic theorists] inaugurate a new way of looking at the world, which includes a new set of concepts, as well as new cognitive and normative standards. Taking this as a suggestion of how to think about great theories, the first feature shared by epic theorists has to do with magnitudes. . . . He [the theorist] aims to grasp present structures and inter-relationships, and to re-present them in a new way. Like the extraordinary scientific interrelationships, such efforts involve a new way of looking at the familiar world, a new way with its own cognitive and normative standards. The second aspect of epic theory can be brought out if we look upon a theory not only as a structure of formal features, but also as a structure of intentions. The structure of intentions refers to the controlling purposes of the theorist, the considerations which determine how the formal features of concept, fact, logic, and interconnection are to be deployed so as to heighten the effect of the whole. In using the word ‘purposes’ I mean to acknowledge that the structures exhibit considerable variety, and yet I also mean to maintain that there has been a persistent feature in all of them . . . All of the major theories of the past were informed by ‘public concern’, a quality which was not incidental to the activity, but fundamental to the very notion of being engaged in political theory (Wolin 1969: 1078-9).

Wolin puts emphasis on two things: first, an epic theorist presents the ‘extraordinary scientific’ view that inaugurates a new perspective on the world as well as new criteria for looking at it; second, political theory requires ‘public concern’, which is fundamentally intrinsic to the vocation of political theory. In my view, he focuses particularly on the second theoretical perspective, which is much more related to ‘problems-in-the-world’ (‘a particular magnitude of problems created by actual events or states of affairs in the world’) than to ‘problem-in-a-theory’ (‘problems related to deficiencies in theoretical knowledge’) (1969: 1079; emphases added). In other words, it is considered that all the epic theorists concern themselves with res publica (ta politika), literally meaning the political affairs, whose tasks are above all accomplished by the theorists. In this respect, epic theories, says Wolin, are generated not by ‘crises in techniques of inquiry’ but by ‘crises in the world’ (1969: 1080). From these perspectives, we can precisely understand his intention of describing the epic theorist: ‘Although each [the epic political theorist and the scientific theorist] attempts to
change men’s views of the world, only the former attempts to change the world itself’ (1969: 1080; emphases added; cf. 1968b: 144). In this sense, political theory, says Wolin, contains the concept of ‘radical critique’ (1969: 1080).

(c) The vocation of political theory

Here I will summarise what I have discussed as follows. First, my discussion has concentrated on Wolin’s sense of theory that, ‘[m]any of the great theories of the past arose in response to a crisis in the world, not in the community of theorists’. For Wolin, theory means ‘traditional theory’, ‘extraordinary science’ and ‘epic theory’, all of which are different from ‘behavioural theory’, ‘normal science’ and ‘scientific theory’ respectively – they are not necessarily completely different from one another. In short, the former theories have a strong awareness of changing the world. Second, my discussion has focused on the aspect of action, which has been described by both Maruyama’s view of ‘political world’ and another view of ‘social action’, in which a political theory that expresses an opinion on actual politics is qualified for its vocation as opposed to one which concerns itself solely with theories themselves. In other words, this means that political theory concern itself not only with theorists’ political theories for themselves but also with politics even if it devotes its attention to one’s political theory. Third, it has been stressed that, in addition to the second point, Isaac’s viewpoint that ‘substantive political concerns’ are essential and intrinsic to political theory is relevant particularly to my discussion. It has led me to the significant conclusion that it is necessary that political theory should be supported by the definite theoretical consciousness that raises actual political issues. Finally, my discussion has laid stress on Wolin’s perspective of political theory that its vocation requires that we should show ‘public concern’.

All the above four viewpoints have a lot in common with one another. Then, I reach a conclusion as follows: political theory is the theoretical activity that is concerned about politics, that is conscious of politics, that publicly participates in politics, and that actually changes politics. From this perspective, I will next provide some theoretical standpoints concerning possible meanings of political theory with respect to the vocation of political theory.

Political theory

With regard to the activity of the discipline of political theory, its disciplinary issues, undoubtedly, depend heavily upon what the political means. This view, however, is profoundly associated with the issue of whether it is possible to rigorously distinguish between the political and everything else. To be sure, we
have considerable difficulty in dividing the latter from the former, but it is noted that most of the things concerning human activities turn into political issues if we take account of the feminist view that ‘the individual thing is political’. In this respect, Wolin’s argument might seem irrelevant to my investigation. Indeed, he does not mention anything about what is counted as the political in our society. Nonetheless, it is possible to specify what it means from his perspective:

The political signifies the attempt to constitute the terms of politics so that struggles for power can be contained and that it is possible for common ends, such as justice, equality, and cultural values to be promoted. Commonality is what the political is about (Wolin 1988c: 253; emphases added).

It is not difficult to see Hannah Arendt’s influence on Wolin’s view of the political. In this respect, he regards the political as a positive social component in contrast to politics signifying power and force. From this perspective, he points out that political theory requires that we should seek the ‘community-oriented politics’ (1988c: 253). Unfortunately, there is not enough space to prove that his conception of the political is plausibly acceptable to my enquiry here. Rather, it should be noted that, if we can connect his notion of ‘public concern’, by which epic theorists are intrigued, with ‘commonality’, then it is not difficult to identify the role of a political theorist. Wolin says:

Political theory, in my view, is both a political and theoretical activity. As a political activity it is concerned with and about the being and well-being of collective life, that is, of that comprehensive form of life and common fate we share with others (1988b: xiii; emphases added).

From Wolin’s perspective, the political is closely related to our life which is directly concerned with commonality, that is to say, political theory devotes itself to understanding common things and shared things with others. Most importantly, in many respects, Maruyama’s ‘political world’, Isaac’s ‘substantive political concerns’ and Wolin’s ‘public concern’ have a lot in common with each other. These concepts more or less indicate that we have already inevitably been involved in political life in which we are all political actors. If so, then it is appropriately claimed that political theorists are required to contribute to society, to develop value judgements and to take responsibility for their behaviour, all of which are directly linked to the enquiry as to what our life should be. In this respect, we are responsible for indicating ‘public concern’ and for taking part in politics.
3. The Future of Political Theory

I hope that the above descriptions will contribute to providing a future prospect of what political theory ought to be. However, it means neither that one which I described above is the sole political theory, nor that it is the best approach to political theory. Needless to say, the discipline also displays the raisons d’être of Foucauldian political theory, for example, which aims at destructing the dominant form of discourse and at having a continuous discussion. Rather, we dare to pose a challenge to the dominant political theories for contributing to developing a more down to earth approach which is neither simply normative nor post-modern deconstructive but consists of pluralistic theoretical components, and which can tackle contemporary complex disciplinary and political issues. In addition, as Bo Rothstein says, political theory will definitely have to work together with the ‘positive/empirical side’ (2005: 10). It is expected that they will achieve the dialectical development between both sides.

However, if political theory comes to a standstill, then the reflective standpoint as seen from Maruyama will be effective for a theoretical reconsideration and modification of the discipline (see App. 1, s. 4). It will definitely give a great opportunity for reflecting upon what political theory lacks and for reconsidering its own theoretical standpoints. In these respects, the fact that the task of the academic discipline of political theory is an ‘interdisciplinary endeavour’, and that it is required to constantly rectify itself (Dryzek et al. 2006b: 4, 6; emphasis added), can even work to its advantage in the sense of its own disciplinary evolution. In this respect, we do not need to lament the necessity of them. For these reasons, political theory rather welcomes the ‘field’s pluralism’ (Dryzek et al. 2006b: 6).

Notes

1 This word was offered by the Japanese medical doctor Shuntarō Hida, who is a famous translator of the Jewish American physicist E. J. Sternglass and the American statistician Jay M. Gould, both of whom take a tough stance against nuclear energy (Hida and Morita 2011: 148). Unfortunately, I was not able to find Sternglass’s original text.

2 In addition to this account, David Leopold and Marc Stears give a clear description of the present state of the discipline: ‘The books that political theorists write . . . rarely include much explicit reflection on method . . . even less frequently do they produce works explicitly concerned with research methods’ (2008b: 1).

3 This does not mean that there are no method and approach in political theory. In this academic field, rather, there are a large number of them, such as Rawlsian and Foucauldian
approaches, all of which are also related to other disciplines of the social sciences. In the sense of these ‘overlapping connections’ with other fields, interdisciplinarity and cross-disciplinarity characterise political theory – Dryzek et al. call these characters ‘mongrel’ (2006b: 5, 34).

4 Dryzek et al.’s work, for instance, explains as follows: ‘Political theory is an unapologetically mongrel sub-discipline, with no dominant methodology or approach’ (2006b: 5; emphases added); ‘political theory is something of a mongrel sub-discipline, made up of many traditions, approaches, and styles of thought, and increasingly characterized by its borrowing from feminist and critical theory, film theory, popular culture, mass media, behavioural science, and economics’ (2006b: 34). According to their account, the reason for these facts is partly because of the use of the ‘shorthand of a key formative influence’, and so the discipline seems to ‘lack a core identity’; a political theorist might say that ‘I’m a Deleuzean’, or Rawlsian, or Habermasian, or Arendtian’ (2006b: 5-6). In addition, their work adds that ‘to be labelled in this way [by way of identifying one as a Rawlsian, Arendtian, and the like] by others’ is a characteristic feature of that discipline (2006b: 5).

5 On the concept of politics, see App. 1, s. 1.

6 In the work, ‘Kagaku to shite no seijigaku’ (Politics as a Science in Japan), Maruyama indeed employs the term ‘political practice’. It would seem, however, that the expression of ‘political action’ is also applicable or rather more suitable to this context.

7 In this context, referring to Karl Mannheim’s concept of ‘existentiality’ (Seinsverbundenheit, Seinsverbundenheit), Maruyama points to the interrelation between the ‘process of knowing’ (ninshiki) and the ‘object to be known’ (taishō) in an academic task (Maruyama 1969c: 238; [1995c: 149, 152, n. 10]). Not surprisingly, this theme was Habermas’s primary task in Knowledge and Human Interests.

8 This means that Wolin’s ‘commonality’ resembles Arendt’s ‘public’ in relation to her concept of the ‘common world’. Arendt, as is well known, divides the term public up into two meanings: first, ‘publicity’, namely ‘public appearance’ or the ‘space of appearance’; second, the ‘common world’ noted above (1998: ch. 2, s. 7; on the ‘space of appearance’, see ch. 5, s. 28, 29, 30). The first concept denotes the public realm where ‘everything that appears in public can be seen and heard by everybody’ (1998: 50). The second one means the public space in terms of the world which is ‘common to all of us’ (1998: 52). In this respect, the public in the latter sense has what common things signify, namely ta politika (res publica), in common with Wolin’s concept of commonality, literally meaning the common. Arendt’s following description completely elucidates Wolin’s commonality: ‘To live together in the world means essentially that a world of things is between those who have it in common, as a table is located between those who sit around it; the world, like every in-between, relates and separates men at the same time’ (1998: 52; emphases added).

9 Chantal Mouffe, famously, defines the political as ‘a space of power, conflict and antagonism’ (Mouffe 2005: 9).
Part II

Narcissism:

An Anthropological Issue
INTRODUCTION

The Age of Narcissism

The term narcissism has been employed by a variety of persons in the social sciences in a broad sense particularly since the late twentieth century. Representative scholars who have effectively applied the concept are Erich Fromm, Theodor W. Adorno, Christopher Lasch, Richard Sennett, Charles Taylor, Slavoj Žižek, Julia Kristeva and Axel Honneth, all of whom are undoubtedly regarded as key persons of their respective academic realms. Rigorously speaking, Fromm first applied the psychoanalytic term to social studies – taking account of his speciality of psychoanalysis, his name might have to be excluded from the above list.¹ With the exception of Fromm, Lasch, American historian, earlier adopted the notion to a rigorous analysis of society in his best-known work The Culture of Narcissism (1979).² In fact, this book was profoundly provocative in the sense that it claimed that American society as a whole suffered from narcissism, which means that its culture itself induced a narcissistic disease which aims only at satisfying the present pleasure of the self, and so does not have any sense of history; this was profoundly emphasised as a cultural problem of America. This view is actually well described by the sub-title of the work, American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations. To be sure, this writing presents a groundbreaking theoretical view in connection with its sensational standpoint which extensively adopts psychoanalytic theory for the purpose of analysing society. Taylor, absorbing the concept of the ‘culture of narcissism’, carried out an analysis of society from a slightly different perspective in his work The Ethic of Authenticity (1992). According to him, it is not true that, as Lasch says, there are no moral ideals in the culture of narcissism, but it is true that, while achieving the aim of some ideals, our society has remained under the condition that we have not yet accomplished the objective. In this sense,
although Taylor stresses that the ‘ethics of authenticity’ indeed has been realised to a certain extent in the narcissistic culture, there is nevertheless no significant difference between these two theorists’ views of narcissism in the sense that the latter also puts emphasis on the fact that contemporary society has resulted in spoiling the purpose of ethics.

In sum, narcissism to a greater or lesser degree contains a negative sense. Interestingly, the term, which has its origins in psychoanalysis, relates itself as a mere individual psychological disease to a social-level pathological phenomenon. In this respect, it can be argued that the concept of narcissism describes one of the most essential human aspects, which sheds light on an understanding of natural human instincts in terms of the relation between the individual and society. So far it has hardly been explained that the concept is to theoretically contribute to an understanding of some social and political phenomena by providing a rigorous systematic description; this means that the notion has a great potential for laying new theoretical foundations of the social sciences. It is undoubtedly true, however, that to demonstrate how relevant it is to effectively apply the term to an analysis of society, it is absolutely necessary to provide a systematic illustration of how it is appropriate to adopt the psychoanalytic concept to rigorous social studies.

In this part, therefore, my aim is to demonstrate how the concept of narcissism elucidates some characteristic phenomena associated with both the individual and society, and what impact it makes on politics. I shall first find out some methodological, epistemological and ontological implications of the concept provided for political theory, and then discuss the relevance of the term to an understanding of politics, relying upon Fromm’s and Kohut’s psychoanalytic theories. Through these examinations, I will be able to demonstrate that, above all, the concept of narcissism shows problems and matters lying between the self and the other.

Notes

1 Except for Fromm, it is believed that Adorno earliest applied the term narcissism to a rigorous analysis of society in his work ‘Sociology and Psychology’ (1968) (see App. 2, p. 249).

2 Strictly speaking, while Lasch’s preceding work Haven in a Heartless World (1977) had also employed the term, The Culture of Narcissism developed the critical analysis of society that rigorously applied psychoanalytic theories such as ‘Object Relations Theory’, represented by the British psychoanalyst Melanie Klein.

3 While this issue has hardly been tackled in any subject domains of the social sciences, the
relation between group personality and political behaviour has been raised primarily in the field of political psychology. It does not seem, however, that ‘personalities’ in this academic discipline have contained ‘narcissistic personality’ (on the latter concept, see App. 2, s. 2), and it seems that, instead, the theme has strongly tended to address the issue of political leaders’ personalities (see Ch. 3, pp. 32-5). On the concept of narcissism, as mentioned above, it is believed that Fromm introduced the psychoanalytic term to an analysis of group (society). Later, in the field of psychoanalysis the issue was also tackled, e.g. by Heinz Kohut (see Ch. 3, pp.32-3, Ch. 4, s. 2).
CHAPTER 3

Narcissism: Between Psychoanalysis and Politics

1. The Self

The self, undoubtedly, has been one of the concepts at the centre of the social sciences and humanities. Western society, obviously, has so far laid too much stress on the term having some philosophical implication.\(^1\) It is generally assumed that the history of the concept of self began with Descartes.\(^2\) To be sure, his famous words elucidate its relevance to the later development of the human mind: ‘I think, therefore I am’.\(^3\) From this philosophical perspective, it can plausibly be argued that the modern age began with his discovery of the self. However, the absolute trust in this rational self later resulted in being to a large extent rejected by some important thinkers, amongst them Friedrich Nietzsche and Sigmund Freud (Freud 2001d; Nietzsche 1967). Freud says:

> all the acts and manifestations which I notice in myself and do not know how to link up with the rest of my mental life must be judged as if they belonged to someone else: they are to be explained by a mental life ascribed to this other person (2001d: 169).

This is the moment that it was plausibly explained that ‘I’ (self) am controlled to a certain extent by something that I cannot know (the so called ‘unconscious’) – famously, this is regarded as ‘Freud’s great discovery’. However, while it was appropriately pointed out that the self also relies upon the ‘unconscious self’, it does not mean that the raison d’être of the self itself was completely rejected by its account. Freud’s psychoanalysis, as is well known, consists primarily of a psychological device called the ‘structural model’ composed of the ‘id’, the ‘ego’
and the ‘superego’, which tries to explain ‘conflicts’ inside the human mind (Freud 2001e). These ‘three instances’ account for and are generally related only to the inside of the human psyche, so his model of psychoanalysis, in this sense, does not take account of the other. For psychoanalysts such as Heinz Kohut, as a matter of fact, it is impossible to precisely grasp human psychology by applying Freud’s structural model, and he instead puts forward the provocative psychoanalytic theory based on the ‘Tragic Man’ who ‘is led by his ideals but pushed by his ambitions’ (called the ‘bipolar self’) (2011c: 435; 1977: ch. 4). Kohut says as follows:

It seems to me that . . . man’s functioning should be seen as aiming in two directions. I identify these by speaking of Guilty Man if the aims are directed toward the activity of his drives and of Tragic Man if the aims are toward the fulfillment of the self (1977: 132).

In other words, Kohut’s model of psychological device for a ‘Tragic Man’, as opposed to Freud’s model, does not aim solely at explaining the inside of his conflict, but at understanding his ‘gradient of tension between two differently charged (+, -) electrical poles’ (1977: 180), which is, above all, for the purpose of providing an account of the individual psyche from the viewpoint of the relationship between the self and the other, who is expected to satisfy the ‘grandiose-exhibitionistic self’, meaning the ambitious pole, and the ‘idealized parent-imago’, meaning the ideal pole (e.g. 1977: 185). In short, in Kohut’s psychoanalytic view, in our psyche there is a bipolar pole, namely two poles of ambition and ideal: the former needs to be charged with some mirroring selfobjects (someone like mother who mirrors and recognises myself), and the latter needs to be charged with idealised selfobjects (someone like father who makes myself idealise him) respectively – their relations are well explained by the metaphor of an electric arc. In sum, Kohut describes the self of a human being as something that requires being related to others, and this means that it is impossible to grasp the depths of our psychology by Freud’s method, which automatically attempts to recognise the human mind only from the inside of our psyche. In fact, Kohut’s psychoanalytic theory is much more appropriate to contemporary society, where, no doubt, there exist many more tragic men than guilty men. (These facts are definitely not to deny Freud’s great discovery and task.)

Significantly, the above evidence elucidates the importance of the existence of both the other and the self. This means, most importantly, that the significance of the self, whose relevance to human beings was once denied to a large degree by Freud, has been revived by Kohut by means of the rediscovery of the other from the new standpoint that its existence is necessary for our mental health.
This account, needless to say, is also relevant to the present-day social sciences carrying out research into contemporary society, which is likely to be composed of many individuals all of whom should be regarded as tragic men.

2. Psychoanalysis and Politics

All the above descriptions will contribute to a good illustration of the close relation between psychoanalysis and society. As noted above, the self, ironically, cannot be well organised only by himself, and the existence of the other is therefore essential for his health. What, then, should we recognise here with regard to the relationship between psychoanalytic and social scientific views? As far as human beings are concerned, we all need each other in order that we can manage our lives, and this fact clearly explains what our social life ought to be. In this respect, it might be argued that the psychoanalytic stance attempting to grasp human intrinsic nature in terms of the essential relationship between the self and the other is regarded as one of the social sciences in the sense that the self is closely related to society, which can be defined as the ‘group self’ (e.g. Kohut 2011d). Significantly, this fact is much more relevant to the discipline of politics. Kohut says:

Churchill . . . , who was unacceptable before the crisis, filled his role to perfection during the crisis and was the unquestioned leader of the nation. Yet he was discarded after the crisis had subsided. The British people identified themselves with him and with his unshakable belief in his and, by extension, the nation’s strength so long as their selves felt weak in the face of the serious danger; as soon as victory had been attained, however, the need for a merger with an omnipotent figure subsided, and they were able to turn from him to other (noncharismatic) leaders. It takes little effort to discern the parallel between the temporary needs of the enfeebled self of the creative person and the temporary needs of an endangered nation in times of crisis; in both instances, the idealization of the leader, the narcissistic transference to him, is abandoned when the need for it has come to an end (2011d: 827-8; emphasis added).

The above description explains, no doubt, that our psychological condition, more correctly, personality, largely affects the formulation of politics. As far as the above example is concerned, it can be argued that, in the sense that, from Kohut’s psychoanalytic perspective, the ‘grandiose selves’ (group self) of the British people were transferred to Churchill – in fact, Kohut regards this phenomenon as a ‘narcissistic transference’ (selfobject transference) (e.g. 1971, 1977) – British politics at the time was narcissistic. It is little wonder, in this respect,
that the more that individuals (selves) become narcissistic, the more politics (group self) becomes narcissistic; according to a few psychoanalytic theorists, in fact, it is appropriate to consider that the characteristics of these two phenomena resemble each other (Fromm 1964; Kohut 2011d).⁶

The personality approach of political psychology

The relationship between the psychology and personality of an individual, and of politics, has primarily been demonstrated by political psychological theories, especially in the form of ‘personality and political behaviour’ (see, e.g. Winter 2003). Indeed, from the political psychological perspective, its relationship is to a large extent appropriately recognised, and it seems that a great deal of interest in this connection has raised significant issues of political psychology. In fact, many political psychological works, whose task has a relatively long history in this discipline, have stressed its significance (e.g. Adorno et al. 1950; Erikson 1958; Lane 1962; Lasswell 1977 [1930]; Smith et al. 1956).⁷ David O. Sears et al.’s work, for instance, first deals with the ‘personality approach’ on the topic of the ‘psychological approaches to politics’ (2003b: 4-5), and so it would seem that the above view is to a certain extent appropriate.⁸

David G. Winter provides an explanation of the ‘personality approach’ in more detail; his work raises two important points for my enquiry (Winter 2003). First, it refers to Fred I. Greenstein’s significant work, Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference, and Conceptualization (1969), which points to ‘four conditions’ that can be important for personalities of political actors, both leaders and groups: first, ‘when a political actor occupies a strategic location’; second, ‘when the situation is ambiguous, unstable, or complex’; third, ‘when the situation is laden with symbolic and emotional significance’; and fourth, ‘when spontaneous or especially effortful behavior is required’ (2003: 112). From these perspectives, then, Winter, laying stress on the fact that all the above situations are suitable particularly for the case of ‘crisis’, advances three contents of the research into personality and political behaviour possibly included: first, ‘how leaders act during escalating crisis and war’; second, ‘how they structure their advising staff and make decisions’; and third, ‘how public opinion changes under conditions of threat’. In addition, he points out that personalities are primarily apt to be represented by ‘foreign policy’, adding that the personality approach can even supplement rational choice theory, due to the fact that personality factors largely determine not only leaders’, ‘goals’ and ‘preferences’ but also their ‘persistence’, ‘endurance’ and ‘management’, and their way of response and resistance to ‘cues’, ‘symbols’ and ‘signs’, and of interpretation of ‘stimuli’ (2003: 112).
Second, Winter’s work points to a ‘fourfold conception of personality’ whose theory literally consists of ‘four elements of personality’: ‘traits’, ‘motives’, ‘cognitions’ and ‘the social context’ (2003: 114-7) – these are, in other words, appropriately considered as the components of personalities from the political psychological perspective. Also, these four elements, according to Winter, are explained by the following two dimensions: ‘inferential’ (inner) and ‘observable’ (public), and ‘typical’ and ‘situational’ or ‘contextual’ (see Table 1 below). First, ‘cognitions’, says Winter, mean a broad sense of mentality such as beliefs, values and attitudes, including mental representations of the self and its ingredients composed of social identity, schemas recognising others, groups and social systems, and so on (2003: 116). Second, ‘motives’ mean continuous anticipation and pursuit, particularly in terms of one’s goals; it is interesting to note that he stresses that, ‘[w]hen and how any given motive is expressed depends on the perceived opportunities and incentives of the specific situation, the time since previous satisfaction, and the presence of other activated motives that may fuse or conflict’, and so those are sometimes inconsistent with patterns of action of themselves (2003: 116). Third, ‘traits’, by contrast, are represented by an observable element such as language recognised by others, says Winter. It is, for example, noticed as energy level of a person or neurotic on occasion (2003: 115-6) – the topic of ‘Big Five’, known as ‘five trait factors’, is not discussed here (on this, see 2003: 117). Finally, the ‘social context’ is composed of a variety of social constructions such as gender, social class, culture and so forth. On this point, Winter contends that social contexts need to be observed from the following three viewpoints; elements of personality, demographic characteristics and situational features. From this perspective, he argues that it is possible that

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<td>Beliefs, attitudes, values, self-concept(s).</td>
<td>Motives, goals, regulating and defence mechanisms.</td>
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*Table 1 The Four Elements of Personality by Winter (modified Table 4.1, Winter 2003: 115).*
The individual as the psychoanalytic self: an anthropological matter

In relation to these four personality elements, it should be noted that Winter adds that every aspect of personality is determined ‘to some extent’ by and depends upon ‘situations’ (2003: 115). In this respect, it is reasonable that some research on personality draws particular attention to the ‘social context’ – Winter raises Clyde K. M. Kluckhohn et al.’s work as an example of those researches (Kluckhohn et al. 1953) (2003: 116) – which is an element of personality and not just of demographic characteristics but of situational features at the same time, because, while it is presumed that the formation of the personality of an individual can most heavily be affected by situational features surrounding him which are, meanwhile, the primary factors of its formation, it is also possible that those factors can most easily be disregarded. Indeed, this point is of great interest to me since it is evident that the issue of personality relies heavily upon the fact of how the individual is counted; that is, whether man is independent of his external contexts and therefore static and autonomous, or whether man is dependent of his external contexts – such as economic, social, cultural and historical contexts – and therefore dynamic and embedded in them. As a matter of fact, I am aware that this issue has been tackled from several disciplinary perspectives such as the philosophical and political ‘subject’, the sociological ‘individual’ and the philosophical, sociological and psychological ‘self’ – in addition to the preceding section on the theme of the self, this topic, in respect of the first and second one, is also partly addressed in Appendix 1, section 3.

In my discussion concerning the above first and second issues, the individual and the subject were dealt with primarily in terms of the functionalist view of a sui generis society as a ‘social fact’ and Foucault’s ‘power/knowledge’. These views, as noted above, are profoundly associated with how we consider the individual. If we see the individual from the former perspective, then it appears as the ‘product of society’ (Durkheim: 1982), and if we see the subject, in relation to the individual, from the latter perspective, then it is recognised as the ‘product of power/knowledge’ (Foucault: 1998). However, it does not seem appropriate to consider that, as Durkheim says, the individual is the mere sui generis product. Also, it does not seem right to think that, as Foucault says, the subject is the mere product constituted by power (knowledge). From these two perspectives, it is admitted that Durkheim and Foucault have the same view of the subject (individual) in terms of a given ‘product’. However, if we see the

personality can even be regarded as ‘a series or accumulation of past “embodied contexts”’ related to the ‘current situation’ (2003: 116-7).
individual only from their perspectives reducing individuals to extremely abstract things, then we fail to precisely understand it. In short, they completely ignore or rather are not aware of the existence of the relations between the *self* and the *other* as an aspect of an individual and a subject, in which one is free to a certain extent from both a *sui generis* society and power. Indeed, it is true that the individual is produced by those external entities, but it is also true that the self (individual) is affected by the other (individual). Here I hesitate to employ the expression that man *is produced* in the sense that, without understanding of another aspect of the individual as the self, its emphasis is merely to lead us to see it only as a simple *thing*, and then to fail to recognise the existence of *self-other relations*.

The following diagrams illustrate how individuals are situated from some particular of view. Figure 1, for example, shows us how and where individuals are placed from Foucault’s subject-object theoretical perspective. From this viewpoint, it is admitted that individuals are as if they were *unsold products*, and they must therefore be controlled and charged by a whole logistic system, even if they are regarded equally as waste. Thus, one does not even know where he is going. In addition, he is not even allowed to have his own will. Rather, he cannot possess it as though he was being confined in a jail – he has been sentenced to the very life imprisonment of a product from birth! So whether an individual has a personality or not is not regarded as problematic. It is irrelevant, therefore, to consider that an individual is related to others, but rather it is much more appropriate to acknowledge that all individuals are seen as the

![Figure 1](image-url)

*Figure 1* The place of individuals from the perspective of Foucault’s subject-object theory (*i* = individual, *p* = power).
equivalent of the *mere abstract thing* from the point of view of *abstract* subject-object relations, in which, *after all*, there exist no individual wills by themselves; the will of being the subject is simply given by the power of ‘discipline’ that no one can know by whom it is activated, and his will is thereby simply internalised as if it was provided by someone or something else. For these reasons, in all circumstances, no one can go outside of these worlds controlled by invisible physical forces whose true colour cannot ever be known, and which do not have any personality (‘strategy’ of the subject). No matter what the external context is, an individual is merely thought of as a ‘product of power’ *which more or less results in* the same quality as the rest. Here there are only individuals who do not have their own ‘masks’ (personality).

In Figure 2, on the other hand, there are no individuals who are not related to others. In this context, individuals are seen neither as subjects nor as objects, but as based on self-other relationships respectively, that is as selves connected with others, all of whom have their own personalities – the modern concept of self, as we have seen, is derived from the Latin ‘persona’ (see n. 2 below) – and their own conscious wills which are not controlled by the subject which (who) cannot be known. The individual as the self supports and is also supported by the other, and constitutes and is also constituted by his or her personality, but absolutely neither produces nor is produced by the other. The relationship is thus a very *concrete* human activity. In this respect, it is possible, or rather quite natural, to consider that individuals as selves have different personalities from one another, and that all of them are *visible* from everyone and everywhere –

![Figure 2](image-url)

*Figure 2* The place of individuals from a self view from the perspective of self-other relationships (*r* = relations).
since respective personalities of selves can occasionally be similar to each other, selves are also a potential ‘group self’. Here all the individuals can be recognised by others all of whom own their respective masks.

If we see the Foucauldian individual from the latter above perspective, then we can expect things to emerge as in Figure 3 below. The individual there has not solely the abstract aspect of the individual as the subject and the object but another concrete aspect of the self and the other. He is not, thereby, merely controlled by nor does he seize power, but is related to others in the space which enables him to break free to a certain extent from the category of power – this is called the space of the self. It is considered that in this space others satisfy his grandiose self and idealised parent-imago – ‘he is “driven” by his ambitions and “led” by his ideals’ (Kohut 1977: 180). An individual who has become a self can even connect with other kinds of selves who are in different self contexts by using his space of the self. It is profoundly relevant, therefore, that in the world of the self he constitutes concrete personal relationships with concrete others, in contrast to the world of the Foucauldian Panopticon prison. Hence, it is valid to consider that how a self context is going to be depends heavily upon what personality and character selves in a group self, or a group self, have. It is rather variable and also likely to be constituted by them. Significantly, this world is no longer a prison.

From these perspectives, I can answer the above significant question (p. 35 above) as follows: the individual is dependent upon and so embedded in his

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Figure 3 The place of individuals on the basis of Foucault’s model of the individual with an emphasis on the role of the psychoanalytic relations between the self and the other (i = individual, p = power, r = relations).
external contexts, but is separated to some extent from them at the same time, that is to say, there is a certain space for the self and the other that is managed by their own conscious (the sphere of the self) without regard to either society in the Durkheimian sense or power in the Foucauldian sense. From this perspective, I can reach the appropriate conclusion that it is unreasonable to consider the individual solely as the given abstract product, that is to say, it is absolutely not the mere abstract entity observed only from the outside, and that it is inevitable to actually go into his ‘inner world’ (Kohut e.g. 2011b: 205-6) and to attempt to precisely know him in the world in which there are the certain relations between the self and the other – the method observing the Kohutian self as an individual is called the methodological psychoanalysis in my research.¹⁰

As mentioned in note 10, I essentially call the individual from the perspective of self-other relations the ‘methodological psychoanalytic individual’, which is rigorously distinguished from any other kinds of methodological individuals, from the conventional liberalist autonomous individual, from the Marxist materialist individual, from the functionalist individual and from the Foucauldian and postmodern individual. This new anthropological measure is expected to contribute to gaining a new understanding of politics and to establishing a new type of political theory. For a while, from this philosophical-anthropological perspective I want to see the topic of the relations between human psychology (or personality) and politics on track.

**Personality approach and self-other relations**

The concept of self, as we saw in Table 1, has already been highlighted from the political psychological perspective. It is plausibly understood that the notion is of huge significance for present-day scholarship due to the fact that there is firm evidence that the discipline has recently laid great stress on a variety of self-concepts for understandings of political behaviours (e.g. Hermann 1999; Kohut 2011d [1976]; Post 1997; Schütz 2001). In fact, the personality approach, as noted in the above table, contains the ‘self-concept’ approach of the cognitive section in the four types of personality approaches, and, according to Winter, self-concepts are also the ‘most important cognitive structure’ for us; the reason for the importance, he says, is because the self that expresses what and how we regard ourselves is profoundly associated with our ‘political decision-making and action’ (2003: 125-6). The works noted above, however, focus on the topic of individual political leadership, and it does not seem, therefore, that they tackle the issue of group political behaviour, with the exception of Kohut. To be sure, as Winter puts it, ‘any attempt to assess psychological characteristics of large groups and especially whole nations quickly runs into formidable conceptual
and empirical difficulties’ (2003: 111), so I am aware, in this sense, that we should be cautious about the immediate application of psychological and psychoanalytic approach to research on political group behaviour without any regard to its methodological difficulties. Nonetheless, it is noted that, as Kohut stresses, it is ‘not too early to suggest that it [the approach of the group self] should be tried’ (2011d: 838), and so we certainly should not give up tackling the issue simply due to the methodological problems.

Political psychology, as Sears et al. suggest, is an approach of psychology to politics (2003b: 4). In this sense, if it is regarded as the psychology focusing on political topics from the psychological side, then it will result in being merely considered as one type of psychology – indeed, this seems most appropriate account of the present-day discipline. It is impossible, on the other hand, to overlook it in terms of politics, simply because political psychology is not politics, even if it can be a psychological approach of the study of politics – generally, it is not called psychological politics. For instance, there is no space of the disciplinary genre of ‘political psychology’ in the Oxford handbook series of political science.\footnote{As mentioned in note 8, political psychology does not consist of one psychology; in this respect, as Sears et al. say, it is appropriate to recognise that there are a variety of political psychologies. My account above employing the singular form of ‘political psychology’, then, might not appear to be suitable for the fact of its discipline. But it is highly valid, nonetheless, to choose its style there if it is recognised simply as a discipline’s name. In short, neither political psychology nor the psychological approach is a complete theory of politics; they are, so to speak, theories borrowing from psychology – the former is rather appropriate to consider as a branch of psychology. Much more importantly, however, whether it is possible to shed new light on politics depends heavily upon whether we manage to employ those borrowing theories. In this sense, it must be noted that the success of one’s research, above all, is dependent on one’s insight.}

At the same time, nonetheless, it must be pointed out that what I aim to achieve in this research differs from and thus does not belong to political psychology – first of all, I do not intend to do political psychology. My aim is instead to illustrate the impact of the concept of narcissism on politics; in this respect, it is associated with methodological and anthropological views of this research. From the political psychological perspective, indeed, my research might seem to partly introduce the cognitive approach of the personality approach, but it should be emphasised that the intention of my approach is definitely not simply to apply a political psychological theory. Rather, it must be stressed that my purpose is to illuminate politics from the perspective of the self-other relationship, whose view gives rise to a relevant understanding of
what our social life ought to be. For these reasons, it is noted that my attempt is to generate a very new theoretical framework, which is expected to contribute to the foundations of a new aspect of political theory, and therefore that the theoretical structure of this research constituted by the concept of narcissism is basically associated with methodology and philosophical anthropology.

3. Narcissism: Between the Self and the Other

Essentially, narcissism is concerned with the mental condition of the self. This is elucidated by the expression that ‘Narcissus vainly reaches out to embrace his own reflection’ (Holmes 2001: 3; emphasis added). It is plausible to assume, therefore, that this depiction sheds light on the fact that narcissism is associated with the self as the myth is generally represented as ‘self-love’ and ‘self-reflection’ – as Elsa F. Ronningstam points out, it is possible to see that self-love means the ‘inability to love’ (2005: 3). As a matter of fact, narcissism, as Kohut stresses, expresses the ‘cathexis of the self’ (e.g. 1971: xiii). To be sure, in this sense, it is noteworthy that the term narcissism may illuminate the natural instinct between the individual and politics since the face of its term conveying the mythical concept of self, no doubt, has well depicted our essential character.

Here I want to refer to Kohut again. He identifies what animal we are from his psychoanalytic perspective. Human beings, according to him, are intended to be supported by others so that they can continue living; it is achieved by way of the ‘charge of their two poles’ (see p. 31 above), and ourselves can only thereby be healthy. In this respect, it is profoundly reasonable to believe that, as Kohut insists, our aims are directed towards ‘Tragic Man’. Kohut highlights the fact that man is twofold being, referring to Eugene O’Neill: ‘Man is born broken. He lives by mending. The grace of God is glue’ (1977: 287; emphasis added). It would seem that this literary expression leads me to an appropriate understanding of my issue here. We ourselves need the other for ourselves and vice versa (narcissism); in fact, this point has been stressed by Kohut (e.g. 1984: 47; 2011e: 343). This narcissistic desire does not ever have to be denied, indeed it is impossible to throw it away. Most importantly, in this respect, man is a vulnerable animal who requires others, that is to say, he is Tragic Man who needs to be “driven” by his ambitions and “led” by his ideals’. On this essential point, it must be claimed that Kohut provides us with a much more precise view of what it is to be human beings. From these perspectives, it would appropriately acceptable to maintain that it is necessary not to deny our narcissism but rather to fulfil its need. This is why we are in need of the other.
Notes

1 Winter, for example, emphasises that the concept of self has origins in an important western tradition which gave rise to its later evolution: ‘The concept of “self” . . . derives from the western philosophical tradition of individualism and is closely linked to many features of western industrial society’ (2003: 126; emphases added) – on the views of the self in relation to this ‘individualism’, see ns. 2-3 below.

2 The ‘modern Western self’, as Graham Cassano highlights, is derived from the ancient Roman concept of the ‘persona’. This view, according to him, was presented by the sociologist and anthropologist Marcel Mauss in his ‘The Subject: The Person’ (1979) (Cassano 2008: 194-5). Although it is appropriately considered that its history started with the ancient Rome, says Cassano, it is noted that its self is different from the modern meanings of the self in the sense of the ‘modern Western notion of the person as a psychological being’ (2008: 195). Cassano takes the view that the Protestant Reformation contributed to the rise of the concept of self in its terms, relying upon Weber’s discussion. He says: ‘With this emphasis on conscience and personal responsibility, a new notion of self emerged, a psychological being with a complex interior life visible to God but concealed from the world at large’ (2008: 195; emphasis added); here we can see the emergence of the modern concept of self, as far as Weber’s view is concerned. It seems, however, that his view does not match my stance on this subject (cf. n. 3 below). Most importantly, however, it would appear that this religious self in the Weberian sense can be distinguished to a certain extent from the philosophical self in the Descartes sense.

3 For example, Daniel Garber stresses Descartes’s discovery of the concept of self: ‘The first step towards certainty, the Archimedean point from which the whole structure will grow, is the discovery of the existence of the self. At the beginning of Meditation II, reflecting on the evil genius posited at the end of Meditation I, Descartes observes: “Let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something . . . I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind”.’ (Garber 1998). After these sentences, he adds that its proportion is seen in the famous form, ‘Cogito Argument’, in works such as Principle of Philosophy (1644).

4 On Kohut’s important concept of ‘selfobject’, also see Ch. 4, s. 2.

5 Rigorously speaking, as far as I know, Kohut’s term ‘group self’ was first employed in his article ‘Creativeness, Charisma, Group Psychology: Reflections on the Self-Analysis of Freud’ (1976) – abbreviated to ‘CCGP’ below (2011d: 799). While, however, in ‘On Leadership’ (1969-70), for example, he had already used such concepts in some forms such as ‘a shared grandiose self’ (1985b: 55), ‘the group’s grandiose self’ (1985b: 57) and ‘the grandiose self of the masses’ (1985b: 67), at its stage it had not yet been made clear as a rigorous term – this means that he later gradually began to draw too much attention to the issue about which he had cared in his actual works. In the later essay ‘CCGP’, as noted above, the completed term of ‘group self’ was first introduced: ‘a firm group self supports the productivity of the group just as a firm individual self supports the productivity of the individual’ (2011d: 799). It is also noted, however, that the validity of its concept was hypothetical at its stage as he in fact highlighted difficulties with a psychoanalytically relevant concept despite the fact that it potentially had a great deal of relevance: ‘It is too early to say how successful this approach will be, but not too early to suggest that it should be tried. The difficulties are great, since the relevant depth-psychological data about the
group self have to be obtained with the aid of a specific instrument of observation’ (2011d: 838). Nonetheless, it did not take him a long time to illustrate the appropriateness of the concept. In ‘Self Psychology and the Sciences of Man’ (1978), Kohut used solid concepts based on his psychoanalytic theory such as ‘nation’s group self’, ‘the national self’ (1985c: 78, 91), ‘the German group self’ and ‘the German self’ (1985c: 81-93) as examples of the group self, ‘a healthy group self’ (1985c: 88) and ‘the (a) diseased group self’ (1985c: 83, 84, 86); this fact is largely the result of the illustration of the validity of the concept. (While employing the term ‘group self’ in his work The Restoration of the Self (1977), Kohut does not give consideration to it in any detail. In fact, it is provided solely in a footnote – see 1977: 184, n. 7.)

6 Fromm, for instance, argues in favour of this view as follows: ‘the sociological function of group narcissism . . . parallels the biological function of individual narcissism’ (1964: 78; emphasis added) – I find that the former is intended as narcissism in sociological meaning (group narcissism), and that the latter is intended as narcissism in Freudian sense (individual narcissism). Also, Kohut argues in the same way by emphasising the function of self: ‘the group self . . . is analogous to the self of the individual’ (2011d: 837-8). This illuminates the fact that the narcissism of the self, and of the group (society), are also in parallel. On this point, it is observed that Kohut uses the latter concept in the form of ‘the narcissism of the group’ (e.g. 1985c: 84).

7 According to David O. Sears et al., political psychology as an academic discipline started in the late 1960s (2003b: 3). Obviously, in this sense, it is not appropriate to consider that its field has a long history. It is presumed, however, that research into the connection between ‘personality and political activity’ has been conducted for a relatively long time in the sense that the discipline has its origins in the canonical work Harold D. Lasswell’s Psychopathology and Politics (1930); he is appropriately regarded as a ‘pioneer’ in research into the ‘personalties of political activists’ by introducing the psychoanalytic unconscious theory (Sears et al. 2003b: 5). This means that Lasswell is a pioneer in the exploration of the relationship between ‘personality and political activity’ (‘personality approach’).

8 Sears et al. raise six types of general psychological approaches to politics: ‘personality’, ‘behaviourist learning theories’, ‘developmental theory’, ‘incentive theories’, ‘social cognition’ and ‘intergroup relations’ (2003b). Significantly, in addition, they emphasise that political psychology does not consist of a simple theory, arguing that it is the studies of politics from the psychological perspective: ‘there is no one “political psychology”.’ Rather, there are a number of political phenomena that have been investigated from a psychological approach, and using a number of different psychological theories. In that sense there are a number of “political psychologies”.’ (2003b: 4). Furthermore, they point out that Lasswell's Psychopathology and Politics is the pioneering work on the personality approach, as mentioned in note 7, and that Adorno et al.'s The Authoritarian Personality (1950) is the best-known work applying the ‘idiographic approach’ of the personality approach, which focuses on the ‘idiosyncrasies of specific individuals’; they add that the ‘nomothetic’ approach, statistically places of larger numbers of people at various positions on a specific dimension of personality’, is the antonym of the former approach (2003b: 5).

9 For example, the Neo-Freudian psychiatrists such as Fromm, Karen Horney and Harry Stack Sullivan are representatives who highlight the influence of the social and cultural factors on the formation of personality from the psychoanalytic perspective; in this context, Erik Erikson should also be recognised (see, e.g. Fromm 1956 [1955]; Sullivan 1997 [1953]; Erikson 1963). (To be honest, I do not feel inclined to recognise someone by attributing his academic
works to a group, a circle, etc. with a label (e.g. schools and political labels). Here I therefore emphasise only that this method is convenient for identifying one.)

10 Psychoanalysis, as is typically seen in Kohut, sees the individual as the self characterised as a concrete human being by separating it to a large extent from any abstract entities such as currency, power and the 

_\textit{sui generis}. In other words, an individual as a psychoanalytic self cannot be observed by such abstract measures. On this view, Kohut says: ‘The inner world cannot be observed with the aid of our sensory organs. Our thoughts, wishes, feelings, and fantasies cannot be seen, smelled, heard, or touched. They have no existence in physical space, and yet they are real, and we can observe them as they occur in time: through introspection in ourselves, and through empathy . . . in others’ (2011b: 205-6; emphases added).

In sum, it is noted that, from Kohut’s perspective, in order to fully understand the individual apart from his other aspects, we need to actually go into ‘his inner world’, in which ‘introspection’ and ‘empathy’ are employed as the sole methods of observing its world. From this perspective, I call the method that sees the Kohutian self (individual) in an analysis of society the methodological psychoanalysis and such an individual the methodological psychoanalytic individual.

11 This series contains ten volumes of the branches of politics: Political Theory, Political Institutions, Political Behaviour, Comparative Politics, Law and Politics, Public Policy, Political Economy, International Relations, Contextual Political Analysis and Political Methodology.

12 In this context, indeed, Kohut employs the term ‘selfobject’. However, this is a being exclusively as seen from the self side and therefore the narcissistic object; in this respect, it is not already the other. From the political perspective, thus, we need to replace the word with the other, thereby establishing genuine and authentic human relationships, namely self-other relationships, since in actual politics man is required to be the self and to be the other at the same time – not to be an object of the self (selfobject).

13 This understanding is in favour of Kohut. Opposed to him, however, Klein asserts that narcissism, basically, is ‘secondary’, and therefore means a pathological defence mechanism (Klein 1975); in her view, therefore, it must be treated – on the concept of ‘secondary narcissism’, see App. 2, s. 2. On the contrary, Kernberg contends that it is possible to distinguish between ‘pathological and normal narcissism’ (1975: ch. 10). In his view, therefore, it is most important to distinguish between them. Thus, it is important to remember that understandings of narcissism vary amongst theorists – with respect to the overall concept of narcissism, see App. 2.
In the preceding chapter, I raised and discussed the issue of how narcissism is methodologically and ontologically related to politics by focusing on the concept of self. It is plausibly presumed that, through this examination, I successfully managed to obtain an essential perspective in relation to the basic anthropological position of my research that essentially we need the ‘other’. In this respect, it is believed that man is by nature intended to be narcissistic; throughout my research, I basically rely upon this stance. On the other hand, it has been demonstrated that the term narcissism has significant implications for and makes a provocative impact on politics. In the preceding chapter, I was able to gain an appropriate theoretical understanding of the relation between personality and political behaviour from the perspective of political psychology, and this led me to prove my hypothesis that the term narcissism, which accounts for a fundamental aspect of our personality, gives politics a high relevance in terms of the above essential connection. Hence, from these perspectives it has been concluded that the concept, elucidating not only the natural instinct of human beings but also the substance of politics, sheds new light on politics. Narcissism, then, has given rise to an essential conceptual device for my research.

As has been mentioned, the concept of narcissism is basically concerned with methodological and ontological standpoints in my research. In other words, it provides the fundamental viewpoints of how to be involved in politics and how it comes into being. In fact, Part II aims to offer methodological and ontological perspectives – of course, the notion is also associated with the epistemological view of how to recognise political issues, and with regard to this view, in my research it basically presents diagnostic and remedial standpoints on the grounds
that the concept has its origins in psychiatry in a broad sense. A great deal of interest in methodological issues is of vital importance to my research. As a matter of fact, the concept of narcissism my doctoral thesis raises also contains a methodological and ontological (epistemological) sense. In short, it is expected that I will examine political issues from a new perspective which presents a research methodology based on the psychoanalytic term. To put it another way, narcissism puts forward a methodological viewpoint based on the self-other relationship and medical diagnosis and remedy. These perspectives, then, facilitate the application of the three therapeutic steps: examination, diagnosis and prescription.

In this chapter, I will actually see a political issue in terms of narcissism. This does not mean, however, that I attempt to analyse politics by applying some psychoanalytic theory of narcissism. It is fundamentally extremely difficult unless I am a psychoanalyst even if I am intrigued by its method – although I will actually carry out an analysis of the ‘Tennō system’ by applying a psychoanalytic theoretical perspective in the next chapter. Indeed, I have never specialised in psychoanalysis and psychology, nor have I had any special practice of psychoanalysis in an academic institution. In this chapter, instead, I will scrutinise the issue from two psychoanalytic perspectives, that is from two psychoanalytic theoretical viewpoints of politics with a focus on the concept of narcissism: from Fromm’s and Kohut’s theories. In some respects, their theories have a great deal in common with each other. For they take the same stance on the formulation of politics particularly with respect to the emergence of fascism. We must gain some significant insight for seeing politics from their psychoanalytic perspectives. Thereby, it is hypothesised that the term narcissism enables us to address political issues. This must illustrate that the mere mythical and psychoanalytic clinical term and concept illuminate an understanding of politics. Here I want simply to refer to Kohut’s emphasis on new attempts. As he puts it, ‘[i]t is too early to say how successful this approach will be, but not too early to suggest that it should be tried’ (Kohut: 2011d: 838).

1. Narcissism and Fascism: Fromm

Fromm, as far as I know, first described the connection between narcissism and fascism. In his early psychoanalytic work, ‘The Method and Function of an Analytic Social Psychology: Notes on Psychoanalysis and Historical Materialism’ (1932),¹ he had already suggested that narcissism can have political implications:
In a society that pays the highest recognition and admiration to the rich man, the narcissistic needs of the society’s members inevitably lead to extraordinary intensification of the desire for possessions. On the other hand, in a society where services performed for the whole society rather than property are the basis of social esteem, the same narcissistic impulses will find expression as a ‘drive’ to contribute to society in some important way. Since narcissistic needs are among the most elemental and powerful psychic strivings, it is most important to recognize that the goals (hence the concrete content) of these narcissistic aspirations depend on the specific structure of a society (Fromm 1991: 152).

It is assumed that in this phase Fromm had already implied the relation between narcissism and fascism he later mentioned. More precisely, he stressed that how politics is formed is explained to a certain extent by the fact that ‘the goals of ... narcissistic aspirations depend on the specific structure of a society’. Needless to say, this accounts for a great deal of emphasis on the concept of narcissism not only in his psychoanalytic theory but also in his political theory.

Narcissism and self-love

Despite the aforementioned fact, in his works such as Escape from Freedom (1941), Man for Himself (1947) and The Sane Society (1955), narcissism has a small role, and only a simple account of the concept is offered in those respective writings (Fromm 1941: 116; 1971 [1947]: 127-31; 1956 [1955]: 30-6). By contrast, in the subsequent works such as The Art of Loving (1956), the notion of narcissism is given an important role in relation to the concept of love.

Interestingly, for Fromm narcissism in most respects differs from ‘self-love’. In fact, putting emphasis on the connection between narcissism and ‘selfishness’, and referring to Freud, he says: ‘Freud holds that the selfish person is narcissistic, as if he had withdrawn his love from others and turned it toward his own person. It is true that selfish persons are incapable of loving others, but they are not capable of loving themselves either’ (Fromm 1962 [1956]: 61). Selfish persons, according to Fromm, are exactly narcissistic, that is to say, this type of persons means exact narcissists who cannot love others and themselves as well. From this perspective, he briefly points out as follows: ‘Selfishness and self-love, far from being identical, are actually opposites’ (1962: 60). This elucidates the fact that he considers that narcissism meaning selfishness is definitely different from self-love – he takes the same view in some other works (1971: 131; 1956: 36). On this view, in Escape from Freedom Fromm has claimed: ‘narcissistic person, who is not so much concerned with getting things for himself as with admiring himself. While on the surface it seems that these persons are very much in love with themselves, they actually are not fond of themselves, and their narcissism – like selfishness – is an overcompensation for the basic lack of self-love’ (1941: 116).
From individual narcissism to group narcissism

It should be noted that Fromm's view of narcissism is basically negative. It is little wonder, therefore, that his position on its human need generates some negative connection between narcissism and politics. As a matter of fact, he takes the view that 'social narcissism' (group narcissism) – Fromm basically employs the latter term though they essentially have the same meaning – can even contribute to violence and war (Fromm 1964: 78). In The Heart of Man (1964), as he puts it:

From the standpoint of any organized group which wants to survive, it is important that the group be invested by its members with narcissistic energy. The survival of a group depends to some extent on the fact that its members consider its importance as great as or greater than that of their own lives, and furthermore that they believe in the righteousness, or even superiority, of their group as compared with others. Without such narcissistic cathexis of the group, the energy necessary for serving the group, or even making severe sacrifices for it, would be greatly diminished (1964: 78).

Indeed, this way of understanding narcissism explains that Fromm believes that it performs one of the most fundamental functions of human nature; he calls this the 'sociological function of group narcissism' (1964: 78). According to Fromm, this functions in three ways: first, in the 'narcissistic cathexis', with which group members provide their group as a whole they belong to – this is highlighted in the above quotation; second, in the dialectical process of 'benign' and 'malignant' narcissism; and third, in the way of giving members a 'malignant narcissistic satisfaction' (1964: 78-9).

With regard to the second function, Fromm explains that, if the needs of group narcissism are directed towards creative things, then they will be reduced to one which is 'compatible with social co-operation' (benign narcissism), on the one hand, but if its needs are directed towards the 'splendour' of a group, 'its past achievements' and 'the physique of its members', then they will be converted to 'narcissistic passion' (malignant narcissism), on the other; he adds that these two types of narcissism are generally intertwined (1964: 73-8). Significantly, on this view, Fromm stresses that narcissism undergoes the dialectical developmental process. In addition, with respect to the third function, an 'extreme form of narcissism', says Fromm, stems from the malignant function of narcissism since the narcissistic satisfaction that is part of a group is the sole contentment for members who are neither economically nor culturally satisfied with their group; he points to the Third Reich and the 'racial narcissism' in the Southern US as examples of this type of narcissism (1964: 79). In short, these functions are fulfilled, on the one hand, by absorbing the narcissistic energy
from members, and, on the other hand, by providing them with a malignant narcissism, when a group gives them only dissatisfaction. In Fromm’s view, above all, individual narcissism enables group narcissism to be alive, i.e. the latter narcissism inevitably needs the cathexis of the former, and it can thereby gain its own energy.

Furthermore, Fromm provides a significant account of the four characteristics of group narcissism from a pathological perspective with reference to the negative relation between narcissism and politics: first, the ‘lack of objectivity and rational judgement’; second, the need for ‘narcissistic satisfaction’; third, the ‘reaction of rage’ caused by vulnerability; and fourth, narcissistic ‘symbiosis and identification’ (1964: 85-7). It is noted that these features of group narcissism are regarded as analogous to those of individual narcissism (1964: 78). Most importantly, his above account elucidates why group narcissism is negatively associated with politics. Individual narcissism, then, is allowed to become group narcissism. As a matter of fact, as Fromm puts it, ‘[i]nasmuch as the group as a whole requires group narcissism for its survival, it will further narcissistic attitudes and confer upon them the qualification of being particularly virtuous’ (1964: 80). In other words, group narcissism results mostly in a spiral of malignant narcissism when the narcissistic energy of individuals continues to be offered to their group. This is why for Fromm group members necessarily have considerable difficulty in retaining their benign group narcissism – it is also one of the primary reasons why he sees narcissism essentially as an obstacle to human beings. Next, I will need to go on to tackle the primary issue of the connection between narcissism and fascism. Since, however, it has already been partly discussed, I will focus on the functions of ‘malignant group narcissism’.

Group narcissism and fascism

From Fromm’s perspective, group narcissism leads people to fascism. As noted above, in his view, an extreme form of group narcissism means malignant narcissism, which gives rise to passionate fascist politics, an extreme racialism, and so on. Fromm, as a matter of fact, stresses the importance of the influence of this group narcissism on the formulation of politics in his work Greatness and Limitations of Freud’s Thought (1979). As he says, ‘[g]roup narcissism is a phenomenon of the greatest political significance’ (Fromm 1980b [1979]: 51). His account, above all, illuminates one of the primary reasons for the emergence of fascism from a psychoanalytic perspective. In this respect, it is particularly important to gain a full understanding of group narcissism on the grounds that the concept largely explains why fascism comes into being as our politics.
First, I will look at the characteristics of group narcissism which triggers insane and abnormal political phenomena such as fascism and authoritarianism apart from the above four character features. From Fromm’s psychoanalytic perspective, fascist group narcissism denotes a malignant type of narcissism. Malignant group narcissism, which is analogous to individual narcissism, lacks self-regulatory abilities, and it therefore cannot control its own narcissism without outside help, in contrast to benign narcissism. For this reason, it is appropriate to assume that this type of group narcissism is always in danger of developing cruel behaviour induced by its uncontrolled state of mind – with regard to this feature, for instance, Fromm stresses ‘fanaticism’ and ‘destructiveness’ (1964: 83). In addition, malignant narcissism generally aims at obtaining ‘something he has’ (1964: 77; and see n. 4 below). It is plausibly presumed, therefore, that a malignant type of group narcissism directs its needs at ‘nation’, ‘race’, ‘religion’, and the like (1964: 73).

Second, I will see the process of the emergence of political fanaticism from Fromm’s perspective. In order to clarify this mechanism, it is most important to grasp his conception of ‘social transference’. Fromm says:

He is nothing – but if he can identify with his nation, or can transfer his personal narcissism to the nation, then he is everything. . . . The individual satisfies his own narcissism by belonging to and identifying himself with the group. Not he the nobody is great, but he the member of the most wonderful group on earth (1980b: 51-2; emphases added).

The mechanism that generates fascism is very simple from his perspective. In Fromm’s view, it is done simply by transferring one’s own individual narcissism to his narcissistic objects – this is understood as equivalent to Kohut’s selfobject transference (narcissistic transference) (on this, see Ch. 3, pp. 32-3). Of course, however, this factor is not sufficient to fully elucidate the emergence of fascism. Nonetheless, taking account of the characteristics of malignant group narcissism, we perceive that the appearance of fascism is illuminated by that dynamics: the lack of objectivity and rationality, the necessity for narcissistic satisfaction, the reaction of rage, fanaticism, destructiveness and the distorted narcissistic object (e.g. nation, race, and the like). It would seem that these factors are enough to provide a cogent account of why fascism comes into being, if I add that one cannot endure his loneliness and fear (Fromm 1941: chs. 2-4).

Malignant group narcissism, then, is ready to give rise to fascism. However, it is important to note that Fromm does not primarily draw attention to the above mechanism. His primary concern is rather to identify the conditions under which fascism develops. In fact, as he puts it, ‘[t]he most important and most difficult problem, however, is that group narcissism can be produced by the
basic structure of society, and the question is how this happens’ (1980b: 53; emphases added). With regard to this issue, for instance, Fromm stresses the possible connection between the ‘structure of industrial cybernetic society’ and the dynamics of individual narcissism in Greatness and Limitations of Freud’s Thought (1980b: 53). So let us see it briefly below.

Fromm points out that in our industrial society ‘loneliness’ and ‘hostility’ amongst individuals are the primary factors in increasing narcissism (1980b: 53). He adds, however, that contemporary industrial society has developed the ‘worship of industrial production’ regarded as the primary conditions inducing our narcissism (1980b: 53). With respect to our fetishistic behaviour, Fromm emphasises that human beings have turned into a god. As Fromm puts it,

it happens that modern man has developed an extraordinary pride in his creation; he has deemed himself to be a god, he has felt his greatness in the contemplation of the grandeur of the man-made new earth. Thus admiring his second creation, he has admired himself in it. The world he has made, harnessing the energy of coal, of oil, and now of the atom, and especially the seeming limitless capacity of his brain, has become the mirror in which he can see himself (1980b: 54).

Has he fetishised his mirror as if ‘vainly reach[ing] out to embrace his own reflection’ (Holmes 2001: 3; emphasis added)? In fact, Fromm employs the myth of Narcissus in order to illuminate the bizarre behaviour that we worship industrial products we produced, and that we see ourselves through them. He says: ‘Will he drown in this mirror as Narcissus drowned gazing at the picture of his beautiful body mirrored in the lake?’ (1980b: 54). To be sure, whether he stays gazing at his figure reflected on the surface of the water until death (on this, see App. 2, p. 241) depends heavily upon his future imagination. Most importantly, however, Fromm stresses that ‘antagonism’, which is the primary factor in causing narcissism, is provoked by ‘an economic system’ which allows people to be extremely selfish and to make it work to their advantage (1980b: 53). From his prescriptive perspective, he suggests that we should cultivate the spirit of ‘sharing’ and ‘mutuality’, or else we will result in inducing narcissism (1980b: 53).

Fromm is always intrigued by the precondition of a social structure which enables us to love each other and to get rid of our intrinsic condition of narcissism – it is even possible to think that he continually sought for it in his entire life. Indeed, with regard to this point, he mentioned in his early years as follows: ‘The progress of psychology lies not in the direction of divorcing an alleged “natural” from an alleged “spiritual” realm and focusing attention on the former, but in the return to the great tradition of humanistic ethics which
looked at man in his physico-spiritual totality, believing that man’s aim is to be himself and that the condition for attaining this goal is that man be for himself (1971: 7). This means precisely that Fromm’s primary concern is to find out the social conditions not simply under which fascism develops, but rather under which our humanistic ethics develop; in this respect, it is emphasised that the latter is much more important for his work. For this reason, it must be pointed out that his most important conceptual device of ‘social character’ elaborated through his early works is of huge significance in the sense that it is essentially capable of seeking for the conditions as identified by his above task. In this sense, most importantly, I should devote myself to carrying out the essential enquiry as to how industrial cybernetic society, the primary structure of contemporary society, can be related to fascism, and, much more importantly, another enquiry as to what social conditions enable our society to break free from fascism and to establish genuine and authentic democracy.

2. Narcissism and Fascism: Kohut

Kohut also highlights the connection between narcissism and fascism from his self psychological perspective. First of all, it must be pointed out that Kohut proceeded with his discussion of fascism in conjunction with the ‘group self’, one of his most important concepts (we saw this notion in the preceding chapter). Indeed, this point is of huge importance to my exploration due to the fact that his investigation into the significant political theme was conducted by applying the provocative idea. Second, it must be noted that the group self (vis-à-vis the self), whose conceptual device attempted to carry out a social and historical enquiry, was invented for his analysis of social phenomena from his psychoanalytic perspective, and that Kohut hypothesised that the concept would establish a valuable connection between psychoanalysis and the humanities (sciences of man) such as history and politics (e.g. 1985c: 81).

According to Kohut, psychoanalysis based on ‘self psychology’ – this is the theoretical scheme of Kohut’s psychoanalysis – offers some significant insights into the respective fields of the social sciences; it is rather expected, he stresses, that his psychoanalysis has a great deal of interest in applying his psychoanalytic conceptions to those disciplines (1985c: 75-6, 81). As Kohut puts it, ‘[t]he cultural, economic, political, and military situation that followed the military defeat and the effectiveness of the “blockade” led . . . to the situation in which a proud, gifted, moral and highly civilized nation became ready to accept the leadership of a man who offered it the instantaneous feeling of intense power
and pride and the sense of action-poised idealized omnipotence with which individual Germans could merge’ (1985c: 81; emphases added). Kohut’s account explains that he in fact highlights a strong probability that psychoanalysis will shed new light on some important historical and political themes such as fascism. This is why I am very much intrigued by Kohut’s psychoanalytic theory, which illuminates politics from a psychoanalytic perspective with a focus on the self, that is from self psychology. (However, the reason why I draw too much attention to his theory is not only because of being of significance in that sense but rather because of being capable of giving my research a relevant methodological and epistemological viewpoint concerning philosophical anthropology.)

The group self

It is likely that, as explained in the previous chapter, the complete term ‘group self’ was first applied in ‘Creativeness, Charisma, Group Psychology’ (1976) – abbreviated to ‘CCGP’ below (see Ch. 3, n. 5). With regard to this concept, most importantly, it enabled Kohut to tackle historical and social themes, that is to say, he came up with the academic device so as to attempt to address those topics which were provoked by his interest in the humanities. Significantly, the concept was aimed at his important academic experiment that psychoanalytic self psychology could approach some historical issues. The historical enquiry always requires, therefore, that we should take account of the concept of group self. In other words, it was rather impossible for him to conduct his exploration without the conceptual device.

Kohut, while dealing with the issue in his essay ‘CCGP’, proceeds with it primarily in his ‘Self Psychology and the Sciences of Man’ (1978) – abbreviated to ‘SPSM’. The group self, as mentioned in Chapter 3 (see pp. 32-3 and ns. 5-6), is analogous to the individual self, and in fact, Kohut admits that all the observations of the concept are ‘in analogy to phenomena of individual psychology to which we have comparatively easy access in the clinical (psychoanalytic) situation’ (2011d: 838). Needless to say, this means that, as Kohut himself puts it, the group self is theoretically regarded as the straightforward equivalent of the self as the individual ‘being laid down and formed in the energetic arc between mirrored self-object greatness (ambitions) and admired selfobject perfection (ideals)’ (1985c: 82). In addition, he stresses that not only does the conceptual device offer three types of transference (mirror, idealising and alter-ego transferences), but it also works in two ways: first, by way of ‘gross identifications’, meaning the ‘revival of an archaic state’; and second, by way of ‘working-through’, meaning the ‘fluid processes [of those identifications] of alternating self-strength through empathic merger and renewed self-weakness subsequent
to breaks in the empathic state’ (1985c: 83). Furthermore, Kohut explains that a group is created and managed in two ways: first, by way of ‘unstable identifications’ in the existential form of its group leader; and second, by way of ‘mature internal changes’ (1985c: 83). On the other hand, he points to two essential differences in the developmental process of the self between psychoanalysis and history: first, while the former is concerned with ‘a single person’, the latter is concerned with both a leader as a single person and a group; and second, in the historical arena, while gross identifications are based on ‘a single dominant figure’ and are occurred ‘by his presence’, the working-through process needs the ‘interpretative presence of many active and influential minds’ (1985c: 83).

Despite some clear differences mentioned above, Kohut acknowledges that his psychoanalytic theory requires ‘empathy’ and ‘introspection’ as the essence of self psychology whether a psychoanalytic or historical enquiry (1985c: 73; and see Ch. 3, n. 10). In this sense, there is no difference between them, and both investigations try to go into man’s inner world. He says:

Self psychology is instrumental in ushering in a new phase in the history of psychoanalysis: the move from a preoccupation with the elaboration and refinement of the established theories to one of renewed emphasis on the gathering of primary data, a return to the empathic observation of inner experience (1985c: 73).

Interestingly, Kohut suggests that, from his psychoanalytic perspective, a historical enquiry should be conducted by a ‘psychohistorian’ who proceeds with his investigation, keeping a tight grip on the concept of group self (1985c: 82). In this respect, it must be stressed that crucial political issues such as fascism, which have been tackled in the field of the humanities and the social sciences, will be addressed by psychohistorians who work primarily on history by applying the conceptual device elaborated through Kohut’s experience from his self psychological perspective. The existence of the scholars, therefore, must enable us to address those topics on the basis of the inner experience of the self, for instance, for examining why fascism emerges, and why our politics has always been in danger of developing fascist politics particularly after the twentieth century by emphasising our narcissistic personality from a self-psychological perspective.

The German group self: the essence of ‘Self Psychology and the Sciences of Man’ (1978)

We now turn to the main issue here, namely an exploration of the relation between the formulations of fascist politics and narcissism. With regard to his
account of this connection, it is noted that Kohut takes an example of Nazi Germany. First of all, it must be stressed that, in his important essay ‘SPSM’, in which he focuses particularly on the ‘German group self’, he begins to carry out an analysis of the relationship, making the following statement. He claims:

The primary psychological cause of the historical events under scrutiny was a serious disturbance in the strength and cohesion of the German group self, which was experienced without the empathic sustaining voice of the truly creative individuals among the artists or political leaders or from the world that surrounded Germany during the 15 years between the peace of Versailles and the assumption of power by the Nazi party (1985c: 81; emphases added).

Kohut, as far as I know, first applied the complete term of ‘German group self’ in this sentence. However, it is provided simply as an important example of a group self which actually suffered from a ‘serious disturbance’ in history. In addition, the above expression makes it clear that a mere experimental conceptual device has turned into a solid notion that enables him to conduct an analysis of historical events without any doubt.11 Obviously, this explains that Kohut has got a firm grip on the concept of group self.

Next, Kohut actually starts to discuss the formulation of Fascism particularly by focusing on the Third Reich. First, from his psychoanalytic perspective, he observes that the Nazi party took advantage of ‘German sensibilities’; as he puts it, ‘the Nazis clearly exploited German sensibilities in order to harness the ensuing narcissistic rage in the service of their vengeful atrocities and of a vengeful war’ (1985c: 86). Second, he points out that the German group self had a ‘chronic weakness’ which ‘suffered a serious acute or subacute disorder’, and ‘which took the form of serious fragmentation’, before the rise of the Nazi government (1985c: 87). Third, Kohut maintains that its group self ‘shattered the pole of self-confidence’ through a series of bitter experiences such as the Treaty of Versailles and the deep recession in the 1920s and early 1930s, and that it ‘wiped out the pole of ideals’ (1985c: 87).12 From these perspectives, Kohut comes to the essential conclusion in relation to the ‘principles’ which psychohistorians are required to follow:

A healthy group self, as is the case for the healthy self of the individual, is continuously sustained in its course throughout time – during its life one can say – by ongoing psychological work that provides the cohesion and vigor of its changing yet continuous structure within a matrix of selfobjects who are in empathic contact with its changing needs. The sum total of the results of this work that must affect all layers of a people or at least the great majority of them – those minorities who are excluded are the disenfranchised, the outsiders, the true pariahs of a nation – we call ‘culture’ (1985c: 88; emphases added).
According to Kohut, a ‘healthy group self’ is maintained by the sustainable ‘cohesion’ and ‘vigor’ over a period of time; as we shall see in more detail below, they can be offered by a series of ‘artistic works’. In addition, he contends that those works can have a profoundly psychological effect on the majority of people, that is to say, a result of the works can give rise to a ‘culture’. In other words, an analysis of a German group self has led Kohut to a careful investigation into a whole social culture with a focus on the meaning of ‘civilization’. In fact, he has resulted in conducting a significant enquiry into, ‘[w]hy . . . did the cultural work fail to respond to the disease of the fragmented and depleted German self?’ (1985c: 88).

Finally, through the aforementioned analyses, Kohut makes a conclusive discussion of ‘art’ in relation to a lump of culture coming into being as a result of the sum of artistic, cultural works. First of all, he asserts that artists who make a great work always generate the ‘preeminent psychological tasks of a culture’ – Kohut calls this artistic role the ‘anticipatory function of art’ – and, much more importantly, that they know how people react to the psychological experiences of their work, and can therefore bring individuals to a better position particularly with a significant cultural effect (1985c: 88-9). With reference to this crucial matter concerning the artistic circumstance of Weimar Germany and the Third Reich, Kohut claims that no artist managed to identify what Germany needed for its own politics at the time. He says:

A large sector of Weimar Germany, including all classes and those with all levels of education, knew that they were not in touch with modern German art and felt preconsciously that German art was out of touch with them. And the Nazis knew it. They heaped endless scorn on the art of Weimar, they paraded it in large exhibits under the banner-title Entarte Kunst (Degenerate Art) all over the Reich. Why this display, why the bitter sarcasm, why the angry laughter? I think the Nazis accurately reflected a disappointment that they shared with a broad sector of Germany, a disappointment over the fact that their artists had failed to understand their needs and had failed to portray them with any degree of sensitivity (1985c: 89).

In addition, Kohut maintains that, while prominent artists who intrigued people in the German cultural world – he raises the specific names such as Franz Kafka, Rainer M. Rilke and Kurt Weill – appeared in great numbers, their works generally created ‘lonely’, ‘estranged’, ‘disintegrating’ and ‘depleted’ characters who did not successfully manage to form a ‘reliable sustaining matrix of selfobjects’ (1985c: 90). In particular, Kohut stresses that art in this context in some way required the ‘empty’, ‘devitalized’ and ‘fragmented’ state of people, who ‘felt alive, strong and cohesive’, and that they called for the ‘symbol of a Kaiser and a strong and disciplined army’ and the ‘ideals of Imperial Germany
The core of the self, except for one nucleus of infantile grandiosity, is lost. Thus the personality, however extensive its grown in the many layers that are acquired around the archaic core, remains cold. Having severed its relationship with a traumatically frustrating selfobject, it never acquires the capacity for modulated empathy with others. Such a personality is characterized by a near-total absence of compassion, except where total identification is concerned, when the ‘other’ is totally experienced as part of the self. Such people – and they may well be the majority of the charismatic and messianic leaders of all nations, whether in the historical and political arena, or in religion or health cults, or as the crystallization point for cultural fads – are no longer in need of selfobjects. They have acquired self-sufficiency. Whatever the details of their personality organization may be, such people become ideal targets for those who are in desperate need of selfobjects (1985c: 91-2).

Kohut’s above description is of vital importance to my analysis. Here I am intrigued by his essential theoretical view of the direction of a German group...
self particularly in relation to the rise of the Nazi party. Most importantly, it is noted that a self in ‘a near-total absence of compassion’ no longer needs to be satisfied by his selfobjects. In principle, his needs, says Kohut, are fulfilled only by selfobjects who fully recognise him by way of satisfying his abnormal impulse.

Kohut ends his discussion by pointing to the possible difference between the two ‘selfobject transferences’ of the German group self by comparing the transference to Weimar leaders and to Hitler. First, Kohut observes that, although the group self of the German people at the time was ‘most severely damaged’ as a result of World War I, their leaders responded to them by means of the ‘silly diagnosis’ (1985c: 92). Next, he turns to the issue of why the ‘Nationalists’ offered the ‘broken German self’. Kohut stresses that the ‘pre-Hitler’ and ‘non-Nazi elite’ failed to give effective remedies for the damaged self. He says: ‘The Nationalists denied the presence of the depression, the de-vitalisation, the fragmenting of the German self and failed to outline the difficult but exhilarating task of forming a new one out of the ruins of the old, followed by persistent support as the creative work moved on’ (1985c: 92-3). Finally, Kohut points out that at the time, after all, no one could successfully offer a ‘really new German self’ with the exception of Hitler (1985c: 93).

Through these examinations, Kohut particularly emphasises that ‘analysts’ lacked both the ‘power to influence populations’ and the ‘insights . . . to support the remnants of good will and of constructive political action’ (1985c: 93). In other words, psychoanalysis failed to understand the ‘pathology of the self, both in the individual and in the group’ (1985c: 93). It is important to note that ‘analysts’ do not necessarily mean psychoanalysts, but rather include artists who can generate cultural works fulfilling the ‘anticipatory function of art’ noted above; Kohut rather intends the latter by the word. To put it another way, in so far as the ‘preeminent psychological tasks of a culture’ always have a significantly psychological and remedial effect on people’s psychology, it is true that artists are also regarded as psychoanalysts. However, neither artists nor political thinkers nor politicians managed to appropriately recognise the psychology of the German self at the time, and this fact led to a fatal effect on the German group self. Most importantly, Kohut shows that society can be extremely narcissistic whenever there is no person who can diagnostically grasp people’s psychological condition and remedially offer an appropriate solution with a possibly psychological influence. Hence, it is necessary that an injured group self should be treated by analysts.
The relevance of Kohut’s self psychology for the social sciences

At this point I need to make concluding remarks about my investigation into Kohut’s psychoanalytic theory with a focus on the possible connection between narcissism and fascism. It seems to me that, most importantly, what Kohut significantly tells us by applying his concept of group self is that it is particularly important to gain a deep understanding of the condition of our group self for maintaining our society and politics, namely our life itself. In this respect, the crucial issue is whether our culture is being led by the ‘preeminent psychological tasks’, and what shape it is in, because our psychology should be diagnosed and cured by them, and we can thereby shed light on the present condition of our politics. In short, Kohut’s psychology with a particular emphasis on the self illuminates and greatly helps us to understand our society and politics. In other words, it offers an important criterion of how to see them in order that we may bring about some appropriate remedial effects on our life. This is why it is expected that Kohut’s self psychology will make a significant impact on the social sciences. In these respects, perhaps the fact that Kohut shines a light on the connection between the narcissistic self and the formulation of fascism indicates that the relationship is based on the fundamental psychological framework of human beings.

Notes

1 This work was originally published in German in 1932. Later it was translated into English and partly modified by Fromm himself; however, most parts of the original text were not changed. In fact, he says as follows: ‘There is little I would change in these early papers . . . the only changes I made were to shorten essays where they seemed too lengthy or where they dealt with small points that are of little interest today’ (Fromm: 1991: ‘Preface’). It is much more reasonable, therefore, to employ the English version, due to the following three reasons: first, the English text is more suitable for the present academic situation; second, he translated the German text into English himself; and third, my doctoral thesis is written in English. (Having said that, it would be better that we should refer to the German version so long as it is the original, and so long as he was not a native English speaker. Nonetheless, this merely means that to do so will be better, and so I do not necessarily need to use the German version.)

2 Although it is fundamentally negative, Fromm nevertheless provides a pathological standpoint which takes the view that narcissism can be somewhat positive, distinguishing between benign and malignant narcissism (Fromm 1964: 77). For him, above all, narcissism is essential for human existence due to its ‘biological function’, and it is therefore negative. This point is actually illuminated by his stress on his sociological view: ‘once we recognize that narcissism fulfills an important biological function, we are confronted with another
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question. Does not extreme narcissism have the function of making man indifferent to others, incapable of giving second place to his own needs when this is necessary for co-operation with others? Does not narcissism make man asocial and, in fact, when it reaches an extreme degree, insane? There can be no doubt that extreme individual narcissism would be a severe obstacle to all social life. But if this is so, narcissism must be said to be in conflict with the principle of survival, for the individual can survive only if he organizes himself in groups; hardly anyone would be able to protect himself all alone against the dangers of nature, nor would he be able to do many kinds of work which can only be done in groups’ (1964: 73).

Hence, for Fromm narcissism essentially fulfils a negative function; as he puts it, it undergoes the ‘dialectical process’ of development (1964: 78).

3 The term ‘social narcissism’, which is mostly replaced by ‘group narcissism’, is presented primarily in his work The Hart of Man. This concept, according to Fromm, is analogous to ‘individual narcissism’, which is psychoanalytically understood and performs the sociological function of narcissism (1964: 78) (cf. Ch. 3, n. 6).

4 With respect to these two types of narcissism, Fromm provides detailed accounts of those respective concepts. He says that benign narcissism is characterised as ‘self-checking’, but by contrast, malignant narcissism is not ‘self-limiting’. As to the former, he explains: ‘In the benign form, the object of narcissism is the result of a person’s effort. Thus, for instance, a person may have a narcissistic pride in his work as a carpenter, as a scientist, or as a farmer. Inasmuch as the object of his narcissism is something he has to work for, his exclusive interest in what is his work and his achievement is constantly balanced by his interest in the process of work itself, and the material he is working with. The dynamics of this benign narcissism thus are self-checking. The energy which propels the work is, to a large extent, of a narcissistic nature, but the very fact that the work itself makes it necessary to be related to reality, constantly curbs the narcissism and keeps it within bounds. This mechanism may explain why we find so many narcissistic people who are at the same time highly creative’ (1964: 77). As to the latter, he claims: ‘In the case of malignant narcissism, the object of narcissism is not anything the person does or produces, but something he has; for instance, his body, his looks, his health, his wealth, etc. The malignant nature of this type of narcissism lies in the fact that it lacks the corrective element which we find in the benign form. If I am “great” because of some quality I have, and not because of something I achieve, I do not need to be related to anybody or anything; I need not make any effort. In maintaining the picture of my greatness I remove myself more and more from reality and I have to increase the narcissistic charge in order to be better protected from the danger that my narcissistically inflated ego might be revealed as the product of my empty imagination. Malignant narcissism, thus, is not self-limiting, and in consequence it is crudely solipsistic as well as xenophobic. One who has learned to achieve cannot help acknowledging that others have achieved similar things in similar ways – even if his narcissism may persuade him that his own achievement is greater than that of others. One who has achieved nothing will find it difficult to appreciate the achievements of others, and thus he will be forced to isolate himself increasingly in narcissistic splendour’ (1964: 77).

5 As Fromm suggests, however, group narcissism does not necessarily have a negative effect on politics – this mechanism is identical to individual narcissism (cf. n. 3 above). It must be stressed, nonetheless, that from Fromm’s psychoanalytic perspective, basically, group narcissism negatively affect politics, in the sense that he stresses that, ‘[t]he full maturity of man is achieved by his complete emergence from narcissism, both individual and group narcissism’ (1964: 90).
Indeed, Fromm does not mention that group narcissism causes fascism by the use of the term.

The mechanism of social transference is completely explained by the sociological function of group narcissism noted above; in Fromm’s psychoanalytic theory, the phenomenon of social transference leads narcissism to cause the vicious cycle of malignant narcissistic cathexis and malignant narcissistic satisfaction.

Fromm’s humanistic theory is not discussed in this chapter. It will be raised in Chapter 6.

With regard to this issue, it should be pointed out that famously Fromm takes the view that democracy and fascism are two sides of the same coin. He does not consider that the former is simply the opposite of the latter and vice versa. It is noted that he rather see the possibility that fascism comes into existence from democracy. Basically, this explains that Fromm stresses the importance of the essential conditions under which fascism is established. He sees that it is fundamentally possible that democracy should develop fascism, and that ‘industrial cybernetic society’ should propagate some fascist tendencies. We shall discuss this crucial issue in Chapter 6.

In fact, Kohut mentioned that its conceptual device was an experimental attempt (see, e.g. 2011d: 838).

As far as I know, the idea of group self was developed in ‘On Leadership’ (1969-70), in which Kohut employed a series of terms such as ‘a shared grandiose self’, ‘the group’s grandiose self’ and ‘the communal narcissistic self’, all of which are closely connected with the present form of group self.

For example, in his essay ‘On Leadership’ Kohut also gives a similar explanation by providing expressions such as the ‘loss of self-esteem’ and the ‘loss of national prestige’ (1985b: 64).

Interestingly, Kohut raises two names, Alfred Hugenberg and Kurt von Schleicher, in respect of ‘Nationalists’. With reference to this issue, Kohut says that they lacked ‘unique talents’ and ‘charisma’, and according to him, this fact is regarded exactly as the primary reason why they failed to give people remedies for the damaged self (1985c: 93).
Part III

Political Theories of Narcissism
INTRODUCTION

Political Theories of Narcissism

In Part I, I demonstrated that political theory ought not only to carry out research on political thoughts but also to tackle methodological issues of its own theory for rectifying and improving the disciplinary quality and to indicate value judgements on politics in conjunction with social theory and the empirical sciences: political theory is ‘the theoretical activity that is concerned about politics, that is conscious of politics, that publicly participates in politics, and that actually changes politics’ (see Ch. 2, p. 20). From this perspective, we saw that it can and should aim at being a pluralistic theory and at making an ‘interdisciplinary endeavour’.

In Part II, on the other hand, I considered the implications of narcissism that can affect the disciplinary attempt of political theory and actual politics. This examination led me to find that narcissism is a social phenomenon found in contemporary society, and that the mental disease of society is profoundly associated with the self. We became aware, however, that narcissism is not necessarily a negative human constructive ingredient through focusing particularly on Kohut’s psychoanalytic theory; it is, on the whole, the psychological condition and distortion of the relationship between the self and the other. From this perspective, it was understood that ‘man is a vulnerable animal who requires others, that is to say, he is Tragic Man, who needs to be “driven” by his ambitions and “led” by his ideals’ (see Ch. 3, pp. 38, 41). That is, man needs the help of others.

In Part III, then, I will conduct a theoretical exploration of the political thoughts of the two theorists Erich Fromm and Shōzō Fujita, and consider some issues concerning democracy on the basis of the disciplinary stance put forward in Part I and the philosophical-anthropological standpoint of narcissism eluci-
dating the intrinsic relationship between the self and the other. How do the two political theorists see narcissism, and what can we learn from them? Would it be possible to deny narcissism? If not, how should we think of it? How do we see democracy amongst narcissists, and how does democracy come out as seen from narcissism? The key point of this part is that narcissism is the mental condition under which the self cannot glue himself to the other.
CHAPTER 5

Shōzō Fujita:¹

The Death of the ‘Other’ (Tasha)

1. What Connects Fujita with the Concept of Narcissism?

In this chapter, my aim is to examine the political theory of the Japanese political theorist Shōzō Fujita (1927-2003) through focusing on his quasi-psycho-analytic perspective, particularly on his conception of narcissism. In Japan, as we shall see below, he is known as a pupil of Masao Maruyama (on him, see App. 1, s. 4), who is often regarded as a founder of modern politics in Japan, and also as a person who contributed to the study of the ‘Tennō system’ (Tennōsei) particularly from the standpoint of the history of ideas (shisōshi). Perhaps the reason why this image of Fujita exists is primarily due to the following two facts: first, that he began his academic career by publishing an article entitled ‘Tennōsei’ (The Tennō System) (1954),² which contains an interesting anecdote that this particularly important earliest work was written on behalf of his mentor Maruyama – this story has often been referred to when this writing is introduced (e.g. Iida 2006a: 254-5, 287, 351; Iida 2006b; 348-9); and second, that his representative early work was ‘Tennōsei kokka no shihai genri’ (The Principles of Rule of the State of the Tennō System) (1956) – abbreviated to ‘Shihai genri’ below. As regards this issue, it is important to remember that the theme of ‘Shihai genri’ addressed subsequent to the first essay was to ‘construct the adequate logic that blows a hole in the “state of the Tennō system” (Tennōsei kokka) in prewar and wartime Japan – and the society of the Tennō system (Tennōsei shakai) . . . by finding out the logical essence of the system and by
objectifying the whole structure’ (Iida 2006a: 255). From these perspectives, it is admitted that Fujita’s early concerns gave rise to his image as a scholar of the Tennō system that has haunted him since.

To be sure, it seems true that the most popular image of Fujita noted above has so far confined his role to a scholar of the history of Japanese ideas who devoted himself primarily to analysing the Tennō system as a Maruyama’s follower by laying great stress on the aforementioned facts. On this view, giving firm evidence, the Japanese sociologist Yū Wada says: ‘in general, Shōzō Fujita, when referring to his thought, is categorised as part of Maruyama’s genealogy, that is as a scholar of the history of Japanese ideas (Nihon shisōshi-ka) who “analysed and criticised, for example, the Tennō system and the principles of the system of the Meiji state (Meiji kokka) in his works such as ‘Shihai genri’ (1966) and ‘Ishin no seishin’ (The Spirit of the Meiji Restoration) (1967) by highlighting western modernist senses of value” (The Asahi Shimbun, 04.06.20 03)’ (Wada 2004: 186). In fact, as the Japanese philosopher Takashi Kawamoto refers to himself as, ‘a university student who had had a secret longing for the discipline of the history of political thought (seiji shisōshi) knew the name of Shōzō Fujita on the extension of Masao Maruyama and Bunzō Hashikawa.’ The first of Fujita’s books I bought were Tennōsei kokka no shihai genri (Miraisha 1966) [abbreviated to Shihai genri below] and Ishin no seishin (Misuzu Shobō 1967) (Kawamoto 2004: 231). This story provides enough evidence that we have labelled Fujita as a pupil of Maruyama, that is to say, his academic efforts have been seen exclusively as an extension of his great mentor’s work, namely as a scholar of the ‘Maruyama School’ (Maruyama gakuha).

Despite these facts, on the other hand, it is also true that Fujita has another aspect of his career, apart from being a scholar of the school, which has been commented on. Indeed, it is acknowledged that it is not only this aspect, being under the shadow of Maruyama, but also another aspect characterising his post-‘despair’ period (zetsubō no jidai) (Iida 2006a: 260), that have been recognised (e.g. Higashi 2004; Hondō 2004; Taraba 2004). Representative works written in the period undoubtedly include Seishinshi-teki kōsatsu (Reflections on Intellectual History) (1982) – abbreviated to Kōsatsu below – which, as Taizō Iida (who has the same mentor as Fujita and was a colleague of Fujita’s) puts it, is regarded as ‘the memorial writing signifying the birth of “the world of Shōzō Fujita” (Fujita Shōzō no sekai)’ (Iida 2006a: 330). One of his masterworks, Zentaishugi no jidai keiken (The Experience of the Twentieth Century of Totalitarianism) (1995) – abbreviated to Zentaishugi below – is also counted as his representative writing published after his ‘despair’. Roughly speaking, the concept constituting these two works is to restore the ‘substance of things’ (honrai-teki na mono) on the basis of ‘experience’ (keiken) (Iida 2006a: 336); now-
adays these two notions have become important key terms for understanding the essence of the ‘later Fujita’ (kōki Fujita) that is provided primarily in the above two works. For instance, all the three essays on Fujita noted above often refer at least to one of those two works – Akira Hondō’s and Masashi Taraba’s articles deal with both works. In these respects, it is admitted that this data supports the fact that there exists a different aspect constituted primarily by the two books regarded as his representative later works, whose importance has sometimes been highlighted in addition to his early contributions.

It should be noted, however, that the psychoanalytic issue of Fujita’s theory has hardly been addressed in related academic fields. Rigorously speaking, no work on Fujita has so far tackled the topic. In this respect, it is generally believed that there is no such thing as a psychoanalytic subject of Fujita. Some scholars of his thought might say, therefore, that there is no need to deal with such a topic concerning Fujita, even if this perspective is quite relevant to research into his theory. Rather, it would seem natural that any works have not addressed the psychoanalytic issue in the sense that the topic in respect of his thought has not been recognised by the many. For it might even seem weird to raise Fujita’s thought in terms of the subject. In fact, the theme has been dealt with simply in relation to other theorists (e.g. Iida 2006a: 316) and other subjects of his thought (e.g. Hondō 2004: 87) in accordance with those respective topics intriguing them. Also, it is important to note that even the term narcissism including the equivalent concept of the Japanese jiko-ai has hardly been applied to any issues of his thought.

On the other hand, however, it is also certain that, in the sense that the theme I will tackle below is profoundly associated with Maruyama’s essential issue that was his primary concern, it can be argued that it was inherited from him. To take an example, the subject of ‘Chō-kokkashugi no ronri to shinri’ (Logic and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism) (1946) – abbreviated to ‘Chō-kokkashugi’ below – which is definitely regarded as one of Maruyama’s most important articles, as he himself put it, was undoubtedly to provide an ‘analysis of the spiritual structure (shisō kōzō) [and] the psychological basis (shinriteki kiban) of Japanese ultra-nationalism’ (Maruyama 1995b: 17; emphases added; [1969b: 1; translation modified]). In other words, the purpose of the essay, no doubt, was to diagnose the ‘diseases of the spiritual structure of the Tennō system’ (Tennōsei-teki seishin kōzō no byōri) (Maruyama 1964: 496; emphases added; [1969b: 23; translation modified]). Maruyama thereafter retained this essential perspective, namely an ‘understanding of “diseases” of “the Tennō system as a spiritual structure”’ in terms of Japan’s ‘modernisation’ (kindaika) for his entire career, regardless of whether or not significantly he later attempted to reconstruct his conception of modernisation in itself (Iida 2006a: 148-9). With regard to his
concept of ‘spiritual structure’, which was continually stressed by Maruyama, we should rather consider this theme from the following perspective: ‘for Maruyama, the “postwar” (sengo) was aimed at restarting by reflecting upon his academic subject that he had engaged with since his first article, that is by “exploring the developmental process of the modern thinking of Japan” (Nihon ni okeru kindai teki shihii no seijuku katei no kyûmei)’ (Iida 2006a: 147). This demonstrates that the idea of spiritual structure was conceptualised for the purpose of understanding the process of maturation of the modern thinking of Japan. In short, Maruyama consistently took the most fundamental theoretical standpoint that carries out an analysis of his subject from the inside of a problem since his first academic task. From this perspective, it is possible to believe that his essential viewpoint of observing some social and human illnesses is even associated with social psychology and psychoanalysis.

It is no wonder, then, that with respect to his psychoanalytic standpoint Fujita inherited Maruyama’s method of diagnosing some disease. In fact, with regard to this theme, he later clearly mentions in the significant letter for the memorial service for Maruyama: ‘I clearly decided to attend “Maruyama Seminar” (Maruyama zemi) at the University of Tokyo in the light of the theme of “Gunkoku shihai shi no seishin keitai” (Thought and Behaviour Patterns of Japan’s Wartime Leaders) [on this, App. 3, p. 251] . . . in particular, I wished to study the “spiritual structure” (seishin kôzô) at the time’ (Fujita 1998c: 680).9 This shows that Fujita started out to study the method of analysing the spiritual structure of the Tennô system. This perspective leads me to concentrate on the core issue of this chapter, that is what we should count as narcissism with respect to Fujita’s political theory.

Fujita puts forward his view of narcissism primarily in his quasi-psychoanalytic work ‘Narushizumu kara no dakkyaku: Mono ni iku michi’ (To Break Free from Narcissism: A Way of Finding out the Essence of Things) (1983) – abbreviated to ‘Narushizumu’ below.10 His psychological view, however, is presented not only in this article but also in some of his other important writings such as ‘Kon’nichi no keiken: Habamu chikara no naka ni atte’ (Experience in These Days: What Prevents Us Experiencing?) (1982) and ‘Anraku e no zentaishugi: Jûjitsu wo torimodosu beku’ (Totalitarianism to Unruffled Ease: Towards the Restoration of Intersubjectivity) (1985) – abbreviated to ‘Anraku’ below.11 In particular, these three works, in my view, present his essential quasi-psychoanalytic view, or rather it is possible to assume that they aim at carrying out his fundamental analyses of the psychology of human beings and society.

With regard to the reason why Fujita became interested particularly in the analysis of the psychology of society, in ‘Kaidai’ (Editor’s Note) for Fujita Shôzô
chosakushū 6: Zentaishugi no jidai keiken (The Writings of Shōzō Fujita, vol. 6: The Experience of the Twentieth Century of Totalitarianism) (1997) – abbreviated to Chosakushū 6 (and others as well) – Keiji Katō gives a good description from a slightly different viewpoint which, as I mentioned in note 7, provides the fact that the new disciplinary perspective forms a link in the chain of Fujita’s attempt at establishing the ‘studies of the twentieth century’. First of all, Katō writes that Fujita regarded his primary task as laying the foundations of a new knowledge constituted by a multiple structure made up of three types of themes, ‘reflections on human history in contemporary times’ (jinruishi-teki mondai), ‘reflections on the twentieth century’ (nijusseiki ron) described by the notion of ‘intolerable experience’ (junan keiken) and ‘reflections on contemporary Japanese society’ (gendai Nihon shakai ron) at the time when marking his turning point in his career, particularly when writing ‘Seishin no hijōji’ (Crisis of Our Thought) (1981) – abbreviated to ‘Hijōji’ below – soon after his ‘despair’; for Fujita, thereupon, his tasks all had to be carried out for establishing the structure consisting of his above three fundamental issues (Katō 1997: 233-4). Next, Katō explains that, in the essay ‘Kon’nichi no keiken’, Fujita started to examine the psychology and mentality of human beings and society and diagnose their disease, which elucidates ‘why people avoid experience’, on the basis of his fundamental diagnosis that ‘Japanese society is nowadays being confronted with the crucial problem that experience has gradually ceased to exist’ (1997: 234-5). According to Katō, ‘Narushizumu’ published after ‘Kon’nichi no keiken’ proposes a more clear perspective of the psychology and mentality in comparison with related viewpoints offered by works published before the article (1997: 235). Also, ‘Anraku’, he says, carries out a more detailed analysis of them (1997: 236). The psychological perspective in this work, Katō claims, is presented in conjunction with the new concept of ‘totalitarianism towards unruffled ease’ (anraku e no zentaishugi), which is used as a title of his work, by combining the two terms ‘totalitarianism’ (zentaishugi) and ‘a voluntary servitude to unruffled ease’ (anraku e no jihatsuteki reizoku) developed by Richard Sennett (1997: 236). Finally, Katō points out that Fujita had preserved his sociopsychological perspective till the late 1980s while his concern changed from such a simple analysis of the psychology of society into the new point of view of ‘personal relationships’ (pāsonaru rirēshon) (1997: 239) – on this concept, see s. 7 below.

From Kato’s perspective, it is not surprising that Fujita became much interested in the term narcissism that has been the concept at the centre of psychoanalysis (see App. 2). Rather, in so far as his earliest concern and research aim themselves had been to dive straight into studying the method of a ‘spiritual structure’, which diagnoses some illness of society, it was quite natural that he should show a great deal of interest not only in the notion of narcissism, des-
scribing ‘human nature’ (on this view of narcissism, see Pt II), but also in the disciplines of psychology and psychoanalysis, both of which deal with the human psychosis. As a matter of fact, it is evident that Fujita consistently concerned himself with those approaches even during the last ten years of his life. In his ‘Chiisana kibō no shushi: 1996 nen “Misuzu” dokusha ankēto’ (Small Seeds of Hope: Misuzu Book Reviews in 1996) (1997), for example, referring to the Japanese psychiatrist Hisao Nakai, Fujita says: ‘by necessity I read Shakai to byōsha [sic] (Patients and Society)13 (1991) containing “Seken ni sumu byōsha” (Patients Living in the World) several years ago, underlining sentences at least twice and writing notes in the margin’ (1997e: 218). In addition, it is noteworthy that he highlights the importance of ‘intersubjectivity’ (sōgo shukanteki kankei) – on this, see s. 7 below – and ‘common sense’ (shakaiteki jōshiki) amongst ‘others’ (tasha), referring to the German psychiatrist Wolfgang Blankenburg (1997e: 215). These viewpoints put forward by Blankenburg and emphasised by Fujita are particularly relevant to the above Japanese psychiatrist raised by the latter. In fact, Nakai stresses both the above concepts. For instance, distinguishing between ‘common sense’ (jōshiki) and ‘social mind’ (shakai tsūnen), he claims that the former is of great significance for clinical treatment (Nakai 1991b: 9). He then lays emphasis on ‘human relationship’ in terms of Harry S. Sullivan’s psychoanalytic theory: ‘In reality, many patients are suffering for personal relationships (taijin kankei). Perhaps the reason why Harry Stack Sullivan’s psychoanalytic theory based on the standpoint that “mental diseases are concerned with personal relationships in disorder” has been accepted by Japan rather than by his country, the US, is because the problem appears prominently in Japan in particular’ (1991c: 244; emphasis added). This knowledge enables us to understand how important intersubjective human relationships are – in fact, there is some evidence that Sullivan lays stress on the importance of intersubjectivity in the therapeutic process (see, e.g. Evans 1996: 166). What Fujita highlights through referring to the two psychiatrists Nakai and Blankenburg in his book review, most importantly, is not only to shed new light on politics and contemporary society but also to suggest some remedies for society’s illness of narcissism particularly by introducing the two concepts of intersubjectivity and common sense. These facts precisely explain that and why he was consistently intrigued by psychiatric and psychoanalytic issues.

From these analyses, then, the following question arises: why was Fujita particularly interested in the psychoanalytic concept of ‘narcissism’ as his new analytic device? As we have seen, however, we do not have any difficulty in understanding why he was intrigued by the academic discipline represented by psychiatry and also by the notion; rather, it seems natural that the concept should be applied to his study, taking account of the above pieces of evidence.
Despite this fact, however, it must be admitted that I have not yet answered the question appropriately. I will carry out this task by means of presenting a possible view of what narcissism should be counted in relation to Fujita. Here giving an answer to this enquiry, which seems crucial to my exploration in this chapter, is regarded exactly the same as replying to the question about the reason for Fujita’s interest in a psychoanalytic approach stressing narcissism. In my view, an answer should be provided by focusing on the concept of ‘other’ (tasha). Perhaps this is the most appropriate perspective on this issue because the concept has been of huge importance to psychoanalysis particularly since the discipline established ‘object relations theory’ and ‘self psychology’, on the one hand, and because it was greatly stressed by his academic mentor Maruyama, on the other. On the concept, for example, Iida maintains, ‘a “sense of the other” (tasha kankaku) Maruyama-san\textsuperscript{14} says . . . how important it is to understand the other. We absolutely should not exclude others simply on the grounds that they are different from us. Laying the foundations of society is based on the fact that we autonomously establish relationships and associations with heterogeneous others (ishitsu na tasha) by ourselves . . . this is why I want to highlight the importance of his theory of “sense of the other”’ (2006a: 131-2; emphases added). In fact, jiko nai taiwa: Sansatsu no nōto kara (Dialogue in the Self: As Suggested in Maruyama’s Three Notebooks) (1998) based on Maruyama’s three notebooks, which contain his diary and memorandums recorded by himself from 1943 to 1987, tries to penetrate both the other and a sense of the other. Particularly through writing down ideas concerning these concepts in his notebooks, Maruyama sought to view the ‘absence of a sense of the other’ (tasha kankaku no nasa) as the root of all evils.\textsuperscript{15} His account of this notion, on the whole, was provided as if relying upon some psychoanalytic theory of narcissism, regarding the communal sense viewed to be specific to Japan as a primary problem of its politics, that is focusing on ‘zuruzuru bettari’ (going along to get along)\textsuperscript{16} and ‘mochitsu motaretsu’ (pathologically depending upon and being depended upon), in which the self and others have not been separated from each other.\textsuperscript{17}

These analyses enable me to give an appropriate answer to my question on the basis of the above fact as follows. The absence of the other, namely the psychological condition that views others as extensions of the self in a psychoanalytic sense, is the intrinsic feature of narcissism, and the concept of other is nowadays of vital importance to a psychoanalytic understanding apart from the concept of self (e.g. Cohen 2007; Ronningstam 2005; Wada 1999). From this psychoanalytic perspective, it is acknowledged that Fujita counted narcissism not simply as a psychoanalytic concept illuminating contemporary society and politics for conducting an analysis of them from a new perspective, but rather
as one which he enhanced after having inherited Maruyama's above standpoint. If this is true, then this viewpoint in Fujita's theory must rather be regarded as one of his most important theoretical devices.

2. The Tennō System (Tennōsei) and Totalitarianism (Zentaishugi): Between Fujita’s Early and Later Works

In this section, I want to establish a fundamental connection between Fujita's early and later works. First of all, I am well aware that, in his early work, Fujita had had a great deal of interest in politics, but in his later work, by contrast, he gradually lost his political concern. His great declaration (see App. 3, pp. 256-8) must have been issued when his high hopes for politics were publicly raised. This clearly explains that in those days Fujita retained a strong interest in the creation of his political theory, focusing on his conception of jinmin-shugi (see App. 3, p. 253 and n. 13). He remained interested in its task in the period when he wrote 'Jiyū kō' (On Liberty) (1970). We perceive that in this essay, in which he did not lose his hope, employing and based on the methods of ‘critique’ (hihan) – this was consistently his style since his first work – and ‘self-control’ (jiko seigyo) (cf. App. 3, p. 267), Fujita gave possible remedies for rationalising without reason:

What can and ought we, as individuals respectively, to do for it [high growth] in such a society? One is to criticise (hihan), and another is to have one's self-control (jiko seigyo) as much as one can. To put it another way . . . it is most important to walk slowly, not to take part in ‘walking race’ (kyōhō), and to refrain from exaggerated self-advertisement, as much as possible; to pick up one's pace, that is to criticise problems appearing from the capitalist structure of Japan (Nihon shihonshugi no kōzō) and the spiritual structure of our advertising-oriented society (kōkoku shakaiteki seishin kōzō) in one's own pace (1998c: 49).

Here it is possible to see an adequate political theorist who suggests what we ought to do for politics. In the above essay, however, Fujita no longer put all his energies into developing his theory. The writing does not seem to be open to his more general attempt to formulate his political theory based on the ‘sovereignty of the people’. While it was indeed aimed at dealing with political themes by suggesting some ways of coping with the evils of high growth (Kōdo Seichō), there was already no strong purpose of advancing his political theory in the work. It is evident that, in ‘Jiyūkō’ published in 1970, he lost his iron will to actively build a theory for establishing jinmin-shugi in contrast to his early theoretical contributions, such as ‘Shaku-shaku daiji wo eien ni hakaran: Kikyō
gakusei S-kun e no tegami’ (On the Basis of Common Sense: A Letter to Mr S, Students in Favour of Their Home Villages) (1960) – abbreviated to ‘Shaku-shaku’ below – ‘Zero kara no shuppusu’ (Start from Scratch) (1960) and ‘Gendai ni okeru “risei” no kaifuku’ (The Restoration of Reason in Contemporary Times) (1962) – abbreviated to ‘“Risei” no kaifuku’ below – all of which were oriented towards formulating and laying the foundations of his political theory. Rather, roughly speaking, particularly since ‘“Kōdo Seichō” hantai’ (A Protest Against ‘High Growth’) (1969) – abbreviated to ‘Kōdo Seichō’ below – Fujita drew attention to the identification of evils produced by the Kōdo Seichō, that is of the conditions that made society impossible to realise democracy in postwar Japan, and he sought to find some ways of surmounting the ‘culture of finished products’ (on this concept, see App. 3, pp. 261-2); that is to say, he worked on the theme of identifying the conditions that prevent people having an opportunity of encountering the ‘essence of things’ and the ‘fundamental conditions of contemporary times’ (on these concepts, see App. 3, s. 2), relying upon his essential method of analysing a ‘spiritual structure’.

Despite these facts, Fujita’s consistent subject must have been to identify and cure diseases of the spiritual structure of the ‘society of the Tennō system’ (Tennōsei shakai). This theme that was dealt with in the best article in the early Fujita ‘Shihai genri’ is undoubtedly regarded as one of the most important notions for grasping his political theory. While employing the term with a focus on the concept of ‘society’ in the brilliant writing, Fujita did not provide any detailed account of the concept in the work. Instead, he gave a description of the notion in his postscript to the third edition of Shihai genri (1996). According to Fujita, the ‘society of the Tennō system’ is rigorously distinguished from the ‘state of the Tennō system’ (Tennōsei kokka). At this point it is important to define the latter concept exactly in order to know what the former is. So let us first have a look at it below.

The state of the Tennō system (Tennōsei kokka)

Fujita claims that the state of the Tennō system, whose basic theoretical framework was already presented in ‘Shihai genri’, was established during the three years before and after 1889, that is before the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) in the Meiji period (1868-1912) (1998a: 17-9). Roughly speaking, Fujita’s ‘Tennō system’ means the system of rules (regime) organised by the constitution based on the Tennō-centred social structure. This is characterised as follows: on the one hand, as the ‘political state’ (seiji kokka) unified by Tennō’s supreme power (kunken), in which he becomes and takes on the role of a ‘monarch’ (kunshu); on the other hand, as the ‘land of the kami (gods)’ (shinkoku) ruled by his absolute
value, in which he comes into existence as a *kami*, and as the ‘family state’ (*kazoku kokka*) organised by his patriarchal and paternalistic emotional values, in which he is regarded as a ‘patriarch’ (*kafū, kafuchō*) – the former denotes the basic political (power) structure of this political system, and the latter means the political function fulfilled in it (1998a: 2-5, 14-63; cf. Seifert 2010: 214-8).

It is important to note that the mechanism of the Tennō system with a focus on its ideological aspect had been proposed to a certain extent by Maruyama in his most important early writing ‘Chō-kokkashugi’ (1946) before identified by Fujita.22 However, it must be pointed out that the dual constructive function of the ‘political power’ of the system and the ‘interior value’ of the system, which Maruyama and Fujita considered as most problematic concerning politics in modern Japan, was actually realised, that is *institutionalised*, after the emergence of the society of the Tennō system (1998a: 17-9); most importantly, in fact, Fujita distinguishes between the ‘logical process’ (*ronri katei*) determined in the Meiji Era (the establishment of the ‘state of the Tennō system’) and the ‘historical process’ (*rekishi katei*) actualised after the Russo-Japanese War (the historical process that Japan underwent after establishing the ‘society of the Tennō system’) (1998a: 15). Perhaps this is a crucial point in gaining an understanding of the essence of this issue. Here I must therefore shine a light on the ‘process of the transformation’ so as to grasp the state of the Tennō system.

First, it must be noted that Fujita draws attention to the process of building the state of the Tennō system that was, he highlights, ‘healthier’ (*kenkō*) than the social version of the system (e.g. 1997e: iii-iv; 1998a: 15-7, 44-8; 1998c: 504).23 At this point I am aware that the reason why he stresses the importance of distinguishing between those two kinds of Tennō system is primarily because there is such a significant difference between them. As has already been pointed out, in Fujita’s view the task of establishing the state of the Tennō system had been completed before the Russo-Japanese War began – perhaps this is a key point. Thus, second, it is noted that Fujita particularly emphasises that the war was a ‘epoch-making’ (*kakkiteki*) event in the sense of the first ‘total war’ (*sōryokusen*) occurring in Japan, and therefore that it gave a provocatively historical meaning, namely a profound effect on Japanese history, just as the Meiji Restoration and the *Kōdo Ōichō* had huge impacts on it (1998a: 298); to put it simply, the event profoundly affected all the things there. Despite these facts, Fujita asserts that there is an important difference in degree and quality between a ‘political change’ and a ‘radical change in lifestyle’ brought about throughout a society. From this perspective, then, let us look briefly at the process of the building and transformation of the state of the Tennō system, focusing primarily on the postscript to the third edition of *Shihai genri* below.
According to Fujita, one of the most important characteristics of the Tennō system as a state is described by the fact that statists and statesmen (seijika) were independent of society, and therefore kept a proper distance from ordinary people and their life and from thinkers and scholars, and vice versa (1998a: 298-9). This, says Fujita, resulted in this system maintaining a good balance between state and society, and between politics and thoughts (1998a: 299). This is why he stresses that statists and statesmen there managed to comply with the raison d'état (kokka risei) required by the state (1998a: 299-301). In his view, however, the concept of ‘statesman’ profoundly changed the way of expressing its own important political implication from an ‘actor in politics’ (seiji kōdōsha) into a ‘symbolic character’ (shōchōsei), ‘status’ (shakaiteki chii) and ‘authority’ (ken’isei) after the Russo-Japanese War, that is exactly since the Taishō period (1912-26) (1998a: 301). Above all, Fujita lays stress on Taishō Tennō’s character of a ‘mikoshi portable shrine’ (o-mikoshi) – on this, see p. 79 below – which was employed for intensifying the unification of groups (1998a: 302; cf. 1998a: 45-8); here Fujita sees the emergence of the society of the Tennō system. In addition, he contends that the birth of the new system is characterised not only by the transformation (change of leadership qualities) of statesmen (seijika) (seijika no henshitsu) from ‘political actors’ (seijiteki kōsha) to ‘ritual beings’ (gishikiteki sonzai) but also by ‘social reform’ (shakai kairyō) promoted by the government (1998a: 304).

Fujita must have considered that healthy politics needs a proper distance from its objects. From this perspective, much more importantly, it is presumed that the transformation divided the Tennō system up into two kinds of characteristics. In other words, there is a huge difference in the above degree of distance between them. Obviously, in this way, Fujita recognised a ‘radical change’ in lifestyle implemented throughout society as noted above. Presumably, this is primarily why Fujita needed to particularly highlight the Russo-Japanese War, which transformed the history of Japan thereafter, that is to say, which triggered the emergence of the society of the Tennō system.

The society of the Tennō system (Tennōsei shakai)

At this point I need to look at the Tennō system as a society Fujita particularly emphasises. According to him, as mentioned in note 23, a kind of ‘sense of the responsibility’ in the period when Japan established the state of the Tennō system gave Japan’s political leaders ‘fairness’ and ‘toleration’. In this respect, I described it figuratively by the word of ‘healthy’. In fact, as noted above, Fujita clearly mentions that the state version of the system was healthier than its social version. As we have seen, the historical process of losing this healthiness is cha-
racteristic of the process of establishing the society of the Tennō system. Above all, then, what is it? With respect to this vital point, I suggest tackling this issue from the following perspective: ‘Fujita’s consciousness of history (rekishi ishiki) highlights Japan’s aspect of the “society of the Tennō system” that has been deep-seated in this society up till now, or rather that has been even increasingly intensified through the negative epoch-making (kakki) discontinuity caused by the direction of postwar society, since the Russo-Japanese War (Nichiro igo) as a starting point of history (rekishiteki shiten)’ (Miyamura 2009: 168). This elucidates why Fujita draws too much attention to the concept, which illuminates our society per se. In short, in Fujita’s view Japan has remained the society of the Tennō system since the Russo-Japanese War.

It must be noted, however, that with regard to this concept, Fujita gives a complex description. Indeed, it was developed in conjunction with some other important political concepts such as ‘fascism’ (fasizumu) and ‘totalitarianism’ (zentaishugi), which were applied to the society of the Tennō system constituted by its state version that accomplished the institutionalisation (seidoka) of the dual construction of the ‘state of the apparatus of political power’ (kenryoku kokka) and the ‘communal state’ (kyōdōtai kokka) (Fujita 1998a: 18). Despite these facts, the complicated perspective gives great consistency to his political theory. In fact, his following words refer to the certainty of the view: ‘Japanese society, while flustered soon after the war had exposed its own disease of Japan’s total war, gradually became stable through re-establishing the social system and its organisation (kikō). Democracy in this society cannot control itself (jiko) and results simply in self-assertion for fulfilling its own desire even though politics exists there. A new framework of behaviour is also organised by the pattern of physical laws (butsuriteki kikaku) of the society institutionalising (kakuitsuka) man’ (Fujita 1998a: 193). This elucidates why Fujita stresses that the society of the Tennō system came into existence as ‘Fascism’ in wartime Japan and as ‘totalitarianism’ in the twentieth century. As Miyamura emphasises, the society of the Tennō system ‘has been deep-seated in this society up till now’, or rather it ‘has been even increasingly intensified’. In Fujita’s view, for these reasons, Japanese society still retains social evils brought about by the Tennō system, and the existence of this system therefore still has an actual meaning.

To fully understand the society of the Tennō system, then, is definitely not impossible even though it is composed of a complicated conceptual structure as mentioned above for Fujita gives a consistent account of the system. Rather, on this view, it is presumed that a postscript added to ‘Shihai genri’ forty years later when the article first had been published aimed precisely to cast new light on his concept of the society of the Tennō system as the ‘greatest enemy’ (saidai no teki) (Miyamura 2009: 169), which is, Fujita highlights, still deep-rooted in Japan,
taking the form of ‘contemporary totalitarianism’ (see pp. 94-6 and App. 3, pp. 265-6) – significantly, this task was his last academic work. As Fujita puts it:

What is the society of the Tennō system? This is the existential form of fear that individuality (kobetsusei) is exposed by the destruction of harmony (ittaikan) in respective group dimensions, and it signifies a social group in which all group members constantly avoid individualising themselves (1998a: 304).

From this perspective, Fujita mentions that there are three kinds of society of the Tennō system. However, he puts forward only its two types: first, ‘a group and an organisation in which decision-making on the raison d’être and problems of group depends heavily upon certain persons regarded as “religious leader-like” (kyōso-teki), “boss-like” (bosu-teki) and “feudal lord-like” (tonosama-teki)’ – this can be called the tonosama type of society of the Tennō system; second, ‘a group in which there is no certain (core) person who represents its own group’ – the ‘common and partial ownership’ (sōyūteki bun’yū) type of society of the Tennō system’ (1998a: 305-8). With respect to the first type, Fujita focuses particularly on the feature of a ‘mikoshi portable shrine’ noted above, which illuminates the transformation from the state to the society of the Tennō system and Taishō Tennō. According to Fujita, the following two elements are key characteristics of this kind of society of the Tennō system: first, a ‘person carried on his members’ shoulders’ (katsugareru mono) – as if he was a portable shrine – who is always required to make an unnatural smile signifying the symbol of ‘stable optimism’ (anteishita rakutensei) – Fujita applies the Tennō to a typical person carried; and second, ‘persons carrying (portable shrine-like) one’ (katsugiya) who signify the ‘way of social behaviour’ (shakaiteki kōdō yōshiki) (1998a: 305-6). The second type, says Fujita, is that all the behaviours of almost all the members of a group, with the exception of ‘odd persons’ (kawari mono), are directed particularly at preventing the dissolution of the harmony of its group and the appearance of their individual personality; this aspect of Japanese tradition, remaining until today, is still deep-seated.

To identify the third type is hard for me in terms of his final suggestion for its characteristics. Rather, it would seem meaningless to devote my efforts to the identification of the whole structure. I should, much more importantly, direct my attention to an understanding of the essence of the deep-rooted characteristics of the society of the Tennō system; this task will probably contribute to an appropriate understanding of the core of Fujita’s political theory connecting his early work with his later work. I will therefore attempt to shed light on it, referring to the above two analyses and focusing primarily on the connection between the society of the Tennō system and totalitarianism.
Contemporary totalitarianism (gendai zentaihugi) as the society of the Tennō system

As noted above, the society of the Tennō system first emerged as the distortion of its state version in the beginning of the twentieth century. It meant a profound change in the quality of statesmen, on the one hand, and a radical change in people’s lifestyle, on the other. This led to an inevitable logical consequence for the state of the Tennō system. In other words, the logical process of establishing the ‘dualism of the constitutive principles of the state of the Tennō system’ (kokka kōsei genri no nigenron) (e.g. 1998a: 39-45) completely determined Japanese history thereafter. In this sense, it is not surprising that the Russo-Japanese War triggered the emergence of the society of the Tennō system connected with ‘totalitarianism as war’ and ‘political totalitarianism’ (1997e: 49-61; see pp. 75-9, 95-6 and App. 3, pp. 264-6. With respect to Fujita’s political theory, it would rather seem more appropriate to consider that the appearance of these political diseases were natural consequences of the logical process, so to speak.

Perhaps here I should concentrate on the concept of the ‘twentieth century’, which probably illuminates the core issue of Fujita’s political theory shining a light not only on the society of the Tennō system but also on totalitarianism called a ‘monster’ (kaibutsu) (1997e: 77). That is to say, to grasp his theory is exactly to look back on the twentieth century. For Fujita, in this respect, both the concepts undoubtedly best explain contemporary Japan, which inherited the essence of the society of the Tennō system and totalitarianism, both of which are supposed to have lasted up until now, as inextricably interwoven. In sum, in Fujita’s view the twentieth century is the time distorted by the pathology of the spiritual structure of society. In this respect, totalitarianism and the society of the Tennō system are the core social diseases of the time. Roughly speaking, it is believed that, in his view, the former characterises the tendency of the world as a whole, and the latter describes the social conditions of Japan, in the twentieth century. In fact, as Fujita puts it, ‘[t]he twentieth century is the age of totalitarianism’ (1997e: 197). For him, it is a deep-rooted ‘monster’ in society as a whole on the grounds that it has subsequently continued to appear, taking slightly different forms. Most importantly, therefore, ‘contemporary totalitarianism’ noted above is our inner enemy that has remained up until now in Fujita’s view.

Theoretical problems: the society of the Tennō system and totalitarianism

Admittedly, Fujita’s theoretical framework is essentially consistent throughout his works focusing on the two concepts of society of the Tennō system and total-
itarianism. The key notions that his political theory shines a light on, no wonder, are these two notions. At this point it is important to raise some potential problems of his political theory through focusing on the two important concepts to the extent that it concerns my research. It should be noted, however, that we have considerable difficulty in dealing with the issue in the sense that both the ideas contain complex political and sociological themes, such as ‘fascism’ and ‘mass society’, that are associated with both the concepts, and that its task requires an enormous length of space. Here I will therefore simply deal with logical problems included in Fujita’s theory in respect of his two most important concepts – for I am always intrigued by the logic of a theory rather than the contents of a theory.

First, it is pointed out that the introduction of the concept of totalitarianism to Fujita’s work has obscured some characteristics of Japanese problems that his theory has identified. For example, indeed, the ‘character of a mikoshi portable shrine’ and ‘common and partial ownership’ may have some aspects of totalitarianism, but paradoxically, the application of the political concept, derived from Fascist Italy, has proved that his political theory has not needed those Japanese concepts. In this respect, it must be noted that, on the one hand, the political notion serves to shed light on the fundamental problems of twentieth-century Japan, but on the other hand, it rather serves to make it unclear what problems are peculiar to Japan. For these reasons, indeed, Fujita’s attempt at understanding all the things by applying the concept of totalitarianism contributed solely to concealing the essence of problems specific to Japan. Hence, it is possible to acknowledge that his view that ‘Japan [has] become a leading and typical contemporary totalitarianism as the third type of totalitarianism’ (1997e: 86) has even spoilt the concept of the society of the Tennō system even if contemporary Japan is totalitarian.

Second, I point to the problem of to what extent the concept of the society of the Tennō system can characterise contemporary Japanese society, or, to put it another way, whether it is possible to characteristically describe society nowadays by applying the concept, even if it is possible to consider contemporary Japan as Tennō system society-like. Undoubtedly, it is not plausible to think that society nowadays is exactly the same as society a hundred years ago. Of course, presumably he did not intend to say such a thing. Rather, my questions are as follows: first, until when Japan will continue to be the society of the Tennō system – this enquiry is not ridiculous to this issue, as we shall see below; and second, whether it can be applied only to Japan. (It is important to note that the society of the Tennō system, including the original ‘Tennō system’, is a phenomenon appeared only in Japan. If not, then what does the name of the ‘Tennō
system’ mean?) On this point, there seem to be logical *aporias* in the theory of the society of the Tennō system.

With regard to the first question, since no one can know the future, it might be irrelevant to this issue. Is it possible, then, to assume that Japan a hundred years later will be the society of the Tennō system? It will probably be impossible to think so for it absolutely cannot be the same as the present one even though it will retain some characteristics of the society of the Tennō system. It seems, however, that the concept allows Fujita to apply it to every age. In fact, this is clearly explained by his theory putting emphasis on its *logical consequence*, as we saw above. In this sense, precisely because Fujita was not aware of this fact, he assumed that, ‘[s]ince society is a merely external condition, a *possible* great social upheaval might simply result in a knee-jerk reaction to the instantaneous variation’ (1998a: 193). Rather, he should have identified some difference in the society of the Tennō system between the Taishō, Shōwa and Heisei periods, taking account of the flow of ‘mass society’ emerged in 1950s Japan.30

As a matter of fact, Fujita does not practically employ either the terms ‘masses’ or ‘mass society’ in his later contributions; *instead*, his theory gives us the impression that the term totalitarianism suddenly appeared in his work.31

With regard to the second question, I draw attention to his precise definition of the society of the Tennō system, namely ‘the existential form of fear that individuality is exposed by the destruction of harmony in respective group dimensions, and a social group in which all group members *constantly avoid* individualising themselves’, as noted above (1998a: 304). Are they relevant only to the Tennō system and Japan? I do not think so. As far as Fujita’s above account of the society of the Tennō system is concerned, it is presumed that many groups in the world *to a greater or lesser extent* have such features, or rather, that there are some groups which have stronger characteristics of them than those of the society of the Tennō system.32

Surely, as we saw above, Fujita divides it up into its three types and gives clear descriptions of them, putting forward some interesting concepts presenting some important Japanese characteristics such as a ‘*mikoshi* portable shrine’. In this respect, there appears to be no difficulty in his theory of the society of the Tennō system because concerning this concept he can show some significant differences between Japanese and other societies by applying some concepts describing problems specific to Japan. To be sure, as Fujita says, the ‘fear that individuality is exposed’ may primarily characterise the ‘form of social beings’ (*shakaiteki sonzai keishiki*) and the ‘way of behaviour’ (*kōdō yōshiki*) of the society of the Tennō system in the sense that he considers the *fear* chiefly as the primary characteristic of the society of the Tennō system (1998a: 304-5). Does this fear, however, have its origins in the ‘society of the Tennō system’, and is it therefore the *sole* feature of the system? Isn’t it rather
appropriate to assume that the phenomena described by the Japanese cultural product of o-mikoshi and the concept of sōyūteki bun’yū, which, says Fujita, characterise the existence of the fear, can be seen in many groups and places in the world? Shouldn’t we presume that there is only a difference in the degree of the fear? In my view, in many respects, there is no reason why the theory aims exclusively to explain the Tennō system, even though it is meaningful to divide the society of the Tennō system up into its three types. From the logical perspective of Fujita’s theory of the Tennō system, the raison d’être of the concept of the Tennō system is fulfilled only by the fact that it is simply somewhat of a traditional political system which has continued to exist since the Meiji period.

For these reasons, indeed, the concept designed for explaining the character traits of twentieth-century Japan, paradoxically, enables us to apply it to different kinds of societies which are likely to have the same features as the former society. In short, in many respects, the Tennō system has already had only a nominal sense, but has not had an actual sense particularly with respect to its contemporary social type. In these respects, it must be stressed that Fujita should have differentiated between what is the society of the Tennō system-like in contemporary Japan and what is not – theoretically, it is contradictory to allow the concept to adopt itself to non-Japanese societies on the grounds that it must characterise only Japan as noted above. Therefore, it is irrelevant to consider that the society of the Tennō system ‘has been even increasingly intensified’ (Miyamura 2009: 168) unless taking account of the above structural fault in the theory. For these reasons, the concept results in exactly the same logical consequence as the first problem that it is impossible to peculiarly characterise Japan by focusing exclusively on the term totalitarianism concerning Fujita’s conception of totalitarianism as noted above.

Perhaps, we should rather regard the concept of the society of the Tennō system as a metaphor to explain contemporary Japanese society particularly in the postwar period – in this sense, the concept of Tennō is nowadays even regarded as a metaphor for a boss, a religious reader and the like. If not, what does it mean to particularly stress the term Tennō system despite the fact that the ‘dual construction’ explained above has collapsed in these days? In many respects, it is much more appropriate to believe that the Tennō system in the postwar period has simply played a practical role of an image formed in terms of contemporary social conditions than to believe that the root of all evils, which has constantly appeared in political reality, is the result of the existence of the system, namely some characteristics of the society of the Tennō system, such as ‘little Tennō systems’ (chiisana Tennōsei, shō-Tennōsei), which have remained everywhere in Japan (Fujita 1998a). The Japanese political theorist Keiichi Matsushita, for example, focuses on the social aspect of the function of building
politics based on the ‘consent of the masses’ (taishū no dōi) by way of manipulating their ‘image of Tennō’ directed exactly towards the ‘masses’ (taishū) – the ‘mass Tennō system’ (taishū Tennōsei) (Matsushita 1994). In this respect, it can be argued that the image as an advertisement produced by ‘mass media’ actually has had a more powerful influence on the creation of political reality than the Tennō system per se – in this sense, there is some evidence that Tennō himself and the Imperial Household of Japan (Kōshitsu), instead of the system, have effectively fulfilled the function of forming public opinion, namely politics. From this perspective, reality created by ‘mass society’ must be regarded as more problematic. Hence, it might be much more appropriate to conclude that, as far as contemporary evils are concerned, the roles of mass media and advertisement – namely the way of using contemporary technology – are more relevant to the ‘root of those evils’. For these reasons, the Tennō system has to a large extent been depoliticised – here there is not enough space to provide a detailed explanation of its historical process, e.g. focusing on the process of the transformation of the political meanings of the Tennō system. Thus, there is, then, no longer any actual meaning in the system in itself. From this perspective, it is not appropriate to emphasise that ‘little Tennō systems’ signifying Japan as a society of the Tennō system still exist unless it is proved that the signification intended by the concept must be the Tennō system. Hence, it can be argued that there is no conceptual significance of the Tennō system. Rather, it is important to identify the meaning of the ‘continuity of the spirit’ (seishin no renzokusei) between wartime and postwar Japan (1998a: 148) not by laying stress on the concept. In sum, it must be noted that Fujita should have changed the name of the society of the Tennō system either to the Tennō system-like society (Tennōsei-teki shakai) or to the society of the Tennō system-like society (Tennōsei shakai-teki shakai), and that he should have distinguished between the society of the Tennō system-like and contemporary things, so as to clarify the difference between communal society and mass society in postwar Japan. To put it another way, he should have made a rigid distinction between his two concepts of the society of the Tennō system and totalitarianism concerning what they describe and what they do not, respectively. Presumably, thereby, he must have succeeded in showing some potential contemporary significance of the Tennō system; most importantly, thus, these tasks must be completed by our academic efforts. With regard to this issue, over twenty five years ago the Japanese historian Shigeki Tōyama gave a significant tip for shedding light on those tasks, taking account of the flow of Japanese society in the 1980s as follows:

It seems to me that society nowadays in the 1980s is increasingly highlighting the importance of recognising ideological control (ideorogi shihai), which is not simply elucidated by
nationalism of the Tennō system (Tennōsei nashonarizumu) in the prewar period. With regard to issues of our society, complex themes such as modernisation (gendaika and kindaika), mass society (taishū shakai), welfare state (fukushi kokka), large economy (keizai taikoku), middle-class consciousness (chūryū ishiki), generated in postwar society, are intertwined with each other. In a rigorous sense, therefore, Tennō regulated by the Constitution is not concerned with the Tennō system (1987: 16).

From his viewpoint, it is possible to see that Tōyama implies the possible ideological effect of the Tennō system that took different form from one in the wartime period on Japanese society in the 1980s. It is unclear, however, what the ideology of Japanese society meant in this period. Nonetheless, his analysis made it clear that the Tennō system no longer has any substantial meaning in itself. Having said that, this view definitely does not spoil the theoretical significance of the concept of the society of the Tennō system. Rather, in my view, Matsushita's and Tōyama's perspectives do not fully grasp problems internalised in society in the sense that they are both not aware of the existence of the pathology of society stemming from certain sociocultural conditions. In this respect, Fujita's theory of the Tennō system whether the state or social version is of great value particularly in illuminating some specific social circumstances of Japan in terms of its pathological perspective.

My research is not concerned with the Tennō system. For this reason, there is no longer any space for further discussion. Only a point, however, should be noted here. My survey and analysis of Fujita's political theory have particularly highlighted his aspect of a political actor. As a matter of fact, Fujita laid great stress on the autonomy of political subjects who came into existence in the Anpo Tōsō (US-Japan Security Treaty): ‘[t]he protest movement against the US-Japan Security Treaty has widely spread out throughout Japan, and has been based on the universal principles of democracy that require the people to be autonomous subjects (jiritsuteki shutai) in most respects’ (1998b: 244). Of course, this view affects the fundamental stance of my research. From this standpoint focusing particularly on the political function of human beings, it is appropriate to emphasise that my exploration has shined a light on Fujita's aspect of a political theorist, namely a political actor, who creates political reality. This is why my survey has depicted him not as a scholar of the history of ideas nor as a simple thinker but as a political theorist (on the conception of ‘political theorist’ in my research, see Ch. 2 and App. 1).
3. Fujita’s Conception of Narcissism (1):
The Death of the ‘Other’ (*Tasha*)

In my view, Fujita’s important conception of ‘narcissism’ is a medium connecting the society of the Tennō system with totalitarianism in his political theory. Admittedly, as noted earlier, the psychological state of mind of the ‘absence of a sense of the other’ in the self, which Fujita recognised as a contemporary disease through his mentor Maruyama, signifies the exact narcissistic condition that is depicted as the ‘loss of the other’; on this view, it is important to remember that the crisis of the expansion of this psychological feature characterising contemporary times was particularly stressed by Fujita’s words that ‘the self (*jiko*) concentrates all his interest on his ego (*jiga e no kanshin no shūchū*)’ ([1997e]: 21). Indeed, it is admitted that, after having been aware of the disease, he was always of the opinion that such a mental condition denotes a serious human psychosis throughout the twentieth century in relation to the above two political concepts; in this respect, Fujita related the society of the Tennō system to totalitarianism. Above all, for these reasons, narcissism sees through the *spiritual structure* common to these two structural diseases in his works.

However, it is not easy to precisely grasp Fujita’s conception of narcissism. Perhaps one of the primary reasons for the difficulty is because in his theory the notion is not simply understood by a monolithic structure. Significantly, at least his two important political conceptions and even his other conceptions such as ‘experience’ (*keiken*) and ‘high growth’ (*Kōdo Seichō*) are concerned with the psychoanalytic concept in his theory and methods. Admittedly, this clearly explains that the term narcissism constitutes the multilayered structure of Fujita’s political theory in relation to philosophical, historical, political, economic, sociological and psychoanalytic controversies. In short, his method of analysing some spiritual structure retained since his first encounter with Maruyama’s article ‘Thought and Behaviour Patterns of Japan’s Wartime Leaders’ even learnt to fathom the depths of the *unconscious* world of society by absorbing the mythical and psychoanalytic concept.

Although, as we have seen, narcissism is an important conception in Fujita’s political theory, this psychoanalytic term is not used in his early works at all. Perhaps this fact is associated particularly with his methodological change in 1970s (see App. 3, p. 259). In fact, rigorously speaking, Fujita first employed it in ‘Sōsōki’ (1974), written in his period of ‘pause’ (*rōnin*) meaning his significant reflection which gave rise to his change. To be sure, it is admitted that, in the reflective pause, he devoted himself to studying relatively new disciplines established during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such as
anthropology, linguistics, psychoanalysis and folklore, which were all aimed at identifying the ‘primordial conditions’ (genshoteki jōken), namely the fundamental conditions of human nature (see n. 8). I believe, however, that one of the most important ingredients of his theory is definitely a psychoanalytic element, and this is actually elucidated by the fact that, from Maruyama, as we saw above, Fujita learnt the huge importance of being aware of both the other as the heterogeneous and the contemporary crisis of its absence (see pp. 73-4 above). Presumably, this experience must have triggered his concentration on the psychoanalytic concept, and must have led him to recognise the necessity of curing the disease of narcissism. Indeed, my research has drawn too much attention to the psychoanalytic concept and the discipline of psychoanalysis. Actually, one of the primary reasons for my devotion to an understanding of the idea and the discipline is because Fujita continually highlights the importance of interest to the other, namely the existence of the other, sounding the alarm about a growing narcissistic tendency for contemporary society (e.g. 1997d: 265, 272; 1997e: 26-8; 1998c: 68-9); that is to say, he has also contributed to creating my intention of identifying what narcissism as a contemporary menace to our politics signifies in a negative sense by concentrating on an understanding of the psychoanalytic meaning of the concept. For these reasons, it is acknowledged that what psychoanalysis intends by the concept of narcissism does not give Fujita any specifically new impression, or rather, that for him the connection between his important interests in the concept of other and the psychoanalytic term is simply the result of his original concern per se, which must have been generated primarily through Maruyama’s lectures.

The above pieces of evidence clearly explain that in Fujita’s view narcissism is connected particularly with the human psychic condition of the absence of the other. In fact, he points out that contemporary people have a strong tendency to avoid encountering ‘others’ (tasha). He says:

Others (tasha), whether human beings or things (mono, koto), are avoided so as not to suddenly encounter them; one capsules himself. In a cocoon-like chamber (mayu no yōna katei), he feels really comfortable only with homogeneous friends (yasashii tomodachi). In this way, experience aiming to establish interpersonal relationships (sōgo kōshō) with others is eliminated (1997e: 24).

Admittedly, these sentences clearly explain that Fujita warns us against our strong narcissism which, in his view, has spread out in contemporary society. According to him, as shown above, narcissists are afraid of meeting others due to the latter heterogeneity – this means that, strangely enough, from the general perspective, simply for its reason, the former seems to avoid encountering the
latter. For Fujita, most importantly, it is the primary contemporary crisis; he calls this condition the ‘loss of experience’ (keiken no shōmentsu) (e.g. 1997d: 17, 190; 1997e: 15). Through seeking to identify and examining the essence of some historical changes in society, such as the conclusion of the US-Japan Security Treaty and high economic growth, indeed, he recognised that ‘experience’ meaning the interrelationship between the self and the other has disappeared from society, and diagnosed the psychic condition of contemporary society as narcissism, which can be thought of exactly as the ‘loss of the other’ in the self. Presumably these ways of understanding contemporary people and society provided Fujita with his essential standpoint of the death of the other. (It should be noted that Fujita himself does not give the expression of the ‘death of the other’. Obviously, however, he regards interrelationships with others as the appearance of experience, on the one hand, and the loss of an encounter with them as the disappearance of experience, on the other. Most importantly, in this respect, he no doubt intended experience as the meeting with others. For these reasons, it is asserted that for him the loss of experience denotes the death of the other. On this view, as we shall see in the next chapter, Fujita takes a similar stance to Fromm’s.)

Narcissism: shii

After having first introduced the term narcissism, Fujita applied it, for example, to his study of the poet in the Edo period Matsuo Bashō’s Nozarashi kikō (Exposure in the Field: A Travel Account), which was presented as the lecture ‘Nozarashi kikō ni tsuite no oboegaki’ (Notes on Exposure in the Field: A Travel Account) (1978). In this lecture, significantly, he regards a narcissist who embodies ‘narcissism’ (shii) as the opposite of a ‘cosmopolitan’ (ekkyōsha), meaning a ‘beggar’ (kotsujiki mono) who is counted as Bashō (1997d: 270).

According to Fujita, a beggar who is a metaphorical person and so actually does not exist has no narcissistic characteristics such as ‘self-containment’ (jiko kanketsusei) and ‘autistic withdrawal’ (jiheiteki gyōko), and he is willing to accept his status in which he is in ‘the place of “praxis” (jitsuen’ no genba), in which others (tasha) and things (mono) first correlatively appear in accordance with the degree of “spiritual preparedness” (kakugo)’ (1997d: 270). This beggar tries to ‘distance himself from narcissism’ (shii wo hanare yo) so as to ‘encounter’ heterogeneous others and things (ishitsu no tasha ya mono ni deau), only thereby ‘gain[ing] an understanding of the ‘world’ (sekai) including himself’ (1997d: 272). As Fujita stresses, this beggar’s attitude that he ‘gets his narcissistic self out of the way’ (jiko wo tsukihanasu) are diametrically opposed to narcissism (1997d: 273).
This beggar, as mentioned above, does represent Bashō, who, in Fujita’s view, characteristically attempted to ‘undertake’ (hikiukeru) the difficult task of doing ‘praxis’ noted above (1997d: 270). In other words, he sought to provide the subjective viewpoint of ‘seeing’ (miru) in exactly the same way as the objective viewpoint of ‘being seen’ (mirareru), just as Plotinos says (1997d: 265) – in this argument, needless to say, Bashō and Plotinos are treated in the same line with respect to the standpoint of seeing others. As Bashō himself puts it, it is done by way of ‘know[ing] pine, study pine’ (Matsu no koto wa matsu ni narai), distancing himself from narcissism; this is the exact ‘way to know the essence of things’ (mono e yuku michi) (1997d: 272-4). Not surprisingly, it is a little known fact that, in his early writings, Fujita already put forward the same view concerning the importance of facing the other. In ‘Taisei no kōsō’ (A Framework of Politics) (1961), for example, he stressed the way of ‘seeing oneself as if seeing others, seeing others as if seeing oneself’ (1997c: 162). Similarly, in ‘Manhaimu no episódio’ (1971) (on this, see n. 35), he highlighted the necessity of obtaining its capacity, namely ‘curiosity (kōkishin), which enables one to try to understand others as otherness different from oneself, namely “alterity” (tazai), from the inside (uchigawa), and which is open to others’ (1998c: 68). ‘Matsu ni kike: Gendai bunmei e no rekuiemu’ (Study Pine: Requiem for Contemporary Civilisation) (1982), which focuses particularly on Bashō’s words quoted above, undoubtedly elucidates the importance of ‘being aware of the other’ (tasha no ninshiki) explained above (1998c: xii). These facts give a good illustration of how important it was for Fujita to do ‘praxis’. (As we shall see later, these perspectives emphasising the mutual self-other relationships presented by Fujita have much in common with Hegel’s ‘self-knowledge of the other’ (Sich-Wissen des Anderen) – see Hegel 1983: 115.)

Fujita’s above way of addressing Bashō’s issue in relation to a major hindrance, namely our natural narcissistic desire, to constructing ‘mutality’ (sōgosei) presents his original viewpoint (on this word, see, e.g. 1997d: 289). It must be emphasised, however, that Fujita was entirely consistent in aiming particularly to establish the interrelationships mentioned above. In fact, he much earlier drew attention to some concepts describing such personal relationships between us; for instance, ‘personal communication’ (kojinteki ningen kōryū, pāsonaru komyunikēshon), which is used in ‘Tōzen no koto: Seiji shisō no genzaiteki jōkyō to kada’ai’ (A Political Matter: Present Conditions and Problems in Political Thoughts) (1961), and which is understood to be classified into the same category as the idea of ‘interpersonal relationship’ (1998b: 303). In addition, it is also clearly shown that Fujita consistently concerned himself with this perspective in other writings (e.g. 1997b: 107, 196; 1998c: 461). These pieces of evidence, above all, illustrate that he continued to seek for the opposite of narcissism. From this
perspective, most importantly, the relevance of the concept of shii found through encountering Bashō was largely supported by Fujita’s interest in narcissism.

**Narcissism: narushizumu**

It is not inappropriate, then, to consider that Fujita’s above important perspective developed by Bashō’s view led Fujita to write the quasi-psychoanalytic work ‘Narushizumu’, which is in fact subtitled ‘Mono ni iku michi’, meaning an effort to know the ‘essence of things’; it is important to remember that the essays referring to Bashō noted above pays particular attention to this concept. As mentioned above, Fujita’s three works, ‘Kon’nichi no keiken’ (1982), ‘Narushizumu’ (1983) and ‘Anraku’ (1985), can be regarded as a series of quasi-psychoanalytic articles, in the sense that they put forward and are based to some extent on diagnostic and remedial perspectives, actually using psychoanalytic terms – this fact suggests that he had devoted himself to psychiatry and psychoanalysis in a certain period of time before he published these three essays (see p. 70 above). (It might seem that precisely those essays should be thought of as sociopsychological to the extent that they all focus not simply on a general psychoanalytic perspective analysing individuals but rather on a social-scientific viewpoint laying stress on society. However, they attempt not only to diagnose (analyse) but also to give some remedy for diseases of society, and therefore they rather take a medical psychoanalytic standpoint. This is why I identify the three works as psychoanalytic.)

It might be argued, however, that the influence of this medical perspective on Fujita’s work is also slightly seen in his previous essays, such as ‘Sengo no giron no zentei’ (The Conditions of Postwar Theory) (1981) and ‘Hijōji’ (1981), both of which primarily concern the concept of ‘experience’, as exemplified by the fact that several words and expressions describing some psychoanalytic meanings are embedded in them (e.g. 1997d: 196-7; 1997e: 3-5). It might be the case, therefore, that his interest to psychoanalysis is associated with the fact that he too much cared about the notion of experience almost in the same period, that is between the middle 1970s and the early 1980s – concretely speaking, in my view, he started to draw attention to the term in ‘Keiken to iu hon’ (A Book on Experience) (1976). Admittedly, as Katō says, Fujita changed his primary concern from the concept of experience to “psychology” (shinsei) “avoid”ing (kaihi) experience’ after ‘Kon’nichi no keiken’ (Katō 1997: 234). As we have seen, however, it is noteworthy that he already recognised the importance of some meanings described by the term narcissism at the latest in the phase of giving his lecture on Nozarashi kikō; this means that he had already been aware of some
psychological implications for his work before presenting it. In addition to this fact, it is noted that, much earlier, for example, in 1971, Fujita perceived the signification of the concept (1998c: 68-9). In other words, it is much more plausible to suppose that his psychoanalytic viewpoint of narcissism was already related to his another important conception of experience around in the middle 1970s, which means that we should not think that the former standpoint followed the latter, but that both his perspectives were correlated with each other in 1970s.41

These analyses demonstrate why Fujita was consistent in laying stress on and aiming to construct our mutual ‘personal relationships’, whose idea must have been absorbed primarily through reading several psychoanalytic writings – I shall discuss this issue later. This mutuality, in his view, is based not on ‘an experience’ (taiken) which is not mutually but privately experienced,42 and which is only once experienced, but on ‘experience’ (keiken) which can be gained only through attempting to know the ‘essence of things’, that is through mutual relationships (e.g. 1997d: 204-5). If this is true, then experience is fundamentally interpersonal. To put it another way, Fujita argues that the acquisition of keiken requires the establishment of interrelationships. From this perspective, it is admitted that Fujita rather retained his great attention to one of his essential viewpoints, experience, in his lifetime. In contrast to the logic of experience and mutuality, however, in Fujita’s view narcissism does not rely upon either encountering or interrelating with others and things. Roughly speaking, in his conception narcissistic personality evades facing what is in front of one. This mechanism is clearly depicted primarily in ‘Kon’nichi no keiken’. Let us see this psychological viewpoint Fujita proposes in conjunction with his important conception of experience in more detail.

The work ‘Kon’nichi no keiken’ is subtitled ‘Habamu chikara no naka ni atte’, meaning that we are living in the world which prevents us having experience; in Fujita’s view, this world is exactly narcissistic. Significantly, this short article also provides his fundamental standpoint of seeing the opposite. First of all, it takes the view that in our daily living we are put into a ‘cocoon-like chamber’ (hoikuki) in which only the things determined in advance may be done, and in which everyone therefore knows beforehand what to do (1997e: 7-8). From another perspective, thus, in this nursery capsule people have a strong tendency to avoid doing things that have not been known, namely the unknown. This attitude, according to Fujita, leads them to require some kind of ‘apriorism’ (senken-shugi) – the Japanese original term will be provided below – that we should know everything in advance; this mind, in his view, is linked to and causes ‘totalitarianism’ (zentaishugi) (1997e: 9). This psychological state means exactly the ‘loss of experience’. Second, the writing also aims to examine why such a psychology has been generated and spread out in society. In conclusion,
it is the result of our ‘anxiety’ (fuan) about and ‘fear’ (kyōfu) for the encounter with things and others. On this view, Fujita begins by contending that the psychological state of mind of senken-shugi needs and tries to behave in accordance with a ‘blueprint’ (sekkeizu) (1997e: 10). He points out, then, that the psychic attitude of ‘positive avoidance’ (nōdōteki kaihi) stems from such a psychological condition; this is why senken-shugi induces the pathology of ‘voluntary servitude to unruffled ease’ (anraku e no jihatsuteki reizoku), presented by Richard Sennett (1997e: 10) – in Fujita’s theory, this is counted as an alternative to ‘given comfort’ (shōhō sareta kōfuku), as previously provided (1997e: 4). To put it another way, it acts as a defence mechanism that one attempts to avoid accidents which have not been expected beforehand due to great anxiety and fear. For living in the outside world causes ‘pain’ (kutsū). In other words, one requires a perpetual nursery capsule, so to speak; this means that he always needs to stay in such a place which ensures them a life of ease without uncertainty. He cannot even accept ‘conflicts’ (katto). Through these examinations, Fujita metaphorically identifies contemporary society, looking healthy at first glance, as a ‘corpse with chubby cheeks’ (hōkyō wo tataeta shitai) (1997e: 11). Paradoxically speaking, while people in this world are not interested in, or rather, avoid others, they drive themselves towards depending upon others – for there are no others in them. In this sense, this world is a place in which the other is no longer alive.

Fujita always sees not only plain facts but also opposite facts and things that can be extrapolated. In this respect, for him reality is an important mirror reflecting what we ought to be – he sees it as if gazing at the self mirrored in the surface of the water. ‘Kon’nichi no keiken’ highlights the necessity of interrelating others repeatedly (1997e: 13). This article, however, is not only involved in discussion simply by referring to his philosophy of experience. Significantly, its quasi-psychoanalytic work proceeds with its own argument, employing the words of ‘conflicts’, ‘avoidance’, ‘pain’, and so forth, all of which carry psychoanalytic implications. In Fujita’s conception of the other, for this reason, it is possible to recognise multilayered significations concerning the functional structure of the term. In short, Fujita’s attention to the concept enabled his fundamental analytical method of understanding a spiritual structure even to examine the unconscious mind.

The reason why we avoid encountering others and things is explained primarily in the subsequent works ‘Narushizumu’ and ‘Anraku’ in more detail. The former analyses an ‘ego’ (jiga) which has suffered from narcissism (narushizumu) – indeed, this is demonstrated to some extent by the fact that the term ego is used thirty nine times in this short essay consisting of only ten pages. Apparently, this writing, which begins by declaring that ‘the contemporary psychological state of mind is depicted as “the time of the ego on a mass scale”’
(1997e: 20), characteristically displays the psychoanalytic feature of Fujita’s work. Although it shines a light on the ego for the purpose of exploring the reason for the mechanism of avoidance, the primary concern is nevertheless rather to account for the importance of experience, namely mutuality, highlighting the concept of ‘other’ – as we shall see below, this implies that the most important aim of that article is neither to examine nor to diagnose but to prescribe society – whether or not its prescription is effective. At first glance, however, it is difficult to understand its intention through seeing its psychoanalytic method provided in the work. In fact, the term other is applied simply in the last section in contrast to the application of the term ego. Nonetheless, it must be emphasised that the above view is too much appropriate to this issue in the sense that Fujita believed, no doubt, that the ego mirrors contrasts to itself; through this prescriptive significance, the disease should be prescribed. Indeed, this is why Fujita actually introduced the psychoanalytic concept of narcissism.

According to Fujita, the ego in contemporary society has suffered from narcissism (1997e: 23). This ego, he says, aims only at satisfying itself, and therefore, paradoxically, results in itself causing the strong emotions of ‘frustration’ (yokkyū fuman) and ‘anxiety’ (fuan) despite regarding its own satisfaction as its main purpose, as characteristically presented by the famous metaphor of Narcissus (1997e: 23), who ‘vainly reaches out to embrace his own reflection’ (Holmes 2001: 3). Narcissists are simply insanely interested in themselves, and possess instrumental reason only for fulfilling their own needs (1997e: 19-22). This, after all, shuns dialogue with others; experience, thus, has disappeared (1997e: 24). Strong narcissistic needs induce not only ‘ego narcissism’ (jiga no narushizumu) but also ‘collective narcissism’ (shūdanteki narushizumu) in Fujita’s view; to put it differently, the latter is based on the former (1997e: 25-6). Fujita, however, does not proceed with this discussion by focusing on his concept of collective narcissism. Rather, thereafter, his concern turns to examining how to change our narcissistic society to what it ought to be, that is giving some possible remedies – I perceive that this is indicated by the title of ‘To Break Free from Narcissism’.

4. Fujita’s Conception of Narcissism (2):
Totalitarianism (Zentaishugi)

Totalitarianism towards ‘unruffled ease’ (anraku e no zentaishugi)

Another work ‘Anraku’, as mentioned above, also primarily tackles the issue of why people escape from reality, that is from experience. Interestingly, however,
it connects narcissism with ‘totalitarianism’ (zentaishugi). In this sense, his view of society has become much more negative. This article mainly analyses the psychology of ‘uprootedness’ (nekogi), similarly applying a series of words providing psychoanalytic implications, such as ‘pain’, ‘avoidance’ and ‘discomfort’ (fukai) (e.g. 1997e: 30). This essay intends the notion of uprootedness as eradicating everything. This way of explaining people’s defence mechanism, however, is basically the same as the above work’s regarding the ego, while introducing the new concept. The different points between these articles are concerned only with whether referring to totalitarianism. So far, we have not seen the term totalitarianism in writings raising the topic of narcissism with the exception of ‘Kon’nichi no keiken’, in which it is only once used. This implies that his psychoanalytic method was first completely related to the political concept in ‘Anraku’. It is quite important to recognise this fact in the sense that Fujita diagnosed the essence of the Kōdo Seichō as totalitarianism. In other words, he saw the impulse of uprootedness in the unconscious instinct of narcissism. That is to say, in his view contemporary society does not hesitate to exterminate all the things causing discomfort, or, more precisely, it is driven by the desire to root out the uncomfortable for obtaining ‘ease’; for Fujita, thus, this is the exact sense of ‘totalitarianism towards “unruffled ease”’ (anraku e no zentaishugi).

There is some evidence, however, that the above examination concerning the psychology of society already began with ‘Kōdo Seichō’ (1969), which showed the birth of the later Fujita. This work, in fact, characterises the Kōdo Seichō primarily as the attitude of ‘foresee[ing] how things will turn out’ (jōkyō no sakidori) (1998c: 8). From this perspective, Fujita observes that, paradoxically, people cannot see the surroundings, namely reality, as always driven by the desire to foresee, that is to ‘follow a situation’ (jōkyō ni tsuizui suru) (1998c: 8; emphasis added). It seems to me that this discussion to a certain extent determined the later introduction of the concept of totalitarianism. In other words, his above view had predicted later society turning to an ‘economic bubble’ (baburu keizai) starting just from around the year when ‘Anraku’ was published. That is to say, Fujita’s above description had anticipated that Japan would fall into ‘a voluntary servitude to unruffled ease’ (emphasis added), or, more strictly, ‘totalitarianism to unruffled ease’, as negatively emphasised by the article. This is why in ‘Kōdo Seichō’ he had to express the attitude of the Kōdo Seichō as ‘follow’.

**Totalitarianism as contemporary way of life (seikatsu yōshiki ni okeru zentaishugi) as contemporary totalitarianism (gendai zentaishugi)**

These diagnoses lead Fujita to provide a much more strict view of society. In fact, his attitude to examinations characterises his work as much more political.
(This means only that his research objects are – substantially almost all are – coloured to a great extent by the term totalitarianism just as this concept signifies.) ‘Zentaishugi no jidai keiken’ (The Experience of the Twentieth Century of Totalitarianism) (1995) – abbreviated to ‘Zentaishugi’ below – is depicted thoroughly as the world ruled by the idea of the political system bringing back brutal memories.\(^{46}\) Significantly, this writing was once revised for adding the concept of ‘totalitarianism as contemporary way of life’ (seikatsu yōshiki ni okeru zentaishugi), which enhanced ‘totalitarianism to unruffled ease’ (on this point, see, e.g. Katō 1997: 236-9). This is why he begins this article by declaring that, ‘[t]he twenty century has brought about totalitarianism. The former has produced the latter, and is even continuing to produce it’ (1997e: 43).

According to Fujita, there are three types of totalitarianism: ‘totalitarianism as a way of war’ (sensō no arikata ni okeru zentaishugi) (totalitarianism as war), ‘totalitarianism as a way of political rule’ (seiji shihai no arikata ni okeru zentaishugi) (political totalitarianism) and ‘totalitarianism as contemporary way of life’ (contemporary totalitarianism) (e.g. 1997e: 43).\(^{47}\) With regard to the first one, he explains that it is the result of World War I, which provoked ‘commercial war’ (senden-sen) and ‘total war’ (zentai sensō) that primarily generated ‘another type of soldiers especially having a psychological effect on the war’ (mōhitotsu no sentōin) and removing the ‘distinction between the “front line” (zensen) and the “rear line” (kōhō)’ by applying the method of ‘mass destruction’ (tairyō satsuriku) (1997e: 49-56).\(^{48}\) Hannah Arendt is introduced to the second one, which is, says Fujita, typically described by her account. It is therefore basically ruled by using ‘ideology’ (ideorogī) and ‘terrorism’ (teroru), and thus inevitably continues to produce ‘displaced persons’ (nanmin) for maintaining the system itself (1997e: 45-9, 61-76).\(^{49}\) In addition, David Riesman’s discussion in conjunction with Arendt’s is applied through focusing on the psychological aspect of ‘lonely crowds’ (kodoku na gunshū), which, in Fujita’s view, describes people’s narcissistic attitude that ‘vainly reaches out to embrace only the self’ (jiko ni dake mōmokuteki ni shūchakusuru), and that greatly contributes to inducing ‘heroism’ (eiyū taibōron); this mind enables a totalitarian regime to come into existence (1997e: 56-9). The third one follows the above two types. ‘Reducing the things which have been sophisticated through affected by Western civilisation to a simple quantitative dimension’ (ryōteki jigen e no kangen) typifies this kind of totalitarianism (1997e: 76). To put it another way, most importantly, it is based on the logic of ‘currency’ (kahei); this signifies exactly our society. While currency was once a simple means of exchanging things, it has aimed at exchanging itself; all the things, on the whole, have been explained by this logic (1997e: 77-85). From these perspectives, contemporary market society is also diagnosed
as ‘a new totalitarianism’ (atarashii zentaishugi), that is to say, we are ‘continuing to produce totalitarianism’ (1997e: 43, 83).

The theoretical functions of narcissism and totalitarianism

This world in a sense looks like places depicted by Fromm’s Escape from Freedom (1941) and Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944) rather than Friedrich Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom (1944) and George Orwell’s 1984 (1949). In this respect, Fujita’s zentaishugi seems to have more in common with fascism and authoritarianism than totalitarianism – Fromm, Horkheimer and Adorno, indeed, rarely use the latter term. It is more than mere coincidence, therefore, that they all come from Germany. Much more importantly, however, Fujita’s argument fulfils paradoxical and dialectical logical functions. This may be to some extent the result of accepting Maruyama’s viewpoint. However, it is not right simply to think so on this issue. As has often been mentioned, Fujita’s work is thoroughly performed by the method of ‘internal understanding’ (naizaiteki rikai, naizaiteki kentō) (e.g. Hondō 2004: 86-7; Ichimura 2010: 413-8; Makimura 2004: 107-8; Wada 2004: 192-5). For him, needless to say, this is aimed at recognising the ‘essence of things’. If so, then the introduction of both the concepts of narcissism and totalitarianism to his study must have also been aimed at carrying out its crucial task in his work.

To conclude, the two terms narcissism and totalitarianism provided Fujita with paradoxical and dialectical viewpoints which were probably necessary for gaining a deep understanding of others and things. In fact, the derivation of narcissism clearly tells us the paradoxical logic of the concept in the mythical sense, particularly in Ovid’s myth: while Narcissus had insanely tried to embrace his own reflection, he nevertheless failed to reach it and ended up dead (see App. 2, p. 241). From this perspective, one may highlight Tiresias’s famous prophecy that ‘Narcissus will have a long life . . . unless he knows himself’ (si se non noverit) (Levy et al 2011: 3). On this view, it is possible to understand that it corresponds to the standpoint that, paradoxically, narcissists cannot love (e.g. Fromm 1941: 116; 1962: 57-63; 1971: 119-33). In addition to this stance on narcissism, from some psychoanalytic perspectives such as Donald W. Winnicott’s ‘false self’ and Fromm’s ‘pseudo self’, they are not capable of loving either genuine others or themselves due to the fact that the self of a narcissistic person is occupied to a large extent by his false or pseudo self; if so, then the narcissistic self is necessarily identified by the other. Similarly, the concept of totalitarianism expresses a quite paradoxical implication. In fact, this is typically described by relying upon Arendt’s argument. By ideology and terrorism as a primary means of ruling in totalitarianism, paradoxically, a totalitarian regime is
controlled; this is explained to a certain extent by the fact that an extremely totalitarian politics always results in self-destruction. Quite interestingly, another paradoxical fact concerning a totalitarian rule is also provided by Fujita: ‘Stalinism practically utilised Marxism containing the radiant, rich tradition of Western culture for eliminating the vanishing class and for getting rid of intellectuals who raise an objection to the political power, reducing it to political doctrines (kyōgi mondōshū) convenient to mass manipulation and political manifesto’ (1997e: 47). To put it differently, as Fujita puts it, ‘rampant totalitarianism in the twentieth century is an absolute monster (kaibutsu) which, unexpectedly, has come into existence from illustrious, continuous efforts of Western modern intellectual movement’ (1997e: 77). From these three viewpoints, I must make sure of a common feature between Fujita’s conceptions of narcissism and totalitarianism with respect to the paradoxical function of logic.

It is important to note that these two concepts are related to one another. That is to say, totalitarianism is a function of narcissism in relation to the logic of paradox without regard to Fujita’s intention of relating the terms. Perhaps this is elucidated by the following descriptions. I suggest referring to the mythical story:

Catching a glimpse of himself in a pool of water, Narcissus was paralyzed by the beauty of his own reflected image. The more he gazed at himself, the more infatuated he became, but like the many others whose affection he did not return, he was left empty in his futile love. He remained gazing at his own reflection in despair until death, with Echo by his side to repeat to him his last dying words (Levy et al 2011: 3; emphases added).

When Narcissus fell in love with the image in the pool, he mistakenly took it for a real body and did not understand that it was a reflection of his own body. In other words, Narcissus could not conceive that he was in love with his own reflection; he was caught in an illusion. All efforts to converse with the unreachable image in the spring left Narcissus disheartened and filled with despair. Finally he realized: ‘I am he! Oh, now I know for sure the image is my own; it’s for myself I burn with love; I fan the flames I feel’ . . . Heartbroken, he wished he could separate himself from his own body so that the image he loved would go away. He then sensed that death was the only solution as ‘now we two – one soul – one death will die’ . . . He faded away, and when the nymphs came to bury his body, they found a flower at its place (Ronningstam 2005: 3; emphases added).

These pictures should not be understood simply either as metaphors of an aspect of human beings or as expressions of a human psychosis. It seems to me that some of the most fundamental intrinsic characteristics concerning human nature are represented in the above sentences. One of them is that the self who is always attracted only to himself is paradoxically to depend upon the other; that is, such a self misidentifies the other with oneself, and is therefore identified only by the other. In this sense, for this self the fact that he is interested in the
other exactly means that he is interested in the self for he does not and cannot have either the genuine self or the other. This is probably another expression of the fact that he cannot see his surroundings (reality). Not only does the mythology illuminate this paradox, but it also indicates to us that the self is driven by the desire to engage in destructive behaviour when failing to obtain objects of his desire (selfobjects). In other words, Narcissus did not even hesitate to die in order to achieve his objective.

Also, such human features are more concretely conveyed by Kohut. They are expressed almost only by relying upon his concept of 'grandiose self' – although the following quotation was already given in Chapter 3, this issue allows me to cite it again in order that we can see it from a slightly different perspective. As he puts it,

the British people identified themselves with him and with his unshakable belief in his and, by extension, the nation's strength so long as their selves felt weak in the face of the serious danger; as soon as victory had been attained, however, the need for a merger with an omnipotent figure subsided, and they were able to turn from him to other (noncharismatic) leaders. It takes little effort to discern the parallel between the temporary needs of the enfeebled self of the creative person and the temporary needs of an endangered nation in times of crisis; in both instances, the idealization of the leader, the narcissistic transference to him, is abandoned when the need for it has come to an end (Kohut 2011d: 828; emphases added).

This description suggests essential human vulnerability. Perhaps an understanding of the primary reason for this man's vulnerable character is provided by Kohut's account that, '[t]he unconscious fantasies of the group's grandiose self, expressed in the transference upon the image of an appropriate leader figure ... can play at times a crucial role in its cohesion. ... Individuals seek to melt into the body of a powerful nation (as symbolized by a grandiose leader) to cure their shame and provide them with a feeling of enormous strength, to which they react with relief and triumph' (Kohut 1985b: 57; emphases added). The words of 'at times' denote the period that Germany was governed by Nazi party. Kohut explains that the 'grandiose self' abnormally developed was ready to transfer to a certain Nazi political figure (Hitler) of its selfobject for satisfying its own narcissistic self; as a result, this enabled Nazi to come to power in Kohut's view. To put it simply, the narcissistic, vulnerable self is – generally unconsciously – willing to depend upon anyone who fulfils his needs mostly so as simply to gain his distorted feelings as if breathing 'relief' and 'triumph'. Such grandiose selves, thus, turned an unhealthy group's grandiose self, namely the Nazi 'diseased group self' (e.g. Kohut 1985c: 83, 86).

Perhaps these viewpoints best explain why paradoxical logic with regard to narcissism and totalitarianism comes into existence. They elucidate, on the one
hand, why the self who is infatuated with himself, paradoxically, is bound to rely upon the other, and, on the other hand, why the narcissistic self is similarly bound to be driven by the desire to exterminate everything regarded as obstacles to satisfying his narcissistic needs including others. In this respect, the classic mythical story and Kohut shed much light on this issue. In sum, such a self always unconsciously conceals an opportunity for establishing fascist and totalitarian politics behind his distorted self-image – this is basically triggered regardless of whether or not it aims to organise such political rules.

Fujita, undoubtedly, was not aware of such a narcissistic self in a more rigorously psychoanalytic sense. For instance, this is clearly explained by the fact that he often mistakenly takes the ‘self’ for the ‘ego’, as mentioned in note 43. For this reason, he often seems to unconsciously hesitate to use the term narcissism. His conception of narcissism, therefore, appears to be obscured by the term totalitarianism. On the contrary, however, with regard to the latter his term of zentaishugi quite precisely gives us its implications with a focus on the paradoxical function of the term. In addition to this fact, it performs a dialectical logical function. This means, most importantly, that Fujita’s stance is far from the view that totalitarianism and fascism are the opposite of politics meaning liberal democracy.\(^5\) Admittedly, this is characteristically described by his important concepts of ‘totalitarianism towards unruffled ease’ and ‘contemporary totalitarianism’. To put it simply, zentaishugi contains dialectical contradiction, that is to say, our society does not contradict either totalitarianism or fascism. From this perspective, most importantly, there exists some possibility that totalitarian or fascist politics emerges from democracy; for Fujita, this is much more problematic in the sense that its logic is very often not recognised, and is therefore disregarded. In this sense, it is admitted that he takes the same position not as Arendt, Hayek and Orwell but rather as Adorno, Horkheimer and Fromm. In these respects, Fujita’s work is self-reflective and self-critical.

Obviously, as noted above, Fujita’s perspective providing paradoxical and dialectical logic is profoundly associated with his epistemological position of ‘internal understanding’. Admittedly, in this connection his theory has much in common with Critical Theory;\(^5\) in this sense, it is more than coincidence that it gives self-reflective and self-critical perspectives. Much more importantly, however, it is claimed that the two most fundamental logical functions of Fujita’s theory fulfilled by the term narcissism have the primary effect on his immanent critical method of ‘understand[ing] others as otherness different from oneself, namely “alterity”, from the inside’ quoted above. It is noted that, evidently, this perspective is much more sophisticated by absorbing the concept. In other words, Fujita accomplished ‘seeing [him]self as if seeing others, seeing others as if seeing [him]self’ through understanding human characteristics offered by the
meaning of pathological narcissism – while narcissists could not meet real others, he managed to do it ironically by using his mirror reflecting a narcissistic self-image. It is interesting to note, however, that Fujita already succeeded to a certain extent in putting forward such a standpoint, for example, in the writing on ‘Yukichi Fukuzawa in 1964 (on him, see App. 3, p. 266); it was given as seeing ‘our self-image’ (seishinteki yōshi) through a picture of the Meiji government (1997b: 48). Although at the time Fujita must have not been aware of the concept in its rigorous sense, he no doubt recognised some implications described by the term. However, he acquired its viewpoint not only by the concept but also by many other positive influences. One of them is definitely the Hegelian dialectic. Significantly, Fujita learnt the method of seeing the opposite of a thing to a large extent from Hegel (e.g. 1997b: 156-8). This, then, leads me to be aware that the philosophical methods of dialectic and immanent critique are closely intertwined with one another. Indeed, this is relevant to Fujita’s perspective. To put it differently, his encounter with Hegel greatly contributed to his immanent critical method of ‘internal understanding’, as Fujita calls it – as we have seen, this was attained not only through Hegel but also through many other persons, amongst them Bashō, Fukuzawa and Mannheim. For these reasons, it is claimed that Fujita connected the Hegelian ‘mind that recognizes itself in nature as in its other’ (Habermas 1987: 32) with the method of narcissism that the self is identified by the other.

Without regard to Fujita’s philosophical-psychoanalytic theory, the epistemological perspective of narcissism substantially coincides with Hegelian immanent critique in terms of intersubjective understanding – namely ‘knowing-one-self-in-the-other’ (Sich-im-andere-Erkennen) (Honneth 1995: 37). From this perspective, Fujita’s research style is much closer to Hegel’s and Freud’s than Kant’s and Marx’s in connection with highlighting immanent criticism based on intersubjective recognition through shining a light on dialectical logic and through seeing the unconscious mind. Furthermore, when adding Marx’s ‘praxis’ here, then Fujita’s philosophical standpoint functioning in his political theory, on the whole, comes close to Critical Theory in epistemological and ontological dimensions. For these reasons, Fujita epistemologically and methodologically takes dialectical-phenomenological position primarily through intermediating between Hegel and Freud.
5. Fujita’s Conception of Narcissism (3):
The Society of the Tennō System (Tennōsei shakai)

In Fujita’s political theory, as has been mentioned above, narcissism functions
intermediately between totalitarianism and the society of the Tennō system.
Since we already saw what he intends by the latter concept in detail in the
preceding section, only a simple account of the concept will be provided for
establishing the relationship between narcissism and the society of the Tennō
system. For this purpose, I simply bring my discussion back to the core issue
relating the state version to the social version concerning the Tennō system.
Here I can thereby focus my attention on the task of connecting them.

According to Fujita, as we have seen, there are two distinct versions of the
Tennō system: the state of and the society of the Tennō system. The former type,
in his view, is the system of rules on the basis of the Tennō-centred social order,
and is approximately characterised by the two aspects of the modern ‘political
state’ and the communal ‘family state’. He claims that, after having come into
existence in the late nineteenth century, the establishment of the Tennō system
was completed in around 1889. In Fujita’s view, however, this version of the
Tennō system changed its own essential feature from a political action into a
symbol particularly through the Russo-Japanese War, that is just before the
Taishō period; this is, according to him, exemplified by the change of the features
of statists and statesmen. From this perspective, Fujita points out that Taishō
Tennō representing his era typifies this fundamental transformation of the sys-
tem; that is to say, Tennō transformed himself from a political actor into a simple
ritual symbol. On this view, Fujita must have seen that this marked change
stemmed primarily from the completion of the task of excluding ‘the hetero-
genous’ from society by bringing about the unconscious elimination of an
appropriate certain distance between statesmen and people which had enabled
the state to adequately perform a function of its own system; this significant
distance, as he stresses, was kept until around the war. This social change is
explained to a large extent by his emphasis on Taishō Tennō’s ‘character trait of
a “mikoshi portable shrine”’ (‘o-mikoshi’-sei) in contrast to the ‘transcendent’
Most importantly, however, the transformation of society was triggered not by
some strong intention but by some invisible automatic physical force in my view.
Indeed, it is profoundly associated with Fujita’s expression of the existential
characteristics of Taishō Tennō, which can be regarded exactly as one of the
most fundamental, typical features of the society of the Tennō system (1998a:
In Fujita’s view, this greatly contributed to strengthening the conformity of society. This exactly means the emergence of the society of the Tennō system. In conclusion, apparently the society of the Tennō system is quite narcissistic in Fujita’s sense on the grounds that the existence of the system depends upon the narcissistic selves of members, for example, in the sense that the avoidance of ‘fear’ (kyōfu), says Fujita, is exactly characteristic of this kind of society, or rather avoiding it even seems their major purpose (e.g. 1998a: 304; 1998e: 7-12, 22-6); that is to say, this kind of society seems to be based on human vulnerability characterising narcissism, as we have seen. In this respect, its organisation is no longer a political system, and indeed, illuminating this point is his exact intention of presenting this type of Tennō system. Does it, indeed, express its own essential vulnerability in its intrinsic nature? Also, from Fromm’s sociopsychological perspective the society of the Tennō system seems to have suffered from ‘malignant group narcissism’ (Ch. 4, s. 1). Fujita, however, could not link this concept, which had been proposed in his early masterwork ‘Shihai genri’, to his conception of narcissism, as opposed to his intention – he did not even make clear the former notion in detail. It is admitted, therefore, that I am oriented to this task, and that I will actually attempt to establish its connection. To address this issue, I will be a quasi-psychohistorian – whose importance was highlighted by Kohut, as we saw Chapter 4 – relying primarily upon Fromm’s theory of narcissism. Let us begin this important work by seeing Fromm’s concept of malignant group narcissism. (It is important to note, however, that my exploration will simply slightly develop the concept of the society of the Tennō system, depending upon psychoanalytic knowledge gained through examining Fromm’s psychoanalytic theory in Chapter 4, for the purpose of diagnosing the society of the Tennō system as malignant narcissism. This is therefore a simple experimental attempt to contribute to the future mutual development between social and political theory and psychoanalysis. For this reason, I cannot help leading this examination to propose a partial and incomplete view of narcissism, and thus there remain some methodological problems as to whether Fromm’s theory of narcissism should be applied to this issue, as we shall see later.)

Malignant group narcissism: a sociopsychological analytic device

As we saw in the previous chapter, Fromm puts forward two types of narcissism in accordance with its individual and sociological functions: individual and group (social) narcissism – on the latter, here I will use the term group narcissism. Basically, as mentioned above, he is of the opinion that individual narcissism is analogous to group narcissism (Ch. 4, n. 3); or, to put it another way, there is a simple quantitative difference between them, as represented by the
same distinction between individual and social psychology (Funk 1990). In fact, Fromm did not abandon this view of psychoanalysis in favour of social psychology even in his later years (e.g. Fromm 1980b). This elucidates great importance of taking its position to Fromm, which actually led his psychoanalytic theory to tackle social issues; as noted in Chapter 4, he requires that, intrinsically, the task of psychoanalysis or individual psychology must be carried out in conjunction with social psychology on the grounds that an individual is always regarded as a ‘social being’ (also a ‘socialised being’), or, more precisely, for him individual psychology must be social psychology (e.g. 1941: 290; 1991: 142; cf. Funk 1990). As a matter of fact, his perspective relating a psychoanalytic standpoint to a sociological standpoint enabled him to come up with provocative theoretical ideas such as ‘group narcissism’ and ‘socially patterned defect’ (1956: 15) – in this respect, while Fromm strongly recognises himself as a follower of Freud (e.g. Evans 1966), he nevertheless takes a completely different position from his mentor (e.g. Fromm 1980b). This is of huge importance to me for its exact standpoint as his essential analytic device can contribute to dealing with some issues concerning the society of the Tennō system in terms of Fromm’s psychoanalytic theory. (For this reason, my research relies not only on Kohut’s psychoanalytic theory but also on Fromm’s sociological psychoanalytic theory.)

According to Fromm, as we saw above, both individual and group narcissism necessarily develop in their dialectical process. (Some might anticipate that the society of the Tennō system also dialectically functions. However, this issue is not tackled in my exploration here.) In other words, malignant factors always lurk in ‘benign narcissism’ (Ch. 4, s. 1); in this sense, his theory is fundamentally dialectical. That is to say, Fromm claims that ‘if the needs of group narcissism are directed towards creative things, then they will be reduced to one which is “compatible with social co-operation” (benign narcissism), on the one hand, but if its needs are directed towards “its splendour”, “its past achievements” and “the physique of its members”, then they will be converted to “narcissistic passion” (malignant narcissism), on the other’ (Ch. 4, p. 48). In my view, however, we have considerable difficulty in sublating the contradiction of narcissism by the above former way of development in his theory of narcissism because, as mentioned in the preceding chapter, his group narcissism mostly results in a negative narcissistic spiral. (It would seem that, in Fromm’s psychoanalytic theory, in so far as a socioeconomic structure giving rise to narcissism – also, thereby transforming it into group narcissism – does not change, then it is impossible to sublimate it. As we shall see in the next chapter, it seems to me that Fromm’s social and political theory has limitations in this respect.) This is primarily because Fromm suggests that his important concept of ‘having mode’, which, he says, characterises contemporary consumer society, intrinsically typi-
fies malignant narcissism; in fact, he writes, ‘[t]he nature of the having mode of existence follows from the nature of private property’ (1964: 77; 2005: 57-64). In his view, therefore, the narcissism of human beings must be ‘overcome’ (1962: 118-21; 1964: 90; cf. Bacciagaluppi 1993: 6). Fromm, however, avoids falling into a serious aporia to some extent by providing a significant account of distinguishing between narcissism and ‘self-love’. In fact, his conception of self-love defined by this interesting difference, Marco Bacciagaluppi stresses, is of great relevance for developing an alternative scheme of psychoanalytic theory of narcissism (1993: 11). The distinction established by Fromm, then, contributes to making the fundamental connection between narcissism and the society of the Tennō system. In other words, it allows my investigation to identify some ‘malignant group narcissism’ differentiated to a certain extent from ‘benign group narcissism’, namely collective self-love.

From these perspectives, it is hypothesised that the narcissistic characteristics meant by Fujita’s concept of the society of the Tennō system can be defined by extracting some intrinsic features of the social system, namely the ‘shared, socially relevant psychic attitudes’ (Fromm 1991: 149). Or, to put it another way, if there are some ‘socially patterned defect[s]’ based on the sociological standpoint of socialised beings not in an individual dimension but in a social dimension, then I am allowed to diagnose the group narcissism of the society of the Tennō system particularly by focusing on some kind of its existential and behavioural pattern. Here in Frommian terms I refer particularly to the psychoanalytically significant concept of ‘pathological symbiosis’, which provides a person with ‘an illusory sense of power’ (Bacciagaluppi and Biancoli 1993: 6). At this point it is important, first, to look again at Fromm’s theory of narcissism concerning the negative relationship between narcissism and politics, namely the framework of pathological group narcissism inducing negative politics, as examined in Chapter 4, and then, to provide a brief description of the sociopsychological mechanism of how malignant group narcissism develops, shining a light on Fromm’s method of analytic social psychology.

Fromm defines four kinds of characteristics of the pathology of group narcissism, the ‘lack of objectivity and rational judgement’, the ‘need for “narcissistic satisfaction”’, the “reaction of rage” caused by vulnerability and ‘narcissistic “symbiosis and identification”’ (Ch. 4, p. 49). In his view, however, only the existence of these character traits is not sufficient for generating malignant group narcissism. According to Fromm, ‘social transference’ is always necessary for generating a group type of narcissism (Ch. 4, pp. 50-1). As we saw above, it implies not only that it is needed for laying out the framework of collective narcissism causing some negative politics, but, most importantly, that group narcissism is fully based on our social structure, or, more accurately, a way of
developing it is almost completely determined by what society it is. From this perspective, we must expect that the formulation of group narcissism depends to a large extent upon the ‘character structure’ of a society (Fromm 1941: 277), or, to put it differently, it is conceivable in the abstract that the character structure of a group might be more narcissistic than others; that is to say, theoretically, there can exist a society which is apt to induce malignant group narcissism.

Fromm, then, identifies a society constituted by this character structure as contemporary industrial society (e.g. 1980b: 53-4). From this perspective, he leads this topic to apply the Marxist concept of the ‘worship of industrial production’ on the basis of his stance that the endurance of society is determined by the most fundamental socioeconomic framework (Ch. 4, p. 51). Here I will draw attention to the latter logic of socioeconomic system as the basic structure of contemporary society. Fromm writes:

the phenomena of social psychology are to be understood as processes involving the active and passive adaptation of the instinctual apparatus to the socio-economic situation. In a certain fundamental respects, the instinctual apparatus itself is a biological given; but it is highly modifiable. The role of primary formative factors goes to the economic conditions (1991: 149).

Fromm’s stance, however, is only in a sense completely different from Marx’s position of historical materialism. Fromm offers a provocative account of the reason for the ‘active and passive adaptation of the instinctual apparatus to the socio-economic situation’ from his psychoanalytic perspective. In this respect, he is not only an heir of Marx but also of Freud. As Fromm puts it,

Marx and Engels are the last people to whom one would impute the idea of transfiguring bourgeois and capitalist traits into a universal human trait. They were well aware of the place psychology had within sociology, but they neither were nor wanted to be psychologists. . . . Psychoanalysis was the first to provide this psychology, and showed that the ‘acquisitive drive’, although important, did not play a predominant role in man’s psychic armament by comparison with other (genital, sadistic, narcissistic) needs. Psychoanalysis, in fact, indicates that in large measure the ‘acquisitive drive’ is not the deepest cause of the need to acquire or possess things; it is rather the expression of a narcissistic need or wish to win recognition from oneself and others (1991: 152; emphases added).

Admittedly, this account elucidates why the ‘having mode’ is of huge importance to our society. In Fromm’s view, the reason for the importance of ‘having’ is because it ensures ‘recognition’. (Or, from a Kohutian perspective, acquiring selfobjects – that is having someone or something – is the sole means for obtaining admiration at which the narcissistic self aims – without referring to Kohut’s psychoanalytic theory, however, Fromm’s above account enables us
to understand why narcissism is the most fundamental human intrinsic feature.) From this standpoint, we can grasp how malignant group narcissism comes out, specifically by caring about and in accordance with the basic character traits of a society, particularly through examining how members are given recognition in its society. In these respects, significantly, Fromm's social psychology precisely illuminates the process that a society strengthens its own malignant group narcissism.

**The society of the Tennō system as one type of malignant group narcissism**

From these viewpoints, how can we explain the society of the Tennō system by applying the concept of malignant group narcissism? As noted above, here I want to suggest the method of employing another psychoanalytic concept of ‘pathological symbiosis’ for tackling its issue. According to Bacciagaluppi and Romano Biancoli, narcissism is caused by this pathological symbiosis, which is, they say, offered by both the parents through fulfilling an ‘inappropriate parental role’ (1993: 6); as mentioned above, this leads their children to possess an ‘illusory sense of power’. Indeed, this dynamics is best explained by Fromm’s *The Heart of Man* from a pathological perspective. However, my exploration is unable to devote itself to an analysis of the concept due to the fact that it needs an enormously long space for describing its whole logical framework. Here I therefore simply carry out introductory research into the society of the Tennō system by introducing the notion.

Fromm’s above work addresses some issues of the inner evil of human beings, which from a pathological perspective he calls the ‘syndrome of decay’, dividing it primarily up into three kinds: ‘love of death’ (necrophilia), ‘incestuous symbiosis’ and ‘malignant narcissism’ (1964: e.g. 13, 37). This evidence, in relation to my research, explains the importance of the concept of pathological symbiosis to Fromm in addition to the last one – of course, the first one is also of huge importance to him, but it is disregarded in my examination on the grounds that my research does not aim at dealing with its issue in terms of the concept. This fact is profoundly relevant to my investigation too. In fact, as we saw above, Fromm highlights the notion of symbiotic fixation through analysing individual and group narcissism in the same writing. In addition, the concept of pathological symbiosis, which has been aimed at the therapeutic transformation of Fromm’s conception of narcissism, is profoundly associated with malignant narcissism, that is to say, as Bacciagaluppi and Biancoli put it, ‘narcissism is the result of the pathological symbiosis’ (1993: 6). Significantly, indeed, this is also clearly shown by Fromm himself (1964: 108). In the book, he gives a brief account of the pathological function performed by an incestuous
type of symbiosis, regarded as a pathological symbiosis, in terms of narcissism (cf. 1964: 101). Fromm says:

First of all there is a close affinity between incestuous fixation and narcissism. Inasmuch as the individual has not yet fully emerged from mother’s womb or mother’s breasts, he is not free to relate to others or to love others. He and his mother (as one) are the object of his narcissism. This can be seen most clearly where the personal narcissism has been transformed into group narcissism. There we find very clearly incestuous fixation blended with narcissism. It is this particular blend which explains the power and the irrationality of all national, racial, religious and political fanaticism (1964: 108).

This psychoanalytic description contributes to understanding why Fromm had to suggest the four kinds of characteristics of malignant group narcissism as shown above. Roughly speaking, it can be argued that symbiotic fixation signifies and stems from immaturity, similarly as other types of features of malignant group narcissism are all characterised as its signification (e.g. Fromm 1964: ch. 5). Most importantly, indeed, this is directly relevant to the primary characteristics of the society of the Tennō system.

As we have seen, Fujita stresses that Taishō Tennō represents himself as a mikosi portable shrine character. According to him, this primarily performs the function of enforcing group conformity. That is to say, he suggests that Tennō became a ritual symbol simply enshrined and carried on his subjects’ shoulders as if being a portable shrine. Indeed, this is quite important for knowing the intrinsic feature of the society of the Tennō system, which, as Fujita highlights, started to come into existence in around the Taishō period. In other words, the terms ‘enshrine’ (matsuru) and ‘carry on a shoulder’ (katsugu) signify the nature of the system. In addition, as Fujita writes, if Taishō Tennō’s character strengthens the conformity of the society, then it is possible to presume that the system contains some kind of socially patterned feature – namely a ‘social way of being’ (shakaiteki sonzai keishiki) or a ‘behavioural pattern’ (kōdō yōshiki) (Fujita 1998a: 305). Significantly, as Fromm puts it,

by adapting himself to social conditions man develops those traits that make him desire to act as he has to act. If the character of the majority of people in a given society – that is, the social character – is thus adapted to the objective tasks the individual has to perform in this society, the energies of people are molded in ways that make them into productive forces that are indispensable for the functioning of that society (1941: 283).

In short, it would seem that some specific meanings expressed by the above Japanese verbs are provided exactly by the reason why the group of the society evades ‘fear’, which is likely to be induced by vulnerability, that, as Fujita says,
the group members’ own respective ‘individuality’ (kobetsusei) is unmasked (1998a: 304). (My research, however, does not conduct any further investigation into this topic. As noted above, it simply demonstrates that Fujita’s society of the Tennō system signifies that it suffers from malignant narcissism.)

To conclude, the characteristics depicted by the passive verbal expressions, be enshrined and be carried on a shoulder, which signify exactly Tennō’s character traits, concern the quasi-specific form of symbiotic fixation induced by the immature narcissistic needs of the society of the Tennō system. Or, more precisely, both individual and group narcissism offered by its society have given rise to a social range of pathological symbiosis between a ‘person carried on his group members’ shoulders (katsugaru mono), described as a metaphorical person of Tennō, and ‘persons carrying him’ (katsugiya), described as group members (Fujita 1998a: 305); in this respect, both their existence and their existence value are dependent upon each other. (Perhaps individual malignant narcissism one has once suffered from can most often cause a negative narcissistic spiral. This must be the primary factor of social transference, and the reason why narcissism springing from the pathological symbiosis is bound to fall again into a condition causing narcissism and group narcissism.) The individual and group narcissism of the social system satisfy their own narcissistic needs for acquiring recognition in this way. Psychoanalytically, those desires also explain why superficially the group members are willing to accept ‘arbitrary teachings’ (oshie), on the one hand, and why substantially their attitudes are determined by their ‘naturalistic egoism’ (shizenshugiteki egoizumu), on the other (Fujita 1998a: 231). For probably it is the best way to obtain recognition, and also for some behaviour disturbing a symbiotic fixation (harmony) is regarded as a negative factor in achieving the objective in that society. It might be the case that this results exactly in their ambiguous attitude to any decisions which, in this sense, always brings group members to ‘unexpected results’ (ito sezaru kekka). Perhaps the state of the Tennō system must have transformed itself into the society of the Tennō system in this way.

Some suggestions for the concept of the society of the Tennō system

Presumably Fujita must have wished to provide such account as the above describes by way of connecting his concept of the society of the Tennō system with some psychoanalytic method in detail, focusing on the notion of narcissism despite the fact that he was not able to complete its task primarily due to a lack of his sociopsychological concern. Perhaps, regardless of Fujita, it is necessary to view one’s own research object from some sociopsychological perspective for analysing society by introducing a psychoanalytic theory, that is to say,
one's research cannot be acceptable in social studies simply by adopting psychoanalysis when using some psychoanalytic approach since, as a matter of fact, most of the contemporary psychoanalytic theories do not concern *the social* (cf. Millán 1996: 5); to put it simply, most of them are *not* oriented to examining society. For this reason, we necessarily run into methodological difficulties whenever applying some psychoanalytic theory. In these respects, Fromm was one of few scholars who were involved in both psychoanalysis and social psychology (cf. Funk 2006: 2). Of course, it is not right to believe that there is no problem in Fromm’s sociological psychoanalytic theory. To be sure, it lays too much stress on the significance of his most famous sociopsychological device of ‘social character’, which primarily supports his sociological view of a *socialised individual* and his sociopsychological view of a *character structure common to group members in a group*. Also, as has sometimes been said, the concept is quite relevant not only to social studies but also to psychoanalytic clinical practice (Funk 1990, 1996; Ortmeyer 2002), and it even has the great potential for effectively incorporating psychoanalysis into social science (Grey 1993) – my above examination and diagnosis, needless to say, are also essentially based on that sociopsychological analytic tool. In my view, however, it is still regarded as an *insufficient* and *partial* concept, and should therefore be improved to some extent, in the sense that the analytic device very often functions in *overgeneralising* individual character traits. In addition, it seems that Fromm’s theory of narcissism has got into difficulties with putting too much emphasis on a narcissistic aspect of contemporary industrial society. For example, it is questioned why are *highly developed countries at present* much more narcissistic than others, while authoritarian and fascist politics are similarly too narcissistic *regardless of wartime and postwar*? Also, is it possible to presume that a past society was largely narcissistic? On these issues, it would seem that we fail to penetrate their logic simply by way of dialectic. I shall deal with those issues in the next chapter.

Having said that, my examination analysing Fujita’s concept of the society of the Tennō system in terms of narcissism is of considerable significance in gaining a new understanding of the topic despite the fact that my exploration is biased in favour of Fromm’s psychoanalytic theory. It is expected that this task will lead Fujita’s early important political concept to develop particularly in terms of social psychology and psychoanalysis so that it can much more illuminate our society and politics. Of course, nonetheless, my research still remains in the dark about many other problems, in addition to a further psychoanalytic investigation: first, concerning some ways of understanding of the cultural, social phenomenon as to *why* the society of the Tennō system takes the cultural form of a *mikoshi* portable shrine, *whether* it is specific to the society – I had to employ the expression of ‘quasi-specific’ above – and *what* enables the
social system to maintain its own style, not from a psychoanalytic perspective but from different perspectives (other problems also come into existence from theses perspectives, e.g. whether it is appropriate to apply the term mikoshi portable shrine to an understanding of the social system, and whether it is possible to identify the system by other expressions); second, concerning methodology as to whether to apply Fromm’s psychoanalytic theory proposed over fifty years ago to studying Fujita’s society of the Tennō system, and whether it is possible to understand the concept from a psychoanalytic or sociopsychological perspective in the first place and from other perspectives. To deal with these issues, therefore, we need to work together with other disciplines providing different viewpoints – politics, sociology, history, social psychology and psychoanalysis – such as cultural studies, cultural anthropology and folklore apart from philosophical epistemology. With regard to those themes, it would seem that they require some other explorations from the above disciplinary perspectives, and also that a reconsideration of the modern and contemporary history of Japan is of vital importance. In addition, we should tackle some topics of the concept, dividing the system up into its three patterns Fujita proposes – unfortunately, as mentioned above, one of them has not been made clear by him. Furthermore, it is noted that Kohut’s psychoanalytic theory can also be applied to and shed much light on both the society of the Tennō system and the state of the Tennō system. In that case, I suppose the concept of Japanese group self, which can be suggested by Kohut’s term ‘German group self’, focusing particularly on his other important concepts such as the ‘group’s grandiose self’, the ‘communal narcissistic self’ and the ‘nation’s group self’, and taking account of the difference between a ‘healthy group self’ and a ‘diseased group self’ (e.g. 1985b: 57, 67; 1985c: 78, 81-93). His psychoanalytic theory caring about our ‘cultural background[s]’, notwithstanding primarily stressing an understanding of human nature, must illuminate some social concepts specifically describing Japan (e.g. 2011b: 210).

6. Concluding Remarks on Fujita’s Conception of Narcissism

Did I successfully manage to illustrate some significations given by Fujita’s conception of narcissism, focusing primarily on his terms totalitarianism and society of the Tennō system, and drawing attention to the psychoanalytic concept of narcissism? Yes, I did in some respects, but, no, I did not in some respects. On the former, I argue that the above research is highly acceptable to the extent that the introduction of the psychoanalytic standpoint is regarded as
appropriate and relevant to Fujita’s issue of narcissism – it would seem, however, that this has been demonstrated in large measure. On the latter, I argue that I was not able to completely establish the connection between Fujita’s totalitarianism and society of the Tennō system, penetrated by his conception of narcissism, and thus that I have not yet made it clear apart from some other enquiries particularly concerning the society of the Tennō system as noted above, even though I have described those respective concepts in conjunction with the term narcissism. In addition, I have not examined his term society of the Tennō system from any philosophical-epistemological perspective; indeed, this task is quite important for me in the sense that my research highlights the logical function of a theory, and therefore that I always motivate myself to investigate the logic of a theory as my research object. Indeed, these attempts are of huge importance for a better understanding not only of Fujita’s political theory but also of our society. In particular, with regard to the first point, unfortunately Fujita has not tackled the issue as opposed to his wishes, or rather he has remained in the dark about its crucial task, and it seems that he has even oriented us towards undertaking the work. (With regard to this issue, it would appear that despite some difficulties Fromm’s theory of fascism, which stresses the dialectical aspect of democracy, focusing on its sociopsychological personality, can be helpful in and a vital clue to accounting for the relation between Fujita’s totalitarianism and society of the Tennō system.)

With regard to Fujita’s theory of narcissism, does it have some theoretical possibilities for developing our insight not only into gaining an understanding of some problems of society and politics but also into dealing with them? On the one hand, I must point to its negative aspect. As exemplified exactly by the word negative, his theoretical view thoroughly emphasises only a negative aspect of narcissism – in this respect, as we shall see in the final chapter, Fujita shows a stark contrast with Kohut. In this sense, it should be noted that Fujita simply takes the same stance as Maruyama’s, and that, for this reason, he has not been able to break free from and overcome the narrow-minded framework of his mentor’s, with respect to his theory of narcissism. For these reasons, it is difficult to precisely grasp human nature and to find some solutions to narcissism solely by applying his theory. In addition, it seems to me that, although having aimed at curing the narcissistic disease of society, Fujita abandoned the crucial task in the middle of its process. In fact, it can be argued that, when he said that ‘the time I have lived has come to an end’, there was no strong will to deal with the problem in his words (1997e: 208) – it might be more appropriate to believe that he had to give up completing the task for he suffered from rectal cancer and was therefore operated for it in the same year. However, it is evident that Fujita precisely aimed at reforming society, that is at giving some remedy
for narcissism, for example, when writing ‘Narushizumu’ – in this respect, it
might be the case that he metaphorically applies a medical standpoint by way
of the remedial three steps of examination, diagnosis and prescription. Admittedly,
as a matter of fact, this has been demonstrated to some extent by my above
analysis. On the other hand, therefore, my research has sought for and shined a
light on Fujita’s theoretical possibilities for fining some clues to curing social
narcissism with respect to his theory of narcissism. This will be achieved by
examining Fujita’s important conceptions of ‘intersubjectivity’ (sōgo shutaisei) and
‘personal relationships’ (pāsonaru rirēshonshippusu), both of which are dire-
ccted exactly towards the restoration of experience, that is towards the treatment of
narcissism, as we saw above. With regard to those concepts, he draws his inspi-
ration from psychoanalysis, and for him they are likely to have some remedial
effects on the disease despite many problems in addition to the above difficult
point. In short, they are directed toward curing narcissism. This is the exact
positive aspect of his theory of narcissism.

7. Fujita’s Theory of Phenomenology:
His Conception of Intersubjectivity (Sōgo shutaisei)

The ‘self-reform of its own spiritual structure’ (seishin kōzō no jiko henkaku):
Towards the restoration of experience

I want to begin this issue by looking again at the three quasi-psychoanalytic
essays putting forward Fujita’s primary view of narcissism. So far I have dis-
cussed his conception of narcissism particularly in conjunction with his two
important terms totalitarianism – I have occasionally chosen to employ the
Japanese original term zentaishūgi – and society of the Tennō system. With reg-
ard to the connection between these political terms, it seems to me that Fujita
gradually drew his attention primarily to an understanding of the former imp-
lications after his crucial turning point of ‘despair’ despite the fact that, as has
sometimes been mentioned, he was consistent in concerning himself with the
latter term he himself originally presented even equally as important as the
former (Cho 2012: 144-7; Iida 2006a: 351; Miyamura 2009: 168-71). In particular,
on this view, the Kōdo Seichō undoubtedly triggered his significant interest in
totalitarianism, whose impact, in my view, is also made on his conception of
narcissism. In other words, Fujita sought to precisely grasp the new pheno-
menon of Kōdo Seichō, which started to come into existence in the middle 1950s,
by devoting himself exclusively to a deep understanding of some significations
intended by the negative political term, similarly as caring about the same fea-
tures as meant by the conventional characteristics of the society of the Tennō system inherited from the previous society in wartime; in this respect, presumably he became aware that it was already impossible to see his society simply in terms of his original concept. For this reason, with regard to this issue, it is appropriate to believe that the new problem under his very nose, “positive totalitarianism to finished products” (shōhin e no nōdōteki zentaishugi), generated as a result of the development of the disease of “totalitarianism to unruffled ease”, was inherited from the familiar problem, retained since his first article, that is rigorously distinguished from the state system, on the one hand, and that is regarded as specific to Japan and has been deep-seated in Japanese society after the Russo-Japanese War, on the other; in this respect, Fujita did not lose his original concern (Fujita 1997e: 98). To put it simply, he found that contemporary Japan has fallen into a ‘serious crisis’ (shinkoku na kiki) due to the appearance of a new totalitarianism as serious as or as more serious as its two other versions in war and in politics, as preserving the character traits since the early twentieth century (Miyamura 2009: 170) – on this view, for example, Ichimura is also aware and points out that Fujita consistently held a ‘sense of imminent crisis’ (kiki ishiki) of the decline of society, which must have been triggered by the Kōdo Seichō (2010: 422). In the first place, in my view, the reason why he applied the concept of totalitarianism to an analysis of society is because of his more pessimistic view than before. In fact, this is precisely explained by his words that ‘there is neither any remedy nor solution to the structural crisis of contemporary society (gendai shakai no kōzōteki kiki)’ (1997e: 41). We are thereby aware of his negative view of contemporary things.

However, it is not right to think that Fujita does not provide any remedies for the new disease. As mentioned above, basically his logic is constituted by dialectic. In this respect, in his view, society always immanently contains negative factors, thereby necessarily taking the dialectical development; it therefore definitely cannot be understood in terms of a simple aspect. Perhaps this a priori assumption led Fujita to self-critically and self-reflectively recognise his society particularly by seeing the dialectic of the Kōdo Seichō; from this perspective, we can accurately understand why he had to leave the above pessimistic words. Fujita nonetheless seeks to find some effective ways to sublate the internal contradiction included in the Kōdo Seichō through focusing on the ‘dialectic of “experience”’ (keiken no benshōhō) (Iida 2006a: 334). This way of dealing with a problem is therefore not found simply by a single subjective therapeutic process. For him, the purpose is accomplished through intersubjectively constituted personal relationships; in this sense, it is achieved as if undergoing a psychoanalytic therapeutic process. To put it differently, essentially Fujita requires us to be involved in the interrelationship between the self and the other, even though they
accompany ‘pain’, in order that we can cure our respective diseases of narcissism and the narcissism of our society by ourselves – to this extent, it is implied that selves are prescribed by others. That is to say, it appears to be intended that ‘the analyst is required to undergo analysis in the role of patient in order to free himself from the very illnesses that he is later to treat as an analyst’ (Habermas 1987: 236; emphases added), and thereby, ‘both the social structure as a whole and the relation of the theoretician to society are altered, that is both the subject and the role of thought are changed’ (Horkheimer 2002b: 211; emphases added). Perhaps this is why Fujita particularly highlights the importance of ‘reforming our spiritual structure by ourselves’ (seishin kōzō no jiko kakumei) (1997c: 18; emphases added; cf. 1998b: 213; 1998c: 180, 191; 1997g: 61).

(a) ‘How, then, ought we to do?’

As we have seen, Fujita provides his theoretical stance of narcissism primarily in his three quasi-psychoanalytic essays, ‘Kon’nichi no keiken’, ‘Narushizumu’ and ‘Anraku’. Basically, these articles make an examination of society and carry out a diagnosis of the disease of society. It is important to note that not only do those tasks conduct analyses of society, meant by the two terms examination and diagnosis, but significantly they also aim at achieving treatment through examining society and diagnosing the disease. In fact, they are respectively subtitled ‘What Prevents Us Experiencing?’, ‘A Way of Finding out the Essence of Things’ and ‘Towards the Restoration of Intersubjectivity’, all of which intend the objective of prescription. Also, his emphasis on a remedial purpose can be explained by his series of normative enquiries as to ‘[h]ow, then, ought we to do?’ (1997e: 15), and ‘[h]ow should we do . . .?’ (1997e: 26). In these respects, Fujita, while quite pessimistically viewing the present social circumstances, attempts to relieve society in a seriously diseased condition, seeking for the exact meaning of his most important conception of experience by using his fundamental method of internal understanding.

‘How, then, ought we to do?’ Fujita answers this enquiry in terms of his phenomenological-psychoanalytic standpoint, which indeed integrates his conventional perspective into a new one. He begins this task by reflecting on the process that society has lost experience – admittedly, for him his later work was directed entirely towards identifying this process. Fujita’s conception of experience, however, covers a wide range of his theory of philosophy, so here I cannot develop his argument about it, following my above discussion concerning the signification of the concept. Instead, I concentrate my exploration on seeing his phenomenological-psychoanalytic viewpoint intertwined with his psychoanalytic perspective, which sheds much light on an understanding of his
suggestions on the basis of reflections on some meanings of the ‘loss of experience’.

(b) Intersubjectivity (sōgo shutaisei)

In Fujita’s phenomenological theory, the existence of his conception of ‘intersubjectivity’ is indispensable for restoring experience. Basically, this term is offered by his representative later works, such as ‘Shinpin bunka’ (The World Surrounded by Finished Products) (1981) (1997d: 8) and ‘Aru sōhitsu no keiken: Kakurenbō no seishinshi’ (The Experience of Deprivation: An Intellectual History of Hide-and-Seek) (1981) (1997d: 30, 31, 37), in which that is oriented towards establishing a ‘free society interrelating people’ (jiyū na sōgōteki shakai) (1997d: 42). To be sure, his conception of intersubjectivity is constructed primarily in his later writings, but the construction is not confined to those works. For instance, ‘“Puroretaria minshushugi’ no genkei” e no hochū’ (A Postscript to ‘The Principles of Proletarian Democracy’), which is supposed to have been written just after having published the original text (1964) – unfortunately the published year of this writing has not been made clear – employs the term ‘intersubjective’ (sōgo shutaiteki) for describing Lenin’s political theory in conjunction with his series of sociopolitical terms ‘interrelation’ (sōgo kankei, sōgosei) and ‘interrelatedness’ (sōgo kanrensei, sōgo izonsei, sōgo kainyūsei), all of which signify exactly the appearance of intersubjectivity (1997b: 107). Also, it is believed that the method of immanent critique attained through studying Hegel’s dialectic was aimed precisely at founding interrelationships based on its intersubjectivity, that is at ‘establishing “society”’ (shakai no kōchiku) (Ichimura 2010: 418); the mind that recognises a ““being in nature” “as in itself and as reasonable”” (sonzaisuru mono wo sore jishin ni oite risiteki na mono to shite) is one which Fujita learnt from Hegel in his understanding (1997c: 156). That is to say, this epistemological tool helps Fujita to construct his phenomenological-psychoanalytic conception of intersubjectivity. In other words, the existence of Hegel, constituting Fujita’s philosophical epistemology formulated in his early years, is indispensable for the foundation of society based on the mutual relationship between the self and the other. These pieces of evidence clearly explain why the concept connects his early concern with his later concern.

Perhaps the term intersubjectivity is most famous as Husserl’s important conception, and the concept is therefore understood mostly through his phenomenology. My investigation, however, does not refer to his theory of phenomenology. Instead, my concern is simply to briefly examine how it has been formed, focusing on Honneth’s terminology of intersubjectivity; for his exact con-
ception draws its inspiration from Hegel. It would seem that his conception of the term will greatly contribute to grasping the central meaning of the concept.

Scholars in the English-speaking world must have known the name of Honneth primarily through his theory of ‘recognition’, constituted by his representative works such as *The Struggle for Recognition* (1995 [1992]), whose idea was put forward by drawing attention to the role of the young Hegel’s notion of ‘struggle for recognition’. Indeed, this work precisely provides Honneth’s conception of intersubjectivity. As a matter of fact, he recognises that there is an important clue to a new foundation of socially formed, given and received recognition in the young Hegel’s conception of the theory of recognition. In Honneth’s view, recognition is based on intersubjective mutual relationships in the positive sense of having some possibilities for normatively founding a social theory by transforming the concept, on the one hand, and it later led Hegel to establish *The Phenomenology of Spirit* in the negative sense of reducing the normative concept simply to labour, on the other. My investigation, however, will not describe the developmental process of Honneth’s theory of recognition, but it will instead concentrate its task on gaining a brief understanding of the concept of intersubjectivity through shining a light on his phenomenological epistemology.

As mentioned above, Honneth’s theory of intersubjectivity is proposed primarily by *The Struggle for Recognition*, which attempts to reflect on the young Hegel’s theory of recognition. In my view, it is an epoch-making work in the sense of incorporating the concept of intersubjectivity into normative theory. In fact, it seems that in the writing it effectively functions in establishing his theory of recognition, which first of all tries to transform the conceptual value of recognition from the mere labour, which Hegel reduced normative significance to, into intersubjective recognition responding to normative claims, seeking to change the sociopolitical view of human history from the ‘struggle for self-preservation’ into the ‘struggle for recognition’ (Honneth 1995: chs. 1-3). Honneth aims not only to lead the term to fulfil its function, but quite interestingly, also to practically lay the foundations of the concept of recognition primarily by introducing Mead’s social psychology and psychoanalytic object relations theory in the work (1995: ch. 4). Then, he enables intersubjective functions to work in ‘empirical events within the social world’ (1995: 68). This allows intersubjective recognition to be regarded as the three actual forms of recognition, ‘love’, ‘rights’ and ‘solidarity’, which Honneth himself has proposed through arranging Hegel’s motif (1995: chs. 5-6). Finally, he shows that intersubjective mutual relationships result in performing a function in moral foundations in the following two ways: first, by comparing Hegel’s theory of recognition to Marx’s, Sorel’s and Sartre’s social theories, all of which, according
to Honneth, failed to be aware of the moral basis of recognition (1995: ch. 7); and second, by demonstrating that social conflicts are essentially provoked for gaining intersubjective recognition (1995: ch. 8). He comes to the conclusion that, ‘[t]he three distinct patterns of recognition then represent intersubjective conditions that we must further presuppose, if we are to describe the general structures of a successful life’ (1995: 174; emphases added).

From these perspectives, what can we see in respect of Honneth’s conception of recognition particularly concerning its intersubjective functions I emphasised above? Perhaps, first, one must perceive that it is basically concerned with a way of understanding of history. Second, one might recognise that it affects ways of understanding of social justice (e.g. Fraser and Honneth 2003). Third, one can see that it is about what morality should be. It would seem that they are all appropriately acceptable. However, I am unwilling to highlight all those views on the grounds that they are aware simply of an aspect of recognition respectively, and therefore fail to precisely grasp the core of the conception. To conclude, in my view, Honneth’s conception of recognition is rather associated primarily with his philosophical-anthropological viewpoint of how the self and the other are interrelated with each other, and thus, if the above standpoints do not notice this fact, then they miss the most important point.

From this perspective, we can probably see the individual in a considerably different way, in which individuals are not intertwined with one another simply in one direction of influence. Honneth suggests that they instead mutually affect and are affected by each other, and therefore that their behaviour is determined by their respective effects per se; this elucidates why we are fundamentally intersubjectively correlated with one another. The psychiatrist Harry S. Sullivan, for example, well explains this dynamics in terms of interpersonal relationships in psychoanalytic interviews – while his account, however, is insufficient for completely describing intersubjectivity, it is nevertheless quite relevant to my research. He writes:

The gist of the matter is that self-understanding is not primarily an intellectual achievement. . . . it is a work primarily of intuition, of grasping the ‘whole’ of a configuration. . . . the method of statement, unsupported by the method of free fantasy, cannot provide rational insight – however much the insight of the questioner may assist the intuition of the subject-individual. And . . . the rational insights of the interviewer cannot expend the totality of human personality, be he the most ‘analyzed’ person extant. There is always interaction between interviewer and interviewee, between analyst and analysand, and from it, both must invariably learn if sound knowledge of the subject-personality is to result (1984: 334).

First of all, it is noteworthy and we cannot help being surprised that Sullivan
presented this view through conducting practical experience of psychotherapy over eighty years ago. For his description clearly shows that in psychoanalytic therapeutic interviews the perception of an analyst as an interviewer psychologically brings about the change of his patient’s mind as an interviewee and vice versa. Most importantly, however, we definitely should not think that this psychological mechanism functions only in psychoanalytic therapy. It should rather be regarded as a function in actual interrelationships in miniature. Significantly, in other words, Sullivan precisely tells us that human beings are essentially mutually correlated with each other, that is to say, ‘[n]o two people have ever talked together with entire freedom of either one from effects of interaction of the other’ (1984: 328); for this reason, in his view, ways of our personality development even depend upon the same principle. This is why, as Sullivan puts it, ‘in the schizophrenic process and in the preliminaries of schizophrenic illness – so common among adolescents who are having trouble in their social adjustments – can be seen . . . glimpses which will combine as a mosaic that explains many more than half of the adult personalities that one encounters’ (1974: 201-2; emphases added); in this sense, for him schizophrenia is a mental disorder of interpersonal relationships, that is Schizophrenia as a Human Process (Sullivan 1974; cf. 1973, 1997). Most importantly, this signifies that human beings are intrinsically interrelated with each other.

As noted above, however, his standpoint does not succeed in offering the complete intersubjective view; it has not yet achieved a rigorous understanding of the concept in the sense that Sullivan’s ‘subject’ has not been able to fully absorb the eye of the other. With respect to this issue, phenomenological psychopathology appears to manage to provide a more thorough perspective of intersubjectivity. Wolfgang Blankenburg is one of the persons who enable their disciplinary stance to shed much light on the implication of the notion. (On this view, I will also have to concern myself with Husserl’s conception of intersubjectivity in conjunction with his term ‘lifeworld’ in the future.) He says:

The other is not simply a specific form made up inside the world. Rather, relationships with others – since they establish intersubjectivity (Intersubjektivität), and constitute the world at the same time – are a constitutive component which defines inner-worldliness (innerweltlichkeit) and natural self-evidence (natürlichen Selbstverständlichkeit) concerning human existence (1971: 199).

His account illuminates why the human mind is constituted not only by the perception of the self but also of the other. The semantic importance described by the above viewpoint does not simply give this fact. Much more importantly, it rather emphasises that the constitution of the ‘natural self-evidence’ (natür-
lichen Selbstverständlichkeit) of the self is largely dependent upon the existence of and relationship with the other. This well explains that the formation of our mind essentially undergoes intersubjective cognitive processes amongst the self and the other. At the same time, therefore, the above view elucidates why the schizophrenic patient requires 'himself to recognise himself as in others' (Kimura 2005: 235); in this respect, as the psychopathologist Bin Kimura stresses, indeed non-schizophrenia patients are even no exception to this rule (2005: 248-51). (This would perhaps remind one of Hegel’s ‘self-knowledge of the other’ we saw above in respect of this issue. As regards this concept, it is interesting to note that Kimura has introduced into this argument primarily concerning the constitution of intersubjectivity in schizophrenic patients the concept of the ‘absolute other’ (zetтай no ta), whose term was put forward by the Japanese philosopher Kitārō Nishida (1870-1945), who profoundly affected the later foundation of the Kyoto School (Kyōto gakuha) (2005: 70-1, 176-7, 250-70, ch. 10). It is expected that, in relation to Fujita’s phenomenological perspective, this topic will be dealt with in the future.)

What, most importantly, do these psychiatric perspectives intend by highlighting intersubjectivity? One is, no doubt, that the perception of our mind is created through a mutual-subjective cognitive process – it is noted that my discussion does not care about the issue of whether this view is experimentally plausible, but it rather draws attention to the intention that can be anticipated in terms of the above exploration carried out by applying some psychiatric standpoints. Indeed, this point is closely associated with Honneth’s theory of recognition. As a matter of fact, he takes notice of the ‘subject’s self-perception’, which is indeed always built through intersubjective relationships, attempting to challenge and modify the classical standpoint of political theory. Honneth claims:

In acting, the property-seizing subject had initially been occupied only with itself. It carried out the act of seizure, egocentrically conscious solely of expanding its economic holdings by one additional object. The counter-reaction of its partners to interaction brings home, for the first time, the fact that in acting it related indirectly to its social environment as well, by excluding others from the use of the object. In this sense, the other is constitutively included in the propertied subject’s self-perception as well, since the other has enabled it to decentre its initially egocentric way of looking at things (1995: 45).

This subject, thus, first attained the ‘self-knowledge of the other’. It must be stressed, however, that this picture tries to depict not only the fact that social conflicts are aimed at the acquisition of intersubjective recognition between subjects, but also the fact that recognition has been constituted and gained through social conflicts based on intersubjective interactions. Notwithstanding these acco-
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...ubjects, nonetheless, there remains a troublesome problem of why intersubjective recognition comes into existence even in the state of nature. With regard to this issue, Honneth answers as follows: ‘the conflict in the state of nature presupposes an implicit agreement between subjects, one that consists in the affirmation of each other as partners to interaction’ (1995: 46). According to him, this is justified on the grounds that ‘if the social meaning of the conflict can only be adequately understood by ascribing to both parties knowledge of their dependence on the other, then the antagonized subjects cannot be conceived as isolated beings acting only egocentrically’, and therefore that ‘in their own action-orientation, both subjects have already positively taken the other into account, before they became engaged in hostilities’ (1995: 45). Honneth thus manages to lay the foundations of the concept of inter-subjectivity in his social theory, contending that ‘the first step in developing a morality of recognition consists in the essential proof that the possibility of moral injures follows from the inter-subjectivity of the human form of life’ (2007: 137). From this perspective, we can see that indeed all human actions are based on intersubjective perceptions between subjects.

Not surprisingly, Fujita must have been aware of these pieces of knowledge despite a lack of his careful attention to psychiatry in general including psychoanalysis. In fact, his theory of inter-subjectivity is profoundly affected by such disciplinary standpoints combined together by Honneth (e.g. Fujita 1997d: 289; 1997e: 84-5, 89, 214-8). (It is evident that Honneth’s theory of recognition constituted by the phenomenological semantics of inter-subjectivity is built up intermediately between Hegel and psychoanalysis in particular. It is noteworthy that, apart from Hegel, Honneth’s epistemological framework of recognition relies heavily upon social psychology and psychoanalysis particularly for establishing his theory of inter-subjectivity – see, e.g. 1995: pt II; 2007: chs. 7-8.) It is quite interesting to note that, for instance, Fujita lays great stress on the political-theoretical significance of inter-subjectivity in conjunction with the term experience in his several important later works (1997d: 1-45, 259-89; 1998c: 435-62); this clearly shows that for him the concept was aimed precisely at restoring experience, that is at curing the narcissism of society. In this respect, it is admitted that the concept gives him a certain positive sense of leading society to reform itself. As a matter of fact, as we have seen, the term inter-subjectivity, epistemologically signifying some intrinsic human nature, contributes to recognising that we human beings are intrinsically involved in interpersonal relationships with others, exactly thereby creating our society by ourselves. Fujita writes:

How ought we to do . . . ? . . . basically, we should achieve a full-scale reform of the ego (jiga). We ought to aim at changing the narcissistic ego (narushizumu no jiga) to one who
considers others (tasha); . . . so that I can think about others, therefore I am (watashi wa tasha ni tsuite kangaeru. Yue ni watashi wa sonzaisuru). . . . Nowadays, however, it is difficult to carry out this task by such a Descartian way of requiring absolute certainty. . . . there is only the way that, ‘[s]ometime I think; and sometime I am’ (watashi wa tokidoki kangaeru. Yue ni watashi wa tokidoki sonzaisuru). . . . Although, however, ‘I’ (watashi) have become an intermittently existent being (kanketsuteki sonzai) who sometimes exists after losing the Descartian certainty and stability, this being, importantly, performs the function of giving us inhibition and control; it plays a significant role in stopping narcissism increasing itself. The narcissistic way is disrupted and inevitably restarts the action whenever encountering beings who care about things (mono). And if the number of intermittently existent beings increase, and if intermittency (kanketsusei) increases the frequency of appearance of those beings, then it will be possible to identify the existence of others and to restore natural beings outside them as a result of making sure of mutuality (sōgōteki na shūgō) amongst the beings; thereby, they will be us (wareware) who connect ourselves with such beings without seeking return (1997e: 26-8).

It might seem that we have difficulty in accurately understanding these sentences rhetorically expressed. In my view, however, the main point in grasping some important meanings of his above description lies in the last section, which makes us aware of an intersubjective aspect of human beings in terms of a phenomenological epistemology. In short, Fujita attempts to lead us to rediscover the social that proposes its significant normative implication through presenting his view of intersubjectivity. Here I need to refer to neither Arendt nor Nietzsche for describing the concept, relying upon its simple negative implication; the validity of this way of understanding is shown exactly by the fact that the term is a typically dialectical concept. Perhaps, nonetheless, with regard to this issue it is worth recalling that, since zōon politikon was put forward by Aristotle, it has aroused a long-lasting controversy about the concept of ‘the social’ (shakaiteki na mono) primarily between the disciplines of politics and sociology (Ichinokawa 2006: pt II) – on this view, as the Japanese sociologist Yasutaka Ichinokawa suggests, it is possible to suppose that in Aristotle there already existed knowledge about the latter academic field (2012: 1-6).

Through the social (shakaiteki na mono)

Significantly, Ichinokawa seeks to find a normative and positive implication of the social through shining a light on Jean-Jacques Rousseau in particular. He, first, explains that Seneca had translated Aristotle’s zōon politikon as the Latin animal socialis, and that this translation was later absorbed by Thomas Aquinas, depending upon Arendt’s discussion (2006: 90). Ichinokawa, second, points out that Arendt’s view of this issue is not right about Aquinas as he had also understood Aristotle’s original term as civilis, and therefore that it is believed that this
The word, as he emphasises, is almost the same: the English ‘civil animal’ as the French ‘l’homme civil’, which in his view signifies ‘court society’ (kyūtei shakai) and ‘civil animals’ in palaces (reigi tadashiku furumau dōbutsu tachi) typifying the ‘class system’ (mibunsei) that existed since the Middle Ages (2006: 93–5). Ichinokawa, finally, comes to the conclusion that Arendt failed to understand this negative genealogy of the Greek politikon and the Rousseauian sense of civilis, and that, in contrast to her, Rousseau critically broke free from this difficulty by applying the exact term social, thereby enabling the concept of ‘civil’ to change itself to a positive term (2006: 95). Indeed, Ichinokawa subsequently continues this discussion. However, it is important to note that, exactly from the above perspective, he starts to modify the status quo of the social, whose normative sense, as he emphasises, has been removed primarily by Durkheim, Weber and Parsons, for the purpose of seeking for ‘what society ought to be’ (aru beki sugata no shakai) (2006: 35–45, 96); this is why he particularly highlights the significance that the social is a normative concept. Admittedly, in these respects, Ichinokawa reappraises Rousseau’s conception of the social primarily in the sense of its normative possibilities for enhancing the concept as required to comply with ‘equality’ (byōdō) and ‘liberty’ (jiyū) despite the fact that it failed to sublate the discrepancy between ‘difference’ (sai) and ‘equality’ (2006: 98–127).

How can we optimistically develop the dialectic of the social supported by Rousseau? For this purpose, I want to give a clue to its positive development by presenting the following standpoint: ‘human beings are vulnerable in the specific manner we call “moral” because they owe their identity to the construction of a practical self-relation that is dependent upon the help and affirmation of other human beings’ (Honneth 2007: 137; cf. Habermas 1990: 43–57). It is admitted that this stance is very close to my standpoint attained through laying the anthropological foundations in Part II as relying upon Kohut’s self psychology; that is to say, the signification described by this picture is almost the same as narcissism. This image of human beings, however, penetrates only a passive aspect of their characteristics – although in my view this is the exact most fundamental human intrinsic feature – and it therefore does not enable them to establish democratic politics. To deal with this problem, I need to seek to transform our simple way of thinking into a dialectical one, even though supporting the negative view of human characteristics. Again, I want to refer to Ichinokawa:

Man cannot live alone. He needs interpersonal relationships (sōgo kōryū) and cooperation (tasukeai) with others, namely the so-called society (shakai). In this respect, human beings are social beings (shakaiteki na sonzai) (2012: 3).
In sum, no one can live alone while being alone (the necessity of society), man is intrinsically passive while he cannot always be passive (narcissism), and he therefore needs to interact with others because of essentially being interrelated with them (the necessity of democracy); that is to say, everyone intrinsically requires others for themselves and thus the social, for they always stay in solitude. For this reason, man is a dialectical being in the first place. Ichinokawa seems to succeed in sublating the de-normative and normative concept of the social concerning the semantics of the term. It would seem that I also achieved my objective with the exception of the dialectic between ‘difference’ and ‘equality’, whose themes I did not concern myself with – my task here is only to see a normative implication of the social. From these perspectives, I find that the social definitely holds the normative sense of ‘interpersonal relationships’, by which we might identify the existence of others and restore natural beings outside them as a result of making sure of mutuality amongst intermittently existent beings; thereby, they will be us who connect ourselves with such beings without seeking return’ (Fujita 1997e: 28). This implies that, only if we can be aware of others and the importance of the existence of them through intersubjectively interacting with subjects, then we will also sublate the difference between the self and others amongst us; thereby the social would come into existence. However, I still remain in the dark about the issue of whether it is possible to realise ‘a full-scale reform of the ego’ (jiga no kumikae) (1997e: 26) – in this context Fujita’s term ego should be replaced with the self. Would that be possible? I do not believe so; rather, it would be enormously difficult to accomplish the task. (I shall discuss this view in the final chapter.) Basically, however, from this perspective Fujita’s social theory seeks to reform the ‘spiritual structure’ of our society for realising the social, only thereby actually bringing others who have been dead back to life in his view.

8. Concluding Remarks on Fujita’s Political Theory

Social theory or political theory?

Apparently, Fujita’s work shows itself to be a social theory rather than a political theory to the extent of my research. With regard to the adjective ‘social’, however, we definitely should not understand it only in Rousseauian terms and in Durkheimian terms. As we have seen, social theory as a discipline is concerned at least in both normative and descriptive engagements. In addition, it does not perform simply these two functions but also diagnostic and remedial functions,
both of which are indeed considered as descriptive in so far as those methodological standpoints are derived from Durkheim. With respect to the latter point, however, I rigorously divide these two important viewpoints from them in Durkheim’s sociological sense on the grounds that practically they contain reflective and critical features, and are based on the reflection of what society has so far been, in my view. Basically, therefore, I understand social theory as follows:

social philosophy is primarily concerned with determining and discussing processes of social development that can be viewed as misdevelopments (Fehlentwicklungen), disorders or ‘social pathologies’. . . . Since [the] primary task [of social philosophy] is the diagnosis of processes of social development that must be understood as preventing the members of a society from living as ‘good life’, it relies upon criteria of an ethical nature. Unlike both moral and political philosophy, therefore, social philosophy can be understood as providing an instance of reflection (Reflexionsinstanz), within which criteria for successful forms of social life are discussed (Honneth 2007: 4).

Honneth’s terms ‘social philosophy’ and ‘political philosophy’ are regarded exactly the same as social theory and political theory, respectively. As regards the former disciplinary functions, he clearly describes how the discipline sees its own research objects. While primarily social theory seeks for and identifies what disturbs the realisation of ‘good life’ (diagnoses), it also reflects upon what actually prevents human beings achieving a ‘healthy life’ (Fromm 1956). From this perspective, the critical function is indispensable for social theory, which aims precisely at emancipating us from the exact pathological situation (Horkheimer 2002b: 242-3; 2002c: 264-5, 270). For this purpose, in my view, somewhat reliable psychoanalysis and social psychology must be applied particularly for identifying what are ‘healthy’ and ‘unhealthy’ concerning society (Fromm 1956; Funk 2006; cf. Honneth 2007: 34-5), and we can thereby give an appropriate remedy for the first time. (As to the relation between social theory and political theory, see Appendix 1, section 3, in which it has been pointed out that my research is in favour of and reflects upon Critical Theory.)

From these perspectives, it is not surprising that Fujita’s social theory seems endowed with all the above theoretical features. Admittedly, to the extent of my research his theory fulfils those functions, as we have seen, taking account of the purpose of his work of diagnosing society as narcissism (reflection) and criticiising the society of Tennō system and totalitarianism, that is attempting to help us to break free from them (prescription). In addition, these tasks were directed exactly towards laying the normative foundations through his series of descriptive attempts. In these respects, in Fujita’s work the accent is on social theory rather than on political theory. Presumably, however, it is not right to believe that his theory thoroughly functions as a critical social theory for it
seems simply to act like that when focusing on his later work as far as my theoretical attempt is concerned. Nonetheless, it is undoubtedly true that, in Fujita’s theoretical framework, there exist the two types of theoretical components, social and political theories.

The status quo

I still remain in the dark about many issues concerning Fujita’s social and political theory. On this, first of all, I point to his conception of the ‘people’ (jinmin). This related particularly to his theory of the ‘sovereignty of the people’ (jinmin-shugi) is of huge importance for his political theory in the sense that, as Miyamura says, it is profoundly associated with his earliest task of the criticism of the Tennō system (Iida 2006a: 353) – for this research aim, for example, the following sources will be helpful (Fujita 1998b: 211-24, 225-7, 228-57, 335-48, 349-70, 380-3; 2006a: 119-48, 189-219, 279-310; cf. Iida 2006a: 280-329, 343-55; Makimura 2004; Wada 2004). Second, I point to his theory of ‘common sense’ (komon sensu, kyōtsū no shiki, kyōtsukō). It seems that he bases his theory of the sovereignty of the people largely on this concept – Fujita employs these Japanese terms, e.g. in the following sources (Fujita 1998b: 223, 318, 360, 383; 2006a: 337). Third, I refer to the theory of the ‘reform of spiritual structure’, whose issue was addressed by the above final investigation of this chapter but has not yet been completely made clear – on this, sources are as follows (Fujita 1997c: 1-43; 1998b: 211-24, 335-48; 1998c: 45-9, 177-86, 187-94). There also remain other important issues on Fujita’s work. To take one example, his theory of the state of the Tennō system his earliest concern proposed is characterised as one of them. His theory of fascism is also typified as one; significantly, this looks different from his theory of totalitarianism. Unfortunately, my primary aim was not to deal with these issues. It will be particularly interesting to carry out an exploration of connecting his theory of the Tennō system with the theory of mass society. Chikanobu Michiba, for instance, tackles this theme in relation to the Japanese political theorist Keiichi Matsuhita’s theory of mass society (Michiba 2004).

With regard to the status quo of research into Fujita’s work, many scholars either organise his materials (e.g. Iida 2006a, 2006b) or aim at conducting an explanatory task of his thought (e.g. Hondō 2004; Ichimura 2010; Iida 2006a; Miyamura 2009) on the basis of their historical concern. Of course, I do not deny the significance of these tasks, and they are even of considerable relevance to present-day scholarship – in particular, Iida’s work is a noteworthy historical effort. Instead, however, it is problematic that most of them do not try to deal with and overcome problems proposed by Fujita nor those of his theory, do not seek to see
them in accordance with some social concern, and therefore result in simply generating explanatory works; this might be associated with the fact that most works on Fujita have been conducted by the Maruyama circle and its acquaintances. Quite ironically, many researchers, while categorising their own branch as one of the social sciences, have not attempted and have failed to tackle social issues in respect of Fujita’s theme; they seem simply to have showed historical and philological concern. In fact, in works focusing particularly on Fujita there are only a few articles written by scholars who specialise in the academic fields in the so-called social sciences (Makimura 2004; Nagahara 2004; Taguchi 2001; Wada 2004); in this respect, the status quo is a natural consequence. In addition, therefore, the many do not pose any challenge to Fujita’s view of society, politics, methodology, epistemology, and so on, that is to his exact theory itself, and thus there is no criticism of his work with the exception of Wada’s article; they solely praise Fujita and his thought to the skies. Obviously, this is a crucial matter. As opposed to them, I am critical of his theory while admitting the relevance of his theoretical ingredients; to take one example, as far as my research is concerned, it seems to me that, with respect to Fujita’s remedies for narcissism (and totalitarianism as well), while effective to a certain extent to those diseases, they nevertheless include some great difficulties. To consider this issue, I want to quote the following sentences:

The more one shows his respect (sonkei), the more he shows a lack of criticism (hihanryoku), on the one hand, and the more one shows his disrespect (keibetsu), the less he shows his sympathy (kasetuteki kyōkanryoku). Russell claims that it is necessary to keep a balance (dōjisei) between respect and criticism (Hondō 2004: 87).

This standpoint was provided precisely by a researcher in Fujita’s thought. Indeed, his view may be methodologically quite relevant to research in general, and so I want to absorb it. It must be noted, however, that in Hondō’s style there is a troublesome problem that he himself, while referring to this relevant method, has ironically failed to accomplish the practice. It would seem that there is the core difficulty with scholarship in Japan exactly in this point. Not surprisingly, Fujita is the exact person who criticises such an ironical state Hondō has fallen into. He stresses:

They (university lecturers), first of all, cannot strictly criticise any tasks of their forerunners to whom they owe a debt of gratitude for caring about and hooking them up with a job there – particularly in very narrow Japanese academic circles. They, second, have considerable difficulty in becoming simple readers (ikkai no dokushonin) and disorganised thinkers (datsu-soshikiteki shisakusha) in so far as they are concerned in studying knowledge (gakumon) in the university system. . . . Under the symbolic Tennō system (shōchō Tennōsei), the actions
of understanding (rikai) and critique (hihan) are taken with neutral care (genseteki hairyo) and ordinary diffidence (jōshikiteki enryo) (1997e: ii-iii).

He quite accurately sees the core problems in scholarship in Japan. How, then, can we deal with it? Significantly, Fujita actually replies to this question.

From a spiritual structural (shisō kōzōteki) perspective . . . many scholars cannot distinguish between a respectful internal understanding (songen ni michita naizaiteki rikai) of accumulated past works and a strictly relevant critical analysis (kon'nichiteki hitsuyō kara suru genkaku na hihanteki kentō), and therefore cannot balance the former and the latter or combine them; a genuine and authentic understanding, by no means affected by trends or popular consciousness, is brought about by a balance between and a combination of them. . . . the task of studying works carried out previously, in contemporary society, requires one's attitude that distinguishes, balances and establishes the connection between understanding (rikai) and critique (hihan), and between respect (sonkei) and earnestness (kibishisa) (1997e: iii).

Perhaps we have a lack of ‘critique’ and ‘earnestness’ in Fujita’s sense, which has brought social theory and political theory in Japan to a fatal flaw; in this sense, we might be unable to either understand or respect anything. In the first place, however, in my view it is unnecessary to refer to any knowledge in order to see such a crucial fact easily to know. This signifies that the fault is our exact problem that underlies our style itself, and that must and can definitely be dealt with only by us. Hence, it is directed not at Fujita, who is not alive, but at scholars in existence; needless to say, in this respect, this fact is not necessarily mediated by Fujita. Did, then, Fujita himself in large degree achieve this practice? It would be possible to know the truth for the first time after gaining the genuine and authentic method of ‘immanent critique’. We have not yet dealt with the problem raised by Fujita at the moment when it has taken ten years since he passed away. In these respects, overcoming Fujita signifies exactly overcoming this problem.

Notes

1 With respect to the person of Fujita, there are some great works such as biographies that precisely depict both the man and his intellectual activities (e.g. Iida 2006a, 2006b; Miyamura 2009; Sakurai 2014 – in particular, Iida’s works describe Fujita’s theoretical activities including his bibliography in great detail). Unfortunately, however, there is no translation of his writings nor any work focusing on Fujita in English and any other European languages. But there exists a translation of Zentaishugi no jidai keiken into Korean (Fujita 1998d), the contents of which are slightly different from the original. Also, there is a great work on
Fujita in German that focuses on his early contributions (Seifert 2010). Furthermore, Miriam Silverberg's Erotic Grotesque Nonsense refers to Fujita in English (2007: 265-6).

2 This is counted as Fujita's 'first article' (shojo ronbun) despite the fact that he previously published several essays, such as 'Kōdōryoku to shite no gunbu: Nihon fashizumu no kōzō' (The Military as Leverage: The Structure of Fascism in Wartime Japan) (1951), contributed to Tōdai Shinbun (The University of Tokyo Newspaper) when he was a student at the University of Tokyo, and 'Shohyō: Shinobu Seizaburō Taishō seijishi 1, 2' (A Book Review: Seizaburō Shinobu's The Political History of the Taishō Period, vol. 1, 2) (1952), written in conjunction with Giichi Inumaru, who was a member of Tōkyō Daigaku Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai (Historical Science Society) – on this view, see, e.g. Miyamura 2009: 149. It is noted that Haruo Miyamura uses the expression of shojo ronbun, meaning the first written and published article, in his 'Editor's Note for The Writings of Shōzō Fujita, vol. 1' (1998: 318). However, this word is not provided in his work later published noted above, in which the contribution was to some extent modified. In the latter work, Miyamura has replaced it by the words of 'Fujita's first writing' (Fujita no hajimete no ronbun) (2009: 149; emphases added).

3 Fujita's terms 'state of the Tennō system' and 'society of the Tennō system' will be explained in sections 2 and 5 below.

4 In his lecture in 1985 – this was later published as 'Tennōsei ni tsuite' (On the Tennō System) printed in the work Hōsei Heiwa Daigaku kōgiroku 3: Heiwa to yutakas a wo toinaosu (Transcripts of Lectures at Hōsei Peace University 3: The Reflection of the Meanings of Peace and Affluence) edited by Hōsei Heiwa Daigaku (Origin Publishing Centre, 1991) – with respect to the view that he is regarded as a scholar of the Tennō system, Fujita himself says as follows: 'he [facilitator of the programme] requested me to give a lecture on the Tennō system on the grounds that I'm regarded as a specialist in the system . . . To be sure, I explored and wrote some articles on it in youth, but I didn't do anything about it except for such tasks, and merely carried out research into the Tennō system in the post-Meiji period . . . so I'm not even a leading professional or a working specialist in the Tennō system' (Fujita 1998c: 480-1).

5 Hashikawa is a famous follower of Maruyama.

6 It is believed that the 'period of despair' marked a turning point in his career, around between the early 1960s and the middle 1970s. For example, Iida clearly mentions that "Kōdo Seichō" hantai' (A Protest Against 'High Growth') (1969) marked the point (e.g. Iida 2006a: 346-7).

7 The early and later Fujita will be explained in Appendix 3.

8 Exceptionally, Iida perceives that Fujita devoted himself to the subject especially in his later years. In fact, Iida gives a brief description that Fujita willingly conducted research into 'psychopathology' (seishin byōrigaku), which is, according to him, one of the 'studies of the twentieth century' (nijusseikiteki na gakumon), such as anthropology (jinruigaku), mythological studies (shinwagaku), linguistics (gengogaku), social history (shakaishi-gaku) and folklore (minzokugaku), in which it is important for Fujita to lay the foundations of the 'primordial conditions' (genshoteki jōken) (see App. 3, pp. 254, 262) of human beings, society and culture (2006a: 316).

9 Here Fujita clearly mentions that he knew the term spiritual structure through the Japanese translation of a German term (1998c: 680) which is presumed to be 'die geistig-seelische Struktur' (Maruyama 2007: 142).

10 This article is printed in Zentaishugi no jidai keiken.
These articles are also printed in Zentaishugi no jidai keiken.

Fujita introduced this term from Richard Sennett’s The Uses of Disorder (1970) (see Sennett 1974: 8).

Correctly, this work is entitled Byōsha to shakai.

The Japanese expression of ‘-san’ is a title that is put to the right of both a man’s name and a woman’s name equivalent to the English Mr, Ms, Miss and Mrs.

This expression, indeed, is not offered in the work Jiko nai taiwa. As far as I know, it has not yet been made clear when and where the words were first provided. However, it is sometimes said that the term was often used in Maruyama’s later seminars.

This is David Noble’s translation (Karube 2008: 117).

Interestingly, in his later years Maruyama drew attention to the narcissistic connection between the self and the other – it is important to remember, however, that his view is simply based on its negative aspect, and also that it does not absorb any specific psychoanalytic perspective. In 1969, for example, on the theme of the meaning of ‘self-critique’ (jiko hihan) he provides a brief account of the undifferentiated self, actually employing both the terms self (jiko) and other (tasha): ‘it is contradicio in adjecto that [t]he self criticises the self for the purpose of criticising the other’ (Maruyama 1998: 86-7). Also, around between 1961 and 1987 – the certain dates when sentences were written are often not recorded in the work, in which two memorandums and a diary were edited and printed, as noted above – Maruyama wrote that ‘society with pathological symbiosis’ (mochitsu motaretsu shakai) – this is also used in a negative sense – relies upon the feature that ‘everyone is not independent [of others] and is dependent upon others (tasha) one another’ (1998: 147). Instead, he highlights the necessity for society to consist of ‘heterogeneous others’ (ishitsu na tasha) and others (1998: 148). Furthermore, in my view Maruyama already put forward the same viewpoint in his early writing ‘Chō-kokkashugi’. See his following sentences: ‘the self comes to identify his own interests with those of the Emperor, and the self automatically regards his enemies as violators of the Emperor’s powers’ (1969b: 13; translation modified; [1995b: 28]); ‘the self involved a constant impulse to unite oneself with the ultimate entity, and the resultant sectionalism was of a far more active and aggressive type than that associated with feudalism’ (1969b: 15; translation modified; [1995b: 30-1]); ‘Society was so organized that each component group was constantly being regulated by a superior authority, while it was imposing its own authority on a group below’ (1969b: 16; [1995b: 31]). It is possible to presume that all of these pathological phenomena essentially stem from a symbiotic fixation in which the self are undifferentiated from the other, and perhaps Maruyama must have been aware of the essence of this problem; this can be regarded exactly as a negative aspect of narcissistic dependency. If this is true, then Maruyama’s famous and important concepts such as the ‘system of irresponsibility’ (musekinin no taikai) and the ‘transfer of oppression’ (yokuatsu ittō) are also elucidated by some theories of narcissism. It must be noted, however, that his above descriptions and terms are directed towards the criticism of Japan, particularly towards the criticism of a Japanese narcissistic tendency that, in Maruyama’s view, is deep-seated in Japanese society.

Taking account of his early work, Fujita is definitely regarded as an ‘epic political theorist’, whose concept was presented by Wolin: ‘he attempts [not only] to change men’s views of the world . . . [but also] . . . to change the world itself’ (1969: 1080; emphases added). It is admitted that Fujita’s political theory contains a ‘radical critique’ in Wolin’s sense in the sense that Fujita aimed at reforming politics itself through formulating some significant theoretical
frameworks directed at establishing genuine and authentic democracy, such as the sovereignty of the people and *jinmin-shugi*.

19 This term was first employed in ‘Shihai genri’ (1998a: 45). Its framework, however, had already been provided in the preceding work ‘Tennōsei’: the ‘society of the Tennō system’ fulfils the ‘political and social functions of the Tennō system’ (*Tennōsei no seijiteki shakaiteki kinō*) (1998a: 4).

20 This postscript, which was written forty years later after ‘Shihai genri’ (1956) had been first published on November 1996, and which consists of fifteen pages, is entitled ‘Shinpen e no atogaki: Kakinokoshita bubun no suan no danpen’ – abbreviated to ‘Shinpen e no atogaki, “Shihai genri”’ below. This elucidates how important the subject of the society of the Tennō system was for Fujita.

21 In ‘Tennōsei’, Fujita explains that the establishment of the ‘absolutist Tennō system’ (*zettaishugi Tennōsei*), namely the state of the Tennō system, was completed just at the time when the Meiji government started to open the Imperial Diet (*Teikoku Gikai*) and promulgated the Imperial Edict on National Education (*Kyōiku Chokugo*) in 1890 (1998a: 7). As he says, the year was exactly ‘during the three years before and after 1889’ (1998a: 18).

22 In this writing, Maruyama says, ‘“Those things”, writes Hegel, “that are free in an interior sense and that exist within the individual subject must not enter into the purview of the law.” It was precisely the sanctity of such an interior, subjective sphere that the Japanese law failed to recognise. On the contrary, inasmuch as the law of the land in Japan arose from the “national polity” [*kokutai*], which was an absolute value, it based its validity on inner or contentual [sic], rather than on external or formal, norms and was thus free to operate in all those interior realms from which law in the West had been excluded’ (Maruyama 1969b: 6; [1995b: 22]). Here Maruyama analyses the ‘spiritual structure’, focusing particularly on the ideological function of the ‘national polity’. Fujita does it, drawing attention to the fundamental framework of the ‘Tennō system’.

23 In an introduction to *The Writings, vol. 6*, Fujita writes by using the adjectives ‘unprejudiced’ (*kōsei de*) and ‘broad-minded’ (*kan’yō na*): ‘the “state of the Tennō system” is distinguished from the “society of the Tennō system” in the sense that statesmen responsible for the state often made unprejudiced and broad-minded decisions; they were far from enthusiasm (*nekkyōshugi*) . . . because their sense of responsibility brought about their sense of balance and fairness’ (1997e: iv). Needless to say, he intends this fact by the word of healthier.

24 Here Fujita intends Hirobumi Itō (1841-1909) and Masayoshi Matsukata (1835-1924), in addition to Tarô Katsura (1848-1913), who was less than a third-rate statesmen, says Fujita (1998a: 300-1). In Fujita’s view, even Meiji Tennō (1852-1912), who was also classified as a third- or fourth-rate Emperor by him, is included in statists in the period of the state of the Tennō system (1998a: 299).

25 In this context, he puts some names of ‘ruling elites’ (*seijika*), who differed from *seijika* as statesmen noted above, such as Gonnohyōe Yamamoto (1852-1933), regarded as ‘military elites’ (*gunjin*) (1998a: 301).

26 In ‘Shihai genri’, Fujita writes, ‘[H]ere society is ordered and institutionalised by the microcosmic hierarchy of the state of the Tennō system constituted by a host of Tennōs; this is regarded exactly as the establishment of the society of the Tennō system’ (1998a: 45). This elucidates why the feature of a mikoshi portable shrine is the core characteristic of the society of the Tennō system on the grounds that the mikoshi is the ‘palanquin of a Shinto god’ (Befu
and Guichard-Anguis 2003: 212), namely the symbol of the religious authority of the Imperial Household (Kōshitsu) and of communities in Japan.

27 Fujita does not use this term. Rather, I aim only at simplifying the concept.

28 On this view, rather ‘Shinpen e no atogaki “Shihai genri”’ (1996) even gives the impression that he intended to eliminate this aporia of his theory.

29 To be sure, Fujita distinguishes to a certain extent between Japanese problems which can be depicted by totalitarianism and those which cannot be done by the concept. As regards this issue, he says, ‘[t]he difference in the quality of Japan’s contemporary totalitarianism is drawn by the national heritage (dentō)’ (e.g. 1997e: 86). However, then, why did he particularly highlight the concept of the society of the Tennō system in his later years again? Did he intend to illuminate and address some characteristics of problems of Japan even if they are connected to totalitarianism? For these reasons, Fujita should rather have made the expression that contemporary Japan also has a strong aspect of totalitarianism.

30 To be sure, Fujita makes some significant distinction between some historical periods in respect of the society of the Tennō system by applying the term totalitarianism. However, it does not make any difference in national character between Japan and others on the grounds that the latter political concept also describes non-Japanese society – the concept of ‘contemporary totalitarianism’ does not seem to clearly describe the character traits peculiar to contemporary Japan too. In other words, a wide range of applications of the concept of totalitarianism contributes to removing clear differences between Japanese and other national characters. Is it true that Fujita intended such a thing? Of course, it is not. As a result, however, he has not been able to display the sole raison d’être of the term Tennō system. (As noted above, the term totalitarianism is derived from Fascist Italy, and the range of application of the concept has been expanded over the world. Famously, the term characteristically depicts Nazism and Stalinism, but it has also been applied to industrialised and democratic countries). Nonetheless, with respect to the process of the formation of Japanese Fascism in the 1920s, Fujita’s following view might appropriately be accepted in relation to totalitarianism: ‘[t]he corporatist state imagery drawn by revolutionary bureaucrats looks strikingly similar to Fascist Italy’s state corporatism declared by Mussolini’ (1998a: 168).

31 For example, as Chikanobu Michiba says, Fujita was indeed aware of the relation between the ‘society of the Tennō system’ and ‘mass society’ in 1957 (Michiba 2004: 214) – in his essay, Michiba compares Fujita’s theory of the society of the Tennō system with Keiichi Matushita’s theory of ‘mass Tennō system’ (taishū Tennōsei) (on this, see pp. 83-4), focusing on Fujita’s early works. Most importantly, however, Fujita did not make any connection between those concepts by giving a detailed description.

32 On this view, it is interesting to note that Fujita says that, ‘[t]he function of a Tennō as an individual can be applied to everyone else’ (1998b: 319). This principle is directly applied to his theory of the society of the Tennō system, that is to say, he has showed that the theory is applicable to different kinds of societies despite the name of the ‘Tennō system’.

33 I do not mean that substantially the Tennō system has not fulfilled its function in postwar Japan. Rather, I admit that the Tennō system has played a role in influencing people’s mind in the postwar period too, for example, in the sense that the emergence of the ‘mass Tennō system’, which is based on the new legitimacy of the Tennō system conferred by the ‘consent of the masses’, and which is therefore closely linked to the appearance of a ‘mass society’ in postwar Japan, explains how it has continued to perform a political function in Japan.
(Matsushita 1959). This new movement has often been raised by mass-media as the topic of the ‘Imperial Household of Japan’ (Kōshitsu) particularly in the late of the twentieth century.

34 As we shall see later, Fujita confuses the self and the ego in the sense that he does not distinguish between them.

35 It should be noted that Fujita had already applied the Japanese term jiko-ai, which is often regarded as equivalent to the English narcissism, for example, in his short article ‘Manhaimu no episōdo: Shōhyō no seishinteki zentei’ (An Episode of Mannheim: The ‘Psychological Requisites’ for Writing a Book Review) (1971). It must be stressed, however, that to devote myself to an identification of when he first employed the term is irrelevant to my disciplinary enquiry despite the importance of some differences between narcissism and jiko-ai in respect of his view.

36 As we have seen, this is also relevant to a psychoanalytic understanding of narcissism. For example, in Kohut’s psychoanalytic theory others always appear as ‘selfobjects’ (see Pt II above). Interestingly, it puts forward the view that, for the self, the other exists as an extension of himself; in this sense, the Kohutian self is essentially narcissistic. Kohut, however, does not deny this narcissistic need. In these respects, it must be noted that Kohut’s view is the diametrical opposite of both Fujita’s and Fromm’s. This issue will be tackled in the final chapter.

37 As regards this issue, it is interesting to note that Hiromasa Ichimura, who studied under Fujita, gives a great description of why the tendency to avoid encountering others has spread out in contemporary times from a psychopathological perspective with the use of Sennett’s expression of the ‘fear of the unknown’ (on this, see Sennett 1994 [1976]) (Ichimura 1996). According to Ichimura, contemporary people avoid encountering ‘the unknown’ (michi naru mono), namely the other, for ‘preventing “the unexpected” happening’ (yoteigai no dekigoto no kaihi); he says that this psychological attitude is essentially based on and stems from the ‘fear of the unknown’ (tasha e no osore) (1996: 77). From this perspective, Ichimura contends that ‘our psychological foundation constituting the “self” (jiko) is extremely vulnerable (kijaku), and that “this anthropophobia (kankei kyōfushō) escapes from conflicts (katto) in a complex context, and evades decision-making (sentaku no ninmu)’ (1996: 78). I am aware that this way of explaining the contemporary state of mind is very similar to Fujita’s argument. However, considering that Ichimura’s essay, referring to Sennett, was published in 1986, it is plausible to think that Fujita’s later work affected Ichimura’s.

38 This is Don Sanderson’s translation (Katō 1997: 155).

39 It is noteworthy that, in the same period when Fujita gave the lecture, he also learnt the importance of being aware of others from the Japanese Buddhist monk in Kamakura period, Shinran, in relation to the concept of spiritual preparedness (1997d: 298).

40 The original translation is ‘To know pine, study pine’.

41 Or, more rigorously, it can be argued that Fujita’s psychoanalytic perspective preceded his attention to the concept of experience for the former emerged much earlier. In ‘Kōdo Seichō’ (1969), for example, Fujita provided an interesting account of the narcissistic mind that, quite paradoxically, the self (jiko) gets caught up in the emotion of the moment (1998c: 6).

42 According to Hannah Arendt, as is well known, the signification of the adjective ‘private’ is ‘a state of being deprived of something’ (Arendt 1998: 38; emphases added).

43 In this respect, it is pointed out that Fujita regards the symmetrical object of other as both the self and the ego. This is, however, inappropriate as an understanding of contemporary psy-
choanalysis (e.g. Wada 1999). Admittedly, he confuses the ‘self’ (jiko) with the ego (jiga). I shall later raise this issue.

44 It is particularly important to note that first of all his way of understanding narcissism is profoundly associated with Fromm’s theory of narcissism. As we saw in the preceding chapter, it presents two kinds of narcissism, individual and group (social) narcissism. Significantly, Fujita’s account is in the same line of Fromm’s that individual narcissism causes social narcissism, in so far as ego narcissism and collective narcissism are regarded almost the same as individual and group narcissism respectively – group narcissism, in Fromm’s view, needs the cathexis of individual narcissism (see Ch. 4, s. 1). Also, Kohut’s psychoanalytic theory is in favour of Fujita’s way of understanding the mechanism in the sense that, as we have seen, Kohut’s important concept of ‘group self’ is regarded as an analogy with the individual self (see Ch. 4, s. 2). On this point, it is likely that Fujita read Fromm’s works while it is unlikely that he read Kohut’s.

45 More precisely, Japan moved to the bubble economy in 1986.

46 Osamu Kawasaki, for example, provides a great account of this work with regard to the implications of totalitarianism (2005: 352-3).

47 It is important to note that Fujita has abbreviated these three types of totalitarianism primarily to ‘totalitarianism as war’ (sensō (no) zentaishugi) (1997e: e.g. 59, 74, 76), ‘political totalitarianism’ (seiijiteki zentaishugi) (1997e: e.g. 69, 70, 75, 77) and ‘contemporary totalitarianism’ (gendai zentaishugi) (1997e: e.g. 86) respectively, for it is handy for repeated use.

48 In the sense of total mobilisation, Fujita’s understanding of total war has a lot in common with Erich Ludendorff’s famous classic account (Ludendorff 1936). In this respect, the former view, no doubt, has been affected by the latter.

49 It is important to remember that, basically, Fujita’s view of totalitarianism is different from Arendt’s in respect of ‘political totalitarianism’ only in the sense that he highlights the importance of the ‘decline of ideology’ (ideaorogi no keigaika) (1997e: 63-76).

50 Interestingly, in this respect, they take the same stance as Maruyama.

51 This term was provided by Fujita himself (e.g. 1997e: iii; 1998b: 383).

52 Quite interestingly, distinguishing self-love from narcissism and selfishness, Fromm highlights a paradoxical fact contained in the former concept, namely love for others (1949: 119-33; 1962: 57-63); in this respect, for him self-love has a positive meaning. On the contrary, however, according to Fromm, narcissism is the same as selfishness, and therefore means the incapacity to love (e.g. 1962: 61).

53 Fromm’s ‘pseudo self’ was put forward in his early writing Man for Himself (1947) (1949: 157-8). On the ‘false self’, see, e.g. Winnicott 1965. I borrow the connection between these two concepts from Marco Bacciagaluppi (e.g. 1991: 579; 1993: 2).

54 This is characteristically depicted by Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951).

55 For example, Sung-Eun Cho and Taraba also highlight the importance of this point (Cho 2012: 144-5; Taraba 2004: 175-6).

56 With respect to this issue, Fujita’s essay on Adorno, ‘Hihanteki risei no jojishi’ (An Epic of Critical Reason) (1979), may contribute to an understanding of the relationship.

57 On this point, I might seem to misunderstand when highlighting the importance of Fujita’s ‘experience of Marxism’ (Marukusushugi to iu keiken). Through this experience, as some researchers say, he took the opportunity of accepting Marx’s ‘method of immanent critique of objects’ (taishō naizai teki hihan no hōda), as Fujita himself called it (e.g. Ichimura 2010: 413-7). Hegel, however, should be much more emphasised in respect of Fujita’s method of internal
understanding in the sense that it is essentially based on *intersubjective recognition*, as we shall see later – undoubtedly, there must have been no such thing as an epistemological concept in either Marx or Marxism, which Fujita learnt knowledge from. For this reason, his method made up of phenomenological epistemology is aimed neither only at the history of writing nor at social reform. This is why my research lays too much stress on psychoanalytic epistemology, which no doubt influences Fujita’s political theory. Fujita’s later work, in my view, much more strongly puts forward this viewpoint, as exemplified by the fact that in his later writings his research accent is on *intersubjectivity*.

58 With regard to Hegel’s conception of intersubjectivity, Honneth sheds much light on an understanding of it (see Honneth 1995: ch. 2). Also, with respect to Honneth’s discussion it is important to remember that he establishes such a connection not by introducing some theory of narcissism but by applying George Herbert Mead’s theory of social self and the British psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott’s object relations theory. It is thus my understanding.

59 Perhaps Habermas best explains why psychoanalysis proposes an immanent-critical standpoint. He says: ‘the ego of the patient recognize [sic] itself in its other, represented by its illness, as in its own alienated self and identify with it. As in Hegel's dialectic of the moral life, the criminal recognizes in his victim his own annihilated essence’ (1987: 235-6). Also, the reason why Freud’s psychoanalysis requires *intersubjective recognition* is primarily because psychoanalytic treatment (dialogue) is always offered by the other as a psychoanalyst; in this sense, it establishes a *quasi*-intersubjective relationship. However, it is noted that Freud’s ego psychology is not based on and interested in the concept.

60 Not surprisingly, this epistemological standpoint was proclaimed by the early Habermas’s best writing *Knowledge and Human Interest* (1968). Thereafter, however, he seems to have gradually abandoned this stance. By contrast, Honneth appears to have retained this significant tradition of the Frankfurt School.

61 As we saw above, however, it does not seem to have been made clear why it must be called the Tennō system. In fact, unfortunately, no one has so far tried to answer this enquiry with respect to Fujita’s theory of the society of the Tennō system in any detail.

62 In this examination, however, I will not care about either whether Honneth’s understanding of Hegel is plausible or what Hegel actually intended by dialectical recognition. As far as my research is concerned, the theoretical validity of Honneth’s view of Hegel’s theory of recognition does not matter in so far as his interpretation helps me to accomplish the purpose of gaining a clear understanding of an aspect of the concept of intersubjectivity even if it is not acceptable. For developing the potential of Fujita’s phenomenological theory, I will simply establish a theoretical connection between Fujita’s and Honneth’s conceptions of intersubjectivity in my exploration.

63 Basically, this means that the person to whom one is talking largely determines one’s speech, tone, gesture and the like; that is to say, it is believed that the self changes his attitude *in accordance with the fact of who* the other is, and this apparent change, in Kimura’s view, stems from one’s ‘intuitive experience’ (*chokusetsu keiken*) made up by Husserl’s ‘noesis’ on the basis of the intersubjective relationship between the self and the other (Kimura 2005: 248-50). Needless to say, this mechanism is profoundly associated with the experience of intersubjectivity of human beings.

64 Honneth gives a further detailed account of this point by focusing on the ‘claim to individual rights’ after pointing out that ‘the anticipation of one’s own or the other’s death is supposed to lead to . . . recognition’: ‘through the reciprocal perception of their mortality, the
subjects in the struggle discover that they have already recognized each other insofar as their fundamental rights are concerned and have thereby already implicitly created the social basis for an intersubjectively binding legal relationship. For the explanation of this subsequent discovery, however, the reference to the existential dimension of death seems to be completely unnecessary. For it is the mere fact of the morally decisive resistance to its interaction partner that actually makes the attacking subject aware that the other had come to the situation harbouring normative expectations in just the way that it itself had vis-à-vis the other. That alone, and not the way in which the other asserts its individual rights, is what allows subjects to perceive each other as morally vulnerable persons and, thereby, to mutually affirm each other in their fundamental claims to integrity. In this sense, it is the social experience of realizing that one’s interaction partner is vulnerable to moral injury – and not the existential realization that the other is mortal – that can bring to consciousness that layer of prior relations of recognition, the normative core of which acquires, in legal relations, an intersubjectively binding form’ (1995: 48-9).

Famously, this expression was provided by Paul Valéry.

With respect to this issue, Wada’s work (2004) is exceptional in research into Fujita in the sense that it actually to a certain extent achieves an ‘immanent critique’ of Fujita’s theory.

Neither the history of ideas nor the history of political thought – occasionally, ironically, neither political theory nor social theory – is regarded as a branch of the social sciences. If they are believed to be the sub-disciplines of the social studies, then they necessarily hold some direct interest at least either in the social or in society itself; indeed, however, most often these disciplines do not seem to contain them. As a matter of fact, as far as I can see, it is difficult to find such a concern in any articles on Fujita published so far – to this extent, however, this fact may have no relation to their respective research areas. Notwithstanding these views, they definitely do not give the social sciences any priority.

Despite these circumstances, Hideharu Saito’s work, ‘Genshiryoku no sangyöteki riyö to “shijö keizai zentaishugi”: Fujita Shözö, Käru Poranni, Mishuru Fükö no shijö keizai ninshiki no kentö wo tōshite’ (The Industrial Use of Nuclear Energy and ‘Totalitarianism as Market Economy’: As seen from Shözö Fujita’s, Karl Polanyi’s and Michel Foucault’s Theories of Market Economy) (2013), is quite interesting in the sense that it attempts to grasp the core problems of nuclear power and to find a clue to solving those difficulties primarily by applying Fujita’s concept of ‘totalitarianism as market economy’ – this is the same as contemporary totalitarianism – and by seeking for common characteristics of Fujita’s, Polanyi’s and Foucault’s theories of totalitarianism and market economy. His work shows that we are in our daily living involved in an enormously risky game, in which we are all taking part in free competitive markets at the risk of our human capital, namely our lives. Indeed, it is not impossible to understand the present situation only in terms of totalitarian market economic system. His standpoint is nonetheless absolutely relevant to dealing with the issue. Saito’s article tries to help us to cope with the dialectical problem between two aspects of human capital as our life and ‘totalitarianism as market economy’ as our system, and it is thus a reflective and critical effort – in relation to my research, it is therefore regarded as an immanent criticism. In these respects, it is noted that the standpoint his work proposes is close to my research interest. For these reasons, it would seem that Saito’s concern can help us to break free from the current theoretical impasse.
CHAPTER 6

Erich Fromm:

The Death of Man

1. Psychoanalysis for Fromm

Perhaps Erich Fromm (1900-80) is a typical scholar whose certain branch is difficult to identify. This is elucidated primarily by his work as a whole which cannot be categorised simply as either sociology or psychology or social psychology or politics or philosophy or psychoanalysis. This clearly shows that Fromm carried out a wide variety of studies, and therefore that his efforts are not reduced to a certain academic field, despite the fact that he conducted research essentially on the basis of social psychology and psychoanalysis. His following words clearly tell his interdisciplinary concern: ‘[p]sychology can not [sic] be divorced from philosophy and ethics nor from sociology and economics’ (1971: ix). In fact, the interdisciplinarity of his academic concern is typically described by a series of Fromm’s writings themselves, for example, as follows: by his doctoral work which tackled the issue of ‘Jewish law’, which is profoundly associated with his Hebrew background, based on his sociological concern (1922); by his first sociopsychological article, ‘The Method and Function of an Analytic Social Psychology’ (1932), which underlay and greatly contributed to developing his fundamental analytic tool, ‘social character’; by Escape from Freedom (1941), which established the dialectical connection of politics between fascism and democracy, as laying the foundations of the above sociopsychological, methodological concept; by The Art of Loving (1956), which addressed philosophical and ethical aspects of love, relying primarily upon his
knowledge of philosophy and psychoanalysis; by *The Hart of Man* (1964), which put forward three kinds of human psychological evil on the basis of his psychoanalytic theory; by *To Have or to Be?* (1976), which sought what society ought to be, dividing our way of life up into the two modes, ‘having and being modes’. This picture leads us exactly to know that Fromm’s academic activity is not restricted to a certain discipline, and that his scholarly concern is considerably variable, while Weber, Marx and Freud form the intellectual framework of his work, as has often been mentioned (e.g. Okazaki 2004). From this perspective, it is plausible to believe that Fromm is an exact intellectual who accomplished the objective of philosophy in its original sense of *loving knowledge*.

Nonetheless, it appears that there is one common feature expressed throughout Fromm’s works: they all aimed at establishing a society in which human beings can fully develop their personality that displays ‘spontaneity’ – this is most often replaced by his conception of ‘activity’ meaning the ‘active’ – and ‘productive love’ on the basis of his humanistic ethics. From this perspective, it is possible to see that his therapeutic activity based on his psychoanalytic theory was rather directed towards the above end. However, this does not provide us with some new impression of Fromm. For example, in his relatively recent research Harold B. Davis has put forward almost the same view as mine, particularly emphasising ‘human development’ and ‘humanistic ethics’ (2006: 42). József Koch, over twenty years ago, also pointed out that ‘Fromm considered the supreme goal of human life to be the full development of one’s own personality and of one’s fellow man’ (1990: 4). These views show that the achievement of the above aim was the exact objective of Fromm’s psychoanalytic therapy and social and political theory.

With regard to this issue, however, I do not concern myself with the enquiry as to whether Fromm is a social theorist or a political theorist. For his theory no doubt contains theoretical components requisite for both theories; in particular, it is natural to regard him as the former to the extent that he began his work with sociology, which the former theory belongs to in the sense of its tradition (see App. 1, s. 3) – there already exist some works presenting this view (on the former, see, e.g. Elliott 2004; Wilde 2004, and on the latter, see, e.g. Okazaki 2004; Wilde 2004). Instead, my research interest is directed towards identifying some theoretical possibilities and difficulties of Fromm’s social and political theory, focusing on his theory of narcissism. With respect to his latter theory, however, virtually the issue is hardly dealt with in the field of psychoanalysis. As a matter of fact, for instance, several articles observe that his *psychoanalytic theory* has mostly been disregarded by the mainstream of psychoanalysis despite its significant contributions to the discipline (Bacciagaluppi 1990: 6; Bacciagaluppi and Biancoli 1993: 6; Greenberg and Mitchell 1983: 106; Lesser 2002: 23).
According to Marco Bacciagaluppi and Romano Biancoli, Fromm’s psychoanalytic theory of narcissism characterises this tendency (1993: 6). It would seem that this is a right view in the sense that, for example, *The Handbook of Narcissism and Narcissistic Personality Disorder* (2011), published by John Wiley and Sons, Inc., *only once* refers to Fromm. In this lexicon, his prominent work *To Have or to Be?* is referenced by social psychologists simply for describing ‘consumer behaviour’, which is, in their view, regarded as a contemporary narcissistic form (Sedikides et al. 2011: 382) – his theoretical contributions are almost completely disregarded by *forty four articles* included in this handbook despite the fact that the name of Christopher Lasch, albeit no specific contribution to psychoanalytic theory, is mentioned *three times* (Campbell and Miller 2011: 498). In addition, *Narcissism: A Critical Reader* (2007), edited chiefly by the psychoanalysts Anastasios Gaitanidis, contains *only a work* raising the topic of Fromm’s theory of narcissism (Mawdsley 2007: 176). The famous psychoanalytic theorist of narcissism Elsa F. Ronningstam, in her recent work, does *not* refer to Fromm at all (Ronningstam 2005). From these perspectives, it seems that those respective writers *even intend* to disrespect for him. In fact, my view of this issue does not appear to be wrong, taking account of the following evidence of its fact: quite interestingly, the psychoanalyst Ruth Lesser claims that one of the primary reasons for ignorance of Fromm is due to his ‘negative impact of the marketplace mentality’ (Lesser 2002: 24).

Despite the aforementioned facts, some researchers reappraise Fromm’s great contributions to the scholarship of the theory of narcissism. One of them is definitely Rainer Funk, who does highlight not only the significance of Fromm’s psychoanalytic theory particularly from a therapeutic perspective (e.g. Funk 1994, 2002, 2009) but also of his theory of narcissism (e.g. Funk 1993, 1994, 2000). Bacciagaluppi and Biancoli, whom I referred to in the last chapter, also lay stress on the present-day relevance of Fromm’s idea of narcissism (Bacciagaluppi 1993, 2012; Bacciagaluppi and Biancoli 1993). Leonidas K. Cheliotis, in his recent article, tries to find the theoretical possibilities of Fromm’s concept of ‘benign narcissism’ (Cheliotis 2012). It must be noted, nonetheless, that the many scholars are so careless about his contributions to the psychoanalytic theory of narcissism. On this view, it is difficult to seek for works concentrating on Fromm’s theory of narcissism with the exception of the above writings. No doubt, this is profoundly associated with the aforementioned fact Lesser points out. For essentially Fromm’s study is carried out by the dialectical method of ‘immanent critique’, that is to say, for his theoretical perspective above all points to *inconvenient* truths about contemporary society, that is about *ourselves*. In my view, his endeavour to develop the theory of narcissism forms a link in the chain of this task. In his best early work, for instance, Habermas claims that
psychoanalysis intrinsically requires ‘self-reflection’ (1987: chs. 10-2), and that this signifies that it takes an immanent-critical standpoint.² He says: ‘the process of inquiry . . . is at the same time a process of self-inquiry’ (1987: 287). In my view, Fromm is one of the persons who best understood some signification and intention of it. In this respect, Habermas’s early perspective that epistemologically regards psychoanalysis as social theory (1987: 274-90) is related to Fromm’s essential viewpoint of ‘establishing a society’ through applying psychoanalytic method requiring self-reflection.

From this fundamental standpoint, I will start my exploration by seeing Fromm’s early work ‘The Method and Function of an Analytic Social Psychology’ (1932), which helped Fromm to develop his concept of ‘social character’ (e.g. Funk 1990: 3), whose sociopsychological device enables us to understand narcissism in the ‘level of social pathology’ as ‘a character structure’ (Bacciagaluppi 1993: 3). Second, I will actually examine Fromm’s theory of narcissism by focusing particularly on its social implications, following my discussion developed especially in Chapter 4. From this perspective, third, I will tackle the topic of his dialectical view of politics presented primarily by Escape from Freedom, in which narcissism intermediates between Fascism and democracy, as we shall see later. Finally, I will address the issue of Fromm’s concept of ‘human change’, which is counted as his sole solution to narcissism in contemporary society in which ‘man is dead’ (Fromm 1956: 74). On this view, however, essentially I will doubt the relevance of his remedy, and instead seek to find another solution to social narcissism, while accepting this intrinsic human and social need. That is to say, this chapter will conclude that it is possible to change our society, paradoxically, only by confessing that we are intrinsically narcissistic.

2. Fromm’s Early Work: Analytic Social Psychology

The ‘social character’

According to Funk, Fromm’s sociopsychological concern is older than the time when he started his academic study, which was conducted as a religious work on ‘Jewish law’ in terms of sociology at the University of Heidelberg in Germany;³ he later attempted to link his sociological perspective to his psychological perspective by encountering with ‘Freud’s instinct theory’ (1990: 1). Curiously enough, however, his effort into establishing this connection is rarely recognised by any related branches for generally there is great difficulty in und-
understanding both the standpoints of those two fields at the same time, that is to say, sociological and psychological ways of thinking are different from each other (1990: 1). This disciplinary condition actually affects his view of the socio-psychological device of ‘social character’, which is virtually ‘a difficult concept that crosses academic boundaries of psychology, sociology, anthropology and economics’, says Michael Maccoby (2001: 21); in this respect, the adjective social of the notion covers a wide range of social sciences. Perhaps this is primarily why it seems that on the whole Fromm’s work has not been accepted by the mainstream of any disciplines.

It is interesting to note that Fromm, working together with Maccoby, conducted empirical research into the social character of the people in a Mexican village for examining the relevance of the concept (Fromm and Maccoby 1970). Maccoby, following their own report on this research published in 1970, recently presents three kinds of significations the social character intends (Maccoby 2001). First of all, a social character is distinguished to a certain extent from an individual character. This means that the former character is mostly determined not by the latter but by the ‘internalization of cultural norms that determine social attitudes and give meaning to social behavior’ (2001: 23). Second, ‘Organizational Social Character’ explains how a character structure changes on the basis of the ‘socio-economic base, the social character, and the ideals, ideology, or social self rooted in the bureaucratic and interactive social characters’ (2001: 24). Third, there are two ways of developing a social character as to whether it takes ‘bureaucratic’ or ‘interactive’ course (2001: 24-5). Above all, what does Maccoby’s research show us? On the one hand, I notice that Fromm’s method of ‘social character’ is a troublesome analytic device in the sense that the research team sometimes ran into methodological difficulties with the concept particularly in explaining how and to what extent it can show the ‘rigidity of character’ (Millán 1992: 57); it would seem that this problem is also illustrated by the above fact that the concept crosses several disciplines in the social sciences. Perhaps, for these reasons, it often seems to overgeneralise some character features of a group, as I mentioned in the last chapter (Ch. 5, p. 109). On the other hand, however, I stress that the provocative socio-psychological tool can have a profound impact on many fields in the social sciences. Alan Grey, for instance, supports my view in the sense that it relevantly ‘integrat[es] psychoanalysis more effectively with social science’ (1993: 13). In addition, it should be noted that the clinical significance of the concept has already been highlighted by some psychoanalysts (Funk 1994; Ortmeyer 2002). In these respects, I find that the ‘social character’ as a concept, illuminating an understanding society and individuals, is of considerable relevance to present-day scholarship while it needs to be improved to some extent.
However, my primary concern in this section is not to show the significance of that concept. It is rather to focus on Fromm’s early work ‘analytic social psychology’, whose task was carried out primarily through his most important early contribution, ‘The Method and Function of an Analytic Social Psychology’. Virtually, this article had aimed to lay the foundations of the methodological tool of ‘social character’, which was actually later named and first came up for discussion in *Escape from Freedom*, which primarily described the dialectical development of politics between fascism and democracy. In fact, Fromm took up a long space to account for the concept in an appendix in the latter work (1941: 277-99); this elucidates how important it was for him to clarify and conceptualise the device at the time. My purpose is therefore to examine how the former work affected and determined his later contributions. In this respect, I believe that everyone can first grasp Fromm’s other works after reading his fundamental article published in 1932.

‘The Method and Function of an Analytic Social Psychology’ (1932)

Fromm’s early sociopsychological work ‘The Method and Function of an Analytic Social Psychology’ – abbreviated to ‘Analytic Social Psychology’ below – is subtitled ‘Notes on Psychoanalysis and Historical Materialism’. Obviously, this means that Fromm sought to relate Freud to Marx through conducting its research. It is important to remember that this task led him to depart the simple influence of both his great mentors, or, to put it another way, it signifies that he achieved the sublation of the contradiction between the two thinkers through writing the article (e.g. Erös 1992; cf. Funk 1990). From this perspective, we can perceive that his task of analytic social psychology aimed precisely at integrating Freud’s psychoanalysis and Marx’s historical materialism.

(a) Fromm and Reich

With regard to this issue, a comparison of Fromm with Wilhelm Reich will probably best explain the background of Fromm’s method of analytic social psychology. Ferenc Erös illustrates that the young Fromm and the young Reich had significantly affected each other (Erös 1992); this experience actually determined Fromm’s method of analytic social psychology. Quite interestingly, Erös contends that their approaches have much in common with one another, but, at the same time, that Fromm’s is ‘more sophisticated’ (1992: 71). First of all, Erös implies that both Fromm and Reich succeeded in ‘esca[ping] from [Marx’s and Freud’s] dogmatism’; according to Erös, Fromm tried to achieve it by putting forward ‘Analytic Social Psychology’ (1932), on the one hand, and Reich attempted to accomplish it by coming to his standpoint in ‘Dialectical Materialism'.
and Psychoanalysis’ (1929), on the other (1992: 71-2). That is to say, their respective perspectives marked turning points in their careers. Second, much more importantly, while Reich claimed that the application of psychoanalysis to society is restricted to its ‘irrational phenomena’, Fromm, on the contrary, argued that the disciplinary capacity of psychoanalysis is based on both individual and social behaviours (1992: 70). The following description, for instance, well characterises the latter stance.

In the very beginning – and even later on – Freud concerned himself with the psychology of the individual. But one the instincts were discovered to be the motive force behind human behavior, and once the unconscious was seen as the source of man’s ideologies and behavior patterns, it was inevitable that analytic authors would make an attempt to move from the problem of the individual to the problem of society, from individual to social psychology. They had to try to use the techniques of psychoanalysis to discover the hidden sources of the obviously irrational behavior patterns in societal life – in religion, custom, politics, and education. This obviously meant that they would encounter difficulties that were avoided so long as they restricted themselves to the realm of individual psychology (Fromm 1991: 141-2).

Interestingly, Fromm later slightly modified these original sentences first published in German when rewriting them in and translating into English in 1970 (cf. Fromm 1991: 9-10). Since the transformation of Fromm’s standpoint of psychoanalysis, namely ‘escape from dogmatism’, is of huge importance, I will also quote the original sentences in German below. We will see that there is almost no difference between his stances of 1932 and of 1970.


It is quite difficult to identify some change between the original German version and the later English translation in these sentences. This means exactly that Fromm was consistent in taking the standpoint in his lifetime. Or, more accurately, for him individual psychology had always to be social psychology since having written the significant article, and the primary aim and intention of the
work were exactly to declare this position; in the above quotations, his certain view first clarified is quite precisely shown. In these respects, Fromm’s criticism of Reich that, ‘[t]he fact that a phenomenon is studied in sociology certainly does not mean that it cannot be an object of psychoanalysis’ (1991: 142), brought the two persons to the crucial difference. ‘E’scape from dogmatism’, however, had not been completed in the first sociopsychological work; this was, Erös claims, achieved in his later book Escape from Freedom. With regard to their ‘escape[s]’, nonetheless, Erös is much more in favour of Fromm than Reich: first, in the sense that the former conducted empirical research; second, in the sense that he broke free from Freud’s orthodox psychoanalysis. This is why Erös states that Fromm’s ‘escape from dogmatism’ is ‘more successful and more fruitful’ (1992: 72). (I do not refer to Reich’s ‘escape’, primarily for it is not my research object, and for here I cannot devote myself to tackling its issue.)

(b) The current position of ‘Analytic Social Psychology’

It is surprising that many researchers seem careless about ‘Analytic Social Psychology’ when referring to Fromm’s sociopsychological foundations at least as far as its English and German contexts are concerned. As a matter of fact, for example, Helmut Johach does not often notice Fromm’s early contribution in his writing Analytische Sozialpsychologie und gesellschaftskritischer Humanismus: Eine Einführung in das Denken Erich Fromms (1986). Biancoli simply slightly raises the topic in his report ‘Erich Fromm and His Criticism of Sigmund Freud’ (1988), which draws attention to Fromm’s critique of Freud according with the title, focusing on Fromm’s stress on the ‘social aspect’ of psychoanalysis; this is therefore regarded as the exact theme of ‘Analytic Social Psychology’. Funk also does not too much refer to the early theoretical work in his lecture ‘Fromm’s Method of Social Psychology’ (1990), which, on the whole, however, tackles the precise issue of Fromm’s sociopsychological approach, taking notice of the significance of Fromm’s view of a ‘social being’. Bacciagaluppi cares little about the early essay in his short report ‘The Relevanc of Erich Fromm’ (1990), which primarily mentions Fromm’s psychoanalysis that can be seen in his main works. Burkhard Bierhoff has little concern about the sociopsychological writing in his recent article ‘Analytische Sozialpsychologie und humanistischer Sozialismus’ (2008), which shines a light on Fromm’s later theoretical activity that his early sociopsychological theory contributed to, focusing on his ‘humanistic socialism’. It would seem that there exist his other works concerning this issue. Of course, not all of them are mainly concerned with Fromm’s early conception of analytic social psychology, but admittedly, nonetheless, there is a strong tendency for them to disregard the significance of the work. In fact, surprisingly, there are
not so much writings which concern themselves with the theme of ‘Analytic Social Psychology’. In these respects, it is rather plausible to believe that the many rarely concentrate their tasks on his early contribution. On this view, the task is indeed undertaken merely by a few works such as Gerald Mackenthun’s *Die Entstehungsgeschichte der ‘Analytischen Sozialpsychologie’ Erich Fromms 1928-1938: Eine Einführung* (1991), Bierhoff’s *Analytische Sozialpsychologie und Visionäre Gesellschaftskritik* (1993) and Erös’s above article – these writings, nonetheless, do not aim only at understanding and shining a light on the early contribution, and are therefore insufficient to see the whole essence. Rather, it appears that most researchers are interested particularly in the concept of ‘social character’ when conducting a study of Fromm’s sociopsychological method (e.g. Essbach-Kreuzer: 1978; Funk 1996; Gojman de Millán and Millán 2001; Grey 1993; Maccoby 2001; Millán 1992; Ortmeyer 2002).

Okazaki’s book (2004), which is, however, written neither in English nor in German but in Japanese, is one of the contributions devoting themselves to an understanding of Fromm’s ‘Analytic Social Psychology’. In fact, his work tackles the core issue of Fromm’s early theoretical foundations, and the fourth chapter aims primarily at shedding new light on the article, particularly at seeking for Fromm’s conception of ‘politics’ in the work – this book manages exactly to precisely describe Fromm’s socioeconomic-psychoanalytic standpoint put forward in the work. My investigation, however, does not focus on the topic concerning whether the early writing presents some political concepts. I will rather try to highlight the considerable significance of ‘Analytic Social Psychology’, while admitting the huge importance of *Escape from Freedom*, which puts forward the ‘social needs’ (kankeisei no yokkū) whose concept contributes exactly to Fromm’s later theoretical activities, as Okazaki stresses (2004: 85). That is to say, in my view Fromm had laid his theoretical foundations of psychoanalysis primarily in the early sociopsychological writing, and this experience profoundly affected his later psychoanalytic tasks. I think, therefore, that no one can precisely understand his theory of narcissism and psychoanalysis unless reading ‘Analytic Social Psychology’ which takes the dialectical view. For these reasons, I rather believe that this early writing captures the essence of Fromm’s psychoanalysis, and marked a turning point in his career which first allowed him to be a ‘sociological psychoanalyst’ (Grey 1993: 11). In this respect, I drive myself to pay attention to the dialectical development of his theoretical ingredients rather than to his conception of politics for the purpose of gaining an understanding of his social and political theory.
(c) The method of ‘Analytic Social Psychology’

Perhaps Funk’s ‘Fromm’s Method of Social Psychology’ (1990) best summarises the essence of Fromm’s ‘Analytic Social Psychology’. However, this work is not sufficient for a better understanding of the early work for it does not concentrate on the essay as my research object, as mentioned above. Nonetheless, Funk seems to succeed in grasping the core point through undertaking the task. In fact, a ‘socialized being’ he highlights is a key concept of ‘Analytic Social Psychology’. As Funk mentions, Fromm’s sociopsychological concern is provided not only by ‘Analytic Social Psychology’. As a matter of fact, as we saw above, it is derived from his ‘religious upbringing’ (Funk 1990: 1), and the standpoint had been clarified to a certain extent by some other essays before publishing the writing. To be sure, for instance, ‘Psychoanalyse und Soziologie’ (1929), ‘Der Staat als Erzieher’ (1930), ‘Zur Psychologie des Verbrechers und der strafenden Gesellschaft’ (1931) and ‘Politik und Psychoanalyse’ (1931) already provided his sociopsychological viewpoint. To take one example, the above first article sought to apply psychoanalysis to sociology and vice versa, and in fact terms giving a sociopsychological implication such as the ‘mass psyche’ (Massenseele), contrasting with the ‘individual psyche’ (Individualseele), came into existence in the work (Fromm 1989: 3). Funk is also well aware of this fact, and shows how provocative it was to make its attempt at the time as exemplified by the contradiction between the metapsychology of psychologists and the conventional standpoint of sociologists (1990: 1-2). It must be noted, however, that there is another important issue concerning Fromm’s efforts: Weber’s sociological influence on Fromm’s method of analytic social psychology. With respect to this topic, Okazaki quite precisely describes this signification. First, according to him, it explains that Fromm regards society as a ‘group of individuals’ (2004: 110). Second, Weber’s effect, says Okazaki, accounts for the fact that Fromm tried to modify Marx’s view of the ‘ideological superstructure’ by applying Weber’s sociology. (2004: 116-8). Virtually, to be sure, this standpoint was first put forward in his later works such as Escape from Freedom, as Okazaki clarifies, but the awareness of its point is nonetheless of particular importance for gaining a rigorous understanding of his method of analytic social psychology. In fact, Fromm attempted the sublation of his theoretical incompatibility between Marx and Freud to a large extent by applying Weber to the work ‘Analytic Social Psychology’. In contrast to Okazaki, however, Funk does not perceive this fact, and takes no notice of Marx or Weber in respect of Fromm’s early foundations of analytic social psychology. As a matter of fact, Funk’s lecture notes ‘Fromm’s Method of Social Psychology’ are prejudiced in favour of an analysis of Fromm’s knowledge of Freud’s psychoanalysis concerning his
socio-psychological method, and the work has therefore resulted in ignorance of Fromm’s acceptance of historical materialism and Weber’s sociology. This is why in the work Funk has failed to rigorously understand Fromm’s sense of ‘social’ despite his success in seeing the signification of Fromm’s analytic social psychology as a whole.

From these perspectives, I want to begin to analyse the provocative writing ‘Analytic Social psychology’. My primary enquiry in this topic is what the purpose of this essay was. Superficially, it seems that the work simply integrated Marx into Freud and vice versa, but this does not mean that I provide an account of it. In order to know something about human beings, it is always most important to seek for one’s intentions. One of his intentions of writing the essay is definitely to get out of disciplinary difficulties with the conventional methodologies of sociology and psychoanalysis – this is explained to a certain extent by the above evidence concerning the incompatibility between both disciplines to which Fromm actually devoted himself. Another intention is probably to lay the foundations of his methodology of social science. It is surprising to me that these standpoints, identifying some intentions of one’s action, have hardly been presented by any researchers who have carried out a study of Fromm’s work – with regard to this issue, by contrast, Okazaki attempts to understand the background of the foundations of the method of analytic social psychology (2004: 116-8). Perhaps this problem is characterised by the research style of conducting a study of ‘Analytic Social Psychology’. These two viewpoints, however, seem quite appropriate to Fromm primarily in the sense that, as mentioned earlier, his work is characteristically not regarded as any certain disciplines in a narrow sense. This means precisely not only that Fromm had a variety of scholarly concerns, but also that he already showed such a quality at the time when writing ‘Analytic Social Psychology’. Indeed, this evidence is of huge importance for being aware of the implications of Fromm’s academic activities themselves.

From these viewpoints, I will start an investigation into ‘Analytic Social Psychology’ by identifying my first enquiry into the position of Freud’s instinct theory in the work concerning the above first purpose. With regard to this issue, to be sure this writing to a large extent supports Freud’s orthodox approach. However, it tries to put forward a new perspective different from his original instinct theory. Fromm says:

*The active and passive adaptation of the biological apparatus, the instincts, to social reality is the key conception of psychoanalysis, and every exploration into personal psychology proceeds from this conception (1991: 141).*
This depiction signifies the emergence of Fromm’s original standpoint which leads him to propose the ‘social instinct’ (1991: 144). On this view, Fromm clearly points out that Freud had denied this viewpoint, and thus that, as a result, he failed to recognise social psychology even though having been aware of the existence; in Fromm’s view, after all, Freud confined psychology to the matter of individuals (1991: 141-2). Through taking this view, Fromm does not abolish the instinct theory, but nonetheless obviously distances himself from his mentor of psychoanalysis. His following view allows him to become much more independent of Freud:

[Psychoanalysis] seeks to know the psychic traits common to the members of a group, and to explain these common psychic traits in terms of shared life experiences. These life experiences, however, do not lie in the realm of the personal or the accidental – the larger the group is, the more this holds true – but rather they are identical with the socio-economic situation of this particular group. Thus analytical social psychology seeks to understand the instinctual apparatus of a group, its libidinous and largely unconscious behavior, in terms of its socio-economic structure (1991: 144).

Here we can see that Freud’s instinct theory was integrated into Marx’s materialist view – it would be possible to see that Freud’s was integrated into Marx’s in this context. Fromm’s strong interest in Marx, even though in his view the latter theory needs to be modified, is also depicted by his expression that, ‘[t]he theory of society with which psychoanalysis seems to have both the greatest affinity and also the greatest differences is historical materialism’ (1991: 142). This is concerned with my second enquiry with respect to Fromm’s first purpose of writing the article. First, why, however, does he adhere firmly to historical materialism? Perhaps this is best illustrated by his words that ‘historical materialism teaches that social events (gesellschaftliche Geschehen) are explained by economic conditions (ökonomischen Bedingungen)’ in the preceding work ‘Politik und Psychoanalyse’ (1989: 32). Why, then, psychoanalysis is required for this standpoint? I believe that the primary reason is because the approach is associated with his fundamental method of analytic social psychology, that is to say, ‘[p]sychoanalysis can enrich the overall conception of historical materialism’ (1991: 154). This position, as Okazaki notices, stems primarily from Fromm’s emphasis on the necessity of accounting for the ‘psychological factor’ apart from his acceptance of Marx’s stress on the economic factor (2004: 115). In Fromm’s view, to put it simply, Marx’s historical materialism has to be improved by Freud’s psychoanalysis. On this view, according to Fromm, Marx and Engels ‘neither were nor wanted to be psychologists’, while coming to know that sociology substantially contains psychology (1991: 152). For Fromm, this is a crucial factor in explaining the necessity of integrating psychoanalysis into Marx’s original
standpoint of historical materialism. In sum, while essentially supporting Freud instinct theory, and while transforming individual psychology into social psychology, Fromm supplemented Marx’s defect with ‘a psychoanalytic social psychology’ (1991: 157, 162).

Next, I will conduct an exploration of Fromm’s attention to ‘social processes’ concerning his second purpose noted above. This notion, as Funk implies, is one of Fromm’s most important theoretical ingredients in addition to the concept of ‘social character’ in his social psychology (1990: 3). That is to say, the concept is of vital importance for Fromm’s theory of social science in a broad sense – this follows the discussion developed earlier – in the sense that, on the whole, his theory seeks to understand how social processes perform their functions by integrating philosophy, sociology, social psychology and psychoanalysis into a theory – in fact, this is the exact task of Escape from Freedom – and, much more importantly, in his theory both the concepts were first conceptualised together in the work in 1941. However, it is not right to think that Fromm first theorised the notion of ‘social process’ in its writing. The term social process had already been employed in ‘Analytical Social Psychology’ (1991: e.g. 154-5, 157), and this later gave rise to a key concept of Fromm’s social science; it is believed that in his work this writing first provided the term. He definitely laid the foundations of his theory of social science in ‘Analytic Social Psychology’ – on this view, Erös, for example, contends that ‘in 1932 . . . Fromm first formulated his thoughts on the tasks and methods of analytical social psychology’ (1992: 73; emphases added). Indeed, this fact is quite important for understanding his later works published after its significant article. After successfully integrating psychoanalysis into historical materialism, Fromm makes it clear how the former functions in the latter. He claims:

[Psychoanalysis] can provide a more comprehensive knowledge of one of the factors that is operative in the social process: the nature of man himself (1991: 154).

His socio-psychoanalytic stance, as this sentence clearly shows, was taken over and more sophisticated, for example, by the later work Escape from Freedom primarily through focusing on ‘character structures’ (e.g. 1941: app.). We can make sure of this fact by looking at the following description: ‘although character development is shaped by the basic conditions of life and although there is no biologically fixed human nature, human nature has a dynamism of its own that constitutes an active factor in the evolution of the social process’ (1941: 289). Here Fromm’s primary concern is not how the instinctual needs affect the social process of human beings, but how one’s character structure determines his social process and vice versa. To put it another way, his main interest changed to social processes of
individual and social characters. This basically means that his psychoanalytic theory first clarified the ‘social needs’ in *Escape from Freedom*. Much more importantly, however, Fromm definitely did not completely reject Freud’s instinct theory nor fall into ‘sociological relativism’ (1941: 289), but succeeded in overcoming Freud’s orthodox psychoanalytic theory by incorporating the concept of social needs into his psychoanalytic theory even though supporting Freud’s theory in that work; Fromm is regarded as a great supporter of dialectic. I believe, nonetheless, that the basic framework of his method of analytic social psychology had been developed in the essay ‘Analytic Social Psychology’, which in fact profoundly affected the subsequent works. For we can clearly see that he sublated the contradiction between his disciplinary components to a certain extent in the early sociopsychological work. It is also elucidated, for example, by his expression that, ‘[t]he fruitfulness of a psychoanalytic social psychology will depend, of course, on the significance of the libidinal forces in the social process’ (1991: 157).

With regard to Fromm’s acceptance of Weber’s sociological view, finally, how can we connect this theoretical standpoint with his work of analytic social psychology? To be sure, as Okazaki says, we have considerable difficulty in seeking to complete this task through concentrating on ‘Analytic Social Psychology’ (2004: 117). In order to try to establish its connection, it might be necessary to trace my exploration back to his PhD thesis. It should be noted, however, that the framework of ‘Analytic Social Psychology’ precisely gave rise not only to Fromm’s theoretical foundations of his analytic social psychology but also to those of his theory of social science, and that it greatly contributed to constructing the idea of *Escape from Freedom*, in which he first completed the dialectic of his analytic social psychology, coming up with the concept of social character.

3. Fromm’s Conception of Narcissism: The Death of Man

**How is Fromm’s theory of psychoanalysis relevant?**

Not only has research on Fromm’s theory of narcissism hardly been conducted, but his psychoanalytic theory itself has also been disregarded by the mainstream of psychoanalysis (pp. 137-8 above). Perhaps disrespect for his former theory should be understood as an extension of the latter fact. At the same time, however, it must be stressed that the present-day relevance of his psychoanalytic theory has definitely attracted many researchers. In fact, they have so far considered that Fromm’s psychoanalytic theory is relevant in the following
respects: first, to the discipline of psychoanalysis itself in terms of his method of ‘analytic social psychology’ (Bacciagaluppi 1990; Funk 1990), his theory of ‘social transference’ (García 1991; Millán 1996) and his unique conception of ‘mental health’ (Buechler 2006; Funk 2006; Lesser 2002); second, to therapeutic practice (Funk 1990, 1996; Ortmeyer 2002) and to theoretical foundations relating psychoanalysis to some social sciences (Grey 1993; Millán 1992, 1996) in terms of the theory of ‘social character’; third, to psychoanalytic therapy in the sense of making an ethical impact, based on his humanistic ethics, on clinical practice (Buechler 2006; Davis 2006; Eckardt 1996; Funk 2002; cf. Panfilova 2007); fourth, to psychoanalytic disciplinary tasks in both theoretical and therapeutic dimensions in terms of his theory of ‘narcissism’ (Bacciagaluppi 1993; Bacciagaluppi and Biancoli 1993; Funk 1993; cf. Funk 2000). From these perspectives, we can see that Fromm’s psychoanalysis has primarily fascinated psychoanalysts as a natural consequence. It is not right to believe, however, that it has attracted them without regard to any social issues. In reality, ways of addressing all the above four topics are diametrically opposite to conventional psychoanalytic approaches. Funk, for instance, claims that Fromm’s psychoanalytic approach can have a provocative impact on psychoanalytic therapy in the sense that his theory, laying stress on the socioeconomic effect on individuals, brings the field of psychoanalysis to the awareness of the importance of ‘unreflected social determinants’ (1990: 5; emphasis added). Grey, focusing on the concept of social character, contends that Fromm’s psychoanalytic theory does not only enhance the quality of remedies for ‘psychosocial disorders’ but also incorporate psychoanalysis within social science (1993: 10-1; emphasis added). Jorge Silva García maintains that prejudices such as racism, on the whole, stem from the ‘irrational social component’, shining a light on Fromm’s psychoanalytic theory of transference (1991: 4; emphasis added). Salvador Millán allows that the psychoanalytic dialogue is constituted simultaneously in individual and social dimensions, primarily seeing Fromm’s theory of social transference (1996: 6; emphasis added). On the basis of his clinical experience, Davis, referring to Fromm, contends that an individual character structure is made up of a ‘socio-economic-political structure’ (2006: 42; emphases added). These pieces of data clearly show that direct interest in psychoanalysis has triggered another interest in society; perhaps this best characterises Fromm’s theoretical contribution to psychoanalysis.

However, my primary task is not to tackle general issues of Fromm’s psychoanalytic theory. Rather, my attention is directed to his theory of narcissism, the topic of which has rarely been dealt with, as mentioned earlier. In this respect, my purpose is to identify the possibilities and difficulties of the theory on the basis of the above fourth concern. I believe that to shine a light on his
forgotten theory of narcissism, requiring dialectical immanent critique, is exactly to give both theory and practice an opportunity for self-reflection.

**Fromm’s theory of narcissism**

As noted above, only a few scholars have so far conducted research into Fromm’s theory of narcissism. Bacciagaluppi (1993), for example, contributed his article on Fromm’s psychoanalytic theory, focusing on his conception of narcissism, particularly of ‘self’, and comparing other kinds of notions concerning narcissism – my discussion has a few times referenced this work. Significantly, this article divides the semantic scope of Fromm’s theory of narcissism up into its three levels, theoretical, social pathological and clinical levels (1993: 3-8). My research objective in this section is primarily to gain an understanding of the signification of Fromm’s conception of narcissism in line with the second level, in which narcissism comes into existence as ‘character structures’ (1993: 4-6). In this investigation, therefore, I will draw my attention to the concept of ‘social (group) narcissism’, evolved in parallel with ‘individual narcissism’ in Fromm’s psychoanalytic theory, and to the distinction between benign and malignant narcissism, particularly in terms of Fromm’s conception of the essential character structure of contemporary society, the primary function of which relies upon market economy. From this perspective, we will exactly notice why Fromm diagnoses our society in which ‘man is dead’ (1956: 74) as malignant narcissism. This will lead me to draw careful attention to the dialectic of narcissism concerning the ‘productive orientation’ and the ‘nonproductive orientations’ (Fromm 1971: 62-117).

(a) Social (group) narcissism

As already argued primarily in Chapter 4, Fromm’s conception of narcissism puts forward two types of narcissism, individual and social (group) narcissism, in the two respective dimensions of the individual and society (Ch. 4, s. 1). According to Fromm, social narcissism is analogous to individual narcissism (1964: 78). In other words, there is simply a *quantitative* difference between them in his theory of narcissism; this is precisely described by the distinction between his individual and social psychology (cf. Funk 1990: 1). In Fromm’s view, this is described by another differentiation between the ‘biological function’ and the ‘sociological function’ of narcissism (1964: 72-3, 78). This point is of vital importance to his theory of narcissism for these two quantitatively distinguished versions of narcissism perform their respective functions on the basis of its sociopsychological rule, which exactly allows him to diagnose not only individual but also *social* diseases. (In this context, I am aware of the exact influence
of Freud and Weber on Fromm’s method of the theory of narcissism concerning
the meanings contained in the respective terms ‘individual’ and ‘social’. In
addition, it is pointed out that, in the pathological level of Fromm’s psycho-
analytic epistemology, the theory involves Freud and Marx (e.g. 1980a: chs. 6-7)
– needless to say, Fromm’s early methodological foundations gave rise to this
theoretical development. These pieces of evidence enable us to admit the long-
term effects of his method of analytic social psychology on his work."

(b) Narcissism and contemporary society: the ‘structure of industrial cybernetic society’

To fully understand Fromm’s conception of narcissism, it is most important to
see its great stress on an aspect of narcissism in contemporary society. Indeed, this
is precisely explained by his account of the ‘relation between the structure of
industrial cybernetic society and the narcissistic development of the individual’
(1980b: 53; emphases added). The term ‘cybernetics’ suggested by the adjective
cybernetic, as is well known, has gradually been used after WWII. Perhaps the
most famous definition of the term in its contemporary sense is provided by the
title of the mathematician Norbert Wiener’s book (1948): Cybernetics: or Control
and Communication in the Animal and the Machine. In his sense, cybernetics is
understood as a scientific approach aiming at controlling the world. To be sure,
it would seem that this task is considered as the exact end that the ‘Enlighten-
ment’ has attempted to achieve since Bacon and Descartes. If Enlightenment
reason indicated by the intention of controlling the world, however, aims sim-
ply to control the world, then it means only that we control the world and
ourselves by knowledge. On the contrary, if it aims to emancipate us by con-
trolling both the world and ourselves, then it leads us to control ourselves by
ourselves. Quite ironically, nonetheless, while the latter is our purpose, the
former is a consequence in reality. Rather, this aim has brought about the
paradoxical fact that we are controlled by science (technology) exactly we have
developed; in this respect, it is plausible to suppose that a result of the
Enlightenment is dialectical, that is to say, we always intrinsically contain anti-
thesis.

Fromm attempts to transform this dialectic by establishing his social theory
particularly by considering how to overcome human narcissism. To put it dif-
ferently, in his view the contradiction included in contemporary society, the
outcome of the Enlightenment, should be sublated by overcoming ourselves. For
these reasons, it can be argued that Fromm’s suggestion is that we should
revive the position of subject only by getting rid of our subjectivity. For him,
narcissism is exactly the condition in which man has not yet attained objectivity
– in Fromm’s view, in this sense, science whether natural or social science is
quite subjective per se. (With respect to this issue, it would be necessary to offer a further account of his view of contemporary science. My stance on this theme is thus a simple provisional conclusion. It is expected that I will carry out research into this topic in the future.)

(c) Narcissism and the productive and nonproductive orientations

In this section, first, it is important to look at the two kinds of character orientations, the ‘productive orientation’ and the ‘nonproductive orientations’. These ideas were first conceptualised in Man for Himself (1947), which on the whole related psychological problems to ethical matters. With regard this theme, Funk explains that, ‘[w]ith his [Fromm’s] theory of character (and of social character) he made values into an integral part of psychoanalytic theory’, and that, ‘[i]n so doing, he simultaneously advanced an ethical theory that gave a fruitful turn to the . . . psychoanalytic insight’ (Funk 2002: 4). In other words, Fromm turned his attention to ‘norms and values leading the realization of man’s self and of his potentialities’ (Fromm 1971: vii), taking over the issue of his preceding book Escape from Freedom; in this respect, his social psychology requires itself to be a normative theory too. With regard to this issue, much more importantly, the two concepts have contributed particularly to laying Fromm’s later theoretical foundations of his ideas, two kinds of character modes, ‘having and being modes’, in To Have or to Be? (1976); these two conceptions drew their inspiration primarily from Marx and the theologian Meister Eckhart (e.g. Fromm 2005: pt III; 2011: chs. 3, 7). Fromm asserts that the ‘having mode’ characterising contemporary industrial society needs to be changed to the ‘being mode’ in accordance with the transformation of its social character and its social structure (2011: ch. 7). He also tackles the issue of how it is possible (2011: chs. 8-9). In order to know this crucial point, however, we should first of all see the ethical theme presenting the two types of character orientations.

The productive orientation, Fromm explains, is concerned with a personality theory ‘refer[ring] to a fundamental attitude, a mode of relatedness in all realms of human experience’ (1971: 86). Fromm, then, makes it clear that the adjective ‘productive’ means the individual potential of whether one can show one’s ability one is endowed with. In other words, it is about how one relates himself to the world, that is about ‘a particular mode of relatedness to the world’ (1971: 91). Here Fromm’s conception of ‘relatedness’ is of enormous importance for grasping the signification of the term ‘productiveness’. For this purpose, his following account is supposed to be of considerable relevance. Fromm says:
Human existence is characterized by the fact that man is alone and separated from the world; not being able to stand the separation, he is impelled to seek for relatedness and oneness. There are many ways in which he can realize this need, but only one in which he, as a unique entity, remains intact; only one in which his own powers unfold in the very process of being related. It is the paradox of human existence that man must simultaneously seek for closeness and for independence; for oneness with others and at the same time for the preservation of his uniqueness and particularity (1971: 96-7).

As we shall see later, this description signifies the dialectic of human narcissism, namely ‘existential dichotomies’ (Fromm 1971: 41-5) – Koch, for example, calls this ‘existential contradictions’ (1990: 2). Regardless of Fromm’s psychoanalytic philosophy, however, it is possible to point out that it is always unavoidable that we run into difficulties with our narcissistic needs intrinsic to human nature despite some possibilities for coping with them; we have already known this fact particularly through carrying out some explorations of narcissism in Part II. In Fromm’s view, his conception of ‘productiveness’ enables us to achieve the sublation of those dialectical contradictions (1971: 97). He points, for example, to ‘productive love and thinking’, which bring us to the full realisation of its aim (1971: 96-107). ‘Care’, ‘responsibility’, ‘respect’ and ‘knowledge’, says Fromm, produce productive love, on the one hand (1971: 97-101), and ‘objectivity’ that respects the object, and that ‘see[s] the object as it is and not as he wishes it to be’, and ‘subjectivity’ that is interested in the object, bring about productive thinking, namely ‘reason’, differentiated from ‘intelligence’, on the other (1971: 102-7); love allows us to relate ourselves to others, and reason allows us to ‘reach to the essence of things and processes’ (1971: 102). To put it simply, each of productiveness is about ways of relating oneself to others and the world. In contrast to the productive orientation, in Fromm’s view, the non-productive orientations, on the whole, are the result of failing to establish those relationships. Any persons in these orientations, in other words, are not aware of the dialectic of narcissism, and thereby cannot sublate their intrinsic contradictions.

According to Fromm, the nonproductive character structure consists of four kinds of character orientations: ‘receptive’, ‘exploitative’, ‘hoarding’ and ‘marketing orientations’ (1971: 62-82). Dependence, on the whole, typifies the first orientation. Fromm claims that, for this type of persons, it is always quite difficult to say ‘no’, and instead they say ‘yes’, whose attitude stems primarily from their ‘loyalty’ based on the senses of ‘gratitude’ to authorities and extreme ‘fear’ of losing their help; this results in them being dependent upon anything and anyone for gaining any support despite the fact that superficially they seem ‘optimistic’ and ‘friendly’ (1971: 62-3). The second type of orientation is characterised by the character trait of ‘kleptomaniac’. This kind of person, Fromm
Erich Fromm explains, is driven by the desire to use ‘cunning’ to obtain whatever they want for they cannot produce anything; he makes it clear that ‘suspicion’, ‘cynicism’, ‘envy’ and ‘jealousy’ are characteristic of kleptomaniac personality that considers that, [s]tolen fruits are sweetest’ (1971: 64-5). ‘O’bsessive punctuality’ is the general character of the third type of orientation. On this view, Fromm argues that hoarding character trait does not put trust in anything except for oneself, and therefore that this attitude leads this type of persons to ‘hoarding’ and ‘saving[s]’; in his view, thus, they are always driven only to save their money by suspicion at the sacrifice of interpersonal relationships with others (1971: 65-7).

It is important to note that Fromm mostly devotes himself to accounting for the above fourth character orientation. The main reason for this devotion, however, is clearly given by his explanations that, ‘[t]he marketing orientation developed as a dominant one only in the modern era’ (1971: 67), and that, ‘[t]he marketing orientation does not come out of the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries [but] . . . is a modern product’ (1971: 81). In other words, it is typical of ‘modern society’ and ‘modern man’ fulfilling the ‘economic function of the market’ (1971: 67). This is a quite natural consequence because, in addition to the facts mentioned above, Fromm sees that an essential contradiction of contemporary society lies exactly in this issue – in this respect, his theory is self-critical. This is quite explicitly drawn by his following words, focusing on the function of ‘time’ in its contemporary sense:

In industrial society time rules supreme. He current mode of production demands that every action be exactly ‘timed’, that not only the endless assembly line conveyor belt but, in a less crude sense, most of our activities be ruled by time. In addition, time not only is time, ‘time is money’. The machine must be used maximally; therefore the machine forces its own rhythm upon the worker (2011: 104; emphases added).

Moreover, Fromm adds:

Via the machine, time has become our ruler. Only in our free hours do we seem to have a certain choice. Yet we usually organize our leisure as we organize our work. Or we rebel against tyrant time by being absolutely lazy. By not doing anything except disobeying time’s demands, we have the illusion that we are free, when we are, in fact, only paroled from our time-prison (2011: 105; emphases added).

Fromm sees a great paradox in his society and his times in which he himself is embedded too, that is to say, he sees that although we are exactly the subject generating technology, we have been transformed into its object by our object; ‘time’ as a manmade invention, in his view, confines man to its routine operation.
To be sure, such a view is not a new way of understanding modern and contemporary times, as mentioned below, but it is characterised by a specific feature: Fromm’s theory is self-critical, and requires itself to give an opportunity for self-reflection at the same time. This clearly explains, most importantly, that his primary concern is to struggle with his times, namely contemporary times. From this perspective, we can understand why Fromm concentrates his attention on addressing the above fourth orientation concerning our character structure.

What kind of character, then, is the ‘marketing orientation’? He quite precisely tells that it ‘is rooted in the experience of oneself as a commodity and of one’s value as exchange value’ (1971: 68). To put it differently, one aims at satisfying his needs, on the one hand, and one sees himself as a means of fulfilling them, on the other. Significantly, this viewpoint reminds me of my research on Fujita’s political theory in the last chapter, that is to say, I am aware that in a sense it has much in common with a paradoxical understanding that, ‘[w]hile currency was once a simple means of exchanging things, it has aimed at exchanging itself’ (see Ch. 5, p. 95). It is interesting to note that this is profoundly associated with the classic argument, or, more accurately, it implies that, as is well known, when capitalism highly develops its own mechanism, depending upon its specific ‘mode of production’, we human beings come into being as the object of products exactly we have produced in its system of society which relies upon the capitalist system of production. Perhaps, therefore, these two descriptions indicate that modern times have brought about a paradox peculiar to the era concerning the weird phenomenon of alienation; from this perspective, thus, we have become a simple commodity called ‘labour-power’. In philosophy, needless to say, the term alienation gives the certain signification that, in a capitalist market economy, human beings are controlled by the exact man-made methods fulfilling an important function of capitalist economy, such as currency, production and commodity, all of which generate ‘surplus value’, that is by ‘capital’, thereby losing the position of the subject; in this system, paradoxically, capital turns into the subject. With regard to Fromm’s view of alienation, in connection with this situation, it must be stressed that Marx’s conception of Entfremdung, no doubt, must have occurred to Fromm when he was acutely aware of man’s bizarre attitude of regarding oneself as a means of preserving one’s own life. As a matter of fact, he received his interest in this concept almost completely from Marx’s theories of philosophy and economics particularly from Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844) and Capital, vol. 1 (1867) (e.g. Fromm 2004: ch. 5). This is precisely explained, for example, by Fromm’s following words provided in his work on Marx, Marx’s Concept of Man (1961): ‘Marx’s philosophy, like much of existentialist thinking, represents a protest
against man’s alienation, his loss of himself and his transformation into a thing’ (2004: v; emphases added). On this view, it is noted that Marx’s significance for Fromm is given precisely by Marx’s description itself as follows:

A direct consequence of the alienation of man from the product of his labor, from his life activity and from his species life is that man is alienated from other men. When man confronts himself he also confronts other men. What is true of man’s relationship to his work, to the product of his work and to himself, is also true of his relationship to other men, to their labor and to the objects of their labor. In general, the statement that man is alienated from his species life means that each man is alienated from others, and that each of the others is likewise alienated from human life (Marx 2004: 103).

In Marx’s sense, alienation means that man is alienated not only from others, but, most importantly, also from himself, that is from his ‘species-being’ (e.g. 2004: 100). In this situation, in Marx’s view, ‘species-life’ is completely spoilt by the phenomenon and disappears as a result (2004: 100-3). That is to say, this is the exact condition of ‘alienated labor’, which is done at the expense of species-life, namely ‘human life’ (Marx 2004: 93-109). Fromm, needless to say, is too much aware of this fact. After pointing out that these circumstances give us an ‘existential egotism’ represented by alienated labour as ‘a means for [our] individual existence’, Fromm cites Marx: ‘[i]t [alienated labor] alienates from man his own body, external nature, his mental life and his human life’ (2004: 53; cf. Marx 2004: 103).

Marx’s influence on Fromm particularly in respect of the latter view of alienation is of huge importance for gaining a rigorous understanding of the concept of ‘nonproductive orientations’ – this point is also relevant to Fromm’s theory of ‘having and being modes’. In fact, his conception of alienation characterises his theory of marketing orientation as a nonproductive orientation. This is typically illustrated, for example, by his following description concerning self-identity formulated in societies based on the function of market economy. Fromm says:

In the marketing orientation man encounters his own powers as commodities alienated from him. He is not one with them but they are masked from him because what matters is not his self-realization in the process of using them but his success in the process of selling them. Both his powers and what they create become estranged, something different from himself, something for others to judge and to use; thus his feeling of identity becomes as shaky as his self-esteem; it is constituted by the sum total of roles one can play: ‘I am as you desire me’ (1971: 72-3).

It is plausible to believe that this human attitude leads to the precise process of alienating us from ourselves explained by Marx. Everything in this marketing
orientation is required to obey the principle of exchange, and the person characterised as this type of orientation therefore needs always to be liked by others; that is, the self is identified only by the other – surprisingly, we perceive that this state of mind is exactly the same as narcissism. According to Fromm, in such persons, much more seriously, even the notion of equality is to stimulate ‘selflessness’. He says:

Equality, instead of being the condition for the development of each man’s peculiarity, means the extinction of individuality, the ‘selflessness’ characteristic of the marketing orientation. Equality was conjunctive with difference, but it has become synonymous with ‘indifference’ and, indeed, indifference is what characterizes modern man’s relationship to himself and to others (1971: 74).

‘Equality’, then, has turned into a meaningless concept only inducing the attitude of ‘indifference’ typifying contemporary society. However, it is not yet clear how Fromm associates individual character traits with the social level of phenomenon of alienation. With regard to this issue, he provides a precise account by focusing on the ‘correlation between character orientation and social structure’ (1971: 78): ‘the whole personality of the average individual is molded by the way people relate to each other, and it is determined by the socio-economic and political structure of society to such an extent that, in principle, one can infer from the analysis of one individual the totality of the social structure in which he lives’ (1971: 79). Although to be sure Fromm basically distinguishes between a social character and an individual character, and although he admits that there is a certain difference between them, he lays stress on ‘social and cultural patterns’, paying attention to a common feature characterised by the majority of members in a society (1971: 60-1; 1980a: 74-5; cf. 1941: 277-8). This clearly means that individual character orientations enable him to identify social structures bringing about the phenomenon of alienation. We can thereby understand why the marketing orientation is the result of the development and existence of market economic society.

How are these four character orientations related to each other? Quite interestingly, Fromm points out that the three character traits, receptive, exploitative and hoarding orientations, have a common feature that they are specific to one’s character structure. By contrast, the marketing orientation is characterised by the fact ‘that no specific and permanent kind of relatedness is developed, but that the very changeability of attitudes is the only permanent quality of such orientation’, says Fromm (1971: 77; emphases added). This is why he concludes that the ‘ability to play the expected role is one of [the] main assets’ to contemporary people (1971: 82; emphasis added). In sum, man in the marketing orientation
Erich Fromm believes that what he behaves as desired by others determines his value as a human being.

To be sure, Fromm’s personality theory seems to be in danger of over-generalising individual character traits. It is important to remember, however, that he notes that those distinctions are ‘ideal-types’, and that they definitely do not denote the certain individual character traits (1971: 61). In addition, he clarifies the psychological meaning of the categorisation of the character orientations, that is to say, he shows that ‘the character of any given person is usually a blend of all or some of these orientations in which one, however, is dominant’ (1971: 61). To put it simply, in Fromm’s view, despite the fact that one’s personality mostly contains all the four orientations, certain features determine a pattern of one’s character traits embedded by a social structure by which one’s life has largely been affected.

(d) Narcissism and the ‘having mode’

These discussions of the productive and nonproductive orientations, as mentioned above, were succeeded, for example, by the theory of having and being modes in Fromm’s later work To Have or to Be?. This fact is of huge importance to my research particularly for seeing the close relationships between the productive orientation and the being mode, on the one hand, and between the marketing orientation as a nonproductive orientation and the having mode, on the other. To be sure, it is difficult to see these connections in Fromm’s works. Nonetheless, it is noted that the reason why I point to such relations, specifically to the latter, is because, as we saw above, the having mode characterises contemporary capitalist society operated by the marketing orientation in particular, and that this viewpoint is indeed appropriately explained in term of his concept of ‘social character’. For in Fromm’s sociopsychological theory the socioeconomic factor has the most powerful influence in determining social structures, as we have seen. This accounts for a profound effect of the marketing orientation and the having mode on his social psychology as negative factors for social processes. My investigation, then, focuses on the having mode making a negative impact on society. Having said that, I do not devote myself to completing this task due to the fact that, in my view, the issues concerning the having mode tackled by To Have or to Be? do not present new themes with the exceptions of the primary influence of Marx and Eckhart in respect of the inspiration of ‘having’ and ‘being’ and his new theory of ‘human change’ to establish a new society. Rather, therefore, I will concentrate my research on analysing the dialectical development of narcissism.

According to Fromm, the having mode is characteristic of ‘industrial society’,
namely the ‘acquisitive society’ (2011: 57), in contrast to the being mode functioning as ‘productive activity’ (2011: e.g. 74) – this term has almost the same meaning as ‘productiveness’, as we saw above, but it puts forward only a different standpoint in the sense that To Have or to Be? much more strongly stresses the active. The present-day meaning of the having mode is that ‘to consume is one form of having, and perhaps the most important one for today’s affluent industrial societies’ (2011: 23), while the being mode is ‘the mode of existence in which one neither has anything nor craves to have something, but is joyous, employs one’s faculties productively, is one to the world’ (2011: 16). On the former, in particular, Fromm emphasises that the main concern in contemporary industrial society is to increase ‘property’ by which one can gain recognition (2011: 58); therefore, he says that, ‘[t]he nature of the having mode of existence follows from the nature of private property’ (2011: 63). This society, as mentioned above, reverses the positions of man and things, that is to say, the former turns into the object, on the one hand, and the latter turns into the subject, on the other. This is understood as a paradox of capitalism illuminated by Marx’s theory of alienation.

What, however, most characteristically describes this kind of society? It is definitely not the marketing orientation or the having mode; in principle, these two concepts are regarded completely the same as each other. Needless to say, Fromm sees that narcissism characterises its society, that is to say, contemporary society is narcissistic – in Fromm’s view, the ‘separateness and antagonism of individuals toward each other’ and the ‘worship of industrial production’ are the essential conditions developing narcissism (1980b: 53-4). He believes, however, that while it is intrinsic to human nature, we are required to overcome its natural human needs. We have to attain objectivity by breaking free from our narcissism, thereby first sublating the immanent contradiction of our existence. How, then, is this dialectic performed?

(e) The dialectic of narcissism

In order to consider this theme, I want to provide Fromm’s important viewpoint concerning his fundamental diagnosis of contemporary society: that is, ‘[i]n the nineteenth century the problem was that God is dead; in the twentieth century the problem is that man is dead’ (1956: 360). It is important to note that this signifies the psychic condition that man is alienated from himself. As Koch puts it, ‘[i]nstead of experiencing oneness and the reality of the Sane Society, Fromm was confronted by estrangement and alienation everywhere’ (1990: 3). Fromm, through this diagnosis, takes particular notice of the spiritual crisis that our present-day society has suffered from alienation. In fact, he lays stress on
this pathological state of mind of society repeatedly, for example, in 1961 (2005: 27): ‘alienation as a disease of modern man’ (2005: 23). This implies that he transferred a great emphasis on its concept primarily from his further reflections on Marx (1961) I raised above and on Marx and Freud, Beyond the Chains of Illusion (1962), to his later representative works such as The Revolution of Hope (1968) and To have or to Be? (1976). These pieces of evidence demonstrate how the social phenomenon of alienation had a powerful impact on Fromm and his psychoanalytic therapeutic activities. From this perspective, I suggest that the most important signification of Fromm’s theory of narcissism can be seen only in terms of the socioeconomic structure of contemporary society. In these respects, the present-day implication of his conception of narcissism signifies precisely the death of man in which he has been alienated from his ‘humanity’ (e.g. Fromm 1980a: chs. 3-7; 2004: chs. 4-5; and see 1964: ch. 4; 1980b: 51-4); to this extent, its mental condition is most dangerous to human beings. That is to say, the phenomenon of alienation stimulates narcissism; in this sense, they are compatible with each other.

Despite these facts, in Fromm’s view, as we have seen, since narcissism is the most fundamental human intrinsic nature, it is increasingly getting harder to deal with its problem in contemporary society primarily as contemporary socioeconomic structure spurs narcissism on to develop itself; in Fromm’s sense, it is quite difficult to cure the disease and to sublate the dialectical development containing the narcissistic contradictions. Notwithstanding such circumstances, however, he never gives up undertaking these difficult tasks. From Fromm’s perspective, man is by nature bound to require himself to sublate the contradiction that he is each of biological and social beings. Fromm says:

There is only one solution to his problem; to face the truth, to acknowledge his fundamental aloneness and solitude in a universe indifferent to his fate, to recognize that there is no power transcending him which can solve his problem for him. Man must accept the responsibility for himself and the fact that only by using his own powers can he give meaning to his life. But meaning does not imply certainty; indeed, the quest for certainty blocks the search for meaning. Uncertainty is the very condition to impel man to unfold his powers. If he faces the truth without panic he will recognize that there is no meaning to life except the meaning man gives his life by the unfolding of his powers, by living productively; and that only constant vigilance, activity, and effort can keep us from failing in the one task that matters – the full development of our powers within the limitations set by the laws of our existence (1971: 44-5).

At this point it is quite important to notice that Fromm divides the contradiction, namely the ‘dichotomy’ in Fromm’s sense, up into its two kinds, with which we are naturally endowed: ‘existential and historical dichotomies’ (1971: 44-5).
According to Fromm, the former is described by the incompatibilities of human existence between reason and nature, between transcendence and partialness, between life and death, and so forth, whose problems cannot be solved in principle; other contradictions between loneliness and relatedness, and between solitude and solidarity, are also included in this type of dichotomy. The latter, says Fromm, is the contradiction between ‘individual and social life’, whose difficulty can be solved, as exemplified by the distinction between ‘an abundance of technical means for material satisfaction and the incapacity to use them exclusively for peace and the welfare of the people’ (1971: 43). However, it is interesting to note that as to the former, too, he admits that it is to a certain extent possible to deal with the problems, despite the fact that there is no complete solution to them (1971: 44). From this perspective, as noted above, Fromm asserts that only productiveness is to defeat the loneliness and meaninglessness of human existence. In addition, as he puts it: ‘[o]nly if he recognizes the human situation, the dichotomies inherent in his existence and his capacity to unfold his powers, will he [sic] be able to succeed in his task: to be himself and for himself and to achieve happiness by the full realization of those faculties which are peculiarly his – of reason, love, and productive work’ (1971: 45).

Perhaps it is possible to replace the expression of existential and historical contradictions by of narcissism in existence and in history. In the above context, although indeed Fromm does not refer to his theory of narcissism, it is no doubt appropriate to understand its discussion as an extension of that psychoanalytic theory. For in my view his word of dichotomies is merely an alternative of narcissism. In fact, this is elucidated by Fromm’s view of love that regards it as diametrically opposite to narcissism. Fromm writes: ‘[l]ove is not primarily a relationship to a specific person; it is an attitude, an orientation of character which determines the relatedness of a person to the world as a whole, not toward one “object” of love’ (1962: 46). It is considered that his conception of love explains how one relates himself to the world, that is to say, how he solves his existential and historical contradictions. As Fromm puts it, ‘the main condition for the achievement of love is the overcoming of one’s narcissism’ (1962: 118). From this viewpoint, man can overcome his contradictions in existence and in history by realising this type of love which aims at establishing relationships with others and the world. In other words, for Fromm loving is the most important and difficult productive work; love is ‘the answer to the problem of human existence’ (1962: 7). For these reasons, in terms of Fromm’s theoretical framework narcissism reflects the bilateral character structure of the existence of human beings.

As regards the distinction between the two types of contradictions in existence and in history, however, it is important to note that the core issue is simply to find some solutions to social problems (historical dichotomy) by overcoming
narcissism (existential dichotomy) with the help of love – it goes without saying that to perform this task is not simple. In this sense, most importantly, they are intertwined with one another. (From this perspective, our problems spring all from narcissism – each in historical and in existence.) In this scheme, however, the former narcissism is not dealt with only by the power of love, even though it can much help in making an effort of overcoming that. In Fromm’s view, historical narcissism must be tackled by another help of reason as noted above. The concept of reason, in Fromm’s sense, is quite different from Enlightenment reason and science in general. As mentioned above, it is directed towards ‘reach[ing] to the essence of things and processes’, and, in this respect, it is subjective and objective. For Fromm, however, subjectivity does not simply denote enlightenment, and objectivity definitely does not mean empirical science given by the significations of ‘positivism’ and ‘behaviourism’. In some respects, Fromm’s ‘reason’ is rather much closer to the terminological sense of ‘philosophy’ (philosophia), namely the love of knowledge; in this respect, in his view to be sure love enables man simultaneously to overcome his narcissism and to obtain reason.

Fromm, notwithstanding, is basically of the opinion that we have considerable difficulty in accomplishing both the objectives since, needless to say, contemporary man and society are based on the socioeconomic structure inducing malignant narcissism. This is why in Fromm’s view we have been caught in and have not managed to get rid of a spiral of malignant narcissism, as mentioned in Chapter 4. The contemporary narcissistic self, who has resulted in killing oneself as well as others, is described in terms of Fromm’s theoretical stance as follows:

The statement ‘I (subject) have O (object)’ expresses a definition of I through my possession of O. The subject is not myself but I am what I have. My property constitutes myself and my identity. The underlying thought in the statement ‘I am I’ is ‘I am I because I have X’ – X equaling all natural objects and persons to whom I relate myself through my power to control them, to make them permanently mine (2011: 63).

In this way, man has died. He has lost any relationships with others and the world. He only seeks to stick firmly to property, private things – this is our exact state of mind that man is deprived of reality! In these circumstances, obviously, it is not easy or even seems impossible to restore love and reason. While, therefore, Fromm essentially puts his trust in human nature and some possibilities for restoring them (e.g. Fromm 1941, 1962, 1971), he leads us to realise ‘human change’ (2011: 137), namely the change of the character structure of contemporary society (e.g. Fromm 1980b, 2011); this requires that we should alter our social character at the same time (2011: ch. 7).
My fundamental question is whether it is possible to realise human change Fromm requires. I do not think it is possible if it means a complete change of man’s character structure and contemporary social structure. Although I do not completely reject Fromm’s suggestion, there is nevertheless little possibility of realising the change – to hold such a hope is always of huge significance though (I shall raise this theme in section 5 below). At this point it is enough to remember that Fromm’s view on the narcissism of contemporary society in respect of his remedial perspective has much in common with Fujita’s in the sense that the latter also requires such a change, namely the ‘reform of our spiritual structure’, as we saw in the preceding chapter. Rather, my concern is to see Fromm’s best work – I think so – *Escape from Freedom* in terms of the development of narcissism concerning the dialectic of politics – I believe that there is a more practical answer to the crucial problem concerning some solution to it and some view of society exactly in this work. However, I will not conduct a detailed exploration, but simply look at the essence of the book, concentrating particularly on the political implications of narcissism.


**Fromm’s philosophical method of dialectic**

It has hardly been mentioned that *Escape from Freedom* basically describes the dialectical development of politics. Of course, ‘dialectic’ has sometimes been referenced, for example, in respect of Fromm’s view of politics almost to the extent that he points out that freedom undergoes a dialectical process (Bronner 1992; Okazaki 2004; Xirau 1971; cf. Fromm 1941: 35, 104), and in terms of his view of human nature primarily concerning his discussion of the dichotomies (Braune 2011; Eckardt 1996; Millán 1996). Indeed, however, his philosophical position of dialectic concerns not simply the book and his view of politics, freedom and human nature but also other kinds of his tasks. In short, *Fromm’s work itself is based on* the philosophical method constituting his academic methodology and epistemology as a whole; this means that one cannot see Fromm’s attempts unless one knows this fact and the meaning of the philosophical method of dialectic. Funk (1982, 1986), for instance, is one of the few persons who take notice of this point. Also, some other researchers clearly understand its crucial standpoint of Fromm’s (Klein-Landskron 1989; Le 2006). However, there is a common misunderstanding that the book *Escape from Freedom* is directed at a simple criticism of fascism (e.g. McLaughlin 1996). It is noted that this stems
primarily from the fact of not being aware that the task is performed by the method of dialectic. This philosophical device, most importantly, makes it possible that democracy is compatible with fascism. Significantly, the existence of dialectic in Fromm elucidates the close relationship between his theory and Critical Theory (on this relation, see, e.g. Okazaki 2004) – since it takes a long space to address this topic primarily as it is generally thought of as a difficult and complex issue, I do not discuss its theme in my research. In this respect, therefore, it is plausible to believe that Fromm takes the dialectical viewpoint throughout his works. The following sentence, for example, characterises his method of dialectic.

In my view, no one can provide such a view of things without being aware of the dialectical principle. It was natural, however, that Fromm should absorb this method, taking his academic background into account. In fact, he accepted its methodological device primarily from Marx (e.g. Biancoli 1989; Funk 1982, 1986). Nonetheless, it is not right simply to think so. Funk, for example, points to the ‘ecstatic-cathartic conceptual model’ in relation to Fromm’s dialectic (1986: 1). According to Funk, this is derived from the ‘gnostic myths’, whose motif is depicted as the ‘pressure of reality’ in the state ‘cutting incisiveness’, and claims, therefore, that human beings require the salvation of the ‘human self’ and the ‘entire world process’. In these circumstances, they have been alienated from ‘their knowledge of their divine origin’, and thus, ‘they can either become completely estranged from that origin or recover knowledge of it . . . by becoming aware of their divine character’; this is the exact meaning of ‘gnosis’ (1986: 1). This fact, then, leads Funk to see that ‘paradoxical logic’ also springs from the ecstatic-cathartic conceptual construct; for Fromm, this principle is the result of the ‘negative concept of God’ and of the view that philosophy embodies ‘the idea that god is the extreme form of ignorance’ (1986: 3). From this perspective, Funk says that dialectic takes a ‘three-phase rhythm of original state, alienation and return, of negation and negation of the negation, etc.’, referring to Ernst Topitsch: ‘[t]he distinctiveness of dialectics lies in its concept of negation, which means that dialectics proceeds by the negation of the given. It thus implies a particular kind of criticism’ (1986: 5; emphases added). He finally comes to the following conclusion:
[n]egation ultimately always means the negation of a negation. When a process and development is understood dialectically, what exists is always and necessarily alienated and to be seen as the negation of an original condition. Interpreting a development dialectically as a process of negation means negating what existed before and exists now as a negation of an original state, and to abolish with this negation of the negation the negation of the original state (1986: 6; emphases added).

Funk’s standpoint is of great value to my research, particularly to an exploration of Escape from Freedom from Fromm’s dialectical viewpoint. That is to say, dialectic, from this perspective, reflects the ‘negation of the given’, namely the return from alienation. I will look at the work employing dialectical logic below, focusing primarily on this crucial point.

Escape from Freedom: the emancipation of constraints on human nature

Perhaps Escape from Freedom is divided up into its three kinds of motifs concerning politics: the critique of fascism, the critique of democracy, and the critique of human nature. Indeed, all the statements are probably right about the concept, but virtually a combination of these three views is the most plausible account of the work. When, however, integrating the above third motif into the other views, shining a light on the last one, then a different motif as a whole comes into being as follows: the emancipation of constraints on human nature – in principle, this is the same as ‘positive freedom’, namely ‘freedom to’, as Fromm calls it (1941: 35-7). The three steps of dialectical development of ‘original state’, ‘alienation’ and ‘return’ are a process of emancipating human nature for in this context sublation means the ‘negation of the given’, namely the return from alienation. That is to say, the negation of the present condition is exactly to break free from the constraints. In principle, we can release ourselves from our present suffering according to this framework. If we see Escape from Freedom in accordance with this logic, focusing on the concept of narcissism, then it comes out as follows.

Since in my research narcissism is regarded precisely as the most important intrinsic human nature, the primary emancipation of constraints is to overcome this sense of narcissism. As we saw above, however, according to Fromm, this fundamental need of ours (original state) has fallen into malignant type (alienation) due to the character structure of our society, or rather we are encouraged to be much more narcissistic (alienation). That is to say, our social structure has broken our mind, or, to put it another way, we have alienated ourselves from our original human nature. On this view, focusing on the relationship between ‘human existence’ and ‘freedom’, Fromm says:
Human existence begins when the lack of fixation of action by instincts exceeds a certain point; when the adaptation to nature loses its coercive character; when the way to act is no longer fixed by hereditarily given mechanisms. In other words, human existence and freedom are from the beginning inseparable (1941: 32).

Fromm’s view of human existence is of huge importance to my enquiry as to what political implications of narcissism are included in his theory. That is to say, as he puts it, ‘man’s biological weakness is the condition of human culture’ (1941: 33). Fromm illustrates the process that human beings establish their culture by employing the story of the Book of Genesis as follows – the illustration is cited below, although it requires a long space:

The myth identifies the beginning of human history with an act of choice, but it puts all emphasis on the sinfulness of this first act of freedom and the suffering resulting from it. Man and woman live in the Garden of Eden in complete harmony with each other and with nature. There is peace and no necessity to work; there is no choice, no freedom, no thinking either. Man is forbidden to eat from the tree of knowledge of good and evil. He acts against God’s command, he breaks through the state of harmony with nature of which he is a part without transcending it. From the standpoint of the Church which represented authority, this is essentially sin. From the standpoint of man, however, this is the beginning of human freedom. Acting against God’s orders means freeing himself from coercion, emerging from the unconscious existence of prehuman life to the level of man. Acting against the command of authority, committing a sin, is in its positive human aspect the first act of freedom, that is, the first human act. In the myth the sin in its formal aspect is the acting against God’s command; in its material aspect it is the eating of the tree of knowledge. The act of disobedience as an act of freedom is the beginning of reason. The myth speaks of other consequences of the first act of freedom. The original harmony between man and nature is broken. God proclaims war between man and woman, and war between nature and man. Man has become separate from nature, he has taken the first step toward becoming human by becoming an ‘individual’. He has committed the first act of freedom. The myth emphasizes the suffering resulting from this act. To transcend nature, to be alienated from nature and from another human being, finds man naked, ashamed. He is alone and free, yet powerless and afraid. The newly won freedom appears as a curse; he is free from the sweet bondage of paradise, but he is not free to govern himself, to realize his individuality (1941: 33-5; emphases added).

Fromm’s description is thoroughly constituted by dialectical logic. Quite interestingly, first of all, while man is a human being, being himself is forbidden; that is, despite a human being, he is not allowed to be man. He is, however, a human being, so he naturally requires himself to be a human. Then, he has become himself by committing a sin. He has thus had his original sin by becoming himself. Whilst, however, he has already been a human being, he has not yet recognised his true self. Perhaps such an understanding can also be
illuminated by relying upon the gnostic interpretation I mentioned above. It is described by explaining a process of recovering one’s own knowledge. However, here I proceed with my examination in a more appropriate way, concentrating on narcissism. That is to say, while overcoming our ‘primary narcissism’ (on this, see App. 2, p. 248), we are nonetheless in danger of suffering from it again; we are still narcissistic. As Fromm puts it,

Primary bonds once severed cannot be mended; once paradise is lost, man cannot return to it. There is only one possible, productive solution for the relationship of individualized man with the world: his active solidarity with all men and his spontaneous activity, love and work, which unite him again with the world, not by primary ties but as a free and independent individual. However, if the economic, social and political conditions on which the whole process of human individuation depends, [sic] do not offer a basis for the realization of individuality in the sense just mentioned, while at the same time people have lost those ties which gave them security, this lag makes freedom an unbearable burden. It then becomes identical with doubt, with a kind of life which lacks meaning and direction. Powerful tendencies arise to escape from this kind of freedom into submission or some kind of relationship to man and the world which promises relief from uncertainty, even if it deprives the individual of his freedom (1941: 36-7; emphases added).

Here I replace the term freedom by emancipation. That is to say, primary emancipation means ‘alienation’, and secondary emancipation is a way to ‘return’. Fromm depicts the former, namely ‘malignant narcissism’, as fascism (staying at the state of alienation), on the one hand, and the latter, namely the productive solution, as a way to democracy (returning), on the other. From this perspective, we are still under the condition that the existential contradiction (narcissism) has not yet been sublated. Rather, our state of mind that cannot bear our own existence of human beings (existential narcissism) has led us to be constrained by ‘secondary bonds’ as a substitute for primary bonds which have been lost’ (1941: 141); in Fromm’s view, this means exactly the process of ‘escape from freedom’. From these viewpoints, our society to a greater or lesser degree has some fascist aspects. It is noted, however, that its degree determines whether or not a society is fascist, and that a pathological degree of narcissistic needs determines the condition of a society. To put it differently, according to Fromm’s sociopsychological theory, they depend upon the respective character structures of society.

Contemporary man, then, has suffered from his narcissism again. In my view, narcissism is our existence itself, and therefore constantly exists in our mind. As opposed to this intrinsic need of human beings, however, Fromm requires that we should always attempt to overcome our narcissism. How, then, can we do it? With regard to this issue, he is consistent in claiming that active love and reason (productive work) – spontaneity or activity – can break free from the
psychological condition and lead us to realise positive freedom and democracy; from a dialectical perspective, it is understood that they can emancipate us from constraints on our human nature. However, Fromm does not clarify anything about a possible way and process of recovering them. He simply says as follows: '[t]he victory of freedom is possible only if democracy develops into a society in which the individual, his growth and happiness, is the aim and purpose of culture, in which life does not need any justification in success or anything else, and in which the individual is not subordinated to or manipulated by any power outside of himself, be it the State or the economic machine; finally, a society in which his conscience and ideals are not the internalization of external demands, but are really his and express the aims that result from the peculiarity of his self' (1941: 270-1).

Surprisingly, Fromm does not change his stance at all even in his later book To Have or to Be?; this work is virtually regarded as his last task based on his social concern in his life. This writing as well as Escape from Freedom requires restoring democracy through ‘productive activity’ (2011: chs. 1-3, 5); in terms of the psychoanalytic intersubjective relationship, democracy requires the transformation from the having mode, in which there exists only the ‘pseud self’ (1971: 158), and in which this self is identified only by others, to the being mode, in which the self establishes relationships with others through creating activity, depending upon love and reason. However, there is only a different point between those works in the sense that the former aims at ‘human change’, that is at changing social and individual characters. Obviously, it seems quite difficult to realise this change primarily because it principally requires the change of the social structure of our society. Would it be possible? Fromm says yes, it would be when we meet the conditions of reforming it. Before seeing his conception of ‘human change’, then, I will put forward three theoretical models of Escape from Freedom in terms of his theory of politics below, and thereby stressing some important political implications of narcissism in the work.

Three theoretical models of Escape from Freedom: breaking free from fascism, realisation of democracy, emancipation of human nature

First of all, the model of ‘emancipation of human nature’ is particularly stressed, comparing it with two other models as seen in Table 2. As described in ‘three theoretical models’, Escape from Freedom is composed of ‘overcoming fascism’, the ‘realisation of democracy’ and the ‘emancipation of humanity’ (realisation of self-love) in three theoretical levels. These three components contain three motifs of critiques of ‘fascism’, ‘democracy’ and ‘human nature’ respectively. Also, concerning these motifs of theory it is important to note that they have
Table 2 Three theoretical models of politics in *Escape from Freedom*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models</th>
<th>Motifs of theory</th>
<th>Basic theories</th>
<th>Subject realms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overcoming fascism</td>
<td>Criticism of fascism (Nazism and authoritarianism)</td>
<td>Sadism-masochism (dependence on others)</td>
<td>Psychoanalysis (social psychology), politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realisation of democracy</td>
<td>Criticism of democracy (regular life)</td>
<td>Alienation (dependence on machine)</td>
<td>Philosophy, sociology, politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emancipation of humanity</td>
<td>Criticism of human nature (narcissism)</td>
<td>Narcissism (exploitation of others)</td>
<td>Philosophy, sociology, politics, psychoanalysis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

their respective theoretical implications, ‘critiques of authoritarianism’, ‘regular life’ and ‘narcissism’. On this view, for Fromm ‘authoritarianism’ is replaced exactly by *bureaucracy*, which means that the former concept does not simply mean so-called *violent Fascism* as is well known, that ‘democracy’ means daily ‘regular life’ repeated in the same way, and that ‘human nature’ is another expression of narcissism, which signifies the most fundamental human needs determining *human nature and features*. Sadistic-masochistic ‘authoritarianism’ is essentially based on ‘dependence on others’, on the one hand, and ‘democracy’ in a negative sense, which signifies contemporary disciplined, workaday daily-life, is based on ‘dependence on machine’ as a routine life-cycle inducing ‘alienation’, on the other. Also, while ‘humanity’ denotes both ‘self-love’ and ‘narcissism’, love for the self in the negative sense, namely narcissism, comes into being in the form of ‘exploitation of others’.

As seen above, ‘authoritarianism’ and ‘narcissism’ are explained basically as pathological phenomena lying between the self and the other. On this view, as the Japanese sociologist Takeshi Deguchi puts it, ‘narcissists psychologically attack and distance from others, projecting their own negative personality traits onto the latter ... thereby protecting their own pride and grandiose selves, and preventing their own painful negative psychology’; in this sense, authoritarianism is *symbiotic*, but narcissism is *detached* (2014: 6). To put it another way, while authoritarians are characterised by *symbiosis*, narcissists are characterised by *segregation*, namely *exploitation*. They are both described by the *quality of relationships* between persons, but most importantly, they have in common the fact that they both need *others*. For this reason, it is understood that those pathological phenomena are typified by the *difference in distance* between the self and others.

Next, it is important to note that ‘democracy’ and ‘fascism’, and ‘self-love’
and ‘narcissism’, are respectively in the dialectical relationships in Fromm’s theory of politics (democracy and fascism). Narcissism as an ‘existential dichotomy’ (see p. 163 above) is characterised as the dialectical contradiction between ‘self-love’, which has a positive effect on humanity, and ‘narcissism’, which has a negative impact on human beings. Furthermore, in the human condition of ‘existential narcissism’ (see p. 168 above) the dialectical process of history undergoes in two dialectical ways of whether the self returns to ‘self-realisation’ on the basis of ‘productive love’ and ‘reason’, devoting himself to acquiring positive ‘self-love’ internalised in himself (realisation of democracy), or whether he keeps being alienated by the ‘exploitation of others’, falling into the mechanism of negative narcissism existing in himself (backsliding into fascism). In Fromm’s social theory, this dialectical dynamics is called ‘historical dichotomies’ (pp. 161-3 above), meaning the dialectical political law of development.

5. Fromm’s Theory of ‘Human Change’

According to Fromm, the change of character structures, namely ‘characterological change’, can be done when individuals fulfil the four conditions: the awareness of our suffering, the acknowledgement of the cause of our ‘ill-being’, the recognition of some remedy for our ‘ill-being’, an understanding of the necessity of changing the present way of living according to norms for overcoming the difficulty (2011: 137). Subsequently, he suggests the conception of a ‘new Man’, which is composed of twenty one qualities concerning character structures (2011: 139-40), and which brings himself to the ‘being mode’ for est-
Political Theories of Narcissism

ablishing the new society on the basis of ‘productive activity’. Since this is an important issue, I will summarise them below:

1. ‘Willingness’ to transform from one’s own having mode into being mode.
2. ‘Security’, ‘sense of identity’ and ‘confidence’ obtained by ‘relatedness’, ‘interest’, ‘love’ and ‘solidarity’ on the basis of the being mode.
3. The acknowledgement of the meaninglessness of one’s own life and the awareness of the ‘radical independence’ and ‘no-thingness’ leading one to ‘sharing’ and ‘caring’.
4. Self-expression.
5. Satisfied not with ‘hoarding’ and ‘exploiting’ but with ‘giving’ and ‘sharing’.
6. ‘Love’ and ‘respect’ for all living creatures.
7. Efforts to reduce ‘greed’, ‘hate’ and ‘illusion’.
8. Having nothing about ‘worshiping idols’ and ‘illusions’.
9. Cultivating individual ability to ‘love’ in conjunction with ‘critical’ thinking.
10. Overcoming individual ‘narcissism’.
11. Strong hopes of the full development of ‘one’s fellow beings’.
12. The awareness of the necessity of ‘discipline’ and ‘respect for reality’
13. Admitting the possibility of healthily developing individuals only in the specific structure and the distinction between ‘structure as an attribute of life’ and ‘“order” as an attribute of no-life, of the dead’.
14. Raising individual ‘imagination’ expecting ‘real possibilities’.
15. Do not involve oneself and not be involved in dishonest behaviour.
17. An understanding of ‘nature’ and a sense of unity with it.
18. Freedom enabling one to become ‘oneself’.
19. Distrust of ‘evil’ and ‘destructiveness’.
20. Do not have any ‘ambition’ to a full realisation of these two qualities.
21. Replete with oneself ‘in the process of ever-growing aliveness’.

Fromm presents not only the conception of a new Man but also of the new society; we should be careful about the signification of the latter concept, by which he intends the sole society. At this point it is important to remember that in his theory creating a new man precedes establishing a new society; this means that in his view the change of individual characters is previously completed rather than the structural change of society. His suggestions for altering our society, focusing on some ways of dealing with social problems, are as follows.
1. Constructing the ‘industrial mode of production without total centralization’.
2. The decentralisation of planning and the abolition of ‘free-market economy’.
3. Aiming not at unlimited but at selective growth.
4. Establishing working conditions stimulating one’s spiritual motivations.
5. The development of science that avoids endangering man.
6. The construction of social conditions giving well-being.
7. ‘Basic security of individuals’ and the independence of bureaucracy.
8. The realisation of ‘individual initiative in living’.

From these perspectives, one might see that there is almost no possibility of establishing a new Man or the new society Fromm puts forward. However, I do not deny his view. To be sure, virtually it would be true that either do we have considerable difficulty in realising them, or is there almost no hope to realise them – even though not entirely impossible. Much more importantly, however, Fromm is well aware of this fact (2011: 159); he best recognises that it is hard to deal with the difficulties. Most importantly, nonetheless, Fromm never throws away his hope for those attempts, or rather he tries to devote all his efforts to the task, which is given only a slight possibility. It can be argued that from his psychoanalytic perspective the reason why he decided to choose a more difficult way of radically changing society by establishing his conception of the new society is because, unexpectedly, he arrived at the practical conclusion that society he saw needs a much more effective prescription which enables it to face exactly its own unconscious through his therapeutic practice. Perhaps this is why Fromm particularly stresses that, ‘[i]nsight separated from practice remains ineffective’ (2011: 139). In this respect, we should once listen to and accept the standpoint presented by a psychoanalytic practitioner. Or, more accurately, however, Fromm’s stance on contemporary society that quite severely sees the negative essence, no doubt, stems primarily from his actual experience that Nazi politics fell into the Weimar Republic. For instance, the dialectical view of politics Escape from Freedom takes cannot rigorously be understood without knowing the fact that it was first of all written on the basis of his background. In addition, it is pointed out that the primary reason why Fromm took part in the programme of ‘interdisciplinary materialism’ of the Institute for Social Research is because of the fact that Fromm shared with the main figures of the Frankfurt School not only the disciplinary concern but also a sense of crisis induced by the emergence of fascism apart from the failure of performing the historic task of the working class (cf. Whitebook 1996b: 288). His experience of facing a real fascism, undoubtedly, largely determined his standpoint that proposed a series
of concepts critical of contemporary ‘free-market society’, such as the ‘marketing orientation’ and the ‘having mode’, by laying stress on a passive and indifferent attitude regarded as a negative aspect of contemporary people shared by Nazis (see, e.g. Fromm 1941, 1962, 1964, 1971, 2010, 2011).

These two experiences must have given rise to his position that problems come not from outside but from inside. According to this view, we therefore immanently internalise evil. As a matter of fact, Escape from Freedom begins by putting forward the viewpoint, raising John Dewey’s description of the political menace: ‘“[t]he serious threat to our democracy”, he says, “is not the existence of foreign totalitarian states. It is the existence within our own personal attitudes and within our own institutions of conditions which have given a victory to external authority, discipline, uniformity and dependence upon The Leader in foreign countries. The battlefield is also accordingly here – within ourselves and our institutions”.’ (1941: 5; emphases added); in this sense, Dewey is a political spokesman for Fromm.

My research, however, does not take the same stance as Fromm’s particularly with respect to his remedial perspective. While admitting that his prescriptive standpoint I noted above is to a certain extent relevant to curing individuals and society, I am nevertheless of the opinion that Fromm’s social theory has resulted simply in focusing on ethical and normative viewpoints despite his psychoanalytic knowledge, and therefore that it has not sublated the contradiction generated by our narcissistic needs. That is to say, any suggestions are not useful for giving a remedy unless they identify how it is possible to realise them. Hence, I do not require ‘human change’, but changing our political view into another one that leads us, individuals and society, to be aware of the importance of social solidarity, and then that realises the change by ourselves. In this respect, my standpoint, different from Fromm’s, aims not at the complete reform of society but at a partial reform of society.

Notes

1 To describe the signification of its full development, Fromm stresses the importance of the personality of spontaneity in his following writings (e.g. 1941: ch. 7; 1962: 20-33, 128-9; 2011: 38-9, 72-9; cf. 2005: 126) and the personality of productive love in following sources (e.g. 1941: 114-6, 261; 1962: chs. 2, 4; 1971: 96-110, 129; 2005: 101-2; 2011: 37-9; cf. 2010: 75). In these works, both terms are often employed together.

2 I do not concern myself with the criticism of Habermas’s application of psychoanalysis to Critical Theory represented by Joel Whitebook (e.g. Whitebook 1996a, 2001). To be sure, it might seem that my research relies upon the early Habermas’s epistemology in respect of the self-reflective standpoint particularly through the psychoanalytic way of intersubjective
Erich Fromm

mutual understanding, but it is noted that such a viewpoint has already been not specific to Habermas. Whitebook has actually become aware of this fact and wrote, e.g. ‘Mutual Recognition and the Work of the Negative’ (2001), directing her critique against Honneth. He actually replies to Whitebook’s view that Critical Theory spoilt sociotheoretical ‘negativity’ through this ‘intersubjective, socialization-theoretical turn’, and argues as follows: ‘whether the life-long influence of early expectations of security can be described as the “work of the negative” or merely as a largely unconscious need might be a question of scientific temperament. In any case, it does not seem to me to be wholly inappropriate to view this as an infinite source of antisociality, because each act of resistance to the independence and uncontrollability of the other, who thereby embodies socially, is new. But it remains unclear to me why this motive should be antithetically opposed to intersubjectivism. Why should the idea of a life-long willingness for fusion contradict the concept of recognition? Is the fact that transitional objects serve to help us cope emotionally with our separation from primary objects, which we now recognize as being independent, not a clear indication of the inordinate significance of intersubjectivity?’ (2012: 229). Perhaps the core issue of Critical Theory’s theory of intersubjective recognition lies in this point.


4 Salvador Millán identifies a problem contained in this concept: ‘[h]ow shall we facilitate the breaking down of the rigidity of the structures without opposing it rigidly with a solution? And in the very terms of the social character, how shall we face the rigidity of character, if it is itself the result of social adaptation, a process in which class differences, exploitation on the job, and inequality prevail as determining elements and in which, as a dominant emotional characteristic, is apparent a vertical authoritarian type of relationship and a passive-exploitative character?’ (1992: 57).

5 Okazaki’s view would be true to this extent. However, if he is of the opinion that the emphasis on the social needs is specific to Fromm’s psychoanalysis, then it is completely wrong (2004: 85-6, 134-40). Many psychoanalysts who started their academic careers from Freudsians have laid stress on the fact that they are intrinsic to human beings (e.g. Kernberg 1975; Kohut 1971, 1977; Sullivan 1974, 1997; Winnicott 1965). Phenomenological psycho-pathology, for example, extends such a simple psychoanalytic scope of individual perception to ‘lifeworld’ (e.g. Blankenburg 1971). In my view, instead, the theoretical possibilities of Fromm’s psychoanalytic are illustrated precisely by ‘Analytical Social Psychology’ whether or not the conception of the social needs exists in the works written before the publication of Escape from Freedom. That is to say, Fromm is characterised particularly by his academic style of absorbing Marx and Freud at the same time and integrating them into a psychoanalytic theory by means of his sociological approach – as far as I know, there are only a few socio-psychoanalytic approaches which related these two theorists in a theory, and which the so-called psychoanalysts have proposed. In this sense, one cannot see Fromm’s psychoanalytic theory or his theory unless one knows Fromm’s fundamental philosophical method of dialectic, which typifies his theory in general apart from his academic background of sociology.

6 It would seem that this is also elucidated by Fromm’s unique conception of narcissism, distinguishing between individual and group (social) narcissism, the latter of which was invented by his later psychoanalytic theory; this means that he was consistent in his early methodological stance.

7 It would seem, however, that I should carry out a further investigation into whether Fromm’s social theory is self-critical and self-reflective. Having said that, since my primary
purpose in this exploration is not to conduct research into its theoretical aspect of Critical Theory, it will be done in the future.

8 With regard to this issue, to be sure, Fromm seems slightly confused. Although ‘existential dichotomy’ in Fromm’s sense is understood as narcissism that must be surmounted, he insists that there is no hope to settle the difficulties; however, he says that it is possible to cope with them by respective means (1971: 44). That is to say, my enquiry is what it means that human beings are all required to overcome narcissism. Indeed, it is understood that we cannot remove the contradiction between life and death. It is possible, however, to erase the dichotomies between loneliness and relatedness, and between solitude and solidarity, that is to say, the differences between them are given merely by the description of human emotions. Whilst the former contradiction is a physical problem that is definitely not soluble, the latter is a soluble sociopolitical problem concerning our mental condition. This is the exact dialectical matter. Maybe, in this respect, Fromm is not confused by the theme, but implies that narcissism as existential dichotomy should be overcome by means of the latter way, namely the solution of historical dichotomy.

9 As opposed to Arendt, however, Fromm definitely does not deny the social, but he rather supports the essence and finds some vital clues to steering contemporary society out of the spiritual crisis exactly in this concept. Here I do not discuss this topic since my concern in this research is not to tackle its issue.

10 The concepts of ‘true self’ and ‘false self’ were presented by Winnicott (1965) (on this, see App. 2, pp. 247-8).
CHAPTER 7

How Is the Self Related to Politics?
Towards the Foundations of Democracy

So far I have discussed human nature in respect of some social and political issues with a focus on the indispensable human intrinsic feature of narcissism, referring to Fujita’s and Fromm’s social and political theories. The former lived in Japan, and the latter was born and lived in Germany and stayed in the US for over forty years; hence, their social and historical backgrounds are different from each other despite some similar aspects concerning the processes of their historical developments. As we have seen, nonetheless, they shared a certain stance on society concerning its negative aspect particularly with respect to contemporary times; that is, contemporary society has killed ‘others’ and ‘man’ (narcissism). There is no need to explain that this view is provided simply as a metaphor – however, since generally it means a specific view of human existence in the spiritual dimension, the sentence is not understood simply as a metaphorical expression. Rather, the two theorists’ common viewpoint shows a state of mind of contemporary people. It must be stressed, however, that each theory does not provide any effective prescription for curing society’s ill of narcissism. They both, on the whole, have failed to create practical treatment for social narcissism as we have seen: first, in the sense that Fujita’s theory neither epistemologically nor methodologically nor practically satisfies a requisite for a remedial standpoint despite some relevant suggestions; second, in the sense that Fromm’s theory has fallen into a simple moral and normative theory with respect to its prescriptive viewpoint of society; and third, in the sense that each theory ineffectively stresses only negative ingredients of narcissism specifically in relation to their respective perspectives of society. In these respects, it is con-
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sidered that both theorists do not fulfil theoretical requirements of prescription. For these reasons, it should be noted that those theories have resulted merely in identifying the existence of the social unconscious particularly concerning the social disease of ‘social (group) narcissism’ as far as their social theories are concerned. However, it should be noted that the task of identification only concerns examination and diagnosis; thus, there remains the most important work of treatment.

How can we perform this function? Of course, it is absolutely impossible to complete the task only through my doctoral research. Rather, it requires a certain period of time and several remedial steps, and here I will therefore concentrate my exploration on laying the theoretical foundations of a political view of democracy in its epistemological dimension. To put it differently, here my attempt will simply put forward a slightly provocative standpoint of politics that is expected to change the fundamental stance on our way of social and political life. For this purpose, I want once to refer to Kohut, focusing particularly on his conception of the ‘self’. It is hypothesised that his perspective highlighting the vulnerable self will help to alter a general view of democracy. That is to say, most importantly, the issue is how to face this weak self who is concerned only with oneself. From this perspective, I will first consider whether democracy is incompatible with narcissism, getting back to my previous discussions. I will then apply Kohut’s psychoanalytic theory to social and political theory, shining a light on the psychoanalytic meaning of self-other relations. I will finally reflect upon politics in terms of this psychoanalytic interpersonal relationship. These explorations must lead us to see our democracy from a novel and unconventional perspective.

The task of giving a prescription for the disease of narcissism, then, will be undertaken through carrying out a series of works on laying the foundations of society and politics. At this point, therefore, I simply attempt to prevent our narcissism from consigning its own conflicts to the unconscious. That is to say, through this investigation it is claimed that we can sublate our contradiction causing social and political problems only in so far as facing our difficulty, namely the psychological vulnerability of human beings. My primary concern, however, is not only to carry out these idealistic reflections. Most importantly, I am definitely not satisfied with a simple theoretical and speculative research. Above all, my theoretical endeavour will need some practical attempt in the future – this does not mean that empirical research fulfils its requisite, but that theory concerns and requires practice.
1. Is Narcissism Incompatible with Democracy?
Between Fromm and Fujita

Can narcissism be coexistent with democracy? Or is the former *incompatible* with the latter? If so, why? Perhaps, first of all, some might see that these enquiries are quite ridiculous primarily because there is no need to explain that democracy requires *individual autonomy*; this perspective is of the opinion that individuals are intrinsically independent of each other. This stance is represented definitely by John Locke. For him, individual autonomy is a mere alternative of ‘property’ defined as a right to one’s inviolable ‘own person’ (1988: pt II, ch. 5). In Locke’s view, everyone has a ‘property in his own person’, and so his person and his labour specific to him are necessarily inseparable from each other; hence, his property is only his *own* thing. Also, on the grounds that man was given property rights by God, says Locke, no one can infringe upon his property. In other words, for him the individual means simply a subject provided with a ‘property in his own person’; in this respect, he writes that ‘all mankind [is] . . . equal and independent’. In Locke’s political society, the autonomous individual is a man who is related only to God; this individual therefore establishes his society simply for protecting his *own* property. Hence, Locke’s political society essentially requires individual autonomy. For these reasons, Locke is not aware of the phenomenological signification of individual constituted by intersubjective relationships. Second, one might see that my enquiry provides an implausible standpoint of the individual in the sense that the concept of narcissism is invalid in the first place. Perhaps this stance is characterised by Nietzsche’s conceptions of the subject and the self. Not only does he deny the idea that the subject controls its own action, that is to say, he invalidates the modern concept of subject (see Ch. 3, s. 1), but obviously he also refuses the notion of *vulnerable* self. His perspective, then, rejects the above issues themselves. Third, some others might claim that, since the self is constituted by collective identity and character, and therefore since the individual does not directly concern politics per se, the weakness of a self should supplement its necessities with the *empowerment* of a group he belongs to. This stance may be represented by Michael Walzer. He contends that the individual powerlessness stems from the fact that one belongs to a group, or, to put it simply, its disadvantage and powerlessness are ‘the result of [one’s] collective identity’ itself (2004: 32): ‘the individual men and women who occupy the lowest ranks on the global hierarchy are there because they are poor, obviously, but also because they are . . . Congolese, Rwandan, or Bengali – or Kurdish or Palestinian’ (2004: 135). Hence, ‘meat-and-potatoes multiculturalism’, namely
material empowerment of groups, is necessary for them (2004: 38). To be sure, his argument is aware of the collective self, and seems quite relevant to political practice. However, it also compels me to spoil my discussion for his view disregards the psychoanalytic individual self made up of different ingredients from group identity.

It should be noted that these three standpoints do not necessarily epistemologically correspond to the issues raised above. It is important to remember, however, that through establishing these viewpoints I definitely do not aim at denying the significance of their respective perspectives but at identifying the political implication of narcissism: the intersubjective ingredient constructing the individual in political life. Most importantly, this psychoanalytic standpoint clarifies what is intended by the ontological individual that has been ignored by many fields in the social sciences. To put it differently, so far a large number of issues in the social sciences have not perceived the individual intersubjectively constituted in the space of psychoanalytic self-other relations, in which one is not reduced, for example, either to an autonomous individual or to a social being or to a simple psychological being or to a disciplined self (see Ch. 3) – although phenomenological sociology, constructivism in international relations and phenomenological linguistics, for example, try to deal with their respective disciplinary issues by applying the concept of intersubjectivity, my approach is distinguished from those standpoints, for neither do they present the viewpoints of the psychoanalytic individual and society consisting of that kind of beings, nor do they aim to gain an understanding of these two theoretical perspectives. Hence, the three issues Locke, Walzer and Nietzsche have put forward should be understood as simple examples to demonstrate this fact. This means, therefore, that the three descriptions show the important evidence that the discipline of political theory has so far almost completely disregarded and has been unaware of the psychoanalytic, intersubjective individual I explained above.

By contrast, as we have seen, Fujita and Fromm perceived – albeit not completely – the existence of the psychoanalytic function of intersubjectivity in the formation of the individual. Nonetheless, they almost entirely rejected human narcissism, and therefore did not manage to grasp the political signification of the vulnerable self. This is a crucial matter for my research. In my view, narcissism is not simply a hindrance to political and social life, but most importantly, the instinctual need is essential for human life. From this perspective, the critical problem is how to face the obstacle and indispensable human need of narcissism. From my research perspective, there is no person who gives a vital clue to seeking for some ways of tackling this problem as better as Kohut does. Above all, he provides us with some essential meanings of the self concerning
How Is the Self Related to Politics?

social and political life, and his viewpoint must be of great relevance for establishing a new type of view of politics.

2. What Is Needed? As Seen from Kohut’s Perspective

What is needed for balancing democratic life in which, while the self is absorbed in himself, he cares about and respects others? This is actually a considerably difficult matter for both individuals and politics. It would be impossible, however, to emancipate human nature from the constraint of narcissism, and to even realise democracy, by denying the need as Fromm and Fujita did. Essentially, my stance is to accept the narcissistic self. Basically, I take the view that there is no way of performing those crucial tasks with the exception of this method. In fact, my position is in favour of Kohut on the grounds that his self psychology stresses the raison d’être of the self, while based on the stance that human psychology and human beings are intersubjectively constituted. To put it simply, his psychoanalytic theory highlights the significance of the self. Since in Chapter 3 I already laid the anthropological foundations of my research through applying Kohut’s psychoanalytic theory based on the relevance of the self, focusing particularly on his theory of narcissism, here I will therefore devote my attempt to integrating the Kohutian self into a theory of political life in the ontological dimension of the individual. My research, however, will simply carry out a brief exploration, referring primarily to the anthropological foundations laid through conducting the works of Chapters 3 and 4. I will first raise an issue of the self presented by the discipline of political theory, particularly taking notice of Foucault’s conception of the self, and then examine what meanings the Kohutian self gives to politics.

The concept of self and Foucault

As we saw in Chapter 3, the concept of self began with Descartes. This Descartian rational self, however, later resulted in being rejected primarily by relying upon the notion of ‘will to power’ and by discovering the ‘unconscious’. These challenges to the modern self and the subject were taken over, for example, by Foucault who strongly supports the former view. Famously, he has conducted a series of historical research into the connection between ‘knowledge’ and ‘power’, primarily raising the concepts of ‘madness’ and ‘discipline’. In his early work Madness and Civilization (1961), Foucault claims that since modern times madness has transformed itself from the embodiment of reason into
Through this transformation, in his view, this sense of madness has gradually been excluded from society by institutionalising the modern asylum as a device of incarceration; in this context, it does not simply mean insane patients but excluded persons, and the completion of this mechanism is therefore exactly the birth of the apparatus of social exclusion as a modern technology. For him, thus, psychiatry merely fulfils its role as a technique for removing madness as an object of social oppression; this knowledge is therefore complicit in the institutionalisation. In Discipline and Punish (1975), then, Foucault shows that the transition from corporal punishment to imprisonment means the emergence of a new kind of power that the modern power of knowledge justifies and determines punishment (‘power/ knowledge’), and that the subject is disciplined by internalising the surveillance of prison as a modern technique (‘disciplinary power’), introducing Bentham’s idea of Panopticon prison. From this perspective, modern-contemporary society comes into being as a prison, and knowledge and technology as important means of disciplining man. Here knowledge and power are closely intertwined with each other – in this context, Foucault’s criticism is also directed against psychoanalysis as well as psychiatry as pseudo-sciences. He has thus led the subject to become a simple being internalising discipline as the demands of society by adopting the systematic theoretical panopticism to the theory of power.

Significantly, however, in his last work The History of Sexuality (1976-84) his concern turns into the concept of self on the whole. In this series of works, Foucault begins by throwing into question the ‘repressive hypothesis’ that sexuality has been repressed in modern western society, arguing that, in contrast to the supposition, the Western world has brought man to sexual beings through increasing the discourse on sexuality on the basis of the ‘will to knowledge’; here ‘biopower’ controlling human sexual desires, namely human life itself, has come into being. Second, Foucault starts to draw attention to the self. In this attempt, focusing on ancient Greece, he contends that in Greek antiquity provocatively the subject of morality obtained truth and self-mastery through sexual relationships, that is through the ‘use of sexuality’; in his view, sexual practice was directed exactly towards attaining morality in this society. Finally, Foucault elaborates his discussion of sexual morality, shining a light on the self. In ancient Rome, he claims, man was led to the ‘care of the self’ by the ‘culture of the self’. In particular, he stresses that this attitude of self-esteem enabled another aspect of marriage to be a contract for sexual and interpersonal relationships between spouses; this is the emergence of the mutually equal relationship between husband and wife. In sum, the care of the self captures the essence of Greek and Roman antiquity concerning sexuality, says Foucault.
My fundamental enquiry is why Foucault later concerned himself with the concept of self. From the above brief survey of his works, however, my insight into this topic is limited to a very narrow extent. While, unfortunately, he himself does not say anything about the reasons for it in his above last reflections, it is possible, nonetheless, to gain a clue to dealing with this issue by taking notice of his later series of lectures on ‘government’ given from 1977 till 1984. It is quite interesting to note that this work was conducted precisely during the term when Foucault published the series of volumes The History of Sexuality, which displayed his strong interest in the self, as we saw above; in this respect, it is evident that there are some important suggestions concerning his conception of the self in the lectures. Yet there does not remain any space to tackle this issue in great detail. Some points, however, can be observed at this stage. With regard to this topic, it can be argued, first of all, that Foucault became aware of the limitation of his systematic theoretical concept of ‘power/knowledge’ in terms of an aporia of his theory of power, given exactly by his conception of subjectivity (subject) he himself had put forward, and, second, that he recognised that there is no other way of establishing a new kind of society, in which the subject as well as knowledge can break free to some extent from his idea of power, with the exception of relying to a greater or lesser degree upon the self, even if succeeding in deconstructing the concept. Or, more accurately, Foucault at long last arrived simply at the conclusion that it is necessary to give not solely the subject but the self some possibilities for altering a structure that disciplines human body and regulates human life itself, and that absorbs knowledge – and his theory itself as well – into the category of power, by way of the intersubjectively constituted ‘government of self and others’, whose theoretical signification and intention essentially cast doubt on his conception of subjectivity made up primarily through his early works. Here I do not afford to devote myself to carrying out any detailed research into these topics concerning the later Foucault. Instead, I will only raise some issues concerning the above views below. First, is Foucault’s conception of social struggle compatible with his theory of ‘government of self and others’? Second, is the latter concept based on and does it aim at establishing intersubjective interpersonal relationships? To clarify these issues, it would seem that I should refer to his concept of ‘governmentality’, which is believed to be first put forward in his lecture ‘Security, Territory and Population’ (1978). In short, my primary enquiry is how Foucault attempted to change negative systematic panopticism to positive government based on the place of social struggle – the latter can be understood as ‘agonistic democracy’. Unfortunately, here I cannot proceed with a further discussion. Rather, my exploration suggests that, instead of the Foucauldian self
who is willing to be involved in social struggle, the subject regarded as the vulnerable self constitutes democracy.

**The relevance of the Kohutian self for politics**

Basically, as we have seen, my stance is that the self is made up of psychoanalytic interpersonal relationships with others. This self, in my view, is based on Kohut’s model of ‘Tragic Man’ who ‘is led by his ideals but pushed by his ambitions’, that is who comes into existence as the ‘bipolar self’ having ‘gradient of tension between two differently charged (+, -) electrical poles’ (see Ch. 3, s. 1). On the one hand, the ‘grandiose-exhibitionistic self’ requires charging his ambitious pole up with the help of the ‘mirroring selfobject’, and, on the other hand, the ‘idealized parent-imago’ requires charging his ideal pole up with the help of the ‘idealized selfobject’. As explained in Chapter 3, this means that the existence of two types of others is indispensable for human beings. Admittedly, from this perspective the self is an extremely vulnerable being. Again, we remind ourselves of this fact by referring to Eugene O’Neill’s literary depiction of human existence: ‘Man is born broken. He lives by mending. The grace of God is glue’. My task is therefore to seek to glue the self onto the other. From this perspective, narcissism is the state of the self who has not yet glued himself to others. At this point we become aware that there is no need to regard narcissism as a hindrance to the politics of democracy, and that it is rather an absolute necessity in political life.

How do we manage to establish the above relationship? With regard to this issue, I am of the opinion that performing this work signifies exactly politics. However, it might seem necessary for us to follow some principles that regulate our behaviour itself. My method, nonetheless, is not simply to apply a normative approach for addressing this theme. Rather, I take a remedial standpoint based on Kohut’s psychoanalytic theory. Again, let us take a look at the discussion in Chapter 3. Both sociological functionalism and Foucauldian panopticism have resulted in eliminating the scope for individual capacity to act freely from sui generis social facts and power. For them, therefore, all are reduced merely to each category, and then there is no room for individual thinking and determination that neither social facts nor power affect. For the purpose of overcoming these theoretical difficulties, I advanced my methodological tool called ‘psychoanalytic self-other relations’, in which it is supposed that both the categories do not influence individual behaviour on the grounds that the individual does not come into being either as a functionalist social being or as a disciplined subject but as a self (other) in the relationship; the self acts in his own ‘space of the self’, in which the self becomes the other and vice versa. In
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In this context, individuals are all recognised by others who own their respective masks. In addition, the fact that the self is affected and constituted by others gives rise to the emergence of the ‘group self’; many similar personalities of selves are a potential group self. In order to see this self, we actually need to go into ‘his inner world’ by employing Kohut’s methods of ‘introspection’ and ‘empathy’ – as mentioned in Chapter 3, I call this ‘methodological psycho-analysis’ and the individual observed by this method, namely the Kohutian self, the ‘methodological psychoanalytic individual’. I will seek to establish a new aspect of the knowledge of politics in terms of this psychoanalytic anthropology of intersubjectivity.

3. The Dialectic of Narcissism: Democracy amongst Narcissists

In my view, politics is always quite dialectical; it dialectically develops. My stance is therefore that all the kinds of existent politics can turn into either a healthy or unhealthy condition, and that there exist neither healthy nor unhealthy politics in advance. Politics, most importantly, is changeable – either negatively or positively – and this process is undergone on the basis of the extent to which politics cares about the ‘injured self’ (Kohut e.g. 1985c: 78). In addition, it is hypothesised that in this context an ‘original state’ (see Ch. 6, s. 4) is not necessarily politics which glues the self onto the other – metaphorically, an expected child connected with his mother in her womb – but it might rather be either one which seems to link the self to the other or one which seems not to do so. In other words, the dialectic of narcissism does not always suggest that the ‘original state’ means the state that one is in mother’s womb, that ‘alienation’ is in the state that he was born from there, that is, he has been separated from his mother (other), and that ‘return’ is in the state that he links himself to others. With regard to this issue, most importantly, the meaning of politics always is and seems ambiguous. In this respect, the dialectic of politics does not always undergo the certain process; to this extent, dialectic is not a perfect method. It is nonetheless still of considerable relevance for gaining understandings of politics, particularly for illuminating its ambiguity. From this perspective, politics attempts to determine what is good and bad, and what is negative and positive, through its own political practice; that is to say, it paradoxically cannot clarify what is right and wrong. For dealing with this difficulty, however, I take the remedial standpoint that provides me with an important criterion that healthy politics satisfies the narcissistic need of self, that is to say, it connects the self with others on the basis of the intersubjective personal relationship, and that politics ful-
filling this requisite is right and good; needless to say, a psychoanalytic – and medical – treatment process is dialectical – many diseases often take the course of changing both good and bad conditions in turn.

Having said that, I do not completely deny some negative aspects of narcissism as suggested by Fromm and Fujita, while supporting some positive aspect of the need as seen from Kohut, as mentioned above. Rather, my position is between these two sides; in this respect, too, I am in favour of dialectic. Of course, I am really aware that, whenever narcissism is excessively strong and insanely requires satisfying its own needs, politics would drive the self to take part in itself in reasonable ways; we have already known the consequence. Importantly, this means not only well-known types of fascism, in which power violently forces one to follow its own way of controlling him, but also ‘fascism with a smile face’ (Fromm 2011: 141), in which the self unconsciously oppresses and depresses himself as well as others particularly by passively and differently behaving in a regular and routine life cycle – the latter is much more problematic, provocatively due to nonviolent politics – and the main problem in contemporary society is rather that problematic situations themselves are often not perceived; that is to say, apparently, it is difficult to see what problems are – it is supposed that contemporary people are most often not even aware that in their everyday life they are alienated from others and themselves, and that they are insanely much more narcissistic. One of our primary tasks is thus to prevent the social unconscious from eroding the space of intersubjectivity by reinforcing the self-other interpersonal relationships as much as possible.

4. Theoretical Contributions

Meta-theoretical contribution: a way of seeing politics

From the perspective of the Kohutian self, how does politics come out? It is expected that my explorations which have so far been conducted have contributed to the transformation of habitual views of the narcissistic self in politics by adopting Kohut’s self psychology; from a problem of the self that must be overcome to a state of the self that does not connect oneself with others, and that is in need of others. From this viewpoint, narcissism is regarded not as a negative state of mind but rather as an indispensable human need. My task, as already mentioned above, is to reflect upon our politics on the basis of this standpoint. How does, then, it come out by applying Frommian dialectic Funk developed (as we saw in the preceding chapter) to this reflection? I will first of all identify what
political action means in terms of the Kohutian self, and then clarify the signifi-
cation of this kind of politics from a Frommian dialectical perspective.

First, politics is not simply a place to conflict or communicate and cooperate with others but also one to establish the intersubjective psychoanalytic self-other relationships, in which the primary aim of politics is not only to express and claim some value and identity of the self and to show some common good to public, but also to gain an intersubjective mutual understanding between the self and the other. Second, politics is constituted by the vulnerable self based on the view of ‘Tragic Man’ made up of the ‘grandiose-exhibitionistic self’ and the ‘idealized-parent imago’, and this kind of politics therefore aims to treat the self by charging his two ambitious and ideal poles, that is by leading the other to become the mirroring and idealised selfobject, thereby curing diseased politics which to a greater or lesser degree breaks the intersubjective self-other relationships. And third, this kind of self is not necessarily willing to take part in politics; but rather the self is cured by doing so. From this perspective, I see that politics which does not give any remedy for his injury, namely one which prevents the intersubjective psychoanalytic self-other relationships, and one which the self does not participate in, are regarded exactly as unhealthy and diseased.

Theoretical contribution: political practice

Indeed, however, these three viewpoints all concern only a meta-theoretical framework of politics, and it might seem, therefore, that my research proposes nothing new concerning issues of actual politics. To be sure, apparently through my research I simply rejected Fromm’s and Fujita’s theoretical perspectives as a result of the fact that I critically reflected upon them, and that I introduced Kohut’s psychoanalysis for modifying their standpoints and for breaking their theoretical impasse. Also, I claimed that their political theories are simply normative, and thus not of relevance for curing narcissism in contemporary society. However, I did not completely reject their theories by conducting an investigation into them. Rather, the intention of my research is to develop their political theories into a more applicable and effective knowledge.

Having said that, what can we actually gain through a series of examinations, particularly through critically analysing the two theorists from a Kohutian psychoanalytic perspective of narcissism? First, from the viewpoint of the political practice of democracy, my theoretical attempt provides two perspectives: first, concerning social norms in political life; second, concerning ways of maintaining democracy. As regards the first point, the standpoint of the ‘vulnerable self’ puts forward some criteria of social norms in which both a self and a group self are
supported by their respective ‘selfobjects’. For example, social norms require reflecting some psychological condition and experience of individuals and their society (e.g. school authorities may not force a high school student bullied in school to take part in classes, and they are responsible for identifying its fact and problem and for improving that pathological condition). As regards the second point, it is stressed that politics requiring ‘selfobjects’ underpins the practice of democracy in a way that group and social activities (e.g. activities of neighbourhood community associations and PTA activity) can involve individuals and other groups only to the extent that they respond to one’s and groups’ psychological needs and bring them satisfaction.

Second, with respect to ways of establishing a theory of politics, I claim as follows: first, that morality and ethics are also based on psychological harm; second, that for establishing social norms we need to refer to psychological grounds; and third, that political activities need to care about psychological condition and background of participants. These three standpoints explain that, for determining things that ‘ought to’ or ‘must’ be done, we need some reliable knowledge that accounts for one’s psychological experience. In other words, democratic politics requires its own psychological criteria for assessing itself, and political practice is prepared through fulfilling the above requirements. Also, these criteria can be an indispensable tool for examining politics. From these perspectives, an attempt of normative foundations is also based on psychological and psychoanalytic, ethical ground (e.g. Honneth 2007, 2012).

Furthermore, from the perspective of political system my research can affect some ways of performing democracy. ‘Deliberative democracy’ is required to take account of social conditions, for example, in which the majority of people in a neighbourhood association do not intend to particulate in any consultation process, do reject the way of deliberation, and do not have their own opinions, e.g. on the grounds that this group do not allow them as members to have their respective own opinions, and that they are all forced to share an opinion with other members without regard to their own wills, that is to say, in which this neighbourhood association cannot fulfil any requirements of participation, deliberation and political equality (they are conceivable in the abstract, and it is supposed that they sometimes come out); how does the idea vindicate itself in that case? In my view, deliberative democracy needs to care for both a group and its group members, and their psychological conditions, in order that they can willingly take part in consultation in a way that their narcissistic needs are fulfilled by selfobjects (e.g. by other participants and groups, meanings of his participation, and things gained through participating); thereby, they will incline to be involved in a deliberative process.
Some possibilities for applying my research standpoint

The conception of politics I established through my doctoral research can be applied to some concrete political problems. First, concerning social norms, for example, it may be suitable for tackling ‘bullying problems’. In many cases, this type of problem stems from the fact that it is rooted out in relation not only to individuals but also to groups that are supposed to be concerned (students of other classes, teachers, parents, local communities and so forth, and colleagues, managers, business partners and so forth), and that it is most often difficult to identify the latter; in this respect, bullying problems should be regarded not as a certain individual and group problem but rather as a social and political (public) problem (e.g. Duffy and Sperry 2014; Dupper 2013; Masiello and Schroeder 2014; Monks and Coyne 2011). In addition, they are most often associated with mental distress, and it is therefore quite difficult to deal with them (e.g. Masiello and Schroeder 2014; Tehrani 2012). These behaviours, needless to say, spoil intersubjective mutual relationships, and must therefore be cured by intersubjective politics itself. Second, concerning social norms I raise discriminations, particularly ‘racial discrimination’. With regard to this issue, it seems unnecessary to explain why my concern is directed towards them. And third, it is expected to adopt the outcome of my research to some ‘Fukushima problems’. It is often believed that the accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant was induced not simply by technological problems but rather by political and cultural problems, or, more accurately, it is understood as an ‘inevitable consequence’ (e.g. Kainuma 2011: 17, 368) – the latter is a main issue on this matter (e.g. Kainuma 2011; National Diet of Japan 2012; Sakai 2011). In particular, the Japanese sociologist Hiroshi Kainuma’s work is noteworthy in the sense of capturing the essence of the problems in terms of sociology and being written before the accident (see Kainuma 2011: 9-17); this shows a stark contrast with efforts of many Japanese scholars in politics which have failed to explain and deal with the difficulties.

Basically, Kainuma’s book tackles the structural problems of Japan’s nuclear power industry regarded as a primary contribution to the ‘economic growth of postwar Japan’ (sengo seichō) (2011: 52-4, 362-3), reflecting upon numerous failures of the general approach of the social sciences in Japan. Significantly, his postcolonial standpoint gives us a great opportunity for the reflection, first, that the simple dichotomy between assailants and victims, namely the ‘assailant/victim’ (kagai/higai) theoretical scheme, has solely contributed to generating the problematic situation that it has been completely impossible to explain that the former has sometimes become the latter and vice versa, and that it has thereby even made the distinction blur, and, second, that our insensibility of ‘position-
ality’ (tachiichisei) has given rise to the unconscious oppression of others (2011: 15, 37-41, 330-50). Kainuma’s work, however, is diametrically opposite to a great deal of habitual research carried out by Japanese scholars in terms of some postmodern standpoints primarily in the sense that it succeeds in accomplishing an immanent critique as opposed to their attempts. On the whole, his work aims to demonstrate that the symbiotic relationship between central (chūō) and local (chiho) governments achieved an illusory objective of impossible and improbable economic growth by making the latter extremely impoverish: on the one hand, as drawing attention to ‘culture’ (bunka) intended by Japan’s ‘nuclear power village’ (genshiryoku mura) – abbreviated to mura below (2011: 36-7, 75-6, 181); and, on the other hand, as reflecting that many structural-analytic approaches of sociology have failed to elucidate the ‘things of essence difficult to seek for and deep-seated in society’ (shakai no konpon ni yokotawaru mienikui mono), and that ‘wishful thinking’ (kibōteki kansoku) that has simply resulted in providing an account which seems to argue to the point has overlooked the ‘openness’ (miketsusei), or rather it has even had harmful effects on reality (2011: 54-69). Quite interestingly, Kainuma shows that the atomic power industry, while seemingly constituted by modern structure, is actually organised by extremely premodern structure unexpectedly (2011: 14). According to him, there remains only the survival way of being integrated into mura as a local function of nuclear agency (birth of another mura) for unindustrialised local communities as represented by the periphery of Fukushima. For this reason, problematically they drive themselves to perform this function and to undertake the task despite the fact that they are aware of a high risk of accepting the role, particularly the construction of the plants as a troublesome technology in their local places – this behaviour that can be regarded as active obedience reminds us of Fromm’s ‘escape from freedom’ though local mura’s escape is different from the former escape in the sense that mura has no alternative. Nuclear power organised and maintained by the sacrifice of local communities, Kainuma believes, is an extremely outdated and vulgar technology. In his view, both sides of mura must abolish the bad custom that insanely consigns their reality to the ‘social unconscious’ (shakaiteki muishiki) on the basis of the ‘illusion’ (gensō) that they will both obtain the position of the forefront of the age (2011: 52-4, 293-4, 362-3, 368).

Kainuma lays stress on the ‘unchangeable’ (kawaranu mono) (2011: 379). In particular, he thereby warns people against their insanely absent-minded and changeable attitude; that is to say, he believes that their repressive state of mind and behaviour exactly caused the accident, which means the ‘emergence of disturbance’ (kyōki no hyōshutsu) as an ‘inevitable consequence’ (hitsuzenteki na kiketsu) (2011: 17, 368). To put it differently, from the perspective integrating
Kohut’s self psychology and Fromm’s theory of narcissism, it may be possible to understand that the insane trouble was induced by the social range of psychological condition that mura as central government resonated with another mura as local government and vice versa, that is to say, the two group selves, who were injured by social and political life, and thus, who were not able to accept true reality, consigned this fact inconvenient to the selves to their unconscious, and transferred to their respective selfobjects (selfobject transference or social transference); thereby, the symbiosis between them managed to construct such a diseased group self and malignant social narcissism with the help of the transference. It is noted that this phenomenon is not confined to mura. That is to say, from some psychoanalytic perspectives it is believed that the social dimension of transference has hitherto been and is now seen everywhere in Japan or rather everywhere in the world, and that social transference can give rise to nation-wide transference. Most importantly, here we avoid this kind of transference by restoring intersubjective mutual relationships; for it is considered that problems described by the symbiotic fixation are primarily caused by the mental condition that intersubjectivity is broken and does not work, and therefore that any relationships are not based on an intersubjective mutual understanding. Many issues represented by Fukushima problems, however, are quite complex, and it will supposedly take a long time to find useful solutions to them. Hence, many fields in the social sciences and the natural sciences must work together with each other for dealing with the difficulties.

5. Concluding Remarks

Unfortunately, it must be noted that most of the existent political theories presented by Japanese political theorists are quite helpless in tackling the above issues and some themes that require gaining a deep understanding of ‘culture’ and the ‘things of essence’ Kainuma highlights, primarily on the grounds that, on the whole, neither do they concern themselves with any topics and issues rooted in the social context of Japan, nor do they have any sociocultural standpoints in contrast to Kainuma’s perspective – in this sense, it is not right simply to believe that the problem stems from the fact that the discipline of political theory in Japan consists of western political theories. However, the symbiosis, as represented by mura, that can be regarded as the core problem concerning economic growth in postwar Japan and Japanese society itself is penetrated simply neither by the distortion of interpersonal relationships springing from the breakdown of intersubjectivity nor by the psychoanalytic sadomasochistic
relationship. In addition, obviously, it can be explained neither by the Foucauldian theory of power nor by any theories of recognition. With respect to the difficulty, it is rather believed that, curiously enough, on the basis of the certain premodern circumstances of Japan – the ‘rest of premodern Japan’ (zenkindai no zan’yo) – respective actors constituting politics have been led by the postmodern situation for aiming to achieve modernity – the ‘forefront of the modern age’ (kindai no sentan) (Kainuma 2011: 52-3, 361-3). This way of understanding will probably be slightly different from Kainuma’s original standpoint as he seems simply to lay stress on premodern and modern situations concerning the problem as a whole. Rather, it appears that the primary subject of his work is to illustrate the fact that the desire of the ‘forefront of the modern age’, triggered by the circumstances that *mura* as local government remains persistently the premodern that can be described by Fujita’s society of the Tennō system, led to the self-destruction; the problematic factor is therefore the situation that it *cannot obtain the modern*. On this view, for example, the Japanese historian Naoki Sakai contends that, identifying the ‘institutional conditions’ (seidoteki jōken) concerning the determination and responsibility that provoked the disaster, Japan needs to get out of the bad habit of ‘obscuring its own responsibility’ from Maruyama’s perspective of the ‘system of irresponsibility’ (*musekinin no taikai*), which characterises a primary aspect of premodern Japan (2011: 33). The Japanese sociologist Eiji Oguma stresses that Fukushima problems are a microcosm (shukuzu) of tons of problems in Japanese society (2012: 54-9, 134). If their claims are true, then it is quite natural that political theory in Japan (*seiji riron*) should be useless for addressing the problems for there is no standpoint understanding premodern Japan nor specific viewpoint seeing the social context of Japan in the discipline – it is not excused for its indifferent attitude by claiming that it is aimed at studying western political theory in so far as the field calls itself ‘political theory’ (*seiji riron*).

Furthermore, with regard to the present condition of the discipline of *seiji riron*, it is pointed out that its theoretical activity is confined to simple introductory and explanatory attempts that concern themselves exclusively with importing theories (on this, see App. 1, s. 4) – of course, I do not deny the significance of these tasks. That is to say, it is *not* implausible to believe that there is *no genuine action of creating a theory* in the academic field of *seiji riron*. For these reasons, it must be stressed that the helplessness is a natural consequence. However, this is concerned not only with the discipline of *seiji riron despite a strong tendency for it*. As far as I know, this kind of indifferent and passive attitude to reality is also quite relevant to German scholarship; in this respect, it can be a contemporary tendency in the world beyond the scope of scholarship and university activities. With regard to this matter, I notice that Fromm and Fujita
warned us exactly against this problem deep-rooted in our way of life – it is precisely the narcissistic and fascist attitude represented by the contemporary self and the Nazi self respectively, as can be seen in Eichmann. We must aim to establish a political theory based on reality and respective social contexts, and must therefore be cautious about pseudo-theories indifferent to reality and practice, and about quasi-theories simply imported – the latter means that at the point of being imported a theory does not function, that is to say, it is always dangerous to directly apply an imported theory to some research objectives in some specific social context. Political theory definitely may not result in a mere speculative action in a seminar room by employing a theory. On this view, the discipline, too, is responsible for ‘distanc[ing] [itself] from perishable issues and . . . [for] aim[ing] to acquire a sustainable perspective that defeats unconscious perishing theories and to establish society with the help of theory’ (Kainuma 2011: 374).

Having said that, a theory is always incomplete, as mentioned above; this signifies that we are always required to improve and modify it. Perhaps it is most important for each theory to continually seek to complete a theoretical task, and to constructively criticise one another for enhancing their respective own theories, instead of satisfying their ‘grandiose selves’ (Kohut 1977). In addition, it is necessary that social theory and political theory should collaborate with psychoanalysis so as to deal with contemporary complex social issues; otherwise, my suggestions in this research will be spoilt exactly by contemporary indifference. I believe that through these efforts it would be possible to emancipate the contemporary narcissistic self from its own condition with psychological constraint and to enable politics to play an important role in establishing intersubjective relationships without falling into nihilism. From this perspective, the issue of how the self is concerned in politics is regarded as a primary subject of politics. If succeeding in theoretical construction on the basis of the above principles, then political theory can better lead politics to fulfil the function of democracy without relying upon Fromm’s and Fujita’s conceptions of radical change.

Notes

1 On this view, most importantly, I definitely do not see my research simply as a study of some thoughts (see Ch. 2, s. 2). Rather, it concerns and aims at altering some views of society and politics and dealing with social and political problems (altering society and politics), and it is not a simple research but a document of discussion with friends of ours who are all the people living in the world. I always try to think about and deal with our problems with all the companions in
society and in the world – individual problems are thus always ours and social at the same time. That is to say, I am a ‘subject ... in the resultant web of relationships with the social totality and with nature’ (Horkheimer 2002a: 211), and therefore think ‘with friends of ours’ (watashi no tomo to issho ni) (Ichinokawa 2012: 160). With respect to this issue, I will try to integrate the following epistemological perspective into social and political theory: ‘We believe that it is absolutely impossible to see that human beings are independent of their surroundings, even from the human-centred viewpoint. We must prevent the harmful effects of radiation on animals, plants and ecosystems even if simply putting ourselves first’ (ECRR 2010: 260) – unfortunately I was not able to obtain the English original text. I do not understand the term ‘surroundings’ simply as nature in the sense of natural science. I count it exactly as society, the world and nature in Horkheimer’s sense. In my view, ‘animals’, ‘plants’ and ‘ecosystems’ mean individuals and society – not social system – and the ‘harmful effects of radiation’ signify ‘alienation’, ‘indifference’ and ‘fascism’, which have a harmful effect on them. From this perspective, we are required to curb such negative influences on individuals and society ‘even if simply putting ourselves first’. Social and political theory always ‘exists amongst others in society’ (Ichinokawa 2012: 160); every theory, above all, is aimed not at existing theorists but rather at future theorists who are facing and trying to deal with social problems.

2 Importantly, on this view, from a perspective of narcissism, although not to take part in politics (not to make a relationship with others) is exactly to refuse the existence of oneself itself, generally narcissists are not aware of this fact.

3 On this view, see, e.g. Kohut 1985c.
CONCLUSION

Towards the Foundations of Political Theory and Politics

Can the concept of narcissism contribute to laying the foundations of political theory, or more broadly, the social sciences? My answer is that it can do so to the extent that as many scholarly attempts as possible concern themselves with the issue without regard to disciplinary genres. Otherwise, my effort will be spoilt as mentioned in the last chapter. Most importantly, however, my primary concern is how theory can perform its function in our society, and how theory leads society to play its role and vice versa. In this respect, it appears that political theory based exclusively on normative theory is running into a theoretical impasse – for its approach does not provide any criteria of how it can realise its own suggestions. It seems to me that the concept of narcissism is making a breakthrough in the current academic situation on the grounds that not only does it give a vital clue to finding solutions to society’s ills, but it also offers knowledge and society an opportunity for self-reflection, taking a remedial standpoint, as exemplified by the fact that Fromm and Fujita took notice of the psychoanalytically relevant notion for those purposes. The viewpoint of my research, therefore, applies the method not of ought to but of curing. From this perspective, my enquiry is not how we ought to act, but how we cure our disease. I am aware, however, that this standpoint as such is not different from the classic Durkheimian methodological position. Instead, I have taken the psychoanalytic standpoint that requires self-reflection, while supporting sociological approaches. Furthermore, my psychoanalytic approach concerns neither Freudian ego psychology nor Lacanian psychoanalysis but Kohut’s self psychology, which essentially relies upon the ‘vulnerable self’ on the basis of its own theoretical view of ‘Tragic Man’ who enlists the help of others. In general, Kohut’s society comes into being not as reasonable but rather as unreasonable in
the sense that, for the self in his society, it is most important to satisfy his narcissistic needs, and others therefore come into existence as selfobjects. Perhaps, from this perspective we understand why so far politics mostly has not managed to fulfil its main function; this is clearly explained by Churchill’s expression that ‘democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time’.

My perspective, then, reflects upon our politics as follows. If there is no doubt that people should participate in decision-making, then how do they behave in their political life in a Kohutian society? (Of course, politics is not only concerned with decision-making, but is most often concerned with everything else, as we have seen in these discussions.) Some might take part in politics, but some might disregard the activity. With regard to the latter, however, it is absolutely meaningless to claim that they ought to take their responsibility for self-government because they are not concerned with what they are not interested in. From a Kohutian perspective, there is no exception to this rule. From the former viewpoint, however, this Kohutian standpoint can also be applied to those who are willing to engage in politics. After all, human beings act so as to fulfil their narcissistic needs. In other words, the former behaves so on the grounds that their narcissism is satisfied with it, but the latter does so as they cannot satisfy their narcissism with politics. From these perspectives, we perceive that in this kind of society it is difficult to talk in both rational and logical ways. This means that political theory requires putting forward a standpoint which is different from both moral philosophy and analytic philosophy, and which is applicable to contemporary narcissistic society.

Essentially, my standpoint is based on the enquiry of how political theory displays its raison d’être if many people are not willing to be involved in deliberating political issues concerning politics itself. The primary issues of political theory, as we saw in Part I, are not confined to its own disciplinary activity, but rather they are relevant to people’s life, and it is right, therefore, to believe that people should undertake the task not only of decision-making but also of studying the knowledge of politics. In my view, political theory as knowledge concerns not only political theorists but also everyone else (cf. Ch. 2, s. 2). However, most conventional political theories have considerable difficulty in performing their functions in a Kohutian narcissistic society, in which they are often not relevant to reality. In my view, a remedial and prescriptive perspective is most suitable for this society, in which first of all it is most important to fulfil the needs of the self. Admittedly, nonetheless, it is not right to think that there is nothing wrong with this type of political theory. Rather, it is noted that its approach has some difficulties. First of all, theory can be easily swayed by the demands of the narcissistic self. In this case, theory itself can be quite vulnerable to the fluctuating
mental condition of the self. Second, theory requires itself to rely more extensively upon empirical evidence. On this view, for example, depending heavily upon some psychological and psychoanalytic theories is always in danger of leading one’s theory to ‘psychologization’, as Fraser calls it (e.g. Fraser and Honneth 2003: 31). Referring to the injustice of ‘misrecognition’, she claims that it can be reduced to the mere individual attitudes when a theory lays stress on the individual phenomenon of psychological harm; for avoiding psychologisation, she advances the ‘status model of recognition’ (2003: 28-33).¹ In addition, Fraser contends that psychologisation is based on some psychological theory, and therefore that it can spoil the normative values of theory. She says: ‘When claims for recognition are premised on a psychological theory of “the intersubjective conditions for undistorted identity-formation” . . . they are made vulnerable to the vicissitudes of that theory’ (2003: 32).² Why, however, does applying a psychological theory to normative theory directly mean undermining the latter significance and theory? As Simon Thompson stresses, since it is unavoidable for a theory of recognition to rely upon and require the support of empirical theory, ‘it is not a criticism to point out such dependence’ (2006: 38).

With regard to Fraser’s view, her stance on normative theory is diametrically opposite to Fromm’s and Fujita’s, both of which are in favour of psychological approach, or, more precisely, psychoanalytic theory, as we have seen. Having said that, we should once accept her criticism of psychologisation.

The facts mentioned above do not allow narcissists to disregard democratic life and to assume an indifferent attitude towards politics – here normative and moral theories are expected to appropriately function as democratic theory. Rather, we can no longer deny and cast doubt on the raison d’être of democracy as the best political form at the present stage – we have not yet found any form of government as better as democracy. This means that it is better and important that as many people as possible should take part in political decision-making in our democracy; for, otherwise, it does not function, needless to say. If the many avoid considering their political matters, then their unconscious violence is to lead their politics to repress and depress selves and others and to occasionally emerge as an extreme form of government. What can we do for dealing with this troublesome problem? If we can do anything about it, how can we realise it? Seeking for answers to these enquiries is exactly the task of political theory.
1 With regard to this concept, compared to Honneth’s psychological model of recognition, Fraser supports its validity as follows: ‘When claims for recognition are premised on a psychological theory of “the intersubjective conditions for undistorted identity-formation”, as in Honneth’s model, they are made vulnerable to the vicissitudes of that theory; their moral bindingness evaporates in case the theory turns out to be false. By treating recognition as a matter of status, in contrast, the model I am proposing avoids mortgaging normative claims to matters of psychological fact. One can show that a society whose institutionalized norms impede parity of participation is morally indefensible whether or not they distort the subjectivity of the oppressed’ (2003: 32).

2 With reference to Fraser’s psychologisation, Simon Thompson divides her critique up into the following three types: ‘reduction to individual attitude’, ‘dependence on empirical theory’ and ‘sectarianism of self-realization’ (2006: 31-9).
APPENDIX 1

Political Theory as an Academic Discipline

This appendix is aimed at gaining a better understanding of the disciplinary characteristics of political theory. Regarding this issue, I take the view that it is most reasonable to begin my exploration by conducting a survey of the origins of politics because a description of the derivation provides us with a lucid account of the characteristics of the discipline in the sense that the origins of politics are undoubtedly identical to those of political theory. Next, I will make a possible distinction between political theory, political philosophy, the history of political thought and social theory. Finally, I will raise some methodological issues of political theory in Japan, the discipline of which is called seiji riron in Japanese.

1. The Nature of Politics

The origins of politics

It has sometimes been said that ‘politics is as old as humankind’. To be sure, it is correct in Aristotle’s sense: ‘man is by nature a political animal’ (zoon politikon) (e.g. Aristotle 1988: 1253a2, 1278b19). If this is true, then it is quite natural that politics should be intrinsic to us. A possible tip for considering this issue is to know the origins of the concept of ‘politics’ itself. The German term Politik, equivalent to the English politics, etymologically has its origins in the Greek ta politika, signifying the ‘political (public) matters relevant to the polis’, and in politikē technē, meaning the ‘art of control and administration of the political
(public) duties concerning the community of citizens and the common (public)
goods of the polis’ (Schultze 2010: 746). Not surprisingly, the derivation of the
German term corresponds precisely to the English one in respect of the word of
polis; needless to say, the English politics is also derived from polis (e.g. Heyking
2008: 319; Vincent 1997: 6). This denotes that the term politics originates in
Greek and ancient Greece.

The term politikē technē, meaning a political expertise in governing the polis, is
expressed by Socrates’s political philosophy. According to him, the words sig-

nify the ‘political art’ (special knowledge of politics), which was aimed at
‘excellent political leadership’ – famously, this is told by Plato’s Gorgias. The art
is composed of two basic components: legislation and corrective justice. Socrates
defined the concept as ‘an analogy between health as the good condition
of the body . . . and virtue as the good condition of the soul’ (Devereux 2011:
99). However, it is noted that the notion was originally developed by Plato.
After in his famous work Republic Plato had inherited the term from Socrates,
he gradually gave new meanings to the concept. According to Daniel Devereux,
Plato required ‘legal checks on the power of rulers’ so long as there was some
possibility that they would be driven by their greed (pleonexia) whether or not
they possessed the political art – obviously, Plato’s stance on it is closely asso-
ciated with his pessimistic view on the possibility of gaining the expertise, and
the reason why he took such a negative stance on the acquisition of the political
skill is because indeed he declared a more negative position on the concept in
his later work Statesman (2011: 106, 109). As a matter of fact, Plato revised the
concept of political art, which ideal rulers possess, in his works Statesman and
Laws, in which he gave some different implications, laying great stress on the
‘knowledge of particulars’ – this was later called by Plato’s successor Aristotle –
which could be obtained through political experience; Plato’s change is eluci-
dated by the fact that he modified the concept of political art in order that the
‘citizenry’ may legislate (Devereux 2011: 107-8). As a result of his dynamic
change, Plato opened up a way of democracy not as the ideal state but as the
second-best state of a polis governed in accordance with law. For these reasons,
the Laws and the Statesman give the impression that Plato became an ‘enlight-
ened democrat’ in comparison with the Republic (Devereux 2011: 107-11). In
sum, the life of the ancient Greek polis at Plato’s time, on the whole, was closely
connected with politikē technē and vice versa, and this fact, as we shall see below,
is undoubtedly of huge importance for recognising an aspect of politics and its
origins. Plato’s view, however, is still not associated with ‘polis life’ later defined
by Aristotle, and Plato’s polis, in this respect, does not have any implication of
‘political life’ in Aristotle’s sense. At this point it is important to look at Aristotle’s
political philosophy by focusing on the characteristics of his polis.
Aristotle’s best-known work *Politics* provides us with a great illustration of what *polis* life meant. As we have seen, while in the *Republic* Plato had particularly emphasised the ‘political art’ aimed for good political rules through Socrates, in his later years he gradually changed his view to a more accessible one available to democracy. As opposed to Socrates and Plato, Aristotle put particular emphasis on ‘practical wisdom’ (*phronēsis*) about ‘a broad understanding of ethics and politics’, after having rejected the political art, proposed by Plato’s *Republic* (Devereux 2011: 117). Here it would seem that the best way to gain an understanding of what *polis* meant is to shine a light on what Aristotle intended by the concept of *polis*, that is to know its *features*.

First, according to the *Politics*, the human life of the *polis* depended upon the ‘good life’; that is to say, life in a *polis* was based on ‘living well’, and basic necessities were aimed at its purpose (Aristotle 1988: 1252b29-30). Here my question is what the good life signified for Aristotle. It is presumed that the concept is closely related to his specific *ethics*, which was oriented overall towards seeking for good actions and good things. In this respect, his ethics was directed to the *good* — Aristotle’s view of ethic, famously, is presented primarily in his *Nicomachean Ethics*. For him, in other words, the good existed for the *polis* because *polis* life was the end (*telos*) and the good end, and the good life was therefore to live in a *polis*; hence, *polis* life was the good thing. Second, as regards the constitution, Aristotle’s *polis* consists primarily of two basic components: first, a *politēs*, meaning a citizen who has a right to participate in decision-making based on his deliberation; and second, a *poleiteia*, meaning a constitution which organises a *polis* (Aristotle 1988: book III). The former denotes the person who is eligible to run a city state (*polis*). The latter is defined as institutional arrangements aimed at deliberating and judicial decision-making; in this respect, it is also called ‘polity’ today. In short, a *polis* (city state) is organised by *politai* (the plural of *politēs* meaning citizens) on the basis of a *poleiteia* (constitution), a *politēs* denotes a person living in a *polis* based on a *poleiteia*, and a *poleiteia* is the constitution of a *polis* organised by *politai*.

These two perspectives, then, lead me to the next discussion as to what *polis* is. In Aristotle’s view, lives in a *polis* are all closely connected with *polis* life. Also, things in a *polis* are all related to the life. The life of the *polis* must therefore be the good life, and things of the *polis* must also be the good thing. In this respect, Aristotle does not concern himself with lives and things in the outside of the *polis*. The citizens, in his view, have a great deal of *interest* in the matters of the *polis* (*ta politika*), which are called ‘politics’ today. From these viewpoints, my discussion in this section takes an explicit view of the *polis* as follows: Aristotle believed that politics is the matters of the *polis*, and therefore that *political* life is *polis* life and vice versa.
Aristotle, obviously, gives us a clear description of the characteristics of the *polis*. In Plato’s time, the *polis* had to be closely associated with the ‘political art’ for ruling the *polis*. However, it varied its own form through Aristotle. In contrast to Plato, as we have seen, Aristotle laid great stress on ‘practical wisdom’. As a matter of fact, this paradigm shift gave rise to a new way of ruling that citizens took part in running the constitution of the *polis*, namely democracy. Despite these facts, however, it is noted that Plato and Aristotle had a common view of politics in the sense that both their perspectives sought to connect politics with ethics. In short, it is appropriate to understand that politics is derived from *polis* not only in the terminological sense but also in the actual sense, as exemplified by the fact that *polis* is primarily made up of *politēs* and *politeia*, regarded as the primary components of the *politics* of the *polis*; in Aristotle’s view, these three Greek concepts are intertwined with each other. For these reasons, ‘politics’ characterises the *polis* and *polis* life in terms of the political art (*politikē tekhē*) and the matters of the *polis* (*ta politeia*), both of which are considered as the derivations of the term *Politik* (politics), on the one hand, and as the essential conditions and ingredients for achieving the end of the *polis*, on the other.

**The political and *polis***

The above investigation into the origins of the term politics has aimed at preparing to grasp its *nature*, namely what politics can be viewed. In my view, every attempt at seeking for the nature of a thing necessarily involves exploring its origins. However, then, what does it mean to concern politics? This perspective leads me to carry out an enquiry into what *the political* signifies in its original sense. In order to see it, I want to focus on Aristotle’s concept of political.

What Aristotle intends by his words that ‘man is by nature a political animal’ is obviously not that all men are political, but that they are all born in the *polis*. As Humphrey D. F. Kitto clearly explains, all men are above all intended to live in the *polis* in Aristotle’s view (Kitto 1957). It is evident that his provocative words suggest that the matters of the *polis* should be regarded as politics and the political, and vice versa. Aristotle’s words, however, do not necessarily imply that we are by nature political animals, but rather that we are concerned in the *polis*. Quite interestingly, as is well known, the politics of the *polis* virtually depended heavily upon slavery, by which women were almost completely excluded from both the politics and the political life of the *polis*, and the citizens having *political* rights were restricted to a minority of adult males (e.g. Brunt 1991: 98; Minogue 1995: ch. 2). In fact, there is the concept of slavery in
Aristotle, for example, as seen from his Politics – here he supports slavery (e.g. Aristotle 1988: 1253b4-1255b39). This political life, needless to say, is not equivalent to ours, and the political in Aristotle’s sense is therefore definitely not the same as ours. What does, then, Aristotle mean by the word of politics? Again, here I refer to his words that ‘man is by nature a political animal’. This expression should be understood as follows: man is an animal born in the polis.

It is important to remember that the English adjective political is derived from the Greek term politikos (e.g. Allen 2011: 75), the adjective of polis (e.g. Druwe 1987: 393), and it means ‘belonging or pertaining to the polis’ (Allen 2011: 75). In this sense, the political might indeed seem peculiar to the polis. This simply denotes, however, that the specific feature of the political has one of its origins in the polis, and it does not mean, therefore, that the polis is and the matters of the polis are the sole political. From these perspectives, we can clearly see that the polis and the matters of the polis have their own specific characteristics of politics and the political respectively. In short, a polis must have been a city based on a specific politics. In this respect, politics and the political are not specific characteristics of the polis. In other words, a polis is a peculiar city and state having the specific political style from the outside perspective.

The political

Taking account of a large number of discussions of the view of what politics and the political signify, it is not easy to gain a deep understanding of the nature of politics and the political. Needless to say, this means that the task has continually been carried out up until now. Interestingly, however, there are some common features in approaches to understanding politics and the political. A typical way of understanding the specific characteristics of politics is to divide the political from everything else. It is not simple, however, to identify this considerably complex and abstract thing. Nonetheless, it is noted that there is a tip for a clear understanding of the intricate concept. Elizabeth Frazer’s ‘Political Theory and the Boundaries of Politics’ (2008), for example, carries out a great survey of the theme. It seems that her work gives us a clue to dealing with the issue. So let us look briefly at it below.

First, Frazer begins by exploring the complexity of the concept of politics in the work, in which she stresses the huge importance of the problems of the ‘boundaries of political theory’s subject matter’ and of the implications of the adjective political meant by the discipline’s name (2008: 171-4). By highlighting the complexity of the concept of politics, she draws attention to two basic elements of politics: first, ‘policy’ and ‘the competition for the power to govern’; and second, the fact that a person who is not a professional politician can act
politically. According to Frazer, these facts have caused the problems of distinguishing between political and social actions and setting them in the ‘public’ and ‘private’, and they have made the meaning of ‘political’ much more complex. In her view, despite the complexity, politics has so far been understood in the following three ways: first, in the way of confining politics to the role of ‘internal relations between a state and its citizen’; second, in the way of relating it to ‘power’; and third, in the way of accepting the method of associating politics with power to some extent, on the one hand, and the method of connecting it with any other things, on the other.

Second, Frazer highlights two kinds of controversy over the view of what is regarded as politics: ‘academic disciplines’ and ‘methodologies’ (2008: 174-80). The former has primarily been caused by the disciplinary differences between political science, sociology and economics, involving normative theorists, amongst them philosophers and political theorists; the primary issue has been to separate politics from any other kinds of human life. The latter is divided up into three types of approaches: positivism, rational action theory and structuralism. Here Frazer shines a light on the possibility that these perspectives will present the view that state and political institutions are separated from society. In addition, while to some extent accepting the view of ‘political action’ concerning and involving all the people, she casts doubt on this view. According to Frazer, nevertheless, approaches to politics by means of distinguishing between politics and any other human activities have been rejected by most academic researches.

Third, despite the aforementioned facts, Frazer attempts to define the specific characteristics of ‘doing politics’ and ‘being political’ (2008: 180). She presents a theory concerning the features of ‘politics’ and ‘political’ in terms of ‘politics’ ends and means’, as seen from Table 3. The first viewpoint lays stress on politics’ means; this belongs to cells 1 and 2. The former highlights ‘any ends’ and ‘any means’, which lead to the standpoint that we consider politics either as all the things of a state or as all the things within a state; according to Frazer, Max Weber is a representative who takes this sort of view of politics. Although emphasising any ends of politics, the latter stresses the importance of some ‘particular means’ of achieving ends; this is characterised, e.g. by Machiavellianism. In contrast to these perspectives, the second viewpoint focuses on the ends of politics; this belongs to cells 3 and 4. The former regards politics as things concerning ‘particular ends’, but this does not restrict it to particular means. In this view, the end of politics is to gain the ‘power to govern’; Frazer might call this kind of view politics’ semantic Platonism. The latter denotes that some particular means play a role in reaching ends; this view is characterised, e.g. by Aristotle and Hannah Arendt. Despite these distinctions, the border bet-
Table 3 Frazer’s classification of the meanings of politics in terms of its ends and means (cited from Frazer 2008: 181).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Any ends</th>
<th>Particular ends</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Any means</td>
<td>1. For example, ‘everything is political’ or ‘everything to do with the state is political’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. For example, politics is securing the power to govern by any means</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particular means</td>
<td>2. For example, ‘Machiavellianism’ or ‘Ciceronianism’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. For example, ends and means are mutually conditioning</td>
</tr>
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ween cells 3 and 4 is not stable. For instance, Frazer points out that Arendt’s perspective does not necessarily belong to cell 4 in the sense that it separates politics’ ends from politics’ means of achieving its ends. For Arendt, as Frazer puts it, politics signifies ‘a public encounter between individuals’ (2008: 189).

Finally, Frazer sums up her article in terms of the following three issues (2008: 190-4): first, there is no specific political action, while to some extent it is possible to demarcate the border between political life, namely the institutions and process of states, and any other kinds of life; second, with respect to the view of the nature of political action, while it is possible to confine its signification to politicians, it is nevertheless also possible to think that everyone can act politically; and third, many scholars seek to distance social and individual lives from political life, but virtually, the border between them are unclear and variable. From these perspectives, Frazer clarifies the four kinds of ways of understanding political borders: ‘state-society-individual’, ‘publicity-secrecy’, ‘deliberation’ and ‘openness-closure’.

How, then, should we consider the meaning of politics from these points of view? Can we find anything helpful in gaining a clear understanding of the political from Frazer’s perspective? Not surprisingly, she does not make any lucid and rigid distinction between politics and everything else. For this reason, her discussion might seem helpless in finding some clue to a better understanding of the political. Nonetheless, it is noted that her work is relevant for identifying both politics and the political in the following two respects. First, Frazer agrees to some extent with an attempt at distinguishing between the political and everything else, on the one hand, but she does not completely agree with the standpoint, on the other. Indeed, in this respect, her stance seems
ambiguous. For instance, she flatly refuses to categorise politics on the basis of the view of confining politics to the functions of the state by entirely relating it to power and by simply connecting politics with power. In my view, however, the significance of her stance is rather to lay great stress on the ambiguity and variability of politics. In other words, Frazer poses a challenge to an approach to simply classifying its meanings by emphasising the ambiguous feature of politics. In short, as the adverb ‘simply’ clearly shows, she requires avoiding an understanding of politics by way of the sole simplification of its significations, even though categorisation is helpful in gaining an easy understanding of the concept.

Second, Frazer’s work implies that issues concerning the meaning of politics have so far been addressed in a variety of ways; this solid evidence means that politics has multiple characteristics. As far as her discussion is concerned, the meaning of politics is divided up into its four kinds of views with a focus on the five types of approaches; Machiavellian, Weberian, Platonic, Aristotelian and Arendtian approaches. Of course, in so far as the way she proposes is a division of politics from the viewpoint of ‘ends and means’, her description is merely one of the ways of understanding politics. Indeed, political studies and political science have also provided other types of viewpoints of politics in order to establish better disciplinary understandings: e.g. politics as ‘conflict’. To be sure, as we shall see in more detail below, this typical perspective of politics provides a different viewpoint from Frazer’s in the sense that it is primarily characterised by ‘power’. Adam Swift, for instance, clearly explains that, ‘[p]erhaps politics happens wherever there is power’ (Swift 2001: 5).

Third, Frazer has shown that what politics means has been much more complex by demonstrating that essentially everyone can act politically, and that politics requires considering all the persons concerned. This clearly explains that we have considerable difficulty in defining the specific characteristics of politics even though many political scientists and political theorists have regarded what concerns state as a typical meaning of politics. To be sure, not only what politics means but also what research objects of politics are elucidated by the fact that many scholars have so far illuminated their understandings of politics by focusing particularly on state. Nonetheless, they both do not necessarily confine themselves to state and the matters of state. Rather, it would seem that, as Swift says, politics exists wherever there is power, and that, as Jean Blondel stresses, it exists when more than two persons are involved in decision-making. In short, Frazer implies that politics is associated with the matters of state, but nonetheless that its scope is not entirely restricted to them. In this sense, treating the concept of politics and the political is a laborious task.
The features of politics

Frazer has indeed proposed a very useful idea of understanding politics by highlighting its ambiguity. At the same time, however, it means that politics is a sort of vague. It might seem that there is no method of coping with this problem. Is there no approach to gaining a more lucid understanding of politics in a different way? Perhaps the best way to see politics is to focus on state and power, regarded as describing its specific features. However, it should be emphasised that politics is not specific to them while the latter can be specific to the former. Here I will devote myself to finding out some reasons for difficulty in defining politics. Ulrich Druwe, for example, establishes a practical way of understanding it by setting out the following three levels of the concept of politics (Druwe 1987: 395-6):

1. Politics contains goals (Ziele), aims (Zwecke) and norms (Normen).
2. Politics concerns state (Staat).
3. Politics means social action (soziales Handeln).

Regardless of whether or not Frazer’s approach takes account of these components of politics, her description evidently contains most of those ingredients Druwe identifies. In this respect, it can be argued that these three political dimensions overlap with one another in accordance with necessity, and that each ingredient might sometimes be included in some action regarded as political. As far as Druwe’s perspective is concerned, politics primarily involves action. He then describes the above respective concrete features as follows (1987: 395-6):

1. Good (das Gute), peace (Frieden), emancipation (Emanzipation), etc.
2. Power (Macht), rule (Herrschaft), class conflict (Klassenkampf) or participation (Partizipation).
3. Decisions (Entscheidungen), consensus building (Konsensfindung) and rulemaking on social dimensions (Regelformulierung von gesellschaftlicher Tragweite).

This classification contributes to our understanding of politics. On the basis of his above specification, then, I will first give a description of the main points of the conceptual history of politics in terms of three kinds of perspectives, namely three dimensions of politics as art, conflict and cooperation – it seems to me that the primary issues concerning the signification of politics have been tackled
from these three perspectives. I will next describe the features of politics so as to clearly understand the multiplicity of the concept.

(a) Politics as art

Politics as art has a long history, and it has been typically depicted by the Platonic ‘political art’ (politikē technē), as we saw above. As the Greek term technē shows, in this context, the role of politics is defined as either art or technique; as we have seen, this is another origin of the term politics denoting a ‘political expertise in governing the polis’ aimed at ‘excellent political leadership’. For Plato, governing the state (polis) is aimed at producing ‘harmony’. For this purpose, he requires that rulers should possess the political art – his aim is to establish his ideal state. From this perspective, politics is viewed as a specific expertise only a few can gain. Here we become aware that keeping a political order characterises this type of politics. Modern and contemporary politics, however, is not unrelated to this politics, for example, in so far as Bismarck’s view that ‘politics is the art of the possible’ has in common to some extent with Plato’s. Rather, it is noted that the view that essentially politics involves maintaining order even captures an aspect of politics.

(b) Politics as conflict

The second perspective defines politics as conflict. This is closely linked to power, rule and dominance; in this sense, we are familiar with this kind of politics. Thomas Hobbes is a representative who takes this view of politics. Famously, shining a light on power, he said as follows: ‘in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceaseth only in death’ (Hobbes 2007: 70). The reason why Hobbes highlighted the importance of the existence of an absolute power is obviously because it would offer security and achieve peace; in his sense, the establishment of a state aims at accomplishing them. His famous words of ‘war of all against all’, in which all are coloured by conflict and violence, describe this type of politics. As far as his claim is concerned, politics is associated with the process of laying the foundations of order. For this reason, this kind of politics is not immune from the first type, as we have seen above.

Weber’s conception of politics may be much more applicable to this kind of politics in relation to power. He clearly defines power as ‘the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance’ (Weber 1978: 53). From this perspective, power seems to aim at arbitrarily ruling over and dominating people, and therefore seems to be
violent. For Weber, the aim of politics is to govern by means of power and violence. In this respect, it can be argued that basically his politics stems from conflicts. On the other hand, however, famously he lays great stresses on the specific ability of politicians to govern; in this sense, Weber's conception of politics bears a close resemblance to the Platonic political art.

In so far as politics points up conflict, I also need to refer to Carl Schmitt's political theory. In his masterpiece, *The Concept of the Political* (1927), Schmitt points out that distinguishing between 'friends' and 'enemies' is the essence of politics, which means that he regards conflict as the core of politics. For him, it is inevitable that one comes into conflict with others, and it is most important, therefore, that politics should reach a decision. In this respect, it is possible to consider that his politics is associated with power and politics as art to make decisions.

(c) Politics as cooperation

On the one hand, as we have seen, some theorists count the essence of politics as conflict, but, on the other hand, some others highlight a political aspect of cooperation. For example, Arendt stresses the concept of 'action' to cooperate with somebody and to establish a mutual action amongst individuals by means of power – essentially, her conception of action is based on 'plurality' directed towards 'public encounter between individuals' in the 'space of appearance'. For Arendt, in other words, action means politics. Her following sentence clearly expresses her view of power, which stresses the importance of cooperation: 'Only where men live so close together that the potentialities of action are always present can power remain with them, and the foundation of cities . . . is therefore indeed the most important material prerequisite for power' (Arendt 1998: 201). Arendt's stance on power might seem peculiar and provocative from the above two other standpoints. From Weber's perspective, for example, it might be difficult to understand her position. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, despite many differences, there is some common ground between these two theorists, in the sense that the two kinds of power they put forward are two sides of the same coin.

(d) Politics as social action

The aforementioned facts, after all, might still remain in the dark about what politics is. Indeed, however, it might be expressed either as some art or as some conflict or as some cooperation or as a combination of them. In this respect, it must be stressed that we have considerable difficulty in defining and identi-
fying politics. As far as my research is concerned, however, it is most plausible to believe that politics denotes social action (soziales Handeln); many political scientists are of the same opinion that politics means some kind of action (Handeln) (e.g. Druwe 1987: 395-6; Patzelt 2007: 22-8) or activity (Handlung) (e.g. Blondel 1991: 482-4; Heyking 2008: 319). For this reason, it can be validly argued that, in so far as politics is some action, that is to say, in so far as it is a political action, it might sometimes aim at achieving something, i.e. peace and good, and it might sometimes be a state’s action, such as rule and domination, and other types of action, such as decision and consensus building. In this respect, it is not plausible to think that a certain action is the sole political action. Rather, it is most reasonable to think that in reality politics comes into being as a combination of the three essential ingredients I identified above. In other words, the three components of politics are intertwined with each other, and politics therefore does not come to existence only as a certain action. In short, the meaning of politics constantly varies in respect of social action, and what it signifies depends heavily upon what kind of social action one regards as political. For this reason, it should be noted that the diversity of political theorists’ ways of understanding politics elucidates the complexity of the concept of politics. In this respect, Frazer’s account helps us to know how difficult it is to grasp the nature of politics. Andrew Vincent, for example, precisely tells us the characteristics of politics:

politics is not an independent ‘thing’ which we theorize about. . . . politics is not one simple thing to which we refer. It is the site of a multiplicity of vocabularies (Vincent 2004: 9).

Does this mean, however, that it is not plausible to think that there is no specific feature of politics? As we have seen, it is certain that politics characteristically concerns state and power. Having said that, it is also true that, with reference to the diversity of the meaning of politics, even an attempt at seeking for politics can be a political action.\textsuperscript{18}

2. Political Theory, Political Philosophy and the History of Political Thought

Political philosophy

With regard to the discipline of politics, it is believed that, particularly since David Easton had issued ‘The New Revolution in Political Science’ (1969), contemporary politics dramatically changed its disciplinary characteristics. A
representative work characteristically describing this fact is regarded as John Rawls's *A Theory of Justice* (1971). In the sense that his work thoroughly tackled value issues, it was completely different from any studies that were carried out from the ‘value-neutral’ standpoint, although it was believed that issues of normative political theory were no longer meaningful particularly since Peter Laslett had declared the ‘death of political philosophy’ in 1956 (1956: vii). For this reason, it is completely understandable that Will Kymlicka claims as follows: ‘It is generally admitted that the recent rebirth of normative political philosophy began with the publication of John Rawls’s *A Theory of Justice* in 1971’ (2002: 10). In addition, as Swift puts it, ‘Rawls’s *A Theory of Justice* is the most influential book of contemporary political philosophy’ (2001: 51). Admittedly, in these respects, ‘contemporary political philosophy’ Swift intends began with Rawls. In other words, the provocative work has largely determined the direction of the discipline since then, and it might be argued, in this sense, that political philosophy commonly denotes its own field in post-*A Theory of Justice* particularly in the English-speaking world.

How is political philosophy in this sense related to political theory? For considering this issue, for example, Vincent clearly mentions: first, ‘I do not draw any rigid distinction between political theory and political philosophy. They are considered, on most occasions, as synonymous’ (2004: 7); second, ‘political theory is not clearly distinguishable from political philosophy in all circumstances’ (2004: 9). Despite his view, however, the methodological matter of the connection and distinction between these two disciplines is not quite as simple as we might expect particularly with respect to the terms theory and philosophy included in the two fields’ names. At this point, then, for the purpose of grasping the disciplinary relationship and methodological distinction between political theory and political philosophy, I will first address the issue of what theory means by comparing its implications with those of the term philosophy, and will next identify the possible differences between the two disciplines.

**Political theory and political philosophy**

As some political theorists mention, the term theory etymologically has its roots in Greek (e.g. Vincent 2004: 8; Wolin 1968a: 319). For example, Vincent provides an account of this word in terms of three kinds of Greek words, *thea*, *theoros* and *theoria*: ‘A thea was a spectacle’, ‘the one who observed the spectacle was a theoros’ and ‘theoria meant beholding a spectacle’ (2004: 8). First, Vincent begins his explanation of the term theory with other two kinds of terms, ‘event’ and ‘practice’, which are closely connected with the above three Greek words. According to him, theory has a role in mediating between events and observers.
In other words, theory can explain and is interconnected with events (practice). Next, Vincent shines a light on the three terms, ‘theory’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘philosophy’. As mentioned above, theory is connected with events, but knowledge, by contrast, is an ‘unmediated event’ (2004: 8). He stresses that theory is generally associated with philosophy and knowledge, and he puts emphasis on the relation between theory and philosophy. Vincent says: ‘The friend or lover (philia) of wisdom (sophia) had the ability to see or behold (theoria) through the eye of the mind. Theoria therefore virtually became the act of knowing itself’ (2004: 8; emphases added). That is to say, theoria (theory) means beholding, namely knowing, and is the ability of the philia (lover) of sophia (wisdom). As Vincent puts it, theory is also the ‘best walk of life’ (2004: 8). Finally, he emphasises that the term theory in its modern usage has been transformed into a concept in the narrow sense within the natural sciences which consists of hypothesis and experiment for the purpose of controlling the world.

Admittedly, theory and philosophy are profoundly associated with one another in their Greek contexts, and we thereby perceive that essentially they cannot be separated from each other. In fact, Vincent describes that theory is ‘a specific wisdom of philosopher’ (2004: 10; emphasis added). However, the distinction between theory and philosophy is not yet clear, and I must therefore tackle this issue, focusing on the terms theory and philosophy in more detail so as to let us fully understand the disciplinary connection and distinction between political theory and political philosophy.

Sheldon Wolin’s discussion makes the distinction much more clear. Again, it begins with ancient Greece. Wolin explains that classical political theory had been developed by Socrates and his colleagues in ancient Athens in the fifth century BC, and that it was enhanced by Plato and Aristotle. In this context, Wolin aims at integrating the three essential ingredients, ‘politics’, ‘theory’ and ‘philosophy’ (1968a: 319). According to him, they were constituted respectively as follows: by ‘the political’, meaning the matters of the polis (so-called ta politika); by the ‘observation of practice’, the ‘collection of experience’ and the ‘process of appraising the importance of what has been observed’; and by ‘philosophia’, meaning the love of wisdom (1968a: 319).

Here I should shine a light on the two terms philosophy and theory. First, with regard to the former, Wolin’s view is that it meant a ‘knowledge which would enable men to become wiser’ in the context of classical political theory (1968a: 319). Second, he sums up the latter term, focusing on its revolutionary role that a ‘new theory’ aimed to pose a challenge to traditional ways, conventions and customs and to displace them by new ways (1968a: 319). Here Wolin takes the view that terminologically both words had been formulated by Plato and Aristotle, and stresses that this fact gave a crucial meaning to the later
The evolution of the two concepts. In my view, there is an appropriate answer to my enquiry in the above two points. That is to say, a rigid distinction between philosophy and theory is drawn by their respective functions which can be seen in a clear difference between knowledge as wisdom and knowledge as reformation. In short, Wolin’s accent in the article is not on philosophy but on theory in relation to a disciplinary character. In other words, he lays stress not on political philosophy but on political theory in favour of its revolutionary function. For instance, using the term political theory, his following description shows it: ‘The aim of many political theorists has been to change society itself: not simply to alter the way men look at the world, but to alter the world’ (Wolin 1968b: 144; emphases added). In addition, it might be argued that his methodological position on the discipline of political theory is also elucidated by the fact that he employs ‘political theory’ as some titles of his works such as ‘Political Theory as a Vocation’ (1969). In sum, political theory with a particular emphasis on its revolutionary function is separated to some extent from political philosophy.

**Political theory and the history of political thought**

Next, I will draw a rigid distinction between political theory and the history of political thought. The discipline of political theory, as mentioned above, has been considered to be almost identical to political philosophy. Similarly, it is noted that the name of political theory has sometimes been replaced by the history of political thought without any distinction. However, it is observed that, as far as the functions of these two disciplines are concerned, the usages of their names are not correct. The best possible way to make a clear distinction between them is to compare the methodology of political theory with Quentin Skinner’s approach to the history of ideas, a representative approach of the so-called Cambridge School regarded as one of the predominant styles of the history of political thought. So let us first find out the disciplinary meanings of his method of the history of political thought, and second describe a possible distinction between them.

**(a) Quentin Skinner’s approach to the history of ideas**

*Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics* (1988), edited by James Tully, clearly describes Skinner’s methodological position on the history of political thought. His famous article ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’ – abbreviated to ‘MUHI’ below – printed in Tully’s above work suggests his general methodology. So I will begin by summarising the main points the essay puts forward:
1. It is risky to focus ‘simply on what each classic writer says’ as this approach necessarily leads readers not to history but to the following mythologies (1988a: 30-49):

(a) Mythology of doctrines
(b) Mythology of coherence
(c) Mythology of prolepsis
(d) Mythology of parochialism

2. The approach dealing with texts and their doctrines has considerable difficulty in recognising the problems of the relation and difference between ‘what a given writer may have said’ and ‘what he may be said to have meant by saying what he said’ (1988a: 50-6):

(a) Intellectual biographies run into confusion about a possibly huge difference between what a given writer says, what it means to readers and what they understand concerning sense and reference the writer intends due to the fact that the literal meanings of terms can alter.
(b) The study of histories of ideas results in some confusion which can be caused by an essential difference between meaning and use because there is the possibility that words meaning a given idea can be employed in different intentions.

3. It is necessary to understand how a statement intended and to grasp the relation between a variety of statements with respect to whether ‘to be said to have understood’ statements given in the past (1988a: 62).

4. A full understanding of a text denotes the awareness of two kinds of intentions: first, an intention ‘which should be understood’; and second, an intention which must describe the ‘text itself as an intended act of communication’ (1988a: 63-4):

(a) Every understanding of statements requires that we should replicate (or restore) ‘the complex intention on the part of the author’.
(b) It is most important that the approach to the history of ideas should describe the ‘whole range of communications which could have been conventionally performed on the given occasion by the utterance of the given utterance’ in detail.
(c) An understanding of a given author’s real intention requires tracing the ‘relations between the given utterance and the linguistic context’.
5. There is not any continual problem as such, but simple ‘individual answers to individual questions’, and it is absolutely impossible, therefore, to obtain the timeless answers or solutions to actual themes by reading classic texts in studying the history of ideas (1988a: 65).

With regard to the first point, Skinner first of all stresses the ‘mythology of doctrines’, which is diametrically opposed to history in his view. He highlights the possibility that some statements made by a classic theorist can turn into a ‘doctrine’ of readers; this generates two kinds of ridiculous things, intellectual biographies and histories of ideas. In addition, Skinner’s emphasis is on eternal and traditional ‘true standards’, with which some readers connect ethical and political theory – here his criticism is directed against Leo Strauss. Skinner, next, comments that readers sometimes give great consistency to a classic writer’s idea – he calls this the ‘mythology of coherence’. In addition to the above two mythologies, he finally proposes two types of mythology: the mythology of prolepsis and parochialism. The former stresses the significance of classic works to us, and the latter has a tendency to be biased in favour of one’s standpoint when describing contents of classic texts. These four methods, in Skinner’s view, are unconsciously applied by readers, and these problems are thus deep-rooted in their approaches.

The second point suggests some problems concerning the difference between ‘what a given writer may have said’ and ‘what he may be said to have meant by saying what he said’. According to Skinner, the following two types of approaches are contained in a study which does not care about the distinction: first, works of ‘intellectual biography’, which tackle issues of the doctrines of a given classic writer; and second, the study of ‘histories of ideas’, which aims at tracing the form of a doctrine. He is of the opinion that these two approaches provoke unavoidable confusion about the difference between meaning and use – his emphasis on the latter approach is based primarily on Wittgenstein. The third point highlights Skinner’s essential view that the awareness of the ‘intention of what was said’ and of the relation between a variety of types of statements concerned with one another in the same context is a crucial matter for his approach to the history of ideas. He asserts that, simply by means of an understanding of what was said in terms of meaning, we cannot fully see any statements of classic writers. The fourth point focuses on the view that recovering the total aim of writers is an essential task of the history of idea. As regards the fifth point, Skinner concludes that any classic texts do not answer any actual questions from our standpoint, but do simply answer questions of individuals.\textsuperscript{28}
What impression do we get of his approach? It might seem peculiar particularly from some familiar approaches to the history of ideas, which stress the ‘validity or present significance of past ideas’ (Femia 1988: 157). Joseph V. Femia claims: ‘Skinner writes of the history of political thought as if it were merely a series of disconnected intellectual events, historical inquiry itself becomes impossible. . . . If all historical events are sui generis, then we cannot write history; we can only pile up documents’ (1988: 168). It is admitted that, from Skinner’s perspective, as Femia emphasises, everything is counted as something different from one we know, and very often seems to be weird. As a result, it appears that every past event is completely separated from our familiar phenomena, and therefore that it is absolutely impossible to explore historical events, regarding them as perennial issues. With regard to this vital point, Femia, referring to Antonio Gramsci, puts forward the following four essential components of the study of the history of thought (1988: 158):

1. Historical ideas contain ‘permanent value’.
2. All the tasks of thinkers deal with transcendental issues of history.
3. Issues of past events can help us to solve problems nowadays.
4. Historical issues are all aimed at ‘contemporary history’.

In his article ‘Historicist Critique of “revisionist” Methods’, Femia depends basically upon Gramsci, and occasionally refers to Dilthey and Croce, in order to highlight the significance of studying history from the present perspective. In addition, stressing ‘a present interest’, Femia refers to Croce as follows: “only an interest in the life of the present can move one to investigate past fact”. Therefore, “this past fact does not answer to a past interest, but to a present interest”’ (1988: 169). In other words, he requires that we should situate past events in a contemporary context, which sees the past not as the world of aliens but as a kind of human phenomenon connected with the present. After all, his above four standpoints account precisely for the necessity of a contemporary interest to history. Femia, then, comes to the conclusion that, ‘[i]f we follow Skinner’s instructions, we can never produce “contemporary history” – historical knowledge that has as its sounding-board and measuring rod contemporary preoccupations and concerns. The methods and practices denounced by Skinner are precisely the methods and practices which enable us to separate what is valuable from what is erroneous or transient (tied to a determinate social form) in the philosophical works of the past’ (1988: 174).

Does his criticism, however, get right to the point of the issue? Indeed, it
seems that Skinner almost completely rejects today’s meaning of history when contending that what we can learn from Plato is only that slaves such as cooks might not have participated in politics; in this sense, Femia’s demands seems relevant. His critique, however, is not appropriate to Skinner’s above discussion as he rather misses the mark. In short, Skinner does not deny any present significance of studying the history of ideas, or rather he even supports its perspective. Above all, Skinner seeks for a historical importance not in the past connected with the present but in the world of aliens disconnected with it. He claims: ‘it is the very fact that the classic texts are concerned with their own quite alien problems, and not the presumption that they are somehow concerned with our own problems as well, which seems to me to give not the lie but the key to the indispensable value of studying the history of ideas. The classic texts, especially in social, ethical, and political thought, help to reveal – if we let them – not the essential sameness, but rather the essential variety of viable moral assumptions and political commitments. It is in this, moreover, that their essential philosophical, even moral, value can be seen to lie’ (Skinner 1988a: 67; emphases added).

It is not correct, then, to believe that Skinner does not concern himself with the present – we are driven by the hope to label him as a ‘revisionist’. For him, the importance of studying the history of ideas is rather shown by recognising something unfamiliar to us from an objective perspective which is not biased in favour of our standpoint – of course, he is aware that it is impossible to see it from the complete objective standpoint. Perhaps the reason why Skinner lays great stress not on meaning but on use is primarily because its approach breaks free from our biased view. According to him, as we have seen, if we see a past idea only in terms of its meaning, then it is impossible to fully understand its thought; we can grasp it only by considering the ‘intention of what was said’, thereby correctly recognising the idea in an unfamiliar world. I believe that Skinner’s above demands are all aimed at presenting a possible neutral view in order that he can look at past events without any biased viewpoint; otherwise, he cannot grasp anything about the history of ideas from his perspective. Skinner arrives at a more general conclusion as follows:

The investigation of alien systems of belief provides us with an irreplaceable means of standing back from our own prevailing assumptions and structures of thought, and of situating ourselves in relation to other and very different forms of life . . . such investigations enable us to question the appropriateness of any strong distinction between matters of ‘merely historical’ and ‘genuinely philosophical’ interest, since they enable us to recognize that our own descriptions and conceptualizations are in no way uniquely privileged (1988b: 286).
Here we can clearly see an academic orientation towards his own times in his approach. Skinner calls the above viewpoint the ‘anthropological justification for studying intellectual history’ (1988b: 286). In addition, emphasising this anthropological justification, he adds:

We can hope to attain a certain kind of objectivity in appraising rival systems of thought. We can hope to attain a greater degree of understanding, and thereby a larger tolerance, for various elements of cultural diversity. And above all, we can hope to acquire a perspective from which to view our own form of life in a more self-critical way, enlarging our present horizons instead of fortifying local prejudices (1988b: 287; emphases added).

Obviously, Skinner is in favour of the present-oriented study of the history of ideas, and implies that intellectual history is even aimed at us. He simply requires that we should present an impartial view through highlighting certain objectivity for only thereby we can place ourselves at a ‘self-critical’ position in his view. At this point it is interesting to note that Skinner’s viewpoint has a lot in common with Wolin’s in the sense that they both point up an understanding of the alien character of studying the history of ideas. According to them, in other words, since past views are not understandable, it is relevant to seek to understand them. Is it right, however, to believe that only a ‘purely historical’ approach is of ‘further relevance’ for the study of the history of ideas? (1988b: 287). It is stressed that Skinner’s method is definitely not the sole way of studying the history of ideas, and is not given any further relevance only by the fact that it is ‘purely historical’. To be sure, it is admitted that pure and objective historical research is highly relevant to academic studies. Nonetheless, it is impossible to deny other kinds of methods such as one which Femina presents, and to claim that only Skinner’s approach has the highest validity, even though one can occasionally show a higher relevance than others. Rather, it is important to note that to stress that one’s own approach is much more relevant than others – in Skinner’s case, only in terms of the genuine historical – is exactly to push one’s own standard on them. In short, Skinner’s perspective seems to simply insist that his method with an accent on the ‘purely historical’ is the sole certain knowledge.

There, then, may and should exist other types of approaches to the history of ideas and social and political thought as well. In this respect, I must admit that there is some possibility that one’s approach can have a higher validity than others. However, Skinner stresses that ‘the “pure historical” study of social and political thought may prove to have a further relevance’ (1988b: 287). As mentioned above, it is absolutely impossible for me to agree with the stance that the pure historical method for studying political thought has a higher relevance than others only in the sense of the purity of a historical study. Rather, it appears
that Skinner simply wants to assert that his approach is most suitable to academic studies. If this is true, then it must be stressed that he has a fatal misunderstanding of knowledge itself.

With regard to this issue, Mark Philp, while acknowledging the significance of the historical perspective (e.g. 2008: 130-1, 136, 146-8), highlights his stance that the historical approach itself is merely a method that does not have any advantage – of course, even if it is highly objective (Philp does not refer to Skinner’s method in this context) – and that other approaches are also relevant and significant, focusing on the meaning of the past. He says:

The past is one field on which people can draw for insights and evidence, and the methods of the professional historian provide a set of tools to work that field, but it is certainly not the only field or discipline in which political theorists should be interested – philosophy, sociology, psychology, anthropology, law, and economics are also often equally relevant. . . . Politics may look to history, but it does so because it is concerned to understand events, to construct explanations and models of political order, and to develop a sense of what is politically possible and desirable. It comes to history with specific purposes that derive from the nature of its own discipline and its object – the understanding of politics – and it addresses historical material with greater or lesser degrees of attention according to its purposes (and it is as possible to over-invest as it is to underinvest). But its object is not identical with history, and its aim is not merely historical (2008: 130-1).

Regardless of whether or not Skinner’s way of studying the history of ideas is relevant, I comment that his approach is a method for studying the history of political thought, which should be rigidly distinguished from political theory. Philp puts forward his methodological viewpoint of political theory, highlighting the disciplinary difference between these two academic fields as follows:

Political theory, much like political science, need not be historical. There are many other disciplines to draw on for insights into the nature of politics and the challenges it faces at any one point of time. And yet the language of politics and vocabularies and lexicons we draw on in reflecting on its character and demands is profoundly shaped by the events and the writing of the past . . . We are more in control of what we say the more we understand the tools and materials with which we work, and a historical understanding of those tools and materials can be a powerful source of illumination and can contribute dramatically to the self-awareness with which we engage with difficult conceptual and theoretical problems. To that extent there is a clear case for ensuring that political theorists understand something of the history of their discipline. Developing that understanding does not entail becoming a historian (2008: 148).

Philp’s account sheds much light on a sharp difference between political theory and the history of political thought. Quite significantly, he makes it clear that the former has not only a historical character but also a non-historical character
as opposed to the latter typically seen as Skinner's approach. Needless to say, this means that we can draw an important disciplinary difference between them in this point, regardless of whether or not the history of political thought should aim to be purely historical. It should be noted, however, that this particularly important distinction between the two rigidly distinct disciplines is very often obscure. On this view, I draw particular attention to Philp's following lucid explanation as to why we are required to distinguish between them:

political theory has a concern with the past that serves its disciplinary interests in understanding the character of political rule, the conditions for social and political order, the parameters of political possibility, and the values we should pursue within that set of possibilities. But those interests also demand contributions from other disciplines. Moreover... while the standards by which we judge the truth and falsity of claims are similarly inherited, they too are open to interrogation and question. In that possibility lies the distinctive philosophical moment for those who argue about politics, and in that moment is embedded an essential distance for political theory from history (2008: 148-9).

I strongly agree with his way of drawing a disciplinary distinction between political theory and the history of political thought through focusing on a methodological function of the former discipline, which presents a historical perspective on the basis of a direct interest in politics in contrast to the latter, which identifies itself as history. In fact, Philp's account clearly illustrates that, while the history of political thought can be history, political theory is not history, even though the latter often refers to the past. Furthermore, the method of gaining a genuine understanding of history is occasionally to be an effective means, but it is by no means the ends of political theory. For these reasons, it is reasonable to recognise a rigorous distinction between these two disciplines in terms of the respective research objectives.

Some possible characteristics of political theory, however, are elucidated not only by the above difference but also by some features common to other related fields. A good example of this is provided by the disciplinary characteristics of social theory, whose research field is generally considered either to be different from political theory or to embrace it, as we shall see below. Presumably this is primarily the result of the respective disciplinary developments. Nonetheless, it is emphasised that, in social theory's perspective, no doubt, there are some important field characteristics which can disciplinarily help political theory to tackle its own issues, to illuminate an understanding of politics and to practically contribute to dealing with some political problems, that is to say, which can give rise to the significant development of the discipline through absorbing them. So let us see their relevant standpoints which can provide some provocative ideas for political theory.
3. Political Theory and Social Theory

Normative political theory and social theory

It is important to note that the task of providing some detailed account of the connection between political theory and social theory involves us dealing with exceedingly troublesome issues, and thereby that my discussion inevitably becomes complex. Social theory, as opposed to political theory, consists of a wide range of theoretical ingredients of the social sciences, including empirical science, with a particular focus on sociology and anthropology. From this perspective, complicated issues in this section stem from a profound epistemological difference between these two research fields. This elucidates the fact that they have been largely determined by respectively different disciplinary influences apart from some similar effects; this leads us to have further difficulty in tackling the theme. On this view, for example, Lois McNay points out that, in general, Anglo-American world supports the view that social theory and political theory are independent of one another (2008b: 85).

According to Christine Helliwell and Barry Hindess, social theory has primarily addressed issues concerning the nature of society and human sociality, which have not been provided as purely explanatory descriptions but as normative descriptions by which the discipline is related to political theory (2006: 811). First, they observe that the normative character of social theory was profoundly affected by the two major founders of positive social theory, August Comte, who took the view that social theory primarily attempts to accomplish ‘social reform’, and Émile Durkheim, who enhanced sociology as a ‘diagnostic discipline’ by which this study learnt to appropriately shine a light on and explain ‘society’s ills’ so as to offer effective ‘remedies’ for them; in Durkheim’s view, social theory is viewed as an analogy between medicine and sociology, and the aim of the knowledge is to identify and tackle ‘social problems’ (2006: 811). Second, Helliwell and Hindess highlight the functionalist view of the individual that, as opposed to traditional political theory, which counts one as an ‘autonomous individual’, man is primarily made up by a society in which he is born and brought up, that is to say, he is a ‘product of society’ and a ‘social artifact’; this view, they writes, is shared to some extent with poststructuralists, amongst them Michel Foucault and Nikolas Rose, despite many differences (2006: 814-5). Third, Helliwell and Hindess claims, referring to Foucault, that the concept of the ‘figure of man’ elucidates the relationship between political theory and social theory in the sense that we are not only epistemic and cultural constructs but ‘political’ constructs (2006: 816). Finally, they describe that, whilst
political theory generally raises only normative issues, social theory addresses both normative and descriptive themes, and therefore that the latter field takes the view that these two research fields are interconnected with one another; this is why the former is thought of merely as a branch of the latter (2006: 821).

All the above four points with respect to the foundations of social theory are closely associated with its epistemological position generated by the sociological diagnostic standpoint conventional non-empirical political theory lacks. From this perspective, it is natural that social theory should generally be considered to be separated from the realm of political theory and vice versa. However, it is not right to distance the former from the latter, taking account of the following statement: ‘Normative theory can only develop in tandem with a continuous sociological self-critique that . . . is oriented to uncovering the exclusions that it makes’ (McNay 2008b: 105). In other words, it is impossible to separate their disciplinary attempts for undertaking their respective tasks. Thus, if McNay’s words of ‘sociological self-critique’ denote the approach of ‘critical social theory’, then I will next explore the relation between the two academic realms from a slightly different angle in relation to their epistemological standpoints, namely the relation between normative political theory and critical social theory.

**Political theory and critical social theory**

The topic of ‘recognition’ is an attempt to epistemologically interconnect political theory with critical social theory. This task has been performed by some famous social theorists, amongst them Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth. However, here I do not aim to address the issue of recognition. My primary concern in this section is rather to carry out a detailed investigation into the epistemological difference and connection between those two academic realms. This exploration is expected to illustrate that the critical, dialectical, reflective, diagnostic and remedial standpoints, which critical social theory is based on, are of high relevance for the disciplinary efforts of political theory. In short, this task has a great deal of interest not in Honneth’s political theory but in his epistemology. So let us raise this significant theme serving as a bridge between political theory and critical social theory.

(a) **Critical social theory**

According to Honneth, the concepts of ‘diagnosis’ and ‘pathology’ in social theory are derived from the field of medicine – here the discipline’s name of ‘social philosophy’ is replaced by social theory (1996: 387). I am aware that this
fact is completely identical to Durkheim’s view that the diagnostic discipline of sociology describes society’s ills, and that it gives appropriate remedies for social problems regarded as either ills or diseases; his methodological and epistemological views are affected by the approach of medical science in particular. This raises the important issue of how to count the individual, who can be, as we saw above, recognised by the sociological standpoint of a ‘product of society’, on the one hand, and by the ‘figure of man’, on the other. From these perspectives, social theory generally does not approach its own topics in exactly the same way as medicine’s despite the fact that the medical model of epistemology has had a profound effect on the former discipline’s epistemological understanding.

Not surprisingly, the epistemology of critical social theory is most characteristically presented by Max Horkheimer. For instance, he highlights the role of his theory as follows: ‘Critical thinking is the function neither of the isolated individual nor of a sum-total of individuals. Its subject is rather a definite individual in his real relation to other individuals and groups, in his conflict with a particular class, and, finally, in the resultant web of relationships with the social totality and with nature. The subject is no mathematical point like the ego of bourgeois philosophy; his activity is the construction of the social present. . . . the social structure as a whole and the relation of the theoretician to society are altered, that is both the subject and the role of thought are changed’ (2002b: 210-1). In these sentences, we can identify his stance of the individual, which is constituted by and embedded in both society and history in which man including Horkheimer himself is contextualised, on the one hand, and which has certain consciousness that reforms society, on the other (‘immanent critique’); in this respect, his view is dialectical. It should be noted, therefore, that I perceive that in Horkheimer’s words there are both the frameworks of Comtean and Durkheimian social theories, which aim to diagnose for the purpose of accomplishing ‘social reform’ and offering Cartesian and Marxist ‘social criticism’ – this critique, most importantly, is aimed at achieving reformation. In other words, Horkheimer consciously intends that, while to a certain extent rejecting ‘traditional theory’, which contains not simply empirical and positive theory including natural science but also other kinds of academic theories such as normative theory (in this sense, his critique is directed against all the academic disciplines and styles), Critical Theory consists of its traditional-theoretical ingredients; in this respect, too, the latter theory is dialectical. What precisely distinguishes the latter from the former, then, is that Critical Theory is based on the theoretical function of reflection in addition to certain self-awareness. When Horkheimer says, therefore, ‘for all the agreement of its elements with the most advanced traditional theories, the critical theory has no specific influence on its
side’ (2002b: 242), his theory requires distancing itself from traditional theory, even though it somewhat accepts its traditional view – indeed, Critical Theory is made up of the components of traditional theory. This is precisely described by his following sentence, emphasising the dialectical evolution of ideas: ‘truth is forged in an evolution of changing and conflicting ideas’ (1947: 63). In sum, as a result of self-reflection and self-awareness, Critical Theory has displayed its own epistemological characteristics, such as dialectic, diagnosis and critique, all of which are regarded as its own crucial theoretical standpoints. Next, let us see these several essential theoretical features of Critical Theory in more detail below.

In his early writing, Horkheimer writes: ‘The real social function of philosophy lies in its criticism of what is prevalent’ (2002c: 264; emphasis added). Indeed, this sentence tells the derivation of the name of critical social theory, and he in fact draws his attention to the function of critique. However, it is noted that the meaning of his criticism is not simply to criticise in its literal sense – of course, its role is also included in his intention. Rather, it should be considered that his conception of critique signifies that ‘the task of theory was practical, not just theoretical’, and that ‘it should aim not just to bring about correct understanding, but to create social and practical conditions more conducive to human flourishing than the present ones’ (Finlayson 2005: 4; emphases added). In addition, James G. Finlayson stresses that Critical Theory intends to be diagnostic and remedial, which means, as he says, ‘[t]he goal of the theory was not just to determine what was wrong with contemporary society at present, but, by identifying progressive aspects and tendencies within it, to help transform society for the better’ (2005: 4) – these two important ingredients have already been noted above. Horkheimer, above all, is willing to undertake the difficult task of practice. He says: ‘By criticism, we mean that intellectual, and eventually practical, effort which is not satisfied to accept the prevailing ideas, actions, and social conditions unthinkingly and from mere habit; effort which aims to coordinate the individual sides of social life with each other and with the general ideas and aims of the epoch, to deduce them genetically, to distinguish the appearance from the essence, to examine the foundations of things, in short, really to know them’ (2002c: 270). In this sense, I believe that he is a direct heir of Durkheim.31

In addition to the above critical character, as noted earlier, there are some other important theoretical features in Critical Theory: reflective and dialectical. It is presumed that they both have their primary roots in G. W. Friedrich Hegel. As has often been mentioned, Critical Theory draws its inspiration primarily from Immanuel Kant, Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud and Max Weber apart from Hegel. Also, it must be noted that the main figures of the Frankfurt School (e.g.
Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm and Jürgen Habermas) have more or less absorbed – whether critically or uncritically – almost all the theories of modern philosophy and the social sciences. In these respects, it can be argued that they have captured the essence of approximately almost all the modern philosophical theories on which many branches of the social sciences are based. In fact, in his article ‘The Social Function of Philosophy’ (1939) Horkheimer refers to an extremely wide range of scholars and thinkers, amongst them Thomas Hobbes, Rene Descartes, Baruch Spinoza, David Hume, Gottfried W. Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Friedrich W. J. Schelling, J. C. Friedrich Schiller, some Neo-Kantians, Max Scheler, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Karl Mannheim, Ernst Mach, Rudolf Carnap, Paul Valery, Henri Bergson, Comte, Herbert Spencer, Bertrand Russell, Alfred N. Whitehead and some American pragmatists.32

However, it must also be pointed out that Critical Theorists were definitely not affected by the above theories without any reflection. Rather, it must be emphasised that Critical Theory reflects on all the things concerning its own theoretical and practical efforts, that is on knowledge, society, human beings and interests, and so on, all of which contribute to its own theory. As Finlayson says, most importantly, ‘critical theory reflected on the social context that gave rise to it, on its own function within that society, and on the purposes and interest of its practitioners, and so forth, and such reflections were built into the theory’ (2005: 3; emphases added). In addition, it is important to remember that this fact is profoundly associated with the reason why Critical Theory has applied the Hegelian dialectic to its own theoretical framework. Furthermore, this clearly explains another reason why the theory takes the fundamental standpoint that knowledge and society reciprocally determine one another. In fact, as Horkheimer writes: ‘Mind . . . is not cut loose from the life of society; it does not hang suspended over it. In so far as mind seeks autonomy or man’s control over his own life no less than over nature, it is able to recognize this same tendency as a force operative in history’ (2002b: 223; emphases added). From this perspective, he stresses, ‘in genuinely critical thought explanation signifies not only a logical process but a concrete historical one as well. In the course of it both the social structure as a whole and the relation of the theoretician to society are altered, that is both the subject and the role of thought are changed’ (2002b: 211; emphases added). To put it another way, Horkheimer takes the view that ‘society’ and ‘theory’ progress and develop dialectically, and that both their functions and the relation between them change in the historical process, at the same time. This standpoint enables Critical Theory to concern itself not only with theoretical activity but also with practical activity – from the dialectical viewpoint, theory necessarily involves itself in practice and vice versa – that is
to say, it requires that Critical Theorists should change not only theory but also reality (society) as a process of historical progress from their reflective perspective; this is also why Critical Theory applies the style of critique. In Critical Theory, for these reasons, the above theoretical components of reflection, dialectic and critique are inseparable from each other.

Through the above discussion, I arrive at the following conclusion. Social theory can and ought to be not simply descriptive and explanatory but normative, diagnostic and remedial. In addition, from the epistemological perspective the discipline can also be critical, reflective and dialectical. There is thus no reason why political theory cannot absorb these methodological and epistemological frameworks. In this respect, it is noted that the disciplinary style of critical social theory must be profoundly relevant to some disciplinary efforts of political theory. However, there is a troublesome problem with respect to the above diagnostic viewpoint, which presents the pathological view of what is normal and abnormal. In other words, provided that social theory takes a methodological position which regards a problem as a society’s ill, what is identified as an illness or a pathology is a crucial matter for the task of diagnosis. With respect to this issue, Honneth gives his opinion as follows: ‘the application of both concepts [diagnosis and pathology] to the realm of psychic disturbances presents major difficulties, since clear standards of what is normal for the psychic life of a person until now were barely establishes in clinical research’ (1996: 387). Here he takes the view that there is no certain criterion for the determination as to what is normal and not, with regard to our psychological condition, obviously because of a great deal of difficulty in defining it. Also, there is another serious problem of applying the medical, pathological standpoint to the social sciences in the sense that a research object transfers from a simple individual to a society or a group by introducing it to a study of society, and issues tackled thereby become much more complex, says Honneth. As a matter of fact, he is of the opinion that what counts as normal is determined entirely by cultural contexts, so criteria for what should be considered as normal and abnormal (pathological) always exist within respective societies (1996: 387-8). Despite these pieces of evidence, nonetheless, Honneth draws attention to the following fact: ‘the determination of social pathologies in social philosophy always proceeds with a view to the social conditions that can promote the individual’s self-realization’ (1996: 390). In other words, in his view normality, proposed as ‘an ethical representation of social normality’, ‘is derived from the conditions of possibility of self-realization’, which is of particular importance in order that society may be normal (1996: 388).

Needless to say, Honneth concerns himself primarily not with social psychology but with the specific ethics for laying the ethical foundations of society, by
which he can give appropriate diagnoses and remedies – according to Honneth, this is the primary task of social philosophy. With regard to the approach of presenting a social underpinning, my enquiry is whether the psychological ground is based on ethical grounds or vice versa. Fromm, for example, stresses that first of all it is necessary to lay the sociopsychological foundations so as to provide an appropriate diagnosis of a society’s ill, and we can thereby adequately create the ethical ground of society. He claims:

It may be surprising to many readers to find a psychoanalyst dealing with problems of ethics and, particularly, taking the position that psychology must not only debunk false ethical judgements but can, beyond that, be the basis for building objective and valid norms of conduct (Fromm 1971: vii).

Fromm believes that psychological perception, no doubt, gives rise to our ethical and normative basis – as argued in Chapter 6, his word of ‘psychology’ is replaced by ‘social psychology’ in the sense that for him the former must always be the latter, and, in this respect, in Fromm’s view an individual denotes a ‘socialized individual’ (e.g. Fromm 1991: 142). As a matter of fact, his great contribution to the early Frankfurt School elucidates the special need of social psychology as a primarily requisite ingredient of the project of Critical Theory, called ‘interdisciplinary materialism’. Fromm emphasises that psychoanalytic knowledge provides us with social norms based on its solid ethical ground. For these reasons, it must be stressed that Fromm’s social and psychoanalytic theory is still of vital importance to the task of reflecting on Critical Theory.

(b) Social and political theory

Again, how does the above epistemological ways of understanding theory and society affect political theory? As far as normative political theory is concerned, it seems that many works of political theory have concentrated all their efforts on topics concerning social justice in post-A Theory of Justice, as if the primary task of the discipline was to deal with those issues. However, it is important to remember that Rawls’s task and approach are concerned only with the establishment of distributive justice. In general, therefore, it is interested neither in any sociological diagnoses nor in Marxist social criticism and reform. However, there is no reason why political theory may not be critical, reflective, diagnostic and remedial. If this is true, then the disciplinary style of normative theory is not the sole political theory. On this view, I want to refer to McNay. She writes:

To criticize normative political theory in terms of its sociological pre-understandings is not necessarily to forestall it. It is rather to continue the dialectical engagement between the
two areas of thought and, in using each to expose the limits of the other, to provide renewed grounds for critical debate (McNay 2008b: 105).

It is possible to believe that, as McNay says, political theory and critical social theory are already dialectically interwoven; in this sense, there is no need for them to exclude each other. Rather, it can be validly argued that social theory is indispensable for laying the theoretical foundations of political theory, and that the latter discipline can thereby even deal with unfamiliar issues contributing to new theoretical attempts of its own field.

4. Seiji riron: Political Theory in Japan

In this section, I will carry out an exploration of the discipline of seiji riron in Japan, which is regarded as equivalent to political theory, focusing on its methodological issues. No one can avoid addressing one’s own problems. It goes without saying that this task forms a link in the chain of self-reflection; thus, this is a crucial matter.

The discipline of seitigaku and Masao Maruyama

In the aftermath of World War II, the best-known Japanese scholar of politics (seiji gakusha) and political theorist (seiji rironka) Masao Maruyama (1914-96) wrote in his famous article ‘Kagaku to shite no seitigaku: Sono kaiko to tenbō’ (Politics as a Science in Japan: Retrospect and Prospects) (1947) as follows:

Instead of drawing its problems from its own native soil, Japanese scholarship has tended to chase persistently after the passing themes and methods developed in the European academic world. To this may be traced the divorce of our scholarship from reality. Politics (seijigaku) in Japan manifests this fatal weakness (shukumeiteki na yowasa) in an extreme form. Here the dissociation of scholarship from the reality it purports to study is so deep that the gap seems to be almost insurmountable (Maruyama 1969c: 227; emphases added, and translation modified; [1995c: 136]).

In this article, Maruyama highlights the following two crucial matters with respect to the disciplinary conditions of politics in Japan (seijigaku): first, the dissociation of theory and practice; and second, escape from actual political issues (1969c: 225-32; [1995c: 133-42]). As regards the first problem, he clearly says that ‘for in its development it [seijigaku] almost never had the corrective experience of shaping and being shaped by political realities’ (1969c: 227; [1995c: 136]); this
best explains the ‘fatal weakness’ (shukumeiteki na yowasa) he stresses above. In other words, the reason why the academic discipline of seijigaku caused such a weakness, according to Maruyama, is due to the fact that it had not tried to connect itself with political realities; this is directly associated with the second problem he raises. In short, in Maruyama’s view these faults are the result of the historical process the field of seijigaku underwent, and it implies that his criticism was directed not only against seijigaku but also against a wide range of fields in the social sciences in Japan. On this view, Maruyama claims as follows: ‘The sterility (funinsei) of Japanese political science is not to be blamed on either the laziness or the incompetence of individual scholars of politics. It is essentially an outcome of the political structure established after the Meiji Restoration’ (1969c: 227; emphasis added, and translation modified; [1995c: 136]). Most importantly, however, his primary aim is to criticise not social science as a whole but seijigaku: ‘It is unreasonable to expect any genuine social science to thrive where there is no undergirding of civil society. It is particularly unreasonable to expect it in the case of political science’ (1969c: 227–8; [1995c: 136–7]).

How should we accept Maruyama’s criticism of the ‘sterility’ of seijigaku? In order to consider this issue, I want to refer to the Japanese scholar of politics and the history of ideas Noriaki Ono’s stance on the knowledge of politics. In the afterword to his book Seiji riron no genzai (Present-Day Issues of Political Theory) (2005), Ono says as follows:

In my lecture ‘Public Philosophy and Contemporary Politics’ (Kōkyō Tetsugaku to Gendai Tōchi) (Summer Semester 2004), I necessarily hesitated to decide my attitude towards actual political issues and to express it to students, although I was able to explain what and where their problems are from the perspective of normative theory (Ono 2005: 232).

Ono gives three reasons for his silent attitude towards his own lecture: first, he is unwilling to express his opinion about politics in his lectures; second, he is in favour of the ‘bottom-up approach’ (genba-shugi); and third, his manner is based on his way of thinking as a specialist in the history of ideas (2005: 232). In addition, it is noted that he declares that his work holds onto a ‘value-neutral’ stance (kachi chūritisu) for making his explanatory attempt (2005: 3). How, then, should we see Ono’s position on the knowledge of politics? In conclusion, in my view, his attitude towards politics as a reality denotes exactly the abandonment of the role of politics as a discipline. With regard to this issue, however, there is a troublesome problem concerning whether the accent of his study is on political theory (politics) or the history of ideas (history). Basically, as we saw in section 2 above, I am of the opinion that these two disciplines should be distinguished from each other due to their different disciplinary characteristics;
and therefore its issue is a crucial matter. With respect to this vital point, however, it is observed that Ono himself has begun to occur to him that a value-neutral position that consistently stands to objectivity is no longer relevant to Japanese scholarship (2005: 232). Here I reference Easton’s later position on his study of political science. Why did he later abandon his early methodological stance of ‘pure science’? From Easton’s later perspective, knowledge that is driven by its desire to adhere firmly to objectivity is a pseudo-theory regardless of disciplinary genres. Here I am not intrigued by justifying Easton’s view. Rather, my concern is why Ono tries to stick strongly to the ‘value-neutral’ position. At this point I want to return to Maruyama’s discussion. He claims:

A scholar of politics must start by frankly recognizing the existence in his own field of this kind of close interrelation between the process of knowing and the object known. In other words, he must recognize that all political speculation, including his own, is existentially bound. In the political world there can be no observer who is not also an actor. ‘Strict neutrality’ (gensei chiritsu) is also a political position. In this sense, when a scholar constructs a theory of political situation, he is ipso facto committing himself to a specific political course of action (1969c: 238; translation modified; [1995c: 149]).

From Maruyama’s perspective, Ono’s academic position is an invalid and impossible methodological choice. According to Maruyama, ‘If a person professes to be a mere spectator of the all-out political struggle among the various types of Weltanschauungen, he shows himself by that very fact to be unqualified as a political scientist’ (1969c: 238-9; [1995c: 150]). How, then, did Maruyama cope with the problem that every task of political science necessarily bases itself on one’s subjectivity, while the discipline requires certain objectivity? Significantly, he answers this enquiry as follows:

Political investigation both regulates and is regulated by its object of study. Therefore it is the ‘original sin’ (shugō) of political theory (seiji riron) to be markedly subjective and to take on an ideological cast. . . . a person who is deeply concerned with actual political trends and who sincerely desires to affect them will probably realize through self-examination that any speculation is existentially bound. In his perception of political reality he will be particularly conscious of the need to guard against any clouding of the cognitive process that arises from his own hopes and aspirations. Thus he is likely to attain a higher level of objectivity than the self-styled ‘value-free’ observer (1969c: 239-40; [1995c: 150-1]).

Maruyama attempts to support political theory partaking of subjectivity, producing a paradoxical effect on his logic. To be sure, it seems that, while admitting that his political theory can take on a dogmatic character, he tries to take his responsibility. Rather, he even lays stress on the necessity of subjectivity, and
requires us to face political realities, by emphasising ‘our politics’ (wareware no seiji):

it is characteristic of speculation about politics that problems of methodology are inseparably intertwined with its subject matter. A pure methodology that transcends its subject matter has no meaning in this world. Another important activity for political science is comparative government. But I suspect that Japanese studies of foreign political systems, unless they are ultimately related to the problem of what to do about Japan’s [our] politics [wareware no seiji], are rather in the nature of old man’s hobbies (1969c: 234; [1995c: 144]).

Quite interestingly, Maruyama warns particularly against the personalisation of knowledge that is caused paradoxically by highlighting purity. From this perspective, he comes to the conclusion that, ‘[n]owadays political science must, above all, be a science oriented to actualities (Wirklichkeitswissenschaft)’ (1969c: 234; emphasis added; [1995c: 144]). Is there, then, any problem in the way that politics aims exclusively to pursue ‘actualities’? In any case, from Maruyama’s standpoint, too, political theory is definitely regarded as a sub-discipline of politics. I therefore want to seek a possible answer to the question by observing the present state of the discipline of seiji riron.

Seiji riron

(a) Imported studies (yu’nyū-gaku)

With regard to a major methodological issue of political theory in Japan, the Japanese political theorist Seiki Okazaki raises a significant topic associated with Maruyama’s view of ‘sterility’ in his short article ‘Seiji riron hōhōron ni tsuite’ (On the Methodology of Political Theory) (2008). Basically, Okazaki admits Maruyama’s view. His stance is that the primary reason for the ‘immaturity’ (mihattatsu) of seiji riron is because most Japanese political theorists have ignored methodological issues in the discipline (2008: 3). In addition to this evidence, it is noted that the ‘sterility’ of seijigaku can be explained by the fact that the Japanese term shakai kagaku is the translation of the ‘social sciences’ and ‘social science’. In other words, it can be argued that the problem is profoundly associated with the historical circumstances to which Japan has been adopted – this is exactly ‘an outcome of the political structure’ Maruyama stresses. According to Okazaki, however, the main factor in immaturity is not the above second reason. On this view, as Okazaki puts it, I am convinced that Japanese political theorists have been merely ‘importers of Western political theory’ (seiji riron no yu’nyū gyōsha) (2008: 5) – similarly, the political theorist Keiichi Matsushita describes shakai kagaku as ‘studies based on imported the-
ories’ (yu’nyū-gaku) (1991: 14). From this perspective, Okazaki requires the shift away from importers to ‘producers of political theory’ (seiji riron no seizō gyōsha) (2008: 5). In addition, referring to William Galston, he reflects on a harmful tendency of seiji riron as follows: ‘Unless political theory presents a new theory which creates “difference”, it results either in a mere “political criticism” (seiji hihyō), which simply expresses one’s attitude towards actual politics, or in mere “studies of political theory” (seiji riron-gaku), which solely import foreign political theories, even if regarded as “political theory”.’ (2008: 5). Taking account of this condition of the scholarship of political theory, it is not surprising that Gendai seiji riron (Contemporary Political Theory) (2006), edited by the best-known Japanese political theorists Osamu Kawasaki and Atsushi Sugita, which is counted as a major text of seiji riron, refers only to five Japanese scholars, despite the fact that the book contains one hundred-four foreign scholars’ theories (Kawasaki and Sugita 2006) – these solid pieces of evidence have been offered by Okazaki’s article (2008: 3).

(b) Two types of seiji riron: Western political thought and Japanese political thought

Next, I will point out that there is a weird segregation in the discipline of seiji riron: Western and European political theory (Seiō or Seiyō seiji shisō) and Japanese political theory (Nihon seiji shisō). In Japan, scholars of the former theory, on the whole, have so far performed the task of ‘political theory’ in the literal sense – the primary reason is obviously because political theory is derived from the West. The latter, which has largely been determined by ‘Maruyama’s approach of the history of ideas’ (Maruyama shisōshi-gaku), is characterised by a profoundly historical feature, and has primarily been provided by Maruyama’s disciples who have formed the ‘Maruyama School’ (Maruyama gakuhō). In other words, there is a rigid distinction between European political theory, which is regarded as political theory in Japan (seiji riron), and Japanese political theory, which is generally called Japanese political thought (Nihon seiji shisō) or the history of Japanese political thought (Nihon seiji shisōshi). How is, then, seiji riron related to social and historical issues of Japan? If not, then it means exactly that the discipline cannot tackle political issues associated with sociohistorical themes – moreover, if seiji riron is not interested in politics concerning the Japanese, then it does not and cannot precisely deal with Japanese political themes ironically despite the discipline’s name. How is seiji riron connected to Japanese political thought? Does the former make such an effort? If not, then the present-day scholarship of seiji riron is definitely not a ‘science oriented to actualities’ (genjitsu kagaku), which the young Maruyama demanded, on the grounds that, if it is constituted exclusively by imported theories – this is not the core problem,
and is not too problematic – and if it does not concern its own methodology and methodological issues so as to adapt them for its own sociocultural ground, they cannot function in its own context. In this respect, to be sure there may be no problem with it, and seiji riron does not necessarily fulfil the requisite of a science oriented to actualities. However, then, doesn’t seiji riron tackle actual political issues? And doesn’t it concern itself with its own sociocultural themes? In my view, the primary problematic and troublesome point of the discipline of seiji riron lies exactly in these issues. In this sense, Maruyama’s suggestion is still of great value for considering those problems. For these reasons, there is no reason why the two studies may not be integrated into seiji riron. With regard to this vital point, I will summarise primary issues concerning the integration of the two types of seiji riron below.

Seiji riron, as mentioned note 34, is the translation of political theory. Here my primary concern is whether Japanese political theory exists or not. As we saw above, (the history of) Japanese political thought consists of historical contents, and most often does not tackle actual themes. Can we, then, call it Nihon seiji riron (Japanese or Japan-based political theory)? If Maruyama’s canonical works are not categorised as seiji riron, then does there exist seiji riron in Japan? If not, it is undoubtedly mere import-based studies in view of the current disciplinary condition. So what is political theory translated as seiji riron for? Why don’t we employ the expression of poritikaru seorī (ポリティカル・セオリー)? Most importantly, how and what should we do for overcoming these troublesome problems concerning methodology? At this point I arrive at the conclusion that we cannot find any reason why seiji riron does not concern itself with political actualities. From this perspective, I will suggest a possible clue to surmounting the present condition of seiji riron beset with methodological difficulties which stem from its import-oriented character and the segregation noted above.

(c) Political theorist as a political practitioner

Consider some academic fields such as medicine and law, which characteristically involve themselves in the actual application of their own theories beyond the scope of the engagement with theorisation. This means that medical and judicial practitioners actually become decision-makers who are required not only to suitably apply their respective own theories but also to decide what theory, to whom, when, where and how to adopt it. This is well explained by the fact that in general a medical scientist is a doctor at the same time – it is, of course, profoundly associated with the discipline’s characteristics and objects. From this perspective, however, there is no reason why political theory cannot actually engage, for example, in policy-making and political decision-making – of course, these act-
ions are dangerous in the sense that theory is used to one’s and a certain group’s advantage. Having said that, the standpoint of a practitioner suggests that political theory should be satisfied neither simply by a philosophically abstract thinking nor by a conceptual analysis nor by the destruction of the dominant discourse nor by a simple criticism. It should intervene in actual politics from the perspective of a political practitioner different from a politician in accordance with disciplinary necessity. On this view, Maruyama’s following words might demonstrate the validity of my view:

We must now make every effort to use the vast amount of living research material spread before our eyes. We must do as Aristotle did with the ancient polis, as Machiavelli did with Renaissance Italy, as Hobbes and Locke did with seventeenth-century England, as Marx did with the Revolution of 1848 and the Paris Commune, as Bryce did with the democracies, as Beard, Merriam, Laski, and Siegfried did in the twenties and thirties. By analysing the complicated trends that underlie Japanese politics, we must elicit the laws of political process and behaviour, constantly trying to verify in the actual political situation the propositions and categories thus acquired (Maruyama 1969c: 233-4; emphases added; [1995c: 143-4]).

Perhaps Maruyama did not intend that politics (political theory) should rely upon natural science’s behaviourist and positivist approaches depending heavily upon the verification of hypotheses, nor should it be political science. On this view, for Maruyama the term seijigaku does not necessarily signify natural science-based political science but rather politics, as exemplified by the fact that in the essay he fully intends ‘Kagaku to shite no seijigaku’ not to avoid falling into ideology and to achieve certain objectivity – his term of seijigaku denotes them to a certain extent, but they are not most important for him – but to be a genjitsu kagaku (Wirklichkeitswissenschaft) by applying the term ‘science’ (kagaku) – in this respect, in Maruyama’s view, seijigaku is not necessarily scientific as his article ‘Kagaku to shite no seijigaku’ is precisely translated as ‘Politics as a Science’. 41

The arrogant “positivist” dislikes to pass value judgements and professes to stand for “objectivity”. Though he makes a great show of his freedom from values, in the midst of his “positivist” cognition value judgements are likely to creep inadvertently into his “objective observations”. On the other hand, a person who is deeply concerned with actual political trends and who sincerely desires to affect them will probably realize through self-examination that any speculation is existentially bound. In his perception of political reality he will be particularly conscious of the need to guard against any clouding of the cognitive process that arises from his own hopes and aspirations. Thus he is likely to attain a higher level of objectivity than the self-styled “value-free” observer (1969c: 239-40; emphases added; [1995c: 150-1]).
Paradoxically speaking, Maruyama explicitly avoids implying ‘science’ in the positivist sense with the effective use of the term kagaku; this is why ‘Kagaku to shite no seijigaku’ does not mean seiji kagaku but genjitsu kagaku which is regarded as seijigaku. Most importantly, however, my other enquiry is whether his politics and political theory actually contributed to establishing a genjitsu kagaku, and whether he actively participated in politics as a political actor or a political practitioner. If not, then it is possible to presume that Maruyama was also driven by his impulse to stay in the outside of political realities. If this is true, then his discussion turns into a political doctrine. In that case, it is not implausible to believe that Ono’s academic position is rather more valuable to scholarship.42

Notes

1 John von Heyking, for example, calls attention to ‘political activity’ for scientific enquiry into the meaning of politics. He thereby distinguishes between the two basic components of political studies, the ‘character’ and the ‘scope’ of political activity (2008: 319).
2 With regard to this issue, for example, Dustin Ells Howes clearly explains as follows: ‘a great deal of political theory involves thinking about the nature of politics itself’ (2008: 318).
3 Interestingly, Richard Kraut has provided the statistical data that Aristotle uses the phrase in his works ‘seven times’ (2002: 95).
4 The originals of these expressions are provided in German: the former is given as ‘Tà politikà, bezeichnet die auf die Polis bezogenen öffentlichen Angelegenheiten’; the latter is given as ‘die Kunst der Führung und Verwaltung der öffentlichen Aufgaben im Interesse der Gemeinschaft der Bürger/des Gemeinwohls der Polis’. As regards the terminology of Politik, Werner J. Patzelt, for example, has also offered a good illustration of it. He has translated ta politika as ‘die einem Freien wohlanstehenden Diskussionen über die Angelegenheiten der Polis (citizens’ pending discussions about the matters of the polis)’ (2007: 20).
5 With regard to Socrates and Plato, my discussion depends upon Daniel Devereux’s work (Devereux 2011).
6 According to Devereux, the political art does not have its origins in Socrates. Devereux has presented the important historical fact that Protagoras and other sophists ‘set themselves up as teachers of the “political art”’ (2011: 99).
7 For example, Cambridge’s English translation of the Politics edited by Stephen Everson (1988) has translated polis as ‘state’ – this is the revised version of Jonathan Barnes’s translation (1984). With respect to this point, after explaining that in today’s meaning Aristotle’s polis is not state but ‘city’, and that what he actually described in the Politics is the ‘city-state’, Everson says as follows: ‘Aristotle’s subject in the Politics is neither the nature of the “city-state” nor of the “city” but of the society unified by constitutional government – and the closest notion we have to capture this is that of the state’ (Aristotle 1988: xv).
The polis, needless to say, was made up of the ‘two kinds of spheres’, oikos (economic and familial sphere) and polis (‘sphere of general binding regulation of the public matters’) (Rieger 2010: 744). Hence, the polis denotes the politics of the polis.

With respect to Aristotle’s conceptions of polis, politēs and politeia, see Devereux’s work (2011: 112).

See the following account of politics (Politik): ‘er [Politik (begriff)] bedeutet soviel wie “von öffentlichem Interesse, dem Gemeinwohl gemäß” (The concept of politics signifies the same thing ‘as the public interest in accordance with the common good’) (Druwe 1987: 393).

With respect to the meaning of the political in classical political theory, Sheldon Wolin’s following description is quite relevant to my enquiry: ‘Classical theory identified the political with the common involvements which men shared by virtue of membership in the same polis. Romans of the republican period called their political order a res publica, literally, “a public thing”; the same idea was reflected in the sixteenth-century English usage of “commonweal”. The core meaning of “political” – a sharing of what is common – was eloquently expressed by Cicero: “Further, those who share Law must also share Justice; and those who share these are to be regarded as members of the same commonwealth” (De legibus I, 7.23).’ (1968a: 319-20). My survey focuses on the context of ancient Greece.

This view has been put forward, for example, by Humphrey D. F. Kitto. He says: ‘Man is an animal whose characteristic it is to live in a city-state’ (1957: 11).

Frazer also takes a similar standpoint to Swift’s (2008: 179).

For example, Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes and Weber are categorised as theorists taking this type of view.

Blondel sets out the appearance of politics with reference to ‘decision’ as follows: ‘There are no politics unless at least two individuals have to take a decision together’ (1991: 483).


To the extent that Druwe employs the term ‘social activities’ (soziale Handlungen), corresponding to ‘social actions’ (soziale Handeln), and that Patzelt occasionally uses the word of ‘activity’ (Handlung) instead of ‘action’ (Handeln), ‘activity’ is identical to the term ‘action’ in this context. In addition, Blondel defines politics as ‘activity by which decisions are arrived at and implemented in and for a community’. According to him, politics is characterised by the three features, activity, decisions, ‘arrived at and implemented’ by activity, and community, in which activity takes place (1991: 482-4).

With respect to this view, see the Japanese political theorist Masao Maruyama’s following description (on him, see s. 4 below): ‘In the political world there can be no observer who is not also an actor. “Strict neutrality” is also a political position. In this sense, when a scholar constructs a theory of political situation, he is ipso facto committing himself to a specific political course of action’ (1969c: 238; emphases added [1995c: 149]).

See, for instance, the following description: ‘When John Rawls wrote A Theory of Justice in 1971, which I take as ground zero for our debates, there was only one journal (Ethics) devoted to the field of political philosophy, and it was more or less moribund’ (Kymlicka 2002: x).
On this, three political theorists take the same view as Kymlicka’s: ‘For many years before Rawls, academic political philosophy was either the history of political thought or quasi-technical linguistic analysis of the meaning of political concepts. Since Rawls there has been systematic and substantive argument about what the societies we live in should actually be like . . . Much of what has been written since then can helpfully be understood as engaging with Rawls’s theory – like it or not, those writing in his wake have to think about how their arguments relates to his’ (Swift 2001: 10); ‘In the mid-twentieth century John Rawls single-handedly revived Anglo-American political philosophy, which had not been significant progress since the development and elaboration of utilitarianism in the nineteenth century’ (Arneson 2006: 45); ‘Much academic work in political theory – including much that disputes his substantive positions – operates in a Rawlsian paradigm’ (Swift and White 2008: 59).

See, for instance, the following account: ‘With the advent of Rawls’s work, normative political theory began to form the dominant motif from the later 1970s up to the late 1980s’ (Vincent 1997: 2; emphases added).

On this view, it appears that these two fields’ names are nowadays employed without any different implications in their English contexts.

Despite the fact that some theorists, including Vincent, notice that there is no clear difference between these two disciplines, some others make a distinction between them. One of them, Mark Philp, claims as follows: ‘If we think of political philosophy as involving this focus on values, and political theory as including concerns about the conditions under which these values can be realized, or the extent to which they can be realized under current conditions – with the latter shading at times into political science – then, even if we recognize the distinctive character and independence of the different activities, we can see that having an understanding of a body of past thinking about politics and a grasp of the context and the imperatives and constraints facing earlier thinkers is likely to be a considerable asset to any political theorist even if it has no direct impact on the work of the philosopher’ (2008: 147). It seems that Philp’s explanation highlights the historical perspective of political theory. However, we cannot find a clear difference between them only in terms of his account. In any case, here I simply stress that the task of political theory is not confined to the discussion of the historical conditions that realise values; in this respect, I am not in favour of his view. As we shall see later, however, he draws a significant distinction between political theory and the history of political thought.

In his Politics and Vision (2004 [1960]), for example, Wolin employs the term political theory in almost the same sense as political philosophy, but this fact does not affect my understanding of his stance on the distinction between them on the grounds that there is enough evidence that he gives a special meaning to the term political theory in his primary three methodological essays.

For example, the Japanese political theorist Seiki Okazaki’s article, ‘Seiji riron no hōhōron ni tsuite’ (On the Methodology of Political Theory) (2008), makes some clear distinctions between these two fields by focusing on their respective disciplines’ roles. This is particularly useful for rigorously distinguishing between them not only in Japan but also in Europe.

With regard to this topic, it is particularly important to note that in the UK the study of the academic discipline of the history of political thought is generally conducted by the department of history. It seems that this is closely associated with the fact that Skinner’s approach is recognised predominantly by many British universities.

Skinner published Visions of Politics, vol. 1: Regarding Method (2002), which contains the sum-
mary and revised version of ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, and which includes his other methodological articles.

28 I have roughly summarised the primary issues of Skinner’s approach to the history of ideas by focusing on his ‘MUHI’. His other essays, however, also provide its essence; while his methodology is suggested primarily in his methodological article printed in Meaning and Context, his stance on the discipline is put forward even by his primary works which do not focus on methodological issues, such as The Foundations of Modern Political Thought (1978), as Tully says (1988b: 19). Having said that, Skinner often refers to his article ‘MUHI’ when presenting his view on approaches to the history of ideas, and the work should therefore be regarded as his primary essay on his methodology.

29 Wolin says: ‘one reads past theories, not because they are familiar and therefore confirmative, but because they are strange and therefore provocative’ (Wolin 1969: 1077).

30 I do not think that there exist pure things in human activity even though we can try to create such a thing. In this respect, there is no such thing as a purely historical standpoint, and the pure can be seen as a kind of ‘ideal type’. Of course, nonetheless, Skinner intends a complete historical approach by the expression. The reason why I highlight this point is because the word of pure seems to suggest at least two meanings in his context: first, being unmixed for arriving at complete objectivity (literal meaning); second, having only a historical perspective. It seems to me that his methodological aim is to achieve both objectives.

31 In these respects, it must be stressed that, despite his ‘pessimism’, Horkheimer’s critique was aimed at offering constructive criticism.

32 Perhaps the interdisciplinarity of Critical Theory may be derived from these intellectual backgrounds – even though most of those scholars are generally regarded simply as philosophers. In other words, Critical Theory has aimed to be methodologically interdisciplinary by absorbing and reflecting on ‘traditional theory’, which captures the essence of all the social science theories which were predominant particularly in the twentieth century, and which does not include self-reflection and self-criticism such as pragmatism, positivism and behaviourism. In this respect, Critical Theory reflects on all the existing theories, while containing them all.

33 In Fromm’s view, the insane condition is characterised by a lack of ‘productivity’ and ‘objectivity’ – this does not mean what is value-neutral – in society and human beings. By contrast, when they fully develop these two essential characteristics, they can first exhibit their complete humanity as opposed to insanity (see Ch. 6).

34 The term seiji riron is derived from ‘political theory’, and is regarded as the translation of the discipline (e.g. Kawasaki and Sugita 2006: i). To avoid confusing the former with the latter, therefore, I will basically employ the term seiji riron in my exploration.

35 He can be regarded as the ‘father of modern politics in Japan’. On the discipline’s name of ‘political science’, it is generally translated as either seijigaku or seiji kagaku in Japanese. The latter is used in the literal sense of ‘science’ meaning the Japanese kagaku. The former is most often employed for the latter is an unnatural literal translation of the English political science. Despite these facts, there is nowadays a remarkable tendency for Japanese academic community – especially for the discipline of politics – to intend seijigaku as the English politics and seiji kagaku as political science.

36 I am aware that there is the important fact that Maruyama wrote this article with a strong awareness of Weber’s methodology of social science (e.g. Takabatake 1997: 59). This elucidates another fact that some kind of Weberian ‘academic asceticism’ lies in this essay, and
therefore that Maruyama simply required the revival of the discipline of *seijigaku*, and confined his intention of the writing to the improvement of the field. To be sure, this way of understanding the article is appropriate to this issue here, but his aim should be viewed as a more radical demand for the awakening to *reality* in the sense that he actually refers to Weber in the work as follows: ‘Max Weber’s demand for value-free judgement is apt in Japan to become a disguise for the positivist “onlooker”. But Weber himself thought that the separation of theoretical value relations from practical value judgements was an “investigator’s ideal”, and that its perfect realization was even incompatible with the unity of the personality. . . . In his *Die Objektivität der Sozialwissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen* and his *Die Wissenschaft als Beruf* Weber sharply rejects any confusion of his theory with the attitude of the ‘purely impartial observer’ regarding value judgements on different *Weltanschauungen*, or with a neutral position *vis-à-vis* both the right and the left wings in politics. He claims that it is a scholar’s duty as a citizen to state clearly his *Weltanschauung* and his political position’ (Maruyama 1969c: 239; [1995c: 152]).

37 It is noted that such a fact has been observed by many Japanese social scientists particularly in the postwar period. A representative of those who stress the separation between the social sciences and reality in Japan is the Japanese political theorist Keiichi Matsushita (e.g. 1971: 163). In addition, the Japanese political scientist Michitoshi Takabatake expresses the tendency as ‘perverse (ashiki) Japanese scholarship’ based on ‘imported theories’ (*yu’nyū gakumon*) and ‘idealistic discourse’ (*kan’nen rongi*) (1997: 59).

38 Philp, for example, describes an aspect of the task of an explanation as follows: ‘attempting to do so [to offer a complete overview of . . . challenges concerning the methods for the study of political thought and political theory] would at best replicate work that others have done in recent years’ (2008: 128; emphases added). With respect to the deep-rooted ‘explanatory character’ (*kaisetsu-teki seikaku*) of Japanese scholarship, Hisaki Matsuura’s and Tadashi Karube’s ‘Shintaika sareta chi no fuken wo’ (Towards the Restoration of Physicalised Knowledge) (2011) is valuable to my discussion, despite the fact that it rather refers to the ‘obstacle of the academic culture of explanation’ in Japan (*kaisetsu bunka no kōzai*), meaning an ‘additional explanation by some specialist with a series of small format paperback books of Japan’ (*bunko kaisetsu*); in this respect, it is directed towards a slightly different context from my intention. Nonetheless, their work elucidates the existence of an abundance of ‘explanatory books’ (*kaisetsu-sho*) in Japan. Of course, I do not deny the necessity for them, but here it is emphasised that the ‘explanation of a political theory’ is not the primary role of the field of political theory.

39 Ono actually raises Easton’s declaration of 1969 at the beginning of the book (2005: 7-8). In addition to Easton’s statement, it is noted that the following illustration concerning the meaning of the historical approach of political theory presents the complete opposite view from Ono’s: ‘We should not underestimate either the difficulty of attaining that depth of understanding [a precise understanding of the past thought in its historical context (here it denotes Thomas Paine’s political thought)] or the contribution that historical evidence and argument can make to its formation. But, in so far as we gain a sense of those core values and commitments, we may have a distinct set of questions of a less historical character to ask about how far those commitments map onto our own political values and practices, how far they raise issues that are critical of our contemporary institutions, and how far they provides insights and distinctions that can modify or enhance the way in which we understand and defend our own practices and values’ (Philp 2008: 144; emphases added). Philp’s des-
cription provides us with a significant criterion that the study of political thought even entails us making a value judgement which is closely associated with our political life.

40 The Japanese-Australian sociologist Yoshio Sugimoto, for example, explains that a problemmatic tendency to rely exclusively upon Western theories on a nationwide scale concerns not only Japan but also a wide range of countries in the Asia-Pacific region (2000: 179-80).

41 I must point out, nonetheless, that Arthur Tiedemann’s translation published by Oxford has a problem with his overall translation of seijigaku into ‘political science’ despite his correct translation of the title of ‘politics’, in the sense that in the article, as can be seen above, Maruyama does not imply political science, which explicitly contains a greater orientation towards the natural science-based value neutral position – though this fact does not denote that he does not intend that meaning by it. On this view, first, it can be argued that Maruyama wittingly distinguishes politics (seijigaku) from political science (seiji kagaku) – indeed, the expression of political science is nowadays regarded as the most general usage of it, but, strictly speaking, it is inappropriate to Maruyama’s view in the context, taking account of the academic situation of Japan in 1947 when he published the article. Second, although Tiedemann has translated ‘seiji no kagaku’ as ‘political science’ (1969c: 234; [1995c: 144]), it is a definite mistranslation, provided that for Maruyama it does not signify seiji kagaku, namely political science, but simply intends to distinguish ‘his seijigaku’, which Japanese scholarship in the field of politics should aim at, from seijigaku as an academic realm – it is oriented not to seiji kagaku but to genjitsu kagaku. Indeed, we run into great difficulties with the task of translating ‘seiji no kagaku’. For example, whether to translate ‘seiji no’ as ‘political’ – in this case, seiji no kagaku must be translated as ‘political science’ – or whether to employ ‘of’ – in this case, it is translated as ‘the science of politics’. Most problematically, in this sense, there is no English word that is the exact equivalent of the Japanese ‘no’, which is grammatically entitled as ‘joshi’ (rigorously speaking, ‘kaku joshi’) in Japanese – the English ‘of’ is not identical to the Japanese ‘no’. As a matter of fact, this evidence is quite important to the issue here, due to the fact that Maruyama in fact lays stress on the ‘seiji no’ of seiji no kagaku – this cannot be identified in the English translation (1969c: 234; [1995c: 144]). In short, it is definitely impossible to rigidly express the Japanese no in English – nor in German – especially in the above case, even though the English ‘of’ and the German ‘von’ – and der and des as well – can occasionally contribute to an understanding of the meaning of the Japanese word.

Apart from this issue, there exist other kinds of terms equivalent to the Japanese seijigaku in both English and German, the English discipline of ‘political studies’, which is generally distinguished from political science, the German politische Wissenschaft, Politologie and Politikwissenschaft, all of which are very often used in the German context (Berg-Schlosser and Stammen 2003: 1-2; cf. Patzelt 2007: 19). To be sure, it is true that the English term political studies is handy for avoiding implying the US-based political science, but it is equally true that it seems to intend the British discipline of politics. Also, the above German terms might be helpful in drawing some kind of distinction – there is nonetheless no clear distinction between them in the sense of some special implications (Berg-Schlosser and Stammen 2003: 1-2).

42 In spite of my negative view on value neutrality, as far as Ono is concerned, I am wholly respectful of his reflective attitude towards his lectures and studies (2005: 231-3). Rather, he should be regarded as a historian in the sense that he recognises himself as a scholar of the ‘history of political thought’ (seiji shisōshi) (2005: 232).
APPENDIX 2

Psychoanalytic Meanings of Narcissism

1. The Derivation of Narcissism

The term narcissism is derived from psychiatry in the broad sense. According to Kenneth N. Levy et al., this term, originating in the German form, was first used by the German sexologist Paul Näcke in 1899 (2011: 4). Thereafter, it was developed into a psychiatric theory – rigorously speaking, into a psychoanalytic theory – by Otto Rank, Sigmund Freud, Heinz Kohut, and so on. However, the word, which gives us a mythical impression, requires that I should provide a detailed explanation of the derivation of the term on the grounds that the evolutionary process of the term is extremely complicated.

The myth of Narcissus

The concept of narcissism has its roots in the ‘Narcissus story’, the classical mythology by the Roman poet Ovid’s Metamorphoses (e.g. Levy et al. 2011: 3-4; Jacoby 2010: 9-12). Narcissus was a young man at the centre of attention, whose beauty attracted people. The nymph Echo, one of those who fell in love with him, was a victim of Narcissus’ cruelty, which resulted in him being punished by the goddess of revenge Nemesis. This led Narcissus to ‘vainly reach out to embrace his own reflection’ (Holmes 2001: 3; emphasis added) mirrored in ‘a pool of water’ (Levy et al. 2011: 3); this triggered his abnormal narcissistic behaviour that he gazed away at his figure reflected on the surface of the water until his death.
This version of the tale, according to Levy et al., is the best-known story of narcissism, which best explains the essence of the evolution of the psychoanalytic concept. Interestingly, Ovid’s text contains three motifs: first, the prophecy of the blind seer Tiresias that ‘si se non noverit’, meaning that Narcissus will enjoy a long life so long as ‘he does not come to know himself’; second, the relationship between the myth of Narcissus and the fate of Echo; and third, the discrepancy between the descriptions of error and illusion and of recognition and acknowledgement, which depicts Narcissus’s reflection episode (Jacoby 2010: 9-12). One might be intrigued by the first motif, which elucidates the reason for the appearance of the arguments about a ‘modified treatment for pathological narcissism’ raised by important psychoanalysts nowadays, as Levy et al. put it (2011: 3-4). In addition, it is noted that there are other types of myth of Narcissus apart from Ovid’s version. My survey, however, does not conduct any further investigation into some other versions of the myth. My aim is not to describe a historical evolution of the mythology. I must proceed to tackle the next issue of the derivation of narcissism as a psychoanalytic term.

Narcissism as a term

As mentioned above, Näcke first used the term narcissism (the German ‘Narcismus’). According to Levy et al., the British sexologist-physician Havelock Ellis first employed the myth of Narcissus to describe an ‘autoerotic sexual condition’ explaining ‘human sexuality’ (2011: 4). Here I draw attention to Ellis’s expression of ‘Narcissus-like’ provided in his ‘Auto-Eroticism: A Psychological Study’ (1898), which denotes the ‘sexual emotions to be absorbed, and often entirely lost, in self-admiration’ (2011: 4). After Ellis had introduced the myth to his psychiatric enquiry in his work ‘Die Sexuellen Perversitäten in der Irrenanstalt’ (1899), Näcke developed Ellis’s idea into a more accessible style by applying the term ‘Narcismus’, meaning that ‘the self is treated as a sexual object’; this word contributed to his study of autoeroticism (2011: 4). Likewise, in his famous work Zur Einführung des Narzißmus (On Narcissism: An Introduction) (1914), Freud gave a slightly different account of the terminological development of narcissism. So let us look at his work by focusing on some different points of it below.

In his ‘On Narcissism’, Freud also explained that the name of narcissism was provided by Näcke in 1899. In 1920, however, Freud added a footnote in his paper, ‘Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality’ (1905), in order to modify his previous view of the terminological derivation of narcissism. In this new footnote revising the preceding view, he commented that the term was devised not by Näcke but by Ellis, and his previous account thereby resulted in being
rejected (Freud 2001b: 218, n. 3). I am intrigued and also irritated by this point because, if his account was true, then mine would have to be revised. However, we do not have to be annoyed by his modification, taking account of the following evidence presented by the editor of the writings of Freud The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud – abbreviated to SE below – which completely supports my view:

Ellis himself . . . subsequently (1928) wrote a short paper in which he corrected Freud’s correction and argued that the priority should in fact be divided between himself and Näcke, explaining that the term ‘narcissus-like’ had been used by him in 1898 as a description of a psychological attitude, and that Näcke in 1899 had introduced the term ‘Narcismus’ to describe a sexual perversion (Freud 2001c: 73, n. 1).

The validity of Freud’s correction to his preceding view in 1920 is called into question by this description identical to my view. In other words, Freud’s view is rejected by the crucial evidence that Ellis himself claimed that Näcke first applied the term. Despite his wrong way of understanding, however, it is possible to think that, if Freud’s intention had been to explain not the term but the concept of narcissism, namely the ‘introduction of the Narcissus myth’, then his view would have undoubtedly been acceptable.

Let us get back on track. Narcismus put forward by Näcke, as we have seen, was further developed by psychoanalysts. Between 1908 and 1910, a colleague of Freud’s, the Austrian psychoanalyst Isidor Sadger, divided the concept up into two types; first, the normal forms of ‘egoism’ and ‘self-love’; second, the pathological forms based on ‘overvaluation’ and ‘overinvestment’ (Levy et al. 2011: 4). In addition, one of the most famous colleagues of Freud’s, the Austrian psychoanalyst Otto Rank, defined narcissism as a ‘vanity’ and ‘self-admiration’, which do not necessarily sexually but defensively fulfils their functions in the work Der Doppelgänger: Eine psychoanalytische Studie (The Double: A Psychoanalytic Study) (1914), after having written the first psychoanalytic essay on narcissism ‘Ein Beitrag zum Narzissimus’ (A Contribution to Narcissism) (1911). In the same year, in ‘On Narcissism’ Freud pointed out that, ‘[n]arcissism . . . would not be a perversion, but the libidinal complement to the egoism of the instinct of self-preservation, a measure of which may justifiably be attributed to every living creature’ (2001c: 73-4). Freud’s account of narcissism, as Levy et al. put it, varied between ‘sexual perversion and quality of primitive thinking’ and ‘self-esteem’ (2011: 4). I shall later conduct a survey of the psychoanalytic concept of narcissism.

Let us focus on the appearance of the term narcissism. In 1898 Ellis had first adopted the Narcissus myth to psychiatric studies in the form of ‘Narcissus-
like’, and in 1899 Näcke transformed it into the German Narcismus. However, the later direction of the evolution of the term has remained unclear in my discussion. Indeed, it is made clear that Freud employed the term ‘Narzißmus’ (Narzißmus) in his ‘On Narcissism’ – the German title is ‘Zur Einführung des Narzißmus’ – but it is not yet clear who finally transformed it into the present forms, the English ‘narcissism’ and the German ‘Narzißmus’.

The complexity of my enquiry is obviously triggered by the two derivations of the terms in English and German, as exemplified by the fact that Ellis was a British psychiatrist, and that Näcke was a German one. For this reason, they carried out their studies in their respective languages, English and German, and it can be argued that this fact leads us to have difficulty in explaining the terminological enquiry. In addition, it is noted that the following interesting piece of data regarding its theme might seem to spoil my view:

Actually, the term narcissism was introduced into psychoanalysis in 1908 by Sadger, for which Freud gave him due credit. Rank, too, wrote on the subject (Rank, 1911, vol. 3: 401-26) (Jacoby 2010: 249, n. 2).

If this was true, then my discussion would go to waste. However, I do not think so because, as noted above, there are two language contexts in the terms narcissism and Narzissmus. In short, with regard to Mario Jacoby’s view neither Sadger nor Freud nor Rank, all of whom worked in Austria, generally conducted their research in English. In relation to their works my discussion raised, their important writings were all written and published in German. How, then, should we consider the above evidence? Perhaps it is better to divide the issue up into two language contexts, English and German, so that I can validly identify their respective derivations. As far as the German context is concerned, however, the editor of SE makes the issue more complex:

In his paper on Schreber (1911c), near the beginning of Section III, he [Freud] defends this form of the word on the ground of euphony against the possibly more correct ‘Narzissmus’ (2001c: 73, n. 1).

This solid evidence means that in the above essay Freud had already referred to Narzissmus before publishing his significant paper on narcissism; to be sure, this is an interesting fact amazing us. However, I am much more intrigued by the expression of ‘Narzissmus’. Nonetheless, we are not surprised at the word if we are aware that, in 1911 when Freud pointed out the above fact, Rank employed the unfamiliar form in his commemorative essay on narcissism, ‘Ein Beitrag zum Narzissmus’ (A Contribution to Narcissism).
However, I do not go on to carry out any further investigation which will be an extremely historical enquiry, for example, as to whether Rank actually referred to Freud in the above essay and vice versa, in relation to \textit{Narzissismus}. In addition, I do not have any further exploration of the issue due to the following two reasons: first, it is meaningless unless the issue is divided up into two language contexts, German and English; and second, in so far as narcissism is a translation of the German term (or terms), the enquiry as to who introduced the term depends heavily upon which German term is regarded as the general form of narcissism. Indeed, it might be argued that, as Jacoby says, Sadger introduced the term, considering that \textit{Narzissmus} is generally viewed as the general form equivalent to the English narcissism. How, then, should we count Näcke’s \textit{Narcismus}? Is it impossible to regard it as one type of narcissism as a word regardless of some possible grammatical problem? It is undoubtedly counted as the original version of narcissism. If so, why can’t we think of it as general? My answer is that there is not enough reason why we cannot think so, and that there is only the fact that in general a term gradually changes into a suitable form in accordance with necessity.

2. Narcissism as a psychoanalytic concept

Here I want to simply give a précis of the development of the concept of narcissism presented above. It can be validly argued that its summary is sufficient to gain an appropriate understanding of some reasons for the appearance of the term primarily in the field of psychoanalysis.

The early development

The first stage of the early development of narcissism, put forward by Ellis, meant an ‘autocratic sexual condition’ which was presented by the expression of ‘Narcissus-like’, whose sexual emotion is aimed only at ‘self-admiration’. Näcke, as noted above, inherited and elaborated Ellis’s idea by applying the term \textit{Narcismus}, which describes such an abnormal sexual condition as something that ‘the self is treated as a sexual object’. The second stage of the definitions of the concept, presented by Sadger and Rank, was what distinguished between normal and pathological narcissism, and what signified that narcissism is not necessarily a sexual emotion. The former scholar defined it as normal ‘egoism’ and ‘self-love’ and pathological ‘overvaluation of and overinvestment in one’s own body’. The latter presented the view that narcissism means ‘vanity’ and
‘self-admiration’, which do not necessarily function sexually. Next, Freud also participated in the argument of narcissism, publishing his famous article ‘On Narcissism’, which regarded narcissism as something that ‘consistently keep[s] out of awareness any information or feelings that would diminish one’s sense of self’ (Levy et al. 2011: 4). Freud’s view of narcissism, as noted earlier, consists of a variety of understandings, the ‘sexual perversion and quality of primitive thinking’, ‘a mode of object relationship’ and ‘self-esteem’. Although a variety of his views consistently defined narcissism not as a personality type or a personality disorder – which later came to existence – but as a process or a state, his complex understanding of narcissism caused significant confusion about what narcissism signifies. The third stage of the early evolution we have not yet seen is characterised by ‘pathological narcissism’ connected with the concept of ‘envy’. In 1913, the British psychoanalyst Ernest Jones defined narcissism as a mentality described as ‘aloof’, ‘inaccessible’, ‘self-admiring’, ‘self-important’ and ‘over-confident’, and as ‘omnipotence and omniscience’ (Levy et al. 2011: 5). In addition, in 1919 the German psychoanalyst Karl Abraham presented his theory of narcissism from the viewpoint of envy, which signifies a ‘contemptuous or hostile attitude toward love objects’ induced by the past disappointed experience (Levy et al. 2011: 5).

In sum, with the exception of the confusion caused by Freud the early stage of the evolution of narcissism is generally characterised by the distinction between normal and pathological narcissism and the difference between narcissism as a sexual emotion in the first stage and one as a variety of views. However, the concept did not consist of a sexual element since the second stage.

The stage of an individual personality or a character type and disorder

The first account of narcissism as a personality or a character trait, according to Levy et al., was provided by the Austrian psychoanalyst Robert Wälder in his article ‘The Psychoses: Their Mechanisms and Accessibility to Influence’ (1925), in which narcissism was defined as a ‘condescending’ attitude that is ‘pre-occupied with themselves and with admiration’, and that lacks empathy – interestingly, they point out that in 1931 Freud referred to Wälder and connected narcissism with ‘aggression’ in his ‘Libidinal Types’, focusing on the feature of ‘self-preservation’ (2011: 5). In addition, the famous Marxist psychoanalyst Wilhelm Reich, who was largely affected by Freud’s work presenting the above connection, proposed the ‘phallic-narcissist character’, which is characterised as the ‘phallus’ that is based on masculinity, and which is generally described as ‘self-confidence’, ‘arrogance’, ‘coldness’ and ‘aggressiveness’, in
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Character Analysis (1933). Since then, narcissism as a character trait has been explained by a number of well-known psychoanalysts.

The German-American psychoanalyst Karen Horney, for example, divided narcissism up into two types, ‘healthy self-esteem’ and ‘pathological narcissism’, in her work New Ways in Psychoanalysis (1939), defining narcissism as ‘aggressive-expansive’, ‘perfectionist’ and ‘arrogant vindictive types’ (Levy et al. 2011: 5). Not only did Horney contribute these distinctions to the theory of narcissism, but she also took the view that ‘narcissism should be restricted to unrealistic self-inflation’, and that narcissists are actually ‘unable to love anyone’ including themselves, as opposed to ‘self-love’, which had generally been considered as a narcissistic character trait (Levy et al. 2011: 5-6). With regard to the narcissistic self, the British psychoanalyst Donald W. Winnicott pointed out that a narcissist induces a ‘grandiose false self’; here he laid stress on his famous distinction between the ‘true and false self’ (1960) (Levy et al. 2011: 6). Annie Reich observed that narcissists are suffering from an ‘inability to regulate their self-esteem’ caused by ‘early traumatic experiences’ in ‘Pathologic Forms of Self-Esteem Regulation’ (1960), which highlighted the narcissistic character of the ‘repetitive and violent oscillations of self-esteem’ (Levy et al. 2011: 6).

According to Levy et al., in around the early 1960s narcissism appeared as a disorder. They observe that, in his Foundations of Psychopathology (1961), for example, the American psychiatrist John Case Nemiah put forward the term ‘narcissistic character disorder’, which shows narcissism to be a disorder (2011: 6). They also point out that, in his work ‘Borderline Personality Organization’ (1967), the Austrian-American psychoanalyst Otto F. Kernberg had employed the concept of ‘narcissistic personality structure’, which later the Austrian-American psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut called ‘narcissistic personality disorder’ on the one hand, and which contributed to the later distinction between normal and pathological narcissism on the other (2011: 6).

The above summary of narcissism as an individual personality type and disorder obviously complicates our understanding of the concept, and it therefore seems solely to contribute to increasing the complexity of the term. Indeed, there is no simple way of understanding the complex psychoanalytic term, but it is nonetheless possible to identify some characteristics of the complicated word. I will next summarise the primary points of issues of the concept of narcissism below, and my account can thereby make sense to readers who do not specialise in psychoanalysis – this is also much applicable to me.

Narcissism as a personality trait, as we have seen, was first defined as a ‘condescending attitude’ satisfying self-admiration without sufficient empathy (Wälder). Later, Freud also took part in this argument, connecting narcissism with aggression; narcissism, in his view, is based on ‘self-preservation’. Freud's
view of narcissism motivated W. Reich to describe the ‘phallic-narcissist character’. Thereafter, many theories of narcissism came out: for example, the distinction between ‘healthy self-esteem’ and ‘pathological narcissism’ (Horney), the ‘grandiose false self’ (Winnicott) and the ‘repetitive and violent oscillations of self-esteem’ (A. Reich). Next, narcissism as a disorder came out: ‘narcissistic character disorder’ (Nemiah), ‘narcissistic personality structure’ (Kernberg) and ‘narcissistic personality disorder’ (Kohut).

In short, we are aware that the above views of narcissism are all concerned with the distinction between normal and pathological. As we have seen, the way of understanding narcissism by distinguishing between these two meanings had already been seen in the early evolution; in this sense, it was not a new view of narcissism in particular. Nonetheless, it is noted that the above theorists’ views are undoubtedly more sophisticated than before. In addition, the fact that many theorists participated in the establishment of the theory of narcissism obviously contributed not only to the formulation of a variety of ways of understanding it but also to the identification of its primary issue. As far as my discussion is concerned, the primary point of the issue in this stage is obviously whether narcissism is counted as either a character trait or normal or pathological; that is whether it is considered as personality traits such as a condescending attitude and a phallic-narcissist character, or whether it is distinguished between healthy self-esteem and pathological narcissism and is therefore intrinsically pathological, or whether it is divided up into two types, namely healthy and pathological narcissism. Indeed, these issues are quite complicated, but main issues are confined to the above three points. On this view, it is noted that primarily these issues are concerned with and have been tackled as the distinction between ‘primary narcissism’ and ‘secondary narcissism’; that is to say, the former is normal and healthy, and the latter is unhealthy and pathological. Furthermore, as Levy et al. put it, although Kernberg and Kohut, both of whom have intrigued many scholars who are interested in narcissism, to some extent take different views of narcissism concerning what is counted as normal and pathological – for instance, while Kernberg regards ‘narcissist's grandiose self-representation’ as pathological, Kohut thinks of it as normal – it is obvious that both their ways of understanding narcissism are profoundly associated with the problem of the self: ‘Others are taken as extensions of the self’ (selfobject) (2011: 6-7). In this respect, the difference between their views of narcissism is not particularly important for me. Rather, I concern myself with the enquiry as to how the narcissistic self is related to others.

However, I will next see narcissism as a social phenomenon. Not only does this exploration contribute to a good understanding of the close relation between society and the individual from some psychoanalytic perspectives, but
much more importantly, it also provides a relevant illustration of how it is appropriate to apply the term narcissism to an analysis of society. I discuss the fundamental issue of how the narcissistic self is linked to others from Chapter 3 onwards.

The stage of a social phenomenon

Levy et al. point out that a great deal of interest in narcissism emerged in personality psychology and social theory at the same time. They first put emphasis on the name of Theodor W. Adorno, who introduced the term narcissism to an analysis of society to explain both individual and social phenomena. According to them, in the work ‘Sociology and Psychology’ (1968) Adorno employed the word for describing the ‘defensive management of weakness in the modern collective ego in the face of changing economic factors and industrialized structures’ (2011: 7). In addition, they point up Lasch’s ground-breaking work, The Culture of Narcissism, which observed a ‘compensatory self-preoccupation’ of American society as a whole (2011: 7). Their account, however, misses some important names in the field of the social sciences who contributed to describing narcissism as a social phenomenon, such as Erich Fromm and Charles Taylor, but they instead simply refer to an empirical research which proposed the diagnosis of a ‘societal epidemic narcissism’ (2011: 7).

To be sure, the above studies which concern themselves with narcissism provide a good explanation of the rise of interest in narcissism in the social sciences. It must be noted, however, that Levy et al.’s attention to the issue obviously lacks their account of the topic as a whole, even though they explain enough for their primary concern of individual psychology. In addition, it must be stressed that, in order to precisely know the meanings of narcissism at a social level, it is necessary to give a more detailed description from some different perspectives. In any case, most importantly, the primary object of my research is not individual psychology but social psychology in so far as my primary interest is not in individuals but rather in society in general. What is most important, nonetheless, is that the key concept connecting an individual to others and society is the self, which is profoundly associated with both the psychological studies noted above. For this reason, the concept of self carries its significance both to individual and social psychology.
Notes

1 As far as Levy et al.’s work is concerned, it could be argued that Havelock Ellis gave the name of narcissism in his ‘The Conception of Narcissism’ (1927). In this sense, I notice that it had taken quite a long time until the present English form of narcissism appeared since Näcke had first employed ‘Narcismus’ (on this German version of narcissism, I shall raise it later). However, there is some doubt about this view in the sense that, for example, the English term narcissism had already come into existence in the English version of Freud’s essay ‘On Narcissism’ published in 1925. The view that narcissism was introduced by Ellis, therefore, is not correct in the sense that, as we will see in more detail, Ellis’s ‘Narcissus-like’ was transformed into Narcismus by Näcke. On this view, the following sentence vouches for the validity of my view: ‘Ellis gives Näcke credit for appending the “-ism” that led to the eventual term narcissism (1927)’ (Levy et al. 2011: 4, n. 2). In this respect, it is plausible to think that the English term narcissism appeared in 1927.

2 I highly recommend Mario Jacoby’s work for a further enquiry into this theme (Jacoby 2010: 12-4).

3 This work was first translated into English by Cecil M. Baines in 1925 (Freud 2001c: 69, Editor’s note).

4 Freud says: ‘The term “narcissism” was not introduced, as I erroneously stated in that paper [‘On Narcissism’], by Näcke, but by Havelock Ellis’ (2001b: 218, n. 3).

5 In German context, Narzißmus has been old-fashioned, and Narzissmus is nowadays commonly used.

APPENDIX 3

The Political Theorist Shōzō Fujita:
From the Critique of the Tennō System
to the Critique of the Kōdo Seichō

This appendix aims to write a biography of the Japanese political theorist Shōzō Fujita (1927-2003) through focusing on his political activities and his struggle with reality. With respect to the person of Fujita, there are already some great works that precisely depict both the man and his intellectual activities (e.g. Iida 2006a, 2006b; Miyamura 2009 – in particular, Iida’s works describe Fujita’s theoretical activities including his bibliography in great detail). Unfortunately, however, there is no translation of Fujita’s writings, nor any work focusing on Fujita in English. This explains the need for a biography of him in English.

1. The early Fujita (zenki Fujita)

Shōzō Fujita was born in Ehime in Shikoku, ‘the fourth largest island in Japan’ (Iida 2006a: 252), on 17 September 1927. It is believed that, in the educational stage of the lower sixth form (kōkō ni-nen), Fujita already decided to go to the University of Tokyo (Tōkyō Daigaku) – often abbreviated to Tōdai – in order to study the ‘spiritual structure’ (seishin kōzō) of the Tennō system under Maruyama, on the grounds that he was particularly impressed by Maruyama’s essay ‘Gunkoku shihaisha no seishin keitai’ (Thought and Behaviour Patterns of Japan’s Wartime Leaders) (1949), which critically analysed the psychic disease of wartime Japan noted above (Iida 2006a: 253; Iida 2006b: 346). It is possible to anticipate the later birth of the political theorist (seiji rironka) Shōzō Fujita by
stressing this strong passion for studying politics on the basis of Maruyama’s research method.³

In 1950, Fujita actually started to study in the Faculty of Law at the University of Tokyo – in July of this year, the Korean War began. In 1952, as per his wishes, he was allowed to participate in Maruyama’s seminar, and studied the method of the history of political thought with the use of the English text Ideology and Utopia (1936 [1929]) by Karl Mannheim. In 1953, Fujita graduated from the university and started to work in the Faculty of Law at Hosei University (Hosei Daigaku Hōgakubu), where he lectured on the history of Japanese politics (Nihon seijishi). In the same year, as noted above, he wrote his first article ‘Tennōsei’ printed in The Lexicon of Politics (Seigakku jiten) (1954) on behalf of Maruyama due to a relapse of his tuberculosis. Iida precisely depicts Fujita’s research aim at this time – here Iida’s sentences are cited again although they were already partly quoted above: ‘Fujita’s subject of research in the postwar period designated as his starting point of forming his thought was . . . to construct the adequate logic that blows a hole in the “state of the Tennō system” in prewar and wartime Japan (and the society of the Tennō system), which led this country to destructive militarism and fascism on the grounds that the people got carried away (yarikirenai) with the specific mood of the whole nation, by finding out the logical essence of the system and by objectifying the whole structure’ (2006a: 255). It is presumed that this theme became the fundamental basis of his study thereafter. In fact, the subject of his early masterwork, ‘Tennōsei kokka no shihai genri’ (The Principles of Rule of the State of the Tennō System) (1956), captures the essence of the Tennō system. It claims,

The absolutist Tennō system (Tennōsei zettaishugi) enabled the arbitrary and absolute manner of action to permeate every aspect of society, paradoxically, not by carrying absolutist power (kenryoku zettaishugi) throughout society; it thereby succeeded in laying the incomparable and solid foundations of an absolutist system (zettaishugi taikei) (Fujita 1998a: 48).

The 1956 declaration that ‘it is no longer “postwar”’ (mohaya sengo de wa nai) by Keizai Hakusho (Economic White Paper of Japan), which aimed at ‘Japan’s economic growth and modernisation’ (Nihon keizai no seichō to kindaika), and which meant the transition from the postwar period to the ‘high growth’ (Kōdo Seichō) period, signified the ‘departure from the “postwar”’ (sengo e no ketsuetsu) and the experience of ‘intellectual conversion (tenkō) stemming from the despair of radicalism in the postwar era’; this denoted the necessity of reflecting upon ‘postwar’ (sengo) and ‘prewar’ (senzen) Japan, which gave rise to another essential reflection of ‘modern Japan’ (kindai Nihon) (Iida 2006a: 256-7). As Iida
puts it, ‘the period from 1956 to 1959 marked a huge turning point for intellectuals in postwar Japan (sengo chishikijin)’ (2006a: 256).

In 1960, Fujita, in conjunction with Maruyama and other Japanese intellectuals, was actively involved in the ‘the Anti-Security Treaty Struggle of 1960’ (Anpo Tōsō) – the latter Japanese term will primarily be used below – which was organised on the grounds that Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi at the time concluded the ‘US-Japan Security Treaty’ (the 1960 Anpo) on 19 January, which was finally approved by the House of Representatives on 20 May of the same year. Through taking part in this political activity, Fujita contributed several writings on those political events such as: ‘Tokkenteki chishikijin e no yōsei: Arata na kōdō no jihatsuteki soshiki wo’ (An Appeal to Privileged Intellectuals: Towards Establishing Voluntary Associations Aiming for New Politics) (1960) printed in The University of Tokyo Newspaper (Tōkyō Daigaku Shimbun), which encouraged students at the University of Tokyo to try to get rid of ‘Tōdai’ as a ‘school for bureaucrats’ (kanryō yōseijo) that cultivated a sense of perquisite and to transform the university into a ‘place of genuine and authentic scholarship’ (junsui na gakumon no fu) (Fujita 1998b: 183); ‘6/15 jiken, ryūketsu no kachū kara: Kono me de mita keisatsu kenryoku no bōryoku’ (The Front Line of Defence Against Violence and Bloodshed in the 6/15 Incident: The Truth of the Violence of Police Authority) (1960), which, as an actual document of the 6/15 Incident, was contributed to Asahi Journal; and ‘Shaku-shaku daiji wo eien ni hakaran: Kikyō gakusei S-kun e no tegami’ (On the Basis of Common Sense: A Letter to Mr S, Students in Favour of Their Home Villages) (1960) – abbreviated to ‘Shaku-shaku’ below – printed in the monthly journal Sekai, a speculative article that imitated a letter for ‘students in favour of their home villages’ (kikyō gakusei), and that aimed at discussing ‘jinmin-shugi’ – although this can be translated as ‘people-ism’ in which politics is based on the principles of Fujita’s theory of ‘sovereignty of the people’ (jinmin shuken), the Japanese term will primarily be used below – with the students (Fujita 1998b: 220). These facts elucidate the person of Fujita who did not always closet himself in his study but sometimes actually took part in political activity. In fact, he formulated his theory through these political practices. As Iida puts it, ‘Fujita’s basic position at the time was to seek to find out the conditions (possibilities) for establishing the principles of “sovereignty of the people” – the conditions of “democratisation” (minshuka) – through reflecting upon and identifying a new political situation brought about on “19 May 1960’ – abbreviated to the ‘5/19’ below – with the past situation, in which the original individual freedom and the sense of “natural rights” (shizenken) came into existence from the “state of nature” (shizen jyōtai) without a state (kokka izen) – a “tabula rasa” (hakushi) – under the conditions that the people had to live in the “burnt-out ruins and the black

The above description clearly explains that Fujita was not a scholar who was simply satisfied with speculative, empirical and positive theories. Rather, his stance was characterised as the complete opposite of the habitual scholarly styles, and required observing practice, collecting experience, achieving ‘perspective upon [his] own society’ and ‘appraising the importance of what had been observed in the light of what was known’ (Wolin 1968a: 319; emphases added). In this respect, he is regarded exactly as a theorist in the original Greek sense. In fact, his theory of ‘primordial man’ (Ur mensch, genjin), whose standpoint was first provided in his interview ‘Zero kara no shuppatsu’ (Start from Scratch) (1960), was advanced through actually observing, experiencing and appraising the political movement, the Anpo Tōsō, particularly through focusing on the 5/19. Fujita says:

I believe that in the spiritual dimension the Anpo Tōsō was constituted by the social conditions of the black market, that is by the characteristics of primordial man (genjin-sei) in postwar Japan. Almost all the people in Japan have been living through the market. This way of life has given them the prototype of the character features. There is the living spirit claiming the right to live outside the law represented as the natural rights in them (Fujita, Tanikawa, Tsurumi and Yoshimoto 2006: 132).

As Iida clearly mentions, ‘after the Anpo Tōsō, Fujita fell into “despair” (zetsubō) particularly after the 1960s, during the age of “high economic growth” (kōdo keizai seichō)’ (2006a: 260). However, it is possible to believe that, in the early 1960s, he still retained his strong interest in actual politics. In fact, Fujita actively contributed some politically-charged works which show that he was a political activist and theorist: for example, ‘Nihon ni okeru futatsu no kaigi’ (The Two Kinds of Discussions of Japan) (1960) – abbreviated to ‘Futatsu no kaigi’ below – which warned against the Japanese ‘gossip session model of existing primarily to meet and talk’ (hanashiai-shugi), and, at the same time, which tried to design the ‘principles of genuine and authentic discussion’ (ikita kaigi); ‘Tōjisha yūi no genri: Terorizumu to shihaisha e no kōgi’ (Towards the Principles Based on Persons Concerned: A Protest Against an Act of Terrorism and Rulers’ Attitude) (1961) – abbreviated to ‘Tōjisha’ below – which was aimed at protesting against an act of terrorism, the “Shimanaka Incident” (Shimanaka jiken), and against Japan’s rulers’ and conservative thinkers’ attitude towards it’ (1998b: 267), and at applying the ‘principles based on “persons concerned” (tōjisha)’; ‘jiyū kara no tōbō hihan’ (The Criticism of Behaviour of Escape from Freedom) (1962) – abbreviated to ‘Tōbō hihan’ below – which cri-
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Shōzō Fujita criticised a compromise solution adopted by Shisō no Kagaku Kenkyūkai (Research Association for the Science of Thought) towards ‘Shisō no Kagaku Incident’ (Shisō no Kagaku jiken) provoked by Chūkōron-sha (Chūkōron Publishing Company), and which called for ‘civil liberties’ (shimin-teki jiyū).

At this point it is interesting to note that all the above three works published after the Anpo Tōsō are more theoretical than his other writings previously published while taking a more strong position of ‘protest’ and ‘criticism’. Perhaps this is profoundly associated with Fujita’s more sophisticated theoretical view of politics which was taken particularly since ‘Shaku-shaku’, in which, as noted above, Fujita provided the essential framework of his theory of ‘sovereignty of the people’. In fact, his article “5/19” zenshi’ (The History of the Preceding Period of the 5/19) (1960) published just after ‘Shaku-shaku’ presented a more precise view of his conception of the people. As Fujita writes, ‘nations (kokumin) mean the people (jinmin) who are willing to be nations (kokumin) and those who formulate a theory for their nation (kuni)’ (Fujita 1998b: 245). Significantly, this implies that Fujita recognised that the ‘autonomous subjects’ (jiritsuteki shutai) came into being in the 5/19.

For these reasons, it should be considered that all of the above three works, ‘Futatsu no kaigi’, ‘Tōjisha’ and ‘Tōbō hihan’, as well as the above two works, ‘Shaku-shaku’ and “5/19” zenshi’, were intended particularly as a theoretical process of establishing his theory of sovereignty of the people. For instance, ‘Tōjisha’ suggested the direction that postwar Japan should have taken in the light of the experience of Shimana Incident, entertaining Fujita’s hopes of laying the foundations of the principles of sovereignty of the people:

There is still no sovereign spirit (shukensha no seishin) in most of the people (kokumin) of this county. In principle, however, it must be built, and they would be the people (Nihon kokumin) who accomplish this objective in the future, when necessary. It is believed that the Constitution requires that they should do so, and I hope that they will complete the task (1998b: 285-6).

Here it is possible to see an adequate image of a political theorist who sought to find out what politics ought to be through political practice. In this period, in addition, he published some significant writings such as ‘Atarashii seijiteki shutai no shutsugen’ (The Emergence of New Political Subjects) (1962), which also constructed his theory of sovereignty of the people, and ‘Gendai ni okeru “risei” no kaifuku’ (The Restoration of Reason in Contemporary Times) (1962) – abbreviated to ‘“Risei” no kaifuku’ below – which provided his essential theoretical stance on the political situation in terms of philosophical thought.

It is noted, however, that there was a gradual change in Fujita’s state of mind.
at this time. An opportunity of changing his mind was provided, as Iida says, by ‘the fact that Fujita’s “disappointment at defeat in the Anpo Tōsō” (anpo zukare) had a lasting effect on him’, that is to say, ‘the experience of the “defeat in the Anpo” (haiboku) and “high growth” (Kōdo Seichō), while society gradually underwent a radical transformation of culture and spirit . . . , crushed his “hopes” (kibō) based on the sole possibility of restoring society in postwar Japan, and it rather led him to start to seek a way of more radical “restoration” (saisei) by keeping himself within the “disappointment” (shitsubō)’ (2006a: 263). From this perspective, Fujita’s masterworks, ‘Puroretaria minshushugi no genkei: Rēnin no shisō kōzō’ (The Principles of Proletarian Democracy: Lenin’s Spiritual Structure) (1964), ‘Gensho-teki jōken’ (The Primordial Conditions) (1964) and ‘Jinmin shuken no seishinteki ichijyōken’ (A Spiritual Condition of the Sovereignty of the People) (1964) – abbreviated to ‘Jinmin shuken’ below – all of which were published after his silence for one and a half years, are regarded precisely as ‘the declaration of his new start’ (Iida 2006b: 364).

In the middle 1960s, just when Japan was in the midst of strong economic growth and the Vietnam War was heating up, Fujita’s series of works ‘Ishin no seishin’ (The Spirit of the Meiji Restoration) (1965) began to be published. As Iida puts it, the work ‘aimed to see the driving force of reform by shining a light on the fact that the “unbiased and impartial style of argument, behaviour and solidarity” (ōgi, ōkō, ōketsu), signifying the new “spirit of the Meiji Restoration” (Ishin no seishin), came into existence from the old regime’ (Iida 2006a: 263; cf. Fujita 1997c: 1-43). However, here I am intrigued primarily by Fujita’s ‘15 August statement’, which was issued in 1965, while he was writing the article ‘Rondan ni okeru chiteki taihai’ (Intellectual Decay in Discourse) and the interview conducted by Sekai ‘Betonamu shinryaku hantai undō no hitotsu no jiko ninshiki’ (A View on the Anti-Vietnam War Movement), both of which raised the politically-charged topic of US military intervention in Vietnam. I will first quote the statement, and then consider it briefly below – although it consists of relatively long sentences, its entirety is cited, so we can be aware that he consistently concerned himself with the same issue after his first work.

Declaration:

On 15 August 1945, the whole world brought an end to World War II, which produced tens of millions of casualties, and which left the basis for human life in ruins, defeating fascism and militarism. It was an epoch-making day in world history. For us, the people of Japan (Nihon kokumin), in particular, that revolutionary day, bringing about a considerable change in social values, marked a starting point for nationwide reflection (kokuminteki hansei).

Today, going back to our first objective twenty years ago, we who are gathering together at Kudan Kaikan hall (Kudan Kaikan) appeal vigorously to the people (kokumin): first, that
we resolve on making utmost efforts to realise the principles of fundamental human rights (kihonteki jinken) and unarmed neutrality (hibusō) under the Constitution; second, that in the global community we assign maximum value to equal rights for and independence of people in the world, and oppose all uses of military force endangering the dignity based on this first principle. On the basis of these principles, then, we appeal for the following necessity for the US and Japan concerning the present political situation: first, to leave the fate of resolving the political conflict over Vietnam in the hands of the Vietnamese people on the grounds that we protest against the US military intervention in the country; second, to resume diplomatic relations with China, and to bring it into the fold of the international community; and third, to put an end to all of Japan’s policies harmful to the unification of Korea.

It goes without saying that for twenty years the people of Japan have made a tireless effort to realise democracy (minshushugi) and to achieve lasting peace (heiwa) up until now. To be sure, therefore, we have yielded valuable results. At the same time, however, it is observed that we have constantly experienced political resistance to this attempt. We have a challenging task ahead of us. V-J Day is not yet over; it has been twenty years. We the People hereby pledge to continue unremittingly with our efforts to realise the universal value shared by all humanity (jinrui kyōtsū no mokuteki), represented by fundamental human rights and freedom of all the people in the world, together with them.

Tokyo, 15 August 1965
(1998c: 714-5)

We are well aware that this description captures the essence of the early Fujita. First of all, the above statement overlaps with the essential standpoint of the early Fujita: first, that it ‘construct[s] the adequate logic that blows a hole in the “state of the Tennō system” in prewar and wartime Japan (and the society of the Tennō system), which led this country to destructive militarism and fascism . . . by finding out the logical essence of the system and by objectifying the whole structure’ (Iida 2006a: 255); and second, that it ‘seek[s] to find out the conditions (possibilities) for establishing the principles of “sovereignty of the people” – the conditions of “democratisation” (minshuka) – through reflecting upon and identifying a new political situation brought about on the “5/19” in 1960 with the past situation, in which the original individual freedom and the sense of the “natural rights” came into existence from the “state of nature” without a state – a “tabula rasa” – under the conditions that the people had to live in the “burnt-out ruins and the black market” since “V-J Day” in 1945’ (Iida 2006a: 259). In addition, it is understood that his ‘tireless effort(s)’ (fudan no doryoku) regarded as the process of advancing his theory of ‘sovereignty of the people’ faced ‘political resistance to [his] attempt’ (doryoku wo habami samatageru seijiteki dōkō), which presumably signifies, for example, the direction of the Anpo and the Kōdo Seichō determined exactly by politics. For Fujita, perhaps, the ‘first objective’ (shoshin) must also have meant his decision to study the ‘spiritual
structure’. In sum, it can be argued that these attitudes to the ‘postwar’, namely his fundamental principles that had been consistently retained since his first objective, were methodologically applied to his position on actual politics represented by the Vietnam War. In particular, the three principles of ‘sovereignty of the people’ (kokumin shuken), ‘fundamental human rights’ (kihonteki jinken) and ‘pacifism’ (heiwa-shugi), which the ‘Constitution of Japan (Nihonkoku kenpō) requires, must have reminded him of his theory of ‘sovereignty of the people’ based on the autonomy of the people and the ‘principles of universal value of human beings’ (fuhen ningenteki kihan-shugi) on the basis of ‘fundamental rights’ (kihonken) guaranteed by ‘common sense’ (komon sensu). For these reasons, it must be stressed that Fujita’s 8/15 declaration is of huge significance for his early work.

Since the statement, Fujita went into his silence again after having issued ‘‘Shingi’ ni tsuite’ (On Decision-Making) (1965). As Iida puts it, ‘it is believed that at the time Fujita internally philosophised in a deep trough, as seeking for a new direction of his study as later suggested by “Itanron danshō” (The Writings, vol. 10: Political Fragments of Unorthodoxy) which was to be written next spring (1967)’ (2006a: 266). Under this state of mind, he left for the UK for his study in 1967.

2. The later Fujita (kōki Fujita)

Fujita, after having returned to Japan from the UK, showed a significant change in his work in the sense that it is believed that in those days there was a perceptible change in his sense of ‘despair’ of theory and practice (Iida 2006a: 346-7; cf. Iida, Miyamura and So 1998: 446-7). In this respect, it is possible to assume that the two years’ duration between 1967 and 1969 when he studied in Sheffield and Oxford marked his huge turning point in his career, as a result of his new experience and encounter with new things subsequent to the above crucial event. This is largely explained by the fact that this new attitude towards reality brought about new methods of exposing his state of despair as the ‘criticism of contemporary times’ (jidai hihan) and analysing the ‘spiritual structure’ of society that prevents the people seeing politics as the basis of the principle of sovereignty of the people. In fact, after having returned from the UK, Fujita first published an interview entitled ‘‘Kōdo Seichō’ hantai’ (A Protest Against ‘High Growth’) (1969) – abbreviated to ‘Kōdo Seichō’ below – in which he first bitterly opposed ‘society nudging itself towards ‘high growth’’. (Iida 2006a: 266). His stance on reality in this work is clearly described by his
words: ‘only those who learn the lessons of history can make progress (shinpo)’ (1998c: 8; emphasis added).

This evidence, then, accounts to a certain extent for his significant change. Iida clearly describes Fujita’s state of mind at this time, broaching the subject of the work ‘Jiyū kō’ (On Liberty) published in the following year (1970) after publishing ‘Kōdo Seichō’: ‘“Jiyū kō” shows that “high growth” was produced by the full of energy of free competition edging out one’s rivals under the conditions of being jostled by the crowds, and that it was leading society to be on “the cutting edge” (saisentan) of Joan Robinson’s “new mercantilism” . . . on the basis of the historical conditions of the country of “the absence of the constitution (kōkyō seido) guaranteeing human rights” and “the lack of capacity for autonomously establishing a social order based on freedom by way of bottom-up decision making (shita kara)”. High growth in its developmental process dashed Fujita’s “hopes” of laying the foundations of the principles of “sovereignty of the people” brought about by the “state of nature” coming into being soon after WWII’ (2006a: 267). Obviously, this description shows a marked change in his position on and understanding of reality. As we shall see, in this respect, it is evident that the above fact, that his ‘hopes’ gradually faded, had a profound effect on his later works. For this reason, it appears that, from then on, Fujita did not tackle any topics of actual politics. As noted above, however, it must be stressed that he consistently retained his essential standpoint of analysing a spiritual structure in his later works. Rather, it seems to me that the indispensable device for him was more sophisticated, particularly as a result of a ‘methodological change’ (hōhōteki sai-shuppatsu) (Miyamura 2009: 194-9).

Fujita left his academic job in 1971 on the grounds that ‘he was no longer able to stand the situation of holding his privileged position of “professor” (kyōju) constituting the fabricated university system under the conditions of “intellectual decay” (chiteki taihai) based on “high growth”’ (Iida 2006a: 269). This gives a clear indication of his outlook on reality at the time. During 1968 and 1969, ‘university troubles’ (daigaku funsō) burgeoned in many universities in Japan. Perhaps this extremely violent behaviour in the place of the university must also have constituted a major factor in leading Fujita to take the decision to hand in his resignation as a professor in addition to the ‘intellectual decay’ induced by the Kōdo Seichō, whose act contributed to spoiling his aim of realising ‘democracy in postwar Japan’ (sengo minshushugi), namely Fujita’s jinmin-shugi. From this perspective, it is not surprising that he did not return to his old place of work for nine years.

In 1980, Fujita returned to his work. It is noteworthy, however, that he continued to publish his articles during these nine years. His activities during that
time give the impression of being more active in writing than before, as far as the number of essays issued during the period is concerned. It is presumed that during this time Fujita had already restored his energy by repairing the damage done to his intellect by his sense of despair, which was replaced with his ‘new intellectual movement’ (atarashii seishin no undō) (Iida 2006a: 270). Seishinshi-teki kōsatsu (Reflections on Intellectual History) (1982) – abbreviated to Kōsatsu below – is undoubtedly one of the works illustrating this restoration. In fact, all the writings printed in this book were written between 1975 and 1981, when he did not officially belong to any university, with the exception of 1980 and 1981. This demonstrates why the work is described as the ‘memorial work’ created as a result of reaching a peak of his spiritual movement, ‘signifying the birth of “the world of Shōzō Fujita”’ (Iida 2006a: 330). In addition, Iida clearly describes Fujita’s intention of this significant work as follows: ‘Perhaps Fujita intended not only Burckhardt’s Reflections on World History (Sekaishi-teki kōsatsu) but also Dilthey’s and Simmel’s ‘intellectual history’ (Geistesgeschichte) by the title of “Seishinshi-teki kōsatsu” (Reflections on Intellectual History). It is most likely, however, that the title, aimed at putting forward his position and method, represented a radical departure from a passing fad for the “history of ideas” (shisōshi būmu) that existed in the publishing industry of the country from the late 1960s to the early 1970s. In other words, he definitely avoided having some kind of sale of thoughts (shisō) for a liberal arts education (kyōyōshugiteki shisō asari) in a department store providing history (rekishi) as commercial products (shōhin) in which ready-made thoughts (sho-shisō) are displayed, and in which readers, as customers, find a favourite. In short, it can be argued that Fujita sought to discover the method of illuminating the essence of history by shining a light on the transformation of the living spirit (ikita seishin), creating himself and things – particularly on the historical significance of decline (hōkai) and fall (botsuraku) – through encountering many different kinds of facets and through responding to and communicating with the world’ (2006a: 331). The ‘living spirit’ (Dem lebendigen Geist), on which Fujita laid great stress, probably best explains his fundamental position articulated particularly after his ‘pause’ (rōnin) (Iida 2006a: 270), that is since his ‘methodological change’. In other words, this concept elucidating the transformation of the living spirit sheds light on the reason why the spirit regarded as the subject of history changed itself by itself. In addition, Fujita’s emphasis on the essence of the notion accounts for the reason why, exactly from then on, he focused all his attention on another concept of ‘experience’. That is to say, the ‘transformation of the living spirit ... creating himself and things’ captures the essence of experience in this sense, which requires ‘encountering many different kinds of facets and . . . responding to and communicating with the world’. Here we perceive that his attention to
the concept of experience, meaning the ‘communication between the world and a spirit’ (sekai to seishin to no ōtō) (Iida 2006a: 332), became his new method based on analysing a ‘spiritual structure’.

It is also important to note that Fujita’s style of criticising contemporary times noted above represents another important aspect of the above significant book. The primary subject of the work, showing the new phenomenon of the ‘loss of experience’ (keiken no sōshitsu), was undoubtedly also aimed at criticising the Kōdo Seichō that prevented people encountering the ‘substance of things’ (honrai-teki na mono), and, at the same time, that spoilt his hopes of establishing jinmin-shugi based on his theory of sovereignty of the people. In the chapter ‘Aru sōshitsu no keiken: Kakurenbō no seishinshi’ (The Experience of Deprivation: An Intellectual History of Hide-and-Seek) (1981), Fujita claims:

It is quite natural that the ‘new mercantilism’ (shin jyūshōshugi), which requires making money hand over fist, should take a heavy toll on society, and that ‘high-growth economy’ (seichō keizai) should come at the cost of social foundations, as explained by the law of costs, that profit comes at the expense of something – we cannot have it all. This results in our forgetting what economic activity is for when distracted by increases in wages, unless well aware of what has been lost; due to moneymaking, in that case, we are bound to lose a set of values and the criteria of our way of life. This is the exact nihilism of the new mercantilism (Fujita 1997d: 11-2).

Significantly, these words elucidate Fujita’s fundamental stance on the Kōdo Seichō. According to him, contemporary times characterised as the ‘world surrounded by finished products’ (seihin bunka no sekai) (1997d: 7), above all, have brought about the ‘loss of experience’ (keiken no shōmetsu) (e.g. 1997d: 17; 1997e: 15) by way of ‘rationalising without reason’ (risei naki gōrika),16 which was particularly highlighted in an introduction to Chosakushū 5: Seishinshi-teki Kōsatsu, ‘Shinpin bunka: Jōshō ni kaete’ (The World Surrounded by Finished Products: As an Introduction to the Writings vol. 5, Seishinshi-teki kōsatsu) (1981). For Fujita, in other words, the Kōdo Seichō was the world in which everything was bound to be rationalised by ‘given alternatives to experience’ (sekkeisaretakenokeno daiyōhin) instead of by reason (1997e: 10):

today’s finished products (kanseihin) and completed devices, which have transformed the human capacity for imagination (sōzōryoku), are all produced in accordance with the ‘deductive-nomological model’ (gōhōsokutekinakata) . . . Products (seihin), in this way, embody rationality (gōrisei). The embodiment of rationality means, therefore, exactly that finished goods (seihin) completely rob the human mind of reason. Commodities produced (seihin) come into existence from the absorption of things (mono) into reason, and ‘rationalisation’ (gōrika) as the finished reification (busshōka) of reason is completed when products (buppin) completely deprive man of reason (1997d: 3; emphasis added).
In his view, as shown above, the direction of the Kōdo Seichō exactly meant the last process of decline, and resulted in fall. That is to say, in his later work ‘Kon’ni”chī no keiken: Habamu chikara no naka ni atte’ (Experience in These Days: What Prevents Us Experiencing?) (1982), as Fujita put it, ‘we are living through the last experience (saigo no keiken), meaning the loss of experience (keiken no shōmetu)’ (1997e: 15). This is why he took the methodological style of the ‘chronological history of decline’ (hōkaishi) in Kōsatsu (1997d: iii). In these respects, the ‘world surrounded by finished products’ (shinpin bunka) denotes the last phase of history.

Not only did Fujita advance a new method and criticise the contemporary way of life in his ‘memorial work’, but he also tried to give society some possible remedies for ‘rationalising without reason’ through reflecting upon the history of decline. He suggested some of them by applying several important concepts of intersubjectivity (sōgo shutaisei), a ‘sense of minority spirit’ (seishin no yatōsei) and Walter Benjamin’s ‘Untergang zum Grund’ (kiso ni made tassuru botsuraku, to perish) – the German original will be used below – in conjunction with his essential conception of ‘experience’. According to him, combining some possibilities for our capacity for imagination, plenty of scope for reason and the intersubjectivity of experience, all of which have nowadays shrunk to insignificance, we should devote ourselves to completing this task so as to direct the fragmentary combination amongst them against ‘rationalising without reason’. . . . only . . . a sense of minority spirit, keeping a sceptical attitude, has potential for designing the originality of experience (seisei keiken), revival (saisei) and restoration (fukkatsu) (1997d: 8).

For Fujita, as Iida puts it, ‘death (shi) and revival (saisei) were exactly the fundamental experience (kongenteki keiken)’ (2006a: 334). In this respect, it was quite natural that Fujita has required us to perish (zugrunde gehen, monogoto no kiso ni tassuru), and that he has claimed that we can thereby revive our society, which has become a ‘dead body with ruddy cheeks’ (kesshoku yoku shindeiru jyōtai) (1997e: 10). Here we are aware that his long-lasting standpoint of exploring the ‘conditions (possibilities) for establishing the principles of “sovereignty of the people” – the conditions of “democratisation”’ was replaced with the ‘philosophy of “experience”’ (keiken no tetsugaku) for exploring the ‘fundamental conditions of contemporary times’ (gendaiteki jyōken) by way of finding out the ‘primordial conditions’ (genshoteki jōken) (e.g. Iida 2006a: 311, 334, 336, 350, 354).

Fujita’s philosophy of experience seems to have come to a climax with his writing ‘Kon’ni”chī no keiken’. His view of society in this work was presented precisely by the words that ‘Japanese society is nowadays being confronted with the crucial problem that experience has gradually ceased to exist’ (Katō
In other words, it is the world subject to the contemporary attitude of ‘apriorism’ (*senken-shugi*) – the Japanese original will be used below – that ‘requires complete knowledge of others and things before encountering them’ (Fujita 1997e: 9). In such a society, there is no opportunity of experiencing anything or encountering things (*monogoto*) and the other (*tasha*) (Fujita 1997e: 8-13). Everything requires living in a ‘cocoon-like chamber’ (*hoikuki*) in this world (1997e: 7). For these reasons, ‘Kon’nichi no keiken’ introduced the term ‘totalitarianism’ (*zentaishugi*) containing the weird attitude of *senken-shugi* towards all the things (1997e: 9).

As an editor’s note puts it, however, ‘Fujita’s concern, instead of raising the theme of “experience”, turned to analysing psychology (*shinsei*) avoiding (*kaihisuru*) experience’ after the main work focusing on establishing his theory of experience (Fujita 1997e: 234). Thereafter, he devoted himself to writing a series of quasi-psychoanalytic works, ‘Kon’nichi no keiken’, ‘Narushizumu kara no dakkkyaku: Mono ni iku michi’ (To Break Free from Narcissism: A Way of Finding out the Essence of Things) (1983) – abbreviated to ‘Narushizumu’ below – and “Anraku” e no zentaishugi: Jyūjitsu wo torimodosu beku’ (Totalitarianism to Unruffled Ease: Towards the Restoration of Intersubjectivity) (1985). The reason why I employ the term ‘series’ above is, first, because ‘Kon’nichi no keiken’ already put forward his psychological view primarily by using the terms such as ‘anxiety’ (*fuan*), ‘avoidance’ (*kaihi*) and ‘pain’ (*kutsū*) (Fujita 1997e: 10-15), all of which explained aspects of our psychology invisible to our eyes, and second, because these three articles were published consecutively. Obviously, this means the transformation of his academic style from the philosophy of experience to the ‘analysis of the psychology of human beings and society’. In particular, it is noted that, in ‘Narushizumu’, Fujita drew particular attention to the term ‘self’ (*jiko*), which captures the essence of narcissism. He says:

> Nowadays . . . the ‘ego’ (*jiga*) concentrating its concern on itself acts in a dominant fashion. . . . The contemporary state of mind, in this way, characterises the *age of the ego on a mass scale* (*taishūteki kibo ni okeru jiga no jidai*) (1997e: 19-20).

These sentences clearly describe why Fujita applied the term ‘narcissism’ (*narushizumu*). In his view, in other words, this psychoanalytic word illuminates products of the *Kōdo Seichō*. Perhaps his emphasis on the psychology of self avoiding anxiety and pain led him to introduce Richard Sennett’s term ‘a voluntary servitude to unruffled ease’ to his work. The common subject of his three quasi-psychoanalytic works is undoubtedly described by the concept; in this sense, it is emphasised that Fujita must have found some relevance of the
notion of narcissism for the social sciences through reading Sennett’s book. For him, however, it was provided not just as a metaphorical term that illuminates the social sciences and contemporary problems in the sense that he actually had a great deal of interest in psychiatry in the broad sense, which means that he highlighted the significance of the medical and psychiatric meanings intended by the term. As mentioned earlier, rather, it is much more plausible to think that Fujita was intrigued primarily by the mythical and medical implications, as exemplified by the fact that he first of all became interested in analysing the ‘spiritual structure’ (of the Tennō system), the method of which examines and diagnoses inner problems of the human mind. For this reason, it is presumed that for Fujita the encounter with the term narcissism was exactly the discovery of another type of his methodological device that had been retained since his most significant encounter with Maruyama.

As noted above, Fujita primarily considered the ‘psychological basis’ (seishinteki kiban) (1997e: 29) of people’s attitude that ‘requires complete knowledge of others and things before encountering them’ (1997e: 9) as ‘totalitarianism’. In other words, it is ‘the psychology that has a strong impulse to sweep out everything (mono) inducing discomfort (fuyukai na kanjō) and pain (kutsū no kankaku)’ (Fujita 1997e: 29-30); in his view, this is based on and described by the political concept that depicts the age of the twentieth century. This is why Fujita called contemporary ‘high tech society’ (kōdo gijutsu shakai) ‘totalitarianism towards unruffled ease’ (anraku e no zentaishugi) (1997e: 29).

In this way, the concept of ‘totalitarianism’ became one of his most important analytical devices since Fujita had seen the psychology of contemporary people that avoids experience as senken-shugi, which has a lot in common with the implications of the political term. This analysis with a focus on the concept reached a climax with his article ‘Zentaishugi no jidai keiken (jyō)’ (The Experience of the Twentieth Century of Totalitarianism, Original Edition) (1986) – abbreviated to ‘Zentaishugi (jyō)’ below. Roughly speaking, the subject of this work was to grasp the characteristics of the age of the twentieth century by focusing on the concept of totalitarianism. In this writing, Fujita first of all described ‘totalitarianism as a way of war’ (sensō no arikata ni okeru zentaishugi or sensō no zentaishugi) – abbreviated to ‘totalitarianism as war’ below – which is, according to him, typical of World War I, regarded as a ‘commercial war’ (senden-sen) and a ‘war of attrition’ (shōmō-sen). Referring primarily to Hannah Arendt, then, Fujita explained ‘totalitarianism as a way of political rule’ (seiji shihai no arikata ni okeru zentaishugi, seiji shihai no zentaishugi or seiji no zentaishugi) – abbreviated to ‘political totalitarianism’ below – which is characterised particularly by the use of ‘ideology’ (ideorogī) and ‘terror’ (teroru), and
by the appearance of ‘mass’ (taishū). Through shining a light on the connection between the former and latter concepts, Fujita contended,

not only does political totalitarianism (seiji no zentaishugi) denote the secondary stage (dai-niki or dai-nidankai) of the history of the formation of totalitarianism in the twentieth century, but the violent extension movement (bōryokuteki bōchō undō), namely war (sensō) meant by the concept, also notably and intentionally contains totalitarianism as war (sensō no zentaishugi) that emerged in the first stage (dai-ikki). In this respect, the latter totalitarianism was integrated into the former (1998c: 524).

Subsequently, ‘totalitarianism as a contemporary way of life’ (seikatsu yōshiki ni okeru zentaishugi, seikatsu yōshiki no zentaishugi or gendai zentaishugi) – abbreviated to ‘contemporary totalitarianism’ below – which was first provided in the revised edition of ‘Zentaishugi no jidai keiken’ (1995) – abbreviated to ‘Zentaishugi’ below – was raised fundamentally on the extension of the above two types of totalitarianism. In this kind of society, says Fujita, ‘fictitious commodities’ (gisei shōhin) put forward by Karl Polanyi, namely ‘land’ (tochi), ‘labour’ (rōdō) and ‘money’ (kahei), and Marx’s ‘labour power’ play a major role (1997e: 77-81). In particular, money is bound to acquire all those things. Fujita writes:

Currency (kahei) essentially based on the principle of currency (ryūdō, ryūtsū) represents all wealth (tomi) – what a paradox! Doesn’t currency (ryūdō) representing all kinds of values and wealth precisely characterise totalitarianism per se? . . . Isn’t it a new totalitarianism in a different dimension and form from the original and classical one (sōzōtekina kotenteki zentaishugi) which emerged in the catastrophic 1930s in so far as fierce and ceaseless mobilisation (ryūdō and ryūtsū) sucks everything – figurations (keitai), objects (taishō) and things (mono) – out of society, and in so far as this world typifies this feature, regardless of the banner? (1997e: 82-3)

The above sentences explain why Fujita claims that ‘contemporary totalitarianism’ is ‘not the opposite of totalitarianism but rather captures the essence in peaceful appearance’ (1997e: 77). Admittedly, from this perspective, he rather stresses the problematic situation that it is quite hard for contemporary people to be aware of the existence of the problem per se exactly in the sense that apparently it looks nonviolent.

Another important viewpoint ‘Zentaishugi’ presents, quite interestingly, is to identify the totalitarianism of Japan as a representative ‘contemporary totalitarianism’; in my view, this is of vital importance to Fujita. Previously, he already pointed out that Japan was characteristic of ‘political totalitarianism’ in ‘Zentaishugi (jyō)’, in which, similarly, he said that it was established subsequent to ‘totalitarianism as war’ (1998c: 526). In this work, however, cont-
temporary totalitarianism was neither clarified nor even described; instead, he
simply observed that a strong need for ‘newness’ (atarashisa, shinpin) is an
essential feature of totalitarianism in contemporary Japan. In ‘Zentaishugi’, later
published, by contrast Fujita provided a more precise account. Indeed, focusing
on this new edition, it is very easy to understand what the article intends by
introducing the concept of totalitarianism. In short, his intention of advancing
the concept of contemporary totalitarianism following two kinds of totalitari-
anism noted above is oriented exactly towards criticising ‘contemporary Japanese
society’. As he puts it,

The characteristics of the totalitarianisation (zentaishugika) of Japan are described simply by
the fact that the attitude that ‘New is beautiful!’¹⁸ (sōdai na atarashii mono wa yoi mono dã)
established totalitarianism based on the whole society by exploring (tsuikyû) or copying
(mohô) or modifying (kakô) or highly streamlining (kô-nôritsuka) it, regarding even the
newest evil (shijyô saišhin no aku) as good (zen). This resulted in Japan becoming a leading
and typical contemporary totalitarianism (gendai zentaishugi) as the third type of totalitari-

According to Fujita, Japan’s proposition that ‘New is beautiful!’ is derived from
the ancient ‘ritsuryô kokka’ (code-based state) (1997e: 86). He claims that the
Meiji Restoration also inherited its spirit from the ancient state. In this respect, it
is stressed that Japan has so far valued its conventional spirit for long periods of
time. For instance, referring to the thinker of Meiji era, Yukichi Fukuzawa, who
is often regarded as a founder of modern Japan, Fujita points out that most of
the Japanese ‘Europeanists in the nineteenth century’ (jûkyû seiki seiô bunmei
shugisha) including Fukuzawa were absorbed in the act of ‘imitating the ori-
ginal’ (mohô) (1997e: 87). In addition, focusing on the 1930s, Fujita emphasises
that their strong praise for newness and magnificence clearly explains that
Japan was intrigued by totalitarianism such as Fascism and Stalinism charac-
terised as new and magnificent – he provides an interesting piece of data that
the book entitled Zentaishugi sôsho (A Series of Totalitarianism), which seems to
‘put a high value on the total (zentai) and totality (zentaisei)’, was published in
Japan in the 1930s (1997e: 88-9). Needless to say, here he recognises one of the
significant characteristics of Japan that even puts a high value on ‘the newest
evil’. Through these analyses, Fujita puts forward his remedial perspective on
totalitarianism as follows: ‘every part (bubun) is described by them as such, and
possible comparative differences between them are therefore represented sim-
ply either as a more important part (yori taisetsu na bubun) or as a part previously
existing (yori saki ni atta bubun); there is no privileged part representing exactly the
total as such (sonomono)’ (1997e: 89).
From these perspectives, we can precisely acknowledge that Japan has consistently sought to obtain newness by means of an act of imitation. It is understood that the efficiency of this Japanese fundamental style has been greatly improved, for example, through experiencing fascism in wartime Japan and the Kōdo Seichō. Presumably this is why Fujita had particularly to highlight Japanese totalitarianism. In other words, he believed that Japan has been totalitarian continuously for long periods, particularly through laying stress on the essence of newness and magnificence, and that, after WWII, it has made more sophisticated the problematic feature by way of ‘rationalising without reason’. Most importantly, in this respect, we should consider that, above all, his object of study was always the ‘present age’, and therefore that he criticised ‘contemporary totalitarianism’ in our time. (In many respects, Fujita’s stance particularly on contemporary society has much in common with Critical Theory’s, regardless of the roughly 30-year generation gap between them.19)

It is recognised that in the interview ‘Gendai nihon no seishin’ (The Spirit of Contemporary Japan) (1990) – abbreviated to ‘Gendai seishin’ below – Fujita’s interest somewhat changed. As the editor’s note for Chosakushū 6 puts it, Fujita concerned himself ‘neither with the theory of “experience” nor with the psychology of society but with ethics’ (1997e: 240). Briefly speaking, Fujita summarised the essence of his knowledge cultivated since ‘Kōdo Seichō’, and addressed issues of contemporary Japan from his new ethical perspective in the work. First, depending on the ‘ability of self-criticism’ (jiko hihan nōryoku), namely ‘ethics’ (rinriteki burēki), he primarily criticised the Kōdo Seichō and ‘companyism’ (kaisha-shugi),20 which were, according to him, based on ‘narcissism’, ‘totalitarianism towards unruffled ease’, the ‘spirit of the imitation of the original’, the ‘impulse of extension’ (bōchō-shugi) and ‘exclusionary collectivism’ (haigaiteki shūdanshugi), all of which are induced by Japanese uncontrollable instincts without self-criticism (1997e: 92-110). Referring primarily to Konrad Lorenz’s perspective of the ‘point of no return’ and Edward M. Forster’s perspective that ‘man can’t touch’, Fujita presented the provocative view that ‘ethics (rinri) is aimed at learning our own personal boundaries’ (1997e: 112; cf. 110-26). Significantly, ‘Gendai seishin’ introduced his new perspective of ethics with a particular focus on several scholars, including natural scientists such as zoologists and biologists, and, in this respect, it is noted that there was no change in his primary aim of criticising contemporary society.

In the interview ‘Marukusushugi no baransu shīto’ (The Balance Sheet of Marxism) (1991), Fujita suggested his significant proposition that ‘democracy is the minimum purpose’, referring to Russell and Laski (1997e: 168). In addition, he highlighted the importance of ‘personal relationships’ in the work (1997e: 185-90). Most importantly, however, as he says, ‘I, as a Japanese, cast doubt on
the raison d’être of pure science (*junsui gakumon*) that is not motivated to deal with unhappy conditions about which the well-organised society, Japan, has brought, and from which one has suffered enough’ (1997e: 141; emphases added). Perhaps this motivation accounts for Fujita’s most fundamental academic position throughout his works, that academic knowledge ought to contribute to creating solutions to our actual problems. This is another reason why I am intrigued by Fujita’s political theory.

It is important to remember that, after his rectal cancer had been diagnosed in 1993, Fujita published ‘Zentaishugi’ mentioned above. Taking account of the fact that he wrote the volume of forty nine pages during that serious illness, we can easily recognise how seriously he devoted himself to the work. In this respect, it can be regarded as the best work of his later years, in which, as we have seen, he tried to settle the primary issue of his later work, the Kōdo Seichō. However, Fujita had already provided its brief summary in the preceding work ‘Mittsuno zentaishugi’ (Three Types of Totalitarianism) (1994) as an interview, in which he began by explaining his state of mind of ‘discontinuity’ (*danzetsu*).

As Fujita puts it:

Since the extension of the Japanese economy had been completed at the stage of the end of so-called industrial capitalism and national economy, there remained only the possibility of some economic bubbles (*baburu*); recently, in fact, there were such opportunities . . . in the 1960s and 1980s. These experiences described by high growth, regarded either as capitalism or as market society, demonstrate how society is to renounce all connections (*danzetsu*) to cultural history. We were given the last experience through the events. This led me to conclude that all my tasks were completed (*owatta na*), and I gave up (*owatta na*); I got rectal cancer at precisely the same time (1997e: 192-3).

Needless to say, this is a crucial matter for Fujita. For this statement clearly denotes that Fujita abandoned political practice; it therefore gives a vital meaning to his life’s work, namely the task of establishing *jinmin-shugi* that was unalterably of huge importance to him. In this interview, then, Fujita put forward three kinds of totalitarianism noted above, and claimed that ‘Japan has led itself to a leading totalitarianism towards unruffled ease’ (1997e: 207). From this perspective, he concludes that ‘the twentieth century is the age of totalitarianism’ (1997e: 197). At this point it is important to note that Fujita’s diagnoses of contemporary society are based on his following another fundamental diagnosis. He says,

High growth gave society the specific discontinuity (*tokubetsu no danzetsu*). . . . around the middle of the 1960s . . . . The high economic growth, market society or, say, perpetuating or
revitalising bubble society . . . brought about the transmutation of and discontinuity in cultural history concerning individuals (1997e: 191).

This statement attaches special importance to both Fujita’s early and later works, for it profoundly affected his final examination and diagnosis, as noted previously. We remind ourselves that his ‘8/15 declaration’ was issued in the mid-1960s. In this period, on the other hand, as Iida puts it, “‘High growth’ . . . while society gradually underwent a radical transformation of culture and spirit . . . crushed his “hopes” based on the sole possibility for restoring society in postwar Japan’ (2006a: 263). In other words, it is presumed that it was during the time Fujita underwent his inner conflict between ‘hope’ of realising jinmin-shugi and ‘despair’, stemming from the spiritual change of Japanese society aiming at the Kōdo Seichō, that gave him a considerably negative perspective. It is noted, however, that although the conflict had given rise to his pessimistic view of the Kōdo Seichō, he managed to overcome it. Perhaps he repeatedly experienced such a psychological conflict. After all, it led Fujita to arrive at the above final conclusion that brought about his abandonment of hopes for politics. Thus, Fujita must have fallen into ‘despair’ again after overcoming it through regarding ‘the place severing ties with society’ (danzetsu no basho) as his home (1997e: 205). It must be emphasised that coming to such a conclusion means that he also abandoned being a political theorist, for his words that ‘all my tasks were completed’ questions the value of a theorist.

Notes

1 Unfortunately, as far as I know, there is still no translation of his works into English, German or any European language. But there exists a translation of Zentaishugi no jidai keiken into Korean (1998d), the contents of which are slightly different from the original. Also, there is a great work on Fujita in German that focuses on his early contributions (Seifert 2010).
2 There are, however, some works referring to Fujita, e.g. Miriam Silverberg’s Erotic Grotesque Nonsense (2007: 265-6).
3 So far, no one has viewed Fujita as a political theorist. Most researchers on Fujita’s work have believed him to be either a ‘thinker’ (shisōka) (e.g. Cho 2012; Ichimura 2010; Iida 2006a) or a ‘scholar of the history of ideas’ (shisōshi-ka) (e.g. Ichimura 2003, 2010; Miyamura 2009). However, it seems that these ways of understanding Fujita have been largely determined by some partial views of the persons carrying out research on his work, that is by their research fields. In other words, they simply reflect their fixed views, as exemplified by the fact that, mostly, those who have studied Fujita’s theory have regarded themselves and have also been regarded as neither political theorists nor scholars of political theory primarily due to their research areas. In Japan, two disciplines of political theory and Japanese political theory, which
have close links with one another – generally, the latter is called ‘(the history of) Japanese political thought’ (Nihon seiji shisōshi or Nihon seiji shishō), and is also sometimes called the ‘history of Japanese ideas’ (Nihon shisōshi) – have been separated, and it is sometimes believed that they are different fields (on the segregation between these two branches, see pp. 232-3). It is generally considered, on the one hand, that the former studies Western political theory including its history with a focus on studying its ideas, exploring political principles and laying the foundations of political norms, and, on the other hand, that the latter studies Japanese political thought with a particular focus on understandings of its historical development and its ideas. Admittedly, the latter discipline very often does not consider and reflect upon political principles and norms, as does the former. In other words, there is a distinct difference in disciplinary characteristics between them. Although researchers on Fujita’s work are not confined to these two disciplines, these facts to a certain extent explain what concern their works have been based on, and why the above views have primarily been provided. In short, most persons who have tackled topics of Fujita’s writings have unconsciously disregarded his aspect of a political theorist.

4 This term has specific meaning to Fujita, and it is therefore much better to use the Japanese expression of Kōdo Seichō than the English words equivalent to the term such as ‘high growth’ and ‘high economic growth’. Hence, my research prefers the Japanese original.

5 On the meanings of tenkō, see, e.g. Tsurumi 1991, 2011.

6 This is usually abbreviated to the ‘Rokujū-nen Anpo’ or the ‘Anpo’ in Japanese.

7 This is the incident that, on 15 June 1960, an anti-Security Treaty demonstration organised by several groups such as Anpo Kaitei Soshi Kokumin Kaigi (The People’s Council to Prevent the Revision of the Security Treaty) and Zengakuren (The All-Japan Federation of Student Associations) had fought with the police, who had injured many demonstrators, and this violent behaviour led a student at the University of Tokyo, Michiko Kanba, to her death.

8 For example, Fujita’s sovereignty of the people is defined by Fujita himself as follows: ‘We, as the people (jinmin) engaging in certain occupations respectively, aim to establish relationships with others (kojin). Ways of communicating with them are bound to depend upon respective interpersonal relationships between the people. I believe that communication independent of the state system will come into existence, and that we will gradually be able to create the people (jinmin) as subjects who check and control political power on the basis of these principles. This is the exact sovereignty of the people’ (Fujita 1998b: 220).

9 It is said that, on this day, the Anti-Security Treaty movement supporting parliamentary democracy had begun to gain strength before the Security Treaty bill was railroaded through the Lower House late at night (e.g. Iida 2006a: 258).

10 Fujita provides a brief account of this concept: ‘The term bourgeois is often translated as citizen (shimin, citoyen) [he most often intends the French term citoyen by the Japanese shimin]. Although Japanese language has a lack of the terminological tradition, I do not mean bourgeois or the middle class by citizen particularly when referring to citizenism (shiminshugi). All the classes and workers, that is ‘primordial men’ (Urmensch, genjin), are meant by the word. In short, it denotes citoyen’ (Fujita, Tanikawa, Tsurumi and Yoshimoto 2006: 131-2). For Fujita, therefore, the German Urmensch and the Japanese genjin mean the French citoyen equivalent to the English ‘citizen’. In this respect, it can be argued that, in his sense, the former two terms imply the German Bürger.

11 This is Wesley Makoto Sasaki-Uemura’s translation (2001: 138).

12 “Risei” no kaifuku’ (1962) primarily presents this theoretical standpoint (see p. 255).
For example, Fujita has stressed the importance of ‘common sense’ in relation to the Constitution of Japan (Fujita, Ishida, Hidaka and Fukuda 2006: 337-8); he called for an act of ‘filibuster’ (giji bōgai), ‘a right based on the spirit of parliamentarism (gikaishugi no seishin ni nezashita kenri)’, as the common sense of the Constitution. Needless to say, he intended particular emphasis on the role of common sense in every constitution. Also, it is noted that Fujita employs the term kyōtsukō as a translation of the English common sense, e.g. in his work ‘Jinmin shuken’ (Fujita 1998b: 383), and the term kyōtsū no shiki, a translation of common sense, in ‘Shaku-shaku’ (Fujita 1998b: 223).

My own experience to some extent supports the idea that living in a foreign country whose culture and lifestyle are considerably different from one’s own over several years significantly affects one’s mind. In this respect, it can be argued that there was a marked change in Fujita’s mind through his first study abroad even if he hesitated to discuss his experience – e.g. in ‘Kōdo Seichō’, which, as noted above, was first published shortly after his return to Japan (Fujita 1998c: 1). Indeed, it was the first time the Japanese Fujita had ever lived in Europe.

According to ‘Fujita Shōzō chosaku mokuroku’ (A List of the Writings of Shōzō Fujita) edited by Iida, Miyamura and Hondō, Fujita published over ninety writings – albeit mostly short essays – between April 1971 and March 1980, that is during the period from when he left his job at the university to his return.

This is a Japanese translation of Ernst Bloch’s term Rationalisierung ohne Ratio.

It is noted that Fujita himself does not give the German original. This is Iida’s suggestion (e.g. 2006a: 358).

This is Erich Fromm’s expression (2011: 62), which seems to capture the essence of what Fujita intended by the words.

On this, see Ch. 7.

On this term, Fujita writes: ‘The Japanese company self is always driven by the desire to expand its territory on the basis of Mitsubishi-ism, Itochū-ism and Marubeni-ism; this is exactly the economic imperialism of Japan (keizai teikokushugi)’ (1997e: 94-5).

In addition, Fujita stresses the importance of the contribution of ‘knowledge’ (gakumon) towards establishing the sovereignty of the people (jinmin shuken). He says, ‘[k]nowledge is merely a means of achieving it [sovereignty of the people]’ (1998a: 231).
APPENDIX 4

On Fujita’s Terminology of Totalitarianism (Zentaishugi)

In this appendix, I want to clarify Fujita’s terminology of ‘totalitarianism’ (zentaishugi) on the grounds that we can presume that it can often serve to confuse one particularly in terms of his specific usage of the concept. As is well known, the term has its origins in early Fascist Italy (Bracher 1973; Gleason 1995). Later, however, it has not only meant Fascist politics but also been applied specifically to extreme forms of Communist politics, especially to Stalinism. Furthermore, the concept has been widely applied to the most advanced capitalist societies such as the US and Western Europe. In fact, it is important to note that it has often been used particularly for Nazism and Stalinism and also for Communist countries in the context of the Cold War, on the one hand, and for some democratic countries based on mass production and consumption, on the other. For these reasons, totalitarianism is regarded as a typical complex word which is the result of its own way of developing as a concept. I will first give a brief account of the emergence and development of the concept, next, see Fujita’s usage of the notion, and finally, seek for some problems of and consider the relevance of his conception of totalitarianism below.

1. The Origins and Expansion of the Concept of Totalitarianism

The emergence and early development of the term

As has been mentioned above, the term of totalitarianism (Totalitarismus) is derived originally from Fascist Italy. On this view, there is some evidence that
the adjective ‘total’ was terminologically developed into the Italian terms *totalitario* and *totalitarìtà* in the context of Italian Fascism (Bracher 1973: 408). It is assumed, however, that the word was first used for criticising Fascism in Italy in 1923 (Gleason 1995: 13). Despite this fact, the philosopher of Italian Fascism Giovanni Gentile introduced the term, and Mussolini regarded the political system as totalitarian.

Later, the concept of totalitarianism was applied to the intensification of Nazism and Stalinism (Bracher 1973: 406). We can clearly see the idea of trying to understand both the two right- and left-wing extreme forms of political system by applying the notion typically in Hannah Arendt’s *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951), which argues that totalitarianism is characteristically seen in those new types of despotism with a wide range of uses of ideology and terror. Particularly in the late 1940s, meanwhile, it started to be applied for criticising the Communist side of politics from the perspective of the Western side, in conjunction with the concept to a ‘war of ideas’. George Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1949), for example, intends to offer a criticism of Communism by using the concept. Through these processes, the word of totalitarianism has been a rigorous political term.

With regard to the terminological signification of the concept, it is important to note that we generally use the term in an Arendtian or Orwellian sense for describing a political world. For this reason, we often misunderstand one’s intention of criticising Western society by the idea, for instance, primarily due to the above fact – we will see its signification below. In fact, this is primarily why Fujita’s usage of totalitarianism confuses us.

**The application of the concept to the criticism of the West**

The term totalitarianism has also been adopted to the critique of Western, capitalist, democratic countries particularly since the 1950s. Jacob L. Talmon’s *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy* (1952) contends that a democratic system of government most often does not represent the people. Herbert Marcuse’s *One-Dimensional Man* (1964) describes and criticises ‘advanced industrial society’, in which individuals are integrated into an existent controlling system based on mass production and consumption by effectively utilising advertising media; this world, he stresses, is not different from a totalitarian oppressive society even though raising the banner of democracy and freedom, in the sense that it propagates ‘false needs’, thereby enforcing conformity (2002: 3-8). With respect to the latter issue, however, it is possible to think that, for example, Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1944) precedes Marcuse’s work on the grounds that, highlighting the ‘culture industry’, which even makes art
or culture a product, the former work stresses that the primary function of contemporary industrial society controls individual desires and enables them to conform, similarly to authoritarianism or totalitarianism. Interestingly, their common intention of introducing the concept for describing those problems of Western society is to criticise capitalist, liberal democracy in parallel with communist or totalitarian politics.

2. Fujita’s Usage of the Term Totalitarianism

Three types of totalitarianism

Basically, Fujita’s conception of totalitarianism proposes three types of totalitarianism: ‘totalitarianism as a way of war’ (sensō no arikata ni okeru zentaishugi) – often abbreviated to ‘totalitarianism as war’ (sensō no zentaishugi) – ‘totalitarianism as a way of political rule’ (seiji shihai no arikata ni okeru zentaishugi) – often abbreviated to ‘political totalitarianism’ (seijiteki zentaishugi) – and ‘totalitarianism as contemporary way of life’ (seikatsu yōshiki ni okeru zentaishugi) – often abbreviated to ‘contemporary totalitarianism’ (gendai zentaishugi).

Fujita explains them as follows. With regard to the first one, a ‘commercial war’ (senden-sen) and a ‘war of attrition’ (shōmō-sen) characterise it, which is represented by WWI (Fujita 1997e: 49-56). The second one is typified by ‘ideology’ (ideorogi) and ‘terror’ (teroru), and given its own energy by the mass (taishū), exactly as Arendt clearly describes (1997e: 45-9, 61-76). From these two perspectives, he says:

not only does political totalitarianism denote the secondary stage (dai-niki or dai-nidankai) of the history of the formation of totalitarianism in the twentieth century, but the violent extension movement (bōryokuteki bōchō undō), namely war (sensō) meant by the concept, also notably and intentionally contains totalitarianism as war that emerged in the first stage (dai-ikki). In this respect, the latter totalitarianism was integrated into the former (1998c: 524).

In Fujita’s view, ‘totalitarianism as war’ is intrinsically interwoven with ‘political totalitarianism’. The third one describes some negative aspects of contemporary society and its social functions, in which, on the one hand, Karl Polanyi’s ‘fictitious commodities’ (gisei shōhin) – ‘land’ (tochi), ‘labour’ (rōdō) and ‘money’ (kahei) – and Marx’s ‘labour power’ perform a major role (1997e: 77-81), and on the other hand, man’s need for ‘unruffled ease’ (anraku) requires him and his society to eliminate ‘anxiety’ (fuan), ‘pain’ (kutsū) and ‘discomfort’ (fukai) (1997e: 30). In particular, Fujita calls the former ‘totalitarianism as market
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That is to say, there are two types in contemporary totalitarianism. On the former totalitarianism, he says as follows:

Currency (kahei) essentially based on the principle of currency (ryūdō, ryūtsū) represents all wealth (tomi) – what a paradox! Doesn’t currency (ryūdō) representing all kinds of values and wealth precisely characterise totalitarianism per se? . . . Isn’t it a new totalitarianism in a different dimension and form from the original and classical one (sōzōtekina kotenteki zentaishugi) which emerged in the catastrophic 1930s in so far as fierce and ceaseless mobilisation (ryūdō and ryūtsū) sucks everything – figurations (keitai), objects (taishō) and things (mono) – out of society, and in so far as this world typifies this feature, regardless of the banner? (1997e: 82-3).

As Fujita stresses, in the world of ‘totalitarianism as market economy’ currency represents ‘all kinds of values and wealth’ and absorbs all the other things. In this world, market mechanism even requires human beings to be means of currency. With respect to ‘totalitarianism towards unruffled ease’, Fujita draws his inspiration from Richard Sennett’s concept of ‘a voluntary servitude to unruffled ease’ (Sennett 1974: 8). In this society, as can be seen in Sennett’s term, everyone desires a life of comfort exactly as if living in a ‘cocoon-like chamber’ (hoikuki), while, as can be seen in Ernst Bloch’s ‘rationalisation without reason’, they are deprived of humanity by the rationalisation of society, and need to exist in the harsh environment of exact rationalised market economy, at the same time (1997e: 7).

For Fujita, these two types of totalitarianism are regarded as more troublesome existences because generally people are not even aware of the problem per se exactly as they look nonviolent. In his view, however, they are definitely ‘not the opposite of totalitarianism but rather capture the essence in peaceful appearance’ (1997e: 77; emphasis added). In other words, for Fujita, living especially after the war, peaceful totalitarianism is much more problematic than any others previously existing. In these respects, both totalitarianism as market economy and totalitarianism towards unruffled ease are regarded as contemporary totalitarianism exactly as our problem.

Problems

From the above perspective, how can we see Fujita’s conception of totalitarianism? To be sure, it stresses and is in favour of the above critique of contemporary capitalist society. However, it does not intend primarily to criticise capitalism or western society. He rather aims to enable people to reflect upon their way of life and society by considering that totalitarianism has been the
world order since the twentieth century, and by warning them about their weird behaviour that they devote their attention to consuming things satisfying their needs in dialectical social conditions between market economy and their desire for unruffled ease. From this perspective, it can be well understood why he writes, ‘[t]he twentieth century is the age of totalitarianism’ (1997e: 197).

Is there, however, noting wrong with Fujita’s way of understanding both contemporary aspects of capitalism (consumption) and democratic life (privacy) simply as totalitarianism even though the negative factors he provided perform a function in centralised control over people, thereby repressing them, as it does? In my view, there are at least three problems with his conception of totalitarianism. First, it does not have any positive sense from a democratic perspective, and it can therefore shed light only on negative aspects of contemporary society. Second, it rather serves to blur the borders between traditional and contemporary problems. And third, it ironically ignores any differences between contemporary totalitarianism and the other two types. With regard to the first problem, the conception does not enable us to find any positive aspects of society – this is also applicable to his many other concepts provided in his later years – or, more accurately, it serves to hide what social aspects are not categorised as totalitarianism. With regard to the second problem, the conception cannot describe what problems are specific to contemporary society. With regard to the third problem, his way of using the term contributes solely to finding common aspects between past and present societies, and the concept in his usage thereby loses its general meanings. These three problems can be explained by the metaphor that the taste of a soup including some vegetables can be masked in accordance with the amount and quality of pepper. Concretely speaking, both problems and benefits in contemporary society are masked by a strong flavour of totalitarianism.

Relevance

Despite the above difficulties, his conception of totalitarianism is of great relevance for critically understanding contemporary social and political phenomena. As mentioned above, it is greatly helpful particularly in elucidating our problems common to the past – in this respect, it seems that the conception has developed Arendt’s, Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s, and Marcuse’s issues. To put it another way, it helps to reflect upon what we generally do not regard as problematic. Most importantly, he tells us that a past problem is directed not only at the past but also at the present by conceptualising some contemporary phenomena as totalitarianism.
Notes

1 On this issue, for example, Horkheimer, Adorno and Fromm rarely use the term totalitarianism, rather it seems to me that they prefer the terms authoritarianism and fascism.
2 On this issue, see Chapter 5, sections 2 and 4, and also Appendix 3, section 2.
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