The Modification of Mantras in Vedic Rituals according to the ninth Adhyāya of the Dīpaśikhā of Śālikanātha Miśra

Vorgelegt von

Oliver Lamers

Contents

Preface

The present study is based on a second-level-commentary called *Dīpaśikhā*, "The peak of light", by Śālikanātha Miśra who is assumed to have written his treatises in the latter eighth and early ninth century CE.[1] Śālikanātha belonged to the Prābhākara-school of Pūrvamīmāṃsā, named after its founder Prabhākara Miśra. Together with his rival Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, founder of the Bhāṭṭa-school of Pūrvamīmāṃsā, he stands for the "golden age" of Pūrvamīmāṃsā[2], when adherents of these sub-schools seem to have had vivid philosophical, exegetical debates amongst each other and with adherents of Buddhist and other schools. Both, Prabhākara and Kumārlia based their commentaries on the *ŚBh*, which is – to our knowledge – the first and only complete commentary on the *JS* predating them. We know Prabhākara's works only through the commentaries of Śālikanātha. While he wrote the *Rjuvimalāpañcikā* as a gloss on Prabhākara's *Bṛhatī*, he comments on Prabhākara's *Laghvī* in the *DŚ*. Śālikanātha is the primary and most reliable source for an understanding of the Prābhākara-school[3], but his works have received little attention within research on Pūrvamīmāṃsā.

My presentation of the *DŚ* commenting on a selection of *adhikaraṇa*s, "topics", from the ninth *adhyāya*, "book", dealing with the modification of *mantra*s is a first attempt at making this commentary of Śālikanātha known. While it has to remain with others to work on further passages and/or the complete text, I hope to present the reader with a clear edition and translation of the selected passages. To this end I edited the text, taken from the only known existing manuscript of the *DŚ*. Most emphasis was put on differentiating the layers of textual material included in the *DŚ*. For clarity, the three most important levels are visually distinguishable: a) The "authentic" text of the *DŚ* in regular font; b) Quotations from Prabhākara's *Laghvī* which the former comments

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[1] See Part II, section 3.1 (p. 40f) for more.

[2] See VERPOORTEN 1984: 22, Chapter III, "The golden age of *Mīmāṃsā*".

[3] In his detailed analysis of the concept of *niyoga* in Prabhākara's *Bṛhatī* Yoshimizu states: "Weil Prabhākara im wortkargen, knappen Stil ohne systematische Entfaltung seine Gedanken äußert, ist es ohne Kommentar Śālikanāthas sehr schwierig, der *Bṛhatī* die Auffassung Prabhākaras zu entnehmen. Es kommt nicht selten vor, dass man ohne Śālikanātha zu Rate zu ziehen nicht feststellen kann, wo der Gegner einsetzt und wo Prabhākaras Erwiderung beginnt." (YOSHIMIZU 1997: 34.)

upon in bold font; c) Quotations from the *ŚBh*, the *JS* or other third sources such a
Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* or different *Śrautasūtra*s in bold, underlined font. In the last cat-
egory are also included citations of a certain *mantra* or parts of an injunction included
in some *saṃhitā*, the reference to which is given in the footnotes. A further visual level
distinguishes between statements belonging to the *prima facie* view of the opponent
(*pūrvapakṣa*) represented by [P], and the correct, established view of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā
(*siddhānta*, rarely *rāddhānta* in the *DŚ*) represented by [S] at the beginning of a para-
graph.

For the same reasons of clarity and coherence the translation follows the visual presenta-
tion of the edition. It is not aimed at being "pleasant reading" – such is most certainly
impossible with any scholastic text of Pūrvamīmāṃsā. The abundance of long compound
phrases involving abstract nouns in the ablative or instrumental and other peculiarities
of Sanskrit commentarial literature are mostly rendered by subordinate clauses. At the
same time, the translation of technical terms and some other phrases is guided more by
a one-to-one correspondence with the Sanskrit expression than by its fluidity, thereby
grasping the full scope of it. Where possible I use only one translation coherently for one
term. An example: *kārya* literally means "something that is to be done", consequently
an "act" and also the "duty to act". Wicher, after initially using "Zutuendes" (what
is to be done), later translates it as "Pflicht".[4] She justifies this by arguing that the
understanding of *kārya* out of the Vedic injunction automatically creates a reference to
oneself – according to Śālikanātha.[5] This translation may be suitable in view of the
theory of language developed by Śālikanātha in the *Vākyārthamātṛkā*. But in the con-
text of ritual activity, around which most of the discussion in the passages of the *DŚ*
revolves, Śālikanātha does not refer to the individual in his usage of *kārya*. Furthermore,
the translation with "Pflicht", duty, carries a moral connotation, which is completely
out of place in Pūrvamīmāṃsā.[6] In my opinion the term denotes "what is to be done"

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[4] WICHER 1986: 8f.

[5] "Die wörtliche Übersetzung "Zutuendes" erweist sich dann, wenn von seinem Erkennen als jeweils eigenes die Rede ist, als unbrauchbar." (WICHER 1986: 33)

[6] See CLOONEY 1990, expecially Chapter IV and Chapter VII.4 for the role of the individual in the *JS*, and how Prabhākara remains in line with his predecessor's view.

in its most basic sense. However, such a translation often collides with the remaining syntax in English, for which reason I use *kārya* throughout. By remaining as literal as possible in the translation, I try to preserve the technical, argumentative, often allusive character of the text also in English.

The edition and translation of the selected *adhikaraṇa*s is preceded by an introductory section, in which the issues raised by Śālikanātha and Pūrvamīmāṃsā in regard to *mantra*s and their modification are located in the scholarly discourse revolving around *mantra*s. I consider my analysis as contributing a genuine "emic" view to the ongoing debate about the meaning and function of *mantra*s and the characterisations of their language and role in Vedic ritual. It is usually silently assumed that *mantra*s are subject to the least change in their religious applications. According to Patton "their power as speech acts derives from this fixity".[7] Most works on Vedic *mantra*s have thus focused on diachronic changes, not so much in their form but in their application and interpretation.[8] Although Pūrvamīmāṃsā supports the view that *mantra*s are fixed by even claiming that a change made to one produces a "non-*mantra*"[9], the discussions in the ninth *adhyāya*, which deal with the modification of ritual details (*ūha*) after they have been transferred (*atideśa*) from an archetypal (*prakṛti*) to an ectypal ritual (*vikṛti*)[10], will present a different picture:

- *Mantra*s, as well as *sāman*s and *saṃksāra*s ("embellishments" of ritual details), may be subject to change after they have been transferred into a new ritual setting.[11]

- Only single phrases within *mantra*s can be subject to change, the general proposition of the text remains the same.[12]

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[7] PATTON 2005: 60.

[8] See for example Patton's diachronic analysis of the application (*viniyoga*) of *mantra*s according to the *Ṛgveda-Saṃhitā*, the *Śrautasūtra*s, the *Gṛhya-Sūtra*s and the *vidhāna*s (PATTON 2005); also the contribution by Wheelock in Alper's *Understanding Mantras* (ALPER 1989: 96-122).

[9] See *DŚ*, p. 316. References to the *DŚ* refer to the page number in the manuscript.

[10] I translate the terms *prakṛti* and *vikṛti* as has been most common – see JHA 1942, and CLOONEY 1990. A similar translation would be "model" and "derivative ritual".

[11] See *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.1.1: *trividhaścohaḥ. mantrasāmasaṃskāraviṣayaḥ.*

[12] Since only single items are changed in the new *vikṛti* – for example the presiding deity from Agni to Sūrya (see 9.1.11/12), only references in *mantra*s to a changed item have to be considered.

- The principles and rules expounded by Pūrvamīmāṃsā for structuring the Vedic texts, specifically *mantra*s, help the specialist to determine the proper functional meaning of a (part of a) *mantra* within the ritual context.

- On the basis of the functional meaning he can decide whether and how a phrase has to be modified.

- Despite the system's emphasis on "ritual pragmatics" the statements contained in *mantra*s are not seen as essentially different from "worldly" counterparts.

- The human aspect has to be accepted by Pūrvamīmāṃsā in this context, as it is the ritual specialist who determines the modification, ultimately led by his understanding of the meaning of the texts and situation at stake.

- Like in other instances, the modification of *mantra*s reflects the constant striving of the system to bring the orthodoxy expounded in *śruti* to terms with the orthopraxis of an assumed ritual reality. While trying to establish rules to ultimately safeguard the unity and thus authority of the Veda, Pūrvamīmāṃsā here has to admit the human aspect into the system.

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List of Figures

Abbreviations of Sanskrit Works

ĀpŚS	*Āpastambaśrautasūtra*
ChU	*Chāndogyopaniṣad*
DŚ	*Dīpaśikhā*
JB	*Jaiminīyabrāhmaṇa*
JS	*Jaiminisūtra*
MS	*Maitrāyaṇī-Saṃhitā*
MŚS	*Mānavaśrautasūtra*
ṚV	*Ṛgveda*
SatŚS	*Satyāṣāḍhaśrautasūtra*
SV	*Sāmaveda*
TĀ	*Taittirīyāraṇyaka*
TāB	*Tāṇḍyamahābrāhmaṇa*
TB	*Taittirīyabrāhmaṇa*
TS	*Taittirīyasaṃhitā*
ŚB	*Śatapathabrāhmaṇa*
ŚBh	*Śābarabhāṣya*

Part I

Introduction

1 Mantras – Meaning – Modification: An Overview

*Mantra*s have witnessed considerable scholarly attention since the content of the Veda was first disclosed as a valuable source of information. They have constantly bewildered researchers in regard to their origins in pre-Vedic mythology, their language and meaning, and also in regard to their multiple, often contradictory applicability in the religious life on the Indian subcontinent. A single *mantra* expressing a very general idea may be used in a variety of contexts. For Patton this "'hyperapplicability' of *mantra* to ritual" represents one end of the spectrum, while "opaque uses of *mantra*s" form its other.[1] Gonda's attempt at listing such multiple uses points in the same direction: "A mantra is now invocatory, then evocatory, now deprecatory, then again conservatory. It may be beneficient or hurtful, salutary or pernicious."[2] Similarly difficult to understand are *mantra*s consisting only of syllables which do not form words or even sentences. Such *bījamantra*s have added to the confusion about understanding the nature and essence of *mantra*s, culminating in the provocative view of Staal that they are without any meaning in themselves.[3]

I shall return to Staal below. The present work will not consider definitions of *mantra*s, but will shed light on their treatment and theoretical usage according to the Pūrvamīmāṃsā represented by Śālikanātha Miśra. Their usage must remain theoretical inasmuch as it is doubtful whether Vedic rituals were at any time performed in such a way as expounded by this system. The unificatory, even apologetic character in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā's treatment of Vedic rituals, which was directed against the growing uncertainty about the validity of Vedic utterances and the proper execution of the rituals contained in them, was also detached from the actual practitioners of these rituals, who were traditionally organized in branches (*śākhā*). Pūrvamīmāṃsā thereby deducted the *raison d'être* from these *śākhā*s, unwillingly catering to the growing ignorance regarding Vedic ritual. Göhler aptly states: "Das Ritual wurde zur reinen Fiktion. (...) Ein korrektes "Mīmāṃsā-Ritual" durchzuführen, war allerdings unmöglich geworden, da dieses

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[1] Patton 2005: 67.
[2] Gonda 1977: 245.
[3] Staal 1989. See Michaels 2010 for a discussion of this point.

keine Bindung an irgendeine lebende Tradition mehr hatte. Es war lediglich ein Ritual in der Theorie."[4]

However, the discussions on and systematisation of Vedic texts and rituals by the Pūrvamīmāṃsā are in no way completely detached from Vedic tradition and have provided essential insights for our understanding of it. In fact, it has been convincingly argued by Clooney and others that the system as expounded in the *Sūtra*s of Jaimini (*JS*) can be read in a continuing line with the *Śrautasūtra*s.[5] Furthermore, I consider Pūrvamīmāṃsā similar to "idealized, artificial minds", which Lawson and McCauley see constructed mainly by the social sciences to neutralize "the sting of intentionality and idiosyncracy".[6] Pūrvamīmāṃsā constantly tried to remove all doubts, discrepancies, irregularities and even contradictions from the Vedic texts and the interpretative traditions expounded in the *Śrautasūtra*s. In doing so, it made its system an idealized representation, but one nevertheless based on the more individual representations by its predecessors. The viewpoints of such a system can thus yield valuable insights into the tradition which we should not neglect. The status of Pūrvamīmāṃsā in the philosophical tradition on the Indian subcontinent, handed down to us in a vast number of textual sources, can be counted as proof for the system's authority in such matters.

Before going deeper into the tradition and the ninth *adhyāya* of the *DŚ* by Śālikanātha Miśra, a critical overview of the scholarly discourse on *mantra*s is in place. This discourse can be divided into two main approaches, one being based on their use or application, the other on their language. They overlap considerably, since the analysis of the use of a *mantra* allows for conclusions on its language and *vice versa*. They are thus not in opposition, but rather represent a shift in emphasis. Furthermore, while the functional approach was prominent in earlier works dealing with *mantra*s, more recent publications have focused rather on their language. Focusing on the usage of *mantra*s scholars have arrived at different categorisations or typologies of them, which I will present in the first section. The second section will deal with positions regarding the language and meaning

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[4] Göhler 2011: 131.
[5] Clooney 1990: 79ff; also Staal 1989: 121f; Göhler 2011: 21ff.
[6] Lawson / McCauley 1990: 64.

of *mantras*. I will try to connect this review of literature with the passages from the ninth *adhyāya* of Śālikanātha's *DŚ*, which I will discuss in more detail in the subsequent chapter. The concluding section of the current chapter will generally locate the concept of modification (*ūha*) within the system of semantics and ritual as expounded by the Pūrvamīmāṃsā, especially in reference to the transfer of details (*atideśa*) from archetype (*prakṛti*) to ectype (*vikṛti*).

1.1   Categorisations and Analyses of mantras

The earliest systematic accounts dealing with *mantra*s were formulated by Fay in 1890, and by Apte in 1939-40. Both worked on the *mantra*s contained in the *Ṛgvedasaṃhitā*. In his approach Fay attempted to investigate "the relation which obtains between the *mantra* and the rite with which it is rubricated", being aware of the "subjective nature" of this undertaking.[7] He categorised *mantra*s according to "degrees of applicability" by determining how well the content according to his understanding of the meaning of a *mantra* represents or at least refers to the ritual context at which it is employed. The categories Fay established ranged between the "opposing poles" of *mantra*s with a general applicability, i.e. employed on different ritual occasions, and *mantra*s with a specific applicability, i.e. employed only in one instance.[8]

Apte presents us with an account of "the liturgical employment of a RV. mantra"[9] successively in the *Brāhmaṇa*, the *Śrauta-* and the *Gṛhyasūtra* of one Vedic branch (*śākhā*). He thereby attempts to overcome the gap "when the original RV. setting of a mantra fails to explain its liturgical employment"[10]. His analysis aims at refuting superficial judgements by Winternitz and others that *mantra*s are often mistakenly employed in rituals to whose context they do not fit. While his attempt would have met with agreement from Śālikanātha, the category of "superficial *mantra*s"[11] would certainly have

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[7] Fay 1890: 14.
[8] Ibid.: 17.
[9] Apte 1939-40: 2.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.: 4.

been rejected. The complete discussion on the modification of *mantra*s is only justified through the premise that a *mantra* has to be denotative of the ritual setting in which it is employed – however indirect or remote the denotation may appear to us. In opposition to the approach of Fay, Apte's categories are not quantitative, but qualitative, thus providing more scope for the nuances of meanings they may have.

While these early categorisations were certainly helpful in gaining a first overview and idea of the vast textual sources labeled "*mantra*", they – in many ways – not even told half of the story. They were only concerned with *mantra*s from the *Ṛgveda*, and their analysis did not take into account important contextual aspects, such as the full ritual environment and the variety of settings and functions one *mantra* could serve. The first and until today most exhaustive treatment of "*mantra*" as such was given by Gonda.[12] Rather than providing a clear definition – he attempted several preliminary ones[13] – or categorisation of *mantra*, Gonda surveyed all texts, concepts and practices associated with this term on the Indian subcontinent. Contrary to his predecessors he not only dealt with the textual sources containing the *mantra*s, but also provided references to traditions writing about them. An all-encompassing study like this, also taking the historical perspective into account, was certainly an important step, and his study remains the best entrance to the topic of the Indian *mantra* in general. While Gonda's sorting into Vedic and post-Vedic *mantra*s may be taken as irrelevant, his dealing with traditions of *mantra*-usage was accepted and continued in later works.

Subsequent research on *mantra*s has on the one hand focused on the concept within specific traditions, and has on the other hand looked in detail at their language and meaning in comparison to contemporary conceptions of language. Before dealing with some of these works in the next section, the collection of essays called *Understanding Mantras* and edited by Alper deserves mentioning for its exhaustiveness and representation of varied approaches to the study of *mantra*s.[14] The single contributors to the volume did not attempt new categorisations of *mantra*s, neither did Alper in the introductory part.

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[12] GONDA 1977.
[13] GONDA 1977: 247, 255.
[14] ALPER 1989.

He, however, raises an interesting point. Understanding the nature of *mantra*s is not achieved by seeking an overall definition or providing categorisations. It is rather their prescribed usage and meaning which helps in understanding what a specific *mantra* essentially is.[15] Alper proposed a grid reproduced in figure 1.1, on which a *mantra* can be located according to these parameters. The grid opens the possibility to locate a single *mantra* in several spots, if it is used in different contexts, thereby providing room for possible changes. I believe that also a Pūrvamīmāṃsaka would have generally approved such a categorisation.

Figure 1.1: Grid to localize a *mantra* according to Alper (ALPER 1989: 7).

While the vertical range related to the usage would not have interested him much – being concerned only with a single tradition, he would certainly not have disapproved of the horizontal axis. It does not indicate the suitability or applicability of a *mantra* to the ritual context, but the way in which the connection comes about – directly ("quotidian intention") or indirectly ("redemptive intention"). This resembles Śālikanātha's treatment of propositions as direct denotative of an aspect of the ritual, or indirectly indicative of it by – for example – praise.

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[15] ALPER 1989: 5ff.

1.2 Magical and Pragmatic Meaning

I have consciously avoided the key term "meaninglessness" in this sections's title. Nevertheless, no discussion on *mantra*s in terms of their language and meaning can avoid dealing with Staal's claim.[16] For Staal, "the meaning of a *mantra* is its ritual use" – nothing more or less.[17] All attempts at providing explanations, interpretations as to a meaning beyond the functional – irrespective of the fact that they stem from a tradition employing the *mantra* or others – cannot be accepted as its meaning proper, they are rationalisations, later superimpositions.[18] They are therefore also not translatable. Staal bases his claim on a number of observations, to which I shall try to provide the refutation of a Pūrvamīmāṃsaka: The priests uttering a *mantra* are often not aware of any meaning except that it has to be used at a certain point. Similarly, the learning process for *mantra*s emphasizes the form (proper wording and pronunciation), not the meaning. In the recitation of *mantra*s often meaningless syllables or words are added, *bījamantra*s even only consist of mere syllables, not words. Lastly, *mantra*s also do not have any intention as in communicative language, according to Austin's and Searle's taxonomies of speech acts. The Pūrvamīmāṃsaka understands himself as a ritual specialist, and Śālikanātha provides evidence in each selected *adhikaraṇa* from the ninth *adhyāya* that it is possible to provide one proper meaning for a *mantra*. In addition, such a meaning is mirrored in its ritual use, but not identical with it. Formal aspects are less of a concern in regard to *mantra*s as they are in regard to *sāman*s, and are not at all discussed in this respect by Pūrvamīmāṃsā. The meaning of *mantra*s further has to be seen in the larger Vedic context in which they appear. Taken together with the respective injunction they make man enact the ritual properly. As such they could even be seen as intentional.[19] These and more arguments will be dis-

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[16] His theses have impacts beyond the realm of *mantra*s, as they extend to ritual and language in general.

[17] Staal 1989b: 51. Staal presents his views in a number of publications. In regard to *mantra*s, they do not differ much from one another, and I am therefore mostly referring to his later contribution in Alper 1989.

[18] Staal even stretches this to the point of claiming that meaningless language in the form of mere sound-*mantras* constitutes the beginning of all language. See Staal 1989a: 253ff.

[19] See Taber 1989 on this issue.

cussed below in the analysis of the selected passages from the ninth *adhyāya* in the *DŚ*.
Staal has been criticised by many. Most prominent are the disputes between him
and Schechner on the performance and entertainment aspects of the staging of the
agnicayana[20], which serves as the basis for Staal's theses. More important in the present
context is the criticism raised by Penner, although it rather deals with Staal's emphasis
on syntax and denial of semiotics. Penner convincingly shows that Staal's comparison of
ritual and language only in terms of syntax is not tenable, since according to Saussure
language combines a sound-image with a concept. Syntax complements semiotics in
providing definite combinations in opposition to mere sign-systems, in which the com-
bination is arbitrary.[21] Along similar lines the Pūrvamīmāṃsā claims that the relation
between word and meaning is original (*autpattika*) and eternal (*nitya*), i.e. definite.
*Mantra*s consist of words, like regular language does, so they have to be expressive of
some meaning.

An interesting contribution to the question, how one can determine the proper
meaning of a *mantra*, has been made by Patton. Objecting to tendencies to take
*mantra*s either as meaningless or "magical spells", she traced the use of specific *mantra*s
from the *ṚV* in different contexts to obtain a better understanding of the seman-
tics at work in *mantra*s. At the heart of this semantics is "associative thought",
which she terms metonymy.[22] Patton thereby argues against the formalism of Staal,
instead showing that the symbols in *mantra*s created a network of associated images
very much in the sense of Gonda's analysis of *bandhu*s in the *ṚV*.[23] Patton's descrip-
tion of the working of such associative thought resembles a number of issues which will
figure in the ninth *adhyāya*[24]: It works only in a set perceptual framework – for the
Pūrvamīmāṃsā this would be the Veda and ordinary world. Associative thought is
guided by functional, contextual pragmatics – the terms discussed in the *DŚ* 9.1.11 are
assoiated with the sacrificer in his function of making the offering, which is the context

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[20] Schechner 1986 and 1987, Staal 1987.
[21] Penner 1985: 9f.
[22] Patton 2005: 2.
[23] Gonda 1965.
[24] See Patton 2005: 47ff.

of the *nirvāpamantra*. Furthermore, associative thought often works with prototypes by identifying only one common characteristic – this is also the case for the qualities which can be attributed to Indra as well as Agni in the *DŚ* 9.1.15. Patton concludes that the metonymic language in *mantra*s establishes "imaginative linkages between poetic image and gesture".[25] A *mantra* ultimately becomes applied in a certain ritual context because its language is metonymicly describing the activity taking place, or aspects of it.

Staal and Patton represent the two poles inbetween which the discourse on the meaning and language of *mantra*s has taken place recently. What I consider still underrepresented in this discourse are the views and methods of the traditions which used these *mantra*s. Patton has shown the possibility of such an application, and in this connection mention must also be made of a discussion by Houben of the riddle hymn *ṚV* 1.164 used at the *pravargya*.[26] His detailed reading of the hymn parallel to the ritual is an exemplary – and hopefully not the last – attempt at establishing a coherent meaning of a text which was long assumed to be a riddle. Even though Houben does not deal with the modification of a *mantra*, his methodology and argumentation resembles that of Pūrvamīmāṃsā. The claim that *mantra*s are without a meaning in themselves is difficult to be upheld in light of his analysis.

1.3   Hermeneutics, Transfer and Modification

The starting point for all considerations according to Pūrvamīmāṃsā is the authorless Veda, which provides all knowledge in regard to *dharma*. However, while the collections of Vedic *mantra*s in the *Ṛg-*, *Sāma-* and *Yajurvedasaṃhitā* were considered as the Veda proper by earlier thinkers, Pūrvamīmāṃsā develops its interpretation of the Vedic corpus from the *Brāhmaṇa*s. The injunctions (*codanā*, *vidhi*[27]) contained in them are seen as the core of *śruti*, they reveal hitherto unknown (*apūrva*) truths by enjoining man to

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[25] Ibid.: 58.

[26] HOUBEN 2000.

[27] See Clooney for a distinction between the two terms according to Jaimini's usage of them (CLOONEY 1990: 137f). Śālikanātha seems to prefer the term *vidhi*, for which reason no differentiation in the denotation can be made.

perform the rituals they mention. All other statements found in the Veda derive their meaning, purpose, even *raison d'être* by being subordinated to these injunctions. They supply knowledge of the means (*sādhana*) and the manner (*itikartavyatā*) for accomplishing the ritual, resulting in the fruit (*sādhya*). Thus, the correct enactment of the Vedic rituals enjoined in the *Brāhmaṇa*s is the overall purpose of the Veda, *dharma* not only denotes the prescription of this correct enactment, but the enactment itself, through which the word becomes reconfirmed and the order of things upheld.

Pūrvamīmāṃsā further differentiates its category "injunction" according to the position of the enjoined act in the ritual. The overall, "primary injunction" (*apūrvakarmavidhi*, *karmotpattivākya*) prescribes the main act (*pradhāna*), usually the giving of the prepared substance in the sacrificial fire. Preparatory acts, such as the threshing of the rice grains, are enjoined in "secondary injunctions" (*guṇavidhi*). Jha mentions further distinctions of injunctions – he calls them *vākya*, sentence – in relation to their content.[28]

Admittedly, injunctive sentences make up only a rather small part of the Vedic texts. Moreover, the example *par excellence* for an injunction in Pūrvamīmāṃsā sources, "one desiring heaven should sacrifice" (*svargakāmo yajeta*), cannot be traced back to any Vedic source at all.[29] Pūrvamīmāṃsā thus attempts to streamline its interpretation and analysis of the remaining parts of the Veda to arrive at a coherent, unified reading of the whole corpus. Two further categories of passages are added to that of injunctions: explanatory, eulogistic statements (*arthavāda*), and formulas recited or sung (*mantra*). *Mantra*s still enjoy a higher rank than *arthavāda*s in the textual hierarchy, as they are directly used in the ritual. Furthermore, *mantra*s are more often seen as directly denoting the ritual context, while propositions in *arthavāda*s never directly denote a factual meaning. They only provide additional explanations, associations or allusions for a purpose beyond the mere statement of facts – often simply to motivate the sacrificer to

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[28] Jha 1978 (1911): 111f. Besides the *karmotpattivākya* and *guṇavākya*, they are: injunctions of a result (*phalavākya*), injunctions of details for a result (*phalāyaguṇavākya*), injunctions of an act with accessories (*saguṇakarmotpattivākya*). The added value, however, for the general logic of the textual division of Pūrvamīmāṃsā can be neglected.

[29] For the interpretation of this basic injunction according to the Prābhākaras see Wicher 1994; further Yoshimizu 1997: 149ff.

proceed as prescribed.[30]

As stated before, the ultimate purpose and meaning of the Veda is to provide man with the knowledge of *dharma*, constituted by the proper execution of Vedic rituals. The consequence is that there has to be a direct relation between the Vedic word and the ritual. Since action is the purpose, the ultimate essence of it is contained in the verbal form of the injunction, the optative enjoining one to act accordingly. But this pure form of the injunction has to be substantiated by a noun denoting the result. According to the Prābhākaras only in combination can the injunction fullfil its purpose and make one begin the ritual. Yoshimizu has analysed in depth the two steps in understanding the directive (*niyoga*) in an injunction: The mentioning of the result (*svargakāma* in the common example) makes the man desiring the result one who is authorised (*adhikārin*) to perform the ritual. Only in a second step does he also become the agent (*kartṛ*), after he has realised the obligation to follow the directive (*niyojya*) he actually performs the prescribed act.[31]

The preceding remarks have already offered an insight into the parallelity between the structure of the Veda as "text" and as "act" in the systematisation of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā. To be more explicit, every constituent, the substance (*dravya*), the sacrificer (*yajamāna*), the main act (*pradhāna*), the subordinate act (*aṅga*), the embellishments (*saṃskāra*), the deity (*devatā*), etc., has its existence in the ritual grounded in some Vedic statement. The more directly it is expressed, the less dependent it is in the sytactical-semantic structure, and the closer it is to the main injunction, the more importance it has in the ritual and the more directly it contributes to its main act. It is therefore a major concern of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā to define in detail means to properly categorise terms denoting constituents of a ritual in the syntactical semantic context. As we will see in the subsequent analysis of the *DŚ*, localizing the proper meaning of a passage in its syntactic-semantic context forms the basis for arriving at a decision on the modification of the detail denoted by the phrase. The syntactical-semantic function of a phrase and its denoted meaning are crucial for understanding ritual and *mantra*s according to the Pūrvamīmāṃsā.

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[30] See *DŚ* 9.1.15, p. 229.
[31] YOSHIMIZU 1997: 158ff.

In this connection the Prābhākaras – and most notably Śālikanātha in his *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā* – have advocated the *anvitābhidhānavāda*.[32] A term or phrase by itself has a general, universal denotation – "*go*" denoting "cow" in general. While the followers of Kumārila claim that the meaning of a sentence is the sum total of the meanings of its words, the followers of Prabhākara hold that the meaning of a sentence is beyond this sum total. In fact, the single terms only receive their full, specific denotation through their syntactical-semantic role in the overall sentence meaning.[33] The Prābhākaras furthermore do not define "sentence" in the narrow sense as the grammarians. The sentence-unit (*ekavākya*) consists of all statements which can be subordinated (*viniyoga*) to the directive (*niyoga*) by their words requiring each other (*ākāṅkṣā*) to complete the sentence-unit.[34] A sentence is thus not a syntactical unit in the modern sense, but one rather defined by semantics.

To return to the means to locate a specific ritual constituent denoted in a Vedic sentence, six such means have been identified and set in a specific hierarchy by Pūrvamīmāṃsā.

1. The most immediate information is gained from the direct statement in the Veda, called *śruti*. It is mostly the word in the syntactical connection that is meant here, which results in the concrete meaning. Because the syntactical connection is mostly determined by the case endings depending on the verb, *śruti* mainly functions in regard to injunctions.

2. For *mantra*s, however, indicative phrases (*liṅga*) may provide information on which occasion it should be uttered in case that no direct injunction to this end is found.

3. A third hint may be gathered by taking into consideration the complete "sentence" (*vākya*). As was described above, the sentence can consist of a number of distinct statements, which may – for example – be connected through pronomina. Because pronomina depend on referential terms, most likely in the injunction, these connected statements can specify how a constituent is to be subordinated into the

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[32] See JHA 1978: 62, and WICHER 1984: 14ff for more.
[33] See WICHER 1987: 14ff.
[34] YOSHIMIZU 1997: 119.

ritual whole. Inasmuch as the words are in mutual need (*ākāṅkṣā*), so are the ritual constituents.

4. Furthermore, apparently independent statements may be belonging to the same larger context (*prakaraṇa*).[35] Again parallel to the textual relation of two distinct sentence-units two distinct ritual acts can be related to each other by means of context (*prakaraṇa*). In a larger ritual complex, for example, a preparatory act is laid down by a distinct injunction, which belongs in the context of the injunction of the main ritual act (*pradhāna*) and is thus subordinate to it. The textual context to some degree corresponds to the complete ritual procedure (*itikartavyatā*) in regard to archetpyes which are fully described in the Veda. Ectypes, however, usually lack most details of their *itikartavyatā*.

5. The order or place in which constituents are expressed in a Vedic statement (*krama/sthāna*) also helps in determining the importance of the constituents. For example, a sequence of *mantra*s should be recited in the same order as they are given in the Vedic source.

6. The last means is the etymological naming a ritual constituent might be given (*samākhyā*). The *iḍopahvānamantra* is an invitation to the *iḍā*, and is thus connected by its name to the *iḍā* in the *darśa*- and *pūrṇamāsa*.[36]

The final two means may appear to be incorporated in the concept of *śruti* in that they bear a rather direct relation to individual text-units.

The applicability of each of these six means decreases according to the outline above: *Śruti* certainly is the strongest indicator, while a mere name can be misleading. A brief example, taken from *adhikaraṇa* 9.1.11 and 12, at *JS* 9.1.36-39, shall illustrate this. The *nirvāpamantra* (TS 1.1.4.2) is recited at the *darśa*- and *pūrṇamāsa*, and contains the terms *savitṛ*, *aśvin*, *pūśan*, and *agni*. By means of *śruti*, i.e. taking the terms as directly denotative, the *pūrvapakṣin* argues that all terms have to denote deities. As a

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[35] See for example the *DŚ* 9.3.3, p. 324.
[36] See *DŚ* 9.1.13 and 14.

mantra can only denote deities which actually are present in the ritual during which it is recited, all these deities must be deities of the sacrifice. This argumentation, however, only applies to the term Agni in the *siddhānta*. *Śruti* only carries weight in regard to injunctions, and since Agni is laid down for the *darśa-* and *pūrṇamāsa* as the deity to which the offering is directed, the *mantra* refers to that deity.[37] The case is, however, completely different for the other terms. There exists no *śruti* to the effect that also these deities are present at the *darśa-* and *pūrṇamāsa*. As *mantra*s cannot enjoin anything, their denotation must lie with something else. Through the context at which the *mantra* comes to be employed and due to its name, it is clear that its purpose and meaning is to praise the offering made by the sacrificer. The terms *savitṛ* and *pūṣan* indicate (*liṅga*) the sacrificer, the term *aśvin* him and his wife. While in theory a "weaker" hermeneutical means only carries force in case the stronger cannot be taken into account in the specific instance, in praxis more than one means may support the correct conclusion. In the given example it is the ritual context of the *mantra* (*prakaraṇa*) determining its meaning and purpose, and this is supported by the name of the *mantra* itself.

To briefly summarize the above: The emphasis of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā on a hermeneutical approach towards the Veda, culminating in a strict hierarchy of its elements analysable through a set of tools, is mirrored in the system's construction of ritual out of distinct constituents in a complex, but clearly hierarchically structured relational network. This parallelity surfaces in a syntactical-semantic interpretation of the texts which corresponds to the pragmatic concerns of ritual. In the following I will present more insights into the concepts of the transfer (*atideśa*) and modification (*ūha*) of ritual details.

According to Śabara the second half of *adhyāya*s of the *JS*s stands in opposition to the first half. The latter deals with issues in the context of archetypal rituals (*prakṛti*), for which the Veda lays down the procedure. *Adhyāya*s seven through twelve complementarily deal with issues in the context of rituals not fully laid down in the Veda, called *vikṛti*.[38] While early scholars of Pūrvamīmāṃsā have misjudged these later *adhyāya*s as

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[37] See *DŚ* 9.1.12, p. 215f.

[38] Clooney has justly questioned the traditional structure of the *JS* based on Śabara's division (CLOONEY 1990: 55f). Kumārila rather draws the line between direct injunctions dealt with in the

collections of unsystematically amassed examples supporting or deviating from a variety
of rules made more or less explicit in between[39], Clooney has convincingly demonstrated
the high level of systematisation, logic and consistency in argumentation also in these
sections of the *JS*.[40] The argumentation within textual units is often proceeding from
the most general rule to subordinate rules and subsequent exceptions to those rules. In
such manner also the seventh to twelth *adhyāya*s step by step lead the ritual specialist
to construct the full procedure of an ectypal ritual (*vikṛti*).

A first systematisation of the Vedic rituals according to the scheme *prakṛti-vikṛti*,
archetype-ectype or model ritual and derivative ritual, was already achieved in the
*ŚS*s.[41]. While the archetype is fully described in the Vedic sources, ectypes usually lack
information on the procedure (*itikartavyatā*), but also on the material (*dravya*) or the
deity (*devatā*). There may only be an injunction given to the effect that "ritual A should
be accordingly", or there may be similarity in the naming of certain constituents.[42] As
a consequence ritual details have to be applied by extension or transfer (*atideśa*) to the
vikṛti, the general rule being: The ectype has the same form as the archetype[43]. It is
noteworthy that an ectype can only have a single archetype, i.e. constituents cannot
be transferred from several archetypes. In order to grasp the concept of *atideśa*, the
Pūrvamīmāṃsā felt compelled to reiterate the hierarchical structure of complex rituals.
All constituents of such a complex ultimately relate to the *apūrva* or *kārya* of the main
act (*pradhāna*) and are thus specific to this ritual. Otherwise they could apply to all
rituals without the concept of transfer. For the same reason rituals can only be related
as archetype and ectype, if they are laid down in the same context (*prakaraṇa*). As is the
case for a number of concept of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā, the procedure for determining the

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first six, and sacrificial matters based on indirect implication dealt with in the second six *adhyāya*s.
This, however, should not lead to the conclusion that Śabara was completely mistaken, and – in an
admittedly reductionist fashion – it is taken over for the present purpose. See also JHA 1942: 328.

[39] Keith labels these sections as of "necessarily little value" (KEITH 1921: 79). Jacobi argues along
similar lines and denies these sections the status of "Philosophie im eigentlichen Sinne" (JACOBI 1929:
145).

[40] CLOONEY 1990: Chapter II.

[41] GÖHLER 2011: 21ff.

[42] JHA 1942: 328.

[43] *prakṛtivad vikṛtiḥ kartavyā* (JHA 1942: 330). The *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.3.21 formulates: *yat prakṛtau tad
vikṛtau kartavyam.*

transfer of details involves identifying similarities and parallels. A ritual constituent can only be transferred, if it comes to be employed in the same place at the ectype as in the archetype, thus sharing its essential function. Furthermore, it must be justified either by the parallelity being directly declared or indicated, or by a parallelity of naming of the ritual as such or the constituent to be transferred.

Needless to say, there would hardly be any difference between archetype and ectype(s) – or amongst the latter, if all constituents would simply be transferred. The new, ectypal ritual has its own *kārya*, despite its close relation to the archetype, and thus the ritual setting is distinct. The procedure has to do justice to this difference, therefore not all details come to be transferred. The transfer is determined for specific conditions presented in *adhyāya* seven. Furthermore, transferred constituents may be adapted to the new context by modifying them (*ūha*), or by excluding them from the ectype altogether. Modification (*ūha*[44]) is said to affect three kinds of constituents: *mantra*s, *sāman*s, and embellishments (*saṃskāra*).[45] This is in line with the hierarchical structure of rituals. The ritual in its core is an interplay between a material, the act of giving it into the fire, the deity presiding, and the sacrificer. A change in these core constituents would not be based on a previous transfer (*atideśa*), which will be explained to be a mandatory precondition for modification below, but would directly be enjoined for the ectype. Hence, modification can only come into play for the three kinds of constituents subordinated to these.

In his commentary on *JS* 9.1.1 Śālikanātha in the *DŚ* programmatically discusses the nature of modification in general. Considering the modification of a ritual detail (*ūha*) is said by him to be the natural consequence of its transfer (*atideśa*) from an archetype (*prakṛti*) to an ectype (*vikṛti*).[46] While the transfer of a specific detail (*viśeṣātideśa*) is in some way based on direct Vedic instruction (*upadeśa*), modification sets in when no such reference is available anymore, i.e. the concluding part of the injunction (*vidhyanta*, ibid.) is missing. It thus is defined as "logical deduction" (*tarka*) by Śālika-

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[44] Jaimini rather speaks of *vikāra*. See CLOONEY 1990: 97.

[45] The *DŚ* on p. 145 quotes the *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.1.1 (*mantrasāmasaṃskāraviṣayaḥ*) only after discussing the character and process of modification outlined below.

[46] See *DŚ*, p. 135.

nātha (p. 136). But the origin of this deduction has to lie in a direct Vedic instruction (*upadeśa*) – there is no reasoning exclusive of the context of the Veda for Śālikanātha.[47] Whether or not a specific detail transferred to an ectype has to be modified depends on the relation of the detail to "what is to be done" (*kārya*[48]). The ectype has its own *kārya* through a distinct injunction, but the procedure (*prayoga*) thereof is not prescribed in the Veda, it has to be deducted (*tarkāvagamya*).[49] The *pūrvapakṣin* objects that the question, by what factor details of the ritual procedure are determined, has already been dealt with (in the seventh *adhyāya*) and is thus redundant. By arguing that even the decision, whether or not a certain detail has to be modified, depends on the primary injunction because the details are prompted by its *kārya*, the *siddhāntin* justifies this question to be raised yet again. For the opponent, however, the difference to simply transferring a detail from the archetype to the ectype (*atideśa*) is not at all clear (p. 145). It is essential to determine the function of a detail in view of the *kārya* – if the function is different in the ectypal context, the detail may have to be modified. As the *kārya* is expressed in an injunction, all logical deduction (*tarka*) regarding modification has to be based on that injunction.

As the analysis in the following chapter will show, Śālikanātha was right in emphasizing the mental effort implied in the concept of modification. While the reference to the Veda remains prominent in the discussion, the conclusions about the role and meaning of statements from *mantra*s in their ritual context are arrived at to a large part without specific Vedic instructions (*upadeśa*).

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[47] Clooney notes that "[b]oth Śabara and Kumārila [...] describe the distinction between *upadeśa* and *atideśa* as that between the *pratyakṣavihita* and the *anumānavihita* (or *ānumānikavacanopadiṣṭa*) details" (CLOONEY 1990: 121f). For them already the transfer of details involves a kind of logical deduction. For Śālikanātha, however, the mental effort seems less important in view of its source, a direct instruction found in the Veda.

[48] According to Wicher *kārya* replaces *dharma* in Prabhākara's system. The obligation and directive to act according to the Veda is the object (*artha*) of the Veda – see WICHER 1987: 31. This is reiterated by Śālikanātha in the *DŚ* on p. 139.

[49] *DŚ*, p. 143.

2 The modification of mantras according to the Dīpaśikhā

In the following chapters I will present an analytical summary of some of the *adhikaraṇa*s from the ninth *adhyāya* of the *DŚ* which discuss the modification (*ūha*) of *mantra*s. My presentation will refer back to the theoretical considerations of the previous chapter, and will ultimately aim at establishing the genuine treatment of *mantra*s and their modification in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā as expounded by Śālikanātha.

2.1 The complexity of meaning – a selection of adhikaraṇas

In my analysis I will deal with a number of *adhikaraṇa*s included in the subsequent edition and translation. I mainly follow the order in which they appear in the *DŚ*, as their sequence also represents a certain systematic approach of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā's treatment of the topics. The further we advance into the *adhyāya*, the more specific the cases become. The examples are not, however, becoming less important, but the phrases in *mantra*s under scrutiny denote items with an increasingly lower status in the ritual hierarchy. The concluding *adhikaraṇa*s all deal with sections of the *adhrigu-praiṣa-mantra* employed at the *agnīṣomīyā*. Although they touch upon topics presented before, their role is to represent certain exceptions to the general guidelines for modifcation, as is evident especially in 9.3.12. It will further be seen that Śālikanātha is very familiar with the Pūrvamīmāṃsā's "scientific method"[1]. He establishes cross-references between topics not given in the *ŚBh*, widening the context for discussion.

The first *mantra* discussed in regard to its modification is the *nirvāpamantra*[2] employed at the *darśa-* and *pūrṇamāsa*. It is dealt with in the *adhikaraṇa*s 9.1.11 and 9.1.12. Besides discussing the same *mantra*, the two *adhikaraṇa*s are connected by the ritual item denoted in the propositions, i.e. certain deities. One would expect a reversed order of these *adhikaraṇa*s, as only the latter considers the main proposition in the *mantra*,

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[1] The stringent methodology for the analysis of sentences is complemented by an equally stringent system of argumentation, which is based on the creation of analogies and cross-references.

[2] *TS* 1.1.4.2. This *mantra* also appears in the *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* 14.1.2.7 and the *Vājasaneyisaṃhitā* 37.1. However, Pūrvamīmāṃsā is traditionally associated with the Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda, I therefore refer to the sources belonging to that branch throughout.

agnaye juṣṭaṃ nirvapāmi, in which the main deity of the ritual, Agni, is mentioned. It seems that for the Pūrvamīmāṃsaka the case is rather clear: At the ectypal *saurya*, in which the main deity is not Agni but Sūrya, the term denotative of the deity in the *mantra* has to be modified to *sūryāya*. Only the preceding discussion on the further phrases included in the proposition motivate the *pūrvapakṣin* to argue against this straightforward case in analogy to the *siddhānta* in 9.1.11.

The main question raised in both *adhikaraṇa*s then is: What do the terms under scrutiny denote in view of the ritual context in which the *mantra* is employed? The *mantra* – as its name already suggests – accompanies the main offering, in which the sacrificer gives the offering substance away into the fire for the deity. Although Pūrvamīmāṃsā does not consider deities as essential or instrumental for the success of a ritual[3], they are nevertheless one basic item in the setting of a ritual. It is argued by the *siddhāntin* that the dative case in *agnaye* is not mainly due to its connection with the past participle *juṣṭa*, but because Agni is the object of the act of offering (p. 214). The *mantra* thus echoes the assumed extended injunction for the ritual, in which the deity would also figure in the dative case (p. 217): *svargakāmo darśapūrṇamāsenāgnaye yajeta.*

The opponent does not accept this meaning to be expressed in the statement. For him *agnaye* depends solely on the past participle *juṣṭa*, and he claims that in the reading of the *siddhāntin* the *mantra* would be contradicting the ritual reality: "I offer what has been enjoyed (*juṣṭa*) by Agni" (p. 215), while the offering is only taking place with the recitation of the *mantra*. Therefore, the term Agni in the *mantra* cannot directly denote the main deity of the *darśa-* and *pūrṇamāsa*, it has to indicate something else.

This conclusion was reached in *adhikaraṇa* 9.1.11 in regard to the terms *savitṛ*, *pūṣan* and *aśvin*.[4] For the *pūrvapakṣin* it was obvious that these terms denote deities. And since the *mantra* mentions the deities, they have to appear in the context of the *darśa-* and *pūrṇamāsa*, only such a "seen meaning" (*dṛṣṭārtha*) can justify their mentioning (p. 209). Either each deity is part of the ritual, or the terms are all expressive of the

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[3] See CLOONEY 1997.

[4] These appear in the first half of the proposition: *devasya tvā savituḥ prasave 'śvinor bāhubhyām pūṣṇo hastābhyām agnaye juṣṭaṃ nirvapāmi* (*TS* 1.1.4.2).

main deity, Agni. In any case the proposition would be split into distinct statements (p. 211f), as in the case of the *mantra* beginning with *syonaṃ te*[5], which was discussed in the context of *JS* 3.3.14. For the *pūrvapakṣin* his claim is further substantiated by the subordination (*viniyoga*) of the *mantra* to the *kārya*, the syntactical connection of the terms (*anvaya*) suggests the deities to be offered to (p. 211).

The *siddhāntin* rejects the opponent's assumption of such a *kārya* as not based on any proper means of knowledge (p. 212). The *kārya* can only be enjoined by the injunction, not by a *mantra*. Furthermore, the seen meaning of a *mantra* is praise – here of the act of offering. The meaning of the proposition is praising the offering by motivating the sacrificer, denoted by the terms apparently referring to deities (p. 213). The terms *savitṛ* and *pūṣan* thus indicate the sacrificer, *aśvin* the sacrificer and his wife, assisting him in the offering. Their motivation is clearly subordinated to the overall meaning of praise, which remains the same in the ectypal *sattra* with several sacrificers. Therefore, the correct conclusion is that these terms do not require any modification in the ectype. Returning to *adhikaraṇa* 9.1.12, the view of the *pūrvapakṣin* following the line of the *siddhānta* in 9.1.11 is refuted by two main arguments. The use of the dative case in *agnaye* mirrors the injunction for the offering, as was mentioned above. Furthermore, the term *juṣṭa* does not necessarily express an already accomplished act. Śālikanātha refers to Pāṇini, *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 3.3.132, declaring that in case of an expectation the suffix *-kta* can also indicate an act in the present or future tense (p. 219). The correct meaning of the proposition, therefore, is: "I offer what will have been enjoyed by Agni."

This *adhikaraṇa* has an optional reading, in which the term *dhānya* appearing in a *mantra*[6] for the preparation of the oblation at the *darśa-* and *pūrṇamāsa* (p. 219ff) is under scrutiny. The *pūrvapakṣin* claims that the term has to be modified, as it denotes paddy, the unhusked rice, while the ritual act involves husked rice (*vrīhi*). He thus again sees an analogy to the treatment of the term *agnaye* in the *nirvāpamantra*. It is interesting that neither Śālikanātha nor Śabara argue with the obvious here, as elsewhere[7]:

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[5] *MŚS* 1.2.6.19-22.

[6] *TB* 3.2.3.6.

[7] In 9.3.4 it is explicitly stated that the *mantra* has to be employed without modification at the archetype, because it is validly enjoined there.

Modification concerns ectypal ritual settings, not archetypes. Different to the case of the *nirvāpamantra*, the *siddhāntin* has to concede that *dhānya* includes the husked rice through indication (*lakṣaṇā*) and thus is not modified. A comparison to worldly uses of languages shows that expressions using *totum pro parte* are commonly accepted, i.e. "eating paddy" actually means "eating rice" (p. 221). Husked rice being a product obtained from unhusked rice, the term *dhānya* is accepted as denotative of the ritual situation and is not changed. It is noteworthy in this respect that even the possibility of modifying a *mantra* in an archetypal setting is seriously considered. However, neither Śabara nor Śālikanātha mention this. The former only adds that in the ectypal *śākyā-nāmayanam* the term has to be modified to *māṃsam*, as the offering is made of meat there.[8]

Important aspects are already revealed by these first two *adhikaraṇa*s. The main proposition of a *mantra* has a direct connection to the ritual activity at which it is recited, it thus has to "fit" in the sense that its wording should be directly denotative rather than only indicative. One of the main purposes of a *mantra* is praise. The proposition thus does not have a factual meaning, but praises the act and thereby motivates the sacrificer to perform it accordingly (p. 213). The act being primary, the remaining parts of the proposition denote secondary aspects and can be read in terms of indication or metonymy – very much in the sense of Patton.[9] Secondary meaning based on indication certainly is less prone to modification in a new, ectypal context.

From the deities and the offering-substance attention shifts to the sacrificer, the priests, and the fruit of the sacrifice in the following two *adhikaraṇa*s, 9.1.13 and 9.1.14. The discussion revolves around the *iḍopahvānamantra*[10], with which the priests are summoned to partake in the eating of the *iḍā*, a portion made from the sacrificial cake (*puroḍāśa*) in the *darśa-* and *pūrṇamāsa*. The question is, which role the sacrificer plays in the *mantra* according to the meaning of the term *yajñapati* in its proposition. The general meaning is accepted by both, *pūrvapakṣa* and *siddhānta*, to be that the sacrificer

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[8] *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.1.39, second interpretation.
[9] Patton 2005.
[10] *TS* 2.6.7.4.

will obtain prosperity through the performance of the *iḍā* with the help of the invited priests. But what is the core proposition? The prosperity as a promise to motivate the sacrificer? Or the prosperity as the fruit of the *iḍā*, to which the priests are summoned? The latter view represents the *siddhānta*. Śālikanātha again – as in 9.1.11 – lets the *pūrvapakṣin* adduce the example of the *mantra* beginning with *syonaṃ te*, consisting of several distinct statements (*vākyabheda*), to argue that the *iḍopahvāna* also consists of two distinct propositions (p. 223). The one concerning the sacrificer promises him the desired fruit in the form of prosperity through the verb *vṛdh*, the other invites the priests.

For the *siddhāntin*, however, the mentioned prosperity is only a subordinate aspect of the main proposition that the priests are summoned to the *iḍā*. For this purpose the *mantra* has been enjoined, this represents the *kārya* (p. 224). The premise of *ekavākyatva*, that this passage forms a single, coherent sentence, can easily be upheld by remembering the respective injunction. Indeed it is together with this injunction that the *mantra* forms a single statement (*ekavākya*). The prosperity, which is assumed by the opponent as the main aspect, is nowhere remembered to be mentioned as to be effected, and can thus not be the main aspect. In Śālikanātha's argumentation the referentiality to the injunction is not made as explicit as in the *ŚBh* on this topic. Though I cannot adduce clear evidence, it seems to me that Śālikanātha wants to give more weight to the implicit argument that the proposition as such, even without the injunction as reference, does not have the meaning of promising the fruit for the sacrificer. After all, this is only mentioned in a subordinate relative clause, while the main clause expresses the summoning and praising of the priests. The prosperity is inferred (*anumāna*, p. 223f) as resulting from the *iḍā*, which the proposition expresses. Since the prosperity of the sacrificer aims at summoning the priests, no modification is required at the ectypal *sattra* at which there are several sacrificers.

The following *adhikaraṇa* 9.1.14 again discusses a *mantra*, namely the *sūktavāka-mantra*[11], which is recited by the *hotṛ* towards the conclusion of the *darśa-* and *pūrṇa-*

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[11] *TB* 3.5.10.4.

māsa when the sacrificial seat (*prastara*) is disposed of in the fire. The *mantra* praises heaven and earth, and then mentions the sacrificer and his expected fruit, longevity (*āyus*). According to the *pūrvapakṣin*, the term "sacrificer" (*yajamāna*) in the *mantra* is subordinated to the fruit mentioned in the same, namely longevity. The fruit is the primary meaning of the proposition, and the sacrificer is only secondary to it. Also in the ritual setting the sacrificer only renders assistance to the offering of the grass-bedding, for which longevity is the fruit (p. 224). The sacrificer's connection to the ritual and the fruit is not directly denoted, and the *mantra* can be employed at a ritual involving many sacrificers without modification.

The *siddhāntin* concedes to his opponent that the sacrificer is subordinated to the fruit (p. 225). However, in contrast to the *iḍopahvānamantra* the fruit forms the main aspect of the proposition, it is mentioned without referring to something else – such as the summoning of the priests. According to Śālikanātha the fruit is directly connected to the individual sacrificer, its mentioning is an appeal to his desire to obtain the fruit (p. 225). In the systematisation of the Prābhākaras, the mentioning of the fruit is necessary for the individual sacrificer to consider himself authorised (*adhikārin*) and compelled (*niyojya*) to execute the injunction.[12] The fruit provides the *sādhya* for the sacrificer (p. 225). Śālikanātha further argues, that the desire to obtain the fruit is a quality of the specific sacrificer, and that it is independent of the role in the overall ritual.[13] The meaning of the *sūktavākamantra* clearly emphasizes the fruit in direct connection to the sacrificer. The term *yajamāna*, therefore, has to be changed at an ectype according to the number of sacrificers involved.

The discussion in the *adhikaraṇa*s 9.1.13 and 9.1.14 yields a further interesting issue. Some have claimed that the argumentation advanced by the Pūrvamīmāṃsā – but already made by the *Brāhmaṇa*s – to provide a *mantra* with a clear meaning is superimposed on the text from the ritual context.[14] The chain of causality has to be viewed

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[12] Yoshimizu 1997: 161ff.

[13] The offering of the grass-bedding is only a secondary act (*aṅga*) included in the *darśa-* and *pūrṇamāsa*, its fruit is thus also secondary. However, the same argument would apply to the main fruit (p. 226).

[14] Staal speaks of the meaning of a *mantra* solely resting "in its ritual use", with all other explanations being mere "rationalisations" (Staal 1998: 51f.). Thompson supports this claim in a modified form

in a different light in my opinion: The meaning of a *mantra* has to align to the ritual context. But for the Pūrvamīmāṃsā it does so by its own meaning. It is no superimposition that the fruit for the sacrificer is directly meant in the *sūktavākamantra*, while it is mentioned for a different purpose in the *iḍopahvāna*. Ritual context and meaning of a *mantra* are *per se* univocal, the former does not cause the latter to be read as such. Śālikanātha commences the following *adhikaraṇa* 9.1.15 with the *siddhāntin* citing the position of the *pūrvapakṣa* in direct opposition to the correct view. While thus far denotations of deities, persons involved in the sacrifice – sacrificer, wife, priest – and of the fruit were scrutinized, the present *adhikaraṇa* shifts attention to attributions made in the *subrahmaṇyānigada*[15]. This *mantra* is recited at the *jyotiṣṭoma* to invite Indra to preside over the ritual. The same *mantra* will be employed at the ectypal *agniṣṭut*, with the term Indra being replaced by Agni in analogy to the conclusion in *adhikaraṇa* 9.1.12 – though this is not made explicit. The question arises, whether the stated attributes mean specific qualities of Indra, or whether they mean qualities which the deity of the sacrifice possesses. In the former case, advocated by the *pūrvapakṣin*, the qualities would have to be modified to be suitable to Agni in the ectype, while the *siddhāntin* argues for the latter conclusion, in which case the same qualities remain applicable for Agni at the ectype.

Again, rather than the conclusion the argumentation is of interest on both sides. Very explicitly in this *adhikaraṇa* reference is made to examples and knowledge outside the Vedic realm. The *pūrvapakṣin* claims that the qualities are well-known to belong to Indra, which the *siddhāntin* denies to be the case (p. 227f). The *pūrvapakṣin* further compares the attribution in the *mantra* to the general attribution in: "the earth containing fragrance" (*gandhavatī pṛthvī*, p. 228). But for the *siddhāntin* such an attribution points to something beyond the actual earth and is thus not comparable to the case at hand. Rather, as it is not known that the mentioned attributes are genuinely those of Indra, it can already be deducted that they are attributions for the deity of the sacrifice, whichever that may be. The opponent subsequently aims at beating the *siddhāntin*

(Thompson 1997: 574f.).

[15] *TĀ* 1.12.3-4.

with his own weapons. He adduces a further indicative text, directly attributing the said qualities to Indra and providing justifications of these attributions in the form of stories and the like. Referring to a further passage to support one's argument is a very legitimate instrument for the Pūrvamīmāṃsā, specifically in view of its striving for *ekavākyatva* in its broadest sense.[16] However, the *siddhāntin* proves his opponent wrong in this instance. The adduced passage is part of an *arthavāda*. Such passages only provide knowledge in the context of the relevant injunction, but not factual knowledge. The apparent attribution of the qualities to Indra in the *arthavāda* in fact supports the correct claim that they are not well-known qualities of that deity (p. 229f). The *arthavāda* eulogizes the deity by the attributes to justify its presence in the ritual, and this applies to another deity as well. Śālikanātha briefly provides one further argument in favour of the meaning "qualities of the deity of the sacrifice" (p. 230): If the qualities were genuinely those of Indra, they would apply in all cases where he is present, and as such the *subrahmaṇyānigada* would have to be used whenever Indra is the main deity of a ritual.

This *adhikaraṇa* has an optional interpretation in the course of which again reference is made to "common sense". The heifer at the archetypal *jyotiṣṭoma* is brought to the sacrificial arena with a *mantra*[17] attributing the typical products of a cow to it, such as milk (p. 230). At the ectypal *sādyaskra*, a calf replaces the heifer. For the *pūrvapakṣin* it is common sense that the female heifer is attributed with the products of the cow, since it will one day become one and provide the mentioned products. The male calf, however, will not do so, and thus the attributions do not apply at the ectype – the *mantra* has to be changed. The *siddhāntin*, like in the primary interpretation of the *adhikaraṇa*, corrects the opponent's "common sense". In some future time everything is possible: On the one hand the heifer could become a barren cow, on the other hand the calf could beget a heifer which then would yield the products of a cow (p. 231). What is understood by common sense is the situation at hand, and neither heifer nor calf produce milk etc. The attributions, therefore, praise the animal and are applicable

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[16] See Yoshimizu 1997: 101ff, and McCrea 2000: 433ff for more.

[17] *ŚB* 3.3.3.1-2.

at archetype and ectype.

The outlined discussion clearly shows that Śālikanātha aims at a "middle path". He does still frequently rely on references to the ritual and textual context in which the respective *mantra* is employed. But he also wants to show that the resulting meaning of a *mantra* essentially does not differ from the meaning of ordinary, worldly statements and situations. Furthermore, by directly connecting the *mantra*-passage with worldly assumptions he situates their meaning somewhere between one derived from ritual pragmatism and one understood independently out of the passage as such.

After *adhikaraṇa* 9.1.16 the discussion of the modification of *mantra*s is left, turning to the modification of *sāman*s in the second *pāda*. It is taken up again at the beginning of the third *pāda*.

*Adhikaraṇa*s 9.3.4 and 9.3.5 discuss one of the rare instances in which the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* cannot accommodate a contradiction within *śruti* itself, and has to accept an option. At the *agnīṣomīyā* a *mantra* is enjoined accompanying the tying of the animal to the sacrificial post with a noose. This *mantra* exists in two recensions. *MS* 1.2.15 mentions the noose (*pāśa*) in the singular, while *TS* 3.1.4.4 mentions it in the plural. As was the case already in the presentation of *adhikaraṇa*s 9.1.11 and 9.1.12, the treatment of these two versions is discussed first – in 9.3.4 – in regard to an ectypal context in which two animals are tied to the post, and only in the subsequent *adhikaraṇa* in the context of the archetype. The correct procedure for the ectype is rather obvious. The *mantra* is meant to accompany the tying of the two distinct animals. Neither the singular noose in *MS* 1.2.15, nor the plural nooses in *TS* 3.1.4.4 do justice to the ritual setting, thus both have to be modified into the dual form (p. 325).

While Śabara spends a considerable part of the discussion on expounding the three different suggestions of the *pūrvapakṣa*, Śālikanātha only briefly introduces the various views (p. 324f) and rather deals with the core problem. In the *DŚ* the *pūrvapakṣin* clearly alludes to the conclusion arrived at in 9.3.5, that both versions of the *mantra* are meaningful at the archetype with just one noose. How can the *siddhāntin* claim that the plural form is not applicable for the two nooses in the ectype, when he will claim it to be applica-

ble for the one noose at the archetype in *adhikaraṇa* 9.3.5 (p. 327f)? The *pūrvapakṣin* seems justified to question this contradiction. The justification is straightforward, it does not rely on common sense or grammatical rules, but solely on the premise that a direct Vedic instruction (*upadeśa*) cannot be questioned (ibid.). The *mantra* is enjoined for the *agnīṣomīyā*, so both versions *per se* have to express the desired meaning. Only in the progressing discussion the *siddhāntin* adduces other supportive arguments. For him the plural is seen in worldly matters to apply to singular, not, however, to dual items. Therefore, also in the Vedic context the plural could denote the singular but not the dual (p. 329). In answer to this the opponent tries to claim that the *kārya* is denoted by the *mantra*, which remains the same in the ectype as it was in the archetype. But the *kārya* can only be brought about by the respective injunction which is distinct for the ectype. In consequence, also the *kārya* is distinct and supports the claim that modification is necessary. Śālikanātha concludes *adhikaraṇa* 9.3.4 by stating that grammatical agreement between the denotation in the *mantra* and the ritual context at the ectype requires modification (p. 331).

In the subsequent *adhikaraṇa* 9.3.5 the *pūrvapakṣin* undertakes a new attempt at claiming that the version of the *mantra* containing the plural form cannot be used at the archetype with just one noose. He argues that the version with the plural is enjoined for such ectypes where there are several nooses. However, the *mantra* appears in proximity to the injunction for the *agnīṣomīyā* and is thus directly instructed (*upadiṣṭa*) for it (p. 331) – this was already stated in *adhikaraṇa* 9.3.4. The *siddhāntin* supports this premise along grammatical lines, claiming that the form does not denote the grammatical number, but only the basic form (*prātipadika*) and the case ending (p. 332f). The plural ending thus becomes irrelevant, nevertheless retaining its inherent meaning.

The argumentation of the *siddhāntin* appears to be more an apologetics than proper reasoning.[18] The reference to common sense proving that a plural form can be employed

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[18] In comparison, *adhikaraṇas* 9.3.12-14, deal with a similar case in the *adhrigupraiṣamantra* (*MS* 4.13.4; *TB* 3.6.6.1). The term *medhapati* is enjoined in the singular and dual form respectively in the two recensions. It denotes the two deities, Agni and Soma, which are considered as a group at the archetype. Thus both forms, the singular and the dual, are directly expressive of the ritual situation. The reference to worldly custom taking several items as one coherent unit appears more plausible than

for a single object is not presented as a strong point, the only real support is gained from both versions of the *mantra* being there in *śruti* and consequently being applicable. Śālikanātha at least manages to refer to a rule established by Pāṇini, that the case-endings can be changed in the Veda (p. 334).[19]

To conclude my analysis, I shall now compare a further set of two *adhikaraṇa*s, 9.4.3. and 9.4.5. Although an unrelated *adhikaraṇa* is placed inbetween them[20], their topics and the argumentation contained in them resemble each other. Śālikanātha has the *pūrvapakṣin* refer to this apparent analogy in 9.4.5 (p. 364f). The *adhrigupraiṣamantra* is enjoined for the killing and cutting up of the sacrificial animal at the archetypal *agnīṣomīyā*. It directs the priest to properly perform his duty of preparing the animal. One passage warns the the priest not to cut the rectum, "thinking it to be *urūka*"[21]. Does the term mean an object of comparison in the form of an owl (*ulūka*), or does it denote a part of the animal's body, the fat (p. 357f)? If the former is the case, then the term would not have to be modified in an ectype in which more than one animal is offered, while in the latter case it would, because the body part is distinct for each animal.

The *pūrvapakṣin* argues for the meaning "owl", the syntactical connection with the participle *manyamāna* and the prohibition of cutting the rectum only leave room for an object of comparison. Furthermore, reading the term as a compound phrase consisting of *uru* ("large") and *ka(śa)* ("marrow"), which the *siddhāntin* argues, involves several flaws. The major problem in this view is the splitting of the word, which should be avoided. Even worse, it would necessitate the assumption that syllables have been dropped in the second part of the compound phrase (p. 360). For the *pūrvapakṣin*, therefore, the statement in the *mantra* creates the apprehension in the priest that the rectum resembles an owl and should not be cut into pieces – this would be the most

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the reference in the current *adhikaraṇa*.

[19] I assume this to refer to *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 3.1.85.

[20] It is not related in regard to the kind of phrase under discussion. However, it shares with the surrounding topics the overall meaning of the passage: Certain parts of the animal's body are meant to be cut out in their entirety.

[21] *MS* 4.13.4; *TS* 3.6.6.3-4.

obvious meaning (p. 359f).

For the *siddhāntin*, however, the opponent's understanding would involve the assumption of an unseen object of the statement, as an owl does not form part of the sacrificial context (p. 358). Furthermore, the consequence of the interpretation would be a general prohibition of every cutting of the rectum. This would contradict a later declaration to the effect that the rectum should actually be cut out as well. The *adhrigupraiṣamantra* guides the priest through the killing and preparation of the animal step-by-step, so the prohibition can only be valid temporarily. The proper view is based on the perception that the rectum resembles a large piece of fat – anyone who has once prepared a Christmas goose will agree to this. The current task of the priest is to remove the fat from the animal in order to subsequently cut out the important parts[22] one-by-one. The prohibition is thus tied to the context of cutting the fat and warns the priest to work precisely (p. 360), thus yielding a seen object (*dṛṣṭārtha*). At the end of the *adhikaraṇa* Śālikanātha's *siddhāntin* claims the support of etymology for splitting the term, and of grammar for forming the proper instruction from the splitted term (p. 361).

In *adhikaraṇa* 9.4.5 we are presented with a number of statements in the *adhrigupraiṣamantra* with a parallel form. They are not a prohibition or warning, but a certain resemblance between a part of the animal's body and an object of comparison is stated. The *pūrvapakṣin* thus transfers the right conclusion from *adhikaraṇa* 9.4.3 to the present instance. The resemblance has to be created, i.e. each body part is instructed to be cut in a given form. The chest of the animal shall be cut in the form of a hawk, only in this way the *mantra*'s passage would have a seen object (p. 365). The decisive difference is yet again obtained through proper perception. While the rectum is not preceived as resembling an owl, the body parts mentioned here in fact have the form of the objects with which the are identified. This perception corroborates the *mantra*'s ritual purpose. Because the body part has the form of the object it is compared with, the meaning is to cut out the entire part – this is the correct procedure for the priest.[23]

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[22] For example the "arms", better front legs, of the animal in 9.4.4, or the chest in 9.4.5.

[23] This functional meaning, to cut out the complete body part mentioned, also forms the basis of argumentation in the series of *adhikaraṇa*s dealing with the *adhriguraiṣamantra*, 9.4.1 through to the

A last note of comparison is in place here. That the entire part of the body should be cut is already mentioned in 9.3.11 as denoted by the term *ekadhā* in the context of cutting the skin of the animal. There, like in the present *adhikaraṇa* 9.4.5, the *mantra* provides the manner of performance (*itikartavyatā*) for the priest. Despite the parallelity, the term *ekadhā* has to be modified by repetition (p. 342), while the terms of comparison remain the same. Why this difference? The term *ekadhā* as an adverbial phrase directly expresses the manner of cutting the skin. The direct expression refers to the specfic skin of the animal, so that it would not be applicable to several skins at the ectype. The hawk and further terms, on the other hand, are terms of comparison without a direct reference to the individual chest etc. Independent of the number of animals involved these terms indicate the proper procedure.

2.2 Mantras – Meaning – Modification: A Re-Evaluation

Śālikanātha's gloss in the *DŚ* on the relevant *adhikaraṇa*s deviates only in minor aspects from the presentation in the *ŚBh*. In fact, in several instances we need to refer to Śabara's commentary to understand the full scope of the argument. This is partly in line with the general picture we have of the Prābhākaras: In comparison to their rivals they are more conservative and traditional in their interpretation of the *JS*, and mostly follow the arguments of Śabara.[24] The Bhāṭṭas, on the other hand, were more open to the trends of their times and readily engaged in discussions beyond the usual scope of Pūrvamīmāṃsā topics.

Furthermore, Prabhākara's *Laghvī* is said to be the shorter of his two known commentaries, and Śālikanātha's gloss seems to support this assumption. His greatest achievement probably remains the *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, in which he presents his own, independent discussion of major topics of Pūrvamīmāṃsā. However, a combined reading of the *DŚ* with the *Ṛjuvimalāpañcikā* might prove to be a fruitful endeavor in terms of a better understanding of Śālikanātha and the school his *guru* founded. Given the facts that the

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presently discussed 9.4.5. See also CLOONEY 1990: 58f.

[24] JHA 1978: 12.

Ṛjuvimalāpañcikā continues where the *Bṛhatī* stops in the sixth *adhyāya*, and that the *DŚ* might become readable also in the *adhyāya*s seven and eight parallel to that text, a more coherent picture of Śālikanātha's contributions to the discussions of his time may be possible. Certainly, a more complete manuscript of the *DŚ* would facilitate such an endeavor.

The analysis of Śālikanātha's treatment of the modification of *mantra*s has revealed a number of interesting points. It is obvious that Śālikanātha would have never subscribed to Staal's claim that *mantra*s are ultimately without meaning. Neither would he have agreed that *mantra*s have to be treated differently than statements of ordinary language. While the transfer (*atideśa*) of a *mantra* from an archetype (*prakṛti*) to an ectype (*vikṛti*) is mainly based on *śruti* – either by the general rule that the ectype has to be performed like its archetype, or by a specific injunction or mentioning/naming to the effect that the *mantra* has to be transferred to the ectype[25] – and does not require an understanding of the *mantra* itself, the question of modification (*ūha*) can only be decided by grasping the full meaning and function of the propositions of the *mantra* in the archetypal and ectypal contexts.

Taber has convincingly analysed how language – including that of *mantra*s – was seen by the Pūrvamīmāṃsā in terms similar to the modern theory of speech acts. As part of the procedure of ritual (*itikartavyatā*), *mantra*s are included in the network of constitutive rules framing the ritual.[26] However, Taber has repeatedly argued that the meaningfulness of *mantra*s for the Pūrvamīmāṃsā only carries as far as necessary, it is bound to the question of the use of *mantra*s in the ritual: "Indeed, it would seem that the Mīmāṃsā is not really interested in explaining mantras at all but only in eliminating them as a potential source of doubt about the rationality of the Veda."[27] Taber even claims that *mantra*s are only part of the larger system of references, which is the Veda.[28]

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[25] See JHA 1942: 331. Jha includes the general rule in the category of an inferred injunction.

[26] TABER 1989: 154.

[27] Ibid. 151.

[28] Ibid. 159: "[The Mīmāṃsaka] is not hoping to restore the literal or symbolic significance of the Veda. Indeed, he is nearly doing the opposite, reducing the text to a series of mere references." Göhler apparently is of a similar opinion: "Auch wenn die Semantik, wie sie Jaimini entwirft, für die damalige Zeit auf einem hohen theoretischen Niveau steht und über erstaunliche innere Konsistenz verfügt, ist

Based on the material presented in this work, I argue that Taber's conclusion is too narrow. It is true that the ritual context as delineated in the relevant Vedic passages serves as the fix-point for determining the meaning of a *mantra*, i.e. that its meaning has a high degree of ritual pragmatism to it. *Mantra*s are, after all, part of the procedure of a ritual. But the system tries to argue for the correct meaning of a proposition not exclusively through its ritual usage. The term *urūka* in *adhikaraṇa* 9.4.3 does not denote "owl", because this understanding is supported a) neither by etymological derivation, b) nor by common knowledge of the rectum resembling that animal, c) nor by the contextual knowledge that at the moment of recitation the fat is being cut. The *pūrvapakṣa* is shown to apply an incorrect etymology and an invalid reference to common knowledge. Pūrvamīmāṃsā thus strives hard to provide arguments based on "common sense" in support of its conclusions. Nevertheless, the "stain" of an apologetic aspect in the system cannot be removed completely. The Vedic word still is paramount to all other means of knowledge, and sometimes supportive arguments are streamlined in regard to that Vedic word – see *adhikaraṇa* 9.3.5.

It is furthermore noteworthy that Śālikanātha apparently saw less need than Śabara for extensively dealing with the actual mode of modifying a *mantra*. The question how a phrase has to be modified is certainly of secondary importance to the question whether modification is required at all – which in turn depends on the meaning of the phrase. While the last sentences of an *adhikaraṇa* in the *ŚBh* regularly provide the reader with brief information on where and how modification would apply, this information is often missing in the *DŚ*. This is not only due to the brevity of Śālikanātha's gloss in my opinion. I rather consider this omission as the logical consequence of the detailed analysis of the meaning of a *mantra* leading to its modification. Once the ritual specialist in *adhikaraṇa* 9.3.12 has understood that the forms of *medhapati* appearing in the two versions of the *adhrigupraiṣamantra*[29] both refer to the deity of the sacrifice – with the dual form directly denoting Agni and Soma at the archetypal *agnīṣomīyā*, and the singular form indirectly denoting them as one group – it is rather clear that the dual form

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sie vor allem aus pragmatischen Gründen entworfen worden." (GÖHLER 2011: 61.)

[29] *MS* 4.13.4 and *TB* 3.6.6.1.

has to be modified in all ectypes involving a number of deities other than two[30], and that the singular form only has to be modified at ectypes involving two or more deities which do not form a group[31]. The case is similar in *adhikaraṇa* 9.3.11: Once it is concluded that the term *ekadhā* denotes the "entirety" of the animal's skin that is to be cut, only a modification through repetition of the term can carry the same meaning in the ectype with several animals.[32]

The modification of *mantra*s has limits which are, however, not made explicit by Śālika-nātha or any other Pūrvamīmāṃsaka to my knowledge. Changes are only discussed for single phrases, never for a whole proposition. In *adhikaraṇa* 9.1.12 it is argued that the name of the deity in the *nirvāpamantra*[33] has to name the main deity of the respective ritual. At the archetypal *darśa-* and *pūrṇamāsa* the *mantra* is laid down with the form *agnaye*, which has to be modified to *sūryāya* at the ectypal *saurya*. The presiding deity forms one major part in the ritual and is included in the direct proposition of the *mantra* as the one to which the offering is dedicated. The situation is, however, in contrast to the example adduced in *adhikaraṇa* 9.1.13, the *iḍopahvānamantra*[34]. The *mantra* mentions the sacrificer, who – as the deity – is one of the central elements in any ritual. Unlike was the case in 9.1.12, the sacrificer here is not part of the main proposition of the *mantra*, he merely appears as the object of a relative clause. The *mantra* therefore does not denote the sacrificer's prosperity – thereby encouraging him to undertake the offering, but it praises the *iḍā*-offering as worth being attended to by the mentioned priests. Here – like in all other instances – the proposition made in the *mantra* reflects the ritual situation, in which the sacrificer has already started to undertake the ritual and the priests are being asked to partake in it.

One level below in the hierarchy are phrases of attribution, in *adhikaraṇa* 9.1.15 those mentioned for the main deity Indra in the *subrahmaṇyānigada* at the *jyotiṣṭoma*. These

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[30] See *adhikaraṇa* 9.3.13.
[31] See *adhikaraṇa* 9.3.14.
[32] Note that the meaning "sameness of time" assumed by the *pūrvapakṣa* is also refuted on the basis of common sense. A single skin at the archetype cannot be cut "simultaneously" (*ekadhā*).
[33] *TS* 1.1.4.2.
[34] *TS* 2.6.7.4.

attributes have to be understood as belonging to the deity in that ritual, not the mentioned deity as such.[35] Their meaning does not change essentially with a new deity, rather the deity coming in at the ectype takes over the role of Indra at the archetype. Such a general attribution, however, does not imply that it is not meant or real. The image created is that Indra as well as Agni manifest these attributes in the respective ritual. This point becomes even clearer in the interpolated passage in *adhikaraṇa* 9.3.2., where the *kuśa*-grass strewn is qualified in the *mantra* as "green" (*harita*). At the ectype lotus-grass is strewn. As it is known that *kuśa*-grass is green, the specific mentioning of the quality in the *mantra* is taken to deliberately denote the "green substance for strewing". Accordingly the qualification has to be changed to "red" (*lalita*) for the ectypal lotus-grass.

The understanding of meaning therefore heavily depends on understanding the semantic structure of language and of ritual. The intricate relation between Vedic word and act in the systematization of Pūrvamīmāṃsā has frequently been observed.[36] In almost all discussions I am aware of, however, scholars have considered the system's approach rather limited in its basic argumentation: Since the Veda enjoins ritual, its sentences have to express that. The semantic considerations and methodology of text interpretation resembling methods of contemporary hermeneutics have been acknowledged, but usually only in the limited scope of Vedic language and ritual. Göhler recently wrote: "Sie geht von einem idealen, widerspruchsfreien Opfersystem aus, für das sie ein eigenes *System* der Interpretation entwirft."[37] To me this appears to be not even half the truth, definitely not the rule, as Staal has argued.[38] While the main point of references for Śālikanātha's considerations remains Vedic ritual, he constantly refers to "common sense" or worldly perception for determining the proper meaning of a *mantra*-passage. Furthermore, the context is also a factor framing ordinary, worldly statements.[39] In this sense Wheelock

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[35] The argumentation, again, is not solely based on ritual context, but also on "common sense" that Indra is not known to possess the stated qualities as such!

[36] See for example CLOONEY 1990: Chapter I; BENSON 2010: 27f; GÖHLER 2011: 26.

[37] GÖHLER 2011: 26.

[38] STAAL 1989: 51.

[39] See the statements adduced on p. 323: "I desire the houses of this Devadatta. Summon him! He, indeed, is rich in animals." While at face value the single sentences are unrelated, they appear in

seems right in viewing *mantra*s as "situative speech".[40]

A further limitation for the modification of *mantra*s is only briefly discussed explicitly by Śālikanātha in *adhikaraṇa* 9.3.1. A change in the wording of a *mantra* ultimately destroys its character of "*mantra*". *Mantra*s are included in *śruti*, the author- and beginningless Veda. A change adds a new, human component to it, and conservative tradition does not consider it a *mantra* proper anymore.[41] Śālikanātha supports this view without laying too much emphasis on it. He may have been aware of the problem this premise poses for the whole discussion on the modification of *mantra*s. It is also made obvious that modification was to be avoided wherever possible. In at least as many cases the decision is made against modification as it is made in favour.

Nevertheless, modification is necessary – maybe more often than the *Pūrvamīmāṃsaka*s liked it to be. They thus had to admit deviations from *śruti* as essential elements in their ritual system. Śālikanātha even goes one step further. He clearly states in 9.1.1 that the question of modification is to be decided by logical deduction (*tarka*). It remains the task of the ritual specialist to undertake this mental effort, but this effort is considered a source for flaws in the ritual procedure. The authority of the Veda can hardly be upheld at this point, the human – decentered at an earlier point in the discussion[42] – has come back into the equation. It is noteworthy that Śālikanātha stresses this issue. He does so in contrast to the preceding discussion of the transfer of a detail from an archetype to an ectype (*atideśa*) in the *adhyāya*s seven and eight. In the case of *atideśa* the point of departure is always a direct Vedic instruction (*updeśa*), not so in the case of modification (*ūha*). Of course, the ritual context for the Pūrvamīmāṃsā is mainly constructed through a structured reading of the Veda. Nevertheless, especially in regard to a *mantra*, understanding its meaning is essential in properly situating it in the ritual context. Again, Śālikanātha's explanations foster the conclusion that it is not the ritual

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proximity to each other, thus forming a singular unit of meaning.

[40] Wheelock 1989: 99.

[41] Gonda, in reference to the *Nirukta*, writes: "It was taught that the fixed combination of words marked by a definite and rigid syntactical order did not allow any alteration whatsoever." (Gonda 1963: 270.)

[42] Clooney 1990, Chapter V: The "Decentering" of the Human.

context governing the meaning of the *mantra*. It may be difficult to claim the complete opposite, i.e. that the meaning governs the ritual context. However, for Pūrvamīmāṃsā text and performance at least run parallel to each other, the former makes men acting out the latter. Viewed from the standpoint of Śālikanātha attempts at reconstructing the meaning of *mantra*s in a manner as Patton[43] and Houben[44] have done seems the best way to really understand them. The meaning might often be difficult to arrive at for outsiders of the tradition, nevertheless Śālikanātha has advocated the possibility to understand it as directly denoted or indirectly implied within the framework of metonymic linkages.

An interesting starting point for a further study in this field may be a comparison of the modification of *mantra*s with that of *sāman*s. It seems from my understanding of the passages – mainly the second *pāda* of the ninth *adhyāya* – that the modification of a *sāman* is usually based on a direct instruction, and thus relies less on the mental effort of a person. I therefore believe that the process of modifying a *mantra* may be the most delicate point in the ritual system proclaimed by the Pūrvamīmāṃsā. It is here that the system has to deviate the farthest from its constant point of return, the Veda. Despite trying to constantly connect the deductive process (*tarka*) to *śruti*, a natural, "worldly" understanding of propositions appears to be equally necessary and applicable to determine the proper meaning of Vedic *mantra*s.

Further insights for the internal development from the *JS* via the *ŚBh* to the texts of the Prābhākaras may be gained by comparing the texts in regard to their changing terminology. Clooney has convincingly shown how Śabara's comments, which had long been taken as the reliable interpretation of Jaimini's aphorisms, disagree at certain points with the premises established by Jaimini. Focusing more on ritual activity Jaimini apparently preferred the term *vikāra*, while Śabara gives *ūha* as the topic of the ninth *adhyāya*. Furthermore, the actual discussion at the beginning of the *adhyāya* revolves around *prayojana*, the specific purpose of a ritual element in the complete ritual struc-

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[43] Patton 2005.
[44] Houben 2000.

ture.[45] Śālikanātha, on the other hand, follows Śabara in his usage of the term *ūha*, but seems to disagree with both, Jaimini and Śabara, in introducing the topic as a logical consequence of *atideśa* and as a process of logical deduction (*tarka*). I would assume that a careful linguistic, comparative analysis of these texts, which could not be done for the present study, would produce further interesting results.

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[45] Clooney 1990: 56ff.

Part II

Text and Translation

3   Śālikanātha Miśra and the Dīpaśikhā

Before presenting the edition and translation of those passages from the ninth *adhyāya* of the *DŚ* which discuss the modification of *mantra*s, I will introduce Śālikanātha and the *DŚ* as well as important secondary sources at hand.

3.1   Śālikanātha Miśra, his life and works

As is common with most authors of Sanskrit works written before 1000 CE, hardly any facts regarding Śālikanātha's life and environment can be gathered without doubt. His works present the most important account of the school of Pūrvamīmāṃsā[1] founded by Prabhākara, in his *Prakaraṇapañcikā* he speaks of Prabhākara as "*guru*". Jha[2] reads this mentioning of "students of the *guru*, Prabhākara" as proving that Śālikanātha was a direct disciple of Prabhākara. It is, however, more reasonable to follow Yoshimizu[3], who interprets this passage to indicate other direct disciples of Prabhākara. In fact, in the *Prakaraṇapañcikā* Śālikanātha further mentions certain *ekadeśin*s, but no evidence on such predecessors is available to us.

Śālikanātha might not have known Prabhākara directly, a relative chronology, however, may begin with the founder of the Prābhākara-school and his opponent, Kumārila. They are assumed to have been more or less contemporaries. Jha[4] has tried to conclusively argue against the legend that Prabhākara was the best student of Kumārila, ultimately defeating his teacher during debate in class. He adduces a number of quotations from Kumārila's works, in which he appears to directly criticise views expounded by Prabhākara. Yoshimizu provides a more substantial analysis of relevant passages from Kumārila's works and Prabhākara's *Bṛhatī* to conclude that they must have been more or less contemporaries.[5] It might be true, however, that Kumārila became familiar with his opponent's views, as his later works, the *Tantravārttika* and *Ṭupṭīkā*, seem

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[1] See Yoshimizu 1997: 34; also Verpoorten 1987: 40.
[2] Jha 1978 (1911): 12.
[3] Yoshimizu 1997: 33, footnote 5.
[4] Jha 1978 (1911): 13ff.
[5] Yoshimizu 1997: 49.

to refer to them on a number of occasions. Prabhākara, on the other hand, does not directly deal with positions of his opponent. Still, some critical remarks in Prabhākara's *Bṛhatī* lead Yoshimizu to the conclusion that he knew of Kumārila also.[6] Since Maṇḍana Miśra, who is supposed to have worked between 660 and 720 CE, already criticises the Prābhākara-school, Prabhākara must have been active in the first half of the seventh century, and must have been a (younger) contemporary of Kumārila.[7]

As already mentioned above, Śālikanātha was not a direct disciple of Prabhākara. He quotes Maṇḍana Miśra several times, and is himself quoted by Vācaspati Miśra (mid-tenth century CE) and the Buddhist writer Prajñākaragupta (750-810 CE).[8] According to these "cornerstones" Śālikanātha should have written his treatises in the latter half of the eigth and/or the first half of the ninth century CE.

Even more obscure than his dates is Śālikanātha's location on the Indian subcontinent. Like his *guru* he is supposed to have lived and worked in South India, the area comprising the modern states of Karnataka and Kerala. The spread of manuscripts from the Prābhākara-school supports this assumption, while the texts of the rival Bhāṭṭas prominently figure in the northern parts of the subcontinent. The same "north-south-divide" is still found amongst contemporary experts of Pūrvamīmāṃsā in India.

It has been noted before that Śālikanātha is the most important source in regard to his predecessor Prabhākara. Not only do we know the latter's work only through the former's, it is also Śālikanātha's systematisation of Prabhākara's positions which makes them understandable.[9] Śālikanātha wrote one commentary on each of Prabhākara's treatises, namely the *Ṛjuvimalāpañcikā* on the *Bṛhatī* (also known as *Nibandhana*), and the *Dīpaśikhā* (*DŚ*) on the *Laghvī*. While the *Ṛjuvimalāpañcikā* has been edited together with the *Bṛhatī* by Sastri[10] and has been translated in parts by Yoshimizu[11],

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[6] Ibid.
[7] Besides Yoshimizu, Thrasher also argues for this chronology (THRASHER 1979: 119).
[8] VERPOORTEN 1987: 38; YOSHIMIZU 1997: 33, footnote 5.
[9] See YOSHIMIZU 1997: 40; also VERPOORTEN 1987: 40.
[10] SASTRI 1934-67.
[11] YOSHIMIZU 1997: 227-405.

the *DŚ* has not been subject to research at all.[12]

Besides these commentaries, Śālikanātha also wrote an independent treatise, structured according to the major topics of Pūrvamīmāṃsā, called *Prakaraṇapañcikā*[13]. Included in Sastri's edition of the *Ṛjuvimalāpañcikā* is a brief commentary on the first *adhikaraṇa* in the *JS*, the *Tarkapāda*. This is called *Bhāṣyapariśiṣṭa* and attributed to Śālikanātha. Prabhākara's works, as they are available to us, provide comments on the *ŚBh* in a highly condensed, often cryptical language. The arguments are mostly impossible to follow without the help of Śālikanātha's explanations. Śālikanātha is, furthermore, credited with the proper systematisation of the positions held by the Prābhākara-school on the basis of his topically arranged account in the *Prakaraṇapañcikā*. Despite his status as *the* commentator of Prabhākara, Śālikanātha seems to have tried to open the Prābhākara-school to the wider philosophical discourse of his time, especially in exchange with the Buddhists. It is, among other factors, mainly due to the intense discussions the Bhāṭṭas had with their Buddhist opponents on philosophical rather than ritualistic issues, that Kumārila and his followers have been relatively much more influential until today. Prabhākara, instead of engaging in these philosophical discussions, put his focus on ritualistic correctness and the validity of the relation between Vedic word, its capacity to make man undertake ritual activity, and the effect of that activity for Vedic word and man. In this respect Śālikanātha adds important aspects to the system of his *guru*, in his *Prakaraṇapañcikā* he argues against the Buddhist Dharma-kīrti and develops his *anvitābhidhānavāda*.[14] If we thus impute to Śālikanātha that he wanted to make the Prābhākara-school a participant of philosophical discourse coequal to the Buddhists – also to the Vedāntins and Naiyāyikas – and mainly to the Bhāṭṭas,

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[12] It is noteworthy in this context that Wicher completely neglects the existence of the *DŚ* in her work on the *Prakaraṇapañcikā* (WICHER 1987). Also Verpoorten only dedicates a footnote to its existence (VERPOORTEN 1987: 38, footnote 208).

[13] SASTRI 1961.

[14] The "theory (deriving) the denotation (of a word) from it being interlinked (with other words in a sentence)" of the Prābhākaras stands in opposition to Kumārila's understanding of sentence meaning. According to him the meanings of the individual words together effect the meaning of a sentence (*abhihitānvayavāda*). For Prabhākara and Śālikanātha the word meaning can only be understood as derived from the meaning of the sentence in which the word is employed. Verpoorten claims that Śālikanātha "seems more at ease with the philosophical problems (e.g. the theory of knowledge) than with the ritual ones". (VERPOORTEN 1987: 40)

we have to state his failure. References are made to positions of the Prābhākaras, but never at the same level as the discourse of the other schools presents itself in the primary sources.

The "shadowy existence" of Prabhākara and Śālikanātha is mirrored even nowadays in academic works, where Kumārila's treatises have received most attention in studies on Pūrvamīmāṃsā. A few exceptions shall briefly be discussed.

Already the early "pioneer" in the study of Pūrvamīmāṃsā, Ganganatha Jha, saw the importance of the Prābhākara-school for understanding the development of Pūrvamīmāṃsā in the context of the six *darśana*s and heterodox schools of thought. Besides his two best known works, *Pūrvamīmāṃsā in its sources*[15] and the translation of the *ŚBh* in three volumes[16], he wrote a monograph on *The Prābhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*[17]. In it Jha presents the first – and until now only – complete overview over Pūrvamīmāṃsā as represented in the *Bṛhatī* and the *Ṛjuvimalāpañcikā*. Frequent references are made to Kumārila and also Śabara in instances where the view of the Prābhākaras stands out.

As it was and still is the case with studies on the *ŚBh* and works of Kumārila, so also in regard to Prabhākara and his followers primary interest of scholars has been directed towards the philosophical aspects of the schools, mainly their philosophy of language.[18] An example for this focus is Wicher's unpublished doctoral dissertation titled *Vākya und Vidhi. Śālikanātha's Vākyārthamātṛkā*[19]. Wicher discusses and translates the eleventh chapter of Śālikanātha's *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, in which he develops his arguments in favour of the *anvitābhidhānavāda* as the basis for understanding "what is to be done" (*kārya*) from the Veda.

Three years later than Wicher, Sarma published a further study on the *Prakaraṇapañcikā*. His *Verbal Knowledge in Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsā*[20], again, focuses on the chap-

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[15] Jha 1942.

[16] Jha 1936.

[17] Jha 1978 (1911).

[18] While, as stated above, this emphasis is there in the works of Kumārila, it is not so prominent in those of Prabhākara and Śālikanātha.

[19] Wicher 1987.

[20] Sarma 1990.

ter called *Vākyārthamātṛkā*, and is "unusual as the usual chapterwise division is not maintained"[21] in his work. Sarma instead presents an elaborate commentary in English on the chapter.

Yoshimizu delivered one of the most elaborate studies on *Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsā*, titled *Der "Organismus" des urheberlosen Veda. Eine Studie der Niyoga-Lehre Prabhākaras mit ausgewählten Übersetzungen der Bṛhatī*[22]. His detailed study is a very fine example of close textual scrutiny combined with an analytical representation of the content, which is located at the intersection between purely linguistic, textual topics of Pūrvamīmāṃsā and their ritualistic implementations. Yoshimizu thus presents an account of the textual-ritual framework in which Prabhākara and his followers positioned themselves.

Finally, Freschi has recently published her detailed discussion of Rāmānujācārya's *Tantra-rahasya* under the title *Duty, Language and Exegesis in Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā*. She has edited and translated the section called *Śāstraprameyapariccheda* of the *Tantra-rahasya* together with an extensive analysis of Rāmānujācārya's comprehensive presentation of the viewpoints of the *Prābhākara*'s in opposition to the *Bhāṭṭa*s of his time. As Rāmānujācārya bases his points to a large extend on the works of Śālikanātha, Freschi's contribution indicates the major importance of the latter for *Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā* and our knowledge of the same.

There are some more recent studies on Śālikanātha from Japan, which could not be taken into consideration for the present work.[23]

3.2 The Dīpaśikhā

Only one manuscript of the *DŚ* is known to date, which is kept in the Adyar Library in Chennai.[24] It is inventoried in two bound volumes under the number 54.A.32.

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[21] Sarma 1990: vii.

[22] Yoshimizu 1997.

[23] I am grateful to Birgit Kellner for making me aware of this.

[24] Also during the extensive research conducted for the new edition and extension of Aufrecht's *Catalogus Catalogorum* no further manuscript was found. This was confirmed by Siniruddha Dash in a meeting in Chennai in March 2006.

Figure 3.1: Front page of the second volume of the *Dīpaśikhā*.

The front page to the first volume reads:

<div align="center">

dīpaśikhā

Vol. I

by

śālikā nāthamiśraḥ

pages 1-to-472.

</div>

The front page of the second volume corresponds to that of the first volume – see figure 3.1.

The manuscript's colophon on p. 923 is signed by V. Narayanasamy Sastri on October 12th, 1937. The scribe's colophon reads as follows:

> *Dr. c. kuñjanrājñaḥ nikaṭād āgataṃ keralalipyātmakaṃ śrītālapatrakośaṃ dṛṣṭvā likhitam idaṃ pustakaṃ aḍayārpustakaśalāyāḥ.*
>
> "When a palm-leaf manuscript in the script of Kerala, brought from far by Dr. C. Kunjan Raja, was found, this manuscript was written for the Adyar Library."

Figure 3.2: The scribe's colophon on p. 923 of the *Dīpaśikhā*.

As can be seen from the calculation of the pages on the title page of Volume II, 24 pages have been added after the end of the twelfth *adhyāya* on p. 923 and the colophon on p. 924. At the end of this addition one reads: "Copied by V. Narayanasamy Sastri 16/10/1937". According to the *Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Adyar Library, Vol.IX, Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta* [25] the addition is the continuation of the text breaking off on p. 249. The scribe has added a remark pointing in the same direction: "It is inferred that the manuscript breaks off" (*granthapāta ity ūhyate*).

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[25] KRISHNAMACHARYA 1952: 19.

Upon close reading, however, the text already is inconsistent on p. 244. In the fourth line the subject-matter suddenly changes from *adhikaraṇa* 9.1.18, the *yajñāyajñīyāsāman* employed at the *jyotiṣṭoma*, to the *nirmanthya*-fire, which is enjoined for baking the bricks for the fire-piling (*agnicayana*). It continues further until the text completely breaks off on p. 249. There is a comparable inconsistency in the appended 24 pages. Contrary to the scribe's comment ("see page 249") these pages represent a mixture of short and longer passages from the seventh *adhyāya* on pp. 1-8, and from the ninth *adhyāya* on the remaining pages.[26] It is further worth mentioning that the numbering in the *marginalia* underlines the confusing character of these sections. While the last number of the regular manuscript is "37/B" on p. 240, immediately preceding the assumed break on p. 244 we find "38/A", continuing with "38/B" on p. 257 and "39/A" on p. 250. The appended pages begin with "37/A" right at the beginning, and immediately preceding the remaining part from 9.1.18 we read "38/A", which is continued by "38/B" on p. 12. On p. 17, again, where a clear separation of the passages is indicated by the pagebreak, also the numbering leaps to "56/A", and is continued by "56/B" on p. 20.

If we believe the scribe's colophon, the manuscript is a copy of an original manuscript in Keralese script, which was in the possession of C. Kunjan Raja. The copy was commissioned by the Adyar Library and carried out by the scribe in the first half of October 1937. Unfortunately, the fate of the original manuscript is not known. It is probable that it remained with C. Kunjan Raja, and after his death passed over to his son K. Kunjunni Raja, who as his father was a Sanskrit scholar.

In March 2006, during a visit to Chennai and the Adyar Library, I tried to find traces of the original with the help of Siniruddha Dash, unfortunately without success. With the passing away of K. Kunjunni Raja the tradition of Sanskrit learning in his

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[26] In more detail, pp. 1-2 appear to include a passage from 7.3.3, pp. 2-5 a passage from 7.3.4, pp. 5-7 one from 7.3.6, and p. 7 and the beginning of p. 8 a passage from 7.3.7. This last passage mentions the *nirmanthya*-fire, which also had been there in the corrupt passage on p. 244 of the regular manuscript. The collection is continued with the following passages from the ninth *adhyāya*: The remaining part of 9.1.18 on pp. 8-11; 9.2.1 and part of 9.2.2 on pp. 12-16; an unidentifiyable section, followed by a verbal repetition of 9.4.14 (pp. 376/7) on pp. 17/8, which is concluded by another passage which I cannot identify.

family also vanished. Some of the family's possessions, which appeared to have some (indological) value, were given to relatives and acquaintances in Kerala, but some of them were probably thrown away. It might well be that the original manuscript was among the first group – being in Keralese script after all, but no traces of it could be found.

The manuscript in the Adyar Library is a paper manuscript, written in blue ink, and bound in two hardback volumes. A sample page of the manuscript is reproduced in figure 3.3. Pages measure 16.5 cm in width[27] and 20 cm in height. Margins are drawn on all four sides of a page with a double line. The margins' width is 1.3 cm at the top, 2.5 cm at the bottom, and 1.3 - 2 cm at the in- and outside of each page, thus providing a text field of 12 cm in width and 16.5 cm in height. Regular pages have fifteen lines at a distance of 1 cm from each other. The first line on each page is reserved for the page number (in Arabic numbers) in the outside corner, the text is written on the remaining fourteen lines. Except for the scribe's signature, the manuscript is written in *Devanāgarī* in a clear, mostly uniform handwriting. Each *akṣara* measures 0.5 cm in width and height, diacritics above and beneath add further 0.3 - 0.5 cm to an *akṣara*.

There are occasional *marginalia*, both on the in- and outside, and often the writing crosses the margin-lines. *Marginalia* consist mostly of corrections, sometimes question-marks for uncertain parts, and – most importantly – increasing numbers with an added "A" or "B" after a slash. The numbering starts with a simple "A" (p. 1), continuing with "B" (p. 3), "1/A" (p. 6), and again "B" (p. 8). After this initial inconsistent sequence they systematically increase, "2/A", "2/B", "3/A", "3/B" and so on. The final number is "129/B" on p. 919. Most certainly these numbers refer to the folios of the original palm-leaf manuscript consisting of 129 folios inscribed *recto* ("A") and *verso* ("B"). On average three and a half pages of the present manuscript make up one side of a folio of the original manuscript.

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[27] All measurements in this and the following paragraphs are approximations and/or averages.

Figure 3.3: A typical page of the manuscript of the *Dīpaśikhā*.

The manuscript begins its commentary with the seventh *adhyāya* and continues it up to the end, the twelfth *adhyāya*. Due to a large number of *lacunae* and missing parts, the *adhyāya*s seven and eight are impossible to be read and understood. Only the latter half of *adhyāya*s are presented in a form which facilitates a thorough reading. The *DŚ* is Śālikanātha's gloss on the *Laghvī*, the shorter one of Prabhākara's works. The *DŚ* appears to be rather independent in its treatment of the *JS*s, some *adhikaraṇa*s are

dealt with rather in depth, while others are done with in a single sentence or two.[28] Furthermore, Śālikanātha regularly emphasizes a different line of argumentation and adduces other examples than Śabara. However, the general brevity of the text complicates reading and understanding it – one is often forced to obtain further information from the *ŚBh*.

3.3   Notes on the Edition and Translation

As noted before the manuscript contains a number of *lacunae* to the extent that a comprehensive reading of the seventh and eighth *adhyāya*s is impossible. Questionable passages and *lacunae* also appear in *adhyāya* nine, nevertheless it can be read and understood in full. While in general I have tried to remain as close to the manuscript – in the edition as well as in the translation, certain emendations and additions were necessary in order to present the reader with an understandable text in Sanskrit and English.

The manuscript presents the *DŚ* with some structure and punctuation. Presumably both have their source in the scribe's understanding of the original palm-leaf manuscript at his disposal[29]. The knowledge of the scribe, however, seems to be rather limited – one proof being his obvious misunderstanding of the content of the appended pages explained in 3.2. Further, even the style of punctuation provides room for doubt: While a full stop is generally indicated after the first part of a relative clause, there is generally no punctuation after the term *uttaram*, which I translate as introducing a subsequent answer in the form "The answer is: ...". The end of a paragraph is usually marked by a double-*daṇḍa*, often rather representing inverted commas, within each paragraph some sentences seem to be finished by a single-*daṇḍa*, although they sometimes could also be read as comma. Furthermore, appendices to single sentences, such as abstract nouns in the ablative, providing additional reasoning to the issues raised before, are often separated from the sentence to which they belong by a full stop.

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[28] Such an example being 9.3.8.
[29] See the scribe's colophon discussed in 3.2.

I shall proceed from the general structure to the details. Each *adhyāya* and each *pāda* is introduced by the auspicious form *śrīḥ*, and is concluded by a colophon. This reads, for example, at the end of the fourth *pāda* of the ninth *adhyāya*: *iti dīpaśikhāyāṃ navamasya caturthaḥ pādaḥ*∥.

At the beginning of each *adhikaraṇa* a part or the whole first word or phrase of the first *sūtra* of the *JS* is quoted by Śālikanātha. A single *adhikaraṇa* may have two or more interpretations already presented in the *ŚBh*, the alternatives are usually introduced by the phrase *evaṃ vā*, also in the *DŚ*. In my edition and translation, I have represented the structural elements outlined so far rather directly. An *adhikaraṇa* is further divided into several paragraphs, although not in all instances does such a division appear plausible according to the meaning. While I have added the number of the *adhikaraṇa* before the quotation of the respective beginning of the *JS*, I have not directly taken over the division of paragraphs given in the manuscript. Instead, I have structured the text according to my understanding of the arguments between the propounder of the *pūrvapakṣa* and the propounder of the *siddhānta*, each change in point of view being represented by a new paragraph.

Generally, the first line of argument in an *adhikaraṇa* is presented by the *pūrvapakṣin*.[30] This is the opponent of the proper view of the *siddhānta*, i.e. the *prima facie* opinion[31], or superficial, preliminary view. Śālikanātha regularly declares a statement to be one of either side[32], and often one paragraph in an *adhikaraṇa* is begun with: *rāddhāntas tu ...*, using the synonym for *siddhānta*. A further structuring phrase is *nanu*, or *nanu vā*, both often taken by the scribe to indicate a new paragraph. These phrases in fact introduce an objection – and are translated by me as such, but can belong to both, *pūrvapakṣin* and *siddhāntin*. Most of the time, however, they are used at the beginning of a rejoinder by the opponent against a first *siddhānta*.

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[30] Regularly, also an introductory statement or a critical question as to the purpose of the discussion commences an *adhikaraṇa*. These preliminary statements, sometimes even objections, can be made by both sides.

[31] Jha favours this translation (Jha 1933-36).

[32] Regular phrases for the *pūrvapakṣa* are: *... iti pūrvapakṣavādī manyate*, or *... iti manvānasya pūrvaḥ pakṣaḥ*.

While the explicit mentioning of *pūrvapakṣa* and *siddhānta* helps in understanding the argumentation to a certain limit, there is a frequent back and forth between arguments on both sides, which one can only arrive at by a close reading of the text. A helpful indicator are questions raised by the opposing side towards positions put forth by the other side. Such questions are often brief or have to be supplemented.[33] To facilitate an understanding of the selected passages, I have started a new paragraph whenever the side changes, and have added [P] for the *pūrvapakṣa*, and [S] for the *siddhānta*.

The same individual reading is, of course, given in my separation of sentences. As mentioned above, the punctuation inserted by the scribe can hardly be counted as reliable support. Rather, I have relied on some stylistic and phonetic indicators. The first and most important one concerns the obvious negligence of *sandhi*. To continue an example already mentioned, Śālikanātha frequently uses the phrase *uttaram* to introduce the answer to a preceding question. In most cases, the phrase is not followed by any punctuation, but *sandhi* is neither applied. According to my reading this indicates that the subsequent statement is a quotation, or at least a proposition worth being specifically introduced by this kind of *hiatus*. Similar instances of obvious neglect of *sandhi* can be found when Śālikanātha concludes a quotation from Prabhākara and begins his gloss on the same.[34] Furthermore, Śālikanātha tends to add statements of reasoning at the end of his sentences, which are then often overseen by the scribe and separated from the sentence. The same holds true for the term *yataḥ* suffixed to a sentence.

Most emendations and corrections, though, have been made according to the context of the statement and larger paragraph, also by a parallel reading of the *ŚBh*, from which Śālikanātha regularly quotes. I have presented the text as it appears in the manuscript, and have provided my own reading in the footnotes. The translation is based on my emendated, corrected reading.

A major task in editing this manuscript was the distinction of textual levels. While quotations from the *JS* and the *ŚBh* could be identified rather straightforwardly, and

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[33] A frequently used interjective question is: *tathāpi kim.* Sometimes Śālikanātha only uses *(iti) cet* without providing the latter part of the sentence, which can then be rendered as "what if one assumes that ...".

[34] The relation between such quotations and the gloss will be elaborated below.

their sources are provided in the footnotes, identifying the textual layers from Prabhā-kara's *Laghvī* had to be solely based on the manuscript itself. I therefore relied on the structural indicators I have already described to decide, which statement could be a quotation, and which a gloss. Regularly Śālikanātha uses phrases such as *ity (atra) āha*, which I have taken throughout to introduce a quotation of Prabhākara. Another common introduction of a quotation from the *Laghvī* – in most cases belonging to the *siddhānta* – is *pariharati*, which I translate as "he resolves". Furthermore, some statements are concluded by *ity ucyate*. While the formulation seems to indicate the conclusion of a quotation – and it sometimes is, for example of a passage from the *ŚBh*, often it seems rather to introduce a statement of general truth.

In the ninth *adhyāya* of the *DŚ*, from which all passages discussed in this study are taken, Śālikanātha only twice mentions Śabara as the source for a quotation. He refers to him as the *bhāṣyakāra* on p. 135 and p. 364. Once, on p. 329, he apparently directly refers to Prabhākara as the *vivaraṇakāra* – *Vivaraṇa* being another name for the *Laghvī*. In my presentation of the Sanskrit text and the English translation, I use the following features to distinguish textual layers:

Regular text	The passage is assumed to be one composed by Śālikanātha, it is a genuine part of the *DŚ*.
Bold text	The passage is assumed to be a quotation from the *Laghvī* by Prabhākara.
<u>Bold, underlined text</u>	The passage is a quotation from a third source – mostly the *ŚBh* or the *JS*, but it also includes citations of *mantra*s, *sāman*s or *arthavāda*s. In two instances Pāṇini is the source. The references are provided in the footnotes.

Text in italics	All Sanskrit terms, which I leave untranslated or which I add to my translation, are italicised.

While a regular full stop in my edition represents the same punctuation in the manuscript, I additionally make use of the following *sigla* and conventions:

(Sanskrit term)	In regular brackets I add the Sanskrit term to my translation for clarification.
[Text]	Text I add, which is not as such found in the manuscript, is given in square brackets.
x	In the edition this indicates one missing *akṣara*. The number of *akṣara*s missing in one part is based on the length of the missing part in the manuscript, and the average space of one *akṣara*.[35]
ı	This represents a single *daṇḍa* in the manuscript.
‖	This represents a double *daṇḍa* in the manuscript.
◊	This represents the end of a sentence according to my reading, with no punctuation given in the manuscript.
209	The number in a box represents the page number of the manuscript.

4 Text

4.1 Ninth adhyāya, first pāda

[11.] **arthābhi.**[1]

[P] nanu śrutyā savitrādiṣv abhidhīyamāneṣu kathaṃ lakṣaṇayā devatātvenābhidhānāśaṃkety

[S] atrāhaṃ[2] ◊ **darśapūrṇamāsasambandhitayā ’bhidhānaṃ mantrāṇām iti sthitam**[3] 209 **phaladevatayoś ce**[4]**ty atrādhikaraṇe**◊ idam idānīṃ cintyate. kim ete ’pi darśapūrṇamāsasambandhitayābhidhīyante yathāgnyādayaḥ◊ uta nirvāpastutyartha eṣām anvaya iti◊

[P] tatra pūrvapakṣavādī manyate. **kṛtsnasya mantrasya samavetārthatopapannā bhavatīti nādṛṣṭakalpanāprasaṅga iti**◊ asamavetārthābhidhāne savitrādiśabdānām adṛṣṭārthatā samavetārthābhidhāne tu dṛṣṭārtheti◊

[S] tatra dṛṣṭārthatvāya lakṣaṇām apy āśritya samavetārthābhidhānam eva nyāyya(ṃ)[5] manyate pūrvapakṣavādī ‖

[P] nanv [S] **agnyādidevatāke karmaṇi devatābhidhānena kathaṃ savitrādiśabdānāṃ dṛṣṭārthate**ty [P] āśaṅkyopasaṃharann āha – 210 **tasmād vaikalpikaṃ vāgner abhidhānam astu. devatāntaraṃ vā kalpyatām.** asyārthaḥ◊ sthite samavetārthābhidhāne yathākathaṃcit[6] gauṇyā lākṣaṇikyā vā vṛttyā śaktyantarakalpanayā vā samavetasyāgner evābhidhānaṃ savitrādiśabdeḥ kriyatām. teṣāṃ caikakāryatayā vikalpo ’stu. yadi vā mantravarṇikyo nyāya eva devatāḥ savitrādayaḥ kalpyantām. tāsāṃ ca vikalpo ’stu. ‖

nanu **vibhaktiśrutibhir ekavākyatāvagamyamānānāmuxaixvotsṛjyate**ǀ asyārthaḥ◊ sarvāṇi savitrādiśabdāni nirvapati naikavākyatāpannāni vibhaktiśrutibalena◊

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[1] *JS* 9.1.36: *arthābhidhānasaṃyogān mantreṣu śeṣabhāvaḥ syāt tatrācoditam aprāptaṃ coditābhidhānāt.*

[2] *corr*: *atrāha.* This is the usual phrase used by Śālikanātha to introduce Prabhākara as the speaker of the following statement.

[3] *corr*: *sthitaṃ.*

[4] *JS* 9.1.4.

[5] The scribe adds the *anusvāra* suggesting the correct form, which is adopted here.

[6] *corr*: *yathākiṃcid.*

[S] ataḥ kathaṃ devatābhidhāyakatvaṃ devatābhidhāne hi ⟨211⟩ vikalpaḥ◊

[P] **vikalpe ca vākyabhedo vinā kāraṇenāpadyata** iti pariharati ၊ **kāryārthatād[7] viniyogasya yathākāryaṃ viniyogo yuktaḥ**◊ viniyogaḥ padārthāntarānvayaḥ◊ sa kāryārthaḥ◊ kāryārthaś cet tadā tadanusāreṇa varṇanīyaḥ ၊ **yathā <u>prayājaśeṣeṇe</u>[8]ty evam ādiṣu**◊ avadhārite hi dravyapratipattyarthatve 'bhighāraṇasya prayājaśeṣaṃ haviḥṣu kṣārayatīti viniyogo varṇyate◊ evam ihāpi savitrādiśabdānāṃ devatābhidhāne kārye niścite tadānuguṇyena vaikalpiko viniyogo varṇanīya iti yukta eva vākyabhedaḥ ၊

[S] evam aprāpte 'bhidhīyate. nātraikavākyatā vihantuṃ śakyate.

[P] kasmād ity

[S] āha – **na hi viniyogāntaraṃ pṛthag asti. savitrādīnāṃ ye-** ⟨212⟩ **na sākāṅkṣatve 'pi vākyabhedaḥ syāt.** yadi hi viniyogavaśena savitrādīnāṃ kāryabhedo 'vagamyeta. tatādvākyabhedaḥ[9] saty api sākāṅkṣatve padānāṃ yathā **<u>syonanta</u>**[10] ity atra na ca savitrādipadānāṃ pṛthag viniyogāntaram asti ။

[P] nanv ekavākyatve dṛṣṭakalpanā$\frac{33}{B}$prasaṅga ity uktam ၊ viniyogāntare kāraṇam.

[S] uttaraṃ[11]◊ nedaṃ kāraṇam. stutyarthatve 'pi padānvayasya dṛṣṭārthatvāt stutir api dṛṣṭārthaivety uktam. arthavādādhikaraṇe kāryavirodhād dhi prayāja-śeṣādiṣu kāryānuguṇo vibhaktyartho varṇitaḥ ၊ **iha punaḥ kāryānuguṇye sati kāryāntarakalpanā niṣpramāṇikā. devasya tve**[12]ti nirvapatīti yad idaṃ nirvāpa-lakṣaṇam kāryaṃ tadānu- ⟨213⟩ guṇye 'pi sati vibhaktyarthānyathātvakalpane nāsti pramāṇam[13]◊ prayājaśeṣādi tu pratītaprayājaśeṣapratipattilakṣaṇakāryavirodhād

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[7] *corr*: *kāryārthatvād*.

[8] This refers to *ŚBh* 4.1.14, where the following statement from *SatŚS* 2.2.32 is discussed: *prayājaśeṣeṇa havīṃṣy abhighārayati*.

[9] *corr*: *tadā vākyabhedaḥ*. The given reading is not possible as such. Assuming that the technical term *vakyabheda* is correct, and given that the previous sentence provides a condition, the present clause deals with the consequence. The correlative clause is regularly introduced by Śālikanātha with *tadā* or *tataḥ* instead of *tarhi*.

[10] *MŚS* 1.2.6.19-22: *syonaṃ te sadanam kṛnomi ghṛtasya dhārayā suśevaṃ kalpayāmi. tasmin sīdāmṛte pratitiṣṭha vrīhīnām medhaḥ sumanasyamānaḥ*.

[11] *corr*: *uttaram*.

[12] *TS* 1.1.4.2: *devasya tvā savituḥ prasave 'śvinor bāhubhyām pūṣṇo hastābhyām agnaye juṣṭaṃ nir-vapāmi*. This is the *nirvāpamantra*, which is the subject-matter of the *adhikaraṇa*. However, Śālikanātha only here directly refers to it.

[13] *corr*: *pramāṇam*.

viniyogabhaṅga iti caturthe darśitam ǀ sthite stutyarthatve nimittadvayakalpanāyāṃ savitṛśabdena yajamāna ucyate.   tasya **prasave** 'nujñāyāṃ **nirvapāmi**[14].   yadi vā **savitur** evādityasya prasaṃtvapa upadaye **nirvapāmī**ty evaṃ rūpāyāṃ yajamāna-pareṣu nimitteṣu yā ūhaśaṅkā dvibahuyajamānake karmaṇi sā saṃbandhyabhi-dhānārthā◊ yajamānasaṃbandhī prasavābhidhānanibandhanā yajamānasaṃbandhī cet **prasava** ucyate ǀ

[P] tadā yajamānadvitve yajamānabahutve ca vacanoho nyāyya iti◊

[S] **pārārthye tu saṃbandhimātratayo-** ⟨214⟩ **papatter anūha** ity arthaḥ ǀ nātra mānasaṃbandhī[15] prasavasvārthaprakāśyate[16] ǀ   tasyādhvaryuṇānanuṣṭhīyamānatvāt. kiṃtu nirvāpaviśeṣaṇārthatvena parārthaṃ tasya kīrtanaṃ parārthe cānūho yajñapatiśabdavad ity uktaṃ bhāṣye ‖

[12.] **guṇa.**[17]

[P] pūrvādhikaraṇopajīvanena pūrvapakṣam āha – **yadi savitrādayo nirvāpārthā evaṃ tac ca niśabdo**[18] **'pi nirvāpaguṇa eva pratipattavyam** ‖

[S] nanv **agnyarthatvān nirvāpasya na guṇatayāgniḥ śakyate 'vagantum.** agny-artha evāyaṃ nirvāpaḥ◊ ataḥ pradhānabhūtasyāgneḥ[19] na parārtham abhidhānam iti na guṇatayāgniḥ śakyate 'vagantum.

[P] **saivatv agnyartha-** ⟨215⟩ **tā nirvāpasya na pratīyata** iti[20] ayam abhiprāyaḥ ǀ yadyapi vastusthityā nirvāpasyāgnyarthatā tathāpi nāsmān mantravākyād agnyarthatā nirvāpasya pratīyate.

[S] kutaḥ◊

[P] uttaraṃ[21]◊ juṣṭaśabdaśravaṇāt◊ etad eva vivṛṇoti. **juṣṭam**[22] **iti bhūtam ava-**

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[14] This is the final phrase of the *nirvāpamantra* (*TS* 1.1.4.2) under disussion here.

[15] *corr*: *yajamānasaṃbandhī*. The correction is in accordance with other phrases in this paragraph.

[16] *corr*: *prasavasvārthaḥ prakāśyate.*

[17] *JS* 9.1.37: *guṇaśabdas tatheti cet.*

[18] *corr*: *cāgniśabdo.* The given reading does not provide any meaning. According to the context – the *adhikaraṇa* deals with the final statement in the *nirvāpamantra* (*TS* 1.1.4.2 *agnaye juṣṭaṃ nirvapāmi*) – the word under discussion here can only be *agni.*

[19] *corr*: *pradhānabhūtasyāgner.*

[20] *corr*: *ity.*

[21] *corr*: *uttaram*

[22] *TS* 1.1.4.2.

gamayati ꟾ

[S] tathāpi kim ity

[P] āha – **bhāvyatayā cāyaṃ nirvāpaḥ śrūyate** ꟾ asyārthaḥ ꟾ yā ca nirvāpo bhāvya-
tayā śrūyate nirvāpe ca sati vrīhayo joṣiṣyante. ataḥ prāṅnirvāpāt[23] vrīhayo yena
juṣṭāḥ[24] tasmāt stutyarthatayaivānvayopapattiḥ ‖

nanu stutivelāyām api katham **agnaye juṣṭam** iti vyapadeśaḥ ꟾ prāṅnirvāpād ajuṣṭa-
tvād ity

[S] atrāha – **tādarthye** 216 **tu parārthyaṃ**[25] **śabdasya nānyāyyam**[26] **yataḥ**◊
asyārthaḥ ꟾ tutyarthatve[27] juṣṭaśabdasya pārārthyam ajuṣṭe 'pi◊ vartamānatvam
anyāyyaṃ na bhavatīti◊ **gauṇam apy ālamba iti padānāṃ nyāyya eve**ty arthaḥ ꟾ

[P] yadā tu na stutyarthatā tadā mukhya eva śabdārtha ity ajuṣṭe juṣṭaśabdānupa-
pattiḥ◊ **tasmān nirvāpābhidhānaniṣṭha evāhyaṃ mantra** iti pūrvapakṣavādī
manyate ‖

[S] rāddhāntas tu – **yathā juṣṭaṃ** $\frac{34}{A}$ **bhavati tadartho nirvāpa iti mantrārtho**
varṇanīyaḥ. na punar juṣṭaṃ **nirvāpamīti prāṅnirvāpād agnaye juṣṭaṃ nir-**
vāpamīty evaṃ mantrārtho na varṇanīyaḥ ꟾ kiṃtu yathāgnaye juṣṭaṃ bhavati
tadarthaṃ nirvapāmīti āśāsyate hi joṣaṇam[28]◊ ato 217 bhaviṣyaty api bhūtapratyaya
upapadyata iti bhāvaḥ ꟾ

[P] kiṃ punar atra bhūtatvādi(ti?)krameṇa[29] niṣṭhāvarṇane kāraṇam[30]◊

[S] uttaram[31]◊ **caturthīto devatātvena ca śravaṇam agneḥ**[32] **yataḥ**◊ asyārthaḥ◊
agniśabdāt tāvac caturthī parā śrūyate. tenāgniṃ prati tādarthyaṃ jyoṣaṇasyāva-

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[23] *corr*: *prāṅnirvāpād.*
[24] *corr*: *juṣṭās.*
[25] *corr*: *pārārthyaṃ.* This is an incorrect form, as *vṛddhi* is used for derivative nouns. The correct
form also appears in the following sentence.
[26] *corr*: *nānyāyyaṃ.*
[27] *corr*: *stutyarthatve.* The reading is clearly incorrect. The context and similar phrases in this
passage suggest the corrected reading.
[28] *corr*: *joṣaṇam.*
[29] *corr*: *bhūtādikrameṇa.* The scribe doubts the given reading and suggests the correction adopted
here.
[30] *corr*: *kāraṇam.*
[31] *corr*: *uttaram.*
[32] *corr*: *agner.*

gamyate[33]. na ca tadasaṃbhavaḥ agner[34] devatātvena śravaṇāt. tasmān na tādarthyam apanetuṃ śakyate ɩ etad evopapādayituṃ codayati ॥

[P] nanu ca◊ yathā caturthī tādarthyād apanetuṃ yuktā. tathā niṣṭhāpratyayasyāpi bhūtārthatvam apanetuṃ na yuktaṃ[35]◊

[S] pariharati◊ **yuktaṃ niṣṭhāpratyayasya bhūtārthatvam apanetuṃ**[36]◊

[P] kasmād ity

[S] āha – **nirvāpasyānyāyyām agnyartha-**⟨218⟩**tāṃ viruddhyāt**[37] **yataḥ**◊ niṣṭhāpratyayasya hi bhūtārthatva ādrīyamāṇe prāg eva[38] nirvāpād agnisaṃbandhe nirvāpasyāgnyarthatā nyāyyāpi[39] satī viruddhyeta. agnisaṃbandhitāṃni(tāṃni)-rūpyamāṇānāṃ[40] vrīhīṇām āpādayan nirvāpo 'gnyartho bhavet ɩ prāk tv agnaye juṣṭānāṃ niṣpanne 'gnisaṃbandhe na nirvāpasya tatsaṃbandhāpāṭa(da)katvam[41] astīty agnyarthatā nirvāpasya viruddhyeta. atas tādarthyabhūtārthayor anyatarāpaneye dṛṣṭārthatvena nirvāpasya prādhānyam evāgneḥ[42] yuktam avagantuṃ na punar bhūta upasarjanatvam◊[43] **agnyarthatām āpādayan nirvāpo dṛṣṭārtho bhavati. anyathā dṛṣṭārtha iti** tadānuguṇyena prādhānyam eva joṣaṇe 'gneḥ[44] yuktam

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[33] *corr*: *joṣaṇasyāvagamyate*. The form appearing in this context is *joṣaṇa*, denoting the act, while the given form would represent an unknown derivative of the same. See also *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.1.39.

[34] *corr*: *tadasaṃbhavo 'gner*.

[35] *corr*: *yuktam*

[36] *corr*: *apanetum*.

[37] *corr*: *viruddhyād*.

[38] *corr*: *prāca eva*. The only meaningful connection the term can have is with the following *nirvāpāt*. The correct corresponding form – without the application of *sandhi* – is *prācaḥ*. In the previous instances of these phrases appearing together (p. 215), they were combined into the compound phrase *prāṅnirvāpa*. However, such a compound phrase could not include the term *eva* set in between in the present instance.

[39] *corr*: *nirvāpasyāgnyarthatānyāyyāpi*. The same phrases appear in the statement before, to which this is a gloss. The concessive construction, used by Śālikanātha here, indicates that something is expressed which actually is not the position of the *siddhāntin*, i.e. that *Agni* is not the object of enjoyment.

[40] *corr*: *agnisaṃbandhitāṃnirūpyamāṇānāṃ*. The scribe doubts the given reading and suggests the correction which is adopted here.

[41] *corr*: *tatsaṃbandhāpādakatvam*. Again, the scribe doubts the reading and suggests the correction adopted here.

[42] *corr*: *evāgner*.

[43] According to the ligation in the manuscript, the construction would continue. Nevertheless, all other options of separating the sentences appear to be more constructed. In the whole passage, a conclusion is presented with a following half-sentence, in which the alternative is dismissed. According to this scheme, the sentence has to stop here.

[44] *corr*: *'gner*.

avagantuṃ na puna-⟨219⟩r bhūte joṣaṇa upasarjanatvam. tasmād āśaṃsāyāṃ kto varṇa-
nīyaḥ◊ bhaviṣyaty eva joṣaṇe◊ **āśaṃsāyāṃ bhūtavac ce**[45]**ty anena sūtreṇa kta-**
pratyayo 'yam iti varṇanīyo vartamānārtho vā kto varṇanīyaḥ ǀ yathaiva hy agnaye
vrīhīṇāṃ nirūpyamāṇatā saiva teṣāṃ tasmai joṣyamāṇatety anuṣṭhānānusāreṇa
vartamāne 'rthe ktapratyayo varṇanīyaḥ ǁ

evaṃ vā.[46]

[P] **dhānyaśabdo**[47] **'yaṃ taṇḍulebhyo 'rthāntarasya vacana ity adhyupyamāna-**
taṇḍulānabhidhānād asamavetārthābhidhāno 'yaṃ mantra iti pūrvapakṣayati ǁ
[S] nanu **lakṣaṇayāpi samavetārthābhidhānasiddheḥ**[48] **nādṛṣṭārthatā man-**
trasya yuktā kalpayitum. dhānyaśabdasyāsamavetā-⟨220⟩rthatve kṛtsnasyaiva man-
trasyādṛṣṭārthatā◊ na punaḥ◊ nirvāpamantraṇyāyena dṛṣṭārthatā◊ tataś ca varaṃ
lakṣaṇayā dhānyaśabdasya taṇḍulārthatvam āśritya samavetārthatvam āśrīyatāmiti◊
[P] pariharati◊ **dṛṣṭasāmarthyasya prayojanakalpanā◊ na punaḥ prayojan-**
antaḥ[49] **sāmarthyakalpanā bhavitum arhati. atiprasaṅgāt◊** asyārthaḥ ǀ lakṣa-
ṇaiva nāma vede na yukteti manvānaṃ[50] pūrvapakṣayati ǀ $\frac{34}{B}$tathā hi kiṃ lākṣaṇī(ṇi)ke[51]
'rthe śabdasya sāmarthyam asti vā na vā. asti cet sama(sā)mrthyaṃ[52] tadā vācyatva-
prasaṅgaḥ◊ vācyatve ca vṛddhavyavahārāpekṣā◊ na ca lakṣaṇike[53] 'rthe vyavahāra-
saṃbhavaḥ ǀ asāmarthye tu na cākṣaṇiko[54] 'rthaḥ śakyate 'vagantum.   tataś ca

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[45] *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 3.3.132.

[46] *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.1.38, second interpretation.

[47] This refers to the *mantra* given in *TB* 3.2.6.3: *dhānyam asi dhinuhi devān ity āha*. It is used in
the context of the *darśa-* and *pūrṇamāsa*.

[48] *corr*: *samavetārthābhidhānasiddher*.

[49] *corr*: *prayojanataḥ*. The scribe doubts the given reading. As this part of the sentence is introduced
as a reverse argument by *na punaḥ*, the ablative ending seems plausible here as it takes up the term
from the previous sentence.

[50] *corr*: *manvānaḥ*. This reading is incorrect in combination with the following verb. The correction
is based on the complete phrase, *iti manvānaḥ pūrvapakṣayati*, being used by Śālikanātha througout
the *DŚ*.

[51] *corr*: *lākṣaṇike*. The scribe doubts the given reading and suggest the correction which is adopted
here.

[52] *corr*: *sāmarthyaṃ*. Again, the correction suggested by the scribe fits the context well and is,
therefore, adopted here.

[53] *corr*: *lākṣaṇike*. See footnote above.

[54] *corr*: *lākṣaṇiko*.

dhānyaśa-$\boxed{221}$bdasya   lākṣaṇikatvānupapatteḥ[55]   mantrasyādṛṣṭārthatvam   eva
nyāyyam. yasya hi yatra sāmarthyaṃ dṛṣṭam. tadanusāreṇa prayojanaṃ kalpayituṃ
nyāyyam. na punaḥ prayojanavaśena sāmarthyakalpane 'sti[56]. tasmād asamavetārtha-
taiva nyāyyeti.

[S] evaṃ prāpte 'bhidhīyate. nāsamavetārthatā lakṣaṇayāpy arthāvagamāt ‖

[P] nanu **lakṣaṇaiva niṣpramāṇikety uktam** ǀ

[S] pariharati. **na niṣpramāṇikā lakṣaṇā◊ loke 'rthāvagamahetutvena siddhatvāl**
lakṣaṇāyāḥ◊ śālayo bhujyante 'nudinam asmadgṛha ity evam ādiṣu lokeṣu
vyavahāreṣu siddham abhidheyāvinābhāvaparyupasthāpite 'pi śabdānāṃ tāt-
paryam astīti. tataś ca lakṣaṇāyāṃ $\boxed{222}$ vinā śaktyantarakalpanayā nyāyyā prati-
pattiḥ ǀ tasmāl lakṣaṇayā samavetārthatve mantrasya saṃbhavati. nādṛṣṭakalpanā pra-
māṇam asti ‖

[13.] **codite.**[57]

[S] atra sandihyate. **kiṃ yajñapatitvena yajñaṃ prati pradhānatvena yajñapati-**
śabdo yajñapatim abhidhatte ǀ **utānyārthataya ṛtvigupalakṣaṇībhūtavṛddhi-**
viśeṣaṇatayeti◊

[P] kathaṃ punar atra yajñapatitvenābhidhīyate ǀ kathaṃ vānyārthatayā◊

[S] uttaraṃ[58]◊ **yadi vṛddhir yajñapatyarthā.** yadi vṛddhiviśiṣṭo yajñapatir ucy-
ate tadā patitvenābhidhānaṃ[59]◊ atha tv iḍayā saṃbadhyate ǀ ṛtvigupalakṣaṇā vṛddhi-
viśeṣaṇadvāreṇā◊ tataḥ patitvam upalakṣaṇayaiva kevalaṃ vṛddhiviśeṣaṇārtham[60]

[P]   tatra   pūrvapakṣavādī   yajñapativṛddhiṃ   prakāśyabhūtāṃ $\boxed{223}$ protsāhana-
prayojanikām iḍopahvānāt prayojanāntaraṃ manvāno yajuṣo vibhāgam āha –

[S] kiyatā vibhāgena yajñapativṛddhiḥ prakāśyate.

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[55] *corr*: *lākṣaṇikatvānupapatteḥ.*

[56] *corr*: *sāmarthyakalpanā 'sti.* The dual form here does neither fit the syntax with the copula *asti*, nor the context. Therefore, the singular form seems to be correct here.

[57] *JS* 9.1.40: *codite tu parārthatvād vidhivad avikāraḥ syāt.*

[58] *corr*: *uttaram.*

[59] *corr*: *patitvenābhidhānam.*

[60] *corr*: *vṛddhiviśeṣaṇārtham.*

[P] yathāpi cedopahvānam iti prakāśya bhedāt **syonanta**[61] iti vadyajuṣo vibhāga iti manyate pūrvapakṣavādī ॥

[S] rāddhāntas tu◊ **na viyogād**[62] **ṛte prayojanāntarakalpanā nyāyyā. yady ubhayatra viniyogaḥ syāt tadā prayojanadvayaṃ yuktaṃ kalpayitum. tannibandhanaś ca yajuṣo vibhāga iti** ॥

$\frac{35}{A}$ [P] nānv ayamānavṛddhau[63] mantrasya viniyogo 'sti. kathaṃ punar viniyogāntaraṃ nāsti ।

[S] uttaraṃ[64]◊ **kāryatvena vṛddher anu-** 224 **mānāt**◊ **yadi vṛddhir anuṣṭheyā syāt tadā nāsmṛtānuṣṭhātuṃ śakyata iti**◊ tatsmaraṇārthatayā mantrasya viniyogo yujyate. na cāsau[65] anuṣṭheyāphalatvāt. na ca protsāhanāya tatprakāśanam iti yujyate kalpayitum. **sākṣād anuṣṭheyodopahvānenaikavākyatayā**[66] **anuṣṭheyārthatvasambhavāt**◊ **tasmān nāpoddhāre pramāṇam astī**ti(tī)ḍārtha[67] **evāyaṃ nigada iti yuktam** ॥

[14.] **vikāra.**[68]

[P] **atrāpi phalacodanān nāstīti manvānaḥ kratūpakāratayaiva yāgacodanayopapatter yajamānaśabdaḥ parārtha iti pūrvapakṣayati.** asyārthaḥ◊ prastarapraharaṇārtho yāgaḥ◊ kratūpakārakatayaivāsyāyurā- 225 dikaṃ phalam. ataḥ phalasambandhitayā yajamānasya neha kīrtanam iti◊ **parārtho yajamānaśabda** iti pūrvaḥ pakṣaḥ ॥

[S] rāddhāntas tu◊ **satyaṃ kratūpakārakatayā itthaṃbhāvopanipātitayā**[69]

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[61] *MŚS* 1.2.6.19-22: *syonaṃ te sadanaṃ kṛnomi ghṛtasya dhārayā suśevaṃ kalpayāmi. tasmin sīdāmṛte pratitiṣṭha vrīhīnāṃ medhaḥ sumanasyamānaḥ.* See also 9.1.11.

[62] *corr*: *viniyogād.* The correction is based on the following sentence.

[63] *corr*: *yajamānavṛddhau.* The scribe doubts the given reading. The *pūrvapakṣin* repeats his claim, that the main object of the *mantra* is to denote the prosperity of the sacrificer (*yajamāna*), thus encouraging him to sacrifice.

[64] *corr*: *uttaram.*

[65] *corr*: *cāsāv.*

[66] *corr*: *anuṣṭheyeḍopahvānenaikavākyatayā.* As the invitation to the *iḍā* is the subject-matter, the correction seems likely. The *sandhi* between the present and the following phrase has not been applied, probably due to readability.

[67] *corr*: *astītīḍārtha.* The correction suggested by the scribe is adopted here.

[68] *JS* 9.1.41: *vikāras tatpradhāne syāt.*

[69] *corr*: *kratūpakārakatayetthaṃbhāvopanipātitayā.*

yāgasya prayojanam.

[P] ka̠(ta?)thā̠pi(vi?)kṛtim[70] ity

[S] **aṃśopanipātitayāyurādīnām abhidhānam upapadyate. āśāsanayogāt**◊ āśāsyamānatayā hi sūktavākanigada āyurādīnām abhidhānatā◊ **na cāphalasyāśāsanam upapadyata** ity āyurādīnāṃ sādhyatvenānvayaḥ ‖ **tatsādhyatve ca yadi kratu-**

phalatayā sādhyatvam. tathāpi prādhānyaṃ yajamānasya na vihanyate. yadi vaṅgabhūtāt prastaraharaṇād eva kratūpakārakād āyurādiphalaṃ 226 niṣpadyate. yadi vā darśapūrṇamāsakrato̠(tau)[71] praharaṇāṅgayuktād idaṃ phalaṃ niṣpadyate. tathāpi yajamānasya phalasaṃbandhāt prādhānyam. tasmād aparārthatvāt[72] bahukarṇake tadabhidhānayogyatayohaḥ kartavya iti sūktam ‖

[15.] **asaṃ̠yo.**[73]

[S] atra bhāṣyakāreṇa rāddhānta evoktam ‖ **na harivattādaya ucyeran. harivattādibhiḥ so 'sya guṇī lakṣyate**iti.[74] evaṃ ca bruvāṇenedam uktam.

[P] **pūrvapakṣe harivattādayo guṇā indrasya guṇā ity abhidhīyante** ‖ iti vacanavyaktiḥ ‖

[S] **siddhānte harivattādaya (e)veti**[75]

[P] tatrānayor vacanavyaktyor viśeṣamava̠(pa)śyan[76] pṛcchati. **kathaṃ punar harivattādayo guṇā indrasya guṇā ity abhidhīyante** ‖ 227 $\frac{35}{B}$**kathaṃ vā harivattādaya eveti**◊

[S] **uttaram** ‖

[P] nanu vā yam eva viśeṣaṃ[77] ya etebhyo 'kṣarebhyaḥ pratīyate ‖

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[70] *corr*: *tathāpi kim.* The correction suggested by the scribe remains somewhat unclear: Does he read *tathāvikṛtim*? If so, I do not see what the phrase could mean. Rather, I assume this to be a brief interjection by the *pūrvapakṣin*, as it occurs quite frequently.

[71] *corr*: *darśapūrṇamāsakratau.* The correction suggested by the scribe is adopted here.

[72] *corr*: *aparārthatvād.*

[73] *JS* 9.1.42: *asaṃyogāt tadartheṣu tadviśiṣṭam pratīyate.*

[74] *corr*: *guṇo lakṣyata iti.* See *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.1.42. The corrections are based on the reading in the original.

[75] *corr*: *harivattādaya eveti.* The correction suggested by the scribe is adopted here.

[76] *corr*: *viśeṣam apaśyan.* The correction suggested by the scribe is adopted here.

[77] *corr*: *nanu vāyam eva viśeṣo.* Due to the following relative clause, the correlate terms can only

[S] pratyuttaram ꞁ **ayam eva viśeṣo na bhavatīti**◊

[P]   ubhayathāpīndraśabdasyāparityāgāt◊   indrasaṃbandhitayābhidhānāt   samartha-
yitottaram āha – **a(ya)m**[78] **asti viśeṣaḥ** ꞁ **etasmin pakṣa evaṃguṇayukta indra
iti vākyārthaḥ** ꞁ

[S] **itarasmin punar indra ebhir guṇair guṇavān iti.**

[P]   yadyapi   nigadasyendraśabdasyāparityāgād   indrānvayo 'sti   tathāpy   ekasmin
pakṣe   prasiddhaharivattādiguṇasaṃbandhāśrayaṇena   tadguṇo[79]   upalakṣita   eva
vākyārthaḥ ꞁ

[S] itarasmin punaḥ pakṣe prasiddhaharivattādisaṃbandha indrasyocyata iti etad evodā-
 228 haraṇadvaye na yathākramaṃ prapañcayati.

[P] **yathā śuklaḥ paṭa iti**◊ paṭaguṇatayaiva śuklasya pūrvasiddhasya paṭo lakṣaṇā-
rtham[80] abhidhānaṃ paṭaśuklaguṇaka iti◊

[S] guṇa eva paṭasaṃbandhitayocyate ꞁ pūrvaprasiddhaḥ◊

[P] tatrāyaṃ pūrvapakṣavādino 'bhiprāyaḥ ꞁ **indraguṇatayāpy abhidhāne matv-
arthasya**[81] **saṃbhavāt**[82] **gandhavatī pṛthivītivat**◊ **arthavādāc ca tadguṇāva-
gates tadīyā ity abhidhānam** iti harivattādiguṇayuktendropalakṣaṇaparatve 'py ayam
arthaḥ ꞁ

[S] **saṃbhavaty evāyathā pṛthivī svarūpopalakṣaṇapare gandhavatī pṛthivīty
atra**◊ na ca prāgasiddhau harivattādisaṃbandha indrasya yenānupakṣaṇaṃ[83] syāt.

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be *ayam* and *viśeṣaḥ*. The correction is corroborated by the almost verbal repetition of this statement
in the following rejoinder.

  [78] *corr*: *ayam*. The corrections suggested by the scribe is adopted here.

  [79] *corr*: *tadguṇa*.

  [80] *corr*: *paṭopalakṣaṇārtham*. Since *sandhi* is applied to *paṭaḥ*, the given reading would have the
cloth (*paṭa*) as the subject. In that case, *abhidhānaṃ* would have to be the object with a proper verb
missing. It is difficult, however, to construe a useful meaning in: "The cloth (does something) to the
direct denotation." For this reason *pa* must have been dropped here.

  [81] *corr*: *saty arthasya*. The given reading does not provide a proper meaning. I cannot adduce any
external proof that my suggested correction is plausible, though.

  [82] *corr*: *saṃbhavād*.

  [83] *corr*: *yenānupalakṣaṇaṃ*. The correction is corroborated by similar phrases in the present passage.

[P] arthavādāt **pūrvottarapakṣau indrasya hariva**[84] ity evam ādes tadguṇāvagateḥ[85] ta-[229]smād indropalakṣaṇārtham eva harivattādīnām abhidhānam. evaṃ cāgnir api tair guṇe[86] upalakṣaṇīya iti ∥

[S] rāddhāntas tu◊ **pramāṇāntarato 'navagamādidravyasaṃbandhasya**[87] **svārthā-bhidhānenaivendrasaṃbandhitāvagamyata iti nyāyyam.** asyārthaḥ ı pramāṇāntareṇa harivattādīnām indrasaṃbandhasyānavagamān na tadupalakṣaṇārthaṃ teṣām abhidhānam. kiṃtu nigadagataharivattāder indrasaṃbandhitā harivattādibhiḥ śabdaiḥ śrutyaivāvagamyata iti nyāyyam ∥

[P] nanv arthavādāt tadgataguṇāvagatir ity uktam ity

[S] āśaṅkyāha – **arthavādavacanaṃ tv anyaparatvān na saṃbandhitām avagamayi-**[230]**tuṃ kṣamam.**

[P] athānyaparatvam eva neṣyate

[S] 'trāha – **harivattādīnāṃ vidhāv anekārthavidhānaprasaṅgād vākyabhedā-patteḥ◊ nigadasyāpi sarvatra vidhānāt.** ataḥ stutyaivārthapādānam[88] anvaya iti yuktam ı tasmād agnāv api yathārtham abhidhānam. tatrāpi $\frac{36}{A}$harivattādisaṃbandhābhidhānasyāvirodhād iti sthitiḥ ∥

evaṃ vā.[89]

[P] **atrāpi svasamavāyitayā kālāntare saṃbhavaṃ manvānaḥ pūrvapakṣayati.** asyārthaḥ ı kālāntarasaṃbhāvitayā pramāṇāntaraprasiddhaikahāyanīsaṃbandhaiḥ

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[84] *corr*: *pūrvottarapakṣau vā indrasya harī* (without *sandhi* at the end). Also the *ŚBh*, at *JS* 9.1.44, refers to an *arthavāda* from *ṢaḍB* 1.1.13, reading: *pūrvapakṣāparapakṣau tāv indrasya harī*. The similar beginning of the passage suggests this *arthavāda* to be indicated here, especially as the given reading at the end does not provide a correct statement.

[85] *corr*: *tadguṇāvagates*.

[86] *corr*: *guṇair*. It appears that *sandhi* was incorrectly applied, as *guṇaiḥ* is the only form congruing with the remaining sentence.

[87] *corr*: *'navagamād indrasaṃbandhasya*. The given reading does not provide a coherent meaning, and is corrected according to the following explanation of this statement.

[88] *corr*: *stutyaivārthavādānām*. The confusion of *pa* and *va* is not unusal, and obvious here. Also the incorrect form of the genitive plural is obvious.

[89] Even though the optional interpretation of *JS* 9.1.42-44 is introduced by Śālikanātha with the regular phrase also appearing in the *ŚBh*, the present *adhikaraṇa* is introduced by Śabara with: *athedam anyad udāhriyate*.

śrutādibhir[90] ekahāyany evopalakṣyate.   na śrutādīnām[91] abhidhānaṃ svārtham eveti◊ **sāṇḍopalakṣaṇārtham api tulyā guṇā vaktavyā** iti pūrvaḥ pakṣaḥ∥

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[S] rāddhāntas tu◊ **kālāntaravipakṣayā[92] cet sambandhe hetuḥ⟨ ādhārāntare 'pi tulyaniyamābhāvāt.**   asyārthaḥ◊ prayogakāle tāvad ekahāyinyām api naiva śrutādīni[93] pramāṇāntaraprasiddhānīti harivattāditulyatā.   atha kālāntarābhiprāyeṇa sambandhapravṛttir āśrīyate. sā sāṇḍe 'pi tulyā **niyamābhāvāt**◊ kālāntarasambhava ekahāyanyām eva na sāṇḍa iti niyamo nāsti.   yataḥ sāṇḍād api yā dhenur jāyate sā mugdhavaty apīti sambhāvyata eva. **tasmād yathārtham eva prayoga** iti sūktam ∥

[16.] **li ̇ngat.**[94]

[P] **atra samānavidhipakṣe 'pi paśutvasya coditatvāt puṃvi-** 232 **ṣayeṇa śab-dena**

tasyāpy[95] abhidhānāt sārasvatyām apy adhriguḥ prāpta eveti pūrvapakṣayati⟨

[S]   na◊ kevalaṃ   tāvad agnīṣomīyārthatve dharmāṇāṃ codakaḥ sārasvatyām adhriguḥ prāpnoti⟨

[P] kiṃtu samānavidhipakṣe 'pi sārasvatyāṃ meṣyām adhriguḥ prāpnoty eva ∥

[S] nanu **liṅgaviniyojyatvād adhrigoḥ <u>prāsmā</u>[96] ity atra puṃliṅganirdeśān na sārasvatyā viniyoga upapadyate**⟨ ucyate meṣaprātipadikārthasya meṣatvasya ca paśuśabdābhidheyasya viniyogaśeṣatvāt◊ puṃviṣayeṇa ca śabdena tasyāpy abhidhānāl liṅgāvirodhād yukta eva. tasyām api viniyogaḥ ∥

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[90] *corr*: *śṛtādibhir*. In this and the following sentence a form of *śruta* is given by mistake in place of *śṛta*. What is mentioned by the *mantra* as connected (*sambandha*) to the one-year old heifer are the products of the cow, boiled milk (*śṛta*) and others (*-ādi*).

[91] *corr*: *śṛtādīnām*. See preceding footnote.

[92] *corr*: *kālāntaravivakṣayā*.   The given phrase does not provide a proper meaning here. As the future time (*kālāntara*) is assumed to be considered here by the *pūrvapakṣin*, I believe the term *vivakṣā* suitable to express this assumed, intended meaning.

[93] *corr*: *śṛtādīni*. See preceding page of the MS.

[94] *corr*: *liṅga*. JS 9.1.45: *liṅgaviśeṣanirdeśāt samānavidhāneṣv aprāptā sārasvatī strītvāt*.

[95] *corr*: *tasyā apy*. The feminine gender should be used here, as the pronoun refers to the female ewe dedicated to *Sarasvatī* (*sārasvatī*).

[96] This is part of the *adhrigupraiṣamantra*, which is the subject-matter of this *adhikaraṇa*. The part under consideration here is: *prāsmā agniṃ bharate* (*MS* 4.13.4; *TB* 3.6.6.2).

[P] nanūpādānaśeṣatve liṅga-235syāviśeṣatoditaiva. asyārthaḥ. yathā śeṣatvaṃ[97] viniyogaśeṣabhūtaṃ mantreṇa prakāśyate। tathā strītvam apy upādānaśeṣabhūtam iti tad aprakāśanīyam eva.

[S] na ca puṃviṣayeṇa tac chakyata iti kathaṃ meṣyā liṅgaviniyogaḥ◊

[P] pariharati. **satyam uditā liṅgasyopādānaśeṣatā.** ayaṃ tv abhiprāyaḥ pūrva-pakṣiṇaḥ◊ **viniyogaśeṣābhidhānenaivopādānaśeṣatāvagamān na viśeṣo vivakṣita iti**◊ asyārthaḥ। sarvaṃ śeṣabhūtaṃ mantreṇaiva prakāśanīyam. iha ca viniyogaśeṣibhūtameṣatvābhidhānenaiva liṅgasyāpy avagamān na liṅgaviśeṣo 'pi mantreṇaiva vikṣata[98] iti ॥

[S] nanv ayuktam idam uttaram.

[P] nāyuktaṃ sāmānyāva(pa)gamād[99] eva viśeṣāvagamasiddheḥ◊ 234 $\frac{36}{B}$tadvivakṣā niṣpramāṇikā yataḥ –

[S] rāddhāntas tu – **sannidhānamātrāpekṣitvāt sarvanāmapādānam**[100] **arthaś ca viśeṣanidher**[101] **na sāmānyābhidhānakalpanāpramāṇam asti। sāmānyābhidhāna iva viśeṣasya**◊ asyārthaḥ। yadi hi **parasmā** iti sarvanāmaprātipadikaṃ prakṛtibhūtaṃ tatsannihitābhidhāyi[102] arthena ca sannidhānād viśeṣā eva sannihitā na sāmānyam। tataś ca viśeṣā eva sarvanāmnām abhidhānam. **te ca viśeṣā liṅgaviśeṣavanta** iti thataiva teṣām abhidhānam. tataś ca yadi meṣyām api sarvanāmaprātipadikaṃ vartate. tasyāḥ strītvāt strīpratyayāpattau puṃliṅganirdeśo viruddhyeta. viśeṣā-235bhidhāne ca **sāmānyābhidhānakalpanā pramāṇaṃ nāsti.** yathā sāmā-

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[97] *corr: meṣatvaṃ.* The given reading would involve a tautology, namely that "the secondary character is revealed as a secondary element ...". The correction is based on the explanation below on this page of the *DŚ*, clearly speaking of the character of being a ram (*meṣyatva*) in opposition to the specification of the gender (*liṅgaviśeṣa*).

[98] *corr: vivakṣita.* In analogy to the same phrase appearing in this context, the given reading cannot be correct.

[99] I do not follow the suggestion of the scribe to read *apagama*, as I do not see any reason for doing so. Rather, the argument made is that only through understanding the general category can the particular individual instance of that category be understood.

[100] *corr: sarvanāmapadānām.* This clearly is an instance of accidental switching of vowels, as pronoun words (*sarvanāmaśabda* or *sarvanāmapada*) are meant here.

[101] *corr: viśeṣanirdeśān.* The given reading does not provide a proper meaning in this context. I assume that the term *nirdeśa*, which appears at the beginning of this *adhikaraṇa* and also in *JS* 9.1.45, is correct here.

[102] *corr: tatsannihitābhidhāyy.* It maybe the case that *sandhi* was not applied here on purpose, as it would make the reading rather difficult to follow.

nyābhidhāna upādeyavākyeṣu viśeṣābhidhānakalpanāyāṃ tasmān na liṅgasyāvi-
vakṣeti śakyate vaktum. **viśeṣābhidhānaniṣṭhātvāt◊ sarvanāmnaḥ◊ viśeṣasya tu
liṅgaviśeṣavatvād viśeṣābhidhānaniṣṭhatvāt◊ sannidhānaviśeṣāt tadabhidhāne
'pi ca mantrasya śeṣatvasaṃbhavāc ca◊** yady asya viniyuktatvād yukteḥ śeṣatā
nāsti. tathāpi tasyāḥ karmopayogitvāt tadabhidhāne 'pi mantrasya śeṣatopapadyata
eva ॥

[P] nanu paśuśabdaprayoge 'pi tarhi strīliṅgasyārthasya puṃviṣayeṇa śabdena nirdeśo
nopapadyata ity

[S] atrāha – **paśuśabdaprayoge punaḥ sāmānyasya ca vivakṣitatvāt** 236 **tasya
ca strīliṅgatvābhāvān na vivakṣāliṅgasyeti yuktam** ।

[P] viśeṣāvagatis tarhi kuta ity

[S] atrāha – **sāmānyato viśeṣāvagamasiddhir iti◊ tasmāl** liṅgaviśeṣanirdeśād **aprāptā
sārasvatyadhriguvacanam**[103] iti sūktam.

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[103] *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.1.49.

4.2 Ninth adhyāya, third pāda

⟦313⟧

śrīḥ

[1. - 3.] **prakṛtau.**[104]

[S] nanu ca **karmāṅgatayā mantreṇa prakṛtau devatābhidhīyata ity uktam. katham atra pūrvaḥ pakṣaḥ** | avikāreṇa hi prayoge 'gnyādīnām abhidhānam. na ca teṣām aprakṛtakarmāṅgatāsti◊ karmāṅgatayā ca mantreṇa prakṛtau devatābhidhīyata iti **phaladevatayor**[105] ity atroktam. ataḥ karmāṅgabhūtadevatāprakāśanasamarthaṃ sūryādipadam evohitavyaṃ samavetārthaṃ ca tat sūryādi ucyate.

[P] satyaṃ karmāṅga$\frac{48}{A}$tvenābhidhānam mantrāṇāma(ṃ)[106] samavetārthatā ca sūryādipadānāṃ tathāpi kāryato 'nūham eva pūrvapakṣavādī manyate. **prākṛtakāryā-loca-**⟦314⟧**nayānūha eva yuktaḥ.**

[S] katham[107]◊

[P] uttaraṃ[108]◊ mantreṇa smṛtaṃ kartavyam iti prakṛtāv arthaḥ. na punar amantreṇeha◊ pakṣe ca prayogo nāmantreṇa kriyate. ūhasyāmantratvāt◊ **tasmād vikṛtāv apy ayathārthato 'bhidhānam mantrapadānāṃ smṛtaye kalpanīyam. guṇād vābhidhānaṃ kathaṃcit**◊ **na punar ārṣaṃ bādhanīyam.** agnipado yathārthataḥ[109]◊ laukikam atikramya sūryābhidhānaṃ kalpanīyam. laukikārthāśraya-ṇena vā kathañcit[110] gauṇyāvṛtyeti nārṣaṃ bādhanīyam.

[S] evaṃ prāpte 'bhidhīyate. satyam amantrasya prayogo na prāpnoti. codakato

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[104] *JS* 9.3.1: *prakṛtau yathotpattivacanam arthānāṃ tathottarasyāṃ tatau tatprakṛtitvād arthe cākāryatvāt.* Śabara takes *JS* 9.3.1 and 2 as the first *adhikaraṇa* of the third *pāda*. *JS* 9.3.3 represents an interpolation of the *adhikaraṇa*, which is then continued by a parallel interpretation of *JS* 9.3.2 and 3, continuing through *JS* 9.3.8, which Śabara takes as the third *adhikaraṇa*. Śālikanātha discusses the complete part as one *adhikaraṇa*.

[105] The beginning of *JS* 9.1.4 reads: *phaladevatayoś ca.*

[106] *corr*: *mantrāṇāṃ.* The correction suggested by the scribe is adopted here.

[107] *corr*: *katham.*

[108] *corr*: *uttaram.*

[109] *corr*: *'yathārthaḥ.* The given reading would contradict the sense expressed above, namely that despite the term *agni* not corresponding to the new ritual setting in the ectype, in which Sūrya is the deity, it has to remain the same. Therefore some other meaning of the term has to be come up with in order for the *mantra* to express what is actually happening.

[110] *corr*: *kathañcid.*

mantrasyaiva prāpteḥ. kiṃtu[111] ayathārthatvam api mantrapadānāṃ guṇād vābhidhānam ity api naiva śakyate kalpayituṃ pramāṇābhāvāt ‖ 315

[P] nanu **vacanāt kalpyata evaindrīvat◊**

[S] **maivaṃ mantrasya◊**[112] **na vikṛtau vacanam asti.   prāptir eva kevalā kāryataḥ**[113] **bhavatu◊**

[P] prāptir eva kevalā mā bhūt. vacanam[114]◊

[S] **tathāpi kim** ity

[P] āha◊ **prāptau satyām abhidhānam eva prakṛtivad iti◊ bhavati nāyathārthakalpanā◊** anyārthaḥ[115] ǀ kāryato mantraprāptau yathā prakṛtau tena mantrakāryaṃ kṛtaṃ tathāpi kṛtāv[116] api tena kartavyam iti śāstrārtho bhavati ǀ

[S] prakṛtau ca mukhyayā vṛtyābhidhānaṃ kṛtam. na tasya gauṇakalpanā bhavati. na ca śaktikalpanāpi yuktā. klptaśaktikapadāntara- 316 prakṣepeṇaiva kāryasiddher avighātāt ‖

[P] nanu ca **nāmantrasya prakṛtau prayoga** ity

[S] uktaṃ pariharati. **kena voktam amantrasya prayoga iti◊ vikṛtāv api tasyaiva mantrasya prayogaḥ** ‖

[P] nanu cohe saty amantratvasya prasaṅgaṃ[117] ◊

[S] pariharati◊ **satyaṃ nimittatayohyamānasyāmantratvaṃ**[118]◊ yat padaṃ nimittatayohyate. tasya satyam amantratvaṃ[119]◊ na punarabhidhāne 'pi◊ vākye 'pi śakyate mantratvam avagantuṃ mantrārthāvagamāt◊ mantrārthe 'py avagamyamāne tad evedaṃ vākyam iti samudāyāpannaṃ padajātaṃ pratyabhijñāyate. kevalaṃ padamātrasya hy anyatvam.

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[111] *corr*: *kiṃtv.*

[112] The following two and a half lines have been crossed out by the scribe. From what can still be deciphered, they repeated the last lines from the previous page of the MS.

[113] *corr*: *kāryato.*

[114] *corr*: *vacanam.*

[115] *corr*: *asyārthaḥ.* Even though the given reading is not incorrect as such, it is rather likely that Śālikanātha introduces an extensive gloss on a passage from the *Laghvī* here as he usually does.

[116] *corr*: *tathā vikṛtāv.* Because of the preceding *yathā*, I believe the given reading to be incorrect. The correction provides a clear argument of parallelity between archetype (*prakṛti*) and ectype (*vikṛti*).

[117] *corr*: *prasaṅgam.*

[118] *corr*: *nimittatayohyamānasyāmantratvam.*

[119] *corr*: *amantratvam.*

[P] tad āha◇ **nimittamātraṃ hy atrānyatvenāvagamyate.** ⟨317⟩ **na punar mantraḥ◇ tasmāt prakṛtivad iti◇**

[S] padāntaraprakṣepa evāśrīyate. nāyathārthatvaṃ[120] padasya kasmād ity

[P] āha – **anyataḥ smṛtiprasaṅgāt◇**

[S] **kathaṃ punar ayathārthatve saty anyataḥ smṛtiprasaṅga** ity

[P] atrāha – **na hy anyato 'rtham anavagamyāyathārthatvaṃ śakyate varṇa-yitum.** yataḥ pramāṇāntareṇārtham avagamya tatparatāṃ buddhvā yathārthatva-kalpanā saṃbhavati.

[S] kāraṇāntaraṃ na cet so 'rtho 'vagataḥ ǀ tadā mantreṇa smṛtaṃ kartavyam iti śāstrārtho nānupālitaḥ tasmān mantreṇa smṛtam iti śāstrārtham anupālayatā[121] ūho 'sya nimittasyety āśrayaṇīyaḥ. atra bhāṣyakāreṇa **li·ṅgadarśanāj jātinimittaṃ yathā-sthānam**[122] ity ekaprayojanayaikavākyatayā 'pi ⟨318⟩ $\frac{48}{B}$sūtrārthāvagamaḥ(ma)nā-dṛtyāntarāgarbhinyupanyāsās[123] tu yaḥ kṛtaḥ sa guṇapadānām api samavetārthābhi-dhāyināṃ na guṇamātrābhidhānaṃ nyāyyam iti darśayituṃ[124]◇

[P] kiṃ punaḥ kāraṇaṃ guṇamātrārthābhidhāyitayāpi vākyārthopapatteḥ◇

[S] guṇiparatā nimittasya gṛhyate.

[P] kim iti◇

[S] śrutiparityāgena lakṣaṇāśrīyata ity arthaḥ ǀ

[P] svata eva dṛṣṭārthatve saṃbhavati.

[S] na parato yuktam. dṛṣṭagatasyādṛṣṭasyāparihāryatvāt◇ guṇamātraparatve guṇi-padasya guṇipadanimittanibandhanaṃ yat[125] guṇyabhidhānaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ tad āśritam adṛṣṭam avaśyaṃ vaktavyam. na ca svata eva dṛṣṭārthatve saṃbhavati◇ tadyuktā[126]

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[120] *corr*: *nāyathārthatve*. The construction in the nomintive or accusative does not provide a coherent meaning with the remaining sentence. See translation.

[121] *corr*: *anupālayatayā*. The reading is not clear here. It seems as if the scribe has indicated a *lacuna*, which is supported by the syntax of this statement. From the meaning of the preceding sentence and the syntax the instrumental case seems plausbile.

[122] *JS* 9.3.2 and 3: *liṅgadarśanācca* (2) and *jātinaimittikaṃ yathāsthānam* (3).

[123] *corr*: *sūtrārthāvagamanādṛtyāntarāgarbhinyupanyāsas*. I follow the suggestion of the scribe as-suming a long compound phrase.

[124] *corr*: *darśayitum*.

[125] *corr*: *yad*.

[126] *corr*: *tadyuktyā*. The given reading with an obvious feminine nominative singular has no congru-ence with the remaining sentence.

tasmād varaṃ lakṣaṇayā guṇiparaṃ guṇaparasyābhidhānaṃ saṃbhavatīti 319
sūktam. idānīm ekaprayojanatayaiva sūtrārtho varṇitaḥ.

[P] kiṃ liṅgadarśanaṃ[127]◊

[S] darśayatā athāhy asrāṇām[128] ity evam ādīnāṃ prayogavacanena vidhāne saṃbhavaty
adṛṣṭārthatvaprasaṅga iti vadatā bhāṣyakāreṇa◊ yadyapy **usrāṇām**[129] ity evam ādīnāṃ
prayogavacanena vidhānaṃ saṃbhavati. tathāpy anūhapakṣe
dṛṣṭārthatvaprasaṅgaṃ[130]◊ ūhapakṣe tu dṛṣṭārthataivaṃ[131]◊

[P] kiṃ punaḥ kāraṇam ūhenaivaprāptānām[132] usrādipadānāṃ punarāmnānam ity

[S] āśaṅkya **mantratvasaṃpattyartham** iti◊ parivṛtaṃ mantratvaṃ yathā syād ity
evamarthaṃ svādhyāye◊ **pāṭhavyavasthārtho vacananirdeśa** iti◊ **yady ekaṃ
yūpam upaspṛśed**[133] iti yo 'yam ekatvādīnāṃ nirdeśaṃ[134] savyavasthārtha anyathaika-
yūpopasparśana eva sarvamantrāḥ syur iti na mantrabhedaḥ. 320

[P] **atrādhikārāntarakalpanā mā bhūd** iti vaidike naimittikanirūpaṇā◊ yadi laukika-
yūpopasparśanimittakam idaṃ bhavet tadā svatantrādhikārakalpanā syāt. **sā mā bhūd**
iti vaidike yūpopasparśane naimittikam etad iti nirūpitam. tathā hi sati prakṛtādhi-
kārānupraveśān nādhikārāntarakalpanāvakāśaḥ ‖

[S] rāddhāntas tu – **iṣṭaśabdābhisaṃbandhān na karmaṇā yoga upapadyate.
doṣaśruteś ca yūpo vai yajñasya duriṣṭam āmuñcata**[135] iti vākyaśeṣe śrūyate.
tenaṣṭaśabdābhisaṃbandhād[136] iṣṭe sati yad yūpopasparśanaṃ tatra naimittikam ity
avagamād vaidikasya yūpopasparśanasyeṣṭottarakālabhāvitvāsaṃbhavāt tat tāvad iha
ni-321 mittaṃ na bhavati. yathā doṣaśruteś ca doṣavad upasparśanaṃ nimittam ity

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[127] *corr*: *liṅgadarśanam.*
[128] *corr*: *usrāṇām.* The correction is based on the phrase appearing in the subsequent sentences.
[129] See preceding footnote.
[130] *corr*: *anūhapakṣe 'dṛṣṭārthatvaprasaṅgaḥ.* In combination with the subsequent sentence introduced with *tu* the view denying the need for modification has to result in an unseen meaning, as the (correct) view demanding modification provides a seen meaning.
[131] *corr*: *dṛṣṭārthataivam.*
[132] *corr*: *ūhenaivaprāptānām.*
[133] *MS* 3.9.4, continuing: *yadi dvāv etau te vāyū iti yadi bahūn ete te vāyavaḥ.*
[134] *corr*: *nirdeśaḥ.* The given reading does not fit the syntax of the remaining sentence.
[135] *MS* 3.9.4.
[136] *corr*: *teneṣṭaśabdābhisaṃbandhād.* The given reading clearly is incorrect, as the term *iṣṭa*, appearing in the passage referred to, is the subject-matter here. The present form does not provide a proper meaning.

upagamyate. na ca vaidikakarmāṅgabhūte doṣavattopapadyate. tad āha **na ca karmāṅgatve doṣavattopapadyate yataḥ. tena na vaidikanimittam** iti◊ na vaidikena karmaṇām[137] sahāṅgāṅgibhāva upapadyate. ato laukikayūpopasparśana-nimittatvād adhikārāntarakalpanopapannaiva.

[P] **kathaṃ punaḥ stutiparadanaikavākyabhū**-$\frac{49}{A}$**taṃ**[138] **dr̥ṣṭāntaṃ yūpopa-sparśanavidhānaviśeṣaṇaṃ bhavitum arhati.** yūpo(pa)spa(rśa)ne[139] naimittikasya vidhānaṃ tatra◊ nimittaviśeṣaṇaṃ nisṭhāntaṃ[140] kathaṃ bhavati. stutipadenaikavākya-bhūtatvād ity arthaḥ ।

[S] uttaram[141]◊ **bhavati viśeṣaṇam apekṣātaḥ sannidhānāc ca**◊ kasyāṃ daśāyāṃ yūpopaspa-[322]rśane naimittikam etad ity apekṣitatvād iṣṭaśabdasannidhānāc ca yuktam eva viśeṣaṇam ॥

[P] nanu cā**nyaparoccāraṇe dvayam apy etad atantrapuruṣāntaragatasyeva padasya**◊ puruṣāntaragatena vākyena tatra hi saṃnihitasyāpy ekavākyatvaṃ na bhavati. arthāntaraparoccāraṇāvagamāt◊ iṣṭapadam etat stutipadam avagamyate. sākṣāt stutipadaikavākyatvāvagamāt tasya vidhyuddeśena saha satyām apy ākāṅkṣāyāṃ saṃnihitasyāpi saṃbandho nopapadyate। puruṣāntaragatasyeva padasya puruṣāntaragatena vākyena tatrāpi hy asaṃbandhe 'nyaparoccāraṇāvagama eva hetuḥ।

[S] atrocyate◊ **bhavati yogyatayānyaparasyāpi saṃbandhaḥ**◊ [323] **pradarśitam idaṃ prahara śīghram**[142] **iti**◊ yathā **ramaṇīyo daṇḍo manoharaś ce**ty atra saṃ-bandho daṇḍaḥ satyām ākāṅkṣāyāṃ **prahara śīghram** ity anena yogyatayā saṃ-badhyate. tathehāpi yukta evaṃ saṃbandhaḥ ॥

[P] nanu **tad evāyuktam ity ucyate. anyārthasyānyena saṃbandho na bhava-**

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[137] *corr*: *karmaṇā*. The given reading with the genitive plural does not provide a proper meaning.

[138] *corr*: *stutipadenaikavākyabhūtaṃ*. The scribe's doubt is justified, as the given form does not exist as such. The correction is based on the same phrase appearing in the following gloss of the passage by Śālikanātha.

[139] The insertions of the scribe are correct.

[140] *corr*: *dr̥ṣṭāntaṃ*. The correction is based on the previous statement to which it is a gloss.

[141] *corr*: *uttaram*.

[142] *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.2.9 for this and the following quotations, which form a single statement: *daṇḍo manoharo ramaṇīyaśca prahara śīghram.*

tīti sthite◊ yad idaṃ pradarśitaṃ **prahara śrī(śī)ghram**[143] iti tad evāyuktam iti [S] pariharati.   **nāyuktaṃ vākyāntaragatenāpi sannidhānān nairākāṅkṣyaṃ manvānā**[144] **vākyāntaram uccārayanto laukikā upalabhyante.**   **yataḥ**[145]◊ icchāmy asya devadattasya gṛhāṇi◊ āmantrayasvainaṃ āḍhyo vai paśurūpa iti◊ [P] yathā bhavatv evaṃ tathāpi kim ity [S] āha – 324 **laukikavyavahārapūrvakaś ca vaidikaśabdārtha ity uktam.** puruṣāntaragatenāpi dṛśyata eva sambandhe laukike 'pi pakṣāvagame sati praśnottarādiṣu ko 'yaṃ yātīti praśne devadatta ity uttare yātīti praśnagatasya sambandhadarśanāt◊ **vivakṣā vaśavartinī ca**◊ **laukikaḥ śābdo vyavahāra** iti◊ yathā vivakṣaṃ sambandhaś cāsambandhaś ca◊ tasmāt stutigatasyāpīṣṭaśabdasya vidhyuddeśena sambandhālaukika[146] upaspa xx prāyaścittam[147] iti sūktam ∥

[4.] **anyāyas tu** –[148]

[S] caturthapakṣe dvayor apy ūhitayoḥ pravṛttir iti ̲ẏạ̱varaṇāt[149] gamyate.   tena dvitīyapakṣeṇa saha paunaruktyaṃ nāsti.   dvitīye hi pakṣa ekavacanāntasyāhe- 325 na[150] pravṛttiḥ ꞁ bahuvacanāntasya sarvathaiva nirvṛttiḥ ∥

[P] nanu yady anūhitābhiprāyeṇa bahuvacanāntasya nivṛttir ity ucyate.   evaṃ tarhy ekavacanāntasyāpi kim iti nocyate.

[S] tatrāha – **dvitve 'py ekatvam astīti**◊ bahuvacanānto nivartata ity uktam.   dvivacanohe kṛte 'py ekavacanānto nivartata iti na śakyate $\frac{49}{B}$vaktum.

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[143] *corr*: *śīghram*. The correction suggested by the scribe and corresponding to the previous quotation from the *ŚBh* is adopted here.

[144] *corr*: *manvāno*. I am not certain about this correction. However, the given reading would connect the participle *manvāna* in the active voice with the main verb in the passive voice, *upalabhyante*. This does not provide a coherent meaning.

[145] *corr*: *upalabhyante yataḥ*.

[146] *corr*: *sambandhāl laukika*. The given reading does not provide any coherent meaning. The long *ā* in the middle of the compound phrase hints at the ablative, which is supported by the meaning of the statement.

[147] *em*: *upasparśana prāyaścittam*. The emendation is rather clear, as the subject-matter of this part is the touching of the sacrificial post, which makes the expiatory rite necessary.

[148] *JS* 9.3.10: *anyāyas tv avikāreṇādṛṣṭapratighātitvād aviśeṣāc ca tenāsya.*

[149] *corr*: *vivaraṇād*. Though the correction cannot be supported by external evidence, it fits the context.

[150] *corr*: *ekavacanāntasyohena*. It seems as if the scribe forgot the diacritical mark here.

[P] **ekatvasya tadarthasya sambhavāt**[151] **bahutvam**[152]◊

[S] **bahuvacanasyārtho nāstīti.** bahuvacanānta eva nivarta[153] ity uktam.

[P] tatra pūrvapakṣam āha◊ **asamavetārthatvāt**[154] **bahuvacanāntaram ārṣānu-grahāya pravartata ity ekaḥ pakṣaḥ**ı **dvayor adarśanāt**[155] **dvibahuvacanānta-syaikavacanānta eva ūhe-** 326 **na**[156] **pravartata iti dvitīyaḥ pakṣaḥ**ı bahuvaca-nāntasya tāvad yathārtham dvayoḥ pāśayoḥ prayogo nopapadyate. prakṛtau bahu-vacanāntasya dvite darśanāt[157]◊ param samavetārtha ekavacanānta eva ūhe na[158] pra-vartatām iti dvitīyaḥ pakṣaḥı **dvayor api prāptir aviśiṣṭā◊ pāśābhidhāyitvāt**[159] **bahuvacanāntasya tasya ca dvitve 'pi sambhavāt◊ tasmāt**[160] **dvayor api pra-kṛtāv iva vikṛtāv api prayogo yuktaḥ**ı ekasyaikavacanāntasyohena vacanāviprati-pattyā anyasya tu prakṛtāv iva vikṛtāv apy adhikāreṇeti tṛtīyaḥ pakṣaḥı

[S] idam tadvivaraṇam vakṣyamāṇam caturthapakṣopanyāse **yathārtham dvi-vacanam ūhitavyam. bahuvacanam ekavacanam ca nivartatetām**[161] iti◊ 327

[P] kiṃ punaḥ kāraṇam.

[S] **samavetārtham api bahuvacanam prakṛtau vikṛtāv ūhate**ı yāvatā hari-padādivad anūha eva prāptaḥı sa eva śakyate dvayor adṛṣṭatvāt◊

[P] bahuvacanaprayogasyāsādhutvaprasaṅgād ūha iti cet[162] dūṣayatī[163]◊ **ekasminn api loke bahuvacanasyādarśanād abhidhānavipratipattir aviśiṣṭā◊ anyathā sam-pratipattir eva syāt.** tatra yathā loke dṛṣṭasyāpy ekasmin bahuvacanāntasyāsādhor api prayogaḥı tathā dvitve 'pi kiṃ na syād iti bhāvaḥı

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[151] *corr: saṃbhavād.*

[152] *corr: bahutvam.*

[153] *corr: nivartata.* This is a clear mistake, the same sentence has appeared before.

[154] *corr: asamavetārthatvād.*

[155] *corr: adarśanād.*

[156] *corr: evohena.*

[157] *corr: dvitve 'darśanāt.*

[158] *corr: evohena.* The negation is not correct, as the second *pūrvapakṣa* specifically argues for the *mantra* containing the singular form to be used at the ectype. Furthermore, the locative case in *ūhe* would be difficult to be construed with the remaining sentence.

[159] *corr: pāśābhidhāyitvād.*

[160] *corr: tasmād.*

[161] *corr: nivarteyātām.* The present reading involves a form not existent as such. As this represents a direct quotation from the *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.3.13, the correction is assumed in accordance to that.

[162] *corr: ced.*

[163] *corr: dūṣayati.*

[S] punar āśaṅkate. **atha tatra mantropadeśād vipratipattāv api prayoga ity ucyate.**

[P] dūṣayati◊ **atrāpi prakṛtivat prāptir mantrasya◊ kena pāryate** ‖

nanu prakṛtāv upadeśataḥ ⌷328⌷ prāptiḥ. iha kāryata iti viśeṣaḥ ।

[S] tatrāha – **kāryato 'pi prāptir abhidhānavipratipattir naiva vārayituṃ kṣamā. prakṛtivat pāśapratipatter avyāghātād vārasaṃve**[164]◊ **bahuvacanāntasyāpi mantrasya prayogāt**◊

[P] punar apy āśaṅkate. loke prayogasyādarśanād iti cet[165] dūṣayati. ekasminn apy adarśanād eva vipratipattir eva◊

atrocyate – **na prakṛtau pāśaikatve bahuvacanāntasyādarśanam iti śakyate vaktum. mantropadeśād eva vaidikam api prayogadarśanaṃ**[166]◊ darśanam eva. tena yathā laukikaprayogadarśanāt sādhutvāvagamāt tathā vaidikaprayogadarśanād api dvitve punaḥ[167] $\frac{50}{A}$laukikaṃ vaidikaṃ vā prayogadarśanaṃ nāsti. atas tatrāsādhutvāt[168] bahuvacanasyoha eva ⌷329⌷ yuktaḥ.

[P] yady ekasmin bahuvacanasya vaidikaprayogadarśanāt sādhutvaṃ kathaṃ tarhi vipratipattiḥ । sampratipattir eveyaṃ prāpnoti.

[S] uttaraṃ[169]◊ prayogam aṅgīkṛtyaitad ucyate. loke ca pāśaikatve bahuvacanād vipratipattir eveyam ucyate ‖

paramārthatas tu sampratipattir eveyaṃ[170]◊ evaṃ ca bruvāṇasya vivaraṇakārasyedaṃ mataṃ pratīyate. vikṛtāv api◊ **pāśaikatve bahuvacanāntasyāvikāreṇaiva prayoga iti.** iha tu pāśadvitvena laukikaḥ prayogo nāpi vaidiko nāpi lakṣaṇataḥ prāpnoti. urvādiṣv iva ‖

[P] nanu **kāryato mantraprāptau vaidika evāyaṃ prayoga iti prakṛtāv iva bhavitu-**⌷330⌷**m arhati.**

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[164] I am unable to provide a suitable emendation here.
[165] *corr: ced.*
[166] *corr: prayogadarśanam.*
[167] *corr: punar.*
[168] *corr: tatrāsādhutvāt.*
[169] *corr: uttaram.*
[170] *corr: eveyam.*

[S] pariharati **na kāryato 'bhidhānaprayogaḥ śakyate vaktum.** atra na kāryopa-
deśāt[171] dvivacanakārye bahuvacanaṃ prayoktavyam ity evaṃvidhopadeśāt◊ vyati-
rekeṇa kāryato 'bhidhānaprayogo 'bhidhāyakaśabdaprayogo na śakyate 'vagantuṃ
mantrasyābhidhānāntaraprakṣepeṇāpi kāryakaratvasaṃbhavāt◊ prakṛtau punaḥ[172]
mantropadeśāt tathābhūtasyaiva prayogād ekasmin bahuvacanapravṛttiniścayād
abhidhānā vipratipattiḥ ǀ **na ca tadeva darśanam anyatrāpi sādhutāvagamayati.**
viśiṣṭaviṣayatvād upadeśānāṃ yo 'sāv upadeśaḥ prakṛtau sa vikṛtāv api tāvan na saṃ-
bhavati. pratikaraṇam upadeśavyavasthānāt◊ nāpi prakṛtāv ekatve dṛṣṭaṃ vikṛtāv api
dvitve dṛṣṭaṃ bhavati bhinnatvāt◊ ta-⟨331⟩smāt[173] lakṣaṇata evāyaṃ prayogāvagatir iti
sūktam. yata eva lakṣaṇānusāreṇohaḥ kartavyaḥ. xx nāta[174] evohaḥ◊ **prayojanaṃ**
vyākaraṇasyeti varṇitam. tadvaśena vyākaraṇavaśenohyamānaprayoganir-
ṇayāt ‖

[5.] **vipratipattau.**[175]

[P] **atra liṅgād utkarṣaṃ manvānasya pūrvaḥ pakṣaḥ** ǀ bahuvacanaliṅgāt[176] bahu-
vacanāntasya pāśonmocanamantrasya bahupāśake karmaṇy utkarṣa iti pūrvaḥ
pakṣaḥ ‖

[S] rāddhāntas tu◊ **prakaraṇena viśeṣa upadiṣṭasya prātipadikārthasaṃbhave**
notkarṣo bhavitum arhati. grāhakasannidhānalakṣaṇena prakaraṇena bahuvaca-
nāntasyāpi mantrasyāgnīṣomīyāpūrvaviśeṣa[177]◊ upadiṣṭatvāt ⟨332⟩ prātipadikārthasya
saṃbhavāc ca notkarṣo bhavitum arhati ǀ **prātipadikārthatvenaiva◊** prātipadikārtha-
prakāśakatvenaiva bahuvacanāntamantropadeśāvagamāt. vacanārthatā tu bahutvaprati-
pādanārthatā tu mantrasya naivāvagamyate bahutvasya karmaṇy adarśanāt. tena prāti-

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[171] *corr*: *kāryopadeśād.*
[172] *corr*: *punar.*
[173] *corr*: *tasmād.*
[174] I am unable to suggest a proper emendation here. The only suitable form ending in *-nāta* can be a past participle, such as *snāta* or *(ā-)mnāta*. However, none of these fits the meaning of the remaining sentence.
[175] *JS* 9.3.15: *vipratipattau vikalpaḥ syāt samatvād guṇe tv anyāyakalpanaikadeśatvāt.*
[176] *corr*: *bahuvacanaliṅgād.*
[177] *corr*: *mantrasyāgnīṣomīyāpūrvaviśeṣaḥ.*

padikārthamātraprakāśanaparatvān mantrasya cātra saṃbhavāt[178] bahutvasyāman-
trārthatvād anutkarṣaḥ ꞁ amantrārthatā ca viniyogavaśena mantrārthāvagamāt pra-
karaṇena caikapāśakāpūrvagṛhītatvāt◊ tatra viniyogāvagamān na bahutvaṃ
mantrārthaḥ ꞁ

$\frac{50}{B}$ [P] evaṃ tāvat prātipadikamātraṃ samavetārthaṃ bahuvacanam asamavetārtham
ity uktam. na cāsamavetārtho vacanaprayoga iti śakyate vaktum. kārakārthasya vidya-
mānatvāt◊

[S] karmatvapratipattyā samavetārthaṃ bahu-☐333☐vacanaṃ[179]◊ bahutvābhāvād
asamavāya iti cet pariharati. **asamavāye viprayuktir na śakyate vārayitum. kāra-
kārthatayāpi dvārasya saṃbhavāt◊**

[P] bhavatu prayuktis tathāpi kim ity

[S] āha – **prayuktasya ca samavetārthatvam avagamyate. na punaḥ samavāyāt
prayuktir anyatra kāryaprayogāt.** kārye yaḥ prayogo laukikaḥ◊ tadvyatiriktaṣu[180]
autpattikeṣu prayogeṣu prayuktasya sataḥ samavetārthatvam ity avagamyate. na punaḥ
samavāyamālocya prayuktiḥ. tena prayukte 'smin mantre saty api bahuvacanārthe
karmatvābhiprāyeṇa bahuvacanaṃ samavetārtham ity evaṃ gamyate. yata eva pāśa-
mantrasya bahuvacanāntasyāpy ekasminn eva pāśe prayogaḥ. ata eva bhagavataḥ pāṇi-
ner vibhaktivyatyayānuśāsanam upapannam. tasmād **anutkarṣa** iti ☐334☐ sūktam.
yuvaṃ hi stha svaḥ patī[181] ity ādibhir vaiṣamyaṃ[182]◊ ekayajamānaparatvena pra-
yogānavagamāt. iha tv ekapāśaparatvena prayoganiścayāt ꞁꞁ

[6.] **apū.**[183]

[P] **atra samavetāsamavetābhidhānam ekasya na saṃbhavatī**ti dvayor bahuṣu

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[178] *corr*: *saṃbhavād.*
[179] *corr*: *bahuvacanam.*
[180] *corr*: *vyatirikteṣv.* This is clearly a spelling mistake.
[181] *corr*: *stha svaḥ patī.* *ṚV* 9.19.2. In the *ŚBh* at *JS* 3.3.17 the statement continues: *iti dvayor
yajamānayoḥ pratipadaṃ kuryāt.* This extended version appears in *SV* 2.351.
[182] *corr*: *vaiṣamyam.*
[183] *JS* 9.3.20: *apūrve tv adhikāro 'pradeśāt pradīyate.*

coham manyate.[184]   pūrvapakṣavādī◊ **patnīṃ saṃnahye**[185]ty ekavacanam eka-
patnīke◊ dvipatnīke bahupatnīke ca yady avikāreṇa prayujyeta. tataḥ samavetān sama-
vetārthatvaṃ[186] syāt. na caika(ta)d[187] ekasya yuktam. tasmād ekapatnīke vikāreṇaiva
prayogaḥ[188] dvayoḥ patnyo(ḥ)[189] bahvīṣu ca◊ **dvivacanabahuvacanohaḥ kartavya**
iti pūrvaḥ pakṣaḥ ‖

[S] rāddhāntas tu – **viniyogavaśān mantrāṇām arthanirūpaṇaṃ na svātantryeṇa**

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[P] ekataś cāyaṃ viniyogaḥ◊ trayāṇām api kṛte katham eko viniyoga ity

[S] atrāha – **aviśiṣṭapatnyarthas tisṛṣv api◊ tadvaśenaiva viniyogas tisṛṣv api◊**
mantrasya tasmān na vibhāgaḥ śakyate **vacanāt**[190] ekavacanāt kalpayitum ‖

[P] nanv **ekapatnīke samavetāsamavetatve na śakyate 'pahnotum.**[191] **vaca-**
nasya◊

[S] pariharati. **satyaṃ na śakyate◊ na punar dvayor bahuṣu ca prayoganivṛttiḥ**
śakyate va na kalpayitum[192]. prātipadikaliṅgavacanābhyāṃ viniyogasaṃbhavād eka-
vacanānurodhena   viniyogasaṃkocānupapatteḥ[193]   bhavatu   mantrasya   sarva-
prayogaḥ ।

[P] tathāpi kim ity

[S] āha – **prayuktasya ca samavetāsamavetatvaṃ nirūpaṇam ity uktam.** pra-

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[184] Even though the full stop is clearly indicated here, it is incorrect. The subject corresponding with the verb *manyate* is the following term *pūrvapakṣavādī*, which could, otherwise, not properly be connected to the subsequent sentence.

[185] *TB* 3.2.9.14. The complete *mantra* reads: *prokṣaṇīrāsādaya idhmābarhir upasādaya sruvaṃ ca srucaśca samṛddhi patnīṃ saṃnahyājyenodehi.* ("Fetch the water for besprinkling, pile up the burning fuel, bring together the small and large ladle, dress up the wife, come forth with clarified butter.")

[186] *corr*: *samavetāsamavetārthatvaṃ*. The given reading does not provide a proper meaning. I assume that Śālikanātha reiterates the phrase from the quotation of the *Laghvī* given at the beginning of this *adhikaraṇa*.

[187] *corr*: *caitad*. The scribe's suggested correction is adopted here.

[188] *corr*: *prayogo*.

[189] *corr*: *patnyor*. The scribe's suggested correction does not include the correct application of *sandhi*.

[190] *corr*: *vacanād*.

[191] I consider this punctuation to be incorrect, as the following genitive form *vacanasya* cannot be connected with the subsequent verb *pariharati*. Furthermore, Śālikanātha usually uses *pariharati* by itself to introduce a reply, or together with a conditional sentence involving *(iti) cet*.

[192] *corr*: *śakyate kalpayitum*. The scribe is correct in indicating his doubt about the given reading. This forms the basic statement of the *siddhāntin* against his opponent, namely that the *mantra* applies also in instances of sacrificers with more than one wife.

[193] *corr*: *viniyogasaṃkocānupapatter.*

yuktasya sato mantrasya kiṃ $\boxed{336}$ samavetārtha utāsame(ma)veṭā(kā?)rtha[194] iti ni-rūpatyate[195] ǀ ayaṃ ca mantraḥ sarvatra prayuktaḥ◊ tatraikavacanaṃ dvayor bahuva-canam ekārthaṃ na saṃbhavati. ata $\frac{51}{A}$ekasminn api tad ekatvapratipattiparaṃ na bhavati. karmatvapratipattyartham eva prayogasādhubhūtam iti vyāpakatayā kalpy-ate. tad āha◊ **dvayor bahuṣu caikatvābhidhānaṃ na saṃbhavatī**ty ekasmin na hy atatprayuktam eva tat. tasmāt tatrāpi prayogo 'ṅgam evety aviruddham[196] dvayor bahuṣu caikābhidhānam.

[7.] **vikṛtau.**[197]

[P] tatra pūrvapakṣavādī◊ **viśiṣṭaviṣayatvād upadeśasya prakṛtāv eva dvayor bahuṣu cāyaṃ sādhur na vikṛtāv api kāryatvāt prayogasya.** asyārthaḥ. **patnīṃ saṃnahye**[198]ti prayogasādhubhūtam ekavacanaṃ prakṛtāv eva tatraiva mantrasyo-$\boxed{337}$padiṣṭatvāt◊ na vikṛtau tatrānupadiṣṭatvāt◊ **prayogasya kāryatvād yathā lakṣaṇam eva pāśamantravat◊ prayogaḥ kārya** iti pūrvapakṣayati ‖

[S] rāddhāntas tu – **satyaṃ viśiṣṭaviṣaya upadeśaḥ prakṛtāv eva cāsau◊ tathāpi dvayor bahuṣu cāyam ekavacanāntaḥ sādhur iti tatrāvagatam.** tad evedaṃ dvitvaṃ bahutvaṃ ca vikṛtāv api◊ atas tatra sādhutvāvagamāt[199] na **kāryaḥ prayoga** iti◊ yathārtham eva prayogaḥ. pāśadvitve punaḥ[200] bahuvacanasya dvayor adarśanāt tatra prayoge kalpye lakṣaṇam anusaraṇīyam iti yuktam. iha punar dvitvabahutvayor api siddhatvāt prayogasya kāryakāṅkṣā nāstīti◊ **kīdṛśaḥ prayogaḥ kriya-tām ity apekṣaiva nāstīti◊** na lakṣa-$\boxed{338}$ṇasya vyāpāraḥ. tasmād vikṛtād **vikṛtāv api tadvacanād**[201] iti sūktam.

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[194] *corr*: *utāsamavetārtha.* The first correction suggested by the scribe is plausible, but the second does not provide any meaning. Rather, as in the phrase *samavetāsamavetārtha* appearing before in this *adhikaraṇa*, the opposition here is between *samavetārtha* and *asamavetārtha.*

[195] *corr*: *nirūpyate.*

[196] *corr*: *aviruddhaṃ.*

[197] *JS* 9.3.21: *vikṛtau cāpi tadvacanāt.*

[198] *TB* 3.2.9.14. See preceding *adhikaraṇa.*

[199] *corr*: *sādhutvāvagamān.*

[200] *corr*: *punar.*

[201] *corr*: *tasmād* **vikṛtāv cāpi tadvacanād.** The latter part is a direct quotation of *JS* 9.3.21 (see beginning of this *adhikaraṇa*), with the initial *ca* missing. The given sentence framing this quotation, *tasmād vikṛtād … sūktam,* does not provide a proper meaning. Rather, it should read: *tasmād …*

[8.] **adhriguḥ.**[202]

[S] yogāntarakaraṇaṃ paśvadhikaraṇapūrvapakṣabhūtasamānavidhānaprayojana-kathanārtham.

[9.] **prati.**[203]

[P] atra nīvāreṣu vrīhiśabda yaveṣv ivāvācakaṃ manvānaḥ pūrvapakṣayati ।

[S] rāddhāntas tu – **satyaṃ syād avācako yadi nīvāradravyako 'yaṃ prayogaḥ** । **vrīhitvalakṣitāvayavasāmānyasampattyarthaṃ tu nīvāradravyāṇām upā-dānam iti darśitam.**[204] **ṣaṣṭhe◊ vrīhitvena yal lakṣitaṃ tasyaivāvayavasāmā-nyād iti◊**

[P] kathaṃ nāmopādīyantām ity

[S] evam arthaṃ vrīhyapacāre nīvārāṇām upādānaṃ na dravyāntaratayeti darśitaṃ ṣaṣṭhe ॥ 339

[P] nanv evam upāttās tāvan nīvārāḥ◊ na ca teṣāṃ vrīhiśabdo vācaka ity ūho yuktaḥ.

[S] tatrāha◊ **viśeṣaniṣṭhaś ca saṃskāreṣu jātiśabda iti sthitam.** yatra saṃskārā vidhīyante. tatra viśeṣaniṣṭho jātiśabda iti sthitam. **mantreṇāpi ca yad abhidhānaṃ tad api saṃskāra eveti◊** tatrāpi viśeṣaniṣṭha eva jātiśabdaḥ◊ tasmād viśeṣapra-yuktatvāt[205] jātiśabdasyāvikāreṇa prayoga iti sūktam ॥

[P] nanu **nīvāravyaktir na vrīhivyaktir iti kathaṃ vrīhiśabdenocyate.**

[S] ayam abhiprāyaḥ । **yad upādānena vrīhijāteḥ sādhanatvam avagatam anu-gṛhyate tatpratipādanāya vrīhiśabda iti◊** atrāpi tad aviśiṣṭam i- 340 ti vrīhiśabda eva prayoktavyaḥ ॥

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sūktam.

[202] *JS* 9.3.22: *adhrigau savanīyeṣu tadvat samānavidhānāś cet.* The obvious beginning of this *adhikaraṇa* was not recognized by the scribe, as he continues it in line with the preceding *adhikaraṇa*. This may also be due to the shortness of it – one brief sentence.

[203] *JS* 9.3.23: *pratinidhau cāvikārāt.*

[204] I assume this punctuation to be incorrect, as the following *ṣaṣṭhe* should rather be read together with *darśitam* than with the subsequent sentence.

[205] *corr*: *viśeṣaprayuktatvād.*

[10.] <u>saṃsargiṣu.</u>[206]

[P] **paśunibandhano bhedaḥ prakṛtau vivakṣita** iti manvānaḥ pūrvapakṣayati. yadyapi prakṛtāv ivādhiṣṭhānasyānupādānāt $\frac{51}{B}$tannibandhano bhedo vivakṣitaḥ ǀ evam api <u>sūryam asya cakṣur</u>[207] ity atrāsyaśabdena paśoḥ pratinirdeśād asmāt paśubhede tattejasī bhinne iti yathārtham ūho yuktaḥ ǁ

[S] rāddhāntas tu – **na bhedavivakṣāyāṃ pramāṇam asti. tejasa ekatvāvagamāt**◊ na hi paśubhede 'pi saṃsargitejo bhidyate. tasmād aniṣṭhānabahutvam[208] eva vikṛtāv api gamyate.[209] na tejaso bheda ity anūhaḥ ǁ

[11.] <u>ekadhā.</u>[210]

[P] **sahayoge 'py eva-** 341 **m artha upapadyata evety anūhaṃ manyate. ekadhā asya tvacam ācchyatād**[211] iti yo 'yam ekadhāśabdasyārthas sa x hayoge[212] 'py upapadyata eva◊ sahayoge 'py ekadhety anenābhidhānāt◊ tasmādvipaśvādiṣv[213] ekadhāśabdasyābhyāso na kartavya iti manyate.   kiṃtu[214] asyaśabda eva vacanohaḥ kartavyaḥ ǁ

[S] rāddhāntas tu – **ekatvān mantropadeśasya tadanurodhī ca mantrārtha ity ekatvāt paśor na prakṛtau sahārtha upapadyate ǀ tasmād vikṛtāv apy arthāntarakalpanety ūha eva**◊ asyārthaḥ. prakṛtau tāvad ekatvāt paśor na sahārtha ekadhopapadyate.   tena vidhārtha eva grāhyaḥ ǀ yādṛśo hy asya prakṛtau mantrasyārthaḥ[215] 342 vikṛtāv api tādṛśa eva◊ vikṛtau mantrasyopadeśāntarābhāvāt kāryata eva prāpteḥ ǀ upadeśāntare hi kadācid arthāntaram api varṇyeta. kāryatas tu pra-

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[206] *JS* 9.3.27: *saṃsargiṣu cārthasyāsthitaparimāṇatvāt.*

[207] *MS* 4.13.4; *TB* 3.6.6.2. Both sources, however, do not contain the term *asya.*

[208] *corr*: *adhiṣṭhānabahutvam.* The correction has been made in analogy to the statement of the *pūrvapakṣa* above, and the terminology in the *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.3.27.

[209] I do not follow this punctuation in my translation. Rather, I consider the two clauses to have a kind of relative relation.

[210] *JS* 9.3.29: *ekadhety ekasaṃyogād abhyāsenābhidhānaṃ syāt.*

[211] *MS* 4.13.4; *TB* 3.6.6.2. The original sources apply the proper *sandhi*: *ekadhāsya … .*

[212] *em*: *saḥ sahayoge.* The emendation is based on the statement quoted before from the *Laghvī.* The missing part seems to be the beginning of the correlative clause.

[213] *corr*: *tasmād dvipaśvādiṣv.* This is clearly a spelling mistake, as the dissolution of the *sandhi* in the given reading would result in non-existing terms.

[214] *corr*: *kiṃtv.*

[215] *corr*: *mantrasyārtho.*

vṛttau nārthāntarakalpanāvakāśo 'sti nirṇītārthasyaiva prāpteḥ◊ ata ekadhāśabdasya vikṛtāv api vidhārtha evārtha ity ūha eva yuktaḥ ǁ

[12.] **medhaviti.**[216]

[P] **atra nimittārthasya medhapatipadārthasya svāmini devatāyāṃ cāviśeṣād ubhayaparatāṃ manyate.** svāmivacanatāṃ devatāvacanatāṃ ca manyate. **padānta-rasaṃbandhe viśeṣadarśanān**[217]◊ **medha**śabdena saṃbandhe svāmivacanatā◊ **upa-nayata**śabdasaṃbandhe ca devatāparateti viśeṣadarśanād ubhayārthatvaṃ 343 na saṃbhavati ǁ

nanu kevalasyāviśeṣād ubhayārthatvaṃ bhaviṣyatīty atrāha – **anvitābhidhānena ca nimittatopapatteḥ**[218] **na padārthāntarasaṃbandhinirapekṣasya padārthasyā-bhidhānam.** anvitābhidhānena padārthānāṃ vākyārthanimittatvāt◊ tatraikārthatve sthita ubhayoś cānukarṣād[219] yajamānadampatyabhiprāyeṇa svāmiparateti pakṣāntaraṃ[220]◊ ekavacanāntasya yajamānābhiprāyeṇānutkarṣaḥ ǀ dvivacanāntasya dampatyabhiprāyeṇa◊ devatāparatve tu dvivacanāntasyaiva samavāyaḥ syāt. eka-vacanānta utkarṣyeta. tasmād ubhayānutkarṣāt svāmiparateti pakṣāntaraṃ[221]◊

[S] **svāmiparatāyām āśaṃsanānvaya-** 344 $\frac{52}{A}$ **virodhāt. svāminā medhasya prāptatvāt. aprāptiviṣayatvāc cāśaṃsāyā**[222] **svāmiparatāyām āśaṃsanārtha-virodhād devatāpara eve**ti rāddhāntaḥ ǁ **anutkarṣaś ca svāmivad eva vyava-sthāyā**[223] **prātipadikārthābhiprāyeṇa dvivacanāntasya kārakābhiprāyeṇa caikavacanāntasye**ty uktam ǁ

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[216] *corr*: *medhapati. JS* 9.3.32: *medhapatitvaṃ svāmidevatasya samavāyāt sarvatra ca prayuktatvāt tasya cānyāyanigadatvāt sarvatraivāvikāraḥ syāt.*

[217] *corr*: *viśeṣadarśanāt.* As the same meaning is again expressed in the following phrases, I take this to be a quotation from the *Laghvī*. See the translation for more.

[218] *corr*: *nimittatopapatter.*

[219] *corr*: *cānutkarṣād.* The given reading is incorrect, as the term *anutkarṣa* is repeated further down, its meaning fitting the context.

[220] *corr*: *pakṣāntaram.*

[221] *corr*: *pakṣāntaram.*

[222] *corr*: *cāśaṃsāyāḥ.* As no application of *sandhi* is possible here, the given reading does not represent an existing form. The genitive seems to be the best option.

[223] *corr*: *vyavasthayā.*

[13.] **niyamaḥ.**[224]

[P] ādhastyanyāyasya[225] prayojanam idaṃ cintyate. **devatāparatve kathaṃ bahu-devatāke prayoktavyo mantra iti**◊ anenāvāntarasaṃgatiṃ lakṣaṇasaṃgatiṃ cāha —[226] tatra pūrvapakṣavādī◊ dvivacanāntasya prakṛtau samavetārthatayā vikṛtāv ūhena prayoge saṃbhavati. tenaiva kāryasiddher naikavacanā-[345]ntasyādṛṣṭasya bahu-ṣv ekasmiṃś ca prayogo yukta iti nivṛttiṃ manyate ɪ ekavacanānto hy ayaṃ dvayoḥ prayogasādhur iti na bahuṣv ekasmiṃś ca prayoktavyaḥ ɪ[227]

[S] atra bhāṣyakāreṇa ‖[228] **nanu prakṛtau dvitvasyāvivakṣitatvād avikāreṇa pra-yogaḥ prāpnoti.**[229] paricodanā kṛtā◊ tasyāḥ prayojanaṃ varṇayati. **paricodanā punar atra bhāṣyakāreṇa yā dvivacanasyāvivakṣeti kṛtā sā**◊ **vivakṣābhāve svārthābhidhānenānvayo na saṃbhavatīti mā māṃ śaṅkāṃ nivartayituṃ**[230]◊ atra codayati —[231] **nanu naiveyaṃ śaṅkānivartayituṃ śakyate**◊ **vivakṣāyām asatyāṃ svārthābhidhānenānvayo 'nupapanna eva.** ata iyam āśaṅkā [346] ni-vartayituṃ na śakyate.

[P] kuta ity

[S] āha – **vivakṣā hi vaktum icchā.**

[P] tataḥ kim ity

[S] āha – **vacanaṃ cābhidhānam. tena vivakṣito 'bhidhātum iṣṭaḥ.** avivakṣitaḥ punar mantreṇa nābhidhātum iṣṭaḥ

[P] punar api tataḥ kim ity

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[224] *JS* 9.3.41: *niyamaḥ bahudevate vikāraḥ syāt.*

[225] I am unable to provide a suitable correction here.

[226] I do not accept this punctuation. Although it is frequently used after the term *āha* to introduce a longer quotation from the *Laghvī*, in the present case this reading does not apply. The sentence continues with *tatra pūrvapakṣavādī*, which cannot be connected to the sentence following it.

[227] I do not follow the separation of paragraphs in the manuscript here. The following sentence introduces the subsequent quotation from the *ŚBh* and cannot be separated from it. In fact, I read it together with *paricodanā kṛtā* following the quotation, which seems to be embedded in this framing statement. The scribe obviously considered the initial *nanu* in the quotation to indicate a distinct objection.

[228] In my reading of this section this punctuation is wrong.

[229] *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.3.41.

[230] *corr*: *nivartayitum.*

[231] Again, I do not follow the separation of paragraphs made in the manuscript. The given phrase introduces a quotation und is as such connected with the following statements.

[S] āha – **abhidheyatayā cāniṣṭam abhihitam iti durbhaṇam.** yuktyantaraṃ cāha – **iṣṭārthaś cautpattikeṣu niyogābhiprāya iti yuktam.** tena yad ākāṅkṣitaṃ niyogena tad vivakṣitaṃ[232]◊ yac cāpi vivakṣitaṃ na tan niyogenākāṅkṣitaṃ[233]◊ yac cānākāṅkṣitaṃ na tat tadanvayi◊ yac cātadanvayi nāsāv abhihita iti śakyate vaktum. vyutpattivirahāt◊ atrocyate – **avikṣāśabdo[234] 'trāniṃdaparābhiprāyo draṣṭavyaḥ◊ etad uktaṃ bhavati. dvitvam api vivakṣitaṃ[235]◊ dvitva-** 347 **paro 'yaṃ mantro na bhavatīy**ti tena tātparyābhiprāyeṇāvivakṣitatvam ucyate. na punar abhidhātum ani{ṣṭa}tvena[236]◊ anyathā ditvāvagatir mithyety abhyupagataṃ bhavet. dvitvatvān-abhihitatvāt◊ tasmāt[237] dvīpavacanāntena dvitvam abhidhīyata eva kiṃtu tātparyaṃ nāsti. anyata eva dvitvā̲ya̲(pa)gamāt[238] ॥

[P] nanv evaṃ tātparyam abhidhānaṃ ca bhinnaviṣayam abhyupagataṃ bhavati. tataś cānyatrāpi yatrābhidhānaṃ tatra tātparyaṃ na syā-$\frac{52}{B}$d i(ty)[239]

[S] atrāha – **na ca tātparyāvagatir anvayāvagatyā vihanyate. tadapekṣam eva tātaparyam। yataḥ**[240]◊ anvayāvagamapūrvakam eva tātparyam. anvitāvagateṣv[241] eva hi kasmiṃścit tātparyaṃ bhavati. 348 nānyathābhūte◊ tasmād atātparye 'pi dvivacanam anvitārtham evety ūhārham ॥

[S] rāddhāntas tu – **yuktaṃ dvivacanam ūhena pravartata iti◊ ekavacanam api pravartata eva.** ekavacanānto 'py avikāreṇa pravartata ity arthaḥ ॥

[P] nanv ekatra bahuṣu ca dṛṣṭatvād[242] ayuktaḥ prayoga ity uktam. kiṃtu pāśavad-

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[232] *corr*: *vivakṣitam.*

[233] *corr*: *niyogenānākāṅkṣitam.* The given reading would contradict the preceding as well as the following statement. Before, it was said that what is required is also intended. In the present sentence, the counter-conclusion is stated, i.e. that when something is not intended, it is also not required. This is extended in the following sentence: What is not required is not syntactically connected.

[234] *corr*: *avivakṣāśabdo.* Clearly, the given reading is not correct, as the intention (*vivakṣā*) is discussed throughout this section.

[235] *corr*: *vivakṣitam.*

[236] The missing ligature is written on the inside margin.

[237] *corr*: *tasmād.*

[238] The correction suggested by the scribe is accepted here.

[239] The correction suggested by the scribe is accepted here.

[240] *corr*: *tātparyaṃ yataḥ.* As is often the case, the ablative subjunction *yatas* is added at the end of a statement of reason. This is clear from the missing application of *sandhi* with the following sentence.

[241] *corr*: *anvitāvagate tv.* The given reading does not correspond to the following *kasmiṃścit*, to which it should belong. Therefore, the particle *tu* is assumed here.

[242] *corr*: *cādṛṣṭatvād.* The given reading would provide no proper meaning: Why should the form not be correct (*a-yukta*), if it is found in instances of many items?

vikāreṇaiva prayogo yuktaḥ ।

[S] uttaraṃ[243]◊ **anvāruhyavacanam idam**[244]◊ apūrvasminn[245] adhikaraṇe◊ eka-vacanaṃ samavetārtham iti gauṇābhiprāyeṇa samavetārthatvasya varṇitatvāt◊ evaṃ ca bruvāṇasya gaṇibhyo 'nyo gaṇo 'stīty upādhyāyasyābhiprāyo lakṣyate. **tasmād anūhita-[349]syaikavacanāntasya prayogaḥ । bahuṣv apy ekasya gaṇārthasya vidyamānatvāt patnīśabdavad** ity anūhitaprayogamātratayā dṛṣṭāntaḥ ।

[P] tatra hy ekavacanasya prayogasādhutvam. iha tv abhidhānasādhutvam eva. atra bhāṣyakāreṇaikavacanāntasya nivṛttir ity uktaṃ[246]◊

[S] tadākṣipati —[247] **nanv adṛṣṭasyāpi bahuṣv ekasmiṃś caikavacanāntasya pra-vṛttir ity uktam.** atra cādhikaraṇe yad idam uktam. ekavacanāntasyaikasminn adarśanam iti tadvaidikaprayogābhiprāyeṇeti mantavyam. samādhatte◊ **anūhitābhi-prāyaṃ draṣṭavyam.** anūhitapravṛttim icchato rāddhāntinaḥ pratipakṣabhūtam an-ūhitasyaikavacanāntasya nivṛttir iti◊

[P] tenātra dvayor apy ūhitayoḥ pravṛttir iti pūrvaḥ pakṣaḥ ।

[S]	dvi-[350]vacanāntasyaivohaḥ◊	ekavacanāntasyāvikāreṇaiva	pravṛttir	iti rāddhāntaḥ ॥

[14.] **artha.**[248]

[S] **atra saṃsargābhāvān naikavacanāntasya yathārthaḥ prayoga upapadyate ।** yadi hy agnīṣomayoḥ saṃsṛṣṭayor devatātvam. tadā 'tra syāt. tadā yathārtham ekavaca-naṃ tasya prayoga upapadyate. na cātra saṃsṛṣṭānāṃ devatātvam[249]◊ atra bhāṣya kāreṇai**kavannigadaḥ kim avikāreṇa pravarteta. nivarteteti**[250] siddhāntavacana-

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[243] *corr*: *uttaram.*

[244] *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.3.40.

[245] *corr*: *pūrvasminn.* The given reading of the manuscript continues without separating the previous quotation from the following phrases. This, however, cannot be correct, as this quotation from the preceding (*pūrva*) *adhikaraṇa* is referred to.

[246] *corr*: *uktam.*

[247] I do not follow the indication of the beginning of a new paragraph here in the manuscript, as the preceding statement appears to be the introduction of the subsequent one.

[248] *JS* 9.3.43: *arthāntare vikāraḥ syād devatāpṛthaktvād ekābhisamavāyāt syāt.*

[249] *corr*: *devatātvam.*

[250] *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.3.43. In the original, *uta* is added between the two verbs, making the alternative clear.

vyaktitayaikavacanāntasya nivṛttir uktā.

[P] tasyārtham avagantukāmaḥ pṛcchati. kiṃ nivartata vacānto[251] mantraḥ◊

[S] uttaraṃ[252]◊ **nivartate. devatāparatvāt tasyāś cātrābhāvāt**◊ ekavacanāntas tu na prayujyate. bahutvadarśanād[253] ekavacanāntasya bahuvacanam ūhyate ꟾ ⟨351⟩ an-ūhitābhiprāyeṇaiva pūrvavad atrāpi nivṛttir uktā ‖

<p style="text-align:center">iti dīpaśikhāyāṃ navamasya tṛtīyaḥ pādaḥ ‖</p>

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[251] *corr*: *ekavacanānto*. This clearly is a spelling mistake.

[252] *corr*: *uttaram*.

[253] *corr*: *bahutvādarśanād*. The given reading would mean that the singular ending is found in regard to plurality. But in that case, there would be no justification for modifying it to the plural.

4.3 Ninth adhyāya, fourth pāda

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śrīḥ

[1.] **ṣaḍviṃśatiḥ.**[254]

[S] pakṣacatuṣṭayam apy etat siddhāntabhūtasamasyavacanapratipakṣatayo$\frac{53}{A}$pany-astam.[255] na pa(ra)sparapratipakṣatayā[256]◊ tatra bhavatu vaṃkrīprādhānyam◊ apa-kraya[257] eva gaṇyantām ॥

[P] tathāpi ṣaḍviṃśatipadābhyāsena tāsāṃ gaṇanam astv iti kaścin manyate. kaścit tv asyapadābhyāsena◊ dvivacanabahuvacanohena kaścit◊ karaṇatvenāviniyogād vaṃkrīgaṇāparatvam api nāstīti manyate.[258] kaścit◊ sarve hy ete samasyavacanaṃ na yuktam iti manyante. tatra ṣaḍviṃśatipadābhyāso 'syapadābhyāsaś ca paśoḥ prādhāny-āpattyaiva◊

[S] nirākṛtam. **pakṣadvaye 'py asmin** 353 **paśoḥ prādhānyam āpadyate. tac ca na yuktaṃ prakṛtau vaṃkrīpradhānatvān mātrārthasya**◊ yadi pakṣadvaye 'py etasmin paśuprādhānyāpattiḥ. kimarthaṃ tarhi bhedenopanyāsaḥ◊

[P] asyapadābhyāsasya viśeṣaṇatayāpy upapattiṃ manyate ı **ṣaṣṭhyantenāsya-padena paśupatinirdeśakena vaṃkraya eva viśeṣyante. tena tāsāṃ prā-dhānyam upapadyata eve**ty asya padābhyāsavādī manyate. kathaṃ tarhi paśuprā-dhānyāpattyāsya ca pakṣasya nirākriyā◊

[S] tatrāha – **anyatas tu prādhānyāvagamād viśeṣaṇāvagater nirākriyā**◊ śabdāt prādhānyāvagateḥ kāraṇāntareṇa viśeṣaṇāntarāvagatir vaktavyā◊ na ca śabdāt prā-

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[254] *JS* 9.4.1: *ṣaḍviṃśatir abhyāsena paśugaṇe tatprakṛtitvād guṇasya pravibhaktvād avikāre hi tāsām akārtsnyenābhisaṃbandho vikārānna samāsaḥ syād asaṃyogāc ca sarvābhiḥ.*

[255] I do not follow this punctuation in the translation, as I take the following negated instrumental phrase to be included in the sentence as the counter-statement.

[256] The suggestion of the scribe is followed here.

[257] *corr*: *vaṃkraya.* I believe that the *halanta* in *vaṃkrīprādhānyam* and the *anusvāra* got lost in the copying process. As a conseqence the terms got read together, resulting in an impossible form. The change from *va* to *pa* is a common phonetic and lexical shift.

[258] I do not follow this punctuation in my translation, as I consider the following *kaścit* to belong to the present sentence. This assumption is based on the parallel construction in the previous sentences.

dhānyāvagamād anyato viśeṣaṇāvagatir vaktavyety arthaḥ �ι **na ca kāraṇāntara-** 354 **m apy astī**ty asya padābhyāsanirākriyā◊

[P] yathārthapakṣas tu karaṇatvena[259] arthaprakāśanakaraṇatvenāviniyogaṃ manvānasya◊ liṅgād api karaṇaviniyogo nāsti.

[S] **tathāpi liṅgād api viniyogo 'pi niyoga eveti**◊[260] yathārthapakṣanirākriyāvacanohas tu saṅkhyāprādhānyāpatteḥ nirākṛtaḥ �ι tasmāt samasyavacanam eveti sthitam ⊫

[2.] **aśvasya.**[261]

[S] padapratiṣedhaśaṅkānirākaraṇārtham idam adhikaraṇam.

[P] **na catustriṃśad iti brūyād**[262] **iti śrutyā padamātraṃ pratiṣidhyate.   na punar ṛt**[263] **lakṣaṇāprasaṅgād** iti

[S] pūrvapakṣāśaṅkāṃ nirākriyate.

[P] katham ity

[S] āha – 355 **padamātrasyāviniyogāt tadvacanasyāprāptatvāt prāptipūrvaka- tvāc ca pratiṣedhasya**◊ mantravacanasyāprāptatvāt mantrasyaivāyaṃ pratiṣedha iti padapratiṣedho nirākṛtaḥ ⊦

[P] tad idam ākṣipati. **tad ayuktam iti manyante.   irāpade na girāgireti brūyād**[264] **iti girāpadamātrasya nivṛttidarśanāt**◊

[S] samādhatte. **atra vaiṣamyam abhidadhati.   tatrerāpadavidhānāt stotrārtho- pādāneṣu hṛtpadeṣu girāpadasya sthāne**◊ **irāpadaniyamāt tasyaivopādānāt**◊ **tenaiva kāryasya kṛtatvāt**◊ **girāpadaṃ nivartata iti yuktam.**

[P] bhavatv evam. ka̱(ta)thāpi[265] kim ity

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[259] There should apply *sandhi* here.

[260] A line has been crossed out here by the scribe, which appears at the beginning of the next *adhikaraṇa*.

[261] *JS* 9.4.17: *aśvasya catustriṃśat tasya vacanād vaiśeṣikam.*

[262] *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.4.18. The original source is untraced.

[263] *corr*: *ṛg*. This clearly is a spelling mistake. The opposition between the *pūrvapakṣa* and the *siddhānta* is that the former takes the prohibition to apply to the word only, while the latter takes it to apply to the complete verse (*ṛk*).

[264] The quote is based on *TāB* 8.6.9-10, and refers to 9.1.17 (*ŚBh* at *JS* 9.1.45 - 49).

[265] The reading suggested by the scribe is adopted here.

[S] āha – **na girāgire**[266]**ti pratiṣedhānuvāda iti darśitam. dharmasyārthakṛta-
tvād** ity atra tenānuvādasya pramāṇāntarasa-⬚356 vyapekṣatvāt padamātrasya nivṛtti-
prāpteḥ[267] tadanu$\frac{53}{B}$vādo nāyuktaḥ. iha punaḥ padāntarasyāvidhānam[268]◊

[P] katham avidhāne◊

[S] **evaśabdasaṃbandhād iti darśitam.** evaśabdasaṃbandhāddhi yathāprāptāva-
gamyate. yathāprāptasya ca vidhānam.

[P] athaḥ kiṃ nibandhanā padamātravṛttir anūdyate.

[S] **na catustriṃśad** iti pratiṣedha eva nānuvāda iti.

[P] kim ato yady evam[269]◊

[S] uttarā[270]◊ **etad ato bhavati. na viniyogaḥ**◊ **padamātrasya prayuktir avasīya-
te. yathopādānataḥ**◊ yathopādānāt padamātrasya prāptir avasīyate. tathāviniyoga-
taḥ[271] mantrasyaiva viniyogāt prāptyavekṣaś ca pratiṣedha iti◊ mantrasyaivāyaṃ prati-
ṣedha iti sūktam. padāntaravidhāne 'pi◊ yadyapi padāntarā vidhīyate ⬚357
tathāpi catustriṃśatpadakāryasya ṣaḍviṃśatipadena kartum aśakyatvān na catustriṃ-
śatpadasya nivṛttiḥ prāptā. **ato nāyam anuvādaḥ**[272] iti◊ mantrapratiṣedha
evāyaṃ padāntaravidhāne 'pi kimuta pratiṣedhavidhāne◊ tasmād vihitapratiṣiddhatvād
vaikalpiko mantra iti sūktam ॥

[3.] **vaniṣṭhaḥ.**[273]

[S] **atra mantrārthāvadhāraṇaṃ kāryānugrahavaśena darśayitum idam adhi-
karaṇam**[274]◊ yasmin mantrārthe svīkriyamāṇe 'gnīṣomīyāpūrvakāryānugrahaḥ sa
mantrārtha iti darśayitum idam adhikaraṇam.

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[266] See preceding footnote.

[267] *corr*: *nivṛttiprāpter.*

[268] *corr*: *padāntarasyāvidhānam.*

[269] *corr*: *evam.*

[270] *corr*: *uttaram.* This clearly is a spelling mistake, as this represents the usual introduction of the
answer to the previous question.

[271] *corr*: *tathāviniyogato.*

[272] *corr*: *anuvāda.*

[273] *corr*: *vaniṣṭhu. JS* 9.4.22: *vaniṣṭhusaṃnidhānād urūkeṇa vapābhidhānam.*

[274] *corr*: *adhikaraṇam.*

[P] tatra pūrvapakṣavādī mantrapadārthānvayavaśena yo 'rthaḥ pratīyate. tam arthaṃ kāryaupayikatayā manvānaḥ pūrvapakṣayati ।

[S] kaḥ punar asau mantrānvayavaśena yo 'rtha ity

[P] āha – ⟦358⟧ **uru̱(rū)kaśabdaś**[275] **cāyam ekaṃ padam ulūkārtha iti yuktam. padabhede hy arthāntarakalpanāprasaṅgāt.** lokaprasiddho vapālakṣaṇortha uruka-śabdasyārthaḥ kalpayitavyaḥ sa cāyuktaḥ । ataḥ padapratyabhijñānaivārtho[276] yukto mantrāṇāṃ tasya ca tathābhūtasya prayogaupayikatvakalpanā yuktā.

[S] na punaḥ prayogopayikatvakalpanā । evaṃ prāpte 'bhidhīyate. **kāryato 'rthanir-ṇayo yuktaḥ. niyogataḥ prāmāṇyābhidhānāt**◊ niyogapratipādakatayā sarvasya prāmāṇyābhidhānāt◊ tadvaśenaiva yo 'rtho 'vagamyate sa eva mantrārtho yuktaḥ◊ tataś cet prāmāṇyaṃ na yogavaśena[277] cet prāmāṇyaṃ tanniṣpattau dṛṣṭe 'rthe saṃ-bhavati nādṛṣṭakalpanā pramāṇam asti. vistīrṇavapā-⟦359⟧bhidhāne ca dṛṣṭārthaḥ◊ ulūkavacanatve tv adṛṣṭārthatā. tasmāt padabhedakalpanaiva jyāyasī ॥

[P] nanu prayājādivatvamantrasyaiva[278] kimity aṅgatā na bhavatīty

[S] atrāha – **bhāvārthebhyaḥ kriyāpratīyate** । aṅgāpūrvotpattidvāreṇa hi pra-yājādīnām aṅgatvam. na ca tatra dravyād apūrvotpattiḥ । tato na prayājādivad aṅga-tvam[279]◊ pūrvapakṣadūṣaṇam āha – **ulūkasadṛśapakṣe ca yadi tāvad vaniṣṭhum anudyaiva tan mā lāviṣṭaity**[280] **evārthaḥ parigṛhyate. tato vihitavaniṣṭhu-lapanapratiṣedhād viruddho mantrārthaḥ** ।

[P] atholūkasadṛśaṃ manyamānā[281] **mā lāviṣṭe**ti[282] kalpyate. ulūkasadṛśabuddhir vaniṣṭhol[283] lapana-⟦360⟧kālena kartavyety eva mantrārthaḥ kalpyate. tato dṛṣṭa-

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[275] The correction suggested by the scribe is adopted here.

[276] The given reading appears to be a compound phrase including the particle *eva*. Alternatively, one could assume an incorrect reading, the correction being: padapratyabhijñāna evārtho.

[277] *corr*: *niyogavaśena*. The negative particle does not provide a proper meaning in the statement. Furthermore, the directive (*niyoga*) was also referred to in the same context in the preceding sentence.

[278] *corr*: *prayājādivattvamantrasyaiva*. The meaning I gather from this compound phrase is the following: The *mantra* has a character (*-tva*) of being comparable (*-vat*) to the fore-sacrifices and others (*prayājādi*). Based on this understanding, the ligature is not written correctly.

[279] *corr*: *aṅgatvam*.

[280] *corr*: *rāviṣṭety*. *TB* 3.6.6.3-4; *MS* 4.13.4. The common exchange of *ra* and *la* need not be mentioned. However, the *sandhi* between *rāviṣṭa* and *iti* clearly is incorrect.

[281] *corr*: *manyamāno*. The feminine singular does not fit into the structure of the sentence. The only possible reading is the masculine singular of the nominative.

[282] *corr*: *rāviṣṭeti*.

[283] *corr*: *vaniṣṭhor*.

kalpanā.

[S] **na hi tadbuddhipratiṣe**$\frac{54}{A}$**dhasya dṛṣṭo 'rthaḥ** ⏐ **aśakyārthatā ca**◊ **auṣadha-pāne śākhāmṛgasmaraṇapratiṣedhavad ulūkasadṛśabuddhir vaniṣṭhau na kartavye**ty evam artham anusandadhata eva tadbuddheḥ◊ tasmād urūkaṃ vistīrṇaṃ vapāṃ manyamānā vapābuddhy āvacālavane vaniṣṭhuṃ[284]◊ **mā rāviṣṭe**ty asaṃkīrṇa-lavanāya mantrārtha āśrayaṇīyam ‖

[P] nanv asmin pakṣe padabhede<u>vi</u>(pi)varṇalopādikalpanā[285] parādyadhikā◊

[S] pariharati **kāryato 'rthāvagame varṇalopādiparikalpanātmako 'yaṃ doṣo na bhavati. yata eva ca kāryavaśenaivaṃvidhaparikalpanā. ata** [361] **eva bhaga-vanto nairūktā varṇāvagamād vyācakṣate vaiyyākaraṇāś ca varṇo<u>va</u>(pa)jana-nānuśāsanam**[286] ‖

[4.] **praśasā.**[287]

[S] kāryata eva pūrvapakṣottarapakṣopanyāsaḥ ⏐ pūrvapakṣa uttarapakṣe ca kāryāvaya-vasya tulyatvāt◊

[P] tatra pūrvapakṣam āha – **bāhupraśaṃsābhimāno dṛṣṭārthatā prāpnotīti**◊ **bhinnavibhaktika evāyaṃ nirdeśo yuktaḥ** ⏐ bāhuśabdena ca[288] dvitīyādvivacanam. praśaṃsāśabde ca tṛtīyaikavacanam iti varṇanā yuktā. anena praśaṃsā bāhū kartavyau utkartavyāv ity arthaḥ. kartitavyāv iti <u>no</u><u>ya</u>oktam[289]. anityatvād i<u>dā</u>gamasya◊

[S] kasmād ayaṃ mantrārtha ity

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[284] *corr*: *vaniṣṭhum.*

[285] *corr*: *padabhede 'pi varṇalopādikalpanā.* The correction suggested by the scribe does not include the necessary *avagraha.*

[286] The correction suggested by the scribe is adopted here.

[287] *JS* 9.4.23: *praśasāsyābhidhānam.*

[288] *corr*: *bāhuśabde ca.* Neither the instrumental ending nor the negative particle would provide a proper meaning in the given sentence. Rather, parallel to the construction in the subsequent sentence, it should be the locative singular with *ca.*

[289] *corr*: *nāyuktam.* I read this as an additional statement to the previous instruction how the sentence is to be correctly read. this addition is expressed by a double negation.

[P] atrāha – **dr̥ṣṭārthopapatteḥ.** sa sādha-⊡362⊡noddharaṇaprakāśanāt śāsaśabdanni-
karṣāt[290] tasya cāsipratipādakatvād asmād api śabdād asyārthāvagamāt[291] praśasā
asinety arthaḥ ‖

[S] nanu **svadhitividhānād aser uddharaṇasādhanatvābhāvād asyartho nopa-
padyate**◊

[P] pariharati. **svadhitinā saha māntravarṇikasyāses tulyakāryatve 'pi vaikalpi-
katvāt◊ pakṣe sarasabhavād upapadyata evāsyarthaḥ**[292]◊ dr̥ṣṭārthaś ca bhavati.
utkartanasādhanatvāt ‖

[S] nanu svadhitir eva gauṇyā vr̥tyā praśasāśabdenocyatām[293]◊

[P] tatrāha – **na parokṣāvr̥ttiḥ**◊ paraṃ mantravarṇād vikalpo mantrārthasya◊ bāhu-
praśaṃsāpakṣe ca doṣam āha – **prāśastyaṃ punar ucyamānam adr̥ṣṭārtham
acoditaṃ ca stutibhāgitayā** ⊡363⊡ **devatātvaṃ bāhvor utpādayati◊ tasmād ati
neti**[294] **mantrārthaḥ** ⲓ

[S] evaṃ prāpte 'bhidhīyate. **bāhuśabdena sāmānādhikaraṇye saṃbhavatīti
bhinnavibhaktinirdeśo na yuktaḥ◊ avayaviprakarṣāt**[295] sāmānādhikaraṇye sanni-
kr̥ṣṭo'nvayaḥ◊ vaiyyadhikaraṇye viprakr̥ṣṭo 'nvayaḥ◊ na ca bāhvoḥ prāśastyam ucya-
mānam adr̥ṣṭārthaṃ kārtsnyenoddharaṇāvagatiḥ[296] tato 'vasīyate ⲓ [297] yataḥ◊

[P] kathaṃ punaḥ praśaṃsātaḥ kārtsnyenoddhāraṇam avasīyate.

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[290] *corr*: *śāsaśabdasannikarṣāt*. The scribe seems to have suggested the correction, but has crossed it
out again. There are two more additions above the line, which have also been crossed out and are not
properly readable.

[291] *corr*: *asyarthāvagamāt*. Rather than having two forms of the pronoun *adas* in one sentence
referring to different items, I prefer to read the term *asi*, "sword", here, which also appears in the same
compound phrase *asyartha* again in the subsequent sentence.

[292] The doubt of the scribe regarding this reading is not justified, as again we have the compound
phrase of *asi* and *artha*.

[293] *corr*: *praśasāśabdenocyatām*.

[294] *corr*: *asineti*. This clearly is a spelling mistake. The *pūrvapakṣin* argues that the meaning of the
form *praśasā* in the *mantra* means "by means of a sword" (*asinā*).

[295] *corr*: *anvayaviprakarṣāt*. This is a spelling mistake, as is clear by the repeated use of the term
anvaya in the subsequent gloss.

[296] *corr*: *kārtsnyenoddharaṇāvagatis*.

[297] I do not follow this punctuation in my translation, as I read the subsequent *yataḥ* as belonging to
the present statement.

[S] uttaraṃ[298]◇ **kārtsnyena hi praśastābhidhānaṃ kāryakaratvāt**◇ yo 'bhy-
akṛtsnaḥ nāsau kāryakaraḥ◇ yaś ca kāryakaro[299] na sa praśastaḥ ꣇ **ataḥ kāryakaratayā**
praśastābhidhānam apy aṅgasya ca kāryakarateti kārtsnyam ava-☐364☐sīyate. yau
praśastau bāhū tāv uddhakaraṇakāryakarau[300]◇ apy aṅgau ca praśastau kāryakarau ca◇
tasmād apy aṅgāv uddharatety uktaṃ bhavati. tad idam uktam. **na ca praśastau**[301]◇
tābhyāṃ hi paśur gacchanti[302]. **avanamayya śamīkarīreva**[303] **bhakṣayati**◇

[P] kim anena bhāṣyakāra āhety

[S] atrāha – **kāryataḥ** $\frac{54}{B}$**prāśastyam upadarśayan nu vaikalpyaparatāṃ man-**
trasya darśayati –[304] **evaṃ ca praśaṃsāśabdasya**[305] **svadhitau parokṣāvṛttiḥ**
kalpitā na bhaviṣyati ꣇ **nāpi svadhitinā sahānyāyyo vikalpo 'ṅgīkṛto bhavati.**

[P] kathaṃ punar anyāyyatvaṃ svadhiteḥ◇

[S] sākṣād eva vidhānād asaśye[306] śabdabalena kalpitatvāt ॥

[5.] **śyenakaḥ.**[307]

[P] **punar urūkam ity a-**☐365☐**nena viśeṣaḥ.**

[Preliminary objection agains the *pūrvapakṣa*] **sādṛśye hy adṛṣṭārthatodikaiva**[308] ꣇
tatrāpi◇ ulūkasādṛśye adṛṣṭārthateti[309] tatroktam eva.   tadvad ihāpi śyenādi-

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[298] *corr*: *uttaram.*

[299] *corr*: *cākāryakaro.* A negation is missing in this part of the relative clause, as otherwise the
preceding statement would be contradicted.

[300] *corr*: *uddharaṇakāryakarau.* As in previous instances the taking out (*uddharaṇa*) of the arms is
meant here.

[301] *corr*: *na ca na praśastau.* This is the beginning of a longer quotation from the *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.4.24,
which is partly incomplete and incorrect. All corrections are based on the reading in the *ŚBh*.

[302] *corr*: *gacchati.*

[303] *corr*: *avanamya śamīkarīraṃ.* There is an alternative reading: *śamīkarīre.*

[304] I am not sure why this punctuation is given – as if another quotation were started here. However,
I take it to indicate the continuation of the quotation.

[305] *corr*: *praśasāśabdasya.* The word being discussed is *praśasā* appearing in the *mantra.*

[306] The given reading is clearly incorrect. I am, however, at a loss regarding an emendation.

[307] *corr*: *śyenaka.* *JS* 9.4.24: *śyenaśalākaśyapakavaṣasrekaparṇeṣv ākṛtivacanaṃ*
prasiddhasaṃnidhānāt.

[308] *corr*: *adṛṣṭārthatoditaiva.* The correction is corroborated by the same construction being repeated
in the following lines. I do not follow the punctuation indicated here, as the subsequent *tatrāpi* appears
to belong to the present sentence.

[309] *corr*: *'dṛṣṭārthateti.* The scribe – or the manuscript at his disposal – represents this and subsequent
readings rather inconsistently. As the whole passage refers to *adhikaraṇa* 9.4.3, and the claim that the
mentioning of similarity would have no visible object, I read all inconsistent passages in light of this
reference.

sādṛśyo dṛṣṭārthatvam[310]. ataḥ punaruktam ạḍadhikaraṇam[311]◊

[P] pariharati ꟾ **satyaṃ sādṛśyo dṛṣṭārthatoditā**[312]◊ **iha kr̲ (tu)**[313] **śyenābhi-**
dhānam eva sādṛśyam antareṇa nopapadyate. yathā tatra padabhedāvistīrṇa-
vapābhidhānam[314] iti manvānasya pūrvaḥ pakṣaḥ ꟷꟷ

rāddhāntas tu – **kṛtsnoddharaṇe 'pi tadākāradarśanābhidhānopapatteḥ**[315]
nādṛṣṭakalpanā pramāṇam asti. śyenam asya pakṣaḥ[316] **kr̲ṇutād** ity asyāyam
arthatarāpakṣaṃ[317] kṛṇuta. yathā śyenasadṛśam bhavati. **kārtsnyoddharaṇe ca**
śyenasadṛśatā bhavatīty anayā bhaṅgyā 366 kārtsnyenoddharaṇam evopadiśyata iti◊
tasmāt kārtsnyoddharaṇārtho mantra iti sūktam ꟷꟷ

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[310] *corr*: *śyenādisādṛśye 'dṛṣṭārthatvam.*

[311] *corr*: *punaruktam idam adhikaraṇam.*

[312] *corr*: *sādṛśye 'dṛṣṭārthatoditā.*

[313] *corr*: *tu.* The correction suggested by the scribe is adopted here.

[314] *corr*: *padabhedād vistīrṇavapābhidhānam.* In *adhikaraṇa* 9.4.3, which is referred to here, the meaning of the term *urūka*, "large piece of fat", was correctly determined on the basis of reading the term as a compound phrase consisting of *uru* ("large") and *ka(śa)* ("marrow"). This correct understanding is based on splitting (*bheda*) the compound phrase into its componend parts. The ablative ending therefore seems to be plausible here.

[315] *corr*: *tadākāradarśanābhidhānopapatter.*

[316] *corr*: *vakṣaḥ.* See *TB* 3.6.6.2, and *MS* 4.13.4. Even though the exchange of *va* and *pa* is common, it changes the meaning considerably in the present instance – *pakṣa* denoting the flank or wing of an animal, *vakṣas* denoting the chest.

[317] *corr*: *asyārthaḥ◊ tathāvakṣaḥ.* The given reading does not provide any meaning. As a gloss on the statement found in the *mantra* is presented, I assume the common introduction used by Śālikanātha to be meant here. Furthermore, there seems to be a correlative construction to be intended, as is clear from the subsequent sentence beginning with *yathā*.

5 Translation

5.1 Ninth adhyāya, first pāda

[11.] ***arthābhi.***

[P] Objection: As *Savitṛ* and the other [deities][1] are directly denoted by *śruti*, how then [can] the direct denotation, [based on] them being deities (*devatvena*), be doubted through [them] indicating [something else] (*lakṣaṇā*)?[2]

[S] Here he states: **It has been established here in the *adhikaraṇa* [whose first *sūtra* reads] *phaladevatayoś ca*[3], that direct denotation** 209 **belongs to the *mantra*s through [their] connection to the *darśa-* and *pūrṇamāsa*. The following is now considered: Are also these [deities mentioned in the *mantra*] directly denoted through [their] connection to the *darśa-* and *pūrṇamāsa*, just as [it is the case with] Agni and the others? Or are they syntactically connected (*anvaya*[4]) in regard to the object [of *mantra*s], which is praising**

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[1] The reference, here, is to the *nirvāpamantra* (*TS* 1.1.4.2), laid down in the context of the *darśa-* and *pūrṇamāsa*. It reads: *devasya tvā savituḥ prasave 'śvinor bāhubhyām pūṣṇo hastābhyām agnaye juṣṭaṃ nirvapāmi.* The main deity, also mentioned in the *mantra*, is Agni. The other deities besides Savitṛ are the two Aśvins and Pūṣan.

[2] As the *mantra* contains the terms for the three above mentioned deities, the question in this *adhikaraṇa* is whether these terms are also applicable in an ectype where the deities differ. Underlying this question is another one: Do these terms denote the deities directly – in which case they will have to be part of the *darśa-* and *pūrṇamāsa* at which the *mantra* is employed? Or are they indirectly denotative of something else, which is part of the sacrifice? By claiming the *mantra* as *śruti* here, the *pūrvapakṣin* insists on the terms being directly denotative of the deities. In consequence they have to be deities of the *darśa-* and *pūrṇamāsa*.

[3] This is *JS* 9.1.4, representing the *pūrvapakṣa*. In the preceding *adhikaraṇa* it had been established for certain details that they are all prompted by the *apūrva*. Against this conclusion, the opponent there claims, that also the deity and the fruit of a sacrifice can prompt certain details. In the examples, these are heaven (*svarga*) and Agni, the fruit and the deity at the *darśa-* and *pūrṇamāsa*. Both are mentioned in *mantra*s accompanying the sacrifice, so they are assumed by the *pūrvapakṣin* to be the prompter for the *mantra*s. But in fact, the terms there do not refer to "heaven" and "Agni", but to "the fruit" and "the deity of the *darśa-* and *pūrṇamāsa*". As a consequence, they are prompted by the *apūrva* of that sacrifice. It is this connection of the terms to the sacrifice, which is referred to here again. This is further discussed in the following *adhikaraṇa* where the main deity of the sacrifice, Agni, is expressed in the same *nirvāpamantra*. As in that case the term denotes the deity enjoined for the sacrifice, the term will have to be changed in the ectype, where the deity is different (Sūrya, for example, in the case of the ectypal *saurya*).

[4] Wicher shows that *anvaya* refers to the concrete syntactical connection at work in a sentence. She defines the meaning of the term in Śālikanātha's system with the following words: "(...) das konkrete, für jeden einzelnen Satz spezifische Zusammenwirken einer begrenzten, definierten Gruppe von Worten

(*stuti*) the act of offering?[5]

[P] There, the propounder of the *pūrvapakṣa* ponders over [the following issues]: **The fact that the meaning of the whole *mantra* is inherent [in its words] (*samaveta*) has been obtained. Thus, there is no occasion for assuming something unseen.** In the case that a meaning would be directly denoted which is not inherent, the words *savitṛ* and the others would have an unseen object.[6] But in the case that a meaning would be directly denoted which is inherent, they would have a seen object.[7]

[S] There, the propounder of the *pūrvapakṣa* also relies on [them] indicating [something else] (*lakṣaṇā*) in order to obtain a seen object, and considers it to be correct that a meaning [of the *mantra*] is directly denoted, indeed, which is inherent.[8]

[P][9] Objection: [S] **In case that the [sacrificial] act has Agni and others as [its] deities, how do words such as *savitṛ* and the others have a seen object through them being directly denoted as [those] deities?** [P] Thus expressing the doubt, [Pk] states by way of summary: ⟨210⟩ **Therefore, either the direct denotation of Agni has to be optional[10], or another deity has to be assumed.** The meaning of this is: As it has been established that an object is directly denoted which is inherent, somehow or the other – either by secondary or indirect application, or by assuming a different expressive force (*śakti*)[11] – Agni, being inherent indeed, has to be directly

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bzw. durch sie vermittelten Inhalten, nicht etwa eine allgemeine Fähigkeit der Worte in Verbindung aufzutreten." (WICHER 1986: 19)

[5] In order to express the general purpose of the *mantra*, i.e. praising the act of offering, the terms need not be directly denotative.

[6] This would be the case, if the terms were taken to denote neither the deities with these names nor Agni, the main deity of the sacrifice.

[7] I.e. the words would refer to the deities they denote.

[8] Even though the standpoint of the *pūrvapakṣin* is expressed here, I take the statement to be that of the *siddhāntin*. It shows the logical inconsistency involved in the *pūrvapakṣin*'s argumentation: He argues that only the direct denotation of the words under consideration yields a visible object, but in fact – according to the *siddhāntin* – taking the terms as denoting Agni also involves indication (*lakṣaṇā*).

[9] The first sentence of this part is a doubt from the *siddhāntin* to which the *pūrvapakṣin* replies.

[10] This point is explained in detail below. The different terms denoting deities could be taken as all referring to the main deity, Agni. As such, the terms would indicate distinct statements, each of which would be an alternative to the final statement *agnaye juṣṭaṃ nirvapāmi*. The other solution, given in the second half of the present sentence, would be to take each term as denoting the specific deity. This, in consequence, would mean that each deity has to be offered to during the *darśa-* and *pūrṇamāsa*. See *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.1.36 for the full elaboration of this point.

[11] It is a fact for the *pūrvapakṣin* that the terms under consideration have to denote Agni and other deities laid down for the *darśa-* and *pūrṇamāsa*. How this meaning is arrived at he leaves open: Either

denoted of the words *savitṛ* and the others. And there must be an option between them[12] by the fact that there is [only one] *kārya*.[13] Or, if by rule (*nyāye*), indeed, the deities, Savitṛ and the others, have to be assumed as expressed by the words in the *mantra*, there has to be an option between them, also.[14]

Objection: **The fact that [these words form] one single sentence, which is being understood by directly hearing (*śruti*) the case endings[15], is dismissed (xxx)[16].** The meaning of this is: He makes the offering [using] all [words][17], *savitṛ* and the others. They are not obtained on the basis of them forming one single sentence by force of the case endings being directly heard.

[S] Hence, how can [the words] directly denote the deities?

[P] **There can be an option only in case** ⟨211⟩ **the deities are directly denoted. And in case there is an option, a split in the sentence occurs without any reason,** thus he resolves. **Since subordination (*viniyoga*) has the *kārya* as its object, the subordination in accordance to the *kārya* is correct.**[18] Subordination

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this denotation already belongs to those terms as a secondary function, or through the context this expressive force has to be assumed of them.

[12] I.e. the words *savitṛ*, etc.

[13] The *mantra* refers to only one sacrificial act, so only one statement in the *mantra* should express that.

[14] As will be explained in more detail below, the distinct terms expressing the deities are taken by the *pūrvapakṣin* as indicators for splitting the *mantra* into separate statements for each deity. This procedure is applied to either interpretation of the terms – if they denote Agni and the other deities of the sacrifice, or if they denote "new" deities, Savitṛ etc., thus laying down offerings to them.

[15] The term *śruti*, here, does not refer to the Vedic revelation, but in combination with the term *vibhakti* it refers to the direct expressiveness of a word through its case ending. This applies specifically in the context of subordination (*viniyoga*) of ritual elements to one another, which is adduced by Śālikanātha in the following argumentation. Yoshimizu writes: "Wenn aber insbesondere von dem Zusammenhang zwischen einem Untergeordneten und dessen Übergeordnetem die Rede ist, wird mit dem Terminus "*śruti*" die Kasusendung (*vibhakti*) bezeichnet, die in der Vorschrift einem Nominalstamm (*prātipadika*) hinzugefügt ist und einen Handlungsfaktor (*kāraka*) direkt ausdrückt." (YOSHIMIZU 1997: 112)

[16] *ekavākyatāvagamyamānāmu* x *ai* x *votsṛjyate*. I take *ekavākyatā* as the subject, qualified by *avagamyamānā*. I am, however, at a loss how to emendate the missing part.

[17] I am not sure why Śālikanātha uses the neuter plural here.

[18] Subordination (*viniyoga*) is defined by Yoshimizu as the function of the six criteria – direct expression (*śruti*), indication (*liṅga*), syntactical connection (*vākya*), context (*prakaraṇa*), sequence (*krama*), etymology of the name (*samākhyā*), according to which parts of sentences, but also whole statements, are hierarchically ordered in regard to one another. The textual hierarchy reflects the order of ritual elements expressed by their textual equivalent. Subordination, thus, structures the ritual whole into relationary primary (*mukhya*, *pradhāna*) and secondary elements (*śeṣa*, *guṇa*, *aṅga*). See YOSHIMIZU 1997: 109-130; also CLOONEY 1990: 98-100; PATTON 2005: chapter 3.

is the internal syntactical connection (*antarānvaya*) between wordmeanings. It has the *kārya* as its object. And if it has the *kārya* as its object, then it must be explained in accordance with that. **Just as in such [statements] as: <u>with the remains from the fore-sacrifice (*prayāja*)</u>.**[19] As the fact that the sprinkling has the object of disposing of the substance [ghee, still sticking to the *juhū* from the fore-sacrifices], has been ascertained, indeed, the subordination is explained [in the form] that he pours the remains from the fore-sacrifice into the oblations. In the same way also here, since it has been determined that words such as *savitṛ* and the others directly denote deities in regard to the *kārya*, the subordination has to be explained as optional in analogy to that [direct denotation of several deities]. Thus, a split in the sentence is correct, indeed.[20]

[S] As it is not obtained as such, it is explained: The fact that [the statement in the *mantra* represents] a single sentence cannot be denied here.

[P] Why?

[S] To this he states: **Indeed, another subordination, by which there would be a split in the sentence, even in the case that [the words] require each other (*ākāṅksā*[21]), ⬚212 is not distinct for [words such as] *savitṛ* and the others.**[22] If, indeed, a split in the *kārya* would be understood by force of the subordination of [the words] *savitṛ* and the others, then there would be a split in the sentence, even if the

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[19] See *ŚBh* at *JS* 4.1.33-39, where the statement *prayājaśeṣeṇa havīṃṣy abhighārayati* is said to enjoin the disposal of the remainder into the oblation, not the preparation of the oblation by way of sprinkling. This interpretation is said by the *siddhāntin* to be based on taking the instrumental (*prayājaśeṣeṇa*) as an accusative, and the accusative (*havīṃṣi*) as a locative. For Śālikanātha this interpretation of the cases is based on the *kārya* expressed by the statement. The fore-sacrifices are laid down for the *darśa-* and *pūrṇamāsa* in *TS* 2.6.1.1-3.

[20] With this the *pūrvapakṣin* justifies to take each deity separately to be construed with the final phrase *juṣṭaṃ nirvapāmi* of the *mantra*.

[21] The term *ākāṅkṣā* represents an essential precondition for understanding a sentence. It is "the mutual relation of expectancy of words and their meanings in a sentence" (OBERHAMMER 1984: 82, my translation.). Words in a sentence cannot convey their proper meaning without being related to the other words in the sentence, and this mutual requirement among the words is also felt in the perceiver of a statement. Pandeya ultimately ascribes *ākāṅkṣā* to the perceiver, and *sākāṅkṣa* to the word or the meaning, which is lacking its proper use in a sentence (PANDEYA 1963: 158). See also WICHER 1987: 20-22.

[22] I do not follow the punctuation of the manuscript here, which concludes the sentence with *pṛthag asti*. In the gloss of this statement by Śālikanātha, the sentence is almost verbally repeated at the end of this paragraph, including *savitrādipadānām*.

words would mutually require each other, as [in the *mantra*] **_syonaṃ te_**.[23] And here, another subordination is not distinct for the words *savitṛ* and the others.

[P] Objection: It has been stated that assuming a seen [object] follows in case that [they represent] a single sentence. [This] is the cause for another subordination.

[S] The answer is: This is not the cause. Since, even in the case that praise is the object, the syntactical connection between the words provides a seen object, the praise, also, has a seen object, indeed. This has been stated. In the *adhikaraṇa* dealing with *arthavāda*[24], the object of the case endings has been explained in accordance with the *kārya* in regard to such cases as [the *mantra* beginning with] "the remains from the fore-sacrifices (*prayāja*)", since [otherwise the meaning] would be in contradiction to the *kārya*. **Here, again, as there is an analogy to the _kārya_, assuming a different _kārya_ is not based on any proper means of knowledge.**[25] He makes the offering [with the *mantra*] **_devasya tvā_**[26]. Thus, even if the assumption that the object of the case endings is different is in accordance to that *kārya*, 213 which is defined as the act of offering, [the other *kārya*] is not [based on] a proper means of knowledge. But [for] the case of the remains from the fore-sacrifices etc. in the fourth [*adhyāya*] it has been shown that there is a split in the subordination[27], since [otherwise] there would be a contradiction to the *kārya*, defined as the disposing of the remains from the [already] concluded fore-sacrifices. As it has been established in regard to the assumption for both causes (*nimitta*)[28] that praise is the object, the sacrificer is expressed by the word *savitṛ*.

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[23] This is the beginning of a *mantra* (*MŚS* 1.2.6.19-22) recited at the *darśa-* and *pūrṇamāsa*, before the oblation-cake is baked in a pan with ghee. In *ŚBh* at *JS* 3.3.14, where the hierarchy in the means to determine subordination is discussed, this *mantra* serves as the example. It is arrived at that by indirect indication, which is stronger here than syntactical connection, the *mantra* consists of two statements, each of which should be recited along the corresponding act. This reasoning is transferred to the present case, i.e. even though the mutual requiring of the terms suggests that they form a single sentence, through subordination the sentence would be split.

[24] See *ŚBh* at *JS* 1.2.1-18. The *adhikaraṇa* establishes *arthavāda*s to have a seen object in praising or commending certain aspects of the sacrifice. They are, thus, to be considered as "one sentence" (*ekavākya*) together with the injunction.

[25] The analogy will be explained by the *siddhāntin* subsequently: The terms do not denote deities which do not figure in the *kārya*, but the sacrificer.

[26] I.e. the *nirvāpamantra* (*TS* 1.1.4.2). See first footnote of this *adhikaraṇa*.

[27] As explained above, the case endings were taken to express the meaning of other cases in that instance, thereby subordinating the meanings within the sentence differently as directly expressed.

[28] I believe this to refer to the two options the *pūrvapakṣin* had suggested, i.e. that either the terms

I make the offering in view of his ***prasava***, i.e. permission.[29] (...)[30] As thus the causes are beyond the sacrificer in such a form, the doubt concerning modification, which arises in regard to a sacrificial act involving two or more sacrificers[31], that [doubt] has the direct denotation of the connected [meaning] as its object.[32] The connected [meaning], namely [that it is] the sacrificer, is based on the direct denotation of ***prasave***.

[P] If the connected [meaning], namely [that it is] the sacrificer, is expressed [in the term] ***prasave***, then modification of the number is correct in case of two sacrificers and in case of many sacrificers.

[S] **But in case that it has an object beyond itself (*parārthya*)[33], there is no modification,** 214 **since it is obtained by the fact that it is only the connected [meaning],** thus the object [of discussion in the present *adhikaraṇa*]. Here the connected [meaning], namely [that it is] the sacrificer, is not shown to have *prasava* as its own object, since it is not to be employed by the *adhvaryu*. But the mentioning of that [*prasava*] has an object beyond itself by the fact that its object is specifying the act of offering. And as it has an object beyond itself, there is no modification containing the word "sacrificer", this has been stated in the commentary.[34]

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directly denote the deities, which are there at the sacrifice, or that they all denote Agni, the primary deity. Against these two causes for taking the terms to denote deities, the *siddhāntin* takes the terms to be subject to the overall object of the *mantra*, which is praising the act of offering.

[29] This and the following sentence remain cryptic to me. This may be due to uncertain readings, indicated by the scribe, giving room for also doubting other parts of the sentences. I assume that this part glosses the discussion at the end of the *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.1.36, specifically the answer of the *siddhāntin* against his opponent's assumption that there has to be modification in the case of several sacrificers. The *siddhāntin* differentiates between two possible meanings of the *mantra* in the ectype: The permitting (*anujñāpana*) of the priests to be the sacrificers at the *sattra*, or the worshipping (*joṣaṇa*) of them. The second is correct. The first statement here seems to represent the first interpretation, so the second sentence may refer to the alternative. However, I am unable to give a proper translation of the second sentence and therefore leave it untranslated.

[30] yadi vā **savitur** evādityasya prasaṃtvapa upadaye **nirvapāmī**ty ...

[31] The example alluded to here, and stated in *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.1.36, is the *sattra*, were several priests have been appointed as the sacrificers.

[32] The term *sambandhin* appearing here seems to refer to the second level of meaning: The terms in the *mantra* do not directly denote the deities, but refer to the sacrificer. But because they appear in a *mantra*, their reference to the sacrificer is not direct, but serves the ultimate purpose of the *mantra*, which is praising the act of offering.

[33] The term refers to the sacrificer, but its object is to praise the act of offering.

[34] This is not a direct quotation from *ŚBh*, even though the formulation by Śālikanātha here seems to suggest this.

[12.] *guṇa.*

[P] He states the *pūrvapakṣa* by deriving it from the previous *adhikaraṇa*:[35] **If *savitṛ* and the other [words][36] have the act of offering as their object as such, then the word *agni* also is a quality of the act of offering, indeed. [That] has to be assumed.**

[S] Objection: **Since Agni is the object of the act of offering, [the word] *agni* cannot be understood by the fact of it [denoting] a quality.**[37] This act of offering, indeed, has Agni as its object. Hence, the direct denotation of Agni, who is an element of the primary aspect[38], does not have an object beyond itself. Thus, [the word] *agni* cannot be understood by the fact of it [denoting] a quality.

[P] **But indeed, this fact that Agni** 215 **is the object of the act of offering is not understood.** This is the [correct] opinion. Although in reality Agni is the object of the act of offering, nevertheless on the basis of the present sentence from the *mantra* the fact is not understood that Agni is the object of the act of offering.

[S] Why?

[P] The answer is: Since the word "enjoyed" (*juṣṭa*), [contained in the final part of the *nirvāpamantra*] is handed down by *śruti* (*śravaṇāt*). This, indeed, he explains: **[The term] *juṣṭam* provides understanding of something that has [already]**

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[35] The example remains the statement found in the *nirvāpamantra* (*TS* 1.1.4.2), which formed the subject matter of the preceding *adhikaraṇa*. Now, the concluding part of the statement is considered: *agnaye juṣṭaṃ nirvapāmi*. The *purvapakṣin* adopts the conclusion of the *siddhāntin* from the previous *adhikaraṇa* for the present topic. He thereby applies a basic method of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā, namely to decide uncertain points not only according to logical deduction in the strict sense, but "to discern what is similar and what is different, and to authorize action on that basis" (CLOONEY 1990: 61). Patton shows that all six *pramāṇa*s accepted by Pūrvamīmāṃsā are based on metonymy, which she terms "associative thought" (PATTON 2005: 64ff). The association is not based on "de facto proximities and likenesses", but mainly on perceptual, partial similarities (Ibid.: 47f). Further, it is related to the practical aspects of ritual.

[36] The terms *savitṛ*, *aśvin*, and *pūṣan* appearing in the *mantra* were discussed in the preceding *adhikaraṇa*, and it was said that they do not denote the deities, but indirectly the sacrificer (and his wife) by associating him with certain qualities. This viewpoint is now transferred by the *pūrvapakṣin* to the other term apparently denoting a deity in the *mantra*, namely *agni*.

[37] The deity Agni is the main deity of the *darśa-* and *pūrṇamāsa*, to which the act of offering is directed. Therefore, according to the *siddhāntin*, the term appearing in the *mantra* cannot denote a quality of the sacrificer – as was the case with the other terms, but directly denotes the main deity. The consequence of this is that the term has to be changed in an ectype in which the main deity is not Agni.

[38] The primary aspect (*pradhāna*) is the act of offering.

happened.[39]

[S] Nevertheless what?

[P] To this he states: **And this act of offering is handed down by *śruti* by being characterised as something that will happen.**[40] The meaning of this is: And those rice grains [out of which the oblation has been prepared], which have been handed down by *śruti* as the act of offering by being characterised as something that will happen, will be enjoyed [by the deity, Agni,] at the time the act of offering takes place. Hence, since the act of offering would precede [the enjoyment], the syntactical connection – through the fact that praise is its object – would arise on account of that [expression], with which the rice grains [already] would have been enjoyed.[41]

[Thus the] objection: Even if it is within the limit of praise, how can there appear the statement **what has been enjoyed by Agni (*agnaye juṣṭam*)**? Since it is a fact that it has not been enjoyed on account of a preceding act of offering?[42]

[S] Here he states: 216 **But since it is not incorrect – as [the *mantra*] serves the purpose of something else – that the word [*juṣṭa*] has another object beyond itself.** The meaning of this is: As praise is the object [of the *mantra*], the word *juṣṭa* has another object beyond itself, even if [that other object] would [in fact] not be enjoyed. The fact that there is the present tense is not incorrect. **Secondary application also [applies] in regard to a dependent term (*ālamba*), this is the rule for words,**

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[39] According to the *pūrvapakṣin*, the past participle refers to an action that has already been completed. But the ritual reality is that during the recitation of the *nirvāpamantra* the offering is performed, through which the oblation only becomes enjoyed (*juṣṭa*) by the deity.

[40] The main act of offering, being the primary aspect (*pradhāna*), ultimately is the new, unprecedented (*apūrva*) knowledge conveyed by the injunction. It is "what is to be done" (*kārya*), not something that has already been established. This is the characteristic which differentiates the injunction from *mantra*s and *arthavāda*s, which do not have this aspect. The *pūrvapakṣin* mentions this fact in order to contrast it with the use of the past participle in the term *juṣṭam*, according to him referring to something past/established, although it points to the act of offering, which is unprecedented (*apūrva*).

[41] The *pūrvapakṣin* emphasizes the internal contradiction: The syntactical connection of the term is with the act of offering, during which the offering is enjoyed by the deity, Agni. But what the expression denotes is an act of offering which has already taken place, as it has been enjoyed already. This is more explicitly discussed in the following.

[42] The *pūrvapakṣin* objects that also in the case of praise being the purpose of the statement, it cannot express something that is not somehow related to the ritual reality. In this ritual reality it is a fact that the oblation has not been enjoyed by the deity Agni at the time the *mantra* is recited.

indeed – thus, the meaning.[43]

[P] But when it is not the case that praise is the object, then the object of the word is its primary [meaning]. Thus, as it has not been enjoyed [at the time the *mantra* is recited], the term *juṣṭa* cannot occur. **Therefore, this *mantra* contains the suffix of the past participle, directly denoting the [concluded] act of offering, indeed** – this the propounder of the *pūrvapakṣa* considers.

[S] But the *siddhānta* [is represented as follows]: **Just as the object of the *mantra* has to be explained as "it is enjoyable**[44]**, [and] the act of offering has that [enjoying] as its object", in the same way again the object of the *mantra* must not be explained [in the form that the phrase] "I place as an offering *juṣṭaṃ*" means "I place as an offering to Agni what has been enjoyed [by him] on account of a previous act of offering".** But in fact, the enjoying is praised [in the sense that] "just as it is **something that will be enjoyable for Agni, I place it as an offering** for that object". Hence, ⟨217⟩ the suffix for the past participle is possible also in [place of] the future tense, thus the opinion.

[P] Again, what is the reason here for explaining the past participle by violating the fact that it [actually expresses] the past tense?

[S] The answer is: **Because of the fourth case [in the term *agnaye*], and since Agni has been handed down by *śruti* (*śravaṇa*) by way of him being the deity.**[45] The meaning of this is: Meanwhile, the fourth case is handed down by *śruti* as pointing beyond the word *agni*.[46] Therefore, it is understood that the enjoyment has its object [directed] towards Agni. And this is not impossible, since Agni has been handed

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[43] The term *juṣṭa* depends on another term not explicitly mentioned in the *mantra* – most likely *havis*.

[44] As will be clarified in the following explanation of this statement, the past participle does not have to express the aspect of precedence or past tense. According to the *siddhāntin*, one has to connect it to the main statement of the *mantra*, which clearly refers to and thus praises the act of offering. Therefore, the act cannot have taken place, and the oblation cannot have been enjoyed by Agni. The past participle depends on the act of offering, which is in the future, and could as such be rendered with "what will have been enjoyed", i.e. when the offering has taken place.

[45] Agni is enjoined as the main deity of the offering at the *darśa-* and *pūrṇamāsa* – this is the difference to the argumentation in the preceding *adhikaraṇa*, where the terms did not denote deities laid down for the sacrifice.

[46] The following sentence explains this: The fourth case connects it with the enjoyment, to which Agni is the object.

down by *śruti* by way of him being the deity. Therefore, it cannot be denied that that [term *agni*] is the object. He urges this to be accepted.

[P] And a [further] objection: Just as it is correct to deny that the fourth case has that object, in the same way it is not correct to deny also that the suffix of the past participle has the object [of expressing] the past tense.[47]

[S] He resolves: **It is correct to deny that the suffix of the past participle has the object [of expressing] the past tense.**

[P] For which reason?

[S] To this he states: **Since [the past tense] would contradict the fact** ⟨218⟩ **that Agni is the object, [even if] that were incorrect for the act of offering.**[48] The fact that the act of offering has Agni as the object – even if that were incorrect – would be contradicted in case that the connection to Agni were based on a preceding act of offering indeed, honouring the fact that the suffix of the past participle only has the past tense as its object. The act of offering should have Agni as the object, [as such] bringing about the connection between the rice grains under consideration (*nirūpyamāṇānām*) and Agni.[49] But the procuring of the connection of the act of offering with that [deity, Agni,] is not preceding, as a connection with Agni of those [rice grains] which are enjoyable for Agni is obtained [through the act of offering] – thus the fact that the act of offering has Agni as its object would be contradicted. Hence, as either of the two [alternatives, namely that the term] has that [connection] as its object or that it has the past tense as its object, are to be excluded, it is correct to understand Agni as the primary aspect by the act of offering having a seen object.[50] [It is] again not [correct to

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[47] The *pūrvapakṣin* returns to his view, already rejected by the *siddhāntin*, that the past participle can only express the past tense. In analogy to that point he here also takes the opposite view, namely that the fourth case cannot express Agni as the object of enjoying the oblation.

[48] In his gloss on this statement made by Prabhākara, Śālikanātha expresses the same content with a concessive construction, *api satī*. Therefore this meaning can be assumed for the present construction as well. What this means is, that in any case there would be a contradiction involved in taking the past participle in *juṣṭa* as denoting the past. This contradiction would also be there, if one would not subscribe to the claim of the *siddhāntin* that Agni is the object of the offering and as such also of the enjoyment expressed by *juṣṭa*. This had been argued by the *pūrvapakṣin* before.

[49] If the act of offering would in no way be connected to the deity, Agni, to which the offering is dedicated, the oblation would remain unrelated to the deity.

[50] The sentence in its construction in the manuscript continues. But it cannot be rendered with one

understand Agni] as a subordinate aspect in regard to the past participle. **The act of offering procures Agni as the object, and thus has a seen object. Otherwise it would have an unseen object.** In analogy to that Agni is correctly understood as the primary aspect, indeed, in regard to the [subsequent] enjoyment, $\boxed{219}$ not again as a subordinate aspect in regard to the enjoyment that has [already] happened. Therefore [the suffix] -*kta* has to be explained in regard to praise. The future tense, indeed, [applies in regard] to the enjoyment. **In the case of an expectation / a wish (*āśaṃsā*) it can be treated as if in the past tense.**[51] **According to this *sūtra* this suffix -*kta* [applies] – thus it has to be explained, or -*kta* has to be explained as having the present tense as its object.** Just as, indeed, it is a fact that the rice grains are being determined for Agni, as such it is a fact that there is enjoyment of them for him. Thus the suffix -*kta* has to be explained in accordance to the performance (*anuṣṭhāna*), as its object is the present tense.

Option.[52]

[P] **This word "paddy" (*dhānya*) is expressive of a different object than the rice grains. Thus, since the rice grains which are being scattered are not directly denoted, an object which is not inherent [in the sacrifice]**[53] **is directly denoted in the *mantra*.** This he presents as the *pūrvapakṣa*.

[S] Objection: **Since the direct denotation of an inherent object is obtained also by means of indication (*lakṣaṇayā*), it is not correct to assume that the *mantra* has an unseen object.** In case that the word "paddy" (*dhānya*) would have no

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sentence here satisfactorily.

[51] This *sūtra* from the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini lays down that in cases where there is an expectation of something, the past participle cannot only refer to the past, but also to the present or the future tense. See BÖHTLINGK 2001: 128.

[52] This represents an alternative explanation, also given in the *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.1.38 and 39. The ritual context remains the *darśa-* and *pūrṇamāsa*, but a *mantra* recited during the preparation of the oblation, more exactly when putting the rice grains on the stone-slab to grind them, forms the example here. The *mantra* reads: *dhānyam asi dhinuhi devān* (*TB* 3.2.6.3). According to the *pūrvapakṣin* the word *dhānya* in the *mantra* denotes unhusked rice, and thus cannot refer to the husked rice used during the recitation of the *mantra*.

[53] As the term refers to the unhusked rice, it denotes something that is not part of the sacrifice.

inherent object, 220 the whole *mantra*, indeed, would have an unseen object.[54] Again, [this is] not [the case]. By the rule [established] in [connection with] the *nirvāpamantra* there is a seen object. And then it should rather be relied on the word "paddy" (*dhānya*) having the rice grains as its object through indication (*lakṣaṇayā*), and it should be relied on them being the inherent object.[55]

[P] He resolves. **It can be assumed that something which is capable of [providing a] seen [object] has a purpose. Again, it is not possible to assume on the basis of the purpose that it is capable [of that]. As this would be stretching the rule too far (*atiprasaṅgāt*).**[56] The meaning of this is: Indication (*lakṣaṇā*), indeed, is not correct in case of the *Veda* – considering this he presents the *pūrvapakṣa*. Because as such [there arises the question], whether or not the word is capable of that [seen object] in case that its object is based on indication (*lākṣaṇike 'rthe*). If it were capable, then it would follow that it has to be expressed [as such]. And as it would have to be expressed [as such], the use of the augmented form (*vṛddhavyavahāra*) would be required.[57] And as the object would be based on indication, this usage [of the augmented form] would not be possible.[58] But as it is not capable [of a seen object], the object cannot be understood as being based on indication. And then, 221 since it is not the case that the word "paddy" (*dhānya*) is based on indication (*lākṣaṇika*), the fact that the *mantra* has an unseen object, indeed, is correct. Because, where some [word] is capable [of having] a seen [object], in accordance to that [word] it is correct to assume the purpose. Again, the capability is not assumed by force of the purpose. Therefore it

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[54] As the term *dhānya* is included in the main proposition of the *mantra*, it would render the complete *mantra* having an indirect meaning and as such an unseen object.

[55] The *ŚBh* provides some more details regarding the argumentation of the *siddhāntin*: The word *dhānya* can easily be taken as denoting the husked rice grains through indication, as the husked rice grains are a product from the unhusked rice. As such this meaning is included in the term indirectly.

[56] The *purvapakṣin* accuses the *siddhāntin* of messing with the condition and the result of a logical deduction: Just because it meets with the desired end – a seen object, one cannot simply take the word *dhānya* as denoting the husked rice grains. The argument only works in the opposite direction: If the term does denote them, it yields a seen object!

[57] The augmented form would involve the *vṛddhi* of the stem, hence the term *vṛddhavyavahāra* here. The argument is that the secondary meaning of a word, obtained by indication, would be expressed in a secondary, derivative form of the word. The derivative forms often involve augmentation of the vowels in the stem, called *guṇa* and *vṛddhi*.

[58] The augmented form directly expresses a secondary meaning, making the assumption superfluous that the basic form has to be taken by its secondary meaning.

is correct that the object is not inherent, indeed.

[S] If it is arrived at as such, it is said: It is not the case that the object is not inherent, since the object is understood also by indication.

[P] Objection: **It has been stated that indication, indeed, is not based on a proper means of knowledge.**

[S] He resolves. **It is not the case that indication is not based on a proper means of knowledge. Since indication is taken as valid in the world by the fact that it provides understanding of an object. "Paddy is eaten daily in our house."**[59] **In case of such and other worldly usages it is valid that the words have an object beyond themselves, even if it leads to the meaning (*bhāva*) without it having to be directly denoted (*abhidheya*).**[60] And then, as there is indication, ⟨222⟩ the supposition [that the rice grains are expressed by the word "paddy" (*dhānya*)] is correct without assuming another expressive force (*śakti*). Therefore it is possible for the *mantra*, as its object is inherent through indication. Assuming something unseen is not a proper means of knowledge.[61]

[13.] *codite.*

[S] Here [the following] is doubtful: **Does the word "master of the sacrifice" (*yajña-pati*) directly denote the sacrificer by the sacrificer being the primary aspect (*pradhānatva*) in regard to the sacrifice? Or by having another object, namely the specification of prosperity which is an element designating the**

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[59] This example is similar to the one adduced in the *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.1.39, second interpretation: "In the *Kāśī*-country paddy is eaten and cows are drunk." (*kāśikeṣu śālayo bhujyante gāvaḥ pīyante.*) The examples are meant to show that the word "paddy", as well as the word "cow", can denote something coming from the directly denoted objects, namely "rice" (= husked paddy) and "milk" (= product of the cow).

[60] Paddy cannot be eaten, so it is clear that rice has to be meant here naturally. In the same way it can be assumed also in the ritual context.

[61] This means that the term *dhānya* does denote the husked rice grains. Śabara explains the relevance in terms of modification: The same *mantra* is used at the *śākyānāmayanam*, which is a *soma*-ritual lasting 36 days. Each day in this ritual is to be concluded by offerings of cakes baked from the meat of animals the *yajamāna* has hunted down during the day. As the original term in the *mantra* does denote the element in the ritual, it has to be modified in the ectype, where a different substance takes the place of the rice grains. The modified *mantra* reads: *māṃsam asi dhinuhi devān* (*ŚBh* at *JS* 9.1.39, second interpretation).

priest?[62]

[P] How again can [the sacrificer] here be directly denoted through the character "sacrificer"? Or how through the character of [the term] having another object?

[S] The answer is: **If the prosperity [spoken of in the *mantra*] has the sacrificer as its object** − i.e. if the sacrificer is said to be specified by prosperity, then he would be directly denoted by means of him being the master. But now [the prosperity] is connected to the *iḍā*. The priest is implied (*upalakṣaṇā*) by means of the specification of prosperity. Then only the character of [him] being the master has the object of specifying the prosperity through implication, indeed.[63]

[P] There the propounder of the *pūrvapakṣa* thinks that the prosperity of the sacrificer, 223 which is the element that is to be revealed [by the *mantra*], and which has the purpose of motivating [the sacrificer], has a purpose other than the invitation to the *iḍā*, and he states [that there is] a partition (*vibhāga*) in the sacrificial formula (*yajus*).[64]

[S] By what kind of a partition is the prosperity of the sacrificer revealed?

[P] And even though it has been shown that [the *mantra* represents] an invitation to the *iḍā*, the propounder of the *pūrvapakṣa* thinks that the sacrificial formula (*yajus*) contains

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[62] The subject-matter is the *iḍopahvānamantra* (*TS* 2.6.7.4), which is recited during the *darśa-* and *pūrṇamāsa*: "The divine *adhvaryu*s are invited, the humans are invited, who shall help this sacrifice and make the master of the sacrifice prosper." (*daivyā adhvaryava upahūtā upahūtā manuṣyā ya imaṃ yajñam avān ye yajñapatiṃ vardhān*.) As in the preceding *adhikaraṇa* the question is discussed, whether or not the term *yajñapati* should be modified in the *sattra*, an ectype which is performed by several sacrificers. Two alternative views are briefly introduced in the first sentence here: If the term *yajñapati* is taken as denoting the specific sacrificer, the *mantra* would have the purpose of encouraging the sacrificer by promising him prosperity. In this case the term would have to be modified, as it directly refers to the specific sacrificer. But according to the *siddhānta*, the *mantra* has the purpose of eulogising the *iḍā*, an offering included in the *darśa-* and *pūrṇamāsa*, and the mentioned prosperity of the sacrificer is subordinated to this overall purpose. Therefore the specific sacrificer is not directly denoted, and the term does not have to be modified in case that the *mantra* comes to be used at the ectypal *sattra* with several sacrificers.

[63] The eulogising of the *iḍā* is the main objective of the *mantra*, and as such the prosperity spoken of in it also serves this objective by its connection with the priest bringing about the sacrifice. Nevertheless, the prosperity relates to the sacrificer, and as such his mentioning is indirect or only implied.

[64] In the following explanation the *pūrvapakṣin* – as in 9.1.11 – refers to the *mantra* beginning with *syonaṃ te* (*MŚS* 1.2.6.19-22), discussed in the *ŚBh* at *JS* 3.3.14. This reference as well as the argument that also the *iḍopahvānamantra* consists of two distinct statements – the conclusion arrived at in the case of the *mantra* beginning with *syonaṃ te* – are not given in the *ŚBh*, and are not explained in detail by Śālikanātha. But based on the preceding statements it can be safely assumed that the split is meant by the *pūrvapakṣin* between the prosperity of the sacrificer and the invitation to the sacrifice mentioned in the first part of the *mantra*.

a partition like [the *mantra* beginning with] ***syonaṃ te***[65], since there is a split.

[S] But the *siddhānta* [is represented as follows]: **It is not correct to assume another purpose [for the *mantra*] without [a distinct] subordination.**[66] **If in both instances there were subordination, then it would be correct to assume a twofold purpose. And the distinction in the sacrificial formula would be the basis for that.**

[P] Objection: The *mantra* is subordinated to the prosperity of the sacrificer. How again can there be no other subordination?

[S] The answer is: **Since prosperity is [only] inferred** 224 **by [the *mantra* actually expressing] the *kārya*.**[67] **If prosperity were to be effected, then it could not be effected as something that has not been remembered (*asmṛta*).**[68] Thus, the subordination of the *mantra* is correct by its object being based on what is remembered. And [the prosperity] is not to be effected, as that would bring no fruit. And no, it is correct to assume that [the *mantra*] reveals that [fruit] for the sake of invitation. **It clearly is to be performed, since it is possible that what is to be accomplished is the object by the fact that [the *mantra*] forms one single sentence with the invitation to the *iḍā*, [which is the context in which the *mantra* appears]. Therefore there is no proper means of knowledge in singling it out.** Thus this sacrificial formula (*nigada*) has the *iḍā* as its object, this is correct.

[14.] ***vikāra.***

[P] **Also here he thinks that there is no [modification of the term *yajamāna*],**

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[65] *MŚS* 1.2.6.19-22. See preceding footnote.

[66] As is explained in the following sentence, the split in the *mantra* would only be justified in case the purpose would also be distinct for each statement – and *vice versa*.

[67] And the *kārya* is known through the connection with the context, as is explained in the following. The context is the invitation to the *iḍā*.

[68] I believe the term *asmṛta*, and *smaraṇa* in the following sentence, to refer to the argument expounded in the *ŚBh* at this point, which connects the *mantra* to a passage (*TS* 1.7.1.2) dealing with the invitation to the *iḍā*. In doing so the *siddhāntin* argues that the *mantra* has to be understood in light of that passage, and thus has the purpose of supporting the invitation. As the *mantra* (*TS* 2.6.7.4) is not appearing in the immediate context of that passage (*TS* 1.7.1.2), I understand the "remembering" to refer to this "textual" gap. As the prosperity does not figure in the contextually connected passage, it cannot be the object of the *mantra*.

since the fruit is enjoined [by the *mantra*], and presents as the *pūrvapakṣa*
that the word "sacrificer" (*yajamāna*) has an object beyond itself, since [the
word] is brought up by means of the injunction of the sacrificial act which,
indeed, includes [the sacrificer] as rendering assistance to the sacrifice.[69] The
meaning of this is: The sacrificial act has the offering of the grass-bedding as its object.
By [the sacrificer being] an assistance to the sacrifice, indeed, ⟨225⟩ the fruit in the form
of longevity and the others [mentioned in the *mantra*] belongs to him.[70] Hence, through
the connection with the fruit the sacrificer is not directly mentioned here. **The word
"sacrificer" (*yajamāna*) has an object beyond itself**, this is the *pūrvapakṣa*.

[S] But the *siddhānta* [is represented as follows]: **It may be that the sacrificial
act (*yāgasya*) has a purpose through [the sacrificer] rendering assistance to
the sacrifice, through him coming in as having such [qualities that render
assistance].**

[P] Nevertheless, what?

[S] **The direct denotation of longevity and others occurs by them coming in
as a part [of the sacrificer]. Since [longevity and the others] are connected
to [his] desire.** By means of them being what is actually desired longevity and the
others are directly denoted in the *sūktavāka-nigada*. **And a desire for something
which is not the fruit does not arise** – thus longevity and the others are syntacti-
cally connected through [their] being what has to be achieved (*sādhya*).[71] **And in case
[the grass-bedding] has to be achieved by him, if that [bedding] is what has
to be achieved by means of [longevity and the others] being the fruit of the**

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[69] In the present *adhikaraṇa* the term *yajamāna* in the *sūktavākamantra* (*TB* 3.5.10.4: *ayaṃ ya-
jamāno 'sau āyur āśāste*), recited during the *darśa-* and *pūrṇamāsa*, is discussed. The *pūrvapakṣin*
considers its treatment to be comparable to that arrived at in the preceding *adhikaraṇa*, where the
term was subordinated to an object beyond the expressed meaning (the sacrificer's prosperity), and
as such was not in need of modification in case of the *mantra* being used in a sacrifice with several
sacrificers. Also here it is clear, that the sacrificer is subordinated to the sacrifice by rendering help in
accomplishing it.

[70] I have found no reference to any other fruit mentioned in this respect.

[71] The term *sādhya* denotes the result of the sacrifice, while *sādhana* refers to the way in which the
proper result has to be obtained, i.e. the specific sacrifice. Finally, the means by which this sacrifice
has to be performed in order to achieve the result is termed *itikartavyatā*. The *sādhya* in the present
case is the grass-bedding (*prastara*), which is to be prepared reciting the *sūktavāka*.

sacrifice, nevertheless then, the fact that the sacrificer is the primary aspect is not denied. Whether the fruit [in the form of] longevity and the others is effected because the offering of the grass-bedding, which is a subordinate element, renders assistance to the sacrifice –; 226 or whether this fruit is effected, because it is connected as subordinate to the offering [of the grass-bedding] within the sacrificial context (*kratu*) of the *darśa-* and *pūrṇamāsa* –; nevertheless, the primary aspect belongs to the sacrificer, since he is connected to the fruit.[72] Therefore, since the object [of the word *yajamāna*] does not point beyond itself, it has been properly stated that modification [of the word *yajamāna*] has to be done in case of [an act] involving several actors by [the word *yajamāna*] being compatible (*yogya*)[73] with its direct denotation.[74]

[15.] *asaṃyo.*

[S] Here the *siddhānta*, indeed, has been stated by the commentator.[75] **[The terms] *harivat* and the others would not be directly denotative [in the view of the *pūrvapakṣin*]. [But] through [the terms] *harivat* and the others some [factual] quality of him would be indicated.**[76] And by expounding it in this manner the following has been stated [by the commentator Prabhākara].

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[72] Different to the example discussed in the preceding *adhikaraṇa*, the subordination to the overall sacrifice does not play any role in regard to the question of modifying the term *yajamāna*. We are presented with a subordinate injunction to the effect that the sacrificer should offer the grass-bedding. The fruit missing in this injunction should not be assumed in accordance with the *darśa-* and *pūrṇamāsa*, though, but with the one mentioned in the *mantra* laid down in this context, namely longevity.

[73] The term *yogya* refers to the precondition in understanding a sentence by its constituent words working together to produce the meaning of the sentence. They require each other (*ākāṅkṣita*), they are found close to each other (*saṃnihita*), and are compatible (*yogya*) to produce the desired meaning. See WICHER 1986: 19.

[74] The word *yajamāna* thus denotes a specific sacrificer by referring to the fruit, which is also obtained by the individual sacrificer. Therefore, the several sacrificers appearing in the ectypal *sattra* also have to be directly denoted.

[75] In contrast to the usual outline of an *adhikaraṇa* the present one commences with the view of the *siddhāntin*.

[76] My own translation, but based on that of Jha (JHA 1933-36: 1475). The reference here is to the *subrahmaṇyānigada* (*TĀ* 1.12.3-4), with which Indra is invited to the *jyotiṣṭoma*. The *nigada* is addressed to Indra, who is the primary deity at the archetypal *jyotiṣṭoma*. For the ectypal *agniṣṭut*, a one-day *soma*-rite, we find a direct injunction to the effect that the term *indra* in the *nigada* is to be replaced by *agni* in the *agniṣṭut*. The question discussed now is how the other terms appearing in the *mantra* are to be treated. If they refer to qualities or actual actions of Indra, they would also have to be modified – this is the view of the *pūrvapakṣin*. If not, they can remain the same also if Agni is the referential deity – this is the view of the *siddhāntin*.

[P] **In the *pūrvapakṣa* [the qualities] *harivat* and the others are directly de-noted as "qualities of Indra"** (*indrasya guṇāḥ*)**,** thus the [first] distinct statement.

[S] **In the *siddhānta*, [the terms] only [denote] *harivat* and the others.**[77]

[P] He does not perceive the difference in regard to both adduced, distinct statements, and poses a question:[78] **How again are the qualities *harivat* and the others directly denoted as "qualities of Indra"?** 227 **Or how [do they] only [denote] *harivat* and the others?**

[S] The answer [will be given in the following].[79]

[P] Or an objection [could be raised]: This, indeed, is a specification [of Indra], which is understood by these [specific] syllables.

[S] The rejoinder is: **This, indeed, is not a specification [of Indra].**

[P] Since also in both [views] the word *indra* cannot be left aside.[80] Since [the qualities] are directly denoted by being connected to Indra, he states the answer capable [of answering the question] (*samarthayita*): **This is a specification [of Indra]. In this viewpoint the meaning of the sentence is that Indra is endowed with such qualities.**

[S] **In the other [viewpoint] again Indra is [only] characterised by these qual-ities.**[81]

[P] Although [the word] *indra* is syntactically connected, since the *nigada* containing the word *indra* cannot be left aside, nevertheless in the one view [of the *pūrvapakṣa*] the quality of him (Indra) is indirectly indicated as the meaning of the sentence, indeed,

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[77] They do not denote these qualities as specific to Indra. This is the second distinct statement.

[78] This is a basic preliminary *pūrvapakṣa* to the actual discussion taking place in this *adhikaraṇa*. This preliminary *pūrvapakṣa* questions both opposing positions in regard to their validity.

[79] The Sanskrit reading in the manuscript is somewhat strange, as a form of *uttara*, usually employed by Śālikanātha to introduce the answer to a position, appears at the end of the statement. I believe this to indicate the fact mentioned in the previous footnote, namely that the paragraph discusses a preliminary *pūrvapakṣa* questioning the purpose of the whole *adhikaraṇa*. Consequently the complete expounding is the answer to this preliminary argument.

[80] And as the word explicitly states the deity and has to be changed in the ectype, where Agni is the deity, so do the terms referring to that word. Otherwise this reference would be left aside.

[81] In both views the qualities are ascribed to Indra. However, in the view of the *siddhāntin* he is characterised by them in view of the ritual context and the context of the *mantra*, the qualities are not genuinely those of Indra. The *pūrvapakṣin*, on the other hand, argues for the latter view.

by resorting to the connection [of Indra] with those well-known (*prasiddha*) qualities, *harivat* and the others.

[S] Again, in the other view Indra is said to have a connection to the well-known (*prasiddha*) [qualities] *harivat* and the others. Thus, he does not dwell in detail ⟨228⟩ on these two instances according to the sequence [given in the *ŚBh*].

[P] **Just as [in the phrase] "the white cloth" (*śuklaḥ paṭaḥ*).**[82] The direct denotation [of the colour "white"] has the object of indicating (*lakṣaṇā*) the cloth as "having the attribute 'white' in the cloth" (*paṭaśuklaguṇakaḥ*) by attributing the previously well-known white [colour] to the cloth, indeed.

[S] Only the quality is expressed by its connection to the cloth. [And that quality] is previously well-known.

[P] There the following is the opinion of one belonging to the *pūrvapakṣa*: **Since an object is possible similar to [the expression] "the earth containing fragrance", as [the qualities] are directly denoted also by them being qualities of Indra. And since the qualities are understood to belong to him (Indra) on account of an *arthavāda*[83], they do belong to him – this is their direct denotation.** This is the meaning even in case the implying (*upalakṣaṇā*) of Indra as being endowed with the qualities *harivat* and the others has an object beyond itself.[84]

[S] **The earth, which is [actually] not as such, is possible here as "the earth containing fragrance", because the implying of [the earth's] own form has [an object] beyond itself.** And thus there is no connection of Indra with [the qualities] *harivat* and the others, as [the qualities] have not been previously well-known [of him], for which reason [the qualities] should not be implied [of him].

[P] Since they are understood as qualities of him on account of an *arthavāda* beginning

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[82] This example is discussed in the *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.1.33, where the phrase reads: *śuklāṃ śāṭīm ānaya*. The example is used there by the *siddhāntin* to show that the gender of an attribute is only referential towards the term it depends on. This argument is adapted by the *pūrvapakṣin* to the present case: The qualities refer directly to Indra, from which they are dependent.

[83] The *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.1.42 lists an *arthavāda* for each attribute mentioned in the *mantra*. The most extensively discussed is the explanation of the term *harivat*, which is alluded to also here in the following lines.

[84] This other object, according to the *siddhāntin*, is praise.

with "**the former and the latter half of the lunar month are the *hari*s of Indra**"[85], 229 therefore the qualities *harivat* and the others are directly denoted for the sake of implying Indra. And in the same way also Agni has to be implied by those qualities [which actually belong to him].

[S] But the *siddhānta* [is represented as follows]: **Since the connection [of the qualities] to Indra is not understood on account of another means of knowledge, the connection to Indra is understood only through the own direct denotation [of the qualities], this is correct.**[86] The meaning of this is: Since the connection of [the qualities] *harivat* and the others with Indra is not understood by another means of knowledge [but only through the statement in the *mantra*], their direct denotation does not have the purpose of implying him. But the connection of the qualities *harivat* and the others with Indra, which are derived from the *nigada*, is understood through *śruti*, indeed, by means of [these] words, *harivat* and the others – this is correct.

[P] Objection: It has been stated [above] that the qualities as derived from him (Indra) are understood on account of an *arthavāda*.

[S] He doubts this and states: **But the statement in the *arthavāda* is not capable of providing an understanding of that connection,** 230 **since it has an object beyond itself.**[87]

[P] Then it should not be desired, indeed, that it has an object beyond itself.

[S] Here, he states: **Since a split in the sentence would occur, as regulations for several objects would follow for *harivat* and the others in the injunction.**[88] **Also, since the regulation for the *nigada* [would apply] everywhere.**[89] Hence,

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[85] The *pūrvapakṣin* takes this *arthavāda* as stating a fact, namely that the term *harivat* does denote a genuine quality of Indra. According to the *siddhantin* the *arthavāda* has to be taken into the same context as the *mantra* – both forming one single sentence (*ekavākya*) – and as such the meaning is also merely eulogistic and not factual.

[86] The *siddhāntin* does not deny that Indra is attributed by these qualities. But this attribution is directly denoted through the *mantra*, the qualities do not inhere in Indra as such.

[87] Statements made in *arthavāda*s cannot be taken at face value, as their purpose is to commend certain aspects of the ritual. All propositions have to be read in light of this, so in the present case the attribution of Indra is also not a statement of facts, but one supporting the *mantra*.

[88] The sentence would express several distinct meanings for each attribution of Indra, and this cannot be the case in one *mantra*.

[89] The *nigada*, being an invocation to a specific deity by eulogising that deity, would always have

*arthavāda*s have a syntactical connection with praise indeed, this is correct. Therefore the direct denotation also has the corresponding purpose in regard to Agni. Since also there the direct denotation providing the connection of [the qualities] *harivat* and the others [with Agni] is not in any contradiction, thus [this is] the established view.[90]

Option.[91]

[P] **Here also he thinks that [the producing of boiled milk and the others, mentioned in the *mantra*,] are possible at another time by them being inherent in itself, and puts forth the *pūrvapakṣa*.**[92] The meaning of this is: By [boiled milk and the others] being possible at another time the one-year-old heifer, indeed, is implied through boiled milk and the others, which are connected to the one-year-old heifer as well-known by another means of knowledge.[93] The direct denotation of boiled milk and the others does not have its own object, indeed. **The adequate qualities are to be stated also for the sake of implying (*upalakṣaṇā*) the uncastrated calf**, thus the *pūrvapakṣa*. 231

[S] But the *siddhānta* [is represented as follows]: **If it [is said] that there is a reason for the connection [of the products with the animals and thus the ritual] by them being meant [to be manifested] at another time, [then it is not so][94],**

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to be modified in case of an ectype with a different deity, and this is certainly not acceptable for the *siddhāntin*.

[90] Agni can also be praised in the ectype by the same attributes, through which Indra is praised in the archetype. This is only possible, if the terms directly denote the attributes themselves, and not "attributes of the specific deity". They are functional attributes of the deity of the sacrifice.

[91] This represents an alternative interpretation of the same *JS* 9.1.42-44. The subject-matter now is a *mantra* (*ŚB* 3.3.3.1-2: *iyaṃ gaus tayā te krīṇāmi, tasyai śṛtam, tasyai śaraḥ, tasyai dadhi, tasyai mastu, tasyā ātañcanam, tasyai navanītam, tasyai ghṛtam, tasyā āmikṣā, tasyai vājinam.*), which is used during the *soma*-rituals. The archetype is the *jyotiṣṭoma*, at which a one-year old heifer (*ekahāyanī*) is bought with the said *mantra*. At the ectypal *sādyaskra*, a one-day ritual, the animal is a three-year old, uncastrated calf, and the question is whether the terms in the *mantra* – apparently referring to a female cow – have to be modified or not.

[92] The *mantra* (*ŚB* 3.3.3.1-2, see preceding footnote) mentions the products derived from a cow. The *pūrvapakṣin* argues that these products are relevant for the ritual in case of the female heifer in the archetype as well as the male calf in the ectype, as both can bring forth the products at some future time – the heifer directly, the calf by begetting a cow.

[93] The milk and the other products are well-known by everyday experience to come from the cow.

[94] The construction of the whole statement involving the particle *cet* is difficult to understand due to its brevity. Usually *cet* introduces a concessive reasoning, which is then denied in the following. Therefore I take the final construction in the ablative as that reason for denying the position expressed

since there is no restriction that [the manifestation of the products is][95] **the same also in case of another subject**[96]**.** The meaning of this is: Thus far at the time of the [actual] employment (*prayoga*) [of the *mantra*], boiled milk and the others are not, indeed, well-known by another means of knowledge [to be present] also in the one-year-old heifer – thus the similarity to *harivat* and the others.[97] Now the manifestation of that connection [between the one-year-old heifer and the products of a cow] depends on the opinion that [they become manifested] at another time. This [manifestation] is similar also in case of an uncastrated calf, **since there is no restriction.** The restriction that it is possible at another time only in case of the one-year-old heifer, [but] not the uncastrated calf, does not exist. Since it is considered possible, indeed, that the cow, which could be born also from the uncastrated calf, could also be silly.[98] **Therefore the [actual] employment (*prayoga*) [of the *mantra*] takes place according to its object [being praise],** this has been well said.

[16.] *li ̇ngat.*[99]

[P] **Here also in the view [taking] the injunction (*vidhi*) to deal with the general category (*samāna*) the *adhrigu[praiṣa]* applies, indeed, to [the ewe]**

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[95] See the explanation below. The products of the cow can or cannot be manifested in the case of the one-year-old heifer as well as the uncastrated calf.

[96] I.e. the uncastrated calf.

[97] This refers to the first interpretation of the present *adhikaraṇa*, i.e. the qualities mentioned in the *mantra* addressed to Indra.

[98] The uncastrated calf would, in that case, not be connected to the said qualities, even though it has brought forth a cow. Therefore the possibility of the products actually being brought forth at a future time applies to the one-year-old heifer as well as to the uncastrated calf, and cannot serve as a reason for the terms to be modified. What is decisive is the ritual reality, in which both animals do not produce the boiled milk etc. Thus, the *mantra* is purely eulogistic, and as such no modification is necessary for the terms to convey this eulogistic meaning.

[99] In the present *adhikaraṇa* we are dealing with the *adhrigupraiṣamantra* (*TB* 3.6.6.1), a directive *mantra* addressed to the *adhrigu* and employed during the animal-sacrifices at the *jyotiṣṭoma*. The archetype of these animal-sacrifices is the *agnīṣomīya*. The *adhrigupraiṣamantra* concludes with the statement: *prāsmā agniṃ bharate*. The (hypothetical) discussion in this *adhikaraṇa* concerns the pronoun *asmai*, which according to the *siddhāntin* refers to the specific, male animal, while the *pūrvapakṣin* takes it to denote only the general category "animal". The discussion is hypothetical, as it had been decided in the *ŚBh* at *JS* 3.6.31 that the details regarding the animal of the *agnīṣomīya* are specifically laid down for that animal. Therefore the pronoun in the *mantra* has to be changed into the feminine in order to be applicable to the ewe dedicated to Sarasvatī at the ectypal *atirātra*.

dedicated to Sarasvatī 232 **on account of the injunction of the category "an-
imal" (*paśu*), since that [general category] also is directly denoted by the
word in the masculine.** Thus he puts forth the *pūrvapakṣa*.

[S] No. Only thus far as [the *adhrigupraiṣa*] has the *agnīṣomīya*[-animal] as its object[100]
does the *adhrigu[praiṣa]* apply to [the ewe] dedicated to Sarasvatī as enjoining the details
(*dharma*).

[P] But also in the view [taking] the injunction (*vidhi*) to deal with the general category
(*samāna*) the *adhrigu[praiṣa]* applies, indeed, to the ewe dedicated to Sarasvatī.

[S] Objection: **Since the masculine is designated here in the *adhrigu[praiṣa]* [in
the form] *prāsmai*, based on the subordination to the gender the subordina-
tion cannot arise in regard to [the female ewe] dedicated to Sarasvatī.**[101] [The
pronoun *asmai*] is explicitly stated, since the object of the base "ram" (*meṣa*) and the
category "ram", to be directly denoted by the word "animal" (*paśu*), is secondary (*śeṣa*)
by subordination.[102] And since the direct denotation also of that [ram] by the word in
the masculine category is not in contradiction to the [actual] gender, subordination is
correct, indeed, in regard to that [ewe], also.[103]

[P] Objection: **As [the gender] is secondary due to it being incorporated
(*upādāna*)[104] [into the category "ram" referred to in the *mantra*],** 233 **no**

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[100] The *mantra* belongs to the specific animal, as it is laid down as a detail (*dharma*) for the same.
Therefore the pronoun cannot refer to the general category "animal", but to the specific *agnīṣomīya*-
animal. As the ewe dedicated to Sarasvatī comes in at the ectype in place of the *agnīṣomīya*-animal,
the details come to be employed for it as well.

[101] Since the pronoun *asmai* in the *mantra* does not have a referential term in its direct context (i.e.
the *mantra*), the only direct reference of the term is to the gender it denotes. The referential term,
which has to be found in the (wider) ritual context, is subordinated to that gender. If the female ewe
were now taken to be expressed by the *mantra*, the subordination of the male gender in the pronoun to
the female ewe would be incorrect.

[102] The sentence continues here, the first part being expressed solely by abstract nouns in the ablative.
However, this structure is not possible to be rendered in English.

[103] The ram, which is the animal to be offered in the archetypal *agnīṣomīyā*, is the reference for the
pronoun in the *mantra*. The general (*samāna*) abstractions "ram-ness" (*meṣatva*) and "animal-ness"
(*paśutva*) are only derived from the specific ram in the *agnīṣomīyā* and thus secondary. Therefore the
pronoun cannot denote them, even though they would be applicable to the female ewe as well, and as
such it does not refer to the ewe dedicated to Sarasvatī.

[104] Incorporation is a somewhat complementary principle to subordination (*viniyoga*). Through
the principle of incorporation certain aspects are included into the ritual whole, based on additional
text passages being incorporated into the basic injunction (*adhikāravidhi*). As Yoshimizu shows, the
injunction that "one should offer with curd" (*dadhnā juhoti*) is incorporated into the general injunction

specification of the gender has been expressed, indeed. The meaning of this is: Just as the category "ram" is revealed by the *mantra* as an element secondary by subordination, in the same way the feminine gender also is an element secondary by incorporation [into that category]. Thus [the feminine gender] is not something that is to be revealed [by the *mantra*], indeed.[105]

[S] And this [incorporation of the feminine gender] cannot [be revealed] by the masculine category [in the pronoun]. Thus, how can the [masculine] gender be subordinated by the [female] ewe?

[P] He resolves: **It may be that the secondary character of the [female] gender has been expressed through incorporation.** But the following is the opinion of the propounder of the *pūrvapakṣa*: **The specification [of the gender] cannot be meant to be expressed, since the character of being secondary due to incorporation is understood by the direct denotation of the secondary element through subordination.** The meaning of this is: Everything has to be revealed by the *mantra* as a secondary element. And here, since the [masculine] gender is already understood through the direct denotation of the category "ram", which is a secondary element by subordination, the specification of the gender also is not meant to be expressed by the *mantra*, indeed.

[S] Objection: This answer is incorrect.

[P] It is not incorrect, since an understanding of the particular is obtained on account of an understanding of the general category, indeed. [234] Since the intention of that [masculine gender] is not based on a proper means of knowledge.

[S] But the *siddhānta* [is represented as follows]: **Since [a pronoun] requires only [another term which is] in proximity, and since designating the paricular**

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for the *agnihotra*, "one should offer the *agnihotra*" (*agnihotraṃ juhoti*), thereby providing the way in which the *agnihotra* has to be done. In addition to this incorporation (*upādāna*), subordination (*viniyoga*) rather refers to the ritual logic and the status quo, in the form that in the example used by Yoshimizu the curd is subordinate to the act of offering as its substance. See YOSHIMIZU 1997: 101-105. In our case of the *adhrigupraiṣamantra* the *pūrvapakṣin* argues that the *mantra* is subordinated, as it serves the purpose of directing the *adhrigu*. Therefore the pronoun cannot be taken as indicating the gender of the specific animal, but only the general category of the animal.

[105] According to the *pūrvapakṣin* the masculine gender is included in the category "ram", and as such cannot be meant to be expressed by the pronoun in the *mantra*.

(*viśeṣa*) **is the object of all pronominal words, there is no proper means of knowledge for assuming that the general category (*sāmānya*) is directly denoted [by the pronoun *asmai*]. Just as the particular (*viśeṣa*) directly denotes the general category (*sāmānya*).**[106] The meaning of this is: If in fact [there is the pronoun in the phrase] **_prāsmai_**, then the base form (*prātipadika*) of the pronoun in its original form directly denotes [a word which] is in proximity to that [pronoun], and since proximity is with the [actual] object, the particulars, indeed, are in proximity, not the general category. And then the particulars, indeed, are what is directly denoted of pronouns. **And these particulars contain the specification of the gender,** thus in this way, indeed, those [particulars] are directly denoted [by the pronoun in the *mantra*]. And then, if the base of the pronoun would occur also in case of the ewe, the designation of the masculine gender [in the pronoun] would be in contradiction to the occurrence of the feminine suffix [in the term "ewe" (*meṣī*)], since that [ewe] has the feminine gender. And as the particular ⟨235⟩ is directly denoted, **there is no proper means of knowledge for assuming that the general category (*sāmānya*) is directly denoted [by the pronoun *asmai*].** As it would be similar in case that the direct denotation of the particulars would be assumed in sentences, which are to be included [in the context] when the general category were actually directly denoted, therefore it cannot be said that the gender is not signified.[107] **Since the direct denotation of the particular has been firmly estabished (*niṣṭhātva*) for a pronoun. But since it has been firmly established that the direct denotation of the particular is based on the particular being specified by its gender. Since the particular is in proximity also in case that [the general category] were directly denoted,**

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[106] Pronouns refer to nouns, and by rule they refer to nouns which are in close syntactical and semantical proximity to the pronoun. The nouns they refer to denote particulars, i.e. specific manifestations of – for example – a cow. By them denoting the particular cow, they also refer to the general category "cow-ness" – not the other way round, as was argued by the *pūrvapakṣin*. Śālikanātha argues in line with the *anvitābhidhānavāda* of the Prābhākaras, in which the individual word denotes the universal category (*sāmānya*), while the words combined in a sentence provide a particular meaning. Words in a sentence thus denote particulars (*viśeṣa*).

[107] This point is explained further below. Even if the pronoun would have a referential term in proximity referring to the general category (i.e. *paśu*), it would still denote the gender as a subordinate aspect. Therefore, even in that case the term would not be applicable to the female ewe.

and since the secondary character of the *mantra* is possible.[108] If [the *mantra*] would have no secondary character, based on the argument derived from [the *mantra*] being subordinated to that [general category], then nevertheless the *mantra* is obtained, indeed, as secondary, since that [ewe] is correctly employed (*upayogin*) in the ritual act (*karma*), even if [in the *mantra*] that [general category] would be directly denoted.

[P] Objection: Then, even in case that the [actual] employment [of the *adhrigupraiṣa*] would include the word "animal" (*paśu*), the object, which has the feminine gender, would not be obtained by the word in the masculine category.

[S] Here he states: **Again, in case that the [actual] employment [of the *adhrigu-praiṣa*] would include[109] the word "animal", [then] it would be correct that the gender is not meant to be expressed,** 236 **since the general category would be meant to be expressed, and since that [general category] would not contain the feminine gender.**

[P] From where, then, would the understanding of the specification arise?

[S] Here he states: **The understanding of the specification would be obtained from the general category. Therefore**, since [only] the specification of the gender is designated [in the pronoun],[110] it has been well said that **[the ewe] dedicated to Sarasvatī is not obtained as expressed in the *adhrigu[praiṣa]*.**

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[108] I see no other way than to understand this accumulation of abstract constructions in the ablative as a list of reasons given in the *Laghvī*. Śālikanātha seems to provide that list comprehensively in order to prove the impossibility of his opponent's view. His gloss on this list does not pick up all items again.

[109] Until the last sentence of this paragraph, the *siddhāntin* concedes to the *pūrvapakṣin*, that his view would be possible only if the general category would be directly expressed by the word "animal" (*paśu*) appearing in the *mantra*. But as this is not the case, and the pronoun stands by itself, the only reference it has is to the masculine gender. To make this concession clear, the passage is translated in the conjunctive.

[110] Again this is the case, since the referential term "animal" (*paśu*) does not appear in the *adhrigupraiṣamantra*.

5.2   Ninth adhyāya, third pāda

313

śrīḥ

[1. - 3.] *prakṛtau.*

[S] And a [preliminary] objection:[111] **It has been stated that the deity is directly denoted in the archetype by the *mantra*, which is an element subordinate to the sacrificial act. How can the *pūrvapakṣa* [arise] here?** Agni and the others[112] are directly denoted for the performance [of the sacrificial act] specifically without any alteration. And they are not subordinate elements to a sacrificial act other than the archetypal one.[113] And in the archetype, the deity is directly denoted through the *mantra*, which is a subordinate element of the act. This has been stated here [in reference to the *adhikaraṇa* beginning with] *phaladevatayoś ca*.[114] Hence, the term [*agni*] has to be modified, indeed, into *sūrya* etc., capable of indicating the deity as a subordinate element to the sacrificial act, and this [deity], Sūrya and others, is as such said to be the inherent meaning [of the *mantra*].

[P] It may be that direct denotation belongs to the *mantra*s by them being subordinate to the sacrificial act, and that the word *sūrya* and the others are the inherent meaning.

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[111] This objection is not part of the actual discussion in this *adhikaraṇa*, but doubts the general justification of the question raised, namely whether terms laid down in a *mantra* should be changed in the ectype in case they denote things that are part of the sacrifice. As such, this objection is neither a *pūrvapakṣa* nor a proper *siddhānta*. However, as mainly the doubt raised by the *purvapakṣin* is questioned, this preliminary objection is taken as a *siddhānta*.

[112] There are two main examples discussed in the *ŚBh* in this *adhikaraṇa*. On the one hand, there is the *nirvāpamantra* (*TS* 1.1.4.2), which had already been discussed in 9.1.11 and 12, recited at the *darśa*- and *pūrṇamāsa*. As in 9.1.12, the final statement, *agnaye juṣṭaṃ nirvapāmi*, is under scrutiny now in regard to the question, whether or not in ectypes with deities other than Agni – several examples are given by Śabara – the term in the *mantra* has to be modified or not. The other example is the *mantra* beginning with *syonaṃ te* (*MŚS* 1.2.6.19-22), which is also recited during the *darśa*- and *pūrṇamāsa*, and had already been adduced in 9.1.11 and 9.1.13 as a parallel instance. In this *mantra* we find the term *vrīhi*, "husked rice", while for the ectypal offering to Indra-Marutvat "wild, unhusked rice" (*nīvāra*) has been enjoined. Also here the question arises, whether the term in the *mantra* has to be modified or not.

[113] I.e. the terms and the objects they denote cannot be automatically transferred to an ectype, as they are subordinate to specific aspects of the archetypal sacrifice which they denote.

[114] As in 9.1.11, Śālikanātha refers to *JS* 9.1.4 and the *ŚBh* on it to show that the deity mentioned in a *mantra* denotes "the deity of the sacrifice at which the *mantra* is used". As such, the *mantra* is subordinated to the act and denotes a part of that act.

Nevertheless, the propounder of the *pūrvapakṣa* thinks that no modification [applies] due to the *kārya*.[115] **By taking the *kārya* of the archetype into consideration,** ⌊314⌋ **non-modification, indeed, is correct.**

[S] How?

[P] The answer is: What has been handed down as *smṛti* (*smṛta*) through the *mantra* has to be done, this is the object in the archetype. Not, again, [something handed down as *smṛti*] by something which is not [part of] the *mantra* here.[116] And in [our] view the performance should not be done by something which is not [part of] the *mantra*. Since modification [would make the original wording into] something which is not [part of] a *mantra*. Therefore, also in the ectype the words of the *mantra*, despite their object not corresponding [to the ritual setting in the ectype], have to be assumed to be directly denoted for the sake of [them being included in] *smṛti*. **Or they are, somehow, directly denoted on the basis of a secondary application.[117] Again, the Veda is not to be ignored.** The word *agni* [applies] despite its object not corresponding [to the ritual setting in the ectype]. Going beyond worldly custom, the direct denotation of *sūrya* has to be assumed, or [has to be reached] somehow by some secondary application, which depends on the worldly object. Thus, the Veda is not to be ignored.

[S] If it has been obtained as such, it is stated: It may be that the performance of something which is not [part of] a *mantra* does not apply. Since the *mantra*, indeed, is obtained on the basis of a statement containing the injunction (*codaka*).[118] But it cannot be assumed, indeed, that the words of the *mantra* do not contain the corresponding object, or that they are directly denoted based on secondary application, since this is not proven on the basis of a proper means of knowledge. ⌊315⌋

[P] Objection: **It can be assumed, indeed, on the basis of the direct statement**

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[115] The *kārya*, here, is what is laid down by the injunction, which mentions the archetypal *mantra* to be used at the ectype by the general rule that the ectype is to be done as the archetype.

[116] According to the *pūrvapakṣin*, a change in the wording of the *mantra* is not admissable, as otherwise the changed wording would not be a *mantra* anymore.

[117] This resembles the argument of the *pūrvapakṣin* in 9.1.11, where he argues that the terms *savitṛ* and the others in the same *nirvāpamantra* have to denote the deities enjoined for the *darśa-* and *pūrṇamāsa*.

[118] Only what is enjoined can be the subject-matter of a *mantra*, as the *mantra* itself cannot enjoin parts of the sacrifice.

[of the term *agni* in the *mantra*], as in the verse addressed to Indra (*aindrī*).[119]

[S] **[It shall] not [be] as such for [this] *mantra*!** There is no direct statement in regard to the ectype. The obtaining [of the term], indeed, has to be exclusively based on the *kārya*.

[P] The obtaining, indeed, is not to be exclusively [based on the *kārya*]. There is a direct statement [of the term in the *mantra*].

[S] Nevertheless, what [then]?

[P] To this, he states: **In case [the term] is obtained as such, its direct denotation [in the ectype], indeed, is like in the archetype. Thus, an object which is not corresponding [to the ritual setting] is not assumed.** The meaning of this is: Just as the *kārya* of the *mantra* has been accomplished by that [term] in the archetype – because the *mantra* is obtained on the basis of the *kārya*, in the same way it has to be accomplished also in the ectype by that [term]. This is the meaning of the rule (*śāstrārtha*).

[S] And in the archetype, the direct denotation has been made through the primary usage [of the term]. There is no assumption of a secondary application (*gauṇa*) for it. Nor is the assumption of [another] expressive power (*śakti*) correct. ⬚316 Since by inserting another word whose expressive power is right the accomplishing of the *kārya* would not be hindered.

[P] And an[other] objection: **The performance (*prayoga*) in the archetype [is] not [carried out] of something which is not a *mantra*.**

[S] What has, thus, been stated, he resolves: **On what ground, however, has it been stated that the performance [would be carried out] of something which is not a *mantra*? Even in the ectype the performance [is carried out] of a**

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[119] This refers to the *ŚBh* at *JS* 3.3.14, where the order among the six means for determining subsidiaries had been discussed, using the verse to Indra as the example. The direct assertion according to the injunction is: "One should worship the *gārhapatya*-fire with the verse addressed to Indra." (*MS* 3.2.4.) This *mantra* (*MS* 1.3.26 and further *ṚV* 8.51.7; *TS* 1.5.8.4.) includes the term *indra*, hence the question arises, what is worshipped with the verse: the fire, or Indra, or both. Direct assertion based on an injunction is stronger than the indicative power of a word in the *mantra*, hence the fire is worshipped. The term *indra* is then taken as indirectly indicating the fire. This rule is used here by the *pūrvapakṣin* to support his view that the word in the *mantra* is not to be modified.

mantra, **indeed.**

[P] And the [continued] objection: If there were modification, something which is not a *mantra* would be the inevitable consequence (*prasaṅga*).

[S] He resolves: **It may be that [the word which] is being modified would have the character of not being [part of] a *mantra* by it being contingent (*nimitta*).**[120] That word, which is modified by it being contingent, may be characterised as not being [part of] a *mantra*. [This is] not [the case], however, as [the word has] a direct denotation [in regard to the sacrificial setting]. Also, as the sentence [remains intact], the character of being [part of] a *mantra* can be understood, since that [sentence] provides understanding of the object of the *mantra*.[121] As the object of the *mantra* is being understood [by that sentence], what is obtained from the group [of words making up the sentence] is understood to arise on the basis of the words in the form, that "this, indeed, is a sentence". The only alteration, indeed, is that of a mere word.[122]

[P] To this he states: **The mere fact that [the word] is contingent is understood here by its being subject to change, indeed.** 317 **Again, [the changed word] would not be [part of] a *mantra*. Therefore, [the word] should be like in the archetype.**

[S] The insertion of a different word, indeed, should be applied. Why should it not be [as such], when the [original] word has an object which is not corresponding [to the ritual setting]?

[P] To this, he states: **Since [mere] remembrance would be the inevitable consequence (*smṛtiprasaṅga*) [following] from another [word].**

[S] **How, again, would [mere] remembrance be the inevitable consequence [following] from another [word], if the object [of the original word given in**

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[120] The contingent term is either the attribute in the interpolated interpretation of *JS* 9.3.2 and 3, or a non-generic term in a *mantra*, which would be meaningless if not expressing something as part of the sacrifice. Therefore, they will have to be modified. See the *ŚBh* for more.

[121] Through the word being changed according to the new, ectypal ritual setting, the *mantra* relates to that setting. In the example, it refers to the deity being offered to.

[122] The main object of the *mantra*, and as such the unity of the sentence, are not changed by one term being modified. Therefore, the argument of the *pūrvapakṣin* is not valid, i.e. that the change would render the whole *mantra* invalid (*a-mantra*).

the *mantra*] would not be corresponding [to the ritual setting]?

[P] Here, he states: **It cannot, indeed, be explained that the object is not corresponding, when the object has not been understood from a different [word].** Since the assumption, that the object is corresponding, is possible after the object has been understood by a different means of knowledge, [and] after it has been acknowledged that [the word] has an object beyond itself.

[S] If there were no other instrument, this would have been understood as the object. Then the object of the rule would not have been preserved, i.e. that what has been handed down as *smṛti* through the *mantra* has to be done. Therefore, as the object of the taught rule would not be preserved in the form that it has been handed down by *smṛti* through the *mantra*, modification is to be applied as belonging to this contingent term. Here the reference to the interpolation[123] respects (abs.) the understanding of the meaning of the *sūtra*s by the commentator [Śabara] by taking them as having one purpose [and] also as representing one sentence: **On the basis of perceiving an indicative text the generic and the contingent term [should be] corresponding [to the ritual setting].**[124] ⟨318⟩ This reference, which as been made in regard to the interpolation, is there to show that the direct denotation only of the quality is not correct even for adjectives which are directly denotative of an inherent meaning (*samavetārtha*).[125]

[P] Again for what reason, since the meaning of the sentence would be obtained also by means of [the adjective] directly denoting the meaning of merely a quality?

[S] The noun is taken as superior to the contingent term.

[P] How?

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[123] This translation of the phrase *antarāgarbhin* is in analogy to the translation used by Jha (Jha 1933-36: 1555). See also the following footnote.

[124] With this statement, reference seems to be made to what is presented as the second part of the second *adhikaraṇa* in the *ŚBh*, according to the translation (Jha 1933-36: 1555). This *adhikaraṇa* interprets *JS* 9.3.2-3 differently, connecting these *sūtra*s also with the following *JS* 9.3.4-8. The first interpretation is done in the *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.3.1-2, taking *JS* 9.3.3 as an interpolated topic.

[125] The example in the *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.3.3 deals with lotus-grass used at an ectypal ritual. The *mantra* at the archetype includes the phrase *darbhaiḥ haritaiḥ*. Certainly *darbhaiḥ*, the generic term for the *Kuśa*-grass, has to be modified into *pauṇḍarikaiḥ*. According to the *pūrvapakṣin* the contingent term denotes only a quality and as such does not have to be modified. The correct procedure, however, includes the modification also of the contingent term, as it depends on the generic term.

[S] Indication (*lakṣaṇā*) is applied by leaving aside *śruti*, thus the meaning.[126]

[P] [The contingent term] occurs because it has a seen object out of itself, indeed.

[S] No, it is correct, because [it refers to] something else. Since something unseen[127] should not be resolved as arrived at by something seen. As a quality is only meant for the noun, the visible direct denotation of the noun, which constructs (*nibandhana*) the contingent term and the noun, by all means has to be stated as dependent [and] unseen. And [the contingent term] does not occur because it has a seen object out of itself, indeed. Through this argument, therefore, the direct denotation of the quality, which is meant for something else, rather occurs as meant for the noun by indication (*lakṣaṇā*), 319 this has been properly stated. Now the meaning of the *sūtra*s has been explained by means of them having a single purpose, indeed.

[P] What about the perceiving of an indicative text?[128]

[S] It has been shown by the commentator stating that, moreover, only in case of a regulation through the direct statement of the procedure for such expressions as **of the cows (*usrāṇām*)** it is possible that [the respective term] having an unseen meaning would be the inevitable consequence. Although a regulation is possible through the direct statement of the procedure for such expressions as **of the cows (*usrāṇām*)** [mentioned for the ectype], nevertheless, in the view [denying] modification [the respective term] would, as an inevitable consequence, have an unseen meaning. But in the view [advocating] modification [the respective term] has a seen meaning as such.

[P] Again, for which reason are the terms such as "cow" (*usra*), which have been obtained through modification, indeed, reiterated in the scriptures?

[S] Doubting [this question he states] that **[the reiteration] has the object to provide**

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[126] This represents an instance, where the usual order in the means to determine the proper meaning of a sentence are not used according to their hierarchy: The direct mentioning in *śruti* usually is the strongest evidence for a meaning. But here taking the term only as indicating (*lakṣaṇā*) the quality of the generic term is the correct way to read the passage.

[127] I.e. the contingent term indirectly denoting the quality of the generic term.

[128] See *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.3.2, second interpretation. The indicative text is a *mantra* laid down for an ectypal ritual. In it, several modified terms appear – among them the form *usrāṇām* discussed in the following. This explicit mentioning of the modified *mantra* supports the *siddhāntin* in his claim that modification is necessary. As is further argued in the *ŚBh*, the specific statement of this *mantra* provides it with the status of "*mantra*" proper, not a modification of a *mantra*.

[the statement] with the status of being a *mantra*. The status of being a *mantra* in regard to the recitation, which has thus been revolved around, is for the sake [of confirming] that "[the wording] should be in accordance [to the sacrificial setting]". **The designation of the [respective] statements has the object to distinguish between the [respective] recitations. If he touches one sacrificial post [...].**[129] This designation, which [is made] in reference to singularity etc. [of the sacrificial post], has the object to distinguish [between the respective cases, otherwise all *mantra*s would be [applied] in case that a single sacrificial post were touched, indeed. Thus, there is no split in the *mantra*.[130]   **320**

[P] **Here, a different authorisation should not be assumed.** Thus the explanation that [the expiation] is contingent (*naimittika*) upon a Vedic [sacrificial act].[131] If [the expiation] would be contingent (*nimittaka*) upon a worldly touching of the post, then an independent authorisation would be assumed. **This should not be the case.** Thus it has been explained that [the expiatory recitation of the *mantra*] is contingent (*naimittika*) upon the touching of the sacrificial post as part of a Vedic [sacrificial act]. As it is as such, there is no possibility for assuming another authorisation, since the primary authorisation comes in.[132]

[S] But the *siddhānta* [is represented as follows]: **A [direct] connection with the sacrificial act is not obtained, since [the statement must be understood] in relation to the word *iṣṭa* [appearing in that context]. And since a bad con-**

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[129] This *mantra* (*MS* 3.9.4) is laid down for the *agnīṣomīyā*.

[130] This passage refers to the *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.3.5. The *pūrvapakṣin* had mentioned a different supportive passage for his argumentation against the need for modification. The explicit mentioning of the regulations for the touching of two posts or more prove that modification is not the rule but the exception.

[131] The object of discussion is taken over from the preceding argument, and in the *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.3.9 it is presented as a distinct *adhikaraṇa*. The regular introduction, however, of an *adhikaraṇa* by stating the first phrase of its first *sūtra* is missing here in the *DŚ*. Maybe because we remain with the same *mantra*, Śālikanātha continues the discussion without beginning a new *adhikaraṇa*. The question considered now is different to the one before. The argument does not revolve around an apparent repetition, but what kind of touching of the sacrificial post is referred to in the injunction for the expiation. While the *pūrvapakṣin* argues for the touching in the course of the sacrificial act, as that is the context of the statement, the *siddhāntin* will show that only a worldly touching can be meant here.

[132] The primary authorisation lays down the *agnīṣomīyā*, in the context of which the *pūrvapakṣin* also reads the present injunction. Reading it together with the main injunction, the touching can only be prohibited in the sacrificial, Vedic context.

sequence is handed down by *śruti* [in connection with the sacrificial post]:
The sacrificial post takes on the badly done aspects of the sacrifice.[133] This is
handed down by *śruti* in [the context of] the remaining sentence. Since [the statement]
is related to the word *iṣṭa*, the touching of the sacrificial post, which is there when
the offering has been made, is contingent (*naimittika*) upon that [completed offering].
Thus since, on the basis that this [relation] is understood, the touching of the sacrificial
post during a Vedic [sacrificial act] cannot take place subsequent to the completed offer-
ing, 321 there is, therefore, no contingency [of the expiation upon the touching during
the sacrificial act], here. And accordingly, since a bad consequence [of the touching] is
handed down by *śruti*, the touching from which follows [this] bad consequence is arrived
at as the contingent cause [for the expiation]. And the fact that a bad consequence would
follow [from it] is not obtained in case that [the touching] is a subordinate element of
a Vedic [sacrificial act]. This he states: **Since the fact that a bad consequence**
would follow [from it] is not obtained in case that [the expiation] is subordi-
nated to the sacrificial act, therefore [the expiation] is not contingent upon a
Vedic [sacrificial act]. The aspect of subordinate-primary (*aṅgāṅgibhāva*) in relation
to (*saha*) a Vedic sacrificial act is not obtained. Hence, since the worldly touching of the
sacrificial post is the contingent cause [for the expiation], the assumption of a different
authorisation [for it] has been obtained, indeed.

[P] **How, again, can the instance [of the bad consequence] which forms a**
single statement together with a phrase of praise be a specification for the
regulation regarding the touching of the sacrificial post? The regulation [applies
to an instance] which is contingent upon the touching of the sacrificial post. How can
the exemplification be a specification of the contingent cause, since it forms a single
statement together with a phrase of praise? This is the meaning.

[S] The answer is: **[The statement] is a specification on the basis that it depends**
[on that phrase of praise] and is in proximity [to it].[134] Since [the statement] de-

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[133] This statement precedes the injunction of the expiation.

[134] The *pūrvapakṣin* had not connected the injunction of the expiation with the preceding statement,
that the sacrificial post absorbs the bad aspects of the sacrifice. The *siddhāntin* argues for reading it

pends on [the question] under which condition 322 it is contingent upon the touching of the sacrificial post, and since the word *iṣṭa* is in proximity, it is correct as a specification.

[P] And an objection: **As the enunciation is meant for something else, both these aspects belong to the word which comes from a different, independent person.**[135] There, even if [the statement] is in proximity, indeed, it cannot form one sentence. Since the enunciation is understood to be meant for a different object. This word, *iṣṭa*, is understood as a phrase of praise. Since it is clearly understood that it forms a single sentence with the phrase of praise, the connection of it with the instruction from the injunction is not obtained, even if it is in proximity due to its being required to complete the sentence. As also in that case the phrase coming from one person, indeed, is not connected with a sentence coming from a different person, the reason [for the term] is to understand it as being enunciated for something else.

[S] Here, it is stated: **Even if [the statement] is meant for something else, it is connected by its being suitable [for being read as one sentence].** 323 **This has been shown [for the statement]: Thrust quickly!**[136] Just as the stick, which is connected here [in the form that] "**the stick is pleasant and beautiful**", is connected by its being suitable for [being read with the statement] **thrust quickly**, as it is needed to complete the sentence. In the same way, the connection is correct as such also here.

[P] Objection: **It is stated that this, indeed, is incorrect. As it has been established, that there is no connection of one object with another.** It is, indeed, incorrect what has been shown [in regard to the statement] "**thrust quickly**".

[S] [This] he resolves: **He thinks that it is not incorrect that there is no need to complete the sentence (*nairākāṅkṣya*), as [the statements] are in proximity despite an intermediate sentence. Since these [statements] are obtained as**

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in this context by claiming its meaning is dependent on and closely related to it.

[135] This discussion is not found in the *ŚBh*, and I am not completely certain about its meaning. The *pūrvapakṣin* apparently argues against the *siddhāntin* that the proximity does not merely refer to space, but also to the cause for the appearance of a statement. Hence, the two under consideration are not in proximity, as they could be taken to be even enunciated by two different persons.

[136] This and the following quotation form one statement: "The stick is pleasant and beautiful, thrust it quickly!" According to the *siddhāntin*, even though the term "stick" is spatially separated from the main sentence, "thrust quickly", it is connected to it by being in proximity.

referring to the worldly [touching of the sacrificial post] while including in their proposition (*uccārayat*) an intermediate sentence. "I desire the houses of this Devadatta. Summon him! He, indeed, is rich in the form of animals."[137]

[P] As it should be accordingly, nevertheless what then?

[S] To this he states: ⟦324⟧ **And the Vedic meaning of a word is preceded by its worldly usage, this has been stated.** As the side of [the statement] is understood even in a worldly connection [the proximity] is found, indeed, also when [the side of the statement] comes from an intermediate person (instr.). [This is the case] in such a question and answer [as follows]: "Who is it, who goes?" Since, when the answer to the question is "Devadatta", a connection is found between [part of the question in the form] "he goes" and [the statement] coming from another person.[138] **And the sense [of the complete passage] carries the force. The usage of the words is worldly.** Thus, connection and non-connection are [governed] according to the sense. Therefore it has been properly stated that the expiatory rite [is to be done] in case of a worldly touching [of the sacrificial post], since there is a connection between the instruction from the injunction and the word *iṣṭa*, despite its coming from [a passage of] praise.[139]

[4.] *anyāyas tu.*

[S] Based on the explanation [given] in the fourth view it is arrived at that both [*mantra*s] also should be employed as modified.[140]   Therefore, this [view] does not [present] a

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[137] These sentences, in themselves independent of each other, are connected through appearing in proximity, therefore requiring each other to form a coherent unit.

[138] In order to connect the two sentences coming from different persons, one has to add a part of the question from the person with the answer from the other. Even though there appears some distance due to two persons talking, the answer refers to the question and is thus in proximity.

[139] Even though the term is part of an *arthavāda*, it is connected also to the injunction. This connection is termed as "one sentence" (*ekavākya*) in other parts of this and other texts of Pūrvamīmāṃsā.

[140] This refers to the four different solutions to the problem presented below and in the *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.3.10-14. At the archetypal *agnīṣomīyā*, two *mantra*s (*MS* 1.2.15 and *TS* 3.1.4.4) are enjoined. Both *mantra*s mention the noose to tie the animal to the sacrificial post, but *MS* 1.2.15 in the singular, and *TS* 3.1.4.4 in the plural. In the following *adhikaraṇa* the *siddhāntin* will argue that due to direct Vedic instruction both should be used as alternatives at the archetype, even though only one animal is tied and killed. At the ectype, which is discussed in the present *adhikaraṇa*, two animals are killed – one white goat for Mitra, one black goat for Varuṇa. Four options how to treat these two *mantra*s are given, the first three representing the *pūrvapakṣa*, the last representing the *siddhānta*: 1. The *mantra* containing the plural form should be used; 2. the *mantra* containing the singular form should be used,

repetition with the second view.[141] In the second view, indeed, there was application [of the *mantra*] $\boxed{325}$ by means of modulation of the singular ending. The plural ending was left out altogether, indeed.

[P] Objection: If, by means of the opinion that there should be no modification, it is stated that the plural ending is left out, then why is it not stated as such also for the singular ending?

[S] There he states: **Singularity[142] is present also in case of duality.** Thus, it has been stated that the plural ending is left out. It cannot be said that the singular ending is left out, as it also has been modified into the dual.

[P] **Since it is possible that this [plurality] has the singularity [of the noose in the archetype] as its object, the plurality [applies also at the ectype].**

[S] **The plural does not have an object [in the ectype].** Thus, it has been stated that the plural ending, indeed, is left out.

[P] There he states the *pūrvapakṣa*: **Since the object [of the archetypal sacrifice with the single animal] is not inherent [in the other *mantra* containing the plural], one [should] use the other [*mantra*] containing the plural [at the ectype] in order to do justice to the Veda – [this is] one view. Since in case of the two [nooses in the ectype] the plural ending for those two is not seen [to apply],** $\boxed{326}$ **[the *mantra* containing] the singular ending, indeed, [should] remain by means of [it being] modified (*ūhena*) – [this is] the second view.**

Thus far the usage [of the *mantra*] for the two nooses is not accomplished accordingly of the plural ending. Since in the archetype the plural ending is not seen [to apply]

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modified into the dual; 3. both *mantra*s should be used as alternatives, the one containing the singular modified to the dual, or the one containing the plural without modification; 4. both *mantra*s should be used modified to the dual.

[141] Obviously, the opponent had objected to the view of the *siddhāntin* that his conclusion is identical with the second view of the *pūrvapakṣa*. This objection is not found in the *ŚBh* or elsewhere to my knowledge, it seems to be genuine to the *Laghvī*.

[142] A remark on the translation of the different words denoting numbers is in place here. While the single number, such as *eka*, refers to the specific example (the one noose in the archetype), the corresponding abstract noun, *ekatva*, refers to the general quality "singularity". The grammatical category "number" is referred to by *ekavacana*, and its specific ending by *ekavacanānta*, the "singular ending". Śālikanātha appears to be rather exact in his usage of these distinct aspects.

to duality.[143] But [the *mantra* containing] the singular ending, indeed, which has the object [of the archetypal sacrifice with the single animal] inherent, should remain [at the ectype] by means of [it being] modified (*ūhena*) – [this is] the second view. **Also in case of two [nooses] the occurrence [of the plural form] is not specified. Since the plural ending has to directly denote the [one] noose [in the archetype],[144] and since this [denotation] is possible also in case of the duality [of the nooses in the ectype]. Therefore, also in case of two [nooses] the usage [of the *mantra* containing the plural] is correct in the ectype also, as [it was] in the archetype.** Since there is no contradiction of the grammatical number through any modification of the singular ending for the one [noose], but of the other ending, [the usage is correct] in the ectype also, as in the archetype, through the authorising [injunction] – [this is] the third view.[145]

[S] This explanation of that [view], which will be expounded in the following, is [made] in reference to the fourth view. <u>**In accordance with the object [in the ectype], [the respective form] has to be modified into the dual. The plural and the singular should be left out.**</u> 327

[P] Again, what is the reason?

[S] **The plural, even though its object is inherent in case of the archetype, is modified in the ectype.** Inasmuch as no modification has been obtained for [the *mantra*] containing words such as *hari* and others, indeed,[146] he doubts it, indeed, since [the plural] is not seen [to apply] in case of a duality.[147]

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[143] In the archetype the *mantra* with the plural is used for a single noose. The only justification for this, according to the *siddhāntin*, is that this is what the Veda directly lays down, as this *mantra* appears in the context of the archetypal injunction. In the ectype, however, it does not appear in this context and hence is not laid down to be used. Śabara further explains that at the archetype the setting free of the animal is the object to be denoted by the *mantra*, while at the ectype the setting free of the two animals *simultaneously* is the point to be denoted.

[144] The plural has to denote the single noose for the reasons described in the preceding footnote.

[145] Both *mantra*s appear in the context of the authorising injunction for the setting free of the animal from the noose. See *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.3.14.

[146] This refers back to 9.1.15, where the *subrahmaṇyānigada* addressed to Indra at the archetypal *jyotiṣṭoma* was discussed. At the ectype, where Agni is the deity, only the term denoting the deity has to be changed, while terms denoting qualities, such as *hari*, remain the same. It was argued that they do not denote qualities of Indra, but of the deity of the sacrifice. As such they are also applicable to Agni, when he is the deity in the ectypal sacrifice.

[147] While in case of the *subrahmaṇyānigada* the terms were denotative and as such applicable also

[P] If [it is argued] that there [has to be] modification, since [otherwise] it would be the inevitable consequence (*prasaṅga*) that the usage involving [the *mantra* containing] the plural form is incorrect, then he objects to that. **Since in wordly matters the plural is also not seen in case of one [object], the contradiction in the direct denotation is not specific [to the dual].**[148] **Otherwise there would be agreement [between the ending and the denoted object], indeed.** There the opinion is that just as in worldly matters the usage [of statements containing] the incorrect plural ending found (*dṛṣṭa*) in regard to one [object takes place], should it not be accordingly also in the case of duality?

[S] Again, he raises a doubt: **Now, there [in the following *adhikaraṇa*] it is stated that the usage [of the *mantra* containing the plural occurs], since the *mantra* is directly instructed by the Veda (*upadeśa*), despite there being a contradiction [between the plural ending and the denoted single noose].**

[P] He objects: **Here also the *mantra* should be obtained as in the archetype – by which [measure] can this be preserved?**

[And further] an objection: In the archetype [the plural form] is obtained from direct Vedic instruction (*upadeśa*). **328** Here it [would be obtained] from the *kārya*, thus the specification.[149]

[S] There he states: **The obtaining [of the plural form] even from the *kārya* cannot, indeed, be explained as being in contradiction to the direct denotation. Since as in the archetype the assertion of the noose is not in contradiction,**

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in the ectype, this applicability is not given in the present case for the plural form. In the archetype the plural form could also be applicable to the one noose. In the *ŚBh* the *siddhāntin* argues that the *mantra* containing the plural form is directly laid down by the Veda, and the basic form of the word is what is meant to be expressed, thus referring to the single noose. In the ectype, however, the dual is needed, as the two nooses have to be loosened *simultaneously*. This cannot be referred to by the basic form contained in the plural form.

[148] The plural ending does not have any meaning in regard to a single item as well as to two items. In consequence the plural form should also not be applicable in the archetype.

[149] The *pūrvapakṣin* insists on the *mantra* containing the plural ending being applicable also in the ectype. He concedes that there is no direct Vedic instruction, but the *kārya* for the *mantra* is generally the same as in the archetype: While there the plural form was applicable to the single noose, there is no reason why it should not be applicable to two nooses. This complete argument is made further down by the *pūrvapakṣin*.

(...)[150]. **Since the usage of the *mantra*, even if it contains the plural ending,
[applies in the archetype].**

[P] Yet again he raises a doubt. If it were said [that it is as claimed by the *siddhāntin*],
since in worldly matters the usage [of a statement containing the plural] is not seen [in
regard to two objects], then he shows the mistake. **Since [the plural] is also not seen
in the case of a single [object], indeed, there is a contradiction.**

[S] Here it is stated: **It cannot be said that the plural ending is not seen in
the archetype, where there is a single noose. Since the *mantra* [containing
the plural form] is directly instructed by the Veda, indeed, the seeing of the
usage [involving that *mantra*] is also based on the Veda.** Therefore just as [the
usage involving that *mantra*] is seen [in the archetype], since it is understood to be
correct on account of [the plural] being seen in wordly usages, in the same way again
also on account of seeing the Vedic usage [in the archetype], neither worldly nor Vedic
usage is seen in case of duality. Hence, since [the plural ending] would not be correct
there [in the ectype], the modification of the plural, indeed, is correct. 329

[P] If the plural were correct in case of a single [object] based on it being seen in Vedic
usages, how then could there be a contradiction [in case of two objects]? It [would be]
obtained, indeed, as in agreement.

[S] The answer [is]: This is stated in agreement to the usage. And since in worldly
matters the plural [is used] in case of a single noose, it is stated that this [use of the
plural for two objects], indeed, would be a contradiction.

**But the highest object is [to have] this agreement [of the form in the *mantra*
and the object denoted], indeed.** And this idea of the commentator [Prabhākara][151]
expressing it as such is understood – also in case of the ectype. **The usage [takes place]
in case of a single noose without alteration of the plural ending, indeed.** But
here in case of two nooses neither a worldly, nor a Vedic usage, nor one derived from

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[150] *vārasaṃve.* I am unable to think of a suitable continuation of this sentence according to the given
phrase.

[151] While Śālikanātha refers to Śabara as the *bhāṣyakāra* (for example p. 135 of the manuscript), he
seems to address Prabhākara in this instance by *vivaraṇakāra.* This assumption is corroborated by the
fact that the *Laghvī* was also called *vivaraṇa* (VERPOORTEN 1987: 32).

indication (*lakṣaṇa*), is obtained. Just like in case of *uru* and the others.[152]

[P] Objection: **This usage is based on the Veda, indeed, as the *mantra* has been obtained from the *kārya* – thus it can take place [in the ectype] as in the archetype.** ☐330

[S] He resolves: **The usage involving the direct denotation [of the plural] cannot be said [to apply] on account of the *kārya*.** Here [the usage] cannot be based on the direct Vedic instruction of the *kārya*, since the direct Vedic instruction would be such that "the plural should be used for the *kārya* involving the dual". Through [this] difference [between the direct Vedic instruction in the archetype and that in the ectype] the usage involving the direct denotation [of the plural], which would be based on the *kārya*, cannot be understood as a usage involving a word which is directly denotative [of the ectypal ritual setting], since the *mantra* is possible to be effective for the *kārya* (*kāryakara*) also by it having [a word] inserted which has a different direct denotation. Since in the archetype, again, the usage of an element which corresponds [to the ritual setting takes place] in case of a single object on account of the direct Vedic instruction of the *mantra* [containing the plural form]. Since the application of the plural is a certainty, there is no contradiction to the direct denotation. **And the fact that [the *mantra* containing the plural] is correct [in the archetype] does not provide the understanding that it is seen as such anywhere else.** Because the direct Vedic instructions [each] have their [own], specified sphere (*viṣaya*), this direct Vedic instruction [here of the *mantra* containing the plural], which [is given] in the archetype, is thus far not possible [to be applied] also in the ectype. Since the direct Vedic instruction is different according to the respective context. Also, it is not the case that what is seen in the archetype [to apply] to the singularity [of the noose] is also seen in the ectype [to apply] to the duality [of the nooses], since there is a split [in the respective instructions].

☐331 Therefore, it has been properly stated that this usage [involving the *mantra* with

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[152] I am uncertain about this reference by Śālikanātha. It could, however, refer to 9.4.3, where the meaning of the term *urūka* in the *adhrigupraiṣamantra* is discussed. The *pūrvapakṣin* takes it to denote an owl, thus rendering the passage as a comparison based on indication. According to the *siddhāntin*, on the other hand, the direct denotation of the term is formed from its constituents, namely *uru* ("large") and *ka(śa)* ("marrow").

the plural form] is understood from indication (*lakṣaṇa*), indeed. Since, indeed, *ūha* has to be made as a result of [that] indication, *ūha* [applies to both], indeed.[153] **The need (*prayojana*) [of modification] has been explained to be "for grammar". Since by force of this – i.e. by force of grammar – the usage has been determined to involve the modified [*mantra*].**

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[153] xx nāta. I am unable to suggest an emendation here. However, the sense has to be that modification has to be made to both, the singular and the plural forms in the respective *mantra*s, as this is the final view of the *siddhānta* in the present *adhikaraṇa*.

[5.] *vipratipattau.*

[P] **Here the *pūrvapakṣa* belongs to one thinking that there is taking out (*utkarṣa*)[154] on account of the indicative mark (*liṅga*).** As – on account of the indicative mark in the form of the plural – the act involving several nooses belongs to the *mantra* dealing with the untying of the noose, which contains the plural ending, [that *mantra*] is taken out [in the archetype where there is one noose], [this is] the *pūrvapakṣa*. [S] But the *siddhānta* [is represented as follows]: **As there is a specification by means of the specific context, [in which the *mantra* containing the plural form appears], the *mantra*, directly instructed by the Veda (*upadiṣṭa*), cannot be taken out, since its object in form of the basic noun[155] is possible [to be denoted].** The *mantra*, even though containing the plural ending, is specified for the *apūrva* of the *agnīṣomīyā* by means of the context, which indicates (*lakṣaṇā*) [the *mantra*] as in proximity by grasping [the object from the sacrificial context]. Since [the *mantra*] is directly instructed by the Veda, 332 and since the object in form of the basic noun is possible [to be denoted], [the *mantra* containing the plural] cannot be taken out. **By means of the basic noun being the object [of the term in the plural], indeed.** Since the *mantra*, containing the plural ending, is understood to be directly instructed by the Veda by the fact that it reveals, indeed, the basic noun as its object. But neither is it understood that the object of a *mantra* is [to denote] the grammatical number (*vacana*), nor to emphasise (*pratipādana*) plurality, since plurality is not seen in the sacrificial act. And therefore the *mantra* is not taken out, since it is possible here that it is meant for something else, namely for indicating (*prakāśana*) the basic noun (*prātipadika*) as the only object, [and] since it is not the object of the *mantra* [to indicate] plurality. And

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[154] The discussion revolving around the usage of the two *mantra*s already discussed in the previous *adhikaraṇa* is continued here – this time in regard to the archetypal *agnīṣomīyā*. The "taking out" can be interpreted in two ways here: The *mantra* is taken out of the context, in which it appears in the Veda, namely together with the *mantra* with the singular form in the context of the *agnīṣomīyā*. It is also taken out of the procedure of the archetypal sacrifice. This double interpretation, again, shows the intricate parallelity of Vedic text and Vedic sacrifice in the view of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā.

[155] The basic noun (*prātipadika*) is the primary aspect of a word, as it carries the primary denotation. In the present case it would be "noose" (*pāśa*). The secondary aspect is expressed by the specific ending, here the plural. The *siddhāntin* argues that only the primary aspect is relevant for the applicability of the *mantra* containing the plural form for the single noose.

that is not the object of the *mantra*, since the object of the *mantra* is understood by force of it being subordinated [to the injunction], and since by means of the context the *apūrva* is obtained as related to the single noose. There the object of the *mantra* cannot be plurality, since it is understood that [the *mantra*] is subordinated [to the injunction]. [P] As such thus far it has been stated that only the basic noun is the inherent object [of the plural form in the *mantra*], [while] plurality is not the inherent object. But (*ca*) it cannot be said that the usage of the [specific] number has an object which is not inherent. Since an object is present for the [specific] case notion.

[S] By admitting (*pratipatti*) that [the *mantra* containing the plural form] is part of the sacrificial act [with the single noose], the plural has an inherent object. ⟨333⟩ If it is said that there is no inherence, since plurality [is not there in that sacrificial act], then he resolves: **In regard to lack of inherence it cannot be explained that [the mantra] is not used. Since [the plural form] can provide a means (*dvāra*) also by it having the case-notion as its object.**

[P] Let it be used! Nevertheless, what then?

[S] To this he states: **And when it is used, it is understood to have its object inherent. Again no, based on this inherence its use [applies] elsewhere, since the usage is based on the *kārya*.** It is understood that what has been employed in such natural usages – even though they are in contradiction to that use, which is worldly in regard to the *kārya* – has an inherent object. Again no, having considered this inherence it should be used. Therefore, as the plural even has an object in this *mantra* when it is used, the plural has its object inherent by the opinion that [the *mantra*] is part of the sacrificial act. Since, indeed, the *mantra* dealing with the noose, even though containing the plural ending, is used in case of the single noose. Hence, indeed, the precept of lord Pāṇini regarding the inversion of the case endings has been obtained.[156] Therefore, it has been correctly stated ⟨334⟩ that **there is no taking out.** There is a

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[156] As Śālikanātha does not quote a *sūtra* from the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini directly, I can only assume that he refers to *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 3.1.85: "In the Veda often the case endings are exchanged." (*vyatyayo bahulam*. BÖHTLINGK 2001: 85, my translation.) This reference justifies the *siddhānta* taking the plural form to denote the single noose.

difference to such [statements in *mantra*s] as: **You two are the lords of heaven.**[157] Since [there] the usage [of this verse] cannot be understood by means of it having the single sacrificer as its object. But since here the usage [of the *mantra* containing the plural form] is ascertained by the fact that it has one noose as its object.

[6.] **_apū._**

[P] **Here the single [word] cannot directly denote its inherent and its non-inherent [object].**[158] Thus, the propounder of the *pūrvapakṣa* thinks that there is modification in case of two and more [wives]. **Dress up the wife.**[159] Thus, the singular appears in case of a man with one wife. And if it were employed without change in case of a man with two wives and of a man with many wives, then it would have an object inherent and not inherent. And this is not correct for a single [word]. Therefore, as [the term in the *mantra* applies] to a man with one wife, [the *mantra*] is used by means of [the term *patnīm*] being changed, indeed, when there are two wives and when there are many [wives]. **Modification into the dual and into the plural has to be made,** this is the *pūrvapakṣa*.

[S] But the *siddhānta* [is represented as follows]: **Determining the object of *mantra*s is based on the force of them being subordinated, not by means of [taking them as] independent.** 335

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[157] This refers to the *ŚBh* at *JS* 3.3.17, where the use of this first of three "openings" (*pratipad*) is discussed. Śabara also mentions this example in the present *adhikaraṇa*, at *JS* 9.3.15. The *mantra* is enjoined to be used when there are two sacrificers, while a separate one is enjoined for several sacrificers. According to the *siddhāntin* these two *pratipad*s are not to be recited at the archetypal *jyotiṣṭoma*, in the context of which they appear, but should be employed at those ectypes involving the mentioned number of sacrificers. Contrary to the example discussed in the present *adhikaraṇa* the grammatical number is the primary aspect there in connection with the specific injunction.

[158] The context of the present discussion is the *darśa*- and *pūrnamāsa*, for which the following *mantra* (*TB* 3.2.9.14) is enjoined: "Fetch the water for besprinkling, pile up the burning fuel, bring together the small and large ladle, dress up the wife, come forth with clarified butter." (*prokṣaṇīrāsādaya idhmābarhir upasādaya sruvaṃ ca srucaśca samṛddhi patnīṃ saṃnahyājyenodehi.*) The *pūrvapakṣin* thinks that the term *patnīm* denotes a single wife, the inherent object, so that the *mantra* would have to be changed in case of a sacrificer with two or more wives. If the *mantra* were to be used by a sacrificer with two or more wives, the singular form would also denote an object which is not inherent. In the preceding *adhikaraṇa*, however, it was arrived at that only the inherent object can be denoted by terms appearing in *mantra*s.

[159] See preceding footnote.

[P] And this [present] subordination [is derived] from the single [term]. When [the term] would be used also for [men] with three [wives], how could then there be a single subordination?

[S] To this here he states: **The object, i.e. the wife, is unspecified also when there are three [wives]. By force of this [unspecified object], indeed, the subordination is there also in case of three [wives].** The *mantra* cannot be separated from that [subordination] **on account of the grammatical number**, i.e. the singular.

[P] Objection: **As in case of a man with one wife there would be inherence and non-inherence, [the subordination] to the grammatical number cannot be denied.**[160]

[S] He resolves: **It may be that it cannot [be denied]. Again, in case of two and in case of many [wives] it cannot be assumed that one should desist from using [the *mantra*].** Since subordination is possible [only] through the direct expression of the basic noun and the gender, [and] since no limitation (*saṃkoca*) for the subordination through the compliance with the singular is obtained[161], the *mantra* has to be used for all [sacrificers, independent of the number of their wives].

[P] Nevertheless, what?

[S] To this he states: **It has been stated that [the *mantra*] used would be determined as inherent and not inherent.** It is determined whether the *mantra*, which is used, 336 has an inherent object or whether it has no inherent object. And this *mantra* is used everywhere. There, [in the preceding *adhikaraṇa*], the singular applies to two, [but] the plural is impossible to have the singular as its object. Hence, even in regard to one [wife] that [object] is not different to providing singularity. It is assumed, because it is widely spread (*vyāpakatva*), that an element which has the purpose of providing

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[160] The singular form in the *mantra* would in case of a sacrificer with one wife denote its inherent meaning of "the one wife". However, in the argument of the *siddhāntin* this would not be the inherent object, the term simply referring to "the wife" without necessarily including the specific number. The *pūrvapakṣin* does not accept this double denotation, thus claiming that the grammatical number is decisive in determining the meaning and use of the *mantra*. See the beginning of this *adhikaraṇa*.

[161] In the form *patnīm* in the *mantra* only the basic noun "wife" and the feminine gender are denoted, but not the singular number.

(*pratipatti*) [the *mantra*] as part of the sacrificial act is suitable for the procedure. This he states: **The direct denotation of singularity is not possible in regard to two or many.** Thus, in regard to [a case with] one [wife] it has, indeed, not been prompted by something else (*a-tat*).[162] Therefore, also there the procedure is subordinary, indeed. Thus, the direct denotation of "one" [wife] is not in contradiction in regard to two or many.

[7.] *vikṛtau.*

[P] There the propounder of the *pūrvapakṣa* [states]: **Since the subject-matter, [to which the use of the *mantra* belongs,] is specified by (gen.) direct Vedic instruction (*upadeśa*) in regard to the archetype, indeed, this [*mantra*] is not suitable also in the ectype in case of two or more [wives], since its use [depends on] the *kārya*.**[163] The meaning of this is: **Dress up the wife.**[164] Thus, the singular is the suitable element to be used in the archetype, indeed, since there, indeed, the *mantra* 337 is directly instructed by the Veda (*upadeśa*). [But the singular] is not [the suitable element] in the ectype, since there it is not directly instructed by the Veda. **Just as [the number] is indicated (*lakṣaṇā*), indeed, in the *mantra* dealing with the noose**[165]**, since the use [of that *mantra*] depends on the *kārya*. The use [of the *mantra*] is the *kārya*,** thus he puts forth the *pūrvapakṣa*.

[S] But the *siddhānta* [is represented as follows]: **It may be that the direct Vedic instruction has its subject-matter specified, and that this [instruction applies]**

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[162] As the singular form is also applicable to sacrificers with more than one wife, it must have the same cause in all instances independent of the number of wives.

[163] We remain with the same *mantra* (*TB* 3.2.9.14) as in the preceding *adhikaraṇa*. While it was there discussed how one should deal with the singular form *patnīm* in an archetypal sacrifice where a sacrificer has more than one wife, the same question is now discussed in an ectypal setting. According to the *pūrvapakṣa* the *mantra* should not be used as such, since only for the archetype it was directly laid down, even if the singular form does not correspond to the dual or plural of the sacrificial setting. In the ectype, however, this direct Vedic instruction is not there.

[164] See the preceding *adhikaraṇa* for the full *mantra*.

[165] This refers back to 9.3.4 and 5, where the *siddhāntin* had argued that the *mantra* containing the plural form serves as an alternative to the one containing the singular at the archetypal sacrifice with a single noose. At the ectype with two nooses, however, he argued that both *mantra*s are not applicable without the respective forms changed to the dual. The duality was explicitly needed for the two nooses to be untied *simultaneously* – this was the *kārya*. The *pūrvapakṣin* here uses this argument to make his point, i.e. that the singular form *patnīm* has to be changed in the ectype.

in regard to the archetype, indeed. Nevertheless, it has been understood there [in the archetype] that this singular ending is suitable in case of two and many [wives]. Now, this duality and plurality are also there in the ectype. Hence, since [the singular ending] has been understood to be suitable there [in the archetype], it is not the case that **the use [of the *mantra*] is the *kārya*.**[166] The use [of the *mantra*] is in accordance with its object, indeed. Again, in case of the two nooses it is correct that one has to conform to the indication [that the dual is to be expressed], as the use [of the *mantra*] there has to be assumed on the basis that the plural is not seen [to apply] in case of two [objects]. Here, again, the use does not require the *kārya*, since duality and plurality also are obtained [through the given form in the singular]. **There is no need [to question] what kind of use has to be made.** ⃞338⃞ Thus, no indication (*lakṣaṇā*) is employed. Therefore it has been correctly stated: **Also in case of the ectype [the *mantra* containing the singular form applies], since that [*mantra*] is directly expressed.**[167]

[8.] *adhrigau.*

[S] The reason [given] in form of another argument has the object of explaining the purpose of [taking] the regulations [in the present example] as similar to elements in previous views from the *adhikaraṇa* [dealing with] the animal [at the *agnīṣomīyā*].[168]

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[166] This was the conclusion of the *pūrvapakṣin* at the end of the preceding paragraph.

[167] My translation is not in line with that of Jha (Jha 1933-36: 1571). He takes the pronoun *tad* to refer to the general rule that the ectype is like the archetype. This translation is corroborated by the respective explanation in the *ŚBh*, referring to the general rule: *yat prakṛtau tad vikṛtau kartavyam.* Even though this general rule is the basis for the *siddhāntin*'s argument here, I interpret – especially Śālikanātha's gloss – to specifically refer to the *mantra* as laid down without restriction, and hence as applicable also in the ectype.

[168] This single statement – not even recognized by the scribe as a distinct *adhikaraṇa* – serves to support the argument in the preceding *adhikaraṇa*, but using the example of the *adhrigupraiṣamantra* (*TB* 3.6.6.1). The *mantra* is transferred from the archetypal *agnīṣomīyā* to the *savanīya*-sacrifices in some instances, even though they are not ectypes of the same. This, therefore, is a hypothetical discussion. The argument is developed parallel to the preceding *adhikaraṇa*: The number is not specifically intended in the pronoun *asmai* appearing in the final part of the *mantra*. Therefore, it can also apply without modification at the *savanīya*-sacrifices, which involve more than one animal.

[9.] *prati.*

[P] Here he puts forth the *pūrvapakṣa* as thinking that in regard to wild rice (*nīvāra*) the word "rice" (*vrīhi*) is not directly expressive, similar in regard to barley (*yava*).[169]

[S] But the *siddhānta* [is represented as follows]: **It may be that it would not be directly expressive, if this use [of the unchanged *mantra*] would involve un-husked rice (*nīvāra*) as the substance. But it has been shown in the sixth [*adhyāya*][170] that the incorporation (*upādāna*) of unhusked rice (*nīvāra*) as the substance has the object of accomplishing similarity, in the form that the parts [of the unhusked rice] are characterised by their quality of containing husked rice (*vrīhi*).[171] Since that [substance], which is characterised by its quality of containing husked rice, is similar [to husked rice] in its parts.**

[P] How, indeed, should [the unhusked rice] be incorporated?

[S] For such a purpose it has been shown in the sixth [*adhyāya*] that the unhusked rice is incorporated into the proceedings for the husked rice, not through something that has the character of a different substance. 239

[P] Objection: As such so far the unhusked rice is employed [in place of the husked rice]. But (*ca*) the word *vrīhi* cannot directly express that [unhusked rice], thus modification is correct.

[S] There he states: **It has been established that the class-word (*jātiśabda*) is referred to by the particular [term] in the case of embellishments.**[172] Where

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[169] During the preparation of the rice-oblation (*caru*) at the *darśa-* and *pūrṇamāsa*, the *mantra* beginning with *syonaṃ te* (*MŚS* 1.2.6.19-22) is recited. The latter part of it includes the term *vrīhi*, "husked rice". In the sixth *adhyāya*, at *JS* 6.3.15, it was decided that in case that the husked rice should be spoiled unhusked rice (*nīvāra*) serves as a substitution. The substituted substance has to be similar to the original one, and thus shares its main qualities as well as the ritual details laid down for it (see *ŚBh* at *JS* 6.3.27). Referring to this case it is discussed in the present *adhikaraṇa* whether or not also the term *vrīhi* in the *mantra* has to be modified. Śālikanātha further gives barley (*yava*) as a possible substitute.

[170] *JS* 6.3.15 and 6.3.27. See preceding footnote.

[171] This argument is made in line with the *ŚBh* at *JS* 6.3.27, where similarity was discussed as the major criterium for a substance to be substituted by another. As unhusked rice by nature includes the husked rice – the latter being gained from the former –, similarity is given.

[172] The *mantra* is an embellishment of the act of preparing the rice-oblation. In the *mantra* we find the term *vrīhi*, denoting a particular state of rice, namely the husked, clean rice. But according to the *siddhāntin* the term in the *mantra* does not denote this specific rice, but the category "rice". In this category also the unhusked rice is included, hence the *mantra* is not modified.

embellishments are enjoined, there the class-word is referred to by the particular [term], this has been established. **And [the class "rice"], which is directly denoted also by the *mantra*, is also there in the embellishment, indeed.** There also the class-word is referred to by the particular [term]. Therefore, since the class-word is used by means of the specific [term], it has been correctly stated that [the *mantra*] is used without being changed.

[P] Objection: **The specific appearance of unhusked rice is not [comparable to] the specific appearance of rice, thus how can [the unhusked rice] be expressed by the word *vrīhi*?**

[S] The following is the [proper] opinion: **The word *vrīhi* [is upheld] for the sake of expounding what has been understood – through incorporating [the unhusked rice] – as the means [to do the sacrifice] (*sādhana*[173]) based on the category "rice" (*vrīhi*).** Here also [the substance] is not specified, ⟦**340**⟧ thus the word *vrīhi* has to be used.

[10.] _**saṃsargiṣu.**_

[P] **The distinction involved in tying the animal [between the singular form *cakṣus* in the *mantra* and the actual two eyes of the animal] in the archetype is intended**, considering this he puts forth the *pūrvapakṣa*.[174] Although like in the archetype the distinction involved in tying the animals [could be] intended [in the ectype],

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[173] See footnote at 9.1.14 for more on the relation between *sādhana*, *sādhya*, and *itikartavyatā*. The term *vrīhi* is justified to be used according to the *siddhāntin*, as it refers to the general *sādhana*, the offering of a rice-oblation. As such it incorporates also the unhusked rice, which has come in as a substitute for the same *sādhana*.

[174] We are – once again – dealing with a passage of the *adhrigupraiṣamantra* (*MS* 4.13.4; *TB* 3.6.6.2), recited during the *agnīṣomīyā* when the animal is tied to the sacrificial post. The passage under discussion mentions the (single) eye of the animal going to the sun. The question is whether this singular form has to be modified into the dual or plural at an ectype, where two or more animals are sacrificed. The introductory statement here refers to a preliminary question by the *pūrvapakṣin* why the singular form should even be applicable at the archetype with one animal, as also there we find two eyes. The solution is that the light (*tejas*) of the two eyes of a single animal is one. The term *cakṣus* in the *mantra* refers to this light, its singular form is thus justified at the archetype. See *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.3.27.

since the physical eye (*adhiṣṭhāna*[175]) is not incorporated.[176] Still, as such the [eye-]lights of those [animals in the ectype] are distinct in case that there are distinct animals, since the [individual] animal is referred to back by the word *asya* here [in the *mantra* reading] **the eye of it (*asya*) [may go] to the sun** – thus in accordance with the object modification is correct.

[S] But the *siddhānta* [is represented as follows]: **There is no proof based on a proper means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) that the difference is intended (loc.). Since it is understood that the light [of the eyes of several animals] is a single one.** Even in case that the animals are different the light of [each of] those [eyes] combining together cannot be differentiated at all. Therefore, even [though] in the ectype the physical eyes are arrived at to be many, their light cannot be differentiated, thus there is no modification.

[11.] *ekadhā.*

[P] **The object as such [as expressed by *ekadhā* in the *mantra*] is obtained, indeed, 341 also in case [the skins of the animals at the ectype are cut] in combination – thus [the *pūrvapakṣin*] thinks that there is no modification [of the *mantra*].**[177] **Cut out its skin at one time (*ekadhā*).** This object, which belongs to the word *ekadhā* [in this part of the *mantra*], is obtained also in case that [the skins of two or more animals in the ectype are cut] in combination, indeed. Since

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[175] I follow the translation of Jha (Jha 1933-36: 1575f). In the *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.3.27 the term is used in the dual. The term stands in opposition to *cakṣus*, "eye" in general, which is argued to denote the light (*tejas*), the power of eyes.

[176] One could, according to the *pūrvapakṣin*, argue that the light of the eyes even of several animals in the ectype represent a single force. The physical eyes are not incorporated into the meaning of the *mantra*, which was said to refer to the light. However, the animals being distinct also their individual eye-light must be distinct. The reference to the term *asya* is not made in the *ŚBh* – nor elsewhere, as far as I am aware. In the given sources for the *adhrigupraiṣamantra*, *MS* 4.13.4 or *TB* 3.6.6.2 it is not found within the present statement, but several times in the immediate context.

[177] A further part, quoted in the following statement, of the *adhrigupraiṣamantra* (*MS* 4.13.4; *TB* 3.6.6.2) is discussed in the present *adhikaraṇa*. The term *ekadhā*, according to the *pūrvapakṣin*, refers to the cutting out of the skin of all animals at one and the same time in the ectype. In this way the term keeps its archetypal meaning, and no modification is necessary. The *siddhāntin*, however, will argue that the term means that the skin should be cut in one piece for each animal. As such it should be repeated according to the number of animals at the ectype. As there is only one animal at the archetype, *ekadhā* could not mean the cutting at one and the same time – there only being one cutting.

also in case that [the skins of two or more animals in the ectype are cut] in combination, [this aspect] is directly denoted through this [word] *ekadhā*. Therefore he thinks that in case of two or more (*-ādi*) animals the word *ekadhā* should not be repeated.[178] But in regard to the word *asya* a modification of the expression has to be made, indeed.[179]

[S] But the *siddhānta* [is represented as follows]: **And since the singularity [of the animal] is contained in the direct Vedic instruction (*upadeśa*) of the *mantra*, the object of the *mantra* would be in contradiction to those [animals in the ectype]. Thus, since there is [only] a single animal, a combined object [as expressed by *ekadhā*] is not obtained in the archetype.[180] Therefore also in the ectype a different object [of the word *ekadhā*] is assumed – thus there has to be modification, indeed.** The meaning of this is: Since thus far there is [only] a single animal in the archetype, a combined object is not obtained "at one and the same time" (*ekadhā*). Therefore [the term] has to be taken to have the manner [of cutting the skin] as its object, indeed. Only that kind of object, which this *mantra* has in the archetype, ⏍342⏍ can it have, indeed, also in the ectype. Since there is no separate direct Vedic instruction (*upadeśa*) of a *mantra* in the ectype, [and hence] since [the *mantra*] is obtained only on the basis of the *kārya*.[181] Only if there were a separate direct Vedic instruction (*upadeśa*), a different object [of a *mantra*] could sometimes be explained. But because the application [of the *mantra*] is based on the *kārya*, there is no room for assuming a different object [in the ectype than in the archetype], since the object fixed [in the archetype], indeed, is obtained. Hence, the object of the word *ekadhā*, indeed, has the object of [indicating] the manner [of cutting the skin] also in the ectype – thus

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[178] The *siddhāntin* will argue for the repetition of the term *ekadhā* for each animal sacrificed.

[179] The modification of the term *asya* in the same statement of the *adhrigupraiṣamantra*, which appears to be a logical consequence of the *pūrvapakṣin*'s position, is not discussed in the *ŚBh* nor elsewhere to my knowledge. Either it was assumed to be implicit in the *pūrvapakṣa*, where the term *ekadhā* is taken to refer to all animals, or it was deemed worthless for the present discussion. However, the same term and context is again given in 9.4.1, where *asya* is connected to the ribs of the sacrificial animal which are to be cut out.

[180] In the archetype only one animal is sacrificed, thus only one skin is cut out. Therefore, there cannot be a combination, i.e. simultaneity, of the cutting. As the ectype is derived from the archetype, this meaning of the term can also not be assumed in the ectype where there are several animals.

[181] The *kārya* remains the same in the ectype as in the archetype: The skin of each animal has to be cut in one piece.

modification [of the term in the ectype through its repetition according to the number of animals], indeed, is correct.

[12.] *medhapati.*

[P] **Since the object of the indicating [word in the *mantra*] (*nimitta*), i.e. the object of the word *medhapati*, is not specified in regard to [either] the master [of the sacrifice]**[182] **or (*ca*) the deity, he considers that both are meant [by that term].**[183] He thinks that [the term] directly expresses the master [of the sacrifice], and that it directly expresses the deity. **Since a specification is seen in the relation [of the term *medhapati*] to a different word.**[184] [The term *medhapati*] direcly expresses the master [of the sacrifice] in its relation to the word **sacrifical animal (*medha*)**, and it is meant for the deity in its relation to the word **bring forth (*upanayata*)**.[185] Because of this specification ⃞343⃞ it is not possible that [the term *medhapati*] has both as its objects.

Objection [by the first *pūrvapakṣin* to the second]: Since neither one, [the sacrificer or the deities], is specified, [the word *medhapati*] will have both as its object. Here [the first

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[182] The master of the sacrifice is the sacrificer.

[183] Also in the present *adhikaraṇa* the context is the *adhrigupraiṣamantra* (*MS* 4.13.4; *TB* 3.6.6.1), recited during the archetypal *agnīṣomīyā*. The passage under consideration reads: *daivyāḥ śamitāraḥ uta manuṣyā ārabhadhvam. upanayata medhyā dura āśāsānā medhapatibhyāṃ medham* (*TB* 3.6.6.1), with the reading *medhapataye* appearing in *MS* 4.13.4. The first question to be discussed is what the term refers to – the sacrificer, which is one at the archetype, or the deities, which are two. The answer to this question determines the employement of the two versions of the *mantra* – first at the archetype, and then at the ectype(s). The *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.3.32-34 presents three distinct views of the *pūrvapakṣa*: 1) The term refers to sacrificer and deities together, thus both forms are not directly denotative in the archetype and need not be modified in the ectype(s). 2) Each version refers to either the sacrificer (the singular) or the deities (the dual) at the archetype, consequently both forms need to be modified according to the number of sacrificers or deities respectively in the ectype(s). 3) Only the sacrificer is referred to by the term, the dual form including the sacrificer's wife, so that both versions are modified according to the number of sacrificers in the ectype(s).

[184] According to the reading in the manuscript the sentence continues. However, the following phrases repeat and gloss this brief statement of reason, and do not syntactically connect to it in a proper way. Therefore I assume the following to be Śālikanātha's gloss, and the present statement to be Prabhākara's quotation. It represents a second *pūrvapakṣa*, arguing that only the master of the sacrifice is the lord over the sacrificial animal.

[185] Both terms, *medha* and *upanayata*, appear in the statement under discussion from the *adhrigupraiṣamantra* (*MS* 4.13.4; *TB* 3.6.6.1). Through this proximity according to the *pūrvapakṣin* the term *medhapati* is syntactically related to them. But depending on which relation one considers essential the meaning is different. Therefore, both meanings are not possible to be assumed at the same time – as was done by the first *pūrvapakṣin*.

pūrvapakṣin] states: **Since an indication (*nimitta*) is obtained through the direct denotation of [the words in their] syntactical connection (*anvītābhidhāna*), the word-meaning (*padārtha*) cannot be directly denoted, when it is independent of being connected to another word-meaning.**[186] Since the word-meanings are indicators for the sentence-meaning through the direct denotation of [the words in their] syntactical connection. And as it has been established that there can only be one object [of the one term in the *mantra*], [the term in the dual] is meant for the master [of the sacrifice] through the opinion that [it refers to] the sacrificer as accompanied by his wife, since both [forms] cannot be taken out [and transferred to an ectype] (*utkarṣa*[187]) – thus another view [belonging to the *pūrvapakṣa*]. Through the opinion that [the term *medhapati*] with the singular ending [refers to] the sacrificer, [the *mantra* containing that term] cannot be taken out [and transferred to an ectype]. [And the *mantra* containing the dual form cannot be taken out] by the opinion that [the term] with the dual ending [refers to] the sacrificer and his wife. But in case that [the term] were meant for the [two] deities, the dual ending, indeed, would be inherent. [The term with] the singular ending would be taken out [and transferred to an ectype]. Therefore, [the term] is meant for the lord [of the sacrifice], since [in that case] both [forms] would not be taken out [and transferred to an ectype] – thus another view.

[S] **Since in case the lord (*svāmin*) [of the sacrifice] were meant [by the term *medhapati* that meaning] would be in contradiction to the syntactical connection with the intention [to give the sacrificial animal to the *medhapati* mentioned in the *mantra*].**[188] 344 **Since the sacrificial animal has [already]**

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[186] The *pūrvapakṣin* utilises the major premise of the Prābhākaras in regard to the theory of understanding language, called the *anvītābhidhānavāda*. This premise, claiming that despite the natural (*autpattika*) and eternal (*nitya*) relation between a word and its object the meaning can only be properly understood in the context of a sentence, where the word is connected with other words to form the meaning of the sentence, stands in opposition to the premise of the Bhāṭṭas that the meaning of a sentence is nothing more than the sum total of the individual word-meanings (see Jha 1942: 128-153). The *pūrvapakṣin* here relies on *anvītābhidhāna* to show that the term *medhapati* can only be understood in its connection within the sentence in which it appears. This connection can only be one, i.e. either to the animal (*medha*) or the verb (*upanayata*), and consequently also the reference can only be one, either to the sacrificer or to the deities.

[187] See footnote at 9.3.5 for more on this term.

[188] The 'intention", termed *āśaṃsana* by Śālikanātha, is given in the latter part of the statement

been obtained by the lord [of the sacrifice].[189] And since in case the lord [of the sacrifice] were meant [by the term *medhapati*, that meaning] would be in contradiction to the object of the intention [to give the animal], due to the intention [to give the animal] not being the object of obtaining [the animal the term] is meant for the deity, indeed – thus the *rāddhānta*. **And [the *mantra*] would not be taken out [and transferred to an ectype] as [assumed for the term referring to] the lord [of the sacrifice], indeed, through the difference [in form of one] opinion that [the term] with the dual ending would have the basic noun as its object, and [in form of another] opinion that [the term] with the singular ending would have the case-notion [as its object]**, thus it has been stated.[190]

[13.] *niyamaḥ.*

[P] He considers this use of what is not according to the rule (...).[191] **When [the term *medhapati*] is meant for the [two] deities [in the archetype], how can the *mantra* be used in [a sacrifice] directed to many deities?** And with this [introductory statement], the propounder of the *pūrvapakṣa* states another associated topic (*saṃgati*), an associated topic based on indication (*lakṣaṇa*): **Through the fact that [the version of the *mantra*] with the dual ending has an inherent object in the archetype the use [of that *mantra*] is applicable in the ectype by means of it being modified. Since the *kārya* is achieved by that [version of the *mantra*], indeed,** 345 **the use of the singular ending, which does not have a seen [object], is not correct in case of many [deities] as well as in case of**

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from the *adhrigupraiṣamantra* presently under discussion. It reads: ... *āśāsānā medhapatibhyām / medhapataye medhaḥ* (*MS* 4.13.4; *TB* 3.6.6.1). According to the *siddhāntin* the intention is to be construed with the term *medhapati* in both forms, which then has to refer to the two deities, Agni and Soma, either through the basic noun in the singular form or the dual form.

[189] Therefore it cannot be intended for him, as it already belongs to him.

[190] The *pūrvapakṣin* had argued that in regard to the term denoting the sacrificer the version of the *mantra* containing the dual form would have to be used at an ectype with the corresponding number of sacrificers, and not at the archetype. This position is objected to here.

[191] The present *adhikaraṇa* continues the discussion from the preceding one, i.e. the applicability of the two versions of the *adhrigupraiṣamantra* (*MS* 4.13.4; *TB* 3.6.6.1). While before the matter was considered in regard to the archetypal *agnīṣomīyā* with the two deities Agni and Soma, we are now turning to an ectypal sacrifice in which the animal is sacrificed to more than two deities. The *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.3.41 mentions two such optional rites, one directed to the Ādityas, the other to the Viśvedevas.

one [deity].[192] Thus he considers it to be left out [in the ectype with many deities]. This singular ending is only correct to be used in case of two [deities]. Thus, it is not to be used in case of many [deities] and in case of one [deity].

[S] Here a counter-statement (*paricodanā*) has been made by the commentator [Śabara]: **Objection: Since duality would not be intended in the archetype [by the dual form], the use [of that form in the ectype] would apply without modification.**[193] He explains the purpose of that [counter-statement]: **The counter-statement again, which has been made here by the commentator, that has been made in the form that <u>the duality [of the deities] was not intended</u> [by the dual form in the archetype]. The syntactical connection through the own, [inherent] object [of a word] being directly denoted does not apply, when [that own, inherent object] is not intended [in the sentence].**[194] **Thus, my doubt is not to be left aside!**

Here, he further urges: **The objection [is that] this doubt, indeed, cannot be left aside. When [the duality of the deities] were not intended [of the dual form], a syntactical connection through the own, [inherent] object [of that form] being directly denoted would not, indeed, be obtained.** Hence this doubt

346 cannot be left aside.

[P] How?

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[192] This does not, however, mean that the *mantra* with the singular ending does not figure in a sacrifice to just one deity. The *pūrvapakṣin* only wants to emphasise that it can either be used in that case or in a sacrifice with many deities, but not in both.

[193] Jha translates: "Under this principle the Dual form would come to be used in its unmodified form, at the Primary Sacrifice; because the *duality* is not meant to be signified there." (JHA 1933-36: 1584) According to my understanding of the sentence, the translation is incorrect in its syntactical connection of the phrase "at the primary sacrifice" (*prakṛtau*). The modification of the dual form would not follow in the archetype, where the duality of deities is given (Agni and Soma). But because the duality was not the primary significance of the dual form at the archetype, it could remain as such also in the ectype. This whole argument regarding the use of the *mantra* with the dual form is formulated in the *ŚBh* as an objection to the *pūrvapakṣa*. However, it is not the proper *siddhāntin*'s view, as he will consent with his opponent that the dual form comes to be used at the ectype in its modified form. It serves as a challenge to the *pūrvapakṣin* to justify his position.

[194] The dual form expresses the two deities at the archetype. But if it were argued that this form also applies in an ectype with more than two deities, one would have to assume that the duality was not intended of the form also in the archetype. And this is not possible, as the dual form can only be applicable in the archetype if that duality is also intended.

[S] To this he states: **Intention (*vivakṣā*) is the desire to express something, indeed.**

[P] [And] then what?

[S] To this he states: **And expressing something (*vacana*) is direct denotation (*abhidhāna*). Therefore, what has been intended is desired to be directly denoted.** Again, what is not intended is not desired to be directly denoted through a *mantra*.

[P] Yet then, again, what?

[S] To this he states: **And [the duality of the deities], when it is not desired through it being required to be directly denoted, can hardly be said to be directly denoted.** And he states another argument: **And it is correct that in the opinion [taking into consideration] the directive there is a desired object in regard to original [uses of a word].** Therefore, what is required [in a sentence] (*ākāṅkṣita*) by means of the directive, that is intended. And also, what is not intended, that is not required [in a sentence] by means of the directive. And what is not required [in a sentence], that is not syntactically connected (*anvayin*) to that [sentence]. And what is not syntactically connected to that [sentence], that is not directly denoted (*abhihita*) – [all] this can be said. Since [otherwise] there would be want of etymological understanding (*vyutpatti*[195]). Here it is stated: **The opinion, regarding a word as not intended, has to be seen as not being beyond blame. The following has been stated: Also the duality [of the deities] is intended.** ⟨347⟩ **This *mantra* is not [meant for] something other than that duality.** By the opinion that [the dual form in the *mantra*] is meant for something else it would be said that [the dual] would not be intended. Again, [the dual is not there in the *mantra*] in order to be directly denoted by

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[195] Wicher notes: "Śālikanātha definiert den Terminus *vyutpatti* als "Erfassen der Verbindung von dem, was auszusagen ist, und dem, was das Aussagende ist"." And further: "Das Erkennen eben dieser Verbindung kann man Sprachverständnis nennen, wobei dieses Sprachverständnis eine für jedes Wort nur einmalige Erfahrung des Lernenden ist." (WICHER 1986: 17) The understanding of the inherent relation between word and denoted object can only be gathered through hearing the specific word used in sentences, as this is the essential premise of the *anvitābhidhānavāda*. If a specific form of a word would not be required in a sentence, its inherent meaning could not be understood. This would make any understanding of language, being based on listening to others, impossible.

not being desired. Otherwise it would be arrived at that understanding the duality [of the deities] would be a mistake. Since duality would not be something directly denoted. Therefore, duality is directly denoted by the dual ending [in the *mantra*], indeed. But [the dual ending] is not meant for something else. Since otherwise the aspect of duality would be gone.

[P] Objection: As such being meant for something else (*tātparya*) and direct denotation (*abhidhāna*) are arrived at to have distinct objects. And then also in other instances, where something is directly denoted, that should not be meant for something else.

[S] Here he states: **And understanding that it is meant for something else is not hindered by understanding the syntactical connection. Since being meant for something else depends on that [syntactical connection], indeed.** Being meant for something else is preceded, indeed, by understanding the syntactical connection. But being meant for something else is there only in regard to some [word], when it is understood on the basis of it being syntactical connected, indeed, $\boxed{348}$ not in regard to [a word] containing other elements. Therefore, even if it were not meant for something else, the dual would have its object syntactically connected, indeed. Thus it is qualified for modification.

[S] But the *siddhānta* [is represented as follows]: **It is correct that the dual should be employed by means of it being modified [to the plural]. Also the singular should be employed, indeed.** The meaning is that also the singular ending should be employed, [but] without being modified.

[P] Objection: At one point it has been stated that the use [of the singular form] in case of many [deities] would not be correct, since it is not seen [in such a case]. But the use [of the singular form] would be correct by means of it being modified, indeed, like that [singular form] found in regard to the noose.[196]

[S] The answer that <u>this statement could be followed</u>[197] [has been given] in the

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[196] This refers back to 9.3.4. There the conclusion was that at the ectype both versions of the *mantra* are used, with the singular and the plural respectively modified into the dual. The *pūrvapakṣin* transfers this argument to the present instance.

[197] Jha translates: "This is a bold assertion." (JHA 1933: 1583)

preceding *adhikaraṇa*.[198] Since it has been explained that the object is inherent through the opinion that [the statement] "the singular has its object inherent [in the sacrifice]" is metaphorical. And the opinion of a teacher is referred to, who states it as such: "A group is something other than its members." **Therefore, 349 the singular ending, which has not been modified, should be used. Since the single object in the form of the group [of deities] is given [in the mentioned ectypes], as [it was the case in the *mantra* containing] the word *patnī*.**[199] Thus, the final conclusion [can only be arrived at] by the fact that the unmodified [singular form] should be used. [P] There, indeed, the use of the singular was applicable (*sādhutva*). But here, direct denotation is applicable, indeed. Here it has been stated by the commentator that the singular ending should be left aside.

[S] This he refutes: **Objection. It has been stated that the singular ending, even if it is not seen in case of many [deities] and in case of one [deity at the same time], should be employed.** What has been stated here in this *adhikaraṇa*, namely that the singular ending is not seen in case of one [deity][200], has to be considered "by the opinion that it refers to Vedic use". He settles: **One has to see it as the opinion that it is not modified.** The *siddhāntin*, who desires the employment of [the *mantra* with the singular form], which has not been modified, contains an element from his opponent's view [arguing] that the singular ending, which has not been modified, is left out.

[P] Therefore, here, the *pūrvapakṣa* [argues] that both [versions of the *mantra*] are employed after they have been modified. 350

[S] The *siddhānta* [argues] that the dual ending is modified, indeed. [And he argues] that the singular ending is employed without being modified, indeed.

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[198] See *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.3.40.

[199] This refers back to 9.3.6. There it was arrived at that the singular term in the phrase *patnīṃ saṃnahya* contained in the *mantra* should not be modified in case the sacrificer has more than one wife. Although in that instance the reason was not that the wives form a group, the *siddhāntin* uses this reference to support his view in the present instance.

[200] See beginning of this *adhikaraṇa*, p. 345 of the manuscript.

[14.] *artha.*

[S] **Since here [at the *ekādaśinī*] there is no union [of the deities], the use of the singular ending in accordance with the object [it denotes] does not apply.**[201] When [as at the archetype] the character of being the deity [of the sacrifice] would belong to Agni and Soma in union, then [this] could be [the case] here [at the ectype]. Then the singular would be according to the object [it denotes], [and] its use would be obtained. But (*ca*) here [at the *ekādaśinī*] the character of being the deity [of the sacrifice] does not belong to [those eleven deities] in union. Here in regard to the question **whether the *nigada* containing the singular should be applied without modification, [or] whether it should be left out [at the ectype]**, the commentator [Ś] has stated by means of a distinct statement of the *siddhānta* that [the version containing] the singular should be left out [at the ectype].

[P] One who desires to understand the meaning of that [statement] raises a question: Why (*kim*) should the *mantra* containing the singular ending be left out?

[S] The answer is: **It should be left out. Since it is meant for the [single] deity, and since this [single] deity is absent here [at the ectype].** But [the version containing] the singular ending should not be used. Since plurality is not seen to belong to the singular ending, [that singular ending] should be modified to the plural ending. 351 As before by the opinion that it is not modified, here also it has been stated that [the version with the singular] is left out.[202]

Thus reads the third *pāda* of the ninth *adhyāya* in the *Dīpaśikhā*.

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[201] We are – yet again – discussing another application of the *adhrigupraiṣamantra* in its two versions (*MS* 4.13.4; *TB* 3.6.6.1). The context in the present *adhikaraṇa* is the ectypal *ekādaśinī*, where eleven distinct animals are sacrificed to eleven distinct deities. The distinction of the deities is the point of difference to the archetype emphasised by the *siddhāntin*, where Agni and Soma form a single entity and are offered to with one animal. This union (*saṃsarga*) is not given at the *ekādaśinī*, for which reason the version of the *mantra* with the singular form of *medhapati* should be left out and modified to the plural.

[202] I.e. the singular form is not used, but in the preceding *adhikaraṇa* it was also not modified.

5.3 Ninth adhyāya, fourth pāda

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<div align="center">śrīḥ</div>

[1.] ṣaḍviṃśatiḥ.

[S] This fourfold view [of the *pūrvapakṣa*] has been explained in opposition to the expression combining [the number of ribs], which is an element of the *siddhānta*, not in opposition to each other.[203] There [at the archetypal *agnīṣomīyā*] the primary aspect has to be the ribs [of the animal]. The ribs, indeed, are to be counted.

[P] Nevertheless, some [opponent] thinks that the counting [of the ribs] has to take place by repeating the word *ṣaḍviṃśati*. But some other [opponent thinks that it has to take place] by repeating the word *asya*. [Yet] some other [opponent thinks that it has to take place] by modifying [the term *ṣaḍviṃśati*] to the dual or the plural. [Lastly] some [opponent] thinks that [the term *ṣaḍviṃśati*] is even not meant for the group of ribs, since it is not subordinated by being in the instrumental case.[204] They all, indeed, think that the expression combining [the number of ribs] is not correct. There [in the first two views] the word *ṣaḍviṃśati* has to be repeated, and the word *asya* has to be repeated, as the animal comes in as the primary factor.[205]

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[203] This first *adhikaraṇa* of the fourth *pāda* is rather extensive, incorporating sixteen *sūtras*. We continue dealing with the *adhrigupraiṣamantra* (*MS* 4.13.4; *TB* 3.6.6.3) employed at the archetypal *agnīṣomīyā*. In the course of the *mantra* we find the mentioning of "the twenty-six ribs of the animal" (*ṣaḍviṃśatir asya vaṅkrayaḥ*). The *siddhāntin* argues that the number refers to the specific number of ribs of the animal, especially in connection with the subsequent statement that the priest "should count them and cut them out" (*tā anuṣṭhyo 'ccyāvayatāt*). The purpose served is to have the complete flank with all ribs cut out. Accordingly in ectypes with more than one animal the term has to be modified to the number of ribs of all animals together. In opposition to this we are presented with four distinct views of the *pūrvapakṣa*. These are – as listed in detail in the *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.4.1-16, and only summarised here in the *DŚ*: 1. The term *ṣaḍviṃśati* should be repeated according to the number of animals; 2. The term should remain as such; 3. The term should remain, but its ending should be adapted to the number of animals, i.e. changed into the dual or the plural; 4. The accompanying term *asya* should be repeated according to the number of animals.

[204] The instrumental case would subordinate the number to the cutting out mentioned in the subsequent sentence in the *mantra*. But as the term appears in the nominative, it cannot be connected to this activity according to this *pūrvapakṣa*.

[205] In both views, the animal seems to be the primary concern, as the number of ribs is taken as a whole, referring to the animal. This view has the consequence that the whole term has to be repeated – either the one denoting the number, or the one directly referring to the animal.

[S] [This view] has been rejected: **Even in both these views, 353 the animal comes in as the primary aspect. And this is not correct, since the object [of the mantra] in the archetype, which is measuring out [the part to be cut], has the ribs as its primary aspect.** If in both these views, even, the animal comes in as the primary factor, why then are [the views] presented separately (*bhedena*)?

[P] He thinks that [the separate presentation] comes about because the repetition is specified for the word *asya* [in the second view]. **The ribs, indeed, are specified by the word *asya*, which has the ending of the sixth case**[206] **and refers back to the animal. Therefore, those [ribs] are obtained as the primary aspect, indeed.** Thus the adherent of the repetition of the word *asya* thinks.[207] How then can the view that [the term] *asya* [is repeated] be refuted by [claiming that in that case] the animal would come in as the primary aspect?

[S] There he states: **But it is refuted, since the specification [of the repetition] would be understood, because something other [than the ribs] would be understood as the primary aspect.** Since the primary aspect is understood on account of the term [in the *mantra*], the understanding of a different specification would have to be expressed by means of a separate instrumental [case]. And the understanding of the specification should not be expressed on the basis of an understanding of the primary aspect other than the term [in the *mantra*], thus the meaning. **And there even is no separate instrumental [case].** 354 Thus the repetition of the word *asya* is refuted.

[P] But the view that the object [of the *mantra*] has to be according [to the archetype] by being instrumental [in bringing about the sacrifice] belongs to one who thinks that there is no subordination to the instrumental [case] indicating the object. Due even to an indicative mark (*liṅga*) [the *mantra*] is not subordinated to the instrumental [case].

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[206] I.e. the genitive case.

[207] This *pūrvapakṣin* claims to hold the same view as the *siddhāntin*, namely that the sentence in the *mantra* mainly concerns the ribs of the animal. However, the *siddhāntin* shows that by repeating the term *asya* the animal – not the ribs – would become the centre of attention in the sentence. And this is not correct.

[S] **Nevertheless, even because of the indicative mark [in the *mantra*], [the *mantra*] is also subordinated to the directive, indeed.** But after the view that the object [of the *mantra*] has to be according [to the archetype] has been refuted, the modification of the grammatical number has [also] been rejected, since the [counted] number [of the ribs] comes in as the primary aspect.[208] Therefore it has been established that the combination [of the number of ribs of all animals involved] should be expressed, indeed.

[2.] *aśvasya.*

[S] This *adhikaraṇa* has the object to refute the doubt that [only] the word [*catustriṃśat*] is prohibited.[209]

[P] **One should not say "thirty-four". By what has been thus handed down by *śruti* only the word is prohibited. Again not the verse [is prohibited], since indication (*lakṣaṇā*) would be the inevitable consequence (*prasaṅga*).**[210]

[S] This doubt of the *pūrvapakṣa* is refuted.

[P] In what way?

[S] To this he states: ⟨355⟩ **Since the direct expression of that [*mantra*] would not be obtained – since only the word would not be subordinated [to it],**

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[208] The modification of the grammatical number refers to the fourth view of the *pūrvapakṣa* mentioned above.

[209] The present *adhikaraṇa* discusses the same passage from the *adhrigupraiṣamantra* (*MS* 4.13.4; *TB* 3.6.6.3) as the preceding one. The context here is its application at the ectypal offering of the *savanīya*-animal included in the *jyotiṣṭoma*. Three animals are offered, a horse with 34 ribs, and a goat and an ox-deer (*gomṛga*), each of which has 26 ribs. Adapting the argument from the preceding *adhikaraṇa* it is clear that the term *ṣaḍviṃśati*, "26", has to be modified to *ṣaḍaśīti*, "86", summing up the number of ribs of all animals. But in the context of the *savanīya*-horse we find a *Ṛk*-verse (*RV* 1.162.18: *aśve catustriṃśad vājino devabandhor vaṅkrīr aśvasya svadhitiḥ sameti.*) specifically mentioning the 34 ribs of the horse. Because of this verse specifically mentioning the increased number of ribs of the horse, it can be argued that the number of ribs of the horse should be mentioned separately in the use of the *adhrigupraiṣamantra* – such will be the position of the *siddhāntin*. However, a further statement is found, prohibiting the use of *catustriṃśat*, instead commending the original *ṣaḍviṃśat*. According to the *siddhāntin*, this is a prohibition of the whole *Ṛk*-verse containing the term, but not of the term itself. According to the *pūrvapkṣin* it is a prohibition of the word only.
This discussion only forms part of the *adhikaraṇa* as it is presented in the *ŚBh*. This is due to a difference of opinion whether *JS* 9.4.17-21 form one or several *adhikaraṇa*s. See Jha 1933-36: 1597 and 1600f.

[210] If the whole verse would be prohibited, the statement cited – even though directly denoting only the term *catustriṃśat* – would be taken as indicating the complete verse as prohibited.

and since the prohibition is preceded by [the *mantra*'s] obtainment. Since the *mantra*'s direct expressing would not be obtained, the *mantra*, indeed, is prohibited. Thus, the prohibition of the word has been refuted.

[P] This he objects to in the following: **They think that that [prohibition of the word] is incorrect. [But it is not so,] since it was seen that the word *girā* is left out in place of the word *irā* [as enjoined in the statement]: One should not say *girā girā*.**[211]

[S] He settles [the problem]: **Here they**[212] **explain [that there is] a difference [to the present instance]. There in cases where [only] carrier-words (*hṛtpada*?) are incorporated for the sake of praise (*stotra*) [the prohibition of only the word applies], since the word *irā* is regulated in place of the word *girā*.**[213] **Since that word *irā*, only, is incorporated, as it is restricted. Since only through this [word *irā*], indeed, the *kārya* is accomplished, [therefore] it is correct that [only] the word *girā* is left out.**

[P] It shall be as such. Nevertheless, what [then]?

[S] To this he states: **[One should] not [sing] *girā girā*. It has been shown that this [statement] is a commendation (*anuvāda*) of the prohibition. Since that *dharma*[214] accomplishes its object.** Therefore here the commendation of that [word *irā*] is not incorrect, 356 since – as the commendation requires a separate means of knowledge to be proven – it is obtained that only the word [*girā*] is left out. Here again there is no regulation for another word.[215]

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[211] This refers to 9.1.17 in the *DŚ*, representing the *ŚBh* at *JS* 9.1.45-49. There the word *girā* had been discussed, appearing in the *yajñāyajñīyasāman* which is sung at the *jyotiṣṭoma*. An additional injunction is found (*TāB* 8.6.9-10) prohibiting the use of the word *girā*, instead laying down the use of the word *irā*. This example of one word being prohibited and another being enjoined in its place is applied by the *pūrvapakṣin* to the present instance, thus rejecting the view of the *siddhāntin* that the whole verse is prohibited.

[212] I.e. the commentators?

[213] The words *girā* and *irā* are only filling words (*stobha*) in the *sāman* without adding a specific meaning to the text. I suppose that this is alluded to in the argument, although I am not aware of the term *hṛtpada*.

[214] The *dharma*, a detail of the sacrificial procedure, is the commendation through the proper use of the *sāman*.

[215] The difference here is that in the example adduced by the *purvapakṣin* the word *irā* is enjoined in place of the word *girā*. In the present instance, however, we only find the prohibition of *catustriṃśat*,

[P] How [can it be thus], when there is no regulation?

[S] **It has been shown [that this can be the case], since there is a connection with the word *eva*.** On account of the connection with the word *eva* [the term *ṣaḍviṃśatī*] is understood to have been obtained according [to the archetpye already]. And [as such the term], which has been obtained according [to the archetype already], is regulated.[216]

[P] Hence, is it the case that the usage only of the word [*ṣaḍviṃśati*] is commended to be fixed (*nibandhana*)?

[S] The prohibition that **[one should] not [say] *catustriṃśat***, indeed, is not a commendation.

[P] Hence, what if it is as such?

[S] The answer is: **The following hence happens. There is no [new] subordination. The use of only the word [*catustriṃśat*] is confirmed. Since the incorporation [of the *mantra*] is according [to the archetype].** Since [the *mantra*] is incorporated according [to the archetype], the obtaining of only the word is confirmed. Since the *mantra* is subordinated according [to the archetype], the prohibition points to the obtainment [of the word *catustriṃśat*] based on that subordination.

It has been correctly stated that the *mantra*, indeed, is prohibited – even if another word should be regulated [by the statement]. Although [the leaving out] is enjoined in form of another word, 357 nevertheless the leaving out of the word *catustriṃśat* is not obtained, since the *kārya* of the word *catustriṃśat* cannot be accomplished by means of the word *ṣaḍviṃśati*. **Hence, this is not a commendation.** This prohibition of the *mantra*, indeed, [would apply] also in case that another word were regulated [by the statement in question] – how much more [does it apply] in case that the prohibition [itself] is regulated [by that statement]! Therefore it has been correctly stated that the

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and a commendation of *ṣaḍviṃśat*, which is already given by it being enjoined for the archetype.

[216] The term *eva* appears in the injunction prohibiting the number 34 and commending the use of the number 26. According to the *siddhāntin*, the term *eva* indicates that nothing new is enjoined by stating that the number 26 should be used. It is a mere affirmation of the application of the general rule that the *mantra* used at the archetype is to be transferred to the ectype. Therefore, the sentence does not only lay down the prohibition of the term *catustriṃśat*, which would be superfluous, but the prohibition of the complete verse containing that term.

mantra contains an option [in its usage], since it has been enjoined and prohibited.

[3.] *vaniṣṭu.*

[S] **Here this *adhikaraṇa* is [expounded] to show that the object of the *mantra* is restricted by force of it being an assistance to the *kārya*.**[217] This *adhikaraṇa* is [expounded] to show that the object of the *mantra* assists the *kārya*, which is based on the *apūrva* of the *agīṣomīyā*, when that [assistance] is admitted to be the object of the *mantra*.

[P] There the propounder of the *pūrvapakṣa* thinks that the object, which is understood to be the object by force of the wordmeanings in the *mantra* being syntactically connected (*anvaya*), to be the [proper] object by it leading to the *kārya* – [and as such] he puts forth the *pūrvapakṣa*.

[S] Again, what is this object, which is [understood] by force of the syntactical connection in the *mantra*?

[P] To this he states: 358 **And this term *urūka* is a single word, which has the meaning "owl" (*ulūka*) – this is correct. Since only when the word would be split, assuming a different meaning would be the inevitable consequence (*prasaṅga*).**[218] The meaning, which is widely known in worldly usage, [only] indicates "fat" (*vapālakṣaṇā*), [and as such] would have to be assumed as the meaning of the word *urūka*. And this is not correct. Hence it is correct that *mantra*s have the object of recalling to mind words, indeed. And it is correct to assume that such a kind of element assists the procedure [of the sacrifice].

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[217] Again the *adhrigupraiṣamantra* (*TB* 3.6.6.3-4; *MS* 4.13.4) as recited at the *agnīṣomīyā* forms the subject matter. Specifically the following statement is discussed: "Do not cut the rectum into pieces – thinking it to be *urūka*." (*vaniṣṭhum asya mā rāviṣṭorūkaṃ manyamānāḥ.*) According to the *pūrvapakṣin* the term *urūka* actually denotes an owl (*ulūka*). The similarity between the rectum and the owl shall hinder the priest to cut it out accidentally. But the proper view of the *siddhāntin* is that the term denotes "fat". This is proven by etymological derivation – *uru* ("large") and *ka(śa)* ("marrow") are claimed to be the two constituents of the term. Furthermore, the context in which this passage is recited also supports this view, as the fat of the animal is being cut. The statement thus warns the priest not to cut out too much, including the rectum which looks like fat.

[218] The *siddhāntin* reads the term *urūka* as a compound phrase (see preceding footnote). As a consequence only by splitting the term into its constituent parts can one claim that the term denotes a "large piece of fat".

[S] Again, it cannot be assumed that it assists the procedure [of the sacrifice]. If it were arrived at as such, it is explained: **It is correct to determine the meaning [of the word _urūka_] on the basis of the _kārya_. Since [the meaning], which is proven by a proper means of knowledge (_prāmāṇya_), should be directly denoted (_abhidhāna_) by (gen.) the directive.** Since [the meaning], which is proven by a proper means of knowledge (_prāmāṇya_), is directly denoted by everything being taught by the directive. The meaning, which is understood by force of this [direct denotation], is the correct meaning of the _mantra_, indeed. Then – if [the meaning] is proven by a proper means of knowledge by force of the directive, if it is proven by a proper means of knowledge when it is brought forth – assuming something unseen is not proven by any proper means of knowledge, as it is possible that [the _mantra_] has a seen object. And in case that the large lump of fat is directly denoted, ⟨**359**⟩ [the _mantra_] has a seen object. But in case that an "owl" would be expressed, [the _mantra_] would have an unseen object. Therefore the assumption that the word has to be split, indeed, is stronger.

[P] Objection: Why does the _mantra_, indeed, being comparable to the fore-sacrifices (_prayāja_) and others, not have a subordinate character?[219]

[S] There he states: **The actual activity is understood through the objects of the fundamental notion of the verb.** The fore-sacrifices and others have a subordinate character only by means of a subordinate _apūrva_ being brought up [for each one]. And there, [in the case of the fore-sacrifices], the _apūrva_ is not brought up on the basis of the [offering-]substance. Then the subordinate character [of _mantra_s], like that of the fore-sacrifices and others, is not given. He states the objection against the _pūrvapakṣa_: **And if thus far, in the view taking [the rectum] as resembling an owl, the rectum would be commended and the meaning would be grasped, indeed, that it <u>shall not be cut into pieces [at all]</u>, then the meaning of the _mantra_**

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[219] I take this example of the _prayāja_s to refer to the _ŚBh_ at _JS_ 2.2.2. It had been decided there that several statements found in the _TS_ 2.6.1.1 lay down distinct rites, due to each verbal form being connected with a distinct name for a sacrifice. However, they are all subordinated to the primary _apūrva_. So the whole _mantra_ could be subordinated to the prohibition of cutting out the rectum according to the _pūrvapakṣin_. The _siddhāntin_, however, will claim in the following that the _mantra_ cannot be subordinated as such, as then it would contradict the primary _apūrva_, which is the cutting out of the different parts of the animal.

**would be contradictory, since cutting the rectum, which has been directly
denoted, would [then] be prohibited.**[220]

[P] Now, thinking that [the rectum] resembles an owl it is assumed that **one shall not
cut it into pieces**. The apprehension that [the rectum] resembles an owl should not
be made 360 at the time when the rectum is cut. Thus in this way the meaning of the
mantra [should be] assumed. Then something seen would be assumed.

[S] **The prohibition, indeed, of this apprehension would not have a seen ob-
ject. And its object would [even] be impossible. The apprehension that it
resembles an owl, which would be like a prohibition to remember a monkey
when one is taking drugs**[221]**, should not be made in regard to the rectum –**
as such he reconciles the meaning, indeed, on the basis of this [following] apprehension.
Therefore the apprehension that it is fat, which considers [the term] *urūka* [to denote]
a large lump of fat, is expressive for not cutting the rectum. The object of the *mantra*,
one shall not cut [the rectum] into pieces, has to be referred to for the sake that
nothing mixed up[222] should be cut out.

[P] Objection: In this view, even when the word is split, the assumption that syllables
have been dropped etc. goes beyond the remotest beginning (?).[223]

[S] He resolves: **As the object is understood on the basis of the *kārya*, this is
not a fault [in the view] which assumes the dropping of syllables etc. And
since, indeed, it can be assumed in such a way by force of the *kārya*,** 361
**hence indeed, the venerable etymologists would argue [for this conclusion]
on the basis of [their] understanding of the syllables, and the grammarians
[would argue] that what is created through the syllables [provides] the in-**

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[220] The resemblance to an owl would render the sentence in the *mantra* laying down a general
prohibition of cutting the rectum. But in fact, the cutting is only prohibited at this specific stage in
the sacrifice, where the fat is cut out of the animal. Therefore, the priest should not confuse the rectum
with fat and cut it out then, as it should only be cut later.

[221] *auṣadhapāne śākhāmṛgasmaraṇa◦*. I am at a loss to provide the meaning of this simile.

[222] I.e. the rectum, which is not fat, when the fat is being cut out.

[223] This apparently refers to the etymological analysis of the term *urūka* as given in the *ŚBh* at *JS*
9.4.22. The derivation of the *siddhāntin* is based on *uru* ("large") and *kaśa* ("marrow"). The latter
part of the compound phrase is shortened to *ka*, and this dropping of syllables is obviously criticised
here by the *pūrvapakṣin*.

struction.

[4.] *praśasā.*

[S] *Pūrva-* and *uttarapakṣa* are [both] expounded on the basis of the *kārya*, indeed. Since the component part of the logical argument regarding the *kārya* is the same in the *pūrva-* and *uttarapakṣa*.[224]

[P] There he states the *pūrvapakṣa*: **The conception (*abhimāna*) regarding [the two terms] *bāhu* and *praśaṃsā* is that they provide a seen object. It is correct that this instruction [in the *mantra*], indeed, contains different case endings.** And in regard to the word *bāhu* there is the dual of the second case[225]. And in regard to the word *praśasā* there is the singular of the third case[226]. This explanation is correct. The meaning is that "the two arms are to be made, i.e. to be cut off, by means of this sword". "Have to be caused to be made" would neither be incorrect. Since what goes to/comes from *Iḍā* would not be eternal.[227]

[S] Why is this the object of the *mantra*?

[P] Here he states: **Since a seen object is obtained.** $\boxed{362}$ The meaning is that *praśasā* means "by means of a sword" (*asinā*) for the following reasons: Since it indicates the taking out as the means, since the word "knife" (*śāsa*) is in proximity, since that [word "knife"] is explained as "sword" (*asi*), since the meaning "sword" is understood also on the basis of this word [*praśasā*].

[S] Objection: **The meaning "sword" (*asi*) is not obtained, as a sword is absent in the means for taking out [the front legs], since an axe (*svadhiti*) has been**

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[224] We are dealing – yet again – with a passage of the *adhrigupraiṣamantra* employed at the *agnīṣomīyā*. The considered statement (*TB* 3.6.6.3-4; *MS* 4.13.4) reads: *praśasā bāhū kṛṇutāt*. The term *praśasā* is claimed to denote "sword" by the *pūrvapakṣin*, who derives it from the verbal root *śas*, "to cut". The form is thus taken as an instrumental singular, denoting the sword with which the "arms" – i.e. the front legs – of the animal should be cut out. The correct reading according to the *siddhāntin* is derived from the verbal root *śaṃs*, "to praise", and the form is an accusative dual corresponding to the term *bāhū*, thus denoting "the two praiseworthy arms". The form has an unusual ending due to its Vedic use. The similar argumentation mentioned here by Śālikanātha at the beginning of this *adhikaraṇa* apparently refers to the fact that both, *pūrvapakṣa* and *siddhānta*, base their arguments on an etymological derivation of the term.

[225] I.e. the accusative case.

[226] I.e. the instrumental case.

[227] The meaning of this sentence is beyond my grasp. It might be an incorrect interpolation.

instructed [for that already].

[P] He resolves: **Since, as also the *kārya* is the same for the sword mentioned in the *mantra* and the axe**[228]**, there could be option [which instrument for cutting can be used]. Since in this view there is elegance of expression (*sarasabhāva*?)**[229]**, the meaning "sword" is indeed obtained.** And [that meaning] has a seen object. Since [it expresses] the means for cutting out [the front legs].

[S] Objection: The axe, indeed, would have to be expressed by the word *praśasā* through secondary application.

[P] There he states: **It is not an [already] completed action (*parokṣāvṛtti*).**[230] The meaning of the *mantra* contains an option [in reading it] beyond the sound of the *mantra*. And he states the fault in the view taking [the term *praśasā* to denote] the praise of the arms: **The excellence again – would it be expressed – would have an unseen object, and it would make │363│ the arms have the character of deities, which has not been enjoined, through them receiving praise. Therefore, the meaning of the *mantra* is "by means of a sword" (*asinā*).**

[S] If it should be arrived at as such, it is argued [against it as follows]: **[A meaning] is possible [only] if the case [of the word *praśasā*] is in grammatical agreement with the word *bāhu*. Thus, the instruction [in the *mantra* assumed] to contain different case endings is not correct.**[231] **Since that is remote in regard to the syntactical connection (*anvaya*).** The syntactical connection is in proximity, when the cases are in grammatical agreement. The syntactical connection is remote when the cases are not in grammatical agreement. And the excellence of the arms, which is being expressed, does not have an unseen object, since then the understanding is ascertained that [the arms] are taken out in their entirety.

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[228] Literally: "of the sword ... with the axe" (*svadhitinā saha*).

[229] I am not sure about the meaning of this expression.

[230] I am not sure what this answer is supposed to mean. I can only assume that the *pūrvapakṣin* claims his reading to be supportive of the action taking place during the recitation of the *mantra*, i.e. the cutting of the legs. If the term *praśasā* would denote the arms as being praiseworthy, it would state a mere fact.

[231] In the interpretation of the *pūrvapakṣin* the term *bāhu* is an accusative dual, while the term *praśasā* is an instrumental singular. In the argumentation of the *siddhāntin* the cases agree, as the latter term qualifies the former.

[P] How again is the taking out [of the arms] in their entirety ascertained on the basis [of them being] excellent?

[S] The answer is: **Only through [their] entirety are they directly denoted as excellent, since that accomplishes the *kārya*.** What is not complete, that does not accomplish the *kārya*. And what does not accomplish the *kārya*, that is not excellent. **Hence, [the arms] are also directly denoted as excellent by them accomplishing the *kārya*, and the body part has the task to accomplish the *kārya*** – thus the entirety ⟨364⟩ is ascertained. The two arms, which are excellent, thus far accomplish the *kārya* by their being taken out. Even if they are body parts, they are excellent and accomplish the *kārya*. Therefore, also, it has been said that one takes out the two body parts. The following has been stated: **It is not [the case] that they are not excellent. On them, indeed, the animal walks. Bowing down [on them] it eats *śamī*- and *karīra*-grass.**[232]

[P] What does the commentator [Śabara] say by this [statement]?

[S] Here he states: **Presenting the excellence [of the arms] on the basis of the *kārya* he shows that the *mantra* is far from containing an option [in its meaning]. And as such an [already] completed action will not have been assumed for the word *praśasā* in place of the axe. Neither has the option been agreed to, which would be incorrect in combination with the [enjoined] axe (*svadhiti*).**

[P] How, again, is it incorrect because of the axe (*svadhiti*)?

[S] Since, clearly indeed, there is the regulation (?)[233], and since that [argument of the *pūrvapakṣin*] has been assumed by force of the word [alone].[234]

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[232] *Prosopis Spicigera*, or *Mimosa Suma*, and *Capparis Aphylla*.

[233] A part of this statement is unreadable, and it is thus questionable whether the statement is complete as such.

[234] I.e. the word *praśasā* denoting a sword, when actually the axe (*svadhiti*) is enjoined to be used.

[5.] *śyenakaḥ.*

[P] **Again, there is a distinction** ⌈365⌉ **to this [***adhikaraṇa*** **dealing with]** *urūka*.[235]
[Preliminary objection against the *pūrvapakṣa*:] **There also it had been said that
[the term *urūka*] would have an unseen object if the resemblance [to an owl
would have been expressed by it].** It has been stated there, indeed, that there would
be an unseen object if the resemblance to an owl [would be denoted]. Likewise here also
there would be an unseen object if the resemblance to a hawk and others [would be
denoted]. Hence, this *adhikaraṇa* is repeatedly stated.

[P] He resolves: **It may be that it has been stated that there would be an unseen
object, if the resemblance [were denoted]. But here the direct denotation of
the hawk, indeed, would not be obtained without similarity – just as there a
large lump of fat is directly denoted because of the word [*urūka*] being split.**
The *pūrvapakṣa* belongs to one thinking thus.

[S] But the *siddhānta* [is represented as follows]: **Since the direct denotation is ob-
tained as indicating the shape of that [body part being taken out] also when
the whole [body part] is taken out, assuming something unseen would not be
a proof based on a proper means of knowledge.** <u>**One should make its chest
[like] a hawk.**</u> This is the meaning of it: One should make the chest in such a way,
just as it is similar to a hawk. **And the resemblance to a hawk is present, when
[the chest] is taken out in its entirety.** In this way ⌈366⌉ the taking out [of the body
part] in its entirety, indeed, is instructed. Therefore it has been correctly stated that
the *mantra* has the taking out [of the body part] in its entirety as its object.

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[235] This refers to *adhikaraṇa* 9.4.3. For the last time we are dealing with passages from
the *adhrigupraiṣamantra* (*TB* 3.6.6.2 and *MS* 4.13.4: *śyenam asya vakṣaḥ kṛṇutāt śalā doṣaṇī
kaśyapevāṃsau kavaṣorū srekaparṇāṣṭhīvantā*). The question is what the resemblance between the
body parts to be cut out and the animals is meant for. The correct view is the same as in the preceding
adhikaraṇa, i.e. it helps one to cut out the body parts in their entirety, as only then they fulfill the
stated resemblance. Against this the *pūrvapakṣin* claims that the body parts are to be made to resemble
those animals, only in this way there is a proper meaning of the statements possible. In support of
his view he refers back to an argument made by the *siddhāntin* in *adhikaraṇa* 9.4.3: There the term
urūka was denied to mean "owl", as this resemblance would have no visible object. The case is different
here, and so the *pūrvapakṣin* defends this *adhikaraṇa* against an opponent who thinks it to be a mere
repetition of a case already discussed.

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