Interim Governments and the Stability of Peace

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Acronyms

AFP  Agence France Press
AIA  Afghan Interim Authority
AIC  Akaike Information Criterion
AMAA  Agreement on the Monitoring of Arms and Armies
ANC  African National Congress
ANIK  National Army for an Independent Kampuchea
AP  Associated Press
ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BLDP  Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party
BRA  Bougainville Revolutionary Army
BTI  Bertelsmann Transformation Index
CA  Constituent Assembly
CAR  Central African Republic
CGDK  Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
CPA  Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPN  Communist Party of Nepal
CPN (M)  Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
CPN – Fourth Convention  Communist Party of Nepal (Fourth Convention)
CPN – Masal  Communist Party of Nepal – Masal
CPN – Mashal Communist Party of Nepal – Mashal

CPN – Unity Center Communist Party of Nepal – Unity Center

CPN-M Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist

CPN-UML Communist Party of Nepal – United Marxist Leninist

CPP Cambodian People’s Party

DCAF Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces

DDR Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

DPKO United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations

DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo

FALA Forças Armadas de Libertação de Angola or Armed Forces of the Liberation of Angola

FAPLA Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola or People’s Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola

FMLN Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional or Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front

FNLA Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola or National Front for the Liberation of Angola

FPTP First-Past-the-Post

FRELIMO Frente de Libertação de Moçambique or Mozambique Liberation Front

FRETILIN Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor

FUNCINPEC Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique et Coopératif or National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia

FUNK Front Uni National du Kampuchea or National United Front of Kampuchea

GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies

GIZ Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit

JPMC Joint Political-Military Commission

JURA Revolutionary United Youth of Angola
KPNLAF Khmer People’s National Liberation Armed Forces
KPNLF Khmer People’s National Liberation Front
LIMA Angola Women’s League
LURD Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MODEL Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MOULINAKA Mouvement pour la Libération Nationale du Kampuchéa or Movement for the National Liberation of Kampuchea
MPLA Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola or People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NA Nepal Army
NADK National Army of Democratic Kampuchea
NC Nepali Congress
NELDA National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy Dataset
NTCL National Transitional Council of Libya
NTGL National Transitional Government of Liberia
ODA Official Development Assistance
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OHR Office of the High Representative
PDK Party of Democratic Kampuchea
PH Proportional Hazards
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PNG Papua New Guinea
PRIO Peace Research Institute Oslo
PRK People’s Republic of Kampuchea
PRPK People’s Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea
RENAMO Resistência Nacional Moçambicana or Mozambican National Resistance
RNA  Royal Nepalese Army
RPP  Rastrriya Prajatantra Party
RUF  Revolutionary United Front
SNC  Supreme National Council
SOC  State of Cambodia
SPA  Seven-Party-Alliance
SSR  Security Sector Reform
SWAPO  Southwest Africa People’s Organization
UCDP  Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UCPN (M)  Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
UIFSA  United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan
ULF  United Leftist Front
UN  United Nations
UNAMIC  United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNAVEM I  United Nations Angola Verification Mission I
UNAVEM II  United Nations Angola Verification Mission II
UNDP  United Nations Development Program
UNDPA  United Nations Department of Political Affairs
UNICEF  United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund
UNITA  União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola or National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNMIK  United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL  United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIN  United Nations Mission in Nepal
UNOMIL  United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNTAC  United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAES  United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium
**UNTAET** United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

**UNTAG** United Nations Transition Assistance Group

**UPFN** United People's Front Nepal

**VDC** Village Development Committee

**VORGAN** *Voz da Resistência do Galo Negro* or *Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel*

**YCL** Young Communist League
Chapter 1

Introduction

Intrastate armed conflict has long been considered as one of the greatest threats to human security worldwide (King and Murray, 2001). Since 1989, more than one million people have been killed as a result of direct combat between governments and rebel groups (Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015). This number does not even begin to account for the numerous other types of violence typically associated with internal conflict, or for the vast indirect cost such violence bears for human development (Sköns, 2005). Armed conflict is not only about death, but is “a breeding ground for mass human rights violations,” including torture, sexual violence, or forced migration (Amnesty International, 2016). It also has tremendous detrimental effects on various development issues such as maternal health, infant mortality, or access to safe water (Gates, Hegre, Nygård, et al., 2012). In 2014 alone, more than 100,000 people were killed in armed conflicts worldwide, which represents the highest battle-related death count in any year since the end of the Cold War (Gates, Nygård, et al., 2016).

As a remedy to this problem, scholars and practitioners alike have proposed the purposeful design and reform of formal state institutions. If intrastate armed conflict occurs because groups experience political exclusion and violently rebel to address this grievance, the argument goes, then reforming formal state institutions so that post-conflict politics are more inclusive, democratic, and responsive to society’s needs should have a pacifying effect. Based on this belief, there has been an impressive growth of global financial assistance to post-conflict institutional reform in recent years. In 2012, for instance, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) allocated more than 17 billion USD of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to support governance and peace in developing countries. This is the highest amount of assistance provided to any ODA sector that year (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2014). This empirical development has also been accompanied by a growing number of academic studies that analyze the institutional causes of peace after war (e.g. Ansorg and Kurtenbach, 2017; Cammett and Malesky, 2012; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007; Hegre and Nygård, 2015; Schneider
In this dissertation, I argue that this literature needs improvement. Firstly, the theoretical and empirical peace and conflict literature has thus far focused on studying the patterns and effects of permanent state structures, or has not sufficiently distinguished short-term institutions put in place for an interim period and long-term structures that come without sunset clauses (cf. Schmidt and Galyan, 2017). To name just one example, the statistical literature on post-conflict power-sharing governments regularly pools into one data set both interim power-sharing arrangements, such as the one endorsed by the signatory parties to Liberia’s 2003 peace agreement, and long-term designs of joint rule, such as following Bosnia’s 1995 accord (e.g. Cammett and Malesky, 2012; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Pospieszna and Schneider, 2013). It is however reasonable to expect that both types of institutions come with different effects on peace, or induce distinct causal mechanisms (cf. Binningsbø, 2013).

Secondly, the peace and conflict literature that explicitly focuses on the role of interim governments after intrastate armed conflict faces its own theoretical and methodological limitations. These include a reliance on findings derived from under-theorized and non-comparative case studies, as well as a strict focus on the specific concepts of power-sharing and international interim government as explanations for long-term political developments in war-torn societies. By this means, the literature still follows a typology of interim governments that was introduced more than 20 years ago by Shain and Linz (1995) in their seminal work on the topic, *Between States: Interim Governments and Democratic Transitions*. Scholarship may, however, omit other important explanatory variables or causal processes that link interim governments to peace after armed conflict. This is not least because Shain and Linz originally developed their typology as part of the transitology paradigm in democratization research, and hence not with a specific focus on situations in which interim governments follow large-scale conflict (cf. Chapter 2).

As a result, it is still unclear why some interim governments that convene to end intrastate armed conflict are followed by stable peace, while others are not. This is the focus of this dissertation – and it is one of high empirical relevance. This relevance not least stems from the strong belief that international policy-makers have recently and repeatedly expressed in the peace-conducive potential of interim governments. For instance, then-United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stressed in 2012 the necessity to form an interim government in Syria, in order to stop the fighting that had erupted in 2011 (cf. The Telegraph, 2012). This call has often been supported by German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier (cf. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2015). Also in the Central African Republic (CAR), an interim government headed by Catherine Samba-Panza assumed power in January 2014. The US Department of State (2014) has expressed strong support for this interim government and has argued that its institutions were the best way to ensure “that the democratic
transition process [was] rooted in a broad-based national consultation with all of the Central African Republic’s people.” And in Afghanistan, observers have recently termed the rule of an interim government “the only choice left” for peace (Koskinas, 2014).

This belief among policy-makers that interim governments are part of their institutional “toolkit” to promote peace after armed conflict is also one reason for why such governments have become regular features of war-torn societies in the past 25 years. Examples of interim governments range from the early post-Cold War cases of Cambodia or Namibia, where then unprecedented international involvement charged the United Nations (UN) with organizing national elections, through numerous power-sharing interim institutions created in the 1990s and 2000s in places such as Burundi, Sudan, or Côte d’Ivoire, to UN interim administrations in Kosovo and East Timor at the turn of the century. More recently, the topic has been pushed back to the top of the international agenda after interim governments convened in Ukraine (cf. Strasheim, 2016) and South Sudan. But the empirical record of many of these interim governments in promoting peace is mixed at best. As I will show in Chapter 4, out of 62 interim governments analyzed in this dissertation, 35 (or 56.5 percent) were followed by a relapse to intrastate armed conflict in the post-interim period. This variation is the primary puzzle driving the analysis of this dissertation that is guided by the research question:

**Research Question:** *After intrastate armed conflict, what properties of interim governments increase the stability of post-interim peace?*

The argument that I will make and evaluate in the following chapters of this dissertation goes as follows. Empirically, the appointment of interim governments has been at the core of an impressive number of peace processes since the end of the Cold War. These interim governments vary with regard to the institutional designs they are ascribed with. For instance, some interim governments offer cabinet posts to representatives of all warring parties, while others function without such power-sharing deals. Interim governments also come with diverging degrees of political authority assumed by international actors. These variations have informed an array of previous research on the topic that closely links to the aforementioned typology by Shain and Linz (e.g. Croissant, 2008; Jarstad, 2010; Rothchild, 2007; Sisk and Stefes, 2005). However, interim governments also vary with regard to the reform processes they realize in order to induce transitions to post-conflict peace, meaning in how they help to change the rules governing a society from those of war to those of peace (cf. Jarstad and Sisk, 2008; Lyons, 2005). For instance, interim governments may differ with regard to how successfully they disarm and demobilize the warring parties, or to how they allow for unarmed actors to assume power in political processes (cf. Paris, 2004). These issues have been neglected by past research as specific explanatory variables for how interim governments add to peace.
I will show that by focusing predominantly on the institutional designs of interim governments, past research has only weak explanatory power in how such governments promote long-term peace after war. This is not least because their institutional designs are temporary and should thus fail to address the warring parties’ concerns and uncertainties about marginalization, or their costs of remobilizing for armed combat in the long run. The focus on institutional designs also has weak explanatory power because it fails to explain how interim governments are truly instruments to induce a transition to peace, rather than bodies that merely keep the relevant warring parties satisfied in power and that delay an actual resolution of the conflict to a later point in time.

I therefore complement the predominant institutional design approach by incorporating two further sub-fields of peace and conflict research into my framework. Both address features of reform processes in interim governments. Firstly, by borrowing from studies concerned with the role of non-state actors in war and peace, I hold that as long as the parallel war-time institutions of warring parties persist throughout an interim period, parties retain the financial resources, popular legitimacy, military infrastructure, and war-time mindsets to remobilize in the post-interim period. Interim governments that implement reforms to integrate such parallel institutions should thus increase the stability of peace. Secondly, by borrowing from studies concerned with the role of unarmed actors in war and peace, I argue that as long as interim governments fail to strengthen an unarmed domestic audience that would punish warring parties remobilizing for combat, violence also becomes more likely. Interim governments that allow for the participation of unarmed actors in reform processes – such as civil society or political parties without a history of armed insurgency – should also increase the stability of post-interim peace.

The rest of this introductory chapter is structured as follows: I first turn to defining the central concepts used in this study. In section 1.1.1, I formulate a definition of interim governments that links to past research on the topic, and in section 1.1.2 I repeat this exercise for my dependent variable, the stability of post-interim peace. In conducting this task, I concentrate on theoretical definitions of my concepts, while I discuss their operationalization in Chapter 4. I also focus on defining these two key concepts, while I discuss the conceptualizations of other relevant terms “on the go” throughout the remaining chapters. I end this introduction in section 1.2 with presenting the structure of my dissertation and summarizing the content of each individual chapter.

1.1 Defining Central Concepts

1.1.1 Interim Governments after Armed Conflict

I define interim governments as the formal state institutions exercising executive and legislative authority between the demise of an old regime and first
This definition consists of several elements that require further discussion. Firstly, by *institutions* I mean “the patterns of interaction that govern and constrain the relationships among individuals” (North et al., 2009b, p. 59). I emphasize in this regard formal institutions as opposed to informal norms and rules (on informal rules in transitional regimes, see Grzymala-Busse, 2010).

Secondly, in the context of intrastate armed conflict, I understand the *demise of an old regime* as its irregular overthrow through military victory, international intervention, or negotiated peace agreements (cf. Kreutz, 2010). For instance, the 2011 National Transitional Council of Libya (NTCL) convened as the country’s interim government after rebels ousted the regime of Muammar Ghaddafi, while the 2001-04 Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) was installed after a US-led intervention induced the fall of the Taleban regime that had been at war with the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA). The National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) was negotiated by the warring parties in the 2003 Accra Peace Agreement.

Thirdly, using *elections* as a right-censoring point of interim governments has been disputed in the literature. My definition follows recent comparative studies on interim governments in peace and conflict research (e.g. Jarstad, 2010; Lyons, 2005; Strasheim and Fjelde, 2014). These studies have pointed out that elections are empirically the most frequent trigger to end interim periods and transfer power to a permanent regime (Schmidt and Galyan, 2017). Also Shain and Linz (1995, p. 8) define interim government as institutions promising “to facilitate the country’s transition to a democratic political order in free and contested elections.” However, Guttieri and Piombo (2007) have more recently argued that because intrastate conflict destroys much of the political infrastructure of sovereign states, the creation of a *de jure* and *de facto* sovereign and permanent government is substantively more decisive than the mere realization of a single public vote in the aftermath of war.

While Guttieri and Piombo (2007) raise a valid point, their definition of interim governments as bodies ruling between the fall of an *ancien régime* and the creation of a sovereign government bears both theoretical and methodological problems for comparative research designs – their own edited volume consists largely of single or small-n comparative case studies. In terms of theory, arguing for the installation of a sovereign government to judge whether an interim period has ended or not disregards the issue of weak statehood after war. By definition, weak states are characterized by a lack of popular legitimacy toward political authorities, who are perceived as either incapable or unwilling to provide basic public services for the population (Holsti, 1996; Ohlson and Söderberg-Kovacs, 2011). As a result, if a government cannot or does not intend to provide such services after the end of armed conflict, international engagement that limits this government’s sovereignty – for instance by deploying peacekeepers that provide for the security of civilians (cf. Bellamy and Williams, 2011; Hultman et al., 2013) – may both be necessary and desirable also *after* elections have
transferred power away from an interim government.\footnote{Likewise, since war-torn countries often belong to the most aid-dependent states in the world long after violence has subsided, it is often difficult to judge at what point a government truly is sovereign (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2013).}

In terms of methodology, the need to disambiguate interim government termination more clearly than proposed by Guttieri and Piombo (2007) also goes hand in hand with measurement issues. While the case studies in the authors’ edited volume make a “thick” conceptualization of such termination feasible, the mixed-method research design of this dissertation warrants a more narrow definition (cf. Coppedge, 1999). An election date thus provides a clear cut-off point for when a case enters a post-interim period (cf. Chapter 4).

1.1.2 The Stability of Post-Interim Peace

I define my dependent variable as the sustained absence of intrastate armed conflict after the termination of interim government. This concept also consists of several elements that require further discussion. Firstly, I concentrate on the absence of violence in the post-interim period, which is due to a number of theoretical and methodological considerations that I discuss in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.\footnote{I add a control variable capturing violence in the interim period in my robustness checks.} Secondly, and linking to what may be the central dividing line in peace and conflict research as a whole (cf. Wæver, 2004), my definition incorporates a negative conceptualization of peace. This means that I understand peace conceptually as the absence of direct, physical, inter-group violence (Galtung, 1969). Empirically – and in line with the vast majority of statistical peace and conflict research – I understand it as the absence of a very particular form of such violence: intrastate armed conflict. By intrastate or internal armed conflict I mean armed combat within the boundaries of a sovereign state, fought between the government of this state and at least one rebel group (Kalyvas, 2006; Sambanis, 2004). I refer to intrastate conflicts of large scale as civil wars (cf. Chapter 4). I also understand a government as the conflict actor controlling the national capital of a state and a rebel group as a formally organized opposition movement that uses armed force to challenge the government’s authority (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2015a).

Limiting my research to studying peace as the absence of this particular type of violence comes with advantages and disadvantages, and the negative peace concept has thus been subject to both criticism and defense in the academic debate. From within the statistical peace and conflict literature, this negative conceptualization – that typically operationalizes armed conflict and peace through counting battle-related deaths (cf. Chapter 4) – has been argued to conflate the concept of violence with the concept of conflict. Prominently, Kalyvas (2006) has reasoned that violence (and battle-related deaths as a result of such violence) may be endogenous to armed conflict. This means that violence and deaths may be unrelated to the actual causes of conflict and rather
the result of an inherent escalation process in which violence causes more violence. In addition, assessing peace as the absence of battle-related deaths has been argued to merge different versions of peace into one. For instance, it may conflate phases in which parties disarm, demobilize, and actively implement a peace agreement with phases in which they take time to regroup for combat (Florea, 2012).

From outside of statistical peace and conflict research, qualitative studies have promoted the positive peace concept and in that have formulated two specific points of critique regarding the understanding of peace as the mere absence of intrastate conflict (e.g. Paffenholz, 2010; Simons and Zanker, 2012; Wæver, 2004). Firstly, scholars have reasoned that the absence of direct, physical violence should not be sufficient to classify a society as peaceful. They have argued that peace encompasses also the additional prevalence of “desirable” features such as social justice, democracy, the rule of law, or economic equality (cf. Gal tung, 1969). Secondly, scholars have argued that particularly in post-conflict societies, the absence of intrastate conflict does not necessarily mean the absence of all other forms of violence. Instead, many societies emerging out of armed conflict typically experience profound levels of organized crime, domestic violence, or state repression (Kurtenbach and Wulf, 2012; Westendorf, 2015). For instance, as traumatized soldiers acculturated to the use of violence return home to their families after war, many societies see a rise in post-war domestic violence (cf. Manjoo and McRaith, 2011).

While part of the critique of the negative peace concept is warranted – I discuss this aspect further in Chapter 9 – conceptualizing and measuring peace as the absence of intrastate conflict comes with key advantages for this research design. Firstly, it is reasonable to focus on intrastate armed conflict as one particular type of violence, because we know that other types are accounted for by different explanatory variables or causal mechanisms (cf. Eck and Hultman, 2007). Secondly, any conceptualization of peace that does not only entail the absence of intrastate armed conflict but also the presence of any “desirable” societal features also includes the absence of any potential source of intrastate conflict as a definitional element. As a result, the statistical assessment of positive peace is inherently problematic. This is because an inclusion of factors that can potentially stir or mitigate conflict in a concept of peace renders analyzing a correlation between peace and such causes impossible. Furthermore, defining peace through notions of justice, democracy, or equality would also blur the lines separating these concepts and thus decrease their theoretical utility in comparative political science research (Gerring, 1999).

Particularly the conceptualization of post-interim peace through the inclusion of democracy in such definition would entail methodological problems for the purpose of this dissertation. The reader could rightfully point out that a

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3I test this proposition by modeling the effect of properties of interim government on hazards of non-state conflict and one-sided violence against civilians in Chapter 9.
negative peace concept ignores the inherent idea of interim governments. This
is because such governments are not only put in place to reduce battle death
counts, but also to organize the elections terminating their rule and thus to
forward democratic reforms early on in a peace process. In other words, interim
governments convene to prepare war-torn societies for a situation where peace
is stable enough to exercise democracy (cf. Paris, 2004; Sisk, 2008). However,
since terminating in elections is among the conceptual cornerstones of interim
government, and since elections are also an accepted minimum criterion for
defining and measuring democracy, any analysis of the relationship between
interim government and some form of “democratic peace” would inevitably be
biased.

1.2 Structure of the Dissertation

Following this introduction, the dissertation is organized in nine additional chap-
ters. In Chapter 2, I review previous research on interim governments. This
review will show in detail the argument I formulated above, in that even though
the study of institutions in the broader peace and conflict literature has forged
ahead in terms of methodological and theoretical advances in the past decade,
this has not resulted in a better understanding of interim governments. This
is because the broader literature has concentrated on permanent institutional
structures, or has not distinguished between short- and long-term institutions
in its research designs. Studies focusing on interim governments at the same
time suffer from their own theoretical and methodological shortcomings. To
underline this argument, I begin Chapter 2 by briefly reviewing how the con-
cept of interim government was introduced to political science research in the
tradition of democratization studies. This review centers on the seminal work
by Shain and Linz (1995) and their typology of interim governments that still
informs most research to date. Next, I review the study of interim government
in peace and conflict research. I show that scholarship in this tradition has
particularly focused on examining the power-sharing and international models
of the Shain and Linz (1995) typology and is thus linked to the broader debates
on consociationalism and international interventions after war.

Based on this discussion, I close Chapter 2 by identifying three shortcomings
that I address in this dissertation. Firstly, I mitigate the more general neglect
of interim governments in the broader study of the institutional causes of peace
by zooming in on the particularities of such institutions. This will allow me
to identify more concrete causal mechanisms and ultimately also help policy-
makers to make more informed decisions in designing transitions from war to
peace. Secondly, I address the methodological shortcoming that studies focusing
on interim government often base their inferences on under-theorized and
non-comparative case studies. This is problematic because results are difficult
to generalize across a larger number of cases. Such research designs also insuffi-
ciently deal with the question of what types of interim governments are selected in which situations. I thus advance previous research by using a mixed-method research design that combines statistical analysis with comparative case studies.

Thirdly, I address the theoretical shortcoming that studies focusing on interim government have predominantly analyzed institutional designs as explanatory variables. This may omit other important explanations in how interim governments add to peace. As discussed above, I thus complement the predominant institutional design approach by incorporating features of reform processes in interim governments into my framework.

In Chapter 3, I begin to address these shortcomings by developing a theoretical framework on the effects of interim governments on post-interim peace. This framework builds on bargaining theory and the mechanism of commitment problems. I first present the standard bargaining model of armed conflict and discuss why credible commitment problems help to understand bargaining breakdowns and the resumption of armed combat. I then formulate three causal mechanisms on how interim governments can mitigate commitment problems and thus increase the stability of peace. These mechanisms are (1) to decrease the warring parties’ future uncertainty concerning their political, economic, or physical survival, (2) to increase their costs of defection, and (3) to help parties send costly signals by creating domestic audience costs.

From this model, I derive four hypotheses. Following past research, I hypothesize that (H1) power-sharing interim governments increase the stability of peace by decreasing future uncertainty and that (H2) international interim governments do so by raising the costs of defection. I then demonstrate the weakness of this institutional design approach that fails to take into account how the temporality of such designs can exacerbate, rather than mitigate, commitment problems. I thus formulate two further hypotheses, arguing that (H3) more advanced processes of integrating the warring parties’ parallel political and military institutions into the authority of an interim governments raise the costs of defection and increase the stability of peace. Finally, I hold that (H4) more advanced opportunities of participation for unarmed actors in interim governments create audience costs and increase the stability of peace. In sum, I expect to find more profound empirical support for the two latter hypotheses.

In Chapter 4, I test my hypotheses using survival analysis. This chapter is the first of five empirical chapters that as a whole form a mixed-method research design combining statistical analysis and within- and between-case analysis in qualitative case studies.\footnote{Mixed-method research is becoming increasingly popular in the social sciences. It is considered a “standard to be emulated” (Goemans and Spaniel, 2013) and the best way to induce a complete understanding of an under-researched phenomenon (Ahram, 2013). This is also because it allows for both the “exploration of general relationships and explanations and the specific explanations of individual cases and groups of cases” (Lieberman, 2005, p. 436).} I first present a novel data set on the properties of all interim governments that followed intrastate conflict between 1989 and 2012 and then discuss my sampling strategy, data sources, and coding rules. Next,
I investigate the relationship between the hypothesized properties of interim government and stable post-interim peace by fitting a series of Cox Proportional Hazards (PH) models. In sum, my findings lend support to the argument that reform processes in interim governments are better explanations for stable post-interim peace than such governments’ institutional designs. While the coefficients for power-sharing and international interim government are either not statistically significant or not very robust, the integration of parallel institutions as well as the participation of unarmed actors are both valid predictors of the hazard of armed conflict in the post-interim period.

Following my statistical analysis, Chapters 5 to 9 form the qualitative analysis of how properties of interim governments are linked to stable post-interim peace. In Chapter 5, I discuss the limitations of my statistical analysis, as well as my case selection strategy and qualitative research design. I select cases according to a most-similar system design and by using statistical matching techniques. This strategy results in (1) Nepal’s 2006-08 interim government, (2) Angola’s 1991-92 interim government, and (3) Cambodia’s 1991-93 interim government as cases under analysis. I use a mix of process-tracing and comparative between-case analysis in order to study the causal mechanisms that account for the outcome in each case, and to investigate why post-interim peace lasted in Nepal, but not in Cambodia and Angola. For all cases, I rely on a mix of primary and secondary sources, including academic studies, newspaper articles, policy reports, and gray literature. My analysis of Nepal’s interim government additionally builds on 30 semi-structured interviews carried out during empirical fieldwork in September and October 2015. Chapter 5 thus ends with a discussion of fieldwork methods and techniques.

The three following chapters are dedicated to within-case analyses of Nepal (Chapter 6), Angola (Chapter 7), and Cambodia (Chapter 8). Each chapter starts with a brief historical overview of the countries in order to situate the rule of the respective interim government in the peace process. These overviews focus specifically on the dynamics that led to each civil war (rather than portraying broader historical processes) as well as on introducing the relevant warring parties. I then outline the role of commitment problems and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the bargaining argument in each case. Subsequently, the main part of the within-case analyses attends to all hypothesized properties of interim government sequentially and analyzes whether or not a property set into motion the theorized process of steps and actions that led to post-interim peace or the absence thereof. In this analysis, I also attend to possible alternative mechanisms and explanatory variables.

Chapter 9 is devoted to a comparison of the three case studies in order to draw inferences that move beyond the within-case level. This chapter also allows me to reflect on conceptual and methodological fallacies with regard to my dependent variable, fit new Cox PH models to study variables and variable interactions that my within-case analyses suggested, and discuss the limitations.
of the bargaining theory argument. In sum, I find that also in my case studies, reforms implemented by interim governments are a better explanation for long-term peace than the institutional designs of such governments. This is particularly true for whether or not interim governments integrate the parallel political and military institutions of warring parties, such as by implementing disarmament and demobilization programs. I also find that mechanisms concerning the warring parties’ raised costs of defection provide the most powerful causal link to peace, and that it is fruitful to relax the unitary actor assumption of bargaining theory. Such reformulation of theory allows to consider how interim governments alter cohesion within warring parties to raise their costs of defection, and thus expands explanations of how interim governments mitigate commitment problems to avoid armed conflict.

Finally, Chapter 10 concludes this dissertation by summarizing its main findings as well as its theoretical, methodological, and empirical contributions to the peace and conflict literature. The chapter also formulates a number of policy recommendations for international actors concerned with the design of interim periods following intrastate armed conflict. It ends by identifying several implications for future academic research on interim governments in specific, and the institutional causes of peace after armed conflict in general.
Chapter 2

Literature Review

What do we know about interim governments and peace in war-torn societies? This chapter reviews theoretical explanations, empirical results, and methodological issues in the existing literature on interim governments. My review aims to demonstrate in more detail my argument from Chapter 1: While peace and conflict research in general, and its scholarship on post-conflict institutions in particular, have recently forged ahead in terms of methodological and theoretical advances, the growing number of studies has not resulted in a better understanding of interim governments due to two reasons. Firstly, the broader post-conflict institutions literature insufficiently acknowledges the specific causal mechanisms of interim governments, as it either focuses on permanent institutional structures or does not separate short- and long-term institutions in its research designs. That this represents a shortcoming becomes visible by looking at studies that are specifically interested in instances of interim rule, because such studies use similar explanatory variables but formulate causal mechanisms that at times contradict those of the broader literature. However, and this is the second reason for why the recent scholarly trend has not resulted in a better understanding of interim rule, those works focusing on interim government largely base their evidence on non-comparative case studies difficult to generalize. They also focus exclusively on institutional designs on interim rule at the expense of addressing the role of reforms in such governments, and may thus overlook key variables and causal mechanisms in how interim governments contribute to peace.

This chapter proceeds in three steps. Section 2.1 briefly discusses how the concept *interim government* was introduced to comparative political science in the tradition of democratization studies, as well as how this debate relates to studying interim governments in societies marked by armed conflict. In section 2.2, I review the study of interim government in peace and conflict research and reflect on the relationship between this scholarship and the broader debates of the discipline – particularly works on consociationalism and international

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5I present democratization research and the peace and conflict literature as separate literatures in this dissertation, albeit the lines between the fields are at times blurred.
intervention – identifying both similarities and differences. The final section 2.3 concludes by outlining three shortcomings of past research.

2.1 Interim Governments and Democratization

The concept of interim governments was introduced to comparative political science research in the seminal work *Between States: Interim Governments and Democratic Transitions* published by Shain and Linz (1995). In *Between States*, the authors situate their work in the tradition of the transitology paradigm that – together with modernization theory – has been said to have both “dominated and distorted” the study of how authoritarian regimes democratize (Gans-Morse, 2004, p. 321). Hence, the transitology paradigm – that emerged as an answer to modernization theory’s focus on macro-level and structural explanations – is just one of several theoretical approaches to explain why and how democratic regimes arise, consolidate, or collapse.6

Tracing back to Rustow (1970)’s seminal piece *Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model*, the transitology paradigm shifted the angle of explanation from macro-level conditions at the center of modernization theory to micro-level and elite-oriented perspectives, thereby opening the “black box” of the democratization process by breaking it into a number of consecutive steps (Schedler, 2001). In specific, the literature argues that the ideal type democratization process proceeds in three steps: a political struggle that results in the demise of authoritarian rule, followed by the transition to democracy, and the consolidation of such democracy that becomes the only “game in town” (Linz and Stepan, 1996; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986).7

Its focus on the interactions of elites is the trademark of the transitology paradigm: “[Nearly] all detailed descriptions of particular transitions and most efforts to theorize them focus on the interests, choices, and strategies of elite political actors” (Geddes, 1999, p. 3), who are typically classified into four ideal type groups. **Hardliners** of an outgoing, non-democratic regime prefer to

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6In brief, modernization theory analyzes the structural conditions conducive to democracy, holding that explanatory variables such as industrialization and economic development are necessary conditions to sustain democratic rule. This relationship is often paraphrased by Lipset’s influential thesis: “The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances it sustains democracy” (Lipset, 1959, p. 79). Modernization theory has faced much criticism also outside the transitology paradigm, such as concerning its portrayal of the nature of male-female relations during democratization and its Euro-centric conflating of modernization with westernization (e.g. Jaquette, 1982). Also within modernization theory, Lipset’s thesis is not undisputed, and some have noted the different effects of economic growth and modernization on democratization and on democratic consolidation (Przeworski, Alvarez, et al., 2000).

7Also the transitology paradigm has faced harsh critique, particularly from area studies that criticize its overemphasis of elite behavior and its approach to develop generalizable ideal types of transformation processes (Gans-Morse, 2004). Newer works in the comparative democratization literature have argued it has actually been democratic transitions not guided by elites but by the broader masses that have produced the most stable democratic regimes (McFaul, 2002). As one of the paradigm’s most prominent critics, Carothers (2002) also called for *The End of the Transition Paradigm* by pointing out that in the empirical reality, transitions often do not end in democratic consolidation.
Figure 2.1: Interim Governments in Democratization Research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elite Group in Control</th>
<th>Mode of Transition</th>
<th>International Authority Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opposition Moderates</td>
<td>Replacement</td>
<td>Administrative Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalizers &amp; Moderates</td>
<td>Transplacement</td>
<td>Executive Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Community</td>
<td>Intervention</td>
<td>Supervisory Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Liberalizers</td>
<td>Transformation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Central claim: interim government models vary in their effect on democratic consolidation – power-sharing transitions are often seen as most promising.

**Notes:** Illustration based on the figure presented by Croissant (2008) and the typologies by Shain and Linz (1995), Huntington (1993), and Doyle (2002).

sustain the status quo and their control over power; while regime Liberalizers negotiate with the opposition to assure their political survival in a future democratic regime. Opposition Moderates and Radicals do not necessarily have distinct interests, but are divided by strategy and risk aversion: Radicals are resolved to use violence to achieve their goals (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Przeworski, 1992). Democratic transitions in which Liberalizers retain a high degree of control are termed top-down reform processes (Linz, 1978), transitions through transaction (Share and Mainwaring, 1986), or transformations (Huntington, 1993). Transitions controlled by Moderates are labeled bottom-up ruptures (Linz, 1978), transitions through collapse (Share and Mainwaring, 1986), or replacements (Huntington, 1993). In an intermediate type – transitions through extrication (Share and Mainwaring, 1986) or transplacements (Huntington, 1993) – Liberalizers negotiate their exit with Moderates in a pact. Huntington (1993) also considers external intervention as a fourth mode of transition (cf. Levitsky and Way, 2005; Whitehead, 2001).

How does Between States fit into this debate and what does it tell us about how the type of interim government impacts democratic consolidation? When it was published, Shain and Linz (1995)’s volume added to the debate by introducing a typology that relates a type of interim government to each mode of transition (cf. Figure 2.1). Firstly, if an old regime is defeated in a replacement, opposition forces rule in a revolutionary interim government – track (1) in Figure 2.1 – such as in Libya after Muammar Gaddafi was ousted in 2011. Secondly, power-sharing interim governments come into being in a transition through extrication – track (2) – such as after Nepal’s civil war in 2006 (cf. Chapter 6).
Thirdly, in international interim governments (3) “the international community, through the aegis of the United Nations, directs and monitors the process of democratic change” (Shain and Linz, 1995, p. 5). This was the case with the 1991-93 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) (cf. Chapter 8 and Croissant, 2007). And fourthly, an incumbent caretaker interim government reflects a transition managed by Liberalizers (4), such as in Angola, where the 1991-92 interim period was ruled by the incumbent Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola or People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) while insurgents of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola or National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) remained outside power (cf. Chapter 7).

All in all, the central thesis of the literature is that negotiated pacts – resulting in power-sharing interim governments – offer the best prospects for democratic consolidation, because such pacts make a positive-sum outcome for all sides feasible (cf. Figure 2.1). In contrast, revolutionary upheavals create winners and losers and turn interim politics into a zero-sum game (Friedheim, 1993; Huntington, 1993; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986) – at least in the short run. Long-term effects of power-sharing transitions on democratic consolidation are seen more critically, as they have been found to “tempt elites to extend their agreements beyond the period of early uncertainty and reinforce a pattern of collusion between political parties that generates corruption and citizen disillusionment” (Schmitter, 2010, p. 23). Bosnia, where long-term power-sharing institutions that are in place since 1995 have also been described as “faking democracy” (Chandler, 2000) is a case in point (cf. below). Concerning other types of transitions, Linz and Stepan (1996, p. 57) point out that revolutionary interim governments often tend to only carry the prefix “interim” on paper, and while claiming to “act in the name of the people” they are really often postponing elections to extend their rule. Valenzuela (1990) similarly diagnoses that while revolutionary interim government has the merit to generate an institutional tabula rasa on which new political, military and economic institutions can be built upon, it often entails the risk that not everyone who fills a power vacuum is committed to democracy.

From the perspective of peace and conflict research, one remarkable conclusion of the transitology paradigm is that this research agenda regards all interim government models as either unlikely to occur or to succeed (in terms of democratic consolidation) if interim rule is preceded by intrastate conflict. Shain and Linz (1995) expect a history of internal conflict to significantly reduce the chances of a caretaker interim government to convene because a regime’s participation in armed combat turns legitimate caretaker rule into a remote option. They similarly argue that power-sharing interim government is an unlikely option if the time before its creation is marked by widespread violence.8

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8This is not undisputed, and Ottaway and Lacina (2003, p. 82) have reflected on the advantages of caretaker interim government after violent conflict. They reason that after such
Equally, Valenzuela (1990, p. 76) holds that revolutionary interim government can only successfully pave the way to democracy if a regime collapses “swiftly in the absence of civil war or much internal violence.” While international interim government is regarded as the most likely option where “deep-seated historical rivalries are so profound, so violent, and so seemingly irresolvable” that domestic interim rule is nonviable (Shain and Berat, 1995, p. 63), studies are divided on the degree of regime destruction that renders such rule successful (Croissant, 2008; Paris, 2004). While this discussion relates more generally to questions concerning the link between armed conflict and democratization that are outside the focus of this dissertation (cf. Gates, Hegre, Jones, et al., 2006; Jarstad and Sisk, 2008; Ohlson and Söderberg-Kovacs, 2011; Vreeland, 2008), the present debate nevertheless begs the question: if interim governments are seemingly nonviable to promote democracy after civil war, can they be instruments for peacebuilding and conflict resolution?

### 2.2 Interim Governments and Peace

Interim governments are regular institutional features in societies marked by intrastate armed conflict; and thus they have naturally been picked up by peace and conflict research. This political science sub-discipline has traditionally analyzed three fundamental and often interlinked research questions on the causes and consequences of conflict onset (or why some states experience conflict while others do not), conflict duration (or why some conflicts last longer than others), and conflict resolution (or why some conflicts are followed by stable peace while violence recurs, or never subsides, in other cases). Early studies of the sub-discipline were thereby chiefly interested in explaining the onset, duration, and resolution of interstate armed conflicts (e.g. Hensel, 1996; Powell, 1994; Tir and Diehl, 1998). That this empirical phenomenon has however vanished from the global scene has given rise to analyses of the onset, duration, and resolution of intrastate armed conflict.9

In answering if interim governments are instruments for conflict resolution and can play a role for stable peace in the post-interim period, existing studies within peace and conflict research are in agreement that interim governments do have long-term effects, but studies are divided by what those effects may be. I quoted Manning (2007, p. 54) in Chapter 1, who has phrased this idea by saying that while interim governments are short in duration, they “cast a long shadow into the future” by “affecting who gets early access to the levers of the state” and “by influencing the expectations and strategies of those elites as they

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9In 2014, only one of 40 armed conflicts recorded by the UCDP was fought between two states (the conflict between India and Pakistan), while the remaining 39 conflicts were fought within the borders of sovereign states (Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015).
seek to hold onto power over the transition to permanent governing arrangements.” Shain and Berat (1995, p. 68) argue that “a well-designed international interim government arrangement may have a long-term impact in securing not only the creation of democratic institutions that may minimize violence but also in ameliorating structural and socioeconomic defects inherited from the previous regime.” In the same vein, Hughes (1996, p. 72) writes on the legacy of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and on the “effect of the transition period on Cambodia’s long-term political development.” Similarly, Croissant (2008, p. 659) argues that interim governments come with “long-term achievements in terms of sustainable peace-building and durable democratization” that are yet difficult to achieve. Rothchild (2007) instead holds more critically that interim structures that enhance prospects of peace in the short term can be potential sources of instability or conflict in the long run; and also Donini (2007, p. 45) notes on interim government in Afghanistan that “short-term gain may turn into long-term pain.”

Why are some interim governments then followed by stable peace in the aftermath of war while others are not, and how do interim governments lead to long-term peace? In answering this question, existing research in the peace and conflict realm narrows the focus of the democratization debate and focuses on the power-sharing and international interim government models of the Shain
and Linz (1995) typology (although there is a small literature on “victor’s peace” that links to revolutionary interim rule, see Piccolino, 2015). In what follows I will now first discuss the concept of power-sharing in the broader peace and conflict literature, then situate the interim government-specific literature in this debate, and I then repeat this exercise for the concept of international interventions and international interim government. Generally, this discussion will show that the broader literature insufficiently acknowledges the specifics of interim governments, and that few comparative studies exist that do.

This general lack of research on interim governments is also reflected in Figure 2.2. For this plot, I web-scraped data from Google Scholar to search for those articles that mention “interim government” (or related terms) at least once within their title, abstract, or full text, which constitutes a very liberal interpretation of articles being written “about” the topic interim government. I concentrated my search on those articles published in the five journals with the highest 2013 impact factor in political science and international relations. I then aggregated all counts by journal name and year of publication. This exercise shows that interim governments have thus far been rather neglected by the literature – with typically only four or less articles per year even mentioning “interim governments” at all, while exceptional peaks exist in 1993 and 2004. These peaks, further demonstrating my point above, are driven by either single-case analyses of political developments in South Africa and Western Sahara (e.g. Durch, 1993; Shapiro, 1993; Wyk and Radloff, 1993) or by more conceptual accounts on the consequences of international interim government in weak and war-torn states (e.g. Fearon and Laitin, 2004; Kelley, 2004; Krasner, 2004).

### 2.2.1 Power-Sharing Interim Government

Peace and conflict research has ascribed most attention to the question if power-sharing interim government is a viable instrument to resolve the underlying incompatibility of armed conflict and bring durable peace in the aftermath of war. In recent years, a number of single case studies and small- to medium-n comparisons have been published on this topic (e.g. Jarstad, 2010; Lemarchand, 2007; Lyons, 2005; Papagianni, 2008; Rothchild, 2007; Schmidt and Galyan, 2017; Sisk and Stefes, 2005; Strasheim and Fjelde, 2014). Power-sharing interim governments can be defined as institutions that, between the demise of an old regime and first elections, offer warring party representatives seats in a cabinet or legislative (cf. Chapter 3 and Walter, 2002). But power-sharing institutions are not necessarily ascribed with sunset clauses that regulate their termination. For instance, Bosnia’s Dayton Peace Agreement called for permanent power-sharing structures following all elections and regulated:

> “The House of Representatives shall comprise 42 Members, two-

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thirds elected from the territory of the Federation, one-third from the territory of the Republika Srpska. ... The Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina ... shall consist of three Members: one Bosniac and one Croat, each directly elected from the territory of the Federation, and one Serb directly elected from the territory of the Republika Srpska” (United Nations, 1995).

Studies on power-sharing interim government are thus only part of a broader debate that is not limited to pacted deals as short-term arrangements (e.g. Cammett and Malesky, 2012; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007; Mukherjee, 2006; Ottmann and Vüllers, 2014). In this regard, the concept of power-sharing is inherently linked to the study of consociationalism as introduced by Arendt Lijphart (Lijphart, 1977; Lijphart, 1999; Lijphart, 2007). Concerned with explaining the quality of democracy in divided societies, Lijphart framed the idea that ethnicity (or any other form of identity) should be politically accommodated in state institutions in order to make democracy viable in societies characterized by antagonistic sentiments between identity groups. He suggested measures such as implementing grand coalition cabinets, veto and autonomy rights to protect minority interests, or allocating votes and civil service appointments through the principle of proportionality. Although the study of power-sharing in peace and conflict research directly descends from Lijphart’s work, the concepts of power-sharing and consociationalism are not identical, not least because both research agendas come with distinct explanatory interests (Jarstad and Sisk, 2008): while Lijphart was interested in how consociationalism can increase the quality of democracy in divided societies, peace and conflict research treats power-sharing as a mechanism to sustain peace where democracy seems impossible (but see Hartzell and Hoddie, 2015).  

**Consociationalism after Civil War** Why should power-sharing lead to peace after war? The main theoretical argument of the broader peace and conflict literature builds on rationalist explanations and hypothesizes that power-sharing addresses the security dilemma and commitment problems of warring parties (cf. Chapter 3). Thus, in the context of intrastate conflicts, the institutional environment of a weak state, mutual fear and mistrust, as well as existing military organizations and the uncontrolled spread of weapons result in a high degree of physical and political insecurity. This makes warring parties unwilling to demobilize and peacefully resolve their incompatibilities, because they fear being attacked by their enemy. Power-sharing is expected to mitigate this dilemma by decreasing such uncertainties, because by allocating seats

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11 Furthermore, O’Leary (2005) reasons that consociationalism is only one of many ways how groups can share power – other forms include, for instance, to alternate government – and Boogards (2013) refers to Hartzell and Hoddie (2003)’s influential typology of political, military, territorial and economic power-sharing between warring parties in post-conflict societies and argues that Lijphart neither considered warring parties as actors to share power, nor did he reflect on the allocation of posts in the national military.
to all warring parties engaged in war, it assures those parties that they will not be ambushed and marginalized, but instead obtain long-term influence over decision-making processes (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Walter, 2002). As Mat-tes and Savun (2009, p. 739) phrase it, power-sharing reduces parties’ “fear regarding future actions of the opponent by imposing constraints on the opponent’s ability to renege on the deal” – thus the “whole trick of consociational democracy” is the long-term accommodation of fear (Fearon, 1995a, p. 14).

Empirically, the relationship between power-sharing and peace has in recent years been predominantly tested by statistical analyses that make use of peace agreement cases as samples for their study (most prominently by Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007). Most studies implement survival models and increasingly use sophisticated mixed-method research designs (e.g. Cammert and Malesky, 2012) and methods to account for selection bias (e.g. Hartzell and Hoddie, 2015). This debate is complemented by a substantial body of case studies, primarily on Africa (e.g. Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010; Lemarchand, 2007; Meher, 2009; Simons, Zanker, et al., 2013; Tull and Meher, 2005). In sum, empirical results are inconclusive. For instance, Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) find that power-sharing in political institutions is unrelated to peace; Mattes and Savun (2009) and Walter (2002) find a statistically significant and positive coefficient for power-sharing institutions in for their samples; and Tull and Meher (2005) find detrimental effects of power-sharing, because the inclusion of warring parties in joint government generates new rebel movements by rewarding the use of violence with political office.

Why are empirical results on power-sharing inconclusive? In her review of the literature, Binningsbø (2013) argues that ambivalent findings stem to a large extent from methodological issues and are often caused by distinct units of analysis, sampling strategies, or operationalizations. She also briefly responds to the difference between power-sharing in interim governments and permanent deals of joint rule and the problems of pooling both types of power-sharing into joint data sets, but does not dive further into the issue:

\[\text{“Since every researcher provides her own conceptualization of power sharing, there is an unlimited number of ... understandings I could discuss here. ... In particular, it is important to keep in mind the difference between long-term power sharing institutions and short-term power sharing arrangements” (Binningsbo, 2013, p. 97).}\]

Mukherjee (2006) criticizes the focus on power-sharing after peace agreements, arguing that a comprehensive theory on the effects of power-sharing should examine how victories condition the impact of joint rule and showing that power-sharing after victory is most likely to lead to peace. But the focus on peace agreements can also be considered a hard test for the effect of power-sharing, because peace after negotiated settlements is found to be inherently unstable: in contrast to decisive victories, accords leave warring parties with sufficient resources to attack each other, thus creating a situation in which parties have difficulties to commit to disarmament (Licklider, 1995; Mason and Fett, 1996; Walter, 2002).

For instance, while Walter (2002) employs a narrow operationalization of power-sharing and allows for a positive coding only if parties are offered positions at the level of cabinet or above, Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) also include proportional electoral systems.
Power-Sharing Interim Government  What are the differences between long- and short-term power-sharing that Binningsbø (2013) mentions? In terms of theory, the studies quoted above draw the causal story between power-sharing and peace as one in which long-term power-sharing enables parties to “look down the road” and be assured of their future role in post-war politics – but can power-sharing interim government offer such forward-looking guarantees to the same extent or in the same way as long-term deals? In other words, does power-sharing interim government have different effects than long-term arrangements have, or does it work via distinct causal mechanisms?

Some studies focusing on power-sharing interim government stay in line with the rationalist argumentation of the broader literature. Notably, Jarstad (2010, p. 46) argues for the immediate effect of power-sharing interim government on the uncertainty and need for physical and political protection of warring parties by settling their “immediate dispute for political power.” Manning (2007) changes the focus from the immediate to the long-term, arguing that it is possible to expect that even though power-sharing interim governments terminate, they have a long-term impact on reducing future uncertainty for warring parties. She argues that it is not the offer of constant representation that is important, but that power-sharing interim government grants parties two particular advantages that will be of use to them further down the road. Firstly, it offers them an incumbent benefit of name recognition for the elections terminating interim government. Secondly, because interim governments are usually the bodies that design permanent laws for post-interim politics, power-sharing also offers all warring parties the benefit to strategically design post-interim structures according to their own desires. To this end, even if post-interim politics may not run on a system of fixed quotas, former power-sharers can still expect to dominate political competition. Manning (2007)’s view on power-sharing interim government thus differs from Przeworski (1991)’s idea that transitions fall under a Rawlsian veil of ignorance, meaning that elites know little about their future role in a political system and thus design institutions with strong checks and balances and maximum political leverage for minorities.

Others have considered causal stories diverging from the broader debate. A first noteworthy idea is that power-sharing interim rule resembles a “school in democracy” (Jarstad, 2010, p. 46) where warring parties learn to communicate and assure each other that they are willing to solve disputes verbally through political institutions instead of violently and on the battlefield. Leaving the question aside how unelected interim governments can teach democracy, a system “in which parties loose elections” (Przeworski, 1991, p. 10), this mechanism resolutely demarcates the concept of power-sharing interim government from permanent joint governance. While power-sharing has been regarded as a driver for democracy by some in the broader political science literature (cf. section 2.1 and Norris, 2008), the debate on consociational politics after armed conflict has often denounced power-sharing as profoundly undemocratic. This
is because guarantees for inclusion in decision-making processes contradict the uncertain and competitive nature of democracy (Jarstad and Sisk, 2008; Jung, 2012; Roeder and Rothchild, 2005; Sisk and Stefes, 2005).

A final causal mechanism proposed by scholarship on power-sharing interim government is that power-sharing interim government adds to peace by gradually embracing an unarmed opposition in politics. Permanent power-sharing institutions are often criticized precisely for bringing the exact opposite and excluding societal voices other than the warring parties from governance in the long run (Jung, 2012; Papagianni, 2007a; Schneckener, 2002). Therefore, Papagianni (2007a, 29f.) argues: “Power-sharing arrangements should be transitional,” because “[transitional] periods should create space for the continuation of talks and for the emergence of new political actors.” Equally, Paris (2004) holds that peace processes should begin with a period of institution-building during interim rule before elections are held, because interim periods offer political parties and civil society organizations without a history of armed insurgency the chance to organize, compete, or watch over the electoral process. Also Söderberg-Kovacs (2008, p. 154) reasons that one strategy to bring unarmed non-signatory parties into politics is to create power-sharing interim governments that include warring parties only for the interim period while a post-interim system also encompasses parties without a background in armed struggle (cf. Papagianni, 2009).

In terms of empirical results, scholarship focusing on power-sharing interim government shares its inconclusive results with the broader literature. For instance, Lyons (2005) and Papagianni (2008) find that power-sharing interim government contributes to peace in their case studies by reducing the risks of one party becoming dominant and endangering the security of the other parties. Jarstad (2010) does not detect any relationship between power-sharing interim government and post-electoral peace in societies after war. Analyzing power-sharing interim government in the DRC and in Burundi, Curtis (2007) concludes that power-sharing interim governments that were “overloaded” with antagonistic elites were even detrimental to peace and made effective decision-making impossible. Similarly, Croissant (2007, p. 233) reasons that including all warring parties in Cambodia’s power-sharing Supreme National Council (SNC) during the interim period impeded prospects for peace and democracy because it “led to double, sometimes even triple structures” of governance. One problematic aspect with regard to these results is that they are largely based on small-n research designs and thus it is difficult to generalize from these findings.

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14Proposing a practical solution to this problem, Sisk (2008, p. 196) imagines a sequential model that first accommodates belligerents in power-sharing interim government, while post-interim institutions overcome quotas, reward moderation, and denote a “much more fluid form of democracy.” Empirical evidence shows some support for the positive effect of power-sharing on post-conflict democracy, but as Hartzell and Hoddie (2015) note, there is still too little empirical research on the topic and the results of existing studies are problematic due to operational issues of regime type data sets that include measures for political violence (Gates, Hegre, Jones, et al., 2006; Vreeland, 2008).
2.2.2 International Interim Government

A second major focus of the peace and conflict literature when it comes to interim governments is the study of Shain and Linz (1995)’s international interim government model. This literature encompasses a vast number of case studies or conceptual work dealing with the UN’s role in administrating the interim periods of Namibia, Cambodia, Kosovo, East Timor, and Bosnia (e.g. Caplan, 2005; Caplan, 2006; Chesterman, 2005b; Chopra, 2000; Chopra, 2002; Croissant, 2007; Doyle, 2002; Fearon and Laitin, 2004; Gorjao, 2002; Harland, 2004; Lemay-Hébert, 2011; Ratner, 2005; Wilde, 2001). Similar to the studies on power-sharing interim government, this scholarship speaks to a broader research agenda in peace and conflict research that investigates the more general question of the role of international actors in peace processes.

International Interventions after Civil War  How does the intervention of international actors, most notably the UN and its peacekeeping operations, impact chances of sustainable peace after war? International intervention in and after intrastate conflict is not a phenomenon of the post-Cold War period, as external actors supported warring parties engaged in intrastate warfare already before 1989, for instance by providing financial support (Harbom and Wallensteen, 2005). However, the deployment of UN peacekeeping missions has exploded since the fall of the Berlin wall, and more peacekeepers were sent to mitigate intrastate conflicts between 1989 and 1993 than in the foregoing four decades all taken together (Fortna and Howard, 2008). The academic interest in such interventions has risen in response to this empirical trend, and although international involvement in war-torn states includes a variety of actions from mediation to foreign aid, much attention has been attributed to the effects of peacekeeping operations (e.g. Bellamy and Williams, 2011; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2008a; Fortna, 2008b; Hultman et al., 2013; Karim and Beardsley, 2016; Richmond, 2004). One overarching question driving this debate is if and how peacekeeping can keep peace after armed conflict has terminated.

Similar to the power-sharing debate, the main theoretical argument of the broader peace and conflict literature builds on rationalist explanations and hypothesizes that international interventions address three causal mechanisms: credible commitment problems, anarchy, and cost and benefit equations of warring parties (cf. Chapter 3). Prominently, Walter (2002) has coined the term third-party security guarantee and holds that international intervention increases chances for peace because once warring parties know that peacekeepers will enforce their compliance, their ability to commit to disarming their troops increases. Similarly, Doyle and Sambanis (2006, p. 780) reason that in a security dilemma after war, peacekeepers represent a neutral authority that reduces the anarchic institutional environment of war-torn states where all other institutions have collapsed. Mattes and Savun (2009) hold that peacekeepers are
a cost-increasing mechanism for warring parties, as they physically constraint soldiers: peacekeepers can stand in the way of parties attacking one another meaning that parties spend valuable resources to fight peacekeepers that they could otherwise use fighting their enemy. If peacekeepers come under attack themselves, they may use force for self-defense (cf. Salverda, 2013).

Empirically, there exists a strong consensus in the statistical debate on the issue that “peacekeeping works,” (Fortna, 2004a, p. 288). All other things being equal and adhering to selection bias, peacekeeping is positively correlated with the likelihood and stability of peace after war. Most studies thereby separate diverse types of peacekeeping to study variation in effects, and a common strategy is to distinguish observer missions that are unarmed and small in size; traditional peacekeeping operations that are staffed only with lightly armed units; and multidimensional peacekeeping mission that supplement traditional missions with civilian components (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2004b). Particularly multidimensional peacekeeping missions are found to strongly and positively correlated with the likelihood of peace after armed conflict (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000), even though peacekeepers tend to be sent to the most severe cases of war (Fortna and Howard, 2008). Hegre, Hultman, et al. (2011), by simulating the effect of peacekeeping operations between 2010 and 2035, even find that multidimensional peacekeeping can reduce the global incidence armed conflict by 65 percent. This statistical euphoria is not echoed to the same extent in qualitative research. Particularly multidimensional operations regularly come under fire for seeking to remodel war-torn societies in the Global South after Western ideas of democracy and ignoring these societies’ own cultural and institutional heritage (cf. below and Heathershaw, 2008; Richmond, 2004; Richmond, 2009). Newer studies have also increasingly attended to sexual violence by peacekeepers (Karim and Beardsley, 2016; Simić, 2010) and unintended consequences of expatriate social habits (Autesserre, 2014).

With her work situated in the statistical peacekeeping literature, Fortna also considers differences between multidimensional peacekeeping and UN administrations as a form of international interim government, although she does not integrate this variance into her empirical analysis. In specific, she argues

“This breakdown of mission types does not distinguish missions that temporarily take over the administration of the country … from other types of peacekeeping. These transitional administration missions may have rather different effects than missions that oversee national administration of the state only during the transition to peace” (Fortna, 2008b, p. 43).

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15 Similarly, Chesterman (2005b, p. 5) conceptualizes international interim government as a “less common type” of peacekeeping operation, in which transitions to peace are “pursued by assuming some or all of the powers of the state on a temporary basis.”
**International Interim Government** What are the differences between “regular” peacekeeping and international interim government that Fortna (2008b) refers to? Conceptually, scholarship on international interim government shares with the broader debate its differentiation of degrees of international involvement. When the concept of the international interim government model was first introduced by Shain and Linz (1995), the authors could not possibly have foreseen the scope of intrusive authority of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). This empirical development is what makes employing the international interim government model as a framework for analysis in the way that it was put forward by Shain and Linz (1995) problematic, for two reasons.

Firstly, Shain and Berat (1995, p. 64) regard international interim government as an unsuitable institution for failed states “where no modern civil institutions remain functioning” and instead consider it necessary that “state institutions have remained largely intact” and a regime “has not been totally delegitimized.” This perspective is yet in contrast both to the situations where international interim government has occurred empirically – East Timor and Kosovo experienced a formal “administrative vacuum” after Serb and Indonesian state personnel had fled (Bull, 2008) – and to findings of more recent studies. For instance, Croissant (2008, 663f.) concludes after comparing international interim government in Cambodia and East Timor that the theory put forward by Shain and Linz (1995) suggests “that this model was better suited for Cambodia than for East Timor” because “in East Timor, state institutions and the incumbent regime were swept away after the Indonesian military had withdrawn.” However, at closer inspection, he finds that conditions “were more conducive to a successful outcome of democratization through international interim government in East Timor than in Cambodia.” More generally, authors have found the “direct international administration of war-torn territories” to be better suited for societies “where no functioning governmental institutions exist and have to be created from scratch” (Paris, 2004, p. 206). Secondly, most interim governments put in place in the aftermath of intrastate conflict today see some degree of international engagement (Guttieri and Piombo, 2007; Ottaway and Lacina, 2003).

Based on these developments, more recent works differentiate three types of international interim government after war (cf. Figure 2.1). Firstly, under **supervisory authority**, international actors assume full legislative, administrative, and executive powers (as exercised by UNTAET); secondly, under **executive authority**, international actors have full executive authority but share other powers with domestic elites (as exercised by the 1996-98 United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) in

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16 Only later in the year of publishing *Between States*, Bosnia’s Dayton Agreement was signed and represented a new climax in post-conflict international engagement by awarding the OHR with the authority to remove from office any domestic politician who violated the terms of Dayton and to run Bosnia “like a feudal fiefdom” (Chandler, 2007).
Croatia); and thirdly, under administrative authority, international actors oversee the bureaucracy for the time of interim rule (as exercised by UNTAC in Cambodia, cf. Chapter 8 and Doyle, 2001).

Beside these conceptual advances, the debate on international interim government is little theory-driven and typically focuses on producing policy-relevant “lessons learned” from the few cases at hand. The results it presents are often extremely critical – particularly of the supervisory model – and thereby link to the broader qualitative debate on international interventions (e.g. Barnett and Zürcher, 2009; Bull, 2008; Caplan, 2005; Chesterman, 2005b; Chopra, 2000; Gorjao, 2002; Lenay-Hébert, 2011). The vast majority of the studies have often heatedly dismissed international interim rule for being “undemocratic” (Chesterman, 2005b, p. 205), “illegitimate” (Harland, 2004, p. 15), or of “neo-colonial” nature (Peterson, 2007). The labeling of UNTAET as “The UN’s Kingdom of East Timor” (Chopra, 2000), of international administration in Kosovo as “UNMIKist” (King and Mason, 2006, p. 16), or Chandler (2000)’s scorning of international authority in Bosnia as “a parody of democracy” are examples of the emotional tone the debate has taken at times.17

One central empirical finding of the debate is that international interim government is more likely to lead to (positive) peace if it promotes local ownership, referring to the extent by which domestic parties are in control over the design and conduct of the political process (Donais, 2009). In a causal mechanism between international interim government and peace, local ownership is regarded as vital not only because it increases the legitimacy of international interim government by ingraining its reforms in a society, but is also seen as creating long-term domestic governance capacity if domestic staff is trained by international personnel (Hansen and Sharon Wiharta, 2007). Neglecting local ownership in international interim government is consequently perceived as having profound negative effects on a peace process. For instance, Croissant (2008, p. 662) concludes for East Timor that a “major shortcoming was UNTAET’s quasi-feudalist exercise of political authority and its failure to include local people in the political process.” Narten (2008) shows that the late realization of local ownership and transfer of authority from UNMIK to domestic elites in Kosovo not only increased popular doubts on the legitimacy of the peace process. It also turned domestic elites into spoilers of the peace process who increasingly assumed confrontational positions towards the international authorities. Finally, Donini (2007) argues that during Afghanistan’s interim government, the ignorance towards local perspectives lead to a “perception gap” and the inability of interim government officials to understand how security concerns and feelings

17Notably, there have been a few arguments for the viability of international interim government that comes with the financial resources, knowledge, and influence to rebuild institutions and may thus translate into effective decision-making and implementation of policies (Papagianni, 2009; Rotberg, 2002). Caplan (2005) recognizes reasons for why domestic input in interim rule should be limited under some circumstances, for instance to ensure that international actors are not prone to public pressures that compromise their neutrality.
Table 2.1: Shortcomings of Previous Research

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<tr>
<th>Research gap</th>
<th>Shortcoming</th>
<th>Strategy</th>
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<tr>
<td>The peace and conflict literature neglects interim governments in theories that focus on long-term institutions and by pooling both institutional types in one data set.</td>
<td>This is a shortcoming, because we may expect that both institutional types run via distinct causal pathways to promote peace after war.</td>
<td>In this dissertation, I focus on the particularities of interim governments to advance our theoretical and empirical understanding of how such bodies add to peace after war.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The literature that focuses on the effects of interim governments is mostly comprised of under-theorized single case studies, but lacks theory-driven, comparative research designs.</td>
<td>This is a shortcoming as this methodological approach makes it difficult to generalize findings, identify causal mechanisms that work across cultural contexts or account for selection bias.</td>
<td>In this dissertation, I use a mixed-method approach to study interim governments that combines Cox Proportional Hazard models with three comparative case studies from different world regions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The literature that focuses on the effects of interim governments studies almost exclusively static institutional designs as explanatory variables, rather than the reforms interim governments implement.</td>
<td>This is a shortcoming as this theoretical approach to understand why some interim governments lead to peace while others do not may omit key variables that help to explain the stability of peace after war.</td>
<td>In this dissertation, I complement the existing “institutional design” approaches to interim governments with a focus on reform practices &amp; show that it is the latter that come with the strongest explanatory power.</td>
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of marginalization in the periphery added to ongoing violence.

2.3 Shortcomings of Past Research

To summarize the foregoing sections, more than 20 years after Shain and Linz (1995)’s seminal volume, the literature has arrived at a significantly better understanding of the role of interim governments for peace after war, but several interrelated shortcomings still exist. These shortcomings and the strategies of how I address them in this dissertation are also summarized in Table 2.1. Firstly, I have more generally demonstrated above as well as in Chapter 1 that the broader debate within peace and conflict research to some extent conceptually acknowledges the profound differences between short-term, interim institutional configurations and long-term deals (e.g. Binningsbø, 2013; Fortna, 2008b). However, it then vastly neglects such differences in its empirical anal-
yses, for instance by pooling together interim versions of power-sharing and long-term deals in one data set (e.g., Cammett and Malesky, 2012; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007; Pospieszna and Schneider, 2013). This runs into danger of conflating different causal mechanisms. This dissertation thus advances existing research by zooming in on the particularities of interim governments. Eventually, this will not least help policy-makers to make more informed decisions in designing transitions from war to peace (cf. Chapter 10).

Secondly and methodologically, I have also demonstrated that while there has been a growing amount of scholarship dealing specifically with interim governments as instruments for the promotion of long-term peace, this literature still predominantly exists of qualitative, under-theorized, and often single-n case study research design. This state of the art is problematic because the results derived from non-comparative case study research designs are difficult to generalize across a larger number of cases, and case study research designs have also insufficiently dealt with the question of what types of interim governments are selected in which situations. Notably, in reviewing the edited volume by Shain and Linz (1995), Heydemann (1997, p. 986) raises doubts that interim governments can independently impact democratic consolidation because they are likely determined “by the contexts that created them.” Wilde (2001, p. 606) also notes that we must “question why [the international interim government model] is deployed selectively, and ask how such selectivity affects the institution’s realization of its own objectives.”

These remarks on the endogeneity of institutional designs are increasingly addressed by statistical peace and conflict research that studies if institutions are an epiphenomenon and merely reflect existing social cleavages – thereby having only a limited effect on peace (Fortna, 2003b; Reynal-Querol, 2005; Schneider and Wiesehomeier, 2008) – or if we can be “institutional optimists” in the sense that institutions do function independently from their contexts. For the study of interim government, this issue of endogeneity means that there may be factors that lead to the creation of specific properties of interim government, and that these factors are also correlated with post-interim peace, which would make interim government an epiphenomenon in the peace process. I address this shortcoming of previous research by introducing a mixed-method research design that combines statistical analysis with qualitative case studies in order to allow for not only discovering more particularized observations and causal processes but also for a more sound generalization of my results. I also run several logistic regression and ordered logistic regression models in Chapter 4 and Chapter 9, as well as Cox PH models on subsets of my original analysis, to assess the selectivity of interim governments.

Thirdly and conceptually, the study of interim government in the peace and conflict literature can be also be advanced by considering properties of interim government other than their institutional designs. As I have argued in Chapter 1, this approach may omit or overlook important variables and mechanisms
that help to explain the stability of peace after armed conflict. I address this shortcoming by developing a bargaining theory framework that in a first step incorporates the existing institutional design approach in a model on how interim governments mitigate credible commitment problems among warring parties. In a second step, I then demonstrate how a focus on the institutional designs of interim governments has weak explanatory power for how interim rule adds to peace in the long run and may miss out on important causal mechanisms. In a third step, this framework thus complements the previous focus on the institutional designs of interim government with an analysis of what reforms these interim governments implement to induce transitions from armed conflict to peace; and the manner by which they do so.
Chapter 3

Theoretical Framework

This chapter develops a bargaining theoretical framework to explain how properties of interim government increase the stability of post-interim peace. To recall, I have shown in Chapter 2 that many accounts of the comparative and quantitative peace and conflict literature have thus far neglected the specific causal mechanisms linking interim governments to peace, while the literature that deals explicitly with the role of interim governments after war faces its own conceptual and methodological limitations. In this chapter, I address the shortcomings of previous research by proceeding in three steps. Section 3.1 outlines the core assumptions of bargaining theory and presents an argument for why it is theoretically and empirically fruitful to focus on credible commitment problems as an explanation for post-interim peace (or the absence thereof). The section ends with identifying three concrete causal mechanisms on how interim governments can be instruments to mitigate commitment problems and increase the stability of peace. Section 3.2 derives four hypotheses from this argument. The first two hypotheses follow existing research on interim governments and concern these governments’ institutional designs. Next, I show with the help of bargaining theory why a strict focus on such designs may be insufficient to explain how interim governments mitigate commitment problems in the long run. I build on research on non-state and unarmed actors in war and peace to develop two additional hypotheses on reform features of interim government. I summarize the theoretical framework in section 3.3.

3.1 The Bargaining Theory of War

As part of game theory, bargaining models are concerned with strategic situations in which two players must reach an agreement on how to distribute a good. While each player prefers to reach a deal rather than abstain from doing so, each also prefers the agreement that most favors her respective interests.
The Underlying Assumptions of Conflict Bargaining  
Modeling the social situation of war this way, the bargaining theory of war – based on the work by Fearon (1995b) and Powell (2006) – builds on three underlying assumptions about players and their choice of actions. Firstly, in order to understand why a player chooses a particular action given her set of possibilities, the bargaining theory of war assumes that players are rational actors (cf. Becker, 1996; Kalyvas, 2006). This means that an individual has complete and transitive preferences – if she, when presented with two options $X$ and $Y$, prefers $X$ to $Y$ and $Y$ to $Z$, she also prefers $X$ to $Z$. It also means that an individual can outweigh costs and benefits when selecting her course of action, as well as choose the action that maximizes her utility. Not only do structural conditions (such as institutions) thereby affect her expected utility of a particular action, but so do decisions of other individuals in the bargaining situation.\(^{18}\)

Secondly, on the organizational level, bargaining theory follows a unitary actor assumption. By organizations I mean bodies that consist of individuals who pursue “a mix of common and individual goals through partially coordinated behavior” (North et al., 2009a, p. 15), such as rebel groups engaged in intrastate armed conflict. Treating organizations as unitary, rational actors means that bargaining theory regards players as monolithic entities that try to maximize their interest, while it disregards any internal cleavages that may occur, for instance between rebel leaders and rank-and-file soldiers. Some models have criticized and loosened this assumption by allowing for distinct types of unitary actors. For instance, Fearon (1994) studies the role of audience costs in international disputes and argues that because democracies face stronger domestic audiences than authoritarian regimes, the former are less likely to back down from a threat and thus are able to credibly signal their true intentions. This loosens the unitary actor assumption because it envisions a state as “run by an agent on behalf of a principle (the ‘audience’) rather than a unitary state with a perfectly secure leadership” (Fearon, 1995b, p. 396).

Thirdly, bargaining theory models interactions between actors as two-player games. This is also because “although n-player games are not necessarily any more difficult to analyze formally, it is often harder to specify a substantively convincing or ‘natural’ bargaining protocol,” such as the sequence of moves (Powell, 2002, p. 14). This assumption has not been without criticism, and Lake (2010, p. 9) has argued referring to the Iraq war that “this analytic simplification [masks] important dynamics” in conflict, for instance if multiple domestic and international audiences – including minorities within the state or regional rivals – hear the same signal but interpret it in different ways.

\(^{18}\)For instance, an ethnic minority’s utility for declaring independence from a state will always also depend on what action it expects the government of that state to follow, such as whether the latter will accept its declaration without further action or whether it will use violence in order to prevent its loss of territory.
Bargaining Model of War  Based on these assumptions, the bargaining model of war thus examines strategic interactions of states in international war, or of governments and rebel groups in internal conflict, usually as two-player, sequential, zero-sum games (cf. Findley, 2013). This means that one player chooses her action before the other one chooses hers, implying that the second player is informed of the choice of the first one. It also means that one player’s gain of utility is the other one’s loss. To illustrate, in the modeled situations, two players – I focus now on a government $G$ and a rebel group $R$ – are at dispute over a continuously divisible issue (such as cabinet seats or territory), represented in Figure 3.1 by the interval $[0, 1]$. Both prefer the outcome that most favors their respective interest, such as receiving all seats or controlling all territory. Thus, $R$’s ideal point is at 1 ($R$ gets all land or seats), while $G$’s ideal point is at 0 ($G$ gets all land or seats), meaning also that $R$’s and $G$’s preferences are strictly opposed. The status quo or current division of seats or land is denoted at $q$ ($R$ has very few seats or very little land), and the expected division of the issue through conflict is denoted at $p$ (thus, $R$ would get a much better share of seats or land). If $R$ is currently growing stronger – for instance because it receives external support – it has incentives to challenge $G$’s authority over the status quo, because its expected capabilities to prevail in armed conflict do not reflect the current division of the issue at stake (cf. Lake, 2010).

But war is costly. Firstly, fighting entails intrinsic costs, in that it requires the large-scale mobilization of military troops and the acquisition of heavy weapons, entails the human costs of battle-related deaths on both sides, and the act of fighting itself comes with no inherent benefits but represents only a means to achieve future payoffs. This means that both warring parties should prefer to receive such payoffs without having to pay the costs of war. Secondly, fighting is also costly because it entails exogenous costs, for instance because it destroys resources – arable land becomes unusable due to land mines, oil fields burn down, and skilled, educated workers flee the country – and thus the “share of the pie” that both players receive after violence has started is always smaller than it was before the onset of war (Powell, 2006). In Figure 3.1, these costs of armed conflict are denoted as $C_R$ for $R$ and $C_G$ for $G$. As long as these costs of fighting are positive, they have to be calculated into what can be achieved through war, and thus a bargaining range must exist around $p$ that includes a set of possible divisions of the issue at stake – for instance, the number of cabinet seats allocated to $R$ – that both players prefer to war.

Given that, in theory, there always exists at least one ex ante peaceful bargain that both players would prefer to war – even if the costs of war were minimal and approaching zero – war is an inefficient or pareto-inferior outcome of the bargaining situation (Fearon, 1995b). Thus, the fact that internal conflict is still a frequently occurring empirical phenomenon represents a puzzle: Why were parties in Ukraine, Syria, or Afghanistan recently unable to arrive at this mutually beneficial peaceful bargain? Bargaining theory explains this puzzle by
referring to two types of bargaining failures: Private information (and incentives to misrepresent it) and credible commitment problems.\textsuperscript{19} Firstly, in games with imperfect or \textit{private information}, war breaks out because parties either overestimate their own chances of winning in war and thus disagree over relative power, or they lack information about the enemy’s resolve to fight. This could be because they have incentives to misrepresent private information by exaggerating or concealing their true capability to fight – a government may, for instance, want to deter future challengers (Fearon, 1995b). Powell (2006, p. 172) yet is skeptical of informational accounts and argues that they often lead to “bizarre historical readings” of cases; and Fearon (2004) agrees, arguing that fighting itself (particularly in very long civil wars) helps parties to reveal their capabilities. It is difficult to imagine, for instance, that Bashar Al-Assad has in 2016 doubts about the Syrian opposition’s willingness to fight in order to reach its goals. And Walter (2009) has in this regard argued that in post-war societies, military victories disclose more information than negotiated settlements and thus lead to fewer repeated civil wars; but she argues that this explanation is less convincing than that military victories also solve commitment problems. Analyses of civil war termination are thus dominated by the discussion of credible commitment problems (but see below and Moon and Souva, 2016).

\textbf{Credible Commitment Problems} Commitment problems mean that two players are unable to settle on an efficient \textit{ex ante} peaceful bargain because they cannot commit to uphold the deal in future, leading to three types of situations that all represent large and rapid shifts in the distribution of power (Powell, 2006). Firstly, commitment problems can lead to \textit{preventive war} that occurs if one party is growing stronger relative to the other and will thus have incentives to demand a more favorable division of the object at stake in future. Knowing this, the best strategy of the party growing weaker is to initiate war as early as possible, rather than to wait until power has shifted even more in favor

\textsuperscript{19}Fearon (1995b) also discusses the \textit{indivisibility of stakes} as a third type of bargaining failure, but dismisses this mechanism as not being a convincing explanation as it is often other mechanisms that prevent parties from arriving at a bargain. Powell (2006) agrees and notes that issue indivisibility should really be regarded as one form of commitment problems. I thus refrain from discussing this mechanism in further detail.
of the stronger-growing adversary (Fearon, 1995b). Secondly, commitment problems may lead to preemptive attacks that occur if, for instance, military technology creates first-strike advantages that eliminate or weaken an opponent, so that neither party can credibly commit not to make use of such advantage as neither wants to be eliminated (Fearon, 1995b). And thirdly, commitment problems may arise over disputes concerning objects that affect both parties’ future bargaining power. For instance, it is more difficult for parties to commit to a deal if a territory is strategically located so that controlling it vastly increases a party’s bargaining position, or because it comes with the resources necessary to attack or defend – such as Sierra Leone’s diamond mines the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) used to finance its fight against the state.

In peace and conflict research, Fearon (1995b) and Powell (2006) were concerned with explaining the onset of armed conflict, while Walter (2002) was the first to introduce commitment problems to the study of conflict resolution in the aftermath of civil war (cf. Chapter 2). In brief, her argument is that peaceful settlements after internal conflict break down and war recurs if parties are unable to commit to the terms of a deal they previously struck, because the weak institutional structure of war-torn states resembles an anarchic environment in which parties cannot rely on any neutral authority that would enforce such bargain. In this situation, any deal – either reached explicitly in the form of a peace agreement or informally on the battlefield (cf. Toft, 2010) – that asks a weaker-growing party to lay down its arms without giving it some guarantee that it will not be ambushed, will break down in war.

The game tree in Figure 3.2 – that is loosely based on the sequential two-player game with perfect information by Walter (2002) – helps to illustrate this approach. In Figure 3.2, I consider a situation in which G and R are at war and assume that at a given moment G offers R a take-it-or-leave-it deal that would stop any further fighting, but that would not offer R any guarantees it will not be ambushed in future. For instance, G could ask R to lay down its arms and surrender, and in return G would call its soldiers back to the barracks, but keep control over the state and its institutions. The game begins as R must choose between continuing war and accepting G’s offer. If it chooses combat, G can either capitulate and let R win without resistance – but why would it do that, given the smallest chance of winning in war – or fight back, and thus war follows for both (WR, WG). If R however accepts G’s deal and surrenders, G has the choice between either forgiving R for staging a rebellion (for instance by offering R’s leaders amnesty, which would result in peace for both, PR, PG); or prosecuting R for having violently challenged G’s authority in the first place. G could, for instance, execute all of R’s leaders (ER). This move would make G

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20Fearon (1995a) illustrates this point using the example of the Serb minority after Croatia’s declaration of independence in 1991. The Croatian majority was unable to commit itself not to exploit its greater power it would have enjoyed after the consolidation of an independent Croatia, for instance by limiting autonomy rights of Serbs. Knowing this, ethnic Serbs were better off mobilizing for secessionist war than waiting for what would happen in future.

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Figure 3.2: Game Tree

the dominant actor in the new state \((D_G)\). Considering the order of preferences, both parties have the highest interest in states in which they are dominant. For instance, \(G\) prefers executing \(R\) so that it can eradicate or severely weaken its enemy (without paying the costs of further war) and show strength toward any potential future challengers. The second-ranked preference is a state in which they are offered amnesty without paying the costs of future war, and last ranks execution or elimination.

Using the process of backward induction, Figure 3.2 shows the presence of credible commitment problems. When \(G\) offers \(R\) the deal, it can rightfully argue that both parties prefer a situation in which \(G\) forgives \(R\) to a situation of continued fighting: for both, the payoffs rank \(P_R > W_R\) and \(P_G > W_G\). But \(G\) cannot credibly commit to uphold this bargain after \(R\) has accepted the deal and we have moved to the second stage of the game, because now that \(G\) faces the choice between executing or forgiving \(R\), it will choose execution. This is because now that \(R\) has integrated into \(G\’s\) rule, power has shifted to \(G\’s\) advantage, and \(G\’s\) payoff for eliminating \(R\) is higher than its payoff for granting \(R\) amnesty \((D_G > P_G)\). \(G\) thus has incentives to renge on the bargain. Knowing this, \(R\) will not accept \(G\’s\) offer in the first place, as its payoffs for war (in which it has a chance of winning) are higher than for definite execution \((W_R > E_R)\). Therefore, in the presence of commitment problems, bargaining will break down and fighting will occur.

But commitment problems can be overcome, and the existing peace and conflict literature has proposed three specific causal mechanisms that are conceptually distinct, but at times difficult to differentiate empirically. Firstly, commitment problems are overcome by reducing future uncertainty – what Matthes and Savun (2009) call “fear-reducing mechanisms” – through increasing the benefits of cooperation in institutional mechanisms that raise the warring parties’ expected utility of peace relative to their expected utility of defecting and
returning to war (Flores and Nooruddin, 2011; North, 1990). As Sawyer et al. (2015, p. 22) argue, “effectively reducing uncertainty about ... war-making capacity can ... open the door towards peaceful conflict resolution.” In Figure 3.2, if commitment problems arise and lead to war as \( R \) fears that the stronger-growing \( G \) will exploit its position in future by marginalizing \( R \), mechanisms that reduce \( R \) uncertainty about the future behavior of \( G \) – for instance by securing \( R \)'s role in future politics – would mitigate commitment problems.

Secondly, commitment problems are overcome by creating mechanisms that raise the costs of defection for players to renege on a deal – or what Fearon (1997) refers to as parties engaging in “tying their hands” to peaceful behavior. This solution links to Elster (2000)'s work on constitutions as mechanisms of constraint and his analogy of Homer’s Odysseus who resisted the calls of the Sirens by making his crew tie him to the mast of his ship, and forcing them to cover their ears in wax. In Figure 3.2, if commitment problems arise and lead to war as \( R \) fears that the stronger-growing \( G \) will exploit its position in future by marginalizing \( R \), mechanisms that make defecting and returning to guns extremely costly both prohibit \( G \) from reneging on the deal and “tie \( R \) to the ship’s mast,” preventing it from taking up arms again.\(^{21}\)

Thirdly, commitment problems are overcome through mechanisms that help the parties send costly signals concerning their true commitment to peace, thereby “distinguishing them from insincere parties that will only engage in cheap talk” (Flores and Nooruddin, 2011, p. 482) by creating audience costs. This means that insincere parties suffer ex post opportunity costs by international or domestic audiences (e.g. the donor community, civil society, or electoral constituencies) if they do not follow through with an initial peaceful commitment (cf. Manning and Malbrough, 2010). Audience costs thus “increase the costs of bluffing” (Hegre, 2014, p. 161). In Figure 3.2, \( G \)'s offer to provide amnesty to \( R \) was cheap talk, because as soon as \( R \) integrated, nothing would force \( G \) to follow through with this promise. If mechanisms would however be implemented that enable \( G \) to send a costly signal that it will not renege, for instance by creating audience costs that would increase public disapproval if \( G \) made a commitment and did not follow through, this would both help demonstrate \( G \)'s commitment to peace while at the same time constraining it from fighting in future war (cf. Fearon, 1994). For that matter, Flores and Nooruddin (2011) suggest that parties could reassure each other by not only committing to peace to each other, but also to players outside the bargaining situations, including other societal actors or the international community.

While the signaling and audience costs mechanism is regularly portrayed as a solution to the standard game of commitment problems both in the broader institutions literature (e.g. Lohmann, 2003) as well as in peace and conflict research (e.g. Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Mattes and Savun, 2009), studies have

\(^{21}\)Both mechanisms thus concern the relationship between \( P_G \) and \( D_G \), showing that commitment problems are overcome by anything that increases \( G \)'s utility of \( P_G \) over \( D_G \).
noted how it is different from the first two mechanisms presented here. This is because through notions of bluffing or cheap talk, the mechanism introduces incomplete information to the commitment problem game (where belligerents are usually completely informed), which is in contradiction to studies that have analyzed these two bargaining failures in isolation to one another (cf. above). However, some studies have integrated audience costs also into situations of commitment problems (cf. Moon and Souva, 2016; Wolford et al., 2011). As Prins (2003, p. 69) holds, also in an “environment where the misrepresentation of preferences is common,” mechanisms that allow parties to signal their true commitment to peace – by helping them to introduce political penalties for backing down – solves commitment problems. These studies come with contrasting findings for the relationship between audience costs and commitment problems, which I discuss further in Chapter 9.

3.2 Causal Mechanisms and Hypotheses

In sum, the foregoing discussion helps to show that if interim governments are to help warring parties overcome commitment problems after internal conflict, they must include mechanisms that (1) reduce their uncertainty and increase benefits of cooperation, (2) tie their hands and increase costs of defection, and/or (3) help parties send credible signals by generating audience costs. I now derive hypotheses from this logic. I begin by following the lead of existing research on interim government and integrate arguments on how the institutional designs of power-sharing and international interim governments increase the stability of post-interim peace into this model.

3.2.1 Institutional Designs of Interim Governments

Power-Sharing Interim Government I define power-sharing interim government as one in which warring parties are offered guaranteed positions in the institutions exercising executive and/or legislative power between the demise of an old regime and first elections (Jarstad, 2010; Walter, 2002). Under this definition, the 2003-05 National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) is a case of power-sharing interim rule – legislative institutions included fixed quotas for the former government as well for the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) rebels – while the 1992-94 Mozambican interim government is not. In Mozambique,

22In Chapter 2, I noted the problematic comparability of previous research on power-sharing that suffers from a large variety in conceptualizing and operationalizing joint rule (cf. Binningshe, 2013). In order to position my research in the existing debate, I here follow those works that study power-sharing (1) in political institutions (as opposed to manage participation in military, territorial, or economic dimensions), (2) as an interim, rather than a permanent mode of government, (3) as an agreement between warring parties (rather than between ethnic or religious groups), and (4) as an instrument to build peace (instead of democracy).
only the ruling *Frante de Libertação de Moçambique* or Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) controlled the interim government.

I argue that power-sharing interim government increases the stability of post-interim peace predominantly through reducing future uncertainty and fear by increasing the warring parties’ benefits of cooperation relative to their expected utility of returning to war. I expect power-sharing to do so through three concrete sub-mechanisms (cf. Figure 3.3). Firstly, power-sharing interim government comes with political benefits that reduce future uncertainty, because – in the example of Figure 3.2 – the inclusion in such government increases R’s immediate political leverage. Power-sharing interim government (1) grants R a voice in the design of post-interim institutions (for instance through jointly passed policies and laws that are difficult to achieve, costly to violate, and hard to renege on later, cf. Jenne, 2004, p. 737) and the ability to learn about the rules of the post-interim political game, which decreases its uncertainty about G’s future behavior (Call and Cook, 2003; Manning, 2007; Sisk and Stefes, 2005). Power-sharing interim government (2) gives R the knowledge on how to manipulate these future institutional rules to its advantage, for instance by forcing G to introduce an electoral system that will give R a fair chance to be represented in the post-interim period, or to circumvent laws on accountability or transitional justice (Davis, 2013). Both aspects grant R the ability to look down the road, see that it will not be marginalized or eliminated, and thus make peaceful cooperation more likely in the long run.

Secondly, power-sharing interim government comes with economic benefits that reduce future uncertainty for players. In war-torn states, the distribution of resources and individual access to wealth or public goods is usually determined by control of or loyalty to the government, and thus either side to a conflict must fear to be economically marginalized if the other side fully controls a transition to peace (Le Billon, 2008). If a weaker-growing party uses armed combat to prevent or fight against its marginalization from the resources its requires to survive, it should prefer joining a power-sharing interim government that offers economic payoffs without paying the costs of war. By rewarding parties with cabinet or legislative positions, power-sharing interim governments enable them to control (or loot) the resources ascribed to their post – and keep them either for themselves or distribute them to electoral constituencies – and thereby lower their incentives to renege on a deal and acquire economic benefits by violent means (Haaß and Ottmann, 2015). Anecdotal evidence demonstrates how vital economic benefits through power-sharing interim governments are to buy parties into a peace process. In Sierra Leone, RUF leader Foday Sankoh was convinced into signing the 1999 Lomé Agreement by granting him Vice Presidency as well as Chairmanship over the *Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development* that awarded him control over the national diamond trade (Binningsbø and Dupuy, 2010). In Liberia, where interim government representatives were banned from running in the 2005
Figure 3.3: Causal Mechanisms

Independent Variables:  
- H1: Power-Sharing Interim Government  
- H2: International Interim Government  
- H3: Integration of Parallel Institutions  
- H4: Participation of Unarmed Actors

Mechanisms:  
- Decreases Uncertainty  
- Costs of Defection

Sub-Mechanisms:  
- Political Security  
- Economic Security  
- Physical Security  
- Physical Deterrence  
- Policy Influence  
- Financial Resources  
- Public Legitimacy  
- Military Infrastructure  
- War-time Mindsets  
- Institutional audience costs  
- Ad hoc audience cost

Dependent Variable:  
Stability of Post-Interim Peace
national elections, joining the power-sharing interim government became purely a question of what positions would be the most lucrative ones (International Crisis Group, 2003a), and interim leaders even “blocked disarmament until they received more government jobs” (Papagianni, 2008, p. 46).

Thirdly, power-sharing reduces future uncertainty by increasing R’s physical security. Joining power-sharing institutions requires warring parties (1) to reveal at least some of their organizational structure to each other, which makes it more difficult to remobilize for conflict. It also requires them (2) to come out of their hiding places in the remote periphery and to join the interim government institutions in the capital, where they become easy targets for enemy troops. This should reduce uncertainty about the opponent’s behavior (cf. Binningsbø and Dupuy, 2010). For instance, South Sudan’s rebel leader Riek Machar returned to the capital Juba in April 2016 after two years in hiding to join a power-sharing interim government as its Vice President, which diplomats called the “best chance yet” for peace (in The Guardian, 2016). And in Burundi, “to alleviate the minority’s physical insecurity from surrendering control, the power-sharing deal ... guaranteed the Tutsi one of two key security posts – minister of the army or police – and reserved one of two vice presidential slots for a Tutsi” (Kuperman, 2015). In addition, power-sharing interim governments frequently offer state bodyguards to rebel-leaders-turned-politicians, and the move to the capital comes with increased international and media attention that the new office brings, further increasing the physical security of parties. As Rothchild (2007, 86f.) thus argues, power-sharing interim governments are “logical responses” to “challenges of political – even physical – insecurity.”

Hypothesis H1: Power-sharing interim government, as opposed to any other interim government, increases the stability of post-interim peace.

International Interim Government In Chapter 2, I discussed existing research on international interim government and noted that the literature remains limited in that it predominantly consists of under-theorized case studies interested in the few prominent historical instances of international authority. I have also contended that employing the model as a framework for analysis in the way that it was put forward by Shain and Linz (1995) is problematic, not least because most interim governments put in place in the aftermath of armed conflict today see some degree of international engagement (Guttieri and Pionobo, 2016).

Alternatively, one could theorize that power-sharing interim government raises the costs of defection for warring parties. Firstly, if G now has to share state resources with R in a power-sharing interim government instead of being in control over all national means to defend or attack in combat, this decreases its perceived probability of winning in war. Secondly, power-sharing interim government can weaken the relationship between party leaders and subordinates. While this perspective violates a pure unitary actor assumption, one may theorize that if G offers R positions in a power-sharing interim government, G demonstrates its incentives to make such government an institution that addresses R’s fear of future marginalization, thereby weakening R’s leaders’ claim to their followers that the interim government does not act in their interest and should be fought. This in turn should increase the costs of leaders of recruiting rank-and-file soldiers for war (Mukherjee, 2006).

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2007; Ottaway and Lacina, 2003). Building on this discussion, it is thus fruitful to conceptualize international interim rule not as an exclusive category of a typology (such as in Figure 2.1 on page 13) but as cross-cutting other institutional designs of interim government. I thus define international interim government as one in which the international community assumes de facto executive and/or legislative authority in some or all policy matters between the demise of an old regime and first elections. Under this definition, East Timor and Liberia are both cases of international interim government, as executive and legislative power in the former rested until 2001 in the hands of UN Transitional Administrator Sergio Vieria de Mello, and as the UN also de facto functioned “as a co-principal agent of executive authority” next to the NTGL in Liberia (Morgan, 2007, p. 212). On the contrary, South Africa’s 1990-94 interim government ruled with little to no international involvement (Höglund, 2008).

I argue that international interim government increases the stability of post-interim peace predominantly through increasing the warring parties’ costs of defection and tying their hands to peaceful action, and I expect it to do so through two concrete mechanisms (cf. Figure 3.3). Firstly, international interim government increases costs of defection through physical deterrence, because the military components associated to such rule bring a large number of international troops that place physical constraints on the parties’ ability to break a deal. For instance, parties do no longer only have to fight their adversary, but also have to spend valuable human and military resources fighting peacekeepers in case they want to break away from the peace process (Mattes and Savun, 2009; Salverda, 2013). In addition, external military force associated with international interim government may also implement demilitarized buffer zones – such as the “Zone of Separation” around the Inter-Entity Boundary Line negotiated in Bosnia’s Dayton Agreement (United Nations, 1995). Finally, and not least because of the high financial and human costs that governing war-torn states entails for international actors, international interim government also assures parties that the international community has a strong interest in upholding an agreement and achieving a positive outcome of the peace process, which makes such interim rule a particularly good “moderating force” in war-torn states (Flores and Nooruddin, 2011, p. 488). This all reduces the utility of the outcome $W_G, W_R$ for the parties (cf. Figure 3.2).

Secondly, international interim government increases costs of defection via policy influence, because every policy field that is advanced by an international interim officer decreases $G$'s ability to use its position for factional interest and to pursue politics that will marginalize $R$ in a future state, which in turn strengthens $R$’s belief that the post-interim order will be one that is more attractive than a costly war (cf. Doyle and Sambanis, 2006). This is in line with previous academic studies on peacekeeping and transitional administration that

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24 Alternatively, agreeing to international interim government can serve as a costly signal by one party to another that it intends to abide by a peaceful bargain (cf. Fortna, 2008a).
have stressed particularly the UN’s role as “as truly neutral authority” (Gis-sselquist, 2002, p. 12) that mitigates commitment problems by reducing the in-
security produced by the anarchic institutional environment of war-torn states (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; Walter, 2002).

For instance, previous research has established that if elections in war-torn
societies are organized by the international community instead of, for ex-
ample, the former government, this increases all warring parties’ belief that
such elections are free of large-scale fraud and that a subsequent political
system will allow for the fair representation of a variety of societal voices (Kumar, 1998). An example for the importance of international interim government in
increasing parties’ perceptions of neutrality is UNTAG in Namibia. In 1989, the
design of this interim government required South African Administrator Gen-
eral Louis Pienaar to consult with UN Special Representative Martti Ahtisaari
on the reform of legislative issues; and when Pienaar proposed an electoral law
for the upcoming elections, Ahtisaari identified a number of problematic issues
regarding the secrecy of the ballot as well as vote counting procedures. The law
was consequently altered according to Ahtisaari’s wishes, ensuring free and fair
elections and restricting South Africa’s ability to dominate Namibia’s transition

Hypothesis H2: International interim government, as opposed to any other
interim government, increases the stability of post-interim peace.

3.2.2 Reform Processes in Interim Governments

Following existing research, the foregoing paragraphs have argued that the short-
term institutional designs of power-sharing and international interim govern-
ment mitigate long-term commitment problems of warring parties and thus in-
crease the stability of post-interim peace. Weaker-growing parties, for instance,
can use power-sharing interim governments to negotiate laws that ensure their
survival in the post-interim period and thus decrease any future uncertainties.
International actors can prohibit the remobilization of forces during interim rule
and thus increase any costs of defection.

But it is also possible to imagine a counterargument to the causal stories
presented above. As Powell (2006) reasons and as I have shown in section 3.1, if
(1) commitment problems result from shifts in the relative distribution of power
between warring parties – $G$ is growing stronger, $R$ is growing weaker, and thus

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25 The counterargument is not trivial. One could also theorize that every post an
international actor sits on during interim government is unavailable to the warring parties; thus,
their immediate quest for power and for political security is not addressed. This may have
been the case in East Timor, where all power rested initially with UNTAET and FRETILIN
soon protested for more power in the interim government (Bull, 2008; Chopra, 2000).

26 While I formulate this hypothesis in binary fashion, my robustness checks in Chapter 4
include a continuous measure of the international interim government variable, and thus also
test the related hypothesis: The higher the degree of international authority in an interim
government, the higher the stability of post-interim peace.
it is rational for $R$ to fight now rather than wait until $G$ consolidates its unilateral grip onto power and eliminates $R$ – and if (2) commitment problems are overcome by introducing mechanisms that help parties to look into the future and see that non-violent cooperation is their long-term best strategy, then the terminable and temporary nature of interim governments introduces a logical inconsistency to this idea. For instance, if one causal mechanism of how international interim governments mitigate commitment problems and lead to peace moves through the notion of physical deterrence, what happens if international personnel uses elections as an exit strategy and decreases its deployment significantly in the post-interim period – would knowledge about the future lack of physical deterrence not increase rather than mitigate commitment problems on the side of the weaker-growing party already during interim rule?

Similarly, if power-sharing interim rule mitigates commitment problems by reducing insecurity through political, economic, or physical benefits, what happens when interim rule terminates in elections and a “much more fluid form of democracy” (Sisk, 2008) is introduced that precisely allows for shifts in the relative distribution of political power? It is easy to imagine that former power-sharers will not accept being stripped of their authority and forced into taking a seat in the opposition, as they have come to enjoy the goods associated with holding office, or because they cannot trust the winning party that it will not instantly get rid of elections as a means of peacefully assuming power (Paris, 2004). For instance, in Côte d’Ivoire, parties negotiated a power-sharing deal in the 2007 Ouagadougou Political Accord that made rebel leader Soro interim Prime Minister, while Laurent Gbagbo remained President. When Gbagbo lost the 2010 presidential vote against opposition candidate Ouattara, violence by pro-Gbagbo militias erupted throughout the country (Freedom House, 2012).

Weaker-growing parties in these situations thus have incentives to remobilize for war. But given these incentives, what gives parties the capacity to do so after they initially agreed to stop fighting? In other words, what aspects of interim governments other than their institutional designs can explain why some warring parties stick to peace in the long run also in the post-interim period, while other mobilize for war? A first explanation offered by existing research is that in the aftermath of armed conflict, the question why some parties remobilize while others do not is at least partially due to “lingering” parallel war-time structures of these parties (cf. Persson, 2012). These structures – that I will term in what follows the parallel political and military institutions of warring parties – include both persisting shadow governments and parallel administrations, as well as lasting logistical military infrastructure and command structures (e.g. Mampilly, 2011; Schlichte, 2009; Themnér, 2011). These parallel institutions do not automatically disappear just because a peace agreement is signed that declares armed conflict to be over and that installs an interim government as a new national authority in the capital of a state. For instance, as Robinson, Valters, et al. (2015, p. 36) note, “[the] limited job creation witnessed in Liberia
can mean that former combatants rely on their old command structures to source work, which in itself keeps the conditions in place for a potential return to conflict.” The general argument of the literature is thus as long as parallel, war-time institutions continue to exist following the formal termination of war, parties retain the structures necessary to remobilize.

The Integration of Parallel Institutions  To reconnect and integrate this discussion into my model of section 3.1, I now build on this research on non-state actors in post-war situations. I argue that as long as the parallel institutions of these actors persist throughout an interim period, commitment problems are not mitigated because parties retain the financial resources, popular legitimacy, military infrastructure, and war-time mindsets to remobilize for war in the post-interim period. I define parallel institutions as the warring parties’ political and military structures that allow them to “accumulate the power and resources necessary both to engage in the conflict and to maintain their organizations” (Lyons, 2005, p. 34).

Specifically, by integrating parallel political structures, I mean that upon joining the interim government, parties give up any forms of parallel administrations that exist if (1) they exercise control over territory, (2) establish “institutions within or outside of its military to manage relations with the civil population, and (3) these institutions set in place a series of formal or informal rules that define a hierarchy of decision making and a system of taxation” (Weinstein, 2006, p. 164).27 A prominent example of parallel rebel government are the institutions established by the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq since 2014. A member of the Syrian opposition has recently more generally reflected on the detrimental effects of parallel governance on peace processes by noting, “if one milk carton cannot go in [to a besieged area, how] can there be a political transition” to peace (in Black, 2016)?

By integrating parallel military structures I mean that interim governments disarm and demobilize all non-statutory armed forces before they terminate in elections, implying (1) that weapons are collected and disposed to strip parties of their means of fighting and to create an environment of personal security and political stability that reduces parties’ incentives for war; as well as (2) that military units are formally disbanded and discharged (e.g. Humphreys and Weinstein, 2005; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007; Knight and Özerdem, 2004; Muggah, 2005; Muggah, 2010).28 According to this definition, the integration

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27 My definition is more narrow than the one of Lyons (2005, p. 35), who also understands “black markets and humanitarian relief networks; and chauvinistic ... identity groups” as parallel institutions – a thick conceptualization difficult to apply in statistical research.

28 Following Spear (2002), I thus focus on the first two steps of a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) process. This is also because reintegration – the reinsertion of demobilized recruits back into civilian lives, their reconciliation with communities, psychological treatment, integration in veteran’s organizations, or vocational training that enables them to provide for a living without requiring a gun (Ball, 1997; Rolston, 2007) – is a process that is unlikely to be feasible under short-term interim rule. As Collier, Elliott, et al. (2003, p. 160) note, “[while] disarmament and demobilization are reasonably straightforward logis-
of parallel institutions was fully realized in El Salvador, because at the time of elections in 1994, the caretaker interim government had restored almost one hundred percent of mayors and judges in former zones of Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional or Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) control, and had completed a disarmament and demobilization process (Stanley, 2007). In Afghanistan, neither form of integration occurred, as the rule of the AIA did not extend much beyond Kabul, and a disarmament and demobilization process was far from being completed when elections were held in 2004 (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2006).

I argue that interim governments that integrate the parallel political and military institutions of warring parties increase the stability of peace predominantly by tying the hands and raising the costs of defection for parties through four sub-mechanisms (cf. Figure 3.3). All link to previous arguments that the dissolution of parallel structures, such as through Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs, present solutions to credible commitment problems in various forms (Diehl, 2016; Flores and Nooruddin, 2011). Firstly, and concerning the integration of parallel political institutions, such integration ties the hands of parties because it reduces their financial resources to remobilize for war, while as long as parallel institutions continue to exist, parties retain such financial resources. Referring to the game tree in Figure 3.2, this depicts a situation in which facing commitment problems due to uncertainty about G’s future behavior, the continued existence of parallel administration allows R to retreat to its zones of territorial control and regroup for war, or to use these parallel structure for acquiring the financial means to buy new weaponry: “Zones of territorial control ... are often the backbone of a rebel group’s resource mobilization capacity” (Fjelde and Nilsson, 2012, p. 610). Such acquisition of means may come through the parallel taxation of the population living under the party’s control – such as in Burundi (Sabates-Wheeler and Verwimp, 2014) – or through controlling valuable natural resources in administrated territories (cf. Johnston, 2004; Sanín, 2004). For instance, the RUF administrated the eastern part of Sierra Leone and controlled the diamond mines, which allowed it to fund their fight against the government (Binningsbo and Dupuy, 2010).

Secondly, integrating parallel political institutions into the authority of an interim government also increases the costs of defection for warring parties by affecting their levels of popular support. This mechanism builds on the idea that, in order to raise its expected capability to prevail in war, parties need to obtain and maintain support from the civilian population – for instance because this decreases their costs of conscription (if people join voluntarily rather than after the use of force), or because civilian supporters provide valuable lodging places for rebel groups in hiding (cf. Ottmann, 2015). Parallel political structures in that regard represent key mechanisms to build and maintain such
popular support, such as through providing public services including healthcare, justice, or education (cf. Arjona, 2014; Barnabas and Zwi, 1997). As with the sub-mechanism on financial means, as long as warring parties can continuously prove in parallel administrated zones that they can deliver public services more effectively than an interim government, they keep significant popular legitimacy which reduces their costs of remobilizing for war (Branch and Mampilly, 2005; Englebert and Tull, 2008).

Thirdly, and concerning the integration of parallel military institutions into the authority of an interim government, such integration ties the hands of parties because (1) it strips them of their means to prevail in combat by collecting and destroying weapon stocks, for instance in public “Flames for Peace” arms burning ceremonies, which reduces the utility of remobilizing for the parties in the bargaining situation. It also (2) should weaken social networks within military organizations, such as bonds between recruits and hierarchical command structures between rank-and-file soldiers and military leaders, increasing the costs of such leaders to remobilize for war (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010). For instance, one of the key reasons why ex-combatants in Sierra Leone did not resort to war after their DDR process is that they had no access to networks of elites that were seeking to recruit them (Themnér, 2011). Banholzer (2014, p. 7) also argues that the “hasty and disorganized” demobilization of German soldiers at the end of World War I “resulted in a failure to collect all weapons” and “[many] of these arms were later used in partisan struggles.”

Having said that, several authors have pointed out that this proposed theoretical mechanism of increasing the costs of war and defection (and thus of decreasing the utility of the $W_R,W_G$ outcome in Figure 3.2) through destroying weapons and weakening social relationships is unlikely to come about in practice. Firstly, and ironically, the manner by which the demobilization of military structures is carried out in the majority of DDR processes through the isolated and concentrated cantonment of combatants has actually been found to reinforce the very command structures “that the process is intended to dissolve” (Knight and Özerdem, 2004, p. 509). And while some weapons may be destroyed in the aftermath of war or during the rule of an interim government, it is unlikely that all weapons will be collected or cease to exist. Individual soldiers may hide their gun out of fear of future harm; weapons may represent an essential livelihood asset in post-conflict societies, such as for farmers who want to protect their livestock (Young and Goldman, 2015); arms may be closely connected to masculine identities (Myrttinen, 2003; Spear, 1999); black markets and weak border controls imply that guns are accessible at every time; and even if many are destroyed, the skills to use such weapons remain widespread (Collier, Elliott, et al., 2003).

For instance, Mozambique has often been considered a DDR success story, in that elections ending the interim government were postponed several times until the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana or Mozambican National Resis-
tance (RENAMO) was considered sufficiently disarmed. When RENAMO then lost the 1994 elections, the advanced state of the demobilization process gave its leader Dhlakama no other opportunity than to accept a seat in the opposition (Flores and Nooruddin, 2012). But by no means had all arms been collected and destroyed in Mozambique. Instead, studies have stressed the symbolic nature of DDR in Mozambique and elsewhere that creates situations in which the use of weapons is not socially accepted anymore (particularly among ex-combatants, Spear, 2002). Such reform processes are also seen to instill “trust in the entire peace process” more generally, as well as to offer ex-combatants the opportunity to envision alternatives to military livelihoods (Banholzer, 2014, p. 10).

Thus, fourthly, the integration of parallel military structures during interim rule raises the costs of defection and ties the hands of warring parties to peaceful behavior because it adds to changing cultures and acceptance of violence (on how broader societal rejection of violence increases the costs of defection, cf. Nilsson, 2012). By that I mean even if not all weapons, personal relationships, or hierarchical command structures are destroyed or weakened at the end of interim government, a sufficiently advanced DDR process still signifies “that the country is embarking on an era of peace” (United Nations, 2000a), helps to “push individuals away from war-time mindsets that legitimized violence” and facilitates ‘ex-combatants’ attempts to distance themselves from war-time abuses they committed or experienced” and to envision economic livelihoods alternative to that of being soldiers in war (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010, pp. 10, 18). As one UN report noted, DDR programs that help combatants to envision “livelihoods or employment options that offer a sense of purpose and respect may thus provide an important source of resilience” against remobilization (in Munive and Stepputat, 2015, p. 9). This in turn raises the costs of defection for the party growing weaker in the bargaining situation.

Hypothesis H3: The more advanced the process of integrating parallel political and military institutions into the authority of an interim government, the higher the stability of post-interim peace.  

A valuable critique concerning my third hypothesis may be that while integrating parallel institutions into the authority of an interim government may increase the parties’ costs of defection and tie their hands to peaceful behavior, parties would never agree to such integration in the first place because it is not in their self-interest (Thyne, 2009; Walter, 2002). Following studies that do argue for DDR as a solution to commitment problems (Diehl, 2016; Flores and Nooruddin, 2011), I disagree with this critique to some extent, because weaker-growing parties in peace negotiations may not be in a position to refuse disarmament; and even stronger-growing parties may have to agree to disarm in order to make concessions in the settlement. But the question remains why, for instance, R should follow through with disarming and demobilizing – and not cheat in the process, such as by actively solidifying its command structures in cantonment sites – if it does not receive any guarantees that it will not be marginalized after having finalized a DDR process? This question already indicates that the precise implementation of integrating parallel institutions – and thus also their effects on post-interim peace – is conditioned by underlying context factors; and the institutional designs of interim governments may well represent such context. For instance, international interim government increases parties’ costs of cheating in integrating their parallel military institutions; and power-sharing increases the parties’ incentives to integrate parallel institu-

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The Participation of Unarmed Actors  

A second explanation offered by the peace and conflict literature for why some parties remobilize while others do not – in addition to lingering parallel structures – is the context of collective, domestic audiences, although Svensson (2014) has pointed out that such domestic actors have received much less attention in the literature than warring parties or their international custodians. Broadly speaking, studies have argued that the participation of civil society and political parties in peace processes can be regarded as explicitly influencing future violent behavior of warring parties. This is because such participation increases transparency and lets audiences assume a watchdog function over the warring parties’ courses of action (cf. Nilsson, 2012). Paffenholz and Spurk (2006, p. 8) hold, for instance, that civil society and political parties without a history of armed insurgency have a “major role ... to establish [a] ‘democratic public’ and to act as a watchdog” over the peace process. An often referred to example in this regard is the Women of Liberia Mass Action for Peace movement. In 2003, this movement directly impacted the Liberian warring parties’ behavior because it forced the warring parties to engage in bargaining and peace negotiations. For instance, the movement prevented party representatives from leaving the peace talks by physically blocking the doors and windows of Charles Taylor’s presidential palace.

Nilsson (2012, p. 250) has furthermore reasoned that civil society and political party participation in peace processes “can serve as an indication to warring parties ... that the support for continued violence in the society at large is reduced,” thereby limiting their utility of remobilizing for war. Others note that civil society actors can undermine the “moral authority” of remobilizers which may dissuade individuals from accepting or participating in future war (Barnes, 2006, p. 8). A number of studies focusing on interim governments have in the past also loosely referred to unarmed domestic actors – i.e. civil society organizations and political parties – as an important and integral part of the domestic audience of warring parties in peace processes (e.g. Papagianni, 2007a; Papagianni, 2009; Paris, 2004). Most have however highlighted how interim governments can help bring civil society and political parties into post-conflict politics (cf. Chapter 2) and increase the general legitimacy of the peace process (cf. Belloni, 2008; Paffenholz, 2010; Wanis-St. John and Kew, 2008). They have not integrated this aspect into a theoretical model regarding the behavior of parties, because the economic benefits associated with a position in power-sharing can replace the economic gain parties received from taxing a population in parallel institutions. Similarly, while disarmament and demobilization (at best) retrieves parties of what constituted the means of power during the war, power-sharing positions offer a replacement of such authority. In Liberia’s interim government, leaders therefore “blocked disarmament until they received more government jobs” (Papagianni, 2008, p. 46). If the institutional designs of interim governments thus condition the effect of integrating parallel institutions, this would methodologically call for interaction effects in my statistical models, as we could expect that the integration of parallel institutions has a more pronounced positive effect on the stability of post-interim peace in power-sharing or international interim governments. I test this aspect in my robustness checks in Chapter 4 and 9.

30This perspective thereby reflects the perception of civil society’s role as a domestic audience in the broader political science literature (e.g. Lipson, 2003; Slantchev, 2006).
of the warring parties.

This perspective yet links to my argument from section 3.1, that in order to mitigate commitment problems, interim governments must introduce mechanisms that help parties send costly signals. That is – in the example of Figure 3.2 – G’s act of proposing R to integrate into a future state with the outcome of \( P_R, P_G \) for both must create some cost that would discipline G, would it not implement its proposal. I have shown that the literature has in this regard perceived the creation of domestic audience costs as a way to signal one’s true intentions (cf. Fearon, 1994; Fearon, 1997; Flores and Nooruddin, 2011).

As long as interim governments thus fail to enable warring parties to send costly signals of their true intentions to each other that create domestic audience costs – which would punish them if they renege on a peaceful bargain – violence in the post-interim period is more likely. I propose that interim governments can create such costs by allowing for the ad hoc or institutional participation of unarmed actors in reform processes between the demise of the old regime and first elections. By ad hoc participation I mean that unarmed actors are invited to take part in decision-making processes through informal, one-time and purpose-specific events in which reforms are negotiated between the members of the interim government and unarmed actors – such as Sierra Leone’s 2002 National Dialogue Conference – or through regular consultations with the interim government. Unarmed actors may, for instance, be regularly invited to issue statements on electoral reform draft proposals. Institutional participation means that unarmed actors assume positions in the interim government in order to influence reform processes, such as in Liberia’s 2003-05 NTGL.

Consequently, I argue that interim governments that allow for the participation of unarmed actors either institutionally or through ad hoc measures increase the stability of post-interim peace by representing a costly signal of G about its true intention for peace, thereby mitigating R’s commitment problems (cf. Figure 3.3). By agreeing to let a wider spectrum of unarmed actors participate in interim governments and in the reforms implemented by the interim government, G credibly signals to R that it is willing to be held accountable for its actions through transparent and “publicly observable measures” (Fearon, 1997, p. 577) and willing to accept sanctions from a public domestic audience if it does not follow through (cf. Flores and Nooruddin, 2011). One may additionally expect that participation of unarmed actors through receiving institutional representation is a more costly form of commitment for G and should thus have a more pronounced positive effect on the stability of post-interim peace than mere ad hoc participation.

**Hypothesis H4:** *The more advanced the opportunities of participation for unarmed actors in interim government decision-making, the higher the stability of post-interim peace.*
3.3 Chapter Summary

This chapter has started out by conceptualizing intrastate armed conflict as a bargaining failure due to the presence of credible commitment problems. This means that bargaining breaks down and parties remobilize for armed conflict in the post-interim period because anticipated shifts in the relative distribution of power make them unable to credibly commit to uphold any previously brokered deal in future. But commitment problems can be overcome. Following the theoretical and empirical literature on this topic, I have consequently outlined three overriding causal mechanisms in how interim governments may mitigate commitment problems and contribute to the stability of post-interim peace. Firstly, by reducing future uncertainty for warring parties, secondly, by increasing the parties’ costs of defection, and thirdly, by enabling the parties to send costly signals that create audience costs.

| H1: Power-sharing interim government, as opposed to any other interim government, increases the stability of post-interim peace. |
| H2: International interim government, as opposed to any other interim government, increases the stability of post-interim peace. |
| H3: The more advanced the process of integrating parallel political and military institutions into the authority of an interim government, the higher the stability of post-interim peace. |
| H4: The more advanced the opportunities of participation for unarmed actors in interim governments, the higher the stability of peace. |

I have then integrated previous research on interim governments and peace processes into this theoretical model. Building on studies such as by Jarstad (2010), I have argued that power-sharing interim government increases the stability of post-interim peace by reducing the warring parties’ political, economic, and physical uncertainty (H1). Building on studies such as by Doyle and Sambanis (2000), I have argued that international interim government increases the stability of post-interim peace by raising the warring parties’ costs of defection (H2). I have then demonstrated that it is also plausible to imagine a counter argument to these hypotheses, in that the previous argumentation may lack explanatory power because it neglects the temporality of interim government institutions that exacerbates, rather than mitigates commitment problems. I have therefore complemented the approach of past research by incorporating two further sub-fields of peace and conflict research into my framework. Both address features of reform processes in interim governments. I have argued that more advanced processes of integrating the parallel political and military institutions of warring parties into the authority of an interim government are associated with a higher stability of peace (H3). This is because integrating parallel structures – such as rebel governments and non-statutory armed forces

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- increases the warring parties’ costs of defection in the long run. Finally, I have argued that more advanced opportunity of participation for unarmed actors should be associated with a higher stability of post-interim peace (H4). This is because participation creates domestic audience costs that punish parties defecting from a previous agreement. Table 3.1 provides an overview of my hypotheses.
Chapter 4

Statistical Analysis

This chapter tests my hypotheses by using statistical survival analysis. It represents the first of six empirical chapters that together make up the mixed-method research design outlined in Chapter 1.31 To recall, the argument that this chapter sets out to evaluate is that four institutional design and reform features of interim government – (H1) power-sharing deals between warring parties, (H2) international authority in interim institutions, (H3) the integration of the warring parties’ parallel institutions into the authority of an interim government, and (H4) the participation of unarmed actors in reform processes – all increase the stability of post-interim peace. This chapter thereby provides first correlational evidence for my broader argument from Chapter 3, i.e. that reform aspects of interim government are better suited to explain long-term peace than these governments’ institutional designs. The chapter yet also shows that selection issues are part of an explanation for why the coefficient associated with power-sharing interim government in particular lacks statistical significance. To arrive at this conclusion, the chapter proceeds in three steps. Section 4.1 presents the data set underlying my statistical analysis. Because I coded several variables myself, this section discusses my sampling strategy, the quality of information underlying the coding process, as well as benefits and pitfalls of coding choices. It then goes into detail concerning the operationalization of my independent, dependent, and control variables, as well as concerning my methodological approach. In section 4.2, I present and discuss the results of several Cox Proportional Hazards (PH) models, perform a number of model diagnostics and robustness checks, and address the question whether institutional design and reform features of interim governments are endogenous. Section 4.3 concludes by summarizing the insights gained in this chapter.

31I presented earlier versions of this chapter at the third ISP Network Conference in Geneva (May 2014), a GIGA Research Program 2 – Research Team 3 meeting (August 2014), a DFG-funded Point Sud Workshop in Stellenbosch (November 2014), the colloquium of Aurel Croissant in Heidelberg (January 2015), and the International Studies Association’s 56th Annual Convention in New Orleans (February 2015). I thank all participants, and in particular Gerald Schneider, Christof Hartmann, and Susanna Campbell, for their valuable comments.
4.1 Research Design

4.1.1 Sampling Strategy and Data Sources

I test my argument on a sample of all cases of interim government that followed at least one year of intrastate armed conflict since 1989 and that terminated in elections by 31 December 2012. In line with the vast majority of existing research, I operationalize intrastate armed conflict as a contested incompatibility between a government and at least one rebel group “where the use of armed force ... results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year” (cf. Chapter 1 and Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 2001).

Four theoretical and methodological issues motivate my choice for this observation period. Firstly, and concerning the left margin of 1989 as a delineation of this period, the end of the Cold War enabled international engagement in war-torn states to a degree that ever more included the reform of state institutions and the promotion of democracy. This empirical development closely links to the role of interim governments as instruments for peacebuilding, not least because such governments often convene to prepare war-torn states for elections (cf. Paris, 2004; Sisk, 1993). Secondly, intrastate conflicts and their resolution attempts before 1989 often took the form of proxy wars, were strongly influenced by relations between the superpowers, and thus followed different dynamics compared to internal conflicts in the post-Cold War period (cf. Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010). Thirdly, many data collections on conflict characteristics start with information collected from 1989 onwards, so my choice also concerns issues of data availability. Fourthly, because I want to understand the effects of interim governments on the stability of post-interim peace, only analyzing interim governments that terminated by December 2012 allows me to assess this duration aspect of my dependent variable for at least two consecutive years (as of June 2016, conflict data is available until December 2014).

This strategy results in a sample of 62 instances of interim government, fully listed in Table A.1 in the Appendix. To visualize the distribution of interim governments across the world, Figure 4.1 additionally plots these governments on a map that shows how interim governments are chiefly an African and Asian phe-

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32 Because I do not include any interim governments that enter my study already in place in 1989, I circumvent the issue of left truncation.
33 I argued in Chapter 1 that I understand interim governments as institutions that terminate in elections. The only exception I make in my data set is Sudan’s interim government that ended in a popular referendum in 2011, and that I keep in my sample because of its influence in the qualitative debate on power-sharing interim government (e.g. Johnson, 2008; Zambakari, 2013). I run a robustness check in which I exclude the case from the sample. If an interim government convened between 1989 and 2012 but did not hold elections by December 2012; or if it convened but did not hold elections within 15 years, I drop a respective case from my sample. This concerns three cases of interim rule: (1) Afghanistan’s 1992 Peshawar Accords transferred power to an interim council, but elections never took place as the Taliban seized power in 1996; (2) the May 1993 Memorandum of Settlement for India’s Bodoland conflict called for an Interim Bodoland Executive Council, but elections scheduled for November 1993 never transpired; and (3) the interim government set up following a military coup in Mali in 2012 only ended in elections in 2013, well after my December 2012 cut-off point.
Figure 4.1: Map of Interim Governments in the World

Notes: Map based on the data described in this chapter. Countries that experienced interim governments following intrastate armed conflict are shaded in dark gray.

nomenon, reflecting the predominance of internal conflicts on these continents (cf. Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015). It is important to note that previous studies on interim government – as well as more generally on institutions in war-torn societies – have often used sampling strategies that only consider institutional configurations negotiated in peace agreements (e.g. Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Jarstad, 2010; Lyons, 2005), while I do not restrict my empirical analysis to this criterion. Firstly, an important empirical argument for extending my sample beyond cases of peace agreements is that a more inclusive sampling strategy does not select against some of the four interim government models as put forward by the Shain and Linz (1995) typology; a typology that as I have demonstrated in Chapter 2 forms the conceptual basis of most present-day interim government research. For instance, it is possible to imagine that restricting my analysis to interim governments after peace agreements would likely result in a biased sample where power-sharing governments comprised of the signatory parties to an agreement are over-represented. Secondly, this strategy would also overlook prominent cases of interim government that were not called for in peace agreements but that have strongly influenced the qualitative academic debate on the topic, such as the 2001-04 Afghan Interim Authority (AIA), or the rule of UNTAET in East Timor from 1999 to 2001.

To delineate a sample of interim governments that goes beyond peace agreements, I relied on a number of existing data sets as well as on information from qualitative data sources. In a first step, I identified all intrastate conflict episodes using the Armed Conflict Dataset provided by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), v. 4/2014 (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, et al., 2002; Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015).
I then coded whether an interim government convened after a case experienced at least one year of intrastate conflict according to the UCDP/PRIO data, consulting four existing data sets. Firstly, I referred to the *Polity IV Annual Time-Series Dataset* that captures regime patterns and changes in all sovereign states with a population of over 500,000 inhabitants since 1800. Polity IV also reports “transition periods,” defined as phases in which new institutions are planned and implemented (Marshall et al., 2014). Secondly, I relied on the *Authoritarian Regimes Dataset* that includes a measure for “transitional regimes,” defined as temporary institutions with the purpose to realize a transition (Hadenius and Teorell, 2007; Wahman et al., 2013). Thirdly, I consulted the National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy Dataset (NELDA) that offers data on all elections from 1960 to 2006 and that captures if a country was “ruled by ‘transitional leadership’ tasked with ‘holding elections’” (Hyde and Marinov, 2012). Fourthly, Jarstad (2010) presents the Post-Accord Elections (PAE) data set on power-sharing interim rule between the signing of peace accords and first post-accord elections (1989-2004).

Three aspects explain why it proved insufficient to only rely on these data sets. Firstly, my theoretical definition of what constitutes as interim government does not translate one-to-one to the conceptualizations of these data sets that are often more restrictive in their definition of an interim government. For instance, I have in Chapter 1 defined interim governments as the institutions with executive and legislative power between a disintegration of an old regime...
and first elections. Wahman et al. (2013) however use a further coding rule and only consider interim governments lasting fewer than three years, which would inter alia exclude Burundi’s 2000-05 interim government from my sample. The case of Burundi has yet inspired a vast number of qualitative analyses on power-sharing interim government in particular (e.g. Curtis, 2007; Lemarchand, 1994). Figure 4.2, depicting interim government duration by length in years, moreover shows that it is not unusual for interim governments in war-torn societies to last longer than three years. Secondly, many of the cited data sets select against some of Shain and Linz (1995)’s four models of interim government. For instance, although it is not explicitly stated in their codebook, Hyde and Marinov (2012) do not include interim periods with high degrees of international authority in the NELDA data set, such as the rule of UNTAET.

Thirdly, only using information provided by existing data sets does not allow me to consider if interim government was really the result of armed conflict and meant as an instrument for its resolution. For instance, according to Hyde and Marinov (2012), Bangladesh has had repeated interim governments since the early 2000s, and UCDP/PRIO data report an internal conflict in Bangladesh in 2005-06, thus simply matching these two data sets would have included Bangladesh as a case of post-conflict interim government in my sample. But caretaker interim governments are formalized in Bangladesh’s constitution and appear regularly before elections to create a political environment in which voting can take place without influence by an outgoing regime. Similarly, Hyde and Marinov (2012) code an interim government in Thailand in 2006-07, a period in which Thailand also saw ongoing conflict. But fighting took place between the government and secessionist insurgents in southern provinces, whereas the interim government was not put in place to solve this conflict over territory, but resulted from a coup d’état against then-Prime Minister Shinawatra.

To deal with these issues of ambiguity, I complemented the data taken from the existing regime data sets with qualitative information to delineate my sample – and, in a second step, to code my independent variables (cf. below). I used

<table>
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<tr>
<td>PAE Dataset</td>
<td>1989-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Conflict Narratives</td>
<td>1989-2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa Yearbook (Afrika Jahrbuch)</td>
<td>1989-2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Survey</td>
<td>1989-2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTI Reports</td>
<td>2003-2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House Reports</td>
<td>1998-2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economist Intelligence Unit</td>
<td>1996-2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
sources that are comparable over time and cases. These include, firstly, Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) country reports that biannually assess political transformation in independent countries with a population of over two million inhabitants since 2003, except consolidated democracies (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2014). All BTI reports include standardized sections on issues such as institutional performance, power to govern, and elections. Secondly, Freedom House’s “Freedom in the World” country reports compare political rights and civil liberties in all independent countries and in selected disputed territories since 1998 and address issues such as the nature of government or the role of political opposition and civil society (Freedom House, 2014). Thirdly, conflict narratives that also review the institutions put in place for conflict resolution are available for every intrastate conflict reported in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset in the UCDP “Conflict Encyclopedia” (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2014). Fourthly, country reports of the Economist Intelligence Unit (2014) provide detailed accounts on political and economic developments worldwide since 1996, sometimes on a monthly basis, although reports vary in frequency across countries and time. Finally, for cases in Sub-Saharan Africa, I also used the annual Africa Yearbook (“Afrika Jahrbuch” until 2003) that covers political developments in the region (Mehler et al., 2014); and for cases in Asia, I relied on the bimonthly academic journal Asian Survey published by the University of California Press, which covers contemporary politics in South, Southeast, and East Asia since 1961. Table 4.1 displays that while more information is available for more recent cases of interim government, all years in my observation period are covered by several independent sources (“period” describes the portion of the observation period covered by each source).

4.1.2 Measuring the Dependent Variable

In Chapter 1, I defined my dependent variable by using a negative conceptualization that understands peace as the absence of intrastate conflict after the termination of interim government. I also discussed that this negative conceptualization is common in statistical conflict research, as it is easily measurable across time and space, does not blur the lines between peace and its causes, and thus comes with higher conceptual utility and clarity than “thick” conceptual notions of positive peace (cf. Gerring, 1999). Given these theoretical considerations, I operationalize my dependent variable here following the convention in academic research as the duration of peace between the termination of interim government until intrastate armed conflict occurs in the post-interim period. Survival time is measured in days to allow for a maximum amount of information. Because the bargaining theory framework employed in this dissertation focuses on war as a strategic interactions of warring parties (cf. Chapter 3), I measure conflict occurrence on the individual conflict-level, meaning I assess whether the violence in the post-interim period was actually the result of clashes between those parties that had previously been involved in war. I run a
robustness check on post-interim violence on the country-level in section 4.2.2.

To identify if and at what time armed conflict occurs in a post-interim period, I again rely on the data provided by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. To be included in the data set, a conflict must have surpassed 25 battle-related deaths before the installation of an interim government through the formal termination of war in a military victory, peace agreement, or international intervention (cf. Chapter 1). If armed conflict does not occur after the end of interim government, I right censor the respective case on 31 December 2014. Right censoring represents a particular type of missing data problem that is common in survival analysis, and observations are right censored when information about their survival time until an event is incomplete, meaning that they did not experience the event before the end of an observation period (cf. section 4.1.5). For instance, the case of Liberia is right censored on 31 December 2014, because no armed conflict occurred since the termination of Liberia’s interim government in November 2005. In total, my sample includes 35 interim governments that were followed by armed conflict in the post-interim period (56.5 percent), as well as 27 interim governments (43.5 percent) that are right censored on 31 December 2014. In sum, these interim governments are at risk for 172,380 days in the post-interim period, which I aggregate to 522 unique yearly spells that represent actual changes in one of my time-varying co-variates (cf. below and Wucherpfennig et al., 2012).

Assessing my dependent variable using the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset comes with advantages and pitfalls. One general problem that the data set shares with most other conflict data sets is that information on violence is gathered by evaluating news resources (Kreutz, 2015; Öberg and Sollenberg, 2011), meaning that conflict data sets may in fact not capture intrastate armed conflict as such, but rather intrastate armed conflict reporting. As a result, the UCDP/PRIO data (and every other conflict data set based on news reports) may portray a biased form of the actual conflict. This bias may include capital bias (reporting is skewed towards a capital, as more journalists are present in urban areas), or event size bias (the more victims, the higher the news value of an event, and the more likely it is that editors agree to publish it, cf. Davenport and Ball, 2002). In addition, coding conflict data based on news reports is typically obstructed by the phenomena of issue crowding (prominent international events

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34 Although not reported in any table, I ran my models also with a right-censoring date of 31 December 2013 as a robustness check. This only changed the coding of the dependent variable for the case of Libya, and did not affect my results in any way.

35 As a special case, the post-interim period of Comoros in 2002 and 2003 is right-censored on 19.12.2003, as the day after, a second interim government following a second peace agreement convened, before the conflict had re-escalated again to over 25 battle-related deaths. I run a robustness check excluding this case (and other critical coding decisions) below. In addition, my data set also includes a number of cases where armed conflict occurs at the time a case enters the sample. Excluding such cases can bias my results, if armed conflict is explained by properties of interim government. Because Cox Proportional Hazards (PH) models are yet a class of survival models only sensitive to the rank of duration values, not to their absolute value, I code all respective cases with \( t = 1 \), a number that corresponds to a duration value smaller than the smallest one recorded in my sample (cf. Nelson et al., 2007).
overshadow conflict developments that are then less likely to be reported in international news media) and issue fatigue (spells of limited conflict reporting in civil wars of long duration or high intensity, cf. Themnér and Wallensteen, 2014). Chapter 5 offers a more general discussion of validity problems with statistical data and information coming out of conflict zones.

Despite these drawbacks, the Armed Conflict Dataset has key advantages over other conflict data collections that are readily available in an electronically accessible format and can be used for statistical analysis (Eck, 2005). This includes particularly the Correlates of War Project (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010) that only captures civil wars, i.e. intrastate armed conflicts that result in over 1000 battle-related deaths per calendar year. By considering a casualty threshold of 25 battle-related deaths, the Armed Conflict Dataset permits a more nuanced view on conflict, allowing me to analyze the full range of conflict behavior and to consider conflict intensity as a covariate (Eck, 2005).

### 4.1.3 Measuring the Independent Variables

Based on my theoretical argument on how interim governments mitigate commitment problems of warring parties, I argued in Chapter 3 for the effects of four independent variables: the institutional designs of power-sharing (H1) and international interim government (H2), as well as the reform aspects of integrating parallel political and military institutions into interim government (H3), and of allowing unarmed actors to participate in interim reforms (H4). In order to test these hypotheses, I collected novel information on all four independent variables, as well as for some control variables (cf. section 4.1.4), based on the coding rules and sources reported below. More information on coding rules, as well as a listed overview of the variables included in the data set, is available in the codebook provided in Table A.2 in Appendix A.  

**Power-Sharing Interim Government**  
Firstly, and based on my definition of power-sharing interim government in Chapter 3, I code such interim government as present and with a value of 1 if rebel groups are offered guaranteed positions in interim executive or legislative. Power-sharing is coded as a binary variable; and thus all other cases receive the value 0. Given that my sample only includes 62 actual instances of interim governments, it is unrewarding to have too few cases in each variable category, and I thus code the revolutionary and caretaker interim government models of the Shain and Linz (1995) typology as non-instances of power-sharing. As a result, Liberia’s 2003-05 NTGL worked under a power-sharing deal and is coded as “1”, while the party of President Aristide boycotted Haiti’s 2004 interim government (“0”). If power-sharing deals

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36Especially for early cases and those where little information was available, I relied in addition to the sources reported below on news reports, case studies (e.g. Cohen, 2007; Curtis, 2007), or policy reports (e.g. Nixon and Hartzell, 2011; Papagianni, 2008). The data set and R scripts to replicate my analyses are available at [https://github.com/juliastr](https://github.com/juliastr).
change during the rule of an interim government, I consider the design that exists at the end of interim government. For instance, Burundi’s 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement installed an interim government that continued to fight in armed conflict against the *Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie – Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie* or National Council for the Defense of Democracy—Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD). The CNDD-FDD was only integrated into power-sharing interim government when it signed a ceasefire agreement in 2001.

To code the power-sharing variable, I relied on those sources that I used to select my sample and that I discussed above, in particular Freedom House’s “Freedom in the World” country reports and the Bertelsmann Foundation’s BTI reports. In addition, and for those cases of interim government that followed negotiated peace agreements, I consulted the Peace Accord Matrix provided by the University of Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies (Joshi and Darby, 2013; Joshi, Quinn, et al., 2015). This project offers detailed information on the implementation time line of accords negotiated between 1989 and 2012 and includes the category “power-sharing transitional government,” defined as one that guarantees elites of a non-governmental party positions at the level of cabinet or above, or one in which they receive quotas in the main branches of government. In my sample, 32 interim governments (51.6 per cent) include power-sharing provisions for the warring parties.

**International Interim Government** Following my definition of international interim government in Chapter 3, I code such government as present and with a value of 1 if members of the international community assume political authority in some or all policy matters during interim rule. International interim rule is also coded as a binary variable; thus, all other cases receive the value 0. To recall, I outlined in Chapter 2 that past research has often looked at international interim rule in a strict interpretation following Shain and Linz (1995) or Doyle (2002). Doyle classifies subtypes of international interim government by separating supervisory, executive, administrative and monitoring authority, and considers all but monitoring authority as types of international interim government (cf. Croissant, 2008). In Chapter 3, I then explained that I prefer a lenient perspective on international interim rule that follows the reasoning by Guttieri and Pionbo (2007), who argue that most present day interim governments see large degrees of international influence in decision-making, even though this input may not be formalized in international administrations. This perspective on international interim government is also based on the fact that troops in monitoring UN peacekeeping operations usually tend to assume *de jure* or *de facto* authority over “interim security arrangements” in some or all parts of a war-torn state (Call and Stanley, 2001).

Based on this discussion, I code three versions of the international interim government variable. A first version aligns my coding with Doyle (2002) and
codes all supervisory, executive, and administrative authority as 1; and all other cases as 0 (I will refer to this as the “strict” version of the variable). A second version (that I prefer) also includes monitoring peacekeeping missions in the category of values that are coded with 1 (the “lenient” version). A third version used in my robustness checks codes international interim government without any arbitrary conceptual delineations but as a continuous variable and according to the total number of UN peacekeeping personnel (military observers, police, and civilians) present in the final year of interim government. To code the two binary variables, I relied on the classification by Doyle (2002) as a source, as well as on the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2014) website that informs about the mandate of all present and past peacekeeping missions. Its reports include information on whether the tasks of peacekeeping missions only comprised monitoring activities – such as for the 1993-97 United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) – or if operations assumed further tasks – such as the post-2003 United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). To code the continuous version of the variable, I relied on the “Providing for Peacekeeping” data made available by the International Peace Institute (2015). In sum, my sample includes 13 international interim governments (20.9 per cent) in the strict version, and 29 cases (46.8 per cent) of such government in the lenient version. The continuous version of the variable ranges from zero international staff deployed during the interim period (such as during South Africa’s 1993-94 transition) to 18.296 members of UN peacekeeping personnel deployed in the final year of the DRC’s interim period (cf. Table A.3 in Appendix A).

**Integrating Parallel Institutions** Thirdly, and following my conceptualization of the integration of parallel political and military institutions in Chapter 3, I code such integration as an ordinal variable receiving the values 2, 1, and 0. Integration is fully achieved and coded with a value of 2 if warring parties abolished both parallel political institutions, such as a shadow governments, and disarmed and demobilized before the end of interim government. Integration is partially achieved and coded with a value of 1 if either one of the two institutional areas is integrated into the authority of an interim government. All other cases receive a 0. For instance, and as I noted in Chapter 3, by the time of the 1994 elections in El Salvador, the interim government had restored almost 100 percent of mayors and judges in former zones of rebel control, and had completed disarming and demobilizing ex-combatants (Stanley, 2007). The case is thus coded as 1. The authority of Afghanistan’s AIA did yet not extend much beyond Kabul, and a voluntary DDR program had only been initiated in 2003 and was not finalized with the 2004 elections (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2006). Afghanistan is thus coded as 0.

I assess the integration of parallel institutions into the authority of an interim government on an ordinal scale that combines the integration of political and military institutions into a single variable and measures the overall state
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power-Sharing IG</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>0.494</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International IG</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>0.538</td>
<td>0.499</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel Institutions</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>1.320</td>
<td>0.714</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>2.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>1.433</td>
<td>0.736</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>2.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Conflict</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>0.387</td>
<td>0.488</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompatibility</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>1.703</td>
<td>0.457</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>2.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Intensity</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>0.523</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per Capita</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>5,588.569</td>
<td>5,021.162</td>
<td>267.598</td>
<td>22,965.310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Size</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>29,612,268</td>
<td>53,874,004</td>
<td>575,428</td>
<td>254,454,778</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The lenient, binary version of the international interim government variable is reported. For descriptive statistics of all other coding versions and additional control variables, see Table A.3 in Appendix A. For a correlation matrix, see Table A.4 in Appendix A.

of monopolization by an interim government, but I fit political and military integration separately as a robustness check in section 4.2.2.\(^\text{37}\) To code whether interim governments integrated the parallel political and military institutions of warring parties, I relied on the sources I used to delineate my sample, in particular the Bertelsmann Foundation (2014) BTI reports. In addition, and in order to assess the state of military integration, I used the above-quoted University of Notre Dame’s Peace Accord Matrix that offers detailed accounts on the timeline of realization of DDR programs after peace agreements (Joshi and Darby, 2013; Joshi, Quinn, et al., 2015). I also relied on case studies published by the Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) (Bryden and Scherrer, 2012). In sum, my sample includes 16 cases of full integration of parallel institutions (25.8 per cent), and 19 cases where parallel institutions were partially integrated into interim rule (30.6 per cent).

The Participation of Unarmed Actors Fourthly, and following my definition of the participation of unarmed actors in interim decision-making as laid out in Chapter 3, I code such participation as an ordinal variable receiving the values 2, 1 and 0. The variable is coded with the value of 2 if an interim government includes institutional posts that allow for the participation of civil society and/or political parties in decision-making processes, such as the aforementioned Liberian NTGL that allocated seats in the parliament to civil society leaders. The variable is coded with the value of 1 if the interim government allows for ad hoc participation of civil society and unarmed opposition parties, for instance in one-time, topic-specific events such as in Sierra Leone. During

\(^{37}\)In my main analysis, I do not fit the categorical variable parallel institutions in the software environment R’s factor data format (that lets me interpret each distinct variable value with regard to a reference category), but treat the variable as continuous, because I am interested in a continuous interpretation of its effects (cf. the formulation of my hypothesis in Chapter 3, “the more advanced the process of integration, the higher the stability of peace”). I run a robustness check with the variable fitted in a factor data format in Table A.5 in Appendix A, which does not change the interpretation of my results.
the rule of the Sierra Leonean interim government, “politicians, former combatants, and civil society representatives joined together ... and approved a new electoral system for polls scheduled for May 2002” in a national conference (Freedom House, 2002b). All other cases are coded as 0, such as Haiti, where one of the weaknesses of the post-2004 interim government was reportedly “its complete neglect of the civil society within the formulation and implementation of its policy” (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2008a).

Some critique may be warranted that this coding rule (and the theoretical conceptualization of civil society and political party participation that underlies this coding) represents a very liberal interpretation of what constitutes as “participation.” For instance, my coding does not account for whether political parties or civil society actually had a meaningful voice in decision-making, or whether their participation was only pro forma – such as to please international donors – while in reality, unarmed actors were intimidated by the warring parties or threatened to cast their vote for a certain policy. Similarly, one may criticize that a one-time, ad hoc participation of unarmed actors does not fully capture the concept of participation; or that the inclusion of civil society and political parties in interim government institutions may actually be harmful for their theoretical role of creating domestic audience costs as hypothesized in Chapter 3. These aspects would make my coding result in ineffective measures of unarmed actor participation during interim rule.

While these are valuable points of critique that highlight the difficulties in portraying the world in binary or ordinal variables, my choice to capture the participation of unarmed actors in the way outlined above is driven by concerns of reliability. A coding rule that asks if an interim government consults at least once with unarmed actors; or if these actors received actual seats in interim institutions can more easily be replicated by other researchers than a rule asking if an interim government, for instance, included meaningful participation of civil society and political parties, as the latter rule is much more subject to the perception of the individual researcher. In addition, particularly for early instances of interim government, it was often difficult to find detailed information on the role of unarmed actors during interim rule (cf. Chapter 5), so my approach is also driven by data availability. The mixed-method research design adopted in this study provides a remedy for the limitations of this coding rule, as it allows me to analyze unarmed actor participation in interim rule in a more nuanced way in subsequent case studies. In sum, 27 interim governments (43.5 per cent) include institutionalized participatory structures and 17 governments (27.4 per cent) implemented ad hoc structures.

38As with the variable measuring the integration of parallel institutions, I treat the participation variable as continuous. A robustness check with the variable fitted in a factor data format in Table A.5 in Appendix A does not change the interpretation of my results.
4.1.4 Measuring the Control Variables

A number of other factors, in addition to properties of interim government, can affect commitment problems of warring parties and thus explain the stability of post-interim peace. The existing literature has particularly argued for the role of several characteristics of (1) a foregoing intrastate armed conflict, (2) a previous regime, and (3) the post-interim period; and one may additionally argue that (4) other aspects of interim governments than the ones captured by my independent variables affect the stability of post-interim peace. In my main analysis – and thus also in the subsequent discussion of this section – I follow Achen (2005) and Clarke (2005) who caution against over-specified “garbage can” regression models with too many controls, and I thus focus on five key control variables belonging to these four categories just listed; control variables that have been proposed as important by the vast majority of recent literature.

In my robustness checks in section 4.2.2, I fit further sets of controls that I explain “on the go” and list in the codebook in Appendix A.

Firstly, many scholars reason that ethnic conflict is less conducive for stable peace in the aftermath of war as compared to intrastate conflict over non-ethnic issues. In ethnic conflicts, rebel groups typically fight in the name of a specific, previously marginalized ethnic group or a coalition of several ethnic groups. This impedes the chances for peace because violence exacerbated by ethnic divisions makes peaceful coexistence unlikely if minorities do not receive credible guarantees that they will not be marginalized in future politics (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Lake and Rothchild, 1996; Wucherpfennig et al., 2012). To capture the ethnic conflict control variable, I rely on previously collected data by Walter (2004) and Kreutz (2010), who code all cases as conflict over ethnicity and with a value of 1 where “combatants broke down along ethnic lines, or a faction defined itself as a separate ethnic group” (Walter, 2004, p. 376), such as in Burundi’s civil war between ethnic Hutus and Tutsis (Kuperman, 2015). All other cases are coded as 0. In my sample, 31 interim governments (or exactly 50 per cent) follow periods of conflict over ethnicity.

Secondly, intrastate conflict over territorial issues has been found to result in more stable peace as compared to conflict over government, for instance because a government may be more willing to bargain and make concessions to a rebel group if the fight concerns not the entire national territory, but only smaller parts of it (Flores and Nooruddin, 2012; Svensson, 2009). I understand conflict over government as one with an incompatibility “concerning type of political system, the replacement of the central government or the change of its composition,” while a conflict over territory includes an incompatibility “concerning the status of a specified territory,” such as secession or autonomy (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2015a). To capture the variable conflict incompatibility, I use the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset that codes territorial conflicts as 1 and government conflicts as 2 (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, et al., 2002; Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015). In my sample, 49 interim governments follow
Thirdly, past research argues that conflict intensity affects the stability of peace, because intrastate conflicts that result in more battle-related deaths reduce the parties’ ability to reconcile (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008; Mason and Fett, 1996). I follow previous studies that have captured armed conflict intensity as a dichotomous measure (e.g. Reid, 2015) and include a dummy for conflict intensity in my models that captures if a preceding conflict exceeded 1000 battle-related deaths over the entire conflict period (“civil wars” coded as 1) or not (0), using data in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. 33 interim governments followed high-intensity civil wars.

Fourthly, qualities of the post-interim period are possible explanations for post-interim peace. Past research has found the level of economic development and population size to impact the stability of peace. Low levels of economic development decrease employment opportunities for young men; and a pool of impoverished, unemployed men reduces the costs of recruiting for warring parties (Bigombe et al., 2000; Collier, Elliott, et al., 2003). I capture economic development as the level of GDP per capita in the post-interim period and log-transform the variable for my models due to a right-skewed distribution. Robustness checks additionally include a measure of annual GDP per capita growth as well as infant mortality rate (per 1,000 births) to capture the quality of post-interim socio-economic livelihoods. In addition, the very definition of intrastate armed conflict “which classifies armed conflict as a civil war only if there is a high threshold of deaths, implies that civil wars are more likely to occur in populous countries” (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006, 514f.), and I thus also include the logged value of a country’s population size. For all GDP, infant mortality, and population statistics, I rely on the World Bank (2014)’s World Development Indicators.

Others have argued that more severe conflicts with higher numbers of deaths reveal more private information and thus correlate with a lower risk of renewed violence (Fearon, 1995b). Generally, it would also be reasonable to argue that institutional aspects of the post-interim period, such as the level of democracy or type of electoral system impacts the stability of peace. Yet, these political variables may be directly affected by properties of the interim government. For instance, electoral systems (or any other institutional qualities of a post-interim political system) are likely to be negotiated by those elites that are involved in decision-making in an interim government. Moreover, and related to a point I formulated in the introduction, because my definition of interim government includes the criterion that such governments end in elections, any variable measuring post-interim levels of democracy (a concept that includes elections as a minimal criterion) would be biased. Thus, all variables capturing political institutions of the post-interim period are likely to be intervening, instead of confounding variables, and should thus not be controlled for (King, Keohane, et al., 1994; Ray, 2003). By definition, a confounding variable is an antecedent factor that correlates with both predictor and outcome. A variable Z however intervenes in the relationship between predictor X and outcome Y. For instance, the design of post-interim institutions is likely to be an intervening variable if it correlates with the stability of peace (Y), but is the result of a property of interim government (X). This is likely the case if post-interim institutions are designed, for instance, by parties in power-sharing rule. Controlling for Z may make me discover intermediate links in the relationship between X and Y, but no confounding factors that discredits my hypothesis about a link between X and Y (Ray, 2003).
4.1.5 Estimation Techniques

In my main analysis and in most robustness checks, I use survival analysis to test how properties of interim governments affect the stability of post-interim peace (cf. Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2001). Survival analysis has as its central advantage over other statistical methods for the purpose of my dissertation its inherent interest to study the duration of time until an event occurs, rather than whether it happens or not. This means that survival analysis provides clues as to what makes peace more stable in one case than in the other, even if both eventually fail – such as 19 years of peace in Mozambique between the end of the interim government and the recurrence of war, as opposed to a few months in the DRC. For this reason, Collier, Hoeffler, et al. (2008, p. 466) argue that survival analysis is the method best suited to study “the distinctive structure of post-conflict risks or how they evolve as a result of policy choices.”

Specifically, I fit semi-parametric Cox Proportional Hazards (PH) survival models (Cox, 1972), because my theoretical considerations outlined in Chapter 3 do not predict any specific functional form of the underlying baseline hazard $\lambda_0(t)$ – something which parametric models would do (cf. below). This means that my empirical analysis can focus on how my co-variates shift the underlying baseline hazard (cf. Wucherpfennig et al., 2012). In their basic form, the hazard rate $\lambda_i(t)$ in Cox PH models is defined as

$$\lambda_i(t) = \lambda_0(t) e^{\beta' x}$$

(4.1)

where $\lambda_0(t)$ again specifies the baseline hazard and $\beta' x$ depicts the co-variates included in the regression model and their respective coefficients. The baseline hazard is defined as the conditional probability of an event at time $t = \tau$, given that the event did not occur at any $t < \tau$. For instance, it is the risk of an onset of violence after one month in the post-interim period given that conflict did not occur before this point in time. With this specification, a coefficient $\beta_K > 0$ implies an increase in the hazard rate. This means that with a positive coefficient, an increase in the associated explanatory variable $x_K$ leads to an increase in the hazard of armed conflict in the post-interim period and thus to a decrease in the expected stability of post-interim peace. Vice versa, a negative coefficient $\beta_K < 0$ implies that an increase in the associated explanatory variable $x_K$ leads to a decrease in the hazard of conflict and thus an increase in the stability of peace.

For two different values of $x_K$ – for instance, an interim government $i$ that has implemented a power-sharing agreement between warring parties and an interim government $j$ without joint rule between belligerents – the hazard ratio of these two cases at time $t$ can be written as

$$\frac{\lambda_i(t)}{\lambda_j(t)} = \frac{\lambda_0(t) e^{\beta' x_i}}{\lambda_0(t) e^{\beta' x_j}} = e^{\beta' (x_i - x_j)}$$

(4.2)
meaning that mathematically, \( \lambda_0(t) \) cancels out and stays unspecified. This is why Cox models are called Proportional Hazards models: Even though the hazard of seeing an event at time \( t \) may vary over time, the hazard in one group is a constant proportion of the hazard in the other group. Hence, semi-parametric Cox PH models come with a greater flexibility as compared to parametric survival models that make assumptions about the hazard. Weibull regression models assume that \( \lambda_0(t) \) is monotonic, and either decreasing or increasing over time. Exponential models, representing a special form of Weibull regression models, assume that \( \lambda_0(t) \) is constant. In sum, at two times \( t_1 \) and \( t_2 \) with \( t_1 < t_2 \), the hazard ratio for two distinct cases in the Cox PH model is thus defined as

\[
\frac{\lambda_i(t_1)}{\lambda_j(t_1)} = \frac{\lambda_i(t_2)}{\lambda_j(t_2)}
\]

(4.3)

To illustrate this by using an example from this dissertation, although the hazard of intrastate armed conflict in the post-interim period may be higher right after an interim government ends \( (t_1) \) than long way down the road when war-torn societies stabilize \( (t_2) \), the Cox PH models assumes that the hazard of power-sharing interim governments to be followed by armed conflict is a constant proportion of the hazard of interim governments without power-sharing deals. As this is a strong assumption to be made, section 4.2.2 runs model diagnostics that assess whether the proportional hazards assumption holds for my variables.

4.2 Results and Discussion

4.2.1 Regression Results: Main Analysis

To evaluate the hypothesized relationships of Chapter 3, I now explore the effect of my predictor variables across several specifications of Cox PH models. Table 4.3 presents the results for four of such models. I estimate all models using clustered standard errors on the country level to account for possible interdependence, meaning that I assume that repeated cases of interim government within one country are not independent of each other (such as interim rule in Liberia in the 1990s, and in 2003-05). Model 1 reports a baseline model that provides a test for the perspective of the previous literature on interim governments that I reviewed in Chapter 2, and thus only fits the independent variables measuring the institutional designs of power-sharing and international interim government. This serves to illustrate the precise relationship between my independent variables and post-interim peace and to make sure that adding control variables does not arbitrarily change coefficient signs. Model 2 repeats this exercise but additionally includes measures of the reform aspects in interim governments that serve to evaluate my Hypotheses H3 and H4 on the integration of parallel institutions and the participation of unarmed actors. I again do not include control variables in this model in order to present initial evidence of
the relationship between all properties of interim government and the stability of post-interim peace. Models 3 and 4 are then fully specified including all five control variables described in section 4.1.

The broad story that these models tell – and that robustness checks confirm below – is that interim governments matter for long-term peace, but that reform aspects come with higher explanatory power than the institutional designs of such governments. Firstly, and following past research, I have argued in Hypothesis H1 that power-sharing interim government, as opposed to any other interim government, increases the stability of peace. I have reasoned based on the existing literature that power-sharing can be expected to mitigate commitment problems by reducing uncertainty for the weaker-growing party in the bargaining situation concerning the future behavior of the stronger-growing party. I have yet also cast my doubts on this predominant approach in the existing literature, and I have argued that the terminable nature of interim government institutions introduces a logical inconsistency to the idea that short-term power-sharing reduces uncertainty in the long run. Table 4.3 provides empirical evidence for my doubts on the effect of power-sharing interim government on peace, and Hypothesis H1 cannot be supported by the evidence presented in Table 4.3. In all four models, the coefficient for power-sharing interim government is positive (meaning power-sharing rule would actually increase the hazard of armed conflict in the post-interim period), albeit not statistically significant. This indicates that power-sharing interim government is not associated with armed conflict risks in the post-interim period.

The lack of statistical significance for the power-sharing coefficient mirrors studies that have previously argued that power-sharing in political institutions is less vital for peace after war than territorial and military power-sharing deals, for instance because the latter versions of power-sharing represent more credible signals (Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008). Since power-sharing interim government was the only variable for which I drew the causal mechanism to peace through “reducing uncertainty” for the warring parties, my finding may also give initial evidence that other mechanisms are more vital to mitigate commitment problems after war. I further scrutinize this finding in my robustness checks below as well as in my qualitative case analyses in the next chapters.

Secondly, and also following past research, I have argued in Hypothesis H2 that international interim government, as opposed to any other interim government, increases the stability of post-interim peace. I have reasoned based on the existing literature on international peacekeeping operations that external actors taking over some or all political authority during interim government mitigates commitment problems because it renders defection very costly for warring parties; thus decreasing the utility of the outcome $W_R, W_G$ in the bargaining situation (cf. Figure 3.2 on page 31). I again have cast doubts due to the terminable nature of interim governments (cf. above). The results reported in Table 4.3 empirically underline my doubts to some extent. In all four models, I
Table 4.3: Cox Proportional Hazard Models (Main Analysis)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stability of Post-Interim Peace</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power-Sharing IG</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>0.245</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>0.283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.346)</td>
<td>(0.362)</td>
<td>(0.388)</td>
<td>(0.400)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International IG</td>
<td>-0.467</td>
<td>-0.392</td>
<td>-0.722*</td>
<td>-0.820**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.358)</td>
<td>(0.368)</td>
<td>(0.461)</td>
<td>(0.422)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel Institutions</td>
<td>-1.663***</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.480***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.341)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.352)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>-0.697***</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.213***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.204)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.293)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Conflict</td>
<td>0.943**</td>
<td>0.920**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.413)</td>
<td>(0.445)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompatibility</td>
<td>1.515***</td>
<td>1.756***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.639)</td>
<td>(0.721)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Intensity</td>
<td>0.686</td>
<td>1.527***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.433)</td>
<td>(0.440)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln. GDP/Capita</td>
<td>-0.123</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.175)</td>
<td>(0.194)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln. Population</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.165)</td>
<td>(0.166)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of interim gov.</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-129.320</td>
<td>-106.808</td>
<td>-107.631</td>
<td>-85.952</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence level, respectively. Standard errors clustered on country level are reported in parentheses. Coefficient sizes instead of hazard ratios are reported.

fit the “lenient” version of international interim rule that also codes monitoring peacekeeping missions with the value of 1 (cf. section 4.1). As expected, international interim government has a negative effect on the hazard of conflict in the post-interim period throughout all model specifications and the coefficient sizes are comparable in substantive terms, but only the coefficients in Model 3 and 4 are statistically significant at the 0.1 and the 0.05 level. Only the results in Model 3 and 4 thus support findings of the existing statistical literature on the positive effect of international actors in war-torn societies. In section 4.2.2, I further scrutinize the effect of international interim government, for instance by using a more strict definition of such rule that more closely follows the work of Doyle (2002) and that excludes monitoring peacekeeping missions, and by testing the continuous coding version of the variable.

Thirdly, I complemented the institutional design approach to studying interim governments as employed by existing research and argued for the effect of reform features during interim government. More specifically, in Hypothesis H3, I expected a positive effect of interim governments that integrate the parallel
Table 4.4: Hazard Ratios (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>exp(beta)</th>
<th>Effect on the Hazard Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.327</td>
<td>33% increase, but no significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.441</td>
<td>56% decrease, but not very robust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.228</td>
<td>87% decrease of conflict hazard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.297</td>
<td>70% decrease of conflict hazard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.509</td>
<td>150% increase of conflict hazard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.787</td>
<td>479% increase of conflict hazard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.603</td>
<td>360% increase of conflict hazard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.980</td>
<td>2% decrease, but no significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.004</td>
<td>&lt;1% increase, but no significance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Model 4 was selected as it had the best fit according to the Aikake Information Criterion (AIC). The AIC balances model parsimony and fit and informs about the predictive power of models compared to the number of variables included. AIC values for my main analysis are: Model 1 (262.6405), Model 2 (229.2615), Model 3 (221.6168), Model 4 (189.9042).

political and military institutions on the stability of peace. In Chapter 3, I built on research regarding non-state actors and their parallel political and military institutions in post-conflict situations and reasoned that as long as the parallel political and military institutions persist throughout the interim period, parties retain the financial resources, popular legitimacy, military infrastructure, and war-time mindsets to remobilize for war in the post-interim period. The more advanced the process of integrating such parallel institutions into the authority of an interim government at the end of such government’s rule, the higher the costs of defection for warring parties and the higher consequently also the stability of post-interim peace.

The results reported in Table 4.3 strongly support this hypothesis. Table 4.3 shows that more advanced processes of integrating parallel institutions into an interim government come with a statistically significant and negative effect on the hazard of conflict in the post-interim period, meaning that such integration substantially increases the stability of post-interim peace. As the reported hazard ratios in Table A.6 in Appendix A show (that fits the parallel institutions variable in factor data format, allowing me to distinguish the effect of each step in the integration process), the effect of the variable is also pronounced. Interim governments that integrate both parallel political institutions and completely disarm and demobilize warring parties before their termination in elections decrease the hazard of armed conflict by 94 per cent compared to interim government where no integration whatsoever takes place (cf. also Table 4.4). Interim governments that only manage to integrate one type of parallel institution still decrease the conflict hazard by 79 per cent. This is an impressive result, and it further underlines the findings of a vast array of qualitative case studies, for instance on the vital role of disarming and demobilizing warring parties in the aftermath of war (e.g. Knight and Özerdem, 2004; Muggah, 2005;
Myrttinen, 2003; Spear, 2002). I disaggregate the variable in section 4.2.2 in order to test whether the integration of military or of political institutions into the authority of an interim government is more conducive to peace.

Finally, in Hypothesis H4, I have argued that more advanced opportunities of participation for unarmed actors in interim government decision-making increase the stability of post-interim peace, because such participation creates domestic audience costs that punish parties who renege on previously struck peaceful bargains (cf. Fearon, 1994). I theorized also that participation through institutionalized positions in the interim government (e.g. if civil society members receive seats in the interim parliament) should have a more pronounced and positive effect on the stability of post-interim peace than ad hoc participation of unarmed actors. The empirical results as reported in Table 4.3 as well as in Table A.5 in Appendix A support my expectations. In Table 4.3, the variable measuring the participation by unarmed actors has a statistically significant and negative effect on the hazard of armed conflict in the post-interim period; an effect that is in substantive terms yet a little smaller than the one for the integration of parallel institutions.

Table A.5 in Appendix A that fits the participation variable in R’s factor data format also shows more clearly that the coefficient size is constantly larger for institutionalized participation, meaning the results also support my expectation that letting unarmed actors participate in the actual interim executive or legislative has a more pronounced effect than ad hoc participation because it is a more credible and costly signal for peace. As Table A.6 in Appendix A visualizes, interim governments that allow for the institutional participation of unarmed actors decrease the hazard of armed conflict in the post-interim period by 92 per cent as compared to interim governments where no unarmed actors are invited to participate in decision-making. In sum, these results support the general idea as brought forward by Papagianni (2007b) and others that when studying interim government, it is fruitful to not only look at power relations between warring party elites, but to also examine how such elites engage with unarmed societal actors in decision-making processes.

With regard to control variables, several important findings appear in Model 3 and Model 4. As expected, all variables measuring characteristics of the foregoing armed conflict are strong and robust determinants of the stability of post-interim peace. Intrastate armed conflicts fought over ethnic issues (such as the protracted civil wars in Burundi or Bosnia), armed conflicts fought over controlling the national government (such as in Liberia or Nepal), as well as conflicts that result in over 1000 battle-related deaths over the entire conflict period (such as in Afghanistan or Mozambique) all have a statistically significant, positive effect on the hazard of conflict in a post-interim period. In other words, ethnic conflicts, conflicts about government, and conflicts of high intensity decrease the expected stability of peace in my sample, which is consistent with findings from past research. As the hazard ratios reported in Table 4.4 show, these effects are
also quite pronounced. For instance, ethnic conflicts increase the hazard of violence in the post-interim period by 150 per cent, as opposed to conflicts where ethnicity plays no role. This is in line with findings that ethnic nationalism and mobilization tend to “continue to exist after an often unstable peace [has] been made” (Cordell and Wolff, 2009, p. 177). The remaining control variables do not report any statistically significant results.

Figure 4.3 provides a graphical interpretation of my analysis. The upper left panel plots the predicted survival functions from Model 4 for interim governments with (dark gray) and without (light gray) power-sharing arrangements. All other variables are held at their median (for continuous variables) or mode (for categorical variables). The y-axis depicts the predicted survival rate at any given day of peace in the post-interim period (on the x-axis). The upper left panel thereby reiterates the previous insight from Model 4, in that it does not predict a higher stability of peace for power-sharing governments than for
interim governments without power-sharing deals for warring parties. The two curves are almost indistinguishable from each other, meaning that there is no statistically significant difference in the predicted survival rate.

The other panels repeat this exercise for all additional independent variables. The upper right panel plots the predicted survival functions from Model 4 for interim governments with (dark gray) and without (light gray) international authority. The lines are further apart than those in the power-sharing panel and this divergence indicates a difference in the predicted survival percentage for interim governments with and without international actors involved. The difference in survival probability becomes most obvious for the reform features of interim governments in the two bottom panels. For instance, the bottom left panel plots the predicted survival functions based on Model 4 that allow to differentiate between interim governments that integrate both parallel political and military institutions (dark gray), either one of (medium gray), or no parallel institutions whatsoever (light gray). The graph reiterates the prediction of the model that interim governments integrating both types of parallel institutions into their authority are followed by much more stable peace in the post-interim period than interim governments without an implementation of such integration. For instance, after approximately four years – the usual length of one legislative period – almost fifty percent of interim governments without an integration of parallel institutions are at war again, while most of those interim governments that integrated both types of parallel institutions remain at peace. Results are similar for the participation of unarmed actors.

4.2.2 Model Diagnostics and Robustness Checks

In addition to the results reported in Table 4.3 for my main analysis, I now evaluate my models with respect to two diagnostics: (1) influential observations and (2) proportional hazards. I discuss the proportional hazards assumption in this section, while I report the test for influential observations in section A.4 in Appendix A due to reasons of parsimony.41 I also test the robustness of my findings by replicating the above Cox PH models in several ways. The following section reports results from (1) sub-setting my original sample in various ways, (2) recoding independent and dependent variables, and (3) fitting additional control variables. I also address (4) possible selection bias of properties of interim government in section 4.2.3. I report further robustness checks, including (5) interaction models (cf. Footnote 29 in Chapter 3), (6) additional recodings of variables, (7) further control variables, and (8) results from frailty models in Appendix A. Interaction and frailty models – the latter aiming to account for unobserved heterogeneity if it is impossible to measure all relevant covariates related to post-interim peace (cf. Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 1999; Wienke, 2003) – are also only reported in the Appendix because they reveal

---

41Because none of my main independent variables represent continuous predictors, I do not report any results that test the linearity assumption of Cox PH models.
Table 4.5: Schoenfeld Residuals Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>rho (ρ)</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power-Sharing Interim Government</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0.420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Interim Government</td>
<td>-0.285</td>
<td>0.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration of Parallel Institutions</td>
<td>0.406</td>
<td>0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation of Unarmed Actors</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>0.322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Conflict</td>
<td>0.249</td>
<td>0.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompatibility</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Intensity</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per Capita</td>
<td>-0.208</td>
<td>0.258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Size</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>0.913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBAL</td>
<td>0.432</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

no new insight into the relationship between properties of interim government and stable peace in the post-interim period.\(^{42}\) If anything, the results based on the frailty models in particular strengthen my confidence in the effect of the reform aspects of interim governments, while they do not produce statistically significant results for the institutional design aspects.

The Proportionality Assumption

As their name indicates, Cox PH models rest on the assumption of proportional hazards, meaning that the hazard of seeing an event in one group is a constant proportion of the hazard of seeing the event in the other group. I test this assumption by applying the Schoenfeld (1982) residuals test to Model 4 of Table 4.3 (cf. the notes to Table 4.4). The test – as reported in Table 4.5 – assesses the null hypothesis that the \( \beta \) coefficient of each co-variate is constant in time, and gives a column for \( \rho \) (for the Pearson product-moment correlation between scaled Schoenfeld residuals and the logarithm of time for each of my predictor variables) as well as a column with p-values. A statistically significant p-value of less than 0.05 indicates a violation of the proportionality assumption and a rejection of the null hypothesis. As Table 4.5 shows, none of the variables violate the proportional hazards assumption, and there is no statistically significant

\(^{42}\)In Footnote 29, I argued for interaction effects between the institutional designs of power-sharing or international interim government and the integration of parallel institutions, and thus Table A.9 in Appendix A adds interaction terms. In Table A.9, the unique effect of integrating institutions on the hazard of conflict is not limited to interpreting the coefficient of the parallel institutions variable, but also depends on the values of the interaction coefficient and on those of power-sharing and international interim government. This means that the coefficient of integrating parallel institutions is now interpreted as the unique effect of integration on the hazard of armed conflict only when power-sharing or international interim rule equal 0, which allows me to evaluate the effect of integrating institutions in institutional contexts where parties do not come together in power-sharing deals, or where international actors are absent, and see if the effect is any different. As Table A.9 shows, the integration of parallel political and military institutions has a negative and statistically significant effect on the hazard of armed conflict in interim governments without power-sharing and international rule. The idea of conditional effects can thus not be supported.
Table 4.6: Robustness Check I: Sub-setting (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>National (1)</th>
<th>No TA (2)</th>
<th>No Coup (3)</th>
<th>Critical (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power-Sharing IG</td>
<td>0.544</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>0.340</td>
<td>0.324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.433)</td>
<td>(0.404)</td>
<td>(0.478)</td>
<td>(0.409)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International IG</td>
<td>-0.819**</td>
<td>-0.767**</td>
<td>-0.635*</td>
<td>-0.883***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.434)</td>
<td>(0.440)</td>
<td>(0.466)</td>
<td>(0.438)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel Institutions</td>
<td>-1.368***</td>
<td>-1.362***</td>
<td>-1.776***</td>
<td>-1.441***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.370)</td>
<td>(0.353)</td>
<td>(0.457)</td>
<td>(0.369)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>-1.258***</td>
<td>-1.224***</td>
<td>-1.113***</td>
<td>-1.217***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.318)</td>
<td>(0.303)</td>
<td>(0.339)</td>
<td>(0.302)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Conflict</td>
<td>0.910**</td>
<td>1.093***</td>
<td>0.946*</td>
<td>0.974**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.454)</td>
<td>(0.465)</td>
<td>(0.503)</td>
<td>(0.460)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompatibility</td>
<td>1.804</td>
<td>1.504**</td>
<td>1.378**</td>
<td>1.673***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.221)</td>
<td>(0.725)</td>
<td>(0.754)</td>
<td>(0.720)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Intensity</td>
<td>1.360***</td>
<td>1.565***</td>
<td>1.393***</td>
<td>1.493***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.452)</td>
<td>(0.449)</td>
<td>(0.503)</td>
<td>(0.456)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln. GDP/Capita</td>
<td>-0.119</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>-0.040</td>
<td>0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.212)</td>
<td>(0.193)</td>
<td>(0.221)</td>
<td>(0.199)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln. Population</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.193)</td>
<td>(0.167)</td>
<td>(0.185)</td>
<td>(0.171)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations | 434 | 416 | 446 | 464 |
Number of interim gov. | 55 | 56 | 53 | 58 |
Log Likelihood | -78.017 | -82.125 | -60.956 | -80.526 |

Note that *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence level, respectively. Standard errors clustered on country level are reported in parentheses. Coefficient sizes instead of hazard ratios are reported.

evidence of non-proportional hazards for my predictors.

Sub-setting the Sample

It makes sense to subset my original sample to address a number of theoretical concerns. Firstly, my sample of 62 interim governments includes both national interim governments – such as Liberia’s 2003-05 NTGL – as well as interim governments that only convened to govern part of a territory, such as the 1996-98 United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) in Croatia, or Bougainville’s Interim Provincial Government that convened in 2001 as a result of a territorial conflict between the government of Papua New Guinea and the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA). Some have studied such sub-national interim institutions together with national-level ones (e.g. Caplan, 2005). But it may be plausible to assume that sub-national interim institutions follow a different causal logic in terms of how they address commitment problems, for instance they may build more strongly upon parallel rebel administrations than national governments that
aim to reestablish control over a territory. Model 1 (“National”) in Table 4.6 reports results of a Cox PH model that tests my hypotheses on a sub-sample of national-level interim rule only.

Secondly, and addressing a similar concern, my sample of interim governments includes also six UN transitional administrations that are typically studied separately from interim governments run by domestic actors in the qualitative literature on the topic. From the perspective of bargaining theory, it is also reasonable to assume that UN administrations follow a distinct logic as compared to interim governments run by domestic elites in terms of how they address commitment problems, for instance as they may put less effort in allowing for the participation of unarmed actors and focus on establishing basic levels of security and a monopoly of violence. Addressing this concern, Model 2 (“No TA”) in Table 4.6 reports the results of a Cox PH model that test my hypotheses on a sub-sample excluding international administrations.

Thirdly, in Hypothesis H3 I argued for the peace-conducive effect of integrating parallel political and military institutions of warring parties into the authority of an interim government; and the results as reported in Table 4.3 lend strong empirical support to this hypothesis. Integrating parallel institutions requires that such structures exist in the first place, and in coding this variable, I thus had to first assemble information on whether parties had even set up parallel political institutions (the use of armed force by an opposition that is inherent in the concept of intrastate conflict means parallel military structures must be given by definition). I found information on parallel institutions to various degrees in all but seven cases (these are coded as 0 in my main analysis) – but, as Buhaug et al. (2009) note stating a similar concern, these cases are not a random sub-sample but all represent interim governments that follow coup d’états. Coups are captured by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset if they resulted in over 25 battle-related deaths, such as the ousting of Haiti’s President Aristide in 1991 by military forces that then installed an interim government. To address a possible bias, Model 3 (“No Coup”) in Table 4.6 reports results that test my hypotheses on a sub-sample excluding interim governments that followed coup d’états. Information on coup d’états comes from the data set provided by Powell and Thyne (2011).

Fourthly, during the coding process, I had difficulties fitting the cases of Bosnia and Mozambique to the overall conceptual framework, because the negotiated peace agreements in these countries specifically asked rebel groups to retain parallel political institutions during the interim period. For instance, the General Peace Agreement for Mozambique states in Protocol V.3 (“Specific guarantees for the period from the cease-fire to the holding of the elections”) that in order to provide for a stable interim period, “public administration in the areas controlled by Renamo shall employ only citizens resident in those ar-

43These are the previously described UNTAC in Cambodia, UNTAET in East Timor, UNTAES in Croatia, UNMIK in Kosovo, UNTAG in Namibia, and the international administration of Bosnia after the Dayton Peace Agreement (cf. Caplan, 2005; Chesterman, 2005b).

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The variable measuring power-sharing interim government continues to come with a positive coefficient, but misses out on statistical significance at the conventional levels. The variable capturing the presence of an international interim
government reduces the risk of armed conflict in the post-interim period, indicated by the negative coefficient for the variable that is statistically significant at the 0.05 level in all models but Model 3 that excludes coup d’états, where it is significant at the 0.1 level. Both the integration of parallel institutions as well as the participation of unarmed actors in interim decision-making strongly reduce the hazard of armed conflict in the post-interim period, again indicated by substantial and statistically significant negative coefficients. Findings for control variables remain overall similar to those of the main analysis: Ethnic conflict and conflict intensity are robust predictors of violence in the post-interim period, as expected by theory and past research. The variable measuring conflict incompatibility loses its statistical significance in Model 1 (“National”), which is likely the result of the few observations of territorial conflict in the reference category. All other controls remain statistically insignificant.

**Receding Variables**

I addressed the value of fitting stricter or more lenient versions of my variables above (cf. section 4.1). Firstly, I described in section 4.1.3 that I coded different dichotomous and continues versions of the variable assessing whether an interim government included degrees of international authority; and I used the lenient and dichotomous version in my main analysis. Because this lenient coding goes against some of the qualitative literature that follows the work of Doyle (2002), Model 1 in Table 4.7 instead fits the strict coding version of the variable, and Model 2 fits the continuous coding version of international rule.

Secondly, I used the integration of parallel political and military institutions

---

*Notes:* Dark gray lines represent interim governments that have integrated parallel political or military institutions, light lines plot the survival function for when parallel institutions have not been integrated.
to assess the overall state of institutional monopolization by an interim government in my main analysis and did not distinguish between political and military institutions. It is however interesting to evaluate whether it is more important for the stability of post-interim peace that warring parties disarm and demobilize before an interim government terminates, or that they integrate parallel political structures into the authority of the interim government. Thus, Model 3 in Table 4.7 fits political and military integration separately.44

Thirdly, I have noted above that because the bargaining theory framework employed in Chapter 3 focuses on war as a strategic interaction of warring parties, my main analysis measured conflict occurrence on the individual conflict level, which means that I assessed whether violence in the post-interim period was actually the result of clashes between those parties that had previously been involved in war. This does yet not mean that all armed conflict ceases to exist in a country. For instance, while intrastate armed conflict between Angola’s Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola or People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola or National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) ended in 2002 following the death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, the MPLA continued to fight a territorial conflict against insurgents in the Cabinda region. For that reason, Model 4 in Table 4.7 recodes the dependent variable to assess the occurrence of post-interim conflict on the country-level.

The results in Table 4.7 again provide support for the findings of my main analysis, but also shed some new insights. The variable assessing whether or not warring parties implemented a power-sharing agreement during interim government continues to come with a positive, but not statistically significant coefficient. International interim government continues to decrease the risk of armed conflict, as indicated by the negative coefficient, but the variable is not robust across model specifications or coding rules. There is some evidence that the strict version of the variable has a more substantial effect than the lenient version, as seen in Model 1 in Table 4.7. The variable coefficient yet loses its significance in the continuous coding version (Model 2) or when parallel political and military institutions are fit separately (Model 3).

The integration of parallel institutions and the participation of unarmed actors stay valid predictors for decreased risks of armed conflict in the post-interim period. Model 3 shows that military integration – i.e. the disarmament and demobilization of warring parties before the termination of interim government – has a much more substantive effect that integrating parallel political structures. Hazard ratios – not reported in any table – of 0.06 for the integration of military institutions and of 0.46 for the integration of political institutions indicate that the risk of armed conflict in the post-interim period drops by 94 percent when interim governments perform DDR processes for their termination, but by only

44I also coded a dichotomous version of the participation variable that codes with a value of 1 both instances of ad hoc and of institutional participation of unarmed actors. Fitting this variable does not change my results, and it is for reasons of brevity not reported in any tables.
54 percent when they integrate political institutions. This is further reflected in Figure 4.4 that plots predicted survival functions based on Model 3 in Table 4.7.

The graph reiterates, for instance, that after almost four years almost thirty percent of interim governments without an integration of military institutions are at war again, while most of those interim governments that integrated such institutions remain at peace. This finding speaks to qualitative research that has called for the timely implementation of DDR processes during the rule of interim governments and before first elections are held after war (e.g. Lyons, 2005; Reilly, 2015). It also links to results of statistical research on the importance of reforming military organizations early on during peace processes (cf. Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008).

**Fitting Additional Control Variables**

I now fit several additional control variables. Firstly, and in terms of additional measures of a foregoing war, in Model 1 of Table 4.8, I add a measure for conflict duration. Previous studies have found conflicts of longer duration to have reduced risks of new war, for instance because long conflicts decrease parties’ prewar uncertainty about an enemy’s capabilities or resolve (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008). I capture conflict duration as the number of weeks since a conflict first became active, using UCDP/PRIO data. Secondly, and also regarding measures of a foregoing war, in Model 2 of Table 4.8, I add a variable for rebel strength, taken from Cunningham et al. (2013), because stronger rebels may be able to press a government into making considerable concessions concerning the design of an interim government.

Thirdly, I add measures for democratic experience to Models 3 and 4 in Table 4.8. Scholars have argued that a history of democratic rule before conflict onset is conducive to peace, because past experiences with democracy make it more likely that elites accept to bargain in a framework of political institutions instead of fighting on the battlefield (Fortna, 2004b; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007; Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008). I control for democratic history using the Democracy/Autocracy Dataset (Ulfelder, 2012; Ulfelder and Lustik, 2007). Ulfelder (2012) defines democracy as a form of government in which citizens freely and fairly elect and routinely hold accountable their rulers and which meets four conditions: (1) elected officials make policy, (2) elections are fair and competitive, (3) all adult citizens have equal rights to vote and be voted for, and (4) civil liberties are protected (codebook of Ulfelder, 2012). He captures history of democracy as a variable that indicates any occurrence of any episodes of democracy, coded as 1 if a country saw at least one episode of democracy (0 if not),
Table 4.8: Robustness Check III: Additional Control Variables (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Stability of Post-Interim Peace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power-Sharing IG</td>
<td>0.269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.407)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International IG</td>
<td>-0.818**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.424)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel Institutions</td>
<td>-1.482***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.355)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>-1.224***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.297)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Conflict</td>
<td>0.928**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.448)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompatibility</td>
<td>1.756***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.723)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Intensity</td>
<td>1.570***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.471)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln. GDP/Capita</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.194)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln. Population</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.182)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Duration</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Strength</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.233)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (lenient)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (strict)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence level, respectively. Standard errors clustered on country level are reported in parentheses. Coefficient sizes instead of hazard ratios are reported.

which is the measure added to Model 3. In Model 4, I include a more restrictive version of this variable that is coded as 1 if a country sustained democracy for at least five consecutive years in its history.

In Table A.7 (reported in Appendix A), I add further control variables. In Model 1 to 3, I fit several measures of additional characteristics of interim government. According to previous research, the stability of peace decreases if an interim government is the result of a peace agreement, because warring parties retain sufficient resources to attack each other. This creates situations in which warring parties have difficulties to credibly commit to disarm (Licklider, 1995; Mason and Fett, 1996; Walter, 2002). I follow Kreutz (2010) and define peace agreements as pacts concerned with the resolution of the core incompatibility underpinning a conflict and signed by the key actors engaged in such a con-
flict. As Kreutz, I capture peace agreement as a dummy variable that indicates whether an interim government was created in an agreement signed between the warring parties to an armed conflict (coded as 1) or not (0).

Also the duration of interim government may affect the stability of peace: During short interim periods, parties should have little time to actively implement reforms, integrate their parallel political institutions, or disarm and demobilize, thus decreasing the stability of post-interim peace. I capture interim government duration as the number of weeks an interim government ruled between the demise of an old regime and first elections using self-collected data. I log-transform the variable due to a right-skewed distribution. In my sample, the shortest interim government was Sierra Leone’s 1996 National Provisional Ruling Council that lasted for 73 days; while the longest interim government ruled for 3673 days or 10 years in Rwanda, terminating in elections in 2003.

As noted above, my assessment of peace as the dependent variable starts only after an interim government ends, meaning that if conflict occurs during interim rule, it is unaccounted for by my dependent variable. This choice is motivated by my hypotheses H3 and H5 that argue for the effect of integrating parallel institutions and of allowing for the participation of unarmed actors: implementing reforms takes time and parties will not let go of parallel structures on day one of interim government, but only once they believe that an adversary’s promise not to ambush them is credible. But one may plausibly argue that violence during interim rule can affect whether and how reforms are implemented, for instance because parties may refrain from allowing the participation of unarmed actors as quick decisions are needed. To address this aspect, I capture interim violence as a dummy variable that is coded with the value of 1 if conflict over the 25 battle-related deaths threshold occurred during the rule of an interim government (0 in all other cases).

Finally, in Model 4 of Table A.7, I address a further measure of the quality of a post-interim period and fit a variable assessing the extent of natural resource rents (as % of GDP). Natural resources have been argued to imply that rebels have decreased costs of remobilization, because they have access to fund their strive through looting resources (Le Billon, 2001b). I capture the variable by relying on the World Bank (2014)’s World Development Indicators. Further measures of the quality of socio-economic livelihoods in the post-interim period – captured through annual per capita GDP growth as well as infant mortality rates – are reported in Table A.12 in Appendix A.

The results reported in Table 4.8 and A.7 support my previous findings. The variable assessing the presence of power-sharing interim government is not associated with hazards of armed conflict in the post-interim period, while international interim government, the integration of parallel institutions into an interim government, as well as the participation of unarmed actors in such government all decrease the conflict hazard. With the exception of the strict version of democratic history, all additional control variables in Table 4.8 and
Table 4.9: Robustness Check IV: (Ordered) Logistic Regressions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Power-Sharing</th>
<th>International</th>
<th>Parallel Inst.</th>
<th>Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnict Conflict</td>
<td>0.501</td>
<td>-0.069</td>
<td>-1.219**</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.592)</td>
<td>(0.635)</td>
<td>(0.540)</td>
<td>(0.488)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompatibility</td>
<td>0.756</td>
<td>0.372</td>
<td>-1.440**</td>
<td>0.593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.815)</td>
<td>(0.790)</td>
<td>(0.7143)</td>
<td>(0.655)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Intensity</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>1.267**</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>-0.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.649)</td>
<td>(0.627)</td>
<td>(0.550)</td>
<td>(0.523)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic History</td>
<td>0.611</td>
<td>-0.197</td>
<td>0.311</td>
<td>0.610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.665)</td>
<td>(0.681)</td>
<td>(0.506)</td>
<td>(0.521)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Agreement</td>
<td>2.150***</td>
<td>2.003***</td>
<td>0.804</td>
<td>0.450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.713)</td>
<td>(0.707)</td>
<td>(0.617)</td>
<td>(0.559)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.126</td>
<td>-2.612</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.930)</td>
<td>(1.845)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations 62 62 62 62
Log Likelihood -35.376 -32.849 -59.026 -65.580
AIC 82.752 77.698

Note that *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence level.

A.7 stay statistically insignificant at conventional levels and do not affect the statistical influence of any of the other variables included. Model 4 in Table 4.8 yet shows that countries with a history of more than five years of democratic rule (such as El Salvador) face substantially lower risks of peace breaking down in the post-interim period. Table A.12 in Appendix B furthermore shows that while infant mortality rates are not associated with risks of armed conflict in the post-interim period, the variable measuring annual GDP per capita growth decreases such risk, and the coefficient is statistically significant at p < 0.05.

4.2.3 Addressing Endogeneity Issues

Do interim governments matter? The analysis presented in this chapter gives strong evidence that they do; and I particularly demonstrated in the sections above that reform aspects of interim government play a profound role in predicting the stability of post-interim peace. Nevertheless, a number of studies have recently considered that institutions and institutional reforms in post-conflict societies are endogenous (e.g. Fortna, 2003b; Mattes and Savun, 2009; Reynal-Querol, 2005; Schneider and Wiesehomeier, 2008). For my analysis, this means that the effects I see for interim governments may be conditioned by the specific context they appear in: properties of interim governments are not distributed at random, but are consciously selected by the warring parties who will be directly affected by such properties, or by their third-party mediators. For instance, the non-effect of power-sharing interim government in all of my models may be due to the fact that warring parties agree on power-sharing only in particularly difficult cases of armed conflict, such as conflicts over ethnic issues or conflicts
of particularly high intensity. If this is the case, then the non-conducive effect of power-sharing interim government on peace would rather reflect the unfavorable circumstances in which such interim government is selected, rather than the effect of power-sharing deals as such.

To address this point, I follow previous research designs and proceed in two steps. Firstly, and heeding the approach to address endogeneity issues in Cox PH models by Mattes and Savun (2009), Fortna (2008a), or Nilsson (2012), I estimate several models that predict the presence of properties of interim governments based on the armed conflict characteristics that I discussed in section 4.1.4. I also add information on whether interim governments were the result of a peace agreement and appeared in countries with a history of democracy as predictor variables to my models. Peace agreements help to capture how the distribution of bargaining power affected the choice of interim government, and former democracies may be most likely to allow for civil society and political party participation during interim rule. In these models, I use logistic regression to predict the outcome of my binary dependent variables (power-sharing and international interim government); while I use ordered logistic regression to predict the integration of parallel institutions and the participation of unarmed actors that are assessed on ordinal scales (McCullagh, 1980). All previously discussed variable codings apply, and results are presented in Table 4.9. Secondly, I then follow the approach by Hultman et al. (2015) and fit all my predictor variables to limited sub-samples of those variables that have predicted properties of interim governments to be more or less likely. This allows me to assess whether the effect of institutional design and reform features is actually different depending on certain underlying conditions. The results of these four additional Cox PH models are presented in Table 4.10.

In the four logistic and ordered logistic regression models reported in Table 4.9, a positive coefficient indicates that an independent variable increases the likelihood of an interim government to include power-sharing between warring parties (Model 1) or the assumption of authority by international actors (Model 2), respectively the likelihood that such government integrates parallel institutions (Model 3), or that it allows for the participation of unarmed actors (Model 4). The findings reported in Table 4.9 lend support to the notion that properties of interim government are not distributed at random.

Ethnic conflict and conflict incompatibility have a statistically significant and negative impact on the integration of parallel political and military institutions, meaning that in cases of conflict fought over ethnic issues or over government, warring parties are less likely to integrate parallel structures of authority into an interim government. This may point to the particular dynamics of an ethnic security dilemma after civil war, as noted in the broader literature (e.g. Jenne, 2009; Manning, 2004). For instance, following the 1998-99 ethnic conflict in Kosovo, ethnic Serbs maintained extensive parallel governance structures that neither the UNMIK international interim government nor Kosovo’s
Table 4.10: Robustness Check V: Sub-setting (2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ethnic Governm.</th>
<th>Civil War Accords</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power-Sharing IG</td>
<td>0.204 (0.607)</td>
<td>0.158 (1.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International IG</td>
<td>–0.011 (0.616)</td>
<td>0.267 (0.990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel Institutions</td>
<td>–2.490*** (0.768)</td>
<td>–2.833*** (0.958)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>–1.655*** (0.449)</td>
<td>–2.858*** (0.998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompatibility</td>
<td>0.923 (1.075)</td>
<td>2.301** (1.335)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Conflict</td>
<td>0.848** (0.472)</td>
<td>3.321*** (1.280)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Intensity</td>
<td>1.767*** (0.657)</td>
<td>3.502** (1.363)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln. GDP/Capita</td>
<td>–0.280 (0.318)</td>
<td>–1.150*** (0.565)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln. Population</td>
<td>–0.323 (0.282)</td>
<td>–0.420* (0.285)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations: 200 352 264 322
Number of interim gov.: 31 49 33 35

Note that *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence level, respectively. Standard errors clustered on country level are reported in parentheses. Coefficient sizes instead of hazard ratios are reported.

national authorities have yet been able to integrate. This is particularly so in the northern exclave Mitrovica, where Serbs retain (inter alia) separate monetary and healthcare systems. Existing studies have revealed that such parallel structures are also kept because Serbs feel unsafe visiting hospitals run by Albanian staff, due to fears of “violence and maltreatment, mutual mistrust and a lack of inter-ethnic confidence in the quality of care provided by other communities” (Bloom et al., 2007, p. 431).

Conflict intensity has a statistically significant and positive coefficient in the model predicting the presence of international interim government, meaning that external actors are more likely to assume authority in interim periods following civil wars. This is consistent with previous studies that have found that the UN only gets involved in the most “difficult” cases of conflict and deploys its peacekeeping missions predominantly to particularly bloody wars that the parties are unable to resolve on their own (Fortna, 2008a). Some have argued that this selection effect explains “why the UN fails” (Touval, 1994). But while this selection effect may explain why the international interim government variable has not been a robust predictor of post-interim peace, the fact that the variable measuring international interim rule still has a negative effect on the hazard of armed conflict in the post-interim period in several models give some
validation to the peace-conducive effect of international interim rule.

Finally, while a history of democracy does not predict any properties of interim government at the conventional levels of statistical significance, the variable measuring whether or not warring parties decided on interim government in a peace agreement predicts the presence of both institutional design features of interim rule, i.e. the presence of power-sharing and international rule. This is consistent with my above reflections on the selectivity of power-sharing interim government as well as with findings from previous studies on where international actors get involved (Hultman et al., 2015). Furthermore, if power-sharing is most likely to follow peace agreements, and if peace agreements make peace after war inherently unstable (Licklider, 1995; Walter, 1997), then the fact that power-sharing interim government has no statistically significant effect on post-interim peace may be explained by this selection issue.

Building on these insights, Table 4.10 fits four final Cox PH models on different subsets. Model 1 (“Ethnic”) limits the sample to ethnic conflicts, because I found parallel institutions are less likely to be integrated after such conflicts; and Model 2 (“Governm.”) limits the sample to conflicts over government for the same reason. Model 3 (“Civil War”) limits the sample to civil wars, because I have found that international interim government is more likely to be present after conflicts of high intensity. Finally, Model 4 (“Accords”) limits the sample to interim governments negotiated in peace agreements, because such accords were strong predictors of power-sharing and international interim government.

Overall, while some of the results for my control variables are now less robust, the models in Table 4.10 validate the broader story as presented in this chapter. The variable capturing power-sharing continues to have no statistical significant effect on the risk of armed conflict in the post-interim period at conventional levels of statistical significance, except if we only look at the sample of interim governments that followed peace agreements (Model 4). In that sample, power-sharing has a statistically significant and negative effect on the hazard of armed conflict in the post-interim period. This means if we only compare interim governments that followed peace agreements, those that include a power-sharing deal between the warring parties increase the stability of peace. This is thus the only model that confirms hypothesis H1. The effect of international interim governments on peace remains inconclusive, and as in my main analysis it is not robust over model specifications. If only governmental conflicts and interim governments following peace agreements are compared, international interim government is associated with reduced risks of violence in the post-interim period. This is not the case for the sub-samples of ethnic conflicts and civil wars. This finding can be interpreted as an interaction effect, in that the effect of international interim government is different following ethnic conflicts and civil wars. The integration of parallel institutions and the participation of unarmed actors in interim decision-making, however, remain strong and robust predictors of post-interim peace, throughout model specifications.
Table 4.11: Summary of Evidence: Statistical Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>H1</strong>: Power-sharing interim government, as opposed to any other interim government, increases the stability of post-interim peace.</td>
<td><strong>Not supported.</strong> The coefficient is not statistically significant at conventional levels, throughout model specifications. One explanation is that power-sharing is more likely following peace agreements that leave both warring parties with sufficient resources to attack each other.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H2</strong>: International interim government, as opposed to any other interim government, increases the stability of post-interim peace.</td>
<td><strong>Weakly supported.</strong> International interim rule decreases risks of conflict in the post-interim period, but the effect is not robust. One explanation is that such interim government is more likely after intense civil war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H3</strong>: The more advanced the process of integrating parallel political and military institutions into the authority of an interim government, the higher the stability of post-interim peace.</td>
<td><strong>Supported.</strong> The coefficient is robustly negative and statistically significant throughout model specifications and independently of the condition it appears in. The integration of parallel military institutions has a more pronounced effect on peace than political integration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H4</strong>: The more advanced the opportunities of participation for unarmed actors in interim governments, the higher the stability of post-interim peace.</td>
<td><strong>Supported.</strong> The coefficient is robustly negative and statistically significant, throughout model specifications. Institutional participation has a more pronounced effect than ad hoc participation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and independently from the conditions they appear in. To further investigate the underlying mechanisms between these variables and post-interim peace, the next Chapter will select case studies for qualitative analysis.

### 4.3 Chapter Summary

This chapter presented correlational evidence and a first empirical test of the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3. After introducing my data set and estimation techniques, I discussed the results of several Cox PH models and scrutinized these results in a number of model diagnostics and robustness checks. In sum, these tests lend support to the general argument in Chapter 3 that held that reform aspects of interim government are more important for the long-term stability of post-interim peace than institutional design aspects. Firstly, the vast
majority of my models show that in particular power-sharing interim government has no statistically significant effect on the hazard of armed conflict in the post-interim period at conventional levels of statistical significance. This is however likely the result of a selection effect. I found power-sharing interim government to be most likely following the signing of a peace agreement, and the existing literature portrays peace agreements as resulting in rather unstable peace spells (e.g. Walter, 2009). If only interim governments following the signing of peace agreements are compared to each other, power-sharing interim government comes with the hypothesized negative effect on hazards of armed conflict. I scrutinize the effect of power-sharing interim government on peace further in my case studies.

Secondly, there is more evidence for the variable measuring the effect of international interim governments. In most models, the variable assessing the presence of such interim government comes with a statistically significant and negative coefficient, meaning that the assumption of authority by international actors during interim rule decreases the hazard of post-interim violence. This is even though international actors get engaged in interim governments only in especially difficult cases, such as after particularly intense civil wars with high battle-related death counts. This selection issue may explain why the variable is not overly robust throughout model specifications.

Thirdly, both the integration of parallel political and military institutions as well as the participation of unarmed actors in interim rule come with substantive, negative, and statistically significant coefficients, meaning that they robustly decrease the hazard of armed conflict after interim government has terminated. As my robustness checks have revealed, the effects are most profound for the integration of military institutions through disarmament and demobilization, as well as for institutional (rather than ad hoc) participation of unarmed actors. Notably, these effects persist and remain comparable in substantive terms when I fit the variables to subsets of cases aimed at addressing the selectivity of these properties. In that way, my analysis in this chapter lends not only compelling evidence for my theoretical argument of Chapter 3, but also adds to the existing literature on parallel political and military institutions after civil war that is thus far dominated by qualitative case studies (cf. Chapter 10). Table 4.11 summarizes the findings of this chapter for each hypothesis.
Chapter 5

Qualitative Analysis

In the foregoing Chapter 4, I estimated several Cox PH models that established profound correlational evidence on the role of interim governments for stable peace after war. I showed that while there is lesser empirical evidence for the impact of the institutional designs of interim government, i.e. power-sharing arrangements between warring parties and international authority during interim rule, reform aspects of interim rule are substantive and robust predictors of stable peace in the post-interim period. More specifically, whether interim governments integrate the parallel political and military institutions of warring parties into their authority, and whether they allow for the participation of unarmed actors in reform processes, significantly decreases risks of armed conflict in the post-interim period. This chapter complements my statistical analysis by outlining a research design for qualitative case studies. It proceeds in four steps. In section 5.1, I motivate the necessity of case studies for the purpose of this dissertation by discussing the limitations of my statistical analysis. In section 5.2, I discuss my strategy of selecting cases according to a most-similar system design and by using matching techniques. This selection strategy results in (1) Nepal’s 2006-08 interim government, (2) Angola’s 1991-92 interim government, and (3) Cambodia’s 1991-93 interim government as cases under analysis. I also present the qualitative research design, discuss the methodology of within- and in-between case analysis, and give an overview of the sources that underlie my qualitative analysis. Finally, in section 5.3, I discuss my empirical fieldwork in Nepal in the fall of 2015; outlining methods, sources, as well as some reflections on fieldwork in post-disaster situations.

5.1 Limitations of the Statistical Analysis

In Chapter 4, I achieved two central goals of this dissertation that help to better understand the role of interim governments for stable peace after war. Firstly, and based on my theoretical framework of Chapter 3, I identified those
properties of interim government that are particularly relevant for the stability of peace across all cases under analysis. In that regard, I added to existing research on interim governments that has been conceptually and empirically limited by focusing exclusively on the institutional designs of power-sharing and international interim authority (cf. Chapter 2). Secondly, I was able to establish that my statistical results are robust across model specifications; and I confirmed that my models meet the underlying assumptions of Cox PH models.

At the same time, Chapter 4 was unable to achieve a third objective of this dissertation: My inferences based on Cox PH models are inapt to confirm the precise causal mechanisms by which properties of interim government link to stable peace in the post-interim period – “the pathway or process” by which peace comes into being (Gerring, 2008, p. 161). This relates to what Shadish et al. (2002) have termed problems of internal validity of statistical research. For instance, in Chapter 3, I argued that integrating parallel military institutions into the authority of an interim government mitigates commitment problems of weaker-growing parties in the long run, because it increases their costs of remobilization by disentangling hierarchical relationships within military organizations. My analysis in Chapter 4 lends strong correlative support to the empirical relationship between integrating parallel military structures and reduced risks of post-interim conflict, but it cannot test any assumed causality. This is because none of the intervening steps in the process – such as the dissolution of hierarchical command structures – are observed.

In addition, the inability to test any underlying causal mechanisms between independent and dependent variables also relates to issues of construct (Shadish
et al., 2002) or concept validity (George and Bennett, 2005). By this I mean the “validity of inferences about the higher order constructs that represent sampling particulars” (Shadish et al., 2002, p. 38). As George and Bennett (2005, p. 19) argue, quantitative research does often not allow to assess “the indicators that best represent the theoretical concepts the researcher intends to measure,” because many social sciences variables are “notoriously difficult” to assess (cf. also Ahram, 2013). This is not least due to the quality of statistical data that is impaired by difficulties in obtaining precise information from conflict zones, a topic that I have addressed in Chapter 1 for the operationalization of post-interim peace. But construct validity does not only become an issue with regard to the statistical measurement of peace. In Figure 5.1, I present a graphical interpretation of my Cox PH models from Table 4.3. The dots represent the estimated coefficients of each variable in the four models, the whiskers span the 95 per cent confidence interval. Figure 5.1 shows that many variables in my models have large standard errors, represented through wide whisker spans particularly of the variable measuring conflict incompatibility. This can mean that they are inefficient measures (cf. Menard, 2002), which “in themselves do not devalidate the model” (Grobbel, 2009, p. 189), but which may not truly represent the underlying theoretical concepts at large. I discussed this issue for the participation variable in Chapter 4 in particular.

5.2 Research Design

5.2.1 Case Selection Strategy

To address these validity concerns of statistical research, I complement my analysis of Chapter 4 with three qualitative and comparative case studies that are selected according to a most-similar system design (cf. George and Bennett, 2005; Lijphart, 1975; Przeworski and Teune, 1970; Seawright and Gerring, 2008). Following Gerring (2004, p. 342), I understand a case as “a spatially bounded phenomenon” that is “observed at a single point in time or over some delimited period of time”, and a case study as an intensive study of this phenomenon with the goal of understanding a larger class of comparable phenomena. Given these definitions – and inherently linked to Mill (2002)’s “method of difference”, Lijphart (1975)’s “comparative method”, as well as George and Bennett (2005)’s “controlled comparison” – selecting cases according to a most similar system design means that I select cases that are similar on a large number of important explanatory variables except the explanatory variables of interest. Consequently, any set of variables that are similar in the cases are irrelevant in determining the outcome, because different outcomes are observed among cases that share these variables. Any set of variables differentiating these cases can be considered as explaining distinct outcomes, such as post-interim peace and the absence thereof (Przeworski and Teune, 1970). I use such a most similar
system design for my between-case analysis not least because this approach to case selection has been identified as one of the most useful strategies for theory- and model-testing in mixed-method research designs (Gerring, 2004).

To implement a most similar system design and arrive at a selected group of cases, I use statistical matching techniques (cf. Tarrow, 2010).\footnote{Practically, this means I employ the software environment R’s \textit{caseMatch} package to match cases (Appendix A, Nielsen, 2014). By default, \textit{caseMatch} matches cases according to an approximate matching technique that minimizes their pairwise Mahalanobis distance – a scale-invariant distance metric – in order to ensure that a selected pair of cases is as similar as the data allow (cf. Gerring, 2006).} Matching techniques have become increasingly popular in statistical observational or quasi-experimental research designs (notable examples include Arceneaux et al., 2006; Ho et al., 2007). For qualitative research, matching has recently been identified as “an approach to purposeful case selection in large-n studies with the goal of finding comparable units within a data set” (Nielsen, 2014, p. 7). It has in this regard been recognized as the “most useful statistical tool for identifying cases for in-depth analysis in a most similar setting,” also because matching means that case selection is more transparent and replicable than selecting cases by hand (Gerring, 2006, p. 134). Having said that, matching does come with similar practical research issues as if one would select cases by hand. Firstly, exact matching of control variables is often impossible, especially if the variable that is to be similar is not binary but continuous. In such instances, cases are selected in order “to maximize the variance of the independent variables and to minimize the variance of the control variables” (Lijphart, 1975, p. 164), so that cases from the control group approximate or are “close enough” to those of the treatment group (Seawright and Gerring, 2008, p. 305). Secondly, it is wise to restrict one’s analysis to “the key variables and omitting those of only marginal importance” (Lijphart, 1975, p. 159), because it can have negative consequences to condition on control variables that are not actual confounders, since matching on these controls reduces the similarity on actual confounding variables (Nielsen, 2014).

Bearing in mind these issues and heeding Lijphart’s advice to focus on the most important confounders for case selection, I started by matching cases to be similar according to the three control variables from my Cox \textit{PH} models of Chapter 4 that have robust statistically significant effects on the stability of peace. These are (1) \textit{ethnic issue}, or whether warring parties broke down along ethnic lines; (2) \textit{conflict intensity}, or whether a foregoing armed conflict reached the level of a civil war with over 1000 battle-related deaths; and (3) \textit{incompatibility}, or whether conflict was fought over controlling a government or a territory (cf. the coding rules listed in section 4.1). But because all three control variables are coded following binary schemes, matching produced a high number of most similar case groups, and I thus also introduced the statistically non-significant controls to the matching equation, while weighting those three control variables with statistically significant effects.\footnote{To recall, the non-significant control variables or those that are not robust across model}
In addition to minimizing the variance on control variables while maximizing the variance on independent variables, I require three practical research issues from the selected pair of cases, in order to address issues similar to those that have been identified for random case selection (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). Firstly, I demand that interim governments selected for case studies ruled for at least six months. This choice is implemented to ensure that a sufficient amount of case-specific literature exists, and that interview respondents during empirical fieldwork recall the course of a respective interim government (cf. section 5.3 and Eck, 2011). The decision should not result in a bias in that I select particularly successful or unsuccessful cases of interim government, because my statistical analysis in Chapter 4 has demonstrated that the duration of an interim period has no statistically significant effect on the stability of peace, and the substantive effect is also comparatively small. Secondly, I select cases from distinct world regions – which “still constitutes the exception to the rule” when analyzing polities in the Global South – because I expect this to further validate my findings by ensuring that no cultural factors underlie the stability of post-interim peace, thus permitting me to test “the universal character” of my theory and concepts (Basedau and Köllner, 2007, p. 112). Thirdly, I demand that at least one case is suitable for fieldwork in 2015 in terms of security and language issues. This case selection strategy is common in the sub-discipline of peace and conflict research, where data gathering is often risky for both the researcher and her informants (Brounéus, 2011; Höglund, 2011). For instance, I opted against matched groups of cases such as Afghanistan, Libya, and Liberia, due to travel warnings for ongoing violence or the prevalence of the Ebola virus at the time I implemented my case selection in December 2014 (but see my discussion on Nepal in section 5.3).

5.2.2 Introducing the Cases

This case selection strategy resulted in the matched group of (1) Nepal’s 2006-08 interim government, (2) Angola’s 1991-92 interim government, as well as (3) Cambodia’s 1991-93 interim government as cases under analysis. In Nepal, the decade-long “People’s War” between the insurgents of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN (M)) and the national government escalated when King Gyanendra ascended the throne following a massacre of Nepal’s royal family in June 2001. Unlike his deceased brother King Birendra – who had refused to deploy the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) internally and to fight the Maoist insurgency – Gyanendra had no such reservations. Consequently, the number of battle-related deaths exploded between 2002 and 2005. Gyanendra also dis-

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solved the parliament and dismissed the Prime Minister in order to consolidate his power. This move united the political parties and the Maoists who signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in November 2006 and decided on implementing an interim government. This government was characterized by strong power-sharing provisions for the Maoist rebels, as well as by the substantial participation of civil society and political parties in interim decision-making. The CPN (M) also formally abandoned its parallel political structures – the “People’s Courts” and “People’s Governments” – upon joining the interim institutions and completed cantonment and disarmament, although the demobilization of its troops was stalled. Nepal’s interim government thereby saw almost no international authority, as the small United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) was under the control of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA), not the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Following the termination of interim government in April 2008, no armed conflict has been observed in Nepal.

In Angola, the two former liberation movements Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola or People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola or National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) had been at war ever since the country’s independence from Portugal in 1975. Peace talks only became possible when the end of the Cold War put a halt to financial and ideological support to the warring parties by the superpowers. In May 1991, the MPLA government and UNITA insurgents signed the Bicesse Agreement, in which they decided on the rule of an interim government and on holding national elections in September 1992. The interim government did not include any power-sharing provisions for UNITA but represented a caretaker interim government controlled by the MPLA alone; and it also did not foresee any participation of unarmed actors in decision-making. The warring parties invited the UN to monitor the interim period and the elections, and the Security Council consequently authorized the deployment of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I). UNITA initially agreed to integrate its parallel political structures – the Terras Livres de Angola – and to disarm and demobilize before the end of the interim period, but the interim government failed to implement either of the two reforms. Following the termination of interim rule with a MPLA victory in the 1992 elections, UNITA remobilized and a high-intensity civil war endured in Angola until UNITA’s leader Savimbi was killed in battle in 2002.

Cambodia’s civil war started when neighboring Vietnam invaded in January 1979 to overthrow the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) or “Khmer Rouge,” which had led one of the most brutal regimes in history in the years before. Forcing the PDK to flee to the Thai border, Vietnam installed the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) in Phnom Penh, a puppet regime that was subsequently fought by three rebel factions: Pol Pot’s communist PDK, Prince Sihanouk’s royalist Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre,
Pacifique et Coopératif or National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), and Son Sann’s republican Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF). The end of the Cold War also enabled an intensification of peace negotiations in Cambodia, and in October 1991 the warring parties signed the Paris Agreements and agreed on the formation of an interim government. This interim government combined the rule of the power-sharing Supreme National Council (SNC) – where each faction was represented – with unprecedented degrees of international authority through the deployment of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UN-TAC). Unarmed actors were excluded from any interim decision-making. The warring parties also neither negotiated nor implemented the integration of parallel political or military structures during the rule of the interim government. Following the end of the interim period in May 1993, the PDK fought a low-level armed conflict against the elected government.

Table 5.1 gives an overview of the variable values of the cases and shows that they are similar on all statistically significant control variables and on almost all other control variables, while they differ in their respective properties of interim governments (as well as in their outcome). Most importantly, Nepal, Angola, and Cambodia share that they experienced conflicts fought over the incompatibility of controlling the national government, but not over an ethnic issue, and all three conflicts were civil wars that resulted in over 1000 battle-related deaths over the entire conflict period – the three most robust and substantive control variables to determine the stability of peace.

Having said that, Table 5.1 also demonstrates the issue of construct validity with statistical variables as mentioned above. For instance, while the civil wars of Nepal, Angola, and Cambodia are all considered non-ethnic conflicts in the statistical literature and according to the data provided by Walter (2004) and Kreutz (2010) that I depend on, the respective case literature strongly disagrees with this crude approximation of conflict dynamics. In Nepal, the Maoist insurgents of the CPN (M) recruited particularly among excluded ethnic and social groups, such as the Tharu and Madhesi communities in the southern Tarai plains or the Dalit “untouchables” in the caste system (Lawoti, 2012; Lecomte-Tilouine, 2011). In Angola, while UNITA’s strive started out as a Maoist insurgency against the MPLA government – Jonas Savimbi even copied Mao Zedong’s “Long March” that would come to represent a significant event in UNITA’s history – the rebels mobilized particularly from Savimbi’s Ovimbundu ethnic group (Heywood, 1989). And in Cambodia, the PDK often primarily attacked ethnic Vietnamese, while the ruling PRK regime was installed and backed by Vietnam (Chandler, 2009). The ethnic conflict variable in my statistical models may thus represent an inefficient measure, and it accordingly comes with large standard errors as displayed in Figure 5.1.

In that way, Table 5.1 also shows the merit of the three cases with regard to addressing issues of construct validity for my binary independent variables,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Nepal</th>
<th>Angola</th>
<th>Cambodia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Statistically Significant and Robust Control Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Conflict</td>
<td>No, but underlying ethnic issue (CPN (M) recruited from excluded groups)</td>
<td>No, but underlying ethnic issue (UNITA recruited among Ovimbundus)</td>
<td>No, but underlying ethnic issue (e.g., PDK violence against Vietnamese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompatibility</td>
<td>Conflict over government</td>
<td>Conflict over government</td>
<td>Conflict over government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Intensity</td>
<td>Civil war with over 1000 battle-related deaths</td>
<td>Civil war with over 1000 battle-related deaths</td>
<td>Civil war with over 1000 battle-related deaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Not-Significant or Not-Robust Control Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Agreement</td>
<td>Comp. Peace Agreement</td>
<td>Bicesse Peace Agreement</td>
<td>Paris Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coup d’état</td>
<td>No coup d’état</td>
<td>No coup d’état</td>
<td>No coup d’état</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic History</td>
<td>History of democracy</td>
<td>No history of democracy</td>
<td>No history of democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Duration</td>
<td>Long (&gt; 10 years)</td>
<td>Long (&gt; 10 years)</td>
<td>Long (&gt; 10 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IG Duration</td>
<td>506 days (2nd quantile)</td>
<td>488 days (2nd quantile)</td>
<td>583 days (2nd quantile)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP/Capita</td>
<td>1787 USD (2nd quantile)</td>
<td>2131 USD (2nd quantile)</td>
<td>1792 USD (2nd quantile)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Resources</td>
<td>Low (5.3% of GDP)</td>
<td>High (47.9% of GDP)</td>
<td>Low (8.2% of GDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables: Properties of Interim Government</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power-Sharing IG</td>
<td>Strong degree of power-sharing between SPA and CPN (M) insurgents</td>
<td>No power-sharing, instead MPLA caretaker interim government</td>
<td>Medium degree of power-sharing in SNC with limited powers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International IG</td>
<td>No international authority, UNMIN managed by UNDP, not DPKO</td>
<td>Medium level of international authority via monitoring UNAVEM I</td>
<td>High degree of international authority (UNTAC transitional authority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel Institutions</td>
<td>Fully integrated political structures, military integration under way</td>
<td>Political and military integration negotiated but not implemented</td>
<td>Political and military integration neither negotiated nor integrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Institutional participation for political parties and civil society</td>
<td>No participation of unarmed actors during interim government</td>
<td>No participation of unarmed actors during interim government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variable: Stability of Post-Interim Peace</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Interim Peace</td>
<td>No armed conflict in the post-interim period</td>
<td>Rescaling to civil war in post-interim period</td>
<td>Low-level armed conflict in post-interim period</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

as the cases allow for a deeper investigation of the particularities of different properties of interim government. For instance, while both Nepal and Cambodia are considered cases of power-sharing interim government in the statistical literature and in my analysis of Chapter 4, power-sharing was present to a significantly higher degree in Nepal than in Cambodia, where the powers of the interim Supreme National Council (SNC) were limited due to the additional presence and authority of UNTAC (cf. Chapter 8). And while both Cambodia and Angola saw some degree of international authority during the interim period (according to the lenient coding version of the international interim government variable that I discussed in Chapter 4), such authority was significantly higher in Cambodia’s UNTAC mission. While UNTAC assumed administrative authority, Angola’s UNAVEM I peacekeeping operation only assumed monitoring powers during the country’s interim period.
A note of caution is necessary with regard to two control variables, in that Nepal, Angola and Cambodia differ in their experience with democracy as well as in their reliance on natural resource rents as percentage of GDP. Following the downfall of the panchayat authoritarian system through the popular Jana Andolan I movement in 1990, Nepal had begun a process of democratization and looked back on five years of (unstable) multi-party democracy when its civil war broke out in February 1996 (cf. Chapter 6). Neither Angola nor Cambodia, however, had implemented any democratic political system before the outbreak of violence. Angola’s civil war started immediately following the country’s independence in 1975; and while a series of elections had been held in Cambodia since the 1950s, those either de facto or de jure took place in authoritarian one-party systems (cf. Chapter 8). Similarly, while natural resource rents – chiefly through the extraction of oil – make up a significant part of Angola’s national GDP (Le Billon, 2001a), this is not the case for Nepal and Cambodia, although timber exports did play a role as a financial resource for the warring parties of Cambodia’s civil war (cf. Chapter 8 and Le Billon, 2000). Following the results of my Cox PH models of Chapter 4, I do not expect this divergence to bias my case study results, because these two control variables were statistically insignificant and/or not very robust in their effects on the stability of post-interim peace. However, because both variables have been regarded as predictors for peace after war in the broader qualitative and quantitative literature, I will pay particularly attention to democratic history and natural resources as possible confounding variables in my case studies.

Finally, the selection of Nepal as a relatively recent “success” case as opposed to Angola and Cambodia as early “failures” could reflect that successes and failures of interim government are unevenly and non-randomly distributed over time. If failure cases – i.e., interim governments that are followed by armed conflict in the post-interim period – all occur in the early 1990s, while successes of interim rule are clustered in the late 2000s, this could mean that cases are not independent of each other. For instance, international policy makers could have learned from early mistakes and adopted the interim designs they promote for war-torn societies. This is yet not the case, as Figure A.2 in Appendix B shows. Figure A.2 displays the number of events (i.e., armed conflict recurrence in the post-interim period) grouped by calendar year, and no clear trend is detectable.

5.2.3 Within- and Between-Case Analysis

I make use of both within-case analysis and between-case comparison in my qualitative analysis. Combining the tracing of precise causal mechanisms and the study of covariance with a comparative approach has widely been regarded as the most fruitful way to improve certainty on a causal story, as well as to derive generalizable conclusions from qualitative research (Bennett and Elman, 2006; Checkel, 2006; Checkel, 2008; George and Bennett, 2005).

Systematic within-case analysis through process-tracing has been described
as one of the most suitable analytical tools to investigate the underlying causal mechanisms between independent and dependent variables (Beach and Pedersen, 2013; Collier, 2011). Two aspects make it a particularly helpful approach for the purpose of this dissertation. Firstly, process-tracing helps to alleviate some of the disadvantages of statistical analysis and in particular the above discussed internal validity threats to quantitative modeling, as it allows to systematically investigate the historical sequences that link my independent variables to stable post-interim peace. It also allows me to test whether empirical evidence exists that each part of my hypothesized causal mechanisms is present in each case. Existing research has in that regard argued for the value of within-case analysis through process-tracing to empirically evaluate bargaining models, because the central components of these models are nothing else but descriptions of “patterns in agents’ perceptions, decision-making and action” (Nome, 2013, p. 51). Thus, they are causal mechanisms that statistical studies are often inapt to trace (e.g. Jenne, 2004; Lake, 2010).\textsuperscript{47} Process-tracing therefore allows me to counterbalance one problem in particular: an independent and a dependent variable may positively correlate with each other although no causal pathway between them can be detected. For instance, Nepal’s CPN (M) integrated its parallel People’s Courts and People’s Governments into the authority of the interim government, but this action may be unlinked to why the party decided to stick to peace following the interim period.

Secondly, within-case analysis through process-tracing helps me to alleviate some of the disadvantages of comparative between-case analysis in most similar system designs (Nome, 2013). This is because one of the central pitfalls of such designs is that it is often “not possible to find cases similar in every respect but one” and that more than one independent variable may have causal impact (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 214) – see my note above on the role of democratic history and natural resource rents. Tracing causal processes and mapping the historical paths from $X$ to $Y$ is a suitable strategy to assess whether each of the variables can or cannot be ruled out has having causal significance, and helps to mitigate risks of obtaining spurious results.

My bargaining model for the role of interim governments in increasing the stability of peace already formulates explicit causal mechanisms by identifying a set of intervening steps and observable implications under which the theorized mechanisms should become visible (cf. Figure 3.3 on page 34). Consequently, if I can establish in my within-case analyses in Chapters 6, 7, and 8,

1. that each property of interim government correlates in the theoretically expected manner with the dependent variable;
2. that commitment problems were at play for a weaker-growing party in each of the cases, risking a remobilization for armed conflict;

\textsuperscript{47}Having said that, arriving at a definitive test of all underlying assumptions of bargaining theory is often not possible through process-tracing, for instance when it comes to the rationality assumption of players in the bargaining situation (cf. Chapter 9, Kuehn, 2013).
3. that a specific property of interim government mitigated such commitment
problems for the relevant parties (or, alternatively, that the absence of such
property exacerbated commitment problems); and

4. that mitigated (exacerbated) commitment problems influenced the the-
orized decision-making process of the warring parties in the bargaining
situation to follow (or not) peaceful behavior,

then confidence in my theoretical argument of Chapter 3 is greatly strengthened.
My case studies of Chapters 6 to 8 are thus all structured as follows. Firstly, and
in order to situate the rule of the respective interim government, each chapter
begins with a brief historical overview of the countries. Each overview thereby
(1) focuses in particular on the dynamics that led to the Nepalese, Angolan,
and Cambodian civil wars; (2) introduces the warring parties of the respective
civil wars; and (3) ends with a detailed description of the negotiation processes
that culminated in the peace agreements in which the parties decided on the
formation of the interim governments under analysis. Secondly, I then outline
in detail the role of commitment problems during and after the rule of each
interim government under analysis and discuss some of the merits and pitfalls of
applying the bargaining theory argument to each of the cases. Thirdly, the main
part of each within-case analysis will then be attending to each hypothesized
property of interim government and analyzing whether the respective property
set into motion the theorized process of steps and actions that led to post-
interim peace or the absence thereof. In this analysis, I also attend to possible
confounding mechanisms and variables, such as alternative and case-specific
explanations. Fourthly, and not least in order to discern the relative explanatory
power of each of my proposed causal mechanisms, each chapter ends with some
main conclusions drawn from within-case analysis.

Three notes of caution with regard to my within-case analysis. Firstly, it is
not enough to show that the relationship of $X$ and $Y$ changes via the theorized
mechanism. For instance, it is not sufficient to demonstrate that integrating the
Maoist People’s Governments into the authority of the Nepalese interim gov-
ernment limited the possibilities for parallel taxation and thereby influenced the
decision-making of the CPN (M) to remain at peace. I must also demonstrate in
Chapters 6 to 8 that alternative or counterfactual causal paths and explanatory
variables are not responsible for the change of $Y$ (Checkel, 2008; Collier, 2011).
Secondly, the scope of my case studies does not allow me to trace each and
every underlying decision and micro process of all relevant actors, and thus I
understand process-tracing in my case studies “merely as a conceptual approx-
imation to the logic underlying such situations” (Kuehn, 2013, p. 59). Thirdly,
while within-case analysis generates strong knowledge about the precise causal
mechanisms at work in one or several cases, results from such analysis cannot
be generalized. In other words, knowledge generated from process-tracing “im-
proves the internal validity of causal claims, but does not enhance the robustness

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of the inferences on the cross-case level” (Kuehn, 2013, p. 56). Also for that reason, combining within-case analysis with other qualitative and quantitative methods is fruitful; and thus Chapter 9 closes the empirical part of this dissertation by scrutinizing the three cases in relation to each other to lend further evidence to my causal argument.

5.2.4 Material and Sources

The detailed evidence that is necessary to detect every step in a theorized causal mechanism and thus to conduct within-case analysis through process-tracing is often difficult to obtain. This is especially so in conflict settings where warring parties may refrain from stating their true intentions in order to keep ahead of an adversary; where victims may be too frightened to speak the truth due to fears of reprisal or revenge; or where official documents may get lost or are purposefully destroyed (cf. Bakke, 2014). UNESCO, for instance, lists deliberate war-related violence as one of the key threats to “world documentary heritage” (Hoeven and Albada, 1996). Therefore, and similar to the importance of being aware of validity issues and selection bias when gathering statistical conflict data through the evaluation of news reports (cf. Chapter 1 and Kreutz, 2015; Öberg and Sollenberg, 2011; Themnér and Wallensteen, 2014), it is vital to discuss possible weaknesses in the data underlying my qualitative, comparative analysis (George and Bennett, 2005).

In a first step, and in order to arrive at detailed day-by-day information account on events leading up to, during, and after the respective interim periods in Nepal, Angola, and Cambodia, I conducted an initial search on news reports in the LexisNexis database on the situation in the three countries. Due to the overwhelming amount of material, I concentrated my search on news reports published by the two largest global news agencies that hold offices in the majority of countries around the world – the Associated Press (AP) and the Agence France Press (AFP). I also included articles published by a few internationally renowned newspapers that had sent their own foreign correspondents to the respective conflict zones, such as Victoria Brittain reporting for The Guardian in Angola (e.g. Brittain, 1992a; Brittain, 1992c), Somini Sengupta reporting for The New York Times from Nepal (e.g. Sengupta, 2006a; Sengupta, 2006b), or Terry McCarthy (1991) reporting for The Independent from Cambodia. Confining my search that way resulted in 2892 documents published for the search term “Nepal” between 01 January 2006 and 31 December 2008; 2258 documents published for “Angola” between 01 January 1991 and 31 December 1992; and 2673 documents published for “Cambodia” between 01 January 1991 and 31 December 1993. For Nepal, I additionally relied on three English language newspapers published by outlets in Kathmandu – the Nepali Times, The Himalayan Times, and The Kathmandu Post (cf. section 5.3) – and for Cambodia, I made use of the online archives of The Phnom Penh Post.

Naturally, these news reports suffer from similar issues as gathering quanti-
tative conflict data through reporting as discussed in Chapter 1, not least in that foreign correspondents are likely to be based in the national capital. This bias is also detrimental for the purpose of this dissertation, because it could result in under-reporting of events in the periphery, in particular events and actions concerning parallel political rebel government structures (although UNITA, for instance, regularly invited journalists to its parallel-held territories and the rival capital of Jamba, cf. Chapter 7 and AFP, 1991c). Furthermore, news reports come with a temporal bias in that they tend to focus on “big events” of interest for readers in Western societies. This includes in particular the signing of peace agreements and the holding of elections that terminate an interim government. I illustrate this temporal bias using the example of AP reporting on Angola between January 1991 and December 1992, as visualized in Figure 5.2. The graph displays the number of AP articles containing the search term “Angola” aggregated by week, with the interim period shaded in gray. The graph shows that the largest number of articles was published in the last week of May 1991 (33 articles in total), which is when the warring parties signed the Bicesse Peace Agreement in Portugal. The second largest spike in Figure 5.2 is displayed in the last two weeks of September and the first two weeks of October 1992 (between 19 and 26 articles per week), which is when the elections terminating the interim period were held.

I also found that news reports were more likely in providing information on aspects relating to power-sharing or international interim government, or
with regard to the disarmament and demobilization of warring parties, while they rarely report details on the role of civil society in interim decision-making. Finally, news reports can of course be biased in how they provide information on the respective warring parties engaged in a civil war, and some journalists may be more supportive of one side to the conflict than of the other. For instance, Heywood (2000) and Windrich (1992) discuss how UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi managed to gather a significant amount of overly sympathetic support for his strive against Angola’s MPLA government, as reflected in the style of reporting by Western journalists. Becker (1998) similarly reflects upon her own interpretations in reporting as a correspondent on Cambodia’s civil war.

In order to deal with these issues, I rely in my case studies on a broad mix of sources to assess the statements and actions of parties in each interim government under analysis; and while I expect this triangulation of sources to be a remedy for some of the problems of news reports, each of the additional types of sources of course suffer from their own limitations. In particular, I complement news reports with secondary political science, historical, ethnographic, and area studies academic literature (that is however often not detailed enough to trace very particular mechanisms). I also consult a variety of primary sources, such as policy reports (e.g. Human Rights Watch, 2015b; International Crisis Group, 2005) and official documents (e.g. UN Security Council Resolutions). Policy reports are insofar often biased in that they tend to focus on issues of interest to Western policy makers, while official documents may be biased in that confidential documents with particular important insights may be impossible to obtain. I also rely on personal memoirs (e.g. Anstee, 1993), transcripts of speeches and radio broadcasts (e.g. in Weimer and Fandrych, 1995), blog posts and websites (e.g. Nepali Congress, 2015; United We Blog, 2006), as well as “gray literature” like party manifestos (e.g. Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), 1993; Embassy of Democratic Kampuchea, 1976) or letters to newspapers by warring party representatives (Primo, 1992; Savimbi, 1989). Particular sensitive aspects of gray literature published by the parties may thereby get lost throughout the course of the war, especially so if there is one clear winner or loser. Finally, my collection of information on the qualitative case studies is limited because I have to rely on sources published or translated into English or German – UNITA, for instance, published German versions of their party programs (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, 1988; National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, 1991) – and I thus cannot reconstruct events only reported in Portuguese, Khmer, or Nepali.
5.3 Empirical Fieldwork in Nepal

5.3.1 Methods and Techniques

For the early cases of interim government in Angola and Cambodia, I can draw upon a large variety of existing research. For the case of Nepal, I furthermore rely on new data gathered through semi-structured interviews conducted during six weeks of empirical fieldwork in the Kathmandu Valley in September and October 2015. The generation of new data has been named one of the most important steps for qualitative case study research (Blatter and Haverland, 2014), and the method of semi-structured interviews has been argued to offer a unique “source of information since it provides research with depth, detail and perspective on a certain research question, and at a certain moment in time” (Brounéus, 2011, p. 131). Semi-structured interviews have also been portrayed as being especially well-suited for gathering the information necessary for process-tracing (Tansey, 2007); and interviews have been identified as a technique to increase the validity of inferences in triangulations of qualitative data (Kern, 2016).

To select my interview partners, I used a combination of specific targeting and snowball sampling. For instance, when I interviewed Chandra Prakash Khanal alias “Baldev,” a former deputy commander in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) – the armed wing of the CPN (M) – he provided me with the contact details of Nanda Kishor Pun alias “Pasang,” also a former deputy commander of the PLA and the current Vice President of Nepal as of 2016. To avoid bias and gatekeeper problems in targeting interview partners, I thereby relied on different points of entry to informants, including the help of a local peacebuilding NGO, several academics previously and presently employed at the Tribhuvan University in Kirtipur, as well as members of the international development community previously and presently employed in Nepal (on avoiding gatekeeper problems during fieldwork in post-conflict countries, see Höglund, 2011). Having said that, and due to the politicized situation in Nepal in September and October 2015 following the April 2015 Gorkha Earthquake and the subsequent promulgation of a new constitution (cf. below), it was often easier to access members of the CPN (M) and PLA than members of the Nepali Congress (NC) or Communist Party of Nepal – United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML). The NC and CPN-UML represented the “government” side to the previous armed conflict and were engaged in coalition talks in the fall of 2015.

In order to gain a better understanding of the role of the interim government in Nepal’s peace process, and how features of this interim government affected the actions and decision-making of the warring parties, I asked my interview partners a broad set of questions regarding their perceptions on the interim government. These questions included, but were not limited to, how the parties used the power-sharing arrangement to negotiate laws for the post-interim period, how they experienced the actions of UNMIN in Nepal’s peace process, or how interim government officials cooperated with civil society in re-
Table 5.2: Overview of Semi-Structured Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Interview Partner</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil society leaders, academics, journalists</td>
<td>7 Interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees of international organizations</td>
<td>9 Interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPN (M) &amp; PLA leaders and ex-combatants</td>
<td>9 Interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC, CPN-UML, and Nepal Army (NA) leaders</td>
<td>5 Interviews</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

form processes. For instance, to assess the CPN (M)’s capacity and resolve for remobilization, I asked interview partners if they believed that the party would also have accepted losing the 2008 Constituent Assembly elections; and if they believed that UNMIN had been in a position to stop the Maoists had the latter decided to remobilize. While I formulated a core set of questions that I tried to ask every interview partner, some questions varied between interviewees. For instance, I did not speak to ex-combatants of the PLA on how the interim government allowed for the participation of civil society but concentrated on their experience of the disarmament and demobilization process and how it affected their perceptions of the party leadership; while I asked more questions about civil society involvement in the interim period to representatives of Nepalese NGOs. The template of my core interview questions is provided in section B.1 in Appendix B; while transcripts can be provided upon request.

In total, the empirical evidence underlying my analysis in Chapter 6 is based on 30 semi-structured interviews. Table 5.2 gives an overview of my interview partners by type, although this distinction is not always easy to make, because some of my interview partners were quick to identify themselves as academics, civil society activists, political party members, and technical advisers to the peace process all in one. Table B.1 in Appendix B provides a full overview of all semi-structured interviews conducted on Nepal’s interim government. All interviews took place in the Kathmandu Valley and primarily in the cities of Patan and Kathmandu, except for interviews INT-29 with a diplomat (on 03 November 2015) and interview INT-30 with an international development worker (on 12 November 2015), which were conducted via phone and in Berlin respectively, following my return from Nepal. Some of my interview partners wished to remain anonymous in order to openly speak about politically sensitive subjects. This concerned particularly those who were members of the international community (who cited their diplomatic standing), as well as demobilized ex-combatants of the PLA (who cited security reasons). To ease an overview, all interview partners are thus listed in Table B.1 not with their names, but with a description of their professional roles during the peace process as well as with a short code so as to indicate when the same interview partner is quoted more than once. A list with the actual names of those interview partners that did not insist on remaining anonymous can be obtained on request.

Most interviews were recorded on tape, but again some interview partners
felt uncomfortable with being recorded, so I relied on taking notes for these interviews. While I at times directly quote a statement from a taped interview, I cannot use direct quotes from unrecorded conversations. Furthermore, I had to rely on the help of an interpreter for some interview partners who felt uncomfortable talking in English. The interpreter was trained beforehand in that we discussed my questionnaire template and I instructed her to translate back to me every few sentences, so that little information would get lost (cf. Brounéus, 2011). I discuss some reflections on working with an interpreter below. Finally, and in addition to interviews, I also conducted archival work while staying in Nepal. I accessed Nepali newspapers in English (cf. above) through the archives of the Press Council Nepal and used the library of the Martin Chautari organization in Kathmandu that offers a collection of academic literature and policy reports. I was also provided with additional gray literature by some of my interview partners (e.g. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, 2013; Pasang, 2008).

5.3.2 Reflections on Fieldwork

Personal reflections on empirical fieldwork – that go beyond the usefulness of a specific scientific method in the field (e.g. Bunselmeyer and Schulz, 2016), but that also address how demographic aspects of the researcher may bias access to informants – have become increasingly common in peace and conflict research. Such reflections are naturally more common in research designs with constructivist methodological foundations (e.g. Höglund, 2011; Pearce, 2015; Wood, 2003). Nevertheless, a few reflections on my fieldwork in Nepal are fruitful to discuss also here in order to understand how certain aspects of my fieldwork may influence my results.

First and foremost, Höglund (2011) has reflected upon how fieldwork in volatile social contexts means that security conditions change rapidly and thus force the researcher to limit or adapt her initial research design. This also applies to my fieldwork in Nepal. I carried out my case selection in December 2014 and as discussed above, required that at least one case of my matched group of cases was suitable for fieldwork. At that point, Nepal, Angola, and Cambodia seemed like a particularly rewarding group of cases to study for the purpose of this dissertation due to three reasons. Firstly, comparatively little detailed information was available on the role of Nepal’s interim government for the country’s peace process, which made the gathering of new data through empirical fieldwork especially fruitful. Secondly, Nepal was also a relatively safe country to travel to for a Western, female researcher. Thirdly, Nepal has furthermore hardly been studied in comparative case study research designs; while Cambodia and Angola could serve as historical comparisons that have been thoroughly covered by the existing literature, although often only in intra-regional comparisons (e.g. Bekoe, 2005; Croissant, 2007; Pearce, 2010).

After having made all necessary travel arrangements to start my fieldwork
at the end of April 2015, the 7.8 magnitude Gorkha earthquake struck Nepal on
25th April 2015, killing over 8,000 people, while displacing and injuring many
more. As a result, I postponed my fieldwork and after addressing the ethical
considerations of the value and necessity of research in a post-disaster zone (I
closely stayed in touch with my contacts in Kathmandu, cf. the discussions
However, in the aftermath of the earthquake, an urgency to begin reconstruction
had accelerated a long-stalled constitution-making process between the former
warring parties. After nine years of deadlocked constitution-making, Nepal’s
Constituent Assembly (CA) promulgated a new constitution for the country on
the day before my arrival, 20 September 2015 (cf. International Crisis Group,
2016; Strasheim and Bogati, 2016). While some argue that this constitution rep-
resents the successful “end of the peace process” with the Maoist insurgents (cf.
Chapter 6) – meaning I was able to observe this peace process at a particularly
crucial point in time – constitutional provisions concerning the federalist re-
structuring of Nepal had over the summer created a highly politicized situation
in the Himalayan state. As a result, violent protests among the Madhesi and
Tharu communities had erupted in southern Nepal in August 2015 and clashes
between security forces and civilians had killed at least 50 individuals, including
eight policemen (Human Rights Watch, 2015b). In order to make their demands
heard, protesters also began to establish a blockade of the Nepali-Indian border
in late September that stalled all imports of petroleum – as well as medicine
and earthquake relief material – which meant that from early October onwards,
and for the better part of my fieldwork, little to no fueled transportation was
available as gas stations were out of petrol.

This situation affected my fieldwork with regard to two aspects. Firstly, it
meant that traveling within Nepal (and even within the Kathmandu Valley) was
extremely restricted. While I had originally planned to conduct semi-structured
interviews not only in Kathmandu but also in a district under former Maoist
control during the civil war – such as the western districts of Rukum or Rolpa –
in order to learn more about local perceptions of parallel rebel government, the
earthquake had destroyed many roads and made several regions inaccessible,
and violent protests as well as the fuel crisis resulted in further physical travel
restrictions. The fuel crisis also meant that I was able to do less interviews per
day in Kathmandu, because my interpreter and I often had to walk for several
hours across town to get to an interview, as no taxis or buses were available.

Secondly, the politicized situation that the new constitution had created also
meant that members of the governing NC and CPN-UML parties were more dif-
icult to reach than members of the CPN (M), as the former were engaged in
coalition negotiations. This situation also meant that many interview partners
wanted to discuss the current situation and thus may have spoken more
negatively of the CPN (M)’s role in the interim government: A number of re-
pondents pointed out that because the Maoists had broken the promises they
had made during the war to Madhesi and Tharu communities, these groups felt betrayed by their politicians and resorted to protests. This can however be interpreted as a “hard test” for my argument, in that if interview partners evaluate the Maoists’ strategies and actions more critically, they may for instance not easily admit that the Maoists were sending costly signals to prove their intention for peace.

Finally, Höglund (2011) also reflects upon how the demographic identity of the researcher can bias access to interview partners in the field. Therefore, it is important to point out that being a woman (and having a young woman function as my interpreter during interviews) meant that access into the patriarchal political structures of Nepal was challenging at times. Having said that, I more often than not felt that my identity meant that interview partners spoke very openly because they did not regard me or my interpreter as a “threat” to sensitive information. Finally, being German also greatly aided my access to interviews with the CPN (M) in particular. Many interview partners mentioned their respect for the work of the German development cooperation agency Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in Nepal during our conversations, an organization that has a particular positive standing among the Maoists due to its poverty-alleviating work during the civil war. GIZ was also the only development organization the Maoists allowed into their cantonment sites after the end of the war (Bleie and Shrestha, 2012; Bogati, 2015; Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, 2013).
Chapter 6

Interim Rule in Nepal

In November 2006, Nepal’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) brought a civil war to an end that had been ravaging the country for ten years. This accord, negotiated by the rebels of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN (M)) and a coalition of political parties calling itself the Seven-Party-Alliance (SPA), paved the way for an impressive number of political reforms. Within two years alone, the former belligerents installed a power-sharing interim government, proclaimed the country a republic, brought the army under parliamentary control, disarmed the Maoist ex-combatants, and held elections to a Constituent Assembly (CA). These elections – to everyone’s surprise – were won by the Maoists, who had themselves already prepared to be badly defeated at the polls after several opinion surveys had placed them in a distant third place behind the established political parties (Ogura, 2008). Following the elections, the former rebels entered politics. While peace has prevailed ever since, this was not always the case for the Maoist dominance. Corruption, factionalism, personal feuds, and broken promises all contributed to the party’s difficulties in maintaining a position of power in the post-interim period, and some even argue that the party is among the key losers of the peace process (cf. below). This is not least because the Maoists’ goals of a “radical transformation” of the Nepalese society and the political inclusion of minorities (Lawoti, 2003, p. 52) remain unachieved, and Nepal is today still ruled by its traditional social and political elites.

This chapter aims to answer the question to what extent post-interim peace in Nepal is attributed to the interim government mitigating the warring parties’ commitment problems, rather than the favorable coincidence that the Maoists won first post-war elections and were subsequently no longer interested in re-mobilizing for war. I proceed in three steps. Firstly, to contextualize Nepal’s interim and post-interim politics, section 6.1 offers an overview of the country’s conflict-ridden history. I focuses particularly on the political developments since 1950, when those organizations began to grow that would later become the warring parties in Nepal’s civil war. Section 6.2 consequently analyzes if com-
mitment problems were at play during and after interim government in Nepal, and how the design of each property of interim rule mitigated such commitment problems, thus adding to peace in the post-interim period. Throughout section 6.2, I also attend to alternative explanatory variables and mechanisms for peace in Nepal. Finally, section 6.3 concludes with a summary of findings, while I conduct a comparative analysis that evaluates my findings vis-à-vis the results from the other case studies in Chapter 9.

6.1 Nepal: A History of Political Turmoil

“[The] palace, the parties, and the Maoists” – the modern history of Nepal has been defined by political-ideological conflicts between these three forces over controlling the state, its political system, and its resources (International Crisis Group, 2003b, p. 7). While particularly the time since 1951 has been one in which “revolution has been followed by royal coup followed by revolution followed by royal coup” (Cadwalladr, 2016), the latest escalation of tumults into large-scale violence occurred in 1996. That year, the CPN (M) began attacking government offices, police stations, and banks, marking the start of the country’s decade-long civil war (Upreti, 2008). At that time, Nepal looked back on over half a century of turbulent transitions to – and from – democracy. This historical overview thus begins with a short outline of key political events before 1950, before it focuses on the anti-Rana movement in the 1950s, the Panchayat system of the 1960-80s, and Nepal’s transition to democracy in the 1990s. All periods are vital to understand the formation of those political-ideological movements that later became the warring parties in Nepal’s People’s War. Subsequently,

48The name Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) has been used by a number of organizations since 1995. The first group was the CPN (M) led by Pushpa Kamal Dahal (“Prachanda”) and “chief ideologue” Baburam Bhattarai. The party went under the name from 1995 to January 2009 before changing it to Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (UCPN (M)), when it merged with the CPN (Unity Centre – Masal). The second organization is a breakaway faction of the UCPN (M), the Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist (CPN-M) or “Dashists” that uses a dash instead of parentheses in writing its name. The CPN-M was formed in June 2012 by Mohan Baidya (“Kiran”) and Ram Bahadur Thapa (“Badal”), who were leading a radically left-wing faction that argued the CPA had “seriously hurt ... the credence and value of the Nepalese revolution” (Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist, 2012). The third group is the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN (M)), formed in March 2014 by Netra Bikram Chand (“Biplav”) and equally arguing that the UCPN (M) leadership was betraying the causes of the revolution. To make the series of splits and mergers of the Maoist movement in the post-interim period complete, Vice Chairperson Baburam Bhattarai announced his resignation from the party on 26 September 2015 and formally launched the Naya Shakti (New Force) party on 23 November; and several members of the post-2014 CPN (M) announced in May 2016 that they are re-joining Prachanda’s UCPN (M), which announced its new name CPN (Maoist Center) at its first Central Committee meeting on 23 May 2016. Because this dissertation focuses on the 2006-08 interim government and Nepal’s immediate post-interim politics, I use the acronym CPN (M) to describe the rebel group turned political party led by Prachanda.

49The label “People’s War” was coined by the Maoists and is thus an inherently political description of the violence in Nepal. But it is also a common colloquial term among Nepalis when referring to the war – regardless of political affiliation – and I use it thus interchangeably with the more objective terminology. Additionally, many political leaders in Nepal are colloquially referred to by acronyms (e.g. “B.P.” for Bishweshwar Prasad Koirala) or by their
I discuss the unfolding of the war in 1996, the events leading up to the signing of the CPA in November 2006 that marked the start of Nepal’s interim period, as well as the political dynamics of Nepal’s post-interim period.

6.1.1 Introducing the Warring Parties

Present-day Nepal was created in the early nineteenth century (Burghart, 1984). Before, and until 1769, the geographical area of what is today Nepal had been ruled by several small, independent kingdoms. The culturally most influential ones were those of the Kathmandu Valley – the kingdoms of Kathmandu, Lalitpur, and Bhaktapur, each headed by a ruler of the Malla dynasty – as well as the Kingdom of Gorkha, where members of the Shah dynasty occupied the throne (Whelpton, 2013). But after he was crowned King of Gorkha in 1743, Prithvi Narayan Shah initiated a process of territorial expansion of his kingdom that would defeat the Malla rulers in the Kathmandu Valley, unify several independent kingdoms, and create a national monarchy under the rule of the Shah dynasty in 1769 (Burghart, 1984; Whelpton, 2005). The Gorkha rulers’ territorial expansion continued after Prithvi Narayan Shah died in 1775, but reached its limits when the British East India Company disputed the Gorkha’s claim to the agriculturally fertile Tarai plains in southern Nepal. These disputes escalated into the Anglo-Nepali War in 1814, which ended two years later in the Treaty of Sugauli that put halt to the Gorkhas’ territorial quest and established Nepal’s modern boundaries (Mann, 2015). By making the Gorkha rulers accept significant territorial concessions in the Tarai, the treaty also marked the beginning of intra-elite disputes within the kingdom, which would ultimately “create an environment favorable for a strong leader to emerge and seize control” of the government (Malagodi, 2013, p. 74).50

nom de guerre (e.g. “Prachanda” for Pushpa Kamal Dahal). I use the acronyms and assumed names if they are more commonly used than the original names. Finally, Nepal uses the Vikram Samvat as its official calendar, which is roughly 56 years ahead of the Gregorian calendar. In this dissertation, I use the Gregorian date except for when I cite official documents, which is when I give reference to both dates (e.g. “Interim Constitution of 2063 (2007)”).

Contributing to the instability of the Gorkha Kingdom’s final years was Nepal’s new multitude of ethnic, linguistic, regional, and religious groups, as well as social castes. Before Nepal’s unification, the large number of identity groups populating the area had been able to pursue its daily affairs autonomously within the borders of the independent kingdoms, but the Gorkhas’ territorial expansion forced them to live under one political roof (Gellner, 1997b). This situation was not accommodated by the authorities of unified Nepal (who promoted the Nepali language and the Hindu religion); and it troubles Nepal until today (Hangen, 2010; Lecomte-Tilouine, 2011). While ethnic, linguistic, regional, caste, or religious cleavages are often blurred, six broad identity markers remain politically salient until today. (1) Nepali-speaking, high-caste Hindus from the central hill region (Pahad) – chiefly Bahuns and Chhetris – make up only 30 percent of the population but constitute the politically dominant groups that have controlled positions in the government, administration, or army from unification until today (Hangen, 2010). (2) Newars, the indigenous people of the Kathmandu Valley, have developed their own caste system and also hold positions of power (Gellner, 1997a). (3) Janajatis – an umbrella term for all other indigenous groups – remain outside the Hindu caste system and are facing pervasive political and economic discrimination (Lawoti, 2012). (4) Tharus are an ethnic group indigenous to the southern and south-western Tarai and (5) Madhesis, Muslims or caste-based Hindus equally living in the Tarai, have close socio-economic
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1743</td>
<td>Prithvi Narajan Shah ascends the throne of the Ghorka Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1769</td>
<td>As several independent kingdoms are unified under Ghorka rule, several ethnic groups now live under one political roof</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1846</td>
<td>The Rana family comes to power in the Kot Massacre and over the next 100 years systematically benefits high-caste Hindus from the central hill region while minorities are politically marginalized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>The NC forms in Indian exile under the leadership of B.P. Koirala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>The NC succeeds in an armed uprising against Rana rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>The NC wins Nepal’s first democratic elections, B.P. Koirala becomes Nepal’s first elected Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>A royal coup by King Mahendra ends the short democratic experiment and introduces the authoritarian Panchayat system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>The First People’s Movement ends absolute monarchy and returns the NC to power, but minorities remain marginalized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>The CPN (M) begins its insurgency against the government and promises minorities enhanced political representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>King Gyanendra ascends the throne following the Royal Massacre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>A royal coup by King Gyanendra dissolves Nepal’s government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>The Second People’s Movement ends absolute monarchy; the SPA and the CPN (M) sign the CPA and form an interim government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>The CPN (M) wins elections to a CA and abolishes the monarchy. The factionalized CA is unable to proclaim a constitution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>The CPN (M) is defeated in elections to a second CA, its political leader Prachanda loses his seat in parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Earthquakes kill over 8,000 people but accelerate the constitutional process. A constitution is proclaimed on 20 September. Minority protests over constitutional provisions kill 58 people.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This leader was Jang Bahadur Rana, who used the instability and cultural heterogeneity (cf. Footnote 50) of the late Gorkha Kingdom to seize power in the 1846 Kot Massacre (Pradhan, 1991). In this coup d’état, Rana and his brothers killed 40 members of the royal court, ended the rule of the Shah dynasty and started what would become known as the Rana Period of Nepalese politics. Rana and his brothers introduced a deeply unequal and discriminatory political system of hereditary prime ministers within their family that systematically benefited high-caste Bahuns and Chhetris, while marginalizing everyone else (Hachhethu, 2007a; Rose, 2001; Thapa, 2012). In building their rule, the ties to communities in northern India, and constitute approximately 35 per cent of Nepal’s total population (Government of Nepal, 2014). (6) Dalits, the lowest Hindu caste, make up 15 percent of the population and “are affected by the widespread practice of untouchability that considers them impure” and segregates them from society (Lawoti, 2012, 130ff.).
Ranas also reduced the Shah king to a “ceremonial figurehead” without any real political or military power (Malagodi, 2013, p. 74), and they were said to preserve the monarchy mostly “for the façade of legitimacy that it offered” (Ganguly and Shoup, 2005, p. 130).

Despite several splits and tensions within the family, the Rana Period lasted for 104 years. Opposition – long restricted as the regime closely monitored all public life in Nepal – only began to grow in the years following World War II among the educated classes in Kathmandu, as well as in the Nepalese diaspora in India. This opposition was spurred both by the struggle of independence in India, as well as by new Western ideas of democracy (Lal, 2001; Levi, 1952; Whelpton, 2005). The new opposition found a partner in King Tribhuvan, who was far from being a democrat but “unhappy with his own status as a pampered puppet” and thus willing to cooperate with the emerging political parties to reclaim power (Whelpton, 2013, p. 39).

Among the key drivers in the anti-Rana movement was the Nepali Congress (NC) that would later not only lead the revolution ending Rana rule, but that would also be among the key agents of Nepal’s People’s Movements in 1990 and 2006, as well as of the post-2006 peace process. Led by Bishweshwar Prasad (“B.P.”) Koirala, the NC was founded in 1950 following the unification of the Nepali National Congress and the Nepali Democratic Congress, which had both been created in 1947 in India (Levi, 1952). Today, the NC is described as a conservative to centrist “grand old lady among Nepal’s parties” (Krämer, 2007, p. 184), dominated by Bahuns and with the strong electoral advantage of being an alternative to the left majority (International Crisis Group, 2008).

The NC has throughout its existence particularly stressed its commitment to democracy, which remains deeply entrenched in the party’s self-perception until today (Hachhethu, 2007b). For instance, the NC describes its early objectives in the 1950s as to “raise political consciousness of the people to overthrow the century old Rana rule” and “to establish a democratic system of government with constitutional monarchy” (Nepali Congress, 2015).51

The NC’s plan succeeded. On 6 November 1950, the disempowered king fled to the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu to seek political asylum from the Ranas, thus deriving their rule of any royal legitimacy (Malagodi, 2013). Five days later, the NC’s military wing Mukti Sena (Liberation Army) started a violent uprising in the Tarai. This led to the Indian-mediated Delhi Accord in 1951 that reinstated Tribhuvan in power, installed a government jointly run by the Ranas and the NC, and made Matrika Prasad (“M.P.”) Koirala – the older brother of B.P. – Prime Minister of Nepal (Gupta, 1994; Lal, 2001; Levi, 1952). The

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51This self-perception is not always reflected in how others see the NC, for instance after several prominent former NC ministers were convicted of corruption by Nepal’s Supreme Court after 2007. Recently, both Madhesis and NC leaders have accused the NC leadership of participating in “undemocratic democracy” in the 2015 constitution-making process, as the leadership inter alia supported the abandonment of public consultation procedures of constitutional provisions (International Crisis Group, 2016, p. 17).
Figure 6.1: Splits and Mergers of Nepal’s Communist Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Communist Party of Nepal (CPN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>CPN Pro-China Faction, CPN Pro-Russia Faction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>CPN Fourth Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>CPN Masal, CPN Mashal, Fourth Conv.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>CPN Unity Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>CPN Unity Center, Parallel CPN Unity Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>CPN (Maoist)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Delhi Accord marked the beginning of a decade of constitutional monarchy in the 1950s in which Tribhuvan and – after his death in 1955 – his son Mahendra promulgated two constitutions that called for a democratic government with the king as head of state. The document also allowed for free and fair elections on 18 February 1959 (Malagodi, 2013). In these elections, the NC won a two-third majority and B.P. Koirala consequently became the first democratically elected Prime Minister of Nepal (Nickson, 1992).

The Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) only played a marginal role in the 1959 elections, winning only 7.2 percent of the vote and four seats in parliament, and observers agree that the party’s lack of support for the monarchy was a key reason for its poor showing (Krämer, 2001; Nickson, 1992). Similar to the NC, the CPN had been founded in the late 1940s by the Nepalese diaspora in India under the leadership of Pushpa Lal Shrestha and in order to fight against the Ranas. After it had only played a secondary role in the anti-Rana movement, the CPN was then banned between 1952 and 1956 because of anti-government activism – in 1951, it had for instance stated that its main objective was to “transform Nepal into a republican state through violent revolution” (in Khadka, 1995, p. 57). In the decades to follow, the CPN’s popularity and organizational strength would increase, but its political development was always hampered by “a series of never ending splits and mergers” (Whelpton, 2005, p. 203) caused by “internal feuds and factionalism” (Khadka, 1995, p. 57).
Figure 6.1 illustrates the main splits that led from the CPN to the CPN (M), the party that would start an insurgency against the state in 1996.\textsuperscript{52}

Nepal’s democratic experiment of the 1950s was short lived. Only eighteen months after the 1959 elections, King Mahendra staged a royal coup that suspended the constitution, dismissed the elected government, detained all political leaders or drove them into exile, and ruled under emergency powers until he promulgated the Panchayat constitution in 1962 (Brown, 1996). Having declared that political parties had endangered Nepal’s national security and that “Nepal was unprepared to function according to the rules of Western-style ... democracy” (Malagodi, 2013, p. 88), Mahendra used the Panchayat constitution to legally enshrine a ban of all parties and create a political system that foresaw the monarch’s involvement at every level of the state. The system provided for directly elected village councils that formed electoral colleges to choose district-level representatives. Representatives in turn selected members of a national legislature that had however only advisory powers (Malagodi, 2008). All power rested with the monarch – “the whole arrangement was designed to allow an element of popular representation while the king ruled unhindered by the pressures of parliamentary democracy” (Whelpton, 2005, p. 101).

When Mahendra died in 1972 and his Western-educated son Birendra ascended the throne, hopes for liberalization arose among Nepal’s banned parties, but it would take until Birendra was facing student protests in May 1979 that he could no longer ignore public pressure, and was ultimately forced to schedule a referendum on the Panchayat system (Ganguly and Shoup, 2005). The vote was hardly free and fair: “While the government used all the financial and political resources at its disposal, the opposition was hampered by the prohibition placed upon the formal organizational structures of political parties” (Nickson, 1992, p. 361). Together with the regime’s grip on rural Nepal, where illiteracy

\textsuperscript{52}Both the CPN (M) and the second prominent communist party in Nepal today, the Communist Party of Nepal – United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML), eventually emerged from this series of splits and mergers of the CPN. In 1974, the CPN split when Mohan Bikram Singh established his own Communist Party of Nepal (Fourth Convention). In 1983, the CPN – Fourth Convention then split into two, Singh’s own group – the Communist Party of Nepal – Masal (CPN – Masal), which also included the future CPN (M) leaders Prachanda and Bhattarai – as well as Nirmal Lama’s faction that continued to call itself CPN – Fourth Convention. In 1985, the CPN – Masal split into the CPN – Masal – led by Mohan Bikram Singh – and the CPN – Mashal. Both parties were differentiated mostly “by their pronunciation” and little “in their ideology” (Khadka, 1995, p. 60). In 1990, the CPN – Mashal merged with the CPN – Fourth Convention and the Nepal Proletarian Worker’s Organization, to form the CPN – Unity Center. In 1994, a faction led by Bhattarai and Prachanda broke away from the CPN – Unity Center to form the Parallel CPN – Unity Center that promoted “politics in favor of an armed revolt in a bid to capture state power by force” (Thapa, 2012, p. 42). And in 1995, this faction formally assumed the name CPN (M) and condemned the existing political parties as supporters of the feudal system (Lal, 2001; Whelpton, 2013).

\textsuperscript{53}In an attempt to strengthen the legitimacy of the Panchayat system, the new constitution also declared Nepal a Hindu kingdom and revered the monarch in his position as a godlike king and reincarnation of Vishnu (Haviland, 2005; Shrestha, 2012). The constitution also enshrined Nepali as the national language, deepening the systematic marginalization of Madhesis, Tharus, Dalits, and Janajatis (Thapa, 2012) that later played into the hands of the CPN (M) that capitalized on the grievances of these marginalized groups.
rates remained at up to 98 percent, this produced a victory for Birendra and further endorsed the Panchayat system for another decade (Khadka, 1995).

6.1.2 Democratization and Insurgency

The end of the Panchayat system only came in 1989, when the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and an intensifying economic crisis inspired many young Nepalis to urge the banned political parties to take action and reestablish democracy (Einsiedel et al., 2012; Malagodi, 2013). The still banned political parties started to publicly organize and – led by the NC, as well as by a coalition of seven leftist parties calling itself the United Leftist Front (ULF) – to pressure the king into introducing serious political reforms (Baral, 1994; Mitra et al., 2006). In February 1990, large numbers of citizens began to take the streets of Kathmandu and other cities in the Valley, in order to demand free and fair elections and the end of Panchayat rule – a movement that is today known as Jana Andolan I or First People’s Movement (Srivastava and Sharma, 2010).

After initial resistance, Birendra eventually bowed to public pressure, lifted the ban on political parties, nominated a government under the NC’s Krishna Prasad Bhattarai, and promulgated a new constitution in November 1990 (Hutt, 1991). This constitution “largely reflected the demands of the democratic forces” – such as the introduction of multi-party democracy under constitutional monarchy – but “in a compromise with the palace and the generals, confirmed Nepal as a Hindu state and the king as the supreme commander of the army” (Einsiedel et al., 2012, p. 7). Thus, with democracy reinstated, the representation of Janajatis in government institutions actually decreased as compared to the Panchayat period, while male, high-caste Hindus from the central hill region further monopolized their grip onto power, their dominance in party structures, and their rule in an exclusive political system dominated by patron-client relationships (Lawoti, 2010; Riaz and Basu, 2007).

In 1991, elections set the stage to a rocky restart of democracy, in which a series of unstable, short-lived, and relentlessly reshuffled governments came to power that failed to advance any popular aspirations for economic inclusion or good governance (Einsiedel et al., 2012). It was this time of political instability that the CPN (M) launched its violent rebellion, which soon turned into one of the “highest intensity internal conflicts in the world” (Murshed and Gates, 2005, p. 121). After communist leaders Pushpa Kamal Dahal (“Prachanda”)

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54 This was also reflected in the May 1991 elections that the NC won with 39.5 percent of the vote and following which Girija Prasad (“G.P.”) Koirala, brother of early NC leaders M.P. and B.P., was inaugurated as Prime Minister (Krämer, 2001): “Was this too much of a coincidence or a disturbing reminder of the system devised by Rana Jung Bahadur” 150 years earlier (Gupta, 1994, p. 2799)?

and Baburam Bhattarai had split from the CPN – Unity Center to form the “parallel” CPN – Unity Center in 1994, they created the political front United People’s Front Nepal (UPFN) in order to participate in the upcoming 1994 elections (cf. Footnote 52, Figure 6.1, and Lawoti, 2010). But just before the elections took place, the parallel CPN – Unity Center and UPFN union experienced the chronic problem of factionalism that has defined the communist movement since its foundation, and the splinter faction that emerged under Prachanda and Bhattarai quickly denounced all other political parties as supporters of the feudal system. This was likely also because their group was denied participation in the 1994 elections by the Election Commission (Lawoti, 2010).

In 1995, the Prachanda and Bhattarai faction renamed itself the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and openly declared its goal to change Nepal’s unequal and discriminatory political system through violent rebellion, with the explicit aim to “confiscate the lands of feudals and landlords,” distribute them among landless and poor peasants, and – “in order to cut the roots of imperialist exploitation” – to nationalize all industries and banks that they argued were in the hands of “bureaucratic capitalists” (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), 1995). On 4 February 1996, Bhattarai and female party leader Pampha Bhusal handed the NC-government a list of forty demands that was effectively their party manifesto, but the Maoists threatened that they would start an insurgency if the government would not meet their demands before 17 February (Whelpton, 2005). Among those demands were that elected representatives would draft a new constitution that would declare an end to monarchy and turn Nepal into a secular state, and that all languages should be given equal status (Raghavan, 2011). On 13 February and four days before the ultimatum ran out, the CPN (M) began attacking police stations, banks, and local government offices.

As Figure 6.2 shows, the first years of the Maoist insurgency were thereby marked by low levels of fatalities, but the CPN (M) was still able to slowly extend its sphere of influence to numerous districts throughout the country. Both the low number of battle deaths and the CPN (M)’s ability to conquer territory can be explained by two aspects. Firstly, the rebels were only fighting the Nepal Police, while the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) under the control of the king was not deployed. This was in part because of Birendra’s “genuine unwillingness” and reluctance to use the RNA against his own citizens, but also because the monarch perceived the insurgency “as a useful tool against the politicians who had forced him to yield power in 1990” (Whelpton, 2005, p. 207). Secondly, the rebels were able to conquer territory because the state and its institutions only weakly penetrated the remote areas in western Nepal and the mountainous north (Parbat) and was inefficiently equipped to stand in the way of the Maoists. For instance, the Nepal Police is traditionally centrally

56 In theory, the RNA was during the 1990s under the control of the National Defense Council made up of the army’s Chief of Staff, the Prime Minister, and the Defense Minister (Adhikari, 2015). In practice, however, the traditionally Chhetri dominated army “looked to the king who thus had a de facto veto upon its deployment” (Whelpton, 2005, p. 207).
recruited and trained, so that police forces do “not normally enjoy close ties to the community in which they [are] stationed” (Whelpton, 2005, 206f.). Many Village Development Committees (VDCs) also lack roads that police vehicles can drive on (Adhikari, 2014).

With little resistance by the state, the CPN (M) was in the late years of its insurgency also able to establish an extensive structure of parallel “People’s Governments” and “People’s Courts” in the VDCs under its control (cf. section 6.2.3). The People’s Courts were primarily set up by the Maoists in order to adjudicate conflicts in the villages and punish opponents (but see the self-perception of the courts by Maoist deputy commander Pasang, 2008). The People’s Governments additionally enforced a parallel taxation system to level revolutionary taxes, staged political education programs in which villagers were indoctrinated with Maoist ideology, and coerced villagers into providing “voluntary” labor for development projects, as well as food and lodging for traveling cadres of the CPN (M)’s armed wing People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (Einsiedel et al., 2012). The People’s Courts would however also address “the immediate needs of the rural people because the formal conflict resolution mechanism – the district court system – was far away, slow, costly and often corrupt,” so that many villagers were “relieved when minor conflicts were settled quickly in villages at much lower costs” (Lawoti, 2010, p. 16). For instance, because the Maoists promoted an ideology opposed to gender discrimination, women often benefited from the People’s Courts that strictly punished domestic violence, polygamy, or men taking child brides (Lohani-Chase, 2008). The People’s
Governments would also burn land-ownership records, which “made them immensely popular among the poor segments of the rural population” (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2015b).

A change to the low-intensity insurgency came on 1 June 2001. That day, an intoxicated Crown Prince Dipendra shot his father King Birendra, his mother Queen Aishwarya, and eight other members of the royal family before committing suicide – although conspiracy theories remain widespread, and many Nepalis do not believe official reports but instead accuse Birendra’s only surviving brother Gyanendra as the murderer (Shrestha, 2012). Gyanendra, for that matter, ascended the throne on 4 June, and inaugurated the NC’s Sher Bahadur Deuba as a new Prime Minister in July 2001. Following Deuba’s nomination, the CPN (M) initially agreed to a ceasefire, as it believed that Deuba “would be more flexible in negotiations” than his predecessor Koirala (Freedom House, 2002a). This belief would not manifest itself. The CPN (M) soon argued that Deuba was “a mere helpless pawn in the hands of Gyanendra” and “did not make a single political proposal to solve the problems of the country” (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), 2001).

Consequently, the rebels broke the ceasefire in November 2001, upon which Gyanendra declared a state of emergency and ordered the RNA to fight the Maoists. While Birendra thus had always been reluctant to deploy the RNA internally, Gyanendra had no such reservations (Adhikari, 2015). As Figure 6.2 shows, deploying the RNA led to an escalation of the war and to skyrocketing numbers of battle deaths – what it did not lead to, however, was an increased control of the state over its territory. The CPN (M) would not only keep most rural areas under its control but would also come to be “increasingly active in towns nominally controlled by the government” and build up “a nationwide presence” (International Crisis Group, 2005). For instance, in the final years of the war, the rebels were said to control up to 80 percent of Nepal’s territory, and had forced 68 percent of VDC secretaries and 1,271 of 1,979 police units to withdraw (Adhikari, 2014; Einsiedel et al., 2012).

Lingering hopes for peace or democracy were further shattered on 1 February 2005. In a move similar to his father Mahendra’s 1959 decision to suspend fundamental constitutional rights, Gyanendra that day sacked the Prime Minister, assumed full political power, and claimed he did so to defend multiparty democracy (International Crisis Group, 2005). This royal coup only played into the hands of the CPN (M) that could rally supporters ever more around the idea that the king was opposing democratic reforms. The coup thus led to a further escalation of violence until 3 September 2005, when the CPN (M) declared a ceasefire in order to hold talks with political parties, who had come to equally opposed Gyanendra. These talks culminated in the 12-Point-Agreement of November 2005, in which the Maoists and the parties agreed that the main obstacle to peace was the monarchy, and that all forces should step up “to end the autocratic monarchy and establish complete democracy” (in Nepali Times,
The 12-Point-Agreement thus not only united the seven mainstream political parties against Gyanendra – a movement calling itself the Seven-Party-Alliance (SPA). It also “changed the political equation and squarely allied both the parties and Maoists against the palace” (Freedom House, 2006), and set the stage for a Second People’s Movement (Jana Andolan II) in April 2006 that demanded a return to democracy, peace, and finally inclusion for the historically marginalized groups (Routledge, 2010).57

Gyanendra eventually bowed to public pressure, accepted to install a government formed by the mainstream political parties, and reinstated Nepal’s parliament. This move opened new opportunities for intensified peace negotiations between the political parties and the CPN (M) – but not with the king (Routledge, 2010). These negotiations culminated in the signing of the CPA in November 2006, as well as of the subsequent Agreement on the Monitoring of Arms and Armies (AMAAA) of December 2006 and the Interim Constitution of 2063 (January 2007). In these documents, the SPA and the Maoist insurgents inter alia agreed on (1) the formation of a power-sharing interim government to rule the country until (2) the holding of elections to a Constituent Assembly (CA), which would draft a final constitution for Nepal; (3) on the dissolution of all parallel forms of governance, in particular the Maoist People’s Courts and People’s Governments; and (4) on the encampment and disarmament of the PLA under UN supervision, and the simultaneous reform of the RNA that was brought under parliamentary control and renamed the Nepal Army.

6.1.3 Post-Interim Politics in Nepal

The CPA formally ended Nepal’s People’s War, and intrastate conflict has not resumed ever since (cf. Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2015b).58 While some observers were concerned that radically left elites of the CPN (M) would remobilize following a series of splits in the party between 2012 and 2014 (cf. Footnote 48), most agree today that the Maoist movement has given up violence for good, has fully integrated into parliamentary politics (Basnyat, 2013; Ishiyama and Batta, 2011; Ishiyama and Marshall, 2015), and that the shape of politics in Nepal has been “seriously revised” (International Crisis Group, 2008).57

57 Jana Andolan II’s legitimacy was boosted among the poorer and rural segments of Nepal – after Jana Andolan I had taken place largely in urban areas – when the CPN (M) called its supporters to join peaceful protests (e.g. Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), 2006).

58 In 2007, Nepal saw a short period of non-state conflict between Maoist cadres and the Madhesi Jana Adhikar Forum (Madheshi People’s Rights Forum) in the Tarai. This violence erupted and resulted in 32 battle-related deaths after it became apparent that the Interim Constitution would not fully address the interests and grievances of Madhesis (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2015b). Notably, violence broke out again in the Tarai in 2015, and once more these turnmills were a result of Madhesi unrest in relation to the constitutional process (International Crisis Group, 2016; Strasheim and Bogati, 2016). Yet again, these tensions did not escalate into an intrastate conflict between the government and an organized rebel group, but instead 58 individuals died as a result of government violence against civilian protesters (cf. Human Rights Watch, 2015b). In Chapter 9, I discuss how these forms of post-interim violence relate to issues of concept validity in my dependent variable.
The post-interim period started when, to everyone’s surprise, the CPN (M) won the CA elections in April 2008 with 30.52 percent of the vote, turning Prachanda into Nepal’s first elected post-war Prime Minister. This victory allowed the Maoists to achieve one of their central goals: to abolish the monarchy and promulgate the Republic of Nepal in May 2008 (Bhatta, 2012; Lawoti, 2014). The party’s electoral victory and Prachanda’s nomination as Prime Minister was unexpected or “shocking” (cf. Martin, 2010) to most observers, also because the CPN (M) had itself not expected to do well under the mixed proportional and First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) electoral system that had been subject to much debate during the interim period (cf. section 6.2.1). Several opinion polls had also placed the party behind both the NC and the CPN-UML (Nepali Times, 2007; Reuters, 2007; Uppal, 2007). “Some voices [had] even suggested that the CPN (M) did not want CA elections to be held because they were afraid of being badly defeated” (Ogura, 2008, p. 46).

Following their victory, the Maoists could not sustain their early success, were unable to consolidate their power, and did not manage to push through other central goals they have formulated as their policy platform during the war. From today’s perspective, some even argue that the CPN (M) belongs to “the biggest losers of the peace process” (INT-20, 09.10.2015) and is “damaged” (cf. Randolph, 2013) and “completely ruined as a party” (INT-12, 29.09.2015, cf. INT-27, 19.10.2015 and INT-28, 19.10.2015). For instance, in 2012, one news magazine commented that while Prachanda was long “regarded as a strong political personality,” his status had changed and severely weakened: “Maoist supremo Prachanda is nowhere near what he was then” (Spotlight Nepal, 2012).

The decline of the Maoists took several steps. In July 2008, the CPN (M) lost the presidential election, after its new coalition partner CPN-UML decided to vote for the rival NC candidate Ram Baran Yadav (United Nations, 2008). In May 2009, Prachanda’s government fell over a dispute concerning the NA Chief of Staff, and he was succeeded by CPN-UML Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal.59 Prachanda’s replacement was the beginning of intense factionalism within the CPN (M), and “[ideological], partisan, intra-party, and personal conflicts as well as sheer lust for power led to four governments” in the next four years (Lawoti, 2014, p. 135). In June 2012, and as a consequence of these power struggles, the Maoist party split and a significant breakaway faction under “Kiran” and “Badal” formed the CPN-M (cf. Footnote 48). In early 2013, the Maoists lost negotiations on the integration of their ex-combatants into the NA. The NA resisted former PLA cadres joining its ranks, because the army deemed the ex-combatants to have too little formal education. Instead of the originally desired 4,000 ex-combatants joining the NA, only approximately

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59Prachanda had wanted to dismiss the NA’s General Rookmangad Katawal, who was a major opponent of the Maoists during the People’s War, but the move was objected by President Yadav who personally instructed Katawal to continue in his position. Prachanda’s successor Madhav Kumar Nepal promptly restored General Katawal to his post – where he had continued to function on the basis of Yadav’s direction in any case (Lal, 2009).
1,400 were integrated (Martin Chautari, 2013).

Finally, in November 2013, the factionalized CA was dissolved because it had been unable to draft a new constitution, and the CPN (M) only scored a distant third place in elections to a second CA. It regressed from 229 parliamentary seats to a mere 80, and was forced into opposition (Lawoti, 2014, p. 139). Most humiliatingly, Prachanda lost his own seat in the national parliament (Randolph, 2013). Many observers argue that the internal power struggles that reminded voters of the unstable years in the early 1990s were only part of the equation for why the CPN (M) lost substantively. In addition, the Maoists had, once in power, displayed corruption, nepotism, and personal enrichment on the same level as the political parties they used to fight during the war, and they had abandoned many of the promises they had made to mobilize minorities into their ranks (cf. below, Bhatta, 2012; Strasheim and Bogati, 2016). This particularly drove poorer segments of society away from the party (cf. below, Bhatta, 2012; Strasheim and Bogati, 2016). This particularly drove poorer segments of society away from the party (cf. below, Bhatta, 2012; Strasheim and Bogati, 2016). This particularly drove poorer segments of society away from the party (cf. below, Bhatta, 2012; Strasheim and Bogati, 2016). This particularly drove poorer segments of society away from the party (cf. below, Bhatta, 2012; Strasheim and Bogati, 2016). This particularly drove poorer segments of society away from the party (cf. below, Bhatta, 2012; Strasheim and Bogati, 2016). This particularly drove poorer segments of society away from the party (cf. below, Bhatta, 2012; Strasheim and Bogati, 2016). This particularly drove poorer segments of society away from the party (cf. below, Bhatta, 2012; Strasheim and Bogati, 2016). This particularly drove poorer segments of society away from the party (cf. below, Bhatta, 2012; Strasheim and Bogati, 2016). This particularly drove poorer segments of society away from the party (cf. below, Bhatta, 2012; Strasheim and Bogati, 2016). This particularly drove poorer segments of society away from the party (cf. below, Bhatta, 2012; Strasheim and Bogati, 2016).

Having the experienced NC back in power in 2013 – the party won 196 out of 575 CA seats – did however not speed up the constitutional process, and also the second CA was politically deadlocked for over one year. This was largely due to differences over how to delineate federal provinces (Human Rights Watch, 2015b). The constitutional process only accelerated after the devastating 7.8 and 7.3 magnitude earthquakes on 25 April and 12 May 2015 killed almost 9,000 people: “[Propelled] by the urgency to begin reconstruction” (Sharma and Barry, 2015), the major parties agreed to complete the constitution in a “fast track” process (Human Rights Watch, 2015b). On 20 September 2015, President Yadav promulgated Nepal’s first post-war constitution in what many call “the end of the peace process” with the former Maoist insurgents (INT-02, 23.09.2015, Bhattarai, 2015; Kantipur, 2015).

### 6.2 Interim Government in Nepal

Peace thus prevailed in Nepal’s post-interim period. Can this outcome be explained by properties of the 2006-08 interim government mitigating credible commitment problems, such as when the perceived relative distribution of power shifted to the CPN (M)’s disadvantage in 2007, as the party feared it would lose

“In 2008, who were these people? [They were] strangers, revolutionaries, their body language [was] different. ... Many of them had been [living] underground for 10 years ... Prachanda was a brand new [politician], he had been active underground his entire life ... So with that kind of aura, inspiration, and threat, it was possible [to win the election] in 2008. In 2013, they just had become one of the other [parties]” (INT-24, 13.10.2015).
the elections? Would the Maoists also have accepted loosing these elections, or would and could they have remobilized for war? Or are other causal mechanisms and variables more powerful explanations for the absence of intrastate conflict, such as the favorable condition that the CPN (M) won the 2008 elections?\textsuperscript{60}

In the subsequent sections, I will argue that stable peace in Nepal can be regarded as a function of mitigated commitment problems that drove the parties’ decision to abolish their violent campaigns and that made it rational to stick to peaceful behavior. This is particularly because, firstly, the interim government enabled the Maoists to decrease any future political or economic uncertainty, thus increasing their utility of the $P_R, P_G$ outcome in Figure 3.2 relative to the $W_R, W_G$ outcome. Secondly, both institutional designs of and reforms in the interim government helped to alter intra-party elite-combatant dynamics in the CPN (M), which substantively increased the party’s costs of remobilization. In these sections, I will yet also show that while mitigated commitment problems are among the explanation for peace in Nepal, the case study also demonstrates the limitations of bargaining theory with regard to two aspects. Firstly, applying bargaining theory to Nepal faces limitations due to the theory’s standard modeling of war as a two-player game (cf. Chapter 3 and Lake, 2010), because Nepal’s modern politics are marked by conflicts between the palace-parties-Maoists troika. Excluding the palace from the analyses would overlook some important dynamics in how particularly power-sharing interim government helped to mitigate commitment problems. Secondly, bargaining theory faces limitations for the case of Nepal due to its modeling of players as unitary actors. Not only have political forces in Nepal been historically plagued by extreme horizontal factionalism, as well as frequent splits – with the “lines of difference” often not being “over ideologies but over individual personality” (Bhatta, 2012, p. 2). Furthermore, my discussion on power-sharing interim government below will also demonstrate the importance of adhering to vertical elite-combatant divides within the CPN (M). I discuss these limitations in detail also in Chapter 9.

In what follows, I attend to each hypothesized property of interim government sequentially in order to analyze how institutional designs and reforms did or did not help to overcome commitment problems in Nepal, and how this is linked to stable post-interim peace This concerns (H1) power-sharing and (H2) international interim government, (H3) the integration of parallel institutions, and (H4) the participation of civil society and political parties. I structure each section in three parts. Firstly, I briefly review the theoretical causal mechanism for each property of interim government. Secondly, I describe the respective provisions as decided upon in the 2006 CPA, as well as the ensuing AMAA

\textsuperscript{60}Past research on Nepal has hardly referred to bargaining theory, while structural, socioeconomic variables remain “central in the existing literature and dominate most analyses of the armed conflict in Nepal” (Eck, 2010, p. 37). Extreme poverty (Do and Iyer, 2010), economic inequality (Murshed and Gates, 2005), as well as the exclusion of minorities (Malagodi, 2013) belong to the most prominent explanations of conflict in the country.
and Interim Constitution. Thirdly, I outline the process of its implementation, present an analysis on how this process of events and actions affected the causal mechanisms between each property of interim rule and peace in the post-interim period, and discuss competing explanations and limitations of my theoretical argument.

6.2.1 Power-Sharing Interim Government

Following the seminal work on interim governments by Shain and Linz (1995), Chapter 3 formulated a distinction between power-sharing interim government and interim periods in which only one party holds power. I held that compared to caretaker or revolutionary rule, power-sharing is more likely to mitigate commitment problems as it comes with physical, economic, and political benefits that decrease future uncertainty for warring parties (cf. Figure 3.3).

In the CPA and the Interim Constitution of 2063 (2007), CPN (M) and SPA negotiated a power-sharing interim government to rule until first post-war elections. In specific, the parties agreed to “form an interim legislature on the basis of [the] interim constitution” (Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2006), which promulgated that the interim legislature should have 330 seats as an “expanded form of the current House of Representatives” (International Crisis Group, 2006, p. 12). The House was to be formally dissolved, but all sitting members would fill 209 seats, the CPN (M) would receive 73 seats, and 48 seats would be allocated to civil society and oppressed communities.

These provisions were accordingly implemented. On 12 January 2007, the Maoists named the 73 people to represent them in the interim legislature, among them – in a first for Nepal – nine women, eleven Dalits, 20 Madhesis, and 23 Janajatis (AFP, 2007c). The CPN (M) formally joined the interim parliament three days later, and formed a power-sharing interim cabinet with representatives of the SPA on 31 March 2007. Although the CPN (M) had thereby initially voiced its desire to obtain the position of Chair or Vice-Chair in the interim parliament, it compromised and ceded both seats to the NC and the CPN-UML; but instead received the post of deputy prime minister in the interim

61 That the warring parties decided on implementing a power-sharing interim government in the first place was certainly not a random coincidence, but is the result of an inherently path-dependent process and intrinsically linked to Nepal’s historical experiences with democratic – and power-sharing – rule. This aspect is particularly relevant for the research design of this dissertation, because its democratic history distinguishes Nepal from the other two case studies in my analysis (cf. Chapter 5). That NC and CPN-UML leaders had experience in forming coalition governments and cooperating in the political institutions of the state during the 1990s – at least among high-caste, Nepali-speaking, Hindu men from the central hill region – contributed both to why power-sharing interim government with the Maoists became possible in 2006; and to to why the NC and CPN-UML also quickly accepted their 2008 electoral defeat (Upreti, 2008). For instance, interim Prime Minister G.P. Koirala demonstrated his confidence in the democratic system by declaring in late 2007: “Victory or loss is part of the election. If we lose this time we’ll win in the next election five years later” (in Reuters, 2007). But as I showed in Chapter 4, what holds for Nepal cannot be generalized for the whole sample, as a history of democratic rule is not a valid predictor of why power-sharing interim governments form. I further discuss the role of democratic history comparatively in Chapter 9.
government (Ogura, 2008). The rebels in total assumed five cabinet portfolios, although the NC kept the position of the Prime Minister and the crucial ministries of defense, interior, and finance. The CPN-UML received the foreign ministry (Taylor, 2007).

**Decreasing Uncertainty through Physical Security**

In Chapter 3, I held that a first causal mechanism for why power-sharing interim government is more apt to increase the stability of peace than other governments is that power-sharing reduces future uncertainty by raising the physical security of weaker-growing parties (cf. Figure 3.3). Power-sharing requires, firstly, that parties come out of hiding in the periphery and join the institutions in the capital, which means they reveal their organizational structure to one another (making it difficult to remobilize for war) and which turns them into easy targets for enemy troops (further reducing uncertainty about their future behavior). Secondly, power-sharing governments also tend to offer state bodyguards to rebel-leaders-turned-politicians, and the move to the capital comes with international attention, further increasing physical security.

Nepal does not confirm to this causal pattern, because the necessary temporal precedence of cause to effect cannot be established: On the one hand, there is evidence of a clear link between the offer or awaiting possibility of joining power-sharing interim rule and Maoist senior leaders coming out of hiding and moving to the capital. On the other hand, these leaders came out of hiding well before they actually joined the power-sharing institutions, but appeared in public already in June 2006 as they struck an informal deal on joint rule.

CPN (M) chief negotiators arrived in Kathmandu on 22 May 2006 to start talks with the SPA (Gurubacharya, 2006a). Only weeks later Prachanda started publicly appearing for the first time after a decade of living underground at a meeting 2,000 kilometers southwest Kathmandu (AFP, 2006). Based on his interviews with the Maoist leadership, Ogura (2008, p. 31) notes that these early public appearances were specifically meant to convey the CPN (M)’s commitment to peace. By mid June, Bhattarai and Prachanda arrived in Kathmandu – much in contrast to their Angolan or Cambodian counterparts, who only returned to the capital well into the interim period. On 16 June 2006, “Prachanda’s first media appearance in 35 years of political life took place at the press conference that was held after a meeting with SPA leaders at the prime minister’s official residence” (Ogura, 2008, p. 31). The next day, the parties struck an informal bargain to include power-sharing provisions in the upcoming peace deal. Narayan Wagle, editor of the Kantipur newspaper and one of Nepal’s best-known journalists, commented that Prachanda’s public appearance was “a big achievement that guarantees that ... the rebels will not be returning to the jungles again” (in Gurubacharya, 2006b).

Nepal equally does not confirm to the aspect of the proposed causal mechanism that power-sharing interim governments decrease uncertainty by providing
official bodyguards to rebel-leaders-turned-ministers. Evidence from Nepal’s peace process rather points to the opposite. Upon joining the interim government, CPN (M) leaders were provided with official government security guards, a deal negotiated upon in the CPA. Leaders yet perceived this as a security threat instead of as a benefit; and in July 2007, they threatened to pull out of the interim government because of these physical security details. CPN (M) interim Minister for Communication Krishna Bahadur Mahara stated: “We have sensed a conspiracy against us ... Of all the 22 ministers only we were given security guards from the ranger battalion, who received jungle warfare training during the insurgency ... There was no need to send army with sophisticated weapons for our security ... This move is very suspicious and we were not consulted. We are now seriously considering whether to stay in the [interim] government or not” (in AFP, 2007b). In the following weeks, the CPN (M) demanded that their representative’s security was provided by the PLA, and accordingly, “a small number of armed combatants were [mobilized] outside the cantonments in order to provide security to the Maoist leaders” (Subedi, 2013, p. 148) parallel to the NA security guards (Adhikari, 2015).

Decreasing Uncertainty through Economic Security

In Chapter 3, I held that a second mechanism for why power-sharing interim government is more efficient in increasing the stability of peace than caretaker or revolutionary governments is that power-sharing reduces future uncertainty by raising the economic security of weaker-growing parties (cf. Figure 3.3). In war-torn states, access to wealth is often determined by control of the government, and thus either party must fear to be economically marginalized if the other one fully controls an interim government. By rewarding weaker-growing parties with cabinet or legislative positions, power-sharing enables them to control (or loot) resources that come ascribed to each post they hold and lowers incentives to acquire such benefits through costly war (Haaß and Ottmann, 2015).

Nepal strongly confirms to this causal pattern. Both my interview data as well as previous accounts on Nepal’s interim period indicate that economic benefits from joining the power-sharing interim government were among the main reasons for why CPN (M) leaders abandoned their violent campaign against the state. This becomes visible as throughout the interim period (and well thereafter), corruption among political elites in Kathmandu was perceived to be “epidemic” (cf. Freedom House, 2008). Others argued that the inclusion of provisions in the interim constitution, “such as the unrestricted authority of the government to grant pardons suggest that interim arrangements may enable the political elite to sweep past misdeeds under the carpet” (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2008b, p. 10). Some media outlets accused Maoist chairman Prachanda in particular of “promoting corruption, nepotism and lack of transparency in financial matters,” and of using his control and influence over political institutions and processes to protect corrupt elements within his party (Indian Express,
2010). Several interview partners – and many Nepalis in private conversations – voiced their perception that as soon as Maoist senior leaders joined the interim government, they underwent a “remarkable change in ... lifestyle” opposed to what they had preached during the war (Dahal, 2008, p. 28).62 Instead, it resembled the lifestyle of those politicians the Maoists had fought against (Adhikari and Gautam, 2014). They were said to use the interim government to prioritize their individual economic benefits over society’s growth, much in the tradition of the Nepalese state as “the overriding mechanism of accumulation and vehicle for private enrichment” (Pfaff-Czarnecka, 2005, p. 164).

For instance, a civil society leader pointed out that as soon as the Maoist leaders moved into the capital and joined the political institutions, “the prices of real estate in Kathmandu went so high, and [sixty per cent of] the buyers ... were Maoists” (INT-27, 19.10.2015). Similarly, an international development worker remembered how Nepalis liked “to point out the residences of the [Maoist] leadership,” in particular of Baburam Bhattarai (INT-02, 23.09.2015); and a former NC minister equally remembered that Nepalis saw how the Maoist leaders became “the richest people” heading “the richest party within one year” after signing the CPA (INT-23, 12.10.2015). This public perception is not least reflected in cartoons published in late 2006 in the Kantipur newspaper that depict NC leader Koirala and Maoist chairman Prachanda in large government vehicles they were reported to misuse (see United We Blog, 2006). All in all, the acquisition of economic benefits through joining the power-sharing government not least meant that even though the Maoists were growing weaker in the post-interim period, they were doing so while the leadership was in an economically extremely comfortable position. For instance, in 2012 – the year that the CPN (M) split up into two factions, and the year before the party was badly defeated in the elections to a second CA – Prachanda came under fire and “compounded the resentment of some of his comrades” for acquiring a luxury mansion and seemingly adopting “the lifestyle of the billionaire royals he once loathed” (Nelson, 2012).63

Having said that, there is also evidence that the causal mechanism linking power-sharing interim government to post-interim peace through economic security includes a further intermediate step for Nepal. My interviews indicate that while receiving economic benefits reduced uncertainty for elites; this was directly linked to another sub-mechanism that raised the costs of defection for Maoist elites by changing intra-party elite-combatant dynamics. As the above-quoted statement of “comrade resentment” towards Prachanda’s post-war

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62To which Prachanda responded: “We’re in multiparty politics now, not in the jungles... We must understand that the notion of equality is relative even within Marxism. If the leadership has a horse to ride, all cadres can’t expect to have that” (Dahal, 2008, p. 28).

63The question is, would the CPN (M) have received economic benefits had it not joined the interim government? This is unlikely, not least because unlike UNITA (cf. Chapter 7), the CPN (M) formally abolished its parallel government upon joining the interim government and was unable to continue its main sources of funding during the interim period, meaning it became dependent on extracting wealth from state institutions (cf. section 6.2.3).
lifestyle indicated, this means that while joining the power-sharing interim government increased the economic security of CPN (M) leaders, receiving these benefits tied these leaders’ hands to peaceful behavior also because it alienated them from combatants. In other words, combatants noticed that they had “lost everything on a personal level,” but what they had fought for was not practiced in Kathmandu (INT-16, 05.10.2015). As the former RPP minister Pashupati Shumsher Rana phrased it, “Comrade Prachanda has a war chest of more than a billion rupees … It’s just too bad for the rest of his supporters. The whole problem with the Maoist party is that within it are the haves and the have nots. The differences between them are quite remarkable” (in Nelson, 2012). Observing the behavior of their political leaders in the interim government who they perceived as enriching themselves while failing to address the needs of ex-combatants – some even argue that CPN (M) leaders tried to intentionally keep an unsatisfied and potentially violent group of ex-combatants in cantonment sites as a bargain for further negotiations (Bleie and Shrestha, 2012) – ex-combatants became increasingly frustrated and disillusioned with their leadership. As Adhikari and Gautam (2014, p. 80) note, Maoist leaders were accused if stealing “state resources meant for the upkeep of combatants for several years” which led to a “sense of betrayal among former fighters.”

For instance, one international development worker remembered that ex-combatants quickly became “disillusioned” with or felt “betrayed by Prachanda, Bhattarai, and the leadership,” as they had been made promises by their political leaders in order to recruit them for the PLA, which yet did not materialize (INT-02, 22.09.2015, cf. similar statements by INT-16, 05.10.2015; INT-07, 25.09.2015; INT-16, 05.10.2015; INT-22, 10.10.2015; or INT-26, 19.10.2015). Another development worker also established a link between ex-combatant disillusionment and corruption among the CPN (M) interim representatives and argued that intra-party mistrust and frustration started as soon as the Maoists assumed positions in the interim government and became perceived as corrupt as other politicians had been as before them (INT-03, 23.09.2015). And a third development worker described how this process of intra-party splits between combatants and the leadership particularly materialized in late 2007, when radios and computers had been installed in the cantonment sites so that cantoned combatants were able to more intensely follow politics of the interim government in Kathmandu, and were able to see how their leadership pursued its own agenda but did not advocate for the ex-combatants (INT-30, 12.11.2015, cf. a similar statement by INT-27, 19.10.2015). As Prachanda’s former chauffeur phrased it: “The ideals that we have fought for have all been wasted... This is not the communist spirit. This is why I decided to disassociate from Prachanda” (in Nepali Times, 2012). With respect to this discussion, the mechanism linking power-sharing interim government and post-interim peace through economic benefits may be modified for Nepal to depict the extra step of raising the costs of defection (cf. Figure 6.3). The mechanism thereby illustrates the limitations
Figure 6.3: Updated Causal Mechanism: Economic Security

- **Power-Sharing Interim Gov.**
  - Increases the stability of
  - Reduces uncertainty

- **Post-Interim Peace**
  - Ties hands

**Economic Benefits** (Elite Level)

**Disillusionment** (Combatant Level)

of bargaining theory, as its modeling of unitary actors does not normally assume such intra-party dynamics.

**Decreasing Uncertainty through Political Security**

In Chapter 3, I proposed that a final mechanism for why power-sharing interim government is most efficient in increasing the stability of post-interim peace is that power-sharing reduces future uncertainty through increasing the *political security* of warring parties (cf. Figure 3.3). Power-sharing (1) grants weaker-growing parties a voice in the design on post-interim institutions (for instance through jointly passed laws that are difficult to achieve, costly to violate, and hard to renge on), which decreases their uncertainty about an adversary’s future behavior. It also (2) gives weaker-growing parties the knowledge on how to manipulate future institutions to their advantage (Manning, 2007).

Nepal confirms to this causal pattern. Joining the power-sharing interim government awarded the CPN (M) with a position to directly influence future laws by which it could negotiate the design of the post-interim state in a way that reduced its fears of political marginalization. This can best be illustrated by using the example of the implementation process of a new electoral law. After the CPN (M) had joined the interim government in April 2007, increased polarization between the former belligerents meant that the party announced its resignation from the interim institutions already on 18 September 2007 in protest over not seeing two of its central demands met. Firstly, the CPN (M) demanded an amendment to the Interim Constitution of 2063 (2007) that would immediately call for an end of the monarchy. Secondly, it asked for a constitutional amendment that would alter the proposed mixed electoral system so that proportional elements would be strengthened at the costs of FPTP elements (Bhandari, 2007). This move was purely based on worries of the CPN (M) leadership regarding their political security in the post-interim period: “The Maoists became concerned about their chances at the polls” after several opinion surveys had placed them behind both the NC and the CPN-UML, and “issued 22 pre-conditions for their participation in the CA elections, including the immediate
declaration of a republic and a shift to a fully proportional electoral system” – under which they expected to do better (Freedom House, 2008). Both the NC and the CPN-UML, however, preferred the mixed electoral system. A former NC minister remembered,

“We did not want this proportional system by which no party will gain majority ... [We] thought that we can give [seat] reservations to women and backward groups, ... but [that] at the same time, one party can form a majority government ... It was [the Maoists’] insistence that we retain this [electoral law], probably because ... they thought through proportional rule they will get more seats, so they insisted on a higher number of [seats elected by a] proportional system” (INT-23, 12.10.2015).

On 26 September 2007, NC and CPN-UML partly gave in to the Maoists’ demands and the parties resumed negotiations on reaching an agreement on the pending issues. On 23 December 2007, they struck a 23 Point Agreement for the Maoists to reenter the power-sharing interim government. This agreement changed the text of the Interim Constitution considerably and in many ways according to the demands of the Maoists, for instance because it increased the number of CA members from 497 to 601, of which 335 members would be elected through proportional representation, 240 through a FPTP system, and 26 would be nominated (United Nations Mission in Nepal, 2007). In addition, the Interim Constitution was amended to read that Nepal should be a federal republic that would be declared at the first meeting of the elected CA. Consequently, the CPN (M) reentered the interim government on 30 December 2007, being given two further minister portfolios in the expanded cabinet and occupying seven posts out of a total 30 (AFP, 2008b; Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), 2007). CPN (M) Central Committee member “Badal” later admitted that this process was central to the party’s decision to stick with the peaceful electoral process: “Although our demand to adopt a full proportional representation system for CA elections was not adopted, the number of seats to be allocated through proportional representation increased ... We thought this was a gain for the people” (in Ogura, 2008, p. 44). In sum, the power-sharing interim

64In specific, paragraph 63.3 of the Interim Constitution was amended from reading: “The Constituent Assembly shall consist of ... four hundred twenty five members, out of which four hundred and nine members shall be elected through Mixed Electoral System and sixteen members shall be nominated ... (a) Two hundred and five members shall be elected from among the candidates elected on the basis of First-Past-the-Post system ... (b) Two hundred and four members shall be elected under the proportional electoral system ... considering the whole country as one ... constituency. (c) Sixteen members to be nominated by the interim Council of Ministers ... from amongst the prominent persons of national life,” to: “(a) One member elected, under the first-past-the-post system, from each geographical constituency, two hundred and forty ... based on the national census preceding the Constituent Assembly elections ... (b) Three hundred and thirty-five members to be elected according to the proportional representation system ... treating the whole country as a single constituency. (c) Twenty-six members nominated by the Council of Ministers ... from among distinguished persons and persons from among ethnic and indigenous groups” (Government of Nepal, 2007).
government thus awarded the CPN (M) the opportunity to manipulate the rules of the political game to its advantage, and positively influenced its decision to stick to peace in the long run.

**Power-Sharing Interim Government and Costs of Defection**

While I only argued for the link between power-sharing interim government and peace through the mechanism of *decreasing future uncertainty* in Chapter 3, Nepal also offers evidence for a mechanism that links power-sharing to peace through raised *costs of defection*. In Nepal, power-sharing raised the costs of defection for the one party in the bargaining situation that remained outside of power during and after the interim period: the royal palace. The palace had become substantively sidelined during the interim period. Already in July 2006, King Gyanendra was forced to take an oath of allegiance to the reinstated national parliament. In September that same year, the parliament passed a law to tighten civilian control over the armed forces and change its name from RNA to NA. In December, Gyanendra was “forced to pay customs tax to collect shipped goods at the airport in a first for the embattled royal family” (MacRae, 2008).

In January 2007, Gyanendra’s head was removed from Nepal’s banknotes, and in August, the interim government nationalized his palaces. The NA, meanwhile – long loyal to the king – was said to be “looking at the government with resentment” while the government was “looking at security forces with suspicion” (in Sengupta, 2006c). A NA major reflects on the mood within in the NA that time: “Sometimes I think that we were one of the losers [of the peace process], because we were fighting for the king ... Our party was very loyal to the king. We could not save the king. That [was] good for the country perhaps, but for us at the time, [it was] very painful” (INT-09, 27.09.2015).

From a bargaining perspective, the fact that the sidelined king and his army “surrendered” (Bell, 2008) and did not stage another royal coup against the newly formed and institutionally unconsolidated interim government presents a puzzle, particularly as Gyanendra was increasingly “humiliated” in the peace process (AFP, 2008a). Why did he not violently prevent his ousting from power? Two factors emerge as an explanation for the lack of royal violence that had been so common in the previous decades of Nepalese politics, and both relate to the palace’s increasing costs of defection. Firstly, public opinion of Gyanendra was expressively resentful not least due to popular conspiracy theories about his involvement in the 2001 Royal Massacre and the death of his brother Birendra (cf. above; INT-02, 23.09.2015; INT-06, 25.09.2015; INT-09, 27.09.2015; INT-19, 09.10.2015; Ogura, 2008). Observing the deteriorating public opinion of the monarch, the NA decided that it was rational not to take his side. As a former CPN-UML minister remembers, while the “armed forces were very much controlled by the royal palace [throughout history], ... the institution of the monarchy had become so unpopular, particularly after the Royal Massacre,” that the NA decided not to intervene (INT-25, 19.10.2015).
Secondly, also the installation of a power-sharing interim government increased the palace’s costs of defection and ultimately forced it to accept its new position in the political system. This is because the broad coalition of the parties and the Maoists contributed to the general perception that the country was resolutely united against the royal palace. A former PLA deputy commander points out that now that all parties “were in a common agreement and ... on the people’s side, the NA and the monarchy ... were the representatives of some minor ... feudal class. So if there had been a military coup, it wouldn’t have been successful” (INT-08, 26.09.2015, cf. INT-14, 30.09.2015 and INT-18, 06.10.2015). A NA major general agrees with this perspective, noting that there was a strong majority in the interim government and the subsequent CA to abolish the monarchy, so it was “not up to us [the NA] to do anything. We could perhaps have staged a coup ... and resorted to undemocratic means, but it was not possible for us to bring back the monarchy. So we said okay, sorry, this is the decision of the people of Nepal, and we are the army of the people, so we have to accept this decision” (INT-09, 27.09.2015).

6.2.2 International Interim Government

My second hypothesis held that international interim government, as opposed to interim government without the involvement of external actors, increases the stability of peace. I defined international interim rule as one in which members of the international community assume political authority. I outlined that past research has often looked at such interim government in a strict interpretation following Doyle (2002), but that I prefer a more lenient perspective because most present interim governments see vast degrees of international influence in decision-making – even if this influence is not formalized in administrative structures. In Chapter 3, I then held that in the presence of commitment problems, international interim rule increases the stability of peace by raising costs of defection through two mechanisms (cf. Figure 3.3). Firstly, international interim government increases costs of defection through physical deterrence, because international actors can protect buffer zones during demobilization periods or raise the costs of combat for parties that no longer only have to fight each other but also international peacekeepers. Secondly, such interim government comes with policy influence, meaning that every policy field advanced by an international officer decreases a stronger party’s opportunity to marginalize a weaker one, thus mitigating the weaker party’s commitment problem and decreasing its likelihood to resort to war. Concurrently, in cases where international actors do not take on interim authority, commitment problems should be exacerbated for weaker-growing parties.

Following either a lenient or a strict understanding of the concept, Nepal did not see any form of international interim government. The warring parties agreed in Paragraph 9 (“Implementation and Monitoring”) of the CPA to “the monitoring of the management of arms and the armies by the United Nations...
Mission in Nepal” (Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2006) and to have the UN observe the CA elections. But UNMIN was established in UN Security Council Resolution 1740 not a peacekeeping mission under the authority of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), but as a smaller political mission under the authority and management of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA) (United Nations, 2007b).65 By 31 October 2007, UNMIN’s strength of staff comprised 153 military observers, 222 international civilian staff, 179 local civilian staff, and 200 UN volunteers, making it lack both the mandate and the resources to assume a authority in Nepal’s interim period (Center on International Cooperation, 2008).

This lack of international authority in Nepal’s interim government has two reasons. The first reason is of regional nature, as Nepal’s southern neighbor and regional power India “had only reluctantly come to accept the need for any UN role, and ... certainly did not want to see a UN peacekeeping force in a neighboring country with which it has an open border” (Martin, 2010, p. 9).66 The second reason for UNMIN’s weak mandate is of domestic nature, as also Nepal’s warring parties were not in favor of a deeper role for the UN during the interim period (Center on International Cooperation, 2010). They argued that Nepal’s state structure had not completely collapsed during the People’s War, and believed that they consequently had enough local capacity to manage a transition to peace (INT-24, 13.10.2015; INT-25, 19.10.201; INT-27, 19.10.2015; cf. International Crisis Group, 2008; Sisk, 2014). This perception was particularly fueled by leading voices in the NA that had long been one of the main troop contributors to UN peacekeeping missions worldwide, and that was convinced to have enough expertise to guide Nepal’s peace process. A former major general of the NA remembered how “it was very hard for us [the NA] to accept that peacekeepers from other countries would be coming here, it was very humiliating ... What we accepted was that they would not come in uniform,” or with a mandate to override local decisions (INT-09, 27.09.2015).

Local Ownership as an Alternative Mechanism

Consequently, the international interim government variable does not correlate with the outcome in the theorized way in Nepal, and both proposed sub-mechanism on physical deterrence and policy influence do not hold – instead, there is evidence that the lack of physical deterrence and of policy influence mitigated commitment problems. In other words, a more intrusive international role during the interim period would likely have had a much more detrimental effect on political developments in Nepal; and it was rather substantive local ownership of interim rule as an alternative causal mechanism that added to

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65UNMIN’s mandate was originally set for a period of 12 month but extended by Resolutions 1796 (2008), 1825 (2008), 1864 (2009), 1879 (2009), 1909 (2010), 1921 (2010), and 1939 (2010). UNMIN ceased its operations on 15 January 2011.

peace in the long run, both on the elite as well as on the combatant level (cf. Dahal and Bhatta, 2008).

Firstly, and on the elite level, Suhrke (2011, pp. 17, 39) argues in her rare analysis of the UN’s role in Nepal that the notion that Nepalis should locally own the peace process “was established early and became the centerpiece in the political culture that surrounded the peace talks,” and that “a more prominent international role would likely have been counterproductive by courting ... nationalist reactions” among elites in the interim government (cf. Sisk, 2014). This means that increased international authority would have negatively influenced the mitigation of commitment problems for Nepal’s former belligerents, if the fueling of nationalist rhetoric and policies – particularly the CPN (M) had in the past often formulated their agenda in a “strongly nationalist frame” (International Crisis Group, 2005, p. 5) – had prohibited the cooperation between the parties in the power-sharing institutions. Instead, Nepal’s political elites were not only able to take “justifiable pride in the fact that their peace process was their own, and not imposed or mediated by any external actor” (Martin, 2010, p. 10) – one interview partner stressed that Nepal’s peace process was completed “with Nepali experience and Nepali knowledge” (INT-05, 24.09.2015) – but such local ownership also helped the cooperation in the interim government. For instance, a former NC minister recalled that the inclusion of CPN (M) leaders in the interim government made all “problems” of the peace process to become the Maoists’ problems as well, thus adding to their sense of ownership of the interim period (INT-23, 12.10.2015). And Prachanda stated on the 23 Point Agreement compromise that the parties arrived at in December 2007 (cf. above): “If CA elections had not been held because we stuck to our demands, we [Maoists] would have been blamed for the failure of the peace process. We did not want that to happen” (in Ogura, 2008, p. 44).

Secondly, and on the combatant level, evidence suggests that stronger international authority could also have obstructed the disarmament process in Nepal, because the process of international peacekeepers forcefully retrieving combatants of their arms would likely have been perceived by the latter as “emasculating” (INT-29, 03.11.2015, cf. Spear, 2002). Many interview partners in that regard pointed out that while UNMIN would not have been in a position to stop the Maoists had the rebels decided to remobilize for war, this was precisely the idea of the peace process (cf. INT-09, 27.09.2015; INT-19, 09.10.2015; INT-23, 12.10.2015; INT-24, 13.10.2015; INT-27, 19.10.2015; INT-29, 03.11.2015). For instance, a major general of the NA remembered that ex-combatants could always have opened the weapons storage containers had they wanted to, not least because “UNMIN monitors were very small in number, and they were not armed at all” (INT-09, 27.09.2015). Some also argued that UNMIN presence was thus only meant to offer “psychological support” instead of actual physical deterrence (INT-23, 12.10.2015 and Bleie and Shrestha, 2012). As an UNDP program director phrases it: “I think they [UNMIN] would not have been [able
to stop the Maoists] if there would have been a real political decision to go back [to war]. But I think that was not the idea: ... UNMIN’s presence was ... [symbolical]” (INT-24, 13.10.2015). This symbolical role meant that ex-combatants voluntarily deposited their weapons, and kept the option to take their weapons and leave the cantonment sites should the peace process fail – which turned disarmament into a “personal sacrifice” for peace (cf. section 6.2.3, INT-29, 03.11.2015, INT-30, 12.11.2015). In sum, this discussion highlights the vital role of local ownership during interim governance that has often been brought forward by the critical peacebuilding literature on international interim government as reviewed in Chapter 2 (e.g. Chopra, 2000; Donais, 2009; Narten, 2008; Narten, 2009). The UNMIN success also provides an argument for the merit of smaller “designer peace missions” that more flexibly adapt to local contexts than extensive peacekeeping missions that tend to be heavily criticized for their “one fits all” approach to peacebuilding (cf. Martin, 2010; Narten, 2008).

6.2.3 Integration of Parallel Institutions

My third hypothesis in Chapter 3 reasoned that in the presence of commitment problems, more advanced processes of integrating the parallel political and military institutions of warring parties into the authority of an interim government come with a higher stability of peace because of raised costs of defection. In order to sustain in war, parties need parallel military and political institutions to accumulate means and resources for fighting and to manage their relation with the population. As long as these parallel institutions persist throughout an interim period, parties retain the financial resources, popular legitimacy, hierarchical command structures, and war-time mindsets to remobilize in the post-interim period. Interim governments that integrate these parallel institutions should consequently increase the stability of peace (cf. Figure 3.3).

Parallel Political Institutions

During the People’s War, the CPN (M) developed an extensive set of parallel political structures in the areas under its control. As I outlined in section 6.1, these parallel structures included the People’s Governments as well as the People’s Courts, the Maoists’ parallel judiciary system. These political structures were used by the CPN (M) both for acquiring financial resources, as well as for increasing their popular legitimacy. The party decreased its costs of war through these structures inter alia through parallel taxation – for instance by collecting “protection money” from the salaries of government schoolteachers.

67There is also evidence that local ownership was a beneficial aspect in the interim government because the warring parties did not perceive the UN as a “truly neutral authority” (Gisselquist, 2002), but thought that it was leaning towards the CPN (M) (cf. INT-08, 26.09.2015; INT-12, 29.09.2015; INT-19, 09.10.2015, and Center on International Cooperation, 2010). This would have impeded any international authority’s role in mitigating commitment problems through policy influence, an aspect that I further discuss in Chapter 9.
– and through non-monetary taxation – such as seasonal donations of parts of the harvest from farmers (Whelpton, 2005). Forced conscription was another mechanism to service this purpose, and the CPN (M) sent letters to families demanding a son or daughter for the movement, threatening violence for non-compliance (Lohani-Chase, 2008). Political education and the indoctrination of the population living in the controlled territories were further functions the People’s Governments served, and “this was done with various forms of propaganda such as mass meetings, cultural campaigns, posterizing and walling, pamphlets, newspaper articles, and holding political classes” (Eck, 2010, p. 39). Controlling territory also allowed the Maoists to set up illegal arms trafficking routes over the Nepali-Indian border (Karp, 2013).

But while the CPN (M) often built its parallel political structures on fear, threat, and coercion, these structures also helped the party to increase its legitimacy among the rural population, such as by delivering public goods and a cheap judicial system, or because violence against local elites immensely increased their support among poor peasants (Lawoti, 2010). For instance, a female ex-commander of the PLA remembered that after installing the People’s Courts, justice provision in the villages became much faster and more accessible for women in particular, and that cases of sexual violence were often solved “immediately” by the Maoist court system so that women did not have to take up the long way to the district court (INT-10, 28.09.2015; cf. INT-15, 04.10.2015; INT-19, 09.10.2015; Pettigrew and Shneiderman, 2004). Furthermore, another “strategy of the Maoists to assert their legitimacy as a political and administrative power in the villages” was to make local NGOs acknowledge their political authority by registering with the People’s Government and donating a yudda kar (war tax) to the parallel structures (Lohani-Chase, 2008, p. 122). As it signed the CPA in November 2006, the CPN (M) thus administered significant parts of Nepal’s territory, as is illustrated in Figure 6.4 that plots all districts in which People’s Governments had been erected in dark gray.

In the CPA, the Maoists agreed to reintegrate all territory into the control of the state and dissolve all parallel political structures upon joining the interim government. In specific, in Paragraph 10.1 of the accord “both sides agree not to run any structure, including those parallel to the government, in any areas of government or state apparatus.” In Paragraph 5.2.1 the parties furthermore compromise that “[forced] and unlawful collection of donations in cash or kind and illegal collection of tax shall not be allowed” (Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2006). On 18 January 2007, Maoist leader Prachanda issued a statement that “[as] per the agreement reached with the government, our party declares that the people’s governments and people’s courts run by our party in the past have been dissolved from today ... The interim government will run all local-level governments in the future” (in AFP, 2007a). Overall, the CPN (M) formally followed through with its commitment, and all interview partners – regardless of party affiliation, and also from civil society and
the international community – agreed that Prachanda’s statement was sincere, and that at the end of the interim government, parallel government structures were largely disbanded (cf. also UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2007). Human Rights Watch (2008, p. 294) also reported that throughout 2007, the People’s Courts “and other parallel government structures have been mostly dismantled.” Having said that, particularly in the early days of the interim period frequent reports on cheating the integration process by local Maoist cadres persisted. This evidence particularly contributes to the lack of confirmation on the mechanism of popular legitimacy (cf. below and International Crisis Group, 2009).


69 For instance, in December 2006, the Maoists were still “reported taxing peasant farmers and businessmen as they [jockeyed] to bolster their position in the new unity government … and to hedge their bets in case they feel a need to resume to the war” (Rosenberg, 2006). In January 2007, Maoist cadres reportedly prohibited the government from reestablishing a presence in some rural districts: “Only 904 of 1,271 police posts damaged during the insurgency have been restored, despite the government’s [January] 14 completion date. Local Maoists have blocked work on the remaining posts” (Logan, 2007). Around the same time, concerns arose that the CPN (M) had revived its Young Communist League (YCL), a youth organization that was engaging in “quasi-policing activities” as a type “parallel security mechanism” (United Nations, 2007a, p. 3) – although it is difficult to assess the YCL’s true influence – Skar (2008), for instance, locates them somewhere in between “Boy Scouts and Paramilitary Storm Troops.”
Affecting Financial Means  I held that a first mechanism for why interim
governments that integrate the parallel political institutions of warring parties
increase the stability of peace vis-à-vis all other interim governments is that
the former raise costs of defection by limiting the financial resources parties
need to remobilize (cf. Figure 3.3). In contrast, and when facing commitment
problems caused by uncertainty of a stronger-growing party’s future behavior,
the continued existence of parallel political institutions allows a weaker-growing
party to retreat to its zones of territorial control and regroup for war. It also
enables the party to use parallel structures to acquire the financial means to
buy new weaponry through parallel taxation or natural resource extraction.

There is weak evidence that Nepal confirms to this causal mechanism. De-
spite early reports of cheating, the Maoists lost – or at least significantly reduced
– what constituted their main sources of monetary and non-monetary funding
during the People’s War when they abolished their parallel political structures
and joined the institutions of the interim government in Kathmandu. These
sources of funding during the war particularly included the parallel taxation of
teachers or farmers (reports on the extent of this yadda kar vary from constit-
tuting between five and 25 per cent of individual incomes), forced labor as well
as forced donations of food or accommodation to combatants, bank robberies
(particularly in the early days of the People’s War), extortion, as well as comp-
lusory contributions by tourists and trekkers in the Himalaya (International
Crisis Group, 2005). International fundraisers among Maoist networks in India
and Europe, the control over and extraction of natural resources (such as herbs
and timber), as well as the production and trade of drugs (such as cannabis)
constituted an additional source of income during the war – although not to
the same extent as it did in Angola or Cambodia (cf. Chapter 7 and 8) – that
the CPN (M) gave up during the interim period (US Bureau for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2005). While some reports on parallel
taxation and extortion – particularly in the Tarai – persisted throughout the
interim period, it was often unclear who was responsible for this violation of the
peace agreement or how closely violators were connected to the Maoist move-
ment or answered to the Maoist leadership. UNMIN loosely referred to such
instances as “extortion carried out by armed groups” when reporting on this
issue (United Nations, 2008, p. 8).

Having said that, while the integration of parallel political institutions thus
limited the CPN (M)’s ability for monetary gain through such structures, this
integration did not immediately increase the party’s costs of defection to an ex-
tent that made it unable to remobilize for war had it wanted to do so. This was
also because the CPN (M) had been described at the end of the war as “Nepal’s
richest political party” (International Crisis Group, 2005, p. 17). Rather, there
is some indication that formally abandoning its parallel political structures –
even if cheating was part of this process – meant that CPN (M) leaders were
gradually, throughout the interim period and beyond, becoming increasingly
dependent on extracting additional personal wealth through their control over state institutions, as was part of the general political culture (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2008b; Pfaff-Czarnecka, 2005). This increased their utility of the outcome \( P_R, P_G \). In other words, these leaders thus benefited from sticking to peaceful cooperation in the interim government, being set “on a path of dependency where politics trumped military power” (Suhrke, 2011, p. 46). As Hisila Yami, wife of Baburam Bhattarai, stated in 2013, “[people] gave us money earlier out of fear, but they don’t do that now,” and after the Maoists had given up bank robbery and extortion, money was “harder to come by” (in Harris, 2013). Also therefore, the reintegration of parallel institution has been named “the one major concession” by the Maoists (Sengupta, 2006a); and one of the factors by which the Maoists “repeatedly tried to convey their commitment to the public that they would remain in the peace process” (Ogura, 2008, p. 45).

**Affecting Levels of Popular Support** In Chapter 3, I held that a second mechanism for why interim governments that integrate the parallel political institutions of warring parties come with more stable peace is that such governments increase costs of defection by affecting the **levels of popular support** parties need to remobilize (cf. Figure 3.3). In order to raise their expected capability to prevail in war, parties need to maintain support from the civilian population (for instance, because voluntary conscription is cheaper than forced conscription), which they can acquire by providing public services through parallel administration. As long as parties can prove that they deliver public services more effectively than an interim government, they also keep significant legitimacy which reduces their costs of remobilizing for war.

Nepal does not confirm to this causal mechanism. Although there is evidence that levels of popular support for the Maoists were diminishing during the interim period, this evidence is unrelated to the reintegration of parallel governance structures. Several observers have argued that the CPN (M)’s popular legitimacy was fading after it joined the interim government. This was not least reflected by the party’s fear that it would not do well in the 2008 elections (cf. section 6.2.1). For instance, the International Crisis Group (2005, p. 16) reported that the “Maoists’ early gains in public image and sympathy have not been sustained ... [but have] significantly eroded” due to vastly increasing levels of brutality – also against civilians – in the final years of the People’s War (cf. Tamang, 2012). Others have argued that the “Maoist leadership faced challenges about maintaining their revolutionary image” after joining the interim government (Ogura, 2008, p. 42). However, while both points contributed to the CPN (M)’s raised costs of defection, both are unrelated to the process of disbanding parallel government structures. Rather, both points connect to (1) increasingly hostile behavior towards civilians at the end of the People’s War (which was also threatening UNITA’s legitimacy during the interim period, cf. Chapter 7), as well as to (2) the corruption and personal enrichment displayed
by CPN (M) leaders in the interim government.

In addition, even though the CPN (M) formally abandoned its parallel structures, the interim government (and state institutions in the post-interim period) did not extend its reach throughout national territory and re-assume those government functions and public services that had been provided by the Maoists during the war (INT-04, 23.09.2015; The Asia Foundation, 2007; The Carter Center, 2008). In early 2008, observers reported for instance that “little effort has gone into making sure the state bodies meant to perform [judicial or policing] functions can regain public trust” (International Crisis Group, 2008, p. 22).

Moreover, those individuals who were running parallel government institutions during the war were still living among the local populations during the interim period and did not automatically lose credibility or the ability to threaten and extort villagers (INT-01, 22.09.2015; INT-02, 23.09.2015; INT-27, 19.10.2015). This situation represented at least part of an explanation for why the Maoists were able to win the 2008 CA elections. As a civil society leader recalled:

“In 2006, when the Maoists entered the peace process, it was wishful for everyone to think that things change all of a sudden and overnight … [But the] Maoists were still strong in the villages. Of course they gave up their arms, they dissolved the People’s Governments and the People’s Courts, but they were still strong compared to … the other political parties [that] could not do anything in these villages for ten years, so it would take time to build their strength … in the villages” (INT-20, 09.10.2015).

Parallel Military Institutions

In addition to integrating parallel political structures into the authority of the interim government, the CPN (M) also agreed in the CPA to disarm before the elections. The design of the DDR process was up for much controversy in Nepal in the lead up to the CPA, highlighting particularly the Maoists’ commitment problems to disarm as long as the NA would not do the same. For instance, Prachanda had declared in March 2006 that he perceived unilateral CPN (M) disarmament as suicidal: “If anybody is thinking of disarming the Maoists while keeping the ‘royal’ army as it is, then they are having a suicidal dream” (in BBC, 2006). Observers thereby remarked that Prachanda’s comment was hinting “at a deeper concern: Less than a month after helping to dislodge King Gyanendra’s royal government, the Maoists … are worried about being … sidelined in the new political landscape” (Sengupta, 2006b). The governing parties yet formulated the disarmament of combatants as a core condition before they would agree to let the CPN (M) join an interim government. Prime Minister Koirala in particular categorically ruled out any “Maoist participation in an interim government without them first laying down their arms” (in Pradhan, 2006b). He also declared that the Maoists “cannot be given the status of a political
party ... until they give up weapons” (in Pradhan, 2006a).

The bargain that the parties then struck in the CPA clearly displayed an intent to mitigate commitment problems through the design of the DDR process, with regard to three factors (cf. Subedi, 2015). Firstly, both the CPN (M) and the NA agreed to move into “temporary cantonments” (Maoists) or back into the barracks (NA), and to securely store and lock “with a single padlock” all of their arms and ammunition (Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2006). Secondly, both parties furthermore agreed to do so under UNMIN supervision, as a form of (symbolical) third-party security guarantee (cf. above, and Suhrke, 2011; Walter, 2002). And thirdly, both parties agreed on a double-key system by which one PLA or NA commanders kept a key to the weapons storage containers that were monitored by UNMIN, while the other key to each respective container was placed with the UN.70

As with the implementation process of integrating the CPN (M)’s parallel political institutions, there were also reports on party cadres cheating the implementation of the DDR process, such as through late recruitment, or the registration of primitive weapons instead of modern guns (AFP, 2007e; Bleie and Shrestha, 2012; Rosenberg, 2006). But by and large, the CPN (M) kept its commitment as negotiated in the CPA, and thus the general agreement today is that (particularly in comparison to other countries), the DDR process belongs to one of the key successes of the Nepalese peace process: “Bringing the ex-combatants into cantonments [in the first place] ... helped the [CPN (M)] to strategically demonstrate its commitment to the peace process” (Subedi, 2015, p. 154), and from today’s perspective, ex-combatants “have integrated as much as they could into the communities they started living [in]” (INT-02, 23.09.2015, cf. INT-05, 24.09.2015; INT-23, 12.10.2015; and INT-26, 19.10.2015).

The Maoist combatants began moving into the designated seven main cantonment sites and 21 satellite camps in November 2006. Similar to the situation in Angola or Cambodia (cf. Chapter 7 and 8), they faced extremely harsh living conditions in the beginning, because the interim government was slow in providing for warm water, electricity, showers, latrines, or any basic housing infrastructure (Taylor, 2006). One international development worker remembers that this was also because decision-makers initially thought that the DDR process would only take few weeks or months, “so there wasn’t any effort to work

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70The technical details were laid out in the AMAA that regulated how weapons and ammunition storage areas were to be secured inside the cantonment areas, and that displayed vast differences of the Nepalese DDR process as compared to the one in Angola. For instance, the AMAA regulated that (1) a solid fence with gate and lock was to surround the weapon storage area, which itself included (2) “storage containers painted white and furnished with shelves for safe weapons storage and easy control, and with a complete inventory,” (3) a “single lock provided by the UN” to secure each storage container, (4) a key “held by the designated main cantonment site commander,” (5) a “24-hour surveillance camera provided by the UN”, (6) floodlights that “will be switched on automatically during hours of darkness,” and (7) an “alarm system provided by the UN” and connected to sirens in the UN office that was to be activated “if the container door is opened without a safe button having been switched off in connection with regular inspections” (Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2006).
on the infrastructure or on activities for the combatants” (INT-02, 23.09.2015, cf. INT-21, 10.10.2015, cf. INT-29, 03.11.2015; INT-30, 12.11.2015). Such initiatives would only start in mid-2007 after a then-GTZ project was set up in the camps to improve infrastructure, health services, and vocational training for combatants (cf. below, Bleie and Shrestha, 2012; Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, 2013). Combatants began disarming and handing over their arms for UN inspection, recording, and storing in January 2007 (Shrestha, 2007). On 18 February 2007, UNMIN confirmed that all ex-combatants were disarmed and registered, and deputy commander “Pasang” reassured that the “verification of 32,000 PLA soldiers has been completed” (AFP, 2007d). As is noted in the Peace Accord Matrix (Joshi and Darby, 2013), even though 96 weapons were retained outside the cantonment sites to provide for the security of Maoist leaders (cf. section 6.2.1), this development “is recognized as the complete implementation of the CPA.”

While the disarmament process thus moved on relatively swiftly, this was not the case for the demobilization of ex-combatants, also because the CPA did not specify a time frame by which the CPN (M) was required to demobilize. After completing the cantonment, registration, and disarmament of ex-combatants in early 2007 – around the time that the interim government convened in Kathmandu – UNMIN and the warring parties began to verify those registered ex-combatants that were meant to be immediately demobilized and discharged, for instance because they were deemed disqualified for reintegration. This affected, for instance, ex-combatants who were under the age of 18 at the start of the peace process (Bleie and Shrestha, 2012; Subedi, 2015). However, due to various political deadlocks in the interim government, uncertainties about the fate of discharged ex-combatants, as well as diverging interests about what combatants could actually be deemed “disqualified,” the demobilization and discharge of ex-combatants began as late as 2009. It was only completed in 2013, when the last cantonment sites closed and 1,352 ex-combatants officially joined the NA, while all others entered civilian lives (Martin Chautari, 2013). Thus, by the time of the elections terminating the interim government, the Maoist combatants had disarmed, but not demobilized, and thus the integration of parallel military institutions was only partially achieved. As I show below, this did yet not reinforce credible commitment problems when the CPN (M) found itself in a weaker-growing position, due to several reasons.

**Affecting Military Infrastructures** I held that a first mechanism for why interim governments that integrate the parallel military institutions through disarmament and demobilization processes increase the stability of peace is that such governments destroy the *military infrastructure* necessary for remobilization. The integration process, firstly, retrieves parties of their means to prevail in combat by collecting and destroying weapon stocks. Secondly, it weakens hierarchical command structures between rank-and-file soldiers and commanders
within armed organizations, thus increasing the costs of leaders to remobilize for war (cf. Figure 3.3). In contrast, following interim governments that fail to disarm and demobilize warring parties before the end of their rule, violence in the post-interim period becomes more likely.

Nepal does not confirm to this causal pattern, because neither were weapons sufficiently removed from the hands of the combatants, nor were command structures within the PLA dissolved. However, and closely related to my discussion on the role of international interim government above, this aspect mitigated, rather than exacerbated, commitment problems for the CPN (M). Firstly, while weapons were officially collected and stored in metal containers supervised by UNMIN, these containers not only remained inside the cantonment and satellite camps, but PLA commanders also retained a key to unlock the storage boxes. Secondly, also war-time social bonds among ex-combatants as well as hierarchical command structures between ex-combatants and immediate commanders remained intact throughout the interim period and beyond, and the cantonment process even provided the CPN (M) with the opportunity to “better consolidate its force in one place” and create “an environment for ‘systemic’ remobilization of ex-combatants because ... it reinforced chain of command between combatants and their commanders” (Subedi, 2015, p. 154). This also became visible when I interviewed a former PLA deputy commander in his house in October 2015, where he introduced me to a number of ex-combatants and their families who came to live with him after the war. Also when I asked a second former PLA deputy commander on whether he was still in contact with any ex-combatants, he replied “all of them have been in contact with me” (INT-08, 26.09.2015). Finally, this finding is also in line with how the Maoist ex-combatants I interviewed in Nepal described their past and current relationships with immediate commanders (INT-21, 10.10.2015; cf. INT-30, 13.11.2015).

Having said that, “[not] a shot was fired between the two armies, and there was not a single known case of weapons being removed from the storage containers” during and after the interim period (Martin, 2010, p. 10). Why did the continued existence of parallel military infrastructure not exacerbate commitment problems, for instance when the Maoists were fearing to lose the 2008 elections? Part of the explanation for why the suggested causal mechanism did not come into being in Nepal is that the continued existence of military infrastructure provided a “safety valve” for ex-combatants that mitigated any future uncertainty. As I argued above, the general idea of the disarmament process was to mitigate fears among ex-combatants by keeping the possibility that they could take their gun and leave the cantonments. Forcefully retrieving them of their weapons would likely have been perceived as “emasculating” and as endangering their personal security (INT-29, 03.11.2015, cf. Spear, 2002).\footnote{This became particularly relevant after the discussion on disqualified ex-combatants had triggered intense feelings of humiliation among ex-combatants, because disqualified translates into the profoundly negative Nepali term ayogyā (meaning being incomplete, handicapped, or even useless, cf. Bleie and Shrestha, 2012).}
same vein, the continued existence of social bonds between ex-combatants and of close relationships to their commanders also provided a sense of protection in the interim and post-interim period. Many ex-combatants expressed their anxiety of leaving their units and feel stigmatized by civilian communities for their past in the rebel movement, or – in the case of female ex-combatants – for having transgressed social norms and conceptions of what constitutes as “adequate” female behavior (INT-29, 03.11.2015, INT-30, 13.11.2015, Bogati, 2015; Ogura, 2010).

**Affecting Cultures of Violence** In Chapter 3, I held that a second mechanism for why interim governments that integrate the parallel military institutions of warring parties increase the stability of peace is that such interim governments raise the parties’ costs of defection by adding to changing cultures of violence. They do so, because even if not all weapons are collected and hierarchical command structures disentangled at the end of the interim period, a sufficiently advanced DDR process still decreases the social acceptance of violence among ex-combatants and the wider population, signifies “that the country is embarking on an era of peace” (United Nations, 2000a) and facilitates “ex-combatants’ attempts to distance themselves from war-time abuses they committed or experienced” (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010, p. 18). This in turn should raise the costs of elites to remobilize for war. Contrariwise, a missing DDR process should mean that no such process takes place, so that individuals are not pushed away from the “war-time mindsets that legitimized violence” (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010, p. 10).

Nepal confirms this causal pattern. The decreased social acceptance of war among ex-combatants – that was a direct result of how the disarmament process was designed – is among the key explanations for post-interim peace in Nepal due to three reasons. Firstly, and even though many have pointed out the difficult job situation for former fighters in Nepal (e.g. Martin Chautari, 2013), ex-combatants were early on in the disarmament process and during the interim period offered a vision of alternative professional livelihoods as opposed to their military careers, which profoundly decreased their willingness to remobilize for war and increased the costs of the party leadership to do so. Both inside cantonment and thereafter, ex-combatants received vocational training as well as schooling. Particularly younger combatants had thereby never received a formal education before, and had only attended Maoist political education programs. This not only offered combatants a clearer perspective on what they wanted to do once discharged, but which also helped to normalize life in the cantonment because it provided combatants with activities that prevented them to leave the camps before being formally discharged, as happened with UNITA in Angola (Bleie and Shrestha, 2012; Bogati, 2015; Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, 2013). Although not all combatants describe

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72The vision of alternative professional livelihoods also included options for legal migra-
such training as useful, many say the time spent in cantonment was a chance to “gain additional qualifications” and “advance their schooling” (Robins and Bhandari, 2016, p. 33).

Secondly, ex-combatants were offered alternative private livelihoods as opposed to their military identities early on in the interim period, which contrasts, for instance, the extreme militarization of lives under UNITA in Angola. A key part of this pattern was the PLA’s demographic structure. The Maoist movement recruited a particularly high number of child soldiers (Human Rights Watch, 2007) and female combatants during the war – some numbers say that “up to 40% of all combatant and civilian political supporters” of the Maoists were women (Pettigrew and Shneiderman, 2004, p. 19). As the combatants moved to cantonment in late 2006, many soon desired to get married and have children instead of continuing to fight: “Having spent their youth in the war, sacrificing all, it is marriage, family and livelihood that are central” (Martin Chautari, 2013). Thus, “[numerous] arranged marriages and love marriages ... created a vast number of family establishments from 2007 onward,” when many female combatants became pregnant and gave birth (Bleie and Shrestha, 2012, p. 8). This significantly increased the costs of remobilization for the Maoist leadership. For instance, asked why no Maoist ex-combatant was remobilized out of the cantonments, one international development worker noted that because ex-combatants “were really young when they were recruited and [had] never lived an adult civilian life, they really [wanted] to establish a family and ... basically be part of the community” instead of returning to war (INT-02, 23.09.2015, cf. INT-10, 28.09.2015; INT-29, 03.11.2015; INT-30, 13.11.2015, Bogati, 2015). And when I asked an ex-combatant if he could imagine a situation in which he would have rearmed, he replied negatively and referred to his family: “No war with a baby” (INT-21, 10.10.2015). Thereby, this mechanism also links to the opportunity cost argument for rebel recruitment in the wider peace and conflict literature (e.g. Weinstein, 2005).

Thirdly, ex-combatants were offered an improved legal and logistical standing inside cantonment as opposed to the People’s War, which increased the costs of party leaders to remobilize. Logistically, and in addition to vocational training, schooling, or leisure activities inside cantonment, observers point out that with all difficulties at the beginning of the DDR process, ex-combatants were content to stay in cantonments as they received more to eat than during the war when they at times went without food for days (INT-02, 23.09.2015; INT-10, 28.09.2015, INT-21, 10.10.2015, INT-22, 10.10.2015, cf. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, 2013). Throughout the interim period, and many ex-combatants migrated to work in India or the Gulf countries (Bleie and Shrestha, 2012). Several interview partners in this regard stressed that one reason for why the Maoists did not remobilize following the interim period was that “all the ex-combatants [were] working in Dubai” (INT-03, 23.09.2015; cf. INT-02, 23.09.2015; INT-21, 10.10.2015; INT-27, 19.10.2015). During private conversations, Nepalis also repeatedly mentioned that a common slogan in Nepal names “Militia or Malaysia” as employment options for ex-combatants (cf. also Haaß, Kurtenbach, et al., 2016).
“living conditions in the cantonments greatly improved and they were transformed into... ‘communes’ rather than military camps” (Upreti and Vanhoutte, 2009, p. 170). Legally, combatants were no longer regarded as outlaws, but felt that they were given a role in the peace process and for their country (INT-14, 30.09.2015, cf. INT-17, 06.10.2015; INT-22, 10.10.2015; and INT-27, 19.10.2015). For instance, asking whether she recalled ex-combatants protesting or rioting again being encamped (as occurred several times in Angola and presented a major obstacle to the demobilization process, cf. Chapter 7), an international development worker remembered,

“Actually, they were ... accepting the conditions. I think [this was] partly because it was an improvement of their status. Before, they were outlaws, they were guerrillas, they were living underground in the jungle in terrible conditions, going without food for days, eating grass, it was really difficult [for them]. So the cantonments provided them with a legal status, where they ... were by and large being taken care of. So ... this was some form of relief” (INT-02, 23.09.2015).

6.2.4 Participation of Unarmed Actors

My final hypothesis in Chapter 3 reasoned that in the presence of commitment problems, more advanced opportunities for the participation of unarmed actors in interim governments come with a higher stability of post-interim peace. This is because they enable warring parties to send costly signals of their true intentions to each other that create domestic audience costs, which in turn punish them if they renege on their peaceful bargain (cf. Figure 3.3).

Nepal does not confirm to this causal pattern, but the participation of unarmed actors still set into motion an alternative causal mechanisms within the bargaining framework. As I have outlined in section 6.1, Nepalese civil society played a particularly prominent rule during the 2006 Jana Andolan II that paved the way to end the monarchy and to start negotiations to a peace agreement (Shah, 2008). “The general public, led by professionals, civil society leaders, human rights leaders, and the civil service, formed the core of most demonstrations and marches; party cadres and leaders were initially rarely seen in the streets” (Freedom House, 2008). This means that “civil society had a very significant role” in the movement also because the political parties were “discredited” among protesters (INT-05, 24.09.2015, cf. INT-19, 09.10.2015).74

73The case of Nepal is in so far distinct as a rebel group fought against a divided government in which political parties controlled the police as one major opponent of the Maoists on the battlefield, while control over the RNA de facto remained with the king. This “sets a unique example for the world” (Shah, 2008, p. 24). Because of this role of the political parties during the war, I concentrate here on the participation of civil society in interim rule.

74One situation that is memorized by many Nepalis, that several interview partners described, and that illustrates the vital role of civil society in the early peace process is when during Jana Andolan II, SPA party leaders were sitting on the floor surrounded by civil society leaders, listening to their demands on political reforms, and promising to engrish those reforms in the CPA (INT-04, 23.09.2015; INT-05, 24.09.2015; INT-20, 09.10.2015).
In the CPA, the warring parties agreed to take “responsibility for resolving any problem arising ... with the support of all political parties, civil society and local organizations” and “sincerely” appealed to “civil society, the professional groups, the class organizations, the media, the intellectuals and the entire Nepali people to actively participate and make successful the historic campaign of building a new democratic Nepal and establishing lasting peace” (Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2006). Also the subsequent Interim Constitution of 2063 (2007) called for the participation of civil society during the interim period. However, while the CPN (M) had originally suggested that civil society leaders would be broadly represented in the interim parliament – an idea was that the interim parliament was to be composed one-third each of the Maoists, the SPA, and civil society – this “was never going to be acceptable to the mainstream parties: it suggested that they were only on a par with the Maoists, and many suspected the civil society appointments would give the body a dangerously radical tint” (International Crisis Group, 2006, p. 10).

Because of these concerns, the Interim Constitutions eventually included a compromise by which the interim parliament would reinstate all former members, but would additionally include 73 seats for the Maoists and 48 seats for “members nominated by consensus from ... people-based and professional organizations, oppressed communities, backward regions, indigenous ethnic groups ... and from among women and various political personalities” (Government of Nepal, 2007, cf. section 6.2.1.). This thus represented a commitment for institutionalized participation of civil society according to my conceptualization. This commitment was also by and large implemented (INT-15, 04.10.2015, International Crisis Group, 2006) – although “most of these seats were later divided among politicians, a few did go to civil society leaders who had played a prominent role in the April 2006 movement” (Shah, 2008, p. 11).

In addition to the institutionalized participation of civil society in Nepal’s interim government, civil society was also received opportunities for what I termed ad hoc participation outside the formal interim government structures in Chapter 3. It was repeatedly reported that the leaders of the CPN (M), NC, and CPN-UML met with civil society members to consult on political reforms during the interim period. For instance, between late March and early April 2008, civil society leaders were invited by interim representatives and security staff (such as the chief of Nepal Police) to consult on how to prevent violence at the polling stations during the 2008 CA elections, and the parties and civil society eventually agreed on setting up monitoring committees comprised of civil society leaders during the polling process (Ekantipur, 2008a; Ekantipur, 2008b).

While this decrease of institutional participation for civil society was heavily criticized by some civil society leaders who demanded a broader representation of voices of unarmed actors in the interim government (cf. The Himalayan Times, 2007), others commented the demands “made in certain quarters to bring civil society representatives into the new government” with: “We civil society members do not join governments. It is an insult to ask us to become ministers or to allege that we work to become one” (in Shah, 2008, p. 12).
One civil society leader in that regard remembered that up until the first CA elections in 2008, he experienced the decision-making process of the interim government as very consultative, and he was regularly invited to voice his concerns and make suggestions for improvements in the constitutional committees (INT-07, 25.09.2015; cf. also INT-15, 04.10.2015; INT-18, 06.10.2015; INT-19, 09.10.2015; INT-23, 12.10.2015).

Some interview partners thereby did regard the participation of civil society in interim decision-making as a costly signal by the parties that created domestic audience costs; and argued that civil society came to represent “an unorthodox guarantor” for transparency in the peace process: When political reforms were debated in the interim government and discussions became polarized, civil society representatives – although “kind of symbolic in their role” were “guarantors for save landing” (INT-24, 13.10.2015).

Having said that, there is stronger evidence for an alternative causal mechanism within the bargaining framework, in that the participation of civil society in interim government was not so much a costly signal by the parties to create audience costs, but instead strategically used by the warring parties to raise their political and economic benefits and thus decrease any future uncertainty. This mechanism came into being because over the course of the interim period, civil society started becoming more and more aligned to and co-opted by the former warring parties. This means that all political and economic benefits that were supposed to go to civil society to create a domestic audience – such as receiving a voice in changing and promulgating laws and institutional reforms in the interim government; or receiving funds by the international community – became benefits for the warring parties in the bargaining situation.

Without exception, all interview partners argued that while civil society had a strong momentum in the 2006 Jana Andolan II, this extraordinary role gradually diminished during the rule of the interim government until it was non-existent following the 2008 CA elections: “Civil society was unified and important during the April movement but since then group and individual interests have diverged” (International Crisis Group, 2006, p. 21). Instead, civil society became – with few exceptions – virtually indistinguishable from the parties represented in the interim government as well as “very politically charged” (INT-20, 09.10.2015, cf. also INT-01, 22.09.2015, INT-15, 04.10.2015), and thus its participation was merely to the benefit of the parties who all “used patronage to reward their civil society supporters” (International Crisis Group, 2006, p. 21). This is not least due to the fact that many previous political elites began to engage as civil society leaders during the interim period, and “like a revolving door, many now in civil society were in government positions in the past” (Shah, 2008, p. 11). As a development worker stated, civil society “is not so strong when it comes to doing things independently of the political parties ... There are very few NGOs that manage to stay free from political influence ... If you give funds to them you are basically funding po-
Table 6.2: Summary of Evidence: Case Study Nepal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>H1</strong>: Power-sharing interim government, as opposed to any other interim government, increases the stability of post-interim peace.</td>
<td>Supported. The causal mechanisms on the warring parties’ political and economic security are most convincing. Power-sharing also increased the costs of defection for the parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H2</strong>: International interim government, as opposed to any other interim government, increases the stability of post-interim peace.</td>
<td>Not supported. Empirical evidence rather points to “local ownership” on the elite and combatant level as an alternative explanation outside the bargaining framework.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H3</strong>: The more advanced the process of integrating parallel political and military institutions into the authority of an interim government, the higher the stability of peace.</td>
<td>Supported. The causal mechanisms on ex-combatants’ war-time mindsets and (to a lesser extent) on parallel financing through political structures are most convincing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H4</strong>: The more advanced the opportunities of participation for unarmed actors in interim governments, the higher the stability of peace.</td>
<td>Weakly supported. There is yet no evidence for the mechanism on audience costs – evidence rather suggests participation reduced future uncertainty for the warring parties.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.3 Chapter Summary

This chapter discussed the question to what extent post-interim peace in Nepal can be attributed to properties of interim government mitigating the warring parties’ commitment problems. Throughout this chapter, I also attended to alternative explanatory variables or causal mechanisms, such as the role of democratic history in negotiating and accepting power-sharing interim government, or of local ownership instead of international authority in interim governments. Concerning the independent variables proposed in Chapter 3, the chapter yields several interesting conclusions (cf. Table 6.2).

Hypothesis H1 on the role of power-sharing interim government for stable peace is supported. Particularly the mechanisms on the economic and political security of warring parties account for empirical evidence. Power-sharing interim government decreased uncertainty for the CPN (M) by increasing its political security, as it enabled the party to negotiate a conceivably more fa-
vorables electoral law. More generally, it also enabled the Maoists to show the other political parties that it was capable of participating in national governance, thus lending itself as a future coalition partner. Power-sharing interim government also decreased uncertainty for the CPN (M) by increased its economic security, as it enabled party leaders to control and loot state resources through corruption. Power-sharing interim government also added to peace by increasing costs of defection, an alternative causal mechanism not envisioned in Chapter 3. For CPN (M) leaders, the corruption displayed in the interim government and beyond alienated them from increasingly disillusioned and frustrated ex-combatants. This increased the rebel leaders’ costs of remobilization. For the one party outside the agreement – the royal palace – power-sharing interim government added to the perception of the king and his subordinate army that the country was strongly united in the peace process. These increased costs are part of an explanation for why the king accepted his political marginalization and did not, for instance, repeat his actions of earlier years and stage a royal coup. The proposed mechanism on power-sharing increasing the physical security of warring parties does not hold for Nepal, because I cannot establish the necessary temporal precedence of cause to effect in that relationship.

Hypothesis H2 on the role of international interim government for stable peace is not supported. The international interim government variable does not correlate with the outcome in the theorized way in Nepal, and the absence of international authority did not exacerbate, but mitigate commitment problems. Firstly, on an elite level, it enabled cooperation in the power-sharing interim government without any nationalist rhetoric, and it provided particularly the CPN (M) with a sense of ownership over reforms. Secondly, on a combatant level, it contributed to perceptions that disarmament was a voluntary “sacrifice” for peace and the country – a term repeatedly used by my interview partners – rather than a forced process. Thus, local ownership emerges as an alternative explanation for peace.

Hypothesis H3 on the integration of parallel political and military institutions is supported. Even though Maoist cadres often cheated the integration of parallel political institutions in the early days of the interim period and through continued parallel taxation and extortion, the Maoists eventually gave up on parallel political structures. Thereby, they also gradually became dependent on extracting future economic gain through controlling formal state institutions. This becomes visible by the growing corruption they displayed. Further, even though the integration of military institutions failed to truly strip ex-combatants of their arms or dismantle the Maoists’ command structures, the process still increased the costs of defection (as predicted in Chapter 3). This is because the process offered combatants a vision of alternative (1) professional and (2) private livelihoods, as well as (3) an improved legal and logistical situation inside cantonment.

Hypothesis H4 on the role of the participation of unarmed actors in interim
rule is supported, although evidence suggests a different causal mechanism between independent and dependent variables. Rather than affecting signalling behavior of the warring parties, the participation of civil society decreased future uncertainty for the parties. This is because by co-opting and politicizing civil society, all political and economic benefits that were supposed to go to civil society to create a domestic audience — such as receiving a voice in institutional reforms; or receiving funds by the international community — turned into benefits for the warring parties instead.

In sum, post-interim peace prevailed in Nepal. Although its surprising victory in the 2008 elections was certainly among the reasons for why the CPN (M) successfully and peacefully integrated into the political scene, two aspects related to institutional design and reform properties of the interim government are particularly relevant in explaining mitigated commitment problems and stable peace. Firstly, the Maoists could use their participation in the power-sharing interim government to secure both economic and political benefits that mitigated commitment problems by reducing future uncertainties about their survival in the post-interim state. It also made their weaker-growing position in the post-interim period — that culminated into their defeat in the 2013 elections — a very comfortable one (cf. INT-29, 03.11.2015). Secondly, at the end of the interim period and in the time thereafter, the costs of defection for the Maoist leadership had become so high that they lacked the opportunity to remobilize. This is not least because both the leadership’s behavior in the power-sharing interim government and the design of the integration of parallel military institutions process had changed intra-party dynamics between Maoist elites and combatants, had alienated many rank-and-file soldiers from the political leadership, and had provided ex-combatants with visions of alternative private and professional livelihoods: “In 2008, they [the Maoists] had come so far that they did not want to fight the war anymore, especially the ex-combatants would not fight anymore” (INT-30, 13.11.2015). A NA lieutenant general remembers,

“Many people ask me if [ex-combatants] will take up their weapons again. My answer is that [they] will not ... because they were so badly used by their political leaders. They gave their lives, but they got nothing in return. Will they again go to war to make somebody rich, make somebody Prime Minister? No.” (INT-12, 29.09.2015).
Chapter 7

Interim Rule in Angola

In March 2016, José Eduardo dos Santos made international headlines by unexpectedly announcing that he would step down as President of Angola come 2018, a position that he has held since September 1979 as one of the longest-ruling leaders in the world (BBC, 2016). While dos Santos and his party – the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola or People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) – issue a tight grip over politics in Angola today, their rule was bitterly contested by insurgents of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola or National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) until 2002 (Freedom House, 2015). That year, UNITA’s leader Jonas Savimbi was killed in battle. UNITA had started its violent campaign against the MPLA directly after Angola’s independence in 1975, and it took 26 years until a window for peace opened for the first time in 1991, when the warring parties signed the Bicesse Accords. In this peace agreement, they agreed on a 16-months interim period in which the MPLA would act as caretaker interim government until elections in September 1992 determined the future government of Angola. After all observers – including the warring parties themselves – had been certain that UNITA would stand as a winner of those elections, it was dos Santos and the MPLA that managed to gain most votes. Almost immediately, UNITA remobilized for war.

This chapter explores whether violence in Angola’s immediate post-interim period was the result of credible commitment problems; and to what extent properties of interim government in Angola failed to mitigate such commitment problems. I proceed in three steps. Section 7.1 gives a brief overview of Angola’s history, beginning with the war of independence against Portugal’s colonial regime and continuing with the ensuing civil war between the former independence movements. The section ends with a closer look at the negotiations leading up to the signing of the Bicesse Accords in 1991, in which the warring parties agreed on the interim government under analysis. In section 7.2, I attend to each property of interim government as outlined in Chapter 3, and I investigate how the design of each property was linked to the re-intensification
of armed conflict following the 1992 election. In this section, I also study any alternative explanatory variables and mechanisms for armed conflict in Angola. Section 7.3 summarizes my findings and concludes this chapter.

### 7.1 Angola: Three Decades of War

When their warring parties signed the Bicesse Accords in May 1991, most citizens of Angola – among the countries with the lowest median age in the world – had known nothing but war. The younger history of armed conflict in Angola can thereby be roughly divided into three phases. Firstly, Angola’s war of independence against the Portuguese colonial regime between 1961 and 1974 that resulted in the signing of the Alvor Accords and Angola’s ensuing independence in November 1975. Secondly, the first phase of Angola’s civil war fought between the former national liberation movements – MPLA, UNITA, and initially also the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola or National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) – between 1975 and 1991 that resulted in the Bicesse Accords, an interim government, and elections in September 1992. And thirdly, the second phase of Angola’s civil war between the re-escalation of violence following the 1992 elections and Savimbi’s death in 2002; a phase that was repeatedly broken up by several fragile periods of relative peace, for instance after the parties signed the 1994 Lusaka Protocol. As the case study under analysis in this dissertation focuses on the 1991-92 interim government that followed the Bicesse Accords, the ensuing overview briefly outlines the key events of Angola’s decolonization war and then concentrates on the initial period of the civil war until Bicesse, while neglecting all developments thereafter.

#### 7.1.1 Introducing the Warring Parties

When Angola’s war of independence started in 1961 as an armed struggle of three liberation movements against Portugal’s colonial regime, Portugal had been present in the region for centuries. The first Portuguese settlers had arrived in 1483, initializing both the Christianization of the region and the export of slaves and ivory. By 1575, Portugal had built widespread coastal settlements around Luanda that had developed into the primary slave trade market for the sugar plantations in its colony of Brazil (Birmingham, 2015). In 1836, Portugal then abolished this transatlantic slave trade. This move that coincided with the country consolidating its territorial occupation of Angola by establishing a more thoroughly institutionalized colonial administration and by using Portuguese Angola – a colony rich in diamonds or timber – as its chief exporter for oil, coffee, or rubber (Malaquias, 2007; Ohlson, 1998; Tvedten, 1997).

Until the mid-twentieth century, Portuguese rulers manifested their administration of Angola on a social hierarchy system that is described by some as “Portuguese apartheid” (Loffman, 2009). While the white population stood on
top of the social hierarchy (with white Portuguese settlers born in Portugal being superior to white Portuguese born in Angola), colonial authorities relied on the bureaucratic services of the *mestiço* and, to a lesser extent, the *assimilado* communities. The former were non-whites of mixed Angolan-Portuguese parentage, a biographical detail that was the result of the skewed gender ratio in Angola’s urban areas during the colonial period when a “shortage of white Portuguese women” had ”led to numerous relationships between Portuguese men and African women” (James, 2011, p. 99). *Assimilados* were black Angolans who aimed at achieving better education and employment and therefore abandoned their indigenous culture, learned Portuguese, and adopted colonial social customs. As the colonial legal framework regulated the highest possible job level for non-whites, *assimilados* occupied often mid-level jobs in the administration (Malaquias, 2007).76 This segregation of educated Angolans from the rest of the society – rural peasants or *indígenas*, who made up 90 percent of the population but lacked any political rights (Götz, 2002) – is not least one of the reasons for why Angola’s decolonization struggle began much later as compared to other African states (cf. Birmingham, 2015; Tvedten, 1997).

In the second half of the twentieth century, the rapid rise in world coffee prices turned Angola into Africa’s largest coffee producer. This encouraged a significant increase in white immigration to Angola (Cornwell, 2000). For instance, by 1960, the white settler population in Uíge – Angola’s main province for coffee production – was six times larger than in 1950; and Angola’s total settler population increased from 80,000 in 1950 to 350,000 in 1974 (Sogge, 1992). As the white population grew, *mestiços* and *assimilados* were soon outnumbered and had to compete with settlers for government jobs. Particularly *mestiços* began to lose earlier privileges, which added to growing antagonism as it emphasized a primacy of white interests (Cornwell, 2000). Portugal’s response to the intensifying protests among *mestiços* was violence; and its growing repression did not help to appease the situation but triggered the beginning of the colonial war (Ohlson, 1998; Pearce, 2015). This war – as a direct result of growing social tensions and *mestiço*, *assimilado* and *indígena* divisions – was fought by three movements: the MPLA, the FNLA, as well as UNITA.

As the oldest liberation movement of the three, the MPLA was founded in 1956 as a merger group of three organizations: the Communist Party of Angola, the Party of the United Struggle for Africans in Angola, and the Movement for the Independence of Angola. The MPLA’s early leader – formally elected by party members in 1962 – was Agostinho Neto, who became Angola’s first President upon independence and who ruled until he died in 1979 in Moscow and was replaced by José Eduardo dos Santos. Above all, the MPLA was an “urban, multi-racial, intellectual, and socialist” group (Ohlson, 1998, p. 66).

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76 Some describe the lines between the two groups as fluid. For instance, Tvedten (1997, p. 28) writes that “*assimilados* made up only 80,000 of the total population ... and most of them were *mestiços*.” Similarly, Götz (2002) notes that almost 90 percent of *mestiços* achieved the status of *assimilados*, but only one percent of the black population did.
Table 7.1: Key Dates and Events in Angola’s History

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>The MPLA is founded as Angola’s oldest liberation movement, a party that would come to rule Angola from independence until today.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Jonas Savimbi returns from military training in China with its own liberation movement: UNITA. The Angolan parties increasingly fight the repression by the Portuguese colonial authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Portugal’s Caetano is ousted by a military that favors decolonization, which eases negotiations for Angola’s independence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Angola is declared independent, the MPLA assumes power, and UNITA mobilizes for a civil war against MPLA rule.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>MPLA leader Augustinho Neto dies and José Eduardo dos Santos becomes the MPLA’s – and Angola’s – President.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale results in high numbers of casualties for both sides, which opens room for peace negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>The New York Accords regulate the withdrawal of South African and Cuban forces from Angola, monitored by UNAVEM I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Savimbi and dos Santos sign the Bicesse Accords that call for an interim period and general elections, monitored by UNAVEM II.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>UNITA is defeated in the general election and Savimbi immediately remobilizes his party to fight the ruling MPLA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>The warring parties sign the Lusaka Protocol, but this agreement only leads to several fragile periods of relative peace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Savimbi is killed in battle. Shortly thereafter, UNITA signs a ceasefire agreement and integrates into the rule of the MPLA.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Its chief support base was made up of Luanda’s educated mestizo community and of ethnic Mbundus, although it also included Ovimbundus in leading positions (Pereira, 1994; Tvedten, 1997). Due to its popular standing among mestizos, the rivaling FNLA tended to label the MPLA as a non-African elite movement “that wants independence in order to take the place of their ‘fathers’ (the whites)” (in Götz, 2002, p. 54). To UNITA, the MPLA “was led by the mixed-race offspring of the erstwhile colonisers” (Pearce, 2015, p. 13) and was thus “just another European import product” (Spikes, 1993, p. 10).

From its early days onwards, the MPLA was not only a military movement but strongly emphasized its political and ideological goals of gaining control over the administration of Angola and starting a national transformation project that would make Angola a socialist state (Malauquias, 2007). In its own words, the “laying down of People’s Democracy and Socialism as goals to be attained implies qualitative leaps in the politico-ideological and organizational sphere, so that the vanguard organization may play its full role in the leadership of society.”

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77 Angola’s main ethnic groups are the Bakongo, Mbundu, and Ovimbundu. In 1986, the Bakongo constituted around 13 percent of Angola’s population, while the Mbundu made up 23 and the Ovimbundu approximately 39 percent of the population (Götz, 2002).
(People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola, 1979). To this end, the MPLA developed tight ideological linkages to the Soviet Union, many of its cadres received Soviet military training, and the party was also financially supported both by Cuba and by the Soviet Union which significantly contributed to its battlefield capacity towards the end of the independence strive (Birmingham, 2015). In 1974 alone, the Soviet Union supplied the MPLA with logistic material worth over 300 million US Dollar, and Cuba deployed 12,000 soldiers in order to ensure the MPLA would win the struggle for independence (James, 1992; Ogunbadejo, 1980). In 1975, UNITA leader Savimbi commented on these Cuban troops with “everyone was so weak that after 6 months it [the war] would have ended” and “it was the Cubans’ entry ... which altered the entire context” (in Radu, 1990, p. 128).

As one of the MPLA’s rivals in Angola’s struggle for independence, the FNLA was founded in 1962 against the background of a second stream of nationalism that was based in Angola’s rural north among ethnic Bakongos and local coffee farmers (Cornwell, 2000; Marcum, 1983; Pearce, 2015).78 The FNLA, led by Holden Hoberto, was itself a successor movement to the Democratic Party of Angola and the Union of People of North Angola – an organization founded in 1957 and later renamed into the Union of People of Angola, in order to (formally) assume a more national role. Compared to the urban, multi-ethnic, and elitist MPLA that envisioned the political overhaul of Angola and the creation of a socialist state, the FNLA has been called a rural, regionalist, and ethno-nationalist organization that lacked strong ideological goals, and that mostly included indigenas in its ranks (James, 2011; Ohlson, 1998). Because of this regional background in Angola’s north and the dominance of ethnic Bakongos, the FNLA turned insignificant after Angola’s independence. This was both due to political changes – more Bakongo parties began to organize in the early 1990s (Götz, 2002) – and military events, as it was decimated by the MPLA’s armed wing Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola or People’s Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) in the 1970s. In 1985, the FNLA was described as soldiers roaming “the bush dressed in rags,” going “into battle armed with only two bullets each” (Radu, 1990, p. 130).

In 1962, upon its foundation and when it was still a force to be reckoned with for the MPLA, the FNLA had created the Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile in Kinshasa, then Leopoldville (Heywood, 1989; Malaquias, 2007; Spikes, 1993). Foreign Minister of this government in exile was Jonas Savimbi, an ethnic Ovimbundu from Angola’s Bié province who would soon become critical of the FNLA’s persistent ethnic ambitions, its “flagrant ... tribalism” and Bakongo dominance (Savimbi, 1972), and who would thus found a third stream of nationalism in Angola. Savimbi announced his resignation from both the government in exile and the FNLA in 1964, and, after briefly flirting

78In 1960, as the Mbundu population that backed the MPLA constituted about 24 percent of the population, the Bakongo (who represent also the largest ethnic group in the neighboring Republic of Congo) accounted for 12 percent (Wright, 1997).
with joining the MPLA – that denied him a leadership position and only offered him to join as a rank-and-file soldier (Ohlson, 1998) – he in 1965 traveled to China with a band of followers to receive military training. In 1966, Savimbi returned to Angola with his own movement: UNITA. While UNITA resembled the FNLA in its success of building a rural, ethno-nationalist support base among Ovimbundu farmers in southern and central Angola, a key difference to the FNLA were UNITA’s ideological ambitions (Birmingham, 2015; Ohlson, 1998). UNITA emphasized both a “black power” rhetoric that highlighted the struggle of indigenas in the colonial history and adopted Maoist mobilization strategies, such as attributing great importance to political organization, popular support and education, and economic self-reliance (Potgieter, 2000).

Angola’s war for independence was thus unique among other decolonization struggles in that there existed no single, unified movement for liberation; but instead the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA “battled each other more than the Portuguese” and failed to form a joint front line against the colonial authorities (James, 1992, p. 45). As a result, no movement made significant gains against the colonial power. By 1974, the groups had spent most of their military resources against each other. Help came from developments within Portugal, where the military ousted Marcelo Caetano on 25 April 1974 and immediately signaled its willingness to grant Angola independence, not least because the officers staging the coup “better knew than anyone that the colonial wars were unwinnable” and thus favored decolonization (Pearce, 2015, p. 31). The warring parties signed the Alvor Accords on 15 January 1975 and Portugal agreed to proclaim independence on 11 November 1975 by handing over power to a unified national and transitional power-sharing government, in order “to end its colonial history in an acceptable way” (Tvedten, 1997, p. 36).

The Alvor Accords failed. The leaders of the three independence movements – Savimbi, dos Santos, and Roberto – were extremely antagonistic, and nothing about the foregoing independence war had generated a remote willingness among them to cooperate in a power-sharing national government (Ohlson, 1998). Instead, as the groups assembled in Luanda in January 1975, “personality, ideological, and ethnic conflicts quickly arose” (James, 1992, p. 7), and “insecurity, distrust, fear and hatred burst out in full now that the parties could openly campaign for internal and external support” (Ohlson, 1998, p. 69). The

79 Having said that, confusion over what UNITA actually stood for reigned throughout its active years. For instance, UNITA received support both from Maoist China as well as from the United States – “Savimbi called upon Maoist ideas as readily as he presented himself to Western backers as dedicated to the free market” (Pearce, 2012, p. 459) – and while UNITA emphasized tribalism and black power, it joined forces with South Africa’s apartheid regime on the battlefield. As Tanzania’s first President Julius Nyerere paraphrased it, Savimbi may best be described as a “political opportunist” (Marcum, 1983).

80 For instance, while the MPLA did most of the fighting against the Portuguese, the FNLA and UNITA regarded the MPLA as their main enemy; and although UNITA recurrently denounced the MPLA as collaborators of the colonial administration (Cornwell, 2000), the commander in chief of the Portuguese military said that “it was understood that Portuguese and UNITA forces would not fight against each other” (in Malaquias, 2007, p. 69).
power-sharing government formed by the peace agreement was thus barely functioning, although it is said that Portugal used its de jure existence to distance itself from the violent events unfolding in Angola at the time (Pearce, 2015).

Consequently, an ever rising number of Cuban soldiers were arriving in Angola throughout 1975 in order to train MPLA cadres and to assist them in combat. By July, the MPLA was strong enough to force the FNLA – “supported by a Zairian army lacking professionalism” – and UNITA – “backed by a South African army lacking the political will to fight” – out of Luanda (Malaquias, 2007, p. 71). On 10 November 1975, the last Portuguese troops departed from Angola, and a day later, the Portuguese High Commissioner granted Angolans their independence. Agostinho Neto reacted immediately and declared that “[i]n the name of the Angolan people,” the MPLA “solemnly proclaims the independence of Angola before Africa and the world” (People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola, 1978b). The next day, UNITA’s Savimbi declared the independence of the Democratic People’s Republic of Angola in the city of Huambo (Pearce, 2015). This marked the beginning of Angola’s civil war.

7.1.2 From Civil War to General Elections

In a seamless transition, the decolonization struggle thus turned into a civil war between UNITA and the MPLA over controlling Angola’s government, after the FNLA gradually disappeared from the scene as a military force (Ohlson, 1998). Until the mid-1980s, UNITA was able to gain control over significant parts of Angolan territory. While the MPLA controlled Luanda “and little else” (Malaquias, 2007, p. 39), UNITA was in charge of several south-eastern provinces, including Huambo, Angola’s second largest city. As Pearce (2015, p. 39) writes, Angola was literally “divided into what the press and the Portuguese authorities termed ‘zones of influence’: a euphemism for outright control” by one of the movements. Although the area under its control was only sparsely populated, UNITA managed to create “basic insecurity in around 80 percent of the country,” with detrimental effects on the life and socioeconomic situation of the majority of Angola’s population (Tvedten, 1997, p. 38). In order to sustain control over its Terras Libres de Angola, UNITA thereby established an extensive system of parallel government that provided basic social services to the population it administrated, including the creation not only of 22 secondary and almost 700 primary schools “with 7,127 teachers and 224,811 students” (Potgieter, 2000, p. 262), but also centrally managed collective farms, a health care system with six hospitals and 1,989 clinics, as well as a national provisional capital in Jamba (Brittain, 1998; Pearce, 2015).

To manage this parallel administrative system, UNITA set up a broad political leadership structure, including a Party Congress that met every four years to select the decision-making Central Committee and Political Bureau, and to formulate policy for the controlled territories. In all meetings of the Congress, Savimbi was naturally reelected as President and Commander in Chief of UNITA’s
armed wing, Forças Armadas de Libertação de Angola or Armed Forces of the Liberation of Angola (FALA). UNITA also founded a youth wing – the Revolutionary United Youth of Angola (JURA) – and the Angola Women’s League (LIMA), and maintained an administrative council (that inter alia included Savimbi’s wife Ana Isabel Paulino Savimbi) and an external mission with offices in Portugal, Germany, the UK, Senegal, or at the UN (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, 1991). All in all, UNITA tried to establish itself as “an alternative state model for Angola” (Heywood, 1989, p. 48) – with success: during the 1980s, Angola essentially had two governments.81

The first phase of Angola’s civil war culminated in the six-months long Battle of Cuito Cuanavale in 1987 and 1988, a former Portuguese military base held by the FAPLA and Cuban troops that UNITA desperately wanted to control in order to achieve a strategic advantage in the fight against the MPLA government (Birmingham, 2015). For several months, no side was able to defeat the other, but each party was reporting high numbers of casualties. Then, UNITA and South Africa had to retreat from the city in the spring of 1988, which turned Cuito Cuanavale into “a symbol across the continent that apartheid and its army were no longer invincible” (Brittain, 1998, p. 36). But also the MPLA had experienced heavy losses. Hence, for the first time, room for negotiations opened and Angola’s warring parties embarked on a peace process that would last for several years. On 22 December 1988, Angola, South Africa, and Cuba signed the New York Accords that regulated the withdrawal of South African and Cuban armies from Angola monitored by the United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I), a peacekeeping mission that had been authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 626 two days earlier (United Nations, 1988). The New York Accords thus “removed the international character of the Angolan conflict without bringing it to an end,” because it had little to do with the violent struggle between the warring parties (Ottaway, 1998, p. 135).

But strongly pressured by the international community, the warring parties engaged in further peace negotiations and for the first time, Savimbi and dos

81Why was the MPLA in the initial years of Angola’s civil war able to consolidate its power and drive UNITA and FNLA forces out of Luanda but then lost ground so quickly against UNITA? Part of an explanation is the involvement of foreign powers during the Cold War that turned the conflict into an international affair. In 1975, the MPLA had the strongest external backing and received weaponry, training, and on-the-ground support from the Soviet Union and Cuba. This made the party prevail over the FNLA – with financial help from the US and on-the-ground support from Zaire – and UNITA, fighting with Chinese weapons and the help of South African troops (Malaquias, 2007). But during the 1980s, intensified operations of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Southwest Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) in Angola were used by South Africa’s apartheid government as an excuse to launch several invasions into Angola, arguing that it feared the MPLA government would offer support to the ANC or SWAPO (Birmingham, 2015). While South Africa’s advances helped UNITA to make territorial and military gains against the MPLA, it was changing US foreign policy that made the difference. The 1976 Clark Amendment had long prohibited closer US assistance to Angola’s rebels, but the amendment was repealed in 1985 as a new policy under the Reagan administration advocated backing anti-Marxist strives in Africa as the US did not wish “to see the MPLA lead the nation-building process in Angola, fearing a socialist-style regime with close ties with the Soviet bloc” (El-Khawas, 1977, p. 36).
Santos shook hands and announced the verbally concluded Gbadolite Agreement at the Summit Conference of African Presidents in June 1989. This ceasefire agreement however collapsed immediately, not least because confusion reigned over what had actually been decided on in the meeting (James, 1992): The MPLA declared that Savimbi had fully agreed to all points of dos Santos’ peace plan – which would inter alia have required UNITA to respect the Angolan constitution and the MPLA’s one-party rule (Foreign Ministry of Angola, 1990). Savimbi yet objected in a The New York Times opinion piece, reasoning that it would have been “silly” for him to surrender to the MPLA that way (Savimbi, 1989). The MPLA’s reaction: “Savimbi is lying” (Foreign Ministry of Angola, 1990). Likewise, UNITA’s Washington representative Macos Samondo stated that the MPLA “thought the cease-fire was an end in itself,” while UNITA “thought the cease-fire was a means to achieve ... continued dialogue toward a government of national unity” (in James, 1992, p. 245).

Despite the hostile atmosphere between the two party leaders, their meeting in Gbadolite was not the end of Angola’s peace process. Especially the MPLA was under intense pressure after the collapse of the Soviet Union meant an end to its financial support. On 31 May 1991, Savimbi and dos Santos met in Lisbon in order to sign the Bicesse Accords. This peace agreement provided inter alia for the disarmament and demobilization of both standing armies and the creation of an integrated national army with guaranteed posts for UNITA, as well as an interim period governed by the incumbent MPLA that would culminate
in multi-party general elections monitored by the United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II). The latter had been created the day before in UN Security Council Resolution 696 (United Nations, 1991b; United Nations, 1991c). The pressure that the MPLA was facing internationally was thus also reflected in the one-sided concessions it had to agree on with Bicesse: At the meeting in Gbadolite two years earlier, it had vehemently insisted on retaining a one-party state and the constitution of Angola, while it had to agree with Bicesse to constitutional changes and multi-party politics that would for the first time allow UNITA to participate in national elections.

Peace after Bicesse was brief. While the 16 months between the signing of the peace agreement and the holding of national elections are described as “the most spectacular period of optimism and freedom that Angola had ever witnessed” (Birmingham, 2015, p. 109), the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative to Angola Margaret Anstee (1993, p. 495) also notes that while “there were sixteen brief months of comparative peace ... after elections which the United Nations certified as ‘generally free and fair’, civil war broke out again, of a ferocity worse ... than at any time in the previous thirty years.” These elections to determine the post-interim President and National Assembly of Angola were held on 29 and 30 September 1992. All observers, including Savimbi and the MPLA, had been certain that UNITA would win the vote. After all, it was 1991 and “all over the world socialist parties which had run one-party states, such as MPLA, were being rejected by their people after years in power” (Brittain, 1998, p. 46). At a campaign rally in early September 1992, Savimbi had declared that he would “easily” take 75 percent of the presidential vote (in Ellis, 1992), and he had also announced that if “UNITA does not win the election, it has to be rigged,” and if elections were rigged, “I don’t think we will accept them” (in The Toronto Star, 1992). UNITA thus left no doubt that a vote for the MPLA was a vote for war – “Savimbi himself suggested as much ... ten days before the election” (Maier, 1997, 12f.).

The elections themselves, monitored by UNAVEM II and 400 additional international monitors, were conducted peacefully and without larger disruptions (cf. a similar situation in Cambodia, Chapter 8). To the surprise of many, both the vote to the parliament and the presidential vote resulted in a MPLA victory (Fortna, 2003a). In the legislative elections held under a system of proportional representation, the MPLA received 54 percent of the vote and 129 of 220 seats in the parliament, while UNITA gained 34 percent and 70 seats. In the presidential vote, dos Santos gained 49.6 and Savimbi 40.1 percent (Clemente-Kersten, 1999).\footnote{Results also showed that while regional and ethnic patterns of voting remained, this was not the key factor that determined voting behavior. While Savimbi gained the majority of Ovimbundu votes and many Bakongos in Angola’s north cast their vote for the MPLA (Heywood, 1998; Ottaway, 1998), an MPLA-commissioned research team conducted a survey in August 1992 in which, in response to the question “In choosing who to vote for President, do you think it is very important ... that your candidate be from your region or province?”, 65 per cent of respondents replied that it was “not at all important” (Pereira, 1994, p. 18).}

\footnote{As official results were published on 3 October, Savimbi claimed fraud
and declared on UNITA’s radio station Voz da Resistência do Galo Negro or Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel (VORGAN):

“We would like to draw the MPLA’s attention to the fact that there are men and women in this country who are ready to give up their lives so that the country can redeem itself. As far as we are concerned, it will not depend on any international organization to say that the elections were free and fair” (in Maier, 1997, p. 13).

On 5 October, UNITA pulled its generals out of the joint army that had been hastily created only days before the vote, and its soldiers began attacking MPLA troops (Ohlson, 1998). On 16 October the UN issued the final election results and Special Representative Anstee declared the vote free and fair. She also noted that in accordance with the electoral law – that required the President to be elected by an absolute majority – a second round of presidential elections would have to take place in due time, as neither Savimbi nor dos Santos were able to gain the necessary 50 percent. This second round never took place: by November 1992, Angola’s civil war had resumed in full scale.

7.2 Interim Government in Angola

I highlighted in Chapter 6 the limitations of applying bargaining theory to cases such as Nepal, where adhering to the unitary actor assumption or two-player games would result in overlooking important dynamics in how interim governments contribute to long-term peace after war. On the contrary, UNITA’s remobilization in the post-interim period is a classic bargaining breakdown due to prevailing commitment problems. To recall, I conceptualized intrastate conflict in Chapter 3 as a bargaining failure caused by the presence of commitment problems that arise if expected shifts in the relative distribution of power make stronger-growing parties unable to uphold an efficient peaceful deal in future (Powell, 2006). In such situations, it becomes rational for weaker-growing parties to rather sooner than later resort to war.

At the time of signing the Bicesse Accords, Angola’s warring parties had publicly announced their commitment to uphold the terms peace agreement. In a speech before Angola’s parliament in May 1991, President dos Santos highlighted how neither party was “in any condition to reject the accords now without being totally discredited” (in Amado, 1991a), thus emphasizing the role of domestic and international audience costs. Also Savimbi affirmed his commitment to uphold the bargain reached in Portugal: “What I wanted to do here was to state ... before the international community that we ... will do our utmost, absolutely our utmost, so that these accords may be fully implemented” (in Weimer and Fandrych, 1995). But when UNITA lost the 1992 elections and power had shifted to the MPLA, UNITA had no guarantees that it would not be marginalized or eliminated in the post-interim period. This was not least
because the MPLA had for decades resisted the introduction of multi-party politics and had only agreed to constitutional changes following intense international pressure at the end of the Cold War. Dos Santos had also moved back and forth over the years with regard to whether he would allow Savimbi to participate in a post-interim coalition government which would guarantee the latter’s political survival, and dos Santos had both declared that he would not accept any international pressures “which aim is the formation of a so-called coalition government” (in Brooke, 1988), and had pledged his readiness for forming a coalition after the 1992 elections (Finn, 1994).

As a result, it became rational for UNITA to remobilize for war. Following the setup of Figure 3.2 in Chapter 3, UNITA had two options in the aftermath of its electoral defeat: It could either have accepted the MPLA’s victory and peacefully integrate into the post-interim opposition; or it could not have accepted its defeat and remobilize for war. We know that UNITA chose remobilization and thus war followed for both – but what would have happened if UNITA had accepted the electoral result, laid down its weapons, and had reintegrated into the state? In that case, the MPLA would have had two options: It could either have reconciled with UNITA, offer Savimbi amnesty, and allow him to peacefully participate in post-war politics; or it could have executed Savimbi and his cadres for having violently challenged its authority in the first place, which would have made the MPLA the dominant actor in the new state. UNITA’s highest preference would have been a future state in which it is the dominant actor – previous research has argued that Savimbi’s aspiration was obtaining absolute political power and control over the Angolan state and its resources (Pearce, 2010). Its second highest preference would have been a situation in which it is offered amnesty but does not have to pay the costs of further war, and its least favorable outcome would have been execution.

Savimbi knew that the MPLA would not allow him a peaceful and valuable integration into post-interim politics. Not only were the MPLA’s commitments to let Savimbi participate in a post-interim coalition government non-credible from the start – after dos Santos repeatedly altered his positions on the topic and only committed to Savimbi’s participation following international pressure (Finn, 1994) – but the MPLA could never have committed to uphold this bargain had UNITA fully disarmed and demobilized. This is because facing the choice between executing Savimbi or forgiving him, the MPLA would have chosen the former option: Now that UNITA had demobilized, power would have shifted even further to the MPLA’s advantage and the latter’s payoff for eliminating UNITA would have been higher than its payoff for granting Savimbi amnesty. The MPLA thus had incentives to renege on the bargain. UNITA knew this

83 As the election winner, the MPLA was gaining in strength not least by being increasingly regarded as the legitimate Angolan government by the international community. For instance, even the US opened a Liaison Office in Luanda in 1992, and President Bill Clinton formally recognized the MPLA government in early 1993 (cf. Pearce, 2015).

84 Similar concerns were voiced should UNITA win the elections: “There are fears that should
– after all, several rumors persisted about the MPLA’s attempts to kill Savimbi – and consequently remobilized, because its payoffs for further war (in which it had a chance of winning) were higher than those for definite execution.

But commitment problems can be overcome (Walter, 2002). Why did institutional and procedural features of the foregoing interim government fail to mitigate commitment problems for the warring parties (or even exacerbate them), and how precisely did this lead to the re-escalation of war in the post-interim period? The ensuing sections analyze these links. I thereby attend to each hypothesized property of interim government of Chapter 3 sequentially – (H1) power-sharing and (H2) international interim government, (H3) the integration of parallel institutions, and (H4) the participation of civil society and political parties. I structure each section in three parts. Firstly, I very briefly review the theoretical causal mechanism for each property of interim government. Second, I describe the respective provisions as decided upon in the 1991 Bicesse Accords. Thirdly, I outline the process of its implementation, present an analysis on how this process of events and actions affected the causal mechanisms between each property of interim rule and war in the post-interim period, and discuss competing explanations and limitations of my theoretical argument.

7.2.1 Power-Sharing Interim Government

Following Shain and Linz (1995) seminal work on interim governments, I formulated in Chapter 3 a distinction between power-sharing interim government and interim periods in which only one party holds executive and legislative power. I consequently held that in the presence of commitment problems, power-sharing interim governments should be more likely to lead to stable post-interim peace as they come with physical, economic, and political benefits of cooperation that decrease future uncertainty for weaker-rowing parties (cf. Figure 3.3 on page 34). In contrast, revolutionary or caretaker interim governments should reinforce commitment problems among those warring parties that are left outside executive or legislative power during the interim period.

Both warring parties had in the lead up to the Bicesse Accords rejected the option of a period of power-sharing before elections, although joint rule “could have secured minimum standards of impartiality” in preparing for the vote or alleviated the winner-takes-all nature of the peace process (Messiant, 2004). In the 1991 Bicesse Accords, UNITA and the MPLA consequently negotiated an incumbent caretaker interim government and agreed that the ruling MPLA would remain in power until elections.85 In the early days of the interim pe-

\footnote{Savimbi win one of the first casualties would be democracy” (in Windrich, 1992, p. 169).

85While no power-sharing was thus negotiated for the interim executive or legislative, another element of cooperation was implemented for the interim period, as the parties agreed to form the Joint Political-Military Commission (JPMC) to monitor the peace process. This commission included delegates from the MPLA, UNITA, the US, the Soviet Union, Portugal, and the UN. It was not created to replace the MPLA caretaker government and had no legislative or executive functions, but at times seemed like a \textit{de facto} government, further}
period, executive power thereby rested exclusively with President dos Santos, who was at the time of the peace accords also serving as Angola’s Prime Minister, President of the National Assembly, and Chairman of the MPLA (Fritscher, 1991). The party had merged all posts in December 1978, when it had formally adopted a Marxist-Leninist program, introduced a socialist one-party state, and promulgated a constitution that asked the Angolan President to also be “the President of the MPLA” and “represent the Angolan nation” (People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola, 1978a). When it formally accepted the move towards multi-party democracy, the MPLA had to separate these posts, and dos Santos appointed Fernando Jose Franca Van-Dunem as Prime Minister on 19 July 1991. The last parliamentary elections to Angola’s National Assembly had thereby taken place on 9 December 1986 – when the MPLA was the sole legal political party and consequently occupied all 289 seats in parliament – and this was therefore also the case in the caretaker interim legislative.

### Decreasing Uncertainty through Physical Security

I argued that a first mechanism for why power-sharing interim government is more apt to increase the stability of post-interim peace than caretaker interim governments is that power-sharing reduces future uncertainty through increasing the physical security of warring parties (cf. Figure 3.3). It does so, because joining power-sharing institutions requires parties, firstly, to come out of hiding in the remote periphery and join the interim institutions in the capital – which means they have to reveal their organizational structure to each other (making it more difficult to remobilize for war), and which turns them into easier targets for enemy troops (reducing future uncertainty about the opponent’s behavior). Secondly, power-sharing interim governments also mean that rebel-leaders-turned-politicians receive state bodyguards and international attention, further increasing their physical security (cf. Binningsbø and Dupuy, 2010).

This mechanism does not hold for Angola. Even though the warring parties did not implement a power-sharing interim government, the theorized process was still set into motion: UNITA (partially) came out of hiding, established new national headquarters in Luanda (installed yet a number of its own bodyguards to protect Savimbi in the capital), and received massive degrees of international and domestic publicity and news coverage.

Cuban troops had withdrawn from Angola by May 1991. In line with the contributing to the parallel structures of authority during the interim period and to confusion over who was responsible for what tasks (Malaquias, 1995). The JPMC met for the first time on 17 June 1991; and on 10 September, UNITA suspended its participation. Head of the UNITA delegation Salupeto Pena proclaimed UNITA believed the MPLA was not demobilizing and was hence “not committed to implementing the peace agreements” (AFP, 1991f). While UNITA resumed its posts on 17 September, these fights meant that the JPMC was an “admirable compromise” but a generally ineffective and unsatisfactory body (Anstee, 1993).

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86In 1986, members of parliament had been indirectly elected by electoral colleges set up in all 18 provinces of Angola, and provincial assembly members had been selected by citizens in communities and work places (Inter Parliamentary Union, 2015).
1988 New York Accords, their departure was monitored by UNAVEM I and was even completed a month ahead of schedule. After President dos Santos had returned to the capital on 1 June 1991, the way was paved for Savimbi to move UNITA’s headquarters from Jamba to Luanda. On 16 June 1991, UNITA sent a delegation of 65 guerrillas to Luanda that would join the JPMC (cf. Footnote 85 and Amado, 1991d). One week later, the rebels held their first public rally in Luanda since the onset of the civil war in 1975 in front of 10,000 supporters (Amado, 1991e) – previously unthinkable and a clear sign that the rebel group and its followers were coming out of hiding. The (MPLA-controlled) national television also broadcasted scenes of UNITA and MPLA soldiers “fraternizing” in Luanda (Fritscher, 1991). In July 1991, UNITA then officially set up its new national headquarters at the Hotel Turismo in Luanda, but retained some of its parallel institutions in Jamba (cf. below and Maier, 1997).

Savimbi, who had originally scheduled his move to Luanda for July 1991, arrived in the capital on 28 September (Amado, 1991c). He had however refused to accept any official state bodyguards for his protection (cf. Chapter 6 on the similar situation of the CPN (M) in Nepal). A week before his arrival, one hundred “heavily armed rebel soldiers” had thus been sent to Luanda to act as Savimbi’s bodyguards and provide for his security in the capital that was still in the hands of MPLA troops (Amado, 1991b). Even though Savimbi did not assume an official role in the interim government, international political and media attention to his presence in the capital became enormous, also because many international observers – particularly in the US – were convinced that he would dominate the coming national elections (Malaquias, 2007). As a result, Savimbi – who was described as very charismatic and eloquent with international media (Ames, 1992) – received also significant TV coverage during his highly publicized visits to the US (Windrich, 1992). Furthermore, and due to its long established networks and external missions in Western Europe and the US (cf. section 7.1), UNITA was also able to pursue its own media campaign by publishing opinion pieces in several outlets (Samakuva, 1992; Savimbi, 1989).

**Decreasing Uncertainty through Economic Security**

In Chapter 3, I argued that a second mechanism for why power-sharing interim government is more apt to increase the stability of post-interim peace than caretaker interim governments is that power-sharing reduces future uncertainty through increasing the economic benefits for warring parties (cf. Figure 3.3). It does so, because in war-torn states, individual access to wealth and resources is usually determined by control of or loyalty to the government, and thus either side to a conflict must fear to be economically marginalized if the other side fully controls a transition to peace. By rewarding weaker-growing parties with cabinet or legislative positions, power-sharing interim governments enable them to control (or loot) the resources ascribed to their post and thus lower their incentives to acquire such benefits by violent means (cf. Haaß and Ottmann, 169).
Contrariwise, caretaker interim governments should only award the party in power with access to wealth, public goods, and resources; making it rational for the outside party to remobilize for war.

Angola does not confirm to this causal pattern. Again, even though UNITA did not receive any power-sharing guarantees during the interim period, the proposed mechanism came into being and UNITA had the opportunity to enrich itself by looting resources due to the continued existence of its parallel political institutions in the periphery. As I show below, this highlights significant interactions between interim institutional designs and the integration of parallel political institutions into the authority of interim government; an aspect I attended to in Chapter 3 but did not find any support with regard to my full sample (cf. Chapter 4).

As noted above, most observers were certain that UNITA would win the elections scheduled for September 1992, not least because of the departure of socialist parties from office all over the world. Also the MPLA was aware of this trend. This became visible when in July 1991, corruption in the caretaker interim government reached new levels as officials had started to “buy cars and to ensure a comfortable living standard in the event of an UNITA defeat in the elections” (Maier, 1991) – and thus behaved very much like interim elites in Liberia would 12 years later (Haaß and Ottmann, 2015; Human Rights Watch, 2005; International Crisis Group, 2003a). In January 1992, the MPLA caretaker legislative tried to ever more secure the interim government’s access to resources as it passed a new Mining Law 1/92. This law revoked previous legislation (which had banned the private possession of diamonds) and now legally allowed “senior members of the government to take stolen and smuggled diamonds out of the country” (Dowden, 1992a) – which is precisely what my proposed causal mechanism would predict for caretaker interim governments. Consequently and in February 1992, MPLA interim authorities – preparing for an eventual UNITA victory in the upcoming elections – were reportedly “on the run” and “stealing large chunks of the country’s wealth as they go,” such as the “proceeds of the sale of a 10-per-cent share in an oilfield” (Dowden, 1992a).87

Having said that, economic benefits directly resulting from passing the new law were also available to UNITA, the party outside the interim institutions, thus disproving my proposed causal mechanism. Firstly, while Mining Law 1/92 legally enabled MPLA interim authorities to privately engage in diamond trade, the law “backfired” because it also opened the door for UNITA – and literally everyone else – to engage in diamond mining and smuggling (Finkel, 1992a). As a result, and while the interim government managed to retain control over oil revenues, diamond revenue became a major source of funding for UNITA, thus significantly decreasing its cost of future combat (cf. below, Le Billon, 2001a).

Secondly, UNITA was able to engage in the informal acquisition of economic

87This behavior did not, as Le Billon (2001a, p. 63) notes, undermine public support for the government and provide UNITA with an advantage for the upcoming elections, as a popular graffiti during the interim period paraphrases: “The MPLA steals, UNITA kills.”
benefits through diamond smuggling because it refused to reintegrate its parallel administered territories into the control of the MPLA caretaker government. Because it also refused to disarm and demobilize, UNITA was able to use its arms to pressure an estimated 150,000 unauthorized diamond miners (garimpeiros) into helping them in the mining and smuggling business, for instance by setting up patrolling forces in diamond abundant areas (Finkel, 1992a; Malaquias, 2007). Diamond trade was such an enormous economic benefit and financial resource for the rebels that it replaced all other external sources of funding that had waned after the end of the Cold War (Malaquias, 2007). It was not least a key determinant for UNITA’s ability to remobilize for war because it also maintained UNITA’s internal stability (Le Billon, 2001a, p. 71).88 I further attend to the role of diamonds for UNITA’s financial situation below.

Decreasing Uncertainty through Political Security

In Chapter 3 I argued that a third mechanism for why power-sharing interim government is more apt to increase the stability of post-interim peace than caretaker interim rule is that power-sharing reduces future uncertainty through increasing the political security of warring parties (cf. Figure 3.3). Power-sharing firstly, grants weaker-growing parties a voice in the design of post-interim institutions (for instance through jointly passed laws that are difficult to achieve, costly to violate, and hard to renege on) which decreases their uncertainty about the enemy’s future behavior. Secondly, it gives weaker-growing parties the knowledge on how to manipulate future institutional rules to their advantage (Manning, 2007). Contrariwise, in caretaker interim governments the party in power may unilaterally pass laws that secure its own political survival but increase fears of marginalization among the party left outside of power.

There is weak evidence that Angola confirms to this causal pattern. The case shows how the MPLA used its unilateral grip on the interim legislative to pass laws for the post-interim period that secured its own survival, but made peaceful politics more difficult for UNITA. It is yet difficult to secure evidence confirming that UNITA had not remobilized had it been part of a power-sharing interim government. This becomes visible with regard to the drafting and implementation of the Political Parties Law 15/91. Observers have generally described the Bicesse Accords as “very sketchy” (Ottaway, 1998, p. 137) in terms of provisions regulating the interim period, because the agreement merely stated “that 1 September to 30 November 1992 will be the period within which free and fair elections should be held in Angola” and that until that date the MPLA would act as caretaker government (United Nations, 1991b). The warring parties thus only agreed to “fundamental principles of democracy” for the interim period but

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88 UNITA’s ability to use diamonds to fund its violent campaign against the state was only inhibited after UN Security Council Resolution 864 of September 1993 placed international sanctions on the rebel activities (United Nations, 1993) – cf. the situation in Cambodia, where such sanctions were already authorized during the interim period (Chapter 8).
these were stated in very general terms, “and no mechanisms were put in place to continue negotiations” or allow the parties to work together in governing Angola (Ottaway, 1998, p. 137).

With regard to implementing the laws necessary for Angola’s first multi-party elections, the MPLA-controlled parliament had already passed the Political Parties Law 15/91 on 11 May 1991 in order to pave the way for the Bicesse Accords – the law explicitly allowed for opposition parties and called for an end of the one-party state. On the surface, this law was precisely what UNITA had demanded during the peace process and in the lead up to the Bicesse Accords. As I outlined above, the rebels had previously rejected the terms of the 1988 Gbadolite Agreement that would have required UNITA to integrate into a MPLA-controlled one-party state. On a closer look, however, the law was unilaterally drafted and passed by the MPLA legislative to include several paragraphs that favored the political survival of the MPLA following the 1992 elections at the expense of parties outside the interim government.

Firstly, the law outlawed ethnically-based political parties and required that parties present membership numbers in each province in order to register. This requirement strongly favored the traditionally multi-ethnic MPLA and was more difficult to achieve for UNITA – a party with a dominant ethnic Ovimbundu base – or parties operating in northern Angola among the ethnic Bakongo population, such as the FNLA (cf. section 7.1 and Tomasevski, 1994). Secondly, the law demanded that parties must present at least 3,000 signatures of civilian supporters in order to register for elections. Civilians signing up to support a party had to produce a number of photocopies and stamps that were “difficult to come by in Luanda and nearly impossible to get in the provinces” controlled by UNITA (Maier, 1991). Thirdly, the relatively low number of required signatures at the same time was meant “to facilitate the emergence of various political parties to dilute UNITA’s electoral base” and the anti-MPLA vote (Malaquias, 1995, p. 296). Fourthly, some argue that the law constituted a clear victory for the MPLA because the party could demonstrate “that it was not afraid to move its contest with UNITA into the political arena,” thereby using the law “to significantly weaken UNITA by bringing into the same arena many other political formations that could complicate UNITA’s claim to be MPLA’s only real opposition” (cf. below, Malaquías, 2007, p. 138).

The process of events and actions that followed the implementation of the Political Parties Law 15/91 highlights how the behavior of the caretaker interim government increased antagonism and mistrust between the parties as well as UNITA’s fear of marginalization in the post-interim period. Although UNITA agreed in the Bicesse Accords under Section IV (“Political Rights to be Exercised By UNITA”) to “satisfy the formal requirements for its registration as a political party pursuant to the Political Parties Law of the People’s Republic of Angola” (United Nations, 1991b), it had not filed all necessary documents for registration by October 1991. Consequently, President dos Santos publicly
requested that the rebels comply with Law 15/91 (as well as with all further regulations issued by the interim legislative regarding the elections), so that the interim government would be able to move forward with the electoral process (Brittain, 1998). In February 1992, UNITA reported that it had submitted two of the necessary documents required for registration, but the interim government argued in response that the rebels had still failed to hand in the compulsory 3,000 signatures of supporters, which it interpreted as a sign that UNITA was trying to impede a smooth electoral process (Permanent Mission of Angola, 1992). UNITA immediately reacted to this statement and argued that all delays in the electoral process were not the fault of the rebels, but of the interim government. Savimbi himself thereby accused the MPLA of trying to push back elections that could end its grip to power as it “had not yet issued an election code for multiparty legislative and presidential elections” (AFP, 1991d). And on 26 March 1992, UNITA’s UK representative Samakuva furthermore argued in a letter to The Guardian that the “main factor seriously threatening to delay the elections” was not UNITA’s fault in not submitting necessary documents for registration, but “the government’s failure to finalize the laws vital to good governance, these being the Law on Political Parties, the Electoral Law and the law guaranteeing freedom of the press” (Samakuva, 1992).

Some have argued that had Angola’s interim government included a power-sharing formula for UNITA – any arrangement that would have forced the parties to work together on key legislation and enabled them to communicate privately instead of through public media and campaign statements – it would have helped them to develop confidence and trust in the true intentions of the adversary, aided them to use a more appeasing language behind closed doors, and thereby mitigated fears of marginalization and commitment problems (cf. Fortna, 2003a). Ottaway (1998, p. 146) has also reasoned in this regard that power-sharing would “have provided a valuable training opportunity for UNITA ... that had no experience in governing a country and would undoubtedly have benefited from early exposure to the problems of administration.” This could in turn have increased UNITA’s chance of political survival by showing prospective voters that it was capable of running a national government.

But any argumentation along these lines misses out on three aspects. Firstly, UNITA did have the opportunity to demonstrate its ability to govern a larger territory because it never reintegrated its parallel political institutions into the authority of the interim government (cf. below). It did however not use its opportunity because it acted increasingly predatory, repressive, and violent towards the population living under its control. Secondly, any argument calling for power-sharing interim government as a determinant for peace in Angola ignores that neither UNITA nor the MPLA were willing to consider joint rule during peace negotiations in the first place, not for the interim period, and certainly not for the post-interim period. This is because both parties were extremely centralized, hierarchical, and populist organizations led by strong men
convinced that they would win an election (Anstee, 1993; Heywood, 2000; Ottaway, 1998). UNITA was actually convinced that it would be more beneficial for its long-term political survival if it stayed outside the formal interim government institutions. As Pereira (1994, p. 15) phrases it, the MPLA “wanted to retain control over the state, while [UNITA] was convinced that the Luanda régime would become so unpopular by being unable to meet the economic expectations of the population that it was better to remain in opposition.” And thirdly, while one may imagine a hypothetical situation in which Savimbi could have used a participation in a power-sharing interim government to manipulate the electoral rules so that he would not have lost the 1992 elections, it is difficult to imagine dos Santos accepting to lose this vote after over 25 years in power; and it is more likely that the MPLA had then remobilized for civil war.

7.2.2 International Interim Government

My second hypothesis held that international interim rule, as opposed to interim government without the involvement of the international community, increases the stability of post-interim peace. I defined international interim government as one in which members of the international community assume political authority in some or all policy matters. I outlined that past research has often looked at such interim government in a strict interpretation following Doyle (2002), but that I prefer the more lenient perspective of Guttieri and Piombo (2007) who reason that most present interim governments see vast degrees of international influence in decision-making – even though this influence may not be formalized in administrative structures. In Chapter 3, I then held that in the presence of commitment problems, international interim rule increases the stability of peace through the mechanism of raising costs of defection via physical deterrence, as well as by the means of policy influence (cf. Figure 3.3). Concurrently, in cases where international actors do not take on any kind of interim authority, commitment problems should be exacerbated for weaker-growing parties.

By signing the Bicesse Accords in 1991, UNITA and the MPLA agreed to offer international actors – and in particular the UN – an influential role during the rule of Angola’s interim government, allowing me to classify Angola as international interim government under a lenient understanding of the concept, albeit not under a strict definition (cf. Chapter 4). In specific, and in accordance with Bicesse, the UN Security Council adopted its Resolution 696 on 30 May 1991 to authorize the United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II) for an initial period of 17 months (United Nations, 1991c). UNAVEM II’s initial mandate included the verification of the Bicesse Accords, as well as the monitoring of the ceasefire and of the Angolan national police

89In June 1991, Savimbi stated in this regard that “the new political system should give strong powers to a head of state elected for a five-year term” (Ames, 1991), and both Savimbi and dos Santos regarded the elections “as a chance to win at the ballot box what they could not win on the battlefield: legitimate power to rule Angola alone” (Fortna, 2003a, p. 75).
during the interim period. The mandate was enlarged on 24 March 1992 in Security Council Resolution 747 to comprise also the observation and verification of presidential and legislative elections, as well as to increase the number of personnel on the ground for this purpose (United Nations, 1992d). UNAVEM II was quickly deployed – likely due to its small size as compared to previous peacekeeping operations in Namibia or Cambodia (cf. Chapter 8). Already on 2 June 1991, military observers arrived in five of what would be the six regional headquarters of UNAVEM II in Saurimo, Luena, Menongue, Huambo, Lubango, and Luanda. In the weeks thereafter, UNAVEM II deployed further military observers to 46 assembly areas or cantonment sites in which the warring parties would disarm and demobilize (cf. below) and assumed its seat in the JPMC to oversee the implementation of the ceasefire (cf. Footnote 85). On 25 October 1991, UNAVEM II was fully staffed and included 350 military observers, 89 civilian police officers, 14 medical staff, 54 international civilian personnel, and 41 local civilian personnel (United Nations, 2000b). These numbers were increased following Resolution 747 and at the end of the interim period, UNAVEM II comprised 126 civilian police officers, 87 international civilian officers, 155 local staff as well as 400 additional electoral observers deployed to Angola to oversee the electoral registration and polling process.

**Tying Hands through Physical Deterrence**

In Chapter 3 I argued that a first mechanism for why international interim government is more apt to increase the stability of post-interim peace than any other interim government is that international authority increases the warring parties’ costs of defection through *physical deterrence* (cf. Figure 3.3). It does so, firstly, because the military components associated with international interim government bring large numbers of troops that place physical constraints on the warring parties’ ability to break a deal (for instance by implementing buffer zones for the disarmament and demobilization of those parties). Secondly, parties do no longer only have to fight their enemy but also have to spend valuable resources fighting peacekeepers. Thirdly, the high financial and human costs that come with assuming authority in war-torn states assure parties that the international community has a strong interest in upholding a bargain and achieving a positive outcome of the peace process.

Under a lenient definition that conceptualizes Angola as an international interim government, the case does not confirm to this suggested causal pattern. Even though UN Special Representative Anstee had optimistically announced UNAVEM II’s foreseen function of tying the hands of the warring parties to peaceful behavior – “[a]ny party will have to think twice about deviating from the peace process due to the strong reaction which will result from the international community” (in AFP, 1992g) – UNAVEM II’s mandate (and the manner of its implementation) did not actually increase the warring parties’ costs of defection. Firstly, the number of UN personnel was too few to control the
territory of Angola and impose real constraints on the behavior of the parties. Namibia, for instance, a country of similar size that saw stable post-interim peace following the rule of its UNTAG international interim government, had seen a peacekeeping operation of 4,493 personnel of all ranks, which was more than five times the size of UNAVEM II (cf. Maier, 1997). Even though 400 additional electoral observers were fielded during the polling period at the end of interim rule, those were still far too few to check the over 6,000 polling stations set up throughout the country, as head of UNDP Paulo Baldan remarked in the summer of 1992 (IPS, 1992). Secondly, UNAVEM II was also lacking the material resources to demobilize the Angolan warring parties and increase their costs of defection during and after the interim period (Fortna, 2003a). For instance, when UNAVEM II began to staff the cantonment sites in September 1991 as foreseen by Bicesse, a UN officer in the central province of Malanje stated that among the key logistical obstacles in UNAVEM II’s operation were the few vehicles available to actually bring troops to the designated assembly areas – and if there was a car, there was usually no fuel (Finkel, 1991c).

This lack of mandate and resources directly affected the perception of the warring parties, and particularly UNITA, that the international authority UNAVEM II represented would not increase its costs of defection in case it wanted to remobilize for armed combat against the MPLA. A year into the rule of the interim government, both warring parties (as well as the public) knew that international actors would not punish any violation of the peace agreement, and they started to exploit this situation to defect from the negotiated bargain struck in the Bicesse Accords. Firstly, both parties repeatedly exploited the lack of resources the UN faced in Angola, knowing that their reluctance to send combatants to cantonment sites would not result in any penalty by the UN, and also knowing that combatants deserting from the harsh living conditions in the assembly areas would not be punished either (cf. below). As a result, UNAVEM II announced in early 1992 that 35,000 previously detained troops had left the cantonment sites again (AFP, 1992a).

Secondly, UNITA exploited the lack of mandate of UNAVEM II (that forbid peacekeepers to use force other than for self-protection) and immediately after the 1992 elections began killing prominent supporters of the MPLA while explicitly stating that the UN was not in a position to stop them. Thereby, UNITA is said to have expressively wanted to demonstrate “that even the best known, the best educated, the most loved of local leaders, and whites” were not protected against UNITA, and “that no one in the UN or the international community could or would protect anyone” (Brittain, 1998, p. 62).

Furthermore, once combatants arrived in the designated assembly areas, UNAVEM II was unable to provide for the necessary amounts of food, which not only contributed to riots within the cantonment sites, but also made fully mobilized soldiers desert from the assembly areas to steal food from the farmers in neighboring areas (cf. below). As Director of the World Food Program Ramiro da Silve said, “[soldiers] will not stay in the camps if they have nothing to eat .... Without guaranteed food, they will form banditry groups” (Finkel, 1991b).

90Not least, the UN’s failure to increase UNITA’s costs of defection deepened mistrust...
That a lack of mandate and resources directly contributed to why Angola does not confirm to the causal pattern between international interim government and peace is also visualized in Figure 7.2. This figure displays the number of battle-related deaths in Angola between 1989 and 2002 (dashed line), as well as the number of UN peacekeeping troops deployed (solid line).\textsuperscript{92} The graph thereby clearly shows the high intensity of Angola’s civil war until the signing of the Bicesse Accords in 1991, after which intrastate violence dropped significantly only to spike again following the electoral defeat of UNITA in the fall of 1992. Following fragile periods of peace and remobilizations for war in the second half of the 1990s, civil war in Angola finally came to an end with Savimbi’s death in 2002. Figure 7.2 also displays that there exists a clear negative correlation between the number of UN peacekeeping personnel on the ground and battle-related deaths. In periods when more UN troops were deployed to Angola, fewer battle-related deaths occurred. This is not to assume any causal relationship – peacekeeping troops may have deterred violent combat between the warring against international actors in Angola that UNAVEM II was not up to its job (Ottaway, 1998). For instance, when in September 1992 an expatriate working in Angola spotted a man jogging in the streets and commented: “He must be from UNAVEM II ... They are the only ones with time to run” (IPS, 1992). UN electoral observers were also frequently criticized for being overpaid, not speaking Portuguese (let alone local languages), having little knowledge of Angolan social customs or little interest in the job (IPS, 1992).

\textsuperscript{92}These include all troops deployed on the ground during UNAVEM I, UNAVEM II, as well as during all subsequent UN peacekeeping and political missions in Angola.
parties; but violent combat could also have lead to the UN withdrawing its personnel for security reasons.

Observers of the Angolan peace process thereby agree that a stronger mandate during the interim period that would have allowed UNAVEM II to actively disarm and demobilize the warring parties and to penalize the parties in cases of non-compliance with the terms of the Bicesse Accords would have contributed also to stable peace in the post-interim period: “[H]ad the United Nations been empowered, and able, to disarm both sides before the elections, the possibilities of a return to hostilities would have been seriously curtailed” (Anstee, 1993, p. 500). And had UNAVEM II been mandated to “act as a deterring factor within the framework of traditional peackeeping, defined ... as keeping the antagonists away from each other through measures – such as monitoring the cease-fire, controlling buffer zones and military encampment sites, investigating arms flows – that could have prevented the resumption of fighting” following the 1992 elections (Malaquias, 2007, p. 90).

### Tying Hands through Policy Influence

In Chapter 3 I argued that a second mechanism for why international interim government is more apt to increase the stability of post-interim peace than any other interim government is that international authority increases costs of defection for warring parties through policy influence. It does so, because every policy field advanced by a neutral international officer decreases a stronger-growing party’s ability to use this position for factional interest and thus to pursue politics that marginalize a weaker-growing party. This reasoning thus goes hand in hand with previous studies on peackeeping that stress the UN’s role as “as truly neutral authority” (Gisselquist, 2002, p. 12).

Also this causal mechanism does not come into being in Angola. Not only was UNAVEM II never endowed with any de jure policy influence in the first place – due to the MPLA’s objection and the international perception of Angola as an “easily resolvable” case of war – but the UN was also never regarded as a “truly neutral authority” that could solve commitment problems. Generally, when the Bicesse Accords were signed, Angola was “not viewed as a particularly difficult peackeeping case” (Fortna, 2003a, p. 74) – after all, its predecessor UNAVEM I had succeeded in monitoring the Cuban withdrawal a month ahead of schedule, the Cold War and its ensuing external support to the warring parties had ended, and the Angolan conflict was also regarded as a non-ethnic, non-secessionist war “easily” to be solved by holding elections (cf. MacQueen, 2000). Furthermore, although UNITA had in the talks leading up to the Bicesse...
Accords demanded “a large UN presence with far-reaching powers,” the ruling MPLA had strongly objected this proposition “on the grounds that this would prejudice Angola’s national sovereignty” (Anstee, 1993, 496, cf. Chapter 6 on the same reasoning among RNA elites in Nepal).

It is difficult to assess whether, had UNAVEM II been mandated to influence policy in the interim period, UNITA’s commitment problems would have been mitigated and it would not have resorted to war. Greenhill and Major (2007, p. 21) suggest as much, arguing that the “primary responsibility for implementation of the [Bicesse] protocol was assigned to the local parties rather than to UNAVEM II” which “exacerbated already extant commitment problems.” But the events and actions taken by UNITA immediately after the elections leave strong doubt for this theoretical pattern. This doubt is not least grounded in the observation that UNITA never perceived UNAVEM II as what the mission presented itself as – a “neutral, sufficiently accountable, comprehensively multilateral and reasonably transparent” authority to mitigate the parties’ commitment problems (Aksu, 2013, p. 160). For instance, as quoted above, Savimbi announced on 3 October 1992 on VORGAN that “it will not depend on any international organization to say that the elections were free and fair” (in Maier, 1997, p. 13). He also “dismissed entirely the views of nearly 800 foreign election observers” stating that UNAVEM II had been biased all along, had participated in the MPLA’s electoral fraud, and that he had “all the data concerning the violation and theft of votes, which we will steadily provide to the national and international opinion” (Noble, 1992). A few days later, VORGAN also claimed that international observers only called the elections free and fair as they were bribed by the MPLA government with “money, diamonds and mercury” (in The Guardian, 1992). These observations imply that increased policy input by the UN during the interim period would not have mitigated commitment problems, because the UN was not perceived as the “truly neutral authority” (Gisselquist, 2002, p. 12) that mitigates commitment problems by reducing the insecurity produced by the anarchic institutional environment of war-torn states (cf. Chapter 8 on the similar situation in Cambodia).

7.2.3 Integration of Parallel Institutions

My third hypothesis in Chapter 3 reasoned that in the presence of commitment problems, more advanced processes of integrating the parallel political and military institutions of warring parties into the authority of an interim government come with more stable post-interim peace spells by raising the costs of defection. It does so, because in order to sustain in war, parties need parallel military and political institutions to accumulate means and resources for fighting and to manage their relation with the population. As long as these parallel institutions persist throughout an interim period, parties retain the financial resources, popular legitimacy, hierarchical command structures, and cultural mindsets to remobilize for war in the post-interim period. Interim gov-
ernments that integrate these parallel institutions should consequently increase the stability of post-interim peace (cf. Figure 3.3).

**Parallel Political Institutions**

As I have outlined in section 7.1, UNITA developed an extensive system of parallel political structures in the areas under its control before signing the Bicesse Accords. These structures included a parallel education system for thousands of students, a healthcare system including a two hundred fifty-bed hospital in Jamba, a comprehensive agricultural program with centrally managed farms to provide food for civilians and combatants alike, as well as a political leadership structure with several ministries and a party secretariat (Brittain, 1998; James, 1992; Pearce, 2015; Potgieter, 2000). These parallel institutions were also developed because early UNITA ideology – inspired by Maoist mobilization strategies – had focused on the “political indoctrination of the masses rather than the development of a strong military force” (James, 1992, p. 100). As visualized in Figure 7.3, the rebels administered a significant amount of territory when they signed the Bicesse Accords and virtually represented a second government of Angola. However, UNITA formally agreed to reintegrate all parallel structures into the control of the caretaker interim government and to accept this government’s authority during the period leading up to the 1992 elections: Under Section IV of the Bicesse Accords (“Political Rights to be exercised by UNITA following the Cease-Fire”), UNITA agreed to the “extension of the Central Administration to those areas of Angola that are presently beyond the range of its authority” (United Nations, 1991b). This commitment was not credible: UNITA did not follow through with the bargain struck in the Bicesse Accords and refused to reintegrate its parallel political structures. Instead, it represented a parallel authority to the MPLA government throughout the entire interim period, “left ambiguous the question of where real power was to lie in the transitional period up to the elections,” hindered the electoral registration process in the areas under its control, and repeatedly blamed the interim government for any failures (Brittain, 1998, p. 45).

On 1 July 1991, observers were still optimistic that UNITA would integrate its parallel political structures into the authority of the caretaker interim government, because UNITA’s parallel capital of Jamba “celebrated the historic arrival of the first government delegation to visit the rebel headquarters” that day (AFP, 1991c). After this symbolic visit, no further actions were however taken to reintegrate UNITA’s parallel administration. In October 1991, the rebels still controlled 24 municipalities and 162 communes in south-eastern Angola, showing “no sign of returning them to government administration as required by Bicesse” (Brittain, 1998, p. 50). When the situation had not changed by March 1992, MPLA Minister of Territorial Administration Lopo do Nascimento demanded that the warring parties “put a final date on extending territorial administration so that we can start registration” for the elections (Brittain,
1992a). Directly responding to do Nascimento’s remark, UNITA’s UK representative Samakuva stated in a letter to The Guardian that it was not UNITA’s fault but the interim government’s “incompetence” that explained why the latter was “extremely slow to deploy into the southern areas,” and that “various elements of the population throughout the entire country refuse to accept some government administrators who have in the past been identified as ruthlessly suppressing them” (Samakuva, 1992).

In May 1992, the interim government formally began registering voters for the upcoming election (Smith, 1991). By June only fourteen of 80 planned electoral registration centers had yet opened and had only registered about one percent of all voters (AFP, 1992e). In July, the interim government was able to send its officials to more registration centers throughout Angola and also to areas controlled UNITA. However, this personnel had to quickly retrieve back to MPLA territory after the rebels kidnapped registration officials or burned their cars, stole electoral registers, and generally used violence to enforce the flight of the MPLA administration and the cancellation of the electoral registration (Brittain, 1998). In August, Angola’s Ambassador to the UK José Alves Primo (1992) wrote to The Independent that the government was “unable to

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94 The MPLA had initially planned to staff electoral registration centers with demobilized FALA soldiers but abandoned the plan after protests by the international community arose. Centers were staffed with teachers and civil servants instead (Bayer, 1992).
extend the central administration to the whole country in order to register the electorate” due to UNITA’s “continued illegal occupation of some places, where representatives of the government and of newly formed political parties have been subjected to extreme intimidation and even physical violence.”

**Affecting Financial Means** In Chapter 3, I held that a first mechanism for why interim governments that integrate the parallel political institutions of warring parties increase the stability of post-interim peace vis-à-vis all other interim governments is that the former raise costs of defection by limiting the financial resources warring parties need to remobilize (cf. Figure 3.3). In contrast, and when facing commitment problems caused by an uncertainty of the adversary’s future behavior, the continued existence of parallel political institutions allows parties to retreat to their zones of territorial control and regroup for war. It also allows them to use parallel structures to acquire the financial means to buy new weaponry through parallel taxation as well as through managing natural resource extraction.

Angola confirms to this causal pattern. UNITA’s ability to manage the extraction and sale of natural resources by means of controlling parallel political institutions during the rule of the interim government is one of the central explanations for why it was able to remobilize for war in the fall of 1992. Firstly, as a result of UNITA’s ongoing administration of large parts of Angolan territory, Jonas Savimbi had the opportunity to immediately flee to Luanda’s airport and then take off to rebel-held Huambo when the election results were announced in September 1992. Interim Minister of Territorial Administration do Nasciminto quickly commented this move with: “If he’s gone to Huambo, it is a declaration of war” (in Brittain, 1992c, p. 57). Secondly, its ongoing parallel administration of Angola allowed UNITA to acquire the financial means for remobilization by looting and smuggling natural resources, but not so much by taxing civilians living in the zones under its control (McGreal, 1991). Parallel taxation generally only played a marginal role in determining UNITA’s financial situation because such taxation did not take a monetary form. After all, the rebels never established a monetary system in the areas they administered, meaning that a whole generation grew up “not knowing what money is” (AFP, 1991c). Instead, civilians were expected to donate their time to work on collectively managed farms and were paid in food or salt (Pearce, 2015).

But retaining its set of parallel political institutions throughout the interim period enabled UNITA to preserve and further develop its means of financing armed combat by introducing parallel patrolling forces at diamond mines, and exchanging looted diamonds for weapons at the international borders with Zambia and Namibia that were under its control. “In the post-Cold War era, diamond smuggling from rebel controlled areas took place within a context of unprecedented worldwide proliferation of light weapons” and “Angola’s diamonds helped to fuel the war by providing the rebels with the means to prolong
Having said that, my theoretical argument in Chapter 3 strictly isolates the causal mechanism of raising costs of defection by relinquishing the means of financing armed combat from raising such costs by losing the opportunity to deliver public services more effectively than an interim government, thus affecting levels of popular support. As I show next, these mechanisms are interlinked in Angola.

**Affecting Levels of Popular Support** I held that a second mechanism for why interim governments that integrate the parallel political institutions of warring parties increase the stability of peace is that such interim governments increase costs of defection by affecting the levels of popular support parties need to remobilize (cf. Figure 3.3). This argument builds on the idea that in order to raise their expected capability to prevail in war, warring parties need to maintain support from the civilian population (e.g. because voluntary conscription is cheaper than forced conscription), which they can acquire by providing public services through parallel administration. Consequently, as long as warring parties can prove that they can deliver public services more effectively than an interim government, they also keep significant popular legitimacy which reduces their costs of remobilizing for war.

There is only weak evidence for this causal mechanism in Angola. A key explanation for why the case does not more strongly confirm to the causal pattern is that UNITA used its parallel political institutions for looting natural resources to improve its financial situation. It thereby exchanged persuasive with predatory behavior. UNITA had initially created its parallel structures precisely in order to build popular legitimacy: when Savimbi started the movement in 1964, he was convinced that “the population under UNITA control had to be satisfied that the insurgent administration was as effective as the government’s” bureaucracy (James, 1992, p. 98). He further was said to believe “that providing services was essential in establishing a political relationship with people” (Pearce, 2015, p. 96).

As long as the rebels were dependent on financing their violent campaign against the MPLA through external funds as well as the help of the civilian population to support the rebellion – e.g. by donating their work force of farms, thus cultivating food for soldiers – they also ensured that civilians were satisfied with the rebel administration by providing basic social services (Pearce, 2015). As a result, and until 1991, many residents of UNITA-administrated

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95I attended to the role of natural resources as an alternative explanatory variable for peace in Chapter 5, particularly because this variable is not held at constant in my most similar system design. Diamond mining and smuggling does represent an important explanation for why UNITA could return to war, but the explanation follows a mechanism in which parallel political and military structures represent a core first step: Without upholding troops it did not disarm and demobilize, UNITA could not have set up armed parallel patrolling forces at diamond mines; and without its continued parallel administration of border regions, UNITA could not have smuggled diamonds in exchange for weapons.

96For instance, as a former village director recalls, teachers and nurses “lived at the bases and left the bases to help the people in the villages,” and they were paid in food or salt, and
areas expressed their support for the movement *explicitly* because of the parallel government structures that the rebels had created, and they regarded these parallel institutions as underpinning UNITA’s credibility in seeking national aspirations for governing Angola (Pearce, 2012). This decreased the costs of war for UNITA, not least because UNITA had provided the population also with a “perception of fear and threat so as to convince people that they needed UNITA as a defender” of basic order and security (Pearce, 2015, p. 103).

To some extent, UNITA was eager to prove its ability to provide basic services in order to maintain popular legitimacy also during the interim period. This was to prove to prospective voters “the weakness of the Luanda government” (James, 1992, p. 100) and to demonstrate its “persuasive capabilities” during the interim period (cf. Pearce, 2015, p. 102). Firstly, in its parallel education system, UNITA teachers refused to use schoolbooks printed by the interim government. One teacher was quoted in early 1992 with “we cannot use those books,” stating he could not teach students the words of the MPLA (in Finkel, 1992c). Secondly, in its parallel healthcare system, UNITA denied government doctors access into administrated areas. The rebels also refused to distribute the yellow United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) vaccination cards that were inscribed with “Angolan Ministry of Health,” forcing UNICEF to print special vaccination cards for rebel territories (Finkel, 1992c). UNICEF representative Marli Pinto thus protested in February 1992 that UNITA was asking UNICEF “for help in supplying their own health clinics,” while UNICEF was supposed to be working with the interim government (in Finkel, 1992c). And thirdly, in its parallel economy, UN officials warned in early 1992 that UNITA’s centrally managed farms were not enough to feed all civilians living under rebel control, to which UNITA responded with a demand that UN food aid was delivered into its areas so that it could label and distribute it itself in order to increase its legitimacy among prospective voters (Brittain, 1992c).97

But the relationship between UNITA and the civilian population under its control also changed during the interim period. As a result, UNITA’s continued provision of public services did not positively affect its public legitimacy vis-à-vis the MPLA interim government, thereby decreasing its costs of remobilization. This step in the proposed causal mechanism fails to come into being in Angola because UNITA no longer assumed its wealth and organizational strength through external financial support and local aid of the population. Instead, UNITA resorted to smuggling diamonds out of the areas it administered, thereby missing out on positioning itself “as the natural political alternative to the governing MPLA” (Malaquias, 2007, p. 111) while its behavior towards the

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97 UNITA’s demand was thereby also linked to its strategy to keep the civilian population in the areas it governed. This is not least in order to retain close control over prospective voters and because controlling an even more sparsely populated territory would have reduced the viability of its claim to be a true alternative to the MPLA interim government (cf. Chapter 8 on a similar mechanism unfolding in Cambodia, and Brittain, 1992c).
civilian population grew increasingly predatory (Pearce, 2012):

“For the rebels – no longer dependent on the population for food and other necessities because such essential goods could now be purchased abroad with diamonds and flown into rebel controlled areas – people became both dispensable and disposable. Consequently, ... control of resources, not people, became the rebels’ primary concern. ... UNITA used its substantial diamond revenues to undertake a fundamental military reorganization away from its traditional posture as a guerrilla army into a more conventional disposition in preparation for delivering a last victorious blow against government forces and finally seizing power” (Malaquias, 2007, p. 111).

This amounted to a situation immediately after the 1992 elections, when UNITA remobilized for war and a citizen of Huambo remembered that “UNITA killed, it didn’t recruit anyone new” because it was not in need of any further support – it had money from natural resource extraction, and everyone living under its control was already a soldier (cf. below and Pearce, 2015, p. 130). This situation and the resulting behavior of UNITA also lead to an almost paradoxical situation in Angola from the lens of bargaining theory. If UNITA’s ultimate goal was to achieve full and unrestrained political power (cf. Pereira, 1994), it should have favored to reach such goal by winning elections (and then abandoning any structures of political accountability), but without paying the costs of further war. However, while the continued control over its parallel political institutions and with that the means to loot natural resources, smuggle them over the border, and sell them to acquire further weaponry contributed to its ability to fight in war, it significantly decreased its ability to secure political survival (or even political dominance) through a less costly electoral process. Ultimately, UNITA’s hostile behavior towards the civilian population provoked growing skepticism among potential voters regarding UNITA’s credibility as a legitimate national government. This becomes not least visible in that the MPLA was able to win several of the provinces controlled by UNITA, such as gaining 53.14 percent of the parliamentary votes in Moxico. Thus, UNITA’s behavior transformed the rebel group’s “assets (its arms and the ‘culture’ associated with them) into liabilities: its arrogance, its blatant retention of its weapons, and its thirst for revenge” (Messiant, 2004).

Parallel Military Institutions during Angola’s Interim Period

UNITA and the MPLA also agreed in the Bicesse Accords to disarm and demobilize their respective military forces and create a joint national army before

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98 This aspect of resource rents and public legitimacy of parallel rebel governments points to studies on political dynamics in resource-rich countries that have found that if governments do not rely on citizens for tax revenues because natural resources provide them with a guaranteed source of government income, such governments are often characterized by authoritarian and non-accountable political structures of authority (Robinson, Torvik, et al., 2006).
holding elections. In specific, the terms of the peace agreement stated that at the time of elections, “only the Angolan Armed Forces shall exist” and all “members of the present armed forces of each party who do not become members of the Angolan Armed Forces shall be demobilized prior to the holding of elections” (United Nations, 1991b). The deal moreover outlined 48 designated cantonnement sites for the MPLA and UNITA respectively, and regulated that all forces should be assembled at the latest 60 days following the ceasefire.

The parties did not follow through with the bargain they struck in the Bicesse Accords. They began moving their troops into the designated cantonnement sites in June 1991, a process that was set to be completed by August that same year. But on 14 September 1991, UNITA Representative to the JPMC Elias Salupeto Pena argued that three months “after the formal signing of the Angolan peace accords, we have come to contest that we do not have a single government soldier in any concentration area” (in Finkel, 1991a). UNITA itself claimed by November 1991 that it had concluded the process of cantonnement and that all of its troops were now in the assembly areas overseen by UNAVEM II. The UN, however, only listed 26,968 cantoned UNITA combatants out of an estimated 49,800, as well as 68,666 government soldiers out of an estimated 115,640. The UN furthermore noted that many “combatants” that UNITA had sent to cantonnement included elderly, children or unarmed peasants instead of guerrilla fighters (Malaquias, 2007) – increasing fears at the time that Savimbi was really building a “secret army” in Jamba (cf. below and Brittain, 1998).

Those soldiers and combatants that had moved into the cantonnement sites began disarming in April 1992, months behind schedule (Dowden, 1992b). By June 1992 – when armed forces should have already been fully demobilized and reintegrated into civilian life or into the national army, had the Bicesse Accords been accordingly implemented – an estimated 85 percent of UNITA’s troops, as well as 37 percent of soldiers loyal to the MPLA were still encamped (Fortna, 2003a; Ottaway, 1998). By September 1992, and one week before the national elections, only 10 per cent of UNITA forces had been completely demobilized, while up to 47,000 remained in the assembly areas as fully organized and disciplined units that had access to an array of light and heavy weapons not turned over to the UN (Brittain, 1992b). Two days before the elections, UNITA was reported to have “tipped the security equation further in its favor by sending its personnel to areas formerly under MPLA control and hiding arms caches to support an offensive” (Fortna, 2003a, p. 76). In sum, UNITA thus entered the general elections of 1992 with most of its parallel military structure “strengthened by eighteen months of preparation” (Maier, 1997, p. 11).

Affecting Military Infrastructures  In Chapter 3, I held that a first mechanism for why interim governments that integrate the parallel military institutions of warring parties increase the stability of peace is that such interim governments destroy the military infrastructure necessary for remobilization.
They do so, because such integration through disarmament and demobilization programs, firstly, retrieve parties of their means to prevail in combat by collecting and destroying weapon stocks. Secondly, they also weaken hierarchical command structures between rank-and-file soldiers and military commanders within armed organizations, thus increasing the costs of such leaders to remobilize for war (cf. Figure 3.3). In contrast, and following interim governments that fail to disarm and demobilize warring parties before the end of their rule, violence in the post-interim period becomes more likely.

Angola confirms to this suggested causal pattern. The poorly realized disarmament and demobilization process neither removed UNITA’s means of fighting nor weakened its command structures, and this directly reduced the rebels’ costs of remobilizing in 1992. Firstly, the warring parties kept their weapons throughout the interim period. In the early days of the rule of the interim government, when those troops that were sent to canton arrived at the designated sites, they were even allowed to keep their weapons when operating inside the camp, in order to increase the individual perceptions of safety for each soldier. As UNITA deputy intelligence chief Zacarias Meoldombe commented: “Soldiers are going to say: ‘My gun is my security and I won’t leave it while the situation is not resolved.’ We have to explain that it is OK to leave their guns, that they are exchanging their guns for a ballot” (in McGreal, 1991).\footnote{Even in September 1992, a UNDP representative asserted both sides were “not confident enough to fully give up their weapons and soldiers before the election” (in Finkel, 1992b).}

When UNITA combatants however began to continuously violate the terms of the peace agreement, such as by moving out of the camps to threaten civilian communities in search for food, UNAVEM II began to more actively disarm combatants and store their weapons inside the cantonment sites. Having said that, secure weapon storage was impossible to implement in the remote areas of Angola where most buildings were makeshift grass huts or self-made tents, and thus soldiers had easy access to their guns at all times (Fortna, 2003a; Niekerk, 1992). Furthermore – and demonstrating how cheating the DDR process was directly used by Savimbi and his cadres to remobilize in the fall of 1992 – while the “most obsolete of UNITA weapons were handed over to teams of international inspectors,” the rebels stored military equipment “in arms dumps strategically chosen around the provinces by Savimbi himself” so that the rebels would have access to these weapons come the day remobilization was necessary (Birmingham, 2015, p. 110).

Secondly, the warring parties retained their internal command structures throughout the interim period. Instead of breaking up these hierarchical structures, the Angolan cantonment process actually resulted particularly for UNITA in retaining intact military units. This was aided by the almost paradoxical situation that the warring parties were supposed to form a joint and integrated national army, but in reality kept their respective forces in separate cantonment sites and with separate identities (Finkel, 1992c): “Both FAPLA and UNITA...
soldiers retained their different uniforms and different loyalties” throughout the rule of the interim government (Pearce, 2015, p. 127). This meant particularly for UNITA that party elites were able to exercise an extremely strict and hierarchical control over combatants – Savimbi was quoted with the remark that if at any time “any UNITA soldier fires a shot without an order, it will be his last shot. ... If we catch you firing your gun, you will not move again from that very spot” (in Pearce, 2015, p. 48). This was more so than in the MPLA – and some observers note that the military infrastructure of the MPLA had disintegrated to a larger extent than the one of UNITA, also because the MPLA had made an attempt to demobilize “in the hopes of finally winning the international respectability and US diplomatic recognition which had eluded them for so many years” (Brittain, 1998, p. 59).

As a result, and when he lost the 1992 elections, Savimbi could mobilize his forces directly out of the cantonment sites. Three days after election results were officially announced on 3 October 1991, journalists reported from four provinces that UNITA combatants were pouring out of the cantonment sites with their “weapons in hand,” immediately started attacking MPLA soldiers and moving “seamlessly back into the war mode” (Brittain, 1998, p. 58). While this is a direct result of the continued existence of UNITA’s military infrastructure, the ease with which the rebels remobilized is not least also explained by the fact that they had not been forced to integrate their parallel political institutions into the authority of the interim government. Some accounts say that administrating significant territory allowed UNITA to build what was then referred to as a “secret army” – a 20,000 men strong, fully mobilized faction that was stationed both in Jamba and at the Angolan-Namibian border and that was prepared to return to combat would Savimbi not win the election (Brittain, 1998).

**Affecting Cultures of Violence** In Chapter 3, I held that a second mechanism for why interim governments that integrate the parallel military institutions of warring parties increase the stability of peace is that such interim governments raise the parties’ costs of defection by adding to changing cultures of violence. They do so, because even if not all weapons are collected and hierarchical command structures disentangled at the end of the interim period, a sufficiently advanced DDR process still decreases the social acceptance of violence among ex-combatants, signifies “that the country is embarking on an era of peace” (United Nations, 2000a), and facilitates “ex-combatants’ attempts to distance themselves from war-time abuses they committed or experienced” (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010, p. 18). This in turn should raise the costs of elites to remobilize for war. Contrariwise, a missing DDR process should mean that no such process takes place, so that individuals are not pushed away from the “war-time mindsets that legitimized violence” (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010, p. 10).

Angola confirms to this causal pattern. Many accounts on Angola’s political
developments between the signing of the Bicesse Accords and the 1992 elections generally stress the extreme militarization of Angolan society after more than 15 years of war, in which conflicts were generally known to be resolved through violence. This is also because in UNITA territory, the lines between who was a civilian and who was a member of the military became blurred due to military conscription and abduction that often affected children younger than 18 years, who grew up never knowing anything else than owning a gun: “In UNITA zones, ... there was no possibility of imagining an alternative to joining the army” (Pearce, 2015, p. 118). A UNAVEM II commander commented this persisting culture of violence throughout the interim period with: “What dominates in Angola is the single-option response: if you don’t like something, you point a weapon at it” (in Maier, 1997, p. 4).

This culture of violence particularly affected UNITA and its cadres, and aided Savimbi’s remobilization of its troops in 1992 (cf. Beinart, 1992; Brinkman, 2000). Already in March 1992, Miguel Maria N’Zau Punka – a previous Secretary General of UNITA who had deserted during the interim period – stated that the Bicesse Accords and interim period had not changed much about the perceptions and behavior of Savimbi, and that UNITA “still uses violence and intimidation as a political system and lies as a strategy” (in Finkel, 1992). And one day before the elections, a Western diplomat commented that he does not believe that large-scale warfare will break out again, but that “there will be violence because Angola is a very violent country” and that the parties only knew “the power of the gun” (in Manthorpe, 1992).

Later, also UNITA’s Samakuva argued that the interim period had failed to introduce a transition “from the culture of war to a culture of peace” within his party (in Samakuva and Vines, 2013, p. 5). How this made it easier for Savimbi to remobilize his combatants only becomes evident in comparison with Nepal: At the end of the interim period, UNITA’s combatants had never assumed any other occupation than that of being soldiers with guns; this was the only professional identity they knew to select; and using arms was the only means many of them knew to solve personal or political conflicts (Pearce, 2015, p. 119). In Nepal, contrastingly, ex-combatants had received vocational training from 2007 onwards inside cantonment; had gotten married and had started families. When the interim period ended, ex-combatants knew not only their life as soldiers, but could imagine civilian livelihoods as well.

In the second phase of the civil war, Pawson (1999) describes this as: “Years of fighting have created little more than an accepted culture of violence. In Malanje, for example, many people say they become angry when UNITA are not lobbing shells into the center of town. As absurd as this might seem, the sad truth is that here, silence breeds fear and fear breeds tension. As far as Malanjinos are concerned, when bombs are raining down at least they know where they stand. For them, running to the nearest shelter is part of everyday life.”
7.2.4 Participation of Unarmed Actors

My final hypothesis in Chapter 3 reasoned that in the presence of commitment problems, more advanced opportunities for the participation of unarmed actors in interim governments come with a higher stability of post-interim peace. This is because they enable warring parties to send costly signals of their true intentions to each other that create domestic audience costs, which in turn punish them if they renege on their peaceful bargain (cf. Figure 3.3). In contrast, when interim governments fail to create domestic audience costs that punish parties who renege on previously struck peaceful bargains, post-interim violence becomes more likely (cf. Fearon, 1994).

Angola does not confirm to this causal pattern. Even though there exists a positive correlation between the independent and dependent variable – i.e. no unarmed actors participated in interim governance, and post-interim violence persisted – no causal relationship can be detected. Rather, UNITA expressed feeling threatened by the idea of opening up interim decision-making to domestic audiences. In that regard, the Angolan case also points to an interesting theoretical interaction of the participation variable with the explanatory factor of democratic history.

The warring parties had only agreed to vague regulations concerning the participation of political parties during the interim period in the Bicesse Accords, and the agreement left the participation of civil society untouched. In Attachment II (“Fundamental Principles for the Establishment of Peace in Angola”), the accord states that the “Angolan Government will hold discussions with all political forces in order to survey their opinions concerning the proposed changes in the Constitution” and “will then work with all the parties to draft the laws that will regulate the electoral process” (United Nations, 1991b).

But no such participation of unarmed actors in interim decision-making was realized in practice. This is also because the history of non-democratic rule in Angola did not allow for the organization of a viable civil society or strong political opposition parties. Firstly, the MPLA’s one-party state had never allowed for public organizational sphere outside the MPLA party structure. While some women’ and religious organizations as well as labor unions had developed towards the end of the colonial period in the early 1970s, the MPLA quickly absorbed all organizations that had been in the hands of civil society the moment it assumed power in 1975. It confiscated all church property and radio stations controlled by the church (Chatham House, 2005), merged all labor unions and women organizations into its party structure, and turned all youth organizations into “nurseries for MPLA cadres” (cf. Pearce, 2015, p. 71). This destruction of civil society even reached traditional customs and informal institutions, such as councils of elders at the village level that were sidelined and replaced by elected village committees (Tvedten, 1997). UNITA did the same in the areas it governed – and thus a Catholic priest recalls that “[people] couldn’t choose. The movement that was there controlled everything” (in Pearce, 2015,
As a result, most “civil society” organizations that existed in Angola at the time of the Bicesse Accords had strong links to the MPLA, and many civil society leaders were in fact former MPLA bureaucrats (Chatham House, 2005). For instance, the Angolan Action for Development that was founded in 1989 as Angola’s first non-church civil society organization was led by members of the MPLA political elite in Luanda (Human Rights Watch, 1999).

Secondly, over 15 years of MPLA rule also had not allowed for any opposition parties in the socialist system. However, in order to pave the way for the Bicesse Accords, the Angolan National Assembly had to allow the formation of opposition political parties in legislation passed on 26 March 1991 (Becker, 1991; Maier, 1997). On 1 June 1991, President dos Santos then announced during a broadcast on the Radio Nacional de Angola that the warring parties not only “count on the contributions of an organized civil society” during the interim period because they regarded such input as “necessary to calm existing emotions arising from the cruel and devastating war.” He also stated that both the MPLA and UNITA “would like to see the political parties play their true role in the new multi-party system in the country” and “would like to see debates and political struggle replace the language of weapons” (in Weimer and Fandrych, 1995). As a result of these de jure changes, a number of political parties started to organize during the interim period – much according to the role Paris (2004), Söderberg-Kovacs (2008), or Papagianni (2008) perceive for interim governments in peace processes. Most of the new parties were thereby founded by business men and intellectuals in Luanda, without having any programmatic profile despite their strict nonalignment with UNITA and the MPLA (Becker, 1991). In October 1991, 13 new opposition parties that wanted to contest in the upcoming general elections announced the creation of a National Council of the Opposition, “to be heard in matters of electoral legislation” (Clemente-Kersten, 1999, p. 66).

However, on 1 November 1991, the MPLA caretaker interim government blatantly “refused to call a national conference to work out the ground rules for the transition process to elections,” thereby dismissing “the calls from emerging opposition parties” to convene such conference “on the grounds that it was both unnecessary and dangerous to the peace process,” for instance because it would automatically lead to the dissolution of the interim legislature and the destabilization of the interim government (Malaquias, 2007, p. 161). Instead of thus sending a costly signal that it intends to allow for an open and transparent interim period by creating a domestic audience for its decision-making, the MPLA interim government opted only for very vague consultative mechanisms. For instance, it asked representatives of newly founded political parties to examine laws that the interim government had already submitted to the interim parliament (Maier, 1997). In addition, the participation of political parties

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101 For instance, in August 1992 the interim parliament (without consulting any other political forces) amended the constitution so that it provided for a unitary presidential system in the post-interim period that would place all political power in the hands of the central government in Luanda (Ottaway, 1998). Such a system that is often regarded as ill-suited for countries
without a history of armed insurgency was complicated by the fact that few opposition parties had offices in Luanda – let alone in other parts of Angola – and even fewer had access to the MPLA controlled media or could use the officially allotted ten minutes each day on the Radio Nacional de Angola due to their limited financial or human resources (Ottaway, 1998). As a result, political parties formed during the interim period were thus strikingly unimportant in the 1992 elections, and voters could only make an informed choice between the MPLA and UNITA. In sum, there was “no role for key civic voices such as churches, civil society organizations, other political parties, traditional authorities, academics or key personalities in Angola who had knowledge and understanding of the conflict” during the interim period (Comerford, 2007, p. 16).

Having said that, there is no evidence that this missing participation of political parties and civil society in interim decision-making in any way affected the behavior of the warring parties so that it increased commitment problems and contributed to UNITA’s remobilization for war. This is also because UNITA itself did not want any deeper participation of civil society and political parties in interim decision-making (and as a “check” on the rule of the MPLA). UNITA did not regard such participation as a costly signal by the government but as an existential threat to its own role in Angola’s transition.

While dos Santos only stated that the convening of a national conference that would give unarmed actors a voice in interim decision-making would mean the “dissolution” of parliament, Savimbi was more blunt on this topic and called national conferences “civilian coup d’états” (Malaquias, 2007, p. 161). His position is explained by to two aspects. Firstly, Savimbi was against the participation of unarmed actors in interim decision-making because this would have threatened his party’s unique position as the only viable alternative to the MPLA interim government in the upcoming vote. Any additional political party actively involved in politics in the interim period would have weakened UNITA’s position vis-à-vis the interim government (Malaquias, 2007; Pearce, 2015). Secondly, Savimbi was also against the participation of unarmed actors because he was guided by the belief that there were two qualitatively different groups of political parties in Angola: the “traditional parties” of the MPLA, UNITA and the FNLA – that had been established to fight colonial rule in the 1960s – as well as the partidecos or newer parties that were “created to take advantage of the new era of multi-partyism” and that he regarded as “simply irritating encumbrances” on his way to power (Malaquias, 2007, p. 161).

emerging out of civil war (cf. Reilly and Nordlund, 2008; Reilly, 2008). Ottaway (1998, p. 139) thereby notes that – besides unconcealed political unwillingness – “great time pressure” to meet the September 1992 deadline for the elections may be among the key explanations for why changes to the constitution and the adoption of laws for the post-interim period were not negotiated with outside political parties and civil society actors, which points to the alternative explanatory variable of interim government duration. Generally, many observers point out that the interim period in Angola had been too brief to have a real impact on peace and achieve all that was necessary; and should have been conditional on the implementation of key reforms (Anstee, 1993; Fortna, 2003a; Maier, 1997; Tvedten, 1997).
The aspects in turn shed light on a causal mechanism that diverges from the theoretical framework as proposed in Chapter 3 and that relates to the issues of selection bias and interaction effects that I have attended to in Chapter 4. Although my quantitative analysis in Chapter 4 did not find statistical significant and correlational evidence that the participation of civil society and political parties in interim rule is more likely in countries with a history of democracy, the Angolan case points to the importance of this factor – particularly in comparison with civil society participation in Nepal’s interim government (cf. Chapter 6). Among the key reasons for why unarmed actors were not given a stronger role during the rule of the interim government was also that no viable civil society organizations or political opposition parties existed when the interim government convened. However, this aspect also points to a second factor: the unfamiliarity with the participation of unarmed actors in decision-making turned such participation into a threat, rather than a mitigation of commitment problems through domestic audience costs. That means in cases without a history of armed insurgency, the participation of unarmed actors in interim decision-making may even reinforce commitment problems and motivate a weaker-growing party to return to arms rather sooner than later, for instance before it fears being “out-performed” by new political parties. Methodologically, this reasoning points to a thus far unaddressed interaction effect between a history of democratic rule and the participation of civil society and political parties. I address this further in Chapter 9.

7.3 Chapter Summary

This chapter discussed the question to what extent the absence of post-interim peace in Angola can be attributed to properties of interim government failing to mitigate the warring parties’ commitment problems. Throughout this chapter, I have in that regard also attended to alternative explanatory variables, in particular the role of democratic history or of natural resource rents. Concerning my independent variables as proposed in Chapter 3, the chapter yields several interesting conclusions (cf. Table 7.2).

Hypothesis H1 argued that power-sharing interim government increases the stability of post-interim peace; while revolutionary or caretaker interim governments should exacerbate commitment problems of warring parties. The Angolan case study provides weak empirical supported for this hypothesis. The caretaker interim government failed to mitigate commitment problems for the UNITA rebels, because it did not include mechanisms that could have decreased UNITA’s future uncertainty by providing for its political security. Instead, it enabled the caretaker MPLA to unilaterally pass electoral legislation to ensure its own political survival, for instance by trying to dilute the UNITA vote in the 1992 election. Angola provides no empirical evidence for the proposed causal mechanisms linking power-sharing to physical or economic security.
Table 7.2: Summary of Evidence: Case Study Angola

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>H1:</strong> Power-sharing interim government, as opposed to any other interim government, increases the stability of post-interim peace.</td>
<td><strong>Weakly supported.</strong> There is some empirical evidence for the mechanism on the political security of warring parties, but not for the others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H2:</strong> International interim government, as opposed to any other interim government, increases the stability of post-interim peace.</td>
<td><strong>Not supported.</strong> UNAVEM II offered neither physical deterrence nor policy influence. While this could call for longer or more substantive international authority, the UN was also not perceived as neutral, which added to commitment problems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H3:</strong> The more advanced the process of integrating parallel political and military institutions into the authority of an interim government, the higher the stability of peace.</td>
<td><strong>Supported.</strong> Mechanisms on military infrastructure, war-time mind-sets, and parallel financing are most convincing. The legitimacy mechanism is undermined by resource trade as a means of parallel financing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H4:</strong> The more advanced the opportunities of participation for unarmed actors in interim governments, the higher the stability of peace.</td>
<td><strong>Not supported.</strong> The variables correlate in the expected way, but there is no causal evidence. A lack of democratic experience turned the hypothetical participation of unarmed actors into a threat, rather than mitigating commitment problems.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hypothesis H2 argued that international interim government, as opposed to any other interim government, increases the stability of post-interim peace. The Angolan case does not provide support for this hypothesis. The case represents an international interim government according to the lenient definition of the concept (cf. Chapter 4), and the weakly mandated and staffed UNAVEM II mission neither offered substantial physical deterrence to increase the warring parties’ costs of defection from the terms of the peace agreement, nor did it encompass any policy influence. This does yet not necessarily provide support for conceptualizing international interim government in the strict version and according to the definition by Doyle (2002), because evidence suggests that increased levels of international interim authority could also have exacerbated commitment problems. This is not least because the UN was not perceived as a neutral political authority by the warring parties.

Hypothesis H3 argued that more advanced processes of integrating parallel political and military institutions into the authority of an interim government come with a higher stability of peace, while a lack of such integration should exacerbate commitment problems. This hypothesis is supported for Angola.
Firstly, the lack of integration of UNITA’s parallel political administration during the interim period offered the rebel group an opportunity to extract and trade diamonds, as well as to manage non-monetary tax and forced labor systems in the areas under its control. This decreased UNITA’s costs of defection from the terms of Bicesse by providing it with funding for further combat. Secondly, the lack of integration of UNITA’s parallel military institutions meant that the rebel group had full access to weapons and an intact system of hierarchical command structures at the end of the interim period. It also meant that UNITA combatants were not able to envision any professional alternatives to military careers. This decreased UNITA’s costs of defection from the terms of Bicesse, as it offered its leader Savimbi a standing military organization to remobilize following the 1992 elections.

Finally, Hypothesis H4 argued that more advanced opportunities for the participation of unarmed actors in interim decision-making come with a higher stability of peace, while a lack of participation should exacerbate commitment problems. Even though a lack of participation opportunities for unarmed actors positively correlates with an absence of post-interim peace in Angola, I find no causal empirical support for my theoretical argument. This is because instead of perceiving a (hypothetical) participation of unarmed actors as a costly signal by the MPLA caretaker interim government, UNITA perceived such participation as an existential threat to its own long-term political survival. One reason is that any additional political or civic actor involved in decision-making processes during the interim period could have weakened UNITA’s position as the only political alternative to the ruling MPLA. Based on this observation, I hypothesized that the effect of the participation variable may be conditional on whether or not a country has a history of democratic rule: in countries lacking democratic history, the creation of domestic audiences through the participation of unarmed actors becomes a threat, rather than a mitigation of commitment problems for warring parties inexperienced in competing under political pluralism. I study this argument further in Chapter 9.
Chapter 8
Interim Rule in Cambodia

Much like many Angolans have only ever known the rule of the MPLA, also Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen has served in his position for over thirty years, balancing “politically motivated violence, control of the security forces, manipulated elections, massive corruption, and the tacit support of foreign powers” (Human Rights Watch, 2015a, p. 1). Hun Sen came to power in 1985 – six years after Vietnam’s overthrow of the regime of the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) or “Khmer Rouge” – and his rule was from the start violently contested by three rebel groups: the toppled PDK, the royalist Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique et Coopératif or National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), and the republican Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF).102 In 1991, an internationally sponsored peace agreement was meant to end Cambodia’s civil war by calling for a 21-months long interim period terminating in elections. But the PDK abandoned disarmament already during the interim period, and while the actual polling process proceeded in relative calm, the PDK remobilized in the post-interim period to fight the elected government of Prince Ranariddh’s FUNCINPEC and Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). In 1997, conflict between the CPP and FUNCINPEC over integrating defected Khmer Rouge cadres escalated in clashes that killed at least 32 people. Hun Sen ousted Ranariddh and manifested his power in Cambodia’s politics until the present day, thereby effectively ending the country’s short democratic experiment.

This chapter investigates to what extent the absence of post-interim peace in Cambodia is the result of credible commitment problems among the warring parties; and how properties of interim government failed to mitigate such commitment problems. I proceed in three steps. Section 8.1 offers a brief overview

102 The name “Khmer Rouge” was coined by Prince Sihanouk, but not used by the PDK itself. Due to the proliferation of the alias, I use it here interchangeably with PDK. Many PDK cadres are also best known under their nom de guerre (e.g. “Pol Pot” for Saloth Sar), and I use assumed names when they are more common than original names.
of Cambodia’s violent history that focuses on political developments since 1975, when the communist Khmer Rouge marched into Phnom Penh to proclaim “Democratic Kampuchea,” a regime responsible for one of the worst genocides in human history. Section 8.2 analyzes if and how each property of interim government was linked to the parties’ credible commitment problems and the absence of post-interim peace in Cambodia. In this section, I also study any alternative explanatory variables and mechanisms that account for continued intrastate armed conflict in Cambodia. Section 8.3 summarizes my findings and concludes this chapter.

8.1 Cambodia: From Genocide to Civil War

From the time of its independence in 1953, Cambodia was “characterized by political unrest and violence” (Edwards, 2004, p. 56). This section briefly sketches the main events in Cambodia’s history before independence. I then focus on four periods of violence in the second half of the 20th century (cf. Chambers, 2015): the years of political neutrality (1953 to 1969), the military dictatorship under Lon Nol (1970 to 1975), the “Democratic Kampuchea” regime (1975 to 1978), and the civil war against the rule of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) (1979 to 1991). The section concludes by discussing the peace process that culminated in the signing of the peace agreement in October 1991, and the ensuing violence that characterized Cambodia’s post-interim period.

8.1.1 Funan, Chenla, and French Indochina

In the early history of South-East Asia, ethnic Khmers – the identity group that still accounts for approximately 90 percent of Cambodia’s population today – were among the first people that began to build political institutions and establish centralized kingdoms.103 The earliest known of such kingdoms

103Compared to Nepal or Angola, a “rather high degree of ethnic homogeneity” exists in Cambodia (Vickery, 1986, p. 2). Besides the demographically, culturally, and politically dominant Khmer, the country is home to both indigenous and non-indigenous ethnic minorities, although a lack of population surveys makes it difficult to quantify the number and size of ethnic groups (Asian Development Bank, 2002). Indigenous minorities – around 20 groups variously called “ethic minorities, hill tribes, highlanders, highland people, indigenous people” or Khmer Loeu (“Highland Khmer”) – often populate the remote mountainous provinces of Cambodia (Asian Development Bank, 2002, p. 3). Among the main non-indigenous minorities are Chinese Cambodians, Cham people, and Vietnamese. Persisting Vietnamese influence on Cambodian society throughout the centuries is thereby vital to understand not only anti-Vietnamese violence before and during the rule of the PDK, but also the motivation of the factions in Cambodia’s civil war. After Vietnam had conquered significant parts of Cambodian territory during the 17th and 18th century in a quest for regional power, and had co-administered Cambodia in the early 19th century, this influence grew further during the French protectorate. This was also because ethnic Vietnamese had better access than Cambodians to French education and thus occupied high positions in Cambodia’s civil service (Simbolon, 2002). In 1951, 250,000 ethnic Vietnamese were estimated living in Cambodia (Amer, 1994). But following Cambodia’s independence in 1953, this number declined as violence against Vietnamese communities arose and “virtually all Vietnamese were expelled or killed in 1970-9” (Vickery, 1986, p. 2). For instance, in 1970 alone, the Lon Nol government
Table 8.1: Key Dates and Events in Cambodia’s History

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Seeking help against regional aggressions of Siam (Thailand) and Champa (Vietnam), Cambodia becomes a French Protectorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>French authorities install Norodom Sihanouk as the new king, who follows his maternal grandfather Sisowath Monivong on the throne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Two years after Cambodia’s independence, Sihanouk abdicates in favor of his father and in order to seek political office. He becomes Prime Minister and later Head of State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Sihanouk is ousted in a coup d’état by his Prime Minister Lon Nol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>After 5 years of fighting the Lon Nol regime, the Khmer Rouge capture Phnom Penh and proclaim “Democratic Kampuchea”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Vietnam invades and installs the PRK. The regime is fought by the Khmer Rouge, Sihanouk’s FUNCINPEC, and the KPNLF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>The PRK – now renamed SOC – and the rebels sign the Paris Agreements and agree on an interim period and national elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>The UN Security Council authorizes UNTAC for the interim period, but the mission fails to disarm the Khmer Rouge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>FUNCINPEC wins elections while the CPP comes in second; Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh form a coalition government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>The Khmer Rouge give up their violent campaign against the government; Hun Sen ousts Prince Ranariddh in a coup d’état</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>The CPP wins elections and manifests its power until today</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

– Funan – reigned from the first to the sixth century, when it was succeeded by its northern neighbor – Chenla – which existed between the sixth and the early ninth century. Chenla controlled large areas of what are today Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand (Cœdès, 1966; Stark, 2006). In 802, internal fighting among local lords in Chenla enabled King Jayavarman II’s ascension to the throne. Jayavarman II would rule for 48 years and unite the multiple states in the region. His “Khmer Empire” marked the beginning of a “Golden Age” for the Khmer people, who now resided for the first time as a unified nation in the predecessor state to modern Cambodia (Chandler, 2009; Sodhy, 2004).

The Khmer Empire survived until 1431 when it fell to Siam, the predecessor state to what became Thailand in 1939 (Corfield, 2009; Widyono, 2008). Cambodia now lost much of its regional power and territory. Continued external threats by Siam and Champa (today Vietnam), as well as domestic succession disputes and civil wars added to its weakening political and economic position (Chandler, 2009; Sodhy, 2004; Vickery, 2004). By the early 18th century, Cambodia had become a semi-independent state and subordinate to its powerful

“slaughtered thousands of ethnic Vietnamese” and expelled 200,000 more (Peou, 2007, p. 61), labeling “the entire Vietnamese community as communist as a pretext for the mass detention, ‘ethnic cleansing’ and slaughter of civilians” (Tully, 2006, p. 157).
neighbors (Vickery, 1986). By the early 19th century, the Vietnamese even directly administered Cambodia, “placing puppets on the throne and striving to assimilate the Khmers, whom they regarded as ‘barbarians’, into Vietnamese culture” (Tully, 2006, p. 10). Historians consider the period between the 15th and the 19th century as Cambodia’s “Dark Ages,” or “a period of economic, social, and cultural stagnation when the kingdom’s internal affairs came increasingly under the control of its aggressive neighbors” (Ross, 1987).

Seeing its sovereignty existentially threatened, the Cambodian court turned to France to seek protection from regional aggressions. France had previously shown a growing interest in colonizing the region, not least due to its rivalry with Great Britain, that controlled India and parts of Southeast Asia (Corfield, 2009). On 11 August 1863, French officials and King Norodom I signed the “Treaty of Friendship, Trade, and French Protection,” and France began to deploy local governors to Cambodia (Chandler, 2009). These governors only had narrow impact in the early years of the protectorate, but France soon began to tighten its control over Cambodia in order to create a “de facto colony (Tully, 2006, p. 10). In 1887, France made Cambodia part of the Union Indochinoise Française (French Indochina Union) and ruled it through a colonial administrator situated in Hanoi (Chandler, 2009).

Despite an early rebellion against tightening French rule, no major protests against French authorities evolved in the coming decades, making Cambodia “one of the few colonized countries in the region without an independence movement” (Becker, 1998, p. 43). This was also because the French had done very little to transform the economy, had largely focused on collecting taxes, and had only started late in building an education system outside Buddhist pagoda schools (Becker, 1998; Kiernan, 2008b). Hence, a Khmer nationalist elite only became organized in the late 1930s, most of them graduates from Cambodia’s newly-founded first high school, the Lycée Sisowath (Vickery, 1986).

This rising nationalism among Cambodia’s educated elite coincided with the start of World War II, and in the summer of 1940, France fell to Germany. This military defeat on the European continent also weakened France’s colonial rule in Indochina. The Vichy Administration soon lost significant amounts of Cambodian territory to Thailand. From 1941 onwards, Cambodia was also occupied by German ally Japan, until France reimposed its protectorate in 1945 (Ross, 1987). But with Cambodia’s occupation by Thailand and Japan, the French had effectively failed in their most basic raison d’être, and the reason for why their rule was welcomed by Cambodians in the first place: to protect the country from its aggressive neighbors and regional powers (Becker, 1998). After World War II, Cambodian opposition to French rule grew within the course of the First Indochina War, which would pave the road for Cambodian independence declared on 9 November 1953 and confirmed by France at the 1954 Geneva Conference (Keller, 2005).
8.1.2 Introducing the Warring Parties

When Cambodia became independent, Norodom Sihanouk had been its king for 12 years. Sihanouk, who would later lead the FUNCINPEC rebels during Cambodia’s 1979-1991 civil war – had followed his maternal grandfather Sisowath Monivong on the throne in 1941. The French had chosen him over his father Norodom Suramarit in the belief that he “would be a docile puppet,” easily manipulated, and pliable to French interests (Tully, 2006, p. 106). Following independence, Sihanouk soon aspired to pursue a political career. In 1955, he abdicated from the throne in favor of his father, became known as Prince Sihanouk, founded the Sangkum Reastr Niyum (“Popular Socialist Community”), and called for elections (cf. Hughes, 2001). Realizing “that elections conferred legitimacy on those who won them,” Sihanouk “wanted to make sure that his power would be enhanced, not challenged,” so he pressured opposition parties to join Sangkum as a political umbrella movement and effectively turned Cambodia into a one-party state (Tully, 2006, p. 129). Sangkum captured all seats in the 1955 elections and Sihanouk became Prime Minister. When his father died in 1960, Sihanouk – not willing to relinquish power – introduced a constitutional amendment that made him head of state, while his uncle Monireth became chairman of a regency council.

Following this constitutional amendment, domestic politics became more polarized and resistance against Sihanouk grew (Keller, 2005). From the left, he was opposed by the communist Krom Pracheachon (“People’s Group”) that had in 1955 been one of the few parties refusing to join the Sangkum movement (Chandler, 2009; Vickery, 1986). It was the political right, however, that proved to be a more immediate danger to Sihanouk’s political survival. In 1970, Sihanouk’s experiment of keeping Cambodia a non-aligned state was undermined by the escalating Vietnam war, not least because part of its territory was used by Northern Vietnamese troops as safe havens, and the US had issued an undeclared bombing campaign. On 18 March, right-wing military leaders ousted the prince in a coup d’état. Supported by the US, these leaders swiftly abolished the monarchy and instead installed an authoritarian regime under General Lon Nol, a previous Prime Minister under Sihanouk (Curtis, 1993; Peou, 2007). Unlike Sihanouk, Lon Nol was a “staunch anti-Communist” (Sodhy, 2004, p. 155) and he allowed the US to bomb the North Vietnamese forces’ Ho Chi Minh Trail that lead through Cambodia’s countryside.

\[104\] It is said that Sihanouk thereby initially surpassed France’s best expectations, “preferring to chase girls and watch films than worry himself with affairs of state or nationalist politics” (Tully, 2006, p. 106), as well as being “little more than a carefree lycée student ... fond of horses, ice cream, and the cinema” (Becker, 1998, 43f.). Observers of Cambodia’s peace process in 1991 still describe him as “a pampered blueblood, fond of French wine and cuisine, who entertains diplomats with his singing and bores them with Grade B movies he has directed” (Gray, 1992). But Sihanouk was not only “[unpredictable], ebullient, mercurial, autocratic, [and] self-indulgent” but also a “a master politician and leader who frequently changed allegiances but always tried to preserve the unity of his country,” as the BBC argued in the obituary that followed his death in 2012 (BBC, 2012).
Sihanouk, meanwhile, sought exile in Beijing to plot his return to power. On 23 March 1970, he announced the formation of the Front Uni National du Kampuchéa or National United Front of Kampuchea (FUNK), a political umbrella organization in which Sihanouk’s royalist supporters joined forces with the communist “Khmer Rouge” to remove Lon Nol from power (Tully, 2006). While it is said that Sihanouk did not like this coalition with the PDK, he realized that it would keep “his name on the forefront of Cambodian affairs” (The Independent, 1991). By 1972, the Khmer Rouge controlled the resistance against Lon Nol, “but for the sake of international respectability continued to operate behind the facade of Sihanouk’s coalition” (Chandler, 1992, p. 2).

Who were the Khmer Rouge? The movement’s roots stretch back to the Krom Pracheachon formed in the 1940s (Chandler, 1992; Etcheson, 1987). In the 1960s, several young communists known as the “Paris Group” had gained control over the party structures. This group consisted of graduates of the Lycée Sisowath who had met as students in Paris in the 1950s. Among them were Saloth Sar – who later became known as “Pol Pot” and would serve as Prime Minister of Cambodia from 1976 to 1979 – and his wife Khieu Ponnary, as well as Son Sen (Defense Minister), Ieng Sary (Foreign Minister), and Ieng Thirith (Minister for Social Affairs). As the US bombing campaign of the Ho Chi Minh Trail pushed Vietnamese troops deeper into Cambodian territory until they controlled significant border areas, the Khmer Rouge was provided with a “powerful boost” in its violent campaign against the state and the Lon Nol regime (Jones, 2006, 188f.). The party managed to gradually solidify its grip onto the countryside in the early 1970s. In the areas under its control, it established regional collectives as a parallel system of governance, commonly referred to as the process of collectivization (Chandler, 1992). These collectives would later serve as a model for the regime the party imposed in 1975, and for the manner by which it would manage its relations to the civilian population during the civil war (cf. below and Brown, 1998; Frings, 1994).

In 1975, the Vietnam war ended with South Vietnam’s capitulation and a communist victory. So did the war between FUNK and the Lon Nol regime. On 17 April 1975, Khmer Rouge cadres marched into Phnom Penh, executed most of the ruling elite, and proclaimed “Democratic Kampuchea.” This regime was built on “cynical deception and stupefying violence” (Kiernan, 2008b, p. 4) and envisaged to create “a communist agrarian society whose achievements would rival the glories of the ancient Angkor Empire” (Curtis, 1993).

Within hours of assuming power, the Khmer Rouge began to evacuate all cities and force the entire urban population to the Cambodian countryside (Chandler, 2009; Keller, 2005). In May 1975, the PDK proclaimed a new constitution that provided for a People’s Representative Assembly responsible for electing a government and appointing a judiciary. The constitution made Sihanouk head of state, but he was kept under house arrest in his palace while (in his own words) being “completely cut off from the outside world” and see-
ing many of his closest family members killed by the new rulers (in Schier and Schier-Oum, 1985). Sihanouk would resign in 1976 to once more seek exile in Beijing, prompting the PDK to announced a new cabinet that made Khieu Samphan President (“Chairman of the Presidium”), while Pol Pot was named Prime Minister (Chandler, 1992; Kiernan, 2008b).

The PDK also used its short time in power to implement a radical social transformation project that would confiscate all private property, abolish all currency, and destroy all factories, industrial equipment, hospitals, or any means of a modern civilization. The party closed all schools and markets, outlawed trade, divided families, and converted Buddhist pagodas into dining halls or storage units (Curtis, 1993). Local traditions, religious beliefs, and all forms of earlier ways of life were forbidden (Keller, 2005; Kiernan, 2008b). The regime was responsible for the death of millions of Cambodians through hard and collective labor, having almost nothing to eat, or having virtually no modern medical facilities to turn to in a country where Malaria and malnutrition remained widespread (Becker, 1998). The PDK furthermore made both dissent as well as smaller crimes like hiding food punishable by death, and particularly targeted and executed former government officials, as well as anyone with a higher education such as doctors, lawyers, or people speaking a foreign language (Brown, 1998; Peou, 2007). The result was “one of the worst genocides ... in recorded history” that killed almost 1.7 million Cambodians (Jones, 2006, p. 195).

8.1.3 Civil War and Peace Negotiations

It was Vietnam that ended the rule of the PDK, after PDK cadres had repeatedly entered Vietnamese territory to attack villages in the neighboring country. On 25 December 1978, Vietnamese troops entered Cambodia. On 7 January 1979, they reached Phnom Penh, chased the PDK forces to the Cambodian-Thai border, and installed the PRK: a pro-Vietnamese satellite regime that was in 1989 renamed State of Cambodia (SOC). The PRK on the one hand reminded many Cambodians of the aggressive politics Vietnam had historically executed towards its Western neighbor, but on the other hand provided them with at least a small guarantee that Pol Pot would not regain power (Chandler, 1992). The leadership of the PRK was largely made up of former Khmer Rouge officials who had earlier defected and taken refuge in Vietnam (Amer, 1995; Jones, 2006; Sodhy, 2004). Among this elite were Heng Samrin, who was appointed President, and 26-year-old Hun Sen, “who became the world’s youngest foreign minister” and was promoted to the post of Prime Minister on 14 January 1985 (Human Rights Watch, 2015a, p. 22). While the new leadership reinstalled hospitals, schools, markets, and family life, Heng Samrin and Hun Sen still became the heads of a “virtually unchecked” socialist one-party state (Peou, 2007, p. 62). The entire political system, its administration, and its security forces were fully controlled by the sole ruling party, the People’s Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea (PRPK) (renamed Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) in
Figure 8.1: Intrastate Armed Conflict in Cambodia

Notes: Conflict data by the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (Sundberg and Melander, 2013) show battle-related deaths per month. The UCDP data set only includes information from 1989 onwards, thus previous years of the civil war cannot be plotted. The interim period is shaded in gray.

1993). What the new regime lacked was international recognition – and internal control over the Cambodian territory (Keller, 2005).

Vietnam’s imposition of the PRK immediately gave rise to an armed rebellion by three opposition forces. Firstly, the PDK and its armed wing, the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK) regrouped in 1980 in order to fight the new regime, and it would control territory along the Thai border during the civil war (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2016). Secondly, in 1981, the still-exiled Prince Sihanouk founded FUNCINPEC and the party’s armed wing National Army for an Independent Kampuchea (ANIK) to seek his return to power. FUNCINPEC was a royalist party led by Sihanouk’s son Ranariddh that drew on those forces that had supported the royal government in the 1950-60s and that represented Cambodia’s aristocratic elite (Amer, 1995). Towards the end of the civil war, FUNCINPEC would constitute of an army of roughly 10,000 combatants that controlled a small territory in the north-western region of Cambodia (Keller, 2005). Thirdly, also the KPNLF and its armed wing, the 5,000 combatant strong Khmer People’s National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF) mobilized against the PRK. The KPNLF was a republican, conservative, and middle class movement that had been founded by Son Sann – a previous Prime Minister under Sihanouk in 1967 and 1968 – and that represented...
those forces who helped to overthrow Sihanouk in 1970 (Doyle, 1995). The KPNLF later changed its name to Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP) to contest in the 1993 elections.

By the early 1980s, Cambodia’s intrastate conflict had turned into one of the most intractable armed conflicts in the world, “despite the fact that race, religion or nationality” did not play a major role and the conflict primarily pitted ethnic Khmer against ethnic Khmer (Curtis, 1993). In June 1982, when it became apparent that no rebel faction by itself was able to overthrow the PRK – and the 200,000 Vietnamese troops stationed in Cambodia to support the regime – the three opposition movements formed the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). The CGDK was a parallel political authority that was “neither a coalition, nor a government, nor democratic” (Kiernan, 2008a, p. 318). It was headed by Prince Sihanouk as President, Son Sann as Prime Minister, and Khieu Samphan as Vice President (Amer, 1995; Chandler, 1992; Erlanger, 1991b; Kroef, 1990). This “very strange alliance” (Ledgerwood, 1994, p. 3) or “marriage of convenience” (Hughes, 2003, p. 118) of a royal, a republican, and a communist rebel group was financially backed by China, the US, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and controlled about one third of Cambodian territory by December 1983 (Schier and Schier-Oum, 1985). Chinese media reported that the PDK in particular retained a functioning parallel administration system “complete with producing collectives” throughout the country, while the PRK only controlled Phnom Penh and some provincial capitals. The PDK had itself claimed earlier: “[O]ur proletarian state administration from the cooperative level upward throughout the country still remains intact” (in Kroef, 1979, p. 733).

Internationally, the CGDK was recognized as the legitimate successor to the PDK government and awarded with Cambodia’s seat in the General Assembly (Kroef, 1990). The international community thus went from “branding the Khmer Rouge as communist monsters to embracing them as Cambodia’s legitimate representatives” over the Hanoi-backed PRK (Jones, 2006, p. 201). Internally, however, Cambodia’s rebel government was far from being united, and parallel structures of authority remained within the coalition. Each of the CGDK leaders – Sihanouk, Sann, and Samphan – retained full authority over their respective organization, the coalition failed to formulate a joint political program (Raszenelberg and Schier, 1995). It instead resembled “a loose federation” operating out of refugee camps at the Thai border, and was only united by the desire to force the Vietnamese out of Cambodia through forging a “People’s War” (Kroef, 1990, 204f.).105

Given its internal divisions, the coalition did not mitigate the weakness of the rebel groups vis-à-vis the PRK. By the mid-1980s, no end to the war was

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105 Reports also persisted that the PDK attacked the other two rebel groups (Schier and Schier-Oum, 1985), and while the KPNLF and FUNCINPEC were “united in their distaste for the Khmer Rouge,” they still clashed over other political issues, not least since Son Sann had been a close follower of Lon Nol (Mezzera et al., 2009).
in sight. At that time, the international community increasingly began to make proposals on how to settle the conflict and put growing pressure onto the warring parties to arrive at a deal. It took until 1987, however, until Hun Sen met with Sihanouk for the first time (Keller, 2005; Sodhy, 2004). This new opportunity to discuss an end to Cambodia’s civil war also opened up because of “Sihanouk’s advancing age, Hun Sen’s desire to obtain international recognition,” military exhaustion, the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, as well as easing East-West tensions towards the end of the Cold War (Doyle, 1995, p. 21).

Peace talks between the rebel factions and the PRK – now renamed the State of Cambodia (SOC) – intensified with two meetings in Jakarta, where the warring parties started to discuss the question of how an interim government for Cambodia’s transition could look like and if the Khmer Rouge were to be granted a role in such government (Keller, 2005). In 1989, the parties met for the first time in Paris – but after weeks of negotiations, they fell short on signing a peace agreement as they could not agree on a power-sharing formula for such interim government (Findlay, 1995). With increasing pressure from an international community, further meetings in Paris eventually resulted in the signing of the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict (commonly referred to as the “Paris Agreements”) on 23 October 1991. The Paris Agreements formally sought to “turn the battlefield into a ballot-box” (Peou, 2007, p. 34) by (1) calling a ceasefire into place, (2) requiring the parties to partially demobilize before free and fair elections were held, and (3) making them agree to install the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) as well as (4) the interim Supreme National Council (SNC), a domestic organ “under which power would be split almost equally between the warring parties” (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2016). On 31 October 1991, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 781 that welcomed the accords, and Cambodia formally entered its interim period (United Nations, 1991d).

Peace after Paris was brief. While Birmingham (2015) has argued that the signing of the peace accords in Angola brought unprecedented optimism to a society that had suffered from decades of war, no such optimism was visible in Cambodia. For instance, an Associated Press (AP) news report (titled: “Despite peace treaty, peace will be hard to achieve in Cambodia”) quoted a KPNLF signatory who called the Paris Agreements “peace-on-paper” (Gray, 1991a). The New York Times called the peace agreement a “cause for alarm” and cited a diplomat who voiced his concern that the setup of the interim government contained no credible guarantees that the Khmer Rouge would not return to full political power in Cambodia (Shenon, 1991b). The Paris Agreements thus only managed to bring a “semi-peace” to Cambodia (Hall Macleod, 2006, p. 51). While during the interim period that followed the accords, episodes of intrastate armed conflict between the warring parties significantly dropped (cf. Figure 8.1 and Thayer, 1992b), other forms of violence persisted. Regular
features of daily life in Cambodia were mob violence (for instance by angry citizens attacking Khmer Rouge leaders upon their return to Phnom Penh, cf. section 8.2.1), violence against civilians (for instance by PDK cadres against ethnic Vietnamese, cf. footnote 103), or later PDK attacks against UNTAC peacekeepers (cf. section 8.2.2).

Having said that – and to the surprise of many observers – the actual polling process for elections terminating the rule of the interim government took place in an astonishingly peaceful environment and went forward without any larger reports of disruption or clashes. The registration of political parties had begun in August 1992, and the registration of eligible voters in October the same year. Balloting took place between 23 and 27 May 1993 at 1,430 polling stations throughout the country. UN monitors oversaw the voting process, except in a few Khmer-Rouge controlled areas, where UNTAC had been denied access (cf. section 8.2.3). Despite earlier threats by the PDK to violently disrupt the vote and their call on citizens to boycott the elections, 4.2 million Cambodians – or an overwhelming 89.56 percent of registered voters – voted for representatives of a 120-member Constituent Assembly (CA) (Hall Macleod, 2006). Civilians living under PDK control reportedly traveled to other zones in order to cast their vote – where registration for the elections had as a result at times surpassed 100 percent of eligible voters – and the PDK did not prevent them to do so and did not attack any polling stations, “in complete contradiction to expectations,” as head of the UNTAC Election Component Reginald Austin commented (in Cumming-Bruce, 1993b). On 29 May, the UN officially declared the election free and fair.

**Neither Peace nor Democracy in Cambodia’s Post-Interim Period**

Final election results were announced on 10 June 1993 and showed that no party had managed to obtain an absolute majority in the CA. Instead, and to the “shock” of Hun Sen and his Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) – the successor party of the ruling PRPK that remained virtually indistinguishable from the administrative structure of the SOC – FUNCINPEC came out as the winner of the elections (International Crisis Group, 1998, p. 6). FUNCINPEC gained 45 percent of the vote and 58 seats in the CA, while the CPP only won 38 percent of the vote and 51 seats. Son Sann’s BLDP received 10 seats, and the Mouvement pour la Libération Nationale du Kampuchea or Movement for the National Liberation of Kampuchea (MOULINAKA) – a FUNCINPEC splinter group that dissolved in 1998 – one seat in the CA (Hall Macleod, 2006; Keller, 2005). The party that had been formally created by the Khmer Rouge in November 1992 (the “Cambodian National Unity Party”) had ended up not registering for the 1993 elections, being fully aware of its extremely “limited popular appeal” (Cumming-Bruce, 1992, cf. section 8.2.1).

With this electoral result, FUNCINPEC was neither in a position to rule outright and alone – as all previous political parties had done in Cambodia –
nor was the CPP ready to relinquish power to its political opponents. After all, the 1993 elections had been the first time that multiple parties had realistically competed for power at the ballot box in Cambodia, and also the first time that an incumbent party had as a result been defeated (Chambers, 2015): “Having no experience with contested elections, or cohabitation with opposition parties, the CPP was concerned about its future” (Un, 2005, p. 210). The reaction of the CPP was immediate. Having failed to disarm and demobilize, Hun Sen could use his party’s control over a standing army, a loyal police force, and a fully functioning parallel SOC administrative system to threaten with violence and secession and thereby blackmail his way into a coalition government with FUNCINPEC (Bartu and Wilford, 2009; Hall Macleod, 2006). Initially resisting these threats, FUNCINPEC eventually agreed to a coalition with the CPP after Sihanouk had issued significant pressure on the parties: Prince Ranariddh became First Prime Minister, Hun Sen was named Second Prime Minister, and both men were additionally named “Co-Ministers” of Defense and the Interior (Doyle, 1995; Findlay, 1995).

FUNCINPEC and the CPP thus entered a complex and complicated system of joint rule that failed to provide any form of political stability for the country’s citizens, and that could not prevent that violence persisted throughout Cambodia’s post-interim period (Hall Macleod, 2006; Hughes, 2003). Not only did the PDK remobilize against the elected government and continue its violent campaign against the state until it disintegrated in 1998 and its last active leaders surrendered in 1999 (Keller, 2005; Peou, 2007). But also relations between the two national coalition partners CPP and FUNCINPEC further deteriorated in the early post-interim period, with one source of such tensions particularly being the upcoming 1998 elections.

Already in 1996, FUNCINPEC – “alarmed” that it had little influence in the civil administration of Cambodia’s countryside, which it found decisive in determining the winner of the 1998 vote (Doyle, 1995, p. 92) – had demanded a share of local district offices, which the CPP was not ready to give (Barma, 2006; Mezzera et al., 2009). This was not least because after its bitter defeat in the 1993 elections, the CPP was concerned to lose power completely to its coalition partner in 1998, as it knew that it was “deeply unpopular in the country as a whole: only 20 percent said they supported Hun Sen’s party” according to a 1997 opinion poll (Doyle, 2001, 91f.). Its waning support was aided by the new Sam Rainsy opposition party “emerging as a serious threat” to CPP dominance in Cambodia’s politics (Human Rights Watch, 2015a, p. 37).

Tensions escalated in the spring of 1997, when up to 1,000 soldiers loyal to either one of the coalition partners clashed in Phnom Penh (Hall Macleod, 2006). During that time, a grenade attack on a Sam Rainsy opposition rally in Phnom Penh for which the CPP was widely held responsible left at least 16 people dead (Human Rights Watch, 2015a). On 5 July 1997, Hun Sen, the CPP and the forces it controlled managed to violently enforce the departure of Ranariddh
and FUNCINPEC (as well as the opposition Sam Rainsy party), a move that became widely denounced by the international community. UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Human Rights in Cambodia, Thomas Hammarberg, strongly condemned “the violent coup d’état of 5-6 July which has displaced the lawfully-elected government of Cambodia,” arguing that the overthrow of Ranariddh “by armed force violates the Cambodian Constitution and international law and overturns the will of the Cambodian people in the 1993 UN-sponsored election” (UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1997). Unimpressed, Hun Sen returned to the office of Prime Minister – and the CPP has manifested its control over Cambodian politics ever since (Bartu and Wilford, 2009; Human Rights Watch, 2015a).

8.2 Interim Government in Cambodia

The PDK’s mobilization against the elected FUNCINPEC-CPP government can be conceptualized as a bargaining breakdown due to prevailing commitment problems. In the lead up and immediately after the 1993 elections, the PDK was growing weaker and had no guarantees against its elimination would it lay down its arms and join a peaceful post-interim order. Firstly, the PDK became politically and economically isolated. After the party had enjoyed a certain degree of international legitimacy throughout the 1980s – when the CGDK occupied Cambodia’s seat in the UN General Assembly – it was isolated during the peace process as the international community increasingly awarded the Hanoi-backed PRK with diplomatic legitimacy (Chapon, 1991; Kroef, 1990; Roberts, 2001).106 This growing political isolation of the Khmer Rouge also meant that China reduced and eventually stalled its financial and military support to the party’s strive. China also reportedly pressured the PDK leadership to join the negotiated settlement in Paris (Nerciat, 1991b). As Greenhill and Major (2007, p. 32) argue, leaving the PDK behind was “relatively easy” for China, because “by the time of the Cambodian election, the balance of power had so shifted in favor of the UN and its SOC/CPP partner.” In November 1992, the UN Security Council also authorized an economic embargo against the PDK after the faction had stalled the disarmament and demobilization process. In Security Council Resolution 792, the UN demanded that the PDK “fulfill immediately its obligations under the Paris Agreements” and called on the international community to take measures that “prevent the supply of petroleum products to the areas occupied by any Cambodian party not complying with the military provisions of those Agreements” (United Nations, 1992e). Although these sanctions were weakened by significant violations at the Thai border, they imposed real costs

106 For instance, the US, France, and the UK, “who once supported the resistance factions (including the PDK) to contain Soviet influence in the region, were now apprehensive that the PDK might regain power after the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops” (Wang, 1996, p. 9). The US also lifted its trade embargo against the SOC in early 1992.
on the PDK and further isolated it from the other parties in the peace process (cf. section 8.2.3 and Cortright and Lopez, 2002)

Secondly, the PDK was growing weaker because it had nothing to gain from a peace process that focused on creating a liberal-democratic political order through elections (Peou, 2000; Peou, 2007; Richmond and Franks, 2007). It had “acceded to a peace agreement that required disarmament and demobilization, but its nearly exclusive source of power was its military might” (Greenhill and Major, 2007, p. 32). Because of its treatment of the Cambodian population during its 1975-1978 rule and during the civil war, the PDK knew that it would not stand a chance in the 1993 elections. This became particularly obvious when former President of the Pol Pot regime and PDK interim representative Khieu Samphan was violently attacked in November 1991 and driven out of Phnom Penh by an angry mob of citizens (cf. section 8.2.1). As Brown (1998, p. 97) argues, by being pressured to agree to elections, the PDK was “placed in a no-win situation. If they took part, they would commit political suicide. If they did not take part, they would become outlaws whom the new government could eventually wear down and destroy.”

Following the setup of Figure 3.2 on 31, the PDK thus had two options: it could either have accepted that its past behavior prevented it from gaining power in the 1992 elections and peacefully integrate into the post-interim opposition; or it could not accept this situation and remobilize for intrastate conflict. We know that the PDK chose the latter strategy and continued its violent campaign until 1998. But what would have happened had the PDK accepted the elections, laid down its weapons, and peacefully reintegrated into the post-interim state? In that case, the new government would have had two options: It could either have reconciled with the PDK, offer the party leadership amnesty, and allow them to peacefully participate in post-interim politics (the \( P_R, P_G \) outcome in Figure 3.2); or it could have tried to prosecute and eliminate the PDK and become dominant over the entire Cambodian territory (the \( E_R, D_G \) outcome). The PDK’s highest preference would have been a situation in which it is offered amnesty and political survival but does not have to pay the costs of further war, while its least favorable outcome would have been its elimination.

According to the bargaining model of Chapter 3, while the government could have rightfully argued that it preferred a situation in which the PDK peacefully integrates into the opposition to a situation of continued war (its preferences ranked \( P_G > W_G \)), it would not have been able to uphold this commitment once the PDK had laid down its arms; because power would have shifted even further away from the PDK and the government would have had incentives to renege. The PDK knew this: “Almost as soon as the initial election results were broadcast over UNTAC radio, the CPP regime began wielding its most trusted tools – force and fraud – in order to remain in power and derail the transition to democracy” (Jeldres, 1993, p. 112). And on 26 May 1993, Sihanouk made sure that the party had no credible guarantees against its marginalization in the post-
interim period. That day, Sihanouk withdrew his original commitment to let the PDK participate in a post-interim “Coalition Government of National Unity and Reconciliation” that he had envisaged earlier during the interim period. This was followed by the new government turning to further actions against the PDK, such as with the decision of the newly elected National Assembly on 7 July 1994 to outlaw the PDK and criminalize “mere membership in the political organization or military of the Khmer Rouge” as well as stipulate “the confiscation of all property under Khmer Rouge control” (Human Rights Watch, 1995, p. 113). This move reflected the determination of Ranariddh and Hun Sen (and likely significant parts of the international community) not to allow the Khmer Rouge “any form of participation” in any future government (Grundy-Warr, 1994, p. 90). The new law also finalized the PDK’s outcast position in Cambodian politics. The continued use of violence thus became rational for the PDK, as continued conflict gave it the opportunity to retain control over at least small parts of Cambodian territory and with it the possibility of economic and political survival.107

But commitment problems can be overcome (Walter, 2002). How did institutional design and reform features of Cambodia’s interim government fail to mitigate commitment problems for the warring parties (or even exacerbate them), and how did this lead to conflict in the post-interim period? The ensuing sections analyze these links, and I thereby attend to each hypothesized property of interim government of Chapter 3 sequentially – (H1) power-sharing and (H2) international interim government, (H3) the integration of parallel institutions, and (H4) the participation of civil society and political parties. I structure each section in three parts. Firstly, I briefly review the theoretical causal mechanism for each property of interim government. Secondly, I describe the respective provisions as decided upon in the 1991 Paris Agreements. Thirdly, I outline the process of its implementation, present an analysis on how this process of events and actions affected the causal mechanisms between each property of interim rule and conflict in the post-interim period, and discuss competing explanations and limitations of my theoretical argument.

107 Besides the situation of the PDK, there is also a merit to look at a second dimension by which the Cambodian case highlights the role of commitment problems; an argument that focuses on the decision-making of the CPP. It is conceivable that the CPP unexpectedly found itself in a weaker-growing position (1) after FUNCINPEC won the 1993 elections and (2) after the Sam Rainsy party was threatening its power in the lead-up to the 1998 elections, and thus experienced a sudden shift in the relative distribution of power which made it plausible for Hun Sen to violently overthrow Ranariddh in 1997 and consolidate the CPP’s position in power. Having said that, and as I will show in section 8.2.3, this argument is less convincing, not least because while power shifted nominally at the center of Cambodian politics in 1993, real power remained with the CPP, also because the interim government had failed to integrate the parallel administrative system of the SOC (cf. Barma, 2006).
8.2.1 Power-Sharing Interim Government

Chapter 3 formulated a distinction between power-sharing interim government and interim periods in which only one party holds legislative and executive power. I held that in the presence of commitment problems, power-sharing interim governments should be more likely to lead to stable peace as they come with physical, economic, and political benefits that decrease future uncertainties for weaker-rowing parties (cf. Figure 3.3 on page 34).

The question of whether or not the warring parties should share power during the interim period had been a major obstacle to overcome in Cambodia’s peace negotiations (United Nations, 2003a). Driven by the demands of the PDK, the CGDK rebel coalition had throughout the 1980s formulated the convention of a power-sharing interim government as a key demand to put its signatures underneath a peace agreement. It had also argued that the Khmer Rouge could not be excluded from institutions of joint rule. Hun Sen’s SOC, however, had “flatly rejected” the very idea of sharing power with the PDK and had voiced concerns that power-sharing would inevitably help the PDK to return to political power (Hall Macleod, 2006). This concern was supported by several members of the UN Security Council who “were opposed to including the PDK in an interim government due to its notorious record of human rights violations in the late 1970s” (Wang, 1996, p. 8). Inviting a UN transitional administration to guide Cambodia’s transition to peace yet required that Cambodians created a legitimate sovereign entity, because its Charta prevented the UN from installing a trusteeship over a member state. Thus, the SOC eventually agreed to institutionalize a power-sharing interim body (Doyle, 1995).

Consequently, and in Section III of the Paris Agreements, the warring parties and the international community negotiated to form the power-sharing SNC (Barma, 2006). The agreement foresaw the SNC to be “the unique legitimate body and source of authority in which, throughout the transitional period, the sovereignty, independence and unity of Cambodia are enshrined,” and the agreement asked the SOC to “represent Cambodia externally and occupy the seat of Cambodia at the United Nations” (United Nations, 1991a). The agreement furthermore designated the SNC to have twelve members – six from the SOC, and two each of FUNCINPEC, the KPNLF, as well as the PDK – and it declared Prince Sihanouk President of the SNC, “in recognition of his role as former king

108 Technically, the SNC existed already during the peace process as a venue for negotiations between the parties, but it never met in Cambodia. It was founded on 10 September 1990 in Jakarta, and it had held several meetings outside Cambodia: in Bangkok (17 September 1990), Paris (21 December 1990), Jakarta (3 June 1991), Pattaya (23 June 1991), Beijing (15 July 1991) and Pattaya (25 August 1991) (Nerciat, 1991a; United Nations, 1991a). Following the peace accord, it was installed in Phnom Penh as Cambodia’s interim body. Because of the high degree of authority that UNTAC assumed during Cambodia’s interim period, the existing literature is divided on whether or not the SNC counts as a full power-sharing government. In this dissertation and in creating my data set (cf. Chapter 4), I follow the majority of the quantitative literature (e.g. Hoddie and Hartzell, 2003; Jarstad, 2010; Joshi and Darby, 2013; Joshi, Quinn, et al., 2015) and code Cambodia as a case of power-sharing; while, for instance, Högbladh (2011) does not classify it as such.
and prime minister and as the only leading figure acceptable to all Cambodian parties” (Doyle, 1995, p. 27). Having said that, the Paris Agreements limited the powers of the SNC in so far that while UNTAC was bound to comply with any policies formulated by the SNC – provided there was a consensus among its members and that the policy was consistent with the objectives of the peace process – the Special Representative of the Secretary-General remained the final authority in theater when it came to determine whether SNC policy was to be implemented (United Nations, 1991a, cf. below).

**Decreasing Uncertainty through Physical Security**

In Chapter 3, I argued that a first mechanism for why power-sharing interim government is more apt design to increase the stability of post-interim peace than all other interim governments is that power-sharing reduces future uncertainty through increasing the *physical security* of warring parties (cf. Figure 3.3). Joining power-sharing institutions requires warring parties, firstly, to come out of hiding in the periphery and join interim institutions in the capital – meaning they have to reveal their organizational structure to each other, making it more difficult to remobilize for war. Secondly, power-sharing frequently also means that rebel-leaders-turned-politicians receive state bodyguards and international attention, further increasing their physical security.

Cambodia does not confirm to this causal pattern due to two reasons. Firstly, while joining the power-sharing SNC did make all rebel leaders return to Phnom Penh in the early interim period and join institutional politics in the capital, this move decreased rather than increased the physical security of the weaker-growing PDK. This is because the move to Phnom Penh made the party vulnerable to (likely SOC-instigated) mob attacks, which in turn contributed ever more to its mistrust of the SOC and thus to an eventual bargaining breakdown and the PDK’s return to combat (cf Sanderson and Maley, 1998).

The SNC had already formed as a venue for negotiations for the parties before it was officially installed as an interim body (cf. Footnote 108). In June 1991, while meeting in Pattaya, the rebels agreed that they would return to the Cambodian capital as soon as the power-sharing SNC was installed as an interim government. Sihanouk in particular had repeatedly depended his return to Cambodia on the installation of the SNC “in our motherland” (in AFP, 1991a). At the same time, the rebels insisted that SNC members would take their own guards to Phnom Penh and refused being provided official bodyguards by the SOC (Thayer, 1991a). This was chiefly due to concerns of the Khmer Rouge leadership who – similar to the CPN (M) in Nepal – only wanted to return to the capital under strong protection by soldiers drawn from their own army, as they did not trust the SOC police to be willing or able to guarantee their security (AFP, 1991b; McCarthy, 1991). Unlike Nepal, however, where rebel leaders returned to the capital months before the power-sharing interim government convened to demonstrate their commitment to the peace process, Cambodian
rebels only returned to Phnom Penh to attend the first meeting of the SNC on 23 November 1991. The KPNLF arrived on 12 November and Sihanouk two days later, among public celebrations for the long-exiled king (Thayer, 1991b). In a much different fashion, PDK leaders returned to the capital on 16 November, being “mobbed” by journalists as they were escorted from the airport, while citizens were largely unaware of the event because authorities had expected mass protests (Corfield, 2009; Gray, 1991b).

On 27 November 1991, PDK interim representative to the SNC and former President of the State Presidium in the Pol Pot regime Khieu Samphan was then attacked and nearly killed in his new Phnom Penh home; while SOC police officers were unable (or unwilling) to protect him from this mob violence (Shenon, 1991a). Some observers argue that the attack was orchestrated by members of the SOC government or even masterminded by Hun Sen himself, who had however not anticipated such violent escalation (Pokempner, 1992). Corfield (2009, p. 109) yet also notes that “there were enough people who hated Khieu Samphan to take part in the attack, regardless of government involvement or encouragement.” Following the attack, Samphan escaped to Thailand and remained absent for the SNC meeting in Phnom Penh on 20 December 1991, and he would only sporadically return to the capital.

Secondly, Cambodia also does not confirm to the suggested causal pattern because the PDK’s move to the capital was not a credible commitment to peace that revealed any organizational structures in the first place. This is not least because the PDK (and all other parties) retained its parallel administration of controlled territories throughout the interim period (cf. section 8.2.3). This means that after its leaders no longer felt their physical security safeguarded in Phnom Penh and increasingly mistrusted the SOC’s commitment to a peaceful solution of the Cambodian conflict, PDK leaders could retreat to the areas under their party’s control. Specifically, on 13 April 1993 and thus shortly before the elections terminating the interim government, it was reported that the PDK representatives in the interim SNC had completely reneged on Cambodia’s peace process, because “all Khmer Rouge officials in the capital appeared to have left” and the PDK office in Phnom Penh was closed (McNulty, 1993). Days later, the party sent a letter of withdrawal to the UN, saying that they no longer felt safe in the capital and thus returned to their administrated areas (Wang, 1996). More generally, this situation highlights the interaction between power-sharing interim government and the integration of parallel political institutions that I touched upon in Chapter 3 and that I also noted for the case of Angola. I further discuss this in Chapter 9.

Decreasing Uncertainty through Political Security

I held that a second mechanism for why power-sharing interim government increases the stability of post-interim peace is that it reduces future uncertainty through increasing the political security of warring parties (cf. Figure
Power-sharing, firstly, grants weaker-growing parties a voice in the design of post-interim institutions (for instance through jointly passed laws that are difficult to achieve, costly to violate, and hard to renege on) which decreases their uncertainty about the enemy’s future behavior. Secondly, it gives parties knowledge on how to manipulate future institutional rules to their advantage.

Cambodia also fails to confirm to this causal pattern. One reason is that the high levels of international authority during its interim period meant that the warring parties could not use the power-sharing arrangements to safeguard (or manipulate) their long-term political security – even though there is some evidence that they tried. Remember that in Chapter 6, I showed that the political security mechanism represents a key explanation for peace in Nepal, because the CPN (M) was able to push the other parties in the power-sharing interim government to revise the electoral law to its advantage. I also demonstrated in Chapter 7 how Angola’s MPLA caretaker interim government passed electoral legislation that threatened UNITA’s political survival in the post-interim period. At the same time, I argued in Chapter 3 that I expect international interim government to mitigate commitment problems because every policy field that is advanced by a neutral international interim officer decreases the stronger-growing party’s ability to use its position for factional interest, which strengthens the belief of a weaker-growing party that the post-interim order will be one that is more attractive than a costly war (cf. section 8.2.2).

In Cambodia, the presence of both power-sharing and international interim government meant that UNTAC’s authority prohibited warring party leaders in the power-sharing SNC to use joint rule as a way to manipulate laws to their advantage and increase their political security. As with Nepal and Angola, this aspect of political security can be highlighted by looking at interim decision-making concerning electoral legislation.

I argued above that the very fact that the interim government was to terminate in elections was perceived by the PDK as a major threat to its political security – Brown (1998) even calls it the party’s “political suicide” – because the party was fully aware of its very limited popular appeal if it were to come to such vote. This is also why it did not end up registering for the elections (Cumming-Bruce, 1992). In 1992, one observer directly related this aspect to perceptions on the future political survival of the party, arguing that Khmer Rouge “commanders must prepare for the future because I don’t think they can live in Cambodia after everything has changed ... People are very angry at [the Khmer Rouge]; nobody loves them” (in Stier, 1992). But the PDK’s perception of being threatened by a popular vote could have been mitigated by negotiating an extensive set of laws during the power-sharing interim period that would have provide for the survival of the Khmer Rouge in the post-interim.

109 Some argue that the fact that the PDK perceived the elections as a threat to its survival begs the question whether the liberal democratic polity that the international community imagined for Cambodia – that included elections as a central ingredient – was a problem, rather than a solution in building post-war peace (Richmond and Franks, 2007).
period, even if an electoral victory was out of sight. Leaving domestic and international unwillingness regarding such safeguards aside, such laws theoretically could have included, for instance, designing stronger proportional elements in the electoral law or eliminating election thresholds for the minimum share of votes a party requires to secure parliamentary representation, so that even few votes for the PDK would result in seats in the post-interim CA. This is not least important, because even though decisions of the SNC could be overridden by UNTAC and elections were closely monitored by the latter as well, a more powerful (or any) position in the CA would have given the PDK more control over the constitution-making process and thus increase its political security.

The electoral law had already been a major hurdle in the negotiations before the signing of the Paris Agreements. In September 1991, SOC Foreign Minister Hor Namhong called the electoral system the only obstacle in reaching a settlement, as the parties could not agree on whether Cambodia should have a proportional or First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) electoral system (United Nations, 2003b). While the rebels were in favor of a proportional system, the SOC called for a majority system that favors larger parties. In the Paris Agreements, the parties then negotiated elections to be held “on a provincial basis in accordance with a system of proportional representation on the basis of lists of candidates put forward by political parties.” Eligible to cast their vote were “Cambodians,” which the accord defined as every person “who either was born in Cambodia or is the child of a person born in Cambodia” (United Nations, 1991a). However, by designing most constituencies to be rather small – with a number of single-member districts (cf. Gallup, 2002) – the electoral system still had a “majoritarian effect” (Nohlen et al., 2001, p. 18). In addition, the provisions were perceived to now extend voting rights also to Chinese and Vietnamese residents in Cambodia ( Minority Rights Group, 1995). During the interim period, the PDK thus began to strongly oppose the implementation of this bargain that the parties had arrived at in Paris.

The party reasoned that by allowing ethnic Vietnamese to vote, the law would give a clear advantage to the Hanoi-backed SOC, and thus directly threaten its own political survival – the PDK had a history of violent attacks against ethnic Vietnamese (Amer, 1995). For instance, Khieu Samphan said with regard to the electoral law on 10 June 1992: “At stake here is the issue of a ‘Cambodian’ Cambodia, and not a ‘Vietnamized’ Cambodia where foreigners were to be given the right to take part in the elections” (in Colm, 1992). The party also alleged that “there were one million illegal Vietnamese migrants who had come to [colonize] Cambodia and support the CPP in the forthcoming elections” (Thayer, 2012, p. 64).

To increase its future political security, the PDK tried to make use of its position in power-sharing and attempted to push the other parties represented in the SNC to insert Khmer nationality into the electoral law (Amer, 1994; Amer, 1995; Colm, 1992; Un, 2005). This move can be interpreted in two
ways. Firstly, and resembling the CPN (M)'s strategies to use its participation in Nepal's power-sharing interim government to change electoral legislation to its own advantage, the PDK's move can be seen as the party's attempt to use the power-sharing SNC for political benefits that prevent its marginalization in the post-interim period (cf. Amer, 1994): “Former parties to the CGDK ... attempted to limit the number of ethnic Vietnamese who could take part in the planned general elections,” which became “most evident in the discussion prior to the adoption of the Electoral Law in 1992” (Amer, 2006, p. 392).

Secondly, and rather than attempting to actually change the electoral law, the PDK may also have resorted to racist language as a strategy to attract voters in the upcoming elections (Hughes, 2002). The UN Secretary-General, however, “after careful consideration in view of the support expressed for the two proposals by Prince Sihanouk” (Amer, 1995, p. 33), instructed his Special Representative not to approve these amendments. Akashi himself commented on the process of arriving at a final electoral law that there was “a strong push ... to insert Cambodian citizenship or nationality (as a criteria for voting) – a radical modification from the Paris Accords ... We have to refrain from creating racial undertones to such a matter” (in Colm, 1992). While the other parties in the SNC eventually accepted Akashi’s decision and adopted the finalized electoral law (cf. United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, 1993), this example thus not only highlights how international authority during interim rule can impede the pattern by which power-sharing interim government adds to the political security of warring parties. In Cambodia, it also meant that in contrast to increasing the political security of the Khmer Rouge, it advanced the party’s isolation among the other factions in the SNC. This finding could thus indicate a possible interaction effect between the two institutional designs features of interim government, in that power-sharing only has a negative effect on the hazard of armed conflict in cases where international actors are absent. I address this point further in Chapter 9.

Decreasing Uncertainty through Economic Security

In Chapter 3 I held that a final mechanism for why power-sharing interim government increases the stability of post-interim peace is that power-sharing reduces future uncertainty through increasing the economic benefits for warring parties (cf. Figure 3.3). In war-torn states, individual access to wealth is usually determined by control of the government, and thus either side to a war must fear to be economically marginalized if the other side fully dominates a transition to peace. By rewarding weaker-growing parties with cabinet or legislative positions, power-sharing interim governments enable them to control (and loot) the resources ascribed to their post and thus lower their incentives to acquire such benefits by violent means (cf. Haas and Ottmann, 2015).

There is no evidence in the primary and secondary literature on Cambodia that the case confirms to this causal pattern. As during the rule of Angola’s in-
terim government (cf. Chapter 7), this lack of evidence is explained by the fact that the warring parties could rely on extracting economic benefits through the continued control of parallel political structures and did not need the participation in the power-sharing SNC to secure such benefits. This becomes obvious with regard to the securing of economic benefits in three ways.

Firstly, particularly the PDK continuously secured economic benefits and prevented its economic marginalization by trading and smuggling natural resources – particularly timber and gems – out of its administrated areas along the Cambodian-Thai border. I discuss this mechanism further in section 8.2.3. Secondly, particularly the SOC government was said to secure economic benefits through corruption during the interim period, but it did not need to rely on the institutions of the interim government to do so (as, for instance, warring parties in Liberia, cf. Chapter 3). Instead, the SOC could sell off state assets that it controlled; use its control over the police force to evacuate citizens from their houses in Phnom Penh and rent them to arriving members of the international community (who would pay much higher rents); and demand bribes, parallel taxes, and payments from workers and students living in SOC controlled areas during the interim period (cf. Hughes, 1996; Sanger, 1991). Thirdly, all parties could use the influx of foreign aid during the interim period to secure economic benefits and lower their costs of defection. Yet, while Haaß and Ottmann (2015) highlight how foreign aid to power-sharing interim institutions in Liberia and Aceh helped to “buy off” warring parties, aid was not channeled through the power-sharing SNC to the parties in Cambodia. Instead, it was channeled through each parties’ parallel institutions. For instance, the Khmer Rouge even protested the influx of foreign aid during the interim period and insisted that such aid would only strengthen the “Phnom Penh government” of the SOC – not the power-sharing SNC (AFP, 1992c). This highlights the role of parallel structures of political authority in this regard. Having said that, emergency aid to refugee camps under the parallel control of the PDK also aided the party’s economic security and decreased its costs of defection (cf. below). I further attend to the interplay of parallel institutions and power-sharing with regard to economic benefits in Chapter 9.

8.2.2 International Interim Government

My second hypothesis in Chapter 3 held that international interim government, as opposed to interim government without a direct involvement of the international community, increases the stability of post-interim peace. I defined international interim government as one in which members of the international community assume political authority in some or all policy matters. I outlined that existing research has often looked at such interim government in a strict interpretation following Doyle (2002), but that I prefer the more lenient perspective of Guttieri and Piombo (2007) who reason that most interim governments see vast degrees of international influence in decision-making – even though this
influence may not be formalized in administrative structures. In Chapter 3, I consequently theorized that in the presence of credible commitment problems, international interim government increases the stability of peace through the mechanism of raising costs of defection via physical deterrence, as well as by means of policy influence (cf. Figure 3.3).

Cambodia saw an international interim government in the strict and lenient understanding of the concept. In Section II of the Paris Agreements, the parties invited the UN Security Council to establish UNTAC “with civilian and military components under the direct responsibility of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.” They further delegated “all powers necessary” to UNTAC to ensure the implementation of the agreement, which included placing all “administrative agencies, bodies and offices which could directly influence the outcome of elections” under UN supervision (United Nations, 1991a). This meant that the interim government oversaw the policy fields of foreign affairs, national defense, finance, public security, as well as information. However, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General Yasushi Akashi de facto refused to use UNTAC’s full administrative authority and was instead eager to engage the power-sharing SNC in decision-making (cf. Croissant, 2008; Mezzera et al., 2009). This not least resulted in the problematic distribution of political authority as discussed in section 8.2.1.

Notes: Figure based on data from the International Peace Institute (2015).
Setting up the international interim government was flawed from the start. While the UN Security Council had in Resolution 717 of 16 October 1992 already authorized the establishment of the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) that was to be deployed immediately after the signing of the Paris Agreements to help the warring parties maintain the fragile ceasefire, the new UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali announced the appointment of Yasushi Akashi as his Special Representative in Cambodia only two months into the interim period on 9 January 1992 (Hall Macleod, 2006; Jennar, 1994; United Nations, 2003a).

On 28 February 1992, the UN Security Council then authorized in Resolution 745 the deployment of UNTAC for a period of 18 months, and decided that the mission should be comprised of seven key components: one military component and six civilian components dealing with issues human rights, elections, civil administration, police, the repatriation of refugees, and economic rehabilitation (United Nations, 1992c). The total number of international personnel was set at around 20,000 members of staff (cf. Figure 8.2). 308 members were employed in the civil administration component, 3,600 as civilian police monitors, and 72 persons formed the election component (United Nations, 2003b). Election personnel was additionally supplemented by 4,000 Cambodian civilian staff during the electoral registration phase in 1992, as well as by 1,000 international and 56,000 Cambodian observers during the actual polling process in 1993 (Amer, 1995). All in all, this meant that once the UNTAC mission was fully deployed, it assumed an “unprecedented degree of transitional authority” in Cambodia (Doyle, 1995, p. 13), virtually took over governing the country (Lewis, 1992), and thus represented the most expensive, comprehensive, and intrusive UN operation at this point in history (Wang, 1996).

**Tying Hands through Physical Deterrence**

In Chapter 3, I argued that a first mechanism for why international interim government is more apt to increase the stability of post-interim peace than any other type of interim government is that international authority increases the warring parties’ costs of defection through physical deterrence (cf. Figure 3.3). Firstly, military components associated with international interim government bring large numbers of troops that place physical constraints on the warring parties’ ability to break a deal (for instance by implementing buffer zones for disarmament and demobilization). Secondly, parties do no longer only have to fight their enemy, but also have to spend valuable resources fighting peacekeepers. Thirdly, the high financial and human costs that come with assuming authority in war-torn states assure parties that the international community has a strong interest in upholding a peaceful bargain.

Cambodia does not confirm to this causal pattern. Observable evidence thereby points to issues of late deployment and early withdrawal as explanations for why UNTAC was unable to increase costs of defection through physical
deterrence, highlighting the aspect of temporality in interim governments I outlined in Chapter 3. Firstly, the international interim government failed to raise the warring parties costs of defection because it was deployed late in Cambodia’s interim period, a fact that has been thoroughly noted in the case literature (e.g. Doyle, 1995; Doyle, 2001; Findlay, 1995; Mersiades, 2005; Roberts, 1998). Reasons for the late deployment of international personnel are plenty, and particularly include the unprecedented size of the mission and the dragging bureaucratic and budgetary planning within the UN. For instance, the UN was reported to have done “very little substantial advance planning for UNTAC although diplomats and officials in the negotiating process were able to foresee an agreement as early as August 1991” (Wang, 1996, p. 16).

By August 1992 – ten months into the 18-month-long interim period – only half of the roughly 1,000 civil administrators had arrived in Cambodia. While the international interim government did for a short time during the interim period manage to create a degree of stability that was previously unforeseen in Cambodia and increase the costs of remobilization for the warring parties to some extent by effectively standing in the way of PDK combatants attacking the other parties – causing the death of 4 military observers, 41 other military UN staff, 16 civilian police officers, 5 international civilian staff and 16 local staff of the UNTAC mission (United Nations, 2003b) – this was by no means enough to create true physical deterrence. “UNTAC had no stomach for fighting between factions resistant to disarmament and its peacekeeping troops” (Richardson and Sainsbury, 2005, p. 287). Instead, slow deployment negatively affected the perception of the parties in the bargaining situation of how the international interim government would raise their costs of defection. The PDK in particular “decided not to lay down their arms because they saw how slowly UN troops were being deployed and decided UNTAC was not taking control of the situation” (Ledgerwood, 1994, p. 8).

More specifically, this means that observing the late deployment of international authority to Cambodia, the PDK had determined early on in the interim period that UNTAC was not going to significantly (1) raise its own costs of defection from the bargain struck in Paris and prevent it from remobilizing for war. In fact, UNTAC’s insistence in sticking to the resolution of Cambodia’s underlying conflict through popular elections may have been one of the reasons for why the PDK remobilized for combat in the first place (cf. Richmond and Franks, 2007). It also had (2) determined that UNTAC would not help the PDK to protect itself from the attacks of others – it had lost this trust after Khieu Samphan was attacked in November 1992 as the international community had yet failed to deploy UNTAC forces.\footnote{The PDK had already called for fastened UN deployment immediately following the attack against Khieu Samphan in the beginning of the interim period, and observers warned in early 1992 that although the Paris Agreements “succeeded in bringing an end to the fighting” the accords would fail if UNTAC would not establish its presence soon, given the sharp decline in the parties’ mutual trust as a consequence of the attack on Khieu Samphan (Thayer, 1992b).} This becomes also visible as the PDK
and the other warring parties – had already consolidated its parallel political and military institutions as UNTAC personnel arrived in Cambodia (cf. section 8.2.3 and Pokempner, 1992; Wang, 1996). The PDK was neither punished for defecting from the Paris bargain or penalized for refusing to disarm and demobilize, nor was it disciplined for trying to disrupt the campaigning period leading up to the May 1993 elections (Becker, 1998).  

Secondly, UNTAC was not only unable to substantively raise the costs of defection for the warring parties because the parties were well aware of the fact that UNTAC personnel would withdraw soon following the 1993 elections. Most of the electoral component staff already left in June 1993, and military troops were gradually withdrawn between August and November 1993 (Amer, 1995). This points to the issue of temporality in interim governments that I discussed at length in Chapter 3. The eventual withdrawal of UNTAC failed to mitigate commitment problems in the long run as it increased the warring parties’ perception that any hypothetical raised costs of defection through international interim government would expire immediately after the inauguration of the CA (cf. Hall Macleod, 2006). As an UNTAC military observer noted, the PDK had quickly “cracked the code” and “learned that the UN’s a paper tiger” that would not represent any deterrence for defection in the long run (in Cumming-Bruce, 1993a). And another observer of the peace process in Cambodia noted that Cambodian factions knew “that UNTAC was going to leave anyway. There was a calendar; there was a clear statement that UNTAC would not be there forever” (Carney and Choo, 1993, p. 42). And Joshi (2013, p. 367) calls the immediate withdrawal of UNTAC forces a major flaw in the design of international authority in Cambodia, and argues that post-conflict societies require a longer deployment of such authority to ensure that “former rivals will continue to have faith after the mission is withdrawn.” Yet, as Chesterman (2005a, p. 174) notes, the “counterfactual is hypothetical, as there was no willingness before or after the vote for UNTAC to remain beyond the completion of its mandate.”

Tying Hands through Policy Influence

In Chapter 3, I argued that a second mechanism for why international interim government is more apt to increase the stability of post-interim peace than any other interim government is that international authority increases costs of defection for warring parties through policy influence (cf. Figure 3.3). I held that every policy field advanced by a neutral international officer decreases a

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112 Is there evidence for the alternative mechanism, i.e. that had UNTAC been deployed more quickly, peace would have prevailed in Cambodia? The majority of the cited literature argues as much, although Pokempner (1992, p. 7) reasons that “[e]ven had the deployment of the UN in Cambodia begun on the day of the Paris Accords, such a schedule would have been extremely optimistic for a country with minimal communications and electricity whose dilapidated roads are barely passable for motor vehicles in dry season, and impassable for the five months of monsoon rains each year.” This argumentation points to an alternative mechanism of interim government duration (cf. also Buerger, 1994; Choo, 1995) that I also briefly discussed for Angola in Chapter 7.
stronger-growing party’s ability to use this position for factional interest and to pursue politics that marginalize a weaker-growing party. This reasoning thus goes hand in hand with previous studies on peacekeeping that stress the UN’s role as “as truly neutral authority” (Gisselquist, 2002, p. 12).

Cambodia does not confirm to this causal pattern, because UNTAC’s strong policy influence (1) meant that the parties could not use the power-sharing SNC to safeguard political benefits to increase their long term survival – an interaction that I discussed above – and (2) failed to mitigate commitment problems because the parties did not perceive UNTAC as a “truly neutral authority.” During the rule of the interim government, the “creation of laws and procedures regarding elections was a critical function granted” to the international interim government (Doyle, 1995, p. 29). For instance, the electoral law was even colloquially called the “UNTAC electoral law” (Peou, 2000). In Chapter 3, I argued based on past research if international actors serve as a neutral arbiter “to whom each side can take its concerns and complaints about the other,” this should allow “for increased communication between the sides and a reduced risk of a preemptive return to arms” (Flores and Nooruddin, 2011, p. 488).

International policy influence yet did not mitigate but exacerbate commitment problems particularly for the weaker-growing PDK, because the party – and the other factions – did not perceive UNTAC as a neutral authority to turn to as conceptualized by the existing literature. Instead, parties perceived “a lack of impartiality on the part of external sponsors of UNTAC” (Peou, 2002, p. 518). For instance, an aid worker observed during the interim period that the SOC had no confidence in the UN system as such and UNTAC in particular, because it had perceived it for 12 years to be on the side of the rebel factions, after the UN had granted Cambodia’s General Assembly seat to the CGDK coalition (in Eng, 1991a). Neither did the Khmer Rouge perceive UNTAC as a neutral force. I mentioned above how its leaders felt that the UN was not protecting them sufficiently from violent attacks due to UNTAC’s late deployment to Cambodia. Instead, the PDK elite argued that the international interim government was biased towards the SOC, not least after the UN Security Council imposed an oil embargo on PDK territory on 30 November 1992. Reflecting this suspicion of the PDK towards UNTAC, on 7 December 1992 Khieu Samphan told the press as a reaction to the sanctions against his party that in “certain provinces ... certain elements of UNTAC have not hesitated to openly collaborate with the Vietnamese and their puppets” and that UN peacekeepers had “penetrated” into Khmer Rouge zones “followed by the Vietnamese forces and their puppets who come to attack our villages” (in AFP, 1992b). A PDK radio broadcast further accused UNTAC of having “joined hands with the Yuon aggressors and their puppets ... in realizing their strategy to annex Cambodia

113International actors were well aware how this embargo could be perceived by the Khmer Rouge and had raised concerns that sanctions would drive the party further away from the peace process – UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had, for instance, asked the Security Council on 20 November 1992 to refrain from imposing sanctions (Spielmann, 1992).
and the Cambodian race” (“Yuon” is a pejorative for Vietnamese in Khmer, literally translating into “savage,” cf. Pokempner, 1992, p. 8). And on 2 January 1993, the party argued “UNTAC has not been neutral” but “totally, bluntly, and shamelessly siding with Vietnam and its puppets” (in Reid, 1993).114

8.2.3 Integration of Parallel Institutions

My third hypothesis reasoned that in the presence of commitment problems, more advanced processes of integrating parallel institutions of warring parties into the authority of an interim government come with higher stability of peace by raising costs of defection. In order to sustain in war, parties need parallel military and political institutions to accumulate means and resources for fighting and to manage their relation with the population. As long as these structures persist throughout an interim period, parties retain the financial resources, popular legitimacy, command structures, and war-time mindsets to remobilize in the post-interim period. Interim governments that integrate parallel institutions should consequently increase the stability of peace (cf. Figure 3.3).

Parallel Political Institutions

The establishment of parallel political institutions during Cambodia’s civil war goes beyond the installation of rebel government as with the Maoist People’s Governments in Nepal or with UNITA’s Terras Libres de Angola (cf. Chapter 6 and 7). In Cambodia, parallel structures of government existed at several levels until 1991. As outlined above, Cambodia de facto had two governments at the international level from 1982 onwards: while the PRK controlled around 70 to 90 percent of national territory during the civil war (depending on the source of information, cf. Kroef, 1979), the CGDK rebel coalition was internationally recognized and occupied Cambodia’s seat in the UN General Assembly (cf. section 8.1.2). Within Cambodia, rebel factions set up parallel administrations to regulate their relationship with the civilian population in the areas under their control, although the existing case literature suggests that public service provision and institutionalization of these structures was carried out to a significantly lesser degree than in Angola or Nepal.

114 There is also evidence that the international interim government’s policy influence failed to raise costs of defection for parties because a “major limitation of UNTAC’s mandate was that it did not include any democratic institutional engineering that went beyond the electoral arena” (Croissant, 2008, p. 657) and that its authority to draft laws was not extended to other areas of civil administration (Doyle, 1995; Mezzera et al., 2009). From a bargaining perspective this argument yet points to inconclusive results. On the one hand, the failure of deeper institutional engineering by UNTAC during the interim period, in particular in the realm of administrative reform, contributed to the CPP’s violent rise to power in the post-interim period by not increasing its costs of defection through an integrated and controlled civil bureaucracy. On the other hand, and as with Nepal, where the absence of international ownership in the interim period and during the institutional reform process added to peace, a further international involvement would likely have polarized the parties involved in power-sharing and have pushed the PDK even further to the margins.
Particularly the PDK yet tried controlling every aspect of the everyday lives of civilians even after it had been forced out of power in 1979. The party became known to set up mandatory political reeducation and indoctrination programs in the villages under its control also during the civil war (Erlanger, 1991a; Sopheak and Clayton, 2007). These structures also served to closely administer marriages, the political administration of rural areas, as well as the village economy, and in particular the production of rice and other food (Grundy-Warr, 1994). In that regard, the administration of rice production and distribution in its zones of control significantly contributed to the PDK’s ability to wage a war against the central PRK government, because it provided a valuable source of nutrition for PDK soldiers (Human Rights Watch, 1995). To complete its parallel economy, the PDK also threatened to withdraw the Cambodian riel completely from its zones of control in exchange for its own currency (Channo and Colm, 1992). In sum, a “steady goal of the Khmer Rouge [during the civil war had] been the destruction of the government’s administrative structures throughout the village, commune and district level,” to which end it sought to replace such structures formally or informally, indoctrinated ordinary civilians, imposed forced labor in the zones of its control, and reigned with “what appeared to be a deliberate policy of terror” (Human Rights Watch, 1995, p. 24).

The Paris Agreements did not serve as a blueprint for the reintegration of parallel political structures but preserved and extended parallel structures of authority of all warring parties for the interim period. It did so by asking the parties only to refrain “from any deployment, movement or actions which would extend the territory they control” (Jennar, 1994; United Nations, 1991a). At the national level, the peace agreement asked the parties both to form the SNC, as well as to place “all administrative agencies, bodies, and offices” under the direct and supervision of UNTAC (United Nations, 1991a). This introduced at least two further avenues of parallel authority that added to “double, sometimes even threefold structures” of power during the interim period (Croissant, 2008, p. 661): (1) between the SOC and UNTAC, (2) between the SNC and the SOC, and (3) between the interim institutions in the capital and parallel structures in rebel zones of control. For instance, while UNTAC was tasked to supervise and control the existing SOC administration, even in Phnom Penh – “where a central administrative apparatus was still functioning” and where UNTAC concentrated most of its work at – the SOC “administered around UNTAC,” allowed international interim authorities to control its bureaucrats only when it “wished to be controlled,” and made sure that “the actual chain of policy bypassed UNTAC, whose officer was kept busy watching an official without function while the real decisions were made elsewhere, out of UNTAC’s sight” (Doyle, 1995, 43f.). Because the SOC had feared that dismantling its ad-

115 Reasons for why UNTAC was unable to exercise the degree of control it would have needed to actually transform Cambodia’s civil administration are plenty, and include that the few UN officials assigned to head 21 provincial administration offices established throughout Cambodia could not control a SOC bureaucracy of over 200,000 employees (Findlay, 1995; Roberts, 225
ministration would facilitate the PDK’s return to power, it also de facto refused to transfer authority over its bureaucracy to the SNC but kept such authority “largely intact” (Ledgerwood, 1994, p. 2).

Consequently, political elites of all parties kept the perception throughout the interim period that the design of Cambodia’s interim government had meant for them to retain parallel political institutions. Prince Sihanouk, for instance, was a strong proponent of preserving the “two rival governments of Phnom Penh and the tripartite resistance coalition” throughout the interim period instead of inaugurating a joint SNC with full powers (AFP, 1991e). He also argued that both governments should be allowed to “continue to function, each in its own zones, with their own administrations, ... flag, national anthems, ... constitutions, [and] laws” (ibid.). And SOC Foreign Affairs Minister Hour Namhong added,

“[The] SNC has no legal basis, nor does it have the institutional basis of a government, even a ‘de facto’ one ... [It] has unequivocally been decided that the two governments in place will continue to administer their respective zones of control ... until the nomination of a new government after the general election ... There should not be any misunderstandings ... The SNC has its seat in Phnom Penh ... [but] the government of the SOC runs the country” (Hughes, 1996, p. 25).

As a result, after 18 months of interim government in Cambodia, the parties had not only preserved but even advanced their respective parallel administrations. For instance, “the territory to which the UN was prohibited access by the Khmer Rouge had [even] more than doubled” as compared to the beginning of the interim period (Jennar, 1994, p. 145). Some even say that the PDK managed to increase its territorial administration from five to 20 per cent of Cambodia’s territory during the interim period (Richardson and Sainsbury, 2005). As during the civil war, FUNCINPEC and KPNLF were thereby not attempting “to control daily life ... as minutely as the Khmer Rouge” and had most administrative tasks executed by military personnel in their small zones of control, but the PDK increasingly infiltrated SOC territory where it then “set up a shadow administration loyal to itself” (Pokempner, 1992, pp. 24, 42). Such parallel structures of political authority also continued to exist in the post-interim period (AFP, 1992d; Downie and Kingsbury, 2001). For instance, after Cambodia’s elected National Assembly voted to outlaw the PDK in 1994, the party established on 11 July 1994 the “Provisional Government of National Union and National Salvation of Cambodia” in the Pailin and Preah Vihear provinces at the Cambodian-Thai border, with Khieu Samphan as Prime Minister and Son Sen as his Deputy – the two Khmer Rouge leaders who had represented

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the party in the power-sharing SNC during the interim period (Human Rights Watch, 1995; Mehta, 1996).

**Affecting Financial Means** In Chapter 3, I held that a first mechanism for why interim governments that integrate the parallel political institutions of warring parties increase the stability of post-interim peace is that they raise costs of defection by limiting the financial resources parties need to remobilize (cf. Figure 3.3). In contrast, and when facing commitment problems caused by an uncertainty of a stronger-growing party’s future behavior, the continued existence of parallel political institutions allows a weaker-growing party to not only retreat to its zones of territorial control and regroup for war, but also to use parallel structures to acquire the financial means to buy new weaponry through taxation as well as managing natural resource extraction.

Cambodia confirms to this causal pattern. Particularly the PDK’s ability to manage the extraction and sale of natural resources and implement a parallel taxation system by means of controlling parallel political institutions during the rule of the interim government is one of the central explanations for why the party was able to return to armed combat in the early 1990s. This becomes visible with regard to two aspects. Firstly, while the Khmer Rouge’s “Maoist inspired leaders [had] punished free-market commerce by death” during the Pol Pot regime, during the interim period the party began to function “to a large degree as a business venture,” granting lucrative concessions to Thai companies that were involved in gem-mining and the timber trade in the rebel territories (Shenon, 1992). This meant that the PDK used its parallel administration of Cambodian territory and its control over border areas to implement a parallel taxation system that is said to have resulted in 10 to 20 million USD income per month throughout the interim period (Cortright and Lopez, 2000; Gennino, 1992; Koning and Capistrano, 2007). In June 1992 alone, for instance, companies from Thailand were reportedly paying 40,000 USD per day “to mine for rubies around the Khmer Rouge headquarters of Pailin” (Grundy-Warr, 1994, 89f.). In addition to natural resource extraction, smuggling, and trading, the PDK could also use its parallel administration of several refugee camps along the Thai-Cambodian border to acquire money through retrieving international aid (as well as food or medicine) directed to these camps, in order to finance its continued strive against the government (Grundy-Warr, 1994; Vickery, 1988).

This parallel finance system directly affected the PDK’s ability to remobilize against the government, meaning that the continued existence of parallel administration and the management of natural resources it enabled failed to decrease costs of defection for the rebels. This is because the PDK used the money extracted through the parallel taxation of resources to purchase weapons and continue its violent campaign (Cortright and Lopez, 2000; Shenon, 1992). In late 1991, Pol Pot argued that the “resources [in our liberated and semi-liberated zones] absolutely must be [utilized] as assets” (in Global Witness, 2002, p. 17).
While UN sanctions in late 1992 specifically aimed at weakening the PDK’s ability to use its parallel administration for resource trading, violations against the international embargo never completely shut down the border trade (Cortright and Lopez, 2002). This points more generally to the role of natural resources as a competing explanatory variable for continued conflict in Cambodia’s post-interim period, a variable that is thoroughly discussed by previous research (e.g. Le Billon, 2000; Le Billon, 2001b; Ross, 2004). Le Billon (2000) in that regard however particularly points out the importance of parallel administration of territory and a population by the PDK and the links to how this enabled the party to retrieve natural resources: By inviting Thai companies to secure log supply from Cambodia, the PDK was able to impose a parallel taxation system largely directed at Thai businessmen that helped them to strengthen their “shadow state,” as well as to “increase territorial control and thus financial revenue” (Le Billon, 2000, p. 789).

Secondly, the continued existence of parallel political structures also failed to increase the PDK’s costs of defection because it enabled the party to forcibly enlist the population living under its control. This provided the rebels with a larger fighter base to draw upon, and it was often reported conscripting children “at the earliest age possible” (Pokempner, 1992, p. 41). To achieve this end, the PDK also used its parallel administration of refugee camps to forcibly relocate emigrated Cambodians into its zones of control (Nerciat, 1992; Vickery, 1988). It thereby considered and penalized civilians who refused its orders as “traitors’ if they did not go [back] to rebel zones in Cambodia” (Eng, 1991b). This forced repopulation of the areas under their administration also decreased the PDK’s costs of defection because it created “a labor force with which to continue the lucrative border trade, and a supply of soldiers and porters” for the resumption of armed combat against the government (Pokempner, 1992, p. 34): Throughout the interim period, the PDK could use the population it controlled to “drain human and material resources” away from the SOC and “influence and coerce people to supply food” for its soldiers (Grundy-Warr, 1994, pp. 87, 89).

Finally, and while I have focused on the role of parallel political institutions in failing to increase the PDK’s costs of defection, parallel structures are also part of an explanation why the CPP could blackmail its way into a coalition government in 1993 and carry out its 1997 coup d’état. As the other parties, the SOC government that controlled civil administration in most of rural Cambodia and “sought to retain the loyalty of its armed forces and political functionar-

116Having said that, it is also possible to imagine a competing causal mechanism for the parallel political administration of territorial zones during the interim period, and argue that the warring parties used the practice of enforced relocation to create an electorate for the May 1993 election – and thus decrease its future uncertainty. For instance, observers argued in late 1991 that the PDK aimed at maintaining control over the refugees and their voting behavior “in anticipation of future elections” (Eng, 1991b), and Prince Sihanouk later argued that he had heard the PDK wanted to extend its parallel administration “so as to enable it to win at least 30 of the 120 seats in the new legislature” (in Pokempner, 1992, p. 37).
ies” throughout the interim period (Hall Macleod, 2006, p. 84). As a result, in SOC areas, the party could use its bureaucracy to subject opposition parties to extreme harassment, enforce “legislative or administrative regulation of expression and association,” maintain “political dossiers on citizens,” or restrict “movement through an identity card system” (Pokempner, 1992, p. 12). The continuation of parallel administration throughout the interim period failed to decrease costs of defection for the CPP in the post-interim period because it meant that real power remained with the party (even though FUNCINPEC had won the majority of votes in 1993). This was not least because the SOC controlled tax collection and could use a standing army to force its way into the post-interim government (Amer, 1995; Doyle, 2001). As Barma (2006, p. 145) argues, had UNTAC stood up to the SOC – “had it effectively prized the reins of administrative apparatus from the SOC and not instead relied on the SOC to administer the country before the elections were held – it may have prevented the ... later dominance of the CPP.”

Affecting Levels of Popular Support I further held that a second mechanism for why interim governments that integrate the parallel political institutions of warring parties increase the stability of post-interim peace is that such interim governments increase costs of defection by affecting the levels of popular support parties need to remobilize (cf. Figure 3.3). In order to raise their expected capability to prevail in war, warring parties need to maintain support from the civilian population (e.g. because voluntary conscription is cheaper than forced conscription). They can acquire such support by providing public services through parallel administration. Consequently, as long as warring parties can prove that they can deliver public services more effectively than an interim government, they also keep significant popular legitimacy which reduces their costs of remobilizing for war.

Cambodia does not confirm to this causal pattern. There is no evidence in the case literature that the warring parties sought to increase their popular legitimacy through the provision of public services. Instead they reigned with “what appeared to be a deliberate policy of terror” (Human Rights Watch, 1995, p. 24). While there is very weak observable evidence that parallel authorities of the various Cambodian factions assisted villagers in the production and distribution of rice during the interim period (but often for the benefit of soldiers, cf. Pokempner, 1992), the prevailing description of parallel administration throughout Cambodia’s interim period is that parties controlled the populations living under their control by establishing systems of fear and forced obedience. For instance, Hughes (1996, p. 86) concludes that the interim period “left in place an abusive and secretive administrative structure ... [and] reign of terror of secret police and military units” of the SOC.

Having said that, one could conclude from this observation that the Cambodian case demonstrates an important theoretical precondition to my argument
that warring parties even need to prove their legitimacy to a civilian population through public service provision. Such argument requires that a civilian population is also aware of the demands that it can pose to a (parallel) government and administrative structure in the first place, i.e. that civilians have experience in what public service provision by a legitimate government looks like. In Cambodia, the “reign of terror” by the warring parties did however not start during the country’s civil war or during the rule of the interim government, but the history of violence against and exploitation of civilians through government goes back to the brutal rule of the Khmer Rouge between 1975 and 1978 and to the imposed one-party state of the PRK during the 1980s. In that regard, Cambodia also stands in stark contrast to Angola, where – although the country was equally ruled by authoritarian and predatory elites since its independence – UNITA was due to its Maoist ideology in its early days eager to provide public services to increase its popular legitimacy, and only during the interim period demonstrated increasingly vicious behavior toward civilians (cf. Chapter 7). The Cambodian case may thus also demonstrate that the causal mechanism between interim governments failing to integrate parallel institutions and the absence of post-interim peace is conditional to some extent of a history of democracy or of strong statehood before the outbreak of war.

Parallel Military Institutions

The integration of parallel military structures through the disarmament and demobilization of warring parties had been a major issue in Cambodia’s peace process. Negotiations between the international community and the parties had long focused on the question of how many of the Cambodian troops on the ground would be disarmed and demobilized during the interim period and before the 1993 elections. For instance, an early UN proposal for a road map to peace foresaw the complete disarmament and demobilization of all parties before the elections, a plan that was vehemently opposed by the SOC that feared that the PDK would never follow through with complete demobilization and consequently threaten the power of the central government (Gray, 1991c).

In the Paris Agreements, the warring parties thus arrived at a compromise and agreed to disarm and demobilize 70 percent of their forces before the 1993 elections, while the remaining 30 percent were to be cantoned or confined to the barracks during the electoral process (Doyle, 1995). In specific, the terms of the accord read that the parties would “undertake a phased and balanced process of demobilization of at least 70 per cent of their military forces ... prior to the end of the process of registration for the elections” and to “demobilize all their remaining forces before or shortly after the elections and, to the extent that full demobilization is unattainable, to respect and abide by whatever decision the newly elected government that emerges ... takes.” The agreement furthermore assigned UNTAC to “supervise the regrouping and relocating of all forces to specifically designated cantonment areas” and, after the forces had entered the
cantonments, to “initiate the process of arms control and reduction,” as well as take “necessary steps regarding the phased process of demobilization” (United Nations, 1991a).

The Paris Agreements thus never foresaw the complete integration of parallel military structures into the authority of the interim government in the first place, and even the partial disarmament and demobilization plan that the parties had agreed upon in Paris eventually failed. Only on 9 May 1991 – more than six months into the interim period – UNTAC Lieutenant General John Anderson announced that the cantonment, disarmament, and demobilization of all parties would begin on 13 June 1991 and involve 200,000 troops and 250,000 militia men. The PDK immediately reacted to this announcement and declared that it would postpone the cantonment, disarmament, and demobilization of its armed wing NADK until UNTAC had created what the party called the two necessary preconditions for it to join the demobilization process: Firstly, to ensure the withdrawal of all Vietnamese forces from Cambodia (which UNTAC said was a precondition already fulfilled) and secondly, to completely dismantle the SOC’s parallel structures and transfer all powers to the SNC – which UNTAC was never supposed to do according to the terms of Paris (Amer, 1995; Doyle, 1995).

On 10 June 1992, the PDK saw that UNTAC would not meet its demands, and refused to send its troops to the designated cantonment sites. This meant that the other parties that had started to dismantle their parallel military structures (and had disarmed almost 55,000 soldiers according to UNTAC estimates) ceased the process as well (cf. Table 8.2 and Wang, 1996). On 15 November 1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali announced that it was no longer feasible to move forward with the DDR process (United Nations, 1992b). On 30 November, Security Council Resolution 792 confirmed that the 1993 election would go forward as planned and without completing the demobilization of the warring parties (United Nations, 1992e).\footnote{This is in stark contrast to, for instance, the case of Mozambique, where a dragging DDR process meant that elections were continuously postponed until the warring parties had disarmed and demobilized (Flores and Nooruddin, 2011).}

The interim government failed to even partially integrate parallel military structures into the central authority because it neither foresaw any penalties against non-compliance with the disarmament and demobilization process, nor did it implement any incentives for following through with such an undertaking. While some argue the PDK never intended to disarm in the first place and “used unattainable demands to justify their disengagement from the process” (Ferry, 2014, p. 133), the interim government failed to make such non-compliance extremely costly, as using force to coerce the PDK into compliance was beyond UNTAC’s mandate (Croissant, 2008; Wang, 1996; Westendorf, 2015). For instance, because the PDK could use its parallel zones of control to earn money through timber and gem trade, the international interim government failed to make conditional foreign aid an attractive monetary alternative for the party (Brown, 1998; Doyle, 1994).
### Table 8.2: Overview of the DDR Process in Cambodia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faction</th>
<th>Forces (1991)</th>
<th>Cantoned</th>
<th>% Cantoned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOC</td>
<td>131,000</td>
<td>42,368</td>
<td>32.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPNLF</td>
<td>27,800</td>
<td>6,479</td>
<td>23.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDK</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUNCINPEC</td>
<td>17,500</td>
<td>3,445</td>
<td>19.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>203,300</td>
<td>52,252</td>
<td>25.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Information taken from Wang (1996). The numbers should only be understood as rough estimates, not least because of the number of “ghost soldiers” in the armies’ ranks (cf. below).

In that regard, the integration of parallel military structures also failed because combatants were not given incentives to remain in the cantonment sites, as local conditions and international resources were insufficient in allowing for a decent livelihood of combatants while awaiting their disarmament and demobilization, similar to the situation in Angola. Neither were the battalions of UNTAC’s military component adequately staffed and equipped with the necessary material resources to disarm and demobilize the warring parties. UNTAC had initially “required that all battalions should arrive in Cambodia with 60 days’ self sufficiency without resupply,” but some units “arrived with 850 men with just rucksacks and rifles” (Wang, 1996, p. 43) – nor were local physical and logistical conditions anything but disastrous. The international interim government had, for instance, difficulties in providing adequate shelters, sufficient food, or any medical care for combatants. It also was reluctant to offer any vocational training or activities, and cantonment sites were lacking fresh water supply, so that many initially cantoned soldiers left the sites in search of food or water. This was also because a large part of the costs of the DDR program – “including expenditures on regrouping, cantonment, disarmament, and demobilization” – was meant to be borne by the warring parties, “a policy that overlooked the destitution of these armed groups” (Bartu and Wilford, 2009, p. 2). As one UNTAC General pointed out, “even had [the PDK] agreed to disarm, we would have had major problems in carrying out the operation because it had been so badly prepared at the technical and psychological level” (in Wang, 1996, p. 44).\(^{118}\)

**Affecting Military Infrastructures** In Chapter 3, I held that a first mechanism for why interim governments that integrate the parallel military institutions of warring parties increase the stability of peace is that such interim

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\(^{118}\)Some also argue that the integration of parallel military structures also failed due to *internal dynamics* of the PDK and “disunity” within its ranks (Findlay, 1995, p. 51), although there is only scant information on this issue. Observers note that “the PDK was not a monolithic body but was divided on the issue of the peace process from the very beginning” (Wang, 1996, 46f.). While moderate forces within the party regarded a compliance with the politics of the interim period – such as joining the SNC and implementing a partial DDR process before elections – as a way to retain some power in the post-interim period, hard-liners within the PDK were not interest in such arrangements (cf. Frost, 1992; Kiernan, 1992).
governments destroy the military infrastructure necessary for remobilization. Integration through disarmament and demobilization programs, firstly, strip parties of their means to prevail in combat by collecting and destroying weapon stocks. Secondly, it weakens hierarchical command structures between rank-and-file soldiers and military commanders within armed organizations, thus increasing the costs of leaders to remobilize for war (cf. Figure 3.3). In contrast, following interim governments that fail to disarm and demobilize parties before the end of their rule, violence in the post-interim period becomes more likely.

Cambodia confirms to this causal pattern. The interim government’s inability to retrieve the factions from their means and structures to prevail in combat stands as one of the main explanations for post-interim violence in the country. Firstly, the case literature overwhelmingly agrees that the failure of the interim government to disarm particularly the PDK not only positively contributed to the party’s own opportunity structure to remobilize against the elected FUNCINPEC-CPP government in 1993 by failing to raise the PDK’s costs of defection. It also exacerbated rather than mitigated commitment problems of the other parties to lay down their weapons (e.g. Doyle, 1995; Findlay, 1995; Peou, 2007). For instance, Croissant (2008, p. 660) reasons that the failure “to disarm and demobilize aggravated the security dilemma, particularly for the opposition factions,” because “[political] and military tensions, and attacks on UNTAC staff, increased ... [and] led UNTAC to restrict its presence more and more to the capital city.” Such commitment problems are also highlighted in the remarks of the warring parties or international observers during the interim period. When the PDK refused to proceed with disarmament on 10 June 1992, FUNCINPEC’s Ranariddh the same day told reporters that he would as a consequence also “not allow his army to be disarmed in light of the Khmer Rouge refusal” (Thayer, 1992a). KPNLF ex-combatants who had already moved to the cantonment sites also voiced concerns, and one is quoted with: “Everyone wants to come here [to cantonment] to lay down their weapons. They do not want to fight. But all the soldiers are worried because not far from here the Khmer Rouge are gathering” (in Eng, 1992b). As a result, UNTAC even returned some of the weapons to FUNCINPEC, KPNLF, and the SOC that had previously been collected, because the factions demanded they retain the right to self-defense against the PDK (Peou, 1997).

The actions of the various rebel factions equally highlighted their difficulties to commit to disarmament as it became obvious that the PDK would not follow through with its own commitment. For instance, it was reported that the factions that had originally agreed to disarm more and more resorted to cheating in anticipation of the PDK’s non-compliance with the Paris bargain, and stopped sending their combatants to the cantonment sites but presented the UN “untrained teenagers with old, often useless weapons, while superior forces and cashes of weapons remained in the field” (Berdal and Leifer, 1996, p. 43). Dobbs (1992) describes a KPNLAF cantonment ceremony with:
“The guerrillas brought an array of largely ancient and rusting carbines, assault rifles, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and mortars ... most of which would probably be more dangerous to the user than the target. ... Dien Del, a legendary figure in ... the KPNLAF, voiced concern at the Khmer Rouge attitude and admitted that his forces were keeping back some of their better equipment and men for self defense. ‘If UNTAC can protect us 100 percent, we wouldn’t need soldiers out of cantonment,’ he said.”

Secondly, there is evidence for that hierarchical structures and social bonds within the warring parties remained intact at the end of the interim period. A clear goal of the demobilization process in Cambodia was to weaken command structures within the warring parties and form a unified and integrated national army by the end of the interim period (Findlay, 1995). But no neutral and central command structure of an integrated army developed (Croissant, 2008) and the PDK in particular remained well organized (Frost, 1992): “Remaining intact [following the interim period, was] virtually all of the important [Khmer Rouge] political leadership and most of its military command structure. These include party supremo Pol Pot, his second in command Nuon Chea, chief of the general staff Ta Mok, and Defense Minister Son Sen” (Thayer, 1996), and all of them were determined to maintain an intact military infrastructure (Frost, 1992; Richardson and Sainsbury, 2005).

The goal to weaken command structures was not only obstructed by the unwillingness of the parties to stick to the Paris bargain, but also by the realities of the disarmament and demobilization process. For instance, all four factions came to demand a larger number of cantonment sites than originally foreseen, because combatants wanted to remain within their units and close to their home villages, so that they could visit their families and help with rice farming (on agricultural leaves for cantoned combatants, cf. Bartu and Wilford, 2009). Not only does this highlight the problems of implementing DDR processes in societies where the line between soldiers and civilians becomes blurred – throughout the civil war and the interim period, particularly SOC soldiers were organized to help farmers on the field, meaning that when “they had to leave their village to enter the cantonment sites ..., the disarmament would disrupt the normal social and economic life of Cambodia” (Wang, 1996, p. 41). It also meant that at all stages of the disarmament and demobilization process, units would proceed to be under the control of their respective commanders at the cantonment sites.119 As Branigin (1993) notes, the PDK leadership would later directly “remobilize fighters who had returned to peasant farming in Khmer Rouge zones” (cf. also Burdman, 1993). This continued existence of military infrastructure on the interim period was thus directly related to conflict in the post-interim period:

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119This points to issues pointed out in the wider DDR literature on multiple identities of combatants and the role of guns in some societies (Spear, 2002), showing that DDR in Cambodia was “not simply a military issue, but a social problem as well” (Wang, 1996, p. 75).
Two “direct consequences of the failed disarmament were the intensification of NADK’s direct attacks on the UNTAC military and the fighting between the SOC and the PDK” (Wang, 1996, p. 71).

Affecting Cultures of Violence In Chapter 3, I held that a second mechanism for why interim governments that integrate the parallel military institutions increase the stability of peace is that such governments raise the parties’ costs of defection by adding to changing cultures of violence. They do so, because even if not all weapons are collected and command structures disentangled at the end of the interim period, a sufficiently advanced DDR process decreases the social acceptance of violence among ex-combatants, signifies “that the country is embarking on an era of peace” (United Nations, 2000a) and facilitates “ex-combatants’ attempts to distance themselves from war-time abuses they committed or experienced” (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010, p. 18). This should raise the costs of elites to remobilize for war. Contrariwise, a missing DDR process should mean that no such process takes place, so that individuals are not pushed away from the “war-time mindsets that legitimised violence” (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010, p. 10).

Cambodia confirms to this causal pattern. Similar to the situation in Angola, the missing integration of parallel military institutions failed to create a symbolic end to war and made cultures of violence persist throughout the interim period. This contributed to the PDK’s ability to remobilize against the FUNCINPEC-CPP government following the 1993 elections (cf. Eng, 1992a). As with Angola, many accounts on Cambodia’s political developments between the Paris Agreements and the 1993 elections generally stress the militarization and gun culture of Cambodian society and the belief that political disagreements should be resolved through the use of violence. For instance, Wang (1996, 74f.) notes that even had the disarmament process “been a success for the regular forces of the four factions, weapons control outside of the cantonment sites” would not have been easy, because the “war-seasoned Cambodians developed a sort of gun-culture and were very reluctant to give up their weapons,” and because interviews with both civilians and combatants confirmed that “nobody thought the elimination of guns was a good idea, regarding them as a symbol of power and pride” as well as a “necessity under constant ... bandit attack.” As Poulton (2001, p. 80) later notes, this “gun culture” means that “[wealthy] industrialists still travel with openly armed bodyguards” or that soldiers carry “their official weapons when off duty for illegal hunting or to threaten rivals in karaoke bars,” meaning that if Cambodia was “to obtain long-term peace and prosperity, the rule of law must replace the rule of the gun.” This also directly affected the perspective of combatants during the interim period, for instance one is quoted with

“Speaking of soldiers, there is nothing better than having guns with us. If a soldier doesn’t have guns, we wouldn’t call him a soldier.”
In the shop, if anybody dares to cough ... we will let them taste it immediately because guns are used for shooting – it doesn't matter where. Without guns, we wouldn't be able to get pretty girls. So if guns were eliminated, of what things could I be proud?” (in The Phnom Penh Post, 1992).

This visualizes the continued existence of wartime identities and cultures of violence among combatants throughout the rule of the interim government, decreasing the costs of party leaders to remobilize for war. As noted above, this situation was also aided by the fact that while UNTAC designated 14 million USD for vocational programs that would train demobilized combatants to get a job other than one as soldiers for the warring parties, UNTAC was reportedly reluctant to actually engage in such programs (Bartu and Wilford, 2009; Wang, 1996). In this regard, Findlay (1995, p. 114) also notes that UNTAC did not provide for “the early integration of the military into civilian life and an early start to vocational training” as originally perceived, because budgetary restraints caused the UN to concentrate on security in the cantonment sites. Of the few of the forces that were actually cantoned (cf. Table 8.2), even fewer thus received literacy and vocational training designed to help demobilized combatants to find employment (or read the electoral ballot), and this training came relatively late in the interim period (Chopra, 1994).

8.2.4 Participation of Unarmed Actors

My final hypothesis in Chapter 3 reasoned that in the presence of commitment problems, more advanced opportunities for the participation of unarmed actors in interim governments come with a higher stability of post-interim peace. This is because they enable the warring parties to send costly signals of their true intentions to each other that create domestic audience costs, which in turn punish them if they renege on their peaceful bargain (cf. Figure 3.3 on page 34). In contrast, when interim governments fail to create domestic audience costs that punish parties who renege on previously struck peaceful bargains, post-interim violence becomes more likely (cf. Fearon, 1994).

Cambodia does not confirm to this causal pattern. Even though there exists a positive correlation between the independent and dependent variables – i.e. no unarmed actors participated in interim decision-making between 1991 and 1993, and post-interim violence persisted – no causal relationship can be detected. Instead, and similar to the case of Angola, the weaker-growing PDK rather expressed feeling threatened by the idea of opening up interim decision-making to broader domestic audiences. The missing participation of civil society and political parties without a history of armed insurgency is at least partly explained by the fact that Cambodia’s history of war and non-democratic rule had never allowed for the organization of viable, strong, and independent civil society organizations or opposition parties in the first place. “Historically, Cam-
bodia has not been characterized by a strong tradition of civic engagement,” its
social fabric was long “based on informal organizations such as pagoda ... com-
mittees, and social interaction [was] deeply embedded in kinship and patronage
networks” (Dosch, 2012, p. 1071). This situation was further negatively af-
fected by the PDK’s rise to power in 1975, whose “wicked leaders destroyed
the country’s state, political, and civil society institutions,” which were only
marginally rebuilt during the subsequent rule of the PRK that yet had little
time or interest to institutionalize a critical civil society or political opposition
(Peou, 2007, p. 137). For instance, in rebuilding civil society after the Khmer
Rouge regime, the PRK particularly focused on the revival of Buddhism but
at the same time ensured that Buddhist leaders remained politicized and sup-
portive of the Vietnamese satellite regime, so that the latter could rule virtually
unchecked (Hughes, 1996; Human Rights Watch, 2015a).

The Paris Agreement did not foresee any participation of civil society or
political parties in interim rule, and no such participation was thus implemented
during the interim period. As Becker (1998, p. 512) notes, the “only Cambodians
brought to the negotiating table and given legitimacy were those with guns,”
reflecting a belief in the international community that if the war had to end, the
“armies had to be bought off with a seat at the table” while it was unnecessary
to include the wider population in the interim institutions.

During the rule of the interim government, one of UNTAC’s premises was to
strengthen civil society. It has been said that there was significant progress in
the reemergence of alternative voices to the warring parties, which was inter alia
“reflected in the establishment and expansion of political parties, the media, ... 
professional and religious associations, trade unions, academic institutes, think-
tanks, and human rights groups” (Downie and Kingsbury, 2001, 44ff.). For in-
stance, the first of hundreds of new local Cambodian civil society organizations
were founded in 1991 with the help of the international interim government
(Dosch, 2012), and “traditional Buddhist organizations began to reestablish
their role as spiritual guides and community organizers in the countryside” in
march – that had begun in a refugee camp along the Thai-Cambodian border
– arrived in Phnom Penh to strengthen popular confidence in the peace pro-
cess and the upcoming elections, something that would have been a “political
impossibility” before the signing of the peace agreement (AFP, 1992f).

As a result, civil society increasingly demanded a higher level of participation
in the affairs of the interim government. For instance, shortly after Khieu
Samphan had been driven out of the capital in November 1992, Cambodians
took the streets of Phnom Penh in large numbers to demonstrate against a return
of the PDK to the capital and to demand that their voices are heard by the
SOC and SNC. But instead of addressing the concerns of protesters and making
room for their participation in Cambodia’s interim politics, the SOC police fired
into the crowds, thereby killed several protestors, and passed legislation on 27

“Inclusiveness, the world was told only two months ago, was the key to peace in Cambodia... [but not] much attention was paid to including independent representatives of the Cambodian public. After all, how could there be any robust independent thinking? During two terrifying decades of war, genocide and foreign occupation, Cambodians had focused their energies solely on physical and cultural survival. Or so it seemed. But no sooner did an initial UN team arrive in Phnom Penh... than Cambodians took the streets by the thousands, ... demanding a greater role in their own political future.”

In sum, the interim government thus did not include any ad hoc or institutionalized forms of participation for unarmed actors without a history of armed insurgency. Such participation theoretically could have involved “supplementing the Supreme National Council with other bodies, such as one for civil society” that would have included “Buddhist monks, nongovernmental organizations, and other representatives of society outside the state” to “participate in the decision-making process, at a minimum through formally recognized consultative channels” (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, p. 311). There is however no detectable causal link between this lack of participation and the absence of post-interim peace. This is also because the warring parties itself did not regard such participation as a costly signal but as an existential threat to their own role in Cambodian politics.

Firstly, the weaker-growing PDK strongly objected to the participation of civil society or political parties, because it perceived the “dispersion of the Khmer Rouge vote resulting from the emergence of new political parties” as a serious threat to its own political survival (Azimi, 1995, p. 83). As a result, and just like the other warring parties, the PDK continuously obstructed even the slightest development of civil society or political party institutions through intimidation and violence in its zones of political and territorial control (Hughes, 1996). Secondly, also the stronger-growing SOC/CPP rejected the participation of civil society and political parties during interim decision-making because it similarly regarded such participation as a threat to its own rule. Downie and Kingsbury (2001, p. 54) thereby highlights the role of democratic history in this regard, noting that as “Cambodia did not have a history of legitimate political opposition within a democratic context, ... without sufficient exposure to such a context, the SOC/CPP did not know how to act and react to opposition parties in the 1993 elections,” saw “opposition parties as the enemy, and reacted as

120The restrictive policies towards civil society also meant that political party and civil society building came to a halt as soon as UNTAC had left in the post-interim period. For instance, except for those parties that had developed out of the armed groups of the civil war, “virtually all the political parties that contested the 1993 elections folded or went into hibernation” in the post-interim period (Downie and Kingsbury, 2001, p. 52).
they had for the previous thirteen years, by persuading them to defect, by using propaganda, or by resorting to violence.\textsuperscript{121} As a result, while more than 20 political parties ended up contesting in the 1993 elections, only the warring parties truly “mattered” and none of them brought new elites to power. Instead, each of the warring parties was led by “officials of former governments that brought Cambodia corruption, bungling and often violent repression,” had “taken its turn in ruining Cambodia,” and when in power, “tried by one means or another to wipe out the opposition” (Eng, 1993).

Similar to Angola (cf. Chapter 7), this discussion sheds light on a counterfactual causal mechanism from the one proposed in Chapter 3, that would indicate that the unfamiliarity with the participation of unarmed actors in decision-making turns such participation into a threat, rather than a mitigation of commitment problems through domestic audience costs. That means in cases without a history of armed insurgency, the participation of unarmed actors in interim decision-making may even reinforce commitment problems and motivate a weaker-growing party to return to arms before it is “outperformed” by new political parties. I address this further in Chapter 9.

\textbf{8.3 Chapter Summary}

This chapter discussed the question to what extent the absence of post-interim peace in Cambodia can be attributed to properties of interim government failing to mitigate the warring parties’ commitment problems. Overall, the chapter has shown that some limitations with regard to the bargaining theory framework exist. For instance, the multi- rather than two-player nature of the Cambodian conflict may have added to perceived threats of marginalization and thus to the belligerency of the PDK. Nevertheless, the chapter has also shown that among the main reasons for why the Cambodian interim government was unable to bring about durable peace is that the bargain struck in the Paris Agreements “had not even foreseen the possibility of non-compliance” of the warring parties – that is, the possibility of their defection from the deal (Wang, 1996, p. 83). Had the interim government been awarded from the start with clearer “definitions of [such] non-compliance” and of mechanisms that penalize it, it “would have been in a much stronger position to handle or even preempt the problem” of defection and alleviate any existing commitment problems (ibid.). Concerning my independent variables, the chapter in that regard yields several interesting conclusions.

Hypothesis H1 argued that power-sharing interim government increases the

\textsuperscript{121}This was also because while Cambodians voted in a number of elections, the 1993 elections were the first that even allowed more than one political party to participate. In 1955, 1958, 1962, and 1966, Sihanouk’s Sangkum movement was the only party allowed to participate in the elections; in 1972, Lon Nol’s Social Republican Party won all seats, in 1976, only FUNK participated and drove home a complete victory, and in 1981, the PRPK won every available seat “in a legislative election, which only it was allowed to contest” (Chambers, 2015, p. 186).
Table 8.3: Summary of Evidence: Case Study Cambodia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>H1</strong>: Power-sharing interim government, as opposed to any other interim government, increases the stability of post-interim peace.</td>
<td><strong>Not supported.</strong> Power-sharing rule failed to advance the physical, economic, or political security of parties, also because high degrees of international authority and the continued existence of parallel institutions impeded the causal mechanisms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H2</strong>: International interim government, as opposed to any other interim government, increases the stability of post-interim peace.</td>
<td><strong>Not supported.</strong> The terminality and perceived bias of UNTAC increased, rather than mitigated the parties’ commitment problems, and thus UNTAC failed to include any substantive physical deterrence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H3</strong>: The more advanced the process of integrating parallel political and military institutions into the authority of an interim government, the higher the stability of peace.</td>
<td><strong>Supported.</strong> The causal mechanisms on military infrastructure, war-time mindsets, and parallel financing remain the most convincing. No evidence exists for the mechanism on popular legitimacy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H4</strong>: The more advanced the opportunities of participation for unarmed actors in interim governments, the higher the stability of peace.</td>
<td><strong>Not supported.</strong> The variables correlate in the expected way, but there is no causal evidence. A lack of democratic experience turned the hypothetical participation of unarmed actors into a threat, rather than mitigating commitment problems.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

stability of post-interim peace; while revolutionary or caretaker interim governments should exacerbate commitment problems of warring parties. The Cambodian case study does not provide empirical support for this hypothesis. The power-sharing SNC that convened for the interim period failed to have an impact on the behavior of the warring parties for at least two reasons. Firstly, although there is some evidence that the warring parties attempted to use their participation in the SNC to decrease future uncertainty over their political survival in the post-interim period, they were prohibited from doing so by the strong international interim authority exercised by UNTAC. The parties’ attempts to increase their political security included efforts to change electoral legislation to bolster the rebels’ position vis-à-vis the SOC in the post-interim Constituent Assembly (Amer, 1994), as well the resort to racist rhetoric against ethnic Vietnamese during SNC negotiations over electoral legislation as a strategy to attract voters (Hughes, 2002). Secondly, the power-sharing SNC also failed to impact the behavior of the warring parties because the continued existence of parallel po-
itical institutions provided the parties with alternative sources of physical and economic security.

Hypothesis H2 argued that international interim government, as opposed to any other interim government, increases the stability of post-interim peace. The Cambodian case does not provide support for this hypothesis. The international interim authority exercised by UNTAC failed to have a substantive impact on the behavior of the warring parties due to at least two reasons. Firstly, UNTAC’s late deployment and early departure failed to raise any costs of defection from the terms of the Paris Agreements, because the parties were aware that any hypothetical physical deterrence by UNTAC would disappear with the end of the mission’s mandate. Thereby, the Cambodian case study highlights the issue of temporality in interim institutional designs that I discussed in Chapter 3. Secondly, UNTAC also failed to impact the behavior of the warring parties because the latter did not perceive the mission as a neutral political authority (Peou, 2002). Rather than mitigating commitment problems, UNTAC’s policy influence thus likely contributed to the PDK’s perception of its marginalization and isolation during the interim period.

Hypothesis H3 argued that more advanced processes of integrating parallel political and military institutions into the authority of an interim government come with a higher stability of peace, while a lack of such integration should exacerbate commitment problems. This hypothesis is supported for Cambodia, and a lack of integration affected the behavior of the warring parties by two means. Firstly, the failure to integrate parallel political institutions during the interim period enabled all warring parties to pursue parallel systems of financing their violent campaigns, such as through corruption, extortion, taxation, or forced labor and recruitment. The PDK in particular used its parallel administration of territory along the Cambodian-Thai border, as well as its control over refugee camps, for forced conscription as well as to implement a parallel trade and taxation system for natural resources. This decreased its costs of defection by allowing it to fund further combat as well as to increase its military force. Secondly, the failure to integrate the PDK’s parallel military institutions meant that the rebel group had full access to weapons, an intact system of hierarchical command structures, as well as an established military culture at the end of the interim period. This not only decreased the PDK’s costs of defection and remobilization, but it also exacerbated commitment problems of the other warring parties that, seeing the PDK not being penalized for its breaking with the bargain of Paris, also began rearming.

Finally, Hypothesis H4 argued that more advanced opportunities for the participation of unarmed actors in interim decision-making come with a higher stability of peace, while a lack of participation should exacerbate commitment problems. Even though a lack of participation opportunities for unarmed actors positively correlates with an absence of post-interim peace in Cambodia, I find no causal support for my argument. This is because instead of perceiving a
(hypothetical) participation of unarmed actors as a costly signal, the PDK in particular was said to have perceived such participation as a threat to its own long-term political survival and a dispersion of its vote (Azimi, 1995). As for the Angolan case, I hypothesized based on this observation that the effect of the participation variable may be conditional on whether or not a country has a history of democratic rule: in countries lacking democratic experience, the creation of domestic audiences through the participation of unarmed actors in interim rule becomes a threat, rather than a mitigation of commitment problems, to which warring parties do not know how to react (cf. Downie and Kingsbury, 2001). I study this argument further in Chapter 9.
Chapter 9

Comparative Analysis

The previous chapters on interim government in Nepal, Angola, and Cambodia have highlighted both similarities and differences in how properties of interim government mitigated, failed to mitigate, or even exacerbated commitment problems of warring parties; and how such properties by that means influenced the stability of post-interim peace. This chapter complements these within-case analyses by discussing my results in a comparative perspective. The aim of this comparison is to understand how properties of interim government link to peace by drawing on inferences that move beyond the within-case level. The chapter thereby offers me the opportunity to perform four tasks in particular. Firstly, this chapter allows me to reflect on conceptual and methodological fallacies with regard to my dependent variable that the within-case analyses disclosed. Hence, section 9.1 briefly discusses issues in studying post-interim peace in a mixed-method research design. Secondly, this chapter offers me the opportunity to stipulate which properties of interim government and combination of properties are most closely linked through what mechanisms to the outcome of interest. Thus, section 9.2 discusses comparatively how interim governments influenced the warring parties’ future uncertainties, costs of defection, or audience costs in the three cases. Thirdly, and building on Lieberman (2005) who suggests that case studies in mixed-method research designs are fruitful approaches to discover new variables or variable interactions, this section also fits several additional regression models to study interaction effects that my within-case analyses suggested. It also discusses alternative explanations and mechanisms that affected the outcome in the three cases. Finally, the chapter elaborates on limitations of the bargaining theory argument that the case studies disclosed.

9.1 The Quality of Post-Interim Peace

Throughout this dissertation, I have repeatedly attended to the theoretical conceptualization and empirical measurement of various variables that are relevant
to explain the link between interim governments and peace. I have also addressed the issue of **construct validity** with regard to the independent and control variables in my statistical models. This refers to the issue of how well statistical indicators capture underlying theoretical concepts (cf. Chapter 5, Shadish et al., 2002). Before I thus turn to systematically comparing the extent to which each property of interim government has contributed to the outcome in the three case studies, let me briefly discuss the issue of concept validity with regard to the measurement of my dependent variable, the **stability of post-interim peace**.

Recall that I defined peace in Chapter 1 following a negative tradition, and that I operationalized the concept in Chapter 4 as the absence of more than 25 battle-related deaths resulting from intrastate conflict per calendar year. I have explained in that regard that while such conceptualization and operationalization has in the past faced critique from qualitative scholarship, issues of conceptual clarity and the specification of causal pathways make it a common and accepted measurement in quantitative research (cf. Gerring, 1999).

Having said that, from the perspective of this dissertation it is vital not to ignore that existing studies have frequently pointed out that while direct battle between two warring parties may not recur in all post-conflict societies, many of such societies still experience other types of violence, such as violent crime or gender-based, domestic violence (cf. Kurtenbach and Wulf, 2012; Manjoo and McRaith, 2011). Calling these societies “peaceful” not only means using a flawed terminology, because the actual *quality* of peace for the everyday life of civilians is very low. In addition, this simplification can mask that while warring parties do not have the desire or opportunity to return to war – for instance because their costs of defection are too high – other types of violence may be directly linked to their past and present interests or behavior, both during a war and during the rule of interim governments.¹²²

This becomes visible with regard to Nepal’s post-interim period. I treated Nepal as a “success” case of my qualitative research design where stable peace persisted throughout the post-interim period according to my operationalization (cf. Chapter 5). I demonstrated in Chapter 6 how the interim government in Nepal substantively contributed to the end of intrastate armed conflict between the CPN (M) and government security forces through a mix of decreasing the Maoists’ future uncertainty and increasing their costs of defection. By that matter, the quality of life of Nepal’s citizens in the post-interim period was substantially different from that of citizens in Angola and Cambodia, where armed conflict re-escalated after relatively peaceful elections had been held.

Having said that, this does not mean that politics in Nepal since the 2006

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¹²²For instance, domestic violence is often on the rise only after civil war has ended, not least because combatants that are accustomed to the resolution of conflict through the use of force are returning home to their families, or because alcoholism among severely traumatized men remains widespread. Similarly, while warring parties may not have the resources to remobilize for war, some may make use of criminal activities with the specific political interest to destabilize a newly elected post-war or post-interim government (Westendorf, 2015).
peace agreement have been marked by a complete absence of any type of violence; and such violence was related to the rule of the interim government and the behavior of the former warring parties. In 2007, after it became obvious that the Interim Constitution promulgated by the CPN (M) and the SPA would not fully address the demands of Madhesis – such as their request to delineate federal provinces according to identity and create an autonomous Madhesh province – clashes between armed Madhesi activists and Maoist cadres resulted in at least 30 deaths. This was also because the Maoists had during the People’s War recruited many Madhesis into their ranks with the promise of fighting for identity-based federalism (International Crisis Group, 2016). The violence that ensued has been classified as a non-state conflict (cf. Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2015b). In 2015, polarization over the new constitutions – again over provisions for federalism – resulted in clashes between unarmed Madhesis and Nepal security forces that killed over 50 individuals (cf. Human Rights Watch, 2015b). Again, many protesters have named as their grievance that the peace process has further marginalized the already marginalized Madhesis. This is because it has since the interim period ensured the continued dominance of the traditionally ruling elites, and the political survival of the leaders of the former warring parties (Strasheim and Bogati, 2016).

Two conclusions can be drawn from this example. Firstly, from a policy perspective, this discussion links to the question of what actually constitutes as a success or failure in peace processes (cf. Campbell, 2007). This is not limited to the case of Nepal, as it can be argued that there are also some drawbacks with regard to calling Angola and Cambodia complete “failures” of interim rule. Even though armed combat between the warring parties re-escalated in both countries, it should not be ignored that the 16 months between the signing of the Bicesse Agreement and the 1992 elections have been described as “the most spectacular period of optimism and freedom that Angola had ever witnessed” (Birmingham, 2015, p. 109). In the same vein, it has been argued that the picture of the Cambodian interim government is also “far from all bad” (Doyle, 1995, p. 32). After all, Cambodians were for the first time in history truly independent, received the chance to vote in their first free and fair elections, and repatriated a large number of refugees (ibid.). Both interim governments thus managed to at least temporarily improve the lives of citizens in each country.123 In that regard, this discussion underpins the argument that the traditional emphasis of defining successful peace processes through positive and negative notions of peace may be too limited (cf. Westendorf, 2015).

Secondly, and within empirical peace and conflict research, the discussion on other types of violence in Nepal’s post-interim period helps to demonstrate that those properties of interim government that mitigate commitment prob-

123 Although given Cambodia’s history of “bloodthirsty dictatorship and civil war,” some have pointed out that the bar for what constitutes as success and improvement was extremely low, and it has been said Cambodians also accept Hun Sen’s authoritarianism and corruption “because strongman rule is a lesser evil than mass murder” (McCargo, 2005, p. 106).
lems between warring parties previously engaged in intrastate conflict can at the same time be still linked to risks of other types of violence. One could, for instance, argue more generally that if power-sharing interim governments mitigate commitment problems by ensuring the long-term political survival of warring parties, such deals can at the same time lead to situations in which groups left outside an agreement feel sufficiently marginalized and threatened in their survival, and thus turn to violence to make their grievances heard.

Although it is outside the scope of this dissertation to at length explore all precise causal mechanisms that connect properties of interim governments to all other types of violence in the post-interim period, Table A.11 in Appendix A offers some preliminary statistical evidence of this issue. In Table A.11, I estimate four additional Cox PH models to complement my analysis of Chapter 4. These additional models explore the link between properties of interim government and hazards of one-sided violence (Model 1 and 2) and non-state conflict (Model 3 and 4) in the post-interim period. The sampling strategy and coding rules for all independent and control variables as outlined in Chapter 4 apply. However, I now understand peace in Model 1 and 2 as the number of days peace lasts until an episode of one-sided violence occurs in the post-interim period. One sided violence is defined as the use of armed force by a government or rebel group against civilians that results in at least 25 deaths per calendar year (data from the UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset v. 1.4, Eck and Hultman, 2007). In Model 3 and 4, I operationalize peace as the number of days peace lasts until an episode of non-state conflict occurs. Non-state conflict is understood as the use of armed force between two groups neither of which is the government of a state (data from Sundberg, Eck, et al., 2012).

The results reported in Table A.11 show that properties of interim government are generally better predictors of risks of intrastate armed conflict between two organized warring parties than of one-sided violence or non-state conflict in the post-interim period. In Table A.11, the coefficients associated with the institutional designs of power-sharing and international interim government are not statistically significant. More advanced processes of integrating parallel institutions into the authority of an interim government predict longer peace spells if understood as the absence of one-sided violence, but the coefficient is no longer statistically significant when peace is understood as the absence of non-state conflict. The participation of unarmed actors in interim rule – one of the most substantive explanations for peace in my main analysis in Chapter 4 – is not a statistically significant predictor for risks of one-sided violence or non-state conflict. In sum, these results mean that my inferences on how properties of interim governments impact post-interim peace are limited to one particular type of violence: the recurrence of intrastate armed conflict between two warring parties. However, the results at the same time strengthen my theoretical argument from Chapter 1, in that different types of organized violence are explained by different predictor variables and follow different causal pathways.
9.2 Why Interim Governments Matter

I now discuss comparatively the extent to which properties of interim government affected the stability of peace in the three cases and via the proposed causal mechanisms. I begin with elaborating on the role of the institutional designs of power-sharing and international interim government. I then complete this perspective by comparing the impact of the reform features of integrating parallel institutions and allowing for the participation of unarmed actors. I also discuss alternative explanatory variables and mechanisms in this regard. In specific, I below attend to five of such alternative, case specific explanations within and outside the bargaining framework: (1) the role of power-sharing interim governments in increasing costs of defection, rather than decreasing future uncertainties; (2) the role of local ownership, instead of international authority during interim rule; (3) the role of civil society participation in decreasing future uncertainties for warring parties, rather than creating audience costs; as well as the effect of (4) democratic history and of (5) natural resources in on post-interim peace. The section concludes by discussing the limitations of the bargaining argument that my case studies revealed, and presents first attempts to address these limitations.

9.2.1 Institutional Designs of Interim Governments

Power-Sharing Interim Government  My first hypothesis in Chapter 3 argued that power-sharing interim government, as opposed to any other interim government, increases the stability of post-interim peace. Taken together, the quantitative and qualitative findings of this dissertation demonstrate that whether or not warring parties come together in power-sharing rule during the interim period is not an overly robust predictor of stable peace in the post-interim period. This is mostly because the effect of power-sharing is highly conditional on the situations it appears in.

My quantitative analysis in Chapter 4 already demonstrated that the variable measuring the presence of a power-sharing interim government does not have a statistically significant effect on the outcome. It also showed that this lack of statistically significant evidence is explained by the fact that power-sharing is particularly likely to follow the signing of peace agreements. Previous research has established that peace agreements result in more difficult post-conflict peace periods, for instance because all parties retain sufficient resources to attack one another (Licklider, 1995; Walter, 2002). Comparing only cases of interim governments that followed peace agreements, the variable comes with the expected negative and statistically significant coefficient.

My three qualitative case studies built on this finding and focused on investigating the links between properties of interim government and post-interim peace following the signing of peace agreements. In my case studies, I demonstrated that power-sharing interim government substantially contributed to
stable peace in Nepal. At the same time, Angola shows weak empirical evidence that a lack of interim power-sharing exacerbated commitment problems for UNITA. Interim power-sharing did not help in curbing post-interim armed conflict in Cambodia. Viewed in comparison, and concerning the explanatory power of causal mechanisms, my case studies come with three core findings.

The first finding is that the causal mechanism regarding the political security of warring parties is most convincing one. This mechanism argued that power-sharing interim government mitigates commitment problems through decreasing uncertainty for warring parties, by granting them a voice in the design of post-interim laws and institutions, as well as the knowledge on how to manipulate such laws to their own advantage. In Nepal, participation in the power-sharing interim government allowed the CPN (M) to push for changes in the electoral law after it became concerned about its chances at the polls, and it succeeded in revising the legislation so that proportional elements were strengthened. Participating in the power-sharing interim government also more generally enabled the Maoists to position and to suggest themselves as future coalition partners for the other political parties. In Angola, there is some empirical evidence that the MPLA used its grip onto the caretaker interim government to design electoral legislation that would impede UNITA’s chances in the 1992 vote, thereby threatening the long-term political survival of the rebels. This is however only a weak explanation for UNITA’s remobilization, also because the counterfactual argument remains a hypothetical one: neither UNITA nor the MPLA had been willing to credibly consider joint rule during the peace negotiations. In Cambodia, there is some evidence that parties attempted to use their participation in power-sharing to decrease future uncertainty over their political survival, either through actually altering electoral legislation or through using communication within the SNC for racist propaganda as a strategy to attract votes. However, such mechanisms were prohibited by the strong international interim authority exercised by the UNTAC mission, for instance because UNTAC retained the final decision over the electoral law.124 In sum, my finding on the role of power-sharing as a mechanism for political survival supports how previous work has portrayed its role in peace processes (cf. Manning, 2007), but it opposes studies that have treated power-sharing predominantly as a mechanism for economic gain (e.g. Haaß and Ottmann, 2015).

124Can this finding be generalized? If power-sharing interim governments add to peace in the post-interim period because weaker-growing parties can manipulate future laws to their advantage; and if the simultaneous assumption of political authority by international actors prohibits such manipulation, then power-sharing interim governments may have a more pronounced effect on peace in situations where international actors are absent from the interim period. I empirically test this proposition by adding an interaction term to my statistical models. In Table A.10 in Appendix A, Model 1 adds the interaction term power-sharing x international interim government (lenient operationalization) to my fully specified model from Chapter 4. Model 2 repeats this exercise with the strict operationalization of international interim government. Hence, the effect of power-sharing interim government is now interpreted as the unique effect of power-sharing on the hazard of conflict only when international actors do not assume any political authority during the interim period. The results in Table A.10 do however not confirm an interaction effect for the whole sample.
Table 9.1: Overview of Qualitative Evidence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable and Mechanism</th>
<th>Nepal</th>
<th>Angola</th>
<th>Cambodia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power-Sharing IG: Physical Security</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power-Sharing IG: Economic Security</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power-Sharing IG: Political Security</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International IG: Physical Deterrence</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International IG: Policy Influence</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel Inst.: Financial Resources</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel Inst.: Popular Legitimacy</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel Inst.: Military Infrastructure</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel Inst.: War-time Mindsets</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation: Audience Costs</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>–</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note that ++, +, and – indicate strong, weak, and no causal evidence, respectively.

The second and related finding of my case studies is that the mechanism on how power-sharing increases the economic security of warring parties is highly conditional on the value of other properties of the interim government. The mechanism argued that interim power-sharing mitigates commitment problems through decreasing uncertainty for warring parties, because it rewards them with the opportunity to loot resources ascribed to power-sharing offices. This should in turn lower their incentives to acquire economic gain by violent means.

In Nepal, participation in the power-sharing interim government significantly raised the economic security of CPN (M) leaders. The Maoist elites were reported to have engaged in corruption and the assumption of exactly those luxurious lifestyles that they had fought against during the People’s War. This added to stable post-interim peace not least because it turned any weaker-growing position rebel leaders found themselves in during the post-interim period – such as when Maoist leader Prachanda lost his parliamentary seat in the 2013 elections – a very comfortable one. In Angola, however, UNITA secured its economic survival even though the rebels were not part of any power-sharing deal during the interim period. One explanation for this situation is that UNITA continued its parallel political administration of territory throughout the rule of the interim government. This enabled the rebels to engage in diamond smuggle over the international borders it controlled. In Cambodia, participation in the power-sharing SNC became equally irrelevant for decreasing long-term uncertainties over economic survival for the warring parties, because the parties could secure such survival through corruption, extortion, resource trade and taxation in their parallel political institutions. In sum, my finding adds to the broader academic debate on power-sharing after intrastate armed conflict by highlighting the conditional nature of power-sharing institutions. It further reiterates the results from my statistical analysis on the conditionality of the power-sharing effect. I attend to my contributions to this literature further in Chapter 10.
The third finding of my case studies on the role of power-sharing is that, rather than only decreasing future uncertainties for the warring parties, power-sharing interim government can also add to peace by increasing the costs of defection for parties both inside and outside the deal for joint rule. Nepal demonstrates this causal mechanism through two aspects. Firstly, power-sharing interim government in Nepal increased the CPN (M)’s cost of defection by weakening the relationship between rebel leaders and ex-combatants. When CPN (M) leaders began to secure their long-term economic survival by engaging in corruption and looting of state resources through their control over posts in the power-sharing government, their actions frustrated and disillusioned CPN (M) combatants. During the rule of the interim government and thereafter, the gap between elites and combatants widened, which increased the Maoist elites’ costs in remobilizing combatants. As one NA general phrased it: “Will they [the ex-combatants] again go to war to make somebody rich, make somebody Prime Minister? No” (INT-12, 29.09.2015). I attend to this aspect further below. Secondly, power-sharing interim government in Nepal also increased the costs of defection for the one party outside of joint rule: the royal palace. This was because power-sharing added to the perception of the palace and its traditionally subordinate army that the country was strongly united in the peace process. In sum, this finding links to previous research that has argued that by offering rebel groups a participation in power-sharing, governments can increase the rebels’ costs of remobilization. They do so by weakening rebel leaders’ claims to rank-and-file soldiers that the government is not acting in their interest (Mukherjee, 2006). At the same time, my finding yet also point to limitations of strictly adhering to the underlying assumptions of bargaining theory. I attend to such limitations below.125

International Interim Government My second hypothesis argued that international interim government, as opposed to any other interim government, increases the stability of post-interim peace. Taken together, my quantitative and qualitative findings show that whether or not international actors assume political authority during the interim period is also not an overly robust predictor of stable post-interim peace. My statistical analysis in Chapter 4 already demonstrated that the variable measuring the presence of an international interim government does not have a statistically significant effect on the outcome across coding versions or model specifications. I argued that this is likely the result of a selection effect, in that international interim government is particularly likely to follow high intensity armed conflicts, as well as conflicts that ended in peace agreements. Thus, international actors are most likely to assume political authority in interim governments that appear in difficult cases of peacebuilding.

My case studies again built on this finding and focused on investigating the

125I refrain from discussing the causal mechanism on the physical security of warring parties here, because none of my case studies showed empirical support for this mechanism.
links between properties of interim government and post-interim peace in interim governments that followed the singing of peace accords as well as high intensity civil wars. In my case studies, I demonstrated that contrary to theoretical expectations, the lack of international authority during Nepal’s interim government did not exacerbate commitment problems and was not followed by internal conflict. I also showed that both in Angola – an international interim government following the lenient definition of the concept (cf. Chapter 4) – and in Cambodia – an international interim government following the strict conceptualization – international interim authority did not help in curbing post-interim violence. Overall, and bearing in mind that my cases all followed particularly difficult starting positions for (international) interim government, the case studies come with two core findings.

The first finding is that the ability of international interim governments to raise the warring parties’ costs of defection through physical deterrence is limited by their late deployment and early departure, amongst other issues.\textsuperscript{126} For instance, I found that the expected withdrawal of UNTAC from Cambodia in the post-interim period already exacerbated the warring parties’ commitment problems during the interim period. This is also because this expectation contributed to the warring parties’ perception that any hypothetically raised costs of defection as a result of the international interim government would expire immediately after the termination of such interim government. The belief was that “UNTAC was going to leave anyway” and “would not be there forever” (Carney and Choo, 1993, p. 42). As a result, when the PDK abandoned the internationally supervised disarmament and demobilization process, it became rational for the other parties to do the same, knowing that after UNTAC’s withdrawal they would not be protected against the PDK’s military advances. A similar situation appeared in Angola. This empirical finding thus supports my theoretical argument concerning the temporality of interim institutional designs (cf. Chapter 3). It shows that under the circumstances of pending international withdrawal in the post-interim period, international interim governments fail to mitigate commitment problems. In that regard, my finding also links to research that has advised against the use of elections terminating an interim government as an “exit strategy” for international actors that want to demonstrate foreign policy success at home (Caplan, 2005; Chandler, 2000; Reilly, 2015). I attend to this finding in terms of policy recommendations again in Chapter 10.

The second – and perhaps contradictory – finding is that rather than international authority in interim governments, it is local ownership during interim periods that can make a difference for stable post-interim peace. While there is a lack of a universally accepted definition of what constitutes as local ownership in peace processes, the concept is usually understood in terms of the relationship between international and domestic actors, as well as the degree to which the

\textsuperscript{126}Others have, for instance, noted the lack of cultural competences and language skills as limitations to the impact of international interim governments on societal developments (Autessere, 2014; Croissant, 2007; Doyle, 1995).
latter have a voice in designing and implementing reforms in peace processes (Donais, 2009; Narten, 2008; Reich, 2006). I demonstrated in my case study on interim government in Nepal that local ownership in interim rule can be understood as an alternative mechanism to mitigate the warring parties’ commitment problems by two means. Firstly, on the elite level, local ownership can enable deeper cooperation between elites represented in power-sharing interim governments, for instance because elites do not become tempted to engage in nationalist, polarizing rhetoric (cf. Suhrke, 2011). Secondly, on the combatant level, local ownership can contribute to the perception that disarmament and demobilization is each combatant’s voluntary “sacrifice” for the peace process, rather than a forced process implemented by international soldiers. My interview partners in Nepal also pointed out that increased international ownership of the disarmament process would likely have been perceived as emasculating and threatening in a society where gun ownership was long regarded as a central element of male identity (INT-30, 12.11.2015). While there was no evidence in my case studies on the Angolan and Cambodian interim governments that would reiterate these two mechanisms, previous research has pointed out conflicting processes in the international community’s attempts to export liberal peacebuilding models to local contexts in both cases (Pearce, 2010; Richmond and Franks, 2007).127

9.2.2 Reform Processes in Interim Governments

Integrating Parallel Political Institutions My third hypothesis in Chapter 3 argued that more advanced processes of integrating parallel institutions into the authority of an interim government come with a higher stability of peace, while a lack of integration should exacerbate commitment problems. My quantitative and qualitative results strongly support this hypothesis. Firstly, they show that integrating the parallel political institutions of warring parties is a strong predictor of stable peace in the post-interim period. My statistical analysis in Chapter 4 already demonstrated that the variable measuring the integration of parallel institutions comes with a substantive, negative, and statistically significant coefficient across model specifications. Robustness checks additionally demonstrated that interim governments that integrate parallel political institutions in particular reduce risks of intrastate armed conflict in the post-interim period by 54 percent.

My case studies reinforced this finding. I demonstrated that the integration

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127As an additional empirical result, I found no support for the policy influence mechanism in the three case studies. In all cases, the fact that international actors were not perceived as a neutral authority emerges thereby as the main explanation. In Angola, UNITA claimed that UNAVEM II was helping the MPLA to win the 1992 elections. In Cambodia, the PDK claimed that UNTAC was siding with the PRK, and this perception may even have raised the party’s commitment problems as it felt further isolated in the peace process. And in Nepal, the parties justified their objection against a deeper international involvement during the interim period arguing that the political UNMIN operation was not impartial but siding with the Maoists (United Nations Mission in Nepal, 2010).
of parallel political institutions is part of the explanation for stable peace in Nepal. In Angola and Cambodia, the continued existence of parallel political institutions is directly related to armed conflict in the post-interim period.

Overall, the central finding of my case studies is that the mechanism regarding the financial resources of warring parties, rather than the one concerning their popular legitimacy, accounts for a causal explanation of peace.\(^{128}\) To recall, the financial resource mechanism held that interim governments integrating the parallel political institutions of warring parties increase their costs of defection, because such governments limit the parties’ ability to finance a continuation of their violent campaigns. In Nepal, even though Maoist cadres cheated the integration of People’s Courts and Governments in the early days of the interim period by continuing with parallel taxation and extortion, the Maoists gradually became dependent on extracting future economic gain through their participation in state institutions. This also becomes visible by looking at the growing corruption that the party displayed once it joined mainstream politics. In Angola and Cambodia, UNITA and the PDK continued their parallel political administration of substantive portions of the national territory and the civilian population throughout the interim period. This failed to increase the rebel groups’ costs of defection and thus made their remobilization for armed conflict possible in three ways.

Firstly, the parallel political administration of territory throughout the interim period allowed the rebel groups to force the population under their control into providing labor, as well as other monetary or non-monetary types of support for their violent campaigns. Secondly, the parallel political administration allowed the rebels to forcefully conscript the population under their control to fight in their respective armies. Thirdly, the parallel political administration allowed the rebels to manage the extraction and sale of natural resources over the international borders they controlled, including the smuggling of diamonds (Angola) or timber (Cambodia). Both rebel groups used the money earned from resource trade to buy arms for their strive. Thus, control over parallel political institutions belonged to the central explanations for why UNITA or the PDK could continue their violent campaigns in the post-interim period.

Related to this first finding is that the case studies demonstrated how natural resources are part of an explanation for the prevalence of armed conflict in Angola and Cambodia. However, this aspect does not change my results. Recall that when I discussed my case selection strategy in Chapter 5, natural resource rents (as percentage of GDP) was one of two variables I could not hold at constant for the otherwise most similar cases Nepal, Angola, and Cambodia. While Angola’s natural resource rents were at almost 48 percent of the country’s GDP in the first year of the post-interim period, Nepal’s rents were

\(^{128}\)This public legitimacy mechanism failed to contribute to an explanation for post-interim peace, for instance because interim governments were unable or unwilling to extend their public service provision into previously rebel held territory (as in Nepal), or because parties did not need to provide public services for remobilization purposes (as in Angola or Cambodia).
at approximately 5 percent and Cambodia’s rents at approximately 8 percent. Natural resources have in the past been identified as an important factor in explaining the occurrence of civil war (Ross, 2003; Ross, 2004). My case studies, however, firstly demonstrated that the statistical measurement of natural resource rents is not a good assessment of the underlying process it aimed to capture, i.e. how natural resource looting decreases the costs of mobilization during civil wars (Le Billon, 2001b). This is not least because even though the Cambodian GDP comprises low levels of resource rents as compared to Angola, looting and smuggling of timber and gems was central in how the PDK financed its violent campaign (Le Billon, 2000). My case studies secondly demonstrate that natural resources also enter the theoretical framework not so much as an independent variable, but as one step within the causal mechanism connecting the integration of parallel institutions to post-interim peace. This is because without the continued parallel administration of territory, parties would have lacked the ability to manage the extraction and sale of natural resources.

**Integrating Parallel Military Institutions** My quantitative and qualitative findings furthermore show that whether or not interim governments manage to integrate the parallel military institutions of warring parties into their authority is a strong predictor of stable post-interim peace. My robustness checks in Chapter 4 already demonstrated that the variable measuring the integration of parallel military institutions has a substantive effect on peace: interim governments that integrate parallel military institutions through disarming and demobilizing warring parties reduce the risk of armed conflict in the post-interim period by 94 percent as compared to interim governments that fail to do so. This also means that after approximately four years into the post-interim period, almost thirty percent of interim governments without an integration of parallel military institutions are at war again, while most of those interim governments that integrated military institutions remain at peace.

My case studies support this finding. I demonstrated that the integration of parallel military institutions is a central part of explaining stable peace in Nepal, while in Angola and Cambodia, the continued existence of parallel military institutions is directly related to conflict in the post-interim period. Both causal mechanisms thereby receive support, with some limitations.

My first finding is that the causal mechanism concerning the military infrastructure of warring parties is a necessary, but not a sufficient explanation for peace. Drawing this mechanism, I argued that interim governments that integrate the parallel military institutions of warring parties into their authority mitigate the parties’ commitment problems by increasing their costs of defection. They do so in two ways. Firstly, they strip parties of their means to prevail in combat by collecting and destroying weapon stocks. Secondly, they weaken command structures within hierarchical military organizations, making it more difficult for leaders to remobilize combatants (cf. Themnér, 2011). There was
no empirical evidence for this mechanism in Nepal, where combatants retained access to their weapons at all times. Command structures also remained intact throughout the interim period. I have reasoned that there is instead merit in considering the counterfactual argument to my initial idea, i.e. that the access to, rather than the removal of arms and command structures can mitigate fears for ex-combatants concerning their marginalization and provide them with a personal safety valve. For some ex-combatants in Nepal, access to mid-level commanders from during the war provided them with civilian job opportunities in the post-conflict period, for instance as drivers or interpreters. Particularly female combatants also benefited from drawing on war-time social networks in the post-conflict period, as they faced stigmatization for having transgressed what is considered “adequate” female behavior (Bogati, 2015). In Angola and Cambodia, on the other hand, continued access to arms as well as lingering command structures within UNITA and the PDK were among the key explanations for why the parties could remobilize for armed conflict. For UNITA, this remobilization process even occurred at times directly out of the cantonment sites that had been meant to dissolve the military organization. For the PDK, lingering command structures and the continued parallel administration of territory meant that the party could directly “remobilize fighters who had returned to peasant farming in Khmer Rouge zones” (Branigin, 1993).

The second finding is that the causal mechanism regarding war-time mind-sets within warring parties is part of the explanation of the outcome in all three cases. This mechanism argued that even if not all weapons are collected or command structures are destroyed, a sufficiently advanced DDR processes still raises the costs of defection by lowering the acceptance of violence among ex-combatants and helping them to envision civilian livelihoods (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010). In Nepal, even though the integration of parallel military institutions failed to strip combatants of their weapons or to dismantle command structures, the process still managed to increase the costs of defection for the CPN (M). This is because it provided ex-combatants with a vision of alternative professional and private livelihoods, as well as with an improved legal and living situation in cantonment sites. Specifically, this was achieved by offering vocational training and schooling programs in the cantonment sites, by improving the cantonments’ logistical conditions (such as showers, latrines, or access to medical care), and by giving ex-combatants the opportunity to get married and start families within cantonment.

This is not to say that DDR in Nepal was a complete success – I mentioned, for instance, the dragged time frame of the process, and the need of many combatants to seek employment abroad due to the lack of such employment at home. It however highlights relative differences particularly in comparison with Angola and Cambodia. In these latter cases, the failed disarmament process meant that the majority of combatants did not move away from only being able to imagine their professional roles as soldiers. For instance, in UNITA zones
of control, “there was no possibility of imagining an alternative to joining the army” (Pearce, 2015, p. 118), and years of fighting had “created little more than an accepted culture of violence” among the Cambodian factions (Pawson, 1999). This facilitated the remobilization of fighters for the party leaderships. Insufferable living conditions in the cantonment sites also explained why combatants often left before undergoing the disarmament and demobilization process. In sum, this is an important finding that underpins previous results on DDR processes that while it is often not feasible, possible or desirable to collect all weapons and disintegrate all command structures; sufficiently advanced DDR processes can still help curbing violence. They can do so by enabling ex-combatants’ access to “civilian symbols of masculine prestige, such as education, legal income, or decent housing” early on in the interim period (Theidon, 2009, p. 18).

The Participation of Unarmed Actors My final hypothesis argued that more advanced opportunities for the participation of unarmed actors in interim decision-making come with a higher stability of peace, while a lack of participation should exacerbate commitment problems. Taken together, the quantitative and qualitative findings of this dissertation have thus far demonstrated mixed results regarding whether or not this variable is a viable predictor of stable post-interim peace. In my statistical analysis, the variable was associated with a robustly negative and statistically significant coefficient. Both the ad hoc participation of unarmed actors – for instance in national conferences – as well as their institutionalized participation – through receiving seats in the interim government – decreased the hazard of armed conflict in the post-interim period across model specifications. Robustness checks showed that following interim governments that offer civil society or political parties without a history of armed insurgency seats in the interim government, armed conflict risks drop by 92 per cent. Notably, opportunities for participation appear independently of the context the interim government appears in, and are not predicted – for instance – by a history of democratic rule (cf. Table 4.9 on page 81).

The participation variable also correlates with the outcome in my case studies in the expected manner. Nepal’s interim government included both ad hoc and institutionalized opportunities for the participation of civil society, and peace lasted in the post-interim period. In Angola and Cambodia, no unarmed actors were included in interim decision-making, and armed conflict persisted.

I did however not find empirical evidence for the causal pattern I suggested in Chapter 3. To recall, I argued that interim governments that allow for the participation of unarmed actors should enable the warring parties to send costly signals of their true intentions to each other that create domestic audience costs. This should mitigate commitment problems because such audiences then punish those warring parties that renege on a peaceful bargain in the post-interim period (cf. Nilsson, 2012). Evidence from Nepal however suggests that rather than creating audience costs, the participation of civil society in the interim in-
stitutions added to decreasing future uncertainties for the warring parties. This is because civil society became over the course of the interim period more and more co-opted by the warring parties and extremely “politically charged” (INT-20, 09.10.2015), as the warring parties began to use their patronage networks to “reward their civil society supporters” (International Crisis Group, 2006, p. 21). This however also meant that all political and economic benefits that were ascribed to civil society became political and economic benefits ascribed to the warring parties instead. For instance, votes of civil society leaders in the interim parliament for laws and regulations became more votes for the respective warring party they supported, and international funds to civil society organizations became funds for the warring parties “by proxy” (INT-02, 23.09.2015). While this aspect does certainly not explain stable post-interim peace in Nepal by itself, it added to how the CPN (M) increased its future political and economic security through participating in the interim government. By that means, my finding from Nepal still supports the results of my statistical analysis.

Also in Angola and Cambodia, the lack of participation of unarmed actors correlates with the outcome – armed conflict in the post-interim period – in the expected way. However, this does not translate into any causal evidence in these cases. Instead, I demonstrated that rather than perceiving any (hypothetical) participation of unarmed actors in interim rule as a costly signal by the MPLA or the SOC, UNITA and the PDK felt threatened in their future political survival by the idea that civil society or political parties without a history of armed insurgency could participate in interim rule. UNITA leader Savimbi called the idea of a national conference that would have consulted with civil society on future laws a “civilian coup d’état” (cf. Malaquias, 2007, p. 161) and was guided by the belief that such participation would threaten UNITA’s unique position in Angola as the only viable alternative to the MPLA caretaker interim government (Pearce, 2015). Similarly, the PDK was argued to have perceived such participation as a threat to its own long-term political survival, because it understood the emergence and participation of new political parties as the “dispersion of the Khmer Rouge vote” (Azimi, 1995, p. 83).

Some have argued, with reference to the situation in Cambodia, that the perception of participatory mechanisms as a threat, rather than a mitigation of commitment problems, may be caused by the inexperience of warring parties in reacting to political pluralism and competition (cf. Downie and Kingsbury, 2001). I have noted in Chapter 7 and 8 that one could generalize from these observations that the relative effect of the participation variable on hazards of armed conflict in the post-interim period is different for countries with a history of democratic rule than for countries without such democratic experience. To test whether such conditional effect exists for my sample, I introduce an interaction term participation x history of democracy in Model 3 (lenient operationalization) and Model 4 (strict operationalization) of Table A.10 in Appendix A. The interaction term is however not statistically significant. The effect of
the participation variable on the hazard of armed conflict does also not change as compared to the models without the interaction effect.

To further validate this result, I additionally ran my original Cox PH models from Table 4.3 (Chapter 4, page 62) – that do not include any interaction terms – on a subset of cases that lack any democratic experience. This serves once more to test whether or not the effect of unarmed actor participation in interim governments is different when warring parties are inexperienced in democracy. It is not. Results – not reported in any table – show instead that contrary to what my case studies of Angola and Cambodia suggested, interim governments that allow for the participation of unarmed actors in reform processes still decrease risks of armed conflict in the post-interim period by 78 per cent when they appear in countries that lack a history of democratic rule.

Figure 9.1 provides a further visual interpretation of the links between participatory mechanisms in interim governments, democratic history, and post-interim peace. The graph shows the predicted survival probability for all possible value combinations of the participation and the democratic history variables (cf. Chapter 4 for the specific coding rules). The graph suggests thereby that interim governments with institutionalized opportunities for the participation of unarmed actors that convene in countries with a history of democratic rule have the highest survival probability (Scenario “Participation 2, Democracy 1”). The case of Nepal, for instance, represents such an interim government. However, this curve is very similar to the one of interim governments with institutionalized opportunities for participation that convene in countries without a history
of democratic rule (“Participation 2, Democracy 0”).

In sum, the divergence between my statistical finding and the lack of evidence for my proposed causal mechanism in the qualitative case studies may thus be due to two reasons. Firstly, the lack of empirical evidence for the suggested audience costs mechanism may simply indicate that this mechanism is not an adequate portrayal in how civil society and unarmed political parties influence the success or failure of peace processes after intrastate armed conflict. This would link to previous theoretical work that finds little empirical evidence for the audience costs argument (cf. Hegre, 2014). For instance, Downes and Secher (2012) call audience costs an “illusion of democratic credibility,” and Trachtenberg (2012) notes that it is difficult to name a single empirical case in which audience costs played out as a causal mechanism. It would further support the empirical literature that has conceptualized civil society participation in post-conflict countries as a factor that more generally contributes to the wider legitimacy of the peace process, rather than as one that affects the behavior or belligerency of the warring parties (cf. my discussion in Chapter 3). Secondly, the divergence between my quantitative and qualitative finding on the participation variable could also suggest that the statistical indicators used to measure participation – or those used to measure democratic history – are invalid predictors of the true underlying theoretical concepts. I discussed such concerns for the participation variable in Chapter 4. I attend to this issue with regard to the implications for future research on the topic in Chapter 10.

9.2.3 Limitations of Bargaining Theory

Game-theoretical models – such as the framework that I proposed in Chapter 3 – have been both hailed (Healy, 2016) and criticized (Schmitter, 2009) in their power to explain complex social phenomena like peace after war. Several recent applications of game theory have additionally pointed out the utility of process-tracing in particular for testing the theory’s underlying assumptions and proposed strategic interactions (e.g. Goemans and Spaniel, 2013; Kuehn, 2013). In Chapter 7, I have in this regard highlighted how bargaining models and their focus on commitment problems are a particularly apt theoretical approach to study the remobilization of UNITA following Angola’s interim period. In Chapter 6 and 8, I however also noted how the cases Nepal and Cambodia demonstrate some of the weaknesses of the standard bargaining model of war as promoted in the wider literature (e.g. Fearon, 1995b; Walter, 2002). Following previous studies that have pointed out the difficulties in rigorously testing all of bargaining theory’s assumptions and in overcoming the simplifications of bargaining models (e.g. Driscoll, 2012; Gartzke, 1999; Lake, 2010), my within-case analyses suggest two key limitations to the utility of the bargaining argument.

**Unitary Actor Assumption**  Firstly, my within-case analyses show the limitation of bargaining theory modeling intrastate armed conflict as a strategic
interaction between unitary actors, such as between sovereign states, or governments and rebel groups. Particularly my case study on Nepal’s interim government has disclosed how the unitary actor assumption simplifies or masks important dynamics that help to explain how commitment problems are mitigated and how interim governments add to peace. As I have explained above, Nepal’s power-sharing interim government mitigated commitment problems precisely because it changed intra-party dynamics between CPN (M) elites and combatants. After witnessing that their representatives in the interim government were only interested in political survival and personal economic gain while neglecting the grievances of combatants, the latter became increasingly frustrated and disillusioned. This ultimately made the CPN (M) less belligerent and the peaceful resolution of Nepal’s conflict easier to achieve, because such intra-party dynamics increased the CPN (M)’s costs of defection.\footnote{This observation links to the wider peace and conflict literature that has in the past adhered to benefits of loosening the unitary actor assumption for the analysis of armed combat. This aspect has however mostly been discussed in studies concerned with states in international crises (e.g. Barbieri and Schneider, 1999: Fearon, 1994; Filson and Werner, 2004). For instance, Lake (2010) has noted that the “much criticized unitary actor assumption” (Barbieri and Schneider, 1999, p. 388) of bargaining theory is misleading for studying the case of the 2003 US intervention in Iraq. This is because internal politics within both the US and Iraq did not only violate the assumption, but also – and contrary to Nepal – increase the belligerency of the players so that a peaceful resolution of the interstate armed conflict became more difficult to achieve.}

Few studies have thus far investigated how intra-party dynamics affect credible commitment problems for parties engaged in intrastate conflict. Most of them have focused on explaining variance in civil war duration and outcome (Cunningham et al., 2009; Cunningham et al., 2013), or in civilian victimization during civil war (Wood, 2014). The insights from Nepal however suggest that it is also theoretically and empirically fruitful to inspect how intra-party structures and dynamics affect warring party behavior and decision-making also after the formal termination of a civil war. A thorough empirical test of this argument would certainly require a dyadic data structure, instead of an empirical model that assesses the presence of armed conflict on the country or conflict level, as in this dissertation (cf. Chapter 4). However, I can approach this argument to some degree by adding an additional control variable to my Cox PH models that assesses the concept of rebel group cohesion in order to see whether interim governments following conflicts with less cohesive rebel groups are linked to longer peace spells.\footnote{To capture this variable, I use the centcontrol measure from Cunningham et al. (2013) and create a binary indicator that assesses whether or not at least one rebel group engaged in the intrastate armed conflict with the government had a central command structure.}

\textsuperscript{129} Even though evidence is much weaker, some selected sources also report on intra-party splits within the PDK (Findlay, 1995; Thayer, 1996) and UNITA (Brittain, 1998). Results reported in Model 4 of Table A.12
Two Player Games  Secondly, my within-case analyses highlighted the limitations of bargaining theory that models intrastate armed conflict as two player games. This simplification fails to adequately portray the situation in Nepal or Cambodia, where multiple players were involved in the respective civil wars and subsequent interim periods. This includes three rebel groups against one government in Cambodia, and one rebel group against a fragmented government comprised of the royal palace (backed by the army) and several political parties (in control of the police force) in Nepal.

I have argued that this simplification may overlook key sub-mechanisms in the suggested causal patterns of how interim governments contribute (or fail to contribute) to peace after war. In order to understand why peace lasted in Nepal, I illustrated in Chapter 6 the benefit of analyzing how the power-sharing interim government mitigated not only commitment problems of the parties participating in joint rule through decreasing their future uncertainty. I also showed that joint rule between the CPN (M) and the SPA further increased the costs of defection from the peace process for the party outside of the deal: the royal palace (cf. above). In Chapter 8, I then discussed that while the PDK entered the loose CGDK coalition with the two other rebel groups during the civil war against the PRK regime; FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF arguably moved closer to Hun Sen’s government with the signing of the 1991 Paris Agreements and during the rule of the power-sharing SNC. For instance, all parties but the PDK came to agree on holding elections in order to determine a legitimate post-interim government. It is feasible to imagine that this political isolation of the PDK may have exacerbated the party’s perception of becoming marginalized in the peace process and thereby added to its difficulties to commit to a peaceful solution to the conflict (cf. Cunningham, 2011).

In that regard, my findings link to past research on multiple rebel groups in war and peace that have demonstrated the difficulties in buying off several warring parties at once to establish durable peace (Fjelde and Nilsson, 2012; Nilsson, 2006; Nilsson, 2008). From a bargaining perspective, Lake (2010) has also previously argued that the analytical simplification of two-player games overlooks important dynamics in how conflicts become violent, for instance because multiple actors involved in a bargaining situation hear the same signal, but interpret it differently (cf. also Driscoll, 2012). I can again test whether

(Appendix A) suggest as much and offer initial support of the evidence from Nepal, as indicated by the positive and statistically significant β coefficient. This indicates that interim governments following conflicts with cohesive rebel groups face a higher risk of conflict recurrence in the post-interim period, for instance because such rebel groups find it easier to remobilize. Because this broad measure can yet only be understood as an approximation of the underlying concept of intra-party dynamics in peace processes, further research on the topic is required (cf. Chapter 10).
or not the number of warring parties engaged in an armed conflict has any effect on the duration of post-interim peace in my sample. To do so, I add an additional control variable to my Cox PH models that counts the number of rebel groups engaged in an armed conflict with a government (data taken from Gleditsch, Wallensteen, et al., 2002; Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015). The variable ranges from one rebel group (such as in Nepal) to eight rebel groups (Afghanistan). Results reported in Model 3 of Table A.12 (Appendix A) do however not provide evidence for this aspect, and the coefficient is not statistically significant.
Chapter 10

Conclusion

Interim governments remain common institutional features in many war-torn societies. The recent interim governments in Ukraine and South Sudan, as well as the negotiations for a prospective interim government in Syria are cases in point. In the academic community, it is widely accepted that these short-term institutions have substantial effects on long-term political developments in the societies they rule (e.g. Donini, 2007; Manning, 2007; Rothchild, 2007; Shain and Berat, 1995). However, and despite their real-world significance, a number of theoretical, empirical, and methodological shortcomings in previous peace and conflict research have left us in the dark about why some interim governments are followed by stable peace in the post-interim period, while others are not. This dissertation has sought to address these shortcomings by answering the following research question: After intrastate armed conflict, what properties of interim governments increase the stability of post-interim peace?

I have argued that peace and conflict research has neglected interim governments in theoretical frameworks that focus on permanent institutional designs, as well as in methodological approaches that pool together both institutional types within one data set. I have also argued that those studies that specifically focus on the patterns and effects of interim governments overwhelmingly rest on evidence gathered through under-theorized and non-comparative case studies. Thus, their findings are difficult to generalize. This literature also tends to concentrate on studying the institutional designs of interim governments as explanatory variables, while neglecting the variety of reforms such governments implement, as well as the modi operandi by which they do so. By this means, the literature strictly follows the typology of interim governments by Shain and Linz (1995) and may not recognize all underlying explanatory variables or causal processes that link interim governments to stable post-interim peace. This is particularly so, because the Shain and Linz typology was developed within democratization research and not with a specific focus on situations where interim governments follow large-scale intrastate armed conflict.

I began to address these shortcomings by incorporating existing research
on interim governments into a standard bargaining model. This model framed intrastate conflict as a bargaining failure due to the presence of credible commitment problems. I have then highlighted that it is possible to imagine a counterargument to the “traditional” approach of the literature that has depicted power-sharing and international interim governments as increasing the stability of peace. This counterargument reasons that this traditional institutional design approach neglects the *temporality* of such designs – a factor that may *exacerbate*, rather than *mitigate* commitment problems.

Consequently, I have complemented this approach by incorporating two further sub-fields of peace and conflict research into my theoretical framework. Firstly, by borrowing from studies concerned with the role of non-state actors, I have argued that as long as the parallel war-time institutions of warring parties persist throughout an interim period, parties retain the financial resources, popular legitimacy, military infrastructure, and war-time mindsets to remobilize in the post-interim period. Interim governments that implement reforms to integrate such parallel institutions should thus increase the stability of peace. Secondly, by borrowing from studies concerned with the role of unarmed actors, I have argued that as long as interim governments fail to create domestic audience costs that punish warring parties reneging on a peaceful bargain, violence also becomes more likely. Interim governments that allow for the participation of unarmed, domestic audiences in reform processes – such as civil society representatives or political parties without a history of armed insurgency – should thus increase the stability of post-interim peace.

I have empirically tested this framework by using a mixed-method research design that combines statistical survival analysis with process-tracing in and a comparative analysis of three case studies. In my quantitative analysis, I have used a novel data set of a sample of all interim governments that followed at least one year of intrastate armed conflict since 1989, and that terminated by 2012. This temporal constraint allowed me to assess the stability of post-interim peace for at least two years. My qualitative case studies, selected under a most-similar system design, included the interim governments of Nepal (2006-2008), Angola (1991-1992), and Cambodia (1991-1993).

I did not find any statistical support for hypothesis H1 on the peace-conducive effect of *power-sharing interim government*. The coefficient was not statistically significant at conventional levels throughout model specifications. I showed that this is likely due to a selection effect, as power-sharing interim governments tend to appear more often following peace agreements, and the latter have been identified to result in unstable peace after war (Licklider, 1995; Walter, 2002). If a sub-sample of only those interim governments that were negotiated in peace agreements is studied, power-sharing arrangements come with the expected negative effect on the hazard of armed conflict in the post-interim period. Building on this finding, my case studies compared three interim governments that followed peace agreements, in order to tease out the effect that power-sharing deals
can have in these situations. My main finding from the within- and between-case analyses was that the most important mechanism in how power-sharing interim government links to peace is that of political security. This means that warring parties use their participation in power-sharing interim rule to design or manipulate laws that decrease any future uncertainty about their survival in the post-interim period. In interim governments without any power-sharing deals, the party in control over the interim institutions may pass laws that threaten the political survival of its adversary. The case studies also demonstrated that the peace-conducive effect of power-sharing is highly dependent on the situation it appears in, for instance on whether or not parties can safeguard their survival through parallel institutions (cf. below).

I found mixed evidence for hypothesis H2 on the role of international interim government for post-interim peace. In my statistical analysis, the coefficient associated with the variable was negative throughout model specifications and coding versions, but its statistical significance was not robust. Again, this is at least partly the result of selection issues, as international interim governments tend to appear more frequently after high-intensity civil wars and peace agreements. Building on this finding, none of my case studies supported the idea that international interim governments increase the stability of peace. In that regard, I found support for my theoretical argument that the temporality of international interim governments is at least part of the explanation for why they fail to raise the costs of defection for the warring parties. My case study of Nepal’s interim government additionally suggested that local ownership during interim rule, rather than international authority, can be an alternative driver of peace outside the bargaining framework.

I found strong support for hypothesis H3 on the integration of parallel political and military institutions into the authority of interim governments. In my statistical analysis, the variable came with a negative and statistically significant coefficient throughout model specifications. Robustness checks additionally demonstrated that this effect is substantive: Interim governments that integrate parallel political institutions into their authority – such as rebel governments – reduce risks of armed conflict in the post-interim period by 54 percent. Interim governments that integrate parallel military institutions through disarming and demobilizing the warring parties reduce such risks even by 94 percent as compared to interim governments that fail to do so. My case studies supported this finding. They also demonstrated that the mechanisms concerning the warring parties’ financial resources and war-time mindsets are the strongest explanations. This means that interim governments integrating the parallel political institutions of warring parties reduce risks of future war because they strip parties of their means of financing a violent campaign (such as through parallel taxation or natural resource trade), and that interim governments integrating parallel military institutions reduce risks of future war because they help combatants to envision alternatives to military careers.
I found mixed support for hypothesis H4 on how the participation of unarmed actors in interim government increases the stability of peace. In my statistical analysis, the variable came with a robustly negative and statistically significant coefficient. I showed, for instance, that interim governments that offer seats to civil society or political party representatives reduce armed conflict risks by 92 percent as opposed to interim governments that only comprise the warring parties. My case studies did not mirror this finding. Although the participation variable correlated with the outcome in my case studies in the expected manner, I did not find evidence for the suggested causal pattern on domestic audience costs. In Nepal, there was instead some evidence that the participation of civil society decreased future uncertainties for warring parties. In Angola and Cambodia, the hypothetical participation of unarmed actors was perceived as a threat, rather than a mitigation of commitment problems by weaker-growing parties that were inexperienced in competing with a political opposition. I have hypothesized that, generalizing from these observations, the relative effect of participation on the hazard of armed conflict could be different in countries with a history of democratic rule than in countries without such history. Additional survival models did yet not provide support for an interaction effect.

In sum, and reflecting on how my empirical findings support my theoretical argument, this dissertation has illuminated three key aspects. Firstly, the reforms implemented by interim governments provide for a better explanation for long-term peace as compared to the institutional designs of such governments. While the peace-conducive effects of power-sharing and international interim governments remain conditional on the situation these designs appear in as well as limited by their temporality, whether or not interim governments integrate the parallel institutions of warring parties raises those parties’ costs of remobilization in the long run. Secondly, mechanisms regarding the warring parties’ raised cost of defection provide for a more powerful causal explanation as compared to any reduced future uncertainties or audience costs. This is in line with previous findings (cf. Downes and Sechser, 2012; Trachtenberg, 2012). However, my case study on Nepal also showed that costs of defection and decreased uncertainty are mechanisms that can closely interact in how they affect the behavior of warring parties (cf. also Mattes and Savun, 2009). Thirdly, Nepal also supported previous studies in showing that it is fruitful to relax the unitary actor assumption of bargaining theory (cf. Barbieri and Schneider, 1999; Filson and Werner, 2004). Such reformulation of theory can help expand explanations of how (interim) institutions mitigate commitment problems and avoid bargaining breakdowns and war. I attend to how future research can address this aspect further below.
10.1 Contributions and Limitations

Based on these findings, my dissertation comes with a number of theoretical, empirical, and methodological contributions – and limitations – that link to the existing debate on interim governments, as well as to other debates in the wider peace and conflict literature. In terms of theory, this dissertation has (1) complemented existing institutional design approaches to studying interim governments with two additional explanatory variables on reform processes in such governments, and (2) formulated a bargaining argument that combines all explanatory variables under one theoretical roof. These are key contributions to the peace and conflict literature for at least two reasons.

Firstly, with the help of my bargaining framework I could demonstrate that it is theoretically – and empirically – fruitful to study “static” institutional designs in combination with more “dynamic” reform processes after war. In the current literature, these two explanations for peace are often separately dealt with and hardly integrated in joint theoretical frameworks or empirical research designs. A good example for this lack of combination and integration is the academic debate on DDR processes after intrastate armed conflict. Studies on DDR have in the past remained remarkably disconnected from analyses that focus on how the design of post-conflict political institutions shapes prospects for long-term peace. This is also more generally the case for scholarship that analyzes the statutory and non-statutory security sectors of war-torn states (Ansorg, Haass, et al., 2013). While the study of post-conflict political institutions as causes for peace – such as the role of power-sharing governments, post-conflict democratization, or electoral system designs – is increasingly theory-driven and methodologically advanced (see, e.g. Hegre and Nygård, 2015; Walter, 2015), the debate on DDR processes remains overwhelmingly policy-oriented and focuses on deriving “lessons learned” from a few prominent cases. Another focus in this debate is to formulate “good practice” guidelines for international actors engaged in post-conflict peacebuilding, DDR, and Security Sector Reform (SSR) (e.g. Bryden and Scherrer, 2012; Gamba, 2003; Muggah, 2010). Such studies are thus able to identity the nuanced and idiosyncratic mechanisms of how DDR processes successfully contribute to peace after war in single cases, but they lack the ability to draw generalizable conclusions and also often focus on the technical aspects of DDR, rather than on the political dynamics and structures DDR is embedded in.

This dissertation has thus not least demonstrated the value of “bringing politics back in,” as I studied disarmament and demobilization as part of how interim governments integrate the parallel institutions of warring parties into their authority. My case studies have suggested that the peace-conducive effect of power-sharing governments, for instance, also depends on the availability of parallel political and military structures to the warring parties. In that way, this dissertation illuminates both the scholarly discussion on the institutional
causes for peace after war (Ansorg and Kurtenbach, 2017; Hegre and Nygård, 2015; Strasheim and Fjelde, 2014; Walter, 2015; Wolff, 2011), as well as the literature on technical reforms in post-conflict societies.

Secondly, this dissertation has also contributed to theory-development in the peace and conflict literature by discussing the utility of the bargaining framework for the study of war and peace. On a general theoretical level, the dissertation has demonstrated that bargaining theory can be a promising approach to study the role of interim governments after armed conflict. It has thereby added to the prevalent discussions highlighting that arguments originally developed for the analysis of interstate wars (in Fearon, 1995b; Powell, 2006) can be fruitfully applied to study the behavior of governments and rebel groups in intrastate conflict. The dissertation however also links to a growing number of recent studies that have adhered to the limitations of bargaining theory in portraying the empirical reality of violent conflict, as well as to the necessary modifications that would help link the theory more closely to this reality (cf. Driscoll, 2012; Hegre, 2014; Lake, 2010). Most importantly, I have demonstrated that strictly adhering to bargaining theory’s unitary actor assumption can mask important processes in how interim governments causally connect to peace. My case study on Nepal has disclosed how power-sharing interim governments can mitigate commitment problems by changing intra-party dynamics between party elites and combatants, increase elites’ costs of remobilization, and make a party less belligerent. I have proposed the idea that, generalizing from this observation, less cohesive rebel groups may have a harder time remobilizing in the post-interim period, and I found support for this claim when I added a measure of rebel group cohesion as an additional control variable to my regression. My crude empirical test of how the presence of non-unitary actors is linked to peace after war can however only be seen as an approximation of the underlying relationship, and more research is needed on this issue (cf. below).

In terms of methodological contributions to the peace and conflict literature, this dissertation has (1) presented the first statistical data set that specifically coded information on properties of interim government. By means of building this data set, I also (2) departed from the typical sampling strategy of previous studies that have concentrated largely on studying the stability of peace following the signing of peace agreements (e.g. Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007; Jarstad, 2010; Joshi and Darby, 2013). Mukherjee (2006) has previously critiqued this sampling strategy, and I have demonstrated that – with the exception of power-sharing – the effects of other properties of interim government do not depend on whether or not warring parties have put their signatures under negotiated accords. Furthermore, this dissertation has also (3) integrated the statistical analysis into a mixed-method research design in order to allow for identifying both generalizable as well as non-generic results in how interim governments contribute to peace. These are all key contributions to the literature, not least because they allow me to present first quantitative results concerning variables
that have in the past predominantly been studied in qualitative research. An example is the role of integrating the war-time parallel political institutions of warring parties, our evidence of which is thus far largely based on case study research (e.g., Barter, 2015; Hoffmann, 2015; Mampilly, 2011).

I have also demonstrated that qualitative case studies are a useful approach to identify concrete issues of concept validity in statistical research. This has not only allowed me to contribute to the application of mixed-method research in the study of peace and conflict (cf. Thaler, 2015). It has also enabled me to utilize my case studies to more concretely show the limitations of merely conceptualizing and operationalizing peace as the absence of intrastate armed conflict, as has become the standard approach in the quantitative literature. I have demonstrated that this standard approach neglects that other types of violence may be directly linked to the behavior of warring parties in the interim government. Using non-state conflict and one-sided violence to operationalize my dependent variable, I have then verified for my full sample that any inferences on how properties of interim governments impact post-interim peace are limited to explaining the recurrence of intrastate armed conflict. However, this at the same time strengthens my initial theoretical argument that different types of violence are explained by different variables and follow different causal pathways. This finding links my dissertation to recent discussion on the quality of peace and various types of violence in war-torn societies (e.g., Westendorf, 2015).

A limitation with regard to the mixed-method research design concerns the aspect of unarmed actors participating in interim government. I have summarized above that my statistical and qualitative findings diverge on questions about whether and how the participation of unarmed actors in interim rule contributes to stable post-interim peace. While the variable was one of the most robust explanatory factors for peace in my regression models, this was not mirrored by my case studies. I have reasoned in Chapters 4 and 9 that one explanation for the lack of congruence of quantitative and qualitative results could be that the statistical coding of participation that I presented in this dissertation is an inefficient measure of the underlying concept. I could not solve the discrepancy in quantitative and qualitative findings in this dissertation, but I discuss below how this presents avenues for future research.

In terms of empirical contributions to the peace and conflict literature, it is valuable to highlight that this dissertation has also (1) presented newly collected qualitative data on Nepal’s peace process. The interview data on the dynamics of the early days of this peace process is of scholarly use beyond the scope of this dissertation, not least because it helps to advance our understanding for why the country continues to be affected by other types of post-conflict violence even though the warring parties did not remobilize for war (cf. Strasheim and Bogati, 2016). For instance, I have presented a link in Chapter 9 between how warring party elites consolidated their political power in the long run through their participation in the interim government and grievances that drove the 2015-2016
anti-constitution protests, which killed over 50 people. Many protesters stated that they felt betrayed by the Maoist elites for neglecting the political promises they had made to minorities once they joined mainstream politics during the interim period. In that way, and by presenting new empirical evidence for the case of Nepal, my dissertation also illuminates the literature on the institutional causes for peace after war that has overwhelmingly studied African cases in the past (e.g. Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010; Lemarchand, 1994; Lemarchand, 2007; Mehler, 2009; Tull and Mehler, 2005; Zanker et al., 2015).

Finally, this dissertation has also contributed to the comparative area studies literature by (2) conducting a cross-regional comparison of the three cases, which still constitutes – as I have argued in Chapter 5 – “the exception to the rule” in analyzing politics and politics in the Global South (Basedau and Köllner, 2007, p. 112). For instance, the Angolan peace process in particular has in the past predominantly been studied in comparison with similar developments in lusophone Africa, such as Mozambique (e.g. Bekoe, 2005; Pearce, 2010). Thus, my cross-regional approach has also helped me to ensure that no cultural, area-specific factors underlie the stability of post-interim peace in my cases.

10.2 Policy Recommendations

My findings also allow me to formulate several concrete policy recommendations to international actors promoting peace in societies torn apart by armed conflict. Recall that I have argued in the introductory chapter to this dissertation that the international community has attributed an impressive amount of global financial assistance to post-conflict institutional reform in recent years. This strategy is based on a belief that institutions can be reformed so that they inspire peaceful inter-group relations. It is also not least guided by the fact that unlike many other features of war-torn societies that are difficult to influence from the outside, institutional designs and reforms provide a vital opportunity to shape desirable outcomes. Interim governments thereby remain a core part of international peacebuilders’ institutional “toolkit” to promote peace after violent conflict. The most recent illustration of this is the case of Syria, where UN-brokered negotiations in early 2016 have attempted to negotiate an interim government that would guide a transition to peace.

The first implication for policy that my findings suggest is that in planning and implementing the rule of interim governments following intrastate armed conflict, international actors should not exclusively focus on the institutional designs of such governments. They often do so, while neglecting the “wide range of potential measures” that allow warring parties to “share influence, as well as balance that influence with mre roles for noncombatants [or] civilian political actors” (Nixon and Hartzell, 2011, p. 4). For instance, the Syrian peace plan that was presented on 18 December 2015 in UN Security Council Resolution 2254 included as its two core propositions (1) to set up a power-sharing interim
government that would draft a new constitution, as well as (2) to invite the UN to assume authority of administering elections that would terminate such interim government. In specific, the resolution expressed support for

“... a Syrian-led political process that is facilitated by the United Nations and, within a target of six months, establishes credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance and sets a schedule and process for drafting a new constitution, and further expresses its support for free and fair elections, pursuant to the new constitution, to be held within 18 months and administered under supervision of the United Nations” (United Nations, 2015).

The results in this dissertation however suggest that these two institutional designs of interim governments are not enough to explain why some interim governments are followed by long-term peace in the post-interim period while others are not. The results also disclosed that particularly the effect of power-sharing interim government is highly conditional on the situation it appears in. Power-sharing should thus not be treated as a general blueprint for international efforts to promote peace – although it has been in the past (Zanker et al., 2015).131 As comparing my case studies on interim rule in Nepal and Cambodia verifies, for power-sharing to contribute to ending violent conflicts, it is important that the participation in joint rule is also truly a commitment to or a gain from the peace process. Thus, parties should not have access to parallel structures to secure their political or economic survival, otherwise power-sharing can become meaningless. This is a key problem also in the Syrian case, where the Islamic State is just one of several armed groups that have erected parallel government structures in the areas under their control (cf. Kalyvas, 2015).

Nor is establishing an international interim government a blueprint for efforts to promote peace after war. My findings have reiterated what others have argued before me: The international community’s use of elections as an “exit strategy” from their engagement in war-torn states entails potential dangers to peace processes (cf. Chandler, 2000). If warring parties know that any raised cost of defection resulting from physical deterrence by an international interim government is going to disappear in the post-interim period, this can exacerbate rather than mitigate commitment problems. One implication from this result would advise the more gradual reduction of international personnel in the post-interim period. Such reduction should thus not be based on the successful completion of singular events – such as elections – but on more profound changes in underlying conflict-inducing conditions of war-torn states. For instance, as Collier (2009, p. 15) has argued, “economic development may be the true ‘exit strategy’ for international peace-keeping.”

131 By no means does this imply that power-sharing arrangements for the interim period are not important at all. For instance, coming to terms on a power-sharing formula early on in the course of peace negotiations could make it easier for warring parties to subsequently agree to disarm and demobilize in exchange for receiving cabinet posts.
Another vital policy implication that my findings relate to concerns the role of parallel institutions during interim periods. My findings have particularly illustrated that whether or not interim governments integrate the parallel military institutions of warring parties through disarmament and demobilization processes is one of the most important explanations for stable peace in the post-interim period. On the one hand, this means that international actors should envision to substantially advance a DDR process early on in the interim period in order to address any lingering military infrastructure parties need to remobilize for war. This includes the swift setup of cantonment sites, the adequate staffing of such sites, as well as the early collection and disposal of arms. It also means that living conditions inside cantonment must not be as insufferable as to make fully armed and mobilized combatants leave again, such as in search for food. Beyond the case studies analyzed in this dissertation, previous research has in that regard pointed to the case of Mozambique as a “best practice” example for this process (cf. Flores and Nooruddin, 2011). In Mozambique, elections terminating the interim government were delayed several times until combatants of the RENAMO rebel group were disarmed and demobilized. When RENAMO lost the 1994 elections against the incumbent FREELIMO party, it had no other choice than to accept its electoral defeat and a seat in the political opposition. This is in sharp contrast particularly to the situation in Angola.

On the other hand, it is often not possible or even desirable to completely strip warring parties of their arms during the interim period, or to disintegrate their command structures. My case studies have suggested as much and thereby support previous research on the topic (e.g. Myrätinen, 2003; Spear, 1999; Theidon, 2009). For instance, the case of Nepal shows that access to commanders can help ex-combatants integrate into new civilian communities after the end of war, or find civilian jobs in the post-conflict period. This means that – in the same vein as the institutional designs of interim governments – there is no blueprint of how parallel military institutions should be integrated in the aftermath of armed conflict. Some of my interview partners in Nepal in that regard mentioned that they felt frustrated when they perceived that UNMIN came with “lessons learned” from DDR in several African countries, even though those had not been “clear cut success stories” (INT-12, 29.09.2015).

The good news in this regard is that even if not all weapons are collected by the end of the interim period, and even if not all hierarchical command structures between commanders and ex-combatants have disintegrated, adequately designed DDR processes can still increase the stability of post-interim peace. They do so by addressing what I called the war-time mindset of ex-combatants, i.e. how closely combatants still identify with their roles from during the war (cf. Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010). My findings imply that international actors engaged in promoting peace after war should ensure that ex-combatants early on in a peace process can start to envision alternative private and professional livelihoods as opposed to their military careers. Most notably, this means
that international actors should implement schooling or vocational training inside cantonment. From a broader development perspective, this finding yet also means that international actors should support government programs that create decent job opportunities for ex-combatants, or offer them legal options for economic migration. I have cited the phrase “Militia or Malaysia” that respondents in Nepal used to describe the possible job opportunities of Maoist ex-combatants in that regard. If such opportunities to live a decent civilian life are lacking, the presence of a pool of unemployed young men trained in the use of arms can substantially decrease the cost of remobilization for warring party leaders (cf. Collier, Elliott, et al., 2003).

Another policy recommendation based on my findings is that international actors should also promote the integration of parallel political institutions into the authority of an interim government. As Riyad Hijab, a member of the Syrian opposition, has reasoned with regard to the continued parallel administrations set up by various rebel groups throughout Syria: “[If] one milk carton cannot go [into a besieged area, how] can there be a political transition” to peace (in Black, 2016)? However, there is an important caveat to this policy recommendation: Parallel political institutions can and do provide vital public services that an interim government may be unwilling or unable to provide (cf. Englebert and Tull, 2008). For instance, I have elaborated on how the Maoist People’s Courts added to the CPN (M)’s popularity during Nepal’s civil war, because their judicial work was perceived as more efficient and cheaper than the services offered by the regular government district courts. Particularly women were said to have benefited from these parallel structures because the Maoist courts strictly punished rape, domestic violence, or men taking child brides (Lohani-Chase, 2008). Thus, in order to avoid perpetuating or even causing new violence by dismantling widely legitimate governance structures, international actors must always embed strategies that integrate the parallel institutions of warring parties in wider efforts to ensure public service provisions to a civilian population in war-torn states.

A final policy implication of my research concerns the role of unarmed actors in interim governance. Although my case studies could not verify how precisely the participation of civil society and political parties in interim decision-making adds to peace, my statistical analysis strongly suggested that it does. For international actors engaged in the promotion of peace after war, this finding indicates that they should promote the inclusion of civil society and political parties without a history of armed insurgency during interim rule. They should equally strengthen the capacity of these actors to become true domestic audiences that can hold warring parties accountable for their behavior, and that can ensure transparent decision-making in the interim period.

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132 Some of my interview partners in Nepal have discussed the downsides of offering such services inside cantonment, especially if a civilian population does not have the same access to such opportunities (cf. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, 2013).
10.3 Avenues for Future Research

This dissertation also opens up several avenues for future research on interim governments in war-torn societies, as well as on related topics. Generally, both my quantitative and my qualitative findings point to the conditionality of institutional designs. This means that institutions do not work in isolation, but deeply interact with existing formal or informal institutional structures as well as with other context factors in war-torn societies. While studies in peace and conflict research increasingly attend to such conditionality (e.g. Pospieszna and Schneider, 2013), it still represents a relatively new approach to studying post-conflict institutions that needs more systematic analysis and generalizable findings (cf. Ansorg and Kurtenbach, 2017; Basedau, 2017). Such findings could also help formulate more precise policy recommendations on which institutional configurations work best under what context conditions.

Most notably, my case studies have suggested two specific conditionalities that present promising avenues for future research. Firstly, the impact of power-sharing arrangements on peace after war may depend upon how a participation in power-sharing institutions alters intra-party dynamics, such as in Nepal. This aspect has not been addressed in previous research on the topic, not least because many statistical analysis on post-conflict power-sharing institutions refer to the standard bargaining model with unitary actors as a theoretical explanation (e.g. Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Mattes and Savun, 2009). In that way, this aspect thus calls for more research that takes into account the structure of warring parties in examining how power-sharing arrangements – or other institutional formations – affect warring party behavior after war. This could be implemented in qualitative case study research designs that trace causal mechanisms linking warring party structures, institutions, and post-conflict outcomes. Recent data collections yet also allow for statistical tests of this issue (Cunningham et al., 2009; Cunningham et al., 2013).

Secondly, my findings also suggest that the peace-conducive effect of power-sharing deals is conditional on whether or not warring parties integrate parallel institutions. Particularly my case study on the Cambodian interim government revealed that as long as warring parties have access to economic gains through their control over parallel political structures, they lack incentives to peacefully cooperate in formal state institutions. In the worst case, this can render power-sharing interim governments meaningless institutional façades rather than structures with a substantive impact on local political developments (cf. the notion of post-conflict “Potemkin States” in Bliesemann de Guevara and Kühn, 2010). This aspect then calls for more research on how the peace-conducive effect of formal (interim) institutions is conditional on the patterns of and dynamics within parallel war-time institutions of warring parties.

Because – as I have argued above – scholarship on parallel political institutions has thus far been mostly informed by qualitative analysis (but see Sabates-
Wheeler and Verwimp, 2014), this would also call for a more substantive data collection on the properties of parallel structures that warring parties set up during the course of armed conflict. Such data collection could include, for instance, more nuanced information on the types of public services warring parties offer to gain popular legitimacy (such as parallel judicial systems, healthcare, or education). It also could include information on the types of finance mechanisms warring parties implement (such as monetary and non-monetary taxation, extortion, or resource trade), as well as on the depth of their institutional control. Especially since parallel political institutions by warring parties have been decisive in how rebel groups in recent cases of civil war manage their relationship with the civilian population – think of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, as well as the self-proclaimed parallel administrations of the Donetsk People’s Republic in Ukraine – generalizable results on the role of parallel political institutions in war and peace would also be of highest policy relevance.

Finally, my dissertation also opens up avenues for future research on the role of unarmed actors in interim governments specifically, as well as in post-conflict peace processes more generally. I have noted above that I only found mixed support for my hypothesis on how the participation of unarmed actors in interim government increases the stability of post-interim peace. While the variable was one of the most robust explanations for peace in my Cox PH models, this finding was not mirrored by my case studies. I have furthermore reasoned that one explanation for this lack of congruence is that the statistical coding of participation that I presented in this dissertation is an inefficient measure of the underlying concept of such participation. Generally, there has thus far been very little statistical research on the role of civil society and political parties in peace processes (a notable contribution is Nilsson, 2012). While the debate on civil society has vastly been dominated by qualitative research (cf. Belloni, 2008; McKeon, 2005; Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006; Pouligny, 2005; Wanis-St. John and Kew, 2008), the role of unarmed political parties in post-conflict politics is hardly addressed in the literature at all. Most research has in that regard focused on rebel-to-party transformation instead of on parties without any history of armed insurgency (Ishiyama and Batta, 2011; Ishiyama and Marshall, 2015; Söderberg-Kovacs and Hatz, 2016).

My dissertation thus provides a starting ground for promising future research on the topic. Firstly, it proves that more statistical research is needed on the role of unarmed, civic actors in order to develop more efficient indicators to measure the participation of civil society and political parties in interim governments, as well as in the wider peace process. Such research, together with new data collection, could further disaggregate the form of participation by unarmed actors and not only ask if unarmed actors participated through ad hoc measures in reform processes, but how often they were consulted by the warring parties. Future research could also borrow from other sub-disciplines of the political sciences in order to advance our understanding of the dynamics of civil society
and political party participation. For instance, studies concerned with European Union politics have demonstrated how quantitative text analysis can be a promising tool in studying interest group influence on policy outcomes (Klüver, 2009). One future research project could try to measure civil society influence in post-conflict decision-making by comparing civil society positions with final legislation outcomes, subject to the availability of written statements. Last but not least, also my qualitative finding on the interaction between unarmed actor participation and a history of democracy was not supported by my quantitative analysis. This could not only be due to inefficient measures of participation, but also due to the measure of democracy employed here. Future research could make use of new advances in data collections on political regimes – such as the Varieties of Democracy project (Coppedge et al., 2016) – and disaggregate the democracy measure in order to tease out more subtle causal mechanisms.
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Appendix A

Statistical Analysis

A.1 Statistical Software

I used a number of software applications to conduct my statistical analysis. All data was prepared and models were computed using the software environment R (R Core Team, 2013). Some additional packages for the R environment deserve a special mention: I relied on the `survival` package by Therneau (2015) to estimate Cox PH models in Chapter 4. All graphs were plotted using the `ggplot2` package by Wickham (2009), often after organizing data with `dplyr` (Wickham and Francois, 2015). To plot the trends of interim government research in political science journals in Figure 2.2, I relied on the updated `GScholarScraper` function by Haass (2015). Generating maps was greatly aided by the `ggmap` package by Kahle and Wickham (2016). Matching for case selection in Chapter 5 was done using the `caseMatch` package by Nielsen (2014). I exported all tables from R to Latex using the `stargazer` package by Hlavac (2015).

A.2 Constructing the Sample

The table below lists my sample of cases for the statistical analysis that includes all cases of interim government that followed at least one year of intrastate conflict since 1989 and that terminated by December 2012 (cf. section 4.1).

Table A.1: List of Interim Governments, 1989-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Interim Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2001-04</td>
<td>Afghan Interim Administration &amp; Afghan Interim Authority following the Bonn Agreement</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Interim Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1991-95</td>
<td>Conseil Consultatif National &amp; Conseil National de Transition after cancelled elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1991-92</td>
<td>MPLA-run caretaker interim government following the 1991 Bicesse Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>2002-08</td>
<td>Power-sharing interim government following the Luena Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Aliev-run interim government following a coup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1997-99</td>
<td>Chittagong Hills Tract Interim Regional Council following the 1997 CHT Peace Accord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>1995-96</td>
<td>Peace Implementation Council interim administration following the Dayton Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1992-93</td>
<td>Caretaker interim government under Buyoya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>2000-05</td>
<td>Power-sharing interim government following the 2000 Arusha Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1991-93</td>
<td>UNTAC administration &amp; power-sharing SNC following the Paris Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>2003-05</td>
<td>Interim government under Bozizé</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>2008-11</td>
<td>Power-Sharing Interim Consensus Government following the Bisao Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1990-96</td>
<td>Conseil Supérieur de la Transition (CST)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>2001-02</td>
<td>Interim government following Famboni II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>2003-04</td>
<td>Interim government after the Agreement on the Transitional Arrangements in the Comoros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>1999-02</td>
<td>Transitional Assembly following the Accord de Cessez-le-Feu et de Cessation des Hostilités</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1995-98</td>
<td>UNTAES administration in Eastern Slavonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>1994-97</td>
<td>Power-sharing interim rule after the Accord de Paix &amp; de la Reconciliation Nationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>2003-06</td>
<td>Power-sharing interim government following the Intercongolesse Political Negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1991-95</td>
<td>EPRDF revolutionary interim rule following the victory over the Dergue military junta</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Interim Government</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Revolutionary Interim Military Council and State Council under Shevardnadze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1996-97</td>
<td>Caretaker IG following the Agreement on the Implementation, Compliance and Verification Timetable for the Peace Agreements</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>1998-99</td>
<td>Interim Government of National Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1990-91</td>
<td>Interim government after Avril’s exile</td>
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<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1991-95</td>
<td>Interim government after coup against Aristide</td>
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<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>2004-06</td>
<td>Alexandre &amp; Latortue’s interim government</td>
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<tr>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>1999-01</td>
<td>UNTAET administration until independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2005-06</td>
<td>Transitional National Assembly in Banda Aceh</td>
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<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2003-05</td>
<td>Coalition Provisional Authority &amp; Iraqi Governing Council following the ousting of Hussein</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>2003-10</td>
<td>Power-sharing interim government under Guillaume Kigbafori Soro &amp; Laurent Gbagbo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>1999-01</td>
<td>International administration by UNMIK</td>
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<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1989-92</td>
<td>Power-sharing interim government following the Taif Accord</td>
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<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>1998-02</td>
<td>Interim Political Authority under Raditapole</td>
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<td>Liberia</td>
<td>1990-97</td>
<td>Power-sharing interim rule under Sawyer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>2003-05</td>
<td>NTGL following the Accra Peace Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2011-12</td>
<td>Revolutionary National Transitional Council following the death of Muammar Gaddafi</td>
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<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>2001-02</td>
<td>Power-sharing interim period following the Ohrid Agreement</td>
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<td>Mali</td>
<td>1992-97</td>
<td>Interim government after the Pacte National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1992-94</td>
<td>FRELIMO-led caretaker interim government following the Acordo Geral de Paz</td>
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<td>Namibia</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>International administration by UNTAG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>2006-08</td>
<td>Power-sharing interim rule after the CPA</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Interim Government</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1991-93</td>
<td>Interim government under Cheiffou and the legislative High Council of the Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Interim Council of National Salvation following a military coup</td>
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<td>Niger</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Transitional National Reconciliation Council following the assassination of Mainassara</td>
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<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>2010-11</td>
<td>Interim government following Tandja’s ousting</td>
</tr>
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<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Caretaker interim government under Jatoi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>1993-96</td>
<td>Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority following the 1993 Oslo Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNG</td>
<td>2001-05</td>
<td>Bougainville Interim Provincial Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Interim government under Rodriguez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2000-01</td>
<td>Interim government under Paniagua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1996-01</td>
<td>Transitional Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development following the Mindanao Final Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1989-90</td>
<td>Interim government under Iliescu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>1993-03</td>
<td>Interim government under Kagame</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Military interim government under Bio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1999-02</td>
<td>Power-sharing interim government following the Lomé Peace Accord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>2004-12</td>
<td>Power-sharing interim government under Yusuf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1993-94</td>
<td>Power-sharing Interim Gov. of National Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2005-11</td>
<td>Power-sharing Interim Gov. of National Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>1997-00</td>
<td>Power-sharing interim government following the 1997 Moscow Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>2011-12</td>
<td>Power-sharing interim government under Hadi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A.3 Codebook

The table below offers an overview of the definitions and sources of all variables that underlie my statistical analysis in Chapter 4. For a detailed description
of the universe of cases, the procedures of how I delineated a sample, and the coding rationale behind all main independent variables, see section 4.1.

Table A.2: Codebook for the Statistical Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Variable Description, Coding, and/or Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>igname</td>
<td>Factor variable of name of the country or territory that the interim government convened in (e.g. “Liberia”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ig_startdate</td>
<td>Variable in POSIXct class of the calendar date that the interim government convened (e.g. “2003-08-18”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>igenddate</td>
<td>Variable in POSIXct class of the calendar date that the interim government terminated (e.g. “2005-11-08”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>obs_enddate</td>
<td>Variable in POSIXct class of the calendar date that an observation drops from the sample (thus either the date conflict recurred or the censoring date 2014-12-31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>year</td>
<td>Numeric variable of the calendar year (e.g. “2006”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>days_interval</td>
<td>Numeric variable of the precise count of days a case is at peace at the start of a yearly peace spell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dur_interval</td>
<td>Numeric variable of the precise count of days a case is at peace at the end of a yearly peace spell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>recur_interval</td>
<td>Dichotomous variable (0/1) measuring whether or not a peace spell ended with conflict or censoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ig_survobject</td>
<td>A survival object as returned by the Surv function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>powersharing</td>
<td>Dichotomous variable (0/1) measuring whether or not rebels are offered guaranteed positions in interim gov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inter_lenient</td>
<td>Dichotomous variable (0/1) measuring whether or the international community assumes authority during interim rule (including monitoring missions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inter_strict</td>
<td>Dichotomous variable (0/1) measuring whether or not the international community assumes authority during interim rule (excluding monitoring missions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inter_cont</td>
<td>Numeric variable measuring total number of UN peacekeeping personnel present in final year of an interim government; from International Peace Institute (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parallel</td>
<td>Ordinal variable measuring whether warring parties integrated both parallel political and military institutions (2); integrated either one of the two (1); or did not integrate any into the interim government (0).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Continued on next page*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Variable Description, Coding, and/or Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>parallel_pol</td>
<td>Dichotomous variable (0/1) measuring whether or not parallel political institutions are integrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parallel_mil</td>
<td>Dichotomous variable (0/1) measuring whether or not parallel military institutions are integrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>participation</td>
<td>Ordinal variable measuring whether an interim government allows for institutional (2), ad hoc (1), or no participation of unarmed actors (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>participation_01</td>
<td>Dichotomous variable (0/1) measuring whether or not unarmed actors participated in interim government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>igdur</td>
<td>Numeric variable measuring interim government duration in days, created using the <code>difftime</code> function between <code>ig_startdate</code> and <code>ig_enddate</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>igdurweeks</td>
<td>Numeric variable, interim gov. duration in weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>igviolence</td>
<td>Dichotomous variable (0/1) measuring whether or not armed conflict occurred during the interim period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agreement</td>
<td>Dichotomous variable (0/1) measuring whether or not interim government was negotiated in a peace accord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>national</td>
<td>Dichotomous variable (0/1) measuring whether or not the interim government convened at the national level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coup</td>
<td>Dichotomous variable (0/1) measuring whether or not interim government convened following a coup d’état, information from Powell and Thyne (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>Dichotomous variable (0/1) measuring whether or not the interim government convened following ethnic conflict, data from Walter (2004) and Kreutz (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>incompatibility</td>
<td>Dichotomous variable (0/1) measuring whether or not interim government convened following a conflict over territory or government, data from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intensity</td>
<td>Dichotomous variable (0/1) measuring whether or not the interim government convened following a civil war, data from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, et al., 2002; Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Continued on next page*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Variable Description, Coding, and/or Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>condur</td>
<td>Numeric variable measuring conflict duration in days, created using the <code>difftime</code> function between UCDP conflict start date and <code>ig_startdate</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>condurweeks</td>
<td>Numeric variable measuring conflict duration in weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rebelstrength</td>
<td>Ordinal variable measuring rebel strength, from Cunningham et al. (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rebelcohesion</td>
<td>Binary variable measuring whether or not at least one rebel group in the intrastate armed conflict had a central command structure, based on the <code>centcontrol</code> coding by Cunningham et al. (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rebelnumber</td>
<td>Number of rebel groups in intrastate conflict from UCDP/PRIO (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, et al., 2002; Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>demo_strict</td>
<td>Dichotomous variable (0/1) measuring whether or not a country sustained democracy for at least five consecutive years in the past, data from Ulfelder (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>demo_lenient</td>
<td>Dichotomous variable (0/1) measuring whether or not a country saw at least one episode of democracy, data from (Ulfelder, 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gdpcap</td>
<td>Numeric variable measuring GDP per capita in each year of the post-interim period, data from the World Bank (2014)’s World Development Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gdpgrowth</td>
<td>Numeric variable measuring annual GDP per capita growth (in percentage) in each year of the post-interim period, data from the World Bank (2014)’s World Development Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>infantmortality</td>
<td>Numeric variable measuring infant mortality rates (per 1,000 live births) in each year of the post-interim period, data from the World Bank (2014)’s World Development Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>population</td>
<td>Numeric variable measuring population size in each year of the post-interim period, data from the World Bank (2014)’s World Development Indicators</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Continued on next page*
Table A.2 – continued from previous page

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Variable Description, Coding, and/or Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>resources</td>
<td>Numeric variable measuring natural resource rents (% of GDP) in each year of the post-interim period, data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>from the World Bank (2014)’s World Dev. Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gwnoa</td>
<td>Country codes from Gleditsch and Ward (1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iso2c</td>
<td>ISO2 character country code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ucdp_region</td>
<td>Region identification code from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, et al., 2002;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ucdp_id</td>
<td>Conflict identifier from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, et al., 2002; Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A.4 Additional Tables and Figures

Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics (2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International IG (strict)</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>0.255</td>
<td>0.436</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International IG (cont.)</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>1,517.247</td>
<td>3,245.186</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>18,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel Political Inst.</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>0.738</td>
<td>0.440</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel Military Inst.</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>0.573</td>
<td>0.495</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation (binary)</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>0.852</td>
<td>0.355</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Duration (weeks)</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>861.053</td>
<td>724.572</td>
<td>0.429</td>
<td>3,323.286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Strength</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>2.837</td>
<td>1.045</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>5.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (strict)</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>0.496</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (lenient)</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>0.705</td>
<td>0.456</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IG Duration (weeks)</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>107.535</td>
<td>94.582</td>
<td>10.429</td>
<td>524.714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Agreement</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>0.636</td>
<td>0.482</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IG Violence</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>0.402</td>
<td>0.491</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Resource Rents</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>10.061</td>
<td>12.012</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>68.043</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure A.1: Detecting Influential Observations

Figure A.1 reports the results of testing for influential observations to make sure that my models are not unduly influenced by a small number of influential observations, such as outliers. I assess this by plotting the difference in fit for all $\beta$ coefficients reported in my models (x-axis) against the count of observations (y-axis). There are no influential observations that would be reflected by bars with larger distances from zero.
### Table A.4: Correlation Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: Power-Sharing IG</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: International IG</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: Parallel Institutions</td>
<td>-0.094</td>
<td>0.308</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: Participation</td>
<td>-0.092</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: Ethnic Conflict</td>
<td>0.387</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>-0.125</td>
<td>-0.056</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6: Incompatibility</td>
<td>-0.230</td>
<td>-0.215</td>
<td>-0.296</td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>-0.284</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7: Conflict Intensity</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.539</td>
<td>0.536</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>-0.060</td>
<td>-0.201</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8: GDP per Capita</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.327</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>-0.119</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9: Population Size</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>-0.074</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>-0.127</td>
<td>-0.071</td>
<td>-0.320</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table A.5: Robustness Check VI: Recoding Variables (2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stability of Post-Interim Peace</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power-Sharing IG</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>0.423</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>0.292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.346)</td>
<td>(0.379)</td>
<td>(0.388)</td>
<td>(0.428)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International IG</td>
<td>-0.467</td>
<td>-0.502</td>
<td>-0.722**</td>
<td>-0.907**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.358)</td>
<td>(0.387)</td>
<td>(0.461)</td>
<td>(0.447)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel Institutions (1)</td>
<td>-2.206***</td>
<td>-1.533***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.492)</td>
<td>(0.520)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel Institutions (2)</td>
<td>-3.018***</td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.793***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.693)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.778)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation (ad hoc)</td>
<td>-0.303</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.518**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.460)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.637)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation (institut.)</td>
<td>-1.532**</td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.494***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.444)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.594)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.943**</td>
<td>0.989**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.413)</td>
<td>(0.469)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompatibility</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.515***</td>
<td>1.879***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.639)</td>
<td>(0.760)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Intensity</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.686</td>
<td>1.606***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.433)</td>
<td>(0.517)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln. GDP/Capita</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.123</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.175)</td>
<td>(0.203)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln. Population</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.165)</td>
<td>(0.179)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table replicates Table 4.3 by fitting parallel institutions and participation in factor data format (cf. section 4.1.3). *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence level. Standard errors clustered on country level reported in parentheses.
### Table A.6: Hazard Ratios (2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>exp(beta)</th>
<th>Effect on the Hazard Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power-Sharing IG</td>
<td>1.339</td>
<td>34% increase, but no significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International IG</td>
<td>0.404</td>
<td>60 % decrease, but not very robust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel Institutions (1)</td>
<td>0.216</td>
<td>79 % decrease of conflict hazard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel Institutions (2)</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>94 % decrease of conflict hazard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation (ad hoc)</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>78 % decrease of conflict hazard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation (institution.)</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>92 % decrease of conflict hazard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Conflict</td>
<td>2.688</td>
<td>168 % increase of conflict hazard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompatibility</td>
<td>6.544</td>
<td>554 % increase of conflict hazard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Intensity</td>
<td>4.980</td>
<td>398 % increase of conflict hazard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per Capita</td>
<td>0.964</td>
<td>4 % decrease, but no significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Size</td>
<td>0.968</td>
<td>4 % increase, but no significance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table reports hazard ratios for Model 4 in Table A.5.

### Figure A.2: Distribution of Events over Time

*Notes: illustration based on the data presented in Chapter 4. The y-axis displays the number of events (i.e. armed conflict recurrence) per calendar year.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Stability of Post-Interim Peace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power-Sharing IG</td>
<td>0.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.495)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International IG</td>
<td>−0.895***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.468)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel Institutions</td>
<td>−1.512***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.364)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>−1.244***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.306)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Conflict</td>
<td>0.899**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.449)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompatibility</td>
<td>1.890***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.804)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Intensity</td>
<td>1.503***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.444)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ln. GDP/Capita</td>
<td>−0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.198)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln. Population</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.167)</td>
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<td>Peace Agreement</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.631)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IG Duration</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IG Violence</td>
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<td>(0.014)</td>
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<td>Number of interim gov.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>−85.880</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence level, respectively. Standard errors clustered on country level are reported in parentheses. Coefficient sizes instead of hazard ratios are reported.
Table A.8: Robustness Check VIII: Frailty Models

<table>
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<th>Model 1</th>
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<th>Model 4</th>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
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<td>-0.47</td>
<td>-0.72</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
<td>-0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel Institutions</td>
<td>-1.66***</td>
<td>-1.48***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>-0.70***</td>
<td>-1.21***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Conflict</td>
<td>0.94*</td>
<td>0.92*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompatibility</td>
<td>1.51*</td>
<td>1.76*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.64)</td>
<td>(0.72)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Intensity</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>1.53***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln. GDP/Capita</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln. Population</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AIC</th>
<th>Num. events</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Number of interim gov.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>262.64</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>62</td>
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<td></td>
<td>229.26</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>62</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>221.58</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>189.90</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence level. Coefficient sizes instead of hazard ratios are reported.
Table A.9: Robustness Check IX: Interaction Models (1)

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<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) (2) (3) (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power-Sharing IG</td>
<td>0.614 0.485 0.267 0.268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.436) (0.489) (0.365) (0.403)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Parallel Institutions</td>
<td>−0.892 −0.481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.619) (0.666)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International IG</td>
<td>−0.441 −0.787** −0.578 −0.638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.371) (0.420) (0.460) (0.532)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Parallel Institutions</td>
<td>0.430 −0.385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.626) (0.695)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel Institutions</td>
<td>−1.272*** −1.311*** −1.880*** −1.318***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.393) (0.407) (0.476) (0.447)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>−0.747*** −1.221*** −0.749*** −1.179***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.209) (0.293) (0.220) (0.298)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Conflict</td>
<td>0.947** 0.972**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.450) (0.456)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompatibility</td>
<td>1.586*** 1.693***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.746) (0.721)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Intensity</td>
<td>1.528*** 1.602***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.444) (0.460)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln. GDP/Capita</td>
<td>−0.002 −0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.196) (0.193)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln. Population</td>
<td>−0.035 −0.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.173) (0.181)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>522 506 522 506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of interim gov.</td>
<td>62 62 62 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>−105.770 −85.690 −106.577 −85.797</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence level, respectively. Standard errors clustered on country level are reported in parentheses. Coefficient sizes instead of hazard ratios are reported.
### Table A.10: Robustness Check X: Interaction Models (2)

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<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power-Sharing IG</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.368</td>
<td>0.265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* International IG (lenient)</td>
<td>0.949</td>
<td>(0.911)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* International IG (strict)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.804</td>
<td>(1.131)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International IG (lenient)</td>
<td>-1.413</td>
<td>(0.742)</td>
<td>-0.804**</td>
<td>-0.726**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International IG (strict)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.977*</td>
<td>(0.914)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel Institutions</td>
<td>-1.550***</td>
<td>(0.368)</td>
<td>-1.631***</td>
<td>-1.509***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>-1.269***</td>
<td>(0.298)</td>
<td>-1.467***</td>
<td>-1.106***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Democratic History (lenient)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.148</td>
<td>(0.476)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Democratic History (strict)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Conflict</td>
<td>0.855**</td>
<td>(0.447)</td>
<td>0.808*</td>
<td>0.825**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompatibility</td>
<td>1.753***</td>
<td>(0.722)</td>
<td>1.801***</td>
<td>1.569**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Intensity</td>
<td>1.497***</td>
<td>(0.440)</td>
<td>1.591***</td>
<td>1.444***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln. GDP/Capita</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>(0.194)</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln. Population</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>(0.165)</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic History (lenient)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-0.265</td>
<td>(0.622)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic History (strict)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.831</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Observations | 506 | 506 | 506 | 506 |
| Number of interim gov. | 62 | 62 | 62 | 62 |
| Log Likelihood         | -85.376 | -83.485 | -85.456 | -84.385 |

Note that *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence level, respectively. Standard errors clustered on country level are reported in parentheses. Coefficient sizes instead of hazard ratios are reported.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>One-Sided Violence</th>
<th>Non-State Conflict</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power-Sharing IG</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>−0.336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.367)</td>
<td>(0.423)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International IG</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>0.141</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.367)</td>
<td>(0.441)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel Institutions</td>
<td>−1.163***</td>
<td>−1.286***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.298)</td>
<td>(0.373)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Participation</td>
<td>−0.323</td>
<td>−0.455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.206)</td>
<td>(0.261)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Conflict</td>
<td>0.883*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.502)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompatibility</td>
<td>−0.196</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.668)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Intensity</td>
<td>1.089**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.457)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln. GDP/Capita</td>
<td>−0.352</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.238)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln. Population</td>
<td>0.478***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Observations         | 541                | 523                | 655  | 617  |
| Number of interim gov.| 62                 | 62                 | 62   | 62   |
| Log Likelihood       | −107.514           | −85.618            | −98.681 | −80.200 |

Note that *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence level, respectively. Standard errors clustered on country level are reported in parentheses. Coefficients instead of hazard ratios are reported.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Stability of Post-Interim Peace</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Power-Sharing IG</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.402)</td>
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<tr>
<td>International IG</td>
<td>−0.622*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.436)</td>
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<td>Parallel Institutions</td>
<td>−1.466***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.347)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Participation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.298)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Conflict</td>
<td>1.131***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.476)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompatibility</td>
<td>1.660***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.700)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Intensity</td>
<td>1.612***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.440)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP/Capita Growth</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In. GDP/Capita</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In. Population</td>
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<td>(0.175)</td>
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<tr>
<td>No. of Rebel Groups</td>
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<td>(0.176)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Cohesion</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations: 514, 522, 513, 475
Number of interim gov.: 62, 62, 62, 62
Log Likelihood: −84.752, −97.342, −89.320, −65.035

Note that *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence level, respectively. Standard errors clustered on country level are reported in parentheses. Coefficients instead of hazard ratios are reported.
Appendix B

Qualitative Analysis

B.1 Questionnaire Template

Introductory Questions

1. Express gratitude; briefly present the dissertation project; clarify the rules (Quote by name? Use recording equipment?)

2. Could you start by explaining your link to / your role in / how you followed the peace process since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)?

3. What is your general assessment of the peace process? What were great achievements / positive aspects? What has not been achieved?

Power-Sharing Interim Government and Elections

1. How would you generally assess the role of power-sharing during the interim government? What were the aspects did you think were good; what were more negative aspects?

2. In your opinion, what was the most important law passed during the rule of the interim government?

   (a) On passing the electoral law: In 2007, the CPN (M) left the cabinet shortly in protest over provisions concerning the electoral system. In your opinion, what were their motivations?

   (b) Were you ever concerned that the CPN (M) leaving the interim government could mean the party remobilizes for war?

3. Do you think the CPN (M) had demobilized had they not received any power-sharing guarantees?
4. Why do you think the CPN (M) won the 2008 elections to the first Constituent Assembly (CA)? Do you think it would have accepted losing these elections, or would it have remobilized for war?

5. In your opinion, would it have been beneficial to include the RPP in the power-sharing agreement? Why / why not?

6. How did you perceive the king’s / NA role in the interim period? Why do you think did the king / NA did not stage a coup?

**International Involvement during the Interim Period**

1. How would you generally assess the influence of international actors and particularly United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) in the peace process? Where do you think international actors were particularly helpful; where could they have done better?

2. Would you have wished for more international involvement in some policy areas right after the CPA? Why / why not? Where? In your opinion, why did UNMIN not receive a stronger mandate?

3. Had the Maoists wanted to remobilize for war, do you think UNMIN had been in a position to stop them?

**Civil Society Participation in the Interim Government**

1. How would you generally assess the inclusion of civil society,
   
   (a) during the negotiations leading up to the CPA?
   (b) during the rule of the interim government until the 2008 elections?

2. Can you give me examples for how civil society participated in decision-making during the interim government? For instance, can you remember any specific laws or regulations where the interim government consulted with civil society leaders and asked for advice?

3. Would you have wished for a deeper inclusion of civil society (e.g. more seats in the interim government offered to civil society leaders) or do you prefer the “watchdog” role over the political and peace process?

**The Integration of Parallel Political and Military Institutions**

1. How would you generally assess the disarmament and demobilization process? What has been achieved, what has not been achieved?

2. The demobilization of ex-combatants was supposed to be completed by the time of elections in 2008, but then took much longer. Why / do you think this affected the election in any way?
3. The weapons were stored in containers under a double key system and supervised by UNMIN. If the CPN (M) had wanted to take their weapons and leave the cantonment sides, would that have been possible?

4. (To commanders, combatants) Can you tell me more about the conditions in the camps? What was good / what was particularly bad?

5. (To commanders, combatants) Did you follow what was happening in Kathmandu when you were cantoned?

6. (To commanders, combatants) Are you still in contact with your friends from the war / your commanders / your recruits?

7. Did ex-combatants in the camps have any contact to local communities? Do you remember public events involving the civilian population?

8. The CPN (M) also constructed the parallel People’s Governments and People’s Courts in the areas they controlled. In your opinion, what role did they serve during the People’s War?

9. What happened to the People’s Governments during the peace process?
   
   (a) In your opinion, were the People’s Governments and Courts completely dissolved in 2007? Why / why not?
   
   (b) How were People’s Governments and Courts “dissolved?” Did dissolving the People’s Courts reduce public support for the CPN (M)?

Ending the Interview

1. Is there anything else you think is important for me to know? Can you recommend any other persons who I should talk?

B.2 Interview Partners in Nepal

Table B.1: List of Interview Partners in Nepal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description of Interview Partner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INT-01</td>
<td>22.09.2015</td>
<td>Western diplomat of international community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT-02</td>
<td>23.09.2015</td>
<td>Western employee of development cooperation agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT-03</td>
<td>23.09.2015</td>
<td>Western project leader of development coop. agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT-04</td>
<td>23.09.2015</td>
<td>Nepali employee of a development cooperation agency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued on next page
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description of Interview Partner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INT-05</td>
<td>24.09.2015</td>
<td>Technical adviser, <em>Special Committee for Supervision, Integration and Rehabilitation of Maoist Combatants</em></td>
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<td>INT-06</td>
<td>25.09.2015</td>
<td>Nepali country director of an international NGO</td>
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<td>INT-07</td>
<td>25.09.2015</td>
<td>Nepali director of a local Human Rights NGO</td>
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<td>INT-08</td>
<td>26.09.2015</td>
<td>Former deputy commander of the Maoist PLA</td>
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<td>INT-09</td>
<td>27.09.2015</td>
<td>Former major general of the RNA and member of the <em>Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee</em></td>
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<td>INT-10</td>
<td>28.09.2015</td>
<td>Former female commander of the Maoist PLA</td>
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<td>INT-11</td>
<td>28.09.2015</td>
<td>Nepali director of a local human rights NGO</td>
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<td>INT-12</td>
<td>29.09.2015</td>
<td>Former lieutenant general of the RNA and adviser to the <em>Technical Committee for Supervision, Integration and Rehabilitation of the Maoist Combatants</em></td>
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<td>INT-13</td>
<td>30.09.2015</td>
<td>CPN (M) Minister in the interim government (1)</td>
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<td>30.09.2015</td>
<td>CPN (M) Minister in the interim government (2)</td>
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<td>04.10.2015</td>
<td>Member of the CPN (M) Central Committee, formerly <em>Interim Constitution Drafting Committee</em></td>
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<td>05.10.2015</td>
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<td>INT-18</td>
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<td>Form. CPN (M) Minister for Peace &amp; Reconstruction</td>
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<td>INT-19</td>
<td>09.10.2015</td>
<td>Nepali journalist and opinion-maker</td>
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<td>09.10.2015</td>
<td>Nepali director of a local NGO; election observer</td>
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<td>Demobilized ex-combatant of the PLA (1)</td>
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<td>INT-23</td>
<td>12.10.2015</td>
<td>Member of the NC Central Committee, former minister and negotiator to the 12-Points-Agreement</td>
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<td>INT-24</td>
<td>13.10.2015</td>
<td>Nepali program director at UNDP (1)</td>
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<td>INT-25</td>
<td>19.10.2015</td>
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<td>INT-26</td>
<td>19.10.2015</td>
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<td>Nepali director of a local peacebuilding NGO</td>
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*Table B.1 – continued from previous page*

*Continued on next page*
Table B.1 – continued from previous page

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<td>03.11.2015</td>
<td>Western diplomat (phone interview)</td>
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<td>INT-30</td>
<td>12.11.2015</td>
<td>Former Western project leader of an international development agency (interview in Berlin)</td>
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