ASEAN’S DEFENCE DIPLOMACY: THE ROAD TO SOUTHEAST ASIAN DEFENCE COMMUNITY?

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Abstract

The purpose of this study is to examine whether the practice of ASEAN member states' defence diplomacy through practical defence cooperatives for handling security challenges in Southeast Asia contain the characteristics of a defence community which could pave the way for the formation of a future Southeast Asian defence community. The security challenges facing the countries of Southeast Asia today lie in creating a stable environment. The debate over the concept of security has broadened the discourse on regional security cooperation, which drives states to engage more deeply in multilateral diplomacy in order to defend better and promote their national interests, and particularly in handling problems in maintaining a stable peace in the region.

As the unit of analysis, this study examined the forum of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), and selects six ASEAN member states as the loci of the study, namely: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore; Thailand and Vietnam. The different forms of government system became the reasons for selecting these six countries, i.e. a democratic state such as Indonesia, a semi-authoritarian system such as in Malaysia and Singapore, a monarchy as in Brunei and Thailand, socialist countries such as Vietnam. However, only four out of the six chosen countries were founding members of ASEAN.

This study proposes two central questions. The first question focuses on the development of forms of threats found in Southeast Asia today, which encourages ASEAN member states to conduct defence diplomacy, while the second question focuses on whether the implementation of ASEAN defence diplomacy helps to shape an ASEAN defence community. In answering those questions, this study is applying qualitative methodology to address an explanatory aspect of these questions, and using the theory of regionalism through presenting empirical evidence of ASEAN member states practical defence diplomacy. It seeks to show how ASEAN member states develop their military role in handling new emerging non-traditional security threats contain the characteristics of a defence community which could pave the way for this regional organisation to turn into a collective defence grouping.
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Although the institutions and persons mentioned above provided significant contributions to my study, I alone take full responsibility for any factual inaccuracies and misinterpretations in this doctoral thesis.
Table of Contents

Abstracts ................................................................. i
Acknowledgments ......................................................... ii
Tables and Figures ........................................................ viii
Abbreviations .............................................................. ix

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION: THE STUDY OF DEFENCE
DIPLOMACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA ................................. 1
1. Background .............................................................. 1
2. Security Regionalism in Southeast Asia .......................... 3
3. Does Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia Matter? ......... 6
4. Definition of Defence Diplomacy .................................. 13
5. Definition of Defence Community ................................. 18
6. Statement of Problems .............................................. 22
7. Research Design ....................................................... 25
8. Thesis Structure ....................................................... 27

CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW: DEFENCE COMMUNITY AND
THE ASEAN COMMUNITY .......................................... 28
1. Introduction ............................................................. 28
2. Regionalism in Southeast Asia’s Defence Diplomacy ........... 30
3. Defining a Security Community .................................... 37
4. The Construction of ASEAN Community ......................... 46
5. The Significance of Study ............................................ 53
6. Summary ............................................................... 56

CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY .......................................... 58
1. Introduction ............................................................. 58
2. Qualitative Research .................................................. 58
3. Case Selection .......................................................... 62
4. Data-Gathering Techniques ......................................... 65
  4.1. In-Depth Interview ............................................... 66
4.2. Direct Observation ................................................. 71
4.3. Documentary Analysis ........................................... 72
5. Data Analysis ............................................................. 73
6. Summary ................................................................. 75

CHAPTER 4 THE HISTORICAL EXISTENCE OF COLLECTIVE DEFENCE ORGANISATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA ........................................ 76
1. Introduction ............................................................ 76
2. The Development of Regionalism ................................. 78
3. Historical Evidence of Collective Defence in Regional Organisations in Southeast Asia ......................... 83
   3.1. The creation of Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) .................................................. 84
   3.2. The Establishment of Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) ......................................................... 86
   3.3. The Formation of Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia (MAPHILINDO) ........................................ 88
   3.4. The Formation of ASEAN ........................................ 91
   3.5. The Emergence of ADMM ....................................... 95
4. The Characteristic of a Defence Community in a Southeast Asian Defence Cooperation .......................... 99
5. The Reasons for Defence Procurement .......................... 102
6. Summary ................................................................. 106

CHAPTER 5 REGIONALISM IN HANDLING SECURITY ISSUES ..... 108
1. Introduction ............................................................ 108
2. Common Perceptions of Threat in ASEAN ...................... 109
3. Political Efforts and Defence Cooperation Mechanism in Tackling Challenges ........................................ 112
   3.1. The Roadmap for an ASEAN Community .................. 114
   3.2. The Mechanism of Defence Diplomacy Within the Framework of ADMM .................................... 121
   3.3. The Mechanism of Defence Diplomacy Within the Framework of ADMM-Plus .............................. 127
   3.4. Working Mechanism of ADMM and ADMM-Plus ......... 129
6.4. Defence Cooperation of Littoral States in Response to Piracy in the Malacca Strait ........................................... 213
6.5. Inter-operability in Maritime Security Cooperation ............ 215
7. Counter Terrorism and Military Medicine Policies ............... 216
  7.1 General Objectives .............................................................. 217
  7.2 Specific Objectives ............................................................. 218
8. Summary .................................................................................. 221

CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION ............................................................ 223
  1. Observation ............................................................................ 223
  2. The Elements of a Defence Community in ASEAN’s Defence Diplomacy .............................................................. 227
  3. Limitation of the Study .......................................................... 234
  4. The Opportunities for Future Research ................................. 237

Appendix 1. Respondents ............................................................... 240
Appendix 2. Interview Guides ....................................................... 243
Bibliography ............................................................................... 248
Tables and Figures

Table 5.1  Military Spending Evolution Comparison 2000 and 2012 in Current $US ...................................................... 138
Table 5.2  Trend of Defence Spending in Southeast Asia 2000 – 2012, Based on GDP Percentage ........................... 138
Table 5.3  Defence Figure of Selected ASEAN Member States .... 151
Table 5.4  Intra-ASEAN Bilateral Military Exercise ...................... 155
Table 5.5  Bilateral Defence Cooperation intra-ASEAN ............. 159
Table 6.1  Southeast Asian Member States Contribution to the UN .......................................................... 194
Table 6.2  Venues that are used as the Road to ASEAN Community .......................................................... 202
Table 6.3  Comparison of Piracy and Armed Robbery in Littoral Sates Waters ...................................................... 208

Figure 1.1  Majority Types of ASEAN Documents (1967-2009) ..... 10
Figure 4.1  The Existence of Inter-Operability Component ........... 77
Figure 5.1  ASEAN Defence Cooperation Structure .................. 130
Figure 5.2  Indonesia – Malaysia Border Security Cooperation Diagram .................................................. 161
Figure 5.3  Indonesia – Singapore Security Cooperation Diagram.. 163
Figure 5.4  Malaysia – Singapore – Indonesia – Thailand Security Cooperation Diagram ............................... 165
Figure 6.1  Position of Malacca Strait.................................... 205
Figure 6.2  The Corridor of Passage .................................... 206
Figure 7.1  The Timeline of Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia.. 228
# Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AADMER</td>
<td>ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAFCC</td>
<td>ASEAN Air Force Chiefs’ Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AARM</td>
<td>ASEAN Armies Rifle Meet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACAMM</td>
<td>ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multilateral Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACMDC</td>
<td>ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACDFIM</td>
<td>ASEAN Chief of Defence Forces Informal Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACMMC</td>
<td>ASEAN Chiefs of Military Medicine Conference</td>
</tr>
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<td>ACMR</td>
<td>Air Combat Manoeuvre Range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADIC</td>
<td>ASEAN Defence Industrial Collaboration</td>
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<td>ADMM</td>
<td>ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting</td>
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<td>ADMM-Plus</td>
<td>ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus</td>
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<td>ADSOM</td>
<td>ASEAN Defence Senior Officials’ Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADSOM WG</td>
<td>ASEAN Defence Senior Officials’ Meeting Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADSOM Plus WG</td>
<td>ASEAN Defence Senior Officials' Meeting Plus Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>ASEAN Economic Community</td>
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<td>ALawMM</td>
<td>ASEAN Law Ministers’ Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMIIM</td>
<td>ASEAN Military Intelligence Informal Meeting</td>
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<td>AMM</td>
<td>ASEAN Ministerial Meeting</td>
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<td>AMMTC</td>
<td>ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMOIM</td>
<td>ASEAN Military Operation Informal Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMRAAM</td>
<td>Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles</td>
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<td>ANCM</td>
<td>ASEAN Navy Chiefs' Meeting</td>
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<td>ANI</td>
<td>ASEAN Navy Interaction</td>
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<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>APSC</td>
<td>ASEAN Political-Security Community</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
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<td>ARDEX</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise</td>
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<td>ASA</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASCC</td>
<td>ASEAN Social-Cultural Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nation</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<td>ASMAM</td>
<td>ASEAN Sergeant Major Annual Meeting</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWR</td>
<td>Air Weapon Range</td>
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<td>CARM</td>
<td>Combined Annual Report Meeting</td>
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<td>CBM</td>
<td>Confidence Building Measures</td>
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<td>CMPT</td>
<td>Combined Mission Patrol Team</td>
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<td>COC</td>
<td>Conduct of Conduct</td>
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<td>COCC</td>
<td>Coordinated Operation Control Committee</td>
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<td>CPX</td>
<td>Command Post Exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Centre for Strategic and International Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>C4ISR</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DOC</td>
<td>Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Defence Officials' Dialogue</td>
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<tr>
<td>DTAFO</td>
<td>Designing Team for Air Force Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DTAFT</td>
<td>Designing Team for Air Force Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>DTAO</td>
<td>Designing Team for Army Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DTAT</td>
<td>Designing Team for Army Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>DTC</td>
<td>Designing Team for Communication and Electronic</td>
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<td>DTI</td>
<td>Designing Team for Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>DTMO</td>
<td>Designing Team for Maritime Operations</td>
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</table>
DTNO : Designing Team for Navy Operations
DTNT : Designing Team for Navy Training
DTPO : Designing Team for Police Operation
DTPT : Designing Team for Police Training
DTS  : Designing Team Staff for Training
EAS  : East Asian Summit
EEZ  : Exclusive Economic Zone
EiS  : Eye in the Sky
EiS JWG : Eyes in the Sky Joint Working Group
EPG  : Eminent Persons’ Group
EU   : European Union
EWG  : Experts’ Working Group
FPDA : Five Power Defence Arrangements
FMS  : Foreign Military Sale
FTX  : Field Training Exercise
GAM  : Gerakan Aceh Merdeka/Free Aceh Movement
GBC  : General Border Committee
GDP  : Gross Domestic Product
HADR : Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
HLC  : High Level Committee
HQ   : Headquarters
IEG  : Intelligence Exchange Group
IMB  : International Maritime Bureau
INDF : Indonesian National Defence Forces
INDF PKC : Indonesian National Defence Force Peacekeeping Centre
ISINTELTEX : Indonesian-Singapore Joint Intelligence Exchange
ISJCC : Indonesian-Singapore Joint Coordinating Committee
ISJLC : Indonesian-Singapore Joint Logistic Committee
ISJTC : Indonesian-Singapore Joint Training Committee
ISJWG : Indonesian-Singapore Joint Working Group
JAFTWG : Joint Air Force Training Working Group
JATWG : Joint Army Training Working Group
JIDD : Jakarta International Defence Dialogue
JID SAF : Joint Intelligence Singapore Armed Forces
JNTWG : Joint Navy Training Working Group
JPCC : Joint Police Cooperation Committee
JTC : Joint Training Committee
KITLV Leiden : Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde
MAF : Malaysian Armed Forces
MALSINDO : Malaysia Singapore Indonesia
MAPHILINDO : Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia
MMEA : Malaysia Maritime Enforcement Agency
MOU : Memorandum of Understanding
MSP : Malacca Strait Patrol
MSP JCC : Malacca Straits Patrol Joint Coordinating Committee
MSSP JWG : Malacca Straits Sea Patrol Joint Working Group
MTA : Military Training Area
NADI : Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institution
NATO : North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO : Non-Commission Officer
OFTA : Over Flying Training Area
OPV : Offshore Patrol Vessel
PKO : Peacekeeping Operation
RBAF : Royal Brunei Armed Forces
ReCAAP : Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships
REGSOCEC : Regional Socio-Economic
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>RMMP</td>
<td>Royal Malaysian Marine Police</td>
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<td>RMSI</td>
<td>Regional Maritime Security Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSAF</td>
<td>Republic of Singapore Armed Forces</td>
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<td>RSIS</td>
<td>Rajaratnam School of International Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSN</td>
<td>Republic of Singapore Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTAF</td>
<td>Royal Thai Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTN</td>
<td>Royal Thai Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>Search and Rescue</td>
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<td>SAR TF</td>
<td>Search and Rescue Task Force</td>
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<td>SEANWFZ</td>
<td>The South East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty</td>
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<td>SEATO</td>
<td>South-East Asian Treaty</td>
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<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
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<td>SLD</td>
<td>Shangri La Dialogue</td>
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<td>SLOC</td>
<td>Sea Lines of Communication</td>
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<td>SOCEC TG</td>
<td>Social Economic Task Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPCG</td>
<td>Singapore Police Coast Guard</td>
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<td>STANAGs</td>
<td>NATO Standardization Agreements</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAC</td>
<td>Treaty of Amity and Cooperation</td>
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<td>FCC</td>
<td>Troops Contributing Country</td>
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<td>TSASM</td>
<td>TNI-SAF Annual Staff Meeting</td>
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<td>UNPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. PACOM</td>
<td>United States Pacific Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAP</td>
<td>Vientiane Action Plan</td>
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<td>VPAF</td>
<td>Vietnam People Armed Forces</td>
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<td>ZOPFAN</td>
<td>Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality</td>
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Chapter One
INTRODUCTION:
THE STUDY OF DEFENCE DIPLOMACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

1. Background

The Southeast Asia region is an extraordinarily diverse collection of states, which vary widely in their population size, their wealth, their political systems, and the security challenges they face. Nevertheless, there are many similarities between the countries of this region. The elements of these similarities include: natural or geographical circumstances, basic culture, and the feeling of kinship. Furthermore, the leaders of these Southeast Asian countries realise the importance of a partnership for peace, progress, and prosperity. There are also some parallels in terms of common interests, problems faced, and the importance of cooperation and solidarity with their neighbours. Having an understanding of all these factors, the leaders in Southeast Asia were encouraged to form an association to replace the failures of previous regional organisations.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established as a regional organisation in 1967. It has the reputation of being the most successful regional organisation in the developing world, in terms of its internal cohesion and international effectiveness. ASEAN has strengthened its foundation in security cooperation through the declaration of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). The leaders in

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2 ASEAN’s original members are Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines. Brunei joined in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Myanmar and Laos in 1997, and finally, in 1999, Cambodia became the 10th member
ASEAN realised that future security issues couldn’t be dealt with effectively without a sense of common regional interest.4

The end of the Cold War led to much dynamic debate about the concept of security, and changes to its meaning has arisen during different historical periods. The traditional view of security, with its strong emphasis on state security and the use of military force to deal with other countries, has expanded to include economic, social and environmental issues under the framework of non-traditional security issues. Various efforts need to be addressed to manage the new, emerging security challenges in order to maintain peace and stability. The debate over the concept of security has broadened the discourse on regional security cooperation. This has resulted in the member states engaging more deeply in multilateral diplomacy in order to better defend and promote their national interest, particularly in the handling of problems in maintaining a stable peace in the region.

The role of the military has also evolved since the end of the Cold War. “Due to the impact of the new security challenges, militaries of today have had to diversify their primary mission from the traditional focus of war fighting to incorporating a range of new and diverse roles, such as peacekeeping and disaster relief”.5 To meet this new challenge, ASEAN members have developed the role of the state and the military as the main players to deal with security matters in “dialogical activity to include practical

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4 Regional interest is interpreted as the common desire of ASEAN member states to create a stable peace and security and to promote peaceful settlement of disputes; see An overview of ASEAN, available at www.asean.org/asean/about-asean/overview, accessed on 21 October 2014; see Alexandra Retno Wulan and Bantarto Bandoro, ASEAN’s Quest for a Full-Fledged Community (Jakarta: CSIS, 2007), p. 1

5 Bhubhindar Singh and See Seng Tan (ed.) From Boots to Brogues, the Rise of Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia (Singapore: RSIS Monograph no 21, 2011), p.1
and actionable response to non-traditional security issues”⁶ and in greater engagement in defence diplomacy efforts. The notion of defence diplomacy itself refers to a regional strategic engagement in creating a sustainable, cooperative relationship to build trust and to facilitate conflict prevention.⁷ This is required to create mutual responsiveness to tackle security challenges through the mechanism of regional cooperation for the maintenance of peace and stability.

2. Security Regionalism in Southeast Asia

The challenges faced by ASEAN range from internal security challenges⁸ to tension between ASEAN member states, as well as challenges from extra-regional powers. Such challenges have never been defined solely in terms of military-related security. To meet these challenges, ASEAN has redefined its framework of security cooperation. During the process of cooperation, ASEAN experienced two waves of regionalism, namely old regionalism and new regionalism.⁹ The first wave of regionalism, the old regionalism, emerged during the Cold War. Even though the word ‘security’ did not appear explicitly in ASEAN’s declaration, it has been the focus of ASEAN since its beginnings. This is in accordance with ASEAN’s

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objective of preserving regional peace and stability.\textsuperscript{10} Old regionalism has been characterised as a product of the Cold War, as inward-looking, exclusive and created by governments for specific security or economic purposes.\textsuperscript{11} On the contrary, the second wave of new regionalism emerged after the collapse of bipolarity when ASEAN faced unipolarity and globalisation, becoming outward-looking\textsuperscript{12} and facing growing demands from its member states to expand its function into areas other than the diplomatic field.\textsuperscript{13} This new regionalism is a product of the demands of state as well as non-state players.\textsuperscript{14} In this regard, the growing challenge from traditional to non-traditional threats has a wide-reaching impact and currently requires a regional approach to solving today’s security challenges. When a national solution is not adequate any more, then regional cooperation and a multilateral approach becomes essential.\textsuperscript{15} Such regional cooperation that brings regional governance and participants to address security is referred to as new regionalism.\textsuperscript{16} Further discussion about new regionalism is elaborated in Chapter 4.

For some ASEAN member states, such as Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia, and Malaysia, internal security remains a primary challenge for national states.\textsuperscript{17} Territorial integrity, economic weaknesses, regime insecurity feelings, unstable civil–military relations, ethnic and religious

\textsuperscript{10} Lianita Prawindarti, \textit{The ASEAN Security Community: Reconciling Traditional and Non-Traditional Security Issues} (University of Trento, 2005), pp. 3-4
\textsuperscript{11} Buszynski (1997-98), \textit{Ibid}, p. 555
\textsuperscript{12} Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver, \textit{Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security} (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 16-19
\textsuperscript{13} Buszynski (1997-98), \textit{Op.cit}, p. 556
\textsuperscript{14} Buzan and Weaver (2003), \textit{Op.cit}, pp. 16-19
\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Ibid}, p. 4
differences, and separatism have been identified as the main security concerns in many Southeast Asian countries.\textsuperscript{18} There is the realisation that internal security has become the most common threat perception in Southeast Asia. However, this may vary in terms of each country’s salience of internal problems needing to be solved. “For example, Singapore is more concerned with the problem of racial harmony than of economic weakness and separatism, although from a military point of view feels some degree of threat from Indonesia and Malaysia. Indonesia is more concerned with the problem of territorial integrity, communal violence, terrorism, and political stability. The problem of economic weakness and political independence has been more pressing in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar than any other regional states.”\textsuperscript{19}

In addition to internal security challenges, there are threats to the security and stability in Southeast Asia which come from two sources: bilateral tension and tension with extra regional power.\textsuperscript{20} Firstly, since the expansion of ASEAN into 10 states, Southeast Asia has been relatively conflict-free\textsuperscript{21} in recent years. In fact, it has been noted that physical conflict amongst states in Southeast Asia is quite unlikely.\textsuperscript{22} However, this does not mean that Southeast Asian states do not arm themselves without one

\textsuperscript{18} Sukma (2008), \textit{Op.cit}, p. 16
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid, p. 17
\textsuperscript{20} Rizal Sukma, \textit{Managing Security Challenges in Southeast Asia: Is there a Role for the European Union?} (4\textsuperscript{th} Berlin Conference on Asian Security, October 2009), pp. 1-6
\textsuperscript{21} However, a border disputes between Thailand and Cambodia exist on the issue of ancient Preah Vihear temple, a Hindu masterpiece. Since 2008, the temple has been an increasing point of conflict between Thailand and Cambodia that appears to be for purely domestic political motives; See Aurel Croissant and Paul W. Chamber, \textit{A Contested Site of Memory: The Preah Vihear Tempel} in Yudhishthir Raj Isar and Helmut K. Anheier (ed.), \textit{Cultures and Globalisation: Heritage, Memory and Identity} (London: SAGE Publications, 2011)
another in mind; rather, such arms are unlikely to be used in anger.\textsuperscript{23}

Secondly, during the Cold War era, Southeast Asia relied on the U.S., with its ‘hub-and-spoke system’\textsuperscript{24} of bilateral alliances and its forward deployed military power to maintain security in the region. However, after the Cold War, bilateral relations with the U.S. became more complicated as the U.S. government applied certain measurements and political pressure in relation to the very sensitive issues of human rights and democratisation. Most notably, the emerging power of China and India has changed the security dynamic, and especially the current relationship between the U.S., China and Japan. Moreover, “a principal challenge facing ASEAN in its relationship with an emerging China is the ability to forge a consensus on key issues and to promote ASEAN solidarity”.\textsuperscript{25} Managing uncertainties in the future direction of major power relations serves as a major challenge for ASEAN.\textsuperscript{26}

3. \textbf{Does Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia Matter?}

The development of threats that occurred in Southeast Asia, encouraged the governments of ASEAN member states to establish a new forum that specifically discusses security issues. A forum for dialogue was established with the Defence Ministers and the Foreign Ministers of the ASEAN member states, called the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting.

\textsuperscript{23} See Daljit Singh, \textit{Southeast Asian Security: An Overview} (Singapore, ISEAS 2008), pp.1-7. In this article, Singh explained about the security outlook and concern amongst ASEAN member states. He noted security outlook from two big perspective such as, political outlook and economic outlook;

\textsuperscript{24} Jürgen Haacke and Paul D. Williams, \textit{Regional Arrangements and Security Challenges: A Comparative Analysis} (Washington DC: Crisis States Working Papers Series no. 52, July 2009), pp. 3-4


\textsuperscript{26} Sukma (2009), \textit{Op.cit,} p. 6
(ADMM). Significantly, at the inaugural meeting of ADMM in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on 9 May, 2006, a new concept and terminology in ASEAN defence cooperation was introduced, namely “defence diplomacy”. As ASEAN secretariat spokesman, M.C. Abad pointed out, "defence diplomacy will consolidate the prevailing peace and stability relations in Southeast Asia by promoting greater convergence between national security and regional security". Based on the above statement it appears that there has been a shift in ASEAN’s viewpoint and that discussing defence is no longer a sensitive issue. Currently, the concept of defence diplomacy has emerged as an important tool of state foreign and security policy, particularly in ASEAN. The past 10 years has seen a series of regional activities in which ASEAN member states have used various kinds of defence diplomacy to promote their security, as well as their foreign policy.

During the Cold War, “defence diplomacy was used to pursue geostrategic goals, including strengthening the military capabilities of friends and allies against common enemies — both internal and external — and to sustain spheres of influence”. However, in the post-Cold War period, due to the change in threats, the military has been used for peace efforts (preventing conflict), providing disaster relief, and “greater engagement in the defence diplomacy effort”. This has been effective “in promoting good and accountable governance”. Due to the emergence of non-traditional

27 The Jakarta Post, 8 May 2006
30 Ibid, p. 1
31 Aurel Croissant (et.al), Democratization and Civilian Control in Asia (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 6. Croissant stated that in certain Southeast Asian country such as Indonesia, over the past ten years or so the military has been willing to accept its
security challenges, the patterns of defence diplomacy have evolved. In the Southeast Asia region, governments are aware of the changing nature of threats. The threats are “increasingly transnational or trans-boundary, and non-military in nature”.\(^{32}\) It is important for regions to work together in order to handle the threat collectively to create a more secure and stable region. It is in such conditions that the term ‘defence diplomacy’ has emerged. From a theoretical perspective, the change of regional inter-state relations and ASEAN’s defence diplomacy cooperation in Southeast Asia in addressing the changing nature of challenges is referred to as new regionalism.

In the context of ASEAN, defence diplomacy is a series of military to military cooperation in the form of tackling non-traditional security threats. This has become an important tool of the states’ foreign and security policy. It is conducted through dialogue, regular meetings, officer exchanges and field activities that reflect the regional countries’ awareness to address regional issues on a regional basis. Defence diplomacy “is a process that may involve state officials (politicians, security personnel, and intelligence services), as well as non-governmental organisations, think tanks, and civil society”.\(^ {33}\) The 1997 economic crisis that hit ASEAN badly marked the shift of security challenges from traditional to non-traditional ones. In line with the evolvement of security challenges, defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia also evolved from bilateral to multilateral, although for some, issues remaining bilateral.\(^ {34}\) In the future, ASEAN might face even more severe security, societal, environmental, political, as well as economic challenges,

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\(^ {33}\) Ibid, p. 73

and there are concerns amongst ASEAN leaders that its current working mechanism is not adequate to address a new and acute regional problem.

The practice of defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia started long before the first inaugural meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994, which specifically addressed security matters, although the term of defence diplomacy at that time was known as the defence cooperation activities. The first bilateral naval exercise happened between Indonesia and the Philippines in 1972, with the code name 'Corpatphilindo'. It marked the practice of defence diplomacy in the region, and since then the region has played the host to bilateral and multilateral levels in the area of defence and military issues. A series of meetings which related to the form of defence diplomacy at the regional level from 1967 to 2009 produced more than 270 documents, mainly in the form of Chairman Statements, Declarations, Statements, Joint Communiqués, and others (see Figure 1.1).  

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35 Interview with Juwono Sudarsono, Former Defence Minister of Indonesia in two periods in 1999 – 2000 under the administration of President Abdurrahman Wahid and in 2004-2009 under the administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Jakarta, 13 March 2013
38 Evan, A Laksmana, Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia, Trends, Prospects and Challenges, in Bhubhindar Singh and See Seng Tan (ed.), From Boots to Brogues, the Rise of Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia (Singapore: RSIS Monograph no 21, 2011), p. 86
Military officials and civilian officials have also played a role in defence diplomacy by producing such documents (as described above) through events such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), Shangri La Dialogue (SLD) and Jakarta International Defence Dialogue (JIDDD), which are contingent on the various levels of each delegation. Most of the delegations at each event combined civilians and the military, except in the field of military exercise, in which purely military personnel featured. These events are some of the important regional venues in which ASEAN tried to develop ways in which to address regional security issues collectively.

As noted, on the multilateral level from 2000 to 2009, ASEAN, on average, conducted “15 formal and informal meetings annually involving defence and security officials”. With its ‘ASEAN Way’, ASEAN defence

\[^{39}\text{Ibid, p. 81}\]
\[^{40}\text{Scholar such Severino define ASEAN WAY as the principle of ASEAN diplomacy. This is a Southeast Asian's way in dealing with one another as a manifestation of “goodwill and the}\]
diplomacy had two different goals: on the one hand, to cooperate and, moreover, to solve intrastate problems between ASEAN member states, and, on the other hand, to focus on the external powers involved in the region’s security issues. However, due to the characteristics of the consensus decision-making mechanism, differences were sometimes caused and this was frequently exploited by certain countries, such as China. ASEAN’s principle of ‘non-interference’ also sometimes posed ineffectiveness in a multilateral form of defence diplomacy, since certain key states use it to bandwagon with an external power by addressing common issues bilaterally. Meanwhile, ASEAN as an association needed its unity to get a binding agreement. For example, ASEAN and China failed to bind a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea dispute during an ADMM retreat in Brunei in 2012, because China avoided having an agreement with ASEAN as an organisation,41 but at the same time, certain ASEAN member states held talks with China bilaterally to solve the problem.

The way ASEAN member states conduct defence diplomacy cannot be separated from the way in which ASEAN member states organise their foreign policy. Firstly, the characteristics of a consensus decision-making mechanism, which sometimes reaches the position of ‘agree to disagree’, paves the way for certain ASEAN member states to deal with other countries bilaterally and multilaterally. Secondly, relative to the first characteristic is the ASEAN commitment to engaging an outside regional power. The creation of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus

slow winning and giving of trust, and the way to arrive arrangements through consultation and consensus. It is as part of an institutional culture with the principle of non-interference, especially in dealing with intrastate conflicts”. See Rodolfo C. Severino, The ASEAN Way and The Rule of Law, available at http://www.asean.org, accessed on 11 July 2013

41 Interview with I Gusti Agung Wesaka Puja, Director General of Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jakarta, 20 March 2013
dialogue partners (ADMM + 8 external partners)\textsuperscript{42} showed significantly the importance that ASEAN countries assign to engaging external powers.\textsuperscript{43} Having such conditions, it is, therefore, relative to discuss the operation of defence diplomacy at a regional level due to the emergence of non-traditional security issues. Moreover, the natures of ASEAN to prioritize the consensus decision-making mechanism has brought about a dilemma on how to define the existing defence community in Southeast Asia.

The effectuation of defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia is always within the framework of regional organisations that have developed in Southeast Asia. Again, ASEAN has demonstrated a paradox in which, traditionally, when a group of states cooperate with security objectives as their goal, it is not uncommon for their collective entity to assume a military form or military alliance such as NATO.\textsuperscript{44} ASEAN, however, has been a notable exception. The development of the formation of regional organisations, e.g. SEATO (South-East Asian Treaty Organization), ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and ADMM (ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting), shows he evolution of regionalism in Southeast Asia. Through an examination of the security cooperation conducted by ASEAN member states within the existing regional defence organisation, this study hopes to reveal the defining characteristics of the defence community.

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\textsuperscript{42} ADMM Plus is a “platform for ASEAN and its eight dialogue partners to strengthen security and defence cooperation in the region. The member of ADMM Plus are ten ASEAN member states plus Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Russia and the United States”; see ADMM, available at http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-political-security-community/category/ asean-defence-ministers-meeting-admm, accessed on 12 April 2014.
\end{flushright}
Currently, ASEAN’s defence diplomacy is manifested through a series of bilateral and multilateral relations. The emergence of defence diplomacy in ASEAN is marked by various security cooperation activities. For instance, the exchange of officers to attend the defence university in pursuit of a higher education degree. The different elements of ASEAN’s defence diplomacy consist of “Track 1 (leaders, ministers and chiefs of defence forces), Track 2 (defence colleges, defence ministry-related think tanks/research institutions) and increasingly, Track 3 (civil society and non-governmental organisations)”.

The promotion of member states security and foreign policy has been clearly reflected in the ASEAN-initiated defence forums, such as ADMM and other senior military official meetings. ASEAN has practised defence diplomacy in such a way that it reflects a real sense of “strategic engagement” between the member states. The message sent emitted by this “engagement” demonstrates that diplomacy between ASEAN’s military is not only necessary, but also imperative to address the current and future regional security challenges. It also reflects that ASEAN has pursued defence diplomacy in operations other than war, and as a means to build mutual trust amongst its members.

4. Definition of Defence Diplomacy

The terminology defence diplomacy, defence community and other related definitions need to be clarified. For a considerably long period of time, the terms defence and diplomacy could not be put together in the same phrase. Presently, such terminology has become more familiar and recognised in international politics. Defence diplomacy is described by Cottey and Forster as “peace time cooperative use of armed forces and related infrastructure

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(primarily defence ministries) as a tool of foreign and security policy”. Anton Du Plessis has defined defence diplomacy as “the use of armed forces in operations other than war, building on their trained expertise and discipline to achieve national and foreign objectives abroad”. In the United Kingdom, the expression defence diplomacy is understood “to provide forces to meet the varied activities undertaken by the Ministry of Defence to dispel hostility… thereby making a significant contribution to conflict prevention and resolution”.

The understanding of defence diplomacy varies from one region to another; although in principle, it is very similar. For example, the government of South Africa describes defence diplomacy as a vital function of the defence ministry’s component to assist the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in achieving the government’s foreign relations objectives. Anton Du Plessis explained further that defence diplomacy is using the means of the military means and related institutions, but not the armed forces. Muthana has argued that (defence) diplomacy seeks the maximum national advantage without using force and preferably without causing resentment. Comparatively, the government of Spain described defence diplomacy as the use of the armed forces capability to support state diplomacy to reinforce national interests.

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46 Cited in Ian Storey (2012), *Op.cit*, p. 289. In this article, Storey broadens his explanation about port calls in international visit for China’s vessel. Such visit is believed as a medium that effectively generating goodwill and mutual trust; See also Andrew Cottee, and Anthony Forster, *Reshaping defence diplomacy: New roles for military cooperation and assistance* (Adelphi Paper 365, London: Oxford University Press for IISS, 2004). pp. 7, 15


51 Spain Ministerio De Defensa, *Defence Diplomacy Plan* (Spain: January 2012), p. 16
In terms of defence diplomacy, the involvement of the military in foreign policy is not only limited in peacetime, depending on its objective of involvement. Defence diplomacy encompasses a wide range of activities that might, in the past, have been described as military cooperation or military assistance, for example the appointment of defence attaches and assistance in the establishment of a defence college. In this regard, the role of the military is a kind of “transition from the military to the political domain”. The idea that armed forces and related defence infrastructures have the potential to contribute to international security also by helping to promote a more cooperative and stable international environment. Military and defence instruments are used as ‘ambassadors’ to deter, in a diplomatic way, rather than in a sombre military mode. Specifically, defence diplomacy is defined as military cooperation and assistance which is beneficial in the pursuit of national interest. From these perspectives, it is clear that the essence of defence diplomacy has two aspects: ‘the use of military’ and ‘national interest’. This kind of motive becomes legitimate in the political and security domain, as the concept of national interest prevails as the main reason.

Cottey and Forster stated that the emergence of defence diplomacy has penetrated every aspect of military tasks, which previously was not a traditional military task. This new role is a result of three important developments. The nature of security has evolved from traditional to non-traditional challenges, and the tasks of the military are not just purely military-based anymore, but deal with areas of peace and promoting good governance, including collaboration with allies and potential adversaries.

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52 Cottey and Forster (2004), Op.cit, p. 6
54 Cottey and Forster (2004), Op.cit, p. 77
Accordingly, this study’s working definition of defence diplomacy ensues as ‘all methods and strategies used by countries that may be in a state of competition with one another, but they have used a certain kind of practice including economic, culture, political cooperation, defence cooperation and diplomacy to make friends, hopefully cooperate with one another, and, most importantly, to build and increase mutual trust’. In recent years, defence diplomacy has been a front line in the defence of national dignity and integrity. To clarify the meaning, it is worth bearing in mind the words ‘military’ and ‘defence’, which are used loosely and can be freely interchanged.

In the defence diplomacy process, each country builds interaction aimed to satisfy its interest in every field. Therefore, defence diplomacy is a necessity and can benefit each country in establishing interactions which include trade, economy, and development aimed at strengthening security and preventing conflict.

Communication between the military is important in the defence diplomacy process as bilateral and multilateral collaboration impacts on joint training and joint patrols, as well as the procurement of necessities. It is therefore logical for each member states to cooperate with each other to

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56 Researcher’s personal definition of defence diplomacy after a discussion with Aurel Croissant at Universität Heidelberg, 2015, and See Seng Tan, on 19 August 2013 at RSIS Singapore

57 Indonesian Ministry of Defence released its White Paper in 2008, in which Defence Diplomacy is described as an ‘intensive effort’ to prevent war and hostilities manner amongst the states, especially in the region of Southeast Asia. Please see, Indonesian White Paper, *Buku Putih Pertahanan Indonesia* (Jakarta: Departemen Pertahanan RI 2008), pp. 68-70


59 David Capie, Structure, Shocks, and Norm Change: Explaining the Late Rise of Asia’s Defence Diplomacy, *op. cit.*
improve security to jointly cope with conflicts and threats that may occur. Defence diplomacy is especially beneficial between regional countries, who working together in trust, are able to face common enemies, particularly in this era of globalization where non-traditional threats into the main scourge facing each country. The implementation of defence diplomacy involves high-level security dialogue between members, the import-export of major weapons and participation in peace operations.60

There are three characteristics in the objections of defence diplomacy. Firstly, defence diplomacy is aimed at confidence building which in turn can prevent conflict through reinforced perceptions of common interest with former or potential enemies. As such, mutual trust and understanding can be built, and a broader area of cooperation can possibly be reached. Secondly, defence diplomacy is a process of good governance in which civilians control the military.61 In this regard, defence diplomacy can encourage reforms in the security and defence sector, which means civilian control of the defence policy and the armed forces.62 Thirdly, defence diplomacy is a means of pursuing wider foreign and security goals through the support of other countries in the area of defence, humanitarian relief, inter-state security problems, and peace capacities. This is normally in the form of peacekeeping activities, which include political dialogue.63 In the context of humanitarian relief, inter-state security problems and the support of peace, and particularly ASEAN, the objective is focused on regional cooperation that places these as common security issues.64

60 Ibid., p. 4.
61 Croissant (2013), Op.cit, p. 6-8, Croissant described, that in supporting a good governance the military has been willing to accept its subordinate to civil power; see also Plessis (2004), Op.cit, p. 97
Security analysts have identified at least five dimensions of defence diplomacy:  

1) to strengthen cooperation with former enemies and engage potential adversaries to dispel mistrust; 2) defence diplomacy is used to advance security-sector reform in foreign militaries, especially in the development of democratically armed forces to respect human rights and to promote good governance; 3) defence diplomacy has been employed to counter the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; 4) defence diplomacy is preparing for, and undertaking, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief operations (HADR); and 5) defence diplomacy is developing the capabilities of the military to contribute to UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs).” Furthermore, defence diplomacy will enhance military capacities and mutual trust amongst countries. Further indicators of defence diplomacy activities will be elaborated in the subsequent chapters.

5. Definition of Defence Community

Citing the work of Jared Beck in reviewing Adler and Barnett’s articles on security communities, he stated “the nature of a (security) community has at least three characteristics: “1) members of a community have shared identities, values and meanings; 2) the members of a community have direct (face-to-face) encounters with one another; and 3) members of a community develop some sense of responsibility toward one another in the long run”. In line with the current development, challenges to a certain region cannot be addressed by a single country alone.

Julian R. Friedman added that “in a defence community there is mutual interest either in the preservation of aggrandisement in regard to

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territory, population, strategic resources and so forth.”67 Furthermore, a defence community is defined or at least commonly regarded as a form of international cooperation which by its very nature incorporates a military aspect and the existence of common perceptions of threat.68 To ensure the smooth and effective incorporation of the military aspect, inter-operability has become important.69 Inter-operability in terms of objectives represents the strategic and operational levels which are planning coordination, unity of effort, joint and integrated approaches, building of confidence amongst respective national military organisations and diversity, which can be the strength of unification to achieve the goals. Objectives are influenced by two means: general means, such as the repetition of training personnel experienced in conducting joint operations, division of responsibility and the effectiveness of communication or language; and functional means, such as the leveraging of equipment technology, integrating elements of organisation, understanding the rules of engagement, understanding specific tasks and the completeness of information.70

From the perspective of defence being representative amongst ASEAN member states, “community itself means that we do have a mechanism as an ASEAN fellow in the international association; however, in some cases, certain countries in ASEAN are free to have their own defence cooperation with a foreign country outside ASEAN”.71

70 These statements based on empirical analysis on defence cooperation to achieve the objective of exercise and training
71 Interview with Yudi Abrimantyo, Chief Section of Bilateral Cooperation, Indonesian Ministry of Defence, Jakarta 21st March 2013
In this regard, the “concept of a Southeast Asian defence community” was represented in the Bali agreement II (Bali Concord II). This reflected the need for norms and principles in governing politics and security in the region. This document stated the desire to shift and accelerate regional integration and identity-building.\(^{72}\) At the same time, the European Defence Community Treaty preamble stated that to maintain peace and to ensure the defence of Western Europe through close relationships with organisations that possess the same purpose is considered as complete integration with the military requirements of human and material elements and was determined in this way to ensure the development of their military power.\(^{73}\)

In the history of forming a regional organisation in Southeast Asia, there was a collective defence organisation with operating principles similar to that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).\(^{74}\) As a matter of fact, from the beginning of ASEAN, establishments have consistently rejected a military pact and will never be in a military pact, despite an integrated effort to address security issues in Southeast Asia, i.e. the eradication of piracy in territorial waters. Thus, in defining defence community characteristics through the practice of ASEAN defence cooperation, it should meet the conditions of the existing joint operations and inter-operability components, such as the standardisation of major weaponry systems.\(^{75}\)

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\(^{73}\) European Defence Community Treaty, p. 167

\(^{74}\) *Text of the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty* (International Organization, vol. 8, no. 4, Nov 1964), pp. 617-621

In recent years, ASEAN has come up with a concept or spirit of transferring the challenges into a ‘venue of cooperation’ — not just a ‘venue of conflict’. The leaders of the ASEAN states pledged to transform ‘troubled’ Southeast Asia into a ‘united’ region. Thus, the very idea of ASEAN’s ‘defence community’ implies the need for some form of trilateral or multilateral military arrangement within the group.

In the context of ASEAN, the defence community is not just narrow-minded as many experts suggest. It has a broad perspective on the common issues. Each defence community in the region is closely attached to the existence of ASEAN as a regional organisation. Indeed, the distinctive interlocking pattern of it has been described as an ASEAN "defence spider web". It is believed that the signs and characters of ASEAN’s "defence community" exist, are relevant, and are able to address uncertainty and change in politics, the economy and culture, which are all very closely related to the existence of ASEAN. In short, the existence of defence community characteristics in ASEAN’s defence diplomacy can be identified through the effectiveness of intra-ASEAN member states' defence cooperation, the efforts of unification and the integration of military forces, together with the components of inter-operability which are planned and executed accordingly in tackling the threat.

Angel Rabasa and C. Richard Neu (ed.), The Role of Southeast Asia in U.S. Strategy Toward China (RAND Corporation, 2001), pp. 46-47

This point of view is abstracted from the experienced and deep observation of Chief Section of Bilateral Cooperation, Indonesian Ministry of Defence, during his continuous presence in various defence activities amongst ASEAN states.


Ibid, p.160. Indonesian Vice President Try Sutrisno delivered this statement, during his position as Commander in Chief of Indonesian Armed Forces. See also Strait Times (Weekly Overseas Edition), 9 December 1989
6. **Statement of Problems**

As has been discussed above, the defining principle of ASEAN diplomacy is prioritising tactics through consultation and consensus, and with the principle of non-interference. It causes ASEAN member states to conduct international relations with ambiguity and sound ineffective in solving regional security problems. These conditions motivate this thesis to observe the significant mechanism of ASEAN’s regional defence diplomacy. The involvement of external powers in ASEAN’s defence diplomacy also prompted a debate to investigate its influence on the assumption of an existing defence community in Southeast Asia. A call from the former Foreign Minister of Malaysia stated that the countries of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) were to form a ‘defence community’ in May 1989, acknowledging ASEAN’s constant rejection of the idea of a military pact. This certainly represents a striking departure from the long-standing position of ASEAN countries which favour strictly bilateral arrangements in the sphere of military cooperation. It is against such a background that the idea of transforming ASEAN into one single community came into being.

Regional security challenges remain and, therefore, continued efforts should be made to address them. These challenges are addressed at ASEAN’s Defence Ministers’ Meetings where they exchange ideas regularly.

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80 *Ibid* p.159. Acharya described that the concept was presented in Omar’s speech at a conference held in Singapore, upon the minister being asked at the conference by Acharya to provide some specifics as to what the concept of ‘defence community’ means, or how it would be operationalized. The minister merely noted that it would go beyond existing bilateral cooperation and might possibly involve cooperation on arms manufacturing.

81 A brief explanation of ASEAN Defence Cooperation can be reviewed from Bantarto Bandoro, *ASEAN Defence Cooperation: Current Trends and Future Developments* (Southeast Asia Security Public Lecture Series III, Brunei Darussalam, Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, July 2009). The paper was prepared for public lecture in Brunei Darussalam, July 2009.

on how regional challenges have to be tackled on a regional basis. The creation of ADMM should not be seen in isolation from the way in which ASEAN addressed its immediate strategic environment. The first ADMM in Kuala Lumpur conveyed ASEAN’s decision to build closer military ties amongst ASEAN militaries, which reflects the fact that regional defence matters are no longer a sensitive issue to be discussed openly.

This thesis will analyse ASEAN’s defence diplomacy which through defence and security cooperation addresses regional challenges, and in this way be able to identify the characteristics of the defence community. Thus, the objectives of this thesis are as follows:

The first objective is to identify the implementation of defence diplomacy in ASEAN. How has the military played a role in diplomacy? How has coordination and cooperation been used between ASEAN’s member states to discuss security matters? The analysis will be conducted through ADMM and ADMM-Plus meetings on regional security.

The second objective is to analyse the existing characteristics or elements of the defence community, and whether the venues that had been used for defence diplomacy can channel a pathway towards a Southeast Asia defence community.

This thesis assesses the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) by their practical cooperation. The venues for defence dialogue used by defence leaders of ASEAN to discuss security issues demonstrate ASEAN’s defence regionalism. Such defence regionalism has laid strong grounds for

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83 Furthermore Bandoro (2009), Op.cit
84 Ibid
ASEAN as a defence community. The establishment of ADMM and ADMM-Plus has set a medium to bridge both dialogue and practical cooperation amongst ASEAN member states and external powers. Moreover, the purpose of ADMM-Plus is “to enhance defence cooperation across the whole spectrum of security issues”. Various activities of defence diplomacy under the auspices of ADMM and ADMM-Plus will be elaborated further in Chapter 5 as an illustration of how wide the range of defence cooperation is within the context of these forums.

This thesis aims to address the following questions: 1) How does ASEAN’s defence diplomacy address security challenges? 2) Does the implementation of ASEAN’s defence diplomacy help to shape an ASEAN defence community? The answers to these questions provide an understanding of the role played by the ASEAN militaries in defence diplomacy, aside from their traditional tasks. These questions are important because the term ‘defence diplomacy’ in Southeast Asia has only just emerged in the past few years and, more particularly, the idea of a defence community did not exist in the concept of the establishment of ASEAN. Hence, this research is interesting and hopes to present a new perspective in relation to defence cooperation in Southeast Asia.

This thesis attempts to further study whether there are indicators multilateral defence diplomacy within ASEAN, in which the militaries play a role in foreign policy, and which contain the characteristics of a defence community. The thesis is limited to examining only the role of intra-ASEAN militaries in defence diplomacy, particularly defence cooperation activities within the framework of ADMM and ADMM-Plus. This thesis further

86 Brendan Taylor, The Rise of Asian Defence Diplomacy: Convergence of Divergence in Sino Australia Security Relations? (CICIR, 2012). Taylor describes his views that the rise of multilateral defence diplomacy in Asia is an important new phenomenon, in addition to the form of many Asian and Southeast Asian defence and security dialogues.
discusses two areas of practical cooperation under the auspices of ADMM-Plus, the mechanism of peacekeeping operations and maritime security cooperation, as case studies. This focus intends to assist readers in understanding the extent to which ASEAN’s security and military officials have pursued regional interest\textsuperscript{87} and have been committed to building long-lasting trust and regional stability. This thesis is not intended to test any theories. However, a new regionalism approach will be applied for the analytical framework, and some findings of this research may have theoretical implications. In the future, other researchers might use some of its data for such purposes.\textsuperscript{88}

7. Research Design

In order to be able to study the different aspects of defence diplomacy, such as the players, the venues and the pattern of security cooperation, the study needs a methodology that enables it to test theoretical argument. The methodology used in this study will be elaborated in Chapter 3.

This study will explore defence diplomacy as an independent variable. It will answer research questions by examining the defence diplomacy fora that had been used by ASEAN from 2000–2012. This study will focus on the role of military and security officials in the practice of ASEAN defence diplomacy by detecting whether the mechanism of defence diplomacy justifies the formation of an ASEAN defence community. This independent variable serves to provide insight into how the practices of defence diplomacy have paved the way for the creation of future defence communities.

\textsuperscript{87} See footnote no-4, p. 2
\textsuperscript{88} Derek Layder, \textit{New Strategies in Social Research: An Introduction and Guide} (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), p. 5. According to Layder, not all research falls neatly into one category [theory testing] or the other [theory building], as at different stages and degrees each involves the other and degrees each involves the process
Since the Southeast Asia defence community is viewed as a dependent variable, this thesis attempts to prove that the defence diplomacy reveals elements needed to form an ASEAN defence community. A hypothesis will be assessed to gain a better understanding of this study, namely, the practice of defence cooperation for handling security challenges in Southeast Asia is the implementation of a defence diplomacy under the auspices of ADMM and ADMM-Plus which contains the characteristics of a defence community that could pave the way for the formation of a future Southeast Asian defence community.

The focus of this research is from 2000 to 2012. The sources for this research are divided into primary and secondary data. The primary sources consist of formal and informal interviews, personal communication and documentary material (government reports, official statements, speeches, declarations, treaties, policy papers, statistical data, and internet resources). A series of interviews carried out with government officials from the ministry of defence, armed forces HQ, policymakers, prominent scholars, officials from designated ASEAN states, and officials from the ASEAN secretariat. The respondents were decision makers, politicians, military officials and intellectuals from countries such as Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Four of these six countries were founding members of ASEAN, and believed that the research data available in the six countries is appropriate and more than adequate. The interviews were conducted in person, i.e. face-to-face interviews, and via electronic mail. All of the interviews were recorded.

Secondary sources include books, research publications from academics, journals, articles, conference proceedings, newspapers, magazines, manuscripts, and other personal documents. The secondary
data was collected from the Universität Heidelberg Library, KITLV Leiden, RSIS Singapore and CSIS Jakarta, as well as relevant information from the Indonesian National Defence Forces archives.

8. Thesis Structure

This thesis is divided into seven chapters. After an introductory chapter, Chapter 2 follows with reviews of literature related to the study of Southeast Asia's defence community and the ASEAN community. It conducts a theoretical overview. Chapter 3 explains the research methodology. Chapter 4 traces the historical evidence of the establishment of regional organisations that indicate whether the elements of a defence community ever existed in Southeast Asia, as well as the development of regionalism in the region. Chapters 5 and 6 discuss the regional mechanism in handling security challenges in the region, through the practical cooperation of ADMM and ADMM-Plus, i.e. the Maritime Security Cooperation, specifically the Malacca Strait Patrol, and the Peacekeeping Centre Network. Also discussed are the efforts of integrating military forces and practical inter-operability as a requirement of a defence community. Finally, Chapter 7 presents the findings of this thesis, and discusses the future possibilities of the Southeast Asian defence community as a strategic imperative for ASEAN to address the region's future challenges.
1. Introduction

The main goal of the establishment of ASEAN, as noted on ASEAN’s own website, is “to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship between countries of the region”.¹

It is to create a stable peace for the long term in the region, either through economic, technological and socio-cultural cooperation or through cooperation in politics and security. According to Frances Stewart, there are two alternatives that may be taken by an organization to be able to evolve and develop. The first alternative is to focus on the field of security and the second alternative is to focus on the economy.² The creation of a stable security and economy will directly impact on the stability in an organisation. The stable conditions of an organisation would be very conducive for development, in terms of developing a community. In the context of ASEAN member states’ defence diplomacy, the focus is on developing defence cooperation between ASEAN member states, and the establishment of equilibrium in the interaction with regional external powers in order to tackle regional security challenges.

The principles of cooperation in ASEAN were then inserted into the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, also known as the ASEAN Concord I (Bali Concord I), on 24 February 1976, while the procedure and steps to create a

¹ www.asean.org/asean/about-asean/overview, accessed on 21 October 2014
stable peace through the peaceful settlement of disputes were later formalised in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC).³

On 7 October, 2003, through the declaration of the ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), which was produced at the 9th ASEAN Summit in Bali, the leaders of ASEAN member states agreed on gradually establishing the ASEAN Community, which consists of three pillars of cooperation, mutually binding and strengthening to achieve a common goal to ensure that sustainable peace, stability and prosperity are equitable in Southeast Asia.

The establishment of the ASEAN, however, was not simply altruistic, namely to promote peace and stability in the region through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship amongst countries of the region, and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter.⁴ Instead, it is also driven by political and security considerations, especially as ASEAN was formed shortly after Indonesia ended the policy of konfrontasi, a low-level military conflict against the Federation of Malaysia.

In addition, all these ASEAN member states had one thing in common: they were facing both the internal and external threats of Communism. Believing that Communism only thrived in economically poor countries, one of the main goals of ASEAN, as enshrined in the Bangkok Declaration, is to accelerate economic growth, social development, and cultural development in the region - policies that were believed to be able to counter the Communists’ threats effectively.

In a sense, ASEAN was formed as a means to reassure Indonesia and other members that they had agreed to settle various issues peacefully.

⁴ Ibid.
and not through armed conflict. ASEAN was thus established as a trust-building project, to create a sense of security amongst member states.\footnote{Stated in the document of ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration on 8 August 1967), available at http://asean.org/the-asean-declaration-bangkok-declaration-bangkok-8-august-1967/, accessed on 21 October 2014}

Even though there are three main pillars of the ASEAN Community, namely the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC), for the purpose of this thesis, this chapter focuses on the political and security aspect of ASEAN, notably on defence diplomacy conducted by ASEAN member states that contains the elements of defence community. In the process of the establishment of the ASEAN Community through the APSC pillar, various defence cooperation between ASEAN member states occurred which shows the progress of the ASEAN community while containing elements of a defence community. Therefore, the focus of this chapter is to discuss literature on Defence Diplomacy and the ASEAN Community.

In order to do so, this chapter will first discuss regionalism in Southeast Asia, where the emergence of non-traditional security threats had actually brought the region together. This is followed by analysis of a security community and defence diplomacy per se. This chapter concludes with an examination of the Asean Security Community and the importance of Defence Diplomacy in achieving such community.

2. **Regionalism in Southeast Asia’s Defence Diplomacy**

Mely Caballero suggests that the emergence of non-traditional security threats, defined as non-military in nature, has expanding rapidly in recent years as a result of globalisation. Unlike traditional security threats, non-
traditional security threats cannot be solved entirely by one nation on its own. Instead, regional and multilateral cooperation is required to deal with the non-traditional security threats due to extensive impacts of the non-traditional security threats. Cabellero pointed out that such non-traditional threats can break-through diplomatic barriers, and encourage regional integrity, as the policymakers in Southeast Asia portray the emerging threats as jeopardizing their national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Furthermore, Caballero stated that the involvement of regional governance in Southeast Asia had the purpose of improving the management of the new security environment as a form of regionalism in Southeast Asia. More specifically she referred to it as 'new regionalism'.

Joseph Nye suggested that states in a particular region all have the same responsibility to maintain regional stability and security. Moreover, he pointed out two major classes of regionalist activity: microeconomic organisations involving formal economic integration, and macro-regional political organisations concerned with controlling conflict. In the context of ADMM, ASEAN members feel it’s imperative to create what Juwono Sudarsono, Indonesia’s former minister of defence, called “strategic space” and to reduce ‘technology disparity’.

According to Sudarsono, such terms came into being because of the reality that foreign affairs can gradually develop convey their respective political, defence and economic interests. In short, the framework of ADMM

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7 Ibid, p. 2
9 Interviewed with Juwono Sudarsono, former Defence Minister of the Republic of Indonesia, in Jakarta, on 19 March 2013
is designed to facilitate and manage a transnational character of specific security problems in Southeast Asia. This is where one sees the dynamics of Southeast Asia international relations.

At the same time, the degree to which regionalism occurs is dependent upon the amount of region that is felt amongst the regional powers. Väyrynen discussed in detail that the character and function of regions have encompassed the level of analysis that is global, regional and national. The idea of regionalism as a political solution for regional problems has been a prominent discussion during the 20th century, and became a phenomenon in international relations after World War 2.

In a historical context, the period of the 1980s was the resurrection of the discourse on regionalism. Following the end of the Cold War, a new school of regional analysts, such as Hettn, Yi and Väyrynen, started to label this phenomenon as a new regionalism, as compared to one that took place in an earlier period.

The concept of regionalism itself is heavily debated amongst international relations theorists, notably the realists, institutionalists, and constructivists, who have a different understanding of regional security,

namely on how to create conducive conditions for regional security.\textsuperscript{13} From a realist perspective, cooperation amongst countries in the region is difficult because of the lack of mutual trust. Regional cooperation does happen due to common interests, but is very difficult to sustain due states’ calculations of self-interest.\textsuperscript{14} From this perspective, the integration of the region will never be realised. Military cooperation is most likely to occur in the region to deal with the common enemy from outside the region and once the enemy is gone, the relations amongst states in the region will be altered, causing fear and suspicions, leading to war in the long run.\textsuperscript{15}

From an institutionalist perspective, however, regional institutions will facilitate the establishment of regional cooperation and international anarchy, and help to eliminate the interests of countries to create a regional security.\textsuperscript{16} This is, of course, contrary to the realist's perspective which doubts the loss of anarchistic attitude, and spawned a research agreement. Hedley Bull believes that the "law of cooperation" can occur if the system of contingency and equivalence is put in place.\textsuperscript{17} Contingency is defined as a reward for the efforts of countries willing to cooperate and the provision of penalties for those who refuse to do so.

Helen Milner further notes that a balanced reward is needed for intertwined relations between the countries who get rewarded.\textsuperscript{18} In contemporary development, rewards obtained from the results of those

\textsuperscript{13} Snyder (2007), \textit{Op.cit.} p. 4
\textsuperscript{17} Hedley Bull, \textit{The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics} (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1977), p. 67
\textsuperscript{18} see Hellen Milner, \textit{International Theories of Cooperation Amongst Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses} ((World Politics, vol. 44, 1992), pp. 446-496
areas of cooperation can be shared between economic progress, such as within the European Union, or regional stability, such as with ASEAN. The main difference between these two objectives is the most important factor that determines the difference in regional security. The realist view is that the military is the most important factor for safety. On the contrary, the institutionalists say that not only the military, but also politics and society, might constitute an important aspect of regional security.\footnote{Snyder (2007), \textit{Op.cit}, p. 5}

Unlike the realist or institutionalist schools, the constructivists argue that regional security can be constructed through social interaction that will establish common identity and interests amongst states. Alex Wendt states that this condition can be realised if it meets the three main basic foundations, namely: sharing of knowledge, sharing of material resources, and practicality.\footnote{Alexander Wendt, \textit{Constructing International Politics} (International Security, vol. 20, 1995), pp. 71-73; see also Snyder (2007), \textit{Ibid}} These would form an effective regional security system – in essence, a common identity as a region.

Andrew Hurrel in \textit{Regionalism in World Politics} contended that \textit{regionalism} can be defined as state-led political projects, which aim at promoting intergovernmental policy collaboration at the regional level.\footnote{Andrew Hurrell, \textit{Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective}, in Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrel (ed.), \textit{Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 39-40} The Southeast Asia defence community can also be viewed from such a perspective. Regionalism is a top-down process in intergovernmental policy collaboration at the regional level. Then again, Björn Hettne explained in his work \textit{The New Regionalism: Implications for Global Development and International Security} that the ‘new’ regionalism differs from the ‘old’
regionalism. Furthermore, Hettne argues that the “difference between ‘old’ and ‘new’ forms of regional security analysis is that in the past the region was not an actor itself, only a ‘level’ or ‘space’ of action”. It is through the development of its regionality that a region moves from being a passive part of the structure to its own right.

Since the mid-1950s, at the time of the SEATO formation, we have seen the regionalisation of defence relations in Southeast Asia. The evolution of defence cooperation involving ASEAN countries and their dialogue partner countries has been impressive, with the formation of the ADMM and ADMMPlus a defence ministerial arrangement. They are the beneficiaries of more established dialogue processes. Despite these developments, the aim of defence regionalism in Southeast Asia has remained modest. While ‘action-oriented’ cooperation in various non-conventional security areas has been incorporated into its agenda, Southeast Asian defence regionalism persists largely as an exercise in informal confidence building, with, at best, limited and incidental forays into preventive diplomacy.

The late 1980s and the 1990s experienced the emergence of new regionalism. APEC, ASEAN Plus Three (APT), and currently the mechanism of ADMM and ADMM-Plus provide an excellent example of this new type of regionalism. Although the earlier literature on regionalism tends to treat a region as a more or less autonomous sub-system of the broader international system, the growing literature on new regionalism emphasises the

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relationship between regionalism and the *extra-regional environment*. In this regard, the studies of new regionalism considered new aspects, particularly those focused on conditions related to what increasingly came to be called globalisation. Björn Hettne suggested that regionalisation is an integral part of globalisation and a political reaction against the process. He argues further that regionalism has been characterised as a halfway house at a time when a single nation is no longer viable and the world is not ready to become one. According to this definition, regionalism as a bridge could be even beneficial for global cooperation. As has been explained before, regionalism is a state-led political project, by definition, and the government is the principal architect of regionalism. Furthermore, national players may, in fact, perceive regionalism as a defence mechanism against the competitive pressure arising from the globalisation process. Hettne and Söderbaum insisted upon a ‘*new regionalism theory*’ built around the core concept of regionness, ranging from the regional space, regional complex, regional society, and regional community to the regional state. This thesis will show that a Southeast Asia defence community will reflect the sense of a regional society, regional complexity, and regional interest, all of which are the core elements of new regionalism, as proposed by Hettne and Söderbaum.

27 Ibid
3. Defining A Security Community

Since its inception, ASEAN member states have been committed to settle disputes amongst its members in a peaceful and cooperative manner. As Acharya said, ASEAN’s concept of regional order has centred on the creation of a Southeast Asian security community, which is defined in the Deutschian sense as a group of states whose members share “dependable expectations of peaceful change” in their mutual relations and rule out the use of force as a means of problem solving.\(^{31}\) However, Acharya took a position that was very different from that of Karl Deutsch and his colleagues in 1957,\(^{32}\) because he was trying to explain that the security community could be established amongst countries that do not embrace liberal democracy.

Acharya argued further that the ASEAN Security Community “needs to be not only strengthened and secured against a host of potential inter-member conflicts, but also broadened by bringing into its fold the Indochina states and developing a *modus vivendi* for regional reconciliation between the Communist and non-Communist segments of Southeast Asia”.\(^{33}\) His position seems appropriate; if not, it is impossible to adopt the concept of a security community for regions outside Western Europe and North America whose countries are not applying the principles of liberal democracy.


although the draft of the ASEAN Charter also started talking about democracy and human rights.

Acharya also differentiate the idea of the security community from the idea of the defence community.\textsuperscript{34} Defence community “implies an alliance relationship which is usually conceived and directed against a pre-recognised and commonly perceived external threat”.\textsuperscript{35} At the same time, a security community identifies no such threat and does not have the function “of organising joint defence” against an external threat.\textsuperscript{36} A security community, must be based on a fundamental, unambiguous and long-term convergence of interests amongst the players in the avoidance of war.\textsuperscript{37} Moreover, a security community, within a conceptual framework, is that a dependable expectation of peaceful change would be a prerequisite for a security community to exist. Such expectations, however, will not become a reality unless two or more states are integrated to the extent that there is an overall sense of community. This, in turn, creates the assurance that they will settle their differences in a peaceful manner.\textsuperscript{38}

While the Deutschian notion of security communities may have an explanatory appeal in Europe and in North America, other scholars in the field are challenging the applicability of the Deutschian framework for security communities in the developing countries.\textsuperscript{39} Amitav Acharya, for

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{34} Wulan and Bandoro (2007), \textit{Op.cit}, p. 10
\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Ibid}, p. 10; see also Paridah Abdul Samad and Mochtar Mohammad, \textit{ASEAN's Role and Development as a Security Community} (Jakarta: CSIS, The Indonesian Quarterly, vol. 23, no. 1, First Quarter, 1995), p. 68
\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Ibid}, p.10
\end{footnotes}
example, proposes an alternative security community framework applicable to developing countries. Examining the prospects of building a security community in Southeast Asia, Acharya identifies the following basic requirements: 1) a total absence of armed inter-state conflict, or prospects for such conflict within a region; 2) an absence of a competitive military build-up or arms race involving the regional players; 3) the existence of formal or informal institutions and practices; and 4) the existence of a high degree of political and economic integration as a necessary precondition for a peaceful relationship.\(^{40}\)

Karl Deutsch defines integration in relation to the concept of ‘a security community’. A security community is a group of people which is integrated to the point where there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight one another physically, but rather resolve disputes between them in other ways.\(^{41}\) A security community points to a group of states which has developed a long-term habit of peaceful interactions and has ruled out the use of force as a means to solve conflicts amongst members of the group. The concept also refers to a group of states that has achieved this condition as a result of the flow of communication and the habit of cooperation,\(^{42}\) where members share the “expectation of peaceful change” and rule out “the use of force as a means of problem solving”.\(^{43}\) States that belong to a security community come to see their security as being fundamentally linked to other states and their destiny

\(^{40}\) Carlyle A. Thayer, *Arms Control in Southeast Asia* (Defence Analysis, vol. 12, no. 1, 1996), p. 78

\(^{41}\) Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 16

\(^{42}\) Alexandra Retno Wulan and Bantarto Bandoro (ed.), *ASEAN’s Quest for a Full Fledge Community* (Jakarta: CSIS, 2007), p. 8

bound by the common norms, history, political experience, and regional location. A security community exists when states reach the level of confidence wherein security can only be attained if they cooperate with one another. In the case of ASEAN, it is a regional grouping that has renounced the use of force as a means of resolving intra-regional conflicts.

Deutsch observed that there are two forms of security community: amalgamated and pluralistic. Deutsch argues that it is the building of a security community that can eliminate “war and expectation of war” within the boundaries of participating nation states. An amalgamated security community is when there is a merger of two or more units that have been independent into a larger unit, with one type of common government after the amalgamation. He cites the United States as an example of an amalgamated security community. He also provided the following conditions for the formation of an amalgamated security community: 1) the mutual compatibility of values; 2) a distinctive way of life; 3) the expectations of joint rewards timed so as to come before the impositions of burdens from the amalgamation; 4) a marked increase in political and administrative capabilities of at least some participant units; 5) superior economic growth on the part of some participating units, and the development of so-called core areas around which comparatively weaker areas are grouped; 6) an unbroken link of social communication, both geographically between territories and between social strata; 7) a broadening of the political elite;

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8) the mobility of persons, at least amongst the politically relevant strata; and 9) a municipality of communications and transactions.47

A pluralistic security community is the alternative, maintaining the legal independence of separate governments. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the security arrangement between the United States and Canada are two notable examples of this kind of security community. Countries in a pluralistic security community have the suitability of core values in the thrust of the joint institutions, and a shared responsibility to build a common identity and loyalty, a sense of ‘we feelings’, and integration to the point where they have dependable expectations of peaceful change. In other words, a pluralistic security community is formed when countries become integrated to the point where they have a sense of community, which, in turn, creates an assurance that they will resolve their differences outside of war. Deutsch identifies the following conditions for the formation of a pluralistic security community: 1) the compatibility of values amongst decision makers; 2) the mutual predictability of behaviour amongst decision makers of units to be integrated; and 3) the mutual responsiveness of government to actions and communications of other governments.48

Many scholars and practitioners49 believe that the formation of a security community is the answer to tackling international issues and would be able to prevent the occurrence of war amongst states, but also make the

prospect of war amongst nations utterly impossible. This notion actually has two central points. Firstly, interaction and socialisation will enable states to manage anarchical situations and even escape from security dilemmas. Secondly, this concept offers a theoretical and analytical framework that helps the contribution of international institutions, including regional institutions, towards peace and stability.50

Puchala argued that the conception of a security community optically discerns international cognations as a process of social learning and identity formation, driven by transactions, and socialisation.51 It recognises change as being a fundamentally peaceful process, with its sources lying on the perceptions and identifications amongst actors.52 Such processes could expound why states develop more preponderant mutual independence and responsiveness, that is, to develop the ‘we feelings’ and ultimately come to forsake the utilisation of force to settle quandaries amongst them. International cognations could in addition be reconceptualised as a ‘world society’ of political communities, consisting of social groups, a process of political communication, machinery of enforcement, and popular habits of compliance.

Acharya stated that ASEAN has the potential to be a security community in Southeast Asia, and it is recognised by academics and decision makers both within and outside the region. One is a study in which ASEAN is considered a pluralistic security community, where each member retains its sovereignty.53 Sheldon Simon defined the understanding that

50 Ibid, pp. 5-6; see also Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 64
52 Ibid; see also Wulan and Bandoro (2007), Op.cit, pp. 5-6
ASEAN becomes more of a security community based on the fact that none of its members use armed force or perceive the need for use of military force in resolving conflicts in the region.\textsuperscript{54} Michael Leifer agreed that ASEAN is a security community for its ability to prevent conflicts of intramural or the possibility of an escalation of armed confrontation to be a political community.\textsuperscript{55}

Accordingly, Samad and Mohammad also regard ASEAN as a ‘security community’ in the sense that “no member would seriously consider to use force against another to settle disputes”.\textsuperscript{56} Just like Acharya, however, they contradict themselves when they highlight the absence of a common threat with the presence of actual and potential conflicts in the region. They describe ASEAN as a community that “has not reached the stage of a security community”, in a Deutschian sense, although ASEAN has come a long way in reducing tensions between its members.\textsuperscript{57} In fact, the absence of war amongst ASEAN member countries since the organisation was founded in 1967 is the biggest achievement of ASEAN in regulating the interaction of peace in the region. The absence of war or organised violence did not, however, imply an absence of differences, disputes or conflicts of interest amongst the players.\textsuperscript{58}

Acharya applied a constructive theory in his book \textit{Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia}, wherein the idea of security was kept

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[]\textsuperscript{55} Michael Leifer, \textit{ASEAN as a Model of a Security Community?} in Hadi Soesastro (ed.), \textit{ASEAN in a Changed Regional and International Political Economy} (Jakarta: CSIS, 1995), pp. 129-132
\item[]\textsuperscript{56} Further http://chacmool.sdnp.undp.org/pacific/forumsec/about/vision.htm; Wulan and Bandoro (2007), \textit{Op. cit} p. 11
\item[]\textsuperscript{57} Desmond Ball, Richard L. Grand and Jusuf Wanandi, \textit{Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region} (Colorado: Westview Press, 1993)
\item[]\textsuperscript{58} Acharya (2001), p. 16
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
alive mostly in the work of a handful of scholars working on regional security organisations.\textsuperscript{59} Since the end of the Cold War, it can be said that ASEAN is one of the regional organisations, amongst other regional organisations, concerned about security issues. Constructivism, as an approach, is most often applied by experts to assess the security community. Acharya concludes that the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) contained the elements of a security regime. However, in its development, a security community is more appropriate in describing the security system in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{60}

In this context, according to Wulan and Bandoro, constructivists' influence on shaping the new discourse on security communities can be found in three areas.\textsuperscript{61} The first area is the social construction of a security community, the second area concerns the norms, and the third is the impact of material forces. According to constructivism, a security community is socially constructed, and, as well as interstate cooperation, should be understood as a social process that can ultimately prevent a war as a result of the interaction, socialisation, norm setting, and identity building of the players. In the security community, the norms are important, even though these norms are also present in the form of understanding in other international relations theories, but in the view of constructivism, such norms are even deeper. Norms regulate state interest and constitute state identities, including the development of collective identities. In the third area, it provides an opportunity for researchers to better understand the impact of material forces on shaping international politics. Neo-realism and most liberal theories accept state interest to be shaped by material forces and concerns, such as power and wealth.

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid, pp. 3-4
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid, p. 11
\textsuperscript{61} Wulan and Bandoro (2007), Op.cit, pp. 7-8
According to constructivism, while material forces remain important, inter-subjective factors, including ideas, culture and identities, play a determining, rather than secondary role in foreign policy interactions.\footnote{Reuben Martine, “Regionalism Agenda in Africa in an Era of Globalization” Who are the Actors and for Whose Interest? The Experience of the Great Lakes of African Continent, (Paper for Presentation at the Conference “Regionalism and the Taming of Globalisation, University of Warwick, UK, October 2005), Retrieved from http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgrevents/conferences/2005_conferences/8_annual_conference/papers/, 2 February 2015} By focusing on the constitutive effects of norms, constructivism has thus restored some of the original insights of an integration theory regarding the impact of socialisation on creating collective interests and identities. Norms play a crucial role in the socialisation process, leading to peaceful conduct amongst states, which forms the core of security communities. Thus, constructivism provides important insights into the role of cultural norms and the emergence of ‘we feelings’, which has been identified by Deutsch as a crucial feature of security communities.\footnote{Ibid}

Furthermore, Acharya does not stand alone in his works. Another scholar, Caballero-Anthony, in analysing ASEAN cooperation, also defined ASEAN as a security community.\footnote{James Ferguson, ASEAN Concord II: Policy Prospects for Participant Regional “Development” (Singapore: ISEAS, Contemporary Southeast Asia, A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, vol. 26, no. 3, 2004), pp. 393-415; Mely Caballero-Anthony, Re-visiting Security Communities: ASEAN and Bali Concord II (Background notes for Presentation at Harvard-IDSS Workshop on Southeast Asian IR and Security, IDSS, Singapore)} In the concept of a security community delivered by Caballero, the current trend of growing cooperation in Southeast Asia has resulted in the expansion of economic cooperation which also encompasses security cooperation as a form of greater capacity in addressing new security issues.\footnote{Caballero-Anthony (2010a), Op.cit. p. 4} Cabellero considers that the ASEAN security community has moved
beyond a 'nascent' security community to become a 'soft' security community. Acharya was supported by constructivist adherents Alice D. Ba and Sorpong Peou. Alternatively, a realist theory loyalist, such as Nicholas Khoo, would have opposed Acharya. Both the supporters and critics of Acharya all attempt to analyse the development of ASEAN cooperation.

4. The Construction of ASEAN Community

Wulan and Bandoro stated that the underlying idea of community is to establish norms, principles and expectations that facilitate cooperation towards solving problems of common concern in a way that meets the expectations of the members of the community. Literature of international relations’ studies refer to the concept of security communities as a form of security arrangement. Bruce Cronin puts the concept of security communities along with seven possible types of security arrangements, namely: 1) the international state of nature; 2) the balance of power system; 3) the pluralistic security community; 4) the collective security system; 5) the concert system; 6) the common security association; and 7) the amalgamated security community. Cronin added that there are four characteristics that distinguish one type of community from others. They are constitutive rules, patterns of behaviour, types of institutions, and common identity. Moreover, Cronin added that the type of security arrangement, such as the international state of nature, would constitute transnational political communities.

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66 Ibid
68 Nicholas Khoo, Deconstructing the ASEAN Security Community: A Review Essay (International Relations of the Pacific, vol. 4, 2004), pp. 35-46
70 Bruce Cronin, Community Under Anarchy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 8-13
Cronin proposed that in a world of independent sovereign states, it is difficult to conceive of a community beyond the protective walls of national borders. As mentioned previously, the terminology of community is very rare or even very difficult to find in the international relations field as either a theoretical concept or a descriptive phrase. The word *cooperation* is used more often than *community*. Realists tend to see alliances as the primary form of cooperation, while institutionalists examine regimes and other types of institutions. However, none of them see a foundation for cohesive communities amongst sovereign states. States are seen as entities that can share interest, but not share identities.

Gusfield identifies two dimensions of communities, namely territorial and relational communities. Of the relational dimension, the community is concerned with the nature and relationships within the community, and some communities do not even have territorial boundaries, such as the community of scientists working in the same field or having specificity, which has contacts and in which relationships are of a very high quality, but they can live in separate locations, or even possibly be scattered throughout the world. Other communities can be interpreted mainly according to territory. However, in many cases, proximity and shared territory cannot by themselves constitute a community, because relational dimensions are essential.

Thus, the community is determined not only by the region, but also by relation. If the members of the community meet one another in terms of interaction, i.e. face to face, then that community is real or authentic. However, a community can also be something that is 'imagined', because its

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72 Cronin (1999), p. 1
members do not interact as described previously. Rather, its members have a mental image of the closeness between them. According to Anderson, in the political context, this type of community can be interpreted as “an imagined political community” (that is) imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.\textsuperscript{75} Anderson added that a nation is thought of as a community, because “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that has made it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, but being willing to die for such limited imaginings”.\textsuperscript{76} Moreover, the political community is not only limited to the territories that make up the nations, but it is much wider at regional and international levels. This is what is referred to as an ‘imagined security community’, which is believed by the supporters of the community approach in understanding international politics. In this regard, if there is a sense of community, there will be freedom and security. The community will live on their own, where people are free to share and advance and secure enough to get along or unite, which is known as the spirit of community. McMillan and Chavis interpret the sense of community as “a feeling that its members have a sense of belonging, a sense of where the members matter to one another and to the group, and a shared belief that the needs of its members can be met through their commitment to be together”.\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{75} Benedict Anderson, \textit{Imagined Communities: Reflections of the Origins and Spread of Nationalism} (London: Verso, 1983), p. 6
\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Ibid}, p. 7
\textsuperscript{77} David W. McMillan and David M. Chavis, \textit{Sense of Community: A Definition and Theory} (Journal of Community Psychology, vol. 14, no. 1, January 1986), pp. 6-23
According to Lewis, the process of the formation of the ASEAN community is a process of regional integration politically.\(^{78}\) He stated that there are several theories being advanced as to the purposes or goals of integration, the structure of the integrated community, the conditions likely to help or hurt the development of that community, and the best way to examine this process of development. Integration studies are concerned with how and why states voluntarily merge or interact with others. Within the field, though, it is difficult to even reach agreement on a definition. Some theorists focus on the integrative process, and others on the end result. Most writers on the integration theory would probably agree, though, that international political integration is the process by which two or more states form a new entity, possibly a political community.\(^{79}\)

Lewis, by citing De Vree, further stated that integration is a process, whereby political players in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.\(^{80}\) The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones.\(^{81}\) As has been mentioned above, integration can be defined as the process of the formation and development of institutions through which certain values are authoritatively allocated for a certain group of political players or units.

\(^{78}\) Jason D. Lewis, *The Integration of Southeast Asia: ASEAN’s Role in the Creation of a Security Community* (PhD Thesis, 1999), pp. 18-32
\(^{79}\) Ibid
For Ernst Haas, the study of regional integration is concerned with explaining how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign, and how and why they mingle, merge, and mix with their neighbours in order to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty.\(^82\) Leon Lindberg also defines integration as a process; in specific terms, political integration is: 1) the process whereby nations forego the desire and the ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision-making process to new central organs; and 2) the process whereby political players in several distinct settings are persuaded to shift their expectations and political activities to a new centre.\(^83\)

Thus, by integration, we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change amongst its population. By a sense of community, we mean a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to an agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by a process of ‘peaceful change’. By peaceful change we mean the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalised procedures, without resorting to large-scale physical force.\(^84\) In short, according to Deutsch, the countries that are members of the security community have created not only an order that is stable (a stable order), but, in fact, also a peace that is stable (a stable peace).\(^85\)

\(^{82}\) Ibid, p. 20  
\(^{83}\) Ibid  
\(^{84}\) Ibid, p. 4; Deutsch (1957), Op.cit, p. 5  
According to Bellamy, a community can be defined as a human collection formed by shared norms and understanding amongst its members. There are three characteristics to the formation of a community.86 The first characteristic is the existence of a collective identity formed by shared values and meanings. These are the key to what is called transnational understanding, meaning that members of the communities have, amongst other things, a common understanding about certain norms. A common understanding would then serve as a basis for common actions and common feelings. The second characteristic is that there should be direct interactions amongst members of the community. This will enable members of the community to follow recent developments from either inside or outside the community through constant dialogue. A practice of reciprocity is the third characteristic. This indicates, not only a sense of long-term interest between the groups within the community, but also an obligation towards, and responsibility for, the members of the community.87

The second and third points above show that, in a community, that it is still the behaviour of the members that is based on self-interest. Tonnies distinguishes between society (Gesellschaft) and community (Gemeinschaft), where the Gesellschaft acknowledges the existence of self-interest and Gemeinschaft rejects the idea.88 Tonnies’ assumption has given an unfavourable impression, as if the player in a community does not have or act on behalf of their own interests. In fact, even though the players will identify themselves and achieve interests and belief in the social structure of the group, they will still have different interests, which can lead

86 Alex J. Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? (Hampshire: Palgrave McMillan, 2004), p. 31
to competitive behaviour, and competition can lead to conflict. Thus, the best way to distinguish between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* is not through the presence or absence of self-interest, but rather through the degree of its reciprocity, which in *Gemeinschaft* concerns long-term interests, and in *Gesellschaft* which is very short-term in nature. Therefore, it is important to understand that in the community there is definitely competition due to the pursuit of interests on the basis of different motives. However, in the interests of rivalry or differences, they are no longer afraid of the use of force or military means to resolve disputes between them. These three characteristics of communities exist at local, domestic and international level. Thus, if it is associated with “dependable expectations of peaceful change”, the community members did not expect and were not prepared to use force that is organised as a way to resolve the conflict between community members.  

The process of building a community, while referring to some previous theoretical background, emphasises the need of cooperation between even conflicting states. It means that the members of the community will no longer see the enmity nature of their relationship as it was in the past. This is the essence of what David Mitrany referred to as functional theory. Collaboration in one functional field can lead to collaboration in other related fields. Mitrany identifies this concept as ramification. In such a condition, for example, the cooperation in the defence industry can pave the way to cooperate in a defence alliance, etc. Thus, when the members of the community are confronting traditional and

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non-traditional security challenges, they act in concert to produce an acceptable solution to the regional security problems they face.

There have been efforts to understand the existence of a community on an international level. These efforts show that political security is deeply rooted, and that the countries occupying a habitat in the international community can develop a peaceful character. This is not the vision of constructivists in international relations. 92 Policymakers have begun to merge security and community in its new form. They identify the existence of shared values as a source for closer security cooperation, and *vice versa*, anticipating that the security cooperation will deepen the values that are shared, and transnational linkages. Through a merger between security and community, certain countries revise the concept of security and power.

Those states revising the concept of security include the community’s ability to maintain the values and the presence of expected behaviour against external threats, and excite new countries with the idea of national security and the development of the economy. Thus, as the meaning and purpose of the power begins to change, the meaning and purpose of security also changes. If in the past, security meant military security alone, countries now identify security issues as also including economic, environmental and social prosperity, and have put aside their fears of a possible military threat from other countries in the community. 93

5. **The Significance of Study**

The concept of a defence community was first introduced by Richard Van Wagenen in the early 1950s, and then elaborated by Karl Deutsch in

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92 *Ibid*, pp. 35-36  
93 *Ibid*, p.39
the late 1950s. These two scholars studied the phenomenon that occurred in the North Atlantic, namely the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community, through the ‘Treaty of Rome’, which was the forerunner of the European Community (and has now evolved into the European Union).

In European history, the search for a sense of security or the effort to avoid war was established in the early modern centuries, including through ‘The Peace of Westphalia’ on 24 October, 1648, which provides a benchmark in international relations on the basis of the concept of state sovereignty. Westphalian sovereignty is a concept of nation states, based on the principles of territory and non-interference, which exclude the external players from domestic authority structures. ASEAN member states apply the principles of state sovereignty, treat all states as being equal, and have the fundamental right of political self-determination to secure its interest. When ASEAN member states engage in defence diplomacy, it is a cross-border activity. ASEAN member states show its respect for the principle of sovereignty as envisioned by the Westphalian Treaty. The European Community, on the contrary, does not perceive the principle of sovereignty as a constraining factor in its diplomatic activities. This means that members of the community can always ignore the Westphalian system in their diplomatic activities. However, it is not to say that the form of defence diplomacy and the assumption of an existing defence community in ASEAN are adherent to the Westphalian system.


95 Benno G. Teschke, Theorizing the Westphalian System of States: International Relations from Absolutism to Capitalism (European Journal of IR, 2002), pp. 5-7
As Acharya said,\(^{96}\) the establishment of ASEAN was never intended to be a military alliance, however, the idea that ASEAN member states should develop some form of broader military role is nothing new in Southeast Asia. There are some interesting examples. In 1970, the then-Indonesian Armed Forces Commander, General Maraden Panggabean, constituted that Indonesia would be ready to provide military assistance to its ASEAN partners facing a security threat. In 1976, Indonesia was again reported to be encouraging the creation of a ‘Joint Defence Council’ between the ASEAN countries. In the same year, several ASEAN states were proposing a type of bilateral agreement related to border security issues and intelligence exchanges in anticipation of Communist insurgency at home.\(^{97}\) In times of conflict in Indochina, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman, also suggested the establishment of an ASEAN ‘Joint Command’ to facilitate a common response to the possibility of seepage from the conflict.\(^{98}\) However, the decision maker for the ASEAN member states supported none of these proposals.\(^{99}\) This was because the concept of a defence community required the absence of internal conflicts in ASEAN. Acharya and Tan challenged the realist view on the absence of security problems in Southeast Asia. In the ASEAN context, since 1967, there has been no wars between any ASEAN member states. There was one minor incident - a small skirmish in the Thailand–Vietnam or Thailand–Cambodia border area.

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\(^{99}\) *Ibid*
A defence community is a form of collective defence aimed at dealing with an external threat. A defence community may be incorporated within a larger security community and it is always multilateral. The idea of a security community, which was delivered at the 36th AMM and officially incorporated in Bali Concord II, is different from other concepts of security arrangements because it is more inward-oriented and focuses on the ability and the mechanism of intra-ASEAN dispute settlement, in which the use of threats and force would not be an option to solve conflict. Potential conflicts, however, will continue to exist in the region due to differing interests, perspectives, and the social and political backgrounds of ASEAN state members.

The ASEAN Security Community is a long-term project that is intended to provide a sense of purpose, a practical goal, and a future condition for which all member states should strive. In the process of establishing an ASEAN security community, various defence cooperation mechanisms of ASEAN’s defence diplomacy may contain elements of a defence community. This could pave the way for the prospect of a Southeast Asia’s defence community.

6. **Summary**

A review of the literature reveals that there has been direct research by scholars and writers on the issue of security communities. However, direct research on finding of a defence community, especially in Southeast Asia, has not been found at all. Departing from different theories about the application of military cooperation amongst ASEAN member states could be a motivating factor for the continuance of this research. The lack of

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100 Wulan and Bandoro (2007), pp. 2-3
adequate sources of literature that discusses the signs of the existence of defence community has become an important point of the research.

Literature reviews largely refer to the practical preparation of the ASEAN member states to establish the ASEAN Community. The ASEAN community building process, based on the concept of operations contained in the APSC Blueprint, is through various defence cooperation called defence diplomacy. Examining various defence cooperation within the umbrella of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting forum, as a means for the ASEAN member states to build the ASEAN community, is expected to find the characteristics of the defence community, and at the same time can prove the hypothesis that was built in this study.

There are several opportunities to prove the hypothesis, research question and research objective by tracking the formation of a security community that will be elaborated further in subsequent chapters. Some earlier studies have been linked to various defence cooperation with the theory of a security community, and it appears that the presence of these characteristics of the defence community has been neglected in many of these studies. The gaps found in various research papers on defence cooperation of the ASEAN member states, in relation to the existence of a defence community, is the core of this study.
Chapter Three
METHODOLOGY

1. Introduction

As previously noted, the aim of this research is to explore the phenomenon of defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia and its development through defence cooperation, which affects its military involvement in other tasks, in addition to the military's traditional tasks. This chapter is divided into four main parts. The first part explains the research method applied in this study, namely, qualitative method. The second part describes ADMM and ADMM-Plus as the unit of analysis, as well as certain ASEAN member states as the focus of the study, while the third part describes the data-gathering techniques employed in this study. The final part discusses the techniques and procedures of the data analysis.

2. Qualitative Research

Bogdan and Biklen describe qualitative research as follows: "Reality is a multi-layered, interactive and a shared social experience interpreted by individuals". Whereas in studying reality as a social construction, individual or group, interesting or give meaning to a reality is by constructing it. Qualitative research is more concerned in terms of 'the process' rather than 'the results' because the relationship between the parts to be examined is obvious when observed in the mechanism of the process.

Furthermore, Creswell describes that in qualitative research, researchers use the process rather than a preconceived result, with the focus on the process of data collection and analysis in an effort to build

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1 Robert C. Bogdan and Sari K. Biklen, Qualitative Research for Education (Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon 2nd ed, 1982), p. 16
abstractions, concepts, hypotheses and theories in more detail. Moreover, as Glesne explains, the role of field research through direct interaction with the respondents is crucial in order to obtain a comprehensive explanation and interpretation.

There are several reasons why a qualitative method is applied in this study. First, besides the reasons stated in the previous paragraph, qualitative methods are believed to provide space for the researcher to develop an understanding of the meaning, process and context of the unit of analysis. Second, this study intends to explore the phenomenon of defence diplomacy in the ADMM working mechanism, and qualitative methods provide flexibility for researchers to study these phenomena in depth and detail. Third, qualitative methods are generally applied in the study of political science, especially in the context of micro-level analysis. It is expected, therefore, that by applying qualitative methods the researcher can detect, capture and elaborate on the experiences observed and outline them academically. As this thesis is to examine how the member states of ASEAN conduct defence diplomacy and whether it is appropriate to believe that such defence diplomacy activities have some elements of a defence community, qualitative research is suitable for application in this research.

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3 Corinne Glesne, *Becoming Qualitative Researchers: An Introduction* (New York: Longman White Plains, 1999), p. 5. There are several considerations that the reason he used qualitative research methods in this study. Qualitative methods believed to give space for the researcher to develop an understanding of the meaning, process and context of the unit of analysis examined

4 Furthermore, see Fiona Devine, *Qualitative Analysis*, in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (ed.), *Theory and Methods in Political Science* (New York: Palgrave 2002), pp. 197-215

Yin explains that qualitative research is highly relevant to different disciplines and professions. He further argues that qualitative research has five distinctive features which are complementary to other expert views, such as Fiona Devine’s. “Qualitative research is studying the meaning of people’s lives, under real-world conditions; representing the views and perspectives of the people (in this context, the perspective of defence diplomacy players); covering contextual conditions within which people live; contributing insights into existing or emerging concepts that may help to explain human social behaviour; and striving to use multiple sources of evidence rather than relying on a single source alone”.

Thus, qualitative methods describe a process of investigation in understanding a social or human problem, based on the development of a complex holistic picture, formed with a view to a resource report in detail and in a reasonable situation. In citing Creswell’s explanation, a qualitative method has at least five approaches, namely, narrative, phenomenological, grounded theory, ethnographical and case study. Creswell defines the case study as a method which explores one or more cases within a bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time through detailed and in-depth data collection by involving multiple sources of information. Case studies in social research explain certain phenomena that relate to people, groups, organisations, communities, large towns or

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even countries. Furthermore, Swarnborn explains there are two types of strategy in case studies for studying social phenomena: extensive and intensive strategies. In an extensive strategy, we need to collect relevant evidence of a large number of instances of a phenomenon, while in an intensive strategy, the researcher focuses on only one specific instance of the phenomenon to be studied. In effect, compared with other approaches, the case study method is the standard method in social science.

Moreover, Yin stated that case study research is used when a researcher focuses on answering “how” and “why” questions, and when they want to cover contextual conditions and believe the behaviour of those involved in the study are relevant to the phenomenon under study. Furthermore, Gerring explains when the strategy of a study is “exploratory” rather than “confirmatory”, when a study focuses more on “causal mechanisms” than “causal effects” and when a study has “useful variance” which is available for only a single unit or a small number of units, so that basically, the same case is studied several times.

In the context of this study, case study research is selected for the following reasons. As mentioned earlier, this study attempts to explore defence diplomacy activities within the auspice of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) working mechanisms in Southeast Asia. Therefore, this

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study attempts to answer how these forums are organised and why they are organised the way they are. In this context, this study also intends to conduct explanation rather than confirmation analysis. Moreover, this study focuses on causal mechanism rather than causal effects.\textsuperscript{16}

3. Case Selection

Many experts\textsuperscript{17} and officials\textsuperscript{18} say that classifying ASEAN as a defence community or military alliance in Southeast Asia through defence diplomacy activities is not possible, since ASEAN was not formed to establish a military alliance. Moreover, proving the existence of a process that helps shape a defence community in Southeast Asia requires the collection of vast and diverse data on all defence diplomacy activities. If all data is collected, the research will be too wide and unfocused. Indeed, there are only six areas of practical cooperation that are currently described as phenomena in the defence mechanism of ASEAN’s defence diplomacy, consequently only two types of practical defence cooperation will be assessed to prove that ASEAN’s current defence diplomacy meets the criteria of defence community elements. Other practical defence cooperation strategies are out of the scope of this thesis.

It is important to understand the phenomenon of how the actual mechanism of defence diplomacy, that is associated with defence community elements, took place in Southeast Asia. In order to narrow the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{16} Sukmajati PhD Thesis (2011), \textit{Ibid}, p. 67
\item \textsuperscript{18} See Chapter-6, footnote no 66, The view of the Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff, the expression of the Deputy Defence Minister of Brunei and Director of Policy Office, Singapore
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
field of research and make it more focused in the issue of defence community elements, Bandoro and Emmers suggested focusing on certain areas of cooperation within the auspices of the ADMM and the ADMM-Plus by tracing the process and using interview data. Subsequently, the new regionalism approach and, at the same time, the regional mechanism in handling security issues can be defined more clearly, proving the presence of a defence community in Southeast Asia.

Although this study focuses on the areas of cooperation of the ASEAN member countries in the ADMM and ADMM-Plus events, specifically, the cooperation in peacekeeping operations and maritime security, it takes a great deal of data to obtain comprehensive information. For the purpose of analysis, this study applies a multi-strategy analysis. By using a multi-strategy approach, this study focuses on two areas of cooperation within the ADMM and ADMM-Plus events, to avoid over-treating or repeatedly studying the same point several times, namely maritime strategy and peacekeeping operations. These two areas of cooperation are currently a focus of cooperation in Southeast Asia, and accordingly the research process in these areas will provide a more representative research opportunity. This kind of approach allows a reasonable balance of exploration and comprehension of the dynamic changes in military politics and their consequences. As Huxley stated, there is a lack of inter-operability in ASEAN defence ties. To prove how

19 Series of discussion with Bantarto Bandoro, Professor and Senior Lecturer at Indonesia Defense University in 2013; Interview with Ralf Emmers, at RSIS, Singapore, 20 August 2013
important inter-operability is and how it became the centre of verification for the existence of the elements of a defence community within the ASEAN defence cooperation will be further explained in the sequence chapters.

This study selects Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam as research countries, with research conducted mainly in Jakarta-Indonesia. The reasons for selecting these six ASEAN countries as the study sites are due to several factors, including the limited research time and the readiness of government officials to be interviewed in the proposed timeframe of the interview. Four out of the six chosen countries were founding members of ASEAN, excluding Brunei and Vietnam, and consequently access to defence cooperation data and the involvement of the defence ministry of these countries was more easily obtained. The different forms of government systems, for example, the democratic state of Indonesia, the semi-authoritarian systems of Malaysia and Singapore, the monarchies of Brunei and Thailand, the socialistic regime of Vietnam, are reasons which prove the diversity of the official response of each country at the time of receiving the request for an interview. The different forms of government system of each country is demonstrated by the answers received from a letter requesting an interview with targeted government officials, as well as the government officials’ treatment of the researcher at the time of the interview. The six countries also have a different defence policy to ensure its national defence in terms of government policies of each country in the field of defence cooperation. For instance, Singapore and Malaysia have had FPDA (Five Power Defence Arrangements) as a means of defence cooperation with Commonwealth countries in Southeast Asia.

NATO, even though the military alliance organization has been established since 1949, NATO’s interoperability policy defines the term as the ability for Allies to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational and strategic objectives, available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_84112.htm?
while Brunei, as a small country in terms of total area, entrusts its defence matters to Malaysia. Thus, each country has visibly different defensive orientations.

Collecting data from official statements by designated respondents from six countries is considered to be representative of the defence policy of the ASEAN countries as a whole. With regard to the time frame of the study, data was collected from 2000 to 2012 with consideration that this period of time is sufficient to gain comprehensive data. This was mostly conducted in Indonesia.

4. Data-Gathering Techniques

This study combines three data-gathering techniques, namely, in-depth interviews, direct observation and documentary analysis. Each of these data-gathering techniques will be explained in the following subsections. These three techniques are popular for conducting academic research, since they are comprehensive methods of collecting the required information in a qualitative study. To process the data that has been collected, the researcher used a method of triangulation, generally considered as a process of using multiple sources to clarify meaning in order to verify information. Direct observation and documentary analysis are treated as supporting or complementary data-gathering techniques. English language conference papers, books, journals and periodical articles, newspapers, press releases, etc. were examined to determine perceptions of security, to follow the mechanism of the defence community in Southeast Asia’s defence diplomacy activities and to analyse factors influencing peace and stability in the region. Thus, in order to produce insightful findings, all

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three techniques were applied in this study, in which the in-depth interviews serve as the primary data-gathering technique while other techniques serve as secondary data-gathering techniques.

4.1. In-Depth Interviews

The in-depth interviews were carried out as confidential and secure conversations to explore deeply each respondent's point of view, feelings and perspectives individually, or sometimes in pairs, to provide a more immersive experience. In conducting the in-depth interviews, respondents were divided into one of three categories. However, sometimes an interviewee had a dual status, that of being a bureaucrat, while at the same time also being a high-ranking military figure. Such interviews were targeted at the person from a particular group with sufficient knowledge and information on a specific topic. To validate the usefulness of the data, it was then cross-referenced by asking the opinion of other officials in each ministry of defence of the researched countries.

During the field research in these six designated countries, approximately 34 respondents were interviewed. The list of respondents (interviewees) and the interview guide are included in Appendix-1 and Appendix-2, respectively. The interviews were carried out with mostly prominent officials in the researched countries, such as the former Vice-President of the Republic of Indonesia, the Deputy Defence Minister of Brunei, the Commander-in-Chief of the Brunei Armed Forces, the Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Navy, the Director of the Strategic Defence of

Malaysia and so on. Interviews with experts from Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand also were conducted in order to gain a more comprehensive insight into the topic from the viewpoint of the military, bureaucrats and intellectuals. Most of these individuals have been directly involved in the activities of defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia, or have closely studied matters of defence diplomacy. In these cases, the in-depth interviews were focused on their experiences and the information obtained from their vantage-point of which they had been categorised.

During nearly seven months of field study, the researcher managed to visit the six designated countries and interviewed officials in order to collect as much useful information as possible and to obtain the personal views of the respondents. The first field research was conducted between July and September 2013 and the second field research was conducted between July and September 2014. All the designated countries were visited on the first field research trip, while, during the second field research trip only Indonesia was visited to complete the data collection. In addition, prior to research in the field, the researcher had sent the ‘Terms of Reference’, (included in appendix-2), as a formal procedure to targeted respondents through the office of the Indonesian Defence Attaché that was accredited to the designated countries. This is not to say, however, that there were no obstacles; for example, there were several respondents who were suspicious about the topic and declined permission for the interviews to be recorded. Facing these problems, the researcher used all means available to take notes and to record all conversations. To deal with these issues, the researcher uses a purposeful sampling strategy (a snowball or

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25 The profiles of these respondents can be found in Appendix 1
chain strategy)\textsuperscript{26} in understanding and interpreting research problems. Consequently, by using this strategy, the number of respondents was extended, based on the recommendations of other respondents, and which covered missing information that could not be noted during interviews with certain respondents who prohibited the electronic recording of interviews. The results of recorded interviews with each respondent are provided in the form of a CD-ROM.

With regard to the interview process, the average duration for each interview was 60 to 90 minutes. Even though each respondent had been given information through the ‘Terms of Reference’ that had been sent previously, either through the defence attaché’s office or via email, at the beginning of each interview the respondents were provided with a general introduction to the study.\textsuperscript{27} In this short introduction, the respondents were informed about the main purposes of the study and the information needed for the thesis. Because the research topic involves sensitive issues in ASEAN, the initial brief explanation had to be given to respondents to convince them that any information obtained from the interviews would remain confidential and used only for academic purposes.

In most interviews, the respondents who were identified as intellectuals preferred informal discussion, while the bureaucrats and military officials preferred the interview to be conducted in more formal circumstances. Most of the interviews were carried out in private, except with the military officials in Vietnam when the interviews were conducted in groups. The questions

\textsuperscript{26} See further Creswell (2007), \textit{Op.cit}, p. 126-129; Creswell suggested applying a purposeful sampling strategy. This strategy is useful “because it can purposefully inform an understanding of the research problem and central phenomenon in the study”\textsuperscript{27} Buttolph Johnson, Richard A. Joslyn and H.T. Reynolds, \textit{Political Science Research Methods} (Washington: CQ Press, 2001), p. 219; Johnson names the general introduction for respondent as ‘informed consent’
prepared before the interviews were used flexibly, and encouraged the respondent to talk freely. In the context of this study, a set of questions was prepared in the interview guide prior to the interviews. As explained by Patton, "the standardized open-ended interview consists of a set of questions carefully worded and arranged with the intention of taking each of the respondents through the same sequence and asking each of the respondents the same questions with essentially the same words". However, once the interviews had started, the questions could be expanded to explore related topics of the thesis.

In addition, during the field research, many respondents in the designated countries were valuable to this study, not just because of their previous experiences but also due to their voluntarily helpfulness in introducing the researcher to other respondents that they thought might help in giving opinions which were relevant to the study. For instance, a respondent from RSIS, Singapore, introduced the researcher to another expert who is currently writing articles about Southeast Asian defence cooperation. On another occasion, the researcher was introduced to a military official in Indonesia. From this discussion, the researcher asked about and gathered a wide range of information from the personal experiences of a respondent who was involved at staff level in an Expert Working Group of ADMM, and who now serves as the Director of International Relations in the Ministry of Defence. In such discussions or interviews, the researcher was able to explore the respondent’s feelings about the so-called defence diplomacy mechanism in certain areas of cooperation within ADMM and ADMM-Plus. At the same time, the researcher could ask the respondent's opinions on how he perceived other officers’ feelings and behaviour as they took part in the defence diplomacy mechanism in Southeast Asia.

These kinds of personal views and experiences were important, as the researcher obtained much information, in terms of the sense of community, from the respondent mentioned. Moreover, from that interview, the researcher also had the opportunity to observe and explore more comprehensively the process in the area of cooperation that had been organised and carried out. It is important to mention that the interviews were tape-recorded to avoid any errors in what the respondents actually said, since the interviews were not always carried out in exactly the same manner as the interview guide stipulated. During the interview process, the respondents were given an opportunity to provide their own opinions. At the same time, to record the information as comprehensively as possible, extra notes were taken as well.

As noted earlier, opportunities for interviewing a high-ranking military official were sometimes difficult to obtain. This may have been due to the fact that most official information or documents in the military being classified as “confidential” so they cannot be revealed to the public, or due to the restrictions of the official’s schedule at the proposed time of the interview. Prior to the interview sessions with high-ranking military officials, the researcher got formal confirmation from their office, either by email or phone communication, to determine the availability of each respondent. Even when interviews were carried out, unfortunately it sometimes happened that the information obtained from the high-ranking military officials was not very different from the formal institutional statement that can easily be found in a variety of mass media. To overcome this problem, the researcher looked for subordinate officials to elaborate on the information and convinced them that their answers would be kept confidential and would not in any way endanger them or their institutions, because the study was for academic purposes.
4.2. Direct Observation

Direct observations were carried out mainly in the Indonesian National Defence Force Peacekeeping Centre (INDF PKC), in Sentul, Indonesia. The decision to conduct direct observation in the INDF PKC was based on the consideration that this centre for the preparation of Indonesian peacekeepers is the largest and the most comprehensive peacekeeping centre model in Asia Pacific today. The Centre regularly carries out peacekeeping exercises, seminars, workshops, education and host international peacekeeping events that are attended by international and regional military personnel.

The researcher visited INDF PKC, for field research purposes, on two occasions in July and August 2014. Besides that, an intensive direct observation was carried out initially between 2007 and 2010 during the researcher’s time as an operational staff member in INDF PKC. During direct observation, the researcher closely observed the preparation phase of the Indonesian Peacekeepers for missions in the Middle East and Western Sahara. The researcher also sat in international classes for peacekeepers and observed the atmosphere. On these occasions, both in the field and in the classroom, the researcher carefully observed the attitudes of military personnel from various countries, especially from ASEAN member states. For example, whether there were indications of any sense of equality, dominance or solidarity and solidity between them, or conflicting attitudes which might have arisen behind the scenes. This atmosphere could not be found during formal interviews or through documents, and the researcher tried to understand and capture the sense of mutual trust, mutual understanding and the maturation of inter-operability readiness of the regional military personnel.
4.3. Documentary Analysis

Analysis of documents is one of the data-gathering methods used in this study. This method, according to Patton, can provide additional as well as initial information, which can be explored further through in-depth interviews and direct observation.\(^\text{29}\) The advantages of implementing document analysis is to assist researchers to avoid misspellings that might arise from the interview, as well as assisting them in understanding the details of activities, and especially in the focus of a research topic that can be developed in an interview session.\(^\text{30}\) In the context of this study, documentary analysis was carried out in order to find patterns of defence cooperation, its process and event phases to find the elements that may be contained within a defence community. In practice, documentary analyses were conducted before, during and after the field research.

Documentary analysis was applied in this study in order to collect information on the proliferation of defence diplomacy terminology in relation to Southeast Asia defence. This first step was conducted before the field research, guiding the researcher to find a fundamental reason for the necessity of defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia. This is where the role of documentary analysis becomes important: to understand the direction of the organisation of defence diplomacy in the region. Likewise, during the field research, as mentioned before, the results of analysing documents were very helpful in making the interview sessions more focused, both for in-depth interviews and direct observation. The importance of the role of documentary analysis is very significant and supports other methods during this research process.

5. **Data Analysis**

In interpreting data, this study takes into account the importance of consistency found in some samples, as well as the accuracy of the information contained on the social phenomena on the studied object.\(^{31}\) The process of data collection, data analysis and report writing are not distinct steps in the process; they are interrelated and often continued simultaneously in a research project.\(^{32}\) Creswell points out that the early stage of the analytical process involves the researcher organising the data into folders with index cards, then converting the data into textual data for the appropriate folders. The next procedures are managing the data, reading and memoing data, describing, classifying, interpreting and presenting data.\(^{33}\) These procedures must be conducted in sequence and reiterated.

In the context of this study, all the information collected from the interviews, or information that was recorded in non-textual form was converted into textual data or transcribed. The researcher categorised the data into the following: information on defence cooperation as a defence diplomacy; the organisational structure of defence cooperation; the development of defence cooperation which shows defence regionalism; and related defence cooperation which forms part of the elements of a defence community. As mentioned previously, all data needed to be carefully read to achieve a comprehensive understanding. Cross-referencing and double-checking data using triangulation was carried out to ensure accuracy and validity.\(^{34}\)

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The process of ensuring accuracy and validity requires multiple forms of evidence to support each aspect. From the evidence found, an interpretation was carried out to match that evidence with the other aspect. In this instant, the interpretation and argument must have a correlation with the logical framework. If these are both coherent, then connections are made. Otherwise, if the interpretation and argument had no correlation with the logical framework, they were treated and re-evaluated. Moreover, if interpretation and arguments sounded plausible, then interpretations and arguments were made. On the other hand, if they seemed implausible, these tentative interpretations and arguments were treated and re-evaluated.

In developing interpretations and arguments, this study applies both deductive and inductive analysis. As Mannheim and Rich explain, inductive analysis refers to an analytical process in which theories are built from empirical events, and deductive analysis refers to an analytical process in which theories are used to explain real-world events. In developing inductive analysis, this study uses simple patterns of information from narrative text in interpretation and argument; more specifically, the information was gained from interviews, since the interpretation in this thesis is based on empirical data. Meanwhile, in developing deductive analysis, this study applies the logical framework of a defence community formation to explain the phenomenon of defence diplomacy activities in Southeast Asia. In general, to understand the elements of a defence community in

35 In developing interpretations and arguments, this study applies two data analysis techniques namely the conceptual coherence and plausibility. See Matthew B. Miles and A. Michael Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis. A Sourcebook of New Methods (Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications, 1984), pp. 215-130
36 Sukmajati (2011), p. 76
ASEAN's defence diplomacy, it is necessary to understand the requirements of a defence community as discussed in Chapter 1, and the theory of new regionalism that was proposed by Hettne.38

6. Summary

In order to find the elements of a defence community, this study applies qualitative research, which relies on interviews as the primary source. This study focuses on ASEAN's defence cooperation on ADMM and ADMM-Plus as its units of analysis and determined six countries in Southeast Asia as the loci of the study. In collecting information on how and why ADMM and ADMM-Plus were organised, this study applies a triangulation method by combining documentary analysis, in-depth interviews and direct observation techniques. Finally, this study applied all data analysis techniques that have been discussed above in order to gain valid findings.

Chapter Four
THE HISTORICAL EXISTENCE OF COLLECTIVE DEFENCE ORGANISATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

1. Introduction

Before further discussing the empirical analysis of defence cooperation in Southeast Asia, it is necessary to trace the historical evidence of collective defence organisations that once existed in this region, which are believed to contain the elements of a defence community. This chapter attempts to analyse how defence cooperation has been instrumental in helping to address regional security issues. This chapter does not intend to examine why organisations such as ASEAN are currently not a form of defence community, but aims to prove that in the process of achieving the ASEAN community through the development of defence cooperation under the auspices of the ADMM and ADMM-Plus, there is an element of a defence community.

The characteristics of a collective defence organisation are very similar to the characteristics of a defence community or military alliance. With reference to the theory of regionalism, the researcher believes that it can be used to find elements of a defence community in the defence cooperation that has been operationalised by ASEAN countries presently in the region. It is noted that military cooperation between ASEAN member states is aimed at tackling regional security problems. Currently, the concept of a defence community in the region has not been clearly defined, but it is not impossible that a defence community really exists in Southeast Asia.

The chapter begins with a further discussion on the regionalism theory which is the basis for an assessment of defence cooperation in
Southeast Asia with the aim that the development of ASEAN defence cooperation can be assessed. The form of regional organisation in the region has evolved since the early 1950s within the context of a changing regional security environment. Assessing the evolution of a regional organisation is expected to paint a portrait of the development of regionalism in Southeast Asia from old regionalism to new regionalism, in which this theory will be applied as a basic theory for the whole research.

By first discussing the creation of the SEATO as part of the United States Cold War containment policy and other organisations in the region, followed by analysis of the characteristics of a defence community associated with the evolution of regionalism, a connection is expected between the activities of a defence cooperation and regionalism theory. This theory is used to prove the existence of defence community characteristics in defence cooperation in Southeast Asia (see Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1

The Existence of Inter-Operability Component

Source: Researcher’s own figure
Note: The above figure shows the establishment of various regional organisations that illustrate the evolution of regionalism in Southeast Asia. In this context, it is necessary to prove the existence of inter-operability components in the activities of ASEAN’s defence diplomacy under the auspices of ADMM and ADMM-Plus as the evidence of characteristics of a defence community in Southeast Asia.
ASEAN member states translate one of the basic principles of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation by stating that each member state has the right to be free from external interference, subversion or coercion in the form of strengthening defence cooperation among member states.\(^1\) “The basic idea is for ASEAN to be able to respond collectively and promptly to intra-state conflict and security challenges, from within as well as from outside the region, based on the understanding that a community will provide bigger assurance that the conflict will be solved in a peaceful manner”.\(^2\) It is within such a context that ASEAN, through the form of defence cooperation, can handle the challenges appropriately.

2. **The Development of Regionalism**

ASEAN is an example of regional cooperation which represents two waves of regionalism. This organisation was founded during the Cold War, during the first wave of regionalism when its original members attempted to reduce the negative impact of the Cold War to regional stability, as well as to avoid war between themselves by its basic principle of non-interference and peaceful settlement of disputes.\(^3\) In the post-Cold War era, ASEAN leaders prompted a new discourse on the view of security challenges which incorporated military and non-military threats into its agenda.\(^4\) The emergence of new challenges in the form of non-traditional security threats had wide-reaching effects and were transnational in scope. Mitigating such threats through national solutions is often inadequate and needs the cooperation of

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1 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, available at www.asean.org  
2 Alexandra Retno Wulan and Bantarto Bandoro, *ASEAN’s Quest for a Full-Fledged Community* (Jakarta: CSIS, 2007), p. 3  
4 Interview with Juwono Sudarsono, Former Defence Minister of Indonesia Jakarta, 13 March 2013
regional governance and multilateral cooperation. “This trend to strengthen cooperation has resulted in the expansion of its mandate beyond economic cooperation to also encompass security cooperation”. The involvement of regional governance to tackle this new challenge led to the development of regionalism in Southeast Asia and is referred to as new regionalism. New regionalism is not an option but a necessity in addressing non-traditional security threats in the region which are multiple in nature and threaten the safety of the population, national sovereignty and territorial integrity, so that military involvement in addressing non-traditional security threats becomes essential. Consequently, military security cooperation is one of the effective aspects of regionalism among developing world countries.

Analysing regional security cooperation cannot be separated from the analysis of the development of regionalism and its perpetuation aspects. Theories regarding regionalism are helpful in analysing the sustainability of a region. It is through historical explanation that the development of regionalism can be traced back and explains why a region still exists and determines what possible efforts should be made to perpetuate it.

A region or area is defined as a group of states in proximity to each other within a particular geographic area. Nevertheless, geographic proximity is not enough to unite a country in some areas. Hettne and Söderbaum argue that geographic proximity must be supported by a similarity of cultural values,

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6 Ibid, p. 4
7 Ibid, p. 2
8 Craig A. Snyder, Contemporary Security and Strategy (Palgrave: Macmillan, 2008), p. 228; see also Craig A. Snyder, Regional Security and Regional Conflict paper presented to 48th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (Chicago, IL: March 2007), p. 2
social bonds and the same historical legacy.\textsuperscript{9} Meanwhile, Jervis argues that a region “can be defined as groups of interconnected states where a change in any relationship within the group will influence the others, and that the region as a whole develops characteristics and behaviours that are distinct from those of the individual states”.\textsuperscript{10}

In this way, the requirement for the formation of a region can be met geographically and structurally. With this logic, any regions of the world can be a group of countries that declare themselves belong to the same region. However, not all regions have the intensity of interaction or the same progress between one area and another. Bennett argues that the concept of ‘Anglosphere’ is an example of a region that is not bound by geographic proximity. It is a kind of ‘network civilization without a corresponding political forum’, in which its boundaries are by their very nature vague.\textsuperscript{11}

Based on the new regionalism approach,\textsuperscript{12} the development of regionalism depends on three things, namely: 1) the support of the major powers in the region (regional great powers); 2) the level of interaction between countries in the region; and 3) mutual trust between countries in the region. It explains why one region may be lagging behind another due to power problems in the country and the desire to form a region. It could be that an area of integration cannot be created because integration in the region is not desired or pursued by the greater powers.

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The new regionalism in ASEAN has been determined by a set of structural changes in the international system where it is closely attached to the global structural transformation, namely from a bilateral form to multilateral ones, from a bipolar world (major power rivalry) to multipolar ones. As has been discussed in previous chapters, the collapse of the bipolar system paved the way for all major powers to come into the same arena to discuss security issues. In facing such a situation, ASEAN member states adopted a strategy to build equilibrium between the great powers and themselves.\textsuperscript{13} Buzynski points out that, “As an institution, ASEAN acted as a diplomatic vehicle for the coordination of regional positions”.\textsuperscript{14} Since the end of the Cold War, new expectations have stimulated the demand for an extension of ASEAN functions into areas other than the diplomatic field.\textsuperscript{15} Following such demands, the goal to develop a coherent region will not come into reality unless the ASEAN member states integrate with an overall sense of community.

Moreover, the pressures that ASEAN faces today could be depicted as a clash between the old and the new regionalism.\textsuperscript{16} “There are three differences between the ‘Old and New Regionalism’. First, the old regionalism has been characterized as the product of the Cold War during a bipolar era which was inward looking and exclusive, whereas the new regionalism taking shape in a multipolar world order, is outward looking and non-exclusive. Second, the government created the old regionalism from


\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Ibid}, p. 555
the outside (from above), meanwhile the new regionalism is more spontaneous, from within and from below, in which the constituent states themselves are the main players. Third, the old regionalism was created for specific economic objectives, whereas the new regionalism is more comprehensive, and multidimensional in processing.\textsuperscript{17}

Thus, the old regionalism usually refers to the Cold War product, whereas the new regionalism emerges as the second wave of regional cooperation. It implies a stronger emphasis on political dimensions, in a situation where ‘national’ economics is outgrowing their national politics. As Fawcett points out, regionalism can be defined as state-led political projects, which aim to promote intergovernmental policy collaboration at the regional level.\textsuperscript{18} It is the top-down processes in which governments deliberately attempt to enhance cooperation primarily through the creation of regional institutions.\textsuperscript{19}

By examining the development of regionalism and defence diplomacy operational mechanisms that occur today in the region, this research tries to identify and trace the characteristics of a defence community that may exist in Southeast Asia. By using the new regionalism approach, a common ground is anticipated between the need for defence diplomacy and the

elements of a defence community in political and defence cooperation in Southeast Asia.

3. Historical Evidence of Collective Defence in Regional Organisations in Southeast Asia

Examining the existence of a regional organisation creation cannot be separated from efforts to trace the influence of superpowers in the formation of these organisations, as well as any defence community that has historically existed in Southeast Asia. The roots of regional organisations in Southeast Asia began in the early 1950s with the United States' efforts to create a defensive military group aimed at containing Communism in East Asia and increasing regional stability. Even before the establishment of ASEAN in August 1967, the regions tended towards cooperation and regional affiliation. The countries of Southeast Asia attempted a number of different regional groupings, each with slightly different membership, objectives, motivations and length of existence.

Various regional organisations were established in Southeast Asia, including SEATO, ASA, MAPHILINDO and ASEAN itself. Every organisation had its own reasons in the process of its formation, as well as factors that caused malfunctioning. Major powers like the United States, involved in the formation of a regional organisation, had different interests from the Southeast Asian countries that were members of those organisations. The United States, as mentioned above, was involved in defence relations with the Philippines and Thailand under the SEATO arrangement, whereas England retained its military personnel in Malaysia and Singapore, and China developed its power with its interest in the region.20 Southeast Asian

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20 Jason D. Lewis, *The Integration of Southeast Asia: ASEAN's Role in the Creation of a Security Community* (Ph.D Dissertation, December 1999), p. 50
countries which at that time had just a few years of independence were looking for a forum that could represent the form of their political orientation based on the national interests of each country through regional integration.

3.1. The Creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO)

From the late 1940s to the early 1950s, many regional conferences were held to examine various possible forms of regional organisation. One reason for holding such conferences was a common concern for the problem of Indonesian independence, beginning with an Asian conference in New Delhi in 1949, followed by a proposal from the Philippine President Quirino, for the creation of a Southeast Asian Union to provide an anti-communist alliance that did not get a serious response from attendees. However, it can be said that the idea was a corner stone for the establishment of a regional organisation in the Southeast Asian region.

The proposal initiated by the Philippine President was followed by a meeting of Asian and Africa countries in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955. This was a meeting of the South-South states that had just gained independence, with a view to speeding up the process of decolonisation and to protect their newly acquired independence. Although no formal organisation was created until the creation of SEATO, such conferences were able to generate feelings of solidarity and common identity among South-South countries.

Through the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty (Manila Pact), SEATO was established on 8th September, 1954. The influence of the U.S. in creating this defence organisation was very pronounced since its creation was part of the U.S. strategy at the time to contain presumed communist expansion around the globe and to provide a collective security
arrangement in the region.\textsuperscript{21} The design of SEATO was similar to that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). As suggested by Halle, NATO had been organised to contain the Communist empire in the Baltic, while SEATO had been created to block further communist expansion in Asia.\textsuperscript{22}

The Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty clearly indicated the three operating principles of SEATO: 1) to provide a military or defence shield for the area; 2) to prevent and counter subversive activities; and 3) to assist the Asian partners in their social, economic and cultural development. To advance in these areas, three bodies were devised: a diplomatic apparatus, a military apparatus and the Secretariat General. The governing body of SEATO was the Council of Ministers, composed of the foreign ministers of the member countries. They were to determine policies and review the progress of its activities at its annual meetings.\textsuperscript{23}

The member countries of SEATO were defined in Article VIII; “the general area of Southeast Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian parties, and the general area of the Southwest Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes’ north latitude”.\textsuperscript{24} Referring to this geographical area, the countries covered include all Southeast Asian states. However, only two Southeast Asia countries joined the organisation: the Philippines and Thailand, whereas other countries were reluctant to join in an organisation known as an alliance. The reason they refused to join a defence alliance such SEATO was due to its initiative coming from a

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{21} See Jason D. Lewis, \textit{The Integration of Southeast Asia: ASEAN’s Role in the Creation of a Security Community} (PhD Dissertation, December 1999), pp. 48-49; See also Louis J, Halle, \textit{The Cold War as History} (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 338
\item \textsuperscript{22} Louis J, Halle, \textit{The Cold War as History} (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 338
\item \textsuperscript{23} Further see \textit{Text of the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty} (International Organization, vol. 8, no. 4, Nov 1964), pp.617-621; see also Jason D. Lewis, \textit{The Integration of Southeast Asia: ASEAN’s Role in the Creation of a Security Community} (PhD Dissertation, December 1999), p. 55
\item \textsuperscript{24} \textit{The Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty}, p. 619
\end{itemize}
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Western country, an initiative seen as contrary to the spirit of the 1949 Asian conference to accelerate the process of decolonisation.

The existence of two Southeast Asian states in SEATO certainly could not be representative of the political orientation of Southeast Asian countries. As a consequence, however, it led to the birth of new ideas and new proposals from leaders of other Southeast Asian countries.

3.2. The Establishment of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA)

The foundation of ASA in 1961 presented examples of how the policy makers in Southeast Asia related to the American foreign policy objective of containing China. Although the existence of ASA was comparatively short, from July 1961 through August 1967, it provides an excellent opportunity to understand how a defence community pattern existed in Southeast Asia.  

The formation of ASA originated from a proposal presented by the Philippines President, Carlos Garcia, and the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tuanku Abdul Rahman, in early 1959. They drafted a proposal called the Southeast Asian Friendship and Economic Treaty (SEAFET). This made sense, considering the three member states of ASA, the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand, were the three countries with the highest economic growth in Southeast Asia in 1960. Together, they produced half the world’s tin, rubber and coconut oil.

Although the purpose of the establishment of the ASA was for economic cooperation, the leaders of Malaysia and the Philippines failed to persuade other Southeast Asian countries to join. However, the main

26 Ibid, p. 245
purpose of the establishment of the ASA can be inferred from the remark of Thailand’s Defence Minister on the eve of the signing of the ASA declaration: “while the ASA states of the organization, this stage or level of cooperation should quickly be replaced by or subordinated to a coordination of military policies”.27

Nevertheless, the dysfunction of ASA was not merely caused by the sceptical view of Southeast Asian countries to join the organisation, because they considered ASA to be a form of Western bloc, as its members—Malaysia, The Philippine and Thailand—belonged to a Western Alliance. In fact, the ASA foreign ministers were aware that their pro-Western alignment would lessen the chance of the organisation’s expansion. This view was strengthened by an American political observer, Judd, who saw ASA as politically subordinate to U.S. interests in Southeast Asia.28 Moreover, a conflict of interest between the Philippines and Malaysia also contributed significantly to the end of ASA. The Philippines government assumed that the case of Sabah ownership was still unresolved and, on 22 June, 1962, the Government of the Philippines officially submitted to the British government a formal claim to Sabah.29 As a result, the denial of Malaysia rights over Sabah by the Philippine caused ASA’s totally paralysis in 1963 and opened an opportunity for the establishment of a new regional organisation.

27 Ibid; see also Hugo Durant, ASA: Prospects and Results (Eastern World, vol. XVII, August 1963), p. 12
29 Lewis (1999), Op.cit, p. 59
3.3. The Formation of Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia (MAPHILINDO)

After the failure of ASA, another regional organisation was established, called MAPHILINDO, comprising Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia. While ASA’s primary aim was to form an economic framework for cooperation, the objective of MAPHILINDO was to create cooperation in the fields of economy, culture and social science. 30 Discussion on MAPHILINDO appeared at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the three member countries in June, 1963. The establishment of MAPHILINDO by these countries can be described as defining Southeast Asian regionalism on the basis of ethnic identity. 31 The name MAPHILINDO is derived from the first letters of each member. For the first time, Indonesia under the Sukarno administration was willing to join a regional organisation. Previously, Indonesia declined the invitation to the proposed regional group and was of the opinion that it would be best to strengthen ties with countries of the Southeast Asian region only through bilateral cooperation. Moreover, “without Indonesian participation, any effort at regional cooperation in Southeast Asia would at best be a limited achievement”. 32

However, unifying regional politics through economic, cultural and social science rarely runs smoothly. Once again, conflict within the organisation, which prioritised national rather than regional interests, caused the failure of MAPHILINDO as a means of unifying the region. The first conflict was Indonesian opposition to the creation of a New Federation of

30 See further Amfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, Regional Organization and Order in South-East Asia (New York; St. Martin’s Press, 1982)
Malaysia. In this case, the United States favoured the creation of a new federation by President Sukarno of Indonesia as a form of neo-colonialism interest in the region. Opposition not only came from Indonesia, but from the Philippines. Both Indonesia and the Philippines were trying to work in tandem to prevent the formation of a new Federation of Malaysia. Moreover, Indonesia took a step further by declaring a policy of confrontation against Malaysia. According to Armstrong, the strongest argument against the Federation of Malaysia was based on the need of the two countries to protect themselves against an impending Chinese Communist surge into Southeast Asia and wanting to control a disputed area (North Borneo) for its natural resources, as well as territorial aggrandisement.

The second argument against the formation of the Federation of Malaysia was related to the Philippines' claim to part of Sabah. Settlement of this claim involved British intervention on the side of Malaysia and the United States on the side of the Philippines. Although the dialogue between representatives of the British and the United States was already underway on the claim, and the UN study team had not completed their research reports on self-determination of the population of Sabah, the government of the Federation of Malaysia was inaugurated on 16th September 1963. Of course, this action provoked reactions from Indonesia and the Philippines. Indonesia

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refused to recognise the new Federation and declared a confrontation, while the Philippines recalled its ambassador from Kuala Lumpur.36

Once again, a newly formed regional organisation of Southeast Asia failed to perform their function because of a rupture in diplomatic relations between its members. However, MAPHILINDO’s failure to function as a means of unifying the countries in Southeast Asia was, in fact, also due to the issue of racial profiling. The emphasis on racial profiling in the formation of MAPHILINDO can be inferred from the Philippines’ President Macapagal’s statement, “the first step toward the realization of his lifelong dream of reuniting the Malay nation… triplets long separated by colonial foster parents, now at least about to rediscover their common origin and shape their common destiny”.37 As a region that is highly heterogeneous in terms of ethnic, cultural and natural resources, the concept espousing a racial group became ineffective, because the countries that were not racially Malaysia refused to join. According to the Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, the existence of MAPHILINDO was jeopardising the political stability in the region by being based on racial unity.38

As with its predecessor organisations, one of the factors of MAPHILINDO’s failure was due to conflicts of interest between members. However, there were interesting aspects that were successfully triggered by the presence of MAPHILINDO, namely, the emergence of consciousness in Southeast Asian leaders on the need for equality in relations between states. The integrity of an organisation would only be realised if differences, as well as diverse interests, can be placed after common interests through mutual trust and mutual understanding. MAPHILINDO was never actually disbanded, and by

36 Lewis (1999), Op.cit, p. 64
38 Ibid, p. 65
realising the concept of togetherness, as well as prioritising regional rather than national interests, became the spirit of the formation of ASEAN in August 1967.

3.4. The Formation of ASEAN

The US involvement in the establishment of the ASEAN was pronounced along with the worsening security situation in South Vietnam in 1960. The weakening of the leadership of President Ngo Dinh Diem, who was little more than a puppet of U.S. imperialism, caused great concern in the American government that if Diem’s regime fell into Communist hands, then all of Southeast Asia would be lost to the free world system.\(^39\) Diem’s oppressive strategies, including attacks on students and Buddhist monks, created a worse situation in South Vietnam. The U.S. representative urged Diem to ease his repressive tactics; however, he ignored this advice and the worsening situation in South Vietnam lead to a coup against him on 2 November, 1963.\(^40\) The instability in Saigon drove the U.S. Government to take further steps to avoid South Vietnam becoming a Communist state.\(^41\) During this time, the U.S. again began to push the concept of regional organisations in Southeast Asia to protect their interests in the region, by encouraging the leaders of Southeast Asian countries to form a new organisation to replace the paralysed ASA and MAPHILINDO.

The failures of SEATO, ASA and MAPHILINDO and, after the end of the confrontation, the ensuing tension between the countries, encouraged the leaders of the countries in Southeast Asia to form a new association. The Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand signed a document for the formation of the Association of Southeast

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40 Lodge (1998), *Op,cit*, p. 117-118
41 Ibid, p. 41
Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Bangkok, Thailand. On 8th August, 1967, the Association was established with the aim to promote economic, cultural, technical and political cooperation and advancement of Southeast Asian nations. Reconciliation brokered by Thailand between the three member countries of MAPHILINDO had raised awareness among the founding fathers of ASEAN that regional cooperation was essential or the region’s future would remain uncertain. A key factor behind the creation of ASEAN was the willingness of member states to act collectively to be independent from former colonial powers.

The rise of China and efforts to avoid the dependence of security on the U.S. and Japan, led to renewed interest in Southeast Asian regionalism, and the desire for regional neutrality to remove Southeast Asia from Cold War military action. If a new regional organisation could alleviate political tensions between member states, each could concentrate their energies on economic development, which in turn would reduce the attractiveness of Communism to the local populations. The foundation already established by ASA, combined with new political and security relations, soon helped lead to the creation of the ASEAN.

Despite ASEAN’s establishment to prioritise economic growth, socio-cultural and development in the region of Southeast Asia, ASEAN member states should try to protect mutual interests and create regional solidarity, as

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42 Furthermore see in www.asean.org Association of Southeast Asian Nations history, accessed on 17 August 2014
43 See the History of ASEAN Declaration at www.asean.org
47 Ibid, p. 506
well as promote regional peace and stability.\(^{48}\) As contained in the text of the Declaration of ASEAN, the member states understand that the problem of insecurity in the region is political instability and underdeveloped economies, as well as security concerns of external intervention.\(^{49}\) Only with the success of overcoming these problems can lasting security be realised in the region.

Addressing these issues, there needs to be an acceleration of economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavour and the promotion of regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationships between the countries of the region.\(^{50}\) Accordingly, the basic principle of political stability, which can ensure the regional security of ASEAN, is the existence of stable and significant economic development. However, ASEAN almost suffered the same fate as other regional organisations previously created. The Philippines’ effort to reassert its intention to pursue its claim on Sabah in 1968 threatened the existence of ASEAN. Only with the intention to preserve the integrity of the organisation in order to create lasting security in the region, by subordinating their national interests to cooperation, can ASEAN survive.

Nevertheless, the United States policy through the Nixon Doctrine in 1969, which intended to limit its commitment in the region, provided insight to the leaders of Southeast Asian countries that the stability of the region depended entirely on their own efforts. Since the announcement of the Nixon doctrine, ASEAN changed their orientation; from prioritising its economic growth to more concern about security. At the 1971 Ministerial


\(^{49}\) See *The ASEAN Declaration* at www.asean.org

\(^{50}\) Ibid
Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, the ASEAN member states declared the principles of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) for the region. The declaration of ZOPFAN, followed by the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 1976 and the Treaty of Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) in 1995 provided ASEAN with mechanisms to help manage regional security.\(^{51}\) These mechanisms are desirable objectives for ASEAN’s role as a forum for inter-member conflict-prevention and resolution.\(^{52}\) In essence, despite ASEAN member states placing economic progress as their main priority, ASEAN member states could not isolate their economic drive from the political issues of war and peace that major power politics introduced in the region at the time.\(^{53}\)

Furthermore, the declaration of ZOPFAN showed that the Southeast Asian region was no longer considered a contested area for the influence of a major power, and in this way this neutralisation represented a programme to ensure stability and maintain peace in the region to ASEAN member states. by improving the welfare of their people.\(^{54}\) Therefore, ZOPFAN, TAC and SEANWFZ was opened up to be accessed by certain states. However, without endorsement from the three major powers at the time – the U.S., China and the Soviet Union - the concept of ZOPFAN lay idle for many years.

ASEAN expansion began when Brunei joined as a sixth member on 8\(^{th}\) January, 1984, not long after Brunei gained independence. ASEAN

\(^{51}\) M.C. Abad, Jr., *The Role of ASEAN Security Multilateralism ZOPFAN, TAC and SEANWFZ* (Bandar Seri Begawan: Paper presented at the ARF, Professional Development Programme for Foreign Affairs and Defence Officials, 2000), p. 1


\(^{54}\) *Ibid*, p. 3
member states amounted to a total of ten consecutive states after the integration of Vietnam on 28th July, 1995, Laos and Myanmar on 23rd July, 1997 and Cambodia on 30th April, 1999. During the enlargement of ASEAN, many regional cooperatives within the framework of ASEAN were formed, especially with regard to economic development, such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992 and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994. However, no single organisation was built for the specific purpose of addressing security issues, in terms of the leading sector of these regional organisations not being the Ministry of Defence, until the formation of ADMM in 2006.

3.5. The Emergence of ADMM

One of the significant developments of regional organisations to be studied was the establishment of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM). The proposal for the ASEAN Security Community (ASC) in the 2003 Bali Concord II declaration was initially the origin of ADMM’s creation. Shortly after this, the proposal changed into a Plan of Action which was adopted at the 10th ASEAN Summit, held in Vientiane on 29 November, 2004, which stipulates that ASEAN shall work towards the convening of an annual ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting. The inaugural meeting of the ADMM was held in Kuala Lumpur on 9 May, 2006. The formation of the ADMM was based on the initiative of ASEAN member states with the aim of gaining ‘strategic space’ and to reduce ‘technology disparity’ for ASEAN member states. In this context, all ASEAN member states have a forum or means for dialogue to convey their political interest, defence and economy

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55 See further, admm.asean.org, was accessed on 2 February 2014
56 Interviewed with Juwono Sudarsono, former Defence Minister of the Republic of Indonesia, on 19 March 2013
issues, as well as a forum for dialogue to create a sense of understanding and transparency in relation to military cooperation.

The ADMM should not be seen in isolation from the way ASEAN, as a regional entity, perceives developments in its immediate strategic environment.\(^{57}\) It is suggested that ADMM should be an integral part of the regional organisation of ASEAN, specifically tackling the issue of security. As Bandoro said, “Because ADMM is established to reflect the need for ASEAN Defence Ministers to address comprehensively regional security problems, the ministers agreed that the specific objectives of the ADMM would be (a) to promote regional peace and stability through dialogue and cooperation in defence and security; (b) to give guidance to existing senior defence and military officials through dialogue and cooperation in the field of defence and security within ASEAN, and between ASEAN dialogue partners; (c) to promote mutual trust and confidence through greater understanding of defence and security challenges, as well as the enhancement of transparency and openness; and (d) to contribute to the establishment of an ASEAN Security Community (ASC) as stipulated in the Bali Concord II and to promote the implementation of the Vientiane Action Programme on the ASC”\(^{58}\).

After its inauguration, the ADMM began to consider broadening its dialogue partnership with other regional states. An outward-looking orientation is shown in 2007 in ADMM concepts that set a wider meeting with


outside regional dialogue partners. In October 2010, the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) was inaugurated at a meeting in Hanoi. This ADMM-Plus consisted of ASEAN Defence Ministers joining their eight external power counterparts from Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea and the United States.

Observing the development of the ADMM, there are fundamental differences in the process of its formation compared to previous regional organisations. The establishment of previous regional organisations was based on initiatives and encouragement from countries outside the region who had vested interests, whereas the establishment of the ADMM and ADMM-Plus was purely on the initiatives of ASEAN. The concept paper adopted at the inaugural ADMM “views the establishment of the ADMM as complementing other regional efforts to facilitate the interactions between the region’s defence and military officials in promoting security dialogue and cooperation”. It also served as the main driving force for defence dialogue and cooperation within the ASEAN member states through consultation, coordination and report.

There are three important factors in the second meeting of Defence Ministers of Southeast Asian countries that produced documents called the ADMM Joint Declaration. “First, a framework for institutionalization the form for dialogue and consultation to enhance mutual understanding and dialogue, either within the member states of ASEAN or extra-regional powers. The second framework, as stated in the ADMM Three-Year Work Programme, deals with practical defence cooperation between ASEAN

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60 Bandoro (2009), Op.cit, pp. 3-4; see also Protocol to the Concept Paper for the Establishment of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting, Adopted by the Defence Ministers at the 2nd ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting in Singapore on 14 Nov 2007, available at www.cil.nus.edu.sg
militaries. The third framework focuses on ASEAN’s Defence Ministers to engage countries outside ASEAN in a dialogue process, but at a pace comfortable with ASEAN countries”.61 However, “it would have invited comparisons with the discredited great power security guarantees of the Cold War era, represented by the increasingly defunct SEATO”.62

Like ASEAN as a whole, the ADMM has acknowledged the external environment and has actively engaged friends and dialogue partners from outside the region. By connecting with the external environment, the ADMM allows ASEAN “to draw on the varied perspectives and resources of a wide range of non-ASEAN countries in addressing the security challenges of the region”.63 Such steps had an added-value in the process of ASEAN regionalism with the outward-looking mechanism to engage actively with external partners. “A combination of cohesiveness amongst ASEAN countries and active external engagement will enhance ASEAN’s resilience and enable ASEAN to position itself to influence the development of constructive relationships between the major powers”.64 This is a necessary step if ASEAN is to have a sustained regional peace, stability and security.

In building peace in the region, especially in the face of non-traditional threats, the legality of the ADMM as the ASEAN Defence Community is a program under the framework of regional defence community. The legality of the programme of security activities that are in the initiatives on establishing the ASEAN Defence Interaction Programme

61 Ibid, p. 4
63 Indonesian Ministry of Defence Archive, Concept Paper of ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus
and the ADMM Logistics Support Framework were also adopted by the 7th ADMM in 2013. Implementation of these initiatives is currently underway. Another important new ADMM initiative is the establishment of a Direct Communications Link, which was adopted by the 8th ADMM in 2014. Departing from legality, the ADMM at a regional level, can be understood by simply analyzing the four countries of the six founding countries and 10 ASEAN member states. This study did not look at each state as an player that stands alone, but the selection of four countries as representatives of ADMM as a skeleton defense ASEAN community. These four countries have the capacity of the countries that have contributed and policies that also affect the passage of the ADMM. In other words, the data obtained through these four countries has already been proven sufficient and does not reduce the substance of the study.

In its implementation, the ADMM is running on the policy that every country is devoted to regional interests within the framework of the ADMM. Although the analysis of four countries in the ADMM, the focus of this research looks at the ADMM as the contribution of ASEAN member countries that do not stand in isolation but collectively in regard to regional peace. This discussion is found in Chapter 1.

4. The Characteristics of a Defence Community in a Southeast Asian Defence Cooperation

As noted in the new regionalism approach, a community is not only dependent on geographic proximity, but the level of interaction between countries is also crucial. In a defence community, cooperation in arms manufacturing to obtain a standardisation of armament is the best way to achieve the requisite characteristic of a defence community. Although there is no single accepted definition of a defence community, it is at least commonly regarded as a form of international cooperation, which by its very

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nature incorporates a military aspect. The characteristics of a defence community are established by agreement by its members that the community will build an organisation with activities directed to dealing with defence issues which cannot be addressed by a single country alone, even though the formation of a defence community does not have to be under an agreement that is legally binding. In principle, the main instrument of a defence community is one in which countries seek cooperation from others in order to preserve, enlarge or create a position of strength, either for diplomacy or war. Thus, the state enters into a defence community to pursue goals which they cannot achieve in the absence of a cooperative effort with other countries. Moreover, as Osgood observes, “every state must have an alliance policy even if its purpose is only to avoid alliance”. In fact, bilateral military arrangements among the ASEAN member states have reached a stage which can no longer be ignored when evaluating the purpose and role of ASEAN as a regional group.

In the context of Southeast Asia, political and security relations between the member states of ASEAN in recent years have seen a rapid expansion of bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation between and among ASEAN member states evolving from intelligence exchanges to joint operations against insurgents on common borders and regular intelligence exchanges between high-level military and security officials. In the field of

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67 Interview with Bantarto Bandoro, Jakarta, 8 August 2014
68 Ibid
69 Osgood (1968), Op.cit, p. 17
operations, ASEAN member states have conducted exchanges of senior level officers for education, training, joint contingency planning for mutual assistance against external threats, provision of field training facilities, joint maritime surveillance and patrols, cooperative arms transfers and, most importantly a range of military exercises to develop common operating procedures and simulate joint action against common threats.\(^72\)

Indeed, such ASEAN defence cooperation is particularly aimed not only at managing commonly perceived regional threats and challenges, but also as an instrument to build cooperation beyond confidence building measures. Moreover, as clearly stated by the Chief of Malaysia’s Defence Force, General Hashim Mohammed Ali, “the main aims of ASEAN defence and security cooperation is to reduce conflict and to facilitate confidence building measures”.\(^73\) However, examining the existence of elements of a defence community or a collective defence organisation in Southeast Asia needs close scrutiny. Existing defence cooperation must meet the incorporation of military force and the elements of inter-operability which is a prerequisite for any elements or prospect of a defence community in the defence cooperation among ASEAN member states. Repetition of military exercises has also opened an opportunity for all personnel to gain skills and understanding in performing inter-operability and integration between armed forces, and this in turn will develop defence links within ASEAN naturally. The above activities serve as a defence diplomacy effort within ASEAN and the development of intra-ASEAN defence ties will increase familiarity and understanding among the ASEAN member states. Such conditions can

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\(^{72}\) Ibid: see also Document of Indonesian National Defence Force, had been accessed in August 2013

generate ASEAN credibility and increase its capability to guarantee its own security.

There are several requirements of inter-operability to identify the existence of defence community elements in the ASEAN member states’ defence cooperation, namely through its technical (standardisation of equipment, armaments and system), procedural (including doctrines and procedures) and human (including terminology and training) dimensions. Furthermore, the standardisation of military equipment, through modernisation of military equipment and local defence industry products, will increase the capability of personnel and meet the same standards of skill. Although “there was agreement among the member states in the formative years of ASEAN on the undesirability of a military pact, military cooperation was not completely ruled out as a future option”.

The following section briefly discusses defence procurement for the modernisation of military equipment in ASEAN member states. Both issues, modernisation of military equipment and inter-operability, are discussed further in Chapter 5.

5. The Reasons for Defence Procurement

The increase of Southeast Asia’s real defence spending is in line with the region’s robust economic growth. A certain amount of budget was used for the modernisation of military equipment with sophisticated technology. As Chang states, “the reasons behind Asia’s military build-up are varied and often intertwined with strategic considerations and domestic ones. The first reason is concerns in countries where militaries have intervened in politics,

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domestic political calculations for civilian politicians use larger defence
budgets to buy military quiescence. The second reason deals with military
expenditures that are directed to support and favour domestic companies or
industries or to provide local employment. The third reason is a growing
appreciation among national leaders of how military power can contribute to
humanitarian relief efforts”. 76 These reasons are in line with the
developments of ASEAN’s defence diplomacy, with the purpose of
overcoming various kinds of threats, through military exercises, sharing
experiences and knowledge between armed forces personnel, where having
sophisticated weapon technology is necessary.

Furthermore, a limited meeting of defence officials in Southeast Asia
agreed that the consideration to change its current weaponry system or to
modernise it should fulfil three conditions: 1) if obliged by constitution; 2) in
accordance with international standards, in terms of its operational systems;
and 3) to meet a clausal transfer of technology in a procurement
Memorandum of Understanding,77 as has been mentioned by Mahadzir, a
defence expert, “the development of the local industry and transfer of
technology as part of the purchase of military equipment, with ASEAN
countries looking to develop their manufacturing capability and their skilled
workforce capability”.78

Within the framework of ADMM, industrial efforts for defence industry
cooperation between ASEAN countries, which is called the ASEAN Defence

76 Felix K Chang, A Salutation to Arms: Asia’s Military Build-up, Its Reasons, and Its
Implication (Foreign Policy Research Institute, Sep 2013); see also Aurel Croissant, David
Kuehn and Philip Lorenz, Breaking With the Past?: Civil-Military Relations in the Emerging
Democracies of East Asia (Honolulu; East-West Center, 2012), pp. 34-41
77 Interview with Syarifudin Tippe, former Director General of Defence Strategic of
Indonesian MOD, Jakarta, 27 March 2013
78 Dzirhan Mahadzir, Southeast Asian Defence Cooperation (Asian Military Review,
October 2013)
Industry Collaboration (ADIC), led to an initiative which was signed in May 2011 at the Fifth ADMM in Jakarta. “Military cooperation in the region has been on the rise”, not only between nations in Southeast Asia but also between Southeast Asian nations and extra-regional countries, particularly the United States and Australia.\textsuperscript{79} Defence cooperation with industrial partners outside the region is increasing. Such efforts centre upon, as a whole, future military sales to such countries which “will involve industrial cooperation requirements rather than just being performed as a pure sale”.\textsuperscript{80}

Indonesia and Vietnam, for instance, are working on joint shipbuilding with Damen Schelde -a Dutch naval shipbuilding company- “for their respective warship procurements; similarly, Indonesia is pursuing the same course of shipbuilding by its purchase of submarines from South Korea and on the aviation side, its purchase of C-295 turboprop freighters from Airbus Military which includes final assembly in Indonesia”.\textsuperscript{81} At the same time, the Malaysian Army, “Malaysia’s Defence Technology and Turkey’s FNSS Defence Systems are currently working together on the eight-wheel drive AV-8 Armoured Fighting Vehicle, the prototype being currently on trial in Malaysia with local production of 257 wheeled armoured vehicles under the agreement which were signed in 2011”.\textsuperscript{82}

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid
\textsuperscript{80} Interview with Jan Pieter Ate, Director of International Cooperation, Indonesian Ministry of Defence, Jakarta, 16 September 2013; See also Mahadzir, Southeast Asian Defence Cooperation (Asian Military Review, October 2013)
\textsuperscript{81} Mahadzir (2013), Op.cit
These conditions should be met by ASEAN member states in modernising its main weaponry systems to reach their goal in covering crucial issues such as lack of a common doctrine and language, standardisation of equipment and common logistical support infrastructure. The issue of democratisation has become very salient in Southeast Asia, at least after the 1997 crisis. Each level of society in ASEAN member states demands an openness and transparency in defence budgeting. Prior to the 1997 financial crisis, the military was a dominant party in certain Southeast Asia countries, and procurement systems were mostly a neglected public concern of weaponry utility. Times have changed for the military and a strong demand for controlling military procurement by society through parliament has become a necessity.

On one hand, the military is a tangible domain, which needs new and sophisticated weaponry systems. Required weaponry can only be bought if it had been approved by the parliament. The military needs to bridge this gap (of required approval), as it cannot buy any weapon without approval from society. Terms of standardisation of weaponry operational systems are needed in every defence cooperation or exercise. Each ASEAN country has different sources of weapon suppliers, making inter-operability problematic. In doing so, standardisation has become a crucial condition with the aim that every soldier can work well with soldiers of neighbouring countries, with equal arms and the same advanced technologies. On the other hand, as has been argued by many scholars that inter-operability of military capability, in times of crisis, is one of ASEAN’s military problems. Such problems

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84 Interview with Jan Pieter Ate, Director of International Relations, Indonesia Ministry of Defence, Jakarta, 16 September 2013
would be eliminated if every ASEAN member state had the same standard weaponry system, even if the weapons were purchased from different countries with different technologies.

6. Summary

From the description above, we can see that bilateral relations between ASEAN member states have developed into multilateral relations and the common understanding of the need for a secure and stable region. At the beginning of the establishment of ASEAN, many experts held the sceptical view that it would suffer the same fate as other regional organisations and would not function as expected. This scepticism was also based on the fact that a collective defence organisation had been previously formed, even though not all Southeast Asian countries were willing to become members of such an organisation. In addition, the unresolved territorial disputes between the members of that collective defence organisation became a contributing factor to the failure of the organisation to be able to function optimally.

History has proven that, with the current developments, ASEAN is able to stand strong as a means to unite the nations of Southeast Asia in the political field. In line with the development of a strategic security environment, the demands of creativity in addressing the strategic challenges has encouraged the leaders of ASEAN member states to establish new mechanisms, especially in the field of defence, so that they have more specific means to address the changing form of security challenges. ASEAN member states developed their defence cooperation under the auspices of the ADMM and ADMM-Plus, and showed their coordination and cooperation in addressing the security issues.
In assessing the existence of ASEAN defence community elements in Southeast Asia’s defence diplomacy, these can only be examined through the effective employment of inter-operability components such as standardisation, training and direct interaction between players in practical defence cooperation. ASEAN member states, in this case, developed their own concept of intra-ASEAN regional cooperation to achieve the same standard of armaments in terms of quality and technology, and from their own production which is a credit to smooth inter-operability. Nevertheless, the defence community characteristics that are allegedly contained in the defence diplomacy activities in Southeast Asia will only be identified if the inter-operability requirements are met.

Moreover, ASEAN member states have developed forms of cooperation with the establishment of certain agencies such as the ADIC that deal directly with military industrial enterprises, as well as at the operational level through the provision of training facilities. In cooperation with the ASEAN defence industry, the military plays a central role through direct cooperation in building a major military weaponry system that fosters mutual trust. Such cooperation and mechanisms are exactly the goal of this research, to assess how the defence cooperation has operated between ASEAN member states to address security issues contained in the elements of defence community.
Chapter Five
REGIONAL MECHANISMS IN HANDLING SECURITY ISSUES

1. Introduction

After discussing the ever-present collective defence organisation in Southeast Asia, Chapter 5 thoroughly investigates the regional mechanisms in terms of the regional infrastructure in addressing security issues in Southeast Asia. This chapter relies on primary and secondary data that was gathered during the field study. Empirical and descriptive analysis supported by empirical evidence is used to strengthen certain facts that were found, to give a clearer explanation of how states address security issues in the region. In studying defence diplomacy practice in the region, the requirements of inter-operability will be assessed through various forms of defence cooperation to search for the elements or characteristics of a defence community. Various defence cooperatives within the auspices of ADMM as a regional mechanism in addressing evolving threats in the region will be discussed individually.

This chapter begins by discussing the existence of common perceptions of threat in Southeast Asia amongst ASEAN leaders. A common understanding of threats in the region encourages ASEAN leaders to have the same perspective in addressing common threats and the commitment to act, ensuring the sustainability of the region.\(^1\) Subsequently, this chapter discusses the working mechanism of the ADMM and the units or entities, as well as military procurement trends over the last decade within the framework of the ADMM and ADMM-Plus.

2. Common Perceptions of Threat in ASEAN

The security challenges facing the countries of Southeast Asia today are being shaped by global, regional (Asia-Pacific) and domestic trends. The Defence Ministers of ASEAN member states have the same view of the development of global and regional problems at this time, i.e. security issues in the South China and East China Seas, maritime security, natural disasters, terrorism and epidemic disease which have impacted security in many regions, including Southeast Asia. Cooperation in the areas of security and the military is indispensable when threats come from both within and outside the region. The evolution of threats has forced the governments of ASEAN member states to adjust their policy in conducting defence cooperation to what is now called defence diplomacy. The mechanism of defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia is a mixture of multilateral and bilateral. Both forms of diplomacy are conducted at the same time.

Since its first summit in 1967, ASEAN’s member states have conducted a series of bilateral security cooperation, as well as with certain external powers, such as naval patrols along the borders, joint naval exercises and the exchange of intelligence data. These measures are intended for ASEAN to develop not only trust, but also a common mechanism to address common security problems and regional security. It is through this pattern of security cooperation that ASEAN attempts to build its strength in facing regional problems and maintaining regional stability.

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2 Report of Indonesia Defence Ministry to the President of Indonesia, regarding ADMM Retreat, in Myanmar, November 2014
3 Interview with Jan Pieter Ate, Director of International Cooperation, Indonesian Ministry of Defence, Jakarta, 16 September 2013
At this point, regional stability means that ASEAN has the independence to conduct security cooperation at all levels by mobilising its own mechanisms in facing security challenges. The government of ASEAN member states, through ASEAN Defence Ministers, have reached an agreement to increase cooperation in the field of defence both within ASEAN and others, including external dialogue partners, to further effective means of ASEAN defence cooperation such as ADMM and ADMM-Plus.\(^5\) The increased cooperation is directed towards practical cooperation as a concrete contribution to the pillars for the creation of the ASEAN Community.

Due to economic growth after the monetary crises of 1997-1998, the militaries of ASEAN member states in the region have become self-sufficient. Diversity of training, staff exchanges and joint exercises have also enhanced mutual understanding. On one hand, it means the prospect of using force within ASEAN is greatly diminished.\(^6\) On the other hand, the degree of military cooperation for the effectiveness of operational theatre in terms of interoperability has also increased. Arms procurement followed by military cooperation in the form of bilateral, trilateral or multilateral, shape regional stability. In fact, ASEAN military cooperation has been in existence since the beginning of the seventies and it reflects the elements of the defence community currently displayed by ASEAN, although some of the military officials of ASEAN member states declined to say that it existed as a defence community.\(^7\) They have gone as far as to suggest that such security cooperation between Malaysia and Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia, Brunei and Singapore, Singapore and Thailand, and Thailand and

\(^5\) Report of Indonesia Defence Ministry to the President of Indonesia, regarding ADMM Retreat, in Myanmar, November 2014
\(^7\) This is a view from some interviewees such as Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff, Admiral Marsetio, also the expression of Deputy Defence Minister of Brunei, Dato’ Paduka Mustappa, and Director of Policy Office, Singapore BG. Cheng
Indonesia is what Indonesia's armed forces commander, General Try Sutrisno, has aptly referred to as a ‘defence spider web’ in ASEAN. Defence cooperation, as an implementation of defence diplomacy between ASEAN member states is present and manifests itself in the form of dialogue and military exercises.

Ever since its inception in 1967, ASEAN cooperation and collective actions have intended to achieve what many called the ‘regional mission’ of ASEAN. The dramatic changes to the challenge in its strategic environment motivated ASEAN to develop more systematic cooperation in the military field. It is through the military field that ASEAN promotes its cohesiveness and increases its credibility. The primary objective of the ASEAN defence cooperation is to develop a common understanding and position on how to contain internal and external security challenges in a way which reflects the awareness of ASEAN that regional security problems need to be addressed through collective efforts.

ASEAN has continued to assess the fundamental changes to its strategic environment in its political, security and economic fields. Moreover, it continues to develop common perceptions of new threats and challenges, both globally and regionally, and to determine their impact on the region. Whether internally or with others, ASEAN military cooperation does not conflict with the stated objectives of ASEAN as a collective entity. ASEAN has its own mechanism to facilitate such cooperation, which forms the basis for, and

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11 Bandoro (2000), Ibid, p. 192; see also the mechanisms and guidance of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM); the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (ASEAN PMC); and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
supports the role of, ASEAN military cooperation in enhancing regional security and stability.

3. Political Efforts and Defence Cooperation Mechanisms in Tackling Challenges

In discussing the ASEAN defence community, one first needs an assessment of the plan and the process of establishing the ASEAN community which was geared towards the establishment of the ADMM and the ADMM-Plus. In mid-June 2003, at the 36th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Indonesia submitted a proposal on the establishment of the ASEAN Community, with the motivation that the ASEAN Community is a community that specifically relies on the peace process in resolving disputes that may occur between members of ASEAN, and with the bottom-line that security in the community cannot be separated, as was envisioned at the Bali Summit I, into national and regional resilience.\(^{12}\)

Starting from the declarations of the Bali Agreement II (Bali Concord II), which was signed by the heads of government of the ten ASEAN member states at the ASEAN Summit in Bali on 7 October 2003, this marked the process of the establishment of an ASEAN community comprising of the ASEAN Security Community (which is refined into the ASEAN Political-Security Community), the ASEAN Economic Community and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. At the same place, 27 years previously, the Bali Agreement I (Bali Concord I) had been declared and signed by the founders of ASEAN.\(^{13}\) Both the Bali Summits I and II had the


\(^{13}\) *Ibid*, pp. 67-68
same goals of fostering peace, creating prosperity and building a regional identity.

Since ASEAN’s inception, the concept of unified resilience between economic development and security has been a major consideration in the interaction between Southeast Asian nations.\textsuperscript{14} This concept or doctrine of national and regional resilience underlines that each member state’s economic development is the basic foundation for achieving stability and, in turn, stability is the key to the success of sustainable economic development. National and regional resilience covers the whole spectrum of life of each member country to eliminate the discomfort of threats and challenges from the outside or from within the country,\textsuperscript{15} such as separatist movements, feuds between multiple ethnic groups, inter-religious and inter-racial conflicts, as well as security threats and conventional challenges to its own member states. To address the entire spectrum of new challenges that has been identified previously, ASEAN has decided to build the ASEAN community with three pillars: ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC).

ASEAN membership has expanded from five countries to ten. This strengthened ASEAN member states cooperation to face these new challenges. The scope of ASEAN cooperation had also been expanded by inviting other Asian countries and outside regional powers to respond to the

\textsuperscript{14} It is stated implicitly in the aims and purposes of ASEAN declaration that the salient point of the establishment of ASEAN is to promote regional peace and stability through “joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast Asian Nations”; see An overview of ASEAN establishment, available at. www.asean.org/asean/about-asean/overview

\textsuperscript{15} Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Kerjasama Politik dan Keamanan ASEAN in C.P.F. Luhulima (et.al), Seperempat Abad ASEAN, Sekretariat Nasional ASEAN, Departemen Luar Negeri RI (Jakarta: 1994), pp. 26 and 46
pressure of deepening interdependence, and expands as a result of the
development of information and communication technology.\textsuperscript{16} ASEAN has
directed its political goals for the establishment of an ASEAN Community,
and the most significant pillar to be investigated to find the elements of a
defence community is the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC).
Thus, amongst the three pillars of the ASEAN community, the APSC will be
explained further in the next section with the aim to finding answers to the
research questions.

3.1. \textbf{The Roadmap for an ASEAN Community}

In the opinion of Tomotaka Shoji, the evolution of APSC discussions is
still underway and the cooperative framework has yet to be fully formed.\textsuperscript{17}
However, intensive discussions by the leaders of Southeast Asia during the
period 2003-2006 had at least opened up a new optimism that the plan to
establish APSC in 2015 could be realised. Although, during the study, through
the researcher’s various interviews, a more pessimistic tone often appeared with
doubts as to the readiness of ASEAN member states to achieve the target of
establishing the APSC, such as had been proclaimed by ASEAN.\textsuperscript{18} Undeniably,
the idea of the formation of APSC in 2003 began at the time of the Bali Concord
II, followed by the Vientiane Action Plan 2004 (VAP), the ASEAN Charter in
2009 which put forward the policy challenges that must be overcome in order to
establish the APSC, and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting, all of which
were crucial steps in the process of the formation of the APSC.

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\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Ibid}
\textsuperscript{17} Tomotaka Shoji, \textit{ASEAN Security Community: An Initiative for Peace and Stability}
(National Institute for Defence Security Studies Reports, 2008), available at
\textsuperscript{18} Interview with Yuri O. Thamrin, Director General of Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
for Asia Pacific, Jakarta, 31 March 2013; interview with Ngurah Swajaya, Indonesia
Ambassador to ASEAN, Jakarta, 28 March 2013; interview with Dato’ Paduka Mustappa,
Deputy Defence Minister of Brunei Darussalam, Bandar Seri Begawan, 17 July 2013
\end{flushleft}
Although the term APSC has been used since the ZOPFAN and the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia was launched, the use of such term is not evenly distributed internationally. As one of the pillars of the ASEAN Community by 2020, the establishment of the APSC was initially started at the Bali Concord II in 2003 through enhancing political and security cooperation at a higher level. It was first known as the ASEAN Security Community (ASC) and was renamed the APSC in the ASEAN Charter in 2007. The concept of APSC refers to the UN Charter and the principles of international law. Through this APSC pillar, the regional association of Southeast Asia at once developed political cooperation, strengthening security through the establishment and enforcement of norms, preventing the outbreak of conflict, developing methods of conflict resolution and post-conflict peace building. The APSC serves as the umbrella for bringing ASEAN’s political and security cooperation to a higher plane.19 Through the ASEAN charter, the government of ASEAN member states agreed to accelerate the establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015 in order to retain its significance and have an enduring quality.20

The APSC blueprint envisages ASEAN as a rule-based community of shared values and norms; a cohesive, peaceful, stable and resilient group “with shared responsibility for comprehensive security as well as a dynamic and outward-looking region in an increasingly integrated and interdependent world”.21 The APSC is a framework based on the idea of a comprehensive

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approach to “security with the strategic thrusts of conflict prevention, peaceful conflict resolution and post-conflict peace building”. A framework of this nature represents one of the ultimate goals of ASEAN, which has achieved a record of political cooperation since its inauguration.

As aforementioned, the establishment of APSC was proposed by Indonesia and was responded to by a variety of attitudes from ASEAN member states. Despite ASEAN members’ states being generally supportive of the APSC concept, much scepticism and discussion arose at the beginning. It was in the specific details and actual modalities of the APSC that objections and obstacles arose. The most highly discussed points in the concept were the “Peace Keeping Force, ASEAN Maritime Forum, ASEAN Maritime Safety and Surveillance Unit, and ASEAN Non-Aggression Treaty”, since Indonesia had not adequately explained the concept which was not clear. However, in the finally approved draft, mechanisms such as the ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement, the ASEAN Extradition Treaty and the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism were accepted from the original Indonesian draft. As the Malaysian Foreign Minister, Syed Hamid Albar stated, “Our focus for the ASEAN Security Community is on coming up with a caring society and human security”.

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APSC’s mission is “to hold political and security cooperation to a higher level”,\textsuperscript{28} so that member states maintain peace between themselves and with other countries. In line with this commitment, ASEAN member states maintain a common commitment to seek to resolve disputes between themselves peacefully, in addition to realising that there is a fundamental connection between their securities. This association is also bound together by geographic location, common vision and objectives. Foreign policy and the defence of each member country is formulated and implemented by themselves. However, foreign and defence policies are still being created in the context of ASEAN. Thus, ASEAN as a whole adheres to the principles of national and regional resilience that has political aspects of economic, social and cultural harmony with the ASEAN Vision 2020.

Meanwhile, ASEAN member states also adhere to their rights to defend their existence, free from external interference in each other's internal affairs, and a principle that this should reflect ASEAN's determination to move forward with a step that can be accepted by all member states or, "at a pace comfortable to all".\textsuperscript{29} The ASEAN community now had to be realised in 2015. The problem is that this statement did not match the target establishment of an ASEAN Community in 2020 and was moved forward to 2015,\textsuperscript{30} as proclaimed in Cebu, Philippines in January 2007. Some member states obviously had difficulty in adhering to this milestone. The ASEAN’s security concept had been reformulated to include economic and financial factors into the concept of national and regional resilience. Security of ASEAN member states can only develop on the basis

\textsuperscript{29} Rodolfo C. Severino, \textit{The ASEAN Regional Forum} (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009), pp. 16-17
\textsuperscript{30} Interview with Deputy Defence Minister of Brunei, Bandar Seri Begawan, 17 July 2013; Interview with Yuri O. Thamrin, Directorate General for Asia Pacific, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, Jakarta, 21 March 2013
of financial development and a strong economy, while economic and
financial life can only flourish if security can be guaranteed.\textsuperscript{31} To support the
implementation of the concept of economic power that goes along with
stability, the ASEAN member states established new institutions adapted to
the new goals because the ASEAN Secretariat alone is no longer sufficient
and its function is limited to the administrative field. The Secretary cannot
take the initiative and cannot take decisions without the approval of Foreign
Ministers.

As mentioned before, amongst three pillars of the ASEAN
Community is the APSC with its objective to heighten political and security
cooperation. The Bali Concord II is believed to be the future direction of
ASEAN security cooperation, which is based on existing instruments such
as the ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality), SEANWFZ
(Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone) and TAC (Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation).\textsuperscript{32} The contents of the Bali Concord II make it clear that the
APSC concept is the culmination of security cooperation fostered by ASEAN
since its inception. It lists by name the various treaties and declarations
concluded by ASEAN in the past and the statement in the preamble states
that ASEAN member states, “are determined to ensure their stability and
security from external interference in any form or manner”.\textsuperscript{33}

This was followed by the adoption of Vientiane Action Plan (VAP) in
Vientiane at the Tenth ASEAN Summit in 2004. In this action plan, ASEAN
member states included the initiation of “preparatory activities to develop an
ASEAN Charter” as a goal in the VAP, which was formalised into a mandate

\textsuperscript{32} Aisarieva (2012), \textit{Op.cit.,} p. 55; see also Donald E. Weatherbee, \textit{International Relations in
Southeast Asia} (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield Publisher, 2009), p. 105
\textsuperscript{33} Aisarieva (2012), \textit{Op.cit.,} p. 57
in 2005. It encourages ASEAN to be prepared in term of structure and process to meet the APSC Plan of Action to achieve the establishment of an ASEAN Community, as well as being more responsive, more powerful and able to cope with various challenges, both in terms of coordination and efficiency. Therefore, the VAP began with items related to the APSC, to “implement the proposed APSC by growing a democratic, tolerant, participatory and transparent community”. Moreover, the APSC will be pursued along five strategic thrusts, namely, political development, shaping and sharing of norms, conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict peace-building, the implementation of which shall focus on actions that are conceivably achievable by 2020. Realising the importance of accelerating the establishment of the ASEAN Community will reinforce ASEAN’s centrality and its role on the driving seat and encourage the government of ASEAN member states to accelerate the establishment of the ASEAN Community by 2015.

Then, at the 11th ASEAN Summit, on the 12-14 December, 2005 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, with the theme, “One Vision, One Identity, One Community”, the leaders of ASEAN member states produced the ASEAN Charter as a firm foundation in achieving the ASEAN Community. At this summit, the ten leaders of ASEAN member states appointed an Eminent Persons’ Group (EPG) to guide the development of the ASEAN Charter as a step towards the

34 Ibid; see also Wilfrido V. Villacota, Strengthening the Foundation for an ASEAN Community in Lee Yoong Yoong (ed.), ASEAN Matters: Reflecting on ASEAN (Singapore: World Scientific Printers, 2011), p. 306
36 Furthermore Vientiane Action Program: http://www.aseansec.org/ADS-2004
development of the ASEAN Community. The EPG had been undertaking private and public consultation with a view to presenting some recommendations to the leaders of ASEAN member states at the ASEAN summit one year later in Cebu, the Philippines, in December 2006.\textsuperscript{39} Two years later, the charter was adopted and officially came into force on 15 December 2008, and a gathering of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers was held at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta to mark this very historic occasion for ASEAN. ASEAN will henceforth operate under a new legal framework to establish a number of new structures to boost its community-building process.\textsuperscript{40} The charter was aimed at transforming ASEAN from a non-binding political association to an international organisation with a legal disposition and a rule-based organisation with an effective and efficient organisational structure.\textsuperscript{41}

The charter codifies ASEAN norms rules and values, sets clear targets and presents accountability and compliance, and also establishes the association as a legal entity with a juridical disposition. With these means, as well as by the associations’ very existence, “the ASEAN system has enabled ASEAN to keep the peace in the region, promote regional stability and play a constructive role in a world out of proportion to its military might or economic weight.”.\textsuperscript{42} The ASEAN Charter is expected to be a positive development, which could move ASEAN ahead in terms of security as well.

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\textsuperscript{39} Rodolfo C. Severino, \textit{The ASEAN Charter: An opportunity not to be missed} (UNISCI Discussion Paper, no. 12, October 2006), p. 164
\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Ibid}
\textsuperscript{41} Amitav Acharya, \textit{Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia} (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 267
\end{flushleft}
Although one of the objectives of the charter is a regional economic integration arrangement, it does not mean its purpose is solely a matter of economics. It has other targets for cooperation on transnational issues and problems and the strengthening of regional institutions, although the economic goal is worthy of debate. The following statement describes it: “The Charter would enshrine the values and principles to which the association’s members adhere. The charter would envision the arrangements for further integration”.

3.2. The Mechanism of Defence Diplomacy Within the Framework of ADMM

As the highest level of ministerial defence and security consultative and cooperative mechanism within ASEAN, the annual ADMM enables the ASEAN Defence Ministers to discuss and exchange views on current defence and security issues and challenges faced in the region. In this ADMM, ten Defence Ministers from Southeast Asian countries, which are bound in the TAC as a base, agreed that the values of ASEAN would be the codes for the norm. These became the codes of practice or the codes of conduct for the ADMM itself. Cooperation domains, or ADMM domains, discuss cooperation in the field of defence as their core. This forum discusses defence cooperation within the scope of ASEAN. In doing so, the implementation includes exchanges of views on regional and global security developments that affect ASEAN or Southeast Asia and it further discusses areas of cooperation more specifically in defence matters. ADMM is a mechanism for ten ASEAN member states in the scope of a multilateral framework.

43 Severino (2005), Ibid, p. 7
44 Interview with Jan Pieter Ate, Director of International Cooperation, Indonesian Ministry of Defence, Jakarta, 16 September 2013
In effect, the ADMM was one of the results which arose in 2006 from the movement to form the APSC. The ADMM is aimed at increasing the synergies amongst Southeast Asian military forces. In fact, for years, military-to-military cooperative activities were conducted at various levels, including on a bilateral basis, but were lacking in significant coordination. Although the ADMM forum is a result of the planned formation of the APSC, discussion of ADMM in this section aims to prove that in the process of establishing a security community, there is a mechanism of a defence community. The APSC’s Plan of Action “set working towards convening an annual ADMM as one of its objectives, with the aim of enhancing confidence-building measures to prevent conflict”.45

The concept paper at the inaugural ADMM in 2006 views the establishment of the ADMM as complementing other regional efforts that promote security dialogue and cooperation. It serves as the main driving force for a defence dialogue and cooperation within the Southeast Asian region, which includes officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs along with Ministry of Defence officials.46 The ADMM inaugural meeting was convened in Kuala Lumpur, 2006 as the newest sectorial ministerial body for ASEAN.47 This meeting was a new step signifying ASEAN’s shift in focus to embark upon closer military ties.48 In this regard, the meeting of Defence Ministers in Southeast Asia would promote cooperation amongst the militaries in the region.

46 Interview with B.G. Cheng, Director of Policy Office, Singapore MINDEF, Singapore, 20 September 2013
Thus, through the forum of ADMM, ASEAN cooperation introduces a new concept of ‘Defence Diplomacy’. In particular, prior to the arrival of ADMM, all Defence Ministers and Chief of Staffs of ASEAN member states were involved in a variety of security dialogues through participation in the Annual ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting, (ASEAN SOM) and in the meetings of the ARF. Some attempts to enhance regional coordination were put into place in the course of the last decade, and meetings between ASEAN Chief Defence Forces, Chiefs of Armies, Navies and Air Forces started to be held regularly in the form of an ASEAN Chiefs’ Defence Forces Informal Meeting (ACDFIM) in 2001. ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multilateral Meetings (ACAMM) have been held since 2001, the ASEAN Navy Interaction (ANI) since 2001, the ASEAN Air Force Chiefs Conference (AAFCC) since 2004, along with the ASEAN Military Intelligent Informal Meeting (AMIIM) and the ASEAN Armies Rifles Meeting (AARM).49

To guide the ADMM cooperation, the Three-Year ADMM Work Programme (2008-2010) was adopted at the second ADMM in Singapore in 2007.50 The Work Programme (2008-2010) included measures and activities in five areas, namely: 1) promoting regional defence and security cooperation; 2) shaping and sharing of norms; 3) conflict prevention; 4) conflict resolution; and 5) post-conflict peace-building. In promoting regional defence and security, for instance, ASEAN member states used Track-2 such as cooperation between defence universities, military academies, staff colleges, think-tanks and similar institutions, as well as Track-3 such as other civil institutions to organise various seminars on defence and security issues, to enhance mutual understanding of

national and security policy and its development. In this programme, all information related to national defence and security, particularly in relation to inter-ASEAN problems, will be shared transparently to prevent the situation worsening, since every member state has a different approach to solve the problems.

At the first ADMM meeting, the Defence Ministers of ASEAN member states promoted cooperation amongst the militaries of regional countries which led to the creation of a peaceful and stable security environment. In this meeting, the Ministers of Defence introduced the terminology of ‘defence diplomacy’ that implied the basic principle of ASEAN—that of non-interference-as well as increasing the level of interaction and mutual trust and confidence amongst member states of ASEAN.

In ADMM’s first meeting, two other important documents were also adopted – besides the Three-Year Work Programme. They were the Protocol of the Concept paper for the establishment of the ADMM and the concept paper on the ADMM-Plus. The Protocol of the Concept paper was crucial because of its stipulation of a ‘chain of command’ for ASEAN defence cooperation, with the ADMM as the highest ministerial defence and security consultative and cooperative mechanism. The programme of the ADMM shows substantial development in the aspect of military and security cooperation in ASEAN through practical cooperation.

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52 Interview with Dato’ Paduka Mustappa, Deputy Defence Minister of Brunei Darussalam, Bandar Seri Begawan, 17 July 2013
Meanwhile, in the field of shaping and sharing norms, ASEAN leaders stressed that the Foreign Ministers are looking for new ways to improve security and establish modalities for the establishment of the ASEAN Community. In this context, Foreign Ministers still play an important role, although since 2006, Defence Ministers have played a role in practical defence cooperation,\(^\text{57}\) i.e. contributing actively to the implementation of a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. The success of Indonesia’s Foreign Minister ‘shuttle diplomacy’ to overcome the appearance of ASEAN’s disarray during the ASEAN Summit in Cambodia in July 2012 to produce a joint communiqué that nearly annihilated ASEAN, cannot be separated from the successful achievement of an ASEAN common position.\(^\text{58}\) Determination of the norm is intended to achieve a standard of compliance with common adherence to norms of good conduct by the member states of the ASEAN Community. Producing the ASEAN Charter is a step in the development of these norms.\(^\text{59}\) These norms are formulated by sticking to the principles of non-alignment, development-oriented attitudes of peace amongst ASEAN member countries; conflict resolution by peaceful means; rejection of the possession of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and avoiding an arms race in Southeast Asia. The inclusion of shaping and sharing norms in the Three-Year Work Programme of ADMM to support APSC “clearly suggested that it is designed to be more than an instrument for practical cooperation, but is also a political project aimed at extending regional cooperation from the mere functional to the normative”.\(^\text{60}\)

\(^{57}\) Interview with Dato’ Paduka Mustappa, *Op.cit*
\(^{58}\) Interview with I Gusti Agung Wesaka Puja, Director of ASEAN International Cooperation, Indonesia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jakarta, 20 March 2013
In the activities of conflict prevention and conflict resolution, ADMM referred to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as the fundamental rules of behaviour between member states to promote mutual trust and confidence through greater understanding of defence and security issues, to prevent disputes between member states and between member states with other countries, as well as avoiding the escalation of existing conflicts. In this context, ASEAN member states developed a coordination mechanism for military cooperation in the areas of non-traditional security. Two important areas of cooperation in this framework are humanitarian assistance/disaster relief and peacekeeping.

There were reasons for ASEAN member states to promote practical cooperation in the area of non-traditional threats as ADMM’s primary concern. First, cooperation in non-traditional security is more agreeable than traditional, and often sensitive, security issues. Second, certain ASEAN member states experienced large-scale natural disasters such as the Sumatran earthquake and tsunami in 2004, and because the slow response from other ASEAN member states to provide help had created the impression of a paralysed ASEAN. Third, for ASEAN, the importance of cooperation in peacekeeping was associated with increasing international reputation and status grouping by contributing more peacekeepers to international security. In regard to any dispute or conflict involving ASEAN members, states are encouraged to resolve them peacefully and in the spirit of peace, security and stability. The aims and purposes of ASEAN member states to contribute more peacekeepers in peacekeeping operations will be elaborated in Chapter 6.

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61 Indonesian Ministry of Defence Archive, ADMM Three-Year Work Programme, *Building the Foundation and Setting the Direction of Defence Dialogue and Cooperation*


63 *Ibid*
Post-conflict peace-building is intended to create the conditions necessary to preserve the peace in areas of conflict and prevent a return to fighting. This means cooperation and coordination between agencies in dealing with a broad spectrum of issues. Post-conflict peace-building activities include the development of appropriate mechanisms and the mobilisation of resources for making them successful, including humanitarian aid, reconstruction and rehabilitation. In this context, ASEAN develops human resources and builds capacity for the rehabilitation of post-conflict areas.64

3.3. The Mechanism of Defence Diplomacy Within the Framework of ADMM-Plus

At the 2nd ADMM meeting in 2007, the ADMM-Plus Concept Paper was adopted.65 Following this, in October 2010, the inaugural ADMM-Plus was convened, opening up ASEAN’s now highest level security and defence mechanism with eight of its dialogue partners. The scope of ADMM-Plus is greater than ADMM’s. It is, in effect, a Defence Ministers’ meeting in the East Asia Summit format. It involves the ten ASEAN Defence Ministers, plus eight of the Defence Ministers of dialogue partners’ countries, namely, the US, China, India, Japan, Australia, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, and Russia. By involving all members of the East Asia Summit, the ADMM-Plus strengthens and deepens trust and cooperation on defence and security matters throughout the Indo-Pacific.66 It develops a similar mechanism as ADMM to discuss security issues in term of conditions and developments,

as well as global and regional security issues that can be handled by eighteen countries within the multilateral framework.\textsuperscript{67} The purpose of ADMM-Plus is to bring expertise, perspectives and resources from extra-regional countries to bear on shared security challenges and practical cooperation through strategic dialogue. At all times, ASEAN member states should collectively weigh the benefits of engaging extra-regional countries.\textsuperscript{68}

In the concept paper for the establishment of an ADMM, it is anticipated that the ADMM shall be ‘open, flexible and outward-looking and should actively engage ASEAN’s friends and dialogue partners in promoting peace and security in the region.\textsuperscript{69} To reach such goals, the ADMM concept paper calls for the establishment of an ADMM-Plus. The ADMM-Plus serves as an integral part of the ADMM, bringing together ASEAN and its dialogue partners to forge common security viewpoints and to set in place practical defence cooperation and collaboration.\textsuperscript{70} At the inaugural ADMM-Plus meeting, the Defence Ministers agreed on five areas of practical cooperation to pursue under this new mechanism: 1) maritime security, 2) counter-terrorism, 3) disaster management, 4) peacekeeping operations and 5) military medicine, and from 2014, the areas of cooperation were increased by another cooperation, that of Humanitarian Mine Action. To facilitate cooperation on these areas, five initial Experts’ Working Groups (EWGs) were established with another added in 2014. By the end of 2011,

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{67} Interview with Jan Pieter Ate, the Director of International Cooperation, Indonesian Ministry of Defence, Jakarta, 16 September 2013
\end{flushright}
all of the EWGs had held their inaugural meetings. The Concept Paper of the EWG was adopted. The EWGs have their own programmes that function for a period of three years. The system of forming EWG co-chair pairs between an ASEAN country and a ‘plus’ country, for instance, Indonesia and the US for the Counter-Terrorism EWG, has worked well.

3.4. Working Mechanism of ADMM and ADMM-Plus

As mentioned above, the ADMM is an annual gathering and dialogue forum for Defence Ministers of ASEAN member states, while the ADMM-Plus is a triennial meeting forum. Perceiving that the development of the ADMM-Plus was very rapid, the members of the ADMM-Plus Defence Ministers were encouraged to review the original frequency of the meetings from once every three years to become once every two years. Subsequently, after the meeting of ADMM-Plus in Brunei, future meetings are calculated every two years, while in terms of the working programme of EWGs, these remain in a three-year period. An illustration of the scope of defence cooperation to be achieved by the ASEAN Community, and which is targeted to be realised in 2015 can be seen from the figure below (see Figure 5.1).

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73 Michito Tsuruoka, An Era of the ADMM-Plus? Unique Achievements and Challenges (Honolulu, Hawaii: PacNet, no 69, Sep 2013); Interview with Jan Pieter Ate, the Director of International Cooperation, Indonesian Ministry of Defence, Jakarta, 16 September 2013
74 Indonesian Ministry of Defence Archive
Figure 5.1

ASEAN Defence Cooperation Structure

Source: Indonesia Ministry of Defence Archive

Note: The figure shows ASEAN’s defence cooperation under the auspices of the ADMM and ADMM-Plus that is a form of cooperation to support the establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015. In the above structure, defence cooperation mechanisms that are within the dotted red line (added by the researcher) are the cooperatives within the scope of the ADMM and ADMM-Plus.

To support and accommodate the agenda of ADMM, the Defence Minister agreed to establish an ASEAN Defence Senior Officials’ Meeting (ADSOM) for ADMM, and an ASEAN Defence Senior Officials’ Meeting-Plus (ADSOM-Plus). These ADSOMs have working groups (ADSOM WG and ADSOM-Plus WG) as the lowest mechanical processes of ADMM or ADMM-Plus. All ideas as initial proposals are started at the level of the working group. Ideas that are proposed by member states are brought into the meeting at the working level. This is where the ideas are filtered, discussed, selected and processed, until a common point of view and agreement is reached and the accepted idea is forwarded to a higher

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75 New Straits Times, 10 May 2006
level. The delegate at the level of working group is an official with the rank of Brigadier or Director, or in the second echelon of the Ministry of Defence; these officials also act as the head of the delegation. The officials that represent their country are permanent members of the working group and cannot be replaced by other officials until the idea has been discussed at ministerial level. The same mechanism has also been applied in ADMM-Plus.

The next step of the mechanism is the level of ASEAN Defence Senior Officials’ Meeting (ADSOM), which is led by the Secretary General of the Ministry of Defence. At this level, ADSOM receives proposals from working groups to discuss the proposed issue or idea. Ten ADSOM leaders discuss matters that are proposed by ADSOM WGs or ADSOM-Plus WGs. The result of the ADSOM meeting is forwarded as meeting material at ministerial level. The final level is the level of Defence Ministers’ meeting which is the peak of the proposals that have been discussed at the level of the working group. What is interesting about the mechanism at the level of ADSOM is that, since this proposal is the result of an agreement of ten ADSOM Working Group leaders, usually at the level of ADSOM, such proposals do not change much. As all ADSOM leaders have already appointed a member of their staff as a representative or even as a leader of a delegation at the WG, at which point the ADSOM WG leaders discuss and select the ideas that will be meeting material at the level of ADSOM and ADMM or ADMM-Plus. However, between these three levels, if it seems there is a shortage of time or an agenda is required to discuss specific items, the host of the ADMM meeting can invite all Defence

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76 Interview with Jan Pieter Ate, Director of International Cooperation of Indonesian Ministry of Defence, Jakarta, 16 September 2013; interview with Yudi Abrimantyo, Jakarta, 13 March 2013 and 18 September 2013
77 Interview with Jan Pieter Ate, Director of International Cooperation of Indonesian Ministry of Defence, Jakarta, 16 September 2013
Ministers from member states to hold an additional ministerial meeting called a retreat (ADMM retreat or ADMM-Plus retreat). In the interim, the ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multilateral Meeting (ACAMM), the ASEAN Navy Interaction (ANI), the ASEAN Air Force Chiefs Conference (AAFCC), the ASEAN Military Intelligent Informal Meeting (AMIIM), and the ASEAN Military Operational Informal Meeting (AMOIM) are meeting within the framework of the ASEAN Chiefs’ Defence Forces Informal Meeting (ACDFIM).

Although ADSOM WG is the lowest level, this level is the most crucial stage of all levels in the existing mechanism of the ADMM or the ADMM-Plus. At this level, it tends to be highly operational and the actors fully understand the day-to-day activities of the results of the meeting from the highest level or ministerial level of ADMM or ADMM-Plus. The implementations of decisions that have been taken at the ministerial meeting are fully executed by the participants at ADSOM WG level, or the operational players become the executors of the ministerial level decision. Accordingly, participants at the ADSOM WG level know with certainty the constraints they will face if an issue is discussed at a higher level and becomes a decision which they will implement later. In other words, it will begin with the WG and end with implementation by the WG. The WG filters the issue, and then forwards it to the next level to be processed, up to the ministerial level for a final decision, and again at a later stage at the WG level ministerial level, decisions have to be implemented. Analysis of the cycle shows that it is increasingly clear that the process of defence diplomacy, which relates to the requirements of interoperability of a defence community, has been started. Realising that the region needs more concrete defence cooperation, the Defence Minister of ASEAN agreed to establish the ASEAN Defence Industry Collaboration (ADIC).
4. **ASEAN Defence Industry Collaboration (ADIC)**

In May 2011, with the aim “to encourage the development of industrial and technological strength, and to seek opportunities to promote technological sharing”\(^\text{78}\) and to reduce annual defence procurement from non-ASEAN member states from $25 billion in 2010 to $12.5 billion by 2030, the Defence Minister of ASEAN agreed to adopt the concept paper on the establishment of ADIC as an integral part of ADMM. The idea of ADIC is to reduce the technological disparity amongst its member states. At the same time, it also serves to reduce regional dependency of defence equipment from outside the region.\(^\text{79}\) The original motivation to create ADIC was to determine how ASEAN member states, that have very high defence spending for purchasing equipment, can rotate their money within the ASEAN itself,\(^\text{80}\) and in this way, enable them to regenerate the economic sector of every ASEAN member state.

The ASEAN leaders realised that ASEAN has countries that are strong in the defence industry within the scope of Southeast Asia. For example, Indonesia is strong in the aircraft industry, Malaysia in the field of maintenance, Thailand in the field of propellers and Singapore in Information Technology and so on. Thus, these capabilities are the key driving forces for Southeast Asia to adopt the idea of collaboration through ADIC. The objectives of ADIC were defined in the framework for the implementation of ADIC in the fourth ADMM in 2010 in Vietnam, such as the collaboration of ASEAN member states on strategic projects through

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\(^{78}\) Guy Ben-Ari, *Can ASEAN Integration Deliver in Defence Technology?* (cogitASIA, CSIS, September 2011); interview with Dato’ Paduka Mustappa, Deputy Defence Minister of Brunei Darussalam, Bandar Seri Begawan, 17 July 2013

\(^{79}\) Interview with Mr. Shakieb bin Ahmad Shakir, Deputy Undersecretary for Policy and Strategic Planning Division, MoD Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 13 August 2013

\(^{80}\) Interviewed with Jan Pieter Ate, Director of International Cooperation, Indonesia Ministry of Defence, Jakarta, 16 September 2013
partnership, joint-ventures and co-production, promoting intra-ASEAN trade of defence products, increasing ASEAN technology and industrial competitiveness in defence and dual-use industry and creating incentives that would assist defence industry growth within the ASEAN defence industry. The abilities possessed by some ASEAN member states can be utilised for the sake of Southeast Asian defence capability.

For certain countries, such as Brunei, there are no plans to build its own defence industry at this time. With the growth of the technology world so rapid, for small countries, such as Brunei, it is still cost-effective to submit their defence industry to the private sector. Therefore, for Brunei, defence industry cooperation makes use of equity-opportunity that utilises the defence industries that are in Indonesia and Malaysia. In point of fact, the perspective delivered by Brunei’s Ministry of Defence is in line with the spirit and purpose of the initial establishment of ADIC. As cited by the Malaysian Ministry of Defence, the Malaysian defence industry aims to share technology and weapons technology advances with other ASEAN members such as Cambodia, Myanmar and Brunei.

However, there are some constraints that have become a barrier for ASEAN defence industry collaboration. The first challenge is the existence of conflict in the region, including territorial disputes at borders such as between Cambodia and Thailand. Hence, when it comes to the clause of buying defence industry products from a neighbouring country within ASEAN member states, the disputant tends to look to other countries.

81 Annex 4 of ADIC framework, Indonesia Ministry of Defence Archive
82 Interview with Dato’ Paduka Mustappa, Deputy Defence Minister of Brunei Darussalam, Bandar Seri Begawan, 17 July 2013
83 Ibid
84 Interview with Mr. Shakieb bin Ahmad Shakir, Deputy Undersecretary for Policy and Strategic Planning Division, MoD Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 13 August 2013
outside ASEAN. The second challenge is governments’ desires for full reciprocity in the defence trade, despite the imbalance in national defence industrial capabilities, since only Indonesia and Singapore have a significant defence industrial base.\textsuperscript{85} In light of these facts, it is not surprising that the countries of Southeast Asia remain heavily dependent on imports of defence equipment.\textsuperscript{86} Indeed, the concept of ADIC is still at an early stage, but the concept of this defence industry collaboration can be a very significant strategic step in the establishment of the ASEAN Community, especially if the various constraints and weaknesses contained in the ADIC concept paper can be overcome. If the formation of the ADIC can be developed further and firmly institutionalised, then the process of standardisation of weaponry amongst ASEAN member states will be implemented more easily. Thus, the modernisation of weaponry systems and inter-operability amongst ASEAN military will also be reached more easily. With the economic growth of ASEAN member states being relatively stable since the 1997 financial crisis, an effective ASEAN defence industry collaboration is not impossible to achieve.

In a special meeting on the development of ADIC which was held in conjunction with the ninth ADMM on 15 – 18\textsuperscript{th} April, 2015, the Malaysian government proposed to other ASEAN member states the concept and process of remanufacturing to enhance ASEAN member states’ capacity in upgrading current defence industry products to an advanced technical level or standard and to bring products back to their original quality and performance.\textsuperscript{87} This proposal was welcomed by other ASEAN member states

\textsuperscript{85} Ben-Ari,\textit{ Op.cit}
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid
\textsuperscript{87} Malaysian Ministry of Defence Proposal at Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition (LIMA 2015) on 20 March 2015 for a joint remanufactured defence product between ASEAN member states
states since the objectives of remanufacturing are in line with the objectives of the ADIC to increase ASEAN technology and industrial competitiveness to international standards.

5. The Evolution of Southeast Asian Defence Spending

In 2012, military spending in Southeast Asia amounted to US$33.677 billion. This sum represents 11.17% of the East Asian total for the same year, or 8.72% of the Asian total. In ASEAN itself, there is a striking difference in the field of military spending, with the combined spending of the five biggest countries - Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam - covering approximately 89.18% and the rest being the total of all the other Southeast Asian countries. Amongst Southeast Asian countries, Singapore is the biggest spender for equipment reaching a total amount of $9.7 billion or 3.6% of its GDP. Meanwhile, Laos is the lowest at 0.2% of its GDP. In terms of nominal expenditure, Laos is again the lowest. A huge disparity between the highest and the lowest is a concern that has become the focus of other Southeast Asia countries to help improve Laos's weaponry capability, as per the objectives of the ADMM.

In the study of the evolution of military expenditure in the period 2000 - 2012, we see the same trend with the previous data in that there is a very wide disparity between countries with high and low GDPs. Actually, it is a

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89 East Asia" comprises Southeast Asia as well as China, Japan, South Korea, Mongolia, and Taiwan, and Taiwan. Data for North Korea are available, and data for China have been estimated by SIPRI
90 Asia" comprises not only “East Asia” (see above), but also “South India” (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, data for Nepal unavailable) and “Oceania” (Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea), Central Asia is not included (see methodological notes); Ibid
91 Data for Laos and Myanmar are not included in this figure, since those countries data are not available in SIPRI; See also Military Balance 2013, pp. 320-321
natural situation because a country's military spending is constrained by fresh funds, or depends upon what national resources they have. In the period between 2002 and 2012, Southeast Asian military spending grew by 62%, half as much as the growth rate ratio calculated for the period 2000-2012 (111.71%), and this includes missing data for 2000 and 2001. The rate of growth of military-spending countries such as Cambodia, Indonesia and Thailand fluctuates between 61% and 131% in the period 2002 and 2012.92 Similarly, Malaysia and the Philippines, in the same period, increased their military spending by 35% and 30%, respectively, in contrast to Laos which lowered its spending by 30%. Only two ASEAN member states, Brunei and Singapore, keep a stable profile of +17% and +14%, accordingly.

If such figures were converted at the current U.S. dollar and inflation rates, Cambodia’s military spending was about $136 million in 2002, increased to $210 million in 2012; Indonesian military spending was about $19.25 billion in 2002, increased to about $79.75 billion in 2012; and Thailand was about $32.27 billion in 2002, increased to $54.20 billion in 2012, respectively. Referring to the data shown in table 5.1 in U.S. dollars, Malaysia’s military spending was about $34.52 billion in 2002, increased to about $46.64 billion in 2012. The Philippines was about $21.71 billion in 2002, increased to about $27.39 billion in 2012 (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2).93

93 Ibid
Table 5.1

Military Spending Evolution Comparison 2000 and 2012 in Current $US

Sources: SIPRI Year Book 2013
Note. This figure explains the comparison of military spending of ASEAN member states at the current US dollar and inflation rates, based on the fluctuation of defence expenditure in the period 2000 to 2012.

Table 5.2

Trend of Defence Spending in Southeast Asia 2000-2012 Based on GDP Percentage

Sources: SIPRI Year Book 2013
Note. The graphic shows the trend of defence spending in Southeast Asia in the period 2000 – 2012, based on the increase of percentage in GDP
In the two charts above, in addition to the six countries where the research was conducted, other ASEAN member states are deliberately included as a comparison, although there are countries that do not list their military spending data and trends due to a lack of adequate data. In the timespan of 2011-2012, Singapore military spending trends remained stable at +0.34%, along with the Philippines at +4.22%. Although the rate of increase in military spending amounted to +9.38% in Cambodia, if it is compared with Indonesia and Vietnam that raised their military spending by 23.54% and 36.47%, respectively, the increase is still a concern. However, Malaysia, Brunei and Thailand showed a decrease of approximately -3.02%, -3.13% and -3.37%, respectively.

In the period 2009-2012, there was a striking difference in terms of the military spending of the countries of Southeast Asia, with almost all countries experiencing a slowdown or decline, from 2.9% in Brunei up to 20.45% in Cambodia. Indonesia is the only ASEAN member states which had a drastic increase of approximately +62.55%, while other countries such as Vietnam increased theirs by approximately +31.62%, and the Philippines by +11.18%, or in other words, by no more than 50% from the previous budget.\(^4\) The growth in military spending of each ASEAN member state could be a significant contributor to the escalation of military spending trends in Southeast Asia.

The above explanation shows that the ASEAN member states in the period 2000-2010 in general increased their defence spending to acquire a wide range of sophisticated weapons technology for major weaponry systems, so that the target of own-weapons production amongst ASEAN countries can be realised as an objective of ADIC. The faster the ASEAN

\(^4\) SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, *Op.cit*
member states master a high-tech weapons system, the quicker is the reduction in technology disparity amongst ASEAN member states. For this reason, similarities in defence technology by strengthening relationships with the defence and security industry will be achieved since the member states will have the same standard of weaponry systems.95

6. The Reasons for Military Modernisation in Southeast Asia

The reasons behind modernisation of ASEAN member states major weaponry system seems driven by the concept of ADIC to reduce technology disparity in term of standardization of weaponry system, and the growing political pressure due to the growing threats that are shaping and the type of military duty in Southeast Asia.96 There is concern that an increase in military spending will ultimately encourage an ‘arms race’ that can ruin the planned establishment of the ASEAN Community. However, as Bitzinger states, “these acquisitions do not fit the pattern of an ‘arms race’ as laid out in prevailing theory such as, mutually adversarial relationships, explicit tit-for-tat arms acquisitions, the intention of seeking dominance over one’s rivals through arming intimidation”.97

One factor that deserves serious concern is the extent to which the clausal Transfer of Technology in the MoU, which is one of the conditions of purchasing military equipment, can run and, significantly, what happens if the end-user or buyer is able to master the technology and becomes able to produce their own equipment when needed. The technology transfer

96 Suara Karya Newspaper, 22 August 2011, DPR Desak Peningkatan Anggaran Kementerian Pertahanan/ The Parliament Urges Government to Increase Defence Budget
97 Richard A. Bitzinger, A New Arms Race? Explaining Recent Southeast Asian Military Acquisitions (Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, vol. 32, no. 1, Apr 2010), p. 50
process is fairly well developed amongst ASEAN member states; for example, Indonesia through its state weapons manufacturer, PT. PINDAD, has been able to produce world-class military equipment. Adopting the technology and science of Europe and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation), this defence company has produced dozens of types of light to heavy equipment, from hand guns to Armoured Personnel Carriers. They have been producing the assault rifle SS-2 type assault rifles since 2006. Its reliability levels are even better than the original prototype of the Belgian-made FNC or Russian-made AK-47. Moreover, a country like Singapore is represented on the list of top 100 global defence countries, having developed its defence technology based on the Transfer of Technology clause, as well as military equipment with their own technology. Below are some major weaponry systems that are already owned and which will be acquired by selected ASEAN member states, as follows:

6.1. BRUNEI

The fact that Brunei, which is by far the smallest of the ASEAN states in terms of population, has outspent its ASEAN partners (except Singapore) in term of military expenditure per capita. In 2011, for instance, Brunei military expenditure per capita was at US$ 1015, while the figures for Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam were at US$ 23, US$ 164, US$ 1721, US$ 82, and US$ 29, respectively. The sultanate country, which is rich in oil, has long defence ties with the British. Under the agreement of September 1983, the British Ghurkha battalion under

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99 The Military Balance 2013, pp. 284-382
100 Michael Leifer, Decolonization and International Status: The Experience of Brunei (International Affairs, vol. 54, no. 1, April 1978), p. 244
British command still remain in Brunei, way beyond its independence. The agreement is open-ended, although the situation is reviewed every five years if either party so desires.\(^{101}\)

Brunei’s modernisation in terms of procuring the latest equipment concentrated on surveillance equipment, humanitarian capability, air defence capability, integration of mobility and logistics support.\(^{102}\) Brunei’s Armed Forces, despite being well-trained but with constraints in term of its size, could offer little resistance to determined aggressors. Its land forces purchased French-made Renault VAB wheeled armoured personnel carriers for mechanised infantry. Well before this procurement, the Royal Brunei Armed Forces had purchased a light tank, the Scorpion Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance from the UK which has a 76mm gun mounted on it. Meanwhile, the Brunei Air Force has also purchased an Indonesian-made squadron of maritime patrol aircraft, the CN-235. Currently, the air force has received the initial batch of Sikorsky UH-60L Black Hawk utility helicopters for the army support role to replace the current utility helicopter fleet which consist of Bell 212s and 214 (SAR Transport). The Brunei Air Force has been strengthened by the 100-series of two-seat advanced trainers and the 200-series single-seat radar from British Aerospace which has strengthened Brunei’s air force which is equipped with light fighters.\(^{103}\)

With an average of 2.5% GDP per year, Brunei really does not have any budget constraint for its military modernisation. The total amount of defence budget was US$ 415 million in 2011 and slightly decreased to

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\(^{101}\) According to Tim Huxley, the precise details of the agreement contained in private letters exchanged between the British and Brunei governments have not been made public. See Tim Huxley, *Brunei: Defending a Mini-State*, in Chin Kin Wah (ed.), *Defence Spending in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 1987), pp. 224-251

\(^{102}\) Brunei Defence White Paper 2011, pp. 19-20

\(^{103}\) *The Military Balance 2013*, p. 285
US$ 411 million in 2012. Brunei modernised its Navy with various version of corvette and missile-armed unit “Waspada” class 206t fast attack craft. “Each ship was equipped with two MM 38 Exocet surface-to-surface missiles for long range anti-ship engagement, twin 30mm GCM 01 guns and two 7.62mm machine guns”. Furthermore, there is a fleet of 95m Offshore Patrol Vessels for coastal naval units that are able to patrol and defend the Brunei’s Exclusive Economic Zone.

6.2. INDONESIA

Over the past 20 years, Indonesia’s conventional defence capability has remained modest. Defence spending as a percentage of GDP declined from 1.5% to 0.78% after the financial crisis in 1997. The official defence total in Indonesia is unlikely to capture the true extent of defence expenditure as it fails to include pensions and benefits for retired military personnel and overseas procurement. Around 60% of the defence budget is allocated to personnel for salaries and the regular provision of military logistics. Following his victory in the July 2009 general elections, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono announced an increase of the defence budget of 21% more than the previous fiscal year. In August, 2012, the President again reinforced his commitment to develop armed forces by injecting more into the defence budget. In 2011, the defence budget amounted to US$ 5.7 billion, and increased to US$ 6.8 billion in 2012.

The navy has two fleets, West in Jakarta and East in Surabaya. Since 2011, Indonesia has planned to develop a third fleet command which will cover all Indonesian territory that stretches from Weh Island (Aceh Province) in the West to Rote Island (Nusa Tenggara Timur) in the Central

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104 Mohd Radzi, Brunei’s Defence Modernization, 15 July 2010
105 The Military Balance 2010, p. 391
and to the Arafuru Sea (Papua Province) in the East. Indonesia needs to boost its navy capability and capacity to face increasing pirate activities in its sea jurisdiction. The current fleets’ main combatants are equipped with submarines and the fleets are in varying states of seaworthiness that are insufficient to secure Indonesia’s territory from violation at sea. Indonesia’s navy has signed an agreement with the Netherlands to build 20 Sigma Class frigates that will be assembled in Surabaya, Indonesia, and there is the possibility of buying German Type 209 Submarines with South Korea. Currently, PT. PAL, the Indonesian shipbuilder, has continued to build small vessels with stealth technology. One squadron of F-16s (10 aircraft) has been crippled since the U.S. military embargo which paralysed many Indonesian fighters. For the F-16s, Indonesia has operated Block 15 since the 1960s and, in 2011, in line with the lifting of the military embargo from the U.S., Indonesia obtained a grant from the U.S. for 24-unit F-16 C and D Block 25 that will be upgraded to Block 52. These 24-unit F-16s were expected to fly over Indonesian skies in 2014. In addition, 12 SU-30MK that are currently owned have been equipped with the R-77 Rudal. With this air-to-air Rudal, Indonesia’s Sukhoi has a Beyond Visual Range capability, something that has already been held by other ASEAN states such as Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.

106 Interview with Marsetio, Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff, Jakarta, 1 April 2013
107 Document of Indonesian Navy, accessed 27 March 2013
108 Interview with Marsetio, Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff, Jakarta, 1 April 2013
109 Discussions with senior Indonesian Air Force officers, Jakarta, March 2013, See also Tim Huxley, ASEAN Defence Policies and Expenditures in Richard Solkolsky, Angel Rabasa and C. Richard Neu (ed.), The Role of Southeast Asia in U.S. Strategy Toward China (RAND Corporation, 2001), p. 52
6.3. MALAYSIA

Since the 1980s, the Malaysian Armed Forces has been transitioning from a counter-insurgency force to a more conventional one. Its force is structured to protect maritime and territorial claims in the South China Sea and the protection of Economic Exclusive Zones (EEZs). According to SIPRI, the Malaysian defence budget more than doubled between 2000 and 2008, from US$ 2.4 billion to US$ 5 billion (constant US dollar), and reached a stable amount of around US$ 4.7 billion in 2011 and 2012. Malaysia has acquired 18 Russian-made, MiG-29Ns, 25 BAe Hawk fighter/bombers, 13 F-5Es and 8 F/A-18Ds and, in 2003, Malaysia ordered 18 SU-30MKM Flankers from Russia. Bitzinger states that the MiG-29s and F-5s are scheduled to be deactivated in a few years.

The flurry of big-ticket procurement that characterised the Malaysian force modernisation is part of the Versatile Malaysian Armed Forces of the 21st Century (VMAF21) which included buying submarines, main battle tanks, multi-launch rockets, Armour Personnel Carriers and multirole fighter aircraft under the Eight Plan (2000-05) and Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006-10), which had an emphasis on ground forces with a procurement wish list worth US$ 1.8 billion. Malaysia also added 48 PT-91M main battle tanks from Poland worth US$ 1.4 billion, along with 15 support vehicles and major enhancement in the acquisition of 211 Savunna Sistmeleri from Turkey.

The Malaysian navy still operates 40 1980s-made frigates, patrol craft and coastal vessels armed with Seawolf surface-to-surface missiles and Exocet anti-ship missiles. Under their submarine programme, the navy

will obtain two Scorpene class boats, and introduce the “capability and the launch of a major offshore patrol vessel (OPV) programme”. Finally, as in the Ninth Malaysia Plan, the OPV programme will be strengthened with six German-designed MEKO A100 and 21 more expected in a follow up to supplement the two *Lekiu*-class ships constructed in the UK.

6.4. SINGAPORE

Despite Singapore being small in term of size and population, its economic importance and military capability rank it amongst Southeast Asia’s middle powers. During the 1997 financial crisis, Singapore continued its force modernisation. The crisis did not seem to affect it significantly. Since the early 1970s, “Singapore has allocated an average of 6% of its GDP to defence expenditure, which has enabled it to acquire, for a state of Singapore’s size, a very capable, modern and well-trained ground, air and naval forces”. Accordingly, the defence budget increased from S$6.1 billion to S$7.3 billion in 1998. Planned defence expenditures also increased, in U.S. dollars, from $4.1 billion to $4.3 billion over the same period.

Singapore’s procurement would have initially indicated a significant investment. However, in the Air Force, procurement did not introduce any new generation of fighter aircraft until the current year. The Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) is the most advanced in Southeast Asia with its 24 F15SG fighters. Over the past decade, the RSAF has operated 74 F-16s Block 52/52+ (the latest type of F-16). It has nearly 200 modern aircraft in its inventory. Additionally, the RSAF has a squadron of aircraft tankers.

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113 Karniol (2005), *Op.cit*
(9 aircraft) for the purpose of supporting F-5Es in-flight refuelling capability with the capability of extending their range and patrol capability well into the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{117} Furthermore, the RSAF possesses a wide variety of sophisticated air-carried ammunition, including the AIM-9X Sidewinder, Israeli Phyton IV and U.S. Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM).\textsuperscript{118}

The Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN), has six missile gunboats, and six formidable class frigates. Besides these frigates, the RSN has also acquired four Type-A12 submarines from Sweden.\textsuperscript{119} “In 2009, Singapore took delivery of two more Swedish Västergötland-class submarines. These submarines have been retrofitted with air-independent propulsion (AIP) that permits it to remain submerged for much longer periods of time than conventional battery-powered diesel-electric submarines”.\textsuperscript{120} In short, despite recent modernisation efforts, Singaporean armed forces recognise the critical importance of technology for effective and modern armed forces.

6.5. THAILAND

Thailand’s military expenditure was significantly affected by economic instability for a period of time. The Thai defence budget fell more than 30% after the 1997 economic crisis, however, military expenditures began to rebound to US$3.1 billion in 2000.\textsuperscript{121} The Thai Prime Minister, Thaksin Sinawatra, had approved a modernisation plan totalling US$ 6.6 billion

\textsuperscript{118} Bitzinger (2010), \textit{Op.cit}, p. 57
\textsuperscript{120} Bitzinger (2010), \textit{Op.cit}, p.56; see also Tim Fish and Richard Scott, \textit{Archer Launch Marks Next Step for Singapore’s Submarine Force} (Jane’s Defence Weekly, 18 June 2009)
\textsuperscript{121} SIPRI Military Expenditure Data Base, www.sipri.org, accessed on 12 March 2014
between 2005 and 2015, along with adding approximately US$ 700 million per year to the defence budget.\textsuperscript{122} The Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) capability has improved significantly with the acquisition of 12 Gripen JAS 39C/D fighters, two Saab S100B Argus Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft with Erieye radar and two Saab 340s.\textsuperscript{123} New equipment also includes transport helicopters, main battle tanks, Armour Personnel Carriers, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), Frigates, Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV) and SAR aircraft. Thailand upgraded its Lockheed Martin F-16A/B Block 15 fleet via the Foreign Military Sale (FMS) mechanism in 2010.

The Royal Thai Navy (RTN) has considered developing its capability into more of a blue-water force to include the protection of offshore oil and gas reserves, and EEZ maritime security. The RTN has expressed interest in acquiring submarines but current budget constraints have made this unlikely in the near future.

\textbf{6.6. VIETNAM}

Within a one-year span, between 2011 and 2012, Vietnam raised its military spending by 26.47\%. Its defence budget in 2012 was roughly US$ 3.3 billion, around 2.4\% of Vietnam’s GDP. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Vietnam lost its major arms supplier and soon afterwards, its military equipment deteriorated; most of this equipment remained in serious disrepair due to lack of funds for spare parts. After a long period of neglect in defence modernisation, since the 1990s, the country has begun to rearm itself. The Vietnamese continue to view China as a long-term adversary, thus the country needs a credible naval capability, particularly in balancing China’s naval capability. To protect its EEZ

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Bitzinger (2010), \textit{Op.cit.}, p. 58
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
resources and to enforce its territorial claims in the disputed area of Spratly Islands, Vietnam has acquired the first of three Airbus Military C-212 light transport aircraft.\textsuperscript{124} Vietnam’s navy is currently acquiring three new corvettes outfitted with German engines, and British and American radar.\textsuperscript{125}

In 2009, Vietnam revealed that it would procure six conventional diesel powered Kilo-class submarines from Russia at a cost of US$2 billion. These submarines would be integrated into the navy since this country currently operates only two mini-submarines acquired from North Korea over a decade ago.\textsuperscript{126} Prior to those modernisations, in 2003 the Vietnam People’s Air Force (VPAF) had bought 12 Su-27s and 12 Su-30 MKKs to modernise its arsenal. In 2011, Vietnam reportedly stepped up its naval modernisation programme when it took delivery of four additional Su-30MK2 multi-role jet fighters. These are expected to be equipped with the Kh-59MK anti-ship cruise missile with a range of 115 km. Vietnam currently has on order sixteen more Su-30MK2 jet fighters.\textsuperscript{127}

\textbf{6.7. Total Strength of Certain ASEAN Member States’ Major Weaponry System}

From the detailed account above, it is shown that ASEAN member states purchased similar weaponry systems and with an equal capability as a bridge for inter-operability. Soldiers require a range of skills to fulfil a wide spectrum of roles,\textsuperscript{128} and it is through standards of equipment, in terms of new and modern weapons, that such requirements can be achieved.

\textsuperscript{125} Bitzinger (2010), \textit{Op.cit}, p. 59
\textsuperscript{126} Carlyle A. Thayer, \textit{Vietnam Security Outlook} (National Institute for Defence Studies, Joint Research Series, no. 7, ch-6, 2012), p. 79
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid
Standards of equipment amongst national armed forces do not vary greatly. The aim is that various national equipment share common facilities and communication procedures.\textsuperscript{129} As has been stated before, many experts have said that with current military modernisation, it is feared that it could trigger an arms race in Southeast Asia. However, Colin Gray has developed a definition of an arms race, which must meet four basic conditions; 1) there must be two or more parties, conscious of their antagonism; 2) they must structure their armed forces with attention to the probable effectiveness of the forces in combat with, or as a deterrent to, the other arms race participants; 3) they must compete in terms of quantity and quality; and 4) there must be rapid increases in quantity or improvement in quality. Gray also clarified that, ‘there must be a measure of action-reaction, or there would be no arms race at all’.\textsuperscript{130} In fact, the modernisation of ASEAN member states’ military does not show any such conditions described by Bitzinger or Gray. The modernisation in major military weaponry systems is aimed at gaining a sophisticated technology that can be applied within ASEAN member states’ military industry to achieve the goal of the ADIC. Briefly, the armed forces of selected countries of ASEAN member states as described above have the following defence figures (see Table 5.3).\textsuperscript{131}


\textsuperscript{131} The data was compiled from various sources such as Indonesian National Defence Forces Document, SIPRI Year Book and Military Balance as of 2012
Table 5.3
Defence Figure of Selected ASEAN Member States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Armed Personnel</th>
<th>Light &amp; Main Battle Tanks</th>
<th>Armoured Personnel Carrier</th>
<th>Combat Aircraft</th>
<th>Principal Surface Warships</th>
<th>Missile Gunboats</th>
<th>Submarine</th>
<th>Submarine</th>
<th>Submarine</th>
<th>Submarine</th>
<th>Submarine</th>
<th>Major Landing Ships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>434,410</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>1,119</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>1,318</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>125,800</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>1,335</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>306,000</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>1,268</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>586,838</td>
<td>2,070</td>
<td>2,150</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Document of Indonesian National Defence Forces, SIPRI Year Book and Military Balance as of 2012

7. The Elements of a Defence Community in Southeast Asian Defence Cooperation Under the Auspices of ADMM

Although the notion of inter-operability has been discussed in brief in Chapter 4, it is necessary to add at this point another discussion that can reinforce the importance of conducting inter-operability smoothly to prove the existence of the elements of a defence community in ASEAN’s defence cooperation. As has been stated earlier, current defence cooperation or defence diplomacy amongst ASEAN member states contains the elements or characteristic of defence community. Explanations of forms of a defence community usually refers to NATO as a role model. NATO has been developing inter-operability since the alliance was founded in 1949. Tresch and Picciano define the objective of inter-operability as “the capability of different military organisations to conduct joint operations. It allows forces, units or systems to operate together, to share common doctrine and

132 In various document of ASEAN’s defence cooperation, either in the form of joint exercise or combined training amongst ASEAN member states; it is always stated that the aim of those cooperation is to achieved inter-operability as the main requirement of the existence of Defence Community elements
procedures and to be able to communicate with one another”. Interoperability reduces duplication within the alliance, allows the pooling of resources and does not necessarily require common military equipment. It is important for this equipment to be housed in common facilities and to be inter-operable with other equipment. Otherwise, inter-operability is difficult to achieve.

“NATO militaries have achieved inter-operability through joint planning, training and exercises within NATO-led operations that could include disaster relief, humanitarian relief, search and rescue, and peace support operations”. Moreover, inter-operability requires the establishment of necessary levels of compatibility, interchangeability or commonality in operational, procedural, material, technical and administrative fields. In addition, NATO standardisation agreements, known as STANAGs, establish processes, procedures, terms and conditions for common military or technical procedures or equipment shared by NATO member nations. Whereas, in defence cooperation amongst ASEAN member states, standardisation of weaponry systems is still in the process of being established as stated in the concept of the ADIC. Up to now, the document of foreign defence cooperation intra-ASEAN stated the aim and purpose of the use of joint military assets.


134 Ibid


136 Ibid; Furthermore NATO Briefing, A New Command Structure for a Transformed Alliance (Belgium, August 2005; http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/nms/nms-e.pdf

137 Indonesian National Defence Force Archive, in the occasion of Indonesia – Malaysia defence cooperation document about ASEAN Military Operations Informal Meeting
Since the inauguration of ADMM in 2006, defence cooperation amongst ASEAN member states has been conducted on bilateral and trilateral bases, mainly under the auspices of this institution. At the bilateral level, cooperation is based on a series of bilateral understandings or arrangements between two ASEAN states. Bilateral border and maritime security arrangements have become common practices since the 1970s. For instance, bilateral border security cooperation existed between Indonesia and Malaysia, and between Malaysia and Thailand, and normally involved a combined task force headquarters, as well as the combined and unilateral operations.

The scope of bilateral cooperation also includes joint military exercises, training and cooperation on the standardisation of weaponry systems. At the multilateral level, cooperation usually involves two ASEAN members and an external power, with multilateral cooperation between ASEAN member states. One multilateral cooperation currently in effect, for example, is the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), which relates to the defence of Malaysia and Singapore with Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand.

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138 Indonesian National Defence Force Archive. Cooperation under the ADMM as envisaged in the ASEAN defence cooperation structures such as the ASEAN Chief of Defence Force Informal Meeting (ACDFIM), which reach the operational level, one of which is to be able to implement cooperation in the use of military assets and capacity in humanitarian relief operations and disaster relief


140 T.B. Miller, The Five Power Defence Agreement and Southeast Asia Security (Pacific Community, vol. 3, no. 2, January 1972). The FPDA, which came into effect on 1 November, 1971, provided that in the event of any externally organised or supported armed attack or threat of attack against Malaysia or Singapore, the five governments would consult together for the purpose of deciding what measures should be taken, jointly or separately
The common desire of ASEAN member states is to maintain regional security; it is within such a context that ASEAN member states strengthen their defence diplomacy. Regional security issues, multilateral as well as bilateral, have never been absent from ASEAN meetings on regional security. “The bilateral security linkages that have developed amongst ASEAN states fall into two distinct categories. The first includes measures geared to counter internal threats to the members, as well as sharing of intelligence about subversive elements. The second form of cooperation addresses the external threats to regional security, as well as measures to enhance the long-term self-reliance of the members in security and defence. These measures include joint exercises, training, cooperation in arms manufacturing and the exchange of senior level personnel for familiarization with each other’s military establishments”.\(^{141}\) The table below indicates the various levels of defence cooperation amongst ASEAN member states (see Table 5.4).

Table 5.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Exercises</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia-Philippines</td>
<td>Phlindo/Corpatphilindo</td>
<td>Naval</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Intermittent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia-Malaysia</td>
<td>Malindo Jaya</td>
<td>Naval</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Annual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia-Singapore</td>
<td>Eagle</td>
<td>Air/Naval</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Annual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia-Singapore</td>
<td>Englek</td>
<td>Naval</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Biennial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia-Malaysia</td>
<td>Elang Malindo</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Biennial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia-Thailand</td>
<td>Sea Garuda</td>
<td>Naval</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Intermittent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia-Malaysia</td>
<td>Kekar Malindo</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Annual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei-Singapore</td>
<td>Pelican</td>
<td>Naval</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Annual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia-Thailand</td>
<td>Thalay</td>
<td>Naval</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Intermittent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia-Thailand</td>
<td>Elang Thainesia</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Annual</td>
</tr>
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<td>Indonesia-Singapore</td>
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<td>Air</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Annual</td>
</tr>
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<td>Malaysia-Thailand</td>
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<td>Air</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Annual</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brunei-Malaysia</td>
<td>Hornbil (&amp; others)</td>
<td>Naval</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Intermittent</td>
</tr>
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<td>Indonesia-Malaysia</td>
<td>Kripura Malindo</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Intermittent</td>
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<td>Singapore-Thailand</td>
<td>Sing-Siam</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Intermittent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia-Malaysia</td>
<td>Tatar Malindo</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Intermittent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia-Malaysia</td>
<td>Darsasa Malindo</td>
<td>Multi services</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Intermittent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore-Thailand</td>
<td>Thai-Sing</td>
<td>Naval</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Annual</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malaysia-Singapore</td>
<td>Malapura</td>
<td>Naval</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Annual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei-Singapore</td>
<td>Termite/FlamingArrow/Juggernaut</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Annual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia-Singapore</td>
<td>Safkar Indopura</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Annual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia-Singapore</td>
<td>Semangat Bersatu</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Intermittent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines-Singapore</td>
<td>Anoa-Singa</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Annual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei-Singapore</td>
<td>Maju Bersama</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Annual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore-Thailand</td>
<td>Kocha Singa</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Annual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia-Cambodia</td>
<td>VIP Guard</td>
<td>Multi services</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Annual</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Document of Indonesian National Defence Force, 9 May 2011; Military exercise as revealed by the table are excluded by six members of ASEAN only. There was no data confirming the involvement of CMLV countries in the military cooperation between themselves.

Indonesia and the Philippines’ joint naval exercise in 1972 were noted as the first bilateral defence cooperation between two ASEAN states, followed by a series of bilateral cooperation events between ASEAN states.

such as joint naval exercises between Singapore and Indonesia in 1974, air force exercises in 1980 and land forces in 1989. A MoU signed in March 1989 “made provision for Singapore troops to train in Indonesia. Following their successful joint development of the Siabu Air Weapons Range (in eastern Sumatra), Singapore and Indonesia proceeded, in 1991, to develop an electronic Air Combat Manoeuvre Range (ACMR) at Pekan Baru, near Siabu”. The ACMR was completed in 1995 and the process of updating the new MoU on military cooperation between Indonesia and Singapore in an agreement called the Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) was terminated.

At the same time, Malaysia and Indonesia began the process of confidence-building through border security cooperation and joint exercises soon after ASEAN was established. Their series of joint exercises now comprise Exercise Kekar Malindo (Army), Exercise Malindo Jaya (Navy), Exercise Elang Malindo (Air Force), and Exercise Malindo Darsasa (Armed Forces). Singapore-Malaysia defence cooperation outside the Five-Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) rubric took some time to gather momentum but has also advanced. For example, the Singapore-Malaysia Defence Cooperation Forum, jointly chaired by the two Defence Ministers, has been set up to focus on joint training and defence industry projects.

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144 The MoU between Indonesia and Singapore on Defence Cooperation Agreement for Military Training Area had been terminated on 11 March 2009; see also Document of Indonesian National Defence Force, accessed on 22 August 2013; Berita Sore, *RI – Singapore DCA Terminated*; Minister, www.beritasore.com, had been accessed in September 2010


146 Ibid
Before the financial crisis in 1997, bilateral defence cooperation between ASEAN member states took place more regularly. The quality of cooperation and activities amongst defence ministry officials and senior officers from ASEAN states was incredibly high. Amongst the founding fathers of ASEAN were close security partners, although at the same time those countries engaged in security cooperation with external powers, albeit to varying degrees. Thailand, for instance, has had long-established border security cooperation with Malaysia, and also conducts bilateral military exercises with Malaysia and Singapore. In recent years, “Brunei and the Philippines have, since the end of the Cold War, become more involved in this web of security cooperation”.\(^{147}\)

Another defence cooperation between ASEAN member states was the cooperation along their common land and sea borders for several years on a bilateral and trilateral basis. “There have been four bilateral border security arrangements within ASEAN: between Thailand and Malaysia, Malaysia and Indonesia, the Philippines and Indonesia, and Malaysia and the Philippines. The most important arrangements related to communist insurgency are the ones between Malaysia and Thailand, and Malaysia and Indonesia”.\(^{148}\) The most successful example of such cooperation has been the 1976 *Thai-Malaysian Border Agreement*, which is considered as ‘the most extensive institutionalization of joint military action between two ASEAN states”.\(^{149}\)

The Malaysia-Thailand arrangements constitute the earliest and most comprehensive form of such cooperation within ASEAN. Soon after the new

\(^{147}\) *Ibid*
\(^{149}\) Sheldon W. Simon (1982), *The ASEAN States and Regional Security* (Hoover Institute Press, Stanford University, 1982), p. 88
agreement was signed, the two states launched a major military operation (a force of 5,000 men) against an estimated 200 insurgents in the area. The operation continued throughout 1977 and 1978, thus making the combined efforts the most extensive bilateral collaboration amongst the ASEAN states.\footnote{Sheldon W. Simon, The ASEAN States’ Obstacle to Security Cooperation (Orbis, vol. 22, no. 2, Summer 1978), pp. 420-425} The Thai-Malaysian border agreements were used as a basis for establishing similar types of cooperation amongst other ASEAN member states with respect to border insurgency control.\footnote{John McBeth and K. Das, A Frontier of Fears and Factions (FEER, 20 January 1980), pp. 16-22}

The Indonesia-Malaysia border cooperation has been much more smooth and effective. Malaysia and Indonesia have long coordinated military actions to suppress the Communist insurgents along their Sarawak-Kalimantan border in Borneo.\footnote{Simon (1978), Op.cit, p. 420-425} These operations were largely responsible for a dramatic fall in the number of insurgents. The border committee shifted its attention to military threats from the South China Sea and devised a series of military exercises. In 1984, the twelve-year old Malaysian-Indonesian agreement was revised. The new agreement extends an existing pattern of military cooperation to all borders, including maritime borders as well as the combined use of naval and air forces.\footnote{Acharya (1990), Op.cit, pp. 1-2} The table below indicates intra-ASEAN bilateral defence cooperation (see Table 5.5).
Table 5.5

**Bilateral Defence Cooperation intra-ASEAN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Specific Issue</th>
<th>Related Issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia-Thailand</td>
<td>Border agreement</td>
<td>Border issue concern on communist insurgent</td>
<td>Intelligence exchanges, joint military exercise, military operations to handle insurgent and maritime areas patrol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia-Philippines</td>
<td>Border agreement</td>
<td>Border issue over Sabah</td>
<td>Both claimed over Sabah leave an uncertainty about the agreement. Joint military exercise and military information exchanges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia-Philippine</td>
<td>Border agreement</td>
<td>Border issue concern</td>
<td>Periodical exercise of navy and naval patrol to check smuggling, piracy and illegal shipment of arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore-Philippine</td>
<td>Training Facilities agreement</td>
<td>Cooperation on Air Force training facilities in Philippine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore-Thailand</td>
<td>Training Facilities agreement</td>
<td>Cooperation on Army training facilities in Thailand</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore-Brunei</td>
<td>Training Facilities agreement</td>
<td>Cooperation on Army training facilities in Brunei</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore-Indonesia</td>
<td>Training Facilities agreement</td>
<td>Joint air weapon testing range and land force exercise area</td>
<td>Naval exercise and joint navy patrol in Malacca strait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia-Indonesia</td>
<td>Border agreement</td>
<td>Border issue concern over Kalimantan-Sarawak and Sabah</td>
<td>Intelligence exchanges, joint military exercise, military operations to counter insurgent, and expanded to maritime security issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia-Singapore</td>
<td>Military Exercise</td>
<td>Military annual exercise</td>
<td>Expanded to Integrated Air Defence System</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Indonesian National Defence Force Archive and Researcher’s compilation data

ASEAN defence cooperation is particularly aimed not only at managing commonly perceived regional threats and challenges, but also as an instrument to build cooperation beyond confidence-building measures. It was clearly stated by
the then Chief of Malaysia’s Defence Force, General Hashim Mohammed Ali, that “the main aims of ASEAN defence and security cooperation is to reduce conflict and to facilitate confidence building measures”. Repetition in military exercise has also opened an opportunity for all personnel to gain skills and understanding in achieving inter-operability and integration amongst armed forces, and in turn this will naturally develop defence links within ASEAN. The above activities serve as a defence diplomacy effort within ASEAN, in that the development of intra-ASEAN defence ties will increase familiarity and understanding amongst the ASEAN member states. Such conditions could generate ASEAN credibility and ensure its increasing capability to guarantee its own security.

Over the past few years, several ASEAN member states have developed a network of informal bilateral defence ties that are often described as an “ASEAN defence spider web”. Underpinning this form of cooperation is a “widespread conviction on the part of ASEAN leaders that bilateral cooperation offers advantages over other forms of multilateral military cooperation”. In the words of the former chief of the Malaysian armed forces:

“Bilateral defence cooperation is flexible and provides wide-ranging options. It allows any ASEAN partner to decide the type, time, and scale of aid it requires and can provide. The question of national independence and sovereignty is unaffected by the decision of others as in the case of an alliance where members can evoke the terms of the treaty and interfere in the affairs of another partner”.

Within ASEAN, “mutual use of facilities has increased and there has been a significant increase in joint military exercises, with a focus on air and naval operations in maritime scenarios”, as has been explained in detail, such as the

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156 *Ibid*
Malaysian-Thai joint air exercises which have been extended to patrol maritime areas, cooperation agreements that provide “for regular joint military exercises, military information exchanges and the possible use of each other’s military facilities for maintenance and repair”. Furthermore, the Thai and Singapore air forces train together in the Philippines, and Singapore has also had access to excellent training facilities in Brunei. Meanwhile, Singapore has cultivated defence ties with Indonesia and has reached agreements that allow Singapore to conduct naval exercises in Indonesian waters.

In explaining the requirements of inter-operability and integration between armed forces, we can analyse from the diagram below, a structural organisation of bilateral security cooperation between Indonesia and Malaysia that shows the similarity of elements to handle the exercise, which in turn paves the way for the purposes of bridging the gap of inter-operability between ASEAN states’ armed forces (see Figure 5.2).

**Figure 5.2**

**Indonesia–Malaysia Border Security Cooperation Diagram**

Source: Document of Indonesian National Defence Forces

Note. This diagram is the General Border Committee structure between Indonesia – Malaysia: in this committee, the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces of the respective country occupies the highest level of the committee.

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159 *Ibid*
160 *Ibid*
161 Document of Indonesian National Defence Force, 9 May 2011
The legal basis of such cooperation is an arrangement on the border between the government of Indonesia and the government of Malaysia, signed on 3 December, 1984 in Yogyakarta. Indonesia was represented by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, General LB Moerdani, while the Malaysian side was represented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia, Dato’ Mas Bin Hitam. The cooperation between both Armed Forces was programmed in the forum of the General Border Committee Malaysia-Indonesia (GBC Malindo) and the agencies under it, with the scope of cooperation in the form of joint training, joint operations, exchange of students, exchange of reciprocal visiting officers and military officials.\textsuperscript{162}

The General Border Committee calls a meeting once every two years, in which the Indonesian side is led by the Defence Minister of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Malaysian side is led by the Minister of Defence for Malaysia. Meanwhile, the High-Level Committee Malaysia-Indonesia (HLC) conducts a meeting once a year alternately, in which the Indonesian side is led by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and the Malaysian side is also led by its Chief of Armed Forces. The agencies under the HLC were coordinated by Assistants to the Commander-in-Chief for Operations from both sides. Agencies supervised by the HLC include a steering team for intelligence, communication, SAR, socio-economy, joint police operations, and a steering team for land, naval and air force operations. These steering teams have a schedule to conduct a meeting once a year alternately in Indonesia or Malaysia.\textsuperscript{163}

Another example is the structural organisation of bilateral security cooperation between Indonesia and Singapore (see Figure 5.3).

\textsuperscript{162} Document of Indonesian National Defence Force in relation with Defence Cooperation of Indonesia with other ASEAN member states. 10 May 2011

\textsuperscript{163} Ibid
Figure 5.3

Indonesia-Singapore Security Cooperation Diagram

A similar organisation has also been formed between Singapore and Indonesia. The cooperation was begun with an Army joint exercise with the code name, ‘Safkar Indopura’, a Navy joint exercise with the code name, ‘Eagle Indopura’ and an Air Force joint exercise with the code name, ‘Elang Indopura’. In addition, for the purpose of border security cooperation, both countries have programmed a forum as a Combined Annual Report Meeting (CARM). This forum has scheduled a meeting once a year alternately in Indonesia or Singapore in which the Chief of Defence Force/CDF (Commander in Chief) has led the meeting.  

The agencies under CARM are the TSASM (TNI-SAF Annual Staff Meeting), which conducts a meeting once a year in rotation. In this agency, both countries are led by the Chief of General Staff for Indonesia and the Chief of Staff-Joint Staff for Singapore, positions equal to a three-star general. Other committees under CARM are the Joint Coordinating Committee, Joint Training Committee, Joint Logistic Committee and Joint

164 Ibid
Air Force Training Working Group. All these committees are led by two-star generals or their equivalent, in order that such high-ranking personnel can make any crucial decision when it is needed with immediate effect.\textsuperscript{165}

Intelligence sharing cooperation between the Indonesia Armed Forces Intelligence Staff-Joint Intelligence Directorate SAF based on the \textit{Arrangements for the Exchange of Intelligence} between the Indonesian Armed Forces Intelligence Staff and JID SAF was signed on 1 March, 2001 in Singapore. The signatories were the Assistant to the Indonesian Armed Forces C-in-C for Intelligence and the Director of JID SAF. Technical cooperation between the two armed forces included the use of a training area in Baturaja for the Indonesian Army and the Singapore Army, the use of a training area in Kayu Ara for the Indonesian Navy and the Singapore Navy and the use of the Military Training Area (MTA-1 & 2) for Singapore Armed Forces. These training areas are located in Indonesian territory. Singapore is the main beneficiary of this form of cooperation with its constraint of small air and land space for training. A series of other cooperative events are Over Flying Training Area (OFTA) in Pekanbaru, cooperation for Air Weapon Range (AWR) in Siabu and cooperation for Air Combat Manoeuvre Range (ACMR) at the Indonesian Air Force Base, Pekanbaru.

Furthermore, the form of multilateral security or defence cooperation can be analysed from this diagram of Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia-Thailand (see Figure 5.4).

\textsuperscript{165} Interview with Jan Pieter Ate, Director of International Cooperation, Indonesian Ministry of Defence, Jakarta, 16 September 2013
At a multilateral level is the cooperation between Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand for the security of the Malacca Straits. At an early phase, this cooperation was undertaken first by three countries: Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia (MALSINDO). However, in its development since the signing of the MoU, Thailand became the fourth country to join this organisation. The MoU was signed by the Assistant to the Commander–in-Chief of Armed Forces for Operations, INDF (Indonesia); the Assistant Chief of Staff for Defence Operations and Training, MAF (Malaysia); the Head of Naval Operations, RSN (Singapore); and the Chief of Staff, 3rd Naval Area Command, RTN (Thailand). Finally, the Terms of Reference for the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) was also signed by four countries, namely, the Commander-in-Chief of the INDF (Indonesia); the Chief of Defence Force, MAF (Malaysia); the Chief of Defence Force, SAF (Singapore) and the Supreme Commander of RTAF (Thailand) on September 18th, 2008 in Bangkok.

This cooperation covers security cooperation in the Straits of Malacca, called the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP). Two kinds of security
cooperation are implemented, namely: 1) in the sea area, called the Malacca Straits Sea Patrol (MSSP), which executes an activity of coordinated sea patrols in their respective territories; and 2) in the airspace, implementing a joint air maritime patrol called Eyes in the Sky (EiS). This patrol uses aircraft from one of the signatory countries alternately, and in this aircraft there are crew as Liaison Officers from signatory countries called the CMPT (Combined Mission Patrol Team). The Patrol aims to support the implementation of the marine patrols.

To evaluate these two patrols, a joint committee was formed with the Malacca Straits Patrol Joint Coordinating Committee (MSP JCC) led by four Operational Assistants to Chiefs of Defence Forces of the signatory countries; to evaluate the implementation of the marine patrol itself was the Malacca Straits Sea Patrol Joint Working Group (MSSP JWG), whereas the Eyes in the Sky Joint Working Group (EiS JWG) was formed for air patrols.

From these structures, personnel composition and the integration of military force in conducting sea patrol, we can analyse that, for high level and operational structures, matters are always handled by the Chief of Defence Forces or staff (flag officers) under his direct command. This indicates that in every bilateral or multilateral cooperation, ASEAN member states have the intention to conduct a joint effort and to bridge the gap of; 1) the development of a common doctrine and language; 2) the standardisation of equipment; and 3) the development of common logistic facilities. It is believed that, with the same structures and the continuance of joint exercises, the above gaps will be reduced and all personnel will reach the same standard. Moreover, through this training or cooperation, the forces can reach the target of being able to work as a unit or system that operates together and, most notably, the forces are able to communicate with one another in wider terms.
The cooperation effort of these countries either in border security cooperation or in the, also includes the intelligence staff which subsequently develop the information system in every exercise to improve coordination and situational awareness amongst the participating countries. Cooperation implies that regional cooperation amongst ASEAN militaries is much more the use enhancing mutual trust and confidence building measures, as it is a nascent experiment in preventive diplomacy.\textsuperscript{166} Exchange of military training represents another aspect of ASEAN defence diplomacy. Firm and strong bilateral relations between ASEAN members are a sufficient foundation for multilateral cooperation. Nonetheless, military cooperation within ASEAN is valuable because it advances non-military goals, such as transparency and confidence building.\textsuperscript{167} This cooperation as the implementation of defence diplomacy reflects, is indeed a growing trend towards military “cooperative arrangements to work for the common security of countries”.\textsuperscript{168} Therefore, it is no surprise that ASEAN members try to strengthen their intra-mural partnership, habits of cooperation and conflict avoidance,\textsuperscript{169} and will ultimately strengthen the unity as a community.

8. ADMM and ADMM-Plus Impacts Regional Security Architecture.

ADMM plays an important role in the internal structures of the ASEAN member states and has a positive impact on regional security and stability, especially on peace and maritime security operations. Cooperation in the ASEAN defence sector has grown steadily since its inception in 2006. Work in

\textsuperscript{167} Bandoro (2000), Op.cit, p. 192
\textsuperscript{168} Mushaid Ali, Fresh Impetus for an Asian Security Community, The Straits Times, Singapore, 26 November, 2003
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), in particular, has been progressing at a significant pace. Similarly, cooperation in the area of peacekeeping operations and the defence industry has moved steadily with the adoption of the Concept Papers on the Establishment of ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network and on ASEAN Defence Industry Collaboration by the 5th ADMM in 2011. Initiatives on establishing the ASEAN Defence Interaction Programme and an ADMM Logistics Support Framework were also adopted by the 7th ADMM in 2013. Implementation of these initiatives is currently underway. Another important new ADMM initiative is the establishment of a Direct Communications Link, which was adopted by the 8th ADMM in 2014. The Link, when established, will be a practical confidence and security-building measure that aims to promote quick response cooperation in emergency situations, in particular relating to maritime security.\(^{170}\)

ADMM activities that are aimed at encouraging humanitarian operations for the purpose of peace and maritime security operations in response to the threat in the region have a real impact on the ASEAN countries in the region. With reference to regional security architecture, the ADMM has had a number of achievements since its establishment. Cooperation with humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) has been expanded through the ADMM, with the adoption of the concept paper on the use of ASEAN military assets and capacities for HADR at the 3rd ADMM in 2009. Eight workshops on cooperation between ASEAN defence establishments and civil society organisations on non-traditional security issues have been conducted.\(^{171}\)


At present, in step-by-step implementation, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) receives an annual contribution of US$30,000 from ASEAN member states totalling US$300,000 for operating costs. As a result, direct contributions do not cover the current level of coordination activities, which in actuality, needs further development. While the AHA Centre was able to go beyond the region and receive donations from dialogue partners as part of its first Work Programme, the continuation and reliance on external funding sources for its operations is unsustainable.\footnote{172 Roundtable On The Future of The ADMM/ADMM-Plus and Defence Diplomacy in The Asia Pacific, available at https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/PR160223_Future-of-the-ADMM.pdf , accessed on 21 November 2016, p. 39.}

With the contribution of above funds, disaster management has become very significant for the ASEAN region as a humanitarian mission which is very important for the political stability in the region.

In addition, major achievements during this period include the establishment of the National Points of Contact (POCs), the common framework for information sharing, and the inventory of medical support capabilities. Standard Operating Procedures for Joint and Combined Medical Operations (SOPs-MM) were also developed to enhance the effectiveness of disaster medical assistance. Moreover, joint table-top exercises (scenario-based) were conducted. Such collective efforts led to a successful launch of the joint HADR/Military Medicine exercise in Brunei Darussalam in June 2013, which involved about 3,200 personnel, seven ships, and 15 helicopters from 18 ADMM-Plus nations. In October 2013, Singapore and Japan handed over Co-Chairmanship to Thailand and Russia at the Third EWG meeting on military medicine in Singapore.\footnote{173 Ibid.}
From these facts, one realises that the existence of ADMM has been a real achievement. Integration between ASEAN countries can be seen by the contribution of each country in both the policy and operational level in the field. This has huge implications for security in the region.

In addition, the management of security in the region also reflects the positive impact of the ADMM. The ADMM has made significant progress in dealing with real and current security issues. ASEAN centrality in the emerging multilateral and multilayered regional security institutions is the key to managing the power rivalry amongst the big countries so that peace and stability can be assured.\textsuperscript{174}

Another issue that is often discussed and which is an area of concern is maritime security in Southeast Asia. Many ASEAN economies are critically dependent on the maritime trade that flows through sea lanes such as the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and the South China Sea. ASEAN also shares other security interests in areas such as counter-proliferation and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. As they go forward, enhanced practical cooperation amongst ASEAN and other major security partners will be crucial in tackling these transnational security challenges and enhancing regional peace and stability.\textsuperscript{175}

Comprehensively, the role of the ADMM in regional security, found in the successive establishment of ARF, ADMM and other relevant multilateral mechanisms in recent years, has further emboldened this trend, stemming from changes across four key variables:\textsuperscript{176}

\textsuperscript{174} ASEAN Security Outlook, 2015, p. 28
\textsuperscript{175} Ibid., p. 64.
8.1. Perception of Security Challenges

ASEAN countries have generally perceived their security challenges in three different dimensions. First, they see increasing external challenges. The withdrawal of United States troops from the Philippines left a security vacuum in Southeast Asia, alerting ASEAN states to the possibility that regional powers would step in to fill it. The rise of China and remilitarization of Japan, in particular, provided external pressure on ASEAN to foster a collective security concept and to strengthen multilateral coordination. Second, there has been an increase in intra-regional uncertainty. Territorial disputes between some ASEAN members that were concealed during the Cold War resurfaced in the 1990s, for example, the controversies over Batu Puteh, Sipadan and Ligitan, as well as various fishing areas. This trend has been exacerbated by the arms race in Southeast Asia, pushing ASEAN policymakers to develop confidence-building measures to avoid multilateral conflict. Third, there has been a rise in transnational/non-traditional security threats. Non-traditional threats, such as piracy, terrorism and natural disasters often extend beyond the boundaries of individual states, requiring joint efforts from the armed forces of all regional countries.

8.2. Defence Gaps Between Member States

Operational and technical barriers, including the lack of standardization and differences in doctrines, are not insurmountable, even though they remain significant. First, the doctrinal and language gap has been slowly bridged through bilateral cooperation, such as joint training exercises. Second, the capacity gap has been reduced by military build-up and modernization. In recent years, most ASEAN armed forces have shifted

177 http://www.csis.org.cn/layout.xs
178 ibid
their focuses from anti-insurgency to conventional warfare, providing both conditions and motivations for broader and more pragmatic cooperation.

8.3. **Level of Regional Integration**

According to a report conducted by ADSOM in 2008, the latest developments in ASEAN will help provide guidance to all ASEAN sectoral bodies, including the defence sector. The second Bali Concord (2003), the ASEAN Charter, the ASEAN community Blueprint and other related documents set common goals and a norms-based framework for ASEAN defence cooperation.

8.4. **External Factors**

One of the most prominent trends since the end of the Cold War has been the rise of multilateralism worldwide, illustrated by intersecting multilateral mechanisms in Asia – EAS, APEC, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and more relevantly, WPNS and the Shangri-La Dialogue. This has fostered a regional climate conducive to ASEAN multilateral cooperation. Furthermore, the previous reluctance of the United States towards defence multilateralism has seen some changes. While still relying on bilateral alliances, the United States has started playing a much more positive role in advancing multilateral defence networks both in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia.

With the participation of countries outside ASEAN or ADMM Plus, the expansion of security involving major countries outside the ASEAN region has made a space for political maneuvering on behalf of the region. ASEAN will gain more bargaining power over China on maritime issues, which may introduce complexity into bilateral relations and regional stability. It should

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179 *Ibid*
be noted, however, that even with closer defense ties, ASEAN still does not have the willingness and capacity to confront China. On the contrary, multilateral defense communications can promote mutual trust and help foster the habit of cooperation amongst militaries. With more pragmatic cooperation, such as joint exercises and sharing of military assets, ASEAN and other regional countries will be in a better position to combat complex security challenges.

More importantly, this cooperation will strengthen ‘ASEAN Centrality’ by enhancing ASEAN awareness and capacity, which helps ASEAN play a bigger role in regional security cooperation, and will inject new vitality into current multilateral mechanisms such as the ADMM–Plus and ARF. The enhanced defense networking amongst ASEAN states will help facilitate, not destabilize, regional peace and multi-polarity. China always welcomes and supports ‘ASEAN Centrality’ in regional cooperation. In addition to bilateral exchanges, more attention must be paid to multilateral defense cooperation with ASEAN in future. As Chinese defense minister Chang Wanquan stated: “China is ready to take concerted efforts with all ASEAN parties to actively utilize the existing security mechanisms, strengthen communication and synergy and jointly promote the building of new regional security cooperation architecture with Asian characteristics.”

9. Summary

The discussion in this chapter reveals that ASEAN has, since the early seventies, been conducting a series of defence cooperative events between its members and between ASEAN and external powers, for example, in the form of defence dialogue, regional defence meetings and joint military exercises. Such defence cooperation serves as the basis for

\[181\] Ibid.
ASEAN to build a much stronger foundation to promote trust and regional security. It is through intensive defence cooperation that one can see the operationalisation of defence diplomacy to tackle the security issues in Southeast Asia. Currently, the most important form of defence cooperation in ASEAN is a series of bilateral and multilateral military exercises involving land, air and naval forces.

In examining whether the elements of a defence community in Southeast Asia exist or not, this chapter shows the presence of a common vision amongst ASEAN leaders that, to address security issues in the region, the area of defence cooperation should be strengthened and institutionalised. Defence diplomacy has been conducted under the auspices of the ADMM, in which this institution adopted the concept of the ASEAN Defence Industry Collaboration (ADIC) as a concrete medium to obtain the standardisation of major weaponry systems. Such cooperation, it is believed, will enhance the capacity of the ASEAN member states’ Armed Forces. The increase of the defence budget for modernisation is an attempt to acquire sophisticated technology in major weaponry systems which would then be developed within the mechanism of the ADIC. The mastery of high-tech major weaponry systems will improve the ability and capacity of the ASEAN member states’ military, which in turn will support the inter-operability amongst the military in the region when the integration of military forces is required.

All the requirements that demonstrate the existence of a defence community are present in the ASEAN member states’ defence cooperation. Despite this, ASEAN is not a military alliance but the concept that was developed by ASEAN in its defence diplomacy practice envisaged the synchronisation attempts of forces, as required by inter-operability,
containing the elements of a defence community. In short, ASEAN’s defence diplomacy in the form of practical cooperation will certainly contribute to the building up of the ASEAN defence community, which will be discussed more in the next chapter as a case study.
Chapter Six

THE ROAD TO A DEFENCE COMMUNITY?

1. Introduction

This chapter attempts to further analyse the phenomenon of ASEAN military cooperation that has been implemented so far. Non-traditional challenges faced by ASEAN urged ASEAN leaders to evaluate defence cooperatives that have already been implemented, as well as finding new ways to overcome the challenges. Regional and multilateral cooperation has been developed to meet these challenges. In this chapter, two practical defence cooperatives were selected, namely: peacekeeping operations in the form of a peacekeeping centre network and maritime security. To better identify the presence of elements of a defence community in Southeast Asia, the role and function of defence diplomacy conducted in ASEAN is elaborated further.

This chapter commences with a forum of ASEAN’s top officials who tried to find solutions for the security problems that evolved in Southeast Asia. Based on an insight into the topics on the agenda of regional dialogue mechanisms from 2000, it appears that transnational cooperation in the region extends to non-traditional issues, one of which focuses on natural disaster management cooperation. Behind these natural disasters are opportunities for ASEAN member states to gather momentum in their efforts to establish an ASEAN Community. ASEAN leaders agreed to intensify further cooperation in tackling the disaster. In 2011, ASEAN militaries conducted their first multilateral tabletop exercise on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercises,¹ a symbolically important step as a community.

In the next section, the efforts of ASEAN member states in the field of peacekeeping operations and maritime security, two areas of practical cooperation deliberately chosen, will be elaborated in order to analyse the existence of the elements of a defence community in Southeast Asia, as these two practical cooperation examples are contained with the improvement of inter-operability capability activities and the unification of military forces. With the formation of the ADMM, there appears to be a sense of shared amongst ASEAN leaders, who see it as a key (and for a long time, a missing) piece of the architectural puzzle without which the regional organisation cannot become a single community. ASEAN member states realise that no one member state can act alone to counter a myriad of security and defence issues, hence, cooperation at ASEAN level or regional level is needed.

The 2007 ADMM agreed on a concept paper that set out the modalities and principles in the event that a wider meeting with ASEAN’s dialogue partners might be created. Based on the concept paper of a previous ADMM, which involved the participation of extra regional powers, the region of concern is effectively Southeast Asia. The outcome from that defence ministers’ meeting included the adoption of papers on the deployment of ASEAN military asset capabilities for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR). The principles of cooperation between ASEAN defence establishments and civil society organisations on non-traditional security challenges and the development of a mechanism for regional defence industry collaboration, can be said to be the indicators of a

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defence community mechanism in ASEAN. Through such practical defence diplomacy, ASEAN leaders support the vision of an ASEAN Community. This included the promotion of regional peace and stability through defence and security cooperation.

2. The Process of Military Involvement in Handling Non-Traditional Threats

The tsunami in late December 2004 that hit some countries in the Indian Ocean Rim such as India, Indonesia, Thailand and Sri Lanka has encouraged ASEAN member states to reorganise and strengthen cooperation in the field of disaster management. Commitment of ASEAN member states to help each other at the time of disasters were contained in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord on 24th February, 1976. ³ The declaration states that, "Natural disasters and other major calamities can retard the pace of development of member status, therefore they shall extend, within reviews of their capabilities, assistance for the relief of member states in distress". ⁴ ASEAN leaders agreed to make the issue of disaster management one of the important factors in the objectives of ASEAN cooperation.

The Declaration of ASEAN Concord II in Bali on 7th October, 2003, reaffirms the importance of intensifying cooperation in the area of disaster management. ⁵ To be able to optimise cooperation, the ASEAN member states agreed to form the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management

³ Declaration of ASEAN Concord was signed on 24th February, 1976 in Bali, Indonesia by ASEAN member Heads of State/Government, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines in the pursuit of political stability in the region. It produced the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia
⁴ Dirjen Kerjasama ASEAN, Deplu RI, ASEAN Selayang Pandang (Jakarta: 2005)
⁵ ASEAN Concord II also known as the Bali Concord II was the 9th ASEAN Summit, a meeting on 7th October, 2003 in Bali, Indonesia. ASEAN leaders signed a declaration to pursue closer economic integration by 2020
This committee was given the mandate to manage disaster management cooperation, including preparing the work programme and its priority activities. This cooperation is considered important by ASEAN leaders, in relation to the trend of increasing numbers of disasters in the Southeast Asia region. This was triggered because the ASEAN member countries are located in disaster-prone areas, subject to earthquakes, landslides, tsunamis, floods, droughts, fire and smoke. As an example of the importance of cooperation, the tsunami in 2004 shows that ASEAN still has weaknesses in handling large-scale natural disasters. The effect from this disaster where a joint regional emergency response could not be immediately deployed on the ground because there was no agency in ASEAN specifically coordinating disaster management caused great concern. The experience encouraged the Government of Indonesia to take the initiative to organise the Special ASEAN Leaders' Meeting on Earthquakes and Tsunamis (Tsunami Summit) in Jakarta on 6th January, 2005. The Tsunami Summit, amongst others, produced a joint statement known as the Jakarta Declaration, the "Declaration on Action to Strengthen Emergency Relief, Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Prevention on the Aftermath of Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster of 26th December, 2004".7

In addition to the above, there are several other important points of the Jakarta Declaration in association with ASEAN's programme such as;8 1) the utilisation of civil and military assets in disaster relief operations; 2) the formation of the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Centre (AHA Centre);

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6 The ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) was established in 2003. It consists of heads of national agencies responsible for disaster management of ASEAN member states. The ACDM "assumes overall responsibility for coordinating and implementing the regional activities" in pursuing a region of disaster-resilience and a safer community; see http://www.un-spider.org/sites/default/files/ASEAN.pdf
8 Ibid
and 3) the formation of the Joint Use of Network Information and Communication in ASEAN to Disaster. As a follow-up of the agreements that had been reached at the Tsunami Summit, in June 2005, ASEAN successfully completed the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER). This agreement was signed by ten ASEAN member states’ Foreign Ministers at the 38th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Vientiane, Laos, on 26th July, 2005.9

The AADMER agreement entered into force on 24th December, 2009 after all ten ASEAN member states ratified the agreement.10 To accelerate the implementation of AADMER in the area of disaster mitigation and rapid response, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting agreed the establishment of a Standby Force for disaster management.11 In this case, each ASEAN member is expected to form a standby force so that in the case of major disasters in member states, the standby force units can be deployed immediately to the affected areas. As a follow-up of disaster management, ASEAN member states organise joint training which is called the ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise (ARDEX).12 ARDEX is conducted on an annual basis, based on the vulnerability of ASEAN countries against disasters.

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11 Ibid
12 Coordinated by the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre), the ARDEX was conducted firstly in September 2005, in Selangor Malaysia, as part of AADMER implementation. The ARDEX aims to practice, assess and review disaster emergency response mechanisms under the ASEAN Standby Arrangements and Standard Operating Procedures (SASOP). Available at www.ahacentre.org/disaster-exercise
On 7th December, 2010 in Vietnam, the ADMM-Plus through the ADSOM-Plus working group discussed the practical cooperation of humanitarian assistance and disaster response co-chaired by Vietnam and China; maritime security was co-chaired by Malaysia and Australia; counter-terrorism was co-chaired by Indonesia and the U.S.; the peacekeeping operation was co-chaired by the Philippines and New Zealand; and military medicine was co-chaired by Singapore and Japan.\(^{13}\) The meetings pioneered the establishment of joint operations other than war to tackle disaster relief. The rapid reaction unit of disaster management consists of the elements of the Army, Navy and Air Force.\(^{14}\) This force was formed to carry out the initial actions in the event of a natural disaster. In this case, the importance of joint operations, other than in war, became a shared commitment amongst ASEAN countries.

In the discourse of the ASEAN Community, the occurrence of natural disasters has shown that the ASEAN Community has sympathy and a sense of kinship. Both are very important components to building a sense of community. This was proved in the event of the earthquake and tsunami in Aceh. Even ASEAN member states that were themselves affected by the natural disaster participated by sending humanitarian aid to Aceh. Rescue teams and emergency assistance from ASEAN countries were amongst the first to arrive in the field to distribute emergency aid to disaster victims in Aceh, despite the fact that the delay in the arrival of assistance illustrated the region’s lack of response capacity.\(^{15}\)

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\(^{13}\) Raymund Jose. G. Quilop, *The ADMM-Plus: Yet Another Layer in the Region’s Dense Security Architecture? A Perspective from the Philippines* (25th Asia Pacific Roundtable, Plenary Session Seven, 2011)

\(^{14}\) Document of Indonesian National Defence Force, accessed on 9 May 2011

The involvement and role of the military becomes very significant in implementing the ASEAN disaster relief programme. Cooperation amongst ASEAN member states in the use of military assets and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief are evidence of a military role. The first Workshop on the Use of ASEAN Military Assets and Capacities in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, which took place on 7th and 8th October, 2009 in Jakarta, was attended by a delegation of the Armed Forces of each ASEAN member country, as well as by the Department of Foreign Affairs. This ASEAN Working Group is the manifestation of an idea proposed by Indonesia at the third ADMM 2009, in Pattaya, Thailand, regarding the use of military assets and capacities of ASEAN member states in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. At the workshop, the creation of standard operating procedures or operational guidelines in disaster management in the ASEAN forum was discussed. In this context, military personnel can contribute to the disaster relief operations internationally and regionally, although there are still some constraints due to different bureaucracies, policies and regulations as well as the costs involved and other domestic limitations of each ASEAN member state.

On 17th June, 2013 in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, under the mechanism of the ADMM-Plus, ASEAN conducted the first-ever Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief and Military Medicine Joint Exercise (ADMM-Plus HADR/MM). This joint exercise was attended by 2200 military personnel from 18 member countries of the ADMM-Plus,

17 The Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) provides the guidelines and templates to initiate the establishment of the ASEAN Standby Arrangements for Disaster Relief and Emergency response and most notably the procedures for the utilisation of military assets
which was also equipped with the support of warships, aircraft and other equipment. Through the exercise the participants could consult and develop operating procedures that are mutually recognised, including the filing of applications for assistance by the affected country, confirmation of assistance by other countries as well as practising a single chain of command after the troops arrive in the countries affected. Thus, disaster management and mission effectiveness can be done in time and the number of casualties and material loss can be reduced.

The presence of foreign military troops who become an integral part of the disaster relief mission in ASEAN is noteworthy as a collective learning process in the ASEAN community. The formation of an ASEAN standby force unit for disaster management and joint operations other than war showed the participation of all components in the ASEAN community, both civilian and military. The policy to establish a standby force is part of a national defence policy, particularly in countries prone to disasters and facing a high level of external threats. In this case, civil-military cooperation in the formulation of a defence policy is an inevitable necessity.

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18 Pusat Pengkajian, Pengolahan Data dan Informasi DPR RI, 2009, www.dpr.go.id
19 Ibid
20 Pusat Penelitian Politik LIPI, Politik BBM (Jakarta: LIPI, 2005), p. 48
3. **Defence Diplomacy as an Important Tool for States’ Foreign and Security Policy**

Since the first meeting of the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2002, followed by the ADDM in 2006, “the use of military means for diplomatic purposes has been an established practice” in Southeast Asia.\(^\text{22}\) Defence diplomacy has now become an important part in the implementation of foreign policy, and the existence of the ADMM-Plus since 2010 facilitates this. ADMM-Plus has become an important part of the security architecture of the region, especially with the involvement of the military, including troops from major countries. As explained in the first chapter, in the post-Cold War period, due to the changing of threats, the military was used for peace efforts, preventing conflict, disaster relief and promoting good and accountable governance, such as in Indonesia where the military has been willing to accept its subordination to civil power.\(^\text{23}\)

The cooperation between countries in the region is necessary in order to handle the threat collectively to create a more secure and stable region. The notion of a more secure and stable region definitely refers to the existence of security matters and atmosphere, which traditionally are the result of defence activities. Meanwhile, diplomacy is an official effort of the state, which is traditionally used for practicing foreign policy through political, economic, cultural and military techniques.\(^\text{24}\) Indeed, political effort is the

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\(^\text{22}\) Anton du Plessis, *Defence Diplomacy: Conceptual and Practical Dimensions with Specific Reference to South Africa* (Pretoria: 2008) p. 87

\(^\text{23}\) Aurel Croissant (et.al), *Democratization and Civilian Control in Asia* (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 6

first option of diplomacy regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes. However, the practical situation and the evolving threat in the region is becoming more complex, from a traditional to a non-traditional one, and various diplomacy efforts or techniques are combined and used simultaneously, depending on the situation and the interest of the various states. In the context of ASEAN, the current security conditions have forced the states in the region to adjust their approach from a sequence of traditional diplomacy techniques towards greater priority in the use of defence techniques to overcome the threats or challenges. For instance, the prominence of the military role in handling non-traditional issues, as discussed in the previous section.

Countries struggle to improve their strength or power to create security and to increase their strength in the face any threat. To achieve its national interest, states act rationally with emphasis on strength, especially the increase in the strength of their defence. Southeast Asian defence diplomacy, after the financial crisis of 1997, engaged in the modernisation of their militaries and, at the same time, faced a situation of a very low level of trust between regional states, making diplomatic efforts necessary to improve matters. Thus, military involvement in maintaining security is very crucial, as well as engaging external powers via diplomacy.25

Defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia is the incorporation of national and regional interests.26 Indeed, each single country in ASEAN has its own interests, but ASEAN also has regional interests. ASEAN as an entity bridges the interests of each country on the basis of the TAC, in which all

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25 Evan A. Laksmana, *Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: The View from Jakarta in RSIS Conference Report, Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: RSIS, 30 Nov 2010), p. 8

26 Regional interest had been explained in the first chapter, see footnote no-4, p. 2 of the first chapter
countries are bound in agreed norms and ethics. All the national interests of each country are placed within regional interest, with the spirit of maintaining peace and stability for the prosperity of the nations in Southeast Asia.27

There is the realisation that defence diplomacy arises from a specific issue that for a period of time burdens relationships between countries in the region. Defence forums are used as an arena to discuss differences between countries. Conflicts of interest in terms of security matters are discussed to reach a common ground. ASEAN drives all parties to create peace, stability and prosperity in the region; all countries have to avoid the use of force and promote effort through dialogues. Defence is a tangible domain; each country has its own instrument (the Armed Forces) to conduct defence diplomacy. It is said that an on-table discussion can be transferred into concrete activities through military cooperation. Furthermore, defence diplomacy in ASEAN contains the elements of mutual trust, mutual respect and transparency to reduce tension amongst ASEAN member states.

Nevertheless, “ASEAN-related events, though largely informal in nature, have been considered a step forward in improving regional confidence-building measures. According to Indonesia’s former Minister of Defence, Juwono Soedarsono, ASEAN’s multilateralism and regional community building have allowed the creation of a “strategic space” needed to boost domestic economic and political development while accommodating the interests of extra-regional powers”.28

27 Interview with Jan Pieter Ate, Director of International Relation, Indonesian Ministry of Defence, Jakarta, 16 September 2013
28 Evan A. Laksmana, *Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: Trends, Prospects and Challenges* in Bhubhindar Singh and See Seng Tan (ed), *From ‘Boots’ to ‘Brogues’: The Rise of Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: RSIS Monograph no., 21, 2011), pp. 81-82; The same statement also had been mentioned by Juwono Sudarsono during an interview with the researcher, Jakarta, 19 March 2013
ASEAN states have developed military-security ties through officer exchanges and the provision of field training facilities. It is fairly commonplace for middle-level officers from one ASEAN state to attend command and staff courses offered by military institutions of another state.\(^{29}\) A major benefit of such exchanges, as with joint exercises, is confidence-building through familiarisation with each other’s military doctrines and capabilities. In terms of practical value to military preparedness, provision of field training facilities by one ASEAN state to another assumes greater importance.

4. **The Imperative for Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia**

There are several reasons that could be given as the original reason for implementing ASEAN’s defence diplomacy, meaning that ASEAN member states had to redefine the role of their military.\(^{30}\) Demands for a more prominent military role to address the increasingly complex security challenges which coincided with the financial crisis in 1997,\(^ {31}\) as well as the need for personnel to have a better understanding on human rights in order to remove the stigma as a violator of human rights, is expected to grow "Strategic Trust" both from the major countries and amongst fellow Southeast Asian nations. Strategic trust can be interpreted as the sense of cooperation and confidence that permits countries in the region, either with the external major power or intra-ASEAN member states to work together,

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\(^{29}\) Yearly exchange program of Indonesian National Defence Forces in relation with increasing personnel capacities programme. Indonesia has a defence exchange programme with the U.S. called USIBDD (U.S. – Indonesia Bilateral Defence Dialogue), and IADSD (Indonesia – Australia Defence Strategic Dialogue) with Australia. Other exchange programme between Indonesia and other ASEAN member states has also been conducted with yearly basis
\(^{31}\) Riefqi Muna, *Regional Formats of Military and Security Cooperation* (Berlin: 5\(^{th}\) Berlin Conference on Asian Security, 2010), pp. 8-9; see also Laksmana (2011), pp. 73-74
initially on issues of common interest. The change in the form of today's security challenges is the main reason for an encouraging shift in the military role in many areas, especially in Southeast Asia.

First, there has been the rise various conflicts in other parts of the world. Conflicts in this context are conflicts in a country that require the intervention of the United Nations organisation to resolve them. UN intervention encourages many countries to change the orientation of the development of military capabilities of their countries, as well as providing opportunities for Southeast Asia’s military personnel to experience international duties. Needless to say, opportunities for sending military personnel on a UN mission can also bring significant foreign exchange for the Troops Contributing Country (TCC).

Second, relating to natural disaster, experienced military personnel are always most likely to be the first to arrive at the location of a disaster. It is not surprising that military personnel are the first institution to reach a disaster area and being able to respond quickly, because military personnel already have quick response methods in addressing the issues. The military in general are institutions that have the equipment and trained personnel that are ready to be assigned at any time and in any emergency situation. Certain ASEAN member states, for instance, Indonesia, have issued a special law or national security bill for its military to be directly involved in disaster relief. The task of humanitarian aid, disaster relief, and multilateral peacekeeping are amongst the main tasks for the military in the post-Cold

32 Bantarto Bandoro, Will Good Intentions in Indonesia’s Blueprint for Asia-Pacific Security Collide with Harsh Realities? (Singapore; ISEAS Perspective, 3 Oct 2013), p. 6
33 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia no 34 tahun 2004, tentang Tentara Nasional Indonesia. National Bills of the Republic of Indonesian no 34, 2004. See Chapter VII in its law for further explanation about the role Indonesian National Defence Forces
War era, especially Southeast Asian countries. As has been discussed in the previous chapter, humanitarian assistance is a form of non-traditional security within the domain of defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia.

The choice to upgrade military capacity as mentioned above cannot be separated from government policy and is a logical choice in the international arena. In the context of the ASEAN countries, the fact that the form of threats has changed from traditional threats to non-traditional threats, encourages ASEAN member states to conduct defence diplomacy. All opportunities that ASEAN member states obtain through defence diplomacy are believed to improve the capability and fluency in the process of inter-operability, which is indispensable in the context of a defence community. Intense interaction between personnel of each ASEAN military in various tasks or education will be of benefit in the field of assignment, which will then facilitate coordination and develop mutual trust smoothly. Such kind of interaction is a diplomatic element of ASEAN military defence cooperation, partly through the development of personal and professional relationships between their defence communities. For example, every year ASEAN member states send middle-ranking officers to attend a ten-month Command and Staff College as part of an exchange education program. The duration of the course is long enough to create very close personal relationships amongst fellow students; they became close and very familiar with each other, so that when active cooperation in the field is required, they are able to demonstrate effective performance and can work better than other personnel who had not met previously.

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35 Chapter VII of National Bills of the Republic of Indonesian no 34, 2004
36 Researchers experience during the tsunami emergency response in Aceh shows that close cooperation and mutual trust that has existed at the time of the Command and Staff College was helpful in the field assignment
37 Ho Shu Huang, *Singapore’s Defence Policy: Deterrence, Diplomacy and Soldier-Diplomat* (Singapore: RSIS Commentaries, no. 95, 29 September 2009), p. 2
So defence diplomacy activities through jointly organised military exercises, education, “conferences, workshops and visits, allow officials at different levels to interact with each other on a professional and social level”.\(^{38}\) Personnel exchanges between military units, defence ministries and military and civilian schools allows “more substantial, and therefore deeper, contact between personnel from different countries”,\(^{39}\) significantly enhancing confidence-building measures and a sense of inter-operability. Therefore, the frequency of joint training, joint activities and intensive interaction of ASEAN military personnel can improve the inter-operability required in a defence community. Participants become familiar with ASEAN’s designed training or exercise analysis and its procedures.\(^{40}\)

In the ADMM-Plus concept paper, there are six kinds of practical cooperation covering counter-terrorism, peacekeeping operations, maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, military medicine, and humanitarian mine action. In the next section, some of these will be discussed individually to prove the inter-operability that has been built by the ASEAN military and other partner countries. Two practical cooperation activities in the form of peacekeeping operations in the framework of the Peacekeeping Centre Network and Maritime Security Cooperation have been selected, because within these two practical forms of cooperation the existence of defence community elements in ASEAN member states defence cooperation can be seen.

\(^{38}\) *Ibid*

\(^{39}\) *Ibid*

\(^{40}\) Internal evaluation report of Indonesian National Defence Force on joint and combined exercise of SAFKAR Indopura 2011 between Indonesia Armed Forces and Singapore Armed Forces, and KEKAR Malindo 2011 between Indonesian Army and Malaysian Army
5. Peacekeeping Operations in the Framework of ADMM

ASEAN moved toward the formation of an ASEAN Community by 2015, which would merge the ASEAN member states into an entity with a common vision, mission and identity. This is meant that ASEAN would become a zone like the European Union, where people can travel throughout the region without charge, easing economic relations and, most importantly, being committed to making all security issues in the ASEAN a shared problem. As one of the efforts to resolve the security problems in the region, Indonesia has proposed the creation of an ASEAN peacekeeping force. After the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping was frequently employed to prevent the spread of conflicts around the world. Countries need the military to ensure security, and regions require peacekeeping forces to maintain peace and security.

In 2004 at a meeting of ASEAN Senior Officials, “Indonesia proposed the creation of an ASEAN peacekeeping force that could be deployed to assist in the settlement of internal disputes.” Although others have expressed reservations, citing potential sensitivities, such thinking is a considerable step forward for the group. Nonetheless, in 2009 at an international workshop on peacekeeping and civilian protection jointly sponsored by Global Action to Prevent War, the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Indonesia reiterated the proposal of developing a Peacekeeping Centre.

41 Although, through researcher’s various interviews, a more pessimistic tone often appears and doubts the readiness of ASEAN member states to achieve the target of establishing the ASEAN Community in 2015; interview with Ngurah Swajaya, Indonesia Ambassador to ASEAN, Jakarta, 28 March 2013; interview with Dato’ Paduka Mustappa, Deputy Defence Minister of Brunei Darussalam, Bandar Seri Begawan, 17 July 2013
Network to bridge the gaps in inter-operability between ASEAN member states’ respective militaries with competent personnel, adequate facilities and equipment at the Peacekeeping Centre and effective civilian-military coordination. Such shortcomings, in terms of inter-operability, were much less pronounced and evident at the time of the tsunami that struck Southeast Asia in December 2004. Although, the military personnel from ASEAN member states provided quick relief during the tsunami, however, in general, it highlighted the region’s lack of coherent response capacity,, whereby ASEAN member states were resistant to conducting ASEAN-wide exercises.

Shortly afterwards, in February 2011, Indonesia’s proposal was followed by one from ADMM with a concept paper on the establishment of the ASEAN Peacekeeping Centre Network and included a provision on networking in its second Three-Year Work Programme (2011-2013). At the fifth ADMM meeting held in May 2011 in Jakarta, this concept paper was adopted and followed by the first meeting of the Peacekeeping Centre Network in Kuala Lumpur in September 2012. It is noteworthy that all ASEAN member states’ peacekeeping centres, as well as military representatives from Laos and Myanmar, participated at the second meeting of the Peacekeeping Centre Network in September 2013 in Bogor, Indonesia.

46 Carlyle A. Thayer, ASEAN and UN Peacekeeping: ASEAN will Slowly Develop and Evolve Regional Peacekeeping Coordination Capacity (The Diplomat, 25 April 2014); thediplomat.com/2014/04/asean-and-un-peacekeeping/, accessed on 26 April 2014
The idea to propose the establishment of an ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network originated from the fact that “ASEAN member states have consistently participated in peacekeeping missions worldwide under the United Nations. Having noted that five ASEAN member states, including Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, have already established their own peacekeeping centres.” 47 The objectives of the Peacekeeping Centre Network include “to conduct joint planning and training as well as sharing of experiences with a view to establishing an ASEAN arrangement for maintaining peace and stability.” 48 Indeed, with these objectives, the Peacekeeping Centre Network will enable the identification of “gaps and priorities in the development of ASEAN peacekeeping capacities and capabilities.” 49

Several ASEAN member states already make significant contributions of military and police personnel to peacekeeping duties at international and regional levels. For example, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines actively contribute the troops. “At the end of December 2010, of 115 countries contributing uniformed military and police personnel to UN peacekeeping operations, Indonesia represented the 16th largest contributor, with 1,795 personnel. Malaysia was ranked 21st with 1,163 and the Philippines ranked 27th with 926 military and police personnel compared with other countries.” 50 The figure of ASEAN member states contribution to

47 Annex 9, ADMM, Concept Paper on the Establishment of ASEAN Peacekeeping Centre Network, 2011
49 Annex 9, ADMM, Concept Paper on the Establishment of ASEAN Peacekeeping Centre Network, 2011
the UN has changed as of 31 March, 2015. (see Table 6.1).

Table 6.1

Southeast Asian Member States Contribution to the UN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>PKC Establishment</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>UN Military Expert</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Total Peacekeepers</th>
<th>Rank in UN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>Not having Yet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>854</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2479</td>
<td>2678</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>Not having Yet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>873</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Not having Yet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Not having Yet</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>117</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: www.un.org data as of 31 March 2015

There are already peacekeeping centres in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. Malaysia founded a peacekeeping training centre in 2006, and more recently, a peacekeeping centre in Cambodia has been announced. Indonesia's Peacekeeping Mission Education and Training Facility was founded in 2010 at the Indonesia Peace and Security Centre (IPSC) in Sentul West Java, Indonesia, becoming a host for conferences, exercises and training. In this 480-hectare area, Indonesia has set up Seven-in-One institutions, which include Peacekeeping Centre; Standby Force; National Board on Counter-Terrorism; and National Board on Counter-Disaster. Similar facilities are owned also by NATO and the African Union with its Standby Force.

also, Jiseon Audrey Kim, ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus: Counter Terrorism and Peacekeeping Operations (UTMUN Specialized Committee, 2014), pp.5-6
In the spirit of regional interests and for the readiness of interoperability, Indonesia invited other ASEAN member countries to use the facilities in IPSC for the preparation of their peacekeepers.\(^{51}\) In fact, IPSC is the largest international and training facility for UN peacekeeping forces in Asia Pacific. In June 2013, the centre was further upgraded with the addition of barracks and a training facility, with the support of U.S. funding.\(^{52}\) It even has the notable object of preparing peacekeeping personnel for deployment in UN operations. Thus, ASEAN member states are receptive to UN peacekeeping operations for the sake of international peace and security,\(^{53}\) and ready to develop their potential as an alliance in accordance with the requirements and the necessary supporting facilities.

### 5.1. The Formation of a Peacekeeping Force

Data shows that as many as 40% of hot spots for armed conflicts in the world occur in Asia, yet only 10% of the peacekeeping operations are ever undertaken in the region.\(^{54}\) This means the international community has neglected the rest of the conflicts in the region, including Southeast Asia. In the long term, this negligence may lead to the escalation of conflicts in Southeast Asia. Moreover, the problems in the security sector will inevitably have implications for the stability of other sectors, such as economics and politics. Thus, ASEAN needs a new mechanism in terms of collective operations of military elements to address the issues of security, and the establishment of a regional peacekeeping force could certainly be the answer.

\(^{51}\) Interview with Jan Pieter Ate, Director of International Relations, Indonesian Ministry of Defence on September 2013, 16 September 2013  
\(^{52}\) Natalie Sambhi, *Indonesia’s push for Peacekeeping Operations*, derived from www.aspistrategist.org.au, 17 September 2013  
Although the idea raises a concern that this would violate the principle of non-interference which has been applied to ASEAN over the years, the ASEAN Charter, a legally-binding document signed in 2007 calling for an ASEAN Community and the inaugural ADMM in 2006, along with eight other dialogue partners (ADMM-Plus) in October 2010, has provided a foundation for a bolder form of security cooperation amongst ASEAN member states. The concerns were simply too much, because the APSC plan of action literally states backing peacekeeping cooperation. It says: “(the establishment of) a network amongst existing ASEAN member states’ peacekeeping centres to conduct joint planning, training, and sharing of experiences, with a view to establishing an ASEAN arrangement for the maintenance of peace and stability, in accordance with the ADMM 3-Year Work Programme”.

There are at least two reasons why an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force can be a relevant solution to address security issues in Southeast Asia. Firstly, the idea of integration of the efforts to overcome the issue of security in Southeast Asia is clearly a reflection of the desire of ASEAN countries to reshape the security architecture in Southeast Asia to become cooperative. The ASEAN Peacekeeping Force will drive all ASEAN member states to participate and care for all security issues in Southeast Asia. For example, in conflicts over the disputed territory of Sabah by the Philippines and Malaysia, that developed into political tensions between the two countries which could lead to armed conflict. Indonesia, which has usually been the state mediator in resolving conflict in Southeast Asia cannot do anything because it has areas that are fairly close to

the Sabah region, so the concern is not considered neutral. With the security architecture of non-interference in Southeast Asia leading to a dead-end situation, the conflict continues and potentially could escalate into conflicts between countries, since none of the other Southeast Asian countries can mediate the conflict.57

Secondly, if the idea of forming an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force agrees with the principle of neutrality and impartiality as the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines states,58 ASEAN can send a joint peacekeeping force from countries such as Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam to carry out a mission of peace in the region of Sabah, so that open conflict can be stopped. In this way, the negotiations between the governments of Malaysia and the Philippines (Sultanate Sulu) can be carried out very well. Through the principle of impartiality, there will be the confidence of all parties towards the peace mission so that they will stop fighting without worrying about whether the other party took advantage of the situation. Such involvement of regional states would not be considered interference in domestic affairs, but merely a regional collaboration to push for further progress in member states’ conflict. The benefits of an ASEAN peacekeeping force would go beyond the resolution of the Malaysia-Philippines or the Thai-Cambodian conflicts. One more benefit that may result from the presence of an ASEAN peacekeeping force is the development of military cooperation between the countries of Southeast Asia in terms of inter-operability, because they would carry out an integrated peace mission. ASEAN, through a regional peacekeeping force, can contribute more to ensure regional stability and can take care of itself in times of crises.59

57 Ibid
5.2. Inter-Operability in Peacekeeping

Integrated missions require personnel from diverse backgrounds to work together with people with whom they may be unfamiliar. In such conditions, cultural differences can present challenges or opportunities. Therefore, to bridge the differences that exist and to build harmonisation amongst personnel, various forms of exercise in the framework of peacekeeping missions have been organised at the bilateral, multilateral and regional levels. With the establishment of the ADMM-Plus, any programme of defence cooperation contained in practical cooperation is always within the auspices of ADMM or the ADMM-Plus. In this context, in the Southeast Asian region there are three peacekeeping training programmes undertaken through the peacekeeping centre network, facilitated by the United States Pacific Command (U.S. PACOM), through the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) such as Cobra Gold in Thailand, Cambodia Sentinel in Cambodia and Garuda Shields in Indonesia. These exercises aim to strengthen the relationship and cooperation between countries in Southeast Asia and the wider Asia Pacific in the framework of peacekeeping missions. These exercises are attended by ASEAN member states’ military personnel and Asia Pacific countries.

These exercises are sponsored by U.S. PACOM, or are held within the peacekeeping network centre mechanism which has identical training material based on UN standards or UN training modules for peace-keeping operations. The method applied is the Command Post Exercise (CPX) which is intended to improve cooperation amongst staff, and the Field Training Exercise (FTX) to improve the inter-operability of troops in the field. These activities are integrated exercises in the preparatory phase before the

60 Archive of Indonesian Peacekeeping Centre
implementation of inter-operability applications. A class session is held that contains the provision of knowledge, tactics and military techniques of peacekeeping operations, so that any personnel involved in these exercises has the same knowledge and all future peacekeepers uphold the principles of peacekeeping operations.

In these exercises, an assumed conflict scenario at the brigade level is created within an area that is similar to the Southeast Asian region. Training materials are held, namely: Command and Control; Deliberate Operations; Intelligence/Information; and Media/Public Information for the Command Post Exercise. At the same time, there field training exercises which included amongst others Checkpoint Operations; Patrolling; Secure Distribution Sites; Convoy Operations; Cordon and Search; and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). In short, the exercises cover the full range of military operations, from combat to humanitarian relief, as it is important to validate the concepts, procedures, system and tactics that enable all personnel to practise working together.

Peacekeeping operations are a specific mission, therefore, dexterous operational and tactical military skills are required. Beside technical and tactical techniques, all actions triggering peace must be carried out by all peacekeepers. Peacekeeping operations are different from regular combat operations which need fighting techniques and tactics as well as soldier fighting spirit. In addition, peacekeeping operations require peacekeeper behaviour which prefers a peaceful solution to resolve conflict in their mission. Use of any weapon is actually the last option and can only be

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61 Archive of Indonesian Peacekeeping Centre; UN Standard Generic Training Module and Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials
63 UN Standard Generic Training Modules on Pre-Deployment Training
performed in self-defence.\textsuperscript{64} This is something that is in line with the principle of ASEAN in resolving conflict. Moreover, the objectives of those training is to improve multilateral readiness and cooperation amongst ASEAN member states military personnel, enhancing inter-operability amongst personnel, to integrate operating systems and functional capabilities, and to leverage technological capabilities between states.

Certainly, to date, several ASEAN member states such as Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, are receptive to UN peacekeeping operations as an important element in the maintenance of international peace and security.\textsuperscript{65} Although there is still a degree of hesitation or conditionality on ASEAN states’ provision of peacekeeping forces within the region, at the same time there is an increasing willingness on the part of many ASEAN states to become more active in contributing to peace operations.\textsuperscript{66} In order to achieve the ASEAN Community, ASEAN outlines a number of specific activities, including 1) to carry out technical cooperation with the UN and relevant regional organisations to exchange expertise and experiences; 2) to identify national focal points, with a view to promoting regional cooperation in maintaining peace and security; and 3) to establish a network amongst existing ASEAN states’ peacekeeping centres to conduct joint planning, training and sharing of experiences, with a view to establishing an ASEAN arrangement for the maintenance of peace and stability.\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{65} On 18 March 2015 Malaysia has proposed the setting up an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force to deal with security issues in the region; see Martin Carvalho, Malaysia has Proposed ASEAN Peacekeeping Force for Regional Stability. Retrieved on 2 May 2015 from http://www.thestar.com.my/News/Nation/2015/04/23/Hisham-Asean-Peacekeeping/
\textsuperscript{66} Caballero-Anthony (2010), Op.cit, p. 5
\textsuperscript{67} Annex-E Asean Defence Minister’s Meeting Three-Year Work Program 2011-2013, 27 April 2011
By promoting cooperation in a peacekeeping centre network, just recently, Malaysia has proposed the formation of an ASEAN joint peacekeeping force, as the ASEAN member states measure its peace and stability as a united entity. In general, these measures clearly demonstrate the desire of ASEAN member states to develop a greater capacity to participate in peacekeeping operations. There seems to be a shift in the understanding of the principle of non-interference in the resolution of regional security issues, which encourages both a state and non-state players response to regional problems.

Actually, the notion of 'establishing an ASEAN arrangement' has an open interpretation and can be elaborated in accordance with ASEAN member states interest in maintaining the security and stability of the region. Openness to multiple interpretations in the future or even currently nothing legally prohibits ASEAN preparation to becoming a defence community. Therefore, it would be legitimate, if the member countries of ASEAN develop the concept of interoperability in a variety of defence cooperation events amongst ASEAN countries, which is a requirement for the formation of an alliance, although to date, ASEAN leaders have explicitly rejected the possibility that regional organisations are changed into a defence alliance.

We can make a specific activities table of the variety of venues that are used by ASEAN to achieve the establishment of the ASEAN Community through strategic trusts in the form of promoting regional defence and security cooperation, norm shaping and sharing, conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding as follows: (see Table 6.2).

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70 This is a view from some interviewees such as Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff, Admiral Marsetio, also the expression of Deputy Defence Minister of Brunei, Dato’ Paduka Mustappa, and Director of Policy Office, Singapore BG. Cheng
Table 6.2

Venues that are used as the Road to an ASEAN Community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purposes</th>
<th>ASEAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting Regional Defence and Security Cooperation</td>
<td>SLD ✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ADMM ✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ADMM-Plus ✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JIDD ✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norm Shaping and Sharing</td>
<td>SLD ✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ADMM ✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ADMM-Plus ✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JIDD ✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Prevention</td>
<td>SLD ✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ADMM ✔</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>ADMM-Plus ✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JIDD ✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Resolution</td>
<td>SLD ✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ADMM ✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ADMM-Plus ✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JIDD ✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Conflict-Peace Building</td>
<td>SLD ✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ADMM ✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ADMM-Plus ✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JIDD ✔</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Researcher’s own table

6. **Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia**

Other practical cooperation events under the auspices of the ADMM or the ADMM-Plus that can be used as an example of increasing human resources development and capacity-building programmes include cooperation in the maritime field, which indicates that the level of inter-operability is going well in
addressing the security problems that exist in the waters of Southeast Asia. Maritime security was deliberately chosen in this thesis, as this issue is not only related to the problem of piracy but also armed robbery, attacks and even acts of terrorism. While the frequency of events is considerably high, this is encouraging ASEAN member states to cooperate in tackling the challenges.

Southeast Asia has vast and complex coastlines, encompassing both the Indonesian and Philippine archipelagos, with islands totalling over 20,000 in number. It has provided a fertile area for the growth of piracy as well. “As the sea dominates Southeast Asia, covering roughly 80 percent of its area, the economic and political affairs of the region have been dominated by maritime security concerns”. Today’s globalised “economy is intricately interconnected and is heavily dependent on maritime trade in order to sustain the movement of energy, raw materials and industrial products”. Trade traffic by sea in the Pacific region is largely through Southeast Asian waterways, particularly the Straits of Malacca. “A waterway located in South East Asia between the Malay Peninsula and the island of Sumatra”, carries about a third of the world’s trade and half is transiting through the Straits of Malacca and Straits of Singapore alone.

Major economic countries such as the U.S., China, Japan and India continue their strong economic growth, and maritime trade through regional Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs), particularly the Straits of Malacca

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and Singapore, and this is expected to increase accordingly. These countries all have interests in ensuring the safe passage of shipping through the region. Any disruption to shipping through such passages could have disastrous consequences. The littoral states of Southeast Asia are perhaps the most concerned of all. Despite the success of the sea trade routes, security in the region cannot be handled “by any littoral state in the region alone because they are transnational in nature”.\textsuperscript{75} It needs some kind of cooperation between member states of ASEAN and its dialogue partners with a sound mechanism.

6.1. Maritime Security Issues

In reality, the most problematic maritime regions in terms of maritime boundary is the “disputed territory in the South China Sea where Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, China and Taiwan claim sovereignty to some parts of the sea and island territories”.\textsuperscript{76} However, as this section discusses maritime security cooperation related to interoperability, and in order to prove the existence of defence community elements in maritime security cooperation, this section specifically discusses the ASEAN military cooperation in securing the Straits of Malacca. More specifically, this section seeks to understand “why multilateral cooperation between the littoral states of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore has become reality and what has led to the increased levels of cooperation between these states on a multilateral basis”.\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Ibid}
The Straits of Malacca are considered geographically important in determining the increased levels of cooperation. It lies between “the littoral states of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore just north of the Indonesian island of Sumatra and south of Malaysia. It is 600 miles in length and is the main corridor of passage between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea,” for ocean-moving commercial, private and military vessels. “Approximately 60,000 ships traverse the strait each year, transporting more than 80 percent of Northeast Asia’s oil.” Currently, if compared to the number of ships using the Panama and Suez Canals, “the number of ships that pass through the Malacca Straits is nearly three times greater.” (see Figures 6.1 and 6.2).

Figure 6.1
Position of Malacca Strait

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79 Ibid, p. 560
6.2. Sea Lines of Communication Security

According to data from the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, there are many problems in the international sea-lanes through Southeast Asia, especially the problem of piracy at sea or other kinds of robbery, which have occurred in certain areas. In the busy waterways of the Malacca Straits, pirates have attacked all kinds of commercial vessels. There are several different types of piracy. These include robbery of vessels at sea, the hijacking of different vessels, such as conventional cargo carriers, container vessels, bulk carriers, tankers, as well as kidnap-for-ransom attacks. Another common type of piracy takes place against vessels berthed in harbours or at anchor.81 The attacks have been reported on a daily basis, and as a matter of fact, the great majority of attacks take place in the hours of darkness, since navigation at night is very tricky due to the ever-present danger of collision between vessels. “Under

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such circumstances, it is virtually impossible for the respective marine authorities of littoral states to make pre-emptive checks on potential pirates”.82

Moreover, the robbery of a vessel by pirates usually takes place while the ship is underway. The pirates mostly use small, fast wooden boats and operate in groups. First, they approach the targeted ships from the stern in the shadow of the radar beam so as to remain undetected.83 The pirates board the ships using ropes and grappling hooks. Using guns and knives, they threaten the crew, then take any cash and valuables from the ship and crew, including high-tech navigation equipment or whatever else they can seize quickly.

The piracies in the area of the Malacca Straits have occurred for decades and continue to take place. “The annual number of reported pirate attacks in the strait has gone from virtually zero in 1997 to reach a peak of seventy-five in 2000”.84 From 2002-2007, the International Maritime Bureau has recorded 258 pirate attacks in the Malacca Straits and surrounding waters, including more than 200 sailors held hostage and eight killed.85 Although in 2001 and 2002, there was a declining in the number of attack with 17 and 16 cases, but in 2003 this increased to about 28 cases of piracy and armed robbery (see Table 6.3).

82 Nurbiansyah (2012), Op.cit, p. 4
83 Ibid, p. 5
Table 6.3

Comparison of Piracy and Armed Robbery in Littoral States Waters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Malacca Strait</th>
<th>Malaysia</th>
<th>Singapore Strait</th>
<th>Thailand</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>17</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
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<td>7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>101</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


If we look at the above table, the number of pirate attacks and armed robbery experienced in the Malacca Straits shows an impressive reduction since 2006. Only six attacks and two attempted attacks were reported in the Malacca Straits, up to 1 September 2006, and reached a total of 11 attacks in that year. “The reduction in the number of piracy cases is due to effective security mechanisms that were put in place at the height of piracy incidents...
The positive trend of reducing attacks continued in consecutive years with the total number of 11 and, impressively, become just two attacks per year up to 2012, with the exception of just one attack in 2011.

The report from IMB, strengthened by the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) Information Sharing Centre in Singapore, showed that in 2007 “there were only three successful and four attempted attacks by pirates on shipping in the Malacca Straits”. The same numbers also occurred in the next year, with ReCAAP’s half yearly report “listing only one successful attack on a vessel in the Malacca Straits and three attempted ones.”

Though the number of vessels transiting the straits each year is large, the proportion of ships being attacked is significantly small. The consistently declining trend in piracy attacks may partially be explained by a MoU signed between the government of Indonesia and the rebel group GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or Free Aceh Movement) in August 2005 in Helsinki.

The three littoral states, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, have been complimented by the international world, for their serious efforts in maintaining and securing the safety of the strategic trade route in the Malacca Straits. The reduction in the number of attacks should be examined, however, in the context of effective enhanced cooperative efforts.

87 Ibid
88 Ibid
90 Ibid, p. 247; see also Ian Storey, *Securing Southeast Asia’s Sea Lanes: A Work in Progress* (Asia Policy, no. 6, July 2008), p. 103
at bilateral and multilateral levels. It is not surprising because the three littoral states have the largest interests in safeguarding security in the Malacca Straits as it constitutes an integral part of their territory, where threats in the strait could directly affect the national security of the country.\textsuperscript{91} However, each of the littoral states has different interests and perspectives in assessing the importance of security of shipping in the Malacca Straits. For Indonesia and Malaysia that have a lengthy coastline and coastal communities and who make their living from fishing as a natural result of the strait, they are more concerned about keeping the marine environments and natural resources of the strait. In contrast to Singapore, although it does not have a lengthy coastline compared to the two other countries, the strait is the direct link to the world’s largest seaport, so the security of shipping in the Malacca Strait is vital for the sustainability of the city-state's economy.

Maritime predations in the Malacca Strait thus remain a source of concern. Security analysts have developed a worst-case scenario for piracy in the waterway. The most feared scenario is a conspiracy between terrorists and hijackers, or if the hijackers adopt terrorist tactics to commit a crime. “In one scenario, terrorists scuttle a hijacked ship in the Malacca-Singapore Strait with the intention of disrupting maritime traffic or blocking the strait altogether. In another scenario, terrorists hijack a tanker carrying either crude oil or liquefied natural gas (LNG) and detonate the vessel as a floating bomb in a major regional port such as Singapore.”\textsuperscript{92} Although these two scenarios are very unlikely to happen, given that the narrowest area of the strait’s waterway width is approximately nine miles, it is impossible to block the area through the terrorism alone. Nevertheless, if this scenario occurs, then Singapore would be very badly affected. Being the owner of

\textsuperscript{91} Brasmasto (2012), \textit{Op.cit}, p. 10
\textsuperscript{92} Storey (2008), \textit{Op.cit}, p. 103
the busiest sea-port in the world will be in vain, since the energy carrier vessels will move through Indonesian waters without necessarily docking in the Singaporean sea-port any more.93

6.3. National Response to Piracy in the Malacca Strait

Responses by individual countries to maritime threats differ from country to country, specifically those littoral states of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.94 Indonesia takes security measures in securing the Malacca Straits by expanding its police operations on land to deter and arrest pirates. Beyond security and law enforcement measures, Indonesia also implements socio-economic policies in an effort to develop coastal areas and its communities.95 Indonesia also combines all the functions of military power in the form of unilateral measures, such as establishing a Naval Command Control for Armed Robbery against ships, conducting intelligence operations, anti-smuggling operations, inland political and security measures, and integrated maritime surveillance systems.96

In 2000, Malaysia sent a feasibility study team to India to gain insights on the reorganisation of its maritime enforcement at policy level, and developed its naval capacity to ensure maritime security in its territorial waters. As a result of the study, the government of Malaysia has established

93 Ibid
the Malaysia Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA). At the same time, the Royal Malaysian Marine Police (RMMP) increased its patrol against piracy and the risk of maritime terrorism in the Malacca Strait. These units were supported by the immediate acquisition of 20 fast strike craft and four rigid hull inflatable boats. The special task force is accompanied by Malaysia’s Special Action Forces and 69 Commando Unit and is deployed in the Straits of Malacca.

Singapore has been concerned for its economic survival and strategic value, since this city-state is dependent on its economy to trade traffic and services. Singapore is eager to cooperate and would like to see the safety of navigation ensured in the Malacca Straits. Such enthusiasm to secure the strait, in return, will benefit the island both economically and strategically. The Singapore Police Coast Guard (PCG), which has been going through an upgrading programme since the early 1990s, is directly involved in preventing piracy acts in its territorial waters. Singapore has been said to be the most organised and technologically advanced of the three littoral states. It has established the interagency Maritime and Port Security Working Group, which involves three nautical agencies—the coast guard, the navy and the port authority—to improve detection methods and to keep an eye on vessel traffic as well as ships’ movements near the seaports.

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99 Ibid
100 Brasmasto (2012), Op.cit, p. 4
6.4. Defence Cooperation of Littoral States in Response to Piracy in the Malacca Strait

The littoral states have agreed upon several principles and measures related to security cooperation of the Malacca-Singapore Straits. As early as 1992, both Indonesia and Singapore agreed to establish the Indonesia-Singapore Coordinated Patrols in the Singapore Strait. This coordinated patrol involving the setting up of direct communication links between their navies and the organisation of coordinated patrols every three months.\(^\text{103}\) The same pattern has also been reached between Indonesia and Malaysia, in the same year, to establish the Maritime Operation Planning Team to coordinate patrols in the Straits of Malacca. The Indonesia-Malaysia Coordinated Patrol is conducted twice a year.\(^\text{104}\)

In 2004, the three littoral states rejected U.S. proposals for sending the U.S. Marines to lead a Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) to improve security in the Strait of Malacca. The reason for the littoral states’ rejection was due to the claim that such a proposal was a threat to their national sovereignty.\(^\text{105}\) The Indonesian government asserted that the waters of the “Straits of Malacca are part of the territorial waters of the coastal states over which they have sovereignty, and the security of the Strait is the responsibility of the coastal states.”\(^\text{106}\) At the same time, the Malaysian government stated that such a proposal is not welcome and both countries have the capability to ensure the Strait’s security.\(^\text{107}\)

\(^{104}\) Document of Indonesian National Defence Force HQ
\(^{106}\) Ibid
\(^{107}\) Ibid
Soon after the rejection, the three littoral states-Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore-introduced a trilateral coordinated naval and air patrol within the areas of the Malacca and Singapore Straits. The trilateral patrols or Malacca Strait Patrol (MSP) with the code name MALSINDO, have been underway since July 2004 to increase maritime safety and security in the respective territorial waters. In an effort to increase the coverage and effectiveness of MALSINDO, Malaysia proposed adding maritime air patrols and the EiS initiative was launched on 13 September, 2005. Furthermore, in 2006 the MSP expanded its network element with the Malacca Straits Sea Patrols (MSSP) and the Intelligence Exchange Group (IEG). Therefore, since 2006, the MSP has been comprised of three elements: MSSP, EiS and IEG, which brought together a standard operating procedure (SOP). A joint coordinating committee made up of officials from the three littoral states meets twice a year and a number of working groups have been established to augment the committee’s work. It is worth noting that Thailand expressed interest early on in cooperating with other littoral states in Malacca Strait surveillance. Thailand eventually became the fourth state to join the MSP in September 2008.

108 Ibid, p. 753
109 Storey (2008), p. 116
110 In April 2006 the three littoral states further strengthened their military cooperation in the Malacca Strait by signing an agreement on the formation of a joint coordinating committee on the MSP and Standard Operational Procedures on Coordinated Patrols. Furthermore see the Remarks by Singaporean Chief of Defence Force, LTG Ng Yat Chung at the Malacca Strait Patrol (MSP) Joint Coordinating Committee Terms of References and Standard Operating Procedure Signing Ceremony, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nri/2006/apr/21apr06_nr.html
6.5. Inter-operability in Maritime Security Cooperation

The concept of inter-operability, as a prerequisite in conducting joint operations, is the capability of different military organisations to operate together, to share common doctrines and procedures and to be able to communicate with one another. In the context of ASEAN, the littoral states have maintained the spirit of cooperation from joint statements to concrete forms of cooperation to safeguard the security of the Malacca Strait. Joint and combined exercises, which is practically a joint military exercise amongst the littoral states, was supported seriously by military elements who assigned high-ranking officials in charge of the joint exercise. Such steps could enhance transparency and confidence building,\(^{113}\) and will increase the diplomatic role of ASEAN military officials.

The Terms of Reference and SOP in MSP cooperation could be real steps towards formulating a joint doctrine. The doctrines of joint naval operations act as guidelines in implementing operations and cooperation within the framework of naval inter-operability amongst ASEAN member countries, especially in the case of the Malacca and Singapore Straits. It ranges from a basic doctrine, the main doctrine, concluding with the implementation doctrine, which is formulated in the doctrine of defence and security of each country to create the joint doctrine to fit with the concept of inter-operability.

The existence of the IEG and EiS within MSP has accelerated the exchange of information and data related to developments in the field acquired from marine surveys, mapping and patrols, and coordinated patrols which are a sustainable periodical patrol cooperation.\(^{114}\) With the

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coordinated patrol amongst the littoral states and with Thailand added later, it has improved the abilities of naval personnel of each country. The effectiveness in increasing the abilities of naval personnel in line with the increasing effectiveness of inter-operability, in return has contributed significantly to the decline in the number of sea piracy events in the Malacca-Singapore Straits, with 38 in 2004 down to just two piracy and armed robbery events in 2012.

In carrying out coordinated patrols, each country deployed both warships and aircraft improved by implementing modernisation and technology transfer in order to create harmony to achieve inter-operability. The signatory countries of coordinated patrols in the Malacca and Singapore Straits have implemented an integrated command, control, communications, computer, information, surveillance and reconnaissance policy (C4ISR) as one of the main requirements to support the joint operation in order to improve the ability of naval inter-operability.

7. Counter Terrorism and Military Medicine Policies

This section describes the policy regarding defense diplomacy steps on the issue of threats, namely terrorism, by issuing a counter terrorism policy, and the policy of military medicine.

In the policy measures on military medicine, the objective of the discussion is to share ideas and help develop guidelines to establish the ASEAN Military Medicine Coordination Centre. The meeting touched on the experiences of MM in HADR of ADMM-Plus countries and the need for accurate medical information, such as POC, geography, legal system, from

affected countries and assisting countries. It also discussed the objectives to establish the ASEAN Military Medicine Coordination Centre, cost sharing, the rotation of commander and staff officers, staff functions, capabilities, functionality, mechanisms and structures of the ASEAN Military Medicine Coordination Centre. Finally, the meeting agreed to change the name from the ASEAN Military Medicine Coordination Centre to the ASEAN Centre for Military Medicine (ACMM). The result of this meeting will be developed into the draft concept paper on the ACMM mechanism and structure which will be proposed to ADMM-Plus for adoption in Malaysia.\footnote{ADMM-Plus Experts’ Working Group on Military Medicine Senior Medical Planners’ Workshop, available at https://admm.asean.org/index.php/admm-news/7-news/346-admm-plus-experts-working-group-on-military-medicine-senior-medical-planners-workshop.html, accessed on 21 November 2016.} The ACMM will be established at the Royal Thai Army Military Medical Department in Bangkok, Thailand by 2015. The ASEAN Centre for Military Medicine’s function and mechanism will be tested by ADMM-Plus’s EWG on MM and by the EWG on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) Field Training Exercise (FTX) in 2016, Thailand. Moreover, it will fully operate its duties for example gathering, analyzing and sharing information, cooperating with other related agencies, by training, doing research, holding the workshop, making and circulating relevant documents in 2017.\footnote{Ibid.}

Even comprehensively, the objectives of the ACMM came in generalised stages and evolved into specific steps to ensure that military medicine become part of defense diplomacy, namely:

7.1. General Objectives

a. To play a unique role in demonstrating regional solidarity by integrating capacities to respond to the common challenges;
b. To coordinate and cooperate with the military medical services of the ADMM-Plus countries, related agencies, and international organisations to provide;

1) Military medical services capabilities improvement and standardisation;
2) Harmonisation of unique capabilities;
3) Improvement of capabilities of the ACMM to world class standards;
4) Sustainability development; and

c. To support other areas of collaboration under the ADMM-Plus framework.

7.2. Specific Objectives

a. To develop joint medical response plans;
b. To assess medical needs in crisis situations; and
c. To conduct proper training courses and research in the area of emergency medical services

The ACMM will serve as a vital organ and a workable mechanism to overcome national barriers and to play an essential role in enhancing the security and stability of the region. It will also actively engage, interact, and strengthen cooperation amongst the ASEAN Member States and Plus countries in support of regional integration and community building.

In agreement, the ninth and most recent ADMM was held in Langkawi, Malaysia in March 2015. It adopted concept papers on the ASEAN Militaries Ready Group on HADR and on the establishment of the ASEAN Centre of Military Medicine (an initiative proposed by Thailand). The Defence Ministers agreed to cooperate to counter the “imminent threat” of
terrorist or extremist organisations and radical groups—the threat posed by the Islamic State (IS) being very much the focus at the meeting—through information sharing, surveillance and promoting public awareness.\(^{117}\)

In the development of a new operation, a number of key developments took place in 2013. The Second ADMM-Plus met in Bandar Seri Begawan in August. Earlier in June, the militaries of all 18 ADMM-Plus member countries participated in a massive HADR/military medicine exercise, which involved 3,200 personnel, seven ships, 15 helicopters as well as military medical, engineering, search and rescue teams, and assets. This was followed by a counter-terrorism exercise in Sentul, Indonesia in September and a maritime security field training exercise in Sydney, Australia from September to October. The EWG on Peacekeeping Operations held a table-top exercise in Manila in February 2014.\(^{118}\)

An interesting point that arose in the discussion on military medicine, was that a counter-terrorism policy be included as part of the implementation of military operations medicine. They are linked to each other given that the threat of terrorism is also on the agenda of regional security within the framework of the ADMM.

Terrorism is a regional and global transnational threat. Defence forces play a significant role in combating such a threat. In this regard, regional and international defence cooperation is fundamentally important. The EWG on Counter-terrorism aims to enhance cooperation within the framework of the ADMM-Plus. Cooperation builds closer ties, trust,


transparency, and understanding. Focusing on strengthening the regional capability for countering terrorism threats will further draw ASEAN members states closer together and the benefit of enhancing counter-terrorism capacity will serve in other areas of mutual security concerns. It is important to address the challenges of low-level competency and capability by agreeing on what the critical gaps occur with our partners, finding consensus on what to develop, when, and how much, and to codify regional standards in employing capability to address the risks. This will enhance situational awareness, establish close working relationships between partner defence and security forces and civil authorities, and result in a safer and more secure region.\footnote{Roundtable on The Future of the ADMM/ADMM Plus and Defence Diplomacy in the Asia Pacific, available at https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/PR160223_Future-of-the-ADMM.pdf, accessed on 21 November 2016, p. 15.} As Malaysian Defence Minister, Hishammuddin Hussein said, even before the Lebanon and Paris attacks, the “IS militant threat is real and, if not handled properly, has the potential of turning this region into the biggest catastrophe the world has ever seen.” Hyperboles aside, terrorism is a natural and appropriate focus for the ADMM-Plus defence ministers’ discussions.\footnote{Roundtable on The Future of the ADMM/ADMM Plus and Defence Diplomacy in the Asia Pacific, available at https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/PR160223_Future-of-the-ADMM.pdf, accessed on 21 November 2016, p. 37.}

The discussion on the ADMM awareness in military medicine and counter terrorism policies is on the agenda, which has also received attention in the defense diplomacy member countries of ASEAN. As stated in the establishment of the ADMM and ADMM Plus, integration and mutual trust can be built through the operation of military medicine at the same time as regional security through counter terrorism policies.
8. Summary

This chapter explored defence diplomacy activities undertaken by ASEAN member states in addressing security issues in the region, by taking the example of defence cooperation in the field of peacekeeping and maritime security. This chapter discloses the evidence of the existence of the elements or characteristics of a defence community which are contained in defence cooperation amongst ASEAN member states. In the discussion conducted above, we can see that defence diplomacy aims to establish solid and integrated cooperation between militaries in ASEAN member states. The involvement of the military in handling non-traditional threats originated from the consciousness of ASEAN leaders that the tsunami disaster management mechanisms, as a form of non-traditional threats, showed the unpreparedness of ASEAN member states to cooperate in a unified and integrated response, that humanitarian assistance appeared to arrive very late, even though the militaries of ASEAN member states were amongst the very first to provide disaster relief.

Since the establishment of the ADMM and ADMM-Plus, defence cooperation of ASEAN member countries has been under the auspices of the two organisations. Various defence cooperatives (either joint exercises or exchange of personnel), such as sharing the utilisation of peacekeeping training facilities and the building networks of peacekeeping centres is directed towards establishing synchronisation, can certainly increase confidence-building amongst ASEAN countries and will be geared towards preparedness for emergency situations in Southeast Asia. Through such practical defence diplomacy, inter-operability as a major element of military cooperation, as well as being the main prerequisite for a defence community, will be indirectly formed in the presence of joint planning and training, as
well as the sharing of experiences. The merging of military power, understanding the doctrine, tactics and procedures with the objective to increase inter-operability in the defence cooperation of ASEAN member states are traits of defence community elements. Joint exercises and joint military operations of ASEAN member states, with a view to establishing an ASEAN arrangement for maintaining peace and stability, will enable the formation of a defence community in Southeast Asia. This is starting has proven to be true with Malaysia's proposal to form an ASEAN joint peacekeeping force in March 2015.
Chapter Seven

CONCLUSION

1. Observation

The security challenges facing the countries of Southeast Asia today lie in creating a stable environment. The debate over the concept of security has broadened a discourse on regional security cooperation, which has driven states to engage more deeply in multilateral diplomacy in order to better defend and promote their national interests, and particularly in handling problems in maintaining a stable peace in the region. There is the realisation by ASEAN member states leader that new security threats to regional security have evolved from traditional to non-traditional which requires cooperation amongst countries in the region, as well as the military's role to tackle the security issues through a greater participation in defence diplomacy.

This thesis was developed to answer two main questions. The first question focused on the development of forms of threats found in Southeast Asia today which encourage ASEAN member states to conduct defence diplomacy. Although the security problems already existed before the establishment of ASEAN, the institutions that deal with security threats were never specifically set up to deal with security issues, but concentrated on other issues such as economic and political problems. However, in line with the development of these forms of threat, the ASEAN leaders felt the need to establish new institutions such as the ADMM and ADMM-Plus that focus on handling security issues through the mechanism of practical cooperation and diplomatic protocol. The second question focused on highlighting the implementation of defence diplomacy carried out by ASEAN member states,
which, according to this study, includes the characteristics of a defence community, and even the efforts of a defence community formation, although up to the present time, ASEAN leaders and military officials in ASEAN member countries have said there is no such defence community in Southeast Asia, because a defence community requires the incorporation of military force to be officially stated.

In the previous chapter, this thesis put forward examples of collective defence organisations that have historically existed in Southeast Asia which have similarities with the characteristics of a defence community. This argument arises from the basic theory that analyses the development of regionalism in Southeast Asia, stating that geographic proximity should also be supported by a history legacy,¹ and that the process of the formation of the ASEAN Community is a process of regional integration politically.² This is in line with the establishment of ASEAN which allows the addressing of regional problems collectively, issues that originate both from within or from outside the region.

Before the establishment of the ADMM, ASEAN defence diplomacy in the form of defence cooperation were still under the umbrella of ASEAN’s Chief of Defence Forces Informal Meeting (ACDFIM), which is informal, and a defence mechanism at that time was pure military effort without any diplomatic mechanism. The defence field is not just the responsibility of military means alone, in contrast to the establishment of the ADMM and ADMM-Plus which combines all civilian and military players in the forum of defence diplomacy, although the issue is handled in relation to defence cooperation. In this case, the concept paper at the inaugural ADMM,

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² Jason D. Lewis, *The Integration of Southeast Asia: ASEAN’s Role in the Creation of a Security Community* (PhD Thesis, 1999), pp. 18-32
established that this forum was the main driving force for a defence dialogue and cooperation within the Southeast Asian region, which included officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs along with Ministry of Defence officials.³

Because the logic of defence dialogue, that came about in defence cooperation, is the main principle in defence diplomacy, this emphasizes that mutual trust needs to be developed to achieve common security, from which a defence community can be created in and outside of the region.

The emergence of ADMM and ADMM-Plus in the relations between countries in Southeast Asia was triggered by the awareness of ASEAN leaders that security threats are evolving and that the region requires a special forum that specifically addresses the issue of security. Starting from the Ministers of Defence meeting, when the terminology of defence diplomacy was first mooted, security issues have become a common topic to be discussed in the ASEAN environment. For the military, the presence of the ADMM and ADMM-Plus forums forms a defence cooperation programme which has been implemented since the beginning of the establishment of ASEAN as an official medium and structured organisation. ASEAN’s defence diplomacy through practical defence cooperation to date has been conducted within the scope of bilateral and multilateral levels, including joint operations, joint military exercises, training and cooperation on the standardisation of weaponry systems. To maintain peace and stability in the region, ASEAN member states carry out defence diplomacy through three kinds of simultaneous mechanisms that are related to defence cooperation, namely: 1) political effort, through regional dialogue mechanisms such as forums like ADMM and ADMM-Plus and activity within sections of those institutions; 2) the establishment of formal institutions that

³ Interview with B.G. Cheng, Director of Policy Office, Singapore MINDEF, Singapore, 20 September 2013
are structurally organised as defence cooperatives between countries, such as the Peacekeeping Centre Network, through six practical cooperation events that each has as a working group within the mechanism of the ADMM and ADMM-Plus; and 3) the establishment of institutions that are required to demonstrate the existence of a defence community through the development of an infrastructure that is integrated in one location, such as that initiated by Indonesia and which can be empowered by all ASEAN member states, as well as other Asia Pacific countries.

Based on the above facts, this thesis assessed a hypothesis about the connection between defence diplomacy and the existence of defence community elements in Southeast Asia. In addition, based on the arguments and evidence previously discussed, this thesis examines some of the requirements needed to prove that the activities of defence cooperation, which form the implementation of defence diplomacy under the auspices of ADMM and ADMM-Plus, contain the characteristics of a defence community. First, the existing defence cooperation amongst the countries of Southeast Asia must contain incorporation efforts of military force; second, in the incorporation of military force in the region there should be various efforts to achieve interoperability; third, there are efforts amongst ASEAN member countries to build facilities and institutions that have similar objectives or are equal to the requirements of a defence community; fourth, in addressing security issues in the region there is a common perception amongst the ASEAN leaders that the threat which is currently evolving in the region is a common threat to the whole region. In the following section, this thesis presents the research results and draws the conclusion that the practice of defence cooperation in Southeast Asia contains the elements of a defence community. Finally, this chapter is concluded with the explanation that even though this study had limitations, it also opened up opportunities for further research.
2. **The Elements of a Defence Community in ASEAN’s Defence Diplomacy**

This section summarises the empirical chapters as case study chapters in this thesis, which are conducted in Chapters 4 to 6. Overall, this thesis found that ADMM and ADMM-Plus, with their practical cooperation and venues for defence dialogue used by the defence leaders of ASEAN to discuss security issues, demonstrated ASEAN’s defence regionalism. Therefore, there is relevance in saying that indicators of multilateral defence diplomacy of ASEAN, in which the military plays its role as a tool for foreign policy, contain the elements of a defence community which could lead to the establishment of an ASEAN defence community. From a historical background, it proves that an ASEAN defence alliance was formed through the establishment of SEATO and other regional organisations thereafter, such as ASA and MAPHILINDO; for the same reasons that the formation of NATO was to contain the Communist empire in the Baltic, SEATO was created to block further Communist expansion in Asia.4

In point of fact, the factual existence of SEATO and other regional organisations before ASEAN has no relationship at all in terms of the analysis of the existence of elements of a defence community in Southeast Asia, but looking back at the history of the regional organisation in Southeast Asia proves that a historic collective defence organisation in the region has characteristics similar to a defence community. Hence, the existence of such an organisation in the future is not unthinkable at all. This thesis tried to explore all indications, or at least the elements of the defence community, contained in the defence cooperation network in Southeast Asia today. Although ASEAN is not a defence organisation, in fact, practical

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defence cooperation of ASEAN member states within the auspices of ADMM and ADMM-Plus, whether intentionally or not by the leaders of ASEAN, contain elements of a defence community.

If we follow closely, we can see how far the previously discussed case studies support the hypothesis from the figure below (Figure 7.1).

Figure 7.1

The Timeline of Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia

Source: Researcher’s own figure
Note: The figure shows how the development of defence cooperation in Southeast Asia began in the mid-1950s and, since the late-1990s, defence cooperation as a form of defence diplomacy also evolved in line with the changing of world politics and security challenges

ASEAN, in this context, created ADMM and ADMM-Plus as organisations to deal with defence issues. Through the mechanism of both forums, ASEAN combined its military strength to overcome the challenges that currently exist in the region, but there are still many problems intra-ASEAN itself. From the variety of defence diplomacy actions that have been implemented in Southeast Asia so far, the dominant form of cooperation is in the field of exercises rather than a joint operation as a whole. The existence of ADMM is first to create a forum for dialogue between the participants in the defence
of Southeast Asia. However, because this forum did talk about defence, in
the end, discussion regarding the modernisation of weaponry and defence
spending efficiency was inevitable;⁵ in effect, this highlighted the fact that
amongst the ASEAN member states there is indeed much technological
disparity. Consequently, the concept of ADIC was triggered with the aim to
release the dependence of ASEAN member countries on producer
countries. Thus, ASEAN shows its defence diplomacy activities have
contained the characteristics of a defence community by building an
organisation whose activities are directed to deal with specific defence
issues.

Indeed, ASEAN, through practical cooperation, shows that unification
efforts have created a cohesive region and that it prioritises the
establishment of an ASEAN arrangement for the maintenance of peace and
stability. At the same time, the military of ASEAN member states has been
used for peace efforts, preventing conflicts, providing disaster relief and
“greater engagement in defence diplomacy effort,”⁶ because not all security
issues are purely military problems, issues such as humanitarian aid,
maritime security for civilian shipping, public security from the threat of terror
and other security issues are also the responsibility of state agencies other
than military institutions.

In the maintenance of peace and stability in the region, the ADMM
and ADMM Plus has made major contributions to the region, particularly in
the integration of the region and the ASEAN countries to jointly look at
mutual interests above national interests. This has had a positive impact on

⁵ Interview with Jan Pieter Ate, Director of International Cooperation, Indonesian Ministry of
Defence, Jakarta, 16 September 2013
⁶ Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster, Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for
Military Cooperation and Assistance, (Adelphi Paper No. 365; Oxford: Oxford University
Press for the International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2004), p. 1
the Southeast Asia region with the ADMM and ADMM Plus contributing to the internal stability of the region of Southeast Asia.

To answer the research question, this thesis tried to answer it from the selection of five practical defence cooperation areas in the ADMM and ADMM-Plus, namely: 1) maritime security, 2) counter-terrorism, 3) disaster management, 4) peacekeeping operations and 5) military medicine, and from 2014, the areas of cooperation has been increased by another cooperative, which is Humanitarian Mine Action. These six areas of cooperation are forms of non-traditional challenges that have been inventoried and which demand an active role from the military. The military is a tangible domain that has the necessary equipment as well as the readiness to address such security challenges. ASEAN’s defence cooperation under the auspices of the ADMM and ADMM-Plus is a form of cooperation to support the establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015. In the process of defence cooperation under the umbrella of ADMM and ADMM-Plus, the role of the working group of each practical cooperation is essential, because this is an early planning level of cooperation as well as being the final executor of the plan that has been confirmed at the level of Defence Ministers. Very rarely has an agenda that had been approved at the level of the working group suddenly failed to become a decision at the ministerial level.

All practical cooperation requires concerted effort and mutual trust amongst military personnel. The general requirements of such cooperation contained in the inter-operability level requires joint exercises, understanding of tasks and, especially, standardisation of armaments. With the objective to reduce the technological disparity amongst ASEAN member states, who spend a combined budget of approximately $25 billion per year,
and regional dependency of defence equipment from outside the region, the ADIC was created. Obstacles that may hamper defence industry cooperation include the presence of conflict amongst ASEAN member states that have not been resolved, as this encourages the disputants to keep buying high-tech weaponry from other countries outside ASEAN. Defence cooperation in the field of the defence industry has been implemented so far in the form of bilateral agreement between two ASEAN member states. Meanwhile, defence cooperation in the prosecution of security threats in the region, especially in the field of maritime security, has been implemented in the form of multilateral agreements.

Indeed, modernisation of defence equipment is a bridge for ASEAN member states to develop their own defence industries. In line with the new regionalism approach applied in this study, another mechanism necessary to show signs of a defence community in ASEAN’s defence diplomacy activities is the establishment of the ASEAN Defence Industry Collaboration (ADIC). The idea for ADIC is to reduce the technological disparity between its member states. At the same time, it serves to reduce regional dependency on defence equipment from outside the region. As indicated in the ADIC concept paper, its establishment is geared towards ‘encouraging development of industrial and technological sharing’. Although the concept of ADIC is still at an early stage, the concept of this defence industry collaboration shows a significant element of a defence community and demonstrates to the international community the existence of ASEAN as an independent entity, ready to perpetuate its role in the ‘driver’s seat’ with ASEAN centrality in addressing security issues in Southeast Asia.

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7 Interview with Mr. Shakieb bin Ahmad Shakir, Deputy Undersecretary for Policy and Strategic Planning Division, MoD Malaysia, in Kuala Lumpur on 13 August 2013
8 ASEAN Secretariat, Joint Declaration of the ASEAN Defence Ministers on Strengthening Defence Cooperation of ASEAN in the Global Community to Face New Challenges (Jakarta: 19 May 2011); Furthermore Sneha Raghavan and Guy Ben-Ari, ASEAN Defence Industry Collaboration (CSIS, Defence-Industrial Initiatives Group, no. 25, 9 July 2011)
Moreover, the findings of this study also suggest that the mechanism of defence diplomacy in ADMM and ADMM-Plus has created a sense of kinship between ASEAN leaders, since, the nature of a defence community should have shared identities, values, meet regularly and develop a sense of responsibility towards one another in the long run. In the context of ASEAN, for example, the creation of an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force has been suggested as a means to settle conflicts intra-ASEAN. This ultimately evolved into the peacekeeping centre network and a concrete cooperation in the Malacca Straits Patrol that has shown member states share the same concerns for general security threats in the region.

The development of an integrated seven-in-one facility in one location to improve the capacity of personnel through joint training, exchanged experiences and improved language skills are part of the requirements of inter-operability as the characteristics of the defence community that exists in the ASEAN defence cooperation. Such seven-in-one facilities are utilised and developed together, to cement mutual understanding and to create strategic trust amongst military personnel of ASEAN member states. Similarly, the modernisation of major weaponry systems is an integral element of inter-operability, even though it was feared that this would become an arms race in Southeast Asia.

Recently, Malaysia's proposal to form a joint peacekeeping ASEAN body shows the incorporation effort of military forces, although only in the form of peacekeeping operations. Defence cooperation amongst ASEAN countries clearly contains the elements of a defence community, such as a common perception of threats that occur in Southeast Asia, the ways to deal with the threats and the various efforts to achieve the inter-operability

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contained in a defence cooperative amongst ASEAN member states. Although in the South China Sea dispute resolution ASEAN member states have split views, in general the ASEAN leaders have a common perception that the current growing threat in the region could threaten the stability and security of the region. Acceptance of ASEAN countries of peacekeeping operations with the incorporation of military force, and the smoothness of inter-operability in ASEAN member states defence cooperation can be said to constitute a clear sign of the presence of defence community elements in Southeast Asia.

A defence community in the context of ASEAN is not only inward-looking, but is combined with outward-looking as well. The character of an ASEAN "defence community" exists and is relevant to addressing uncertainty and change in politics, the economy and culture, which are very closely related to the existence of ASEAN. Indeed, the distinctive interlocking pattern of it has been described as an ASEAN "defence spider web". In this regard, the concept of a defence community was first represented in the Bali Concord II. However, from the beginning the ASEAN establishment have consistently rejected a defence alliance and will never sanction a defence alliance, although in recent years, the leaders of ASEAN states have pledged to transform ‘troubled’ Southeast Asia into a ‘united’ region. They have come up with the concept or spirit of transferring the challenges into a ‘venue of cooperation’ not as a ‘venue of conflict’. Thus, the very idea of ASEAN’s ‘defence community’ implies the

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11 Alexandra Wulan and Bantarto Bandoro, *ASEAN's Quest for a Full-Fledged Community* (Jakarta: CSIS, 2007), p. 94
12 *Ibid*
13 Interview with Yudi Abrimantyo Chief Section of Bilateral Cooperation, Indonesian Ministry of Defence, Jakarta 21st March 2013
need for some form of trilateral or multilateral military arrangement within the group.\textsuperscript{14} Existing defence cooperation has also met the elements of inter-operability and unification of military force which can be identified as containing elements or prospects of a defence community within the defence cooperation amongst ASEAN member states.

3. Limitations of the Study

The theoretical approach to explain the defence cooperation of ASEAN member states indicates several things that can be debated. First, as has been discussed in the previous chapters, the requirement for the formation of a region which is contained in the new regionalism approach is not fully met, as evidenced by the persistence of conflicts amongst ASEAN member states. Thus, a region that is fully unified and integrated is constrained. In this context, the principle of non-interference would be violated if ASEAN member states begin to ally themselves with each other and combine their military force formally to face the same challenges.\textsuperscript{15} Although in this case, the characteristic of a defence community is established by the agreement of its members that the community will build an organisation in which its activities are directed to deal with defence issues, something that cannot be addressed by a single country alone, in addition, the formation of a defence community does not have to be under an agreement that is legally binding.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{14} Acharya (1991), \textit{Op.cit}, p.159

\textsuperscript{15} Robert E. Osgood, \textit{Alliances and American Foreign Policy} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), pp. 17-31); see also Craig A. Snyder, \textit{Contemporary Security and Strategy} (Palgrave: Macmillan, 2008),p. 228; see also Craig A. Snyder, \textit{Regional Security and Regional Conflict} paper presented to 48\textsuperscript{th} Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (Chicago, IL: March 2007), pp. 6-7

\textsuperscript{16} Interview with Bantarto Bandoro, Jakarta, 8 August 2014
Second, the existence of disputes between certain ASEAN member states with external powers encouraged ASEAN member states to process the settlement with an integrated entity; however, with the persistence of internal conflict, ASEAN member states adopt the strategy of building equilibrium between external powers and themselves, which is frequently exploited by certain countries into bandwagoning in solving intra-state problems amongst ASEAN member states. In reality, ASEAN shows its defence diplomacy activities have contained the characteristics of a defence community by building an organisation whose activities are directed to deal with specific defence issues. ASEAN, in this context, created ADMM and ADMM-Plus as organisations to deal with defence issues. Through the mechanism of both organisations, ASEAN combined its military strength to overcome the challenges that currently exist in the region, but there are still many problems intra-ASEAN itself.

Third, from the variety of defence diplomacy actions that have been implemented in Southeast Asia to date, the dominant form of cooperation is in the field of exercises rather than a joint operation as a whole. Of the six practical cooperation events contained in the ADMM and ADMM-Plus, those in the field of maritime security, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance can be said to have the elements of a defence community. Meanwhile, other practical cooperation still tends to be a mechanism for administrative cooperation and training. In creating and maintaining regional cooperation, defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia successfully demonstrates its

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existence by supporting other countries in the area of defence, humanitarian relief, inter-state security problems and peace capacities, together with military medicine and counter terrorism in the region.

Understanding regional organisation creation in Southeast Asia cannot be separated from efforts to trace the influence of the superpowers. Through the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty (Manila Pact), SEATO was established on 8 September, 1954, and the influence of the U.S. in creating this defence organisation was very pronounced. The design of SEATO was similar to that of NATO. However, only two Southeast Asia countries joined the organisation: the Philippines and Thailand, whereas other countries were reluctant to join in an organisation known as an alliance. Meanwhile, in the case of the ADMM and ADMM-Plus formation, the creation of these organisations is not described as a form of collective defence organisation, and no such defence treaty has been created yet; however, the two organisations in the political field, through its development, bring new forms of relationships in Southeast Asia, especially in the field of defence. There is a fundamental difference in the formation of ADMM and ADMM-Plus compared to the establishment of previous regional organisations that have existed in Southeast Asia. In the ADMM concept paper, the establishment of the ADMM and ADMM-Plus are purely an initiative of ASEAN member states. The aims to establish this regional organisation is to gain ‘strategic space’ and to reduce ‘technology disparity’ of ASEAN member states. The notion of gaining ‘strategic space’ and reducing ‘technology disparity’ is in line with the principles of a defence

21 Available at admn.asean.org, accessed on 2 February 2014
22 Interviewed with Juwono Sudarsono, former Defence Minister of the Republic of Indonesia, on 19 March 2013
community, that the partnership for peace will allow the member states of ASEAN to share information and to modernise their militaries in line with democratic standards.  

Strategic space, which is created through defence diplomacy, encouraged a more dominant role of the military in the region to address the increasingly complex security issues in the region. Defence diplomacy is believed to increase the understanding of military personnel on human rights, in order to foster strategic trust between ASEAN member countries and with external powers. Strategic trust can be interpreted as the feeling of cooperation and confidence that permits countries in the region, either with an external major power or intra-ASEAN member states, to work together, initially on issues of common interest.

4. The Opportunities for Future Research

Defence cooperation of ASEAN member states within the auspices of ADMM and AMM-Plus with their various mechanisms has surprisingly attracted very little attention of scientists or researchers in Southeast Asia in associating it with the mechanism of a defence community. This may be caused by a variety of previous studies and statements of military officials in Southeast Asia that not all forms of defence cooperation of ASEAN countries are an attempt to establish a defence community, whereas in fact, the degree of inter-operability that has been achieved amongst the military of ASEAN member states, as a result of joint exercises make the readiness of ASEAN member states military, which can encourage the political

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decision of ASEAN leaders to conduct military operations collectively in coping with the threats.\footnote{Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 151}

The ASEAN member states’ big plan to establish the ASEAN Community in 2015 left a lot of work to be completed directly. The role of military cooperation in supporting the achievement of an ASEAN community can encourage the immediate establishment of an integrated ASEAN, with one condition that military cooperation of ASEAN member states really intends to make a stable and peaceful region, and to avoid an arms race. The notion of an arms race can be investigated further with a variety of parameters that have been built by other experts. In the definition of a defence community that has been developed in this study, the need for military modernisation, if it is not in line with the spirit of ASEAN integration, could turn into an arms race arena.

Indeed, the differences in the perception of threat, regarding certain security issues, is still ongoing in Southeast Asia. Therefore, the structure of military cooperation and security arrangements that exist today refer to the understanding of the threat. This is despite the fact that the elements of a defence community are already contained in the ASEAN’s defence diplomacy, which is conducted through defence cooperation and dialogue in the field of defence. Moreover, the history of Southeast Asian countries’ rejection of joining an organisation in the form of defence alliance appears to be under consideration by personal ruling regimes. However, this time, with the development of international relations formed by inter-dependence between countries, it means that no single country or region can stand alone without opening communication with other countries. Consequently, based on the arguments that have been built, there are opportunities for
subsequent researchers to prove that ASEAN can one day evolve into a
defence pact or military alliance in accordance with the policies of the
governments of the ASEAN member states.
Appendix 1: Respondents

**Indonesia**

1. M. Jusuf Kalla  
   Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia
2. Ambassador I Gusti Agung Wesaka Puja  
   Director General of International Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia
3. Ambassador Ngurah Swajaya  
   Indonesian Ambassador to ASEAN
4. Ambassador Yuri Octavian Thamrin  
   Director General for Asia Pacific and African Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic Indonesia
5. Admiral Dr. Marsetio  
   Indonesia Navy Chief of Staff, Indonesian National Defence Force
6. Lt. General (Ret), Dr. Syarifudin Tippe  
   Rector of Indonesia Defense University
7. Dr. Rizal Sukma  
   Executive Director of Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Indonesia
8. Dr. Riefqi Muna  
   Indonesian Institute of Science (LIPI)
9. Dr. Kusnanto Anggoro  
   University of Indonesia, and Indonesia Defense University
10. Begi Hersutanto  
    Commission I, People’s Representative Council, Indonesia
11. BG. Jan Pieter Ate  
    Director of International Cooperation, Ministry of Defence, Republic of Indonesia
12. Colonel Yudi Abrimantyo  
    Chief Section of Directorate of International Cooperation, Ministry of Defence, Republic of Indonesia
13. Lt.Col (Navy), Agam Endrasmoro  
    Senior Staff of Indonesian National Defence Force, Operational Staff for Defence Cooperation, Indonesia
14. Major Fauzi Nurdin  
    Junior Staff of Indonesian National Defence Force Operational Staff for Joint Operations
15. Prof. Bantarto Bandoro
   Senior Lecturer, Indonesia Defense University

16. Dr. Widya Setyabudi
   Lecturer, Padjadjaran University, Bandung, Indonesia

17. Dr. Yohanes Sulaiman
   Lecturer, Indonesia Defense University

18. Dr. Phil. Yandry Kurniawan
   University of Indonesia

19. Dr. Sirojuddin Abbas
   Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting, Indonesia

20. Col Taufik Budi Santoso
   Director of Maintenance, Cooperation and Information, Indonesian Peacekeeping Centre, Indonesian National Defence Force, Indonesia

21. M. Haripin
   Indonesian Institute of Science (LIPI)

22. BG. Jamaludin
   Director “B” for International Cooperation, Indonesian Strategic Intelligence Bureau, Indonesia

**Brunei**

1. Pengiran Dato Paduka Haji Mustappa
   Deputy Minister of Defence, Ministry of Defence, Brunei

2. MG. Dato Paduka Seri Haji Aminuddin Ihsan
   Royal Brunei Armed Forces, Commander, Brunei Darussalam

**Malaysia**

1. Mr. Shakieb bin Ahmad Shakir
   Deputy Under-sectary for Policy and Planning Division, Ministry of Defence, Malaysia

**Singapore**

1. Prof. See Seng Tan
   S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore

2. Prof. Ralf Emmers
   S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore
3. Mely Caballero-Anthony  
   S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore  
4. Dr. Tim Huxley  
   Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore  
5. Lt. General Ng Chee Meng  
   Chief of Defence Force, Singapore Armed Forces  
6. B.G. Cheng  
   Director of Foreign Policy Office, Singapore  
6. Lt.Col Philip E. Kwang Yong  
   Senior Staff of Directorate of Foreign Policy Office, Singapore  

Vietnam  
1. Sr. Col. Le Kim Pung  
   Director of International Department, Vietnam Army  

Others  
1. Anton Ali Abbas  
   Cranfield University, UK
Appendix-2: Interview Guides

Term of Reference

ASEAN’s Defence Diplomacy:
The Road to Southeast Asia’s Defence Community?

1. Background

Although for a long time ago, defence and diplomacy cannot be put together in the same phrase, nowadays defence and diplomacy are used to achieve government’s goals. Defence diplomacy has become an important tool of states’ foreign and security policy. This is a result of three important developments. “First, the understanding of the nature of security challenges among states has evolved. No longer are states preoccupied in addressing the traditional (military) challenges, but also non-traditional ones. Second, defence diplomacy involves cooperation between militaries over a range of issues which call the military to perform their traditional duties, such as counter-balancing efforts against rivals, and new roles that are outside of the traditional duties, such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, promoting good governance, responding to natural and humanitarian disasters, protecting human rights and, at least in the Western context, supporting liberal democracy. Third, in contrast to the past efforts, defence diplomacy of today involves military-to-military cooperation between not only allies and partners but even potential rivals” (Singh and Tan 2011).

Defence diplomacy is described by Cottey and Foster (2004); as “peace time cooperative use of armed forces and related infrastructure (primarily defence ministries) as a tool of foreign and security policy”. Meanwhile Anton Du Plessis (2008) defined, that defence diplomacy as “the use of armed forces in operations other than war, building on their trained expertise and discipline to achieve national and foreign objectives abroad”. There are at least three characteristics of defence diplomacy that can be identified. The first characteristic is “it involves the cooperative activities undertaken by the militaries and its related infrastructure during the peacetime” (Singh and Tan 2011). Following the first characteristic is a broader range of military involvement through a range of issues which outside of its traditional task. Such tasks could be promoting democracy and good governance and a broader scope of civic mission. The third characteristic is the defence diplomacy is a kind of military cooperation with allies and the possibilities to work closely with potential rivals.
Nowadays, ASEAN’s defence diplomacy manifested through series of bilateral and multilateral relations. The emergence of defence diplomacy in ASEAN is marked by various security cooperation activities. Furthermore, defence diplomacy in ASEAN has many layers, it could be Track 1 (leaders, ministers and chiefs of defence forces), Track 2 (defence colleges, defence ministry-related think tanks/research institutions) and increasingly, Track 3 (civil society and non-governmental organisations). Foresaid defence diplomacy effort is ranging from formal ones within the auspice of ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) and ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), to informal ones such as Shangri La Dialogue and Jakarta International Defence Dialogue (JIDD). Meanwhile, in the military area ASEAN has developed many cooperation which include, but not limited to (a) series of peacekeeping training, (b) intelligence exercise, (c) military attaché visit program, (d) combined military exercise (e) arms rifles meeting and (f) military sport competition”. These are just some of the ASEAN defence diplomacy activities which reflect coordination and cooperation among ASEAN militaries, aimed at developing common understanding and confidence building as how to address regional security issues collectively.

Since the past ten years or so, we have seen series of regional activities in which ASEAN member countries have used the first and second layers of defence diplomacy to promote their security as well as their foreign policy. The promotion of their security and foreign policy was clearly reflected in the ASEAN-initiated defence forum, such as ADMM and other military senior official meetings.

This research will explore the first and second track to identify the existence of Defence Community in Southeast Asia. This research aims to analyse ASEAN’s defence diplomacy as a dialogue and process of communication among ASEAN’s military and security officials to help the region address fresh and future security challenges. It is through defence diplomacy that ASEAN will be able to understand not only the position of respective members countries of ASEAN over certain security issues, but also grasp the real sense of the meaning of regional cooperative security. However, It is important to note in this project that the use of defence diplomacy by a single member of ASEAN is not intended to exert influence over the other, but to build common perspective on how to address regional security problems.
2. **Hypotheses**
   
   A hypotheses will be assessed to gain a better understanding of this study, namely: The practice of defence cooperation for handling security challenges in Southeast Asia is the implementation of Defence Diplomacy under the auspice of ADMM and ADMM-Plus contain the characteristic of Defence Community which could pave the way for the formation of future Southeast Asia’s defence community.

3. **Methodology**

   The methodology of this study is qualitative method. Boldan and Biklen (1992: 16) described, qualitative research as reality is multilayer, interactive and social experience shared interpretation by individuals. Through the processing of data this study aims to explore the phenomenon of defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia and its development through defence cooperation, which affects its military involvement in other tasks in addition to the military’s traditional tasks. In order to find the elements of a defence community, which relies on interviews as the primary source. This study focuses on ASEAN’s defence cooperation on ADMM and ADMM-Plus as its units of analysis and determined six countries in Southeast Asia i.e. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam as the loci of the study. In collecting information on how and why ADMM and ADMM-Plus were organised, this study applies a triangulation method by combining documentary analysis, in-depth interviews and direct observation techniques.

   The focus of this research is from 2000 to 2012. It will collect the data primarily from interviews, supplemented by questioners. The respondents will be decision makers, politicians, military officials and intellectuals from selected countries of ASEAN member states as mentioned above. The secondary data are books and articles collected from Universität Heidelberg Library, KITLV Leiden, RSIS Singapore and CSIS Jakarta. Relevant information from Indonesian Armed Forces archives will also be collected.

4. **Questions to be explored during the interview**

   a. How important does the role of military in ASEAN’s defence cooperation? and regional security?

   b. Security challenges in ASEAN have evolved from traditional to non-traditional. What is the main challenges or threat for Southeast Asian defence, and does such threat change the pattern of defence cooperation in ASEAN?
c. ASEAN never claims itself as a security pact, however the spirit of a community to address defence problems exist. Does the current state of defence cooperation in Southeast Asia contain the element of a defence community?

d. When the military involve in diplomacy, do you see any indication that defence community is being processed? Could you identify the indicators of defence community, if any?

e. The security challenges faced by ASEAN has forced them to respond either through bilateral and multilateral mechanism. What kind of venues do you see ASEAN is using to address the challenges? What do you think about the role of ADMM and ADMM-Plus in meeting the regional defence challenges, and does this venue serve as the path towards Southeast Asia Defence Community?

f. Do you agree that ADMM is the main forum for defence dialogue and cooperation in Southeast Asia?

g. The military play its role in diplomacy through ADMM. It is unthinkable in the past. What do you think about this phenomenon; does this role reflect the openness on the part of the military to discuss regional security matters, which used to be taboo in the past? Do you see other regional forums where the military involvement in diplomacy was intensive? Why do you think the military should now be part of regional defence diplomacy?

h. The ADMM serve as a “strategic space” for ASEAN to discuss wide range of regional strategic issues as well as to reduce a “technology disparity”, among ASEAN member states. Can you identify what comes out from ADMM as a strategic space and how do you think the ADMM should perform as a forum for reducing “technology disparity”?

i. When performing defence diplomacy, how does ASEAN members states reconcile their regional and national interest?
j. Do you believe that in the ASEAN Community lies the spirit for developing ASEAN defence community to as always become a corridor in intra ASEAN dialogue to solve its member security challenges? In case diplomatic rift occurs between ASEAN members state, how would ASEAN address it?

k. One of the pillars of ASEAN Community is ASEAN’s Political and Security Community. To what extent does this pillar support regional stability and security? And in that context, do you see the process of ASEAN defence diplomacy?

l. In line with the practice of defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia, do you think now it’s time for ASEAN to establish a regional defence industry?

m. According to you, which countries in ASEAN is assumed to be leading in the formation of a structured defence cooperation?

n. What is the rationale behind ASEAN defence regionalism that encourages the establishment of ADMM?

o. Based on the reality of the defence practice, do you think ASEAN is ready to act as, and be called, a defence community?

p. Has there been evidence of defence cooperation and diplomacy in Southeast Asia during the Cold War era?

q. How do you measure that ASEAN is well mature in addressing the challenges in the region?

r. How important is security relations with the major powers (U.S., China, Russia) for ASEAN?
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