Rethinking Indian Buddhist Logic in Tang China:
An Analysis and Translation of the Sādhana Section of
Kuiji’s Commentary on the Nyāyapraveśa

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Abstract

This project investigates how Buddhist scholars in Tang China adopted and adapted Indian Buddhist logic at the basis of a study on the Yinming ru zhengli lun shu 因明入正理論疏 by Kuiji 窺基 (632–682).

Dignāga’s (ca. 480–540) doctrine of the science of reasons is a watershed in the history of Indian logic because of its contributions to the mode of reasoning. It was first introduced in the Nyāyamūkha by Dignāga himself and then in the Nyāyapraveśa by Śaṅkarasvāmin (ca. 500–560). In the seventh century, the Nyāyapraveśa and the Nyāyamūkha were translated into Chinese by Xuanzang 玄奘 (600/602–664), and then a number of commentaries were made by Xuanzang’s disciples. The most important one was the Yinming ru zhengli lun shu by Kuiji, which was venerated as the Yinming dashu 因明大疏 (Great Commentary on the Science of Reasons) by later generations.

In order to examine Kuiji’s understanding of Buddhist logic, my study analyzes and translates the sādhana section of his commentary. This study mainly deals with the following two aspects. By exploring how Kuiji integrates clusters of concepts to make definitions, how different Sanskrit terms are reconfigured, and how new concepts are invented and employed, I investigate how related concepts are interpreted in Kuiji’s commentary. Secondly, by exploring how Kuiji interprets the rules of debate to make it fair for both sides, and how he expounds the standards for judging the result, I investigate how he explains the standards of the practice of argumentation.

In this manner, this study explores how Indian Buddhist logic was adopted and adapted in Tang China with a focus on Kuiji’s interpretation. In the reception of concepts and practice of Buddhist logic, the study of the science of reasons in Tang China, as a fruit of the Chinese encounter with Indian Buddhism, cannot be understood correctly in isolation, but needs to be made intelligible in relationship to both an intended Chinese readership and a conceptual context provided by Indian texts.
# Contents

Abstract ............................................................................................................................................. i

Contents .................................................................................................................................................. ii

List of Tables and Figures ........................................................................................................................ v

Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................... vi

Abbreviations ......................................................................................................................................... viii

Part I: Rethinking Indian Buddhist Logic in Tang China ................................................................. 1

1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 1

1.1. Object of Study: The Buddhist Science of Reasons ........................................................................ 1

1.2. The Early Reception of the Science of Reasons ............................................................................ 4

1.3. Xuanzang’s Studies in the Science of Reasons ............................................................................. 7

1.4. Kuiji’s Life and His Commentary on the *Yinming ru zhengli lun* ............................................. 11

1.5. Methodology ................................................................................................................................... 19

1.6. Chapter Organization ..................................................................................................................... 24

2. Conceptual Integration, Semantic Reconfiguration and Invention in the *Yinming dashu*: Three Case-studies .................................................................................................................. 27

2.1. Conceptual Integration: Multilevel Definitions of Property-possession and Qualifier ............... 27

2.1.1. “Self-nature” and “Distinguishing-feature” in a Broad Sense .................................................. 30

2.1.1.1. “Self-nature” and “Distinguishing-feature” in a Narrow Sense ........................................... 31

2.1.1.2. “Particular Characteristic” and “Universal Characteristic” ................................................ 36

2.1.1.3. “Self-form” and “Distinction” ............................................................................................. 41

2.1.2. “Property-Possessor” and “Property” ....................................................................................... 42

2.1.3. Integration as Reconstruction ..................................................................................................... 48

2.2. The Semantic Reconfiguration of Concepts: *Upanaya, Anvaya*, and *He* ............................... 49
2.2.1. He in the Pre-Dignāga Yinming ....................................................... 51
2.2.2. Kuiji’s Understanding of He .......................................................... 55
2.2.3. Huizhao’s Understanding of He ..................................................... 60
2.2.4. Effects of the Semantic Reconfiguration of He .............................. 65
2.3. The Invention of New Concepts: The Substrata and Essences of the Thesis and Example, and the Similar and Dissimilar Groups of the Reason ............... 67
2.3.1. The Substrata and Essences of the Thesis and Examples ............... 68
2.3.1.1. The Substrata of the Thesis .......................................................... 68
2.3.1.2. The Essence of the Thesis ........................................................... 72
2.3.1.3. The Substrata and Essences of the Examples ............................. 81
2.3.2. The Similar and Dissimilar Groups of the Reason .......................... 84
2.3.3. Concepts Invented or Merely Renamed ....................................... 91
3. Standards of the Practice of Argumentation ....................................... 93
3.1. Rules for Debate .............................................................................. 93
3.1.1. The Requirement of Being Well-established ................................ 93
3.1.2. The Stipulation of Three Kinds of Inferences .............................. 96
3.1.3. The Application of Three Kinds of Inferences ............................. 102
3.2. The Judgment of the Result ............................................................. 106
3.2.1. The Fallacy of the Antinomic Reason ......................................... 106
3.2.2. The Relationships between Genuine Proof, Genuine Refutation, and their Specious Forms ................................................................. 109
4. Concluding Remarks ........................................................................ 117
Part II: A Translation of the Sādhana Section of Kuiji’s Yinming dashu .......... 124
1. Introductory Notes to the Translation .............................................. 124
2. Kuiji’s Commentary on the First Verse and the Sādhana Section .......... 127
2.1. On the Verse Presenting the Outline ................................................................. 127

2.2. On Proof ............................................................................................................. 161

2.2.1. On the Thesis .................................................................................................. 184

2.2.2. On the Reason ............................................................................................... 230

2.2.3. On the Example ............................................................................................ 311

2.2.4. On the Summary for Proof ........................................................................... 355

3. Kuiji’s Commentary on viruddhāvyabicārin ....................................................... 367

Appendix I A Partial Translation of the Yinming ru zhengli lun based on Kuiji’s Commentary ............................................................................................................ 379

Appendix II A Glossary for the Science of Reasons .......................................... 383

Bibliography ........................................................................................................... 392
List of Tables and Figures

Tables:

Table 1: Xuanzang’s Studies of the Science of Reasons in India .......................7
Table 2: Xuanzang’s Translations of Science of Reasons Literature ...................8
Table 3: Names of the Two Components of the Thesis Member .......................29
Table 4: Vātsyāyana’s and Dignāga’s Formulation of Inference: A Comparison .50
Table 5: Kuiji’s Explanations of the Combinations of Rubrics .......................110
Table 6: Symbolical Comparison of Inference Formulation between the Nyāyapraveśa and the Yinming ru zhengli lun shu .................................120

Figures:

Figure 1: Commentarial Tradition of the Yinming ru zhengli lun in China and Japan
..............................................................................................................................................19
Figure 2: Formulation of Inference according to the Yinming ru zhengli lun shu
..............................................................................................................................................117
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Abbreviations


ASch: Xuanzang’s Chinese translation of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, i.e., the Dacheng apidamo jilun 大乘阿毘達磨集論, T1605.


ASVy: Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā.

ASVy ch: Xuanzang’s Chinese translation of the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, i.e., the Dacheng apidamo zailun 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論, T1606.

IDS: Inmyō daisho shō 因明大疏抄 of Zōshun 蔵俊. T2271.

IDYJ: Inmyō daisho yūkan jō 因明大疏融貫抄 of Kiben 基辨. T2272.


IRMS: Inmyō ronsho myōtō shō 因明論疏明燈抄 of Zenju 善珠. T2270.

ITU: Inmyō taisho uragaki 因明大疏裏書 of Myōsen 明詮. T2274.

NMu: Nyāyamukha.


NPV: Nyāyapraveśaka vyrtti of Haribhadra. See NP.


NSBh: Nyāyabhāṣya of Vātsyāyana. See NS.

PS(V): Pramāṇasamuccaya(-Vyrtti) of Dignāga.

S: Songzang yizhen 宋藏遺珍.

T: Taishō shinshū daizōkyō 大正新脩大藏経.

X: Shinsan Dainihon Zoku zōkyō 卍新纂大日本續藏経.
XSL: Xianyang shengjiao lun 顯揚聖教論. T1602.

YBh: Yogācārabhūmi.

YBhk: Xuanzang’s translation of the Yogācārabhūmi, i.e., the Yijuashidi lun 瑜伽師地論. T1579.


YLL: Yijuashidi lun luezuan 瑜伽師地論略纂 of Kuiji 窺基. T1829.

YRZL: Xuanzang’s Chinese translation of the Nyāyapraveśa, i.e., the Yinming ru zhengli lun 因明入正理論. T1630.

YRZLS: Yinming ru zhengli lun shu 因明入正理論疏 of Kuiji, also known as the Great Commentary on the Science of Reasons 因明大疏. T1840.

YRZLSg: the edition of the Yinming ru zhengli lun shu found in Guangsheng Temple 廣勝寺, Zhao City 趙城, Shanxi 山西, China in 1933, published as the 54th and 55th volumes of the Songzang yizhen 宋藏遺珍 series in 1935.


YRZLSt: the edition of the Yinming ru zhengli lun shu in the Taishō shinshū daizōkyō 大正新脩大藏經.

YRZLSh: Yinming ru zhengli lun shu houji 因明入正理論疏後記 of Zhizhou 智周. X854.

YRZLSQ: Yinming ru zhengli lun shu qian ji 因明入正理論疏前記 of Zhizhou. X853.

YRZLSW: Yinming ru zhengli lun shu 因明入正理論疏 of Wengui 文軌, also known as the Zhuangyan Commentary 莊嚴疏. X848.


YZML: Xuanzang’s Chinese translation of the Nyāyamukha, i.e., the Yinming zhengli men lun ben 因明正理門論本. T1628.
Part I: Rethinking Indian Buddhist Logic in Tang China

1. Introduction

1.1. Object of Study: The Buddhist Science of Reasons

Like many other ancient civilizations, India has a long history of reasoning and debate. Incipient passages on related rules can be found in the Carakasaṃhitā and the Nyāyasūtra (NS hereinafter). Indian schools, especially the Naiyāyikas, developed their systems of logic and argumentation based on them.

Buddhists also produced their interpretations of the science of reasons in the context of religious controversies. The most significant role is attributed to Dignāga (ca. 480–540 CE), who is the successor of Vasubandhu (ca. fourth–fifth century CE) and the predecessor of Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660 CE). Dignāga’s doctrine is even considered as a watershed in the history of Indian logic. He distinguishes between the inference for oneself (svārthānumāna) and the inference for others (parārthānumāna), offers the theory of the wheel of reasons (hetucakra) to specify the conditions of validity, and simplifies the formulation of inference but improves its logical validity at the same time. For instance, according to his doctrine, an inference can be set forth as follows:

Thesis: Sound is impermanent,
Reason: because of being produced,
Example: whatever is produced is seen to be impermanent, like a pot, and so forth;
whatever is permanent is seen to be not produced, like ether, and so forth.

This inference consists of three members, i.e., the thesis, reason, and example. They read pakṣa, hetu, dṛṣṭānta in Sanskrit and zōng 宗, yīn 因, yù 喻 in Chinese respectively. The thesis sets forth the subject and the property to be proved; the

1 There are various Sanskrit terms for the members, e.g., pratijñā for the thesis, apadeśa for the reason, udāhārana for the example.
statement of the reason presents the proving property of the subject; the example contains two statements that demonstrate the logical connection between the proving property and the property to be proved from the positive and the negative angles with respective instances. The thesis states the proposition, and then the reason and the example prove this proposition based on the theory of the three characteristics of a correct reason, i.e., trairūpya in Sanskrit and yinsanxiang 因三相 in Chinese, including being universally a property of the subject in the thesis (bianshizongfa xing 遍是宗法性, paksadharmatva), being certainly present in the similar group of instances (tongpindingyou xing 同品定有性, sapakse sattvam), and being universally absent from the dissimilar group (yipinbianwu xing 異品遍無性, vipakse 'sattvam). Such a structure was then employed as the standard formulation of reasoning in Indian Buddhism.

Dignāga’s doctrine was introduced in the Nyāyamukha (Entry to Logic, NMu hereinafter) by himself first and then in the Nyāyapraveśa (Introduction to Logic, NP for the Sanskrit version hereinafter). Concerning the authorship of NP, there are generally two different opinions, i.e., Śaṅkarasvāmin or Dignāga. However, in the Chinese tradition of the science of reasons, this work is doubtlessly attributed to Śaṅkarasvāmin (ca. 500–560 CE) who is said to be a disciple of Dignāga.²

In the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), NP as well as NMu were translated into Chinese by Xuanzang 玄奘 (600/602–664 CE) and then became popular among Buddhist scholars immediately. NP and NMu were titled Yinming ru zhengli lun 因明入正理論 (YRZL for the Chinese version hereinafter) and Yinming zhengli men lun 因

² See YRZLS in T1840 p.91b16 and p.91c26.

Moriyama (2014, p.128, fn.9) points out: Modern scholars hold two opinions with regard to the authorship of NP, namely, Dignāga or Śaṅkarasvāmin. This discussion is summarized in Inami, 2011: 23–26. Inami has pointed out that in the ninefold classification of paksābhāsa, four items that were added by the author of the NP are refuted by various followers of Dharmakīrti, namely, Sākyabuddhi, Jinendrabuddhi, Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin. This fact probably shows, as many scholars now believe, that Dignāga is not the author of the NP. It seems unreasonable to suppose that Dharmakīrti’s followers would criticize their master’s opinion. Thus, I am also of the opinion that Śaṅkarasvāmin was the author of the NP. See also Tachikawa (1971, p.119, n.3).
Xuanzang’s disciples authored a number of commentaries of YRZL. The historically most influential one among them was the *Yinming ru zhengli lun shu* 因明入正理論疏 (Commentary on the Yinming ru zhengli lun, YRZLS hereinafter) by Kuiji 窺基 (usually recorded as Ji 基 in Japanese sources, 632–682 CE), who is famous as the first patriarch of the Consciousness-only school in East Asia. Although this commentary was composed decades later than others, it was venerated as the *Yinming dashu* 因明大疏 (Great Commentary on the Science of Reasons) by later generations. Unfortunately, only few Tang commentaries survived the persecution of Buddhism from 842 to 846 CE and various wars in the following centuries. However, this YRZLS was preserved in Japan, and since its arrival Japanese Buddhist scholars, e.g., Zenju 善珠 (723–797 CE), Zōshun 蔵俊 (1104–1180 CE), and Kiben 基辨 (1718–1791 CE), composed a high number of sub-commentaries and constructed nearly the whole system of Japanese Buddhist logic on the basis of it.

The YRZLS records not only criticisms on earlier Chinese commentaries but also valuable knowledge about Indian Buddhist logic and other philosophical branches, e.g., the doctrine of the *Śabdotpattivādin* 聲生論,3 and Ulūka’s teaching about *bhāva* for Pañcaśikhin.4 Furthermore, since at present only one later Sanskrit commentary on NP by the Jain scholar Haribhadra (eighth century CE), as well as its sub-commentaries, are extant, YRZLS, at any rate, is one of the most reliable sources for scholars to comprehend NP. It is thus the key to the entire progress of Buddhist logic from India to Japan. If we use Heduvidyā, Yinming, and Inmyō to denote the Sanskrit, Chinese, and Japanese traditions respectively, then YRZLS, as the chief work in Yinming, provides the bridge between Heduvidyā and Inmyō.

Therefore, my project will focus on YRZLS and investigate how concepts and standards of practice of Buddhist logic are interpreted and adapted in the Chinese context. Since the science of reasons is actively employed as a method for philosophical

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3 See YRZLS, T1840 p.108a27–b10 (YRZLS par.192 in Part II), and YRZLS, T1840 p.126b08–b17 (YRZLS par.v6 in Part II).
4 See YRZLS, T1840 pp.129c27–130c11.
argumentation, this project will not only contribute to the study on Buddhist logic in India, China, and even Japan but will also benefit our understanding of the development of Chinese Buddhism, especially the Consciousness-only school founded by Kuiji.

1.2. The Early Reception of the Science of Reasons

The Chinese tradition of the science of reasons, i.e., Yinming 因明, was mainly built upon Xuanzang’s translations of NP and NMu and the commentaries by his disciples, especially Kuiji’s YRZLS. Nevertheless, before Xuanzang’s translation of the science of reasons, there were already several relevant texts introduced into China, including the *Upāyahṛdaya* and the *Tarkaśāstra*. However, the early reception of the science of reasons is very limited, and none of these texts could offer a comprehensive introduction to this subject; it provides only unsystematized fragments instead. A five-member formulation of inference can be found in the Chinese translation of the *Upāyahṛdaya*, and the trairūpya theory appears in the translation of the *Tarkaśāstra*, as well as that of the *Madhyāntānugamaśāstra*.

The first is the *Upāyahṛdaya*. This text is disputably attributed to Nāgārjuna (ca. 150–250 CE). It was translated by Jijiaye 吉迦夜 and Tanyao 曇曜 in 472 CE with the title “*Fangbianxin lun* 方便心論.” This text consists of four chapters. The first explains the purpose and eight principles of debate, the second describes situations of defeat, the third represents examples of proper debate, and the fourth lists twenty kinds of objections.

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5 Giuseppe Tucci retranslated this text from Chinese into Sanskrit in the *Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources* in 1929, and he retranslated the title as *Upāyahṛdaya*. Part of a new translation has been presented in Gillon’s (2008) “An Early Buddhist Text on Logic: *Fang Bian Xin Lun*."

6 Giuseppe Tucci retranslated this text from Chinese into Sanskrit in the *Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources* in 1929, and he retranslated the title as *Tarkaśāstra*.

7 The authorship is still dubious. Tucci and Ui Hakju denied the authorship of Nāgārjuna, who is recorded as the author in Jijiaye and Tanyao’s translation, but their view was later opposed by Kajiyama Yuichi. See Ui (1925, p.493), Tucci (1929, XI), Kajiyama (1984, pp.12–14).

8 See the *Lidai sanbao ji* 歷代三寶紀 in T2034 p.85b23–b27, etc. According to the *Dazhou kandingzhongjing mulu* 大周刊定眾經目錄 in T2153 p.407b29–c03, the *Gujin yijingtuji* 古今譯經圖紀 in T2151 p.357a20–a21, the *Kaiyuan shijiao lu* 開元釋教錄 in T2154 p.505c13. This text was first translated by Gunabhadra 佛陀跋陀羅 (359–429 CE), but this version was already lost when the *Lidai sanbao ji* 歷代三寶紀 was compiled in the late six century.

9 With respect to the word 相應 xiāngyìng in Jijiaye and Tanyao’s translation of the *Upāyahṛdaya*, it is restored as
Although this work does not focus on how to prove a thesis adequately as NP does, an example of proof can be found in the fourth chapter as below:

The *Fangbianxin lun*, T1632 p.28a04–a07: 我常，非根覺故，虛空非覺是故為常，一切不為根所覺者盡皆是常，而我非覺，得非常乎？

(Thesis) The Self is permanent, (Reason) because of being not perceptible by the senses, (Example) ether is not perceptible [by the senses] and it is thus permanent, everything being not perceptible by the senses is permanent, (Application) the Self is not perceptible [by the senses], (Conclusion) how can it be not permanent?

This proof is formed with five members to prove the permanence of the Self, which is doubtless contradictory to the Buddhist doctrine. Accordingly, it is regarded as fallacious in the *Upāyahṛdaya* and serves as the object of ripostes.

In 550 CE, Paramārtha 真諦 (499–569 CE) translated the *Tarkaśāstra* with the title of *Rushi lun* 如實論 and wrote a commentary on it, which was later lost. The authorship of this work is unclear, but it is attributed by Wengui 文軌 to Vasubandhu in his commentary on NP. The extant version consists of three chapters: the first chapter represents a debate; the second lists sixteen kinds of futile rejoinders in three groups; and the third explains twenty-two grounds for defeat. In the second chapter, *trairāpya* is adopted to justify the validity of arguments:

The *Rushi lun*, T1633 p.30c20–c21: 我立因三種相: 是根本法，同類所攝，異類相離。是故立因成就不動。

The reason I set forth has three kinds of characteristics: being a property of the subject, being included in the similar kind, and being excluded from the dissimilar kind. Thus, the reason [I] set forth succeeds and does not deviate.

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*prasaṅga* or *prasanga-jāti* by Kajiyama, retranslated as *sambandha* by Tucci, but Kang suggests *prayoga* instead after refuting the former two. See Kajiyama (1991, p.108), Tucci (1929, UH26), Kang (2006).

10 See the *Kaiyuan shijiao lu* 開元釋教錄 in T2154 p.538b08.

11 See fn.447 in Part II.
Although the Sanskrit original of such an expression in the *Tarkaśāstra* is unknown at present, unlike the obscurity of the relevant expression in the *Madhyāntānugamaśāstra*, scholars on Buddhist logic in the Tang Dynasty knew about this expression of three characteristics and considered it to be representative before the one in Dignāga’s works. In addition, in order to elucidate the failure caused by incompleteness as described in the third chapter, the formulation of an inference is clearly stipulated as consisting of five members, i.e., the proposition, the reason, the example, the application, and the conclusion.

Besides, between the translations of the two works above, Gautama Prajñāruci 瞿曇般若流支 translated Asaṅga’s *Madhyāntānugamaśāstra (Shunzhonglun 順中論)* in 543 CE. This work is an interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s doctrine. An ancient Chinese translation of *trairūpya* can be found therein and reads *pengzhong zhi fa* 朋中之法, *xiangduipeng wu* 相對朋無, *wu zipeng cheng* 復自朋成. They are later expressed as *pakṣadharmatva*, *sapakṣe sattvam*, and *vipakṣe ’sattvam* in NP and translated as *bianshizongfa xing* 遍是宗法性, *tongpindingyou xing* 同品定有性, and *yipinbianwu xing* 異品遍無性 by Xuanzang. However, other than this point, this work has nothing to do with the science of reasons.

Based on extant literature, it seems that this round of reception hardly attracted any contemporary attention and left almost no traces in the history of Chinese Buddhism. However, due to Xuanzang’s introduction of the science of reasons, some Tang commentaries consult these early works. For example, the *Upāyahṛdaya* is quoted in the *Yinming yiduan* 因明義斷 (*Verdicts on the Science of Reasons, YY* hereinafter) by Huizhao 慧沼 (or 惠沼, 651–714 CE); the *Tarkaśāstra* is quoted in YY and the *Yinming ru zhengli lun yizuanyao* 因明入正理論義纂要 by Huizhao, as well as the *YRZLSW* 因明入正理論疏 (as known as the *Zhuangyan shu* 莊嚴疏, *YRZLSW* hereinafter) by Wengui. Besides, another work titled *Dacheng xinjing lun* 大

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12 Tucci (1929, p.13, 17) retranslates this sentence as *pakṣadharmah sapakṣasatvam vipaksavāyāvrttiśca*.
13 See *YRZLSW* in X848 p.684c08–c10, the *Yinming ru zhengli lun yizuanyao* in T1842 pp.161c29–162a05.
14 The *Rushi lun*, T1633 p.35b18–23: 五分者，一立義言，二因言，三譬如言，四合譬言，五決定言。In Tucci (1929 pp.37–38) retranslated as: *pratijñā hetar udāharaṇam upanayanaṁ nigamanam iti pañcāvayavāḥ*.
15 See the *Kaiyuan shijiao lu* in T2154 p.542c10–c11.
16 See Lü (1926, reprinted in 2006, p.27, fn.3), etc.
1.3. Xuanzang’s Studies in the Science of Reasons

From August of the year 627 to January 645, Xuanzang spent over seventeen years travelling and studying in India. Historical evidence to determine how many and which works on the science of reasons circulated in India at the time of Xuanzang is lacking. According to existing materials, Buddhist knowledge of the science of reasons was mainly preserved in Yogācāra texts and some independent treatises on this subject, e.g., the Vādavidhi, NMu, and NP. During his travels, Xuanzang learned the science of reasons from scholars as shown in Table 1:

**Table 1: Xuanzang’s Studies of the Science of Reasons in India**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time of Studying</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Scholar</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>628</td>
<td>Jayendra Monastery</td>
<td>Saṅghayaśas</td>
<td>treatise(s) of the science of reasons²⁰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in Kaśmīra</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>629</td>
<td>Toṣāsana Monastery</td>
<td>Vinītaprabha</td>
<td>the Nyāyamukha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in Cinaḥbhukti</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>631–636</td>
<td>Nālandā</td>
<td>Śīlabhadra</td>
<td>treatise(s) of the science of reasons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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17 See YY, T1841 p.158a02–a13. According to YY, the Dacheng xinjing lun advocates eight members of proof, and it also lists sixteen sorts of fallacious objection, which are extremely the same as those in the *Tarka-śāstra.*

18 Historical records and scholars’ ideas about the beginning year of Xuanzang’s journey to India are conflicting, for 627, 628, 629 are stated in different sources, respectively. The beginning year adopted herein, i.e., 627, is based on Yang Tingfu’s chronicle of Xuanzang and his explanation. See Yang (1988, pp.89–111).


20 What the word yinming lun 因明論 refers to is not clear, for it can mean the science of reasons, or the treatises of the science of reasons, or even NP or the Nyāyamukha. For example, in the Datang Daci’ensi sanzangfashi zhuan 大唐大慈恩寺三藏法师傳 in T2053 p.241b14–b16; when Xuanzang’s translations of the science of reasons is discussed, it refers to NP in T2032 p.262b10. With respect to what Saṅghayaśas taught, since the word yinming lun here is listed together with the Abhidharmakośa and the *Nyāyānusāra*, it may refer to certain works, especially the Nyāyamukha.
When he returned to China, he is said to have taken thirty-six works on the science of reasons along. However, besides related sections in other works such as the Yogācārabhūmi (YBh hereinafter), Xuanzang translated only a few works on the science of reasons. Xuanzang’s translations that were relevant to the science of reasons can be seen in Table 2 according to the Kaiyuan shijiao lu 開元釋教錄 (Kaiyuan Era Catalogue of Buddhist Texts), which records Chinese Buddhist translations up to 730 CE.

Table 2: Xuanzang’s Translations of Science of Reasons Literature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time of Translation</th>
<th>Title in Sanskrit</th>
<th>Title in Chinese</th>
<th>Taishō Number</th>
<th>Author (Attribution by Xuanzang)</th>
<th>Number of Volumes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01.10.645–15.01.646</td>
<td><em>Āryadeśanāvikhyāpana-śāstra</em></td>
<td>Xianyang shengjiao lun</td>
<td>1602</td>
<td>Asaṅga</td>
<td>20 (1 Vol. Related to the science of reasons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Prakaranāryavāca-śāstra</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.01.646–</td>
<td>Abhidharmasamuccaya-</td>
<td>Dacheng</td>
<td>1606</td>
<td>Sthiramati</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21 Ditto.
22 The Sanskrit name of Shengjun 勝軍 as Xuanzang’s teacher is not clear at present. Sakuma (2006, p.360, fn.6) suggests Jeyasena based on the equivalent Sheyexina 鬱耶犀那 found in the Datang xiyu ji 大唐西域記 in T2087 p.920a15, and considers Prasenajit from Boluoxinashiduo 鉢邏犀那恃多 as another person. However, Yao (2009, p.396, fn.31) insists on Prasenajit instead based on the equivalent as Baocuojia 抱蹉迦 given by Kuiji in YRZLS, T1840 p.121b19.
23 See the Datang daci’ensi sanzang fashi zhuan, T2053 p.252c10–c11.
25 For the authorship of the Xianyang shengjiao lun, the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, the Yogācārabhūmi, and the Abhidharmasamuccaya, see Hayashima (1997, pp.26–27), Bayer (2010, pp.41–44), Frauwallner (1956, p.265), Todeschini (2011, pp.30–42), respectively.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Volume</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29.03 (leap month). 646</td>
<td>vyākhyā</td>
<td>apidamo za jilun</td>
<td>(&lt;1 Vol. Related)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.05.646–15.05.648</td>
<td>Yogācārabhūmi</td>
<td>Yujia shidí lun</td>
<td>1579</td>
<td>Maitreya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06.08.647</td>
<td>Nyāyapraveśa</td>
<td>Yinming ru zhenglí lun</td>
<td>1630</td>
<td>Saṅkarasvāmin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.12.649</td>
<td>Nyāyamukha</td>
<td>Yinming zhenglí men lun</td>
<td>1628</td>
<td>Dignāga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.01.652–28.03.652</td>
<td>Abhidharmasamuccaya</td>
<td>Dacheng apidamo jilun</td>
<td>1605</td>
<td>Asaṅga</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to YRZL itself, all the other works above have been quoted in YRZLS. Among them, YZML is quoted most frequently as the fundamental work of Dignāga on the science of reasons. YRZL and YZML are undoubtedly the two most important works in the Chinese Yinming tradition.

The content on the science of reasons in the *Xianyang shengjiao lun* (XSL hereinafter) and YBh, as well as its Chinese translation by Xuanzang (YBhch hereinafter), are approximately the same. They both expound the science of reasons on seven topics, including the argument’s entity, its location, its foundation, its ornament, its failure, the detachment for it, and what are of much utility for it.\(^{26}\) However, a noticeable difference is that in YBh the definition of the science of reasons is provided additionally at the beginning. It defines the science of reasons as whatever is present in the inspecting of property according to Kuiji’s *Yujia shidí lun luezuan* (YLL

\(^{26}\) See YBhch, T1579 pp.356a11–360c21 and XSL, T1602 pp.531a14–535b23. For Kuiji’s interpretation on these seven topics, see YRZLS, T184096a04–a15 (YRZLS par.52 of Part II).
The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (AS hereinafter) and the *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhya* (ASVy hereinafter; ASVyCh for Xuanzang’s translation of ASVy hereinafter) as its commentary also expound the science of reasons according to these seven topics, however, unlike the explaining *hetuvidyā* within the framework of five sciences (*wuming* 五明, *pañcavidyā*) in YBh, these two works explain this subject under the title of “discussion of debate” (*lunguijueze* 論軌抉擇, *vādaviniścaya*) in the framework of the seven topics of “discussion of conversation” (*lunyijueze* 論議決擇, *sāṅkathyaviniścaya*).

In addition, Kuiji has also consulted Dignāga’s *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS hereinafter) in YRZLS. Although Xuanzang had never translated PS, I assume that he had explained it partially or entirely in his oral teachings due to relevant citations by his disciples, such as the quote in YRZLS par.256.

The Sanskrit version of XSL has not been recovered so far. NP and the *Hetuvidyā* section of YBh survived in Sanskrit. The *Vādaviniścaya* section of AS is untranslated from Chinese Tibetan into Sanskrit by Pradhan. The Sanskrit version of ASVy is not extant, but that of the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (ASBh hereinafter), which is another Indian commentary on AS, survives in Sanskrit. Based on their Tibetan translations, we can see that ASVy and ASBh are closely related. ASVy may be a reworked version of ASBh, but they are not always identical. The Sanskrit version of NMu is reported to be preserved in Beijing but remains irretrievable for the time being.

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27 云何因明處？謂於觀察義中諸所有事。（YBhaś, T1579 p.356a11–a12）However, Kuiji’s interpretation in YLL does not accord with the Sanskrit readings in Wayman (1999, p.5) and Yaita (2005, p.98). For more details, see fn.291 in Part II.


29 See ASa in T1605 p.693a09–a11, and ASVyCh in T1606 p.765b14–b16 (written as *lunjueze* 論決擇).

29 See YRZLS in T1840 p.113c14–c16, also in YRZL S par.256. However, the origin of this quote is still not clear.

29 See Dhruva (1930), Mironov (1931), Jambuvijaya (2009), etc.

30 See Dharma (1980), also in YRZLS par. 256. However, the origin of this quote is still not clear.


34 For the relationship between ASBh and ASVy, see Todeschini (2011, pp.56–58), etc.

35 See Li (2008, p.186).
and parallels, Katsura has recovered its verses and parts of the prose. In addition, on the basis of Jinendrabuddhi’s Pramāṇasamuccayajīkā, a tentative reconstruction of the first chapter of PS has been produced by Steinkellner (2005), and reconstructions of other chapters are being prepared by Lasic and Katsura.

The science of reasons before Dignāga is regarded as “ancient” (gu 古) and the masters of the science of reasons before him are also referred to as “ancient masters” (gushi 古師) in the Tang commentaries, especially when they hold views conflicting with Dignāga and Śaṅkarasvāmin. Although to whom “ancient masters” exactly refers is not clear in existing materials, and generally speaking, the ancient science of reasons includes the *Tarkaśāstra and all works listed aboved other than NP and NMu. Kuiji summarizes the differences between the doctrines of “ancient masters” and the “new” ones developed by Dignāga and Śaṅkarasvāmin from YRZLS par.14 to 40.

1.4. Kuiji’s Life and His Commentary on the Yinming ru zhengli lun

Kuiji, also known as Ji 基, or Dachengji 大乘基, was born in 632 CE in Chang’an 長安, the capital of the Tang Empire, present-day Xi’an 西安 in Shaanxi 陝西 province. He passed away in 682 CE. A biography was composed centuries after his death in the Song gaoseng zhuan 宋高僧傳 (*A Song-dynasty version of the Biographies of Eminent Monks*) by Zanning 赞宁 (919–1001 CE), but as Weinstein (1959, p.122) points out, this biography, “despite its length and seeming detail, is filled with the wildest statements and reveals so many glaring internal contradictions that any fact contained herein, lacking support from outside sources, must be considered suspect.” However, based on some fragmentary information offered by himself and contemporaries, the memorial inscription at his stupa and other sources, it is still possible to outline his

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39 Katsura has represented his work on several occasions so far, e.g., the Workshop on Pramāṇasamuccayaṭkā in Vienna in 2015, the 6th Beijing International Seminar on Tibetan Studies in 2016.
Kuiji belonged to the Yuchi family which originated from a Xianbei tribe. His uncle Yuchi Jingde was one of the foremost generals for the establishment of the Tang Empire. His secular given name is Hongdao. When he was young, he studied Confucian classics just like other youths of his time. His talent was then discovered and appreciated by Xuanzang, who soon obtained permission to adopt Kuiji as a disciple from both his influential uncle Yuchi Jingde and even the emperor. As stated by himself, at the age of nine, Kuiji lost his parents, and from then on, he turned towards Buddhism. He formally became a monk at the age of seventeen and started learning Buddhism and Indian languages from Xuanzang directly. At the age of twenty-five, he participated in Xuanzang’s translation team. He stayed in the Da Ci’en Temple (the Temple of Great Kindness and Grace) for the rest of his life, so he is also called the “great Ci’en Master.” After his death, his stupa was built next to that of his teacher Xuanzang but in a smaller size in the Xingjiao Temple. The stupa of Woncheuk (613–696), Xuanzang’s foremost Korean disciple, was built opposite later.

Kuiji is the actual founder of the Chinese Consciousness-only school, i.e., the Chinese Yogācāra school. He wrote many commentaries on Xuanzang’s translations,

40 For materials relating to this biography, see Weinstein (1959, pp.122–129), Yang (2008, pp.565–579), etc.
41 See the Genjō Sanzō shishiden sōsho in X1651 p.381c18.
45 See the Song gaoseng zhuan in T2061 p. 725c10–c14.
46 See the Song gaoseng zhuan in T2061 p. 725c14–c15.
47 The Xingjiao Temple was built for Xuanzang’s stupa in 670. In 664 Xuanzang was first buried in Bailuyuan 白鹿塬 (in the east of present-day Xi’an). In 669 his remains were moved to Shaolingyuan 少陵塬 (also known as Fengqiyuan 鳳棲塬, in the southeast of present-day Xi’an), and a stupa was built there. The next year, the Xingjiao Temple was built around Xuanzang’s stupa. After his death, Kuiji was first buried with a stupa alongside that of Xuanzang in the Xingjiao Temple. According to the Song gaoseng zhuan, his remains were moved into a new stupa on the plain nearby in 830. According to the Dacienshi dafashi Ji gong taming bing xu 大慈恩寺法師基公塔銘序, his remains were first cremated and then moved to the new stupa on the plain in 829. See the Song gaoseng zhuan in T2061 p. 726b02–b13, and the Genjō Sanzō shishiden sōsho in X1651 p.381a21–b06.
48 When Woncheuk died in 696, he was cremated and the relics were first preserved in the Xiangshan Temple 香山寺 in Longmen 龍門 (12 kilometres south of present-day Luoyang 洛陽). A branch tomb with a stupa was later built in the Fengde Temple 豐德寺 in the Zhongnan Mountains 终南山, and a part of his relics was moved into that stupa. In 1115, his relics were gathered and a new stupa was built for them on the opposite of Kuiji’s in the Xingjiao Temple. See the Dazhou Ximingsi gu dude Huance fashi foshelita ming bing xu 大周西明寺故大德惠然法师佛舍利塔銘序 in the Genjō Sanzō shishiden sōsho in X1651 p.384c03–c17.
especially those related to Yogācāra, to explain and spread his Master’s teachings in China. Additionally, he was also venerated as the “master of a hundred commentaries百本疏主.” According to Teng’s (2011) examination, forty-eight works are attributed to him, including commentaries and independent works.  

A tale in Kuijī’s biography by Zanning tells that when Xuanzang was lecturing on the Cheng weishi lun 成唯識論 to Kuijī, Woncheuk bribed the gate guard to eavesdrop. In this manner, Woncheuk gave lectures publicly on this compiled treatise much earlier than Kuijī. When Kuijī heard about this, he felt ashamed of being later than Woncheuk, but Xuanzang encouraged him by saying that “though Woncheuk had written a commentary on the science of reasons, he has not understood it thoroughly.” He then taught Kuijī about Dignāga’s treatise exclusively, which allowed Kuijī to excel in the subject. This situation recurred once more when Xuanzang explained YBh to Kuijī and taught him the doctrine of the five kinds of spiritual predispositions in the subsequence of the same biography. This tale tells of the exclusiveness of Kuijī’s education on the science of reasons, taught by Xuanzang.

During Xuanzang’s translations of NP and NMu around 647–649 CE, when Kuijī had not been formally ordained yet or was just a junior, Xuanzang’s disciples produced over twenty kinds of commentaries on these two works. Unfortunately, most of them did not survive the persecution of Buddhism from 842–846 CE and various wars in the following centuries. However, a commentary on YZML by Shentai 神泰 and a

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49 See the Song gaoseng zhuan in T2061 p. 726b14.
50 See Teng (2011, pp. 16–21 and 169–175).
51 According to the catalogue Kegonsū shōsho byō inmyōroku 華嚴宗章疏并因明錄 (A Catalogue of Commentaries of the Huayan Sect and the Science of Reasons) in T2177 p.1134c07, and so forth, Woncheuk had produced at least a commentary on the Nyāyamukha. Although this work is not available now, it has been quoted in IRMS, IDS, etc.
52 See the Song gaoseng zhuan in T2061 pp.725c24–726a01. Woncheuk’s eavesdropping is also told in his own bibliography in T2061 p. 727b06–b09, but Xuanzang’s teaching of the science of reasons to Kuijī is not mentioned there.
53 Wuxing zongfa 五姓宗法 refers to a classification of spiritual predispositions of living beings based on the doctrine of seeds in the ālayavijñāna, including śrāvakayānābhisamayagotra (shengwen zhongxing 聲聞種姓), pratyekebuddhāyānābhisamayagotra (dujue zhongxing 獨覺種姓), tathāgatayānābhisamayagotra (rulai zhongxing 如來種姓), aniyatagotra (buding zhongxing 不定種姓), and agotaka (wuxing 無姓).
54 See the Song gaoseng zhuan in T2061 p. 726a01–a04. Woncheuk’s eavesdropping is also mentioned in T2061 p. 727b09–b10 without mentioning Xuanzang’s instruction on the doctrine of the five kinds of spiritual predispositions to Kuijī.
55 Takemura lists 12 commentators of YRZL and 11 commentators of YZML contemporary with or later than Xuanzang. See Takemura (2008, pp. 25–38).
commentary on NP by Wengui, who were both disciples of Xuanzang, are partially extant, and fragments of various Tang commentaries are also recorded in Japanese sub-commentaries on Kuiji’s YRZLS, such as the Inmyō ronsho myōtō shō 因明論疏明燈抄 (IRMS hereinafter) by Zenju.

Compared with the commentaries by other disciples of Xuanzang, Kuiji’s is much later. It is still not sure when Kuiji started writing YRZLS. However, in this commentary, an inference contrary to Xuanzang’s inference for consciousness-only by can be found, which was set forth by Sunkyoung 順憬 in Silla and recorded as sent during the years of Qianfeng 乾封. The Qianfeng period lasted from 666 to 668. If this event was not added later, then it proves that the start of Kuiji’s writing must not be earlier than 666 CE. This means that this commentary was produced after Xuanzang’s death. However, Kuiji had not completed YRZLS when he died. His part stopped at the beginning of specious examples, and his disciple Huizhao wrote the rest. In YRZLSg a remark by Huizhao can be found, as below, after the commentary of listing the ten fallacies regarding the example member:

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56 Manuscripts of two commentaries by Jingyan 净眼, i.e., the Yinming ru zhengli lun luechao 因明入正理論略抄 and the Yinming ru zhengli lun houshu 因明入正理論后疏, are found in Dunhuang by P. Pelliot and marked together as P.2063. The life of the author is still unknown at present, we do not even know whether he had learned from Xuanzang or not. When these two commentaries were written is also unknown, but since the Yinming ru zhengli lun luechao criticizes Wengui’s commentary but does not mention Kuiji’s at all, it must have been completed in between. Since the Yinming ru zhengli lun houshu quotes from the Cheng weishi lun, it must have been completed later than 659.

57 See YRZLS, T1840 p.116a15–b10. Sunkyoung’s letter was recorded as responded to by Kuiji on the behalf of his late teacher herein.
YRZLSg, S vol.55, p.8347:

淄州正等寺沙門慧沼
於師曾獲半珠
緣闕未蒙全寶58

[The commentary below is] complemented by Śramaṇa Huizhao of the Zhengdeng Temple (the Temple of Properness) in Zizhou (present-day Zichuan 淄川 District of Zibo 淄博 City in Shandong 山東 Province).

Half of a pearl was obtained from my teacher, but the complete treasure could not be acquired because of the absence of conditions.

Kuiji’s commentary (together with Huizhao’s part) is based on Xuanzang’s

58 This part is lost in YRZLSj and YRZLSl. The sentence “於師曾獲半珠，緣闕未蒙全寶” is also stated in the postscript by Huizhao in YRZLSg in S vol.55, p.8424.
Chinese translation of NP and interprets it word by word in over eighty thousand Chinese characters.\textsuperscript{59} When Kuiji wrote this commentary, on the one hand, he had probably received a significant amount of private teaching on the science of reasons from Xuanzang; on the other hand, there were already dozens of earlier commentaries to consult, such as the one by Wengui. Not surprisingly, this commentary epitomizes the study on the science of reasons of Xuanzang’s circle, for it does not only summarize and criticize those earlier commentaries but also contains comments on points omitted or treated too briefly by them. Because of its prominence as well as the author’s orthodoxy as the patriarch of the Consciousness-only school in East Asia, Kuiji’s YRZLS was venerated as the \textit{Great Commentary on the Science of Reasons} by later generations.

Kuiji’s lineage produces several sub-commentaries. Besides complementing YRZLS, his disciple Huizhao, who is honored as the second patriarch of the Chinese Consciousness-only school in Buddhist history, composed three other works on the science of reasons according to the catalogue \textit{Kegonshū shōsho byō inmyōroku} 華嚴宗章疏并因明錄 by Enchou 円超 (861–925): (1) YY, (2) the \textit{Yinming ru zhengli lun yizuanyao} 因明入正理論義纂要 (An Excerption of Doctrines in the Nyāyapraveśa), and (3) the \textit{Yinming ru zhengli lun luezuan} 因明入正理論略纂 (A Brief Compilation of [Notes on] the Nyāyapraveśa).\textsuperscript{60} Item (1) defends Kuiji’s orthodoxy through both summarizing Kuiji’s interpretation and criticizing others’; item (2) focuses merely on refuting the viewpoints of others; item (3) is presently not extant.

Besides, according to the same catalogue, there are five works by Zhizhou 智周 (668–723), who is known as the foremost disciple of Huizhao and the third patriarch of the Chinese Consciousness-only school. They are: (1) the \textit{Yinming ru zhengli lun shu qianji} 因明入正理論疏前記 (An Earlier Version of Notes for the Commentary on the Nyāyapraveśa, also recorded as \textit{Yinming jiheng} 因明紀衡 or \textit{Yinming lueji} 因明略記),

\textsuperscript{59} According to the Taishō edition.
\textsuperscript{60} This work is marked as “有云偽造” (considered as spurious by someone) in the catalogue of the science of reasons attached to the \textit{Inmyō nissō riron sho zuigenki} 因明入正理論疏源記 by Hōtan 凰潭 (1654–1738).
\textsuperscript{61} See the \textit{Kegonshū shōsho byō inmyōroku} in T2177 p.1134c22–c24.
(2) the Yinming ru zhengli lun shu houji 因明入正理論疏後記 (A Later Version of Notes for the Commentary on the Nyāyapraveśa), (3) the Yinming ru zhengli lun shuchao 因明入正理論疏抄 (An Exception of the Commentary on the Nyāyapraveśa, also recorded as Yinming lueji 因明略記), (4) the Yinming ru zhengli lun yizuan yao ji 因明入正理論義纂要記 (Notes on the Excerption of Doctrines in the Nyāyapraveśa), and (5) the Yinming yiduan ji 因明義斷記 (Notes on the Verdicts on the Nyāyapraveśa).

Items (1–3) are extant, and are further explanations of Kuiji’s commentary; items (4) and (5) are already lost, but according to their titles, they should be sub-commentaries on Huizhao’s works.

However, after Zhihou, the transmission of the science of reasons along with the Consciousness-only school in China soon discontinued. Then, due to the persecution of Buddhism and wars, all these works, even the so-called Great Commentary on the Science of Reasons by Kuiji, disappeared from Chinese Buddhism. Although there are already seventeen works on the science of reasons recorded as produced in the Song dynasty (960–1279) in the catalogue Sinp’yŏn chejong kyojang ch’ongnok 新編諸宗教藏總錄 by the Korean monk Uicheon 義天 (1055–1101), none of them has survived. The only exception is a section interpreting Xuanzang’s inference for consciousness-only in the Zongjing lu 宗鏡錄 by Yanshou 延壽 (904–975), which is apparently far from enough for apprehending the science of reasons in its entirety. As a

62 This work is also marked as “或云偽作” (considered as spurious by someone) in the catalogue of the science of reasons attached to the Inmyō nisshō riron sho zuigenki.

63 A comprehensive investigation of the reasons for the decline of the Consciousness-only school is beyond the scope of this study. Briefly speaking, it is a consequence of doctrinal conflicts with other parts of Chinese Buddhism and traditional Confucianism, a scarcity of ritual and practical instructions, a lack of support from both the imperial court and populace, etc. For further analysis, see Lü (1979, pp.351–352), Xu (2008), Yang (2008, pp.863–866), Teng (2011, pp.166–168), etc.

64 Kuiji’s YRZLS was preserved in Japan and taken back to China by Yang Renshan 楊仁山 (1837–1911) in the end of the nineteenth century.

65 The Sinp’yŏn chejong kyojang ch’ongnok 新編諸宗教藏總錄, T2184 p.1176a06–a22: (1) 演密鈔七卷, 繼倫述,(2) 鈔八卷, 雲儼述,(3) 義樞鈔十二卷(或七卷), (4) 補闕鈔一卷, 已上敬田述,(5) 義雄鈔七卷(或有九卷之本與此亦有不同), 澄浄述,(6) 義曦鈔六卷科二卷, 惠善述,(7) 古今鈔補正衡二卷, 福善述,(8) 集玄手鈔三卷, 懷雅述,(9) 演密手記三卷, 義深述,(10) 手鏡三卷, 惠素述,(11) 備闕手鏡三卷(但云上國沙門達述不見上字或云達瑜伽是), (12) 略鈔二卷, 從隱述,(13) 要略記二卷, 惠善述,(14) 無難略釋一卷, 本真述,(15) 備闕略鈔二卷, 懷雅述,(16) 穩密眾鈔七卷, 科三卷, 元盛述,(17) 演密鈔八卷, 科三卷, 義深述.

66 Generally speaking, the Zongjing lu does not have much to do with the science of reasons. It is mainly a massive compilation of portions of Buddhist works with the purpose of unifying the academic and meditative aspects of the Buddhist teaching with explicit reliance on the academic doctrine of the Huayan school and the meditative doctrine of the Chan school.
result, when scholars in the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), such as Zhenjie 真界, Wang Kentang 王肯堂, Mingyu 明昱, Zhixu 智旭, came across Xuanzang’s translations of NP and NMu again, they had almost nothing in hand to rely on but their mere groundless speculations.

In addition, after its transmission into Japan, Kuiji’s YRZLS was well preserved, highly valued and paid considerable attention to for almost the entire Japanese tradition of the science of reasons is based on this text. Among them, IRMS by Zenju, who was a representative figure of the North Temple Tradition (Hokuji den 北寺伝) of the science of reasons in Japan, is one of the most detailed and influential sub-commentaries of YRZLS. It explains YRZLS sentence by sentence and defends its orthodoxy aggressively with a collection of interpretations by Kuiji and Huizhao’s contemporaries. Besides, many other Japanese sub-commentaries are also significant for the study on the science of reasons in East Asia, e.g., the Inmyō daisho shō 因明大疏抄 (IDS hereinafter) by Zōshun the Inmyō daisho yūkan jō 因明大疏融貫鈔 (IDYJ hereinafter) by Kiben.67

Therefore, if we leave the Ming commentaries alone due to their irrelevance to the Tang commentaries, then the commentarial tradition of NP in China and Japan with YRZLS as its central point can be briefly represented as in Figure 168:

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67 For an overview of the development of the science of reasons in Japan, see Takemura (2008).
68 A dotted line refers to the relationship between an original and its translation, while a solid line refers to the relationship between a text and its commentary.
1.5. Methodology

The Yinming tradition in Tang China is a commentarial tradition of Chinese translations of Sanskrit texts, and the Yinming doctrine is actively employed for philosophical argumentation in Buddhism. As a representative of such a tradition, YRZLS is located in a context that involves the philological issue, philosophical argumentation, logic, and transcultural communication. The first concerns the text itself literally, while the other three, based on the content of this text, refer to different angles
from which it can be investigated. Therefore, methodological approaches related to the philological issue and the three angles above will be taken into consideration.  

An accurate understanding of the text itself is a prerequisite for any further step. The philological work for YRZLS will be based on a collation of different editions of this text, including the Taishō edition, the edition printed by Jinling kejingchu 金陵刻經處 in 1896, and the one found in Guangsheng Temple 廣勝寺 in 1933, as well as the quotes in sub-commentaries, e.g., IRMS, IDS. Meanwhile, since this text is a commentary on a Chinese translation of a Sanskrit text, philological work will be performed in a bilingual way. The Sanskrit version of NP will be consulted to evaluate Kuiji’s punctuation and interpretation of specific sentences in YRZL. In addition, related paragraphs from other Sanskrit texts will also be checked, e.g., PS(V), the hetuvidyā-section in YBh, the vādavinīscaya-section of ASBh. In this manner, an insight into the transformation of ideas from the Sanskrit texts to Xuanzang’s translation and then to Kuiji’s interpretation is expected.

Philological research on NP/YRZL has been conducted due to the extant manuscripts in classical languages including Sanskrit, Chinese, Tibetan, and Mongolian (e.g., Dhruva 1930, Mironov 1931, Katsura 1983, Frankenhauser 1992, Wu 1995, Guo 1999 and 2000, Tang 2007, Jambuvijaya 2009). Scholars have examined philologically the definition of the thesis, the description of the three characteristics, especially the function of eva, etc. This treatise has also been translated into English (Tachikawa 1971, Daye 1972, Gillon and Love 1980). Tucci’s (1930) and Katsura’s (1977, 1978, 1979, 1981, 1982, 1984, 1987) studies on the Chinese translation of NMu provide multilingual materials for analyzing Kuiji’s citation and interpretation of this text. Besides, as mentioned earlier, the reconstruction of the first chapter of PS is finished by Steinkellner (2005), and that of the other chapters are being prepared by Lasic, Katsura, and Pind.

Concerning YRZLS itself, Nakamura (1958) translates the text into modern

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69 In Chapter 1.5, I merely present my methodological concerns about the study part, while the translation strategy related to Part II will be briefly explained in Note 4 of my “Introductory Notes to the Translation” below.
Japanese based on modern studies and traditional Japanese exegeses, especially the interpretation by Kira Kōyō. With regard to Chinese scholars, Zheng (2010) and Mei (2013) carefully collate and explain this text, but due to their limited knowledge of Sanskrit, they treat it as an isolated object in Chinese with hardly any benefit from Sanskrit sources. In contrast, Tang (2014) cites works in Chinese, Sanskrit, and Tibetan to explore the interpretation of sādhana in YRZLS. Tang’s (2015) translation of Gomyō’s Ryakken inmyō nisshōri mon 略顯因明入正理門 (Brief Exposition of the Entrance into the True Principle of the Science of Reasons) also contains analyses of parallel paragraphs in YRZLS as well as a detailed glossary of the terminology of Chinese Buddhist science of reasons.

Based on the philological work above, Kuiji’s interpretation of Buddhist logic in YRZLS will be investigated from the following three angles:

First, since Buddhist logic, i.e., the science of reasons, is meant to serve as a method for philosophical argumentation, Buddhist logic and philosophy influence each other. On the one hand, I will give reflections on the philosophical issues on various levels related to Kuiji’s interpretation of Buddhist logic, such as epistemology, semantics, etc. On the other hand, how Buddhist logic is further employed to demonstrate ideas in Buddhist philosophy, e.g., the Consciousness-only doctrine in the Cheng weishi lun shuji 成唯識論述記, will also be my concern. Teng’s (2011) research connects Buddhist logic in YRZLS with Buddhist philosophical argumentation. He evaluates Kuiji’s interpretation and application of Buddhist logic as part of his methodological restructuring of Chinese Buddhism by examining how Kuiji applies Buddhist logic to analyze arguments and to make his own arguments. According to him, Buddhist logic, “when followed correctly, would enable Chinese Buddhists to develop a rigorous and systematic exegetic tradition.”

Moreover, since YRZLS is a commentary on logic, I will deal with symbolic logic in certain cases. This method has been widely employed in research on NP by Daye (1972), Gillon and Love (1980), Oetke (1994), and others. Chi (1969) analyzes

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70 See Teng (2011, p.161).
Dignāga’s theory of the wheel of reasons (*hetucakra*) and Kuiji’s interpretation in YRZLS in the framework of formal logic. However, as criticized by Tillemans (1988), not the logical method but an accurate understanding of the texts and doctrines is the prerequisite for a significant achievement.

Finally, a transcultural approach will also be adopted to contextualize Kuiji’s interpretation. How Buddhist logic was understood and adapted in Tang China represents a significant aspect to understand the transmission of Buddhism from India into China. This will be considered within the framework of the intellectual history of Buddhism from a transcultural perspective. In other words, this project investigates the (re-)production and the circulation of knowledge about the Buddhist science of reasons in a flow from India to China, and even Japan, with a primary focus on Kuiji’s *Great Commentary on the Science of Reasons*. Methodologically, I draw from Burke’s (2007) “cultures of translation,” when answering six questions about the “cultures of commentary”:

1. Who comments?
   Kuiji, the inheritor of the great Buddhist translator Xuanzang, comments. He established a new school based on the Buddhist knowledge transmitted by his teacher from India.

2. With what intention was it composed?
   In the preface of his commentary, Kuiji states:
   
   YRZLS, T1840 p.91c01–c02: 恐此道不行，乃略述開釋。
   
   For fear that this doctrine might not be widespread, I briefly present my interpretation.

   This statement means that the intention is to spread “this doctrine.” However, as this project clarifies, I define “this doctrine” as the system of the science of reasons reconstructed by Kuiji’s interpretation rather than Dignāga’s doctrine.

3. On what did he comment?
   He commented on YRZL, which is his teacher’s Chinese translation of a Sanskrit text and serves as an introduction to Dignāga’s doctrine of the Buddhist science of
reasons.

(4) For whom was it composed?
It was composed for those who might be interested in the science of reasons, as he states:

YRZLS, T1840 p.91c02–c03: 庶明懸智鏡者，幸留心而鑒照矣。

I hope that those who have mirror-like wisdom can pay attention to and apprehend [the doctrine introduced in YRZL].

(5) In what manner was it composed?
It was composed in the manner of word-by-word interpretation. This is also a standard and favorite commentarial style in Chinese Confucianism. Detailed structural analysis and simulated disputation are also contained. Furthermore, Kuiji’s interpretation is based primarily on Xuanzang’s exclusive teaching to him.

(6) What were the consequences of the commentary?
In consequence this commentary took precedence over all the earlier commentaries by other disciples of Xuanzang and it was venerated as the Great Commentary by later generations. It thus laid the foundation for the Buddhist science of reasons in China and even in Japan.

In summary, Kuiji adapted Indian knowledge in the Chinese context through his particular interpretation. The Sanskrit source was transmitted into China and started a new development there. Therefore, a transcultural perspective ensures that no linguistic or geographical boundaries limit the study of Kuiji’s commentary.

Sugiura (1900) is the first modern scholarly monograph that attempts to connect the traditions of the science of reasons in India, China, and Japan. Takemura (2008) also treats the spread of Buddhist logic from India to China and Japan as an integrated process. By comparison, the studies on the development of Chinese Buddhist logic by Frankenhauser (1996), Harbsmeier (1998), Shen (2001), Zheng (2007), Zhang (2010), as well as those on YRZLS itself by Chen (1938) and Li (2005), have not paid enough attention to Indian sources but isolated the Chinese Yinming tradition. Although it is
difficult and even unfair to judge whether such a phenomenon is in fact caused by limited Sanskrit skills, or a regrettable neglect of the Indian sources, each of these studies is, to some extent, bounded by the Chinese language and geographical range. Just as Franco (2004, p.200) criticizes, such an approach is “to attempt to interpret Chinese Buddhist logic without an adequate study of the Indian logic from which it was derived.” In contrast, Lin and Radich (2014) include many significant articles considering both Sanskrit and Chinese sources. For instance, with a focus on YRZLS, Moriyama (2014) compares Kuiji’s interpretation of the antinomic reason with those by Haribhadrasūri, et al. He examines alternative commentarial lines derived from Dignāga’s system and then points out the peculiarities of Kuiji’s interpretation.

In addition, Lin and Radich (2014) offers another enlightenment related to the methodological concern about transculturality. In the introduction, Radich and Lin argue against “a simplistic understanding of Chinese Buddhism as a product of so-called ‘sinification,’ or ‘making Chinese.’” They thus highly evaluate the significance of “considering the ideas of Chinese authors and thinkers as independent or alternate developments, equally valid, of ideas and systems also known in India.”71 Despite some particularities that will be presented in the following chapters, I will neither label the Chinese Yinming tradition simply “sinificated” nor furnish the present project with strong cultural relativism, which presupposes that the Chinese context must have intensively transformed the original Indian ideas. In contrast, this project investigates the reception of knowledge on the science of reasons in an encounter between India and China and regard the Chinese interpretation therein as an alternative development of the Indian system.

1.6. Chapter Organization

This dissertation is organized into two parts: The first is an analytical study; the

71 See Radich and Lin (2014, pp.15–18).
second is a translation.

Despite its textual-historical and philosophical significance, YRZLS has not been translated into a western language yet. An English translation is thus to be produced in this project. This translation will cover Kuiji’s commentary on the verse presenting the outline, that on genuine proof, and that on viruddhāvyabicārin to show how he interprets the formulation of inference and the standards of the practice of argumentation. This translation is presented in Part II.

Part I will contain my analytical research on the text. Besides this introductory chapter, Part I also includes two more chapters followed by concluding remarks. These two substantial chapters elaborate on and inquire into Kuiji’s interpretation from the perspective of concepts and that of the standard of practice respectively. They mainly deal with two aspects:

(Chapter 2) How Kuiji deals with concepts in YRZLS. I will examine: (1) How various clusters of concepts are integrated, e.g., the concepts related to the property-possessor (youfa 有法) and the qualifier (nengbie 能別) in the definition of the thesis member. (2) How different Sanskrit concepts are reconfigured, e.g., upanaya, anvaya, and the vague Chinese concept he 合. And then, (3) how new concepts are invented and employed, e.g., the substrata and the essence of the thesis (zong yi 宗依 and zong ti 宗體), those of the example (yu yi 喻依 and yu ti 喻體), and the similar and dissimilar groups of the reason (yin tongpin 因同品 and yin yipin 因異品).

(Chapter 3) How Kuiji explains the standards of the practice of argumentation. It includes: (1) How Kuiji interprets the rules for debate to make it fair for both sides, especially the requirement of being well-established (prasiddha, jicheng 極成) and the theory of three kinds of inferences. (2) How he expounds the standard for making the judgment of the result, especially in the case of the fallacy of the antinomic reason (viruddhāvyabicārin, xiangwei jueding 相違決定) and in the relationships between genuine proof, genuine refutation, and their specious forms.
Chapter 2 is meant to explore Kuiji’s understanding of the formulation of inference. NP, as well as other relevant Sanskrit sources, are taken as the baseline to measure how far Kuiji’s interpretation goes. Chapter 3 aims to examine his understanding of fairness and genuineness in the practice of argumentation. We should pay attention to the following: that being genuine in the science of reason is not only a logical issue but also a practical one. These two chapters stand for the aspects of inference and debate, respectively. By such investigations, I pursue a wholesome picture of the interpretation of Indian Buddhist logic in YRZLS. However, sections of YRZLS on specious proof, genuine refutation, and specious refutation cover more detailed interpretations of the practice of argumentation. Since most of them remain untranslated and uninvestigated for the time being, Kuiji’s understanding of debate still needs to be studied further in the future.
2. Conceptual Integration, Semantic Reconfiguration and Invention in the *Yinming dashu*: Three Case-studies

As a detailed commentary, YRZLS provides interpretations of every concept involved in YRZL. Based on my translation of YRZLS on the *sādhana* section of YRZL, this chapter will study three cases of how Kuiji handles the concepts related to the formulation of inference: The first is the integration of different concepts; the second is the semantic reconfiguration of concepts; and the third is the invention of new concepts. With regard to the first case, I will explore how the property-possessor and the qualifier are defined with various groups of concepts. Regarding the second case, I will explore how the Sanskrit terms *upanaya* and *anvaya* are combined into a single Chinese character *he* 合 in YRZLS. Regarding the third case, I will explore how new concepts are invented and employed in the Chinese Yinming tradition, such as the substrata and essences of the thesis (i.e., *zong yi* 宗依 and *zong ti* 宗體), and those of the example (i.e., *yu yi* 喻依 and *yu ti* 喻體), and similar and dissimilar groups of the reason (i.e., *yin tongpin* 因同品 and *yin yipin* 因異品). Thus, with a focus on Kuiji’s interpretation in YRZLS, this chapter will discuss how critical concepts of Buddhist logic are adapted in the Chinese context.

2.1. Conceptual Integration: Multilevel Definitions of Property-possessor and Qualifier

In YRZLS, the two components of the thesis member, i.e., the property-possessor and the qualifier or *dharmin* and *višeṣana* in Sanskrit, are considered as the substrata of the thesis but not the thesis itself. In contrast, the essence of the thesis, i.e., the thesis itself, refers to the inseparable connection to be proved between the two substrata. In this case, how to define and explain the two substrata becomes the first topic in the interpretation of the thesis. Thus, Kuiji wrote long and complicated comments on the
definitions of the property-possessor and the qualifier in YRZLS par.79 to 83 as the section for manifesting the substrata of the thesis. In YRZLS par.79, he divides all the dharms into two kinds and defines each of them with three different names, which aggregates three pairs in total:

YRZLS, T1840 p.98b03–b11: 一切法中略有二種：一體，二義。且如五蘊色等是體，此上有漏、無漏等義，名之為義。體之與義各有三名。體三名者：一名“自性”，《瑜伽》等中古師所說自性是也；二名“有法”，即此所說有法者是；三名“所別”，如下宗過中名所別不成是。義三名者：一名“差別”，《瑜伽論》等古師所說差別是也；二名為“法”，下相違中云法自相相違因等是；三名“能別”，則如此中名能別是。

All the dharms\textsuperscript{72} include two kinds in general: the first is entity; and the second is attribute. For example, the five aggregates of form, and so forth, are entities, while the attributes of them, such as being contaminated or uncontaminated, are called attributes. Both entity and attribute have three names respectively. The three names of entity [are]: first, [it is] named “self-nature,” namely the self-nature mentioned by the ancient masters in the \textit{Yogācārabhūmi} and others; second, [it is] named “property-possessor,” namely the property-possessor mentioned here; third, [it is] named “qualified,” such as [the one] in the fallacy that the qualified is not well-established regarding the thesis. The three names of attribute [are]: first, [it is] named “distinguishing-feature,” namely the distinguishing-feature mentioned by the ancient masters in the \textit{Yogācārabhūmi} and others; second, [it is] named “property,” namely [the property] in the reason with the fallacy that the reason proves the opposite of the self-form of the inferable property said in the part of the contradictory [reasons] below; and third, [it is] named “qualifier,” namely the one named qualifier here.

\textsuperscript{72} For the meanings of \textit{fa} 法 that is translated herein as “dharma” or “property” due to the different contexts, see Section 2.1.2.
Literally speaking, “entity,” under the names of “self-nature,” “property-possession,” and “qualified,” refers to the subject, i.e., dharmin, in the thesis member, while “attribute,” under the names of “distinguishing-feature,” “property,” and “qualifier,” refers to the property to be proved, i.e., višeṣaṇa. However, as I will expound in this section, concerning these names in Kuiji’s commentary, besides logic, the attitude of the *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa, viewpoints from the Abhidharma literature, and the epistemological aspect of Dignāga’s doctrine are also related.

According to Kuiji’s indication of the literary sources of names herein, the first pair of these names refers to the self-nature and distinguishing-feature, i.e., svabhāva and višeṣa in Sanskrit, from YBh and others, the second pair refers to the property-possession and property, i.e., dharmin and dharma from NP itself, while the third pair refers to the qualified and the qualifier, i.e., višeṣya and višeṣaṇa which are also from NP. However, compared with the second and the third pairs, the first one is much more complicated. Based on Kuiji’s commentary in YRZLS par.80–81, at least three different groups of concepts are packed into the same pair of names, including: first, the self-nature and distinguishing-feature themselves from the *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa and the science of reasons, i.e., svabhāva and višeṣa; second, the particular and universal characteristics from the “Mahāyāna” mentioned herein as the theoretical system Kuiji actually follows, i.e., svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa; and third, the self-form and distinction, i.e., svarūpa and višeṣa, with respect to the four fallacies of contradictory reasons in NP. Thus, Table 3 can be drawn up:

Table 3: Names of the Two Components of the Thesis Member

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>entity 體</th>
<th>(1) self-nature/ svabhāva/ zixing 自性</th>
<th>attribute 義</th>
<th>(1) distinguishing-feature/ višeṣa/ chabie 差別</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>self-nature/ svabhāva/ zixing 自性</td>
<td>distinguishing-feature/ višeṣa/ chabie 差別</td>
<td>(2) universal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) particular</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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73 See fn.336 and fn.337 in Part II.
This section will investigate how Kuiji integrates different theories in his interpretations. The first two pairs will be focused on here, while the discussion of the third pair in YRZLS par.83, viz. the qualified and the qualifier, will be postponed to Chapter 2.3.1, for Kuiji’s interpretation is quite clear and definite on this topic but especially related to the topic of the logical relationship between the property and the qualifier in the next section.

### 2.1.1. “Self-nature” and “Distinguishing-feature” in a Broad Sense

Among the three pairs of names for the two components of the thesis member, the first pair, which can be further divided into three, is the most complex. In YRZLS par.80, Kuiji cited the definitions of “self-nature” and “distinguishing-feature” from the *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa* first; then his interpretation turns to the so-called “Mahāyāna”; after that, in YRZLS par.81, he finally offers some explanation based on the science of reasons. Thus, in his interpretation, this first pair of names carries actually three distinct levels of connotations: The first is the level of the self-nature and the distinguishing-feature in the science of reasons, i.e., *svabhāva* and *viṣeṣa*; the second is the level of the particular characteristic or the self-nature, and the universal characteristic based on both the Abhidharma and Dignāga’s theories, i.e., *svalakṣaṇa* or *svabhāva* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*; the third is the level of the self-form and the distinction in the science of reasons, i.e., *svarūpa* and *viṣeṣa*. 
2.1.1.1. “Self-nature” and “Distinguishing-feature” in a Narrow Sense

First of all, Kuiji’s citation of the *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa in YRZLS par.80 is not entirely faithful to the original version of Xuanzang’s translation, but it inherits and even intensifies the isolation of the science of reasons.

The original passage discusses the apprehension of the wondrous observing wisdom, i.e., *pratyavekṣanājñāna*, and two questions emerge as follows: As the *Buddhabhūmisūtra* asserts, *pratyavekṣanājñāna* can apprehend both the particular and the universal characteristics of all the dharma, but since it belongs to the perception of Buddha’s pure wisdom, which is still a kind of perception, how can it apprehend the universal characteristics of all the dharma? If the universal characteristics as objects can be apprehended by perception, why are the two means of valid cognition established according to the two types of characteristics? 74

Three answers are offered: the first one is based on different stages of mind, that means, on the stage of the dispersed mind, two means of valid cognition are established according to the two types of characteristics, while on the stage of the meditative mind, the apprehension of all the characteristics belongs to perception. 75 The second answer does not give a sufficient explanation. It asserts that although the meditative mind is merely able to apprehend the particular characteristic since it can apprehend some principles under the guide of the universal characteristic, the meditative mind can also be said to apprehend the universal characteristic in this case. 76

After these two, the third answer based on the science of reasons, which is cited by Kuiji in YRZLS, is considered as the true one:

The *Fodi jing lun*, T1530 p.318b04–b15: 如實義者，彼因明論立自、共相
According to the true principle, that treatise of the science of reasons establishes the particular and universal characteristics in a slightly different way from this (the *Buddhabhūmisūtra*). That [treatise of the science of reasons] says that the true properties of all the dharmaś should be named “particular characteristic,” because both the particular characteristics and the universal characteristics [in other contexts] are just attached to their own entities, but not jointly shared by others. If a class of expressers and what are to be expressed by them are established by the discriminative mind, and they penetrate through all dharmaś like threads through flowers, then they are named “universal characteristic.” This (the universal characteristic) should be conceptually constructed and provisionally established by the dispersed mind, so it is the object of inference; all meditative mind devoid of this kind of conceptual construction is named “perception.” Although when grasping each dharma, [pain, impermanence, and so forth, can be cognized all the time,] since pain, impermanence, and so forth, are also owned by each dharma itself, [this kind of characteristics] is named “particular characteristic.” Although the true thusness is presented through the universal characteristic, since it is the true

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77 The Taisho Edition of the *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa* reads 若, i.e., “if”, but the Old Sung Edition [CE1104–1148] belonging to the Library of the Imperial Household 宮內省圖書寮本 as well as the quotes of this sentence in all the other works, e.g., IRMS in T2270 p.414c24, reads *ku* 苦, i.e., *duḥkha* or “pain.”
nature and an own characteristic of each dharma itself, it is not a universal characteristic. Therefore, it cannot be named “universal characteristic” just because it is neither the same as nor different from all the dharmas, for the particular characteristics are also neither the same as nor different from all the universal characteristics. Hence, that treatise (the treatise of the science of reasons) says that all the true properties of all the dharmas should be named “particular characteristics.” However, this scripture is not so, so there is no contradiction.

This answer focuses on explaining the particular and universal characteristics in the treatise of the science of reasons in detail and distinguishing them from the particular and the universal characteristics in the Buddhabhūmisūtra to solve the theoretical conflict. The questions above are based on Dignāga’s theory that the two means of valid cognition are established according to the two characteristics, which contradicts the opinion that pratyavekṣaṇājñāna can apprehend both the particular and the universal characteristics in this very context. Therefore, the commentator tries to isolate Dignāga’s theory from the interpretation of pratyavekṣaṇājñāna here. The commentator has not told us to which one precisely this “treatise of the science of reasons” refers, but obviously, it should be one of Dignāga’s works on epistemology and logic, such as NMu. In the commentator’s opinion, this treatise of the science of reasons considers every characteristic attached to a dharma itself but not jointly shared by others as particular and every characteristic jointly shared by others through

78 The *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa (Fodi jing lun 佛地經論) is a commentary on the Buddhabhūmisūtra (佛地經 Fodi jing) translated by Xuanzang in 649 and attributed to Bandhuprabha, and so forth (藐光菩薩等). In addition, the Tibetan version of another commentary on the Buddhabhūmisūtra, i.e., the Buddhabhūmyuśākyāṅkha, is attributed to Śīlabhadra. The authorship of the *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa is still doubted, and besides Bandhuprabha, certain parts of the commentary may also be attributed to other Indian Buddhist scholars. As stated in the Cheng weishi shuji 成唯識論述記 and the Cheng weishi lun liaojian 成唯識論料簡 by Kuiji, and the Cheng weishi lun liaoyideng 成唯識論了義燈 by Huizhao, Dharmaśāla, Bandhuprabha, Sthiramati have all contributed to the Chinese *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa. (See T1830 p.230b18–19; T1832 p.672b8–17; X806 p.362a6–7) Based on parallel passages between the *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa and the Cheng weishi lun, Katsumata (1961, pp.165–189) states that the Chinese *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa consists of a commentary by Śīlabhadra and another by Dharmapāla, and it is compiled by Bandhuprabha. Keenan (1980, pp.363–365) supports this viewpoint. However, Lusthaus (2002, pp.400–405 and 2008, pp.5–7) argues against Dharmapāla’s attribution, and considers the *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa as incorporating at least four distinct commentaries, he also remains skeptical of Bandhuprabha’s role as the compiler or one of the commentators.
expression as universal. In this way, all the particular and universal characteristics in other contexts, as long as they are owned by a dharma itself, belong to the particular characteristic, just as Zenju explains in his relevant commentary in IRMS: “The universal characteristic mentioned in the scripture (the Buddhabhūmisūtra) belongs to the particular characteristic in the treatise of the science of reasons.” Moreover, since the universal characteristic is conceptually constructed and provisionally established by the dispersed mind, it is the object of inference; and since the particular characteristic is apprehended by the meditative mind devoid of conceptual construction, it is the object of perception. Therefore, since the true thusness is the true nature and an own characteristic of each dharma, it should be treated as the particular characteristic in this case. Thus, according to the treatise of the science of reasons, perception can apprehend characteristics like the true thusness, which are treated as universal characteristics in other contexts such as the Buddhabhūmisūtra here. At last, the commentator emphasizes the isolation of the relevant theory in the science of reasons by saying “this scripture is not so” to solve the conflict problematized above.

To sum up, based on the third answer, it can be seen that the commentator is aware of Dignāga’s doctrine as well as its difference from other systems. Furthermore, he distinguishes the theory of the science of reasons from others to answer the questions which are in fact also based on Dignāga’s doctrine. It should also be noticed that the word “the science of reasons,” i.e., Yinming in Chinese, does not refer to the aspect of logic and argument in this passage but to the aspect of epistemology. It implies that the “science of reasons” here is regarded as more or less equivalent to Pramāṇa, i.e., the doctrine of the means of knowledge.

Now it is time to return to Kuiji. Presenting his paraphrased version in YRZLS par.80 side by side with the original in Xuanzang’s translation will reveal some notable changes:

Xuanzang’s Translation of the *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa:

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79 IRMS, T2270 p.417b13–b14: 經說共相，因明論中自相所攝。
The *Fodi jing lun*, T1530 p.318b0–b08: 彼說一切法上實義，皆名“自相”，以諸法上自相、共相，各附己體不共他故。若分別心立一種類能詮所詮，通在諸法如縷貫花，名為“共相”。

That [treatise of the science of reasons] says that the true properties of all the dharmas should be named “particular characteristic,” because both the particular characteristics and the universal characteristics [in other contexts] are just attached to their own entities, but not jointly shared by others. If a class of expressers and what are to be expressed by them are established by the discriminative mind, and they penetrate through all dharmas like threads through flowers, then they are named “universal characteristic.”

In contrast, Kuiji’s citation reads:

YRZLS, T1840 p.98b11–b13: 《佛地論》云，彼因明論，諸法自相唯局自體，不通他上，名為“自性”；如縷貫花，貫通他上，諸法差別義，名為“差別”。

The *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa* says, in the treatises of the science of reasons, the particular characteristics of all the dharmas that are only confined to their own entities but not jointly shared by others are named “self-nature”; the distinguishing properties of dharmas that can be jointly shared by others like a thread through flowers are named “distinguishing-feature.”

In his citation, Kuiji goes beyond Dignāga’s opinion. “Particular characteristic” and “universal characteristic,” viz. *zixiang* 自相 and *gongxiang* 共相 in Chinese, are replaced with “self-nature” and “distinguishing-feature,” viz. *zixing* 自性 and *chabie* 差别. Furthermore, he deletes the descriptive words concerning the expression through the discriminative mind. In this way, he removes the epistemological factor from these two definitions completely and adds two “new” terms from YBhHv instead, though these two terms still appear in a relationship between particular and universal.

Compared with the *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa*, these changes imply two points. On
the one hand, Kuiji tries even harder to express his idea in a way close to “science of reasons” through the replacement of terms with the purpose of isolating the science of reasons from the content below in YRZLS par.80. On the other hand, he is inclined to separate the logical part of Dignāga’s system from the epistemological part through that replacement. In this manner, it becomes possible for him to ignore the epistemological issues, such as the exclusion of the conceptual construction when logic is dealt with.

2.1.1.2. “Particular Characteristic” and “Universal Characteristic”

Secondly, after “self-nature” and “distinguishing-feature” from the *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa, Kuiji presents the related elucidation of “Mahāyāna” which appears as a hybridization.

In this part, he fundamentally separates the inexpressible aspect of dharma as the self-nature from the expressible aspect as the universal characteristic. This sort of universal consists of another hierarchy of the particular and the universal characteristics. As suggested in Katsura (1979b; 2014), this structure is analogous to those presupposed by Dignāga and Vaiśeṣika, but Dignāga’s hierarchy is only confined to the universal characteristics, and the highest category is arranged as “the knowable (jñeya),” which is divided into “existent (sat)” and “non-existent (asat).” After examining the theory of *apoha* in relevant passages of Kuiji’s commentary on the *Cheng weishi lun* Katsura (2014, pp.118–119) summarizes Kuiji’s viewpoint as follows:

Kuiji seems to understand the distinction between the particular and the universal as relative to one another, just as in the hierarchy of the Vaiśeṣika categories. This understanding again might not have been endorsed by Dignāga, because for him, only the universal characteristics are relative to each other and constitute a hierarchy. In any case, it is important that Kuiji refers to the hierarchical construction of Buddhist dharmas when he discusses verbal and conceptual cognition.

This observation is explicit and reasonable, but we still need to ask why Kuiji constructs
such a hierarchy in this way and where his idea is derived from.

As we can see in YRZLS par.80, the so-called “Mahāyāna” “regards all that cannot be expressed through language of all the dhammas as the self-natures, and what can be expressed as the universal characteristics.” Herein the main difference between the self-nature and the universal characteristic is whether it is inexpressible or not. In the expressible part, which is quite similar to “the knowable,” viz. the highest category of Dignāga’s hierarchy, sub-categories of particular and universal characteristics are arranged. However, concerning the hierarchy on the expressible side, compared with those of Dignāga and Vaiśeṣika, a more similar passage can be found in Xuanzang’s Chinese translation of the *Mahāvibhāṣāstra:

The *Apidamo da piposha lun, T1545 p.405b07–b15: 自、共相，差別無邊。
且地大種亦名自相，亦名共相：名自相者，對三大種；名共相者，一切地界皆堅相故。大種造色合成色蘊，如是色蘊亦名自相，亦名共相：名自相者，對餘四蘊；名共相者，諸色皆有變礙相故。即五取蘊合成苦諦，如是苦諦亦名自相，亦名共相：名自相者，對餘三諦；名共相者，諸蘊皆有逼迫相故。

The distinction between the particular and the universal characteristics is boundless. The earth-element can be called both a particular characteristic and a universal characteristic: with respect to the other three elements, it is called a particular characteristic; since all the earth possess the characteristic of hardness, it is called a universal characteristic. The forms of elements constitute the aggregate of form, hence such an aggregate of form can be called both a particular characteristic and a universal characteristic: with respect to the other four aggregates, it is called a particular characteristic; since all the forms possess the characteristic of changeability and corporeality, it is called a universal characteristic. The five aggregates constitute the truth of suffering, thus the truth of suffering can be called both a particular characteristic and a universal characteristic: with respect to the other three truths, it is called a
particular characteristic; since all the aggregates possess the characteristic of being persecuted, it is called a universal characteristic.

The Chinese translation of this extensive treatise was started in 656 CE and completed in 659 CE. Then it became a primary and authoritative source of Abhidharma doctrines in China. Although the angle of description is not entirely the same, this passage of the *Mahāvibhāṣāstra also presents a hierarchy of particular and universal characteristics starting from the elements and ends at the four truths.

It is quite possible that Kuiji’s understanding was influenced by the passage above. To be more accurate, this hierarchy from the *Mahāvibhāṣāstra is contained in Kuiji’s interpretation in YRZLS par.80:

YRZLS, T1840 p.98b14–b21: ... [大乘] 以一切法不可言說一切為自性，可說為共相。如可說中，色蘊等為自，無常等為共；色蘊之中，色處為自，色蘊為共；色處之中，青等為自，色處為共；青等之中，衣、花為自，青等為共；衣、花之中，極微為自，衣、花為共；如是乃至離言為自，極微為共；離言之中，聖智內冥得本真故，名之為自，說為離言名之為共。

... [Mahāyāna] regards all that cannot be expressed through language of all the dharmas as the self-natures, and what can be expressed as the universal characteristics. In what can be expressed, the five aggregates, and so on, are particular, while impermanent, and so on, are universal; in the aggregate of form, the locus of form is particular, while the aggregate of form is universal; in the locus of form, the blue, and so on, are particular, while the locus of form is universal; in the blue, and so on, the clothes and flowers are particular, while the blue, and so on, are universal; in the clothes and flowers, the atoms are

80 See the *Kaiyuan shijiao lu 開元釋教錄 in T2154 p.557a18–a19: 《阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論》二百卷；見《內典錄》。五百大阿羅漢等造，顯慶元年七月二十七日於大慈恩寺翻經院譯至四年七月三日畢，沙門嘉尚、大乘光等筆受。

81 The term “atom” herein is different from that in modern science. It refers to jiwei 極微, i.e., paramāṇu in Sanskrit. This concept means the smallest entity. It is regarded as substantive and composing all mater by the Jain school, the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools, as well as the Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika schools in Buddhism.
particular, while the clothes and flowers are universal; in such a way, then, what is apart from language is particular, while the atoms are universal; in what is apart from language, the original truth which is apprehended mysteriously by sage wisdom is particular, while what is expressed as apart from language is universal.

Despite the resemblance, there are still two critical differences: Firstly, as pointed out above, Kuiji’s hierarchy is based on a distinction between the inexpressible self-nature and the expressible universal characteristic in the first place. Secondly, Kuiji’s hierarchy does not stop at the category of four elements or atoms, but goes two steps further and ends at the particular characteristic that can only be apprehended mysteriously by sage wisdom. On the one hand, the Sarvāstivāda school believes in the existence of elements, so they limit their hierarchy to the level of elements, but Kuiji, as an advocate of the Consciousness-only system, holds a different metaphysical position which is capable of pushing him to move further on. On the other hand, Kuiji’s hierarchy is deeply related to Dignāga’s theory of establishing two means of valid cognition according to two kinds of characteristics meanwhile, so the fundamental distinction between the particular and the universal characteristics actually lies in expressibility.

After the presentation of that hierarchy, Kuiji sums up by separating the true particular characteristic from the provisional universal characteristic. Then he asserts the particular characteristic cognized by perception directly and realized by sage wisdom as the true self-nature because the other so-called self-natures are not devoid of the conventional cognition and the expression through language:

\[
\text{YRZLS, T1840 p.98b21–b23: 共相假有，假智變故；自相可真，現量親緣，聖智證故。除此以外說為自性，皆假自性非真自性，非離假智及於言詮故。}
\]

The universal characteristics are provisional because they are transformed by the conventional cognition; the particular characteristics may be true, because [the most primary particular characteristic] is cognized by perception directly
and realized by sage wisdom. Except this (the most primary particular characteristic), all the others that are expressed as the self-natures are false self-natures but not true self-natures, because they are not devoid of conventional cognition and expression through language.

On this level, both the particular and the universal characteristics of the *Mahāvibhāṣāstra belong to the universal characteristic, and such a viewpoint should also be approved by Dignāga. Thus, this part does return to Dignāga to a certain extent, though it seems that Kuiji prefers the word “self-nature” to “particular characteristic” for emphasizing its absoluteness.

In summary, in Kuiji’s citation of the so-called “Mahāyāna” in YRZLS par.80, he first separates the expressible universal characteristic from the inexpressible self-nature and then presents a hierarchy in the expressible part. Secondly, his hierarchy goes further than that in the *Mahāvibhāṣāstra to include the particular characteristic which is apprehended mysteriously by sage wisdom. Thirdly, he regards the particular characteristic cognized by perception as the true self-nature, and the others non-devoid of the conventional cognition and the expression through language as universal characteristics as well as false self-natures. In this passage, Kuiji constructs a hierarchy similar to that in the *Mahāvibhāṣāstra within the framework of Dignāga’s theory of two kinds of characteristics to interpret the self-nature and the universal characteristic, which takes the place of the distinguishing-feature in this passage. However, most significantly, the difference between Dignāga’s and Kuiji’s theories is that the particular characteristic in Dignāga’s system is directly separated from conceptual construction and language in a more epistemological way, unlike the particular characteristic or the true self-nature inferred through reasoning level by level from both epistemological and ontological perspectives in Kuiji’s interpretation.

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2.1.1.3. “Self-form” and “Distinction”

Thirdly, in YRZLS par.81, Kuiji’s interpretation turns back to the science of reasons.

He states clearly that the science of reasons only takes what is merely confined to a subject’s particular entity as the “self-nature” and what is jointly shared by others as the “distinguishing-feature.” However, he also mentions another pair in the science of reasons, i.e., the self-form and the distinction which refer to svārūpa and viśeṣa of the four kinds of contradictory reasons:

YRZLS, T1840 p.98b25–b27: 准相違中，自性、差別復各別有自相、差別。謂言所帶名為“自相”，不通他故；言中不帶意所許義，名為“差別”，以通他故。

With regard to the [four] contradictory [reasons], each of the self-nature and the distinguishing-feature also has the self-form and the distinction. This means that what is presented by literal words is named “self-form,” because it cannot be shared by others; and what is not presented by literal words but implicated by the meaning is named “distinction,” because it can be shared by others.

This pair, as the Sanskrit originals also reveal, is actually different from the self-nature and distinguishing-feature discussed above. The self-form refers to the literal meaning of a word, while the distinction refers to its implied meaning, and each of the self-nature and the distinguishing-feature has such a pair of the self-form and distinction in the semantical sense. On the other hand, the definitions of the self-form and distinction here take sharability as a standard to distinguish each other. Kuiji regards what is presented by literal words as the particular characteristic because of its unsharability, and what is implicated as the universal characteristic because of its sharability. Such definitions thus appear as entangled with those of the self-nature and distinguishing-feature, and imply that Kuiji does not tell the difference between these two pairs of terms here but
rather confuses them with each other.

After that, still in YRZLS par.81, Kuiji summarizes the self-nature and distinguishing-feature in the science of reasons on three levels: the level of the confined and shared; the level of the former and latter; and the level of the literal words and implication. On the first and the second levels, the words “self-nature” and “distinguishing-feature” refer to the subject and the predicate in the thesis; but on the third level, where the self-nature is defined in the same way as the self-form in the same paragraph above, these two words are taken as the literal meaning of a word and its implied meaning with respect to the four kinds of contradictory reasons. Therefore, even in the interpretation based on the alleged science of reasons, “self-nature” and “distinguishing-feature” still take actually two sorts of referents.

To sum up, in YRZLS par.80–81, Kuiji’s interpretation of the self-nature and the distinguishing-feature as the first pair of names of the entity and attribute implies three distinct levels: The first is the level of the self-nature and the distinguishing-feature in the science of reasons according to the *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa*, i.e., *svabhāva* and *viśeṣa*; the second is the level of the particular characteristic, or the self-nature, and the universal characteristic in “Mahāyāna” based on both the Abhidharma and Dignāga’s theories, i.e., *svalakṣaṇa* or *svabhāva* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*; the third is the level of the self-form and the distinction in the science of reasons, i.e., *svarūpa* and *viśeṣa*.

2.1.2. “Property-Possessor” and “Property”

In YRZLS par.82, Kuiji explains the second pair of names, i.e., “property-possessor” and “property” based on the definition of dharma or *fa* 法 in Chinese. However, since he attempts to interpret a logical issue through elucidating a definition from ontological, epistemological and semantic perspectives, factors on other levels than logic are also entangled in his exegesis.

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83 We can also say that “self-nature” and “self-form” in this paragraph, i.e., *zixing* 自性 and *zixiang* 自相 in Chinese, are equivalent to each other.
The explanation goes as follows:

YRZLS, T1840 p.98c0–c13: 第二，自性亦名“有法”，差別亦名“法”者：法有二義，一能持自體，二軌生他解，故諸論云“法謂軌持”。... 其異解生，唯待後說。故初所陳，唯具一義，能持自體。義不殊勝，不得“法”名。後之所陳，具足兩義，能持復軌。義殊勝故，獨得“法”名。前之所陳，能有後法，復名“有法”。

Second, self-nature is also named “property-possessor” (possessor of dharma), while distinguishing-feature is also named “property” (dharma): “dharma” has two meanings: The first is being capable of maintaining its particular entity; the second is being regular to generate others’ understanding [of it], so the treatises say that “dharma means being regular and maintaining.” ... The generation of new understanding relies on the latterly-stated. Therefore, the formerly-stated only has one meaning, namely being capable of maintaining its particular entity. Its meaning is not excellent, so it cannot obtain the name “dharma/property.” While the latterly-stated has both of the two meanings, it is capable of not only maintaining [its own entity] but also being regular. Its meaning is excellent, so it can obtain the name “dharma/property” solely. The formerly-stated can possess the latter “dharma/property,” so it is named “dharma-possessor/property-possessor” additionally.

Kuiji defines dharma as being regular and maintaining. This definition consists of two parts: being capable of maintaining its particular entity and being regular to generate others’ understanding of it. In Kuiji’s interpretation, the formerly-stated part of the thesis member can only be capable of maintaining its particular entity. This is the reason why it should be called the possessor of dharma; the latterly-stated can qualify the former through variations of sound, i.e., language expression. This means, it can be both, capable of maintaining the entity and be regular to generate others’ understanding, so it can be called dharma. 84

84 The terms “formerly-stated” and “latterly-stated” are based on the Chinese expression, for in an inference in
A typical expression of the first part in this definition can be found in the *Abhidharmakośa*. It reads svalaṣaṇadhāraṇād dharmaḥ\(^{85}\) in Sanskrit and 能持自相故名為法\(^{86}\) in Xuanzang’s translation meaning that dhammas are so called because they bear the particular characteristics. However, differently from the *Abhidharmakośa*, Kuiji uses the word ziti 自體 instead of zixiang 自相, viz. svalaṣaṇa. Thus his definition reads “being capable of maintaining its particular entity” but not “being capable of maintaining its particular characteristic.”

Moreover, compared to that in the *Abhidharmakośa*, Kuiji’s definition contains one more part, viz. being regular to generate others’ understanding. Its earliest source in Chinese can be found in the translation of the *Nyāyānusāra* by Xuanzang:

The *Apidamo shunzhengli lun*, T1562 p.751a11–a12: 此三能持諸所詮義及軌生解，故名為“法”。

These three (name, phrase, and syllable, i.e., nāma, pada, and vyañjana) can uphold what is to be expressed and be regular to generate understandings, so they are named “dharma.”

Quite differently from the usage in the *Abhidharmakośa*, the word dharma here is used on the semantic level, for the referent of dharma is not a subject like that in the *Abhidharmakośa* but the linguistic expression which can denote a subject. Thus, if the definition of dharma quoted in YRZLS par.82 consists of the interpretation of dharma in the *Abhidharmakośa* and that in the *Nyāyānusāra*, then it in fact contains meanings on two different levels. In addition, although Kuiji claims that the quoted definition of dharma is used in various treatises, the only existing material that could offer such a definition in his time is the *Cheng weishi lun*,\(^{87}\) which is actually a translation compiled from ten or even more texts by his Master Xuanzang and himself directly. Therefore, its fidelity is also problematic.

\(^{85}\)Ejima (1989, p.2).

\(^{86}\) The *Apidamo jushe lun*, T1558 p.1b09.

\(^{87}\) See the *Cheng weishi lun* in T1585 p.1a24.
However, the dharma in the science of reasons mainly refers to the property to be proved in the thesis, which is entirely different from the definition here. Nevertheless, regardless of the original meaning of dharma, Kuiji’s interpretation based on this definition of dharma is not reasonable for the following two reasons.

Firstly, as a part of the definition, being regular to generate others’ understanding can be understood as an extension of being capable of maintaining its particular entity on the epistemic level. However, according to Kuiji’s commentary, perhaps influenced by the perspective that “the name indicates the self-nature, the phrase indicates the distinguishing-feature” in the Cheng weishi lun, being regular turns to be a special predicate like a phrase, and qualifies being capable of maintaining the entity which is like a name in a logical proposition. In other words, they are in fact wholly regarded as the self-nature and the distinguishing-feature in the thesis member herein but not as two aspects of one subject as the definition of dharma initially suggests.

Secondly, taking the thesis “sound is impermanent” for example, “sound,” as the subject of this thesis, according to Kuiji’s commentary, has only the meaning of “being capable of maintaining its particular entity,” so it is only the possessor of dharma. While “impermanent,” as the predicate, has both meanings, so it is the dharma. However, concerning the two meanings of this “impermanent” dharma, with respect to the logical structure of this thesis statement, “being regular to generate others’ understanding” is to generate the understanding of “sound.” Thus, the problem is what the aspect “being capable of maintaining its particular entity” of “impermanent” is meant to “maintain.” In other words, the object of the first meaning of “impermanent” in this case is “impermanent” itself, while that of the second meaning is actually “sound” instead. Although in YRZLS par.88, he defends himself by saying “according to the true principle, both the formerly-stated and the latterly-stated have two meanings [of the definition of dharma above], but based on the dominant aspect this treatise gives them

88 The Cheng weishi lun, T1585 p.6b05–06: 名詮自性，句詮差別。See, for example, the Pañcaskandhaka: Li, Steinkellner (2008, pp.15–16): nāmakāyāḥ katame | dharmāṇāṃ svabhāvādhivacanāni | padakāyāḥ katame | dharmāṇāṃ visēṣādhipacanāni | = the Dacheng wuyun lun 大乘五蘊論, T1612 p.849c20–c22: 云何名身？謂諸法自性增語為性。云何句身？謂諸法差別增語為性。the Dacheng wuyun lun 大乘五蘊論, T1612 p.849c20–c22: 45
different names,”\(^{89}\) it is not enough to solve the uncertain referents of the two meanings of *dharma* in the thesis member.

In addition, Kuiji offers a more detailed interpretation of the definition of *dharma* in his commentary on the *Cheng weishi lun*:

The *Cheng weishi lun shuji*, T1830 p.239c0–c11: 法謂軌持，軌謂軌範，
可生物解，持謂住持，不捨自相。一、體有無對，二、自性差別對。三、
有為無為對，四、先陳後說對。前唯有體，後亦通無，《瑜伽論》五十二
說意不壞、法現前，無亦名法，今者相分必有，似無名無。前是共相，
後是自相。前唯有為，後通無為。前唱者名“持”，後唱者名“軌”。合有
四對名為“軌持”。(ad the *Cheng weishi lun*: 法謂軌持)\(^{90}\)

Dharma means being regular and maintaining, [herein,] being regular is meant to generate the understanding of it, maintaining is meant to not quit its particular characteristic. [The relationship between them should be understood as:] firstly, a pair of the existent and the non-existent [or existent]; secondly, a pair of the self-nature and the distinguishing-feature; thirdly, a pair of the conditioned and the unconditioned [or conditioned]; fourthly, a pair of the formerly-stated and the latterly-stated. The former (i.e., being regular) is merely existent, while the latter (i.e., maintaining) can also be non-existent [besides existent], for the 52\(^{nd}\) volume of the *Yogācārabhūmi* says that when the mind [organ] has not decayed yet and the dharma [object] appears, a non-existent (a conditioned thing from the past or the future) [cognized by the mind-consciousness] can also be called dharma, so now the objective aspect [of the mind-consciousness cognizing this non-existent] must be existent, while [the entity of this non-existent] is specious but non-existent, so [the non-existent] is called non-existent.\(^{91}\) The former refers to the universal

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\(^{89}\) YRZLS, T1840 p.99a11–a12: 談其實理，先陳，後說皆具二義，依其增勝論與別名。

\(^{90}\) There is additionally the fifth pair advocated by Kuiji in his *Cheng weishi lun zhangzhongshuyao* 成唯識論掌中樞要 in T1831 p.618b29–c02, which considers the dharmas of the holy teaching as “being regular” and the dharmas of the secular word as “maintaining”：聖教法名“軌”，依用辨故；世間法名“持”，執實自體能自持故。並疏為五。

\(^{91}\) YBha, T1579 p.584c18–c25: 問：如世尊言，過去諸行為緣生意，未來諸行為緣生意，過去未來諸行非有，
characteristic, while the latter refers to the particular characteristic. The former is merely conditioned, while the latter can also be unconditioned [besides conditioned]. The formerly-stated is named “maintaining,” while the latterly-stated is named “being regular.” Thus, in total there are four pairs named “being regular and maintaining.”

The sequence of referents in this passage is quite chaotic, but due to the identifications in the sub-commentary *Cheng weishi lun yiyan* 成唯識論義演 by Ruli 如理, the four cases can be arranged as follows. In the first case, concerning dharma as the object of the mind-consciousness, the objective aspect must be existent for the cognition, but its entity can be either existent or non-existent; thus, being regular as the objective aspect must be existent, while maintaining as the entity can be either existent or non-existent. In the second case, maintaining and being regular are paired as the self-nature and distinguishing-feature, and refer to the particular characteristic and universal characteristic, thus the self-nature and distinguishing-feature are considered as equivalent to the particular characteristic and universal characteristic. In the third case, since being regular is derived from maintaining the particular characteristic through conceptual construction, it belongs to the conditioned, whereas, since a dharma can be either conditioned or unconditioned, its maintaining can also refer to either conditioned or unconditioned. In the fourth case, maintaining refers to the formerly-stated and being regular refers to the latterly-stated, which means, the self-nature of a dharma is first stated for maintaining, then the distinguishing-feature can distinguish it to present its special regularity. On the one hand, the fourth case is mainly corresponding to the explanation of the formerly-stated and latterly-stated in YRZLS par.82 above; on the other hand, it asserts that the latter refers to being regular only but not both maintaining and being regular as YRZLS par.82 suggests.

何故世尊宣說彼行為緣生意？若意亦緣非有事境而得生者，云何不違微妙言說？如世尊言，由二種緣諸識得生，何等為二，謂眼及色，如是廣說乃至意法。答：由能執持諸五識身所不行義故，佛世尊假說名法，是故說言緣意及法，意識得生。

92 The Cheng weishi lun yiyan, X815 p.492b15–b24: 體有無對者，有即是軌，無即是持。自性差別對者，自性即持，差別即軌配持，不依論文但約義配。有為無為對者，先軌後持。前陳後說對者，即前持後軌。故下疏云“前唱者名持，後唱者名軌”。但約義配不依論文。問，前陳後說何別？答，但總申名陳，廣分別名說。
Generally speaking, in Kuiji’s interpretation of the two components of the thesis based on the definition of dharma in YRZLS par.82 and that on the definition of dharma in his commentary on the Cheng weishi lun cited above, distinct levels of theories are combined with no clear demarcation. Factors on the ontological, epistemological, semantic, and logical levels are entangled herein, that is to say, he attempts to interpret a logical issue through elucidating a definition from ontological, epistemological and semantic perspectives. In consequence, his exegesis turns to be outside the focus on logic and more or less disordered.

2.1.3. Integration as Reconstruction

To interpret the two components of the thesis, Kuiji absorbs various opinions from the *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa, the Abhidharma literature, and Dignāga’s doctrines in his commentary. In this manner, the two components of the thesis, also as the entity and attribute of a dharma, virtually consist of distinctive concepts including svabhāva and viśeṣa, svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa, svarūpa and viśeṣa, dharmin and dharma, as well as višeṣya and višeṣaṇa from Sanskrit sources. On the one hand, concepts from different theories are paraphrased and integrated; on the other hand, Kuiji also intends to maintain the attitude adopted in the *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa that emphasizes the isolation of the science of reasons.

Modifications are concealed in Kuiji’s absorptions of theories. With respect to the hierarchy of particular and universal, Kuiji goes further than the *Mahāvibhāṣāstra, which ends the hierarchy at the four elements; he stops at the level utterly devoid of language and states that only this kind of particular characteristic is true. Such a claim definitely breaks the demarcation of the particular and universal characteristics in the Abhidharma doctrine. With respect to Dignāga’s Pramāṇa theory, Kuiji approaches the separation of the true particular characteristic from the universal through inferring within a hierarchy. With respect to the science of reasons, Kuiji equates the self-nature and distinguishing-feature from svabhāva and višeṣa with the self-form and distinction from svarūpa and višeṣa. With respect to the definition of dharma, Kuiji applies its
ontological and epistemological aspects to a logical interpretation. In his elucidation of the two components of the thesis member, different varieties of factors are absorbed but also modified.

However, despite the variations, it would be neither fair nor reasonable to charge him for misunderstanding Sanskrit terms in this commentary, that is to say, we have not only to clarify the hints of such a complex integration but also to apprehend the context and his motivation for doing so. There is not enough evidence to suggest whether Kuiji could really tell the differences between those terms and whether he had ever noticed the problem of his integration or not. However, as the successor of Xuanzang, a significant figure in the transmission of Buddhism from India to China, one of Kuiji’s key concerns should be the passing on of knowledge from his teacher to later generations. In the face of the conflicting doctrines he had learned, he tried to solve the inconsistency through integrating them into one single but complex system to adapt them to and absorb them in the Chinese context. His integration here is thus strongly represented as a reconstruction, which means, he pursued the construction of a new system that connects various concepts absorbed but modified from Indian Buddhist doctrines.

Therefore, Kuiji’s interpretation of the multilevel definitions of property-possessor and qualifier herein is essentially a reconstruction through integration. In contrast with being simply criticized as unfaithful to the original, such a reconstruction should preferably be evaluated as an example of the Chinese endeavor to adopt and adapt Indian Buddhist doctrines.

2.2. The Semantic Reconfiguration of Concepts: *Upanaya, Anvaya, and He*

Two of Dignāga’s important innovations related to the formulation of inference are reducing the members in an inference from five to three, and stipulating the
statements of the example. The latter is called “essences of examples (yu ti 喻體)” in Chinese and Japanese commentaries and aims at ensuring the inseparable connection between the proving property in the reason and the property to be proved in the thesis. For instance, a comparison can be made between an inference from NSBh by Vātsyāyana and another from NMu by Dignāga as in Table 4:

Table 4: Vātsyāyana’s and Dignāga’s Formulation of Inference: A Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vātsyāyana:</th>
<th>Dignāga:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sound is impermanent,</td>
<td>Sound is impermanent,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>because of having the property of arising,</td>
<td>because of being produced immediately after human effort,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a substance having the property of arising, such as a dish, and so forth, is impermanent,</td>
<td>whatever is produced immediately after human effort is seen to be impermanent, like a pot, and so forth; whatever is permanent is seen to be not produced immediately after human effort, like ether, and so forth.(^\text{93})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and likewise, sound has the property of arising,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>therefore, sound is impermanent because of having the property of arising.(^\text{94})</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two differences can be seen here: Firstly, there are five members in Vātsyāyana’s inference, i.e., pratijñā, hetu, udāharaṇa, upanaya and nigamana, but Dignāga removes the last two, i.e., upanaya and nigamana. According to Xuanzang’s Chinese translations of NMu, AS (AS\(_{\text{ch hereinafter}}\), and so forth, these two members are translated as he 合 and jie 結. Secondly, in the statements of example Dignāga uses zhu 諸 and jie 皆, i.e., yat and tat in Sanskrit, to connect the proving property to the property to be proved. Then in another part of NMu, he stipulates the forms of these two statements by saying

\(^{93}\) YZML, T1628 p.2c5–8: 同法者，謂立聲無常，勤勇無間所發性故，以諸勤勇無間所發皆見無常，猶如瓶等；異法者，謂諸有常住見非勤勇無間所發，如虛空等。

\(^{94}\) NSBh ad NS 1.1.39: ...anityaḥ śabda iti pratijñāḥ/ upattidharmakatvād iti hetuḥ/ upattidharmakaṁ sthālādi dravyam anityam ity udāharaṇam/ tathā cotpattidharmakaḥ śabda ity upanayaḥ/ tasmād upattidharmakatvād anityaḥ śabda iti nigamanam/
that “[the examples] express that the reason is followed by [the property of] the thesis, and that wherever [the property of] the thesis is absent, the reason is absent too.”\textsuperscript{95} Thus two logical concomitances concerning the proving property in the reason and the property to be proved in the thesis are claimed, i.e., \textit{anvaya} in the similar example and \textit{vyatireka} in the dissimilar example. These two words are translated as \textit{合} and \textit{離} by Xuanzang.\textsuperscript{96}

In Xuanzang’s translations, two different concepts are translated as \textit{合}. This term can refer to the fourth member of inference and comes from \textit{upanaya} which is a statement summing up that “the subject is so” based on the exemplification. Meanwhile, it can refer to the logical form in the statement of the similar example and comes from \textit{anvaya} which is the positive concomitance between the proving property and the property to be proved. Such an overlap of terms invites a semantic reconfiguration in YRZLS by Kuiji and Huizhao. It presents a special case of conceptual reception in the Chinese Yinming tradition. Thus, this section examines the problem of this twofold \textit{合} based on a textual analysis of relevant materials, with the purpose of elucidating the reconfiguration of relevant concepts.

\subsection*{2.2.1. \textit{He} in the Pre-Dignāga Yinming}

In the Pre-Dignāga Yinming, \textit{合} is merely related to \textit{upanaya}. An inference before Dignāga usually consists of five members, with \textit{upanaya} as the fourth and \textit{nigamana} as the fifth. The word “\textit{upanaya}” comes from the root \textit{nī-} with the prefix \textit{upa}, NS 1.1.38 defines it as \textit{udāharanāpeksastathetyupasamḥāro na tatheti vā sādhyasyopanayah}, i.e., \textit{upanaya} of what is to be proved is the summing up “it is so” or “it is not so” based on the exemplification, i.e., \textit{udāharaṇa}. Since the co-existence of the proving property and the property to be proved has been shown by the

\textsuperscript{95} YZML, T1628 p.1c22: 說因宗所隨，宗無因不有。= PS III. 15: \textit{hetoh sādhyānvayo yatrābhāve ’bhāvaś ca kathyaśe}. See Katsura (1978, p.119, n.4) and (1975 pp.74–75, frag.11).

\textsuperscript{96} E.g. YZML, T1628 p.2c08–c09: 前是遮詮，後唯止濫，由合及離比度義故。

The former [example] both negates and affirms, the latter [example] merely stops the overflow, because [the example by similarity] makes us infer a notion by means of the positive concomitance (\textit{anvaya}) and [the example by dissimilarity] does so by means of the negative concomitance (\textit{vyatireka}).
exemplification, *upanaya* is meant to apply such a relationship and the proving property possessed in the reason to the subject in the thesis, with the purpose of drawing the conclusion that this subject does possess the property to be proved, i.e., *nigamana*. In NSBh, Vātsyāyana interprets *upanaya* based on the positive and the negative kinds of exemplification. Firstly, according to the positive exemplification, the instance possesses the proving property and the property to be proved. In the same way, the subject of the inference also possesses the proving property. Thus, the fact that the subject possesses the proving property is stated. For instance, if it is seen that a substance having the property of arising, such as a dish, is impermanent, then the *upanaya* should state, “likewise, sound has the property of arising.” Secondly, according to the negative exemplification, the instance does not possess the proving property or the property to be proved, while the subject is not so. Thus, by means of negation, the fact that the subject possesses the proving property is also stated. For instance, if it is seen that ātman, which does not have the property of arising, is permanent, then the *upanaya* should state, “on the contrary, sound has the property of arising.”

Concerning the pre-Dignāga stage on the Chinese side, in the *Rushi lun* translated by Paramārtha (真諦, 499–569), the five members are translated as *liyi yan* 立義言, *yin yan* 因言, *piru yan* 譬如言, *hepi yan* 合譬言, *jueding yan* 決定言. With respect to the fourth member, “sound is also the same 声亦如是” is given as an instance. In this text, *he 合* is already used in the Chinese word *he pi yan* to refer to the fourth member, i.e., *upanaya*.

However, it is difficult to find any clear interpretation extant on this *he 合* member. All we know are merely several illustrations by Chinese commentators such as Wengui.

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97 NSBh ad NS 1.1.38: udāharanāpekṣa udāharanatantrya udāharanavasāh/ vaśaḥ sāmarthyam/ sādhyasādharmanyayukta udāharane sthāvyādi dravyam utpattidharmakām anityam drṣṭam, tathā ca śabda utpattidharmaka iti sādhaya śabdasyotpattidharmakatvam upasamhriyate/ sādhavaśayādharmanyayuktaye punar udāharane ātmādi dravyam anupattidharmakām niyam drṣṭam, na ca tathāanupattidharmakāb śabda iti, anupattidharmakatvasopahārayaḥ anupattidharmakatvam udāharanadādhyātāḥ bhavati/ upasamhriyate aneneti copahāryaḥ vedāntavye iti/

98 The *Rushi lun*, T1633 p.35b18–23: 五分者，一立義言，二因言，三譬如言，四合譬言，五決定言。...“聲亦如是”是第四分。In Tucci (1929, pp.37–38) retranslated as: pratijñā hetur udāharanam upanayanaṁ nigamanam iti pañcāvayavaḥ | ...śabdo ’pi tatheti caturtho ‘vayavaḥ |
and Kuiji (all the English translations related to he 合 and their Chinese originals are underlined in this section):

YRZLSW, X848 p.688c23–24: 古師及小乘等合云，“瓶是所作，瓶即無常；當知聲是所作，亦是無常”...

The application of the ancient masters and Hīnayāna states, “a pot is produced, the pot is impermanent; it should be known that sound is produced, it is also impermanent”...

YRZLS, T1840 pp.110c2–111a2: 古師合云，“瓶有所作性，瓶是無常；聲有所作性，聲亦無常”...

The application of the ancient masters states, “a pot possesses the property of being produced, the pot is impermanent; sound possesses the property of being produced, sound is also impermanent”...

In these two instances of upanaya attributed to the “ancient masters,” based on the co-existence of the proving property and the property to be proved, both properties are applied to the subject instead of only the proving property.

In addition, upanaya in ASch and ASVych is also translated as he 合 by Xuanzang, though the definition and explanation are quite distinctive from those in other works. ASch and ASVych define this member as a statement to prove other related topics additionally. This means that, based on the proof accomplished by the three former members, this member is meant to extend the reasoning to other related propositions. 99 This is similar to the instance given in ASVych that “having refuted the perversion of ātman in this way, by means of this reasoning, something permanent, and so forth, does not exist either; such an extension is the application.” 100 With a similarity to

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99 ASVych, T1606 p.771b29–c03: 合者，為引所餘此種類義，令就此法正說理趣。謂由三分成立如前所成義已，復為成立餘此種類所成義故，遂引彼義令就此法，正說道理是名合 = ASBh p.151, 26–28: upanayah शिस्तताज्ञायतनधर्मोपागमाया नयतसामाभ्यानाम/ यातिना साध्यो 'र्थस त्रिभिक अवयायेंत साधितस तात्ताति शिस्तनाम अपि ताज्ञायानाम साध्यानाम साधतीर्थधर्मोपागमाया नयतवें सामाभ्यानाम यक्त्याविदेशा upanayah/ The definition of upanaya of AS is included.

100 ASVy, T1606 p.772a02–03: 次說如是遮破我顛倒已，即由此道理常等亦無，此言是合 = ASBh p.152, 23–24: evam ātmaviparyāsaṃ pratiṣādhyātayaiva yuktyā nityādayo 'pi na santīty atideśa upanayah
arthāpatti\textsuperscript{101} or adhikaraṇasiddhānta\textsuperscript{102}, this kind of upanaya moves one step further beyond the topic of its pratijña. Concerning the he 合 concept in Chinese based on this definition, an illustration can also be found in Wengui’s work:

YRZLSW, X848 p.688c19–23: 古師合云“聲既無常，當知亦是無我”。此即合是類義，以無常者必無我故。陳那云此是自意所許傍顯論宗，言中不立。何須言宗之外別合顯所許義耶？此既太繁，故我不敢為能立支。

The application of the ancient masters states, “since sound is impermanent, it should be known that it is also without self.” This means applying [other] matters of this kind [to the subject], for whatever is impermanent must be without self. Dignāga says that this is a postulated thesis accepted by one’s self but not proved by the literal words [of the inference]. Why should it be asserted that some matter other than the thesis accepted [by one’s self] has to be revealed through applying additionally? Since this is too superfluous, I do not dare to take it as a member of the proof.

The he 合 member here, i.e., application, does not stop at “sound is impermanent,” which is supposed to be proved by this very inference, but extends to “sound is without self.” Such a he 合 member conforms to the definition of upanaya in AS\textsubscript{ch} and ASVy\textsubscript{ch}, but through the words of Dignāga, Wengui regards this extension as a redundant part not meant to be proved directly by the thesis. He calls this kind of application “postulated thesis (bangxian lunzong 傍顯論宗),” which stands as an implication of adhikaraṇasiddhānta or “bangping yizong 傍憑義宗” as indicated by Kuiji in YRZLS par.105, and claims that since what is to be proved in this application does not belong to the original thesis literally, there is no need to admit it.

In the ancient Yinming, only a co-existence of the proving property and the

\textsuperscript{101} Kuiji illustrates arthāpatti by saying: “謂若法無我，准知必無常，無常之法必無我故 (YRZLS, T1840 p.95b17–18) (if a dharma has no Self, consulting this, it can be inferred that [this dharma] must be non-eternal, because what is non-eternal, it must have no Self).”

\textsuperscript{102} NS 1.1.30: yatśiddhāv anyaprakaraṇasiddhiḥ so ’dhikaraṇasiddhāntah. Kuiji calls it “bang ping yi zong 傍憑義宗” and illustrates: “如立聲無常，傍憑顯無我 (YRZLS, T1840 p.100c01) (for example, if ‘sound is non-eternal’ is established, then ‘[sound] is without Self’ can be shown as its postulation).”
property to be proved can be manifested in the inference, and the application and conclusion have no logical function. Concerning the “new” Yinming of Dignāga, to ensure the inseparable connection between the two properties, he stipulates *anvaya* and *vyatireka* in the example statements. Meanwhile, the application member, i.e., *upanaya*, and the conclusion are also removed. As shown above, in Xuanzang’s translations, both *upanaya* of the ancient systems and *anvaya* of Dignāga’s new one are translated as *he 舍*. However, in the later Yinming tradition, Xuanzang’s interpreters, such as Kuiji and Huizhao, do not make any literal distinctions between these two *he 舍* concepts, which causes controversies about the form of the inference, the structure of the similar example, and so forth.

### 2.2.2. Kuiji’s Understanding of *He*

Kuiji’s commentary in YRZLS par.15 concerning the categories of *sādhana* in YBh, XSL, and AS can be quoted as a starting point to examine Kuiji’s understanding of *he 舍*. Generally speaking, his understanding of *he 舍* shifts between *upanaya* and *anvaya*.

The first half of that paragraph states:

YRZLS, T1840 p.93c14–18: 初能立中，《瑜伽》十五，《顯揚》十一，說有八種: 一立宗，二辨因，三引喻，四同類，五異類，六現量，七比量，八正教量。《對法》亦說有八: 一立宗，二立因，三立喻，四合，五結，六現量，七比量，八聖教量。

Concerning the first part, namely proof, the fifteenth volume of [Xuanzang’s translation of] the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the eleventh volume of [Xuanzang’s translation of] the *Xianyang shengjiao lun*, advocate eight sorts: first, setting forth the thesis; second, clarifying the reason; third, quoting the example; fourth, similar type, fifth, dissimilar type; sixth, perception; seventh, inference; and eighth, testimony of genuine teachings. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* also advocates that there are eight [sorts]: first, setting forth the thesis; second,
setting forth the reason; third, setting forth the example; fourth, application (he合, upanaya), fifth, conclusion; sixth, perception; seventh, inference; and eighth, testimony of holy teachings.

This paragraph lists explanations of sādhana in YBh₉ch, XSL as well as AS₉ch respectively. The eight sorts of sādhana in YBh₉ch and XSL include thesis, reason, example, similar type, dissimilar type, perception, inference, and testimony of genuine teachings; by contrast, AS₉ch also advocates eight sorts, including thesis, reason, example, application, conclusion, perception, inference, and testimony of holy teachings. The difference is that there are similar type and dissimilar type after example in YBh₉ch and XSL but application and conclusion instead in AS₉ch. Since AS and XSL are both attributed to Asaṅga by Xuanzang, and YBh is also said to be recorded by Asaṅga based on Maitreya’s teaching in Xuanzang’s Datang xiyu ji in T2087 p.896b21–b24, some explanation is needed:

YRZLS, T1840 p.93c18–28: 皆以自性、差別而為所立。《瑜伽》、《顯揚》八能立中, 三引喻者, 總也, 同類、異類者, 別也。於總比況假類法中,別引順、違同品、異品, 而為二喻。總、別有殊, 分為三種。離因、喻外無別合、結，故略合、結而不別開。《對法》無著八為能立，順前師故。以因總、別，既無離、合，喻之總、別，何假合、離？故總說一，不開二喻。離喻既虧，故加合、結。合、結雖離因、喻非有，令所立義重得增明，故須別立。喻過既說無合、倒合，翻立真支，理須有合。合既別立，結亦須彰。由此亦八。

They all consider the self-nature and the distinguishing-feature as what is to be proved. Among the eight [sorts of] proof in the Yogācārabhūmi and the Xianyang shengjiao lun, the third one, namely the example, is the whole, while similar type and dissimilar type are parts. Among all the comparable instances in the whole example, the supporting similar group and the contradicting dissimilar group are cited particularly as two examples. The whole and parts are different, so they are divided into three sorts. Apart from the reason and
the example, there is no more application or conclusion, so they are not separated individually [from the reason and the example]. In the Abhidharmasamuccaya, Asaṅga also lists eight sorts as proof to follow the predecessors. Since the whole and parts of the reason\(^{103}\) have not [been divided in the inference into] [the reason of] the negative concomitance and [the reason of] the positive concomitance (he 合, anvaya), why should the whole and parts of the example be [divided] according to the positive concomitance and the negative concomitance? Hence, only one overall sort is mentioned without two separated examples. Since separated examples\(^{104}\) are already lacking, the application and conclusion are added. Although the application and conclusion do not exist apart from the reason and examples, to make what is to be proved clearer, they need to be set up additionally. Among the fallacies of example, the fallacy of lacking the positive concomitance (wuhe 無合, ananvaya) and the fallacy that the positive concomitance is reversed (daohe 倒合, viparītānvaya) are mentioned. Hence when the genuine members are set up, logically there should be the application. Then, as the application has been set up individually, the conclusion should also be represented. Therefore, [the proof here includes] eight sorts, too.

In the second half of YRZLS par.15, Kuiji interprets the example and the two types of YBh\(_{ch}\) and XSL in a relationship of a whole with its parts. Namely, he considers these two types as the similar example and the dissimilar example. Moreover, in YBh\(_{ch}\) and XSL the application and the conclusion are not mentioned. This formulation accords with the science of reasons of Dignāga and Śaṅkarasvāmin followed by Kuiji, which also removes these two members, just as Kuiji says above, “apart from the reason and the example, there is no more application or conclusion.”

Regarding why there is no separate similar type or dissimilar type after the example in AS\(_{ch}\), Kuiji’s opinion is that since the reason is not divided into one of

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\(^{103}\) According to Zhizhou 智周’s further commentary in X853 p.802a12–a13, the whole of the reason refers to the reason itself, while the parts refer to the three characteristics of a correct reason.

\(^{104}\) See fn.218 in Part II.
positive concomitance and another of negative concomitance, i.e., *he 合* and *li 離* in Chinese, the example does not have to be divided in that way either. In this context, the character *he 合* is used in relation to *li 離*, i.e., *vyatireka*. It thus refers to *anvaya* as the positive concomitance.

Kuiji gives two reasons why application and conclusion are listed after the example in AS<sub>ch</sub>. Firstly, compared with YB<sub>ch</sub> and XSL, since the similar and dissimilar examples separated from the whole are already removed, the application and the conclusion, i.e., *he 合* and *jie 結*, should be added to make what is to be proved more explicit. Secondly, since there are *ananvaya* and *viparītānvaya*, which are written as *wuhe 無合* and *daohe 倒合* in Chinese, as two fallacies, inversely speaking, *he 合* should be present in the correct form. Accordingly, Kuiji claims that the *jie* member, i.e., conclusion, can also be retained. In the first reason, *he 合* refers to the application member, i.e., *upanaya*, which is listed together with the conclusion; in the second reason, Kuiji mentions *ananvaya* and *viparītānvaya*. Therefore, *he 合* refers to *anvaya* here, but after he claims *he 合* should be present, he also claims the conclusion member should be present too. This *he 合* thus turns to the application member again.

To sum up, in Kuiji’s commentary on the issue of why there is no separate similar type or dissimilar type, *he 合* refers to *anvaya*. In his commentary regarding why application and conclusion are listed, *he 合* refers to *upanaya* in the first reason, but to both *anvaya* and *upanaya* in the second reason. The referent of the character *he 合* in Chinese shifts between *anvaya* and *upanaya*. Both concepts are put into one single character. Therefore, it can be speculated that Kuiji’s understanding of *he 合* confounds these two concepts.

 Likewise, in Kuiji’s interpretation of the expression of the example by similarity in YRZLS par.205, he explains the example by similarity as a statement with both *he 合* and *jie 結*. The character *he 合* in company of *jie 結* standing for *nigamana* here

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105 This reason is not convincing. Firstly, AS is attributed to Asaṅga but not Dignāga or Śaṅkarasvāmin, so it is not reasonable to use the theory of fallacies in Dignāga and Śaṅkarasvāmin’s system to prove the correct form advocated by Asaṅga. Secondly, there are also *avyatireka* and *viparītavyatireka*, in NP, on the analogy of Kuiji’s opinion here, there should also be a kind of “*li*” member in the correct form.
should be taken as *upanaya*. However, in the following text, Kuiji describes *he* 合 as “wherever the reason[-property] is present, the thesis[-property] certainly follows [to be present],” which doubtlessly indicates *anvaya*.

Two more pieces of evidence can be cited from this text.

In the paragraph where Kuiji explains the different theories of specious proof (*si nengli 似能立, sādhanabhāsa*), he quotes extensively from YZML. Concerning the fallacy that the thesis contradicts the reason, he cites “由合喻顯‘非一切故’” in YRZLS par.32. If we leave *he yu* 合喻 aside for the time being, this sentence can be translated as “because through *he yu*, [the correct reason] should be revealed as ‘because it is not-everything.’” A relevant Sanskrit sentence from PS which is still extant reads *asarvaś ca śabda ity upanayād dhetur vaktavyaḥ* and can be translated as “the [correct] reason is to be stated on the basis of the application ‘and sound is not-everything.’” Since there is only *upanaya* but no *anvaya* in this Sanskrit fragment, the *he* 合 character in Xuanzang’s translation is evidently referring to *upanaya*. *He yu* 合喻 here should thus mean applying the example to the subject but not mean the example of the positive concomitance, i.e., the similar example. However, in his commentary cited below, Kuiji explains this quotation from YZML by saying that “thus in order to establish that ‘sound is permanent’, the reason should be ‘because it is not-everything’, and it should be said in *he yu* that ‘whatever is not-everything, its entity is permanent, like ether’…” According to its content, *he yu* here expresses the similar example. Therefore, based on this explanation, as *he yu* 合喻, which literally means applying the example originally, is understood as the example of the positive concomitance, *he* 合 from *upanaya* is taken as *anvaya*.

Moreover, when kuiji addresses the question of why the proving property in the reason must be expressed again in the similar example in his commentary on the similar

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106 YRZLS, T1840 p.109c18: …因有之處宗必隨逐，此為“合”也…
107 See Xuanzang’s relevant translation of YZML in T1628 p.1a27.
108 See Katsura (1977, p116).
109 YRZLS, T1840 p.95a14–15: 故立“聲常”，“非一切”因，合喻中云“諸非一切故者，皆體是常，猶如虛空”…
110 Shentai 神泰’s (ca. seventh century CE) commentary on YZML also interprets *he yu* 合喻 in 由合喻顯非一切 as the example of the positive concomitance. See the *Limenlun shuji*, T1839 pp.79c18–79c24.
example, he compares the ancient masters with Dignāga in YRZLS par.218. Based on the relevant content it can be found that the *he 合* of ancient masters refers to the application member, i.e., *upanaya*. However, Dignāga’s sentence cited by Kuiji is not an application but a statement of the similar example, which possesses the logical form of *anvaya*. Therefore, this paragraph can also prove that in Kuiji’s understanding, *upanaya* and *anvaya* are collapsed into the same character *he 合*.

### 2.2.3. Huizhao’s Understanding of *He*

Kuiji did not finish his commentary within his lifetime. The content from the detailed interpretation of the fallacies of example (in YRZLS, T1840 p.133c11 or YRZLSg, S vol.55 p.8347) was completed to the end by his disciple Huizhao. In the final section, it can be seen that Kuiji uses *anavaya* and *viparītānvaya* to prove the existence of *upanaya* in the correct form. Likewise, Huizhao’s commentary on *ananvaya* concerning the meaning of *he 合* is also notable. Huizhao asserts that the similar example should apply the thesis to itself and reveal *paksadhrmatva*. Both *upanaya* and *anvaya* are thus combined into *he 合*.

A set of question and answer in that part reads as follows:

YRZLSg, S vol.55 pp.8367–8368: 問：“諸所作者皆是無常”，合宗、因不？
（答：）有云不合，以“聲無常”他不許故，但合宗外餘有所作及無常，
由111此相属能顯聲上有所作故無常必隨。今謂不爾。立喻本欲成宗，合
既不合于宗，立喻何關宗事？故云“諸所作者”，即包瓶等一切所作及聲
上所作，“皆是無常”者，即瓶等一切無常並聲無常，112即以無常合屬所
作，不欲以瓶所作合聲所作、以瓶無常合聲無常。若不以113無常合屬所
作，如何解同喻云“說因宗所隨”？若云聲無常他不許114合者，不爾，若
彼許者即立已成，以彼不許，故須合顯云“諸所作者皆是無常，猶如瓶

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111 聲無常 YRZLS, YRZLSj, 合宗 YRZLSg.
112 合宗外餘有所作及無常 YRZLSg, 合聲上所作皆是
113 不許不 YRZLS, YRZLSj.
114 不許不 YRZLS, YRZLSj, 不許 YRZLSg.
等”，故《集论》云：“以未所见边与已所见边和合正说名之为喻”115。

Question: Are the thesis and the reason applied to “whatever is produced is impermanent” or not?

[Answer:] Someone says they should not be applied, because others do not accept “sound is impermanent,” merely the property of being produced and the property of being impermanent possessed by others than [the subject of] the thesis, and through this combination [between these two properties possessed by others than the subject] it can be revealed that since sound possesses the property of being produced, the property of being impermanent will definitely follow. Now I say it should not be so. Setting forth the example is to establish the thesis. If the thesis is not applied to the application/the positive concomitance [in the similar example], then what does setting forth the example have to do with the thesis? Thus, “whatever is produced” includes the property of being produced of a pot and all the others as well as being produced of sound. It means, [the similar example] connects being impermanent with being produced. It does not intend to connect being produced of a pot with being produced of sound or connect being impermanent of a pot with being impermanent of sound. If it did not connect being impermanent with being produced, how would the similar example be explained with saying “[the examples] express that the reason is followed by [the property of] the thesis”? If [you] say that others do not accept to apply “sound is permanent” [to the example], it is not so, because if others accepted it, then [such an inference] would be proving something already established, since others do not accept, [the similar example] must be revealed through applying [the thesis to the example] by saying “whatever is produced is impermanent, like a pot, and so forth.” Therefore, the Abhidharmasamuccaya says, “making a proper statement that equates the side of what is perceived with the side of what is

115 故《集论》云：“以未所见边与已所见边和合正说名之为喻” lost in YRZLS1, YRZLS2.
unperceived” is named an “example.”

The question that arises here is whether the thesis “sound is impermanent” and the reason “because it is produced” are also involved in the he 合 of the form “whatever is produced is impermanent” of the example statement. In his answer, Huizhao quotes an opinion116 which he considers to be wrong and then goes on to correct it and answer the question himself.

Here the meaning of he 合 shifts again. Generally speaking, it includes two meanings. The first one is used more commonly. When he 合 refers to the relationships between the statement of the example and the thesis (especially) as well as the reason, it belongs to the first meaning, i.e., applying the thesis as well as the reason to and containing them in the statement “whatever is produced is impermanent.” However, when he 合 refers to the relationship between the property to be proved in the thesis and the proving property in the reason, e.g., in “以無常 (being impermanent) 合屬所作 (being produced),” it belongs to the second meaning which is used as “heshu 合屬,” i.e., connecting them in the form of the positive concomitance. Thus, these two accord with the verb forms of upanaya and anvaya, respectively. In addition, Huizhao cites the definition of example from ASch to support his interpretation of he 合, but it is not appropriate, because the definition in ASBh reads 

\[ \text{prasānta} \text{prasenāntenādprasasyāntasya samākaraṇasamākhyānam} \]  

(ASBh p.151, 24).117 Thus, the Chinese word hehe 和合 in Xuanzang’s translation refers to samākaraṇa but not anvaya.

Huizhao advocates clearly that the thesis related to the subject under debate should be applied to and contained in the statement of the similar example. Some similar clues can be found in Kuiji’s words. For example, in the paragraph quoted in the previous section, Kuiji considers the statement of the similar example of Dignāga’s science of reasons as “strings both the instance [of the example by similarity] and the thesis[-subject].” which means the subject of the thesis is also applied to the example statement.

Another pair of question and answer in the commentary by Huizhao also displays

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116 According to IRMS, this opinion belongs to Wengui. See IRMS, T2270 p.406b9–12.
117 Pradhan’s retranslation in AS p.105, 6–7 reads: 

\[ \text{prasānta} \text{prasena antena adrasasya antasya samākaraṇasamākhyānam}. \]
a confusion between upanaya and anvaya in he 合:

YRZLSg, S vol.55 p.8369: 問：若爾，喻合並說初相，云何《理門》云同喻等顯第二、三相？

答：同喻體正顯第二相，若說合言亦喻上別義。是故古師於能立中別立合、結。又于同喻不說唯顯第二相言，故亦無失。118

Question: If so, the application in the example should also indicate the first characteristic, then why does YZML say that the similar example, and so forth, reveal the second and the third characteristics?119

Answer: The essence of the similar example reveals directly the second characteristic, but regarding the application, it is also a part of the example. Hence the ancient masters claim the application and the conclusion should be set forth separately in the proof. Moreover, concerning the similar example [YZML] does not say it only reveals the second characteristic, so there is no fault.

The question is raised because, based on Huizhao’s explanation in the paragraph above, the thesis is also applied to and contained in the example. It follows that the subject of the thesis should also be contained in the connotation of the similar example. Thus the similar example should also possess pakṣadharma. However, why then does YZML say that the similar example and the dissimilar example merely reveal sapakṣe sattvam and vipakṣe 'sattvam? Huizhao answers that the similar example reveals sapakṣe sattvam directly. However, this does not mean that it does not reveal pakṣadharma.

Moreover, the relationship between he 合, which refers to the application member here, and the example is just a relationship between a part and the whole, so it is not a mistake.

118 This part is lost in YRZLSi and YRZLSj.
119 YZML, T1628 p.2c11–14: 復以何緣第一說“因宗所隨逐”，第二說“宗無因不有”，不說“因無宗不有”耶？由如是說，能顯示因同品定有，異品遊無。非顛倒說。[Question:] For what reason did you state in the first [example] that “the reason is followed by [the property of] the thesis” and in the second [example] that “wherever [the property of] the thesis is absent, the reason is absent either,” but not “wherever the reason is absent, [the property of] the thesis is absent also”? [Answer:] In that way, it can be manifested that the reason is certainly present in the similar group and universally absent from the dissimilar group. That is not possible if [the dissimilar example is] stated in the reverse way.
to set forth the application and the conclusion separately from the example. Thus, both
the question and the answer here actually understand he 合 of the similar example as
the application but not as the positive concomitance.

The character he 合 concerning the similar example refers to anvaya originally in
contrast to vyatireka. It indicates the logical concomitance that “the reason is followed
by [the property of] the thesis.” It is thus related exactly to the second characteristic of
trairūpya. However, according to Huizhao’s interpretation, this he 合 is regarded as
upanaya, i.e., the application. Since the application member does apply the subject of
the thesis to its statement, the similar example contains the subject too in this manner.
Therefore, the first characteristic, i.e., pakṣadharmatva, is revealed. On the other hand,
if such a reconfiguration of anvaya and upanaya is removed, the similar example should
not be related to the subject directly. When Kuiji explains the definition of the similar
element in this commentary, he says:

YRZLS, T1840 p.109b14–15: “處”謂處所，即是一切除宗以外有，無法處。

[In the definition of the similar example,] “wherever” (chu 處, yatra) means
whatever locus, namely all the loci of existent or non-existent things apart from
[the subject of] the thesis.

Moreover:

YRZLS, T1840 p.109b21–22: 除宗以外，有、無聚中有此共許、不共許法，
即是同故。

Because apart from [the subject of] the thesis, in the sets of existent or non-
existent things there are this equally accepted property and that unequally
accepted property, such is the similarity.

Based on these explanations, the subject of the thesis should be excluded from
the similar example. However, Huizhao insists that the thesis including the subject should
be applied to and contained in the similar example, and so it contradicts the requirement
of “apart from [the subject of] the thesis” advocated by Kuiji.
Furthermore, this mix of he 合 causes a change of the logical structure of the similar example. In the case that the subject is not contained, the essence of the similar example, i.e., the statement, can be logically described as \((x)((x\not=d \land Hx) \rightarrow Vx) \land (\exists x)(x\not=d \land Hx \land Vx))\). The first half shows the logical form of the similar example when the subject is removed, and the second half shows that there exists at least one instance for the similar example. However, based on Huizhao’s understanding of he, the subject is also contained. Then, all that possesses the proving property possesses the property to be proved. The description should read \((x)(Hx \rightarrow Vx) \land (\exists x)(x\not=d \land Hx \land Vx))\).

2.2.4. Effects of the Semantic Reconfiguration of He

To sum up, from upanaya and anvaya to he 合, the semantic reconfiguration of these terms is an interesting case of conceptual reception in the Chinese Yinming tradition. In the ancient Chinese Yinming, he 合 mainly refers to upanaya, but in Xuanzang’s related translations, both upanaya and anvaya are translated as he 合. However, it seems his inheritors could not tell the difference between these two concepts within the same Chinese character precisely. In YRZLS, where Kuiji explains sādhana in YBh, XSL and AS, he 合 shifts between upanaya and anvaya; in the same commentary, Huizhao asserts that the similar example should apply the thesis to itself and reveal pakṣadharmatva, and both upanaya and anvaya are thus combined into he 合. Therefore, to the Chinese Yinming tradition of Xuanzang’s lineage, he 合 is both upanaya and anvaya.

The understanding of he 合 in YRZLS mainly produces two effects: Firstly, Dignāga reduces five members to three by removing the application and the conclusion. However, influenced by this understanding, the application member is not truly

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120 d for dharmin; H for hetu; V for višeṣana. Henceforth.
121 Concerning the dissimilar example, Huizhao says that:
YRZLS, T1840 p.136a13–14: 異喻本欲離彼宗因，顯無宗處因定不有，如何得合？
The dissimilar example intends originally to exclude the thesis and the reason, to reveal that wherever [the property of] the thesis is absent the reason must be absent, therefore how can [the thesis] be applied?
Hence, the dissimilar example is not influenced by his understanding of he, it does not contain the subject of the thesis, and in addition, the instance of the dissimilar example can be absent, so the statement of the dissimilar example can be described as \((x)((x\not=d \land \sim Vx) \rightarrow \sim Hx))\).
removed but included in the statement of the example by similarity instead. The function of the application comes to be fulfilled by the example. Although there does exist a possibility that Kuiji and others do mean to combine these two he 合 concepts consciously, no convincing evidence for such an intention has been found so far. Furthermore, removing upanaya as well as nigamana and presenting anvaya and vyatireka in the example are two critical differences between Dignāga’s science of reasons and that before him. Therefore, even if the combination is intended, such an understanding of he 合 in the Yinming tradition reveals precisely that these two differences are not well apprehended. This understanding even has even impacted some modern research in China. For example, the Yinming xue 因明學 by Yu Yu 虞愚, a modern introduction into Yinming (first printed in 1936, reprinted in 2006), asserts that “the application member can be included in the statement of the example.”

Secondly, the similar example is to ensure the inseparable connection between the proving property and the property to be proved through the positive concomitance. However, in this case, it also has to contain the two properties of the subject in the thesis. However, this is actually contrary to the requirement “apart from [the subject of] the thesis” emphasized by Kuiji and causes the logical structure of the similar example which can be described as \((x) ((x\neq d \land Hx) \rightarrow Vx) \land (\exists x) (x\neq d \land Hx \land Vx)\) originally to turn to \((x) (Hx \rightarrow Vx) \land (\exists x) (x\neq d \land Hx \land Vx)\).

Despite their different understandings, it is not reasonable to assert that these Chinese commentators deviated from or misread Sanskrit terms. It is rather important to evaluate their interpretations as other possibilities of development in the way concepts are adapted from the source to another cultural context.

Besides, related to the understanding of he 合, the question of whether the similar example should exclude the subject in the thesis is a focal point of controversies in China nowadays. On this point, there are generally two groups: one is represented by Zheng Weihong 鄭偉宏 who holds the opinion that the subject should be excluded from “the entity of the similar example (tongyu ti 同喻體, *sādharmyadrṣṭāntabhāva),” i.e.,

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its statement with the positive concomitance. The other side represented by Shen Jianying, Yao Nanqiang, and Shen Haiyan, advocates that the subject should not be excluded. Both these groups have touched upon Huizhao’s commentary on the fallacy of lacking the positive concomitance. Tang and Zheng (2016) consider Huizhao’s interpretation to be “contrary to the teachings of Xuanzang and Kuiji, and belonging to an incorrect interpretation.” Yao (2013), Shen (2014), and so forth cite this paragraph by Huizhao to prove that the subject should not be excluded.

Based on this section, it can be seen that the reason Huizhao claims the similar example should apply the subject to itself is that his understanding of the includes both upanaya and anvaya. Therefore, Huizhao’s relevant commentary is not entirely consistent with Dignāga’s science of reasons. It should not be cited as evidence for objecting to the exclusion of the subject, but merely as representative of the particular elucidation on the similar example in the Chinese Yiming tradition.

2.3. The Invention of New Concepts: The Substrata and Essences of the Thesis and Example, and the Similar and Dissimilar Groups of the Reason

As a commentary on YRZL, the theoretical system in YRZLS is constructed on the basis of the one found in YRZL, and an undoubted similarity of vocabulary can thus be easily observed. However, several new concepts which are not directly based upon the Sanskrit originals but rather derived from certain related concepts are also noticeable. For example, Kuiji devides the thesis and example into substrata (yi 依) and essences (ti 體), and advocates the similar group (tongpin 同品) and dissimilar group (yipin 異品) of the reason. This section will focus on these two cases to investigate why these new concepts appear and what effects they exert on the formulation of inference.

123 Tang and Zheng (2016, p.81) reads “違背了玄奘所傳、窺基所述，屬於錯誤發揮.” Similar statements can also be found in Zheng’s other monographs.

in the Chinese Yinming tradition of Xuanzang’s lineage.

2.3.1. The Substrata and Essences of the Thesis and Examples

In his interpretation of the thesis member and the example member, Kuiji emphasizes the distinctions between substrata and essences. Herein, concerning the thesis member, its substrata, i.e., zong yi 宗依, refer to the property-possessor and the qualifier, while the essence, i.e., zong ti 宗體, refers to the inseparable connection (buxianglixing 不相離性, *avinābhāva) between them. With respect to the example member that is actually divided into one by similarity and another by dissimilarity, the substrata, i.e., yu yi 喻依, refer to the specific instances; the essences, i.e., yu ti 喻體, refer to the explicit statements of the two kinds of examples with the positive and negative concomitances, respectively.125 Buddhist scholars of Xuanzang’s lineage, such as Kuiji and Wengui, use these concepts in their commentaries to interpret Dignāga’s logical doctrine. However, no Sanskrit sources for these terms could be identified in relevant surviving texts. Below, I will examine each of these concepts separately.

2.3.1.1. The Substrata of the Thesis

In YRZLS par.17, the property-possessor and qualifier are mentioned for the first time as the two substrata of the thesis but not the thesis itself, in order to clarify the categories of proof and what is to be proved:

YRZLS, T1840 p.94a14–a16: 今者陳那因、喻為能立，宗為所立。自性、差別二並極成，但是宗依未成所諍，合以成宗不相離性方為所諍，何成能立？

Now Dignāga regards the reason and the example as the proof, and the thesis as what is to be proved. [In Dignāga’s opinion,] the self-nature and the

125 Tang (2015) offers *pakṣāśraya for zong yi 宗依 and *sādharmyadṛśṭāntabhāva and *vaidharmyadṛśṭāntabhāva for tongyu ti 同喻體 and yiyu ti 異喻體, respectively. However, none of these terms can be attested in Sanskrit (neither *pakṣāśraya nor *dṛśṭāntabhāva), and so the retranslations are therefore speculative.
distinguishing-feature, which should both be well-established, are merely the substrata of the thesis but not what is to be argued about, while the inseparable connection in the thesis formed by them is what is to be argued about, so how can it (the thesis) be regarded as the proof?

Kuiji claims that according to Dignāga, the reason member and the example member both belong to the proof, while the thesis member belongs to what is to be proved. However, although the thesis consists of the property-possessor and the qualifier, since these two components are already well-established as preconditions of the debate, not themselves but the relationship between them is to be debated on.

To explain this point further, in YRZLS par.19–21, Kuiji cites three explanations, but according to IRMS,¹²⁶ only the third one cited in YRZLS par.21 is approved by Kuiji himself, i.e., considered as the correct one in YRZLS. Generally speaking, this explanation is meant to harmonize the viewpoints of Dignāga and others. According to other scholars than Dignāga, on the one hand, the meaning constituted by the property-possessor and the qualifier, called the self-nature and the distinguishing-feature, belongs to what is to be proved. The thesis member as a literal carrier of the meaning belongs to the proof. On the other hand, since the thesis is established by the reason and the example for arguing against the opponent, it can also be considered as what is to be proved. Furthermore, Kuiji states that according to Dignāga:

YRZLS, T1840 p.94b09–b11: 陳那但以共許因、喻成他未許，他未許者唯是合宗。宗為所立，自性、差別但是宗依。非是所立，所立之具。

Dignāga only uses the equally accepted reason and example to establish what has not been accepted by others, and what has not been accepted by others only refers to the constituted thesis. The thesis is what is to be proved, the self-nature and the distinguishing-feature are merely the substrata of the thesis.

¹²⁶ IRMS, T2270 p.226a08–a11: 此三釋者是誰所傳？第一釋者，淨眼師之所傳也；第二釋者，文軌師之所傳也；第三釋者，大乘基之所傳也。前二傳者各見彼疏，第三傳者即此文耳。By whom are these three explanations transmitted? The first explanation is transmitted by Master Jingyan 净眼, the second one is transmitted by Master Wengui, the third one is transmitted by Master Mahāyāna Ji 大乘基 (i.e., Kuiji 窺基). The first two can both be found in the [teo master’] commentaries, while the third one is just the text here.
They are not what is to be proved but the implements of what is to be proved.

Here the property-possessor and the qualifier are the substrata of the thesis, for they do not belong to what is to be proved but rather the “implements” of that. Thus, he explains that Dignāga and the other masters make interpretations from different angles, so their viewpoints are not the same. In this case, the term “substrata of the thesis,” i.e., *zong yi* 宗依, is put forward to illuminate the difference in the understanding of what is to be proved between Dignāga and other masters.

Likewise, Kuiji emphasizes this difference repeatedly in other parts of YRZLS. For instance, in YRZLS par.61–62, Kuiji explains in two ways why YRZL says that “the multiple statements of the thesis, and so on, are named ‘proof’” with the thesis member also contained. In both of these two explanations, a difference between Dignāga and ancient masters is the viewpoint that the property-possessor and the qualifier only belong to the substrata of the thesis and not what is to be proved.

Furthermore, as Kuiji interprets, because the property-possessor and the qualifier are considered as the two substrata of the thesis, YRZL stipulates that they must be well-established, i.e., equally accepted by both the proponent and the opponent. This stipulation can be found in YRZLS par.78, where Kuiji explains the term “well-established,” i.e., *jicheng* 極成 or *prasiddha*, on the basis of the concept “substrata of the thesis”:

YRZLS, T1840 p.98a16–a18: 有法、能別但是宗依而非是宗，此依必須兩宗至極共許成就，為依義立，宗體方成。所依若無，能依何立？由此宗依必須共許。

The property-possessor and the qualifier are merely the substrata of the thesis but not the thesis [itself]. These substrata must be accomplished ultimately (i.e., well-established) through equal acceptance by both sides, then they can be established as the substrata, and the essence of the thesis can be set up. If there was no substratum, then how could the reliever be set forth? Therefore, the substrata of the thesis must be equally accepted.
In this paragraph, the logical relationship between the property-possessor and the qualifier is considered as the relier in contrast to the two substrata as what are to be relied on. Therefore, as Kuiji states, to form a thesis, the property-possessor and the qualifier as the substrata must be equally accepted by both sides. He additionally lists the two types of mistakes which would otherwise occur, i.e., proving other theses and the thesis’ being incomplete.127 Thus, to highlight that the logical relationship is not equally accepted but is to be argued upon herein, the two substrata’s being well-established is put forward as a necessary precondition.

However, the concept of “substrate of the thesis” should not be regarded as one that was newly created in Kuiji’s YRZLS, for in earlier Chinese commentaries by Xuanzang’s other disciples, such as that by Wengui, this concept is already employed for the same referents. For instance, at the beginning of his commentary on the property-possessor and the qualifier of the thesis member, Wengui first introduces his paragraphing of that section:

YRZLSW, X848 p.682a03–a04:

謂極成有法，極成能別
述曰：此下第二懸解有五：一辨依，二明體，三示則，四簡濫，五結定。

YRZL: [Herein the thesis] means the well-established property-possessor and the well-established qualifier

YRZLSW: Below is the second part [of explaining the thesis], namely showing the explanation. It has five sub-parts: The first interprets the substrata; the second clarifies the essence; the third presents the rule; the fourth excludes the overflow; and the fifth summarizes.

It can be seen that Wengui also treats the property-possessor and the qualifier as the substrata but not the thesis directly. However, another problem thereupon is the difficulty of finding out the historical origin of the concept “substratum”. Since most of

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127 See YRZLS in T1840 p.98a19–b03.
the Chinese commentaries are not extant at present, there is not enough material to locate the very first usage of this concept. Although as Kuiji asserts, “substratum of the thesis” and “essence of the thesis” are derived from Dignāga’s theory, so far no Sanskrit equivalence like *paksāśraya has been found. However, since this concept was absorbed in the works of Xuanzang’s disciples, we can speculate that it comes from Xuanzang’s teaching on the particularity of Dignāga’s science of reasons system. Therefore, it is best to regard it as a new concept in the Chinese Yiming of Xuanzang’s lineage rather than merely in Kuiji’s interpretation.

2.3.1.2. The Essence of the Thesis

According to Kuiji, to differ from the ancient masters, Dignāga analyzes the thesis member into one essence and two substrata. The property-possessor and the qualifier are not to be argued about. They simply belong to the substrata of the thesis. The inseparable connection between the two substrata is to be argued upon, so this inseparable connection is the true essence of the thesis, i.e., zong ti 宗體. Concerning the definition of the thesis in Xuanzang’s Chinese translation of YRZL, Kuiji identifies the words “chabiexing gu 差別性故” as the description of the essence of the thesis in YRZLS par.99:

YRZLS, T1840 p.100a09–a11:

論：...差別性故...

述曰：出宗體。“差別”者，謂以一切有法及法互相差別。“性”者“體”也，此取二中互相差別不相離性以為宗體。

YRZL: ... because of the nature of qualifying ...

YRZLS: [This is the part of] exhibiting the essence of the thesis. “Qualifying” means all the mutual qualification between the property-possessor and the property. “Nature” means “essence,” this takes the inseparable connection by mutual qualification between these two as the essence of the thesis.
In this explanation, the essence of the thesis refers to the inseparable connection by mutual qualification between the two substrata. Therefore, there are two essential elements, namely the inseparable connection and the mutual qualification.

Concerning the inseparable connection, i.e., *buxianglixing* 不相離性 in Chinese, the only work referring to this term and possibly available to Kuiji among the available sources is *YZML*.128 In the Sanskrit restoration of NMu by Katsura (2015), *buxianglixing* 不相離性 is restored as *avinābhāva*.129 However, the usage of this term in Kuiji’s commentary does not accord with that in NMu. In Xuanzang’s translation, the word *buxianglixing* 不相離性 can be found twice. In both cases, this term refers to the logical relationship between the property to be proved in the thesis and the proving property in the reason. In the first case, when NMu illuminates why there are only three members but no others, the purpose of the example member is described as showing the inseparable connection between the property in the reason and the property to be proved.130 In the second case, when NMu explains why the example should not be separated from the reason, “between the reason and what is to be proved,” i.e., “因與所立,” is mentioned to describe the inseparable connection.131 Furthermore, if the

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128 The Sanskrit term *avinābhāva* is also used in the *Vādavidhi* (Lungui 論軌) attributed to Vasubandhu, also in its adjective form, i.e., *avinābhavin*, to define the reason and example. Related sentences are translated by Frauwallner (1957) as following:

“Der Grund ist die Mitteilung einer Eigenschaft, welche mit einem solchen (zu Beweisenden) untrennbar verbunden ist." (tādrviniḥbhedavādhyāavaitattadāyitam heturiti) (Frauwallner 1957, pp.16 and 34)

“Das Beispiel ist die Mitteilung der Verbindung dieser beiden. Wodurch die Verbindung, d.h. die untrennbare Verbindung (avinābhāvah), dieser beiden, d.h. des solchen und des untrennbar damit Verbundenen, also des zu Beweisenden und des Beweisenden, mitgeteilt wird, das ist das Beispiel, …” (Frauwallner 1957, p.17)

Although the *Vādavidhi* was not translated by Xuanzang or other Chinese scholars, Kuiji’s and Wengui’s commentaries on YRZL mention it several times, which means they did probably know about it through Xuanzang’s teachings or by other means. However, just as in the case of *YZML*, Kuiji’s usage of *buxianglixing* 不相離性 does not accord with that of *avinābhava* (and *avinābhavin*) in the *Vādavidhi* either.

129 See fn.648 in Part II.

130 In YZML, T1628 p.3a09–a11, also quoted in YRZLS par.255:

為於所比顯宗法性, 故說因言; 為顯於此不相離性, 故說喻言; 為顯所比, 故說宗言。

in order to show that a property of the thesis-[subject] is present in the subject to be inferred, the statement of the reason is expressed; in order to show [the reason’s] inseparable connection with this [thesis-property to be proved], the statement of the examples is expressed; and in order to show what is to be inferred, the statement of the thesis is expressed.

131 In YZML, T1628 p.3a20–a23, also quoted in YRZLS par.210:

又因、喻別, 此有立同法異法, 終不能顯因與所立不相離性, 是故但有類所立義, 然無功能。

Moreover, if the reason and the example were separated, [the example by] the similar property and [the
inseparable connection appears where YZML are quoted and commented, Kuiji follows YZML and explains this term as not the relationship between the proving property and the property to be proved.\(^{132}\)

However, as presented above, concerning Kuiji’s interpretation of the essence of the thesis, the inseparable connection is expressed as a relationship between the property-possessor and the qualifier (the property to be proved). In YZML, as a relationship between the proving and the property to be proved, this term is meant to reveal the logical necessity of the thesis through the reason. In contrast, in YRZLS herein, as a relationship between the property-possessor and the qualifier, it loses its logical significance, because this term has no such logical function in the reasoning process anymore. It shows the commentator’s unfamiliarity with Sanskrit terms.

With respect to the mutual qualification here, i.e., \textit{huxiang chabie 互相差別}, in Kuiji’s interpretation, not only can the qualifier qualify the property-possessor, but this can also take place inversely.\(^{133}\) As Kuiji illustrates in YRZLS par.99, in the proposition “the aggregate of form is without Self,” “the aggregate of form” and “without Self” can qualify each other, and such mutual qualification forms the inseparable connection, which is the essence of the thesis.\(^{134}\) However, logically speaking, as components of a proposition, only the predicate should be able to qualify the subject, which Kuiji also accepts. In YRZLS par.90, 91, he emphasizes that only the latter component of the thesis can qualify the former component, so the latter is called the qualifier. However, obviously, this viewpoint conflicts with the opinion of the mutual qualification here. To this problem, he responds by explaining:

\[\text{example by}] \text{the dissimilar property, which possess [the similarity and the dissimilarity to] what is to be proved, could not show the inseparable connection between the reason and what is to be proved. Therefore [these two examples] could merely have some analogy with what is to be proved, but they had no power \{of proving\}.}\]

\(^{132}\) See YRZLS, T1840 p.110b06–b12 in YRZLS par.210, and YRZLS, T1840 p.113c06–c10 in YRZLS par.255.

\(^{133}\) In NPV of Haribhadra, the word for the well-established qualifier and that for the nature of qualifying are read as one compound \textit{prasadddhvīśesānaviśiṣṭatavā}, and only the qualifier is regarded as capable of qualifying:

\textit{NPV} p.20, 14–16: \textit{viśyate ‘nete viśeṣanam, tena viśiṣṭaḥ prasadddhvīśesānaviśiṣṭaḥ, tad bhāvaḥ prasadddhvīśesānaviśiṣṭaḥ tayā prasadddhvīśesānaviśiṣṭatavāḥ hetubhūtāyā prasadddhāḥ |}

\(^{134}\) See YRZLS, T1840 p.100a11–a16.
Question: It is stated earlier that the qualifier refers to the property, then why does one now speak about “mutual qualification”?

Answer: When one considers the relationship between the proponent and the opponent, the property [in the inference by one side] refers to the qualifier. When one considers the relationship between the entity and the attribute, each of them (i.e., the property-possessor and the property) can be the qualifier and the qualified to the other. Since they are in different relationships, there is no contradiction.

In this paragraph, it can be seen that Kuiji analyzes this problem as two kinds of relations: The first is the relation between the proponent and the opponent, wherein only the qualifier, i.e., the property, is capable of qualifying. The second is the relation between the entity and the attribute, wherein the property-possessor and the qualifier can qualify each other as elaborated in YRZLS par.79–91. Since the two kinds of relationa apply to different situations respectively, they should not appear at the same time, and then there should not be any contradiction between them. In other words, on the logical level, the two components should be understood in the mode of the subject and its predicate. On the semantic level, each should be understood as the subject and also the modifier of the other. However, Kuiji interprets above the inseparable connection only on the second level, i.e., in terms of the relationship between the entity and the attribute, but not on the logical one.

In addition, the function word “gu 故” in the Chinese translation of YRZL is also significant for Kuiji’s interpretation. “Gu 故” stands for the instrumental case of the word {prasiddhaviśeṣaṇa}viśīṣṭatayā originally, but in his commentary, Kuiji provides two kinds of meaning. Firstly, it can point to a difference between the ancient masters
and Dignāga, because the ancient master only take one or both substrata but not the inseparable connection between them as the thesi. Secondly, “gu” can once more emphasize the requirement of the two substrata’s being well-established, for they must be equally accepted to make the inseparable connection between them the very point to be argued as the thesis.135

Furthermore, following these explanations, in YRZLS par.102 Kuiji turns to criticize those who read “chabie wei xing 差別為性” instead of “chabiexing gu 差別性故” to be ignorant about the two meanings. Compared with “差別性故” meaning “because of the nature of qualifying,” “差別為性” means “[with] the qualifying as the nature.” According to YY by Huizhao in T1841 p.145b25, the objects of criticism here refer to Lü Cai 呂才136 and Wengui. YY, IRMS, and others provide several explanations for this criticism. According to Huizhao, since the phrase “差別為性” already points to the essence of the thesis, in this case, the phrase “是名為宗,” i.e., “such is named ‘thesis,’”137 becomes a kind of repetition that causes an unnecessary lengthiness.138 Moreover, “差別為性” cannot exclude the theories of the ancient masters.139 At last, the character “故” is meant to reveal the ground for aprasiddhaviśesana, aprasiddhaviśesya, and aprasiddhobhaya based on the requirement of the two substrata’s being well-established.140 According to IRMS, Lü Cai and Wengui only understood that the theories of the ancient masters should be excluded but did not know about the emphasis on the requirement of the two substrata’s being well-established Therefore, they did not apprehend the importance of the character “故.”141 In addition, Master Bin asserts that there were two Sanskrit manuscripts of NP, so the phrase “差別

135 See YRZLS, T1840 p.100a24–b05.
136 呂才 (600–665) was a learned official of the Tang dynasty. In 655, he read Xuanzang’s translation of YRZL as well as several commentaries by Xuanzang’s disciples and wrote the Li po zhujie 立破註解 (Commentary with Proofs and Refutations) with diagrams to discuss with Xuanzang’s school. However, this work is no longer extant; only the preface and several points are preserved in the biography of Xuanzang and Japanese commentaries such as IRMS, IDS. See the Datang Daci’ensi sanzangfashi zhu，T2053 pp.262b12–266a06. See Frankenhauser (1995).
137 In fact the words “是名為宗,” i.e., “such is named ‘thesis,’” does not exist in the extant Sanskrit manuscripts but can only be found in the Chinese translation by Xuanzang.
138 See the Cheng weishi lun luoyide 序，T1832 p.682b12–b14.
139 See the Cheng weishi lun luoyide，T1832 p.682b16–b19.
140 See the Cheng weishi lun luoyide，T1832 p.682b19–b22.
141 See IRMS, T2270 p.250b01–b04.
為性” comes from a different manuscript than the one used by Kuiji. However, according to Kuiji, there is only one manuscript, and the appearance of “差別為性” is merely due to Wengui’s ignorance of the character “故”.

Concerning the two meanings of “故” given in YRZLS, YY, as a work by Kuiji’s direct disciple, claims that Lü Cai and Wengui did not comprehend either meaning. However, IRMS states that they merely did not know about the emphasis on the requirement of the two substrata’s being well-established. A conflict between YY and IRMS is thus notable.

In this case, it is best to have a look at the relevant section of YRZLSW directly to examine the similarity and the dissimilarity between Wengui and Kuiji on this point.

YRZLSW, X848 p.682c09–c22:

差別為性

述曰：此明體也。古因明師或有以“聲”為宗，以成立“聲”為無常故；或有以“無常”為宗，以不許聲有“無常”故；或有以“聲”、“無常”合以為宗，以“聲”、“無常”別非宗故。陳那破云，“聲”及“無常”元來共許，何得為宗？故我但取“聲”及“無常”不相離性以之為宗，以敵論者不許不相離故。謂“聲”是何然？為常、為無常耶？此以“無常”別常聲。“無常”是何無常？為色、為聲耶？是聲無常。此以“聲”別色無常。故言“差別”。如言“青蓮華”，青是何青？為葉、為華耶？是蓮花青。花是何花？為白、為青耶？是青蓮华。青與蓮華相差別也。“為性”者，如此更相差別，總合為一不相離性，如此不相離性方是宗體。

問：“聲”與“無常”既相差別，何故能別獨在“無常”？

答：如其名也，簡法實齊；對敵申宗，便為能別。...

YRZL: … [with] the qualifying as the nature…

YRZLSW: This is [the part of] clarifying the essence. Some of the ancient Yinming masters regard “sound” as the thesis to establish that “sound” is

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142 Based on the extant manuscripts, the Chinese character “性” comes from the affix –tā, which is a part of the compound {prasiddhaviśeṣan}viśiṣṭatā. Hence, the Sanskrit reading equivalent to “差別為性” must take “性” as another independent word apart from “差別,” i.e., viśiṣṭa-, but this does not seem possible.

143 See IRMS, T2270 p.250b04–09.
impermanent; some others regard “impermanent” as the thesis, for [the opponent] does not accept that sound possesses [the property of being] “impermanent”; some others regard “sound” and “impermanent” combined as the thesis, for if “sound” and “impermanent” were separated, then neither would be the thesis. Dignāga retorts by saying, “sound” and “impermanent” are both equally accepted originally, so how can they be the thesis? Thus, I just take the inseparable connection between them as the thesis, because the opponent does not accept this inseparable [connection]. It means, what sound is this “sound”? Is it the permanent sound or the impermanent sound? [To these questions,] “impermanent” answers by excluding the permanent sound. And what impermanence is this “impermanent”? Is it [the impermanence] of form or of sound? [Therefore, “sound is impermanent” means] it is the impermanence of sound. [To these questions,] “sound” answers by excluding the impermanence of form. Therefore, “the qualifying” is said. Just like saying “blue lotus,” what blue is this “blue”? Is it [the blue] of a leaf or of a lotus? [Therefore, “blue lotus” means] it is the blue of a lotus. What a lotus is this “lotus”? Is it white or blue? [Therefore, “blue lotus” means] it is a blue lotus. Thus, “blue” and “lotus” qualify each other. “As the nature” means, the mutual qualification in this manner can constitute an inseparable connection, and such an inseparable connection is exactly the essence of the thesis.

Question: Since “sound” and “impermanent” qualify each other, why does the qualifier merely refer to “impermanent”?

Answer: As names, the qualifying [of “sound” and “impermanent”] is actually equal; in the thesis set against the opponent, it becomes the qualifier. …

In this paragraph, Wengui also regards the inseparable connection by mutual qualification between the property-possessor and the qualifier as the essence of the thesis and underlines it to be the key difference between the theory of Dignāga and those of the ancient masters. Therefore, on this point, the accusation made by Kuiji and Huizhao of Wengui’s ignorance of excluding the ancient masters theories seems
unjustified. However, the most notable dissimilarity between YRZLSW and Kuiji’s YRZLS is Wengui’s neglect of a more explicit emphasis on the substrata’s being well-established with respect to the second meaning of “gu 故” as interpreted by Kuiji. Nevertheless, as far as I can see, there is no significant difference between the viewpoints of Wengui and Kuiji, and there does not seem to be any good reason for Kuiji to denounce Wengui so bitterly as he does in YRZLS par.102.

Moreover, in Wengui’s answer above on the qualifying between the property-possessor and the qualifier, similar to Kuiji, he also distinguishes the unidirectional qualifying in a thesis from the bidirectionally qualifying in a modifying compound. Especially noteworthy here is the illustration of “blue lotus”: on the one hand, it can be seen from this “blue lotus” that the mutual qualification is actually interpreted on the level of semantics but not logic; on the other hand, this “blue lotus” suggests a remarkable resemblance to the fifth chapter of PS(V). In PS(V) 5, Dignāga engages in a lengthy discussion on “blue lotus,” stating that “blue” and “lotus” can each be qualifier and qualified, and the referent can simply be indicated when the words “blue” and “lotus” are combined.144 Analogously, Kuiji’s commentary on the Cheng weishi lun also cites “blue lotus” to illustrate the expression through apoha, i.e., exclusion.145 Thus, it is possible that they both obtained some knowledge about relevant interpretation in PS(V). This means that although PS(V) was not translated by Xuanzang, it was probably introduced to his disciples through oral teachings. Nevertheless, even if Xuanzang did teach his disciples about PS(V), the illustration “blue lotus” in PS(V) 5 is not related to logic at all but only discussed on the semantic level as a modifying compound. Thus, the appropriateness of citing “blue lotus” to explain the mutual qualification of the two components in the thesis member is still questionable.

To sum up, in Kuiji’s YRZLS, the essence of the thesis member refers to the inseparable connection by mutual qualification between the two substrata of the thesis.

144 See PS(V) 5.14ff.
145 See the Cheng weishi lun shuji, T1830 p.296c23–c25. See also Katsura (2014, p.117).
However, the word “inseparable connection” is referred to as a relationship between the two substrata but not as a relationship between the reason and the thesis as in NMu. The mutual qualification is interpreted on the level of semantics, while on the level of logic, the qualification in a thesis is still unidirectional. Furthermore, as Kuiji stresses, Dignāga’s theory of distinguishing the essence is meant to differentiate from the ancient masters’ understandings of thesis. Besides YRZLS, YRZLSW by Wengui also interprets these points in a similar way, which may imply that the origin of their common knowledge is in the teachings of Xuanzang. In addition, since a strong resemblance to a discussion in PS(V) 5 can be found in YRZLSW, Xuanzang might have already taught his disciples about that work. Therefore, the concept of the essence of the thesis, i.e., zong ti 宗體, on the one side, should be regarded as a new term advocated strongly to differentiate the new views from those of earlier theories. On the other side, it is derived from specific Sanskrit sources such as NMu and PS(V) but also modified and reinterpreted by the Chinese commentators. Although there is a possibility that this term was present in Sanskrit, such as in Dignāga’s works and later translated and introduced by Xuanzang, no direct evidence for this has been found so far.

Furthermore, the explanation of the thesis member in NP goes as follows:

NP 2.1: *tatra pakṣah prasiddho dharmī prasiddhaviśeṣaṇaviṣiṣṭatayā svayam sādhyatvena īpsitaḥ | pratyakṣādyaviruddha iti vākyāśeṣaḥ tadyathā anityaḥ śabdo nityo vā iti ||* (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.2, 3–5).

Herein the subject is a well-established property-possessor desired by oneself to be proved as qualified by a well-established qualifier. The supplementary is “not contradictory to the perception, etc.” For example, “sound is impermanent” or “[sound] is permanent.”

In brief, the thesis member here presents a property-possessor to be qualified by a qualifier, so it can be symbolically expressed as *Vd*. Although in YRZLS the inseparable connection between the two substrata of the thesis is to be proved, in the
case of debate only the property can be the qualifier, and the property-possession is to be qualified. This means that the thesis member in YRZLS can also be described as Vd. Therefore, since the thesis member under debate is still meant to present the qualification to a subject by a qualifier through the so-called inseparable connection, essentially no logical change is made.

2.3.1.3. The Substrata and Essences of the Examples

Besides the thesis member, Kuiji also analyzes the example member into substrata and essences, i.e., yu yi 喻依 and yu ti 喻體.

Concerning the example member, Dignāga stipulates two statements in the forms of anvaya and vyatireka, respectively, to represent the second and third characteristics in trairūpya, viz. sapakṣe sattvam and vipakṣa ’sattvam. In YRZLS, these two statements are referred to as the essences of the example by similarity and the example by dissimilarity respectively, while the instances are referred to as their substrata. Let us take the inference “sound is impermanent, because of being produced” as an example. In the example member, the statement “whatever is produced is seen to be impermanent” presents the essence of the example by similarity, while the instances “a pot, and so forth” belong to its substrata; the statement “whatever is permanent is seen to be not produced” presents the essence of the example by dissimilarity, while the instances “ether, and so forth” belong to the substrata.

In YRZLS par.206, Kuiji quotes from YZML to explain the stipulation of the example statements in YRZL. In his commentary, he interprets the role of the example in Dignāga’s system as follows:

YRZLS, T1840 pp.109c24–110a08: 古因明師因外有喻。如勝論云“聲無常”

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146 The functions of the example by similarity and that by dissimilarity are described as paryudāsa and prasajyapratisedha by Dignāga and translated as zhe quan 遮詮 and zhi lan 止濫 by Xuanzang in YZML in T1628 p.2c08–c09. Zhe quan 遮詮 here refers to the negating expression, and in contrast to prasajyapratisedha or 止濫 which only cancels in the non-implicative way, zhe quan is an implicative negation. However, Kuiji interprets it as the opposite of the affirming expression, i.e., biao quan 表詮, and neglects its aspect of expressing. See YRZLS par.227. See also Zamorski, Jakub (forthcoming). “Hetu-vidyā Transmitted or Only Translated? Some Remarks on Chinese Interpretations of the Distinction Between Two Types of Negation.”
宗，“所作性”因，同喻“如瓶”，異喻“如空”，不舉“諸所作者皆無常”等貫於二處。故因非喻，瓶為同喻體，空為異喻體。陳那已後，說因三相即攝二喻，二喻即因，俱顯宗故，“所作性”等貫二處故。…故於因外別說二喻，顯因有處宗必隨逐，並返成故，令宗義成。

Some ancient masters of the science of reasons hold that there are examples separate from the reason. For example, a Vaiśeṣika sets forth the thesis “sound is impermanent,” the reason “because of being produced,” and the example by similarity “like a pot,” and the example by dissimilarity “like ether,” but does not set out “whatever is produced is impermanent” [and its contrary] to go through the two loci (i.e., the pot and ether). Hence, the reason is not the example, and the pot is taken as the essence of the example by similarity and ether is taken as the essence of the example by dissimilarity. Since Dignāga, the two examples are included when the three characteristics of a [correct] reason are expressed, and the two examples just belong to the reason, because both [the examples and the reason] are meant to manifest the thesis, and because [the reason-property] “produced,” and so on, (i.e., the thesis-property “impermanent” and the contraries of these two) go through these two loci (i.e., the pot and ether). … Thus, the two examples are expressed separately from the reason to show that wherever the reason is present, the thesis[-property] certainly follows [to be present], and to establish [the concomitance between the reason and the thesis-property] in a negating way to establish the thesis.

Kuiji states that according to the doctrine of the ancient masters, there is no statement to connect the example with the reason, so the example is considered as an independent member apart from the reason, and the instances stand directly as the essences of the two kinds of examples. However, since Dignāga, the two kinds of examples are regarded as contained in trairūpya instead, so statements are advocated in the two kinds of examples to reveal the second and third characteristics of trairūpya, i.e., sapakṣe sattvam and vipakṣa ‘sattvam. Furthermore, the reason is merely meant to reveal the first characteristic but not the other two. Therefore, although essentially the two kinds
of examples belong to the reason, they have to be present additionally to reveal the other two characteristics.

Besides, from YRZLS par.211–212, based on YZML, Kuiji explains that the example member in the ancient master’s doctrine commits two logical fallacies, i.e., *regressus ad infinitum* and requiring the instance to be similar in all aspects. On the latter point, Wengui’s commentary tells precisely how Dignāga’s stipulation of the example statements is capable of avoiding it:

YRZLSW, X848 p.687a09–a13: 陳那破云，若直以瓶為同法喻，以瓶體是無常故類聲亦是無常者，亦應瓶是四塵、可見燒，聲亦四塵、可燒見。若如我釋，“諸所作者，皆是無常”以為喻體，瓶等非喻是所依，即無此過。（ad YRZL: 譬如瓶等 = yathā ghaṭādir)

Dignāga objects, if [you] take a pot directly as the example by similarity and take the impermanence of the pot to draw an analogy with the impermanence of sound, then since the pot is [made of] the four objects of sense, and is visible and burnable, sound should also be [made of] the four objects of sense, and be burnable and visible. However, if [the example can be formed] as I explain, i.e., with “whatever is produced is impermanent” as the essence of the example [by similarity], and a pot, and so forth, as the substrata [of the example by similarity] but not the example [by similarity] itself, then there should be no such a fallacy.

Wengui uses the terms “essence of the example” and “substrata” to describe the formation of the example in Dignāga’s opinion, and in this manner, he distinguishes Dignāga’s formulation from his opponent who sets forth no statement but merely instances. Moreover, Wengui’s paragraph also implies the possibility of a common understanding of this topic among Xuanzang’s disciples besides Kuiji.148

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147 See YRZLS, T1840 p.110b12–b28, also in YRZLS par.211 and 212.

148 This phenomenon can also be supported by Shentai 神泰’s commentary on YZML, i.e., the *Limenlun shuji* 理門論述記, in T1839 pp.89c21–90a09, where he defines the statements as essences and the instances as substrata:

論: 以諸勤勇無間所發皆見無常 者
[述記]: 此喻體也。
論: 瓶等 者.
To sum up, since Dignāga has already emphasized the role of the statements of the example member,\(^{149}\) Kuiji uses particular terms, i.e., the essence of the example or *yu ti* 喻體 in Chinese, to represent such an emphasis and its particularity compared with the viewpoint of ancient masters. He regards the instances as merely substrata but not the example member itself. However, similarly to the case of the essence and substrata of the thesis, these terms are already used in the same manner by other disciples of Xuanzang before Kuiji, such as Wengui. Thus, there is also the possibility that Xuanzang had already applied such terms to explain Dignāga’s interpretation of the example member and its difference to that of the ancient masters in his oral teaching.

### 2.3.2. The Similar and Dissimilar Groups of the Reason

The similar and dissimilar groups of the reason represent another typical case of the invention of new concepts in the Chinese Yinming tradition. However, compared with the substrata and essences of the thesis and example investigated above, this pair deviates even further from the Sanskrit terminology. Kuiji’s explanations of these terms are self-contradictory, for they are defined as relevant either to only the proving property or to both the proving property and the property to be proved in the same text. However, some clues as to their origins can be found in Dignāga’s NMu, and Kuiji is not the only interpreter to suggest them either.

Besides the similar and dissimilar groups related to the thesis, in YRZLS there is

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\(^{149}\) For Dignāga’s related interpretation on the example member in PS(V) 4, see Katsura (2004) “The Role of *drṣṭānta* in Dignāga’s Logic.”
still another pair related to the reason. Therefore, in order to differentiate between these two pairs, the former pair corresponding to sapakṣa and vipakṣa is called zong tongpin 宗同品 and zong yipin 宗異品, i.e., the similar group and the dissimilar group of the thesis, while the latter is called yin tongpin 因同品 and yin yipin 因異品, i.e., the similar group and the dissimilar group of the reason.

Taking the similar groups as an example, in YRZLS par.146 discussing the second characteristic of a correct reason, translated as tongpindingyou xing 同品定有性 from sapakṣe sattvam, Kuiji provides a comparison explaining the two kinds of similar groups:

YRZLS, T1840 pp.103c2–104a04: 同品有二: 一，宗同品，故下論云“所立法均等義品是名‘同品’”；二，因同品，下文亦言“若於是處顯因同品決定有性”。然論多說宗之同品名為“同品”，宗相似故；因之同品名為“同法”，宗之法故。何須二同？因之在處說宗同品，欲顯其因遍宗、喻故。宗法隨因說因同法，顯有因處宗法必隨故。

The similar group includes two kinds: The first is the similar group of the thesis, so this treatise says below that “the group of [things with] quality equal [to the thesis-subject] by [their] common possession of the property to be proved is named ‘similar group’; the second is the similar group of the reason, [this treatise] also says below “wherever the announced similar group of the reason [is followed by] the character of definite presence [of the property of the thesis].” However, this treatise calls the similar group of the thesis “similar group” most of the time, because it is similar to [the property in] the thesis; and the similar group of the reason is named “similar property,” because it is a property of the thesis[-subject]. Why are two kinds of similar [groups] needed? Because where the reason is present, the similar group of the thesis is mentioned, for it is intended to show that the reason pervades150 the thesis[-subject] and the [similar] instances. When the property of the thesis follows

150 According to trikṛtyā, an inference can be proved even if the reason is present in just one similar instance, so actually there is no need for a reason to pervade all the similar instances as Kuiji states here.
the reason, the similar property of the reason is mentioned, for it is intended to show that wherever the reason is present, the property of the thesis must follow.

This paragraph can be divided into two parts: the first part distinguishes between two kinds of similar groups on the basis of specific textual evidence, particularly in Kuiji’s manner; the second shows the reason for why two kinds of similar groups are needed.

In this paragraph, the similar group of the thesis corresponds to sapakṣa in NP, but the similar group of the reason does not figure in the original text quoted here. Concerning the similar group of the reason, i.e., yin tongpin 因同品, Kuiji quotes the definition of the example by similarity in YRZL to prove the existence of such a term. The relevant sentence in Xuanzang’s translation reads “顯因同品決定有性” for hetoh sapakṣa evāstitvaṃ khyāpyate. Separately speaking, “xian 顯” indicates khyāpyate; “yin 因” indicates hetohi; “tongpin 同品” indicates sapakṣe; and “juedingyouxing 決定有性” indicates evāstitvaṃ. Thus, “yin 因” and “tongpin 同品” should not be read together here as one complete word. Therefore, it can be speculated that the reading “yin tongpin 因同品” is caused by problematic punctuation of the Chinese text due to the commentator’s unfamiliarity with the Sanskrit original. In YRZLS par.203, a definition of this “因同品” is also given:

YRZLS. T1840 p.109b17–b18: “因”者，即是有法之上共許之法，若處有此名“因同品”。

“Reason” is the equally accepted property of the property-possessor, so if it exists in these loci, these loci are named “the similar group of the reason.”

Compared with the definition of sapakṣa in NP, which is based on a similarity to the property that is to be proved in the thesis, the similar group of the reason here is based on the similarity to the proving property in the reason.

Concerning the question of why two kinds of similar groups are needed, Kuiji states that the similar group of the thesis is meant to represent the pervasion of the reason in the thesis-subject and similar instances; that of the reason is meant to represent that wherever the reason is present, the property of the thesis must also be present.
Therefore, both kinds of similar groups are interpreted here as pertinent to the positive concomitance, i.e., *anvaya*. They merely provide two different angles to describe this concomitance. However, in YRZLS par.147, Kuiji explains the similar group of the reason as the loci “wherever the thesis[-property] exists, the reason is certainly present.” Therefore, in contrast to the explanation in YRZLS par.146 above, the definition here points inversely to the second characteristic of *trairūpyā*, i.e., *sapakṣe sattvam*. Even more surprisingly, Kuiji states further that “actually the similar group refers to the similar [group] of the reason principally, because the reason strings the thesis and example with a broad nature, for wherever the equally accepted reason is present, the unequally accepted [thesis-]property certainly follows.” It means that the definition turns back to the positive concomitance again! Thus, on the one hand, the similar group of the reason is confusingly related to not only the proving property in the reason but also the property to be proved in the thesis. On the other hand, the logical sequence of these two properties represented by this concept seems unfixed, which indicates a confusion between the second characteristic and the positive concomitance in Kuiji’s understanding.

To sum up, based on Kuiji’s commentary, the similar group of the reason refers to whatever possesses similarity to the proving property, and this is considered as the main similar group. However, Kuiji also contradictorily explains this similar group of the reason as related to the property to be proved besides the proving property just like the example by similarity and claims that this term, as well as the similar group of the thesis, is meant to represent the positive concomitance. However, as far as I can see, Kuiji’s interpretation of this term is not clear enough.

Analogously, his interpretation of the dissimilar group of the reason is also quite confusing. In YRZLS par.167 he explains it as “wherever the thesis[-property] is absent, the reason must be universally absent.” Thus, both the property to be proved and the

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151 YRZLS, T1840 p.104a09–a10: 有此宗處決定有因，名“因同品”。
152 YRZLS, T1840 p.104a10–a11: 然實同品正取因同，因貫宗、喻體性寬遍，有此共許因法之處不共許法定必隨故。
153 YRZLS, T1840 p.106a18: 無此宗處定遍無因，名“因異品”
proving property are being referred to. However, in YRZLS par.187 he states that “‘be seen to be unproduced’ is also said, because the dissimilar group of the reason is also cited to illustrate [the nature of] being universally absent [from the dissimilar group] simultaneously.”\textsuperscript{154} This statement implies that the dissimilarity points solely to the proving property.

The question is whether this pair of new terms provides benefits to the interpretation of YRZL or not. Still taking the similar group of the reason as an example, in YRZLS par.204, Kuiji divides the definition of the example by similarity into “the announced similar group of the reason” and “the character of the definite presence” as two sides and then constructs a \textit{catuṣkoṭi}-like examination of possibilities:

YRZLS, T1840 p.109b26–c08:

(1) 唯言“因同品”，不說“定有性”，即九句中諸異品有…
(2) 若言“定有性”，不說“因同品”，亦即是九句中同品非有…
(3) 若“非因同品”亦“非定有性”，即九句中異品非有…
(4) 若“顯因同品亦決定有性”，即九句中同品亦有句…

(1 A and -B) If only “the similar group of the reason” is said but not “the character of definite presence,” it refers to all the forms of [the reason’s] being present in the dissimilar group [of the thesis] in the nine forms…

(2 -A and B) If only “the character of definite presence” is said but not “the similar group of the reason,” it refers to all the forms of [the reason’s] being absent from the similar group [of the thesis] in the nine forms…

(3 -A and -B) If neither “the character of definite presence” nor “the similar group of the reason” is said, it refers to all the forms of [the reason’s] being absent from the dissimilar group [of the thesis] in the nine forms…

(4 A and B) If “the similar group of the reason and the character of definite presence” is said (without a logical relationship), it refers to all the forms of

\textsuperscript{154} YRZLS, T1840 p.108a07–a09: 此中既說宗之異品，唯應說云“謂若是常，如虛空等”，復云“見非所作”者，舉因異品兼釋遍無。
[the reason’s] being present in the similar group [of the thesis] in the nine forms…

The nine forms describe the reason’s presence in the similar and dissimilar groups of the thesis. In these four possibilities above, “the announced similar group of the reason” implies the presence of the reason-property (the proving property), while “the character of the definite presence” implies the presence of the thesis-property (the property to be proved). Kuiji explains the four possibilities in the model of the nine forms. Therefore, although the literal words point to the similar group of the reason, they are turned into four possibilities about the presence of the reason-property in the similar and dissimilar groups of the thesis inversely. The definition of the example by similarity in YRZLS can thus be understood as “wherever the reason-property is followed by the thesis-property.” If, for the time being, we shelve the issue discussed in Chapter 2.2 of whether the subject in the thesis should be removed, then the example by similarity in YRZLS can be briefly expressed as \((Hx \rightarrow Vx)\). The original definition in NP reads:

\[
\text{NP 2.3: tatra sādharmyena tāvat yatra hetoḥ sapakṣa evāstitvam khyāpyate |}
\]

(Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.3, 6–7).

Of these, [the example by] similar proper means [the example] wherever the reason is announced to be present only in the similar group.

If, here, we likewise shelve the issue of the subject in the thesis, then this Sanskrit definition also means \((Hx \rightarrow Vx)\). Thus, the usage of such terms has not made any structural change to Dignāga’s system at all. Nevertheless, their benefit to the interpretation of YRZL is quite limited.

In addition, the similar and dissimilar groups of the reason are not newly created by Kuiji either, for references can be found in both YZML and YRZLSW by Wengui. In a sentence from YZML below, the term “yin yipin 因異品,” i.e., the dissimilar group of the reason, can be observed:

YZML, T1628 p.3a29: 世間但顯，宗、因異品，同處有性，為異法喻…
[The science of reasons of the heretics of] the common world merely indicates that, whatever possesses in the same place the existence of the dissimilar groups of the thesis and the reason, is the example by the dissimilar property…

This quote belongs to Dignāga’s criticism of other systems. Although the Sanskrit original is currently inaccessible, in Xuanzang’s Chinese translation the word for the dissimilar group of the reason does indeed occur. Moreover, Wengui, in YRZLSW, comments on the definition of the example by similarity with the following statement:

YRZLSW, X848 p.686b13–b14: “因”者，謂即遍是宗法因；“同品”謂與此因相似，非謂宗同名“同品”也。

“Reason” means the reason which is universally a property of the thesis[-subject]; “similar group” means [the loci] similar to this reason but not those similar to the thesis.

Besides:

YRZLSW, X848 p.686b22: “謂若所作”即前“顯因同品”也。

“Whatever is produced” refers to “the announced similar group of the reason” above.

Thus, in this earlier commentary, “yin 因” and “tongpin 同品” are already read as one word with the same punctuation as that by Kuiji, and such “similar group of the reason” is also distinguished from that of the thesis. Therefore, based on YZML, there is a strong possibility that these terms did exist in Sanskrit materials which Xuanzang had access to. Based on YRZLSW, similar interpretations are existent in works by other

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155 In the following sentence “云何具有所立、能立及異品法，二種譬喻而有此失” in YZML, T1628 p.3b02–b03, also quoted in YRZLS par.214, there is also a Chinese word “異品” related to the proving property, however, I am not sure whether this “異品” here refers to “dissimilar group” or merely “dissimilar.”

156 A definition of “dissimilar group of the reason” (hetor vipakṣaḥ) is found by Tang (2015, pp.309–310) in the Hetuttattvopadeśa, which defines this concept as things devoid of both the proing property and the property to be proved:

However, we find some clues for this misconception even in Indian sources. As we find, the Hetuttattvopadeśa (HTU) of Jitāri gives the following definition of vipakṣa:

\[ \text{ko vā hetor vipakṣaḥ} /\text{yatra sādhyaḥbhāvena hetor abhāvo niyamena kathyate} /\text{yathākāśādiri}/ \]

And what is the vipakṣa of reason (hetor vipakṣaḥ)? [They are things] where the reason is
disciples of Xuanzang.

The usage of this pair of terms was inherited by the Chinese and Japanese successors and was never questioned before the modern period. Lü Cheng 呂澂 points out that the similar and dissimilar groups should only be related to the property to be proved but not the proving property, so the similar and dissimilar groups of the reason are in fact nothing but a misunderstanding.\textsuperscript{157} Xiong Shili 熊十力 agrees with him on this point.\textsuperscript{158} In contrast, Chen Daqi 陳大齊 states that even if such terms may reveal Kuiji’s misunderstanding, they are conducive to clarify the logical theory, and should, therefore, be regarded as useful. Still, he also considers Kuiji’s interpretation of these two terms as antinomic and confusing.\textsuperscript{159}

2.3.3. Concepts Invented or Merely Renamed

In this section, two groups of terms non-existent in the extant Sanskrit literature were examined. The first group contains the substrata and essences of the thesis and example. Those of the thesis read \textit{zong yi} 宗依 and \textit{zong ti} 宗體 in Chinese and refer to the property-possessor, the qualifier, and the inseparable connection between them, respectively. Those of the example read \textit{yu yi} 喻依 and \textit{yu ti} 喻體 and refer to the instances and the two kinds of statements through \textit{anvaya} and \textit{vyatireka}. The second group contains the similar and dissimilar groups of the reason, i.e., \textit{yin tongpin} 因同品 and \textit{yin yipin} 因異品. Although these terms cannot be found directly in related Sanskrit materials, they stem from Sanskrit concepts or theories.

According to Kuiji, the substrata and the essences of the thesis and the example are distinguished because of Dignāga’s distinctive theories on the thesis and the example. Here, the essence of the thesis refers to the inseparable connection by mutual qualification between the property-possessor and the qualifier, but the inseparable

\textsuperscript{157} See Lü (1926, reprinted in 2006, p.26, fn.6, and p.42, fn.3).
\textsuperscript{158} See Xiong (1926, reprinted in 2008, p.222).
\textsuperscript{159} See Chen (1938, reprinted in 2006, pp.49–51).
connection here means the relation between the two substrata of the thesis instead of that between the two properties as stated in YZML.

The similar and dissimilar groups of the reason are advocated by drawing on the reinterpreted literal evidence from YRZL, but defined ambiguously as relevant with the thesis-property besides the reason-property. However, Kuiji’s use of these terms makes virtually no significant change to the original logical system.

Furthermore, besides Kuiji, the earlier commentary on YRZL by Wengui also provides similar usage and interpretation of these terms. Such a resemblance implies a possible source in Xuanzang’s teaching, yet the case of the similar and dissimilar groups of the reason is probably even more likely an outcome of unfaithful punctuation by the Chinese commentators, and cannot possibly be blamed on a person so familiar with Sanskrit as Xuanzang. However, since there is no direct evidence for such terms in Sanskrit for the time being, it is not possible to move closer to the reception of Dignāga’s science of reasons in India (especially in Nālandā) during Xuanzang’s stay. In addition, the illustration by “blue lotus” in Wengui’s YRZLSW and Kuiji’s commentary on the Cheng weishi lun also implies a similarity to the fifth chapter of Dignāga’s PS(V).

To conclude, I would like to, tentatively, attribute the new terms investigated in this section to Xuanzang and his circle, especially his disciples, and not merely Kuiji. These new terms should be regarded as concepts derived from Sanskrit and renamed in Chinese rather than entirely new inventions. Since such new concepts are interpreted in Chinese commentaries on the basis of both Sanskrit sources and Chinese understanding, despite the fact that some of them do not accord with the Sanskrit original, it is better to consider them as some new buds on the Chinese branch of Buddhist argumentation instead of arbitrary misunderstandings.
3. Standards of the Practice of Argumentation

Yinming is not merely theoretical but a system of argumentation and so the standard of being genuine (真) in Yinming argumentation is not entirely a logical issue either. In the previous chapter, I have examined Kuiji’s interpretation of concepts in the formulation of inference. Now I will examine his interpretation of how to practice argumentation through inferences. However, unlike discussion on concepts in Chapter 2, since the topic of the current chapter is more practical than literal, it will focus directly on which interpretation is made rather than how. In this manner, Kuiji’s interpretation of the two aspects of the argumentation process will be investigated: the first refers to the rules for debate; the second is the judgment of result.

3.1. Rules for Debate

As a method of argumentation, the science of reasons stipulates the rule of prasiddha to form the basis of debate. This rule is also interpreted and emphasized in the Chinese context. Besides, the Chinese Yinming tradition creates and applies a new rule of the three kinds of inferences based on prasiddha. Accordingly, this section will investigate how Kuiji interprets these two rules and how they shape the practice of argumentation.

3.1.1. The Requirement of Being Well-established

In the definition of the thesis given by NP, both the property-possessor and the qualifier are restricted by prasiddha, i.e., well-established, which is translated as jicheng 極成 by Xuanzang. Kuiji’s interpretation of jicheng 極成 in YRZLS is as follows:

YRZLS, T1840 p.98a15–a19: “極”者“至”也，“成”者“就”也，至極成就故名“極成”。有法、能別但是宗依而非是宗，此依必須兩宗至極共許成就，
為依義立，宗體方成。所依若無，能依何立？由此宗依必須共許。共許名為“至極成就”，至理有故，法本真故。

“Well” means “ultimately,” “established” means “accomplished,” because of being ultimately accomplished, [such an expression] is called “well-established.” The property-possessor and the qualifier are merely the substrata of the thesis but not the thesis [itself]. These substrata must be accomplished ultimately through equal acceptance by both sides (i.e., the proponent and the opponent), then they can be established as the substrata, and the essence of the thesis can be set up. If there was no substratum (i.e., what is to be relied on), then how could the reliever be set forth? Therefore, the substrata of the thesis must be equally accepted. [An expression which is] equally accepted is named “ultimately accomplished,” because [its denotation] is existent in the ultimate principle and [it shows] an original truth of dharmas.

This paragraph explains what the word jicheng 極成 means and why it is needed as a modifier for the two substrata of the thesis in this definition. The two Chinese characters ji 極 and cheng 成 stand for the Sanskrit prefix prā- and siddha, and they are explained by Kuiji as “ultimately” and “accomplished,” respectively. Concerning the reason for why “well-established” is necessary, Kuiji explains that the property-possessor and the qualifier must be established as the substrata in advance for the essence of thesis, i.e., the inseparable connection between them. Therefore, to be precise, being well-established just means being equally accepted by both the proponent and the opponent.

Wengui’s commentary on “well-established” is much more clear and concise:

YRZLSW, X848 p.682 a22–a23: 言“極成”者，主、賓俱許名為“極成”。

As to the “well-established” said here, being accepted by both the proponent and the opponent is called “well-established.”

Wengui states explicitly that “well-established” just means being equally accepted by both sides.
“Well-established” thus refers to the precondition of being equally accepted and is necessary for the equality of the debate between the proponent and the opponent. Concerning the case that such a precondition is not met, Kuiji points out two errors in YRZLS par.78: The first is the error of proving other theses; the second is the error of the thesis’ being incomplete as a member. In other words, if the two substrata of the thesis were not equally accepted, then the substrata themselves and not the concomitance between them must first be argued about; meanwhile, logical errors of the reason and example would also be caused by this incomplete thesis.

Furthermore, there are three fallacies with respect to the cases when either or both the property-possessor and the qualifier are not well-established, viz. aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇa (nengbie bu jicheng 能別不極成 in Chinese, i.e., the fallacy that the qualifier is not well-established), aprasiddhaviśeṣya (suobie bu jicheng 所別不極成 in Chinese, i.e., the fallacy that what is to be qualified is not well-established), aprasiddhaubhaya (ju bu jicheng 俱不極成 in Chinese, i.e., the fallacy that both [the qualifier and what is to be qualified] are not well-established). In contrast, the ninth fallacy of the thesis given in NP/ YRZL, viz. prasiddhasambandha or xiangfu jicheng 相符極成, refers to the case that the concomitance between the property-possessor and the qualifier that should not be equally accepted is in fact equally accepted.

Besides, according to YRZLS, being well-established is not merely a precondition related to the property-possessor and the qualifier, the reason and the example are also required to be well-established. In YRZLS par.9, Kuiji defines inference as: “It uses what have been well-established to prove what has not been accepted before.” Being well-established is thus also regarded as a precondition of the reason and the example.

However, since “well-established” means being equally accepted by both sides, in YRZLS par.97, a question is raised about why it is not referred to as “equally established” directly rather than “well-established”? Kuiji gives three answers to this:

160 These three fallacies are explained together with detailed explanation on the doctrines of Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika in YRZLS. The doctrines explained therein include the twenty-five true principles (tattva), the six and ten categories (padārtha). See YRZLS in T1840 pp.116c23–117b03 and pp.117c20–118a17.
161 See YRZLS, T1840 p.93b26–b27, in YRZLS par.9.
162 Obviously this question is based on the Chinese word “極成 jicheng” literally, but it can also be understood as why not ubhayasiddha but prasiddha is said.
the first and the third are based respectively on the connotation of the character “jí” and the relationship between the substrata and the essence of the thesis, while the second one is:

YRZLS, T1840 p.99c16–c17: 又因明法有自比量及他比量能立、能破，若言“共成”應無有此。

In addition, according to the principle of the science of reasons, there are proofs as inferences for oneself and refutations as inferences for others, if “equally established” is said, these [two kinds of inference] should not exist.

Kuiji states that if it were referred to as “equally established”, there would be no room left for arguments based on the doctrines of one side. Although the precondition of being equally accepted is necessary to the equality of the debate, not every inference can meet this in practice. In order to continue the debate with some elements not “equally established,” special models of inference are needed, such as the inference accepted by oneself and that accepted by others.

### 3.1.2. The Stipulation of Three Kinds of Inferences

According to the prerequisite of being well-established, every argument must be based on equal acceptance of knowledge. However, this is too ideal for debaters from different schools to practice. To solve this problem, inferences are classified into three types in the Chinese Yinming tradition, viz. the inference accepted by oneself, the inference accepted by others, and the inference accepted by both. These three are respectively written as \( zi \) biliang (自比量), \( ta \) biliang (他比量), and \( gong \) biliang (共比量) in Chinese.\(^{163}\) The inference accepted by oneself refers to that consisting of concepts

\(^{163}\) They are also usually abbreviated as \( zi \) bi (自比), \( ta \) bi (他比), and \( gong \) bi (共比) in YRZLS and other works. Concerning the Chinese terms for the first two kinds, viz. \( zi \) biliang (自比量), \( ta \) biliang (他比量), \( zi \) 自 (自) means oneself, \( ta \) 他 (他) means others, and \( biliang \) 比量 (比量) means inference or \( anumāna \) in Sanskrit. Their literal meanings seem very close to those of the Sanskrit terms \( svārthānumāna \) and \( parārthānumāna \), which designate two critical concepts in Buddhist logic after Dignāga. As Tang (2015) points out, it may be probable that the Chinese terms \( zi \) biliang (自比量) and \( ta \) biliang (他比量) are derived from the Sanskrit terms \( svārthānumāna \) and \( parārthānumāna \), “since at the
and doctrines accepted by merely the proponent but not the opponent, the inference accepted by others refers to the opposite, while the inference accepted by both refers to that consisting of concepts and doctrines accepted by both sides.

Kuiji’s interpretation of the three kinds of inferences is situated in his explanation of Xuanzang’s inference for consciousness-only (Weishibiliang 唯識比量), which goes as follows:

**YRZLS, T1840 p.115b26–b27:** “真故極成色定不離164眼識”宗，“自許初三攝，眼所不攝故”因，“猶如眼識”喻。

The thesis [reads] “from the standpoint of truth, the well-established visual form is certainly not apart from the visual consciousness,” the reason [reads] “because as I accept, it is included in the first three [realms] (viz., the visual faculty, visual form and visual consciousness), but not included in the eye (viz., the visual faculty),” the example [reads] “like the visual consciousness.”165

Firstly, to the question of why Xuanzang’s inference for consciousness-only does not commit the fallacy that the thesis is contradicted by common knowledge, viz. *lokaviruddha* or *shijian xiangwen* 世間相違, Kuiji expounds the three kinds of
inferences by means of qualifications:

According to the principle of the science of reasons, if there are qualifications in what is to be proved and the proof, then no fallacy exists. To [form] an inference accepted by oneself, [the inference] should be qualified with the words “I accept,” then it can be shown that the statements [in this inference] accepted by oneself do not commit the fallacy that [the reason is unestablished] to the opponent, and so forth; to [form] an inference accepted by others, [the inference] should be qualified with the words “you hold,” then there can be no fallacy of contradicting [one’s own] school, and so forth; to [form] an inference accepted by both, [if the inference] is qualified with the words “[from the standpoint of] ultimate truth,” then [such an inference] can avoid committing the fallacy that [the thesis is] contradicted by common knowledge or one’s own teaching, and so forth. According to circumstance, each inference can be marked and qualified. Since there are qualifications in this inference (i.e., Xuanzang’s inference for consciousness-only), it is free from fallacies.

As stated here, different qualifications are added to form special inferences and avoid fallacies. For the inferences accepted by oneself and those accepted by others, “I accept” and “you hold” should be added as the qualifications to manifest that such inferences are based on the knowledge of either the proponent or the opponent, then the charge of fallacies such as *suìyì bu chéng* 隨一不成 (*anyatarāsiddha*, the fallacy that [the reason] is unestablished to either the proponent or the opponent) and *zìjiāo xiāngwèi* 自教相違

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166 許 YRZLS, 167 自許 YRZLS, 自許 YRZLSg. "xu 許" means “accepted,” and “zi 自” means “by myself.” Since this word serves as the restrictive term for the inference accepted by oneself, and that term for the inference accepted by others reads “hold by you,” the character “自” should be present here.

167 自許之 YRZLS, 自許之言 YRZLSg. "yan 言" means “statement,” it should be present as the subject of the adjective “zì xu 自許,” i.e., “accepted by oneself.”
(āgamaviruddha, the fallacy that the thesis is contradicted by [one’s own] teaching) can also be avoided. Moreover, concerning the inference accepted by both, the two kinds of qualifying words above are not needed. However, Kuiji states that other words like “[from the standpoint of] ultimate truth” herein can also be added as a qualification, and therefore the inference for consciousness-only here can avoid lokaviruddha with the use of such qualification.\footnote{He (2014) states that the method of qualification herein is related to Bhāviveka: “Xuanzang’s notion of the jianbie restriction is probably borrowed from Bhāviveka; at least the restriction on the thesis-proposition (*pratijñāviśeṣaṇa) is from Bhāviveka’s Zhangzhen lun, but the restrictions on the hetu and drṣṭānta were probably the result of Xuanzang’s own reflection on the *pratijñāviśeṣaṇa.” See He, Huanhuan (2014, p.1234).}

Besides, an opponent’s inference by Sunkyoung is also recorded in YRZLS. To defend Xuanzang’s inference against this refutation, more relevant rules are explained as below:

\textbf{YRZLS, T1840 p.116a\textbf{168}–b10:} 然有新羅順憬法師者...於此比量作決定相違。乾封之歲，寄請釋之\footnote{寄請師釋云 YRZLSt YRZLSj, 寄請釋之 YRZLSg. The former means literally “send [it to China] and ask the master to explain, [this inference] says”; the latter means “send [it to China] and ask [the master] to explain it.” There is no significant difference.}：“真故極成色定離於眼識，自許初三攝，眼識不攝故，猶如眼根。”

時為釋言：凡因明法，若自比量，宗、因、喻中皆須依自，他、共亦爾。立依自、他、共，敵對亦須然：名善因明無疎謬矣。前云\footnote{言 YRZLSt YRZLSj, 立 YRZLSg. “yun 云” means “state,” “say”; “li 立” means “establish.” They are both possible. The quotes in IRMS and IDS read “云.”}唯識依共比量，今依自立，即一切量皆有此違。如佛弟子對聲生論立“聲無常，所作性故，譬如瓶等”，聲生論言“聲是其常，所聞性故，如自許聲性”，應是前量決定相違。彼既不成，故依自比不可對共而為比量。…又彼比量宗、喻二種皆依共比，唯因依自，皆相乖角。…

However, there is a Master Sunkyoung in Silla… has made [an inference with] the contradictory conclusive [reason] (viruddhāvyabhicārin) against this inference (Xuanzang’s inference for consciousness-only). During the years of Qianfeng (666–668), [he] sent [it to China] and asked [Master Xuanzang] to explain it: “from the standpoint of truth, the well-established visual form is
certainly apart from the visual consciousness, because as I accept, it is included in the first three [realms], but not included in the visual consciousness, like the visual faculty."

At that time, [I] gave explanations as follow [on behalf of Master Xuanzang, since he had already passed away]: according to the principle of the science of reasons, in the case of an inference accepted by oneself, the thesis, the reason, and the example must all be based on one’s own [doctrine], and so are the cases of [the inference] accepted by others and [the inference] accepted by both. If [a proponent] sets forth [an inference] based on [the doctrine of] himself, the others or both, then the refutation of the opponent must also be so: [to argue according to this rule] can be called good at the science of reasons and free from carelessness and errors. The [inference] stated above is an inference based on [the doctrine of] both, but now [this inference by Sunkyoung] is based on oneself, [if man can refute in this way,] then all the inferences would have contradictions of such a kind. For example, a Buddhist, against a *Śabdotpattivādin, sets forth “sound is impermanent, because of being produced, like a pot, etc.,” and the *Śabdotpattivādin says [in reply] “sound is permanent, because of being audible, like the nature of sound which I accept.” [If it is permitted to refute an inference accepted by both through an inference accepted by oneself, then the inference by the *Śabdotpattivādin] should be [an inference with] the contradictory conclusive [reason] to the former inference. Since that (the latter inference) cannot be established [as a valid refutation], an inference based on oneself cannot be set as an [opponent] inference against [an inference accepted by] both.¹⁷¹ … Moreover, both the

¹⁷¹ For the text from 凡因明法 to 而为比量, Moriyama’s (2014, pp.144–145) translation reads:
Generally speaking, in Buddhist logic, “inference based on grounds one accepts oneself” (zibiliang 自比量) is [an inference where] thesis, reason, and example, are all dependent on the grounds of one’s own [position]. The same is [true] for [the other two types of inference, namely,] tabiliang and gongbiliang. When [the proponent] presents a zibiliang, tabiliang, or gongbiliang [type of inference], the opponent should also reply with the corresponding [type of inference]. This is what is called “good logic,” which is free of fallacies. The above-mentioned [inference for] vijñaptimātratā is [presented] as a gongbiliang
thesis and the example of that inference [by Sunkyoung] are consistent with
the inference accepted by both, but only the reason is consistent with the
inference accepted by oneself, so they are quite discordant with each other. …

This paragraph expounds two rules: The first is about the members, the second is about
the opponent’s inference. Firstly, if an inference of one specific kind is to be formed,
then not only the components of the thesis member but also the reason and the example
must comply accordingly with that kind. Secondly, the kind of inference put forth by
the opponent must correspond to that by the proponent. In this paragraph, Kuiji judges
Xuanzang’s inference as an inference accepted by both, and Sunkyoung’s as one
accepted by oneself. Kuiji thus claims that the opponent’s inference by Sunkyoung fails
because it does not follow the rule above.

Concerning the first rule, the thesis and the example of the opponent’s inference
by Sunkyoung are regarded as accepted by both, but the reason is not so because of the
words “as I accept.” Therefore, this inference falls short of the internal consistency.
With respect to the second rule, Kuiji takes Xuanzang’s inference as one that is accepted
by both but Sunkyoung’s as an inference accepted by oneself. Hence, just like the
instance of the debate between a Buddhist and a *Śabdotpattivādin, if Sunkyoung does
intend to set forth an inference with the antinomic reason to Xuanzang’s, then his

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[172] The inference for consciousness-only by Xuanzang is also problematic here. Due to the words “zixu 自許,” i.e.,
“as I accept,” in the reason, it seems not rational to regard this inference as accepted by both, and the reason is not
in compliance with the thesis and the example either. However, according to YRZLS in T1840 pp.115c29–116a15,
Kuiji states that the words “as I accept” here should not be considered as a mark of the inference accepted by oneself,
for it is merely meant to avoid the fallacy that the reason proves the opposite of the distinction of the property-
possessor, viz. youfa chabie xiangwei 有法差別相違 or dharmiviśeṣavaparītāsādhana in Sanskrit. For more detailed
interpretation on Xuanzang’s inference for consciousness-only, see Zheng (2010), Teng (2011), Tang (2014), Moro
(2015), Fu (2016), etc.
inference should be one accepted by both same as that by Xuanzang. Furthermore, it is obvious that an inference accepted by both must be responded to with another inference accepted by both, but the problem lies in how to respond to the other two kinds. On this point, since the debate has to focus on one certain topic, if the proponent sets forth an inference accepted by oneself, then correspondingly the opponent’s inference should be one accepted by others and vice versa. In other words, the opponent’s inference should be based on the concepts and doctrines of whatever it refutes in the debate. This is clarified in Kuiji’s interpretation of \textit{viruddhāvyabhicārin}:

\begin{quote}
YRZLS, T1840 p.126c23–c24: \textit{初是他比，後必自比。若立自比，對必他比}…
\end{quote}

If the first one is an inference accepted by others, then the latter one must be an inference accepted by oneself. If an inference for oneself is set forth, then the opponent one must be an inference accepted by others…

\subsection{3.1.3. The Application of Three Kinds of Inferences}

Since the inference accepted by oneself and the one accepted by others are both in fact based on the knowledge of only one side of the debate, their components are not well-established. As a result, they cannot be set forth for an equal debate with others in the same manner as the inference accepted by both. Otherwise, such inferences would commit fallacies concerning the requirement of being well-established. Therefore, the applications of these two kinds are limited due to their one-sidedness, that is to say, the inference accepted by oneself is merely capable of establishing one’s proposition or defending, but not refuting, while the inference accepted by others is reverse.\footnote{Lü renamed the inference accepted by oneself as “inference for defending (\textit{jiuliang 救量})” or “inference for establishing (\textit{sheliang 設量}),” the inference accepted by others as “inference for refuting (\textit{poliang 破量}),” the inference accepted by both as “inference for proving (\textit{liliang 立量}).” See Lü (1926, reprinted in 2006, p.18, fn.2, 3, 4 and p.29, fn.3, 4, 5).}

In Kuiji’s commentary on \textit{viruddhāvyabhicārin}, he illustrates the fallacy of \textit{viruddhāvyabhicārin} based on the inferences accepted by others with a pair of
Inferences on the non-manifest form:

YRZLS. T1840 p.126c20–c22: 如大乘破薩婆多，云“汝無表色定非實色，
許無對故，如心、心所”，彼立量云“我無對色定是實色，許色性故，如
許色、聲等”…

For example, to refute a Sarvāstivādin, a Mahāyāna scholar says, “the non-
manifest form, as you [accept], must not be a sort of true form, because of
being accepted [by you] to be unobstructive, like the mental events and the
mental associates,” and that (the Sarvāstivādin) sets forth an inference, “the
unobstructive form, as I [accept], must be a sort of true form, because of being
accepted [by myself] to possess the nature of form, like form, sound, and so
forth, which are accepted [by myself to possess their natures]”…

In this debate, the first inference is meant to refute the doctrine of others, i.e.,
Sarvāstivāda here, so it is based on the knowledge of others. As a result, the thesis is
contradicted by the proponent’s teaching, and the reason is also unestablished for the
proponent. To avoid such fallacies, the proponent qualifies the thesis with “you [accept]”
and the reason with “accepted [by you],” and in this manner, he turns his inference into
an inference accepted by others. Then, the opponent sets forth another inference to
defend his doctrine from the proponent’s refutation. However, the opponent’s inference
also commits some fallacies, such as anyatarāsiddha, etc. Therefore, the opponent also
adds the qualifications “I [accept]” to the thesis, “accepted [by myself]” to the reason
and “accepted [by myself]” to the example to form an inference accepted by oneself
and avoid fallacies.

In this pair of inferences by the Mahāyāna scholar and Sarvāstivādin above,
different qualifications are used to form different kinds of inferences. The inference by
the Mahāyāna to refute Sarvāstivāda is qualified by “as you [accept]” and “accepted
[by you]” as one that is accepted by others; the inference by the Sarvāstivādin to defend
himself is qualified by “as I [accept]” and “accepted [by myself]” as one that is accepted
by oneself. Because of their one-sidedness, the proponent’s inference can only refute
others, and the opponent’s can only defend. Concerning the two rules discussed in the last section: firstly, in each inference herein, qualifications for different members are fixed to one particular kind; secondly, to correspond to the proponent’s inference accepted by others, the opponent establishes an inference accepted by oneself as the answer.

Furthermore, Kuiji, in his works, actively employs not only the inference accepted by both but also the inference accepted by oneself and that accepted by others, especially in his commentary on the *Cheng weishi lun.* Inferences can firstly be constructed as summaries of doctrines. For example, at the beginning of the *Cheng weishi lun,* four groups of scholars who misunderstand the principle of consciousness-only are listed, and the views of the first two groups are summarized through inferences in Kuiji’s commentary. According to the *Cheng weishi lun,* the first group considers the external objects as existent in the same way as consciousness, and the second considers the internal consciousness as non-existent in the same way as objects. These two are identified by Kuiji as the Sarvāstivāda school and the school of scholars who study the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* and the *Śataka* (Bailun 百論, attributed to Āryadeva in Chinese Buddhism, translated by Kumārajīva) such as Bhāviveka and others, respectively. Kuiji represents the view on consciousness of the first school through an inference accepted by oneself and that of the second through an inference accepted by others:

The *Cheng weishi lun shuji,* T1830 p.236b28–c01: 其我所說離心之境決定實有，許除畢竟無心、境二法隨一攝故，如心、心所。

The objects apart from the mental event, as I advocate, are certainly existent,
because they, except the absolutely non-existent, are accepted [by me] to be included in either the mental phenomena or the objects, like the mental event and the mental associates.

The *Cheng weishi lun shuji*, T1830 p.236c0–c06: 汝之內識如境非有，許所知故，如汝心外境。

The internal consciousness, as you [accept], is non-existent in the same way as objects, because of being accepted [by you] to be cognized, like the objects outside of the mental events as you accept.

In accordance with their attitudes towards consciousness-only, the first inference stands on the side of the Sarvāstivāda school; it is constructed by Kuiji as one that is accepted by oneself to express its view. In contrast, the second one stands on the side of the Madhyamaka school; it is constructed as one that is accepted by others, in order to refute the doctrine of its opponent, i.e., the Consciousness-only school. Different kinds of inferences are thus used by Kuiji to represent different standpoints.

Besides, the inference accepted by others is applied especially frequently in Kuiji’s commentary as a method to expound the doctrinal refutations in the *Cheng weishi lun*. For example, to refute the view of Lokāyata that atoms are permanent, the *Cheng weishi lun* states that “since [atoms] can produce fruits, they should be [as impermanent] as the fruits they produce, how can you say that atoms are permanent?”\(^\text{177}\) For this refutation, Kuiji constructs an inference accepted by others:

The *Cheng weishi lun shuji*, T1830 p.263c11–c13: 汝之極微應非常住，許能生果故，如所生果。果即子微等。

The atoms, as you [accept], should be impermanent, because of being accepted [by you] to be capable of producing fruits, like the fruits they produce. The fruits refer to the secondary atoms.

By constructing this inference as accepted by others, Kuiji does not only explain

\(^\text{177}\) The *Cheng weishi lun*, T1585 p.3 b23–b24: 既能生果，如彼所生，如何可說極微常住?
the relevant refutation in the *Cheng weishi lun* but also underlines the unacceptance of the opponent’s doctrine.

### 3.2. The Judgment of the Result

Once the inferences by the proponent and opponent have been set forth, a judgment for the result of this argumentation is required. However, due to the practical nature of the science of reasons, the standard of judgment is not only a logical issue. Kuiji’s view on this point can be revealed by two sections of *YRZLS*: one is his commentary on the fallacy of the antinomic reason (the fallacy of the contradictory conclusive reason), i.e., *viruddhāvyabicārin* in Sanskrit or *xiangwei jue ding* 相違決定 in Chinese; the other is his interpretation of the relationships between genuine proof, genuine refutation, and their specious forms. Therefore, these two sections will be examined below with the purpose of investigating Kuiji’s discrimination of genuine and specious.

#### 3.2.1 The Fallacy of the Antinomic Reason

The fallacy of the antinomic reason is considered as one of the six fallacies of inconclusive reasons in Dignāga’s system. It refers to the case where each inference in a debate possesses a reason with the three characteristics but proves a contradictory thesis to the other.\(^{178}\) Separately speaking, each of these two is correct; but once they are set up together, neither can still be conclusive. As Kuiji explains in *YRZLS*, “although the two reasons both possess the three characteristics, since they make [the cognition of] others unascertained, they are given the name ‘inconclusive.’”\(^{179}\) Since neither of these two inferences can make others generate the ascertained cognition, they

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\(^{178}\) See Ui (1966, pp.227–230), Kitagawa (1965, pp.192–199), Tillemans (2000, pp.92–95), Ono (2010), Moriyama (2014), etc. With respect to the Sanskrit term *viruddhāvyabicārin*, Kuiji interprets it as a genitive *tatpurusa* compound or an instrumental one, however, as Moriyama points out, the second interpretation is grammatically impossible, and it reveals that Kuiji’s knowledge of Sanskrit was limited. See *YRZLS* par.v2 in T1840 p. 126a21–a23, and Moriyama (2014, pp.133–134).

\(^{179}\) *YRZLS*, T1840 p.126b28–29: 二因雖皆具足三相，令他不決，與“不定”名。
are both dubious.

However, although the two inferences are both inconclusive due to the fallacy of the antinomonic reason, it is still possible to determine which one is winning in the second step according to Kuiji. His interpretation starts from refuting an ancient rule: “There is an ancient judgment saying that just like [the rule that] the latter Go piece is capable of capturing, the one who puts down [a piece] later [in a Go game] should win.”

Shentai and Wengui both advocate this rule. As Kuiji maintains, the first inference given in YRZL is made by a Vaiśeṣika, while the second one is made by a *Śabdotpattivādin, i.e., a school of scholars which advocates that sound is produced, but it is permanent after being produced. The sequence of these two inferences in YZML is in reverse compared to that in YRZL, therefore, based on such uncertainty of sequence, Kuiji disproves the ancient rule above. On this point, Kuiji states:

\textbf{YRZLS, T1840 p.126c16–c19:} 彼且斷於聲、勝二義聲負勝先，非諸決定相違皆先負後勝，若爾便決定，云何名不定? 由此論主恐謂一切決定相違皆後為勝，故結之云二俱不定。

That [treatise] (the Nyāyamukha) just judges the thesis of the *Śabdotpattivādin as losing and that of the Vaiśeṣika as winning, but it does not mean that in all the cases of [the fallacy of] the contradictory conclusive [reason] the former [inferences] win and the latter [ones] lose, for if so, [which wins] is ascertained, how can [the two reasons in the two inferences of this fallacy] be called inconclusive? Thus, for fear that [the audience] considers the latter [inferences] in all the cases of [the fallacy of] the contradictory conclusive [reason] as winning, the author of the treatise (the Nyāpraveśa) summarizes by saying that these two [reasons] both belong to inconclusive.

Based on this paragraph, in the first step, both of the inferences commit the fallacy of

\textsuperscript{180} YRZLS, T1840 p.126c03: 古有斷言如殺遲碁，後下為勝。

\textsuperscript{181} See the Limenlun shuji by Shentai in T1839 p.89a12–13, IRMS in T2270 p.364a21–24, IDS in T2271 p.573 a01–04, etc.

\textsuperscript{182} In contrast, according to NPV (p.37, 15–16) by Haribhadra, the first inference is made by a Vaiśeṣika, but the second one is made by a Mīmāṁsaka.
the antinomic reason, so they are both inconclusive. Since the winner is still to be determined afterwards, the sequence cannot be taken as the standard for judgment.

Therefore, Kuiji advocates the standard of “xianjiao 現教” for the second step. This term is a part of the compound word “xianjiao lisheng 現教力勝” cited from the YZML which reads pakṣāgamabaliyastva according to Katsura’s (2016b) restoration.183 Accordingly, if we treat it as an independent term, xianjiao 現教 should be equivalent to pakṣāgama. This pakṣāgama is translated mgon sum dang lung in Tibetan as a dvandva compound, but interpreted as a tatpuruṣa compound in NPV by Haribhadra.184 However, in YRZLS, Kuiji provides three kinds of interpretations and analyzes xianjiao 現教 in both ways. In the first kind of interpretation, xianjiao 現教 is interpreted as a dvandva compound, meaning the common word and the Buddha’s teaching. In the second kind, it is interpreted as a tatpuruṣa compound, meaning the teaching based on the Buddha’s direct realization. In the third, it is interpreted as a tatpuruṣa compound, meaning the teaching based on what is already accepted by the world. However, no matter how this term is to be interpreted, the Vaiśeṣika is always judged by Kuiji as the winner.185 Thus, based on such a standard, the winner of two antinomic inferences can be determined in the second step.

Furthermore, Kuiji analyzes this fallacy based on the theory of three kinds of inferences. As examined in Chapter 3.1.2. above, the type of inference used by the opponent in a debate should correspond to that of inference used by the proponent, which means that the fallacy of the antinomic reason only refers to three cases: an inference accepted by others vs an inference accepted by oneself; an inference accepted by oneself vs an inference accepted by others; and an inference accepted by both vs another inference accepted by both. Other cases, such as an inference accepted by others vs another inference accepted by others, do not belong to this fallacy because each of these two inferences is in fact independent from but not directly antinomic to the other. Herein, the mark for identifying this fallacy is elucidated by Kuiji as “both the

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183 See fn.683 in Part II.
184 See Kitagawa (1965, p.203, fn.391), Moriyama (2014, p.124, fn.6).
185 See YRZLS, T1840 p.126c08–c16, also in YRZLS par.v10. See Moriyama (2014, p.139).
proponent and the opponent set forth the same property-possessor, and argue about the properties of this [property-possessor]."\textsuperscript{186}

Therefore, according to Kuiji, in the case of two inferences arguing upon the same property-possessor with antinomic reasons, if each of them has no other fallacy and possesses a correct reason with the three characteristics, then in the first step, they are both inconclusive because of the fallacy of the antinomic reason; but in the second step, other measures are needed for determining the winner. The two inferences here, especially the one by the opponent, are both ineffective and effective with respect to the first step: neither of them can generate the other’s ascertained cognition, so they are both ineffective; meanwhile, each of them does turn the other into a specious inference because of causing such a fallacy, so it should also be regarded as effective in this sense. However, concerning the second step, since the winner can be determined through the measures of xianjiao 現教, the identification as a fallacy does not matter anymore. Thus, the problem left here is how to treat the fallacy of the antinomic reason: Based on Kuiji’s interpretation, this is in any case indeed a fallacy because of being dubious, while on the other side, it can be utilized as a strategy to refute the proponent’s inference, which is also because of being dubious.\textsuperscript{187} In other words, the fallacy of the antinomic reason is inherently temporary in practice.

### 3.2.2. The Relationships between Genuine Proof, Genuine Refutation, and their Specious Forms

The most direct way to examine Kuiji’s standard of judging the result is to investigate how he distinguishes between genuine proof, genuine refutation, and their

\textsuperscript{186} YRZLS, T1840 p.126c28–29: 立敵共申一有法，詔此法等。

\textsuperscript{187} In contrast with Kuiji, since there is no other conclusive reason than the reason of effect (kāryahetu), the reason of essential property (svabhāvahetu), and the reason of non-apprehension (anupalabdhihetu) advocated by him, Dharmakīrti separates the fallacy of the antinomic reason from the three characteristics. He considers the inferences with that fallacy as “scripturally based inference” (āgamāpekṣānumāna) instead of “inference functioning by the force of real entities” (vastubalapravṛttānumāna). Moriyama (2014, p.127) states:

In this manner, in Dharmakīrti’s system of logic, viruddhāvyabhicārin was removed from the wheel of reasons and occupied its own domain outside of empirical reality. At the same time, viruddhāvyabhicārin ended its role as a useful means for driving an opponent to self-contradiction, because in Dharmakīrti’s logic there is little room for open discussion about religious issues beyond empirical reality.

See also Tani (1987).
specious forms, found at the end of his commentary on the outline verse of YRZL in YRZLS par.42 to 46.

In these paragraphs, Kuiji lists six combinations of the first four of the eight rubrics, i.e., genuine proof, genuine refutation, and their specious forms, and then discusses the four possible forms of each combination, i.e., A and -B, -A and B, A and B, -A and -B. Besides, Kuiji provides additional explanations, which negate the original ones, in some cases. Table 5 can be drawn up accordingly.188

Table 5: Kuiji’s Explanations of the Combinations of Rubrics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combination</th>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Original Explanation</th>
<th>Negating Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Proof vs Refutation</td>
<td>(1) A and -B</td>
<td>such as the genuine proof which establishes one’s own thesis</td>
<td>proving one’s own thesis is equivalent to refuting the opponent, because [a genuine proof] must stand against the opponent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) -A and B</td>
<td>such as the refutation through revealing the fallacy of the opponent</td>
<td>refuting the opponent’s thesis make one’s own thesis proved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) A and B</td>
<td>such as the genuine proof which refutes the opponent’s unestablished thesis</td>
<td>“proof” refers to [some statement] which can state one’s own [thesis], while “refutation” refers to [some statement] which is directed at the thesis of others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) -A and -B</td>
<td>specious proof and specious refutation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Proof vs Specious Proof</td>
<td>(1) A and -B</td>
<td>genuine proof</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) -A and B</td>
<td>all kinds of specious proof except [the specious proof with] the fallacy of the contradictory conclusive reason</td>
<td>[the inference with the fallacy of the contradictory conclusive reason] is only a specious proof but not a [genuine]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

188 See YRZLS, T1840 p.95b290c16.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(3) A and B</th>
<th>[the inference with] the fallacy of the contradictory conclusive reason</th>
<th>proof, because although the proof [with the fallacy of the contradictory conclusive reason] has set forth statements, the cognition of others cannot become ascertained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) -A and -B</td>
<td>refuting incorrectly the thesis established by others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Proof vs Specious Refutation</td>
<td>(1) A and -B</td>
<td>such as the inference with no fallacy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) -A and B</td>
<td>such as the fourteen kinds of fallacious objections, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) A and B</td>
<td>such as [the inference with] the fallacy of the contradictory conclusive reason</td>
<td>this is only a specious refutation but not a genuine proof</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) -A and -B</td>
<td>the refutation through revealing the fallacy of the opponent</td>
<td>revealing the fallacy of others makes one’s own thesis proved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Refutation vs Specious Proof</td>
<td>A and -B</td>
<td>A refutation must not be a specious proof or a specious refutation because genuine is different from specious.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Refutation vs Specious Refutation</td>
<td>A and -B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Specious Proof vs Specious Refutation</td>
<td>(1) A and -B</td>
<td>using a fallacious inference to establish one’s own thesis</td>
<td>establishing one’s own thesis successfully is equivalent to genuine refutation, while establishing one’s own unsuccessfully is equivalent to specious refutation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) -A and B</td>
<td>revealing the fallacy of others incorrectly like the fourteen kinds of fallacious objections</td>
<td>refuting others incorrectly is equivalent to proving incorrectly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) A and B</td>
<td>such as using a fallacious inference to refute others unsuccessfully</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Because of the existence of negating explanations, Kuiji’s commentary here is quite obscure and full of literal paradoxes. Moreover, the sub-commentaries such as YRZLSQ and IRMS only make sense of the first combination but not the others. To the question of why there are negating explanations besides the original ones, Chen (1938) and Shen (1985) consider such a phenomenon as merely a presentation of different views with no judgment.\textsuperscript{189} Zheng (2010) interprets the explanations of the first combination according to the theory of three kinds of inferences based on YRZLSQ and IRMS\textsuperscript{190} but omits those of the other combinations.\textsuperscript{191}

Concerning the paradoxes with respect to the first combination, YRZLSQ interprets them as below:

YRZLSQ, X853 p.803c12–c16: 今顯能立立自、破他，能破破他及以自立皆不定故，故置有釋，簡定執也。

Now in order to show that proofs are not certain to prove one’s own [theses] or to refute others’ [and prove one’s own theses simultaneously], and refutations are not certain to refute others’ or to prove one’s own [and refute others’ simultaneously] either, those [negating] explanations are added with the purpose of excluding fixed perspectives.

According to YRZLSQ, the additional negating explanations are just meant to represent other possibilities, and through representing different explanations, the author tries to exclude the fixed perspectives.

Based on the interpretation from YRZLSQ above, Zheng (2010) interprets the four forms of the first combination herein through the theory of three kinds of inferences.\textsuperscript{192}

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
(4) -A and -B & genuine proof or genuine refutation \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{190} The section cited by Zheng from IRMS is mainly a quote from YRZLSQ, see YRZLSQ in X853 p.803c08–c21 and IRMS in T2270 p.231a13–a29.
\textsuperscript{191} See Zheng (2010, pp.32–33 and 46–47).
\textsuperscript{192} See Zheng (2010, pp.32–33 and 46–47 and 72–73). As recorded in IDYJ in T2272 pp.64c01–65b04, the \textit{Yinning ru zhengli lun yixin} 因明入正理論義心 by Daoxian 道獻, who is a disciple of Huizhao, also interprets this part through the theory of three kinds of inferences.
The additional explanations of the first two forms refer to the inference accepted by both, while in the additional explanation of the third form, the statement that “‘proof’ refers to [some statement] which can state one’s own [thesis]” refers to the inference accepted by oneself for establishing or defending, and the statement “‘refutation’ refers to [some statement] which is directed at the thesis of others” refers to the inference accepted by others for refuting.

However, this kind of interpretation is not available to the other five combinations, for they are not related to the three kinds of inferences at all. However, we can still find some clues in the differences between original and negating explanations of other combinations.

Form (2) and form (3) of combination 2, and form (3) of combination 3 focus on the fallacy of the antinomic reason, i.e., the fallacy with the contradictory conclusive reason. The original explanation of form (2) and form (3) of combination 2 regard an inference with this fallacy as both a proof and a specious proof, while the negating explanation regards it as merely a specious proof because “the cognition of others cannot become ascertained.” The original explanation of form (3) of combination 3 regards the inference with this fallacy as both a proof and a specious refutation, but the negating explanation regards it as merely a specious refutation but not a genuine proof. In summary, the original explanations intend to regard the inference with the fallacy of the antinomic reason as proof, but the negating explanations insist that it is merely specious.

Zenju’s interpretation of form (3) of combination 2 provides some clue to apprehend the shift of judgments. He interprets as follows:

IRMS, T2270 p.231b04–b08: “有能立亦似立”者，此有两释：一云有第三句，如相违决定，三支具故，得名“能立”；以犯故，不悟他故，复名“似立”。二云无第三句，真、似异故。

Regarding “(3) some is both a proof and a specious proof,” there are two kinds of interpretations: First, this third form exists, just like [the two inferences in
the case of] the fallacy of the contradictory conclusive reason, since the three members of each inference are complete, they are called “proof”; but since they commit a fallacy and cannot make others understand, they are also called “specious proof.” Second, the third case does not exist, because genuine is different from specious.

There are two interpretations of the form that some is both a proof and a specious proof above. The first interpretation focuses on the inferences with antinomic reasons, and it explicitly tells the reason for why such inferences can be judged in two ways. In the first, since the inferences with antinomic reasons have no error concerning the three members, they are called “proof.” In the second way, since they cannot make others understand, they should be called “specious proof.” Therefore, the standard of “proof” is first set from the angle of form, but then that of “specious proof” is set from the angle of function: the standard of judging genuine and specious herein is thus inconsistent.

Concerning the negating explanation of form (3) of combination 2, the inference with antinomic reasons is merely treated as specious. In YRZLS, the reason is that they cannot generate others’ ascertained cognition, which is merely given from the angle of function.

Likewise, form (3) of combination 3 can also be understood in this model: From the angle of form, the inference with antinomic reasons can be called proof; from the angle of function, it is merely a specious refutation.

Form (4) of combination 3 takes the refutation through revealing the fallacy of the opponent as neither proof nor specious refutation in the original explanation but takes it as proof in the negating explanation. The original explanation here is quite clear. On the one hand, this kind of refutation does not establish any thesis directly but only refutes the opponent, so it is not a proof. On the other hand, since it is a kind of genuine refutation, it is not a specious refutation. However, the negating explanation treats it as proof, because “revealing the fallacy of others makes one’s own thesis proved.” In the case of proof A and refutation -A, refutation -A does not prove any thesis directly, but since “revealing the fallacy of others makes one’s own thesis proved,” -A proves the
negation of A in a refuting way. Hence, in the original explanation, the refutation through revealing the fallacy of the opponent is not taken as proof, because it is indeed not a proof in form; in the negating explanation, it is taken as proof, because it is capable of proving the negation of what it refutes. Therefore, the original explanation is also more relevant to form, while the negating explanation is instead more relevant to function.

Such a difference between the original explanation and the negating explanation can also be confirmed by form (1) and form (2) of combination 6. In the original explanations of these two forms, fallacious inferences and rejoinders are regarded as specious proof and specious refutations respectively but not in reverse, because they are not refutations or proofs in form at all. However, in the negating explanations, they are also regarded as specious refutation and specious proof, because “establishing one’s own thesis successfully is equivalent to genuine refutation, while establishing one’s own unsuccessfully is equivalent to specious refutation,” and “refuting others incorrectly is equivalent to proving incorrectly.” Thus, in the original explanations, being not a specious refutation and being not a specious proof emphasize the aspects of formally being not a refutation or a proof; in the negating explanations, being not a specious refutation or a specious proof emphasize the aspects of being not specious. In this manner, the angle of judgment turns from form to function. Therefore, in the original explanations from the angle of form, fallacious inferences and rejoinders are not specious refutations and specious proofs, respectively, because they are indeed not refutations and proofs in form; in the negating explanations from the angle of function, fallacious inferences and rejoinders are also specious refutations and specious proofs, because they cannot refute its own negation or prove the negation of the other side.

In summary, concerning the forms with two explanations from combination 2–6, there are two angles of judgment in Kuiji’s interpretation: one is form; the other is function. To judge an inference as a genuine proof, the formal standard refers to being complete and committing no error in the three members, while the functional standard refers to being capable of making others understand. Besides, from the angle of function,
being a genuine proof and a genuine refutation are equivalent to each other, and so are being a specious proof and a specious refutation. Hence, in Kuiji’s interpretation, proof A is capable of not only proving A but also refuting -A simultaneously, and refutation -A is capable of not only refuting A but also proving -A.

For combination 1, the relationship between proof and refutation can be clarified through the theory of three kinds of inferences; for the other combinations, relationships can be judged either formally or functionally. Anyhow, Kuiji’s interpretation of the relationships between genuine proof, genuine refutation, and their specious forms is still full of paradoxes, and their standard changes frequently. If Kuiji does present so many antinomic explanations for “excluding fixed perspectives” as explained in YRZLSQ, then concerning the original explanations and the negating ones in combination 2–6, his standard for judging shifts from formal to functional.

In the case of the fallacy of the antinomic reason, despite no fallacy in form, both inferences with this fallacy are still specious because of being dubious and neither can be judged as winning. A further measure is then required for judgment in the second step. Avoiding any fallacy in form is a necessary but not sufficient condition for making others understand. Given both the angle of form and that of function, to be completely genuine, an inference must be perfect in its form and also capable of making others understand at the same time.
4. Concluding Remarks

So far, I have examined the commentary of the Chinese translation of NP by Kuiji in Tang China, i.e., YRZLS. Kuiji interprets concepts and standards of practice in the science of reasons on the basis of his knowledge of Buddhism, and especially what he learned from Xuanzang.

Concerning the concepts of the science of reasons, in Chapter 2, I have reviewed the integration and semantic reconfiguration of concepts from Sanskrit sources, and the invention of new concepts in YRZLS. The first two aspects concern concepts present in Sanskrit, while the third one focuses on those non-existent in Sanskrit but present in Chinese. I have traced these concepts in Kuiji’s text and also situated them in the Chinese context to examine Kuiji’s interpretation in YRZLS.

According to Kuiji’s interpretations of related concepts in YRZLS, his formulation of inference can be reconstructed as seen in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Formulation of Inference according to the Yinming ru zhengli lun shu
For example, a classical inference is as follows:

Thesis: Sound is impermanent,
Reason: because of being produced,
Example: whatever is produced is seen to be impermanent, like a pot, and so forth;
whatever is permanent is seen to be not produced, like ether, and so forth.
Herein, “sound” and “impermanent,” as the property-possessor and the qualifier, are the two substrata of the thesis member, while the essence of the thesis refers to the inseparable connection to be inferred between them. “Produced” in the reason is the proving property. “Whatever is produced is seen to be impermanent” and “whatever is permanent is seen to be not produced” state the positive and negative concomitances, respectively; and so they are the essences of the example by similarity and that by dissimilarity. The instances, such as “a pot, and so forth” by similarity and “ether, and so forth” by dissimilarity are the substrata. Besides, the similar and dissimilar groups of the thesis refer to whatever is impermanent and permanent (both apart from the property-possessor), respectively. The similar and dissimilar groups of the reason refer to whatever is produced and whatever is not produced (both apart from the property-possessor).

Three points differentiate the formulation of inference interpreted in YRZLS from that in NP. Firstly, as already discussed in Chapter 2.3.1.2, the thesis member defined by NP presents a property-possessor to be qualified by a qualifier, while the thesis member defined by YRZLS presents the inseparable connection to be proved between the property-possessor and the qualifier. However, as Kuiji has explained in YRZLS par.100, and so forth, in a debate, merely the qualifier can qualify the property-possessor and not vice versa. Therefore, there is virtually no logical difference between NP and YRZLS concerning the thesis member. Secondly, as discussed in Chapter 2.2, the example by similarity in NP is just to ensure the connection between the proving property and the property to be proved through the positive concomitance, while in YRZLS it also has to contain both the subject’s proving property and the property to be proved. In addition, as investigated in Chapter 2.3.2, although the definition of the example by similarity in YRZLS appears differently from its Sanskrit original due to the new concept of the similar group of the reason, the logical structure remains unchanged.

If we symbolically express the formulation of inference in NP and that in YRZLS, then a comparison can be drawn as in Table 6:
Table 6: Symbolical Comparison of Inference Formulation between the Nyāyapraveśa and the Yinming ru zhengli lun shu

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NP</th>
<th>YRZLS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thesis:</td>
<td>$Vd$</td>
<td>$Vd$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason:</td>
<td>$Hd$</td>
<td>$Hd$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by similarity:</td>
<td>$(x) ((x\neq d \land Hx) \rightarrow Vx) \land (\exists x) (x\neq d \land Hx \land Vx)$</td>
<td>$(x) (Hx \rightarrow Vx) \land (\exists x) (x\neq d \land Hx \land Vx)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by dissimilarity:</td>
<td>$(x) ((x\neq d \land \neg Vx) \rightarrow \neg Hx)$</td>
<td>$(x) ((x\neq d \land \neg Vx) \rightarrow \neg Hx)$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on this comparison, we can see that the formulation of inference interpreted in YRZLS does not deviate too much from that in NP. Nevertheless, a significant difference concerning the example by similarity occurs. Due to the reconfiguration of the former application member and the positive concomitance in the similar example, YRZLS turns the formulation of inference in NP into an inversed version of Aristotle’s syllogism.

Concerning the standards of the practice of argumentation in the science of reasons, in Chapter 3, I have investigated Kuiji’s interpretation of the rules of debate and that of the judgment of result in YRZLS. The first section deals with the requirement of being well-established and the new rule of the three kinds of inferences created in China. The second section examines Kuiji’s interpretation of the fallacy of the antinomic reason and how he distinguishes between genuine proof, genuine refutation, and their specious forms.

According to YRZLS, when the proponent sets forth an inference in a particular debate, the components of the thesis, as well as the reason and example, are required to be well-established for an equal debate. If the equality is indeed not possible to obtain due to the different acceptance of knowledge on each side, meaning if an inference accepted by both sides is not appropriate, then the proponent can set forth an inference accepted by either oneself or others based on the rule of the three kinds of inferences.
Accordingly, the opponent needs a corresponding inference as a response. In other words, the opponent has to establish an inference accepted by others to respond to the proponent’s inference accepted by oneself, or vice versa. When the two inferences by the proponent and opponent are set together, only the one that is devoid of fallacy concerning the three members in form, and also capable of making others understand in function, can be judged as genuine. If both inferences meet the three characteristics and commit no fallacy, then they fall under the case of the antinomic reason because of being dubious, and the measure of xianjiao 現教 is required in the next step for the final judgment. The winning inference must be able to prove itself and refute its negation at the same time.

Herein, the rule of the three kinds of inferences is a new Chinese development from the original Indian system. When Chinese commentators found out the limitation of old rules, new rules were created to extend the applicability. The inference accepted by oneself and that accepted by others shelve the controversy of specific terms and make the argumentation relatively acceptable to both sides. In this manner, the scope of application is significantly extended. This rule is actively adopted in Buddhist philosophical argumentation, e.g., the defense of Xuanzang’s inference for consciousness-only. However, since the requirement of being well-established in the case of the inference accepted by either oneself or others cannot actually be fulfilled, the inference accepted by oneself is merely capable of establishing one’s proposition or defending, while the inference accepted by others is merely capable of refuting.

Kuiji’s interpretation of the definitions of the property-possessor and the qualifier, the concept he 合 consisting of both upanaya and anvaya, and those new concepts relevant to the three members illustrate the integration and semantic reconfiguration of concepts, and the invention of new concepts, respectively. Besides, his explanation of the standards of the practice of argumentation explicates the whole process from establishing inferences of both sides to judging the result. By comparing between YRZLS and other contemporary commentaries, such as YRZLSW by Wengui, although Kuiji did probably receive exclusive teaching from Xuanzang, he did not create the
commentarial system all by himself. However, due to the scarcity of literature material between Xuanzang’s translation and Kuiji’s commentary, it is still impossible to demarcate precisely between Xuanzang’s knowledge from India, the interpretation shared by other disciples of Xuanzang such as Wengui, and Kuiji’s innovation based on his own understanding.

Despite its active employment as a method of philosophical argumentation by Xuanzang and Kuiji’s circle, the science of reasons did not attract much attention from other schools. The only exception was the Huayan school, which absorbed a lot from the so-called Consciousness-only school of Kuiji.193 The science of reasons declined very soon along with Kuiji’s lineage in China. It stayed silent in Chinese intellectual history until the late Ming dynasty, when Wang Kentang, Zhixu, and others got interested in YRZL and YZML. However, since the Tang commentaries including YRZLS were inaccessible to them, the Ming interpretation presents a much different appearance from that of the commentarial tradition of Kuiji and his contemporaries and successors.

In the reception of concepts and practice of Buddhist logic, the study of the science of reasons in Tang China represented by YRZLS and others cannot be understood correctly in isolation but needs to be made intelligible in relationship to both an intended Chinese readership and a conceptual context provided by Indian sources. The Yinming tradition, as a fruit of the Chinese encounter with Indian Buddhism, is a new development of Indian Buddhist logic in a far away place in the east. Concerning YRZLS itself, Kuiji’s relevant knowledge, which comes from Xuanzang’s teaching and previous Chinese Buddhist sources, provides his materials, while his own understanding of Yinming and even the entire Buddhism provides the ideas to adapt these materials. In this sense, the logic system interpreted in YRZLS should not be

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193 As Teng (2011, p.157) points out, the use of the science of reasons of the Huayan school is quite superficial: The Buddhist exegetes of the Huayan school of thought, such as Fazang 法藏, Chengguan 澄觀, and Zongmi 宗密 in a later time, also used the new method of yinming in their commentaries. However, their application of yinming tended to be superficial. Basically what they were able to do with yinming was to identify the basic components of inference, such as subject 宗, property-possessor 宗有法, reason 因, and example 喻. Furthermore, in their use of yinming, we do not find any analysis of the validity of the inference in terms of inferential fallacy.
attributed to Dignāga or Śaṅkarasvāmin but the Chinese commentator, i.e., Kuiji himself, and the “Dignāga” he reconstructed through his interpretations.
Part II: A Translation of the Sādhana Section of Kuiji’s

Yinming dashu

1. Introductory Notes to the Translation

1. The edition of YRZLS in the Taishō shinshū daizōkyō (YRZLS tj) is used as the basis of this translation, while collations are made according to the edition printed by Jinling Scripture-Engraving House 金陵刻經處 in 1896 (YRZLSj), and the version rediscovered in the Guangsheng temple 廣勝寺 in 1933 and published in 1935 (YRZLSg), as well as related quotes in sub-commentaries, e.g., those by Zhizhou 智周, Zenju 善珠, Zōshun 蔵俊, and Kiben 基辨.

As its postscript points out, YRZLS tj is based on a manuscript copied in 1335 (Kenmu 2 建武二年). YRZLSj is based on a Japanese edition taken back to China by Yang Renshan 楊仁山 (1837–1911), but there is not enough information to identify its original edition. However, the text in YRZLSj appears to be almost the same as the edition in the Shinsan Dainihon Zokuzōkyō 幌新纂大日本續藏經 (X849), which is based on a manuscript copied in 1290 (Shōō 3 正應三年), as its postscript states. YRZLSg was engraved in the twelfth century as part of the Zhangcheng jin zang 趙城金藏 (the Jing-dynasty Tripitaka Rediscovered in Zhaocheng).

Due to the limitation of available materials at the time being of this project, mainly these three editions are used. Other editions will be sought for a more complete collation and translation of YRZLS in the future.

2. The text is punctuated, paragraphed and numbered by myself according to Chinese and Japanese sub-commentaries and explanatory treatises, e.g., IRMS, IDYJ, Nakamura (1958), Zheng (2010). However, I do not follow any of them entirely. Arabic numerals are used to number the commentarial sections in YRZLS, while Roman numerals are used to number the sections of YRZL that have been commented on. The numbering of the section on viruddhāvyabhicārin is marked with a lowercase “v.” The
numbering of sections in NP is based on that by Tachikawa (1971), and the numbering of YBhHv is based on that by Yaita (2005). Chapter-titles with Arabic numerals in round brackets are quoted from Kuiji’s structural analysis in this text. In addition, due to the difference between Chinese and English systems of punctuation, Chinese and English texts are punctuated slightly differently.

3. Round brackets ( ) are used to enclose the explanatory notes by myself and chapter-titles quoted from Kuiji’s structural analysis. Square brackets [ ] are used to enclose the words which have no equivalence in the original text but had strong implications and were required to complete the translation. Curly brackets { } are used to enclose the supplementary words in the translations and the Sanskrit texts of NP which are not to be commented on immediately but are necessary for understanding. In addition, round brackets ( ) are also used to enclose the numbering of paragraphs and the sources for the Sanskrit equivalences of terms in the glossary.

4. Regarding the translation strategy, I pursue a word-for-word literal translation of the terms as well as of the syntax. In other words, fidelity to the original Chinese text is the first concern. This strategy is meant to ensure that Kuiji’s interpretation can be presented as faithfully as possible, even when it commits apparent mistakes, such as explaining iti as the ablative case in par.68. In the cliche terms of modern Chinese translation theory, which is advocated by Yan Fu 嚴復 (1854–1921), but derived from Alexander Fraser Tytler’s (1747–1813) idea, of “faithfulness (xin 信),” “intelligibility (da 達),” and “elegance (ya 雅),” “faithfulness” is the first and foremost concern of this translation, followed by “intelligibility” and “elegance.”

Since the object text is a Chinese commentary on the Chinese translation of a Sanskrit text, a balance between the fidelity to the Chinese interpretation and to the Sanskrit source is also to be sought. However, as Chapter 2 of Part I has discussed, the terminology in YRZLS is distinct from that in NP. Therefore, to avoid misunderstandings and misguidances, I merely indicate the Sanskrit equivalences of Chinese terms involved in YRZLS when textual support is evidential enough rather than pair every single Chinese term with a Sanskrit word.
5. The underlined texts in a smaller font refer to the inserted notes in this commentary. Such notes are often supplemented by the author himself in the Chinese Buddhist commentarial tradition, and both the Chinese and Japanese sub-commentaries of YRZLS support this possibility: For instances, these notes are directly commented on as part of YRZLS in YRZLSQ in X853 p.802a02–a03 and YRZLSH in X854 p.843c07–c08 by Zhizhou, as well as in IRMS in T2270 p.220a11–b02 by Zenju. It means that when they wrote these sub-commentaries the notes were already there. Therefore, these notes are probably added by Kuiji himself.

However, some contradictions between the notes and the main text are notable. The first is that in the note in YRZLS par.5, the three members of proof refer to the thesis, reason, and example. In contrast, according to Kuiji, such a classification belongs to Vasubandhu but not Dignāga, and as Kuiji advocates, the three members of proof should refer to the reason and the two kinds of example. The second is that in the note in YRZLS par.6, there are two sorts of specious refutation, the first sort finds a wrong target, while the second commits one or several fallacies. However, the main text of YRZLS only talks about the first sort.

Since the commentary is finished by Huizhao, he could be the other possible author. Nevertheless, even if he does add some notes to the former part, as a direct successor of Kuiji, there is no clue sharp enough to distinguish his interpretation from Kuiji’s with regard to these notes.

In summary, the inserted notes are most likely supplemented by the author as part of YRZLS, but it is still difficult to tell precisely whether they should be attributed to Kuiji or Huizhao.
2. Kuiji’s Commentary on the First Verse and the Sādhana Section

2.1. On the Verse Presenting the Outline

(1. Indicating the Main Topics and Interpreting Them 標宗隨釋)

(1.1. Presenting the Classification and Indicating the Main Topics 舉類標宗)

[Translation and note]

YRZL: Proof (nengli 能立, sādhana), refutation (nengpo 能破, dūṣaṇa) and [their respective] specious [forms] (si 似, ābhāsa) are only [pertinent] for the understanding of others.

Perception (xianliang 現量, pratyakṣa), inference (biliang 比量, anumāna) and [their respective] specious [forms] are only [pertinent] for the understanding of oneself.


(1)述曰: 一部之中，大文有二: 初一頌及長行，標宗隨釋分; 末後一頌，顯略指廣分。初分有二: 前之一頌，舉類標宗; 後諸長行，隨標別釋。條貫義類，舉標論宗，於前所標，隨應釋故。(93a21–a25)

YRZLS: In this one treatise, the main text includes two components: the first verse and

194 / YRZLS, 一 YRZLSg. “yi 一” means “one.” There is no “yi 一” in IRMS in T2270 p.434c20.
the prose constitute the part of indicating the main topics and interpreting them; the last verse is the part of manifesting the general [direction] [of this commentary] and referring to further [works]. The first part is comprised of two sub-parts: the first verse presents the classification and indicates the main topics; the latter prose follows the indication and interprets respectively. These [six] sections [in the prose] coherently connect the classes of rubrics and indicate the topics, because what has been indicated above should correspondingly be expounded upon.

(2)初頌之中，談頌有一，彰悟有二，論句有四，明義有八。一頌四句，文矚可
知。悟他、自悟，論各別顯。四真四似，即為八義。(93a25–a27)
In the first verse, with regard to talking about the verse there is one, with regard to manifesting understandings there are two, with regard to speaking of lines there are four, and with regard to elucidating rubrics there are eight. Four lines constitute one verse, as it can be seen through looking at the text. This treatise elucidates the understanding of others and the understanding of oneself respectively. Four genuine [forms] and four specious [forms] make eight rubrics.

(3)一者能立。因喻具正，宗義圓成，顯以悟他，故名“能立”。 陳那能立，唯取因、
喻，古兼宗等。因、喻有二義: 一者，具而無闕，離七等故; 二者，正而無邪，離十四等故。
宗亦二義: 一者支圓，能依、所依皆滿足故; 二者成就，能依、所依俱無過故。由此論顯真而
無妄，義亦兼彰具而無闕。發此誠言，生他正解。宗由言顯，故名“能立”。由此似立決定相違，
雖無闕過，非正能立，不能令他正智生故也。(93a27–b02)
First, proof. If the reason (yin 因, hetu) and example (yu 喻, drśṭānta) are complete and correct, and the meaning of the thesis (zong 宗, pakṣa) is established perfectly and

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195 They refer to the six parts which the prose is divided into, i.e., proof, specious proof, means of valid cognition, specious means of valid cognition, refutation, and specious refutation. See YRZLS par.56 in YRZLS, T1840 p.96b01–b19.
196 “zhen 真” and “zhên 真” are variants of the same character meaning “correct,” “genuine,” “real.” The same hereinafter.
197 “ji 即” and “jī 即” are variants of the same character, meaning an affirmative copula, and in order to keep consistent, all these characters shown in the text will be written as 即. The same hereinafter.
198 “你 you” means “have.” No significant difference here.
199 The text in a smaller font refers to the inserted notes by the author himself in this commentary. See Note 5 in my “Introductory Notes to the Translation.”
expressed to make others understand, then [such a reason and an example together] are named “proof.” Dignāga’s proof adopts only the reason and example, while the ancient [proofs] also include the thesis. The [genuine] reason and [genuine] example each has two meanings: The first is being complete, namely without incompleteness (闕 que, मुननताः), by virtue of avoiding the seven sorts [of incompleteness], etc.; the second is being correct, namely without fault, by virtue of avoiding the fourteen fallacies of the reason, etc. The [genuine] thesis also has two meanings: The first presents the completeness of the member (支 支, 顶顶ava), because both the relier (能依, namely the inseparable connection in the thesis) and the substrata (所依, i.e., what is to be relied on, they refer to the property-possessor and the distinguishing-feature) should be fulfilled; the second is being established, because both the relier and the substrata should avoid fallacies. Based on these [meanings of genuine members], the argument can be expressed correctly and unmistakably, and the meanings [of all the parts] can also be represented without incompleteness. Advocating these proper statements (言 yan, vacana) can generate the correct understandings of others. The thesis is manifested through the statements, so [the statements] are named “proof.” Therefore, although the specious proof containing the contradictory conclusive reason (決定相違, viruddhāvyabhicārin) does not possess any fallacy of incompleteness, it does not present a genuine proof, because it cannot generate the correct cognition of others.

(4) 二者能破。敵申過量, 善斥其非, 或妙徵宗, 故名能破。此有二義: 一顯他過, 他立不成; 二立量非他, 他宗不立。諸論唯彰顯他過破, 理亦兼有立量徵詰。發言申義, 證、敵俱明。敗彼由言, 故名“能破”也。(93b03–b05)

Second, refutation. If the opponent advocates an specious inference, and one can skillfully point out its mistakes or tactfully cite a thesis [to refute the opponent], then [such an action] is named “refutation.” This includes two sorts: The first reveals the fallacy of the opponent, thus it can disestablish the proof of the opponent; the second establishes an inference to

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200 Viruddhāvyabhicārin is normally translated as “xiangwei jueding 相違決定” in Chinese, for “xiangwei 相違” refers to viruddha and “jueding 决定” refers to avyabhicārin. Kuiji uses both these two versions, i.e., “xiangwei jueding 相違決定” and “jueding xiangwei 决定相違,” equivalently in this text.

201 The Chinese reading “que guo 開過” can means “incompleteness and fallacy” or “the fallacy of incompleteness,” but since viruddhāvyabhicārin is already one of the fourteen fallacies of the reason, “the fallacy of incompleteness” is chosen here.
disprove the opponent, thus it can make the thesis of the opponent unproved. All the treatises only represent the refutation through revealing the fallacy of others (xiantaguo 显他過破), but according to the principle, the refutation through establishing an inference (liliang zhengjie 立量徵詰) should also be included. Such statements are advocated to convey the meanings, then the witness and the opponent can both be made to understand. Since that [opponent] is defeated through [such] statements, they are named “refutation.”

Third, specious proof (si nengli 似能立, sādhanābhāsa). [If in a proof,] members are lacking respectively, or some fallacy occurs in the multiple statements, and so it causes one to fail because of futile efforts, then [such a proof] is named “specious proof.” This includes two sorts: The first lacks members, namely the case lacks the thesis, reason or example; the second has fallacies, namely when all the three parts are complete, there still exist certain fallacies, the proof is stated incorrectly, and the false thesis is expressed absurdly. [This kind of proof] raises statements but causes oneself to fail, so it is named “specious proof.”

Fourth, specious refutation (si nengpo 似能破, dūṣaṇābhāsa). If the inference of the opponent is perfect, but a critique is set forth incorrectly, and fallacies arise [in the critique], then [such an action] is named “specious refutation.” This includes two sorts: The first is that the opposing inference does not commit any fallacy, but a critique is raised incorrectly, such as the fourteen sorts of fallacious objection (guo lei 過類, jāti); the second is that one’s own inference commits one or several fallacies, but it is still regarded as a [valid] refutation to the other side. [Such refutations consist of] fallacious statements but are still considered to be winning [by himself], so they are named “specious refutation.”
The word “and” (yu 與, ca) said in the verse indicates several mutually different entities [to be interpreted]. Genuine proof, genuine refutation and their specious forms have different entities and meanings; the word “and” (yu 與) said here represents the mutual differences of these entities. Then the words “and [their] specious [forms]” (ji si 及似, sābhāsa) show that fallacies can be committed by both the proof and the refutation. It means that regarding proof that is mentioned above there is specious proof, and regarding refutation there is specious refutation, so besides the genuine forms, there are simultaneously the specious forms to be listed, thus “and” (ji 及) is said.

(The first kind of explanation by Kuiji about why they are said to be “only [pertinent] for the understanding of others” is that: ) Each thesis is fixed because [each thesis] is derived from the original understanding of each side, and it is difficult to distinguish between false and genuine because [the relation between the property-possessor and the qualifier] is not equally accepted [by both sides] yet; but when the cause and the comparison are already indicated, the cause [refers to] the reason and the comparison [refers to] the example, and indicated means shown then the correctness and the incorrectness can be finally revealed; if the thesis can be established.

202 既 YRZLSt, 旣 YRZLSj. “ji 既” and “ji 既” are variants of the same character meaning “since it is so.” The same hereinafter.
then it is called correct; if it cannot be established, then it is called incorrect; revealed means clear, when the genuine or specious statements are set up, then the correctness or incorrectness of a thesis can be apprehended then the result emerges as winning or losing, and it is clear to both sides. The [genuine] proof and [genuine] refutation are due to statements expressed by oneself, because they establish victory as the result, both the witness and the opponent understand; specious proof and specious refutation obtain defeat as the result. Because [the fallacy] is pointed out by the opponent, both the witness and the proponent understand. Thus based on the main part, they are all regarded as [pertinent] for the understanding of others. The Nyāyamukha states, “according to their various features, in order to make others understand, this proof or specious proof is spoken of.”203 The proof can make the opponent and the witness understand, because [the proponent’s] own statements can generate others’ understanding; specious proof can make the witness and the proponent understand, because the opponent can make [the witness and the proponent] themselves aware and generate the witness’ and his (the proponent’s) own understanding: so “according to their various features” is said. [Genuine] refutation and specious refutation can be known in the same way with this. What this treatise says below, namely that the proof and refutation can both make others understand, while specious proof and specious refutation cannot make others understand, is just the same with that (the sentence cited from NMu above). Hence, in this verse (NP 1), according to the main part that the witness can always be made to understand, “only [pertinent] for the understanding of others” (wei wuta 唯悟他, eva… parasamvide) is said instead of “[pertinent] for the understanding of oneself” (ziwu 自悟, ātmasamvide). (Now comes the second kind of explanation:) In addition, genuine proof and genuine refutation are only [pertinent] for the understanding of others, although the specious forms can also make oneself understand, they are involved as “only [pertinent for the understanding of others” under the influence of the genuine ones.204

203 YZML, T1628 p.3b08–b09. Tucci (1930, p.50): According as it can [or not] be the cause of another's understanding, the proof is called a (valid) proof or a fallacious proof.

204 The second explanation means, genuine proof and genuine refutation can make others understand, while specious proof and specious refutation can make oneself understand, but since the genuine side is more important...
Fifth, perception. If an action is apart from restlessness, and it realizes the objects clearly and acquires their particular entities\(^{206}\) closely, then it is named “perception.”

The appearance of the cognizer is not restless, it acquires the object correspondingly without any deliberation, corresponds to the present object without any discriminative mind, and it is confined to the particular entity [of the object] definitely, so it is named “perception.” However, it has two sorts: The first is [the perception at] the meditative position; the second is [the perception of] the dispersed mind. The meditative mind is limpid, it realizes all the objects clearly, no matter what it cognizes, [its action] is always named “perception”; regarding all the dispersed minds, if they acquire the particular entities [of objects] closely, [their actions] also belong to the perception.

\(^{205}\)因循照境 \(YRZLSt\), 自唯照境 \(YRZLSj\). “\(yinxun\)” means “following correspondingly,” while “\(ziwei\)” means “by itself” and “merely.”

\(^{206}\) According to PS, the object of perception should be the particular characteristic, but not the particular entity, which is normally a Chinese equivalence of \(svabhāva\).
Sixth, inference. If [an action] uses what have been well-established (jicheng 極成, prasiddha) to prove what has not been accepted before, and the cognition of the universal characteristic (gongxiang 共相, sāmānyalakṣaṇa) is ascertained, then it is named “inference.” The reason and example have already been established, but the thesis has not been accepted before. It uses the accepted property to establish the unaccepted thesis, just like a thread through flowers, the meaning of the reason is shared in common [by the similar instances and the thesis-subject], then the cognition of universal arises and ascertains the foregoing thesis, and a discriminating understanding emerges, so it is named “inference.” If the accepted parts are used to establish the unaccepted thesis, but the cognition is not generated in an ascertained way, [such a case] is not included in the inference.

Seventh, specious perception (si xianliang 似現量, pratyakṣābhāsa). If an action possesses deliberation and does not realize the object clearly, and it pretends to acquire the entity [of the object], then it is named “specious perception.” The dispersed minds have two kinds: The first is discriminative; the second is indiscriminative. All the specious perceptions belong to these two kinds of mind. The [dispersed] discriminative minds pretend to clearly acquire the particular entities of objects, while the [dispersed] indiscriminative minds cannot realize the objects directly and clearly, so [the perceptions of them] are named “specious perception.” [This] treatise only mentions the discriminative ones because they are certain [to be specious perceptions].

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207 花 YRZLS, 華 YRZLSj. “hua 花” and “hua 華” are two variants of the same character meaning “flower.” The same hereinafter.
208 遍 YRZLS, 徠 YRZLSj. “bian 遠” and “bian 徠” are two variants of the same character meaning “universally”, “all.” The same hereinafter.
209 This refers to the “you fenbie 有分別” and “fenbie 分別” in the definition of specious perception in YRZL: YRZL, T1630 p.12c06–c08: 有分別智於義異轉名“似現量”，謂諸有智了瓶衣等分別而生，由彼於義不以自相為境界故，名“似現量”。

i.e., kalpanā- and vikalpayatah in the Sanskrit equivalence: = NP 5: kalpanājñānam arthāntare pratyakṣābhāsam | yat jñānaṁ ghatah pata iti vā vikalpayataḥ samatpayate tad arthasvalakṣāṇāviśayatvāt pratyakṣābhāsam || (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.10, 11–13).
indiscriminative minds are just [genuine] perceptions.

(11) 八者似比量。妄興由、況，謬成邪宗，相違智起，名“似比量”。妄起因、喻，謬建邪宗，順智不生，違解便起。所立設成，此彼乖角，異生分別，名“似比量”。

Eighth, specious inference (si biliang 似比量, anumānābhāsa). If [an action] raises the reason and example mistakenly and sets up the false thesis erroneously, and so a contradictory cognition arises, then it is named “specious inference.” [The action] puts forth the reason and example mistakenly and establishes the false thesis erroneously, and then the agreeable cognition does not appear, while the contradictory understanding emerges. If what is to be proved (suoli 所立, sādhyā) [contradictorily] is established,\(^{210}\) the proponent and the opponent hold contrary theses, and then discernments appear differently. [Such an action] is named “specious inference.”

(12) “及似”等言，皆准前釋。法有幽、顯。幽、微，顯、著也。若現量境，理幽事顯；若比量境，所立為幽，能立為顯。行分明昧。 “行”謂能緣心等行相，真現，比於事幽、顯俱明，似現，比於事幽、顯俱昧。故此二刊定，唯悟自非他現、比於事幽、顯俱自。現、比於事，理應中後他先自，但以權衡之制本以利人，故先悟他，後方自悟。\(^{93c06–c12}\)

The words “and [their] specious [forms]” (ji si 及似, sābhāsa), and so forth, can be explained according to the above. Dharmas (fa 法) can be either obscure or obvious. Obscure means dim, obvious means notable. Regarding the objects of perception, the principles (li 理, referring to the essential natures of things, such as anīna, dukkha, etc.) are obscure, while the things (shi 事, referring to the five kinds of objects, such as rūpa, śabda, etc.) are obvious; regarding the objects of inference, what is to be proved is obscure, while the proof is obvious. Appearances can be either clear or vague. “Appearance” refers to the appearances of the cognizing mind. [the appearances of] both genuine perception and genuine inference are clear, no matter whether their objects are obscure or obvious; [the appearances of] both specious perception and specious inference are vague, no matter

\(^{210}\) According to Zhizhou’s further commentary in YRZLSQ, X853 p.802a02–03, this refers to the case of the contradictory conclusive reason, i.e., viruddhāvyabhicārin.
whether their objects are obscure or obvious either. Therefore, these two (genuine perception and inference) are ascertained as only pertinent for the understanding of oneself but not for that of others. The causes and effects of [the genuine] perception and inference only belong to one’s own cognition, so [these] two are ascertained as for the understanding of oneself but not that of others. When someone does not understand independently, then others cannot be made to understand, so [the understanding of] oneself ought to be placed before [the understanding of] others, but the rule of judging is originally meant to benefit people, hence the understanding of others is first, and then comes the understanding of oneself.

(13) 辨此八義略以三門: 一, 明古今同異; 二, 辨八義同異; 三, 釋體相同異。
(93c12–c13)
These eight rubrics can be analyzed in three aspects: The first clarifies the sameness and difference between past and present; the second analyzes the sameness and difference among these eight rubrics; and the third expounds the sameness and difference of entities and attributes.

(14) 明古今同異者: (93c13–c14)
[Now comes the part of] clarifying the sameness and difference between past and present:

(15) 初能立中，《瑜伽》十五，《顯揚》十一，說有八種: 一立宗，二辨因，三引喻，四同類，五異類，六現量，七比量，八正教量。《對法》亦說有八: 一立宗，二立因，三立喻，四合，五結，六現量，七比量，八聖教量。皆以自性、差別而為所立。《瑜伽》、《顯揚》八能立中，三引喻者，總也，同類、異類者，別也。於總比況假類法中，別引順、違同品、異品，而為二喻。總、別有殊，分為三種。離因、喻外無別合、結，故略合、結而不別開。《對法》

211 正教 YRZLSj, 正教量 YRZLSj. “Liàng 章” refers to pramāṇa, in order to make the word correspond to “xianliàng 現量” and “biliàng 比量” above, based on the relevant text of YBh in T1579 p.356c18–19, the “liàng 章” character is kept.
212 聖教 YRZLSj, 聖教量 YRZLSj. In the relevant text of AS in T1605 p.693b29–c01, the “liàng 章” character is kept.
Concerning the first part, namely proof, the fifteenth volume of [Xuanzang’s translation of] the Yogācārabhūmi and the eleventh volume of [Xuanzang’s translation of] the Xianyang shengjiao lun (顯揚聖教論)*Āryadeśanāvikhyāpanaśāstra//Praśārānyavācaśāstra, advocate eight sorts: first, setting forth the thesis (宗宗, pratijñā); second, clarifying the reason; third, quoting the example (喻喻, udāharaṇa); fourth, similar type (同類同類, sārūpya), fifth, dissimilar type (異類異類, vairūpya); sixth, perception; seventh, inference; and eighth, testimony of genuine teachings (正教量正教量, āptāgama). The Abhidharmasamuccaya also advocates that there are eight [sorts]: first, setting forth the thesis; second, setting forth the reason; third, setting forth the example; fourth, application (合合, upanaya), fifth, conclusion (結結, nigamana); sixth, perception; seventh, inference; and eighth, testimony of holy teachings (聖教量聖教量, āptāgama). They all consider the self-nature (自性自性, svabhāva) and the distinguishing-feature (差別差別, viśeṣa) as what is to be proved. Among the eight [sorts of] proof in the Yogācārabhūmi and the Xianyang shengjiao lun, the third one, namely the example, is the whole, while similar type and dissimilar type are parts. Among all the comparable instances in the whole example, the supporting similar group (同品同品, sapakṣa) and the contradicting dissimilar group (異品異品, vipakṣa)
are cited particularly as two examples. The whole and parts are different, so they are divided into three sorts. Apart from the reason and the example, there is no more application or conclusion, so they are not separated individually [from the reason and the example]. In the Abhidharmasamuccaya, Asaṅga also lists eight sorts as proof to follow the predecessors. Since the whole and parts of the reason have not [been divided in the inference into] [the reason of] the negative concomitance (li 離, vyatireka) and [the reason of] the positive concomitance (he 合, anvaya), why should the whole and parts of the example be [divided] according to the positive concomitance and the negative concomitance? Hence, only one overall sort is mentioned without two separated examples. Since separated examples are already lacking, the application and conclusion are added. Although the application and conclusion do not exist apart from the reason and examples, to make what is to be proved clearer, they need to be set up additionally. Among the fallacies of example, the fallacy of lacking the positive concomitance (wuhe 無合, ananvaya) and the fallacy that the positive concomitance is reversed (daohe 倒合, viparītānvaya) are mentioned. Hence when the genuine members are set up, logically there should be the application. Then, as the application has been set up individually, the conclusion should also be represented. Therefore, [the proof here includes] eight sorts, too.

(16) 古師又有說四能立，謂宗及因、同喻、異喻。世親菩薩《論軌》等說能立有三：一，宗；二，因；三，喻。以能立者必是多言，多言顯彼所立便足，故但說三。且喻總、別，終是見邊，故《對法》言：″立喻者，謂以所見邊與未所見邊和合正說。″師子覺釋：″所見邊者，謂已所顯了分，未所見邊者，謂未所
Furthermore, some ancient master says that proof includes four [sorts], namely the thesis, reason, example by similarity (tongyu 同喻, sādharmyadrṣṭānta) and example by dissimilarity (yiyu 異 喻, vaidharmyadrṣṭānta). Bodhisattva Vasubandhu’s Vādavidhi and others say that proof includes three [sorts]: first, the thesis; second, the reason; and third, the example. The proof must be [constituted of] multiple statements; multiple statements are just adequate for elucidating what is to be proved, so only three are asserted. In addition, both the whole and the parts of the example belong to the side of perceived (jianbian 見邊, the literal translation of drṣṭānta) after all, so the Abhidharmasamuccaya says, “setting forth the example means making a proper statement that equates the side of what is perceived with the side of what is unperceived.”

Buddhasin̄ha explains, “the side of what is perceived refers to the recognized part, while the side of what is unperceived refers to the unrecognized part, so all the correct statements that use the recognized part to recognize the unrecognized part for making their implications equivalent and coordinated are named ‘setting forth the example.’” Therefore, if only one “example” is said as a whole, that can already make what is to be proved get to the side of perceived, then why is it required to list two or three particularly? If there is no positive concomitance in the example, the meaning [of the thesis] cannot be clarified, if the positive concomitance is reversed, [the inference] is set up in a reversed way (which means using the thesis to prove the reason), so they are regarded as fallacies. However, apart from the reason and examples, [the application and conclusion] do not have real entities, so [the application and conclusion] are not included in genuine proof. Just express the reason first, then let the

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221 AS p.105, 6–7: drṣṭāntah drṣṭena antena adṛṣṭasya antasya samīkaraṇasamākhyānam|| Translated based on its Chinese context here.
222 ASBh p.151, 24–25: drṣṭānto drṣṭenāntenādṛṣṭasyāntasya samīkaraṇasamākhyānam pratītena bhāgenāpratītasya bhāgaṃ pratītyahānam samākhyānam ity arthaḥ || Translated based on its Chinese context here.
223 As discussed above, this “positive concomitance” which the character “合” actually refers to in the part of the example and its fallacies is also mixed up with “application” by Kuiji in this paragraph.
example follow, so the meaning of the application is already clear; and if the conclusion is said once again, that is really tedious, so both are omitted.

(17)立論者之現量等三，疎224有悟他，故名能立；敵論者現量等三，親唯自悟，故非能立。今者陳那因、喻為能立，宗為所立。自性、差別二並極成，但是宗依未成所諍，合以成宗不相離性方為所諍，何成能立？故能立中，定除其宗。

(94a12–a17)
The perception and two others (i.e., the inference and the testimony of authoritative teachings) of the proponent are [pertinent] for the understanding of others distantly, so they are [also] named “proof”; the perception and two others of the opponent are only [pertinent] for the understanding of oneself closely, so they are not proof. Now Dignāga regards the reason and the example as the proof, and the thesis as what is to be proved. [In Dignāga’s opinion.] the self-nature and the distinguishing-feature, which should both be well-established, are merely the substrata of the thesis (zong yi 宗依, ) but not what is to be argued about, while the inseparable connection (buxianglixing 不相離性, *avinābhāva) in the thesis formed by them is what is to be argued about, so how can it (the thesis) be regarded as the proof? Therefore, the thesis must be excluded from the proof.

(18)問：然依聲明，一言云“婆達喃”，二言云“婆達泥”，多言云“婆達”。今此能立“婆達”聲說。既並多言，云何但說因、喻二法以為能立？
答：陳那釋云：因有三相，一因、二喻。豈非多言？非要三體。由是定說宗是所立。(94a17–a21)

Question: However, according to the science of words (shengming 聲明, śabdavidyā), one single statement is called “bua dat nem (婆達喃 vacanam),” two statements are called “bua dat niei (婆達泥 vacane),” and multiple225 statements are called “bua dat (婆達 vacanāni).”226 The proof here is said in the form of “bua dat.” Since it refers to

224 疏 YRZLS, 疏 YRZLS. “shu 疏” is just a variant of “shu 疏” meaning “distant(ly).”
225 In this text, multiple means more than two.
226 The pronunciations in Tang dynasty are based on the Hanzi gujin yin biao 漢字古今音表 (Tables of Past and
multiple statements, why are just these two statements of the reason and example asserted as the proof?

Answer: Dignāga explains that the reason has three characteristics, namely one reason and two examples. Are they not multiple statements? It is not necessary to have three [particular] entities. Hence, the thesis is definitely asserted as what is to be proved.

(19) 陳那以後，略有三釋。一云，宗言所詮義為所立，故《瑜伽論》第十五云，“所成立義有二種，一、自性，二、差別”，“能成立法有八種”。其宗能詮之言及因等言義，皆名“能立”。其宗之言227，因、喻成故，雖亦所立，彼於論說，“何故先立宗耶？為先顯示自所愛樂宗義”，故亦所立。非定所立，能成義故，猶如於因，喻所成故，但名“能立“。宗所詮義，定唯所立，獨名“所成”。

There are mainly three kinds of explanation after Dignāga. The first explanation (by Jingyan 淨眼) says that the meaning expressed by the statement of the thesis is what is to be proved, so the fifth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi says, “the meanings of what are to be proved have two sorts: first, self-nature; and second, distinguishing-feature,” “the proof has eight sorts.”228 The statement of thesis that can express, and the statements and meanings of the reason and others, are all named “proof.” Because the statement of the thesis is established by the reason and the example, it is also what is to be proved, but since the Yogācārabhūmi says, “for what reason is the thesis set forth first? For showing the thesis which [the proponent] himself delight in.”229 It is also what is to be proved. However, it is not certainly what is to be proved, because it can also prove the meanings [of the thesis] (i.e., the self-nature and the distinguishing-feature), just like the reason which is set up by the example and named only as “proof.” The

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227 宗言 YRZLSj, 宗之言 YRZLSj. “之 zhī” is an auxiliary word here.
228 YBhah, T1579 p.356c09-11: 云何論所依，當知有十種，謂所成立義有二種，能成立法有八種。所成立義有二種者，一、自性，二、差別 = YBhHv 3–3.1: vādādihiṣṭānaṃ katamat | tad daśavidham draṣṭavyam | sādhyo 'rtho dvividhaḥ | sādhyasyārthasya sādhanam asṭavidham || sādhyo 'rtho dvividhah katamah | svabhāvo viśeśaḥ ca ||
229 YBhah, T1579 p.359a09-11: 問：為欲成就所成立義，何故先立宗耶？答：為先顯示自所愛樂宗義故 = YBhHv 3.a: kena kāraṇena sādhyasyārthasya prasiddhaya āditaḥ pratijñā kriyate || yāvad evābhūruchitasārthasya pariṇāṁjñānaḥ ||
meanings expressed by the thesis must be what are merely to be proved, so they are named “what is to be proved” alone.

(20) 二云，諸法總集，自性、差別，若教若理，俱是所立，論俱名“義”，隨應有故。總中一分，對敵所申，若言若義，自性、差別，俱名為“宗”，即名“能立”。雖此對宗，亦是所立，能立總故，得“能立”名。故陳那等，宗名“所立”，與《瑜伽》等，理不相違，《瑜伽》等不說宗230一向唯能立故。(94a2–b05)

The second explanation (by Wengui 文軌) says that the self-natures and the distinguishing-features of all the dharmas in total, no matter the expressing aspects or the expressed aspects, all belong to what is to be proved, so the treatise (the Yogācārabhūmi) calls all of them “meaning,” 231 because they can be picked up correspondingly [from the pool of meanings to refute the opponent]. When a certain part of the whole [pool of meanings] is [chosen to be] advocated against the opponent, its self-nature and distinguishing-feature, no matter the statements or the meanings, can both be named “thesis,” namely “proof.” Although with regard to the [present] thesis, these [the self-nature and distinguishing-feature here] are also what are to be proved, and they can further prove the whole [pool of meanings], so they get the name “proof.” Therefore, Dignāga and others call the thesis “what is to be proved,” and such is not contradictory to the Yogācārabhūmi and others because the Yogācārabhūmi and others do not say that the thesis is uniformly just the proof.232

(21) 三云，自性、差別合所依義，名為“所立”，能依合宗說為“能立”，總立別故。非此總宗定唯能立，對敵合申，因、喻成故，亦是所立。由非定所立，故得“能立”名。陳那但以共許因、喻成他未許，他未許者唯是合宗。宗為所立，自性、

230 宗非一向 YRZLs1, 宗一向 YRZLsJ. “非” is a negated copula, so if a “非” was present here, the content would be antinomic.
231 This “meaning,” i.e., yi 義, may come fromYBha, T1579 p.356c11: 所成立義有二種者，一、自性，二、差別 = YBhV 3.1: sādhya ‘rtha dvividhaḥ katamah | svabhāvo viśeṣaḥ ca ||
232 It seems Wengui treats the science of reasons as a special thing only for establishing the philosophical principles of Buddhism such as anitya, dukkha, etc., so concerning the overall philosophical principles, all the individual ones can be considered as proof.
The third explanation (by Kuiji himself) says that the meaning as the relier constituted by the self-nature and the distinguishing-feature is named “what is to be proved,” the constituted thesis which can be relied upon is called “proof,” because the whole (the thesis with inseparable connection) is set up by the parts (the self-nature and distinguishing-feature). It does not mean this whole thesis is always merely the proof; because it is constituted [by the self-nature and the distinguishing-feature] to be advocated against the opponent and established by the reason and example, it can also be what is to be proved. Since it is not absolutely what is to be proved, it gets the name “proof.” Dignāga only uses the equally accepted reason and example to establish what has not been accepted by others, and what has not been accepted by others only refers to the constituted thesis. The thesis is what is to be proved, the self-nature and the distinguishing-feature are merely the substrata of the thesis. They are not what is to be proved but the implements of what is to be proved. The meanings investigated [by Dignāga and ancient masters] are from different angles, so they are not contradictory to each other. Otherwise, do Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu not understand the science of reasons (yinming 因明, hetuvidyā) and regard what is to be proved as the proof?234
Concerning the second part, namely refutation, all the treatises only mention the refutation through revealing the fallacy of the opponent (xiandiguo po 显敌过破), but not the refutation through establishing an inference (liliang po 立量破), because establishing an inference can exactly reveal the fallacy of the opponent. Regarding the refutation through revealing the fallacy, some ancient master asserts that the proof has eight [sorts], so [in the fallacies of incompleteness] eight are lacking one, twenty-eight are lacking two, and likewise, till eight are lacking seven and one is lacking eight. Some [ancient master] also asserts that the proof has four [sorts], so [in the fallacies of incompleteness] four are lacking one, six are lacking two, four are lacking three and one is lacking four. Concerning the [cases of] incompleteness (quejianguoxing 缺减过性, nyūnatva) according to Bodhisattva Vasubandhu, among the thesis, the reason and the example, three are lacking one, three are lacking two, and one is lacking three. All [the masters] after Vasubandhu excluded the seventh case (i.e., lacking all the three parts), because the thesis, reason, and example form the proof, if all of them are lacking, then there is no proof at all. If there is actually no entity, how can the proof be set up? [Since there is already nothing.] how can something be still lacking and cause the name “specious [proof]”? While according to Bodhisattva Dignāga, six fallacies are listed

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235 則 YRZLSj, 即 YRZLSj. “ze 則” and “ji 即” are both affirmative copulas with the same meaning here, so they are both possible.
236 Ditto.
237 The word quejianguoxing 缺减过性 in Xuanzang’s translation is from 能立缺减过性 which refers to sādhanadoṣo nyūnatvam, but the character 過 is actually not included in nyūna but doṣa of the former part. However, there is still a possibility that Kuiji quoted this word from other works.
concerning the one reason and the two examples, namely the six fallacies of the three characteristics of a [correct] reason (yinsanxiang 因三相, trairūpya), then three are lacking one, three are lacking two but none is lacking three. Sixty years before Master Xuanzang arrived, there was a master named “Bhadraruci” in the Nālandā Temple; he was famous for his accurate mind as well as his compassionate heart all over the world, and his attainment on the science of reasons was unmatched then. He also excluded the seventh case. However, other masters do not agree to exclude it. That one reason and those two examples refer to the three characteristics of a [correct] reason, and although the thesis is declared, the reason and the examples are not, for example, a Sāṅkhya (shulun shi 數論師) sets forth “the Self is sentient” without offering the reason and examples, so is it not a fallacy? Moreover, although the statements are all there, the three characteristics are totally lacking. For example, a Śabdavādin (shenglun shi 聲論師), against a Buddhist, sets forth “sound is permanent, because of being relied on by qualities, like the annihilation of defilements through the power of analysis, whatever is impermanent is not relied by qualities, like four great elements.” Although the reason “[because of] being relied on by qualities” is set forth here, and the three characteristics are utterly lacking, how can it not be specious? Hence, the seventh [case] is also a fallacy of incompleteness.

(23) 似能立中, 且九似宗。陳那菩薩《理門》等論, 立有五種, 不說後四, 謂能、所別、俱不極成, 相符極成。(94c03–c05)

Concerning specious proof, there are nine specious theses (namely the nine fallacies of the thesis), Bodhisattva Dignāga’s Nyāyamukha and other treatises set up five kinds without the last four, namely the fallacy that the qualifier is not well-established (nengbie bu jicheng 能別不極成, aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇa), the fallacy that the qualified is not well-established (suobie bu jicheng 所別不極成, aprasiddhaviśeṣya), the fallacy that both the qualifier and the qualified are not well-established (ju bu jicheng 俱不極成, aprasiddhaubhaya), and the fallacy that in the thesis the relationship is well-established (xiangfu jicheng 相符極成, prasiddhasambandha).
(24) 以《理門》說“宗等多言說‘能立’，此中唯取隨自意，樂為所立說名‘宗’，非彼相違義能遣”，後之四種既非相違，所以略之。天主宗過，不但相違，故申九種。(94c05–c08)

(There are three kinds of explanation by Woncheuk 圓測 based on Xuanzang’s teaching below according to IRMS. Now comes the first kind:) Since the Nyāyamukha states, “the multiple statements of the thesis and others are called ‘proof’, herein what is desired to be proved only in accordance with one’s own intention can be called ‘thesis’, which those meanings contradictory to that cannot exclude,” the last four kinds do not belong to the contradictory [cases], so they are omitted. However, the fallacies of the thesis by Śaṅkarasvāmin do not only include those contradictory ones, so nine kinds are advocated.

(25) 第二釋云，陳那菩薩以能別不成即是因中不共不定等過，亦是喻中所立不成、闕無同喻等過。所別不成有法無故，即因過中所依不成過。其俱不極成，即合是二過。相符極成者，凡所立論名、義相違，既曰相符便非所立，本非宗故，依何立過？如諸俗人不受戒者非受戒類，依何說有持戒破戒？是故不說後之四過。(94c08–c15)

The second kind of explanation says that Bodhisattva Dignāga considers the fallacy that the qualifier is not well-established as the fallacy that the inconclusive reason is uncommon to both (bugong bu ding 不共不定, asādhāraṇānaikāntika) regarding the reason, also as the fallacy that what is to be proved is unestablished (suoli bu cheng 所立不成, sādhyadharmaśiddha), the fallacy that the similar instance is lacking, and so on, regarding the example. The fallacy that the qualified is not well-established appears

238 YZML, T1628 p.1a08–a09. The quote here is a little different from the original which reads “宗等多言說能立，是中唯取隨自意，樂為所立說名‘宗’，非彼相違義能遣,” a character “qu 取” meaning “take” or “choose” is added, and “cheng li 成立” is simplified into “li 立,” but they can both mean “prove” here, so actually there is no significant difference. The translation is mainly based on the original of Xuanzang’s version and Chinese commentaries.
Tucci (1930, p.5): The proposition and the other terms are called the proof (sādhanā). Here is called ‘proposition’ only that particular argument that we want to prove in accordance with our own opinion. It must be such as no agreement contradictory [to it] can exclude [it].
And in 2) footnote, his restoration reads: paksādvivaçaṇānāti sādhanaṁ tatra hi svayam | sādhyatvenepśitaḥ pakṣo viruddhārthānirākṛtah |
because the property-possessor is not [equally] accepted, so it is just the fallacy that the reason is unestablished (*suoyi bu cheng* 所依不成, *āśrayāsiddha*) regarding the reason. The fallacy that both the qualifier and the qualified are not well-established combines these two fallacies. The fallacy that in the thesis the relationship is well-established means that every inference set forth [by the proponent] should be contradictory [to the opponent] on the statement and meaning, and if it is said to possess an equal relation, it should not be what is to be proved, and then since it is inherently not a thesis, what should the fallacy be based on? Just like those secular people who have not accepted precepts do not belong to the class of precept-accepters, based on what can they be asserted as either keeping precepts or breaking precepts? Hence, the last four fallacies are not advocated.

(26)今者天主,加能別不成,以宗合取不相離性方得成宗。若非能別,誰不相離? 若以因中是不共不定等亦是喻中所立不成,恐繁重故不須說者,因中已有闕同品,有不共等過,喻中復說能立不成,一何鄭重! 是故加之。(94c15–c20)

(The third kind of explanation goes from YRZLS par.26 to 31:) now Śaṅkarasvāmin adds the fallacy that the qualifier is not well-established because the thesis can only become a thesis through holding the inseparable connection between both [the qualified and the qualifier] as a whole. If there is no [real] qualifier, then what constitutes the inseparable connection? If because it is also the fallacy that the inconclusive reason is uncommon to both and others regarding the reason as well as the fallacy that what is to be proved is unestablished regarding the example, for fear of being too prolix, [the fallacy that the qualifier is not well-established] does not have to be advocated again, then there are already the fallacies that no reason resides in the similar group regarding the reason, namely the fallacy that the inconclusive reason is uncommon to both, and so on, but the fallacy that the proof is unestablished (*nengli bu cheng* 能立不成, *sādhanadharmāsiddha*) is still advocated again regarding the example, how serious it is! Hence, it (the fallacy that the qualifier is not well-established) is added.
Śaṅkarasvāmin further adds the fallacy that the qualified is not well-established. If because it is also the fallacy that the substratum of the reason is unestablished regarding the reason, it is also omitted for fear of being too prolix, then regarding the reason there are already the fallacies that the inconclusive reasons pervade the dissimilar group and the fallacies that the inconclusive reasons reside in one part of the dissimilar group, why is the fallacy that the proof is non-excluded (nengli bu qian 能立不遣, sādhanāvyāvrta) advocated again regarding the example by dissimilarity? Why is a fallacy of the thesis abolished just because it is also a fallacy of the reason? The other question can be answered in the same way as that above.²³⁹ Hence, it (the fallacy that the qualified is not well-established) is added.

The fallacy that both the qualifier and the qualified are not well-established combines [last] two fallacies. There must be both [the qualified and the qualifier] which qualify each other and [indicate] an inseparable connection [between them], then the thesis can be formed. If these two are both not [well-established], how can the thesis be formed? Hence, it (the fallacy that both are not well-established) is added.

If these three above are not advocated as fallacies, the substrata [of the thesis] are not well [established], then they must be established again. Since the thesis is not eligible, how can it be named “what is to be proved”?²³⁹ This refers to the response in last paragraph which replies by asking “if there is no [real] qualifier, then what constitutes the inseparable connection,” so the answer here may be “if there is no [real] qualified, then what constitutes the inseparable connection.”

²³⁹ This refers to the response in last paragraph which replies by asking “if there is no [real] qualifier, then what constitutes the inseparable connection,” so the answer here may be “if there is no [real] qualified, then what constitutes the inseparable connection.”
Concerning the fallacy that in the thesis the relationship is well-established, if [the doubt is that] because of the well-established relation [the statement] is virtually not a thesis, then what should this fallacy be based on? [To solve this doubt, it can be considered in this way:] the fallacy that the reason is unestablished to both the proponent and the opponent (liangju bu cheng 两俱不成, ubhayāsiddha), the fallacy that both the proof and what is to be proved are unestablished (ju bu cheng 俱不成, ubhayadharmāsiddha), and the fallacy that both what is to be proved and the proof are non-excluded (ju bu qian 俱不遣, ubhayāvyāvṛtta) actually make the reason and the examples ineligible, then what should these fallacies be based on? If [with these fallacies] the reason and the examples have already expressed something, so they should still be considered as fallacies, then the thesis has also expressed, why is it not a fallacy? Hence, it (the fallacy that in the thesis the relationship is well-established) is added.

However, Dignāga expresses in an omitted way which represents the last four fallacies through the first five ones like shadows [of objects], while Śaṅkarasvāmin does this in an explicit and detailed way, so such [differences between them] are not contradictions between a teacher and his disciple. ²⁴¹

²⁴⁰ “bing 並” and “bing 并” are two variants of the same character meaning “and.” The same hereinafter.
²⁴¹ In order to answer why there are only five fallacies of the thesis in YZML but nine in YRZL, three kinds of explanation by Woncheuk 圓測 based on Xuanzang’s teaching are offered here from YRZLS par.24–31, the first kind (YRZLS par.24) means YRZL is indeed more detailed than YZML; the second (YRZLS par.25) means the latter four do not need to be set up independently; the third (YRZLS par.26–31) holds a contrary position and explains why they should be listed independently.
Moreover, regarding the thesis, some ancient master before Dignāga also advocates a fallacy that the thesis contradicts the reason, and in the Nyāyamukha Dignāga refutes it by himself by saying “some people say that the contradiction between the thesis and the reason is called the contradiction of the thesis (宗違宗過),[but according to me,] this is not an error of the thesis (宗過宗違). Like what is established here [by them] that ‘sound is permanent, because everything is impermanent’, [the reason ‘because everything is impermanent’, [the reason ‘because everything is impermanent’] is [not a formulation of a valid reason but] a formulation of the example, which presents the dissimilar property wrongly, as according to the example of the positive concomitance (合喻) [the valid reason] must be shown as ‘because it is not-everything.’ Dignāga means, such as a Šabdavādin sets forth “sound is permanent” [as the thesis]
and “everything is impermanent” as the reason, it is [actually] that a heretic uses a formulation of the example for this thesis to trickily establish the dissimilar property of impermanence wrongly [as the reason]. [The Śabdavādin] does not explain the reason as “from the example of the positive concomitance, [the valid reason] must be shown as ‘because it is not-everything’” to establish “sound is permanent” in the thesis. Dignāga corrects by saying that to establish “sound is permanent,” the correct reason should be “because it is not-everything,” because the impermanent dharmas advocated by the heretics include many sorts, and those various distinct [dharmas] are named “everything.” Thus in order to establish “sound is permanent,” the reason should be “because it is not-everything,” and it should be said in the example of the positive concomitance that “whatever is not-everything, its entity is permanent, like ether (xukong 虛空, ākāśa),” how can “everything is impermanent” be used as the reason to establish that the thesis is “permanent”?

(33)復云：“此因非有，以聲攝在一切中故。”陳那意言，此古所引“一切皆是無常故”因，於其所立常聲非有，以聲攝在“一切皆是無常”中故。便是因中兩俱不成，共不許因有法有故。(95a16–a20)

Moreover, [Dignāga] says, “this reason does not exist [either] because sound is included in ‘everything.’”245 Dignāga means, the reason “because everything is impermanent”246 cited by the ancient master does not exist in respect to the permanent sound which he establishes, because sound is also included in “everything is impermanent.” Such belongs to the fallacy that the reason is unestablished to both the proponent and the opponent because both sides do not accept that the reason can be possessed by the property-possession.

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245 YZML, T1628 p.1a27–a28. Tucci (1930, p.8): But this reason is non-existent, because “not all (things)” cannot be taken as an attribute of the subject of the proposition, since sound also is included in “all things”.

However, the middle part of this translation is added by Tucci himself, for it cannot be found in the Chinese version. 246 In YZML, based on the context, “this reason” should refer to “because it is not all” but not “because all are impermanent” as Kuiji interpreted. However, the commentary on YZML by Shentai 神泰 says explicitly that the reason here is “because it is not all” in the Limenlun shuju, T1839 p.79 c25. In addition, according to the materials preserved in the Japanese commentaries like IRMS and INRSZ, other Chinese exegetes, e.g., Dingbin 定賓, Jingmai 靖邁, Wenbei 文備, Daoyi 道邑, also explain “this reason” as “because it is not all.”
If he (the Śabdavādin) sets forth “sound is permanent” with “because it is not-everything” as the reason, [to this,] Dignāga says additionally that, “or because it belongs to [the fallacy that] [the reason] is only partially [accepted as] the property of what is to be proved (this refers to anyatarāsiddha).” Only heretics admit “because it is not-everything,” this reason can be present in the thesis[-subject] [to them], while Buddhists do not admit “because it is not-everything” of sound, this reason cannot be present in the thesis[-subject], so it belongs to the reason’s fallacy that the reason is unestablished to either the proponent or the opponent (suiyi bu cheng 隨一不成, anyatarāsiddha). Thus, both of these two approaches (the reason “because all are impermanent” with ubhayāsiddha in the last paragraph and the reason “because it is not all” with anyatarāsiddha here) do not belong to the fallacies of the thesis, so “[they] should be called ‘error of the reason.’”

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247 YZML, T1628 p.1a28–a29. Concerning the fallacy of “suoli yifen yi 所立一分義,” as Kuiji interpreted, it is equal to anyatarāsiddha, while in Tucci (1930, p.8), Tucci translates it as “or it incurs the other fallacy, which is called (presence) in a part only of the probandum.” According to another student of Xuanzang, i.e., Shentai 神泰, this should be translated as “the fallacy that using a part of what is to be proved as the reason,” for his interpretation goes as follows:

The *Limenlun shuji*, T1839 p.80a02–a05: 謂所立宗有二分，有法及法，既是一“聲”故，名“非一切”，此“非一切”因，與所立中有法“聲”何別？然“非一切”言，唯世聲一法上故，不同“所作性”因通餘法。

[This fallacy] means, the thesis to be proved has two parts, the property-possessor and the property, since [the property-possessor] is just a “sound,” it is named “not-everything,” so what is the difference between this reason “being not-everything” and the property-possessor “sound” in what is to be proved? For the statement of “being not-everything” [in this case] is merely present in this (*shi* 世 reads strangely here, it may be a variant of *shi* 是) single dharma sound, this is different from the reason “being produced” which can also pervade other dharmas.

Shentai means, “being not-everything” is just another referent of sound, i.e., just the sound itself, so if the inference is “sound is permanent, because it is not all,” it becomes a kind of vicious circle. Then in this way, the fallacy here should be translated as “the fallacy that using a part of what is to be proved as the reason.” In addition, there is a kind of fallacy named “zongyi yifen wei yin 宗義一分為因” which is exactly the fallacy that using a term of the thesis as the reason in YZML as well as Kuiji’s commentary on YRZL, based on Shentai’s interpretation here, these two may refer to the same thing taking different translations.

248 YZML, T1628 p.1a29. Tucci (1930, p.8): it constitutes a fallacy of the reason, (not of the proposition). In the Chinese version of this sentence, the pronoun is omitted, Tucci understands the omitted pronoun as a single “it” referring to the argument, however, based on Kuiji’s commentary, the omitted pronoun may refer to the two reason-statements with those two fallacies which he has just discussed.
亦是異喻倒離之過。一切離法，先宗後因，既立“常”宗，“非一切”因，異喻離言“諸無常者，皆是一切”，而今說言“一切皆是無常故”者，先因後宗，故成倒離，惡立異法之無常義。由此宗違，非是宗過，是因、喻過。陳那既破，天主順從，故亦不立。(95a24–a29)

[It] (“everything is impermanent”) also belongs to the fallacy of reversing the negative concomitance (daoli 倒離, viparītavyatireka) of the example by dissimilarity. All the negative concomitance should put forward the thesis[-property] first and the reason[-property] later, so if the thesis “permanent” and the reason “because it is not-everything” are set forth, the example by dissimilarity should make the negative concomitance in the way that “everything which is impermanent, it is everything,” but now “because everything is impermanent” is said, which puts forward the reason first and the thesis later, so it belongs to [the fallacy of] reversing the negative concomitance, and it establishes the dissimilar property impermanence mistakenly. Hence, this contradiction of the thesis is not a fallacy of the thesis but fallacies of the reason and the example. Since Dignāga has refuted it, Śaṅkarasvāmin follows and does not list it either.

若以因過，宗中不立，既是喻過，因應不立，且如相違，及不共不定，應非喻中能立不成。今釋不然。因有三相，體義最寬。但陳其因，有是相違、不共不定，未舉其喻，過已彰訖。今陳其宗，猶未有過，舉因方過，何得推過乃在宗中？不同比量相違，彼但舉宗，已違因訖。今此不爾，是故但應如陳那說。
If [the contradiction of the thesis] should not be established in [the category of] thesis [fallacies], because [it is] a fallacy of the reason, then since it is [also] a fallacy of the example, it should not be established in [the category of] reason [fallacies] either, just like [the fallacies of] contradictory (xiangwei 相違, viruddha) [reasons] as well as the fallacy that the inconclusive reason is uncommon to both the similar group and the dissimilar group, which should not be the fallacy that the proof is unestablished regarding the example. Now the explanation is not so. The reason has three characteristics; its entity and meaning are the broadest. If only the reason is stated, then there will be the fallacies of contradictory reasons as well as the fallacy that the inconclusive reason is uncommon to both, so the fallacies have already been represented when the example has not been cited yet. Now the thesis is stated, but the fallacy has not appeared yet; it only appears when the reason is cited, so why should the fallacy be pushed into [the category of] thesis [fallacies]? This is different from the fallacy that the thesis is contradicted by inference (biliang xiangwei 比量相違, anumānāviruddha); in that case, once the thesis is cited, it is already contradictory to the reason. Now it is not the same, so it should just follow what Dignāga says.

(37)外道因明, 四不成中但說兩俱及隨一過, 不說猶預、所依不成。此不成因, 亦不成宗, 立、敵或偏所不成故。陳那說言, 其理雖爾, 因依於宗, 或決或疑, 宗或有、無。既有差別, 總合難知, 故開為四。(95b06–b11)

The heretic science of reasons, regarding the four [fallacies of] unestablished (bu cheng 不成, asiddha) [reasons], only advocates the fallacy that the reason is unestablished to both the proponent and the opponent and the fallacy that the reason is unestablished to either the proponent or the opponent, but not the fallacy that the reason is unestablished because of doubt (youyu bu cheng 猶預不成, saṃdigdhāsiddha) or the fallacy that the substratum of the reason is unestablished. This [fallacy that the reason is unestablished because of doubt] cannot become a [correct] reason, and that [fallacy that the substratum of the reason is unestablished] cannot establish the thesis because both the
proponent and the opponent, or either, consider them as unestablished. Dignāga says that although the principle may be so, but concerning the reason with respect to [the subject of] the thesis, it can be conclusive or doubtful, then [the subject of] the thesis can also be existent (equally accepted) or non-existent (not equally accepted). Since there are such differences, they are not easy to know if said in a generalized way, so these fallacies are classified into four kinds.

(38)《理門論》中，古亦有說不定有五，除不共因，異品無故。陳那加之，由不共故，此如何等。(95b11–b13)

It is said in the Nyāyamukha that some ancient master advocates only five fallacies of inconclusive reasons, excluding the fallacy that the inconclusive reason is uncommon to both (bugong yin 不共因, i.e., bugong bu ding 不共不定, asādhāraṇānaikāntika), because [in this fallacy the reason] even does not reside in the dissimilar group. Dignāga adds it, because [in this fallacy the reason] is not common [to both the similar group of instances and the dissimilar group] and causes doubts.

(39)諸量之中，古說或三，現量、比量及聖教量，亦名“正教”及“至教量”，或名“聲量”，觀可信聲而比義故。或立四量，加譬喻量。如不識野牛，言似家牛，方以喻顯故。或立五量，加義准量，謂若法無我，准知必無常，無常之法必無我故。或立六量，加無體量，入此室中見主不在，知所往處，如入鹿母堂，不見苾芻，知所往處。陳那菩薩廢後四種，隨其所應攝入現、比，故《理門》云：“彼聲、喻等，攝在此中。”由斯論主，但立二量。(95b13–b22)

Concerning the means of valid cognition, some ancient master claims three [sorts], namely perception, inference and testimony of holy teachings, which is also named “testimony of genuine teachings” or “testimony of ultimate teachings,” or “testimony of words” (shengliang 聲量, śabda), for it consults authoritative words to make
inferences. Some [ancient master] advocates four sorts, adding comparison (piyuliang 譬喻量, upamāna). For example, if [someone] does not know wild ox, [he can] be told that it is just like domestic ox, which just uses a comparison to elucidate. Some [ancient master] advocates five sorts, adding postulation (yizhunliang 義准量, arthāpatti), which means if a dharma has no self, then consulting this, it can be inferred that [this dharma] must be impermanent, because whatever is impermanent must have no self. Some [ancient master] advocates six sorts, adding non-existence (wutiliang 無體量, abhāvai), [for example,] if [someone] comes into a room and finds the owner absent, then he knows [the owner] must have gone to some other place, just like if someone comes into the preaching hall of Migāramātā and finds the monk absent, then he knows [the monk] must have gone to some other place. Bodhisattva Dignāga abolishes the last four sorts and includes them in perception and inference according to circumstances, so the Nyāyamukha states, “other means such as the testimony of words, comparison, etc. are included in these two.”

Thus the author of this treatise only proposes two means of valid cognition.

(40)此上略明古今同異，別義所以至下當知。（95b22–b23）
Above clarifies the sameness and difference between past and present briefly, and then the reason why there are [sameness and] difference [among these eight rubrics] is to be known below.

(41)辨八義同異者：（95b23）
Now comes the part of analyzing the sameness and difference among these eight rubrics:

(42)有是能立而非能破，如真能立建立自宗；有釋無此，能立自宗即能破敵，必對彼故。有是能破而非能立，如顯過破；有釋無此，但破他宗自便立故。有是能立亦是能破，如真立破他所不成；有釋無此，立謂能申自，破謂就他宗。有

254 YZML, T1628 p.3b10–b11. Tucci (1930, p.50): since [the other pramāṇas admitted by different schools] such as tradition (śabda), analogy (upamāna) etc. are included in these two.
非能立亦非能破，謂似立破。（95b23–b29）

(1. The relationships between proof and refutation:)

(1 a and -b) Some is a proof but not a refutation, such as the genuine proof which establishes one’s own thesis; but there is an explanation negating this that proving one’s own thesis is equivalent to refuting the opponent, because [a genuine proof] must stand against the opponent. (2 -a and b) Some is a refutation but not a proof, such as the refutation through revealing the fallacy of the opponent; but there is an explanation negating this that refuting the opponent’s thesis make one’s own [thesis] proved. (3 a and b) Some is both a proof and a refutation, such as the genuine proof which refutes the opponent’s unestablished thesis; but there is an explanation negating this that “proof” refers to [some statement] which can state one’s own [thesis], while “refutation” refers to [some statement] which is directed at the thesis of others. (4 -a and -b) Some is neither a proof nor a refutation, namely specious proof and specious refutation.

(43) 有是能立而非似立，謂真能立。有是似立而非能立，除決定相違所餘似立；有是能立亦是似立，謂決定相違；有釋無此，此唯似立非能立故，立者雖具言他智不決故。有非能立亦非似立，謂妄破他所成立義。（95b29–c04）

(2. The relationships between proof and specious proof:)

(1) Some is a proof but not a specious proof, namely genuine proof. (2) Some is a specious proof but not a proof, namely all kinds of specious proof except [the specious proof with] the fallacy of the contradictory conclusive reason; (3) some is both a proof and a specious proof, namely [the inference with] the fallacy of the contradictory conclusive reason; but there is an explanation negating these (both 2 and 3) 255 that [the inference with the fallacy of the contradictory conclusive reason] is only a specious proof but not a [genuine] proof, because although the proof [with the fallacy of the contradictory conclusive reason] has set forth statements, the cognition of others cannot become ascertained. (4) Some is neither a proof nor a specious proof, namely refuting incorrectly the thesis established by others.

255 This opposite explanation points to both of the second and the third cases, not just the third one.
(44) 有是能立而非似破，如無過量。有是似破而非能立，如十四過類等。有是能立亦是似破，如決定相違；有釋無此，此但似破非真立故。有非能立亦非似破，謂顯過破；有釋無此，顯他過非，自便立故。(95c04–c09)

(3. The relationships between proof and specious refutation:)

(1) Some is a proof but not a specious refutation, such as the inference with no fallacy.
(2) Some is a specious refutation but not a proof, such as the fourteen kinds of fallacious objections, etc. (3) Some is both a proof and a specious refutation, such as [the inference with] the fallacy of the contradictory conclusive reason; but there is an explanation negating this that this is only a specious refutation but not a genuine proof. (4) Some is neither a proof nor a specious refutation, namely the refutation through revealing the fallacy of the opponent; but there is an explanation negating this that revealing the fallacy of others makes one’s own thesis proved.

(45) 能破定非似立，亦非似破，真、似異故。(95c09–c10)

(4 and 5. The relationships between refutation and specious proof as well as specious refutation:)

A refutation must not be a specious proof or a specious refutation because genuine is different from specious.

(46) 有是似立而非似破，謂有過量建立自宗；有釋無此，自宗義成，即是真破，自既不立，即似破他。有是似破而非似立，謂妄顯他非，十四過類；有釋無此，妄謂破他，即妄立故。有似能立亦是似破，如以過量破他不成。有非似立亦非似破，謂真能立或真能破。(95c10–c16)

(6. The relationships between specious proof and specious refutation:)

(1) Some is a specious proof but not a specious refutation, namely using a fallacious inference to establish one’s own thesis; but there is an explanation negating this that establishing one’s own thesis successfully is equivalent to genuine refutation, while establishing one’s own unsuccessfully is equivalent to specious refutation. (2) Some is
a specious refutation but not a specious proof, namely revealing the fallacy of others incorrectly like the fourteen kinds of fallacious objections; but there is an explanation negating this that refuting others incorrectly is equivalent to proving incorrectly. (3) Some is both a specious proof and a specious refutation, such as using a fallacious inference to refute others unsuccessfully. (4) Some is neither a specious proof nor a specious refutation, namely genuine proof or genuine refutation.

(47)似現、似比總入非量。由此可言現量非比及非非量，比量亦是非非量攝。有是現量非比、非量，謂證自相真現量智。有比、非量非真現量，即證共相比量智及諸非量。此依見分，若依心體，見分通比、非，自證必現故。(95c16–c20)

(The relationships between perception, inference and the specious means of valid cognition:)

Specious perception and specious inference are both included in the false means of valid cognition (feiliang 非量).256 Thus it can be said that perception is neither inference nor the false means of valid cognition, and inference is not included in the false means of valid cognition either. (1) Some is perception but not inference or false means of valid cognition, namely the cognition of genuine perception which perceive the particular characteristic (zixiang 自相, svalakṣaṇa). (2) Some is inference or false means of valid cognition but not genuine perception, namely the cognition of inference and those false means of valid cognition which perceive universal characteristics. This statement is based on the seeing portion; if based on the entity of mind,257 the seeing portion can be either inference or the false means of valid cognition, while self-awareness must be perception.

256 In the case that feiliang 非量 means immeasurable or unlimited but not a special type of valid cognition, its Sanskrit equivalence can be apramāṇa; furthermore, this apramāṇa indicates “not a pramāṇa,” e.g., in the Pramāṇavārttika 1.335, 3.89, 4.3, 4.237. However, since most of the sources for the usage of feiliang 非量 as a type of cognition are only extant in Chinese, its Sanskrit equivalence is not sure. See Yao (2011, p.479). However, based on Kuiji’s interpretation here, feiliang 非量 consists of specious perception and specious inference, i.e., pratyakṣābhāṣa and anumānābhāṣa, and means the false means of valid cognition, thus, if there does exist a Sanskrit equivalence from some Indian sources which Kuiji or Xuanzang could get access to, pramāṇābhāṣa may be a possibility.

257 In YRZLSH, X854 p.845b24, Zhizhou explains that “見分、自證總名心體 (the seeing portion and self-awareness are named together as the entity of mind).”
Therefore, although there are eight rubrics, there are only seven entities. Although from the angle of the opponent’s thesis, the entity of genuine proof is just genuine refutation, there is the refutation through revealing the fallacy of the opponent which is not genuine proof. Although specious proof is just specious refutation, the incorrect refutation through revealing the fallacy of the opponent is not specious proof. Therefore, besides proof, refutation is elucidated; besides specious proof, specious refutation is elucidated. Genuine perception, genuine inference, specious perception, and specious inference are included in the cognition as apprehensive cause (zhiliaoyin 智了因) because they belong to the two kinds of apprehending cognitions (namely the cognition of perception and the cognition of inference). Thus, those eight rubrics only have seven kinds of entity. The genuine forms and the specious forms can clarify each other, so the rubrics are divided into eight.

释体相同异者，即解论文，辨八体相之同异也。 (95c26–c27) 
[The part of] expounding the sameness and difference of entities and attributes refers to interpreting the prose and discriminating the sameness and difference of the entities and attributes among these eight [rubrics].

258 則 YRZLSi, 即 YRZLS. Both possible.
259 Specious perception and specious inference are counted as a whole, i.e., specious means.
2.2. On Proof

(1.2. Following the Indication and Interpreting Respectively 隨標別釋)

(1.2.1. Summarizing the Essentials of All [the Treatises] 總綰群機)

(95c28) 論：如是總攝諸論要義。

YRZL: So (NP 1) is the summarizing of the essentials of all260 the treatises.261
NP 1: iti śāstrārthasaṅgrahah || (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.1, 5).

(95c28–96a01) 說曰：自下第二隨標別釋。於中有三：初總綰群機；次依標随釋；後且止斯事，方隅略示，顯息繁文。此即初也。

YRZLS: Now comes the second part, namely following the indication and interpreting respectively. It includes three sections: The first summarizes the essentials of all [the treatises]; the second interprets respectively according to the indication; the last just stops this for ceasing the complicated content because of the direction which has generally been shown. This is the first.

“如是”者，指頌所說。“總綰”者，以略貫多。“諸論”者，今古所製一切因明。“要義”者，立破正邪紀綱道理。此義總顯《瑜伽》、《對法》、《顯揚》等說。

(96a02–96a04) “So” (rushi 如是, iti) refers to what has been said in the verse. “Summarizing” (zongshe 總綰, saṅgraha) means using the brief to string the multitude. “All the treatises” (zhulun 諸論, śastra) means all the [treatises on] the science of reasons written in the past and at present. “Essentials” (yaoyi 要義, artha)262 means the doctrinal outline of

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260 There is no “all” in the Sanskrit version, but in Xuanzang’s translation, a Chinese character “諸” which means “all” exists.
261 Tachikawa translates this sentence as “this is a summary of the doctrine” based on Haribhadra’s commentary and the Tibetan translation made from the Sanskrit text. See Tachikawa (1971, p.120 and p.130, n.2)
262 In fact, śastraṅhasaṅgraha is a tatpurusa compound as a whole, but Kuiji divides it into three words and interprets them one by one.
proof, refutation, correct and false. These essentials generally manifest the theories of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, the *Xianyang shengjiao lun*, and so forth.

(52) 因明有七。頌曰：

“論體、論處所，
論據、論莊嚴，
論負、論出離，
論多所作法。”

一者論體，謂言生因，立論之體。二者論處所，謂於王家、證義者等論議處所。
三者論據，謂論所依，即真能立及似，真、似現、比量等。
其自性、差別義為言詮，亦所依攝。四者論莊嚴，謂真能破。五者論負，謂似立、似破。六者論出離，將興論時，立敵安處身心之法。七者論多所作法，由具上六，能多所作。今此括要，總為一頌，雖說八門即彼四種，第一、第三、第四、第五。但敘紀綱，不彰餘理，名“攝要義”。(96a0–a15)

The science of reasons has seven [topics]. A verse says,


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263 即真能立及以真現比量等 YRZLSt, 即真能立及似真現比量等 YRZLSj. The sentence with “以 *yi*” in YRZLSt does not make sense, obviously that character is a typo of “似 *si*,” i.e., “specious,” in addition, there should also be another “似 *si*” character in the second half of this sentence to make the meaning complete like the text in YRZLSj. Hence, there must be some typos in YRZLSt.

264 This verse is quoted from Xuanzang’s translation of *YBh* in T1579 p.356a14–a15, and can also be found in the translation of the *Xianyang shengjiao lun* in T1602 p.531a15–a16. In the Sanskrit manuscript, it lies at the end of the Hetuvidyā section of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, but in Xuanzang’s translation, it is put at the beginning instead. This translation is mainly based on the Chinese translation. Wayman’s translation is also consulted here, he translates as “the debate and its setting, its foundation; its ornaments and points of defeat; undertaking it, and what are of much utility for it” in Wayman (1999, p.41), according to his critical Sanskrit reading: वादो ‘धिकराणम तस्या तदाधिष्ठानम एवा | भृषाणम निग्रहास तस्या निःश्रिति बहुकराकाः।’. In Yaita (2005, p.124), Yaita’s edition reads वादो ‘धिकराणम तस्या तदाधिष्ठानम एवा | भृषाणम निग्रहास तस्या निःश्रिति बहुकराकाः।’. Wayman corrects निःश्रिति into निःश्रिति, and translates it as “undertaking it,” that also fits. The problem in this text is, “undertaking” is a little far from the Chinese word “chuli 出離.” I tend to choose निःश्रिति and use “detachment” here, for this part
First, the argument’s entity refers to the statement as generative cause (yan shengyin 言生因), it is the entity of making argument. Second, the argument’s location (lun chusuo 論處所, vādādhikarana) refers to the residence of king, the place of witness, and other locations for argument. Third, the argument’s foundation (lun ju 論據, vādādhiśthaṇa) refers to the basis of argument (lun suoyi 論所依, vādādhiśthaṇa), namely genuine proof and specious one, genuine and specious perception and inference, and so on. The meanings of the self-nature and distinguishing-feature are expressed by the [thesis-]statements; they are also included in the basis of argument. Fourth, the argument’s ornament (lun zhuangyan 論莊嚴, vādašaṅka) refers to genuine refutation. Fifth, the argument’s failure (lun fu 論負, vādanigraha) refers to specious proof and specious refutation. Sixth, the detachment for argument (lun chuli 論出離, vādaniḥsarana) refers to the ways for the proponent and the opponent to set their bodies and minds at ease when an argument is going to start. Seventh, what are of much utility for argument (lun duosuozuofa 論多所作法, vāde bahukārakā dharmāḥ) means there can be much utility because of possessing those six above. At present the essentials are summarized into one verse, although eight rubrics are mentioned, they only belong to four elements above, namely the first, third, the fourth and the fifth. [The Nyāyapraveśa] just tells the outline but does not expound other principles, [thus] “summarize the essentials” is said.

(53)又世親所造《論軌》、《論式》等，法雖全備，文繁義雜。陳那詳考，更為《因明理門》等論。雖教理論煥，而旨幽詞邃，令初習之者莫究其微。天主此論，纂二先之妙，鳩群籍之玄，奧義咸殫，深機並控，匪唯提綜周備，實亦易葉成功，既彰四句之能，兼明八義之益。故言“總攝諸論要義”。(96a15–a21)
Moreover, in Vasubandhu’s *Vādavidhi, Vādavidhāna*, and so on, although the principles [of argument] are complete, the texts are tedious, and the meanings are miscellaneous. Dignāga considered in detail and then wrote the *Nyāyamukha* and other treatises. The doctrines are precise and clear, but the tenets are abstruse, and the words are profound, which make the beginners out of detailed understandings. This treatise by Śaṅkarasvāmin grasps the excellence of two early [masters] (i.e., Vasubandhu and Dignāga), gathers the mysteriousness of various books and contains every key point as well as profundness; it does not only synthesize comprehensively but also actually gets the achievement [of affording a modal] for later generations; it represents the capabilities of the four lines [of the outline verse], and clarifies the advantages of the eight rubrics. Hence, “[so] is the summarizing of the essentials of all the treatises” is said.

(1.2.2. Interpreting Respectively according to the Indication 依標隨釋)

(1)論：此中宗等多言名為“能立”。(96a22)

YRZL: Herein, the multiple statements of the thesis and others are named “proof.”


(54)述曰：自下第二依標隨釋。於中分六：一，明能立；二，明似立；三，明二真量；四，明二似量；五，明能破；六，明似能破。(96a22–a25)

YRZLS: Now comes the second section [of the second part], namely interpreting respectively according to the indication. It is divided into six sub-sections: The first expounds proof; the second expounds specious proof; the third expounds the two

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267 Kuiji here uses a metaphor of “yi ye 易葉” which means changing leaves or changed leaves, but the connotation is quite obscure. The translation here is based on Zhizhou’s explanation in YRZLSH, but in IRMS by Zenju, there are three other kinds of explanation, according to them this sentence may be translated in these three ways below: 1, get the achievement [of spreading the science of reasons] to a different place (i.e., China); 2, get the achievement based on the gradual works [of early masters]; 3, get the achievement of changing the style [from tedious and miscellaneous into simple and clear]. It is not sure which one shows the original meaning of Kuiji’s metaphor.
genuine means of valid cognition; the fourth expounds the two specious means of valid cognition; the fifth expounds refutation; and the sixth expounds specious refutation.

(55)問：何故長行牒前頌文不依次釋，又與前頌，開合不同？
答：略有三釋268。一云：前頌標宗，二悟類別，立、破真、似，相對次明269，
所以八義，次第如是。長行廣釋，逐便即牒，性、相求之，何須次牒？頌以真、
似各別，開成八義，長行以體、類有同，合成六段270，亦不相違。(96a25–b01)
Question: Why does the prose not paragraph and interpret the verse above in sequence [according to the verse], and why does it classify differently from the verse?
Answer: There are three kinds of explanation in general. The first one says: The verse indicates the main topics, each understanding belongs to a different kind, and the genuine and specious [forms] of proof as well as refutation clarify each other in sequence, so the sequence of those eight rubrics is arranged in this way. The prose 
expounds in detail, it paragraphs in a convenient way and investigates the natures as well as characteristics [of these rubrics], so why must it paragraph in the sequence [above]? Based on the difference between genuine and specious, the verse classifies them into eight rubrics, while the prose based on the sameness of the entity and sort,271 classifies [the eight rubrics] into six sections; it is not contrary to [the verse].

(56)二云：頌中以因明之旨本欲立正破邪，故先能立，次陳能破。《理門論》云：
“為欲簡持能立、能破義中真實作斯論”272, 故所申無過，立、破義成，所述過生，

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268 It is not clear by whom these three kinds of explanation are offered.
269 用 YRZLS, 明 YRZLSj. “ming 明” fits here, for it can mean “clarify,” “expound,” while yong 用 means “use,”
“utility,” etc.
270 段 YRZLS, 叚 YRZLSj. It should be “段 duan” here, for this character means “section,” “paragraph,” etc. While
“jia 假” is a variant of “jia 假,” and it means “false,” “fake” or “borrow,” it must be a typo here in YRZLSj.
271 According to the explanation of IRMS in T2270 p.233c27–234a05, although genuine perception and genuine inference have different entities, they are both genuine means of valid cognition, so they are regarded as same in sort; although specious perception and specious inference are different in sort, they are both false means of valid cognition, so they are regarded as same in entity. Thus two genuine means of valid cognition are merged into one section, and two specious means are also merged in one section. Actually this is the same with the third kind of explanation.
272 YZML, T1628 p.1a07. The original sentence in Xuanzang’s translation does not say “作斯論” but “故造斯論,”
“gu 故” means “so,” “hence,” “zuo 作” and “zao 造” can both mean “compose” here.
Tucci (1930, p.5): I have compiled this book, because I desire to ascertain what is the real nature of the arguments meant to prove [a thesis as well] as to refute it.
何成立、破？故立、破後，次陳二似。雖知真、似二悟不同，開示證人，俱悟他攝。刊定法體，要須二量。現量則得境親明，比量亦度義無謬，故先現量，比量後陳。刊定之則273雖成，謬妄還難楷准，故當對二真次明二似。故頌八義，次第如是。長行同於《理門》所說，以因明法先立後破，免脫他論，摧伏他論，為勝利故。立義之法，一者真立，正成義故，二者立具，立所依故。真因、喻等，名為“真立”，現、比二量，名為“立具”。故先諸師，正稱“能立”，陳那以後，非真能立，但為立具，能立所須。故能破前先明二量。親、疎能立，皆有真、似，以自相明，故真立後即明似立，二真量後，明二似量。此之六門，由是能立及眷屬故，《理門》說上六名真、似立故。立義成已次方破他，故後方明能破、似破。(96b01–b19)

The second [explanation] says: Because essentially the tenet of the science of reasons is to prove the correct and refute the false, the proof is [explained] first, while the refutation is stated later. The Nyāyamukha states, “in order to select and maintain274 the truth of the meanings of the proof and the refutation, this treatise is composed,” so if what is advocated has no fallacy, the meanings of the proof and refutation are established, but if what is advocated has some fallacy, how can the proof and refutation be established? Hence, after proof and refutation, the two specious forms are expressed. Although it is known that genuine and specious [proofs and refutations] belong to two different understandings, from the angle of witness, they are all included in the understanding of others. Two means of valid cognition are needed to ascertain the entities of dharmas. The perception acquires objects clearly and closely, while the inference also inquires into meanings without any mistake, so the perception is [explained] first, and the inference is expressed later. Although the principles of ascertaining are established, it is still difficult to confirm the standard of falsity, so against the two genuine [means of valid cognition] two specious [means of valid cognition] are expounded consequently. Therefore, the eight rubrics in the verse are

273 YRZLS 則 YRZLS，之則 YRZLSj. The character “zhi 之” should be added between “kanding 刊定 (ascertaining)” and “ze 則(principles)” as an auxiliary word.

274 The Chinese word “jian chi 簡持” may come from ava+√dhṛ, but in 1.2.2.1.1.1 “Enumerating the Entities,” Kuiji divides this word into two separate parts, i.e., “jian 簡” and “chi 持,” and interprets them into “select and exclude” and “maintain.”
listed in such a sequence. The [content of the] prose is the same with what is said in the Nyāyamukha, because according to the principle of the science of reasons, proof should be set before refutation, since [proof] can avoid the [refuting] argument of others and [refutation] can defeat the [proving] argument of others for winning. Concerning the principles of proving the meaning [of a thesis], the first one is genuine proof, because it proves the meaning directly; the second are the instruments of proof, because they are what the proof relies on. The genuine reason and example, and so on, are named “genuine proof,” while the perception and inference are named “instruments of proof.” Hence, earlier masters also call [the perception and inference] “proof,” but since Dignāga, they have only belonged to the instruments of proof but not genuine proof because they are required by the proof. Thus, before genuine refutation, the two means of valid cognition are expounded. Both close and distant proofs have genuine [forms] and specious [forms], which should be clarified based on their particular characteristics, so specious proof is expounded after genuine proof, and two specious means of valid cognition are expounded after two genuine means of valid cognition. Since these six rubrics (the proof, specious proof, two genuine means of valid cognition, two specious means of valid cognition) belong to proof and its entourage, the Nyāyamukha states that these six above are named genuine and specious proofs. When the meaning of proof is already established, then can come the refutation, as a result, so refutation and specious refutation are expounded latter.

(57) 三云：真立、似立、真量、似量，各有別體。真立體即無過多言，似立體即有過多言，真量明決之智，似量闇疑之智，各有別故。若真能立，若能立具，皆能立故，先首明之。能破、似破雖體即言，境無有異。能破之境，體即似立，
The third [explanation] says: Each of genuine proof, specious proof, genuine means of valid cognition, and specious means of valid cognition has its particular entity. Because the entity of genuine proof refers to the multiple statements without any fallacy, the entity of specious proof refers to the multiple statements with fallacies, genuine means of valid cognition [refer to] the clear and ascertained cognitions, and specious means of valid cognition [refer to] the obscure and doubtful cognitions, each is distinct. Since both genuine proof and the instruments of proof belong to proof, they should be expounded first. Although the entities of refutation and specious refutation are just statements, [their] objects have no difference. The entity of refutation’s object is specious proof, while the entity of specious refutation’s object is genuine proof, so the proofs as objects must be apprehended first, and then the refutations can be set forth. Only after the proofs, the refutations can be set forth, so [the refutations] are expounded later. The separated [proofs and refutations] and the combined [perceptions and inferences] are expounded respectively, because the entities [of specious perception and specious inference] (which are both false) are the same, and the sorts [of genuine perception and genuine inference] (which are both means of valid cognition) are the same. Thus, [the arrangement of rubrics in] the verse and [that in] the prose are different.

(1.2.2.1. Interpreting Proof 解能立) 279

(58) 初解能立中，大文有三：初舉體釋義，次示相廣陳，後總結成前，簡擇同異。
In the first sub-section, namely interpreting proof, the main text includes three parts: the first enumerates the entities and explains their meanings; the second shows the characteristics through representing in detail; the last summarizes the content above and investigates the sameness and difference.

(1.2.2.1.1. Enumerating the Entities and Explaining their Meanings 畫體釋義)

(1.2.2.1.1. Enumerating the Entities 畫體)

The first part [namely enumerating the entities and explaining their meanings] is also divided into two: the first enumerates the entities; and the second explains their meanings. This is [the part of] enumerating the entities. Enumerating multiple terms as a whole can just constitute proof.

(59)初中復二: 初舉體, 後釋義。此舉體也。總舉多法, 方成能立。(96b28–c01)

(60)梵“能立”義, 多言中說, 故《理門論》陳那指彼天親論云: “故此多言於《論式》等說名‘能立’。”

言“此中”者, 《理門》二解: 一起論端義, 二簡持義。凡發論端, 汎詞標舉,故稱“此中”起論端義。簡持有二義: 一云280, 簡去邪宗增減, 持取正宗中道。邪增者, 以281似立為真立, 以似破為真破; 邪減者, 以真立為似立, 以真破為似破: 中道者, 二真為真, 二似為似。二云, 此論所明總有八義, 且明能立,未論餘七, 簡去餘七, 持取282此一。故稱“此中”是簡持義。清辯菩薩《般若燈論釋》有四義, 謂發端、標舉、簡持、指斥。

280 一 YRZLS，一云 YRZLsj。"yi 一" is “one” or “first,” “yun 云” means “say,” for the explanation of the second meaning is started with “er yun 二云,” i.e., “the second [meaning] says,” this should be “yi yun 一云” alike.

281 增 YRZLS，以 YRZLsj。“zeng 增” means “increase,” “yi 以” has a lot of meanings including “use,” etc. Since to three later sentences are formed with “yi 以,” it should also be “yi 以” here.

282 持明 YRZLS，持取 YRZLsj。“ming 明” means “clarify,” “expound,” “qu 取” means “take,” “choose,” both of them may fit here, but according to the text above and the quotes in Japanese commentaries, such as IRMS and IDYJ, this should be “qu 取.” However, this character will not be translated separately, because “chi qu 持取” means nearly the same with “chi 持” here.
“宗”是何義？所尊、所崇、所主、所立之義。“等”者等取因之異喻，世親以前，宗為能立，陳那但以因之三相，因、同、異喻283，而為能立，以能立者，必多言故。（96c01–c15）

In Sanskrit, the meaning of “proof” is expressed in multiple statements, so Dignāga says in the Nyāyamukha, by pointing to the treatises by Vasubandhu, that, “so these multiple statements are called ‘proof’ in the Vādavidhāna, etc.”284

Concerning the word “herein” (cizhong 此中, tatra), there are two kinds of explanation in the Nyāyamukha: the first introduces the beginning of the discussion; the second selects and maintains.285 The beginning of every discussion should be indicated by a structural word, so it is said that “herein” is meant to introduce the beginning of a discussion. Selecting and maintaining have two meanings: First, they can mean selecting and excluding the increase and decrease of false theses and maintaining the middle way of correct theses. The false increases take specious proofs as genuine proofs, and specious refutations as genuine refutations; the false decreases take genuine proofs as specious proofs, and genuine refutations as specious refutations; the middle way takes the two kinds of genuine [forms] (genuine proof and refutation) as genuine, and takes the two kinds of specious [forms] (specious proof and refutation) as specious. Second, they can mean that this treatise expounds eight rubrics in total, but for the moment, it expounds the proof without discussing the other seven, so it is to select and exclude the other seven and maintain this one. It is thus said that “herein” means selecting and maintaining. There are four meanings [of “herein”] in the Prajñāpradīpa

283 同異喻 YRZLSj, 因同異喻 YRZLSj. “yin 因,” i.e., reason, should also be included here.
284 YZML, T1628 p.1a11. Tucci (1930, p.5): That many terms represent the sādhana, syllogism, was already asserted by Vasubandhu in his Vādavidhī, etc.
285 These two are quoted from YZML in T1628 p.1a13–a15: 言“是中”者，起論端義，或簡持義，是宗等中故名“是中.” Tucci (1930, p.6): The word “here” (atra) is meant either to introduce the beginning (ārambha) of the śāstra, or has the meaning of restriction (avadhāraṇa); that is: among these terms, such as: “proposition etc.” Therefore [the author] uses the word: “atra, here”.

In YZML, these two are actually used to explain “shi zhong 是中” instead of “ci zhong 此中,” but the differences between them can almost be ignored in Chinese. Moreover, Tucci considers “shi zhong 是中” as atra instead of tatra. A Sanskrit equivalence from the Abhidharmakośavyākhyā p.19 reads: tatra iti nirdhāraṇe vākyopanyāse vā. See Katsura (1977, p.112).
by Bodhisattva Bhāviveka, namely introducing the beginning, indicating [the topic], selecting and maintaining, and pointing out [the correct] and excluding [the incorrect].

What does “thesis” mean? It means what is to be revered, admired, advocated and proved. “And others” (deng 等, ādi) contains the reason and examples in the meantime. Before Vasubandhu, the thesis belongs to proof, but Dignāga only takes the three characteristics of a reason, namely the reason, the example by similarity and the example by dissimilarity, as proof, because proof must be comprised of multiple statements.

Now, concerning the statement that the thesis and others are named “proof,” there are two explanations in general: the first says that the thesis is what is to be proved; the reason, and so on, are proof. If the thesis is not cited to elucidate the proof, it cannot be known whose proof the reason and example belong to, and [the reason and example] may be considered as the proof of the self-nature and the distinguishing-feature, which is the same as the [opinion of] ancient [masters]. Now the thesis is indicated as what is to be proved, and the reason and examples that can prove belong to the proof of this thesis to be proved. Although the thesis is cited, virtually the reason and two examples included in “and so on” are taken as the entity of proof. If not so, what is to be proved would be confused with that in the ancient [masters’] explanations, and the proof would

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286 The *Prajñāpradīpa* is translated into Chinese in 629 by Prabhākaramitra with the title of *Boredeng lun shi* 般若燈論釋, it is possible for Kuiji to have access to this text. Nevertheless, I cannot find in the *Prajñāpradīpa* and other works by Bhāviveka the statement of four meanings quoted by Kuiji here. However, I find this statement twice in other works by Kuiji, i.e., his *Cheng weishi lun shuji* 成唯識論述記 (Commentary on the Cheng weishi lun) in T1830 p.234c04 and *Dacheng apidamo zajilun shuji* 雜集論述記 (Commentary on the Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya) in X796 p.9a04–a05. Kuiji may get learn it from Xuanzang’s teaching.
also confusedly commit the fallacy of their proof. To exclude such mistakes, the “thesis and others,” is said.

According to Zenju’s interpretation in IRMS, T2270 p.235c26–28, this fallacy refers to taking all the thesis, reason, and example as the proof like Vasubandhu and others.  

There is no same sentence in YZML, so it is reworded by Kuiji. It may refer to “為所成立說名‘宗’” from the first verse in T1628 p.1a09.  

The Chinese text is from Xuanzang’s translation of svayam sādhyatvenepsitah, but the English translation here is based on Kuiji’s commentary below.
along as “and others” (nengdeng 能等), the meaning of which is different from that of
the ancient masters; and regard what are taken along as “and others” (suodeng 所等),
namely the reason and examples, as [possessing] the nature of proof, hence “the thesis
and others” is cited in [the expression of] proof.

(63) 問：宗若所立，頌中八義，攝法不盡。
答：隨八所成即是宗故。又宗所立，隨能立中，便次明之，彼所成故。攝法亦
盡。又“觀察義中諸所有事”，名“因明”故，不舉其宗於何觀察？故今舉宗，顯
“所有事”為能立體290。 (97a02–a07)

Question: If the thesis is what is to be proved [but not proof], then the eight rubrics in
the verse do not contain all the principles completely (because the thesis, as what is to
be proved, is not contained).

Answer: (The first explanation:) [The verse contains the principles completely] because
what follows those eight [rubrics of proof] as what is to be proved is just the thesis.
(The second explanation:) Moreover, what is to be proved, namely the thesis, can be
clarified successively through [the clarifying of] proof, because [the thesis] is what it
proves. Therefore, [the verse] contains all the principles completely. (The third
explanation:) Additionally, since “whatever present in the inspecting of property”291 is

290 能立體 YRZLSi, 為能立體 YRZLSj. “wei 為” is needed here as a copula.
291 How to translate “觀察義中諸所有事” here is quite a difficulty. This sentence is quoted YBkh, “云何因明處？
謂於觀察義中諸所有事” in T1579 p.356a11–a12. The Sanskrit text reads hetuvidyā katamā | parīkṣārthaṇa yad
vidyādānaṁ vastu | in Yaita (2005, p.98) but hetuvidyā katamā | parīkṣārthaṇa yad vijñānaṁ vastu | in Wayman
(1999, p.5), and Wayman translates as “What is the science of reason? Whatever understanding for the given thing
by virtue of examination.” However, Yaita’s edition is closer to the Xuanzang’s translation, because there is no equal
word of vijñānam in Xuanzang’s translation.

The problem is, firstly, by all means, it seems parīkṣārtha refers to the method because of its instrumental case, but
the Chinese translation “yú 於… zhòng 中” (i.e., “in” in English) by Xuanzang is more inclined to be a locative case.
Secondly, according to the relevant part of Kuiji’s YLL, his understanding is quite strange:

YLL, T1829 p.93b09–b11: 所建立法名“觀察義”，能隨順法，名“諸所有事”，諸所有事即是因明，為因
照明觀察義故。

What is to be established is named “guān cha yì 觀察義,” what can follow and accord with it is named
“whatever present.” Whatever present is just the science of reasons, because as the reason, it clarifies the guān
cha yì 觀察義 (or perhaps, it clarifies and inspects the yì 義).
named “science of reasons,” if the thesis is not cited, then what can be inspected? Hence, now the thesis is cited to show “whatever present” as the entity of proof.

(64) 問：能立因、喻有言、義、智，論何不說多智、多義名為能立，而說多言名為能立？
答：立論之法本生他解。他解照達所立宗義本由立者能立之言。其言生因，正是能立，智、義順此亦得因名。由言生因，生敵、證智，敵、證智解為正了因。

《理門論》難云：“若爾既取智為了因，是言便失能成立性。”此難言因應非能立。彼自釋云：“此亦不然，令彼憶念本極成故。”此釋意云，由言因故令敵、證智了本極成因，解所立宗義，故立論者言，正為能立。敵、證智了亦為能立性。若不爾者，相違決定言支具足，應名“能立”。既由他智不生決解，名為“似立”。故知通取言生、智了為能立體。今此據本，故但標言名為“能立”。《瑜伽》亦云六種言論是論體性，不說智生、義生、義了名為能立。言了即292言生，故，體亦可爾。(97a07–a22)
Question: As proof, the reason and example consist of statements, meanings, and cognitions, so why does this treatise not say that the multiple cognitions or the multiple meanings are named “proof”, but says that the multiple statements are named “proof”? Answer: The principle of making arguments is originally meant to generate the understanding of others. This understanding of others can apprehend the thesis to be proved clearly because of the proponent’s statements as the proof. The statement as generative cause is exactly the proof, but the cognition and meaning accord with this, they also get the name “cause.” The statement as generative cause generates the cognition of the opponent and the witness; the cognitive understandings of the opponent and the witness are exactly the apprehensive causes (liaoyin 因, *jñāpakahetu). The Nyāyamukha objects, “if so, since the cognition [of the opponent] is taken as the apprehensive cause, this statement will lose the nature of proof.” This objection means that the statement as generative cause should not be proof. Then it (the Nyāyamukha) explains by itself, “this [objection] is not correct, because [the statement] reminds those (the opponent and the witness) what is actually originally well-established.” This explanation means that due to the statement as [generative] cause, the cognition of the opponent and the witness apprehend the reason which is actually originally well-established, and then understand the thesis to be proved, the statement [as generative cause] of the proponent is thus exactly the proof. The cognition as apprehensive [cause] of the opponent and the witness also belong to the nature of proof.

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293 Kuiji does not make it clear that the cognition and meaning here refer to the cognition as generative cause (zhì shēngyīn 智生因) and the meaning as generative cause (yì shēngyīn 義生因), or the cognition as apprehensive cause and the meaning as apprehensive cause. Zenju interprets them as the apprehensive causes in T2270 p.236b29–c12, but Kiben refutes Zenju and interprets them as the generative causes in T2272 p.77a29–b22. Kiben means, since in this paragraph the former part talks about the statement as generative cause, and in this sentence, “accord with” is said, the cognition and meaning here should also refer to generative causes but not apprehensive causes which need further explanation like below. I tend to agree with Kiben and consider these two as the cognition as generative cause and the meaning as generative cause.

294 YZML, T1628 p.1b14–b15. Tucci (1930, p.13): [At this point somebody may object]: “If it be so, then [you assume implicitly] that the understanding only is the cause of the notion, and therefore the syllogism would lose its character of being a proof”.

295 YZML, T1628 p.1b15–b16. Tucci (1930, p.13): But this objection is out of place, [because the reason, as it is formulated] is meant to remind the opponent [of a relation] which is already sure and proved to him also.
If not so, the inference with the fallacy of the contradictory conclusive reason (xiangwei jueding 相違決定, viruddhāvyabhicārin) has complete statement-members, and should be called “[genuine] proof.” Since the cognition of others does not generate ascertained understandings, it (the inference with the fallacy of the contradictory conclusive reason) is named “specious proof.” Therefore, it can be known that both the statement as generative [cause] and the cognition as apprehensive [cause] are taken as the entities of proof. Now according to the essential, only the statement is indicated as “proof.” The Yogācārabhūmi also says that six kinds of statements are the essences of argument, and it does not say that the cognition as generative [cause] (zhi sheng[yin] 智生[因]), the meaning as generative [cause] (yi sheng[yin] 義生[因]) and the meaning as apprehensive [cause] (yi liao[yin] 義了[因]) are named proof. The statement as apprehensive [cause] (yan liao[yin] 言了[因]) is just the statement as generative [cause], so its entity can also [belong to proof].

問: 何故能立要在多言, 一、二之言定297非能立?
答: 《理門論》云, 於《論式》等說此多言名“能立”故。世親所造《論軌》、《論式》, 彼說多言名為“能立”。今不違古, 故說“多言”。
彼論復言: “又比量中唯見此理: 若所比處此相定遍298，於餘同類念此定有，於彼無處念此遍無，是故由此生決定解。因之三相，既宗法性、同有、異無。顯義圓具，必藉多言，故說多言名為能立。

296 This refers to the content below in YBh, Xuanzang’s translation reads, “雲何論體性？謂有六種：一言論，二尚論，三諍論，四毀謗論，五順正論，六教導論” in YBh, T1579 p.356a19–a20. The Sanskrit text reads vādaḥ katamah sa saśvīdho draśṭavyah vādaḥ prāvādo vīvādo ‘pvādo ‘prvādo ‘avādaś ca in Yaita (2005, p.98) and Wayman (1999, p.5), and Wayman translates as “What is the debate in itself? It should be observed as six kinds: 1. Utterances of all kinds, 2. A popular message, 3. Quarrels, 4. Noxious talk, 5. (Doctrinally) consistent discussion, 6. Precepts (of guidance).” However, Xuanzang adds the word “tixing 論體性” to “lun 論” that comes from vāda.

297 “寧” is a modal particle of a rhetorical question, “定” means “surely,” “definitely,” so they both fit here.

298 Kuiji’s quote here reads “ding bian 定遍” and means “certain and universal,” but YZML reads “shen ding 審定” and means “ascertained.” The English translation is based on Xuanzang’s original.
又一、二之言，宗由未立，多言義具，所立方成。若但說因，無同喻比，義不明顯，何得見邊？若但同無異，雖比附宗，宗義既自不成，宗義何由得立？果宗不立，因、比徒施，空致紛紜，競何由消？故詳今古，能立具足，要藉多言。(97a22–b07)

Question: Why should proof be multiple statements but surely not one or two statements?

Answer: Because the Nyāyamukha states that in the Vādavidhāna and so forth, these multiple statements are called “proof.” Vasubandhu’s Vādavidhi and Vādavidhāna say that multiple statements are called “proof.” Now [Dignāga and Śaṅkarasvāmin] do not contradict the ancient [theories], so “multiple statements” is said.

That treatise (the Nyāyamukha) also says, “furthermore, with reference to inference, only the following principle is to be observed: when the mark is ascertained on the subject to be inferred, [we] recall its being certainly present in the cases similar to that [subject in possessing the property to be proved] but other than (yu 餘) [this subject], and its being universally absent where that [property to be proved] is absent, then based on these, an ascertained understanding is generated.” [This principle refers to] the three characteristics of a [correct] reason, namely the nature of being [universally] a property of the thesis[-subject] (zongfa xing 宗法性 is short for bianshizongfa xing 遍是宗法性), [the nature of] being [certainly] present in the similar [group] (tongyou 同有 is short for tongpindingyou xing 同品定有性), and [the nature of] being [universally] absent from the dissimilar [group] (yiwu 異無 is 華嚴論式, yiyu 異異法 YRZLSt, 宗異法 YRZLSj. For it is talking about the three characteristics of a reason or the functions of two examples (as Kuiji mixes them up), this should be “yi fa 異法,” i.e., the dissimilar property.

299法 YRZLSj, 異法 YRZLSj. For it is talking about the three characteristics of a reason or the functions of two examples (as Kuiji mixes them up), this should be “yi fa 異法,” i.e., the dissimilar property.

300決 YRZLSj, 立 YRZLSj. “jue 决” means “ascertained,” “li 立” means “proved;” they can both fit here.

301 This quote is reworded, and the original in Xuanzang’ translation of YZML is “此多言於《論式》等說名能立” in T1628 p.1a11. In Tucci (1930, p.5), his translation is “that many terms represent the sādhana, syllogism, was already asserted by Vasubandhu in his Vādavidhi etc.”

302 YZML, T1628 p.3a04–a06. Tucci (1930, p.44): It is evident that in the inference the following rule only is valid, viz.: when the presence of this particular characteristic (liṅga) has been ascertained in the object of inference, and we remember that that same characteristic is certainly present in all the notions analogous to that to be inferred, but absolutely absent wherever that is absent, then the [notion] which results from this [process] is undoubtedly valid. However, the character “yu 餘,” which means the subject itself should be excluded from the similar cases in the second characteristic of the reason, is not translated by Tucci.


177
short for *yipinbianwu xing* 異品遍無性, *vipakṣe 'sattvam*). To manifest the properties [of the three characteristics] [of an inference] perfectly and completely, multiple statements must be based upon, so it is said that multiple statements are named “proof.” In addition, [if there is only] one statement or two, then the reasoning of the thesis is not established; but when multiple statements have made the properties [of the three characteristics] complete, then what is to be proved can be established. If only the reason is said without the example by similarity to analogize, then the properties [of the three characteristics] are not clear, how can it get to the side of perceived? If only the similar [example] is said but not the dissimilar [example], then although the thesis has been analogized, the reason of the proof may contrarily establish the opposite inferable property, since without the dissimilar [example] to stop the overflow (*zhilan* 止濫, *prasajyapratisedha*, to exclude the confusion which may be caused by the unreasonable existence of the reason-property in the dissimilar cases), how can the thesis be set up? If the two examples are there, but the reason’s being universally [a property] of the subject is lacking, and then [the reason] itself is not established as a property of the thesis[-subject] yet, so how can the thesis be proved? If the thesis as the outcome is not set forth yet, then the reason and examples are just applied vainly, and a mess is brought for nothing, how can the conflict be eliminated? Therefore, consulting the present and past [treatises of the science of reasons] in detail, to make the proof complete, multiple statements should be based upon.

(1.2.2.1.1.2. Explaining their Meanings 釋義)

(IV)論：由宗、因、喻多言開示諸有問者未了義故。 (97b08)

YRZL: Because by the statements of the thesis, reason, and example, the meaning unknown to the questioners is unfolded and shown.³⁰³

NP 2: *pakṣahetudṛṣṭāntavacanair hi prāśnikānām apratīto 'rthaḥ pratipādyata iti* ||

³⁰³ “*kai shi* 開示” is actually one whole word from *pratipādyate*, but after several paragraphs, it can be seen that Kuiji interprets it as two separate words, i.e., “*kai 開*” and “*shi 示*,” so it is translated also with two words as “unfolded and shown.”

(66) 述曰：釋能立義。宗義舊定，因、喻先成，何故今說為能立也？《理門》亦云：“由宗、因、喻多言，辨304說他未了義”。“諸有問者”謂敵、證等。“未了義者”立論者宗。其敵論者，一由無知，二為疑惑，三各宗學，未了立者立何義旨，而有所問。故以宗等如是多言成立宗義，除彼無知、猶豫、僻執，令了立者所立義宗。(97b09–b15)

YRZLS: [This is the part of] explaining the meanings of proof. The thesis is originally fixed,305 and the reason and example are already established, why are they regarded as the proof now? The Nyāyamukha also says, “by the statements of the thesis, reason, and example, the meaning unknown to others is explained.”306 “The questioners” refer to the opponent, the witness, and so forth. “The meaning unknown” [refers to] the thesis of the proponent. Because of ignorance, perplexity or different teaching that he believes in, the opponent has not known the meaning proved by the proponent yet, so he asks. Hence, by such statements of the thesis and others the thesis is proved to remove the [opponent’s] ignorance, doubt or bigotry, and make him know the thesis proved by the proponent.

(67) 其論義法，《瑜伽》等說有六處所：“一於王家，二於執理家，三於大眾中，四於賢哲者前，五於善解法義沙門、婆羅門前，六於樂法義者前。”於此六中，必須證者善自他宗、心無偏儻、出言有則、能定是非。證者有307問“立何論宗？”今以宗等如是多言申其宗旨，令證義者了所立義。(97b15–b21)

Concerning the principles of argument, the Yogācārabhūmi and others mention six locations: “first, in the residence of the king (wangjia 王家, rājakula); second, in the residence of officials (zhilijia 執理家, yuktakula); third, in the assembly (dazhong 大

304 This character is actually “bian 辯” instead of “bian 辯” in YZML, but “bian 辯” can be a variant of “bian 辯” in ancient Chinese.
305 It means that the relationship between the inferable subject and the inferable property in the thesis is in fact originally fixed, even though there may be no inference to apprehend it.
306 YZML, T1628 p.1a10–a11. Tucci (1930, p.5): through the formulation of a proposition, a reason and an example, and argument, which has not yet been understood by another [man], is made evident to him.
307 有 YRZLSj, 即 YRZLSj. With “you 有,” the sentence means “the witness has asked”; with “ji 即,” it means “then the witness asks.” Both of them is possible.
眾, *parṣad*); fourth, before the virtuous and wise people (xianzhezhe 賢哲者, *sabhā*); fifth, before the ascetics (shamen 沙門, *śramaṇa*) and Brahmins (poluomen 婆羅門, *brāhmaṇa*) proficient in the doctrine and meaning (shanjiefayi 善解法義, *dharmārthakuśala*); and sixth, before the living beings desiring the doctrine and meaning (lefay 樂法義 *dharmārthakāma*). Among these six, the witness must be good at his own and others’ teachings (shanzitazong 善自他宗, *svaparasamayajñatā*), have no partiality, speak according to rules, and be able to judge between correct and false. Since the witness has asked “what thesis will be proved?” Now the thesis’ gist should be set forth by these statements of the thesis and others to make the witness know the thesis to be proved.

(68)“故”者“所以”，第五轉聲。“由”者“因由”，第三轉攝，因由敵、證問所立宗，說宗、因、喻開示於彼，所以多言名為“能立”。“開示”有三：一，敵者未閑，

308 YBhā, T1579 p.356c06–c08. = YBhHV 2: rājakulam yuktakulam parṣat sabhā dharmārthakuśalalāḥ śramaṇā brāhmaṇāḥ dharmārthakāmāḥ ca sattvāḥ

Also in AS and ASCh:


in ASBh and ASVyCh:

ASBh p.151, 1–5: [vādādhikaranam] atra vādah kriyata iti kṛtvā | (I) rājakulam yatra rājā svayam saṃnihitaḥ | (II) yuktakulam yatra rājñādhiyuktāḥ (III) sabhā vaniksabhdī | (IV) prāmāṇikāḥ sahāyāḥ yeśāṃ vacanam vādiprativādinau na saṃsayaḥ | (V) dharmārthakuśalāḥ ca śramaṇabrāhmaṇāḥ ye teṣu sāstresu granthatas ca vyutpannavuddhayaḥ | = ASvyCh, T1606 p.771a24–b02: 論處者，謂於王家，或於執理家，或於善伴，或於善解法義沙門、婆羅門等而起論端。於王家者，謂若於是處王自降臨。執理家者，謂於執理等處。淳質堪為量者，謂商人等。善伴者，謂於伴侶中立論者，敵論者不越其言。善解法義沙門、婆羅門等者，謂於彼彼論中善通達文義。

In ASCh Xuanzang translates the third term as “chunzhi kanweiliang zhe 淳質堪為量者,” i.e., people virtuous and capable of the means of valid cognition, which is quite close to “xianzhe zhe 賢哲者,” i.e., virtuous and wise people, and the fourth as “shanbao 善伴,” i.e., good companions. In ASBh it can be noticed that the third location refers to the gathering of merchants and so on, and the fourth one begins with prāmāṇikā, but in ASVyCh Xuanzang translates the third as “淳質堪為量者，謂商人等,” it means people virtuous and capable of the means of valid cognition, i.e., merchants and so on, and the fourth location is about good companions, so actually Xuanzang puts the word prāmāṇikā into the third one.

180
因为” means “for the reason that,” [belongs to] the fifth case (the ablative case). 309
“By” means “because of,” [belongs to] the third case (the instrumental case). Because
of310 the opponent’s and the witness’ question about the thesis to be proved, the thesis,
reason, and example are said to unfold and show [what is to be proved] to them, for this
reason, multiple statements are named “proof.” “Unfolded and shown” (kaishi 開示,
pratipādyate) 311 have three [kinds of explanation]: The first is that the opponent is not
familiar [with what is to be proved], so now the proof, and so on, 312 are meant to make
[what is to be proved] unfolded to him for the first time, while the witness knew before
[but has forgotten or been confused], so now the proof, and so on, are meant to make
[what is to be proved] shown to him again. The second is that statements are used to
make the truth unfolded and shown to both of them. The third is that if [the opponent
and the witness] ask because they have forgotten the thesis, it is [the situation of]
“unfolded,” if [they] ask because they want to be reminded of the thesis, it is [the
situation of] “shown.” 313

(69) “諸有問者未了義故”，略有二釋：
一，諸問者通證及敵，敵者發問，理不須疑，證者久識自他宗義，寧容發問未
了義耶？一，年邁久忘；二，賓主紛紜；三，理有百途，問依何轍；四，初聞
未審，須更審知；五，為破疑心，除涉朋意314，故審問宗之未了義。

309 Actually here is no ablative case, for the Chinese character ”you” is from the particle iti.
310 It is not a mistake to interpret “you” as “yin you 因由,” because “yin you 因由” can mean either “because of”
or “by means of,” but since Kuiji mistakenly takes “因由 yin you” as a preposition of “the opponent and the witness’
question,” and the instrumental case actually belongs to paksahetudrśāntavacana in Sanskrit, interpreting “you” as
“yin you 因由,” which can only mean “because of” here, is not right.
311 Xuanzang translates pratipādyate as “kai shi 開示,” but Kuiji separates this whole word into two below, i.e., “kai
開” and “shi 示,” so “unfolded and shown” are used here.
312 Since Kuiji only considers the reason and two examples as the proof, “deng 等,” i.e., “and so on” here may refer
to the thesis part.
313 It seems “unfolded” and “shown” have no difference in the third explanation in Kuiji’s text, but Zhizhou offers a
further explanation in YRZLSQ, X853 p.806a09–a14 and YRZLSH, X854 p.846c04–c06: “unfolded” refers to the
situation of forgetting, while “shown” refers to the situation that since the opponent accepts the reason and examples,
somehow the acceptance of the thesis is already potential to him, then what the proponent does is just to remind him
of this potential acceptance of the thesis through a proof.
314 解師明意 YRZLSj, 訴師明意 YRZLSj, “jie shi ming yi 解師明意” may mean “[let the audiences] understand
and learn the definite opinion,” and “xu shi ming yi 訴師明意” may mean “[let the arguer] state the definite opinion
Regarding “because… the meaning unknown to the questioners…,” there are two explanations in general:

The first (by Wengui 文軌 according to IRMS) [says]: Both the witness and the opponent belong to the questioners; there should not be any doubt about why the opponent asks, but since the witness has been aware of his own and others’ teachings for a long time, how can it be possible for him to ask a question about the meaning unknown? [To this question, there may be five possible reasons:] The first is that [he may be] too old and forget the meaning because it has been a long time; the second is that the opinions of the guest and the host (namely the proponent and the opponent) are too various [and make the witness confused]; the third is that there are hundreds of ways to the principle, so [the witness] asks which one should be relied upon; the fourth is that at the beginning, when [the witness] hears [the inference of the proponent], it is not precise, so [he] must know about it more precisely; the fifth is that in order to solve the audience’s doubt [about the fairness of the witness] and eliminate the suspicion of partiality, [the witness] asks about the unknown meaning of the thesis precisely.

The second (by Xuanying 玄應 according to IRMS) [says]: [The different situations between the witness and the opponent] should be distinguished. [If the proponent] argues and explains for the witness, these multiple statements merely need to be said to unfold and show the meaning [originally known but still] asked by the questioner (namely the witness) because the witness has been aware for a long time without anything unknown. [If the proponent] argues for the opponent, multiple statements should be said to unfold and show the meaning unknown to the questioner (namely the

315 論《YRZLSj》, 論解《YRZLSj》. “Lun 論” means “argue,” while “lun jie 論解” means “argue and explain,” they can both fit here.
opponent), because the opponent does have something unknown about the thesis. Now [these two situations] are written in combination, but it does not mean [the meaning] is also unknown to the witness. Since the meaning is unfolded and shown to these two (namely the witness and the opponent), multiple statements are named “proof.”

(70)問：能立有多，何故一言說為能立？
答：《理門》解云：“為顯總成一能立性。由此應知隨有所聞名‘能立過’，闕支便非能立性故。（97c0–c11）

Question: If proof includes multiple [statements], why is it expressed as one statement (namely in the singular)?

Answer: The Nyāyamukha explains: “[It is expressed as one statement] in order to show that [the multiple statements] have composed the nature of one proof collectively. Therefore, it should be known that if [any member] is lacking, it is called ‘error of the proof (nenglīguo 能立過, sādhanaṣa),’” because [a proof] which lacks a member loses the nature of proof.

This question refers to “以一言說能立者” in YZML, which composes a whole sentence with the quote from YZML in the following answer. The whole sentence reads “又以一言說能立者，為顯總成一能立性，由此應知隨有所聞名‘能立過’” in T1628 p.1a12–a13, and translated in Tucci (1930, p.6) as: but they are called here: ‘the sādhana’, in the singular, in order to show that they have, as a whole, the nature of a syllogism. Therefore we must acknowledge that when [some terms] are defective there is an error of the syllogism.
2.2.1. On the Thesis

(1.2.2.1.2. Showing the Characteristics through Representing in Detail 顯示相廣陳)

(1.2.2.1.2.1. Showing the Characteristics of the Thesis 顯示宗相)

(1.2.2.1.2.1.1. Paragraphing 撰章)

(Y)論：此中宗者(97c12)

YRZL: Herein the thesis…

(Based on the Sanskrit text: Herein the subject…)

NP 2.1: tatra pākṣaḥ… (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.2, 3).

(71)述曰：自下第二示相廣陳。於中有三：一示宗相，二示因相，三示喻相。

(97c12–c13)

YRZLS: Now comes the second part, namely showing the characteristics through representing in detail. There are three parts in this: The first shows the characteristics of the thesis; the second shows the characteristics of the reason; and the third is shows the characteristics of the example.

(72)《瑜伽論》云：“問：若一切法自相成就，各自安立已法性中，復何因緣，建立二種所成立義耶？

答：為欲令他生信解故，非為生成諸法性相。

問：為欲成就所成立義，何故先立宗耶？

答：為先顯示自所愛樂宗義故。

問：何故次辯因耶？

答：為欲開顯依現見事決定道理317，令他攝受所立宗義故。

317 YRZLSj 現理 YRZLSj, 道理 YRZLSj. Since it is quoted from Y’Bha, it should be “daoli 道理” accordingly.
問：何故次引喻耶？
答：為欲顯示能成道理之所依止現見事故。
問：何故復說同類、異類、現量、比量、正教量等耶？
答：為欲開示因、喻二種相違、不相違智故。”

相違謂異類，不相違謂同類。則於因、喻皆有現、比量等相違、不相違，隨其所應真、似所攝。(97c13–c25)

The *Yogācārabhūmi* says:

“What question: if all the dharmas are established on their particular characteristics and placed in their own natures of dharmas, then for what reason are the two sorts of meanings of what is to be proved set up?

Answers: For making the conviction of others generate, but not for generating the natures and characteristics of all the dharmas.318

Question: For establishing the meanings of what are to be proved, for what reason is the thesis set forth first?

Answer: For illuminating the thesis that [the proponent] himself delights in.

Question: For what reason is the reason clarified next?

Answer: For manifesting the ascertained principle based on the perceived thing, to make others apprehend the thesis to be proved.

Question: For what reason is the example cited next?

Answer: For showing the perceived thing that is based upon the principle to be established.

Question: For what reason are the similar type, the dissimilar type, perception, inference and the testimony of genuine teachings mentioned?

Answer: For showing the knowledge of contradiction and uncontradiction of the reason-example pair.”319

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318 There is only *lakṣaṇa* in Sanskrit, but in Xuanzang’s translation, it is translated as “zhū fá xíng xiāng 諸法性相,” i.e., the natures and characteristics of all the dharmas.

319 YBhSa, T1579 p.359a07–a16 = YBhHv 3.a: *yadā svalakṣaṇatah siddhāh sarvadharmā vyavasthāpitaḥ svasyām dharmatāyām kena kāraṇena dvividho ‘rthaḥ sādhya ity ucyate parasampratavyāpattim ārabhyāḥ no tu lakṣaṇopatītaḥ. kena kāraṇena sādhyasyārthasya prasiddhāya aditaḥ pratijñā kriyate. yāvad evabhūructasyārthasyā pariṇāmārtham, kena kāraṇena hetur upasamhriyate, yāvad eva dṛṣṭavastvārthasyā yuktyā tasmā eva pratijñāte ‘rthe paraparārtham, kena kāraṇena dṛṣṭānta upasamhriyate. yāvad eva tasyā eva yukter dṛṣṭavastvāsrayasyadārtham, kena kāraṇena sārūpya vairūpya prayaksam anumānam āptāgamasya.*
Contradiction refers to the dissimilar type, and uncontradiction refers to the similar type. There are contradictions and uncontradictions of perception, inference, and so on, to both of the reason and example, and according to their various features, [they] are genuine or specious.

(73) 彼又重言: “又相違者, 由二因緣: 一不決定故, 二同所成故。初是六不定, 因於同、異二喻或成、或違故。後是四不成及四相違。因於宗過名為“不成”, 於二喻中; 一向相違名曰“相違”。本立共因，擬成宗果，因既帶似，理須更成。若更成之，與宗無別，名同所成。似宗、二喻亦在此攝。(97c25–98a02)

That (the Yogācārabhūmi) says further, “and then the contradiction is [understood] because of two causes: the first is inconclusiveness; the second is the equality with what is to be proved.” The former one refers to the six inconclusive [reasons], because [in these cases] the reason is coincident or contradictory to the similar instances and the dissimilar instances [in an improper way]. The latter one refers to the four unestablished [reasons] and the four contradictory [reasons]. If regarding the thesis-[subject] the reason is fallacious, then [such a fallacy] is called “unestablished”; if regarding the two examples [the reason] is uniformly opposite, then [such a fallacy] is called “contradictory.” Originally it is planned to set forth an equally [accepted] reason to establish the thesis, and since the reason commits some fallacy, logically it needs to be established additionally. If it is established additionally, then it is not different from the thesis, and [such a cause of contradiction] is called “equality with what is to be proved.”

The specious thesis and the two specious examples are also included in this [“equality with what is to be proved”].

**Notes:**
- copasambrhiyate. yāvad eva tayor eva hetūdāharaṇyav yirodha-virodhaṁparidpanārtham.
- According to YBh as well as the following text of this commentary, even the second part of this sentence, it should be mistaken to treat the contradiction and uncontradiction here as the dissimilar type and the similar type.
- YRBh, T1579 p.359a16–a17. = YBHV 3.a: sa punar virodho dvāḥbhāyaṁ kāraṇābhyaṁ veditavyah, anaikāntikatvena ca sādhvyasamatvena ca.
- Kuiji uses the theory of Dignāga and Śaṅkarasvāmin to interpret YBh, this methodology is quite problematic. However, actually this phenomenon is quite common in Kuiji’s commentary, for example, he uses the consciousness-only theory to interpret the opinions of early Buddhist schools in his commentary on the Samayabhедопарачанакрā.

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186
The Yogācārabhūmi says: “The uncontradiction is also [understood] [because of] two causes: the first is conclusiveness; the second is the distinction from what is to be proved.” The former one refers to the genuine reason and genuine example because they can definitely establish the thesis. The latter one means that the genuine reason and genuine example have no fallacy, and since their entities belong to the proof, they are distinct from what is to be proved. [The Yogācārabhūmi says:] “the contradiction cannot be means of valid cognition for establishing the thesis to be proved, so it is not named ‘means of valid cognition.’” It means the specious reason, specious example, specious perception and specious inference are named “contradiction,” and since they do not establish the thesis, they are not named “genuine means of valid cognition.” [The Yogācārabhūmi says:] “The uncontradiction can be genuine means of valid cognition for establishing the thesis to be proved, so it is named ‘means of valid cognition.’” It means that since the genuine reason, genuine example, genuine perception and genuine inference do exactly establish the thesis, they are exactly named “[genuine] means of valid cognition.”

Although now the sequence [of rubrics] is different from that [of the Yogācārabhūmi],

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325 It is possible, but the quotes in ITU and INRSZ both read “ji 即.”
326 T1579 p.359a17–a18. = YBhHv 3.3.avirodho dvābhyaṁ eva kāraṇābhyaṁ veditavyaṁ, aikāntikatvena sādhyaviśeṣa ca.
327 T1579 p.359a18–a20.
328 T1579 p.359a20–a21. = YBhHv 3.3.yatra ca virodhas tat pratijñāsiddhaṁ iti kṛtvā na priyam, yatra tv avirodhas tat pratijñāsiddhau priyam iti kṛtvā priyam ity ucyate.
329 “zhun 准” and “zhun 准” are two variants of the same character meaning “consult” here.
this sequence, in which the substrata of the thesis, the thesis, reason, example, perception, and inference are dealt with one by one, also consults the explanation in that (the Yогācārabhūmi).

(76)初中復三：初牒章，次示相，後指法。此即初也。(98a11–a12)
In the first part, there are still three sub-parts: The first is paragraphing; the second is showing the characteristics; the third is citing an instance. Above is the first one.

(1.2.2.1.2.1.2. Showing the Characteristics 显相)

(1.2.2.1.2.1.2.1. Manifesting the Substrata 顯依)

(VI)論：謂極成有法，極成能別，… (98a13)
YRZL: (Based on Kuiji’s commentary:) {Herein the thesis} means the well-established property-possessor (youfa 有法, dharmin) and the well-established qualifier (nengbie 能別, viśeṣaṇa), {because of the nature of qualifying, }…
(Based on the Sanskrit text: {Herein the subject} is a well-established property-possessor {desired by oneself to be proved as qualified by} a well-established qualifier, …)
NP 2.1: {tatra pakṣaḥ} prasiddho dharmī prasiddhaviśeṣaṇa{viśiṣṭatayā}...
(Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.2, 3).

(77)述曰：下示相有四：一顯依，二出體，三簡濫，四結成。此顯依也。(98a13–a14)
YRZLSS: Showing the characteristics below includes four parts: the first manifests the substrata; the second exhibits the essence [of the thesis]; the third excludes the
overflow; the fourth summarizes. This is [the part of] manifesting the substrata.

(78) “極” 者 “至” 也, “成” 者 “就” 也, 至極成就故名 “極成”。有法、能別但是宗依而非是宗, 此依必須兩宗至極共許成就, 為依義立, 宗體方成。所依若無, 能依何立? 由此宗依必須共許。共許名為 “至極成就”, 至理有故, 法本真故。若許有法、能別二種非兩共許, 便有二過: 一成異義過。謂能立本欲立此二上不相離性和合之宗, 不欲成立宗二所依, 所依若非先兩共許, 便更須立此不成依。乃則能立成於異義, 非成本宗。故宗所依必須共許, 依之宗性方非極成。極成便是立無果故, 更有餘過。若許能別非兩極成, 閃宗支故, 非為圓成。因中必有是因同品非定有性過, 必闕同喻, 同喻皆有所立不成, 異喻一分或遍轉過。若許有法非兩極成, 閃宗支故, 亦非圓成。能別無依是誰之法? 因中亦有所依隨一、兩俱不成。由此宗依本依共許, 能依宗性方非極成, 能立之本所諍故。(98a15–b03)

“Well (ji 极, pra-)” means “ultimately (zhi 至),” “established (cheng 成, -siddha)” means “accomplished (jiu 就);” because of being ultimately accomplished, [such an expression] is called “well-established.” The property-possessor and the qualifier are merely the substrata of the thesis but not the thesis [itself]. These substrata must be accomplished ultimately through equal acceptance (zhiji gongxu chengjiu 至極共許成就) by both sides (i.e., the proponent and the opponent), and then they can be established as the substrata, and the essence of the thesis (zong ti 宗体) can be set up. If there is no substratum (i.e., what is to be relied upon), then how can the relier be set forth? Therefore, the substrata of the thesis must be equally accepted. [An expression which is] equally accepted is named “ultimately accomplished,” because [its denotation] is existent in the ultimate principle and [it shows] an original truth of dharmas.331

331 For the text from “極”者“至”也 to 法本真故, Tang’s (2015, p.296) translation reads:

The [prefix] “pra-” (ji 极) means “ultimately (zhi 至),” and the [word] “siddha” means “accomplished (jiu 就).” [An expression is] named as “prasiddha” on account of [its being] ultimately accomplished (zhiji ji cheng jiu 至極成就). The subject (dharmin) and the qualifier (viśeṣaya) are only [two] substrata of the thesis (paksāśraya, zong yi 宗依), but [yet] not the thesis [itself]. These [two] substrata must be accomplished in ultimate sense through equal acceptance (zhiji gong xu cheng jiu 至極共許成就) by both parties (liang zong 南宗) [in debate]. Then [they] could be established in sense of substratum, and
property-possessor and the qualifier are allowed to be unequally accepted by both [sides], then there should be two mistakes: The first is the error of proving other theses. It means that the proof is meant to prove the constituted thesis with the inseparable connection between these two (substrata) but not the two substrata of the thesis, so if the substrata have not been equally accepted by both, then these unestablished ones should be proved additionally. As a result, the proof [in this case] needs to establish other theses [first] but not the original one. Hence, the substrata of the thesis must be equally accepted, then the nature of the thesis (i.e., the inseparable connection) relying on them can be not well-established.\(^{332}\) If [the nature of the thesis] is well-established, it proves nothing, so there should also be some other fallacy additionally.\(^{333}\) (The second is the error of the thesis’ being incomplete as a member.)\(^{334}\) If the qualifier is allowed to be not well-established by both, then the thesis as a member is not complete, so [the thesis member] is not established perfectly. Then the reason must commit the fallacy of the reason’s being not certainly present in the similar group, and the similar

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\(^{332}\) However, the substrata of the thesis are equally accepted, it cannot necessarily result in that the inseparable connection is not well-established, and vice versa. E.g., in the fallacy that in the thesis the relationship is well-established, i.e., \textit{xiangfu jicheng} 相符極成, \textit{prasiddhasambandha}, even though both the property-possessor and the qualifier are well-established, the inseparable connection is also "well-established" and proves nothing. Therefore, the logical relationship between these two parts is problematic.

\(^{333}\) It is not quite sure what “更有餘過,” i.e., “there would also be some other fallacy additionally,” refers to. It may refer to the last part that “it proves nothing,” and this “some other fallacy” is just the fallacy that in the thesis the relationship is well-established, i.e., \textit{xiangfu jicheng} 相符極成, \textit{prasiddhasambandha}. However, according to YRZLSQ in X853 p.806c06, it refers to the second mistake of the qualifier and the property-possessor. However, in T2270 p.241a15–a25, IRMS states that this explanation is contradictory to Kuiji’s commentary and it is even not from YRZLSQ but from “some note” (youji 有記). In addition, its quote in IRMS does not say the second mistake but the third, which does not exist in Kuiji’s text at all. Moreover, IRMS quotes a sentence from YRZLSQ to support its own explanation, but this quote cannot be found in YRZLSQ. IRMS perhaps mistakes some other work for YRZLSQ or consults another different manuscript of YRZLSQ. IRMS regards this “some other fallacy” as the fallacious cases related to the requirement of being well-established discussed below in YRZLS, and this explanation is supported by IDRJ in T2272 p.86b18–b27.

\(^{334}\) The start of the commentary on the second mistake is not denoted. According to IRMS in T2270 p.241a26–b05, the commentary below belongs to the second mistake of the thesis’ being incomplete as a member, and Zenju’s evidence is Kuiji’s note in 1.1.1.1 that “the [genuine] thesis also has two meanings: the first presents the completeness of the member, because both the reliers and the substrata should be fulfilled; the second is being established, because both the reliers and the substrata should avoid fallacies.” However, this is not a good evidence, for in 1.1.1.1 the first meaning “presenting completeness” refers to whether the literal words exist or not, and the second meaning is “being accomplished,” while the incompleteness of the thesis here is an incompleteness of the meaning because of being not equally accepted which actually belongs to the second meaning in 1.1.1.1.
instances must be lacking, and the example by similarity must commit [the fallacy that] what is to be proved is unestablished, while the example by dissimilarity must commit the fallacy that the reason is present in part or all of the dissimilar instances. If the property-possessor is allowed to be not well-established by both, then the thesis as a member is not complete, so [the thesis member] is not established perfectly either. Then the qualifier has no subject, so whose property is it? The reason will also commit [the fallacy that] the substratum of the reason is unestablished to one or both sides. Therefore, the substrata of the thesis must belong to [what are] equally accepted, then the relier as the nature of the thesis can be not well-established, because it is what the proof establishes to argue about originally.

(79)一切法中略有二種：一體，二義。且如五蘊色等是體，此上有漏、無漏等義，名之為義。體之與義各有三名。體三名者：一名“自性”，《瑜伽》等中古師所說自性是也；二名“有法”，即此所說有法者是；三名“所別”，如下宗通中名所別不成是。義三名者：一名“差別”，《瑜伽論》等古師所說差別是也；二名為“法”，下相違中云法自相相違因等是；三名“能別”，則335如此中名能別是。

(98b03–b11)
All the dharmas include two kinds in general: the first is entity (ти–體); and the second is attribute (yi–義). For example, the five aggregates of form, and so forth, are entities, while the attributes of them, such as being contaminated or uncontaminated, are called attributes. Both entity and attribute have three names respectively. The three names of entity [are]: first, [it is] named “self-nature,” namely the self-nature mentioned by the ancient masters in the Yogācārabhūmi and others;336 second, [it is] named “property-possessor,” namely the property-possessor mentioned here; third, [it is] named

335 則[= YRZLSi], 即[= YRZLSj]. “ze 則” and “ji 即” are both affirmative copulas with the same meaning here, so they are both possible.
ASа, T1605 p.693c01: 所成立自性者，謂我自性或法自性 = AS p.105, 3–4: sādhyasya svabhāvaḥ ātmasyavabhāvo dharmasvabhāvo vā |
ASВч, T1606 p.771b05–b06: 自性者，謂我自性、法自性，若有若無所成立 = ASBh p.151, 8–9: svabhāvaḥ sādhyā ātmasyavabhāvo dharmasvabhāvaḥ ca nāsāti viśāti vā

191
“qualified (suobie 所別, viśeṣya),” such as [the one] in the fallacy that the qualified is not well-established regarding the thesis. The three names of attribute [are]: first, [it is] named “distinguishing-feature,” namely the distinguishing-feature mentioned by the ancient masters in the Yogācārabhūmi and others; second, [it is] named “property,” namely [the property] in the reason with the fallacy that the reason proves the opposite of the self-form of the inferable property (fa zixiang xiangwei 法自相相違, dharmasvarūpaparītasādhana) said in the part of the contradictory [reasons] below; and third, [it is] named “qualifier,” namely the one named qualifier here.

(80)《佛地論》云, 彼因明論諸法自相, 唯局自體, 不通他上, 名為 “自性”; 如纏貫花, 纏通他上諸法差別義, 名為 “差別”。此之二337種, 不定屬一門, 不同大乘, 以一切法不可言說一切為自性, 可說為共相。如可說中, 五蘊等為自, 無常等為共; 色蘊之中, 色處為自, 色蘊為共; 色處之中, 青等為自, 青為共; 青等之中, 衣、花為自, 衣、花為共; 如是乃至離言為自, 極微為共; 離言之中, 聖智內冥得本真故, 名之為自, 說為離言名之為共。共相假有, 假智變故; 自相可真, 現量親緣339, 聖智證故。除此以外說為自性, 皆假自性非真自性, 非離假智及於340言詮341故。(98b11–b23)

(1. the first pair of names of entity and attribute, i.e., self-nature and distinguishing-feature)
The *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa* says, in the treatises of the science of reasons, the particular characteristics of all the dharmas that are only confined to their own entities but not jointly shared by others are named “self-nature”; the distinguishing properties of dharmas that can be jointly shared by others like a thread through flowers are named “distinguishing-feature.”[^342]

[^342]: This is not a direct quotation from Xuanzang’s translation of the *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa*, the original text in T1530 p.318b05–b08 reads:

彼說一切法上實義，皆名“自相”，以諸法上自相共相各附己體不共他故。若分別心立一種類能詮、所詮，通在諸法如縷貫花，名為“共相”。

That [treatise of the science of reasons] says that the true properties of all the dharmas should be named “particular characteristic,” because both the particular characteristics and the universal characteristics [in other contexts] are just attached to their own entities respectively but not jointly shared by others. If a class of expressers and what are to be expressed by them are established by the discriminative mind, and they penetrate through all dharmas like threads through flowers, then they are named “universal characteristic.”

The quote in YRZLS makes some changes: The first is the change from particular characteristic and the universal characteristic to the self-nature and the distinguishing-feature; the second is the omission of the description with respect to the expression through the discriminative mind.

[^343]: According to YRZLS in T1840 p.128a14–b04, this means, a word does not absolutely take an unchangeable position as the self-nature or the distinguishing-feature defined above, i.e., the subject and the predicate in the inference. In other words, in one inference, a word may stand for the self-nature as the subject, but in another inference, it may turn to be the distinguishing-feature as the predicate. The example given by Kuiji is that in the thesis “五蘊一切無我 (all the five aggregates are without Self),” which may be reconstructed as sarvapañcaśaṃkhaṇḍhā anātmānaḥ, “我 ātman” and “無我 anātman” stand for the distinguishing-feature, but in the thesis “我是思 cetana ātma (Self is mind according to the Chinese text),” “我 ātman” stands for the self-nature. This is not a good example, because Kuiji breaks the boundary between subject and predictive. However, at least it tells what he means by saying “[each of] these two does not fixedly belong to one specific sort.”

[^344]: Mahāyāna here refers to the Consciousness-only School especially which Kuiji believes in.
characteristics are provisional because they are transformed by the conventional cognition; the particular characteristics may be genuine, because [the most primary particular characteristic] is cognized by perception directly and realized by sage wisdom. Except this (the most primary particular characteristic), all the others that are expressed as the self-natures are false self-natures but not genuine self-natures, because they are not devoid of conventional cognition and expression through language.  

(81)今此因明，但局自體名為“自性”，通他之上名為“差別”。准相違中，自性、差別復各別有自相、差別。謂言所帶名為“自相”，不通他故；言中不帶意所許義，名為“差別”，以通他故。今憑因明總有三重：一者局、通。局體名“自性”，狹故；通他名“差別”，寬故。二者先、後。先陳名“自性”，前未有法可分別故；後說名“差別”，以前有法可分別故。三者言、許。言中所帶名“自性”；意中所許名“差別”，言中所申之別義故。

釋彼名者，自性、差別二名如前。(98b23–c04)

Now in this science of reasons, what is confined to its own entity is named “self-nature,” and what is shared by others is named “distinguishing-feature.” With regard to the [four] contradictory [reasons], each of the self-nature and the distinguishing-feature also has the self-form (zixiang 自相, svarūpa) and the distinction (chabie 差別, viśeṣa).  

This means that what is presented by literal words is named “self-form,” because it cannot be shared by others; and what is not presented by literal words but implicated by the meaning is named “distinction,” because it can be shared by others. Now based on the science of reasons, there are three levels in total: The first is [the level of] confined and

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345 The last two sentences mean, only the most primary particular characteristic is the self-nature, and in this context, all the other particular characteristics should be included in the universal characteristics.

346 They refer to the self-form and distinction in the fallacy that the reason proves the opposite of the self-form of the property-possessor (youfa zixiang xiangwei 有法自相相違, dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana) and the fallacy that the reason proves the opposite of the distinction of the property-possessor (youfa chabie xiangwei 有法差別相違, dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana) with respect to the self-nature, i.e., the property-possessor; and the self-form and distinction in the fallacy that the reason proves the opposite of the self-form of the inferable property (fa zixiang xiangwei 法自相相違, dharmasvarūpaviparītasādhana) and the fallacy that the reason proves the opposite of the distinction of the inferable property (fa chabie xiangwei 法差別相違, dharmaviśeṣaviparītasādhana) with respect to the distinguishing-feature, i.e., the inferable property.
shared. What is confined to [one’s own entity] is named “self-nature,” because [it is] narrow; what is shared by others is named “distinguishing-feature,” because [it is] broad. The second is [the level of] former and latter. The formerly-stated (qianchen 前陳) [in the thesis member] is named “self-nature,” because there is nothing before it to qualify; the latterly-stated (houshuo 後說) [in the thesis member] is named “distinguishing-feature,” because there is something before it to qualify. The third is [the level of] literal words and implication. What is presented by literal words is named “self-nature”; what is implicated by the meaning is named “distinguishing-feature,” because [it is] an implicative distinction of what is expressed by literal words.

Concerning how to explain these [two] names, the two names of self-nature and distinguishing-feature [can be explained] as above.347

347 This refers to the definitions in the rewritten quote of the *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa* above.

348 The Sanskrit word dharma as well as its Chinese equivalent fa 法 has such a great number of meanings that it is not quite possible to translate it into one single English word, but in the context of Hetuvidyā, it mainly refers to the property to be proved in the thesis or the proving property in the reason. However, in this paragraph, Kuiji tries to define the property-possessor and the property in the thesis through the general definition of dharma.

349 Concerning this definition of dharma or fa 法, the first part comes from svalaṇadhāranād dharmaḥ that can be found in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. However, in Kuiji’s definition, there is no svalaṇa, which is translated as “自相 zixiang” most of the time, i.e., the particular characteristic, but “ziti 自體,” i.e., the particular entity. Although generally speaking, “自相,” “自體” and “自性 (zixing, self-nature)” can be regarded as similar or even equivalent, just like svalaṇa and svabhāva in Sanskrit, since Kuiji and his Chinese Consciousness-only School emphasizes
namely maintaining its particular entity, is common to all;\textsuperscript{350} the latter part [of the definition of dharma], namely being regular to generate understanding, requires some variations [of sound].\textsuperscript{351} There is nothing said before the formerly-stated [in the thesis member], it just maintains the entity of itself directly without any variation [of sound] to make others generate new understanding. There is already something said before the latterly-stated [in the thesis member], so this latterly-stated can be used to qualify the formerly-stated, and then there can be some variations [of sound] to generate others’ new understanding. The generation of new understanding relies on the latterly-stated. Therefore, the formerly-stated only has one meaning, namely being capable of maintaining its particular entity. Its meaning is not excellent, so it cannot obtain the name “dharma/property.” While the latterly-stated has both of the two meanings, it is capable of not only maintaining [its entity] but also being regular. Its meaning is excellent, so it can obtain the name “dharma/property” solely. The formerly-stated can possess the latter “dharma/property,” so it is named “dharma-possessor/property-possessor” additionally.

\textsuperscript{(83)} 第三，自性亦名“所別”，差別亦名為“能別”者：立、敵所許不訶先陳，訶先陳上有後所說，以後所說別彼先陳，不以先陳別於後。故先自性名為“所別”，後陳差別名為“能別”。(98c13–c17)

\textsuperscript{350} This means, whatever a subject is, it must be able to maintain its own entity, no matter it is capable of being regular to make others understand or not.

\textsuperscript{351} Cf. the *Nyūyōnusāra (Apidamo shunzhengli lun 阿毘達摩順正理論) in T1562 p.414a05–a06: 是故聲者但是言音，相無差別。其中屈曲必依迦、遮、吒、多、波等。要由語聲發起諸字，諸字前後和合生名。此名旣生，即能顯義。由此展轉而作是言：語能發名，名能顯義。 In Cox (1995, pp.384–385), the English translation reads: Therefore, [in such cases], sound is merely the articulated sound of words; it is without any distinguishing characteristic. The variations within that [sound] necessarily depend upon [the classes of phonemes] ka, ca, ta, pa, and so on. Phonemes, which are issued forth only in dependence upon the articulated sound of speech, combine in a [particular] sequence and produce a name. When this name is produced, it alone is able to manifest the object-referent. The following statement is made on the basis of this process of successive dependence: speech is able to issue forth in name, and name is able to manifest the object-referent.

\textsuperscript{352} / YRZLSi, 故 YRZLS). “gu 故” means “therefore,” “hence,” since the last sentence is the result of the former
(3. the third pair of names of entity and attribute, i.e., the qualified and qualifier)
Third, self-nature is also named “qualified (suobie 所別, viśeṣya),” while distinguishing-feature is also named “qualifier”: the proponent and the opponent both accept the formerly-stated and do not argue about it, but they argue about whether the formerly-stated can possess the latterly-stated, because the latterly-stated qualifies the formerly-stated, but the formerly-stated does not qualify the latter. Therefore, the former self-nature is named “qualified,” and the latterly-stated distinguishing-feature is named “qualifier.”

(84)若爾，此三名皆有失。其失者何？難初名云：若體名“自性”，義名“差別”者，何故下云如數論師立“我是思”，我為自性，思為差別？彼文便以義為自性，體為差別，我、無我等分別思故。(98c17–c20)
If so, these three [pairs of] names all have problems. What are the problems? The first [pair of] names can be questioned as follows: if entity is named “self-nature” and attribute is named “distinguishing-feature,” why is it said below that for instance, the Sāmkhya sets forth “Self is mind”\(^{353}\) with the Self as the self-nature and mind as the distinguishing-feature? That text just takes attribute as the self-nature and entity as the distinguishing-feature, because Self or no-Self, and so forth, can qualify mind.

(85)難次名云：若具一義得“有法”名，若具二義但名“法”者，如即此師立“我是思”，何故思唯一義乃名為“法”，我具二義得“有法”名？(98c21–c23)
The second [pair of] names can be questioned as follows: if what has one meaning can get the name “property-possessor,” while what has two meanings can be named “property,” then in the case that this master (the Sāmkhya) sets forth “Self is mind,” why is mind named “property” with only one meaning, and why does Self get the name “property-possessor” with two meanings?

\(^{353}\) This refers to the part of the fallacy that the qualified is not well-established (suobie bujicheng 所別不極成, aprasiddhaviśeṣya) in YRZL, i.e., in Sanskrit aprasiddhaviśeṣyo yathā sāṅkhyaśya bauddham prati cetana ātmeti | and in Chinese “所別不極成者，如數論師對佛弟子說‘我是思．’” The translation of “Self is mind” is based on the Chinese text.
The last [pair of] names can be questioned as follows: if the latterly-stated is used to qualify the formerly-stated, the former one is “qualified,” while the latter one is “qualifier.” For instance, regarding the “blue lotus” said by people, if only “blue” is said but not “lotus,” then one cannot know what the blue it is of: is it the blue of clothes, or trees, or pots? If only “lotus” is said but not “blue,” then one cannot know what [colour] lotus it is: is it a bright red lotus, or a white one, or a light red one? The “blue” is said now to exclude the bright red lotus, etc.; and the “lotus” is said to exclude the blue of clothes, etc. The formerly-stated and the latterly-stated should qualify each other; each should be both the qualified and qualifier of the other. This [case of the thesis] should also be the same: the latterly-stated can qualify the former, and the formerly-stated can qualify the latter; each should be named both “qualified” and “qualifier” to the other.

The first question can be answered as follows: The school of the science of reasons is different from other treatises; it just names what is confined to its own entity as “self-nature,” because [it is] not shared by others; and names the property that can be shared by others like a thread through flowers as “distinguishing-feature.” The formerly-stated

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554 前 YRZLSî, 先 YRZLSj. Both of “qian 前” and “xian 先” can mean “former,” “prior” here, so they are both possible.
is confined to its own entity; the latterly-stated is a property shared by others. What is shared by others can refer to many [subjects]; what is confined to its own entity can only refer to few (actually only one subject, i.e., the thesis-subject itself). The latter property is used to expound the former, but the former is not used to expound the latter, so the formerly-stated is named “self-nature”; the latter is named “distinguishing-feature.”

The second question can be answered as follows: The proponent and the opponent have nothing contradictory about the formerly-stated property-possessor, but the distinctive feature possessed by this [property-possessor] is debated about by both sides. The point under debate, on which the two sides are contradictory, can generate the understanding of regularity, so it is named “property.” [The formerly-stated] is not argued about; it has nothing to do with being regular to both sides but maintains its own entity directly, and then it cannot lead to other understandings of regularity, so it is named “property-possessor.” According to the true principle, both the formerly-stated and the latterly-stated have two meanings [of the definition of dharma above] (i.e., maintaining its own entity and being regular to generate others’ understanding of it), but based on the dominant aspect this treatise gives them different names, so the formerly-stated is named “property-possessor” and the latterly-stated is named “property.” Therefore, the Nyāyamukha states, “with respect to what is to be proved, then the property and the property-possessor can be set forth; this is not [the situation of] quality (i.e., de 德, guna) and quality-possessor (i.e., substance, shi 實, dravya).”

355 YZML, T1628 p.1e09–c10. There are still a few words left in YZML, for this sentence is started with "you yu ci
are properties or property-possessors, but [in an inference] having regard to what is to be proved, the formerly-stated is always the property-possessor, while the latterly-stated is always the property. This is different from [the relationship between quality and quality-possessor established by] Vaiśeṣika, in which it is always fixed as to which are qualities or quality-possessors.

(89) 釋第三難言：前後所陳互相簡別，皆應得名“能別”、“所別”，如成宗言“差別性故”。然前陳者非所乖諍，後說於上彼此相違。今陳兩諍，但體上義，故以前陳為“所別”，後名“能別”，亦約增勝以得其名。(99a16–a20)

The third question can be answered as follows: Since the formerly-stated and the latterly-stated distinguish (jianbie 簡別) each other, they should both get the names of “qualifier” and “qualified,” just like [the theory shown by] the words “because of the nature of qualifying (chabie xing gu 差別性故, viśiṣṭatayā)” which forms the thesis. However, the formerly-stated is not the point under debate, but whether the latterly-stated can be possessed by [the formerly-stated] is what the two sides are contradictory on. Now in the stated, what the two sides debate about is only the attribute possessed by the entity, so the formerly-stated is named “qualified,” while the latter is named “qualifier”; they also get their names based on the dominant aspects.

(90) 又但先陳，皆名“自性”、“有法”、“所別”；但是後說，皆名“差別”、“法”及“能別”：但諍後於前，非諍前於後故，舉後方諍，非舉前諍，能立於後，不立於前故，起智了不由前故。由此得名前後各定。(99a20–a24)

In addition, whatever is stated formerly should be named “self-nature,” “property-possessor,” and “qualified”; whatever is stated latterly should be named

zhong 又於此中” and finished with read “gu wu you guo 故無有過,” so the whole sentence means “moreover here with respect to what is to be proved, the property and the property-possessor can be set forth; this is not [the situation with respect to] quality and quality-possessor, so there is no fault [in my principle that a property proves another property].” A Sanskrit equivalence from the Dvādaśāranayacakra is offered in Katsu (1978, p.115) reading: sādhyatvāpeksayā cātra dharmadhamivyavasthā na gunagunītvenitya adoṣah. See Tucci (1930, p.18): moreover here subject and predicate are established only having regard to the [notion] to be proved, and therefore their relation is not [like that which is supposed to exist between] the quality and the substance possessing the quality [and by which we infer the quality from the substance;] thus there is no fault in my argument.

556 真 YRZLS, 皆 YRZLSj. “Zhen 真” means “genuine(ly),” while “jie 皆” means “all.” According to the context and the character “皆 jie” in the second part of this sentence, this should be “jie 皆.”
“distinguishing-feature,” “property” and “qualifier,” because [the proponent and the opponent] debate about whether the latter can be possessed by the former but not whether the former can be possessed by the latter, because the argument begins when the latter is set forth but not when the former is set forth, because the proof proves the latter but not the former, and because the cognition as apprehensive [cause] is not generated by the former. Thus, the names of the former and the latter are fixed.

(91)問：前陳、後說既各三名，何故極成初言“有法”，後言“能別”，不以“自性”、“差別”名顯？又復不以“法”及“有法”，“能別”、“所別”相對為名，而各舉一“有法”、“能別”？
答：初有三釋：一云，設致餘名必有此難，隨舉一種，何假為徵？二云，“有法”能有他勝，故先陳舉，明必有後法以釋於前陳。“能別”別於他勝，此宗後陳必與彼宗後陳義異，以後所說能別前陳，故後舉能別。三云“自性”、“差別”，諸法之上共假通名，“有法”、“能別”宗中別稱，偏舉別名，隱餘通號，亦不相違。答後難言：前舉“有法”影顯後“法”，後舉“能別”影前“所別”。二燈、二炬，二影、二光，互舉一名相影發故，欲令文約而義繁故，宗之別名皆具顯故。攝名已周，理實無咎。(99a24–b08)

Question: Since the formerly-stated and the latterly-stated both have three names, why is the former of well-established ones called “property-possession” and the latter “qualifier,” but not represented with the names of “self-nature” and “distinguishing-feature”? In addition, why not use “property” and “property-possession” or “qualifier” and “qualified” as pairs, but just pick up one from each [pair], namely “property-possession” and “qualifier”?

Answer: There are three explanations to the first [question]: The first one says, if other names were used, there would also be the same question, since one pair is picked up optionally, why should it be criticized? The second one says, “property-possession” has the advantage of [showing the meaning of] being able to possess others, so it is stated in a former place to tell that there will be a property later, for expounding the formerly-stated. “Qualifier” has the advantage of [showing the meaning of] qualifying others,
and since the latterly-stated of this thesis must be different from the latterly-stated of that thesis, the latterly-stated can qualify the formerly-stated, thus “qualifier” is picked up as the latter [stated]. The third one says, “self-nature” and “distinguishing-feature” are common names used by all the dharmas, “property-possessor” and “qualifier” are particular names [used] in the thesis, so particular names are picked up specially while other common names are concealed; there is nothing contradictory either.

The latter question can be answered as follows: When “property-possessor” is raised in the former place, it can manifest the latter “property” like the shadow [of an object]; when “qualifier” is raised in the latter place, it can manifest the former “qualified” like the shadow. [The names are just like] two lamps with two shadows and two torches with two light beams, because one name from each [pair] (namely the pair of “property-possessor” and “property,” and the pair of “qualified” and “qualifier”) is raised to manifest the other like the shadow [of an object], because there is a purpose of making the text brief but the meaning abundant, because all the other names of [the substrata of] the thesis can be manifested [by “property-possessor” and “qualifier”]. [“Property-possessor” and “qualifier”] include [the meanings of] the names completely, so logically speaking, [such an arrangement of names] should actually not be blamed.

問：既言“極成”，何所簡別？有幾非成，言成簡別？
答：能別定成，且所別中有自不成，有他不成，有俱不成，有俱非不成。前三是過，第四句非。又有自一分不成，有他一分不成，有俱一分不成，有俱非一分不成。前三並非，第四有是。所別定成能別不成為句亦爾。如是偏句總別合有四種四句。（99b08–b15）

Question: Since “well-established” is said, what are distinguished? How many [of the qualified or the qualifier] are unestablished and regarded as in need of distinguishing?
Answer: When the qualifier is surely established, the qualified can be unestablished to oneself, unestablished to others, unestablished to both and unestablished to neither. The first three are fallacies, but the fourth form (jiu 句, literally it means “sentence”) is not. Moreover, [the qualified] can be partially unestablished to oneself, partially
unestablished to others, partially unestablished to both and partially unestablished to neither. The first three are all false, but the fourth one includes the correct [form].\(^{357}\) (The forms above refer to the fallacy that the qualified is not well-established, i.e., \textit{suobie bujichen \ 孀別不極成, aprasiddhaviśesya.}) When the qualified is surely established, the forms of the unestablished qualifier are also the same. (These refer to the fallacy that the qualifier is not well-established, i.e., \textit{nengbie bu jicheng 能別不極成, aprasiddhaviśeśa.}) Thus, regarding the sectional forms (\textit{pianju 偏句})\(^{358}\) entirely or partially, there are four groups of four forms in total.

\(^{93}\)其俱不成全有五種四句:

- 有自能別不成他所別;
- 有他能別不成自所別;
- 有俱能別不成自所別;
- 有俱能別不成他所別;
- 有自能別不成俱所別;
- 有他能別不成俱所別;
- 有俱能別不成俱所別;
- 有俱能別不成俱非所別。

如能別不成為首有二全四句, 所別不成亦如是。二四句中, 其前七句皆是此過, 其第八句是前偏過。雖總有四, 體唯有二, 後即\(^{359}\)是前更無異故, 所以但名二四句。

- 有自兩俱不成非他;
- 有他兩俱不成非自;
- 有俱兩俱不成;

\(^{357}\) The fourth form, i.e., being partially unestablished to neither, includes the case of being well-established to both and the case of being entirely unestablished to both. The former one is correct.

\(^{358}\) According to IRMS in T2270 p.246c26–c28, “sectional form (\textit{pianju 偏句})” refers to the forms in which only one of the substrata of the thesis is unestablished partially or entirely, so the four groups of forms include:

1. the qualified is unestablished entirely when the qualifier is well-established,
2. the qualified is unestablished partially when the qualifier is well-established,
3. the qualifier is unestablished entirely when the qualified is well-established,
4. the qualifier is unestablished partially when the qualified is well-established.

Each group includes four forms concerning oneself, others, both and neither.

\(^{359}\) 则 YRZLSt, 即 YRZLSj. Each is possible, but the quote in IRMS reads “\textit{ji 即}” in T2270 p.246e09.
有俱非自、他兩俱不成。
前三句非，第四句是。
如是合有五種全句，一一離之，為一分句，復有五句，總成十句。復將一分句
對餘全句，復將全句對餘一分句，如理應思。恐繁且止。(99b15–b28)

The situation that both [the qualifier and the qualified] are not established (namely the fallacy that both the qualifier and the qualified are not well-established) has five groups of four forms in total:

(1) The qualifier is unestablished to oneself, and the qualified [is unestablished] to others;
(2) The qualifier is unestablished to others, and the qualified [is unestablished] to oneself;
(3) The qualifier is unestablished to both, and the qualified [is unestablished] to oneself;
(4) The qualifier is unestablished to both, and the qualified [is unestablished] to others;
(5) The qualifier is unestablished to oneself, and the qualified [is unestablished] to both;
(6) The qualifier is unestablished to others, and the qualified [is unestablished] to both;
(7) The qualified is unestablished to both and the qualifier is unestablished to oneself;
(8) The qualified is unestablished to both and the qualifier is unestablished to others;

Like starting with that the qualifier is unestablished, there are two [groups of] four forms of entirely [unestablished], [the forms started with that] the qualified is unestablished are also the same.\textsuperscript{360} In the two [groups of] four forms, the first seven

\textsuperscript{360} Similarly to the former two groups, these two groups, i.e., the forms starting with that the qualified is unestablished, include:

(1) The qualified is unestablished to oneself and the qualifier is unestablished to others;
(2) The qualified is unestablished to others and the qualifier is unestablished to oneself;
(3) The qualified is unestablished to both and the qualifier is unestablished to oneself;
(4) The qualified is unestablished to both and the qualifier is unestablished to others;
forms all belong to this fallacy (i.e., the fallacy that both are not well-established), the
eight form belongs to the fallacy of the sectional form above (i.e., the form that when
the qualified is well-established, the qualifier is unestablished to both). Although in
total there should be four [groups], the entities [of groups] are only two, because the
latter [two groups] are just the former [two groups] without any difference,\textsuperscript{361} so “two
[groups of] four forms” is said.

There are also the forms that:

(1) Both [the qualifier and the qualified] are unestablished to oneself but not to
others;

(2) Both are unestablished to others but not to oneself;

(3) Both are unestablished to both [oneself and others]; and

(4) Both are unestablished to neither oneself nor others.

The first three forms are false, but the fourth form is correct.

Thus, there are five groups of forms of entirely [unestablished] in total. Each can be
separated into a form of partially [unestablished], so there are also five [groups of]
forms, then they make ten [groups of] forms in total. Additionally, one partially
[unestablished] form [of one component of the thesis] can stand against all the entirely
[unestablished] forms of the other [component], and one entirely [unestablished] form
[of one component of the thesis] can stand against all the partially [unestablished] forms
of the other [component], according to this principle it should be thought over. For fear
of tediousness it is stopped for the present.

\textsuperscript{(94)}其初有法不成偏句，如下所別不成中解。能別不成偏句，如下能別不成中解。
兩俱不成諸句，如下兩俱不成中解。其兩俱全分、一分不極成，即\textsuperscript{362}宗兩俱不
成。其自他全分、一分不極成，即\textsuperscript{363}宗隨一不成。義准亦有宗猶豫不成，兩俱、

\begin{itemize}
\item[(1)] The qualified is unestablished to oneself and the qualifier is unestablished to both;
\item[(2)] The qualified is unestablished to others and the qualifier is unestablished to both;
\item[(3)] The qualified is unestablished to both and the qualifier is unestablished to both; and
\item[(4)] The qualified is unestablished to both and the qualifier is unestablished to neither.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{361} Accord to the last footnote, actually the latter two groups are the same with the former two, for they are only
different in sequence.

\textsuperscript{362} 唯 YRZLS\textsubscript{1}, 唯 YRZLS\textsubscript{2}. Each is possible, but the quote in ITU reads “\textsuperscript{ji} 唯” in T2274 p.179b09.

\textsuperscript{363} Ditto.
隨一、全分、一分等過，至似宗中當廣分別。二種自性及二差別不極成此皆總攝。(99b28–c06)

The first sectional forms of unestablished property-possessor (i.e., the qualified) can be interpreted according to [the commentary on] [the fallacy that] the qualified is not well-established below. The sectional forms of unestablished qualifier can be interpreted according to [the commentary on] [the fallacy that] the qualifier is not well-established below. The forms of both unestablished can be interpreted according to [the commentary on] [the fallacy that] both [the qualifier and the qualified] are not well-established below. [The forms of] unestablished to both [oneself and others] entirely or partially belong to [the fallacy that] [one component or both] of the thesis is unestablished to both [the proponent and the opponent].\(^{364}\) [The forms of] unestablished to either oneself or others entirely or partially belong to [the fallacy that] [one component or both] of the thesis is unestablished to either the proponent or the opponent.\(^{365}\) Based on this principle, there should also be [the fallacy that] the thesis is unestablished because of doubt,\(^{366}\) as well as the fallacies of [unestablished] to both, to one side, entirely and partially, these will be expounded in detail in the part of the specious thesis. The two kinds of [unestablished] self-form (zixing 自性, but usually translated as zi xiang 自相 in this case, svarūpa) and the two kinds of unestablished distinction (chabie 差別, viśeṣa)\(^{367}\) are all included here.

(95)為簡彼非，故二宗依皆言“極成”。(99c05–c07)

In order to exclude those false [forms], the two substrata of the thesis are both said as “well-established.”

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\(^{364}\) There is no such a fallacy regarding the thesis in the 33 fallacies in the Nyāyapraveśa, but one regarding the reason, i.e., the fallacy that [the reason] is unestablished to both [the proponent and the opponent] (liangju bucheng 两俱不成, ubhayāsiddha).

\(^{365}\) There is no such a fallacy regarding the thesis either, but one regarding the reason, i.e., the fallacy that [the reason] is unestablished to either the proponent or the opponent.

\(^{366}\) There is no such a fallacy regarding the thesis either, but one regarding the reason, i.e., the fallacy that [the reason] is unestablished because of doubt (youyu bucheng 犹豫不成, samdigdhāsiddha).

\(^{367}\) They refer to the unestablished self- forms and distinctions of the property-possessor and the qualifier, such as the cases of the four contradictory reasons.
問：何故宗過有其九種，今“極成”簡但簡於三？

答：此中但以宗不極成，所依須極成，故但簡三，非欲具簡一切宗過。《理門》成宗但簡五過，由言“非彼相違義能遣”。此論以彼簡五，故但說三。“隨自”即簡相符極成，簡非周備。《理門》略五，如前所說：亦如喻言“顯因同品決定有性”，不簡合、結，故此但三。(99c07–c13)

Question: There are nine fallacies regarding the thesis, but why does the exclusion by “well-established” only exclude three [of them] at present?

Answer: Since the thesis should not be well-established, but the substrata of the thesis should be well-established, this part only excludes three [fallacies], but does not intend to exclude all the fallacies regarding the thesis. When the Nyāyamukha expounds the thesis, it just excludes five fallacies, because it says “those meanings contradictory to that cannot exclude.” Since that (the Nyāyamukha) has excluded five [fallacies], this treatise (the Nyāyapraveśa) only mentions three. “In accordance with oneself (suizi 隨自, svayam)” [below] just excludes [the fallacy that] [the thesis is] of a well-established relation, for the exclusion by “well-established” is not enough yet. [The situation here is similar to that] the Nyāyamukha simplifies [the fallacies of the thesis] into five, which has been explained above; it is also similar to the statement about the example [in the Nyāyapraveśa] that “[wherever] the announced similar group of the reason [is followed by] the character of definite presence [of the property of the thesis],”[369] [based on this statement literally,] the application and the conclusion[370] are not excluded either, so this part only mentions three.[371]
問：既兩共許，何故不名“共成”而言“極成”？
答：自性、差別乃是諸法至極成理，由彼不悟，能立立之。若言“共成”，非顯真極。又因明法有自比量及他比量能立、能破。若言“共成”應無有此。又顯宗依先須至理極究竟，能依宗性方是所証，故言“極成”而不言“共”。(99c14–c19)

Question: Since [the property-possessor and the qualifier] are accepted by both of the two sides, why are they called “well-established” but not “equally established”? 

Answer: [There are three explanations:] [Firstly,] the self-nature (i.e., the property-possessor) and the distinguishing-feature (i.e., the qualifier) are ultimately established principles of dharmas, and since others do not understand, the proof proves them. If “equally established” is said, the true ultimateness cannot be shown.372 [Secondly,] in addition, according to the principle of the science of reasons, there are proofs as inferences accepted by oneself (自比量 zi biliang 和 the distinguishing-feature are ultimately established principles of dharmas, and since others do not understand, the proof proves them. If “equally established” is said, the true ultimateness cannot be shown.372 [Secondly,] in addition, according to the principle of the science of reasons, there are proofs as inferences accepted by oneself (自比量 zi biliang) and refutations as inferences accepted by others (他比量 ta biliang).373 If “equally established” is said, these [two kinds of inference] should not exist. [Thirdly,] in addition, [“well-established”] shows that the substrata of the thesis must accord with principles ultimately and absolutely first, and then the reliever as the nature of the thesis can become what is to be argued.

372 This kind of explanation seems contradictory to the context, and what “well-established” means is still obscure. One possibility is, the self-nature and distinguishing-feature here should be considered as ontological rather than logical, then regardless of the science of reasons rules, as ontological concepts, these two stand for the ultimate denotations. Another possibility is, what Kuiji says here is especially directed against Wengui’s interpretation. Wengui says in YRZLSW that “well-established” means being accepted by both the proponent and the opponent in X848 p.682a22–a23. However, Kuiji’s standard is more complicated, he emphasizes not only the acceptance from both sides but also the truth, so he mentions “true ultimateness.” However, by all means, since these two parts are already “equally accepted,” I cannot tell what the “true ultimateness” that Kuiji asks for here refers to as a logical requirement. Moreover the statement “proof has to prove them” here is obviously contradictory to what he says in other places, even just after two sentences below, that the real point of argument is not the self-nature or the distinguishing-feature, but the inseparable connection between them.

373 The inference accepted by oneself and the inference accepted by others are quite different from svārthānumāna and parārthānumāna in Indian tradition. “Inference accepted by oneself” refers to the inference for defending the proponent’s own thesis based on only his knowledge but not the opponent’s; “inference accepted by others” refers to the inference for refuting the opponent based on only the opponent’s knowledge but not the proponent’s. There is also another kind called “inference accepted by both” based on common knowledge. In an “inference accepted by oneself,” terms like “accepted by myself (自許 zixu) are added as the qualification; in an “inference accepted by others,” terms like “held by you (汝執 ruzhi) are added instead. Because “equally established” conflicts with such terms, the second explanation herein rejects to use it.
about, so “well-established” is said instead of “equally [established].”

(98)問：宗依須兩許，言“成”簡“不成”：因、喻必共成，言“極”簡“不極”。何因
因、喻不標“極成”，獨於宗依致“極成”簡？
答：有四義。
一，宗依極成宗不極，為簡“不極”言“極成”。因、喻依、體並須成
無所簡故不說“極”。
二，因、喻能立皆須極，無不極故不須簡。宗是所立非共成，為有所簡須言
“極”。因、喻之中自比言“許”，他比言“執”，而簡別之，故無不極。
三，因、喻成中無不成，無濫簡故不言“極”；成宗之中有不成，有濫簡故獨言
“極”。
四，因不成等攝非極，從寬為名不名“極”；宗不成中無別攝，故說“極成”簡不
極。因中兩俱、隨一等過，喻中所立、能立不成，此等過中已攝不極，兩俱等
寬，從餘為稱，有體、無體皆此過故。宗過不爾，言“極”簡之，兩許有體，便
非是過。故於宗內獨言“極成”。
然《理門》云：“此中宗法唯取立論及敵論者決定同許，於同品中有非有等，亦
復如是”，故知因、喻必須極成，但此論略。《唯識》亦言“極成六識隨一攝故”
375，如極成餘，故知此略。(99c19–100a08)

Question: The substrata of the thesis must be accepted by both [sides], so
“[well]-established” is said to exclude “not [well]-established”; the reason and example
have to be established to both [sides], so “well[-established]” should also be said to
exclude “not well[-established].” Why are the reason and example not marked with
“well-established,” while the substrata of the thesis are marked with “well-established”
for distinguishing especially?
Answer: There are four reasons.
(From the angle of the substratum and the entity:) The first is that the substrata of the
thesis need to be well-established but [the essence of] the thesis (the relationship

374 極成 YRZLSt, 成 YRZLSj. It is clearer to have both these two characters here, but according to Kuiji’s simplified
writing style nearby, here may be just a “cheng 成.”
between the property-possessor and the qualifier) does not, so in order to exclude the “not well[-established]” [essence of the thesis], “well[-established]” is said. Both the substrata and essences of the reason and example need to be [well-]established, and there is nothing to exclude, so “well[-established]” is not said.

(From the angle of three kinds of inference:) The second is that [in an inference], as proof, both the reason and example should be well[-established]; neither can be not well[-established], so the exclusion [by “well-established”] is not needed. However, the thesis belongs to what is to be proved; it is not equally established, so in order to exclude [the unequally established relationship in the thesis], saying “well[-established]” is needed. Concerning the reason and example, “accepted (xu 許) [by me]” is said for an inference accepted by oneself and “held (zhi 執) [by you]” is said for an inference accepted by others in order to distinguish these [special cases], so neither can be not well[-established] [even in such cases according to this rule of the three kinds of inference].

(From the angle of establisher and what is to be established:) The third is that there is nothing unestablished in the reason and example which can establish, and no overflow needs to be excluded, so “well[-established]” is not said; there is something unestablished in the thesis which is to be established, and some overflow needs to be excluded, so “well[-established]” is said alone.

(From the angle of whether the relevant fallacies are so broad that they include both existent and non-existent cases:) The fourth is that the fallacies of being unestablished, and so on, regarding the reason include the not well[-unestablished] [cases] (as just a part of the fallacies), the name is given based on the broadness, so [the reason] is not named with “well[-established]”; the fallacies of being unestablished regarding the thesis do not include others, so “well-established” is said to exclude the unestablished. Such as the fallacy that [the reason is unestablished to] both sides, the fallacy that [the

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376 The substratum of the reason refers to the property-possessor, i.e., the subject of the thesis; the essence of the reason refers to the statement of the reason itself; the substratum of the example refers to the instances, i.e., the explanatory aids such as “pots” in the example; the essence of the example refers to the proposition statement in the example, such as “all those produced are impermanent.”
reason is unestablished to] one side, and so on, regarding the reason, as well as [the fallacy that] what is to be proved is unestablished, [the fallacy that] the proof is unestablished regarding the example, these fallacies include the not well-[established] [cases]; [the fallacy that the reason is unestablished to] both sides, and so on, are broader [than just not well-established], so the names [of the reason and example] are given based on others [than just the not well-established ones], because both the existent (youti 有體) cases and the non-existent (wuti 無體)\textsuperscript{377} cases are included in these fallacies. However, the fallacies regarding the thesis are different, once “well-[established]” is said and both sides admit them to be existent, there is no fallacy. Hence, “well-established” is solely said in the thesis.

However, the Nyāyamukha states, “the property of the thesis-[subject] (i.e., the reason) here only takes what are ascertainedly equally accepted by the proponent and the opponent,\textsuperscript{378} its presence or non-presence in similar group, and so on, are also the same,”\textsuperscript{379} so it can be known that the reason and example must be well-established, and this treatise just omits [to clarify this]. The Cheng weishi lun also says, “because it is well-established that each of the six consciousnesses has its own faculty respectively,” [the attribute of the mind-consciousness is well-established] just like that of other [consciousness] is well-established, so it can be known that [the word “well-established” for the reason and example] is omitted in this [treatise].

(1.2.2.1.2.1.2.2. Exhibiting the Essence [of the Thesis] 出體)

(VII)論：…差別性故，…(100a09)

\textsuperscript{377} “Extent” means that both sides of the debate accept its existence, for example, in the inference “sound is impermanent, because it is observable” between a Mahāyāna Buddhist and a Hīnayāna Buddhist, both sides accept the attribute “observable” as existent, but this reason is still obviously fallacious. “Non-existent” means the existence cannot be accepted, for example, a Mahāyāna Buddhist sets forth to a Hīnayāna Buddhist that “sound is impermanent, because it is included in guṇa,” then since Buddhist does not admit the existence of Vaiśeṣika’s concept “guṇa,” both sides do not accept “included in guṇa” in the reason.

\textsuperscript{378} Vibhūticandra as the Pramāṇavātikā 3.17 (R. Sāmkṛtyāyana ed.: paksadharma vādiprativādinīscito grhyate. See Katsura (1977, p.122).

\textsuperscript{379} YZML, T1628 p.1b11–b12. Tucci (1930, p.13): Now we can choose as paksadharna only that particular attribute that the speaker as well as the opponent recognise beyond any doubt, to be resident in the subject. The same is to be said concerning the others referred to, that is: residence and non-residence in the affirmative [and in the negative] instances [respectively].
YRZL: ... because of the nature of qualifying, ...

NP 2.1: ... \{prāsiddhi-viśeṣana\} viśiṣṭatayā... (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.2, 3).

(99)述曰: 出宗體。“差別”者，謂以一切有法及法互相差別。“性”者“體”也，此取二中互相差別不相離性以為宗體。如言“色蘊無我”，“色蘊”者有法也，“無我”者法也，此之二種，若體若義，互相差別。謂以“色蘊”簡別“無我”，色蘊無我，非受無我；及以“無我”簡別“色蘊”，無我色蘊，非我色蘊。以此二種互相差別合之一處，不相離性方是其宗。即簡先古諸因明師，但說有法為宗，以法成有法故；或但說法為宗，有法上法是所諍故；或以有法及法為宗，彼別非宗，合此二種宗所成故。此皆先共許，何得成宗？既立己成而無果故。但應取互相差別不相離性，有許、不許, 以為宗體。(100a09–a21)

YRZLS: [This is the part of] exhibiting the essence of the thesis. “Qualifying” means all the mutual qualification between the property-possessor and the property. “Nature” means “essence”; it takes the inseparable connection by mutual qualification between these two as the essence of the thesis. For instance, in the statement “the aggregate of form is without Self,” “the aggregate of form” is the property-possessor, “without Self” is the property, and these two, as the entity or the attribute, qualify each other. It means that “the aggregate of form” is used to distinguish “without Self,” so the aggregate of form but not the aggregate of feeling (shouyun 受蘊, vedanāskandha) is without Self; “without Self” is used to distinguish “the aggregate of form,” so the aggregate is without Self but not with Self. The inseparable connection by combining the mutual qualification between these two into one is exactly [the essence of] the thesis. This is to exclude [the opinions of] those ancient masters of the science of reasons, such as [the opinion] that the property-possessor should be said as the thesis, because the property is used to establish the property-possessor; [the opinion] that only the property should be said as the thesis, because the property possessed by the property-possessor is what is to be argued about; and [the opinion] that both the property-possessor and the property should be taken as the thesis, for if they are separated, neither can be the thesis, because the thesis can only be established when both of them are put together. [However,
to all the three opinions above] they (the property-possessor and the property) are both equally accepted in advance, how can they become the thesis? Because [in every case,] since the thesis to be proved is already established, there would be no outcome. The inseparable connection by mutual qualification that is accepted by someone (the proponent) but denied by others (the opponent) should just be taken as the essence of the thesis.

(100)問: 先陳能別唯在法中, 何故今言“互相差別”?  
答: 立、敵相形, 法為能別。體、義相待, 互通能、所。對望有異, 亦不相違。 (100a21–a24)

Question: If it is stated earlier that the qualifier refers to the property, then why is “mutual qualification” spoken about at present?  
Answer: When one considers the relationship between the proponent and the opponent, the property [in the inference by one side] refers to the qualifier. When one considers the relationship between the entity and the attribute, each of them (i.e., the property-possessor and the property) can be both the qualifier and the qualified to the other. Since they are in different relationships, there is no contradiction.

(101)問: 互相差別則為宗性, 何假此中須説“故”字?  
答: “故”者“所以”。此有二義: 一簡古說。但以能別或但所別, 或雙以二而為其宗, 陳那簡之, 皆非宗詫, 取此二上互相差別不相離性所詫之義, 方成宗故。其能別等, 彼先共許, 非兩所詫, 皆非是宗。為簡古師遂説“故”字。二釋所依。釋前有法及以能別“極成”之言, 但以有法及法互相差別不相離性, 一許一不許, 而為宗故, 宗之所依有法、能別, 皆須極成。由此宗中説其“故”字。不爾所依須更成立哉。 (100a24–b05)

Question: Since the mutual qualification [between the property-possessor and the qualifier] is just the nature of the thesis (i.e., the essence of the thesis), for what reason
must “because of (gu 故)” be said here?

Answer: “Because” means “for the reason that.” This has two meanings: The first excludes the ancient opinions. [The ancient opinions] only take the qualifier or the qualified, or both of them as the thesis; Dignāga excludes these opinions, because none of them is to be argued about by the thesis, but only when the inseparable connection by mutual qualification between these two is chosen as what is to be argued about, the thesis can be set up. The qualifier, and so on, are equally accepted in advance; they are not to be argued about by the two sides, so neither [the qualifier nor the property-possession] is the thesis. Thus, in order to exclude the opinions of ancient masters, “because of” is said. The second interprets the substrata. [“Because of” is meant] to interpret the words “well-established” of the property-possession and the qualifier; since the inseparable connection by mutual qualification between the property-possession and the property, which is accepted by one side but denied by the other, should just be taken as [the essence of] the thesis, both the property-possession and the qualifier, as the substrata of the thesis, must be well-established. As a result, in [the definition of] the thesis, “because of” is said. If not so, the substrata of the thesis must be proved additionally.

Someone does not understand the grounds here and so modifies the treatise into “[with] qualifying as the nature.” [This modification] does not only appear contradictory to

382 [YRZLS1:1, YRZLS1:3] “Wang 委” means “absurdly,” while “wei 委” means “flightily.” They are both possible, but the quote in IDYJ reads “wei 委” in T2272 p.106b04.

383 According to YY in T1841 p.145b25 and some other materials, this is criticizing the interpretations by a lay scholar Lü Cai 呂才 and Wengui 文軌.
the rules of the science of reasons, but also reflects unfamiliarity with Chinese and Sanskrit grammars. Modifying the treatise easily is quite blameworthy. Even Master “All over the sky” Shi Daoan 释道安384 deliberated over how to translate and put forward [the viewpoint of] “five losses [of originals] and three difficulties” by saying that the Arhats of the canon-compiling gathering were so conscientious, but the ordinary unenlightened people of this final age are so mediocre, and modifying the sublime words of a thousand generations ago into the same with the worst vulgarity after a hundred kings,385 is it not distressing? Besides, they (those who modify the treatise) are not translator-monks but some superficial learners; they misguide the primary knowledge of later students, entice the enlighten education of beginners [into a wrong direction], follow their own ideas flightily, and change the holy teaching. As a result, their promising eyes of wisdom will absolutely never arise, and their existing hearts of wisdom will cease by themselves because of this [modification]. All the learners [of the science of reasons] should know this principle well. According to the original, this should be corrected as “because of the nature of qualifying.”

(103)問：何故但宗說差別性，因、喻中無？
答：宗有一成一不成，故但說宗差別性；因、喻唯成無不成，無簡不說差別性。如因三相，雖有差別，不欲取此上不相離性一許一不許成其能立，即386所依便非，由斯不說“差別性故”。《理門》唯云“宗等多言說‘能立’，是中唯隨自意樂，為所成立說名‘宗’，非彼相違義能遣”，不說所別、能別“極成”及“差別性”，此論獨言。(100b14–b22)

384 Shi Daoan 释道安 (312–385) is a Chinese Buddhist monk, “shi 釋” means Buddhist. He made great contributions to the translation methodology, bibliography and philosophy of Chinese Buddhism, as well as the organizing of Chinese Buddhist community and so on. “All over the sky (mitian 漢天)” is his epithet, this is from a story that once he went to meet a famous lay intellectual Xi Zaochi (習凿齒, ?-383), suddenly Xi called himself “‘within the four seas (sihai 四海)’ Xi Zaochi,” which means he was world-renowned, and then as a response, Shi Daoan said “‘all over the sky’ Shi Daoan.” This response was considered as wonderful by their contemporaries and “all over the sky” became the epithet of Daoan.

385 Above refer to the third and the second difficulties of Daoan’s “five losses of originals and three difficulties,” the first difficulty is that cannons are said by Buddha according to certain circumstance, but now the translations have to be adapted to the present age. The “five losses of originals” includes: 1, the loss from changing the Sanskrit grammatical structure for adapting to Chinese writing style; the loss from the polishing for adapting to the Chinese language habit; 3, the loss from deleting repetitive gāthā; 4, the loss from deleting geya; 5, the loss from deleting some repeating paragraphs.

386 / YRZLSj. “jí 即” means “if” here, according to the context, it is needed.
Question: Why is the nature of qualifying only mentioned in the thesis but not in the reason and example?

Answer: The thesis is established on one side but unestablished on the other, so the nature of qualifying is only mentioned in the thesis; the reason and example are only established but not unestablished [on both sides], there is nothing to distinguish, so the nature of qualifying is not mentioned. For example, although the three characteristics of a reason also contain qualifying, it is not purposed to take its inseparable connections accepted by one side but denied by the other as the proof, but concerning the substrata [of the thesis], [the situation] is different, hence “because of the nature of qualifying” is not mentioned [in the reason and example]. The Nyāyamukha states, “the multiple statements of the thesis and others are called ‘proof’, herein what is desired to be proved only in accordance with one’s own intention can be called ‘thesis’, which those meanings contradictory to that cannot exclude”; it does not mention “well-established” and “the nature of qualifying” of the qualified and the qualifier, but only this treatise (the Nyāyapraveśa) mentions it.

(1.2.2.1.2.1.2.3. Excluding the Overflow 簡濫)

(VIII)論：隨自樂為所成立性，…(100b23)

YRZL: (Based on Kuiji’s commentary:) … desired to be of the nature of being proved in accordance with oneself; …

(Based on the Sanskrit text: desired by oneself to be proved)


(104)述曰：此簡濫失。

“隨自”者，簡別於宗。“樂為所成立性”者，簡別因、喻。故《理門》云：‘‘隨自意’顯不顧論宗，隨自意立。‘樂為所立’謂不樂為能成立性。若異此者，說所成

387 This means, since trairūpya describes the three characteristics of a reason, which can be regarded as predicates of the reason-property, trairūpya also qualifies.
立似因、似喻應亦名‘宗’。”(100b23–b27)

YRZLS: This is [the part of] excluding the overflow. (The first kind of interpretation of “desired to be of the nature of being proved in accordance with oneself”ː)

“In accordance with oneself (suizi 隨自, svayam)” distinguishes the [correct] thesis [from those with overflow] (i.e., the first three kinds of thesis in the next paragraph). “Desired to be of the nature of being proved (le wei suochengli xing 樂為所成立性, sādhyatvenepitsaṭa)” distinguishes [the thesis] from the reason and example. Thus, the Nyāyamukha states, “in accordance with one’s own intention’ (sui ziyi 隨自意) expresses that the thesis is regardless of [the opponent’s] doctrinal system (bugulun 不顧論, śāstrānapekṣa) but established in accordance with one’s own intention.388

‘Desired to be proved’ (le wei suo[cheng]li 樂為所[成]立) means what are not desired possess the nature of proving. If [the thesis were] different from this, whatever is stated to be proved such as a specious reason and a specious example should also be called ‘thesis’.389–390

(105)凡宗有四ː一，遍所許宗，如“眼見色”，彼此兩宗皆共許故。二，先承稟宗，如佛弟子習“諸法空”，鶴鶴弟子立“有實我”。三，傍憑義宗，如立“聲無常”，傍憑顯“無我”。四，不顧論宗，隨立者情所樂便立，如佛弟子立佛法義，或392若善外宗，樂之便立，不須定顧。(100b27–c03)

388 In Katsura (1977, p.112), the Sanskrit fragment of Dignāga which accords with this sentence compiled by Frauwallner reads: svayamśabdena śāstrānapekṣam abhyupagamam darśayati, and that compiled by Kitagawa reads svayam iti śāstrānaprksam. From Katsura’s (2016c) unpublished restoration draft: = PSV ad PS 3.2ab’: svayam iti śāstrānaprksam abhyupagamam darśayati.

389 From Katsura’s (2016c) unpublished restoration draft: Cf. PSV ad PS 3.2ab’: svarūpēnaṃvedi sādhyarūpena, na siddhasādhanarūpena, tathā cāsiddhahetudṛśāntābhāsayor uktiḥ parihṛtā bhavati, na hi tau sādhanīyarūpena nirdiśyete.

390 YZML, T1628 p.1a15–a18. Tucci (1930, p.6): “In accordance with our opinion” is used here in order to express that the proposition is independent of the śāstra, but is established in accordance with one’s own opinion. “That we want to prove” means that we do not want as a proposition [a sentence] having the nature of the proof (śāthana). Were not the probandum defined in this way, that is as a proposition that “one wants to prove,” then even a fallacious reason or a fallacious example (hetvā-ābhāsa, dṛṣṭānta-ābhāsa) could be called a proposition.” See Kitagawa (1965, p.129, fn.167)

391 承禀 YRZLSj, 獨禀 YRZLSj; “cheng bing 承禀” and “ye bing 獨禀” can both mean “inherit” here, but according to the quotes in IRMS, IDS, IDYJ and ITU, it should be read as “cheng bing 承禀.”

392 / YRZLSj, or YRZLSj. “Huo 或” means “or” here as an alternative conjunction between two cases.
All the theses belong to four [kinds]: The first is the thesis accepted by all (biansuoxuzong 遍所許宗, sarvatantrasiddhānta), such as “eyes can see forms,” which can be accepted by both that (the opponent’s) and this (the proponent’s) schools. The second is the thesis inherited from early [teachings] (xianbingchengzong 先承稟宗, pratitantrasiddhānta), for example, the adherents of Buddhism acquire “all the dharmas are empty,” while the adherents of Ulūka (xiuliu 鵂鶹)394 establish “true Self exists” [based on the knowledge they have acquired]. The third is the thesis postulating other meaning (bangpingyizong 傍憑義宗, adhikaraṇasiddhānta), for example, if “sound is impermanent” is established, then “[sound] is without Self” can be shown as its postulation. The fourth is the thesis regardless of [the opponent’s] doctrinal system (bugulunzong 不顧論宗, *śāstrānapekṣasiddhānta), for example, if [the proponent] is good at the other school, [this kind of thesis] can just be established [to refute the opponent’s school] as long as [he] desires, [so this kind of thesis] does not have to consider [other doctrinal system].

Regardless the difference between NS and Kuiji’s explanation, NS talks about siddhānta, meaning “dogma” here but not pakṣa or sādhyā, and the four kinds of siddhānta include sarvatantrasiddhānta, pratitantrasiddhānta, adhikaranasiddhānta and abhyupagamasiddhānta. However, since siddhānta can be translated as “宗” or “宗義” in Chinese, and pakṣa is also translated as “宗,” it is quite possible for Kuiji to mistake siddhānta for pakṣa. In order to keep Kuiji’s original idea, the character “宗” from siddhānta is translated as “thesis” instead of “dogma” in this text.

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The first three among them should not be established. Concerning the first one, namely the thesis accepted by all, if it is allowed to establish, then something already established will be established [again]. Since it is already equally accepted, why should it be established? Concerning the second one, namely the thesis inherited, if two heretics both inherit [the teaching of] Sāṅkhya, and argue about their own doctrine, it is insignificant and resultless, because [they] prove what is already established. Concerning the third one, namely the thesis postulating other meaning, if [the postulated meaning that is really desired to be established] is not argued about through statements, then what is the use of such a thesis? Essentially speaking, the argument is based on statements with the wish of making others’ understanding generate; other meaning shown as postulation is not what should be established originally, so [this kind of thesis] should not be taken as an eligible thesis either, but in the science of reasons, it cannot be found as a fallacy. Since the fallacies of the reason include the fallacy that the reason proves the opposite of the distinction of the inferable property (fa chabie xiangwei 法差別相違, dharmaviśeṣaviparītāsādhana), the thesis postulating other meaning can also be a thesis, but it is not an eligible one. Now the first three, all of which should not be established, are excluded; only the fourth one, the thesis regardless of [the opponent’s] doctrinal system, can be [established] as a thesis, because it is in accordance with what is desired by the proponent’s own intention, while all the first three are not desired by himself.

(107)“樂為所成立性”簡能成立者，能成立者謂即397因、喻。
因、喻成立自義亦應名“宗”。但名“能立”，非所成立。舊已成故不得名“宗”。
既爾，似宗、似因、似喻應得名“宗”，先所未成應更成故。當時所競方是真宗，
所欲為所成立性，樂為所成立性，sādhyatvenepsitaḥ)“
le wei suochengli xing 樂為所成立性，
what can prove, and what can prove refer to the reason
and example.

[If someone says that] since the reason and example also prove their own meanings,
they should also be named “thesis,” [then this is not correct.] [The reason and example]
should only be named “proof”; they are not to be proved. Since they have already
been established, they should not be named “thesis.” Now it is shown that only what is
desired to be newly proved is the thesis; even though the reason and example are desired,
they are not to be newly proved, so if [someone] proves them, there will be the fallacy
that [the thesis is] of a well-established relation. Hence, they are not named “thesis.”

[If someone says that] in this case, the specious thesis, specious reason and specious
example should be named “thesis,” because they were not established before and
should be established additionally, [then this is not correct.] What is argued about at the very
moment is the real thesis, and since it is set forth together with the reason and example,
it should be distinguished [from the reason and example]. Although the specious thesis,
specious reason and specious example can be established additionally, they are not
desired [at the very moment] and belong to what can be established at the next moment,
so they are not what is argued about now. Thus, they are not thesis because of being
distant.

The interpretation above is based on the Nyāyamukha. It only excludes the genuine but
not the specious.399

398 / YRZLSl, 屬 YRZLSj. “shu 屬” means “belong to,” so it is needed here as a copula.
399 The genuine here refers to the reason and example, and the specious refers to the specious thesis, specious reason
and specious example. Kuiji means that, just like in YZML, the interpretations on “in accordance with oneself” and
“desired to be of the nature of being proved” can only show literally the exclusion of three kinds of thesis and the exclusion of the genuine reason and genuine example, but not that of the specious ones; though the exclusion of the specious can also be derived, that is more than what the literal words mean.

As shown above, the fourth kind of thesis refers to the thesis regardless of doctrinal system, while the first three refer to the thesis accepted by all, the thesis inherited from early teachings and the thesis postulating other meaning.

The entity and attribute of what is to be proved now are named “thesis.”
答：宗兩乖訟，須“隨自”簡，因、喻共許，故無“隨自”。因、喻二種，如共比量，必先共許方成能立，無遍許失及承禀亡。要言所陳方名“因”、“喻”，不說亦有傍義差別，無義准失。自、他比量言亦有簡，“許”、“執”故，隨其不顧。故於因、喻不說“隨自”。

(100c22–101a05)

Question: Why is “desired in accordance with oneself” not said in [the definitions of] the reason and example but only in [the definition of] the thesis?

Answer: The thesis is argued about by two sides, it must be distinguished through “[desired] in accordance with oneself,” but the reason and example are equally accepted, so there is no “[desired] in accordance with oneself” [in their definitions]. Like in the inference accepted by both (gong biliang 共比量), the reason and example must be equally accepted in advance, and then they can be taken as the proof, so there is no error of being accepted by all or being inherited from early teaching. Just what is stated through literal words can be named “reason” or “example”; no distinction as the postulated meaning is mentioned, so there is no error of postulating other meanings. The statements of the inference accepted by oneself and the inference accepted by others also distinguish; since “accepted [by me]” and “held [by you]” are said, they can be in accordance with their regardlessness. Therefore, “[desired] in accordance with oneself” is not said in [the definitions of] the reason and example.

(110)問：何故宗中傍有義准名為“差別”，因、喻便無？

答：能立本成，成自所立。隨應之義，立乃乖角，共、自相違，故於宗中傍有義准，則四相違所違差別。言申決定方成能立，故於因、喻不說亦有義准能立。

(101a05–a09)

Question: Why is there other postulated meaning named “distinction” [mentioned] in the thesis, but not in the reason and example?

Answer: The proof is already established, it establishes what is to be proved of the proponent himself. If the corresponding meaning [of the thesis] is to be established

402 承禀 YRZLSt, 被禀 YRZLSj. See fn.391 and fn.396.
403 The corresponding meaning of the thesis here refers to the connotative distinction of the thesis-statement.
[in fact but not just the statement through literal words], there will be contradiction [between the proof and the corresponding meaning purported to be proved], then [the reason and example accepted] by both will be contradictory to [the thesis accepted] by oneself, so there is another postulated meaning [mentioned] in the thesis, namely the opposed distinctions in the four contradictory [reasons]. The proof must be stated through words ascertainedly, so there is no other postulated meaning of the proof mentioned in the reason and example.

(111)問: 何故宗內獨言“樂為”，因、喻不說？
答: 似宗、因、喻當更成立可以為宗，今顯當時所詮為宗，不以彼為，故言“樂為”簡彼三似宗、似因、似喻404。設今及後俱不可說為“因”，為“喻”亦爾。若更立之只是宗攝，不說“樂為”。設更成立以為宗詮，義既成已，方為因、喻，展轉疊成不同於宗。故於因、喻不說“樂為”。
又於宗內說“樂為”言，簡似周詮，因、喻略之。
又宗有詮以更須成。宗義相濫故獨言“樂為”。因、喻必須極成，不成便非因、喻。無所濫故不言“樂為”。(101a09–a18)
Question: Why is “desired to be of (le wei 樂為, īpsita + the instrumental case from sādhyatvena)” only said in [the definition of] the thesis but not in [the definitions of] the reason and example?
Answer: (The first kind of answer based on different moments:) The specious thesis, reason and example should be proved additionally as theses, but now what is argued about at the very moment, not these [three specious ones], is shown as the thesis, so “desired to be of” is said to exclude the three, namely the specious thesis, specious reason and specious example. If both now and later [the specious reason] cannot be called “reason,” [the specious example cannot be called] as “example” either.405 If they

404 三似宗似因喻 YRZLSSt, 三宗似因似喻 YRZLSj. “San sizong siyinyu 三似宗似因喻” means “the three, i.e., the specious theses, specious reasons and [specious] examples,” while “san zong siyin siyu 三宗似因似喻” means “three kinds of thesis, and the specious reasons, specious examples.” According to the context here and the interpretation before, though “desired in accordance with oneself” is meant to exclude the first three kinds of thesis, “desired to be of” is meant to exclude the specious ones, the text here should read “三似宗似因喻.”
405 According to IRMS in T2270 p.253a16–a19, this means that, since the specious reason and specious example are fallacious now, they cannot be called “reason” and “example”; if they can be proved additionally as theses later, then they should be called “thesis” instead of “reason” and “example.”

223
are proved additionally, then they should just also be included in [the category of] thesis, and no “desired to be of” should be said. If they have been proved additionally as [other] theses, when they are already established, and they can be taken as reason and example, then since they are established distantly in such a devious way, they are different from the thesis [argued about at this very moment]. Therefore, “desired to be of” is not said in [the definitions of] the reason and example.

(The second kind of answer based on the extent of details:) Besides, with the words “desired to be of” said in [the definition of] the thesis, the specious can be excluded completely, but such words are omitted in [the definitions of] the reason and example.

(The third kind of answer based on overflow:) Besides, the thesis is argued about, so it must be proved additionally. The thesis can be overflowed, so “desired to be of” is said only [in the definition of the thesis]. The reason and example must be well-established, if not, they are not reason or example anymore. Therefore, since there is no overflow, “desired to be of” is not said [in the reason and example].

(112) 问：何獨宗標“所成立性”，因、喻不說“能成立”也？
答：宗言“所立”已顯因、喻是能成立，顯法已周更不須說。
又宗前未說，恐濫須陳；因、喻已彰，更何須說？
又宗違古，言“所成立”以別古、今；因、喻不違，不說“能立”言以簡別也。
又前標云“宗等多言名為‘能立’”，先已說訖，後更不須。 (101a09–a24)
Question: Why is only the thesis marked with “the nature of being proved,” while the reason and example are not marked with “what can prove”? 
Answer: (The first kind of answer:) “Being proved” said in [the definition of] the thesis can already illuminate that the reason and example belong to what can prove, the

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406 In T2270 p.253a19–a25, IRMS explains that this answer means that, in the definition of the thesis, “well-established property-possession” and “well-established qualifier” exclude aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇa, aprasiddhaviśeṣyā, aprasiddhobhaya, “in accordance with oneself” excludes prasiddhasambandha, while “desired to be of” excludes the other five fallacies of the thesis as well as the fallacies of the reason and example. Although “desired to be of” can also be said in the reason and example, it is omitted to make the explanation brief. However, it is quite strange that Zenju states that “desired to be of” in the thesis can also exclude the fallacies of the reason and example.

407 The overflow of the thesis here refers to the specious thesis, specious reason and specious example which may also be taken as eligible theses.
illumination is already complete, so [the mark “what can prove”] does not need to be repeated.

(The second kind of answer:) Besides, there is nothing said before the thesis, in order to avoid overflow,\textsuperscript{408} [“the nature of being proved”] must be stated; but the reason and example have already been represented [as the proof]\textsuperscript{409} before [the expression of their definitions], so why does [the mark “what can prove”] need to be said again?

(The third kind of answer:) Besides, the thesis contradicts the theses in] the past, “being proved” is said to distinguish [the thesis at] present from [the ones in] the past; the reason and example do not contradict [the reasons and examples in the past], so the words “what can prove” are not said to distinguish.

(The third kind of answer:) Besides, since [the reason and example] are already marked by saying “the multiple statements of the thesis and others are named ‘proof,’” [the mark “what can prove”] has already been said before, and it does not need to be said again after that.

\subsection*{(1.2.2.1.2.4. Summarizing 結成)}

(IX) 論: … 是名為宗。(101a25)

YRZL: … such is named “thesis.”

(This part cannot be found in extant Sanskrit manuscripts of NP, and \textit{pratyakṣādyaviruddha iti vākyaśeṣah} (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.2, 4) in Sanskrit, i.e., “the supplementary is ‘not contradictory to the perception, and so forth,’” does not exist in Xuanzang’s translation either.)

(Based on Kuiji’s commentary, the whole definition of the thesis can be translated as: herein the thesis means the well-established property-possessor and the well-established qualifier, because of the nature of qualifying, desired to be of the nature of

\textsuperscript{408} According to the text above, the overflow excluded by “the nature if being proved” refers to the genuine reason and genuine example.

\textsuperscript{409} Concerning the relationship between the proof and the reason as well as example, see relevant paragraphs in 1.2.2 before 1.2.2.1.
being proved in accordance with oneself, such is named “thesis.”

(113)述曰：此結成也。 (101a25)
YRZLS: This is the part of summarizing.

(1.2.2.1.2.1.3. Citing an Instance 指法)

(X)論：如有成立“聲是無常”。 (101a26)
YRZL: For example, someone sets forth “sound is impermanent.”
(Based on the Sanskrit text: For example, “sound is impermanent” or “[sound] is permanent.”)


(114)述曰：三指法也。如佛弟子對聲論師，立“聲無常410性”、“聲”是有法，“無常”為能別，彼此共許有“聲”及“無常”，名“極成有法”、“極成能別”，為宗所依。彼聲論師，不許“聲”上有此“無常”，今佛弟子合之一處，互相差別不相離性云“聲無常”，聲論不許，故得成宗。既成随自，亦是樂為所成立性，故名“真宗”。恐義不明，指此令解。 (101a26–b04)
YRZLS: This is the third part, namely citing an instance. If, for instance, a Buddhist adherent sets forth “sound is impermanent” to a Śabdavādin, then “sound” is the property-possessor, “impermanent” is the qualifier, and “sound” and “impermanent” are equally accepted as existent by both the proponent and the opponent, so they are named “well-established property-possessor” and “well-established qualifier,” which are relied on by the thesis. That Śabdavādin does not accept that “sound” can possess “impermanent,” now the Buddhist adherent combines them in one place into “sound is impermanent” as the inseparable connection by mutual qualification, which is not accepted by the Śabdavādin, so the thesis can be established. Since it is established in accordance with oneself, and also desired to be of the nature of being proved, it is named

410 聲 YRZLSi, 常 YRZLSj. “sheng 聲” means “sound,” while “chang 常” means “permanent.”
“genuine thesis.” For fear that the meaning is not clear enough, this [instance] is cited for illustration purposes.

(115)《瑜伽論》云: “立宗者，謂依二種所成立義，各別攝受自品所許。”“攝受”者，是自意樂義，“品”是宗義，故《顯揚》云，“各別攝受自宗所許。”此中意說，依二所立立論各別，隨自意樂，自宗所許，故說名“宗”。此中三釋：一者以言對理，取依義能詮名為“各別自宗所許”。二者以別對總，取依總之別，言及義二，名“自宗”所許”。三者以合對離，取彼能依不相離性，合之以為“自宗所許”。正與此同。此文總也。(101b0–b12)

The Yogācārabhūmi says, “setting forth the thesis means based on two sorts of topics of what are to be proved, attaining one or another’s acceptance of his own group.”

“Attaining (sheshou 攝受, parigraha)” means being desired in accordance with one’s own intention; “group (pin 品, pakṣa)” means the thesis, so the Xian yang [sheng jiao lun] says, “attaining one or another’s acceptance of his own thesis.” This means, setting forth one or another’s argument based on the two of what are to be proved, desired in accordance with one’s own intention because of the acceptance of his own thesis, is named “thesis.” Here are three kinds of explanation: The first one is [in a model of] statement vs. meaning; it takes [the statement] that can express based on the [two] meanings as “one or another’s acceptance of his own thesis.” The second one is [in a model of] individual vs. total; it takes both the statement and meaning of the individual from the total as “acceptance of his own thesis.” The third one is [in a model

411 自 YRZLSj, 自宗 YRZLSj. As this is quoted from the text of XSL, it should be “zìzōng 自宗.”
412 合之以為 YRZLSj, 合之以為 YRZLSj. “Zhi 之” is a pronoun meaning “them” here and “以 yi” is a function word, according to the language habit of ancient Chinese, this should be “合之以為.”
413 T1579 p.356c20–c21. The Sanskrit text in Yaita (2005, p.101) reads: pratijñā katamā. dvividhaṃ sādhyam artham ārabhya yo ’nyonyaṃ svapaksaparigrahaḥ. In Wayman (1999, p.10), he separates dvividham from sādhyam artham ārabhya, and suggests svapaksaparigraha should be ended with taḥ in accordance with the following words, because he understands the “one” of “one another (i.e., anyonya)” as “the thesis topic,” which he uses to translate sādhyam artham, and understands the “another” as “from the following list.” However, based on what the Chinese version and Kuiji’s interpretation, the logical clue of this paragraph in YBh is quite different from Wayman’s explanation.
414 Actually in Xuanzang’s translation both “pin 品” and “zong 宗” are used to translate pakṣa, so the “zipin 自品” from YBh a here and the “zipin 自宗” from the next quote of XSL should both be svapakṣa in Sanskrit.
415 XSL, T1602 p.531c19–c20.
416 According to 1.1.2.1.1, what is to be proved in YBh a refers to the self-nature and the distinguishing-feature.
417 These three are summarized from the three explanations on what is to be proved and the proof of Jingyan, Wengui and Kuiji in 1.1.2.1.1.
of constituted vs. separated, it takes that constituted inseparable connection which can rely as “acceptance of his own thesis.” [“Desired to be of the nature of being proved in accordance with oneself” in the Nyāyapraveśa] just means the same with this [“attaining one or another’s acceptance of his own group” in the Yogācārabhūmi]. This text [quoted from the Yogācārabhūmi] is a general [explanation of the thesis].

There are ten sentences below, and they can be divided into three groups. The first two sentences refer to the substances of the thesis. First, “[due to] attaining treatises(sheshoulunzong 撮受論宗, śāstraparigraha)”; second, “or [due to] one’s own eloquence (zibiancai 自辯才, svapratibhāna).” The former one is relying on one’s own inheritance of teaching and setting forth his own thesis against the opponent of another teaching, otherwise [the thesis] would commit the fallacy that in the thesis the relationship is well-established. The latter one is setting forth a thesis of others’ teaching with one’s own eloquence; it is a thesis desired in accordance with one’s own intention and regardless of [the opponent’s] doctrinal system. Only these two kinds are genuine theses, while [the thesis] accepted by all, [the thesis] inherited from the same teaching as the opponent, and [the thesis] postulating other meanings are not attaining individually or desired in accordance with oneself, so they are not genuine theses, because they prove what is already established or what is not to be established originally.

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418 A same paragraph can be found in YLL in T1829 p.94a17–25.
419 辯才 YRLSt, 辯識 YRLSj. “biancai 辯才” and “bianshi 辯識” can both mean “eloquence” here, but according to the original text in YBhSt, this should be “辯才.”
420 Ditto.
421 宗承 YRLSt, 宗業 YRLSj. “Zongcheng 宗承” and “zongye 宗業” can both mean “school-inheritance,” but according to the similar texts above as well as the quote in IDYJ in T2272 p.116c24, it should read “宗承”.
422 YBhSt: 或攝受論宗, 若自辯才, 若輕蔑他, 若從他聞, 若覺真實, 或為成立自宗, 或為破壊他宗, 或為制伏於他, 或為摧屈於他 (T1579 p.356 c21–c2) = YBHV 3.21: śāstraparigraha vā svapratibhānato vā parāvajñāto vā parānuśravato vā tattvābhīṣandhānato vā svapakṣāvasthānato vā paraparādūṣanato vā paraparābhīvato vā parāmukhamanato vā.
423 According to 1.2.2.1.2.1.2.3, actually both of these two kinds can be included in the thesis regardless of doctrinal system.
The next three sentences refer to the causes of setting forth the thesis. First, “or [due to] scorning others (qingmieta 輕蔑他, parāvajñā),” second, “[or] [due to] listening to others (congtawen 從他聞, parānuśrava),” and third, “or [due to] perceiving the truth (juezhenshi 覺真實, tattvābhisanthāna),” [because of the causes above,] the theses are set forth, so they are named “cause.” These three causes accord in sequence with setting forth a thesis of others for scorning them, setting forth a thesis of oneself because of listing to [and following] others, and perceiving the truth and awakening by oneself.

The last five sentences refer to the purposes of setting forth the thesis. The first two sentences of [these five] indicate that all the theses cannot go beyond these: First, “due to establishing one’s own thesis (chenglizizong 成立自宗, svapākṣāvasthāna);” second, “due to refuting [the thesis of] others (pohuaiyuta 破壞於他, parapakṣadīṣaṇa).” The three following sentences are interpretations: First, “due to overpowering others (zhifuyuta 制伏於他, parābhibhava),” it interprets “establishing one’s own thesis”; second, “due to defeating others (cuiquyuta 摧屈於他, paraparibhava),” it interprets “refuting [the thesis of] others”; third, “due to compassionating others (beiminyuta 悲愍於他, parānukampana),” because establishing [the thesis of] oneself and refuting [the thesis of] others are both compassionate.

424 蔑 YRZLSj. “Mie 蕩” means “scorn,” “mie 蕩” means the thin bamboo strip, it may be just a typo of “mie 蕩.”
2.2.2. On the Reason

(1.2.2.1.2.2. Showing the Characteristics of the Reason 明因相)

(1.2.2.1.2.2.1. Indicating [the Topic] 標舉)

(YRZL): The reason has three characteristics.
NP 2.2: hetus trirūpaḥ (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p. 2, 6).

(YRZLS): The characteristics of the thesis have been shown above, and then the characteristics of the reason will be shown below. These characteristics will be analyzed from four aspects briefly: The first exhibits the entities; the second explains the name; the third discerns the differences; the fourth clarifies the abolishing and setting up.

(1.2.2.1.2.2.1.1. Exhibiting the Entities 出體)

First is [the aspect of] exhibiting the entities. The reason has two kinds: The first are generative [causes] (shengyin 生因, *kārahetu); the second are apprehensive [causes]. [The generative causes] are similar to seeds, which can generate sprouts; they
are capable of producing some use (yong 用) additionally, so they are named “generative cause,” therefore, the Nyāyamukha states, “[apprehensive causes] are not analogous to generative causes, which [makes the meaning of what is stated apprehended] through the capability of producing some use.”426 [The apprehensive causes] are similar to lamps which can illuminate objects; they are capable of manifesting effects, so they are named “apprehensive cause.”

(121)生因有三：一，言生因；二，智生因；三，義生因。言生因者，謂立論者立因等言，能生敵論決定解故，名曰“生因”。故此前云，“此中宗等多言名為‘能立’，由此多言，開示諸有問者未了義故。”智生因者，謂立論者發言之智。正生他解實在多言，智能起言，言生因因，故名“生因”。義生因者，義有二種：一，道理名“義”；二，境界名“義”。道理義者，謂立論者言所詮義，生因詮故名為“生因”。境界義者，為境能生敵、證者智，亦名“生因”。根本立義擬生他解，他智解起本籍言生，故言為正生，智、義兼生攝, 故論上下所說多言開悟他時名“能立”等。(101c03–c14)

Generative causes include three [kinds]: The first is the statement as generative cause; the second is the cognition as generative cause; and the third is the meaning as generative cause. The statement as generative cause refers to the proponent’s statements of setting forth the reason, and so on, (i.e., the two examples), and since it can generate the opponent’s ascertained understanding, it is named “generative cause.” Thus, it is said above that “herein, the multiple statements of the thesis and others are named ‘proof’, because by the statements [of the thesis, reason, and example] the meaning unknown to the questioners is unfolded and shown.” The cognition as generative cause refers to the proponent’s cognition for setting forth the statements. What generate exactly the others’ understandings are actually the multiple statements, but the cognition can set forth the statements, [this cognition] is the cause of the statement as generative cause, so it is named “generative cause.” Regarding the meaning as

426 YZML, T1628 p.1b13–b14. Tucci (1930, p.13): Therefore there is no analogy with the efficient cause (kārakahetu), as this brings out its effect through its mere capacity of producing it, [and it remains therefore quite independent of our knowledge of its being a cause].
The meaning (yi 義) has two kinds: first, principle (daoli 道理) can be called “meaning”; second, object (jingjie 境界) can be called “meaning.” Regarding the principle as meaning, it refers to the meaning expressed by the proponent’s statements; it is expressed by the generative cause, so it is named “generative cause.” Regarding the object as meaning, being an object, it can generate the cognition of the opponent and the witness, so it is also named “generative cause.” The fundamental goal of setting forth a thesis is to generate others’ understanding, and the generating of understanding in others’ cognition relies exactly on the statement, so the statement is the main generative [cause], while the cognition and meaning are included as generative [causes] subordinately. Thus, this treatise says above and below that the multiple statements on the occasion of making others understand are named “proof,” and so on.

The cognition as apprehensive cause refers to the witness and opponent’s cognition for understanding the statements of the proof and apprehending the thesis; it can comprehend what has been said (i.e., the statement as generative cause), so it is named “apprehensive cause,” thus, the Nyāyamukha states, “it makes apprehended the

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427 For the text 義有二種 to 境界名“義,” Tang’s (2015, p.264) translation reads: "’yi 義’ (artha) are of two kinds. First, the principle (yukti) can be called ‘yi,’ and second, the object (viṣaya) called ‘yi.’"

428 解 YRZLSt, 能解 YRZLSj. The quotes in IRMS and IDS read just “jie 解” in T2270 p.211c28 and T2271 p.478e09.
meaning of what is stated just through the power of cognition.” The statement as apprehensive cause refers to the proponent’s statements which can prove; because of these statements the two persons, namely the opponent and the witness, apprehend and understand what is to be proved, [this statement as apprehensive cause] is the cause of [the cognition as] apprehensive cause, so it is named “apprehensive cause.” The thesis is not only comprehended through the cognition as apprehensive [cause] but also manifested through the statement [as apprehensive cause], so it is named “apprehensive cause,” thus the Nyāyamukha states, “[at this point someone may object]: ‘If it is so, then [you assume implicitly] that the cognition is chosen as the apprehensive cause, and therefore the statements would lose the character of being what can prove’. However, this objection is out of place, [because the reason] is meant to remind that (the opponent) of what is well-established originally.” The reason and example have been accepted, so they are called “well-established originally.” The statements which can prove establish the meaning of what is to be proved; they are meant to remind the opponent’s cognition of the reason and example that are originally established, so they are named “apprehensive cause.” The meaning as apprehensive cause refers to the meaning expressed by the proponent’s statements of the proof. As object it can generate the cognition of others; it is the cause of [the cognition as] apprehensive cause, so it is named “apprehensive cause.” Alternatively, because the meaning of the proof can establish one’s own thesis to be proved, it can manifest the thesis, so it is also named “apprehensive cause.” Thus, the Nyāyamukha states, “just like the relationship of the two causes above with the thesis to be proved.”

429 YZML, T1628 p.1b13. Tucci (1930, p.13): [In fact] it is only through the faculty of understanding the meaning of [a proposition], as it is expressed (in words).
430 YZML, T1628 p.1b14–b16. Tucci (1930, p.13): [At this point somebody may object]: “If it be so, then [you assume implicitly] that the understanding only is the cause of the notion, and therefore the syllogism would lose its character of being a proof.” But this objection is out of place, [because the reason, as it is formulated] is meant to remind that the opponent [of a relation] which is already sure and proved to him also.
431 This sentence is actually from the section of prāptyaprāptisama (zhìbūzhī xiàngsī 至不至相似) and ahetusama (wùyīn xiàngsī 無因相似) in YZML, but Kuiji quotes it to illustrate the relationship among the three apprehensive causes. This explanation is supported by some other Chinese and Japanese commentators, for example, in YRZLSQ and IRMS, both Zhizhou and Wengui interpret the two causes/reasons above as the statement cause and the meaning cause. However, this interpretation as well as the punctuation is quite far from that of Tucci, Katsura, etc. See Tucci (1930, p.65), Katsura (1987, p.49). According to the context, it may be more rational to consider the two causes/reasons here as the two kinds of reasons in prāptyaprāptisama and ahetusama. This textual evidence offered by Kuiji is quite questionable.
already understood the thesis for a long time, and the establishment of the thesis through the proof is meant to generate others’ understanding, so the understanding in others’ cognition is the apprehensive cause mainly, while the statement and meaning are also included in apprehensive causes subordinately.

(123) 分別生、了雖成六因，正意唯取言生、智了。由言生故敵、證解生，由智了故隱義今顯，故正取二為因相體，兼餘無失。(101c28–102a02)

Although generative [causes] and apprehensive [causes] are divided into six causes, according to the true principle, only the statement as generative [cause] and the cognition as apprehensive [cause] should be chosen. Through the statement as generative [cause] the opponent and the witness’ understandings are generated, and through the cognition as apprehensive [cause] the concealed thesis is manifested now, so these two are mainly chosen as the entities of the reason’s characteristics, while it is also not mistaken to include the others subordinately.432

(1.2.2.1.2.1.2. Explaining the Name 釋名)

(124) 次釋名者。“因”者“所由”，釋所立宗義之所由也；或“所以”義，由此所以所立義成；又“建立”義，能建立彼所立宗故；或“順益”義，由立此因順益宗義，令宗義立，是故名“因”。故《瑜伽》云：“辯因者，謂為成就所立宗義，依所引喻、同類、異類、現量、比量及正教量，建立順益道理言論。” (102a02–a08)

Second is [the aspect of] explaining the name. “Reason” means “what is to be grounded in (suoyou 所由),” for it is meant to explain what the thesis to be proved is grounded in; or “what is to be based on (suoyi 所以),” for by basing on this, the thesis to be proved

432 For this paragraph, Tang’s (2015, p.283) translation reads:

Although [we have] divided the generative and apprehensive [causes] into six causes, the main intention is to choose only the speech as generative [cause] and the intelligence as apprehensive [cause]. On account of the speech as generative [cause], the understanding of the opponent and the witness arises. On account of the intelligence as apprehensive [cause], the implied meaning is now manifested. Therefore, [we] mainly choose these two as the ground (ti 體) for the definition of reason, while there is no fault in referring to the other [four kinds of cause] in passing.
can be established; or “setting up (jianli 建立),” for it can set up the thesis to be proved; or “supporting (shunyi 順益),” because the reason set forth here supports the thesis, and then it can make the thesis proved, it is named “reason.” Thus, the Yogācārabhūmi says that “clarifying the reason means with the purpose of establishing the thesis to be proved, based on the example quoted, the similar type, the dissimilar type, perception, inference, and the testimony of genuine teachings, setting up the supporting declaration of principle.”

(125)問：喻既建成宗，亦能順益，何不名“因”？
答：喻謂譬、況，正云“見邊”。令所立義見其邊際，究竟圓滿故名“見邊”。雖亦順益，非是正釋宗之所以，親初建立得此“因”名，喻疎後成不得“因”稱。是故此因不名“見邊”，說所因時義未成故。至後當知。（102a08–a13）

Question: Since the example can establish the thesis and also support [the thesis], why is it not named “reason”?
Answer: Example means analogy (pi 譬) or comparison (kuang 情); formally it is called “side of perceived.” It makes the thesis to be proved get to the side of perceived and become absolute and perfect, so it is named “side of perceived.” Although it also supports [the thesis], it does not explain what is based upon by the thesis directly, so what sets up [the thesis] closely and first gets the name “reason,” while the example establishes [the thesis] distantly and later, does not get the name “reason.” Thus, the reason is not named “side of perceived,” because when this reason is expressed, the thesis has not been established yet. [This point] will be known later.

(1.2.2.1.2.2.1.3. Discerning the Differences 辯差別)

(126)三辯差別者 434。雖依“建立”、“順益”等義總得“因”名，有果不同，疎成生、了；各類有別，分言、義、智；體異便成立、敵二智、義之與言：生、了各殊，

433 YBha, T1579 p.359c–c27. = YBHV 3.22: hetu katamo. yas tasyaiva pratijñātasyārthasya siddhaya udāharanāśritah sārūpyavairūpyato vā pratyakṣato vāmūmūnato vāpāgamato vā hito yuktivādah
434 辯差別者 YRZLSi, 三辯差別者 YRZLSj. “San 三” is the ordinal number “third.” “Bian 辨” and “bian 辨” can
別開六種。由此應言得果分兩，約體成四，據類有三，望義為六。智了因唯是生因果，而非生因因。智生因唯是生因因，而非了因果。言、義二生因為智生因果，為智了因因。言、義二了因為智了因因，非為智了果。得為智生果，不作智生因。以言望於義，亦成顯了因；以義望於言，亦成顯了果。以義望於言，亦作能生因；以言望於義，亦為所生果。由此應說：唯因不是果，謂智生因；為果亦成因，餘五果。又為四句：有唯生因而非了因，謂智生因；有是了因而非生因，謂智了因；有是生因亦是了因，謂言、義；有非生因亦非了因，謂所立宗。(102a13–a28)

Third is [the aspect of] discerning the differences. Although because of the meanings of “setting up,” “supporting,” and so forth, [the six causes] get the name “reason” generally. (1) There are different effects, so [whether their effects are] distant [or not] separates them into generative and apprehensive [causes];^{435} (2) there are various types, so they are divided into statements, meanings and cognitions; (3) since there are different entities, they belong to the proponent’s cognition, the opponent’s cognition, the meaning and the statement: [thus,] generative and apprehensive [causes] are different, and [the causes] are classified into six kinds separately. Therefore, it should be said that there are two [kinds of causes] according to the effects, four [kinds] according to the entities, three [kinds] according to the types and six [kinds] according to the connotations. The cognition as apprehensive cause is merely the effect of generative causes but not the cause of generative causes. The cognition as generative cause is merely the cause of generative causes but not the effect of apprehensive causes. The statement as generative cause and the meaning as generative cause are effects of the cognition as generative cause but causes of the cognition as apprehensive cause. The statement as apprehensive cause and the meaning as apprehensive cause are causes of the cognition as apprehensive cause but not its effects. Whatever are effects of the cognition as generative [cause] cannot be causes of the cognition as generative [cause]. The statements [as causes] are causes for the apprehending of the meanings [as causes],

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435 The generative causes can generate their effect directly, so their effects are close; the apprehensive causes can only illuminate the effects but not generate them, so such effects are distant.
while the meanings [as causes] are effects of the apprehending by the statements [as causes]. The meanings [as causes] are causes for the generating of the statements [as causes], while the statements [as causes] are effects of the generating by the meanings [as causes]. Thus, it should be said that the cognition as generative cause is merely a cause but not an effect, while the other five are not only effects but also causes. Moreover, there are also four cases: some are only generative causes but not apprehensive causes, namely the cognition as generative cause; some are apprehensive causes but not generative causes, namely the cognition as apprehensive cause; some are both generative causes and apprehensive causes, namely the statements and the meanings; and some are neither a generative cause nor an apprehensive cause, namely the thesis to be proved.

(1.2.2.1.2.2.1.4. Clarifying the Abolishing and the Setting Up 明廢立)

(127)四明廢立者437。

一，問：何故一因，喻分二種？
答：因正建宗，總苞稱一；喻有違順，別離分兩。至下喻中當廣分別。

二，問：何故一因體分生、了？
答：智境疎寬，照顯名“了”；言果親狹，令起名“生”。果既有差，因分生、了。
同能得果，但總名“因”。

三，問：何故二因各分三種？
答：生果、照果義、用不同，隨類有能，故分三種。立智隔於言、義，不得相從名“了”；畧智不生立解，無由可得名“生”。故但分三不增不減。

四，問：何故六因體唯有四？
答：順果義別，分成六因。立者義、言，望果二用。除此無體，故唯有四。

436 For the text from 以言望於義 to 亦為所生果, Tang’s (2015, p.280) translation reads:

[On one hand,] the expression, in relation to its meaning, could be the cause for making [its meaning] manifested and apprehended. The meaning, in relation to its expression, could be the effect thus manifested and apprehended. [On the other hand,] the meaning, in relation to its expression, could be the cause for generating [its expression]. The expression, in relation to its meaning, could be the effect thus generated.

437 明廢立者 YRZLS, 明廢立者 YRZLS. “四” is the ordinal number “four.”
Fourth is [the aspect of] clarifying the abolishing and setting up.

The first question: Why is there one reason but two kinds of example?
Answer: The reason establishes the thesis directly, so it is treated as a whole one; the examples include negative and positive ones, so they are divided into two. [This point] will be expounded further in [the commentary on] the example below.

The second question: Why is the entity of this single reason divided into generative and apprehensive ones?
Answer: The object of the cognition is distant and broad, so the manifesting [of this object] is named “apprehending”; the effect of the statement is close and narrow, so the raising [of this effect] is named “generating.” Since effects are different, their causes are also divided into generative and apprehensive ones. However, they can all get effects, so [generative and apprehensive causes] are named “reason” generally.

The third question: Why is each of these two causes divided into three kinds?
Answer: The connotations and functions of generated and apprehended effects are different, and [the six causes] have different capabilities according to their types [as statements, meanings, and cognitions], so [each of these two causes] is divided into three kinds. The proponent’s cognition is separated [from the opponent’s cognition] by statements and meanings, so it cannot follow [the opponent’s cognition] and be named “apprehensive”; the opponent’s cognition cannot generate the understanding of the proponent, so it has no reason to get the name “generative.” Hence, [each of these two causes] is just divided into three kinds but neither more nor less.

The fourth question: Why do the six causes only have four entities?
Answer: Based on the different connotations of the effects, the causes are divided into six. Each of the proponent’s meaning and statement has two functions to the effects. 438

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438 This means that the proponent’s statement and meaning can be both generative causes and apprehensive causes, so the statement as generative cause and that as apprehensive cause actually have the same entity. The meaning as generative cause and that as apprehensive cause can be understood in the same way.
Apart from these, there is no other entity, so there are only four [entities] (i.e., the proponent’s cognition, the opponent’s cognition, the meaning and the statement).
The fifth question: Why is only the reason separated into three characteristics but not the thesis and the example?
Answer: Separately [the three characteristics] are named with the thesis[-subject] and the examples, but generally [the whole member] is named “reason,” because [the three characteristics are] properties of the thesis[-subject] and the two examples. Moreover, the reason must be broad, while the thesis and example are narrow, so [the reason] strings these two parts like a thread through flowers. Thus, the reason is separated, but the thesis and examples are not.

(128)示因相中有五: 一, 標舉; 二, 徵數; 三, 列名; 四, 別釋; 五, 示法。此即初也。(102b13–b15)
Showing the characteristics of the reason includes five parts: The first indicates [the topic]; the second counts the number; the third lists the names; the fourth explains respectively; and the fifth cites instances. This is the first part.

(129)其言生因及敵證智、所詮之義各有三相。“相”者, “向”也。正取言生, 正能生故, 此生智了, 照解宗故。故正因體, 言生、智了, 兼亦義生, 能建宗故。宗、同異喻各有一體, 因相貫三更無別體, 由此故說“相”者“向”義。故《理門》云不共不定, “一向離故”, 閣一相也。(102b15–b20)
Each of the statement as generative cause, the cognition of the opponent and the witness, and the expressed meaning has three characteristics. “Characteristic” means “direction (xiang 向).” The statement as generative [cause] is mainly referred to, because it is exactly the one capable of generating [the opponent and witness’ cognition], and

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439 The examples here refer to the similar group and the dissimilar group.
440 Ditto.
441 立 YRZLSt, 生 YRZLSj. “li 立” means “prove” or “establish,” while “sheng 生” means “generate” or “produce,” since this section is discussing the generative cause, it should be “生.”
442 A direct reason why Kuiji uses “direction” to explain “characteristic” is that the Chinese character for “direction” is “xiang 向,” while that for “characteristic” here is “xiang 相,” and these two have the same pronunciation.
because it generates the cognition as apprehensive [cause] that can comprehend the thesis. Thus, the main entities of the reason are the statement as generative [cause] and the cognition as apprehensive [cause]; the meaning as generative [cause] can also be included subordinately, for it can establish the thesis. Each of the thesis[-subject], the example by similarity, and the example by dissimilarity\(^{443}\) has one entity, the reason’s characteristics string these three without any other particular entity, so it is said that “‘characteristic’ means ‘direction.’” Thus, the \(Nyāyamukha\) states that the fallacy that the inconclusive reason uncommon to both “is deprived of one of the directions,”\(^{444}\) because it lacks one characteristic (i.e., the characteristic of being certainly present in the similar group).

\(^{(130)}\)又此“相”者，“面”也，“邊”也，三面、三邊。
若爾既一因，如何說“多言名為能立”?
其相義多，能詮言一，於三相中致一因言，故一因所依貫三別處，故多相之言名為“多言”，非言多故名為“多言”。古師解云，“相”者“體”也，初相同此，餘二各以有法為性。陳那不許，同、異有法非能立故，但取彼義，故“相”非“體”。
(102b20–b27)
Moreover, this “characteristic” also means “aspect” or “side,” [so the three characteristics refer to] three aspects or three sides.

[Question:] If so, since there is only one reason, why is “multiple statements are named ‘proof’” said?

[Answer:] There are many characteristics but only one statement that can express; one reason-statement is set for three characteristics, so what is relied upon by this one reason strings three individual parts, thus the statement with multiple characteristics but not multiple statements is named “multiple statements.”\(^{445}\) Some ancient master explains

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\(^{443}\) The example by similarity and the example by dissimilarity here refer to the similar and dissimilar instances but not the statements.

\(^{444}\) YZML, T1628 p.2b17. According to Katsuara (1979a, p.74), “yixiang 一向” in YZML corresponds to ekānta. Tucci (1930, p.33): thus it is deprived of one of the [necessary] aspects of the reason, [that is, it does not reside in any positive instance.]
The one direction here refers to the characteristic of being certainly present in the similar group.

\(^{445}\) This interpretation is certainly contradictory to the explanation of “multiple statements” above. However, this may be considered as an extension of Kuji’s Chinese philological explanation of the three characteristics.
that “characteristic” means “entity,” the first characteristic is the same as [that in] this [treatise], but the other two take the property-possession (namely the similar and dissimilar instances here) as natures (xing 性). Dignāga does not agree, because [to him] the similar and dissimilar property-possession do not belong to proof, and only their properties should be chosen [as proof], so “characteristic” is not “entity.”

(1.2.2.1.2.2.2. Counting the Number 微數)

(YRZL: Then what are the three [characteristics]?

446 This means that the similar and dissimilar instances themselves do not have the function of proving, but their properties which can show the inseparable connection have it.

447 It is not clear who the ancient master here refers to, and from which work Kuiji cites this explanation. However, a similar paragraph can be found in Wengui’s YRZLSW, X848 p.684c03–c12, which is written earlier than Kuiji’s commentary:

陳那以前諸師亦有立三相者，然釋言“相”者“體”也，三體不同，故言“三相”。初相不異陳那，後之二相俱以有法為體，謂瓶等上所作，無常等實為體故，即以瓶等為第二相；虛空等上常、非所作俱以空等為體，故即以空等為第三相。故世親所造《如實論》云，有因三，謂“是根本法，同類所攝，異類相離”。此論梁時真諦所譯，比尋此論，似同陳那立三相義，同《論式》論。而言陳那以前諸師者，即是世親未學時所制《論軌》論義。

Some of the masters before Dignāga also advocate three characteristics, but explain that “characteristic” means “entity,” and since there are three different entities, “three characteristics” is said. The first characteristic is not different from that of Dignāga, but the other two both take the property-possession as the entities, which means since [the properties like] being produced and being impermanent of the pot, and so forth, all take the pot, and so forth, as their entities, the pot, and so forth, are taken as the second characteristic; since [the properties like] being permanent and being not produced of ether and so forth all take ether, and so forth, as their entities, ether, and so forth, are taken as the third characteristic. Thus, the *Tarkaśāstra by Vasubandhu says there are three [characteristics] of the reason, i.e., “being a property of the subject, being included in the similar kind, being excluded from the dissimilar kind.” This treatise is translated by Paramārtha in the Liang dynasty (502–557), but when [I] examined this treatise, [I found the theory there] seems the same with the three characteristics of Dignāga, and also the same with that in the Vādavidhāna. Therefore, the masters before Dignāga here refer to the Vādavidhā when Vasubandhu was not well-learned yet.

According to Wengui’s paragraph above, he considers the expression of trairūpya in the *Tarkaśāstra similar to that in Dignāga’s work and that in the Vādavidhāna, and the masters before Dignāga refer to Vasubandhu’s Vādavidhī when he was not well-learned yet. In addition, Kiben mentions in IDYJ in T2272 p.128c14–c15 that one version records this “ancient master” as Wengui, but he does not agree with it. In T2270 p.260a24–a28 of IRMS, Zenju cites the early expression of trairūpya in the *Tarkaśāstra as evidence of this ancient master’s explanation, but Kiben thinks it does not fit either.

Concerning “characteristic” means ‘entity,’” this statement can also be found several times in Kuiji’s works, and he says clearly once in YLL, T1829p.211b24–b25, this is from his teacher Xuanzang:

Master, i.e., Xuanzang, says, “characteristic means ‘entity.’”

However, in that text, Kuiji is trying to explain “shexiang 疑相,” i.e., upekṣānimitta, which has nothing to do with trairūpya. However, it is still possible that Kuiji did know some kind of trairūpya theory which considers the similar and dissimilar instances themselves, but not the concomitances shown by them, as the last two characteristics. According to Kuiji’s interpretation below, as a feature of the theory, the examples in Dignāga’s Hetuvidyā include the substrata of the examples (yūti 喪他) and the essences of the examples (yūti 喪他), i.e., the instances and the statements, then the instances are just supplements to the essences which can represent the positive and negative concomitances. In addition, Kuiji treats the last two characteristics of the reason equivalent to the two examples. Thus, it is possible for him to emphasize the different understandings of the last two characteristics between ancient masters and Dignāga in this way.

241
NP 2.2: *kim punas trairūpyam* (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.2, 6).

(131)述曰：二徵數也。(102b28)

YRZLS: Second, counting the number.

(1.2.2.1.2.2.3. Listing the Names 列名)

(1.2.2.1.2.2.3.1. Listing the First Characteristic 列初相)

(132)述曰：三列名也。“遍是宗法性”，此列初相。顯因之體以成宗故，必須遍是
宗之法性。據所立宗，要是極成法及有法不相離性。(102c01–c03)

YRZLS: Third, listing the names. “The nature of being universally a property of the
thesis[-subject]” presents the first characteristic. Since the essence of the reason is
shown to establish the thesis, it must have the nature of being a property of the thesis[-
subject] universally. Based on the thesis to be proved, [the purpose of the reason] is to
make the inseparable connection between the [reason-]property and the property-
possessor (i.e., the thesis-subject) well-established.

(133)此中“宗”言，唯詮有法，有法之上所有別義名之為“法”。此“法”有二：一者
不共有，宗中法是；二者共有，即因體是。《理門論》云：“此中宗法唯取立論
及敵論者決定同許。”“何以故？448此唯依證了因故。”彼自難云：“既爾便失前說為能成立性。”論主解云，由有生言“令彼憶念本極成故”，意以因體許之法，成宗之中不共許法。故此二法，皆是有法之上別義，故今唯有法名“宗”。

對敵所申因、喻成立，雖取二依不相離性以為宗體，有法既為二法總主，總宗一分，故亦名“宗”。《理門論》云：“豈不總以樂所成立合說為宗，云何此中乃言“宗”者唯取有法？’此無有失，以其總聲於別亦轉，如言‘燒衣’。或有‘宗'聲唯詮於法。”若以宗中後陳名“法”，即宗是法，持業為名；總宗之法，亦依主釋。具二得名。今因名“法”，宗之法性，唯依主釋。(102c03–c19)

The word “thesis” here only refers to the property-possessor, while all the distinctive features of the property-possessor are named “property.” This “property” has two kinds: the first is not shared [by both the proponent and the opponent], namely the property in the thesis; the second is shared, namely the essence of the reason. The Nyāyamukha states, “the property of the thesis[-subject] (i.e., the reason) here only takes what are decisively and equally accepted by the proponent and the opponent.”

“For what reason? For the reason that now only the apprehensive cause (zhengliaoyin 證了因, “jñāpakahetu”) is depended upon.”450 That treatise retorts by itself, “if so, the character of being what can prove of the [reason-]statement, which has been mentioned above, will be lost.”451 The author of this treatise explains that since there is the statement as generative [cause], “[the reason] is meant to remind that (the opponent) of what is well-established originally.” This means that the essence of the reason, which

448 / YRZLS, 何以故 YRZLSj. “he yi gu 何以故” means “for what reason,” “why.” These characters are present in YZML.
449 See fn.378 and fn.379.
Concerning the word “zheng liaoyin 證了因,” “zheng 證” can mean the same with “liaoyin 了,” and in a very near sentence in YZML, the generative cause “shengyin 生因” is mentioned, so this word may just refer to the apprehensive cause which is usually written as “liaoyin 了因” in this commentary. However, “zheng 證” can also be a nominalization of a verb, in that way, it can mean “realization,” “apprehension,” then “zhengliaoyin 譼了因” means the realization of the apprehensive cause. In addition, some commentators, for instance, Myōsen in T2273 p.155a09, also interprets as “zhengliaoyin 譼了因” as “zhi liaoyin 智了因,” i.e., the cognition as apprehensive cause.
451 “旣爾便失前說為能成立性” is a shortened quote of:
YZML, T1628 p.1b14–b15: 若爾既取智為因，是言便失能成立義。
If it is so, then [you assume implicitly] that the cognition is taken as the apprehensive cause, and therefore the statements would lose the meaning of being what can prove.
Tucci (1930, p.13): [At this point somebody may object]: “If it be so, then [you assume implicitly] that the understanding only is the cause of the notion, and therefore the syllogism would lose its character of being a proof.”

243
is an equally accepted property to both sides, can be used to establish the unequally accepted property in the thesis. Thus, these two properties (the property in the reason and that in the thesis) are both distinctive features of the property-possessor, so now only the property-possessor is called “thesis” [in the first characteristic of the reason]. Although [the thesis], established by the reason and example that are advocated against the opponent, takes the inseparable connection between the two substrata [of the thesis] as the essence of the thesis, the property-possessor is the bearer of both the two properties [in the thesis and the reason], as a certain part of the whole thesis, so it can also be named “thesis.” The Nyāyamukha states, “[now someone may retort:] ‘have you not generally defined what is desired to be proved collectively as the thesis? Why is it said in this [verse] that the “thesis” only refers to the property-possessor?’ [Then my answer is:] there is no fault because the collective term can be used as well to a single part, just like when ‘burned cloth’ is said, [while in fact only a part of it is burned]. Furthermore, there are cases in which the word ‘thesis’ expresses only the property.”

If the latterly-stated of the thesis is named “property,” then [its name “thesis-property (zongfa 宗法)” here] means that the thesis is just this property, so the name [“thesis-property”] is a karmadhāraya compound (chiye [shi] 持業[釋]); if [the latterly-stated is considered as] the property of the whole thesis, [its name “thesis-property”] can also be a tatpuruṣa compound (yizhu shi 依主釋). Based on these two [interpretations] [the latterly-stated of the thesis] gets the name [“property”]. Now the reason is named “property” because of being a property of the thesis[-subject], so [the name “thesis-property” of the reason, which means the reason is a property of the thesis-subject,] is just a tatpuruṣa compound.

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452 YZML, T1628 p.1b08–b10. Tucci (1930, pp.12–13): Now someone may object: “You have already, with a synthetic expression, defined the paksā as “that which somebody wants to prove.” How is it, that in this [kārikā], you give to the same word: “paksā” the (different) meaning of subject of the proposition only?” [I reply that I do not commit the mistakes], because a collective term can be used as well to express a single part; e.g., when we say “the cloth is burning” [while in fact only a part of it is really burning]. [I may say also that] there are cases in which the word “paksā” is used to express only the predicate.
“Nature” means “entity.” However, this [“nature” in the first characteristic] is only a property as nature (yixing 義性) but not an entity as nature (tixing 體性), because [the characteristics of the reason] are related to property [but not to entity]. The other two [“natures” in the second and third characteristics] are also the same. This equally accepted reason can only be universally [a property] of the property-possessor in the thesis, because it is set up as a property that belongs to the thesis-[subject], namely a property of the thesis-[subject]. [The reason] cannot be universally a property of the property in the thesis, because [in that case] the reason commits the fallacy that the reason is unestablished to both the proponent and the opponent, and the property-possessor in the thesis is not meant to be established.

(133)“性”者“體”也。此唯義性，非是體性，義相應故。餘二亦然。此共許因唯得遍是有法宗，以宗之法成，即宗法故。不遍是法宗之性，因犯兩俱不成過故，又不欲成宗有法故。(102b19–c23)

然因明理，有法不成於有法，此亦不成於法，因犯所依不成過故。《理門》難云：“若以有法立餘有法或立其法，如以煙立火，或以火立觸，其義云何？”此義難云，如遠見煙，立“下有火，以有烟故”，豈非彼以有法成有法？煙之與火俱有法故。又如見火云“定有熱，以有火故”，熱觸既是火家之法，豈不以有法成於法耶？陳那釋云：“今於此中非以成立火、觸為宗，但為成立此相應物。”謂成“山處決定有火，以有烟故”，“爐中定熱，以有火故”，名為煙、火相應之物。非以有法煙還成有法火，亦不以有法火而成熱觸法。(102c23–103a05)

However, according to the principle of the science of reasons, a property-possessor [as the reason] cannot establish either another property-possessor or the property, because [in that case] the reason commits the fallacy that the substratum of the reason is unestablished. The Nyāyamukha retorts, “how about using a property-possessor to prove another property-possessor or the property [possessed by this property-possessor itself], for instance, using a smoke to prove a fire or using a fire to prove the quality of being warm to touch?”453 This retort means, just like “there is a fire, because there is a

453 YZML, T1628 p.1c04–c05. Tucci (1930, p.17): [Somebody may ask] ‘is it not possible to prove a subject,
smoke” set forth when a smoke is seen far away, is it not using a property-possession to establish another property-possession? Because the smoke and the fire are both property-posseors. In addition, like “there must be the quality of being warm to touch, because there is a fire” said when a fire is seen, since the quality of being warm to touch is a property of the fire, is it not using a property-possession to establish the property? Dignāga explains, “now the thesis here is meant to prove neither the fire nor the quality of being warm to touch but the particular object associated with them.” This means, like establishing “on the mountain there must be a fire, because there is a smoke,” or “in the stove there must be the quality of being warm to touch, because there is a fire,” [the mountain or the stove in such cases] is named the particular object associated with the smoke or the fire. It is not rational to use the property-possession smoke to establish the property-possession fire or use the property-possession fire to establish the property of the quality of being warm to touch.

Furthermore, that treatise says additionally, “were this not the case and were [we] to prove fire on the basis of smoke, or the quality of being warm to touch on the basis of fire, then [we] should commit [the fallacy of] using a term of the thesis as reason.”

For the reason that [the case of proving fire on the basis of smoke, or the quality of being warm to touch on the basis of fire] takes a term in the thesis, namely the property-possession, as the reason, [this case] is not valid. Thus, [in this case,] the reason would

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_dharmin, by another dharmin, or to prove the predicate (through the subject to which it belongs)? E.g. can we not prove fire through smoke (dharmin proved by dharmin) or the quality of being warm to touch through fire (dharma proved by dharmin)?_

454 YZML, T1628 p.1c05–c07. Tucci (1930, p.17): [This question is meaningless], because we do not establish such a proposition in order to prove either fire or its being hot to touch, but only in order to prove that a particular object is connected with them.

455 YZML, T1628 p.1c07–c08. Tucci (1930, p.17): Were this not the case and were we to prove fire on the basis of smoke, or the sensation of heat on the basis of fire, then we should commit the fallacy of using as reason a term of the proposition.
commit [the fallacy that] the substratum of the reason is unestablished, because there is nothing to rely on; so the reason-property cannot be used to prove the property-possession either. The latterly-stated in the thesis can qualify the formerly-stated, it is named “qualifier” and also named “property.” The reason establishes this [qualifier], and the reason is not meant to establish the formerly-stated, because [the formerly-stated] belongs to the qualified, and because [the formerly-stated] does not qualify the latter [stated].

(137) 《理門》又云：“又於此中觀所成故立法、有法，非德、有德，故無有過。”前陳名“有法”，後陳皆名“法”，非法、有法法性決定，如勝論師德與有德，有德謂實，彼決定故。《理門》頌云：

“有法非成於有法，
及法此非成有法，
但由法故成其法，
如是成立於有法。”

謂有法、因法二俱極成，宗中之法敵先不許，但得共許因在宗中有法之上，成不共許宗中之法，如是資益有法義成。何456得因在不共許中？許在彼中何所成立？(103a11–a19)

Furthermore, the Nyāyamukha states, “moreover here with respect to what is to be proved, the property and the property-possession can be set forth; this is not [the situation with respect to] quality and quality-possession, so there is no fault [in my principle that a property proves another property].”457 Whatever is stated formerly should be named “property-possession,” while whatever is stated latterly should be named “property,” but [the identity as property-possession or property] is not fixed by the nature [of the connotations] of the property-possession and property like [the situation of] quality and

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456 可 YRZLS, 何 YRZLSj. “Ke 可” is an auxiliary meaning “can,” “may,” while “he 何” can be used to lead a question or especially a rhetorical question, based on the context, “he 何” is chosen to make this sentence a rhetorical question.
457 See fn.355.
quality-possessor advocated by Vaiśeṣika that quality-possessor refers to substance, because [the identities of] them are fixed. The [related] verse in the Nyāyamukha states,

“a property-possessor does not prove another property-possessor
or a property, the property does not prove the property-possessor either,
but only by means of the property [in the reason] [we can] prove the property [in the thesis] of that [property-possessor of both properties],
and, as such, it also proves the property-possessor.”

This means that both the property-possessor and the reason-property are well-established, but the property in the thesis is not accepted by the opponent [as possessed by the property-possessor] previously, so if the equally accepted reason-property is possessed by the property-possessor in the thesis, the unequally accepted property in the thesis will also be proved [to be possessed by the property-possessor], then it can help to prove the property-possessor. How can the reason be possessed by an unequally accepted [property-possessor, which still needs to be proved]? What can it prove if it is considered to be possessed by such [an unequally accepted property-possessor]?

(138) 又若共許之因依不共許法，凡所立因皆有他隨一所依不成過。不說有法而為所依，但以其法而為所依，法非共許，縱唯立許，豈定無此過? 又如立宗“聲是無常，所作性故”，“無常”滅義，“所作”生義。聲有滅者以有生故，一切生者皆有滅故。聲既因生，明有果滅。若因“所作”不通“聲”宗，豈得遍在“無常”上有? 一切正因中應皆有兩俱不成，無常之上本無生故。由此故知，因但是宗有法之法，非法法也。(103a20–a28)

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458 YZML, T1628 p.1c11–c12.

Tucci (1930, p.19): A subject cannot prove either another subject or a predicate (viz., a) smoke cannot prove fire; b) fire cannot prove the quality of being hot); nor does the predicate prove the subject, [as in the example of the primeval matter, referred to above]. But only the predicate [as resident in M and in S] proves that predicate [to be proved, as it is expressed in the proposition] and, as such, it proves also the subject [because of the connection between S and P expressed by the pakṣa].
Moreover, if the equally accepted reason relies on the unequally accepted property (but not the equally accepted property-possessor), all the reasons set forth [in this way] will commit the fallacy that the substratum of the reason is unestablished to the opponent. If the property-possessor is not regarded as the substratum [of the reason], while the property [in the thesis] is regarded as the substratum [of the reason], then the property [in the thesis] is not equally accepted, even though the proponent accepts it, is there definitely no such fallacy (āśrayāsiddha)? In addition, like setting forth the thesis that “sound is impermanent, because of being produced,” “impermanent” means ceasing but “being produced” means arising. Sound possesses ceasing because it possesses arising, for whatever has arisen possesses ceasing. Since sound arises because of causes, there will definitely be the effect of ceasing. If the reason[−property] “being produced” does not reside universally in the thesis[−subject] “sound,” how can it reside universally in “impermanent”? [If the reason−property “being produced” is allowed to reside in the thesis−property “impermanent,” then] there should be [the fallacy that] the reason is unestablished to both the proponent and the opponent in all the correct reasons, because there is no arising possessed by [the quality of] impermanent originally. Therefore, it should be known that the reason is merely a property of the property-possessor in the thesis, but not a property of the property [in the thesis].

Question: Since [the reason] is called “property of the thesis[−subject],” it is already a reason, why must “universally” be said additionally? Since “universally” is already said at first, and the definition of reason is already clear, why must “the nature of being a property of the thesis[−subject]” be said additionally?459

459 “Universally,” i.e., “bian 遍,” lies in the first place in the Chinese expression of the nature of being a property of
Answer: If the reason-[property] is not universal to the property-possessor in the thesis, then [the property-possessor] that this [reason-property] is not universal to cannot be proved by the reason, and there will be something unproved. Therefore, [in order to] show that all the property-possessor is proved by the reason, “universally” is said. If only “universally” is said but not “[being] a property of the thesis[-subject],” then it cannot show that the reason-[property] is a property of the property-possessor in the thesis that can prove the [thesis]-property.

(140)又因於宗過名為“不成”，於二喻中俱有、俱無名為“不定”，於二喻中有無相違名曰“相違”。若唯言“法性”不言“遍”者，因於宗過即是“不成”，或兩俱不遍，或隨一不遍，或猶預不遍，或所依不遍，全分、一分等隨應有之。為簡此失是故言“遍”。若但言“遍”不言“宗法”，不知此因誰家之因，為顯是宗有法之因，成於宗法，故言“法性”。(103b04–b11)

Moreover, the fallacies of the relationship between the reason and the thesis[-subject] are named “unestablished”; [the fallacies that] the reason resides in both two examples or neither are named “inconclusive (bu dìng 不定, anaikāntika)” ; and [the fallacies that] the residence and absence in the two examples are opposite are named “contradictory.” If only “the nature of being a property [of the thesis-subject]” is said but not “universally,” then the relationship between the reason and the thesis[-subject] will commit the fallacies “unestablished,” such as being not universal to both [the proponent and the opponent], or being not universal to either, or being not universal because of doubt, or being not universal because the substratum [of the reason] [is unestablished], then the entire and partial [cases of the four fallacies above] also exist correspondingly. In order to exclude such mistakes, “universally” is said. If only “universally” is said but not “[being] a property of the thesis[-subject],” then it cannot be known by what this reason is possessed, so in order to show that [the reason] is possessed by the property-possessor in the thesis and it proves the property in the thesis, “the nature of being a property [of the thesis-subject]” is said.

de: the thesis-subject, i.e., “bianshizongfa xing 遍是宗法性.”

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Thus, there should be forms for distinguishing [distinct cases of reasons]: (1) some is a property of the thesis[-subject] but not universal; (2) some is a property of the thesis[-subject] and also universal; (3) some is neither a property of the thesis[-subjects] nor universal; (4) however, there must not be any [reason] that is universal but not a property of the thesis[-subject]. As long as [the reason] is universal to the property-possessor, no matter whether it has another particular entity or not, it can always prove the thesis. Since the connotation [of the reason] is related [to the thesis-subject], it must be a property of the thesis[-subject]. For example, if against a Mahāyāna scholar, a Sarvāstivādin sets forth “the life force is a substance, because of having action, like the five faculties, and so on,” how can the reason here be [considered as] incorrect just because the life force has another particular entity than action? Hence, [the reason] [is allowed to] have another particular entity [than the property-possessor]. If [a reason] does not have another particular entity, then since its connotation is related, so it can still definitely be a property of the thesis[-subject]; it can also be regarded as a property [of the property-possessor] in the thesis. It is not certain that the reason with no other particular entity must be [a property of the thesis-subject], and it is not certain that the reason with another particular entity must not be [a property of the thesis-subject] either.

(142)初“有宗法而非遍”者，四不成中皆一分攝。初兩俱一分兩俱不成者，如勝論師對聲生者，立“一切聲皆是無常”宗，“勤勇無間所發性”因。立、敵二宗唯許內聲有勤勇發，外聲非有。立、敵俱說此因於宗半有半無，故此過是兩俱有體一分不成。餘無體兩俱一分一種不成。若有體、若無體，若自、若他，合四種一分隨一不成。兩俱一分、若自、若他，合三種一分猶豫不成。兩俱有體一分，
若他、若自有體一分隨一，合三所依不成。如是更有十一，並前十二一分不成。皆如下釋。（103b19–b29)

The former form, namely “(1) some is a property of the thesis[-subject] but not universal,” is totally included in the partial cases of the four [fallacies of] unestablished [reason]. The first is [the fallacy that] [the reason] is unestablished to both sides partially when both sides [accept the reason has its particular entity]460 (regarding ubhayāsiddha, i.e., liăngju bu cheng 两俱不成), for example, a Vaiśeṣika, against a *Śabdotpattivādin (shengshengzhe 聲生者, the school that claims that sound is generated), sets forth “all sounds are impermanent” as the thesis, and “resulting immediately from effort” as the reason. Both the proponent and the opponent only accept that the internal sound has [the property of] resulting from effort, but the external sound does not. Since both the proponent and the opponent advocate that the reason is half possessed by the thesis[-subject], the fallacy here is the case that to both sides [the reason] is unestablished partially with its particular entity. Besides, [there is also] one type that to both sides [the reason] is unestablished partially without its particular entity. Concerning [the cases that the reason is unestablished] with its particular entity to oneself or others, or without its particular entity to oneself or others, in total there are four types of [the fallacy that] [the reason] is unestablished to either side partially (regarding anyatarāsiddha, i.e., suiyi bu cheng 隨一不成). Concerning [the cases that the reason is unestablished] partially to both sides, to oneself or others, in total there are three types of [the fallacy that] [the reason] is unestablished because of doubt partially (regarding samdīghāsiddha, i.e., youyu bu cheng 猶豫不成). Concerning [the cases that the substratum of the reason is unestablished] with its particular entity to both sides partially, with its particular entity partially to others, or with its particular entity partially to oneself, in total there are three types of [the fallacy that] the substratum [of the reason] is unestablished (regarding āśrayāsiddha, i.e., suoyi bu cheng 所依不成). Thus, [besides the fallacy that to both sides the reason is unestablished partially with its

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460 This case is the same with the fallacy that to both sides the reason is unestablished partially with its own particular entity.
particular entity], there are eleven more [cases], and then including the former one there are twelve [cases] of partially unestablished [reason or substratum of the reason]. All are explained as below (below the first sentence of this paragraph).

The latter form, namely “(3) some is neither a property of the thesis[-subject] nor universal,” is totally included in the entire cases of the four [fallacies of] unestablished [reason]. For example, a Śabdavādin, against a Buddhist, sets forth “sound is permanent, because of being visible.” Since both advocate that this reason is not possessed by sound, this is the case that [the reason] is unestablished to both sides with its particular entity entirely to both sides, besides [there is also] one type that [the reason] is unestablished without its particular entity entirely to both sides. Concerning [the cases that the reason is unestablished] with its particular entity to oneself or others, without its particular entity to oneself or others, [in total there are] four types of [the fallacy that] [the reason] is unestablished to either side entirely. Concerning [the cases that the reason is unestablished] entirely to both sides, to oneself, or to others, [in total there are] three types of [the fallacy that] [the reason] is unestablished because of doubt. Concerning [the cases that the substratum of the reason is unestablished] with or without its particular entity to both sides entirely, with or without its particular entity to oneself or others, or with its particular entity partially to oneself, [in total there are] six types of [the fallacy that] the substratum [of the reason] is unestablished entirely to either side. Thus, [besides the fallacy that the reason is unestablished to both sides with its particular entity entirely to both sides], there are fourteen more [cases], then including the former one there are fifteen [cases] of entirely unestablished [reason or substratum

(143) 後句“非遍非宗法”者，四不成中并全分過。如聲論師對佛弟子，立“聲為常，眼所見故”。俱說此因於聲無故，此是有體兩俱全分兩俱不成，餘無體兩俱全分一種不成。有體、無體，若自、若他，四種全分隨一不成。兩倂全分、若自、若他，三種猶豫不成。有體、無體兩俱全分，有體、無體若自、若他，隨一全分六種所依不成。如是更有十四，並前十五全分不成。亦如下釋。(103b29–c08)
of the reason]. All are also explained as below (below the first sentence of this paragraph).

(144) 此二偏句并皆是過，唯第二句“遍亦宗法”是正因相。為簡非句，故說“遍是宗法性”。(103c0–c10)

These two sectional forms are both fallacious; only the second form, namely “(2) [some] is a property of the thesis[-subject] and also universal” refers to the characteristic of correct reason. In order to exclude the false forms, “the nature of being universally a property of the thesis[-subject]” is said.

(1.2.2.1.2.2.3.2. Manifesting the Name of the Second Characteristic 顯第二相)

(145) 言“同品定有性”者，顯第二相。“同”是“相似”義，“品”是“體類”義，相似體類名為“同品”。故《理門》云：“此中，若品與所立法隣近均等，說名‘同品’，以一切義皆名‘品’故。”彼言意說雖一切義皆名為“品”，今取其因正所成法。若言所顯法之自相，若非言願意之所許，但是兩宗所諍義法，皆名“所立”。隨應有此所立法處說名“同品”。以有或、無體名“同品”，由此“品”者是體類故。若唯言所陳所諍法之自相名為“所立”，有此法處名“同品”者，便無有四相違之因，比量相違、決定相違皆應無四。若全同有法上所有一切義者，便無同品，亦無異品，宗有一符相符極成，非一切義皆相違故。故但取所立有此名“同”。然下論云“如立無常，瓶等無常名‘同品’者，唯舉所陳兩宗本諍法之自相名為“同品”。以餘意所許是傍所諍，略而不說，理皆同品。以此釋文應當深義。(103c10–c26)

“The nature of being certainly present in the similar group” is said to manifest the second characteristic. “Similar” means “analogous”; “group” means “type of entity (tilei 體類),” so the analogous type of entity is named “similar group.” Therefore, the Nyāyamukha states, “herein, if a group [of instances] is close and equal to the property to be proved, then it is called ‘similar group’, for all the objects can be called

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461 遍句 YRZLSj, 偏句 YRZLSj. “ju 遍” means “form” here, “bian 遍” means “universal,” while “pian 偏” means “sectional,” “partial.” Since the two forms discussed above are not universal but sectional, this word should read “偏 ju.”
This statement means that although all the objects can be called “group,” only [the objects with] the property that is to be established exactly by the reason are chosen now. No matter the self-form of the property that is represented by the statement of the thesis or the implication of the meaning (i.e., distinction, chabie 差別, viśeṣa) that is not represented by the statement of the thesis, as long as it is the property argued about by the two schools, it can always be named “what is to be proved.” The loci wherever the property to be proved exists are correspondingly named “similar group.” [Corresponding instances] are named “similar group” based on whether [the property to be proved] has its own entity or not (i.e., equally accepted by both sides or not), so the “group” here refers to the type of entity. If only the self-form of the property to be argued about and expressed by statement [but not the distinction] was named “what is to be proved,” while the loci wherever this property exists was named “similar group,” then there would not be the four sorts of contradictory reasons, and both the fallacy that the thesis is contradicted by inference and the fallacy of the contradictory conclusive reason could not be divided into such four sorts. If [the similar group was required] to be completely identical to the property-possessor in all the properties, then there would be neither a similar group nor a dissimilar group, and the thesis would commit the fallacy that in the thesis the relationship is well-established partially, because [the proponent and the opponent] are not contrary to each other on all the properties [of the thesis-subject]. Hence, only whatever possesses [the property] to be proved is named “similar.” However, this treatise (the Nyāyapraveśa) says below “for example, when sound is to be proved impermanent, a pot, and so on, which are impermanent, are called ‘similar group,’” it only takes the self-form of the property which is originally to be argued about by the two schools to define “similar group.” Since the [distinction], which is implicated by the meaning, belongs to the postulated

462 YZML, T1628 p.1c29–2a01. Tucci (1930, p.22): There (viz., in the kārikā) “positive instance” (sapakṣa) is called that particular instance [only], which is analogous to the predicate to be provided; in fact every object can be an instance.
From Katsura’s (2016b) unpublished restoration draft: = PSV ad PS 3.18ab: tatra śādhyadharma-sāmānyena samānah pakṣaḥ pakṣaḥ, prayāsatteḥ, sarvāv ‘ṛhah pakṣaḥ iti kṛtvā |
463 Kuiji’s interpretation here shifts the standard of choosing the similar group from just regarding the property in the thesis to taking the reason into account.
464 = tadyathā aṇitye śabde śādhye ghaṭādir aṇityaḥ sapakṣaḥ | (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.3, 1–2).
point of the argument, the explication [on the aspect of distinction] is omitted [by the Nyāyapraveśa], but logically it also belongs to the similar group.\footnote{This means that though YRZL has not expounded so, but principally speaking, the concept “similar group” concerns not only the self-form (svārūpa) of property but also the distinction (viśeṣa).} Interpreting the text in this way should accord with the profound principle.

\footnote{立法 YRZLSt, 宗法 YRZLSj. “Lifa” 立法” can mean “the property to be proved,” while “zongfa 宗法” means the property in the thesis, they can refer to the same thing, but since the former part of this sentence has mentioned “宗法,” to accord with that, this may also be “宗法.”}

\footnote{立法 YRZLSt, 宗法 YRZLSj. “Lifa” 立法” can mean “the property to be proved,” while “zongfa 宗法” means the property in the thesis, they can refer to the same thing, but since the former part of this sentence has mentioned “宗法,” to accord with that, this may also be “宗法.”}

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The similar group includes two kinds: The first is the similar group of the thesis (zong tongpin 宗同品, sapakṣa), so this treatise says below that “the group of [things with] quality equal [to the thesis-subject] by [their] common possession of the property to be proved is named ‘similar group’”\footnote{立法 YRZLSt, 宗法 YRZLSj. “Lifa” 立法” can mean “the property to be proved,” while “zongfa 宗法” means the property in the thesis, they can refer to the same thing, but since the former part of this sentence has mentioned “宗法,” to accord with that, this may also be “宗法.”}; the second is the similar group of the reason (yin tongpin 因同品), [this treatise] also states below “wherever the announced similar group of the reason [is followed by] the character of definite presence [of the property of the thesis].”\footnote{立法 YRZLSt, 宗法 YRZLSj. “Lifa” 立法” can mean “the property to be proved,” while “zongfa 宗法” means the property in the thesis, they can refer to the same thing, but since the former part of this sentence has mentioned “宗法,” to accord with that, this may also be “宗法.”} However, this treatise calls the similar group of the thesis “similar group” most of the time, because it is similar to [the property in] the thesis; and the similar group of the reason is named “similar property (tongfa 同法, sādharma),” because it is a property of the thesis[-subject]. Why are two kinds of similar [groups] needed? Because where the reason is present, the similar group of the thesis is mentioned, for it is intended to show that the reason pervades\footnote{立法 YRZLSt, 宗法 YRZLSj. “Lifa” 立法” can mean “the property to be proved,” while “zongfa 宗法” means the property in the thesis, they can refer to the same thing, but since the former part of this sentence has mentioned “宗法,” to accord with that, this may also be “宗法.”} the thesis[-subject] and the [similar] instances. When the property of the thesis follows the reason, the similar
property of the reason is mentioned, for it is intended to show that wherever the reason is present, the property of the thesis must follow.

(147) 且宗同品，何者名“同”？若同有法，全不相似，聲為有法，瓶為喻故。若法為同，敵不許法於有法有，亦非因相違宗法中，何得取法而以為同？此中義意不別取二，總取一切有宗法處名“宗同品”，故論說言“如立無常，瓶等無常是名‘同品’”。有此宗處決定有因，名“因同品”。然實同品正取因同，因貫宗、喻體性寬遍，有此共許因法之處不共許法定必隨故。今明一切有宗法處其因定有，故說“宗同”，不欲以宗成因義故，非正同品。其於彼宗同品處決定有性，故言同品定有性也。因既決定有，顯宗法必隨。《理門》亦云“說因宗所隨，宗無因不有”等。(104a04–a16)

Moreover, concerning the similar group of the thesis, what is named “similar”? If it is similar to the property-possessor, [the instances in the similar group] are not analogous at all, because, [for example, in the case that] sound is the property-possessor while pot is the instance, [sound and pot are not analogous].\(^{470}\) If [the similar group of the thesis] is similar to the property [of the thesis], then the opponent does not accept the property to be possessed by the property-possessor, and the characteristic of the reason does not pervade the property of the thesis either, how can the property be chosen as what it must be similar to?\(^{471}\) Herein it means that neither of these two should be chosen individually, but all the loci wherever the property of the thesis exists should be chosen as “similar group of the thesis,” so this treatise says, “for example, when sound is to be proved impermanent, a pot, and so on, which are impermanent, are called ’similar group.’” Wherever the thesis-[property] exists, and the reason is certainly present, [such a locus] is named “similar group of the reason.”\(^{472}\) However, the similar group actually refers to the similar [group] of the reason principally, because the reason strings the thesis and example with a broad nature, for wherever the equally accepted reason is present, the

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\(^{470}\) According to IRMS in T2270 p.268b23–b26, this is to refute Wengui’s opinion.

\(^{471}\) According to IRMS in T2270 p.268b26–b27, this is refuting Master Bi’s 璧法师 opinion. However, the logic here is quite confusing.

\(^{472}\) Kuiji does not only bring the new concept of “similar group of the reason” in but also relates it to the thesis-property.
unequally accepted [thesis-]property certainly follows. Now in order to clarify that wherever the property of the thesis exists there must be the reason, \textsuperscript{473} “the similar [group] of the thesis” is mentioned, but since the thesis is not meant to establish the reason, it is not the main similar group. The reason possesses a nature of being certainly present in the similar group of the thesis, so the nature of being certainly present in the similar group is said. If the reason is certainly present, then it shows that the property of the thesis must follow. The \textit{Nyāyamukha} also says, “[the examples] express that the reason is followed by [the property of] the thesis and that wherever [the property of] the thesis is absent, the reason is absent too,” \textsuperscript{474} and so on.

(148) 依上二相，《理門論》云：“云何別法於別處轉？”此中問意，如“所作”因必隨附聲 \textsuperscript{475}, 與瓶等上所作性別，如何聲宗之上別因於瓶等中別處而轉？或所作因是聲有法宗上別法，云何於彼別瓶處轉，而言共相貫在宗、喻，遍是宗法，同品定有？陳那釋云，“由彼相似不說異名，言‘即是此’故無有失。”此答意言，由聲、瓶上共所作性相似而有，總相合說，不說聲、瓶二異名中，聲所作性即喻處所作性，言“彼即此”，故無有失。(104a16–a25)

Based on the two characteristics above, the \textit{Nyāyamukha} states, “how can a property of a different subject be resident in other different places?” \textsuperscript{476} This question means that just like the reason[-property] “being produced” must attach to sound, it differs from the property of being produced of a pot, and so forth, so how can this different reason[-property] of the thesis[-subject] sound be resident in different places like the pot, and so forth? Alternatively, the reason[-property] being produced is a different property of

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\textsuperscript{473} This statement does not accord with NP, for \textit{sapakṣe sattvam} only means the property of the reason should be possessed by one similar instance at least but not all the similar instances.

\textsuperscript{474} YZML, T1628 p.1c22.

\textsuperscript{475} 隨附聲 YRZLS\text{t}. 隨有附聲 YRZLS\text{j}. “sui” 隨” means “follow,” “\textit{fu}” 附” means “attach to,” “\textit{sheng}” 聲” is “sound,” and “\textit{you}” 有” mainly means “have.” “隨附聲” can mean “follow and attach to sound,” but “有” is redundant in this case.

\textsuperscript{476} YZML, T1628 p.2a09. Tucci (1930, p.25): Now somebody may ask: “how can a predicate of a different subject (“pot”) be resident in a different place (“sound”)?” Tucci considers the property of different subject as a property of the instance and the different place as thesis-subject, but in Kuiji’s commentary here, the former refers to the thesis-subject, and the latter refers to the instance.
the property-possessor sound, how can it be resident in different places such as the pot, be considered to be a universal characteristic stringing the thesis and example, and [possess] [the nature of] being universally a property of the thesis[-subject] and [the nature of] being certainly present in the similar group? Dignāga answers, “Since they (the property of the thesis-subject and those in other places, like the ‘being produced’ property of sound and that of a pot) are analogous [to each other], different names should not be used [to call them]; the statement ‘[being produced of sound] is just this [being produced of the pot]’ is not fallacious.”477 This answer means that since both sound and the pot possess the property of being produced analogously, then [their properties] should be said with one general characteristic but not with two different names [respectively for “being produced”] of sound and the pot, and the property of being produced of sound is the same property of being produced of [similar] instances, so the statement “that is this” is not fallacious.478

477 YZML, T1628 p.2a9–a10. Tucci (1930, p.25, 26): The reply is that, since they are analogous, the two predicates cannot be called different. [Moreover] we said that (the predicates as shown by the reason “viz.: product, as pot”) is just that (of the subject: sound = product) and therefore there is not such a mistake [as supposed by you].

478 This is a paraphrase of “the statement ‘[being produced of sound] is just this [being produced of the pot]’ is not fallacious” quoted from YZML above.

479 YZML, T1628 p.2a10–a11. Tucci (1930, p.26): if the two [predicates, that as “product” as resident in the pot and “product” as resident in sound] are not considered as being different, how then, is it possible to call this reason a predicate resident in the subject (pakṣadharma)?
about why the property of being produced of a pot can be called a property of the thesis[-subject]. Since that property of being produced [of a pot] is not said to differ from the generalized [property of being produced], and the reason[-property] being produced is present in the pot, how can this reason[-property] be called a property of the thesis[-subject]? Then that (the Nyāyamukha) answers, “herein we only say [the reason-property] is a property of the thesis[-subject], but we do not want to say that [the reason-property] can merely be a property of the thesis[-subject].” This answer means that concerning the entire reason, the nature of being certainly and universally a property of the thesis[-subject] but not [the nature of] being merely a property of the thesis[-subject] is said so such a generalized word can string two places: it can be present in both the thesis[-subject] and non-thesis[-subject] (i.e., the similar instance), and then the property which is universally a property of the thesis[-subject] can be found herein. If only the property of being produced of sound is considered to be merely the property of the thesis[-subject] distinctively, then no example can be cited to establish the thesis; and if being produced is considered to be merely belonging to the pot, then it cannot become a property of the thesis[-subject] either, so what can be proved?

Additionally, that (the Nyāyamukha) retorts, “if so, the similar group should also be named ‘thesis[-subject].’” This retort means that [the properties of] being produced of these two (the thesis-subject and the similar instance) are called “reason[-property]” generally, so the properties of being impermanent of these two should both be the

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480 YZML, T1628 p.2a11–a12. Tucci (1930, p.26): In fact as regards the pakṣadharma, we say that it is certainly a predicate of the subject, but we do not want to say that it is only (eva) the predicate of the subject.
481 YZML, T1628 p.2a12–a13. Tucci (1930, p.26): If it be so, the positive instance also could be called pakṣa.
thesis-[property] to be argued about. That (the *Nyāyamukha*) answers by itself that “[this objection] is not right; what is to be established is only said with respect to this different place (i.e., the thesis-subject), but the reason must be non-different [in the thesis-subject and the similar group], and then an inference can be established. Therefore, [the similar group] is not analogous [to the thesis-subject].” To this objection, [the *Nyāyamukha*] answers that it is not right; only the property of being impermanent of the individual [subject], namely sound, but not [the property of being impermanent of] the pot is to be established because it is argued by both sides. The reason to be established must be accepted to be possessed by the thesis-subject and the [similar] instance by both the proponent and the opponent with no difference, and then an inference can be established. Therefore, the proof is broad (for it is accepted by both sides), while the meaning of what is to be proved is narrow (for it is only accepted by the proponent), logically they are not analogous, so [the *Nyāyamukha*] answers “[this objection] is not right.”

(151) 問: 何故此因於宗、異品皆說“遍”字，於同品上獨說“定”言？
答: 因本成宗，不遍成者非立；異喻止濫，不遍止者非遮。成不遍故不成過生；
遮不盡故不定等起。成宗不遍如上已陳，止濫不盡至下當悉。同喻本順成宗，
宗成即名“同喻”，豈由喻遍能順所立方成宗義？但欲以因成宗，因有宗必隨逐，
不欲以宗成因，有宗因不定有。故雖宗同品，不須因遍有。若因483於異品有，
同品半有半無，雖並不定，由因於異有故成過，非因於同不遍為失，即九句內，
後三句中初、後句是，後三中句正因所攝，於異品中止濫盡故。初、後二句不
定過收，皆止異品濫不盡故。由此同品說“定有性”，宗、異品中皆說“遍”也。
(104b13–b26)

482 YZML, T1628 p.2a13–a14. Tucci (1930, p.26): I reply that this objection is invalid, because a different notion, [such as the “pot” which is different from “sound”] declares the probandum [viz, “non-eternal,” since the disputant as well as the opponent agree about the non-eternity of “pot”]. About the reason [viz, “because it is a product”] there is no difference [of opinion between the disputants]. Therefore it can prove the inference. Thus there is no fallacy in it.

483 / YRZLS, 若因 YRZLSj. “ruò 若” means “if,” “yin 因” is “reason.” They are needed for the completeness of the sentence.
Question: Why is the reason said with the word “universally” regarding both [the first characteristic concerning] the thesis and [the third characteristic concerning] the dissimilar group, but with the word “certainly” only regarding [the second characteristic concerning] the similar group?

Answer: The reason is originally meant to establish the thesis, so if it does not establish [the thesis-subject] universally, then it is not a [correct] proof; the example by dissimilarity is meant to stop the overflow, so if it does not stop [the overflow] universally, then it is not a [correct] negation (zhe 遮). If the establishment is not universal, then the fallacies of unestablished [reason or substratum of the reason] will occur; if the negating is not universal, then the fallacies of inconclusive reason, and so on, will arise. The case that [the reason] does not establish the thesis[-subject] universally has already been stated above, and the case that [the example by dissimilarity] does not stop the overflow universally will be expounded below. The example by similarity is originally meant to establish the thesis in a supporting way (shuncheng 顺成), once the thesis is supported [by the example by similarity] (the thesis-property follows the reason-property in the example by similarity), it can be named “example by similarity,” so why should the [similar] example support what is to be proved universally (the thesis-property completely follows the reason-property in the example by similarity) to establish the thesis? [The inference] only intends to use the reason to establish the thesis, because wherever the reason is present, the thesis[-property] certainly follows [to be present]; [the inference] does not intend to use the thesis to establish the reason, because although the thesis[-property] exists, it is not sure whether the reason[-property] exists or not. Therefore, in the similar group of the thesis, the reason[-property] is not needed to be present universally. If the reason[-property] is present in the dissimilar group and present in half of the similar group, then although it is not certain [whether the reason-property exists or not wherever the thesis-property exists] either, [this case] becomes fallacious because the reason[-property] is present in the dissimilar [group], but not because the reason[-property] does not pervade the similar group universally, namely the first and last forms of the last three forms (i.e.,
the seventh form and the ninth form) in the nine forms [of the reason]; the middle form of the last three belongs to the correct reasons, because it stops the overflow completely in the dissimilar group. The first form and the last form belong to the fallacies of inconclusive reason because both do not stop the overflow completely in the dissimilar group. Thus, [the second characteristic concerning] the similar group is named “the nature of being certainly present,” but “universally” is said regarding both [the first characteristic concerning] the thesis and [the third characteristic concerning] the dissimilar group.

Concerning the nine forms [of the reason], the Nyāyamukha states,

“the property of the thesis[-subject] in the similar group can be present, non-present or in both ways; each case also has three cases in the dissimilar group respectively, namely being present, non-present and in both ways.”

(152) 其九句者，《理門論》云：

“宗法於同品，

謂有、非有、俱，

於異品各三，

有、非有及二。”

言“宗法”者，謂宗之法，即因是也。“於同品”者，宗同品也，體即同喻。謂能立因於同品喻成其三種：一，有；二，非有；三，亦有亦非有，彼名為“俱”。此三種因，於宗異品、異法喻上亦各有三：一，有；二，非有；三，亦有亦非有，彼名“及二”。且同品有異品三者，謂因於同品有異品亦有，於同品有異品非有，於同品有異品非有。如是因於同品非有，異品亦三。於同品有非有，異品亦三。故成九句。(104b26–c07)

484 YZML, T1628 p.1b06–b07. Tucci (1930, p.11): The middle term [as resident in the subject of the inference] in threefold, according as it does, or does not reside in the affirmative instance and according as it does or does not reside at the same time in the negative instance; this residence can be in either case of two kinds [that is in all, or in some of the sapakṣas and the vipakṣas].

The “property of the thesis[-subject]” said here means a property possessed by the thesis[-subject], namely the reason[-property]. “In the similar group” refers to the similar group of the thesis; its entity is just the similar instance. It means that the reason that can prove has three cases concerning the instances of the similar group: the first is being present; the second is being non-present; the third is being both present and non-present, which is called “in both ways.” Each of these three types of reason also has three cases concerning the dissimilar group of the thesis and the example by the dissimilar property: the first is being present; the second is being non-present; the third is being both present and non-present, which is called “and in both ways.” And then when [the reason-property] is present in the similar group, the three cases concerning the dissimilar group include [the case that] the reason[-property] is present in the similar group and also present in the dissimilar group, [the case that] [the reason-property] is present in the similar group but non-present in the dissimilar group, and [the case that] [the reason-property] is present in the similar group but both present and non-present in the dissimilar group. In the same way, when the reason[-property] is non-present in the similar group, concerning the dissimilar group there are also three cases. When [the reason-property] is both present and non-present in the similar group, concerning the dissimilar group there are also three cases. Thus, there are nine forms.

485 For this paragraph, Tang’s (2015, p.308) translation reads:
As to the nine forms, the NMu says: “The [reason as a] property of the thesis-subject (pakṣadharma) can be present, absent or in both ways in similar instances, [it] can also be of three kinds respectively in dissimilar instances on account of [its] being present, absent or in both ways.” (NMu k.2106) The so-called “property of the thesis-subject” means the property of the subject of the thesis, and is just the reason. As to [the phrase] “in similar instances,” [the similar instance] is the similar instance of the thesis (zong tong pin 宗同品). [Its individual] substrata are just the positive examples (sādharmyadṛṣṭānta, tong yu 同喻). [Therefore, the phrase “in similar instances”] means that the probative reason (sādhanahetu, neng li yin 能立因) can be of three kinds in examples qua similar instances (tong pin yu 同品喻): (1) being present, (2) being absent and (3) being both present and absent. That [last kind] is called “in both ways” (dvedhā, ju 俱). These three kinds of reason can be also of three possibilities respectively in dissimilar instances of the thesis (zong yi pin 宗異品), which are [just] negative examples (vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta, yi fa yu 異法喻). [These three possibilities are:] (1) being present, (2) being absent and (3) being both present and absent. That [last possibility] is called “in both ways” (dvidhatva, ji er 及 二). Again, the three [possibilities] with regard to dissimilar instances on [the reason’s] being present in similar instances are: (1) the reason’s being present in similar instances and also present in dissimilar
In order to show the nine theses, the Nyāyamukha states,

“[sound’s] being permanent, impermanent, [resulting from] effort, perpetual, constant, firmly stable,
[resulting from] no effort, changeable, and inalterable,
are nine [thesis-properties to be proved] on account of [sound’s] being cognizable (suoliang 所量, prameyatva), and so on.”

All these four words, namely “perpetual,” “constant,” “firmly stable” and “inalterable,” mean permanent. “Changeable” means impermanent. Among this four lines, the first three lines show the nine types of thesis[-property], and the last line concludes that according to the nine reasons, nine types [of inference] are formed.

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YZML, T1628 p.2a28–a29. Tucci (1930, p.29): The major, which have: “knowable and so on” for their middle terms, are eternal, non-eternal, effect of some exertion; [in the middle triad] (nos. 4–6 of the table); eternal; and [in the last triad]: not the effect of some effort, non-eternal, eternal.

= the Nyāyavārttikatātparyayaḥ 300: nityānityaprayatnothamadyamatriikasāsvatāḥ, ayatnānityamityāḥ ca prameyatvādīsādhanāḥ. See Tucci (1930, p.29, fn.54), Katsura (1979a, p.64, n.3).

For this paragraph, Tang’s (2015, p.310) translation reads:

In order to indicate the nine thesis-predicates, it is said in the NMu that:

“[The sound’s] being eternal, non-eternal, resulting from effort, perpetual, constant, firmly stable, not resulting from effort, changeable, and inalterable

Are [properties to be proved] on account of [sound’s] being cognizable and so on.” (NMu k.5)
Concerning the nine reasons, the *Nyāyamukha* states,

“[sound’s being] cognizable, produced, impermanent, produced, audible, resulting from effort, impermanent, resulting from effort and intangible, are nine [reasons] for being permanent, and so on.”

The “intangible” said here means “incorporeal” (*wu zhi ai* 無質礙, *amūrta*). The first three lines show the nine types of reason, and the last line concludes that according to the nine types of thesis[-property], nine types [of inference] are formed. [We] use the first three lines here to prove the first three lines above, and since there are equally three types in each line [here and above], if [we] pair each of them in sequence, then there will be nine types [of inference].

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488 YZML, T1628 p.2b01–b02. Tucci (1930, p.29): The nine middle terms used to prove eternality and the other majors are: knowable, product, non eternal, product, audible, effect of some exertion, non eternal, effect of some exertion, intangible.

= PS 3.21 = the *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaśā* 300: *prameyakṛtānityakṛtaśrāvaṇayatnajāḥ, anityayatnajāsparśā nityatvādiṣu te navā. See Tucci (1930, p.29, fn.54), Katsura (2009, p.158).

489 For this paragraph, Tang’s (2015, p.311) translation reads:

As to the nine reasons, the NMu says:

“[The sound’s being] cognizable, produced, non-eternal, produced, audible, resulting from effort, non-eternal, resulting from effort and intangible

Are nine [reasons] for [proving sound’s] being eternal and so on.” (NMu k.6)

[Here,] the so-called “intangible” (*asparśā, wu chu* 無觸) means “incorporeal” (*amūrta, wu zhi ai* 無質礙). The former three lines indicate the nine reasons, the last one line concludes with nine thesis-predicates, and then there are nine classes. To prove [the predicates in] the former three lines above with
First, concerning [the reason’s] being present in the similar group and present in the
dissimilar group, [an inference can be set forth] like “sound is permanent, because of
being cognizable, like ether” by a Śābdika. Herein, the thesis “being permanent” takes
a pot as the dissimilar group; the reason “being cognizable” is universally present in
both the similar and dissimilar groups.

Second, concerning [the reason’s] being present in the similar group but non-present in
the dissimilar group, [an inference can be set forth] like “sound is impermanent, because
of being produced, like a pot, and so on” by a Vaiśeṣika. The thesis “being impermanent”
takes ether as the dissimilar group; the reason “being produced” is present in the similar
group but non-present in the dissimilar group.

Third, concerning [the reason’s] being present in similar group and [both] present and
non-present in the dissimilar group, [an inference can be set forth] like “sound results
immediately from effort, because of being impermanent, like a pot, and so on” by a
Vaiśeṣika. The thesis “[resulting from] effort” takes lightning, ether, and so on, as the
dissimilar instances; the reason “being impermanent” is also present in the similar
group and [some of] the dissimilar instances [such as] lightning, and so on, but non-
present in [others of the dissimilar instances such as] ether, and so on.

These are the first three [forms].
Regarding the middle three forms, first, concerning “the reason’s” being non-present in the similar group but present in the dissimilar group, [an inference can be set forth] like “sound is permanent, because of being produced, like ether” by a Śābdika. Herein the thesis “being permanent” takes a pot as the dissimilar instance; the reason “being produced” is non-present in the similar group [such as] ether, but present in the dissimilar group [such as] a pot.

Second, concerning “the reason’s” being non-present in the similar group and non-present in the dissimilar group, [an inference can be set forth] like “sound is permanent, because of being audible, like ether” by a Śābdika against a Buddhist. Herein the thesis “being permanent” takes a pot as the dissimilar instance; the reason “being audible” is non-present in both the similar and dissimilar groups.

Third, concerning [the reason’s] being non-present in the similar group but [both] present and non-present in the dissimilar group, [an inference can be set forth] like “sound is permanent, because of resulting immediately from effort, like ether” by a Śābdika. Herein the thesis “being permanent” takes lightning, a pot, and so on, as the dissimilar group; the reason “[resulting from] effort” is solely non-present in the similar group [such as] ether, and present in [some of] the dissimilar instances [such as] a pot, and so on, but non-present in [others of the dissimilar instances such as] lightning, and so on.

These are the middle three [forms].
Regarding the last three forms, first, concerning [the reason’s] being [both] present and non-present in the similar group and present in the dissimilar group, [an inference can be set forth] “sound does not result immediately from effort, because of being non-eternal, like lightning and ether” by a Śābdika. The thesis “not [resulting from] effort” takes a pot as the dissimilar instance; the reason “being impermanent” is present in [some of] the similar group [such as] lightning, but non-present in [others of the similar group such as] ether, and solely present in the dissimilar [such as] a pot.

Second, concerning [the reason’s] being [both] present and non-present in the similar group, as well as non-present in the dissimilar group, [an inference can be set forth] like “internal sound is impermanent, because of resulting immediately from effort, like lightning and pot” by a Vaiśeṣika. The thesis “being impermanent” takes ether as the dissimilar instance; the reason “[resulting from] effort” is present in [some of] the similar group [such as] a pot, and so on, but absent from [others of the similar group such as] lightning, and so on, and it is solely non-present in the dissimilar [such as] ether.

Third, concerning [the reason’s] being [both] present and non-present in the similar group and being [both] present and non-present in the dissimilar group, [an inference can be set forth] like “sound is permanent, because of being incorporeal, like atom and ether” by a Śābdika against a Vaiśeṣika. Herein the thesis “being permanent” takes a
pot, pleasure, and so on, as dissimilar instances; the reason “being incorporeal” is present in [some of] the similar group [such as] ether, but absent from [others of the similar group such as] atom, and also absent from [some of] the similar group [such as] a pot, but present in [others of the similar group such as] the sensation of pleasure, and so on.

These are named “nine forms.”

(158) 然《理門論》料簡此云:

“於同有及二，
在異無是因，
翻此名相違，
所餘皆不定。”

“於同有”者，謂能立因於同品有。言“及二”者，於同品中亦有非有。“在異無”者，此能立因於同品有在異品無，及同品中亦有非有於異品無。言“是因”者，此之二句皆是正因，於九句中第二、第八兩句所攝。

“翻此名相違”者，翻此二正因即名相違。翻初句云，於同非有於異品有，翻第二云，於同非有於異品中亦有非有。即九句中第四、第六兩句所攝，皆相違因，是法自相相違因故。攝餘不盡。“所餘皆不定”者，餘之五句皆為不定，謂九句中第一、第三、第五、第七、第九句。第一句者共不定攝，第三句者異品一分轉同品遍轉，第五句者不共不定，第七句者同品一分轉異品遍轉，第九句者俱品一分轉。此等諸句至下當知。(105a18–b05)

Then the Nyāyamukha states the following to classify these [nine forms]:

“Here, that which is present in the similar kind or is in both ways [in the similar kind],

and absent from the dissimilar kind is a [correct] reason;

what is reversed (fan 翻, viparīta) from this is contradictory,
and all the others are inconclusive (bu ding 不定, aniścita).”

“Present in the similar kind” means that the reason, which can prove, is present in the similar group. “Or in both ways” means that [the reason] is [both] present in and absent from the similar group. “Absent from the dissimilar group” means that this reason, which can prove, is present in the similar group but absent from the dissimilar group or [both] present in and absent from the similar group but absent from the dissimilar group. “Is a [correct] reason” means that these two forms are both correct reasons, and they belong to the second and eighth forms of the nine forms.

“What is reversed from this is contradictory” means that what is reversed from [the form of] [either of] these two correct reasons is a contradictory reason. [The form] reversed from the first form [of the correct reasons] is the one that [the reason] is non-present in the similar group but present in the dissimilar group, and [the form] reversed from the second [form] [of the two correct reasons] is the one that [the reason] is non-present in the similar group and both present and non-present in the dissimilar group.

They just belong to the fourth and sixth forms of the nine forms, and they are both contradictory reasons, since they are reasons that prove the opposite of the self-form of the [inferable] property. However, the others of contradictory reasons are not completely included [in this verse].

491 “All the others are inconclusive” means that the remaining five forms are all inconclusive, namely the first, third, fifth, seventh, and

490 YZML, T1628 p.2b04–b05. Tucci (1930, pp.29–30): Among these, [a middle term] which is present in either or the two [possible] ways in the positive instance and is absent in the negative instance is a valid reason. [A reason] which differs from this is either contradictory or inconclusive.


491 For the text from 翻初句云 to 撥餘不盡, Tang’s (2015, pp.319–320) translation reads:

To reverse [the distribution] from the first form [of correct reason, i.e. from case (2)], [we have the case (4),] namely [the reason’s being] absent from similar instances and present in dissimilar instances. To reverse [the distribution] from the second form [of correct reason, i.e. from case (8)], [we have the case (6),] namely [the reason’s being] absent from similar instances and [being] both present in and absent from dissimilar instances. [They are] just summarized in these two forms as the fourth and sixth in the nine forms. Both are contradictory reason. Since they are [only] reasons proving the opposite of the own form of the [inferable] property (dharmavāriṇiparītāśādhanā, fa zi xiàng xiàng wèi yǐn 法自相違因), the other [kinds of contradictory reason140] are not exhaustively summarized [here in this verse].
ninth forms. The first form belongs to the fallacy that the inconclusive reason is common to both (共不定, sādhāraṇānaikāntika); the third form belongs to the fallacy that the inconclusive reason resides in part of the dissimilar group and pervades the similar group (同品一分轉同品遍轉, vipakṣaikadeśavṛttīḥ sapakṣavyāpī); the fifth form belongs to the fallacy that the inconclusive reason is uncommon to both; the seventh form belongs to the fallacy that the inconclusive reason resides in part of the similar group and pervades the dissimilar group (俱品一分轉, ubhayapakṣaikadeśavṛttī). All these forms are to be known below.492

(159) In the nine theses above, there are five [theses of] “being permanent,” namely the first of the first three, all three of the middle ones, and the last of the last three. [There are] two [theses of] “being impermanent,” namely the middle ones of the first three and the last three. [There is] one [thesis of] “[resulting from] effort,” namely the last one of the first three. [There is] one [thesis of] “not [resulting from] effort,” namely the first one of the last three. There are four sorts in total.

492 For the text from “所餘皆不定” to 至下當知, Tang’s (2015, p.320) translation reads:

The [expression] “[all] the others are inconclusive” means that the remaining five forms [of reason] are all inconclusive. They are the first, third, fifth, seventh, ninth forms in the nine forms. The first form is summarized as the inconclusive reason common [to both parties] (sādhāraṇānaikāntika, gong bu ding 共不定). The third form is [the inconclusive reason] residing in one place of dissimilar instances and pervading similar instances (vipakṣaikadeśavṛttīḥ sapakṣavyāpī, yi pin yi fen zhuan, tong pin bian zhuan 異品一分轉、同品遍轉). The fifth form is the inconclusive reason uncommon [to both parties] (asādhāraṇānaikāntika, bu gong bu ding 不共不定). The seventh form is [the inconclusive reason] residing in one place of similar instances and pervading dissimilar instances (sapakṣaikadesaavṛttir vipakṣavyāpī, tong pin yi fen zhuan, yi pin bian zhuan 同品一分轉、異品遍轉). The ninth form is [the inconclusive reason] residing in one place of both parties (ubhayapakṣaikadeśavṛttī, ju pin yi fen zhuan 俱品一分轉). All these forms are to be known below.
問：第八句因正因所攝，有比量相違，“第八句非正因攝，同品俱故，如第七、九”。
答：此有決定相違量云：“第八句因正因所攝，九句因中具三相故，如第二句”。不言“九”，但言“具三相”，恐有不定過。為如第二句具三相故，此第八句正因所攝？為如決定相違等具三相故，此第八句非正因攝？故言“九句中”便無此過。或決定相違不具三相，他智不決定故。(105b07–b15)

Question: If the eighth reason belongs to the correct reasons, there is [the fallacy that] the thesis is contradicted by inference, [which can be shown by the inference that] “[the reason in] the eighth form does not belong to correct reasons, because of [the reason’s] being in both ways in the similar group [in this form], like the seventh and ninth [reasons].”

Answer: There is an inference of the contradictory conclusive reason against this [inference in the question] saying, “the eighth reason belongs to correct reasons, because of possessing the three characteristics [of a correct reason] in the nine reasons, like [the reason in] the second form.” If only “possessing the three characteristics” but not “[in the] nine [reasons]” is said, then there will be the fallacy of inconclusive reasons. Does the eighth form belong to correct reasons, because of possessing the three characteristics like the second form? Does the eighth form not belong to correct reasons, because of possessing the three characteristics like the contradictory conclusive reason? Therefore, if “in the nine reasons” is said, then there is no such fallacy. Alternatively, [we can also say that] the contradictory conclusive reason here does not possess the three characteristics because the cognition of others cannot be ascertained.

問：言“定有性”已顯有因宗必隨逐，何須言“同品”？既云“同品”即顯有宗因必隨逐，何須復云“定有性”也？
答：但言“定有”不言“同品”，乃顯此因成義不定，非定成宗。但言“同品”不言“定有”，亦顯此因成相違法等，非本宗義。今顯定成宗，及非成異品，故說“同品決定有性”。(105b15–b21)
Question: Since when “the nature of being certainly present” is said, it can already show that wherever the reason is present, the thesis follows [to be present], why must “in the similar group” be said? Since when “in the similar group” is said, it can show that wherever the thesis is present, the reason certainly follows [to be present], why must “the nature of being certainly present” be said additionally? 493

Answer: If only “being certainly present” is said but not “in the similar group,” then it implies that what is proved by this reason is not certain; it cannot prove the thesis certainly. If only “in the similar group” is said but not “being certainly present,” then it also implies that this reason proves the contradictory thesis but not the original one. Now, in order to show that [the reason] can certainly prove this thesis but not a different one, “the nature of being certainly present in the similar group” is said.

(162) 由此應為四句分別:
有同品非定有，謂宗同品非定有因，即九句中中三句是。第四、第六相違過收，第五句者不共不定。
有定有非同品，謂定有因非宗同品，於九句中除二、五、八餘六句是。第四、第六是相違因，餘之四句不定過收：第一句共，第三句者異品一分轉同品遍轉，第七句者同品一分轉異品遍轉，第九句者俱品一分轉。
有亦定有亦同品，謂是宗同品亦定有因，於九句中除中三句初、後三是。實若無過，唯取第二、第八正因；若通有過，即通六句二正因、四不定。
有非同品亦非定有，謂非宗同品亦非定有因，即異品遍無性，於九句中第二、五、八三句所攝，二、八正因，第五不定。
此初三句內，唯第三句少分正因，餘皆有過。為簡過句顯自無過，故說“同品定有性”也。(105b21–c07)

Thus, there should be four forms [of cases] for distinguishing [distinct cases of reasons]:
(1) Some is not certainly present in the similar group; it refers to [the case that] the similar group of the thesis certainly does not possess the reason, namely the middle

493 Both of these two questions are problematic because even the second characteristic itself is not enough to show the inseparable connection between the reason and the thesis, let alone the two separate parts, neither of which can be seen as an independent definite description.
three forms in the nine forms. The fourth and sixth [forms] belong to the fallacies of contradictory reasons, and the fifth form [belongs to] [the fallacy that] the inconclusive reason is uncommon to both.  

(2) Some is certainly present not in the similar group; it refers to [the case that] the reason is certainly present in other places than the similar group of the thesis, namely the other six forms than the second, fifth, eighth [forms] in the nine forms. The fourth and sixth ones belong to contradictory reasons, and the other four forms belong to the fallacies of inconclusive reasons: the first form [belongs to] [the fallacy that the inconclusive reason] is common [to both]; the third form [belongs to] [the fallacy that the inconclusive reason] resides in part of the dissimilar group and pervades the similar group; the seventh form [belongs to] [the fallacy that the inconclusive reason] resides in part of the similar group and pervades the dissimilar group; and the ninth form [belongs to] [the fallacy that] the inconclusive reason resides in part of both groups.

(3) Some is certainly present in the similar group; it refers to [the case that] in the similar group of the thesis the reason is certainly present, namely the first three and last three

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494 To the text from 由此應為 to 不共不定, Tang’s (2015, pp.327–328) translation reads:

Hence, a fourfold distinction [concerning the possible configurations of “sapakṣa” (tong pin 同品) with the reason’s “being certainly present in” (ding you 定有) relation to it] is to be made: (1) It is not the case that [the reason is] certainly present [in places where] there is sapakṣa (you tong pin fei ding you 有同品非定有). Namely, it is not the case that the reason is certainly present in instances similar to the pakṣa (zong tong pin 宗同品). [The reasons conforming to this possibility] are the middle three forms in the nine forms [, i.e. cases (4), (5) and (6) in the hetucakra]. [Among them,] the fourth and sixth are included in the fallacy of contradictory [reason], and the fifth form in the inconclusive reason uncommon [to both parties] (asādhāraṇānaikāntika).

495 For the text of the second form, Tang’s (2015, p.328–329) translation reads:

(2) It is the case that [the reason is] certainly present [in places where] there is no sapakṣa (you ding you fei tong pin 有定有非同品). Namely, [the instances] where the reason is certainly present are not instances similar to the pakṣa. [The reasons conforming to this possibility] are the remaining six forms apart from the second, fifth and eighth [forms] in the nine forms. [They are the cases (1), (3), (4), (6), (7) and (9) in the hetucakra.] [Among them,] the fourth and sixth are contradictory reasons, and the remaining four forms are included in the fallacy of inconclusive [reason]. The first form is [the reason] common [to both parties] (sādhāraṇa). The third form is [the reason] residing in one place of dissimilar instances and pervading similar instances (vipakṣaikadeśavṛttiḥ sapakṣavyāpi). The seventh form is [the reason] residing in one place of similar instances and pervading dissimilar instances (sapakṣaikadeśavṛti vipakṣavyāpi). The ninth form is [the reason] residing in one place of both parties (abhayapakṣaikadeśavṛti).
other than the middle three forms. If there is actually no fallacy, then only the second and eighth, which are correct reasons, should be chosen; if the fallacious ones are also considered, then these six forms, namely the two correct reasons and four inconclusive reasons, should all be considered.\textsuperscript{496}

(4) Some is not certainly present not in the similar group; it refers to [the case that] the reason is certainly not present in other places than the similar group of the thesis, which turns to consider the nature of being universally absent from the dissimilar group, namely the third, fifth, and eighth forms of the nine forms. The second and eighth [belong to] the correct reasons, but the fifth\textsuperscript{497} [belongs to] inconclusive reasons.\textsuperscript{498}

In the first three forms [of cases], only parts of the third form [of cases] belong to correct reasons; all the others are fallacious. In order to exclude the fallacious forms and show that [the proponent’s] own [reason] has no fallacy, “the nature of being certainly present in the similar group” is said.\textsuperscript{499}

\textsuperscript{496} For the text of the third form, Tang’s (2015, p.330) translation reads:

(3) It is the case that [the reason is] certainly present [in places where] there is sapakṣa (you yi ding you yi tong pin 有亦定有亦同品). Namely, it is the case that the reason is certainly present in instances similar to the pakṣa. [The reasons conforming to this possibility] are the first three and last three [forms] apart from the middle three forms in the nine forms. [They are the cases (1)–(3) and (7)–(9) in the hetucakra.] [Among them,] if [we consider only these forms] which are devoid of fallacy, only the second and eighth [forms which are correct reason] are chosen; if [we consider also these forms] which are fallacious, [all] the six forms, including the two correct reasons and the four inconclusive [reasons], are included in general.

\textsuperscript{497} The fifth form belongs to the fallacy that the inconclusive reason is uncommon to both.

\textsuperscript{498} For the text of the fourth form, Tang’s (2015, p.331) translation reads:

(4) It is not the case that [the reason is] certainly present [in places where] there is no sapakṣa (you fei tong pin yi fei ding you 有非同品亦非定有). Namely, it is not the case that the reason is certainly present in instances not similar to the pakṣa. This is just the reason’s being universally absent from dissimilar instances [, i.e. the third characteristic]. [The reasons conforming to this possibility] are included in the second, fifth and eighth forms in the nine forms [, i.e. the cases (2), (5) and (8) in the hetucakra]. [Among them,] the second and eighth [forms] are correct reason, and the fifth is inconclusive.

\textsuperscript{499} For the text from 此初三句內 to 故說“同品定有性”也, Tang’s (2015, p.334) translation reads:

[In sum,] among the first three possibilities [, i.e. possibilities (1)–(3)], only some forms [, i.e. cases (2) and (8)], under the third possibility are correct reason, all the other possibilities [, i.e. possibilities (1) and (2),] contain [only] fallacious [reasons]. In order to exclude those fallacious possibilities and to show that the [third] possibility itself is devoid of fallacy [in regard with the reason’s relation to sapakṣa], therefore, [we] say that [the second characteristic must be “the reason’s] being certainly present in similar instances” (tong pin ding you xing 同品定有性).
(1.2.1.2.3.3. Manifesting Third Characteristic 顯第三相)

"異品遍無性"者，顯第三相。“異”者“別”義，所立無處即名“別”、“異”。“品”者“聚類”，非“體類”義，許無體故。不同同品“體類”解“品”。隨體有、無，但與所立別異聚類即名“異品”。(105c07–c10)

“The nature of being universally absent from the dissimilar group” is meant to manifest the third characteristic. “Dissimilar” means “different,” the place where the property to be proved is absent is named “different” or “dissimilar.” “Group” means “type as gathering (julei 聚類)” but not “type of entity,” because the dissimilar group is allowed to have no entity. This is different from the “group” concerning the similar group, which is understood as “type of entity.” No matter whether [the dissimilar group] has the entity or not, as long as it is a group gathering [of instances with property] different from and dissimilar to the property to be proved, it can be named “dissimilar group.”

(164) 古因明云：“與其同品相違或異說名‘異品’”。如立“善”宗，不善違害，故名“相違”。苦樂、明闇、冷熱、大小、常無常等，一切皆爾。要別有體違害於宗，方名“異品”。或說與前所立有異名為“異品”。如立“無常”，除無常外自餘一切苦、無我等，慮、礙等義皆名“異品”。陳那以後皆不許然，如“無常”宗，無常無處即名“異品”，不同先古。

《理門》破云：“非與同品相違或異。若相違者，應唯簡別。”謂彼若非無所立處名為“異品”，要相違法名“異品”者，應唯簡別。是則唯立相違之法簡別同品，不是返遮宗、因二有。若許爾者，則一切法應有三品，如立“善”宗，“不善”違害，唯以簡別名為“異品”， 無記法無簡別故，便成第三品非善非不善故。此中容品既望“善”宗非相違害，豈非第三？由此應知無所立處即名“異品”，不善、無記既無所立，皆名“異品”，便無彼過。

500 無記之法 YRZLS St, 無記法 YRZLS j. “Zhi 之” is a structural auxiliary word here, whether it exists or not does not make the meaning different.
The ancient [master of the] science of reasons says, “what is contradictory to or different (yi 異, anya) from the similar group is named ‘dissimilar group.’” For example, if the thesis “being good” is set forth, and then evil contradicts, such is called “contradictory.” All the cases such as pain and pleasure, light and dark, cold and hot, big and small, permanent and impermanent are the same. Another particular entity that contradicts the thesis[-property] is required to become “dissimilar group.” Alternatively, what is different from the former [property] to be proved is named “dissimilar group.” For example, if “impermanent” is set forth, all the qualities other than impermanent, such as pain, no-Self, intelligent, corporeal, and so on, are called “dissimilar group.” Since Dignāga, neither [of these two definitions of “dissimilar group”] is accepted, for example, to the thesis “being impermanent,” whatever is not impermanent can be called “dissimilar group.”

To refute [the ancient master of the science of reasons], the Nyāyamukha states, “[the dissimilar group] is not what is contradictory to or different from the similar group. If it were contradictory [to the similar group], then it could merely represent the exclusion (jianbie 簡別, vyavaccheda) of [the similar group].”

It means that if that [ancient master] does not consider the loci wherever [the property] to be proved is absent but [the subjects with] contradictory property as “dissimilar group,” then [such a “dissimilar group”] can merely represent the exclusion of [the similar group]. In this way, [the instances with] contradictory property are merely set forth to exclude the similar group but not to negate the existence of both the thesis[-property] and the

501 YZML, T1628 p.2a02–a03. Tucci (1930, pp.22–23): But this vipakṣa is neither contradictory to, nor what is simply different from the sapakṣa. In fact if it were contradictory to the positive instance, it would necessarily represent the mere exclusion of that.

= PS 3.19: tato 'nyas tadviruddho vā nāsapakṣo dvidhāpi hi | hetvabhāvo viruddhāc ca vyavacchedah prasajyate ||

reason[-property]. If this [definition] is allowed, then all the properties should have three groups, for example, if the thesis “being good” is set forth, then evil is contradictory [to it], so only [evil instances] can be called “dissimilar group” because of exclusion; but since the morally neutral dharmas are not excluded, they would become the third group, which is neither good nor evil. Since such a neutral group is not contradictory to the thesis “being good,” is it not the third [group]? Thus, it should be known that wherever [the property] to be proved is absent, it should be called “dissimilar group”; since evil and morally neutral [instances] do not possess [the property] to be proved, they should both be called “dissimilar group.”

In addition, to refute “what is different [from the similar group] is named ‘dissimilar group,’” the Nyāyamukha states, “if it were different [from the similar group], then there should be no reason.”502 It means that if just what is different from the thesis[-property] is called “dissimilar group,” then there should be no conclusive and correct reason. For example, if “sound is impermanent” is set forth, all [the instances with] [other] qualities of sound such as no-Self, painful, and empty should be called “dissimilar group.” Since the reason “being produced” is present in the dissimilar [group], how can it be called a conclusive reason? It is said that whatever is implied by the postulated meaning of the thesis-property, that attaches to the property to be proved, is also proved by the reason, since [in this case] these [properties] implied by the postulated meaning are called “dissimilar group” and can also be proved by the reason, all the inferences should have no correct reason. Thus, it should be known that just the loci wherever [the property] to be proved is absent should be called “dissimilar group.”

(165)此亦有二: 一, 宗異品, 故下論云“異品者, 謂於是處無其所立”; 二, 因異品, 故下論云, “異法者, 若於是處說所立無, 因遍非有”。然論多說宗之異品名為“異品”, 宗類異故; 因之異品名為“異法”, 宗法異故。何須二異? 因之無

502 YZML, T1628 p.2a03. Tucci (1930, p.23): If, on the other hand, the negative instance is considered as what is simply different, then the necessary consequence is, that there would be no reason.
處說宗異品，欲顯其因隨宗無故；宗之無處說因異品，顯因無處宗必先無。
(106a04–a11)

This also includes two kinds: The first is the dissimilar group of the thesis (宗異品，vipakṣa), so this treatise says below that “the dissimilar group means wherever what is to be proved is absent”504; the second is the dissimilar group of the reason (因異品), so this treatise says below that “[the example by] the dissimilar property means wherever [the thesis-property] to be proved is said to be absent, the reason is universally non-present.”505 However, this treatise refers to the dissimilar group of the thesis as “dissimilar group” most of time, because [it belongs to] a sort dissimilar to that of [the property in] the thesis; the dissimilar group of the reason is called “dissimilar property (yifa 異法, vaidharmya),” because it is dissimilar to a property of the thesis[-subject] (i.e., the reason-property). Why are two kinds of dissimilar [group] needed? Because where the reason is absent, the dissimilar group of the thesis is mentioned, for it is intended to show that following the thesis[-property], the reason is also absent; where the thesis[-property] is absent, the dissimilar property of the reason is mentioned, for it is intended to show wherever the reason is absent, the thesis[-property] must be absent first.

(166) 且宗異品，何者名“異”? 若異有法，同法所依有法必506別，亦應名“異”。若異於法，敵本不許所立之法於有法有，一切異法皆應名“同”。此“異品”者不別取二，總取一切無宗法處名“宗異品”，故論說言“謂於是處無其所立”。(106a11–a15)

Moreover, concerning the dissimilar group of the thesis, what is named “dissimilar”? If it is dissimilar to the property-possessor, then the substratum of the similar property is certainly different from the property-possessor, so it should also be called “dissimilar.” If it is dissimilar to the property [of the thesis], then the opponent does not accept the

503 顯 YRZLSt, 見 YRZLSj. “Xian 顯” and “jian 見” can both mean “show” here.
504 = vipakṣo yatra sādhyam nāsti | (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.3, 2–3).
505 = vaidharmayenāpi yatra sādhyādhāve hetor abhāva eva kathyate | (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.3, 8–9).
506 各 YRZLSt, 必 YRZLSj. “Ge 各” means “respectively,” which does not make sense here; “bi 必” means “certainly.”
property to be possessed by the property-possessor originally, so all [the instances] with
dissimilar property should be called “similar.”

Concerning “dissimilar group” here,
neither of these two (“dissimilar to the property-possessor” and “dissimilar to the
property of the thesis”) should be chosen individually, but the loci wherever the
property of the thesis is absent should all be chosen as “the similar group of the thesis,”
so this treatise says, “[the dissimilar group] means wherever what is to be proved is
absent.”

Moreover, regarding “whatever is permanent is seen to be unproduced, like ether, and
so on,” [in the definition of dissimilar group], this just omits [the postulated
meaning] but argues directly about “impermanent,” and only sets forth “permanent”
as “dissimilar group.” Based on the principle above, [the dissimilar group] does not
possess the properties attached to what is to be proved (i.e., the postulated meaning).
Wherever the thesis[-property] is absent, the reason must be universally absent, and
such is called “the dissimilar group of the reason.” Although the dissimilar group [refers
to that of the thesis], the dissimilar [group] of the reason can also be referred to, for it
shows that wherever the thesis[-property] is absent the reason is certainly absent
accordingly, and inversely, wherever the reason is present, the thesis certainly pervades
accordingly. The negative concomitance should put forward the thesis[-property] first
and the reason[-property] later because if not so, some other property would be proved.
Now it is shown that the proof is originally meant to establish the thesis, and if [the reason] is absent from the dissimilar group [of the thesis], then the thesis can be established, so [“dissimilar group”] refers to the dissimilar [group] of the thesis mainly and the dissimilar [group] of the reason subordinately. The reason should be certainly universally absent from that dissimilar group of the thesis, so “the nature of being universally absent from the dissimilar group” is said.

(168) 问: 言“遍無性”已顯無因宗必隨無，何須言“異品”？既云“異品”即顯無宗因亦隨無，何須復云“遍無性”也？
答: 但言“遍無”不言“異品”，乃顯此因成相違法等，非離於宗返成宗義。但言“異品”不言“遍無”，亦顯此因成不定等，非定成宗。今顯此因定成於宗，同品定有，於異品上決定遍無，故說“異品遍無性”也。(106a23–b01)

Question: Since when “the nature of being universally absent” is said, it can already show that wherever the reason is absent the thesis follows [to be absent], why must “from the dissimilar group” be said? Since when “from the dissimilar group” is said, it can show wherever the thesis is absent the reason follows [to be absent], why must “the nature of being universally absent” be said in addition?
Answer: If only “being universally absent” is said but not “from the dissimilar group,” then it implies that this reason proves the contradictory property, and so on, but does not negate the thesis to prove it in an inverse way. If only “from the dissimilar group” is said but not “being universally absent,” then it also implies that this reason becomes inconclusive, and so on, which cannot certainly prove the thesis. Now, in order to show that [the reason] can certainly prove this thesis, and it is certainly present in the similar group but definitely universally absent from the dissimilar group, “the nature of being universally absent from the dissimilar group” is said.

(169) 由此應為四句分別:
有異品非遍無，謂宗異品非因遍無，即九句中除二、五、八餘六句是。一、三、七、九四是不定，四、六相違，如前配釋。
Thus, there should be four forms [of cases] for distinguishing [distinct cases of reasons]:

(1) Some is not universally absent from the dissimilar group; it refers to [the case that] the dissimilar group of the thesis does not universally exclude the reason, namely the other six forms than the second, fifth, eighth in the nine forms. The first, third, seventh and ninth ones belong to inconclusive reasons, and the fourth and the sixth belong to contradictory reasons.

(2) Some is universally absent from not the dissimilar group; it refers to [the case that] the reason is universally absent from other places than the dissimilar group of the thesis, namely the fourth, fifth, sixth ones in the nine forms. The fourth and the sixth belong to contradictory reasons, and the fifth belongs to inconclusive reasons.

(3) Some is universally absent from the dissimilar group; it refers to [the case that] from the dissimilar group of the thesis the reason is universally absent, namely the second, fifth, eighth ones in the nine forms. The second and the eighth ones are correct reasons, but the fifth belongs to inconclusive reasons.

(4) Some is not universally absent from not the dissimilar group; it refers to [the case that] the reason is not universally absent from other places than the dissimilar group of the thesis, namely the other six forms than the fourth, fifth, sixth in the nine forms. The second and the eighth ones are correct reasons, but the other four belong to inconclusive reasons.
Concerning the forms [of cases] for distinguishing [distinct cases] explained above, [the reasons] with no fallacy regarding both the forms [of cases] here [related to the dissimilar group] and the forms [of cases] there [related to the similar group] belong to correct reasons. Some reasons are not fallacious regarding the forms [of cases] here, [i.e., the forms related to the dissimilar group,] but regarding the forms [of cases] there, [i.e., the forms related to the similar group,] they are fallacious, so [all the cases] should be distinguished one by one as above. In the first three forms [of cases], only parts of the third form [of cases] belong to correct reasons; all the others are fallacious. In order to exclude those fallacies, “the nature of being universally absent from the dissimilar group” is said.

(170)問：此三相中，何故不言“遍是宗品性”而云“法性”? 同、異二相何故不言“同定有法性”、“異遍無法性”而皆云“品”? 答：宗一所立，總說為宗，狹不說“品”：喻寬能立，皆說“品”字。以因成宗，非成二品，初相云“法”，後二不言。(106b14–b18)

Question: In these three characteristics, why is [the first characteristic] not named “the nature of being universally a property of the group of the thesis,” but as “the nature of [being universally] a property [of thesis-subject]”? Why are the characteristics related to similar and dissimilar not named “the nature of the property’s being certainly present in the similar property” and “the nature of the property’s being universally absent from the dissimilar” but with the word “group”?511

Answer: The thesis[-subject] is just the sole [subject] of what is to be proved; it is regarded as the thesis[-subject] as a whole. Thus, since [the thesis-subject] is narrow, the word “group” is not said [in the first characteristic]; since the [similar and dissimilar] instances are broad as [parts of] proof, the word “group” is said in both [the two

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510 This case refers to the fifth form that the dissimilar group of which possesses no reason and the similar group possesses no reason either.
511 The questions here are difficult to translate into English, because they are mainly about the usages of Chinese characters such as pin 品 and fa 法 in the names of the three characteristics.
512 “Narrow (xia 狹)” means the thesis-subject is merely single.
513 “Broad (kuan 寬)” means the similar and dissimilar instances can be a lot.
characteristics related to them]. Since the reason is meant to establish the thesis but not the two groups, the first characteristic [related to the thesis-subject] is named with the word “property,” but the latter two [characteristics related to the two groups] are not.

*(171)* 问：此之三相為具方成，為闕亦得？若具方成，何故前言闕無異品亦成正因？既不要具，何須三相？
答：要具三相。止異濫而成因，非闕喻依，故闕無而許正。同法本成宗義，無依不順成宗；異法本止濫非，濫止便成宗義。故同必須依體，異法無依亦成。此說有體成有體宗，故異體無亦具三相。(106b18–b25)

Question: Should [a reason] possess all these three characteristics for being correct or just some of them? If [a reason] must possess all for being correct, then why is it said above that when the dissimilar group is lacking, the reason is still possible to be correct? If [a reason] does not have to possess all, then why are three characteristics needed?

Answer: [A reason] should possess all the three characteristics. Stopping the overflow in the dissimilar [group] can make the reason established, but the substratum of the example (*yu yi* 喻依, *dṛṣṭāntāśraya* [of the example by dissimilarity]) is not related necessarily, so even if [the substratum of the example by dissimilarity] is lacking, [the reason] can also be accepted as correct. [The example by] the similar property is meant to establish the thesis; if the substratum [of the example by similarity] is absent, then the thesis cannot be established in a supporting way; [the example by] the dissimilar property is meant to stop the overflow, and once the overflow is stopped, then the thesis is established. Hence, the entity of the substratum of the similar [example] must exist, but that of [the example by] the dissimilar property can be absent. This means that [the substratum of the example by similarity] with an existent entity can establish a thesis[-subject] with an existent entity, so when the entity of the dissimilar [example’s substratum] is absent, [the reason] can also possess three characteristics.

*(172)* 上來三句所說過者，各自句中四句之過。若談闕過，闕有二種：一，無體闕；二，有體闕。(106b25–b27)
Concerning the fallacies of the three characteristics expounded above, there are four forms of each characteristic about fallacies, but if the fallacies of incompleteness are to be expounded, then there are two kinds of incompleteness: The first is the incompleteness in the case of no existent entity (wuti que 無體闕); the second is the incompleteness in the case of an existent entity (youti que 有體闕).

(173) 無體闕者，謂不陳言，但在三支，非在三相。若陳因言，必有體闕，三相即義故非無體。無體闕者，此中相對，互說有、無，亦為四句：有闕因非同、異喻，有闕同、異喻非因，有闕因亦闕同、異喻，有非闕因非闕同、異喻。此四句中，初句闕一，第二句闕二，第三句闕三，第四句非過。如是乃至三立皆闕，三皆不闕。有闕皆過，不闕不定，雖有所陳，似立生故。三皆闕者，唯陳其宗，不陳餘故。如是合有三箇四句，一箇兩句。但名“闕過”非餘過攝。(106b27–c07)

The incompleteness in the case of no existent entity means that no statement is stated, so [the problem] is about the three members but not the three characteristics. If the reason statement has been stated [but there is still the fallacy of incompleteness], then it must be the incompleteness in the case of an existent entity, since the three characteristics as the meaning have been implied, this cannot be the case of no existent entity. Concerning the respective existence and non-existence [of the reason and examples], the incompleteness in the case of no existent entity also has four forms: (1) some [inference] lacks the reason but not the example by similarity and the example by dissimilarity; (2) some [inference] lacks the example by similarity and the example by dissimilarity but not the reason; (3) some [inference] lacks both the reason and the two examples by similarity and dissimilarity; (4) some [inference] lacks neither the reason nor the example by similarity and the example by dissimilarity. Among these four forms, the first form lacks one [member], the second form lacks two, the third form lacks three, the fourth form does not have the fallacy [of incompleteness]. There is thus the lack of all the three and the lack of none [as well as the forms in between]. The forms that are lacking are all fallacious, but the form that is not lacking is not certain [to be fallacious or not], because although [all members] are stated, it can still be a specious proof. The
lack of all three refers to [the case that] only the thesis is stated but not the others. Thus, in total, there are three types each comprising four forms and one type comprising two forms. They are just called “fallacy of incompleteness” but not contained in other fallacies.

Furthermore, the incompleteness in the case of an existent entity includes two kinds: the first kind regards the three characteristics of the reason as the proof, and although the three characteristics of the reason are expressed, the lack of the [correct] characteristic is called “incompleteness”; the second kind regards the three members, namely the reason and the two examples, as the proof, and although the entities of the members are stated, the lack of the connotation (i.e., the presentation of the relevant characteristic) is called “incompleteness.”

The three types each comprising four forms may refer to:
1. When the example by dissimilarity exists, (1), the reason is lacking but not the example by similarity; (2), the example by similarity is lacking but not the reason; (3), both are lacking; (4), neither is lacking.
2. The four forms concerning the reason and the example by dissimilarity when the example by similarity is lacking.
3. The four forms concerning the example by similarity and the example by dissimilarity when the reason is lacking.

The one type comprising two forms may refer to the form that all the three are lacking and the form that none is lacking.

The first kind of incompleteness refers to the case that the proving property in the reason member cannot fulfill some or all the three characteristics correctly. It is merely relevant to the reason member but not the two examples.

The second kind of incompleteness refers to the case that some or all of the reason member, the similar example and the dissimilar example cannot present its or their relevant characteristics properly. It takes the relevant characteristic as the connotation of each member.
Concerning the incompleteness of the [correct] characteristic regarding the three characteristics: (1) some [inference] lacks the first characteristic but not the last two; (2) some [inference] lacks the last two but not the first characteristic; (3) some [inference] lacks both the first characteristic and the last two; (4) some [inference] lacks neither the first characteristic nor the last two. Thus, all the three characteristics can be lacking, or there can be none lacking at all. There are three types each comprising four forms and one type comprising two forms. Only the form that the first characteristic is lacking belongs to the four fallacies of unestablished [reason], and then in this way, the lack of two [characteristics] and the lack of three belong to the fallacies of unestablished [reason], inconclusive [reason], and contradictory [reason] correspondingly, because they are all fallacies of the reason.

Concerning the incompleteness of the connotation regarding the reason and the two examples, which are stated as the proof, there are also three types each comprising four forms and one type comprising two forms: (1) some [inference] lacks the connotation of the reason (i.e., the first characteristic which should be presented by the reason) but not those of the last two, and it belongs to the four fallacies of unestablished [reason]; (2) some [inference] lacks the second (the connotation of the similar example, i.e., the second characteristic, which should be presented by the similar example) but not those of the first and the third, and it belongs to the fallacy that both the proof and what is to be proved are unestablished; (3) some [inference] lacks the third (the connotation of the dissimilar example, i.e., the third characteristic which should be presented by the dissimilar example) but not those of the first two, it belongs to the fallacy that both what is to be proved and the proof are non-excluded; (remaining forms:) in this way, there are also [three kinds of] lacking two, lacking three and lacking none. All the forms that are lacking are fallacious, while the form that is not lacking is not fallacious. Correspondingly, there are the four [fallacies] of unestablished [reason] regarding the reason, [the fallacy that] both the proof and what is to be proved are unestablished regarding the example by similarity, [the fallacy that] both what is to be proved and the
proof are non-excluded regarding the example by dissimilarity, and the cases of two or three of them committed together.

(175)賢愛論師、陳那菩薩等不以無體為闕，故唯六句。雖唯陳宗，元517無能立，何名能立缺減之過？諸德皆說總有七句，不言有能立以成過，但是闕能立過，故說七闕。(106c21–c25)

Master Bhadraruci, Bodhisattva Dignāga and others do not consider no existent entity518 as incompleteness, so there are only six forms [to them]. If merely the thesis is stated, then there is originally no proof, so how can it be called a fallacy of an incomplete proof? All the other masters assert that there should be seven forms in total; they do not say that the proof is needed to make the fallacies exist, but only take the incompleteness of the proof into consideration, so seven [fallacies of] incompleteness are advocated.

(176)問：《理門論》料簡九句云，“於同有及二，在異無是因，翻519此名相違，所餘皆不定”。謂九句中唯有法自相一違及五不定，餘四不成、一不定、三相違何故不攝？
答：以因親成於宗，所以說其相順；同、異成宗疎遠，故但標其順、違。由此餘過不攝之盡。(106c25–107a01)

Question: In order to distinguish the nine forms, the Nyāyamukha states, “here, that which is present in the similar kind or is in both ways [in the similar kind], and absent from the dissimilar kind is a [correct] reason; what is reversed from this is contradictory, and all the others are inconclusive.” This means that concerning the nine forms, there are only [the fallacy that] the reason proves the opposite of the self-form of the inferable property and five [fallacies] of inconclusive [reason], but why are the remaining ones,

517 從元 YRZLSt, 元 YRZLStj. “yuan 元” means “originally,” but “cong 從” cannot make any sense here.
518 No entity means none of the reason or example is stated.
519 In both YZML and this commentary above this character is written as “fan 翻,” however, “fan 翻” and “fan 返” can both take the same meaning here, i.e., “reverse.”
namely the four [fallacies] of unestablished [reason], the last one [fallacy] of inconclusive [reason], and three [fallacies] of contradictory [reason], not included?

Answer: The reason proves the thesis closely, so it is said to be supporting (shun 順) [the thesis] [in this verse]; the similar and dissimilar [examples] prove the thesis distantly, so only [their cases of] supporting or contradicting (wei 違) [the thesis] are indicated. Thus, the remaining fallacies are not all included.

Each of the three characteristics above has its own forms and [forms of] being lacking in pairs with others. Although this treatise does not expound them in sequence, the principle is certain. If distinguishing in detail, then there are even more cases. Now if one of the three forms of the first characteristic is taken to pair with [the forms of] the last two characteristics, then [groups of] four forms can be made: (1) some [reason] is...
“being a property of the thesis-subject but not universal” but not “being not certainly present in the similar group”; (2) some [reason] is “being not certainly present in the similar group” but not “being property of the thesis-subject but not universal”; (3) some [reason] is both “being property of the thesis-subject but not universal” and “being not certainly present in the similar group”; (4) some [reason] is neither “being property of the thesis-subject but not universal” nor “being not certainly present in the similar group.” In this way, the first form of the first characteristic can be paired with the four forms of the second characteristic, and then there are four types, each comprising four forms. This form can also be paired with the four forms of the third characteristic, and then there are also four types, each comprising four forms. Thus, there are eight types, each comprising four forms through pairing the first form of the first characteristic with the four forms of each of the other two characteristics. Then the remaining two forms of the first characteristic can be used to pair with the four forms of each of the last two characteristics; their cases are the same. Therefore, if the three forms of the first characteristic are used as starters to pair with the remaining [forms of the other two characteristics], there are three groups of eight [types of four] forms. Then in total, there are twenty-four types, each comprising four forms. The four forms of the second characteristic can be used to pair with the four forms of the third characteristic, and then being distinguished one by one, each [form of the second characteristic] makes four types of four forms, so there are sixteen types, each comprising four forms. In total, there are thus forty types, each comprising four forms. Some [of them] are correct, while the others are false. However, for fear of tedious text, they are just shown in brief.

(178)於前諸句總說頌曰:
“於宗法三相，
各對互隨無，
如應為不成，
不定、相違等。”
The forms above can be summarized in one verse:

"Concerning the three characteristics of the thesis[-subject]'s property, [they can be] analyzed separately (gedui 各對), lacking respectively (husuiwu 互隨無), [or paired with the lack of each other (geduihusuiwu 各對互隨無)]; accordingly [these cases] refer to unestablished [reasons], inconclusive [reasons], contradictory [reasons], and so forth."

“And so forth” means that the fallacies of incompleteness as well as all the fallacies of the example by similarity and the example by dissimilarity are completely included here. “The three characteristics of the thesis[-subject]'s property” are just the three characteristics of a [correct] reason, because the explanation concerns these three characteristics, and the reason establishes the thesis directly and has broad characteristics. “Analyzed separately, lacking respectively, [or paired with the lack of each other]” have four levels: The first is “analyzed separately”; [it means that] each of the three characteristics itself can be analyzed into forms, then regarding the first characteristic there are three [forms], and regarding each of the last two there are four [forms]. The second is “lacking respectively”; [it refers to] the forms in which the three

524 互 YRZLSj. / YRZLS："Hu 互" means "mutually," it is redundant here.
characteristics are lacking, respectively. Although there are many explanations in the past and at present in total, now only the three characteristics are concerned, and three types each comprising four forms and one type comprising two forms are contained in this verse. The third is “paired with the lack of each other”; [it means that] if each of the three forms of the first characteristic is paired with the four forms of each of the last two characteristics, then [two groups of twelve types of] four forms can be made based on the existence and non-existence of each (which makes twenty-four types). Moreover, using each of the four forms of the second characteristic to pair with the four forms of the third characteristic, then [sixteen types of] four forms can be made based on the existence and non-existence of each. In total, there are forty types, each comprising four forms. The fourth is “paired with each other” (geduihusui 各對互隨), [it means that] based on the three characteristics of a [correct] reason accordingly, if there is a fallacy on the first characteristic, then it is called “[the fallacy of] unestablished [reason]”; if there is a fallacy on the last two characteristics, then it is called “[the fallacy of] inconclusive [reason]”; if there is a fallacy of being contradictory regarding these [last] two characteristics, then it is called “[the fallacy of] contradictory [reason].” Concerning the cases that members are lacking, respectively, if the reason is lacking, then it is called “[the fallacy of] unestablished [reason]”; if the similar [example] is lacking, then it is called “[the fallacy that] both the proof and what is to be proved are unestablished”; if the dissimilar [example] is lacking, then it is called “[the fallacy that] both what is to be proved and the proof are non-excluded.” If all the three members are present, but each of the proponent and the opponent considers his own to be correct respectively, then it is called “[the fallacy of] the contradictory conclusive reason.” Hence, “and so forth” is said. All the fallacies are thus included completely. Herein, there are forty-five types each comprising four forms, one type comprising three forms, one type comprising two forms, or three forms of the lack of lacking one.

525 The forty-five types each comprising four forms here refer to the two types in terms of “analyzed separately,” plus the three types in terms of “lacking respectively,” plus the forty types in terms of “paired with the lack of each other.”

526 The one type comprising three forms refers to the one type with respect to the first characteristic in terms of “analyzed separately.”

527 The one type comprising two forms refers to the one type in terms of “lacking respectively,” namely the forms in
three forms of lacking two,\textsuperscript{528} and so forth. Above is called “explaining the three characteristics of the thesis[subject]’s property briefly.”

\textbf{(1.2.2.1.2.2.4. Explaining Respectively 別釋)}

\textbf{(1.2.2.1.2.2.4.1. Question 問)}

\textsuperscript{(XIV)}論：云何名為“同品”、“異品”？(107b09)

YRZL: What are called “similar group” and “dissimilar group”?  
NP 2.2: \textit{kah punaḥ sapākṣaḥ| ko vā vipākṣa iti||} (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.2, 7–p.3, 1).

\textsuperscript{(179)}述曰：四別釋有二：初，問，後，答。此問也。(107b09–b10)

YRZLS: The fourth part, namely explaining respectively, includes two sections: The first is a question; the second is the answer. This is the question.

\textsuperscript{(180)}何故三相不問、釋初？

答：有二釋：一者，同品、異品各各有二，一者\textsuperscript{529}宗同、異，二者\textsuperscript{530}因同、異。今説宗同、異，恐濫因同、異，故偏問之。初相無濫，故不須簡。

問：遍是宗法，宗有別總，義亦有濫，何故不徵？

答：因於有、無說宗同、異，宗成順、違說因同、異，故於宗、因同、異不定，為簡此過，遂別徵二。由因但是有法宗法。成於法故，不是總宗及法之法。無濫可遮，故不徵釋。此問二體相未\textsuperscript{531}顯故。

二者，“宗”是有法，上已明之，二品未明，故須徵釋。(107b10–b19)

\textsuperscript{528} According to Zhizhou in YRZLSH in X854 p.853b02–b03, these two groups belong to the incompleteness in the case of no existent entity (\textit{wuti que}無體闕), since the forty-five types belong to the incompleteness in the case of an existent entity (\textit{youti que}有體闕).

\textsuperscript{529} 一 YRZLS, 一者 YRZLSj. “一” is “first,” and “者” is an auxiliary word following the ordinal number. No difference between these two here.

\textsuperscript{530} 二者 YRZLS, 二者 YRZLSj. Both mean “second” here.

\textsuperscript{531} The text reads “cheng 成,” but “成” seems inexplicable here, another possibility provided by Zhizhou in his YRZLSQ in X853 p.814b02–b07 reads “\textit{wei 未},” i.e., “not yet,” then this sentence means that since the two groups have not been interpreted yet, such a question is raised, and then they will be interpreted below. This has also been discussed by Zenju in IRMS in T2270 p.281 b07–b21 with another reading “\textit{lai 来},” but “未” is still chosen.
[Question:] Among the three characteristics, why is the first one not questioned and explained [but the other two]?

Answer: There are two explanations: First, both the similar group and dissimilar group have two [kinds]: the first are the similar and dissimilar [groups] of the thesis, the second are the similar and dissimilar [groups] of the reason. Now the similar and dissimilar [groups] of the thesis are being expounded, and for fear of being confused with the similar and dissimilar [groups] of the reason, [the similar and dissimilar groups of the thesis] are asked about individually. However, the first characteristic has no problem of confusion, so it does not need to be distinguished.

Question: Concerning [the nature of] being universally a property of the thesis, the thesis contains separate parts and its whole, so there should also be some confusion. Why is it not questioned?

Answer: Based on whether the reason is present or not, the similar and dissimilar groups of the thesis are expounded, while based on whether the thesis is supported or contradicted, the similar and dissimilar groups of the reason are expounded, so when the similar and dissimilar [groups] of the thesis and reason are not definitely fixed yet, in order to exclude the fallacy [of confusing them], these two (the similar and dissimilar groups of the thesis) are questioned separately. The reason is just a property of the property-possessor of the thesis. Since it is meant to prove the [thesis-]property, it is not a property of the whole thesis or the [thesis-]property. There is thus no overflow to negate, so it does not need to be questioned. This question is raised because the entities and characteristics of the two groups have not yet been clarified.

Second, the word “thesis” [in the nature of being universally a property of the thesis] just refers to the property-possessor. This point has been explained above, but the two groups have not been explained yet, so they need to be questioned and explained.

(1.2.2.1.2.2.4.2. Answer 答)

532 The “zong 宗” character, i.e., thesis, refers not only to the thesis-subject in this question but also to the whole thesis member.
533 Regarding their definitions, these two kinds of group do not have to base on each other in fact.
(1.2.2.1.2.2.4.2.1. The Similar Group 同品)

(1.2.2.1.2.2.4.2.1.1. Exhibiting the Entity Entirely 總出體)

(YRZL): The group of [things with] quality equal [to the thesis-subject] by [their] common possession of the property to be proved is named “similar group.”

NP 2.2: sādhyadharmasāmānyena samāno 'ṛthaḥ sapakṣaḥ | (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.3, 1).

(YRZLS): The answer to the question above includes two parts: The first is about the similar [group]; the second is about the dissimilar [group]. [The answer about] the similar [group] also includes two parts: the first exhibits the entity entirely; the second cites an instance individually. This is the first one.

(107b20–b22)
Regarding “the property to be proved (suolifa 所立法, sādhyadharma),” “to be proved” refers to the thesis, “property” refers to the qualifier, “common (jun 均, sāmānya)” means equivalent, “equal (deng 等, samāna)” means similar, “quality (yi 義, artha)” means essence, and “group” means type, namely the loci where the property are either present in or absent from. The general meaning is that if something belongs to the type of entity that possesses the essence equivalent and similar to the property of the entire thesis to be proved, it is named “similar group.” Here it refers to the similar group of the thesis. The thesis to be proved refers to the inseparable connection between the self-nature and the distinguishing-feature proved by the reason. The similar group is also the same, for the similar group just refers to the type [with a connection which is] similar to the inseparable connection by the mutual qualification of the property to be proved.534

If the gathering of all the types with similarity to the entire thesis to be proved is named “similar group,” then all the other various properties implied by the connotation (yìxù 意許) (but not stated by the literal words directly) should be included in the entire thesis. For example, the no-Self of ether in the dissimilar group is similar to the no-Self of sound, which is implied by the connotation, [ether with the property of no-Self but in the dissimilar group] should also be called “similar group.” If the gathering of types with similarity to the property-possessor to be proved is named “similar group,” then all the theses should have no similar group, because for example, to sound as the property-possessor, a pot cannot be the similar group. These will be interpreted further below in the part of “example.” In order to negate these two [explanations of “similar group”], “the property to be proved” is marked in general for distinguishing.

If a gathering consists of types with similarity to the property argued about by the host (the proponent) and the guest (the opponent) and also proved by the reason, then it should be named “similar group”; since the thesis qualified by the qualifying property is established by the reason, this property [to be proved] is cited to illustrate [the definition of] that gathering (i.e., the similar group).

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534 This sentence is quite confusing, for it does not accord with both NP/YRZL and the context here. 
問：若爾，聲上無我等義非因所立，應名“異品”？
答：彼若不許聲有法有，亦成異品，宗、因無故。若彼許有，為因所成，隨意所詣亦名“同品”，故有有法差別相違。(107c08–c11)

Question: If so, then the properties like no-Self of sound are not proved by the reason, should [the instances with no-Self] be called “dissimilar group”? 
Answer: If he (the proponent) does not accept the property-possessor, namely sound, to possess [no-Self], then [the instances with no-Self] should belong to the dissimilar group, because there is no [no-Self] in the thesis and the reason. If he allows [the property-possessor] to possess [no-Self], then [no-Self] is established by the reason and argued as the connotation, and [the instances with no-Self] should also be called “similar group,” so there is [the fallacy that] the reason proves the opposite of the distinction of the property-possessor.

(1.2.2.1.2.4.2.1.2. Citing an Instance Individually 別指法)

(XVI)論：如立無常，瓶等無常是名“同品”。(107c12)
YRZL: For example, when sound is to be proved impermanent, a pot, and so on, which are impermanent, are called “similar group.”
NP 2.2: tadyathā anitye śabde sādhye ghaṭādir anityah sapakṣah|| (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.3, 1–2).

(184)述曰：此別指法。如立宗中陳無常法聚名“宗”者，瓶等之上亦有無常，故瓶等聚名為“同品”。此中但取因成法聚名為“同品”。故《瑜伽》言：“同類者，謂隨所有法望所餘法，其相展轉少分相似。”有五相似：一，相狀；二，自體；三，業用；四，法門；五，因果。今此中說法門相似。(107c12–c18)

535 This means that since the proponent does not accept the thesis-subject to possess no-Self, no-Self does not exist in the thesis; since no-Self is not to be proved by the reason, it does not exist in the reason either.
YRZLS: This is [the part of] citing an instance individually. For example, if the gathering of impermanent subjects stated in the thesis is called “thesis,” then impermanent is also possessed by a pot, and so on, so the gathering of a pot, and so on, is called “similar group.” Herein only the gathering of subjects that can be established by the reason is taken as “similar group.” Thus, the Yogaśāraṇābhuṭi states, “similar type refers to whatever with a characteristic of a certain similarity to the present property against others.”

There are five kinds of similarity: The first is [the similarity in] mark (xiangzhuang 相狀, liṅga); the second is [the similarity in] self-entity (ziti 自體, svabhāva); the third is [the similarity in] activity (yeyong 業用, karma); the forth is [the similarity in] property (famen 法門, dharma); and the fifth is [the similarity in] cause and effect (yin guo 因果, hetupala).

Now the similarity in property is expounded.

(1.2.1.2.4.2.2. The Dissimilar Group 異品)

(1.2.1.2.4.2.2.1. Exhibiting the Entity Entirely 總出體)

(YVII)論：異品者，謂於是處無其所立。(107c19)

YRZL: The dissimilar group means wherever what is to be proved is absent.

NP 2.2: vipakṣo yatra sādhyam nāsti | (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.3, 2–3).

(XIV)述曰：下解異品有二：一，總出體；二，別指法。此初也。(107c19–c20)

YRZLS: The interpretation of the dissimilar group includes two parts: The first exhibits the entity entirely; the second cites an instance individually. This is the first.

(XV)“處”謂處所，即除宗外餘一切法，體通有、無。若立有宗，同品必有體，所以前言“均等義品”，異品通無體，故言“是處”。“所立”謂宗不相離性，謂若諸

\[536 = \text{YBhHv 3.24: } sārūpyam katamat. yat kasya cid dharmasya kena cid sādṛśyena kasya cid eva sādṛśyam. \text{ Translated based on the Chinese context.}\]

\[537 = \text{YBhHv 3.24: } tat paścavidham draṣṭavyam, liṅgasādṛśyam svabhāvasādṛśyam karmasādṛśyam dharmasādṛśyam hetupalasādṛśyam ca.}\]
法處無因之所立即名“異品”，非別無彼言所陳法及與有法名為“異品”。過如前說。此中不言“無所立法”，前於同品已言均等“所立法”訖，此准可知。但無所立，義已成故。《理門》亦云“若所立無說名‘異品’”，但無所立即是異品。同品不說“處”，異體通無故。《瑜伽》說言，“異類者，謂所有法望所餘法，其相展轉少不相似”。故非一切全不相似，但無隨應因所成故。與同相違亦有五種。

“Wherever (chu 處, yatra)” means whatever locus, namely [the loci] all the other properties than the thesis[-property] [are present in], the entities [of those loci, namely the dissimilar group] can be either existent or non-existent. If a thesis with an existent [entity] is set forth, then the similar group must be with an existent entity, so “group of [things with] quality equal [to the thesis-subject] by [their] common possession” is said above, but the dissimilar group can also be with non-existent entity, so “wherever” is said. “What is to be proved” refers to the inseparable connection; it implies that the loci of properties where what is to be proved by the reason is absent should be called “dissimilar group,” but not where the property stated by literal words or the property-possessor is absent. The fallacies [of understanding “dissimilar group” as where the property stated by literal words or the property-possessor is absent] are the same as [those concerning the similar group] above. Here [the treatise] does not say “the property to be proved is absent” because in the [part of] similar group it has already been mentioned that [the object] to equate to is “the property to be proved,” and based on this, it can be known [that the word “property” is just omitted]. The Nyāyamukha also states, “wherever what is to be proved is absent is called ‘dissimilar group,’” so something belongs to the dissimilar group as long as what is to be proved is absent from it. “Wherever” is not said in the [definition of] similar group, [but in the definition of dissimilar group,] because the entity of the dissimilar [group] can also be non-existent [besides existent]. The Yogācārabhūmi states, “dissimilar type refers to whatever with a characteristic of certain dissimilarity to the present property against others.”

538 YZML, T1628 p.2a01–a02. Tucci (1930, p.22): the absence of the probandum (non-P) is called: “negative instance” vipakṣa.
539 = YBhHv 3.25: vairūpyaṃ katamat. yat kasya cit kena cid eva vaisādṛśyena kasya cid eva vaisādṛśyam. Translated
it does not mean that [the instances in the dissimilar group] do not have to be completely
dissimilar in all the aspects [to the thesis-subject], because they should not merely
possess [the property] that is meant to be established by the reason. There are also five
kinds of dissimilarity in contrast to those of similarity.

(1.2.2.4.2.1.2.2.4.2.2.2. Citing an Instance Individually 別指法)

(YRZL) 論：若有是常，見非所作，如虛空等。(108a04)
YRZL: Whatever is permanent is seen to be unproduced, like ether, and so on.
NP 2.2: yan nityaṃ tad akṛtakaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ yathā ākāśam iti|| (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.3, 9–10).

(188)問：何故前說宗之同品不兼定有，此説異品兼釋540遍無？
答：有二解：

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540 解 YRZLS, 釋 YRZLSj. Both “jie 解” and “shi 釋” can mean “explain,” “illustrate” or “interpret.” They are both possible here, but a repeat in the next paragraph reads “shi 釋.”
一者影顯\textsuperscript{541}, 同品之中但為簡別因之同品，顯異亦爾，不要解於定無之相，故文略之。異品之中乘言便故，兼釋遍無，顯同亦爾。

二者同品順成，但許有因即成同品，易故不解決定有性；異品止濫，必顯遍無方成止濫，故解異品兼解遍無同品因也。為顯同、異二品別故。(108a0–a16)

Question: Why does [this treatise] not elucidate [the nature of] being certainly present [in the similar group] when it expounds the similar group of the thesis, but elucidates [the nature of] being universally absent [from the dissimilar group] when it explains the dissimilar group?

Answer: There are two answers:

First, [the parts of the similar and dissimilar groups] manifest each other like the shadows [of objects]. In [the part of] the similar group, it is just meant to distinguish the similar group of the reason, but it can manifest that the dissimilar group is the same (i.e., like the similar group, the dissimilar group refers to that of the thesis but not that of the reason), and [the part of similar group] is not meant to expound the characteristic of [the reason’s] being certainly absent [from the dissimilar group], so the text omits it (the similar group of the reason). In the [part of] the dissimilar group, [the treatise] elucidates [the nature of] being universally absent [from the dissimilar group] incidentally at the same time, it manifests that [the part of] the similar [group] is also the same (so the nature of being certainly present can also be elucidated incidentally).

Second, the similar group is meant to establish [the thesis] in a supporting way; something belongs to the similar group as long as the reason is present in it. This is easy to explain, so the nature of being certainly present does not have to be expounded; the dissimilar group is meant to stop the overflow, and [the reason’s] being universally absent must be shown to complete stopping the overflow, so [the treatise] has to elucidate that the reason present in the similar group must be universally absent [from the dissimilar group] when it explains the dissimilar group. [The difference between the explanations of the similar and dissimilar groups] is meant to show the difference between the similar group and the dissimilar group.

\textsuperscript{541} 彰 YRZLSi, 顯 YRZLSj. “Zhang 彰” and “xian 顯” can both mean “manifest,” so they are both possible here.
Question: For example, when “impermanent” is set forth, the hair of a turtle does not possess the characteristic of permanently abiding, so it is impermanent, but it possesses a nature of non-existence forever, so it is also permanent. Why does [this treatise] not set up a group which is neither similar nor dissimilar?

Answer: The nature of being impermanent of sound refers to ceasing, and the entity of being produced refers to arising, but the hair of a turtle does not cease or arise, so since what is to be proved is not present [in it], it belongs to the dissimilar group. Therefore, there are only two kinds of instance but no [kind] that is neither similar nor dissimilar. [When the thesis “being permanent “is set forth], if [the entity of] the thesis[-property] “being permanent” is existent, then [the hair of a turtle] also belongs to the dissimilar group (because its entity is non-existent); if [the entity of the thesis-property “being permanent”] is non-existent, then [the hair of a turtle] belongs to the similar group.

(YIX) 論：此中所作性或勤勇無間所發性…(108a23)

YRZL: Herein, the property of being produced or the property of resulting immediately from effort…

NP 2.2: tatra kṛatakavāṃ prayatnānantarīyakatvaṃ vā ... (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.3, 3–4).

542 In Buddhism, the hair of a turtle is a typical example of non-existence.
述曰：五示法也。於中有三：初舉兩因；次成三相；後顯所成。此初也。（108a23–a25）

YRZLS: This is the fifth part, namely citing instances. There are three sections in this part: The first is cites two [correct] reasons; the second fits to the three characteristics; and the third shows what is to be established. This is the first one.

“此中”者，發端義，或於此所說因義之中。雙舉兩因者，略有三義：一，對二師；二，釋“遍”、“定”；三，舉二正。（108a25–a27）

“Herein” (cízhōng 此中, tatra) means introducing the beginning of the discussion, or “in regard to the reason explained here.” Citing both of these two reasons has three implications: first, against two schools; second, for illustrating “universal” and “certainly”; and third, for citing the two correct [forms].

[Regarding the first implication] “against the two schools,” the Śabdavādins include two kinds in total: First, [the *Śabdotpattivādin (shengshenglunzhe 聲生論者) claims that] sound is generated under certain conditions, and [once it is generated,] it is to be permanent and will not cease; second, [the Śabdābhivyaktivādin (shengxianlunzhe 聲顯論者) claims that] sound is originally permanent, but it has to be manifested under certain conditions, and then it can be audible, and when the condition-voice disappears,
it becomes inaudible again. The *Śabdotpattivādin is also the same [on this point] that [sound] is inaudible when certain conditions disappear but audible when certain conditions exist. Each of these [two] also has various parts inside with different opinions about a part or all of the internal or external sound, because of their different viewpoints about whether the [sound] as expresser has one single entity or multiple entities. If a Buddhist, against a *Śabdotpattivādin, sets forth “sound is impermanent, because of being produced,” then [such an inference] possesses the three characteristics [of a correct reason]; if against a Śabdābhivyaktivādin, he sets forth “because of [resulting from] effort” as the reason, then [such an inference] possesses the three characteristics [of a correct reason]; if against a *Śabdotpattivādin, he sets forth “because of [resulting from] effort” as the reason, then [such an inference] possesses the three characteristics [of a correct reason].

Concerning the various standpoints here, they are described in more detail in other texts like YRZLSQ, IRMS and Dacheng fayuanyilin zhang 大乘法苑義林章. The relevant passage in the Dacheng fayuanyilin zhang by Kuiji reads as follows in T1861 p.251b02–b19:

聲顯論者，聲體本有，待緣顯之，體性常住。此計有二：一者隨一一物各有一能詮常聲，猶如非擇滅，以尋、伺等所發音顯，此音無常。今用眾多常聲為體。二者一切法上但共有一能詮常聲，猶如真如，以尋、伺等所發音顯，此音無常。今者唯取一常聲為體，於其音響等但是顯緣，非能詮體。此二之中，各有二種：一計全分，内外諸聲皆是常住；二計一分，內聲是常，外聲無常，非能詮故，猶如音響。故聲顯論總束為四，計一、計多各通內、外。其聲生論計聲本無待緣生之，生已常住，由音響等所發生故。此計有二：一計體多，猶如非擇滅。二計體一，猶若真如，音響生緣，體無常法。今取新生常聲為體，以能詮故，誓非能詮。此各有二：一計全分，二計一分，準前應知。選束為四，計一、計多各通內、外。聲顯、聲生各有四種。

The Śabdābhivyaktivādin claims that the entity of sound is originally present, though it manifests under certain conditions, the nature of the entity is permanent. This [viewpoint] includes two sorts: First, each subject has its one permanent sound as the expresser accordingly, just like the annihilation of defilements not through the power of analysis, and [this kind of sound] is manifested by the voice from investigation, analysis and so on, and the voice is impermanent. Now the multiple permanent sounds are taken as entities. Second, all the things share merely one permanent sound as the expresser, just like the true thusness, and [this kind of sound] is manifested by the voice from investigation, analysis and so on, and this voice is impermanent. Now merely one permanent sound is taken as the entity, while the voice and so on are just the conditions of [sound’s] manifestation but not the entities of expresser. Each of these two includes two sub sorts: one takes [sound] as a whole, all the internal and external sounds are permanent; the other takes [sound] as various parts, the internal sound is permanent, while the external sound is impermanent, because [the external sound] cannot express, just like voices. Thus, the Śabdābhivyaktivāda (shengxianlun 聲顯論) includes four sorts in total according to their viewpoints about the number [of entity] as well as the internal and external. The *Śabdotpattivāda (shengshenglun 声生論) claims that sound is originally not existent but only generated under certain conditions, and once it is generated, it is to be permanent, for it is generated by voice and others. This [viewpoint] includes two sorts: First, there are multiple entities [of sound], just like the annihilation of defilements not through the power of analysis. Second, there is only one entity [of sound], just like the true thusness. The entities of the conditions for the generating of sound such as voice and so on are impermanent. Now the newly generated sound, which is permanent, is taken as the entity because it can express, while voice cannot express. Each of these two includes two sub sorts, one takes [sound] as a whole, the other takes [sound] as various parts, which can be known based on above. [The *Śabdotpattivādin] also includes four sorts in total according to their viewpoints about the number [of entity] as well as the internal and external. So each of the Śabdābhivyaktivāda and the *Śabdotpattivāda has four sorts.
forth “all sounds are impermanent” with “because of [resulting from] effort” as the reason, then [the reason] does not pervade the thesis-subject, and [the inference] belongs to [the fallacy that] the reason is unestablished to both the proponent and the opponent. Now [the treatise] shows that, against a *Śabdotpattivādin, the reason should be “because of being produced”; against a Śabdābhivyaktivādin, the reason should be “because of [resulting from] effort.”

Moreover, if “both the internal and external sounds are impermanent” is set forth, then the reason should be “because of being produced,” and if “the internal sound [is impermanent]” is set forth, then the reason should be “because of [resulting from] effort,” otherwise the reason would commit [the fallacy that] [the reason] is unestablished to both sides partially when both sides [accept the reason has its particular entity]. Thus, according to different situations, two reasons are stated [in this treatise].

545 For the text from 聲論師中 勤勇為因, Moriyama’s (2014, p.135) translation reads:

Among the Śabdavādins (shenglunshi 聲論師), there are generally two types: First, [the *Śabdotpattivādin claims that] sound comes into being in accordance with conditions, and [that] it is eternal and nonperishing. Second, [the Śabdābhivyaktivādin claims that] sound is originally permanent; it becomes manifest in accordance with conditions, and only then is it audible; when the conditions, together with the mere sound, cease, it returns [to its original nature] and becomes inaudible. It is the same in the case of the *Śabdotpattivādin: when the condition ceases, [the sound] is inaudible; because the condition exists, it is audible. These two masters both [accept] that there are differences [in the sound] concerning the parts, the whole, [what is] internal [to it], and [what is] external [to it], because of distinctions between single essence and multiple essences in the signifer. If the Buddhist claims the impermanence of sound against the *Śabdotpattivādin, the reason “being a product” (*krtakavta) fulfills the triple characteristics [of a valid reason]. However, if [the same thesis] is presented against the Śabdābhivyaktivādin, [the reason] “being a product” constitutes [the fallacious reason called] anyatarāsiddha. If [the thesis] is presented against the Śabdābhivyaktivādin, [the reason] “[coming into being] immediately after intentional effort” (*prayatnānantarīyakatva) fulfills the triple characteristics [of a valid reason]. If [the thesis] “all sounds are impermanent” is presented against the *Śabdotpattivādin with the reason “[coming into being] immediately after intentional effort,” [the reason] does not pervade the property of the subject [i.e., it does not fulfill the first characteristic of a valid reason, paksadharma] and thus, it constitutes [the fallacious reason called] ubhayāsiddha. It is now clear that one [should] present the reason “being a product” against the *Śabdotpattivādin, and the reason “[coming into being] immediately after intentional effort” against the Śabdābhivyaktivādin.
[Regarding the second implication] “for illustrating ‘universally’ and ‘certainly,’” if the reason “because of being produced” is to establish the thesis “being impermanent,” then all the three characteristics are “universally”; if the reason “[resulting from] effort” is to establish [the thesis “being impermanent”], then [the second characteristic with respect to] the similar [group] is “certainly” while the others are “universally.” To support the thesis, [the second characteristic with respect to] the similar [group] can also just be “certainly,” and it is not necessary to keep all three [characteristics] “universally.” Therefore, two reasons are cited.

[Regarding the third implication] “for citing the two correct [forms],” it shows that in the nine forms, the reason “because of being produced” here belongs to the second form, and the reason “[resulting from] effort” here belongs to the eighth form, both of which Dignāga regards as correct reasons, because they possess the three characteristics. Now in order to show that both of those two reasons possess the three characteristics, they are both stated. “Being produced” means [the subject] is produced by causes and conditions; it is to manifest the property of being generated. Concerning “resulting immediately from effort,” “effort” means exertion. If [the “effort”] is good, then it belongs to diligence; if it is evil, then it belongs to negligence; if it is moral neutral, then it belongs to intension. Because of the attention of mind, or investigation and analysis, or deliberation, and so forth, the wind in the navel, and so on, are stimulated.

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546 慧 YRZLSi. 惠 YRZLSj. “Hui 惠” can be a variant of “hui 慧.”
547 臍 YRZLSi, 齊 YRZLSj. “Qi 臍” means “navel,” while “qi 齊” is the adjective “uniform,” since the word here refers to the navel, it should be “qi 臍.”
and then the throat, lips, tongue, and so on, are stimulated one by one. Thus, [sound] results from the uninterrupted effort.

(1.2.2.1.2.2.5.2. Fitting to the Three Characteristics 成三相)

(XX)論：...遍是宗法，於同品定有，於異品遍無。(108b21)
YRZL: ... is universally a property of the thesis[-subject], certainly present in the similar group, and universally absent from the dissimilar group.
NP 2.2: ... *pakṣadharma eva sapakṣa evāsti vipakṣe nāsti eva | (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.3, 4–5).

(195)述曰：顯成三相。如上所說，生、顯二因皆具三相，故成正因，義應一一皆准前作若遍若闕。(108b21–b23)
YRZLS: [This is the part of] fitting to the three characteristics. As explained above, the reason against a *Śabdotpattivādin and that against a Śabdābhivyaktivādin both possess the three characteristics, so they belong to correct reasons, and their meanings [of characteristics] are either all universal or partially universal, respectively, according to the explanation above.

(1.2.2.1.2.2.5.3. Showing What Is to Be Established 顯所成)

(XX)論：是無常等因。(108b24)
YRZL: So [they] are [correct] reasons for [proving sound’s] being impermanent, and so on.
NP 2.2: ity aṇityādau hetuḥ || (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.3, 5).

(196)述曰：顯因所成。“等”者等取空、無我等，此上二因不但能成宗“無常”法，亦能成立空、無我等，隨其所應。非取一切。若“所作”因亦能成立言所陳“苦”等及“無常”宗意所許“苦”等一切法者，此因便有不定等過。謂立量云“聲亦是苦，
所作性故”，以無漏法而為異品，“所作性”因於其異品一分上轉，應為不定言。此所成聲，為如於瓶，所作性故，體是其苦，為如自宗道諦等法，所作性故，體非是苦？此既正因，無不定過。故此言“等”，隨其所應。故《瑜伽》說同、異喻云“少分相似”及“不相似”，不說“一切皆相似”、“一切皆不相似”，不爾一切便無異品。（108b24–c07）

YRZLS: [This is the part of] showing what is to be established by the reasons. “And so on” includes the property of being empty, no-Self, and so on, because the two reasons above cannot just establish the property “being impermanent” in this thesis but also establish [sound’s] being empty, being no-Self, and so on, according to circumstances. However, this “and so on” does not include all properties. If the reason “because of being produced” can prove both the [theses] “being painful,” and so on, stated by literal words, and all the properties including “being painful,” and so on, which are implied by the meaning of the thesis “being impermanent,” then this reason would commit the fallacy of inconclusive [reason], and so on. This means that if the inference “sound is also painful, because of being produced” is set forth, and the uncontaminated is taken as [instances of] the dissimilar group, then the reason “because of being produced” also resides in part of the dissimilar group, so this is inconclusive. Should the entity of sound established here be painful because of being produced like a pot, or should its entity not be painful because of being produced like the truth of the Way, and so on, of [Buddhist] own school? Since [these two reasons] are [regarded as] correct reasons, they should not have the fallacies of inconclusive [reasons]. Hence, the phrase “and so on” said here [refers to the properties] according to circumstances [in which correct inferences with the reason “because of being produced” can be formed]. Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi defines the example by similarity and the example by dissimilarity by saying “certain similarity” and “certain dissimilarity” but not “similarity in all aspects” or “dissimilarity in all aspects,” otherwise all subjects would have no dissimilar group.

For “certain similarity”: similar type refers to whatever with a characteristic of certain similarity to the present property against others = YBbh. T1579 p.357a01–a02: 同類者，謂隨所有法望所餘法，其相展轉少分相似 = YBbhHV 3.24: sārūpyam katamat. yat kasya cid dharmasya kena cid sadṛṣyena kasya cid eva sadṛṣyaṃ. For “certain dissimilarity”: dissimilar type refers to whatever with a characteristic of certain dissimilarity to the present property against others = YBbh. T1579 p.357a13–a14: 異類者，謂所有法望所餘法，其相展轉少不相
If a narrow reason can prove a narrow [thesis-]property, then this reason can also prove a [relevant] broad [thesis-]property, because [in the inference of the broad thesis-property,] although the reason is not universally present in the similar group universally, it must be universally absent from the dissimilar group. If a broad reason can prove a broad [thesis-]property, this [reason] definitely cannot prove a [relevant] narrow [thesis-]property, because the fallacy of inconclusive reason, and so on, regarding the dissimilar group will arise along with such an inference [with a relevant narrow thesis-property]. Therefore, an effort should be made for [thinking] this [over].

(197)因狭若能成立狭法，其因亦能成立寬法，同品之上雖因不遍，於異品中定遍無故。因寬若能成立寬法，此必不能定成狹法，於異品有不定過等隨此生故。是故於此應設劬勞也。(108c07–c11)

If a narrow reason can prove a narrow [thesis-]property, then this reason can also prove a [relevant] broad [thesis-]property, because [in the inference of the broad thesis-property,] although the reason is not universally present in the similar group universally, it must be universally absent from the dissimilar group. If a broad reason can prove a broad [thesis-]property, this [reason] definitely cannot prove a [relevant] narrow [thesis-]property, because the fallacy of inconclusive reason, and so on, regarding the dissimilar group will arise along with such an inference [with a relevant narrow thesis-property]. Therefore, an effort should be made for [thinking] this [over].
2.2.3. On the Example

(1.2.2.1.2.3. Showing the Characteristics of the Example 示喻相)

(1.2.2.1.2.3.1. Indicating [the Topic] 標舉)

(XXII)論: 喻有二種。(109a14)

YRZL: There are two sorts of example.

NP 2.3: ḍṛṣṭānto dvividhaḥ (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.3, 6).

(198)述曰：自下第三示喻之相。文段有三：一，標舉；二，列名；三，隨釋。此初也。(109a14–a15)

YRZLS: Now comes the third part, namely showing the characteristics of the example(s). The text includes three parts: The first indicates [the topic]; the second lists the names; and the third explains respectively. This is the first.

(199)梵云“達利瑟致案多”，“達利瑟致”云見，“案多”云邊。由此比況，令宗成立究竟名邊；他智解起，照此宗極，名之為“見”。故無著云：“立喻者，謂以所見邊與未所見邊和合正說。”師子覺言：“所見邊者，謂已顯了分，未所見邊者，謂未顯了分，以顯了分顯未顯了分，令義平等，所有正說，是名立喻。”今順方言，名之為“喻”。“喻”者，譬也，況也，曉也。由此譬況，曉明所宗，故名為“喻”。前雖舉因亦曉宗義，未舉譬況令極明了。今由此況宗義明極，故離因立獨明“喻”名。(109a15–a26)

In Sanskrit it reads “dat li fiët ti an ta”(達利瑟致案多), for “dat li fiët ti” (達利瑟致, ḍṛṣṭa-) means [what is] perceived (jian 見), and “an ta”(案多, -anta) means

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550 AS, reads “hehui 和會” in T1605 p.693e06.
551 此況 YRZLSj, 比況 YRZLS). “Ci 此” means “this,” while “bi 比” means “comparision” here, they both make sense, but “ci 此” can show the logical relationship in this passage better, so it is chosen.
552 Based on the Hanzi gujin yin biao, 達利瑟致案多 read dat li fiët ti an ta in the time of Xuanzang and Kuiji. These six Chinese characters read da li se zhi an duo in Mandarin nowadays.
side (bian 邊). Based on this comparison, the thesis is established absolutely, so it is named “side”; the intellectual understanding of the opponent raises and apprehends the absolute gist of the thesis very clearly, so it is named “perceived.” Therefore, Asaṅga says, “‘setting forth the example’ means making a proper statement that equates the side of what is perceived with the side of what is unperceived.” Buddhāsīṃha says, “the side of what is perceived refers to the recognized part, while the side of what is unperceived refers to the unrecognized part, so all the correct statements that use the recognized part to recognize the unrecognized part for making their implications equivalent and coordinated are named ‘setting forth the example.’” Now in order to adapt to the language here, it (the side of perceived) is named “example.” “Example” is the analogy, comparison, and illustration. Through this analogy or comparison, the thesis can be illustrated, so it is named “example.” Although the reason has been cited to demonstrate the thesis (in the inference) before, the example has not been cited above to make the thesis absolutely clear and definite. Now through this analogy, the meaning of the thesis becomes absolutely clear and definite, so apart from the reason, it gets the name “example” separately.

(1.2.2.1.2.3.2. Listing the Names 列名)

(XXIII)論：一者同法，二者異法。(109a27)

YRZL: The first one is [the example by] the similar property, the second is [the example by] the dissimilar property.

NP 2.3: sādharmyeṇa vaidharmyeṇa ca || (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.3, 6).

(200)述曰：二列名也。“同”者相似，“法”謂差別，共許自性名為“有法”，此上差別所立名“法”。今與彼所立差別相似名“同法”；無彼差別名為“異法”，“異”者別也。(109a27–b01)

YRZLS: This is the second part, namely listing the names. “Similar” means analogous, “property” means distinguishing-feature, and the self-nature equally accepted [by both
the proponent and the opponent] is named “property-possessor,” while its distinguishing-feature to be established is named “property.” Now what is analogous to its distinguishing-feature to be established is named “[the example by] the similar property”; what does not have its distinguishing-feature is named “[the example by] the dissimilar property,” for “dissimilar” means different.

(201)問：何故宗同異名“品”，因同異名“法”？
答：若同、異締宗不相離性種類名“品”；若不同、異於締宗，亦不同、異於宗有法，但同、異於有法之上“所作”義者，名之為“法”。又此“所作”，非締所立，不得名“品”，名之為“法”。宗締所立，遂與“品”名，能、所異故。又因、宗二同異名“法”，別同異名“品”。此同、異二，故名為“法”。次下二因同、異，及上宗同、異，並別同、異，故皆名“品”。(109b01–b09)

Question: Why is “group” used to name what is similar or dissimilar regarding the thesis, while “property” is used to name what is similar or dissimilar regarding the reason?
Answer: (The first kind of explanation by Xuanying 玄應:) If the sort [of example] is similar or dissimilar regarding the inseparable connection of the entire thesis, then it is named “group”; if it is not similar or dissimilar regarding the entire thesis, and not similar or dissimilar regarding the property-possessor of the thesis either, but only similar or dissimilar regarding the property “being produced,” which is possessed by the property-possessor, then it is named “property.” (The second kind of explanation by Shunjing 順憬 or Sunkyoung in Korean:) “Being produced” here is not what is to be proved in the entire thesis, so it is not named “group,” but “property.” What is to be proved in the entire thesis is named “group.” This is because of the difference between proof and what is to be proved. (The third kind of explanation by Yuanxiao 元曉 or Wonhyo in Korean, which is considered as the correct one by Kuiji:) If it is similar or dissimilar regarding both the thesis and the reason, then it is named “property”; if it is similar or dissimilar regarding either thesis or reason, then it is named “group.” This (the example by the similar property or the dissimilar property) is similar or dissimilar
regarding both, so it is named “property.” The similar or dissimilar instance of the reason below and the similar or dissimilar instance of the thesis are only similar or dissimilar regarding either part, so they are named “group.”

(1.2.2.1.2.3.3. Explaining Respectively 隨釋)

(1.2.2.1.2.3.3.1. Explaining the Example by Similar Property 解同)

(1.2.2.1.2.3.3.1.1 and 2. Presenting the Name and Interpreting in General 譲名 and 總顯)

(YRZL: [The example by] the similar property means [the example] wherever the announced similar group of the reason [is followed by] the character of definite presence [of the property of the thesis].

(Based on the Sanskrit text: Of these, [the example by] similar proper means [the example] wherever the reason is announced to be present only in the similar group.)

NP 2.3: \textit{tatra sādharmyeṇa tāvat yatra hetoḥ sapakṣa evāstitvaṃ khyāpyate} | (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.3, 6–7).

(YRZLS: this is the third part, namely explaining, and it includes two parts: The first explains [the example by] similar [property]; the second explains [the example by] dissimilar [property]. The Nyāyamukha states, “[the examples] express that the reason is followed by [the property of] the thesis, and that wherever [the property of] the thesis
is absent, the reason is absent too, these two are named ‘examples’; all the others are
specious forms of them.”

There are three parts in the explanation of the first one (the example by similarity): The
first presents the name; the second interprets in general; and the third cites an instance
individually. The word “similar property” is the part of presenting the name; all the
others in this passage compose the part of interpreting in general.

(203)“處”謂處所，即是一切除宗以外有、無法處。“顯”者，說也。若有、無法，
說與前陳因相似品，便決定有宗法，此有、無處，即名“同法”。“因”者，即是
有法之上共許之法，若處有此名“因同品”。所立之法，是有法上共許法，若
處有共因，決定有此不共許法，名“定有性”，以共許法成不共故。《理門論》
云：“說因宗所隨”，是名“同喻”。除宗以外，有、無聚中有此共許、不共許法，
即是同故。以法同故，能、所同故，二合同故。此中正取因之同品，由有此故
宗法必隨，故亦兼取宗之同品，合名“同法”。(109b14–b24)

[In the definition, the word] “wherever” (chu 處, yatra) means whatever locus, namely
all the loci of existent (equally accepted by the proponent and the opponent as existent,
e.g., a pot) or non-existent (unequally accepted, e.g., a sky-lotus) things apart from the
thesis[-subject]. “Announced” (xian 顯, khyāpyate) means said. If those existent or non-
existent things are said to be of the group similar to the former-mentioned reason [in
the statement of the positive example], they will definitely bear the property of the
thesis, then those loci of existent or non-existent things are named “similar property.”

“Reason” is the equally accepted property of the property-possession, so if it exists in
these loci, then these loci are named “the similar group of the reason.” The inferable
property is the unequally accepted property of the property-possession; if there is the
equally accepted reason in these loci, then the unequally accepted property will
definitely exist, and [such a quality] is named “the character of definite presence”

553 YZML, T1628 p.2c03–c04. Tucci (1930, pp.36–37): it (viz., the example) expresses that the reason is followed
by the probandum, and that, wherever the probandum is absent, the reason (also) is absent. Other examples, different
from these (two), must be considered as fallacies of the example.
= PS 4.2: sādhyaṃnāgago hetoh sādhyābhāve ca nāstiḥ | khyāpyate yatra drśṭaṃtaḥ sa sādharmeyatīrto dvīdhā ||
See Katsura (2016a, p.1243)
(dingyouxing 定有性, astitva), because the equally accepted property is used to establish the unequally accepted property. The Nyāyamukha states, “the reason is followed by [the property of] the thesis,” and such is named “the example by similarity (namely positive example).” Because apart from the thesis[-subject], in the sets of existent or non-existent things, there is this equally accepted property and that unequally accepted property, such is the similarity. It is also because the property of the reason and the property of the thesis are both properties; because there also exist both the probative factor and the inferable factor [in the example by similarity]; and because there is also the same inseparable connection [in the example by similarity]. This (the example by similarity) principally refers to the similar group of the reason, because of whose existence the property of the thesis will definitely follow, hence the similar group of the thesis is also referred to additionally, and then the name “[the example by] the similar property” is given as a whole.

問：“顯因同品”，宗法必隨，何須復言“決定有性”？言“決定有性”，因必在宗，何須復說“顯因同品”？
答：(1) 唯言“因同品”，不說“定有性”，即九句中諸異品有，除二、五、八，餘六句是。相違、不定二過所攝554，異喻亦犯能立不遣。(2) 若言“定有性”，不說“因同品”，亦即是九句中同品非有，四、五、六是，相違、不定亦二過攝，同喻亦犯能立不成。(3) 若“非因同品”亦“非定有性”，即九句中異品非有，二、五、八是，正因、不定二種所攝，同喻亦犯俱不成過。(4) 若“顯因同品亦決定有性”，即九句中同品亦有句，除四、五、六，餘六句是，正因、不定二種所攝，異品無過，正因所攝，異品有過，不定所攝，異喻或有一分、全分能立不遣。
此同、異喻所犯諸過，或自、或他，或全、或一分，隨其所應，皆應思惟。為遮前三句及第四少分所說過失，顯第四句少分為正，必須雙言“顯因同品”、“決定有性”。(109b24–c12)

554 亦二過攝 YRZLSi, 二過所攝 YRZLSj. “yi 亦” means “also,” so “yi erguo she 亦二過攝” means “also belong to the two fallacies,” while “erguo suoshe 二過所攝” just means “belong to the two fallacies.” Since this is just the first case in this passage, “yi 亦,” i.e., “also,” is not needed.
Question: If [there is] “the announced similar group of the reason,” and the property of the thesis will definitely follow, why should “the character of definite presence [of the property of the thesis]” also be said? If saying, “the character of definite presence,” then the property of the reason must be included in the property of the thesis, so why should “the announced similar group of the reason” be said?

Answer: (1) If only “the similar group of the reason” is said but not “the character of definite presence,” then it refers to all forms of [the reason’s] being present in the dissimilar group [of the thesis] in the nine forms, namely the six forms other than the second, the fifth and the eighth ones, which should belong to the fallacies of contradictory and inconclusive [reasons], and the example by dissimilarity also commits [the fallacy that] the proof is non-excluded. (2) If only “the character of definite presence” is said but not “the similar group of the reason,” then it refers to all the forms of [the reason’s] being absent from the similar group [of the thesis] in the nine forms, namely the fourth, the fifth and the sixth forms, which should also belong to the fallacies of contradictory and inconclusive [reasons], and the example by similarity also commits [the fallacy that] the proof is unestablished. (3) If neither “the character of definite presence” nor “the similar group of the reason” is said, then it refers to all forms of [the reason’s] being absent from the dissimilar group [of the thesis] in the nine forms, namely the second, the fifth and the eighth forms, which should belong to correct reasons or the fallacies of inconclusive [reason] (the fifth form), and the example by similarity also commits the fallacy that both the proof and what is to be proved are unestablished. (4) If “the similar group of the reason and the character of definite presence” is said (without a logical relationship), then it refers to all the forms of [the reason’s] being present in the similar group [of the thesis] in the nine forms, namely all six forms other than the fourth, the fifth and the sixth ones, which should belong to correct reasons or the fallacies of inconclusive [reasons]: if the dissimilar group [does not possess the reason, then they] do not have fallacies, so such cases should belong to correct reasons; if the dissimilar group [does possess the reason, then they] do have fallacies, so such cases should belong to the fallacies of inconclusive
[reasons], and the example by dissimilarity may commit [the fallacy that] the proof is non-excluded either partially or entirely.

No matter whether they are fallacies to oneself or others, entirely or partially, all the fallacies of the example by similarity and the example by dissimilarity should be taken into consideration. In order to eliminate the fallacies stated in the first three cases as well as in part of the fourth case and express [the other] part of the fourth case as correct, “the announced similar group of the reason” [and the following] “character of definite presence” should both be said in this way.

(1.2.2.1.2.3.3.1.3. Citing an Instance Individually 別指)

(XXV)論：謂若所作，見彼無常，譬如瓶等。(109c13)

YRZL: For instance, whatever is produced is seen to be impermanent, like a pot, and so on.

NP 2.3: tadyathā yat kṛtakam tad anityaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ yathā ghaṭādir iti || (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.3, 7–8).

(205)述曰：別指法也。如立“聲無常”宗，“所作性”因，瓶為同喻。此指法以相明故，合、結總陳。“若所作”者即前總顯因之同品，“見彼無常”亦則前顯決定有性。諸有生處決定有滅，母牛去處犢子必隨，因有之處宗必隨逐。此為“合”也，若有“所作”，其立、敵、證556等“見彼無常”。“如瓶等”者，舉其喻依有法結也。前宗以聲為有法，無常、所作為法，今喻以瓶等為有法，所作、無常為法。正以所作、無常為喻，兼舉瓶等喻依，合方具矣。“等”者等取餘盆、甖557等。(109c13–c23)

555 前 YRZLSj, 先 YRZLSj. Both “qian 前” and “xian 先” can mean “above” here, but since the former part of this sentence uses “qian 前,” this may also be “qian 前.”
556 立敵證 YRZLSj, 敵證 YRZLSj. “Li 立” refers to the proponent, “di 敵” refers to the opponent, while “zheng 證” refers to the witness. Although IRMS also reads 敵證 in T2270 p.288c09, according to the context, the proponent should also be included.
557 盆甖 YRZLSj, 盆甖 YRZLSj. Both “pen 盆” and “ying 盃” refer to two kinds of water-container respectively, so it does not matter whether there is a more “pen 盆” character or not. However, the quote in IRMS reads “pen ying 盆甖,” so it may also be “pen ying 盆甖” here.
YRZLS: [This is the part of] citing an instance individually. For instance, when the thesis “sound is impermanent” and the reason “because of being produced” are set forth, a pot can be taken as the example by similarity. This [member] cites an instance to illustrate [the thesis] with the [instance’s] characteristic, and states the application and the conclusion together. “Whatever is produced” represents the similar group of the reason in the part of interpreting in general above, while “is seen to be impermanent” represents the character of definite presence in the part of interpreting [in general] above. Wherever arising exists ceasing certainly exists; wherever a cow goes the calf certainly follows; and wherever the reason[-property] is present, the thesis[-property] certainly follows [to be present]. This means “application”[558]; [here it is shown as that] if “whatever is produced” is present, then it “is seen to be impermanent” by the proponent, the opponent, and the witness.[559] “Like a pot, and so on” cites the substratum of the example, which are also property-possessors, as the conclusion. The thesis above takes sound as the property-possessor, and takes impermanent and produced as properties; now the example takes a pot, and so on, as the property-possessors, and takes produced and impermanent as properties. It takes [the concomitance between] produced and impermanent as the example directly, and cites a pot, and so on, in addition as the substratum of the example, and then the application is complete. “And so on” includes a basin, a jug, and so on, in the meantime.

(206) 《理門論》云：“若爾，喻言應非異分，顯因義故。”古因明師因外有喻。如勝論云“聲無常”宗，“所作性”因，同喻“如瓶”，異喻“如空”，不舉“諸所作者皆無常”等貫於二處。故因非喻，瓶為同喻體，空為異喻體。陳那已後，說因三相即摂二喻，二喻即因，俱顯宗故，“所作性”等貫二處故。古師難意[560]，若喻亦是因所攝者，喻言應非因外異分，顯因義故，應唯二支，何須二喻？

[558] As discussed above, the “application” here is also because of the confusion between the application (upanaya) and the positive concomitance (anvaya).
[559] For the text from 若有“所作” to “見彼無常,” Tang’s (2015, p.305) translation reads:
Whatever has the [property] “producedness” is observed by [not only the proponent, but also] his opponent and the witness (sākṣin, zheng 證) to be non-eternal.
[560] 云 YRZLSi, 意 YRZLSj. “yun 云” means “say,” “yi 意” means “mean,” for the following part is not another quote of ancient masters but an explanation of the quote above, this should be “yi 意.”
陳那釋云：“事雖實爾，然此因言唯為顯了是宗法性，非為顯了同品、異品有性、無性，故須別說同、異喻言。”意答，喻體實是因爾，不應別說。然立因言，正唯為顯宗家法性是宗之因，非正為顯同有、異無順、返成於所立宗義。故於因外別說二喻，顯因有處宗必隨逐，並返成故，令宗義成。(109c23–110a08)

The Nyāyamukha states, “if so, then the example-statement should not be a different member [from that of the reason] because it illustrates the meaning of the reason.”

Some ancient master of the science of reasons [advocates] that there are examples separate from the reason. For example, a Vaiśeṣika sets forth the thesis “sound is impermanent,” the reason “because of being produced,” the example by similarity “like a pot,” and the example by dissimilarity “like ether,” but does not set out “whatever is produced is impermanent” [and its contrary] to go through the two loci (i.e., the pot and ether). Hence, the reason is not the example, while the pot is taken as the essence of the example by similarity (tongyu ti 同喻體), and ether is taken as the essence of the example by dissimilarity (yiyu ti 異喻體). Since Dignāga, the two examples are included when the three characteristics of a [correct] reason are expressed, and the two examples just belong to the reason, because both [the examples and the reason] are meant to manifest the thesis, and because [the reason-property] “produced,” and so on, (i.e., the thesis-property “impermanent” and the contraries of these two) go through these two loci (i.e., the pot and ether). The objection of the ancient master means

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561 YZML, T1628 p.3a12–a13. Tucci (1930, p.45): At this point some might object that, if it be so, then the formulation of the example does not represent a different member, as it merely declares the meaning of the reason. From Katsura's (2015) unpublished draft: = PSV ad PS 4.7: evam tarhi, dṛṣṭāntavacanam api na prthak syāt, khetvarthapradarsanāt.

562 For the text from 古因明師 to 贊二處故, Tang’s (2015, pp.271–272) translation reads:

The master of old Hetuvidyā has the examples outside the reason. For instance, the Vaiśeṣika states the thesis “sound is non-eternal,” the reason “because of being produced,” and the positive example “like a pot,” the negative example “like ether (ākāśa).” [In this inference, the general proposition that] “whatever is produced is non-eternal” has not been set out so as to go through these two loci [i.e. the pot and ether], therefore the reason is other than the example. [Here, mere such an individual as] the “pot” serves as the positive example-statement (*sādharmyadṛṣṭāntabhāva, tong yu ti 同喻體), and [mere such an individual as] “ether” serves as the negative example-statement (*vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntabhāva, yì yu ti 異喻體).

After Dignāga, the two examples are exactly included in the expression of the three characteristics of a [correct] reason. The two examples are no more than the reason (er yu ji yin 二喻即因), because both [the examples and the reason-statement] are to show the thesis, and because the [probative property]
that if the examples are also included in the reason, then the example-statement should not be a different member from the reason because it illustrates the meaning of the reason, meaning that there should be only two members [in an inference], so why are the two examples needed?

Dignāga explains, “although the fact is actually so, the statement of the reason is only meant to show the [reason’s] being a property of the thesis-subject, but not to show [the reason’s] being present in the similar group and being absent from the dissimilar group. Therefore, it is necessary to express the statements of the example by similarity and the example by dissimilarity separately.” This answer means that the essences of the examples actually belong to the reason, so they should not be expressed separately. However, the reason statement is only established to show directly that a property of the thesis[-subject] is this reason for the thesis, but not to show directly that [the reason’s natures of] being present in the similar [group] and being absent from the dissimilar [group] can establish the thesis to be proved in the supporting and negating ways. Thus, the two examples are expressed separately from the reason to show that wherever the reason is present, the thesis[-property] certainly follows [to be present], and to establish [the concomitance between the reason and the thesis-property] in a negating way to establish the thesis.

彼復難言: “若唯因言所詮表義說名為‘因’，斯有何失？”此難意說，如“所作”言所詮表義唯名為“因”，“瓶”同、“空”異名“喻”非“因”，斯有何失？復問彼言：“復有何德？”(110a08–a11)

That [master] retorts further, “if only the meaning expressed by the reason-statement (i.e., the first characteristic of a correct reason) is called ‘reason’, then is there any

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563 YZML, T1628 p.3a13–a15. Tucci (1930, pp.45–46): [I answer that] although the fact is substantially so, yet the formulation of the reason is only meant to express that this has the nature of being a pakṣadhārma, but it cannot show that this is present in the positive instances, and absent in the negative ones. Therefore it is necessary to express separately the positive and the negative examples [in order to show that the reason possesses these two other essential aspects].
This retort means that for example, if the meaning expressed by the statement “[because of] being produced” is merely called “reason,” so the similar [example] “a pot” and the dissimilar [example] “ether” are called “example” but not “reason,” then is there any demerit?

Then [Dignāga] asks, “then is there any merit”? 565

(208)彼古答言：“別說喻分是名為德。”

陳那復難：“應如世間所說方便，與其因義都不相應。”此難意云，如世間外道亦說因外別有二喻，汝於因外說喻亦爾。遍宗法性既是正因，所說二喻非是正因，但為方便助成因義。此喻方便既與因別，則與因義都不相應。(110a11–a17)

That ancient master answers, “stating the member of the example separately is just the merit.” 566

Then Dignāga retorts further, “then [the problem] should be that just like the inference formulation advocated by [the people of] the common world, [the example] would have no connection with the meaning of the reason.” 567 This retort means that just like the claim by the heretics of the common world that there are two separate examples from the reason, your claim that there are separate examples from the reason is the same [to theirs]. The nature of [being] universally a property of the thesis[-subject] refers to the main reason directly, while the two examples claimed by you do not refer to the main reason but only expediently help to establish the meaning of the reason. Therefore, since these example-formulations are different from the reason, they should have no connection with the meaning of the reason.

564 YZML, T1628 p.3a15–a16. Tucci (1930, p.46): [Now the opponent asks: “if it be so] will there be and mistake in calling "reason" only the fundamental meaning expressed by the reason, [I mean its being a pākṣadharma, and in considering its other two aspects as examples?]"
566 YZML, T1628 p.3a16–a17. Tucci (1930, p.46): “We obtain—you reply—that the example is formulated as a separate member.”
567 YZML, T1628 p.3a17–a18. Tucci (1930, pp.46–47): [My answer is:] Then the necessary consequence of this is that, just as in the syllogism commonly formulated by men, there would be no [indissoluble] connection between the example and the meaning expressed by the reason.
古師復云：“若爾何失？縱同外道亦何過耶？如外道說有五根識，佛法亦有，非為失故。

陳那難云：“此說但應類所立義，無有功能，非能立義。由彼但說‘所作性故’所類同法，不說能立所成立義。”此中難意，我亦不說同於外道說極成義名之為失，由同彼說不極成義有過故。謂諸古師同外道說‘聲無常’宗，“所作性”因，同喻“如瓶”，異喻“如空”，不極成義。陳那難意，若說瓶體、空體為喻，但應以瓶類於所立無常之義，既喻不言“諸所作者皆是無常”，舉瓶證聲無有功能，其喻便非能立之義。由彼舉因但說所作法，舉瓶類聲同無常，不說能立“諸所作者”及與所立“皆是無常”，故無功能，非能立義。又若以瓶即為喻體，瓶即四塵，可燒、可見，聲亦應爾。若我如說“所作者”皆是無常，譬如瓶等所作”，既為宗正同法，“無常”隨之亦決定轉。舉瓶喻依以顯其事，便無一切皆相類失。汝既不然，故有前過。(110a17–b06)

And then the ancient master says, “if so, then what is the demerit?” Even though [the example] is the same as [that of] the heretics, what’s the mistake? For example, the heretics advocate the consciousnesses of the five faculties; the teaching of Buddhism also advocates them, so [an opinion same with the heretics’] is not a mistake.

Dignāga retorts, “in such [a formulation of inference], [the example] can merely express an analogy with what is to be proved, but it has not power [of proving], so it does not accord with the connotation of the proof. That [example] merely expresses [an instance with] similar property [of the thesis], which is analogous to ‘because of being produced’, but it does not indicate the concomitance between the proof and what is to be proved.” The retort here means that I do not say that agreeing with the well-established opinions of the heretics is a mistake either, since agreeing with those not

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568 云 YRZLSt, 意 YRZLSj. See fn.560.
569 所作者 YRZLSt, 所作性者 YRZLSj. “xing 性” refers to the Sanskrit suffix “-tva,” means “nature.” However, since this sentence is expressed without “xing 性” above and below, the “xing 性” here should also be absent.
570 YZML, T1628 p.3a18. Tucci (1930, p.47): “If it be so, which is the mistake that we shall commit?”
571 YZML, T1628 p.3a178–a20. Tucci (1930, p.47): [But I reply:] In such a syllogism the example merely expresses a similarity with the notion to be proved, but it has not the power of proving; therefore it has not the meaning of a proof. According to that [rule], [such an] example merely expresses that the reason: “because it has the quality of being a product,” is analogous to objects belonging to the same class, but it does not indicate that it can prove the notion to be proved.

“不說能立所成立義 bu shuo nengli suochengli yi” may also mean “it does not express the meaning that [the property of the thesis] can be proved by the proof,” or “it does not indicate that it can prove the notion to be proved” as Tucci translated, however, the translation here is based on Kuiji’s interpretation below.
well-established opinions of the heretics is mistaken. It means that the ancient masters agree with [the formulation of inference] by the heretics with the thesis “sound is impermanent,” the reason “because of being produced,” and the example by similarity “like a pot,” the example by dissimilarity “like ether,” [such a formulation of inference] is an opinion not well-established. Dignāga’s objection means that if the entity of a pot and the entity of ether are expressed as examples, then only the pot should be the one taken as analogous to the property “being impermanent” to be proved; since the example does not state “whatever is produced is impermanent,” its citing a pot has no power of illustrating sound, and then the example does not accord with the connotation of the proof. That [formulation of inference] just cites a reason to express the property of being produced, and cites a pot as analogous to sound on being impermanent, but does not express the proof “whatever is produced” and what is to be proved “is impermanent,” so [the example in that formulation] has no power and does not accord with the connotation of the proof. Moreover, if a pot is taken as the essence of the example (yu ti 喻體), the pot is [made of] the four objects of sense, and it is burnable and visible, then sound should also be the same. If I say, “whatever is produced is impermanent, like a pot, and so on, which are produced,” then since [“being produced”] is the main similar property of the thesis, “being impermanent” follows it to pervade certainly [the similar group of the reason]. If a pot is cited as the substratum of the example to illustrate the fact [of this inference], there should be no fallacy of [requiring the instance] to be similar in all aspects. Since yours is not so, [your formulation of the example] commits the fallacies mentioned above.

(210)陳那又難：“又因、喻別，此有所立同法、異法，終不能顯因與所立不相離性，是故但有類所立義，然無功能。”此意難言，因、喻既別，同喻但有所立“無常”，異喻無此。汝同喻不說“諸所作者皆是無常”，異喻不雙無，終不能顯

572 It says so because Kuiji treats the similar group of the reason, but not the similar group of the thesis, as the main similar group, which is mentioned in 1.2.2.1.2.2.3.2.
Dignāga retorts additionally, “moreover, if the reason and the example were separated, [the example by] the similar property and [the example by] the dissimilar property, which possess [the similarity and the dissimilarity to] what is to be proved, could not show the inseparable connection between the reason and what is to be proved. Therefore, [these two examples] could merely have some analogy with what is to be proved, but they had no power [of proving].” This retort means that if the reason and the example are separated, then the example by similarity merely has [the property] “bring impermanent” to be proved, while the example by dissimilarity does not have it. Your example by similarity does not say “whatever is produced is impermanent,” and [your] example by dissimilarity does not negate both [of the property to be proved and the reason], so they cannot show the inseparable connection between the reason “being produced” and the property “being impermanent” to be proved. Then it can be concluded that “therefore [these two examples] could merely have some analogy with what is to be proved, but they had no power [of proving],” so [such examples] do not accord with the connotation of the proof.

(211) 古師復問：“何故無能？”
陳那難云：“以同喻中不必宗法、宗義相類，此復餘譬所成立故，應成無窮。”
意說同喻574無能所以。既汝不言“諸所作者皆是無常”，故彼同喻不必以因宗法及“無常”宗義相類，但云“如瓶”。他若有問“瓶復如何無常”，復言“如燈”，如是展轉應成無窮，是無能義。我若喻言“諸所作者皆是無常，譬如瓶等”，既以宗法、宗義相類，總遍一切瓶、燈等盡，不須更問。故非無窮，成有能也。

(110b12–b21)

573 YZML, T1628 p.3a20–a23. Tucci (1930, p.47): Moreover were the reason and the example separated, then, the analogy or the dissimilarity that this may have with the probandum could not show that the reason is not in a contradictort relation with the probandum itself; therefore it could merely express that the reason has some analogy with the notion to be proved. So it is not sufficient to prove.

574 因喻 YRZLSl, 同喻 YRZLSj. “yin yu 因喻” means “the reason and the example,” while “tong yu 同喻” means “the example by similarity.” According to the content here, it should be “tong yu 同喻.”
The ancient master asks further, “why do they have no power?”

Dignāga retorts, “since the example by similarity [advocated by you] does not certainly analogize the property of the thesis[-subject] (i.e., the reason-property) to the implication of the thesis (zongyi 宗義, i.e., the thesis-property), [the concomitance between the reason-property and the thesis-property in such an example by similarity] must be proved by other examples, so it commits [the logical error of] regressus ad infinitum (wuqiong 無窮, anavasthā).” The meaning [of the sentence above] explains why the example by similarity [advocated by the ancient master] has no power. Since you do not say “whatever is produced is impermanent,” your example by similarity does not certainly analogize the reason, which is a property of the thesis[-subject], to the implication of the thesis “being impermanent,” but merely says “like a pot.” If others ask, “then why is the pot impermanent,” and [you] say additionally “like a lamp,” then [such kind of the example by similarity] should commit regressus ad infinitum because of this deviousness, so it has no power. If I express the [similar] example as “whatever is produced is impermanent, like a pot, and so on,” then [such an example by similarity] analogizes the property of the thesis[-subject] to the implication of the thesis, so it includes completely all the pot, lamp, and so on, and no additional question is needed. Thus, it does not commit regressus ad infinitum but does have the power of proving.

(212)復難彼言: “又不必定有諸品類。”若但瓶體為同喻者, 非燒、見等一切皆類,便成過失。若如我說彼喻依中,但以577“所作”、“無常”等類,便無彼過。(110b24–b28)

And then [Dignāga] retorts further, “moreover, there is not necessarily an absolute similarity in all aspects.” If only the entity of the pot is taken as the example by
similarity, then all the [qualities such as] non-burnable, non-visible, and so on, of sound are analogized [to the qualities such as burnable, visible, and so on, of the pot], [this analogizing] becomes fallacious. If as I say, [the inference] only analogizes with “being produced,” and “being impermanent” of the substratum of the example, then there is no such fallacy.

(213) 又難言：“若唯宗法是因性者，其有不定應亦成因。”此意難言，唯以“所作”遍宗法性是其因性，同有、異無但喻非因，是故瓶、空喻非因者，即不定因應亦成因，但有遍宗法，無後二相故。（110b24–b28）

[Dignāga] retorts additionally, “if only [the nature of being universally] a property of the thesis[-subject] was the nature of the reason, then the inconclusive reasons should also become [correct] reasons.” This retort means that if only the nature of [being] universally a property of the thesis[-subject] of “being produced” is the nature of the reason, while [the nature of] being certainly present in the similar [group] and [the nature of] being [universally] absent from the dissimilar [group] only belong to the example but not the reason, then a pot and ether belong to the example but not the reason, and so the inconclusive reasons should become [correct] reasons, because they only possess [the nature of being] universally a property of the thesis[-subject] but not the last two characteristics.

(214) 古返難言：“云何具有所立、能立及異品法，二種譬喻而有此失？”彼意難言，云何同品“瓶”上具有所立“無常”、能立“所作”，及異品法，此二喻中有不定失？陳那難云：“若於爾時所立異品非一種類，便有此失，如初、後三各最後喻。”謂立量時所立異品亦有非有，非一種類。汝既但指瓶為同品，空為異喻，雖具二喻，喻若非因，便此不定。如初三最後喻者，謂九句中初三第三句同品有異品有非有，後三最後喻者，謂九句中後三第三句同品有非有異品亦有非有。此二喻中，若同取有義，異取無義，同喻亦具所立、能立及異法喻。然由異品一

579 YZML, T1628 p.3b01–b02. Tucci (1930, p.49): If the paksadharmā only [M as resident in P] were the reason, then the inconclusive reason would prove to be a valid reason.
To this point, the ancient master retorts back, "how is such an error possible to the two examples, when [the property] that is to be proved, [the property] that can prove and the dissimilar properties are possessed?'\textsuperscript{580} This retort means, how is the error of inconclusive [reason] possible to the two examples, when the similar group "pot" possesses [the property] "being impermanent" which is to be proved as well as [the property] "being produced" which can prove, and [the example by dissimilarity possesses] the dissimilar properties?

Dignāga retorts, "when the dissimilar group of what is to be proved is not of one and the same class, this error [of inconclusive reason] happens, just like the examples of the last ones of the first and last three [forms].'\textsuperscript{581} This refers to the case that when an inference is set forth, [the reason] is both present and non-present in the dissimilar group of what is to be proved, so [the dissimilar group] is not of one and the same class. Since you merely regard the pot as the similar group, and regard ether as the example by dissimilarity, although the two examples are possessed [by the inference], if the examples do not belong to the reason, then there are [the fallacies of] inconclusive [reason]. The example of the last [form] of the first three refers to [the example of] [the form that] [the reason-property] is present in the similar group but both present and non-present in the dissimilar group, which is the third form of the first three in the nine forms, and the example of the last [form] of the last three refers to [the example of] [the form that] [the reason-property] is both present and non-present in the similar and dissimilar groups, which is the third form of the last three in the nine forms. Concerning the examples of these two [forms], if [the reason] is present in the similar [groups] and absent from the dissimilar [groups], then the examples by similarity possess [the

\textsuperscript{580} YZML, T1628 p.3b02–b03. Tucci (1930, p.49): But how is this mistake possible, when both examples are present, [I mean] that which proves the probandum, and that which possesses the proprieties of the negative instances?

\textsuperscript{581} YZML, T1628 p.3b03–b05. Tucci (1930, p.49): But that fallacy (inconclusive) happens when the negative instances of the probandum are not of one and the same class, just as in the last examples of the first and the last triad [of the table of the reasons already referred to].
property] that is to be proved as well as [the property] that can prove, and [parts of the examples by dissimilarity possess] the dissimilar properties. However, since [the other parts] of the dissimilar groups possess [the reason-property], the reasons [of these two forms] become inconclusive. Because your example by similarity is “like a pot” and [your] example by dissimilarity is “like ether,” the examples do not belong to the reason, and they are not distinguished by saying “whatever is permanent is seen to be unproduced, like ether, and so on” [and the inverse], so there is [the fallacy of] inconclusive [reason]. If they are distinguished additionally, then the examples belong to the reason, and there is no such fallacy. These two third [forms] (the third of the first three forms and the third of the last three forms) are excluded, because they do not belong to correct reasons, for [the reason in a form] must be universally absent from the dissimilar [group] to make it a correct reason.

Then he (Dignāga) concludes, “thus it is certain that the three characteristics are just for showing [the validity of] the reason, and according to this principle, although all the parts can belong to the reason and illustrate what is to be proved, only one part is tentatively called ‘reason.’”582 The words “thus it is certain” and “merely for” here manifest that the three characteristics of a [correct] reason manifest the thesis, and the two examples belong to the reason. Although all [the reason and the two examples] belong to the reason and demonstrate the thesis, among the three characteristics only the part of the nature of [being] universally a property of the thesis[-subject] is called

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582 YZML, T1628 p.3b05–b07. Tucci (1930, p.49): Therefore we must conclude that the coexistence of the three aspects declares [the validity of] the reason. According to this logical rule [as laid down by me], although all the various parts are the reason, in so far as they [equally] show [the validity] of the notion to be proved, still a part only is called the reason [viz., the pākṣadharma].
“reason,” while the other two are named “example.” This statement is based on the partial prominence [of the first characteristic] but not the complete principle, so “tentatively” is said. The content above that the three characteristics of a [correct] reason should be expressed to manifest the thesis is not contrary to this.

(216)問：何故共許法、不共許法分為宗、因，同喻上二合為一支？
答：對敵申宗，不共而為所立。由因成此，共許別立能成。同喻令義見邊，二俱助成前立，故因、宗別說，同喻合故。(110c22–c26)
Question: Why are the equally accepted property and the unequally accepted property separated in the thesis and the reason but combined into one member in the example by similarity?
Answer: Since the thesis is advocated against the opponent, it belongs to what is to be proved because of being unequally accepted. It is established by the reason, for the reason is equally accepted, already proved in another place and able to establish [the thesis]. The example by similarity makes the thesis get to the side of perceived, and both [the reason-property and the thesis-property stated with a concomitance in the example by similarity] can help establish [the thesis] to be proved above, so they are said separately in the reason and the thesis, but combined in the example by similarity.

(217)問：因陳“所作“已貫瓶中，同喻再申豈非鄭重?
答：因雖總說，宗義未明，指事明前，非為鄭重。(110c26–c28)
Question: When “being produced” is stated in the reason, meaning it has already pervaded the pot (i.e., the example by similarity), but the example by similarity states it again, is it not much too serious?
Answer: Although the reason has been expressed generally, the thesis is not yet clear, so the instance is cited to illustrate [the thesis] above, [stating the reason-property in the example by similarity again] is not too serious.

583 This refers to the former part of the sentence quoted from YZML here, i.e., “thus it is certain that the three characteristics are just for showing [the validity of] the reason, according to this principle, although all the parts can belong to the reason and illustrate what is to be proved...”
The application of the ancient master says, “the pot is produced, the pot is impermanent; sound is produced, sound is also impermanent.” Now Dignāga says, “whatever is produced is impermanent.” [Dignāga’s example by similarity] expresses briefly and removes the tediousness; it strings both the instance [of the example by similarity] and the thesis[-subject], so why is the long explanation needed? Therefore, [the formulation by] the ancient master is modified. The conclusion of the ancient master says, “hence, it is known that sound is impermanent.” Now Dignāga says, “like a pot, and so on.” Then, since the thesis is already illustrated, why is the repeat needed? Therefore, it is clear that both the reason[-property] and the thesis[-property] should be stated in the example. This can [also] be known below.

**(1.2.1.2.3.2. Explaining the Example by Dissimilar Property 解異)**

**(1.2.1.2.3.2.1 and 2. Presenting the Name and Interpreting in General 爨名 and 總顯)**

(XXVI)論：異法者，若於是處說所立無，因遍非有。(111a05)
YRZL: [The example by] the dissimilar property means [the example] wherever [the thesis-property] to be proved is said to be absent, the reason is universally non-present.
NP 2.3: *vaidharmayeṇāpi yatra sādhyābhāve hetor abhāva eva kathyate* | (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.3, 8–9).
There are four parts in the explanation of the [the example by] dissimilar [property]: The first presents the name; the second interprets in general; the third cites an instance individually; and the fourth explains the establishment. Here are the first two.

"Wherever" means whatever locus, namely the loci of existent or non-existent things apart from the thesis[-subject]. It means, for whatever existent or non-existent things, if they are said to be devoid of the thesis[-property] to be proved above, and universally do not possess the reason above that can prove, then they are named “[the example by] the dissimilar property,” because the properties [of them] are different, and they are different from both [the thesis-property and the reason-property]. The Nyāyamukha states, “wherever [the property of] the thesis is absent, the reason is absent too”; such is named “[the example by] the dissimilar property.”

Someone (Wengui) explains that [the example by dissimilarity] refers principally to the dissimilar group of the reason, since when this (the reason-property) is absent, the thesis[-property] must follow it to be absent, so whatever is void of the thesis[-property] is also referred to additionally as “dissimilar,” and [whatever is void of both the reason-
property and the thesis-property] together is named “[the example by] the dissimilar property.” Additionally, [this explanation] retorts by itself: “if [the example] which is merely void of the reason is named ‘[the example by] the dissimilar property’, then [the instances in] the similar group [of the thesis] that do not possess the reason should also belong to the example by dissimilarity.” According to this [viewpoint], the thesis “sound is impermanent” takes lightning, pot, and so on, as the example by similarity, and then the reason “[resulting from] effort” is absent from lightening, so it should belong to the dissimilar group, because the thesis[-property] certainly follows [the reason] to be absent. Hence, it should be said that since the similar [example] establishes the thesis in a supporting way, [in the similar example,] [the similar group of] the reason is the main similar [group], while [the similar group of] the [thesis] is the assistant similar [group]; since the dissimilar [example] establishes [the thesis] in a negating way, [in the dissimilar example,] [the dissimilar group of] the thesis is the main dissimilar [group], while [the dissimilar group of] the reason is the assistant dissimilar [group], and [the example] taking [either the dissimilar group of the thesis or that of the reason] partially is not a [correct] dissimilar [example]. Therefore, the Nyāyamukha states that [the example] “wherever [the property of] the thesis is absent, the reason is absent too” is called “[the example by] the dissimilar property”; it does not say that [the example] “wherever the reason is absent, [the property of] the thesis is absent also” is called “example by dissimilarity.” Since such [a certain inference] does not intend to establish another different [thesis]-property, [the property of] the thesis should [be said to] be absent first, and then the reason can [be said to] be absent.

(222)問：何故所立不言“遍無”，能立之因言“遍非有”？
答：宗不成因，不言“遍無”；因成宗故，言“遍非有”。因不遍無便成異法，不定、相違種種過起。宗之所立，其法極寬。如聲無我，空等亦有，若異皆無，都無異品，“如空等”言便徒設施。故知但無隨應少分584因之所立即是異宗，非謂一切皆遍非有。(111a19–a26)

584 小分 YRZLSi, 少分 YRZLSj. “Xiao 小” means “small” of size, “shao 少” means “little” of quantity, but
Question: [In the definition of the example by dissimilarity], why is what is to be proved (the thesis-property) not said to be “universally absent,” while the reason, which can prove, is said to be “universally non-present”?

Answer: The thesis is not meant to establish the reason, so it is not said to be “universally absent” [in the definition of the example by dissimilarity]; since the reason is meant to establish the thesis, it is said to be “universally non-present.” If the reason is not universally absent [from the dissimilar group], then [the reason] may establish a different thesis[-property], and the fallacies of inconclusive or contradictory [reasons] appear. The property to be established in the thesis is extremely broad (because of its possible implication). For example, the no-Self (which can be implied somehow by being impermanent) of sound is also possessed by ether, and so on (which are included in the dissimilar group of “sound is impermanent”); if being dissimilar requires all [the properties which can be implied by the thesis-property] to be absent, then there should be no dissimilar group at all, and the words “like ether, and so on” would be in vain. Thus, it can be known that being dissimilar to the thesis merely means the absence of the corresponding part of what is to be proved by the reason, which does not mean all [what can be implied by the thesis-property] should be non-present.

(223)問：“說所立無”，因已非有，何須復說“因遍無”耶？說“因遍無”，已無所立，何須復說“所立宗無”？

答：(1) 但言“所立無”，因不“遍非有”，即九句中異品有攝，除二、八、五余六句是，異喻亦犯能立不遣。 (2) 若言“因遍非有”，不說“所立無”，即九句中同品非有攝，四、六、五是，同品亦犯能立不成。 (3) 若非“說所立無”，亦非“因遍非有”，即九句中同品有句，除中三句餘六句是，異喻亦犯俱不遣過。 (4) 若“說所立無”，因亦“遍非有”，即九句中二、五、八是，二、八為正，第五不定，同喻或犯俱不成過。他句有過故此有過，不爾此句非有過收。
此中諸過或自、或他，或全、或分，隨其所應，准前思作。第四句少分為正，餘皆有過。為遮此等，必須雙言“說所立無”、“因遍非有”。(111a27–b11)

Question: If [in the definition of the example by dissimilarity,] “[the thesis-property] to be proved is said to be absent,” then the reason is already non-present, so why should “the reason is universally non-present” also be said? If saying, “the reason is universally non-present,” and what is to be proved is already absent, why should “the thesis[-property] to be proved is said to be absent” also be said?

Answer: (1) If only “[the thesis-property] to be proved is [said to be] absent” is mentioned, but the reason is not “universally non-present,” then it refers to those [forms] of [the reason’s] being present in the dissimilar group [of the thesis] in the nine forms, namely the six forms other than the second, the eighth and the fifth ones, and the example by dissimilarity also commits [the fallacy that] the proof is non-excluded. (2) If “the reason is universally non-present” is said, but not “[the thesis-property] to be proved is [said to be] absent,” then it refers to those of [the reason’s] being absent from the similar group [of the thesis] in the nine forms, namely the fourth, the sixth, and the fifth forms, and the example by similarity also commits [the fallacy that] the proof is unestablished. (3) If neither “[the thesis-property] to be proved is said to be absent” nor “the reason is universally non-present” [is said], then it refers to those of [the reason’s] being present in the similar group [of the thesis] in the nine forms, namely the six forms other than the middle three ones, and the example by dissimilarity also commits the fallacy that both what is to be proved and the proof are non-excluded. (4) If both “[the thesis-property] to be proved is said to be absent” and “universally non-present” of the reason are said, then it refers to the second, the fifth and the eighth ones in the nine forms; [among them,] the second and the eighth are correct, while the fifth is inconclusive, and the example by similarity may commit the fallacy that both the proof and what is to be proved are unestablished. If that (the example by similarity) is fallacious, then this case is fallacious; if not, then this case is not fallacious.

585 小分 YRZLSt, 少分 YRZLSj. Ditto.
No matter whether they are fallacied to oneself or others, either entirely or partially, all the fallacies here can be taken into consideration based on the explanation above. Part of the fourth case is correct, while all the others are fallacious. In order to eliminate these [fallacious cases], both “[the thesis-property] to be proved is said to be absent” and “the reason is universally non-present” must be said.

(1.2.2.1.2.3.3.2.3. Citing an Instance Individually 別指)

(XXVII)論：謂若是常，見非所作，如虛空等。(111b12–b25)

YRZL: For instance, whatever is permanent is seen to be unproduced, like ether, and so on.
NP 2.3: tadyathā yan nityam tad akṛtakam drṣṭam yathā ākāśam iti | (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.3, 9–10).

(224)述曰：別指法也。如“無常”宗，是“常”為異，“所作性”因，“非作”為異。返顯義言，於“常”品中既見“非作”，明“所作”者定見“無常”。同成宗故，先因後宗：異法離前，宗先因後。若異離中因先宗後，如言“非作定是常住”，翻成本來非謂“空常住”，非是離前成於無常之宗本義586也。若成“常住”，便犯相符，舊已定宗，今成立故。同既成立，先因後宗；異既離前，隨宗先後，意欲翻顯前成立義。今者宗無因既不轉。明因有處宗必定隨。異但說離，離成即得，必先宗無後因無也。故《理門》云：“說因宗所隨，宗無因不有”。
“如空等”者，此舉喻依以彰喻體，標其所依有法，顯能依之法非有。“等”者等取隨所應宗涅槃等法。(111b12–b25)

YRZLS: [This is the part of] citing an instance individually. For instance, if the thesis[-property] is “impermanent,” then “permanent” is dissimilar, and if the reason[-property] is “produced,” then “unproduced” is dissimilar. [The example by dissimilarity] illustrates the thesis in an inverse way. Since in the group of “permanent,” “unproduced” can be seen, it can manifest that whatever is “produced,” it is certainly seen to be

586 宗義YRZLSt, 宗本義YRZLStj. “Zong yi 宗義” refers to “thesis,” “ben 本” means “original,” since the sentence here is to explain the deviation of the reversed example by dissimilarity, the character “ben 本” is needed.
“impermanent.” The similar [example] establishes the thesis in a supporting way, so the former should be the reason[-property] and the latter should be the thesis[-property]; the dissimilar [example] negates the former [thesis-property], so the thesis[-property] should be the former and the reason[-property] should be the latter. If in the negating by the dissimilar [example], the reason[-property] is former and the thesis[-property] is latter, like saying “whatever is unproduced must be permanent,” then it contrarily establishes “ether is permanent,” which is not to be argued about originally, but does not negate the original thesis “being impermanent.” If “[ether is] permanent” is to be established, then it commits the fallacy that in the thesis the relationship is well-established, because it is now establishing a thesis that has already been confirmed before. Since the similar [example] establishes [the thesis] in a supporting way, former should be the reason[-property] and latter should be the thesis[-property]; since the [dissimilar] example negates the former [thesis-property], the latter [reason-property] follows the former thesis[-property] with the purpose of manifesting the former establishment [in the inference] in a negating way. Now [in the example by dissimilarity,] if the thesis[-property] is absent, then the reason[-property] will not reside. It shows that wherever the reason[-property] is present, the thesis[-property] must follow [to be present]. Since the dissimilar [example] is just said as negating, it merely has to accomplish this negating, thus [in it] the thesis[-property] is absent first, and then the reason[-property] is absent later. Hence, the Nyāyamukha states, “[the examples] express that the reason is followed by [the property of] the thesis, and that wherever [the property of] the thesis is absent, the reason is absent too.”

The words “like ether, and so on” are to cite the substratum of the example to manifest the essence of the example, in order to point out the property-possessor relied upon by the example and to show that the properties that can rely (i.e., the thesis-property and the reason-property) are non-present [in the property-possessor of the example by dissimilarity]. The words “and so on”587 contain Nirvāṇa and other things according to this very thesis in the meantime.

587 The character “等” in Xuanzang’s Chinese translation of YRZL, which means “and so on,” is equivalent to
(1.2.2.1.2.3.3.2.4. Explaining the Establishment 釋成)

(XXVIII)論：此中“常”言表非“無常”，“非所作”言表無“所作”，…(111b26)

YRZL: By the word “permanent” is here meant the absence of “impermanent,” and by the word “unproduced” is meant the absence of “produced,” …

NP 2.3: nityaśabdenātrānityatvasyābhāva ucyate | akṛtakaśabdenāpi krtakatvasyābhāvah | (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.3, 10–11).

(225)述曰：下釋成義，顯異無體亦成三相，正因所攝。(111b27–b28)

YRZLS: Now comes [the part of] explaining the establishment; it shows that if [the substratum of] the dissimilar [example] is of a non-esistent entity, it can still establish the third characteristic, and belong to the correct reason.

(226)因明之法，以無為宗，無能成立，有、無皆異。即如論云，“和合非實，許六句中隨一攝故，如前五句”。前破五句，體非實有，故得為喻，此中以無而成無故。應以有法而為異品，無其體故，還以無法而為異云588，“諸是實者，非六句攝”，無其異體。若無為宗，有非能成，因無所依，喻無所立。故可有為異，異於無故。以有為宗，有為能成，順成有故，無非能立，因非能成，喻無所立。故有、無並異，皆止濫故。“無常”之宗既是有體，“所作”、“瓶等”有為能立。故於異品，若薩婆多立有體空為異，若經部等立以無體空為異，但止宗、因諸濫盡故，不要異喻必有所依。(111b28–c11)

According to the principle of the science of reasons, if [something with a] non-existent [entity] is taken as the thesis[-subject], then [another thing with a] non-existent [entity] [as the instance in the example by similarity] can prove it, while [the instance in the] dissimilar [example] can be either with an existent [entity] or non-existent [entity]. This

588 The incomplete manuscript of this commentary found in the Guangsheng temple in 1933 contains a fragment from “無法而為異云” to “故於異皆止濫故;” and a few recognizable characters including “無常之;” “立;” “故於異;” after this.
is similar to what the treatise (the *Cheng weishi lun*) says, “inherence is not existent, because of being accepted as belonging to the six categories correspondingly, like the first five categories.” \(^{589}\) [In that treatise,] [the existences of] the first five categories have been refuted above, meaning their entities are not existent, so they can be [cited] for the example, because [instances with] non-existent [entities] are used to establish [a thesis-subject with a] non-existent [entity] here. [Originally, in this case,] something with an existent [entity] should be the dissimilar group, but since no entity of such exists, something with a non-existent [entity] is still taken as the dissimilar [group], saying “whatever is existent does not belong to the six categories,” and there is no entity of the dissimilar [group]. If [something with a] non-existent [entity] is the thesis[-subject], then [another thing or property with an] existent [entity] cannot establish it, because [if the reason-property possesses an existent entity, while the thesis-subject possesses a non-existent entity], the reason has no [corresponding subject ] to rely upon, and the [similar] example [with an existent reason-property] has no [corresponding concomitance] to prove. Therefore, [something with an] existent [entity] can [merely] be the dissimilar [group], for [existential] is dissimilar to non-existent. If [something with an] existent [entity] is the thesis[-subject], then [another thing or property with an] existent [entity] can establish it, because [that thing or property] can establish [the thesis-subject with an] existent [entity] in a supporting way; [something or some property with a] non-existent [entity] cannot prove it, because [if the reason-property possesses a non-existent entity, while the thesis-subject possesses an existent entity, then] the reason cannot establish [such a thesis-subject], and the [similar] example [with a non-existent reason-property] has no [corresponding concomitance ] to prove. Therefore, [things with] existent or non-existent entities can both be the dissimilar [group] because both can stop the overflow. Since the thesis[-property] “impermanent”

\(^{589}\) This inference is not a direct quotation from the *Cheng weishi lun* but actually a paraphrase of Kuiji’s commentary. Kuiji’s commentary says as following in the *Cheng weishi lun shuji*, T1830 p.261. a25–a26:

量云: 和合性非實有, 實等十句隨一攝故, 如實、德等。實、德等前已破故, 故得為量。

An inference can be stated as below: inherence is not existent, because of belonging to the ten categories including substance and so on correspondingly, like substance, quality and so on. Substance, quality and so on have been refuted above, so they can be[ cited] for the inference.
possesses an existent entity, “produced,” “the pot, and so on,” which possess existent [entities], can prove it. Hence concerning the dissimilar group, such as the ether with an existent entity cited as the dissimilar [group] by Sarvāstivāda, and the ether with non-existent entity cited as the dissimilar [group] by Sautrāntika, and so on, as long as [the dissimilar group] can stop the overflow of the thesis[-property] and the reason[-property] completely, it is not necessary for the example by dissimilarity to have anything [with an existent entity] to rely on.

(227) 同喻能立，成有必有，成無必無，表詮、遮詮二種皆得。異喻不爾，有體、無體一向皆遮，性止濫故。故“常”言者遮非“無常”宗，“非所作”言表非“所作”因，不要“常”、“非作”別詮二有體，意顯異喻通無體故。《理門論》云：“前是遮詮，後唯止濫，由合及離比度義故。”前之同喻亦遮亦詮，由成無以無，成有以有故。後之異喻一向止濫，遮而不詮。由同喻合比度義故，由異喻離比度義故。《理門論》云：“前是遮詮，後唯止濫，由合及離比度義故。”

(111c11–c19)

The example by similarity belongs to the proof, so [in the example by similarity,] [the thesis-subject with an] existent [entity] must be established by [instances with] existent [entities], and [the thesis-subject with a] non-existent [entity] must be established by [instances with] non-existent [entities], for both the affirming expression (biaoquan 表詮) and the negating expression (zhequan 遮詮, paryudāsa) are admissible [in it]. However, the example by dissimilarity is not so, [in the example by dissimilarity,] no matter possessing existent or non-existent entities, it uniformly just negates, for its nature is to stop the overflow. Thus, the word “permanent” negates the thesis[-property] “impermanent,” and the word “unproduced” affirms the absence of the reason[-property] “produced,” however, these “permanent” and “unproduced” are not meant to express two [properties] with existent entities independently, because the purpose [of such words in the Nyāyapraveśa] is to show that the example by dissimilarity can also possess non-existent entities [besides existent entities]. The Nyāyamukha states, “the former [example] is both negating and affirming; the latter [example] is merely stopping the overflow, because [the example by similarity] makes us infer a notion by
means of the positive concomitance and [the example by dissimilarity] does by means of the negative concomitance.” The former example by similarity both negates and affirms, because [the thesis-subject with an] existent [entity] should be established by [instances with] existent [entities], and [the thesis-subject with a] non-existent [entity] should be established by [instances with] non-existent [entities]. The latter example by dissimilarity uniformly just stops the overflow; it merely negates but does not affirm. This is because the example by similarity makes us infer a notion by means of the positive concomitance, and the example by dissimilarity makes us infer a notion by means of the negative concomitance.

Moreover, that (the Nyāyamukha) summarizes by saying “therefore, even if [an example by dissimilarity is set forth] against [the opponent] who does not admit the substantial existences of ether, and so on, [like Sautrāntika], [this example by dissimilarity with ether, and so on, as instances] can still show that, wherever the thesis[-property] is absent, the absence of the reason[-property] will be necessarily

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590 YZML, T1628 p.2c08–c09. Tucci (1930, p.37): The first example is negative and affirmative, the second is merely exclusive. In fact either of them makes us reach the wanted notion, the first through positive application (anvaya), the second through an exclusive one (vyatireka).

= PSV ad PS 4.3c: pūrvatra paryudāsaḥ, aparatra tu prasajyapratisedaḥ ity uktam + PST ad PSV 4.3cd: anvayavyatirekābhīyām arthānumānāt. See Katsura (2016a, p.1240)

The translation here is based on the context in Kuji’s commentary. However, it should be noticed that 遮詮, i.e., paryudāsa according to PS 4.3, which means the negating expression, should be a single word, but since Kuji emphasizes that the negating expression and the affirming expression are both contained in the similar example, the word 遮詮 quoted here should be taken as 遮 and 詮, with 遮 as “negating” and 詮 as “affirming.” In other words, herein 遮 refers to the negating expression, while 詮 refers to the affirming expression instead of its literal meaning “expression.”

591 太虛空 YRZLSi, 大虚空 YRZLSj. “Taixukong 太虛空” and “daxukong 大虛空” are both possible for translating ākāśa, i.e., ether. However, in Xuanzang’s translation of the Nyāyamukha it reads “tai xu kong 太虛空,” since this is a quote from that text, it should also read “taixukong 太虛空” here.
When the ancient master states the thesis “sound is impermanent,” and the example by dissimilarity is “like ether,” the *Nyāyamukha* retorts by saying, “it is not correct if [an example by dissimilarity] does not indicate in the dissimilar group the nature of [the thesis-property’s and the reason’s] being absent; only when such a distinction exists, [an example by dissimilarity] can be an [available] example by dissimilarity.” This means that regarding the dissimilar group “impermanent,” [the example by dissimilarity] should say “whatever is permanent is seen to be unproduced, like ether, and so on.” This statement takes “permanent” exactly and “unproduced” additionally as the dissimilar group, and takes “ether” as the substratum of the example. Such a distinction is needed to indicate [the thesis-property’s and the reason’s] absence from the dissimilar group and to indicate in an inverse way that wherever the reason “produced” is present the thesis[-property] “impermanent” must follow [it to be present]. If you just say “like ether” [as the example by dissimilarity], then now it can be argued against by saying that it is not correct if [an example by dissimilarity] does not indicate in the dissimilar group the thesis[-property]’s and the reason’s being absent, but only when such a distinction exists, [an example by dissimilarity] can be an [available] example by dissimilarity. Read the text meticulously, and then the profound principle can be seen.

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(229) 又難古言：“世間但顯，宗、因異品，同處有性，為異法喻，非宗無處，因不有性，故定無能。”初四句牒，後三句非。此說外道名為“世間”，但顯宗、因“常”及“非所作”異品同在虛空上，故說此虛空為異喻體。此牒彼宗而申難言：“非宗無處，因不有性，故定無能。”異品不言“謂若是常”宗無之處，“見
Additionally, [the Nyāyamukha] argues against the ancient master, “[the science of reasons of the heretics of] the common world merely indicates that whatever possesses in one and the same place the existence of the dissimilar groups of the thesis and the reason is the example by the dissimilar property; it is not [defined as] wherever the thesis[-property] is absent, the reason is non-present either, so it definitely has no power [of proving].” The first four parts of this sentence quote [the opinion of the common world], while the last three parts of this sentence deny it. This refers to the heretics as “the common world”; [their science of reasons] merely shows the dissimilar groups of the thesis and the reason, namely “permanent” and “unproduced,” are both possessed by ether, so it regards ether as the essence of the example by dissimilarity. This [sentence] quotes their opinion and refutes it by saying, “it is not [defined as] wherever the thesis[-property] is absent, the reason is non-present, so it definitely has no power [of proving].” [Their] example by dissimilarity does not state “whatever is permanent,” [which refers to] wherever the thesis[-property] is absent, and “is seen to be unproduced,” [which refers to] the reason’s being non-present, to negate the thesis[-property] and the reason and to manifest in an inverse way that wherever the reason is present the thesis[-property] must be present, so the example by dissimilarity definitely does not have the power [of proving]. Thus, [the example by dissimilarity] should just be stated as what I have advocated.

(YXIX)論：...如有非有，說名“非有”。(112a08)
YRZL: … like being is not being, then “not being” is said.
NP 2.3: yathā bhāvābhāvo ’bhāva iti || (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.3, 11).

(230)述曰：恐說異喻遮義不明，指事為例。(112a0–a09)

YRZLS: For fear of not expressing the negating of the example by dissimilarity clearly enough, an instance is cited to illustrate it.

(231)此有二釋：

一云，如勝論師為其五頂不信“有性實等外有”，遂立量云，“有性非實、非德、非業，有一實故，有德、業故，如同異性”。陳那破云，此因有有法自相相違，謂“有性應非有，有一實故，有德、業故，如同異性”。此引陳那“有非有”言豈言“非有”別有所目？一向遮“有”故言“非有”，“常”等亦爾，一向遮“無常”及“所作性”故，非有所目。

二云，此言“非有”，非引陳那所說“非有”。汎言“非有”略有二義：一者勝論，除“有”五句，皆是“非有”，此即表詮。二者“非有”但非於“有”，非有所目。欲顯同喻成有體宗，可如表五；異喻止濫，可如遮“有”。(112a0–a20)

There are two kinds of explanation:

Firstly, for example, because his [disciple] Panñaśikha (Wuding 五頂) did not believe that “being exists out of substance, and so on,” the Vaiśeṣika master set forth the inference that “being is neither a substance, nor a quality, nor an action, because of possessing one substance, and residing in qualities and actions, like universal-particularity.” Dignāga refutes this by saying that this reason commits [the fallacy that] the reason proves the opposite of the self-form of the property-possession (youfā zixiang xiangwei 有法自相相違, dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana), and [an opposite inference] can say “the being [said by you] should not be being, because of possessing one substance, and residing in qualities and actions, like universal-particularity.”

599 In a former part of this commentary as well as some other texts, such as Kuiji’s commentary on the Cheng weišhi lun, this name is also transliterated into ”Banzheshiqi 般遮尸棄.”

600 It refers to Kaṇāda, who is the founder of Vaiśeṣika and recorded also as Xiuliu 鶴鶴, i.e., Ulūka, in this text, and also the teacher of Panñaśikha.

601 = na dravyam na karma na guṇo bhāva iti, ekadravyavattvāt gunakarnasu ca bhāvāt, sāmānyaviśesavad iti | (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.7, 12–14).
Therefore, do the words “being is not being” quoted from Dignāga here say that “not being” indicates something else? In order to negate “being” uniformly, “non-being” is said; “permanent,” and so on, are the same, because [they are said] in order to negate “impermanent” and “produced” uniformly but not to indicate anything in particular.

Secondly, the word “not being” is not a quote of the “not being” said by Dignāga. In general, “not being” has two meanings: First, to Vaiśeṣika, the five categories other than “being” are all “not being,” so this [“not being”] is an affirming expression. Second, “not being” merely negates “being” without indicating anything. [If “not being” is said in the example by similarity, then] for purpose of showing that the example by similarity is meant to establish a thesis[-subject] with an existent entity, [“not being”] can be taken as affirming the [other] five [categories]; [if “not being” is said in the example by dissimilarity, then for purpose of showing that] the example by dissimilarity stops the overflow, [“not being”] can be taken as negating “being.”

(232)然中道大乘，一切法性皆離假智及言詮表。言與假智俱不得真，一向遮詮都無所表，唯於諸法共相而轉。因明之法即不同彼，然共相中可有詮表義。同喻成立有、無二法，有成於有，可詮詮也，無成於無，即可遮也。異喻必遮，故言此遮非有所表。異不同同，理如前說。(112a20–a26)

However, according to the middle way of Mahāyāna, all the natures of dharmas are devoid of the conventional cognition and the expression through language. Both the language and the conventional cognition cannot apprehend the truth, so they belong uniformly to merely the negating expression without any affirming, and they can only be applied to the universal characteristics of all the dharmas. Since the principle of the science of reasons is different from that, [in the science of reasons,) expression can be available for the universal characteristics. Since the example by similarity can establish both the subjects with existent [entities] and the subjects with non-existent [entities], [the subjects with] existent [entities] have to be established by [the similar group with] existent [entities], and then the [affirming] expression is admitted [in the example by similarity], while [the subjects with] non-existent [entities] have to be established by
[the similar group with] non-existent [entities], and then [the example by similarity] can be of the negating [expression]. However, the example by dissimilarity must negate, so it is said that this negating [expression] does not have anything to affirm. The dissimilar [example] is different from the similar [example]; its reason has been explained above.

(233)《理門論》中於此二喻而設難言：“復以何緣第一説因宗所隨逐，第二説宗無因不有，不説因無宗不有耶？”此中難意，前頌所言“説因宗所隨，宗無因不有，此二名‘譬喻’”，何不以同例異，先宗後因，説“無常者皆是所作”，而言“諸所作者皆是無常”，説有因處宗所隨逐？何不以異例同，先因後宗，説“非所作皆見是常”，而言“若有是常見非所作”，説宗無處因亦隨無？彼論答云：“由如是説，能顯示因同品定有，異品遍無，非顛倒説。”即彼頌言：

“應以非作證其常，
或以無常成所作，
若爾應成非所説，
不遍非樂等合離。”

初三句答“所作”遍因，後一句答“勤勇”狹因。第一同喻先宗後因，第二異喻先因後宗，返覆相例俱為不可。(112a26–b11)

To [the formulations of] these two examples, the Nyāyamukha raises an objection, “moreover, why did you first say that the reason is followed by [the property of] the thesis, and then, in the second place, that wherever [the property of] the thesis is absent, the reason is absent too, but not say [on the contrary] that wherever the reason is absent, [the property of] the thesis is absent also?” The objection here means, concerning “[the examples] express that the reason is followed by [the property of] the thesis and that wherever [the property of] the thesis is absent the reason is also absent, and these two are named ‘examples’” said in the verse above, then why does it not let the similar [example] imitate the dissimilar [example] and say “whatever is impermanent is

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602 YZML, T1628 p.2c11–c12. Tucci (1930, p.38): Now same may object: “why did you first say that the reason is followed by the probandum, and then, in the second place, that wherever the probandum is absent, the reason also is absent? Wht did you not say [on the contrary] that wherever the reason is absent there is no probandum?”

= PSV ad PS 4.3: kim punah kāraṇam -- ekatra hetoh sādhyenāṇavagama utkha, dvitīye tu sādhyābhāve hetor abbāvah, na tu hetvābhāve sādhyasyābhāva iti. See Katsura (2016a, p.1241)
produced,” but says “whatever is produced is impermanent” which expresses that the reason is followed by the property of the thesis? And why does it not let the dissimilar [example] imitate the similar [example] to [state] the reason formerly and [the property of] the thesis in the latter and say “whatever is unproduced is seen to be permanent,” but says “whatever is permanent is seen to be unproduced” which expresses that wherever [the property of] the thesis is absent the reason follows it to be absent? That treatise answers, “by saying in this way, it can be shown that the reason is certainly present in the similar group and universally absent from the dissimilar group, but not by saying in the reverse way.”

603 This is exactly what is said in its verse,

“[if the example by similarity and the example by dissimilarity were formulated inversely], then through unproduced, permanent would be established, or through impermanent, produced would be established, so [a thesis which] is not [the thesis] stated would be established, or [the thesis] [would be] non-pervasive or undesired through equating the positive concomitance with the negative concomitance.”

The first three lines explain [the case of inversely formulated examples of] the pervasive (broad) reason “produced,” while the last line explains [that of] the narrow reason “[resulting from] effort.” The first [line] is [the case that] the thesis[-property] is former and the reason is latter in the example by similarity, and the second [line] is [the case that] [the contrary of] the reason is former and [the contrary of] the thesis[-property] is latter, for both [the cases that the example by similarity and the example by dissimilarity] imitate each other are not admitted.

603 YZML, T1628 p.2c12–c14. Tucci (1930, p.38): [I have expressed myself in that way because] with such a rule I can show that there is no contradiction with my previous statement, viz., that the reason must be resident in the positive instances, but absolutely non-resident in the negative instances.

= PSV ad PS 4.3: evaṃ hi hetoh sapakṣa eva sattvaṃ, sādhyābhaiśe cāsattvaṃ eva śakyaṃ darsayitum, na viparyayāt. See Katsura (2016a, p.1241)

604 YZML, T1628 p.2c15–c16. Tucci (1930, pp.38–39): If through [the mere similarity with] “non-product” one could prove eternity, or through [the mere similarity with the] non-eternal one could prove [the propriety of being] a product, then the necessary consequence is that positive or negative applications like these will either demonstrate [a thesis which] is not [the thesis] enunciated or prove to be non-pervasive or [implicate the speaker in] undesired [fallacies].

= PS 4.4: nityatā ’kṛtakatvena nāśitvād vātra kāryatā | syād anukā kṛtā ’vyāpyiny aniṣṭum ca same ‘nvaye ||. See Katsura (2016a, p.1243)

However, the translation of this verse here is based on Kuiji’s commentary.
If the negative concomitance imitates the positive concomitance through [stating] the reason formerly and the thesis[-property] in the latter, and says “whatever is unproduced is permanent,” then it should be [the case of] demonstrating “permanent” through the reason “unproduced” itself, but not negating the originally established thesis[-property] former and the [originally established] reason latter. If that is admitted, then another thesis instead of the originally stated “impermanent” should be established. In addition, “ether (the instance of the example by dissimilarity) is permanent” is originally established to the proponent and the opponent, and if it is proved again now, then the fallacy that in the thesis the relationship is well-established is committed. Since this is not to be argued about originally and proves “permanent” inversely, it is said that if so, then [a thesis which] is not [the one] originally stated would be established.

If the positive concomitance imitates the negative concomitance through [stating] the thesis[-property] former and the reason latter, and says “whatever is impermanent is produced,” then it should be [the case of] demonstrating “produced” through “impermanent,” but not demonstrating the [original] thesis “impermanent” through “produced.” If that is admitted, then another thesis instead of “impermanent” which is not to be argued about originally should be established.

亦YRZLSj, 即YRZLSj, “亦” means “also,” “too,” it does not make sense here; “即”, which is a variant of “即,” can be an adverb here, means “then,” in addition, the relevant sentence in the next paragraph also contains “即.”
Moreover, “sound is impermanent” is not accepted by both sides, but the property “produced” possessed by sound is originally accepted by both. If the equally accepted “produced” is to be established through the unequally accepted “impermanent,” then in the thesis the relation is well-established, and the reason is [unestablished] to either [side] (the opponent). Therefore, it is said that if so, then [a thesis which] is not [the one] originally argued about would be established.

Question: Sound and pot are both impermanent, and since whatever is produced is impermanent, sound’s being impermanent and pot’s being impermanent are both established. Sound and the pot are both produced, and since whatever is impermanent is produced, why should it be excluded that sound’s being produced and the pot’s being produced are both established?

Answer: The opponent [accepts] that sound is produced but not impermanent, and pot is both produced and impermanent, so [the proponent] cites that the pot is both produced and impermanent to illustrate that sound is produced and also impermanent. However, pot’s being produced and being impermanent are not meant to be established, so how can being produced be established additionally through being impermanent? (Thus, being produced is not to be established or argued about.)

Question: 声、瓶俱无常，诸所作者皆无常，声、瓶无常两俱成。声、瓶俱所作，诸无常者皆所作，何废606声、瓶所作两俱成？

Answer: 彼声所作非无常，瓶许所作亦无常，举瓶所作既无常，类声所作亦无常。不欲成瓶所作、无常，何得别以无常成所作？(112b22–b27)
The fourth line explains why [the inversely formulated examples] are not admitted in [the case of] the reason “[resulting from] effort” either. The word “non-pervasive” means that if the negative concomitance imitates the positive concomitance by saying, “whatever does not result immediately from effort is certainly permanent” firstly, then since lightening does not result from effort and it is not permanent either, the reason “not [resulting from] effort” is broad while the thesis[-property] “permanent” is narrow. The narrow thesis[-property] is non-pervasive to the broad reason “permanent.” Therefore, if “permanent” is to be established through “not resulting from effort,” then [a thesis which] is not [the one] originally stated is to be established. If the positive concomitance imitates the negative concomitance by saying “whatever is impermanent results from effort” firstly, then since lightening, and so on, are impermanent but do not result from effort, the reason “impermanent” is broad while the thesis[-property] “resulting from effort” is narrow. This narrow thesis[-property] is also non-pervasive to the broad reason. Therefore, if that is also admitted, then a thesis that is not [the one] originally argued about is to be established. Since [the case of inversely formulated examples of] the reason “[resulting from] effort” is the same as [that of] the reason “being produced” (namely they both establish a thesis that is not the original one), (and besides that, the case of the reason “resulting from effort” also causes the problem of non-pervasive thesis-properties), [the fourth line] should say “[the thesis] [would be] non-pervasive additionally,” but in order to be brief, the word “additional” is omitted.

(239) 其“非樂”者，此不遍因應別有成立不愛樂宗。謂若以離類合言“諸非勤發皆常住”者，空非勤發可是常住，電非勤發，如何皆常？此因既於異品中有，即成不定，便為成立“電等常住”不樂之宗607。又若以合類離言“諸無常者皆是勤發”，
“Undesired” means [in the case of inversely formulated examples] this non-pervasive reason would establish another undesired thesis. Namely, if the negative concomitance imitates the positive concomitance by saying “whatever does not result from effort is permanent,” and then ether does not result from effort and it is permanent, while lightening does not result from effort [but it is impermanent], how can all [what do not result from effort] be permanent? Since this reason is present in the dissimilar group, it becomes inconclusive, and it establishes the undesired thesis “lightening, and so on, are permanent.” Moreover, if the positive concomitance imitates the negative concomitance by saying “whatever is impermanent results from effort,” and then a pot, and so on, are impermanent and they can result from effort, how can lightening, and so on, which are impermanent, result from effort? As the reason “resulting from effort” is also present in the dissimilar group, it also becomes inconclusive. Since lightening, and so on, are proved to be “resulting from effort” through “impermanent,” this is also undesired. Thus, both the cases that the positive concomitance and the negative concomitance imitate each other are not admitted, so the similar and dissimilar [examples] with the positive concomitance and the negative concomitance should just be [formulated] as I said.

(240) 彼又問言：“為要具二譬喻言詞方成能立，為如其因但隨說一？”此問二喻，為要具說二，方成能立，成所立宗，為如“所作”、“勤勇”二因，但隨說一即成能立，成所立宗610？
彼自答言：“若就正理，應具說二。由是具足顯示所立不離其因，以具顯
同品定有，異品遍無，能正對治相違、不定。”由具顯二，故能顯示宗不相離因，
亦顯宗因同品定有、異品遍無。二喻既足，故能正除相違、不定，相違、不定
二相過故。相違之因同無異有，不定之因二有二無，故說二喻具以除二過。

(112c16–c26)

That (the Nyāyamukha) asks additionally, “is the possession of both the two examples
necessary to formulate the proof, or is merely either one needed accordingly, just like
the reasons?” This question asks, concerning the two examples, are both of the
examples needed to formulate the proof and then establish the thesis to be proved, or
just like the two [correct] reasons “being produced” and “resulting from effort,” is
merely either one needed accordingly to formulate the proof and then establish the
thesis to be proved?

That (the Nyāyamukha) answers by itself, “according to the true principle, both of the
[examples] should be stated. By presenting both, it can be shown perfectly that what is
to be proved cannot be apart from the reason, so that [the reason’s] being certainly
present in the similar group and being universally absent from the dissimilar group can
both be shown, and then [the fallacies of] contradictory [reasons] and inconclusive
[reasons] can also be removed directly.” Because both of the [examples] are shown,
it can be shown that the thesis-[property] cannot be apart from the reason, and the
reason’s being certainly present in the similar group and being universally absent from

\[611\]示 YRZLS\text{St} YRZLSg. The text in YZML reads “shi 示,” since this is a quote from YZML, it should
also be “shi 示.”

\[612\]二喻具 YRZLS\text{St} YRZLSg. “Ju 具” can mean “both” here. Since in the content above of this
passage, this character has been used several times to emphasize the concurrence of the two examples or the two
characteristics, it may also exist here.

\[613\] YZML, T1628 p.2c26–c27. Tucci (1930, pp.41–42): [Now some ask]: is the formulation of both examples
necessary, so that the syllogism may be valid, or is it the formulation of one single example sufficient, just as that of
the reason?

\[614\] YZML, T1628 pp.2c27–3a01. Tucci (1930, p.42): If one [wishes] to fulfill the rules of true logic, he must
therefore use the two [examples] together. When both are present, they can perfectly show that the probandum is not
contrary to the reason, since they indicate that the pakṣadharmā (M as resident in P) is certainly present in the positive
instances, but absolutely absent in the negative instances. Therefore [in such a way] it is possible to oppose [the
objection that a syllogism contains a fallacy; viz., that it is] either inconclusive or contradictory.

Two Sanskrit fragments of this part read:

\[\text{eṣa tāvān nyāyo yad ubhayaṃ vaktavyam} = \text{若就正理應具說二}
\]

\[\text{viruddhānaikāṇktikapratipakṣena} = \text{能正對治相違、不定}\]

See Katsura (1981, p.72, n.2, 3, 4).
the dissimilar group can also be shown. Since the two examples are both present, [the fallacies of] contradictory [reasons] and inconclusive [reasons] can be excluded directly, because [the fallacies of] contradictory [reasons] and inconclusive [reasons] belong to fallacies of the [last] two characteristics [of a correct reason] (which are shown by the two examples). The contradictory reasons are absent from the similar [group] and present in the dissimilar [group], and the inconclusive reasons are either present in both [the similar group and the dissimilar group] or absent from both, so both of the examples should be stated to exclude these two kinds of fallacies.

(241) 彼復又言⁶¹５：“若有於此一分已成，隨說一分亦成能立。”謂於二喻，有已解同，應但說異；有已解異，應但說同。不具說二亦成能立。(112c26–c29)
Furthermore, that (the Nyāyamukha) says, “if one part of these has already been established, then only with [the other] one part stated accordingly, can the proof also be formulated.”⁶¹６ This means that regarding the two examples, in some [inferences], the similar [example] has already been understood [by both sides and the witness], and then only the example by dissimilarity should be stated; in some [other inferences], the dissimilar [example] has already been understood [by both sides and the witness], and then only the example by similarity should be stated. [In certain situations,] not stating both of the [examples] can also formulate the proof.

(242) 彼論又言：“若如其‘聲’，兩義同許，俱不須說；或由義准，一能顯二。”“聲”謂有法，“所作性”因依此“聲”有。若敵、證等聞此宗、因，如其“聲”上兩義同許，即解因上二喻之義，同、異二喻俱不須說。或立論者已說一喻，義准顯二，敵、證生解，但為說一。此上意說二俱不說，或隨說一，或二具說，隨對時機一切皆得。(112c29–113a07)

⁶¹⁵ 彼復又言 YRZLSi YRZLSj, 彼次有言 YRZLSg. The quote in IRMS reads “彼次又言,” however, all of these three readings mean the same that “in addition, that [treatise] says...” Therefore, they are all possible.
⁶¹⁶ YZML, T1628 p.3a01–a02. Tucci (1930, pp.42–43): If the argument is partly proved, then the [syllogism may be] valid by giving an example only.
Furthermore, that treatise says, “just like [the inference of] ‘sound’, since the two properties (i.e., the thesis-property and the reason-property) are both accepted, then both [the two examples] are not necessary to state; or through the implication (yizhun 義准, arthāpatti) of [either example], [this] one single [example] can indicate both.”

“Sound” refers to the property-possessor, and then the reason “being produced” relies on this “sound.” If once the opponent and the witness have heard the thesis and the reason [of this inference], just like the two properties of “sound” which are both accepted [by them as well as the proponent], they understand the meanings of the two examples for this reason, then both the example by similarity and the example by dissimilarity are not necessary to state. Alternatively, when the proponent has stated one example, through implication both of the [examples] can be indicated, and the opponent and the witness understand, and then just one [example] has to be stated. Above it means, [the case that] both are not to be stated, [the case that] only one is to be stated accordingly, and [the case that] both are to be stated, are all admitted according to different situations.

\[617\] YZML, T1628 p.3a02–a03. Tucci (1930, pp.43–44): E.g. if the two properties of sound [viz., its non-eternity and its quality of being a product], are equally admitted [by either disputant], then it is not necessary to formulate both examples; and also [the same thing happens], when by the mere internal evidence of the argument itself (arthāpatti) one single example is sufficient to declare both.

或由義准一能顯二 = arthāpattvā vānyatāreṇobhayapradarsīnāt. See Katsura (1981, p.72, n.6).
2.2.4. On the Summary for Proof

(1.2.2.1.3. Summarizing the Content Above and Investigating the Sameness and Difference 總結成前，簡擇同異)

(1.2.2.1.3.1. Summarizing the Content Above 結成前)

(1.2.2.1.3.1.1. Summarizing in General 總結成)

(XXX)論：已說宗等。如是多言，開悟他時，說名“能立”。 (113a08)

YRZL: The thesis and others have been expounded. The multiple statements of these [factors, i.e., the thesis, reason, and example,] on the occasion of making others understand, are called “proof.”

NP 2.3 and 2.4: 

uktāḥ pakṣādayah || eṣāṁ vacanāni parapratyāyanakāle sādhanam utkam itī | (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.3, 12–13).

(243)述曰：解能立中，自下第三結成前，簡擇同異。於中有二：初結618成前，後簡619同異。結成620有二：初總621結成，後別牒結。此即初也。 (113a09–a11)

YRZLS: In [the section of] interpreting proof, below is the third part, namely summarizing the content above and investigating the sameness and the difference. There are two parts in it: the former summarizes the content above; and the latter investigates the sameness and the difference. Summarizing includes two [sub-parts]:

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618 結 YRZLSj, 應結 YRZLSg. “Zong 應” is a variant of “zong 總.” “Jie 結” can be regarded as short for “zongjie 應結,” and they can both mean “summarize” here.

619 簡 YRZLSj, 簡擇 YRZLSg. “Jian 簡” can be regarded as short for “jian ze 簡擇,” and they can both mean “investigate” here.

620 結成 YRZLSj, 於中 YRZLSg. “Jie cheng 結成” is short for “zongjie chengqian 總結成前,” i.e., “summarizing the content above,” while “yuzhong 於中” means “in it.” Although they can both make sense here, since there are two parts mentioned in the last sentence, it is clearer to mention the title of the very part again.

621 總 YRZLSj, 應 YRZLSg. “zong 應” is a variant of “zong 總.”
the former summarizes in general; and the latter summarizes separately. This is the former.

(244) 若順世親，宗亦能立，故言“宗等”。宗、因、喻三名為“多言”，立者以此多言開悟敵證之時，說名“能立”。陳那已後，舉宗能等，取其所等一因、二喻名為“能立”。宗是能立之所立具，故於能立總結明之。(113a11–a16)

If following [the viewpoint of] Vasubandhu, then the thesis also belongs to the proof, so “the thesis and others” is said. The three [members], namely the thesis, reason, and example, are called “multiple statements”; on the occasion of the proponent’s making others understand through these multiple statements, they are called “proof.” Since Dignāga, the thesis is regarded as the one that can take others along as “so on,” while what are taken along [by the thesis] are regarded as “so on,” namely the single reason and the two examples, and they are called “proof.” However, because [the statement of] the thesis is the substratum of what is to be proved by the proof, it is summarized and expounded in [the section of] proof.

(1.2.2.1.3.1.2. Summarizing Separately 別牒結)

(1.2.2.1.3.1.2.1. Summarizing the Thesis by Citing an Instance 膲前宗後指法)

(XXXI)論: 如說“聲無常”者是立宗言。(113a17)

YRZL: For instance, that “sound is impermanent” is the statement of the thesis.

NP 2.4: yathā anityaḥ śabda iti pakṣavacanam | (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.3, 14).

(245)述曰：下別牒結能立。文勢有四，此文初也。牒前宗後指法云：如有成立“聲是無常”者。此是所論立宗之言。(113a17–a19)
YRZLS: Now comes [the part of] summarizing [different members of] proof separately. The text includes four sections, and this is the first one. After summarizing the thesis above, an instance is cited, which says that, for instance, someone establishes “sound is impermanent.” This is the statement of setting forth the thesis to be argued about.

**(1.2.2.1.3.1.2.2 Summarizing the Reason by Citing an Instance 前因後指法)**

YRZLS: [This is] the second section. After summarizing the reason above, an instance is cited to illustrate that “because of being produced” here is a property of the thesis[-subject] and the statement of the reason that can prove. Through this property of the thesis[-subject], the thesis “sound is impermanent” [set forth] before can be established, so it is named “reason.” The word “because of (gu 故)” was absent before but is present now, because in order to indicate that the reason-property is to be established, “because of” must be said, otherwise [this member] cannot point to the ground of the thesis [clearly]. [At the

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625 云 YRZLSj, 言 YRZLSg. See fn.624.
626 有 YRZLSj, 無 YRZLSg. “You 有” means “possess,” “have;,” “exist,” while “qi 其” is a demonstrative meaning “the,” “that.” They are both possible, but “qi 其” seems more proper to the Chinese language.
627 前無有顯立因法 YRZLSj, 前無有顯今立因法 YRZLSg. “前無有顯今立因法” means “[the ‘gu 故’ character] was absent before but it is present now, because in order to indicate that the reason-property is to be established, ...” “前無有顯今立因法” means “[the ‘gu 故’ character] was not shown, now since the reason-property is to be established, ...” They are both possible.
628 標 YRZLSj, 釋 YRZLSg. “Biao 標” means “point to,” while “shi 釋” means “interpret,” “explain,” they are both possible.
beginning of this paragraph, when I say “‘being produced’ here is a property of the thesis-subject and the statement of the reason which can prove’”, an instance is just cited briefly, so [the word “because of”] was omitted [there]. In the part of citing instances (1.2.2.1.2.2.5) above, two reasons were cited, but now only one is represented. The part above is meant to manifest [the reason’s] being certainly present in the similar group and the “universally” said in the other two [characteristics]. Since the three characteristics show a difference [between “certainly” and “universally”], two reasons have to be shown separately. However, now [this section] is just summarizing through citing [an instance] briefly, so only one is represented.

(1.2.2.1.3.1.2.3. Summarizing the Similar Example by Citing an Instance 雜前同喻後指法)

(XXXIII)論：“若是所作，見彼無常，如瓶等”者，是隨同品言。(113a28)
YRZL: That “Whatever is produced is seen to be impermanent, like a pot, and so on,” is the statement of following the similar group.
NP 2.4: yat kṛtaṁ tad anityaṁ dṛṣṭam yathā ghaṭādir iti sapakṣānugamavacanam | (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.3, 15–16).

(247)述曰：第三文也。牒前同喻後指法云：謂“若有‘所作’因，見有‘無常’宗，猶如瓶等”，是“無常”宗隨因“所作”同品之言。雖“所作”因舉聲上有以629顯“無常”，“無常”猶未隨“所作”因。“所作”因通聲、瓶兩處名“因同品”。今舉瓶上“所作”故“無常”，顯聲“無常”亦隨因同品，義決定故。(113a29–b05)
YRZLS: [This is] the third section. After summarizing the example by similarity above, an instance is cited, which says “whatever possesses the reason ‘being produced’ is seen to possess the thesis[-property] ‘being impermanent’, like a pot, and so on,” and it is the statement showing that the thesis[-property] “being impermanent” follows the

629 以 YRZLSi YRZLSj, 已 YRZLSg. “已 已” can be an interchangeable character of “以 以,” so both of them can mean “to” here, but usually it should be written as “以 以” in Chinese.
similar group of the reason “being produced.” [Before the example is set forth,]
although the reason “being produced” was cited as possessed by sound to illuminate
“being impermanent,” “being impermanent” had not followed the reason “being
produced” yet, [so the example is needed]. The reason “being produced” is common to
both sound and pot, so they are called “the similar group of the reason.”630 Now, it is
cited that the pot possesses “being impermanent” because of its “being produced,” in
order to illustrate that the “being impermanent” of sound should also follow [sound’s
identity as] the similar group of the reason [to be present], because [such a
concomitance] is confirmed through the indication [of the inseparable connection].

(248) 又“同品”者是宗同品。昔雖舉因，宗猶未隨自瓶同品“無常”義定。今顯有因
宗法必有631，如瓶等故，其所立聲，定隨同品“無常”義立。(113b05–b08)
Moreover, the “similar group” here can also refer to the similar group of the thesis.
Although the reason was cited before, the thesis-[subject] has not followed its own
similar group, namely the pot, to confirm the property of “being impermanent.” Now it
has shown that whatever possesses the reason must also possess the thesis-property,
like the pot, and so on; so sound, which is to be proved, must follow the similar group
to confirm the property of “being impermanent.”

(249) 問：敵者不解632聲有“無常”，何得以瓶而為同品?
答：兩家633共許“所作”同，故因正同品。立者所立本立“無常”，故舉於瓶為宗
同品亦無過也。(113b08–b11)
Question: If the opponent does not understand that sound possesses “being
impermanent,” then how can a pot be taken as the similar group?
Answer: Both schools accept “being produced” equally, so [the similar group of] the

630 In this paragraph, the thesis-subject itself is also included in the similar group of the reason.
631 有 YRZLSj, 隨 YRZLSg. “you 有” means “possess,” “have” or “exist,” “be present,” while “sui 隨”
means “follow,” they are both possible.
632 解 YRZLSj, 許 YRZLSg. “jie 解” means “understand,” and “xu 許” means “accept,” “admit,” they are
both possible.
633 家 YRZLSj, 宗 YRZLSg. “jia 家” and “zong 宗” can both mean “school” here.
reason (which the pot belongs to) is the main similar group. What is to be proved by the proponent is originally meant to prove “being impermanent,” so it is not fallacious to cite a pot as the similar group of the thesis.

**1.2.2.1.3.1.2.4. Summarizing the dissimilar Example with by an Instance 帖前異喻後指法**

(XXXIV)論：若是其常，見非所作，如虛空”者，是遠離言。（113b12）

YRZL: That “whatever is permanent, is seen to be unproduced, like ether,” is the statement of contradicting and negating.634

NP 2.4: yan nityaṃ tad akṛtakaṃ drṣṭaṃ yathākāśam iti vyatirekavacanam | (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.3, 16–17).

(250)述曰：第四文也。牒前異喻後指法云 “若是其常”離所立宗，“見非所作”離能立因，“如虛空”者，指異喻依。此止635於前宗、因二濫名“遠離言”。遠宗離因，或通遠離，或體疎名“遠”，義乖名“離”，與所、能立，體相疎遠，義理乖絕，故名“遠離”。(113b12–b17)

YRZLS: [This is] the fourth section. After summarizing the example by dissimilarity above, an instance is cited, which says “whatever is permanent” to negate the thesis[-property] to be proved; “is seen to be unproduced” to negate the reason that can prove; and “like ether” as the substratum of the example by dissimilarity. This [statement] can stop the overflows of the thesis[-property] and the reason, so it is called “the statement of contradicting and negating.” As a result of contradicting the thesis[-property] and negating the reason; or contradicting and negating both; or contradicting because of a disparate entity and negating because of a different attribute, namely [the statement of

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634 The Sanskrit word vyatirekavacana is translated into “yuanli yan 遠離言” by Xuanzang, so actually “yuanli 遠離” refers to vyatireka- as a whole, but in the interpretation below, Kuiji separates this word into two single ones and explains them respectively, which should come from his incomprehension of the Sanskrit text, thus, the English translation here also treats it as two words in order to accord with Kuiji’s commentary.

635 指 YRZLSJ YRZLSg, 止 YRZLSg. “Zhi 指” means “refer to,” while “zhi 止” means “stop,” according to the content, it should be “stop,” in addition, the quote in IRMS also reads “zhi 止.”
the example by dissimilarity] contradicts what is to be proved and the proof because of a disparate entity, and negates them because of a different attribute: so [this statement] is named “contradicting and negating.”

(251)問：何故但離宗之與因，不別離喻？
答：別離宗、因，合則離喻，更不別說。然同成宗，故必須有體；今以止非，不須異性。(113b17–b20)

Question: Why are only the thesis[-property] and the reason negated, but not the example additionally?
Answer: In a separate way, the thesis[-property] and the reason are negated, while in a combining way, the example is negated, so it does not have to be expressed additionally. However, the similar [example] is meant to establish the thesis [in a supporting way], so it must possess existent entities; now [the example by dissimilarity, which negates the example by similarity] is meant to stop the faults, so [the entities of] dissimilar properties are not necessary.

(252)問：何故但名“異喻”，不名“異宗、因”耶？
答：喻合兩法，宗、因各一，說“異喻”以總包，言異二而為失。若言“異宗”、“異因”，謂更別成他義，非是離前返成能立。故總名“異喻”，合異宗、因，不別說“異宗”、“異因”之號。(113b20–b24)

Question: Why is there only the name “example by dissimilarity,” but no “dissimilar thesis” or “dissimilar reason”?
Answer: An example combines two properties, namely one thesis[-property] and one

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636 能 YRZLS St YRZLS sj，別 YRZLS sg. “Neng 能 means “can,” while “bie 別” means “additionally,” since the example is discussed as an additional issue and “bie 別” is also mentioned in the answer below, it should read “bie 別” here.
637 體 YRZLS St YRZLS sj，有體 YRZLS sg. “You 有” should be here to make the meaning complete.
638 合 YRZLS St YRZLS sj，含 YRZLS sg. “He 合” means “combine,” while “han 含” means “include,” they are both possible, but the quote in IRMS reads “he 合.”
639 喜 YRZLS St，於 YRZLS sj, YRZLS sg. “Bao 包” can be an interchangeable character of “bao 包” and mean “contain,” but usually it should be written as “bao 包.”
640 號 YRZLS St YRZLS sj，號 YRZLS sg. “Hao 號” and “hao 號” are variants of the same character, which means “name” here.
reason[-property], so saying “example by dissimilarity” can contain [the dissimilarities to the thesis-property and the reason-property] together, and saying these two separately is mistaken. If “dissimilar thesis” or “dissimilar reason” was said, then it would establish another thesis additionally, but not negate the original [properties] to prove in an inverse way. Hence, [the statement with the dissimilarities to the thesis-property and the reason-property] is called “example by dissimilarity” as a whole, which combines the dissimilar thesis[-property] and the dissimilar reason, but the names of “dissimilar thesis” and “dissimilar reason” will not be said additionally.

(1.2.2.1.3.2. Investigating the Sameness and Difference 簡同異)

(YRZL) 論：唯此三分說名“能立”。(113b25)

YRZL: Only these three members are called “proof.”

NP 2.4: etāny eva trayo 'vayavā īty ucyante | (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.3, 17).

(253)述曰：此簡同異。《理門論》云：“又比量中唯見此理：若所比處此相審定，於余同類念此定有同品定有性也，於彼無處念此遍無異品遍無性也，是故由此生決定解。”即是此中唯三能立。(113b25–b29)

YRZLS: This is [the part of] investigating the sameness and difference. The Nyāyamukha states, “furthermore, with reference to inference, only the following principle is to be observed: when the mark is ascertained on the subject to be inferred i.e., the nature of being universally a property of the thesis[-subject], and we remember its being certainly present in the cases similar to that [subject in possessing the property to be proved] but other than [this subject] i.e., the nature of being certainly present in the similar group, and its being universally absent where that [property to be proved] is absent i.e., the nature of being universally absent from the dissimilar group, then based on these, an ascertained

641 簡 YRZLSi, YRZLSj, 簡擇 YRZLSg. See fn.619.
642 常定 YRZLSi, YRZLSj, 定遍 YRZLSg. The first characteristic reads “若所比處此相審定” in YZML, since this text is a direct quotation from YZML, it should also read “審定.”
643 三能立 YRZLSi, YRZLSj, 三能立 YRZLSg. “三能” means “cite,” “raise,” “list,” but in the quote of IRMS, there is no this character.
This means exactly [the viewpoint] here that there should be only three [members of] proof.

(254)彼引本頌言：
“如自決定已，
他決定生，
說宗法、相應，
所立餘遠離。”

此說二比：一自，二他。自比處在弟子之位，此復有二：一相比量，如見火相煙，知下必有火；二言比量，聞師所說比度而知。於此二量自生決定。他比處在師主之位，與弟子等作其比量，他他解生。上之二句，如次別配。(113b29–c06)

That (the Nyāyamukha) quotes the fundamental verse saying,

“just as an ascertainment is reached by oneself,
then because of the wish of making others generate this ascertainment,
a property of the thesis[-subject], the relation and what is to be proved are expressed,
and the others are excluded.”

This [verse] mentions two kinds of inference: The first is [the inference] for oneself (zi [bi] 自[比], *svārthānumāna); and the second is [the inference] for others (ta [bi] 他 [比], *parārthānumāna). The inference for oneself lies in the position of the disciple; this also includes two kinds: the first is the inference of mark. For instance, when a smoke, which is a mark of fire, is seen, it can be known that there must be fire. The

644 YZML, T1628 p.3a04–a06. Tucci (1930, p.44): It is evident that in the inference the following rule only is valid, viz.: when the presence of this particular characteristic (śūga) has been ascertained in the object of inference, and we remember that that same characteristic is certainly present in all the notions analogous to that to be inferred, but absolutely absent wherever that is absent, then the [notion] which results from this [process] is undoubtedly valid.

645 YZML, T1628 p.3a07–a08. Tucci (1930, p.44): We maintain that, just as an undoubtedly valid conclusion is reached by one’s own self, [in the same manner] an undoubtedly valid conclusion is produced in the mind of another. [This process] expresses the connection with the pakṣadharmā (M as resident in P) and the exclusion of whatever is different from the probandum.

= PS 4.6: svaṁścayavad anyeśaṁ nāścayaotpādecchāyā, pakṣadharmavasambandhasādhyokter anyavarjanam. See Katsura (2016a, p.1243).

The English translation here is based on Kuiji’s interpretation below.
second is the inference of speech, namely when [a disciple] hears what the teacher says, he can infer and know. Man can generate ascertainties of these two kinds of inference by himself. The inference for others lies in the position of the teacher, for [the teacher] makes this kind of inference for the disciples with the wish of generating others’ understanding. The first two lines [of the verse] accord with [these two kinds of inference] in sequence.

(255) 彼論自釋下二句言：“為於所比顯宗法性，故說因言；為顯於此不相離性，故說喻言。順成、返成宗因不相離性即是二喻；故顯所比，故說宗言。”故成三相宗之法性與所立宗說為“相應”。(113c06–c10)

That treatise explains the next two lines by itself, “in order to show that a property of the thesis[subject] is present in the subject to be inferred, the statement of the reason is expressed; in order to show [the reason’s] inseparable connection with this [thesis-property to be proved], the statement of the examples is expressed establishing the inseparable connection between the thesis[-property] and the reason in a supporting way and a negating way are the two examples; and in order to show what is to be inferred, the statement of the thesis is expressed.”648 Thus, the property of the thesis-subject (the reason) with the three characteristics of a reason is said to be in a relation with the thesis[-property] to be proved.

(256) 釋“餘遠離”言：“除此更無其餘支分，由是遮遣餘審察等及與合、結。”即是此論說“唯此”言，即650簡別故。諸外道等立審察支，立、敵皆於未立論前，

646 為 YRZLSj, 論 YRZLSg. The original in YZML reads “wei 为.”
647 成 YRZLSj, 論 YRZLSg. “Cheng 成” means “establish,” and “xian 显” means “manifest,” “show.” They are both possible.
648 YZML, T1628 p.3a09–a011. Tucci (1930, p.44): The reason is formulated in order to show that the pakṣadharmā is present in the notion to be inferred; the example is formulated in order to indicate that it is indissolubly connected with this; the proposition is formulated in order to show the notion to be proved. From Katsura’s (2015) unpublished restoration draft: = PSV ad PS 4.6: yataḥ pakṣadharmatvapradarśanārthaṃ hetavacanam, tadanumeyānvādvaitapradarśanārthaṃ ca dṛṣṭāntavacanam, anumeyapradarśanārthaṃ ca pakṣavacanam.
649 審察 YRZLSj, 審察支 YRZLSg. “Zhi 支” means “member,” but there is no this character in YZML, since this text is a direct quotation from that, it should also just read “shencha 審察” with no “zhi 支.”
650 即 YRZLSj, 有 YRZLSg. “Ji 即” can mean “be” here, while “you 有” means “have” or “exist,” they are both possible.
先生審察問定宗徒，以為方便言申宗致。《集量》破云：“由汝父母生汝身故，方能立論，又由證者、語具、床、座等方得立論，皆應名‘能立’。”立者智生，望他宗智，皆疎遠故，尚非能立，況餘法耶？(113c10–c17)

It explains “the others are excluded” by saying “[in the formulation of inference,] except these there is no other member, thus others such as the investigation (shencha 審察, jijñāsā), and so on, as well as the application and the conclusion, are excluded.”

It shows exactly the words “only these” in this treatise (the Nyāyapraveśa) to distinguish [the necessary members from the redundant ones]. The heretics establish the member of investigation, [which means,] before making arguments, both the proponent and the opponent should be investigated with questions about their doctrines, in order to help them express the theses conveniently. The Pramāṇasamuccaya retorts, “because your parents gave birth to you, [you] can make arguments; moreover, because of the witness, the speech organs, beds and seats, [you] can make arguments; thus all of them should be called ‘proof.’”

Even the cognition as generative [cause] of the proponent and the cognition for the thesis of the other side (i.e., the cognition as apprehensive cause of the opponent and the witness), because of both being distant, do not belong to proof, let alone others.

The eight or four or three members of proof, and so on, established by ancient masters, are all not necessary or excellent, so they are not advocated. Therefore, the words “and so on” are said. The application member and the conclusion member do not exist

(257) 古師所立八、四、三等為能立支，皆非親勝，所以不說。故說“等”言。其合、結支離因、喻無，故不別立，性殊勝故。於喻過中，無合、倒合過為增勝，故名“似立”。至下當知。(113c17–c21)

The eight or four or three members of proof, and so on, established by ancient masters, are all not necessary or excellent, so they are not advocated. Therefore, the words “and so on” are said. The application member and the conclusion member do not exist

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651 YZML, T1628 p.3a11–a12. Tucci (1930, p.45): Therefore in the formulation of a syllogism no other members are required except those already referred to. Thus I refute the theory of those logicians who consider the desire of knowing (jijñāsā), the application, and the conclusion as members of the syllogism.


652 So far I cannot find the original of this quote, but if it does exist in PS(V) as Kuiji asserts, it may be located in PSV ad PS 4.6 or nearby.

653 立 YRZLS主要 YRZLS, 説 YRZLS. “Li 立” means “establish,” “advocate,” and “shuo 說” means “say,” “advocate,” the are both possible, but the quotes in IRMS, IDS, ITU all read “li 立.”

654 Referring to the words “and so on” in YZML quoted in last paragraph: except these there is no other member,
apart from the reason and example, so they are not established additionally, because [the formulation without them] is excellent. However, among the fallacies of the examples, it makes [the formulation of proof] more excellent to set [the fallacy of] lacking the positive concomitance and [the fallacy of] reversing the positive concomitance, so [the proofs committing them] are called “specious proof.”

(1.2.2.2. Interpreting Specious Proof 解似立)

…

thus others such as the investigation and so on, as well as the application and the conclusion, are excluded= 除此更無其餘支分，由是遮遣審察等及與合，結.

655 The confusion between the application (upanaya) and the positive concomitance (anvaya) can also be observed in this paragraph.
3. Kuiji’s Commentary on *viruddhāvyabicārin*

(vi) 論：相違決定者…(126a20)

YRZL: [The fallacy of] the contradictory conclusive reason [is that, ]…

NP 3.2.2.(6): *viruddhāvyabicārī*… (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.6, 13).

(vi)述曰：第六相違決定有三，此初標名。(126a20–a21)

YRZLS: [The commentary on] the sixth [fallacy of inconclusive reasons], namely [the fallacy of] the contradictory conclusive [reason], includes three parts. This is the first, namely pointing to the name.

(vii)具三相因，各自決定，成相違之宗，名“相違決定”。“相違之決定”，“決定令相違”，第六、第三656兩轉657，俱是依主釋也。(126a21–a23)

Where each of the reasons [in the inferences by the proponent and the opponent] possesses the three characteristics and is conclusive, and then contradictory theses are established, [the fallacy of such a case] is named “[the fallacy of] the contradictory conclusive reason.” [The compound of 相違決定 in Chinese or *viruddhāvyabicārin* in Sanskrit, literally meaning “contradictory” and “conclusive,” can be analyzed as] “the conclusive [reason] of the contradictory [thesis],” or “the [reason] that causes [its thesis] to be contradictory to [the other thesis] through being conclusive,” which belong to the sixth and the third cases658 (the genitive case and the instrumental case), but both belong to the *tatpuruṣa* compound.659

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656 第三第六 YRZLS, YRZLSj, 第六第三 YRZLSg. “Disan [zhuan] 第三[轉]” means “the third [case]” and refers to the instrumental case here; “diliu [zhuan] 第六[轉]” means “the sixth [case]” and refers to the genitive case. According to the sequence of interpretations above in this sentence, the genitive case is the first, then comes the instrumental case. Thus, it should read “第六第三” here.

657 帶 YRZLS, 轉 YRZLSj, YRZLSg. “Zhan 轉” can be a variant of “zhuan 轉,” which refers to the grammatical case here, but “轉” is more often used.

658 However, as an instrumental *tatpuruṣa* compound, *viruddha-* should determine -avyabhicārin, but not inversely as Kuiji interprets here.

659 For this paragraph, Moriyama’s (2014, p.131) translation reads:

[A pair of reasons] are called an “antinomic reason,” when each [reason] is determinative due to [its]
fulfilling the triple characteristic [for a valid logical reason] and when [each reason] establishes [a
mutually] contradictory thesis. [The compound can be analyzed as] a “determinative [reason] of the
There is an inference saying “these two reasons are not fallacious reasons, because of possessing the three characteristics, like the second and eighth reasons,” or “the second and eighth reason should not be correct reasons, because of possessing the three characteristics, like these two reasons.” A contradictory inference should be set forth against it by saying “these two reasons belong to inconclusive reasons, because of making the opponent and the witness generate dubious cognition, like the [other] five inconclusive [reasons],” or “these two reasons do not belong to correct reasons, because of not making the opponent and the witness generate ascertained cognition, like the other fallacious reasons.” If it is accepted that the second and eighth reasons do not belong to the correct reasons, then there should be no correct inference, and the fallacies of being contradicted by one’s own teaching, being contradicted by common knowledge (i.e., āgamaviruddha 自教相違 and lokaviruddha 世間相違), and so forth, [would be committed]. Therefore, it can be known that those (the second and eighth reasons) belong to the correct reasons, while the two reasons above are included in inconclusive [reasons]. [An inference can be formed as below:] the reasons of the second and eighth forms belong to the correct reasons, because of making the opponent and the witness generates ascertained cognition, like the other correct reasons.”

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\(^{662}\) However, the problem here is that there is no more correct reason other than the reasons of the second and eighth forms.
論：…如立宗言“聲是無常，所作性故，譬如瓶等”，… (126b03)

YRZL: {The fallacy of the contradictory conclusive reason is that}, for example, a thesis is set forth as “sound is non-eternal, because of being produced, like a pot, and so on,” …

NP 3.2.2. (6): {viruddhāvyabicārī} yathā anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād ghaṭavad iti | (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.6, 13–14).

述曰: 下第二顯宗，因有二。此乃勝論對聲生論，義如前說，若對聲顯，隨一不成。（126b04b05）

YRZLS: Now comes the second part, namely showing that there are two theses and two reasons. This is the case that a Vaiśeṣika argues against a *Śabdotpattivādin, and the reason [for why the opponent here must be a *Śabdotpattivādin] is the same to that explained before,663 so if arguing against a Śabdābhivyaktivādin, there would be the fallacy that the reason is unestablished to either the proponent or the opponent (anyatarāsiddha).664

述曰：此乃聲生對勝論立，若對餘宗說“所聞性”，是前所說不共不定。（126b06–b08）

663 See YRZLS par.192.
664 For the text from 此乃勝論對隨一不成, Moriyama’s (2014, p.133) translation reads:
   That is to say, [the first proof] is [presented] by the Vaiśeṣika (Shenglun 勝論) against those who claim that sound is produced (*śabdotpattivādin, shengshenglun 聲生論). As has been argued previously, if [the proof] were [presented] against those who claim that sound is [merely] made manifest (śabdābhivyaktivādin, shengxianlun 聲顯論), it would be a [reason] that is not established for either the proponent or the opponent (anyatarāsiddha, suiyi bu cheng 隨一不成).
YRZLS: This is [the inference] established by the *Śabdotpattivādin against the Vaiśeṣika, for if “being audible” is said to other schools, then there should be the fallacy that the inconclusive reason is uncommon to both (asādhāraṇānaikāntika) as explained before.665

(v6)勝論聲性謂同異性。實、德、業三各別性故，本有而常。大有共有，非各別性，不名“聲性”。聲生說聲總三類：一者666聽音，雖耳所聞，不能詮表，如近坑668語，別有響聲；二者669聲性，一一能詮各有性類，離能詮外，別有本常，不緣不覺，新生緣具，方始可聞，不同勝論；三者能詮，離前二有，雖670響及此二皆新生，響不能詮。今此新生聲是常住，以本有聲性為同品。兩宗雖異，並有聲性可聞且常671，故總為同喻。(126b08–b17)

The nature of sound [advocated] by the Vaiśeṣika refers to the universal-particularity. Because of their practicalities, substance, quality, and action are primordially existent and eternal. Being is a universal but not a particularity, so it cannot be called “the nature of sound.” There are three kinds of sound in total advocated by the *Śabdotpattivādin. The first one is the mere sound: although ears can hear it, it cannot express, just like the sound [echoed from the pit] when someone speaks in the vicinity of a pit. The second one is the nature of sound: each expresser has a class of nature, which is primordially existent and eternal outside of the expresser but not cognizable without certain conditions and only audible when the conditions to make it newly arise, so this is different from [the nature of sound advocated by] the Vaiśeṣika. The third one is the expresser, which exists separately from the first two: although the mere sound and this both arise newly, the mere sound cannot express. Now [in this inference by the *Śabdotpattivādin] this sound, which newly arises, is permanent, and the primordially

665 See YRZLS par.156: the second one of the middle three forms.
666 總 YRZLS, YRZLSj, 总 YRZLSg. the same hereinafter. “Zong 总” is a variant of “zong 总.”
667 一者 YRZLS, YRZLSj, 一 YRZLSg. No significant difference.
668 坑 YRZLS, YRZLSj, 瓮 YRZLSg. Kiben’s commentary on Dacheng fayuanyilin zhang reads “du 坑” in T2323 p.538a03. “Keng 坑” means a pit in the ground, while “weng 瓮” and “du 坑” refer to a kind of big pot, they are all able to make an echo.
669 二者 YRZLS, YRZLSj, 二 YRZLSg. No significant difference.
670 / YRZLS, YRZLSj, 雖 YRZLSg. “sui 虽” means “though.”
671 常住 YRZLS, YRZLSj, 常 YRZLSg. They both mean “permanent.” IRMS reads only “常” in T2270 p.363c06.
existential nature of sound is taken as [an instance of] the similar group. Although the two schools are different, they both advocate a nature of sound that is audible and permanent, so [the nature of sound] can generally be cited as the similar instance.

Therefore, one should not differentiate the varieties of nature of sound. For example, if “impermanent” is set forth with “being produced” as the reason and a pot as [an instance of] the similar group, should one differentiate the varieties of being produced and the varieties of impermanence? For example, the being produced of a rope or a wheel and the impermanence because of being broken are possessed by a pot but not by sound, while the being produced of investigation or analysis and the impermanence because of the vanishing of conditions are possessed by sound but not by a pot. If [differentiating the varieties] in this way, then every [inference] would have neither reason nor example at all. Therefore, it should be known that according to the principle of [setting forth] the reason and example, one should not differentiate. Thus, the inference set forth by the

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672 For the text from 聲生說 to 為同品, Moriyama’s (2015, p.134) translation reads:

The Śabdotpattivādin claims that “sound” generally has three aspects: [1] Mere sound, which is audible, but cannot denote [an objectmeaning], just as, when one speaks in the vicinity of a cave, there is an additional [set of] word[s] in the echo; [2] Sound-hood. There is both a class and a genus (xing, lei 性類) in each signifer (nengquan 能詮, *abhidhāna?). Outside of the signifer, [sound-hood] exists originally in permanence. It is not cognizable without a condition (yuan 縁). Once it comes into conjunction with the [appropriate] conditions [to make it] newly come into being, it becomes audible. [This] is different from the [idea of the] Vaiśeṣika; [3] Signifer (nengquan 能詮), which exists separately from the first two (i.e., mere sound and sound-hood). The mere sound and this signifer both come into being anew. This mere sound cannot denote [an object]. Now [i.e., when the Śabdotpattivādin presents the subject], this sound (i.e., signifer), which has newly come into being, is permanent [after it has arisen]. [The Śabdotpattivādin] can [therefore] present originally existing sound-hood (ben you sheng xing 本有聲性) as the similar example (tongpin 同品, *sapakṣa).

673 繩 YRZLSr, YRZLSj, 杖 YRZLSg. “Sheng 繩” means rope, while “zhàng 杖” means stick, they are both possible.

674 繩 YRZLSr, YRZLSj, 杖 YRZLSg. “er 尔” is a variant of “er 翁.”

675 因喻 YRZLSr, YRZLSj, 同喻 YRZLSg. “lin yu 因喻” means “the reason and example,” while “tong yu 同喻” means “the example by similarity;” according to the context, the reason should be referred to here.
*Śabdopattivādin has no fallacy, and if someone differentiates, then [that differentiation] will become the fallacious objection of parity through differentiation (fenbie xiangsi 分別相似, vikalpasama).

(vI\(\text{V}\))論：此二皆是猶預因，故俱名不定。(126b23)

YRZL: (Based on Kuiji’s commentary:) These two are both dubious reasons, so they are both called inconclusive.

(Based on the Sanskrit text: Since these two become a cause of doubt, the two combined constitute a single inconclusive [reason].)

NP 3.2.2. (6): ubhayoh samśayahetutvād dvāv apy etāv eko 'naikāntikah bhavati samuditāv eva | (Jambuvijaya, 2009, p.6, 14–15).

(v8)述曰：第三結成不定也。二因皆不能令他敵、證生決定一智，故如前五俱是不定。《理門論》頌結四相違及不定云，

“觀宗法審察，
若所樂違害，
成躇躇顛倒，
異此無似因”。

由觀察宗法，令審察者智成躇躇，名不定因。二因雖皆具足三相，令他不決676，與“不定”名。(126b23–b29)

YRZLS: This is the third part, namely summarizing as inconclusive. Both of these two reasons cannot make the others, namely the opponent and the witness, generate the ascertained cognition, so just like the first five [inconclusive reasons], they are both inconclusive. The Nyāyamukha summarizes the four contradictory [reasons] and the inconclusive [reasons] with a verse saying,

“Because of the investigation that observes the property of the thesis[-subject] (i.e., the property in the reason),

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676 定 YRZLSt, YRZLSj, 決 YRZLSg. “Ding 定” means “conclusive,” while “jue 決” means “ascertained,” according to the context, this part should mean “make the cognition of others unascertained.”
if what is desired [to be proved] is incompatible,
one will get vacillation or the reverse [of what is desired to be proved].
There is no other specious reason apart from these.”

Because of observing the property of the thesis[-subject], the cognition of the one who investigates becomes vacillant, and [this sort of property of the thesis-subject] is called the inconclusive reason. Although the two reasons both possess the three characteristics, since they make [the cognition of] others unascertained, they are given the name “inconclusive.”

The treatise (the Nyāyapreveśa) says that these two [reasons] both belong to inconclusive. Thus, one should not differentiate between former and latter or correct and false, for both reasons of every pair like this belong to inconclusive. There is an ancient judgment saying that just like [the rule that] the latter Go piece is capable of capturing and the one who puts down [a piece] later [in a Go game] should win, if so, then the *Śabdotpattivādin should win and the Vaiśeṣika should lose. However, the Nyāyamukha judges the two inferences of the *Śabdotpattivādin and the Vaiśeṣika by saying “furthermore, in such a case, since the force of (first explanation:) the world and

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677 YZML, T1628 p.2b29–c01. Tucci (1930, p.36): “[If the opponent] on examining the proposition [finds that it is open to] investigation, or that it is incompatible with the notion that one wants to prove, this means that [the stated] reason is respectively inconclusive or contradictory. There is no other fallacy of the reason different from these two.

= PS 3.26: *pakṣadharmekṣaṇāj jñāṇaṃ ātṛtya yasmiṃ ca bādhite | vīparyāsavimarśāptir hetyābhāna tato 'paraḥ || See Katsura (2009, p.159).

678 言 YRZLSj, YRZLSg. 言 YRZLSj. They can both mean “saying” here.

679 言 YRZLSj, YRZLSg, 本 YRZLSj. The same hereinafter. “Sha 煞” is a variant of “sha 杀.”

680 言 YRZLSj, YRZLSg. “Yun 音” means “say,” and “li 立” means “set forth,” so they are both possible here.

681 先下 YRZLSj, YRZLSg. “Xià 下” means putting down a piece in a Go game. The quotes in IRMS in T2270 p.364c26 and IDS in T2271 p.572b28 both read 先負後勝.

682 Shentai and Wengui both advocate this rule. See the Limentian shujii by Shentai in T1839 p.89a12–13, IRMS in T2270 p.364a21–24, IDS in T2271 p.573 a01–04, etc.
teaching/(second explanation:) teaching based on the direct [realization]/(third explanation:) teaching based on what is already accepted is stronger, one should search after the ascertainment based on this [force].” That treatise asserts that these two reasons are both inconclusive, but in the case that the *Śabdotpattivādin sets forth “sound is permanent” with the reason “being audible” first and the Vaiśeṣika sets forth “sound is impermanent” with the reason “being produced” later, it judges the former as losing and the latter as winning, just like [the rule that] the latter Go piece is capable of capturing. Now the sequence [of inferences] in this [treatise] is contradictory to [the sequence in] that, so [the judgment of the case in the Nyāyapraveśa] should not be so.

Moreover, the heretic retorts, for if the reason “being audible” is [set forth] against someone who accepts the nature of sound, then it should be a correct reason, but the author of the treatise (the Nyāyamukha) denies and asks him to [judge] based on the...
world and teaching/teaching based on the direct [realization]/teaching based on what is already accepted.

(The first sort of explanation of xianjiao 現教: world and teaching, dvandva)

“World (xian 現)” refers to the common world, which sees that sound is discontinuous, and sometimes it cannot be heard and is dependent on many conditions to arise.

“Teaching (jiao 教)” means the Buddha’s teaching that asserts that sound is impermanent, for concerning teachings the Buddha’s is the most excellent. According to these two meanings, the thesis of the Vaiśeṣika wins.

(The second sort of explanation of xianjiao 現教: teaching based on the Buddha’s direct realization, tatpuruṣa)

Moreover, Śākyamuni Buddha realizes all the dharmas directly (xian 現), he sees that sound is impermanent, and then explains a teaching (教 jiao) asserting the impermanence based on this direct [realization]. Therefore, the Vaiśeṣika wins, and the heretic’s teaching which asserts permanence should not be followed.

(The third sort of explanation of xianjiao 現教: teaching based on what is already accepted by the world, tatpuruṣa)

Moreover, concerning the heretics who do not accept the excellence of the Buddha, they should focus on the ultimately true and believable statements that are already accepted (xianyou 現有) by the world. Sound exists when the conditions are met and then ceases after this tentative existence; such is the common teaching (jiao 教) advocated by the believable ones of the world. Therefore, the Vaiśeṣika wins, and the *Śabdotpattivādin loses.

(v11)彼且斷於聲、勝二義聲負勝先, 非諸決定相違皆先負後勝, 若爾便決定, 云何名不定? 由此論主恐謂一切決定相違皆後為勝, 故結之云二俱不定。
(126c16–c19)

That [treatise] (the Nyāyamukha) just judges the thesis of the *Śabdotpattivādin as losing and that of the Vaiśeṣika as winning, but it does not mean that in all the cases of [the fallacy of] the contradictory conclusive [reason] the former [inferences] win and
the latter [ones] lose, for if so, then [which wins] is ascertained, how can [the two reasons in the two inferences of this fallacy] be called inconclusive? Thus, for fear that [the audience] considers the latter [inferences] in all the cases of [the fallacy of] the contradictory conclusive [reason] as winning, the author of the treatise (the Nyāpraveśa) summarizes by saying that these two [reasons] both belong to inconclusive.

(v12)此亦有三。
如大乘破薩婆多，云“汝無表色定非實色，許無對故，如心、心所”。彼立量云“我無對色定是實色，許色性故，如許色、聲等”。此他比量相違決定。
初是他比，後必自比。若立自比，對必他比689，名自相違決定690。無二自、他，若二自、他，俱真立、破非似立故。如大乘立前破691無表比量，小乘對云“大乘無表定有實色，許非極微692等是無對色故，如許定果色”。此非相違決定，俱真能立、真能破故。由此，立敵共申一有法，詮此法等，方是此故。若先立自義後他方破，即是自比量693相違決定。
如論所說，有694共相違決定之過。
是名為三。(126c19–127a02)
This [fallacy] also includes three [sorts].
For example, to refute a Sarvāstivādin, a Mahāyāna scholar says, “the non-manifest form, as you [accept], must not be a sort of true form, because of being accepted [by you] to be unobstructive, like the mental events and the mental associates.” That (the Sarvāstivādin) sets forth an inference, “the unobstructive form, as I [accept], must be a sort of true form, because of being accepted [by myself] to possess the nature of form, like form, sound, and so forth, which are accepted [by myself to possess their natures].”

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689 對他比 YRZLSj, 對必他比 YRZLSj, YRZLSg. “Bi 必” means “must.” The quote in YRZLSQ in X853p.825c18 and that in YRZLSH in X854 p.865b20 both read “對必他比.”
690 自比量相違決定 YRZLSj, YRZLSg. 自相違決定 YRZLSg. “Biliang 比量” means “inference,” i.e., anumāna, “自相違決定” can be short for “自比量相違決定,” and the quotation in IDS in T2271 p.573c28 reads “自相違決定.”
691 前破 YRZLSj, YRZLSg. 破前 YRZLSj. “Qian 前” means “previous,” “above,” and “po 破” means “refute,” since according to the context, there is no other inference before that by the Mahāyāna, it should read “前破.”
692 The words “fei jiwei 非極微” reads “fei jicheng 非極成” in IDS in T2271 p.617c26–c28. See fn.695 below.
693 自比相違決定 YRZLSj, YRZLSg. 自比量相違決定 YRZLSg. Both are possible.
694 有 YRZLSj, YRZLSg. You 有” means “there is,” while “ji 即” means “be,” they are both possible, but the quote in IDS in T2271 p.573c10–c11 reads “有.”
This [pair] belongs to [the fallacy of] the contradictory conclusive [reason] based on the inferences accepted by others.

In the case of the fallacy of the contradictory conclusive reason, if the first one is an inference accepted by others, then the latter one must be an inference accepted by oneself. If an inference for oneself is set forth, then the opposing one must be an inference accepted by others, and [such a pair] is called [the fallacy of] the contradictory conclusive [reason] based on [the inferences] accepted by oneself. There should not be two [inferences] accepted by oneself or two [inferences] accepted by others [as a pair], because if there are two [inferences] accepted by oneself or two [inferences] accepted by others [as a pair], then they are both genuine proofs and genuine refutations but not specious proofs. For example, against the inference above set forth by the Mahāyāna scholar to refute the non-manifest [form], a Hīnayāna scholar says, “the non-manifest [form], as the Mahāyāna accepts, must be a sort of true form, because, as what does not consist of atoms/what is not well-established, it is accepted [by the Mahāyāna] as a sort of unobstructive form, like the form induced by meditation that is accepted [to be unobstructive].” This [pair of the inference by the Mahāyāna scholar and that by the Hīnayāna scholar] does not belong to [the fallacy of] the contradictory conclusive [reason], because they are both genuine proofs and genuine refutations. Therefore, when both the proponent and the opponent set forth the same property-possessor, and argue about the properties of this [property-possessor], only such a case belongs to this [fallacy]. If an inference accepted by oneself is to be proved first, and then comes [another inference] accepted by others to refute it, it is [the fallacy of] the contradictory

695 In the Consciousness-only system of Kuiji, the unobstructive form, i.e., wuduise 無對色, mainly refers to dharmāyatanaśāṅgrāḥṛitam rūpam. Based on Kuiji’s Dacheng fayuanyilin zhang 大乘法苑義林章 in T1861 p.340b29–341b01, dharmāyatanaśāṅgrāḥṛitam rūpam includes five sorts, namely the forms of ābhisaṅkṣepika, abhyavakāśika, sāmādānika, pariklpita, vaibhutvika, i.e., jílue 藐略色, ji huì 極逈色, shousuoyin 極所引色, bianjisuoqise 遍計所起色, zizaisuoshengse 自在所生色 in Chinese, and sāmādānika is equivalent to avijñapti, i.e., wu biao se 無表色. Since both the forms of ābhisaṅkṣepika and abhyavakāśika consist of paramāṇu, i.e., 極微 or atoms, the word “非極微,” as a restrictive term of the reason here, excludes these two. But in this case, the position of pariklpita, which is unobstructive but not true, is still not quite clear.

However, according to IDS in T2271 p.617c26–c28, there is another edition in which “非極微” is read as “非極成.” Moreover, as Zōshun suggests, this “非極成,” meaning “not well-established,” can be a restrictive term to exclude ābhisaṅkṣepika, abhyavakāśika, and pariklpita, for these three are considered as provisional by the Mahāyāna but true by the Hīnayāna. Thus, in this case, vaibhutvika as the fifth sort of dharmāyatanaśāṅgrāḥṛitam rūpam is the only similar instance being unobstructive and true.
conclusive [reason] based on the inferences accepted by oneself. Just as what this treatise says, there is the fallacy of the contradictory conclusive [reason] based on [the inferences] accepted by both. These are called the three [sorts].

...(v13)問：相違決定與比量相違有何差別？
答：彼宗違因，此因違宗，彼寬此狹二類別故。由此696說諸相違決定皆比量相違，有比量相違非相違決定，但宗違因，無二因故697。(127 a09–a13)

Question: What is the difference between [the fallacy of] the contradictory conclusive [reason] and [the fallacy that the thesis] is contradicted by inference (anumānaviruddha)?

Answer: That refers to the contradiction of the thesis to the reason, while this refers to the contradiction of the reason to the thesis,698 because that (anumānaviruddha) is broad but this (viruddhāvyabicārin) is narrow699 and such is the difference between these two [fallacies]. Thus, it can be said that all [the cases of the fallacy of] the contradictory conclusive [reason] belong to [the fallacy that the thesis] is contradicted by inference, while some [cases of the fallacy that the thesis] is contradicted by inference do not belong to [the fallacy of] the contradictory conclusive [reason], for [in such a case of the fallacy that the thesis is contradicted by inference,] although the thesis contradicts the [correct] reason, there are no two reasons.700

696 由此 YRZLSt YRZLSj, 由此故 YRZLSg. These two both mean “thus,” “therefore” with no significant difference.
697 無二因故 YRZLSt YRZLSj, 無二因者故 YRZLSg. The quote in YRZLSH in X854 p.865c18 reads “無二因故.”
698 这意味着每一条的因果关系 (viruddhāvyabicārin) 矛盾于另一条的因果关系。
699 The reason for saying so is in the following sentence.
700 The “two reasons” here refer to the two reasons in a case of viruddhāvyabicārin. Viruddhāvyabicārin only refers to the case that two contradictory inferences with conclusive reasons are set forth together, but anumānaviruddha can also refer to the case of only one inference, thus, since there is only one reason in such a case, then only the thesis of anumānaviruddha contradicts its own reason, but there are no two reasons from different inferences contradicting the theses of each other.
Appendix I A Partial Translation of the Yinming ru zhengli lun based on Kuiji’s Commentary

I (NP 1.) The Verse Presenting the Outline

能立與能破
及似唯悟他;
現量與比量
及似唯自悟。

Proof, refutation and [their respective] specious [forms] are only [pertinent] for the understanding of others;
perception, inference and [their respective] specious [forms] are only [pertinent] for the understanding of oneself.

II–IV (NP 2.) Proof

如是總攝諸論要義。此中宗等多言名為“能立”。由宗、因、喻多言開示諸有問者未了義故。

So (NP 1) is the summarizing of the essentials of all the treatises. Herein, the multiple statements of the thesis and others are named “proof.” Because by the statements of the thesis, reason, and example, the meaning unknown to the questioners is unfolded and shown.

V–X (NP 2.1.) The Thesis

此中宗者，謂極成有法，極成能別，差別性故，隨自樂為所成立性，是名為宗。如有成立“聲是無常”。

379
Herein the thesis means the well-established property-possessor and the well-established qualifier, because of the nature of qualifying, desired to be of the nature of being proved in accordance with oneself, such is named “thesis.” For example, someone sets forth “sound is impermanent.”

XI–XXI (NP 2.2.) The Reason

因有三相。何等為三? 謂遍是宗法性、同品定有性、異品遍無性。云何名為“同品”、“異品”? 謂所立法均等義品說名“同品”。如立無常，瓶等無常是名“同品”。異品者，謂於是處無其所立。若有是常，見非所作，如虛空等。此中所作性或勤勇無間所發性遍是宗法，於同品定有，於異品遍無。是無常等因。

The reason has three characteristics. Then what are the three [characteristics]? They are the nature of being universally a property of the thesis[subject], the nature of being certainly present in the similar group, and the nature of being universally absent from the dissimilar group. What are called “similar group” and “dissimilar group”? The group of [things with] quality equal [to the thesis-subject] by [their] common possession of the property to be proved is named “similar group.” For example, when sound is to be proved impermanent, a pot, and so on, which are impermanent, are called “similar group.” The dissimilar group means wherever what is to be proved is absent. Whatever is permanent is seen to be unproduced, like ether, and so on. Herein, the property of being produced or the property of resulting immediately from effort is universally a property of the thesis[subject], certainly present in the similar group, and universally absent from the dissimilar group. So [they] are [correct] reasons for [proving sound’s] being impermanent, and so on.

XXII–XXIX (NP 2.3.) The Example
喻有二種。一者同法，二者異法。同法者，若於是處，顯因同品決定有性。謂若所作，見彼無常，譬如瓶等。異法者，若於是處說所立無，因遍非有。謂若是常，見非所作，如虛空等。此中“常”言表非“無常”，“非所作”言表無“所作”，如有非有，說名“非有”。

There are two sorts of example. The first one is [the example by] the similar property, the second is [the example by] the dissimilar property. [The example by] the similar property means [the example] wherever the announced similar group of the reason [is followed by] the character of definite presence [of the property of the thesis]. For instance, whatever is produced is seen to be impermanent, like a pot, and so on. [The example by] the dissimilar property means [the example] wherever [the thesis-property] to be proved is said to be absent, the reason is universally non-present. For instance, whatever is permanent is seen to be unproduced, like ether, and so on. By the word “permanent” is here meant the absence of “impermanent,” and by the word “unproduced” is meant the absence of “produced,” like being is not being, then “not being” is said.

XXIX–XXXV (NP 2.4.) Summary for Proof

The thesis and others have been expounded, the multiple statements of these [factors, i.e., the thesis, reason, and example,] on the occasion of making others understand, are called “proof.” For instance, that “sound is impermanent” is the statement of the thesis. That “because of being produced” is the statement of a property of the thesis[-subject]. That “whatever is produced is seen to be impermanent, like a pot, and so on,” is the statement of following the similar group. That “whatever is
permanent, is seen to be unproduced, like ether,” is the statement of contradicting and
negating. Only these three members are called “proof.”

…

vi–vIIV (NP 3.2.2.(6)) The Fallacy of the Antinomic Reason

相違決定者，如立宗言“聲是無常，所作性故，譬如瓶等”，有立“聲常，所聞
性故，譬如聲性”。此二皆是猶預因，故俱名不定。

The fallacy of the contradictory conclusive reason is that, for example, a thesis is
set forth as “sound is non-eternal, because of being produced, like a pot, and so on,”
but someone [else] sets forth “sound is eternal, because of being audible, like the nature
of sound.” These two are both dubious reasons, so they are both called inconclusive.

…
Appendix II A Glossary for the Science of Reasons

bangpingyizong 傍憑義宗,  
adihkaranasiddhānta (NS 1.1.30), thesis postulating other meaning.
beiminyuta 悲愍於他, parānukampana (YBhHv 3.21), compassionating others.
biliang 比量, anumāna (NP 1), inference.
biliang xiangwei 比量相違, anumānaviruddha (NP 3.1), the fallacy that the thesis is contradicted by inference.
*bu cheng 不成, asiddha (NP 3.2), unestablished.
*bu ding 不定, anaikāntika (NP 3.2) /aniścita (PS 3.22), inconclusive.
bianshizongfa xing 遍是宗法性, paksadharmatva (NP 2.2), nature of being universally a property of the thesis[-subject].
biansuoxu zong 遍所許宗, sarvatantrasiddhānta (NS 1.1.28), thesis accepted by all.
biaoquan 表诠, affirming expression.
bugong bu ding 不共不定, asādhāraṇānaikāntika (NP 3.2.2), the fallacy that the inconclusive reason is uncommon to both.

bugulunzong 不顧論宗,  
\*śāstrānapēksasiddhānta, thesis regardless of [the opponent’s] doctrinal system.
bugulunzong 不顧論宗, *śāstrānapēksasiddhānta, thesis regardless of [the opponent’s] doctrinal system.
buxianglixing 不相離性, *avinābhāva (PSV ad PS 4.6), inseparable connection.
chabie 差別, višeṣa (YBhHv 3.1), distinguishing-feature; višeṣa (NP 3.2.3), distinction.
chenglizizong 成立自宗, svapaksśavasthāna (YBhHv 3.21), establishing one’s own thesis.

chuliquy shi 持業釋, karmadhāraya compound.
chuli 出離, niḥśrī (YBhHv A), detachment.
chusuo 處所, adhikarana (YBhHv A), location.
congtawen 從他聞, parānuśrava (YBhHv 3.21), listening to others.
cuiquyuta 摧屈於他, paraparibhava (YBhHv 3.21), defeating others.
dazhong 大眾, parśad (YBhHv 2), assembly.
daohu 倒合, vipārītvānaya (NP 3.3.1), the fallacy of reversing the positive
concomitance.
dao li 倒離, viparītavyatireka (NP 3.3.2),
the fallacy of reversing the negative concomitance.
dao li 道理, principle.
du suo zuo 多所作, bahukāraka (YBhHv A), what are of much utility.
fa 法, dharma (NP 2.2), property.
fa chabie xiang wei 法差別相違,
dharmaviśesaviparītasādhana (NP 3.2.3), the fallacy that the reason proves the opposite of the distinction of the inferable property.
famen 法門, dharma (YBhHv 3.24), property.
fa zixiang xiang wei 法自相相違,
dharmasvarūpaviparītasādhana (NP 3.2.3), the fallacy that the reason proves the opposite of the self-form of the inferable property.
fan 翻, viparīta (PS 3.22), reversed.
fei liang 非量, false means of valid cognition.
fenbie xiang si 分別相似, vikalpasama (NS 5.1.1), the fallacious objection of parity through differentiation.
fu 負, nigraha (YBhHv A), failure.
gong 共, sāmānya, universal. Cf. gong xiang 共相.
gong biliang 共比量, inference accepted by both.
gong bu ding 共不定,
sādhāraṇaśāntika (NP 3.2.2),
the fallacy that the inconclusive reason is common to both.
gong xiang 共相, sāmānyalakṣaṇa (PS ad PS 1.2), universal characteristic.
guolei 過類, jāti, fallacious objection.
he 合, upanaya (NS 1.1.38), application;
anvaya (NP 3.3.1), positive concomitance.
houshuo 後說, latterly-stated.
jicheng 極成, prasiddha (NP 2.1), well-established.
jianbian 見邊, drśṭaṇta (NP 2), side of perceived, i.e., example.
jianbie 簡別, distinguish; vyavaccheda (PS 3.19), exclusion.
jianli 建立, set up.
jie 結, nīgama (NS 1.1.39), conclusion.
jing 境, artha, object.
jingjie 境界, object.
ju 句, form/sentence/line (of a verse).
ju 據, adhiśṭāna (YBhHv A), foundation.
ju bu cheng 俱不成,
ubhayadharmāsiddha (NP 3.3.1),
the fallacy that both the proof and
what is to be proved are unestablished.

**ju bu jicheng 俱不極成**, *prasadiddhāvahaya* (NP 3.1), the fallacy that both the qualifier and the qualified are not well-established.

**ju bu qian 俱不遣**, *ubhayāvyāvirta* (NP 3.3.2), the fallacy that both what is to be proved and the proof are non-excluded.

**julei 聚類**, type as gathering.

**jupin yifen zhuan 俱品一分轉**, *ubhayapakṣaikadeśavṛtta* (NP 3.2.2), the fallacy that the inconclusive reason resides in part of both groups.

**jue zhenshi 覺真實**, *tattvābhisandhāna* (YBhHv 3.21), perceiving the truth.

**kuang 况**, comparison.

**lefayi 樂法義**, *dharmārthakāma* (YBhHv 2), desiring the doctrine and meaning.

**li 離**, *vyatireka* (NP 3.3.2), negative concomitance.

**li 理**, principle.

**liliang po 立量破**, refutation through establishing an inference.

**liliang zhengjie 立量徵诘**, refutation through establishing an inference.

**liaoyin 了因**, *jñāpakahetu*, apprehensive cause.

**liangju bu cheng 两俱不成**, *ubhayāsiddha* (NP 3.2.1), the fallacy that the reason is unestablished to both the proponent and the opponent.

**lun ti 論體**, *vāda* (YBhHv 0), argument’s entity.

**lun chuli 論出離**, *vādaniḥsaraṇa* (YBhHv 0), detachment for argument.

**lun chusuo 論處所**, *vādādhiṣṭāna* (YBhHv 0), argument’s location.

**lun duosuozuofa 論多所作法**, *vāda bahukārakaharmā* (YBhHv 0), what are of much utility for argument.

**lun fu 論負**, *vādanigraha* (YBhHv 0), argument’s failure.

**lun ju 論據**, *vādādhiṣṭāna* (YBhHv A), argument’s foundation.

**lun suoyi 論所依**, *vādādhiṣṭāna* (YBhHv 0), basis of argument.

**lun zhuangyan 論莊嚴** (YBhHv 0), *vādālaṅkāra*, argument’s ornament.

**nengbie 能別**, *viśeṣa* (NP 2.1), qualifier.

**nengbie bu jicheng 能別不極成** (NP 3.1), *aprarāddhaviśeṣaṇa*, the fallacy that
the qualifier is not well-established.

nengli 能立, sādhana (NP 1), proof.
nengli bu cheng 能立不成, sādhanadharmāsiddha (NP 3.3.1), the fallacy that the proof is unestablished.
nengli bu qian 能立不遣, sādhanāvyāvṛtta (NP 3.3.2), the fallacy that the proof is non-excluded.
nengliguo 能立過, sādhanadoṣa, error of the proof.
nengpo 能破, dūṣana (NP 1), refutation.
nengyi 能依, relier.

pi 譬, analogy.
piyuliang 譬喻量, upamāna (NS 1.1.6), comparison.
pianju 偏句, sectional form.

pin 品, pakṣa (NP 2.2), group.
pohuaiyuta 破壞於他, parapakṣaduṣan (YBhHv 3.21), refuting [the thesis of] others.

poluomen 婆羅門, brāhmaṇa (YBhHv 2), Brahmin.
qianchen 前陳, formerly-stated.
qingmieta 輕蔑他, parāvajñā (YBhHv 3.21), scorning others.
que 謂, nyūnatā, incompleteness.
quejianguoxing 缺滅過性, nyūnatva (NP 6), incompleteness.

shamen 沙門, śramaṇa (YBhHv 2), ascetics.

shanjiefayi 善解法義, dharmārthaukṣa (YBhHv 2), proficient in the doctrine and meaning.

shanzitazong 善自他宗, svaparasamayajñatā (YBhHv 4), good at his own and others’ teachings.

sheshoulunzong 掃受論宗, śāstraparigraha (YBhHv 3.21), attaining treatises.

shencha 審察, jijnāsā (PSV ad PS 4.6), investigation.

shengxiaoliang 聖教量, āptāgama (AS p.105, 3), testimony of holy teachings.

shengliang 聲量, śabda (NS 1.1.7), testimony of words.

shenglun shi 聲論師, Śabdavādin.

shengming 聲明, śabdavidyā, word-science.

shengshenglun zhe 聲生論者, *Śabdotpattivādin.

shengxianlun zhe 聲顯論者, Śabdābhivyaktivādin (NP 3.2.1).

shengyin 生因, *kārakahetu, generative cause.
shi 事, thing.

shijian xiangwei 世間相違, lokaviruddha (NP 3.1), the fallacy that the thesis is contradicted by common knowledge.

shulun shi 數論師, Sāṅkhya.

shun 順, support.

shuncheng 順成, establish in a supporting way.

shunyi 順益, support.

si 似, ābhāsa (NP 1), specious.

si biliang 似比量, anumānābhāsa (NP 1), specious inference.

si xianliang 似現量, pratyakṣābhāsa (NP 1), specious perception.

suiyi bu cheng 隨一不成, anyatarāsiddha (NP 3.2.1), the fallacy that the reason is unestablished to either the proponent or the opponent.

suobie 所別, viśeṣya (NP 3.1), the qualified.

suobie bu jicheng 所別不極成, aprasiddhaviśeṣya (NP 3.1), the fallacy that the qualified is not well-established.

suoli 所立, sādhyā (NP 2.2), what is to be proved.

suolifa 所立法, sādhyadharma (NP 2.2), property to be proved.

suoli bu cheng 所立不成, sādhyadharmāsiddha (NP 3.3.1), the fallacy that what is to be proved is unestablished.

suoliang 所量, prameyatva (PS 1.2), cognizable.

suoyi 所依, substratum, i.e., what is to be relied on.

suoyi bu cheng 所依不成, āśrayāsiddha (NP 3.2.1), the fallacy that the substratum of the reason is unestablished.

suoyou 所由, what is to be grounded in.

ta bi 他比, *parārthānumāna, inference for others.

ta biliang 他比量, inference accepted by others.

tilei 體類, type of entity.

tixing 體性, entity as nature.

tongfa 同法, sādharmya (NP 2.3), similar property.

tonglei 同類, sārūpya (YBhHv 3.2), similar type.
tongpin 同品, sapakṣa (NP 2.2), similar group.
tongpindingyou xing 同品定有性, sapakṣaṁ sattvam (NP 2.2), nature of being certainly present in the similar group.
tongpin yifen zhuan yipin bian zhuan 同品一分轉異品遍轉, apakṣāikadeśavṛttir vipakṣavyāpi (NP 3.2.2), the fallacy that the inconclusive reason resides in part of the similar group and pervades the dissimilar group.
tongyu 同喻 = tong fa yu 同法喻, sādharmyadṛṣṭānta, example by similarity.
tongyu ti 同喻體, essence of the example by similarity.
wangjia 王家, rājakula (YBhHv 2), residence of the king.
wei 违, contradict.
wuhe 無合, ananvaya (NP 3.3.1), the fallacy of lacking the positive concomitance.
wuqiong 無窮, anavasthā (PS 4.11), regressus ad infinitum.
wuta 悟他, parasaṃvid (NP 1), the understanding of others.
wuti 無體, non-existent.
wutiliang 無體量, abhāva (NS 2.2.1), non-existence.
wuti que 無體闕, incompleteness in the case of no existent entity.
xianbingchengzong 先承稟宗, pratitantrasiddhānta (NS 1.1.29), thesis inherited from early [teachings].
xiandiguo po 顯敵過破, refutation through revealing the fallacy of the opponent.
xianliang 現量, pratyakṣa (NP 1), perception.
xiantaguo po 顯他過破, refutation through revealing the fallacy of others.
xianzhezhe 賢哲者, saṃbhā (YBhHv 2), virtuous and wise people.
xiangfu jicheng 相符極成, prasiddhasambandha (NP 3.1), the fallacy that in the thesis the relationship is well-established.
xiangwei 相違, viruddha (NP 3.2, PS 3.19), contradictory.
xiangwei jueding 相違決定, viruddhāvyabhicārin (NP 3.2.2), the fallacy of the contradictory conclusive reason.
xiangzhuang 相狀, liṅga (YBhHv 3.24),
mark.

xing 性, nature.

xu 許, accepted.

yan 言, vacana (NP 2), statement.

yan liaoyin 言了因, statement as apprehensive cause.

yan shengyin 言生因, statement as generative cause.

yaoyi 要義, artha (NP 1), essential.

yeyong 業用, karma (YBhHv 3.24), activity.

yi 義, attribute; artha, meaning/quality.

yi 異, anya (PS 3.19), different.

yifa 異法, vaidharmya (NP 2.3), dissimilar property.

yilei 異類, vairūpya (YBhHv 3.2), dissimilar type.

yi liaoyin 義了因, meaning as apprehensive cause.

yipin 異品, vipakṣa (NP 2.2), dissimilar group.

yipinbianwu xing 異品遍無性, vipakṣe 'sattvam (NP 2.2), nature of being universally absent from the dissimilar group.

yipin yifen zhuan tongpin bian zhuan 異品一分轉同品遍轉, vipakṣaikadeśavrūtthi sapaksavyāpī (NP 3.2.2), the fallacy that the inconclusive reason resides in part of the dissimilar group and pervades the similar group.

yi shengyin 義生因, meaning as generative cause.

yixing 義性, property as nature.

yixu 意許, implied by connotation.

yiyu 異喻 = yi fa yu 異法喻, vaidharmyadrṣṭānta, example by dissimilarity.

yiyu ti 異喻體, essence of the example by dissimilarity.

yizhushi 依主釋, tatpuruṣa compound.

yizhun 義準, arthāpatti (PSV ad PS 4.5), implication.

yizhunliang 義準量, arthāpatti (NS 2.2.1), postulation.

yin 因, hetu (NP 2), reason.

yin guo 因果, hetuphala (YBhHv 3.24), cause and effect.

yinming 因明, hetuvidyā, science of reasons.

yinsanxiang 因三相, trairūpya (NP 2.2), the three characteristics of a [correct] reason.

yin tongpin 因同品, similar group of the reason.

yin yipin 因異品, dissimilar group of the reason.
yong 用, use.
youfa 有法, dharmin (NP 2.1), property-posessor.
youfa zixiang xiangwei 有法自相相違, dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana (NP 3.2.3), the fallacy that the reason proves the opposite of the self-form of the property-posessor.
youfa chabie xiangwei 有法差別相違, dharmivīṣeṣaviparītasādhana (NP 3.2.3), the fallacy that the reason proves the opposite of the distinction of the property-posessor.
youti 有體, existent.
youti que 有體闕, incompleteness in the case of an existent entity.
youyu bu cheng 猶預不成, samādīghāśiddha (NP 3.2.1), the fallacy that the reason is unestablished because of doubt.
yu 喻, drṣṭānta (NP 2)yudāharāna (YBhV 3.2), example.
yu ti 喻體, essence of the example.
yu yi 喻依, *drṣṭāntāśraya, substratum of the example.
zhengjiaoliang 正教量, āptāgama (YBhV 3.2), testimony of genuine teachings.
zhengliaoyin 證了因, *jñāpakahetu, apprehensive cause.
zhili 菩德, avayava (NS 1.1.1), member.
zhil 執, held.
zhifuyuta 制伏於他, parābhībava (YBhV 3.21), overcoming others.
zhi ji gongxu chengjiu 至極共許成就, accomplished ultimately through equal acceptance.
zhilan 止濫, prasajyapratisēdha (PSV ad PS 4.3c), stopping the overflow.
zhili 菩理家, yuktakula(YBhV 2), residence of officials.
zhili 菩生因, cognition as generative cause.
zhulian 菩家, bhūṣana (YBhV A), ornament.
zi 自, sva, particular. Cf. gong xiang 共相.
zi bi 自比, *svārthānumāna, inference for oneself.
zi biliang 自比量, inference accepted by oneself.
zibiancai 自辯才, svapratibhāna (YBhV 3.21), one’s own eloquence.
zijiang xiangwei 自 教 相 違 ，
āgamaviruddha (NP 3.1), the
fallacy that the thesis is contradicted
by [one’s own] teaching.
ziti 自 體, svabhāva (YBhHv 3.24), self-
entity.
ziwu 自 悟, ātmasaṃvid (NP 1), the
understanding of oneself.
zixiang 自 相, svalakṣaṇa (PSV ad PS
1.2), particular characteristic;
svarūpa (NP 3.2.3), self-form.
zixing 自 性, svabhāva (YBhHv 3.1), self-
nature.
zizheng 自 證, svasaṃvedana (PSV ad PS
1.6ab), self-awareness.
zong 宗, pakṣa (NP 2) /pratijñā (YBhHv
3.2), thesis.
zongguo 宗 過, pratijñādoṣa (PS 3.6ab),
error of the thesis.
zong ti 宗 體, essence of the thesis.
zong tongpin 宗 同 品, sapakṣa, similar
group of the thesis.
zongwei 宗 違, pratijñāvirodha (PSV ad
PS 3.6), contradiction of the thesis.
zong yi 宗 依, *pakṣaśraya, substratum of
the thesis.
zongyi 宗 義, implication of the thesis.
zong yipin 宗 異 品, vipakṣa, dissimilar
group of the thesis.
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