*Enargeia***, Enactivism and the Ancient Readerly Imagination**

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1 Introduction

In recent years reader-response theorists have begun to explore the potential of the 'second-generation' enactivist theory of cognition for the analysis of readers' quasi-visual responses to literature.[2] While these studies bring to bear a range of perspectives on the phenomenon by which readers may at times feel that they can vividly and directly perceive the storyworld, they converge on a view of vision and imagination, not as driven by mental images 'seen' with the mind's eye (the positing of internal representations being a central tenet of 'first-generation' cognitive studies), but as enactive, that is a way of acting. As I will explain in greater detail below, enactivism posits that (quasi-)visual experience is not all 'in the head', but emerges through interactions with the world around us. In this chapter I wish to contend that there are salient and non-trivial points of resemblance between these enactivist views of the readerly imagination and the ancient rhetorical concept of *enargeia* (usually translated 'vividness'). This term, which on a minimal ancient definition is said to be 'speech which brings the subject-matter before the eyes', figures prominently in ancient criticism and rhetoric and is used in particular to characterize the vivid, quasi-visual effects which epic poetry, historiography, oratory and occasionally other kinds of literature may have on readers.[3]

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[1] This chapter is part of the work of the Heidelberg ERC group *Experience and Teleology in Ancient Narrative* (ERC Grant Agreement n. 312321 (AncNar)).

[2] For general introductions to 'second-generation' cognitive criticism see Kukkonen 2014; Kukkonen and Carraciolo 2014; Cave 2016. Other pioneering studies on which I draw are Bolens 2012; Caracciolo 2014; Grünbaum 2007; Jajdelska et al. 2010; Kuzmičová 2012a; 2012b; 2013; Troscianko 2013; 2014. An application of enactivist insights to the style of Homer is offered by Grethlein and Huitink 2017.

[3] Anon. Segu. 96: ἔστι δὲ ἐνάργεια λόγος ὑπ' ὄψιν ἄγων τὸ δηλούμενον. For lists of ancient definitions along these lines see Manieri 1998: 123 n. 404; Lausberg 1998: 359-61. Related critical terms are φαντασία, πρὸ ὀμμάτων τίθεσθαι/ποιεῖν, διατύπωσις, *illustratio*, *evidentia*, *demonstratio*, *sub oculos subiectio*. Throughout, I use 'readers' to include live audiences, putting to one side the question whether the mode of reception influences the experience of mental imagery, for the reason that more research is required; cf. Kuzmičová 2013: 123. Besides, my chief concern is with ancient critics' responses, and they at least encountered the texts stripped of their performative context; cf. Nünlist 2009: 12.

Now, at first sight this contention must appear implausible. For, whilst acknowledging that *enargeia* is a multifaceted concept, recent classical scholarship holds that the term primarily refers to 'pictorial vividness', as brought about through the transference of picture-like internal representations from author to reader by means of detailed descriptions (*ekphrasis*), and this account ostensibly matches the references to concepts like 'mental images' and 'the mind's eye' found in ancient comments.[4] Thus, a scholiast (Σ bT *Il.* 23.363-72) praises the first lines of the description of the horse race for Patroclus' funeral games in the *Iliad* by stating that Homer 'has projected the entire mental image (*phantasia*) so vividly (*enargōs*) that the readers are no less captivated than the spectators (*theatōn*)'. Plutarch (*Artaxerxes* 8.1) expresses admiration for Xenophon's account of the Battle of Cunaxa in the *Anabasis*, on the ground that 'Xenophon brings it all but before the eyes (*opsei*) and through his vividness (*enargeian*) all the time places the reader, much affected and sharing in the dangers, near to the action, as if it had not been concluded, but is going on'. Quintilian (*Institutio oratoria* 8.3.62), finally, calls *enargeia* a 'great virtue' (*magna virtus*) of style, claiming that 'a speech does not adequately fulfil its purpose or attain the total domination (*plene dominatur*) it should have, if it goes no further than the ears, and the judge feels that he is merely being told the story of the matters he has to decide, without their being brought out and shown to his mind's eye (*oculis mentis*)'.

Given this emphasis in our ancient sources, the case for a non-pictorialist, enactivist interpretation of ancient *enargeia* will have to be made carefully and gradually. I shall first summarise the prevailing 'pictorialist' account and show that supplementing it with an alternative approach is both desirable and methodologically feasible. I will then introduce the main tenets of the enactivist account of vision and imagination, before presenting two case studies which show that this account is often better able to deal with the way ancient critics speak about *enargeia* than the pictorialist one. The goal of this chapter is twofold. On the one hand, by illuminating aspects of *enargeia* which the pictorialist account plays down or leaves unexplained, I aim to contribute to a deeper understanding of ancient reading habits. On the other hand, I also hope that, conversely, critics' on-going efforts to shape a second-generation

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[4] Important analyses of the sources within their wider intellectual context include Zanker 1981 (see p. 297 for the rendering 'pictorial vividness'); Meijering 1987; Vasaly 1993; Innocenti 1994; Manieri 1998; Otto 2009; Webb 2009; 2016; Bussels 2012; Sheppard 2014; Germany 2016. As the overviews of key sources of especially Meijering (1987: 39-44), Manieri (1998: 79-192) and Otto (2009: 67-134) show, one way in which *enargeia* is a multifaceted concept is that it comprises more than just visual imagery; for instance, references to phonetic effects and onomatopoeic devices in various sources indicate that auditory imagery also comes under its purview. However, the present chapter only focuses on aspects of *enargeia* which are broadly visual, but not 'pictorial'.

cognitive criticism may benefit from taking note of the ancient rhetorical tradition, which they have so far largely ignored.

2 *Enargeia* and *Phantasia*: the Pictorialist Account

Ancient remarks on *enargeia* like those quoted at the outset evince a confidence in the feasibility and efficacy of quasi-visual reader responses which contrasts sharply with modern critical attitudes to the phenomenon. To be sure, folk-psychological assumptions about how the imagination works still make it seem plausible that we might in theory be able to 'picture', say, Mme Bovary or a room she is in when we come across sufficiently detailed descriptions whilst reading Flaubert's novel.[5] However, most readers actually experience mental images as feeble and fleeting and as rarely, if ever, attaining anything like the vivacity and vitality of actual visual perception.[6] Partly for this reason, modern critics for a long time did not set much store by quasi-visual responses and tended to distinguish them sharply from (supposedly more rewarding) intellectual and reflective types of response.[7] Iser, for instance, arguably the most influential reader-response theorist of the past half century or so, concedes that mental imagery 'accompanies' reading, but insists that it remains distinguished by its 'optical poverty', as becomes evident when 'one sees the film version of a novel one has read'; verbal descriptions, are not so much processed mimetically, that is by imaginatively perceiving their referents, as semiotically, that is on the basis of the words' conceptual meanings and connotations: 'Even if we are given a detailed description of a character's appearance, we tend not to regard it as pure description, but try and conceive what is actually to be communicated through it'.[8]

The terminology used by ancient critics is often thought to be revealing of certain preconceptions about vision, imagination and language which help explain the difference between ancient and modern attitudes. In particular, scholars have pointed out that in Hellenistic (especially Stoic) philosophy *phantasiai* were, at least in part, conceived of as pictorial images

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[5] Cf. Jajdelska et al. 2010: 437, 440-1.

[6] See Scarry 1999: 3-4; Cave 2016: 78-9. There is, to be sure, individual variability in people's capacity to 'picture' things (Cui et al. 2007), but no literary theory can wholly avoid positing a 'model' reader and it is not absurd to look for common denominators when talking about the cognitive abilities of human adults; nor do we have to rely on introspection alone: empirical studies (e.g. Allington 2011) show that many readers find it difficult to construct clear and complete mental images from verbal descriptions.

[7] See Esrock 1994: 1-6.

[8] Iser 1978: 137-8.

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that were permanently stored in memory in the form of physical imprints on the mind; they were thought to form as a result of visual perception and in turn to give rise to, and be originary of, thought and language. The term *enargeia* itself was used in this connection to refer to situations in which *phantasiai* are grasped with particular 'clarity' and we can accept them as true and accurate representations of the world. These ideas, so the argument goes, informed ancient criticism and made that mental images were regarded as potentially very vivid and as the indispensable medium connecting the visual and the verbal on the one hand, and perception, imagination ('seeing' in the mind's eye) and conceptual thought on the other. Specifically, ancient critics will have supposed that the individual items in a detailed description (*ekphrasis*) could elicit lifelike mental images from readers' memories which they pieced together until they saw a detailed 'picture' of the description's referent in the mind's eye.[9]

In order to see how this is supposed to have worked out in practice, we turn to a much-discussed passage from Quintilian, one of our richest sources. Quintilian's remark, quoted in the previous section, that a speech, provided it possesses the quality of *enargeia*, may come to 'dominate' the judge, introduces his treatment of *enargeia* as an element of the ornate style.[10] He next declares that an elaborate analysis would be cumbersome (*Inst.* 8.3.63) and then mostly contents himself with citing a number of passages which apparently achieve the coveted effect. Among these is a vignette of the aftermath of a luxurious banquet from an otherwise lost speech of Cicero's, which was presumably designed to stir the audience's indignation:

> 'videbar videre alios intrantis, alios autem exeuntis, quosdam ex vino vacillantis, quosdam hesterna ex potatione oscitantis. humus erat inmunda, lutulenta vino, coronis languidulis et spinis cooperta piscium': quid plus videret qui intrasset? (Quint. *Inst.* 8.3.66)

> 'I seemed to see some coming in, some going out, some reeling with drink, some dozing after yesterday's potations. The floor was filthy, swimming with wine, littered with wilting

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[9] The clearest (and most explicitly cognitive) accounts along these lines are Vasaly 1993: 91-9; Webb 2009: 93-7, 110-4; 2016: 205-11. See also Zanker 1981: 308-10; Bussels 2012: 61-71. Elaborate overviews of the Hellenistic philosophical ideas about *phantasia* and *enargeia* are offered by Manieri 1998: 27-51, 113-23; Otto 2009: 31-66. But *mutatis mutandis*, thinking about words as vehicles of images stretches back to classical times (cf. Manieri 1998: 27-75; Sheppard 2014: 1-13) and is an implicit cornerstone of Homeric poetics (Squire 2013).

[10] *Inst.* 8.3.61-71. He provides other brief discussions of *enargeia* in sections on the *virtutes narrationis* (*Inst.* 4.2.63), the arousal of emotions (6.2.25-36) and the figures of thought (9.2.40-4).

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garlands and fishbones.' What more could anyone have seen who had entered the room? (trans. Russell, slightly adapted)

Now from a modern perspective, this passage does not live up to the strong claim which Quintilian makes for it. While it may be 'graphic' in a loose sense of that word, it offers such sparse information about the outward appearances of the banquet hall and the banqueters that an actual witness would surely have seen more than it records.[11] Its effect rather depends on the careful selection of 'telling' details, but if we are precise about that, it must be acknowledged that the reference to 'seeing' obscures the fact that the impact of these details is not so much sensory as semantic, that is based on what Vasaly calls the words' 'symbolical meanings' -- of, say, the 'tottering' (*vacillantis*), from which readers can infer the guests' drunkenness, or of the 'garlands' (*coronis*), which should have no place at a Roman dinner table.[12]

However, because of the *phantasia*-theory outlined above, things may have looked different from an ancient point of view. If for Quintilian and others the generous provision of visual details does not seem to be at stake, then this is perhaps because of the perceived clarity of *phantasiai* and their close connection with words and prior visual perception: as long as authors verbalised the picture to be painted in a series of stock motifs of which they could assume readers to have prior visual experience, then the latter could also be assumed to be able to 'work their way back up the chain' and 'reconstruct (...) the original mental image which gave rise to the words that prompt the reader's own mental image'.[13] A strong belief on the part of ancient critics that a few concrete words effortlessly evoked mental images may even have blinded them to other possibly relevant linguistic aspects of *enargeia*: in accounting for the vividness of a description like Cicero's '*we* might prefer to focus on the use of figures, on the choice of vocabulary and the arrangement of words. But this is not the case for ancient critics'.[14] Furthermore, since *phantasiai* (as elicited by words, but not words *qua* words) were regarded as the basis of thought, ancient critics may have almost automatically rolled visual and more reflective responses into one; when Quintilian and others talk about 'seeing' the storyworld,

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[11] Cf. Vasaly 1993: 97; Webb 2009: 108.

[12] Vasaly 1993: 20, 98-9; similarly Webb 2009: 109-10.

[13] Webb 2009: 96; cf. Calboli Montefusco 2005: 51-2. The imagination was regarded as reproductive rather than creative, and several procedures were developed to cope with the formation of mental images of things previously unseen; Lucretius (4.739-43), for instance, says one can imagine a centaur by combining memory-images of a man and a horse; cf. Vasaly 1993: 97; Sheppard 2014: 11-3; Webb 2016: 214-6.

[14] Webb 2009: 93 (original italics).

this involves, in the words of Webb's slogan, both 'sight and insight', as 'seeing' *phantasiai* in the mind's eye was but the starting point for a more elaborate response, which 'brings with it knowledge, both intellectual and sensory'.[15]

Finally, in line with a current trend in classics to cast even basic sensory and cognitive processes as socio-intellectual constructs,[16] it has been suggested that these considerations may have more than purely theoretical significance. Vasaly speculates that ancient readers 'may well have possessed powers of pictorial visualization much greater and more intense than our own'.[17] Germany thinks that they may have been 'peculiarly susceptible to vivid descriptions', as that 'would certainly explain a great deal about why our sources speak about *enargeia* the way they do and with such perfect consistency'.[18] Webb, finally, sketches a culture in which a strong belief in the power and communicability of mental images and rhetorical training inspired by that belief produced readers who could be counted upon as a matter of course to be 'constantly engaged in a process of calling up, developing and reflecting on these images'.[19]

3 Some Shortcomings of the Pictorialist Account

While the pictorialist account of *enargeia* is illuminating in certain respects, I think we should be wary of attributing 'intense' powers of 'pictorial visualization' to Greek and Roman readers too soon. Apart from the fact that such a move must remain speculative -- and on balance it seems implausible that ancient and modern readers had very different cognitive capacities -- it risks blinding us to an alternative possibility, namely that in important ways *enargeia* differs from ordinary conceptions of 'pictorial vividness', not in degree, but in kind. For instance, are we really to suppose that Quintilian -- of all people, and in a discussion of the ornate style -- was less sensitive than 'we' are to, say, the string of asyndetic and partly anaphoric clauses in Cicero's vignette and that these played no role in his choice of this passage as an outstanding example of visually compelling writing? And what are we to make of the fact that *enargeia* (and *ekphrasis*, for that matter) is routinely used to characterise not only (not necessarily

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[15] Webb 2016: 219. Cf. Webb 2009: 110, stating that details such as the garlands would have been 'so loaded, so telling, for Roman readers like Quintilian that they might not themselves have been fully aware of the amount of decoding involved in their response'.

[16] Squire (2016) is a good example, and concerns vision.

[17] Vasaly 1993: 99.

[18] Germany 2016: 19.

[19] Webb 2016: 208.

elaborate) descriptions of static scenery and objects, but also fast-paced narrative passages, such as the Iliadic horse race or Xenophon's account of Cunaxa?[20] Rather than regarding these and other stylistic features of *enargeia* as irrelevant or as indications of the ease and intensity with which ancient readers allegedly formed mental images, we may wish to ask if mental images are always the best way of thinking about *enargeia*.

When we turn from the stylistic to the experiential side of things, similar questions rise. What are we to make, for instance, of the fact that, as Webb has recently remarked, ancient authors often speak as if *enargeia* involves the visualization of a scene, 'not simply as in a distanced, disembodied photograph, but as if we were present ourselves within the same space, in bodily contact with the place and its happenings'?[21] One may here compare how the scholiast cited above likens the readers of the *Iliad* to the captivated intradiegetic audience of the horse race for Patroclus, how Plutarch suggests that Xenophon's *enargeia* elicits a sense of being physically present in the plain of Cunaxa or how Quintilian envisages the audience of Cicero's vignette as having 'entered' the banquet hall. And finally, while it is clear that *enargeia* was supposed by ancient critics to provide certain kinds of understanding which we are not used to putting under the rubric of (mere) 'sight', is 'insight' always the best term to typify the surplus of 'meaning' generated by *enargeia*? Thus, Quintilian's claim that a speech requires *enargeia* if it is to 'dominate' the judge surely carries a hint that displaying the subject-matter to the mind's eye is an effective way for an orator to avoid inviting too much contemplation;[22] Plutarch's claim that, due to *enargeia*, readers of Xenophon will experience the same emotions as the actual participants in the Battle of Cunaxa ('sharing in the dangers') does not read as if he thought of himself and others as routinely investing mental images with intellectual and emotional meaning in a gradual and inferential process of sense-making; it is rather suggestive of a more immediate, knee-jerk and visceral, sort of response.

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[20] As noted by e.g. Calame 1991: 13-4; cf. Vasaly 1993: 91; Manieri 1998: 144-5; Calboli Montefusco 2005: 57. See also Webb (2009: 67-8) on narrative as a common topic of *ekphrasis* in ancient rhetorical handbooks. In response, Webb (2016: 210) now speaks of a 'virtual film' seen in the mind's eye rather than a 'picture', but this reformulation retains the 'representationalist' bias which the present chapter aims to qualify.

[21] Webb 2016: 213.

[22] Cf. Calboli Montefusco 2005: 48; Dozier 2013: 151-2. Cf. Ps.-Longin., *Subl.* 15.9-11, arguing that *enargeia* in rhetoric does not simply 'persuade' readers, but 'enslaves' (δουλοῦται) them, and that because of it 'the factual aspect of a case lies buried because it is outshone' (τὸ πραγματικὸν ἐγκρύπτεται περιλαμπόμενον); on the reasoning here, see Otto 2009: 95-6, 101; Halliwell 2011: 349-51.

In considering such questions, it is important to note that ancient critics themselves appear to have felt the need to redefine the philosophical terms they adopted. Cicero, for one, always translates *enargeia* as *evidentia* in philosophical, but as *inlustratio* in literary contexts, which may indicate that for him the 'clarity' of the mental images resulting from visual perception was not the same as visual 'vividness' in literature.[23] Ps.-Longinus (*Subl.* 15.1) presents his emotionally charged definition of *phantasia*, 'when under the influence of inspiration and emotion you seem to see what you describe and place it before the eyes of the readers', as a break with the Stoic usage of the term.[24] Quintilian (*Inst.* 6.2.29-30) introduces his discussion of the arousal of emotions through *enargeia* by providing a double gloss on *phantasia*: he uses the word not only for discrete mental images (*imagines*), but also for the human capacity actively to engage the imagination (*visiones*) and to do so in such a way that at times we no longer seem to 'think' (*cogitare*), but actually to 'do' (*facere*) what we imagine.[25] To be sure, formulations like these describe 'intense' responses, but they have little to do with philosophical ideas about mental images passively received and contemplated in the theatre of the mind.

For such reasons I propose now to abandon the notion of mental images as the explanatory medium and of 'seeing' such images in the mind's eye as the phenomenon to be explained and to examine instead if the non-representationalist enactivist theory of vision and imagination can help us develop a more precise account of some crucial stylistic and experiential aspects of *enargeia*. On the assumption that the main thrust of enactivism is correct, this is not *a priori* implausible. As we have seen, the significance of the pictorialist terminology used by ancient critics should not be overestimated; certainly terms like *enargeia* and *phantasia* did not retain their full philosophical meanings when they were transferred to a new context. And since rhetorical theory is ultimately a distillation of what worked best in practice, it is not unlikely that where our sources depart from the philosophical understanding of the imagination, both in their analytical remarks and in the examples which they adduce, they offer glimpses of actual, and cognitively realistic, reader responses.[26] Of course, this does not mean that there existed a

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[23] Otto 2009: 104-5; Bussels 2012: 72-3. It is Quintilian who muddies the waters.

[24] See Otto 2009: 91-2.

[25] See Otto 2009: 109-10; cf. Webb 2016: 210.

[26] Cf. Heath (2009) on the balance between theory and practice in ancient rhetoric. While ancient authors' reluctance to engage in elaborate analyses of *enargeia* has been attributed to the fact that the underlying ideas about *phantasiai* were so widely known that further explication was superfluous (Webb 2016: 208), it is more plausible that *enargeia* was ultimately a rather elusive concept to them, which captured a phenomenon (or a set of phenomena) which was in itself real enough and prompted by certain stylistic properties of texts, but which could

full-blown conception of the readerly imagination as enactivist in antiquity or that pictorialist preconceptions did not influence critical and readerly practice. It does, however, raise the possibility that 'pictorialism' is not the whole story and that the enactivist framework can help us bring out strands of *enargeia* which have hitherto remained underappreciated.

4 The Enactivist Account of Visual Experience and Imagination

The widespread view that picture-like mental images are indispensible to the proper functioning of the imagination, conceived of as simulated vision, arises in part from the folk-psychological assumption that visual perception itself is like taking detailed, high-resolution 'snapshots' of the world.[27] Noë's enactivist theory of visual perception, takes issue with this view.[28] Noë infers from much-discussed perceptual phenomena such as inattentional and change blindness that the perceived world is not in fact like a gap-free and detailed photograph, and posits instead that vision is, to a substantial degree, selective and attention-dependent.[29] The world, that is, is not given, but 'made available' by the activity of the observer, who attends to selected aspects of it through appropriate movements of the eyes, head and body.[30] One might think here of how, when we attentively follow a tennis match, for instance, we have only a dim visual awareness of the crowd or the stadium. Yet, the world does not 'feel' gappy to us, because we know that we can always 'look' further as and when we need to, by moving our eyes, head and body to focus on different aspects of the environment.

The enactivist account understands vision in terms of an on-going, attentive interaction between an embodied observer and the environment, mediated by the observer's mastery of the laws of sensorimotor contingencies, defined as the regularities in how sensory stimulation depends on the movements of the perceiver or the percept.[31] Our bodies, that is, relate to interaction potentials ('affordances') of the environment, as is measurable in neuronal activity associated with anticipatory movements that occur during perception in 'the whole neurally

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not easily be accommodated in received systems of rhetorical theory and therefore only partially explicitly analysed; cf. Vasaly 1993: 90; Innocenti 1994: 360; Manieri 1998: 148.

[27] See Jajdelska et al. 2010: 437, 440-1; Cave 2016: 79.

[28] O'Regan and Noë 2001a; 2001b; Noë 2004. For the background of enactivism in the phenomenological tradition associated with, among others, Merleau-Ponty, see Gallagher 2009.

[29] Noë 2004: 49-57. For an in-depth treatment of selective visual attention, see Zhang and Lin 2013.

[30] O'Regan and Noë 2001a: 956; Noë 2004: 16-17.

[31] O'Regan and Noë 2001a: 944-5; Noë 2004: 15-20.

enlivened body'.[32] As this sensorimotor feedback gives us information about what it would be like to interact with the environment, we perceive it in these terms. Actual and potential movements – both of the observer's eyes, head and body and of the observed entities – so gain salience for visual perception. To make this tangible, one can think of how a tennis player directs her gaze and whole-body intention to an incoming ball, incorporating its trajectory – she literally moves with the ball and 'feels' it approaching – and thereby at the same time already prepares for a well-aimed return.[33]

The claim that vision is enactive entails the claim that it is 'smart', in that it determines the basic way in which we make sense of ('enact') the world.[34] Thus, the enactivist theory of vision delivers everything we need in order to explain how the tennis player from our example hits the return; there is no need to evoke further cognitive acts on her part, such as her forming a belief about, say, the speed or size of the ball on the basis of 'snapshots' of it, and to posit that such 'higher-order' mental processes go into planning the return. On an enactivist view, the player's conscious experience of things like the size, voluminousness and distance of the ball is due to sensorimotor feedback (based on previous visual interactions with this or similar balls), which emerges during, and so is part and parcel of, visual perception.[35] A similar case has been made for the 'emotional colouration' of visual perception (e.g. the felt excitement and exhilaration involved in preparing and hitting a return); on an enactivist view, the neural activation associated with this is indicative, not of a separate cognitive act (by which I infer something from what I see), but of how embodied emotions inform visual perception from the start.[36]

According to a number of cognitive scientists, finally, the 'smartness' of visual perception extends to 'primary intersubjectivity', that is the human ability directly to see other people's movements in the context of the surrounding world *as* expressive of specific intentions and emotions.[37] On an enactivist view, our interactions with people at this level do not involve advanced inferential cognitive processes based on a 'Theory of Mind', but a visually mediated bodily attunement between two or more agents. An example is how our tennis player's return

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[32] O'Regan and Noë 2001b: 89. For 'affordances', see Noë 2004: 21, 103-6.

[33] I owe this example to Fuchs and De Jaegher 2009: 473.

[34] Gallagher 2008: 535-6.

[35] See Gallagher 2001: 88; 2008: 537.

[36] Gallagher 2008: 538. For embodied emotions, see Colombetti and Thompson 2008.

[37] Gallagher 2001; 2008; Fuchs and De Jaegher 2009. Bolens (2012: 1-2), adopting a term from Spolsky, calls it 'kinesic intelligence'. As Gallagher (2001: 91-2) notes, this does not mean that our efforts to 'read' others are never conceptual ('secondary intersubjectivity'), but in many situations primary intersubjectivity suffices.

depends on her ability to incorporate not just the ball's trajectory, but also the movements of her opponent. Evidence from research into mirror neurons, which shows that the perception of an action activates the same areas of the brain as executing that action, indicates that our direct grasp of what others are doing is facilitated by a mechanism which connects their bodies to ours.[38] While the interpretation of this evidence is controversial, it seems that our perception of others' actions always involves a proprioceptive component, and in marked cases -- Fuchs and De Jaegher give the example of someone absorbed in watching the *salto mortale* of an aerial acrobat -- our engagement with others' bodies in action may reach a degree of 'fascination', which may cause our lived body to reach toward and 'conjoin' with the acrobat's swinging movements to the extent that we may be prompted to co-movements.[39]

If this is what visual perception is like, then what does that entail for the imagination, defined as simulated vision? The enactivist account suggests that the phenomenal similarity between 'seeing' and 'imagining' is not to be found in their alleged content, namely mental images (for we do not take detailed 'snapshots' of the world to begin with), but in the embodied, enactive structure of experience: to imagine something, that is, is to simulate an embodied exploration of what one imagines.[40] It is like 'going through the motions' of actual visual perception, but in the frame of 'as if' and with sensorimotor feedback (often called 'resonances' in this context) provided from memory rather than the environment. It is by definition multimodal, involving (like, on the enactivist account, the experience of basic agency itself) the whole sensorimotor array, including the exteroceptive modalities, dominated by vision, and proprioceptive and kinesthetic modalities (a sensory awareness of bodily postures, movements as well as embodied aspects of emotions).[41] If mental images are involved, they are at best a by-product of our 'imaginings', are 'undergone' rather than inwardly 'seen', and need not specify more features than are relevant to the imagined experience at hand.[42] For the vividness of the imagination does not depend on the amount of detail 'seen', but on a distinct, bodily-perceptual 'feel' that is akin to that of actual visual perception.

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[38] E.g. Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004. For discussion, cf. Gallagher 2001: 101-3; 2008: 540-2.

[39] Fuchs and De Jaegher 2009: 473-4.

[40] See Caracciolo 2014: 98-100; Kuzmičová 2012b: 26. Excellent treatments of 'enactment imagination' are Thomas 1999; Thompson 2007. Evidence from eye-tracking experiments shows that imagining involves the same tracing of sensorimotor patterns as actual vision; see Spivey and Geng 2001; Johansson et al. 2006.

[41] Kuzmičová 2012b: 24; 2013: 115.

[42] Thompson 2007: 156; see Caracciolo 2014: 100, Troscianko 2013: 186.

In the following sections I will discuss two complementary ways in which modern critics have applied enactivist insights to quasi-visual reader responses, and which seem to me to resonate with how ancient critics talk about *enargeia*. The first focuses on how texts can model the 'probing' structure of enactive visual experiences and so may prompt vivid (lifelike, intense, smooth) simulations of such experiences. The second is concerned with the story-driven, imaginative equivalent of the real-life phenomenon of 'fascination'. In making the case for embodied reader responses I will be relying on recent linguistic research which emphasises the embodied aspects of language comprehension, such as that of Zwaan, who understands language as 'a set of cues to the comprehender to construct an experiential (perception plus action) simulation of the described situation', and comprehension as 'the vicarious experience of the described situation'.[43] Increasingly, evidence is accumulating that the 'depth' of such embodied processing varies depending on the kinds of language used, and that readers' responses to words through their bodies may lead to fully-fledged bodily feelings which can be linked to a sense of 'presence' or 'immersion' in the storyworld.[44]

5 Enacting Narrative Space: *Enargeia* from 'Seeing' to 'Looking'

When one starts thinking about concrete stylistic differences between the pictorialist and enactivist models of readerly visualization, some of them come down to the issue of detail. The enactivist approach does not set much store by detailed mental images and even suggests that elaborate descriptions may be baffling rather than stimulating, because they contradict the economy and selectivity intrinsic to our normal enactive-perceptual engagement with the world.[45] In fact, descriptions arguably become more vivid if they play on the fallibility of our 'pictorial' vision than if they try to fill in all the details.[46] It is interesting to note in this respect that in Cicero's vignette of the banquet hall, cited by Quintilian as a star example of *enargeia*, the words 'I seemed to see' (*videbar videre*) indicate that, from the very start, the scene which is about to be described could *not* be clearly seen. There may, to be sure, have been good reasons to emphasise the point. Perhaps the first-person observer (Cicero himself?) was ashamed to look closely at so abject a scene and kept his eyes turned on the floor, or it was dawn and the

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[43] Zwaan 2004: 36.

[44] See Zwaan 2008; 2014; Kuijpers and Miall 2011. Sanford and Emmott (2012: 103-31) provide an overview of experimental research in this area. I will refer to some specialised studies below.

[45] Cf. Jajdelska et al. 2010: 442-3; Troscianko 2013: 188; 2014: 129; Kuzmičová 2012a: 309; 2012b: 36.

[46] See Troscianko 2014: 144-59.

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first light only made visible the contours of the guests and a few gleaming wet patches on the floor. But for present purposes the relevant point is that to Quintilian's mind the lack of a 'clear view' apparently did not stand in the way of *enargeia*. So, what could it have been about this passage he found visually compelling?

Part of the answer is, I think, that the passage is structured so as to enable readers to undergo an enactive visual exploration of the represented space. First, the words *videbar videre* inscribe an internal point of view into the text and suggest that the following description will to some extent be tailored to the body and sensory systems of an embedded human observer.[47] To this we can add the present participles ('coming in' (*intrantis*), etc.), which configure the actions they express as on-going and as currently being perceived, and the way in which the guests' comings and goings are described in relation to the internal viewpoint.[48] Secondly, the description does not simply enumerate sense-data, but conveys the impression that the scene is scanned by someone moving her eyes and head in accordance with the enactivist view of how we 'look around' and with the principle of selective visual attention; each of the asyndetic and anaphoric clauses ('*alios ..., alios ..., quosdam ... quosdam ...*') can even be understood as an instance of 'looking' preceded by movement, with the repeated words honing in on the entities to which the observer's attention is drawn each time.[49] The term 'experiential iconicity' has been coined for linguistic structures which are iconic, not of the represented entities, but of the perception of those entities.[50]

It is plausible that Quintilian was sensitive to those features of the passage on which an enactivist approach also hones in. First, embedded viewpoints and the linguistic means of shaping them are often associated with *enargeia* in our sources. A late Roman treatise on figures of thought actually defines *enargeia* in terms of the manipulation of deictic elements which establish an internal viewpoint. It commends a line of Virgil that uses the historical present ('The men are visible (*apparent*) floating scattered on the vast waters') for expressing the action 'as if present' (*quasi praesenti*), and one that uses proximal spatial deictics ('Here (*hic*) the army of the Dolopes had its camp, here (*hic*) savage Achilles') for making it seem as if the entities so pointed to are 'within our field of vision' (*in conspectu nostro*).[51] The historical

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[47] Cf. Kuzmičová 2012a: 301-2; 2012b: 40; Troscianko 2014: 168; Caracciolo 2014: 101, 103-5.

[48] Manieri (1998: 142) comments on 'l'immediatezza' of the present participles in our passage.

[49] Cf. Otto (2009: 118), who notes how the successive clauses seem to represent 'die Bewegung der Augen'. For the general point, see Troscianko 2014: 125-6; Caracciolo 2014: 102.

[50] Wolf 2001.

[51] Anon. *Schem. Dian.* 1 Halm, citing V. *Aen.* 1.118, 2.29. See Ryan (2001: 130-9) for a modern discussion of

present is also repeatedly associated with *enargeia* in the scholia,[52] and Ps.-Longinus (*Subl.* 25) praises Xenophon's and Thucydides' use of the device, because it makes it seem as if past events 'were happening now and were present' (ὡς γινόμενα καὶ παρόντα).[53] Quintilian (*Inst.* 9.2.41-3) himself, finally, knows a figure called 'transference of time' (*tralatio temporum*) or *metastasis*, which is achieved either by prefacing a scene with explicit references to 'seeing' or by using the historical present;[54] this makes it likely that he felt that both *'videbar videre'* and the present participles in the Ciceronian vignette contributed to *enargeia*.

Furthermore, ancient authors seem to have appreciated the fact that 'looking' involves bodily movement. Polybius (3.38.5) significantly instructs his readers that, 'just as in the case of actual visual perception (ἐπὶ τῆς ὁράσεως) we are used to always turning our faces (συνεπιστρέφειν ἀεὶ τὰ πρόσωπα) towards the object pointed out to us, so too should we mentally (τῇ διανοίᾳ) ever turn and shift our glance (συνδιανεύειν καὶ συρρέπειν) to the geographical locations to which the story points'.[55] The clearest indication that it was known that such movements could be mirrored in certain rhetorical figures and so enhance visual vividness comes in Ps.-Longinus' analysis of a famous Demosthenic passage which describes the effects of a blow on the victim:

πολλὰ γὰρ ἂν ποιήσειεν ὁ τύπτων, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὧν ὁ παθὼν ἔνι' οὐδ' ἂν ἀπαγγεῖλαι δύναιθ' ἑτέρῳ, τῷ σχήματι, τῷ βλέμματι, τῇ φωνῇ, ὅταν ὡς ὑβρίζων, ὅταν ὡς ἐχθρὸς ὑπάρχων, ὅταν κονδύλοις, ὅταν ἐπὶ κόρρης. ταῦτα κινεῖ, ταῦτ' ἐξίστησιν ἀνθρώπους αὐτῶν, ἀήθεις ὄντας τοῦ προπηλακίζεσθαι. (Dem. 21.72)

Many things, Athenians, some of which the victim would find it difficult to put into words, may be done by the striker – by gesture, by look, by tone; when he strikes in wantonness or out of enmity; with the fist or on the cheeck. These are the things that provoke men and make them besides themselves, if they are unused to insult.

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how the manipulation of spatiotemporal deixis contributes to 'immersion', and Allan (2013) for a recent analysis of the Greek historical present along these lines.

[52] Meijering 1987: 42-3; Nünlist 2009: 196. Add Donatus, *Comm. in Ter. Hec.* 295: '*"obtrudit" pro "obtrudebat"*: ἐνάργεια *temporis*' (also *Eun.* 594, *Hec.* 174).

[53] Note the similar language used by Plutarch of Xenophon; his account of Cunaxa is rich in historical presents.

[54] Cf. Lausberg 1998: 363; Sheppard 2014: 35.

[55] Cf. Meijering 1987: 47-8. Polybius seems to think of his readers as pouring over a large map of the Mediterranean in their imaginations (rather than as 'embedded' observers).

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Ps.-Longinus (*Subl.* 20.1-2) mentions 'the asyndeta in combination with the cases of anaphora and the vivid description' (ταῖς ἀναφοραῖς ὁμοῦ καὶ τῇ διατυπώσει συναναπεπλεγμένα τὰ ἀσύνδετα) as contributing to a sense that 'the orator accomplishes the same as the assailant: he strikes the jurors' minds with blow after blow'. Readers, then, are in the position of the victim of the attack and may experience what Ps.-Longinus tellingly describes as a 'disturbance and co-movement of the mind' (φορὰ ψυχῆς καὶ συγκίνησις). In my view, the term συγκίνησις is suggestive of how readers may imaginatively follow the virtual blows, encoded in the text, with their eyes in an effort to duck the blow; the addition 'of the mind' refers only to the fact that readers do not actually start turning left and right, but in all other respects what they feel is physical (reliant on sensorimotor resonances).[56] While Ps.-Longinus does not discuss this example under the header of *enargeia* or *phantasia*, the effect which he describes could clearly be called that.[57] The term διατύπωσις is a common synonym of *enargeia* (and apt here, as it is indicative of the almost physical impression which the virtual blows make), and we will see below that συγκίνησις is closely associated with *phantasia* in *On the Sublime*. Other critics also associate rhetorical figures like anaphora and asyndeton with *enargeia*.[58]

Apart from these more or less explicit discussions of relevant stylistic features, it should be noted that examples of visually 'vivid' writing adduced in our sources often contain an internal point of view, tied to a character, explicit indications of bodily movement or travel -- this maybe reflects a sense that in order to make readers consciously aware of the virtual movements on which vividness depends, it helps textually to specify (and exaggerate) them -- and experiential iconicity.[59] One relevant example is a celebrated passage from Demosthenes describing the destruction of Phocis:

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[56] I will return to this term in the next Section. On *kinēsis*-language in ancient criticism, see Meijering 1987: 44-47; Nünlist 2009: 139-40. Both, however, play down its bodily connotations. *Pace* Russell 1964: 135: 'συν- (...) merely emphasizes the completeness or thoroughness of the disturbance'.

[57] Cf. Anon. Segu. 111, which gives the Demosthenic passage as an example of *enargeia*.

[58] Hermogenes (*Id.* 303.1-8 Rabe, citing Dem. 19.10) uses the term to describe the effect of *epanaphora kata komma*, as in the Demosthenic phrase προσιὼν μὲν τῇ βουλῇ, προσιὼν δὲ τῷ δήμῳ ('coming forward to the Council, and coming forward to the people'). See also Ps.-Demetrius (*Eloc.* 211-15) on the *enargeia* of *dilogia* or 'figures involving repetition', with the discussions of Manieri 1998: 134-5; Otto 2009: 80-3.

[59] For internal viewpoints, cf. Walker 1993; Webb 2016: 211-3; Otto 2009: 89 (though all three with a more 'psychological' slant than mine). For 'travel', see e.g. Ps.-Longin. *Subl.* 26.2 on Hdt. 2.29; Σ bT *Il.* 14.226-7: the lines enumerate locations past and through which Hera moves on her flight from Olympus to Lemnos; the scholiast comments that 'the mind (ἡ διάνοια) of the readers travels alongside her (συμπαραθέουσα) and is brought to imagine and visualise (ἐν φαντασίᾳ καὶ ὄψει) the locations'; cf. Meijering 1987: 44; Nünlist 2009: 188.

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ὅτε γὰρ νῦν ἐπορευόμεθ’ εἰς Δελφούς, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἦν ὁρᾶν ἡμῖν πάντα ταῦτα, οἰκίας κατεσκαμμένας, τείχη περιῃρημένα, χώραν ἔρημον τῶν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ, γύναια δὲ καὶ παιδάρι’ ὀλίγα καὶ πρεσβύτας ἀνθρώπους οἰκτρούς. (Dem. 19.65)

So when we were now travelling to Delphi, necessity compelled us to look upon that scene -- homesteads levelled with the ground, cities stripped of their defensive walls, a countryside all emptied of its young men; only women, a few little children, and old men stricken with misery.

This passage was much praised for its visual ‘vividness’ in antiquity.[60] However, like Cicero’s vignette, it is not rich in details, so that it is hard to see how its *enargeia* can be bound up with any ‘pictorial’ qualities. Rather, it is notable for combining a reference to human observers on the spot (ἦν ὁρᾶν ἡμῖν), a verb of movement (ἐπορευόμεθα) and experiential iconicity (short clauses and asyndeton).[61] The enactivist framework helps us understand how these features contribute to eliciting vivid quasi-visual responses from readers and, I would maintain, why ancient critics were drawn to this passage when looking for examples of *enargeia*.

6 Enacting Bodily Movement: *Enargeia* from Pity to Fear

There is one further aspect of Cicero’s vignette which contributes to its visual vividness, and that is that the internal observer’s attention is mostly drawn to aspects of the scene which, on an enactivist view, are cognitively salient. The focus on the floor, for instance, which at first sight seems strange,[62] in fact gets things just right, both because it highlights a crucial element of rooms, in that their canonical affordances of reposing and moving about in them depend on it and because it gives the internal observer whose visual perception the reader simulates a solid surface virtually to stand on, which likely increases the sense of ‘presence’.[63] Furthermore, the

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[60] Cf. Webb 2016: 213. Cf. Nik. *Progymn.* 71.1-5 Felten; Σ Dem. 19.157c Dilts (misplaced from 19.65); Alex. *De fig.* III.25.13-25 Spengel; Anon. Segu. 111.

[61] Also note the ‘presentifying’ deictic νῦν (‘now’), although all sources quote a version of the passage without this word.

[62] Cf. Otto 2009: 119.

[63] For the desirability of stressing canonical affordances, see Kuzmičová 2012b: 31; Troscianko 2014: 137-8, 142; Cave 2016: 46-8. Cf. Kuzmičová 2012b: 28; 2013: 117: ‘The imaginary world is unlikely to feel tangible and

initial focus on the banqueters' comings and goings matches the fact that movements are a natural focal point of our selective visual attention and, as readers virtually follow the represented people around, it also evokes a sense of three-dimensional space more effectively than a disembodied description of the room's dimensions would. Furthermore, since 'entering' and 'exiting' belong to the most common affordances of rooms, the narrative rendition of these actions is also likely to elicit from readers a more vivid sense of the presence of walls and doors than a detailed description of such furnishings: we know (perceptually, that is immediately and experientially) how it feels like to perform such actions and what they look like to an observer, because it is at the level of such actions that we ourselves perceptually-enactively experience the world and know others to experience it.[64]

Like seeing such bodily actions being performed in real life, imagining them involves a proprioceptive component; indeed, imagining actions, the vividness of which depends on one's awareness of sensorimotor processes in one's own body, may to some extent always cut through an inner-outer dichotomy. This helps us understand, I think, why the focus on bodily actions, which is so prominent a feature of Cicero's vignette, may do more than just contribute to spatial vividness and also tell us something about what readers may get out of 'seeing' this scene. Take the example of the banqueters said almost to 'keel over' (*vacillantis*). As we have seen, on a pictorialist account, this is a 'telling' detail from which readers may infer certain things about the physical and psychological state of the people in question. However, the enactivist account of 'smart' vision allows for a different approach. On this view, readers do not infer the guests' predicament as general knowledge, as a conceptual abstraction, but understand it experientially, by 'incorporating' the action involved, by catching, as it were, an echo of the described movement in their bones.[65] Since this understanding is perceptual-enactive, immediate and prereflective, it can be experienced as visually vivid.

This cognitive perspective can be supplemented by a linguistic one. When one thinks about the precise semantic nuances of bodily-action verbs -- for instance, about how 'keeling over'

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present unless physical stimuli that can be interacted with are mentioned (or strongly implied), that is, unless the furnishing of the imaginary world is reached, grasped, manipulated, leaned against, and so forth.' From a non-enactivist perspective, Scarry (1995) argues that indications of the 'solidity' of a room's surfaces contributes markedly to its imageability.

[64] Grünbaum 2007: 307-9, and especially 308, on how the rendition of bodily movements '[i]n a direct and quasi-perceptible (ready for visual imagining) way (...) manifests a spatial situation, which as a whole is strung together by the familiar patterns of movement and orientation'.

[65] I owe this formulation to Cave 2016: 63.

subtly differs from, say, 'tottering', 'dropping down' or 'foundering' -- it becomes clear that these are difficult to capture in abstract terms; rather, it seems that we distinguish such verbs by their appearance (how they develop in space and time) and how they 'feel' in the body.[66] Bodily-action verbs have therefore been a prime focus of research into how language processing activates regions of the brain associated with perception and kinesthesia; motor resonances of motion verbs have been posited in readers and also observed directly in neuroimaging studies.[67] It has also been shown that readers simulate vertical and horizontal movements as expressed or implied by verb phrases,[68] as well as the orientation of objects as implied by the use to which they are said to be put.[69]

Now in the passage from Cicero, an outside perspective on the guests' drunken shenanigans probably predominates and the enactment of the movement of 'keeling over' only has a modest and nearly imperceptible role to play in readers' reception of the passage. There are, however, many indications in ancient criticism that ancient readers' quasi-visual responses included the enactment of bodily actions described in the text.[70] In general, it is remarkable how many examples of passages said to possess the quality of *enargeia* are 'full of details of human action',[71] and how often readers are implicitly compared to the emotionally involved audiences of sports matches, perhaps the paradigmatic example of 'fascinated' spectators in the sense of Fuchs and De Jaegher (see Section 4 above).[72] Indeed, 'fascination' often seems to me as appropriate a way as any to typify the 'intensity' of ancient readers' quasi-visual engagement with literature. The clearest example is Ps.-Longinus' treatment of *phantasia*. As we have seen in Section 3 above, according to this critic (*Subl.* 15.1-2) *phantasia* comes about, 'when under

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[66] Kemmerer 2006: 350; see Cave 2016: 109-10.

[67] Zwaan 2009, and Pulvermüller 2005, respectively.

[68] Richardson et al. 2003.

[69] Stanfield and Zwaan 2001; Zwaan and Madden 2005. Cf. Bolens 2012: 13: 'If a text describes a person hammering a nail into a wall, readers simulate a horizontal nail, whereas the nail is simulated as vertical if it is said to be pounded into the floor'.

[70] Kuzmičová (2012b; 2013) speaks of 'motor enactment' to typify this respone, Bolens (2012) of 'kinesic empathy', Caracciolo (2014: 160) of how readers may 'imaginatively project themselves into the character's fictional body'.

[71] Webb 2009: 109; examples also in Calame 1991; Calboli Montefusco 2005.

[72] The *Iliadic* horse race is commented on by Ps.-Demetrius (*Eloc.* 210) and various scholia; see Grethlein and Huitink 2017: 76-7. Quintilian (*Inst.* 8.3.63) gives the boxing match from V. *Aen.* 5.426ff. as his first example of *enargeia*; in a highly metaliterary passage, Heliodorus (4.3.4) describes the vivid effects of a story about a foot race on the audience; see for analysis, see Grethlein 2015: 270-2.

the influence of inspiration and emotion you seem to see what you describe and place it before the eyes of the readers'. He goes on to specify that *phantasiai* 'seek emotion and excitement' (τό τε <παθητικὸν> ἐπιζητοῦσι καὶ τὸ συγκεκινημένον), and in poetry even aim at the stunning emotional impact he calls *ekplēxis*. I will return to these terms below. He next refers to several passages in support of these claims, the two most elaborate of which concern excerpts from Euripidean messenger speeches. The first is from *Iphigenia in Tauris* and relates how Orestes was (actually or in his imagination) attacked by Erinyes:[73]

> κἀν τῷδε πέτραν ἅτερος λιπὼν ξένοιν
> ἔστη κάρα τε διετίναξ᾽ ἄνω κάτω
> κἀπεστέναξεν ὠλένας τρέμων ἄκρας,
> μανίαις ἀλαίνων, καὶ βοᾷ· 'Κυνωπίδα,
> Πυλάδη, δέδορκας τήνδε; τήνδε δ᾽ οὐχ ὁρᾷς
> Ἅιδου δράκαιναν, ὥς με βούλεται κτανεῖν
> δειναῖς ἐχίδναις εἰς ἔμ᾽ ἐστομωμένη;
> ἣ 'κ γειτόνων δὲ πῦρ πνέουσα καὶ φόνον
> πτεροῖς ἐρέσσει, μητέρ᾽ ἀγκάλαις ἐμὴν
> ἔχουσα, πέτρινον ὄγκον, ὡς ἐπεμβάλῃ.
> οἴμοι, κτενεῖ με· ποῖ φύγω;' (Eur. *IT* 281-90)

Meanwhile one of the two strangers left the cliff and stood there and tossed his head this way and that. He groaned, his arms trembling to his fingertips, swaying because of the onslaughts of madness, and shouted, 'Pylades, don't you see this hound-faced one? And don't you see this one, a she-dragon from hell, how she wants to kill me, brandishing her fearsome snakes at me? And next to her, one breathing fire and gore beats her wings and holds my mother in her arms, a mass of stone, to hurl at me! Ah, she will kill me! Where can I escape to?'

In response to this passage, Ps.-Longinus writes:

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[73] In fact, Ps.-Longinus (*Subl.* 15.2) first cites Eur. *Or.* 255-7, another, and much briefer, vision of Erinyes, which awards them only two descriptive adjectives (αἱματωποὺς καὶ δρακοντώδεις) and then *IT* 290 (οἴμοι [...] φύγω;). However, ancient quotation practices make it likely that he had the whole passage in view (or at least the entirety of Orestes' directly quoted speech), and this likelihood is increased because of the structural similarities (of which I will come to speak) between this passage and the one from *Phaethon* cited below.

ἐνταῦθ᾽ ὁ ποιητὴς αὐτὸς εἶδεν Ἐρινύας· ὃ δ᾽ ἐφαντάσθη, μικροῦ δεῖν θεάσασθαι καὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἠνάγκασεν. (*Subl.* 15.2)

Here the poet himself saw Erinyes and as good as compelled his readers to see what he imagined.

The second is from Euripides' *Phaethon* and concerns the eponymous character's ill-fated journey through the heavens; the longest continuous portion starts with a line of direct speech containing Zeus' final instructions and continues with the start of Phaethon's journey:

ʽἵει δ᾽, ἐφ᾽ ἑπτὰ Πλειάδων ἔχων δρόμον.᾽
τοσαῦτ᾽ ἀκούσας παῖς ἔμαρψεν ἡνίας·
κρούσας δὲ πλευρὰ πτεροφόρων ὀχημάτων
μεθῆκεν, αἱ δ᾽ ἔπταντ᾽ ἐπ᾽ αἰθέρος πτύχας.
πατὴρ δ᾽ ὄπισθε νῶτα Σειρίου βεβὼς
ἵππευε παῖδα νουθετῶν· ʽἐκεῖσ᾽ ἔλα,
τῇδε στρέφ᾽ ἅρμα, τῇδε.᾽
ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἂν εἴποις, ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ γράφοντος συνεπιβαίνει τοῦ ἅρματος καὶ συγκινδυνεύουσα τοῖς ἵπποις συνεπτέρωται; οὐ γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ τοῖς οὐρανίοις ἐκείνοις ἔργοις ἰσοδρομοῦσα ἐφέρετο, τοιαῦτ᾽ ἄν ποτε ἐφαντάσθη. (*Subl.* 15.4, citing Eur. *Phaethon*, *TrGF* 779)

'"Steer steadily towards the seven Pleiads". The boy listened so far, then seized the reins, whipped the flanks of his winged team and let them go. To heaven's expanse they flew. His father rode behind on Sirius' back, giving the boy advice: "That's your way, there: turn the chariot this way, now this way".' Would you not say that the soul of the author also mounts the chariot and, sharing in the danger, takes wing with the horses? For if it had not been carried along keeping pace with those actions in the heavens, he would never have imagined such things.

Ps.-Longinus' response to the Erinyes-passage has been thought to give expression to the

pictorialist idea that verbal descriptions transfer mental images from author to reader.[74] However, the passage does not seem particularly suitable for pictorial visualization, because it does not offer sufficient descriptive detail for readers to be able to piece together a clear and complete mental image of the Erinyes. It has therefore been argued that the effect of the passage is as much semantic as it is sensory: it depends not so much on readers 'seeing', say, a snake-like figure (δράκαιναν) in the mind's eye (such a thing may well be difficult to imagine anyway), as on them having bad associations with the word 'snake'.[75] The *Phaethon*-passage, which is similarly lacklustre from a pictorialist point of view, has also been thought to be interesting mostly for presenting a glimpse of the divine, a 'transcendent vision', designed to 'help us to understand phenomena that are beyond the normal grasp of an individual human's perception'.[76]

In my view, such explanations fail to capture the essence of what is going on here. While neither passage stands out because of its reflections on the supernatural phenomena they describe, they share an emphasis on the simple narration of bodily actions: thus, Phaethon snatches (ἔμαρψεν) the reins, whips (κρούσας) the horses' flanks and then sets them loose (μεθῆκεν); Orestes gets up (ἔστη), tosses his head up and down (κάρα τε διετίναξ᾽ ἄνω κάτω), trembles to his fingertips (ὠλένας τρέμων ἄκρας) and hardly keeps his balance as his body precariously 'sways' (ἀλαίνων). I suggest that immersed readers may be led imaginatively to enact these movements, especially because in both passages the sensorimotor resonances provoked by the verb phrases are reinforced by characters' verbalisations of perceptual-enactive experiences in direct speeches, which further encourage readers to enact the scenes from an internal perspective. The jerky movements of Orestes' head and eyes is continued in the phrase he addresses to Pylades, 'Do you see this one? And this one, don't you see her?' (δέδορκας τήνδε; τήνδε δ᾽ οὐχ ὁρᾷς;). The progress of Phaethon's flight is charted in the instructions he is given by Zeus: 'That's your way, there: turn here, turn here' (ἐκεῖσ᾽ ἔλα, | τῇδε στρέφ᾽ ἅρμα, τῇδε). Both lines combine instructions to turn one's head to 'see', proximal spatial deictics and verbal repetition of these deictics, with an added asyndeton in the example from *Phaethon*.

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[74] Cf. Webb 2009: 96; Otto 2009: 97-8. We would prefer to say that Orestes had the vision, but ancient critics did not usually distinguish between poet and character.

[75] Otto 2009: 98: 'Die Beschreibung hat einerseits einen Visuellen Aspekt, andererseits aber auch eher einen assoziativen (...) schlangenähnliche weibliche Gestalten (...) sind nicht gut visualisierbar, dafür ist das Wort Schlange mit schlechten Assoziationen besetzt'.

[76] Webb 2016: 218.

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The enactivist sensorimotor resonance framework seems to me to fit Ps.-Longinus' markedly non-pictorialist comments on these passages. It is in accordance with his identification of *ekplēxis* as the chief effect of the cited *phantasiai*, which according to Russell expresses a 'surprise or fear which "knocks you out"';[77] the language of compulsion (ἠνάγκασεν) Ps.-Longinus uses in response to Orestes' vision implies that *ekplēxis* is neither entirely voluntary nor wholly open to rational scrutiny: 'the more the poet succeeds in visualizing and transmitting the inner subjectivity of Orestes' frenzied mental state, the more the audience's experience (...) will itself approximate a kind of madness'.[78] *Ekplēxis*, then, appears to consist in a largely spontaneous (even irresistible), close emotional identification with the represented characters, Orestes and Phaethon. Furthermore, the term τὸ συγκεκινημένον in Ps.-Longinus' introductory remark, which literally means 'movement with/alongside', suggests that this identification comes about, quite precisely, by (virtual) co-movements with the represented characters which may accompany a state of 'fascination'. The term is picked up in Ps.-Longinus' comments on the *Phaethon*-passage, where the author's (and by implication the reader's) soul is said to mount the chariot *with* Phaethon (συνεπιβαίνει), to run risks *with* him (συγκινδυνεύουσα) and to take wings *with* the horses (συνεπτέρωται). Like in the previous section, I should like to argue that we should not be too quick to dismiss the *kinēsis*-language as mere metaphor; the response which Ps.-Longinus is after includes, I think, a felt sense of the visceral emotions which come with the imaginative enactment of the described movements, a stomach-churning, sickening fear (in the case of Orestes) or exhilaration (in the case of Phaethon).

I end this section by drawing attention to a problem in the interpretation of Quintilian. We have seen in Section 3 above how Quintilian, in the context of a discussion of *enargeia* and the arousal of emotions, regards the human capacity to visualize a scene as so powerful that at times people do not merely seem to 'think' (*cogitare*), but even to 'do' (*facere*) what they imagine; he then mentions travelling, sailing, fighting, addressing a crowd and disposing of wealth as examples -- schoolboy daydreams indeed! He suggests that budding orators can easily learn to harness this capacity for rhetorical purposes and offers the outlines of a riveting murder story to show how they may do so:

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[77] Russell 1964: 122.

[78] Halliwell 2011: 348. It is true that the verb used for the audience 'seeing' the Erinyes, θεῶμαι, often carries connotations of intellectual contemplation (Liddel et al. 1996: *s.v.* I.2), but I suspect that it was selected here because of its connection to θεατής ('spectator'), which plays on the *enargeia*-trope of turning readers into emotionally involved spactators 'on the spot' (cf. the Homeric scholion cited in Section 1 above).

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hominem occisum queror; non omnia, quae in re praesenti accidisse credibile est, in oculis habebo? non percussor ille subitus erumpet? non expavescet circumventus, exclamabit vel rogabit vel fugiet? non ferientem, non concidentem videbo? non animo sanguis et pallor et gemitus, extremus denique exspirantis hiatus insidet? insequetur ἐνάργεια, quae a Cicerone inlustratio et evidentia nominatur, quae non tam dicere videtur quam ostendere, et adfectus non aliter, quam si rebus ipsis intersimus, sequentur. (Quint. *Inst.* 6.2.31-2)

Suppose I am complaining a man has been murdered. Am I not to have before my eyes all the circumstances which one can believe to have happened during the event? Will not the assassin burst out all of a sudden, and the victim tremble, cry for help, and either plead for mercy or try to escape? Shall I not see one man striking the blow and the other man falling? Will not the blood, the pallor, the groans, the last gasp of the dying be imprinted on my mind? The result will be *enargeia*, which Cicero calls *inlustratio* and *evidentia*, and which makes us seem not so much to be talking about something as exhibiting it. Emotions will ensue just as if we were present at the events themselves. (trans. Russell)

The problem is that the introductory remarks appear to presuppose a first-person perspective, while the story which follows is in the third person. Webb therefore felt that the 'sense of empathy created by the simulacrum of presence is twofold: the orator puts himself in the place of an eyewitness but it is the suffering of the victim that is clearly evoked'.[79] The enactivist view allows us to see that there is not necessarily a contradiction: an immersed reader will both 'see' and 'enact' the actions described in the scene. This has consequences for the emotions (*adfectus*) which Quintilian thought would automatically ensue. What Quintilian thinks readers will feel is in the first place, I feel, the same sort of fear as the victim, which on an enactivist account is part and parcel of the perceptual experience and in that sense indeed automatic. This does not mean, of course, that in a second instance readers may not also feel pity for the victim and anger with the perpetrator, just like readers of Cicero's vignette may come to reflect on the behaviour of the drunken guests or readers of Euripides may come to feel an emotional distance from Orestes in his madness or Phaethon in his foolishness. But I would suggest that such responses comprise a separate, higher-order cognitive act which does no longer come under the purview of *enargeia per se*.

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[79] Webb 2016: 210.

7 Conclusion

This chapter started out with a critical review of the prevailing pictorialist account of *enargeia*. It suggested that this account could not properly explain a number of important stylistic and experiential features of the concept which are repeatedly, if sometimes allusively, flagged up in our sources. It therefore developed an alternative enactivist perspective on *enargeia*, which is able to account for some important properties of *enargeia.* Thus, on the stylistic side of things, we have seen that certain non-pictorial stylistic features, such as asyndeton and anaphora, do make a significant contribution to visual vividness and were in all probability regarded by ancient critics as being conducive to *enargeia*. It has also been shown that there is a positive connection between *enargeia* and narrative, especially the narration of bodily actions. On the experiential level, the enactivist view of readers' vivid quasi-visual responses suggests that they always entail an embedded (internal) view of the represented scene and may also elicit a felt sense of bodily involvement, and this is in accordance with the way in which ancient critics talk about *enargeia*. Finally, I have argued that *enargeia* in the first place brings with it an emotional and experiential grasp of what is going on, as opposed to a reflective, intellectual understanding. This, too, fits the way in which ancient critics talk about readers' quasi-visual responses.

I should like to emphasise that I do not claim that an enactivist approach explains everything about *enargeia*. But if it is the case that readers' quasi-visual responses to literature originate from a combination of biological and cognitive invariables (which I would configure as enactivist) and socio-culturally determined variables (which will have included pictorialist preconceptions), then it is both legitimate and useful to use a 'second-generation' cognitive approaches to arrive at a fuller picture of what 'vividness' entailed for ancient readers. As Kukkonen and Caracciolo state, '[h]istorical practices and embodiment as a biological and cognitive condition are not opposed but, on the contrary, caught in a dialectic relationship, so that exploring the background of bodily invariants can improve our understanding of historical specificities, and vice versa'.[80] It is up to future research into ancient readers' responses to text to investigate the relationship between the enactivist strands of *enargeia* laid bare in this chapter on the one hand and the folk-psychological and philosophical pictorialist theories and the practice of *ekphrasis* on the other.

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