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INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY OF YOUNG EUROPEANS

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES

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ABSTRACT

This thesis sets out to investigate social and political consequences of young Europeans' experiences of intergenerational mobility, i.e., achieving a higher or lower socioeconomic status than one's parents. In particular, it aims at providing a better understanding of how young Europeans' (aged 35 and younger) experience of intergenerational mobility shapes their well-being and normative support for the welfare state. Apart from a descriptive overview on the status quo of intergenerational mobility among young Europeans in three dimensions (educational mobility, economic mobility, and expectations of future mobility), the main objective of the empirical analyses is to investigate the extent to which the psychological experience of intergenerational mobility, independent from the direct impact of one's own and parental socioeconomic status, affect different dimensions of well-being and political attitudes. To this end, I apply diagonal reference models, the only method suitable to disentangle the effects of mobility, social origin, and social destination.

With respect to possible consequences of intergenerational mobility for the young people's well-being, I investigate several hypotheses about individual and societal differences between mobile and non-mobile individuals. In line with the theoretical prediction that psychological mobility effects are more likely to occur in status-based societies, I find net mobility effects in Continental Europe and the Anglo-Saxon countries. Yet, contrary to the theoretical expectations, I also find net mobility effects in the Nordic countries.

In terms of political consequences of intergenerational mobility of young Europeans, I test two competing sets of hypotheses about differences in normative welfare state attitudes between mobile and non-mobile individuals. Thereby, the first set relies on material self-interest as the main determinant for welfare state support, while the second set is based on factors beyond material self-interest, such as deservingness perceptions. The empirical findings do not support the prediction of mobile individuals being more sympathetic with benefit recipients. This arguably owes to the fact that the well-known determinant material self-interest apparently plays a similar role in determining normative welfare state attitudes for the mobile as for the non-mobile.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CASMIN	Comparative Analysis of Social Mobility in Industrial Nations
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CUPESSE (project)	Cultural pathways to economic self-sufficiency and entrepreneurship (project)
DRM	Diagonal Reference Models
EGP class scheme	Erikson, Goldthorpe, Portocarero class scheme
ESS	European Social Survey
EU	European Union
FJH hypothesis	Featherman Jones Hauser hypothesis
ISCED	International Standard Classification of Education
LZ theory	Lipset-Zetterberg theory
NUTS	Classification of Territorial Units for Statistics (*French: Nomenclature des unités territoriales statistiques*)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OED triangle	Origin-education-destination triangle
STYLE (project)	Strategic Transitions for Youth Labour in Europe (project)

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1 Introduction

Today's youth are faced with disadvantageous conditions that have given rise to a series of pessimistic predictions for their future life chances. These conditions, affecting a whole generation of current and prospective labour market entrants, were largely caused by the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the subsequent rise of youth unemployment. Youth unemployment rates all over Europe reached unprecedented levels, with every second young person affected in some member states (Tosun, 2015). While unemployment rates in general have risen due to the recession, it was the young who shared a particularly high burden and suffered the most. Against this background, concerns have been raised regarding the risk of a whole generation of young Europeans becoming a 'lost generation' (Shildrick, 2015: 491). Others dubbed today's youth the 'bad luck' generation due to their bad luck in entering the labour market during years of economic crisis, predicting not only temporary discomfort but also long-term consequences such as lower future wages and distrust of the political and economic system (International Labour Organization, 2011: 6). Yet, it is not only the contemporary circumstances with the economic crisis and its aftermath fuelling pessimistic predictions about the life chances of today's young Europeans, but also long-term trends that predated the recent recession. Among those are tightening youth labour markets and heightened competition for graduate jobs (Furlong, 2015). The experience of the economic crisis for a whole generation of labour market entrants becomes even more visible when comparing to older generations. Starting with the post-war generation, who experienced a constant economic upswing, the structural change and massive educational expansion made upward social mobility the most likely experience for most people in decades. With the recent economic recession and the completion of higher education for a majority of citizens, governments and citizens – for the first time in decades – have expressed fears of the current young generation ending up worse off than their parents' generation (Eurofound, 2017). Linked to this is the fear of a whole generation becoming lost by getting trapped in a spiral of poverty and exclusion.

Against this pessimistic background, this thesis sets out to improve our understanding of social and political consequences of today's young Europeans' mobility experience, where young Europeans are defined by the age group up to 35. In contrast to the predominantly labour-market-oriented research on young Europeans today, this thesis takes a different perspective by explicitly putting today's intergenerational mobility experience

of young Europeans into focus. More specifically, I will start by analysing the status quo of intergenerational mobility today, capturing various dimensions of intergenerational social mobility such as educational mobility, economic mobility and expected mobility.

Taking this analysis of intergenerational upward and downward mobility of young Europeans as a starting point, subsequent analyses will focus on potential risks associated with intergenerational downward mobility and the chances of intergenerational upward mobility, respectively. Potential consequences I investigate include well-being outcomes like life-satisfaction, self-reported general health and psychological distress as well as political consequences, like normative welfare state attitudes. The subsequent chapters will furthermore show that the investigation of mobility consequences is a very long-standing research objective in social stratification research with lots of questions unresolved despite its long tradition. In this vein, the investigation of young Europeans' intergenerational mobility is not only relevant to the pressing sociopolitical consequences described earlier, but also from an academic point of view.

Before coming to basic debates and the state-of-the-art findings of social mobility research in Europe, I will first provide a short introduction of key concepts in social mobility research, lay out the topic's relevance from a political, economic and social point of view and briefly describe the research objectives, and research design of this thesis. The introduction will then conclude with an outline of chapters.

1.1 What is social mobility? An introduction to key concepts

Social mobility can be approached and investigated in various forms. For example, social mobility studies can be divided into two broad types of studies, which differ in the definition of their baseline, i.e. the starting point from where mobility is assessed. Studies on *inter*generational mobility investigate the relationship between people's current circumstances and those from which they originated. The study of the relationship between parental class position and an individual's current class position would be one example for these kinds of studies. In contrast, studies of *intra*generational mobility refer to social mobility over an individual's life course. A typical approach would be to measure career

mobility from the first job to a state of occupational maturity.[1] Yet despite the importance of distinguishing those two types of mobility studies, intragenerational mobility has to be considered a part of intergenerational mobility (Diaz-Bone and Weischer, 2015: 273f.). In this thesis, the focus will be on intergenerational mobility of young Europeans from a country comparative perspective.

Aside from their reference point, social mobility studies typically differ in the respective dimension of life they investigate, depending on the discipline and research interest. For example, sociologists typically focus on *mobility across social class* and *occupation*, whereas economists typically analyse the economic dimensions of *mobility in the form of income, wage, or earnings mobility*.[2] It is important to note that the choice of one or the other mobility dimension will be decisive for the research results. Beller and Hout (2006a: 22), for example, emphasise that '[a]nalyses of occupational mobility and analyses of income mobility provide different pictures of people's prospects, because they ask different questions'. Saunders (2010: 34f.) similarly stresses that class mobility and income mobility capture completely different things. Class mobility serves as a very broad indicator of people's life chances compared to income mobility, because it captures various aspects of life like, e.g., earnings, employment security, retirement pensions, education, cultural capital, economic assets, health, self-esteem, and authority. Moreover, class is considered to give a more reliable picture of long-term life prospects since it tends to be more constant than income.

But not only do perspectives and underlying research questions differ between class and income mobility – methodological implications do, too. To name just one example, measuring intergenerational mobility is oftentimes only possible by using occupational class mobility, since past income data are hard to remember and scarcely available. In contrast, using income as a mobility indicator does offer quite some advantages. It is easily measurable and understandable, and statistical tools for analysing income data, i.e. real

[1] Occupational maturity is considered to be reached in an individual's mid-thirties (Bukodi and Goldthorpe, 2011).
[2] For an overview on sociological literature, see e.g., Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) and Breen (2004a); for an overview on economics literature, see e.g., Solon (1999), Björklund and Jäntti (2009) and Black and Devereux (2011).

numbers instead of categories, are strong. However, social desirability and recall problems when it comes to past incomes (even worse in the case of having to recall one's parents' income) may introduce serious measurement error (Saunders, 2010).

Both the income and class mobility literature emphasise the role of education as a transmission mechanism for income and class mobility. Therefore, *educational mobility* is another important mobility dimension investigated by both disciplines. It is a widespread concept that may under certain circumstances be more easily measurable than occupation or income mobility. For example, information on parental educational levels may be much easier to recall for respondents compared to parental income. Information on current educational attainment may also be easier to collect than income and occupation, since income data is generally hard to collect (due to social desirability issues) and not every person has an occupation. Educational mobility has the big advantage of being measurable for those that do not currently have or never had a job, particularly young people who have not yet finished the transition from school-to-work.

Young people without current or previous income due to their unemployment and early stage of career are very hard to classify in terms of occupational or income mobility. For example, for occupational mobility, mobility researchers recommend to either leave out the unemployed from mobility analyses, assume them to occupy the lowest occupational class, or classify them based on their previous job (Rose and Harrison, 2010).

Either of these alternatives is unsatisfactory. Excluding the young unemployed from mobility analyses is not an option when research questions refer exactly to this age group. Assuming them to occupy the lowest occupational class would treat all unemployed equally, regardless of their very diverse chances of re-integration into the labour market and the associated life chances (such as, e.g., subjective well-being or health). And classifying the young unemployed according to their previous job is not applicable for those who have never held a job before. Especially for today's young generation in Europe, a classification into income or occupational mobility categories may be more problematic than ever with youth unemployment rates at unprecedented, high levels and the accompanying delayed transitions to the labour market.

In light of the aforementioned arguments, I argue that educational mobility constitutes the measurement instrument of choice for intergenerational mobility of young Europeans today. However, I do also acknowledge the limitations and disadvantages of this concept. Comparability of educational levels across countries is a difficult task and posits a huge challenge for comparative research on educational mobility. Comparative research on educational mobility crucially depends on a comparable measurement of educational attainment. This thesis will therefore rely on a validated and cross-nationally tested framework of educational attainment measurement in order to tackle this challenge.

Besides the actual mobility dimension, distinguishing between *absolute* and *relative mobility* belongs to the key concepts of social mobility. Absolute mobility reveals patterns of movement between class of origin and destination and is normally based on a mobility table depicting a cross-tabulation of social origin and destination. Absolute mobility occurs if the class structure changes between two points of time due to war or structural change. For example, the declining demand for jobs in the agricultural sector due to industrialisation during the 20th century forced a lot of people to be mobile, meaning that absolute mobility is dependent from the marginal distribution of the mobility table. In contrast, relative mobility refers to the chances of an individual belonging to a certain category of social origin to reach a specific destination relative to individuals with a different social origin. It is thus independent from the marginal distribution of social classes and independent from changes in the occupational structure. Breen (2010b: 417f.) illustrates the difference between relative versus absolute mobility in a concrete example:

> 'Suppose that my father was a clerk and that I am a manager: then, in absolute terms I have been upwardly mobile. But suppose that, in my father's generation, being a clerk gave him a class position that was better than half of the population, whereas, in my generation, being a manager puts me in a position which is better than, say, 40 per cent of the population. Then, in relative terms I have been downwardly mobile because my rank is worse than my father's.'

Breen's example shows how 'pure exchange mobility' (Morgan, 2006: 5) gives insight into the association between class of origin and destination, whereas absolute mobility allows for insights in the degree of openness of a society net of differences in the occupational structure (Breen, 2004a: 3f.; Diaz-Bone and Weischer, 2015: 273f.). This

openness is frequently referred to as social fluidity, or 'the extent to which the chances of access to class positions are equally or unequally distributed' (Breen, 2004a: 4).

In addition to the distinction between relative versus absolute mobility, total mobility additionally divides into *vertical* and *horizontal mobility*, which refers to the evaluation of an individuals' class destination in comparison to the class of origin. If origin and destination are equivalent in prestige, income or whatever dimension the status comparison is based on, I speak of horizontal mobility. If, however, the destination status is considered higher (upward mobility) or lower (downward mobility) than the origin status, I speak of vertical mobility. Social mobility studies predominantly focus on the latter kind of mobility, since upward and downward mobility are directly connected to an improvement or deterioration of life chances (Diaz-Bone and Weischer, 2015: 275). In the case of intergenerational downward mobility, another frequently used term is *counter-mobility*, meaning a 'work-life movement which has the effect of returning an individual back to his class of origin, following some initial shift away on his entry into employment' (Goldthorpe and Llewellyn, 1977: 274). To give an example of counter-mobility, someone who is downwardly mobile, e.g. because he or she fails to reproduce the parental level of education, can be expected to show extra effort in terms of occupational mobility over his or her life course and thereby catch up with those who kept their parents' level of education (Diewald, Schulz and Baier, 2015).

Another important conceptual difference in social mobility research is the distinction between *actual mobility* (based on the measurement of an objective difference between parental and child situation) and *perceived mobility* (based on the subjective perception of intergenerational change in status). Previous research (Kelley and Kelley, 2009) shows that the perception of moving upward or downward is important on top of the actual movement up- or down the social ladder. Mobility consequences are influenced by people's perceptions, even when controlling for actual mobility (Kelley and Kelley, 2009) and will therefore be included in the analyses of mobility consequences as far as possible.

Finally, there is one portrayal commonly used to illustrate the social mobility process and its underlying mechanisms, which should not be failed to mention: the so-called origin-education-destination (OED) triangle, which presents how social origin and destination are related through a direct and an indirect pathway. The indirect pathway illustrates that

an individual's educational attainment is strongly associated with one's social origin and that an individual's destination is in turn dependent on educational attainment. However, in addition to this indirect pathway from origin to destination mediated by education, there is another direct link between social origin and destination (see, e.g., Goldthorpe, 2014).

To conclude, we have seen that social mobility can be investigated from completely different angles, including:

- intergenerational vs. intra-generational (= life-course) mobility,
- horizontal vs. vertical (= upward and downward) mobility,
- absolute (= observed) vs. relative mobility (= net of structural change),
- actual (= objective) vs. perceived (= subjective) mobility, and
- economic vs. occupational vs. educational mobility.

Furthermore, the OED triangle depicts the direct and indirect pathway from social origin to destination with education as an important mediator between social origin and destination. Having laid out the different key concepts including their underlying aims as well as advantages and disadvantages, the remainder of this thesis will focus on *inter*generational, *vertical,* and *absolute* mobility.[3] It will make use of indicators of past mobility experiences (in particular, educational and economic mobility) as well as expected mobility experiences for the future.[4]

1.2 The political, economic and social relevance of social mobility

It comes as no surprise that the topic of social mobility has attracted lasting interest among social scientists for decades. For various reasons, it can be considered relevant from a political, economic and social perspective. At the same time, it should be noted that it is not a purely academic interest that is driving research on social mobility, but that social mobility in recent years – despite rarely being mentioned explicitly in policy debates –

[3] Having defined the focus of this thesis, I will use the terms 'intergenerational mobility' and 'social mobility' as synonyms throughout the remainder of this thesis.
[4] More details about the indicators used can be found in Chapter 4.

has also emerged as an important field of action for policymakers on different levels (Eurofound, 2017). One example is the aim of fostering social cohesion by improving chances of social mobility, a topic pushed by both the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and European Union (EU) (OECD, 2011; Council of Europe, 2010). For example, the 'New Strategy and Council of Europe Action Plan for Social Cohesion approved by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 7 July 2010' explicitly requests member states to promote social mobility as an essential part of their bigger aim of social cohesion:

> 'With regard to building a secure future for all, member states are invited to […] make special additional provisions – particularly *policies for the promotion of social mobility for all – to support young people in disadvantaged situations.*'(Council of Europe, 2010: 10; emphasis added)

As for another example, social mobility had already attracted the interest of EU policymakers when the European Commission designated the year 2006 as the 'European Year of Workers' Mobility', stressing the importance of labour market and occupational mobility for the enlarged EU (see, e.g., Bukodi and Róbert, 2006). Since then, fuelled by citizens' and governments' increasing concern of younger generations having – for the first time in decades – fewer chances of upward mobility, the increasing interest and growing public debate on social mobility also urged the EU to initiate several research projects on the topic (see, e.g., Eurofound, 2017; Nunn, 2012; Bukodi and Róbert, 2006). Not least, fostering social mobility is also included as an essential part of the Europe 2020 strategy since one of the European Commission's top priorities is to ensure equality of opportunity for all throughout the life cycle (Eurofound, 2017). In light of this, the European Commission consultation for the European Pillar of Social Rights identified various factors that are considered barriers to achieving equal opportunities and promoting the widening inequalities. Among those are unequal access to childcare, education, and health (Eurofound, 2017).

Besides this interest on the supra-national level, the topic also gained substantial attention on the national level. For example in Britain, social mobility is currently a highly debated topic both in academia and in politics. Bukodi *et al.* (2014: 1) name 'social mobility […]

now a matter of greater political concern in Britain than at any time previously'. As another example, in Germany, media attention fuels fears of an end to upward mobility by warnings of a downward elevator effect (Storost, 2014).[5]

But why is social mobility such a much-discussed topic both for academics and politicians? A brief look at its political, economic, and social relevance might answer this question. The political and social relevance of social mobility are closely related and derive from the close connection of concepts like intergenerational mobility, intergenerational persistence of life outcomes, the intergenerational transmission of advantages and disadvantages, and equality of opportunities. An open society reflects the fact that individual life chances do not (only) depend on social origin, i.e. they are not determined by birth. It was Sorokin (1927) who almost a century ago established a strong relationship between social mobility and democracy when he argued that democratic societies do not determine the social positions of individuals by birth. Open societies allow individuals to influence their life chances and outcomes by talent, motivation, and luck (Blanden and Machin, 2005: 2). Other scholars stress that the possibility of moving up the social ladder is also a requirement for modern industrial societies, a significant indicator of individual freedom and therefore an important political goal itself (Róbert, 2010: 523). Social mobility can therefore be considered an indicator of social fairness and equal opportunities. However, this political goal of equal opportunities does not necessarily imply the equality of outcomes. The political goal refers more to the aim of ensuring a level playing field (d'Addio, 2007).

A fairly normative debate revolves about this level playing field and the question of the 'right' degree of intergenerational mobility. No society is perfectly mobile or immobile and the question of the 'right' degree of mobility is hard to determine since some degree of persistence is certainly desirable and accepted. Parents transmit a whole range of 'assets' to their children, among them being genes, wealth, material resources, social capital, knowledge, aspirations, and preferences. The joint distribution of these assets will most likely be unequal across a population, and from a social justice or fairness perspective,

[5] Original quote translated by the author: 'Downwards with the elevator […] the times of upward social mobility are long gone' (Storost, 2014: 1).

there is general consensus on the need to compensate individuals for some kinds of disadvantageous positions (Roemer, 2012). Roemer, an expert in the field of social justice and equality of opportunity research – argues that the differential transmission of economic resources and the lack of knowledge transmission are examples of cases where compensation of a disadvantageous starting point is probably undisputed. Here, the state, respectively the school system, is in charge of compensation for initial disadvantages. In addition to that, Roemer considers it undisputed that schools are in charge of countering the parental transmission of falsely pessimistic aspirations or that the state somehow has to compensate for a parental lack of social capital. However, he admits that it is highly disputable how much the state should interfere in the transmission of genes and preferences. Compensation for an 'unlucky genetic draw' (Roemer, 2012: 483), especially with regard to those genes responsible for cognitive and non-cognitive abilities, raises two problematic issues. Roemer (2012) argues that first, genes can constitute a comparative advantage. From an efficiency perspective, each individual should pursue an occupation that corresponds to his or her abilities in order to raise the total output of a society.

Following this perspective, compensation for 'bad genetic luck' seems inefficient. He suggests that second, from a self-ownership viewpoint, it could also be argued that each person should have the right to benefit from his or her comparative advantage. But this would clearly depend on one's overall understanding of social justice and thus remains a normative question. Concerning preferences and values, Roemer argues further, a distinction between legitimate and non-legitimate preferences and values would be necessary in order to decide in favour or against interference into the transmission process. Whereas certain preferences like e.g. sexist or racist ones are desirable to be countered, he considers it a rather a normative question if the transmission of occupational preferences with its non-negligible consequences on future income and status is legitimate or not.

Whereas 'parents who are teachers may instill in their children a desire to be teachers, and bankers may transmit to their children the desire to earn high incomes […] [t]he extent to which coal miners instill in their children the preference for coal mining […] [based on their belief that] no other occupation is available to them should be compensated, because it is really a low and incorrect aspiration, but to the extent that it is because they love the coal-mining culture, it is a true preference' (Roemer, 2012: 486) and would

therefore be legitimate. In this vein, Roemer (2012: 487) puts forward a plea for recognizing 'the legitimacy of parents' transmitting to their children a variety of values, some of which will doubtless affect the children's material achievements'. His rather radical conclusion in case society does not assent to this view is that otherwise we could just as well dissolve families and raise children collectively. Against this background, it becomes clear that the 'right' degree of intergenerational transmission and mobility is not easy to determine while at the same time, a perfectly mobile or immobile society also does not seem to be desirable.

Aside from this political goal of equality of opportunities, there is also a relevant social policy perspective of intergenerational mobility and two different angles that underline the relevance of the issue. First, some scholars argue that social policy should try to break cycles of disadvantages across generations and thus 'prevent the development of a self-replicating underclass' (d'Addio, 2007: 70). Having the possibility to climb the social ladder by means of personal effort is a central factor in this context. On the other hand, preventing intergenerational downward mobility appears to be equally important, be it in terms of preventing the fall itself, or (similarly important) in terms of preventing negative consequences of downward mobility. One very important factor in this context is the labour market status in the sense that temporary breaks in an employment history and problems in entering the labour market for the first time must not turn out as permanent scars (translating in downward mobility) but stay temporary blemishes. Social policy is in charge thereof, in order to secure individual and public welfare.

Lastly, also the economic relevance of social mobility is not negligible. The central argument in this respect refers to ensuring economic efficiency such that the allocation of talents should be optimal. Accordingly, it is argued that only if the matching of employers and employees depends on achieved rather than ascribed characteristics, then an individuals' human capital and talent is fully utilized. Thereby, opportunities of social mobility also relate to economic efficiency and economic growth. Besides that, social mobility is also related to productivity effects. More specifically, the OECD argues that an inequality of opportunities might lead to adverse productivity effects if the missing possibility to influence one's life chances by individual effort impacts people's motivation, effort, and

productivity. This way, a lack of mobility prospects might adversely affect the overall efficiency and growth potential of the economy (OECD, 2010: 184).

In sum, it becomes clear that social mobility in the form of intergenerational mobility is a very relevant topic from a political, social and economic perspective. Lasting, respectively growing interest by both social scientists and policymakers demonstrates that there is a high awareness of the significance of the topic, but also underlines the necessity to contribute to previous research.

1.3 Research objectives

Having laid out the relevance of the overall research objective, social mobility, I will now give a brief account of the more specific research objectives that will be investigated in this thesis. The present thesis aims to contribute to the understanding of how the experience of intergenerational mobility shapes social and political outcomes of individuals. More specifically, and in the language of an empirically working social scientist, this thesis is centred on the independent variable social mobility. It focuses on the consequences of different dimensions of intergenerational mobility such as educational mobility, economic mobility, and expectations of future mobility. These consequences can be divided into two dimensions: the social dimension, operationalised as the analysis of well-being effects of social mobility, and the political dimension, operationalised as the analysis of the association between social mobility and normative welfare state support.

In order to arrive at a comprehensive account of this main research objective, several minor objectives are pursued. The *first research objective* is to establish an overview of basic debates and the state-of-the art findings of social mobility research in Europe. To this end, I will outline central hypotheses of the social mobility literature and summarise respective findings of earlier studies.

The *second research objective* is to depict the status quo of intergenerational mobility of young Europeans today. Using different survey data sources, and mobility indicators (in particular, educational mobility, economic mobility, and expected mobility), I will provide an overview of the distribution of upward mobility, downward mobility and non-

mobility among young Europeans. These analyses serve as a baseline for the subsequent analyses of mobility consequences since it is crucial to have an idea of the distribution of movements along the socioeconomic ladder before moving on to the analysis of consequences thereof. Only when the extent of intergenerational movements directed upward or downward is assessed is it possible to assess the impact of mobility.

The *third research objective* is to introduce the state-of-the art methodology suitable for the empirical analysis of mobility consequences. In this context, I will illustrate the methodological challenge of disentangling mobility effects from level effects, such as social origin and social destination. Features and findings of conventional regression approaches will be contrasted with those of diagonal reference models, thereby emphasising the need to rely on a suitable analytical approach when interested in 'net' mobility effects, i.e. mobility effects over and above the effects that arriving or stemming from a low or high status position has.

The *fourth research objective* is then to empirically analyse how the experience of social mobility shapes young Europeans' well-being in the form of life satisfaction, self-reported general health, and psychological distress in a country comparative perspective. To this end, I depict a newly developed theoretical framework (see Schuck and Steiber, 2018) for deriving not only individual-level hypotheses, but also macro-level hypotheses on context-specific differences in mobility effects. In particular, this theoretical framework relies on typologies of welfare regimes, their institutional setup and other indicators of countries' social and economic statuses, which are arguably influential with respect to their effects on social mobility.

The *fifth and last research objective* is to empirically investigate how the experiences and expectations of social mobility, both upward and downward, impact young people's attitudes of normative support for the welfare state. As I will argue, it is especially the association between mobility and the normative dimension of welfare state support that can be expected to differ from other welfare support dimensions, since the experience of social mobility might relativise the importance of material self-interest as a determinant of normative welfare state attitudes. Drawing from different strands of literature, I investigate two sets of competing hypotheses based on the assumption that either self-interest

or factors beyond self-interest determine the young people's normative welfare state support.

1.4 Research design and outline of chapters

In order to pursue the five research objectives previously mentioned, this thesis follows an integrated research design. It is based on the empirical analysis of survey data, namely the European Social Survey Rounds 4 – 8 (ESS ERIC, 2017), and the CUPESSE two-generation survey (Tosun *et al.,* 2018).

The analytical approach is based on intergenerational mobility as a central independent variable, and relies on different operationalisations of mobility such as intergenerational educational mobility, intergenerational economic mobility (both indicators of past mobility experiences), and mobility expectations for the future. Central outcome dimensions of this thesis can be differentiated into social and political outcomes. Hereby, the former refers to well-being effects of intergenerational mobility in terms of life satisfaction, self-reported general health, as well as psychological distress. The latter dimension refers to the analyses of attitudinal effects of social mobility. In particular, what shall be subsumed under the 'political dimension' refers to the association between social mobility and normative attitudes toward the welfare state. As far as the theoretical framework focuses on and suggests cross-country differences in mobility effects, I rely on a country-comparative approach (see Chapters 4 and 5). Furthermore, this thesis combines both descriptive and multivariate analyses of the phenomenon of interest, thus aiming to arrive at a comprehensive picture of the overall research objective, social mobility.

This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Following the introduction, the *second chapter* draws an overall picture of basic debates and previous findings in social mobility research. More specifically, it first describes the variation of social mobility rates over time and between countries and continues with the role of context variables for chances of upward mobility and risks of downward mobility. The chapter concludes with a critical discussion of the effects of comparing evidence based on different mobility dimensions (income mobility vs. class mobility, in particular).

The *third chapter* is then concerned with the description of the survey data and statistical methods used in the empirical analysis of the remaining chapters. It presents the different survey data used in the analyses and discusses the advantages and limitations thereof. Not least, it presents and discusses diagonal reference models, which will be used in Chapters 5 and 6 for the analysis of mobility effects.

The *fourth chapter* turns to the descriptive analysis of the status quo of intergenerational mobility of young Europeans. It illustrates the cross-country variation in intergenerational educational mobility, intergenerational economic mobility, and mobility expectations for the future among young Europeans. The description is followed by an excursus on the congruence of past mobility experiences and expectations for the future.

The *fifth chapter* concentrates on the statistical analysis of the association between intergenerational educational mobility and individual well-being. After having established the theoretical framework, the respective micro- and macro-level hypotheses are consequently tested in statistical analyses of European Social Survey data.

The *sixth* chapter then turns to the statistical analysis of the association between intergenerational mobility and normative attitudes toward the welfare state. Relying on two different data sources (European Social Survey (ESS ERIC, 2017) and CUPESSE two-generation survey (Tosun *et al.,* 2018), this chapter integrates the analysis of several dimensions of intergenerational mobility and their effects on normative welfare state attitudes.

The *seventh and concluding chapter* finally summarises the empirical findings, acknowledges the limitations of the here-applied research approach and reflects on the implications of the analysis for current debates and future research.

2 Social mobility research in Europe: Basic debates and state-of-the art

Research on social mobility, especially from a cross-country comparative perspective, has a long tradition. For decades, social scientists have investigated empirically how social mobility developed over time and varied between countries. Investigating consequences of mobility in a comparative approach naturally has to build on this foundation, even if trends over time and cross-country differences are not per se the focus of this thesis. However, this short introduction of basic debates and empirical evidence in social mobility research will help the reader in subsequent chapters, when I come back to theoretical expectations and evidence of previous research.

The starting point for this review will be empirical studies on trends in intergenerational social mobility in Europe with particular emphasis on variation over time and countries in Europe. Subsequently, the role of contextual factors on the macro-level will be described. The chapter will then conclude with a brief summary.

2.1 Variation between countries and over time

One of the central questions in social mobility research has long been the extent of cross-country differences in social mobility as well as the development of these patterns over time (see, e.g., Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992; Ganzeboom, Luijkx and Treiman, 1989; Grusky and Hauser, 1984; Lipset and Bendix, 1959). Among others, two theoretical approaches that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s gained particular importance in the sense that they had a lasting impact on empirical research and the scientific debate: trendless approaches and the corresponding *'Featherman Jones Hauser (FJH) hypothesis'* versus the liberal theory of industrialism and the corresponding *'modernisation hypothesis'*.

Among the proponents of trendless approaches, the first one is known as the Lipset-Zetterberg (LZ) theory. It claims that '*the overall pattern of social mobility appears to be much the same in the industrial societies of various Western countries'* (Lipset and Zetterberg, 1959: 13; emphasis in original). Based on the comparison of mobility tables of a dozen different countries, Lipset and Zetterberg concluded that the degree of intergenerational mobility in industrial societies is rather similar and shows little variation over time. While their hypothesis basically predicts stable mobility rates for industrialised

countries, they acknowledge some kind of threshold effect with higher mobility rates for industrialised compared to pre-industrialised countries. Apart from that, they expect little variation both across time and across countries. However, their hypothesis is restricted to absolute mobility rates, which strongly depend on the occupational structure of a country. With later generations of social mobility researchers acknowledging this fact by shifting their attention to relative mobility rates, Lipset and Zetterberg's hypothesis became the subject of increasing criticism (see, e.g., Featherman, Jones and Hauser, 1975).

Featherman, Jones and Hauser called the LZ-thesis into question, suggesting that variation in total mobility rates might rather result from changes in the occupational structures than due to differences in the movements between occupations. Considering the LZ-thesis 'falsified' (1975: 340), they suggested similar patterns concerning relative mobility, i.e. invariant mobility chances as long as changes in origin and destination distributions are controlled for. In what became known as the FJH-hypothesis,[6] they argue that 'the genotypical pattern of mobility (circulation mobility) in industrial societies with a market economy and a nuclear family system is basically the same. The phenotypical pattern of mobility (observed mobility) differs according to the rate of change in the occupational structure, exogenously determined (as far as an individual family is concerned)' (Featherman, Jones and Hauser, 1975: 340). In other words, the FJH hypothesis shifted attention away from absolute towards relative mobility rates and suggested that there are no differences in relative mobility rates, neither over time nor between countries.

The liberal theory of industrialism, which is often linked to functionalist sociologists like Parsons (1960) and Kerr *et al.* (1960), and was later advanced by important contributions from Blau and Duncan (1967), and Treiman (1970), directly contradicts the previously described trendless approaches. It argues that economic development, i.e. above all, the transition from a pre-industrial to an industrial society, will lead to increasing relative mobility rates, even if structural changes are accounted for. According to the logic of industrialism, the transition from pre-industrial to industrial societies will require a process of rationalisation and thus lead to a more meritocratic society. In particular, industrialisation is argued to lead to high rates of social mobility, with upward mobility

[6] The FJH hypothesis is also called 'common social fluidity' hypothesis (see, e.g., Ganzeboom, Luijkx and Treiman, 1989).

predominating downward mobility, equality of mobility opportunities, and increasing trends for both mobility and equality of opportunity degrees (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992: 5). The underlying reasoning is based on the assumption that the intensifying competition among employers will lead to greater emphasis on merit in allocating people into positions in the labour market. Thereby, achieved rather than ascribed characteristics will be decisive for individual recruitment decisions, and thus strengthen the role of educational attainment for determining one's class destination (Breen, 2004b: 5). This line of argumentation is also known as the *'increased merit selection hypothesis'* (Jonsson, 1996).

The existing evidence is far from straightforward with regard to these contradicting theoretical arguments. Yet, one of the few aspects where mobility research has come to a consensus is the invalidation of the LZ-hypothesis, which happened repeatedly and relatively soon after its publication (Broom and Jones, 1969; Hazelrigg and Garnier, 1976; Hazelrigg, 1974; Miller, S. M., 1960). It turned out to be impossible to find a certain level of industrialisation where mobility rates would show no between-country differences. Moreover, as demonstrated in the replacement of the LZ-hypothesis by the FJH-hypothesis, the fact that absolute mobility rates depend on the occupational structure of a given society was acknowledged in later theoretical predictions.

Concerning the rivalling FJH and modernisation hypotheses, the few studies that provide a large-scale, comparative analysis of industrial societies come to different conclusions. The first of these large-scale studies, which is considered pioneer work still today, was already conducted in the mid-1980s and titled the 'Comparative Analysis of Social Mobility in Industrial Nations (CASMIN)', directed by Müller, Goldthorpe, and Erikson (see, Müller and Goldthorpe, 1988). Here, Erikson and Goldthorpe used cross-sectional data from nine European countries from the late 1960s and early or mid-1970s (plus supplementary analyses for six more countries with shorter observation periods). Their cross-country comparative operationalisation of concepts like e.g. the Erikson, Goldthorpe, Portocarero (EGP) class scheme or the CASMIN educational scheme had an ongoing impact on social mobility research up to today[7] and its main findings have been summarised in

[7] For a presentation of the EGP class scheme, see, e.g., Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992). For a presentation of the CASMIN scheme, see, e.g., König, Lüttinger and Müller (1988).

Erikson and Goldthorpe's 'The Constant Flux: A Study of Class Mobility in Industrial Societies' (1992). Their main conclusion is one of basic similarity among industrial societies, thus replacing the FJH thesis of no trend by the assumption of a common, or at least a very similar pattern of social mobility. Cross-national differences, which they do find are attributed to reflecting 'effects specific to particular societies at particular times' (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992: 388), are therefore not regarded as contradictory to the FJH thesis. Based on their findings in favour of FJH, they proposed a slightly amended version of the FJH hypothesis which reads as follows: 'a basic similarity will be found in patterns of social fluidity […] across all nations with market economics and nuclear family systems *where no sustained attempts have been made to use the power of a modern state apparatus in order to modify the processes, or the outcomes of the processes, through which class inequalities are produced and intergenerationally reproduced*' (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1987: 162; emphasis in original). The possibility of political intervention shaping the chances of intergenerational mobility is an important extension of the FJH hypothesis with which Erikson and Goldthorpe aimed to fill a major omission. Erikson and Goldthorpe's conclusion of basic similarity in industrial societies was later challenged based on the grounds that the analysis of age groups was found unsound for the analysis of cohort changes. For example, Breen and Jonsson (1997) particularly criticised the measurement error associated with the measurement of class origin for older age groups.

The basic similarity or FJH hypotheses has, however, been challenged by others who found support for the modernisation hypothesis. For example, the comparative analysis of 149 intergenerational class mobility tables in 35 countries by Ganzeboom, Luijkx and Treiman (1989) found substantively important cross-national variation in the origin-destination association. More specifically, although they found similar mobility patterns, 'at the same time there are substantial cross-national and cross-temporal differences in the *extent* of mobility' (Ganzeboom, Luijkx and Treiman, 1989: 47; emphasis in original). Their findings thus contradict the FJH hypothesis of common social fluidity and instead support the modernisation hypothesis. More specifically, their finding of an annual reduction of approximately one percent in the strength of the association between class origin and destination indicates a trend towards increasing social fluidity over time. However, their results have subsequently been called into question for data quality problems

and model choice (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992) as well as lacking replicability of the general trend towards increasing social fluidity (Wong, 1994).

More recent evidence from a large-scale comparative study on eleven countries by Breen (2004a) indeed finds a common pattern of social fluidity, yet with considerable differences in their strengths. Based on these findings, they reject the FJH hypothesis as well as Erikson and Goldthorpe's hypothesis of basic similarity. They also find a decline in the intergenerational association of origin and destination, yet only for some countries.

Despite these diverging results regarding theoretical expectations on the development of social fluidity over time and between countries, it was never disputed that there are statistically significant variations in social fluidity (Beller and Hout, 2006b). Rather, the dispute revolved around the question of whether these differences were substantial, or systematic, and if they were worth discussing after all. After several generations of social mobility research, consensus has now been reached that cross-country differences in the degree of social fluidity are substantial. While some countries are relatively open, allowing for upward mobility of those from less privileged backgrounds (e.g., countries with socialist and social democratic welfare regimes, and countries with better educated labour forces (Beller and Hout, 2006b)), others show more closed class structures and/ or hierarchies with greater barriers for intergenerational mobility (Breen, 2004a; Hout and DiPrete, 2006). However, it remains unclear how exactly these cross-national differences in the degree of intergenerational mobility can be explained. Some argue in favour of differences being idiosyncratic, i.e. stemming from country-specific historical events and institutions (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992). Other scholars argue in favour of country-level characteristics of the economic and political systems as predictors for cross-national differences (see, e.g., Grusky and Hauser, 1984; Ganzeboom, Luijkx and Treiman, 1989).

2.2 The role of contextual variables

Previous mobility research offers various hypotheses on the relevance of macro-level factors for explaining national variation in intergenerational social mobility rates. Whereas the importance of economic development was recognised right from the beginning of comparative stratification research (Treiman, 1970; Lipset and Zetterberg, 1959), it took some time until the role of non-economic factors was considered. Grusky and Hauser

(1984) were among the first to emphasise the role of noneconomic variables and over the four generations of comparative stratification research, many contextual factors that could possibly influence rates of social mobility were proposed (see, e.g., Beller and Hout, 2006b; Pfeffer and Hällsten, 2012; Yaish and Andersen, 2012; Sieben and de Graaf, 2001). Above all, welfare regime types, equality of educational opportunity, income inequality and the distance between social classes have been proposed to be influential for a society's openness. In the following, these macro variables will be set in context with the underlying theoretical mechanisms linking them to cross-national differences in intergenerational mobility rates and a summary of the empirical evidence.

2.2.1 Economic development / industrialization / modernisation

By far the largest attention was paid to the relationship between economic development and social mobility rates which is commonly summarised in the industrialisation or modernisation hypothesis. Lipset and Zetterberg (1959) were among the first to stress the role of industrialisation for intergenerational mobility, arguing that absolute mobility rates are influenced by industrialisation and the accompanying change in the occupational structure. In contrast to Lipset and Zetterberg, Treiman (1970) argued that industrialisation was important not only for absolute but also relative intergenerational mobility rates. While he agreed with Lipset and Zetterberg on the association between the industrialisation process and absolute mobility rates, he furthermore suggested an increase in relative mobility rates, i.e., social openness. The underlying reasoning rests on the assumption that there was a historical shift from a stratification process based on ascription towards a stratification system based on achievement occuring along with increasing urbanisation, mass communication and industrialisation. In sum, proponents of the industrialisation hypothesis argue that the process of industrialisation will translate into a long-term decline in the strength of the association between social origin and destination.

However, the empirical investigation of these claims, which largely relies on economic development as the most important measure of industrialisation, has led to conflicting conclusions. The rising meritocracy hypothesis is questioned since 'findings […] are to a significant degree inconsistent with the temporal and cross-national regularities that would be expected under the functionalist theory' (Goldthorpe, 2014: 268). More specifically, the link between educational attainment and social destinations was actually found

to weaken instead of strengthen, i.e. educational attainment was becoming less closely related to an individual's social destination (thus contradicting the industrialisation hypothesis) (Breen, 2004a; Breen and Luijkx, 2004: 393). Furthermore, several studies lend support to the 'persisting inequality' thesis (see, e.g. Barone, 2009 for a review), questioning a weakening association between social origin and educational attainment. As for the overall association between origin and destination, there is evidence for a weakening tendency in some societies (Breen, 2004b; Breen and Luijkx, 2004: 385–90) but 'trendless fluctuation' in others (see, e.g., Falcon, 2012). Some studies find that economic development and mobility rates are unrelated (Hazelrigg and Garnier, 1976; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992; Breen and Luijkx, 2004). Others find a positive relationship between economic development and intergenerational mobility rates (Grusky and Hauser, 1984; Tyree, Semyonov and Hodge, 1979), yet others claim to find a positive, but nonlinear relationship (Yaish and Andersen, 2012; Featherman, Jones and Hauser, 1975; Lipset and Zetterberg, 1959). All in all, existing evidence can fairly be summarized as being inconclusive concerning the relationship between economic development and mobility rates.

2.2.2 Welfare regime type

The welfare regime type or state action in general constitute non-economic factors that are frequently brought forward in order to explain cross-national differences in social mobility rates. However, '[t]he link from government action to mobility remains one of the major unresolved issues in comparative stratification research' (Beller and Hout, 2006b: 353). Despite being 'natural bedfellows' (Tranby, 2006: 405), the two prominent strands of research – welfare state research on the one hand and social stratification and mobility research on the other hand – have long disregarded each other's findings. Given the long research tradition of both literatures, it is quite surprising that first steps towards integrating the social stratification and welfare state literature have been taken relatively late (see, e.g., Tranby, 2006).

How can state action and the welfare regime type theoretically influence the path from social origin to social destination? According to Beller and Hout (2006b), the state can influence the link between origins and destinations if two conditions are met. First, the state must successfully reduce the inequality of outcomes (above all, inequality of incomes, and inequality of educational opportunity). Second, the inequality of outcomes

must also affect mobility. Only if both conditions hold will the state be able to influence social mobility. As regards the influence of the state on the inequality of outcomes, the welfare state literature has clearly established that this holds true (see, e.g., Fischer *et al.,* 1996; Korpi, 2003). For example, the state can compensate for market-generated inequalities by either direct redistribution or via institutions that help redistribution indirectly, be it in the form of encouraging worker-employer cooperation or constraining hiring, promotion and compensation decisions and thereby creating a greater equality of outcomes (Beller and Hout, 2006b). As for the influence of inequality of outcomes and social mobility, this mechanism is far more difficult to establish and therefore disputed. Beller and Hout (2006b: 354) argue that institutions 'can hardly be expected to affect the association between parents' and contemporary workers' occupations'. The underlying reasoning is based on their assessment that wage setting institutions can in fact influence income inequality, but can hardly affect the existing distribution of employment.

Instead, what the state can do is, according to Beller and Hout, encourage the equality of educational opportunity by implementing educational policies. These can affect the degree of social mobility that is mediated by education. The direct link between social origin and destination in turn cannot be influenced by educational policies. If the bigger part of the association between social origin and destination is mediated through education, state action in the form of educational policy can make a major difference in fostering social mobility. For example, policies aiming at subsidized tuition fees for disadvantaged youths or the expansion of higher education might be possible means. If, on the other hand, the direct origin-destination-link plays the major role in the association of social origin and destination compared to the indirect origin-education-destination-link, then national differences in educational policies could hardly make a difference in cross-country social mobility variation.

Other scholars elaborate in more detail on the possible mechanisms of how state intervention might affect social mobility. Hadjar and Samuel (2015), e.g., refer to the general function of welfare states in terms of compensating for individual disadvantages, be it in terms of low educational level or low status. Tranby (2006) argues in favour of two distinct paths toward equality of opportunity: The social democratic strategy with its

generous social policies on the one hand, and the liberal strategy targeted at improving access to education on the other.

Esping-Andersen (2015) gets more specific in what government actions exactly influence the opportunity structure. He suggests the democratisation of the education system and female labour force participation to be the driving sources and draws attention to so-called marginal effects of policies. By that, Esping-Andersen stresses that the marginal value of a policy measure like child allowances for example might be far greater for low-income than for high-income families. Summary measures of intergenerational mobility might mask the non-linearity of mobility patterns, i.e. strong mobility effects are seen in the middle of a distribution, but hardly any down- or upward mobility forms the very top or bottom of distributions. Crettaz and Jacot (2014) argue in favour of a social policy effect on intergenerational mobility. According to their social investment perspective, early childhood education and care will promote intergenerational educational mobility (see also Esping-Andersen, 2002). However, they underline that 'the question may not so much be whether these policies can help, but rather under which conditions they have desirable effects' (Crettaz and Jacot, 2014: 660). In particular, they stress the importance of the quality of provided services and the coordination of policies (above all, the combination with policies reducing economic inequalities).

The theoretical reasoning depicted above suggests that social reforms play the major role in linking welfare states with intergenerational mobility. In 1971, Parkin had already formulated the socialist ideology hypothesis, asserting that countries with left-wing governments will have larger educational equality and occupational mobility due to policies to reduce social inequality (Parkin, 1971). In the same vein, various scholars hypothesised that social mobility is higher in societies with social democratic governments and former Communist societies (Yaish and Andersen, 2012; Sieben and de Graaf, 2001; Grusky and Hauser, 1984). It is argued that in those societies the state takes over important functions of the family. For example, parents might have less influence on their children's decisions if a substantial part of socialisation takes part outside the family (Sieben and de Graaf, 2001), (e.g., if children are in state-organized child care institutions). Using fairly similar theoretical reasoning, the role of social policy and political

regime is often subsumed under the role of the welfare regime type (see, e.g., Beller and Hout, 2006b).

Finally, another perspective to look at the role of welfare states in intergenerational mobility is associated with the role of insurances and incentives. DiPrete (2002) developped the idea of so-called 'mobility regimes', which he undermined by a conceptual model of different degrees of insurance against social risks. His comparative typology is based on institutional structures that promote the stability of household living conditions, including the influence of rates at which mobility-generating events occur, insurance against the potential results of adverse effects, taxation against the potential gains of positive effects, and the promotion of counter-mobility events such as, for example,re-employment. Since the provision of public insurance against major life-course risks can be considered a central aspect of modern welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1990), DiPrete (2002) sees a close connection between welfare states and mobility regimes. While DiPrete's model focuses on various types of insurance that affect the course of *intra*generational mobility, Pfeffer and Hällsten (2012) recently introduced a theoretical model for the comparative study of *inter*generational mobility that also relies on the role of insurance. It is argued that '[f]or the intergenerational case, the main mobility-inducing events are those structuring educational careers (entry, graduation, and drop-out) and labour market entry (school-to-work transitions)' (Pfeffer and Hällsten, 2012: 3). Thus, the welfare states provide different types of insurance that affect not only the course of intragenerational mobility, but also the process of intergenerational mobility.

How about the empirical evidence on the role of welfare regimes in explaining intergenerational mobility rates and cross-national differences in the association between social origin and destination? Several studies show that mobility rates tend to be highest in social democratic and post-Communist regimes, i.e. social democratic and post-Communist regimes foster a weaker origin-destination association (see, e.g., Grusky and Hauser, 1984; Sieben and de Graaf, 2001; Yaish and Andersen, 2012; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992; Breen, 2004a; Esping-Andersen, 2015). Conservative welfare regimes like Italy, Ireland, Austria, or Germany in comparison show a strong association between social origin and destination i.e. lower mobility rates. The liberal welfare states like the United Kingdom, France and the United States, take an intermediate position between the social democratic

and conservative welfare regimes (Beller and Hout, 2006b). It is therefore acknowledged that redistributive policies play an important role in fostering social mobility, whereas at the same time, the finding of high mobility rates in Israel or the Netherlands indicates that there must be other drivers, too (Breen and Jonsson, 2005: 233). Another important finding, in addition to this ranking of countries according to their welfare-regime-typical mobility rates, is that social and educational policy appear to interact, visible, for example, by the fact 'that the tendency for educational access to lower the origin–destination association is most pronounced in the liberal welfare setting where the association would otherwise be greatest' (Beller and Hout, 2006b: 354).

2.2.3 Education systems

Education is considered the most important determinant of class position (Breen, 2010a) and therefore a central driver of intergenerational mobility, both from a micro- as well as a macro-level of explanation. As already described earlier, there are two distinct pathways between social origin and destination. One is the direct link between social origin and destination. The other, indirect pathway is mediated by education. Previous research has identified two mechanisms that are important for the indirect influence of social origin on destination, i.e. the indirect pathway of the OED triangle, which is mediated by education. The first of those mechanisms is called *equalisation* and refers to decreasing inequality in educational attainment or more equality of educational opportunities (Breen, 2010a). Besides this first mechanism, it is increasingly acknowledged that it would be too restrictive to only focus on educational equalisation as driver of intergenerational mobility. Instead, the role of *educational expansion* as a distinct mechanism by which intergenerational mobility is influenced is stressed (Breen, 2010a).

As for the first mechanism of equalisation and its impact on intergenerational mobility, the underlying reasoning is that a decreasing influence of social origin on educational attainment (the so-called OE link) will translate into a decreasing overall influence of social origin on destination (OED link). But how can the link between social origin and educational attainment be weakened? It is frequently argued that the institutional structure of the educational system, in particular its degree of stratification and standardisation, are key drivers of inequality of educational opportunity (see, e.g., van de Werfhorst and Mijs,

2010). Stratification refers to the degree to which an education system differentiates educational opportunities at various educational levels (Allmendinger, 1989). What is commonly referred to as tracking or streaming of students is thought to have consequences on all levels of education. For example, parental guidance in choosing educational career paths is argued to have a much stronger impact in highly stratified education systems and thus might lead to stronger inequality in educational attainment (Pfeffer, 2008). The empirical evidence supports the assumption of highly stratified education systems leading to greater educational inequality (van de Werfhorst and Mijs, 2010; Pfeffer, 2008; Crettaz and Jacot, 2014). In addition to stratification, the standardisation of the education system, i.e. the degree to which the quality of education is defined as a nationwide standard (Allmendinger, 1989: 233), is also argued to impact educational inequality (van de Werfhorst and Mijs, 2010). Van de Werfhorst and Mijs (2010) recommend analysing the impact of both institutional features jointly, since they are related and may also interact. The empirical evidence, however, indicates that standardisation has no effect if stratification is taken into account (Pfeffer, 2008).

In addition to an equalisation of education, the massive increase in formal educational attainment during the last century, i.e., educational expansion, is also expected to affect the rates of intergenerational mobility. The underlying process is compositional, i.e. it holds true only if the educational expansion is combined with a three-way interaction between class origin, educational attainment, and class destination (Breen, 2010a). Put differently, if successive cohorts achieve higher educational levels and if the origin-destination association is weaker for high than for lower levels of education, then there will be a decrease of the gross association between origins and destinations. The logic behind this argument is that more and more people reach high levels of education where the association between social origin and destination is weaker. Therefore, the average OD link for the population as a whole will similarly weaken. Hout (1988) was the first to draw attention to the effects of an educational advancement of the labour force on social fluidity and Breen (2010a) extended his line of argumentation later. Concerning the empirical evidence, the existence of the three-way interaction between class origin, educational attainment, and class destination was found for France (Vallet, 2004), Sweden (Erikson and Jonsson, 1998), and Germany (Breen and Luijkx, 2007). The compositional effect was

found to positively impact social fluidity in Britain, Sweden, and Germany (Breen, 2010a).

2.2.4 Income inequality and the distance between social classes

Income inequality belongs to those macro-level factors that are much disputed in their role with regard to intergenerational mobility. Proponents of its mediating relationship between social origin and destination argue that large socioeconomic gaps between the lower and upper end of the social ladder may lead to lower rates of intergenerational mobility, since elites can and will have a higher motivation to protect the status quo and thus prevent intergenerational mobility (see, e.g., Tyree, Semyonov and Hodge, 1979). If income inequality is low, elites will see less necessity of ensuring their position by hindering mobility (Yaish and Andersen, 2012). It is therefore hypothesised that the distance between social classes will affect intergenerational mobility rates (Grusky and Hauser, 1984). Other scholars propose an opposing scenario by predicting a negative relationship between income inequality and social mobility based on incentive arguments. For example, Hout (2004: 971) states that '[t]he incentive to pursue mobility (either individually or collectively) is proportional to the amount of cross-sectional inequality. As inequality approaches zero, the payoff to mobility does too.' This argumentation is in line with liberal economists' and structural functional sociologists' view on the necessity of unequal rewards and inequality for the allocation of a society's best talented members to important social positions (see, e.g., Davis and Moore, 1945). Empirical evidence is not straightforward as to what line of argumentation holds true. There are some studies that find a positive relationship between mobility and inequality (Grusky and Hauser, 1984; Breen and Luijkx, 2004), whereas others find the opposite (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992; Andrews and Leigh, 2009).

To conclude, what does the literature tell us on macro-level determinants of social mobility? Some scholars argue that economic development goes along with a development from stratification based on ascription towards stratification based on achievement, yet the jury is still out on if this assumption holds true. Furthermore, previous studies argue for higher mobility rates being associated with welfare regime types that offer redistributive policies, equality of (educational) opportunity, a strong role of the state in originally familial functions (like e.g., child-care) and the insurance of major life-course risks (such

as e.g., unemployment). Equality of opportunity, especially with regard to educational attainment (i.e., above all, less stratified systems) seems to enhance mobility prospects. And finally, social inequality is argued to be conducive (incentive effects) or preventive (status-protection motivation of elites) with the empirical evidence being still inconclusive. Against this background, it appears all the more important and interesting to put not only the analyses of intergenerational mobility itself, but also the analyses of mobility consequences in a comparative perspective.

2.3 Different approaches – different results: income vs. class mobility

Intergenerational mobility is a research topic that attracts and has attracted interest from various disciplines in social science. Among others, it is studied by both sociologists and economists and as mentioned before, their approaches differ enormously. Whereas sociologists often base their empirical analyses on class mobility, economists are traditionally more interested in earnings and income mobility (for an overview on sociological literature, see Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) and Breen (2004a); for an overview on economics literature, see Solon (1999), Björklund and Jäntti (2009) and Black and Devereux (2011)). Given these very distinct approaches, it comes as no surprise that results with respect to international rankings over time and space vary substantially. As such, claims have been raised based on undifferentiated interpretations of declining mobility rates by policymakers and media (Bukodi *et al.,* 2014). In the British case, Bukodi *et al.* (2014) argue that the widespread belief of declining mobility rates is solely based on one economic study that is analysing intergenerational income mobility rates. However, Bukodi *et al.* (2014), show that neither absolute nor relative intergenerational class mobility rates are declining, thus contradicting findings on intergenerational income mobility. Similar attempts to draw attention to divergent findings on intergenerational mobility between sociology and economics have been made by Torche (2015) and Blanden (2013).

Conceptually, two perspectives on the divergent findings exist. First, one strand of the literature argues that economists and sociologists capture completely different phenomena by analysing intergenerational mobility based on either income or class. Erikson and Goldthorpe (2010) for example, argue that divergent findings on intergenerational income mobility and intergenerational class mobility result from being different phenomena.

Moreover, they raise the question of why social and income mobility should change uniformly at all. Second, another possibility to approach the topic is to view income and class mobility as two different operationalisations of a common concept, namely the transmission of advantages and disadvantages from one generation to another with its associated impact on future life chances (Breen, Mood and Jonsson, 2015). Recently, Breen, Mood and Jonsson (2015) made a first attempt to reveal the formal and empirical relationship between income and social mobility by asking 'how much of the income correlations across generations could be accounted for by social mobility' (Breen, Mood and Jonsson, 2015: 3). Their analysis reveals a 30 to 50 percent overlap of income and social class mobility and illustrates that the two approaches capture distinct aspects, albeit with some degree of overlap.

Economists are primarily interested in the relation between parental permanent income and children's permanent income since Friedman (1957) proposed the permanent income expectation to determine consumption and ultimate economic welfare. Whereas theoretically it would be possible to analyse both income and earnings, the economic literature is dominated by analysis of the elasticity of sons' earnings with respect to fathers' earnings (Blanden, 2013: 40). The earnings indicator normally ranges between 0, indicating that earnings of parents and children are completely unrelated, and 1, indicating that earnings of parents are perfectly mirrored in the earnings of their children. Non-labour income, people without paid employment, and transmission processes of females are, however, mostly neglected.

The growing interest in the topic of intergenerational mobility becomes visible in the increasing amount of cross-national comparative evidence (d'Addio, 2007; Björklund and Jäntti, 2009; Black and Devereux, 2011; Blanden, 2013; Bowles, Gintis and Osborne Groves, 2005; Causa and Johansson, 2010; Ermisch, Jäntti and Smeeding, 2012; Solon, 1999). In one of the most recent publications, Blanden (2013) conducts an international ranking of intergenerational earnings elasticities based on single-country studies. He draws particular attention to the fact that we can observe stark differences between developed and less developed countries. Besides that, it appears as if Nordic countries have high rates of intergenerational mobility compared to the other countries. However, this interpretation has to remain cautious, since the indicated standard errors are partly very

large, making the ranking very difficult, and Sweden and the USA for example can statistically not be distinguished.

Comparing these elasticity figures to the most recent available ranking of social class fluidity reveals major differences. For example, according to the findings of Breen (2004a), Germany appears to be the least mobile country, a picture that is not supported by Blanden's ranking of intergenerational income elasticity. A similar divergence in country rankings was found for the United States, which in terms of earnings or income mobility often ranks as one of the less mobile countries among advanced industrial countries, while intergenerational class mobility analyses find the United States to be relatively fluid (Torche, 2015; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992; Blanden, 2013). Furthermore, Torche (2015) points to the fact that correlations of economic inequality and intergenerational mobility were found to be strong for income/earnings analyses, but non-existent for class analyses. In addition, Torche (2013) found that educational attainment can explain most of the association between class origin and destination, but mediates only half of the association between parental family income and individual family income.

These differences clearly illustrate that the measurement approaches of socioeconomic standing and its intergenerational transmission come with substantial discrepancies. For a differentiated picture of causes and consequences of social mobility, these discrepancies should be kept in mind.

3 Data and methods used in this study

This study uses different data sources and statistical methods depending on the suitability for the underlying research objective. This chapter will briefly describe the data sources that serve as a basis for the empirical analyses conducted in this thesis. Subsequently, the statistical methods used in this thesis will be introduced.

3.1 The European Social Survey

One of the data sources used for the empirical analyses in this thesis is the European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS is a scientific multi-country survey with a cross-sectional and partly repetitive design. To date, it has been administered in more than 30 countries and eight rounds of fieldwork covering different country samples and topics (ESS ERIC, 2017). The ESS applies strict random probability sampling on respondents aged 15 and older from the non-institutionalized population. High comparability of the study is ensured by minimum target response rates (70%) and rigorous translation protocols. Interviews are conducted face-to-face and include questions on a variety of topics like sociopolitical orientations, values, demographics, and socioeconomics. The ESS provides the unique opportunity to study cross-national differences in the social and political correlates of intergenerational social mobility, especially with regard to intergenerational educational mobility. Cross-national analyses of educational mobility crucially depend on the comparability of educational levels. Given the huge heterogeneity of education systems across Europe, it was of central importance for the data source to have a comparable measurement of educational degrees in order to avoid drawing the wrong conclusions. The ESS makes use of a measurement that was explicitly developed and validated for exactly this purpose (Schneider, 2010): the European Social Survey version of the International Standard Classification of Education (ES-ISCED). It is an extended version of the International Standard Classification of Education 97 (ISCED 97), reflecting 'different types of education within levels of education by considering ISCED subdimensions, most importantly "programme orientation"' (Schneider, 2010: 343). One of the big advantages of this measurement is that it can be applied for most countries in the world by simply deriving the ES-ISCED measurement from ISCED levels and its subdimensions.

Given the focus of cross-national comparability in educational levels as one of the central explanatory variables of this thesis, subsequent analyses will use only those ESS data that implement the ES-ISCED measurement. This is the case for ESS rounds 4 to 8, while rounds 1 to 3 were not able to fully harmonise the old education classifications into the more refined scheme. Therefore, the subsequent empirical analyses will only use data from rounds 4 to 8 collected from 2008-2016 (ESS ERIC, 2017).

The country sample used in this thesis includes data from 18 European countries (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Great Britain, Ireland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Estonia, and Lithuania).[8] Since this thesis focusses on young Europeans, it is restricted to respondents aged 25-34, not currently in full-time education. Thereby, only those likely to have attained their final level of education are included, which is an important precondition for the analysis of intergenerational educational mobility. Depending on the availability of the outcome of interest in the respective survey rounds, the analytical sample is further reduced. To give an example, psychological distress, one of the central well-being outcomes in Chapter 5, is only available in ESS rounds 6 and 7, i.e. the sample sizes for these analyses deviate much from, among others, the analyses on subjective well-being, which are available in ESS rounds 4, 5, 6, and 7.

3.2 The CUPESSE two-generation survey

In addition to the ESS, this thesis draws from another European survey explicitly focusing on young adults, the Cultural Pathways to Economic Self-Sufficiency and Entrepreneurship (CUPESSE) two-generation survey (Tosun *et al.,* 2018). The CUPESSE two-generation survey is a multidisciplinary, cross-sectional survey of about 20,000 young adults aged 18-35 and their parents from eleven countries. The country sample includes Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The survey was fielded between February and

[8] I only include countries that have participated in at least two rounds.

April 2016 and conducted via face-to-face or online interviews based on a common interview guide developed by the CUPESSE project consortium.[9] Sampling was based on population quotas for age, gender, employment status, educational level and region.[10] The CUPESSE two-generation survey was originally designed to reflect the intergenerational transmission of attitudes and values from parents to children. It covers a wide range of topics related to the young adults' current social, economic and cultural capital, their current employment situation, as well as attitudes towards work, politics, and welfare states in general. It furthermore includes retrospective information on the young person's family situation at the age of 14. To be more precise, the young adults are asked about their family's social, economic and cultural capital, parental aspirations regarding their education and the quality of the relationship between their parents and the children in their family. In addition, the young people's parents (or, in the majority of cases one of the parents) were subsequently interviewed online or by Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviews (CATI). Similar to their offspring, they answered questions regarding their economic, cultural and social capital as well as questions regarding their previous parenting style.

The CUPESSE two-generation survey data constitute a unique and rich data source for the purpose of this study for the following reasons. First and foremost, the survey setup allows for the assessment of intergenerational mobility on various dimensions. Unlike other surveys, the survey data contain information on both intergenerational economic mobility and expected future mobility. It thus opens the possibility to compare social and political consequences of intergenerational mobility for both past mobility experiences as well as mobility expectations for the future. Second, the CUPESSE data contain rich information on important social and political outcomes such as political orientation and attitudes on welfare state arrangements. These data are furthermore unique in the sense that they offer an up-to-date insight into attitudes held by today's generation.

[9] More information on the CUPESSE project objectives and the consortium partners can be found on the webpage http://cupesse.eu/.
[10] For regional quotas, the NUTS classification (Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics) was used. Quotas were set to correspond to NUTS 2 levels, the second level of hierarchy dividing the EU territory into statistical units (cf., Eurostat, 2018).

To sum up, the CUPESSE two-generation survey offers the unique opportunity to assess consequences of both past and future intergenerational mobility with up-to-date data of high quality.

3.3 Diagonal reference models

Analysing mobility effects is not as straightforward as it might appear at first sight. This is because of a conceptual and methodological challenge. Conceptually, mobility effects (and their estimation) have to be distinguished from pure level effects. More specifically, I argue that it is a different question to ask if a downwardly mobile person has a lower well-being level because he or she experienced downward social mobility, or because he or she ends up in a social status position that is associated with worse well-being outcomes. Of course, both effects are in some way related, but whereas the former effect would be assumed to stem from the downward movement on the social ladder and the psychological effects due to comparing the current with the former situation, the latter effect would be assumed to be due to low status attainment in general. In other words, I argue that it is necessary to account not only for the psychological processes of moving up and down the social status ladder compared to one's parents *(net mobility effects)*, but also to account for the resources associated with status attainment *(level effects).* Only by following this conceptual reasoning will it be possible to disentangle mobility effects from origin and destination effects, and the mechanisms underlying the effect of intergenerational mobility on individual outcomes (see also Schuck and Steiber, 2018).

As van der Waal, Daenekindt and Koster (2017: 2) put it, '[i]t should be noted that mobility effects refer to the consequences of experiencing social mobility itself, aside from the effects of one's social positions of origin and destination.' In other words, mobility effects do not refer to the fact that socially mobile individuals may adopt a lifestyle (such as a certain diet or a certain level of exercise) that is characteristic of their newly acquired social position and thus experience a better or worse well-being. Rather, effects like the aforementioned ones are due to the fact that an individual adapts to his or her destination status (which will subsequently be referred to as level effect). By mobility effects, I instead refer to the psychological effects (e.g. psychological distress) caused by a shift in

socioeconomic position, apart from those positive or negative influences that one's social origin and destination status play.

In addition to this important conceptual differentiation, estimating the consequences of social mobility also poses a methodological challenge. The methodological challenge associated with estimating mobility effects arises when simultaneously estimating the effects of social position of origin, social position of destination, and mobility between origin and destination across generations (see, e.g., Schuck and Steiber, 2018; van der Waal, Daenekindt and Koster, 2017). In a conventional regression approach, only two of the three effects of interest can be estimated since mobility is linearly dependent on origin and destination (Mobility = Social Destination – Social Origin) (Sobel, 1981). A similar methodological challenge concerns the problem of identifying age, period, and cohort effects (age-period-cohort models) and has been the subject of scholarly debate for decades (see, e.g., Reither *et al.,* 2015; Chan and Ermisch, 2015).

Despite the aforementioned challenges associated with the attempt to identify mobility effects within a conventional regression approach, a substantial part of available research nevertheless relies on such conventional linear regression techniques, following one of three approaches (see Schuck and Steiber, 2018):

1. estimating mobility effects while controlling for origin (but not for destination),
2. estimating mobility effects while controlling for destination (but not for origin), or
3. estimating mobility effects while controlling for origin and destination.

Any of these three approaches – and conclusions drawn from their respective results – fails to tackle the challenge posed by the linear dependency of origin, destination, and mobility indicators. They are generally unsatisfactory since omitting one of the three variables of interest (origin, destination, or mobility) leads to uncertainty about what drives the observed effects of the remaining two. The estimated mobility effects conflate the effects of social mobility with effects of social origin and destination (Schuck and Steiber, 2018).

To be more specific, the first approach leads to estimates of mobility effects that are confounded by the influence of one's own status attainment (destination status), i.e. the level

effect associated with the resources of one's own status. Studies using this approach therefore tend to find positive effects of upward mobility and the reverse for downward mobility (e.g., Campos-Matos and Kawachi, 2015; Nikolaev and Burns, 2014 in models 1 and 3 shown in Table 10 that only control for parental status). The second approach provides estimates of mobility effects that are confounded by the effect of parental status attainment (origin status), i.e. the resources associated with one's social origin. These kinds of models tend to lead to estimates that have been claimed to suggest dissociative effects (e.g., Hadjar and Samuel, 2015). The third approach (e.g., Dolan and Lordan, 2013; Nikolaev and Burns, 2014 models 2 and 4) is not tenable from a methodological point of view, because the models are overidentified (Schuck and Steiber, 2018).[11]

In contrast to these conventional approaches that are still widely used in studies on mobility effects, diagonal reference models are suitable and allow for identifying the effects of mobility, origin, and destination. Calling it a 'a substantively motivated class of designs for the analysis of mobility effects' suitable to overcome the problems mentioned above, Sobel (1981: 893) proposed the use of diagonal reference models already more than 30 years ago. His so-called diagonal reference models (DRMs) are both parsimonious and suited to simultaneously model origin, destination, and mobility effects (Hendrickx *et al.,* 1993), thus being considered 'the only acceptable method to model mobility effects' (Houle, 2011: 764). DRMs are based on sociological theory and allow for a simultaneous modelling of origin, destination, and mobility effects (Hendrickx *et al.,* 1993) while breaking their linear dependency. Following mobility theory, an individual's characteristics and behaviors are affected by both origin and destination status (Blau, 1956; Blau and Duncan, 1967). Furthermore, it has been argued that non-mobiles constitute the core of a social position and therefore best reflect its characteristics (Sorokin, 1959: 509f.). Diagonal reference models incorporate these assumptions in their model specification by modelling the non-mobiles, i.e. those located in the diagonal cells of a mobility table, as primary reference group for mobile individuals.

[11] Other study designs try to circumvent the problem by estimating interactions between origin and destination or by dividing the sample into distinct groups that capture all possible combinations of origin and destination. Such models do not, however, allow for isolating the effect of mobility (Chan, 2017; Tooth and Mishra, 2013).

Studies applying this state-of-the-art statistical technique have investigated a large variety of mobility outcomes, such as political preferences and behavior (Breen, 2001; Weakliem, 1992), attitudes toward ethnic minorities (Tolsma, de Graaf and Quillian, 2009), proximity of couples to parents (Chan and Ermisch, 2015), and fertility (Sobel, 1985).[12] The underutilization of DRMs in wide areas of social mobility research presumably goes back to the fact that DRMs neither are included in standard statistical software packages nor are part of standard university curricula (van der Waal, Daenekindt and Koster, 2017).

DRMs model the outcome of interest as the weighted sum of the estimated mean scores in the non-mobile origin group (μ_i) and the non-mobile destination group (μ_j). The parameters q and (1-q) denote the influence of parental and one's own status, and are bounded by the value 1. They can be regarded as weights for the relative importance of origin and destination for the outcome of interest (Monden and de Graaf, 2013: 982). The functional form can then be described as follows:

$$Y_{ijk} = q * \mu_{ii} + (1 - q) * \mu_{jj} \ + e_{ijk} \quad (1)$$

$$Y_{ijk} = q * \mu_{ii} + (1 - q) * \mu_{jj} \ + \sum \beta_b x_{ijb} \ + e_{ijk} \quad (2)$$

Y_{ijk} represents the value of the dependent variable in cell ij which has k observations. In other words, Y_{ijk} represents the outcome of interest of socially mobile individuals whose social position of origin is i and of destination is j (Missinne, Daenekindt and Bracke, 2015). The error term e_{ijk} depicts a stochastic term with expectation 0 (Sobel, 1981). (1) is the baseline model examining the association between status of origin (O), status of destination (D), and outcome of interest and (2) is an extension thereof including covariates represented by the different x_{ijb} variables (like e.g. dummy variables that capture intergenerational upward and downward mobility) and the associated β-parameters (van der Waal, Daenekindt and Koster, 2017). These covariates are easy to interpret since their interpretation is no different from regular regression models. Depending on whether the dependent variable Y is dichotomous or metric, logistic or linear versions of the diagonal reference models can be applied. For a comparison of nested models (1) and (2), model fit statistics like the Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria (AIC and BIC) and the

[12] Diagonal reference models have also been used to study the effects of *intra*generational mobility (Claussen *et al.,* 2005; Houle, 2011).

likelihood ratio test (LRT) or wald test can be used. DRMs in this thesis are estimated using the Diagonal Reference (DREF) subcommand of the General Nonlinear Models (GNM) package in R (Turner and Firth, 2015).[13]

To give an example based on the investigation of well-being effects of social mobility, let us imagine a socially mobile person *k* in cell 13 of the mobility table who moves from origin status 3 ($\mu_i = \mu_3$) to destination status *1* ($\mu_j = \mu_1$), i.e. the person is downwardly mobile (see Table 3.1.). The well-being of this individual *k* is then modelled as the weighted sum of the estimated mean scores in the non-mobile origin group ($q * \mu_{33}$) and the non-mobile destination group ($(1-q) * \mu_{11}$). The values of q and $(1-q)$ thereby refer to the relative importance of origin status and destination status for the respondents' well-being.

Table 3.1: Visualisation of diagonal reference models



Source: Own illustration based on van der Waal, Daenekindt and Koster (2017) and Missinne, Daenekindt and Bracke (2015).

[13] Running the models in Stata (diagref command) or SPSS (NLR command) lead to very similar results.

4 Intergenerational mobility of young Europeans – the status quo

Having laid out the research agenda for this thesis, it is then a precondition to first assess the phenomenon of study, namely intergenerational mobility in its different dimensions. While it is not the focus of this thesis to investigate the different degrees of social fluidity per se, it is indispensable to be aware of the distribution of intergenerational mobility across European countries when focusing on social and political consequences thereof. I will identify countries with comparatively high or low rates of mobility directed downwards or upwards on the social ladder. Against this background, this chapter shall serve as an *empirical baseline* for the subsequent analyses of mobility consequences and will describe the extent of social mobility in its various dimensions across European countries.

4.1 Intergenerational educational mobility

It is well established that educational attainment is closely linked to 'employment, earnings, overall wealth and the well-being of individuals' (OECD, 2015: 78). Moreover, it is the most important mediator for the origin-destination-association. The degree to which educational attainment is independent from parental educational attainment is therefore also an indicator of the degree of social justice in a society.

Before one can assess the degree of educational mobility, an appropriate measure has to be chosen. Measuring educational mobility across generations and across countries is a challenging endeavor. Specific degrees may vanish over time (e.g. Eastern German degrees that no longer exist after the German re-unification) and more importantly, the relevance of educational levels in terms of labour market opportunities and life chances are changing over time and therefore hard to compare across generations. Apart from that, measuring and comparing educational levels across European countries is the second big challenge in the analysis of educational mobility, since construct validity of cross-national measures of educational attainment is oftentimes problematic (cf., Schneider, 2010). In this thesis, I will address these problems by focusing on young Europeans because the time span between the parents' educational attainment and the young person's educational attainment is comparably small and the intergenerational comparison thus more meaningful than in a comparison with older generations. Second, the subsequent analyses of educational mobility rely on an established measurement scheme that was explicitly

designed for cross-country comparative analysis in Europe (cf., Schneider, 2010). More specifically, I rely on the ES-ISCED classification, which constitutes a reduced form of the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). The ES-ISCED categories are merged into three educational levels ('low', 'medium', 'high'), whereby 'low' comprises ES-ISCED levels I and II (below upper secondary education), 'medium' comprises ES-ISCED levels IIIa, IIIb, and IV (upper secondary and post-secondary, and non-tertiary education) and 'high' consists of ES-ISCED levels V1 and V2 (tertiary education). Parental educational attainment was assessed by combining information from the mother and father at the time when the respondent was 14 years old. The higher of the two educational levels is used, and if the educational attainment is missing for one parent, the information on the other parent is used. Based on this classification, intergenerational educational mobility is then constructed as a categorical variable distinguishing the non-mobile (i.e., same educational attainment as parents), from the upwardly mobile (i.e., more highly educated than parents), and the downwardly mobile (i.e., less highly educated than parents).

As we know from previous research, social mobility varies substantially across European societies (Breen, 2004a). The descriptive analysis of intergenerational educational mobility among young Europeans (aged 25 to 34) based on European Social Survey data (rounds 4-7) confirms this finding (see Figure 4.1 and Table 9.1 respectively for a detailed overview of educational levels and mobility trajectories by country).

The descriptive analyses show that the vast majority of young people in all European countries under study achieve at least the same educational level as their parents. Status maintenance, i.e. intergenerational stability or non-mobility in educational attainment, is thus the most common mobility status among young Europeans. At the same time, high rates of non-mobility for the majority of youths also mean that downward educational mobility is not a majority phenomenon.

Yet, although it might not affect the majority of young Europeans, the shares of downwardly mobile individuals are not negligible either. Estonia (23%) and Denmark (21%) show the highest shares of downwardly mobile individuals. They are followed by Finland, Germany, and Norway which all show absolute shares of downward mobility of 15% and more. In turn, downward mobility is lowest in Ireland and Portugal, with 5 % or less of

all young people. Finally, concerning those who exceed their parents' educational attainment, i.e. those who are upwardly mobile, Poland, the Netherlands, Spain, Ireland and Portugal are the countries with the highest shares of upwardly mobile individuals (equal to or above 43%).

Figure 4.1: Distribution of intergenerational educational mobility by country



Source: ESS4-7, weighted results based on own calculations.

It should be noted that the extent of up- and downward mobility is naturally linked to the distribution of parental educational attainment in the sense that the so-called ceiling and floor effects take place. If a high share of the parental generation already achieved tertiary education, there is naturally little room for their children to surpass this level of educational attainment. Therefore, lower absolute shares of upward mobility are not necessarily bad per se since they may simply result from an already very well educated parental generation. However, this is not the case for high shares of downward mobility. Of course, the risk of downward mobility rises with increasing levels of parental education. Downward mobility should, however, raise concerns, since downward mobility might negatively affect individuals. This interdependency is well illustrated in the Southern European and Nordic countries: Parental educational level is comparatively low in Southern

Europe, naturally reducing the risk of downward mobility and increasing the chance of upward mobility. The opposite takes place in the Nordic countries. There, parental educational level is comparatively high, thus leaving almost no room to surpass one's parents' education and increasing the risk of achieving a lower educational degree compared to one's parents.

4.2 Intergenerational economic mobility

Different measures of mobility can capture different dimensions of life chances and their correlates. This thesis contributes to the existing literature on mobility effects by investigating different mobility dimensions and their correlates, one of them being intergenerational economic mobility.[14]

Intergenerational economic mobility is most commonly based on changes in income, earnings, and wealth from one generation to another. The measurement used for the subsequent analyses deviates from this approach for a number of reasons. From the perspective of a social scientist, income and earnings constitute a very narrow perspective on the economic status of an individual. Reliable information (especially on the often retrospectively surveyed situation of one's family) is very hard to collect in surveys and social desirability as well as memory problems are significant sources of measurement bias. Furthermore, a measurement of economic status does not necessarily have to rely on single numbers like income or earnings mobility. Several studies in the literature have established alternative measures of economic status. For example, Svallfors (2006) uses a composite index that measures a household's financial problems in social inequality research. The CUPESSE two-generation survey (Tosun *et al.,* 2018) – mainly focusing on the broader concept of young people's economic self-sufficiency – uses various items referring to one's financial situation which can be used to describe the young adults' economic statuses.

In the following, I will rely on a specific dimension of the CUPESSE concept of economic self-sufficiency, namely the question, '*Thinking about your personal financial situation over the last six months, please indicate whether the following situation applied to you or*

[14] Throughout this thesis, the terms economic mobility and financial mobility will be used as synonyms.

not: We could afford extras for ourselves (such as trips, hobbies, etc.).' This item taps into the degree of one's perceived financial deprivation and thereby constitutes a proxy for the respondent's economic situation. In order to arrive at a measure for intergenerational economic mobility, the answer to this question is compared to the respondent's family's situation when he or she was growing up. The family's situation is covered by a similar question which reads as, '*Thinking about your family's financial situation when you were about 14 years old, which of the following statements applied to your family?: We could afford extras for ourselves (such as trips, hobbies, etc.).*' with answers ranging from *'always'* to *'never'*. Differences in the degrees of agreement were coded as intergenerational upward or downward mobility while similar levels of agreement (indicating stable economic statuses across generations) were coded as intergenerational economic stability.

Quite similar to what we observed for intergenerational educational mobility, intergenerational economic stability is a reality for the majority group in all countries, with the outliers being Greece and Turkey (see Figure 4.2). Yet, in contrast to intergenerational educational mobility, the distributions are far more equally distributed. In other words, the shares of people that experienced economic upward and downward mobility are much more similar in size compared to the non-mobile group. In particular, the very high rates of economic downward mobility (especially in comparison to the moderate levels of downward educational mobility) are alarming. In nine out of eleven European countries under investigation, 30% or more of the young people experienced economic downward mobility. In Greece, 63% of the young respondents were not able to maintain the economic status of their parents – a situation that is clearly related to the economic crisis and the exceptionally high youth unemployment rates in Greece in the crisis aftermath (see, e.g., Tosun, 2015) which affected young people from all educational levels. In other words, the economic crisis led to a situation where high education and high shares of educational upward mobility did not prevent young people from experiencing economic downward mobility. Thus, high shares of economic downward mobility go along with high shares of educational upward mobility during this particular time period.

Turning to economic upward mobility, Turkey is again an outlier, but this time in a positive sense. 43% indicate that they do financially better than their families did while they

were growing up. In all other countries, except Greece, upward mobility shares are about equal to the shares of downward mobility. Given the high rates of downward socioeconomic movements in Greece, only 10% achieved a higher economic status than their parents.

Figure 4.2: Distribution of intergenerational economic mobility by country



In sum, intergenerational economic mobility appears to be far less stable, i.e., non-mobile, than intergenerational educational mobility. Accordingly, we can observe far more (up- and downward) mobility than for educational mobility. Furthermore, it is striking that educational mobility, at least on the aggregate level does not at all coincide with economic mobility, i.e. countries with high shares of economic downward mobility do not necessarily show high degrees of educational downward mobility. As already mentioned earlier, this fact quite clearly relates to the economic crisis and high youth unemployment levels across Europe in this specific time period.

4.3 Expected intergenerational mobility

Past mobility experiences, both in terms of educational and economic mobility, can, but do not necessarily always shape one's mobility expectations for the future. The CU-PESSE two-generation survey (Tosun *et al.,* 2018) assesses young Europeans' mobility expectations and thus offers the unique opportunity to investigate the effects of both experienced (past) and expected (future) mobility as well as the congruence or divergence of past and expected future social mobility.

The young people's expectations of intergenerational mobility for their future are assessed by asking them about their expectations of their future standard of living as compared to how their parents are living today. To be more precise, respondents answer the question, '*Thinking about how your standard of living will be like in the future, how does it compare to how you are doing today?'* on a 5-point-scale ranging from *"Much worse than my parents"* to *'Much better than my parents'.* Answers are then recoded into the three categories '*expecting intergenerational upward mobility*', '*expecting intergenerational stability*', and '*expecting intergenerational downward mobility*'. Standard of living taps into the more economic dimension of social mobility, but next to the mere economic status, it is equally referring to a person's social status position. How a person lives, i.e. what a person's standard of living looks like, and what it is predicted to look like in the future, certainly also captures parts of social status. It is thus not directly equivalent to either educational or economic mobility. But it does allow for gaining insight into the young people's overall expectations for their future in comparison to how their parents are doing today.

Against the background of young Europeans' past and expected intergenerational mobility experience as illustrated above, in which countries are young people more optimistic or pessimistic than in others? Where are expectations congruent to previous experiences and where do expectations diverge from past mobility?

With regard to pessimistic expectations, i.e. those expecting intergenerational downward mobility, three countries strongly stand out from the country sample: Greece, Italy and Spain. With 34% (Greece), 30% (Italy) and 26% (Spain) young people from those three

countries are outliers with an exceptionally high degree of pessimism regarding their future standard of living as compared to their parents. Being among the countries that have been hit hardest by the global economic crisis and its consequences (Tosun, 2015), young Greeks, Italians and Spanish people seem to fear that they will not be able to maintain the standard of living they grew up with. Interestingly, Italy and Spain have also been countries where economic upward mobility has been highest, with 32% and 60% upward mobility respectively. It therefore seems that upward economic mobility, at least in Italy and Spain, does not give cause for a more optimistic assessment of future mobility expectations.

Next to the three Mediterranean countries, young people from the United Kingdom (19%) and Germany (15%) also express pessimistic views about their expected standard of living in the future to a comparably high extent. Other than that, downward mobility expectations are rather low in the remaining countries. This is mirrored by the fact that in six out of eleven countries around 90% of the young people expect to be able to at least maintain, if not supersede their parents' current standard of living. In particular, the Turkish youth show comparatively high optimism with more than 60% of respondents expecting a better or much better living standard than their parents. Since the young people's expectations are clearly also dependent on their parents' current situation, one could speculate that this high degree of optimism is related to their parents' standard of living being worse in comparison to the other European countries in the sample. Besides that, most youths from all countries are optimistic that their future living standard will exceed their parents' current one.

Unlike past mobility experiences, for future expectations, the non-mobile group does not make up the biggest group in the majority of countries anymore. Accordingly, it seems as if the biggest share of young people expects changes in their standard of living across generations, be it upward or downward.

All in all, the distributions of educational, economic and expected intergenerational mobility for each country clearly illustrate the interdependencies between one's parental situation and one's chances or risks of moving up or down the social ladder. It could also be observed that experienced mobility does not necessarily coincide with what people expect as their future mobility experience.

Figure 4.3: Distribution of expected intergenerational mobility by country



4.4 Excursus: Congruence of past mobility and expectations for the future?

Following up on the previous description of the different mobility dimensions for past and expected mobility, the congruence or divergence of mobility experiences and expectations is now central to this chapter. Since expected mobility could only be measured with the CUPESSE two-generation survey, but not the European Social Survey, the bivariate distribution of mobility groups is only possible for economic and expected mobility. It shall provide insights into the following questions:

1. Which past mobility experiences do individuals who expect upward/ downward mobility in their future have?
2. Among those who experienced upward/downward economic mobility, how many of them are rather pessimistic or optimistic for their future, i.e. expecting upward/ downward mobility?

Among those young people who expect to supersede their parents' current standard of living, most of them have experienced upward financial mobility or maintained their family's economic status. Accordingly, it can be concluded that those who made positive mobility experiences in the past apparently have enough reason to look positively into their future. Interestingly, 23% of those expecting to surpass their parents' standard of living have experienced financial downward mobility in the past. This might be a group of young people who regards their current position as only temporary with much time to improve one's situation both financially and in terms of standard of living.

Among those who expect not to reach their parents' standard of living, most of them (52%) already experienced downward economic mobility in the past. Yet surprisingly, 15% of them have been upwardly mobile in the past and nevertheless have pessimistic expectations about their future standard of living. Past experiences, subsequently, do not seem to determine future mobility expectations in all cases.

Table 4.1: Congruence of expected mobility and financial mobility

Expected mobility	Financial mobility			
	upward	stable	downward	total
upward	0.37	0.40	0.23	1.00
	0.59	0.42	0.31	0.43
stable	0.21	0.44	0.34	1.00
	0.32	0.45	0.44	0.41
downward	0.15	0.33	0.52	1.00
	0.09	0.13	0.25	0.15
total	0.27	0.41	0.32	1.00
	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00

Source: Own calculations based on weighted CUPESSE two-generation survey data.

Changing perspectives to those who experienced downward financial mobility, most of them (44%) expect to be able to maintain their parents' current standard of living in the long term. Only one quarter of them express negative expectations for their future. Thus, despite having experienced financial downward mobility, the majority of young people apparently believe in the opportunity to maintain or exceed their parents' standard of living.

Within the group of financially upwardly mobiles, 59% expect to supersede their parents' standard of living, and 32% expect to at least maintain their parents' current status. Still,

9% of those with experiences of financial upward mobility are rather pessimistic for their future by expecting not to be able to maintain their parents' current standard of living.

All in all, the bivariate analysis revealed that past mobility experiences do not necessarily determine the young people's expectations for their future. Quite to the contrary, it may be speculated that some individuals regard their past inability to maintain their parents' status as only a temporary situation. Given their young age, they may expect to still have enough time to eventually achieve or exceed their parents' status. In many cases, however, past and future mobility assessments do not deviate substantially.

5 Social consequences of young Europeans' intergenerational mobility

5.1 Intergenerational educational mobility and well-being[15]

It is a well-documented fact that higher education entails numerous positive implications like, e.g., longer and healthier lives (Mirowsky and Ross, 2003; Baker *et al.,* 2011), greater life-time income, a higher likelihood of being employed, and having a rewarding job (Powdthavee, Lekfuangfu and Wooden, 2015; Reynolds and Ross, 1998). Previous research further identified 'a significant positive association between expanding mass education and population health' (Baker *et al.,* 2011: 307).

Against the background of these widely known and desirable well-being implications of higher education, the fact that about 50% of Europeans have attained a higher level of education than their parents (Campos-Matos and Kawachi, 2015), may generally be considered a good thing. Yet, from a theoretical perspective, educational upward mobility, i.e. achieving a higher educational level than one's parents, may not necessarily imply positive well-being effects. According to the seminal study of Pitirim A. Sorokin, moving up or down the social hierarchy may just as well be experienced as a stressful and disruptive event. Following Sorokin's dissociative hypothesis (Sorokin, 1927), social mobility – in either direction – means that an individual moves out of his or her familiar environment of social origin and moves into a less known social position the individual has not been socialized into. The disconnection with the individual's social origin and the mentally demanding adjustment to the individual's new and unfamiliar social destination is therefore assumed to go along with a psychological strain.

Meanwhile, other theoretical assumptions run counter this dissociative perspective and rather predict psychological benefits than costs in the context of upward mobility (see, e.g., Goldthorpe, 1980). In particular, keeping up with the increasing pressure to maintain

[15] Chapter 5 constitutes an extension of the co-authored journal article '*Does Intergenerational Mobility Shape the Well-Being of Young Europeans? Evidence from the European Social Survey'* by Schuck and Steiber (2018) to which both authors contributed equally. Within this journal article, the theoretical conceptualization was predominantly Nadia Steiber's work, whereas the empirical analyses were conducted mainly by Bettina Schuck. Both authors contributed substantially to the respective other parts.
In contrast to the journal article, this chapter uses a multidimensional concept of well-being, i.e. it extends the analyses for two more outcome variables. Furthermore, the results and conclusions have been adapted to and embedded into the broader context of the present thesis.

or even exceed the educational level of one's parents may imply positive well-being effects (fulfilled aspirations hypothesis) while one's failure to do so may lead to frustration, i.e. negative well-being implications (frustrated aspirations hypothesis, Schuck and Steiber (2018)). Similarly, Newman (1999) predicts negative well-being implications for those who fail to maintain their parents' status position, labelling it the 'falling-from-grace hypothesis'. In this context, it is important to bear in mind that high levels of social fluidity may involve large shares of 'failures' despite stable or increasing levels of average attainment. According to a recent study, an estimated 3-12% of Europeans are downwardly mobile when comparing their educational attainment with that of their fathers (Campos-Matos and Kawachi, 2015). Among young Europeans aged 25-34, this number is significantly higher with 4-23% being downwardly mobile (see Chapter 4.1).

A third theoretical perspective suggests that social mobility per se does not have any well-being implications aside from the effects of an individual's social origin and destination status (acculturation hypothesis, Blau (1956)). Whereas the previously depicted theories rest on the assumption that there remain 'net' well-being effects independent from the effects that own educational level and parental educational attainment play (see further Sobel, 1981), following the acculturation hypothesis well-being implications of social mobility stem solely from the influence of an individual's social origin and destination. Accordingly, the well-being of socially mobile individuals would be expected to lie in between of the respective non-mobile reference groups, namely the non-mobile groups of social origin and destination.

Due to the methodological challenges involved in estimating the effect of social mobility over and above the effects of the two variables defining mobility – one's own and parental status – (see, e.g., Schuck and Steiber, 2018; van der Waal, Daenekindt and Koster, 2017) the jury on the empirical relevance of the aforementioned hypotheses for contemporaneous societies is still out. Against this background, this chapter uses state-of-the-art methodology to (1) examine the relative importance of young Europeans' own level of education and their parents' educational attainment for their well-being, and (2) investigate if intergenerational educational mobility in this regard has an independent effect over and above the direct impact of one's own and parental education. The focus is on young

Europeans aged 25-34 and cross-country differences in mobility effects in particular. Social status can be operationalized in multiple ways (e.g. education, occupational class, income). In this chapter, I focus on education since it is known to be an important determinant of both occupational class and income (Blau and Duncan, 1967; Card, 1999). Given the timeframe of this study (2008-2014), another advantage of focussing on education is that this approach – opposed to using a mobility measure based on class or income – allows to include all those young Europeans which are currently not employed. The well-being implications of educational mobility are examined from a multidimensional perspective. In contrast to previous studies (see Schuck and Steiber, 2018), this study uses multiple indicators of individual well-being which have been used in prior research on well-being effects of mobility: subjective well-being, self-reported general health, and psychological distress.

5.2 Previous research on well-being effects of intergenerational mobility

5.2.1 Different approaches – different results

Looking at previous studies, the jury is still out on how intergenerational social mobility shapes well-being outcomes such as happiness, life satisfaction, and (psychological) health. Incomprehensible at first sight, the available evidence appears to be rather contradicting, with some studies suggesting positive well-being effects of upward mobility and supporting the fulfilled aspirations argument (Campos-Matos and Kawachi, 2015; Nikolaev and Burns, 2014), and other studies finding negative well-being effects of upward mobility which rather support the dissociative effects hypothesis (Hadjar and Samuel, 2015; Stacey, 1967). Again other studies find negative well-being implications of downward mobility, supporting the expectations of the frustrated aspirations and falling-from-grace hypothesis (Hemmingsson, Lundberg and Diderichsen, 1999; Nikolaev and Burns, 2014). Following the study by Marshall and Firth (1999), social mobility per se has no effect at all.

What appears to be incomprehensible at first sight, namely that previous evidence on well-being effects of social mobility is contradicting and incoherent, goes arguably back to a methodological cause. To be more precise, it is the methodological challenge of simultaneously estimating the effects of social origin, social destination and mobility between

the two across generations, which is leading to this mixed evidence (for more details on this methodological challenge, see Chapter 3.3; see also Schuck and Steiber, 2018, van der Waal, Daenekindt and Koster, 2017).

Yet, only recently has there been a growing awareness of the need to adapt the methodological approaches for the study of social mobility effects from original fields of interest pursued in the 1980s to the study of well-being (see, e.g., van der Waal, Daenekindt and Koster, 2017; Schuck and Steiber, 2018). When looking only at studies that apply diagonal reference models – 'the only acceptable method to model mobility effects' (Houle, 2011: 764) – the available evidence is far more consistent. In general, i.e. considering studies that investigate very different mobility outcomes, findings suggest that net mobility, over and above social origin and destination effects, does not have a strong influence (see, e.g., Breen, 2001; Weakliem, 1992; Tolsma, de Graaf and Quillian, 2009). This similarly holds true for studies on well-being effects of mobility. For example, with regard to life satisfaction Marshall and Firth (1999) do not find any net effects of mobility. Concerning psychological distress, findings from Houle and Martin (2011) do suggest beneficial implications for upwardly mobile sons of farmers. Yet, other types of mobility were found to have no effect.

In sum, it becomes clear that different methodological approaches have led to rather incoherent evidence with regard to well-being implications of intergenerational mobility. Yet, focussing on studies applying state-of-the-art methodology for the analysis of mobility effects provides a much clearer picture: social mobility, independent from origin and destination effects, does not appear to exert strong effects on well-being, neither positive nor negative.

5.2.2 Cross-country differences

Given that there is already rather few evidence on well-being effects of intergenerational mobility based on state-of-the-art methodology, still less is known about potential cross-country differences. One of the few examples is the study by Monden and de Graaf (2013) which investigates a potential East-West divide in the importance of father's educational level (social origin) and own educational level (social destination) for self-assessed health in adulthood. According to their 'equality under socialism hypothesis' (Monden and de Graaf, 2013: 979), they expect the relative importance of social origin versus destination

to be weaker in post-socialist countries when compared to Western European countries. Opposed to that, their 'family support hypothesis' (Monden and de Graaf, 2013: 980) expects the relative importance of social origin versus destination to be stronger in post-socialist countries when compared to Western European countries. In line with the latter hypothesis, the authors find a greater relative importance of father's education compared to own education in Eastern Europe. Their underlying reasoning is that both reliance on parental resources was of higher importance and demand for parental support was of lower importance for an individual's well-being in Eastern Europe compared to Western Europe. Although Monden and de Graaf (2013) also examine cross-country differences in net mobility effects, the neither provide theoretical expectations nor find such differences.

The study of Campos-Matos and Kawachi (2015) on social mobility and self-rated health also has a comparative perspective, but does not apply Diagonal Reference Models. Using conventional multilevel models that control for parental, but not for one's own education, they find beneficial health effects of upward mobility and negative health effects of downward mobility for all welfare regime types. Yet, risk differences between upwardly mobile and non-mobile individuals were found to be particularly high in the Southern, Post Communist European and former USSR regimes. In Scandinavian countries, risk differences were lowest for both upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals. As argued before, these findings have to be considered biased, since their methodological approach does not allow disentangling genuine mobility effects from destination and origin effects.

Finally, the study by Schuck and Steiber (2018) is the first to provide theoretical assumptions and empirical evidence of cross-country differences in well-being effects of intergenerational mobility. As previously indicated, the present chapter builds on and extends their analysis by considering well-being as a multidimensional concept, thus investigating not only life satisfaction but also subjective well-being and self-reported general health.

5.3 Theoretical considerations and hypotheses

The theoretical background and hypotheses can be divided into an individual-level perspective (the microlevel perspective) and a cross-national perspective (the macrolevel perspective). The individual-level hypotheses on existence and direction of mobility effects are already well established in the literature, whereas the cross-national perspective on mobility effects has only recently been developed (cf., Schuck and Steiber, 2018).

5.3.1 Individual-level hypotheses

Generally, the individual-level hypotheses are competing with each other by predicting either dissociative, beneficial or null effects of mobility. The dissociative effects hypothesis (Sorokin, 1927) emphasizes the psychological costs of social mobility – regardless of the fact if an individual moves upward or downward the social ladder. Accordingly, mobility is seen as a process where an individual leaves the social class he or she has been socialised into and moves to another social position that is new and less familiar. This discruptive social experience is assumed to implicate negative well-being effects such as psychological isolation.

In contrast to that, and in line with Michalos' multiple discrepancies theory (Michalos, 1985), fulfilment of one's own, parental or societal aspirations may be expected to translate into psychological benefits rather than costs (Goldthorpe, 1980), and failure to do so may come along with negative well-being implications (falling-from-grace hypothesis by Newman (1999)).

Finally, from an acculturation perspective (Blau, 1956) neither the experience of upward nor downward mobility is expected to influence an individual's well-being over and above origin and destination effects. The underlying reasoning is based on the assumption that social mobility constitutes a process wherein the influence of an individual's origin status is gradually overridden by the influence of an individual's destination status. Accordingly, the well-being of the socially mobile is assumed to lie in-between that of the two non-mobile comparison groups. This implies the assumption of net mobility effects, independent from level effects of social origin and destination, being zero. Table 5.1 provides an overview of the aforementioned individual-level hypotheses on the well-being implications of upward and downward mobility.

Table 5.1: Individual-level hypotheses on well-being implications of social mobility

	Upward Mobility	*Downward Mobility*
Ref.: non-mobile individuals		
Dissociative effects hypothesis	-	-
Fulfilled vs. frustrated aspirations hypothesis	+	-
Falling-from-grace hypothesis	n.a.	-
Acculturation hypothesis	no effect	no effect

Note: +/- indicate positive/negative well-being implications of social mobility

5.3.2 Cross-national differences

With only very few exceptions (Schuck and Steiber, 2018; Campos-Matos and Kawachi, 2015; Monden and de Graaf, 2013), the theoretical background on cross-country differences with regard to the relative strength of mobility effects constitutes a rather neglected perspective so far. For the purpose of this study, I follow the stratified approach of Schuck and Steiber (2018) who developed theoretical assumptions for European countries along six country groups. These country groups are based on widely used typologies of welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Fenger, 2007; Ferrera, 1996), their institutional setup (in particular their education systems (West and Nikolai, 2013; Green, Preston and Janmaat, 2006)) and other indicators of countries' social and economic statuses, which are arguably influential with respect to their effects on social mobility.

Schuck and Steiber's (2018) stratified approach distinguishes the social democratic Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway) from the conservative Continental European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands), the Anglo-Saxon countries (Great Britain, Ireland), the Southern European countries (Portugal, Spain), the the Visegrád Four (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia), and the Baltic States (Estonia, Lithuania).

The Nordic countries can be characterised by their universal, highly distributive system of benefits, their high degrees of decommodification and defamilisation (Esping-Andersen, 1990), and a high degree of both equality of educational opportunity and schooling outcomes (West and Nikolai, 2013).

In contrast, the Continental European countries feature an insurance-based and much less distributive welfare system, which aims at the preservation of status differentials. Also,

the family's role for individual welfare is much more important than in the Nordic countries (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Following West and Nikolai (2013), the education systems in Continental Europe are further characterized by high levels of tracking and stratification resulting in the production and replication of educational inequalities across generations (West and Nikolai, 2013: 482).

The Anglo-Saxon countries as a third country group can be described as a residual welfare system with modest, usually means-tested benefits only and comparatively high levels of income inequality (Schuck and Steiber, 2018; Eikemo *et al.,* 2008b). Class consciousness has been argued to be rather strong in those countries (Hadjar and Samuel, 2015) and equality of educational opportunity and schooling outcomes has been shown to be lower than in the Nordic countries (West and Nikolai, 2013).

Coming to the Southern European countries, this group can be characterized by its dualist system of welfare provision that strongly differentiates between insiders and outsiders (Eikemo *et al.,* 2008a). Compared to the Continental European country group, individual welfare is even more dependent on family support (Saraceno, 2008) and income inequality is much higher (Schuck and Steiber, 2018). In terms of equality of schooling outcomes and educational opportunity, the Mediterranean systems can be placed between the highly equal Nordic countries and the hugely unequal Continental European countries (West and Nikolai, 2013).

Although the post-communist countries in the Baltic country group and the Visegrád Four both feature a rudimentary welfare provision, socio-economic differences give reason to a division into two distinct country groups (Schuck and Steiber, 2018). In particular, social inequality is lower in the Visegrád Four (Bohle and Greskovits, 2007). Concerning educational inequalities, only limited prospects for intergenerational social mobility can be expected from both country groups (see, e.g., Kogan, Gebel and Noelke, 2012).

Based on the differences in the institutional setup of these six country groups (Southern European countries, Nordic countries, Continental European countries, Visegrád Four, and Baltic countries), the following hypotheses regarding cross-national differences in the well-being implications of social mobility can be derived (see further Schuck and Steiber, 2018).

First, education-based well-being gradients are expected to differ between country groups based on the level of equality and degree to which welfare states feature redistributive and decommodifying elements. In particular, well-being gradients can be expected to be weaker in more equal societies and in those country groups where welfare states feature strongly redistributive and decommodifying welfare states. The underlying reasoning is based on the assumption that social status will be less relevant for individual well-being where income inequality is low, since education-based income differentials will also be small. Moreover, education-based well-being gradients can be expected to be smaller in those country groups where welfare states are universal and aim at mitigating the influence of social status on individual well-being. In terms of the previously defined country groups and their institutional setup, this translates into the expectation of weaker education-based well-being gradients in the Nordic countries, the Visegréd Four, and Continental Europe, whereas the largest education-based well-being gradients are expected for the Southern European country group, the Anglo-Saxon countries, and the Baltic States.

Second, the relative importance of one's own and parental education is expected to differ between country groups based on their level of equality and degree of decommodification. In particular, the relative importance of parental education as opposed to one's own education is expected to be higher in contexts of high inequality. Assuming that an individual's well-being is decisively shaped by parental resources during childhood and adolescence, a context of high inequality may enforce a strong link between these important resources and parental education, thus leading to a greater relative weight of parental education in those societies. Moreover, the relative importance of parental as opposed to one's own education is expected to be greater in weakly decommodifying welfare states, since individuals are more often forced to rely on the subsidiary function of family resources. Examples thereof may be cases like illness or unemployment where weakly decommodifying welfare states do not necessarily protect an individual's well-being. Considering that this study focusses on young adults, this mechanism may be even more relevant when weak decommodification is combined with high levels of youth unemployment. Applied to the previously defined country groups, a greater relevance of parental education as opposed to own education, i.e. a greater relative weight of social origin, is expected in the Southern European country group, the Anglo-Saxon countries

and the Baltic States. Among these three country groups, the weight of social origin is assumed to be particularly high in the Southern European group, where high levels of youth unemployment are combined with a comparatively heavy reliance on kinship solidarity. On the other end of the spectrum, the relative weight of parental education is expected to be least pronounced in the Nordic countries.

Third, the importance of net mobility effects (i.e., controlling for origin and destination effects) is expected to vary across country groups based on the importance attached to status and the prevalence of intergenerational mobility. Such net mobility effects may be conceptualised as a psychological phenomenon that is not driven by status-based inequalities in well-being enhancing resources. They are effects that go beyond origin and destination effects and remain when accounting for them (Sobel, 1985). In other words, net mobility effects are those psychological effects on well-being that are found on top of the positive or negative well-being effects of originating from and arriving in a higher or lower social status position. It can be assumed that such psychological mobility effects will be strongest in those country groups that attribute a greater importance to social status. In regards to the countries under investigation, such psychological mobility effects are expected to be strongest in the conservative welfare states of Continental Europe and in the Anglo-Saxon world, where status maintenance and class are of central importance for identity. Finally, net mobility effects may be less noticeable in those country groups where the prevalence of intergenerational mobility is high (Goldthorpe, 1980; Newman, 1999), i.e. mobility is rather the normative expectation than the exception (Schuck and Steiber, 2018). Applied to the previously defined country groups, this would mean less pronounced net mobility effects in the Southern European and Anglo-Saxon countries.

Table 5.2 summarises the macro-level hypotheses on the well-being implications of upward and downward social mobility (see also Schuck and Steiber, 2018):

Table 5.2: Macro-level hypotheses on well-being implications of social mobility

Well-being implication	*Expectation*
Education-based well-being gradients	Weaker gradients in more equal societies and strongly redistributive and decommodifying welfare states (Nordic countries, Visegrád Four, Continental Europe)
Relative importance of one's own and parental education	Greater relative weight of origin status in unequal societies, weakly decommodifying welfare states and where low levels of decommodification are combined with high levels of youth unemployment (Southern Europe, Anglo-Saxon countries, Baltic States)
Strength of net mobility effects	Stronger net mobility effects where status maintenance and class are of central importance for identity (Continental Europe, Anglo-Saxon countries) – weaker net effects where mobility rates are high (Southern Europe, Anglo-Saxon countries)

5.4 Research design

5.4.1 Data and sample

I use pooled data from the European Social Survey Rounds 4 to 7 collected via face-to-face interviews from 2008-2014 (ESS ERIC, 2017). Given its comparable design in all participating countries, it provides the unique opportunity to study cross-national differences in the well-being correlates of intergenerational educational mobility. The analytical sample includes data from 18 European countries and is restricted to respondents aged 25-34, not currently in full-time education (i.e., those likely to have attained their final level of education).[16] Since one of the outcomes of interest, psychological distress, is only available in ESS Rounds 6 and 7, the analytical sample was severely reduced by that for all analyses focussing on this item. The final sample comprises all valid cases of young Europeans providing information about their own and their parents' educational attainment with no missing information for the respective outcome of interest.[17]

[16] I only include countries that have participated in at least two rounds.
[17] The sample size varies depending on which of the three outcomes is used. For psychological distress, the sample is around 8,000 individuals, since this variable was only collected in ESS Rounds 6 and 7. For self-reported general health, the sample size is around 16,000. For life satisfaction, sample size is around 14,000 young people.

5.4.2 Measures

The central explanatory variables are one's own educational attainment, parental educational attainment, and intergenerational educational mobility as the comparison between the two (i.e. distinguishing between non-mobility, downward mobility, and upward mobility). Educational attainment is measured using a reduced form of the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) which was explicitly designed for cross-country comparative analysis in Europe (ES-ISCED, cf., Schneider, 2010). I distinguish three educational levels: below upper secondary education comprising ES-ISCED levels I and II ('low'), upper secondary and post-secondary, non-tertiary education comprising ES-ISCED levels IIIa, IIIb, and IV ('medium'), and tertiary education consisting of ES-ISCED levels V1 and V2 ('high'). Parental educational attainment was assessed by combining information from the mother and father at the time when the respondent was 14 years old. I use the higher of the two attainment levels. For those with missing information on one parent, the information on the other parent is used. Intergenerational mobility is captured by a categorical variable distinguishing the non-mobile (i.e., same educational attainment as parents), from the upwardly mobile (i.e., more highly educated than parents), and the downwardly mobile (i.e., less highly educated than parents).

In order to provide a broad picture of well-being implications, I employ three different measures that have been frequently used in previous research: subjective well-being, self-reported general health and psychological distress.

Subjective well-being (SWB) comprises a broad set of correlated concepts like people's emotional and cognitive evaluations of their lives, their happiness, or judgements of life satisfaction (Diener *et al.,* 1999). I employ a single-item measure of general life satisfaction as dependent variable. It is based on participants' responses to the question, *'All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?'* where 0 means *'extremely dissatisfied'* and 10 *'extremely satisfied'*. Prior research has commonly used life satisfaction as a measure of SWB (e.g., Hadjar and Samuel, 2015) thus allowing for a comparison with previous estimates.

Self-reported general health is measured based on the survey participant's self-assessment with regard to the question '*How is your (physical and mental) health in general?'*. Possible answers were '*very good'*, '*good*', *'fair'*, '*bad*', and *'very bad'* and have been

recoded so that higher scores indicate better health levels (range: 1-5). Due to its use in prior research, comparisons with previous findings are possible (see, e.g., Eikemo *et al.,* 2008b; Campos-Matos and Kawachi, 2015).

Psychological distress is measured by the 8-item short version of the Center for Epidemiologic Studies-Depression Scale (CES-D8) (Radloff, 1977). The CES-D8 scale has been frequently used by previous studies as a general measure of psychological distress (see, e.g., Houle and Martin, 2011), both in its full and its abbreviated version. It captures various aspects of mental health such as positive and negative emotions, sleep quality and energy levels and has been shown to have reliability and validity when using the items to compare mental health differences of men and women across countries (Bracke, Levecque and Van de Velde, 2008). For the purpose of this study, the CES-D8 scale is built as a non-weighted summary index based on the answers to eight questions (see Table 5.3).[18] Responses were assessed on 4-point Likert scales ranging from 0 to 3, and have been reversed for the purpose of a more intuitive interpretation. Accordingly, the CES-D8 ranges from 0 to 24, with higher scores indicating a higher level of psychological distress.

Table 5.3: The CES-D8 scale as used in the European Social Survey Rounds 6 and 7

I will now read out a list of the ways you might have felt or behaved during the past week. Using this card, please tell me how much of the time during the past week…
Answer categories are: almost all of the time (3), most of the time (2), some of the time (1), almost none of the time (0).
…you felt depressed?
…you felt that everything you did was an effort?
…your sleep was restless?
…you were happy?
…you felt lonely?
…you enjoyed life?
…you felt sad?
…you could not get going?

[18] Missing values are dealt with using respondent mean substitution on the condition that respondents had answered at least five items of the scale. Individuals with missing values on more than three out of eight items have been excluded from the analyses.

5.4.3 Analytic strategy

All empirical analyses use a stratified approach, i.e. the 18 European countries under investigation are grouped into six country groups (see Chapter 5.3.2 for details on the country grouping).[19]

As the first step, I replicate previous findings from mobility research using a conventional regression framework. This includes models estimating mobility effects while controlling for parental attainment (origin status), and models estimating mobility effects while controlling for one's own attainment (destination status) for all three well-being outcomes. All models control for sex, age, country, citizenship, membership in minority ethnic group, and ESS round.[20] As outlined above, these kinds of models – and conclusions drawn from their respective results – fail to tackle the challenge posed by the linear dependency of origin, destination and mobility indicators. Omitting one of the three variables of interest (origin, destination, and mobility) leads to uncertainty about what drives the observed effects of the remaining two. Results from such standard regression models that have been applied in prior studies will serve to show how model selection influences estimates of mobility effects and how different specifications lead to radically different findings.

In the second step, I estimate mobility effects using diagonal reference models (see Chapter 3.3). These DRMs are grounded in sociological theory and allow for a simultaneous modelling of origin, destination and mobility effects (Hendrickx *et al.,* 1993) while breaking their linear dependency. In mobility theory it is argued that an individual's characteristics and behaviours are affected by both origin and destination status (Blau, 1956; Blau and Duncan, 1967). DRMs take this as a starting point for model specification, assuming that the outcome of interest for mobile individuals is shaped by their origin and destination status. Non-mobile persons, i.e. those located in the diagonal cells of a mobility table, are assumed to build the core of a social position and to best reflect the

[19] With limited sample sizes for individual countries as well as the limited number of countries available for analysis, a multilevel approach is not appropriate here (Bryan and Jenkins, 2016; Stegmueller, 2013; Maas and Hox, 2005). A sample size of 18 countries lies by far below the recommended number of units at level 2. Several simulation studies (Stegmueller, 2013; Maas and Hox, 2005) have shown that undercutting this threshold has negative effects on the accuracy of parameter estimates and standard errors.

[20] Since I am interested in the overall effects of intergenerational mobility, I do not control for potential mechanisms that might mediate the relationship between mobility and well-being, such as e.g. financial satisfaction.

characteristics of that position (Sorokin, 1959: 509f.). Therefore, the non-mobiles are modelled as the primary reference group for mobile individuals.

Applied to the research question of this chapter, DRMs model respondents' well-being as the weighted sum of the estimated mean well-being scores in the non-mobile origin group (μ_{ii}) and the non-mobile destination group (μ_{jj}). The parameters q and (1-q) denote the influence of parental and one's own education, and are bounded by the value 1. They can be regarded as weights for the relative importance of origin and destination for the respondents' well-being Y_{ijk} (Monden and de Graaf, 2013: 982). The functional form looks as follows:

$$Y_{ijk} = q * \mu_{ii} + (1 - q) * \mu_{jj} \ + e_{ijk} \quad (1)$$

$$Y_{ijk} = q * \mu_{ii} + (1 - q) * \mu_{jj} \ + \beta_1 * UP + \ \beta_2 * DOWN + e_{ijk} \quad (2)$$

(1) is the baseline model examining the association between parental education (origin status), one's own education (destination status), and the respondent's well-being and (2) is an extension thereof including the dummy variables UP and DOWN that capture intergenerational mobility. For each country group, two nested models are estimated. All models include the same control variables used in the conventional regression framework earlier. The Akaike Information Criterion and the likelihood ratio test are used to assess model fit.

5.5 Empirical results

5.5.1 Descriptives

Table 5.4 shows the distribution of intergenerational educational mobility and the three outcomes of interest for each country group. Similar to what is known from previous studies on broader age groups (Böhnke, 2008), average life satisfaction is highest in the Nordic countries and lowest in the Baltic States. With regard to psychological distress, the estimates are in line with earlier studies that found highest risks for depressive symptoms in Continental, Eastern and Southern Europe, and lowest risks in the Nordic countries (Eikemo *et al.,* 2016). Self-reported general health is highest in the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries and lowest in Continental Europe and the Baltic States. These

Table 5.4: Composition of country groups

Group name	*Nordic*		*Continental*		*Southern*		*Anglo-Saxon*		*Visegrád 4*		*Baltic States*	
Countries	*DK, FI, SE, NO*		*BE, FR, DE, NL*		*ES, PT*		*GB, IE*		*CZ, HI, PL, SK*		*EE, LT*	
	Mean	(SD)	Mean	(SD)	Mean	(SD)	Mean	(SD)	Mean	(SD)	Mean	(SD)
Life satisfaction *(range: 0-10)*												
	7.99	(0.03)	7.08	(0.05)	7.09	(0.05)	7.21	(0.08)	7.09	(0.05)	6.59	(0.10)
Self-reported general health *(range:1-5)*												
	4.25	(0.02)	4.02	(0.02)	4.12	(0.02)	4.29	(0.03)	4.14	(0.01)	4.01	(0.03)
Psychological distress *(range: 0-24)*												
	4.45	(0.08)	5.02	(0.09)	5.58	(0.15)	4.70	(0.13)	5.32	(0.11)	5.36	(0.11)
Parents' educational attainment (O)												
Low	0.16		0.24		0.69		0.40		0.28		0.10	
Medium	0.46		0.57		0.16		0.36		0.56		0.59	
High	0.38		0.19		0.15		0.24		0.15		0.31	
One's own educational attainment (D)												
Low	0.07		0.13		0.39		0.22		0.14		0.12	
Medium	0.50		0.61		0.26		0.38		0.54		0.47	
High	0.44		0.26		0.35		0.41		0.33		0.41	
Mobility (M)												
Upward	0.29		0.29		0.42		0.38		0.35		0.25	
Downward	0.16		0.13		0.08		0.12		0.07		0.18	
Non-mobile	0.54		0.57		0.50		0.50		0.57		0.57	

Notes: Abbreviations: O-origin, D-destination, M-mobility.
Source: ESS4-7 (ESS6-7 for outcome psychological distress), weighted results based on own calculations.

findings also correspond to previous studies for the general population that found the highest levels of self-rated health in the Nordic and Anglo-Saxon countries, and comparably low levels in the Southern and Eastern European countries (Eikemo *et al.,* 2008a).

Coming to the explanatory variables of interest, I find that in all country groups, intergenerational stability is the most common mobility status – a fact that is in line with the assumption of DRMs that the group of non-mobiles forms the core of a class. Moreover, it underlines the well-established fact that education has a strong tendency to be reproduced across generations (OECD, 2014: 87ff.). Upward mobility is most common in Southern Europe (42%) and least common in the Baltic States (25%). Downward mobility, in turn, is most prevalent in the Baltic States (18%) and the Nordic countries (16%). Upward mobility is thus found to be far more common than downward mobility in all country groups – a finding that corresponds with earlier findings for the broader set of OECD countries (OECD, 2014: 87).

5.5.2 Conventional regression models

In the following, I estimate mobility effects while either controlling for parental attainment (origin status, see Panels 1, Table 5.5 – Table 5.7) or one's own educational attainment (destination status, see Panels 2, Table 5.5 – Table 5.7) for all three well-being outcomes and using a conventional regression framework. This replication of previous findings will serve to show how model selection (in particular, whether it is controlled for origin or destination status) influences the effects of intergenerational educational mobility.

Panel 1 in Table 5.5 presents the results of conventional regression models regressing life satisfaction on intergenerational educational mobility while controlling for parental education (omitting one's own education). Concerning origin effects, I find parental education to have a substantial impact on an offspring's well-being in all but the Nordic countries. In line with previous studies (e.g., Campos-Matos and Kawachi, 2015) I find positive well-being effects of upward mobility and the reverse for downward mobility in all country groups. Yet, as outlined earlier, these estimates of mobility effects are confounded by the influence of one's own status attainment on well-being (which has not been controlled for in the model).

Panel 2 in Table 5.5 presents the results of conventional regression models regressing life satisfaction on mobility while controlling for one's own education (omitting parental education). Concerning destination effects, I find one's own education to have the lowest explanatory power in the Nordic countries. Results concerning estimates of mobility effects are radically different compared to the first approach (Panel 1 in Table 5.5). I find negative effects of upward mobility in the Baltic States and counterintuitively, positive well-being effects of downward mobility in Anglo-Saxon countries, the Visegrád Four and the Baltic States. This owes to the fact that parental education (i.e. the origin effect) is not controlled for in these models, rendering strongly biased estimates of mobility effects.

Moving on to psychological distress, Panels 1 and 2 in Table 5.6 illustrate a similar divergence of mobility effects, depending on whether the linear regression models control for origin or destination status. Regressing psychological distress on intergenerational educational mobility while controlling for parental education (Panel 1 in Table 5.6) results in negative effects for the upwardly mobile, and positive effects for the downwardly mobiles. In other words, the estimates suggest that upwardly mobiles have lower levels of psychological distress, and downwardly mobiles have higher levels of psychological distress when compared to non-mobiles.

In contrast, regressing psychological distress on intergenerational educational mobility while controlling for one's own education (Panel 2 in Table 5.6) results in completely different mobility effects. While in Panel 1 mobility effects were almost all statistically significant, in Panel 2 all except one mobility effect lost their statistical significance. Even more important, I now find positive effects for upwardly mobile individuals, i.e. higher levels of psychological distress, in four out of six country groups. Similarly, the estimates now suggest downwardly mobiles to have lower levels of psychological distress than non-mobiles in four out of six country groups. Thus, mobility effects in Panel 1 and 2 (Table 5.6) are again radically differing from each other.

A similar picture is finally found with the linear regression models for self-reported general health. As visible in Panels 1 and 2 in Table 5.7, mobility effects differ radically depending on whether the models control for either parental education (omitting one's own education) or one's own education (omitting parental education). In the former case,

I find positive effects for upwardly mobiles and negative effects for downwardly mobile individuals across all six country groups. Accordingly, those who succeeded to exceed their parents' educational level report a better health than individuals who only maintained their parents' educational level. And people who arrived at a lower educational level than their parents report a lower level of health compared to non-mobile individuals.

These findings for mobility effects again change substantially when models control for one's own educational attainment (Panel 2 in Table 5.7). Here, only mobility effects in the Baltic States remain statistically significant. Apart from that, the signs of mobility effects again change their direction in five out of six country groups, so that upward mobility is suddenly associated with lower levels of health, and downward mobility with higher levels of health.

As outlined above, the kinds of models that have been presented here as a replication of approaches in earlier studies are not able to disentangle the effects of social mobility, social origin and social destination. Therefore, conclusions drawn from their respective results have to be considered biased. I refrain from replicating a third regression approach that was applied in previous mobility effects research. Such studies model both origin and destination effects, and mobility effects, thus leading to over-identified models. Instead, I finally turn to DRMs, 'the only acceptable method to model mobility effects' (Houle, 2011: 764).

Table 5.5: Estimates from linear regression models (outcome: life satisfaction)

Panel 1: *'Mobility effects', controlling for parental education (omitting one's own education)*

	Nordic		*Continental*		*Southern*		*Anglo-Saxon*		*Visegrád 4*		*Baltic States*	
	β	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*
***'Mobility'** (Ref.: Non-mobile)*												
Upward	0.14	0.08	**0.53**	0.08	**0.45**	0.09	**0.67**	0.11	**0.63**	0.09	**0.86**	0.14
Downward	**-0.21**	0.09	**-0.63**	0.10	-0.38	0.20	-0.35	0.18	**-0.39**	0.14	**-0.59**	0.15
***Parents' educational attainment** (Ref.: Low)*												
Medium	0.10	0.09	**0.49**	0.08	0.24	0.13	**0.76**	0.11	**0.53**	0.10	**1.03**	0.20
High	**0.25**	0.12	**1.10**	0.11	**0.63**	0.16	**1.25**	0.16	**1.32**	0.14	**2.04**	0.22
Intercept	**7.23**	0.36	**7.70**	0.35	**6.09**	0.53	**4.80**	0.55	**5.72**	0.41	**4.28**	0.61
ESS round	yes		yes		yes		yes		yes		yes	
Country	yes		yes		yes		yes		yes		yes	
N	2,699		4,032		2,102		1,813		3,931		1,473	
Adj. R-sq	0.02		0.09		0.07		0.07		0.09		0.10	

Panel 2: *'Mobility effects', controlling for one's own education (omitting parental education)*

	Nordic		*Continental*		*Southern*		*Anglo-Saxon*		*Visegrád 4*		*Baltic States*	
	β	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*
***'Mobility'** (Ref.: Non-mobile)*												
Upward	-0.01	0.07	-0.08	0.07	0.02	0.13	-0.10	0.11	-0.11	0.09	-0.22	0.14
Downward	-0.05	0.09	-0.04	0.10	-0.08	0.18	**0.36**	0.18	**0.30**	0.13	**0.50**	0.17
***One's own educational attainment** (Ref.: Low)*												
Medium	0.23	0.13	**0.55**	0.10	**0.37**	0.14	**0.66**	0.14	**0.48**	0.13	**0.98**	0.20
High	**0.35**	0.14	**1.07**	0.11	**0.59**	0.14	**1.33**	0.16	**1.27**	0.15	**2.02**	0.22
Intercept	**7.13**	0.37	**7.68**	0.36	**6.06**	0.53	**4.92**	0.55	**5.78**	0.41	**4.28**	0.61
ESS round	yes		yes		yes		yes		yes		yes	
Country	yes		yes		yes		yes		yes		yes	
N	2,699		4,032		2,102		1,813		3,931		1,473	
Adj. R-sq	0.03		0.09		0.07		0.07		0.09		0.10	

Notes: In addition to ESS round and country, all models control for age, sex, citizenship, and membership of minority ethnic group. Numbers (effects) in bold indicate significant effects ($p<0.05$). 'Mobility' refers to effects of mobility that are confounded by one's own attainment (Panel 1) or parental attainment (Panel 2). *Source:* ESS4-7, own calculations.

Table 5.6: Estimates from linear regression models (outcome: psychological distress)

Panel 1: *'Mobility effects', controlling for parental education (omitting one's own education)*

	Nordic		*Continental*		*Southern*		*Anglo-Saxon*		*Visegrád 4*		*Baltic States*	
	β	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*
***'Mobility'** (Ref.: Non-mobile)*												
Upward	**-0.48**	0.23	**-0.92**	0.21	**-0.74**	0.30	**-0.87**	0.27	**-0.74**	0.25	**-0.67**	0.26
Downward	0.48	0.25	**0.96**	0.26	1.06	0.56	**0.47**	0.45	**1.24**	0.42	0.40	0.31
***Parents' educational attainment** (Ref.: Low)*												
Medium	**-0.76**	0.27	**-1.04**	0.23	-0.46	0.40	**-1.11**	0.27	**-0.59**	0.29	**-1.84**	0.40
High	**-1.19**	0.33	**-1.95**	0.29	-0.70	0.49	**-1.15**	0.39	**-1.48**	0.39	**-2.55**	0.45
Intercept	**6.13**	0.99	**7.17**	0.94	**7.47**	1.63	**6.41**	1.36	**8.64**	1.23	**7.56**	1.20
ESS round	yes		yes		yes		yes		yes		yes	
Country	yes		yes		yes		yes		yes		yes	
N	1,580		2,009		878		1,163		1,651		1,101	
Adj. R-sq	0.03		0.05		0.03		0.03		0.07		0.04	

Panel 2: *'Mobility effects', controlling for one's own education (omitting parental education)*

	Nordic		*Continental*		*Southern*		*Anglo-Saxon*		*Visegrád 4*		*Baltic States*	
	β	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*
***'Mobility'** (Ref.: Non-mobile)*												
Upward	0.20	0.19	0.21	0.19	-0.29	0.41	-0.05	0.27	0.08	0.27	0.33	0.27
Downward	-0.18	0.25	-0.16	0.27	0.64	0.50	-0.21	0.44	0.43	0.41	**-0.71**	0.33
***One's own educational attainment** (Ref.: Low)*												
Medium	**-1.30**	0.39	**-1.63**	0.28	-0.36	0.43	**-0.77**	0.35	**-0.78**	0.37	**-1.37**	0.41
High	**-1.86**	0.41	**-2.36**	0.31	-0.71	0.44	**-1.47**	0.39	**-1.53**	0.42	**-2.30**	0.46
Intercept	**6.60**	1.02	**7.60**	0.95	**7.49**	1.62	**6.06**	1.36	**8.69**	1.24	**7.20**	1.20
ESS round	yes		yes		yes		yes		yes		yes	
Country	yes		yes		yes		yes		yes		yes	
N	1,580		2,009		878		1,163		1,651		1,101	
Adj. R-sq	0.03		0.06		0.03		0.02		0.07		0.03	

Notes: In addition to ESS round and country, all models control for age, sex, citizenship, and membership of minority ethnic group. Numbers (effects) in bold indicate significant effects ($p<0.05$). 'Mobility' refers to effects of mobility that are confounded by one's own attainment (Panel 1) or parental attainment (Panel 2). *Source:* ESS6-7, own calculations.

Table 5.7: Estimates from linear regression models (outcome: self-reported general health)

Panel 1: *'Mobility effects', controlling for parental education (omitting one's own education)*

	Nordic		*Continental*		*Southern*		*Anglo-Saxon*		*Visegrád 4*		*Baltic States*	
	β	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*
***'Mobility'** (Ref.: Non-mobile)*												
Upward	**0.22**	0.04	**0.20**	0.03	**0.11**	0.03	**0.20**	0.04	**0.13**	0.03	**0.14**	0.05
Downward	**-0.29**	0.04	**-0.15**	0.04	-0.11	0.07	**-0.17**	0.07	**-0.25**	0.05	**-0.15**	0.05
***Parents' educational attainment** (Ref.: Low)*												
Medium	**0.14**	0.05	**0.18**	0.03	0.07	0.05	**0.26**	0.04	**0.16**	0.04	**0.28**	0.07
High	**0.46**	0.06	**0.38**	0.04	**0.21**	0.06	**0.34**	0.06	**0.34**	0.05	**0.49**	0.08
Intercept	**3.97**	0.18	**4.22**	0.14	**4.49**	0.19	**4.40**	0.20	**4.47**	0.14	**3.84**	0.21
ESS round	yes		yes		yes		yes		yes		yes	
Country	yes		yes		yes		yes		yes		yes	
N	2,699		4,034		2,113		1,822		3,944		1,477	
Adj. R-sq	0.04		0.05		0.02		0.06		0.05		0.05	

Panel 2: *'Mobility effects', controlling for one's own education (omitting parental education)*

	Nordic		*Continental*		*Southern*		*Anglo-Saxon*		*Visegrád 4*		*Baltic States*	
	β	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*
***'Mobility'** (Ref.: Non-mobile)*												
Upward	-0.05	0.03	-0.02	0.03	0.02	0.05	-0.03	0.04	-0.05	0.03	**-0.10**	0.05
Downward	0.00	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.02	0.07	0.02	0.06	-0.06	0.05	**0.13**	0.06
***One's own educational attainment** (Ref.: Low)*												
Medium	**0.21**	0.07	**0.17**	0.04	0.03	0.05	**0.26**	0.05	**0.20**	0.04	**0.34**	0.07
High	**0.47**	0.07	**0.38**	0.04	**0.16**	0.05	**0.42**	0.06	**0.36**	0.05	**0.56**	0.08
Intercept	**3.92**	0.18	**4.22**	0.14	**4.48**	0.19	**4.42**	0.20	**4.46**	0.14	**3.76**	0.21
ESS round	yes		yes		yes		yes		yes		yes	
Country	yes		yes		yes		yes		yes		yes	
N	2,699		4,034		2,113		1,822		3,944		1,477	
Adj. R-sq	0.04		0.05		0.02		0.06		0.05		0.06	

Notes: In addition to ESS round and country, all models control for age, sex, citizenship, and membership of minority ethnic group. Numbers (effects) in bold indicate significant effects ($p<0.05$). 'Mobility' refers to effects of mobility that are confounded by one's own attainment (Panel 1) or parental attainment (Panel 2). *Source:* ESS4-7, own calculations.

5.5.3 Diagonal reference models

Two nested DRMs were fitted for each country group and all three well-being outcomes (subjective well-being, psychological distress, and self-reported general health) consecutively. Concerning the education-based gradient of well-being in the group of non-mobiles (diagonal effects in Table 5.8) the baseline models (Models 1) show rising life satisfaction scores with educational attainment. Comparing country groups, the gradient is found to be most pronounced in the Baltic States and least pronounced in the Nordic countries. The weight parameters from Models 1 indicate whether young Europeans' life satisfaction is closer to their non-mobile counterparts in the destination or origin group. Across all country groups, I find respondents' destination to be more important for their life satisfaction than their origin. The relative weight of the origin status (parental education) is greatest in the Baltic States (q=0.33), followed by the Visegrád Four (q=0.26), and the Anglo-Saxon countries (q=0.25), whereas the influence of parental education is estimated to lie close to zero in the Nordic and the Southern European countries. However, it is important to note that even in the Baltic States, the influence of the destination status trumps the origin status (1-q=0.67).

Model 2 tests for the effects of intergenerational mobility over and above the effects of educational origin and destination, finally allowing mobility effects to be separated from mere level effects. For all but the Continental European countries, model fit statistics indicate that adding mobility indicators to the baseline model (comparing Model 2 with Model 1) does not provide a significantly better fit to the data. Accordingly, upward mobility and downward mobility effects (net of parental and one's own educational level, and controls) are shown to be non-significant, supporting the acculturation hypothesis. The exception is Continental Europe, where I find significant net mobility effects: downward mobility significantly reduces life satisfaction whereas upward mobility significantly increases it. Both upward and downward mobility effects are sizable in magnitude and supportive of the hypothesis of stronger psychological mobility effects in societies where status maintenance is important for social identity.[21]

[21] Given that the vast majority of intergenerational mobility trajectories happen between adjacent educational categories (see Table 5.14), differences in effects between shorter and longer range mobility

Estimates of the two nested DRMs for the outcome psychological distress are summarized in Table 5.9. Similar to the results for life satisfaction, the baseline models show decreasing psychological distress with higher educational attainment across all country groups (diagonal effects in baseline Models 1). This educational gradient of psychological distress in the group of non-mobiles is most pronounced in the Baltic States, and least pronounced in the Southern European countries. Weight parameters in Models 1 furthermore indicate that the young Europeans' level of psychological distress is closer to their non-mobile counterparts in the destination group since the relative weight of origin status (parental education) is estimated to lie close to zero in all country groups except the Baltic States. The Baltic States constitute the exception since they are the only country group where the relative weight of origin status (parental education) is higher than the relative weight of destination status (own education). Accordingly, the level of psychological distress among young people from the Baltic States is closer to their non-mobile counterparts in the origin group than in the destination group.

Subsequently, Model 2 tests for the effects of intergenerational mobility on psychological distress over and above the effects of educational origin and destination. With respect to model fit statistics, I find that adding mobility indicators to the baseline models does not lead to a statistically significant improvement in model fit in any of the six country groups. Mobility effects thus do not seem to shape the young Europeans' levels of psychological distress over and above parental and one's own educational level. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, however, model fit improvement is at least marginally significant (i.e., on a 10 % level) and the estimates furthermore show statistically significant negative effects for upward mobility. In other words, the young Anglo-Saxons' psychological experience of exceeding their parents' educational level is associated with a statistically significant lower level of psychological distress. Since model fit improvement is only marginally significant, I take this as weak support of the previously proposed H3 where I expected stronger psychological effects in societies where status maintenance is crucial

trajectories (e.g., mobility from high to medium versus mobility from high to low levels of education) could – although theoretically interesting – not be investigated further.

for social identity. In all other country groups, I do not find statistically significant mobility effects, which is in line with the lack of model fit improvement by adding mobility indicators to the baseline models.

Moving on to the third outcome, self-reported general health, results from the two nested DRMs for each country group are presented in Table 5.10. With respect to the education-based gradient of self-reported general health in the group of non-mobiles (diagonal effects), the baseline models (Models 1) show rising general health levels with educational attainment. Comparing country groups, I find the gradient to be most pronounced in the Baltic States, and least pronounced in Southern European countries. Concerning the relative importance of parental or one's own education for general health, the weight estimates from Model 1 give a very clear picture. In all country groups, the respondent's destination status (their own education) is more important for his or her self-reported general health level than their origin (parental education). Although destination status plays the dominant role in all country groups, it is noticeable that the relative weight of parental education (origin status) is greatest in the Baltic States (q=0.38), and lowest in the Visegréd Four (q=0.11).

But how does intergenerational educational mobility shape self-reported levels of general health, over and above the level-effects of social origin and social destination? Models 2 can shed light on this question. Looking at the model fit statistics, it becomes clear that for all but the Nordic countries, model fit does not improve significantly by adding mobility indicators to the baseline models (Models 1). Thus, the effects of experiencing upward or downward mobility are shown to be non-significant when controlling for parental and one's own educational level. The Nordic countries represent the exception, since I find both a significant model improvement and significant net mobility effects there: downward mobility significantly reduces the general health level whereas upward mobility significantly decreases them. This finding is admittedly surprising since it is not in line with the previously depicted hypothesis of stronger psychological mobility effects in societies where status maintenance is crucial for social identity and weaker psychological mobility effects in societies with higher social fluidity.

Table 5.8: Estimates from DRM (outcome: life satisfaction)

	Nordic				*Continental*				*Southern*				*Anglo-Saxon*				*Visegrád 4*				*Baltic States*			
	Model 1		*Model 2*		*Model 1*		*Model 2*		*Model 1*		*Model 2*		*Model 1*		*Model 2*		*Model 1*		*Model 2*		*Model 1*		*Model 2*	
	β	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*
Weights [1]																								
O (q)	0.00	0.25	0.00	0.00	0.14	0.08	**0.75**	0.24	0.00	0.00	0.55	0.48	**0.25**	0.09	0.42	0.26	**0.26**	0.09	0.28	0.25	**0.33**	0.08	**0.59**	0.29
D (1-q)	**1.00**	0.25	**1.00**	0.00	**0.86**	0.08	0.25	0.24	**1.00**	0.00	0.45	0.48	**0.75**	0.09	**0.58**	0.26	**0.74**	0.09	**0.72**	0.25	**0.67**	0.08	0.41	0.29
Net Mobility (Ref.: non-mobile)																								
Upward			-0.01	0.07			**0.37**	0.17			0.26	0.23			0.23	0.23			0.08	0.20			0.43	0.34
Downward			-0.05	0.09			**-0.48**	0.17			-0.23	0.24			0.04	0.26			0.09	0.22			-0.14	0.37
Diagonal [2] ***(Ref.: Low education level)***																								
Medium	0.24	0.14	0.23	0.13	**0.58**	0.11	**0.50**	0.10	**0.38**	0.10	0.28	0.19	**0.74**	0.15	**0.77**	0.15	**0.41**	0.14	**0.43**	0.14	**1.01**	0.23	**1.11**	0.24
High	**0.38**	0.14	**0.35**	0.14	**1.13**	0.11	**1.11**	0.11	**0.61**	0.11	**0.63**	0.15	**1.39**	0.16	**1.38**	0.16	**1.28**	0.15	**1.28**	0.15	**2.06**	0.23	**2.12**	0.24
Intercept	**7.57**	0.38	**7.60**	0.38	**7.00**	0.36	**7.07**	0.36	**7.39**	0.52	**7.41**	0.52	**5.57**	0.54	**5.47**	0.54	**6.02**	0.42	**5.98**	0.42	**4.78**	0.61	**4.63**	0.62
AIC	9,912		9,914		16,550		16,547		8,833		8,838		7,653		7,655		16,941		16,944		6,241		6,243	
Pr(>Chi)[3]	0.57				**0.03**				0.87				0.43				0.57				0.27			
N	2,699				4,032				2,102				1,813				3,931				1,473			

Notes: All models control for age, sex, country, citizenship, membership of minority ethnic group, and ESS round.
Numbers (effects) in bold indicate significant effects ($p<0.05$).
[1]O pertains to parental educational attainment; D to one's own educational attainment.
[2]Educational gradient estimated for non-mobile individuals; effects for reference group (low education level) are fixed at zero.
[3]P-value of likelihood ratio test comparing Model 2 and Model 1.
Source: ESS4-7, own calculations.

Table 5.9: Estimates from DRM (outcome: psychological distress)

	Nordic				*Continental*				*Southern*				*Anglo-Saxon*				*Visegrád 4*				*Baltic States*			
	Model 1		*Model 2*		*Model 1*		*Model 2*		*Model 1*		*Model 2*		*Model 1*		*Model 2*		*Model 1*		*Model 2*		*Model 1*		*Model 2*	
	β	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*
Weights [1]																								
O (q)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.14	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.49	1.33	0.08	0.22	**1.00**	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.43	0.77	**0.56**	0.13	**0.71**	0.24
D (1-q)	**1.00**	0.00	**1.00**	0.00	**0.86**	0.10	**1.00**	0.00	**1.00**	0.00	0.51	1.33	**0.92**	0.22	0.00	0.00	**1.00**	0.00	0.57	0.77	**0.44**	0.13	0.29	0.24
Net Mobility (Ref.: non-mobile)																								
Upward			0.20	0.19			0.20	0.19			-0.49	0.79			**-0.87**	0.27			-0.26	0.69			-0.41	0.33
Downward			-0.18	0.25			-0.16	0.27			0.86	0.74			0.47	0.45			0.77	0.74			0.04	0.43
Diagonal [2] ***(Ref.: Low education level)***																								
Medium	**-1.20**	0.38	**-1.30**	0.39	**-1.69**	0.30	**-1.63**	0.28	-0.53	0.32	-0.41	0.56	**-0.84**	0.36	**-1.11**	0.27	**-0.84**	0.35	-0.68	0.40	**-2.08**	0.49	**-2.12**	0.50
High	**-1.67**	0.38	**-1.86**	0.41	**-2.37**	0.31	**-2.36**	0.31	**-0.98**	0.35	-0.77	0.48	**-1.53**	0.39	**-1.15**	0.39	**-1.58**	0.36	**-1.51**	0.41	**-2.71**	0.48	**-2.75**	0.49
Intercept	**6.03**	1.01	**6.21**	1.02	**8.66**	0.96	**8.62**	0.96	**7.01**	1.62	**6.82**	1.64	**6.91**	1.35	**7.21**	1.35	**9.66**	1.23	**9.51**	1.24	**7.24**	1.19	**7.40**	1.21
AIC	8,203		8,205		10,856		10,858		4,927		4,930		6,506		6,505		9,317		9,321		5,814		5,816	
Pr(>Chi)[3]	0.39				-0.39				0.40				0.09				0.73				0.40			
N	1,580		1,580		2,009		2,009		878		878		1,163		1,163		1,651		1,651		1,101		1,101	

Notes: All models control for age, sex, country, citizenship, membership of minority ethnic group, and ESS round.
Numbers (effects) in bold indicate significant effects ($p<0.05$).
[1]O pertains to parental educational attainment; D to one's own educational attainment.
[2]Educational gradient estimated for non-mobile individuals; effects for reference group (low education level) are fixed at zero.
[3]P-value of likelihood ratio test comparing Model 2 and Model 1.
Source: ESS6-7, own calculations.

Table 5.10: Estimates from DRM (outcome: self-reported general health)

	Nordic				*Continental*				*Southern*				*Anglo-Saxon*				*Visegrád 4*				*Baltic States*			
	Model 1		*Model 2*		*Model 1*		*Model 2*		*Model 1*		*Model 2*		*Model 1*		*Model 2*		*Model 1*		*Model 2*		*Model 1*		*Model 2*	
	β	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*
Weights [1]																								
O (q)	0.18	0.08	**0.81**	0.22	0.18	0.09	0.24	0.27	0.22	0.22	**0.52**	0.25	0.18	0.10	**0.52**	0.20	0.11	0.12	0.63	0.46	**0.38**	0.11	0.02	0.33
D (1-q)	**0.82**	0.08	0.19	0.22	**0.82**	0.09	**0.76**	0.27	**0.78**	0.22	0.48	0.25	**0.82**	0.10	**0.48**	0.20	**0.89**	0.12	0.37	0.46	**0.62**	0.11	**0.98**	0.33
Net Mobility (Ref.: non-mobile)																								
Upward			**0.17**	0.08			0.03	0.06			0.06	0.05			0.10	0.06			0.06	0.09			-0.09	0.10
Downward			**-0.23**	0.08			0.01	0.07			-0.03	0.07			-0.09	0.07			-0.18	0.09			0.13	0.10
Diagonal [2] ***(Ref.: Low education level)***																								
Medium	**0.20**	0.07	**0.12**	0.06	**0.16**	0.04	**0.17**	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.01	0.06	**0.29**	0.05	**0.31**	0.05	**0.21**	0.05	**0.17**	0.05	**0.37**	0.08	**0.35**	0.08
High	**0.48**	0.07	**0.45**	0.06	**0.39**	0.04	**0.39**	0.04	**0.20**	0.05	**0.21**	0.06	**0.43**	0.05	**0.40**	0.06	**0.36**	0.05	**0.35**	0.05	**0.56**	0.08	**0.56**	0.08
Intercept	**3.91**	0.18	**3.99**	0.18	**4.37**	0.14	**4.36**	0.14	**4.71**	0.19	**4.71**	0.19	**4.20**	0.19	**4.20**	0.19	**4.49**	0.14	**4.54**	0.14	**3.59**	0.21	**3.59**	0.21
AIC	6,036		6,033		8,988		8,991		4,570		4,572		3,980		3,982		8,526		8,525		3,121		3,124	
Pr(>Chi)[3]	**0.02**				0.77				0.38				0.36				0.10				0.45			
N	2,699				4,034				2,113				1,822				3,944				1,477			

Notes: All models control for age, sex, country, citizenship, membership of minority ethnic group, and ESS round.
Numbers (effects) in bold indicate significant effects ($p<0.05$).
[1]O pertains to parental educational attainment; D to one's own educational attainment.
[2]Educational gradient estimated for non-mobile individuals; effects for reference group (low education level) are fixed at zero.
[3]P-value of likelihood ratio test comparing Model 2 and Model 1.
Source: ESS4-7, own calculations.

5.6 Robustness tests

In addition to the previously shown analyses, several exemplary robustness tests have been conducted for the outcome life satisfaction. In particular, I estimated two nested DRM with a pooled sample of all 18 countries in order to assess the relative importance of one's own versus parental education (see Table 5.11). They can be seen as baseline models for the stratified analyses previously shown.

In line with the findings from the stratified analyses, the pooled model suggests that one's own education is relatively more important than parental education for young Europeans' life satisfaction. The education-based well-being gradient is substantial, with the highly educated having on average a 1.07 point higher life satisfaction score than their counterparts with low levels of education. With regard to net mobility effects, model fit statistics indicate a better fit of Model 2 as compared to Model 1. I find statistically significant positive upward mobility effects and statistically significant downward mobility effects, over and above origin and destination effects.

As shown in Table 5.8, DRM predict origin weights that lie on the boundaries of the theoretically possible interval of 0.00 to 1.00 for the Nordic and Southern European countries. In other words, the estimates indicate that parental education has no well-being effect in these two country groups. To test the robustness of this finding, I ran conventional linear models regressing life satisfaction on one's own and parental education. These models corroborate the finding from DRMs of very small and non-significant well-being effects of parental education for both country groups (see Table 5.12).

For a formal test of significance of differences in effects across country groups, I pooled all data from the 18 countries under investigation and tested interaction effects of the estimates for weights and diagonal effects with the country groups. I compared the fit of a series of nested models using likelihood ratio tests (see Table 5.13). Model A, the baseline model, includes only the basic control variables (age, sex, ESS round, citizenship, and minority group). Model B additionally includes dummy variables for the country groups and shows a significantly better model fit. Model C allows control variables to vary across country groups, again significantly improving the model fit. Model D tests

for significant differences between origin/destination weights across country groups. The significant improvement in model fit compared to model C suggests that the differences between country groups presented in this study are statistically significant. Model E additionally includes interaction effects between diagonal effects and country groups. The significant increase in model fit suggests significant differences in education-based well-being gradients across country groups. Given that model fit statistics suggest that Model 2, shown in Table 5.8 (i.e., the model including mobility dummies), shows a significantly poorer fit to the data than Model 1 in five out of six country groups, I refrain from carrying out a similar test of cross-country differences in net mobility effects.

Furthermore, I conducted sensitivity analyses using a 4-category education variable instead of the 3-category version used in the main analyses (see Table 5.15). I distinguish between basic education (less than lower secondary education comprising ES-ISCED level I), lower secondary education (ES-ISCED level II), higher secondary education (ES-ISCED levels IIIa, IIIb, and IV) and tertiary education (ES-ISCED levels V1 and V2). For the Nordic countries, the Visegrád Four, and the Baltic States, cell sizes for the lowest attainment level are, however, too small to allow for meaningful analysis (i.e., the number of respondents with only basic education is smaller than 25 in these country groups). Results for the three remaining country groups are found to be robust against this change in measurement.

Table 5.11: DRM using pooled data from all 18 countries (outcome: life satisfaction)

	Model 1		*Model 2*	
	β	*SE*	*β*	*SE*
Weights[1]				
O (q)	**0.17**	0.04	**0.53**	0.13
D (1-q)	**0.83**	0.04	**0.47**	0.13
Net Mobility *(Ref.: non-mobile)*				
Upward			**0.26**	0.09
Downward			**-0.20**	0.09
Diagonal [2] *(Ref.: Low education level)*				
Medium	**0.50**	0.05	**0.48**	0.06
High	**1.07**	0.06	**1.07**	0.06
Intercept	**6.60**	0.19	**6.60**	0.19
AIC	66,530		66,525	
Pr(>Chi)[3]	**0.01**			
N	16,050		16,050	

Notes: controls for age, sex, country, citizenship, membership of minority ethnic group, and ESS round.
Numbers (effects) in bold indicate significant effects ($p<0.05$).
[1]O pertains to parental educational attainment; D to one's own educational attainment.
[2]Educational gradient estimated for non-mobile individuals; effects for reference group (low education level) are fixed at zero.
[3]P-value of likelihood ratio test comparing Model 2 and Model 1.
Source: ESS4-7, own calculations.

Table 5.12: Effects of one's own and parental education (using linear regression; outcome: life satisfaction)

	Southern		*Nordic*	
	β	*SE*	*β*	*SE*
One's own educational attainment *(Ref.: Low)*				
Medium	**0.39**	0.11	0.25	0.13
High	**0.61**	0.12	**0.38**	0.14
Parents' educational attainment *(Ref.: Low)*				
Medium	-0.03	0.13	-0.02	0.09
High	0.00	0.15	-0.03	0.09
Intercept	**6.06**	0.53	**7.12**	0.37
ESS round	yes		yes	
Country	yes		yes	
N	2,102		2,699	
Adj. R-sq	0.07		0.02	

Notes: In addition to ESS round and country, models control for age, sex, citizenship, and membership of minority ethnic group. Numbers (effects) in bold indicate significant effects (p<0.05). Source: ESS4-7, own calculations.

Table 5.13: Overview of model fit – interaction effects (outcome: life satisfaction)

Model		*Resid. Df*	*Resid. Dev*	*Df*	*Deviance*	*Pr (>Chi)*
A	Baseline model including only basic controls [1]	16037	63723			
B	A + country group	16032	61407	5	2316.20	0.0000
C	B + interaction basic controls * country group	15993	60988	39	418.50	0.0000
D	C + interaction weights * country group	15989	60949	4	39.07	0.0364
E	D + interaction diagonal effects * country group	15978	60615	11	334.26	0.0000

Source: ESS4-7, own calculations. N=16,050.

[1] Basic controls include age, sex, ESS round, citizenship, and minority group

Notes: Model comparisons are based on likelihood ratio tests.

Table 5.14: Sample composition by country group – detailed

Group name Countries	*Nordic* *DK, FI, SE, NO*		*Continental* *BE, FR, DE, NL*		*Southern* *ES, PT*		*Anglo-Saxon* *GB, IE*		*Visegrád 4* *CZ, HI, PL, SK*		*Baltic States* *EE, LT*	
	Mean	n	Mean	n	Mean	n	Mean	n	Mean	n	Mean	n
Parents' educational attainment (O)												
Low	0.16	437	0.24	1,030	0.69	1,448	0.40	723	0.28	1,116	0.10	141
Medium	0.46	1,241	0.57	2,444	0.16	337	0.36	661	0.56	2,215	0.59	874
High	0.38	1,021	0.19	828	0.15	317	0.24	430	0.15	600	0.31	458
One's own educational attainment (D)												
Low	0.07	181	0.13	539	0.39	825	0.22	393	0.14	535	0.12	173
Medium	0.50	1,337	0.61	2,626	0.26	545	0.38	684	0.54	2,104	0.47	693
High	0.44	1,181	0.26	1,137	0.35	732	0.41	737	0.33	1,292	0.41	607
Mobility (M)												
Upward	0.29	794	0.29	1,262	0.42	892	0.38	687	0.35	1,391	0.25	370
Downward	0.16	441	0.13	568	0.08	160	0.12	212	0.07	284	0.18	266
Non-mobile	0.54	1,463	0.57	2,473	0.50	1,050	0.50	915	0.57	2,255	0.57	837
Detailed mobility trajectories (M)												
Upward (low -> high)	0.04	95	0.03	134	0.16	331	0.10	188	0.04	174	0.02	34
Upward (low -> medium)	0.09	255	0.14	606	0.18	381	0.13	242	0.14	539	0.05	67
Upward (medium -> high)	0.16	444	0.12	521	0.09	179	0.14	257	0.17	678	0.18	269
Downward (high -> low)	0.01	32	0.01	28	0.01	25	0.02	28	0.00	9	0.01	21
Downward (high -> medium)	0.13	347	0.07	318	0.03	71	0.06	111	0.04	152	0.09	133
Downward (medium -> low)	0.02	63	0.05	221	0.03	65	0.04	73	0.03	123	0.08	112
Non-mobile	0.54	1,463	0.57	2,473	0.50	1,050	0.50	915	0.57	2,255	0.57	837
N	2,699		4,032		2,102		1,813		3,931		1,473	

Source: ESS4-7, weighted results based on own calculations. Abbreviations: O-origin, D-destination, M-mobility. Sample refers to the analyses for the outcome 'life satisfaction'.

Table 5.15: Main DRM analyses using a 4-category education variable (outcome: life satisfaction)

	Continental				*Southern*				*Anglo-Saxon*			
	Model 1		*Model 2*		*Model 1*		*Model 2*		*Model 1*		*Model 2*	
	β	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*	*β*	*SE*
Weights[1]												
O (q)	0.14	0.08	**0.78**	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	**0.25**	0.09	**0.44**	0.19
D (1-q)	**0.86**	0.08	0.22	0.20	**1.00**	0.00	**1.00**	0.00	**0.75**	0.09	**0.56**	0.19
Net Mobility *(Ref.: non-mobile)*												
Upward			**0.43**	0.15			0.03	0.11			0.25	0.18
Downward			**-0.47**	0.15			0.07	0.18			0.03	0.22
Diagonal [2] *(Ref.: Basic education)*												
Lower secondary	0.00	0.23	0.24	0.16	0.05	0.15	0.03	0.17	0.05	0.27	0.10	0.25
Higher secondary	**0.58**	0.21	**0.69**	0.14	**0.42**	0.15	**0.39**	0.17	**0.77**	0.23	**0.90**	0.21
Tertiary	**1.13**	0.21	**1.30**	0.15	**0.64**	0.15	**0.63**	0.17	**1.42**	0.23	**1.50**	0.21
Intercept	**7.00**	0.39	**6.85**	0.37	**7.35**	0.54	**7.34**	0.54	**5.53**	0.57	**5.35**	0.56
AIC	16,552		16,547		8,835		8,839		7,655		7,657	
Pr(>Chi)[3]	**0.01**						0.92		0.35			
N	4,032				2,102				1,813			

Notes: All models control for age, sex, country, citizenship, membership of minority ethnic group, and ESS round.
Numbers (effects) in bold indicate significant effects ($p<0.05$).
[1]O pertains to parental educational attainment; D to one's own educational attainment.
[2]Educational gradient estimated for non-mobile individuals; effects for reference group (low education level) are fixed at zero.
[3]P-value of likelihood ratio test comparing Model 2 and Model 1.
Source: ESS4-7, own calculations.

5.7 Discussion and conclusion

This chapter applied state-of-the-art methodology to investigate the well-being implications of intergenerational educational mobility for young Europeans. Using diagonal reference models allowed to estimate genuine 'net' mobility effects, independent from the well-being effects of social origin (parental educational attainment) and social destination (own educational attainment). For three different well-being dimensions – life satisfaction, psychological distress, and self-reported general health – and six country groups formed of the 18 countries under investigation, this chapter investigated well-being implications of social mobility in a cross-country comparative perspective. In line with previous studies, there are considerable cross-country differences in intergenerational educational mobility. For example, Southern Europe stood out as the country group where rates of upward mobility are highest (42%) whereas downward mobility rates were found to be most prevalent in the Baltic States (18%).

Well-being was assumed to increase with levels of educational attainment all across Europe, but smaller education-based well-being gradients were expected in countries featuring high income equality and strongly redistributive and decommodifying welfare states. In line with these expectations, for the first out of three well-being measures, life satisfaction, the smallest gradient was found in the Nordic countries, where neither one's own nor parental education matter much for shaping young adults' subjective well-being. Also in line with such expectations, the strongest gradients regarding life satisfaction were found for the hugely unequal Baltic States. With regard to psychological distress, the second well-being measure under investigation, the educational gradient in the group of non-mobiles was found to be most pronounced in the Baltic States, again supporting the previously described expectations on cross-country variation. The weakest gradient for psychological distress was found in Southern Europe, which is, however, contrary to what was expected. Moving on to self-reported general health, I found rising general health levels with educational attainment. And in line with my expectations, the most pronounced gradients in health levels were again found for the Baltic States. Contrary to my expectations, for self-reported general health, too, the education-based gradient was

found to be least pronounced in Southern Europe. In sum, this evidence is rather supportive of the theoretical expectations with regard to education-based well-being gradients and cross-national differences.

It was further assumed that the relative importance of parental educational attainment as opposed to own educational attainment would be greater in unequal and weakly decommodifying welfare states where family resources play an important role for individual well-being. For subjective well-being, the findings suggest that young adults' own education is more important for their current life satisfaction than their parents' in all countries. Yet, in line with expectations, parental status was found to be least important for life satisfaction in the Nordic countries and most important in the Baltic States compared to the other country groups. Contrary to the expectation of greater relative weight of parental education in country groups that feature both low levels of decommodification and high levels of youth unemployment, the estimates from DRMs show no support of this claim. A potential explanation for this finding may be that education might not be a very good indicator of family resources for Southern European countries, since a majority of parents only have low levels of education (see Table 5.4) (Schuck and Steiber, 2018).

Concerning psychological distress, I found that the young Europeans' level of psychological distress is closer to their non-mobile counterparts in the destination group, with the relative weights of origin status (parental education) estimated to lie close to zero in all country groups except the Baltic States. The findings suggest that in the Baltic States, the level of psychological distress among young people is closer to their non-mobile counterparts in the origin group than in the destination group. In line with the theoretical expectations, parental status is thus found to be most important in the Baltic States compared to the other five country groups.

With regard to self-reported general health, the findings suggest that the respondents' destination status (their own education) is more important for their self-reported general health level than their origin (parental education). In line with expectations, the influence of parental education is again most important in the Baltic States.

Turning to the net mobility effects, over and above (i.e. controlling for) origin and destination effects, the empirical results – for all three well-being outcomes under

investigation – suggest that in most countries mobile individuals do not exhibit significantly higher or lower levels of well-being. These results are in line with the individual-level acculturation hypothesis which assumed mobility per se to have no independent effect. In contrast, individual well-being is chiefly determined by the destination status (one's own education).

Yet, there are a few exceptions to this more general non-finding with regard to net mobility effects. A first exception is Continental Europe, where status loss/gain across generations was found to affect young adults' life satisfaction in addition to the level effect of ending up in a lower/higher status position compared to their parents. These results are in line with the expectation that psychological mobility effects are more likely to occur in status-based societies. Another exception is the Anglo-Saxon country group, where I found statistically significantly lower levels of psychological distress for individuals who have experienced upward mobility. In line with the fulfilled aspirations hypothesis, upward mobility is thus associated with psychological benefits. Furthermore, these findings are in line with the macro-level assumption of mobility effects to be stronger in societies that place more importance on social status. As final exception, and completely contrary to the theoretical expectations, the findings suggest that the experience of upward or downward mobility in the Nordic countries shapes the respondents' level of self-reported general health over and above the influence of social origin and destination. Accordingly, upward mobility is associated with higher general health levels and downward mobility with lower general health levels, thus supporting the fulfilled versus frustrated aspirations hypothesis, and the falling-from-grace hypothesis, respectively.

By different means, the study presented in this chapter has made inroads into further disentangling the relationship between intergenerational educational mobility and well-being. Focusing on young people instead of the general population ensured that an intergenerational comparison of educational attainment is still meaningful. Considering well-being as a multidimensional concept furthermore allowed for a more comprehensive evaluation of results in light of previous studies. Another strength of the study is the use of state-of-the-art modelling techniques for the study of intergenerational mobility that allow isolating the psychological ('net') mobility effects from the level effects of one's own and

parental education. Moreover, this study constitutes a further step in the investigation of cross-national differences in mobility effects by applying an only recently developed theoretical framework (see Schuck and Steiber, 2018) to broader set of well-being outcomes.

Yet, is has to be mentioned that the findings are not without caveats and limitations. The use of a stratified approach, that was required due to restricted options (a limited number of countries) for cross-national comparative analysis, did not allow formally testing the macro-level hypotheses on moderating contextual factors. Future research could therefore build on this chapter and contribute to the knowledge on the relevant moderating contextual factors by using a larger set of countries that provide larger sample sizes. Apart from that, it has to be acknowledged that the present study is based on a very specific time period (2008-2014), which was mainly shaped by the economic crisis. It remains a task for future research to investigate if and to what degree the economic crisis plays a mediating role for mobility effects on well-being.

6 Political consequences of young Europeans' intergenerational mobility

Political opinions and preferences are shaped by a multitude of factors. Hereby, the central role of both current socioeconomic position (social destination) and family background (social origin) has long been documented in the literature (Moene and Wallerstein, 2001; Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Piketty, 1995). An individual's socialisation, and especially their socialisation at a young age, is known to play an important role for their political attitudes. Against this background, there is reason to assume that intergenerational mobility, next to current economic position and social origin, may be influential for young people's political opinions and preferences (see also Schuck and Shore, 2019).

In contrast to the experience of older generations, upward social mobility is no longer a given for young people today. Recent evidence suggests 'that the balance of upward and downward mobility in the experience of successive birth cohorts is moving in an unfavourable direction' (Bukodi et al., 2014: 13). Although referring to the UK, this development is only one example of a bigger picture that depicts the potential end of an era of widespread upward mobility and increasing risks of downward mobility. Due to this change, as well as the perception of constantly new upcoming social crises (like, e.g., the financial crisis of 2007/2008 and its aftermath), fears of intergenerational downward mobility are no longer a phenomenon that only occurs among those at the lower end of the social ladder. Quite to the contrary, fears of downward mobility have diffused into society as a whole (Mitrea, Mühlböck and Warmuth, 2017), and the middle class in particular (Lengfeld and Ordemann, 2016).

Against this background of a newly emerging fear of downward mobility, this chapter sets out to examine how upward and downward mobility, both experienced and expected, shape young people's attitudes toward the welfare state *over and above current and parental socioeconomic status* (see Schuck and Shore (2019) for a different analytical approach of this theoretical question). More specifically, this chapter addresses the question of whether social mobility impacts attitudes of *normative* support for the welfare state. In the following, I will argue that in particular this normative dimension is relevant for the investigation of mobility effects. Socially mobile individuals may – from a theoretical perspective – be especially influenced by factors other than material self-interest,

which is often considered one of the strongest predictors for welfare state attitudes in general (see also Schuck and Shore, 2019).

The investigation of political correlates of social mobility draws upon several literatures and the research objective pulls from various themes that have attracted scholarly interest for quite some time. Without a doubt, social mobility counts as one of these research topics that has been investigated in terms of causes, consequences, cross-country variation, and time trends for decades now. The same holds true for what I call here 'political consequences', i.e. the normative dimension of welfare state attitudes, which arguably are different among the socially mobile than for the non-mobile. The study of welfare state attitudes taps into the literatures on political socialisation, determinants of political behaviour, and comparative welfare state research.

The role of an individual's social position and their expectations regarding future movements up or down the socioeconomic ladder is well examined by previous research. Much less is, however, known about the role of social mobility for welfare attitudes beyond that, in particular for what shall be called 'moral aspects of welfare states' (Schuck and Shore, 2019). The 'moral aspects of the welfare state' refer to the moral or normative dimensions of welfare state attitudes which go beyond pure redistributive preferences by tapping into beliefs about distributive justice and deservingness (Schuck and Shore, 2019; Oorschot *et al.,* 2017; Mau, 2003). Welfare state support is known to be multidimensional. In taking the multidimensionality of welfare state support into consideration, it is possible to look beyond material self-interest as source of welfare state support and focus on normative concerns and preferences (Roosma, Gelissen and Oorschot, 2013; Sihvo and Uusitalo, 1995; Oorschot, 2010). Among the socially mobile, such factors may arguably lead to different attitudes than would otherwise be predicted by material self-interest (given that the focus is on the moral or normative dimensions of welfare state attitudes). This multidimensional conceptualization of welfare state support also takes into account that individuals my hold different views over different dimensions of welfare state support (Schuck and Shore, 2019). Multidimensionality, moreover, 'implies that is it likely that the welfare state's social legitimacy cannot be captured by a single indicator that only reflects people's preferences for the role of the government' (Oorschot, 2010: 20; see also Häusermann, Kurer and Schwander, 2015). This chapter therefore addresses a gap in the

literature by investigating the effects of intergenerational mobility (over and above current and parental socioeconomic status) beyond preferences for redistribution. In examining young adults' support of statements regarding the effects of receiving public assistance and benefit recipients, this study is able to explore a further dimension of the formation of welfare support attitudes.

By adopting a differentiated approach to the study of social mobility, i.e. studying different indicators of social mobility and their association with normative welfare state support, this study furthermore complements previous research on mobility effects. Previous studies in the field of political mobility effects largely relied on *class* mobility approaches, whereas this study will make use of alternative mobility indicators such as intergenerational *educational* mobility, intergenerational *economic* mobility and *expected* intergenerational mobility. In class mobility research, unemployed people, and above all, those who never had a job, are hard to classify and therefore often excluded from the analyses. Considering the turbulent economic timeframe of this study, I feel that the inclusion of unemployed young people is crucial for the analyses. Moreover, by focusing on educational, economic, and expected mobility, I am able to compare implications of both experienced and expected mobility. This seems especially relevant since earlier studies (see, e.g., Lengfeld and Ordemann, 2016; Lengfeld and Hirschle, 2009) have already shown that fears of downward mobility are not restricted to the less well-off, but affect equally (or even more) those whose current position is not bad at all.

Finally, the relationship between social mobility and welfare state attitudes is also relevant from the perspective of policymakers. Intergenerational upward mobility constitutes one of the bedrock beliefs of democratic societies. It 'mirrors the societal expectation that generational reproduction is accompanied by economic prosperity and that the pie that can be distributed is constantly growing' (Mitrea, Mühlböck and Warmuth, 2017: 4). In that sense, the stability of a democracy is directly related to the perception of realistic chances of upward mobility (Blau and Duncan, 1967) and policymakers should be aware of citizens' (perceived) chances and risks of socioeconomic movements in order to be ready to influence these by the right social policy instruments.

With respect to welfare state attitudes and the experience of mobility, it is rather the aspect of welfare state legitimacy that makes the topic relevant for policymakers. Only if beneficiaries of welfare provision are deemed deserving, individual's will support such programs and policies (Schuck and Shore, 2019). Jensen and Petersen (2017), for example, recently demonstrated the functioning of this deservingness heuristic across levels of self-interest, media frames, ideological divides, and national cultures for the example of politics of health care, yet emphasised the fact that it does not apply equally for all social benefits (unemployment benefits, in particular). Policymakers are affected by this deservingness heuristic since they are under pressure 'to provide beneficial policy to powerful, positively constructed target populations and to devise punitive, punishment-oriented policy for negatively constructed groups' (Schneider and Ingram, 1993: 334).

Elections, redistributive policies and even democratic legitimacy may be affected by social solidarity and beliefs about whom is deserving of social assistance and collective resources (Schuck and Shore, 2019; Oorschot, 2013; Rothstein, 1998). The experience and the expectation of intergenerational mobility, which – as we have seen in previous chapters – affect a substantial share of today's young Europeans, should be seen in direct connection to electoral outcomes, support for redistributive policies, and democratic legitimacy, and thus raise awareness among policymakers. If retrenchment is inevitable, policymakers might avoid electoral punishment by a strategy of 'expansionary dismantling' (Jensen *et al.,* 2014).

Moreover, as the empirical analyses will show and is known from the literature (Roosma and Oorschot, 2017), welfare state attitudes are differing across Europe to a substantial degree. Asked about the role and outcomes of the welfare state, Northern and Western welfare states show more approval whereas Southern and Eastern European welfare states are more critical. This geographical gap in welfare state support should raise concerns especially among those policymakers who envision taking the European integration to the next level by establishing a social pillar (Roosma and Oorschot, 2017). The non-negligible differences in social legitimacy of welfare states across Europe therefore constitutes a huge challenge for policymakers and the present study can inform about the role of social mobility in this association.

This study makes use of two datasets, the CUPESSE two-generation survey (Tosun *et al.,* 2018) and the latest round of the European Social Survey (ESS Round 8, 2017). It adopts a cross-national comparative perspective and applies state-of-the art methodology suitable for parsimoniously estimating the effect of social mobility over and above social origin and destination effects.

The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First, I will give an account of the association between social mobility and (normative) welfare state attitudes. Based on this review I will then formulate two sets of competing hypotheses. Subsequently, I will outline the research design including the introduction of the data used to examine my research questions. After the presentation of empirical results, the paper concludes with a discussion and an outline for future research.

6.1 Intergenerational mobility and normative attitudes toward the welfare state

Despite the huge literature on attitudes toward the welfare state, relatively little is known about the role of experienced and expected social mobility in shaping opinions regarding normative aspects of the welfare state. Drawing on two strands of literature which have previously been depicted – the first examining effects of social mobility on redistributive preferences and the second focusing more specifically at welfare attitudes – two sets of competing hypotheses can be derived (see also Schuck and Shore, 2019). In contrast to the more general literature on determinants of welfare state attitudes, this chapter's perspective is on experienced and expected mobility and normative attitudes toward the welfare state in particular. To this end, the focus of the following section will be on how self-interest and especially *factors beyond self-interest* may shape the relationship between social mobility and welfare attitudes.

6.1.1 The self-interest perspective

Within the extant literature on determinants of welfare state attitudes and distributional preferences (see, e.g., Kevins *et al.,* 2018; Guillaud, 2013; Rehm, 2009; Jæger, 2005), economic self-interest is often considered the basis (Schuck and Shore, 2019). In other words, it is expected that those who potentially benefit from redistributive measures, i.e., the lower 50% of the income distribution, are in favour of redistribution, whereas those

who potentially contribute to redistributive measures, i.e., the upper 50% of the income distribution, will oppose redistribution (Moene and Wallerstein, 2001; Meltzer and Richard, 1981). It can be expected that this association between material self-interest and redistributional preferences holds not only for current income, but also for alternative indicators of social status, such as social class or educational level (Schuck and Shore, 2019; Armingeon, 2006).

In contrast to the well-established influence of an individual's current socioeconomic position, the role of an individual's past so socioeconomic position – which may be equally influential in shaping redistributive preferences and welfare attitudes – is much less explored (Schuck and Shore, 2019). Piketty (1995), for example, underlines the influential position of family background (and economic mobility) for an individual's attitudes toward redistribution. Accordingly, an individual's social origin acts as a primary socialisation agent that forms initial preferences and beliefs. Yet, as the young people's lives progress and their socioeconomic status improves or deteriorates, these initial preferences and beliefs will be updated. In other words, upward and downward mobility go along with processes of re-socialisation so that socially mobile people eventually hold attitudes and beliefs that lie in between their points of origin and destination. A re-socialisation thus means that as children grow up and are confronted with different economic circumstances, they might adapt their attitudes to their new socioeconomic status, despite their family background exerting an important influence for the formation of political opinions and values (Piketty, 1995; Abramson and Books, 1971; Lown, 2015).

Next to the influence of current socioeconomic status and social origin, the experience of upward or downward mobility might add another influence with respect to individuals' welfare state attitudes. Following Gugushvili (2016b), the so-called mechanism of internal vs. external attribution of success might affect how socially mobile individuals perceive the role of ascribed and attained factors in determining their success (upward mobility) or failure (downward mobility), as well as their perceptions of existing inequalities and the role of the state (Gugushvili, 2016a; Piketty, 1995). According to this 'self-serving bias in causal attribution', upwardly mobile individuals are anticipated to attribute their success to their own efforts while being less likely to favour a strong welfare state (Gaviria, Graham and Braido, 2007; Ravallion and Lokshin, 2000). In turn, downwardly

mobile individuals are anticipated to attribute their failure to external sources, going along with a higher likelihood to favour a strong welfare state. I will come back to this mechanism in the context of factors beyond material self-interest. For now, based on the aforementioned assumptions, the following hypothesis can be derived:

H1: Intergenerational upward (downward) mobility decreases (increases) the likelihood of holding positive views of benefit recipients and receiving social support.

The self-interest argument is not confined to past and current socioeconomic position. Following previous studies, it can be expected to play a decisive role for the association of expectations about the future and welfare state support, too (Schuck and Shore, 2019). Following the 'prospect of upward mobility' (POUM) hypothesis of Benabou and Ok (2001), rational actors who expect upward mobility for their future may oppose redistribution, even if their current socioeconomic position would predict otherwise (Alesina and Giuliano, 2009). Accordingly, not only one's current socioeconomic position, but an individual's pursuit of insurance against future losses may shape current welfare attitudes (Moene and Wallerstein, 2001). Recent studies (Buscha, 2012; Lee, 2016) suggest that especially the sensitivity to losses may have a positive impact on welfare support, since expectations of downward mobility have been found to strengthen support for redistributive measures. Based on the assumption that this social insurance motive is not limited to redistributive measures, but welfare state support in general, a second hypothesis can be formulated:

H2: Expected upward (downward) mobility decreases (increases) the likelihood of holding positive views of benefit recipients and receiving social support.

6.1.2 Influences beyond self-interest

Despite the well-documented and decisive role of self-interest in shaping welfare attitudes, influences beyond self-interest may arguably be also important. In particular, the concept of deservingness, i.e., whom one considers to be deserving of welfare state support, holds many clues (Schuck and Shore, 2019). When groups are perceived as deserving of public resources, this is often reflected in support for benefits targeted at those groups, especially if these groups are considered to be victims of circumstance. Elderly and the sick constitute typical examples of such deserving groups, as both old age

and poor health are commonly perceived as circumstances beyond one's own control (Jensen and Petersen, 2017; Petersen, 2012; Oorschot, 2006; Oorschot, 2000). Other groups, namely the unemployed, face a fare more negative image and are often perceived as largely responsible for their situation. Unlike the previously mentioned groups, it is assumed that unemployed could have prevented their situation, thus being less deserving of welfare support than the elderly or the sick (Schuck and Shore, 2019). When compared to other groups of welfare recipients, 'the unemployed are seen as having less "character", less self-responsibility, less perseverance, and less trustworthiness' (Oorschot, 2006: 25-26).

If our perception of deservingness shapes our attitudes toward welfare support, how do we actually determine whom is considered deserving or not? Van Oorschot (2000) outlines a fivefold set of criteria people use when assessing whether a group is seen to deserve the social benefits they receive. First, there is the issue of *control*, that is, are recipients responsible for their own situation? Second, *need* matters; the more in need of benefits the group is, the more deserving they are seen to be. The third criterion has to do with *identity*. If individuals identify rather than take an 'us vs. them' perspective with beneficiaries of welfare support, they are more likely to perceive them to be deserving of support. Fourth, the *attitudes* of recipients toward support matter. Are they grateful for the assistance they receive? Finally, the notion of *reciprocity* can shape deservingness: When recipients are seen to have earned the benefits they receive or will do something to pay them back, they are more likely to be viewed as deserving. Among those five criteria, *control* and *identity* have been found to be most influential in shaping deservingness attitudes (Oorschot, 2000). In line with that, Rueda (2018) suggests altruism as an explanation of support for redistributive measures by individuals with higher socioeconomic status. Accordingly, altruism is particularly relevant when individuals can identify themselves with the recipients of benefits.

So why might someone with a high socioeconomic status hold favourable attitudes toward welfare support and their recipients when their rational view, based on their experience or expectation of upward social mobility, would predict otherwise? The answer lies arguably in the formative experience of growing up less well-off and its effects on the

evaluation of deservingness (Schuck and Shore, 2019). Lown (2015: 6) posits that 'personal experiences with the frustrations of economic hardship or poverty […] provide a first-hand understanding of the challenges of being poor and shape beliefs regarding personal responsibility for circumstance'. Accordingly, the experience of upward social mobility, which by definition includes the experience of growing up less well-off, may positively influence the perception of deservingness of welfare recipients. Despite their movement up the social ladder, individuals may still identify with the less well-off, based on their experience of growing up in an economically deprived environment. Similarly, they may be less likely to view benefit recipients, and even the unemployed, as responsible for their own fate (Schuck and Shore, 2019). The fact that socialisation experiences from childhood and adolescent are important for one's political attitudes well into adulthood has been widely documented in previous studies (Campbell *et al.,* 1960; Niemi, Craig and Mattei, 1991; Sears, 1975) and further supports this argument. In line with that, growing up poor might 'serve as counterweight to the conservative effects of upward mobility' (Lown, 2015: 9) and upwardly mobiles may continue to identify with their social origin group, i.e., the social milieu they grew up in. Based on the aforementioned assumptions, a competing hypothesis on the effects of social mobility on normative welfare attitudes can be derived:

H3: Upward mobility (both experienced and expected) increases the likelihood of holding positive views of benefit recipients and receiving social support.

The present chapter has shown that the self-interest perspective leads to different conclusions than the deservingness perspective, when it comes to predicting the direction of the association between social mobility and normative attitudes toward the welfare state. Before moving on to the research design, the empirical predictions of the competing hypotheses according to the self-interest or deservingness perspective are summarized in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1: Overview of hypotheses on the relationship between social mobility and normative attitudes toward the welfare state

	Self-interest perspective	**Deservingness perspective**
(Experienced) upward mobility	Hypothesis 1: **-**	Hypothesis 3: +
(Experienced) downward mobility	Hypothesis 1: +	n.a.
Expected upward mobility	Hypothesis 2: **-**	Hypothesis 3: +
Expected downward mobility	Hypothesis 2: +	n.a.

Note: +/- indicate higher/lower likelihood of holding positive views of benefit recipients and receiving social support.

6.2 Research design

6.2.1 Data

The empirical analyses that will be presented in Chapter 6.3 and Chapter 6.4 make use of the two cross-national survey datasets that have already been described at length in Chapter 3. The CUPESSE two-generation survey (Tosun *et al.,* 2018) as well as the European Social Survey (ESS ERIC, 2017) offer different opportunities to investigate the political consequences of intergenerational mobility. Therefore, and in order to arrive at the most comprehensive picture of how intergenerational mobility shapes normative welfare state attitudes, the empirical insights of both datasets will be combined in this chapter. More specifically, the CUPESSE two-generation survey will be used to investigate *economic* mobility and *expected* mobility, whereas the European Social Survey will be used to investigate *educational* mobility. Both surveys contain items that refer to the normative attitudes toward the welfare state. Although these items are not identical (and a direct comparison of mobility effects across the two data sources is therefore not possible), the combination of two empirical databases allows for a comprehensive insight into mobility effects, independent from the mobility dimension and measurement of welfare state attitudes. Furthermore, the usage of European Social Survey data from round 8 (ESS Round 8, 2017) which include an extra question module with a wide range of welfare state attitudes and were only recently published, allows for the integration of highly topical data that have not been used for mobility analyses before.

6.2.2 Measures

The outcome of interest for this study is normative attitudes toward the welfare state. Previous studies have shown that attitudes toward the welfare state are multidimensional and that attitudes toward a welfare state's goals and scope can differ significantly from attitudes toward the welfare state's efficiency, effectiveness, and policy outcomes (Roosma, 2016). For the purpose of this study, I focus on the *moral* aspects of the welfare state, i.e. the analyses focus on perceptions of the unemployed (Oorschot and Meulemann, 2014), perceptions of benefit underuse and overuse (Roosma, Gelissen and Oorschot, 2013), and perceived consequences of the welfare state on individual morality (Oorschot, Reeskens and Meuleman, 2012)[22] as dependent variables. In sum, I use seven different attitudes to measure normative attitudes toward the welfare state, two stemming from the CUPESSE two-generation survey and five from the ESS. Table 9.3 in the Appendix gives a detailed overview of the exact wording of the items, the respective data source, and the respective sub-dimension of normative welfare state attitudes as referred to in previous research. All welfare attitude items are recoded into binary outcome measures, differentiating agreement from disagreement. Correlation among the items concerning the moral dimension of welfare state attitudes amounts to 0.25; for attitudes towards and beliefs on benefit recipients, correlation is 0.42 (between outcomes 3 and 4), 0.12 (between outcomes 4 and 5), and 0.06 (between outcomes 3 and 5), and correlation for the items concerning perceived consequences of the welfare state (the moral dimension) is 0.60.

The central independent variable of interest is intergenerational mobility. The ESS and the CUPESSE two-generation survey capture intergenerational mobility in three distinct dimensions: whereas the CUPESSE two-generation survey allows assessing the degree of economic and expected mobility, the ESS contains the well-tested base for assessing intergenerational educational mobility.[23] For economic mobility, the respondent's financial situation is compared to the respondent's family's situation when he or she was about 14 years old. For expected mobility, the respondent gives an assessment of whether he or

[22] It has been shown that there are three dimensions of perceived consequences of the welfare state, including the economy, individual morality, and social life (Oorschot, Reeskens and Meuleman, 2012).

[23] Although the CUPESSE survey also contains measures of educational attainment, it will not be used for further analyses of educational mobility. The CUPESSE data collection could not be ensured to be comparable to a degree that is needed for the analysis of cross-national educational mobility. Therefore, I continue to rely on the well-established measure of educational attainment in the ESS, which was explicitly designed for cross-country comparisons of educational levels (cf., Schneider, 2010).

she will have a similar, better or worse standard of living in the future compared to how his or her parents are doing today. And for educational mobility, parental educational attainment is compared to the respondent's educational attainment. Based on the aforementioned comparisons, dummy variables are created differentiating intergenerational upward from intergenerational downward movements as well as intergenerational status stability. A detailed description of the respective measures has already been given in Chapter 4, and will therefore not be repeated at this point.

6.2.3 Analytic strategy

The empirical analyses start with a detailed overview of the phenomenon of study, namely the average level of support for normative welfare state attitudes among young Europeans in general, and across different mobility groups in particular. Accordingly, the descriptive analyses highlight both the cross-country variation in levels of public welfare state support among young Europeans in general and the within-country variation of public support between individuals with different social mobility experiences and mobility expectations. Subsequently, the multivariate analyses estimate the effect of intergenerational mobility on normative welfare state attitudes by means of diagonal reference models. The use of diagonal reference models allows for disentangling the effect of an upward or downward mobility experience from the effects of having arrived at a high or low (educational/economic) status level and originating from a high or low (educational/economic) status level. It is the statistical model of choice for the purpose of this study since the main focus lies on investigating the association between social mobility and normative welfare attitudes, over and above current and parental socioeconomic status (for a detailed description of diagonal reference models see Chapter 3.3).[24]

All models use pooled country data and control for socio-demographic attributes like gender, migration history (both one's own and parental migration status), main economic activity, and one's own and parental educational attainment, as well as left-right political attitudes (Roosma, Oorschot and Gelissen, 2014), level of religiosity (scaled 0 to 10) (Kahl, 2005), previous unemployment experience, and whether the respondent is dependent on income from unemployment or other social benefits (Oorschot, 2010: 22).

[24] See Schuck and Shore (2019) for a different analytical approach.

Educational attainment is measured using a reduced form of the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED), which was explicitly designed for cross-country comparative analysis of educational attainment in Europe (Schneider, 2010). In particular, three educational levels are distinguished: below upper secondary education comprising ISCED levels 0, 1, and 2 ('low'), upper secondary and post-secondary, non-tertiary education comprising ISCED levels 3a, 3b, and 4 ('medium'), and tertiary education consisting of ISCED levels 5a, 5b, and 6 ('high'). All models furthermore control for the respondents' main activity, differentiating those employed from those self-employed, not working, and unemployed. The analytical sample based on the CUPESSE two-generation survey (Tosun *et al.,* 2018) comprises around 11,000 young adults from 11 European countries.[25] The analytical sample based on ESS Round 8 (ESS Round 8, 2017) consists of around 3,000 young adults from 14 European countries.[26] In order to account for variation that goes back to systematic differences between countries, all multivariate models include country-fixed effects.[27]

6.3 Empirical results I: Findings from the CUPESSE two-generation survey

Following the previously described research design, this chapter will illustrate the descriptive findings on the average levels of public support for normative welfare state attitudes across countries and across different mobility groups, before finally moving on to the estimation results. In order to increment the reading flow, only figures regarding within-country differences among different mobility groups will be shown in this chapter,

[25] The CUPESSE country sample includes Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and Turkey.

[26] The country sample based on ESS Round 8 comprises Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Finland, France, Great Britain, Ireland, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Sweden.

[27] Although it would admittedly be very informative to study contextual effects such as regime type by using a multilevel approach, there are two reasons why I refrain from a multilevel approach in this study. First, and most importantly, the central research question clearly focusses on a micro-level mechanism for which no cross-country differences are hypothesized. Second, multilevel models are commonly based on maximum likelihood estimation methods that require sufficiently large sample sizes. Several simulation studies (see, e.g., Maas and Hox, 2005; Stegmueller, 2013) have investigated the effect of simulated design characteristics (sample sizes, in particular) on the accuracy of parameter estimates and respective standard errors. All of these studies conclude that a sample size of 11 (and 14, respectively) countries falls by far below the minimum number of units at level 2 (in the present case, countries). If I were interested in country-fixed effects (which I am not, since it is not the focus of this study), a minimum number of 25 countries would be tenable for linear models, and an even greater number of countries would be necessary for non-linear models like the DRMs here applied (Bryan and Jenkins, 2016).

while figures depicting between-country differences can be found in the Appendix (see Chapter 9).

6.3.1 Descriptives

In a first step, I investigate cross-country differences in the average level of agreement to the statement '*If welfare benefits are too high, there is no incentive to find work*' among young Europeans aged 18 to 35 (see Figure 9.1, Appendix). The item is phrased in such a way that agreement indicates less welfare state support and disagreement indicates more welfare state support. In all countries but Greece, the majority of young people apparently rather agree with that statement, indicating a certain degree of scepticism of welfare benefits and the deservingness of benefit recipients. The highest scepticism is demonstrated in the Czech Republic, with around 90% of agreement. Following with some distance are Austria, Germany, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Lowest levels of agreement can be found in Spain, Denmark, and Greece, with Greece being the only country showing higher disagreement than agreement. Interestingly, it is Denmark and Greece that show the lowest average levels of agreement, despite facing completely different economic circumstances and representing totally different welfare state regimes.

Since the central interest of this study is to investigate differences in welfare state attitudes across groups of young people with different social mobility experiences, the subsequent descriptions are meant to illustrate those differences for the different groups of economic and expected mobility. Before I move on to the description of these differences, a short note on the logic of illustration that will be used for all subsequent figures on agreement to certain welfare state attitudes across mobility groups: Average levels of agreement for those who have experienced financial upward mobility are depicted by a triangle, and for those who experienced financial downward mobility average agreement levels are indicated by a cross. The financially stable group is illustrated by a small circle.

Figure 6.1 depicts differences in the average level of agreement to the statement '*If welfare benefits are too high, there is no incentive to find work*' across European countries and individuals with different social mobility experiences. Although overall levels of agreement vary significantly across countries, a general pattern becomes visible. In all countries, agreement levels for the group who experienced intergenerational financial upward mobility are higher compared to those who experienced intergenerational downward

mobility. In line with the self-interest perspective (H1), potential contributors to the system accordingly show lower welfare state support and higher scepticism of welfare recipients than those who might be potential beneficiaries of the welfare state. The competing deservingness perspective (H3), assuming those who have experienced upward mobility to be more sympathetic with welfare recipients, seems not to be supported. Another interesting finding is the distance between average levels of support between the different mobility groups. Welfare state support among upwardly mobiles and downwardly mobiles is substantially different in Austria and Greece, with average levels of support differing about 20%, whereas they are less substantial in the remaining countries.

Figure 6.1: *'If welfare benefits are too high there is no incentive to find work'*; mean values per country and financial mobility group



Source: Own calculation based on weighted CUPESSE data.

Moving on to expected intergenerational mobility, Figure 6.2 illustrates that the descriptive findings do not deviate much from intergenerational financial mobility. Similar to what was found for financial mobility, the group of young people expecting upward mobility (with the exception of the Czech Republic) on average shows higher level of agreement to the item '*If welfare benefits are too high, there is no incentive to find work*' than the group who expects not to be able to maintain their parents' current standard of

living. Only in the Czech Republic, the country with the highest average level of agreement, those expecting downward mobility show even higher agreement levels than those expecting upward mobility. Since the overall welfare state support, measured as the aforementioned item, seems to be rather low and the difference between upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals not being very high, this deviation from the general pattern seems not too strong. Normative welfare state support is accordingly higher among the group expecting downward mobility than the group expecting upward mobility. Not surprisingly, potential future beneficiaries show higher tendencies of supporting the provision of welfare benefits than potential future contributors. In other words, in line with H1, the logic of material self-interest driving one's preferences seems to be at work here, while there is no support for the deservingness argumentation (H3), which should lead the expectedly upwardly mobiles to hold more positive views of receiving social support.

Figure 6.2: *'If welfare benefits are too high there is no incentive to find work'*; mean values per country and expected mobility group



Source: Own calculation based on weighted CUPESSE data.

Having looked at the distributions across countries and mobility groups for the first measure of normative welfare state support, the focus is now on the second measure of normative welfare state support, which reads as *'It's humiliating to receive money without having to work'*. Again, the item is phrased in such a way that agreement indicates less

welfare state support and disagreement indicates more welfare state support. As illustrated in Figure 9.2 (Appendix), average levels of agreement to this item show much less variance than the attitude looked at previously. In most countries, around half of the young people agree, while around half of the young people disagree with this statement. Turkey constitutes quite an outlier with almost 80% of young Turks agreeing to the statement and thereby showing comparably low welfare state support. On the other end of the spectrum, Hungary and Spain are the only countries that show average levels of agreement that lie below 50%. In sum, the variance across countries is relatively low.

Figure 6.3: *'It's humiliating to receive money without having to work'*; mean values per country and financial mobility group



Source: Own calculation based on weighted CUPESSE data.

How do groups with different mobility experiences differ in their attitudes towards the welfare state? Figure 6.3 gives a first insight into this question, showing average levels of agreement to the statement *'It's humiliating to receive money without having to work'* and distinguishing all three groups of financial mobility. The graph illustrates quite explicitly that in most countries, the attitudes of those who experienced financial upward mobility do not differ substantially from those who experienced financial downward mobility. Only in Italy and Switzerland are slight differences found, with upwardly mobiles showing less support of the welfare state than downwardly mobiles. Here again, the self-

interest logic (H1) appears to underlie this difference, and not a potential empathy with one's social origin group.

Figure 6.4: *'It's humiliating to receive money without having to work'*; mean values per country and expected mobility group



Source: Own calculation based on weighted CUPESSE data.

Far different from that, mobility expectations do seem to shape the respondents' welfare state support. In contrast to what we have seen previously, young Europeans who expect to exceed their parents' current standard of living do show deviating attitudes from those expecting not to be able to maintain their parents' living standard. In seven out of 11 countries, expectedly upwardly mobiles show higher levels of agreement, i.e. less welfare state support, than the expectedly downwardly mobiles. But unlike the previous descriptive analyses across mobility groups, this does not apply for all countries. In Denmark and Switzerland, it is the expectedly downwardly mobiles that show higher levels of agreement than the expectedly upwardly mobiles, i.e. less welfare state support. In the Czech Republic and Spain, both groups do not differ substantially in their level of agreement. In terms of differences between mobility groups, the Hungarian case is most striking. Young Hungarians expecting downward mobility show comparably high levels of welfare state support, and thereby deviate around 30 percentage points from the group expecting intergenerational upward mobility.

In sum, the descriptive analyses so far support the self-interest perspective and are in line with hypotheses 1 and 2 which assume (expected) upward mobility to decrease the likelihood of holding positive views of benefit recipients and receiving social support and (expected) downward mobility to increase the likelihood of holding positive views of benefit recipients and receiving social support. At the same time, the results do not support the competing hypothesis 3, which assumed upwardly mobile individuals to be sympathetic with the less well-off and consequently show higher support for normative welfare state attitudes.

6.3.2 Diagonal reference models

Turning to the multivariate estimation results, I will first describe the estimates from diagonal reference models for the outcome '*If welfare benefits are too high, there is no incentive to work*' and then move on to results for the second outcome '*It's humiliating to receive work without having to work'.* For both outcomes, agreement can be interpreted as less welfare state support while disagreement is regarded as more welfare state support. Accordingly, positive coefficients in the following multivariate models represent less normative welfare state support and negative coefficients represent greater normative welfare state support.

Model 1 estimates net effects of intergenerational financial mobility, i.e. mobility effects over and above current and parental financial status, on welfare state support using outcome 1: '*If welfare benefits are too high, there is no incentive to work*'. While financial mobility apparently does not have a statistically significant effect on normative welfare state support, the financial status itself is found to influence it. As indicated by the positive and statistically significant coefficients for the diagonal, the better one's financial status, the less likely one is to exhibit welfare state support. The diagonal estimates correspond to the financial gradient for non-mobile individuals, i.e. the reference group 'non-mobiles facing a bad financial situation' is compared to non-mobile individuals from groups with a better economic situation. In line with the material self-interest argumentation, a better financial situation corresponds to less welfare state support. Besides this level effect, the findings do not, however, support the assumption that the psychological experience of financial mobility shapes one's welfare state preferences over and above current financial status (i.e., no support for H1 or H3). Weight estimates furthermore indicate the relative

importance of an individual's own and parental financial situation. For Model 1, the statistically significant destination weight of .92 indicates that it is one's current financial situation, and not one's family's situation while growing up, that is driving normative welfare state support. This finding once again underlines the importance of an individual's current economic situation in shaping welfare state support.

Model 1 (as well as the remaining Models 2-4) includes well-known determinants of welfare state support like educational level, employment status, political ideology, religiosity, or dependence on welfare benefits as control variables. In line with previous findings from the literature, those not working and those who are unemployed show more welfare state support than employed individuals. The more right a respondent places himself on the left-right scale, the more likely it is that he or she exhibits less support for the welfare state. Religious individuals are found to exhibit less support for normative welfare attitudes (Oorschot, Reeskens and Meuleman, 2012). Individuals with unemployment experience over 6 months, those with income from unemployment benefits or other social benefits, as well as individuals with a migration background all show statistically significantly more welfare state support.

Model 2 represents an extension of Model 1 in that it adds expected mobility to the previously described model parameters. The addition of mobility expectation leads to a better model fit, based on the reduction of AIC values across models. As before, net financial mobility does not have a statistically significant effect on welfare state support, while financial status continues to shape welfare state attitudes. More importantly, Model 2 reveals that it is rather the *expectation* of intergenerational upward mobility that goes along with a higher likelihood of showing less support for the welfare state, whereas the expectation of intergenerational downward mobility is associated with more welfare state support. Accordingly, it is not the *experience* of intergenerational mobility that is associated with welfare state support, but the *expectation* of intergenerational mobility. These findings are in line with the self-interest argument underlying H2, showing that fears of downward mobility, i.e., being a potential future beneficiary of welfare benefits, make people more inclined to support the welfare state. Likewise, expecting to become a potential contributor in the future apparently makes people less supportive of the welfare state. The fact that the net effects of mobility remain stable when included simultaneously

with expected mobility also speaks in favour of distinct mechanisms that influence the young people's attitudes. Besides that, weight estimates as well as the direction of further control variables do not change substantially from Model 1 to 2. In sum, the findings from Model 1 and Model 2 speak strongly in favour of H2 while they do not support H1 or H3.

Models 3 and 4 are similar to Models 1 and 2, but focus on the second outcome measure '*It's humiliating to receive work without having to work.'* Model 3, which includes financial mobility, but not expected mobility, shows that the net effects of financial mobility, i.e. over and above financial status per se, are not statistically significant. Estimates for the diagonal furthermore indicate that there is no financial gradient in welfare support with respect to this second outcome measure. In other words, for outcome 2, there are no statistically significant differences in welfare support between groups of non-mobiles with different financial situations. With regard to other determinants of welfare state support, I find a higher likelihood of supporting the welfare state among females, those not working or unemployed, and individuals with unemployment experience above 6 months, income from unemployment, or other social benefits. Similar to what can be observed for Models 1 and 2, a more to the right oriented placement on the left-right scale and more religious individuals show less welfare state support.

In Model 4, Model 3 is extended by adding dummy variables for expected mobility. Model fit, based on the comparison of AIC estimates, increases thereby. Comparing the estimates of Model 3 and 4 reveals no substantial changes. I do, however, find statistically significant effects for upward mobility expectations in Model 4, suggesting again, that self-interest (H1 and H2) and not identification with one's social origin (H3) is determining welfare support attitudes.

Overall, I draw two basic conclusions from these results. First, the previously discussed models suggest that expectations for the future clearly outweigh past mobility experience in its importance for shaping welfare state support. Although the current financial status does seem to play a crucial role for welfare state attitudes, the isolated effect of experiencing upward or downward financial mobility over and above the mere level-effect of one's current status does not seem to play a significant role. Second, these results support the assumption of self-interest being a decisive driver of welfare state support, both in

terms of current financial status (not mobility) and future mobility expectations.[28] In that regard, intergenerational mobility apparently does not differ from the well-established social status effects per se. The empathy or identification with one's former social origin group is thus less influential than hypothesised earlier.

[28] These results also hold if I implement a metric operationalisation of outcomes 1 and 2 instead of using binary versions. Detailed results are available as robustness checks in Chapter 6.5.

Table 6.2: Estimates from DRM (logit) (outcome: normative welfare state attitudes)

	If welfare benefits are too high there is no incentive to find work. (1=agree)						It's humiliating to receive money without having to work. (1=agree)					
	M1			**M2**			**M3**			**M4**		
	β	*SE*		*β*	*SE*		*β*	*SE*		*β*	*SE*	
Weights [1]												
O (q)	0.08	0.27		0.15	0.29		0.00	0.00	***	0.00	0.00	***
D (1-q)	0.92	0.27	***	0.85	0.29	**	1.00	0.00	***	1.00	0.00	***
Net financial mobility (Ref.: non-mobile)												
upward	-0.01	0.08		-0.01	0.08		-0.07	0.05		-0.08	0.05	
downward	-0.06	0.08		-0.04	0.08		0.00	0.05		0.02	0.05	
Mobility expectation (Ref.: non-mobile)												
upward				0.11	0.05	*				0.10	0.05	*
downward				-0.29	0.06	***				-0.12	0.06	
Diagonal (Ref.: Financial situation: bad) [2]												
rather bad	0.12	0.07		0.11	0.08		-0.10	0.07		-0.11	0.07	
rather good	0.36	0.09	***	0.33	0.09	***	-0.01	0.08		-0.03	0.08	
good	0.42	0.10	***	0.39	0.10	***	-0.10	0.09		-0.12	0.09	
Education (Ref.: low)												
medium	0.04	0.07		0.03	0.07		0.11	0.07		0.11	0.07	
high	-0.07	0.08		-0.09	0.08		-0.10	0.07		-0.11	0.07	
Parental education (Ref.: low)												
medium	0.01	0.06		0.02	0.06		0.03	0.06		0.04	0.06	
high	-0.15	0.07	*	-0.10	0.07		0.00	0.07		0.03	0.07	
Female	-0.07	0.05		-0.07	0.05		-0.10	0.04	*	-0.10	0.04	*
Main activity (Ref.: employed)												
self-employed	-0.03	0.09		-0.03	0.09		0.03	0.08		0.03	0.08	
not working	-0.23	0.08	**	-0.22	0.08	**	-0.27	0.07	***	-0.27	0.07	***
unemployed	-0.25	0.08	**	-0.23	0.08	**	-0.17	0.08	*	-0.16	0.08	*
Left-right scale (scale: 0-10)	0.18	0.01	***	0.18	0.01	***	0.08	0.01	***	0.08	0.01	***
Religiosity (scale: 0-10)	0.02	0.01	*	0.02	0.01	*	0.03	0.01	***	0.03	0.01	***
Unemp. experience > 6 months	-0.34	0.05	***	-0.33	0.05	***	-0.17	0.05	***	-0.16	0.05	***
Income from unemp. benefits	-0.32	0.10	**	-0.33	0.10	***	-0.17	0.10		-0.18	0.10	
Income from other social benefits	-0.19	0.09	*	-0.19	0.09	*	-0.26	0.08	**	-0.26	0.08	**
Migration background	-0.20	0.10	*	-0.21	0.10	*	0.12	0.09		0.11	0.09	
Parental migration background	-0.04	0.07		-0.06	0.07		0.03	0.06		0.02	0.06	
Country dummies	yes			yes			yes			yes		
Constant	0.00	0.14		0.01	0.14		-0.30	0.13	*	-0.31	0.13	*
AIC	12,582			12,551			14,236			14,228		
N	10,987			10,987			10,965			10,965		

Table 6.2 (continued):

Notes:
All dependent variables are coded in such a way that positive coefficients mean less welfare state support.
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05;
[1]O pertains to parental financial situation, D to one's own financial situation.
[2]Financial gradient estimated for non-mobile individuals; effects for reference group (financial situation: bad) are fixed at zero.
Source: CUPESSE data, own calculations.

6.4 Empirical results II: Findings from the ESS

Findings from the CUPESSE two-generation survey will now be complemented by additional analyses based on the latest European Social Survey data. Although the analyses will be restricted to intergenerational educational mobility (and do not include intergenerational financial mobility or mobility expectations), these additional analyses offer a great opportunity to complement the investigation of mobility effects for normative welfare attitudes with different outcome measures. Moreover, these latest ESS data allow a very up-to-date look into the current opinions of young Europeans today since the data were just released in October 2017.

6.4.1 Descriptives

Similar to the empirical section on CUPESSE data, the descriptive findings shall illustrate average levels of support for normative welfare state attitudes among young Europeans across countries and across different mobility groups before finally moving on to the multivariate analyses. In sum, there are five different outcomes under investigation, of which the first three focus on attitudes towards and beliefs on benefit recipients, whereas the last two outcomes refer to the moral dimension of perceived consequences of the welfare state. All items are phrased in such a way that agreement indicates less welfare state support and disagreement indicates more welfare state support. For the purpose of readability, all outcomes were recoded into binary variables so that positive coefficients in the multivariate analyses indicate more welfare state support, whereas negative coefficients indicate less welfare state support. Furthermore, in order to increment the reading flow, only figures regarding within-country differences among different mobility groups will be shown in this chapter, while figures depicting between-country differences can be found in the Appendix (see Chapter 9).

Attitudes towards and beliefs on benefit recipients

Figure 9.3 (Appendix) illustrates the average level of support for the statement '*Most unemployed people do not really try to find a job*' among young Europeans aged 25 to 34. It constitutes one out of three attitudes towards and beliefs on benefit recipients that serve as a measure for normative welfare support. The graph reveals that only in the Scandinavian countries Norway and Sweden, a majority of young people disagree with the statement, thereby expressing rather high welfare state support. Poland constitutes the outlier of the country sample, with less than 20% of young people disagreeing, i.e. almost 80% agreeing with the statement. The remaining countries vary around 40% disagreement, with the Czech Republic being closest to Poland, and Iceland closest to the strong supporters, Norway and Sweden.

Figure 6.5: *'Most unemployed people do not really try to find a job'*; mean values per country and educational mobility group



Source: Own calculation based on ESS round 8, weighted.

In a second step, these country-level averages are broken down by intergenerational educational mobility groups (see Figure 6.5). Two aspects of this illustration are of particular interest. First, the distance between upward and downward movers with regard to their average level of support allows for insight into attitudinal differences between individuals with different mobility experiences. And second, the order of upward and downward

movers, i.e. which of these groups exhibit more or less support for the statement, indicates more or less support for the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 6.1.

With regard to the distance between mobility groups, I find that the attitudes of upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals differ substantially in most countries, with the exception of Poland (where all mobility groups express comparatively low support for the outcome statement). Thus, upwardly mobile individuals do differ from downwardly mobiles, with differences being greatest in Germany, Iceland, and Finland. With respect to the question of which of these groups expresses more or less welfare support, the descriptive evidence is rather mixed. In six out of 14 countries, the upwardly mobiles express more welfare support than the downwardly mobiles. Yet, in six other countries, the relationship is the other way round. Thus, the findings do not indicate a definitive conclusion for the overall mechanism at work here (self-interest vs. deservingness perspective).

The second of three outcomes measuring attitudes towards and beliefs on benefit recipients reads, *'Many manage to obtain benefits/services they are not entitled to'.* Figure 9.4 (Appendix) reveals that average support for this statement is rather high across all countries (average disagreement to the statement is lower than 40% in all countries). Again, the strongest support, i.e. scepticism against benefit recipients, is found in Poland, and the least support in Finland, Norway, Estonia, and Sweden. Broken down by groups with different mobility experiences, it becomes visible that attitudes are different for upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals in most countries, but to a comparatively low degree. In Belgium, Finland, France, and Norway, experiences of intergenerational mobility do not seem to make a difference between upward and downward movers at all.

Regarding the differences between downward and upward movers that exist at all (see Figure 6.6), welfare state support is higher among the downwardly mobiles than among the upwardly mobiles in most countries. Keeping in mind that the attitudinal differences concerning this outcome measure are comparatively low, this evidence speaks rather in favour of the self-interest hypothesis (H1).

Figure 6.6: *'Many manage to obtain benefits/services not entitled to'*; mean values per country and educational mobility group



Source: Own calculation based on ESS round 8, weighted.

The third outcome measuring attitudes towards and beliefs on benefit recipients reads, *'Many with very low incomes get less than they are legally entitled to.'* With respect to cross-country differences in levels of support for this item, I find that the variance between countries is comparatively high (see Figure 9.5, Appendix). In all 14 countries, average levels of agreement to this item is around 50% or less, indicating that a majority of young people consider benefit recipients with very low incomes to get more than or equal to what they are entitled to. The strongest disagreement with the statement is found among young people from Norway and Sweden, where the welfare state is strongest and young individuals apparently feel that benefit recipients get the benefits they deserve. With respect to differences between individuals with different mobility backgrounds, I find that differences appear to be quite substantial (visible by the distance between crosses and triangles in Figure 6.7). Differences between upwardly and downwardly mobiles are biggest in Ireland, Austria, France, and Sweden. And in ten out of fourteen countries, downwardly mobiles express higher agreement to the outcome statement than their upwardly mobile peers. In terms of the theoretical hypothesis, this finding supports the self-

interest argumentation proposed in H1, and provides only weak evidence (in four countries, where differences between the two groups are not very big anyway) for the deservingness perspective proposed in H3.

Figure 6.7: *'Many with very low incomes get less benefit than legally entitled to'*; mean values per country and educational mobility group



Source: Own calculation based on ESS round 8, weighted.

Perceived consequences of the welfare state (moral dimension)

The two remaining outcome measures refer to the perceived consequences of welfare state in their moral dimension. As visible in Figure 9.6 (Appendix), there is substantial variation in average levels of support for the statement *'Social benefits and services make people lazy'*. Again, Poland stands out with the highest agreement, i.e. highest scepticism with regard to potential consequences of receiving social benefits. In contrast, the most positive assessment of welfare state consequences is expressed by young Estonians, followed by young people from Austria and Iceland. Coming to within-country differences across individuals different mobility experiences, Figure 6.8 reveals that upwardly mobile individuals apparently do express different attitudes than downwardly mobiles (with the exception of Estonia, Finland, Norway, and Belgium). The distance between upwardly and downwardly mobiles is quite substantial for Germany and the Czech Republic, with average levels of support differing around 25% or more. Interestingly, and despite their

similar distance between the two groups, upwardly mobiles in Germany are less supportive, while upwardly mobiles in the Czech Republic are more supportive of the outcome statement. More generally, there is no clear pattern of whether upwardly or downwardly mobiles are more supportive of the outcome statement and no definitive conclusion with respect to the competing hypotheses H1 and H3 can be drawn.

Figure 6.8: *'Social benefits and services make people lazy'*; mean values per country and educational mobility group



Source: Own calculation based on ESS round 8, weighted.

Finally, Figure 9.7 (Appendix) illustrates average levels of agreement to the statement *'Social benefits and services make people less willing to care for one another'* and thereby indicates perceived consequences of the welfare state. I find that most countries express a rather negative view of welfare state consequences, with 50 or more percent agreeing to the statement. The least negative views exist in Estonia, the only country where more than 50% disagree with the statement. Moving on to differences between individuals with different mobility experiences, the graphical illustration shows that upwardly and downwardly mobiles differ comparably little in their attitudes, with the exception of Germany, the Czech Republic, Iceland, and Sweden. And again, there is no clear picture of whether it is the downwardly mobile individuals or the upwardly mobile individuals who tend to

disagree with the statement or not. In some countries, like Germany, Finland, Great Britain, Iceland, and Sweden for example, upwardly mobiles disagree to a larger extent than downwardly mobiles. In other countries, like the Czech Republic, Ireland, Norway, and France, it is the group of downwardly mobiles who disagree to a greater extent. Thus, the descriptive analyses do not allow for a definitive conclusion with regard to which hypothesis is supported by the empirical evidence.

Figure 6.9: *'Social benefits and services make people less willing to care for one another'*; mean values per country and educational mobility group



Source: Own calculation based on ESS round 8, weighted.

In sum, the descriptive analyses show that there is substantial variation in support for the five attitudinal statements, which serve as outcome measures for normative welfare state support. Both on a country level, but above all between groups with different mobility experiences, attitudes vary. The most central question with regard to the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 6.1 is if and how upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals differ in their normative welfare state attitudes from non-mobile individuals. Based on the previous descriptives, I conclude that the evidence rather supports the self-interest perspective proposed in H1, and that there is only weak evidence for the deservingness argumentation summed up in H3. Admittedly, these analyses can only present a first step since the attitudinal differences between upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals

may well be biased by the fact that the descriptive analyses naturally cannot control for other characteristics of these groups. Yet, it was possible to assess the extent of how different the attitudes of downwardly mobile persons are from upwardly mobiles, and how these differences are distributed throughout the countries in the sample population.

6.4.2 Diagonal reference models

Turning to the multivariate estimation results, I will first describe the estimates from the diagonal reference models for the attitudes towards and beliefs on benefit recipients (Models 1-3, Table 6.3) and then move on to results for the moral dimension of perceived consequences of the welfare state (Models 4-5, Table 6.4). To improve readability of the models, the binary outcomes have been recoded so that positive coefficients represent more normative welfare state support and negative coefficients represent less normative welfare state support.[29]

Model 1 (featuring outcome 1, '*Most people do not really try to find a job'*) estimates net effects of intergenerational educational mobility, i.e. mobility effects over and above current and parental educational attainment, on normative welfare state support. While educational mobility apparently does not have a statistically significant effect, the respondent's educational attainment (=diagonal) is found to influence it. As indicated by the positive and statistically significant coefficient for the diagonal, a high educational level increases the likelihood of having a positive attitude towards benefit recipients compared to individuals with a low educational level. The diagonal estimates correspond to the educational gradient for non-mobile individuals, i.e. the reference group 'non-mobiles with low educational level' is compared to non-mobile individuals with higher educational levels. Besides this level effect, the findings do not, however, support the assumption that the psychological experience of educational mobility shapes one's attitudes towards and beliefs on benefit recipients over and above their own educational attainment (i.e., no support for H1 nor H3). Weight estimates furthermore indicate the relative importance of an individuals' own (destination status) and parental educational status (origin status). For Model 1, the statistically significant destination weight of .77

[29] In other words, the binary outcome variables do not always take 1 for *'agree'* versus 0 for *'not agree'* but are partly also coded the other way around so that positive coefficients in the multivariate models always indicate more normative welfare state support and negative coefficients always indicate less normative welfare state support.

indicates that it is one's own educational level, and not the parental educational attainment, that is driving welfare state support.

Model 1 furthermore includes socio-demographic characteristics and well-known determinants of welfare state support like employment status, political ideology, religiosity, or dependence on welfare benefits as control variables. With respect to these controls, I find that those who are unemployed show more welfare state support than employed individuals. The more right a respondent places himself on the left-right scale, the more likely it is that he or she exhibits less support for the welfare state. Finally, individuals with unemployment experience over 3 months, and those with income other social benefits show statistically significant more welfare state support.

Model 2 replicates Model 1, but uses another outcome measure that reads, '*Many manage to obtain benefits/services they are not entitled to'.* With respect to the net effects of experiencing educational mobility, I find statistically significant negative effects for upward mobility and statistically significant positive effects for downwardly mobiles. In other words, upwardly mobile individuals express less normative welfare state support and downwardly mobile individuals express more normative welfare state support than non-mobile individuals. In line with H1, potential contributors thus are more sceptical of benefit recipients, and potential beneficiaries express more positive attitudes for benefit recipients. In contrast, the competing hypothesis H3 is not supported.

As indicated by the positive and statistically significant coefficient for the diagonal, a high educational level again increases the likelihood to have a positive attitude towards benefit recipients compared to individuals with a low educational level. An educational gradient is thus found for Model 2, too. Concerning the relative importance of one's own and parental educational attainment for normative welfare state attitudes, the estimates indicate that it is clearly one's own educational status (destination weight: 1.00) that is important for the respondent's attitudes. In contrast, the influence of parental educational level appears not to be significant. With respect to the included control variables, only two are statistically significant. Accordingly, the more right a person places him- or herself on the left-right scale, the lower his or her likelihood to express positive views for benefit recipients. Furthermore, those who receive unemployment benefits express more normative welfare state support.

Model 3 (featuring outcome 3, '*Many with very low incomes get less benefit than they are legally entitled* to') uses the third outcome measure of attitudes towards and beliefs on benefit recipients, otherwise being identical to Models 1 and 2. In Model 3, net effects of educational upward mobility are negative, whereas net effects of educational downward mobility are positive. In contrast to Model 2, effects are not statistically significant. Accordingly, individuals who have exceeded their parents' educational level express lower normative welfare state support, and individuals who do possess a lower educational level than their parents express more normative welfare state support than non-mobile individuals. Interestingly, the educational gradient (the diagonal) is different from the previous two models. In Model 3, the highly educated show less agreement to the outcome statement compared to those with low levels of education. In other words, highly educated individuals agree less with the statement that many with very low incomes get less benefit than they are legally entitled to. Moreover, the relative importance of parental and one's own education diverges from the previous models. For the third model, both influences appear to be similarly strong, whereas the previous models showed a dominant influence of one's own educational status.

With respect to control variables, I find similar effects to Model 1 and 2. Placement on the left-right scale has a statistically significant negative effect, i.e. the more right, the lower the likelihood of agreeing with the outcome statement/showing more normative welfare state support. Both unemployment experience and receiving income from other social benefits increase likelihood of agreeing with the outcome statement/showing more normative welfare state support.

Models 4 and 5 represent DRM estimates for the moral dimension of perceived consequences of the welfare state. For outcome 4, '*Social benefits/services make people lazy'*, I find neither statistically significant effects of educational mobility, nor an educational gradient. In other words, neither the mobility experience per se, nor educational attainment appears to have a statistically significant influence on the likelihood to disagree with outcome 4. Yet, the weight estimates indicate that one's own education is predominantly influential for the respondent's attitudes towards welfare state consequences. Other than that, I find negative effects for placement on the left-right scale, similar to Models 1 to 3. Individuals that receive income from unemployment benefits or other social benefits have

a higher likelihood of disagreeing with outcome 4, thus exerting more normative welfare state support.

Finally, Model 5 replicates Models 1-4 and uses the outcome statement '*Social benefits make people less willing to care for one another'.* The results show statistically significant negative effects for upward mobility, indicating a lower likelihood for them to disagree with the outcome statement. Put differently, upwardly mobile persons are more sceptical than non-mobile persons when it comes to potential moral consequences of the welfare state. Contrary to the assumptions formulated in H3, the upwardly mobiles do not show greater empathy for benefit recipients, but suspect potential negative consequences of welfare state support. With respect to the diagonal, I find positive effects for the highly educated, i.e. a higher likelihood for them to disagree with the outcome statement compared to those with low levels of education. Again, weight estimates indicate the dominant influence of one's own educational status for the respondent's perceptions of moral consequences of the welfare state. Apart from that, the control variables point to the expected directions, similar to Models 1-4. Positive effects, i.e. a higher likelihood to disagree with the outcome statement, are found for individuals with more than 3 months of unemployment experience, and individuals with income from unemployment benefits or other social benefits. Negative effects, i.e. a lower likelihood to disagree with the outcome statement, are found for individuals that place themselves more to the right on the left-right scale, for more religious individuals, and for those with a migration history.

Overall, and in line with H1, the multivariate results do support the assumption that upwardly mobile individuals are more sceptical towards benefit recipients, i.e. show less normative welfare state support, than non-mobile individuals. Although this effect for educational upward mobility is only statistically significant in two out of the five models, coefficients in Model 1-5 point in the same direction and thereby suggest that the mechanism at play here is self-interest, and not empathy and identification with one's social origin. For the isolated effect of educational downward mobility the evidence is less strong, although Model 2 estimates a statistically significant positive effect, i.e. more normative welfare support among downwardly mobiles. Since the remaining Models are unanimous in their direction of the coefficient for downward mobility, I take this as only slight support for H1, which assumed potential beneficiaries to have a higher likelihood

of holding positive views of benefit recipients and receiving social support. Apart from that, the results further suggest that there is an educational gradient with respect to normative welfare state attitudes, with higher educated individuals showing more normative welfare state support than lower educated people. Finally, it is important to notice that there is strong evidence for the dominant influence of the respondent's own educational attainment as compared to parental educational attainment in shaping normative welfare state attitudes.

Table 6.3: DRM (logit) (outcome: attitudes towards and beliefs on benefit recipients)

	Attitudes towards and beliefs on benefit recipients								
	Most unemployed people do not really try to find a job (1= disagree)			Many manage to obtain benefits/services not entitled to (1= disagree)			Many with very low incomes get less benefit than legally entitled to (1= agree)		
	M1			**M2**			**M3**		
	β	*SE*		*β*	*SE*		*β*	*SE*	
Weights [1]									
O (q)	0.23	0.21		0.00	0.00	***	0.58	0.21	**
D (1-q)	0.77	0.21	***	1.00	0.00	***	0.42	0.21	*
Net Mobility (Ref.: non-mobile)									
upward	-0.16	0.19		-0.39	0.12	**	-0.11	0.16	
downward	-0.09	0.20		0.42	0.15	**	0.28	0.17	
Diagonal (Ref.: Low educated) [2]									
medium	0.28	0.19		-0.02	0.19		-0.15	0.17	
high	1.21	0.19	***	0.97	0.21	***	-0.90	0.17	***
Male	0.13	0.08		-0.06	0.10		-0.05	0.09	
Employment status (Ref.: employed)									
unemployed	0.62	0.19	**	0.18	0.22		-0.07	0.20	
inactive	-0.36	0.14	*	0.18	0.16		0.06	0.14	
Left-right scale (scale: 0-10)	-0.16	0.02	***	-0.11	0.02	***	-0.07	0.02	**
Religiosity (scale: 0-10)	-0.01	0.01		-0.02	0.02		0.01	0.01	
Unemployment experience > 3 months	0.17	0.09		0.12	0.11		0.38	0.09	***
Income from unemployment benefits	0.45	0.29		0.73	0.31	*	0.38	0.30	
Income from other social benefits	0.40	0.23		0.42	0.25		0.57	0.23	*
Migration background	-0.25	0.17		0.12	0.20		-0.13	0.18	
Parents with migration background	-0.09	0.13		-0.05	0.16		0.14	0.13	
Country dummies	yes			yes			yes		
Intercept	-0.36	0.26		-1.28	0.29	***	0.35	0.24	
AIC	3,841			2,946			3,675		
N	3,114			3,044			2.915		

Notes:
All dependent variables are coded in such a way that positive coefficients mean more welfare state support.
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05;
[1]O pertains to parental educational attainment; D to one's own educational attainment.
[2]Educational gradient estimated for non-mobile individuals; effects for reference group (low educated) are fixed at zero.
Source: ESS Round 8, own calculations.

Table 6.4: DRM (logit) (outcome: perceived consequences of the welfare state - moral dimension)

	Perceived consequences of the welfare state (moral dimension)					
	Social benefits/services make people lazy (1= disagree)			Social benefits make people less willing to care for one another (1= disagree)		
	M4			**M5**		
	β	*SE*		*β*	*SE*	
Weights [1]						
O (q)	0.27	0.18		0.00	0.00	***
D (1-q)	0.73	0.18	***	1.00	0.00	***
Net Mobility (Ref.: non-mobile)						
upward	-0.18	0.12		-0.29	0.10	**
downward	-0.24	0.15		0.01	0.13	
Diagonal (Ref.: Low educated) [2]						
medium	-0.23	0.19		0.22	0.15	
high	0.42	0.19		0.76	0.17	***
Male	0.09	0.09		-0.09	0.08	
Employment status (Ref.: employed)						
unemployed	0.17	0.20		0.21	0.19	
inactive	-0.04	0.14		-0.16	0.13	
Left-right scale (scale: 0-10)	-0.18	0.02	***	-0.09	0.02	***
Religiosity (scale: 0-10)	-0.01	0.01		-0.04	0.01	*
Unemployment experience > 3 months	0.13	0.09		0.20	0.09	*
Income from unemployment benefits	0.98	0.29	***	0.81	0.28	**
Income from other social benefits	0.44	0.23		0.67	0.22	**
Migration background	-0.29	0.18		-0.31	0.17	
Parents with migration background	0.11	0.13		0.09	0.13	
Country dummies	yes			yes		
Intercept	0.91	0.26	***	0.15	0.23	
AIC	3,643			4,035		
N	3,136			3,107		

Notes:
All dependent variables are coded in such a way that positive coefficients mean more welfare state support.
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05;
[1]O pertains to parental educational attainment; D to one's own educational attainment.
[2]Educational gradient estimated for non-mobile individuals; effects for reference group (low educated) are fixed at zero.
Source: ESS Round 8, own calculations.

6.5 Robustness tests

Several robustness checks have been conducted in order to support the assumption that the previously described results are not driven by a specific model specification. In particular, two options have been investigated further. First, the variance inflation factor was investigated to be sure that there is no multicollinearity problem in the models. For that purpose, variance inflation measures were calculated (see Table 6.5). Furthermore, Models 1 to 4 from Table 6.2 have been re-run with a metric operationalisation of outcomes instead of binary outcomes (see Table 6.6).

With respect to collinearity diagnostics, it was investigated if variance inflation factors exceeded a critical value of 5 (cf., O'Brien, 2007). The estimation of variance inflation factors did not however reveal a mulitcollinearity problem. In particular, one could be worried about a high correlation of placement on the left-right scale and welfare state support. Based on the VIF calculation (see Table 6.5), I conclude that including both parameters in the diagonal reference models does not lead to multicollinearity problems.

Concerning the alternative model specification as metric outcomes, the previously discussed results do not change substantially. However, one important difference is noticeable. The experience of upward financial mobility now exhibits a statistically significant negative effect. Having improved one's financial situation over the generations is thus leading to more welfare state support. Although in the original models (see Table 6.2) the effects of upward financial mobility have not been statistically significant, the signs of the mobility coefficients suggested a mechanism beyond self-interest, as captured by H3. In sum, these findings may be interpreted as somewhat supportive of the empathy argumentation put forward in H3, assuming that there is more than self-interest driving welfare state attitudes.

Table 6.5: Collinearity diagnostics

Variable	VIF	SQRT VIF	Tolerance	R-Squared
Financial mobility (Ref.: non-mobile)				
upward mobility	1.25	1.12	0.80	0.20
downward mobility	1.27	1.13	0.79	0.21
Mobility expectation (Ref.: non-mobile)				
upward mobility	1.23	1.11	0.82	0.18
downward mobility	1.22	1.11	0.82	0.18
Education, Ref.: low				
medium	2.86	1.69	0.35	0.65
high	3.04	1.74	0.33	0.67
Parental education, Ref.: low				
medium	1.69	1.30	0.59	0.41
high	1.80	1.34	0.56	0.44
Main activity, Ref.: employed				
self-employed	1.05	1.02	0.95	0.05
not working	1.29	1.13	0.78	0.22
unemployed	1.41	1.19	0.71	0.29
Left-right-assessment	1.10	1.05	0.91	0.09
Religiosity	1.14	1.07	0.88	0.12
Unemp. experience > 6 months	1.21	1.10	0.82	0.18
Income from unemp. benefits	1.20	1.09	0.84	0.16
Income from other social benefits	1.11	1.05	0.90	0.10
Migration background	1.35	1.16	0.74	0.26
Parental migration background	1.35	1.16	0.74	0.26
Female	1.09	1.04	0.92	0.08
Mean VIF	1.46			

Table 6.6: Alternative model specification (metric outcomes): Estimates from DRM (outcome: normative welfare state attitudes)

	If welfare benefits are too high there is no incentive to find work.						It's humiliating to receive money without having to work.					
	M1			**M2**			**M3**			**M4**		
	β	*SE*		*β*	*SE*		*β*	*SE*		*β*	*SE*	
Weights [1]												
O (q)	0.00	0.00	***	0.00	0.00	***	0.00	0.00	***	0.00	0.00	***
D (1-q)	1.00	0.00	***	1.00	0.00	***	1.00	0.00	***	1.00	0.00	***
Net financial mobility (Ref.: non-mobile)												
upward	-0.03	0.02		-0.04	0.02		-0.04	0.02		-0.05	0.02	*
downward	-0.01	0.02		0.00	0.02		0.01	0.02		0.01	0.02	
Mobility expectation (Ref.: non-mobile)												
upward				0.05	0.02	*				0.05	0.02	**
downward				-0.11	0.03	***				-0.04	0.03	
Diagonal (Ref.: Financial situation: bad) [2]												
rather bad	0.05	0.03		0.04	0.03		-0.10	0.03	**	-0.10	0.03	***
rather good	0.15	0.03	***	0.13	0.03	***	-0.04	0.03		-0.05	0.03	
good	0.19	0.04	***	0.18	0.04	***	-0.06	0.04		-0.07	0.04	
Education (Ref.: low)												
medium	0.01	0.03		0.00	0.03		0.03	0.03		0.03	0.03	
high	-0.06	0.03		-0.06	0.03	*	-0.03	0.03		-0.04	0.03	
Parental education (Ref.: low)												
medium	-0.03	0.03		-0.03	0.03		0.01	0.03		0.01	0.03	
high	-0.08	0.03	**	-0.06	0.03	*	-0.02	0.03		-0.01	0.03	
Female	-0.02	0.02		-0.02	0.02		-0.03	0.02		-0.03	0.02	
Main activity (Ref.: employed)												
self-employed	-0.01	0.03		-0.01	0.03		-0.01	0.03		-0.01	0.03	
not working	-0.12	0.03	***	-0.12	0.03	***	-0.14	0.03	***	-0.14	0.03	***
unemployed	-0.14	0.03	***	-0.13	0.03	***	-0.12	0.03	***	-0.12	0.03	***
Left-right scale (scale: 1-10)	0.09	0.00	***	0.09	0.00	***	0.04	0.00	***	0.04	0.00	***
Religiosity (scale: 1-10)	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00		0.01	0.00	***	0.01	0.00	***
Unemp. experience > 6 months	-0.17	0.02	***	-0.16	0.02	***	-0.09	0.02	***	-0.09	0.02	***
Income from unemp. benefits	-0.20	0.04	***	-0.20	0.04	***	-0.04	0.04		-0.04	0.04	
Income from other social benefits	-0.10	0.04	**	-0.10	0.04	**	-0.08	0.04	*	-0.08	0.04	*
Migration background	-0.07	0.04		-0.08	0.04		0.05	0.04		0.04	0.04	
Parental migration back-ground	-0.02	0.03		-0.03	0.03		0.02	0.03		0.02	0.03	
Country dummies	yes			yes			yes			yes		
constant	2.58	0.06	***	2.59	0.06	***	2.41	0.06	***	2.41	0.06	
AIC	29,348			29,320			29,180			29,172		
N	10,987			10,987			10,965			10,965		

Table 6.6 (continued)

Notes: All dependent variables are coded in such a way that positive coefficients mean less welfare state support.
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05;
[1]O pertains to parental financial situation; D to one's own financial situation.
[2]Financial gradient estimated for non-mobile individuals; effects for reference group (financial situation: bad) are fixed at zero.
Source: CUPESSE data, own calculations.

6.6 Discussion and conclusion

This chapter set out to investigate the political consequences of different dimensions of intergenerational mobility. The study was based on the assumption that not only current social status and social origin, but also intergenerational mobility play a role in shaping political opinions and preferences. More specifically, in light of a situation characterised by both real and threatened downward mobility, this study aimed to investigate how the experiences and expectations of intergenerational social mobility impact young Europeans' attitudes of normative support toward the welfare state over and above current and parental socioeconomic status.

Normative support toward the welfare state refers to the 'moral aspects of welfare state', i.e. welfare state attitudes which comprise not only redistributive preferences but also beliefs about distributive justice and deservingness (Oorschot *et al.,* 2017; Mau, 2003). Despite the fact that there are huge literatures covering both how social position and the prospect of moving up or down the socioeconomic ladder shape preferences for redistribution, it is much less clear how intergenerational mobility influences welfare attitudes beyond that (Schuck and Shore, 2019). Against this background, this study aimed to complement previous research by acknowledging the multidimensionality of welfare state support (Oorschot, 2010) and investigating the effects of intergenerational mobility beyond preferences for redistribution. Further contributions lie in the use of state-of-the-art methodology that allowed to disentangle mobility effects from the effects of social origin and destination, and the differentiated approach to the study of social mobility, i.e. studying different indicators of social mobility and their association with normative welfare state support. The use of two datasets, the CUPESSE two-generation survey (Tosun *et*

al., 2018) and the latest round of the ESS (ESS Round 8, 2017) allowed for the implementation of both previous experiences of intergenerational mobility (in particular, economic and educational mobility) and expectations of intergenerational mobility.

With respect to the association between intergenerational mobility and normative welfare attitudes, two sets of competing hypothesis were investigated. I hereby followed the approach by Schuck and Shore (2019) who drew from two strands of literature – one examining the effects of mobility on redistributive preferences and the other looking more specifically at welfare attitudes.

Following the first perspective, it is mainly self-interest that shapes normative welfare state attitudes and intergenerational upward (downward) mobility is accordingly expected to decrease (increase) the likelihood of holding positive views of benefit recipients and receiving social support (Hypothesis 1). Similarly, and based also on the self-interest argumentation, expectations of upward (downward) mobility are assumed to decrease (increase) the likelihood of holding positive views of benefit recipients and receiving social support (Hypothesis 2). Taking into account factors beyond material self-interest like empathy, identification, and deservingness perceptions, a second set of hypotheses expects upward mobility (both experienced and expected) to increase the likelihood of holding positive views of benefit recipients and receiving social support (Hypothesis 3).

The descriptive analyses mostly supported the self-interest perspective (H1 + H2) and there was only weak evidence for the competing hypothesis which was based on factors beyond material self-interest (H3). The descriptive analyses did not, however, take into account that upwardly and downwardly mobiles differ in other important characteristics that may influence a respondent's normative welfare state attitudes. Therefore, these descriptive analyses were subsequently complemented by multivariate analyses.

The multivariate analyses aimed at disentangling the effect of experiencing intergenerational mobility from arriving at a low or high status position or stemming from a low or high (parental) status position. With respect to financial mobility, no statistically significant effect was found, i.e. neither of the previously depicted hypotheses was supported. The financial status, however, did exhibit the expected effect. Accordingly and in line

with the dominant self-interest argumentation, the better-off, i.e. potential contributors, show less normative welfare state support than less well-off individuals.

In contrast to the non-findings for economic mobility, expectations for future intergenerational mobility apparently do play a major role in shaping normative welfare state attitudes. Expectations for the future clearly outweigh past mobility experiences in their importance for shaping welfare support. In line with H2, individuals expecting to arrive at a better standard of living than what they are having today express less normative welfare state support than those expecting to maintain their parents' standard of living. In turn, individuals expecting not to be able to maintain their parents' current standard of living express more normative welfare state support.

For educational mobility, the multivariate results do support the assumption that upwardly mobile individuals are more sceptical towards benefit recipients. In line with H1, they express less normative welfare state support than non-mobiles. For educational downward mobility, the evidence is less strong since estimates point to different directions across the different models.

What implications does this evidence have for society and policymakers? Knowledge on whether and why people support different welfare state dimensions is of a broad societal interest since it can inform public debates (Roosma, 2016). It is, however, equally or even more relevant for policymakers and politicians, as it is their duty to take into consideration the dynamics of popular support for the welfare state when they have to decide about welfare rights, entitlements, and obligations (Roosma, 2016; Brooks and Manza, 2007). In a similar vein, the present study constitutes a basis for the assessment of the social legitimacy of the welfare state. As Oorschot *et al.* (2017: xvii) assert, 'the basic welfare deservingness question of "who should get what, and why", dominating discussions in the early times of welfare state formation is back to the forefront again, and will possibly stay there for some time to come.' Elections, redistributive policies and even democratic legitimacy may be affected by social solidarity and beliefs about whom is deserving of social assistance and collective resources (Schuck and Shore, 2019; Oorschot, 2013; Rothstein, 1998). The experience and the expectation of intergenerational mobility, which – as we have seen in previous chapters – affect a substantial share of today's young Europeans, should be seen in direct connection to electoral outcomes, support for

redistributive policies, and democratic legitimacy, and thus raise awareness among policymakers. Furthermore, the geographical variation in welfare state support constitutes a huge challenge for those policymakers who envision taking European integration to the next level by establishing a social pillar (Roosma and Oorschot, 2017).

Though the present study has made inroads into further disentangling the relationships between intergenerational social mobility and welfare attitudes, the findings are not without caveats. The present analytical approach does not allow for the exploration of certainly existing cross-country differences (e.g. different economic circumstances like the especially difficult situation in the Southern European countries, and different welfare regime types, especially with regard to how benefits are allotted and administered, which in turn shapes the perception of welfare beneficiaries). Furthermore, and although the models do include country fixed effects, the study does not explicitly take into account that risks of downward mobility and chances of upward mobility are not equally distributed across countries. Future research could further explore these cross-country differences (e.g. the well-known regime hypothesis (see, e.g. Jæger, 2005)) by using a larger country sample that allows for a multilevel approach which was not tenable here. Moreover, the present analytical approach constitutes a snapshot of a very specific timeframe that is shaped by the aftermath of the economic crisis. Future research could take this study as a starting point for adding a time dimension to the topic, e.g. by comparing different points of time with each other.

7 Overall discussion and conclusion

This thesis set out to investigate social and political consequences of young Europeans' experiences of intergenerational mobility. It does so against a rather pessimistic background: For the first time in decades, concerns have been raised of the current young generation ending worse off than their parents' generation (Eurofound, 2017). These fears go back to two main developments: first, the economic recession that started in 2008 and imprinted a whole generation's labour market experiences, and second, the increasingly widespread completion of higher education and the accompanying concerns of diminishing returns for education.[30]

In light of these developments, this thesis aims at improving our understanding of how achieving a higher or lower socioeconomic status than one's parents shapes young Europeans' well-being and welfare state attitudes as examples of social and political consequences. By doing so, it complements the predominantly labour-market-oriented research on young Europeans that was stimulated by the economic crisis.

In the remainder of this chapter, I will give a brief summary of the empirical results, before turning to the implications of this study. Finally, I will outline the limitations of this study and point to potential avenues for future research.

7.1 Summary of empirical results

The empirical analyses started with an exploration of the status quo, i.e., the investigation among intergenerational mobility of young Europeans in its different dimensions (educational mobility, economic mobility, and expectations of future mobility, in particular). The descriptive analyses (Chapter 4) show that the vast majority of young people in all European countries under study (except for Greece and Turkey) are able to maintain their parents' status position, both in terms of educational level and level of economic well-being. In general, the findings suggest that intergenerational economic mobility is far more fluid than intergenerational educational mobility, i.e. we can observe far more changes in socioeconomic statuses across generations than for educational mobility. Furthermore, it is striking that intergenerational educational mobility, at least on the

[30] See Voßemer and Schuck (2016) for a comparison of overeducation versus prolonged job search.

aggregate level, does not necessarily coincide with economic mobility. Arguably due to the specific timeframe of the study (2008-2016), in some countries high shares of educational upward mobility go along with high shares of economic downward mobility. For example, 44% of Spanish youth exceed their parents' educational level, but only 30% of Spanish youth exceed their parents' level of economic well-being. On the other hand, only 8% of Spanish youth do not succeed to achieve their parents' level of education, whereas 30% state that their economic situation is worse than their parents'.

Turning to mobility expectations for the future, the descriptive findings furthermore suggest that past experiences of intergenerational mobility do not necessarily coincide with what people expect as their future mobility experience. Despite the non-mobiles being the largest group when looking at the distributions of educational and economic mobility, the descriptive findings suggest that the largest share of young people across Europe expects movements in their standard of living across generations for their future, be it upward or downward. Next to rather optimistic expectations for their future in most countries, the Mediterranean countries Greece, Italy, and Spain stand out with an exceptionally high degree of pessimism regarding their future standard of living as compared to their parents. Interestingly, Italy and Spain are countries where economic upward mobility among young people has been quite high, with 32% and 60% respectively. It therefore seems that upward economic mobility, at least in Italy and Spain, does not give cause for a more optimistic assessment of future mobility expectations.

Further bivariate analyses then revealed that past mobility experiences do not necessarily determine young Europeans' expectations for their future. Although in many cases the young individuals' past and future mobility assessments do not deviate substantially, some obviously consider their past inability to maintain their parents' status level as only temporary. Given their relatively young age, which leaves a lot of time to eventually achieve or exceed their parents' socioeconomic level, this may be an expression of an optimistic view into their future.

Having established the status quo of today's intergenerational mobility among young Europeans, the analyses went on to well-being effects of intergenerational educational mobility (Chapter 5). In line with theoretical expectations that assumed well-being to increase with levels of educational attainment all across Europe, and being more

pronounced in countries with high income inequality and less universal welfare states, strongest well-being gradients were found in the hugely unequal Baltic States for all three outcomes under investigation (life satisfaction, psychological distress, and self-reported general health). Smallest well-being gradients were found in the Nordic countries (for life satisfaction) and in Southern Europe (for psychological distress and self-reported general health). Yet only the former finding was in line with theoretical expectations.

With respect to the relative importance of parental and one's own education for young Europeans' well-being, it was hypothesised that the relative weight of parental status would be greater in societies with high income inequality and weakly decommodifying welfare states. The empirical findings suggest that one's own level of education is more important for one's current well-being in all countries. Yet, in line with the theoretical expectations, the influence of one's parents' educational level on all three outcomes under investigation was found to be most important in the Baltic States in comparison to other country groups. However, the assumption of parental education being relatively important in the unemployment-ridden Southern European countries was not supported.

Turning to net mobility effects, i.e. mobility effects that remain after controlling for origin and destination effects, the empirical results for all three well-being outcomes under investigation suggest that mobile individuals do not exhibit statistically significantly higher or lower levels of well-being. This finding is in line with the individual-level acculturation hypothesis that assumed mobility per se to have no independent effect. Yet, the findings for two country groups support the macro-level hypothesis assuming psychological mobility effects to be more likely in status-based societies. In particular, this refers to the net mobility effects that have been found in Continental Europe, where status loss/gain across generations was found to affect the young individuals' life satisfaction, and the Anglo-Saxon country group, where I found statistically significantly lower levels of psychological distress among individuals who have experienced upward mobility. Yet, the finding of upward/downward mobility affecting the respondents' level of self-reported general health over and above the influence of social origin and destination in the Nordic countries runs counter to my macro-level hypothesis. In contrast, it rather supports the individual-level fulfilled versus frustrated aspirations hypothesis, which assumes upward

mobility to be associated with higher well-being levels and downward mobility with lower well-being levels.

The empirical analyses then turned to the investigation of how the experiences and expectations of intergenerational social mobility impact young Europeans' attitudes of normative support toward the welfare state (Chapter 6). More specifically, the analyses aimed at disentangling the effect of experiencing intergenerational mobility from arriving at a low or high status position or stemming from a low or high (parental) status position (net mobility effects). To this end, not only were several outcome dimensions used in the analyses, but also three distinct mobility dimensions – intergenerational educational mobility, intergenerational economic mobility and mobility expectations for the future.

With respect to educational mobility, the findings suggest that net mobility effects are present, i.e. the analyses suggested mobility effects that remained after controlling for parental and one's own education. Accordingly, the empirical findings suggest that educational upward mobility compared to non-mobility is associated with more sceptical attitudes towards benefit recipients. This is in line with the assumption that self-interest is decisive for an individual's normative welfare state support. At the same time, the counter-hypothesis of factors beyond self-interest being more influential than material self-interest found no support. For educational downward mobility, the findings are less clear since estimates of net mobility effects point to different directions across models.

For the second mobility dimension, economic mobility, no net mobility effects have been found. The findings rather suggest that mobile individuals do not exhibit significantly different attitudes towards normative welfare state support in comparison to non-mobile individuals. Yet, the financial status itself, i.e., the respondents' destination status, did exhibit the expected effect. In line with the self-interest argumentation, the better-off, i.e. potential contributors, show less normative welfare state support than less well-off individuals.

Turning from past mobility experiences to expectations for future mobility, the empirical findings suggest that, in line with the theoretical assumptions of the deservingness perspective, individuals expecting to arrive at a better standard of living than what they

currently have, express less normative welfare state support than those expecting to maintain their parents' standard of living. In turn, individuals expecting not to be able to maintain their parents' current standard of living express more normative welfare state support. Consequently, expectations for future mobility seem to play a more influential role in determining the young respondents' normative welfare attitudes than the psychological experience of economic mobility.

7.2 Implications of this study

As a recent report from European Union Agency Eurofound (2017: 71) asserts, despite the aim of fostering social cohesion by improving chances of social mobility (OECD, 2011; Council of Europe, 2010), '[i]n most instances, "social mobility" as a term is rarely mentioned explicitly in policy debates (with the exception of a handful of countries, including Greece and the UK)'. Yet, the results of this thesis can inform the current policy agenda and debate, as I will briefly describe in the following.

It is well-established that education is the essential lever to foster social mobility (Breen, 2010a). Yet, the comparison of distributions of intergenerational educational and economic mobility among young Europeans has shown that educational upward mobility, i.e., achieving a higher social status than one's parents, is no guarantee for economic upward mobility in all European countries. In light of this, the question arises as to what policymakers can do to change this. Especially in times of economic downturn, it is the transition from school to work that constitutes a crucial stage for the young individuals' employment careers and economic well-being (Eurofound, 2017). Policymakers may therefore be well-advised to implement not only measures to eliminate barriers to educational success (such as, e.g., the lasting impact of socioeconomic background for school attainment), but also to implement policies that address the labour market and the critical stage of entering it. The recently introduced Youth Guarantee (see, e.g., Tosun, 2017) can only constitute a first step on a longer path towards a smoother school-to-work transition and subsequent economic self-sufficiency among young individuals. These measures may well be complemented by private education expenditures, like e.g. in Germany, where the private sector invests a substantial amount of money into the dual system of vocational education and training (Wolf and Zohlnhöfer, 2009: 231).

Next to the finding of diverging economic and educational mobility rates, the analyses of well-being effects of social mobility may likewise inform policymakers. For example, the use of state-of-the-art methodology allowed for validly estimating both educational gradients in well-being and well-being effects of social mobility across Europe. The reliable estimates which proved to be markedly different from previous studies using conventional regression approaches, can serve as a foundation for policymakers to formulate effective policy responses to social gradients in well-being (see also van der Waal, Daenekindt and Koster, 2017). Furthermore, the empirical findings suggest that some institutional contexts are less effective in separating social mobility from an individual's well-being than others. Among those are the hugely unequal Baltic States, where one's own level of education is most important for the young people's well-being compared to all other country groups. Results further indicated that young people in status-based societies like the Continental European and Anglo-Saxon countries, as well as in the Nordic countries, experience well-being effects due to net mobility effects over and above those due to arriving or stemming from a different status position than their parents. Policymakers could build on these results by implementing measures to reduce the impact of social origin for the young people's individual well-being. Likewise, policymakers might mitigate net mobility effects in the status-based societies by stimulating public debate on the centrality of class and status maintenance for identity.

Not least, the findings with respect to normative welfare state support can both inform public debates and serve as a basis for the assessment of the social legitimacy of the welfare state. The analyses showed that young individuals who are economically upwardly mobile significantly differ in their normative welfare state attitudes from non-mobiles, being more sceptical toward benefit recipients. Yet, for educational mobility, such differences that go back to the psychological experience of intergenerational mobility, apart from social origin and destination effects, have not been found. Such dynamics of support for the welfare state should be taken into account by policymakers and politicians when deciding on welfare rights, entitlements and obligations (Roosma, 2016; Brooks and Manza, 2007). More generally, the mobility effects found here – for educational and economic mobility, but also for mobility expectations in the future – constitute indicators of social solidarity and the willingness to share social risks which might impact elections, redistributive policies and democratic legitimacy (Oorschot, 2013; Rothstein, 1998). In

that sense, the evidence presented here constitutes a contribution to 'the basic welfare deservingness question of "who should get what, and why"' (Oorschot *et al.,* 2017: xvii).

7.3 Limitations of this study and avenues for future research

The present thesis has aimed to investigate social and political consequences of having experienced intergenerational mobility. Despite numerous strengths and contributions to the literature, the research design as well as the empirical research undertaken have certain limitations that shall be acknowledged at this point. Some of these limitations may, however, point to fruitful avenues for future research under the same theme.

To begin, this study's focus was limited to a certain type of social mobility, intergenerational mobility, and focused on young Europeans. The selection of this focus was laid out from the beginning. Yet, it would admittedly also be interesting to set the empirical results that have been found here in context with other forms of mobility (*intra*generational mobility, in particular) and other age groups as well. Future research could build upon the results of this analysis and broaden our knowledge of mobility consequences by extending both age group and the mobility dimension.

Apart from the limitations arising from the actual research design, the data I was able to draw on brought forth several limitations. In particular, the present analytical approach did not allow for a rigorous formal investigation of cross-country differences in mobility effects. In the absence of suitable cross-country comparative data – especially due to the limited number of countries – macro-level differences in well-being effects of intergenerational educational mobility could not be tested in a rigorous way. Although the stratified approach used in Chapter 5 already constitutes a major advancement of the literature (that, to date, mainly focused on the micro-level), it did not allow for formally testing the macro-level hypotheses on moderating contextual factors. Using a larger set of countries, future research could therefore advance our knowledge on relevant moderating contextual factors such as welfare generosity and income inequality.

With regard to the political consequences of mobility, it would admittedly also have been very interesting to explore the mediating impact of contextual factors such as how differences in economic circumstances (the difficult situation in the Southern European

countries, in particular) and different welfare regime types (especially in terms of how benefits are allotted and administered) shape the perception of welfare beneficiaries. Using a larger set of countries to allow for a multilevel approach, the exploration of cross-country differences (e.g., the well-known regime hypothesis (see, e.g., Jæger, 2005)) could be a promising avenue for future research.

Apart from that, it has to be acknowledged that the data used in this thesis stems from a rather specific time period (2008-2016), which was – to a large extent – shaped by the economic crisis. The status quo regarding the extent of intergenerational mobility, as well as the associated social and political consequences, may very well have been influenced by the economic crisis. With respect to the distribution of intergenerational educational mobility, I speculate that the economic crisis may have caused educational upward mobility to be higher and educational downward mobility to be lower than otherwise (since students that would otherwise become unemployed tend to stay in the educational system and aim for higher degrees). With regard to the social and economic consequences, it remains unclear if and to what degree the economic crisis had a mediating impact, since different scenarios seem plausible. For example, education may have lower returns because a lot of young individuals stay longer in education in order to avoid unemployment or employment in an inadequate position. On the other hand, education is still a major protector against unemployment in times of crisis (Schuck and Steiber, 2018). Not least, the present analytical approach constitutes a snapshot of this very specific timeframe. Future research could take this study as a starting point for adding a time dimension to the topic, e.g. by comparing different points of time with each other.

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9 Appendix

Table 9.1: Distribution of educational levels and intergenerational educational mobility by country

	Own edu: low	Own edu: medium	Own edu: high	Parental edu: low	Parental edu: medium	Parental edu: high	Upward mobility	Stability	Downward mobility
BE	0.16	0.44	0.40	0.27	0.41	0.31	0.31	0.55	0.14
CZ	0.03	0.78	0.19	0.03	0.81	0.16	0.13	0.77	0.10
DE	0.10	0.67	0.23	0.10	0.70	0.20	0.17	0.67	0.16
DK	0.11	0.46	0.44	0.15	0.43	0.42	0.27	0.52	0.21
EE	0.11	0.54	0.36	0.06	0.58	0.36	0.20	0.57	0.23
ES	0.36	0.28	0.36	0.66	0.17	0.16	0.44	0.48	0.08
FI	0.07	0.54	0.39	0.16	0.52	0.32	0.31	0.52	0.17
FR	0.10	0.64	0.26	0.32	0.53	0.15	0.39	0.52	0.09
GB	0.22	0.37	0.41	0.40	0.36	0.25	0.38	0.50	0.12
HU	0.16	0.62	0.21	0.21	0.66	0.14	0.20	0.71	0.09
IE	0.15	0.50	0.36	0.39	0.46	0.15	0.44	0.50	0.05
LT	0.11	0.39	0.50	0.11	0.58	0.31	0.30	0.56	0.14
NL	0.19	0.40	0.40	0.47	0.25	0.27	0.45	0.43	0.12
NO	0.09	0.38	0.53	0.16	0.39	0.44	0.27	0.58	0.15
PL	0.17	0.44	0.40	0.38	0.47	0.16	0.45	0.49	0.06
PT	0.47	0.27	0.26	0.84	0.09	0.07	0.43	0.53	0.04
SE	0.05	0.54	0.42	0.18	0.49	0.33	0.32	0.54	0.13
SK	0.06	0.71	0.23	0.11	0.77	0.12	0.22	0.71	0.07

Source: Own calculations based on European Social Survey rounds 4-7; age limit 25-34.

Table 9.2: Descriptive statistics on intergenerational economic mobility and expected mobility

Country	Expected Mobility				Economic Mobility			
	upward	stable	downward	Total	upward	stable	downward	Total
Austria	0.39	0.50	0.11	1.00	0.23	0.41	0.36	1.00
Czech Republic	0.48	0.43	0.10	1.00	0.32	0.38	0.30	1.00
Denmark	0.41	0.50	0.10	1.00	0.27	0.40	0.33	1.00
Germany	0.41	0.44	0.15	1.00	0.24	0.41	0.35	1.00
Greece	0.32	0.34	0.34	1.00	0.10	0.27	0.63	1.00
Hungary	0.46	0.49	0.05	1.00	0.25	0.47	0.27	1.00
Italy	0.32	0.38	0.30	1.00	0.32	0.38	0.30	1.00
Spain	0.38	0.36	0.26	1.00	0.30	0.41	0.30	1.00
Switzerland	0.40	0.48	0.12	1.00	0.25	0.48	0.26	1.00
Turkey	0.60	0.32	0.07	1.00	0.43	0.42	0.16	1.00
United Kingdom	0.41	0.40	0.19	1.00	0.24	0.41	0.35	1.00
Total	0.43	0.41	0.15	1.00	0.27	0.41	0.32	1.00

Source: Own estimation based on weighted CUPESSE data.

Table 9.3: Measurement of normative attitudes toward the welfare state

The moral dimension of welfare state attitudes [Source: CUPESSE two-generation survey]

Please read the following statements and tell us how much you agree or disagree with them:
[strongly agree (4) - strongly disagree (1)]

(1) It's humiliating to receive money without having to work.
(2) If welfare benefits are too high there is no incentive to find work.

Attitudes towards and beliefs on benefit recipients [Source: ESS Round 8]

Using this card, please say how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about people in [country].
[agree strongly (1) - disagree strongly (5)]

(3) Most unemployed people do not really try to find a job.
(4) Many manage to obtain benefits/services not entitled to.
(5) Many with very low incomes get less benefit than legally entitled to.

*Perceived consequences of the welfare state (moral dimension) [*Source: *ESS Round 8]*

And to what extent do you agree or disagree that social benefits and services in [country].
[agree strongly (1) - disagree strongly (5)]

(6) ... make people lazy?
(7) … make people less willing to care for one another?

Figure 9.1: *'If welfare benefits are too high there is no incentive to find work'*; mean values per country



Source: Own calculation based on weighted CUPESSE data.

Figure 9.2: *'It's humiliating to receive money without having to work'*; mean values per country

Source: Own calculation based on weighted CUPESSE data.

Figure 9.3: *'Most unemployed people do not really try to find a job'*; mean values per country



Source: Own calculation based on ESS round 8, weighted.

Figure 9.4: *'Many manage to obtain benefits/services not entitled to'*; mean values per country



Source: Own calculation based on ESS round 8, weighted.

Figure 9.5: *'Many with very low incomes get less benefit than legally entitled to'*; mean values per country



Source: Own calculation based on ESS round 8, weighted.

Figure 9.6: *'Social benefits and services make people lazy'*; mean values per country



Source: Own calculation based on ESS round 8, weighted.

Figure 9.7: *'Social benefits and services make people less willing to care for one another'*; mean values per country



Source: Own calculation based on ESS round 8, weighted.