

Art History as Anthropology: French and German Traditions

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Visual Studies and Anthropology: Debates about Methods

The anthropological question is on the agenda of art history. Early in the 1990s visual studies (or visual theory and culture) became a challenge to the identity of the discipline. They confronted the history of art with the history of non-artistic images—with photography, film, design, and publicity. The foundations of visual studies were laid out by Keith Moxey, Michael Ann Holly, Norman Bryson, and W. J. T. Mitchell between 1991 and 1994.¹ In 1996 the quarterly *October* published a “Questionnaire on Visual Culture.”² In the same issue, the critic and art historian Hal Foster published an article whose title, “The Archive without Museums,” alluded to André Malraux’s “museum without walls”—the English title of his famous *Le Musée Imaginaire* (1947).³ Hal Foster accepted visual studies not without scepticism, and only by insisting on the historical conditions of the new methodological approach. According to him, visual studies tended toward reducing any image to an immaterial set of visual information, destined to circulate within the orbit of an economy of the image—an economy ruled according to the laws of semiotics and of psychoanalysis. They neglect the differences between images according to genres, media, or their character as artworks or commercial visual products. In the new economy of the image, a virtual “archive without museums,” all the images exist simultaneously, independent of any framing historical narration. According to Foster, paradigms of history—such as origin, tradition, continuity, or rupture—are pushed into the background. Consequently, historical discourses are supplanted by models of anthropology.

Even if Foster defends art history against visual studies, he holds the methodological change to be inevitable. For him, the new methodology ultimately has not been conceived by Moxey, Holly, Bryson, and Mitchell. In the final instance, visual studies are for Foster the form any debate about art and images takes in the age of the internet, of the circulation and increasing availability of images on all screens, of globalization and of post-capitalism. Foster, thus, only accepts visual studies considering the changing place of art in the media system of the arts. In the same number of *October*, Rosalind Krauss discusses the new approach, under the ironic title “Welcome to the Cultural Revolution.”⁴ Whereas the visual studies

debate of 1996 focused on the methodological instruments of the interpretation of images and artworks, the actual discussion about art history as anthropology concentrates on the subject matter of a future, globalized science of the image, and history of art.

October 77 brought up the question: visual studies—but how? Now it seems to be time to ask: art history as anthropology, but how? In spring 2001 the biennial conference of the association of German art historians (Deutscher Kunsthistorikertag) in Hamburg addressed the issue. Hans Belting proposed a new anthropological methodology, whereas others, such as Martin Warnke and Horst Bredekamp, claimed that Aby Warburg might be a predecessor and a model for such an approach.⁵

Warburg is undoubtedly also a godfather of the anthropological consideration of art early in the twentieth century. The 1897 photograph of Aby Warburg



Abb. 2.24: Aby Warburg bei den Pueblo-Indianern, 1895

Fig. 1. Aby Warburg in 1895, from Hans Belting, *Bild-Anthropologie* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2001), 51

visiting the Pueblo Indians in Arizona, by now an icon of art history, is reproduced here from Hans Belting's book *Bild-Anthropologie* (fig. 1).⁶ Guillaume Apollinaire is one of the first art critics sensitive to an anthropological interpretation of culture. His studio is illustrated in André Malraux's book *La Métamorphose des dieux*, published posthumously in 1976 (fig. 2).⁷ I will further attempt in this article to compare two approaches to art history as anthropology—the model of Belting and that of Malraux. The comparison is not merely meant as polemics. Hal Foster and Rosalind Krauss had welcomed the visual studies with a certain sense of irony. Seemingly, I am convinced that an anthropological turn of art history is inevitable. Rituals around man—whether non-Western or post-human—cannot be considered without skepticism—nor can rituals around the end of art. As Foster and Krauss have introduced the historical perspective in their consideration of visual studies, it is time to historicize art history as anthropology: when and how was art history confronted with the anthropological

question? Why is it posed so urgently in 2002—the year of *Documenta II*, directed by the Nigerian Okwui Enwezor?

The Encounter of Art History and Anthropology: Two Key Issues

Art history has always had an anthropological perspective. As a child of historicism, it had to accept the paradox of values that seemed absolute in their time, but



Fig. 2. Guillaume Apollinaire's studio, from André Malraux, *La Métamorphose des dieux*, vol. 3, *L'Intemporel* (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), 243

relative as seen from our historical perspective.⁸ Values, at the same time absolute and relative, are also at the foundation of evaluating artworks as modern: The value of modernity is absolute for contemporaries, but only relative for posterity. The paradox of absolute and relative, eternal and transitory is also, historically, behind the first prominent definition of modernity. As defined by Charles Baudelaire in his 1862 essay on Constantin Guys, “modernité” is “l'éternel dans le transitoire.”⁹ That is tantamount to defining within the transitory, that part of our life, experience, and memory that will fall into oblivion, that will disappear in the obscurity of history, a special value that will not only last for some time, but must be considered as eternal, thus absolute. If art history is a

child of historicism, then so is modernity: only a society that accepts itself as modern can read its past while leading toward its own values as its own prehistory, also as full of values in itself, as “immediate toward God” (Leopold von Ranke).¹⁰

The cultures who had come in contact with the Western world only after colonialism were long considered to be ahistorical, and were refused the right to a history of their own.¹¹ Those peoples who seemed to be without history faced the so-called Western or “civilized” tradition with foreign, if not strange, values. Western knowledge about these cultures was stored and administrated by ethnologists, not historians,¹² and the peoples’ objects were considered to be evidence of “primitive”

early states of mankind—mankind in its childhood. Only a post-historicist, consciously modern society could consider these objects as works of art and allow them into its art collections and museums. Our culture is a concept, a world that continuously changes in the course of such encounters. The writings of Belting and Malraux that I will consider here are all addressed to us, an imaginary community of authors and readers, a community now conceived to be mankind after globalization.

Ever since Western cultures were fascinated by cultures whom they deprived of a history, that fascination was motivated by a search for modernity. Impressionists looked at Japanese woodcuts—which in turn had already been influenced by Western art—in order to find pictorial formulas for contemporary events.¹³ In 1867 Monet confronted his family and friends with the sea—certainly not the eternal world ocean of Romanticism.¹⁴ It was in that encounter with a radiant, secularized nature that Monet redefined his view of the entrepreneurial society of the Second Empire. He borrowed a pictorial formula Hokusai had invented about 1820 for his view of Mount Fuji.¹⁵ Monet took the pictorial formula from Japan to express what he identified as modern, since Japan was for him—as for his contemporaries—the only surviving “antique” culture, a society in harmony with nature and thus without “history” in the Western sense.¹⁶ This appropriation took place only five years after Baudelaire had defined modernity as the eternal within transiency. In a deeper sense, Hokusai’s composition is fascinating because of its anachronistic character in the context of Parisian culture of the 1860s: although it is ostensibly situated out of Monet’s own time and out of his tradition, it enables him to express what he appreciated as absolutely modern in his own experience.¹⁷ What was absolutely modern finds itself guided by what was radically different.

Hal Foster had welcomed anthropological perspectives for their capacity to transcend the traditions and mental inhibitions of the *Geisteswissenschaften*, the *sciences humaines*, and the humanities. Anthropology was for him an antidote against paradigms such as origin and tradition—against history as a model of causality and in favor of presence, of coexistence of artworks and artful objects, in front of us, or in the “museum without walls” and his successor, the “archive without museums.”¹⁸ Georges Didi-Huberman argued that anachronism was the radical form of coexistence of heterogeneous objects within the synchronic spaces of museums and archives, whether imaginary or not. As a radical form of heterogeneity within the homogenic continuum of history, it is history’s other side. As such, the encounter of the historically explained artwork with the ahistorical, anachronistic object has always been the other of art *history* itself.¹⁹

In Monet's *Terrasse à Sainte-Adresse*, the present is constructed through the remote: Japan expresses Monet's own modernity. From Japan, he takes the means to actively alienate what was familiar to him and his contemporaries, to present the everyday life of his time as at once close and far away, or to express what was the eternal within the transitory in his own vital experience.²⁰ From Impressionism to Cubism, and its encounter with what Carl Einstein called *Negerplastik* (Negro sculpture), such anthropological encounters across cultural borders were always also concerned with the medium.²¹ Monet in his *Terrasse à Sainte-Adresse* superimposed the medium of Japanese woodcuts onto easel painting in the European tradition—a window open to the world. The illusionistic gaze, its visual empowerment of the landscape, and the visual sign-poem according to the Oriental tradition mutually cancel each other out.²²

Indeed, it is not only the encounter with non-Western art that brings up the anthropological question; in the arts, it is most often the development of the media, whether those of art or the media of popular or commercial culture, that motivates an exchange with the most foreign cultures. Often it is only through the analysis of their visual media—whether fetishes, ancestors' statues, or tattoos—and of the ritual practices they are part of, that Western cultures learned to take seriously what they continued to consider as primitive.

Ever since media have been criticized, such a criticism brings up the anthropological question, even independent of any consideration of foreign cultures. *Presence against history* is not the only key issue of anthropology. *The body within and against the medium* is another touchstone of the anthropological question. How can man—whether his appearance or his inner essence—be translated into an image? That question is radically anthropological and radically artistic. Aristotle defined imitation—mimesis—to counter Plato, whose *Republic* had condemned theater and images as spoiling young people's fantasy, thus useless for education.²³ Aristotle reduces mimesis to theater, and the theater to the basic drive of children to play and imitate adults and other people. For Aristotle that drive is distinctly human, therefore it cannot be bad. Thus Aristotle reduces the images and their media to the body of man, never just being, but also enacting himself. When mimesis and its media are in a crisis, it always reverts to the body displaying itself. In 1927, Antonin Artaud played the role of the monk Jean Massieu in Karl Dreyer's film *La Passion de Jeanne d'Arc*—a film intensely playing with physiognomy, gestural, and body language, thereby rhyming medieval traditions with modern popular theater and photography.²⁴ Artaud, who loved the intense presence of bodies and

faces in the silent cinema, later strongly argued against the mix of sound and image in the movies after 1928. He wanted bodies to be set free from representation

and the need to fulfill roles according to traditions of the bourgeois theater and of social norms. In his utopia of a total theater, the body as a medium of expressing drives and desires should be set free from word, language, and drama. When he posed for photographs made for the photo-collages *Le Théâtre Alfred Jarry et l'hostilité publique* (Alfred Jarry's theater and public enemies) in 1930, he was already trying to redefine an imaginary stage for the stasis of such bodily expressions.²⁵ Long before he invented his Theater of Cruelty, he tried to express himself exclusively through the medium of his body.²⁶

It is through such paradoxes—presence against history, the body within the medium, and the body against it—that anthropology challenges art history. But as latent (and logical) oppositions of its lead-



ART SUMÉRIEN (III^e MÛLL.), PRÉCÉDENTÉ (?), DÉTAIL DE LA PAGE 25

Fig. 3. Sumerian statuette, detail, from André Malraux, *Psychologie de l'art. Le Musée imaginaire* (Geneva: Skira, 1947), 29

ing affirmations, both of these provocations have always been part of art history and its dialectics.²⁷ Whether to emphasize similarity or otherness, art history is always searching for comparisons, and never ceases to search the meaning of traditions it (re)constructs in other arenas. And the development of media has always urged art history to reinvent its own media, from graphic reproductions to photography, from Heinrich Wölfflin's double slide projections to the illustrated art book, from the digital image to databases of images and video on the internet. Furthermore, with any revolution of the artistic media—from collage to video installation—art history's horizons expanded beyond what was previously accepted as art. To search herself beyond herself, that was the mission, the teleology of art history. The identity of art history is unstable within an essentially open structure, but if art history

projects her continuing border crossing into a comprehensive, global horizon, the horizon *tout court* of man as such, structures are essentially closed.²⁸ The end of art history, the end of mankind, would be the end of its capacity to reinvent itself, to reinvent representation. Globalization seems to impose a perspective of the passed future onto art history, a future when it will everywhere encounter only itself, when the whole of visual culture will already be part of art history's horizon, when nothing new remains to be discovered.

Image Anthropology According to Hans Belting

Our "borrowed" illustrations show a Sumerian statuette from about 2000 B.C., reproduced in Malraux's *Musée imaginaire* of 1947 (fig. 3), and a statuette from the Jericho culture, belonging to the museum in Damascus but now in the Louvre,



Amman (Jordanien), Archäol. Museum (Leihgabe im Louvre). Detail der Figur
Abb. 6.7 aus Ain Ghazal, ca. 7000 v.Chr. Modelliert in Kalk und Lehm über einer
inneren Armatur (vgl. Kap. 6.3) Gesamthöhe 105 cm

Fig. 4. Sculpture from Ain Ghazal, Jordan, detail, cover page illustration in Belting, *Bild-Anthropologie*

from about 7000 B.C., reproduced by Belting—the detail with the face as cover-page for his book (fig. 4). A key for Belting's argument is what he sees as the analogy between the body and the medium.²⁹ For him, the body is not just a subject of art, but the artwork in itself becomes a body, whether as a magic substitute for the body of a dead person or as a metaphor for the body's integrity, or its openness toward eternity, or its disintegration. Belting is interested in bodies of art—in art as art. Before the Egyptians made mummies, the Jericho culture created sculptures by covering the skulls of the dead with restorations of their faces in plaster. Belting interprets statuettes such as this as symbolic substitutions for the dead person during the burial, used before the body can be substituted through its restitution as a sculpture.³⁰ Examples of other substitutive bodies as artworks would be the

wax statues of English kings or queens, which held the monarch “alive” before the coronation of the successor; the lost wax sculptures of Florentine patricians in adoration; the *voti* in the Florentine Chioostro degli Voti at Santissima Annunziata; or the sculpture-body dressed up in a dead woman’s clothes in a church in Bavarian Swabia (fig. 5). Magic rituals guarantee the supposed identity of the dead and its substitutive body—for example the opening of the mouth of an Egyptian sculpture.³¹ The Greek enlightenment challenged that form of magic substitution: Orpheus, although he was able to force open the doors to the underworld through his songs, realizes, according to Belting’s interpretation of the famous relief of the fifth century, that the Eurydice whom he met was only her shadow, forever condemned to stay in the realm of shadows. Shadows—that is what images are by now—*eidola*, as for Plato. Orpheus symbolically regrets the end of the magic power of images to keep the dead alive.³²

Belting’s interpretation of later images, such as the effigy in a portrait, owes much to strategies of interpretation developed from Mikhail Bakhtin to Friedrich Kittler: the body becomes a symbol of the text—an example being Gargantua’s body in Rabelais’s famous novel. Jan van Eyck’s portrait known as *Timotheus* (National Gallery, London) is inscribed “Leal souvenir” (truthful remembrance), a motto that refers to the image in the double sense of its truthfulness and its survival not as an object, but as part of memory. For Kittler, the *Doppelgänger* had been a quintessentially textual body. From Edgar Allan Poe to Vladimir Nabokov, someone inscribes himself into a text, whether into a diary or into letters to the beloved. He starts to generate a double of himself, however, in a new narrative perspective (whether in literary or in visual imagination), generally more pictorial, more iconic, or, as in Nabokov, cinematographic. The double even can kill the original.³³ Also for Belting, idols and bodies are inscribed into a form of historical dialectics. Idols become ideal images that tend to inscribe themselves into our bodies. We enter into a dialectic of the body and the image. Foucault’s history of ideologies inscribed into bodies is kept alive through the rebellion of those bodies against the *eidola* they have to conform to. So far, and with an emphasis on the body and the image, I agree with Belting. I do not subscribe to his statement that the dialectics of bodies and images have come to an end. Our culture of digital images and bodies reduced to a formula, the DNA, for him, is about to abolish that human dialectics. He is convinced that we assist the erosion of that dialectics, the dissolution of both of its elements, the image and the body. Photography had been, ideally, a *leal souvenir*, testifying to the instantaneousness of the moment it documents. In the

digital image, as reworked through a program such as Photoshop, that indexicality, that truthfulness, gets lost. Images no longer have to refer to anything. We see the world more through images than through our own experience.³⁴

On the other hand, gene technology allows the creation of bodies according to preconceived cultural images. Designer babies do not even have to know the ideology behind their being blue-eyed, blond, and having just the right predisposition for height. With the dialectics of bodies and images, the dialectics of nature and culture comes to an end. Strangely enough, Belting sees this end as inevitable.³⁵ In recent discussions he positions himself in the context of the American post-human debate: Foucault argued against humanism because it always prescribes a certain idea of the human (generally a Western idea) as a norm. The advocates of the post-human isolate that argument from the horizon of emancipation in order to justify biotechnological babies. If I cannot prescribe a certain idea of the human, there is no norm to forbid the construction of humans according to its parents' ideas or stereotypes. Belting argues that no national ethic commissions can ever stop that process—a process that may end in a biotechnological aristocracy.

Belting even anticipates that the dialectics of body and image is gone, and he describes this as a process nobody can or should try to stop. However, he defends that dialectics as the only conceivable guarantee of human value.³⁶ That position makes him—like Jean Baudrillard—the prophet of an inevitable apocalypse. Only in the evening's twilight does Athena-Urania's owl start her flight of wisdom, her eyes wide open. She regrets the era of man, of his image. Art historical anthropology is a negative theology. A visual metaphor characterizes and criticizes that vision better than any argument. I want to confront the wide-open eyes of Urania's owl with the "eyes wide shut" (to borrow from Stanley Kubrick) that Man Ray photographed in 1929, in which open eyes are just painted onto the closed eyelids of a woman (fig. 9). These are the "eyes wide shut" of negative theology.

André Malraux and His Anthropological Universe

For André Malraux, art as anthropology always has been a ritual, and about ritual. In 1996 Jean-François Lyotard, in what would be his last book, the biography *Signé Malraux*, uncovered the mythic hero Malraux as a mythopoeic product of his author, André.³⁷ Lyotard ruthlessly tells us the story of the lower-middle-class child living with his mother, grandmother, and aunt in suburban Bondy. André wants to forget the small world he stems from, the cures and cares of all these mothers. Married at the age of twenty to Clara Goldstein, a wealthy woman of German

Jewish origin, by the time he was twenty-two he had already lost her money through his adventurous stock speculations. Now, in 1923, French Indochina lures him into the muds of its rainforests: at Bantea Srey in Cambodia there is an Angkor temple, not yet declared a national monument, still shrouded with vegetation. After an adventurous trip into the outside world—material for his novel *La Voie royale* (The Royal Way, 1930), Malraux discovers the cultural collapse of his time—the clash of civilizations, of Western individualism and Eastern ahistorical meditation, worlds whose fascination for each other would mutually destroy themselves.³⁸ The

West for Malraux will be infected with Eastern nirvanas, and the East with Western individualism. But Malraux has more concrete reasons for his adventurous pilgrimage to Bantea Srey. He saws down five reliefs from the old temple in order to end his financial ruin. Caught by a corrupt colonial administration, he is imprisoned, and condemned, but is soon freed after the intervention of the Parisian intelligentsia.³⁹

Lytard, who tells the whole story—against Malraux's well-known *Anti-Mémoires*—is merciless. But even for him, Malraux is still a hero, albeit a negative hero, behind his mythical world. Malraux's truth is in his lies. His frustration over his criminal act of vandalism turns Malraux into a political activist. In 1925 he leaves again for French Indochina in order to codirect the resistance against colonialism. In Shanghai, he would play a role in the Communist Party, which at the time fought the colonial powers siding with Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang, who soon would crush his former allies.⁴⁰ His experience as a political




Abb. 4.20: Kaufbeuren/Crescentialkloster, Votivfigur aus Wachs

Fig. 5. Wax portrait, from Belting, *Bild-Anthropologie*, 102

activist is the material for the novel *La Condition humaine* (Man's Fate) that would earn him, in 1933, the Prix Goncourt.⁴¹ Behind the human fight for freedom, Malraux always sides with rebellion, linked less to any attainable utopia

than to a symbolic act of self-affirmation, to the human as always involved in an act of becoming. For the heroes, whether Chinese or Western, the human condi-



Fig. 6. Ibero-Phoenician bust, detail, from Malraux, *Psychologie de l'art*, 25.

tion is present as something going beyond their goals and perspectives, their identities and conflicts. Politics is transformed into a ritual of a trans-cultural myth of the human, a rebellion against death. One of the rebels, Katow, has a final act of heroism: he leaves to two fellow prisoners the poison pill that might have killed him painlessly, then he submits himself to the cruelest execution.⁴² Already in 1926 Malraux had published a novel, the exchange of letters between a twenty-five-year-old Frenchman, A. D., and his twenty-three-year-old Chinese partner Ling-W.-Y., under the ironic title *La Tentation de l'occident* (The Temptation of the West). Ling writes to A. D. from Paris to China and vice

versa. In mutually expropriating the other of his culture, each protagonist finds a negative identity, identifying himself in a joint hypercompensation to what was different from the other.⁴³

When, from 1936 to 1937, Malraux organizes a bomber battalion against Spanish fascism, he was about to publish the first idea for his work on world art, first envisaged under the title *Psychologie de l'art* (Psychology of Art). His courageous fight against fascism became a book, and a film, both titled *L'Espoir* (Hope).⁴⁴ Revolt, is both an aesthetic and a collective ritual. When the pilots crash against the Pyrenees, the local peasant population would free the wounded corpses of their martyrs from their old-fashioned aircrafts in order to bring them down to the

valley in a quasi-religious procession.⁴⁵ Film as new medium created a new form of mythic ritual.

The new form for the aesthetic ritual was the book with photographic illustrations. The book as a medium is the *Imaginary Museum* title of the first volume of Malraux's *Psychology of Art* published after 1947, and republished, five years later, as *Les Voix du silence* (Voices of Silence).⁴⁶ Light would transform an early Iberian sculpture (fourth or fifth century B.C.) into a woman's face whose elegance meets modern standards (fig. 6). Photography makes distance present. Malraux introduces a heightened auratic presence—to use Walter Benjamin's term—into these volumes he arranged as quintessential books about art. In antiquity, he makes us meet with modern elegance. Photography assimilates formats, so a minuscule scroll relief becomes abstract, such as Gislebertus's *Eve* in Autun, assimilated, in its turn, to a Scythian gold ornament.

Anthropology originates in the encounter of Western and foreign values, of a clash of humanism into a transcultural human condition. Malraux, once a political fighter close to communism, a d'Annunzio of the left, becomes a secretary of state under Charles de Gaulle, and he organizes the television coverage of prominent burials, such as the burial in 1964 of Jean Moulin in the Parisian Pantheon. He also turns into a negative theologian of art.

What transforms a fetish into a work of art? There are no fundamental differences between an idol of fecundity from the New Hebrides and a Cycladic idol. It is, for Malraux, the fight against death that turns these votive sculptures into icons of the human, fighting against the eternal repetition of the cycles of meaningless life, against nihilism, desperation, and death. The most perfect works, for him, are those in the state of development, works such as Michelangelo's Rondanini *Pietà*, which during the process of its elaboration was ruined in a way that perfection becomes impossible, or else, is attained through its never being attainable (fig. 7). For Lyotard, the Rondanini *Pietà*, or its reproductions in the book, are a *mise en abime*, a symbol of Malraux's own inconceivable humanism.⁴⁷



Fig. 7. Michelangelo's Rondanini *Pietà*, from Malraux, *Psychologie de l'art*, 102

Anthropology and Modesty

In 1998 Belting published *The Unknown Masterpiece*, its title borrowed from Balzac.⁴⁸ He tells the story of modern art—of *Large Bathers*, *Large Glasses*, and *Black Squares*—as a story of the impossible work, in the final instance of Freenhofer's impossible painting, of a dreamt-of work nobody can ever fulfill, an attempt that after long rumors




Abb. 3.12: Hiroshi Sugimoto: *Regency, San Francisco*,
Fotografie aus der Serie „Interior Theaters“, 1992

Fig. 8. Photograph by Hiroshi Sugimoto, 1992, from Belting, *Bild-Anthropologie*, 78

is uncovered as nothing but a dirty mix of paint. Lost being in the world is reflected in the mirror of artworks. The twilight of the gods is prolonged to an arctic night, its own seemingly endless agony.⁴⁹ Recently an exhibition in the Center for Art and Media in Karlsruhe—Belting's home institution—revealed the “iconclash” of impossible images from the icon of Christ's true face (Claude Mellan's single-spiraling-line etching *The Veil of Saint Veronica*, inscribed “formatur unicus una,” 1649) through Kasimir Malevich's *Black Cross* (1923, State Hermitage Museum, St. Petersburg) to Nam June Paik's staging of a sculptural Buddha who mechanically “contemplates” his own image on a video screen (1974, Stedelijk Museum, Amsterdam).⁵⁰

For Belting, as for Malraux, art—after its disenchantment during the enlightenment, and after the end of the Occidental tradition—is a rebellion of man against death, an upheaval against the lack of sense, a resistance against the consequences of the loss of religion. Art is transformed into a post- or meta-religion, and it expresses itself in quasi-religious rituals. Art is human within the post-human, it is religious within the post-religious. For Belting as for Malraux, the *concrete impulse* imposing new forms of artistic development, and of art history, was due to the media. However, both rhyme the media revolution with an anthropological revolution. In Belting's vision, the Internet kills the human, substituted by post-human avatars and clones. But by doing so, it makes the human

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Fig. 9. Man Ray, *Emak Bakia* (Don't Bother Me), film still showing Kiki closing her eyes, revealing a pair of eyes the artist painted onto her eyelids, 1926

appear as the substantial content of a humanistic art history. The omnipresence of images, convertible even into human clones, creates a global sphere where the human circulates in its abolished forms. For Malraux, the imaginary museum of book illustrations and photographic reproductions, in the last instance, is the modern medium of our industrialized fantasy. In *Les Voix du silence* he explains that only a post-religious culture in the tradition of the enlightenment could discover the post-religious idea of man.⁵¹ The enlightenment, here, is that aspect of humanity the eighteenth century succeeded in handing over from the Occidental tradition to the global human condition. In the imaginary museum, man endlessly, everywhere meets man, human faces, gazes, smiles.⁵² The human for Malraux is what man has lost, first—but not only—in the Occidental or Western world. It is lost, but still present in all the attempts to gain it back. For Belting as for Malraux, art history is practiced as anthropology, and thereby as a religion of which they become the priests or prophets. Or, better, as the shadow of a religion.

Okwui Enwezor, chairing *Documenta II*—the first “globalized” one—in Kassel, followed an opposite strategy for staging world art. In a series of interviews he insisted that he did not attempt at exhibiting a post-colonial, global vision of the *condition humaine* as such. Even when confronted with arrogant intellectual criticism, he persisted in modestly refusing to answer to questions inquiring about his master plan. Instead of transforming the *Documenta* into a temple of anthropological art, he invented strategies for defining different places of reflection and proceeded to organize decentralized and multiple encounters with what appeared to be unforeseeably new. It was a strategy of openness, deceiving all those who had expected him to stage a monumental show of lost unity.⁵³ However, even if we try to resist, with Enwezor, the temptations of ritual, the question of an encounter of world art with the Western tradition is inescapable. But it should be treated in historical, contingent terms.

A prerequisite would be to operate more systematic distinctions within the field of visual culture and the approaches to it. There should be a more systematic focus not on the common history of visibility or its homogeneous history, but on the differences between visual production and art within that overall field of visibility.⁵⁴ How did the porous border between art and non-artistic visual production develop within the media system of images? Why did art and art history constantly reinvent itself, and how did that happen? Historical inquiry would have to focus on these questions. If technical and commercial innovations of pictorial media have obliged art to change, changes in art did not always follow technological innovations in media. Whereas in the Renaissance art largely profited from technical inventions such as oil painting or the woodcut, or from new forms of visual projection such as perspective, after the Industrial Revolution, especially after photography and the mass-produced and commercially distributed image, art seemed to systematically attempt to do something else. Cultural formulas of art, once transformed into commonplace images—what Greenberg calls “kitsch”—through capitalist marketing and distribution, become obsolete for art.⁵⁵

The encounter of a Western tradition—a tradition still far from renouncing to its hegemony—with colonial or post-colonial worlds enters into that interplay of art and industrial image production. On the one hand, ever since Japonism, the interest in African art, Pacific cultures, and surrealist appropriations of extra-European cultures helped Western art to reinvent itself. Pushed by that “kitsch” at seeking new formulas, and once the repertoire of popular images such as *images d'Epinal*, luboks, or Bavarian votive painting was exhausted, artists explored and often productively misinterpreted non-Western repertoires. On the other hand, artists in the de-colonized countries through (critical or ironic, playful or deconstructive) appropriations of Western projections try to reconstruct their traditions damaged or partly lost through the effects of colonial and capitalistic domination. Even using the archives of Western culture, they succeed in taking up suppressed identities, including Western projections.

That exchange, these strategies of appropriation (whether ironic or subversive) promise new insights into the logic of the image and of the institutions of its production, distribution, and reception—insights that go beyond an understanding only of “non-Western” countries. Thus, the hegemonic strategies Western art uses to renew itself through appropriations of “exotic” art, the projections and fantasies linked to its importation, are mirrored in the anti-hegemonic strategies of post-colonial cultures to reappropriate these appropriations, and by that to play

the game of global culture according to rules that have not been imposed onto them. Instead of staging ends in visions of (lost) unity, a historical anthropology of art should retrace the history of these exchanges and encounters: on the one hand, that of art and the non-artistic image, and on the other hand, that of the images of the Western tradition and of extra-European, colonial, and post-colonial cultures. Even in a globalized world, the horizon remains open.

1. *Visual Theory: Painting and Interpretation*, ed. Norman Bryson, Michael Ann Holly, and Keith Moxey (New York: Harper Collins, 1991); W. J. T. Mitchell, *Picture Theory* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1994); *Visual Culture: Images and Interpretation*, ed. Norman Bryson, Michael Ann Holly, and Keith Moxey (Hanover, Mass. and London: University Press of New England and Wesleyan University Press, 1994).
2. "Questionnaire on Visual Culture," *October* 77 (summer 1996): 25–70.
3. Hal Foster, "The Archive without Museums," *October* 77 (summer 1996): 97–119.
4. Rosalind Krauss, "Welcome to the Cultural Revolution," *October* 77 (summer 1996): 83–96.
5. "Was War Kunstgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert?" (What Was Art History during the Twentieth Century?), 26th Deutscher Kunsthistorikertag, veranstaltet vom Verband Deutscher Kunsthistoriker e.V. und der Universität Hamburg (21–25 March 2001). Two sessions were especially important for the issue: "The Iconic Turn—Kunstgeschichte als Bildgeschichte und Wissenschaft" (The Iconic Turn—Art History as History and Science of the Image), directed by Michael Diers, in which Hans Belting addressed "Bild/Körper—auch eine Mediengeschichte" (Image/Body—Another Media History), preceded by papers from Gottfried Boehm ("Bild/Theorie/Geschichte"); Gerhard Wolf ("Bild/Orte"); and Horst Bredekamp ("Bild/Technik"). In the session "Konstruktionen der Kunstgeschichte—Inhalte und Institutionen" (Constructions of art history—discourses and institutions), Michael Ann Holly and Keith Moxey controversially discussed "Iconology's Nachleben" and the possibility of reviving a Warburgian approach.
6. Hans Belting, *Bild-Anthropologie* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2001).
7. André Malraux, *La Métamorphose des dieux*, vol. 3, *L'Intemporel* (Paris: NRF Gallimard, 1976), 243.
8. Heinrich Dilly, *Kunstgeschichte als Institution. Studien zur Geschichte einer Disziplin* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1979); *Altmeister moderner Kunstgeschichte*, ed. Heinrich Dilly (Berlin: Reimer, 1990).
9. Charles Baudelaire, "Le peintre de la vie moderne," in *Oeuvres complètes* (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1950), 884–85; Hans Robert Jauß, "Literarische Tradition und gegenwärtiges Bewusstsein der Modernität," in *Literaturgeschichte als Provokation*, 6th ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1979), 11–66, especially 52–56, about Baudelaire, and 57–66 for a refutation of Benjamin's interpretation.

10. Leopold von Ranke, quoted in Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik*, 3d rev. ed. (Tübingen: Mohr, 1972), 191–99. In this book Gadamer had for the first time stressed the importance, in a general sense, of experiencing art for understanding history, and in a more concrete sense, of Immanuel Kant's aesthetics for historicism.
11. According to Ranke, history was the form of existence for Occidental (as opposed to Oriental) cultures. See Gadamer and Karl Hinrichs, *Ranke und die Geschichtstheologie der Goethezeit* (Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1954). Lévi-Strauss redefined peoples without history as peoples without writing. See his conferences broadcast as "Myth and Meaning" by CBC in December 1977, especially the second, about "primitive" and "civilized" thinking. Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Mythos und Bedeutung. Fünf Radiovorträge*, ed. Adlebert Reif (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1996), 27–46.
12. For the connections among historicity, hegemony, and power, see Gérard Chaliand, *Les Faubourgs de l'histoire* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1984); Gayatri Spivak, "Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography," in *Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics* (New York: Methuen, 1987); Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Knopf, 1993).
13. Klaus Berger, *Japonismus in der westlichen Malerei* (Munich: Prestel, 1980); Shuji Takashina et al., *Le Japonisme*, exh. cat. (Paris: Réunion des Musées Nationaux, 1988); J. Thomas Rimer with Gerald D. Bolas, *Paris in Japan: The Japanese Encounter with European Painting*, exh. cat. (St. Louis: Washington University Gallery of Art, 1987).
14. For Monet's painting in Sainte-Adresse, see Robert L. Herbert, *Monet on the Normandy Coast: Tourism and Painting, 1867–1886* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), 9–19; Carla Rachman, *Monet* (London: Phaidon, 1997), 72, 73–74.
15. For contemporary discussions of Japanese prints, see John Sandberg, "The Discovery of Japanese Prints in the Nineteenth Century before 1867," *Gazette des Beaux-Arts* 71 (1968): 295–302; Giovanni Peternolli, "La fortuna critica di Hokusai in Francia nel XIX secolo," *Paragone* 27, no. 315 (1976): 48–72. See also Geneviève Aitken and Marianne Delafond, *La Collection d'estampes Japonaises de Claude Monet* (Paris: Bibliothèque des Arts, 1983), 70, no. 59.
16. Elisa Evett, "The Critical Reception of Japanese Art in Late Nineteenth-Century Europe" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1980).
17. Georges Didi-Huberman has developed a radical notion of anachronism from Carl Einstein in "L'Anachronisme fabrique l'histoire," in *Études germaniques* 53, no. 1 (1998): 29–54, further developed in his *Devant le temps* (Paris: Minuit, 2000), 159–232. He insists that for Einstein, history can only be *present* as collage and montage operating at an active estrangement in confrontation to *the present*. The chapter "L'Image-combat" is intentionally largely based on an interpretation of Carl Einstein's *Negerplastik* (Leipzig: Verlag der Weissen Bücher, 1915). In the introduction of his book (9–54), Didi-Huberman generalizes anachronism as a necessary character of all historic work, of the paradoxical actuality of history that can only be achieved inasmuch as history is not actual. Here I

refer more to Didi-Huberman's discussion of Carl Einstein than to his general approach—which would have to be historicized, in my opinion, as a form of the presence of history. However, I do not attempt to criticize what appears to me to be a general refutation of models of continuity—in such a discussion, Gadamer would have to be introduced as antipode to Didi-Huberman—but I more modestly prefer to insist on strategies of interpretation instead of metahistorical perspectives. I am convinced that Didi-Huberman has in a striking way changed our idea of how history became something else after Cubism and the avant-garde movements.

18. Foster, "The Archive without Museums."

19. See note 17.

20. In order to elaborate more precise—and necessarily historically relative—instruments of interpretation on the basis of Einstein's notion of anachronism, it is necessary to see it within a broader field. Benjamin's definition of the "aura" as appearance of the faraway within closeness ("einmalige Erscheinung einer Ferne, so nah sie sein mag") may be related not only to anachronism as historical distance, but also to strategies of active estrangement (in German, *Verfremdung*; in Russian, *ostranenje*). See Walter Benjamin, "Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit," *Gesammelte Schriften* (1974; reprinted Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991), 471–508. On the notion of "aura," see 478–82; the discussions of this theory are too numerous to be documented here. The notion of active estrangement (*ostranenje*) is roughly contemporary with Einstein's "anachronism." See Viktor Sklovskij, "Die Kunst als Verfahren" (1916), in *Russischer Formalismus*, ed. Jurij Striedter, 5th ed. (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1994), 1:3–35 (text in Russian and German). The best discussion of the historical background and consequences of that theory is in Aage A. Hansen-Löve, *Der russische Formalismus. Methodologische Rekonstruktion seiner Entwicklung aus dem Prinzip der Verfremdung* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1978), 19–42, 238–73. Here, the confrontation of historical closeness to historical distance is seen as a matter of strategies that have their histories. However, in Sklovskij's texts, the notion of *ostranenje* still oscillates between strategy and characteristic of any artwork. Whether or not anachronism/*ostranenje*/*Verfremdung*/active estrangement characterize all or only some artworks, it is necessary to describe strategies of introducing the anachronistic and to see their development and reception in a historical perspective.

21. Einstein, *Negerplastik*, 1915.

22. Joachim Ritter, *Landschaft. Zur Funktion des Ästhetischen in der modernen Gesellschaft* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1963, reprint 1978); Norman Bryson, *Vision and Painting: The Logic of the Gaze* (London: Macmillan, 1983), 87–96.

23. A. Eusterschulte, "Mimesis," in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*, ed. Gert Ueding (Damstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2001), 5: cols. 1232–94.

24. Photograph of Antonin Artaud in the role of the Monk in Karl Dreyer's *La Passion de Jeanne d'Arc* (1927), private collection, Paris. See Alain Virmaux, *Antonin Artaud et le théâtre* (Paris: Seghers,

- 1970); Paule Thévenin, *Antonin Artaud, ce désespéré qui vous parle* (Paris: Seuil, 1993).
25. Antonin Artaud and Roger Vitrac, *Le Théâtre Alfred Jarry et l'hostilité publique*, 1930, photographic album, two copies: Paris, Bibliothèque Littéraire Jacques Doucet and Marseille, Bibliothèque Municipale; reproductions in *Antonin Artaud. Oeuvres sur papier*, ed. Germain Viatte and Bernard Blistène, exh. cat. (Paris: Réunion des Musées Nationaux, 1995), 240–41.
26. Antonin Artaud, "Le Théâtre et son double," in *Oeuvres complètes* (Paris: NRF-Gallimard, 1938, reprint 1978), 4:7–96; see especially "Le Théâtre de la cruauté. Premier manifeste," 86–96 and 310–12, note.
27. In a discussion opposing the absolute of history and its logic of becoming to the absolute of the present and its logic of contingency, Hegel is a key figure. See Judith Butler, *Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France* (1987; reprinted New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). See also Jacques Derrida, *Glas*, trans. John P. Leavey, Jr. and Richard Rand (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), and the volume discussing *Glas*, *Hegel after Derrida*, ed. Stuart Barnett (London: Routledge, 1998), especially the essay by Jean-Luc Nancy, "The Surprise of the Event," 91–105.
28. The Hegelian vision of a totalized—thus necessarily inescapable—development of a "thinking" art toward its own end(s) is fully developed in Stephen Melville, "Counting / As / Painting," in Philip Armstrong, Laura Lisbon, and Stephen Melville, *As Painting: Division and Displacement*, exh. cat. (Columbus, Ohio: Wexner Center for the Arts, Ohio State University; Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, 2001), 1–26; and Stephen Melville, "Des Marques (ce qui reste de Hegel) ou Daniel Buren en tant que peintre," in *La Part de l'oeil. Revue de pensée des arts plastiques* 17/18 (2001–2): 182–95.
29. Belting, *Bild-Anthropologie*, 22–33.
30. *Ibid.*, 150–54.
31. *Ibid.*, 87–113, 143–64.
32. *Ibid.*, 168–76.
33. Mikhail Bakhtin, *Rabelais and His World*, trans. Hélène Iswolsky (Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, 1968); Friedrich Kittler, "Romantik—Psychoanalyse—Film. Eine Doppelgängergeschichte," in *Eingebildete Texte. Affären zwischen Psychoanalyse und Literaturwissenschaft*, ed. Jochen Hörisch and G. C. Tholen (Munich: UTB 1348, 1985), 118–35. See also Tanja Zimmermann, "Der Doppelgänger als intermediale Figur—Wahnsinn als intermediales Verfahren. Zu Nabokovs Otcajanie / Despair," in *Wiener Slawistischer Almanach* 47 (2001): 237–80. For the notion of projection reified in the figure of the *Doppelgänger*, see Otto Rank, *Der Doppelgänger. Eine psychoanalytische Studie* (facs. ed. of 1925 ed., Vienna: Turia & Kant, 1993). T. Zimmermann's interpretation of the *Doppelgänger* in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Russian literature is based on a reading of psychoanalytical projection in terms of media projection.
34. Belting, *Bild-Anthropologie*, 213–39.
35. *Ibid.*, 38–50.
36. *Ibid.*, 21–33.

37. Jean-François Lyotard, *Signé Malraux* (Paris: Grasset et Fasquelle, 1996), trans. *Gezeichnet: Malraux*, (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2001). His text is written like an anti-text of Malraux's autobiography and other texts about himself. See André Malraux, *Anti-Mémoires* (Paris: Gallimard, 1967), 107–257. Significantly, the volume contains also some novels. Malraux here mostly remembers his political life after 1945, with some flashbacks to the period of his antifascist fight after 1936. An exploitation of various texts, excerpts, and interviews by Malraux, rearranged according to his biography, is Roger Stéphane, *André Malraux: Entretiens et précisions* (Paris: Gallimard, 1984). For a biography that—unlike the one by Lyotard—does not attempt at any deconstruction of the myth of Malraux, see Axel Madsen, *Malraux: A Biography* (London: W. H. Allen, 1977).

38. André Malraux, “La voie royale,” in *Romans* (Paris: Pléiade, 1976), 173–311.

39. Lyotard, *Gezeichnet: Malraux*, 119–64; see also Madsen, *Malraux*, 56–77.

40. Lyotard, *Gezeichnet: Malraux*, 164–202; see also Madsen, *Malraux*, 78–113.

41. André Malraux, “La Condition humaine,” in *Romans* (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), 313–566.

42. When the colonial officer came in order to lead the prisoners to execution—they were meant to be thrown alive into the fire oven of a steam locomotive—he found that two of the younger prisoners were already dead. “L’officier regarda Katow:—Morts? Pourquoi répondre?—Isolez les six prisonniers les plus proches!—Inutile, répondit Katow: c’est moi qui leur ai donné la cyanure. L’officier hésita:—Et vous? Demanda-t-il enfin.—Il n’y en avait que pour deux, répondit Katow avec une joie profonde. ‘Je vais recevoir un coup de crosse dans la figure,’ pensa-t-il. La rumeur des prisonniers était devenue presque une clameur.—Marchons, dit seulement l’officier” (ibid., 544).

43. André Malraux, *La Tentation de l’occident* (Paris: Grasset, 1926). The book is dedicated “A vous, Clara, en souvenir du temple de Benteai-Srey.” Ling’s conclusion to the fictive exchange of letters between 1921 and 1925 reads: “Comment exprimer l’état d’une âme qui se désagrège? Toutes les lettres que je reçois viennent de jeunes hommes aussi abandonnés que Wang-Loh ou que moi-même, dépouillés de leur culture, écoeurés de la vôtre. . . L’individu naît en eux, et avec lui cet étrange goût de la destruction et de l’anarchie, exempt de passion, qui semblerait le divertissement suprême de l’incertitude si la nécessité de s’échapper ne régnait en tous ces cœurs enfermés, si la pâleur d’immenses incendies ne les éclairait.” And he goes on to propose a purely negative awakening of Chinese identity. From European ideas of justice, his Chinese fellows knew only injustice, from European happiness only suffering (200–201, 202–3). “La force des nations a beaucoup grandi lorsqu’elle s’est appuyée sur l’éthique de la force; quels seront donc les gestes de ceux qui accepteront de risquer la mort au seul nom de la haine? Une Chine nouvelle se crée, qui nous échappe à nous-mêmes. Sera-t-elle secouée par l’une de ces grandes émotions collectives qui l’ont, à plusieurs reprises, bouleversée?” A. D. concludes (208): “La force échappe deux fois à l’homme. A celui qui l’a créée, d’abord; à celui qui la veut saisir, ensuite.” For A. D., this mutual expropriation of one culture through the other one, in the final instance is the agent of a tragic liberation of its own identity (213): “Quelque jeunes hommes

s'attachaient à la transformation du monde qui se fait en eux. Elle leur donne la différence dont leur esprit a besoin pour vivre." (215) "Pour détruire Dieu, et après l'avoir détruit, l'esprit eropéen a anéanti tout ce qui pouvait s'opposer à l'homme."

44. André Malraux, "L'Espoir," in *Romans*, 567–992.

45. In the novel, Malraux alludes to the visual medium: "Derrière Scali et Magnin ne venait plus que le cercueil. Les brancards, l'un après l'autre, passaient le torrent: le cortège, de profil se déployait sur l'immense pan de roc aux ombres verticales.—Voyez-vous, dit Scali, j'ai eu autrefois. . . Regarde ça: quel tableau! Scali rentra son histoire; sans doute eût-elle tapé sur les nerfs de Magnin comme la comparaison d'un tableau et de ce qu'ils voyaient tapait sur les nerfs de Scali" (*ibid.*, 968).

46. Henri Zerner, "André Malraux ou les pouvoirs de la reproduction photographique," in *Écrire l'histoire de l'art. Figures d'une discipline* (Paris: Gallimard, 1997), 145–56, 166–67; Rosalind Krauss, "Postmodernism's Museum without Walls," in Reesa Greenberg, Bruce W. Ferguson and Sandy Nairne, *Thinking about Exhibitions* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 341–48.

47. Lyotard, *Gezeichnet: Malraux*, 385.

48. In an era of end(s) of painting, evidently Freenhofer is in the air. See Georges Didi-Huberman, *La peinture incarnée. Suivi de "Le Chef-d'œuvre inconnu" par Honoré de Balzac* (Paris: Minuit, 1985); Balzac's novel is on 133–56.

49. Hans Belting, *Das unbekannte Meisterwerk. Die modernen Mythen der Kunst* (Munich: Beck, 1998), especially the last chapter about art after Marcel Broodthaers as remembrance of itself, 469–90. See my critical review of this book: "Ritual um die verlorene Mitte? Hans Belting über die sich selbst überlassene Kunst der Moderne," *Kunstchronik* (Jan. 1999): 47–51.

50. Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel, *Iconclash: Beyond the Image Wars in Science, Religion, and Art*, ed. Peter Weibel et al., exh. cat. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002). The advisory committee of this ambitious show at the ZKM Karlsruhe comprised Hans Belting, Boris Groys, Denis Laborde, Marie-José Mondzain, and Heather Stoddard. The authors of the voluminous catalogue discuss different and even contradictory positions. Belting published two essays in the section "Are There Limits to Iconoclasm?": "Beyond Iconoclasm: Nam June Paik, the Zen Gaze, and the Escape from Representation" (390–411) and "Invisible Movies in Sugimoto's 'Theaters'" (423–27). The first essay discusses Paik's *Zen for Head* (1962), *Zen for Film* (1964), *TV-Buddha* (1974), and *Paik as Video-Buddha* (1974) in connection with Paik's homage to John Cage, concluding that "only the Zen gaze, which we are invited to apply here, offers access to a silence against which, ultimately, no image can win." The second essay is about Hiroshi Sugimoto's Theaters, photographs of cinemas: a film shown on the screen photographed with an extremely long exposure is reduced to a white screen enigmatically illuminating the architecture of the empty hall (fig. 8). "The difference of absolute and relative comes to mind." We are close to a vision of art history as a way toward the absolute(ly empty).

51. André Malraux, *Les Voix du silence* (Paris: Pléiade, 1952), 605–8 (the most significant passages on

history substituting the absolute of art to the absolute of religion).

52. The Menil Collection in Houston has been influenced by Malraux and shows some of the characteristics of his anthropological approach. See Dominique de Menil, Walter Hopps, et al., *The Menil Collection: A Selection from the Paleolithic to the Modern Era* (New York: Abrams, 1987).

53. See Okwui Enwezor, "Die Black Box. Einleitung," in *Documenta 11 Platform 5: Ausstellung*, exh. cat. (Ostfildern-Ruit: Hatje Cantz, 2002), 42–55. See also the publication of the other platforms, such as *Democracy Unrealized. Documenta 11—Platform 1*, ed. Okwui Enwezor et al. (Ostfildern-Ruit: Hatje Cantz, 2002).

54. See W. J. T. Mitchell's critique of Jonathan Crary, *Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, 1990), in W. J. T. Mitchell, *Picture Theory* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 19–34.

55. Greenberg's notion of "kitsch" is, of course, based on a model of exchange between art and non-artistic production of images. In that case, it is an exchange in only one direction, from high to low. See Clement Greenberg, "Avant-Garde and Kitsch," *Partisan Review* (fall 1939) reprinted in his *The Collected Essays and Criticism: Perception and Judgments, 1939–1944*, ed. John O'Brian (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1986; reprint 1988), 15–23. See also the volume synthesizing some of the debate of that essay: *Pollock and After: The Critical Debate*, ed. Francis Frascina (New York: Harper and Row, 1985). For the visual arts, the exchange of art and non-artistic visual production is discussed in Thomas Crow, *Modern Art in the Common Culture* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996); for a comparison of Greenberg's position to that of Meyer Schapiro, see 8–21. Toward the end of the 1920s and before Stalinist oppression, the Russian Formalists developed a model of exchange between art and non-art that operates in two directions, taking into account not only strategies of borrowing and banalizing high art for mass-produced text and images, but also artists' strategies of "importing" material from popular culture, vernacular, class jargon, mass-produced images, "primitive" art, etc. See Jurij Tynjanov, "Über die literarische Evolution," in *Russischer Formalismus*, 433–60; Boris Ejchenbaum, "Das literarische Leben," *ibid.*, 463–480 (both texts in Russian and German; to my knowledge, there is no English translation). For a first introduction to Russian Formalism, see Krystina Pomorska, *Russian Formalist Theory and Its Poetic Ambiance* (The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1968), 21–42. The best discussion, is in, again, Hansen-Löve, *Der russische Formalismus*, 369–425.