

Introduction

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Why Art History within Its Limits?

There is a deeply rooted cliché of the art historian as one who talks instead of produces, surrounding innocent artworks with nebulous over-interpretations.¹ Art historians talking about themselves—that sounds like excuse or narcissism. Even more so, if, as in this book, the topic is not the freedom, but the limits of exploring visual products—the institutional frameworks of art historians' practices, the national traditions behind their education, the discipline's origins in Europe and the United States—in general, in what was once “Occidental” or “Western” culture!

The participants in the conference, organized by Michael Ann Holly and Mariët Westermann and held in May 2002 at the Sterling and Francine Clark Art Institute in Williamstown, Massachusetts, consciously accepted these limits. Academic curricula or career structures, museum budgets and sponsorship, and state offices for the protection of monuments are all formed by the institutional traditions of the nations. However, national voices struggle to organize themselves into a whole—as do the museum and the academic world, studied in 1999 in the Clark Conference “The Two Art Histories,” organized by Charles W. Haxthausen.²

Only in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has art history been established as a professional discipline corresponding to public interest. Succeeding methods and paradigms flourished in institutions: artistic biography within art academies; connoisseurship and oeuvre-cataloguing in museums, in the conservation of monuments, and the art market; interpretations of historical epochs according to style or iconography in the academic field; scientific inquiry into artworks in departments and studios of restoration; inventories of iconographic subject matter or of collections and provenances in research institutes or departments. All this forms a network whose name is art history. As museums became ever more all-encompassing institutions, the field was even extended beyond “art”: from painting to drawing, from sculpture to reproductive casts, from architecture to design, from decoration to graphic art, from reproduction to photography, from popular broadcasts to newspaper illustrations, from scientific illustrations to the Internet, from advertisement to propaganda.³ Art history always comprised many art histories.⁴

The very era that invented national artistic patrimony also invented the idea of a unique, global “art,” distant from religion or philosophy, politics or science.⁵ Romanticism rediscovered folk as well as medieval traditions and made the nation the subject of history. During the nineteenth century, the various national schools, whether historic or contemporary, joined in museums and world fairs, where the spectator could admire Nordic light along with Spanish mysticism, American panoramas along with Italian rhythms, French classicism along with German fantasy. Art history took a long time to emancipate itself from the national paradigm, once artistic development was understood as depending less on national character than on such inner necessities as style or *Kunstwollen*, studied by Heinrich Wölfflin and Alois Riegl.⁶

In the wake of colonialism artists, critics, anthropologists, and finally also art historians, fascinated with Oriental or African art, struggled for the acceptance of a fetish as a work of art, before museums arranged departments of Oriental, Oceanic, Pre-Columbian, or African art side by side with the corridors for European and American works. Ever since the publication of book series such as the Pelican History of Art or *L’Univers des Formes*, the idea of world art swept away the limits of a classical definition of art.⁷ Soon the very notion of “our” culture was questionable. Already in 1895 the art historian Aby Warburg, born into a Jewish family in Hamburg, studied the culture of the Hopi Indians in Arizona, especially the Moki snake dance, even before he discovered forms as related to desires deeply anchored in Renaissance belief systems and visual traditions.⁸ If post-colonial art appropriates suppressive European traditions, this is still an attempt at renegotiating the content, form, and public of a global imaginary museum.⁹

Art history, while it formed national elites and constructed national publics, paradoxically established an idea not less universal than human rights. Nowadays, the idea of art as a collective public heritage, full of promises and deceptions, excluding one and elevating the other, still is institutionally flourishing, even if it may be materially empty except of its dignity, or has come to an end, and only goes on playing with its shadow.¹⁰ “Art” still imposes itself as responsibility: it *has* to be preserved, it *has* to be shown, it *has* to be explained.¹¹ For art history, for its public, and for its private or state sponsors, that purpose or even duty is constantly more tangible than what “art” may *be* in general, or at the moment. That responsibility came up, together with the very idea of art, in certain places, and in concrete historical situations.¹²

“You,” and Games Where the Loser Is the Winner

In the essays assembled in this volume, art historians, discussing how to deal with their heritage within global professionalism, address their colleagues and their public. They address “you,” invited to reflect about what you want to do as art historian, or what you want art historians to do, even without affecting the radical narrative perspective Michel Butor had chosen for his novel *La Modification*, published in 1957, which starts:

You have put your left foot on the copper groove, and with your right shoulder you try in vain to push the sliding panel a little further. . . . You ease your way through the narrow opening, rubbing against both sides, then you take your suitcase, covered in dark, pebbled leather the color of a thick bottle, the rather small suitcase of a man accustomed to long trips, you pull it by its sticky handle with your fingers which have heated up, as light as it is, just from carrying it this far, you pick it up and you feel your muscles and tendons stand out not only in your fingers, in your palm, your fist and your arm, but in your shoulder too, in the whole half of your back and in your vertebrae from your neck to your waist. . . . No, it is not just the hour, scarcely daylight, which is responsible for this unaccustomed weakness, it is already age, trying to convince you of its domination over your body.¹³

The hero, Léon Delmont, is an alter ego for the reader who will, of course, stay himself, even if he feels emphatically with the director of the Parisian branch of an Italian typewriter-producer, who regularly travels to Rome, where he flees from the hostile indifference of his family into a love affaire with Cécile, a French woman living in the eternal city. When she wants to return to Paris, he again travels to Rome, this time in order to propose her to share lives. But on the train he recognizes that all her spell, for him, is Rome. The *modification* of *his* wishes is *yours*, the reader’s, who finally realizes that the novel “has not only allowed for communication between you and the author, but what is more, contains a lesson,” and the game reveals itself “a game of loser takes all.”¹⁴

If art history, in this volume, reflects about the suitcases it wears and that make it aware of its age, this is similarly “a game of loser takes all.” Art history, losing herself to forgotten or suppressed traditions, losing her identity in

the oceans of the non-artistic, even the industrialized image, or simply going on doing what she feels she *has* to do, might end finding herself where she already is, or where she already once had been—and not elsewhere.

The Belgian art historian and critic Thierry de Duve, in the first chapter of his book *Kant after Duchamp* (1996), explicitly addresses “you,” in order to intro-

duce you into the possible approaches of art history.¹⁵ For de Duve, the art historian is neither “I,” “he,” nor part of a “we,” but “you,” looking for what you want to do and don’t want to do with “art.”¹⁶ However, as in a work by Lorenzo Lotto, or by Giulio Paolini, it is not certain who it is who addresses “you,” or who “you” are, being addressed that way (fig. 1). With de Duve, “you and I” (to quote T. S. Eliot, who constructed a “we” that is not a collective singular)—we—now may follow the argument of the introduction of his book.¹⁷

De Duve invites you first into the role of an ethnologist or anthropologist, arriving from outer space on the earth. Art, for you, in most societies you know about is “an activity either

integrative or compensatory, lying midway between their myths and their sciences.”¹⁸ As a structuralist extra-terrestrial influenced by Claude Lévi-Strauss, you accept this place of art as a human activity inaugurating the possibility of symbolic exchange.¹⁹




Fig. 1. Giulio Paolini (Italian, b. 1941), *Young Man Looking at Lorenzo Lotto*, 1967. Photo-reproduction on canvas, 11 ¹³/₁₆ × 9 ¹/₂ in. (30 × 24 cm). Laupheim, Germany; F.E.R. collection. Based on a portrait (possibly a self-portrait) by Lorenzo Lotto in the Uffizi, Florence

But you are not satisfied with that tautological attitude of accepting everything as art—what *humans* might call such. You want to see it from the inside, from a humanistic perspective within a culture you are part of. Whether it originates in Greece or in Mesopotamia, you tell its evolution as a history completing the (however underlying) idea of art. Historians such as Henry Focillon or André Malraux told *La Vie des formes* or *Les Voix du silence* not as a history of change, but of metamorphosis.²⁰ As for a theory of “art as art” (Ad Reinhardt), you are, however, not more advanced than the anthropologist you just ceased to be: art itself negotiates and renegotiates what it is, whether imitation or expression, whether styled object or monument as opposed to document.²¹

Unsatisfied with that relativism, you become a logician and look for a paradigm. And you find it at the very limits of art: “you pull—indeed, yes—a urinal.”²² Of course the urinal shown at the first and juryless exhibition of the newborn Society of Independent Artists, in New York in 1917, was signed “R. Mutt.” One of the founders of the society, Marcel Duchamp, was behind that provocation of the “juryless” notion of art. You realize that art as a human activity, here, still is reduced to a tautology: it is whatever an *artist* calls art. And you realize: “The detachment of the observer—the ethnologist’s outsideness, the historian’s overview, the logician’s neutrality—are unsuitable when the meaning of art, not just its recognition, is at stake. You will have to start all over again.”²³

You will finally accept the loss of a real or possible omniscience. First, you become a sociologist, studying not society in general but your society, studying not human consensus as such, but a consensus you are a part of. Like the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, you realize that there is class privilege behind what seems to be a general consensus.²⁴ You see that art is more a matter of historical conflict than of human identity. If you still believe in art, and do not decide to leave it behind as an illusion—such as the German critic Carl Einstein when he fought, in 1937, in the Spanish civil war²⁵—it becomes for you a purpose, not an accomplishment, and you realize that it always had been a goal, confronting man not with what he was but with what he could or should become. “The word ‘art’ exists, certainly, but when it signals accord, it is already past.”²⁶ Art, by now, is more in its practices than in the work. Of course, de Duve now leads you in the midst of the “new” or “social” art history of the 1970s and 1980s that studied not only art but also hostility toward it, whether the refusal to accept Courbet’s neither humanistic nor romantic representation of provincial society as art, or the destruction of artworks in

churches—from Byzantium, to the followers of Jan Hus, to the Reformation.²⁷

De Duve does not mention the radical historicizing of the concept of “art” by Hans Belting that was possible only on the basis of social art history.²⁸ After having described the artistic practice of the Middle Ages as fundamentally linked to sacral or pagan cult, Hans Belting analyzed the very origins of the concept of art and art history: once the visual objects ceased merely to be functional within a religious or social ritual and started in turn to become the focus of an ever more aesthetic ritual, the idea of “art” only came into being.²⁹ Already Walter Benjamin had described that shift from art as *subservient within* ritual to art as focus of a ritual as a shift of the aura from the Divine to the artistic.³⁰ Belting’s radical analysis is a decisive step: with him, you historicize not only, as with de Duve, the consensus within art, but the very phenomenon (and not just the notion) of art. You do not only realize that art was not always what it is for you, or, to place you within a broader historical context, in societies that had *Kunstkammern*, picture galleries, or even museums and exhibitions.³¹ You do not only realize that art was something else in the Middle Ages, or in those African cultures Carl Einstein had analyzed in his 1917 groundbreaking book *Negerplastik*—a book that obviously influenced Benjamin for his much-disputed idea of the “aura.”³² With Belting, you become aware that only you go on giving the status of “art” to the artifacts of the Middle Ages or to ritual objects of the so-called “primitive” cultures.

In German art history during the 1980s, the analysis of the “functions” of the artwork seemed to be a unifying paradigm.³³ The “function” *as* art was seen as only one of the possible roles *of* artworks and artifacts within all sorts of symbolic exchange. “Art *as* art” is art for “us,” as a value. It goes beyond any function *of* art, analyzed by de Duve’s extra-terrestrials.

The excursion from the “you” of Thierry de Duve to the epic “we” Belting favors more and more in his books, has taught you that art was not always, and will maybe not always, exist. The same is true for that “we”—that collective singular for whom it is “art as art.”³⁴ So, after that extra lesson, you might like to return to being you, instead of “we,” because “you” will remain what you are, as long as you can speak up for yourself, even if it is in “a game of loser takes all.” But you are aware now that art, once reduced, through an urinal, to a proper name, can also be reduced to nothing, or to an empty shadow of what it was, for instance to a new branch of higher entertainment, or to new ways of marketing strategy by means of museums and exhibitions.³⁵

You might follow de Duve when he transforms you back to an amateur, for whom art is charged with a multitude of emotional values, values that cannot be reduced to the simplistic, Kantian alternative of pleasure or pain, but allow for all the light and shadow of desire, and of the unconscious. And you might consider the inventory of art simply as a sediment of amateur's tastes shared by others for their subtlety, for human values once lived and stocked in a repository of life-as-linked-to-visual-artifacts. You cannot but be charmed by this act of modest renunciation to *possess* art, whether in a philosophic definition or in a well-constructed narrative of its history.

You discovered the fragile history and status of art. But you also see that the old-fashioned idea of art is still interesting enough for visual trash culture, for ideology interested in "naturalizing," to use Roland Barthes's term, its key prejudices, for commercial culture that already has started the assault.³⁶ You might still feel compelled to defend it, and to insist that it reveals more than just taste, that it tells of possible freedom and real humiliation, that it gives access not only to life but to something you defend as a fundamental human truth. You might still feel that it is *good*, even a *duty*, to conserve works of art, whether you like what you think is their ideological message or not. Also, you might decide to stay, somehow, the sociologist involved in a struggle for a consensus even if it is unrealistic, for a utopia in the sense of the avant-garde, even if it has lost the totalitarian inclinations of the historical avant-gardes and of modernism, even if it is a very modest utopia.³⁷ But once you do so, you leave the community of the "you" with the one who is speaking, with de Duve, whom you now envy for his optimism and *savoir-vivre*, or with anyone who speaks to you only in order to speak for you. You have learned your own lesson. Art history for you, is also what it *happens* to be for you: your tradition, your education, your institutional practice. And it is what you feel you *must* do with and within it.

Art history, thus, is thrown back to its own history, to an identity it can only maintain in its self-reflexive practice. If art history looks back at its own history, it accepts its task as cultural environmentalism, not only enjoying but defending the fragile values it stands for and is part of.

More or Other Histories of Art History

How did classical antiquity remember its own antiquity; how did Egypt do so? Alain Schnapp, the specialist of archaeology's history,³⁸ now inquires into the construction of cultural memory, into the prehistory of archaeology, arguing

that all historical cultures establish a relationship to the past and its visible remnants. In the thirteenth century B.C. an Egyptian prided himself for having excavated and restored a monument of a priest that dated from around 2700 B.C.. With reference to the research of Jan Assmann, Schnapp insists on the Egyptians' attempts at anchoring historic time in non-historic eternity.³⁹ Preserving and collecting the remnants of the past—not for the present, but for eternity—was an antiquarian activity even then. Ruins from Mesopotamia to China already illuminated their own culture with her previous ambitions and her fate. If the monument erases time, time in turn erases everything. Writing took a long time to encode time into history—and ruins, into material memory.

Art history has told its own origin as rooted in romanticism, its love for the culture of the sane people, understood in a proto-nationalistic sense, its idealization of the corporative society of the Middle Ages, its self-expression in the total artwork of the cathedral.⁴⁰ Instead of reasserting that mythic origin of art history, two of the essays focus on other traditions equally fundamental: one is on the place of art history within the French academic system, and another on the rediscovery of Giorgio Vasari's *Lives* (1550 and 1568) in France, Italy, and Germany—both too-often forgotten sources of an art history keen on erasing its past within the institutional system of absolutism.⁴¹

In 1841 Paul Delaroche had finished his pantheon of the artists of all the times gathered, on a wall painting, behind the teachers and students in the Parisian *École des Beaux-Arts*.⁴² The work illustrates what Stephen Bann now calls a forgotten “ego-nucleus”—a term by Melanie Klein—of art history's pre-history. In the early nineteenth century, art history in France was present in a great variety of institutions. Even today, teaching in the *École des Beaux-Arts*, the *École du Louvre*, the *Collège de France*, the universities and the *École Normale Supérieure* is institutionally much less integrated than in other countries.⁴³ For Delaroche, who previously had proposed a reform of the academy, art history still had its place in the context of training artists. However, an illuminated, historically informed bourgeois public needed historically informed art. If Delaroche used the illustrations of Vasari's *Lives* as a model for some of the artist's portraits, for others, such as Arnolfo, Giotto, and Orcagna, he took his models from the chapterhouse in Santa Maria Novella, in order to avoid anachronism.⁴⁴ In the Napoleonic Louvre art had already been arranged according to the evolution of different “schools,” thus historically.⁴⁵ In Delaroche's assembly of masters of all the times, however, diachronic art history is still synchronically present. The

paradigm of history took a long time to emancipate itself from the paradigm of progress toward its standstill in perfection.

Carlo Ginzburg accentuates the continuity from the art history that was invented in 1550 by Giorgio Vasari, who over twenty years later also founded an academy, and the new discipline shaped during the nineteenth century in the wake of historicism. Recent studies by Gabriele Bickendorf and Elisabeth Décultot reject the image of Johann Joachim Winckelmann as an isolated founder of art history in favor of continuity from humanistic antiquarianism and its methods of linking paleography to connoisseurship to art history.⁴⁶ Ginzburg compares revisionists readings of Vasari after Winckelmann in Germany, Italy, and France. Johann Dominicus Fiorillo, a pupil of the painter Pompeo Batoni and after 1883 a teacher of art history in Göttingen, based his *Geschichte der zeichnenden Künste* (1798–1808) still on Vasari's *Lives*. In the early nineteenth century, Carl Friedrich von Rumohr or Johann David Passavant replaced the role of Michelangelo as the epiphany of art in Vasari through the early Raphael, thereby pleasing the Nazarenes, for whom Michelangelo already meant decadence. Friedrich Overbeck's painting *Italia und Germania* (1828), translating romantic friendship into the longed-for renaissance of two nations, accentuated the reactionary character of that reading. In Italy, the Purists shared the Nazarenes' dreams of catholic unity. But there the rediscovery of Giotto and the medieval tradition, instead of praising the past glory of the Holy Roman Empire, worked for the *risorgimento* of a supposed Italian cultural primacy in a nation-state. Until 1848, such Italians as Vincenzo Gioberti invited the pope to lead Italy toward freedom from Austrian domination. Gaetano Milanesi's two editions of Vasari's *Lives* (1846–55, 1878–85) are still rooted in a catholic reading linked to cultural patriotism. The principal figure of the Vasari renaissance for Ginzburg is Philippe-Auguste Jeanron, painter, director of the Louvre in 1848–49, and writer who commented a translation of Vasari between 1839 and 1842. Even before the avant-garde and its rhetoric, the republican Jeanron, revolutionary of 1830, described art in political terms: he saw artists such as Giotto as having gained individual freedom against Byzantine dogmas. Ironizing the German readings of Vasari, Jeanron argues against final perfection, whether in Raphael or in Michelangelo. He accentuates an element in Vasari that Ginzburg calls historical "perspectivism," not to be confused with relativism. The share Vasari admitted for the historical conditions of art, when he explains why Giotto could not reach the perfection of a Michelangelo, for Jeanron becomes the core of the argument. He links artistic progress, an idea Vasari had

inherited from Pliny, to social conditions and political progress. Thus, Jeanron's truly historic reading is the opposite of Delaroche's. Also his artistic endeavor, focused on the losers of progress, or of the revolution of July 1830, was at the opposite of Delaroche's historicism. For Ginzburg, Jeanron "who identified with the defeated, ended up a winner." And for the conference, Ginzburg's work-in-progress-paper was the model of another art history's history, or, to say it with Michel Butor, of "a game of loser takes all."

The conference did not pass over the exodus of the best of German art history after 1933. The discussions focused also on the destiny of those Jewish art historians in Nazi Germany who were killed or had to give up their careers.⁴⁷ Karen Michels deals with the more practical aspect of the academic (and culinary) experience of Jewish art historians urged into emigration from Germany to the United States. She confronts the American tradition of pedagogic mission with the German university system built on the ideals of Wilhelm von Humboldt, who wanted teaching narrowly linked to research. Nowadays, the situation somehow seems to have turned around: whereas at the time of Erwin Panofsky's arrival in New York, the European approach, presented in "Problems in" seminars, was perceived as over-specialized and technical, now, in many fields European art history would be provincial without the dialogue with American specialists. Students in European mass universities are still required to learn a general (if often superficial) overview of Western art history. Specialization is often allowed only in master's or post-graduate programs. Almost all the German Jewish emigrants welcomed the pragmatic clarity of the English language and felt freed from the fogs of German idealistic philosophy. However, the pragmatic turn of this generation and of their pupils, a change that transformed many radical questions of art history into institutionalized techniques such as an iconography that is all too dictionary-related, is today criticized as a narrowing of the discipline.⁴⁸

Françoise Forster-Hahn defends the disciplinary pragmatism of that generation. Reflecting on her own academic career between "the Old and New Worlds," she regrets that the practices of art history are actually moving further apart. After her dissertation about caricature in Bonn,⁴⁹ she studied at the Warburg Institute in London. She compares the anti-Hegelian tradition of Anton Springer and other German art historians of the nineteenth century with the empiricist spirit of international art history after 1945, when structural analysis of form and style in the wake of the Vienna school joined with iconography in a transatlantic methodological consensus. Even social history of the 1970s shared

aims on both sides of the Atlantic. However, the reception of French theory in the United States has reintroduced difference in academic cultures and mentalities, the belief in “historical continuity and aesthetic coherence” being questioned more on the American than on the European side of the Atlantic.

Questioning Myths and Master Narratives of Art History

However, also in Europe, the postwar consensus so convincingly analyzed by Forster-Hahn is under discussion. How did art historians construct the figure of an artist? Ernst Kris and Otto Kurz had taught *topoi* of artistic biography from Vasari to the present, such as the myth of nature revealing herself to an innocent genius who then is discovered (and introduced into the culture of representation) by a teacher whom he will surpass (Giotto drawing sheep, discovered by Cimabue).⁵⁰ The circularity of nature and culture is repeated in the circularity of work explained through life, and vice versa, in monographs and in connoisseurship—narratives Mieke Bal had already questioned in her book *Reading “Rembrandt”* (1991).⁵¹ Now, she analyses myths that govern even the practices of positivist or scientific analysis. Even if Bal’s attacks against Dutch cultural nationalism may seem a bit vitriolic, her questioning of concepts such as mastery, originality, and authenticity is all the more challenging. Is Rembrandt’s “hand”—a synthesis of all that—just an anthropomorphic fiction implying the possibility of the spectator’s encounter with the painter’s true intentions through his work? Can art history, through its own mastery, grant that encounter with the master, present for example in his self-portraits?⁵² The individualism underlying connoisseurship from Bernard Berenson to Max Friedländer shares the circularity of the artist-and-his-work explanations. Arguing against a paradigm that has structured art history, Bal insists that the artist cannot possibly speak through the mouth of the art historian.⁵³

Vermeer, for H. Perry Chapman, is an artist whose work, so rich in facts, hides a life so poor in them. Research as positivistic as Vermeer’s studio practice has gained evidence about his circle; the trade and prices of paintings as compared to, for example, coats; the artist’s dependence on a patron, Pieter Claesz van Ruijven; his house that could be reconstructed from his paintings; and his use of strings in establishing perspective—or of a camera obscura. A realist who hides everything in showing so much is compelling for postmodern fiction. Chapman takes sides with Tracy Chevalier’s novel *Girl with a Pearl Earring* (1999) that tells Vermeer’s distance from humanity, and from his female sitter, the maid Griet, in a fictional story based on careful observations of his works.⁵⁴

Georges Didi-Huberman inquires into the notion of time that art history implies, just as the artwork cuts into time. If artworks are explained from origins, time is established as a continuous chain of related phenomena encompassing the spectator here and now. Referring to Michel Foucault and his reading of Friedrich Nietzsche, Didi-Huberman argues against origin and continuity.⁵⁵ An African sculpture in a collection of European art was an anachronism, revealing any powerful image as such. Like a symptom, the image arises, interrupting the chain of representation, according to a logic anchored in the unconscious. In *Devant le temps* (2000), Didi-Huberman focused on the anachronism of the artwork, a term he had borrowed from Carl Einstein.⁵⁶ Later, he insisted on the move of art historians such as Aby Warburg of “folding” the past into the present.⁵⁷ He now inquires into the French Annales-School’s historical time, whether fast or slow, on the intersecting rhythms of historical time and time as related to life.⁵⁸ The image, emerging from the “porosity” of history, becomes a paradigm of multifold time. Art history, folding onto its own past, discovers a theory of the image as symptom (linking representation to the unconscious) already developed by Aby Warburg, Walter Benjamin, Carl Einstein, and German Jewish intellectualism before 1933. In contrast to Françoise Forster-Hahn, who prizes the generation of the emigrants and of postwar art history, Didi-Huberman regrets that they suppressed the critical energy of their predecessors in the moves toward philological, technical pragmatism. He invites art history to re-read Warburg, Einstein, Benjamin, similar to how Jacques Lacan re-read Freud, thereby rethinking paradigms such as origin, the haptic, survival, or modernity.

What Art History Is, or What It Does

Horst Bredekamp tries to reconstruct a tradition of *Bildwissenschaften* (inquiry into images, or the image). Focusing on art history and *its* media as well as on art history and *the* media, he demonstrates that the limitations of art history’s field, imposed by idealistic aesthetics, had already been questioned by Austrian and German art historians, who between 1900 and 1933 studied illustrations, figures, and other popular imagery as seriously as works of art. After 1970 social art history regained that breadth, focusing on advertisement, video art, or political iconography.⁵⁹ Only recently, visual studies are established more and more beside art history. Contradicting Belting, for whom iconology could have developed into a general science of the image had it not again limited art history to art, for Bredekamp, it is not the generation of Panofsky who is to blame for the

narrowing of the field, but a more recent loss of disciplinary memory.⁶⁰ The discipline, having used reproduction from photography to double slide-projection in a self-reflective way, also focused on the media outside art history. Warburg had been interested in the propaganda machine of the First World War before studying, in 1919, religious propagandistic prophecies in the woodcut images during the Reformation.⁶¹ The last sheet of his Mnemosyne-picture-atlas is particularly revealing. Here, images referring to the Vatican contract between Pius IX and Mussolini—which in 1929 ended the confrontation of the Italian nation-state with the sovereign of the *patrimonium Petri*—are combined with illustrations alluding to golfing and other seemingly unrelated topics. Revealing a deeper psycho-iconography, all the images refer to the dadaistic mix of mundane triumph typical in the illustrated press. In his 1936 essay “On Movies,” Panofsky would treat cinema as the most important successor of the iconographic tradition, more so than, it is understood, avant-garde art.⁶² Bredekamp strongly argues in favor of the unity of *Bildwissenschaft* and against splitting the fields into interdisciplinary visual studies and traditional art that would, in one of these fields, lead to a lack of professionalism in description, and, in the other, reduce the history of art to its own archaeology.

Not arguing against ethnological or post-colonial approaches, my essay tries to warn against versions of totalizing anthropology, of art history envisioning itself as arrived at its end(s). André Malraux and Belting both radically question art as linked to the imaginary museum, present in books, or as originating in late medieval and early absolutist courts.⁶³ Also, both have contributed toward opening art to global culture.⁶⁴ That opening of the perspective becomes the prelude for a more radical closure if “we” (the epic community of art history) believe to understand in art not men, but man. Urania’s owl flies over the world at dawn, linking understanding to the death of what it understands. For Belting, the death of art is celebrated over and over again within recent art.⁶⁵ Against art history as negative theology, I favor radical contingency (in an admittedly generalizing, thus in itself not contingent, move).⁶⁶ It may be a poor project to focus onto the procedures through which art goes on reinventing itself, against the pressures of the ever more industrialized image. But instead of conflating non-artistic images with “art,” it focuses on an accelerated change—and on artists’ capacity and responsibility to confront societies with themselves, with the human condition they create and with what presents itself as their other side, their hidden self.

Schnapp started the reflective gaze of art history onto itself with the archaeology of archaeology. May it also end with archaeology, with memory, linked to objects. Eric Fernie demonstrates that whereas nowadays archaeology is based on a set of widely accepted methods and techniques, art history's identity is weak. The field of art history, vaguely defined, seems to be ever more restricted. Recent exclusions are architecture, design, photography, film, and digital media. Archaeology, on the contrary, as a scientific approach, is all-inclusive as to the cultural material found in a given site. Art history, belonging to the *humanities*, should less define itself on the ground of what it is, than of what it does: analysis, and behind it, questions. Fernie exemplifies this through an erroneous analysis, misled by evolutionism, of differently decorated arches of the arcades at St. Mary at Hemel Hempstead in Hertfordshire. The paradigm linking variations to changes in the mind of the builders, deeply rooted in art history, was wrong. But the question was not. Thus, even not analysis, but questions are in the center of that insecure discipline which is art history. Fernie's plea for the primacy of questions over answers is one of the rare conclusions a majority of art historians would tend to accept.

Whenever possible, the notes refer to editions in the original language.

1. Willibald Sauerländer, "Kunsthistoriker: 'Alte Meister' oder die Kunsthistoriker in den Romanen," in *Kunstchronik* 39 (1986): 81–86.
2. *The Two Art Histories: The Museum and the University*, ed. Charles W. Haxthausen (Williamstown, Mass.: Sterling and Francine Clark Art Institute, 2002).
3. Heinrich Dilly, *Kunstgeschichte als Institution. Studien zur Geschichte einer Disziplin* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1979); *Altmeister moderner Kunstgeschichte*, ed. Heinrich Dilly (Berlin: Reimer, 1990). The 1979 book is influenced by Thomas S. Kuhn's 1962 study, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (reprinted Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970). Kuhn insists that new paradigms are not introduced in order to solve old problems, but as attempts to restructure entire fields of knowledge, often introducing, at the beginning, more problems than they resolve. The fashionable use of the term *paradigm* goes back to Kuhn. It designates, in a Wittgensteinian sense, a new experiment and interpretation functioning more as a practical than as a theoretical model for further investigation according to similar schemes.
4. That history is always based on narrative structures has been shown by Hayden White—who, however, insists on the fundamental difference between history and fiction, on the paradoxical fact

- that historians attempt, in their storytelling, at telling the truth. See Hayden White, *Metahistory: The Historiographic Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973). For traditional art historical myths, see Ernst Kris and Otto Kurz, *Die Legende vom Künstler. Ein geschichtlicher Versuch*, preface by Ernst H. Gombrich (1934; reprinted Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1980). From its beginnings, the narrative structure of national history—such as the history of the republic of Florence—has influenced the narrative of patriotic art history. See Michael Baxandall, *Giotto and the Orators: Humanist Observers of Painting in Italy and the Discovery of Pictorial Composition, 1350–1450* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). Not by chance, art history has been invented once absolutism, while eliminating the political influence of art, includes it into a separate, autonomous field of knowledge. See Georges Didi-Huberman, *Devant l'image. Question posée aux fins d'une histoire de l'art* (Paris: Minuit, 1990), chap. 2, 65–104: “L'Art comme renaissance et l'immortalité de l'homme idéal”; and Michael F. Zimmermann, “Le Jardin de Cosme I^{er} à Castello. Remarques sur le maniérisme et l'histoire de l'art,” in *Ruptures. De la discontinuité dans la vie artistique*, ed. Jean Galard (Paris: Musée du Louvre / École Nationale Supérieure des Beaux-Arts, 2002), 72–99.
5. See Udo Kultermann, *Geschichte der Kunstgeschichte: der Weg einer Wissenschaft* (1966; Munich: Prestel, 1996). For an example of a national history of art history, see Wilhelm Waetzoldt, *Deutsche Kunsthistoriker*, 2 vols. (Leipzig 1921–24; reprinted Berlin: Spiess, 1986).
6. Thomas DaCosta Kaufman, “National Stereotypes, Prejudice, and Aesthetic Judgments in the Historiography of Art,” in *Art History, Aesthetics, Visual Studies*, ed. Michael Ann Holly and Keith Moxey (Williamstown, Mass.: Sterling and Francine Clark Art Institute, 2002), 71–84; Michael Podro, *The Critical Historians of Art* (New Haven, Conn., and London: Yale University Press, 1982); Joan Goldhammer Hart, “Heinrich Wölfflin: An Intellectual Biography” (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Berkeley, 1981; Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1988); Wolfgang Kemp, “Alois Riegl,” in Dilly, *Kunstgeschichte*, 19–34, 37–60.
7. About the Pelican History of Art, founded by Niklaus Pevsner and published since the early 1950s, see François Souchal, “A Propos de la nouvelle Pelican History of Art,” in *Gazette des Beaux-Arts*, ser. 6, 126, no. 1522 (1995): 1–2; Alban Cerisier, “l'Univers des formes (1955–1997): livres d'art et pratiques editoriales,” in *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes* 158 (2000): 247–71.
8. See Kurt W. Forster, “Zu Aby Warburg. Die Hamburg-Amerika-Linie, oder: Warburgs Kulturwissenschaft zwischen den Kontinenten,” in *Aby Warburg. Akten des internationalen Symposium Hamburg 1990*, ed. Horst Bredekamp, Michael Diers, and Charlotte Schoell-Glass (Weinheim: VCH-Acta Humaniora, 1991), 11–37. Warburg is by now ever more in the center of art historical discourse; see Aby Warburg, *Gesammelte Schriften. Die Erneuerung der heidnischen Antike. Kulturwissenschaftliche Beiträge zur Geschichte der europäischen Renaissance*, ed. Gertrud Bing with Fritz Rougemont, 2 vols. (Leipzig and Berlin: Teubner, 1932; new edition directed by Horst Bredekamp

and Michael Diers, 3 vols. [Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1998]); Edgar Wind; "Warburgs Begriff der Kulturwissenschaft und seine Bedeutung für die Aesthetik," in *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, special issue 25 (1931): 63–179; Ernst H. Gombrich, *Aby Warburg: An Intellectual Biography*, 2d ed. (Oxford and Chicago: Phaidon, 1986); Werner Hofmann, Georg Syamken, and Martin Warnke, *Die Menschenrechte des Auges. Über Aby Warburg* (Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1980); Claude Imbert, "Warburg, de Kant à Boas," in *L'Homme. Revue Française d'Anthropologie* (special issue "Image et Anthropologie") 165 (Jan.–Mar. 2003): 11–40, see also the essays in this issue by Carlo Severi and Giovanni Careri.

9. For the post-colonial perspective, see *Global Conceptualism: Points of Origin, 1950s–1980s*, exh. cat. (New York: Queens Museum of Art, 1999); *Documenta 11 Platform 5: Ausstellung*, ed. Okwui Enwezor, exh. cat. (Ostfildern-Ruit: Hatje Cantz, 2002).

10. Pierre Bourdieu, *L'Amour de l'art* (Paris: Minuit, 1966). See, for the debate of last images and end(s) of art, most recently, *Iconclash*, ed. Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel, exh. cat. (Cambridge, Mass., and London: MIT Press, 2002).

11. Classical text: Max Dvorák, *Katechismus der Denkmalpflege* (Vienna: Bard, 1918). Valuable introductions: Gottfried Kiesow, *Einführung in die Denkmalpflege* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1982); Georg Mörsch, *Aufgeklärter Widerstand. Das Denkmal als Frage und Aufgabe* (Basilea, Berlin et al.: Birkhäuser, 1989).

12. The American pragmaticist philosopher Richard Rorty was asked, after a conference in Munich in presence of the sociologist Ulrich Beck and the philosopher Jürgen Habermas, whether for him participation in political and civic debate was a moral obligation or merely a professional behavior. He replied: "It happens to be a moral obligation" [my italics conveying his emphasis]. See, for the context, Jürgen Habermas, *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit* (Darmstadt and Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1962); Jürgen Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981); Jürgen Habermas, "Vorlesungen zu einer sprachtheoretischen Grundlegung der Soziologie," in his courses at Princeton in 1971, *Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1984); and Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

13. "Vous avez mis le pied gauche sur la rainure de cuivre, et de votre épaule droite vous essayez en vain de pousser un peu plus le panneau coulissant. . . . Vous vous introduisez par l'étroite ouverture en vous frottant contre ses bords, puis, votre valise couverte de granuleux cuir sombre couleur d'épaisse bouteille, votre valise assez petite d'homme habitué aux longs voyages, vous l'arrachez par sa poignée collante, avec vos doigts qui se sont échauffés, si peu lourde qu'elle soit, de l'avoir portée jusqu'ici, vous la soulevez et vous sentez vos muscles et vos tendons se dessiner non seulement dans vos phalanges, dans votre paume, votre poignet et votre bras, mais dans votre épaule aussi, dans toute la moitié du dos et dans vos vertèbres depuis votre cou jusqu'aux reins. . . . Non,

- ce n'est pas seulement l'heure, à peine matinale, qui est responsable de cette faiblesse inhabituelle, c'est déjà l'âge qui cherche à vous convaincre de sa domination sur votre corps." Michel Butor, *La Modification* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1957), 7. My thanks to Sarah Lees for this translation. See Mieke Bal, "Second-Person Narrative," in *Painting and Narrative*, ed. Michael Worton (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996), 179–204.
14. "non seulement aura permis entre l'auteur et vous une communication mais contient, de surcroît, une leçon"; "un jeu de qui-perd-gagne." Butor, *La Modification*, 314.
15. Thierry de Duve, *Kant after Duchamp* (Cambridge, Mass., and London: MIT Press, 1996), 3–86.
16. In technical terms, "you" is an intra-diegetic narrator addressing an intra-diegetic reader. As in an epistolary novel, both are part of the narration. None of them is placed outside, in an objectifying distance. And none can focalize the entire field, outside of its exploration in the course of the narrative. See Gérard Genette, "Discours du récit," in his *Figures III* (Paris: Seuil, 1972), 67–282.
17. T. S. Eliot, *The Waste Land* (1922), with a translation into German by Ernst Robert Curtius (Wiesbaden: Insel, 1957). For the focus onto "you" and "we" see Genette, "Discours" and Mikhail M. Bakhtin, "Discourse in the Novel" (1934–35), in *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin*, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 259–422, especially on his notion of voice, 275–300.
18. De Duve, *Kant after Duchamp*, 3–4.
19. Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Anthropologie structurale* (Paris: Plon, 1958); Claude Lévi-Strauss, *La Pensée sauvage* (Paris: Plon, 1962); Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Mythologies*, 3 vols. (1964; reprinted Paris: Plon, 1968).
20. See Henri Focillon, *La Vie des formes* (Paris: Ernest Lroux, 1934); and the much more voluminous André Malraux, *Les Voix du silence* (Paris: Pléiade, 1952).
21. De Duve, *Kant after Duchamp*, 4–12. See Barbara Rose, *Art-as-Art: The Selected Writings of Ad Reinhardt* (New York: Viking Press, 1975); and *Ad Reinhardt: Schriften und Gespräche*, ed. Thomas Kellein (Munich: Silke Schreiber, 1984).
22. De Duve, *Kant after Duchamp*, 12.
23. *Ibid.*, 14.
24. Bourdieu, *L'Amour de l'art*; Pierre Bourdieu, *La Distinction. Critique sociale du jugement* (Paris: Minuit, 1979); Pierre Bourdieu, *Les Règles de l'art. Genèse et structure du champ littéraire* (Paris: Librairie examens/Seuil, 1992). See also the special issue about Bourdieu, mostly from a philosophical point of view, of *Critique* 579/580 (Aug.–Sept. 1995).
25. Carl Einstein, *Die Fabrikation der Fiktionen*, ed. Sibylle Penkert (Reinbek/Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1973).
26. De Duve, *Kant after Duchamp*, 19.

27. T. J. Clark, *Image of the People* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1973); T. J. Clark, *The Absolute Bourgeois* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1973); Horst Bredekamp, *Kunst als Medium sozialer Konflikte. Bilderkämpfe von der Spätantike bis zur Hussitenrevolution* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1975).
28. Belting's book about Assisi was a cornerstone of the social historical paradigm of the 1970s. See Hans Belting, *Die Oberkirche von San Francesco in Assisi. Ihre Dekoration als Aufgabe und die Genese einer neuen Wandmalerei* (Berlin: Mann, 1977).
29. Hans Belting, *Das Bild und sein Publikum im Mittelalter. Form und Funktion früher Bildtafeln der Passion* (Berlin: Mann, 1981); Hans Belting, *Bild und Kult. Eine Geschichte des Bildes vor dem Zeitalter der Kunst* (Munich: Beck, 1990); Hans Belting, *Das Ende der Kunstgeschichte?* (Munich: Deutscher Kunstverlag, 1983), 63–91, chapter 2: "Vasari und die Folgen. Die Geschichte der Kunst als Prozeß?"; Hans Belting and Christiane Kruse, *Die Erfindung des Gemäldes: das erste Jahrhundert der niederländischen Malerei* (Munich: Hirmer, 1994). See also Umberto Eco, *Arte e bellezza nell'estetica medievale* (Milan: Bompiani, 1987), chapter 10.
30. Walter Benjamin, "Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit" (1935), in *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schwepenhäuser with Gershom Scholem and Theodor W. Adorno (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1974), vol. 1, no. 2, 430–508.
31. Julius von Schlosser, *Die Kunst- und Wunderkammern der Spätrenaissance. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Sammelwesens*, 2d ed. (1923; rev. ed. Braunschweig: Klinkhardt & Biermann, 1985); Horst Bredekamp, *Antikensehnsucht und Maschinenglauben. Die Geschichte der Kunstkammer und die Zukunft der Kunstgeschichte* (Berlin: Wagenbach, 1993). Bredekamp insists on the fact that the status of the artwork was intensely negotiable in the polyphonic ensembles of the *Kunstkammer*. The increasingly differentiated literature on the history of the museum cannot be quoted here. The status of art in the sense of liberal societies with their characteristic public life, however, is reflected in a synthetic manner, in these publications: Georg Friedrich Koch, *Die Kunstaussstellung. Ihre Geschichte von den Anfängen bis zum Ausgang des 18. Jahrhunderts* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1967); Oskar Bätschmann, *Ausstellungskünstler. Kult und Karriere im modernen Kunstsystem* (Cologne: DuMont, 1997).
32. Carl Einstein, *Negerplastik* (Berlin: Die Weissen Bücher, 1915; reprinted Berlin: Fannei and Walz, 1992).
33. *Funkkolleg Kunst. Eine Geschichte der Kunst im Wandel ihrer Funktionen*, ed. Werner Busch with Tilman Buddensieg, Wolfgang Kemp, Jürgen Paul, et al., 2 vols., Deutsches Institut für Fernstudien an der Universität Tübingen, 1984–1987 (Munich: Piper, 1997).
34. Hans Belting, *Das Ende der Kunstgeschichte. Eine Revision nach zehn Jahren* (Munich: Beck, 1995).
35. An example of that expropriation of art in a marketing strategy was, with rare exceptions (notably the show in the pavilion of the Swiss National Bank about "Art and Value—The Last Taboo"

- by Harald Szeemann with Thomas Zaunschirm), the Swiss National Exhibition of 2002 with its *Arteplages* around the lakes of Neuchâtel, Morat, and Bienne. See Nelly Wenger, *The Official Guide to Expo. 02. Arteplages, Exhibitions, Events, Maps, Etc.* (Zurich: Werd, 2002).
36. Roland Barthes, "Le message photographique" (1961) and "Rhétorique de l'image" (1964), in Roland Barthes, *L'Obvie et l'obtus. Essais critiques III* (Paris: Seuil, 1983), 9–42.
37. Boris Groys, *The Total Art of Stalinism: Avant-Garde, Aesthetic Dictatorship, and Beyond* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).
38. Alain Schnapp, *La Conquête du passé. Aux origines de l'archéologie* (Paris: Carré, 1993).
39. Jan Assmann, *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis. Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen*, 3d. ed. (Munich: Beck, 1997).
40. Waetzoldt, *Deutsche Kunsthistoriker*, 1:14–73.
41. Giorgio Vasari, *Le vite de' più eccellenti pittori scultori et architettori nelle redazioni del 1550 e 1568*, ed. Rosanna Bettarini and Paola Barocchi, 6 vols. (Florence: Sansoni; Studio per Edizioni Scelte, 1966–87).
42. See Stephen Bann, *Paul Delaroche: History Painted* (London: Reaktion, 1997), 200–27. In my critical review of the book in *Kunstchronik* (May 1999), 207–18, I did not mention a small but important complement: Stephen Bann: *After Delaroche: Art and Its Reproductions in Mid-Nineteenth-Century France*, exh. cat. (The Strag Print Room, London: University College, 1998).
43. For a history of art history and its institutions from a French perspective, see Roland Recht, *Penser le patrimoine: mise en scène et mise en ordre de l'art* (Paris: Hazan, 1998).
44. About the theory of historicism, see "Geschichte allein ist zeitgemäß," in *Historismus in Deutschland*, ed. Michael Brix and Monika Steinhauser (Gießen: Anabas, 1978).
45. Thomas W. Gaehtgens, "Le Musée Napoléon et son influence sur l'histoire de l'art," in *Histoire de l'histoire de l'art*, ed. Édouard Pommier, Conférences et colloques du Musée du Louvre (Paris: Klincksieck, 1995), 89–112.
46. Gabriele Bickendorf, *Die Historisierung der italienischen Kunstbetrachtung im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert* (Berlin: Gebr. Mann, 1998); Elisabeth Décultot, *Johann Joachim Winckelmann: Enquête sur la genèse de l'histoire de l'art* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2000).
47. Ulrike Wendland, *Biographisches Handbuch deutschsprachiger Kunsthistoriker im Exil. Leben und Werk der unter dem Nationalsozialismus verfolgten und vertriebenen Wissenschaftler*, 2 vols. (Munich: Saur, 1999); Karen Michels, *Transplantierte Kunstwissenschaft: deutschsprachige Kunstgeschichte im amerikanischen Exil* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1999).
48. Michael Ann Holly, *Panofsky and the Foundations of Art History* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).
49. F. Forster-Hahn, *Johann Heinrich Ramberg als Karikaturist und Satiriker* (Hannover: Schulze, 1963).

50. Kris and Kurz, *Die Legende vom Künstler*.
51. Mieke Bal, *Reading "Rembrandt": Beyond the Word-Image Opposition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
52. On the paradox of a technique of originality, see Richard Shiff, *Cézanne and the End of Impressionism: A Study of the Theory, Technique, and Critical Evaluation of Modern Art* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
53. Gary Schwartz, "Connoisseurship: The Penalty of Ahistoricism," *Artibus et Historiae* 18 (1988), 201–6.
54. Tracy Chevalier, *Girl with a Pearl Earring* (New York: Dutton, 1999).
55. Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, la généalogie, l'histoire" (1971), in *Dits et Ecrits 1954–1988*, vol. 2 (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 147–48.
56. Georges Didi-Huberman, *Devant le temps. Histoire de l'art et anachronisme des images* (Paris: Minuit, 2000), ch. 3, "L'image-combat. Inactualité, expérience critique, modernité," 159–232.
57. Georges Didi-Huberman, *L'image survivante. Histoire de l'art et temps des fantômes selon Aby Warburg* (Paris: Minuit, 2002).
58. See also, quoted by Didi-Huberman: Reinhard Koselleck, *Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1979).
59. See, for example, Martin Warnke, "Zur Situation der Couchecke," in *Stichworte zur "geistigen Situation der Zeit"*, ed. Jürgen Habermas, vol. 2, *Politik und Kultur* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1979), 673–87.
60. See already Horst Bredekamp, "Words, Images, Ellipses," in *Meaning in the Visual Arts: Views from the Outside. A Centennial Commemoration of Erwin Panofsky (1892–1968)*, ed. Irving Lavin (Princeton, N.J.: Institute for Advanced Study, 1995), 363–71.
61. Aby Warburg, *Heidnisch-antike Weissagung in Wort und Bild zu Luthers Zeiten*, Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse, vol. 10 (1919), abh. 26 (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1920).
62. The essay was later revised and published as Erwin Panofsky, "Style and Medium in the Motion Pictures," *Critique* 1, no. 3 (1947): 5–28.
63. André Malraux, *Psychologie de l'art. Le Musée imaginaire* (Geneva: Skira, 1947); Belting, *Das Ende der Kunstgeschichte?*; Belting, *Bild und Kult*; Belting and Kruse, *Die Erfindung des Gemäldes*, see n. 29, above. The renaissance of antique strategies to tell art history is analyzed in Baxandall, *Giotto and the Orators*.
64. Hans Belting, "Der Ort der Bilder," in *Das Erbe der Bilder. Kunst und moderne Medien in den Kulturen der Welt*, ed. Hans Belting and Lydia Hausteil (Munich: Beck, 1998), 34–53, where Belting argues still in a perspectivist sense "dass wir selbst die Bilder mitbringen, die wir sehen wollen—und sehen (verstehen) können." (53).

65. Hans Belting, *Das unsichtbare Meisterwerk. Die modernen Mythen der Kunst* (Munich: Beck, 1998). My critical review was published in *Kunstchronik* 52, no. 1 (Jan. 1999): 47–51.

66. That move is all the more regrettable as there would have been the model for a more elegant argument opposing the humanly concrete against the humane in general: for Meyer Shapiro against Heidegger and about van Gogh's shoes, see Meyer Schapiro, "The Still Life as a Personal Object—A Note on Heidegger and van Gogh" (1968), "Further Notes on Heidegger and van Gogh" (1994), in Meyer Schapiro, *Theory and Philosophy of Art: Style, Artist, and Society: Selected Papers* (New York: George Braziller, 1994), 135–42, 143–51.