

1 Isocrates: *Περὶ ἀντιδόσεως* (353 BCE) [*Antidosis*] and Lucian: *Περὶ τοῦ ἐνυπνίου* (2nd Century) [*Dream*]

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Characteristically, the self-perception of current research on autobiography and autofiction emphasizes the resurrection of the author who had been declared dead in postmodernism, and to deduce part of its 'raison d'être' from here, without the want to relinquish that which has been achieved in postmodern debate on theory. The author – set against such a background – can no longer be the compact and steadfast constant, an authority being responsible for the text but standing outside of it, in an unclear relationship to intradiegetic and extradiegetic narrators, and transgressing the border between world and text in abrupt, metaleptic moments. Literary texts, having the status of ego-documents, are therefore of special interest, because they involve the author as an actual person, but at the same time, as products of postmodern speaking, cannot simply depict him. Rather, it seems to turn out that the author as an object of depiction cannot be of any use. The language's semiotic instability shows through in speaking and thereby in the speaker, who is uncertain of his identity in the multiplying of life references in the age of social freedom and globalization, and rather perceives himself as a bunch of conflicting partial identities and identitarian claims. Neither is he able to find any stability in language; the possible forms of an autobiographical statement have multiplied *ad infinitum* as well.

The – imprecisely so-called – 'premodernity', in contrast to that, seems to be characterized by some calming stability of the circumstances in the view of current research, and it has been laconically phrased that premodern man took on the roles that his society made available for him (Wucherpennig 2009). It is easily seen that this view cannot do any justice to the complexity of the actual circumstances. On the one hand a large part also of the contemporary's behavioral role is predefined, the demands of which he cannot simply defy completely, although the number and differentiation of possible roles has multiplied. On the other hand, each role demanded its role player in that seemingly more stable time as well: It was always possible to not do justice to one's role, to fail, if one were supposed to win, one could despair of it and its limitations. Especially the question on the quality of the role play came to the fore like that on the specific character of the obligation. The fact alone that antiquity already knows autobiographical texts shows that answers to these questions were not a matter of course.

From classical studies' view the focusing of autobiographical 'literature' is conspicuous, although quite understandable. It is simply not the act of utterance, but the act of writing down that is examined carefully (Wagner-Egelhaaf 2006, 84–88). It results in the picture of a figure that is uncertain in identitarian regard, that tries to

gain core and contour in writing, makes and destroys drafts, arrives at ever more precision or eventually considers, is forced to consider the self-formation to be a never-ending, never concluded process. It immediately suggests itself that most times the recipient of such texts is also taken into view; it is of course known that autobiographical texts are supposed to meet with approval, admiration, that they often perpetuate and spread ideological positions, but it seems that this is not often taken into view, and even more rarely set off against that identity negotiation. Of course, this is based on the problem that the moment the author gives away his text and into print, his or her person leaves the image field, but that conversely the reader does not enter, because s/he cannot be grasped empirically in the necessary individual sharpness, and therefore again only emerges as a virtual entity of the text.

But it has to be taken into account that ancient literature keeps an orally auditive dimension into and through Late Antiquity, and that it is this dimension that decidedly dominates in archaic and classical times (for an overview see v. Möllendorff 2013). An autobiographical text is first of all recited by the autobiographical subject itself, this means: The subject stands with his body and voice in front of his listeners, that is why it is more difficult to convey identitarian instability and fragility, which possibly cannot be perceived that easily. In the case of Isocrates' *Antidosis* and Lucian's *Dream*, however, the passing on in written form, the receiving through reading is at least as important, probably even more important than their orally auditive situating, which is still strongly evoked and generically underlies both texts.

Isocrates' *Antidosis*

The orator and philosopher appeared before the Athenian court in 353 BCE in order to defend himself, aged 82, against the accusation of some Lysimachus. Lysimachus had charged Isocrates that

διαφθείρω τοὺς νεωτέρους λέγειν διδάσκων καὶ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι πλεονεκτεῖν, ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων λόγων ποιεῖ με τηλικούτον ὅσος οὐδεὶς πώποτε γέγονεν οὔτε τῶν περὶ τὰ δικαστήρια καλινδουμένων οὔτε τῶν περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν διατριψάντων· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἰδίωτας φησὶ μου γεγενῆσθαι μαθητὰς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ῥήτορας καὶ στρατηγούς καὶ βασιλέας καὶ τυράννους, καὶ χρήματα παρ' αὐτῶν παμπληθῆ τὰ μὲν εἰληφέναι, τὰ δ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν λαμβάνειν

[I corrupt young men by teaching them to speak and gain their own advantage in the courts contrary to justice, while in his speech he makes me out to be a man whose equal has never been known either among those who hang about the law-courts or among the devotees of philosophy; for he declares that I have had as my pupils not only private persons but orators, generals, kings, and despots; and that I have received from them and am now receiving enormous sums of money] (Isocr. ant. 30).

The speech Isocrates sets against this has an enormous scope with its 323 paragraphs. It claims to show to the citizens of the polis Athens and to posterity

τὸν τρόπον ὃν ἔχω, καὶ τὸν βίον ὃν ζῶ, καὶ τὴν παιδείαν περὶ ἣν διατρίβω, καὶ μὴ περιδοίμι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἄκριτον ἔμαυτὸν ὄντα, μηδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς βλασφημεῖν εἰθισμένοις ὥσπερ νῦν γενόμενον· [the truth about my character, my life, and the education to which I am devoted, and not suffer myself to be condemned on these issues without a trial nor to remain, as I had just been, at the mercy of my habitual calumniators] (Isocr. ant. 6).

It is due to the length and the general claim for an encompassing life report from high age's retrospective that the signet was given by scholars to the *Antidosis* to be the first proper autobiographical text of Greek literature which deserves this name from a modern perspective (Trédé-Boulmer 1993, 17). Of course we find autobiographisms in earlier forensic speeches and other texts as well (Misch 1949, 158–180), but not in the sense of any presentation aiming at completeness or anyway far-reaching representativity as primary work intent. It is, to speak here with Lejeune (1975, 14), composed in prose; author, speaker and protagonist are identical persons; the report's object lies in the past. In addition, the text again and again focusses on its scripturality, that is, it wants to be read, and thus presents a paradigm of autobiographical writing (in contrast to other medially indeterminated self-reports or, as Breuer and Sandberg [2006, 10–11] put it, ego-documents). Especially the fact that the *Antidosis* belongs to the genre of Attic forensic speech should remind the reader of this genre's being at least four generations older, and that it was always in the nature of the forensic speech to include statements on oneself and autobiographical reports. The beginning of Mantitheus' speech for defending his eligibility to hold public office, delivered at the turn of the fifth and the fourth century BCE, shall be cited here for comparison:

Εἰ μὴ συνήδειν, ᾧ βουλή, τοῖς κατηγοροῖς βουλομένοις ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου κακῶς ἐμὲ ποιεῖν, πολλὴν ἂν αὐτοῖς χάριν εἶχον ταύτης τῆς κατηγορίας· ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ τοῖς ἀδίκως διαβεβλημένοις τούτους εἶναι μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αἰτίους, οἵτινες ἂν αὐτοὺς ἀναγκάζωσιν εἰς ἔλεγχον τῶν αὐτοῖς βεβιωμένων καταστήναι. [...] ἀξιῶ δέ, ᾧ βουλή, ἐὰν μὲν τοῦτο μόνον ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξω, ὡς εὔνοους εἰμὶ τοῖς καθεστηκόσι πράγμασι καὶ ὡς ἠνάγκασμαι τῶν αὐτῶν κινδύνων μετέχειν ὑμῖν, μηδὲν πῶ μοι πλέον εἶναι. ἐὰν δὲ φαίνωμαι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μετρίως βεβιωκῶς καὶ πολὺν παρὰ τὴν δόξαν καὶ παρὰ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς τῶν ἐχθρῶν, δέομαι ὑμῶν ἐμὲ μὲν δοκιμάζειν [...]

[If I were not conscious, gentlemen of the Council, that my accusers are seeking every possible means of injuring me, I should feel most grateful to them for this accusation; since I consider that the victims of unjust slander have the greatest service rendered to them by anyone who will compel them to undergo an examination of the record of their lives. (...) Now, gentlemen, I make no claim to special merit, if I merely make plain to you that I am a supporter of the existing constitution and have been compelled to take my own share in your dangers; but if I am found to have lived, in all other respects, a regular life, quite contrary to the opinion and statements of my enemies, I request you to pass me through (...)] (Lys. or. 16 [Mantitheus], 1–3).

The speech was delivered by Mantitheus himself but composed by Lysias, a professional 'logograph'. In the Attic lawsuit plaintiff and accused emerged in person and their case could not, as was the case in Rome, be pleaded through attorneys. Since not everybody was able to compose an effective, concise and also rhetorically elaborate testimony, there was a sector for speechwriters who tailored a speech for the litigant

and his specific case. The party to the case still had to deliver this speech himself. Since the information on his life therefore comes from Mantitheus himself, one is entitled to speak of an ego-document here. Lysias composed also a speech for self-defense – this, too, is an autobiographical text –, which also concentrated on certain episodes of his life (or. 12). The focus of this speech as well as of its equivalents though is usually significantly narrow, insofar as the life story is reported only scarcely and with a constant view to the concrete object of the lawsuit and, of course, to the autobiographical ‘topics’ (Wagner-Egelhaaf 2006, 87), therefore it is clearly functionalized. This functional relationship between ‘speech’ and ‘autobiography’ however seems to be inverted in Isocrates. For the *Antidosis* is explicitly a fictitious speech, conceived for the purpose of autobiographical presentation:

σκοπούμενος οὖν εὐρίσκον οὐδαμῶς ἂν ἄλλως τοῦτο διαπραξάμενος, πλὴν εἰ γραφείη λόγος ὡσπερ εἰκὼν τῆς ἐμῆς διανοίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν [ἐμοί] βεβιωμένων· διὰ τούτου γὰρ ἤλιπζον καὶ τὰ περὶ ἐμὲ μάλιστα γνωσθήσεσθαι καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον μνημεῖόν μου καταλειφθήσεσθαι πολὺ κάλλιον τῶν χαλκῶν ἀναθημάτων. [...] εἰ δ' ὑποθείμην ἀγῶνα μὲν καὶ κίνδυνόν τινα περὶ ἐμὲ γιγνόμενον, συκοφάντην δ' ὄντα τὸν γεγραμμένον καὶ τὸν πράγματά μοι παρέχοντα, κάκεινον μὲν ταῖς διαβολαῖς χρώμενον ταῖς ἐπὶ τῆς ἀντιδόσεως ῥηθείσας, ἑμαυτὸν δ' ἐν ἀπολογίας σχήματι τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦμενον, οὕτως ἂν ἐκγενέσθαι μοι μάλιστα διαλεχθῆναι περὶ ἀπάντων ὧν τυγχάνω βουλόμενος. [...] ἤδη δ' ἀναγιγνώσκετε τὴν ἀπολογίαν τὴν προσποιουμένην μὲν περὶ κρίσεως γεγράφθαι, βουλομένην δὲ περὶ ἐμοῦ δηλώσαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀγνοοῦντας εἰδέναι ποιῆσαι, τοὺς δὲ φθονοῦντας ἔτι μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῆς νόσου ταύτης λυπεῖσθαι [...]

[And as I kept thinking upon it, I came ever to the same conclusion, namely, that the only way in which I could accomplish this was to compose a discourse which would be, as it were, a true image of my thought and of my whole life; for I hoped that this would serve both as the best means of making known the truth about me and, at the same time, as a monument, after my death, more noble than statues of bronze. (...) But it occurred to me that if I were to adopt the fiction of a trial and of a suit brought against me – if I were to suppose that a sycophant had brought an indictment and was threatening me with trouble and that he was using the calumnies which had been urged against me in the suit about the exchange of property, while I, for my part, cast my speech in the form of a defence in court – in this way it would be possible to discuss to the best advantage all the points which I wanted to make. (...) I beg you now to listen to my defence, which purports to have been written for a trial, but whose real purpose is to show the truth about myself, to make those who are ignorant about me know the sort of man I am and those who are afflicted with envy suffer a still more painful attack of this malady (...)] (Isocr. ant. 7–8. 13).

The speech is based on an actual lawsuit Isocrates carried on at an earlier point of his life, and in which he had to defend himself against the proposal to exchange his fortune (on the procedure Too 2008, 4–6). This actual forensic speech has not been preserved, and this is not forcibly due to the disfavor of tradition, but may go back to Isocrates himself who created a surrogate with his *Antidosis*, which, as cited, was supposed to serve as a lasting monument. Since Isocrates emphasizes in the course of his speech that as a rhetor he did not at all take part in any lawsuits (Isocr. ant. 2–3, 27, 36–42, 238–239) it might be suggested that he could not well have been interested in integrating such a concrete apology for himself into an edition of his rhetoric work. Nevertheless our time still possesses six lawsuit speeches written by Isocrates, but not

on his own behalf. Whereas that speech in the concrete lawsuit certainly contained much information on financial details, Isocrates does not speak about the exchange of his fortune in the *Antidosis* and on the de facto occasion of the judicial dispute as such, but concentrates indeed on a general report, combined with a presentation of what he understands by the term ‘philosophy’. The speech, with its emphasis on the old age of the author, gains the character of a ‘final word’, the mere scope of which shall create medial presence and visibility. Furthermore, in the course of his speech Isocrates time and again quotes parts of his former speeches (§59: *Panegyricus* 51–99; §66: *On the Peace* 25–56, 132–145; §73: *To Nicocles* 14–39; §194: *Against the Sophists* 14–18) – if these parts that are only shown as references in the editions were completely recited as well, then the total length of his speech is increased by almost 40% –, whereby he demonstrates the historical continuity of his thinking and acting. Again one should keep in mind that the *Antidosis* was not only supposed to be read, but also to be spoken and listened to, in short: to be performed, and so it was; literary texts were read aloud into and through Late Antiquity, even if reading only for oneself. It takes about three hours for the recitation of the *Antidosis*, proper citations included. From other speeches and letters of Isocrates it is known that there were complex procedures in the circles of his students to handle the works of their master: They implied multiple acts of reception in recitations as well as lectures, respectively interrupted by discussions of single passages (Usener 1994), and even here Isocrates gives detailed instructions about how to adequately declaim this speech (ant. 12).

It becomes evident from all this that the publication of the *Antidosis* did barely aim at making the biographical person Isocrates accessible. Interestingly enough, Isocrates does not accentuate concrete facts of his life which dismisses the reader of checking the factual truth of his narration. Facts of life of a socially visible individual might have been well known in a nearly face-to-face-society. A still dominant preoccupation of research on autobiographical and autofictional texts (see the overview in Zipfel 2009) is, then, not so important for understanding at least *this* autobiographical text. The private person Isocrates, even something like a deeper identity, is not being at issue here, and obviously not because it were concealed, but because it was not essential to his public, his citizen-like political task. In this sense, Isocrates stands in place of his ideology, his concept of ‘paideia’, the rhetoric as a means of language and intellectual education, of his circle of students and like-minded persons, and his as well as their political influence. If the modern reader wants to understand this as a role play, then s/he has to be conscious of the fact that such a role was first obviously not to be related to any model that was accepted in a socially general way, and second, that there was, in Isocrates’ view anyway, no option for him to not play this role. He fulfilled his role that substantially, and he was that completely permeated by his educational mission that other roles formed no imaginable alternative. This is perhaps underrated by Misch (1949) who rightly describes the self-encomiastic drive as a main stimulus of the speech but too quickly dismisses it as pretentious and deceitful (an opinion shared by most of Misch’s contemporaneous researchers as well

as forerunners). Isocrates is therefore less of an actor than a representative of some specific discourse on education that he shapes by his intellectual and verbal exemplarity within the Athenian society, while he produces a mental present for himself and the education that is embodied by him – he also calls it ‘philosophy’ – through his students in the Greek realm that will continue beyond his death. This philosophy is Isocrates’ qualification for rhetoric, which is again considered the nucleus of all political; the good rhetor is in that – differing from what was advocated by the Sophists at the end of the fifth century – *per definitionem* somebody who has the best for his polis in mind, and is able to achieve it. Talent, which is the most important (ant. 189), must be supplemented by exercise and practical experience, while the education must neither be neglected, but still keeps the third rank (ant. 184–188, 192). For Isocrates it is a natural result that only those coming from a good and at the same time well-off family can become good and responsible rhetors; accordingly, his adepts are recruited from the rich and powerful of the Greek world. Only they can afford the leisure to complete a multi-year rhetorical training course. But they also bear special responsibility for the political system then. The function of the educated rhetor and politician is obviously something that causally has to be inherent in the essence and the natural talent of a person. Whereas a versatile actor must be able to play any role eventually, which the director entrusts to him, here it is about a qualification of the most basic nature: Task and ability, social demand and perception that one can do justice to this demand, have to coincide. Otherwise put: What Isocrates here delivers to be – even if only fictively – valued by the judges of Athens is a stable self-conviction: He has taken the path that his provenance and his aptitude had predelinated for him, he completed it through diligence and experience, and has received appreciation in the shape of wealth and reputation. Self and foreign perception largely coincide. It is eventually only a verification of all this, that they now begrudge him this identity success. Insofar, Isocrates has chosen the subject of his autofictional report in a highly symbolic way: His fortune, that allegedly is to be exchanged here against that of his opponent (and the real existence of which certainly can be taken for granted with regard to Isocrates’ claim that he and his family had financed multiple liturgies), is not a mere financial quantity for disposal, but a constitutive part of his identity. He inherited part of it from his family, a large part he ‘generated’ by taking charges and fees for education in rhetoric which should earn him admiration and acknowledgement by all Athenians (Isocr. ant. 150–152, 161–166, 246, 258 and *passim*). These are therefore earnings that were able to enlarge his δόξα [estimation] and τιμή [honour], the highest values the polis Athens could assign to its members at his time. Greek society knows the exchange of gifts in Durkheim’s and Mauss’ sense. The individual commits himself to the collective through in-kind benefits that are appropriate to his assets – so-called liturgies –, the collective gives thanks to him through the award of honours that are publicly documented (inscriptions, monuments) and manifest themselves in the gain of power. To be forced to exchange this fortune, which in a certain way constitutes identity, against some foreign fortune, would have equalled the loss of

honour, irrespective of its actual amount, and the coincidence of self- and foreign perception would have been severely disturbed by that. Isocrates sets himself into a discursive frame with his speech, he wants to gain acceptance, further τιμή [reputation]. He cannot imagine himself as standing outside of the polis society; to this may be compared Nielsen (2009, 268–269), where the possible step that is taken by Isocrates towards the rhetorical function described above is still missing conceptually, when Nielsen says that the autobiographical text “sich als Beitrag zur kulturellen Öffentlichkeit profiliert und sich im Dialog mit deren institutionalisierten Erzählformen und Gattungskonventionen gestaltet” [‘distinguishes itself as a contribution to the cultural public, and shapes itself by dialoguing with its institutionalised forms of narration and generic conventions’]: Isocrates’ speech would be underrated when characterized as a mere ‘contribution’, insofar as it makes the social acceptance, nay, admiration the object of its convincing strategy. It is all the more important at the same time to refute the claim of his rival Lysimachus that he had dedicated his teaching to persons who had done damage to the polis Athens seen as a whole. Isocrates devotes much space to this refutation, and since a judgment cannot be reached in the frame of the fictitious process, one has to content oneself with its vehemence, even if it does not convince in all points. Thus a continuous chain of identity leads from Isocrates’ family via his own person with its individual talents, abilities and successes to his students who have all gained highest (even if not always flawless) public reputation, and eventually towards the polis Athens and its citizens, the total welfare of which Isocrates is convinced to have always had in mind and to have followed.

Isocrates can claim this all the more easily, because his teaching activity is exactly directed at rhetoric and thereby at *public* speech. The verbally fought struggle of opinions at the (fictitious) time of the *Antidosis* is still standing at the constitutive center of the political existence of Athens and thereby, from a Greek perspective, the οἰκουμένη [inhabited world], even if this constellation was supposed to more and more lose its validity a few years later under Macedonian hegemony. Isocrates’ ability and achievements therefore do not relate to some marginal realm of Attic society, but are immediately settled at its core (ant. 253–257). There are therefore no basic perceptual differences between Isocrates and his ‘social group’ from this perspective, the rhetor – who additionally insists on having always abstained from the rhetorical allday business, the forensic speech, and thereby from the existent dispute between the parties – can feel himself, concerning his identity, to be at home in his social group. The purely affirmative gesture of not questioning himself, not showing any uncertainties, not trying to cover up any breaks, shows that the text’s fictionality does not so much serve self-*construction* than self-*confirmation* and self-*monumentalizing* (for that see *Ant.* 7).

Lucian's *Dream*

It is appealing to contrast Isocrates' *Antidosis* with a much shorter, still in many respects comparable text from a later age and a quite different political concept: Lucian's short preface *The Dream* from the second century CE. Lucian, who is almost not to be grasped as a historical personality, came from Samosata, a Syrian town at the Euphrat's shore, at the margin of the Imperium Romanum. His life data are uncertain, he must well have died before 180 CE. It is possible that he was publicly active as a rhetor: Some of the 'personae' in his writings claim this, but this may be a topical autobiographical construction that is typical for the age. The public emergence of important rhetors was indeed an outstanding feature of socio-cultural life in the Roman high empire. These so-called sophists were travelling rhetors, coming from the best families and rich circumstances who publicly demonstrated their perfect mastery of language, performance and especially classical education – this means: Attic Greek of the fifth and fourth centuries BCE as well as the whole literature, art, history and politics of that epoch as a canon of reference for one's own time – and made a great public stir by that. One can consider them as exponents of a general culture of education, the so-called 'paideia', the principal mastery of which was a task assigned to every member of the upper class, if he wanted to participate in discursive power (research on these aspects of imperial culture is large; see e. g. Schmitz 1997). Greek language and Greek culture belonged to the guiding values of the age; to be called educated, 'παιδευμένος', was an ambition of the time that was embattled and polemically controversial.

Lucian belongs in this sphere. Possibly he had more influence through his writings than through his emergence; but only in a few texts he figures under his proper name. Indeed it is only rarely that this proper name *Loukianós* can be found in the text as one of the many seemingly auctorial 'personae' who appear in the work and reproduce facets of the historical person Lucian. All of these are indeterminate, to an extent that none of them is doubtlessly to be ascertained. That *Dream* is all the more irritating therefore, because it seems almost intrusively autobiographical with a (possibly not authentic) subtitle *Lucian's Life*, and was possibly recited by its speaker as a short preface to a larger declamation.

The speaker reports in first person that his father had, when his son came of age, talked with his friends about his son's professional future, and they had determined – in order that he might as soon as possible contribute to the family subsistence – to apprentice him at his uncle's, a renowned stonemason, because already when he was a child he made small pottery figurines in an imaginative way. In his overeagerness the new apprentice shatters a stone plate on his first day already and takes blows for that from his uncle; sobbingly he rushes home, is soothed by his mother and falls asleep. He dreams that he met two women who each tried to win him for that respective way of life she is the representative of. The one woman is the personified Τέχνη [craftmanship]. She prophesies to him hard and honest work, for which he will gain a solid and appropriate reputation. The other woman is Παιδεία [education]: She tempts him with

the promise of world surrounding fame he could win fast and without much effort. Immediately the dreamer turns to her. She then rides in a celestial car over the earth with him, where he can see men acclaiming him from underneath. Indeed, that young man is now mature and possesses all the reputation he had been prophesied, when returning into his home. He suspects that his listeners might not have appreciated this extensive narration of his dream as a whole, but he insists on having recited it for quite a serious purpose. He pursues that

Καὶ τοίνυν κάγω τοῦτον τὸν ὄνειρον ὑμῖν διηγησάμην ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, ὅπως οἱ νέοι πρὸς τὰ βελτίω τρέπωνται καὶ παιδείας ἔχωνται, καὶ μάλιστα εἴ τις αὐτῶν ὑπὸ πενίας ἐθελοκακεῖ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἥττω ἀποκλίνει, φύσιν οὐκ ἀγεννῆ διαφθεύρων. ἐπιρρωσθήσεται εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι κάκεινος ἀκούσας τοῦ μύθου, ἰκανὸν ἑαυτῷ παραδείγμα ἐμὲ προστησάμενος, ἐννοῶν οἷος μὲν ὦν πρὸς τὰ κάλλιστα ὤρμησα καὶ παιδείας ἐπεθύμησα, μηδὲν ἀποδειλιάσας πρὸς τὴν πενίαν τὴν τότε, οἷος δὲ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐπανελήλυθα [...]

[I told you this dream in order that those who are young may take the better direction and cleave to education, above all if poverty is making any of them faint-hearted and inclining him toward the worse, to the detriment of a noble nature. He will be strengthened, I am very sure, by hearing the tale, if he takes me as an adequate example, reflecting what I was when I aspired to all that is finest and set my heart on education, showing no weakness in the face of my poverty at that time, and what I am now, on my return to you (...)] (Lukian. *somn.* 18).

This autobiographical report tells – this alone is peculiar in an ancient text and sufficiently conspicuous – the history of a juvenile’s development and the story of his social rise, at least to some extent. It also tells it – more on this below – on the foundation of a whole series of important intertexts. And eventually the story is abandoned there, where it starts to become interesting, and from where on it could have gained at least a certain degree of verifiability and thereby facticity, that is, when the speaker after waking from his dream must have started his training to become an educated orator.

The author, appropriate to his general revival in literature and cultural science, stands at the center of today’s research. The role of the recipient seems to be little reflected, although the types of readers, that were for example distinguished in detail by Heinz Schlaffer (1999), might well to a big part be reckoned for autobiographical texts as well. Such recipients have certain needs. They do not, as research mostly seems to assume, only relate to the question on the facticity of that which has been read – in the sense of the autobiographical contract, the way Lejeune has assumed it –, but also to tension, probability, potential for identification and much more. It is therefore especially interesting in Lucian’s small speech that its final part is dedicated to the involvement with his listeners, who have their say quite extensively and critically. Lucian himself already doubts the truthfulness of his dream explicitly. It might have been a spawn from “ἐκταραχθεὶς πρὸς τὸν τῶν πληγῶν φόβον” [“my agitation on account of the fear inspired by the thrashing” (Lukian. *somn.* 16)], and the decision the dreamer had taken in it is in the first place due to the memory of the moment “ἐπεὶ μοι καὶ εἰς νοῦν ἦλθεν ἡ σκυτάλη καὶ ὅτι πληγὰς εὐθὺς οὐκ ὀλίγας ἀρχομένω μοι

χθὲς ἐνεπίψατο” [“when the stick entered my mind and the fact that it had laid many a blow upon me at the very outset the day before” (somn. 14)]. The listeners insert foot into these estimations, and call the narration “μακρόν καὶ δικανικόν” [“long and tiresome”], an “ληρήσαι ταῦτα” [“idle tale”] and “ἔωλος ψυχρολογία” [“flat to spin pointless yarns”] (somn. 17). The speaker knows how to retaliate such reproaches with his already cited good intention of encouraging needy juveniles, but the rebukes for the narrative quality are as little eliminated by that as the estimation that the dream lacks actual significance; especially the latter much counteracts the author’s good intention. For basically, Lucian does not uncover the mystery of his success at all: When the paradigmatically suitable, the ‘instruction’, is supposed to start, his report stops – the orator is standing in completion and with all his renown in front of his listeners, but it remains hidden in uncertain dream images how he had gotten there. Since, as has been hinted at already, there is no known external source on Lucian’s (or the speaker’s) life and because he does not re-narrate the story in any of his other writings, one has to content oneself to admire the speaker in his particularity, as an exceptional personality. However, one should not exclude that this could also be an essential part of the production-aesthetical background for some modern autobiography as well, and all the more for those in which the author seems to struggle with his identity – and also for a dialogue “zwischen eigenen Erfahrungen und fremden, aber ästhetisch verallgemeinerten Erfahrungen auf der Basis der im Werk enthaltenen Einladung zum Austausch, darunter der Authentizitätserwartungen, die mit der autobiographischen Gattung verknüpft sind” [“between one’s own experiences and foreign, but aesthetically universalised experiences, based on the invitation for communication that is implied within the work, including the expectations of authenticity that are related to the autobiographical genre’] (Nielsen 2009, 268–269) this small text does not actually offer itself, simply due to the many indeterminacies.

Indeed, the apparently autobiographical original moment – the apprenticeship as a stonemason that is begun on the father’s decision – as a seemingly authentic small narrative collapses, because one of the favourite auctorial ‘personae’ Lucian makes appear in his oeuvre is a certain Lycinus who makes his dialogue partners be tested and refuted on their veracity: a second Socrates therefore, and indeed the name ‘Lycinus’ – which for its part obviously sounds the auctorial name ‘Loukianós’, without being completely transparent towards it – may be referred to Socrates and his parents through some quite probable allusion to a passage in Aristophanian comedy (Dubel 1994). Socrates came from a stonemason family: With a view to this one cannot be sure at all how Lucian’s childhood narration is to be understood, and it is far from certain that it is authentic. His original listeners might have known what was the truth – but already his contemporary other readers may have seen themselves confronted with the same uncertainty with regard to the actualness of the reported happening as the modern reader. That s/he does not get to know any names, any places, any data does not reduce his or her suspicion. Whitmarsh (2001, 122–124) seems to accept all too quickly the value of the story told here as factual narrative and concludes from this

a conflict between a Syrian and a Greek identity. But this means also to neglect the Socratic allusion in the motif of being born into a stonemason family which certainly should be regarded as an appropriation of a facet of identity belonging to the cultural centre of the ancient world. Furthermore, the dream report itself is related to a story narrated by Xenophon, which again he gets from the sophist Hippias, namely the famous narration of ‘Heracles at the crossroads’, in which the hero meets ‘Virtue’ and ‘Wickedness’, who both want to win him for ‘their’ respective way of life (Xen. mem. 2,1,21–34; see Hopkinson 2008, 94–96). Of course Heracles chooses the path of Virtue, but in Lucian’s dream it is, surprisingly enough, Education whose clothes all too much remind of the luxurious clothing of Xenophon’s ‘Wickedness’ (Whitmarsh 2001, 123; Hopkinson 2008, 96), and when Lucian in his introduction to his dream report cites Homer’s *Iliad* (2,1–335), in which Agamemnon sees a dream image that makes him test his army and propose the premature leave from unconquered Troy, then one may be certain that Lucian’s listeners were reminded of this dream being an elusive one that almost prevented the Greek victory.

The reader is therefore confronted here with what we might almost call a kaleidoscopic identity that is combined from literary set pieces of different provenience, and which leaves all in the condition of being half-finished. It is specifically this construction here that is brilliant from the point of view of the postulate for education. The way the speaker here plays with texts and traditions (for details Hopkinson 2008, 96–97) and combines them with relicts of his proper life until they cannot be distinguished any more, proves him to be an excellent carrier of ‘paideia’, exceptional in his being unpalpable, whose mimetic access to the classics cannot be called otherwise but masterful and inventive. Insofar it may well be said that this narration exactly by its not causing any coherence extracts most voluminous ‘life material’ and downwardly fragmentizes Lucian’s life, lets this his life culminate in the oral performance in his current emergence, his appearance *hic et nunc*, but creates no individuality for the reader with which he may compete, which he could discuss, but creates a document of his life, being completely merged in its educational ostentative gesture.

In Lucian’s case therefore one may say that it is a role play he performs. He presents himself, at a first glance, as a successful social ascender, a selfmade man who looks back to his childish-youthful beginnings with slight self-irony and affection, and who leaves aside the troublesome years of the apprenticeship, yes, leaves the responsibility, whether they want to choose such a way, to his listeners (v. Möllendorff 2010, 189–202). The dream figure of Paideia was similar, as has been explained above, to the allegorical shape of ‘Wickedness’ in Xenophon-Hippias, and to top it all she even claimed that the way to education was easier to tread upon: “Καὶ ὁ νῦν πένης ὁ τοῦ δεῖνος, ὁ βουλευσάμενός τι περὶ ἀγεννοῦς οὔτω τέχνης, μετ’ ὀλίγον ἅπασι ζηλωτὸς καὶ ἐπίφθονος ἔσθι, τιμώμενος καὶ ἐπαινούμενος [...]” [“You who are now the beggarly son of a nobody, who have entertained some thought of so illiberal a trade, will after a little inspire envy and jealousy in all men, for you will be honoured and lauded (...)”] (Lukian. somn. 11). This is an obvious lie, only an immature small boy, like the speaker

was back then, could fall for. Everyone hearing this has to decide for himself/herself therefore, whether s/he is of the opinion that the dream's promises have been fulfilled in the dreamer, and whether s/he wants to dare to set for the journey himself or herself. The story's fragility therefore does not make the reader deduce the fragility of the identity manifesting itself in it, but clearly is a rhetorical strategy to convince. The *Dream* is an autofiction the aim of which is not self-construction, but the positioning within a social structure. It is interesting in this, which means of presentation the speaker uses and in what a skilful way. Specifically, in alluding to different former biographies – Socrates, Heracles – and even autobiographies – Isocrates himself who also alluded to Plato and Socrates and whose *Antidosis* 10 (the possible usefulness of his autobiography for young people wanting to turn to higher education) might constitute the background for the final argument of the *Dream*) – he may be thought to reflect on how to write autobiography. The *Dream* could also be called an implicit metaautobiographical text (Nünning 2007, 275, 278, 280–282) or even a refusal of the autobiographical genre (Bompaigne 1993, 204). The dense intertextual structure, the contact with his audience through inserting dialogical elements, his dignified language that respectively characterizes the different speakers well, the effortless integration of different speakers whereby we get a mixture of genres that is quite typical for Lucian's writing: all this is not a means to an end, is not a form of semantic speaking, but is a semiotic act. This is also true for the implicit figural interconnections with Socrates and Heracles with the help of which the speaker still brings himself into play as a successful philosopher: For Heracles had been accepted by Stoic philosophy as incarnation of the wise par excellence, and that this dimension of the mythical hero is meant here, is shown by the allusion to exactly the episode of choosing virtue. Finally, the presentation mode is the essential element of the role: The speaker becomes the one he claims to have become only through and by the way of his presentation. This might be considered a postmodern trait: a gaining of the subject in and by the moment of writing – and telling, as should be added (de Toro and Gronemann 2004, 9).

This kind of role play is indeed connected to a concept of identity and identity formation in Lucian. In his *Μένιππος ἢ Νεκρομαντεία* [*Menippus or The descent into Hades*] he makes the cynic Menippus – in a parody on Ulysses' Homeric vision of the underworld and the Vergilian view of the heroes in the *Aeneid* – see a procession, in which man's life takes on an allegorical shape. Under the leading of Tyche (Fate), men walk their lives' ways, and Tyche gives them masks for these ways, in which they have to play their lives' roles. But she often takes the masks away from them again, and gives them another one; only at the end of the way and of life do all masks have to be given back, complaining and wailing are of no use. Menippus continues:

Ὅμαι δέ και τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς πολλὰκις ἑωρακέναι σε τοὺς τραγικοὺς ὑποκριτὰς πρὸς τὰς χρεῖας τῶν δραμάτων ἄρτι μὲν Κρέοντα, ἐνίστε δὲ Πριάμους γιγνομένους ἢ Ἀγαμέμνονα, και ὁ αὐτός, εἰ τύχοι, μικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν μάλα σεμνῶς τὸ τοῦ Κέκροπος ἢ Ἐρεχθέως σχῆμα μιμησάμενος μετ' ὀλίγον οἰκέτης προήλθεν ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ κεκελευσμένος. ἤδη δὲ πέρασ ἔχοντος τοῦ δράματος ἀποδυσάμενος ἕκαστος αὐτῶν τὴν χρυσόπαστον ἐκείνην ἐσθῆτα και τὸ προσωπεῖον ἀποθέμενος

καὶ καταβάς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐμβατῶν πένης καὶ ταπεινὸς περίεισιν, οὐκέτ' Ἀγαμέμνων ὁ Ἀτρέως οὐδὲ Κρέων ὁ Μενουκίως, ἀλλὰ Πῶλος Χαρικλέους Σουνιεὺς ὀνομαζόμενος ἢ Σάτυρος Θεογεΐτονος Μαραθῶνιος. τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράγματά ἐστιν, ὡς τότε μοι ὀρώντι ἔδοξεν

[I suppose you have often seen the stage-folk who act in tragedies, and according to the demands of the plays become at one moment Creons, and again Priams or Agamemnons; the very one, it may be, who a short time ago assumed with great dignity the part of Cecrops or of Erectheus soon appears as a servant at the bidding of the poet. And when at length the play comes to an end, each of them strips off his gold-bespangled robe, lays aside his mask, steps out of his buskins, and goes about in poverty and humility, no longer styled Agamemnon, son of Atreus, or Creon, son of Menoeceus, but Polus, son of Charicles, of Sunium, or Satyrus, son of Theogiton, of Marathon. That is what human affairs are like, it seemed to me as I looked] (Lukian. nec. 16).

Human life as a play on stage – this reminds of Paul de Man's famous essay (de Man 1979) – would be a simple metaphor taken by itself, but the consequence that Menippus derives from it is important insofar as it denies all relevance to certain and not unessential aspects of human identity: the proper name ('Polus', 'Satyrus') as well as the mentioning of family (son of ...) and local descend (from Sunium, from Marathon). Man is not to be differentiated from his fellow men in this attitude before and after becoming a man, while in the course of life itself only his masks are to be seen from outside, and that, which is behind it, is not inexistent but it does not interest. Men want to see a *good* representational performance by the actor, they are not interested in the personality behind the mask. Still, neither Lucian would have denied that the personality behind the mask is essential for the quality of the representational play. But it is simply only in this regard essential, simply insofar as it does or does not enable a good play. This certainly supports the conclusion that it is exactly education (encompassing and penetrating the whole personality), which guarantees the demanded quality. Education does not help man to somehow better endure the role that has been forced upon him by fate, but to play it well and in a sophisticated way, simply in such a way that he gives an aesthetically as well as – as one may then say with a view to life *performance* – ethically well-made play; and as this role has to be played anew every day, there never can nor will be an autobiographical final account of one's life. Lucian does justice to this demand – to have created the role of his life on his own, in an original, good and sophisticated way – in his autofictional self-description. The role of the educated rhetor does not fit like an oblique armor on his shoulders (see on this picture *Adversus Indoctum* [*The Ignorant Book-collector*] (Lukian. Adv. ind. 7) but fits like a glove, cannot be separated from him, is embodied by him. He is not more, but neither less than his means of presentation, and the fact that there is almost no authentic information about him as a biographical person, that he indeed emerges in front of the modern reader only in a kaleidoscopic way in the figures of his texts, optimally corresponds to this apprehension and construction of identity.

Let us eventually take a final comparing look at the constructions of identity the way we find them in Isocrates and Lucian. In the view of today's literature and cultural sciences antiquity often appears to be a homogeneous space; it is all the more impor-

tant to remind of the fact that Lucian and Isocrates lived with a temporal distance of half a millennium. Therefore the similarities are not self-evident, but remarkable. Both are rhetors, both texts are composed for oral performance as well as for reading reception, both give an account of their lives in the form of a speech. Both represent a strong concept of education that they regard as constitutive for identity, and both socially claim general acceptance as well for the demand of education as for their imagination of what exactly education is. There the similarities end. Isocrates creates his explanations for a clearly defined audience, the civic judges of the polis Athens that were drawn by lot, and he refers to a precisely to be named biographical event, which, at least in his time, was also officially documented, the *antidosis*. He unfolds his teaching activity for namely mentioned personalities that are historically concrete, he claims an immediate use of his action for his fellow citizens. He embodies his concept of education, but certain further individual factors of identity are not to be separated from this concept: family background, wealth, personal talent, willingness to exercise with effort. His students must have these qualities as well, and it is obvious that neither the political position of a member of the upper class is unimportant for understanding this identity. If all these factors act together, then the educated person is perfect, but it is also clear that this perfection, that even just education is not accessible to anyone. Isocrates is such a perfect representative of this concept, and his *Antidosis* shall prove exactly this.

Lucian's audience is only on first regard closer determined as a local one. In fact, it is nowhere said that the speech is provided for example in Samósata, no names are mentioned, and the moment the first scene reveals itself to the recipient as a fictitious Socratic one, we may not exclude that the vocal speech – if it was delivered at all – was delivered in front of a familiar audience, but this historicity and thereby a properly autobiographical character is not to be gained for a reading audience. Eventually the public is therefore as undetermined as the person of the speaker is. Therefore it remains completely open, how Lucian is related to his listeners, whether he indeed is of use for them, whether he indeed may serve as an example for a solid life choice. Lucian so to say is completely taken up in his 'paideia' as well. In contrast to Isocrates there may indeed be further individual features that create identity, but they are definitely and unambiguously named and treated as irrelevant. Other than in the case of Isocrates not the way to education is seen as important, but the emergence as a ready-made educated person. The fact that not everyone is successful on this way, that many a person cherishes elusive hopes and exaggerated opinions of themselves, even that one may not unconditionally trust dreams stands back behind the general appreciation of human life that people always have to play the role dedicated to them, without being able to be certain that they may keep this role which might change every day; the 'semper idem' of Isocrates (Trédé-Boulmer 1993, 19; Isocr. ant. 195) cannot be true for Lucian. The degree of options of some self-creation that aims at singularity, an existential autofiction, is thereby larger than in Isocrates, the access to education, and with this the chance to become an educated person and to

participate in his social standing, is based on the act of willing and of fundamental willingness to make the best of that which is given by fate. Eventually, education has a larger importance that is constitutive for personality and identity in Lucian than in Isocrates. While in Isocrates education is added to a full range of other, especially also material identity factors, it recreates the personality through and through in Lucian by inscribing it into the voluminous tradition of classical Greek culture and explicitly relativizes material preconditions. The individual is only interesting as a successful exponent of this tradition, he can only unfold and develop individuality in it. It is the equipment that enables him to well and beautifully play the roles of his life that fate supplies him with. Isocrates uses education as an essential although not sole part of his social personality; Lucian is only able to perceive himself in the mirror of rich tradition of 'paideia', his numerous figures and literary roles are her hypostases. We might wonder, whether this means, psychologically speaking, to give up self-possession, to constitute subjectivity only within the intertextual discourse of the Other, and finally means the subject to become excentric (Weiser 2006; for a concept of ancient postmodernism see ní Mheallaigh 2014).

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