The Republican Alternative

The Netherlands and Switzerland compared

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Introduction:
The Dutch and Swiss Republics Compared

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History textbooks tell us that the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were the Age of Royal Absolutism. France under Louis XIV became the model for monarchies across Europe. Nations initially adopted this form of absolutism in a rather autocratic way, but later in a more enlightened sense, as in Frederick II's Prussia or Joseph II's Austria. Absolutism was, for example, sometimes even installed by official royal edict, as was the case with the Danish *kongelov*. Although recent scholarship has suggested that absolutism in general had more trouble unifying the political realm than has often been assumed, it was, nonetheless, a major step towards the formation of the 'modern state' in Europe.[1] However, the monarchical model did not prevail everywhere. The confrontation with absolutism and the recognition of its challenges led to an obvious clash between monarchies and republics in both political theory and political practice. The European free-states developed a decidedly antimonarchist sentiment, which was directed against the arrogance and expansionism of the monarchs. However, many republicans did admire the monarchies because as unified states they managed to monopolise political power, exploit the resources of the country, and achieve military efficiency more effectively.

Nonetheless, the republics of Europe went their own ways for a variety of reasons. Textbooks have long ignored these historical 'anomalies'. After the Italian Renaissance, republics make only brief appearances during the period of the English Civil War and Dutch Golden Age, with the latter usually considered an exception to the general European pattern.[2] In a nutshell, the problem was that, although most republics were successful in terms of political stability

and economic prosperity, their political systems and their societies did not conform to the dominant model of centralised monarchy.

But the republic has made a spectacular comeback, as the concept of 'republicanism' has been rediscovered by historians of political thought as a major aspect of Europe's intellectual heritage.[3] In general, comparative methodologies have forced historians to rethink their evaluations of various historical trajectories. More specifically, recent studies of European state formation have emphasised the diversity of this process and the variety of societal models, especially in the era preceding the French Revolution.[4] This book is part of this republican revival, but seeks to explore beyond the mere notion of republic, by also investigating the practicalities of two early modern republics, as well as their (self-)images. When we start to consider the early modern republic as practice, and not just an idea, several contrasts with the monarchical system come to mind.[5] These contrasts are more distinct in the case of large federal republics like the United Provinces [the Netherlands] and the Swiss Confederation. Many of the distinctions are also typical for the Italian city-states (Venice, Genoa, Lucca, San Marino). In general, these contrasts can be summarised in the following way:[6]

Social Sectors	Republics	Dynastic states
Government	Polyarchic via co-optation	Monarchic with hereditary succession
Commerce	International trade	Regional trade
Production	Manufacturing	Agriculture
Religion	Coexistence	Uniformity
Elites	Bourgeoisie	Aristocracy
Basis of social power	Economic enterprise	Warfare
Mode	Competitive exchange	Regulation and coercion
Theatre of operations	Networks	Territories
Army	Militia, mercenary	Standing professional
Spatial dimension	Discontinuous (poles)	Continuous
Interrelations	Collaboration	Domination
Political and legal consolidation	Local and urban	Central (court)

Broadly speaking, these pairs of characteristics suggest that dynastic states tended to have economies dominated by agriculture, the elites were rural (nobility) rather than urban (bourgeoisie) and they were better at waging war than doing business – an activity that they associated with social declassification. The list also suggests that dynas-

tic states did their business via regulation rather than competition, that they were more at home in their territories than in networks, hence in a continuous rather than fragmented geographical situation. That was one reason for religious unity, while federations of relatively small autonomous territories and urban centres of comparable size favoured religious variety and more generally political fragmentation and competition. Or, to look at it from the republican perspective, republics – especially if they were federate – were forced to find shared solutions for structural and political problems and were thus compelled to collaborate, whereas dynastic (and Absolutist) states could dominate. The republics used local and regional authorities as the foundation for their government, while the dynastic states were much more centralised.

All of this is, quite obviously, a gross simplification of the diversity that was so characteristic of early modern Europe. This becomes immediately clear when we take a closer look at republics, and especially the Swiss Confederation and the Dutch Republic. In actual fact, the Swiss were probably more rural (or less urban) than the ideal type would suggest, whilst the Dutch were more territorial than the model allows for. Nonetheless, an argument can be made for including the two as sub-types of the republican model. Moreover, that model combines two distinct types of polities. On the one hand, we have the city-state, of which Venice was probably the most prominent example, if only because it survived the post-Renaissance period more successfully than most other (Italian) city-states.[7] On the other hand, we have the confederate republics, which were composed of more or less independent regions and towns. In Switzerland and the Netherlands, the problem was further complicated by the fact that many of the composite elements of these two republics were in a way autonomous republics in their own right. As John de Witt, the Grand Pensionary of Holland and the Dutch Republic's political leader during the 1650s and 1660s wrote in 1652:[8]

These provinces do not only constitute a *republic*, but each province *alone* is a *sovereign republic*, and as such, these United Provinces should not bear the name of *republic* (in the singular) but rather the name of *federated* or *united republics*, in the plural.

In the same vein, Franz Michael Büeler from Schwyz, the first Swiss to write something resembling a Swiss public law, maintained in 1689 that the thirteen cantons of the Confederation were all together *and* each in their own right a free, sovereign, independent state (*Stand*).[9]

This book then is concerned with a specific type of republic. The contributors investigate the similarities – often already recognised by contemporaries in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries – and the differences between the Swiss and Dutch confederations from a variety of angles, as well as their interactions during these centuries. The book is therefore also an exercise in comparative history, a type of historical analysis that is perhaps more popular among sociologists than among historians.[10] Even though many historians subscribe to the necessity of comparison, they are sometimes put off by sociology's insistence on model-building and reductionism, which is necessary to fit the complexities of history into those models.[11] As it is, comparisons themselves come in different varieties.[12] The aim of the present book is to investigate the structural aspects of the two early modern republics: their constitution and political cohesion, their religions and forms of confessional coexistence, their political ideas and identities, their art and representation, their commerce and trade, and eventually their need to reform and improve in the later eighteenth century. Many of the contributions also refer directly to exchanges and inspirations between the Swiss and the Dutch. The purpose of this introduction is to outline the inquiries that are pursued in greater detail in the contributions that follow.

PART I   As John Pocock indicated more than thirty years ago, the fundamental problem of the republican form of government, at least theoretically, was its instability. Whereas a monarchy was a universal principle, the republic was temporally defined and thus exposed to circumstance and fate (*fortuna*), which rendered it unstable.[13] In a world governed by the God Almighty, dynastic succession by divine right was not only the rule, but also meant that it was *the* legitimate form of government. On a more practical level, constant warfare was the motor of early modern state building and depended on developing resources, which were best accumulated in a centralised 'coercion-extraction-cycle'; and as the king was the commander-in-chief during wartime, political and military structures were best suited to a monarchy. How could (town) councils with their inevitably long

and drawn-out procedures and dissenting opinions maintain an efficient army? The fact that the Swiss were not involved in any major war between 1515 and 1798 (two years that bookend two crushing defeats) goes a long way toward explaining why they never saw the need for a monocratic military leader like the Dutch stadholder. The Dutch urban elite managed to do without him only when there was no looming war on land (maritime wars depended on a naval fleet funded and led by wealthy merchants) and called upon him in times of external conflict as urgently as they tried to weaken his domestic position during times of peace.

Contemporary observers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries could be forgiven a degree of scepticism, when they judged the lack of political and military efficiency of the republics. Republics were considered slow and indecisive. But the Dutch Republic and the Swiss Confederation each experienced their own specific problems in trying to stabilise their political systems. Andreas Würgler, in his contribution to this book, deconstructs this problem into two separate challenges: complexity and diversity. Würgler defines 'complexity' as the variety of ways in which the component parts were intertwined into the Swiss Confederation, which consisted of the original eight fourteenth-century cantons, plus five cantons added in circa 1500, and the condominiums ruled by various combinations of cantons, and finally, there were the allied cantons. A similar complexity existed in the Dutch Republic, where sparsely populated Drenthe was acknowledged as a full province, for instance. But, nonetheless, it was denied a seat in the States General. The so-called 'generality lands' along the southern borders were ruled as condominiums by the States General in the name of the sovereign provinces, and a substantial number of sovereign pockets dotted the constitutional landscape. Amsterdam alone contributed about one quarter of all Dutch taxes, but in the States of Holland it had just one of 18 seats. In terms of complexity, the Swiss, however, faced greater challenges than the Dutch, because they had no central administrative institution whatsoever other than the fairly powerless Diet.

Besides this complexity, the two republics also had to deal with the problem of diversity. As Würgler points out, each member of the Confederation had its own privileges and customs, its own political structures and traditions, its own religious confession. The mere fact that they were united as one state did not help much to mitigate this diversity. The very first article in the Union of Utrecht in 1579, notes

that the Dutch 'provinces will form an alliance, confederation, and union among themselves ... in order to remain joined together for all time, in every form and manner, as if they constituted only one province', but at the same time, 'each province and the individual cities, members and inhabitants thereof shall each retain undiminished its special and particular privileges, franchises, exemptions'.[14] Although the Swiss had no equivalent written constitutional article, they adhered to the very same practice, i.e., diversity was permitted unopposed. One suspects that this was one of the major attractions of the Confederation. Würgler's chapter one, as well as chapter two by Maarten Prak, discuss the various strategies employed by Swiss and Dutch authorities to cope with these challenges. They both point out a number of instruments employed by the two states, most notably the participation of representative institutions and citizens on various levels of the state. Scholars are becoming increasingly convinced that citizenship – which implies some kind of political participation – was an important prerequisite for stability in early modern Europe, and consequently, that republics were more successful at providing this stability.[15] The chapters by Würgler and Prak are two more voices added to this chorus.

PART II A major threat to domestic stability in early modern European states was the issue of religious diversity. A long history of civil wars in which religion was usually the main cause, or at least one of the contributing factors, testifies to its role in undermining the stability of the political order. Given that republics were potentially unstable regimes and given the many citizens who had their say in (church) politics, it is easy to see that republics were potentially susceptible to the turbulence caused by religious diversity. Thus they had to think hard about how to resolve the issues surrounding religious pluriformity. The chapters three and four by Loetz and Frijhoff discuss two distinct solutions to this challenge. As Francisca Loetz describes it, the solution the Swiss elite became resigned to was to divide the religious communities into territories with their own state churches. Thus, some cantons remained Catholic, whilst others became Reformed. These territorial principles were laid down by the Peace of Kappel in 1531, the first pragmatic and diplomatic solution to confessional strife in Europe which could eventually serve as a model for the more famous German Peace of Augsburg in 1555. Mutual recognition and political collaboration on non-religious issues was thus

agreed upon on the 'national' level in the Confederation. But while the principle of 'cuius regio, eius religio' suited the autonomous cantons with their subject territories that totally subscribed to the premodern ideal of religious unity, it did not appeal to the joint dominions where Catholics and Protestants lived together and were governed by bailiffs of the various creeds. To maintain a religious coexistence, various kinds of intermediate solutions were sought, developed and then tolerated. The most spectacular example is the *simultaneum*, which was practised in several parishes, and meant that two opposing creeds ended up sharing the same church building.[16] Loetz also points out that the two confessions copied certain outward aspects of one another and thus actually came to resemble each other more than the verbal conflicts might suggest.

Loetz proposes that we start thinking in terms of a 'deconfessionalised confessionalisation', a proposal which is further echoed, and indeed amplified, in Willem Frijhoff's contribution. Frijhoff describes how Dutch revolutionaries, during the 1570s and 1580s, introduced Calvinism as the new official creed in the newly independent Dutch Republic. But while the Dutch Reformed Church received all kinds of privileges, its room for manoeuvre was also carefully circumscribed by those same revolutionary leaders. Private religious beliefs were permitted, non-Calvinists, albeit formally illegal, were allowed to continue their own forms of worship. The degree of toleration, of course, depended on local circumstances. Religious unity was promoted in the Dutch Republic via a civic form of religion that emphasised common Christian values and downplayed the differences between the churches. Both of these chapters demonstrate how, in their own unique ways, the Swiss and Dutch political elites steadfastly refused to allow religious conflicts to threaten the political unity and stability they considered the very foundation of the republican regime and hence their own legitimacy as the republic's governing representatives.

PART III The legitimacy of these types of solutions was certainly a challenge in its own right. The republic was, in some sense, a form of anti-government, defined by what it was not – a monarchy – rather than by what it was and listing its own virtues. Political science lectures at the University of Leiden in the first half of the seventeenth century typically praised the monarchy as a superior form of government, without ever referring to the Dutch Republic's own unique

form of government.[17] At the only Swiss university, in Basel, the study of imperial law – i.e. the law of a (universal) monarchy – remained the basic course of study until the late seventeenth century, with academic discussion regarding Swiss public law only commencing in the eighteenth century.[18] This meant that the Swiss Confederation and the Dutch Republic – both officially part of the Empire, at least until the Westphalian Peace settlement of 1648 – had to develop and adapt their own political theories and self-descriptions in response to the standard monarchical presuppositions of universal order and the more demanding exigencies of public law and international law as developed by Jean Bodin, Hugo Grotius, and their successors. Thomas Maissen and Martin van Gelderen discuss aspects of this process in their respective chapters, while Olaf Mörke compares the way the two republics represented themselves. Switzerland somehow managed to co-exist quite comfortably with the imperial structures until the seventeenth century – the idea of Empire and concrete imperial privileges provided legitimacy for the governments in the individual cantons. There was little internal necessity for them to refer to the concept of sovereignty. However, the French provided the Swiss with the ideas that alienated them from the concept of Empire. The new concept of a (sovereign) republic, based on Dutch models of representation, established the Confederation as a (minor) member of the European community of states, but it was also welcomed by the larger Swiss cantons because it introduced 'republican absolutism', which abolished the traditional privileges of the common citizens and helped consolidate a hereditary elite.

Religious unity within the cantons remained quintessential in this republican interpretation of absolutism. However, the Dutch did not follow this path, even though since the beginning of their revolt, the confederate constitution had stimulated discussions about possibly adopting the Swiss cantonal system, and although the Dutch seemed to lack some of the Swiss military virtues. Martin van Gelderen's chapter points out that Justus Lipsius represents the same conventional (Swiss) notion of religious unity as indispensable for the avoidance of political discord. Meanwhile, Dirck Volckertsz Coornhert considered tolerance to be the foundation of concord. Here Coornhert followed Hugo Grotius's Erasmianism and Irenicism. Grotius advocated state control over a public church thereby limiting its dogma to an absolute minimum, thus avoiding discord on religious grounds. Historiography would take the place of theology as the ide-

ological foundation of society. Grotius's *Liber de Antiquitate Reipublicae Batavorum*, provided an essential contribution to the Dutch republic's founding myths, which included the Humanist extrapolation of 'free' ancient ancestors. Swiss humanists had likewise discovered the origins of their nation in the Helvetians. These Batavians and Helvetians would, in the Revolutionary Era of the late eighteenth century, suggest the names of the new 'Batavian' and 'Helvetian' republics.

Medieval history played a more significant role than antiquity for the Swiss, however, and especially with regard to such concepts as *concordia, pax* and *libertas*. Olaf Mörke suggests that the more static Dutch myths tended to neglect the republic's – obvious – inner conflicts, while the Swiss remained conscious of the dangers and internal tensions by dynamically applying historical examples. The glorious past referred to the entire federation for both nations, but local historical references seemed to have been more common in the Dutch towns. Meanwhile, in sixteenth-century Switzerland references to the Confederation in town halls only began to give way in the late seventeenth century to an iconography that focussed on single cantons as sovereign republics.

PART IV Political theory and historiography were sources of inspiration for how artists represented the Swiss and Dutch republics that had to cope with the insecurity of theoretical legitimacy in an often unfriendly international environment. The importance of art during the Dutch Republic's Golden Age is so obvious that it raises questions about the possibility of 'republican art'. These issues are discussed by Michael North and William Eisler. North wonders whether there is any real difference between the production and consumption of the (visual) arts in a republic and in a monarchy. The production of crafts played a role in both countries, but was more decisive in the United Provinces because the quantity and quality of the demand was more dynamic there. As North demonstrates, landscape paintings became really popular in both countries, developing into an export product for painters in both the Dutch Republic and Switzerland. This pictorial celebration of the geography of one's country seems at first sight to be merely a realistic photographic rendering, but was actually imbued with moral suggestions about life and society.[19] The motives and public use of art in the two republics is the source of more similarities, as William Eisler's chapter shows.

Interestingly, the Dassier medal workshop in Geneva offered its medals to the princes of Orange in the same way that they offered them to monarchs. The King of France would, however, have been uncomfortable with the history of the Roman republic, produced on a series of medals for the stadholder, with whose self-image it resonated much better. The Dassier medals often used motifs borrowed directly from Dutch political history, which expressed reconciliation and concord within the republic.

PART V The exchange of visual motifs was one of many political, cultural and economic interactions between the two republics. In the sixteenth century, many Dutchmen studied at the Calvinist academy in Geneva, while in the seventeenth century, the flow of students turned around, when approximately 700 reformed Swiss students came to the Netherlands – especially Leiden – to further their studies. Moreover, Swiss regiments had served in the Dutch army since the 1690s, first in a series of wars against France, and until the nineteenth century fairly often in the Dutch colonies. The relationship was one-sided because the Dutch Republic had evolved into one of the world's great powers during the course of the seventeenth century and therefore required lots of soldiers. This imbalance created some awkward exchanges, as is evident in the efforts of François Louis de Pesmes de Saint-Saphorin from Berne who participated in the negotiations for the Peace of Utrecht in 1713. Stefan Altorfer-Ong, in his chapter, notes that one of Saint-Saphorin's objectives was the defensive military alliance of 1712. Money also came into the equation when Holland received a considerable loan from the mythical Bernese treasury. Saint-Saphorin ultimately tried to throw into the bargain a group of Anabaptists that the Bernese authorities tried to get rid of, which became a delicate issue because the tolerant Dutch disagreed with the harsh treatment the Bernese meted out to dissenters. The Dutch eventually turned the issue into a universal argument for the freedom of conscience. The fate of the Mennonites suggests how the Dutch and the Swiss had quite different ideas when it came to republican virtues. While the commercial and peace-oriented Dutch were constantly threatened by wars, civic and military Berne could develop peacefully and at the same time export war through its mercenaries.

This problem of squaring a political regime with economic expediency was passionately discussed in the eighteenth century by numer-

ous contemporaries, like Walter Harte and Montesquieu, whose ideas are analysed in Ida Nijenhuis's chapter. What type of economy was best suited for a republic? Some insisted that it had to be one based on commerce, and pointed to notable examples like Venice and the Dutch Republic. Others insisted it was one based on agriculture because they looked at the Swiss, or Ancient Rome, for that matter. The argument for commerce seemed the most compelling, as the Dutch did so extremely well in the seventeenth century. The argument for agriculture made a comeback in the eighteenth century because Dutch trade had fallen on hard times, while the agricultural Swiss were suddenly doing well. But the economy was just one aspect of the debate. There was also the underlying issue of national autonomy: could a country afford to rely on substantial food imports? Suddenly the Swiss began to look more prudent, and the Dutch were portrayed as too dependent on the volatile forces of chance. New ideas about luxury further cast this debate into yet another light.

The Swiss reformers during the Enlightenment also participated in these international debates. They wavered between autonomy and autarky, and the necessity of integrating the Confederation into the emerging world economy. Béla Kapossy, in his chapter, demonstrates that the Dutch played an ambiguous role. On the one hand, their Golden Age conjured up a myriad of opportunities for prosperity and freedom. Swiss intellectuals found the notion that tolerance could produce civic peace among religiously different sectors of the population particularly attractive, and that this form of civic peace seemed to provide the ideal springboard for further economic growth. In other words, the Dutch demonstrated, that contrary to the received wisdom of the time, civic peace imposed by government coercion was not a prerequisite for social stability. Instead, the Swiss and Dutch social models of pluriformity were potentially as powerful and successful as any dynastic state. On the other hand, Holland's decline during the eighteenth century suggested that prosperity could also easily lead to corruption, and that corruption, in turn, could lead to economic decline and social disintegration. More alarmingly, Holland's problems in the eighteenth century were not the result of some freak accident of history, but the inevitable outcome of the volatile nature of commerce itself. Holland's dependence on trade had made the country wealthy, but also led to its decline. It is no wonder then that Swiss reformers sought a formula that would provide the benefits of the Dutch model, but spare them its disadvantages.

PART VI The more an idealised 'republicanism' became the model for other countries in Europe, the more the existing republics had to face the need for reform. Montesquieu belonged to a growing number of enlightened authors who were seeking constitutional solutions that would avoid both the risk of an absolutist king's arbitrary rule, and the inefficiencies and irrationality that riddled the republics that were governed by increasingly small and selfish elites. The city-states that once played a crucial role in the development of the republican state, and in the emergence of the Dutch and Swiss federations, was not an apt model for larger nations like France. The English 'mixed constitution' was as much a challenge for monarchies as it was for the free states, where members of the few ruling families decided on legislation and jurisdiction without the aid of written laws and without any notion of the separation of powers. Venice, the Netherlands and eventually even Switzerland – though cherished by many German philo-helvetists – not only became less appealing as political models, but also had to develop new coping mechanisms for the increased demand for political participation.

Geneva in particular became a kind of laboratory for revolutionary movements in the eighteenth century. However 'patriots' appeared almost everywhere to insist on the structural changes necessary for the strengthening of the old republics against both foreign aggression and internal strife. As Marc Lerner's chapter points out, these republican patriots were quite in the vanguard of European radicalism in the late eighteenth century. Jean-Jacques Rousseau's ideas, heavily influenced by his experience as a citizen of Geneva with its long struggle against the town's patriciate, speak volumes. The Dutch Patriots also made their impact well before 1789. Both Swiss and Dutch radicals could be – and in fact have been – mistaken for traditionalists, who couched their proposals in a discourse that hearkened back to earlier times. Lerner points out that in one sense, both republics had constitutions that offered their citizens much of what the French revolutionaries were clamouring for. It is probably no coincidence that the slogan 'liberté, fraternité, égalité' was a Dutch, rather than a French concept. However, while genuine democracy required a certain degree of centralisation, simply to destroy the numerous intervening institutions that prevented political equality, it proved extremely difficult to push through these democratic reforms precisely because of the embedded nature of citizenship in both the Swiss and the Dutch constitutions.[20]

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A comparison of the early modern Netherlands and Switzerland, as we have seen, does not produce a clear-cut opposition between the republican and monarchical models. The reality is much more ambiguous. The constitutional structures of the two countries both stemmed from the medieval Empire. The two treaties of Munster from 1648, which constituted the formalisation of their sovereignty according to international law, could even be interpreted as two exemptions within the Empire and the realm of imperial law at that time. Of course, the fact is that the princely power of the Habsburgs was either abolished (in Switzerland), or at least severely limited and eventually handed over to a 'native' dynasty, the house of Orange (in the Netherlands). But there were few new 'republican' institutions. Federal structures were essentially traditional solutions that allowed city-states and, in the Swiss case, even rural communities to maintain a high level of autonomy according to the rules of the Empire, but at its periphery, where the Emperors and princes could not actually impose their powers. The price for this autonomy (and later their sovereignty) was an inevitable loss in military and political efficiency. The Dutch solution of establishing the stadholder can be seen as semi-monarchic, leading to a strong patronage network and actually preparing for the formal enthronement of the House of Orange in the nineteenth century.[21]

The strategic position as a neutral buffer between Habsburg and Bourbon Empires allowed the Swiss to avoid having to install a stadholder-like commander-in-chief. This would probably have been inevitable in a case involving prolonged warfare with one of its neighbouring monarchies.

The Swiss and Dutch republics realised that the federal model was the only structure that was able to cope with the many internal diversities among the small autonomous units. But it was also an accomplishment of the republican model as such, to guarantee integration and the participation of great numbers of citizens in the public weal, and stabilise complex religious arrangements. By fostering internal competition and differentiation, the republics adapted quite well to changing economic and social environments. In the eighteenth century, the Dutch commercial republic and – despite its predominantly urban and proto-industrial wealth – the agrarian Swiss republic could emerge as models for economically successful and liberal con-

stitutions. However, as objects of a pan-European reform discourse, the two republics were also integral parts of an Ancien Régime dominated by monarchy and aristocracy, which was obvious even in areas such as art production and public and international law. The Dutch and the Swiss elites adapted to this framework, usually willingly. For the Swiss in particular, republicanism was not a reaction against the dynastic state, but a positive combination of their own particular history with available political theories and practices, all contributing to the Swiss' republican identity. When political reform became urgent in the eighteenth century, the two republics played a very important role in the discussion about alternatives to royal absolutism. Eventually, their model had to give way to the universal idea of the 'new' republic as it emerged in the USA and France. When the Ancien Régime came to an end in circa 1800, this also spelled an end to the Dutch and Swiss confederations. Nonetheless, their republican experience, especially in the Swiss Confederation, provided a framework of historical continuity which made it easier to cope with the new structures of the national state and a liberal society.

Notes

1 On the origins of the modern state, see the seven volume series published by Oxford University Press, *The origins of the modern state in Europe, 13th-18th centuries*, under the general editorial supervision of Wim Blockmans and Jean-Philip Genet (Oxford 1995-2001), and Wolfgang Reinhard, *Geschichte der Staatsgewalt in Europa: Eine vergleichende Verfassungsgeschichte Europas von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich 1999).
2 Most famously perhaps in Ivo Schöffer, 'Did Holland's Golden Age coincide with an age of crisis?', in: Geoffrey Parker and Lesley M. Smith (eds), *The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century* (London 1978), 83-109; for a similar argument of Swiss 'exceptionalism' in the long run, see Herbert Lüthy's essay from 1961: 'Die Schweiz als Antithese', in: ead., *Essays I: 1949-1963 (Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 3) (Zurich 2003), 410–430.
3 Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner (eds), *Republicanism: A shared European heritage* 2 vols. (Cambridge 2002).
4 Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990* (Oxford 1990).
5 The following is an adaptation of ideas first developed in Ann Katherine

Isaacs and Maarten Prak, 'Cities, Bourgeoisies, and States', in: Wolfgang Reinhard (ed.), *Power Elites and State Building* (Oxford 1996), 208-10, and elaborated for Switzerland and the Netherlands in Maarten Prak, 'Bourgeoisie, Föderalismus und Modernisierung in der Frühen Neuzeit', in: Nada Boškovska Leimgruber (ed.), *Die Frühe Neuzeit in der Geschichtswissenschaft: Forschungstendenzen und Forschungsergebnisse* (Paderborn 1997), 91-108.
6 Adapted from Isaacs and Prak, 'Cities', 209.
7 For introductions on the city state, see Richard Mackenney, *The City-state, 1500-1700: Republican Liberty in an Age of Princely Power* Studies in European History (Basingstoke 1989); Mogens Herman Hansen (ed.), *A Comparative study of thirty city-state cultures* (Copenhagen 2000) and the sequel, *A Comparative study of six city-state cultures* (Copenhagen 2002).
8 Quoted from Guido de Bruin, *Geheimhouding en verraad: de geheimhouding van staatszaken ten tijde van de Republiek (1600-1750)* (The Hague 1991), 129.
9 Franz Michael Büeler, *Tractatus von der Freyheit, Souverainitet und Independenz der Loblichen Dreyzehen Orthen der Eydgnoßschafft...* (Baden 1689), 17-19.
10 For the historian's endorsement, see Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka (eds), *Geschichte und Vergleich. Ansätze und Ergebnisse international vergleichender Geschichtsschreibung* (Frankfurt am Main and New York 1996).
11 State-of-the-art surveys are provided in James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds), *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge 2003); the most interesting methodological proposal is still Charles C. Ragin, *The Comparative Method: Moving beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies* (Berkeley, etc. 1987).
12 For a helpful introduction to those varieties: Charles Tilly, *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons* (New York 1984), chaps. 4-8.
13 J.G.A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton 1973), 75.
14 Quoted in translation from Herbert H. Rowen (ed.), *The Low Countries in Early Modern Times* (London 1972), 70.
15 General statements to this effect have been offered by Robert D. Putnam in two influential studies: *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton 1992); *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York 2000). See also Jan Luiten van Zanden and Maarten Prak, 'Towards an economic interpreta-

tion of citizenship: The Dutch Republic between medieval communes and modern nation-states', *European Review of Economic History* 10 (2006) 111-45.

16 For the same phenomenon in southern fringe areas of the Dutch Republic, see W.A.J. Munier, *Het simultaneum in de landen van Overmaas: Een uniek instituut in de Nederlandse kerkgeschiedenis (1632-1878)* Maaslandse monografieën vol. 61 (Leeuwarden, 1998).

17 Ernst H. Kossmann, *Politieke theorie in het zeventiende-eeuwse Nederland* Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, afd. Letterkunde, vol. 67, 2 (Amsterdam 1960); English translation: 'The Course of Dutch Political Thought in the Seventeenth Century', in: id., *Political Thought in the Dutch Republic. Three Studies* Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, afd. Letterkunde, vol. 179 (Amsterdam 2000), 25-129.

18 Karl Mommsen, *Auf dem Wege zur Staatssouveränität. Staatliche Gundbegriffe in Basler juristischen Doktordisputationen des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts* (Berne 1970).

19 See also the recent work by Boudewijn Bakker, *Landschap en wereldbeeld van Van Eyck tot Rembrandt* (Bussum 2004).

20 For a further discussion, see Charles Tilly, *Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650-2000* (Cambridge 2004), esp chaps. 3 and 6.

21 See also Olaf Mörke, *'Stadholder' oder 'Staetholder'? Die Funktion des Hauses Oranien und seines Hofes in der politischen Kultur der Republik der Vereinigten Niederlande im 17. Jahrhundert* Niederlande-Studien, vol. 11 (Münster 1997).

PART I

Republican Structures