

Buddhism and Historicity in Early 20th Century China Ouyang Jingwu, Taixu and the Problem of Modernity

Gotelind Müller
(Universität Heidelberg)

Introduction

This article tries to look at some writings of Ouyang Jingwu 欧阳竟无 (1870–1943),¹ an influential Buddhist layman, and Taixu 太虚 (1890–1947),² an influential Buddhist monk in early 20th century China, with regard to their respective visions of a specifically Buddhist relationship

This article is based on a paper prepared for the conference »Is there a Dharma of History?« held in Leiden in May 2006.

¹ Ouyang Jian 欧阳渐 / Jingwu 竟无 has not been the focus of extensive studies up to now, but usually is integrated in general works on modern Chinese Buddhism or thought. Somewhat more extensive treatments in the last two decades include Guo Peng 郭朋 et al., *Zhongguo jindai foxue sixiang shigao* 中国近代佛学思想史稿, Chengdu: Bashu Shushe, 1989; Zhang Yufa 张玉法 et al., *Zhongguo lidai sixiangjia (21): Zhang Binglin, Ouyang Jingwu, Liang Qichao, Ma Yifu* 中国历代思想家(21): 章炳麟, 欧阳竟无, 梁启超, 马一浮, Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu Yinshuguan, new ed., 1999; and my own *Buddhismus und Moderne: Ouyang Jingwu, Taixu und das Ringen um ein zeitgemäßes Selbstverständnis im chinesischen Buddhismus des frühen 20. Jahrhunderts*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1993; furthermore, among shorter articles Zhang Zhiqiangs 张志强 (CASS, Peking, Institute of Philosophy) various recent papers on Ouyang in the context of modern Chinese philosophy may be referred to here.

² The literature on Taixu is more abundant than in Ouyang's case, especially in Chinese. The English reader may refer to Don A. Pittman, *Toward a Modern Chinese Buddhism: Taixu's Reforms*, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001, which includes an updated bibliography.

to the world and times they lived in and how they tried to conceptualize this relationship. Both had undeniably a deep impact on the development of modern Chinese Buddhism as well as on the general perception of Buddhism in China's intellectual circles. How did they grapple with the problems induced by the massive influx of Western thinking at their times? Had this any influence on their framing of Buddhism and if so, what changes can be attested to? In how far were they »modern« and in how far or in which sense did they consciously see themselves as »modern«? The question of »modernization« as a key term in modern China lingers in the background, but the ending »ization« implies a certain concept of history the applicability of which has to be examined first. Therefore the term »modernity« is used here as reflecting the »objective« fact of existence in the »modern« era prior to elaborations on any specific intellectual positioning towards this state of being.

Ouyang Jingwu

The best-known piece of Ouyang's, who mainly held lectures and wrote prefaces to canonical writings (in itself already suggesting that he did not see himself as a »philosopher« but rather as an exegete), is »Buddhism is neither religion nor philosophy but what the present generation is in need of« (»Fofa fei zongjiao fei zhexue er wei jinshi suo bixu« 佛法非宗教非哲学而为今时所必需, 1922).³ (This lecture, by the way, was addressed to an educational philosophical study association.) Since both »philosophy« and »religion« are Western terms, his argumentation is of obvious relevance to the question of confronting Buddhism with Western thought, but in terms of consciousness toward the times he lived in, the second part has to be considered as well.

With his famous dictum »Buddhism is neither religion nor philosophy« Ouyang provocatively took up the problem of defining Buddhist

³ Ouyang announced the complete lecture but actually gave only the first part (Buddhism is neither religion nor philosophy). Consequently he printed only this first part in his own collection of writings (*Ouyang Jingwu xiansheng neiwaixue* 欧阳竟无先生内外学, Nanjing: Jinling Kejingchu, n.d.), whereas the second (Buddhism is what the present generation is in need of) was completed by his follower Wang Enyang 王恩洋, who had also written down the first part, but in this case without being proof-read by Ouyang. The whole piece appears in the collection of Ouyang's writings assembled after his death: *Ouyang dashi yiji* 欧阳大师遗集, 4 vols., Taipei: Xinwenfeng, 1976, vol. 4, pp. 3457–3482.

identity in an increasingly complex intellectual surrounding. His term for »Buddhism,« *fafa* 佛法, literally *buddha dharma*, decidedly rejected other terms like the common *fojiao* 佛教, since this went hand in hand with other *jiao* 教 (teachings) and was part of *zongjiao* 宗教, the Chinese term for Western »religion,« taken over from Japanese.⁴ With this accent on *fa* 法 or *dharma*, Ouyang expressed a claim to universality which a *jiao* could not pose. *Fa*, in Chinese also meaning law, in this sense and context could not be plural: it implied the law governing the universe, whereas there could be many *jiao*. Therefore Ouyang insisted on the inapplicability of »religion« and »philosophy« to Buddhism:

The two terms »religion« (*zongjiao*) and »philosophy« (*zhexue* 哲学) are originally Western terms which have been translated into Chinese and have by way of analogy been forced unto Buddhism. But how can they, being each of diverse meaning and of a very restricted field of content, comprise this enormously broad *fafa*? If one sets straight the terms and defines the words, there is no way of using either term of »religion« or »philosophy.« *Fafa* ist just *fafa*, *fafa* is just called *fafa*.⁵

In other words, Ouyang's primary argument against a terminological compatibility between the Western categories of »religion« and »philosophy« rests on the premise that Buddhism as *buddha dharma* is per definition absolute and all-comprising. Thus, the problem of Western categories versus Buddhism is framed in a »parts – whole«-relationship.

Still, Ouyang does not limit himself to the formal level, but goes on to show that the nature of »religion« and »philosophy« is also uncomparable to Buddhism. In this context he gives a definition of »religion« and of »philosophy« – as if these were uncontested – to demonstrate that Buddhism does not meet either of these definitions and thus cannot be considered one of them:

All religions of the world necessarily comprise four factors, but Buddhism is contrary to each. Therefore I say, Buddhism is no religion. What are these four?

1. All religions venerate one or more gods and the founder of the respective religion. These gods and founders are called holy and unquestionable, they are allmighty and can decide about reward and punishment of all human beings. But all human beings have to trust in them. Buddhism rejects this. When the Buddha was close to entering Nirvana, he taught his disciples the four reliances. These are: first: rely on the Dharma, not on human beings; second: rely on the sense, not the words; third: rely on scriptures revealing the whole truth, not provisorial ones; fourth: rely on wisdom, not consciousness [...].

2. Every religion has necessarily holy scriptures which are preserved and which cannot be discussed by the believers [...]. With Buddhism this is not so [...]. It is wrong to follow blindly; to be able to choose and to follow the key [teachings] is what is praised by the Buddha [...]. The measure of holy words [in Buddhism] [...] consists only in already proven and generally accepted words [...].

3. Each religion necessarily has obligatory dogmas and precepts [...]. Buddhism [...] has only an ultimate goal. Everything else is only an expedient means. This goal is the great enlightenment [...].

4. Everything of a religious kind has a religious faith [...]. It consists in purely emotional obedience which does not permit the least of rational critique [...]. [In Buddhism] the ultimate holy realisation has to be achieved by personal experience [...].⁶

Philosophy has basically three contents, but Buddhism is contrary to each, therefore Buddhism is no philosophy. What are these three?

1. The quest of philosophy is searching for the truth [...]. Every day she is searching, but can it be attained by her? [...] All Western philosophies [...] hold on to the existence of a principle: the first thinks it consists in this, the second thinks it consists in that [...]. This is nothing but augmenting the many false opinions of mankind [...]. Buddhism destructs reliance [...]. Therefore Buddhism does not talk about »truth« (*zhenli* 真理) but about »absolute thusness« (*zhenru* 真如) [...]. If this exists, one does not have to search for it, if it does not exist, one cannot search for it [...].

2. Philosophy discusses the question of cognition [...] but does not go beyond reasoning differentiation. With Buddhism this is different. In the four reliances it is said: rely on wisdom, not on differentiating conscious-

⁴ Federico Masini, *The Formation of Modern Chinese Lexicon and Its Evolution Toward a National Language: The Period from 1840 to 1898*, Monograph No. 6 of the *Journal of Chinese Linguistics*, University of California, Berkeley, 1993, pp. 100, 101, 222.

⁵ »Fafa fei zongjiao fei zhexue er wei jinshi suo bixu.« pp. 3457–3458.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 3458–3460.

ness. [Here Ouyang contrasts Western epistemology with the *weishi* 唯识-theory of eight consciousnesses.] [...] Therefore philosophy is a teaching without results.

3. Philosophers deal with explanations of the cosmos. First there was idealism, materialism, monism, dualism; then the theory of atoms and electrons. Today science has developed the theory of relativity and has started to understand that the cosmos is nothing real [...]. [Again, Ouyang introduces the *weishi*-theory of the eight consciousnesses and how origination is explained therewith.]⁷

In these definitions Ouyang's aim is obvious: both religion and philosophy are partial because they are onesided: religion stresses pure deduction and faith, enslaving the believer, philosophy stresses pure induction and conventional reasoning, but leading nowhere. Buddhism instead offers to satisfy the intellect *and* leads to deliverance. The definitions furthermore show that Ouyang saw the greater problem in the current identification of Buddhism with religion (as a *jiao*), being well aware of the anti-religious bias of the intellectual elite (not only of his times, but nevertheless at the moment of this lecture very virulent because of the anti-religious movement of the early 1920s). As for the deleneation between Buddhism and philosophy (something that was more prestigious at this time: Ouyang, e.g., specifically named Russell who had just toured China and was critical about many trends in Western thinking, as relatively positive), his main issue was to retain an ultimate scope for reasoning: deliverance, distinguishing Buddhism from a purely intellectual exercise. Science he had, as we have seen, included in philosophy, hinting only at the point of partial convergence between recent findings in science and age-old knowledge in Buddhism. The difference between science and Buddhism remains rather implicit: science is based only on the experimental level, whereas Buddhism has achieved these insights by meditational practice, being able also to explain the why of it which is unknown to science in its piecemeal inductive approach. Still, that science is subsumed under philosophy (something he stressed again later in 1925 in a letter to Zhang Xingyan 章行邨), obviously on the common ground of inductive approach, shows also that it was not so important for Ouyang to attack science, or, put differently,

⁷ Ibid., pp. 3461–3472.

that science had the highest prestige among non-Buddhist teachings. Since Ouyang was aware of the intellectual debates of his times, one may note that his relatively positive presentation of science also reflects a kind of reaction to Wu Zhihui's 吴稚晖 »scientism« (KWOK) popular at that historical moment.⁸ (Ouyang corresponded with Wu.)

In the second part of Ouyang's intended complete lecture, »Buddhism is what the present generation is in need of,« he then expounds how he sees the specific relationship between Buddhism and the historical moment he lived in: First of all he stresses the claim of Buddhist categories to absoluteness against the Western ones, i.e. his approach is complementary to the first part of his lecture:

For all sentient beings there are only two ways of existence: the enlightened one and the aberrant one. To return from aberrance to enlightenment [i.e. the original state of being] there is no other way than Buddhism [...]. The buddha dharma is not only needed now and today or especially by the Chinese or mankind. Buddha expounded the necessity of enlightenment to [...] let all sentient beings enter the Nirvana without rest [i.e. the ultimate one of the four nirvanas as understood in the *weishi*-theory] [...]. The chaos of today is only the special result the reason of which lies in the aberrance of human hearts.⁹

Therefore Ouyang warns his compatriots against relying on Western modernity as a means to cure China's ills, especially in the form of religion (i.e., implicitly, above all, Christianity) and philosophy. Only Buddhism can answer the questions of the times as it does at all times.

This brief discussion of Ouyang's most famous piece shows that he tended to stress the total alterity of Buddhism vis-à-vis Western thinking not only on the quantitative but also on the qualitative level with the self-confidence that Buddhism is per definition always the most actual answer to the problems of the times. Still, in the back of this put-forward self-confidence there lingered the attacks on Buddhism of his times as superstitious, anti-intellectual, unscientific etc. But through his argumentation starting from the absolute level of »truth« there was from the beginning no possible matching of categories, and this match-

⁸ See Daniel W.Y. Kwok, *Scientism in Chinese Thought, 1900–1950*, New York: Biblio and Tannen, 1971.

⁹ Ibid., p. 3477. Here one may note the congruence with Confucian thought (cf. *Daxue* 大学 chapter 1).

ing he obviously never intended to achieve. Therefore his definitions of Western categories like »religion« or »philosophy« were basically designed for apologetic use only.

In an important letter (1925), which took up this declassification of categories, Ouyang clearly stated his claim that Buddhism is a category sui generis, a special kind of *xue* 学, because of which he had named his institute *neixue* 内学 (literally: inner studies, distinguishing it from »outer« ones like Confucianism etc.). Here he added to the distinction also science as a third one, but attacked also his fellow Buddhists who did not hold on to the eternal »truth« but tried to accommodate Western categories, as well as non-Buddhist Chinese intellectuals who tried to match categories on their own.¹⁰ Ouyang did not name anyone here, but one may infer that his inner-Buddhist attack was directed not only generally against »the monks« and superstitious people who were culpable of the intellectually poor image of Buddhism in society (as a »religion«), but included also rivals like Taixu (see below) who was more open to matching categories. His criticism of intellectuals »misusing« Buddhism supposedly aimed partly at important figures like Hu Shi 胡适 (1891–1962), Liang Qichao 梁启超 (1873–1929) or Zhang Binglin 章炳麟 (1869–1936), partly at those who had studied with him earlier but had chosen different paths like Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 (1893–1988) and later Xiong Shili 熊十力 (1885–1968), who in turn »founded« the modern Confucian movement. (One may note here that Ouyang developed a more accommodative approach toward Confucianism in his later years, though.)

The justification of this rejection of any non-Buddhist category Ouyang drew from the Buddhist tenet of the two levels of truth. Arguing from the absolute level, there could be no second category to be matched with. All refutations by his contemporary co-Buddhists of his much-discussed hypothesis of the total alterity of Buddhism by way of declaring Buddhism as »the synthesis of religion and philosophy« or as »highest religion« he decried as poor ways of legitimizing Buddhism through alien categories. The Buddha had realized the world as it is,

i.e. has awakened to ultimate thusness. Without this »transformation of the basis« human endeavour is ultimately futile (»philosophy leads nowhere«), and therefore Buddhism has to start from this given experience of the Buddha, but every Buddhist has to realize this given goal by his own enlightenment (no »religious« believing). All other categories of human thinking, spiritual endeavour or scientific investigation remain on the level of conventional truth, which does not evolve into the absolute level, but precisely needs the »transformation of the basis« through enlightenment. Therefore, Ouyang concludes, Buddhism must be acknowledged as unique.¹¹

Even though Ouyang was stressing the absolute claims of Buddhism, he nevertheless did not accept everything comprised traditionally under »Buddhism,« but put great emphasis on sifting out what was »really« Buddhist. This approach was not new, of course, since the endeavour to define »core« tenets and possible »heterodoxies« was integral to Buddhism. This was not only driven by dogmatic considerations but usually also by an awareness of the necessity to define what kind of teaching was adequate for the times (think, e.g., of the *mofa* 末法-idea). Typically, Ouyang did not stress the last argument but tended to stress the first, nevertheless to the outside observer the reflection of his times is obvious.

Ouyang, who had studied with Yang Wenhui 杨文会 (1837–1911), the »father of the Buddhist renaissance in China,«¹² and succeeded him in the Nanjing printing enterprise and Buddhist educational center, inherited the admiration for the *weishi*-theory. He was well aware of the impression this highly sophisticated system had made also on Chinese leading intellectuals which in turn started to reconsider the value of Buddhism like, e.g., a Zhang Binglin. This new »fad« for *weishi* had become possible historically only through the mediation of Japanese Buddhists who had made accessible the texts long vanished in China. Japanese Buddhism and Buddhology at the turn of the century was heavily influenced by Western philology (e.g. Sanskrit studies) and the 19th century »back to the roots«-movement, namely of a Max Müller in

¹⁰ See his letter to Zhang Xingyan 章行严 (»Yu Zhang Xingyan shu« 与章行严书, 1925) in Ouyang's collection of his writings: *Ouyang Jingwu xiansheng neixue*, vol. 3, *Neixue zazhu* 内学杂著, juan 2, pp. 1a–6b.

¹¹ »Yi su shuo zhen zhi fofatan« 以俗说真之佛法谈, lecture not dated, in: *Ouyang dashi yiji*, Taipei: Xinwenfeng, 1976, vol. 4, pp. 3483–3500.

¹² On Yang Wenhui see the recent monograph of Gabriele Goldfuß, *Vers un bouddhisme du XIXe siècle. Yang Wenhui, réformateur laïque et imprimeur*, Paris: De Boccard, 2001.

Oxford with whom early Japanese Buddhologists studied. The equation of authenticity and antiquity brought early Buddhism and thus »Hinayana« back to appreciation. Müller's East Asian students, Buddhists themselves, were surprised, and there even rose a movement to relaunch Buddhism in India, mainly pushed by the Ceylonese Dharmapala. This context suggests that Mahayana as a later development in Buddhism was liable to the charge of »forgery« or »aberration.« One of the consequences was a new interest in the Indian foundations of Buddhism, another the quest for inner-Buddhist criteria for authenticity which could bolster Mahayana against »forgery« charges, since »Hinayana« was never seen as a real alternative to draw on in East Asia.

This means, that Ouyang's favouring *weishi* has also to be seen in a broader context, even though he himself did not express this directly but put forward mainly dogmatical considerations. Still, Ouyang acknowledged that the emphasis on *weishi* was also necessary for »correcting« actual problems in Chinese Buddhism (and Chinese thinking in general), thus admitting extra-dogmatical reasons. These actual problems – having developed through centuries – he saw in the degeneration of Buddhism through the anti-intellectualism of Chan, through Chinese vagueness in thinking, resulting in the sinified schools of Huayan 华严 and Tiantai 天台 which lacked the precision and methodological competence of Indian texts, and through simplifications like Jingtu 净土, which uncritically picked out but one single issue to rely upon.¹³ He basically favoured Tang texts (without explaining, though, why these »sinified« schools in Buddhism prospered exactly in that era), obviously because they were philologically the most advanced and had shaken off the earlier problems with daoist »tainted« terminology. Even though he rejected the classical *pan jiao* 判教-approach because there can be no different *jiao* 教 (teachings) in Buddhism, he still admitted that there existed different ways of explaining (*yi* 义) the Buddhist teaching in various holy texts. Nevertheless these apparent differences were no adaptations to different circumstances or times in terms of content but only in terms of form and thus cannot be differentiated in

validity like the *pan jiao*-pyramides of provisional up to perfect teachings suggested.

What the teaching aims at is without difference in the three vehicles. Therefore it is said that [even though] three animals [hare, horse and elephant] cross the river, the river itself is always the same.¹⁴

At this point then Ouyang at the one hand opens up the general possibility of a Buddhist »ecumenics« and concludes even that the two major schools of Mahayana, Madhyamika and Yogacara – though often seen as contradictory –, are not irreconcilable but rather two ways of looking at the same thing; still, on the other he condemns a widely read text in Chinese Buddhist tradition, the *Dasheng qixinlun* 大乘起信论, as »un-Buddhist« or fake because it draws the absolute into the realm of origination, precisely as the Daoists did. Here Ouyang founds his attacks on the two logical categories of *ti* 体 and *yong* 用 which differentiate between the absolute and the relative, the unmoving and the working aspect, but which the said text – according to Ouyang – inexcusably blends. For him the correct handling of the two shall not only guarantee logical precision but also keep »thusness« pure, i.e. the differentiation is necessary to »soteriological« ends. In other words, texts as the *Dasheng qixinlun* would interfere with this goal and therefore had to be exposed as fakes. But *ti* and *yong* are Chinese categories without an obvious Indian background – something that probably never occurred to Ouyang. Thus in methodology one may note that Ouyang stayed with Chinese elements while attacking »sinified« Buddhist texts. Dogmatical considerations lead Ouyang to question historical authenticity here. This was, of course, nothing new since the Faxiang 法相-school had polemicized against that text earlier, and the questioning of historical authenticity of dogmatically attacked texts was common-stock also in Confucianism. Still, this emphasis of Ouyang's has to be seen in the context of other Buddhist positions of his times, notably the one of Taixu.

The *ti-yong*-categories which Ouyang even doubled (according to him there is a *ti* in the *ti* and a *yong* in the *ti*, a *ti* in the *yong* and a *yong* in the *yong*, cf. the two levels of truth mentioned above) were his most important logical tool to explain why origination can happen without

¹³ See his influential lecture series of 1922 on the core of *weishi*-Buddhism, »Weishi juezetan« 唯识抉择谈, in: *Ouyang dashi yiji*, vol. 2, pp. 1339–1402, preface.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1365.

»tainting« the absolute. With these categories he could, as we have seen, operate to distinguish »right« and »wrong« but also – since they are mere categories and no substances – to foster »ecumenical« harmonization (cf. of Yogacara and Madhyamika or later Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism). This pair of categories seems to me to be the clue to Ouyang's thinking. Asking about his view on *dharma* and history one could thus infer: history should be considered a *yong*-aspect, *dharma* a *ti*. Both cannot exist apart from each other, but they do not evolve into one another. Ouyang posited Buddhism in modernity but did not want to modernize. Still, seeing his endeavors from the outside, he actually did not forward a simple »traditional« Buddhism and thus – in a special way – clearly reflected the times he lived in.

Taixu

Taixu's vision of Buddhism had some similar aspects with Ouyang's, e.g. he, too, favoured *weishi*-Buddhism, being aware of its intellectual appeal as a highly sophisticated doctrine to »scientific« modern minds. Furthermore they agreed on the importance of intellectual study and had both been students of Yang Wenhui. But both men differed also in many respects: not only was Taixu a monk, but he sensed keenly the necessity to reform and modernize the *sangha* and Buddhist institutions in general, something Ouyang was not interested in at all. Furthermore, Taixu was a missionary and as such sought active engagement in the world.

Ouyang's provocative delineation of Buddhism as totally different from Western categories was not echoed by him. Rather, he, the »reformer« and »modernizer« of monastic structures, on the dogmatical level opted for the »traditional« way of integration, i.e. accommodating the newly introduced Western categories to demonstrate Buddhism's continuing relevance. (This, of course, was also due to his missionary impetus and his hope for a »strategic alliance« to save Buddhism, and not only to a »traditional« mind-set, but therewith he opened up also possible conversions of Westerners – something Ouyang seemed not to be interested in.)

Taixu took up Ouyang's claim that the *buddha dharma* could not be matched with the Western category of »philosophy« since this conten-

tion had provoked a debate in intellectual circles, not at least because it was precisely the perceived »philosophical« character of Buddhism that attracted some influential Chinese intellectuals like Zhang Binglin (and earlier Liang Shuming, who now distanced himself) as »sympathizers« to Buddhism. The reason Taixu gives for joining the debate is simple but also telling:

Even though I do not want to take sides I feel responsible as someone who is an active Buddhist [literally: one who is situated in »Buddhization.« i.e. is himself a Buddhist and tries to convert others]. Therefore I have to discuss whether Buddhism is philosophy or not.¹⁵

In other words, Taixu, who had earlier pointed out his being a monk and thus a natural (and legitimate) »spokesman« for Buddhism, postulates the necessity to »officially« participate in discourses on the nature of Buddhism going on in society.

His line of argumentation is first of all, that Ouyang's »counter-category,« the *dharma*, itself can be differentiated into various layers: a) there is the *dharma* in the sense of what the Buddha has taught which can further be divided into the manifest teaching (*jiao*) and the principle of what is expounded; and b) there is the *dharma* in the sense of what the Buddha has experienced which further is to be divided into the aspect of his practice and the fruit of his practice. Thus, Taixu does not posit *jiao* against *fa* (like Ouyang) but defines *jiao* as one aspect of *fa* or *dharma*.

Now, Taixu states, the term *zhexue* 哲学 is a loan from Japanese, denoting Western schools of thought. The application of this term to Oriental traditions is not only done in the Buddhist case, but also with Confucianism etc. – Thus Taixu shows the problem to be not something specifically Buddhist, but as being a general intercultural methodological problem, therewith relativizing it.

As for the matching of contents, Taixu agrees with Ouyang that Buddhism starts from knowledge that has been attained by experience (of the Buddha), whereas philosophy only evolves out of reasoning without a basis in enlightenment. Therefore both are not the same. Still,

¹⁵ »Fofa shifou zhexue« 佛法是否哲学 (1925) in: *Haichaoyin wenku* 海潮音文库, 26 vols., Taipei: Xinwenfeng, 1985, vol. 19/1, pp. 222–234.

since hearing the words of the Buddha and reasoning (on that basis) are integral parts of Buddhism, there is a partial congruence. In this way, »religion,« too, can be accommodated, since »hearing« precisely means to first faithfully believe in holy words, but then the Buddhist shall go on to prove them by his own enlightenment. Thus the answer to whether Buddhism is philosophy or religion is »no« in the sense that they are not totally congruent entities, but »yes« in the sense that they partially are congruent. In other words: Taixu, too, frames the problem in a whole-parts relationship, but therewith draws the opposite conclusion and incorporates Western categories! The same he does with science which is considered the most prestigious of the three Western approaches to knowledge, even though Taixu always retained some distance to it because of its »freeness of values« – something that came under attack especially after World War I with its destructive technologies (cf. the famous debate on metaphysics / view of life and science in 1923: *Kexue yu renshengguan* 科学与人生观)¹⁶.

With respect to Ouyang, the most striking feature is that Taixu is much more positive about »religion« and devoted considerable energy in defining and classifying »religions« without exempting Buddhism.¹⁷ This may be explained in the »traditional« vein of accepting various popular practices in lived Buddhism, since he discusses some phenomena that are present also in popular Buddhism, but it seems that Taixu had some general misgivings for the reasons of the anti-religious movement going on in the 1920s. In fact, not only Communists but also the Guomindang 国民党 continually threatened the *sangha* and its possessions, advancing »materialist« reasons. On the other hand, even though Christianity was the main target of the anti-imperialist thrust of the anti-religious movement, there were positive contacts between Taixu and some Christians (notably Karl Ludwig Reichelt), and Christianity was the inspiring source for much of what Taixu aimed at to reform in Buddhism.

Therefore it was also historical circumstances that pressed him to consider the »future of religions«:

1. Will religions be able to exist? This question is a critical inquiry by today's scholars directed at the religions, and a big problem that has not yet been solved [...]. But for Buddhism, most of them [i.e. religions] will not stand before reason [...]. 2. Will religions be able to merge? [...] Since beings have no [absolute] nature (*xing* 性) but only the Buddha, as long as not all have become Buddhas, there will exist religions because there will be the demand for religions, and thus they cannot merge. When all beings equally have become Buddhas, then all is harmonized into One and there are no more religions.¹⁸

In other words: when the world will have turned Buddhist, the whole question will be obsolete in a »post-religious« era. This vision rests on a profoundly evolutionary concept of religion that proves Taixu to be very much a »son of his age.« The difference in teachings and »types« of religion, e.g. at the most primitive level the belief in ghosts (»superstition«: Shinto or Daoism), then – on a higher level – theism (Brahmanism, Christianity, Islam) and finally »teachings of the own mind« (again moving upward from meditation, Sankya or Jainism to Hinayana and finally Mahayana), is explained by the different levels of knowledge. In helping develop people's minds upward the ladder towards the highest type of religion, i.e. Mahayana, religion itself will finally become obsolete in a universal state of Buddhahood. This, of course, is a Buddhist version of Kang Youwei's 康有为 (1858–1927) Confucian-based *datong* 大同 – a term Taixu favored very much.

Interestingly Taixu couples religious evolution explicitly with the historical and political evolution of society. The framework he uses is clearly taken over from 19th century Western thought, but he merges it with his own Buddhist missionary goal and his own political stance: religion reflects the level of society as a whole: therefore polytheism is coupled with chiefdom, monotheism with monarchy, moral leaders with the republic and finally »atheist religion« or transcendence of »religion« itself with anarchy.¹⁹ He, who had been active earlier in the anarchist movement, thus retained the ideal of a future order of exist-

¹⁶ Edited by Ding Wenjiang 丁文江 and Zhang Junmai 张君勱, reprint Jinan: Shandong Renmin, 1997.

¹⁷ See, e.g., his »Wo zhi zongjiao guan« 我之宗教观 (1925) in: *Haihaoyin wenku*, vol. 2/1, pp. 9–19.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ See Taixu's lectures on his tour through the West in the late 1920s, namely »Über das Nichtvorhandensein eines objektiven Geistes.« This latter lecture, presented in Germany, was published in Richard Wilhelm's *Simca* IV, 1928.

ence for mankind being without boundaries: whether social, political or religious.

Besides the question of defining Buddhism vis-à-vis Western concepts of »religion,« »philosophy« or »science,« Taixu also took up Ouyang's provocative statements about what constituted the »core« in Buddhism. Whereas Ouyang had argued from inside the *weishi*-theory (cf. his »Weishi juezetan« 唯识抉择谈) which he believed to be the ultimate answer to all times, including the times he lived in, Taixu significantly named his response a »discussion on the general core tenets in Buddhism« (»Fofa zong juezetan« 佛法总抉择谈). In this way he underlined the basic unity in Buddhism beyond all sectarian or dogmatical divisions. Taixu's vision of unity is framed in the timely image of a nation: it does not matter where the capital is as long as it holds together the whole. Thus every school declares its »capital« (core tenets) somewhere else, but the nation is always the same. Therefore – using the »three nature«-theory of *weishi*, i.e. the imagined, the dependent and the perfect nature – the different dogmatical schools in Mahayana are not contradictory. The *prajna*-school talks about the imaginary nature (the void), *weishi* about the dependent (everything is caused), *tathagata garbha* about the perfect (thusness). In this way, Taixu integrates not only Madhyamika and Yogacara, as Ouyang had done, but also the teachings of texts exemplifying »sinified« Buddhism like the *Dasheng qixinlun* which expound »thusness.«²⁰ As with different capitals in a nation, the *prajna*-schools have declared theirs in meditation, the *weishi* in dogmatical systematics, the »sinified« schools in faith and practice, but that is only a matter of perspective or approach to the same whole. Therefore there is no need to »purge« certain texts or traditions in Buddhism as Ouyang had proposed.

Still, Taixu advances specifically *weishi* or rather *faxiang weishi* 法相唯识 as the approach most congenial to his times. He explains that neither Hinayana (cf. its popularity in »back to the roots«-Buddhology) nor Madhyamika can satisfy the needs of the day, since the first considers only analysis without grasping »life« itself, whereas the latter in its talk about the void does not explain how existence is generated.

Therefore a school that centers on the phenomenal world like *faxiang* (*dharma laksana* or *dharma* appearances / characteristics, i.e. the Yogacara school), explaining the relation of being to consciousness (i.e. as mere ideations, *weishi*), is adequate in a time that focusses on understanding what being is and how it originates.

Besides »ontological« questions there is also the need to found ethics in some theory. Again, only a school that takes up the phenomena seriously like *faxiang weishi* can provide a solid basis for values, though having to avoid eternalism as well as nihilism.

On these two premises Taixu opts for *faxiang weishi* as the most timely solution and tries to construct his own explanation, consciously confronting himself with Western thought traditions that he was informed about. Interestingly, Taixu names this system a *weixinlun* 唯心论 (»idealism« in standard Chinese translation, but literally a »mere mind«-theory), arguing that the Chinese heritage lacked substantial »idealist« traditions which in the West had been so important. – One may note here, that in the 1930s the opposite »materialism« not only rang »red,« but that after World War I »idealism« was gaining ground with all those disappointed by science's possible consequences (see above). Taixu's appraisal of »religion« also pointed in that direction. – On the other hand, the second possible opposite to »idealism,« simple »realism,« had been shattered by modern knowledge and no longer posed a problem. Therefore Taixu focusses on six newer »idealist« systems in Western thought, as he understands them, to throw his *faxiang weishi* into profile:

1. subjective idealism (e.g. Berkeley): it reduces all being to shadow and thus depreciate ethics. It does not explain why two people can time and again see the same objects.

2. objective idealism (e.g. Hegel): it postulates one universal mind. How then the differences in being can be explained?

3. voluntary idealism (e.g. Schopenhauer): will cannot be the source of everything. If it is without any dependence on something else, then there is no way of eliminating it to end the suffering of life. If it depends on something, it cannot be the primary source.

4. empirical idealism (e.g. James): in the end this is not really idealist but materialist since it grounds everything in experience, the contents

²⁰ See his *Faxiang weishixue* 法相唯识学, 2 vols., Shanghai: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 2nd ed., 1939.

of consciousness being dependent on the sense organs. Furthermore it cannot propose a truth beyond the contingencies of momentary experience, i.e. it is radically relativist.

5. intuitive idealism (e.g. Bergson): it does not explain natural laws and how existence of the world was possible before mind came into being.

6. sceptical idealism (e.g. Einstein, Russell): it is only negative and does not establish something positive.

Now Taixu argues why his *faxiang weishi* answers the needs of his times, taking up fourteen problems which can be solved by it but not by these Western »idealisms«:

1. illusion / reality: in the *weishi*-theory, there are eight consciousnesses, and the first six explain the procedure of cognition as such, five being the senses, the sixth the mind. Now this sixth consciousness is called *dutoushi* 独头识, literally »only head«-consciousness, because it functions only inside the cognizing without interacting with the outside itself. It can be grasped in three particular phenomena: in dream (the senses are inactive, there is no cognition, but dreams can be partially based on earlier experiences), in distraction (again there is no actual cognition but the mind can »work« on memory, e.g.), and in meditation (in which the object is »seen« unmediated and thus there is – so to speak – »inner« cognition). Now, subjective idealism does not talk about the latter, Bergson only acknowledges the sixth consciousness, but – as Russell also states – the senses can cognize »real« outer objects. These objects, though, do not exist without causes, i.e. separate from the consciousnesses. Thus their »reality« is dependent on them. On the other hand – vis-à-vis the »pure experience« of the empiricists – in experience itself there is included also sensation. Therefore all consciousnesses come into play together with their respective objects. The question now is on what these consciousnesses and the whole cognizing process are based, which leads to the second point:

2. phenomena / substance: Here *weishi* argues with the eighth consciousness: Bergson's *élan vital* or the psychological theory of the »unconscious« only partly grasp what *weishi* calls *âlaya*, the eighth consciousness. This has three aspects: a) it (actively) stores the »seeds« (*bija*) of earlier experiences, cognizing processes or deeds (*karman*),

b) it (passively) is defined by these (being »polluted« or not or mixed – depending on the »seeds«), and c) it is the object of the seventh consciousness, the *manas*, which tendentially clings to the idea of an I and thus – as long as unenlightened or not »transformed« – believes *âlaya* to be this »I« or *âtman*. Now since the *âlaya* is the basis (»substance«) of everything (the phenomena) but is itself a consciousness, one can state neither simple »idealism« nor »materialism« but »mere-ideation« (*weishi*) as a middle way between these poles.

3. individuality / commonality: through its understanding of the cognizing process and its basis, *weishi* can easily explain how common perception is possible (e.g. why different people perceive the same river) but also why there are subjective differences in perception (e.g. fish and men have different perceptions of water). The reason lies in the *karman*.

4. the I / the others: according to *weishi*, this problem exists only as long as *manas* has not been transformed and takes the *âlaya* to be an »I.«

5. the general / the particular: the senses perceive the common characteristics of things (e.g. a colour) but then individualize the perception in the cognizing process.

6. subject / object: according to »mere-ideation,« both exist only dependent on each other.

7. cause / effect: *weishi* explains this with the seeds that cause the manifestations.

8. existence / cessation: even though history seems to have gone by, actually it is still in existence by a chain of influences and transformations. In *weishi* this is explained by the seeds stored in the *âlaya*. The seeds, though in themselves instantly arising and waning, define or »perfume« everything. Through good seeds the whole *âlaya* becomes more and more pure and thus the way to active reform is opened up. – Here we come close to a *dharma* of history!

9. identity / difference: all other idealisms explained differences starting from the one mind but did not spell out that process. *Weishi* proposes the *âlaya* with its pluralism of seeds. But since all seeds make up the one *âlaya*, there is also identity.

10. life / death: here again *karman* can explain the problem – *karman* as defined by the seeds which continue to arise and wane, have effects beyond death and link the various forms of life (like animals or human beings) synchronically and diachronically.

11. the void / the real: Even though the *dharmas* and the »I« are actually void or without a »self« (*er wuwo* 二无我), *weishi* proposes the theory of three forms of existence: on the absolute level there is the »true nature of perfection,« on the relative the »dependent nature« (since dependent on the consciousness), and both are real. Only pure imagination is not.

12. the absolute / the appearance: everything dependent (the phenomena) exists only apparently, but when cognition is liberated from differentiations, the absolute true nature, i.e. »thusness,« can be »seen« directly.

13. the profane / the holy: *weishi* challenges mankind to change the world by changing the basis (*ālaya*). Since the world is »mere-idea-
tion,« the polluted world thus will become pure.

14. cultivation / experience: the way to change lies in experience and practice, namely meditation. When enlightenment is achieved, the first six consciousnesses will be without interference, the seventh calm and the eight like a mirror.²¹

Thus, Taixu concludes, *weishi* is of great use for the problems of the times. The problems were not new in themselves, but were still very pressing at his day (not only on the intellectual level but also in terms of the factual consequences of these intellectual positions in real life) and – according to him – had not found a satisfying answer yet with other thought traditions. In other words: even though Taixu does not propose something new in terms of, say, a new variant of *weishi*, his claim of the superiority of *weishi* is grounded in a reaction to discussions of his times, weighing in age-old *weishi* theory against modern Western philosophical systems. Of course, Taixu's discussion of these challenged Western »counter-systems« is by no means extensive – to say the least – but rather a kind of backdrop to his exposition of *weishi*. But what marks his work as modern is the consciousness of the necessity to bring into these discussions a distinctly Buddhist voice that can

²¹ See Taixu's *Faxiang weishixue*, vol. 1, pp. 1–41.

take up the challenge posed by Western rationality actively, even suggesting a kind of »program« for creating a better future (esp. in points 8, 13 and 14). Here *weishi* appeared as the ideal solution.

Still, Taixu did not leave it with juxtaposing Buddhism with Western thought, but tried to incorporate all human mental endeavor into Buddhism, modifying and enlarging the old *pan jiao* method. Using the image of a plant, he explains the root to be Mahayana (Hinayana did not figure separately here as in conventional *pan jiao*) in the form of the traditional eight Chinese Buddhist schools, differentiating itself above earth in leaves of religion, philosophy, science, art etc.²² Thus one has to follow the way down to the root to realize the true foundation, but the leaves are nevertheless organically linked to the root and thus are integral – though secondary – parts of the whole. In this context Taixu introduces the concept of the »five vehicles« which added to the more traditional and better known concept of the »three vehicles« (of the Hinayanist *arhat*, the half-Mahayanist *pratyeka buddha* and the Mahayanist *bodhisattva*) a »godly« and a »human« one, which allows for the integration of »religion« and »philosophy / science« respectively. Matching these »five vehicles« with the Buddhist »historical theory« of the »three ages« (the true *dharma*, the only formally respected *dharma* and the last phase of the *dharma*), he argues that being in the third age, *mofa*, the adequate vehicle is the »human« one, whereas the second age had been focussing on the »godly« vehicle (»belief,« in Buddhism exemplified by schools like Jingtu or Esoterics). Therefore he develops his »Buddhism of / for human life« (*rensheng fojiao* 人生佛教) – later called also »Buddhism among mankind« or »human[ist] Buddhism« (*renjian fojiao* 人间佛教),²³ Taixu's most influential concept in modern Chinese Buddhism, as the specific answer to his times. Furthermore this active and positive engagement would be able to refute attacks from non-Buddhist intellectuals, who precisely used »human« history, philosophy or philology for undermining Buddhism's timeless »supra-human« claim to truth without realizing the »true« nature of each and

²² See Taixu, »Fofa zhi fenzong pan jiao« 佛法之分宗判教 (1924), in: *Taixu fashi quanshu* 太虚法师全书, 64 vols. plus addendum, Taipei: Haichaoyin, 1959, vol. 2, pp. 327–333. (This collection of Taixu's works is now also available in toto on CD-ROM: Taipei: Zhongge, 2004.)

²³ The translation as »humanist« Buddhism used by some Western authors is partly justified but confines the term too much to a pre-defined set of (Western) associations, which is narrower than the Chinese (contesting) interpretations of the term; therefore I prefer the translation »human.«

the relationship between both. In this context Taixu explicitly challenged Hu Shi and his presentation of Buddhism in his *Outline of the History of Chinese Philosophy* (*Zhongguo zhexue shi dagang* 中国哲学史大纲, Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1919):

Mr. Hu uses the concept of history of Western academics as a means to explain and describe the history of Chinese philosophy [...]. The concept of history of Western academics is the evolutionary one. Therefore it highlights the changes but not what is unchangeable in them. It infers the occurrence of changes from the situation of the times and negates other equally important relations. It does not realize that the development of reflective erudition of a philosopher in fact primarily grows out of personal ability, which is accompanied then by many secondary factors.²⁴

Man, for Taixu, cannot be simply subsumed under conditions. This same problematic attitude he equally criticizes in »neutral« descriptions of the Buddha or Buddhist important figures prevalent in »modernized« Japanese academics (specifically naming Sakaino Tetsu's *Outline of a History of Buddhism*).²⁵ By reducing these outstanding human figures to functions of historical contingencies, one cannot explain why they had the impact they historically had and continue to have at the day (and probably in future as well) and what made them so special.²⁶

Since Buddhists are active agents of history, and based on his above referred-to new concept of the »human vehicle« as the corresponding answer to present day *mofa*, Taixu now develops his »human Buddhism« also as a case for Buddhist utility in society. Thus, Buddhism can counter not only philosophical, materialist or relativist intellectual criticisms, but also the questioning of its social desirability in a »modern« China.

Even though the Buddhist view of *mofa* is basically negative, since it makes it hard for human beings to achieve enlightenment and thus, e.g., historically lead to calls for an »other power« to »save« or help, Taixu fuses this traditional view with the positive Western one of evolution. He argues that man can perfect himself to become a *bodhisattva* by perfecting man's life. »Degeneration« here tends to be superseded

by a move »upward.« »Human Buddhism« now has to stress those factors that are adequate in modern times: humanism (caring for human needs), mass (mission and engagement for others) and science (doctrines explaining gradual perfection). In this way Taixu hopes to bridge also the concepts of »human life« and »science« which had been polarized by the »debate on metaphysics / view of life and science« (*Kexue yu renshengguan*) of 1923, to »evolve« the present world into a Buddhist perfected one.²⁷ Ideally, this would lead to a »paradise on earth« (*renjian jingtu* 人间净土), reframing the traditional yearning for rebirth in Amitabha's Pure Land as an active endeavour here and now.²⁸ This concretely calls for Buddhist social engagement (the *bodhisattva* cares), but it goes beyond a purely evolutionist framework in so far as that only the enlightened one (*bodhisattva*) can help others. Without having a foot on the solid ground of the »other shore,« one cannot save anybody out of the flowing river of existence.²⁹ Thus, *only* Buddhists can further evolution truly, since they already know where it has to lead to!

Even though this ultimate goal remained, Taixu's accentuating *renjian* besides *rensheng* (which resonated the 1923 discussions) in the 1930s also reflects the changing times:³⁰ now Buddhism was under massive attack (by parts of the Guomindang as well as by the Communists), and the feeling of national crisis via-à-vis an ever more aggressive Japan deepened. Buddhism's role to provide a foundation of personal as well as social ethics (thus »among mankind«) was consequently stressed by Taixu, who hoped to appeal to the Guomindang then in power. During the war with Japan, this approach translated also into social practice, e.g. with a Buddhist »First Aid Corps« or Taixu's attempt to mobilize

²⁷ See, e.g., his »Rensheng foxue zhi shuoming« 人生佛学之说明 (1928), in: *Haichaoyin wenku*, vol. 2/2, pp. 164–169.

²⁸ For a concise survey on the evolution of this concept in modern Buddhism see Charles B. Jones, »Transitions in the Practice and Defense of Chinese Pure Land Buddhism.« in: Stephen Heine and Charles S. Prebish, *Buddhism in the Modern World. Adaptations of an Ancient Tradition*, Oxford and New York, 2003, pp. 125–142. See also Yang Huinan 杨惠南, »Cong ›rensheng fojiao‹ dao ›renjian fojiao‹ 从›人生佛教‹到›人间佛教‹ in his *Dangdai fojiao sixiang zhanwang* 当代佛教思想展望, Taipei: Dongda, 1991, and several more popular works of the Taiwanese Jiang Canteng 江灿腾.

²⁹ Taixu, *Fosheng zongyaolun* 佛乘宗要论, Wuchang 1920, p. 22.

³⁰ Still, *rensheng* remained important also later. Yinshun claims that Taixu favoured *rensheng*, whereas he himself – along with others – accentuated *renjian*, but *renjian* gained currency already with Taixu in the 1930s.

²⁴ Beihua 悲华 (= Taixu), »Lun Hu Shi zhi Zhongguo zhexue dagang« 论胡适之中国哲学大纲, in: *Haichaoyin wenku*, vol. 3/1, pp. 206–214.

²⁵ I have not been able to ascertain which of Sakaino's outlines Taixu refers to here, since there is no exact correspondence of titles but several similar titles of Sakaino's.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, »Lun Hu Shi zhi Zhongguo zhexue dagang.«

Buddhists around the world to back up the Chinese plight – allying himself publicly with Chiang Kaishek's government. But in terms of Buddhism's self-understanding, »human Buddhism« could be interpreted also differently: as a »back to the roots,« since it rediscovered Buddha, the man. Followers of Taixu's like Yinshun, e.g., took this up. But Yinshun decidedly stressed that where Taixu intended to stay in the Chinese tradition with his »humanist« approach, he instead wanted to go back to the Indian origins, explicitly rejecting »Chinese« syncretic elements »à la Taixu.«³¹ Thus, »human Buddhism« developed into a multi-layered (and contested) concept in modern Chinese history, but in any case it certainly modernized Chinese Buddhism.

Conclusion

Ouyang Jingwu and Taixu exemplify two different approaches to the encounter with Western thinking and to the way how to deal with the times they lived in. Ouyang – at least in his earlier years – favored rejection and self-conscious posture, Taixu opted for accommodation. Ouyang put the accent on lecturing, did no missionary work and tentatively tried to reach an intellectual audience. Taixu was a missionary, a doer, who opted for active engagement. In the traditional fashion he believed that the *upaya* or skillful means for his times was to integrate what was »in« at the moment for converting his contemporaries. Still, authenticity of Buddhism was also for him as basic as the capacity to adapt (cf. the »foot« on the solid ground of the »other shore«). Out of this enlargement of »traditional« techniques he consciously »modernized« Buddhism. Ouyang thought it necessary to explain the truth, but it was up to everybody to follow or not. He did not bother to »convert.« Still, his way of propagating and his doctrinaire options *de facto* were »modernizing« Buddhism, even if he did not state it or even wanted it. His intellectual lay Buddhism and preoccupation with methodology (something that was later perfected by Ouyang's follower Lü Cheng 呂澄) was not really »traditional« and in its approach – to a certain de-

gree – »un-Chinese.« Thus, both of them were explicitly – and more often implicitly – reacting to the historical moment they lived in.

What about their respective visions of history and Buddhism? They never took up this question head-on, but both were convinced that Buddhism was *above and in* history. Taixu stuck to a basically evolutionary framework which he matched with traditional *pan jiao*. Out of this he developed his concept of an (optimist) *renjian / rensheng fojiao* as an answer to the historical (critical) moment to modernize Buddhism, based on the belief that history could, would and should evolve toward the realization of the *dharma* – based on active help by human agents! Ouyang tended to stick to the supra-historical and worked »top-down,« positing Buddhism in modernity. Both believed in the universal validity of Buddhism, even if only Taixu tried to spell this out in social action (overseas missions, e.g.). Therefore it would be improper to call either of them a »particularist«: there was no room for alternative claims to »truth« besides the *buddha dharma*. But only Taixu tried to integrate other claims (in his traditional grading approach), whereas Ouyang contended himself with refuting them *in toto* as invalid, pointing to the absolute level that can be attained only after »transforming the basis.« His »counter-claim« left no room for matching categories or even a »dialogue.« As stated above, history for him was linked to the *dharma* by necessity, but remained conceptionally distinct like *yong* and *ti*.

How about the long-term influence? Ouyang's remained in Buddhist studies and academics. As a layman with expressed contempt for »stupid« monks as well as for »popular« Buddhist practices, he could not appeal to many practicing Buddhists, though impressing many non-Buddhist intellectuals of his time by his erudition and dogmatic rigour. Taixu, though continuously frustrated in most of his »modernizing« efforts at his own times, proved – in the end – more productive. His accent on *renjian fojiao* was continued especially in Taiwan and spurred also international missions (cf., e.g., the Foguangshan). This was due partly to his being a monk, taking up the challenge of working inside »traditional« Buddhist institutions, but not the least it was also due to his greater attention to history and his more flexible stance on the *dharma's* relation to it.

³¹ See Yinshun 印順, *Qili qiji zhi renjian fojiao* 契理契機之人間佛教, 2nd ed., Taipei: Zhengwen, 1990. – For Yinshun's own approach cf., e.g., Stefania Travagnin, »Il nuovo buddhismo per l'umanità (renjian fojiao) a Taiwan: Una nota sulla classificazione degli insegnamenti (panjiao) secondo il maestro Yinshun,« in: *Cina*, No. 29, 2001, pp. 65–102.