

# **The Metalanguage of Performance**

## **A discourse perspective on particle use in Homer and Pindar**

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# 1. Introduction

## Greek particles in epic performance and lyric song

§1 Ancient Greek particles are metalanguage.<sup>1</sup> That is to say, particles prototypically do not have a bearing on the *content* of an utterance, but on its *context*. Metalanguage is language that reflects upon itself and its direct context: it does not contribute to the propositional content of an utterance.<sup>2</sup> The functions of particles as metalanguage concern the ongoing interaction, knowledge states of speaker and listener, stancetaking, and the organization of discourse. Since these aspects of particles cannot be sufficiently described with the terminology of semantics or syntax, I speak of pragmatic functions.

§2 In the present study I engage with a rich field of scholarship from the third century BCE onward. Although neither the scholars working in Alexandria nor Denniston spoke of particles in terms of metalanguage, many of the arguments I make in this thesis build directly on ideas proposed by earlier scholars of Homer and Pindar. Over more than two thousand years of scholarship, practically every single instance of every single particle in Homeric epic and Pindar's lyric has been noted and studied. What I hope to contribute is a shift of perspective: the material is not new, but I shall hold it to the light to reveal new patterns. These patterns are inspired partly by classical scholarship, and partly by contemporary studies of particles and other metalanguage in modern languages.

### 1.1 Corpus and goals

§3 The corpus for the analyses to follow consists in the *Iliad*, the *Odyssey*, and Pindar's *Victory Odes*. For these texts, I have used the editions given in the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*

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<sup>1</sup> Maschler 2009 discusses Hebrew discourse markers in bilingual (English and Hebrew) discourse as metalanguage. The group of words typically called discourse markers in contemporary linguistics shows a significant functional overlap with what we call ancient Greek particles.

<sup>2</sup> Compare Patten 2009:2, who analyzes Benjamin's *Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers*, "Benjamin now speaks of 'something that cannot be communicated', precisely because it is itself a medium and not a potential content transmittable through a medium qualitatively distinct from itself."

*Online* unless noted otherwise.<sup>3</sup> Throughout, the translations are my own, except for those cases where I adduce an existing translation to demonstrate a point. With the aid of the Loeb translations, I have attempted to render the linear progression of the discourse as closely as possible.<sup>4</sup> Although in principle I have considered the entire corpus, for a number of quantitative analyses I have limited myself to four books of each of the Homeric epics.<sup>5</sup>

§4 The overarching goals of my thesis are the following: (1) to reveal patterns of particle use in Homer and Pindar by regarding particles as metalanguage in an interactive discourse; (2) to demonstrate the necessary complementarity of semantics, syntax, and pragmatics in describing discourse sensitive elements like particles; (3) to take a stand for the importance of understanding particles, *especially* when they seem inexplicable or superfluous to grammarians and translators; (4) to illuminate the links between particle use and the generic conventions of epic and lyric; (5) to make more of the continuum of particle studies accessible to the public, ranging from the earliest Homeric scholarship until now.

## 1.2 Three assumptions

§5 The goals listed above suggest a number of assumptions that deserve explicit mention and clarification. One central assumption underlies my work: to understand language use in Homeric epic and Pindar's lyric, we must regard our texts as the verbal component of an event, a performance.<sup>6</sup> In this approach, I align in particular with Nagy, Bakker, Kahane, and Minchin's understanding of the Homeric corpus:<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Allen 1931 for the *Iliad*, Von der Mühl 1946 for the *Odyssey*, and Snell/Maehler 1971 for the *Victory Odes*.

<sup>4</sup> Murray/Wyatt 1999 for the *Iliad*, Murray/Dimock 1995 for the *Odyssey*, and Race 1997 for the *Victory Odes*.

<sup>5</sup> For the statistical analysis of particle use in narrator text and direct speech, I have selected four books of the *Iliad* (4, 5, 6, and 17) and four books of the *Odyssey* (9, 10, 17, and 18), which amounts to 4917 lines, containing 6259 particles. I refer to this analysis at several points, and offer a table with the numbers in chapter 6.

<sup>6</sup> For the importance of interaction in the Homeric performance, see e.g. Martin 1989:4, Slings 1992:95, and Minchin 2001:6.

<sup>7</sup> See Nagy 1979, 1990, and 1995, Martin 1989, Kahane 1994, Bakker 1997 and 2005, and Minchin 2001. Consider also Martin 1997:141, "Miming a desire' is a beautifully apt way of describing what we know happens in

(t1)

“the discourse that was presented in these [sc. Homeric] performances had one very obvious property in common with something in which we all participate: it was a matter of speech and voice, and of the consciousness of the performer and his audience.”

Bakker 1997:1

An important implication of this assumption is that it is not crucial to me when the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* were written down, nor to what time exactly different parts of the texts can be traced back. Let me explain. It is unlikely that the *Iliad* was ever performed in archaic or classical Greece in exactly its current form (let us say West 1999), or even in the form of any of our manuscripts. Notwithstanding this unlikelihood, I believe that the language with all its layers, complexities, and inconsistencies as we find it in the manuscripts and the editions adequately reflects the language used in original composition-in-performance. There are undoubtedly diachronically different linguistic layers in Homer, but the differences in particle use that emerge (at least within the *Iliad* on the one hand and within the *Odyssey* on the other) may just as well reflect synchronic multifunctionality. In short, I treat the written texts as the words to a *potential* unique performance, and analyze the language accordingly. Only by keeping in mind this (imagined) performance can we account for the many aspects of language use.

§6 As for Pindar, my understanding of his lyric language is inspired by the work of Bundy, Mackie, Bonifazi, and Wells:<sup>8</sup>

(t2)

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interactive oral performances of epic, in which performers enact what audiences want, using all the poetic and musical resources at their disposal.”

<sup>8</sup> See Bundy 1962, Mackie 2003, Bonifazi 2001, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, and Wells 2009.

“It is necessary to think away the boundaries of the material text and to see each victory song as an emergent communicative event in order to grasp that at the moment of performance the composer would have been in the process of demonstrating his artistic skill and vying for a positive evaluation of his work from the audience.”

Wells 2009:141

The texts of Pindar’s lyric do not reflect composition-in-performance, but they were composed *for* performance: Pindar composed them with an occasion, a performer, and an audience in mind.<sup>9</sup>

§7 Homeric and Pindaric discourse are the verbal components of a performance, and thereby they presuppose the other elements of the event. Epic and lyric performance was social, interactive, and often ritual: we have to take this performative context into account when we consider the language. Moreover, there was a rhythm to Homeric epic and a melody to Pindaric song that is lost to us, and that we can at best approximate. This performative dimension is reflected in the meters of epic and lyric, which provide a glimpse of the original multimodal whole.<sup>10</sup> Although we cannot reconstruct these elements of the performance, they must constantly be in the back of our minds as we consider the text. An audience receives rhythmic and melodic discourse differently than continuous prose: for instance, the performer can create links between temporally distant words or units through resonance in rhythmic or melodic contours.

§8 The second assumption that informs my understanding of both Homeric and Pindaric discourse is that the language of any performance is the product of an interaction

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<sup>9</sup> See also Wells 2009:30-36 on the interactive nature of Pindaric song: we should not speak of “oral subterfuge” as Carey does, but of the oral primacy of the song. We happen to have the written libretto of a song composed with only performance in mind.

<sup>10</sup> For other works we do have access to most aspects of the original performance: see Bonifazi and Elmer 2012 for a multimodal analysis of a South-Slavic epic.

between performer and audience. Meanings emerge intersubjectively: the performer constantly operates on a set of assumptions about the knowledge shared between him and the audience. This entails that I believe that the Homeric and Pindaric performer intended their communication to be successful.<sup>11</sup> By extension, Homeric epic and Pindaric song have to be studied as interactive discourse, which actively engages with its current context and reflects the knowledge states of performer and audience.

§9 As emerges from the first two assumptions, I consider the external relationship between performer and audience as foundational: issues of internal and external narrators and of implicit or ideal hearers or readers all derive from that situation.<sup>12</sup> Likewise, the question of the identification of the “ego” in Pindar, though crucial, is not central in my research.<sup>13</sup> In both corpora, the performer (a singer or rhapsode for Homer, a singer or chorus for Pindar) will have been the natural referent for the first person singular or plural, barring explicit information to the contrary, as in direct speech. Even in direct speech, moreover, the performer is the speaker, and at that moment embodies the “I”. The layering and manipulation of the *origo* (the referential center of the current discourse) in both authors is an important issue, but I do not address it systematically.<sup>14</sup> For these reasons, I will speak of “performer” and “audience” throughout.<sup>15</sup> I only speak of “composer” when I explicitly focus on Pindar’s act of composition that precedes a performance in time.

§10 The third assumption counters a possible presupposition triggered by the first two. The fact that I regard the performances of Homeric epic and Pindar’s lyric as

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<sup>11</sup> See Bundy 1962:35 quoted in chapter 3 §68.

<sup>12</sup> For the movement of perspectives between narrators and characters in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, see especially the work of De Jong 2001 and 2004<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>13</sup> The discussion of the “I” in Pindaric lyric is complex and ongoing, and it is typically linked to the question of who performed the *Odes*, see e.g. Davies 1988, Heath 1988, Lefkowitz 1988, 1991 and 1995, and Carey 1991.

<sup>14</sup> Recently, Beck 2005 and 2009 and Ready 2011 have studied communication between characters. Especially the former engages with some contemporary linguistic theories about language use.

<sup>15</sup> For the sake of convenience I do speak of “narrator text” to distinguish it from “direct speech.”

communicative events does not entail any limitations on their potential literary artfulness and complexity. I underwrite Kahane’s conclusion:

(t3)

“What this study has tried to show is that, assuming a professional bard and a properly accostumed audience (a widely accepted assumption, even within the otherwise fierce oral/literate debate), the Homeric poems (whatever their precise mode of production) can generate complex ambiguities without forcing the audience to abandon the narrative progress.”

Kahane 1994:143

### 1.3 Four particle problems

§11 Particle use in Homer and Pindar is an infinitely large topic, and no study can address it in all its aspects. Numerous articles, essays, and even monographs have been devoted to single particles like γάρ, δή, and τε,<sup>16</sup> and issues surrounding δέ, μέν, and ἄρα in Homer are addressed in commentaries from the scholia onward. Since questions surrounding particle use in both corpora are potentially without limit, I will start by observing four overarching complicating factors in the study of particles. Consider this passage from the *Iliad*:

(t4)<sup>17</sup>

ἀτὰρ μεγάθυμοι Ἐπείοι  
ἀμφέσταν δὴ ἄστυ διαρραῖσαι μεμαῶτες

*Iliad* 11.732-733

But the great-hearted Epeians  
were marshalled about the city, eager to raze it utterly. [Translation Murray]

<sup>16</sup> Consider e.g. Misener 1904 on γάρ, Thomas 1894 on δή and ἤδη in Homer, and Ruijgh 1971 on “τε épique.”

<sup>17</sup> See chapter 2 throughout for the position of particles in units smaller than the sentence and clause.



If we follow the translation given by Murray, it appears that δῆ is in fifth position in a sentence (ἀτάρ...μεμαῶτες), and moreover the particle remains untranslated. This position does not rhyme well with what we learn about postpositive particles like δῆ. In fact, the position and force of δῆ here cannot be explained sufficiently if one regards the sentence or clause as the main domain of analysis.

§12 Now consider the following use of γάρ in Pindar:

(t5)<sup>18</sup>

θεῶν δ' ἐφετμαῖς Ἰξίονα φαντὶ ταῦτα βροτοῖς  
λέγειν ἐν πτερόεντι τροχῷ  
παντᾶ κυλινδόμενον·  
τὸν εὐεργέταν ἀγαναῖς ἀμοιβαῖς ἐποιομένους τίνεσθαι.

ἔμαθε δὲ σαφές. εὐμενέσσι γὰρ παρὰ Κρονίδαις  
γλυκὺν ἐλὼν βίοντον, μακρὸν οὐχ ὑπέμεινεν ὄλβον.

Pindar, *Pythian* 2.21-26

By the orders of the gods, they tell that Ixion says the following to mortals,  
on his feathered wheel,  
spinning in all directions:  
to go to a one's benefactor and pay him back with good deeds.

And he learned it clearly. Indeed, among the kind children of Kronos,  
having taken a sweet life, he did not endure his bliss for long.

---

<sup>18</sup> See chapter 3 §74-§75 for a discussion of this example.

The relation between the γάρ clause and the one that precedes it cannot be construed as causal: Ixion did not learn his lesson “because” he had a sweet life among the gods, nor “because” he could not endure his bliss. Rather, he was punished “because” he made advances on Hera, and this causal link is marked with ὅτ’ ἐράσσατο in line 27. The link marked by γάρ is a different one, and it does not concern a relation between two adjacent clauses, but between one clause (ἔμαθε δὲ σαφές) and the following narrative (25-34). Commentaries do not address these subdivisions of the discourse above the clause or sentence level, and translations cannot easily render it.

§13 The Homeric simile is very familiar to the reader of epic, but its language is rarely discussed. Consider this typical example:

(t6)<sup>19</sup>

ὥς τε λέοντα,  
 ὅς ῥά τε βεβρωκὼς βοὸς ἔρχεται ἀγραύλοιο·  
 πᾶν δ’ ἄρα οἱ στήθος τε παρήϊά τ’ ἀμφοτέρωθεν  
 αἱματόεντα πέλει, δεινὸς δ’ εἰς ὧπα ἰδέσθαι·  
 ὥς Ὀδυσσεὺς πεπάλακτο πόδας καὶ χεῖρας ὕπερθεν.

*Odyssey* 22.402-406

Just like a lion,  
 which, having fed, comes from an ox in the field,  
 completely then his breast and both his paws  
 are bloody, and terrible for the eyes to see.  
 Just so Odysseus was bespattered, his feet and his hands above.

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<sup>19</sup> See chapter 4 §31 for a discussion of this example.

Odysseus is compared to a lion covered in blood, and in the language we find two instances of so-called “epic” τε, in lines 402 (ὥς τε) and 403 (ὅς ῥά τε), along with two instances of “copulative” τε in line 404 (στῆθός τε παρήϊά τ’). “Epic” τε is most commonly described as denoting a habitual action, a permanent fact, or a temporary fact. On the one hand, this broad description deserves elaboration, and on the other hand, one might ask what makes the τε in lines 402 and 403 so different from the two in line 404. The Homeric and Pindaric material in fact suggests that these instances represent two aspects of the same τε, a particle that reflects an ongoing negotiation of knowledge and tradition between performer and audience.

§14 Consider this final example from Pindar:

(t7)<sup>20</sup>

θάνεν μὲν αὐτὸς ἥρως Ἀτρεΐδης  
ἴκων χρόνῳ κλυταῖς ἐν Ἀμύκλαις,

μάντιν τ’ ὄλεσσε κόραν, ἐπεὶ ἄμφ’ Ἑλένα πυρωθέντας  
Τρώων ἔλυσσε δόμους ἀβρότατος, ὁ δ’ ἄρα [sc. Orestes] γέροντα ξένον  
Στροφίον ἐξίκετο, νέα κεφαλά, Παρνασσοῦ πόδα ναίοντ’.

Pindar, *Pythian* 11.31-35

He himself died, the hero son of Atreus [sc. Agamemnon],  
arriving in time in renowned Amyklai,

and he brought death on the seer girl, after over Helen he had despoiled  
the burnt down houses of the Trojans of their luxury. So HE [sc. Orestes], the young boy,  
went to his aged host, Strophius, living at the foot of Parnassus.

<sup>20</sup> See chapter 5 §52 for a discussion of this example.

The particle ἄρα has confused classicists and linguists for centuries, even more in Homer than in Pindar, but one thing that is clear here is that it cannot mark an inference or conclusion from the preceding. It does not mean: Agamemnon died, “and because of that” Orestes went to Strophius. In fact, when Agamemnon is murdered, Orestes is saved by Arsinoe, and later he goes to Strophius: there is no direct temporal or causal connection between the two events, so (δ’) ἄρα must do something different here.

§15 The four particle problems above raise questions that guide chapters two to five. The assumption that particles are metalanguage until proven otherwise offers new perspectives on these and similar instances. As an alternative to classical explanations of (t4), I will discuss the function of particles with regard to discourse segmentation on the subsentential level (2. Discourse Acts). The problem of γάρ in (t5) can be better understood if we examine more closely discourse segmentation above the sentence level (3. Moves). The different uses of τε in (t6) can best be understood as separate facets of the same word, which marks the interaction between current discourse and knowledge shared between performer and audience (4. Discourse Memory). Finally, an understanding of the cognitive underpinnings of anaphoric reference combined with particles will provide better tools to deal with examples like (t7) (5. Metalanguage and Anaphoric Reference).

## 1.4 Two pillars: Discourse Analysis and Cognitive Linguistics

§16 Four chapters address the four particle problems exemplified above, and they are meant to be complementary. That is to say, each chapter illuminates one aspect of the same larger perspective. Two theoretical pillars form the background to my perspective on Greek particles: Discourse Analysis and Cognitive Linguistics. These fields are complementary and intertwined, but in this section I outline the main contributions of each pillar to my approach. In the introductory sections of the individual chapters I engage in more detail with the scholarship and explain how it can be productively applied to the study of Greek particles.

§17 The underlying message throughout my thesis is that discourse is the domain of language use, and therefore discourse and its subdivisions must be the domain of our analysis.<sup>21</sup> Discourse covers more than just text: it is a process rather than an object;<sup>22</sup> it denotes language-in-use, which means that it is always grounded in a context;<sup>23</sup> it is often multi-modal: it concerns multiple modes of communication (verbal and non-verbal) at once. The concept of discourse is relevant to the analysis of all language use, but particularly so for particles, which are famously hard to account for from the perspective of syntax. The roots of this part of my thoughts lie in the large field of Discourse Analysis. The name covers a myriad of subfields, but they all share the conviction that the object of study should be language within its context. There are several ideas from Discourse Analysis that have influenced my thinking about the Greek language. First, language-in-use takes the form of discourse, not of clauses or sentences. In fact, syntactical units and functions are crystallizations of discourse processes.<sup>24</sup> That is to say, the units within which words “work” are primarily subdivisions of discourse, not syntactical units. The work on acts and moves by several linguists results directly from this view on discourse, and provides the basis of the first two chapters of my thesis.

§18 The fact that I do not regard syntactical units as primary does not mean that I disregard them. Rather, my analyses start from the level of discourse, but take all available factors into account: syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. This holistic approach means that there are more tools at our disposal to understand the presence or absence of a particle when no explanation seems forthcoming from a syntactical analysis. Moreover, even when

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<sup>21</sup> I am inspired by Du Bois’ statement, 2003:11: “Within discourse, *considered as the domain of language use*, the functions most often implemented will play the greatest role (...) in shaping how grammars come to be as they are” [my italics].

<sup>22</sup> See Widdowson 1995:164.

<sup>23</sup> See Brown and Yule 1983:1, who describe Discourse Analysis as “the analysis of language in use.”

<sup>24</sup> See, for instance, Mithun 1988 on the coordination/subordination discussion, and Chafe 1976 and Tomlin 1997 on the “subject” function in English.

a syntactical explanation is readily available, this does not mean that the function of the particle is sufficiently explained.

§19 Second, within the field of Discourse Analysis, the rich subfield of Discourse Marker Studies has emerged.<sup>25</sup> The objects of study in this subfield are exactly those words that do not (only) contribute to the propositional content of an utterance, but that (also) reflect the attitude of the speaker, as well as her assumptions about what she is saying and about her audience.<sup>26</sup> Most ancient Greek particles must be understood in similar terms, and the methodology and terminology developed in Discourse Marker Studies provides invaluable tools for the classicist.

§20 One particular factor that has been explored extensively in the subfield of Discourse Marker Studies is that of “scope.” This is the range of effect that a certain word or phrase has within discourse. The concept of scope is not only important for the understanding of a particle’s force, but also because there is often a tendential link between the different scopes that a word can have, the position it takes in a discourse unit, and its different functions. Consider, *exempli gratia*, four instances of “well” in English:

(t8)<sup>27</sup>

- a) How are you? — I am well.
- b) She is well fit.
- c) Well, if you insist.
- d) How are you? — Well, thank you.

The same lexical item serves three functions, bound to three different positions, and with three different scopes. In (a) “well” is a predicate, which in this case puts it after the copula

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<sup>25</sup> In these massive fields of study there is always some disagreement about terminology. Within the subfield, scholars employ a range of terms, including “discourse markers,” “pragmatic markers,” and “discourse particles”; see I.3 for more terms and a discussion of the different definitions of the category.

<sup>26</sup> See e.g. Schiffrin 1987, Jucker and Ziv (eds) 1998, and Fischer (ed.) 2006.

<sup>27</sup> Examples (a) and (d) are constructed, (c) is an idiom, and (b) is from The Catherine Tate show, series 1 episode 1, 16 February 2014.

(unless the speaker is Yoda, of course). In (b) “well” functions as an intensifier, in this case in a vernacular mostly limited to younger native speakers of English. In this function it has scope over “fit” (“attractive”) and is therefore bound to the position immediately preceding the adjective. In (c) “well” functions as a discourse marker and has scope over the entire utterance. For the listener to interpret “well” as a discourse marker, it has to occur in first position and has to be followed by a prosodic discontinuity (typically a brief pause). The final example demonstrates that the relation between scope, position, and function is never one-to-one. In (d) “well” elliptically represents “I am well,” and it does not modify the rest of the utterance. Note that the difference between (c) and (d) is obvious when spoken aloud, but that they look roughly the same on paper. In the study of ancient Greek particles, the concept of scope is foundational to understanding the different aspects of particles like *δή*, *καί*, and *τε*.

§21 The second theoretical pillar of my research is the diverse field of research that falls under the name of Cognitive Linguistics. Scholars in this field study language and discourse to understand the cognitive processing that underlies them. The objects of their research range from the local processing needed to verbalize a thought, to scripts in our mind for specific activities that are reflected in discourse. In Cognitive Linguistics, “[o]ne generally begins by observing some pattern of linguistic regularity – most commonly semantic regularity – and then showing how it is tied to more general cognitive processes.”<sup>28</sup> For the purposes of this thesis, I focus on broader patterns of regularity: the recurrence of particles in certain positions, in certain cotexts, and in certain contexts. The cotext is the verbal context surrounding the particle, whereas the context covers both the verbal context as well as the place in the larger discourse, the paralinguistic context (such as punctuation or prosody), and the extralinguistic context.

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<sup>28</sup> Tomlin 1997:164.

§22 The cognitive approach to language offers a framework to understand the importance of the mental representation of the unfolding discourse. Many textual relations do not in fact work between parts of the text, but between an utterance and the mental model that the speaker has in her mind. This informs a better understanding of processes like anaphoric reference, but also of the use of most particles.

## 1.5 Outline of the work

§23 This thesis consists of two parts: (1) the research chapters on particle use in Homer and Pindar, including this introduction and a brief conclusion (chapters 1-6); (2) two appendices that represent two other elements of the larger monograph of which my chapters will form a part: “From σύνδεσμος to particula” (appendix A) and “Guide to scholarship on μήν” (appendix B). The second part of my thesis is only tangentially connected to the research chapters, but it is deeply connected methodologically.

§24 Chapter two (*Discourse Acts: the domain of particle analysis*) traces two lines of scholarship on non-syntactical subdivisions of discourse: twentieth century studies of Greek *kôla* and contemporary research on intonation units. Building on Wackernagel’s findings, Fränkel’s work demonstrated the relevance of what he called “*Kola*” in both Latin and Greek. His studies have formed the basis for studies of word order in both Pindar and Homer, and his approach to Greek and Latin literature foreshadowed a transition to a more discourse-oriented perspective. This approach has been championed in Homeric studies especially by Egbert Bakker. In several publications in the nineties he brought together the body of work done on Homeric meter and rhythm, and contemporary ideas about intonation units.

§25 I delve deeper into this scholarship, attempting to come to a more holistic description of the smallest subdivision of discourse: the discourse act. The function of particles must be understood in relation to words or to acts, rather than to clauses or sentences. After arguing for the importance of the discourse act, I demonstrate the



concept's analytical validity for both Homeric and Pindaric discourse. These analyses lead into discussions of the particles  $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$  and  $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ .  $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$  in Homer is the simplest metalanguage, marking only the progress of the discourse. I explain  $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$  in early literature in cognitive terms, building on the concept of projection. This underlying function, I submit, can account for the development of the  $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$  -  $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$  construction, and the later variations on it. The final section of the chapter addresses a category of short discourse acts at hinge points in discourse, which I call "priming acts." It is insufficient to establish that these units are syntactically incomplete or even defective (e.g. the pendant nominative), and I attempt to demonstrate their cognitive usefulness for both performer and audience.

§26 Chapter three (*Moves: metalanguage at discourse transitions*) examines the functions of particles with regard to larger subdivisions of discourse, such as episodes, scenes, or embedded narratives. In current research, such larger discourse units have been called "moves," and I follow that terminology. A move is a collection of acts that forms a whole by virtue of sharing a common discursive goal. Since each act may serve multiple goals at once, the move can only be defined relatively: the size and nature of a move depends on which discourse goal one chooses to focus on. For example, all the acts of an embedded narrative share that they are part of the embedded story, but at the same time, an act in the orientation of that narrative serves another local goal than an act in its resolution.

§27 Earlier scholarship has studied particle use at the beginning of embedded narratives, and that will form the starting point of the research on moves. In this context, I discuss  $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ ,  $\kappa\alpha\iota$   $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ ,  $\eta\delta\eta$ , and  $\tilde{\eta}$ . Next, I study transitions within narratives in Homer and Pindar. The discussion of a Homeric narrative leads into a discussion of the particle  $\delta\acute{\eta}$ , tracing its Homeric use in different kinds of discourse and in a range of positions. In Pindaric narrative, I focus especially on the use of  $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$  and  $\alpha\tilde{\rho}\alpha$ . Finally, I trace the development of Pindaric discourse in a study of acts, moves, and particles in *Pythian* 2.

§28 Chapter four (*Discourse Memory: metalinguistic marking of shared knowledge*) posits the relevance of shared knowledge for the language in the interaction between performer and audience. The use of τε and ἄρα, two typically Homeric particles that have given rise to a lot of discussion, reveals new patterns if we regard the particles as metalanguage relevant to the management of the “discourse memory.” This is the body of knowledge that the performer presumes to be accessible for the audience when uttering the current discourse act, including the preceding discourse, the shared epic tradition, and the shared culture, including common sense and knowledge of social convention. Every discourse act is an update of the discourse memory, and different acts engage differently with it. γάρ serves to introduce an “unframed” addition to the discourse memory, and I illustrate this with its use in Homeric narrative and in Pindaric *gnômai*. Then I analyze the use of τε and ἄρα in the Homeric simile, and in typical scenes. Finally, I present a corpus study of τε in Pindar, in an attempt to reveal a number of patterns that have as yet gone undiscussed.

§29 Chapter five (*Metalanguage and Anaphoric Reference: a discourse approach to particles with anaphoric pronouns*) combines the concepts proposed in the earlier chapters to describe the significance of the use of different particles after anaphoric pronouns. I present a comparative study of the third-person pronouns ὁ and ὅς (in the nominative) followed by δέ, γε, δ’ἄρα, ἄρα, and δή in Homer. I engage with the claim that ὁ δέ generally marks a switch of subject, while ὅ γε supposedly marks the continuity of grammatical subject. Both claims must be qualified, which depends on a closer investigation of the different functions that the pronoun and δέ or γε contribute to the combinations. The analysis of ἄρα and δή after anaphoric pronouns serves to explore these particles that supposedly lend emphasis to the pronoun, as is claimed of γε. In fact, each of the three particles follows demonstrative or relative pronouns in very specific syntactical and discursive contexts; the current literature does not do justice to the different patterns of use that exist for γε, ἄρα, and δή after anaphoric pronouns.

§30 The two appendices of the thesis do not belong to the overarching argument of chapters one to six, but they represent another aspect of my research. The reason for this is that my thesis will form part of a larger monograph that is the result of the Emmy-Noether project “The Pragmatic Functions and Meanings of Ancient Greek Particles,” carried out at the Seminar für Klassische Philologie of the University of Heidelberg (2010-2014). The monograph consists of five parts: I. Foundations, II. Particle Use in Homer and Pindar (Mark de Kreij), III. Particle Use in Tragedy and Comedy (Annemieke Drummen), IV. Particle Use in Herodotus and Thucydides (Anna Bonifazi), V. Online Repository of Particle Studies. Appendix A is my contribution to part I (Foundations), and traces the history of scholarship on particles from the Homeric scholia to the Middle Ages. Appendix B is an example of my contribution to part V (Online Repository of Particle Studies), in the form of a “Guide to Scholarship” on μάν/μήν, which gathers and summarizes all the literature on the particle μάν/μήν in modern (post-1500) scholarship.

§31 In Appendix A, I trace the history of scholarship on the words we call particles from Aristotle and the Homeric scholia to the sixteenth century. This chapter provides a backdrop to the “guides to scholarship” which gather all the literature on twelve particles from the early modern period onward. At the same time, it puts both modern scholarship and the present study into relief: many of the ideas about particles, whether from the nineteenth century or argued in the following chapters, have been stated in some form in ancient or mediaeval scholarship. The differences lie in changes in perspective, systematization of terminology, and shifts in emphasis.

§ The “Guide to Scholarship” in Appendix B gathers as much as possible of the scholarly work done on μάν/μήν, starting from Budé’s *Commentarii Linguae Graecae* (1529). It includes particle monographs, articles on individual particles or particle use in individual authors, a selection of influential grammars, dissertations, and even important notes in commentaries. I have summarized the argument of each work in English, staying as close as

possible to the original. It is not meant as an interpretation of the scholarship but as a repository of knowledge, with the aim of making more obscure and hard-to-obtain works accessible to a wider scholarly audience. The format is not very conducive to linear reading, but in its intended form it will be an online repository. For a database, it is imperative that the entries be as complete as possible, and the interface allows us to draw non-linear links that are impossible to visualize in a paper version. Finally, the repository is completely searchable, with special attention to particle combinations, which significantly improves its usability.

## 2 Discourse acts

### The domain of particle analysis

§1 The present chapter builds on the discussion of discourse segmentation set out in IV.3, so to facilitate understanding I briefly summarize the ideas set out there, where the reader may find a fuller discussion and references. In ancient philosophy and rhetoric, language was described in terms of *períodoi*, *kôla*, and *kómmata*. All three terms are hard to define, and our understanding of them is often strongly determined by English translations of the terms. It appears that the term *períodos* initially described an intonation curve between two prosodically similar moments. The *kôlon* is a subdivision of the *períodos*: either a complete thought or a complete part of a thought, with distinct parts, and easy to repeat in a breath. *Kómma*, finally, is a term applied to particularly short *kôla*. What underlies all three terms is a focus on performance rather than on syntactical shape (e.g. sentence, clause, phrase), and in this chapter I trace modern and contemporary research that takes the same perspective on discourse.

§2 To ancient scholars, discourse consisted of different-sized units not based primarily on syntactical division, but rather on the sense of completion on the one hand and the speaker's physical limitations on the other. From the nineteenth century onwards, conversely, the approach to discourse segmentation in ancient Greek texts reveals a strong tendency to regard syntax as the primary structure. This exclusive focus on syntax obscures the important role of particles in the articulation of discourse. A greater sensitivity to the linear presentation of both epic and lyric is needed for an understanding of the function of particles and their host units. The present chapter gathers the relevant evidence, both cross-linguistic and specific to ancient Greek, for the contention that not the sentence or clause, but the discourse act is the basic unit of language use. It is with regard to this smallest subdivision of discourse that the function of particles is to be understood.

§3 In speech, language is more malleable than the grammatical handbooks would have us believe, as we may note from the loose adherence to grammar even academics reveal in their day-to-day conversations.<sup>1</sup> This is not to say that a grammatical analysis is not a valid approach to such performed texts; both the Homeric and Pindaric corpora show a distinct tendency to obey a set of rules that largely conforms to what the handbooks call Greek grammar. A thorough knowledge of the grammar is indispensable for understanding the texts and allows the reader to note deviations from the standard and to hypothesize explanations for them.<sup>2</sup> Anyone interested in gaining a better understanding of the text's impact in performance, however, cannot stop at contemplating grammar alone.<sup>3</sup> What I wish to challenge here is not the *relevance* of a prescriptive syntax for the study of Homer and Pindar, but its *primacy*.

§4 Consider the following example from the *Odyssey*:

(t1)

ὁ δ' ὄρμηθεὶς θεοῦ ἤρχετο, φαῖνε δ' αἰοιδήν,  
 ἔνθεν ἑλών, ὥς οἱ μὲν εὖσσελμων ἐπὶ νηῶν  
 βάντες ἀπέπλειον, πῦρ ἐν κλισίῃσι βαλόντες,  
 Ἀργεῖοι,

*Odyssey* 8.499-502

and the minstrel, moved by the god, began, and let his song be heard,  
 taking up the tale where the Argives had embarked on their benched ships  
 and were sailing away, after casting fire on their huts

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<sup>1</sup> Tannen 1984 presents a study of talk-in-interaction between academics.

<sup>2</sup> In fact, I believe that there is a strong link between discourse and grammar: with Du Bois and others I assume that it is language-in-use that shapes grammar, not the other way around.

<sup>3</sup> For the Homeric corpus, I might add that the song was composed *in* performance. Naturally we must ask: what is the status of *our* Homeric corpus *vis-a-vis* its probable original composition in performance? See chapter 1 for more on this issue.

## Translation Murray

Murray's pleasant translation tells the story adequately, but it obscures the original word order. In the translation the reader is given a neat sentence, which begins before this excerpt and continues after it. It is worth comparing the punctuation in the Greek (from Von der Mühl's edition) to that in the English translation. Although the placement of some commas corresponds in the two texts, there are some discrepancies. First of all, in the translation there is a comma after "the minstrel," which allows the reader to focus on the new source of the upcoming discourse, but this comma is left out in the Greek.<sup>4</sup> Conversely, Von der Mühl prints a comma before ὡς, but Murray leaves it out before the corresponding "where" in the translation.

§5 These differences may be partly (or even wholly) due to the fact that English has more or less established rules for comma placement in written texts, whereas such a system did not exist for ancient Greek.<sup>5</sup> However, the choices in the Greek edition are revealing: they show that Von der Mühl feels there should be a comma before the "first-position word" ὡς, while he regards the participial construction ὁρμηθεὶς θεοῦ as too closely connected to the pronoun ὁ to permit a comma to intervene. Commas in written English are largely syntactic markers, since they mark the segments they divide as parts of the same superstructure: the sentence, which is in turn bounded by full stops. In (t1) above this convention explains the placement of a comma rather than a period after βαλόντες; the following nominative Ἀργεῖοι is taken as the subject of a long subclause, itself part of the sentence of which ὁ is the subject. However, it is open to discussion whether or not the syntactical unit of the sentence has true analytical value in a study of Homer, Pindar, or any other discourse produced in, or meant for, performance.

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<sup>4</sup> See below §63-§79 for more on this kind of construction.

<sup>5</sup> See IV.3.

§6 The reception of a performed text is at least partly linear: the hearer cannot hear the second word before the first word, and likewise the second verse only after the first verse.<sup>6</sup> In cognitive studies it has been established that the working memory used for processing aurally received text is not all that large.<sup>7</sup> Still, we find numerous instances in Greek epic and lyric where the grammatical subject of a clause is not given until two verses after the verb, as in the *Odyssey* passage above. A close translation looks as follows:<sup>8</sup>

(t2)

And he, having started from the god, began. He made the song appear,  
starting from there, where they, on their well-benched ships,  
sailed off on their way, having thrown fire on their tents,  
the Argives,...

If the Greek audience truly needed the subject from line 502 to complete the construction begun in line 500, one would have to conclude that in performance this text would become rather unsuccessful. In fact, the nominative follows at a point where the audience would have been expected to already know who the story was about; it must therefore be regarded as serving another function. My translation focuses on the articulation of discourse in separate acts, each of which serves at least one purpose in furthering the discourse.

§7 This chapter traces the history of scholarship that established the approach I have just demonstrated to discourse articulation in Greek in general and Homeric epic in

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<sup>6</sup> See Kahane 1994:143, “The *pace*, *direction*, and *sequence* of any particular performance is fixed” [italics original].

<sup>7</sup> See Chafe 1994:53-55 and Rubin 1995:69, “...each intonation unit corresponds to the contents of working memory.”

<sup>8</sup> Bakker 1997 and Edwards 2002 also advocate closer translations. However, Edwards proposes a translation into “conversational English” (2002:11), and he says: “this is the way a bard would address his audience.” I follow both Bakker and Edwards in staying very close to the original order of the Greek, especially as regards the act-by-act progression.



particular. I first outline the ideas presented by Wackernagel and refined by Fränkel and later scholars (§9-§15), which several contemporary scholars have recently revisited (§16). Then I trace contemporary work on discourse articulation, especially in English, which has focused on spoken discourse (§17-§20). The earlier scholarship on ancient Greek, together with contemporary scholarship on modern languages, provides the foundation for my study of discourse acts (§21-§23).

§8 There are several ways in which I regard the study of discourse articulation as relevant to the analysis of the functions of particles. First of all, particles are important boundary markers in ancient Greek, revealing the production of discourse in manageable chunks in Homer (§24-§30) and Pindar (§37-§45).<sup>9</sup> Second, establishing act boundaries allows for a better appreciation of the host units of different particles (δέ §31-§36 and μέν §46-§62). Third, a close examination of discourse segmentation in Homer and Pindar reveals that particles, particle clusters, or a particle in concert with one word (group) function as separate acts. Closely examining the way particles work on the small scale allows for a more precise understanding of the role of some particles in navigating larger discontinuities in discourse, especially in Homeric narrative (§64-§71) and Pindaric performance (§72-§79).

### ***Kôlon*, intonation unit, discourse act**

§9 In 1892 Wackernagel published a seminal article about a rule in the word order of Indo-European languages that he felt was followed so strictly that it deserved the predicate “law.”<sup>10</sup> As Goldstein rightly observes, Wackernagel 1892 presented neither the beginning nor the final form of the argument, but it has become the reference point for the large

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<sup>9</sup> See IV.3 for the same phenomenon in Herodotus and Thucydides.

<sup>10</sup> Wackernagel 1892: “Über ein Gesetz der indogermanischen Wortstellung.”

body of literature that has built upon its ideas.<sup>11</sup> The gist of Wackernagel's argument is that a group of words, including particles, tend to occur in the second position of a clause, be it a main or a subclause.<sup>12</sup> His argument initially excludes enclitic particles that join sentences,<sup>13</sup> as their role of conjoining the host sentence to the preceding one gives them a natural reason to be in second position. His analysis consequently focuses on *κε*, which does not function on the level of *Satzverbindung*.<sup>14</sup> For this enclitic particle, as well as for *θην*, *νυ*, and *τοι*, Wackernagel finds that they have a strong tendency to occur in second position of the sentence. Finally, he notes that a number of non-enclitic particles, called *postpositive Partikeln* by Krüger, follow the same pattern of eschewing initial position.<sup>15</sup>

§10 Some forty years later, Eduard Fränkel refined and extended Wackernagel's ideas<sup>16</sup> in two publications, with the intention of better explaining the many apparent exceptions to the law in extant Latin and Greek literature.<sup>17</sup> Fränkel's contention is that the postpositives, such as particles, come in the second position not necessarily only of sentences, but also of smaller syntactical units.<sup>18</sup> He calls these smaller units *Kola*

<sup>11</sup> Goldstein 2010:9. Wackernagel later attributed the discovery of the law to Delbrück (Wackernagel 1926:46); he had already mentioned the phenomenon himself in 1879. In 1892:342 he also refers to Bergaigne 1877 who had mentioned the second-position tendency of personal pronouns in Greek.

<sup>12</sup> Initially he focuses on enclitic personal pronouns (*μιν, νιν, οί, έ, σ\*, μ\*, σφ\**) in second position.

<sup>13</sup> Wackernagel 1872:370-371 mentions *τε* and *ρα*. He mentions in passing that the position of *ρα* in *Iliad* 2.310 *βωμοῦ ὑπαίξας πρὸς ῥα πλατάνιστον ὄρουσεν* is not problematic since the participle acts like a subclause here: "[hier] ist das Partizip einem Nebensatz gleichwertig" 1892:370-371; this comment foreshadows Fränkel's approach to *kôla*.

<sup>14</sup> Wackernagel 1892:371.

<sup>15</sup> Wackernagel 1892:377 lists *άν, ἄρ, ἄρα, αῖ, γάρ, δέ, δήτα, μέν, μήν, οὖν, τοίνυν*, but his analysis focuses almost exclusively on *άν* (379-402).

<sup>16</sup> Fränkel 1933:336n2 refers to Müller who had shown that Plato's prose proceeds in short *kôla* in his 1927 dissertation. In this work, Müller compares the language of the *Nomoi* with the language of the *Epinomis*, in order to show that the latter was not written by Plato. In the process, he shows the intricate construction of the Platonic sentences, but apparently inadvertently also that Plato constructs his lines from relatively small building blocks, with enclitics in the second position of many of the *kôla*.

<sup>17</sup> E. Fränkel 1932 and 1933, both gathered in Fränkel 1964, 73-130, with additional "Nachträge zu 'Kolon und Satz II'" on pages 131-139; he adds his final thoughts in 1965: "Noch einmal Kolon und Satz."

<sup>18</sup> In "Kolon und Satz I" Fränkel argues that in Latin elegy (Propertius, Horace, Martial) pentameter end almost always counts as a break of some sort, even if the sentence runs in into the next distich. A purely syntactic reading, which may conclude that a subject is divided from its verb by distich end, does not do

(henceforth *kôlon*, *kôla*), a term inherited from ancient scholarship on the units that make up prose and poetry.<sup>19</sup> Fränkel analyzes the use of ὅν in Greek classical prose,<sup>20</sup> and concludes that it can generally be considered to occupy the second position of a *kôlon*, when it occurs later in a clause.<sup>21</sup> Having established this principle, Fränkel revisited the topic in 1965 in order to show that vocatives generally occur at *kôlon* boundaries.<sup>22</sup>

§11 We might describe Fränkel's approach as a shift from a "map view" to a "route view" of language.<sup>23</sup> That is to say, he regards the text as first and foremost a syntactic construct, but rather than contemplating every sentence as an architectonic whole, he assumes that reception was realized in smaller units, which he calls "*syntaktische Kola*."<sup>24</sup> These *kôla* the listener or reader receives in sequence, and they make sense in their linear order. Speakers group their words and thoughts in these smaller units, and it is the existence of these units that explains supposed enjambment in Roman elegy, "abnormal" placement of ὅν in Greek prose, and improves our understanding of how vocatives are used. Fränkel's work would form the basis for a series of studies in Greek linguistics in the following decades; his intuitions have pointed the way for the approach I elaborate in this chapter.

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justice to the *Bau*, the build-up of the sentence. The insertion of a parenthetical phrase at the end of a pentameter, for example, creates a syntactical *Fuge*, a joint: if we can speak of a syntactic break, there cannot be enjambment.

<sup>19</sup> See IV.3 for more on *kôla* in prose, with an overview of ancient and recent literature as well as new analyses of Herodotus and Thucydides. For more on the metrical *kôlon*, see §24-§26 below and e.g. Gentili and Lomiento 2003.

<sup>20</sup> His corpus is Herodotus, Thucydides, Lysias, Plato, Demosthenes, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, and Menander (details in Fränkel 1965:3).

<sup>21</sup> The only exception to this rule is when it comes directly before or after the verb that it accompanies: Fränkel 1933:320.

<sup>22</sup> Fränkel 1965; in later oratory, at least already in the fifth century BCE, vocatives are used much more as a means of "*Gliederung und Hervorhebung*," ("subdivision and emphasis") helpful for the hearer, crucial for the reader.

<sup>23</sup> This terminology is more typically applied to (oral) narrative, compare Zoran 1984, Landau and Jackendoff 1993, Herman 2002, and Ryan 2003; applied to classics by Bonifazi 2008 and 2012, Minchin 2001, Purves 2010, and Clay 2011. Consider also Collins 1991, who says in his *The Poetics of the Mind's Eye* (98): "the consecutiveness of speech accords with the consecutiveness of visual perception."

<sup>24</sup> Fränkel 1932:204.

§12 Now with regard to second, or peninitial, position, some explanation is warranted. In the majority of cases, especially in classical prose, a “postpositive” particle occurs in second position in a clause. However, second position does not necessarily mean the second lexical item in a clause. If the preceding word is part of a tight group, such as article and noun or preposition and noun, it is possible for the whole word group to precede the particle. In such cases this positioning of the particle is unproblematic, although it is worth considering why it occurs on some but not all occasions. First-position particles, like ἀλλά and καί,<sup>25</sup> may similarly cause a particle that comes after it to appear as the third rather than second word. Diagnostically most relevant, then, are those cases where a postposed particle occurs later than in second position in a clause even when none of the two abovementioned situations apply. In these instances it is likely the case that what comes before the peninitial particle and its preceding word is not a full syntactical clause, but a separate *kôlon* nonetheless.

§13 In his 1959 work on word order in Pindar, Lauer retrieves Fränkel’s work on *kôla* to apply it to Pindar’s songs.<sup>26</sup> Like Fränkel before him, he uses the idea of *kôla* to demonstrate that apparently divergent and problematic word order in fact obeys the rules of word order with regard to *kôla*, if not with regard to sentences. Lauer argues that the Pindaric corpus offers more insight into the performative reality than prose does, because of its metrical form. That is to say, whereas prose is only divided into syntactical units (which may or may not have a specific relation to the discourse units it was realized in), poetry is divided into both syntactical and metrical units, which provides slightly more handholds for establishing possible and even probable discourse division.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> καί especially can in some functions be completely mobile, whereas in other functions it is generally in initial position. See IV.2 §117–§132 for more on the scope and position of καί.

<sup>26</sup> The more recent study by Hajdú 1989 does not refer to Lauer, and as a result many of Hajdú’s findings about *kôla* and word order in Pindar had been anticipated by Lauer.

<sup>27</sup> Turner 1992 claims that the notion of breaks at line end is a general characteristic that will be noticed even when one does not know the language of the poetry. As noted above, Fränkel actually used supposed rules governing the coincidence of syntactical breaks with metrical breaks in Latin elegy to establish his *kôlon* idea.

§14 Throughout his study Lauer adheres closely to Fränkel's method, establishing *kôlon* boundaries by using criteria such as the placement of postpositives, quasi-independent grammatical constructions (such as *participia coniuncta*), and stylistic practices (such as parallel constructions). Having established these boundaries, he goes on to describe the *kôla* that emerge. Most of them fall under the open-ended list of types offered by Fränkel,<sup>28</sup> but Lauer makes a few additional observations. Most importantly, Lauer observes that quite regularly there is a very short *kôlon* at the beginning of sentences, which he calls *Kurzkola*, short *kôla*, but he does not further define them.<sup>29</sup> He is similarly taciturn about the term *potentielle Kola*, potential *kôla*, which he uses to describe these same short opening *kôla*, but which might be much more broadly applicable, on which see below.<sup>30</sup> Sometimes these initial *kôla* are so short that they consist of nothing more than a conjunction, which leads Lauer to conclude that conjunctions can stand outside the *kôlon*.<sup>31</sup> Finally, Lauer notes that in case of *hyperbaton*, the two (or more) members, typically an adjective (or a participle in attributive position) and a noun, can be *Kolonbildend*, opening and closing them.<sup>32</sup>

§15 In his analysis of vocatives, Fränkel hints at the phonetic realization of *kôla* and *kôlon* boundaries, namely that the insertion of a vocative would result in a pause, with different possible effects.<sup>33</sup> For Stinton 1977, phonetic realization is the crucial question: can we establish where pauses might have been heard in Greek discourse?<sup>34</sup> His corpus, lyric passages of Greek tragedy, is quite different from Fränkel's material, but "the categories he [sc. Fränkel] establishes for Greek prose can be readily adapted to the more

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<sup>28</sup> Fränkel 1932:212-213, 1933:320-347.

<sup>29</sup> In the 1964 edition of *Kolon und Satz II* Fränkel uses the term *Kurzkolon* in his footnotes, and expands briefly on particles forming *Kurzkola* in "Nachträge zu 'Kolon und Satz, II'" 135-137.

<sup>30</sup> Lauer 1959:46; I expand on such acts in §63-§79.

<sup>31</sup> For καί forming a separate discourse act, see IV.2 §108-§111.

<sup>32</sup> Lauer 1959:54-58. The idea is taken up by Race 2002 and by Markovic 2006. Markovic makes no reference to Lauer's work.

<sup>33</sup> Fränkel 1965:17.

<sup>34</sup> Rather than Fränkel's cola, Stinton consistently uses "(atomic) sense-groups," imported from contemporary studies on English phonetics.

condensed language of lyric poetry.”<sup>35</sup> Using Fränkel’s categories on the one hand, and metrical respension on the other, he makes the argument that both *brevis in longo* and hiatus are generally allowed only where there is a syntactical pause. His research into the intricate language of lyric shows that meter and sense stand in a somewhat natural relationship.<sup>36</sup>

§16 Recently, the concept of the *kôlon* has resurfaced in Scheppers’ *The Colon Hypothesis*.<sup>37</sup> His work is an important step forward because he includes literature from contemporary linguistics. Scheppers builds on the idea of *kôla* with help from research into modern languages, for which a spoken corpus is available. Like Bakker before him, whose work on Homer I discuss below, Scheppers incorporates the work done on “intonation units.”<sup>38</sup> As the term suggests, the units are parts of spoken discourse that cohere by virtue of forming a single intonational contour, generally bounded by pauses. Scheppers combines the concept of *kôlon* and that of intonation unit to analyze the prose discourse of Lysias and Plato “as literary representations of ‘spoken’ Greek.”<sup>39</sup> Before moving on to the corpora of Homer and Pindar, I briefly trace the research on intonation units and discourse acts.

§17 Research on intonation units starts with Halliday’s concept of the “tone group,” which can be distinguished as a separate unit by virtue of having only one “tonic element.” In later scholarship the focus shifts to the “intonational contour,” to fit better with actual

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<sup>35</sup> Stinton 1977:29.

<sup>36</sup> Stinton’s argument is long and intricate, aimed mainly at proving the correlation between metrical period-end and pause. In the final pages he discusses the different gradations of pause that may be found: from the tightest connection of preposition and noun divided by verse end (no pause expected) to a verb divided from its direct object, where the pause is more probable.

<sup>37</sup> Scheppers builds on the word order publications by Dik (1995, 2007). Dik 1995:36 builds on Fränkel’s work and regards the intonation unit or *kôlon* as “the basic units for the analysis of word order, taking precedence, in principle, over syntactically defined clauses.” Goldstein 2010 proposes another approach to word order, but also regards *kôla* as basic units. See IV.3 for more on Scheppers’ work.

<sup>38</sup> Markovic 2006:127-129 also builds on Bakker’s ideas about intonation units and *kôla*.

<sup>39</sup> Scheppers 2011:x.

practice.<sup>40</sup> Speakers portion their discourse by proceeding in units that are marked by an independent intonational contour, and are often bounded by pauses. This segmentation, it appears, is not (or not only) a function of humans' physical need to breathe at regular intervals, but rather of the cognitive effort involved in planning speech.<sup>41</sup> Brown and Yule 1983 follow this line of reasoning and choose to call the small segments "information units," since they reflect the piecemeal addition of information to the discourse. Chafe proposes to use the term "intonation units," and adds that they are generally a combination of given and new information.<sup>42</sup> The combination of given and new information in intonation units is only a trend: some intonation units in fact contain only new, or, more rarely, only given information. Similarly, he notes that in his corpus the correspondence between intonation units and syntactical clauses is in fact quite low.<sup>43</sup>

§18 It is one thing to observe that a certain kind of unit exists in discourse, but quite another to explain *why* it occurs. There is a range of explanations available, each reflecting the particular approach used in establishing the smallest discourse unit. One group of scholars, represented by Roulet on the one hand (Geneva School) and Sinclair and Coulthard on the other (Birmingham School), approach discourse as a strategic construct with a certain aim, and smaller discourse units as having a certain function in reaching that goal. In their seminal 1975 article, Sinclair and Coulthard establish the term "discourse act," analogous to Austin's speech act.<sup>44</sup> They define discourse acts as the smallest step toward reaching a (sub)goal of the discourse, hierarchically ordered on a scale of act - move

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<sup>40</sup> Halliday 1967; his method is adapted especially by Chafe 1979, (ed.) 1980, and by Brown and Yule 1983.

<sup>41</sup> See Pawley and Hodgetts Syder 2000:172-173.

<sup>42</sup> See chapter 5 §9 for a discussion of Chafe's work and what he calls "activation cost."

<sup>43</sup> Even of the substantial intonation units (see note 49), only sixty percent coincides with syntactical clauses. The numbers are inevitably much lower for regulatory and fragmentary intonation units.

<sup>44</sup> Sinclair and Coulthard 1975:23; Austin established the term speech act in his 1962 work *How to Do Things with Words*.

– exchange - transaction - lesson.<sup>45</sup> Roulet 1984 adopts part of this terminology (act - move - exchange),<sup>46</sup> and proceeds to apply the ideas to different kinds of material, including both spoken discourse and written texts. Over two decades of work, Roulet redefines his conceptualization of the discourse act several times, but in 2001 he settles on the discourse act as every “update to the discourse memory,”<sup>47</sup> basing his idea on the work done by Berrendonner.<sup>48</sup>

§19 More recently, cognitive linguists have engaged with the smallest steps in discourse. Chafe regards the intonation unit as a focus of consciousness, “typically expressed with four words of English.”<sup>49</sup> Langacker talks about the same process in terms of “attentional frames,” which function “as instructions to modify the current discourse space in particular ways.”<sup>50</sup> As regards form, attentional frames may well coincide with

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<sup>45</sup> Sinclair and Coulthard use as their corpus recordings of school lessons, and attempt to describe the structure of the strongly dialogic discourse. They first divide the lesson into “transactions,” encompassing the entire discussion of a certain topic. Within those transactions, they establish “exchanges,” typically a dialogue between teacher and student. These exchanges can then be subdivided into “moves,” actions with a specific goal, such as “getting an answer to a question.” There are of course many ways of asking a question, and more often than not a teacher does not simply ask a question outright, but introduces or embeds it in some way, or never even actually asks anything.

<sup>46</sup> In his 1984 article, Roulet says (31-32): “[attempting] to describe the speech acts which constitute authentic (French) conversations and texts – as we have been doing in Geneva since 1979 – (...) has ultimately led us to postulate a hierarchical structure composed of at least three levels: exchange, move, and speech act.” In a later publication, he clarifies that he borrows the terminology exchange-move-act from Sinclair and Coulthard (2001:53).

<sup>47</sup> Roulet 2001:64-65.

<sup>48</sup> Berrendonner 1990, who speaks of the “memoire discursive” or “savoir partagé” [shared knowledge]. He calls the smallest unit of discourse a clause or utterance (“énonciation”). His analysis suggests that he does not take a primarily syntactic approach to establishing these units, but it is not entirely clear what factors he does regard as relevant. Only in his conclusion (“En guise de conclusion” 35) does he bring up prosody: “les segments qui sont prosodiquement ‘détachés’” [italics original].

<sup>49</sup> See Bakker 1997:44-53 for a discussion of the concept of intonation units. Chafe’s intonation units fall into three functional categories: fragmentary, substantive, and regulatory intonation units. Fragmentary are those that remain unfinished, like false starts, and whose function as such is generally hard to establish. Most frequent are the substantial intonation units, containing substantive ideas, states, or referents. The third are the regulatory intonation units, with the function of regulating the flow of discourse, the interaction between speaker and hearer, the cognitive process, and the speaker’s attitude toward what she is saying (1994:62-64).

<sup>50</sup> Langacker 2001:151, quoting from Harder 1996. Langacker and Roulet’s discourse space or discourse memory are echoed in what Steen 2006 calls “mental representations of discourse.” Unhappy with the *ad hoc*



grammatical constituents, but this is “only a tendency, not an inviolable principle.”<sup>51</sup> The relation between the empirically observable intonation unit and the cognitive process of language production may be linked productively to the work of the Birmingham and Geneva schools. The new focus of consciousness forms an update to the discourse memory (on which see chapter 4), which is verbalized in a new intonation unit.<sup>52</sup>

§20 There is one more element that contributes to my understanding of the discourse act. In the field of functional discourse grammar, scholars like Kroon, Hannay, and Hengeveld have approached language in a way largely similar to that of the Geneva and Birmingham schools. They have, however, a slightly different perspective: they define acts specifically as the smallest steps toward the main goal of the discourse. Hannay and Kroon, looking back to Kroon’s earlier work on Latin discourse particles, define discourse acts as “the smallest identifiable unit of communicative behaviour,”<sup>53</sup> but they expand it by stipulating that all acts are “strategic steps which the speaker wishes to make.”<sup>54</sup> Hannay and Kroon conclude that focus should shift from a link between discourse units and grammatical units to a link between discourse units and prosodic/orthographic units.<sup>55</sup> To bring all the above elements together: an intonation unit verbalizes a focus of

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approach applied by his predecessors, Steen introduces the “basic discourse unit.” This ideal unit is at the same time a proposition and a clause and an intonation (or punctuation) unit and an illocutionary act. The strength of Steen’s approach is that he states explicitly what many other researchers do implicitly: that they operate with the idea of an ideal discourse act and categorize the others based on their relation to the ideal (note, for example, Halliday’s positing of a marked and unmarked information unit, Chafe’s “fragmentary intonation unit,” and the like).

<sup>51</sup> Langacker 2001:162.

<sup>52</sup> Chafe 1994 throughout explicitly links these two ideas about the intonation unit: it represents a focus of consciousness, and it is an update to the mental representation of discourse.

<sup>53</sup> Kroon 1995:65. Hannay and Kroon elaborate in 2005:93, “In the 1997 model of FG [Functional Grammar] (...) the speech act (the precursor to the discourse act) was described in terms of clausality. In FDG [Functional Discourse Grammar] this problem is resolved, since discourse acts can also be realized by a variety of non-clausal structures.”

<sup>54</sup> Hannay and Kroon 2005:104.

<sup>55</sup> Hannay and Kroon 2005:88. Note that their conclusion was anticipated by, among others, Chafe 1994:63-69 (whom they cite), Brown and Yule 1983:159-164, and Langacker 2001:154-163 (not cited in their references).

consciousness, which is both an update to the discourse memory and a new step toward the overarching discourse goal.

### **Distinguishing potential discourse acts**

§21 Discussions of the non-grammatically defined smallest units of discourse have followed divergent paths, but their results converge. The conclusions that contemporary linguists have come to share are worth revisiting briefly. First, it is generally agreed that there is more than one kind of organization at work at the same time in any discourse. This position accords with the view that different kinds of subdivision are possible, whether based on syntax, content, discourse steps, performance, or other criteria.<sup>56</sup> Second, discourse units are not building blocks of a grammatical structure, but the verbalization of frames or foci of consciousness. Third, discourse acts function in terms of updates to discourse memory. Fourth, the smallest discourse unit tends to align with the strategic function of the smallest step toward a discourse goal. By and large, the smallest subdivisions of discourse are no larger than clauses, (often smaller), do not consistently map onto syntactical units, represent some elemental progression within a discourse strategy, represent the current cognitive focus of the speaker, and generally manifest in prosodically independent units.<sup>57</sup>

§22 Building on these separate but connected bodies of research, I will henceforth call the smallest subdivisions of discourse “discourse acts.” This choice is not only based on the belief that we should where possible avoid adding to the plethora of terminology used in linguistics, but also on the conviction that the term captures two important features of

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<sup>56</sup> Arguably, the lack of clarity about these different possible levels is part of the reason why “acts” is defined differently among different scholars; see Hannay and Kroon 2005:103-104. They separate “ideas” from “acts,” and they argue that the units that the Geneva school has focused on are in fact “ideas” whereas they themselves focus on “acts.” See IV.3 for a discussion of other discourse segmentation criteria in contemporary discourse analysis.

<sup>57</sup> Prosodically independent units have their parallel in punctuation units in written text, on which see especially Hannay and Kroon 2005:108-116; compare IV.3.

these units. First, it categorizes the unit as a subdivision of discourse, in whatever form, rather than a subdivision of a text or a sentence. Second, it characterizes the unit as an action, a word or word group used by the speaker to do something. This resonates with the concept of “action” in Conversation Analysis, which describes what speakers do with their utterances.<sup>58</sup>

§23 Establishing where divisions lie between discourse acts is inevitably tentative, as may be concluded from the outline of the literature on contemporary languages above. In particular Roulet and the Functional Discourse Grammar researchers have discussed the problem of establishing discourse act boundaries in sentences like:

(t3)

(1) Pierre est sorti malgré la pluie

*Pierre went out despite the rain*

(2) Pierre est sorti bien qu’il pleuve.

*Pierre went out even though it’s raining*

The only apparent difference between these two examples is that in (1) the concessive is expressed through an adverbial phrase, whereas in (2) it takes the form of a subclause. The Geneva School regards both of these discourses as consisting of two acts, whereas Hannay and Kroon agree with them only if the prepositional phrase is realized as a separate intonation or punctuation unit.<sup>59</sup> The deciding factor, then, is performance: whatever the linguistic form of the text, the speaker decides what to present as separate intonation

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<sup>58</sup> See III.4 §21 on “action” in Conversation Analysis and I.1 on the ontology of acts and actions.

<sup>59</sup> In practice, however, Roulet and Hannay and Kroon are closer together than we are led to believe. The question is whether we see the sentence as a generic example or as a unique event. In the former case, the sentence is open to different kinds of performance, and thus can be rendered potentially in one or two (or more) acts. In the latter case, as an actual event, it is rendered in *either* one or two acts (or possibly more, for whatever reason), but this cannot be extrapolated from the written form.

units, and thus as separate discourse acts.<sup>60</sup> In the following analysis of discourse acts in Homer and Pindar any marking of discourse division necessarily represents a conjecture about the work's realization in performance: we cannot fully reconstruct how the text was intended to be realized, and we can never establish how it was actually realized. Any division I propose, then, can only be into potential discourse acts, parallel to Lauer's *potentielle Kola*.<sup>61</sup> To this I would add one *caveat*, posited by Bright: *factum valet* "an action otherwise prohibited by rule is to be treated as correct if it happens nevertheless."<sup>62</sup> Bright's general observation may be extended to the idea of a prescriptive definition: whatever definition of discourse act I establish, actual discourse will always prove it inadequate—there is simply no limit to linguistic creativity.

### Discourse acts in Homer

§24 In his extensive work on Homer from the end of the eighties onward, Bakker has engaged with Chafe's ideas about intonation units.<sup>63</sup> Transcripts of descriptions of Chafe's film, *Pear*, by individuals who just watched it show language use that is remarkably similar to that in Homer. Bakker urges us to consider this spoken narrative style as the blueprint for epic. Let us consider a passage discussed by Bakker, with his division into chunks, or intonation units:

(t4)

ἔνθ' ἄρα τοι, Πάτροκλε,  
φάνη βιότοιο τελευτή· /  
ἦντετο γάρ τοι Φοῖβος  
ἐνὶ κρατερῇ ὕσμινῃ /

<sup>60</sup> This holds independently of whether the discourse is poetry or prose. See IV.3 for the possible match of *kôla* and *kómmata* in Herodotus and Thucydides to intonation units or discourse acts.

<sup>61</sup> Lauer 1959:46, see also Scheppers 2011:40–42.

<sup>62</sup> Bright 1966:323.

<sup>63</sup> Especially Bakker 1993b and 1997.

δεινός·  
 ὃ μὲν τὸν ἰόντα κατὰ κλόνον  
 οὐκ ἐνόησεν, /  
 ἥερι γὰρ πολλῇ  
 κεκαλυμμένος ἀντεβόλησε· / (790)  
 στῇ δ' ὄπιθεν,  
 πληξεν δὲ μετάφρενον /

*Iliad* 16.787-791, as given in Bakker 1997:113

(t5)  
 οἱ δ' ὅτε δὴ  
 κλισίῃσιν ἐν Ἀτρεΐδῃαο γέγοντο, /  
 τοῖσι δὲ βοῦν ἰέρευσεν  
 ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγαμέμνων /  
 ἄρσενά πενταέτηρον  
 ὑπερμενείῃ Κρονίωνι /

*Iliad* 7.313-315, as given in Bakker 1997:97

One of the contentions in Bakker's *Poetry of Speech* is that what Chafe and others call intonation units have their stylized counterpart in metrical *kōla* in Homer, generally about half a line long. Like intonation units, the metrical *kōla* that make up the hexameter are a few words long, probably reflecting “the amount of information that is active at one time in a speaker's consciousness.”<sup>64</sup> Working from this view, Bakker divides each line in the examples above into two “chunks,” which he assumes to have been “a prosodic, intonational reality.”<sup>65</sup> Each line above represents one intonation unit, and the slash (/)

<sup>64</sup> Bakker 1997:48.

<sup>65</sup> Bakker 1997:50.

marks verse end. In positing a boundary Bakker takes two factors into account: first the meter, second the content of phrases.

§25 The Homeric hexameter is a metrical form of remarkable consistency. Since it is a particularly long verse form, it generally consists of two or more metrical *kōla*.<sup>66</sup> In ninety-nine percent of verses there is a caesura (called the B caesura) after the first heavy syllable of the third foot (masculine) or between its two light syllables (feminine).<sup>67</sup> Here is an example of each from (t4):

(t6)

Masculine B caesura:

ἡέρι γὰρ πολλῇ | κεκαλυμμένος ἀντεβόλησε·

Feminine B caesura:

ἔνθ' ἄρα τοι, Πάτροκλε, | φάνη βιότοιο τελευτή·

Beyond this mid-verse metrical break, there are two other frequently occurring breaks: A caesura (ninety percent of verses), in the first foot or after the first syllable of the second foot, and C caesura (eighty-six to eighty-seven percent), either between the fourth and fifth foot (bucolic diaeresis) or after the first syllable of the fourth foot. The common metrical breaks are also points where syntactical and sense breaks typically occur, which brings us back to Bakker's intonation units, or chunks, and my discourse acts. Bakker's analyses demonstrate that the mid-verse caesura in particular often serves as a place for a discourse act boundary. On the other hand, it need not be the case, and even the strong metrical break of verse end does not always coincide with the end of a discourse act.<sup>68</sup> Edwards, who anticipated some of Bakker's points, bases his analysis of the Homeric verse into four units

<sup>66</sup> Literature on Homeric colometry is extensive, but H. Fränkel 1926 (revised in H. Fränkel 1955) is the seminal publication; see for later studies, all building on Fränkel, Barnes 1986, Edwards 1966, 2002, and 2011 (in Finkelberg), and Bakker 1997.

<sup>67</sup> Edwards in Finkelberg 2011:II.518-519.

<sup>68</sup> As Bakker demonstrates in 1997:151-154; see especially the example of *Iliad* 22.451-455 on page 154.

on Hermann Fränkel's observations.<sup>69</sup> Edwards argues for a strict correlation between metrical boundaries and sense units, clear linguistic evidence to the contrary notwithstanding, leading to divisions such as | ὃ δὲ τὸν μὲν | ἔασε |.<sup>70</sup>

§26 Homeric meter is an important guide in suggesting discourse act boundaries, along with syntax, sense, and boundary markers. Building on Bakker's approach I consider all these factors in establishing discourse act boundaries in Homer. There are often several possibilities of dividing the verse, depending on which criteria one gives priority to.<sup>71</sup> Consider once more the following line from (t5), first according to Bakker's division and then ours, with a vertical bar to mark a discourse act boundary.<sup>72</sup>

(t7)

οἱ δ' ὅτε δὴ

κλισίῃσιν ἐν Ἀτρεΐδαι γενοντο, /

*Iliad* 7.313, in Bakker 1997:97

οἱ δ' | ὅτε δὴ κλισίῃσιν | ἐν Ἀτρεΐδαι γενοντο

Bakker keeps οἱ δ' ὅτε δὴ together, despite the position of δὴ, yet divides after δὴ, even though it means dividing the temporal conjunction ὅτε from its clause.<sup>73</sup> Bakker's reason

<sup>69</sup> Compare Edwards 1966:117 "[T]here is a close relationship between the sense-units of the sentence and the metrical *kôla*, or, putting it another way, between the pauses in sense and the caesurae of the verse." In his work, he considers every caesura a possible boundary, yielding more than just half-line *kôla*. Blankenborg (unpublished thesis, Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen) is currently working on a more dynamic model of establishing the likelihood of prosodic pauses at different points in the Homeric verse.

<sup>70</sup> Edwards 2002:4. Edwards argues that this half line may resolve as one or two units, i.e. with or without the boundary, but his system does not allow for a boundary to occur after ὃ δέ, which is where I would put it. More on such small discourse acts in §63-§79.

<sup>71</sup> However, see Kahane 1994:26-29 for a discussion of five separate readings of "sense-pauses" in the Homeric hexameter, which show remarkable convergence.

<sup>72</sup> From this point onward, I will divide all examples into potential discourse acts. Vertical bars are used to identify units of discourse in prose by Blass 1868, in prose and poetry by Fränkel 1932, 1933, 1964, and 1965, and in poetry by Bonifazi and Elmer 2011.

<sup>73</sup> See for the οἱ δ' | ὅτε δὴ construction §64-§66, §71, and De Kreij [forthcoming].

for dividing after δῆ in (t7) is that the particle occurs right before a common position of the A caesura, the trithemimeris.<sup>74</sup> For us, however, οἱ δ' is an important separate cognitive act, and therefore I propose to divide directly after.<sup>75</sup> This boundary coincides with another variant of the A caesura, and a similar break occurs elsewhere in Homer; see also (t8).<sup>76</sup> In (t7) the feminine B caesura (marked by |) does not coincide with a discourse act boundary: a metrical break is an attractive place for an act boundary, but it does not entail an act boundary. In the excerpts from Homer given here and in other chapters, discourse act boundaries will be seen to regularly coincide with one of the three common metrical breaks in the hexameter, or with verse end.

§27 A longer excerpt better illustrates the many possible positions of discourse act boundaries, and the many forms acts take. At the end of the *Catalogue of Ships* there is a description of Achilles and his men loitering near the ships while the other Greeks are advancing on Troy. Taking into account meter and all the other factors outlined above, I divide the fifteen lines into potential discourse acts marked by vertical bars; boundary markers are underlined.

(t8)

ἄλλ' ὃ μὲν | ἐν νήεσσι κορωνίσι ποντοπόροις |  
 κεῖτ' | ἀπομηνίσας Ἀγαμέμνονι ποιμένι λαῶν |  
 Ἀτρεΐδῃ | λαοὶ δὲ | παρὰ ῥηγμῖνι θαλάσσης |  
 δίσκοισιν τέρποντο | καὶ<sup>77</sup> αἰγανέησιν ἰέντες |  
 τόξοισιν θ' | ἵπποι δὲ | παρ' ἄρμασιν οἷσιν ἕκαστος | (775)  
 λωτὸν ἐρεπτόμενοι | ἐλεόθρεπτόν τε σέλινον |

<sup>74</sup> Bakker 1997:150.

<sup>75</sup> Compare Kahane 1994:18, who speaks of the “intricate interrelationships between metrical units and sense-units.”

<sup>76</sup> *Iliad* 4.29 (=16.443 and 22.181): ἔρδ' | ἀτὰρ οὗ τοι πάντες ἐπαινέομεν θεοὶ ἄλλοι.

<sup>77</sup> καὶ frequently occurs directly after the caesura (see Hartel 1874 and Eberhard 1889), in which case it often starts a new *kôlon* (discussed in Bakker 1997:71-74).



ἔστασαν· | ἄρματα δ' εὖ πεπυκασμένα κεῖτο | ἀνάκτων  
 ἐν κλισίῃς· | οἳ δ' | ἀρχὸν ἀρηΐφιλον ποθέοντες |  
 φοίτων ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα κατὰ στρατὸν | οὐδὲ μάχοντο. |  
 Οἳ δ' ἄρ' ἴσαν | ὥς εἴ τε πυρὶ χθὼν πᾶσα νέμοιτο· | (780)  
 γαῖα δ' ὑπεστενάχιζε | Διὶ ὥς τερπικεραύνῳ |  
 χωομένῳ | ὅτε τ' ἀμφὶ Τυφωεῖ γαῖαν ἰμάσσει |  
 εἰν Ἀρίμοις, | ὅθι φασὶ Τυφωέος ἔμμεναι εὐνάς· |  
 ὥς ἄρα | τῶν ὑπὸ ποσσὶ | μέγα στεναχίζετο γαῖα |  
 ἐρχομένων· | μάλα δ' ὦκα διέπρησον πεδίοιο. | (785)

*Iliad* 2.771-785

This is a very turbulent passage from the *Iliad*:<sup>78</sup> out of fifteen verses, only lines 774 and 781 can be divided roughly into two half lines.<sup>79</sup> I have established most of the discourse act boundaries based on the underlined words that tend toward peninitial or initial position in the act. Furthermore, I take the adverbial phrases as separate, as well as participial phrases.<sup>80</sup> In the first part of the passage (771-779, the description of Achilles' camp) these participial and adverbial phrases separate the subject from its verb (an adverbial phrase intervenes in 771 and 773, a participial phrase in 776 and 778-779) with only one exception (ἄρματα 777).<sup>81</sup> The verbs, moreover, are isolated to such an extent that they appear only in

<sup>78</sup> This turbulence, among other things, leads Kirk 1985:242-243 to say about lines 761-779 that it might be “a singer's expansion, and not by Homer himself.”

<sup>79</sup> In many cases the emergent discourse articulation will match metrical division, in the sense that Edwards adopts from H. Fränkel. Consider in the example above especially the verse-initial acts in 773, 775, 777, 778, 780, 782, 783, and 785, as well as the verse-final act in 779. This match is attractive and complements the argument that these acts had some prosodic independence.

<sup>80</sup> My decision to regard adverbial phrases as separate is influenced by how English works. In none of the cases above does the adverbial or participial phrase limit the preceding (pro)noun, in which case prosodic continuity would be necessary: we do not find “the men by the sea” (which implies an opposition with “the men inland”) but “the men, by the sea,” etc; see Langacker 2001:161-162 with example 7.

<sup>81</sup> In line 777, κεῖτο does occur directly after the bucolic diaeresis, which may have led to a break before and after κεῖτο.

the following line. Fifteen out of thirty acts are introduced by a boundary marker, thirteen of which are particles. In line 779 οὐδέ begins an act, illustrating the strong tendency for negatives to be act-initial.<sup>82</sup> It becomes clear from this passage why Bakker would characterize δέ as a “boundary marker,” as it accompanies many small and large steps in the narrative.<sup>83</sup>

§28 The description of Achilles’ camp, placed just after the catalogue of ships and just before the return to the battlefield, only reveals the full extent of its mastery when read as a sequence of small steps. A discourse analysis of any stretch of text must take into account semantics, syntax, pragmatics, meter, and cognition—discourse analysis is a holistic approach to the text.<sup>84</sup> The narrative presents us with a “wide” shot of the camp with Achilles and the Myrmidons. It brings us first to the ships, where Achilles indulges in his wrath; then shows us his people, by the sea, keeping themselves busy; then the horses, which stand idle by their chariots, which in turn are parked in the tents of their owners. My reading reveals the clustering of subjects + δέ throughout the passage. The arrangement is not uncommon in Homer, but the symmetry here is striking. Moreover, the (pro)noun + δέ combinations are consistently postponed until the middle of the verse, whereas typically δέ follows a (pro)noun immediately at the head of the verse.<sup>85</sup> Finally, in three places (lines 773, 775, and 778) we find the subject plus particle isolated as a separate discourse act. This is complemented by the isolation of the finite verbs, also consistently produced as separate acts in this passage. In lines 772, 777, and 779 the verb stands almost alone, and up to 779 even the ones that are less independent are separated from their

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<sup>82</sup> Moorhouse 1959 argues that the negation was originally sentence-initial in Greek, but note the objections raised by Gonda 1963, especially that Moorhouse does not sufficiently take into consideration the role of style and genre. Fränkel appears to agree with Moorhouse, and in his 1964 edition of *Kolon und Satz* II he marks in the footnotes the many instances of negations at *kôlon* beginning; Scheppers 2011:74-75 notes the same tendency in Lysias and Plato.

<sup>83</sup> See Bakker 1993 and IV.2 §14-§46; more on δέ in §31-§36 below.

<sup>84</sup> See IV.3 for a holistic approach to Herodotean and Thucydidean discourse segmentation.

<sup>85</sup> I expand upon the combination of pronoun + particle below in §63-§79 but especially in chapter 5 throughout.

subjects by at least a participle. The position of the verbs, either at line beginning (772 and 777) or at line end (779) suggests that they were prosodically set apart from their context by pauses or other discontinuities.<sup>86</sup> Their isolation will have lent emphasis to the words, putting the spotlight on their sense—which is one of inactivity: *κεῖτο, ἕστασαν, οὐδὲ μάχοντο*.<sup>87</sup>

§29 The narrative and visual path along the different subjects, each highlighted in turn, and the overall sense of inactivity bring us to the reversal in 780, where the audience is presented with the act *οἱ δ' ἄρ' ἵσαν*. The beginning of line 780 is a heavy transition, which supports the choice by most editors to indent before this line – it is natural to print it as a new paragraph. The pronoun *οἱ* here is completely ambiguous, since it comes after a section containing a large selection of referents, but in fact it refers to none of the subjects in the description of Achilles' camp. Rather, it marks the return to the battlefield before Troy, and functions as the cap of the entire *Catalogue*. The surprise effected by the narrative turn would not have had as much impact if it were not for the careful build-up of the preceding ten lines. After dwelling on the picture of soldiers lounging and killing time, the performer brings our attention back to the advancing army with three constituents: the pronoun *οἱ*, the particle combination *δ' ἄρα*, and the verb *ἵσαν*. The use of a particle combination to follow the pronoun instead of just a simple *δέ* provides some warning that we are being presented with a different kind of transition from the preceding ones,<sup>88</sup> but undoubtedly the verb here is the crucial factor. For the audience to be abruptly confronted with “they went”, after encountering a series of static verbs, requires quite a bit of cognitive processing on their part, as they search for the group of appropriate referents.

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<sup>86</sup> For more on prosody see I.1.

<sup>87</sup> *Gesamtkommentar* 2003:II.2.250, “Ausdrücke des Liegens, Stehens und zweckfreien Tuns (...) bzw. unfreiwilligen Nichtstuns (779) sind vorherrschend und stehen oft am [Versanfang].”

<sup>88</sup> See chapter 5 §51-§58 for more on *δ' ἄρα* in Homer and Pindar. As regards its use here, let me anticipate that *ἄρα* often serves to accomplish “frame recall,” a return to the main narrative thread, on which see chapter 4 §18 and §38, and chapter 5 §51-§62.

§30 To seal the return, Homer introduces a simile, comparing the army to an advancing, all-consuming forest fire (780). This image effectively redirects the audience's attention to the battlefield, for it recalls another simile at the beginning of the *Catalogue* (lines 2.455-458) in which the shine of the Greeks' armor is likened to the blaze of a forest fire on a mountain.<sup>89</sup> The simile serves to accommodate the cognitive effort required to travel back to the army advancing, that was last referred to in 2.455-473. The similes before and after the *Catalogue* are further connected in the sense that the one just before it describes a glinting army seen far off while the simile at line 780 gives an image of a Greek horde about to engulf the Trojans. The echo of the imagery must have helped the audience negotiate a considerable narrative and spatial discontinuity.<sup>90</sup>

## Homeric δέ

§31 The scene at Achilles' camp is a linguistically turbulent passage, produced in a stream of short acts that stand in no fixed relation to syntax or meter. The acts direct attention to different aspects of the scene, and allow the audience to take everything in step by step. δέ is instrumental in accomplishing this compartmentalizing effect, and in fact is essentially omnipresent in Homer. Yet the particle, despite its prevalence in the text, has not been the object of as much close analysis as might have been expected. The particle's fundamental function in Homer has most recently been described by Bakker:

(t9)

δέ “marks no more than a new step, a moment in time at which a new piece of information is activated in his [the narrator's] consciousness. The particle

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<sup>89</sup> Scott 2005:38 remarks that the simile at *Iliad* 2.780 “is responding to the first simile in the earlier cluster at 455” but does not expand on the possible performative effectiveness of this “responson”; see also Kirk 1985:243 and *Gesamtkommentar* 2003:II.2.253.

<sup>90</sup> Consider Auer 2005:27, “Memory for form is much shorter than memory for content,” and Langacker 2001:180: “While the essential content may be retained, memory of how it was presented linguistically will soon be lost”. The new image, in other words, may well remind the audience of the earlier one.

*dé* is the most widely used linguistic *boundary marker* between foci of consciousness. And as an observable syntactic cue for such cognitive breaks in our text it is an important element for the study of how consciousness is turned into speech.”

Bakker 1997:63 [*italics original*].

Before Bakker, *δέ* had been viewed as a primarily “connective” particle, sometimes with adversative force.<sup>91</sup> However, especially in Homer, *δέ* can occur at the boundary between two clauses, two phrases, between main clause and subclause, or vice versa, or between a vocative and what follows. In other words, *δέ* is not in the first place a syntactic marker.<sup>92</sup> Bakker, however, argues that it reflects the production of discourse in small steps. As such, *δέ* has little to do with content, and everything with form: the term connective thus is useful only if it concerns discourse rather than content.

§32 One aspect of the previous scholarship on *δέ* that Bakker preserves is the idea of *δέ* as in some way weak or “bleached.” From the earliest studies onward *δέ* has been regarded as etymologically connected to *δή*; Bakker, like others before him, views *δέ* as a bleached version of *δή*.<sup>93</sup> This sense of *δέ* as a bleached form of *δή*, however, focuses overmuch on the semantic load of the particle.

§33 Indeed, Homeric *δέ* often goes (and should go) untranslated in English, but that is because its function does not have its equivalent in English in a lexical item, but in punctuation or prosody. Rather than anything bleached, as a boundary marker *δέ* is in fact the strongest of all second-position words: the only one that is practically never moved

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<sup>91</sup> See for the *communis opinio* in earlier scholarship Denniston 1950<sup>2</sup>:162.

<sup>92</sup> See IV.2 §14-§25 for the syntactic flexibility of *δέ*-acts, especially in Herodotus and Thucydides.

<sup>93</sup> Bakker captures the *communis opinio* when he says (1997:75) that the etymological connection of *δέ* with *δή*, “as a phonetically shortened and weakened version of this latter particle” is “commonplace.”

from its position, in Homer and to a lesser extent in lyric.<sup>94</sup> The particle's strength on a purely functional level has seldom been discussed, yet it is crucial to a number of other questions involving *δέ*. For instance, the fact that *δή* (or at least one of its aspects) seems to have been a mobile in early Greek, of which some trace remains in Homer,<sup>95</sup> speaks against the close relation envisioned between the two words by Bakker and most earlier scholars. Indeed *δή*'s mobility all but eliminates the possibility that in Homer *δέ* functioned as a bleached version of *δή*.<sup>96</sup> *δή* is much less strong when it occurs in second position, whereas *δέ* can be moved from second position only in very rare situations.

§34 To better understand the differences between *δέ* and *δή*, consider first the instances where both particles occur, as in the following haunting scene from the *Odyssey*:

(t10)

οἱ δ' ἤδη γναθμοῖσι γελῶν ἄλλοτρίοισιν, |  
αἰμοφόρυκτα *δέ* *δή* κρέα ἥσθιον· | ὅσσε δ' ἄρα σφέων  
δακρυόφιν πίμπλαντο, | γόον δ' ὤϊετο θυμός. |

*Odyssey* 20.347-349

And they were by now laughing with lips not their own,  
actually they were eating meat defiled with blood, and then their eyes  
were filled with tears; their heart presaged grief.

<sup>94</sup> Not strong in the sense of marking the strongest pause (as a period does in punctuation), but strong in the sense of its adherence to its position – it is clearly strongly connected to the start of new acts. See note 97 for the exceptions.

<sup>95</sup> I gather the relevant evidence and literature in chapter 3 §53-§64.

<sup>96</sup> This is not to say that they may not be etymologically connected, but in Homer the two lexical items have clearly gone separate ways. Alternatively, the particle *δή* might be a strengthened version of *δέ* (parallel to *ἄρα* which seems to have developed from *ἄρα*, see Braswell 1988:173-174 and De Kreij [forthcoming 2014]) in one of its functions; more on this in chapter 3 §56-§57.

Here and in all thirty-one other instances of the combination δέ precedes δή.<sup>97</sup> The same thing holds for the combination of δέ with ἄν/κε(ν) and γάρ; remember that Fränkel actually chose ἄν as a case study for his research into *Kolon* boundaries. The reason must quite simply be that δέ, at least in Homer, cannot leave its peninitial position, at least not for another second-position word. This tenacity suggests that its function is tightly connected to its position, which supports Bakker's description of δέ as the quintessential boundary marker.

§35 The boundary that δέ marks can be that between a main and a subclause, between two parallel phrases, or after a vocative in direct speech, but the particle can also occur at stronger discontinuities in the discourse, as in the following example:

(t11)

εὖτ' ἄστηρ ὑπερέσχε φαάντατος, | ὅς τε μάλιστα  
ἔρχεται | ἀγγέλλων φάος Ἡοῦς ἡριγενείης, |  
τῆμος δὴ νήσω προσεπίλνατο | ποντοπόρος νηῦς. |

<sup>97</sup> The parallels are *Iliad* 7.94, 7.399, 8.30, 9.31, 9.245, 9.432, 9.969, 10.252, 11.524, 13.52, 16.763, 17.466, 18.20, 18.290, 18.291, 19.345, 20.23, 20.307, 21.92, 22.300, 24.398; *Odyssey* 1.26, 2.176, 3.168, 4.706, 5.302, 5.322, 7.155, 13.178, 14.24, and 20.321. There is only one instance of a collocation with γάρ, in *Iliad* 10.188, and here too δέ comes first. Finally, the postpositive that Fränkel took as his case study, ἄν, occurs 30 times with δέ, always following it; the pattern persists in the 130 instances of δέ κ(εν).

There are relatively few examples in Homer (out of 10.969 instances in total) of δέ leaving its peninitial position, largely with prepositional constructions: ἀνὰ ῥίνας δέ (1x: *Odyssey* 24.318), ἀπ' αὐτοῦ δέ (2x: *Iliad* 11.829 and 11.845), δι' ὧμου δέ (2x: *Iliad* 13.519 and 14.451), διὰκ προθύρου δέ (1x: *Odyssey* 21.299), ἐκ θαλάμου δέ (1x: *Iliad* 24.274), ἐκ κεφαλῆς δέ (1x: *Odyssey* 6.226), ἐκ πάντων δέ (2x: *Iliad* 4.96 and *Odyssey* 2.433), ἐκ πυκινῆς δέ (1x: *Odyssey* 6.128), ἐκ τοῦ δέ (3x: *Iliad* 13.779, 15.69, and *Odyssey* 1.212), ἐν μέσση δέ (1x: *Odyssey* 5.326), ἐν θυμῷ δέ (1x: *Iliad* 15.566), ἐν βουλῇ δέ (1x: *Iliad* 2.194), ἐν τῇ δέ (1x: *Iliad* 7.248), ἐν δοιῇ δέ (1x: *Iliad* 9.230), ἐν καυλῷ δέ (1x: *Iliad* 17.607), ἐν λεχέεσσι δέ (1x: *Iliad* 18.352), ἐν γαίῃ δέ (1x: *Iliad* 22.276), ἐν κλισίῃσι δέ (1x: *Iliad* 23.254), ἐν νύσση δέ (1x: *Iliad* 23.338), ἐν Λέσβῳ δέ (1x: *Odyssey* 3.169), ἐν νόστῳ δέ (1x: *Odyssey* 11.384), ἐν πρύμνῃ δέ (1x: *Odyssey* 15.285), ἐν προχοῇ δέ (1x: *Odyssey* 20.65), ἐν δαπέδῳ δέ (1x: *Odyssey* 22.188), ἐπὶ πολλὰ δέ (1x: *Odyssey* 14.120), ἐπὶ στήθεσσι δέ (1x: *Iliad* 21.254), ἐπὶ δηρὸν δέ (1x: *Iliad* 9.415), ἐπ' αὐτῷ δέ (2x: *Iliad* 4.470 and 14.419, once ἐπὶ δ' αὐτῷ *Odyssey* 22.75 [in ἐπὶ δέ, ἐπὶ is otherwise used adverbially, without a complement following the particle]), ἐπ' αὐτῶν δέ (4x: *Iliad* 1.461 and 2.424, *Odyssey* 3.458 and 12.361), ἐς νῆας δέ (1x: *Iliad* 11.513), ἐς ἀλλήλας δέ (1x: *Odyssey* 18.320), ἐς Φηράς δέ (2x: *Odyssey* 3.488 and 15.186), πρὸ Φθίων δέ (1x: *Iliad* 13.693), πρὸς Θύμβρης δέ (1x: *Iliad* 10.430).

Φόρκυνος<sup>98</sup> δέ τις ἐστι λιμὴν, | ἀλίοιο γέροντος, |  
ἐν δῆμῳ Ἰθάκης |

*Odyssey* 13.93-97

When that brightest star rose, the one that most of all  
comes to herald the light of early-born Dawn,  
at that point it approached an island, the sea-faring ship.  
There is a harbor of Phorcys, the old man of the sea,  
in the land of Ithaca.

After describing how the sun comes up and the ship carrying the sleeping Odysseus reaches Ithaca, the performer devotes some attention to the place where Odysseus will be left by the Phaeacians.<sup>99</sup> This new section is set apart by the present tense and starts with δέ but is not otherwise marked, yet it represents a significant redirection from action to image and from movement to stasis. The two parts of discourse are divided by nothing more than δέ.<sup>100</sup>

§36 This passage is one example of how the particle can occur in any kind of transition, because of its ability to occupy the second position of any discourse act. Its syntactic and semantic flexibility is another sign that its function does not primarily lie on those levels, but is rather concentrated on marking a discourse boundary.<sup>101</sup> In Homer, δέ is markedly more frequent in narration than in direct speech. The imbalance suggests that there is

<sup>98</sup> Practically every edition indents before Φόρκυνος, and likewise before “There is” in the translation; see also De Jong 2001:317-318 and Bowie 2013:114, “new episodes in Greek (and Latin) literature are often marked by an *ecphrasis*, a formal description of a place or scene, regularly in the form ‘There is a certain...’”

<sup>99</sup> I explore this discursive device (“unframed discourse”) and the role of particles in it in chapter 4 §11-§28 (γάρ) and chapter 5 §51-§71 (ἄρα and δῆ).

<sup>100</sup> On this kind of discourse transition see also chapter 3 §49, where I discuss a similar construction without a particle; IV.2 §14-§46 examines the different kinds of divisions that may be marked by δέ.

<sup>101</sup> As the instance of δῆ in line 95 illustrates, there is a construction where δῆ is used with temporal markers to signal boundaries in discourse. It is in this function that δῆ and δέ may be connected; see chapter 3 §56-§57 for a discussion.



something in the steps of narrative discourse that allows or requires more neutral boundaries than in direct speech.<sup>102</sup> Over time  $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$  develops from being an omnipresent boundary marker to a particle used to start new *períodoi*, and eventually to a marker of adversativity. This development is accompanied by a steady decline in the particle's frequency in later texts, as well as a looser adherence to its peninitial position.<sup>103</sup>

## Discourse Acts in Pindar

§37 Pindaric language is widely regarded as difficult. This view is implicitly reflected in the punctuation practices found in modern editions, which give the impression that Pindar sometimes wrote monstrously long sentences.<sup>104</sup> This syntactical approach does not do justice to how the songs were received by a listening audience. Like Homeric epic, Pindaric song proceeds in small acts. The most important difference between the two corpora is the music that was an integral part of Pindar's songs.

§38 The melodies of Pindaric song are all lost to us, and we must keep in mind that the melody may have mitigated the apparent complexity of Pindaric discourse. The melodic dimension may have clarified constructions, created breaks and links, and overall made linguistic construction quite secondary. Moreover, music changes the way the lyric language is received and understood on a level above the discourse act. As opposed to the repetitive rhythm of Homer, the division of Pindaric song into strophe, antistrophe, and epode creates an intermittent recurrence of rhythmic (and melodic) units. Songs exploit the audience's "melodic memory" to create resonance beyond the linear production of

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<sup>102</sup> In Homer's narrative passages,  $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$  makes up 6,8% of the words in the *Iliad* and 7,4% in the *Odyssey*, whereas in direct speech it makes up only 3,1% in the *Iliad* and 2,9% in the *Odyssey*.

<sup>103</sup> The details of this development are not easily mapped, since diachronically diverse texts are generally also generically diverse. For the frequency of  $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ , we see around 5.4% in Homer, which is never matched in later literature, where only Herodotus approaches it at 4.2%. However, the strong variation within Homer between narrative and direct speech suggests that the differences with other authors too need not all be the result of diachronic development.

<sup>104</sup> See chapter 3 §68-§72 for a discussion of a twelve-line "sentence" at the beginning of *Pythian* 2. The same prejudice exists about the length and complexity of Thucydides' *períodoi*, see IV.3 for a discussion.

verse after verse, in a phenomenon called “tautometric responsion.”<sup>105</sup> In the example of *Pythian* 6 (t12), for instance, the phrases ἄγεις ἐφημοσύναν (20, about the victor’s son) and νόημα τοῦτο φέρων (29, about Antilochus), occupy the same metrical position in strophe and antistrophe. In this case, the resonance reinforces the comparison that Pindar proposes between the victor’s son and Antilochus.

§39 The one aspect of Pindaric song that is still accessible to us is its meter. Therefore, in dividing Pindar’s songs into discourse acts, metrical considerations play an important role. Since the verses are decidedly shorter than the Homeric hexameter, they are not often broken up into separate metrical *kōla*.<sup>106</sup> Although verse end does not coincide with act boundary quite as regularly as in Homer, this is still a strong tendency. Moreover, the strong metrical boundary after strophe, antistrophe, and epode always coincides with act boundary.

§40 Consider the third strophe of *Pythian* 6. After two *strophai* introducing the event (the chariot race in the *Pythian* games), the winner (Xenocrates), and his clan, Pindar focuses on Xenocrates’ son, who is addressed in line 15 with the vocative Θρασύβουλε, and again in line 19 with σύ τοι:<sup>107</sup>

(t12)

σύ τοι | σχεθὼν νιν ἐπὶ δεξιὰ χειρός, | ὀρθὰν ἄγεις ἐφημοσύναν, |

τά ποτ' ἐν οὔρεσι φαντὶ | μεγαλοσθενεῖ

Φιλύρας υἱὸν ὀρφανιζομένῳ

Πηλεΐδᾳ παραινεῖν· | μάλιστα μὲν Κρονίδαν, |

βαρύοπα στεροπᾶν κεραυνῶν τε πρύτανιν, |

θεῶν σέβεσθαι· |

<sup>105</sup> The idea of tautometric responsion is presented in Metzger 1880:33–41, and critiqued by Gildersleeve 1885:l-li.

<sup>106</sup> There is a lot of scholarship on Pindaric colometry, and different scholars have proposed different metrical articulations of his songs; see e.g. Irigoin 1953, Cole 1988, Gentili and Perusino 1999, and Itsumi 2009.

<sup>107</sup> I follow the colometry given in Gentili 1995.

ταύτας δὲ μή ποτε τιμᾶς  
 ἀμείρειν | γονέων βίον πεπρωμένον. |

Pindar, *Pythian* 6.19-27

You then, keeping him at your right hand, straight you keep the command,  
 which they say that once in the mountains to the greatly powerful—  
 that Philyras' son advised to the orphaned  
 son of Peleus: to honour especially Kronos' son,  
 loud-voiced lord of lightning and thunder,  
 of all the gods.  
 And to never of those honours  
 deprive the given life of one's parents.

In the passage above, I mark discourse act boundaries on the basis of syntax and sense (e.g. the apposition βαρύοπα...πρύτανιν), but also considering postpositives (νιν, ποτε, μέν, and δέ) and hyperbaton constructions (ὀρθάν...ἐφημοσύναν). After σύ τοι<sup>108</sup> follows a participial phrase with the enclitic νιν in second position.<sup>109</sup> The first two lines of this third strophe thus proceed in three acts, the first to direct attention to the focus of the upcoming two strophai ("You then"), the second to provide a link to the preceding ("keeping him [sc. Thrasyboulos' father] at your right hand"),<sup>110</sup> and the third to look ahead to the upcoming discourse ("straight you keep the command").

§41 The next act starts with a neuter pronoun (τά, "those things") that retrieves the referent of ἐφημοσύναν "command." At the same time, the pronoun functions as a

<sup>108</sup> See §72-§79 for a discussion of similar transitions (2<sup>nd</sup> person pronoun + particle) in Pindar.

<sup>109</sup> In Pindar, νιν is not limited to second position, but it does tend toward it. Here the participial phrase following the nominative gives sufficient reason to assume a discontinuity between τοι and σχεθών.

<sup>110</sup> Scholars are not undivided on this point (see Gentili 1995:545-546 for an overview of the possibilities), but I see no reason to read νιν here as referring to the victory.

transition into a little mythical reference (23-26).<sup>111</sup> The clause that provides an orientation for this narrative neatly demonstrates the difference between Pindar and Homer. Line 21 ends with the dative adjective μεγαλοσθενεῖ, which can in no natural way be construed with what preceded; it thus projects<sup>112</sup> an indirect object (dative) of an upcoming new action that will fit the epithet. The first words that follow are Φιλύρας υἱόν, a circuitous way of naming Cheiron, who after φαντί will naturally be taken as the agent in the emerging construction. At this point the audience may already have the information they need: Pindar is elaborating on a saying that Cheiron once taught someone in the mountains (ἐν οὐρεσι), someone as yet unnamed to whom the (rare) epithet μεγαλοσθενής can suitably apply. The combination of cues will have activated the figure of Achilles in the audience's minds. The suspicion gains strength in line 22 when the audience encounters a second epithet, ὀρφανιζομένω, and finally is confirmed with the patronymic in line 23 (Πηλεΐδᾱ). Because of the interweaving construction and because line 23 begins with a lone dative, it is hard to establish where this relatively long act (21-23) may have been subdivided. The adjective in the dative (μεγαλοσθενεῖ) creates the expectation of a noun, and the thought is not yet complete at the end of line 21. Despite its length, however, the audience would still have been able to semantically process the construction on-line.

§42 In Homer, this act would probably have been broken in two, presented with the different components clustered together. Note, however, that such syntactical and discursive flourishes in Pindar are designed precisely to be flourishes; they function as verbal (and perhaps musical) *tours-de-force* that stand out against the general piecemeal progression of the discourse in his songs.<sup>113</sup> The saying itself is introduced at μάλιστα μέν and illustrates how so-called μέν - δέ constructions are often not symmetrical in early Greek poetry (more on this in §56-§59). Finally, line 24 (βαρύοπα στεροπᾶν κεραυνῶν τε

<sup>111</sup> See chapter 3 §50 on relatives (+ποτε) introducing embedded narratives in Pindar.

<sup>112</sup> See below §49-§51 on the concept of (pragmatic) projection.

<sup>113</sup> This observation resonates with the claims about tragic lyric in Stinton 1977:29.

πρῦτανιν) contains another idiosyncrasy of Pindar's. Lauer first observed that Pindar has a tendency to demarcate his *kōla* using hyperbata, which Lauer called *Kolonbildend*.<sup>114</sup> The suggestion is that a lone adjective (βαρύοπα) at the beginning of an act (or *Kolon* in Lauer's terms) creates the expectation of a noun, and the eventual occurrence of the noun (πρῦτανιν) then marks the end of the discourse act.<sup>115</sup> Markovic remarks that throughout early Greek literature, hyperbaton is a tool frequently used especially for “signaling or reinforcing the *end* of syntactical and semantic units” [my emphasis], and that it is a feature “of oral tradition.”<sup>116</sup>

§43 The wisdom that Pindar offers in *Pythian* 6.23-25 is that one should honor Zeus most out of all the gods, and that one should honor one's parents. The second part of the *gnōmē* (“honor your parents”) introduces an important theme in the ode which provides the starting point for the following strophe:<sup>117</sup>

(t13)

ἔγεντο καὶ πρότερον | Ἀντίλοχος βιατὰς | νόημα τοῦτο φέρων, |

ὃς ὑπερέφθιτο πατρός, | ἐναρίμβροτον

ἀναμείναις στράταρχον Αἰθιοπῶν |

Μέμνονα. | Νεστόρειον γὰρ ἵππος ἄρμ' ἐπέδα |

Πάριος ἐκ βελέων δαΐχθεις | ὁ δ' ἔφεπεν

κραταιὸν ἔγχος |

Μεσσανίου δὲ γέροντος |

δονηθεῖσα φρὴν | βόασε παῖδα ὄν, |

<sup>114</sup> Lauer 1959:54-58; see also Race 2002 and Markovic 2006:138-140. Race 2002:21 believes that Lauer pays “little attention” to hyperbata, and does not refer to Lauer's idea of *Kolonbildende* hyperbata. Markovic does not cite Lauer, but describes this kind of hyperbaton similarly, calling it a “framing hyperbaton.”

<sup>115</sup> Especially remarkable are instances where Pindar postpones a word that would otherwise have been in initial position in order to achieve hyperbaton, as ὅς in *Olympian* 1.12 θεμιστεῖον ὃς ἀμφέπει σκάπτων and τόν in *Isthmian* 1.13 παῖδα, | θρασεῖται τόν ποτε Γηρυόνα φρίξαν κύνες.

<sup>116</sup> Markovic 2006:128-129.

<sup>117</sup> See Gentili 1995:547.

χαμαιπετὲς δ' ἄρ' ἔπος οὐκ ἀπέριψεν· | αὐτοῦ μένων δ' ὁ θεῖος ἀνήρ |  
 πρίατο μὲν θανάτοιο κομιδὰν πατρός, |

Pindar, *Pythian* 6.28-39

This happened in earlier times too. Strong Antilochos, keeping this in mind,  
 he died for his father, standing up to the man-slaying  
 general of the Ethiopians,  
 Memnon. For Nestor's horse entangled the chariot,  
 struck by Paris' arrows, and he [sc. Memnon] brandished  
 his powerful spear.  
 The old man from Messene's  
 mind in panic, he called to his son.

And not an earthbound word escaped from him: staying right there, the godlike man,  
 he bought with his death his father's rescue.

The theme established by the end of the third stanza is explored in the fourth, which here takes the form of a little narrative. The transition to the past (ἔγεντο καὶ πρότερον) and the introduction of the story are clear. The adjective in νόημα τοῦτο secures the connection to the preceding discourse, and the next act, starting with the personal pronoun ὅς referring to Antilochus, begins a little abstract of the entire story.<sup>118</sup> Μέμνονα in apposition at the head of line 33 is semantically superfluous, but the name here serves to close the ring begun at the naming of Antilochus, a ring from victim to killer.<sup>119</sup> Furthermore, placing the name here enables Pindar to juxtapose Memnon with Nestor: a reflection in the language of

<sup>118</sup> For the typical components of a narrative see chapter 3 §14-§19.

<sup>119</sup> See IV.3 on the sense of completion inherent in the idea of *períodos*.

the situation on the battlefield. The narrative proper follows, beginning with the particle γάρ,<sup>120</sup> and proceeds in six subsequent acts, no less than four of which start with δέ.<sup>121</sup> Use of δέ in Pindar is noticeably different from Homer's usage: the particle occurs much less frequently, and is more often used to mark more significant boundaries in the discourse.<sup>122</sup> It is in Pindar's narrative sections that we find a distribution of δέ closer to that found in Homer, but even in Pindaric narrative the particle is not used quite as frequently as in Homer. As for the particle's position, in line 37 δέ is postponed until after the word group αὐτοῦ μένων, a license that does not occur in Homer.<sup>123</sup>

§44 The function of μέν in line 39 is not immediately obvious. It occurs in the line that appears to function as the resolution of the narrative (see chapter 3 §14), the end of the story. The sense of resolution is confirmed when we consider how the strophe continues:

(t14)

ἐδόκησέν τε τῶν πάλαι γενεᾷ  
 ὀπλοτέροισιν | ἔργον πελώριον τελέσαις |  
 ὕπατος ἀμφὶ τοκεῦσιν ἔμμεν πρὸς ἀρετάν. |

Pindar, *Pythian* 6.40-42

And among the younger ones of the old generation  
 he was regarded, having done that great deed,  
 to be foremost as regards virtue toward the parents.

<sup>120</sup> I explore this function of γάρ at the beginning of an embedded narrative in chapter 3 §22-§29.

<sup>121</sup> See Gentili 1995:548, “sono descritti con evidenza quasi figurativa, accentuata dall’ andamento rapido e paratattico delle frasi, i particolari dell’ episodio.”

<sup>122</sup> See chapter 3 §65 for more on δέ at significant discursive transitions in Pindar. δέ makes up 5.4% of the words in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, while it makes up 4% of the words in the *Victory Odes*. The contrast is starker when one considers the difference between narration and direct speech in Homer (see note 102).

<sup>123</sup> See note 97 above; Gentili 1995:37 punctuates between αὐτοῦ and μένων; I follow the punctuation and colometry of Gildersleeve and Snell/Maehler.

Line 27, then, functions as the end of the narrative proper, while 28-30 are a reflection on the story's outcome. If we take the classical approach to μέν as a “preparatory” particle, we find no satisfactory explanation for its occurrence here, in the act πρίατο μέν θανάτοιο κοιμίδαν πατρός. On a semantic level there is no parallelism or contrast with the following ἐδόκησέν τε τῶν πάλαι γενεᾶ. Syntactically, the verbs πρίατο and ἐδόκησεν do resonate with each other, as both have Antilochus as their subject. Scholars have consequently argued that μέν in such occurrences is “answered” by τε instead of δέ in Pindar.<sup>124</sup> But the two acts that would here be connected through μέν – τε diverge in their discursive nature. The first (line 27) rounds off the narrative, while the second (line 28) functions as a postscript.

§45 How, then, should we construe this μέν? In the following section I argue that μέν must be taken in instances like this as a metalinguistic cue: its host act rounds off one move, while μέν marks that a new move is coming up. The particle μέν possesses this function regardless of what introduces the upcoming act, be it δέ, τε, καί or no particle at all.

### μέν in Homer and Pindar

§46 In the passages from *Pythian* 6 above (t12-t13), there are two instances of the particle μέν, all of which may offer insight into the workings of the particle. In Attic Greek prose, μέν mostly has a narrow function, that is, it marks the first part in a μέν - δέ construction.

In such contexts it may be translated “on the one hand,” or remain untranslated.

Schömann first argued that μέν developed from μῆν, and that its original force was affirmative.<sup>125</sup> This view is compatible with the argument put forward by Spitzner, and soon promoted to *communis opinio*, that μέν in Homer is simply a dialectal variant (Ionic) of μῆν

<sup>124</sup> See Bury 1892:156, Gildersleeve 1890:164, and Hummel 1993:388-389.

<sup>125</sup> Schömann 1831:176; he revisits the topic in 1862:188.



(Attic) and μάν (Doric).<sup>126</sup> Spitzner's observation led to the argument that μέν *tout court* is descended from μήν and its variants, both on a formal and on a functional level. Leumann further hypothesizes that the μέν - δέ construction preserves the Ionic variant of μάν because the construction found its way into Greek discourse through the scientific works from Ionia. At the same time, all dialects kept their own variant of μάν for all other instances, that is, where it affirms its clause.<sup>127</sup> Among these scholars, some also regard the fact that μέν is a shorter form of μήν as a sign of a bleaching or weakening of the function performed by its ancestor.<sup>128</sup>

§47 Thus the particle's origin in μήν and its more common Attic use in a μέν - δέ construction have been linked.<sup>129</sup> One thing that has been lost in this development of scholarship is the forward-looking force of μέν. If μέν is from affirmative μήν, it implies contrast with the following by strongly affirming the present clause, phrase, or constituent.<sup>130</sup> I follow the majority of scholars in assuming a formal (i.e. diachronic) relation between μέν on the one hand and μήν and μάν on the other. However, unlike the majority I think it is unclear that μέν is functionally connected to μήν and μάν by the time of Homer (i.e. synchronically), since to describe the use of μέν in Homer as "affirming" is insufficient.

§48 Before the focus on the link between μήν and μέν, scholars paid more attention to the function of μέν in the text. This led Hoogeveen to say the following: "when a speaker uses μέν, he warns the reader or hearer that he should not agree to this first part, but

<sup>126</sup> Spitzner 1832:I.2 xx-xxxi, picked up by Hartung 1833:390, expanded by Nägelsbach 1834:I.153-175; see also Bäumlein 1861:160 μέν "[versichert] einfach die Aussage und speziell den voranstehenden Begriff," Ebeling 1885:1046-1061, Wackernagel 1916:117, Denniston 1950<sup>2</sup>:359-397, Ruijgh 1971:202.

<sup>127</sup> Leumann 1949:87-88 is the first to attempt a coherent answer to the question: if μέν is indeed historically connected to μάν, why do we not find different dialectal forms of the μέν - δέ construction?

<sup>128</sup> Matthiae 1845:3, Passow 1852:175, Bäumlein 1861:159, Bakker 1997:80, Beekes 2010:930. In some cases, an analogy is proposed with the relation between δέ and δή, on which see more in §26-§29 above.

<sup>129</sup> There is a useful overview of the early literature on the topic in Mutzbauer 1864:4-9; Ruijgh 1971:202 argues that already in Homer the majority of instances of μέν is of the coordinating μέν - δέ construction.

<sup>130</sup> See Hartung 1833:402-403.

should wait for the ἀπόδοσις, which resolves the utterance.”<sup>131</sup> In other words, with μέν the speaker promises to add something after the current clause, phrase, or constituent.<sup>132</sup>

Rather than a function of the particle’s original affirmative force, I believe that the anticipatory sense is primary in μέν. The question now remains how to read μέν in Homer, since it can either be the Ionic form of Attic μήν, that is with the function of μήν, or the μέν of all dialects. In practice, this question would have to be answered per instance, but we may follow the generalization offered by Hartung that μήν is only shortened to μέν when it is used with other particles.<sup>133</sup> In my analysis of μέν in Homer and Pindar, I have found no instances of μέν on its own (i.e. except particle combinations and after οὐ) where it cannot be explained as forward-pointing.

§49 The next step is to come to a better understanding of this “anticipatory” function of μέν. The words of Hoozeveen may be linked to the idea of metalanguage: μέν does not mark the content, it is an instruction to the hearer. Discourse acts are not strung together at random, but rather stand in some kind of logical relationship to each other. As I discuss in more detail in chapter 3, different kinds of multi-act discourse units (“moves”) cohere for different reasons. The acts within a move may share a common topic, or in narrative they may share a place of action and set of characters (in what I call “contextual frames”). As a result of the coherence that acts possess in relation to each other, acts create expectations in the discourse, in a process called projection.<sup>134</sup> This phenomenon may help

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<sup>131</sup> Hoozeveen 1769:639, “qui enim primo vocabulo apponit τὸ μέν, lectorem vel auditorem monet in hoc tanquam principio ne acquiescat, sed exspectare jubet, donec sequatur ἀπόδοσις, quae orationem absolvat.”

<sup>132</sup> See also Stephens 1837:74, “μέν informs the reader that some statement is about to follow which ought to be considered in connection with that in which μέν itself occurs.”

<sup>133</sup> Hartung 1833:393, see more specifically Ruijgh 1981:274, who lists ἢ μέν, οὐ μέν, οὐδὲ μέν, καὶ μέν, and μὲν δή.

<sup>134</sup> The term projection has its origins in Conversation Analysis, beginning with Sacks and Schegloff 1974 (Schegloff offers a comprehensive definition in 1984:267), and it has been explored by Streeck 1995 and 2009, Goodwin 1996:372 (“prospective indexicals”), Auer, Couper-Kuhlen, and Müller (eds) 1999, Hopper 2004, 2008 and 2011, Günthner 2008 and 2011, Auer 2005, 2009, and 2011 (ed.).

explain the workings of μέν, the particle that appears to have specialized in cueing projection.<sup>135</sup>

§50 In his work on projection, Auer describes the pragmatic process of how one word, utterance, or conversational action projects another. In conversation, speakers are remarkably capable of predicting what is coming next, often even beyond the interlocutor's upcoming turn. This predictability is a result of experience, but more basically it depends on relevance. Any conversational action restricts the range of possible consequent actions:

(t15)

“By projection I mean the fact that an individual action or part of it projects another. In order to understand what is projected, interactants need some kind of knowledge about how actions (or action components) are typically (i.e., qua types) sequenced, i.e. how they follow each other in time.”

Auer 2005:8<sup>136</sup>

An act can project several others, and in practice these possibilities form a limited set. Beyond conversation, projection can become inherent in syntactical constructions, such as “the thing is,...”<sup>137</sup> Therefore, Auer speaks of pragmatic projection: “one act or action projects another” and syntactic projection: “one syntactical constituent projects another.” Thus, projection can work on the microlevel (syntax: a preposition projects a noun to

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<sup>135</sup> Scholars working on projection (be it pragmatic or syntactic) do not explore (to my knowledge) the possibility that certain particles can be linked directly to the process, but Auer 1992:8 (introduction to Auer and Di Luzio (eds) 1992) does say about an occurrence of *allora* in a conversation that it is to be interpreted there as a “projective particle instead of an adverb,” and this “prospective particle foreshadows the upcoming joke-telling.”

<sup>136</sup> For the cognitive relevance of the second part of this definition, see chapter 4 §46-§53 on scripts and Homeric type-scenes.

<sup>137</sup> See Günthner 2008 for such constructions in German.

follow)<sup>138</sup> and on the macrolevel (genre: the first part of a priamel projects at least one more).<sup>139</sup> Moreover, projection can be more specific (preposition projects noun) or less specific (“and” after a syntactic closure “leave[s] all options open apart from *not* continuing”).<sup>140</sup>

§51 The concept of projection can offer better understanding of μέν in its entire range of pragmatic functions in ancient Greek, including the Homeric corpus and Pindar’s *Victory Odes*. In the present section I discuss the functions of μέν in terms of projection. First, the focus is on μέν creating pragmatic projection across discourse transitions. Second comes a discussion of the ultimate pragmatic projection: μέν at the beginning of discourse units, performative units, and even whole works. Finally, I consider the μέν – δέ construction, which works differently when μέν has large scope than when it has small scope.

§52 One aspect of μέν that has suffered in particular from the scholarly focus on μήν, is its use in discourse transitions. In his list of functions of μέν – δέ constructions, the first function Hoogeveen lists is μεταβατικός (“transitional”).<sup>141</sup> In recent scholarship this has been retrieved by Bakker: rather than signaling a juxtaposition in states of affairs, μέν – δέ signals a juxtaposition of two discourse units.<sup>142</sup> As Devarius noted, μέν can have this function on its own as well, without a following δέ. Consider the beginning of book ten of the *Iliad*:

(t16)

<sup>138</sup> See Auer 2005:16, “a preposition prestructures the following slot in a highly compelling way (a noun phrase is bound to follow).”

<sup>139</sup> The audience are familiar with the genre and know “how actions (or action components) are typically (i.e., qua types) sequenced” in a *Victory Ode*.

<sup>140</sup> Auer 2005:16 [italics original].

<sup>141</sup> Hoogeveen 1769:655; see also Devarius 1588:122, who describes the first of μέν’s functions as περιγραφικός, “summarizing.” In later Greek this function is mostly taken over by the combinations μέν δή (see also IV.3) and μέν οὖν (μέν νυν in Herodotus, see IV.3): Hoogeveen 1769:672-685, Hartung 1832:263, 1833:16, 19, and 399-402, Bäumlein 1861:178-179, Denniston 1950<sup>2</sup>:258-259 and 472-473.

<sup>142</sup> Bakker 1993:302-305. In 1997 he phrases his point yet more eloquently: “μέν and δέ mark events in performance time, not in story time.” See IV.3 for the use of μέν and δέ at endings and beginnings of chapters and even books in both Herodotus and Thucydides.

καὶ τότε δὴ σπείσαντες | ἔβαν κλισίηνδε ἕκαστος, |  
 ἔνθα δὲ κοιμήσαντο | καὶ ὕπνου δῶρον ἔλοντο. |

Ἄλλοι μὲν παρὰ νηυσὶν | ἀριστῆες Παναχαιῶν |  
 εὔδον παννύχιοι | μαλακῶ δεδμημένοι ὕπνω |  
 ἄλλ' οὐκ Ἀτρεΐδην Ἀγαμέμνονα ποιμένα λαῶν |  
 ὕπνος ἔχε γλυκερὸς | πολλὰ φρεσὶν ὀρμαίνοντα. |

*Iliad* 9.712-713 and 10.1-4

And at that point, after pouring libations, each went to his tent.

There they lay down and received the gift of sleep.

The others around the ships, the best of all the Achaeans  
 slept through the night, overcome by soft sleep.

But Atreus' son Agamemnon, the shepherd of men,  
 sweet sleep did not hold, as he pondered many things in his mind.

After ending the scene in book nine with all the leaders of the Greeks returning to their tents for the night, at the beginning of book ten the focus shifts to Agamemnon. In contexts like this, Apollonius appears to take μὲν as marking a περιγραφή, a conclusion or summary.<sup>143</sup> Devarius took up this same term, calling μὲν περιφραγικός, whereas Hoogeveen speaks of μεταβατικός; I believe Hoogeveen's description is more helpful. In discourse terms, μὲν does not function so much to mark a conclusion, since that is contained within its host act, but to point ahead. In instances like (t16) μὲν pragmatically projects a new move, even as its host act rounds off the preceding one. As (t16) shows, the

<sup>143</sup> Apollonius Dyscolus, *Combiners* 251.19-26 (edition Dalimier 2001), discussed in Appendix A §74.

continuation of the discourse does not have to start with *δέ*: here *ἀλλά* introduces the new focus of discourse.

§53 Compare one further example, from the *Catalogue of Ships*:

(t17)

τῶν μὲν ἄρ' Ἰδομενεὺς δουρὶ κλυτὸς ἡγεμόνευε |  
 Μηριόνης τ' ἀτάλαντος Ἐνυαλίῳ ἀνδρειφόντῃ |  
 τοῖσι δ' ἄμ' ὀγδῶκοντα μέλαιναι νῆες ἔποντο. |  
 Τληπόλεμος δ' Ἡρακλείδης | ἥϋς τε μέγας τε |  
 ἐκ Ῥόδου ἐννέα νῆας ἄγεν | Ῥοδίων ἀγερώχων, |

*Iliad* 2.650-654

Of them, then, Idomeneus famed for his spear was leader,  
 and Meriones, peer of Enyalios, slayer of men,  
 and with them eighty black ships followed.  
 And Tlepolemus the Heraclid, strong and tall  
 from Rhodos led nine ships of noble Rhodians.

The *Catalogue* consists of a list of entries that describe a people and their leaders, one by one.<sup>144</sup> The entries are linguistically very consistent, giving first the people and the leader in the first line, then often a little narrative, then naming the leader again, and giving the number of ships that he brings. In the renaming of the leader, which starts the final element of the entry, we often find *μὲν*, as in (t17). Just like in (t16) *μὲν* in (t17) prepares the hearer for the transition to a new focus, in this case a new entry. Here *μὲν* is followed by *δέ* (line 653), but there is no syntactical symmetry between the two constructions. Rather, the *μὲν* act looks like a conclusion, with the anaphoric pronoun retrieving the

<sup>144</sup> See *Gesamtkommentar* 2003:II.2.148-150 for the language of the *Catalogue* entries.

people named in the preceding discourse, whereas the δέ act looks like a new beginning, since it introduces a new name in first position.

§54 The function of μέν, however, is not itself “summarizing,” nor does it juxtapose two list items or states of affairs.<sup>145</sup> The particle provides a metalinguistic cue for the upcoming entry even while its host act rounds off the present one: μέν projects an upcoming move.<sup>146</sup> In (t17) the information about the ships intervenes after the projection, but Auer argues that the “trajectory” of a projection may be quite long.<sup>147</sup> The audience will not have regarded the projection as resolved until the start of a new entry; they are able to mentally carry the projection over the intervening discourse.<sup>148</sup>

§55 In (t16) and (t17) μέν is not attached to one particular word in the act. That is to say, I do not take μέν as having small scope over the word preceding it. Its scope extends over the entire act, and its influence in fact reaches beyond. Consider this example from Pindar, where δέ marks the resolution of the pragmatic projection triggered by μέν:

(t18)

μάλα μὲν ἀνδρῶν δικάϊων περικαδόμενοι. | καὶ μὰν θεῶν πιστὸν γένος. |

μεταμειβόμενοι δ' ἐναλλάξ ἀμέραν | τὰν μὲν παρὰ πατρὶ φίλω

Δὶ νέμονται, |

<sup>145</sup> Compare Bakker's description of *Iliad* 8.256-58 (1997:84): “Instead of a referential or stylistic contrast, then, μέν in unit d marks a *moment at which a switch is withheld*, a moment consciously marked as something other than a new step with a new item coming into focus, and a characteristic way of guiding the listener's consciousness through the flow of speech” [emphasis original].

<sup>146</sup> Compare also the μέν in *Pythian* 6.39 (t13) which occurs in the line that rounds off the narrative, yet points ahead to the discussion of the story's relevance for the laudandus.

<sup>147</sup> Auer 2005:8, “An action (or action component) may project onto the timing slot immediately following it, and make some next activity (component) expectable in this slot. But it may also allow other things to happen ‘in-between’, before the projected unit legitimately can or should occur, and it may project more than one ‘next’ in a sequence.”

<sup>148</sup> See also Stephens 1837:74 on μέν, “[the hearer] is kept in expectation, and takes care to retain the former statement distinctly in his view, till he has heard that which he ought to consider it in connection with.”

Pindar, *Nemean* 10.54-56

...taking good care of just men. Yes, the race of gods is truly trustworthy.

And alternately changing the day, the one with their beloved father

Zeus they live...

In *Nemean* 10 Pindar tells the story of Castor and Pollux, who have here just been introduced as the stewards of the *agones* in Sparta. In line 54 this is expanded in an additional participial phrase, introduced by μέν. Now, this participial phrase rounds off the topic of Castor and Pollux as stewards of the Games. The final act of line 54 introduces a new grammatical subject and contains a gnomic thought. Then the epode ends, and at the beginning of the new strophe Castor and Pollux are retrieved as subject (μεταμειβόμενοι), but as part of a new topic: their mortal/immortal status. In this case, then, μέν serves to project a new move, yet it also projects the current discourse topic (Castor and Pollux) across a *gnōmē* and the strong performative discontinuity between the epode and a new strophe.<sup>149</sup>

§56 In early Greek poetry, the relation between a μέν act and the following discourse is decidedly loose: μέν projects pragmatically, so it does not determine how discourse continues, only that it does. This touches upon another function of the particle often addressed in earlier scholarship: its so-called “inceptive” function which in turn is inherently connected to the “asseverative” function of the particle.<sup>150</sup> Bakker links the transitional function of μέν to its inceptive use as follows: “[μέν] is often used to mark a statement that clears the ground, establishing a framework for discourse to come, and as

<sup>149</sup> See chapter 3 §73n241 for more instances of μέν used in this way by Pindar. Compare III.4 §28-§30 for μέν used by speakers in tragic and comic dialogue to “hold the floor,” that is, to extend their utterance over the upcoming line end.

<sup>150</sup> For descriptions of μέν as “inceptive” or “asseverative” see Matthiae 1845:5, Schömann 1862:188, and Denniston 1950<sup>2</sup>:382-384.



such it tends to be used at the beginning of a speech.”<sup>151</sup> Consider the following quote by Denniston about the frequent occurrence of μέν at the beginning of speeches:

(t19)

“It is difficult to resist the impression that the budding speaker, at the turn of the fifth and fourth centuries, was recommended, as a kind of stylistic convention, to start off with a μέν, and to trust more or less to luck that he would find an answer to it, and not to care greatly if he did not.”

Denniston 1950<sup>2</sup>:383.

However difficult we may find it to resist this impression, Denniston here presents as a special use of μέν something that represents a central and original function of the particle. Although any initial act may be said to naturally project by virtue of being initial (projection on a macrolevel), this use of μέν should be regarded as pragmatic projection. In practice, instances of μέν at the beginning of a new discourse rarely represent a balanced combination of a μέν and δέ act. Consider the famous beginning of *Olympian* 1:

(t20)

Ἄριστον μὲν ὕδωρ, | ὃ δὲ χρυσὸς | αἰθόμενον πῦρ  
ἅτε διαπρέπει νυκτὶ | μεγάνορος ἔξοχα πλούτου |

Pindar, *Olympian* 1.1-2

Best is water, but that gold, a blazing fire  
alike that stands out in the night, beyond lordly wealth.

The priamel to *Olympian* 1 starts with a juxtaposition of water and gold, or so it appears. The particles μέν and δέ in the second position of the first two clauses suggests that we are

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<sup>151</sup> Bakker 1997:82.

faced with a classic parallel construction, but the reality is more complex. Gildersleeve's translation nicely brings out the asymmetry in the construction: "...but there is another—gold—a blazing fire like it loometh—a night fire far above all proud wealth."<sup>152</sup> Rather than just an article, ὁ in Pindar is "still largely deictic";<sup>153</sup> because of that and for metrical reasons Gildersleeve translates ὁ δέ as a separate step ("but there is another"), a separate act in my terms. The first act with μέν grounds the song and performance, upon which the next act starting with δέ builds. Then follows another foil before the priamel's climax is reached in line 7. μέν thus marks a discursive beginning, not one half of a syntactically or propositionally symmetrical construction. The fact that μέν so often occurs at the beginning of strophes, antistrophes, epodes, and songs is an extension of this same function.<sup>154</sup>

§57 Until this point, I have focussed on the function of μέν on its own, with large scope, projecting the progression of discourse. We must also consider the construction μέν – δέ, however, which occurs from the earliest Greek literature onward. Since the most basic cue for discursive progress in Homer is δέ,<sup>155</sup> it comes as no surprise that at some stage the frequent act projection of μέν and act introduction of δέ led to a grammaticalization of the μέν – δέ construction.<sup>156</sup> In this construction, μέν does not project "a continuation of discourse" but it grammatically projects "a δέ act."<sup>157</sup> The following two examples from

<sup>152</sup> Gildersleeve 1885:129.

<sup>153</sup> See chapter 5 §25 for more on the demonstrative pronoun and the article in Pindar.

<sup>154</sup> μέν in peninitial position of a new strophe: *Olympian* 10.64, *Pythian* 3.47, 4.93, 4.116, 4.139, 5.94, *Nemean* 7.85; antistrophe: *Olympian* 2.48, *Pythian* 3.8, 3.77, *Nemean* 1.62, 11.6, *Isthmian* 4.7, 4.61; epode: *Olympian* 7.32, *Pythian* 2.65, 4.86, *Isthmian* 1.30; and song: (t21), *Olympian* 9, *Pythian* 4, and *Isthmian* 2. This makes up 22 out of a total of 182 instances of μέν in the *Odes*.

<sup>155</sup> See above §31-§36, IV.2 §14-§46, and Bonifazi [forthcoming].

<sup>156</sup> Auer 2005:28, "the same linguistic element can either constitute an independent action to be dealt with and responded to, or be a grammatical element of a syntactic construction. There is reason to believe that the second is a grammaticalized version of the first. Vocatives (such as address terms, see. Auer 1997 for details) are a case in point." Auer expands on the different uses of the vocative on pages 31-32.

<sup>157</sup> See Ford, Fox, and Thompson 2002:20: "certain recurrent kinds of interactional activities precipitate certain recurrent kinds of grammar, and (...) important cues to an understanding of what grammar is can be found in considering how grammar works in everyday social interactions"; see also Hopper and Traugott 2003.

Pindar illustrate the difference between μέν on its own marking pragmatic projection, and μέν in a μέν – δέ construction:

(t21)

πολλὰ μέν ἄρτιεπής  
 γλῶσσά μοι τοξεύματ' ἔχει | περὶ κείνων  
 κελαδέσαι· | καὶ νῦν

Pindar, *Isthmian* 5.46-48

Many arrows does my fluent  
 tongue have, about them  
 to celebrate; and now

In a typically Pindaric transition, the *Isthmian* ode proceeds from the manifold possible topics to the one the composer wants to focus on.<sup>158</sup> μέν creates a ground, yet points ahead,<sup>159</sup> and is followed by καὶ νῦν, which pins down what Pindar will in fact focus on (νῦν).<sup>160</sup> Some view the relation between the μέν act and what follows as that of general to particular, or of secondary to primary.<sup>161</sup> However, in practice this is often clearly not the case, and moreover when it does occur, it may quite simply reflect the presentation of discourse in order of increasing relevance or importance, more than it does any particular function of the μέν – δέ construction.

<sup>158</sup> See also Patten's note (2009:201) on πολλὰ μέν in *Isthmian* 5.46: "...it plays the same role [as πολλὰ μοι in *Olympian* 2] within the conventional rhetoric of the ode: it prepares the listener for the reduction of the theoretically possible diversity of topics (πολλὰ μέν) to the one topic that the singer intends to choose..."

<sup>159</sup> Especially in this context consider how Cooper 2002:2655 aptly describes the function of μέν: "μέν stops the movement and develops a need for and expectation of reinstituted movement."

<sup>160</sup> See IV.2 §102-§105 for the generally climactic or pinning-down function of καί; on καὶ νῦν/καὶ νῦν in Pindar, see Privitera 1982:198, Felson 1999:8: "καὶ νῦν, (...) and νῦν δέ (...) regularly function as 'shifters' from mythic time to the epinician here and now," see also Felson 2004:374n21 and 378 with n29.

<sup>161</sup> This is frequently noted as typical of μέν and δέ constructions, e.g. Devarius 1588:123: "*Interdum enim universale aliquod proponentes sub μέν particula, postea sub δέ, strictius aliquod subicimus,*" Bäumlein 1861:168-169, and Kühlewein 1870:21.

§58 With an apparently similar turn of phrase, Pindar rounds off one of his *Pythian* odes:

(t22)

πολλὰ μὲν κεῖνοι δίκον  
 φύλλ' ἔπι | καὶ στεφάνους· |  
 πολλὰ δὲ πρόσθεν πτερὰ δέξατο νικᾶν. |

Pindar, *Pythian* 9.123-125

Many did they shower  
 leaves on him and wreaths;  
 and before, many wings of victory did he receive.

Here full symmetry is achieved through the verbal resonance of πολλὰ μὲν - πολλὰ δέ, and this parallellism may have been marked prosodically, as happens with juxtapositions in spoken English.<sup>162</sup> Rather than read (t21) as an instance where the δέ component of the juxtaposition is “omitted,” one might say conversely that Pindar creates a beautiful symmetry in (t22) by adding a parallel δέ act. In this construction, one can also see how both μὲν and δέ have small scope, to emphasize the symmetry. The particle μὲν lends itself to this kind of construction, but the occurrence of μὲν does not – or at least not in archaic and early classical Greek – entail the construction in every instance.<sup>163</sup>

§59 In its use with small scope, which may have been rendered prosodically, μὲν has another pragmatic function. As in the μὲν – δέ construction, small scope μὲν can project something very specific, dependent on the word preceding the particle; one can think for

<sup>162</sup> Compare the instance in *Pythian* 6.23 (t12) where the μὲν act is also part of a closed juxtaposition. About the so-called “list intonation,” see, for example, Liberman and Pierrehumbert 1984, Selkirk 1984 (English), and Truckenbrodt 2004 (southern German); see also IV.3 for list-intonation in Italian.

<sup>163</sup> This was the belief of Hoogeveen 1796:660-672, Thiersch 1826:571-576, and Bury 1892:Appendix A; consider also the comment of the scholiast to μὲν in *Iliad* 4.301: ποῦ ὁ δέ; (“Where is the δέ?”).

example of ἄλλοτε μὲν (which projects ἄλλοτε δέ).<sup>164</sup> A special use of this small-scope μὲν is with personal pronouns in the nominative, as in the following example from the *Iliad*.

Personified Sleep reminds Hera of a time that Hera had commanded Sleep to distract Zeus:

(t23)

ἦτοι | ἐγὼ μὲν ἔλεξα Διὸς νόον αἰγιόχοιο |  
νήδυμος ἀμφιχυθείς | σὺ δέ οἱ κακὰ μήσαο θυμῷ |  
ὄρσας' ἀργαλέων ἀνέμων ἐπὶ πόντον ἀήτας, |

*Iliad* 14.252-254

Yes, I put the the aegis-bearing Zeus to sleep,  
sweet me shed about him, and YOU contrived evil for him in your mind  
stirring up blasts of cruel winds on the sea,

Examples like this are rare in Homer, but in this instance there appears to be a close relation between ἐγὼ μὲν and σὺ δέ. That is to say, uttering ἐγὼ μὲν, when the particle has small scope, limits the possibilities of the following to a variation on σὺ δέ, ὑμεῖς δέ, or ὁ δέ.<sup>165</sup> This projection can even reach across utterances, see this example from Aeschylus:

(t24)

Χ. τοῦργον εἰργάσθαι δοκεῖ μοι βασιλέως οἰμώγμασιν·  
ἀλλὰ κοινωσώμεθ' ἦν πως ἀσφαλῆ βουλευμάτων ἦι.  
— ἐγὼ μὲν ὑμῖν τὴν ἐμὴν γνώμην λέγω,  
πρὸς δῶμα δεῦρ' ἀστοῖσι κηρύσσειν βοήν.  
— ἐμοὶ δ' ὅπως τάχιστα γ' ἐμπεσεῖν δοκεῖ  
καὶ πρᾶγμ' ἐλέγχειν σὺν νεορρύτῳ ξίφει.

<sup>164</sup> *Iliad* 18.472, 21.464, 23.368, 24.530; *Odyssey* 4.102, 5.331, 11.303, 16.209, 23.94.

<sup>165</sup> The parallels of ἐγὼ μὲν are *Iliad* 22.123; *Odyssey* 11.82, 15.515, 17.593, 22.367.

Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 1346-1351

Chorus: The deed is done, it seems to me by the king's cries.

Now let us deliberate if perchance there is a safe course of action.

— I tell you what I think:

to proclaim a call to the citizens to return to the palace.

— It seems to ME that we should barge in as soon as possible,  
and prove the fact with a newly-blooded sword.

The chorus hear Agamemnon's cries as he is attacked, and consider what to do. The deliberations proceed chorus member by chorus member (each speaker marked by —), each sharing his thoughts. The first chorus member in the excerpt starts his utterance with ἐγὼ μὲν, which implicitly juxtaposes his opinion to the others to follow.<sup>166</sup> Two lines later, a second speaker starts with ἐμοὶ δέ, reacting to the first speaker and continuing the discussion of possible courses of action that runs on until line 1371. That is to say, μὲν serves to project an act or in this case utterance that is in a significant way parallel to the present act: it has small scope, which limits the possibilities of what follows. The projection is fulfilled with δέ in the following utterance.<sup>167</sup>

§60 If μὲν can thus project a δέ act across speakers, it follows that μὲν can be used to exploit this function even when the projection is never fulfilled.<sup>168</sup> In (t25) μὲν projects a specific act, which remains unspoken:

(t25)

Ath. οὐκ οὖν γέλως ἡδιστος εἰς ἐχθροὺς γελαῖν;

Od. ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀρκεῖ τοῦτον ἐν δόμοις μένειν.

<sup>166</sup> See Chafe 1994:77 on the influence of the factor of contrastiveness on pronoun selection in English; see also chapter 5 §41-§43 for the use of ὅ γε to mark contrastiveness.

<sup>167</sup> See III.4 §37-§38 on the rarity of turn-initial δέ in responses of one speaker to another.

<sup>168</sup> See for the possible effects of unfulfilled projection Auer 2005:25-27.

Ath. μεμηνότ' ἄνδρα περιφανῶς ὀκνεῖς ἰδεῖν;

Od. φρονοῦντα γάρ νιν οὐκ ἄν ἐξέστην ὀκνῶ.

Sophocles, *Ajax* 79-82

Ath. Is it not the sweetest laughter to laugh at enemies?

Od. Well, it suffices for ME if he stays in the house.

Ath. Do you shrink from seeing a man who is clearly mad?

Od. If he had been sane I would not have avoided him in fear!

Athena tries to convince Odysseus to gloat over the downfall of Ajax, but Odysseus is hesitant, and uses ἐμοὶ μὲν to disalign himself with Athena: “it suffices for ME if he stays in the house. [But you do not seem to agree.]” Quite specifically, in instances like (t25) μὲν locates the referent over which it has scope (ἐμοί) with respect to other available (textually explicit or implicit) referents.<sup>169</sup> This use of μὲν is especially frequent in drama.<sup>170</sup>

§61 Small-scope μὲν following a pronoun or name can thus create a contrast by projecting a viewpoint that differs at least in part from the one held by the first referent. As I explore in a later chapter, γε after names or pronouns can have the same pragmatic effect of creating contrast, but for a different reason. Whereas μὲν creates contrast through projection of another referent (who is often later expressed), γε creates it through emphasis on the current referent.<sup>171</sup> Consider the different interpretation of (t24) if the answer had started with ἔγωγε.<sup>172</sup>

<sup>169</sup> The pragmatic force of such answers beginning with μὲν approaches that of “well” in question – answer sequences. Lakoff 1973:463 describes its use in answers when the speaker “senses some sort of insufficiency in his answer, whether *because he is leaving it to the questioner to fill in information on his own or because he is about to give additional information himself*” [my italics]. Schiffrin 1987:126-127 offers a slightly different analysis of this function of “well,” she explains it as marking how the upcoming statement will not directly answer the *expectations* of the interlocutor; this latter approach is endorsed by Blakemore 2002:133.

<sup>170</sup> See Denniston 1950<sup>2</sup>:380-382 for parallels.

<sup>171</sup> See chapter 5 §27-§50 on ὅ γε in Homer.

<sup>172</sup> Consider for example Sophocles, *Women of Trachis* 232-234 Δη. ὦ φίλτατ' ἀνδρῶν, πρῶθ' ἂ πρῶτα βούλομαι / δίδαξον, εἰ ζῶνθ' Ἡρακλῆ προσδέξομαι. / Λι. ἔγωγέ τοί σφ' ἔλειπον ἰσχύοντά τε, (“Deianeira: Most beloved / teach me, if while living I may receive Heracles. / Li. I have left you when you were still strong.”)

§62 The projecting function of μέν can account for a range of pragmatic functions that it has in Homer, Pindar, and beyond. First, the particle serves as metalanguage to guide hearer through the discourse, often foreshadowing transitions to new moves within the discourse. In this function, its scope extends over its entire host act, and there is no particular relation between μέν and the word that precedes it. Second, μέν can have scope over the preceding word, with a range of possible effects. In Homer and Pindar not every μέν entails a δέ: when μέν has large scope, the projection can be fulfilled with any particle that can continue the discourse, or no particle at all. If μέν has small scope, it most typically forms part of a μέν – δέ construction, which in later literature covers the majority of μέν instances.

### Priming acts

§63 Projection is omnipresent in ancient Greek discourse, reaching far beyond the specialized lexical item μέν. It manifests itself in syntactic constructions, semantic interlinking, and discourse articulation. In contemporary texts, an indentation creates certain expectations in the reader about the relation between the upcoming discourse and the preceding discourse (some kind of discontinuity) and about the nature of the upcoming discourse (in some way coherent). In spoken discourse other tools are available to obtain similar effects, first and foremost utterance- and sentence-initial discourse markers, which are generally intonationally independent from what follows (such as “First, I would like to welcome you all” or “Sadly, Sarah could not make it”).<sup>173</sup> This section focuses on short acts in epic and lyric that share important characteristics with such discourse markers, especially their syntactic and presumably prosodic independence, which creates a projecting effect over the following discourse. The acts under examination are those

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of men, first tell me what I want <to know> first: / if I will receive Heracles alive. / Lichas: Let me tell you, I left him in strength...” where γε limits the applicability of the statement to the “I,” but no other referents are projected. See also III.4 §58-§60 on γε in turn-initial position tragic and comic dialogue.

<sup>173</sup> For sentence adverbials in English see e.g. Swan 1988; Schiffrin 1987:228-266 discusses the discourse marking function of temporal adverbs like “now” and “then.”



consisting of nothing more than a (pro)noun and a particle, which reflect *ad hoc* cognitive processing while projecting the referent's relevance for the upcoming discourse. I propose to call such phenomena priming acts.<sup>174</sup> In the section on Homeric discourse the focus is on the narrative function of these priming acts, while the section on Pindaric song considers the performative effect of priming acts involving a second-person pronoun.

### Priming acts in Homeric narrative

§64 To illustrate the nature of priming acts, consider again Bakker's reading of *Iliad* 7.313-314 (see t5), repeated here. Each line represents, in Bakker's terms, one chunk or intonation unit, forward slash (/) marks hexameter end:

(t26)

οἱ δ' ὅτε δὴ

κλισίῃσιν ἐν Ἀτρεΐδῃσιν γέγοντο, /

τοῖσι δὲ βοῦν ἰέρευσεν

ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγαμέμνων /

*Iliad* 7.313-314, as given in Bakker 1997:97

The boundary marker δὴ is, without further explanation, put here in fourth position of an intonation unit.<sup>175</sup> In performance, it is not inconceivable that οἱ δ' ὅτε δὴ was performed as part of one intonation unit.<sup>176</sup> Cognitively, however, the first intonation unit in (t26) contains two acts, or rather one act and the beginning of a second, which concludes with the second chunk in Bakker's division. Consider this alternative presentation of line 313:

<sup>174</sup> I build on Emmott 1997:123, who uses "priming" to describe the activation of a contextual frame.

<sup>175</sup> δὴ in Homer as a rule has the second position in clause or subclause, and can only be moved by another first- or second-position word. The clear exceptions to this rule are the instances of δὴ τότε and δὴ γάρ, where δὴ is in first position. A possible counterexample is *Iliad* 7.359 εἰ δ' ἐτεὸν δὴ, but the scholia already regarded it as a problematic passage, probably because of the position of δὴ, and Aristarchus did not in fact read the δέ. More on the different aspects of δὴ in chapter 3 §53-§64.

<sup>176</sup> See the discussion of the example in §26 above.

(t27)

οἱ δ' | ὅτε δὴ κλισίῃσιν ἐν Ἀτρεΐδῃ γέγοντο, |  
 τοῖσι δὲ βοῦν ἱέρευσεν | ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγαμέμνων

*Iliad* 7.313-314

And when they came to the huts of the son of Atreus,  
 then did the lord of men, Agamemnon, slay a bull

Translation Murray

When we read these two lines as four acts – with the nominative ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγαμέμνων taken as a separate act expanding the subject contained within ἱέρευσεν – οἱ δ' turns out to be a subject without a verb, a phenomenon generally called a pendant nominative.<sup>177</sup>

Translations, like Murray's above, solve this problem by taking the pronoun as the subject of the following act (a subclause). As a result, the independence of the pronoun is lost in the translation, obscuring the emergent discourse articulation.<sup>178</sup> Consider my alternative translation:

(t28)

And they, when they came to the tents of Atreus' son,  
 for them he sacrificed a bull, Agamemnon lord of men.

<sup>177</sup> See for example Chantraine 1953. Ruijgh 1990 and De Jong in her 2012 commentary on *Iliad* 22, use this term with little elaboration. When the noun or pronoun at the head of the sentence is not a nominative but in another case, the grammars speak of prolepsis. Bertrand 2010 applies a pragmatic model to word order in Homer, and regards these constructions as “undetermined” (page 322, “indeterminée”).

<sup>178</sup> Murray's reading, tacitly accepted by many, may be based on the assumption that for some reason ὅτε δὴ as a unit is transposed until after the pronoun, some sort of anastrophe, to avoid the metrically intractable \*ὅθ' οἱ δὴ or equivalent. However, this reasoning is insufficient. After all, there are adequate metrical equivalents for this construction, especially ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ and καὶ ῥ' ὅτε. Thus, if indeed this construction is some transposition of ὅτε, the reason is most likely not metrical. Rather, it appears that the desire to use the nominative pronoun, which is syntactically optional, demands this construction rather than another.

Syntactically, the isolation of οἱ δ' is troubling, which is probably why instances such as this one are generally read as Murray does, without further discussion.

§65 Fränkel had already noted the existence of such short initial *kôla* containing particles like μέν, δέ, τε, and others in second position.<sup>179</sup> He notes that when a constituent is brought to the front of the sentence, it receives strong emphasis:

(t29)

“Ein starkes Pointieren einzelner Satzglieder wird auch da hervorgerufen, wo (...) ein Glied in auffälliger Weise an die Spitze des Satzes gerückt und so bis zu einem gewissen Grade isoliert wird.”<sup>180</sup>

Fränkel 1933:336

As Fränkel has seen, the act containing the pronoun + particle is a normal and productive rather than anacolouthic construction.<sup>181</sup> Classicists have more recently described the phenomenon in Greek as a sign of “oral syntax,”<sup>182</sup> a characterization that, like earlier views, marks this kind of construction as divergent from a supposed standard syntax.

§66 At certain points in narratives, but also in other kinds of discourse, we find such short discourse acts, comprising a (pro)noun and often a particle, set apart from their main verb by a participle, adverbial phrase, or temporal subclause, or even lacking a main verb, as in (t28). These acts make sense if we consider their possible function not at the level of

<sup>179</sup> Though sometimes discourse-final; see Fränkel 1933:337, where he gives a few examples of summarizing *kôla*.

<sup>180</sup> “A strong emphasis on individual constituents is also accomplished there, where (...) a constituent is conspicuously put at the head of the sentence, and is thus isolated up to a point.”

<sup>181</sup> Compare οἱ δ' followed by a participle in *Iliad* 6.510-511 ὁ δ' ἀγλαΐῃφι πεποιθώς / ῥίμφα ἐ γούνα φέρει, Slings 1992:100 says about such constructions: “[f]rom a point of view of oral communication, if this analysis is correct, the sentence is completely well-formed.”

<sup>182</sup> De Jong 2012:122 ad *Iliad* 22.248-249: “... a pendant nominative (or frame) (...) This is a fairly common phenomenon in the Homeric epics, a clear manifestation of their oral syntax”; Hajnal 2004:243-244 calls the construction of verse-final αὐτὰρ Ἀθήνη in *Odyssey* 6.2 a “Spur mündlicher Syntax,” (“a trace of oral syntax”); see also Slings 1992, referred to above.

the sentence, but of the larger discourse. From that perspective *Iliad* 7.313, for example, reveals itself as a narrative transition. In fact, Murray indents the line, which suggests that he interprets it as the start of a new scene or episode. At the beginning of this new scene, its main characters are activated and primed first of all, with the pronoun, before moving on to a new action: the priming act aids the redirection of the audience's attention.

§67 In contemporary linguistic studies scholars have observed a similar phenomenon in spoken language, generally called left dislocation.<sup>183</sup> More specifically relevant is Ochs Keenan and Schieffelin's discussion of a phenomenon that they call referent + proposition.<sup>184</sup> In these constructions, the subject of a proposition is presented as a separate intonation unit, followed by a proposition with the subject repeated (or changed). Consider the following typical example:

(t30)

"My sister, she and her boyfriend just broke up..."

Ochs Keenan and Schieffelin 1976:243 (adapted)

As οἱ δέ in (t28), the noun phrase "My sister" stands on its own: it does not form part of a clause finished at a later point. Chafe discusses the same kind of construction, but he calls the initial unit an "isolated referent." In his analysis of oral narratives he comes to the

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<sup>183</sup> Established by Van Riemsdijk and Zwarts 1974 (re-published in 1997), see also Ochs Keenan and Schieffelin 1976, Geluykens 1992, Pekarek Doehler 2011. Ochs Keenan and Schieffelin 1976:240-241 already eschewed the term "left-dislocation, and more recently Pekarek Doehler 2011:50 has added that she finds "such a view (..) both pragmatically and cognitively implausible."

The verse-final αὐτὰρ+(pro)noun construction (see t32) is another good illustration of the problem of the term left-dislocation. Because of its position at verse end, it is in the right periphery of the performative unit, i.e. the hexameter verse, and probably in some way independent from the rest of the line. Syntactically it may be in the left periphery of its sentence, but most importantly, it is both performatively and syntactically independent. A more promising approach is to regard the act not at the level of the sentence, but at the level of discourse. From that angle, the act is neither left nor right of anything, and least of all is it dislocated in any way. Rather, it is exactly where it should be to provide a cognitive reorientation.

<sup>184</sup> See also Berrendonner 1990:29 on "syntagme nominal + proposition": the referent "nomme ou met en mémoire un objet de connaissance que Z [sc. the proposition] présuppose ensuite comme thème."

conclusion that “[i]t is not unusual for an intonation unit to verbalize little or nothing more than a referent.”<sup>185</sup> Left-dislocated elements in contemporary discourse are typically associated with topic status: the terms found in the left periphery of the sentence often reflect what a significant part of the upcoming discourse is about.<sup>186</sup>

§68 Since Greek is a Pro-Drop language, the addition of any nominative to a main verb is, strictly speaking, unnecessary. This brings us to examples like the following passage, where the referent in the priming act takes the form of a name, and the main clause has a coreferential verb:

(t31)

Τηλέμαχος δ', | ὅθι οἱ θάλαμος περικαλλέος αὐλῆς  
 ὑψηλὸς δέδμητο | περισκέπτῳ ἐνὶ χώρῳ |  
 ἔνθ' ἔβη εἰς εὐνὴν | πολλὰ φρεσὶ μερμηρίζων |

*Odyssey* 1.425-427

And Telemachus, where for him the bedroom of the magnificent house  
 was built up high, in a place with a view,  
 there he went to his bed, pondering many things in his mind.

In this example the name in the priming act (Τηλέμαχος) cannot be constructed with the verb in the immediately following act (δέδμητο), since it is not coreferential: it supports the validity of likewise regarding οἱ δέ as independent in (t28).<sup>187</sup> Here, Telemachus is singled

<sup>185</sup> Chafe 1994:67, and on page 68: “[t]ypically, such *isolated referents* (expressed as so-called free NPs) are subsequently included as participants in events and states. But intonation units like these show that it is quite possible for speakers to focus on a referent alone” [italics original].

<sup>186</sup> I understand “topic” in the sense of discourse topic, as described by Brown and Yule 1983:71; see also Chafe 2001:673-674.

<sup>187</sup> Consider also *Odyssey* 13.81-88 ἡ δ' | ὥς τ' ἐν πεδίῳ τετράοροι ἄρσενες ἵπποι (...) ὥς ἡ ῥίμφα θεούσα θαλάσσης κύματ' ἔταμνεν. Here after the loading of the ship and two lines about Odysseus falling asleep, the attention is directed back to the ship, captured in nothing more than a feminine pronoun. After the pronoun starts a simile, which introduces a new subject, so in this construction too (there are 9 parallels in Homer:

out of a larger group and remains the main referent in the last lines of book one of the *Odyssey*. Despite the slight variations in form, in all incarnations the priming act reflects a cognitive process: the reorientation of the mind's eye. From a discourse perspective, these priming acts typically occur at narrative transitions, redirecting joint attention to a character that has been out of focus for a time. When a referent is retrieved in a priming act, it creates an expectation of (i.e. projects) an upcoming action done by (or to, if the (pro)noun is in an oblique case)<sup>188</sup> the character.

§69 In a long and complex narrative, neither the audience nor the performer can keep track of every detail or character in the imagined world. Rather, a traditional storyworld is a construction based on the discourse as well as the whole body of knowledge and assumptions about that world shared by audience and performer.<sup>189</sup> A great deal of cognitive processing is involved in keeping track of who is where doing what at any relevant point in the narrative. For this complex task the mind is well equipped, and Emmott has studied this cognitive process for readers of English literature. She speaks of “contextual frames,” a concept that regards people and places in a narrative as interconnected in networks.

§70 Emmott describes how characters are bound to certain places in the storyworld unless we are cued to change our knowledge of their location. The storyworld is only theoretically a whole world: in practice it is a string of discrete spaces containing certain

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*Iliad* 4.433, 11.67, 12.167, 13.62, 15.271, 15.323, 15.381, 16.428; *Odyssey* 22.302) the pronoun is clearly independent. For the function of τε in similes see chapter 4 §31-§37.

<sup>188</sup> Note that when the pronoun in the priming act is in the nominative a following complementary construction is optional (pragmatic projection) whereas if the pronoun is in an oblique case, it is always integrated into a construction (syntactic projection).

<sup>189</sup> I borrow the concept of a storyworld, or the mental representation of the implied (and not always explicitly discussed) world where a narrative takes place, from Herman 2002. For the storyworld as a mental representation of the narrative, see chapter 4 §5-§10.

characters and thus not others.<sup>190</sup> “Thus a narrative has *regions*, filled by *landmarks* (=reference objects) through which a *path* is established.”<sup>191</sup> Just as one word or construction will activate a whole semantic frame, the mention of one referent will make the entire contextual frame accessible. Thus a priming act can accomplish more than just re-orient the performer’s and audience’s attention on a specific character. The reference to a character activates the entire contextual frame to which the character is bound.<sup>192</sup> That is to say, the priming act has a potential double relevance: it is quite likely that it had a performative relevance in allowing the audience to follow the complex narrative of long epics, but it is also quite possible that the language accommodates the cognitive processing of the Homeric performer as he produces his instantiation of, for example, the story of how Telemachus reaches the decision to stand up to the suitors, in the first book of the *Odyssey* (t31). They might be signs of the performer navigating his memory by navigating the storyworld, moving from place to place and focusing on different characters as they become relevant.<sup>193</sup>

§71 In the ongoing narrative, priming acts may also serve to prime a character that has been covertly present in the ongoing contextual frame.<sup>194</sup> This is what happens in example

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<sup>190</sup> Some places are of a specific “nature,” such as Olympus, which has an effect on its contextual frame (some characters are naturally assumed to be there unless we know otherwise, while other characters are by nature excluded from the space).

<sup>191</sup> Landau and Jackendoff 1993:223; compare Chafe 1979:179: “Rather than think of an experience as being stored in memory in terms of distinct episodes, it seems preferable to think of a more complex storage in terms of coherent spaces, coherent temporal continuities, coherent configurations of characters, coherent event sequences, and coherent worlds.”

<sup>192</sup> This is what Emmott 1997:123 calls “priming.” Sometimes this priming of an entire new scene is encoded in the rest of the verse, as for example in *Iliad* 6.237: “Ἐκτωρ δ’ | ὡς Σκαϊάς τε πύλας καὶ φηγὸν ἵκανε / ἀμφ’ ἄρα μιν, and 6.323: Ἀργεῖν δ’ Ἑλένη | μετ’ ἄρα δμῶσσι γυναιξίν / ἦστο.

<sup>193</sup> See Schank and Abelson 1977:19: “If we ask a man ‘Who was your girlfriend in 1968?’ and ask him to report his strategy for the answer, his reply is roughly: ‘First I thought about where I was and what I was doing in 1968. Then I remembered who I used to go out with then.’ (...) Lists of ‘past girlfriends’ do not exist in memory. Such a list must be constructed. The process by which that list is constructed is a search through episodes *organized around times and locations in memory*” [my italics]. For Schank and Abelson’s work on “scripts” see chapter 4 §46-§47.

<sup>194</sup> See Emmott 1997:122-126 for overt and covert characters in contextual frames.

(t32): after a long speech by Telemachus, at which Odysseus and the suitors are present, Odysseus is set apart from the others (πάντες) and primed as the character whom we will be following in the upcoming stretch of narrative.<sup>195</sup>

(t32)

ὥς ἔφαθ', | οἱ δ' ἄρα πάντες ἐπήνεον. | αὐτὰρ Ὀδυσσεύς |  
ζώσατο μὲν ῥάκεσιν περὶ μήδεα, | φαῖνε δὲ μηρούς

*Odyssey* 18.66-67

Thus he [sc. Telemachus] spoke, and they all approved. And Odysseus,  
he girded rags around his loins, and he showed his thighs

Here the act αὐτὰρ Ὀδυσσεύς is divided from what follows verse end, as well as the boundary marker μὲν in the following line.<sup>196</sup> Denniston says the following about such constructions:

(t33)

“Normally μὲν and δέ stand second in their respective clauses, and everything between the last stop and the word preceding μὲν applies to the whole μὲν...δέ complex. (Strictly speaking, one should say, not ‘clause’ but ‘word-group’, which does not necessarily coincide with punctuation.)”

Denniston 1950<sup>2</sup>:371

This clearly holds for (t32), where αὐτὰρ Ὀδυσσεύς provides the “subject” of both the μὲν and the following δέ clause. However, Denniston fails to address the question of why this

<sup>195</sup> This reading is supported by Bonifazi’s recent work on the particle αὐτάρ; see Bonifazi 2012:218-243. On page 222 she speaks of “the visual and presentational function of αὐτάρ.”

<sup>196</sup> See Kahane 1994:114-119 on the name Odysseus in verse-final position; Clark 1997:107-158 (especially 140-142) calls such line endings that open new narrative units “bucolic anticipations.”



construction occurs, nor does he allow for the fact that the act preceding the μέν - δέ construction may project beyond it (i.e. “apply” to more than “the whole μέν...δέ complex”).<sup>197</sup> The priming act αὐτὰρ Ὀδυσσεύς redirects the performer’s and audience’s focus, and projects the character’s relevance for the upcoming discourse.<sup>198</sup> It may not be a coincidence that this kind of short act, which occurs in a myriad of contexts, has been incorporated in the quasi-fixed constructions of the form X δ’ | ὅτε δή, X δ’ | ἐπεὶ οὖν (and 3x τ’ ἐπεὶ οὖν), and X δ’ | ὥς οὖν.<sup>199</sup> The beginnings of new scenes typically require extra attention to be placed on particular referents. In such contexts, priming acts have become part of the verse that concerns itself with framing the upcoming scene.

### Priming acts in Pindar: looking at “you”

§72 Narrative priming acts are especially suited to the performance situation of the Homeric epics, but they can be found even in Pindar’s songs.<sup>200</sup> Examples of the kind described above are few, however, and the units are syntactically fully integrated, as opposed to many instances in Homer. The following passage may function as an exemplar of the narrative priming act in Pindar:

(t34)

βασιλεὺς δ’ | ἐπεὶ

<sup>197</sup> Moreover, the act preceding a μέν - δέ construction can take many forms, and it can be only a particle. See IV.2 §108-§111 for the construction καὶ | X μέν.

<sup>198</sup> Here again the terminology of projection is informative, as Streeck and Jordan 2009:95 define “pre’s” as “the small behavioral units that precede larger behavioral units or adjustments.”

<sup>199</sup> See De Kreij [forthcoming]; the instances of these constructions are: (X δ’ ὅτε δή) *Iliad* 1.432, 3.15, 4.446, 5.14, 5.630, 5.850, 6.121, 7.313, 8.60, 9.669, 10.180, 10.526, 11.232, 11.618, 13.240, 13.604, 14.326, 16.462, 18.67, 18.520, 20.29, 20.176, 21.148, 22.248, 23.38; *Odyssey* 1.126, 1.332, 2.314, 6.85, 7.3, 16.324, 18.208, 18.217, 19.532, 21.42, 21.63, 24.362; (X δ’ ὥς οὖν) *Iliad* 3.21, 3.30, 3.154, 5.95, 5.711, 7.17, 8.251, 11.248, 11.575, 11.581, 14.440, 16.419, 17.198, 18.222, 18.530, 21.49, 21.418; *Odyssey* 3.34, 8.272, 15.59, 17.492, 22.407, 24.232, 24.391; (X δ’ ἐπεὶ οὖν) *Iliad* 1.57, 2.661, 3.340, 4.382, 5.573, 10.272, 11.642, 13.1, 16.394, 18.333, 22.475, 23.813, 24.329, 24.587; *Odyssey* 4.49, 8.372, 8.454, 16.478, 17.88, 19.213, 19.251, 21.57, 21.273, 23.300, 24.384, 24.489.

<sup>200</sup> The occurrence of the priming act outside epic may suggest that the construction was simply entrenched in language, quite independently of epic. In any case, the priming act serves an important function in accommodating the cognitive processing of performer and audience.

πετραέσσας ἐλαύνων ἵκετ' ἐκ Πυθῶνος | ἅπαντας ἐν οἴκῳ  
 εἶρετο παῖδα | τὸν Εὐάδνα τέκοι |  
 (...)   
 ὥς ἄρα μάνυε. | τοὶ δ' | οὐτ' ὦν ἀκοῦσαι |  
 οὐτ' ἰδεῖν εὐχοντο...

Pindar, *Olympian* 6.47-49 and 52-53

And the king, when  
 he came driving out of rocky Pytho, everyone in the house  
 he asked <about> the child, whom Euadne bore,  
 (...)   
 Thus he prophesied. And they, neither having heard,  
 nor having seen it they swore...

In this passage in *Olympian* 6, where king Aipytus returns from Pytho to search for Iamos, the offspring of Euadne and Apollo, the priming act | βασιλεὺς δέ | effects a transition back to the king, who is subject and protagonist for the next five lines. The isolated | τοὶ δ' | in line 52 effects another transition, this time to the king's listeners, who had been passive bystanders until then.<sup>201</sup> In both cases the nominatives fit neatly into the syntactic structure, but as in the Homeric examples their function is not to be sought on a syntactic

<sup>201</sup> The other instances of priming acts in narratives are: *Olympian* 6.39: ἅ δὲ | φοινικόκροκον ζώναν καταθηκάμενα; *Olympian* 8.67: ὃς | τύχα μὲν; *Olympian* 10.42: ὁ δ' ἄρ' | ἐν Πίσῃ ἔλσαις; *Pythian* 4.111: τοὶ μ' | ἐπεὶ; *Pythian* 9.18: ἅ μὲν | οὐθ' ἰστῶν; *Pythian* 9.111: πατήρ δὲ | θυγατρὶ φυτεύων; *Nemean* 1.43: ὁ δ' | ὀρθὸν μὲν ἄντεινεν κάρᾳ; *Nemean* 5.25: αἱ δὲ | πρῶτιστον μὲν; *Isthmian* 6.41: ὁ δ' | ἀνατείναις οὐρανῷ. A slightly larger fronted unit is found in *Pythian* 3.100: τοῦ δὲ παῖς | ὄνπερ. Not narrative, but similar in function are *Olympian* 1.30: Χάρις δ' | ἅπερ ἅπαντα τεύχει τὰ μείλιχα θνατοῖς | ἐπιφέρουσα τιμὰν | καὶ ἄπιστον ἐμήσατο πιστόν ἔμμεναι τὸ πολλὰκις and *Olympian* 6.80: κείνος | ὦ παῖ Σωστράτου.

level only. Here, too, the priming acts function as cognitive pivots, accommodating the redirection of attention.<sup>202</sup>

§73 The Pindaric corpus features a different category of priming acts, which may serve to illustrate a generic difference between epic and lyric. As songs composed for an occasion and for a specific audience, Pindar's *Victory Odes* display a more direct interaction between performer and audience than the Homeric epics do. As a result, priming acts in Pindar typically do not shift perspective or focus solely *within* the storyworld, but shift from one world to the other, such as from the storyworld to the *hic et nunc*.<sup>203</sup> Second-person discourse is especially effective for moving out of the storyworld and into the here and now. Even in the interactive performance situation of Pindaric song, a singular or plural second-person reference has a strong effect. In the following paragraphs I show how the disruptive effect of a transition to second-person discourse can be linked to the occurrence of second-person pronouns in priming acts.<sup>204</sup> These priming acts can take different forms, and can be syntactically integrated to greater or lesser extent into the following discourse. Finally I discuss the frequent co-occurrence of second-person priming acts and names in the vocative.

§74 Pindaric discourse is a complex negotiation between speakers and addressees, who can be physically present (the performer(s), the audience, the victor, and his clan), vicariously present (as the composer through his song), or treated as present (ancestors, heroes, and gods). That is to say, not every “you” has to refer to someone physically

<sup>202</sup> See also *Olympian* 7.49: κείνοις | ὁ μὲν, for an instance where the pronoun is in the dative, and its referent is thus primed as the patient in a following event.

<sup>203</sup> Apart from priming acts, which consist of (pro)nouns and particles, different but comparable constructions occur at discourse transitions in Pindar: *Olympian* 1.67 πρὸς εὐάνθεμον δ' | ὅτε φυάν, *Olympian* 6.4 εἰ δ' | εἴη μὲν, *Olympian* 6.80 κείνος | ὦ παῖ Σωστράτου, *Olympian* 13.104 νῦν δ' | ἔλπομαι μὲν; *Pythian* 1.17 νῦν γε μάν | ταί θ' ὑπὲρ Κύμας, *Pythian* 1.75 ἀρέομαι | παρ μὲν Σαλαμῖνος; *Nemean* 9.39 λέγεται μάν | Ἑκτορι μὲν, *Nemean* 10.90 ἀνά δ' | ἔλυσεν μὲν, *Nemean* 11.11 ἄνδρα δ' ἐγὼ | μακαρίζω μὲν, *Nemean* 11.29 ἀλλὰ βροτῶν | τὸν μὲν; *Isthmian* 2.41 ἀλλ' ἐπέρα | ποτί μὲν, *Isthmian* 8.11 περὶ δὲ πάξαις | Ἄλτιν μὲν ὄγ'.

<sup>204</sup> I take as “second-person priming acts” all those instances where a second-person pronoun makes up a separate discourse act, typically accompanied by one or more particles.

present at the performance.<sup>205</sup> When a second-person pronoun or verb occurs at the beginning of a new act or move, moreover, the audience cannot know who is being addressed unless it is made clear through extra-linguistic means, or until the addressee's identity is specified in what follows.<sup>206</sup> Therefore, when a you-reference occurs (especially outside direct speech), the audience cannot but be highly involved.<sup>207</sup> More than third-person forms, and even more than first-person references, second-person forms create an immediacy in the performance that lends itself well to transitions in the discourse, and especially to marking an upcoming passage as significant.

§75 Taking into account this performative effect of you-references, it is not surprising that we often find a second-person pronoun occurring in a priming act, as at the end of *Nemean* 3:

(t35)

ἔστι δ' αἰετὸς ὥκυς ἐν ποτανοῖς, |  
 ὃς ἔλαβεν αἶψα, | τηλόθε μεταμαιόμενος, | δαφοινὸν ἄγραν ποσίν· |  
 κραγέται δὲ κολιοὶ ταπεινὰ νέμονται. |  
τίν γε μέν, | εὐθρόνου Κλεοῦς ἐθελοίσας, | ἀεθλοφόρου λήματος ἔνεκεν |  
 Νεμέας Ἐπιδαυρόθεν τ' ἄπο καὶ Μεγάρων δέδορκεν φάος. |

Pindar, *Nemean* 3.80-84

The eagle is swift among birds,  
 who seized quickly, chasing from afar, the bloodied prey with his claws.  
 And the chatterers, the jackdaws live down below.

<sup>205</sup> This aspect of Pindaric performance is discussed in Felson 1999 and 2004; Bonifazi 2004:396-400 discusses the range of functions of “you”-reference in Pindar.

<sup>206</sup> See Bonifazi 2004:400 on *Isthmian* 6.19 ὕμμε τ' | ὦ χρυσάρματοι Αἰακίδαι: ὕμμε can be “an *am Phantasma* reference to the Aeginetan ancestors, an ocular reference to some artistic representation of the Aeacids, or an ocular reference to the Aeginetan clan.”

<sup>207</sup> See for example Felson 2004:382-383 on the second-person forms in *Pythian* 9.90-100.

And for YOU, by the will of fair-throned Kleo, because of a desire to win,  
out of Nemea, from Epidauros, and out of Megara light has gleamed.

The last epode of the song starts with a metaphor that sets up a comparison between the eagle, best of birds, and the victor.<sup>208</sup> Then in line 83 we find a priming act that consists of the dative τίν and the particles γε and μέν. Unlike the nominatives in Homer that I discussed above, the pronoun here is fully part of the syntactical construction, but the verb and subject that complete the construction are postponed to the very end of the song (δέδορκεν φάος). A priming act in this form, consisting of a second-person pronoun and a particle, is comparatively rare in Homer.<sup>209</sup>

§76 In (t35), I take μέν as the Ionic variant of μήν/μάν. As I read the passage, the function of γε μέν is not to mark an adversative relation (Denniston 1950<sup>2</sup>:387, with Bowra's reading of the passage), but to mark a conceptual connection. Like in the cluster νῦν γε μάν, the first word (τίν) introduces a concept ("the present" for νῦν and "the victor" for τίν) that is emphatically (hence I render it as "for YOU") juxtaposed with the preceding. The juxtaposition is in itself neutral, but in the majority of instances of γε μέν/γε μάν the relation between the preceding and the following tends to be one of similarity rather than one of difference.<sup>210</sup> Here, eagle and victor are united by the conceit of distant sight; the eagle sees things from afar (τηλόθε), while the victor has light gleaming from afar on his behalf. Despite the syntactic integration of τίν here, the act τίν γε μέν has a force of its own. Irrespective of what follows, the second-person reference at once redirects attention

<sup>208</sup> With Bury 1890:60-61 and Pfeiffer 1999:418 (who reads μέν differently). Bowra, conversely, reads the eagle as referring only to Pindar, and regards the image as unconnected to the final praise of the victor.

<sup>209</sup> One possible exception with σὺ δέ is *Odyssey* 17.379 σὺ δέ | καὶ ποθι τόνδ' ἐκάλεσσας, and with ὑμεῖς *Iliad* 7.73 ὑμῖν δ' | ἐν γὰρ, 13.116 ὑμεῖς δ' | οὐκ ἔτι; *Odyssey* 20.266 ὑμεῖς δέ | μνηστῆρες. In Homer ἀλλά σὺ is more frequent, with the inherent reorienting function of ἀλλά: *Iliad* 1.393 ἀλλά σὺ | εἰ δύνασαί γε, 9.600 ἀλλά σὺ | μή μοι, 18.134 ἀλλά σὺ μέν | μή πω; *Odyssey* 16.256 ἀλλά σὺ γ' | εἰ δύνασαί and especially 21.234 ἀλλά σὺ | δῖ' Εὐμαίε; Drummen 2009 explores the metalinguistic reorienting function of ἀλλά in Greek drama.

<sup>210</sup> νῦν γε μάν occurs in *Pythian* 1.17 and 1.50; νῦν γε μέν in *Pythian* 4.50, and the remaining instances of γε μέν/γε μάν are *Olympian* 12.5, *Olympian* 13.104, *Pythian* 3.88, *Pythian* 7.19, *Nemean* 8.50, *Nemean* 10.33, *Isthmian* 3.18b.

to the “you,” linking the victor to the image of the eagle. By emphatically directing attention to the victor at the end of the song, the most important person of the event is primed and will remain in the audience’s mind even when the music dies down.

§77 The cognitive and performative usefulness of second-person priming acts like the one in (t35) readily suggests itself: just like priming acts that occur in narrative, these redirect joint attention to a new referent. This referent may be physically present at the performance, such as the victor or a member of his clan,<sup>211</sup> or not.<sup>212</sup> Since even deceased people, heroes, and gods can be made present through Pindar’s use of “you,” the potential absence of the referent does not significantly influence the performative impact of uttering the second-person pronoun.<sup>213</sup> The performative effect, in turn, leads to a higher level of audience involvement directly following the priming act. As a result, second-person pronouns have a natural place right before discursive peaks, such as the final line of the song in (t36). The position of the priming act has a particularly poignant peak effect in the second epode of *Isthmian* 7:

(t36)

ἴστω γὰρ σαφὲς | ὅστις ἐν ταύτῃ νεφέλῃ χάλαζαν αἵματος πρὸ φίλας πάτρας ἀμύνεται, |

†λοιγὸν ἀμύνων† ἐναντίῳ στρατῷ, |

ἀστῶν γενεᾷ μέγιστον κλέος αὔξων |

<sup>211</sup> Second-person priming acts, of referent(s) potentially present: *Olympian* 5.21 σὲ τ’ | Ὀλυμπιόνικε (see Kambylis 1964:132n5), *Olympian* 13.14 ὕμιν δὲ | παῖδες Ἀλάτα, *Pythian* 2.18 σὲ δ’ | ὦ Δεινομένειε παῖ, *Pythian* 2.57 τὸ δὲ | σάφα νιν ἔχεις (strophe beginning), *Pythian* 6.19 σύ τοι | σχέθων νιν (t11, strophe beginning), *Nemean* 3.83 τίν γε μὲν | εὐθρόνου Κλεοῦς ἐθελοῖσας. Formally different but functionally similar are *Olympian* 11.11 ἴσθι νῦν | Ἀρχεστράτου παῖ, *Nemean* 5.48 ἴσθι | γλυκεῖάν τοι Μενάνδρου / σὺν τύχῃ μόχθων, and *Isthmian* 6.44 νῦν σε | νῦν εὐχαῖς ὑπὸ θεσπεσίαις λίσσομαι.

<sup>212</sup> Second-person priming acts, of referent(s) not physically present: *Olympian* 9.17-18 σόν τε | Κασταλία | πάρα, *Pythian* 6.50 τὴν τ’ | Ἑλέλιχον, *Pythian* 8.8 τὸ δ’ | ὁπότεν (strophe beginning), *Pythian* 8.61 τὸ δ’ | Ἑκαταβόλε (strophe beginning), *Isthmian* 6.19 ὕμμε τ’ | ὦ χρυσάρματοι Αἰακίδαι, *Isthmian* 7.31 τὸ δέ | Διοδότοιο παῖ; in *Nemean* 5.41 we find τὸ δ’ Αἰγίναθε δῖς | Εὐθύμενες.

<sup>213</sup> Consider also the possibility that a hero or god may be present in the form of a tomb and/or a statue.

ζῶων τ' ἀπὸ καὶ θανών. |  
 τὸ δέ, | Διοδότοιο παῖ, | μαχατάν  
 αἰνέων Μελέαγρον | αἰνέων δὲ καὶ Ἑκτορα |  
 Ἀμφιάραόν τε, |  
 εὐανθέ' ἀπέπνευσας ἀλικίαν |

Pindar, *Isthmian* 7.27-34

So may he know well, whoever in that cloud wards off the hailstorm of blood for the  
 beloved fatherland,

<...> to the opposing army,  
 that for his townsmen's race he magnifies the greatest glory  
 in life as well as after death.

You, son of Diodotos, glorifying the warrior  
 Meleager, and glorifying Hector even,  
 and Amphiaraoon,  
 you breathed out your flowering youth.

In the ode for Strepsiades of Thebes, Pindar reserves most of his praise for Strepsiades' uncle and namesake who had died fighting for Thebes. In these lines, the song transitions from praising this ancestor's virtues to addressing him directly.<sup>214</sup> Consider especially the stark contrast between the third person imperative ἴστω in 27 and the second-person pronoun followed by the vocative in 31. Whereas lines 27-30 are the expression of a wish (ἴστω, “may he know”), line 31, which addresses the uncle directly, appears to fulfill that wish. In performing 31-36, the singer(s), especially if it was a chorus of citizens, perform

<sup>214</sup> Felson 1999 and 2004 discuss deictic shifts marked among other things by first, second, and third person pronouns. Pfeiffer 1999:479 and 550 discusses the instances of τὸ δέ in *Pythian* 8 as markers of topic shift; I do not believe that this explains the performative impact of such acts sufficiently.

the praise of the uncle Strepsiades.<sup>215</sup> The transition from the expression of the wish to its fulfillment is reflected in a change from the third person to the second person, and the pivotal act is τὸ δέ, with the pronoun in the vocative or the nominative.<sup>216</sup>

§78 Considering the effect of the second-person priming act, it does not come as a surprise that it often co-occurs with a name in the vocative. Just as a second-person reference does, a vocative turns attention to a new addressee,<sup>217</sup> and in combination the two are complementary. As noted above, at the moment of utterance the referent of a second-person pronoun is underdefined. The most natural way to resolve the ambiguity through verbal means is to provide a name, which after a second-person pronoun inevitably takes the form of a vocative.<sup>218</sup> Vocatives in Pindar have been described as adding “liveliness” to the songs,<sup>219</sup> or as reminiscences of epic and hymns,<sup>220</sup> but other scholars have noted their discursive importance.<sup>221</sup> Names in the vocative in Pindar may be compared to apostrophes of characters in Homer. Characters in the epic narrative tend to

<sup>215</sup> The date and context of *Isthmian* 7 are obscure, see Privitera 1982:103-107.

<sup>216</sup> The pronoun’s case is important in that if it is a vocative there is no good reason to assume a discourse act boundary before the name in the vocative. If the pronoun is a nominative, however, it is likely that there was a discontinuity between pronoun and name; i.e. τὸ (nom.) δέ | Διοδότοιο παῖ, or τὸ (voc.) δέ Διοδότοιο παῖ. The two cases in Pindar are both followed by a finite verb in the second person: *Pythian* 8.61 τὸ δ’ | Ἐκαταβόλε | (...) ὥπασας, and *Isthmian* 7.31 (t37). In CEG 326.2 τὸ δέ, Φοῖβε, δίδοι, the verb form is an imperative, in which case the pronoun probably should be read as a vocative.

<sup>217</sup> The major study of vocatives in Pindar is Kambylis 1964. The peculiarities of their linguistic form are briefly discussed by Hummel 1993:71-73.

<sup>218</sup> There is also a group of instances where the vocative and the pronoun are inverted. In these cases the second-person pronoun does not form a priming act: *Olympian* 6.12 Ἀγησία | τὴν δ’ αἴνος ἑτοῖμος, *Olympian* 8.15 Τιμόσθενης | ὕμνε δέ, *Olympian* 9.112 Αἶαν | τεόν τ’, *Pythian* 4.59 ὦ μάκαρ υἱὲ Πολυμνάστου | σέ δ’, *Pythian* 5.5 ὦ θεόμορ’ Ἀρκεσίλα | σύ τοί νιν, *Pythian* 5.45 Ἀλεξιβιάδα | σέ δ’, *Nemean* 1.29 Ἀγησιδάμου παῖ | σέο δ’, *Nemean* 2.14 ὦ Τιμόδημε | σέ δ’, *Nemean* 6.60 Ἀλκίμιδα | σέ γ’, *Nemean* 7.58 Θεαρίων | τὴν δ’, *Nemean* 7.94 ὦ μάκαρ | τὴν δ’.

<sup>219</sup> E.g. Gerber 2002:29, “Pindar elsewhere enlivens the style by addressing one of a pair directly,” Meyer 1933:55, “Verlebendigung der (...) Erzählung,” and Hummel 1993:67.

<sup>220</sup> See Braswell 1988:141-142 ad *Pythian* 4.59.

<sup>221</sup> Bundy 1962:6-7 (and *passim*) discusses apostrophe in Pindar in terms of “name caps” and “pronominal caps,” and notes that they occur often directly after a priamel; see also Bonifazi 2001:117 for discussion of the vocative in *Olympian* 6.22.



be addressed at or just before important moments.<sup>222</sup> In Pindar the vocatives likewise occur at discursive transitions, both within the mythical narrative and between myth and *hic et nunc*.

§79 The effect of second-person references in priming acts in a Pindaric performance must have been profound. By devoting a separate discourse step to redirecting attention, Pindar made sure that the audience would be able to follow the path of his song. Moreover, the second-person pronoun primes the audience to focus on the directly upcoming discourse as an important new action. The difference between second-person priming acts and priming acts in narrative is that they do not only effect a cognitive redirection of attention, but may also trigger a physical shift of gaze, especially when Pindar turns to the victor, as in (t35). The cognitive usefulness of the priming act always goes hand in hand with its discursive importance. The fact that a discourse act is entirely devoted to directing attention to a new referent naturally creates anticipation about the upcoming discourse.

### **Concluding remarks**

§80 The first sections of this chapter have sketched the scholarship on the smallest subdivisions of discourse in ancient Greek and contemporary languages. The importance of the concept of the discourse act reaches beyond this chapter and beyond the study of particles. I contend that in language the act, consisting of a few words that verbalize the focus of consciousness, has more claim to the status of the basic linguistic unit than the clause or the sentence. Based on the argument that the discourse act is the most basic unit in the language-producing mind, I claim that metalanguage, such as particles, is relevant to discourse acts rather than to clauses or sentences. Discourse acts and particles exist independently from each other, but each is relevant to the other: discourse acts are the domain over which most particles exercise their force.

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<sup>222</sup> See Block 1982, Richardson 1990:170-171, Kahane 1994:154-155, Mackay 2001, and De Jong 2009:94-95 for literature and discussion of apostrophe of characters in Homer.

§81  $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$  in Homer is inherently linked to the discourse act, by consistently marking boundaries between many different kinds of act. Its function is analogous to the use of “stop” to mark boundaries in telegrams written in English. The other particle that I have discussed in terms of discourse acts is  $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ . I describe this particle’s pragmatic functions in terms of projection:  $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$  projects that another act is to be expected. This force of the particle is further exploited in the  $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$  -  $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$  construction, when  $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$  has small scope and specifically projects a contrasting or complementary  $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$  act. Finally, the priming act, a strongly “incomplete” chunk of discourse in syntactic and semantic terms, illustrates an important discourse function of discourse acts. Priming acts typically occur at the beginning of new scenes, a type of transition that demands significant cognitive processing. To accommodate the speaker and audience's cognitive needs, the “who” precedes the “what”. This reading of syntactically “dislocated” or “pendant” units recognizes their cognitive efficiency rather than focusing on their grammatical deficiency.

§82 An analysis of Homeric and Pindaric discourse demonstrates that the language of the two performative genres is more similar than one might have expected. Despite the fact that the syntax of Pindar’s songs is occasionally more intricate than that of Homeric epic, the discourse still generally progresses in small-ish acts. Both epic and lyric discourse proceed in small strategic steps, discourse acts, each with their own function in reaching the discourse goals.

### 3. Moves

#### Metalinguage at discourse transitions

§1 The present chapter builds explicitly on the preceding chapter on discourse acts and presupposes knowledge of its main points; my understanding of discourse acts is summarized in chapter 2 §16-§18. Greek particles reflect the production of discourse in cognitively manageable units – discourse acts – which are the building blocks of epic and lyric compositions. The analysis in chapter 2 reveals how a performer or author produces his work in small increments to guide his audience through the discourse. In this chapter I am concerned with all kinds of larger discourse units, such as narrative episodes or scenes, and the function of particles with relation to them.<sup>1</sup> First, I introduce the term “move” to describe coherent discourse units consisting of at least one, but generally of multiple discourse acts (§6-§11). An understanding of this phenomenon in discourse then informs my reading of γάρ (§22-§29), καὶ γάρ (§30-§32), and ἤ (§33-§43) in Homer and Pindar, focusing on the introduction of Homeric embedded narratives as a case study. After examining a few other ways in which the poets embed narratives within the larger discourse (§45-§50), I examine how those narratives themselves are articulated. In this section I explore the different functions of δέ, considering also the diachronic development of the particle that may emerge from the Homeric corpus (§53-§64). A narrative from Pindar provides the backdrop for a discussion of his consistent use of ἄρα to round up larger units in discourse (§65-§67). Finally, I consider the role of particles in one of Pindar’s compositions (*Pythian* 2), especially in the many transitions between different kinds of discourse (§68-§76).

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<sup>1</sup> Compare IV.3 for a similar consideration of differently-sized units in discourse.

### 3.1 Moves

§2 Discourse acts, the smallest functional subdivision of discourse, are regarded as the building blocks of larger sections called “moves.”<sup>2</sup> The term originated in the analysis of dialogic discourse, where it makes sense to divide conversation into different moves conceived by the interlocutors.<sup>3</sup> An often-cited example is that of the invitation:<sup>4</sup>

(t1)

A: Are you free tonight? | ‘Cause I have an extra ticket for the symphony orchestra. |

B: Well, | I really should work on this paper tonight. | Sorry, | maybe next time? |

In two turns, which could be expanded almost infinitely, speakers A and B go through an exchange that consists of an “invitation” and “rejection.”<sup>5</sup> Each of the two turns consists of multiple acts that are united by the fact that they share a common communicative goal.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Sinclair and Coulthard 1975; Roulet 1984, Roulet *et.al.* 1985, Roulet 1997, 2001; Risselada 1993; Kroon 1995; Langacker 2001; Hannay and Kroon 2005. Move is not an unproblematic term, as it is used in different ways and has been applied in different fields: compare for example Ryan 1991:130, who uses “move” as follows: “I call a ‘move’ an action with a high-priority and a high risk of failure.”

<sup>3</sup> In this sense the concept of move has been applied to Homeric epic by Beck in Grethlein and Rengakos 2007, where she says (146) that “[a] ‘move’ is essentially a speech act in a conversational context” (she repeats the definition in Beck 2012:12, with reference to Kroon 1995, Risselada 1993, and Roulet 1984). This is a narrower definition of move than the one I (and most of her sources) employ.

<sup>4</sup> This is a constructed example for the sake of illustration.

<sup>5</sup> See III.4 for the Conversation Analysis approach to interactions. In Conversation Analysis these two “turns” form a “sequence,” and the invitation and rejection are an “adjacency pair.”

<sup>6</sup> The establishment of this common goal is inevitably subjective, and it cannot in fact always be ascertained. Consider the final acts by speaker B: | Sorry, | is still part of the rejection move, as an attempt to mitigate the interlocutor’s loss of face. The final act, | maybe next time? | however, could either be regarded as a continuation of this attempt at mitigation, or as an actual question about “next time” in which case it might be regarded as the start of a new move. In practice, it is the reaction of the interlocutor that establishes the “right” interpretation of this act: if speaker A responds “Sure!” the exchange ends without any new moves, but if she responds “OK, | they are also playing next Thursday, | how’s that?” she has clearly taken speaker B’s question as a new move.

Note that even in this English example acts are not coextensive with clauses (consider especially “Well” and “Sorry”).

§3 In the example above, the move starts with an unannounced question, but in practice the context will provide some kind of embedding. We may expect a prefatory remark like, “Oh, by the way, are you...”, when the invitation comes after another move (such as a greeting), or, when the interlocutors have just met face-to-face, “Hey, I wanted to ask you something: are you...”. On the whole, when speakers are initiating a new move, they feel a strong need to mark the transition. At the “end” of moves, conversely, there is typically less explicit marking in the language.<sup>7</sup> Of course, some moves have inherent endings, like the invitation above, but just as often the end of one move is recognizable only because another move begins.<sup>8</sup>

§4 The terminology of moves and acts forms part of a larger framework concerning the subdivision of discourse, and it is most often applied to analyze dialogic discourse.<sup>9</sup> In this framework, researchers are concerned with establishing the structure of an exchange, which they divide into main and subsidiary elements.<sup>10</sup> Since I approach epic and lyric from the perspective of performance, I do not believe such a hierarchical analysis to be the most productive. Rather, I choose to focus on the on-line delivery and processing of the

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<sup>7</sup> See also IV.3. Roulet’s analyses reveal the same tendency in French: the beginnings of moves are often marked by what he calls “pragmatic markers”, while the linguistic form of the ends of moves is never discussed (see especially Roulet 1984:36-39, on a newspaper article). Compare Langacker 2001:178 who remarks that the intonation group “Now Bill,” “serves to announce that structure building is going to start in a new place.” Chafe 2008:674 says the following about “topic”: “Topics generally have clear beginnings, although that is not always the case (...) and their endings are sometimes well defined, sometimes not”; compare Tannen 1984:41-43.

<sup>8</sup> Consider Langacker’s insightful comment (2001:177): “at any point in a discourse can we stop working on one structure and start building another.”

<sup>9</sup> The terminology was established initially by Sinclair and Coulthard 1975 (who founded the so-called Birmingham school). Their work was picked up by Stenström 1994 and by members of the “Geneva school”, represented especially by Roulet 1984, Roulet *et. al.* 1985, Roulet 1997, 2001; see chapter 2 §18. Kroon 1995 applies the Geneva model to written Latin discourse in her discussion of discourse particles.

<sup>10</sup> Consider Kroon’s definition (1995:66): a move is “the minimal free unit of discourse that is able to enter into an exchange structure. (...) A move usually consists of a central act (which is the most important act in view of the speaker’s intentions and goals) and one or more subsidiary acts...”

discourse.<sup>11</sup> Whatever structure may emerge from the written text, in performance the cues to structure would have worked mostly on a local level, guiding the audience linearly through the discourse.<sup>12</sup> What one expects to be marked, then, are the transitions to new moves, since these are the places where both performer and audience need a cue for cognitive reorientation. Since the epic performance makes reception linear, the most important thing is that a move beginning is recognized as some sort of redirection.<sup>13</sup>

§5 The most recognizable transitions in epic are the beginnings and endings of direct speech. Metalinguistically, every start of direct speech is marked explicitly with a speech-introduction verse, probably because the transition from one speaking source (the narrator) to another (a character) is crucial to following the narrative. The same holds for the great majority of transitions after direct speech.<sup>14</sup> The performer of the *Iliad* or the *Odyssey* had only one voice, but comparative evidence from other epic material suggests that transitions from direct speech to narrator text may have been marked prosodically.<sup>15</sup> In the remainder of Homeric epic, most moves are less obviously recognizable as units than stretches of direct speech. Only by considering both the content and the linguistic form

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<sup>11</sup> Roulet insists upon the hierarchical approach, but he suggests that the hierarchy is not absolute when he argues that moves can contain other moves: in 1981:10-11 the examples suggest that an *intervention* (move) can itself be part of larger *interventions*, see Roulet 1984:45 “...moves [can] constitute a larger move and are tied together by interactive functions”; see also Roulet 1997:134 figure 2, and Roulet 2001:53.

<sup>12</sup> This matches the idea of “structuring” instead of the static “structure”; see Sherzer 1982:389, “I use the term *structuring* rather than *structure* in order to stress the dynamic process which is involved” [emphasis original]. Kroon 1995 focuses on rhetorical prose and is more optimistic about establishing the structure of her corpus (66-67): “Many particles (both in Latin and in other languages) appear to be involved predominantly or partly in marking the linear or hierarchical structure of a discourse as outlined above. This means that they mark out the separate units of discourse by indicating how these are structurally tied up with other units of the same discourse, both linearly (i.e. involving relations between units of the same rank) and hierarchically (i.e. involving the relationships that units maintain with ‘higher’ or ‘lower’ units). As such these particles can be said to have a mainly organizational function.”

<sup>13</sup> Even the speech-capping formulae are generally more forward than backward looking. Many of them mark the end of the direct speech rather by focusing on the upcoming narrative move (such as the announcement of a new speaker) than on rounding off the preceding move of direct speech.

<sup>14</sup> See Antović and Pagán Cánovas [forthcoming] on speech-capping formulas in Homer, and Louvriot 2013 on speech-capping in Old-English poetry.

<sup>15</sup> See Bonifazi and Elmer 2012:246.

one can come to an informed analysis of transitions in discourse. Such moments are often marked by some kind of linguistic turbulence,<sup>16</sup> in the form of a change in tense, orientation, or source, or through the occurrence of metalanguage, often in the form of particles. Attention to the path of the discourse, with all its bends and sudden turns, may thus reveal certain functions of particles. At the same time, the occurrence of certain particles may serve as a cue that the discourse is taking a new direction.

### 3.1.1 Discursive and metadiscursive transitions

§6 Because epic and lyric have been transmitted in written form, it is all too easy to consider the genres as ultimately monologic discourse, structured by an author according to a functional hierarchy. As argued in the last chapter, however, it is important to keep in mind that both epic and lyric represent interactions between performer and audience. In fact, traces of this originally dialogic nature are present throughout the discourse, not only in the use of particles that mark its production in acts, but also in more explicit metanarrative comments. Consider the introduction to the Homeric *Catalogue of Ships*:

(t2)

ἔσπετε νῦν μοι Μοῦσαι Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι·<sup>17</sup>

(...)

οἳ τινες ἡγεμόνες Δαναῶν καὶ κοίρανοι ἦσαν· |

πληθὺν δ' οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ μυθήσομαι | οὐδ' ὀνομήνω, |

*Iliad* 2.484 and 487-488

Tell me now, Muses who have Olympian houses,

(...)

who were the leaders of the Greeks and the captains.

<sup>16</sup> I borrow the term from Longacre 1996<sup>2</sup>, discussed in footnote 45 below.

<sup>17</sup> The vertical bars mark discourse act boundaries, see chapter 2 §21-§23.

Their multitude I would not be able to speak nor name,

In a gesture rare in Homeric epic, the (persona of the) narrator breaks the spell of the narrative and foregrounds his role as a performer. Most of the narrative effaces the presence of the performer and audience as much as possible; in order to maintain the illusion of their absence, the performer divides his discourse by more subtle means. In this instance, however, a special piece of discourse is set apart by a special introduction.<sup>18</sup> The performer professes his inability to complete his intended move without help from the Muses, which he apparently receives,<sup>19</sup> since he concludes:

(t3)

οὔτοι ἄρ' ἡγεμόνες Δαναῶν καὶ κοίρανοι ἦσαν·

*Iliad* 2.760

These then were the leaders of the Danaans and the captains.

The listing of the leaders of the Greek army is thus composed as a separate move, explicitly demarcated by metadiscursive comments. Several similar instances are to be found in the Homeric corpus, especially those introduced by metanarrative questions or comments.<sup>20</sup>

§7 A performer has a number of tools at his disposal to mark new beginnings. One basic difference we can establish is between transitions with or without metalanguage. Non-metalinguistic transitions include instances like the priming discourse acts discussed in the preceding chapter, which entail no metalanguage, or language that “discusses” the

<sup>18</sup> See chapter 4 §11-§14 for the comparable “framed” vs. “unframed” discourse, with further examples of this temporary breaking of the spell.

<sup>19</sup> The actual interpretation of the passage is contested, and this summary represents only one possible reading, but the discussion is not relevant to my contention that the *Catalogue* is presented as a separate move.

<sup>20</sup> For a discussion of metanarrative passages in the *Iliad*, with literature, see De Jong 2004<sup>2</sup>:45-53, and see De Jong 2001:119-120 for a listing of narratorial interventions in the *Odyssey*. For this specific line and the cognitive importance of οὔτοι see Bakker 2005:80-81 and 143 (although I would propose a different reading of ἄρα, see for the similar function of ἄρα after the simile chapter 4 §38-§41).



transition. Instead, the narrative is presented in such a way as to accommodate the cognitive processing needed to navigate the discontinuity.<sup>21</sup> Metalinguistic transitions, on the other hand, are those where the performer uses language that is relevant not to the propositional content (*de re*), but to the ongoing interaction (*de dicto*) between him and the audience. Metadiscursive questions or comments (such as the opening of the *Catalogue*) are the prime example of this kind of transition, but they occupy only one end of the scale. The rest of the spectrum is taken up mostly by particles or combinations of particles used *de dicto* rather than *de re*—particles that function as metalanguage.<sup>22</sup>

§8 When I call the *Catalogue* a separate move, I mean this in a relative sense. Above the level of the act, different-sized units are hard to distinguish on any absolute basis. In the *Catalogue*, for example, it would be fully justified to call each geographical subsection a “move” within the larger whole. Rather than assigning different names to moves of different sizes, I use a single term, “move”, with the understanding that the concept is a relational one: the *Catalogue* is a move within the *Iliad*, the subsection on the men from Pylos (2.591-602) is a move within the *Catalogue*, and the story of the singer Thamyras (2.594-600) is a move within that subsection.<sup>23</sup> With these caveats we may productively

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<sup>21</sup> Included in this category are the performative tools that the epic performer has at his disposal to make a transition within the narrative seamless, such as by using sightlines or sounds *et cetera*.

<sup>22</sup> See Maschler 2009, who explores the link between discourse markers and metalanguage in the talk of bilingual speakers of English and Hebrew. Grosz and Sidner 1986:177 talk about “discourse segments” and describe the relation between linguistic form and discourse in the following terms: “There is a two-way interaction between the discourse segment structure and the utterances constituting the discourse: linguistic expressions can be used to convey information about the discourse structure; conversely, the discourse structure constrains the interpretation of expressions.” The first part of their two-way interaction is what I call metadiscursive language.

<sup>23</sup> I want to avoid any attempt to define “move” in an absolute sense, as contemporary literature attempts to do. One can imagine that it is very possible to name the different layers of the hierarchy in the *Catalogue*, where it is so clearly divided, but it does not easily translate to the rest of the Homeric corpus. If we call the *Catalogue* an “episode,” the different entries “subsections,” and then the smallest discourse units above the sentence level “moves,” this distinction may be useful on a local level, but it becomes difficult, and perhaps unproductive, outside of the *Catalogue*. Using a different set of terms, Givón 2005:141 (with reference to Givón (ed.) 1997) does offer a full terminology for what he regards as the different levels of discourse.

approach ancient Greek epic with the terminology employed by the Birmingham and Geneva schools.<sup>24</sup> The performer of epic is engaged in a constant interaction with his audience, the reflections of which must inform our understanding of the language.

§9 For Pindar's lyric compositions the term move is not only helpful, it is, as we shall see, indispensable.<sup>25</sup> While it is not intuitive to describe narrative scenes or episodes in terms of moves, lyric discourse invites it. The work of Schadewaldt and Bundy has taught us to see Pindar's *Victory Odes* as coherent wholes conceived with a single goal in mind: praise. This praise can be multi-faceted, but it is present in every component part of the ode. The priamels, the praise of the family, the reflections upon humanity and the gods, the narrative sections, and of course the praise of the victor are all moves in the larger interaction that is the song, which in turn is part of the festive occasion. The component parts of Pindar's songs, different yet fitting into a larger whole, represent Pindar's many moves toward his goal of praising the victor.<sup>26</sup> Just as a speaker might prepare his interlocutor for an actual invitation by starting with "Are you free tonight?" Pindar often primes his audience for the praise of the victor by starting with a priamel. Another clearly observable kind of move are the gnomic, evaluative statements that occur within

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Do note that the *Catalogue* is not representative for the rest of Homeric discourse. It is a very strict, ringed piece of discourse that – not despite but because of its intricacy – allows the performer to reperform a large body of specific knowledge, such as a list of places and their leaders; see for the cognitive aspect of catalogues in Homer Bakker 1997:60, Minchin 2001:73-99, Tsagalis 2010, and Strauss Clay 2011:117, with note 59.

<sup>24</sup> See chapter 2 §18 for more on the Birmingham and Geneva schools.

<sup>25</sup> Bundy describes the Pindaric odes as unities built up out of different pieces all aimed at praising the victor, but defines the separate pieces, which I would call moves, only on a functional level (a gnomic passage, a priamel, a narrative, etc.). The closest he comes to a description in terms of moves is in the conclusion of his second paper: "[T]o follow the movement of the ode is not to follow the development of a thought that has a beginning, a middle, and an end, but to pursue the fulfillment of a single purpose through a complex orchestration of motives and themes that conduce to one end: the glorification, within the considerations of ethical, religious, social, and literary propriety." See also Felson 2004:387, about *Pythian* 9: "Despite these ruptures, a set of real-world "moves" can be retrieved by an audience informed about pan-Hellenic contests and the epinician genre." It is unclear to me how Felson uses "move" here, but it may be in a deictic sense (compare "shifters").

<sup>26</sup> Wells 2009:61-128 speaks of the different "speech genres" that alternate in Pindaric discourse.

narratives, or at transitions between myths and direct praise.<sup>27</sup> Just like scenes and episodes in epic narratives, Pindaric moves are distinguished by linguistic markers, and are characterized by a specific linguistic form.

§10 I call larger and smaller subdivisions of epic and lyric discourse “moves,” and I assume that these linguistic units in discourse represent specific aspects of a composer or performer’s discourse strategy. This assumption is implicit in my belief that the discourse units I identify represent a textual reality and are not just abstractions projected upon the text. Although I do not claim to be able to establish what the intentions or goals of a composer or performer were, the move boundaries that I posit are the result of the discourse strategy that I infer. In other words, based on what I believe the performer is doing through his discourse, I try to infer where one move ends and another begins. This interpretation always goes hand in hand with an analysis of the linguistic form at what I believe are move transitions. For Homer, I focus on the transition into and out of self-contained stories, as well as the navigation of transitions within narrative.<sup>28</sup> For Pindar’s lyric, my analysis involves transitions between one kind of discourse and another, as from narrative to gnome, or from an address of a god to praise of the victor’s family.

§11 Awareness of different moves in discourse is indispensable for gaining a full understanding of certain particles. In narrative contexts, as in many others, particles are better understood as relevant to the interaction than to the content or syntax.<sup>29</sup> Herman says the following when discussing cognitive narratology: “At issue is how stories reflexively model cognitive, interactional, and other dimensions of acts of narration along

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<sup>27</sup> See chapter 4 §24-§25 for more on this view of *gnômai*.

<sup>28</sup> The term “move” is not commonly applied to narrative, but consider Roulet e.a. 2001, especially the example on page 328-329.

<sup>29</sup> See Grosz and Sidner 1986:177-178 on what they call “discourse segment boundaries”: “The explicit use of certain words and phrases (...) and more subtle cues, such as intonation or changes in tense and aspect, are included in the repertoire of linguistic devices that function (...) to indicate these boundaries.” Compare Bazzanella’s definition of discourse markers in I.1.

with other forms of communicative practice.”<sup>30</sup> His corpus is written discourse, and in the case of performed narratives like the Homeric epics and Pindar’s songs we may focus not only on “how stories model cognitive and interactional acts,” but also on how the language of Homeric and Pindaric stories *reflects and encodes* such cognitive and interactional acts. Particles are crucial tools for locating and understanding such metalinguistic actions behind and beyond the texts.

### 3.2 Particles and narrative

§12 Narrative has received special attention as an object of research ever since the work of the structuralists in the mid-twentieth century,<sup>31</sup> but especially since the advent of narratology.<sup>32</sup> The approach has gained considerable popularity in the field of literary studies and has engendered a significant number of studies in classics.<sup>33</sup> On the whole, narratology’s focus is on the relation between narrator (as removed from author or performer) and narrative, and it considers the latter more as a product than as an ongoing event. As a result, the linguistic form of a story is relevant mainly when it informs the researcher of the narrator’s manipulation of time or space.<sup>34</sup> In the following, I examine the

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<sup>30</sup> Herman 2010:140.

<sup>31</sup> It started in the study of folktales and myth; the landmark works are Propp [1928] 1958, Lévi-Strauss 1960 (review of Propp), Bremond 1973, Todorov e.a. 1979, Detienne 1981, and Vernant and Vidal-Naquet 1986; see also Hansen 2002:1-31 for an overview of the earlier folktale studies and the (limited) application of the methodology in classical studies.

<sup>32</sup> See especially Barthes 1957 and Genette 1972; Prince 1997:39-42 gives a very comprehensive history of narrative and narratology up to the late nineties, and includes a rich bibliography. A central question that has arisen in the last decades is: what makes a discourse narrative? The discussion is too complex to present here, but studies that address the question include Fludernik 1996, Ryan 2007, and Herman 2009. A commonly held principle is to regard something as narrative when it contains at least two unique events in a temporal sequence (see e.g. Labov and Waletzky 1967, Couper-Kuhlen 1988:353).

<sup>33</sup> De Jong 1987, 2001, 2007 (ed.), 2012 (ed.); Rood 1998; De Jong and Sullivan (eds) 1994, De Jong and Nünlist (eds) 2004; Stoddard 2004; Grethlein and Rengakos (eds) 2009; Köhnken 2006; Pelling, Grethlein, and Rengakos (eds) 2009.

<sup>34</sup> E.g. De Jong 2007 *Time in Ancient Greek Literature* and De Jong 2012 *Space in Ancient Greek Literature*. Prince 1997:40 says that it is “the narrating as opposed to the narrated, (...) the signs in a narrative representing the narrating activity, its origin, its destination, and its context (...) that narratologists have explored most

role of particles in articulating and guiding narrative, approaching the texts as encoding an interactive process between performer(s) and audience. By treating Homeric and Pindaric stories as acts of narration and studying the ways in which language reflects the narrative process I aim to provide a complement to the traditional narratological analyses.<sup>35</sup>

§13 If a narrative is perceived as an ongoing interaction between a performer and an audience, it will yield linguistic signs of the composer's cognitive processes as well as his assumptions about the hearer's cognitive processing. In the production of a discourse, whether fully composed beforehand or *in situ*,<sup>36</sup> multiple cognitive processes simultaneously affect the linguistic realization. At the most basic level, the composer's linguistic competence and his training in composing are important determinants. This largely unconscious dimension of language production includes considerations of linguistic limitations, social conventions, and his own cognitive limitations.<sup>37</sup> More conscious is the influence of his expectations about what the audience will be able to process, what relevant pre-existing knowledge they have, and of course what they will appreciate. Such cognitive processes are inherent to all communication,<sup>38</sup> but since epic and lyric are not day-to-day

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thoroughly." However, none of the following examples discusses the language of narrative and its relation to the narrating activity, which is exactly what I focus on in the present chapter.

<sup>35</sup> See Longacre's work on the linguistic form of narrative discourse (1985, 1990, and 1995). Pseudo-Longinus, in his work *On the Sublime* (chapters 23- 29) already discusses the linguistic changes at certain moments in the narrative. His work considers discourse transitions above the sentence level, and suggests that he considers the pragmatic perspective on language; see the summary of Terry 1995:119-120, "Among those changes which he discusses are the expansion of the singular into the plural to convey the idea of multitude (23.2-3), the contraction of the plural into the singular to give an effect of sublimity (chap. 24), the use of the present tense in narrating past time in order to increase vividness (chap. 25), the change of the person addressed from the whole audience to a single individual also to give a vivid effect (chap. 26), the use of the first person for one of the characters to show an outbreak of emotion (chap. 27), and the use of periphrasis or circumlocution to give the work a far richer note (chap. 28-29)."

<sup>36</sup> In its original incarnation, I assume that Homeric epic was composed in performance (I align with Nagy 1996 and Bakker 1997), while Pindar's victory odes were probably composed beforehand. If we assume that a number of odes were performed by a chorus, they must in fact have been finished well before the occasion; see chapter 1 §5-§10 for more on my assumptions about performance.

<sup>37</sup> There are also relevant non-cognitive processes, such as the limitations imposed by the need to breathe.

<sup>38</sup> See Enfield 2006, especially 409-412. This touches upon the topic of common ground, which I explore in terms of Discourse Memory in chapter 4 §1-§10

speech, but rather “special discourse” meant for performance before a listening audience, their literary language may more visibly reflect this active consideration of the audience.<sup>39</sup> With this in mind, let us consider how these processes manifest themselves in the performer’s construction of his discourse in acts and moves.

### 3.2.1 Narrative moves

§14 In the emergent structure of discourse in corpora like Homeric epic and Pindar’s lyric, the component parts of stories are most clearly delineated, especially in Homer. Things do not just happen in stories, but situations are set up, characters are introduced, a complication is presented, and after things come to a head a resolution is achieved. This basic structure of narrative first proposed by Labov and Waletzky has been shown to be inherent in stories across languages, cultures, and media.<sup>40</sup> Their narrative scheme looks as follows (after adaptation in later publications):<sup>41</sup>

(t4)

Abstract (a short preview/overview of the narrative)

Orientation (introduction of time, place, and characters)

Complicating Action (the body of the narrative)

Resolution (the complication is resolved)

Coda (a metanarrative comment to cap the narrative)

Evaluation (the point of telling the story. In the earliest versions of the scheme

“evaluation” was placed between “resolution” and “coda,” but in later publications

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<sup>39</sup> See e.g. Reynolds 1995, a comprehensive study about performances of the *Sirat Bani Hilal* oral epic.

<sup>40</sup> See especially Bamberg (ed.) 1997, which contains a re-publication of the 1967 article; and additions to the scheme offered by Fleischman 1990 (who introduces “peak” between complicating action and resolution), Fludernik 1996, and Klapproth 2004. Minchin 2001:186-196 applies the scheme to Homeric narratives.

<sup>41</sup> I give the names of the different sections as given by Labov and Waletzky, and the brief explanations between parentheses are paraphrases of their longer discussions of the parts.

Labov, Waletzky, and others argued that evaluation is generally present throughout the narrative, in the choice of vocabulary, syntax, evaluative meta-comments, gestures and facial expressions, et cetera.)<sup>42</sup>

The construction of narrative along these lines may be regarded as the result of social convention, but this convention in turn probably has a cognitive basis.<sup>43</sup> Whatever form the narrative takes, verbal or not, it is often possible to distinguish the different constituent parts. The omnipresence of this narrative structure suggests either that the storyteller is aware of the differences between sections and presents them differently, or that a certain linguistic form comes automatically with a certain part of the story—it is hard to establish the extent to which some of this linguistic marking is conscious. Regardless, in the Homeric and Pindaric corpora there appears to be a consistent marking of boundaries between Labovian sections of narrative, and they are realized in different linguistic forms. In the following, I first study embedded narratives as moves within the larger discourse, with a focus on Homer, and I then examine different narrative sections as moves within those stories.

§15 Of all the components in the Labovian model, the complicating action and the resolution are the minimal requirements for something to be perceived as a narrative. When either or both of those components are missing, the most we can say is probably that an expected narrative is lacking, but not that an actual narrative exists. Most commonly, a narrative will have a complicating action and a resolution, often preceded by at least some kind of orientation. Multiple scholars have proposed to include an additional component

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<sup>42</sup> The first explanation of “evaluation” is given in Labov and Waletzky 1997 [1967] 28-35, with a substantial revision in Labov 1972. In the 1997 anniversary volume, several people expand on the topic: Daiute and Nelson 1997 (evaluation as an emergent point of view) and Fleischman 1997:165-166; see also Fleischman 1986 and Bower 1997 (syntax and word order as a possible marker of evaluation).

<sup>43</sup> See for the cognitive basis of narratives: Schank 1995, Talmy 1995, Turner 1996, Herman 2011 (Emergence of Mind), and Sanford and Emmott 2012.

between complicating action and resolution, alternatively called “climax” or “peak.”<sup>44</sup> From a linguistic perspective this claim is sound, since the language of climactic scenes commonly differs from that of the surrounding discourse. Therefore I employ the terms climax and peak to denote the pivotal scene between complicating action and resolution. In Labovian terms, the climax may be regarded as the last part of the complicating action, or the start of the resolution.<sup>45</sup>

§16 Consider the following example of a two-sentence narrative in Pindar’s first *Pythian Ode*. It tells how the Greek heroes on their way to Troy came to get Philoctetes, son of Poias, on Lemnos:

(t5)

νῦν γε μὰν τὰν Φιλοκτήταο δίκαν ἐφέπων |  
 ἐστρατεύθη | σὺν δ’ ἀνάγκῃ νιν φίλον  
 καὶ τις ἐὼν μεγαλάνωρ ἔσανεν. | φαντὶ δὲ Λαμνόθεν | ἔλκει τειρόμενον | μεταβάσσοντας ἐλθεῖν |  
 ἥροας ἀντιθέους | Ποίαντος υἱὸν τοξόταν· |  
 ὃς Πριάμοιο πόλιν πέρσεν, | τελευτάσέν τε πόνους Δαναοῖς, |  
 ἀσθενεῖ μὲν χρωτὶ βαίνων, | ἀλλὰ μοιρίδιον ἦν. |

Pindar *Pythian* 1.50-55

Yes, just now, following Philoktetes’ way,  
 he campaigned, and in need even a proud one

<sup>44</sup> Chafe 2001:677 notes that the idea of “climax” is missing from the Labovian narrative schema. He himself proposes an alternative schema; for the use of the term peak see Longacre 1996<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>45</sup> Longacre 1996<sup>2</sup> designates peaks in narrative as “zones of turbulence” and shows how they can be marked (1996<sup>2</sup>:39-48) by: (1) rhetorical underlining, (2) a “crowded stage” i.e. many characters in the frame, (3) heightened vividness, (4) a change of pace, (5) a change of vantage point, and/or (6) the sudden occurrence or disappearance of certain particles as well as use of onomatopoeia.



greeted him as a friend. They say that from Lemnos they came to take him, tired out by his wound,<sup>46</sup>

the godlike heroes, Poias' archer son.

He razed Priam's city, and ended the Danaans' troubles.

Though walking with flesh infirm, still it was fated.

After a brief orientation (50-51), consisting in the naming of a main character (Philoctetes) as a parallel for the *laudandus* (Hieron), Pindar presents a famous narrative in an extremely condensed form. The actual start of the complication is marked by φαντὶ δέ, which shows once more that δέ in Pindar regularly marks major discourse boundaries.<sup>47</sup>

§17 The complicating action takes up no more than one sentence (52-53 Λαμνόθεν... τοξόταν) before coming to the climax (ὃς Πριάμοιο πόλιν πέρσεν) and then the resolution (τελεύτασέν τε πόνους Δαναοῖς). Note that the run-up to the most important event is presented in the form of an *accusativus cum infinitivo*, while the climax – Philoctetes' role in bringing down Troy – is in the form of a finite clause. This climactic clause, moreover, is formally a relative clause, which is perhaps not expected to drive the narrative forward.<sup>48</sup> It is likely that Pindar is influenced by the use of the relative pronoun in Homer, where its value is regularly closer to that of a demonstrative. Hence, my translation reflects the narrative force of the act (He razed Priam's city, and ended the Danaans' troubles) rather than the grammatical form of the clause (...Poias' archer son / who razed Priam's city...).

§18 The point of the story is the analogy between Philoctetes, who went to battle wounded, and the *laudandus* Hieron, who did so as well. Here the evaluation (ἀλλὰ μοιρίδιον ἦν), in Labov's term, follows the resolution. The punctuation chosen by Snell and Maehler reflects the interpretation that the participial clause ἀσθενεῖ μὲν χρωτὶ βαίνων

<sup>46</sup> In the translation of lines 51 and 52 I have had to change the word order to obtain understandable English.

<sup>47</sup> Note, moreover, that φαντὶ consistently occurs at the start of mythic narratives in Pindar: *Olympian* 7.54, *Pythian* 2.12, *Pythian* 4.88, *Pythian* 4.287, *Pythian* 6.21, *Pythian* 7.19, *Isthmian* 8.46a.

<sup>48</sup> Compare Couper-Kuhlen 1988, who discusses subordinated when-clauses in narrative, which provide foreground rather than background information. See chapter 5 for more on relative clauses in narrative.

following the resolution is still part of the narrative. On several linguistic grounds, however, it is more attractive to regard this act as the start of a new move.<sup>49</sup> First of all the act would be superfluous on the level of content if it were part of the preceding narrative (see ἔλκει τειρόμενον, 52). More important, however, is the use of the particle μέν. As I argue in the preceding chapter, μέν has a projecting function, carrying a constituent, thought, or action forward.<sup>50</sup> As a result it also often has an asseverative function, starting a new move, here with the pragmatic enrichment that gives it a concessive force. Rather than to the preceding finite verbs, μέν connects its host act to the ἀλλά clause that follows: “Though walking with flesh infirm, still it was fated [that he would win the battle].” If taken in this form, the statement is readily applicable to both Philoctetes and Hieron, the *laudandus*. This reading is supported by the imperfect ἦν, which follows the aorists in the complicating action (μεταβάσσοντας ἐλθεῖν 52), climax (πέρσεν 54), and resolution (τελεύτασεν 54): a change of tense suggests a new move, and the imperfect often occurs in evaluative statements.<sup>51</sup>

§19 This brief example illustrates two things: on the one hand the fact that narrative transitions can be explicitly marked in the language, and on the other hand that different narrative sections may manifest themselves through different linguistic patterns.<sup>52</sup> By analyzing these two factors we can observe how certain particles or strings of particles are relevant to transitions between narrative moves.

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<sup>49</sup> Compare the discussion of section beginnings and endings in IV.3.

<sup>50</sup> See chapter 2 §46-62.

<sup>51</sup> See IV.3 for the use of τελεύτα in Thucydides, and Allan 2007:113-115 for the use of the imperfect in evaluative statements in Thucydides.

<sup>52</sup> See III.2 for more on discourse patterns.

### 3.2.2 Narrative beginnings: γάρ and ἤ

§20 The Homeric *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are practically all narrative, in the narrow sense.<sup>53</sup> So most relevant for the current chapter are the transitions to the many discrete narratives embedded within the larger plots of the two epics.<sup>54</sup>

§21 Literature on self-contained stories in Homeric epic abounds, and the scholarship has established an impressive set of terms to describe the phenomenon from different angles. One kind is what Slater called the lyric narrative, characterized especially by its ring-compositional form. This form is not unconnected from the idea of epic regression, although it has sometimes been treated separately.<sup>55</sup> Slater, following West, notes that the lyric narrative in Homer is often introduced by a relative pronoun + aorist + ποτε + aorist participle.<sup>56</sup> Contrary to what Slater suggests, however, this kind of construction does not hold the monopoly on introducing embedded narratives in epic. Each component of Slater's construction in combination with other elements can start a self-contained narrative, which is not by nature different from the "lyric narrative" described by Slater. In all such constructions, the pronoun often does not have a relative but rather a demonstrative force: not "..., who" but "... S/He." As for ποτε, although it is by nature an ideal marker to use for displacing performer and audience to a moment before the narrative *hic et nunc*, parallels show that it is by no means the performer's only or even the most frequently used tool. The particular construction described by Slater is an asyndetic

<sup>53</sup> Which may actually partially explain the explicit marking of this move with a sizeable metanarrative passage.

<sup>54</sup> Other scholars choose to distinguish between the narrative and descriptive mode in epic, but I agree with most current narratologists who argue that description in any form typically performs a narrative function (e.g. Tsagalis 2011: De Jong (ed.) 2012:1-3). As a result, I do not believe it is productive to regard them as two different discourse modes (for the term, see Smith 2003). At the same time, however, the action of a character and the setting of that action may be presented in different linguistic forms, the transition between which I do regard as a narrative transition.

<sup>55</sup> See Slater 1983. Lyric narrative is related to the idea of "epic regression", on which see Schadewaldt 1987<sup>3</sup>[1938]:84 who speaks of "zeitlich rückschreitend" ("walking backward in time"); the term "epic regression" was coined by Krischer 1971:136-140.

<sup>56</sup> Slater 1983:118, referring to West 1966:161, on Hesiod, *Theogony* 22; see also Calame 1985.

transition into an embedded narrative, which is only one of many ways to embed a narrative in the larger plot. I revisit the construction briefly toward the end of this section.<sup>57</sup>

§22 The transition is more often accompanied by one or more particles, instead of or in addition to the use of ποτε. Very common in Homer is the combination of a pronoun followed by a particle (for which see chapter 5), but here I focus on the beginnings of embedded narratives marked by (combinations of) particles, sometimes along with other words. One of the particles most at home in the beginning of embedded narratives is γάρ.<sup>58</sup> Consider this passage from Agamemnon's speech to Diomedes in book 4:

(t6)

περὶ δ' ἄλλων φασὶ γενέσθαι. |  
 ἦτοι μὲν γὰρ ἄτερ πολέμου εἰσῆλθε Μυκῆνας |  
 ξεῖνος | ἄμ' ἀντιθέω Πολυνείκει | λαὸν ἀγείρων· |

*Iliad* 4.375-377

And they say he was beyond others.

Oh yes, for<sup>59</sup> he came to Mycene in peace

as a guest, with godlike Polyneices, to collect an army.

Agamemnon is talking to Diomedes about the latter's father Tydeus, in an attempt to get him back into the fight. Although he has never met Tydeus himself, Agamemnon has heard good things about him (line 375), which leads him to narrate the story about Tydeus' visit to Mycene (lines 376-398). Traditionally, γάρ is explained in this and other instances as

<sup>57</sup> See also chapter 5 for the different combinations of pronouns + particles and their functions.

<sup>58</sup> See Slings 1997 and De Jong 1997. The observation that γάρ often occurs at the beginning of embedded narratives has been noted before, e.g. by Sturz 1801:565 and Slater 1969:99.

<sup>59</sup> Although in some of the examples I have chosen to render this force of γάρ with “for”, this practice should not lead the reader to infer that γάρ always has a causal value, but rather that “for” also has a wider range of functions than just the causal.

providing the justification for what precedes, which would fit into its generally understood main “causal” or “explanatory” function.<sup>60</sup> Consider this relatively recent description by Sicking of γάρ in Lysias: “The purpose of sentences introduced by γάρ is primarily explanatory: they provide answers to all sorts of questions raised by the speaker’s utterances.”<sup>61</sup>

§23 For ancient Greek in general, Slings argues that “the most typical PUSH particle is γάρ,” which is to say that it is the particle most typically used to mark the displacement to a new “frame of reference.”<sup>62</sup> The PUSH is answered by a POP, which marks the return to the main line of narrative or argumentation.<sup>63</sup> De Jong has approached the use of γάρ in Homeric embedded narratives from a different angle, that of epic regression.<sup>64</sup> It appears to be a typical tool of the epic performer to work his way back from the outcome to the beginning of a story, at which point he tells it from beginning to end in more detail: D-C-B-A-A’-B’-C’-D’ in De Jong’s notation.<sup>65</sup> Since γάρ is the particle used to provide the cause or justification of something just mentioned, it fits quite naturally at the beginning of the receding steps C-B-A: D happened because C happened, C happened because B happened, and so on. Over time, a variant on this pattern emerged, D-A-B-C-D’, where the narrator tells the outcome and then skips immediately to the start of a story, which is thus as a whole introduced by γάρ.<sup>66</sup>

§24 Both Slings and De Jong’s approach to γάρ at the beginning of embedded narratives start from the idea that the essence of γάρ, and its basic function, is to provide explanation

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<sup>60</sup> See V.γάρ *passim*.

<sup>61</sup> Sicking 1993:23.

<sup>62</sup> Slings 1997:101: “Embedded sequences are characterised by the fact that they have a different ‘frame of reference’ from the embedding sequence.”

<sup>63</sup> See Slings 1997:101, who takes the PUSH-POP model from Polanyi and Scha 1983.

<sup>64</sup> De Jong 1997 “γάρ Introducing Embedded Narratives.”

<sup>65</sup> The typical example of this pattern is *Iliad* 1.8-16 (discussed in De Jong 1997:177), where we are brought from the outcome to the beginning of the story in successive steps, after which the full story is told from beginning to end.

<sup>66</sup> De Jong 1997:176-179; this is in essence the same kind of construction that Slater discusses, though using different terminology.

or justification. However, scholarship on γάρ is divided on the issue of what the original force of the particle was and – by extension – how that original force led to its different uses in later literature.<sup>67</sup> The *communis opinio* emerging from the end of the nineteenth century, and set in stone by Denniston, is that the causal function of γάρ is a development from an earlier affirmative function, which reflects the particle's origins in the combination γε + ἄρ.<sup>68</sup> Denniston, among others, argued that this force had been lost by the time of the earliest extant Greek literature, except in combinations.<sup>69</sup>

§25 One view that recurs throughout scholarship is that γάρ is relevant to starting new parts of discourse.<sup>70</sup> Hoogeveen initially called it “inchoative,” while in later scholarship it is more generally called asseverative.<sup>71</sup> The focus has been on γάρ in embedded narratives, as in the studies by Slings and De Jong discussed above, and parentheticals.<sup>72</sup> Although asseverative and inchoative are neutral adjectives, since they denote nothing more than a discontinuity, an assumption underlies many of these studies that γάρ marks its host act or move as in some way subordinate to its co-text.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Those scholars who regard γάρ as one of the easily understood particles (e.g. Hummel 1993:406) have focused on classical Attic literature in their analysis of the particle, where its use is quite narrow and specialized.

<sup>68</sup> Denniston 1950<sup>2</sup>:56, “The derivation of γάρ from γε and ἄρ, though occasionally challenged (...), has been pretty generally accepted by scholars.” Bäumlein 1861:68 exemplifies the approach to the original value of γάρ: “Es wird mithin durch γάρ der ganze Satz als unmittelbar gewiss und unbestreitbar, als eine Thatsache, die nun einmal so ist, nachdrücklich hervorgehoben” (“Through γάρ, the entire sentence is emphatically stressed as immediately certain and incontestable, as a fact that is simply the case”).

<sup>69</sup> Denniston 1950<sup>2</sup>:57, referring to Misener 1904:7-10.

<sup>70</sup> Bakker 1997:116-118 notes that γάρ often occurs at the start of the “anecdote” in the structure of the ἀνδροκτασία proposed by Beye 1964.

<sup>71</sup> Hoogeveen 1769:187-188; see also Sturz 1801:565-569 (on Xenophon) and Ebeling 1885:160-164 (on Homer). Denniston believes that the primary use of γάρ is asseverative (1950<sup>2</sup>:57), but he argues that this force is retained only in combinations. Compare also Bakker 1997:114 “...it is not surprising that γάρ is particularly at home in the vicinity of the starting point of all starting points, the very beginning of the epic tale.”

<sup>72</sup> For γάρ-parentheticals in Herodotus see the insightful analysis in Kerschensteiner 1964, and IV.3. Kerschensteiner 1964:36 argues that parentheticals often add crucial, rather than secondary, information (page 36); see also Lang 1984:6-12, although she does speak of “background digressions.”

<sup>73</sup> E.g. Sicking 1993:20 “subordinating the stretch (...) within the scope of the particle,” Slings 1997:102 “subsidiary,” Wakker 2009:69 “subsidiary explanation introduced by γάρ.” A similar view of the particle is

§26 The recent scholarship on γάρ, then, is characterized by these two tendencies, first the tendency to attribute some causal or explanatory value to all instances of γάρ, and second to regard the discourse introduced by γάρ as new, but also somehow backgrounded or subsidiary to the text that precedes it.<sup>74</sup> Both of these ideas may profit from a re-examination of γάρ from the perspective of the division of discourse into acts and moves. Like most particles – and like “because” or “for” in English – γάρ can mark relations both between acts and between moves.<sup>75</sup> Moreover, it can mark relations on a propositional or on a metalinguistic level: *de re* or *de dicto*. When γάρ is used *de dicto* it will most often function on the level of the move, but this is only a tendency, not a rule.

§27 The *de re* / *de dicto* distinction is relevant to the occurrence of γάρ at the beginning of embedded narratives, since γάρ in those instances should be regarded as metalinguistic. The particle says something about the direction of the upcoming discourse, not so much about the content of the upcoming sentence. Slings implies as much in his discussion of γάρ as a PUSH particle, but Bakker’s discussion of γάρ in terms of the “flow of speech” or “movement in speech” is clearer.<sup>76</sup> Bakker argues that the particle in Homer marks necessary steps in the flow of discourse, to develop something mentioned earlier;<sup>77</sup> this development has nothing to do with foreground or background.<sup>78</sup> He thus redirects attention to another aspect of the use of γάρ in Homer that vindicates the idea of an “explicative” function, but with a more literal understanding of its root “explic-”: “unfold”.

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held in the the paper presented by Luraghi and Celano 2012. De Jong and Bakker have actively opposed this notion.

<sup>74</sup> For more on γάρ introducing apparent background information, see chapter 4 §11-§28.

<sup>75</sup> Consider again Sicking’s note about “the purpose of sentences introduced by γάρ” [my emphasis]: he regards the force of γάρ as working on the level of the sentence only.

<sup>76</sup> Bakker 1997:112.

<sup>77</sup> Bakker 1997:112, see Hummel 1993:406 (on Pindar) for the same point.

<sup>78</sup> See Bakker 1997:113n50, with reference to Hopper 1979:215-216. Bakker’s description of γάρ is partly anticipated by Reynen 1958:89-90, who describes its use in *Iliad* 1.55 as making explicit something that has been implicit up to that point. See III.3 for a discussion of γάρ at the beginning of conversational turns, where the contention is likewise that γάρ does not introduce discourse that is in any sense secondary.

§28 Bakker's terminology of "developing" captures well what happens in the ongoing epic discourse. Every embedded narrative in Homer represents a choice, since with every character or event he refers to, the epic performer has the freedom to move on or to expand.<sup>79</sup> γάρ at the beginning of embedded narratives marks sections that are associative unfoldings of the collective memory that is the realm of the Homeric performer.<sup>80</sup> It represents the link that the performer perceives between the preceding and subsequent discourse, even if on the surface the two may seem unconnected. γάρ marks the activation by the performer of a narrative that relates to the ongoing narrative in some way: by enriching the story, reflecting upon it, or putting it in a different light. Sometimes the information provided in the γάρ move proves to be nonessential to the narrative, but more often it is indispensable to the development of the ongoing action. In (t6) above, for example, the story invoked by the performer, in the voice of Agamemnon, is a crucial part of Agamemnon's rhetorical strategy in his effort to persuade Diomedes.<sup>81</sup>

§29 In these contexts, it is thus best not to regard γάρ as explanatory, ("[I say this] because..."),<sup>82</sup> but as a marker of the cognitive act of association.<sup>83</sup> This association, moreover, occurs not on a microlevel but on a macrolevel: it is often not the sentence containing γάρ itself that is particularly relevant to the preceding, but the whole move that

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<sup>79</sup> See chapter 5 for more on expansions about characters and the crucial role of particles in guiding such passages.

<sup>80</sup> The use of γάρ to mark unframed discourse, as discussed in chapter 4, is not so much an unfolding as it is an associative insertion. In both cases there is a displacement, but here it is from one "frame of reference" to another, while in chapter 4 I discuss the movement between framed and unframed discourse. Regardless, it is never productive to talk about these displaced pieces of discourse as "background."

<sup>81</sup> Note, however, Kirk's comment (1985:1.368) that "such a *digression* was itself attractive from a narrative point of view" [my emphasis]. De Jong 2004<sup>2</sup>:155-157 rightly notes the function of the story here, anticipated by Austin 1966:300.

<sup>82</sup> This would be the equivalent of "epistemic because" in constructions like "John's out, because the light is off," discussed by Sweetser and Dancygier 2000:120-122.

<sup>83</sup> A combination that I will not discuss extensively is αἶ γάρ/εἰ γάρ (on which see Misener 1908 and Tabachovitz 1951), which introduces wishes. This is the best construction to illustrate that γάρ can not always be "explanatory" (*pace* Misener 1904 and 1908, who would see a causal relation even in these instances). However, these wishes always arise directly from a preceding thought or utterance, and γάρ signals how the upcoming move arises from the preceding discourse through cognitive association.



follows. That is to say, γάρ at the beginning of embedded-narrative moves marks the theme or idea represented by the move as relevant to the ongoing discourse.<sup>84</sup> The linguistic form of this move may be of any size, but it is more likely to be a multi-act unit than not.<sup>85</sup> A look through Homer and through Homeric scholarship shows that γάρ often occurs at the beginning of embedded narratives, so in the following discussion I focus more specifically on καὶ γάρ and ἥδη γάρ in Homer. In Pindaric song the range of functions of γάρ is the same as in Homer; in chapter 4 I explore one aspect of the particle's use by Pindar more closely.<sup>86</sup>

§30 About καὶ γάρ De Jong says the following: “καὶ γάρ typically signals the introduction of an example which must back up a general claim.”<sup>87</sup> More recently, Aftosmis has made the same claim for καὶ γάρ in Pindar.<sup>88</sup> De Jong's reading is appropriate for *Iliad* 22.46, and there are a number of parallels,<sup>89</sup> but the characterization of καὶ γάρ as introducing examples or paradigmata oversimplifies the combination's workings. This should not be a surprise, since καὶ γάρ is a combination of two particles and thus also a collocation of two spectra of functions, which would make it unlikely for the combination to have only a limited function.<sup>90</sup> In the forty-five instances of καὶ γάρ in Homer, we find combinations of the whole range of functions of both particles. De Jong chooses to focus on the function of καὶ

<sup>84</sup> This function is by its nature of course not limited to embedded narratives, but may also introduce other moves.

<sup>85</sup> Compare the discussion of καί in IV.2 §134-§138, concerning the boundaries of the second conjunct. The process described there for establishing the function of καί could similarly be applied to better understand the function of γάρ *de dicto*.

<sup>86</sup> A selection of examples of γάρ starting embedded narratives in Pindar: *Olympian* 1.55, 2.48, 7.27, 7.48, *Pythian* 2.25, 3.25, 5.83, 6.32, 9.114, *Nemean* 6.34, 8.26, 9.13, 10.60, *Isthmian* 1.17.

<sup>87</sup> De Jong 2012:71, *ad* 22.46; the passage reads as follows: καὶ γὰρ νῦν δύο παῖδε Λυκάονα καὶ Πολύδωρον / οὐ δύναμαι ἰδέειν. *Gesamtkommentar* 2009:VIII.2.216 makes the same observation about καὶ γάρ at *Iliad* 24.602.

<sup>88</sup> Aftosmis 2010:244-270, where he also discusses οὐδὲ γάρ (on which see note 96 below). καὶ γάρ occurs eleven times in Pindar: *Olympian* 7.27, *Pythian* 1.10, 4.181, 9.42, 10.59, *Nemean* 1.50, 1.67, 6.34, *Isthmian* 2.30, 5.4, 5.26; οὐδὲ γάρ once: *Olympian* 14.8.

<sup>89</sup> There are 9 instances out of 45 (22+23) total occurrences of καὶ γάρ in Homer that may be said to introduce particular “examples” in the sense perhaps meant by De Jong 2012 (she does not offer any parallels *ad loc.*): *Iliad* 2.292, 2.377 (example in the form of a little narrative), 5.478 (example in the form of a little narrative), 9.502, 16.810, 22.46, 24.602 (example in the form of a little narrative); *Odyssey* 4.199, 14.70, 17.566.

<sup>90</sup> See I.1 and below §42 on ἦ in combinations.

γάρ to introduce *exempla*, but her claim that this is “typical” is unfounded. I am more interested in the combination’s use in introducing associative narratives, a group of twelve instances that overlaps in part with De Jong’s paradigmatic narratives.<sup>91</sup> The following example of καὶ γάρ from the last book of the *Iliad* represents De Jong’s idea of the introduction of an example, while it takes the form of an associative narrative:<sup>92</sup>

(t7)

νῦν δὲ μνησώμεθα δόρπου. |  
καὶ γάρ τ’<sup>93</sup> ἠΰκομος Νιόβη ἐμνήσατο σίτου, |  
τῇ περ δώδεκα παῖδες ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν ὄλοντο |

*Iliad* 24.601-603

Now let us remember the meal.

After all even pretty-haired Niobe thought of food,  
though for her twelve children died in the halls

As in (t6), the narrative serves as a persuasive device, and again it is triggered by association in the performer’s mind. The example of Niobe’s story is triggered by the parallel with Priam: just as she ate despite her grief, so Priam should too. It is the association between the two episodes that explains why we find γάρ.<sup>94</sup> In this instance,

<sup>91</sup> *Iliad* 2.377, 9.502, 9.533, 11.698, 19.52, 19.95, 24.602; *Odyssey* 2.17, 17.419, 18.138, 19.75, 19.186.

<sup>92</sup> The Niobe narrative is a classical example of a ring-composition; see Richardson 1993:339-340 and *Gesamtkommentar* 2009:VIII.2.212-215.

<sup>93</sup> A possible explanation for the occurrence of τε in instances like this is that it marks a tradition shared between performer and audience, here the famous story of Niobe; I translate “after all.” For an extensive discussion of this aspect of τε see IV.2 §54-§69 and for the particle’s use in Homer see chapter 4 §31-§37 and §54-§68.

<sup>94</sup> De Jong 1997 quotes a few more instances of γάρ introducing embedded narratives: *Iliad* 4.467, 6.130 (see below), 6.37-43, 14.315; *Odyssey* 1.260, 3.262, 3.276, 4.677, 14.244, 14.317. These narratives are listed not only because of the use of γάρ, but also because of their regressive structure. As the examples cited here and in the rest of the chapter show, however, it does not look like the function of γάρ in such contexts should be linked to the recessive nature of the narrative.

there is no doubt that the story introduced by γάρ represents a paradigmatic narrative meant to persuade the interlocutors to have dinner. As such, it is a particular example that follows after a general claim. However, association is the key element in the relation between the preceding and upcoming move signalled by γάρ. As a result, the new move can also be a general statement following upon a particular one; the inverse of an example backing up a general claim.<sup>95</sup>

§31 The apparently specialized function of the combination καὶ γάρ in these instances to introduce associative narratives in fact follows naturally from the combination of καί and γάρ. The twelve instances where καὶ γάρ introduces an associative narrative involve three different functions of καί, while the function of γάρ remains constant. The relevant functions of καί, discussed at length in IV.2, are the scalar function, the function of pinning down, and the more common function of marking similarity. In the little narratives, the inset story features either *better* men, women, or gods doing something that should enlighten the course of action in the current situation,<sup>96</sup> or something that happened to one person or group *in particular*,<sup>97</sup> or something that was *also* once the case for someone else.<sup>98</sup>

§32 The scalar force of καὶ X (“even X...”) is especially suited to introducing a paradigmatic story, since if even in more dire situations better men did something, how

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<sup>95</sup> See for an example of this (t29) below.

<sup>96</sup> Zeus in *Iliad* 19.95 and Niobe in *Iliad* 24.602. Note also *Iliad* 6.130 οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ Δρύαντος υἱὸς | κρατερὸς Λυκόοργος | δὴν ἦν | and 18.117-119 οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ βίη Ἡρακλῆος φύγε κῆρα, which show that the opposite of the scalar function of καί can be rendered with οὐδέ “not even.” These are the only two cases where οὐδέ γάρ introduces an associative narrative (out of 9 + 3 instances in Homer). On οὐδέ as the “negative scalar particle” see Cooper 2002:4.3069 (*sub P*), Denniston 1954<sup>2</sup>:196, Ruijgh 1971:190, and Willmott 2011:13-15.

<sup>97</sup> The Curetes had been the victim of Artemis’ wrath in *Iliad* 9.533; Neleus was owed a debt from the Eleians in *Iliad* 11.698; Aegyptius’ son was killed by the Cyclops in *Odyssey* 2.17.

<sup>98</sup> Agamemnon too had been wounded by Coön in *Iliad* 19.52; Odysseus too had once lived in a house amongst his men in *Odyssey* 17.419-421, 18.138, and 19.75; Odysseus-in-disguise speaks of seeing himself coming to Crete too in *Odyssey* 19.186.

could we not follow their example?<sup>99</sup> The second group involves the pinning-down function of *καί*, where one person or group is singled out from an earlier collective.<sup>100</sup> Finally the last four instances, all in the *Odyssey*, show perhaps the most familiar face of *καί* marking a perceived parallel, to be translated as “too” or “also.”<sup>101</sup> The function of *γάρ* in all these instances does not fluctuate as that of *καί* does, but in all cases it marks an association between the new move and the ongoing narrative. Because of the differences among even these few cases, it is unproductive to think of *καὶ γάρ* as working in a cluster with one specific function in Homer. In Homer the two particles work separately, combining different functions of *καί* with *γάρ* to introduce different kinds of moves. The new move may be a paradigmatic narrative, as in the case of the Niobe story, but it may also be associated to the surrounding discourse in other ways, depending on the function of *καί*.

§33 The function of *γάρ* to introduce associative narratives illustrates the particle’s importance for the process of producing, unfolding the narrative. Not surprisingly, then, *γάρ* can introduce narratives in other combinations than only with *καί*, as in the following passage from *Iliad* book 3, where Antenor describes Odysseus to Priam. We are on the walls of Troy, and Helen is pointing out the best of the Achaeans at Priam’s request. After her brief introduction of Odysseus, Antenor pitches in with an associative narrative to illustrate where Odysseus’ real talents lie:

(t8)

Τὴν δ’ αὖτ’ Ἀντήνωρ πεπνυμένος ἀντίον ἤυδα·

“ὦ γύναι | ἦ μάλα τοῦτο ἔπος νημερτὲς ἔειπες |

<sup>99</sup> In the words of Richardson 1993:340 on the Niobe narrative (t7), these are arguments “*a fortiori*.” See for *καί* as a scalar particle IV.2 §124 and Bakker 1988:75, 84, 113-119, and 205.

<sup>100</sup> See IV.2 §102-§105 for *καί* used to pin down something specific.

<sup>101</sup> See IV.2 §124 for *καί* rendered as “also”; Denniston 1950<sup>2</sup>:293 calls this function “responsive,” but without clarification of the term.

ἤδη γὰρ καὶ δεῦρό ποτ'<sup>102</sup> ἦλυθε | δῖος Ὀδυσσεὺς |

*Iliad* 3.203-205

Her in turn did Antenor the prudent respond:

“Milady, really you told that story truthfully.”<sup>103</sup>

For already here too once came noble Odysseus.<sup>104</sup>

In a valiant attempt to do justice to the string ἤδη γὰρ καὶ δεῦρό ποτ', Murray translates line 204 as: “for (γὰρ) once (ποτ') before (ἤδη) also (καί) noble Odysseus came here (δεῦρο).”<sup>105</sup> This translation sounds forced because, among other reasons, it stretches the meaning of ἤδη. The presence of ποτε (“once”) means that the most common sense of the temporal adverb, “already”, would be superfluous. Murray here translates it to mean “at some point before the present,” when elsewhere in Homer it always bears a relation to the present, so “now” or “already” in the sense of “by now.”<sup>106</sup> Adverbs like ἤδη are called “mobile,” since they can occur in any position in an act. Thus we find it at the beginning (*Odyssey* 2.89 ἤδη γὰρ τρίτον ἔστιν ἔτος, “it is already the third year”), in the middle (*Iliad* 7.293 νῦξ δ' ἤδη τελέθει “and night is already here”), or at the end (*Odyssey* 1.303 αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν ἐπὶ νῆα θοὴν κατελεύσομαι ἤδη “and I will go to my swift ship now”).<sup>107</sup> In (t8) and a

<sup>102</sup> Note that this construction brings to mind the introduction of the “lyric narrative” as discussed by Slater and West, including ποτε and the aorist, but without the pronoun.

<sup>103</sup> νήμερτες is an adjective that goes with ἔπος, but I translate it as an adverb to better render τοῦτο.

<sup>104</sup> Here and in the following examples I give the text of the editions (ἤδη) and translate accordingly (“already”).

<sup>105</sup> *Gesamtkommentar* 2009:III.2.84 takes γὰρ as explanatory: “γὰρ leitet eine Erzählung ein, die als ganze zur Erklärung der vorausgehenden Aussage dient” (“γὰρ introduces a narrative, which as a whole serves to explain the preceding utterance”).

<sup>106</sup> See Thiersch 1852:427.

<sup>107</sup> Thomas 1894:81-83 does note rightly that in Homer in a large number of cases ἤδη is limited to the initial position. This may suggest that ἤδη evolved out of (initial) ἦ + δή, as Thomas believes (84: “In the first part of ἤδη we have plainly nothing but the common circumflexed asseverative particle [ἦ]”). Thiersch 1852:427, conversely, assumes that the manuscripts wrongly render ἤδη in initial position for a certain number of instances and proposes to read ἤδη with a purely temporal sense especially where ἤδη is found in non-initial position (*fit hoc imprimis, si ἤδη in media sententia aut post alias particulas infertur*).

number of parallels, however, I believe that we are not looking at ἤδη at the beginning of an embedded narrative, but at ἤ δή. In the following section, I argue that a number of instances of ἤδη γάρ in the *Iliad* may in fact represent ἤ δὴ γάρ. To back up that argument, I discuss the relevant passages in relation to the instances where our manuscripts do read ἤ δή. Finally, I offer a possible explanation of ἤ in these and similar contexts. Since the relevant instances of ἤδη γάρ are limited to the *Iliad*, I discuss no examples from the *Odyssey*.

§34 Although the manuscripts – especially Venetus A and B – offer valuable readings, strings of letters like HΔH are often ambiguous, and the choices made by the medieval scribes and more recently by editors are to some extent arbitrary.<sup>108</sup> When found at act beginning, HΔH may equally resolve as either ἤδη or ἤ δή.<sup>109</sup> The combination ἤ δή is restricted to act-initial position, since ἤ is initial in Homer. The use of ἤδη throughout the Homeric epics shows beyond doubt that it can be a mobile adverb with the meaning of “already” or “(by) now.” However, it is not to be taken for granted that whenever our manuscripts have ἤδη it is the adverb that we should read. The nature of the textual transmission of the Homeric corpus means that it is possible that HΔH (ΓAP) at verse beginning was simply rendered homogeneously as ἤδη γάρ despite the fact that in some cases it stood for ἤ δὴ γάρ.<sup>110</sup>

<sup>108</sup> Consider, for example, the reading of *Iliad* 1.453 in Ven. A and B: ἤδη μὲν (ἤ μὲν δὴ edd.)

<sup>109</sup> ἤ δή and ἤ δὴ are also possible, but it is normally easier to establish if a feminine relative pronoun is warranted in a sentence.

<sup>110</sup> The instances of ἤδη γάρ at the beginning of narratives are: *Iliad* 1.260, 1.590, 3.206, 5.188, 14.249; in all of these cases ἤδη γάρ is verse-initial. The same use may be found in Hesiod *Theogony* 645-646: ὄφρ’ εἴπω τά με θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι κελεύει / ἤδη γὰρ μάλα δηρὸν ἐναντίοι ἀλλήλοισι, which is one of only two instances of verse-initial ἤδη γάρ in Hesiod.

Since ἤδη is a mobile, there are also instances where ἤδη in first position does mean “already” or “(by) now,” and as a result there is no beginning of a new move, namely: *Iliad* 5.206, 6.361, 14.206 (=14.305), 15.110, 15.139, 15.613, 19.334, 20.306, 23.623, 24.765; In the *Odyssey*, ἤδη γάρ is never used to introduce an embedded narrative; the instances are: 2.89, 2.211, 3.335, 5.161, 5.223, 6.34, 10.381, 12.451, 13.40, 15.16, 15.66, 17.606, 19.160, 19.222, 20.309. In the majority of instances the adverb is here followed by a present, an imperative, or vṽv.

§35 Now to return to (t8) above, I propose the following reading: ἦ | δὴ γάρ καὶ δεῦρό ποτ' ἦλυθε | δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς | (“Oh yes (ἦ), for actually (δὴ γάρ) he came right here<sup>111</sup> once, god-like Odysseus”). This reading of ἦ as a separate act with interjectional value and a distinct prosodic contour marks a strong discontinuity in the discourse, here the start of an embedded narrative. This use of ἦ at move beginning has many parallels in Homer. We find this asseverative force of ἦ in the string ἦ δὴ at the start of direct speech (see below), in ἦτοι (or ἦ τοι),<sup>112</sup> ἦδη, the swearing formula ἦ μὴν, and possibly even the apparent verb form ἦ (“he spoke”, from ἦμι) in Homeric discourse.<sup>113</sup> Moreover, the string δὴ γάρ at act beginning is uniquely Homeric. In Homer we find a limited number of constructions that allow δὴ at act beginning: δὴ γάρ (never at verse beginning), δὴ τότε, δὴ ῥα τότε (both always at verse beginning). In four other separate instances the position of δὴ is debatable.<sup>114</sup> In later Greek δὴ becomes mostly restricted to peninitial position in the act.<sup>115</sup> The fact that δὴ γάρ is never found at verse beginning<sup>116</sup> may be another reason why we find the string ἦ δὴ γάρ.<sup>117</sup>

§36 Compare the following introduction of another associative narrative in *Iliad* 1:<sup>118</sup>

<sup>111</sup> See IV.2 §102-§105 for this pinning-down function of καί.

<sup>112</sup> Thiersch 1852:428 argues that ἦτοι never serves to introduce the first part of an antithesis (contra Apollonius Dyscolus and the recent *communis opinio*, see also Ruijgh 1981), but in fact always serves to start something new (*asseverat*) with a conclusive force from τοι. Ruijgh 1981 reads ἦτοι in narrative and ἦ τοι in direct speech, but Thiersch 1852:452-453 argues that we should read ἦ τοι everywhere in Homer.

<sup>113</sup> Compare the use of interjections after direct speech in the Serbo-Croatian epic song discussed in Bonifazi and Elmer 2012, with examples from PN 662, line 32 “...” *Hey, when the serdar's company heard this* on page 302 and line 476 “...” *Oh, when Halil understood these words* on page 304.

<sup>114</sup> *Iliad* 15.437, 19.342, 23.785, and 24.243, see §57-§63 for a discussion of all four passages. Note that these cases are restricted to the *Iliad*, just like the instances of ἦ δὴ γάρ starting an embedded narrative. See IV.4 for a discussion of γὰρ δὴ in Herodotus.

<sup>115</sup> Except in Hesiod (8 instances of δὴ in initial position) and later imitations of the Homeric style. See IV.3 for δὴ in μὲν δὴ and other combinations in Herodotus and Thucydides.

<sup>116</sup> Metrically it would be quite at home at verse beginning, since the combination often forms a trochae within the verse.

<sup>117</sup> For a discussion of further instances of δὴ γάρ, see §62.

<sup>118</sup> *Gesamtkommentar* 2000:I.2.180 calls the narrative a paradigm, which serves to justify (begründen) Hephaestus' warning.

(t9)

ἀργαλέος γὰρ Ὀλύμπιος ἀντιφέρεσθαι |  
 ἤδη γὰρ με καὶ ἄλλοτ' | ἀλεξέμεναι μεμαῶτα |  
 ῥῖψε ποδὸς τεταγὼν ἀπὸ βηλοῦ θεσπεσίοιο, |

*Iliad* 1.589-591

Because the Olympian is dangerous to oppose.

For already also another time, as I was trying to save you,  
 he threw me, having seized my foot, from the divine threshold.

Line 589 may be read alternatively, with my emendation, as follows: ἤ | δὴ γὰρ με (“Yes, for actually (καί) another time, as I was trying to save you, he threw me...”). If we want to read ἤδη with the manuscripts, the same temporal problem holds as in (t8) above. The event has direct relevance to the present, but if ἤδη indeed is a temporal marker here, its function is not to emphasize that it has “already happened,” but that it “happened at some point before the present” which is in fact fully expressed by ἄλλοτε, as it is by ποτε in (t8).

§37 These two examples may suggest that we should always translate ἤ as “(Oh) yes...” but the exact translation is not the point.<sup>119</sup> The force I would ascribe to ἤ is connected to its prosodic contour, and carries no fixed semantic load. Compare this example from *Iliad* book 14:

(t10)

Ζηνὸς δ' | οὐκ ἄν ἔγωγε Κρονίου ἄσπον ἰκοίμην |

<sup>119</sup> The association of ἤ with affirmation is widespread in earlier scholarship, but Ruijgh 1971:192-194 first argues that it was actually the positive antithesis of οὐ (“Or, il nous paraît possible que dans la préhistoire du grec, ἤ ait eu la fonction et la valeur représentées plus tard par ναί ‘oui!’” 192), and his argument is followed by Sicking 1993:55. The problem of paraphrasing ἤ is well illustrated by Stephens 1837:43, when he paraphrases ἤ πολλά (Sophocles, *Ajax* 1418) as “Much, yes, *much*” [italics original], but does not put forward “yes” as one of the possible ways to render ἤ. “Yes” + repetition happens to be a way to emphasize a word in English (which is what Stephens wants to render), but this does not mean he regards ἤ and “yes” as equivalent in that passage.



οὐδὲ κατευνήσαιμ', | ὅτε μὴ αὐτός γε κελεύοι. |

ἤδη γάρ με καὶ ἄλλο τεῖ<sup>120</sup> ἐπίνυσσεν ἐφετμή |

*Iliad* 14.247-249

To Zeus, I would not go any closer to Cronus' son,

nor would I lull him into sleep, if it were not he himself that ordered me.

For already also another time your command taught me,

If we read ἦ | δὴ γάρ με here, the thought expressed is perhaps best rendered in English as “no” (“No, for actually also another time your command taught me”). A little narrative of that earlier event then follows.

§38 All of the examples above occur in direct speech, where ἦ might at the same time be regarded as a sign of the character's involvement.<sup>121</sup> In fact, where the manuscripts consistently give ἦ δὴ rather than ἤδη, the particles always occur at the start of direct speech.<sup>122</sup> These passages provide another argument to read ἦ | δὴ γάρ rather than ἤδη γάρ in the examples discussed above and their parallels. Three instances are especially relevant: *Iliad* 15.467, 17.538, and 21.583. For *Iliad* 15.467 the Venetus A manuscript offers an informative reading: “ὦ πόποι· ἦ, δὴ πάγχυ...”<sup>123</sup> The comma after ἦ suggests a pause after

<sup>120</sup> See Janko 1992:190-191 for the textual problems in this line, especially regarding ἄλλο τεῖ.

<sup>121</sup> See especially Cuypers 2006 for Homer, who argues that ἦ almost exclusively occurs in direct speech. This is a problematic statistic, however, because ἦ is a typical lexical item that is subject to a lot of editorial interference. For example, there is no consensus about whether the string HTOI should be rendered always as ἦτοι, always as ἦτοι, or one or the other depending on the context. Ruijgh 1981 reads ἦτοι in narrative and ἦτοι in direct speech, but consider Thiersch 1852:452-453, who argues we should read ἦτοι everywhere in Homer. Murray's Loeb text gives ἦτοι everywhere, while Van Thiel 1996 and West 1999 give ἦτοι in narrator text in the *Iliad*; but compare Garvie 1994 and Steiner 2010 (with note on page 96) who consistently print ἦτοι in their *Odyssey* texts.

<sup>122</sup> The instances of ἦ δὴ in Homer are: *Iliad* 1.518, 1.573, 2.272, 2.337, 14.53, 15.467, 17.538 (ἦ δὴ μὲν), 21.583 (ἦ δὴ που), 24.518, compare moreover 17.629 ἤδη μὲν (ἦ δὴ μὲν N; West does not note the variant in his apparatus); *Odyssey* 1.253, 5.182. Compare also ἦ καί at the start of direct speech in *Iliad* 6.441 and *Odyssey* 1.158, 21.131; *Iliad* 6.518, 8.102, 11.441, 15.14, 22.29, 22.297, 22.373 and *Odyssey* 1.384, 4.169, 4.333, 4.770, 5.286, 9.507, 11.436, 12.297, 13.172, 13.383, 15.486, 17.124, 17.264, 22.151, 23.149 ἦ μάλα δὴ; *Iliad* 21.54 ἦ μέγα θαῦμα.

<sup>123</sup> Compare the act-initial δὴ πᾶμπαν in *Iliad* 19.342, see §60-§61.

this single syllable, a reading that I would propose for the examples of ἤδη γάρ under discussion, listed in note 110.<sup>124</sup> The other two relevant instances of ἤ δὴ at the start of direct speech, *Iliad* 17.538 and 21.583, are similar to ἤδη γάρ in that another second-position word follows δὴ: it is followed by μάν in *Iliad* 17.538 and πού in *Iliad* 21.583. Whereas πού, being an enclitic, is often pushed back,<sup>125</sup> μάν is accented and is never pushed from its second position by another second-position word in Homer,<sup>126</sup> except in this passage, *Iliad* 17.538.<sup>127</sup> This exception suggest that here μάν is in fact in its normal second position, and that ἤ, as in the beginnings of embedded narratives in ἤδη γάρ (or ἤ δὴ γάρ, as I propose), forms its own discourse act.<sup>128</sup> Seeing Hector and Aeneas flee before the Aiantes, Patroclus' charioteer Automedon rejoices for having killed Aretus:

(t11)

τεύχεά τ' ἔξενάριξε καὶ εὐχόμενος ἔπος ηὔδα· |  
 “ἤ | δὴ μάν ὀλίγον γε | Μενoitιάδαο θανόντος |  
 κῆρ ἄχεος μεθέηκα | χερείονά περ καταπέφνων.” |

*Iliad* 17.537-539

He stripped him of his armor he spoke this word in prayer:

<sup>124</sup> See IV.3 for the relation of prosody to punctuation in medieval manuscripts.

<sup>125</sup> Although even the position of πού seems to have caused some confusion in 21.583: since the scholiast Herodian notes that some manuscripts wrongly (οὐκ εὔ) read ἤδη here.

<sup>126</sup> Only by the first-position word ἀλλά followed by οὐ: *Iliad* 5.895, 17.41, 17.448, 23.441.

<sup>127</sup> There are no instances of μάν δὴ, but this may be the result of the fact that μάν, μὴν, and μέν before consonants were normalized to μέν. There are 59 (33+26) instances of μέν δὴ in Homer, of which nine instances have ἤ μέν δὴ: *Iliad* 1.453, 2.798, 3.430, 7.97, 9.348, 16.362; *Odyssey* 4.33, 14.216, 18.257.

See Nägelsbach 1834: 153-176, Friedländer 1859:820-823, Bäumlein 1861:153-154, and Wackernagel 1916:177-182 on μέν, μάν, and μὴν in Homer, and specifically on the interchangeability of μέν and μὴν/μάν in Homer see Nägelsbach 1834:159-167, Cobet 1875:365-367, and Leumann 1949:85-89. One of their conclusions is that μέν was probably written before consonants and μάν before vowels.

<sup>128</sup> This would mean that there was one other construction which retained δὴ in act-initial position: δὴ μάν before vowel, as in *Iliad* 17.538 and δὴ μέν before consonant as in *Iliad* 17.629, with possible parallels in *Iliad* 20.187 ἤδη (ἤ δὴ?) μέν and *Odyssey* 24.506 ἤδη (ἤ δὴ?) μέν. In the other instances of ἤδη μέν, I believe we find the adverb ἤδη.

“Yes! Surely at least a little, now that Menoetius’ son died,  
I have eased my heart, having killed only a lesser one.”

As a marker of discursive discontinuity,  $\tilde{\eta}$  is not limited to introducing embedded narratives, which I argue it does in the cluster  $\tilde{\eta} \mid \delta\eta \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ . In (t11)  $\tilde{\eta}$  starts direct speech (with numerous parallels in note 122) and it regularly occurs at the start of oaths (in the cluster  $\tilde{\eta} \mu\eta\nu$ ). In both cases one can imagine the effectiveness of a prosodic interruption in the form of  $\tilde{\eta}$  to mark the transition to a new kind of discourse, a new move.<sup>129</sup>

§39 This correlation between the occurrence of  $\tilde{\eta}$  and the start of a new move supports several scholars’ characterization of  $\tilde{\eta}$  as asseverative.<sup>130</sup> More often, however, descriptions of  $\tilde{\eta}$  focus on the function of affirming what the speaker is saying, as a marker of (emotional) involvement.<sup>131</sup> Whether it is actually used in dialogue, as in drama, or not, its force is generally understood as dialogic in nature. For the passages cited above, I have translated  $\tilde{\eta}$  as a reaction to an implicit question, to better render the discontinuity I perceive.<sup>132</sup> It marks the speaker anticipating a likely question from his audience, and answering it with the narrative (or other kind of move) that is relevant to the imagined question. At the start of direct speech,  $\tilde{\eta}$  rather marks a reaction to something that just happened, as Automedon reacts to what he has done in (t11).

§40 The majority of approaches to  $\tilde{\eta}$  have focused on its possible force and function on the sentence level, with little attention to its place within the larger discourse. Despite etymologists’ observations that the particle may derive from an interjection, few scholars

<sup>129</sup> See also Scodel 2012:329, “ $\tilde{\eta}$  (...) most often appear[s] at this boundary where an individual, internal judgment meets the outside world—or the judgment of others.”

<sup>130</sup> See Thiersch 1852:424–440, Thomas 1894:81–85, Smyth 1956:649, Slater 1969:223; compare also Kühner 1835:391 where he argues that  $\tilde{\eta} \mu\eta\nu$  introduces an autonomous expression.

<sup>131</sup> See V. $\tilde{\eta}$  *passim*; most recently, Sicking 1993, Van Erp Taalman Kip 1997, Wakker 1997, Cuypers 2006, and Caspers 2010 have discussed the particle in terms of the interaction between speaker and hearer. See III.3 on the function of  $\tilde{\eta}$  in tragic and comic dialogue, and IV.4 on  $\tilde{\eta} \mu\acute{\alpha}\nu$  and  $\tilde{\eta}\delta\eta$  ( $\tilde{\eta} \delta\eta$ ) linked to speaker involvement.

<sup>132</sup> See Humbert 1960:406, who imagines the speaker talking to himself: “comme qui se dirait: ‘Oui, c’est bien ainsi’” (“as if someone said to himself: ‘Yes, it is really like that.’”).

have regarded ῥ̃ from this angle.<sup>133</sup> Primary interjections are linguistic renderings of often non-lexical exclamations, and as a result their force lies less in their semantic content (if there is any)<sup>134</sup> and much more in their prosodic contour.<sup>135</sup> Consider the following definition of an interjection by Ameka: “Primary interjections are little words or non-words which (...) can constitute an utterance by themselves. (...) They could be uttered as co-utterances with other units.”<sup>136</sup> And this same author adds that interjections are “always separated by a pause from the other utterances with which they may co-occur.”<sup>137</sup>

§41 I propose that we consider a continuum for the pronunciation of ῥ̃, ranging from a full interjection,<sup>138</sup> reflecting its possible origin, to the disjunctive particle ῥ̃, which has a rather narrow and clear function. This continuum might be regarded as the synchronic reflection of a diachronic evolution.<sup>139</sup> Likewise, the Homeric corpus shows traces of δη̃ as a mobile adverb but also as a particle restricted to second position, while the combination ῥ̃ + δη̃ = ῥ̃δη̃ became a mobile adverb, possibly under the influence of δη̃.<sup>140</sup> If ῥ̃ was indeed originally an interjection, it would have constituted a discourse act by itself, as a vocative does, for example.<sup>141</sup> ῥ̃'s origin as an interjection would explain why it developed into a particle restricted to act-initial position. An independent interjection would always be used before (or after) another act, and if it were to be assimilated into one of the surrounding

<sup>133</sup> See Schwyzler and Debrunner 1950:II.564, Ruijgh 1971:192, Chantraine 2009<sup>2</sup>:387, Beekes 2010:I.507.

<sup>134</sup> Although Nordgren 2012 attempts to establish the semantics of interjections in ancient Greek drama.

<sup>135</sup> See Biraud 2010 for a discussion of the possible prosodic realization of ancient Greek interjections, compare Norrick 2009:868-869 for the prosodic quality of interjections in English.

<sup>136</sup> Ameka 1992, with the definition on page 105; see also Nordgren 2012:8-15 for the discussion of the term as applied to ancient Greek.

<sup>137</sup> Ameka 1992:108.

<sup>138</sup> As apparently imagined by the scribe of Venetus A at *Iliad* 15.467, see §38.

<sup>139</sup> Given the apparent different linguistic layers in the Homeric corpus, it may even be a direct representation of the diachronic development, with different uses of ῥ̃ reflecting different stages in the creation of the text. However, I would insist that it is not problematic to assume that a certain lexical item is used in different ways at one moment in time, with the native speakers often not even conscious of the differences between them, or, conversely, of their common ancestry; see Koier 2013:19-23 for more on this concept.

<sup>140</sup> For a discussion of the different functions of δη̃ in Homer see §53-64.

<sup>141</sup> See Fraenkel 1933 for more on the vocative and act boundaries (*Kolon*-boundaries in his terms).

acts, the interjection would most naturally come at the end of the preceding act or the beginning of the following. Since interjections in Greek are often turn-initial,<sup>142</sup> it makes sense that ἦ would become restricted to act-initial position.<sup>143</sup>

§42 Because of its initial position, ἦ will have become collocated with peninitial words, often other particles. The resulting collocations then specialized into combinations with specific functions (such as ἦ μέν/μήν/μάν to introduce oaths, and ἦ γάρ as a tag question requesting confirmation). The existence of these specializations, however, should not blind us to the original force of the component parts, for two reasons. First, the specialized combination could only come to work as it does because of the function of the particles that originally formed it; a cluster does not form arbitrarily. Second, the fact that a certain cluster specializes into a specific function does not mean that every instance of the combination must have this specialized function.<sup>144</sup> For example, ἦ μέν does not always have to introduce an oath: it may also occur where ἦ is used to mark another kind of new move and μέν marks its host act as the beginning of a larger part of discourse. Likewise ΗΔΗ is not always ἦδη, ΗΤΟΙ can be both ἦ τοι and ἦτοι, and so on.<sup>145</sup>

§43 It is important to remember that even the consensus readings of Homeric manuscripts, scholia, and editions, are fallible. By exercising due skepticism, we may identify phenomena that orthography has obscured. As becomes clear only when one takes into account the larger discourse, the instances of ἦ (δή) above form a separate group that shows a specific (perhaps older) function of ἦ. On its own and in combination with other particles in Homer, ἦ may serve as a prosodic marker of the beginning of a new move, a

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<sup>142</sup> Nordgren 2012:52-55.

<sup>143</sup> Of course, they share this characteristic with discourse markers or pragmatic markers (see Norrick 2009:870), under which many particles may be subsumed.

<sup>144</sup> Compare the discussion of καὶ γάρ in the Homeric epics in §27-§28.

<sup>145</sup> This includes the start of an associative narrative in *Iliad* 6.414 ἦ τοι γάρ, 19.100 ἦτοι ὁ γε, as well as the instances where ἦ τοι introduces indirect speech or indirect thought, as in *Odyssey* 5.383: αὐτὰρ Ἀθηναίη κούρη Διὸς ἄλλ' ἐνόησεν / ἦ τοι τῶν ἄλλων. Compare also *Iliad* 15.699 ὅδ' ἦν νόος | ἦ τοι Ἀχαιοί; see IV.4 for ἦ δή and ἦ μήν in historiography.

paralinguistic means to signal discontinuities in the discourse.<sup>146</sup> However, this does not mean that it does not function at the same time as a marker of speaker involvement, as it has been described in most of the recent publications.<sup>147</sup> The particle can mark a discontinuity or salient moment in the interaction, and at the same time it may reflect the emotional engagement of the speaker.<sup>148</sup>

§44 For different reasons, then, both γάρ and ἤ occur at the beginning of embedded narratives or other moves. The force of γάρ is too often regarded as clearly causal or explanatory, but as I have argued, the causal function does not best describe its force when used *de dicto* in epic or lyric. As for ἤ, I have offered an analysis that considers its function in the flow of discourse, taking into account its possible origin. Whereas the use of γάρ must perhaps be seen as a result of the cognitive activities of composer or performer, the use of ἤ is a direct reflection of an interactional situation, either real or imagined. I analyze the function of δὲ in the combination δὲ γάρ below (§62) and in chapter 4 (II.4 §19).

### 3.2.3 Other narrative markers

§45 Beside ἤ and γάρ, however, there are multiple other linguistic means to start embedded narratives, especially temporal or spatial markers. Since such markers are not the main concern in this study, a quick overview will suffice. Embedded narratives in epic represent unfoldings on the path through the Homeric storyworld. Certain locales in the storyworld bring with them longer or shorter stories. These can be told at any point when the place is mentioned in the narrative, and the stories can therefore be activated with adverbs of place. Consider the following excerpt from Odysseus' stories:

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<sup>146</sup> The corpus of these instances is not complete, there are several other instances of ἤδὲ at move beginnings, and probably others of ἤ + X as well. For now I have focused on ἤδὲ γάρ and ἤ δὲ in the manuscripts. Consider for example *Iliad* 20.187 ἤδὲ μὲν σέ γέ φημι καὶ ἄλλοτε δούρῳ φοβῆσαι (similar in *Odyssey* 24.506) and instances of ἤδὲ νῦν such as *Odyssey* 10.472, 15.65, 16.168, and perhaps ἤδὲ τοι in *Odyssey* 22.101.

<sup>147</sup> See note 131 above.

<sup>148</sup> I maintain this point in spite of Norrick's remark (2009:868) that in his sizeable English corpus "many primary interjections do not express emotions, as is often maintained of interjections generally, but rather information states."

(t12)

Θρινακίην δ' ἔς νῆσον ἀφίξεαι· | ἔνθα δὲ πολλὰ  
βόσκοντ' Ἡελίοιο βόες | καὶ ἴφια μῆλα.

Odyssey 12.127-128

And you will come to the island of Thrinacia. There in numbers  
graze the cattle of Helios and his strong flocks.

ἔνθα is here clearly used in a spatial sense, its original value. In that capacity it serves well to initiate a little narrative associated with a place. The word, however, is used more broadly in Homeric epic—in fact, the majority of instances in Homer marks the start of a new move within a narrative, generally translated with “then.”<sup>149</sup> ἔνθα thus straddles a fuzzy semantic border where it can mean either (or both) “then” and “there”. To better understand this duality, we may recall the distinction between the use of particles *de re* and *de dicto*. When ἔνθα means “there” as a geographical place in the storyworld, it is clearly used *de re*, but when it is most naturally translated as “then,” it may well be a marker of a certain “place” on the unfolding path of the narrative (*de dicto*).<sup>150</sup>

§46 Another marker often occurring in move-initial position is ὥς/ὥς. Like ἔνθα, this word is multi-faceted: it can mean “just like...” or the corresponding “that’s how,” typical of the Homeric simile, but it can also start a “when” clause, often preposed to the initial action of a new scene. The function of such constructions in providing a static setting before the dynamic action makes complete sense with regard to the build-up of narratives

<sup>149</sup> Note, for example, how often ἔνθα occurs after an indentation in modern editions, and even at the very beginning of book 5 of the *Iliad*. Bonifazi 2012:283-284 hints at a similar interpretation of ἔνθα as a discourse marker.

<sup>150</sup> See Bakker’s separation between “performance time” and “story time” 1997:68.

in general.<sup>151</sup> As such, it is important to consider their discursive or narrative function, and unproductive to focus on their syntactical subordinate status.<sup>152</sup>

§47 There are, then, several ways to mark narrative beginnings linguistically. My analysis of γάρ, ἦ, and other words demonstrates that it is important to be aware of such macro-discursive divisions when looking at particles. Only then can they be seen as what they are: reflections of an ongoing interactive exchange. Particles mark moments in the act of narration rather than syntactical relations in a text, and as such provide invaluable insight into the interaction between performer and audience.

§48 On occasion, however, there is no explicit marking of important transitions in the discourse. Since we must start from the assumption that the performer would not have wanted to confuse the audience, a lack of linguistic signs would necessitate some kind of non-linguistic or paralinguistic marking. In Pindar, every new strophe or antistrophe is a new beginning, and the performative discontinuity is even stronger with the start of a new epode. Since the Homeric epics were not generally performed in one go, or not by a single performer,<sup>153</sup> we may assume that they too offered possibilities to break off and start again and thus creating very clear boundaries of which very little trace remains in the text.

§49 Whether or not we may find traces of such heavy performative discontinuities in our texts, on a local level there are passages where a strong discontinuity on the level of content or orientation remains without syndetic marking. In the famous battlefield encounter between Glaucus and Diomedes in book six of the *Iliad*, Glaucus foreshadows the fame of his forefathers, and then embarks on a long story at line 152:

(t14)

ἔστι πόλις Ἐφύρη | μυχῶ Ἄργεος ἵπποβότοιο, |

ἔνθα δὲ Σίσυφος ἔσκεν, | ὃ κέρδιστος γένετ' ἀνδρῶν, |

<sup>151</sup> Compare the function of the priming acts described in chapter 2 §63-§79.

<sup>152</sup> For more on such “when clauses” see Bakker 1991.

<sup>153</sup> See e.g. Ford 1997.



*Iliad* 6.152-153

There is a city<sup>154</sup> Ephyre, in a corner of Argos grazed by horses.

And there Sisyphus lived, who was the craftiest of men.

With the story Glaucus starts a new move, but contrary to expectation we do not find any syndetic marking at its beginning. This start of a new move in asyndeton is informative. The lack of metalinguistic marking suggests that the discontinuity must have been marked by the performer in some non-linguistic or paralinguistic manner.<sup>155</sup> This is not to say that the presence of a metalinguistic marker voids the possibility of extralinguistic or paralinguistic marking. The example shows that there are multiple strategies to negotiate discourse transitions, involving metalinguistic marking to a greater or lesser extent, and always possibly marked otherwise in performance.

§50 Another kind of asyndetic start of narratives is represented by the example below. It consists in a relative or demonstrative pronoun in an oblique case, followed by a little narrative about its referent.

(t15)

γλαυκόχροα κόσμον ἐλαίας, | τάν ποτε

Ἴστρου ἀπὸ σκιαρᾶν παγᾶν ἔνεικεν Ἀμφιτρυωνιάδας |

<sup>154</sup> The construction ἦν or ἔστι followed by a geographic location recurs in Homer, both with and without particles, see *Gesamtkommentar* 2003:II.2.262 ad 2.811 for all parallels and literature. The other asyndetic constructions with ἦν or ἔστι are: *Iliad* 6.152, *Odyssey* 4.354, 7.244, 9.116, 15.403, 19.172. Givón 2005:131-133 discusses the following constructions in English: “There’s this guy...” and finds that the “cataphoric persistence” of those referents in the following discourse is very strong. That is to say that referents introduced through this kind of “existential presentative construction” tend to persist as discourse topics in the following discourse. Recently, Auer and Maschler 2013 have described the narrative function of VS (verb subject) constructions in spoken stories in Hebrew and German, but they do not discuss the construction with existential verbs.

<sup>155</sup> A parallel instance is *Iliad* 9.529 Κουρήτες τ’ ἐμάχοντο καὶ Αἰτωλοὶ μενεχάρμαι, but there the story is announced more explicitly by the verbum dicendi ἐρέω (*I will tell*, 528). This verb is in turn a metanarrative comment by the secondary narrator, Phoenix, who is telling this story.

the graycolored adornment of olive, that once  
from the shady springs of the Ister Amphityron's son brought,<sup>156</sup>

Here we see a narrative of the kind described by Slater and West as a “lyric narrative”, introduced by a pronoun, ποτε, and an aorist.<sup>157</sup> The transition to the narrative falls on a metrical boundary in the song, which would allow for some prosodic marking on τάν ποτε to signal that it is the start of a new move.<sup>158</sup> For the present study it suffices to note that asyndeton, the start of a new sentence without the use of a conjunction, conjunctive adverb, or particle, often occurs at the beginning of new moves. For Homer asyndeta occur mostly at the start of embedded narratives or subsections of narratives, while in Pindar asyndeton can occur at the start of an embedded narrative, at narrative transitions, introducing a gnomic statement, or at the transition to the *hic et nunc*.<sup>159</sup> The lack of any metalinguistic marking of so strong a discursive transition suggests some kind of prosodic discontinuity such as an extended pause.<sup>160</sup>

### 3.2.4 Narrative transitions: δῆ

§51 The preceding section concerned itself with the range of possible methods of marking embedded narratives linguistically. The next step is to discuss the transition between different components of a certain narrative, taking the Labovian division (§14) into

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<sup>156</sup> Translation Race 1997, order adapted.

<sup>157</sup> See Gentili 2013:421. Slater 1983 discusses parallels for this in Homer, with a focus on those narratives introduced by a relative pronoun + ποτε; see above §21-§22. Compare also Pindar *Olympian* 3.13, 3.29, 6.75, 7.30, 9.9, 10.104, 13.63; *Pythian* 1.16, 4.20, 4.107, 4.152, 9.15, 10.31, 12.6; *Nemean* 4.25.

<sup>158</sup> τάν ποτε makes up the final dactyl of the third verse of the epode, Snell/Maehler 1971:11 regard this as a separate metrical *kôlon*.

<sup>159</sup> See Xanthou 2007 on asyndeton in Pindar, and below §65-§76 for transitions in Pindar involving particles and other markers.

<sup>160</sup> Compare IV.3 for Nicanor's contention that asyndetic transitions were accompanied by the longest pause in his system, of four *chronoi*.

consideration. Let us return to Antenor's story about Odysseus (t8). After making some initial remarks about Odysseus' earlier visit at Helen's summons, Antenor continues:

(t16)

τοὺς δ' ἐγὼ ἐξείνισσα | καὶ ἐν μεγάροισι φίλησα, |  
 ἀμφοτέρων δὲ φυὴν ἐδάην | καὶ μήδεα πυκνά. |  
ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ Τρώεσσιν ἐν ἀγρομένοισιν ἔμιχθεν |  
 στάντων μὲν Μενέλαος ὑπείρεχεν εὐρέας ὦμους, | 210  
 ἄμφω δ' ἐζομένω | γεραρώτερος ἦεν Ὀδυσσεύς |  
ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ μύθους καὶ μήδεα πᾶσιν ὕφαινον |  
 ἦτοι μὲν Μενέλαος ἐπιτροχάδην ἀγόρευε, |  
 παῦρα μὲν ἀλλὰ μάλα λιγέως, | ἐπεὶ οὐ πολὺμυθος |  
 οὐδ' ἀφαρμαρτοεπής· | ἦ<sup>161</sup> | καὶ γένει ὕστερος ἦεν. | 215  
ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ πολύμητις ἀναΐξειεν Ὀδυσσεὺς |  
 στάσκεν, | ὑπαὶ δὲ ἴδεσκε | κατὰ χθονὸς ὄμματα πήξας, |  
 σκῆπτρον δ' | οὐτ' ὀπίσω οὔτε προπρηνὲς ἐνώμα, |  
 ἀλλ' ἀστεμφὲς ἔχεσκεν | αἶδρεῖ φωτὶ ἐοικώς |  
 φαίης κε | ζάκοτόν τέ τιν' ἔμμεναι | ἄφρονά τ' αὖτως. | 220  
ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ ὅπα τε μεγάλην ἐκ στήθεος εἶη |  
 καὶ ἔπεα νιφάδεσσιν ἐοικότα χειμερίησιν, |  
οὐκ ἂν ἔπειτ' Ὀδυσῆϊ γ' ἐρίσσειε βροτὸς ἄλλος |  
οὐ τότε γ' ὥδ'<sup>162</sup> Ὀδυσῆος ἀγασσάμεθ' εἶδος ἰδόντες. |

*Iliad* 3.207-224

<sup>161</sup> This reading of ἦ is again quasi-interactional, in this case relevant to the stance of the narrator: see IV.4 for this use of ἦ in Herodotus and Thucydides.

<sup>162</sup> Although generally translated “thus”, ὥδε in fact represents a more complex meaning that often marks particular relevance of this statement for the zero-point of the utterance, the here-and-now (Bonifazi 2012:85). The tensions between τότε “then” and ὥδε “in this way here” represent how the story about Odysseus in the past has direct relevance for how he is now being perceived from the walls of Troy.

The progress of Antenor's story exemplifies the way Homeric epic habitually signals each narrative step with a temporal marker combined with particles. At the same time, this excerpt is special in that it has the same combination four times within thirteen lines: ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ (209, 212, 216, 221).<sup>163</sup> Despite the high frequency of the combination in the Homeric corpus, this four-fold clustering is limited to only three places.<sup>164</sup> The effect in this passage, as in the two parallel passages, is one of crescendo. The audience is kept in suspense as Antenor works toward the climax of his narrative: Odysseus was older than Menelaus, and the latter spoke briefly but very well, and Odysseus did not look impressive; only when he started speaking could one see his true character.

§52 The quadruple ὅτε is answered by ἔπειτα, introducing the climax of the story: “when...and when...and when...and when...then...”<sup>165</sup> In the Labovian model, line 223 is the resolution, the final line of the story. The fact that ἔπειτα is followed by a second temporal marker in 224 (τότε) is marked, suggesting a special addition. This interpretation is supported by the switch to the first person plural (ἀγασσάμεθ'). The last line places the point of view firmly with Antenor (and perhaps the other Trojans), giving it a more explicitly evaluative character. Antenor's personal involvement in these lines evinces itself in another, more subtle manner. The final two lines contain the only two instances of γε in the entire speech, directing attention first to Odysseus himself, and then to τότε, “at that very moment.” The sudden occurrence of γε here illustrates our belief that a higher frequency of γε may correlate with more personal involvement of the speaker, such as in

<sup>163</sup> The repeated ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ serves to mark new points in a report or narrative (*Gesamtkommentar* 2009:III.2.85).

<sup>164</sup> Out of 106 instances of ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ in the corpus, there are only three passages where four instances are found so closely together: here, in *Iliad* 6.172-200 (the embedded narrative by Glaucus to Diomedes) and *Iliad* 10.338-365 (the embedded narrative of Diomedes' and Odysseus' pursuit of Dolon); there is a cluster of three instances in *Odyssey* 14.287-301, but more frequently it occurs in twos: *Iliad* 5.773-780, 11.170-181, 17.728-732, 23.768-773, *Odyssey* 3.269-286 (with ἀλλ' ὅτε in line 278), 4.514-519, 10.144-156, 12.329-335, 12.399-403, 14.472-483, 15.457-477.

<sup>165</sup> In *Iliad* 10.366 τότε δὴ introduces the climax of the story, compare *Iliad* 5.775 ἔνθ', 11.182 τότε δὴ ῥα, 23.774 ἔνθ', *Odyssey* 3.288 τότε δὴ, 4.520 ἄψ δέ, 10.145 καὶ τὸτ' and 10. 157 καὶ τότε, 12.405 δὴ τότε, 14.303 δὴ τότε, 14.484 καὶ τότε, 15.478 μὲν ἔπειτα.

emotional passages.<sup>166</sup> Not surprisingly, in the Homeric corpus γε occurs more than twice as much in direct speech as in narrator text.<sup>167</sup>

§53 Using temporal markers is a very natural way of navigating the narrative, especially in the complicating action. In Homer, however, the temporal marker does not typically occur on its own; among other particles, δὴ tends to gravitate toward such markers in Homer.<sup>168</sup> This tendency is well-known to readers of Homer, and it has led scholars to posit that the original value of δὴ was temporal.<sup>169</sup> Given its formal likeness to ἤδη, this theory is intuitively attractive. As a result, however, these scholars have attributed a temporal value to all instances of δὴ in Homer, whether combined with temporal markers or not. In opposition to this approach, there is a theory that δὴ is in fact etymologically connected to δῆλον (clear, visible),<sup>170</sup> which would better explain its generically emphatic function in *koinḗ* Greek.<sup>171</sup>

§54 However, attempting to establish a general value of δὴ in Homer passes over an important particularity in the distribution of δὴ in the corpus. If the value of δὴ were indeed evidential (or more generally emphatic), one would expect it to occur more frequently in direct speech than in narrative (which it does, by a factor of almost 3 to 1 in the *Iliad*, and less markedly by 1.2 to 1 in the *Odyssey*),<sup>172</sup> but one would not expect the use of

<sup>166</sup> In III.3 and III.5 γε is connected to a speaker's emotional involvement.

<sup>167</sup> The frequencies are based on an analysis of four books of the *Iliad* and four books of the *Odyssey* (4917 lines). In the *Iliad* it occurs 2,7 times per 100 lines of narrator text, and 6,4 times per 100 lines of direct speech. In the *Odyssey*, it occurs 2,9 times per 100 lines of narrator text, and 6,5 times per 100 lines of direct speech.

<sup>168</sup> Edwards 2002:38-61 makes a number of important observations considering narrative transitions in Homer. His argument is that the transitional constructions in Homer have the effect of avoiding narrative breaks (see especially 58).

<sup>169</sup> See Devarius 1588:63-64, Hoogeveen 1769:276, Hartung 1832:245-246, Nägelsbach 1834:48 and 62, Kühner 1835:386, Ellendt 1841:166-167, Döderlein 1858:362, Wetzell 1879:14, Ebeling 1885:291, Thomas 1894:85, Navarre 1904:93-94 (but he argues against the idea in 1932:667-679), Smyth 1920:647.

<sup>170</sup> See Schweighäuser 1824:150, Heller 1853:277, Döderlein 1858:362, and Bäumlein 1861:98.

<sup>171</sup> On the broad application of δὴ in Hellenistic and later Greek see V.δὴ *passim* and I.2 §35.

<sup>172</sup> The frequencies for δὴ are based on an analysis of 12 books of the *Iliad* (13-24) and 12 books of the *Odyssey* (1-12), and the numbers are the following: in the *Iliad* 1,7 instances of δὴ per 100 lines of narrator text and 5,1 per 100 lines of direct speech, and in the *Odyssey* 3,8 per 100 lines of narrator text and 4,7 per 100 lines of direct speech.

the particle to be *qualitatively* different between direct speech and narrative. The same presupposition would hold if δή were to be read everywhere as having some temporal value. Neither of these explanations of the particle can account for the remarkable pattern emergent from the Homeric material, which begs closer analysis. In the entire text, around half of the instances of δή coincide with a temporal marker (-οτε, ἔπει-, νῦν, τῆμος, ἔνθα),<sup>173</sup> but in narrator text the average increases to 75-85%.<sup>174</sup> As a result, the relative frequency of δή with temporal markers in direct speech is quite a bit lower, and in direct speech the particle in fact occurs in a much larger spectrum of cotexts.<sup>175</sup>

§55 These numbers urge us to consider that δή in combination with temporal markers is inherently different from other collocations, which allows it to be used freely in narrator text. In what follows, I present a closer analysis of two groups of instances of δή, which provide a basis for more nuanced descriptions of the particle's function in epic and lyric: (1) δή in peninitial position with a temporal marker, (2) instances of δή in initial or otherwise marked position. The second category also provides material to understand δή in peninitial position without a temporal marker. Since δή is very rare in Pindar (twenty instances in the *Odes*), and use of the particle in Pindar matches that in Homer, the discussion below concerns itself only with Homer; I cite Pindaric parallels for each kind in footnotes.<sup>176</sup>

§56 In its most common use, in peninitial position in combination with a temporal marker, I believe that δή articulates the progression of discourse in larger steps. For

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<sup>173</sup> Overall, in the *Iliad* 39.9% of δή instances are with a temporal marker, while this number is 58.3% in the *Odyssey*.

<sup>174</sup> In narrator text, in the *Iliad* 75% of δή instances occur with a temporal marker, 25% without; in the *Odyssey* this is 84.3% with and 15.7% without temporal marking.

<sup>175</sup> In direct speech, in the *Iliad* 23.1% of δή instances occur with a temporal marker, 76.9 % without; in the *Odyssey* this is 38.4% with and 61.6% without a temporal marker.

<sup>176</sup> The exceptions are *Olympian* 9.9, *Pythian* 11.17, and *Isthmian* 2.27, discussed in chapter 5 §74n194, and *Olympian* 10.60, *Nemean* 5.15, *Nemean* 10.76, where δή occurs in (indirect) questions. In the latter three instances I take δή as intensifying the entire act.

example in the combination ἀλλ' ὅτε δῆ, where δῆ is in its expected peninitial position,<sup>177</sup> the particle signals a narrative boundary on the level of the move. The act introduced by δῆ is often not an especially salient new step in the narrative, nor does the act require any kind of intensification. Likewise, the temporal adverb it follows in such contexts does not appear to need particular stress. Consider the following excerpt from (t16):

(t17)

τοὺς δ' ἐγὼ ἐξείνισσα | καὶ ἐν μεγάροισι φίλησα, |  
 ἀμφοτέρων δὲ φύην ἐδάην | καὶ μήδεα πυκνά. |  
 ἀλλ' ὅτε δῆ Τρώεσσιν ἐν ἀγρομένοισιν ἔμιχθεν |

*Iliad* 3.207-209

Them I welcomed and hosted in my halls.

Of both of them I learned the nature, and the cunning tricks.

Now when<sup>178</sup> among the assembled Trojans they mingled...

After the introductory two lines (207-208), ἀλλ' ὅτε δῆ marks the progression to the complicating action. The move introduced by the combination is not a narrative peak, nor does it in any other way seem to be emphasized. That is to say, it does not seem to be the case that the passage reads with small-scope δῆ as “very much at that moment” (i.e. “just when”).<sup>179</sup> Its function, which is perhaps impossible to render into English, is to mark in concert with ἀλλά that there is some kind of narrative discontinuity, which coincides with

<sup>177</sup> For a discussion of the peninitial position see chapter 2 §12.

<sup>178</sup> Murray translates “Now when...,” which I believe has a similar function of moving the discourse along in English, semantically independent of the temporal value of “now.”

<sup>179</sup> This is how Denniston 1950:219 reads such instances: δῆ used with “[r]elative temporal adverbs, ‘precisely when’, ‘just when’.” His reading is followed by the comment on this passage in *Gesamtkommentar* 2009:III.2.85.

the start of a new move.<sup>180</sup> The function of δή along with a temporal marker to mark new moves in the narrative correlates with the findings of Bestgen and Vonk.<sup>181</sup> In a study of the effect of the use of temporal markers versus “and” at narrative transitions, they found that temporal markers (segmentation markers in their terms) reduced the availability of words in the preceding discourse. This suggests that readers regard those temporal markers as some kind of new beginning. In Greek, the temporal adverb marks the progression, while δή marks the discontinuity.<sup>182</sup> It is no coincidence that in this function δή often occurs in a subordinate clause, which syntactically projects an answering main clause, and thus a longer piece of discourse. There is a productive analogy for this effect of a subordinate clause in recent research on aspect in English. In an experiment, readers were asked to predict what was to follow after a clause with imperfective or perfective aspect: “The diver was snorkeling...” versus “The diver had snorkeled...”. The latter of the two led to the inference that the details of the snorkeling event are less relevant for the ongoing interpretation than whatever follows in the discourse.<sup>183</sup> Likewise, a when-clause of the form ἀλλ’ ὅτε δή suggests that the information in the subsequent act will be more salient than that of the when-clause itself.<sup>184</sup> This formulation makes it less likely that δή here functions to intensify its host act.

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<sup>180</sup> “Demetrius” says in his treatise on style (Pseudo-Demetrius of Phaleron *Style* 56) that in *Iliad* 21.1 δή is used to mark a new beginning, and that, if the combiner had not been used, the reader might have thought Homer was still talking about the same thing.

<sup>181</sup> Bestgen and Vonk 1995, especially 20–21.

<sup>182</sup> I posit a similar force in Pindar *Nemean* 8.19 ἴσταμαι δή, where the discursive discontinuity is implicit in the present tense following upon a narrative act in the aorist; in *Nemean* 10.75 θερμὰ δή τέγγων likewise I believe the function of δή is less to intensify than to mark the narrative progression; *Isthmian* 8.65 ἐνίκασε δή ποτε may represent this function too, or it may represent δήποτε, a result of grammaticalization in which the added value of δή has all but disappeared “once upon a time” (LSJ). See IV.4 on δή marking narrative steps in Herodotus.

<sup>183</sup> Ferretti, Kutas, and McRae 2007.

<sup>184</sup> See Bakker 1991 for the narrative function of temporal clauses in Herodotus, Buijs 2005 for temporal and participial clauses in Xenophon, and Muchnová 2003 for the narrative function of ἐπεὶ clauses in Homer.



§57 For this function of δή it is productive to retrieve the possible etymological relation between δέ and δή.<sup>185</sup> Most scholars believe that δέ and δή are to be regarded as formally related, regarding δέ as a bleached development from δή. Alternatively, I propose the possibility that δή is a lengthened form of δέ, analogous to the development of ἄρα (with long alpha) from ἄρα. This morphological relation is then, for one function of δή, mirrored in a functional relation: δέ marks boundaries between discourse acts, while δή divides the discourse into larger steps, consistently occurring at the start of new moves.<sup>186</sup>

§58 There is also a group of instances where δή occurs with temporal markers, in narrator text, but in initial position: δή τότε and δή ῥα τότε. The act-initial position of δή as well as its position in the larger discourse suggests that the particle has a different function in this construction. A different interpretation of ὅτε δή on the one hand and δή τότε on the other is moreover suggested by the fact that the former introduces a subordinate clause, whereas the latter introduces a main clause. Consider the following passage from the *Odyssey*:

(t18)

ἡμεῖς δ' | αἴψ' ἀναβάντες | ἐνήκαμεν εὐρέϊ πόντῳ, |  
 ἰστὸν στησάμενοι | ἀνά θ' ἰστία λεύκ' ἐρύσαντες. |  
ἄλλ' ὅτε δή τὴν νῆσον ἐλείπομεν | οὐδέ τις ἄλλη  
 φαίνετο γαῖων, | ἄλλ' οὐρανὸς ἡδὲ θάλασσα, |  
δὴ τότε κυανέην νεφέλην ἔστησε Κρονίων |  
 νηὸς ὑπερ γλαφυρῆς, | ἥχλυσε δὲ πόντος ὑπ' αὐτῆς. |

<sup>185</sup> See chapter 2 §24-§27.

<sup>186</sup> Compare the three instances of ὅτε δ(έ): *Iliad* 16.690, 17.178, 19.134. Especially the last of the three is a good comparandum for ὅτε δή clauses in narrative transitions. In the literature, the relation between the two particles is without exception regarded as a development from δή to a (weaker) δέ. However, as far as I am concerned the possibility of δή being a prosodically strengthened form of δέ cannot be excluded. This would be a situation comparable to the possible development of ἄρα to ἄρα in second position (different from ἄρα in initial position) as attested in Pindar and drama (see Braswell 1988:173-174).

## Odyssey 12.401-406

And we, getting on board quickly, set out on the wide sea,  
 setting up the mast and hoisting up the white sail.  
 But when we left the island behind, and no other part  
 appeared of the lands, but only sky and sea,  
 right at that moment Cronos' son raised a black cloud  
 over the hollow ship, and the sea grew dark under it.

In line 403, ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ introduces a new step in the narrative, but the crucial event occurs with δὴ τότε. Whereas δὴ in peninitial position merely marks progression of the narrative, in initial position it marks a salient moment. Here and in a number of parallels, δὴ τότε introduces a peak in the narrative, the moment that has been worked up to until then.<sup>187</sup> The scope of δὴ in such instances is debatable: it either intensifies τότε or the entire act. The translation that I give shows that I take it as intensifying τότε, but I would add that δὴ τότε together introduces the entire move, the intensified temporal adverb functions as what I would call a “peak marker.”<sup>188</sup> Compare the same narrative moment in this passage from the *Iliad*:

(t19)

ἐννῆμαρ ξείνισσε | καὶ ἐννέα βοῦς ἱέρευσεν. |  
ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ δεκάτη ἐφάνη ῥοδοδάκτυλος Ἥως |  
καὶ τότε μιν ἐρέεινε | καὶ ἥτεε σῆμα ἰδέσθαι |

*Iliad* 6.174-176

For nine days he hosted him, and nine cows he sacrificed.

<sup>187</sup> See also Pindar, *Olympian* 3.25.

<sup>188</sup> The combination τότε δὴ serves a similar function, I believe, and illustrates that in its intensifying function too δὴ can occur in peninitial position.

But when the tenth rosy-fingered Dawn appeared,  
right then he questioned him and asked to see the token,

The function of *καί* to introduce a peak or climax is discussed elsewhere, and I believe that the combinations *δὴ τότε* and *καὶ τότε* have the same function in Homer: to introduce a narrative peak.<sup>189</sup> In the combination *καὶ τότε δὴ*, finally, it is hard to establish whether *δὴ* marks a move boundary or intensifies the act, along with *καί*. The construction may serve as a reminder that boundaries are fuzzy, and that the following conclusions are based on patterns I perceive. Since in the end *δὴ* is just one word, its multiple functions may have blended into one another, and more than one of the particle's aspects may be relevant in a single instance.

§59 Recent scholarship has disregarded this discourse-articulating function of *δὴ* and focused on its emphatic function, but Bakker suggests that *δὴ* “is better characterized as a marker of evidentiality”:<sup>190</sup> “[t]he use of this particle draws the hearer into the story by marking the narration as deriving from a shared basis, a common experience that binds the narrator and listeners together as if they were actually jointly witnessing a given scene.”<sup>191</sup> Bakker's reading of *δὴ* in Homer is part of his argument that Homeric language suggests that the performance was a process of bringing the mountain to Mohammed, bringing the narrative into the here and now instead of displacing the audience into the past.<sup>192</sup> This is

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<sup>189</sup> Bakker 1997:79 notes that *καὶ τότε* marks “significant events or breaks in the story”; for this passage, see Graziosi and Haubold 2010:127, “*καὶ τότε μιν (...)* emphasizes that we have reached a crucial point in the story” and *Gesamtkommentar* 2008:IV.2.70. See IV.2 §100–§101 on *καὶ δὴ* at narrative peaks in Herodotus.

<sup>190</sup> Bakker 1997:75.

<sup>191</sup> Earlier scholars have linked *δὴ* to perception; see Döderlein 1850:III.362, Thiemann 1881: 530–531, Paley 1881:21, Sicking 1986:133. More recently scholars have spoken of *δὴ* in terms of “evidentiality,” see Bakker 1997:78–79, Van Ophuijsen 1993:141 and 146 “self-evidential,” Cuypers 2006:38 and 55–59, De Jong 2007:14–15, Van Erp Taalman Kip 2009:114. Wakker 1994, 1995, 1997 argues that it more generally emphasizes the importance of the utterance (1994:351 “*δὴ* draws special attention to the (...) proposition”).

<sup>192</sup> See further Bakker 1993b:15–25 and 2005:146.

also part of the reason that he regards  $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$  as a bleached version of  $\delta\eta$  since: “[i]f  $d\acute{\epsilon}$  is a weak form  $d\acute{\epsilon}$ , then its meaning is similar but weaker.”<sup>193</sup>

§60 As I argue above, I do not think that emphasis or evidentiality has necessarily to be sought in those constructions where  $\delta\eta$  occurs in peninitial position with a temporal marker. Now, in the Homeric corpus  $\delta\eta$  is not always a peninitial particle, but is at least also allowed in act-initial position, as observed above. The instances of  $\delta\eta$  in this position – limited to a few constructions:  $\delta\eta$  τότε,  $\delta\eta$  ῥα τότε,  $\delta\eta$  γάρ, and three isolated examples<sup>194</sup> – reveal a different function, closer to the “emphatic” or “evidential” function posited by earlier scholarship. However, a close analysis of  $\delta\eta$  in apparently divergent position reveals a more detailed picture. Consider first the following two instances:

(t20)

τέκνον ἐμόν |  $\delta\eta$  πάμπαν ἀποίχεται ἀνδρὸς ἑῷος

*Iliad* 19.342 (direct speech)

My child, utterly you forsake your own warrior

(t21)

Ἀντίλοχος δ' ἄρα  $\delta\eta$  λαισθήϊον ἔκφερ' ἄεθλον<sup>195</sup>

*Iliad* 23.785 (narrator text)

Antilochus, then, carried off the very last prize.

<sup>193</sup> Bakker 1997:79.

<sup>194</sup> The third example follows below as (t24). There is one other puzzling position of  $\delta\eta$ , in *Iliad* 24.243 ῥῆϊτεροι γὰρ μάλλον ?|? Ἀχαιοῖσιν  $\delta\eta$  ἔσεσθε; this instance is unique and as yet unclear. The scribe of the Venetus A chose to place the particle between commata, apparently as a parenthetical discourse act: ῥῆϊτεροι γὰρ μάλλον Ἀχαιοῖσιν,  $\delta\eta$ , ἔσεσθε.

<sup>195</sup> This line seems to have been a textually problematic place: British Library add. mss. 17210 reads Ἀντίλοχος δ' ἄρα οἱ λαισθήϊον ἔκφερ' ἄεθλον, while another papyrus (P.Lond.Lit 27) has  $\delta\eta$  added above the line in a second hand.

The instance from direct speech (t20) reveals the act-initial position of δή because it starts with a vocative. The instance in *Iliad* 23 is less straightforward, but I argue that δή is a mobile here, with scope over the following word.<sup>196</sup>

§61 In (t20) δή is arguably act-initial modifying the following word: πάμπαν.<sup>197</sup> The combination of δή and comparatives or superlatives, including “first,” “last,” “all,” and “many,” is widespread enough for me to consider it as a special construction with the particle, where δή functions as an intensifier of an adjective at one end of a scale. If we then consider (t21), δή seems to modify λιοισθήϊον (“the very last”), and therefore occurs just before the adjective, in act-medial position.<sup>198</sup> As far as position is concerned, (t20) and (t21) show that δή in its intensifying function is moderately mobile. The Homeric corpus suggests that δή in some functions can precede its host adjective or adverb, which allows it to occur anywhere from act-initial to act-medial position.<sup>199</sup> Already in Homer δή does not always precede the constituent it modifies, like in (t20) and (t21), but can also follow it.<sup>200</sup>

<sup>196</sup> There are seven other instances of the combination ἄρα δή, all in the *Iliad*, and in most cases I believe that δή has scope over the entire act (the one possible exception is *Iliad* 17.85 δὴ πρίν).

<sup>197</sup> *Gesamtkommentar* 2009:VI.2.147 notes the remarkable position of δή, and takes the particle to have scope over the entire utterance: “[δὴ] verleiht der folgenden Aussage bes. Emphase.”

<sup>198</sup> Denniston 1950<sup>2</sup>:204 calls this the “emphatic” use, and the intensifying function I posit matches in particular Denniston’s description of its use to denote “that a thing (...) is very much so.” Moreover, passages in tragedy (Denniston 1950<sup>2</sup>:212) show that small-scope, forward-looking δή could still occur: δὴ μάλιστα. See also Pindar *Nemean* 8.51 δὴ πάλαι in act-medial position “really long ago.”

<sup>199</sup> Denniston 1950<sup>2</sup>:212 regards this positioning as secondary (“Originally, perhaps, δή was regarded as going with the preceding word.”), whereas I believe that the material suggests that the construction where δή precedes its host disappears from Greek quite early on. The formation δὴ ποτέ (sometimes δὴ ποτε) may invite several explanations, but the simplest one is that in the string at act beginning ποτε would naturally follow δή (ποτε δὴ only occurs twice, in the construction εἰ ποτε δὴ). When it is the accented interrogative πότε it does shift to initial position, and may be followed by δή.

Besides the two quoted instances, the following are the relevant instances of the combination ἤ δὴ where δή intensifies an adjective at one end of a scale: *Iliad* 1.518 (=1.573) ἤ | δὴ λoίγια, 2.272 ὦ πόποι | ἤ | δὴ μυρί (compare Euripides *Heracleids* 331 πόνους δὴ μυρίου), 15.467 ὦ πόποι | ἤ | δὴ πάγχυ, 24.518 ἄ δειλ’ | ἤ | δὴ πολλά, *Odyssey* 1.253 ὦ πόποι | ἤ | δὴ πολλόν, 5.182 ἤ | δὴ ἀλιτρός γ’; I believe that ἤ in these instances is at least partly interjectional (§33-§43). The group may be expanded with Pindar *Olympian* 6.79 πολλὰ δὴ πολλαῖσιν; see also Archilochus fragment 172.3 νῦν δὲ δὴ πολὺς.

<sup>200</sup> The construction that illustrates this best is εἰ δ’ ἐτέον δὴ: *Iliad* 7.359, 12.233 and *Odyssey* 23.107. This is the standard order in later Greek; in Thucydides and Herodotus it occurs frequently just after superlatives, e.g. μεγίστη δὴ (with δὴ in act-medial position) in Thucydides 1.1.2.2.

Because of this mobility, the collocation of δή directly in front of polar adjectives (adjectives near either end of a scale, e.g. first and last) also occurs with δή in its typical peninitial position.<sup>201</sup> As far as the division between direct speech and narrator text is concerned, the use of δή as intensifier is largely limited to direct speech, most likely because the narrator does not often offer an intensification. To better understand this intensifying function of δή, a study of the combination δὴ γάρ is informative.

§62 The peculiar combination δὴ γάρ is largely limited to Homer, with an additional three instances in the *Homeric Hymns* and two in Hesiod.<sup>202</sup> In principle, there are two ways to explain such a combination of particles: either δή and γάρ occur together because they work together, or they occur together because their positions (initial and peninitial) happen to be contiguous. Now, δή in Homer occurs more frequently in peninitial than in initial position, but a pattern emerges from the analysis of the exceptions above. At first glance the δὴ γάρ group might be read like (t20) and (t21) above, as γάρ intervening in a unit of δή X, where δή has scope over the constituent that immediately follows γάρ.<sup>203</sup> Keeping in mind the possibility that one aspect of δή is its use to intensify a following adjective, consider this passage:

(t22)

αὐτὰρ ὁ βῆ κατὰ δῶμα | φίλον τετιημένος ἦτορ, |  
νευστάζων κεφαλῇ· | δὴ γὰρ κακὸν ὅσσετο θυμῷ |

<sup>201</sup> This happens particularly with forms of πρῶτ-, πᾶς\*, and πολ-; the *loci* are *Iliad* 1.235, 1.545, 2.117, 4.97, 7.207, 9.24, 9.348 (ἦ μὲν δὴ μάλα πολλά), 10.173, 11.219, 11.559, 11.825, 13.275, 14.187, 14.509, 15.291, 15.616, 16.23, 16.113, 16.198, 16.538, 17.427, 18.103, 19.9, 19.54, 19.342, 23.490, 23.607, 24.65, 24.167, 24.713; *Odyssey* 3.183, 4.414, 5.76, 5.300, 6.227, 7.134, 8.131, 8.282, 13.155, 14.149, 14.289, 15.401 (ὅς τις δὴ μάλα πολλά), 16.340, 16.469, 17.174, 17.217 (νῦν μὲν δὴ μάλα πάγχυ), 22.195 (=17.217), 22.440, 22.457, 23.49, 24.528.

<sup>202</sup> *Hymn to Demeter* 76, 148, and 159; Hesiod, *Works and Days* 417 and *Fragment* 204.96 (in both instances δὴ γὰρ τότε).

<sup>203</sup> As I argue for καὶ γάρ, §30-§32. Alternatively, one could read it as δή intensifying the force of γάρ, as Denniston 1950<sup>2</sup>:243 does: “The reverse order, δὴ γάρ, which gives an even stronger emphasis [sc. on γάρ], is also frequently found in [Homer].” However, what is intensified is not the relation between the current act and the preceding, but the current act in itself.

## Odyssey 18.153-154

And he went down the hall | sorrowful in his own heart |  
bowing his head. | For his spirit boded a truly bad thing. |

The translation above represents the reading of δὴ with small scope, intensifying κακόν; I believe Murray gives a similar reading, with “for his spirit boded ill indeed,” but the English is ambiguous. This reading, however, only works in this and two other instances of δὴ γάρ,<sup>204</sup> too low a number to sufficiently explain the combination’s function. In the fourteen remaining cases δὴ cannot be read as intensifying the word immediately following γάρ, but rather appears to modify the entire act. This passage from the *Odyssey*, where δὴ γάρ is in act-initial position but not followed by an adjective, exemplifies these cases:

(t23)

ἀλλ’ | ἥ τοι παύεσθαι ἀνωγέμεν ἀφροσυνάων, |  
μειλιχίοισ’ ἐπέεσσι παραυδῶν· | οἱ δέ τοι | οὔ τι  
πείσονται· | δὴ γάρ<sup>205</sup> σφι παρίσταται αἴσιμον ἥμαρ. |

## Odyssey 16.278-280

Now, I tell you, order them to cease from their follies,  
coaxing them with gentle words. And they, not at all  
will they obey you. For really, their fated day is at hand.

I have rendered δὴ γάρ as a separate punctuation unit in English, which is how sentence adverbs are generally rendered to signal that they have scope over the entire sentence.<sup>206</sup>

<sup>204</sup> *Iliad* 13.122 and 15.400, both have the form δὴ γὰρ μέγα νεῖκος ὄρωρεν. A similar reading could be proposed for *Hymn to Demeter* 76, 148, and 159.

<sup>205</sup> I discuss the function of γάρ in δὴ γάρ in chapter 4 §19-§20.

<sup>206</sup> Denniston, conversely, insists that δὴ always modifies one word, which tends to be, but does not have to be, adjacent to the particle. This would mean that in this example δὴ “modifies” παρίσταται, probably. Although

Whereas with scope over one adjective δὴ intensifies the meaning of that word, with a larger scope it rather marks an intensity behind the utterance of the act: not “very X” but “take note that X” or “I insist that X.” This reading of δὴ γάρ is supported by a final example of δὴ in act-initial position:

(t24)

Τεῦκρε πέπον | δὴ νῶϊν ἀπέκτατο πιστὸς ἐταῖρος

*Iliad* 15.437 (in direct speech)

Good Teucer, truly a trusted friend of ours was slain.

The context and content strongly suggest that there is no reason to read δὴ as intensifying νῶϊν here; the focus of the act is on conveying that a close friend has passed away, not that he has passed away *particularly for them*. The most natural reading is that δὴ marks the intensity behind the utterance, and does not function to intensify one of the constituents in the act. Therefore, δὴ has scope over at least its entire act, and its force modifies the act of uttering rather than the content of the utterance.<sup>207</sup>

§63 In its intensifying function, then, δὴ can modify the content conveyed (*de re*, with small scope) or it can mark the intensity of the speaker in conveying his discourse (*de dicto*, with act scope), and the boundary between these two options is inevitably fuzzy. To clarify how δὴ works as a mobile in Homer, I suggest an analogy with καί, a particle that knows a similarly strong correlation between position in the act and scope. If καί has scope over (at least) its host act, it occurs in act-initial position, while if it has scope over one word

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this reading makes sense, it does not recognize the difference in the Greek: it would be very hard to mark that δὴ is supposed to be construed with a word that occurs much later in the act.

<sup>207</sup> Bakker 1997:75-76 reads this instance of δὴ as creating involvement through a shared visible reality: “*Dé* conveys that the consciousness verbalized receives its input from the speaker’s immediate environment, from what is perceptually clear and evident.”



(group) it immediately precedes that word.<sup>208</sup> Homer shows remnants of a similar distribution of δῆ, either directly preceding a constituent that it modifies (t20 and t21), or occurring in act-initial position if it modifies (at least) its host act (t23 and t24).

§64 Recent scholarship on δῆ has focussed largely on its function of emphasizing, and the tendency has been to see the discourse-articulating function of the particle as a branch of this main function, if it is discussed at all. I argue that for δῆ in the Homeric epics (1) it is important to be aware of the clear discursive differences between the two functions, and (2) that even for the so-called “emphatic” function we can come to a more nuanced differentiation. When δῆ marks larger narrative steps, it freely occurs in any kind of discourse, both within and outside direct speech. In this function, δῆ does not serve to intensify either the content or the act, but along with a temporal marker it signals a progression in the articulation of moves in discourse. In its intensifying function δῆ modifies either single words or whole discourse acts, originally occurring in act-initial position when it has scope over the act, or directly preceding the word (group) it modifies when it has smaller scope. By Homer already, but especially in later literature, intensifying δῆ gravitates more and more to peninitial position, exerting its force over the entire act.<sup>209</sup> However, δῆ has small scope in some constructions: preceding the constituent it modifies in fixed constructions like δῆ μάλα, δῆ μάλιστα and following it in constructions like superlative + δῆ.<sup>210</sup> In its peninitial position, the two functions still discernible in Homer start to flow together, but even in authors like Herodotus both of them may still be

<sup>208</sup> See I.1 and chapter 1 §20 on the link between position and scope.

<sup>209</sup> In Homer, δῆ in peninitial position has an intensifying function with act scope in constructions like εἰ δῆ (also in Pindar, *Olympian* 1.54) and ἤ μάλα δῆ (also in Pindar, *Pythian* 4.64).

<sup>210</sup> It is in the latter category, I believe, that we should place Pindar, *Olympian* 13.99 ἑξηκοντάκι δῆ (Race translates “full sixty times”), *Pythian* 4.273 δυσπαλὲς δῆ “difficult indeed,” *Pythian* 9.91 τρεῖς δῆ “full three times” (Race), *Nemean* 1.17 θαμὰ δῆ “often indeed” (Race), and *Nemean* 8.48 δις δῆ “full twice.”

identified.<sup>211</sup> Only through a close examination of context and cotext is it possible to gain a deeper understanding of the many faces of *δή* in Greek literature.<sup>212</sup>

### 3.2.5 Pindaric narrative

§65 The longest narrative in Pindar provides a good counterpoint to Homer's style. His narrative of Jason and Medea in *Pythian* 4 is complex and plays with several narrative voices, but it too guides its audience from scene to scene. In the following I pick out a number of transitional passages that illustrate the linguistic and extra-linguistic tools available to Pindar to mark discontinuities. In the first part of the lengthy song (lines 4 - 58), Pindar adduces Medea as the narrator of the first part of the story regarding the foundation of Cyrene. Medea's words are introduced by a speech formula in 11-12, and start with a story of one of the Argonauts receiving a clod of earth as a guest gift from Triton, which is presented first in regression (lines 20-25)<sup>213</sup> and then recounted from the beginning (line 25 and further):

(t25)

δώδεκα δὲ πρότερον

ἀμέρας ἐξ Ὠκεανοῦ φέρομεν | νώτων ὑπὲρ γαίας ἐρήμων |

ἐννάλιον δόρυ, | μήδεσιν ἀνσπάσσαντες ἀμοῖς. |

τουτάκι δ' οἰοπόλος δαίμων ἐπῆλθεν, | φαιδίμαν

ἀνδρὸς αἰδοίου πρόσοψιν θηκάμενος | φιλίων δ' ἐπέων

ἄρχετο, | ξείνοισι ἅ τ' ἐλθόντεσσιν εὐεργέται |

δεῖπν' ἐπαγγέλλοντι πρῶτον. |

<sup>211</sup> See IV.3 and IV.4.

<sup>212</sup> There is one specific aspect of *δή* that I have not yet discussed, which is the use of the particle after pronouns; this is discussed in chapter 5 §63-§71.

<sup>213</sup> Here too the narrative is introduced by *τόν ποτε*; see §48-§50 for more on such asyndetic narrative beginnings.

ἀλλὰ γὰρ νόστου πρόφασις γλυκεροῦ  
 κώλυεν μεῖναι. | φάτο δ' Εὐρύπυλος | Γαιόχου παῖς ἀφθίτου Ἐννοσίδα |  
 ἔμμεναι· | γίνωσκε δ' ἐπειγομένους· | ἄν δ' εὐθὺς ἀρπάξαις ἀρούρας |  
 δεξιτερᾷ προτυχὸν ξένιον μάστευσε δοῦναι |

Pindar, *Pythian* 4.25-35

Before, twelve

days from the Ocean we carried it, across empty ridges of land,  
 the spear of the sea, drawing it according to my plans.  
 And then the solitary god came to us, with the radiant  
 features of a respectable man. With friendly words  
 he began, just like to arriving guests generous men  
 first announce dinner.

But of course the excuse of our sweet return  
 kept us from staying. He said that Eurypulos, son of the immortal earthholder and -shaker,  
 he was; he noticed that we were pressed. At once having picked up soil,  
 with his right hand he strove to offer it as a makeshift guest-gift.

The narrative progresses at a steady pace, with δέ occurring at every significant narrative step (lines 25, 28, 32, 34, 34). In such narrative passages Pindaric use of δέ may appear to approach that of Homer, but in practice the particle is not as flexible in the *Victory Odes*. Note that, unlike in editions of Homer, δέ is always preceded by a high dot or a period. In Homer, δέ can introduce practically any kind of act, ranging from prepositional phrases to full main clauses. In Pindar the range is similarly large, but most commonly it serves to separate periods or sentences, as in all 5 examples above. Not only are the discourse

segments separated by δέ all syntactic wholes, they also form discrete narrative events.<sup>214</sup>

That is to say, δέ in Pindar serves as a boundary marker on a slightly higher level of discourse division than in Homer, closer in fact to the function of δὴ in the latter (see §61-§62).

§66 After a few lines of reflection, Medea's speech ends, and it is capped with the intriguing construction ἦ ῥα Μηδείας ἐπέων στίχες (line 57).<sup>215</sup> For our current purposes, the occurrence of the particle ἄρα is most relevant. Like δὴ, ἄρα occurs much less in Pindar than in Homer, with only 30 instances in the *Victory Odes*.<sup>216</sup> Of those, seven occur in *Pythian* 4, which is not so surprising if one keeps in mind that in Homer ἄρα is extremely frequent in narrative, but much less so in direct speech.<sup>217</sup> In Pindar this pattern continues, with the great majority of instances of ἄρα occurring in narrative sections.<sup>218</sup> In this construction in *Pythian* 4, ἄρα is not only part of a narrative, but also within that context a part of a speech-capping construction, which is an environment where we often find ἄρα.<sup>219</sup> The verse that follows direct speech represents a return to the action, after the special kind of move that

<sup>214</sup> See also Braswell 1988:284-285 (*ad Pythian* 4.202-203), but he wants to differentiate between those instances where δέ marks temporally sequential steps, and those where these steps are not temporally sequential. Against the background of my discussion of δέ in §24-§27, I do not believe such a differentiation is productive.

<sup>215</sup> The construction is reminiscent of the Homeric ἦ ῥα, καί after direct speech, but represents an interesting variation on this theme. In my reading (as in Race's) ἦ is not the *verbum dicendi*, but the particle ἦ: "Such were the verses of Medea's speech" (Race). Gentili 1995:444 and Braswell 1988:138-139 take ἦ as the verb of speech, with στίχες as subject in a *schema pindaricum* (singular verb with plural subject); Segal 1986:154 proposes a similar reading.

<sup>216</sup> The edition of Snell/Maehler only has twenty-five, but I would add five instances where Snell/Maehler give ἦρα (ἄρα mss.). I follow Braswell 1988:173-174, who reinstates Boeckh's reading of ἦρα as a prosodically lengthened form of ἄρα. This gives a total of thirty instances of the different forms of ἄρα.

<sup>217</sup> In Homer, there are between 8 and 10 instances of ἄρα per 100 lines of narrative, versus between 2 and 3 instances per 100 lines of direct speech. In Pindar, throughout the *Odes* ἄρα occurs 0.9 times per 100 lines, while in *Pythian* 4 the seven instances represent 2.3 occurrences per 100 lines.

<sup>218</sup> Out of the 30 instances in the *Odes*, in only three cases does ἄρα clearly occur outside of a narrative context: *Isthmian* 5.41, *Olympian* 10.52, *Nemean* 8.32.

<sup>219</sup> See Antović and Pagán Cánovas [forthcoming] on speech-capping formulas in Homer. For Pindar, 9 out of 30 instances of ἄρα are in speech-capping phrases (in one instance it caps indirect speech: *Olympian* 6.52); in *Pythian* 4 it is at line 57, 156, and 232. This makes up more than a third of a total of 22 speech-capping phrases in the *Odes*.

direct speech is. In this kind of context, ἄρα marks the expected outcome of what precedes, consider this parallel from later in *Pythian* 4:

(t26)

ἀλλ' ἐν ἕκτῃ | πάντα λόγον θέμενος σπουδαῖον ἐξ ἀρχᾶς | ἀνήρ  
 συγγενέσιν παρεκοινᾷθ' | οἱ δ' ἐπέσποντ' | αἶψα δ' ἀπὸ κλισιᾶν |  
 ὦρτο σὺν κείνοισι· | καὶ ῥ' ἦλθον Πελία μέγαρον· |

Pindar, *Pythian* 4.132-134

But on the sixth, laying out the entire serious story from the beginning, the man shared it with his relatives. And they followed him. At once from the couches he rose with them, and they came to Pelias' palace.

After telling the story of the homecoming of Jason, who spends five days catching up with his father and family (lines 124-131), Pindar moves on to the peak of the encounter between Jason and Pelias. The peak is introduced with ἀλλ' ἐν ἕκτῃ (line 132), which follows a typical pattern: “for five days nothing happened, but on the sixth...”<sup>220</sup> Like in the ἀλλ' ὅ γε construction, a negative statement is followed by a positive one, introduced by ἀλλά. The negative statement inherently projects that a change will come, often from inactivity to action.<sup>221</sup> Thus, ἀλλ' ἐν ἕκτῃ in itself promises the peak, and the participial clause that follows (πάντα...ἀρχᾶς, line 132) serves to postpone the crucial events. As the action starts (from οἱ δέ, line 133) the acts become shorter, and we find three finite verbs in three lines. The final act (καὶ ῥ' ἦλθον Πελία μέγαρον, line 134) contains ἄρα. Although the act is clearly connected to the preceding two, it represents a shift of frame: they arrive at Pelias' palace. In fact, the act is the outcome of the preceding scene, and as such functions

<sup>220</sup> See Braswell 1988:214 for the Homeric origin of this convention; the number of days is not fixed.

<sup>221</sup> See chapter 5 §48-§49 on ἀλλ' ὅ γε.

as a hinge between one scene and the next.<sup>222</sup> This function matches directly the use of ἄρα after direct speech and in the second half of the Homeric simile.<sup>223</sup> Finally, this discourse function of ἄρα recurs in its use after pronouns (as *Pythian* 4.78), especially after unframed discourse.<sup>224</sup>

§67 *Pythian* 4 is an exceptional ode, but quite representative regarding its narrative transitions. Pindar's narratives are less linear than Homer's, and they proceed in a more complex manner, but discontinuities are still typically accompanied by particles or particle combinations pointing the way for the audience. Different from epic, Pindar's odes contain many discursive discontinuities outside of the narrative, which are best illustrated by a close reading of a representative ode.

### 3.3 Discursive transitions in Pindar's *Pythian* 2

§68 In narrative discourse in Pindar, δέ remains the most common marker of progression, though used more sparsely than in Homer. In the same contexts, ἄρα functions to round off scenes or to cap direct speech. Beyond narrative, however, Pindar has a whole array of linguistic and extra-linguistic means at his disposal to steer his song. When considering his navigation of the many (apparent) discontinuities in his discourse, we must remember Bundy's warning:

(t27)

We forget that this is an oral, public, epideictic literature dedicated to the single purpose of eulogizing men and communities; that these eulogies are concentrated upon athletic achievement; that the environment thus created

<sup>222</sup> Compare ἄρα at the end of the arrival scene in line 121 and rounding off the gathering of the Argonauts in 189. Gentili 1995:465 and Braswell 1988:220 rather read ῥα as marking immediate succession, following Denniston 1950<sup>2</sup>:42-43.

<sup>223</sup> More on particles in the similes in chapter 4 §29-§45. In that same chapter the higher frequency of the particle in Homer is discussed. This function of ἄρα with regard to discourse articulation is surprisingly absent in the scholarship on the particle, most notably in Denniston.

<sup>224</sup> See chapter 5 §51-§62.

is hostile to an allusiveness that would strain the powers of a listening audience, hostile to personal, religious, political, philosophical and historical references that might interest the poet but do nothing to enhance the glory of a given patron, hostile to abruptness in transitions, to gross irrelevance, to lengthy sermonizing, to literary scandals and embarrassments...

Bundy 1962:35 [my emphasis]

Pindar's discourse of praise consists of endless twists and turns, transitions from present to past perhaps reflected in the back-and-forth of a dancing chorus. Despite the decidedly lower frequency of particles in Pindar than in Homer (12.7% of words versus 17.1% in the *Iliad* and 18% in the *Odyssey*), they are just as important metalinguistic markers of transitions in the discourse. More so than in Homer, however, asyndeton is the polyfunctional transitional device *par excellence* and can initiate every imaginable new move.<sup>225</sup> At the same time, the many different kinds of transition have caused several markers to become specialized in certain discourse functions. In the present section I discuss several excerpts from Pindar's second *Pythian*, describing its linear progression in acts and moves, along with all the relevant markers occurring at important transitions.

§69 The second *Pythian* is a good example of the many turns one finds in a Pindaric ode. As often in the corpus, the first strophe and part of the antistrophe are taken up by a complex *tour-de-force* introducing the *laudandus* (Hieron), his home, and the gods to whom the ode is directed especially. On the basis of syntax, modern editors take this construction of mounting intricacy and interconnectedness as one sentence, a beautiful piece of language architecture, which is reflected in the recent Loeb translation.<sup>226</sup> Pragmatically, however, the passage consists of a number of separate moves that are themselves articulated in manageable discourse acts. Consider the first strophe:

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<sup>225</sup> See §48-§50 above.

<sup>226</sup> Race uses all of eleven commas in his translation until he comes to the full stop after "trident" (12).

(t28)

Μεγαλοπόλεις ὦ Συράकुσαι, | βαθυπολέμου  
 τέμενος Ἄρεος, | ἀνδρῶν ἵππων τε σιδαροχαρμᾶν δαιμόνιαι τροφοί, |  
 ὕμιν τόδε τᾶν λιπαρᾶν ἀπὸ Θηβᾶν φέρων  
 μέλος | ἔρχομαι | ἀγγελίαν τετραορίας ἐλελίχθονος, |  
 εὐάρματος Ἰέρων | ἐν ᾗ κρατέων |  
 τηλαυγέσιν ἀνέδησεν Ὀρτυγίαν στεφάνοις, |  
 ποταμίας ἔδος Ἀρτέμιδος, | ἅς οὐκ ἄτερ |  
 κείνας ἀγαναῖσιν ἐν χερσὶ ποικιλανίου ἐδάμασσε πώλους. |

Pindar, *Pythian* 2.1-8

Great city—Syracuse! Of deep-in-war  
 Ares a sanctuary, of men and steel-clad horses<sup>227</sup> a divine nurse.  
 To you, bringing from Thebes-the-Shining this  
 song, I come, <with> news of the four-horse chariot that shakes the earth:<sup>228</sup>  
 Hieron of the good chariots, prevailing in that <contest>,  
 crowned Ortygia with far-shining garlands,  
 seat of the river-goddess Artemis. Not without her  
 did he master those pretty-reined mares with his gentle hands.

The intricacy of the syntactic construction of the first strophe belies its performative clarity; consider first the sequence of acts. The first two lines, in three discourse acts, form a tricolon building up to Syracuse's largest boon: her men and horses. The occasion of this song, victory in a chariot race, is thus suggested, and Pindar moves on: with a second-person plural pronoun he involves the audience, followed by a participial act whose final

<sup>227</sup> Lit. "horses that fight in iron-mail," see Gildersleeve 1885:256.

<sup>228</sup> I am aware that ἀγγελίαν is an apposition of μέλος, but the addition of <with> is the most economical way of translating this line into comprehensible English without interfering too much with the Greek word order.



boundary is determined by the hyperbaton of τόδε and μέλος (ὑμῖν τόδε τᾶν λιπαρᾶν ἀπὸ Θηβᾶν φέρων / μέλος).<sup>229</sup> The “you” implies an “I,” which is realized in line 4 (ἔρχομαι). The apposition to μέλος that closes the line (ἀγγελίαν...) projects a report of the actual news, and the audience’s expectation is fulfilled immediately in line 5, in two acts: the first mention of the *laudandus* is accompanied by the third reference to the event (εὐάρματος Ἰέρων), which gives Pindar the possibility to refer to the actual victory – already abundantly in focus – with the minimal participial phrase ἐν ᾧ κρατέων. The following act (τηλαυγέσιν ἀνέδησεν Ὀρτυγίαν στεφάνοις) contains the main verb of which Hieron is the subject, but cognitively the act brings the audience from the athletic event to Syracuse, describing how the victor “crowned Ortygia,” which primes the goddess Artemis, named in the following act (ποταμίας ἔδος Ἀρτέμιδος).<sup>230</sup> This then allows the poet to set up the theme of divine aid in the victory, to be elaborated in the antistrophe.

§70 These acts together make up three coherent moves. The first move of the ode consists of three vocatives (Μεγαλοπόλεις ὦ Συράकुσαι, | βαθυπολέμου / τέμενος Ἄρεος, | ἀνδρῶν ἵππων τε σιδαροχαρμῶν δαιμόνιαι τροφοί, lines 1-2), which establish a marked directionality of the discourse, from chorus or singer to audience. Line 3 marks the transition to the second move with ὑμῖν.<sup>231</sup> Since the pronoun is plural, its referent is potentially ambiguous: it may refer to the city of Syracuse or to its inhabitants. However, deictically ὑμῖν must have been a very strong moment in the song, and the audience cannot but have felt addressed. The second move lays down a foundation for the performance: it establishes the relation between “I” and “you,” it summarizes the nature of the song, and it does all this in the form of a quasi speech-introduction: φέρων μέλος | ἔρχομαι. The third move (lines 5-8) contains the actual ἀγγελία announced at the end of the second move. It follows in asyndeton, and I would expect it to have been performatively

<sup>229</sup> See Lauer 1959:54-58, Race 2002, and Markovic 2006:138-140.

<sup>230</sup> Ortygia is the little island on which Syracuse was built, just off the coast of Sicily; see Gentili 1995:366-367.

<sup>231</sup> I discuss the pragmatic effect of using the second person in chapter 2 §72-§79.

marked as different from the preceding. The news is that of Hieron's victory, probably superfluous to the audience, and it leads the song back to Syracuse, and to Artemis. The hinge act is ποταμίας ἔδος Ἀρτέμιδος (line 7), which describes Ortygia and at the same time serves to introduce the goddess. Lines 7-8, from ἄς οὐκ ἄτερ onward, present Artemis as a divine helper to Hieron, while cohesion with the preceding acts is achieved with yet another reference to the athletic event (ποικιλανίους ἐδάμασσε πώλους, line 8).

§71 It will not have escaped the reader that I have yet to mention particles in this discussion. The simple reason is that apart from τε (line 2), the first strophe of *Pythian* 2 contains no particles, but its relevance derives precisely from this absence. First, the beginnings of Pindaric odes regularly have very few particles. Second, this strophe illustrates well that move transitions are inherent in any kind of discourse, whether it has particles or not. However, I posit that when particles do occur at move beginnings, their function should be understood with respect to those larger movements in the discourse. Consider the first antistrophe of *Pythian* 2:

(t29)

ἐπὶ γὰρ ἰοχέαιρα παρθένος | χερὶ διδύμα |  
 ὃ τ' ἐναγώνιος Ἑρμᾶς | αἰγλάεντα τίθησι κόσμον, | ξεστὸν ὅταν δίφρον |  
 ἔν θ' ἄρματα πεισιχάλινα καταζευγνύη |  
 σθένος ἵππιον, | ὀρσοτρίαιναν εὐρυβίαν καλέων θεόν. |  
 ἄλλοις δέ τις ἐτέλεσεν ἄλλος ἀνήρ |  
 εὐαχέα βασιλεύσιν ὕμνον ἄποιν' ἀρετᾶς. |  
 κελαδέοντι μὲν ἀμφὶ Κινύραν πολλάκις |  
 φᾶμαι Κυπρίων, | τὸν ὁ χρυσοχαῖτα προφρόνως ἐφίλησ' | Ἀπόλλων, |

Pindar, *Pythian* 2.9-16

No, on them the virgin archeress, with both hands,

and Hermes of the games, place the shining harness, whenever <to> the polished car  
 and under the bit-steering chariot he [sc. Hieron] yokes  
 the strength of horses, calling on the trident-wielding, wide-ruling God.  
 Now, to different people does each man pay tribute,  
 a resounding hymn for kings as recompense for their excellence.  
 They often sing about Kinyras,  
 the voices of the Cyprians, whom the golden-haired loved willingly, Apollo

γάρ, or more precisely ἐπὶ γάρ, introduces the antistrophe and functions as a join after the performative discontinuity. ἐπὶ is not followed by a dative (the word following γάρ is in the nominative) which suggests that it refers back to πώλους in line 8.<sup>232</sup> γάρ, meanwhile, points ahead, marking the current act as an elaboration, an unfolding of the claim made earlier (line 8). There is a shift in tense from aorist (ἀνέδησεν 6, ἐδάμασσε 8) to present (τίθησι), which accompanies a shift from the specific victory to the regular aid that Hieron receives from the gods (ὅταν 10), an extension of the general theme of divine aid.<sup>233</sup>

§72 Race's translation of γάρ with "because" renders the function of the word well enough here, but the simplicity of the translation hides the complexities of the construction. It is not the case that "Hieron mastered the horses with Artemis' help, *because* she puts the harness on." That is to say, there is no causal relation on the propositional level between the γάρ act and what preceeds. One could say that γάρ is used *de dicto*, marking what Sweetser would call an epistemic relation between the two clauses: "I can say that Hieron had divine help, *because* Artemis <always> puts the harness on..."<sup>234</sup> More practically, however, γάρ marks its host move (ἐπὶ γάρ...θεόν, 9-12) as one that is triggered

<sup>232</sup> The argument can be made that we should read it as an anastrophe (or as an adverb), in which case the accent should be written on the first syllable: ἔπι. Regardless of this editorial decision, we may assume that a preposition that is not followed by a noun and a pre-verb in tmesis were pronounced with a different intonational contour to avoid ambiguity.

<sup>233</sup> See Gentili 1995:368.

<sup>234</sup> Sweetser and Dancygier 2000:120-122; see also Slings 1997:104-106.

by the preceding discourse: the association here is of a general statement with a particular event.<sup>235</sup> Hence my translation of γάρ as “No,...” which marks the current move as an expansion on the preceding, while at the same time clearly signalling the start of something new; an effect that is lost if one translates “because” or “since.”<sup>236</sup>

§73 I do not dwell here on the instances of τε in line 10 and 11, which represent a typical use of the particle after a pronoun to mark a piece of knowledge as shared or to-be-shared.<sup>237</sup> More noteworthy is the occurrence of δέ in line 13, since it illustrates a difference in the way that the particle functions in Homer and Pindar.<sup>238</sup> Pindar uses δέ more frequently in narrative than in other parts of his discourse, but in both contexts he uses the particle to mark significant discontinuities. Here it accompanies the transition from the specific case of Hieron (line 11) to the gnomic (or at least general) statement that different men honor different heroes (ἄλλοις δέ...ἀρετᾶς, 13-14). In discourse terms, both the content and orientation of lines 13 and 14 differ strongly from what precedes and what follows, suggesting that it is a separate move.<sup>239</sup> It is relevant that in this case δέ is not only in act-peninitial position, but also in verse-peninitial position. The fact that this metrical boundary matches the boundary marked by δέ suggests that the discontinuity perceived is stronger than when δέ is in verse-medial position.<sup>240</sup> The next move is marked by μὲν (line 15), which projects the theme introduced in the act into the upcoming discourse. Pindar

<sup>235</sup> See §22-§29 above on γάρ in Homer: γάρ can also introduce an example following a general claim.

<sup>236</sup> Compare again Sicking's claim that “sentences introduced by γάρ (...) provide answers to all sorts of questions raised by the speaker's utterances,” in Sicking 1993:23; if we substitute “moves” for “sentences” in this statement, I would be inclined to agree.

<sup>237</sup> This aspect of τε is explored in IV.2 §54-§69 and chapter 4 §31-§37, and particularly for Pindar in §54-§68.

<sup>238</sup> See chapter 2 §24-27 for more on δέ in Homer, and §65 above for δέ in Pindar.

<sup>239</sup> Compare the discussion of independent thoughts inserted by means of δέ in Herodotus and Thucydides in IV.2 §26-§28.

<sup>240</sup> Compare the use of δέ in a narrative section of *Pythian* 6 (three instances of δέ in a narrative, all mid-verse), discussed in chapter 2 §43, or the narrative section from *Pythian* 4 (t25), where in ten lines δέ occurs five times (25, 28, 32, 34, 34), of which four are in verse-medial position, before a stronger transition with a first-person verb followed by δέ in verse-peninitial place (38, πεύθομαι δέ).

uses the particle more than once to carry a theme or narrative over the metrical boundary between strophe and antistrophe or, as here, between antistrophe and epode.<sup>241</sup>

§74 In the epode that follows, Pindar does not proceed with a narrative about Kinyras, as the audience would have expected, but rather makes a direct comparison between the Cyprian hero and Hieron (lines 17-20). Subsequently he launches into a narrative about Ixion, a paradigmatic narrative of divine punishment for overreaching.<sup>242</sup> Consider the end of the epode and the beginning of the second strophe:

(t30)

θεῶν δ' ἐφετμαῖς | Ἰξίονα φαντὶ ταῦτα βροτοῖς  
λέγειν | ἐν πτερόεντι τροχῷ |  
παντᾷ κυλινδόμενον· |  
τὸν εὐεργέταν ἀγαναῖς ἀμοιβαῖς ἐποικομένους τίνεσθαι. |

ἔμαθε δὲ σαφές. | εὐμένεσσι γὰρ παρὰ Κρονίδαις |  
γλυκὺν ἐλὼν βίοντον |

Pindar, *Pythian* 2.21-26

By the orders of the gods, they tell that Ixion says the following to mortals,  
on his feathered wheel,  
spinning in all directions:  
to go to one's benefactor and pay him back with good deeds.

<sup>241</sup> Compare the discussion in chapter 2 §55, and further *Olympian* 6.41, 7.69, 7.88, 8.67; *Pythian* 2.15, 2.31, 4.53, 4.154, 11.31, 11.46; *Isthmian* 2.37. A metrical boundary may be compared to what is known as a “Transition Relevance Place” in Conversation Analysis: a point where a switch of speaker is may occur. In Pindar, it is a likely place for a change of discourse topic. The use of μέν to signal the continuity of discourse topic across the metrical boundary may be compared to the use of μέν to “hold the floor” across TRPs in tragic and comic dialogue; see III.4.

<sup>242</sup> See Burton 1962:116-119 on the story of “one of the great sinners of Greek legend” (116).

And he learned it clearly. Indeed, among the kind children of Kronos,  
 having taken a sweet life,

In the epode Pindar introduces the story of Ixion with φαντί (compare the example from *Pythian* 1, t4), followed by a gnomic thought attributed to Ixion. Since the *gnōmē* occurs at the end of the epode, Pindar could have left it at that, but in the following line the third-person aorist form (ἔμαθε) followed by δέ suggests that the audience should assume continuity of grammatical subject at the start of the new strophe: Ixion is still in focus.<sup>243</sup> The actual narrative begins with γάρ (line 25), which introduces a clause that serves as an orientation for the narrative, in the form of a participial construction. The complication is introduced in the apodosis: μακρὸν οὐχ ὑπέμεινεν ὄλβον (line 26), and then the narrative unfolds. Only in lines 34-35 is it interrupted briefly by a gnomic thought, introduced by χρὴ δέ, a cluster that almost invariably starts *gnōmai* in Pindar.<sup>244</sup> After Ixion's misdeeds and his punishments have been discussed (26-41), the resolution of the story (starting with asyndeton, ἄνευ οἱ Χαρίτων τέκεν, 42) tells of the birth of a son from the union of Ixion and Hera-as-cloud, called Centaur, whose offspring with a mare in turn yields the familiar creatures that are half horse and half man. This rounds off the second epode (41-48).

§75 The third strophe starts with an expanded statement of the principle that gods can put down or raise up any mortal, already brought up in lines 7-11. Pindar then redirects attention to the here and now with a metadiscursive statement in 52 (ἐμὲ δὲ χρεών). This leads to an advice to himself in the form of a *gnōmē* at the end of the strophe, urging him to focus on praising positive things rather than blaming (lines 54-56). This advice he immediately applies in the antistrophe to his *laudandus*: τὸ δὲ σάφα νιν [sc. πλοῦτον] ἔχεις (“But you have it [sc. wealth] with wisdom,” line 57) starts a new expansive move dedicated to praising Hieron's money and power. Note how once again the explicit mention of a first

<sup>243</sup> See chapter 5 §19 on finite verb + δέ to mark continuity of grammatical subject.

<sup>244</sup> Of the eight instances in the *Odes*, only one (*Isthmian* 8.16) does not introduce a generic piece of wisdom. This generalization may be extended to most instances of clause-initial χρὴ; see on this instance Gentili 1995:378.

or second person followed by a particle accompanies move transitions in the songs. The remainder of the song alternates between commenting on Hieron's prowess and alluding to some people who seem to have slandered either Hieron or Pindar. At the end of the fourth antistrophe these topics are left behind for another *gnōmē*, in this case acting as a bridge to the last epode, which stresses once more that gods decide the fate of men.

(t31)

χρὴ δὲ πρὸς θεὸν οὐκ ἐρίζειν |

ὃς ἀνέχει | τοτὲ μὲν τὰ κείνων, | τότ' αὖθ' ἑτέροις ἔδωκεν μέγα κῦδος. | ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ταῦτα νόον  
 ἰαίνει φθονερῶν· | στάθμας δέ τινες ἐλκόμενοι  
 περισσᾶς | ἐνέπαξαν ἔλκος ὀδυναρὸν ἑᾶ πρόσθε καρδίᾳ, |  
 πρὶν ὅσα φροντίδι μητίονται τυχεῖν. |  
 φέρειν δ' ἐλαφρῶς ἐπαυχένιον λαβόντα ζυγόν  
 ἀρήγει· | ποτὶ κέντρον δέ τοι  
 λακτιζέμεν | τελέθει  
 ὀλισθηρὸς οἶμος· | ἀδόντα δ' εἴη με τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὁμιλεῖν. |

Pindar, *Pythian* 2.88-96(end)

One should not contend with god.

He raises up, sometimes the fate [lit. "things"] of those people,<sup>245</sup>

then again to others does he gives great honor. But not even that  
 warms the mind of jealous men. Pulling some line  
 too far, they fix a painful wound into their own heart,  
 before they succeed in those things that they plan in their minds.

<sup>245</sup> See Gildersleeve 1885:267, "the fortunes of those whisperers."

To carry lightly the yoke one has taken on one's neck  
 is helpful. And I tell you, kicking against the goad  
 is a slippery course. Pleasing them, may it be granted to me to consort with the good.

Once again  $\chi\rho\eta\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}$  (line 88) introduces the gnomic thought, but it is followed by a change in direction marked by  $\alpha\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$  (line 89).  $\alpha\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$  here expresses no semantic contrast but rather marks a redirection of the discourse, and this use of the particle is decidedly more frequent in Homer and Pindar than it is in Attic Greek. In Homer this use appears most commonly in constructions where  $\alpha\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$  marks transitions to a move containing an imperative or a wish at the end of direct speech. In Pindar, however, it occurs at all kinds of re-orientations, thus often coinciding with move beginning. Here, the penultimate move of the song (lines 89-96) is concerned with the theme of envious men, but the meaning of the passage is ambiguous.<sup>246</sup> It leads on to the final act and final move of the song, introduced by  $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$  and containing a first-person pronoun (line 96), in which Pindar expresses a hope for himself.<sup>247</sup> As all Pindaric discourse, even this apparent personal statement implicitly praises the *laudandus* and the present audience.

§76 The second *Pythian* ode provides a good case study to argue that considering Pindaric discourse as a sequence of moves by the poet provides insight into the use of language in general and of particles in particular. This ode is particularly illustrative since it contains so many different kinds of discursive transitions, but this kind of approach will illuminate the reading of any Pindaric ode. Therefore I apply the terminology of acts and moves throughout the other chapters where relevant.

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<sup>246</sup> Pindar argues that man should bear the fate he is given, without attempting to overreach. It might be read as advice for Hieron, or as an illustration of Pindar's own attitude toward life, and toward his host Hieron; see Gentili 1995:405.

<sup>247</sup> Gentili 1995:405 calls it a "final prayer" ("preghiera finale").



### 3.4 Concluding remarks

§77 In this chapter I have shown that in order to understand why certain particles occur in certain places, we need to look at the larger movements of discourse at all levels beyond that of the sentence. Earlier studies on ἤ and δή have focused mainly on their role within the scope of the sentence, or in relation to adjacent words. Moreover, there is a tendency in the scholarship on almost all particles to find a general description that covers all the different aspects of the particle. Both tendencies have obscured certain patterns that nuance our understanding of what particles do.

§78 ἤ, δή, and γάρ all have a facet that is connected to the start of new moves. For ἤ it is its interjection-like value that makes it performatively effective at discourse transitions. δή's occurrence at narrative transitions, often in concert with temporal markers, is not as easily explained. It is clear, however, that these occurrences should not be regarded as indicating a function that falls under its supposedly intensifying role. In fact, the Homeric corpus reveals that δή possesses a whole spectrum of functions. By using these data we can tentatively reconstruct the particle's various functions, each of which is bound to specific contexts and to δή's position in the act. Finally, as regards γάρ, apparently simple translations often belie the particle's more complex functions. Like "for" in English, the particle can signal relations among many different elements in discourse. In narrative, the use of γάρ often marks the start of a new move, which is associatively connected to the surrounding discourse. Understanding this use of γάρ opens up a range of alternative translations that do not foreground the close causal relation that is rendered by "for" or "since", but rather render the sense of discursive discontinuity between the preceding move and the one introduced by γάρ.

§79 The Attico-centric approach to particles has left its traces everywhere. The focus on the causal/explanatory function of γάρ, the attempt to find a single function for δή, the reading of ἤ as a basically affirmative or emphatic particle, the reading of δέ as adversative,

and the assumption that every μέν implies a δέ, are all examples of the orthodoxy that is especially misleading when working with corpora like that of Homer and Pindar. Starting from Attico-centric assumptions prevents us from perceiving the richness of metalinguistic functions that these particles perform, and it leads to the mislabeling of Homeric and Pindaric usage as odd, anacolouthic, or simply metrically convenient. We should rather view their usage as signs of earlier stages in the grammaticalization of certain constructions, or as due to the particularities of performative genres.

§80 A significant part of the chapter considers particles not in isolation, but in clusters and in constructions with other word groups. Particle combinations are not monolithic: the same combination may combine different functions of the particles involved. Hence we should be wary of attributing fixed functions to a certain combination. Furthermore, there is a difference between a combination (where the sum is no more than its parts) and a cluster (where the sum is more than its parts, and the cluster has evolved to become somewhat detached from its origins). Especially for early Greek, but perhaps for ancient Greek in general, it is risky to make generalizing statements about the force of a particle combination. Only when it has completely grammaticalized so as to be regarded as essentially one word can we speak of a coherent function, and even in that case one can never exclude the possibility that in some instances the particles have ended up next to each other by happenstance. To understand particle combinations, one must appreciate the richness in function of all the constituent elements, and search for patterns in the different contexts in which the combination is found.

§81 A final thought to take from this chapter is that editions are not sacred. Especially for vulnerable little words like particles, and even more so for ambiguous lexemes like H, the normalizing practices of the Alexandrians, scribes, and modern editors may have obscured subtle but important differences. Detailed studies of all these different stages of textual transmission combined with an informed scepticism toward the sources at our

disposal allow us to propose new readings of particles, where the content and the form of the discourse provide enough material to make an argument. In short, paying attention to the larger discursive context in which individual sentences are situated can enable more nuanced readings of even the smallest details in a text.

## 4. Discourse Memory

### Metalinguistic marking of shared knowledge

§1 I have made a distinction in previous chapters between language that refers to the content of the discourse (*de re*) and language that refers to the interaction between performer and audience (*de dicto*). In the present chapter I discuss language that refers to the level of interaction not overtly, but through indirect means. This language is not self-referential, but rather marks the relation of the performer to the content in a manner that reveals his expectations about the knowledge of the audience. We are concerned here with the dimension of shared experience, shared knowledge, shared beliefs, and shared discourse.

§2 Tradition is an important part of this dimension, for both Homeric and Pindaric discourse. Consider what Foley says about the function of tradition in the generation and reception of Homeric epic:

(t1)

“The poetic tradition properly understood is not at all a limiting but rather a connotatively explosive medium, a touchstone or nexus of indication and reference wholly different from the medium at the disposal of the “non-traditional” artist, *for such a diction and narrative structure have obvious and necessary reference not only to the present poem, poet, and time but also to an enormous number of other poets, poems, and eras.*” [my italics]

Foley 1990:2

Any performance of Homeric epic represents a moment in the continuum of tradition.

Whichever part of the tradition is in current focus, the whole remains constantly relevant and accessible as a body of knowledge shared between performer and audience.<sup>1</sup>

§3 Pindar's engagement with tradition is complex, and his songs must be regarded as both a product and a producer of traditional knowledge. That is to say, his songs stand in a continuum, at once forming and being formed by tradition.<sup>2</sup> The difference between lyric song and epic poetry lies in the fact that lyric has to take into account both local and Panhellenic tradition.<sup>3</sup> As Wells puts it:

(t2)

“Pindar's compositions entail a dynamic process of fluid interchange with the past of tradition, the present of original performance, and the future of subsequent reperformance.”

Wells 2009:137

In the Panhellenic culture of the fifth century these three temporal dimensions are inextricably linked, and therefore always intertwined in Pindaric song.

§4 The present chapter studies the linguistic reflection in Homer and Pindar of engagement with tradition and other kinds of shared knowledge, a phenomenon that has been termed “discourse memory.” I argue that apparently random use of certain particles – γάρ, ἄρα, and τε in particular – can be understood as metalanguage reflecting the performer's assumptions about a shared body of knowledge. First, I introduce the term

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<sup>1</sup> Havelock 1963:88-93 speaks of tradition in terms of a house full of furniture through which the Homeric performer threads a path.

<sup>2</sup> See Nagy 1990:128-129, where he argues that the Pelops narrative in *Olympian* 1 need not have been Pindar's invention.

<sup>3</sup> See also Nagy 1990:114, “Though each of Pindar's victory odes was an occasional composition, centering on a single performance, each containing details grounded in the historical realities of the time and place of performance, still each of these victory odes aimed at translating its occasion into a Panhellenic event.”

“discourse memory” and locate it within the larger framework of this study (4.1). Then I discuss how the Homeric performer monitors the discourse memory, supplementing it with pieces of knowledge introduced by γάρ (4.2.1). In Pindar’s *Victory Odes* we find a similar use of γάρ, but beyond introducing information about the storyworld, Pindar uses γάρ to insert *gnômai* (4.2.2). A special kind of traditional discourse is that of the Homeric simile, of which a linguistic analysis is presented in the third section, with a focus on τε and ἄρα (4.3). The fourth section of the chapter studies recurrent or common event sequences (“typical scenes”) in Homer, in which ἄρα is important again (4.4). In the final section, I present an analysis of τε in Pindar (4.5).

## 4.1 Discourse memory

§5 Before going on to discuss how epic and lyric discourse reflect the process of negotiating shared knowledge, it is necessary to consider what form this body of information takes in the mind. In a 1981 article, Lord describes the role of memory in the performance of epic:

(t3)

“...we could safely say for the whole song that Salih has not either memorized or even “remembered” a *text*, but he has remembered the essential elements in each section, and he has remembered the story. It is in *these* areas, i.e., essential elements in the themes or segments and the overall story, that memory plays its role.”

Lord 1981:456 [emphasis original]

Lord highlights two aspects of memory relevant to the epic performance: knowledge of the narrative sequence on the one hand (the “overall story”), and the crucial elements to every segment of the story on the other. Both of these elements are to a large extent prescribed by tradition, a fact that is not limited to epic. In both lyric and epic, the content and

structure of stories is therefore to a certain extent shared by performer and audience.<sup>4</sup>

Besides the narratives within epic and lyric, the genres themselves are traditional too: the performer is aware of the audience's expectations about both form and content. More generally, in a performance at a certain time and place, there exists a body of shared experiences and beliefs, resulting from a world and a culture shared by performer and audience. Finally, the performer can build upon what was said before within the same performance, the shared discourse: he can assume, rightly or not, that the audience remembers the most important events of the preceding discourse.

§6 This pool of information that constantly serves as a background to the unfolding discourse has been discussed in several forms, but I will follow Berrendonner and Roulet in calling it the discourse memory.<sup>5</sup> In chapter 2 I note that Roulet eventually defines the discourse act as every "update to the discourse memory," building on the work done by Berrendonner.<sup>6</sup> Cornish, conversely, speaks of "discourse model" rather than "discourse memory," but he equates his term to Berrendonner's "*mémoire discursive*." In this chapter I follow Berrendonner and Roulet in using the term "discourse memory," but will also refer to Cornish's "discourse model," using the two terms to denote two different things.

§7 The discourse model (Cornish) is "a coherent [mental] representation of the discourse,"<sup>7</sup> while the discourse memory (Berrendonner) contains "the information that, at

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<sup>4</sup> See Havelock 1963:88-93 and Nagy 1979:3, "To my mind there is no question, then, about the poet's ability to say accurately what he means. What he means, however, is strictly regulated by tradition. The poet has no intention of saying anything untraditional. In fact, the poet's inherited conceit is that he has it in his power to recover the exact words that tell what men did and said in the Heroic Age."

<sup>5</sup> Roulet 2001:64-65 and Berrendonner 1990, who speaks of the "*mémoire discursive*" or "*savoir partagé*" [shared knowledge].

<sup>6</sup> Roulet 2001:64-65.

<sup>7</sup> "Discourse model" was coined by Prince 1981, and is used by Cornish 1999:5, who uses it with the following definition: "This model is a coherent representation of the discourse being evoked via the co-text and its context in terms of the speaker's or writer's hypothesized intentions." I employ the term throughout chapter 5.

every moment, is valid for the two interlocutors and shared among them.”<sup>8</sup> Building on Berrendonner’s brief description, I believe discourse memory can be defined more fully. The work by the cognitive linguist Langacker is especially helpful in this respect. He defines the “current discourse space (CDS)” as follows:

(t4)

“[b]esides the context of speech, the CDS includes a body of knowledge presumed to be shared and readily accessible. It also includes the speaker’s and hearer’s apprehension of the ongoing discourse itself: a series of previous usage events, as well as subsequent events that might be anticipated. Any facet of this can be drawn upon or alluded to in the current utterance.”

Langacker 2001:144

I understand the difference between discourse memory and the discourse model as follows: the discourse memory is the whole body of shared knowledge that underlies the current discourse,<sup>9</sup> whereas the discourse model is that part of the discourse memory that has been activated to create a mental representation of the current discourse. In other words, the discourse model is part of the working memory, while the rest of the discourse memory is that part of the long term memory that is shared between performer and audience.<sup>10</sup>

§8 For Homeric and Pindaric discourse, the three components of the discourse memory that exert influence on the linguistic formation and subsequent interpretation of any discourse act in Homer and Pindar are (1) the tradition, (2) the shared knowledge of the

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<sup>8</sup> Berrendonner 1990:25, “(mémoire discursive ou savoir partagé), contenant les informations qui, à chaque instant, sont valides pour les deux interlocuteurs et publique entre eux.”

<sup>9</sup> Compare also Venneman 1975:314 who speaks of a “presupposition pool,” which contains information “constituted from general knowledge, from the situative context of the discourse, and from the completed part of the discourse itself.”

<sup>10</sup> For this relation between working memory and the discourse model, see Cornish 1999:159, 166.



world, and (3) the preceding discourse. Every discourse act thus engages in an interaction with the current discourse model as well as with any other relevant information in the discourse memory.

§9 The world evoked in the narrative of epic or lyric is up to a point removed from the here and now, yet the composer constantly counts on his audience's basic knowledge of the world. The world created to serve as the theater for a narrative has been called a storyworld.<sup>11</sup> The form of a storyworld is subject to what Ryan calls the "principle of minimal departure," which states that the storyworld is the same as the "real" world (i.e. the world in which performer and audience live) except for those aspects explicitly mentioned.<sup>12</sup> So in the storyworld of the *Iliad*, the Greek heroes are taller and stronger than the men of Archaic Greece, but wood still burns, the sea has tides, the sun goes down and comes up again, and so on. Unless the audience receives an instruction to adapt the image, they will project the world they know onto the storyworld.

§10 The discourse memory covers the entire body of relevant knowledge that the performer assumes to be shared between him and the audience at any particular point in the discourse. This cognitive process is a matter of assumption and prediction, since the performer cannot know exactly to which extent the audience shares his knowledge. For that very reason, it is only of limited relevance to know what knowledge exactly is actually shared between performer and audience at a certain point in time. We may compare the use of "of course" in academic papers to indicate that some piece of information is expected to be shared, even if in practice only part of the audience may actually know it. Expressing such assumptions linguistically may thus be as much a rhetorical device as a reflection of reality. In the following sections I trace different linguistic elements that to my mind reflect these assumptions and predictions on the part of the performer.

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<sup>11</sup> I borrow the term "storyworld" from Herman 2002.

<sup>12</sup> Ryan 1991:51.

## 4.2 Unframed discourse

§11 As a story progresses, every discourse act is an implicit instruction to update the storyworld. However, narration of the action is not the only way for the performer to develop the discourse model; he can also choose to engage with the discourse memory more explicitly.<sup>13</sup> At any moment in the narrative the performer may feel the need to explain something, which he cannot always do while staying in the background.<sup>14</sup> To discuss this phenomenon of narrative discourse in particular, I introduce the concepts of framed and unframed discourse.

§12 In her 1997 monograph, Emmott explains narrative as being built around spaces, contexts that contain certain characters at certain times, and are placed relatively or absolutely within the storyworld. Such a space is a “contextual frame” in Emmott’s terms,<sup>15</sup> and it plays a central role in how a narrative is managed.<sup>16</sup> One may imagine a contextual frame as a space in the mental representation of the discourse, which functions as a receptacle for specific characters, items, and events. A character is “bound” to a contextual frame until the performer provides explicit information to the contrary (“covert continuity”).<sup>17</sup> Once characters are bound to a location, activating that character gives both performer and audience access to the entire contextual frame.<sup>18</sup> Emmott demonstrates that

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<sup>13</sup> Beyond language, extralinguistic and paralinguistic information can also influence the discourse model. When a performer points (or even looks) at something in the direct performance context, this may from then on form part of the discourse model without ever having been expressed verbally (see also chapter 5 §37). Likewise, an emphasized personal pronoun may imply a contrast with another referent (e.g. “YOU are not like that”), who at that point becomes a part of the discourse model without ever being mentioned.

<sup>14</sup> See Richardson 1990:5 and 197-198 on the absence and presence of the narrator in Homeric discourse.

<sup>15</sup> Emmott’s contextual frames are an application of the idea of [semantic] frames – interconnected semantic networks, on which see Fillmore 1976 – to characters in narrative discourse. Cornish 1999:44-45 speaks of “referential space” which appears to approach Emmott’s idea of “contextual frame.”

<sup>16</sup> Emmott 1997:121-122. Emmott’s point can be linked directly to the observation by the psychologists Winograd and Church (1988:6-7, referred to by Minchin 2008:10), who claim that spatial information can cue the recall of associated material; see also Rothkopf, Fisher, and Billington 1982:126.

<sup>17</sup> See Emmott 1997:125-129.

<sup>18</sup> The relevance of contextual frames to the linguistic realization of narrative is manifold: see chapter 2 §69-§71 on the link between transitions between contextual frames and the use of priming acts, and chapter 5 *passim* for how the concept of the contextual frame can explain apparent problems of reference.

the largest part of conventional narratives occurs within contextual frames: this she calls “framed” discourse.<sup>19</sup>

§13 Framed discourse consists of those acts that are temporally and spatially positioned within a contextual frame in the storyworld. They tell of the events that occur in a certain time and place within the frame of the narrative. To these framed acts, Emmott contrasts “unframed” discourse: acts that do not present narrative events, but rather inform the audience about the storyworld and its inhabitants. Consider the following example:

(t5)

“How’s the baby?”

“Little bleeder never sleeps, he’s wearing us out, but he’s fine.”

The baby was six years old. Having the baby was a definite achievement:  
getting it safely conceived and born had taken a couple of years.

Doris Lessing 1965 ‘A Man and Two Women’ in *A Man and Two Women*, 91; given as an example by Emmott 1997:246 [underlining Emmott]

The narrator shifts from reporting direct speech to describing a character. The underlined passage is unframed, since it is not concerned with what is happening at a certain point in time. In English unframed discourse is marked by its form as generalizations, often a description or backstory, as here.<sup>20</sup> The information given in unframed text is true beyond the current scene in the storyworld: it is not happening in a narrative “here and now.” Since unframed discourse often takes this form, scholars have described it in terms of

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<sup>19</sup> Emmott speaks of “framed text,” but “text” is a problematic term with regard to the Homeric and Pindaric corpora.

<sup>20</sup> Emmott 1997:252-258.

“descriptive mode” or “background discourse,”<sup>21</sup> but unframed is a more inclusive term: it covers not only descriptions, but also expressions of stance, and it avoids the hierarchical implications of foreground versus background. Most importantly, the status of the discourse as framed or unframed is not dependent on content (i.e. descriptions) but on the attitude of the performer towards the discourse. In many cases, the performer can choose between presenting discourse as framed or unframed: compare “they saw her stride in through the gate. She was a tall woman...” (framed) against “She strode in through the gate. She had always been the tallest of three sisters...” (unframed).<sup>22</sup>

§14 Unframed discourse is reflected through language in multiple ways. First of all, there is often a tense shift after the transition to unframed discourse, and again when the framed text is resumed. Second, the occurrence of unframed discourse has an effect on the flow of discourse. Although unframed discourse typically has direct relevance to the surrounding framed discourse, the change in perspective means that other discourse processes are interrupted. Anaphoric reference in particular is affected: when a character is introduced into a frame, that character remains available in that frame until we are informed otherwise (“covert continuity”). Characters introduced in unframed discourse, however, do not remain available when framed discourse is resumed.<sup>23</sup> In the example above, the “sisters” are not normally available when the “striding through the gate” frame is resumed.<sup>24</sup> Third, metalinguistic markers occur at the transitions into and out of

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<sup>21</sup> Emmott discusses the different terms with extensive literature in 1997:141-145. For Homer, Bakker 2005:123-135 uses both the terms “background” and “off-sequence.”

<sup>22</sup> These are constructed examples for the sake of illustration.

<sup>23</sup> See Emmott 1997:239 and 248-252.

<sup>24</sup> See also Grosz and Sidner 1986:178 “...the discourse segmentation affects the interpretation of linguistic expressions in a discourse. (...) The segmentation of discourse constrains the use of referring expressions by delineating certain points at which there is a significant change in what entities (...) are being discussed. For example there are different constraints on the use of pronouns and reduced definite-noun phrases within a segment than across segment boundaries.”

On pages 193-194 they describe what happens in a shift between two discourses: “Because the second discourse shifts attention totally to a new purpose (...), the speakers cannot use any referential expressions during it that depend on the accessibility of entities from the first discourse.”

unframed discourse. Emmott observes that in English written narrative temporal markers often serve to mark such frame transitions,<sup>25</sup> and she concludes:

(t6)

“Markers such as [“once”] suggest that the distinction between (framed) events in context and (unframed) decontextualized generalizations is important and has a textual realization which needs to be taken into account.”

Emmott 1997:248

In addition to the linguistic marking mentions above, Ancient Greek likewise employs metalinguistic markers at the transitions between framed and unframed discourse. I now turn to the most important of these markers in Homer and Pindar.

#### 4.2.1. γάρ and unframed discourse in Homeric epic

§15 The Homeric performer is omniscient, so he can report not only the observable actions of the protagonists, but also their backstories and their thoughts. Moreover, the performer can reflect upon the narrative situation himself, either as a narrating persona or as a performer in the here and now. These steps out of the storyworld into unframed discourse are often introduced by γάρ. They reveal the performance’s nature as an interactive activity,<sup>26</sup> acting as a sign of the performer assessing the knowledge shared between him and audience, and providing crucial information when needed. In Homeric narrative γάρ has three functions: (1) to introduce information about characters or the storyworld, (2) to

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<sup>25</sup> Such as “now” and “once,” see Emmott 1997:246-250.

<sup>26</sup> Compare Barthes 1977:110 about signs of the narrator and of the hearer/reader in the text. When a first-person narrator in a novel says: “Leo was the owner of the joint...” he is not “giving himself information,” so he must be “turning to the reader.” For more on transitions between the storyworld and the realm of the Homeric performance see Richardson 1990:66, Minchin 2001:43, Bakker 2005:114-135, Clay 2011:21, and Tsagalis 2012:19.

blend the perspectives of the performer with that of a character, and (3) to introduce evaluative comments about the ongoing narrative. My contention throughout is that it is unproductive to link γάρ to the idea of background, since from a narrative and discourse perspective the acts and moves introduced by γάρ are important.<sup>27</sup> They supply information indispensable for the narrative, heighten suspense, and invite audience involvement.

§16 As discussed in chapter 3, the performer can use γάρ to unfold certain story paths. The mention of a place, item, or character may trigger an association with another narrative, which is then introduced by γάρ. In the following passage Odysseus, a first-person internal narrator, introduces his plan (βουλή) to defeat the Cyclops. Before he can outline his plan to his audience, however, he has to explain to them that there is a club in the Cyclops' cave, a crucial element in the plan:

(t7)

ἦδε δέ μοι κατὰ θυμὸν ἀρίστη φαίνεται βουλή |  
 Κύκλωπος γὰρ ἔκειτο μέγα ῥόπαλον | παρὰ σηκῷ, |  
 χλωρὸν ἐλαΐνεον· |

(...)

τοῦ μὲν | ὅσον τ' ὄργυιαν | ἐγὼν ἀπέκοψα | παραστάς |  
 καὶ παρέθηχ' ἐτάροισιν, | ἀποξῦναι δ' ἐκέλευσα· |

*Odyssey* 9.318-320, 325-326

And this seemed in my mind to be the best plan:

You see, there lay a big club of the Cyclops near the pen,

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<sup>27</sup> See chapter 3 §25-§26 for the recent tendency in scholarship to associate γάρ with the introduction of background information.

of green olivewood;

(...)

Of that, then, I cut off about a fathom's length, standing near it,

and put it near my comrades; I ordered them to sand it down.

In lines 319-324 a passage is inserted to give information that the audience needs to understand the point of the narrative. The information that Odysseus offers is in the form of a piece of knowledge about the storyworld of his Cyclops narrative. This shift to the unframed move is marked by γάρ and a change to the imperfect tense (ἔκειτο etc), as typically occurs in such situations. The return to framed discourse is marked by μέν and three verbs in the aorist.<sup>28</sup>

§17 It is clear that in passages like (t7) there is no sense of causality inherent in the γάρ clause, neither *de dicto* nor *de re*.<sup>29</sup> Not even if we take into account the possibility of “anticipatory γάρ” – i.e. the γάρ clause providing the cause before the result – can we explain this instance as causal.<sup>30</sup> Nor can we describe this as “background information,” since in narrative terms the unframed discourse occurs exactly because it is indispensable to understanding the ongoing narrative. The nature of the discourse changes for a limited time, but its importance does not. Consider one more example from the Cyclops narrative:

(t8)

τρεῖς δὲ ἕκαστον φῶτ' ὄϊες φέρον· | αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ γε, |

ἀρνειὸς γὰρ ἔην μῆλων | ὅχ' ἄριστος ἀπάντων, |

<sup>28</sup> See chapter 5 §19-§71 for more on use of pronouns and particles near transitions between framed and unframed discourse.

<sup>29</sup> See De Jong 2004<sup>2</sup>:91-93, who explains this use of γάρ as answering implied questions of the audience, and takes it as a sign that the *Iliad* is a “*récit motivé*” in Genette’s terms.

<sup>30</sup> The discussion of the possibility that a γάρ clause can give a cause before the clause that contains the result goes back to Aristarchus (see Appendix A §31); the existence of “anticipatory” or “proleptic” γάρ is accepted by Schraut 1849:16, Schraut 1857, Fritsch 1859, Hoffmann 1880, Monro 1882, and Ebeling 1885, and opposed by Döderlein 1858.

τοῦ κατὰ νῶτα λαβών, | λασίην ὑπὸ γαστέρ' ἔλυσθεις |  
 κείμεν· |

*Odyssey 9.431-434*

And three ewes carried each man; but then I,  
 there was a ram, far the best of all the sheep;  
 grabbing him down the back, curled under his haired belly  
 I lay;

Again, γάρ is used to introduce a piece of knowledge that the speaker thinks the hearer may not, or cannot, know. In both (t7) and (t8) the piece of unframed discourse interrupts the flow of the narrative, in (t8) actually interfering with a syntactical construction.<sup>31</sup>

§18 Compare the following excerpt from an informal conversation recorded by Chafe, about an old-fashioned Swiss professor:

(t9)

13. ... a--nd he-- .. wou-ld immédiately open his ... nótes up,
14. ... in the front of the róom,
15. .. and he st
16. and évery ... évery lecture,
17. ... áfter the fírst,
18. .. stárted the same wáy.
19. This was .. u--m at Wésleyan,
20. when Wesleyan was still ... a mén's school.
21. ... So évery lecture after the first would begin,
22. ... Géntlemen,

<sup>31</sup> A very similar construction occurs in Herodotus I.126 ἐνθαῦτα ὁ Κῦρος | ἦν γάρ τις χῶρος τῆς Περσικῆς ἀκανθώδης (...) | τοῦτόν σφι τὸν χῶρον. The passage is discussed in Kerschensteiner 1964:40.



23. ...ze lást time,

Chafe 1987:23 [my underlining]

There is no clear marking of the beginning of the unframed discourse, but the return to the narrative frame is marked with “so”; Emmott calls this “frame recall.”<sup>32</sup> The similarity with (t7) and (t8) is striking: as the speaker comes to the *pointe* of his story, he introduces a crucial piece of information: the presence of the club in (t7), the ram in (t8), and the fact that Wesleyan was still a men’s school in (t9). The speaker then proceeds to tell the rest of the story so that Odysseus has a club to make a weapon, an animal to cling to, and so that the “[g]entlemen” in (t9) makes sense. There may be another motivation behind this strategy: by inserting the information at this point in the narrative, in this form, the climax of the story is briefly postponed. Thus introducing this kind of unframed discourse may serve to build up tension in the unfolding of the framed discourse.

§19 There are countless examples of γάρ introducing pieces of important knowledge in narrative. Beyond the instances discussed above, I simply note examples throughout the other chapters where they occur. For now, I turn to another kind of unframed discourse commonly introduced by γάρ. In chapter 3 I discuss δὲ γάρ with regard to the function of δὲ, but now I focus on the function of γάρ in the combination. I have noted before that δὲ in narrator text occurs in the great majority of cases with a temporal marker, signaling larger steps in the narrative. Much less often, it occurs in narrator text in its intensifying function, either with large or with small scope. One of the exceptions to this pattern is δὲ γάρ in narrator text: in act-initial position, δὲ does not appear to have its discourse-segmenting function.<sup>33</sup>

§20 Consider the following example about Deïphobus:

<sup>32</sup> I take the expression “frame recall” from Emmott 1997:150-157, see §38 below and chapter 5 §51-§62 for more on the topic.

<sup>33</sup> δὲ γάρ in narrator text: 3 out of 8 instances in the *Iliad*, 3 out of 9 in the *Odyssey*.

(t10)

τοῦ δὲ βάδην ἀπιόντος ἀκόντισε | δουρὶ φαεινῷ |  
 Δηϊφობος | δὴ γάρ οἱ ἔχεν κότον ἐμμενὲς αἰεὶ. |  
 ἀλλ' ὅ γε<sup>34</sup> καὶ τόθ' ἄμαρτεν, | ὃ δ' Ἀσκάλαφον βάλε δουρὶ |

*Iliad* 13.516-518

And him, as he retreated step by step struck with his shining spear  
 Deïphobus. For he had had a hate for him, ever unceasing.  
 But HE missed right then. He hit Ascalaphus with his spear,

In this prototypical example, it seems almost like we get a glimpse of Deiphobus' thoughts at the moment that he attacks Idomeneus "I have really always hated him!" However, the addition of ἐμμενὲς αἰεὶ, as well as the imperfect (ἔχεν) within the narrative in the aorist, strongly suggest the omniscient perspective of the narrator. In contrast to the unframed discourse discussed above, the kind of information introduced by δὴ γάρ here is not about the external world, but about the thoughts of a character.<sup>35</sup> In fact, the performer uses γάρ to introduce a little insight into a character's psyche.<sup>36</sup> The use of intensification through δὴ within the narrator text may be a sign of empathy of the narrator with that character: there is a blurring of perspectives.<sup>37</sup> In the parallel instances there is always some similar

<sup>34</sup> See chapter 5 §27-§50 for ὅ γε after unframed discourse.

<sup>35</sup> The parallels are *Iliad* 17.546, 17.625; *Odyssey* 10.160 (Odysseus as narrator), 13.30, 18.154. There is one exception of δὴ γάρ in narrator text: *Iliad* 24.351, where δὴ γάρ introduces a piece of knowledge about the storyworld. The role of δὴ in this passage is unclear, and it is one of the passages often adduced to argue that δὴ has a temporal value in Homer (= ἤδη: "by now"); see e.g. Thomas 1894:94 where it is listed under "the purely temporal use [of δὴ]."

<sup>36</sup> Compare the instances of γάρ marking "double focalization" in discourse (i.e. focalized both through the narrator and through a character) discussed by De Jong 2004<sup>2</sup>:111-112.

<sup>37</sup> An especially attractive example of possible empathy of the narrator/performer is *Odyssey* 13.30, about Odysseus: δὴ γάρ μενέαινε νέεσθαι ("he very much wanted to return home").

insight into the feelings of a character.<sup>38</sup> In short, unframed discourse in narrative concerns not only information about the storyworld, but also about the thoughts and feelings of characters.<sup>39</sup>

§21 The expression of omnitemporality ἐμμενὲς αἰεὶ in (t10) brings us to the final kind of unframed discourse in Homer introduced by γάρ: *gnômai*, or generalizing statements about the world, which function as comments on the ongoing narrative. Lardinois has noted the possibility of connecting “a gnomic statement to the particular situation to which [the poet] wants the saying to apply, by inserting a particle or conjunction, such as γάρ or ἐπεὶ, at the beginning of the gnomic expression.”<sup>40</sup> He discusses the phenomenon in Sophocles, but it also occurs in Homer, especially in the combination γάρ τε.<sup>41</sup> Consider the following example from the *Odyssey*, where Nestor is speaking of Agamemnon’s decision to stay in Troy and attempt to appease Athena:

(t11)

νήπιος, | οὐδὲ τὸ ἤδη, | ὃ οὐ πείσεσθαι ἔμελλεν |  
οὐ γάρ τ’ αἴψα θεῶν τρέπεται νόος αἰὲν ἐόντων. |

*Odyssey* 3.146-147

Fool, he did not know that she [sc. Athena] would not be persuaded.

No, not quickly is the mind turned of the gods who are forever.

<sup>38</sup> This kind of blurring also occurs in one of the few instances of γάρ δή in narrator text: *Iliad* 12.331-333 τοὺς δὲ ἰδὼν ῥίγησ’ υἱὸς Πετεῶο Μενεσθεύς / τοῦ γάρ δή πρὸς πύργον ἴσαν κακότητα φέροντες. / πάπτηνεν δ’ ἀνὰ πύργον Ἀχαιῶν εἴ τιν’ ἴδοιτο. The performer explains Menestheus’ shudder (ρίγησε) by verbalizing the character’s perception of the army approaching his part of the wall. I infer a shift in perspective from the use of δή and the fact that the combination γάρ δή rarely occurs in narrator text without a temporal marker (only here and in *Odyssey* 5.276 τὴν γάρ δή μιν ἄνωγε Καλυψώ, δῖα θεάων).

<sup>39</sup> More on the link between δή and the blurring of perspective in narrative in IV.4.

<sup>40</sup> Lardinois 2006:216.

<sup>41</sup> See Ruijgh 1971:720-721, who speaks of permanent and temporary facts introduced by γάρ τε.

Nestor is acting like an internal narrator, and his use of νήπιος clearly shows his non-neutral stance.<sup>42</sup> Here and in other examples of γάρ τε moves in Homer, the pattern is clear: after the two adjacent particles there is a shift to present tense (or an elided ἔστι),<sup>43</sup> and this is often accompanied by a form of αἶψά.<sup>44</sup> Finally, this kind of gnomic unframed discourse typically occurs in direct speech, and is practically limited to the *Odyssey*.

§22 It is telling that we find the combination γάρ τε in these gnomic statements by characters. The discourse function of γάρ can now be explained as introducing unframed discourse, while its logical function here is that of signalling the reason or cause for the preceding. What, then, is the function of τε here? I argue that the addition of τε in this construction serves to mark the statement as referring to a large body of shared knowledge, which we might term tradition. The particle's use in Homeric *gnômai* can be compared to that in similes, other instances of timeless discourse, and to its use in Pindaric song. Finally, it may be brought into connection with the occurrence of τε in proverbs in archaic epic.<sup>45</sup> I cannot, therefore, agree with Denniston's contention that in combinations τε's "association with particular particles" (i.e. γάρ in this case) is rather "loose and fortuitous."<sup>46</sup>

§23 There is a correlation in Homer between the occurrence of unframed discourse and the particle γάρ. Whether to introduce additional information that is crucial to the narrative, or to reflect upon the situation, the performer turns to γάρ to mark the transition and to signal the associative link. Any transition between framed and unframed discourse is neutral with regard to the importance of the unframed move. The correlation

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<sup>42</sup> See also Bakker 2005:84, who calls such *νήπιος* passages "direct interaction between the poet and his audience."

<sup>43</sup> *Odyssey* 1.152 (=21.430) τὰ γάρ τ' ἀναθήματα δαιτός.

<sup>44</sup> *Iliad* 1.63; *Odyssey* 1.351, 4.397, 5.78, 7.294, 7.307, 12.105, 14.228, 15.54 (ἥματα πάντα), 20.75, and 20.85. One may also compare the unique ὥς γὰρ θέσφατόν ἐστι, spoken by Zeus in *Iliad* 8.477.

<sup>45</sup> See IV.2 §55–§56 with further examples from Homer and Hesiod.

<sup>46</sup> Denniston 1950<sup>2</sup>:528.

emerges clearly from the material, but the performer does not have to use the particle when he introduces unframed discourse.<sup>47</sup>

#### 4.2.2 γάρ and unframed discourse in Pindar

§24 The examples of gnomic unframed discourse provide a natural bridge to Pindaric song: their tendency to occur in direct speech in Homer brings us closer to the communicative situation in Pindar. Pindar's movements between framed and unframed discourse are both more numerous and more explicit than Homer's, and he too avails himself of γάρ to add pieces of information about the storyworld where needed.<sup>48</sup> His songs differ from Homeric epic in that Pindar explicitly engages with the real world. Consider the following example:

(t12)

‘χρήματα χρήματ’ ἀνήρ’ | ὅς φᾶ | κτεάνων θ’ ἅμα λειφθεὶς καὶ φίλων. |  
ἐσσι γὰρ ὦν<sup>49</sup> σοφός |

*Isthmian* 2.11-12

‘Means, means make the man’ says he who has been left by both possessions and friends.  
You see, you are well-versed in song.

After the gnomic statement of line 11, Pindar turns to Thrasyboulus, son of the laudandus and addressee for most of this song.<sup>50</sup> The act ἐσσι γὰρ ὦν σοφός marks a discursive discontinuity: it directs attention away from a general statement to Thrasyboulus in

<sup>47</sup> Consider by way of example *Iliad* 16.688, right after a *nēpios* statement (16.686): ἀλλ’ αἰεὶ τε Διὸς κρείσσω νόος ἢ ἐπερ ἀνδρῶν.

<sup>48</sup> γάρ introduces unframed discourse about the storyworld in *Pythian* 2.38, 4.209, *Nemean* 10.46, 10.62, 11.34, *Isthmian* 1.26.

<sup>49</sup> ὦν in Pindar occurs only in combination with other particles, which makes it hard to establish its function. Here I have taken it to mark an inference from the extralinguistic context. About γάρ in Pindar, Hummel says that it is without doubt one of the particles with the clearest semantic value (1993:406, “C’est sans doute une des particules les plus claires du point de vue de la valeur sémantique...”). However, instances like (t12) stretch her classification of γάρ as causal or explicative.

<sup>50</sup> See chapter 5 §72-§75 for a complete analysis of *Isthmian* 2, with additional comments on this passage.

particular. The implication is that the preceding expression is not applicable to Pindar's addressee. Pindar, addressing Thrasyboulus directly and calling upon his authority as poet, seems to: "You are wise, do not try to deny it, I just proclaimed it."<sup>51</sup> Here, and in several other instances where γάρ introduces unframed information about the victor or his family, some kind of extralinguistic reference to them would also be appropriate; perhaps in the form of a gesture or a gaze, just before or along with the γάρ act.<sup>52</sup>

§25 Just as the Homeric performer does, but much more often, Pindar provides reflections on the story or the praise event with interjected pieces of wisdom. These *gnômai* are a common way in Pindaric song to put the rest of the discourse in perspective, and like the γάρ moves in Homer serve to create or recall a shared ground between performer and audience.<sup>53</sup> τε fits gnomic contexts in Homer very well, and it is to some extent surprising that τε does not frequently occur in Pindaric *gnômai*.<sup>54</sup> Consider the following *gnômē* from the seventh *Isthmian* ode:

(t13)

ὅ τι τερπνὸν ἐφάμερον διώκων |  
 ἔκαλος ἔπειμι γῆρας | ἔς τε τὸν μόρσιμον  
 αἰῶνα. | θνάσκομεν γὰρ ὁμῶς ἅπαντες |  
 δαίμων δ' ἄϊσος |

Pindar, *Isthmian* 7.40-43

Pursuing what is pleasant every day

<sup>51</sup> See Bäumlein's characterization (1861:68) of γάρ as marking something as a fact that "nun einmal so ist."

<sup>52</sup> γάρ further introduces unframed discourse about the real world in *Olympian* 4.10, 6.25, 7.23, 10.13, 10.50, 11.19, *Pythian* 5.34, *Isthmian* 2.30, 4.40, 4.45, 4.49, 6.60, 8.70.

<sup>53</sup> I align with Wells 2009:150, "...gnomic style renders statements couched in that style as relevant to all participants in the speech event of performance."

<sup>54</sup> The reason is probably that τε is almost always copulative in Pindar (see 4.5 below), whereas *gnômai* are expressly separated from the preceding discourse. In this kind of context, a copulative particle would be infelicitous.

calmly I go to old age, and to the fated  
life's end. For we all die the same;  
but our fortune is distinct.

Here the *gnô̂mē* occurs in first-person discourse, it puts Pindar's statement about his old age in relief. The transition between different moves of the performer becomes even clearer in the following example, called "parenthetical" by Hummel:<sup>55</sup>

(t14)

ἀλλ' ὅμως, | κρέσσον γὰρ οἰκτιρμοῦ φθόνος, |  
μὴ παρίει καλά.

Pindar, *Pythian* 1.85-86

But still – after all, envy is better than compassion –  
do not pass over good things.

Pindar advises Hieron to not be too humble, it seems, and supports his advice with reference to a common piece of wisdom.<sup>56</sup> As in (t8), the γὰρ act (and move) interrupts a syntactical whole, and for this reason Hummel calls it a parenthetical construction. She adds: "In this type of structure, the particle *serves to signal the change of syntactical and logical level of the utterance.*"<sup>57</sup> Despite the difference in terminology, Hummel's assessment resonates with my analysis of γὰρ as marking that the speaker is (however briefly) performing a different kind of move. *Gnômai* introduce knowledge necessary to understand

<sup>55</sup> Hummel 1993:407.

<sup>56</sup> Commentators point to the same proverb in Herodotus' *Histories* 3.52.2 (φθονέεσθαι κρέσσον ἐστὶ ἢ οἰκτίρεσθαι) and as a saying attributed to Thales by Stobaeus (*Seven Sages* 10.3.δ17, Diels/Kranz p. 64, φθονοῦ μᾶλλον ἢ οἰκτίρου. The text is an emendation by Diels; Stobaeus has φθόνου χάριν μὴ οἰκτίρου); see Gentili 1995:359.

<sup>57</sup> Hummel 1993:407 "Dans ce type de structure, la particule *a pour fonction de signaler le changement de niveau syntaxique et logique de l'énoncé*" [my italics].

the workings of the world of the discourse.<sup>58</sup> In Homer this world is generally the storyworld, sometimes extended to include the world at large, while in Pindar the emphasis is more on the latter.

### 4.2.3 γάρ in Homer and Pindar: an overview

§26 The particle γάρ has been called the “most typical PUSH particle,” marking displacement to a new frame of reference.<sup>59</sup> This characterization is important, since in most of its functions γάρ aids in negotiating different strands of discourse, but both in chapter 3 and here I have described in detail its function in different contexts: chapter 3 focused on γάρ’s role at the beginning of new moves, especially embedded narratives; here I have described its use in transitions between framed and unframed discourse. From a certain perspective, γάρ’s function of introducing embedded narratives may be described in terms of starting unframed discourse.<sup>60</sup> An embedded narrative takes the form of framed discourse, but is “unframed” with regard to the ongoing narrative.<sup>61</sup>

§27 Through an unframed move introduced by γάρ, the performer introduces a piece of information (in the form of a motivation, narrative, *gnómē*, or description) into the discourse model, and thus it becomes part of the discourse memory. Another important factor is that a performer can use γάρ to introduce this different kind of discourse exactly when he means to. By choosing the right moment, the performer manages the knowledge shared between him and the audience, but can also manipulate the flow of the narrative

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<sup>58</sup> γάρ introduces *gnômai* in *Olympian* 8.23, 9.28, 9.104, 14.5, 14.8, *Pythian* 1.41, 1.82, 3.85, 4.263, 4.272, 4.286, 8.73, 10.53, 10.59, 11.29, *Nemean* 1.32, 1.53, 6.29, 7.12, 7.30, 7.52, 8.17, 9.27, 9.33, 11.45, *Isthmian* 1.47, 4.30, 4.33, 7.16, 7.42, 8.14.

<sup>59</sup> Slings 1997:101; see chapter 3 §23 for more on the PUSH-POP distinction.

<sup>60</sup> It is worth noting that in Pindar ἐπεὶ can serve this same function, to introduce embedded narratives or *gnômai*, see e.g. the beginning of an embedded narrative in *Olympian* 9.29 and a *gnómē* in *Olympian* 10.88. For the narrative function of ἐπεὶ-clauses in Homer, see Muchnová 2003, and ancient Greek narrative in general, see Muchnová 2006 and 2009.

<sup>61</sup> Emmott 1997:244 discusses flashbacks in similar terms: they are formally most often “located in a specific context” and thus framed, but they have in common with unframed text that they often provide a “comment on the main narrative.”



and the performance. Below and in chapter 5 §51-§62 I discuss ἄρα in unframed narrative, where the performer assumes that the following information is already part of the discourse memory, but activates it again in the current discourse model. Both ἄρα and γάρ can thus serve to manage the discourse memory.

§28 In order to identify the type of move that γάρ introduces, the tense that follows γάρ offers a cue: (1) when γάρ introduces embedded narratives it is commonly followed by an aorist, (2) when γάρ introduces unframed information about the (story)world it is commonly followed by an imperfect, and (3) when γάρ (τε) introduces an unframed *gnōmē* it is followed by a verb in the present tense.<sup>62</sup> We must keep in mind that the patterns involving γάρ are tendencies rather than rules, and since the different uses represent aspects of the same particle we must keep in mind that boundaries will be fuzzy. Notwithstanding this fact, an analysis of γάρ in terms of introducing different kinds of unframed discourse reveals that the particle is involved in at least three different constructions.<sup>63</sup> This discourse-sensitive approach may serve as a step toward explaining γάρ's multifunctionality across register, genre, and time.

### 4.3 Particles in the Homeric simile

§29 The simile is one of the most recognizable kinds of Homeric discourse,<sup>64</sup> and it touches upon discourse memory in at least two ways. On the one hand it presupposes shared knowledge about the world, while on the other hand it represents itself a body of tradition within epic discourse recognized by the audience. The simile aids in visualizing a complex

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<sup>62</sup> Luraghi and Celano 2012 have done a corpus study of γάρ, and have found that γάρ is frequently followed by tense shift with respect to the immediately preceding clause.

<sup>63</sup> This use of γάρ is not limited to early literature; consider a clear example of unframed discourse in the *New Testament*, Mark 5:42 καὶ εὐθὺς ἀνέστη τὸ κοράσιον καὶ περιεπάτει, ἣν γὰρ ἑτῶν δώδεκα. καὶ ἐξέστησαν [εὐθὺς] ἐκστάσει μεγάλη ("And immediately the girl stood up and walked. She was twelve years old. And [at once] they were amazed with great joy").

<sup>64</sup> Influential studies on the Homeric simile include H. Fränkel 1921, Shipp 1972<sup>2</sup>:3-222, Scott 1974, Moulton 1977, Nimis 1987:23-95, Muellner 1990, Martin 1997 (with a discussion of Fränkel, Scott, and Moulton on 142-143), Minchin 2001:132-160, and Ready 2011.

scene by imposing a somehow different (if not always simpler) image upon it.<sup>65</sup> In a simile such as “Achilles faught like a lioness who, when she sees her cubs attacked, comes snarling at her prey. Just so Achilles attacked...” “Achilles” is the tenor, “lioness” is the vehicle, and the whole description of the vehicle (“like a lioness...prey”) is the “vehicle portion.”<sup>66</sup> By its very nature the simile presupposes that the image in the vehicle portion is recognizable, even if in reality the audience may never have seen a lion.<sup>67</sup> The recognizability derives from the fact that the image is part of the tradition familiar to both performer and audience. In this section I argue that the simile’s dependence on tradition is one of the determinants of the Homeric performer’s use of particles.<sup>68</sup>

§30 My results are based on a study of the language of the similes listed in the appendix of Scott’s study: 341 in the *Iliad* and 134 in the *Odyssey*.<sup>69</sup> A number of these similes take the form of only a marker of comparison (ὥς, ἥύτε, (εἰ)ῖκελος, etc.) and a noun phrase, and are therefore too short for the study of particle use in the simile. The corpus that remains is made up of all those instances where the vehicle portion of the simile is expressed with a clause containing at least one finite verb. This kind of construction occurs 215 times in the *Iliad* (making up 708 lines) and 47 times in the *Odyssey* (148 lines). Of this group, the tenor is repeated in the majority of cases, 182 times in the *Iliad* and 38 times in the *Odyssey*.

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<sup>65</sup> Minchin 2001:137-139 presents a cognitive approach to the Homeric simile, and on 137 says: “[similes] provide listeners (...) with a schema, a conceptual outline, which enables them to focus their attention and to organize their ideas appropriately, in order to build a mental model for understanding what is being presented to them in words.”

<sup>66</sup> I take the term “vehicle portion” from Ready 2011:4-5, with note 10.

<sup>67</sup> Martin 1997:152-153 comments on the observation by Shipp 1953 that the similes contain late language: “[asides, digressions, and similes] must change from year to year or even from one performance to the next (...) since they refer to the ‘real’ world of the audience, are more likely to be in less standardized, ‘later’ language.”

<sup>68</sup> The language of the simile has been regarded by some scholars as significantly different from the rest of the epics (e.g. Tsagalis 2012:18 on dual coding), but the study of Ingalls 1979 shows at least that similes are no less formulaic than the rest of the narrative. Bakker 2005:114-135 thoroughly studies tense and augment in the simile, while De Jong 2004<sup>2</sup>:93-94 notes the recurrence of τε and present tense.

<sup>69</sup> Scott 1974:191-205; De Jong 2001:105 offers slightly different numbers: 346 similes in the *Iliad* and 136 in the *Odyssey*. Since she does not offer a list, I have not been able to compare the numbers.

§31 Typically, the simile takes the form of the following two examples, one drawn from the *Iliad* and the other from the *Odyssey*:<sup>70</sup>

(t15)

ὥς δ' ὅθ' ὑπὸ λιγέων ἀνέμων σπέρχουσιν ἄελλαι |  
 ἥματι τῷ ὅτε τε πλείστη κόνις ἀμφὶ κελεύθους, |  
 οἷ τ' ἄμυδις κονίης μεγάλην ἰστᾶσιν ὁμίχλην, |  
ὥς ἄρα τῶν ὁμός' ἦλθε μάχη, |

*Iliad* 13.334-337

Just as by the whistling winds gusts are driven,  
 on a day, when there is a lot of dust on the roads,  
 they, full of dust, raise a large mist,  
 just so their battle joined.

(t16)

ὥς τε λέοντα, |  
ὅς ῥά τε βεβρωκὼς βοὸς ἔρχεται ἀγραύλοιο· |  
 πᾶν δ' ἄρα οἱ στῆθός τε παρήϊά τ' ἀμφοτέρωθεν |  
 αἵματόεντα πέλει, | δεινὸς δ' εἰς ὧπα ἰδέσθαι· |  
ὥς Ὀδυσσεὺς πεπάλακτο πόδας καὶ χεῖρας ὑπερθεῖν. |

*Odyssey* 22.402-406

Just as a lion,

<sup>70</sup> As the numbers suggest, the simile has a different place and a different form in the *Odyssey* than in the *Iliad*. Not only does the simile occur significantly less in the *Odyssey*, around two thirds of the total take the simple form (“like X”), while this kind makes up only about one third of the instances in the *Iliad*. Of the similes of the complex form that do occur, however, the size in the two epics is similar: the first half of the simile has an average of 3.3 lines in the *Iliad*, next to 3.1 lines in the *Odyssey*. See Moulton 1977:117-119 and De Jong 2001:105 for other differences and similarities between similes in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.

which, having fed, comes from an ox in the field,  
 completely then his breast and both his paws  
 are bloody, and terrible for the eyes to see.  
 So Odysseus was bespattered, his feet and his hands above.

Both these similes follow the basic pattern of the Homeric simile: (1) the vehicle is introduced by a marker, here ὥς, as in the large majority; (2) a combination of a relative pronoun and a particle introduces the information in the vehicle relevant to the comparison; (3) cohesion in the first part of the simile is attained by the recurrence of τε;<sup>71</sup> (4) the simile is rounded off with another marker – here ὥς, which is the rule – in (t15) followed by ἄρα. The particles τε and ἄρα are particularly frequent in similes: τε most typically occurs in the first part of the simile, the vehicle portion, while ἄρα generally occurs at the start of the simile’s resolution, with the re-introduction of the tenor. The first element in the simile, the introductory marker of comparison, varies in form but is always present.<sup>72</sup> The latter three elements deserve more discussion.

§32 τε is inherently bound to the vehicle portion of the simile, where it occurs on average once every two lines in the *Iliad*, and once every three lines in the *Odyssey*.<sup>73</sup> The high frequency of τε is remarkable, and suggests that it is connected to the simile’s strong dependence on discourse memory. Scholarship has sought to link the value and function of τε, especially when it is not copulative, to the permanent truth of the content of the clause

<sup>71</sup> As observed by Ruijgh 1971:352-353, 382-383 and De Jong 2004<sup>2</sup>:93-94.

<sup>72</sup> In the *Iliad*, the variants are ὥς, ὥς τε, ὥς ὅτε, ὥς δ’ ὅτε, ὥς ὁπότε, ὥς εἰ, ὥς εἴ τε, ὥς τε γάρ, ἥ ὅτε, εὐτε, φή, ὅσσοι, ὅσσοι τε, οἷος, οἷος τε, εἰκώς, εἰκελός, εἰκέω, εἴσκω, ἐναλίγκιον, ἴσος, ἅ τε. In the *Odyssey*, they are: ὥς, ὥς τε, ὥς ὅτε, ὥς δ’ ὅτε, ὥς εἴ τε, ὥς τε γάρ, ὥς δ’ ὁπότε, ὥς τίς τε, ὅσσοι, ὅσσοι τίς τε, εἰκέω, οἷος περ.

<sup>73</sup> This should be compared to the normal frequency of once every 7 or 7,5 lines in both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* (in both epics it occurs between 13 and 15,5 times per 100 lines, both in direct speech and in narrator text). The numbers in the *Iliad* are 369 occurrences in 708 lines of simile, and in the *Odyssey* 53 in 148 lines. For the frequencies, I make no distinction between copulative and non-copulative (“epic”) τε; compare the discussion in IV.2.

in which it appears.<sup>74</sup> Rather, the particle should be linked to the interaction between performer and audience: τε marks not a *state* of the propositional content of its host act, but an *assumption* by the performer that this piece of knowledge is shared between him and the audience.<sup>75</sup> In other words, the performer uses τε to mark its host act as accessible in the discourse memory. To be more precise, τε refers either to the “tradition” part of the discourse memory (consider especially its use with names and places) or to the “shared experience” part. In similes, the performer accesses on the one hand shared daily experience (as in shepherd or weather similes), and on the other hand the shared experience of epic: it is unlikely that the audience learned the image of the bloody lion from anywhere other than epic. In the end, this use of τε is a discourse strategy: regardless of whether a piece of information is “permanently true,” the performer presents it as something shared between him and the audience.

§33 Aside from this general high frequency of τε in the vehicle portion, there is a further interesting element to the use of τε in similes. The vehicles introduced in similes, gusts of wind in (t15) and a lion in (t16), do not carry the comparison *per se* – the armies and Odysseus are not compared to winds or a lion, but rather to these things in a specific state.<sup>76</sup> This closer approximation is introduced by a relative pronoun accompanied by τε – οἷ τε in (t15), and by ὅς ῥά τε in (t16). In this way the expanded vehicle portion makes the scene more vivid for the audience while at the same time enabling the poet to convey what he views as the crux of the comparison.<sup>77</sup> In (t15) it is the combination of dust and wind

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<sup>74</sup> See IV.2, with an overview of literature, and below §57-§61.

<sup>75</sup> See IV.2 for a more elaborate presentation of this argument in Herodotus and Thucydides.

<sup>76</sup> See Scott 1974:7-8, with literature, for on the discussion of about the exact point of comparison in Homeric similes.

<sup>77</sup> Cf. Bakker 2005:149 on ὅν τε in line 2 of the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*: “The relative clause gives the *specific respect* under which the god is evoked” [my italics]. Relative clauses in similes work much the same way.

that creates the necessary image, and likewise in (t16) it is the lion after feeding that provides the image of Odysseus that the poet wants to invoke.<sup>78</sup>

§34 The following example from the beginning of *Iliad* 3 illustrates this use of τε:

(t17)

εὖτ' ὄρεος κορυφῇσι Νότος κατέχευεν ὀμίχλην |  
 ποιμέσιν οὐ τι φίλην, | κλέπτῃ δέ τε νυκτὸς ἀμείνω, |  
 τόσσόν τίς τ' ἐπιλεύσει | ὅσον τ' ἐπὶ λαῶν ἴησιν· |  
 ὥς ἄρα τῶν ὑπὸ ποσσὶ κονίσαλος ὄρνυτ' ἀελλῆς |  
 ἐρχομένων· |

*Iliad* 3.10-14

As on the peaks of a mountain the South Wind pours a mist,  
 not at all loved by shepherds, yet to the thief better than night,  
 and one can see only so far as he could throw a stone,  
 just so under their feet a dust-filled cloud rose up  
 as they came on.

The entry of the Greek and Trojan armies on the battlefield is accompanied by a series of similes. The second, given in (t17), is used to describe the advance of the Greeks. The advance of the Trojans has just been compared to that of a flock of twittering birds, noisy and without order, and now the performer turns to the Greeks. They come on in silence, and the dust their feet throw up provides a cover for them as if they were thieves. Since we are in a situation of war rather than peace, the fact that the mist is a nuisance to shepherds suggests the perspective of the Trojans: the Greeks are hidden from their few, just as a mist may hide a flock from shepherds. The image of the thief, in turn, matches the Greeks who

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<sup>78</sup> I would like to thank Philippe Rousseau for refining my thoughts regarding τε clauses in the first part of the simile.

benefit from the dust that hides them. The crucial link proposed by the simile is that between the advancing Greeks and the thief taking advantage of the mist, and this is the element introduced by τε.

§35 Despite the frequency of τε in similes, it does sometimes occur that the particle is absent from the vehicle portion of a simile. In the following example from *Iliad* 9, Achilles compares himself to a mother bird:<sup>79</sup>

(t18)

ὥς δ' ὄρνις ἀπτῆσι νεοσσοῖσι προφέρειῃσι |  
 μάστακ' ἐπεὶ κε λάβῃσι, | κακῶς δ' ἄρα οἱ πέλει αὐτῇ, |  
 ὥς καὶ ἐγὼ |<sup>80</sup> πολλὰς μὲν ἀϋπνοὺς νύκτας ἵαυον, |

*Iliad* 9.323-325

As a bird to her fledgling youngs brings  
 mouthfuls whenever she has found some, bad though it is for herself,  
 so I too, many sleepless nights did I spend

Here we find a whole simile without τε, the absence of which is especially remarkable in the second half of 324, since this act provides the simile's key as in the examples above. A closer look at the editions reveals that most manuscripts as well as a third-century papyrus read κακῶς δέ τέ οἱ.<sup>81</sup> It appears to be mainly the testimony of Aristarchus, transmitted in the scholia, that has led to most editions giving δ' ἄρα.<sup>82</sup> Considering the frequency of τε in

<sup>79</sup> For some discussion of this interesting simile see Lohmann 1970:240; Ready 2011:140-145 solves the apparent mismatch between the tenor and the vehicle by demonstrating that invoking the selfless efforts of the mother bird directs attention toward the similar plight of the warrior who has to give up all the spoils of battle.

<sup>80</sup> Quite frequently, as here, the simile's tenor is resumed with a priming act.

<sup>81</sup> See West 1999:I.266 for the few manuscripts that read δ' ἄρα; the papyrus is *P. Oxy.* 4.765.

<sup>82</sup> See chapter 5 §51-§58 for a discussion of δ' ἄρα: δ' ἄρα typically introduces framed acts that are either fully accessible in the discourse memory or expected; this passage does not easily match either option. This is not in itself enough to dismiss the reading δ' ἄρα, however.

the vehicle portion of the simile, the frequent link between τε and the key of the simile, and finally the manuscript evidence, I would propose that δέ τέ οἱ is the more attractive reading.

§36 The following two similes feature similar textual variants:

(t19)

ὥς δ' ὅτε καπνὸς ἰὼν εἰς οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἵκηται |  
 ἄστεος αἰθομένοιο, | θεῶν δέ ἔ μῆνις ἀνῆκε, |  
 παῖσι δ' ἔθηκε πόνον, | πολλοῖσι δὲ κήδε' ἐφῆκεν, |  
ὥς Ἀχιλεὺς Τρώεσσι πόνον καὶ κήδε' ἔθηκεν. |

*Iliad* 21.522-525<sup>83</sup>

As when smoke goes and reaches the wide sky  
 from a burning city, the wrath of the gods sends it up,  
 makes an ordeal for all, and brings grief upon many,  
 thus Achilles brought toil and grief to the Trojans.

(t20)

ὥς δ' ὁπότ' | ἐν ξυλόχῳ ἔλαφος κρατεροῖο λέοντος |  
 νεβροὺς κοιμήσασα | νεηγενέας γαλαθηνοὺς |  
 κνημοὺς ἐξερέησι | καὶ ἄγκεα ποιήεντα |  
 βοσκομένη, | ὁ δ' ἔπειτα ἐὴν εἰσήλυθεν εὐνήν, |  
 ἀμφοτέροισι δὲ τοῖσιν ἀεικέα πότμον ἐφῆκεν, |  
ὥς Ὀδυσσεὺς κείνοισιν ἀεικέα πότμον ἐφήσει. |

*Odyssey* 4.335-340

As when a hind, in the thicket of a strong lion

<sup>83</sup> Discussed, with literature, in Ready 2011:47.



having put her fawns to sleep, new-born and still suckling,  
 seeks pastures and grassy holows,  
 roaming, and HE then comes to his lair,  
 and brings to both of them an unseemly fate,  
 thus Odysseus will bring an unseemly fate to them.

In line 523 of (t19), several manuscripts and papyri give τε as a variant reading for έ. Editors appear to prefer έ as the *lectio difficilior*, but the statistics for τε in similes support reading τε. The same goes for *Odyssey* 4.338 in (t20), where a group of manuscripts reads ό δέ τ' ώκα rather than ό δ' έπειτα.<sup>84</sup> I cannot establish here what has led editors to prefer the latter reading, but nothing textual or metrical speaks against reading the former. The more common ό δ' έπειτα might be argued to be the *lectio facilior*, while at the same time this construction never occurs in a simile.<sup>85</sup> A further argument for reading ό δέ τ' ώκα is that in *Iliad* 21.261 we find τò δέ τ' ώκα, in the same metrical position, in a simile describing how the river Scamander overtakes Achilles. From the discourse perspective, in both (t19) and (t20) the acts that have τε in a variant reading introduce the simile's salient element: the gods who drive on the smoke is compared to Achilles driving on the Trojans, and the lion who enters his lair is compared to Odysseus returning to his palace.

§37 To sum up, the function of τε in the vehicle portion of the Homeric simile is roughly twofold. On the one hand the particle creates cohesion on the level of language and on the level of knowledge shared between performer and audience.<sup>86</sup> With τε, the performer

<sup>84</sup> The simile is repeated in *Odyssey* 17, and for line 17.129 the same two variant readings are found in the manuscripts.

<sup>85</sup> *Iliad* 6.240, 15.430, 20.342, 23.569, 23.613; *Odyssey* 2.406, 3.30, 3.437, 5.193, 7.38, 8.262, 9.480, 9.526, 14.490.

<sup>86</sup> Moreover, it may be relevant to the link that Martin 1997:153-166 draws between the language of the Homeric simile and the language of lyric. As noted in III.2, τε is especially frequent in tragic lyric, and only in Pindar is the particle more frequent than in Homer. If Martin is right in suggesting that similes were lyric in origin, the high frequency of τε in both corpora may be another relevant correlation.

marks a certain piece of knowledge as available in the discourse memory.<sup>87</sup> On the other hand, when it occurs in the crucial act like in (t14) and (t15) – especially when it occurs only there in the vehicle portion – τε appears to mark its host act as the *pointe*, the salient element of the simile.<sup>88</sup>

§38 Finally, let us consider the end of the simile. As mentioned above, the comparison is always capped by a marker, generally ὥς, sometimes followed by ἄρα. The occurrence of ἄρα in the final part of the simile accompanies the return to the narrative frame. Scholars have noted that across languages conclusive particles (e.g. “so” in English (t9), *also* in German, and *igitur* in Latin) often serve to pick up or recall the main thread.<sup>89</sup> ἄρα in the return to the tenor of the simile does precisely that.<sup>90</sup> This function of ἄρα can also be seen in its occurrence directly after direct speech, as well as after different kinds of unframed discourse.

§39 Earlier scholarship on ἄρα vacillates between two extremes: some scholars view it as marking the upcoming sentence as expected from the preceding,<sup>91</sup> while others assert that the particle marks the new sentence as something unexpected and noteworthy.<sup>92</sup> Denniston’s analysis, following Hartung’s position that ἄρα indicates surprise, is still most

<sup>87</sup> Compare the similar recurrence of non-copulative τε in passages about constellations: *Iliad* 22.29-31 ὃν τε κύν’ Ὠρίωνος ἐπίκλησιν καλέουσι. / λαμπρότατος μὲν ὃ γ’ ἐστί, κακὸν δέ τε σῆμα τέτυκται, / καί τε φέρει πολλὸν πυρετὸν δειλοῖσι βροτοῖσιν· and *Odyssey* 5.272-275, Πληϊάδας τ’ ἐσορῶντι καὶ ὀψὲ δύνοντα Βοώτην, / Ἄρκτον θ’, ἣν καὶ ἄμαξαν ἐπίκλησιν καλέουσιν, / ἥ τ’ αὐτοῦ στρέφεται καὶ τ’ Ὠρίωνα δοκεύει, / οἷη δ’ ἄμμορός ἐστι λοετρῶν Ὠκεανοῖο. De Jong 2004<sup>2</sup>:95 has observed the same pattern, and discusses it in terms of “presupposed knowledge.”

<sup>88</sup> This may be further explored in combination with the possible demonstrative origin of τε, on which see the discussion in IV.2 and Bakker 2005:148-149.

<sup>89</sup> See Schraut 1857:29-30 for ἄρα, οὖν, νύ, and ὥν in Greek, *also* in German, and *igitur* in Latin; Polanyi and Scha 1983:265 for “so” in English; Sicking 1993:25-27, Slings 1997:101, and Wakker 2009:69-70 for οὖν in Greek. In Homer, one of the particles used to mark frame recall is ἄρα, see chapter 5 §51-§62.

<sup>90</sup> Before Schraut 1857:29-30, Nägelsbach 1834:193-196 notes and discusses the use of ἄρα in recaps; Haacke 1857:3-12 in fact lists it as the first of three functions of ἄρα.

<sup>91</sup> Ellendt 1835:85-87, Rost 1836:1011, Stephens 1837:11-12 and 101-112, Klotz 1842:160-195, Matthiä 1845:1-3, Schraut 1849:12-17, Classen 1854:21, Heller 1858, Bäumlein 1861: 19-39, Rhode 1867:iii-xxxiv, Brugmann 1883:36-70, Humbert 1960<sup>3</sup>:380-383, and Grimm 1962.

<sup>92</sup> Hartung 1832:419-427, Denniston 1950<sup>2</sup>:32-43, Ruijgh 1971:432-443, and Wakker 1994:213 and 343.

commonly held to be right. He explains ἄρα as expressing a “lively feeling of interest,” since “[f]or Homer, as for a child, the most ordinary things in daily life are profoundly interesting.” The main reason for Denniston’s choice is that the particle occurs so often in Homer that it is unlikely to confer an idea of connection (as held by other scholars), “except in so far as some kind of connexion must be present in all speech or action.”<sup>93</sup> Ironically, in his attempt to refute connection as the central value of ἄρα, Denniston may have pointed exactly to how the particle works.

§40 Whereas τε is used to refer to knowledge shared beyond the current discourse, ἄρα introduces information that is assumed to be available or inferable from the preceding discourse. It is thus used in rephrasings, quasi-repetitions, and recaps, after similes, direct speech, and excursus. Moreover, ἄρα is used when the action or event in its host act follows naturally from the preceding.<sup>94</sup> That is to say, it occurs with expected actions in typical sequences (see below §46-§53), and with other logical consequences of preceding discourse. The use of ἄρα in similes matches perfectly the fact that it marks something readily accessible in the mental representation of the discourse. Consider the following examples:

(t21)

τῶν δ' ὁμὸν ἴστατο νεῖκος | ἐπὶ πρυμνῆσι νέεσσιν. |

(...)

ὥς ἄρα τῶν ὁμός' ἦλθε μάχη, |

*Iliad* 13.333 and 337

And among them joint strife rose up at the sterns of the ships.

<sup>93</sup> All the quotes are from Denniston 1950<sup>2</sup>:33; this is one of the few truly blasé non-explanations in Denniston’s seminal work. However, relatively recent works still refer to the description “expressing a feeling of lively interest,” e.g. De Jong 2004<sup>2</sup> when discussing ἄρα used in negative statements by the Homeric narrator.

<sup>94</sup> See also Bäumlein 1861:31 “wir begegnen (...) vielen Stellen, in welchen ἄρα ausdrückt (...), dass etwas natürlich und *nach dem Vorhergehenden zu erwarten ist*” [my italics].

(...)

just so their battle joined.

In (t21) ἄρα accompanies the return to the narrative frame in a verse that recapitulates the line just preceding the simile. There is clear resonance on the level of content as well as on the lexical level, as the underlined words show. In (t22), conversely, the link established is more tenuous, but the image of the Achaeans advancing is retrieved with the expression “under their feet”:

(t22)

οἱ δ' ἄρ' ἴσαν σιγῇ | μένεα πνεῖοντες Ἀχαιοὶ |

ἐν θυμῷ μεμαῶτες ἀλεξέμεν ἀλλήλοισιν. |

(...)

ὥς ἄρα τῶν ὑπὸ ποσσὶ κονίσαλος ὄρνυτ' ἀελλῆς |

*Iliad* 3.8-9 and 13

But they of course advanced in silenced, the Achaeans  
desiring in their heart to defend one another.

(...)

Thus under their feet rose an eddying dust cloud

In both instances, ἄρα marks the return to the narrative frame, and the projection of the simile's image on the situation in the storyworld.

§41 ἄρα's presence is not required after a simile, however: it occurs 30 times in the second half of the simile out of a total 182 in the *Iliad*, versus 9 times out of 38 in the *Odyssey*.<sup>95</sup> When ἄρα is absent, no other particle follows, except for μέν on five occasions.<sup>96</sup>

<sup>95</sup> This gives 16.5 instances per 100 lines in the *Iliad* and 23.7 in the *Odyssey*, versus a normal frequency of 10.7 per 100 lines of narrator text in the *Iliad* and 11.9 per 100 lines of narrator text in the *Odyssey*. Given the small size of the data, however, these differences may be the result of chance.

Since the second half of the simile signals the return to the narrative and thus the beginning of a new move, the occurrence of μέν is not surprising,<sup>97</sup> nor is the high frequency of asyndeton.

§42 Out of 262 full similes in the Homeric epic, there is really only one example that diverges significantly in its particle use, from *Iliad* 23. After Diomedes has won the chariot race at Patroclus' funeral games, Menelaus and Antilochus battle for second place, which is finally taken by Antilochus – though apparently not entirely fairly. The miniscule distance between the two chariots is described by the following simile:

(t23)

ὅσσον δὲ τροχοῦ ἵππος ἀφίσταται, | ὅς ῥα ἄνακτα  
 ἔλκησιν | πεδίῳ τιταινόμενος σὺν ὄχεσφι |  
 τοῦ μέν τε ψάουσιν ἐπισσώτρου τρίχες ἄκραι |  
 οὐραῖαι· | ὃ δέ τ' ἄγχι μάλα τρέχει, | οὐδέ τι πολλή  
 χώρη μεσσηγὺς | πολέος πεδίῳ θέοντος· |  
 τόσσον δὲ Μενέλαος ἀμύμονος Ἀντιλόχοιο  
 λείπετ'· |

*Iliad* 23.517-523

As much as a horse is removed from the wheel, one who draws  
 his master across the plain, straining with the chariot.  
 He touches the wheel with the hindmost hairs  
 of his tail, it rolls close behind, and not much  
 space is there in between, as he runs over the long plain;  
 That much did Menelaus trail noble

<sup>96</sup> *Iliad* 12.436, 15.413, 17.740; *Odyssey* 10.487, 23.162.

<sup>97</sup> See the discussion of μέν in terms of projection in chapter 2 §46-§62.

Antilochus.

This little-discussed simile seems, at first glance, to have all the characteristics of a Homeric simile, but it is remarkable in several ways. Rather than illustrating the scene by means of unrelated imagery, the simile retains the image of a horse and chariot in order to establish quite precisely the distance between Antilochus and Menelaus.<sup>98</sup> The mention of the horse drawing its lord (ἄναξ) through the plain does not remove the image from the current scene, for Menelaus qualifies as an ἄναξ, and the venue for the games is the Trojan plain. Beyond making an analogy, then, the passage is an attempt to more precisely establish the physical position of the characters in the storyworld. From a narrative perspective, moreover, the tension evoked by the image seems to miss its mark since the outcome of the scene has already been reached: Antilochus has beaten Menelaus.

§43 The language adds to these peculiarities, in the form of τόσσον δὴ just after the vehicle portion. This is the only occurrence of δὴ in the resolution of a simile, and the particle does not fit the context as readily as τε and ἄρα. The function of δὴ in this situation is more likely one of intensification than of marking a narrative boundary.<sup>99</sup> The only comparable instance is in *Odyssey* 21.253, ἀλλ' εἰ δὴ τοσσόνδε βίης ἐπιδευέες εἰμὲν / ἀντιθέου Ὀδυσῆος..., where δὴ appears to have a small-scope intensifying force over τοσσόνδε: “but if we are *really that much* weaker in might than god-like Odysseus....” As noted in chapter 3, δὴ in peninitial position of the act may have scope over the following word, as possibly in the *Odyssey* example,<sup>100</sup> or over the entire act, as appears to be the case here in *Iliad* 23.522. It cannot be excluded that δὴ has a small scope over the preceding

<sup>98</sup> See Richardson 1993:226, “The comparison in 517-521 is unusual in being taken from the activity described, like expressions such as ‘leading by a head’.”

<sup>99</sup> See chapter 3 §60-§64 for a discussion of the intensifying function of δὴ.

<sup>100</sup> A small scope for δὴ is easier to exclude than to confirm, when the following word (group) clearly cannot be intensified. The *Odyssey* example allows both a reading of small and act scope. In *Iliad* 23.522 it is clear that δὴ cannot intensify Μενέλαος (“\*very Menelaus”); also, καὶ would have been expected in this function: καὶ Μενέλαος, “Menelaus in particular”.

τόσσον, which gives the most natural reading, but this use of δῆ is rare in Homer, and only becomes more frequent in later Greek.<sup>101</sup>

§44 Now, the nature of δῆ does not exclude its use after the vehicle portion of the simile, but the question remains why it is employed only here. The answer may lie in the key of the simile, which is the distance between two competing chariots. In all other instances of ὅσος – τόσσος similes,<sup>102</sup> the comparison is one of approximation, whereas in this case the image is very specific: as closely as a chariot follows the horse – so close that its tail can touch the wheel – exactly as closely behind Antilochus was Menelaus. With scope over the entire act, δῆ places emphasis on the exactness of the entire act – they were *that* close. This emphasis serves moreover a narrative purpose, since it vindicates Menelaus' claim that if Antilochus had not cheated, the former would certainly have beaten Nestor's son.

§45 The linguistic make-up of the Homeric simile is thus rather uniform, and a good illustration for the relation of τε and ἄρα with discourse memory. The difference between τε and ἄρα may be illustrated by the fact that ἄρα can occur within the first half of the simile, while τε never occurs after the final ὥς in the simile. In Homeric discourse, ἄρα is used especially to mark the assumption that the preceding discourse provides the background for understanding what follows. More restricted than ἄρα, τε is used to introduce pieces of knowledge that the performer treats as shared between him and the audience, on the basis of shared experience and tradition. In his similes, the Homeric

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<sup>101</sup> See IV.4 for δῆ in Herodotus and Thucydides.

<sup>102</sup> They are the following, listed by the line number containing the form of τόσσος: *Iliad* 2.472 (a swarm of flies – the Greek army), 5.772 (a man's range of sight – the jump of a divine horse), 8.560 (stars – campfires), 14.150 (the cry of 10,000 warriors – Poseidon's cry), 14.400 (wind – the cry of the Trojans), 16.592 (the throw of a javelin – the retreat of the Trojans), 17.23 (the pride of a lion – the pride of Euphorbus), 17.266 (the roar of the sea against a river – the cry of the onrushing Trojans), 23.433 (the throw of a discus – the run of Antilochus' chariot), 23.847 (the throw of a shepherd's crook – the throw of the iron ingot), 24.319 (the width of a rich man's door – the wingspan of an eagle); *Odyssey* 4.793 (the fear of a lion among men – Penelope's fear), 5.251 (the width of a freight ship – the width of Odysseus' raft), 8.125 (the range of a mule – Clytneüs' lead), 9.324 (a ship's mast – the Cyclops' club).

performer adduces evocative images to both clarify and intensify particular moments in the narrative. The simile illustrates these functions of τε and ἄρα particularly well, but they are relevant to the interaction between performer and audience in all Homeric discourse.

#### 4.4 Scripts, scenarios, and traditional knowledge

§46 The discourse memory contains any kind of information: not just facts, descriptions, names, and events, but also experience-based knowledge of event sequences. This latter kind of knowledge is called a scenario or a script.<sup>103</sup> Scenarios or scripts are packages of associated knowledge about certain activities, such as a sacrifice or an assembly, that are activated as soon as the relevant activity or event is evoked. “[T]he basic *structural* tenet of scenario theory is that much of the information that we store about the world is stored as situation-specific representations.”<sup>104</sup> When a scenario becomes relevant, the knowledge shared between performer and audience creates expectations that can either be met or frustrated in the following discourse. As with the storyworld, the natural reaction to the activation of a scenario is to assume that it follows the known path, unless it is stated explicitly that it does not.<sup>105</sup> In epic, scenarios or scripts are most clearly visible in passages known as type scenes or themes.

§47 The heroes of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* typically engage in activities that the audience may not be familiar with, such as debating with kings or laying siege to a city; in addition, they engage with gods and monsters. Besides these special activities, however, Homeric heroes must still perform the mundane acts of eating, washing, and travelling from place to place. These activities may seem ordinary, but they are not in traditional epic, and accordingly have received a considerable amount of attention.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> Sanford and Garrod 1998 speak of scenarios, Schank and Abelson 1977 speak of scripts.

<sup>104</sup> Sanford and Emmott 2012:24, emphasis original.

<sup>105</sup> This section builds especially on the work done by Minchin 1992, 2001, and 2007.

<sup>106</sup> Arend 1933:27 notes that this may seem strange to the modern reader, and his explanation is that the pleasure for the Greeks lay in presenting the perfect version of a certain activity: “...der Anblick dieses Volkommenen (...) ist für den Griechen zugleich schön und des Erzählens wert.” Do you buy this argument?



§48 The first to study this corpus of recurrent scenes was Arend, who coined the term typical scenes (“*typische Szenen*”). His intent was to show what connects them and how Homer uses variation for rhetorical and stylistic purposes<sup>107</sup> In his review of Arend’s work, Parry makes one important addition.<sup>108</sup> Parry argues that the origin of the type scene must be sought in the nature of oral poetry. Born of tradition, the type scene is a resource in composition, a pattern that the singer learns in his training and can access at will. Lord expands on Parry’s claims, but he speaks of “themes” rather than of type scenes. In a comparative study of Homeric and Yugoslav epic, Lord defines theme more broadly than Arend’s *typische Szene*, and speaks of “a process of composition by theme among oral poets.”<sup>109</sup> In Lord’s analysis, themes are not a special kind of discourse, but the main building blocks of epic composition, important aids to the composer’s memory. Nagler pushes this final idea a bit further when he speaks of a theme as a “preverbal Gestalt for the spontaneous generation of a “family” of meaningful details.”<sup>110</sup>

§49 Minchin draws a direct link between Nagler’s idea and the cognitive concept of scripts.<sup>111</sup> Her adaptation of Arend’s type scene and Lord’s theme is that she does not (only) regard the epic theme as a product of epic tradition, but (also) of human experience.<sup>112</sup> The poet does not narrate the epic theme of saddling a horse, he merely activates his own (and depends on the audience’s) memory of preparing a horse for riding. In my terms, then, Minchin proposes that the performer taps into a different part of memory: that of

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There’s something anachronistic about the idea that even archaic Greeks pursued the classical ideal, it seems to me.

<sup>107</sup> Arend 1933, especially 22-27.

<sup>108</sup> Parry 1936, reprinted in 1971:404-407.

<sup>109</sup> Lord 1951:80, he defines theme on page 73: “a recurrent element of narration or description”; more on theme in Lord 1960:68-98.

<sup>110</sup> Nagler 1974:82; note also the strong resonance between Nagler’s idea and that of the (semantic) frame. See also Havelock 1963:82 “...the real and essential ‘formula’ in orally preserved speech consists of a total ‘situation’ in the poet’s mind.”

<sup>111</sup> Minchin 2001:40.

<sup>112</sup> See also Havelock 1963:77 “After this fashion, the verse composes itself so that the specific situations which are necessary to make a story are put together out of behaviour patterns which are typical. They are all bits and pieces of the life and thought of the day as it is lived in this kind of society.”

experiential knowledge in addition to that of epic tradition.<sup>113</sup> Minchin describes the relation between formula and theme as follows:

(t24)

“...a singer will acquire scripted material in the normal course of life; the metrical language which will give it expression is, by contrast, actively learned by the young singer during his apprenticeship, at the same time as he commits to memory the storypaths of the songs he proposes to sing.”

Minchin 2001:15

That is to say, whereas the formulaic language is part of what the epic singer learns in his craft, the use of themes in composition follows naturally from human experience. I concur with Minchin that a natural connection is to be drawn between the epic phenomenon of typical scene or theme and the cognitive concept of the script. However, the origin of the script need not always lie in common human experience, but may well be the specific epic experience of the performer.

§50 In the following analysis of two recurrent scenes (bathing and arming) I address the question whether typical scenes are instantiations of elements inherent to epic (traditional) or whether they may also be regarded as verbalizations of common scripts (universal). I study the linguistic make-up of the scenes with special attention to particles. The typical scenes of “bathing” and “arming/clothing” demonstrate how the scripts in the performer’s mind project a sequence known to the audience, the fulfillment of which is marked by ἄρα.

§51 The typical scene of bathing occurs only in the *Odyssey*, but it serves as a good starting point because of its brevity and relative uniformity throughout its different instantiations. Consider the fullest example from 17.87-90:

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<sup>113</sup> Minchin 2001:39.

(t25)

ἐς δ' ἄσαμίνθους βάντες ἐϋξέστας | λούσαντο. |  
 τοὺς δ' | ἐπεὶ οὖν δμῳαὶ λοῦσαν | καὶ χρίσαν ἐλαίῳ, |  
 ἀμφὶ δ' ἄρα χλαίνας οὔλας βάλον | ἠδὲ χιτῶνας, |  
 ἔκ ρ' ἄσαμίνθων βάντες | ἐπὶ κλισμοῖσι καθίζον. |

Odyssey 17.87-90

Going toward the baths, well-polished, they washed.

And them, when the maids had washed them, and anointed them with oil,  
 around them woolly cloaks they threw, and tunics.

Going out of the baths, they sat down on the couches.

The parallels are largely the same, though in some instances the scene is shorter.<sup>114</sup> As here, the particles that appear most frequently in these scenes are δέ and ἄρα. The frequency of δέ roughly matches its average in narrator text, but the same is not true of ἄρα. Especially in the second part of the scene, the particle recurs consistently. Its presence thus marks the bathing scene as a little narrative (the progression of which is marked by δέ) that happens to be predictable. Washing, clothing, and returning to the public space are details that can always be expected. The underlying script explains why the performer marks the later narrative steps with ἄρα. To put it in different terms, the activation of the “bathing” script projects a sequence of actions, and the fulfilment of this projection is marked with ἄρα.

§52 Another recurrent scene is that of clothing the hero. Consider this clothing scene from *Iliad* 2, when Agamemnon has just woken from his prophetic dream:

(t26)

ἔζετο δ' ὀρθωθείς, | μαλακὸν δ' ἔνδυνε χιτῶνα |

<sup>114</sup> Odyssey 3.464-469, 4.48-51, 8.454-456, 10.361-365, 23.153-155, 24.365-370.

καλὸν νηγάτεον, | περὶ δὲ μέγα βάλλετο φᾶρος |  
 ποσσὶ δ' ὑπὸ λιπαροῖσιν | ἐδήσατο καλὰ πέδιλα, |  
 ἄμφι δ' ἄρ' ὤμοισιν | βάλετο ξίφος ἀργυρόηλον· |  
 εἴλετο δὲ σκῆπτρον πατρώϊον | ἄφθιτον αἰεὶ |

*Iliad* 2.42-46

He sat up, and put on a soft tunic,  
 fine, newly made, and around it he threw his great cloak,  
 under his smooth feet he tied fair sandals,  
 then around his shoulders he put his silver-studded sword.  
 He took the sceptre of his forefathers, ever imperishable.

The clothing<sup>115</sup> or arming<sup>116</sup> scene has numerous parallels, mostly in the *Iliad*, that all follow the same pattern. As in the bathing scene in (t25), the sequential actions are separated by δέ. Even more than the bathing scene, the linguistic make-up of the clothing scene is indistinguishable from the surrounding narrative.

§53 An important implication of this conclusion is that the use of ἄρα throughout Homeric narrative may be connected to the existence of knowledge stored in the form of scripts.<sup>117</sup> This supports Lord's idea that themes are not a special kind of discourse, but the main building blocks of epic. This knowledge available in the discourse memory includes those scripts learned through the experience of epic. That is to say, the origin of the scripts that underlie the building blocks of oral epic is not just daily experience, but also daily experience of the epic poet as epic poet. Likewise, the knowledge that the performer assumes

<sup>115</sup> The Homeric clothing scenes are *Iliad* 2.42-46, 10.21-24, 10.131-134; *Odyssey* 2.2-4, 4.303-305, 20.124-127.

<sup>116</sup> In the arming scenes of *Iliad* 3.328-338, 16.130-139, 11.16-43, and 19.364-391 use of δέ is even more consistent.

<sup>117</sup> The description of ἄρα by Schraut 1849:14 resonates particularly strongly with this idea: "Through ἄρα the sentence (...) is connected to the memories, the images, and the feelings that fill the soul of both the listener and the speaker" ("durch ἄρα [wird] der Satz (...) mit den Erinnerungen, den Bildern, den Gefühlen, die des Zuhörers wie des Sprechenden Seele füllen, verknüpft").

that his audience possesses derives from their experience as an audience at epic performances. Let me give one example, often adduced as proof that ἄρα marks “surprising” information:

(t27)

καί νύ κέ οἱ πόρεν ἵππον, | ἐπήνησαν γὰρ Ἀχαιοί, |  
εἰ μὴ ἄρ' Ἀντίλοχος μεγαθύμου Νέστορος υἱὸς |  
Πηλεΐδην Ἀχιλῆα δίκη ἡμείψατ' ἀναστάς |

*Iliad* 23.540-542

And now he would have given him [sc. Admetus] the mare, for the Achaeans agreed,  
if Antilochus, son of great-hearted Nestor, had not  
gotten up and rightly answered Peleus' son Achilles:

If we imagine being one of the characters, we may agree with Ruijgh's claim that “the fact marked by ἄρα is surprising.”<sup>118</sup> However, the audience of an epic performance knows that the linguistic construction καί νύ κε always projects its opposite.<sup>119</sup> In other words, the narratively surprising event is rendered in a projected and thus expected discourse act. ἄρα, as often, functions as metalanguage to mark its host act as expected, irrespective of the discourse act's content.

#### 4.5 τε in Pindar

§54 Out of all archaic and classical Greek authors of whom a significant corpus is extant, Pindar's songs have the highest frequency of τε, higher even than Homeric epic.<sup>120</sup> In the

<sup>118</sup> Ruijgh 1971:436 on εἰ μὴ ἄρα in *Iliad* 3.374, “Il est évident que le fait marqué par ἄρα est surprenant.”

<sup>119</sup> See Ruijgh 1971:185-186 on καί νύ κε and De Jong 2004<sup>2</sup>:68-81 on what she calls “if not-situations”; the parallels of καί νύ κε followed by εἰ μή are *Iliad* 3.373, 5.311, 5.388, 7.273, 8.90, 8.131, 11.311, 11.750, 17.530, 18.165, 18.454, 23.382, 23.490, 23.733, 24.713; *Odyssey* 4.363, 4.502, 24.528.

<sup>120</sup> There are 526 instances of τε in the *Victory Odes* (2.37% of words), and 4090 in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* (2.01%).

great majority of cases, τε in Pindar is copulative. Keeping in mind the strong influence of Homer on Pindaric language and its overall archaic nature, it is surprising that so-called “epic” τε is rare in Pindar. In this section I first discuss these few instances of “epic” τε in terms of activating shared, traditional knowledge in the discourse memory. Second, I examine copulative τε’s range of uses, on the one hand to conjoin constituents and on the other hand to connect phrases or clauses. Then I argue that there is a clear common element in the function of τε across copulative and non-copulative uses. Even in its copulative function, τε signals that a fact or a relationship between facts or constituents is available in the discourse memory. Finally, I take the instances of τε in *Olympian* 1 as a case study to demonstrate that the choice for τε over καί is not arbitrary.

§55 Ruijgh defines “epic” τε as those instances of the particle where τε is not copulative, that is, where it cannot be substituted by καί.<sup>121</sup> There are around sixteen instances (out of 526<sup>122</sup> total instances in the *Victory Odes*) where τε is not copulative; in each case after a relative or demonstrative pronoun.<sup>123</sup> Ruijgh divides the cases into two categories: τε introducing digressions containing “permanent facts” and τε introducing relative clauses containing “temporary facts.” Based on my argument in the present chapter about τε accompanying knowledge in the discourse memory, and particularly knowledge shared beyond the present discourse, the distinction between “permanent” and “temporary” facts is perhaps not productive. Consider an example from Ruijgh’s category of permanent facts:

(t28)

τὸ μὲν ἐμόν, | Πηλεΐ γέρας θεόμορον

ὀπάσσαι γάμου Αἰακίδα, |

<sup>121</sup> Ruijgh 1971:1, “on pourrait définir ‘τε épique’ comme l’emploi de τε dans les constructions où il serait impossible de substituer καί à τε.”

<sup>122</sup> Give or take a few instances, depending on how one chooses to read the different instances of ἄτε: as ἄτε or ἄ τε; see also Ruijgh 1971:983-984.

<sup>123</sup> Ruijgh 1971:984-987 finds eighteen in the odes, but I do not include *Pythian* 11.59 and *Isthmian* 2.23.

ὅν τε εὐσεβέστατον φάτις<sup>124</sup> Ἰαολκοῦ τράφειν πεδίον· |

Pindar, *Isthmian* 8.38-40

It is my <opinion>, to give this divine gift of marriage  
to Peleus, son of Aiakos,  
who is said to be the most pious man that the plain of Iolkos has produced.

Themis speaks to Zeus and Poseidon, who have been quarelling over Thetis. Themis prophesies that if Thetis will indeed lie with Zeus or his brother, the offspring of that union will be more powerful than his father. Instead, she proposes, Thetis should be married to a mortal man: Peleus. The relative clause introduced by ὅν τε adds that he is “said to be” the most pious man in Iolkos. Most of Ruijgh’s permanent facts concern gods, but he explains the use of τε here because it concerns the fame (“*renommée*”) of a hero.<sup>125</sup>

§56 This complication can be avoided altogether if we consider the two relevant contexts of this utterance. On the one hand Themis makes a claim about Peleus’ piety among the gods, and on the other hand Pindar declares Peleus the most pious man from Iolkos. In the first context, it is the gods who judge who is most pious, which explains why Themis seeks to create intersubjective agreement through the use of τε. In the second context, Pindar appeals to the audience’s knowledge of the story of Peleus, who came to Aegina from Iolkos. The fact of Peleus’ piety may be traditionally accepted or not, but what is important is that the particle marks the fact as shared in nature, and by extension possessing intersubjective truth.

§57 Compare the following example of a “temporary” fact quoted by Ruijgh:

<sup>124</sup> φάτις is Bothe’s emendation, the manuscripts read φασιν (unmetrical); Bergk proposes φράσι and changes τράφειν to τράφει.

<sup>125</sup> Ruijgh 1971:985, “Il est vrai que la relative mentionne un mortel, mais d’autre part, elle signale la renommée permanente du héros” (“It is true that the relative mentions a mortal, but on the other hand it signals the fame of the hero”).

(t29)

ἐπεὶ νεφέλα παρελέξατο |  
 ψευδὸς γλυκὺ μεθέπων | ἄϊδρις ἀνὴρ· |  
 εἶδος γὰρ ὑπεροχωτάτα πρέπεν Οὐρανιᾶν |  
 θυγατέρι Κρόνου· | ἅν τε δόλον αὐτῷ θέσαν  
 Ζηνὸς παλάμαι | καλὸν πῆμα. |

Pindar, *Pythian* 2.36-40

since he [sc. Ixion] lay with a cloud,  
 pursuing a sweet lie, the ignorant man.  
 For in form it resembled the most eminent of the goddesses,  
 the daughter of Kronos. Her [sc. the cloud] Zeus' plans had put there  
 for him as a beautiful bane.

The only explanation Ruijgh offers for this passage is “fait mythique,” “<it is a> mythical fact.”<sup>126</sup> The effectiveness of Ruijgh’s dichotomy between permanent and temporary facts appears to break down here. After all, if a mythical fact is not permanent, then what is? The passage introduced by ἅν τε appears to be the salient element in the mythical narrative about Ixion’s attempt on Hera (announced in lines 26-33).<sup>127</sup> The reason he was caught is that Zeus tricked him. This is a fact that Pindar takes from tradition, which he conveys with the addition of τε—whether the entire audience actually knows this exact detail or not. To come back to Ruijgh’s definition, it is neither important whether τε marks a fact or not, nor whether this fact is permanent or temporary. All that matters is the social contract of the lyric performance: performer and audience partake in the same world, culture, tradition, and event: τε appeals to *and* creates exactly this shared knowledge.

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<sup>126</sup> Ruijgh 1971:986.

<sup>127</sup> For further instances of τε introducing the salient element of a shared image or narrative, see §31-§37 above on τε in similes and §66-§68 below on *Olympian* 1.



§58 So far the use of τε in Pindar is largely consistent with its use in Homer. However, there is a basic quantitative difference between use of τε in Homer and in Pindar: whereas in Homer non-copulative τε makes up a fifth of the total, in Pindar τε is copulative in the absolute majority of instances.<sup>128</sup> These numbers reflect the tendency of “epic” τε’s decline after Homer, except in hexameter and elegiac poetry.<sup>129</sup> This quantitative development notwithstanding, the copulative and non-copulative uses of τε may be more closely connected synchronically than Ruijgh and most other grammarians concede. In fact, I believe that τε’s pragmatic function of marking knowledge as shared is common to both the copulative and non-copulative uses. The difference between the two uses of τε lies only in their syntactic function.<sup>130</sup>

§59 To support this claim, let me now turn to copulative τε in Pindar. Hummel distinguishes the following kinds of conjuncts connected by τε (with my numbering):<sup>131</sup> (1) τε can connect clauses (“sentential τε”); (2) τε can connect phrases; (3) τε can connect “paires idiomatique”: two items that exist as a pair not only in Pindar, but independently in language;<sup>132</sup> (4) τε conjoins pairs unique to Pindar; (5) τε conjoins complementary pairs, sometimes in the form of a hendiadys.

§60 The last three entries in the list all concern τε connecting constituents. Except for the examples of hendiadys, all these instances may be understood better when we consider the cross-linguistic notion of “natural coordination,” as proposed by Viti.<sup>133</sup> Viti’s point of departure is Wälchli’s definition of “natural coordination” as opposed to “accidental coordination”:

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<sup>128</sup> Ruijgh 1971:351 gives 831 instances of “epic” τε, out of a total of 4090 instances of τε in Homer (20.3%); for Pindar Ruijgh gives 18 out of 528 (3.4%).

<sup>129</sup> See Ruijgh 1971:5.

<sup>130</sup> See IV.2 for the argument that the so-called “connective” and “adverbial” functions of τε should be regarded as two ends of a continuum, rather than mutually exclusive. The material discussed there is mainly from Herodotus and Thucydides.

<sup>131</sup> Hummel 1993:390-393.

<sup>132</sup> Hummel 1993:392, “une paire qui n’est pas propre à Pindare, mais existe pour ainsi dire en langue.”

<sup>133</sup> Viti 2006 and Viti 2008, with reference to Gonda 1954.

(t30)

Natural coordination is the “coordination of items which are expected to co-occur, which are closely related in meaning, and which form conceptual units, such as ‘father and mother,’ (...) rather than ‘the man and the snake’, ‘toe and belly’, (...) which are instances of accidental coordination, coordination of items which are not expected to co-occur, and which do not have a close semantic relationship.”

Wälchli 2005:5

In two recent studies, Viti has argued that in Homer copulative  $\tau\epsilon$  is used more for natural coordination, and  $\kappa\alpha\iota$  more for accidental coordination. For both Homer and Pindar, I believe we may apply the idea of natural coordination even more productively to the use of  $\tau\epsilon$  if we bring it in connection with the concept of discourse memory.

§61 Wälchli speaks of pairs that are “closely related in meaning, and (...) form conceptual units.” However, I submit that the natural association of any pair depends on the cultural, performative, and discursive context. In the right situation, almost any two items may be regarded as naturally connected. The factor that makes any coordination natural is shared knowledge: the whole of the discourse memory. Consider the pairs “earth and sky,” and “blood, sweat, and tears.” The perceived natural association between these terms has its origin in different parts of the discourse memory: “earth and sky” is shared human experience, “blood, sweat, and tears” depends on a shared culture, and will only be a natural tricolon for a limited group of people. I will apply natural coordination as a relative term, depending on the context, language, and the participants in the discourse.<sup>134</sup>

§62 In the context of Pindaric performance, many items can be presented as naturally associated. Consider an example from each of Hummel’s last three categories:

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<sup>134</sup> See IV.2 for the idea that “natural” is better regarded as “culturally shared,” with a study of relevant instances of  $\tau\epsilon$  in Herodotus and Thucydides.

(t31)

νέκταρ ἀμβροσίαν τε

Pindar, *Olympian* 1.62

nectar and ambrosia

Nectar and ambrosia are related as the drink and food of the gods, but this link is limited to a context of people who share this tradition. Hummel lists it among the examples of “paires idiomatiques.” Slightly more specific is the relation between the following two items:

(t32)

ἐν ἀέθλοις |

ἐν μάχαις τε πολέμου |

Pindar, *Olympian* 2.43-44

in athletics

and in battles of war

Hummel lists this passage as an example of a pair that is unique to Pindar. However, the relation between athletic games and battle is inherent in the ritual dimension of the games. It is generally assumed that in essence athletic contests are mock battles that allow its participants to win honour outside of actual war.<sup>135</sup> In the epinician genre, we may say that it is a natural pair from the perspective of the generic conventions. Finally, there are pairs that are related on a more *ad hoc* basis:

(t33)

πατρώας ἀπὸ γᾶς | ἀπὸ τε κτεάνων |

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<sup>135</sup> See Nagy 1990:121-122 on athletic games as mock combat.

Pindar, *Pythian* 4.290

from his fatherland and from his possessions

In the final lines of *Pythian* 4, Pindar asks Arkesilas to allow the exiled Damophilos to return to Cyrene, since he has been away “from his fatherland and his possessions.” The two are no natural pair (Hummel lists the passage under complementary pairs) but they presuppose some specific knowledge about the exile, presumably shared between performer and at least a part of the audience.

§63 The combination τε καί serves even more consistently than τε alone to mark “natural” coordination.<sup>136</sup> In the great majority of instances, the construction X τε καί Y in Pindar conjoins two constituents that are closely connected, for several possible reasons. Closest to Wälchli’s idea of “natural coordination” come examples like the following:<sup>137</sup>

(t34)

γᾶν τε καὶ πόντον κατ’ ἀμαιμάκετον |

Pindar, *Pythian* 1.14

over land and over unfathomable sea

Combinations like land and sea appear to be expressions of shared human experience, but even they are context-based: this one will not be natural to people from a land that knows no coastline. Other pairs conjoined by τε καί are even more clearly bound together by a

<sup>136</sup> Hummel 1993:397 believes that τε καί serves to connect two conjuncts that are typically complementary elements of a whole: “La coordination est le plus souvent à deux termes qui peuvent constituer une totalité dont les deux éléments sont complémentaires.”

<sup>137</sup> I do not see why in this case Hummel does not speak of a “paire idiomatique.” Compare especially *Olympian* 2.10 πλοῦτον τε καὶ χάριν, *Olympian* 9.65–66 μορφῇ τε καὶ ἔργοισι, *Pythian* 8.3 βουλᾶν τε καὶ πολέμων, *Pythian* 8.3 ἔρξαι τε καὶ παθεῖν, *Pythian* 10.24 τόλμᾳ τε καὶ σθένει, *Pythian* 11.45 εὐφροσύνα τε καὶ δόξα, *Nemean* 1.57 λῆμα τε καὶ δύναμιν, *Nemean* 5.9 εὐάνδρον τε καὶ ναυσικλυτάν, *Isthmian* 1.42 δαπάναις τε καὶ πόνοις.

relation that is natural within a specific context.<sup>138</sup> Finally, τε καί occurs particularly often with geographical locations and names.<sup>139</sup> In the remaining cases, τε καί either does not conjoin two syntactically symmetrical constituents, or τε and καί work separately.<sup>140</sup>

§64 Beyond τε καί, in the two semantic fields of geography and proper names, Pindar prefers τε coordination over καί coordination. Overall, τε is directly adjacent to a place or name in almost a third of instances.<sup>141</sup> Often, the relation between the conjuncts is expressed as natural for contextual reasons. Consider the following passage from *Pythian* 11:

(t35)

Ὀλυμπία τ' ἀγώνων πολυφάτων |  
 ἔσχον θοὰν ἀκτῖνα | σὺν ἵπποις, |  
 Πυθοῖ τε | γυμνὸν ἐπὶ στάδιον καταβάντες | ἤλεγξαν  
 Ἑλλανίδα στρατιὰν ὠκύτατι. |

Pindar, *Pythian* 11.47-50

In the famous contest at Olympia  
 they held swift glory with horses,  
 and in Pytho, entering in the naked footrace, they put  
 the Greek host to shame with their speed.

<sup>138</sup> *Olympian* 10.62 ποσὶν τε καὶ ἄρματι, *Pythian* 4.195 νύκτας τε καὶ πόντου κελεύθους, *Pythian* 8.31 λύρα τε καὶ φθέγματι μαλθακῶ, *Isthmian* 6.62 ἄγλαοὶ παῖδές τε καὶ μάτρως.

<sup>139</sup> See IV.2 for τε καί linking such pairs in Herodotus and Thucydides, as well in combinations of geographical locations and names of people. *Olympian* 1.18 Πίσας τε καὶ Φερενίκου, *Olympian* 2.78 Πηλεὺς τε καὶ Κάδμος, *Pythian* 10.4 Πυθὼ τε καὶ τὸ Πελινναῖον, *Nemean* 3.50 Ἀρτεμὶς τε καὶ θρασεῖ Ἀθάνᾳ, *Nemean* 4.46 Οἰώνῃ τε καὶ Κύπρῳ, *Nemean* 4.75 Οὐλυμπία τε καὶ Ἴσθμοι, *Isthmian* 9.2 Ὑλλου τε καὶ Αἰγίμιου.

<sup>140</sup> E.g. *Isthmian* 2.23, see chapter 5 §74.

<sup>141</sup> 143 out of 526 instances.

The venues for the two most important panhellenic games are listed with the use of τε only.<sup>142</sup> The relation between Olympia and Pytho is obvious in the context of an epinician ode. The same natural connection exists between the siblings Castor, Pollux, and Helen:

(t36)

Τυνδαρίδαις τε φιλοξείνοις ἀδελφῖν | καλλιπλοκάμῳ θ' Ἑλένῃ |

Pindar, *Olympian* 3.1

To please the hospitable Tyndarids and Helen of the pretty hair

This kind of connection between people or gods that are naturally associated in a specific context recurs throughout the *Odes*.<sup>143</sup>

§65 In all these cases, it is the knowledge shared between performer and audience that makes two conjuncts a natural pair. From this perspective, the copulative use of τε and so-called “epic” τε are no longer so far apart. Whether τε introduces a relative clause or conjoins two naturally connected items, τε consistently denotes a known relation: either

<sup>142</sup> For the natural pair of Olympia and Pytho, compare *Olympian* 7.10 Ὀλυμπία Πυθοῖ τε νικῶντεσσιν, *Pythian* 9.101-103 ἐν Ὀλυμπίῳ τε καὶ βαθυκόλπου Γᾶς ἀέθλοισι ἔν τε καὶ πᾶσιν ἐπιχωρίοις, and *Isthmian* 1.65 ἔτι καὶ Πυθῶθεν Ὀλυμπιάδων τ'; compare also τε used with other venues for games: *Olympian* 2.49-50 Πυθῶνι δ' ὁμόκλαρον ἐς ἀδελφεόν / Ἰσθμοῖ τε κοιναὶ Χάριτες, *Olympian* 7.81-82 κλεινὰ τ' ἐν Ἰσθμῷ τετράκις εὐτυχέων, Νεμέα τ' ἄλλαν ἐπ' ἄλλα, *Olympian* 12.17-18 νῦν δ' Ὀλυμπία στεφανωσάμενος / καὶ δις ἐκ Πυθῶνος Ἰσθμοῖ τ', *Olympian* 13.34-37 Νεμέα τ' οὐκ ἀντιζοεῖ / πατρὸς δὲ Θεσσαλοῖ' ἐπ' Ἀλφειοῦ / ῥέεθροισιν αἶγλα ποδῶν ἀνάκειται, / Πυθοῖ τ', *Olympian* 13.98 Ἰσθμοῖ τὰ τ' ἐν Νεμέᾳ, *Pythian* 8.36-37 Οὐλυμπία τε Θεόγνητον οὐ κατελέγχεις, / οὐδὲ Κλειτομάχοιο νίκαν Ἰσθμοῖ θρασύγυιον. *Pythian* 11.9-12 Πυθῶνά τε (...) ἀγῶνι τε Κίρρας, *Nemean* 2.9 θαμὰ μὲν Ἰσθμιάδων δρέπεσθαι κάλλιστον ἄωτον ἐν Πυθίοισι τε νικᾶν, *Nemean* 4.75 Οὐλυμπία τε καὶ Ἰσθμοῖ Νεμέα τε συνθέμενος, *Isthmian* 8.4-5 Ἰσθμιάδος τε νίκας ἄποινα, καὶ Νεμέα / ἀέθλων.

<sup>143</sup> *Olympian* 2.82-83 Κύκνον τε θανάτῳ πόρεν, / Ἀοῦς τε παῖδ' Αἰθίοπα, *Olympian* 7.74 εἷς μὲν Κάμιρον / πρεσβυτάτον τε Ἰάλυσον ἔτεκεν Λίνδον τ', *Olympian* 9.43 Πύρρα Δευκαλίων τε, *Olympian* 9.69-70 υἱὸν δ' Ἄκτορος ἐξόχως τίμασεν ἐποίκων / Αἰγίνας τε, *Olympian* 13.42 Τερψία θ' ἔψοντ' Ἐριτίμῳ τ', *Olympian* 14.13-15 <ῶ> πότνι' Ἀγλαΐα / φιλησίμολπέ τ' Εὐφροσύνα, θεῶν κρατίστου / παῖδες, ἐπακοοῖτε νῦν, Θαλία τε, *Pythian* 4.182 Ζήτην Κάλαν τε, *Pythian* 5.71-72 Ἡρακλῆος / ἐκγόνους Αἰγίμιου τε, *Nemean* 5.25-26 Θέτιν / Πηλέα θ', *Nemean* 8.6 οἷοι καὶ Διὸς Αἰγίνας τε λέκτρον ποιμένες ἀμφεπόλησαν, *Nemean* 10.11 Ζεὺς ἐπ' Ἀλκμήναν Δανάαν τε μολῶν, *Nemean* 10.39-40 ἐὼν Θρασύκλου / Ἀντία τε σύγγονος, *Nemean* 10.84 σύν τ' Ἀθαναίᾳ κελαινεγχεῖ τ' Ἄρει, *Isthmian* 5.33 Κάστορος δ' αἰχμὰ Πολυδεύκεός τ', *Isthmian* 6.57-58 ταμίας / Πυθέα τε κώμων Εὐθυμένει τε, *Isthmian* 8.54-55 Μέμνονός τε βίαν / ὑπέρθυμον Ἑκτορά τ'.

between a referent and something about him or between a number of items, referents, or places.

§66 In addition to marking constituents as a natural pair, τε signals this kind of coordination on a macroscopic level. In the final paragraphs of this section, I discuss the use of τε in the narrative of Pindar's first *Olympian*. This most well-known of Pindar's songs in part owes its fame to the intriguing aetiology it presents of the Olympic Games. In his telling of the myth of Pelops, Pindar ostensibly rejects one version of the tradition and substitutes a more politically correct one. However, Pindar does not actually substitute a new story for an old one, but places two available stories in a hierarchy.<sup>144</sup> The first aetiology mentioned in *Olympian* 1 is the story of Pelops being cooked and eaten. This particular narrative correlates with the footrace, the earliest event in the Games. This footrace ended at the ash heap where the thigh pieces of a slaughtered ram would then be burnt by the victor.<sup>145</sup> By the fifth century, however, the chariot race had become the most important event in the Olympic Games. It is this shift in popularity that explains why Pindar gives priority to another version of the story.<sup>146</sup>

§67 The foregrounded story in *Olympian* 1 is the episode where Pelops has to race Oinomaos in a chariot to win his daughter Hippodamia. Pindar does not treat this as a new version of the myth, but the "Pelops is eaten" episode precedes the "chariot race" in time. In Nagy's analysis, *Olympian* 1 presupposes the following elements of the story:

(t37)

(a) Tantalos perverts feast by serving up inappropriate food (the flesh of Pelops) to immortals.

(b) Tantalos is punished by the gods.

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<sup>144</sup> See Nagy 1990:126-128.

<sup>145</sup> See Burkert 1972:108-119, Nagy 1990:123-125, both referring to Philostratus, *On Gymnastics* 5-6.

<sup>146</sup> See Wells 2009:139 "...it is not that selection itself is new in the process of Panhellenism, but that the criteria for selection change."

- (c) Pelops survives cauldron. (c2) Pelops abducted by Poseidon. (c3) Tantalos gets nectar and ambrosia (as compensation?)
- (a') Tantalos perverts feast by serving up inappropriate food (nectar and ambrosia) to mortals.
- (b') Tantalos is punished by the gods. (b'2) Pelops is exiled from Olympus to Peloponnesus. (b'3) Pelops calls on Poseidon for help.
- (c') Pelops survives chariot race against Oinomaos. (c'2) Pelops settles Peloponnesus.

Nagy 1990:133, numbering and layout adapted

Now let us consider the linguistic realization of these elements (/ marks line end):

(t38)

(a) ὁπότ' ἐκάλεσε πατήρ τὸν εὐνομώτατον / ἐς ἔρανον φίλαν τε Σίπυλον, (37-38)

ὔδατος ὅτι τε<sup>147</sup> πυρὶ ζέοισαν εἰς ἀκμάν / μαχαίρᾳ τάμον κατὰ μέλη, / τραπέζαισί τ' ἀμφὶ  
δεύτατα κρεῶν / σέθεν διεδάσαντο καὶ φάγον. (48-51)

(b) ∅

(c) ἐπεὶ νιν καθαροῦ λέβητος ἔξελε Κλωθώ (26)

(c2) χρυσέαισί τ' ἀν' ἵπποις / ὕπατον εὐρυτίμου ποτὶ δῶμα Διὸς μεταβᾶσαι. (41-42)

(c3) [νέκταρ ἀμβροσίαν τε] / δῶκεν οἷσιν ἄφθιτον / θέν νιν (62-64)

(a') ἀθανάτους ὅτι κλέψαις / ἀλίκεσσι συμπόταις / νέκταρ ἀμβροσίαν τε / δῶκεν (60-63)

(b') κόρῳ δ' ἔλεν / ἄταν ὑπέροπλον, ἄν τοι πατήρ ὕπερ / κρέμασε καρτερόν αὐτῷ λίθον  
(56-57b)

(b'2) τοῦνεκα προῆκαν υἱὸν ἀθάνατοί <οί> πάλιν / μετὰ τὸ ταχύποτμον αὖτις ἀνέρων  
ἔθνος (65-66)

<sup>147</sup> Bergk proposes to read this τε as Doric for σε, but since this form is not attested in Pindar or Bacchylides, I follow Gerber 1982:84 and Hummel 1993:399 in reading the particle.



(b'3) τὸν μὲν ἀγάλλων θεός / ἔδωκεν δίφρον τε χρύσειον πτεροῖσιν τ' ἀκάμαντας ἵππους.

(86b-87)

(c') ἔλεν δ' Οἰνομάου βίαν παρθένον τε σύνευνον· (88)

(c'2) ∅

Out of Nagy's nine elements of the story that are expressed in the text, six contain τε (one shared between (c3) and (a')). These passages account for eight out of thirteen instances of τε in *Olympian* 1; the other five instances are outside the narrative.

§68 In these narrative acts, τε almost completely supplants καί (one instance in the acts above, out of nine total instances in the ode). Moreover, τε highlights specifically the essential elements of the tradition, a phenomenon that we might compare to the high frequency of τε especially in the salient parts of a simile. Whether in specific pairs of people, places, items, and ideas or in crucial elements of a traditional narrative, the distribution of τε follows a consistent pattern. It may not always be clear to us what determines the choice of τε over καί, but it cannot be a coincidence that in contexts of shared tradition and shared knowledge τε is preferred.

#### 4.6 Concluding remarks

§69 The language of any discourse is to a large extent determined by what came before, and what comes before a current discourse act reaches far beyond what has been said before: “The meaning of a text is more than the sum of the meanings of the individual sentences that comprise it.”<sup>148</sup> The reason behind this claim by Schank and Abelson is that every discourse act interacts with the discourse memory to create a fuller meaning, and a fuller representation in the discourse model than the words alone provide. In this chapter I have described some of the many possible interactions between current discourse and the larger discourse memory, and its marking through metalanguage.

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<sup>148</sup> Schank and Abelson 1977:22.

§70 The particle γάρ serves to introduce acts that ensure a shared ground, a shared mental representation of the discourse (discourse model) between the performer and the audience. Engagement with the discourse memory is a question of attitude rather than of fact, so in the case of γάρ it is the performer's *belief* that a piece of knowledge is missing from the discourse memory that determines its use. Both in Homer and Pindar γάρ is thus used to introduce information about the storyworld, but also to insert comments on the ongoing discourse. The latter, *gnômai*, generally occur in direct speech in Homer, and are introduced by γάρ τε. In Pindar, gnomic acts account for a much larger proportion of the instances of γάρ than in Homer.

§71 In the Homeric simile, interaction between discourse and discourse memory is constant and particularly visible. Whereas γάρ serves to introduce additional information into the discourse memory, ἄρα and τε accompany knowledge already shared. Both particles do this in their own way, and again they are relevant to the performer's expectations. ἄρα occurs in practically every context in Homeric discourse, and I align with the scholarship that links ἄρα to "expectedness." Rather than focus on the audience's perspective, however, I propose that ἄρα reflects the performer's stance toward his discourse. By uttering ἄρα, the performer metalinguistically marks the current discourse act as either known or naturally expected from what comes before. Since ἄρα works as metalanguage, this value of ἄρα does not necessarily mean that the propositional content of an act is expected, but typically it is.

§72 As emerges from its use in the Homeric simile, τε occurs in more specific contexts. In terms of discourse memory, the difference between ἄρα and τε concerns the part of the discourse memory that is accessed. ἄρα typically – but not exclusively – refers to the current or past discourse, whereas τε refers to the discourse memory beyond the preceding discourse. An analysis of τε in the Homeric simile and Pindar has revealed that τε marks both facts and relations between facts, concepts, places, and people as shared between

performer and audience beyond the present discourse. Thus it typically co-occurs with names, places, or actions that are part of the shared experience or tradition. In Homeric epic, this pattern holds for those instances where  $\tau\epsilon$  is copulative as well as for those where it is not. In Pindar  $\tau\epsilon$  has specialized in its copulative function, but its use still shows clear traces of interaction with the discourse memory.

## 5. Metalanguage and Anaphoric Reference

### A discourse perspective on particles with third-person pronouns

§1 In ancient Greek, pronouns and particles have a special relationship: the two are often found together and intrinsically connected. They are not only frequently adjacent, but they work together to guide the discourse, and may even form a single unit. In chapter 2 I demonstrate how the Homeric and Pindaric performers produce their discourse piecemeal, each piece adding a bit of information to the preceding. As a speaker focuses on the ideas in her mind she verbalizes her words according to the flow of her thoughts, and in the form of discourse acts. Chafe argues that only one new idea can be in focus in the mind at one time.<sup>1</sup> This is reflected in the form and content that discourse acts take: established knowledge tends to appear towards the beginning of the act and new information tends to follow.<sup>2</sup> Because anaphoric pronouns recall referents that are already in the hearer's mind, so they must appear within the body of established, given knowledge (more on "given" below) in order to be effective.

§2 Anaphoric reference directs attention to a referent about which something new will be added, and pronouns are the prototypical markers of anaphoric reference. Combinations or clusters of pronouns and particles are not used randomly; a deeper understanding of the pronoun illuminates the workings of the particle and vice versa. Only by comparing a larger number of instances of different collocations can it become clear that there are significant and consistent differences among them. The ideas established in the preceding chapters are relevant to the role that particles play in guiding reference. In particular the

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<sup>1</sup> See Chafe 1994:108-119 for the discussion of his "one new idea constraint." He applies it to intonation units, but for reasons given in chapter 2 I will consistently use the term discourse act.

<sup>2</sup> For early literature on the idea of topic, see Chafe 1976 and Givón (ed.) 1983. I do not engage with the terminology of topic and focus in this chapter. H. Dik 1995 and 2007 applies a pragmatic approach to word order in Ancient Greek. Scheppers 2011 employs similar methodology to his idea of the "colon" in prose, a close cognate of what I regard as a discourse act.

distinction between framed and unframed discourse (II.4) provides an important analytical tool for the study of anaphoric pronouns in Homer and Pindar.

§3 In this chapter I examine how the use of different particles interacts with different nuances of anaphoric reference. In order to understand these nuances it is first necessary to arrive at a good understanding of how anaphora works, both inside and outside the text. In the first section (5.1) I outline recent approaches that interpret the process of anaphoric reference as an interaction between a speaker and hearer rather than as a set of immanent relations between textual constituents. In the next section (5.2) I address the peculiar place of the nominative pronoun in a pro-drop language like Greek. Moreover, I discuss the ambiguous function of *ὁ* and *ὅς* as both demonstrative and relative pronouns. After addressing these issues, I present a representative case study (5.3) of combinations of the most frequent third-person pronoun in the nominative (*ὅς* and *ὁ*) and different particles in Homeric narrative: *ὁ δέ*, *ὅ γε*, *ὁ δ' ἄρα*, *ὅ/ὅς ῥα*, and *ὁ/ὅς δῆ*.<sup>3</sup> The analysis aims to show that the combinations have consistently and significantly different functions, depending on the particle used.<sup>4</sup> I do not engage in particular with pronouns (and particles) at the beginning of embedded narratives, but this theme has been studied extensively for both Homer and Pindar.<sup>5</sup> The final section (5.4) traces anaphoric reference through an entire Pindaric ode: *Isthmian* 2. In this close reading, I consider not only pronouns and particles, but also nouns and verb forms, to sketch a picture of the audience's on-line processing of anaphoric reference.

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<sup>3</sup> So-called "epic" *τε* after pronouns has already been discussed for Homer in chapter 4 §31-§37 and for Pindar in chapter 4 §54-§68. See also IV.2 for a more complete discussion of *τε*'s functions; for *ὁ καί* I refer the reader to IV.2. Likewise the function of *γάρ* after pronouns falls under the discussion of "γάρ introducing unframed discourse" in chapter 4 §11-§28.

<sup>4</sup> The topic of referents in narrative is to a significant extent more relevant for Homer than for Pindar. First of all, the Homeric epics offer a reasonable number of instances of the phenomena, whereas Pindar's *Victory Odes* have only a very limited number of the kinds of constructions under examination. This is the result of the fact that the Pindaric corpus is smaller, and less of it is narrative. Second, even in narratives, Pindar is much less concerned with scenes involving multiple characters. As a result, Pindar is less prominent in section 5.3, the comparative analysis, but the close reading of *Isthmian* 2 in 5.4 balances the asymmetry.

<sup>5</sup> See e.g. Des Places 1947 and Bonifazi 2004c for Pindar, and Slater 1983 and Calame 1985 for Homer.

### 5.1 A discourse approach to anaphoric reference

§4 Classically, anaphora has been regarded as a relation that functions within a text.<sup>6</sup> An anaphoric relation is expressed as one between an anaphoric pronoun and a textual antecedent. However, recent research that focuses on naturally occurring discourse demonstrates that the textual approach often does not explain what actually happens. Consider the following example:

(t1)

Wash and core six apples. Put them into a fireproof dish.<sup>7</sup>

This simple example demonstrates the problem of a purely textual approach. If a reader regards “them” as referring to the textual antecedent “six apples,” the utterance would be infelicitous. After all, the referent of “them” must be described as “the six washed and cored apples.” In practice, of course, the reader or hearer has no trouble making the inferences necessary to understand the two sentences in the cookbook. This is a relatively simple example of anaphoric reference, but even here an analysis in purely textual terms does not explain the cognitive process sufficiently.<sup>8</sup> It is not enough to say that “six apples” is the textual antecedent of “them.”

§5 To solve problems such as this one, Cornish redefines the term “antecedent” as follows: “I take [antecedent] to be a description of the referent (...) in terms of its salient

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<sup>6</sup> Cornish 1999:116-117.

<sup>7</sup> This is an example from a cookbook, quoted by Halliday and Hasan 1976:2. One may compare the more famous, but constructed, example from Brown and Yule 1983:202, “Kill an active, plump chicken. Put it in the oven.” Consider another example, from Dinsmore 1987:15, “If J. Edgar Hoover had been born a Russian, he would have been a Communist.” Here the named character refers to a historical person, but the personal pronoun “he” refers to a hypothetical referent. Emmott 1997: 179-180 discusses this gap in coreferentiality.

<sup>8</sup> See Berrendonner and Reichler-Béguelin 1995 for their arguments against what they call the “*antecedentiste*” (26-27) approach to reference.

attributes.”<sup>9</sup> The generally understood meaning of antecedent, namely the textual antecedent, Cornish calls the “antecedent-trigger”:

(t2)

The antecedent trigger “introduces an entity into the discourse via its predication and utterance context, and an anaphor of a particular type and form accesses that mentally represented discourse entity at a later point in the discourse, adding to this representation further properties resulting from the processing of the anaphoric clause as a whole.”

Cornish 1999:4

Cornish’s description points to the importance of the cognitive processes involved in the production and processing of discourse. The textual antecedent problem is one of the factors that have led to a cognitive approach to reference.

§6 An other relevant factor is the relationship between different anaphoric expression and the kinds of referents that they can retrieve. In early pragmatic accounts, unaccented anaphoric pronouns were regarded as expressing “given” information, while the following predication contains the “new” information of the sentence. If a full noun phrase or name is used instead of a pronoun, however, this generally introduces new information into the discourse. The form of the referential expression was thus linked to its status of given versus new.<sup>10</sup> In English, the possible forms of referring expressions range from full noun phrases, via prosodically emphasized pronouns (SHE), to unaccented pronouns (she), and null anaphor (the absence of a verbally expressed subject or object). Along a scale between “given” and “new,” established information should receive light linguistic and prosodic

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<sup>9</sup> See Cornish 1999:7 and 41-51; this description of the antecedent is influenced by Ariel 1996:17.

<sup>10</sup> See especially Halliday 1967 and Halliday and Hasan 1976.

marking, whereas new information is made explicit and receives prosodic emphasis.<sup>11</sup>

Consider the following examples:<sup>12</sup>

(t3)

“John called Mary a Republican, and then SAM [new] walked in.”

(t4)

“Mary paid John and he [given] bought himself a new coat.”

It is important to be aware that the labels of “given” and “new” in this framework do not relate to the status of the referent in the speaker or hearer’s knowledge. In fact, (t3) reads most naturally when we assume that both speaker and hearer know who “Sam” refers to. The newness or givenness is rather a status relative to the ongoing discourse, which has led people to prefer the terms *discourse-old* and *discourse-new*. However, even this terminology is insufficient for explaining the forms of referential expressions used in naturally occurring discourse. Most obviously problematic are referents that are introduced into the discourse, then not mentioned for a certain span of text, and then retrieved. Although they are *discourse-old* (i.e. “given”), they cannot generally be retrieved by an unaccented pronoun.

§7 As an alternative to the *discourse-old* and *discourse-new* distinction, scholars have come to describe anaphora in terms of the “accessibility”<sup>13</sup> of referents or, alternatively, in terms of a *givenness hierarchy*.<sup>14</sup> The aim of these approaches is to account for the form of the referential expression in every conceivable reference relation in discourse.<sup>15</sup> What the

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<sup>11</sup> See e.g. Prince 1981 and Brown and Yule 1983:190-222.

<sup>12</sup> Slightly adapted from Prince 1981:226-227.

<sup>13</sup> Ariel 1988, 1990, and 1991.

<sup>14</sup> Gundel, Hedberg, and Zacharsky 1993, expanded in multiple later publications.

<sup>15</sup> The main difference between the two approaches is that whereas Ariel (accessibility) maps referential expressions directly on a status on the accessibility scale, Gundel’s approach (*givenness hierarchy*) allows for upward implication (see most recently Gundel, Hedberg, and Zacharsky 2012:252-254). That is to say that a



approaches have in common is that they assume a match (more or less strict) between the accessibility/ givenness of a referent, and the different available referring expressions. Consider the scheme proposed for English by Gundel *et al.* 2012:251, where the level of focus decreases from left to right, and the linguistic construction becomes more specific (*N* = noun):

(t5)

in focus > activated > familiar > uniquely identifiable > referential > type identifiable

(it) > *that/this/this N* > *that N* > *the N* > indef. *this N* > *a N*

In the Accessibility Marking scale by Ariel, the list is even more extensive.<sup>16</sup> Since it is not my goal to be able to predict the referential expression for each instance of anaphora or deixis in Homer and Pindar,<sup>17</sup> I focus on the thing that these approaches have in common: the supposition that there is a relation between the accessibility of a referent and the referring expression a speaker may use. The next question, then, is what this accessibility consists of.<sup>18</sup>

§8 In the production of a discourse, the aim of the speaker is to guide the hearer's creation of a mental representation of the discourse that is as close as possible to the speaker's. This mental representation, the "discourse model," is the framework within which reference functions.<sup>19</sup> With each new discourse act the discourse model is updated,

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referential expression that is marked low for givenness may be used for entities that are in fact higher on the givenness hierarchy in the minds of speaker and hearer. In simpler terms, it is "allowed" to overdetermine referents, but not to underdetermine them (since in the latter case the communication would probably be unsuccessful).

<sup>16</sup> Ariel 1991:449; see Cornish 1999:6-8 for a discussion of both approaches.

<sup>17</sup> Bakker 1997:111 attempts to create such a scheme for Homer.

<sup>18</sup> For the reader's convenience, I henceforth use the term accessibility to cover both the ideas of givenness and accessibility.

<sup>19</sup> Cornish 1999:5-6, but the term goes back to Prince 1981:235. On page 5 Cornish defines discourse model: "This model is a coherent representation of the discourse being evoked via the co-text and its context in terms of the speaker's or writer's hypothesized intentions." Bonifazi 2012:19-38 proposes a similar approach to anaphoric markers in Homer, with a main focus on (ἐ)κεῖνος and αὐτός.

while at the same time the production of each discourse act presupposes a certain state of the discourse model. There needs to be a minimal correspondence between the speaker's and the hearer's discourse model for us to be able to speak of successful communication. This minimal value is hard to establish, but one crucial factor is the mutual tracking of referents. That is, for us to speak of a successfully communicated narrative, the speaker and the hearer need to agree about who did what to whom. It is the speaker's task, therefore, to assess the salience, accessibility, or givenness of a certain referent in the hearer's current discourse model, if she wishes to successfully refer to the relevant character:

(t6)

“[I]t is incumbent upon the speaker to use the discourse procedure which is in accordance with both his/her referential intention and with his/her assessment of the current state of the interlocutor's discourse model.”

Cornish 1999:20 [my emphasis]

This description of the process of reference has been widely taken up, as witnessed by the following relatively recent quotes:

(t7)

“[T]he grammar of reference and topicality in human language is keyed delicately to anticipate the epistemic mental states of the interlocutor.”

Givón 2005:133 [my emphasis]

Gundel, Hedberg, and Zacharsky focus on the presuppositions inherent in referential expressions:

(t8)

“The major premise of the Givenness Hierarchy theory (Gundel et al., 1993) is that different determiners and pronouns encode, as part of their conventional meaning, information assumed by the speaker about the cognitive status of the intended referent in the mind of the addressee.”

Gundel, Hedberg, and Zacharsky 2012:251 [my emphasis]

What all authors agree on<sup>20</sup> is that anaphora is not to be understood as a relation between a referential expression and its antecedent in the co-text, but as an instruction to the hearer to focus on a certain referent in his discourse model. It is not primarily a process of verbal memory, but of cognitive focus within the mental representation of discourse. As a result, the accessibility of a referent is its status in the current representation of the discourse: regardless of whether it has been mentioned before and how long ago, the referent’s current status as more or less in focus determines the anaphoric expression used.

§9 Over recent decades, Chafe has applied this cognitive perspective to narrative. Chafe follows the basic idea that accessing referents that are already in focus requires less cognitive effort than accessing referents that are out of focus at the moment of utterance. This difference in effort is what explains the use of different referring expressions, with generally less linguistic marking for referents that are in focus, and more for referents that are out of focus.<sup>21</sup> A good illustration of the cognitive approach to anaphoric reference in narrative is the case of (apparent) underdetermination:

(t9)

“Jane hit Abby. She fell.”

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<sup>20</sup> See also Ariel 1991:444 “[T]he claim is that addressees are guided in antecedent retrievals by considering the degree of Accessibility signalled by the marker, rather than by noting the contextual source marked (general knowledge, physical salience, linguistic material), as had commonly been assumed by pragmaticists (Clark and Marshall 1981, Prince 1981, *inter alia*).”

<sup>21</sup> Chafe 1994:75 “For the most part, both new and accessible information are expressed with accented full noun phrases, whereas given information is expressed in a more attenuated way.”

Since we have two female referents in this narrative the “she” in the second sentence is underdetermined at first sight. However, we have no problem interpreting the line since we visualize the scene and imagine the victim falling, rather than the aggressor. From Homer, we might compare the moment of Patroclus’ death by the hands of Hector:

(t10)

ἀγχίμολόν ῥα οἱ ἦλθε κατὰ στίχας, | οὔτα δὲ δουρὶ |  
 νείατον ἐς κενεῶνα, | διαπρὸ δὲ χαλκὸν ἔλασσε· |  
 δούπησεν δὲ πεσών, |

*Iliad* 16.820-822

close to him he [sc. Hector] came through the ranks, and thrust with his spear  
 at the lower belly, and right through he drove the bronze.  
 He [sc. Patroclus] clattered when he had fallen,

In English we find the unaccented personal pronoun “he,” where in Greek we find the equivalent least marked reference, null anaphor, within the third-person singular verb (δούπησεν). Despite the change of grammatical subject (from Hector to Patroclus), the lack of an expressed new subject does not lead to confusion, for three reasons. First, the semantics of πεσών makes Patroclus the logical subject, since he has just been wounded. Second, δούπησεν δὲ πεσών is a formula that always refers to the stricken hero, so the audience’s knowledge of epic will prevent any potential ambiguity of reference.<sup>22</sup> Third, the form of the formula in itself suggests that not just “the referent Patroclus” is in focus, but the entire image of his fall. The finite verb does not strictly refer to the noise Patroclus

<sup>22</sup> It occurs 21 times: *Iliad* 4.504, 5.42, 5.540, 5.617, 11.449, 13.187, 13.373, 13.442, 15.421, 15.524, 15.578, 16.325, 16.401, 16.599, 16.822, 17.50, 17.311, 17.580, 20.388; *Odyssey* 22.94, 24.525; see Kirk 1985:392.

makes, but to that of his armour and weapons.<sup>23</sup> The Homeric performer can present this complete, synaesthetic image, since from the moment that he is stabbed and wounded (line 821), Patroclus is in focus in the mind's eye. It is the idea of "focus" that explains the two examples above: in both cases the mind's eye inevitably moves to the recipient of the attack, putting them in mental focus, and thus making them accessible.<sup>24</sup> In earlier work, Chafe speaks of the "subject of consciousness" in terms of attention, "the mechanism by which the spotlight of consciousness is directed at one or another area of the material accessible to the mind."<sup>25</sup> A higher accessibility leads to a lower "activation cost," in Chafe's terms, which in turn translates to a less specific referring expression.<sup>26</sup> The focus of the mind's eye is an important factor in the process of anaphoric reference. It is especially relevant in passive constructions, where there is a clear distinction between subject/object and patient/agent. In Homer and Pindar, moreover, the grammatical subject can be a part of the body or a hero's weapon or armour, as it might be here, while the subject of consciousness always remains the character (see also t14 below).

§10 In the field of ancient Greek literature, Bakker and Bonifazi have applied the cognitive approach to examine anaphoric reference in several works. Bakker has applied Chafe's ideas on activation cost to expressions of anaphoric reference in Homeric epic.<sup>27</sup> Expanding on Bakker's work, Bonifazi further has addressed the need for a cognitive perspective on anaphoric reference in ancient Greek literature more generally. She has argued that accessibility or activation cost does not sufficiently account for all forms of

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<sup>23</sup> Although the LSJ s.v. δονπέω takes the main meaning of the verb to be "sound heavy or dead," I follow Chantraine 1999<sup>2</sup>:282 in reading it as "the clatter or noise (of battle)" ("fracas des lances" "bruit de la bataille"), since outside of this formula the verb is used chiefly to describe the sound of battle or of the sea.

<sup>24</sup> See also Chafe 1994:175: "Whether or not a referent is assumed to be newly activated in the listener's consciousness is a different question from whether or not it is assumed to be already part of the listener's knowledge." Chafe describes these two separate domains in terms of "active/inactive" versus "shared/unshared."

<sup>25</sup> Chafe 1974:122.

<sup>26</sup> Chafe 1994:71-81.

<sup>27</sup> Bakker 1997:108-111 and *passim*.

anaphoric reference, especially in literature.<sup>28</sup> Her study focuses on αὐτός and (ἐ)κεῖνος, but her brief analysis of anaphoric reference in the first ten lines of the *Odyssey* points the way for further research.<sup>29</sup> The present chapter builds on the work of Bakker and Bonifazi, applying the cognitive perspective particularly to third-person demonstrative pronouns in the nominative (ὁ and ὅς) followed by particles.

## 5.2 ὁ and ὅς

§11 To establish similarities and differences between the possible clusters of pronoun and particle I will take retrieval of a singular masculine referent in the nominative as the basic material. In the ongoing narrative, the Homeric performer constantly manages the relevant referents in multiple ways. Frequently, as in (t10) above, a verb form suffices to successfully select the correct referent in the discourse model. In this chapter I have chosen to focus on lexical items that serve specifically to retrieve referents: anaphoric pronouns.

§12 Such lexical items still cover a wide range of words, including αὐτός, ἐγώ, σύ, μίν, ἐ, τοι, οὗτος, κεῖνος,<sup>30</sup> ὅδε, ὅς, and ὁ. The most frequent anaphoric form in narrative is the third-person pronoun referring to a character. Within this category, ὅς<sup>31</sup> and ὁ<sup>32</sup> give the lightest marking short of a verb form only (null anaphor). Because these forms are by far the most frequent, and are commonly accompanied by particles, they form the core material for my comparative study. Finally, I focus on the nominative rather than the oblique cases because the nominative form is often syntactically superfluous. The nominative forms are particularly interesting, since in a pro-drop language like ancient Greek the grammatical subject is encoded in the verb form. That is to say, ὁ is not equivalent to τόν in referential terms, since the former may in the right context be elided,

<sup>28</sup> Bonifazi 2012:19-26.

<sup>29</sup> Bonifazi 2012:28-38.

<sup>30</sup> For κεῖνος and αὐτός forms referring to Odysseus in the *Odyssey* see Bonifazi 2010 and 2012:38-183.

<sup>31</sup> ὅς: 375x in *Iliad* and 229x in *Odyssey*.

<sup>32</sup> ὁ/ὅ: 751x in *Iliad* and 164x in *Odyssey*.

while the latter is more often indispensable.<sup>33</sup> Although I do not focus on the oblique forms of the anaphoric pronoun, I discuss a small number of instances, mostly in the footnotes.

§13 Among the masculine singular nominative forms, the relationship between ὅς and ὁ is complex in archaic Greek.<sup>34</sup> In classical Attic prose, ὅς is the masculine singular of the relative pronoun, while ὁ is the masculine singular definite article or a weak demonstrative pronoun.<sup>35</sup> In Homeric epic, and through its strong influence in Pindar and other lyric as well, the distinction is not so clear. In this early Greek, the two words can have the respective values they have in classical Greek, but beyond that both can function as demonstrative or relative pronouns. This dual functioning presents significant problems, since it is not always clear from the Greek if a clause should be taken as a relative clause introduced by the pronoun or as a new main clause with a demonstrative pronoun as the grammatical subject. Consider the following example:

(t11)

τοῖσι δ' ἀνέστη |

Κάλχας Θεστορίδης | οἰωνοπόλων ὅχ' ἄριστος, |

ὃς ἤδη τά τ' ἐόντα τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα |

*Iliad* 1.68-70

And amongst them stood up

Kalchas son of Thestor, among augurs by far the best,

who knew what was, what would be, and what had been.

<sup>33</sup> This distinction is not addressed in Des Places 1947:35-50, Hummel 1993:174-177, or Bonifazi 2004c.

<sup>34</sup> For a concise exploration of the issue, see Bonifazi 2004c (with a focus on Pindar); see also Bakker 1999 and 2005:77-80 on ὁ and οὗτος in Homer.

<sup>35</sup> ὁ represents the pronoun from the PIE root \*to, i.e. ὁ, ἡ, τό, while the relative pronoun from the PIE root \*yo gives the paradigm ὅς, ἥ, ὅ. The TLG edition of the *Odyssey* does not accentuate the demonstrative pronoun, while the edition of the *Iliad* does. For reasons of consistency, and in accordance with common practice, I have chosen to give ὁ throughout.

An alternative reading of the final line is: “...by far the best. He knew...,” if we interpret the pronoun as demonstrative rather than relative.<sup>36</sup> In (t11) it is perhaps unnecessary to choose a demonstrative reading, but consider this parallel:

(t12)

ἡ δ' αἶψ' ἐξ ἀγορῆς ἐκάλει κλυτὸν Ἀντιφατῆα, |  
ὃν πόσιν, | ὃς δὴ τοῖσιν ἐμήσατο λυγρὸν ὄλεθρον. |  
αὐτίχ' ἕνα μάρψας ἐτάρων | ὀπλίσσατο δεῖπνον |

*Odyssey* 10.114-116

At once she called from the place of assembly the glorious Antiphates,  
her husband, and he devised for them woeful destruction.

Instantly he seized one of my comrades and made ready his meal,<sup>37</sup>

Here, Murray prefers to read the pronoun as demonstrative, and translates accordingly. In the language there is no formal distinction between the two possible readings of the pronoun, which suggests that Murray was guided by the context.

§14 In (t12) one reason for translating ὃς as “he” rather than “who” is the fact that it constitutes a narrative transition. The act following the mention of the husband (ὃν πόσιν) is not so much a description of this new referent – as might be expected in a relative clause – but rather an act introducing a new event, with the freshly introduced husband as the grammatical subject.<sup>38</sup> The fact that in (t12) an aorist (ἐμήσατο) follows the pronoun,

<sup>36</sup> Probert [forthcoming] section 2.5 quotes this passage as an early example of a relative clause in ancient Greek, and says: “it is not difficult to think of the structure found in (2.1) [sc. “Calchas, who...”] as having come from a structure of type (2.2) [sc. “Calchas. He...”].”

<sup>37</sup> Translation Murray. This is in fact a unique instance of ὃς δὴ in Homer; only here does it introduce framed discourse. See below §63-§71 for the more common pattern of use of this pronoun and particle combination.

<sup>38</sup> Behind Murray’s translation there might also be a presupposition about the status of main clauses and subordinate clauses. The former are generally regarded as carrying the narrative forward, while the latter offer “background” information. This view is challenged by Cristofaro 2003, and specifically for ancient Greek



whereas in (t11) it is a pluperfect (ἤδην), standing in for the imperfect of οἶδα, contributes to this reading.<sup>39</sup> On a macrolevel the δὴ act in (t12) marks the beginning of a new scene within the narrative, which leads to Odysseus' departure from the island of the Laestrygonians. In discourse terms, ὅς in (t11) introduces an act that is unframed (the performer informs us about the character Kalchas), while ὅς δὴ in (t12) introduces a framed act, a continuation of the narrative.<sup>40</sup> This distinction may (unconsciously) play an important part in decisions of editors, regarding punctuation, and of translators.

§15 In Homer and Pindar both ὅς and ὁ are used to retrieve a masculine character.<sup>41</sup> To understand the use of ὁ/ὅς + particle, we must understand the nature of referent tracking in ancient Greek. To an English reader, ὁ may look like “he,” but the two pronouns are not equivalent. Because ancient Greek is a pro-drop language, neutral continuity of grammatical subject is signaled by null-anaphor constructions, with a predicate consisting of a finite verb only.<sup>42</sup> In a similar construction, English supplies the unaccented pronoun. ὁ in Homer, then, is not equivalent to unaccented “he” but to accented “HE.”<sup>43</sup>

(t13)

πρόσθε δ' Ἀλέξανδρος προΐει δολιχόσκιον ἔγχος, |  
καὶ βάλεν Ἀτρεΐδαν κατ' ἀσπίδα πάντοσε ἴσῃν, |

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by De La Villa 2000 and Bonifazi 2004c; see also Probert [forthcoming]. For further discussion of background and foreground see chapter 3 §25-§26, and IV.3.

<sup>39</sup> See below, especially §51-§71, for the possible relevance of the use of the imperfect (sometimes present or pluperfect) in a context of narrative told in aorists.

<sup>40</sup> See chapter 4 §11-§14 for the terms “framed” and “unframed” discourse.

<sup>41</sup> I exclude the feminine singular pronoun in the nominative for practical reasons. First, the feminine pronoun (ἡ and ἥ) occurs much less frequently; second, the constructions in which it partakes do not differ from that of the masculine pronoun that I discuss below.

<sup>42</sup> For a discussion of pronoun use in pro-drop languages, see Frascarelli 2007:694-696, with extensive references.

<sup>43</sup> See Cornish 1999:63 on pronouns in English and French: they “signal referential and attentional continuity.” He adds, “this is the case where they are unaccented in English, and clitic in French. Where they are accented, their indexical properties change: in particular, they are capable of referring to entities which, though assumed to be recoverable by the addressee, are not the ones enjoying the highest degree of focus at the point of use.”

οὐδ' ἔρρηξεν χαλκός, | ἀνεγνάμφθη δέ οἱ αἶχμή |  
 ἀσπίδ' ἐνὶ κρατερῇ. | ὁ δὲ δεύτερον ὄρνυτο χαλκῷ |  
 Ἀτρεΐδης Μενέλαος |

*Iliad* 3.346-350

First Alexander sent off his far-shadowing spear,  
 and he hit on Atreides' shield, perfectly balanced,  
 but the bronze did not break through, and its point was turned  
 on the mighty shield. And HE in turn rushed with his bronze,  
 Atreus' son Menelaus

In this passage the narrator describes the fight between Paris (Alexander) and Menelaus. For this narrative stretch, those two characters are the only relevant referents, and the focus of the mind's eye shifts steadily from one to the other. In lines 346 and 347, agency remains with Paris and as a result the new act in 347 is introduced without a pronoun (Ø βάλεν).<sup>44</sup> A few lines later we have followed the thrown spear to its mark, Menelaus, who has now become focused in the mind's eye. As Tomlin explains, the nominative case is a grammatical reflex of attention management: in English the nominative typically refers to the referent that has become the focus of attention in the directly preceding discourse.<sup>45</sup> However, in instances like (t13) the new grammatical subject (Menelaus) is in focus in the mind's eye, but has not yet been primed in the language. This is the reason that we find *ὁ* in

<sup>44</sup> If there is no ambiguity of anaphoric reference, there is a tendency in English to keep reference to the subject "light," called the "light subject constraint" by Chafe 1994:82-92; Greek appears to function similarly.

<sup>45</sup> Tomlin 1997:181-186 discusses the nominative in terms of attention: the nominative marks the referent being attended to, and this "being attended to" is generally initiated in the preceding act. Consider especially the note on 182: "That is, the grammar of English does not look at the semantic role of an argument when determining subject selection; it only looks for the current output of attention system [sic] – the attentionally detected event parameter."

in line 349, and not just the verb.<sup>46</sup> Contrary to our intuition, then, *ó* is a marked rather than an unmarked anaphoric expression and should be taken as such.<sup>47</sup>

§16 In other words, it seems that Menelaus was not completely accessible in the middle of line 349, and therefore was activated with a pronoun. However, activation cost is only one of many factors affecting the use of *ó* or *ός* in Homer and Pindar.<sup>48</sup> The corpus of Homeric epic and Pindaric song differs to a significant extent from the discourse that contemporary linguists generally engage with. Although Homeric and Pindaric discourse must still, by and large, follow the unwritten rules of communication, they possess an additional layer of artfulness and traditionality that will have an effect on the linguistic form beyond cognitive requirements. Chafe's account of referent retrieval, which proposes that accessibility is only one of many factors determining the form of a referring expression, offers additional avenues of analysis.<sup>49</sup>

§17 To handle a complex narrative, the speaker's mind attempts to maximize clarity while minimizing explicit reference;<sup>50</sup> and the hearer's mind works on the assumption that this is indeed what the speaker does.<sup>51</sup> Therefore, when a referential expression appears to

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<sup>46</sup> Compare the following constructed example from Prince 1981:227 "John called Sam a Republican and then HE insulted HIM." The accented pronouns (as opposed to "John called Sam a Republican and then he insulted him") suggests that there is a shift of subject, leading to the assumption that "HE" refers to Sam, whereas "he" would most naturally have referred to John. See also the example in Prince 19n34. Fox 1987:172 shows that in written English narrative the accented pronoun would most probably take the form of a full noun phrase. For English, Givón 2005:136 shows that zero anaphora and unstressed pronouns signal maximal referential continuity whereas constructions containing a stressed pronoun or even stronger marking signal referential discontinuity.

<sup>47</sup> I use marked/unmarked in the sense proposed by Givón 2005:139: "maximal-continuity anaphoric devices – zero-anaphor and unstressed/clitic pronoun – are the *least marked* devices, carrying the smallest phonological weight and lacking independent lexical status" [emphasis original].

<sup>48</sup> See Bonifazi 2012:26.

<sup>49</sup> First in Chafe 1976.

<sup>50</sup> See Levinson 1987:68 "The less you say, the more you mean."

<sup>51</sup> See Cornish 1999:6 "[T]he speaker's task in referring must be to choose a referring expression marking the level of cognitive accessibility of the intended referent which matches that which s/he assumes the entity in question currently enjoys in his or her addressee's mental model of the discourse under construction," and 20, "the type of signalling device (...), which is most likely to get the addressee to grasp the referent intended in the most economical manner possible."

give more information than required (i.e. when it exceeds the referent's required activation cost) an explanation is called for.<sup>52</sup> In the vast majority of cases, such instances of apparent overdetermination can be explained by considering other factors. Beyond activation cost I consider the relevance of discourse transitions, frame switches, contrastiveness, and “zooming” of the mind's eye.<sup>53</sup>

### 5.3 $\acute{o}/\omicron\varsigma$ + particle in Homer

§18 The following discussion of  $\acute{o}/\omicron\varsigma$  + particle combinations focuses on the pragmatic functions of the acts they introduce. It is from the pragmatic perspective that the particles' force can be understood, and a comparative study shows that the speaker's choice for one particle over another is rarely arbitrary. I first explore the combination  $\acute{o} \delta\acute{\epsilon}$  (and  $\omicron\varsigma \delta\acute{\epsilon}$ ) since it is one of the most common combinations, and has come to be associated with the very specific grammatical function of marking subject change. My analysis aims to separate the different contributions of the two elements (pronoun and particle) in order to come to a better understanding of the whole in its many contexts. Subsequently I turn to the other extremely frequent collocation  $\omicron \gamma\epsilon$ , which has also received some attention in the literature, in this case as a marker of subject continuity. As with  $\acute{o} \delta\acute{\epsilon}$ , the reality in Homer is more complex, but unlike  $\acute{o} \delta\acute{\epsilon}$  the combination  $\omicron \gamma\epsilon$  appears to be working as a cluster.<sup>54</sup> After these frequent and known combinations, I turn to those pronoun and particle combinations that generally go undiscussed, but are in fact crucial in guiding the narrative:  $\acute{o} \delta'\alpha\rho\alpha$ ,  $\omicron \rho\alpha$ , and  $\acute{o} \delta\eta$ .

<sup>52</sup> Gundel *et al.* 2012:251: “A speaker, in producing a particular determiner or pronoun, thus provides a processing signal to the addressee that helps restrict the set of possible referents.” On pages 252-253 they explain how the hierarchy works on the basis of how informative the linguistic referring expression is.

<sup>53</sup> Chafe 1994:77-78 discusses the factor of contrastiveness as a reason for using accented forms in spoken English when unaccented forms might have been expected; Emmott 1997:86 (with reference to Longacre 1974 and 1996<sup>2</sup>) notes that there may be literary reasons for “lexical reiteration” instead of pronominalization.

<sup>54</sup> I use “combination” as a neutral term for two or more particles or other words that co-occur, and “cluster” for recurrent combinations whose resulting function either extends beyond, or is significantly different from, the sum of its parts; see I.1.

### 5.3.1 ó δέ

§19 The cluster ó δέ is probably the most well-known combination of pronoun and particle, but despite its frequency the collocation is not well understood. Contrary to common practice, it is paramount to separate the functions of its two constituent parts. As I showed above, ó is an accented pronoun, roughly equivalent to emphatic “HE” in English, and as such it is used regularly in instances featuring discontinuity of grammatical subject or another kind of referent switch. In chapter 2 I outlined the main function of δέ as the “quintessential boundary marker,” following Bakker’s work.<sup>55</sup> This function suggests that the particle has nothing specifically to do with continuity or discontinuity in the tracking of referents in Homeric discourse. In fact, a combination of a finite verb + δέ is a common way of maintaining subject continuity.<sup>56</sup> If one wishes to link ó δέ to changes of subject one should be aware that the reason for this correlation is ó, not δέ.<sup>57</sup>

§20 There is more to be said about the combination and its relation to referential continuity or discontinuity. Janko writes that ó δέ “normally marks a change of grammatical subject.”<sup>58</sup> His claim is often true for Homer, but it does not address the question of why ó δέ serves this purpose so well. I contend that in the combination ó δέ the lightly emphatic pronoun invites the audience to find a reason for the emphasis – often a change of grammatical subject – whereas δέ simply marks the progress of the discourse.

§21 Since δέ marks the progress of discourse, and because most of Homeric discourse is framed narrative, δέ in Homer typically marks a continuation of framed discourse. In

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<sup>55</sup> See chapter 2 §31-§36.

<sup>56</sup> See for example ἴξε δέ in (t16) below.

<sup>57</sup> Chantraine 1953:159 remains vague when he says “[l]a particule et l’article servent souvent à indiquer un changement de sujet.” Since he discusses ó much more as a pronoun than as an article, it is striking that he calls it an “article.”

<sup>58</sup> Janko *ad Iliad* 16.467, where ó δέ occurs despite continuity of grammatical subject. It is probably comments like this that lead to claims like that in Raible 2001:593 “Languages using this [zero anaphor] technique tend to develop a special morpheme signaling a different subject (...) in the subsequent clause. In classical Greek this is the function of the particle *de*.” While Janko’s generalization holds, Raible’s claim for δέ alone oversimplifies. He might rather have said that in combination with a pronoun in the nominative, δέ often signals a change of subject.

combination with the pronoun *ὁ/ὅς*, then, it is no surprise that *ὁ δέ* in Homer often introduces an act with a new grammatical subject. However, we must remember that *ὁ* as an anaphoric pronoun is only lightly emphatic; it is not as strong an anaphoric expression as a strong demonstrative, for example. Therefore, even when *ὁ δέ* marks change of grammatical subject, the referent of *ὁ* must be highly accessible. Consider the following instance at the end of book twenty of the *Iliad*. After a long list of Achilles' exploits on the battlefield the narrator caps the episode with two similes:

(t14)

ὥς δ' ἀναμαιμάει βαθέ' ἄγκεα θεσπιδαῆς πῦρ |  
 οὔρεος ἀζαλέοιο, | βαθεῖα δὲ καίεται ὕλη, |  
 πάντη τε κλονέων | ἄνεμος φλόγα εἰλυφάζει, |  
 ὥς ὃ γε<sup>59</sup> πάντη θῦνε | σὺν ἔγχρῃ | δαίμονι ἴσος |  
 κτεινομένους ἐφέπων· | ῥέε δ' αἵματι γαῖα μέλαινα. |  
 ὥς δ' ὅτε τις ζεύξῃ βόας ἄρσενας εὐρυμετώπους |  
 τριβέμεναι κρῖ λευκὸν | ἐϋκτιμένην ἐν ἄλωϊ, |  
 ῥίμφα τε λέπτ' ἐγένοντο | βοῶν ὑπὸ πόσσ' ἐριμύκων, |  
 ὥς ὑπ' Ἀχιλλῆος μεγαθύμου | μώνυχες ἵπποι |  
 στείβον ὁμοῦ νέκυάς τε καὶ ἀσπίδας· | αἵματι δ' ἄξων |  
 νέρθεν ἅπας πεπάλακτο | καὶ ἄντυγες αἶ περὶ δίφρον, |  
 ἄς ἄρ' ἀφ' ἱππείων ὀπλέων ῥαθάμιγγες ἔβαλλον |  
 αἶ τ' ἀπ' ἐπισώτρων· | ὃ δὲ ἴετο κῦδος ἀρέσθαι |  
 Πηλεΐδης, | λύθρῳ δὲ παλάσσετο χεῖρας ἀάπτους. |

*Iliad* 20.490-503

<sup>59</sup> For this use of *ὃ γε* – to help retrieve the referent after an intervening discourse discontinuity of some sort (here a simile) – see §27-§50 below.

As a portentous fire rages up deep glens  
of a dry mountain, and the deep forest burns,  
and driving it everywhere, the wind whirls the flame about.  
Thus HE rushed everywhere with his spear, like to a god,  
driving on his victims. And the black earth ran with blood.  
As when someone yokes broad-fronted bulls,  
to crush white barley on the well-built threshing floor,  
and soon they are threshed out under the loud-bellowing bulls' feet.  
Thus under brave-hearted Achilles the single-hoofed horses  
trampled corpses and shields alike; and with blood the axle  
was all spattered below and the rims, those around the chariot,  
for them the drops from the horses' hooves struck,  
and those from the wheels. And HE went to win glory,  
Peleus' son, and with gore were spattered his invincible hands.

The audience cannot but picture the scene of Achilles tearing through the enemy ranks like a forest fire spurred on by the wind, trampling their bodies like grain on a threshing floor. In the final lines the narrator sketches an image of Achilles triumphant on a chariot spattered with blood, riding over the bodies of his adversaries. Although he has not been the grammatical subject since for the last eight lines, and has not been named in four lines,  $\acute{o} \delta\acute{\epsilon}$  suffices to restore Achilles as grammatical subject in 502. The images evoked are strong, but unlike some other similes they apply readily to the current situation on the battlefield. In 498 the horses are the subject ( $\acute{\iota}\pi\pi\omicron\iota$ ) and the axle ( $\acute{\alpha}\xi\omega\nu$ ) in 499, but Achilles is constantly at the forefront of our mind, literally in the center of the image, in focus. As in the case of Jason below (t34),  $\acute{o}$  in 502 does not just retrieve "Achilles" but it retrieves the raging and bloody Achilles that has just been created in the mental representation of the discourse.

§22 However, because *ὁ/ὅς* can retrieve all accessible masculine singular referents in the frame, *ὁ δέ* in framed discourse cannot be mapped directly onto the function “grammatical subject change.” There are several instances where a pronoun is used despite clear continuity of grammatical subject. Such cases of apparent overdetermination deserve closer inspection, as they may occur for several cognitive or stylistic reasons. In book nine of the *Odyssey*, Odysseus relates how he acquired the wine with which he would later intoxicate the Cyclops, saying:

(t15)

ὄν μοι δῶκε Μάρων, | Εὐάνθεος υἱός, |  
 ἱρεὺς Ἀπόλλωνος, | ὃς Ἴσμαρον ἀμφιβεβήκει, |  
 οὔνεκά μιν σὺν παιδὶ περισχόμεθ' ἡδὲ γυναικὶ |  
 ἀζόμενοι· | ὥκει γὰρ ἐν ἄλσει δενδρήεντι |  
 Φοίβου Ἀπόλλωνος. | ὁ δέ μοι πόρεν ἀγλαὰ δῶρα· |

*Odyssey* 9.197-201

[the wine], which Maro gave me, son of Euanthes,  
 the priest of Apollo, who had encompassed the Ismarus,  
 because we had protected him with his son and his wife  
 out of reverence. For he [sc. Maro] lived in a wooded grove of  
 Phoebus Apollo. And HE [sc. Maro] gave me splendid gifts:

After the first plural form *περισχόμεθα*, the singular verb form *ὥκει* suffices to avoid ambiguity. It might seem all the more surprising, then, that the pronoun is used in the following act, even though there is total continuity of grammatical subject.



§23 An explanation for this overdetermination is readily available after the discussion of framed and unframed discourse in chapter 4. Both the imperfect tense of ὥκει<sup>60</sup> and the particle γάρ suggest that the move in lines 200-201 is different from its surroundings. It is in fact a little piece of unframed discourse, where the performer turns to the audience and offers some information needed in order to understand the ongoing action in the narrative. In cognitive terms, the act starting with ὥκει γάρ does not create the image of Maro in any kind of activity, but rather of his house in a sacred grove. The retrieval of Maro after that is therefore more fraught.<sup>61</sup> As we return to the contextual frame of the action, the pronoun (ὁ) turns attention from Maro “living in a grove” to Maro as he is now, having just been saved by Odysseus and his men.

§24 Similarly, in the following narrative about Poseidon intervening in the battle between Aeneas and Achilles, the anaphoric pronoun is used at one point despite continuity of grammatical subject:

(t16)

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ τό γ' ἄκουσε | Ποσειδάων ἐνοσίχθων, |  
 βῆ ῥ' ἵμεν | ἄν τε μάχην καὶ ἀνὰ κλόνον ἐγχειάων, |  
 ἔξε δ' ὅθ' Αἰνείας ἡδ' ὁ κλυτὸς ἦεν Ἀχιλλεύς. |  
 αὐτίκα | τῷ μὲν ἔπειτα κατ' ὀφθαλμῶν χέεν ἀχλὺν |  
 Πηλεΐδῃ Ἀχιλῆϊ· | ὁ δὲ | μελίην εὐχαλκον  
 ἀσπίδος ἐξέρυσεν | μεγάλῃτορος Αἰνείαο· |

*Iliad* 20.318-323

Now, when Poseidon the earth-shaker heard this,  
 he set to go up through the battle and the hurtling of spears,

<sup>60</sup> ὥκει is a single imperfect among aorists (δῶκε, 197, περισχόμεθα, 199, πόρεν, 201): this is typical for unframed discourse in Homer; see chapter 4 §11-§26, and below §51-§62 on ἄρα.

<sup>61</sup> See chapter 4 §14 and Emmott 1997:239 and 248-252.

and he reached where Aeneas and glorious Achilles were.

At once, he then shed a mist over the eyes of the one,

Peleus' son Achilles. And HE, the ashen spear well-shod in bronze

he drew from the shield of great-hearted Aeneas,

In this passage ὁ δέ is problematic, since it would most naturally establish Achilles as the grammatical subject of the new act, instead of continuing to refer to Poseidon as it actually does. This apparent mismatch may have been Aristarchus' reason for athetizing lines 322-324, since taking out these lines creates an attractive symmetry between τῷ μὲν (sc. Achilles, 321) and Αἰνείαν δέ (325).<sup>62</sup> I follow the reading of the manuscripts and editions, however, which requires an explanation. In chapter 2 §63-§79 I devote some attention to small fronted acts that serve to guide the mind's eye of the audience. These priming acts take the form of a referential expression + a particle (often δέ), and are followed by some performative discontinuity. Even though nothing linguistically suggests that there is a boundary after δέ (the accusative that follows seems in no way to be independent), the manuscripts suggest that some kind of discontinuity was assumed after ὁ δέ.<sup>63</sup> Here, the reason for such a discourse act is not obvious, but the motivation may be visual. After his arrival Poseidon sheds mist over Achilles' eyes, which leads the mind's eye to focus on Achilles. The expectation of the audience might have been that focus and agency stayed with Achilles, but in fact the scene moves back to Poseidon with ὁ δέ (322). The god then first enacts a ritual return of the spear to the hero, after which he performs a truly

<sup>62</sup> The reason given in the scholia is that Poseidon could not have drawn the spear from the shield since in lines 276-279 the spear is described as landing on the ground. Edwards 1991:327 plausibly defends the lines by taking it to mean that the shield had been pinned to the ground by the spear, "which is realistic enough."

<sup>63</sup> The codex Marciana 458 has a comma after ὁ δέ, while both Escorial Ω and Venetus B have a sign of a double grave over δέ: "δὲ̀", which I interpret to be some kind of instruction for prosodic discontinuity. This is why I use a comma in the English translation. It resembles *Iliad* 20.455-456, where there is a clear boundary after ὁ δέ: ὡς εἰπὼν Δρύοπ' οὔτα κατ' αὐχένα μέσσον ἄκοντι / ἥριπε δὲ προπάροιθε ποδῶν· ὁ δὲ | τὸν μὲν ἔασε. In this passage ὁ δέ does mark a change of subject (ἥριπε has Druops as its subject), but as in 20.322 there is a transition to a new episode of the narrative.

awesome deed: he throws Aeneas over the entire army to the other side of the battlefield.

The scene is climactic and highly vivid,<sup>64</sup> and the use of the pronoun rather than a null anaphor may serve to prepare for the upcoming image that has Poseidon as its center.

§25 A study of ὁ δέ in Pindar reveals the same range of possibilities as in Homer, the difference being that ὁ δέ almost always marks change of grammatical subject.<sup>65</sup> Since in Pindaric song δέ marks boundaries between larger units of discourse (see chapter 3 §65), this need not come as a surprise. Besides this difference, ὁ δέ in Pindar has two additional functions. First, Pindaric ὁ sometimes comes close to its classical function as an article<sup>66</sup> – a rare use in the Homeric epics<sup>67</sup> – while retaining its Homeric function as a relative or demonstrative pronoun.<sup>68</sup> In two instances, ὁ δέ precedes a proper name, and there the boundary between demonstrative pronoun and article is more fuzzy than elsewhere in Pindar.<sup>69</sup> As in Homer, “there is an uncertainty about the relative vs. the demonstrative use of the pronouns, and (...) a complex interlacing of (...) functions among relative pronouns, definite articles, and articles used as pronouns.”<sup>70</sup> Second, the pronoun can be used as a forward-looking demonstrative in constructions like this gnomic expression:

(t17)

<sup>64</sup> The use of αὐτίκα may also have contributed to the vividness of the scene, see Bonifazi 2012:273-281, with reference to the present passage in 280n40.

<sup>65</sup> ὁ δέ accompanies continuity of grammatical subject only in *Pythian* 4.78, see (t33).

<sup>66</sup> See Gildersleeve 1885:ci and Bonifazi 2004c:49-54. In the present and following notes I give a list of the uses of ὁ δέ in Pindar. I read the article ὁ in *Olympian* 1.1, 8.28; *Pythian* 1.35, 9.78, 11.30; *Nemean* 7.67; *Isthmian* 7.39.

<sup>67</sup> See Chantraine 1953:160-162, 165-166; Chantraine notes that in the Homeric books generally regarded as more recent, the use of the “article” is closer to that in classical Greek (165), and adds “on a pu supposer qu’à l’époque d’Homère, la langue courante connaissait déjà l’article, mais que l’épopée conservait traditionnellement l’emploi démonstratif de l’article.” Bakker 2005:76n12 adds that “in many cases the “article” is more marked [in Homer] than in Attic Greek.”

<sup>68</sup> I read ὁ as a relative pronoun in *Olympian* 1.73, 10.43 (ὁ ἄρα); *Pythian* 1.8, 4.78 (ὁ ἄρα), 3.92, 6.33, 9.17, 11.34 (ὁ ἄρα); *Nemean* 1.43, 1.61, 7.36, 10.13; *Isthmian* 6.41.

<sup>69</sup> *Pythian* 2.73 ὁ δέ Ῥαδάμανθους (“(that) Rhadamanthys”) and 5.60 (“(that) Apollo”). Bonifazi 2004a links this to the idea of “recognitional deixis,” from Diessel 1999, to mark a referent that is new in the discourse, but already known to speaker and listener. Using an article with a name is the exception rather than the rule in Pindar, which suggests that at least some demonstrative force may be attributed to ὁ in these cases.

<sup>70</sup> Bonifazi 2004c:50.

ὁ δ' ὄλβιος, | ὃν φᾶμαι κατέχωντ' ἀγαθαί |

*Olympian 7.10*

He is fortunate, who is held in good repute<sup>71</sup>

Here and in the parallels, the sense of the act introduced by ὁ δέ is gnomic.<sup>72</sup> In all cases I read the first part of the thought as a copulative construction with ἐστί left out, which means that ὁ must be read as a demonstrative pronoun rather than an article. Because in this context ὁ δέ introduces a *gnōmē* – unframed, generalizing discourse – there is always a change of grammatical subject. However, in *gnōmai* the referent of ὁ can be ambiguous; either it can be the indefinite “he”, or it can be the main referent of the preceding discourse, often the victor.

§26 Examples (t15) and (t16) demonstrate that ὁ δέ may accompany continuity of grammatical subject, provided that there is some other reason for emphasizing the referent. The combination ὁ δέ in Homer and Pindar reflects the whole range of ὁ/ὅς as a lightly marked anaphoric expression combined with δέ, the marker of progression of discourse.

### 5.3.2 ὅ γε

§27 ὅ γε enjoys a special status among combinations of pronoun and particle: the LSJ, for example, specifically lists ὅ γε as a special construction under its discussion of ὁ. They describe the combination as follows: “Pron. ὁ, ἦ, τό made slightly (if at all) more emphatic

<sup>71</sup> Literally: “whom good rumours hold.”

<sup>72</sup> The parallels are: *Olympian* 10.66 (“He, who”); *Pythian* 8.48 (“He, who”; in this instance as for *Pythian* 4.78-79, (t33) below, Giannini in Gentili 1995:575 reads ὁ as an article), 8.88 (“He, who”); *Nemean* 5.34 (“He, (...) Zeus”), 9.24 (“He, (...) Zeus”).

The construction does occur in the *Hymns*: *Homeric Hymn to the Muses and Apollo* 4 ὁ δ' ὄλβιος and *Homeric Hymn to the Earth Mother* 7 ὁ δ' ὄλβιος; and there is a rare instance in Homer *Iliad* 1.139 ὁ δέ κεν κεχολώσεται ὃν κεν ἴκωμαι “he will be angry, to whom I will come.”

by the addition of γε.”<sup>73</sup> This description of the function of γε exemplifies most scholarship on the particle, and it covers well the sense that is common to most instances of the particle. Denniston discusses γε in terms of “concentration,” which leads to the two further functions of marking limitation and intensification.<sup>74</sup> About γε after pronouns, Denniston says the following: “Naturally, in many cases γε is limitative: but in many others it is determinative: often it seems to be otiose, the pronoun apparently requiring no stress, or at most a secondary stress.”<sup>75</sup> By limitative, Denniston means that γε marks its host word (group) as the thing that the current claim holds true for *at least*; “determinative” fits his idea of “concentration,” and what other scholars (and the LSJ) describe as “emphatic”; “otiose” appears to mean redundant.

§28 As we shall see, the limitative function of γε (as described by Denniston) does not emerge from the cluster ὃ γε, and yet the particle is clearly not redundant. Rather, γε in ὃ γε mainly lends emphasis, but this idea needs refinement. What does it mean for a particle to make a pronoun (and specifically ὃ) more emphatic? In the following section I demonstrate three things: (1) distributionally, ὃ and ὃ γε are complementary: they occur in mutually exclusive positions in the act and the verse; (2) functionally, ὃ γε serves to retrieve a referent of which some aspect has to be supplied through inference; (3) when ὃ γε appears in contexts where there is continuity of grammatical subject, several factors contribute to the choice of ὃ γε over a null anaphor, including frame switches and transitions between narrator text and direct speech.

§29 First consider the position of ὃ γε, which provides the clearest indication that we are dealing with a cluster rather than a combination. In the discussion above, I have taken

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<sup>73</sup> Liddell, Scott, Jones, and McKenzie 1940<sup>3</sup>:1195b (s.v. ὃ γε).

<sup>74</sup> Denniston 1950<sup>2</sup>:114-115.

<sup>75</sup> Denniston 1950<sup>2</sup>:122. He provides an analogy from English: “The same tendency occasionally shows itself in English, as when we say ‘Not I’, meaning ‘I certainly did not.’” De Jong 2012:68 *ad Iliad* 22.33 (ὃ γε) comments that “the anaphoric pronoun is often redundant and γε unnecessary (...). The combination is found very often, however, and may have been of metrical use to the singer.”

ὁ as the equivalent of the accented pronoun in English. In its relative and anaphoric functions, the pronoun tends to occur in act-initial position in Homer. It is thus a statistical anomaly that ὃ γε *never* occurs in act-initial position. Of course, γε is more mobile than δέ, which means that it can occur later in the act as well as in peninitial position. However, the positional tendency of the pronoun would suggest that at least in some cases we would find ὃ γε at the start of a new act. For metrical reasons ὃ γε cannot occur at verse beginning, but this does not hold for οἷ γε, which still shares the same positional limitation: it never occurs at act or at verse beginning. That is to say, the nominative pronoun occurs in act-initial position, and γε occurs in peninitial position in the act, but ὃ γε as a combination is never act initial. This makes the combination different from the sum of its parts in a significant way, and therefore I shall treat ὃ γε as a cluster. If the positional limitations of the cluster differ from that of its components, the same may be possible for the cluster's function. Unlike ὁ δέ, the function of ὃ γε may be more limited than the range of functions ὁ and γε have on their own.

§30 In commentaries, ὃ γε is regularly described as resuming the subject of the current sentence; that is, it is regarded as marking grammatical subject continuity.<sup>76</sup> Considering once more the masculine nominative pronoun's range of functions, however, we may predict that this generalization will not hold, and the numbers show that it does not.<sup>77</sup> Consider the following passage from *Iliad* book one, where Achilles considers whether he should attack Agamemnon or not:

(t18)

ὦς φάτο· | Πηλεΐωνι δ' ἄχος γένετ', | ἐν δέ οἱ ἦτορ |

στήθεσσιν λασίοισι | διάνδιχα μερμήριξεν, |

<sup>76</sup> See Leaf 1900:149 on *Iliad* 3.409, about ὃ γε in general: "ὃ γε (...) merely resumes the original subject" and Neitzel 1975:47 "ὃ γε steht bei Homer immer demonstrativ als masc. nom. Es nimmt das Subjekt des Satzes betont wieder auf."

<sup>77</sup> Out of a total of 127 instances in the *Iliad*, ὃ γε marks grammatical subject change in 58 instances. This number is 27 out of 62 for the *Odyssey*, so slightly less than half in both epics.

ἢ ὅ γε | φάσγανον ὅξυ ἐρυσσάμενος παρὰ μηροῦ |  
 τοὺς μὲν ἀναστήσειεν, | ὃ δ' Ἀτρεΐδην ἐναρίζοι, |

*Iliad* 1.188-191

Thus he spoke. Peleus' son was distressed, and his heart  
 in his shaggy breast debated two ways:  
 whether HE, having taken his sharp sword from his thigh,  
 should make the others leave, and HE should kill Atreus' son...

The text illustrates neatly how problematic generalizations about ὃ δέ and ὅ γε in Homer are: ὅ γε in 190 marks change of grammatical subject from ἦτορ, “heart,” to Achilles, whereas ὃ δέ in 191 accompanies subject continuity.<sup>78</sup> The choice of the pronoun over null anaphor is expected in 190, since null anaphor would have led to the jarring image of the heart drawing a sword. In 191 the anaphoric pronoun serves to juxtapose the image of the assembly dispersing with the image of Achilles and Agamemnon staying and fighting. This explains the use of the pronoun in both instances, but the question remains what the function of γε is in ὅ γε.

§31 The reason for the addition of γε, although hard to determine, may have been prosodic: ὃ alone is more easily lost than ὃ followed by a clitic and at times a whole syllable.<sup>79</sup> However, this is not enough to explain why we find γε instead of another enclitic, such as ῥα. Whatever the range of functions of ὅ γε when it grammaticalized as a cluster, a particular function of γε must have led to the development of the cluster in the first place. Before moving on to more instances of ὅ γε in Homer, let us examine this question more closely.

<sup>78</sup> Leaf 1900:18 rightly notes that “ὃ δέ as often repeats the subject of the first clause.”

<sup>79</sup> Consider also that Homer has the elided form ὅ γ' 104 times and the full form ὅ γε 86 times.

§32 One way to analyze the function of  $\gamma\epsilon$  is to describe it in terms of focus. The term focus has multiple uses, both technical and intuitive, and use of the term in classical scholarship is diffuse. Denniston spoke of  $\gamma\epsilon$  as a primarily “limitative” particle, reducing an expression’s applicability to “at least” the word (group) marked by  $\gamma\epsilon$ . Building on Denniston’s ideas with the addition of the terminology of functional grammar, Bakker speaks of  $\gamma\epsilon$  in wishes as marking “exclusive focus,” to contrast its function with the inclusive focus marked by  $\pi\epsilon\rho$ .<sup>80</sup> Both Sicking and Wakker build on Bakker’s work but describe  $\gamma\epsilon$  more generally as a “focus particle.”<sup>81</sup>

§33 A number of scholars have attempted to adapt or refine the idea of  $\gamma\epsilon$  as a focus particle. About  $\gamma\epsilon$  in Aristophanes, Tsakmakis says: “ $\gamma\epsilon$  is not a focalizer which can be indiscriminately attached to any element of the utterance (even if that is focalized), but it can only be attached to a word which coheres with the preceding utterance.”<sup>82</sup> About  $\delta\gamma\epsilon$  specifically, Bonifazi says: “ $\gamma\epsilon$  gives prosodic and semantic prominence to  $\delta$ .” This interpretation conflates two elements that are consecutive, I believe:  $\gamma\epsilon$  does indeed give prosodic prominence to  $\delta$ , and it is this prosodic prominence that leads to an interpretation of  $\delta\gamma\epsilon$  as in some way emphatic (“semantic prominence”). Then she argues that in  $\delta\gamma\epsilon$ ,  $\gamma\epsilon$  “emphasizes something relationally new about somebody referentially old.”<sup>83</sup> This claim requires some unpacking. If the “somebody referentially old” is the referent of the pronoun  $\delta$ , then the “something relationally new” must be contained in the rest of the discourse act in which  $\delta\gamma\epsilon$  occurs. However, I believe that  $\gamma\epsilon$  in  $\delta\gamma\epsilon$  has scope only over the pronoun, not over the entire act.

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<sup>80</sup> When used in scalar wishes,  $\pi\epsilon\rho$  marks something that is still attainable (“inclusive”) while  $\gamma\epsilon$  marks something that is impossible to attain (“exclusive”), Bakker 1988:97-98.

<sup>81</sup> See Sicking 1986:125 and Wakker 1994:308.

<sup>82</sup> Tsakmakis 2010:350; see also Slings 1997:126, who believes that the idea of  $\gamma\epsilon$  as a focus marker “cannot do justice to its use in adding constituents to already complete sentences (quite apart from the fact that  $\gamma\epsilon$  hardly ever accompanies the true Focus of a sentence).”

<sup>83</sup> See Bonifazi 2012:31.



§34 In my reading, γε emphasizes the pronoun, which would then have to be both “relationally new” and “referentially old.” I agree with Tsakmakis and Bonifazi that in ὅ γε the pronoun refers to someone who is referentially old and thus “coheres with the preceding utterance.” In line with Bonifazi’s argument, moreover, we may consider that the pronoun can refer to something at once old and new. More specifically, I argue that ὅ γε retrieves an accessible referent in a form that is to be inferred.<sup>84</sup>

§35 Consider the following passage from the *Odyssey*. While Odysseus is sailing past the Sirens, they call to him in an attempt to make him stop:

(t19)

οὐ γάρ πώ τις τῇδε παρήλασε | νηϊ̣ μελαίνῃ, |  
 πρίν γ’ ἡμέων μελίγηρυν ἀπὸ στομάτων ὅπ’ ἀκοῦσαι, |  
 ἀλλ’ ὅ γε τερψάμενος νεῖται | καὶ πλείονα εἰδώς. |

*Odyssey* 12.186-188

For never yet has a man rowed by here in a black ship,  
 before hearing the honey-sweet voice from our lips;  
 no HE enjoys it and travels on, knowing more in fact.

The passage seems straightforward, but on closer inspection it involves an interesting shift. Whereas in the majority of instances of ἀλλ’ ὅ γε there is a single referent who functions as the agent in both parts of the construction, here the tracking of referents is more complicated.<sup>85</sup> The initial assertion is that “no-one sails by before hearing the Sirens,” so what does ὅ γε refer to? To no-one? The participle τερψάμενος makes it clear that who is meant by ὅ γε is the sailor who did indeed stay and listen, and was pleased as a result. The

<sup>84</sup> See III.3 §104-§108 for an exploration of this aspect of γε marking dialogic resonance across utterances in tragic and comic dialogue, and see III.4 §58-§60 for γε in answers to express a speaker’s stance.

<sup>85</sup> See §48-§49 below for more on ἀλλ’ ὅ γε.

automatic inference triggered by “no-one sails by” creates a pool of available referents who *did* sail by, one of whom can then be referred to with ὅ γε.<sup>86</sup> A similar example occurs in the following gnomic thought that Odysseus imparts to the suitors:

(t20)

τῷ μὴ τίς ποτε πάνπαν ἀνὴρ ἀθεμίστιος εἴη,  
ἀλλ’ ὅ γε σιγῇ δῶρα θεῶν ἔχοι, ὅττι διδοῖεν.

*Odyssey* 18.141-142

Therefore let no one ever be an altogether lawless man,

No may HE keep in silence the gifts of the gods, whatever they may have given.

Again, an unproblematic reading belies the underlying referential complexity. As in (t19) ὅ γε directs attention to the indefinite referent that we infer from the preceding act.<sup>87</sup>

Alternatively, one might say that ὅ γε triggers the creation of a generic referent, about which the only inferrable information at the point of utterance is that he has not “been a lawless man.” It is this cognitive action, I propose, that justifies the use of ὅ γε over null anaphor or the pronoun only.<sup>88</sup>

§36 The process of inference also applies in the occurrences of ὅ γε in the following passage from the *Iliad*. The episode reveals more about anaphoric reference than just the use of ὅ γε, however, so allow me a brief excursus. Pandarus is distraught by Diomedes’ relentless attack on the Trojans, and says to Aeneas:

<sup>86</sup> Compare Berrendonner 1990:28 “Au pronom ne s’attache donc pas nécessairement une assumption d’existence: il ne comporte en lui-même aucune présupposition concernant des objets de connaissance qui devraient déjà figurer dans M [=mémoire discursive].”

<sup>87</sup> If one wishes to find a textual antecedent for ὅ γε, one can choose to read “Let it not be that someone is a wholly godless man, but let him own his gifts from the gods in silence.” In this reading ὅ γε could be taken as referring to τίς, and a similar reading could be wrangled out of (t19). However, ὅ γε here is better understood as triggering the creation of a generic referent than retrieving an earlier one.

<sup>88</sup> See *Iliad* 21.113 for another instance of ὅ γε retrieving τις, and similarly ὅ γε retrieving ᾧ κεν in 24.530; compare Cornish 54-56 with examples 2.20a and 2.20b for similar constructions in English and French.

(t21)

“Αἰνεία | Τρώων βουληφόρε χαλκοχιτώνων |  
 Τυδείδῃ μιν ἔγωγε δαΐφρονι πάντα ἔϊσκω, |  
 ἀσπίδι γινώσκων | αὐλώπιδί τε τρυφαλείῃ, |  
 ἵππους τ’ εἰσορόων· | σάφα δ’ οὐκ οἶδ’ εἰ θεός ἐστιν. |  
 εἰ δ’ ὅ γ’ ἀνὴρ ὃν φημι | δαΐφρων Τυδέος υἱὸς |  
 οὐχ ὅ γ’ ἄνευθε θεοῦ τάδε μαίνεται, |

*Iliad* 5.180-185

“Aeneas, counsellor of the bronze-clad Trojans,  
 to Tydeus’ battle-minded son I liken him completely,  
 recognizing his shield and his crested helmet,  
 and looking at his horses. With certainty I do not know if he is a god.  
 And if HE is the man I mean, the battle-minded son of Tydeus,  
 then HE does not rage like that without a god.

Before we look at the two instances of ὅ γε, consider the use of μιν in line 181. μιν is an unstressed (enclitic) third-person pronoun in the accusative that serves to retrieve accessible referents. Pandarus’ speech starts in line 180, and he has not mentioned the referent of μιν (“that man”) up to this point. However, in the preceding turn Aeneas has already pointed the man out (τῷ δ’...ἀνδρί 174). The referent of the strong demonstrative ὅδε is the man they both see, and Pandarus retrieves him with the much less emphatic μιν, since by now he is well established in both their mental discourse models (as well as in that of performer and audience, of course).

§37 To better explain this passage, we must turn to the difference between anaphora and deixis. I follow Cornish’ definition of the terms, which can be put in simple terms: a speaker uses deixis when she wants to bring a referent into focus in the current discourse

model, and anaphora when she retrieves one that is already accessible.<sup>89</sup> Just before (t21), Aeneas introduces “the man” into the conversation with the expression τῷδ’...ἀνδρί, “that man,” a combination of demonstrative pronoun and noun—this is deixis.<sup>90</sup> This same referent, who is still in the discourse context (i.e. visible) for the two interlocutors, is from that moment onward in focus in their discourse model, and can be referred to with the enclitic anaphoric pronoun μιν. Deixis is thus not inherently linked to a reference to something outside of the discourse: the crucial question is whether a referent is part of the current discourse model or not. In fact, both anaphora and deixis function outside the text, since they do not primarily interact with the preceding text but with the mental representation of the discourse.

§38 This brings us to ὃ γε in lines 184 and 185. The first ὃ γε refers again to “that man there,” who Pandarus is not quite sure is even human.<sup>91</sup> Pandarus speculates that it may be Diomedes, since the man seems to bear Diomedes’ shield. The following conditional clause shows that the referent is interactionally clear, but undetermined in textual terms: “If THAT ONE is the man I mean, the battle-minded son of Tydeus...”. Both interlocutors know who they are talking about, but his identity is unknown. Thus, ὃ γε refers to the entirety of Aeneas and Pandarus’ suppositions about the man, including the possibility that he is a god or that he is Diomedes. Finally comes the apodosis, with the second instance of ὃ γε. If ὃ γε in 184 refers to the man in the middle of the spectacle, ὃ γε in 185 no longer has the same referent, since an assumption underlies the utterance of line 185 that the man is indeed human and in fact Diomedes: “if THAT (ὃ γε) is Diomedes, then HE [sc. Diomedes] (ὃ γε)

<sup>89</sup> See Cornish 1999:112-148 for a discussion, with extensive literature.

<sup>90</sup> See Cornish 1999:30, who discusses a speaker using an “accented demonstrative pronoun (*THAT*) fulfilling a deictic function, in order to render accessible and salient an item of information which (...) was in the background, not the foreground, of attention.” There are several similar cases: *Iliad* 13.53 (Poseidon speaking of Hector who is in sight), 13.70 (about Poseidon/Kalchas), and 19.344 (κεῖνος ὃ γε, Zeus to Athena about Achilles).

<sup>91</sup> Especially in instances like this I cannot agree with Bakker 1999:6 that “ὁ is used (...) to refer to any person or thing that the speaker cannot actually point at.”

cannot be raging without divine help.” The second ὅ γε marks this discontinuity of reference in the mental representation of the discourse: it refers no longer to “that man” but to “that man, Diomedes.” The audience can follow this interaction only by taking into account the development of the referent in the mental representation of the discourse, and this inferential process is foregrounded through the use of ὅ γε.

§39 The implied elements pertaining to the referent of ὅ γε can have local relevance, as in (t21) above, but they can also reach beyond the current narrative scene. Telemachus describes the fight between the stranger (Odysseus) and the beggar Irus to his mother Penelope:

(t22)

οὐ μέν τοι ξείνου γε καὶ Ἴρου μῶλος ἐτύχθη  
μνηστήρων ἰότητι, βίη δ' ὅ γε φέρτερος ἦεν.

*Odyssey* 18.233-234

Although, the fight of this stranger and Irus did not end  
according to the will of the suitors: in might, HE was stronger.

The situation here is different from most preceding examples, since the two available referents have both been mentioned only in an oblique case. Neither a null anaphor nor a pronoun suffices to retrieve Irus or the stranger. In the earlier narrative, however, it was told that the “stranger” was indeed the stronger, and in fact the whole co-text suggests that the suitors backed Irus. As a result, the referential ambiguity is resolved by the time that φέρτερος was uttered.<sup>92</sup> There is yet another layer to this reference. In the mind of Telemachus, who is speaking, and in the minds of performer and audience, ὅ γε refers not to a stranger but to Odysseus. The reference means something different to the internal

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<sup>92</sup> Compare (t9) and (t10) above.

audience (Penelope and the suitors) than to the performer and his audience, and this layering has its effect on the content. Bonifazi has demonstrated convincingly that references to the disguised Odysseus are particularly sophisticated in this part of the *Odyssey*, and there is no doubt in my mind that this instance is another example of this complexity.<sup>93</sup> The performer uses ὃ γε because the referent – and the sense of Telemachus' utterance – can only be grasped fully if the listener makes the necessary inferences. It may be surprising to Penelope and the suitors that the stranger beat Irus, but this is decidedly not the case for Telemachus or the audience: obviously Odysseus is stronger in might than the resident beggar of his own palace.

§40 The consideration of the larger discourse is likewise indispensable in the following case of apparently superfluous reference to Telemachus. After he has been washed by Nestor's youngest daughter, he is retrieved with ὃ γε:

(t23)

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ λοῦσέν [sc. Πολυκάστη] τε καὶ ἔχρισεν λίπ' ἐλαίῳ, |  
 ἄμφι δέ μιν φᾶρος καλὸν βάλεν | ἡδὲ χιτῶνα, |  
 ἔκ ρ' ἀσαμίνθου βῆ | δέμας ἀθανάτοισιν ὁμοῖος |  
 πὰρ δ' ὃ γε Νέστορ' ἰὼν | κατ' ἄρ' ἔζετο, | ποιμένα λαῶν. |

*Odyssey* 3.466-469

Now, when she had washed him and anointed him richly with oil,  
 around him she threw a beautiful cloak, and a tunic.  
 Out of the bath he came, his body the immortals alike,  
 and HE went next to Nestor, and sat down by the shepherd of men.

<sup>93</sup> Bonifazi 2012, especially 159-172. Compare also ὃ γε in *Odyssey* 19.575 (reference to Odysseus by Penelope, spoken to Odysseus-in-disguise).

The addition of *γε* in this instance may not appear to be well motivated, since Telemachus is surely constantly in focus as he is being washed and clothed. His continued prominence in the mental representation of discourse is confirmed by the fact that he is retrieved in line 468 as the unexpressed subject of *βῆ*. Since Telemachus remains the subject, *ὃ γε* looks marked in 469. I propose that we read the overdetermination here as an instruction to visualize not just Telemachus, but Telemachus as he is after the ablutions described in the preceding lines. The instruction is perhaps anticipated by the description *δέμας ἀθανάτοισιν ὁμοῖος* (469). It is not just Telemachus who joins Nestor, but it is Telemachus looking like a god. The same expression is used of Odysseus when he arrives at the palace of the Phaeacians and after he has been washed by Eurynome in book twenty-three.<sup>94</sup> Even more salient, Telemachus himself utters similar words when he mistakes his father for a god during the recognition scene in book sixteen.<sup>95</sup> The scene in book three thus reveals its importance on a macro-discursive level. The first books of the *Odyssey* are about how Telemachus finds himself in the role of man of the house. Perhaps the moment when he joins Nestor is the moment when he finally becomes a worthy heir to his father, and thus like his father looks “like a god.” If so, it really is a new Telemachus that sits down next to Nestor.<sup>96</sup>

§41 Now, since *ὃ* is itself a lightly emphatic pronoun, *ὃ γε* can also function to create an explicit or implicit contrast.<sup>97</sup> In this case, *ὃ* and *γε* work together: the emphatic pronoun suggests a contrast, while the particle triggers the implied opposite of the stressed referent. Contrastiveness can be marked with regard to referents already mentioned, to

<sup>94</sup> *Odyssey* 8.14 and 23.163.

<sup>95</sup> *Odyssey* 16.182-183: ἄλλα δὲ εἶματ' ἔχεις καὶ τοι χρῶς οὐκέθ' ὁμοῖος. / ἦ μάλα τις θεός ἐσσι.

<sup>96</sup> Another possible reason for the strong referring expression is the fact that there is a scene boundary after line 468. Compare *Odyssey* 1.443 for *ὃ γε* marking a similarly strong visual focus on Telemachus, as he sits on his bed and ponders his future.

<sup>97</sup> See also Monro 1882:258, who argues that *γε* after pronouns serves “to bring out the contrast which (...) Pronouns more or less distinctly imply.” More generally, Hartung 1832:371, Kühner 1835:398, and Stephens 1837:92 remark that *γε* can mark a contrast with something left implicit; see III.3 §104-§108 for a closer analysis of *γε* marking a contrast with something implicit in tragic stichomythia.

upcoming referents, or to implied referents.<sup>98</sup> Consider the following example of the construction ἧ τοι ὅ γε, from Theoclymenus' words to Penelope:

(t24)

“ὦ γύναι αἰδοίη Λαερτιάδεω Ὀδυσῆος, |  
ἧ τοι ὅ γ' οὐ σάφα οἶδεν, | ἐμεῖο δὲ σύνθεο μῦθον· |

*Odyssey* 17.152-153

“Revered wife of Laertes' son Odysseus,

Let me tell you, HE does not know it clearly, do listen to my word.

ὅ γε creates the contrast: “Don't listen to *him*, listen to *me*.” The referent of ὅ is highly accessible, since it refers to the last speaker (Telemachus), to whom both current interlocutors have presumably been listening.<sup>99</sup> Thus he is part of the speech situation, visually accessible, and in focus in the discourse model.<sup>100</sup>

§42 Consider one final example of subject continuity where ὅ γε serves to set up a contrast with an upcoming referent:<sup>101</sup>

(t25)

αἶψα δὲ νῆας ἔπηξε, | πολὺν δ' ὅ γε λαὸν ἀγείρας |  
βῆ φεύγων ἐπὶ πόντον· | ἀπείλησαν γὰρ οἱ ἄλλοι |  
υἷες υἰωνοί τε βίης Ἡρακληείης. |

*Iliad* 2.664-666

<sup>98</sup> Chafe 1994:76-78, examples on 77: “in” in example 7b (backward), and “doctor” in example 8c (forward). Compare Grégoire 1930:163, who notes that when γε in Homer has the ictus, it usually follows a form of ὅ. In these cases, he believes that the pronoun-particle combination is in some kind of opposition with a preceding element.

<sup>99</sup> The other instances of ἧ τοι ὅ γε where there is no subject continuity are *Iliad* 11.94 and 19.100.

<sup>100</sup> Compare the discussion of ὅ γε in direct speech to refer to “that man there” in (t21).

<sup>101</sup> It is not “semantisch redundant” as Latacz 2003:II.2.215 claims.



Quickly he built ships, and HE, after gathering many men,  
 went fleeing over the sea. For the others threatened him,  
 the sons and grandsons of mighty Heracles.

In the little narrative about Tlepolemus we hear how he kills his uncle, and then starts building ships: HE has to flee, because the *other* children of Heracles are on his tail. The contrast is made explicit by the adjective ἄλλοι, which justifies the use of ὃ γε in 664. As (t25) demonstrates, contrastiveness is a factor that functions separately from activation cost: at that point Tlepolemus is clearly accessible.<sup>102</sup>

§43 In the following complex instance ὃ is placed relative to a contrasted, hypothetical version of its referent. This hypothetical version of the referent is triggered by the very utterance of ὃ γε. In her conversation with Aphrodite about Paris, Helen accuses the goddess of weakness:

(t26)

μηδ' ἔτι σοῖσι πόδεσσιν ὑποστρέψειας Ὀλυμπον, |  
 ἀλλ' αἰεὶ περὶ κεῖνον ὄζυε | καὶ ἐ φύλασσε, |  
 εἰς ὃ κέ σ' ἢ ἄλοχον ποιήσεται | ἢ ὃ γε δούλην. |

*Iliad* 3.407-409

May you not turn your feet toward Olympus yet,  
 but always suffer for him and guard him,  
 until he makes you his concubine or HE makes you a slave.

The passage is far from straightforward, but in line 409 ποιήσεται retrieves Paris, who is clearly very accessible at that point (κεῖνον, ἐ 408). Since the construction changes from imperative to indicative in 409, the third person verb form suffices to disambiguate among

<sup>102</sup> Chafe 1994:77, "Contrastiveness is independent of activation cost."

the three available referents: I (Helen), you (Aphrodite), and he (Paris). Then follows ὃ γε in the second part of the disjunction. The occurrence of ὃ γε in either part of a disjunctive construction is well documented, but little discussed.<sup>103</sup> Contrary to expectation, ὃ γε in disjunctions is not used to juxtapose two referents, but rather two possible events involving the same referent.<sup>104</sup> Here the two items in disjunction, ἄλοχον and δούλην, are syntactically symmetrical and semantic opposites. However, the addition of ὃ γε to the second suggests that the expression ἢ ὃ γε δούλην must be read with emphasis placed on ὃ (“or HE makes you a slave”). The opposite of this statement is not “until he makes you a CONCUBINE”<sup>105</sup> (this is the opposite of “until he makes you a SLAVE”) but rather of “YOU make him a slave.” It is exactly this presupposition that is triggered through the use of ὃ γε.<sup>106</sup> The expected situation in Greek culture is that the goddess of love makes a human her slave, not the other way around.<sup>107</sup> The markedness of the (hypothetical) situation is brought out by the combination of the pronoun and the particle.<sup>108</sup>

§44 The previous examples all illustrate that some of the force of γε remains in the cluster ὃ γε. However, because ὃ γε functions as a cluster, the force of γε sometimes appears to be extremely weak or even lost. In those instances, ὃ γε looks like a formal and metrical variant of ὃ, a weak demonstrative with no further pragmatic enrichment. In the second book of the *Iliad* we are told the story of Agamemnon’s scepter, a piece of unframed discourse introduced just before the king starts to speak in the council.

<sup>103</sup> See Monro 1882:258-259, Denniston 1950<sup>2</sup>:119, Chantraine 1953:II.159.

<sup>104</sup> See Bierl and Latacz 2009, *Gesamtkommentar* III.2.143, “ὃ γε betont im zweiten Satzglied die Identität der (...) unterschiedlich handelnden Person,” with parallels.

<sup>105</sup> ἄλοχος does not mean “wife” here, but “concubine of equal <social> class” (*Gesamtkommentar* 2009:III.2.143, “‘Konkubine, Geliebte’ von ebenbürtigem Stand.”).

<sup>106</sup> It does not “merely resume the original subject,” as Leaf 1900:I.149 believes.

<sup>107</sup> Shipp 1961:14-15 and 1972<sup>2</sup>:240 rather believes that δούλη here means “slave-concubine,” but this is rejected by Krieter-Spiro in the *Gesamtkommentar*, with references. Regardless of the exact meaning of ἄλοχος and δούλη here, the scalar sense is clear: “until he makes you a concubine” (unexpected), and “until HE makes you a slave” (even more unexpected).

<sup>108</sup> See Bonifazi 2012:37 “The particle γε might contribute (...) by stressing the paradoxical novelty introduced by the ongoing discourse act.”

(t27)

ἔστη σκῆπτρον ἔχων | τὸ μὲν Ἥφαιστος κάμε τεύχων. |

(…)

αὐτὰρ ὃ αὖτε Θυέστ’ Ἀγαμέμνονι λείπε φορῆναι, |

πολλῇσιν νήσοισι καὶ Ἄργεϊ παντὶ ἀνάσσειν. |

τῷ ὅ γ’ ἐρεισάμενος | ἔπε’ Ἀργείοισι μετηύδα· |

*Iliad* 2.101-109

He stood up holding the scepter, over which Hephaestus toiled to make it.

(…)

Now this Thyestes in turn left it to Agamemnon to carry,

to rule over many islands and all of Argos.

HE, leaning on this, spoke words to the Argives:

After the story of the scepter, the current frame is recalled with τῷ ὅ γε, the first pronoun retrieving the scepter, and the second guiding attention toward Agamemnon.<sup>109</sup> The latter had been out of focus for several verses, and even though his name is mentioned in the oblique in line 107, this is not actually the referent of ὅ γε. Rather, the act containing ὅ γε re-establishes the frame of Agamemnon in the council, and that is why the pronoun is used rather than a simple verb form. There is, however, no need for further emphasis: γε is there only to accompany the pronoun in its non-initial position. Compare the following example from the *Odyssey*:

(t28)

οἷσιν δ’ Εὐπείθης ἀνά θ’ ἴστατο καὶ μετέειπε |

<sup>109</sup> See chapter 4 §34 and below §51-§62 for frame recall after unframed discourse. The same construction occurs after an intervening relative clause, as in *Odyssey* 15.252-255, or after a simile, see ὅ γε in (t14) above. Sometimes the gap between the final mention of the referent and the retrieval through ὅ γε is rather long, as in *Iliad* 17.108 and *Odyssey* 17.514. A change of subject while the referent is in focus occurs in *Odyssey* 18.398.

παιδὸς γάρ οἱ ἄλαστον ἐνὶ φρεσὶ πένθος ἔκειτο, |  
 Ἀντινόου, | τὸν πρῶτον ἐνήρατο δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς |  
 τοῦ ὅ γε δάκρυ χέων ἀγορήσατο καὶ μετέειπεν· |

*Odyssey* 24.422-425

Among them Eupheithes stood up and spoke –  
 for over his child comfortless grief lay on his heart,  
 over Antinous, whom godlike Odysseus first killed –  
 HE, weeping over him, addressed the assembly and said:

The co-text is essentially the same as in (t27): a speaker is introduced, then follows a brief piece of unframed discourse (γάρ),<sup>110</sup> and finally a pronoun referring to the unframed discourse (τοῦ) and a second pronoun with γε, in the act that re-establishes the narrative frame.

§45 In the above two examples ὅ γε is uttered just before the start of direct speech. This may not be a coincidence. In about a quarter of the instances where ὅ γε accompanies subject continuity, it is in the line right before or after direct speech.<sup>111</sup> The explicit marking of the referent in these instances serves to avoid confusion about the source of the upcoming thoughts or words, or to re-establish the speaker as an agent after his speech has

<sup>110</sup> De Jong 2001:584 reads lines 423-424 as focalized through Eupheithes, upon which the narrator intrudes with his knowledge of whom Odysseus killed first: “The narrator intrudes upon his embedded focalization (...) by adding the detail ‘first’ (something which the father cannot know).” Unlike the instances of δὴ γάρ (see chapter 4 §19), however, there is nothing in the language here to suggest a blurring of perspectives. I read the lines as unframed discourse, directly from performer to audience, where he shares knowledge only he can have. The Homeric performer knows Eupheithes’ mind and he can tell the audience that his son Antinous was in fact the first to be killed.

<sup>111</sup> ὅ γε right before direct speech: *Iliad* 1.93, 2.55, 2.109, 4.357, 8.138, 13.94, 13.480, 17.219, 19.100, 21.367, 23.5, 23.42; *Odyssey* 1.31, 2.24, 4.189, 13.254, 17.466, 18.110, 24.425, ; ὅ γε right after direct speech: *Iliad* 1.68, 1.101, 2.76, 2.207, 4.250, 7.354, 7.365, 9.620; *Odyssey* 2.224.

finished. The construction ἦ τοι ὅ γ' generally occurs in the following formulaic speech-capping verse:<sup>112</sup>

(t29)

ἦ τοι ὅ γ' ὥς εἰπὼν κατ' ἄρ' ἔζετο, τοῖσι δ' ἀνέστη

Hey<sup>113</sup> HE, having spoken thus, sat down. And among them stood up

Since this verse follows direct speech, subject continuity is implicit. It is not hard to see that in this construction ὅ γε serves to set up a light contrast between this speaker and the next.

§46 Immediately after direct speech is one context where ὅ γε consistently differs from ὁ δέ. While ὅ γε marks continuity of grammatical subject after direct speech, ὁ δέ marks subject change.<sup>114</sup> This difference can be explained from the constituent order of the two constructions. With ὅ γε, we find “X ὅ γε | participle | finite verb,” whereas with ὁ δέ we find “finite verb | ὁ δέ.” In the latter construction, null anaphor would have been the natural marker of subject continuity.

§47 An extension of the use of ὅ γε to put particular cognitive focus on a referent can be found in the following example. Like the priming acts discussed in chapter 2 §63-§79, an emphatic pronoun may serve to direct extra attention to a certain referent. A priming act serves to mentally (or visually) turn to or zoom in on a referent,<sup>115</sup> which may in turn create the expectation that this referent will project over a significant piece of upcoming discourse. We can find a cognate of this construction in a small number of instances of ὅ

<sup>112</sup> *Iliad* 1.68, 1.101, 2.76, 7.354, 7.365; *Odyssey* 2.224.

<sup>113</sup> For this interjection-like reading of ἦ at strong discursive discontinuities, see chapter 3 §33-§43.

<sup>114</sup> In both *Iliad* (8x) and *Odyssey* (8x) there is the speech-capping construction ὥς φάθ', ὁ δέ, always marking subject change. A similar construction occurs in the *Odyssey* only, but accounts for 14 out of 41 instances of ὁ δέ: ὥς ἐφάμην, ὁ δέ.

<sup>115</sup> ὅ γε is especially visually relevant in *Iliad* 5.585 (the image of the warrior standing upright with his head in the sand) and *Odyssey* 17.302 (Odysseus' dog Argos).

γε,<sup>116</sup> especially just before direct speech or indirect thought.<sup>117</sup> In other contexts, it can also project the prominence of a character, as in the introduction of Alcinous, in Nausicaä's description of the palace of the Phaeacians to Odysseus:<sup>118</sup>

(t30)

ἔνθα δὲ πατρὸς ἐμοῖο θρόνος ποτικέκλιται αὐτῇ, |  
τῷ ὃ γε οἶνοποτάζει ἐφήμενος | ἀθάνατος ὥς. |

*Odyssey* 6.308-309

And there is my father's throne, leant against that <pillar>.

On that HE sits and drinks his wine, like unto an immortal.

The reference to Alcinous here serves at once as the climax of the imagined entrance into the palace, and as the beginning of the long episode in which Alcinous and Odysseus are the main characters. At this crucial moment Alcinous is granted agency with some emphasis, which prepares the audience for his importance in the upcoming narrative.

§48 As a final consideration, I discuss the construction ἀλλ' ὃ γε, which almost exclusively accompanies continuity of grammatical subject.<sup>119</sup> In the vast majority of cases, the construction takes the following form: "he did not do X, ἀλλ' ὃ γε did Y."<sup>120</sup> That is to say, these are occurrences of ὃ γε within the classical "οὐ X ἀλλά Y" construction, where

<sup>116</sup> There are even a few instances where the two constructions intersect, as in *Iliad* 21.550, 21.581, and *Odyssey* 11.190, 20.140, 22.116.

<sup>117</sup> The cognitive priming is primarily local and visual/experiential in the construction φῆ δ' ὃ γε: *Iliad* 2.37; *Odyssey* 17.142, 24.470. For the loci of ὃ γε near the beginning of direct speech, see note 111 above.

<sup>118</sup> I read a similar projecting function of ὃ γε in: *Iliad* 15.455, 24.189; *Odyssey* 22.480.

<sup>119</sup> There are also 6 instances of the construction where there is no subject continuity: *Iliad* 2.3, 15.676, 17.705, 24.14, *Odyssey* 5.82, 14.526.

<sup>120</sup> 20 times in the *Iliad* and 9 times in the *Odyssey*; the 4 exceptions are *Iliad* 1.281, 5.434 (but this instance is textually uncertain), and 8.311 (=13.518), where we find a different construction. I am not sure what Denniston 1950<sup>2</sup>:12 means by: "Often the emphatic word or phrase in the ἀλλά-clause (which word or phrase follows immediately, or almost immediately, after the particle) is limitatively qualified by γε (...). Homer never has ἀλλά ... γε," especially since he quotes *Iliad* 1.281 ἀλλ' ὃ γε on page 11.

ἀλλά equals German *sondern*. This juxtaposing construction can be used with scope over single noun phrases or over (generally longer) verb phrases. The combination ἀλλ' ὅ γε in Homer always juxtaposes an entire verb phrase with a preceding negated one: after positing what the referent will not do, the action resumes with the statement of what he will do. Consider the following typical instance, where Sarpedon has just heard of the wounding of Glaucus:

(t31)

Σαρπήδοντι δ' ἄχος γένετο Γλαύκου ἀπιόντος |  
 αὐτίκ' ἔπειτ' ἐνόησεν· ὅμως δ' οὐ λήθετο χάρμης, |  
 ἀλλ' ὅ γε | Θεστορίδην Ἀλκμάονα δουρὶ τυχήσας |  
 νύξ', |

*Iliad* 12.392-395

To Sarpedon sorrow came at Glaucus' leaving,  
 right when he had noticed; still he did not forget the fight.  
No, HE, coming upon Thestor's son Alcmaon with his spear,  
 struck him,

There is clear subject continuity from line 393 onward, yet after two verbs with null subjects (ἐνόησεν, λήθετο) we find ἀλλ' ὅ γε. There is a significant difference between the sense of the verbs before and after the pronoun and particle combination, marking the contrast between inaction and action.

§49 ἀλλ' ὅ γε consistently introduces a new action, often marking the beginning of a new scene. The verb in the negated act of the construction is generally a reflection of some inner state of the referent (he was not afraid),<sup>121</sup> a static verb (he did not stay),<sup>122</sup> or a

<sup>121</sup> The parallels are (line numbers refer to the instances of ἀλλ' ὅ γε): *Iliad* 1.320 (λήγ' ἔριδος), 4.389 (τάρβει), 5.321 (ἐλήθετο), 12.305 (μέμονε), 12.394 (λήθετο), 13.523 (πέπυστο, but the text is uncertain for ἀλλ' ὅ γε),

forward-oriented statement (he did not fulfill).<sup>123</sup> What these verbs have in common is that they interrupt the action by explicitly considering and dismissing a counterfactual situation.<sup>124</sup> Pragmatic projection is inherent in the construction, since the assertion that someone did not do one thing suggests that he *did* do another. The *onus* of the construction, then, is on the second part, for which the first part serves as a launching pad. From this perspective, ἀλλ' ὅ γε works to resume the action, and this new beginning justifies the use of the pronoun even if the referent is already in focus. The occurrence of ἀλλ' ὅ γε even when there is apparent subject continuity can thus be explained because some kind of cognitive redirection is needed – suggested by ἀλλά – just before the occurrence of the cluster ὅ γε. The apparent overdetermination can be read as an attempt to bridge this gap and direct attention toward the right referent.

§50 I have devoted a great deal of attention to ὅ γε for the simple reason that it is a very hard combination to pin down. With due attention to the direct co-text, context, and the larger narrative, however, its functions can be discussed. The function of γε that manifests in ὅ γε is the particle's ability to activate an implication about its host word (group). This means that in a number of instances ὅ γε serves to retrieve an inferrable referent, or an accessible referent in an inferrable new form. Since ὅ γε is a grammaticalized cluster, this pragmatic enrichment of γε is not evident in every instance. In a number of cases ὅ γε appears to be nothing more than a formal variant of the demonstrative pronoun in limited positional contexts. The use of ὅ γε in these instances can be explained from the function of the lightly emphatic pronoun, and serves to put the referent firmly into cognitive focus. In

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15.676 (Αἶαντι .. ἦνδανε θυμῷ), 17.705 (ἦθελε), 21.581 (ἔθελεν), 24.14 (μιν λήθεσκεν); *Odyssey* 5.82 (ἡγνοίησεν), 9.554 (ἐμπάζετο), 14.422 (λήθετο), 14.526 (συνώπῃ ἦνδανεν).

<sup>122</sup> *Iliad* 2.3 (Δία δ' οὐκ ἔχε .. ὕπνος), 6.504 (δήθυνεν), 15.586 (μεῖνε), 23.5 (εἴα ἀποσκίδνασθαι); *Odyssey* [5.33 the negation takes the form of an adverbial phrase “without interference by gods or men”], 11.190 (οἱ <ἐστι>), 12.188? (παρήλασε, see τ19), 18.142 (εἶη).

<sup>123</sup> *Iliad* 2.420 (ἐπεκράϊαινε), 22.92 (ἔπειθον); *Odyssey* 9.288 (ἀμείβετο).

<sup>124</sup> For the more well-known variant of a counterfactual construction (“καί νύ κεν...εἰ μή”) see Louden 1993. His argument is that these constructions occur at pivotal moments in the narrative.



this function, ὃ γε occurs particularly often right after frame switches and before and after direct speech. The function of the cluster must be regarded as a continuum with at one end ὃ γε as a variant of ὃ, and at the other end ὃ γε carrying a complex of inferences to be added to the referent. This continuum can be explained from the cluster's origin in ὃ and γε. Every instance of ὃ γε in Homer represents a point on the sliding scale. In any case, it does not do justice to the discourse function of the cluster to remark that ὃ γε is “semantically redundant.”<sup>125</sup>

### 5.3.3 ὃ δ' ἄρα, ὅς ῥα, ὅ ῥα

§51 In contrast to the flexible cluster ὃ γε, ἄρα only follows anaphoric pronouns in very limited contexts. In the present section, I first discuss the cluster ὃ δ' ἄρ(α) in Pindar and Homer, which typically works as a marker of frame recall. Then follows an analysis of ὅς(ς) ῥ(α), a combination that can introduce two distinct constructions: either an unframed act with an imperfect, or a framed act with the aorist.

§52 In chapter 4, I argue that the use of ἄρα in Homer and Pindar is a sign of the speaker's management of discourse memory.<sup>126</sup> The particle introduces acts containing information that the speaker expects to be accessible in the hearer's mind. When ἄρα comes after anaphoric and relative pronouns, it likewise accompanies accessible information in the discourse memory that is not currently being attended to. Consider first this instance of ὃ in Pindar:

(t32)

ξένου Λάκωνος Ὀρέστα.

τὸν δὴ<sup>127</sup> φονευομένου πατρός

<sup>125</sup> See *Gesamtkommentar* 2003:II.2.215, “semantisch redundant.”

<sup>126</sup> See chapter 4 §38-§41 and §50-§53.

<sup>127</sup> See below note 156 as well as (t49) with note 194 for δὴ after pronouns in Pindar.

(18-30)

θάνεν μὲν αὐτὸς ἥρως Ἀτρεΐδης

ἴκων χρόνῳ κλυταῖς ἐν Ἀμύκλαις,

μάντιν τ' ὄλεσσε κόραν, ἐπεὶ ἀμφ' Ἑλένα πυρωθένταςΤρώων ἔλυσε δόμους ἀβρότατος, ὁ δ' ἄρα γέροντα ξένον

Στροφίον ἐξίκετο, νέα κεφαλά, Παρνασοῦ πόδα ναίοντ'.

*Pythian* 11.16-17 and 31-35

of Orestes the Laconian guest.

Him actually, at the slaughter of his father [sc. Agamemnon],

18 – 21 how Orestes escaped from Klytaemnestra

22 – 25 Klytaemnestra's motives

25 – 30 *gnômai*

He himself died, the hero son of Atreus [sc. Agamemnon],

arriving in time in renowned Amyklai,

and he brought death on the seer girl, after over Helen he had despoiled

the burnt down houses of the Trojans of their luxury. So HE [sc. Orestes], the youngboy,<sup>128</sup>

went to his aged host, Strophius, living at the foot of Parnassus.

After a gnomic passage, a demonstrative pronoun and a full noun phrase serve to retrieve Agamemnon (αὐτὸς ἥρως Ἀτρεΐδης 31).<sup>129</sup> Although he had been mentioned in the oblique

<sup>128</sup> The parenthetical apposition comes much later in the Greek, but sticking to this position would yield an ambiguous English translation.

before (φονευομένου πατρός 17, σὺν Ἀγαμεμνονία 20), he had not yet been fully attended to, only mentioned as part of an event relevant to Orestes. Then Pindar narrates a selection of Agamemnon's adventures in reverse: he elliptically retrieves the story of Agamemnon's taking of Priam's daughter Cassandra, and then bringing her to Mycenae where she too is killed by Clytaemnestra (in Pindar's version, lines 19-21) with the four words μάντιν τ' ὄλεσσε κόραν. The particle τε here, I submit, serves to mark the sharedness of this episode, and allows Pindar to waste no more words in telling it.<sup>130</sup> The mention of Agamemnon's death activates the event of line 16 again in the hearer's mind. This makes Orestes, who has not been named or even mentioned for seventeen lines, accessible enough to be referred to with ὁ. In the preceding lines Agamemnon has been the grammatical subject, so the pronoun suggests a change of subject; the only other available masculine singular referent is Orestes.<sup>131</sup> The possible ambiguity in the anaphoric expression is perhaps the reason for the apposition νέα κεφαλά in line 35,<sup>132</sup> since this can only refer to Orestes. Finally, this passage demonstrates that ἄρα functions on the level of the larger discourse or interaction rather than as a link between two contiguous clauses. In narrative terms, ἄρα recalls the frame of the main storyline: lines 32-34 function as a little flashback, told regressively, and δ' ἄρα serves to re-activate the main narrative frame of Orestes' story. At the same time ἄρα marks its host act, as well as the upcoming narrative, as a part of the tradition shared between Pindar and his audience.

<sup>129</sup> See Bonifazi 2012:137-184 for more on the layered meaning of αὐτός, noting especially the strong link with death (141-143 for the body of Patroclus); I merely point out the proximity of θάνεν here.

<sup>130</sup> See chapter 4 §54-§68 for more on the link between τε and tradition in Pindar.

<sup>131</sup> I take issue with Des Places' reading, 1947:45 "11, 34 : ὁ δ' (= Oreste) après (θάνεν) μὲν αὐτὸς ἥρωος (31), qui tient lieu d'ὁ μὲν." From the point of view of discourse and performance there is no reason to see a link between μὲν and δέ in this passage.

<sup>132</sup> Snell/Maehler give the nominative νέα κεφαλά, following Heyne's reading, rather than the dative νέῃ κεφαλῇ of the manuscripts (followed by Gentili 1995); either reading suits my interpretation, although in the manuscript reading it is not an appositive.

§53 This reading of (t32) is supported by both other instances of ὁ δ' ἄρα in Pindar (*Olympian* 10.43 and *Pythian* 4.78), one of which deserves fuller discussion.<sup>133</sup> Pindar's fourth *Pythian* ode is famous for its intricate narrative, an impression reinforced by the passage containing ὁ δ' ἄρα. In a song that is at least partly about his quest, Jason is mentioned once in the beginning of the song (in an oblique case: εἶπε [sc. Medea] δ' οὕτως ἡμιθέοισιν Ἰάσονος αἰχματᾶο ναύταις, "Medea spoke thus to the demi-god sailors of Jason the spearman," lines 11-12), but never named again. First Pindar gives Medea's long prophecy and then he turns, in line 70, to the start of the journey of the Argonauts. This leads him to the episode of Pelias and Jason. Pelias receives a prophecy that a stranger with one sandal will come and be a threat to him and his throne. Later, this man actually arrives:

(t33)

ἦλθε δέ οἱ κρυόεν πυκινῷ μάντευμα θυμῷ, |  
 παρ μέσον ὀμφαλὸν εὐδένδροιο ῥηθὲν ματέρος |  
 τὸν μονοκρήπιδα πάντως ἐν φυλακᾷ σχεθέμεν μεγάλη, |  
 εὔτ' ἂν | αἰπινῶν ἀπὸ σταθμῶν | ἐς εὐδείελον  
 χθόνα μόλη κλειτᾶς Ἰαολκοῦ, |

ξεῖνος αἶτ' ὦν ἀστός. | ὁ δ' ἄρα [sc. Iason] χρόνῳ  
 ἵκετ' αἰχμαῖσιν διδύμαισιν | ἀνὴρ ἔκπαγλος |

*Pythian* 4.73-79

And there came to him [sc. Pelias] a prophecy chilling to his shrewd heart,  
 spoken at the central navel of the well-wooded mother:

<sup>133</sup> *Olympian* 10.43-45 is a good parallel (ὁ δ' ἄρ' ἐν Πίσᾳ ἔλσαις ὅλον τε στρατόν / λάαν τε πᾶσαν Διὸς ἄλκιμος / υἱὸς) with the difference being that the referent in that song, Heracles, is not retrieved by association as Orestes is here. However, Heracles is available at the occurrence of ὁ δ' ἄρα by virtue of the death of the main referent in focus (θάνατον αἰπὺν οὐκ ἐξέφυγεν, 42). Just as in *Pythian* 11, the pronoun is followed by a clarifying appositive later in the sentence (Διὸς ἄλκιμος / υἱὸς).

to always be fully on guard against the man with one sandal,  
 when, from the high dwellings, he came to the sunny  
 land of famous Iolkos;

be he a stranger or a townsman. And HE of course in time  
 did come, with two spears, a terrible man.

I read ἄρα rather than the ἦρα proposed by Schroeder and printed in most editions.<sup>134</sup>

Braswell regards ἄρα as a prosodically enriched form of ἄρα, and I would add that it may be regarded as pragmatically enriched as well. Again, ὁ δ' ἄρα marks the recall of the main narrative frame, after the explanation of the prophecy. The “one-sandaled man” of the prophecy is Jason, as Pindar’s audience would have known. What makes this instance different from (t32) is that here there is apparent continuity of grammatical subject, so the use of the nominative pronoun must be explained otherwise.

§54 The reason for this overdetermination is that the pronoun ὁ has an ambiguous referent. Since *Pythian* 4 activates the narrative of the Argonauts right from the song’s beginning, we can say that Jason has been covertly present throughout the narrative. When Pindar turns to the specific episode of Pelias’ prophecy, the knowing audience will activate the figure of Jason, making ὁ in line 78 a referential nexus. ὁ refers to the one-sandaled man (τὸν μονοκρήπιδα, 75) who comes to Iolkos, but at the same time it refers to Jason. The pronoun conflates the stranger of the prophecy and the Jason of myth. The function of ἄρα is similarly layered: the particle accesses both the local expectations (“of course the prophecy comes true”)<sup>135</sup> and the global discourse memory that consists in the tradition shared by composer and audience (“as we both know, Jason did indeed come to dethrone

<sup>134</sup> The manuscripts have ἄρα, which in most current editions is emended to ἦρα since a heavy syllable is desired; see Braswell 1988:173–174 and De Kreij [forthcoming 2014b] for discussion; Gentili 1995:128 and Liberman 2004:100 also read ἄρα.

<sup>135</sup> Even if some members of the audience may not have known the episode well enough, the fact that something is fated (θέσφατον ἦν, 71) means that it will happen.

Pelias”).<sup>136</sup> As in (t32) and the one other parallel (see note 133), an appositional cap follows, ἀνὴρ ἔκπαγλος, to dispel any possible ambiguity: ἔκπαγλος strongly suggests that the referent is now supposed to be a hero rather than an unknown man with one sandal.<sup>137</sup>

§55 In the three instances in Pindar, the combination δ’ ἄρα (or δ’ ἄρα) after pronouns serves to recall the main narrative frame. I read ἄρα as having scope over the entire act rather than just over the pronoun (I imagine prosodic emphasis as falling on the most important part of the clause, perhaps the verb phrase: “And so he DID come...”). Thus, ἄρα modifies the act by marking its contents as shared between performer and audience. In narrative terms, the acts introduced by ὁ δ’ ἄρα are always framed: they continue the action of the narrative.

§56 The use of ὁ δ’ ἄρα in Homer is slightly more varied, but it falls within the same range as that in Pindar. The following example is representative for the majority of instances. During the battle at the wall of the Greek camp, Ajax gets angry and decides to take drastic measures:

(t34)

Αἶας δὲ πρῶτος Τελαμώνιος ἄνδρα κατέκτα |  
 Σαρπήδοντος ἑταῖρον | Ἐπικλῆα μεγάθυμον |  
 μαρμάρῳ ὀκριόεντι βαλὼν, | ὃ ῥα τείχεος ἐντὸς |  
 κεῖτο μέγας παρ’ ἑπαλξιν ὑπέρτατος· | οὐδέ κέ μιν ῥέα |  
 χεῖρεσσ’ ἀμφοτέρης | ἔχοι ἀνὴρ | οὐδὲ μάλ’ ἡβῶν, |  
 οἶοι νῦν βροτοὶ εἰς· | ὁ δ’ ἄρ’<sup>138</sup> ὑψόθεν ἔμβαλ’ ἀείρας, |

<sup>136</sup> See Bonifazi’s comment at 2004c:63 about pronouns in Pindar: “[t]hrough them both the performer and the audience enter in the dimension of epic memory.”

<sup>137</sup> ἔκπαγλος is most likely (through dissimilation \*ἔκπλαγλος > ἔκπαγλος) from ἐκπλήσσω “expel,” “hunt.” If this is correct, the original sense of “outcast” might interact here with the more generic “terrible.” Pindar refers at once to the “terrible” hero and the “exiled” hero.

<sup>138</sup> Most editions print ὁ δ’ ἄρ’ both here and in 383, but since I regard ὁ as referring to Ajax, I give ὁ δ’ ἄρ’, in this instance supported by the best manuscript (Venetus A gives ὁ δ’ ἄρ’ in both 383 and 385).

θάλασσε δὲ τετράφαλον κυνέην, | σὺν δ' ὅστέ' ἄραξε |  
 πάντ' ἄμυδις κεφαλῆς | ὁ δ' ἄρ' | ἀρνευτῆρι ἐοικώς |  
 κάππεσ' ἄφ' ὑψηλοῦ πύργου, | λίπε δ' ὅστέα θυμός. |

*Iliad* 12.378-386

Ajax Telamon's son first killed a man,  
 brave-hearted Epicles, a comrade of Sarpedon,  
 throwing a jagged rock. This of course lay inside the wall  
 large and topmost near the battlements. And not easily  
 with both hands could a man hold it, even in his prime,  
 as mortals are now. So HE threw it, lifting it high,  
 he crushed the four-ridged helmet, and crushed together  
 all at once the bones of his head. HE, then, an acrobat alike,  
 fell down off the high wall, and life left his bones.

I discuss the use of ὅ ῥα to introduce unframed discourse, as in line 380, in §51-§62 below. For the present, I focus on the instances of ὁ δ' ἄρα in lines 383 and 385. In 383 ὁ δ' ἄρα retrieves Ajax, last named in 378, who picks up a stone no normal man could have lifted. The referential expression comes after the description of the rock, and ὁ δ' ἄρα serves to retrieve the narrative frame.<sup>139</sup> After the image of Ajax throwing the rock at someone, his victim is made an agent by ὁ in 385, while what happens to him (he tumbles off the wall head first) is marked by ἄρα as the expected outcome. In addition, the next words (ἀρνευτῆρι ἐοικώς) suggest that the hearer is invited to imagine the scene by superimposing upon it the (shared) image of a diver. The vivid nature of the acts

<sup>139</sup> Similar instances of ὁ δ' ἄρα clearly marking frame recall in *Iliad* 2.268, 10.354, 19.367, 21.174, 21.246; *Odyssey* 5.392, 5.453, 19.447, 19.464, 20.275, 23.90.

introduced by  $\acute{o} \delta' \tilde{\alpha}\rho\alpha$  is paralleled elsewhere in Homer, and it may be linked to Bakker's reading of  $\tilde{\alpha}\rho\alpha$  as an "evidential" particle.<sup>140</sup>

§57 It cannot be established for every instance why we find  $\acute{o} \delta' \tilde{\alpha}\rho\alpha$  rather than  $\acute{o} \delta\acute{\epsilon}$  in Homer, but some pragmatic difference must underlie their linguistic divergence. The much higher frequency of  $\tilde{\alpha}\rho\alpha$  in Homer suggests that the range of functions of  $\delta' \tilde{\alpha}\rho\alpha$  is larger than in Pindar. Whereas in Pindaric song  $\acute{o} \delta' \tilde{\alpha}\rho\alpha$  consistently serves to recall the main narrative frame, in Homer the common element is that  $\tilde{\alpha}\rho\alpha$  expresses the performer's assumption that the content of the act resonates strongly with the current state of the discourse memory.<sup>141</sup> What happens after  $\acute{o} \delta' \tilde{\alpha}\rho\alpha$  is expected, either based on common sense or social convention (obviously the messenger obeys Agamemnon),<sup>142</sup> or based on traditional knowledge (of course a plan by Odysseus works).<sup>143</sup> The combination in Homer always retrieves an accessible referent, but in many cases it accompanies not only a change of grammatical subject, but also a visual transition.<sup>144</sup>

§58 The combination  $\delta' \tilde{\alpha}\rho\alpha$  thus introduces new framed events that feature a referent who is thought to be retrievable but not necessarily in focus at the moment of reference. When one removes  $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$  from the combination, what is lost is the sense of a discourse boundary. That is to say, whereas pronoun +  $\delta' \tilde{\alpha}\rho\alpha$  moves the narrative ahead, no such thing need be expected of pronoun +  $\tilde{\alpha}\rho\alpha$ . In  $\acute{o}(\zeta) \rho\alpha$  the particle still marks its host act as

<sup>140</sup> See Bakker 1993:15-25 and 1997:17-20. As for the combination  $\acute{o} \delta' \tilde{\alpha}\rho\alpha$ , compare *Iliad* 19.367, where the terrifying image of Achilles as he prepares to re-enter the battle is followed by  $\acute{o} \delta' \tilde{\alpha}\rho\alpha$ ; similarly *Iliad* 12.462 (Hector leaps through the broken gates, followed by a vivid description), *Odyssey* 5.456 (note Murray's translation "So he lay breathless..."). Finally, in 23.90, it appears the hearer is invited to share a character's perception, when Penelope has just entered the hall and sits across from Odysseus, after which:  $\acute{o} \delta' \tilde{\alpha}\rho\alpha \pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma \kappa\acute{\iota}\omicron\nu\alpha \mu\alpha\kappa\rho\eta\nu / \tilde{\eta}\sigma\tau\omicron \kappa\acute{\alpha}\tau\omicron \acute{o}\rho\acute{o}\omega\nu$ , which I am tempted to read as "And there he sat..."

<sup>141</sup> See my discussion of Discourse Memory in chapter 4 §5-§10.

<sup>142</sup> *Iliad* 3.120, compare *Iliad* 5.836, 7.188, 7.416, 8.319, 10.374, 12.385, 13.192, 15.543, 16.413, 16.579, 16.742, 21.118; *Odyssey* 5.456, 8.450, 12.411, 12.413, 14.485, 15.98, 15.121 (this instance is special in the sense that it retrieves specific information that was added to the discourse memory in lines 102-104), 18.396.

<sup>143</sup> *Iliad* 10.350; the boundary between common sense and traditional knowledge was probably fuzzy in the Greek world, but I would offer the following *loci* as parallels: *Iliad* 6.154 (genealogy), 17.196 (Achilles' armor), 20.239 (genealogy), 21.189 (genealogy), 23.642 (the sons of Actor); *Odyssey* 11.257 (genealogy).

<sup>144</sup> The one exception where  $\acute{o} \delta' \tilde{\alpha}\rho\alpha$  accompanies grammatical subject continuity is *Iliad* 11.426.



shared between performer and audience, but the act itself need not necessarily be framed, nor need it move the narrative forward.

§59 The combination ὃ ῥα is very rare in Homer and not attested in Pindar. Of the six instances, two do not in fact contain the demonstrative or relative pronoun, but rather the equivalent of ὃ τι, which is suggested by the preceding verb of perception or knowing.<sup>145</sup> Of the remaining four instances, two are followed by an imperfect and two by an aorist.<sup>146</sup> The meaning of these numbers becomes clearer when we consider that ὅς ῥα occurs in two constructions: (1) ὅς ῥα with an imperfect introduces unframed discourse,<sup>147</sup> and (2) ὅς ῥα with an aorist introduces framed discourse.<sup>148</sup> The following passage illustrates both constructions with ὃ(ς) ῥα:

(t35)

ἐνθά οἱ υἱὸς ἐπᾶλτο Πυλαιμένεος βασιλῆος |  
 Ἄρπαλίων, | ὃ ῥα πατρὶ φίλῳ ἔπετο πτολεμίων |  
 ἐς Τροίην, | οὐδ' αὖτις ἀφίκετο πατρίδα γαῖαν· |  
 ὅς ῥα τότε Ἀτρεΐδαι μέσον σάκος οὕτασε δουρὶ

*Iliad* 13.643-646

There jumped on him the son of king Pylaemenes,  
 Harpalion, who of course followed his beloved father, so that he could fight,  
 to Troy, and not again did he reach his fatherland.

<sup>145</sup> Namely *Iliad* 16.120 and *Odyssey* 24.182.

<sup>146</sup> *Iliad* 12.380 (imperfect, see t34 above), 13.644 (imperfect), 22.470 (aorist); *Odyssey* 22.327 (aorist).

<sup>147</sup> The parallel instances of ὃ(ς) ῥα + imperfect introducing unframed discourse are: *Iliad* 2.77, 2.752, 5.70, 5.612, 5.708, 6.18, 6.131, 11.123, 13.665, 15.431, 15.461, 16.178, 16.464, 16.572, 17.611; *Odyssey* 1.154, 2.225, 9.187, 16.396, 22.331. Sometimes with the pluperfect: *Iliad* 5.77, 12.445, 13.364, 17.350; *Odyssey* 24.445 or present: *Iliad* 15.411, 22.23, 22.27, 23.517; *Odyssey* 15.319, 22.403. The present tense is generally used with ἄρα when it occurs in the first part of a simile, see e.g. chapter 4 (t16).

<sup>148</sup> The parallel instances of ὃ(ς) ῥα + aorist to effect frame recall are: *Iliad* 1.405, 10.318, 11.231, 15.584 (after an apostrophe of a character), 15.644, 17.72 (after ἐνθά κε...εἰ μή flash-forward), 23.384 (after καὶ νύ κε...εἰ μή flash-forward); *Odyssey* 10.158 (beginning of little narrative), 14.380, 20.291, 21.184.

So HE then in the middle of Atreides' shield thrust with his spear

ὅ(ς) ῥα introducing unframed discourse serves to recall little bits of information about the referent which the speaker expects to already be part of (or inferrable from) the discourse memory.<sup>149</sup> In line 643 the next assailant of Menelaus enters the scene, Harpalion son of Pylaemenes. After the name is stated in line 644 we find ὅ ῥα and a verb in the imperfect: the pronoun and particle introduce a piece of unframed discourse that consists of a flashback and a flash-forward. In this instance, one can just as well translate “Harpalion. He followed”; either way the act introduced by ὅ ῥα is unframed. Both the flashback and the flash-forward (οὐδ'...γαῖαν 645) are unframed discourse in the sense that the performer reveals his omniscience and informs the audience outside the frame. The use of ἄρα in unframed discourse marks a piece of knowledge from the discourse memory that is retrieved to become part of the current discourse model: it may be regarded as activating a piece of information in the long-term memory to become part of the working memory.

§60 After the unframed discourse in (t35) ὅς ῥα τότε follows at verse beginning, followed by an aorist. Functionally, there is a clear overlap with δ' ἄρα: ὅς ῥα τότε here recalls the frame and introduces a new action, expressed by an aorist. It is possible that the ὁ δ' ἄρα and ὅς ῥα (τότε) functioned as metrical alternatives to effect the same transition in a different place in the verse.<sup>150</sup> In line with this use, ὅ(ς) ῥα followed by an aorist starts an embedded narrative in two instances in the *Odyssey* and once in a fragment of Pindar, where we might have expected to find γάρ.<sup>151</sup>

<sup>149</sup> See for another interpretation of ὅς ῥα (τε) Ruijgh 1971:432-443; he follows Hartung and Denniston and believes that ἄρα in this construction serves to mark a certain measure of surprise or interest on the part of the speaker.

<sup>150</sup> *Odyssey* 12.281 is different: a present in direct speech actually referring to the present.

<sup>151</sup> *Odyssey* 10.158, 14.380. The only extant instance of ἄρα after a pronoun in Pindar is found in fr. 125.1 τόν ῥα, where it also appears to introduce an embedded narrative about how Terpander invented the *bárbiton* (note the aorist εὔρεν). See chapter 3 §22-§32 on γάρ beginning embedded narratives.

§61 In a small number instances ὅ(ς) ῥα is followed by an aorist when the act appears unframed:

(t36)

αὐτὰρ ὑπέρθυμον Πολυφείδεα | μάντιν Ἀπόλλων  
 θῆκε | βροτῶν ὅχ' ἄριστον, | ἐπεὶ θάνεν Ἀμφιάροος |  
ὅς ῥ' Ὑπερησίηνδ' ἀπενάσσατο | πατρὶ χολωθείς, |  
 ἔνθ' ὃ γε ναιετάων | μαντεύετο πᾶσι βροτοῖσι. |

*Odyssey* 15.252-255

And proud Polypheides, a seer Apollo  
 made him, by far best of mortals, since Amphiaraos died.  
He had moved to Hyperesia, angry with his father.  
 Living there, he prophesied for all men.

My translation and punctuation reflect a reading of line 254 as unframed, despite the presence of the aorist. Two things support this reading: (1) ἀπονάίω is not attested in the imperfect, and (2) there is a parallel passage in the *Iliad*. Compare this passage from the *Catalogue of Ships*, from the entry about the people from Doulichion:

(t37)

τῶν αὖθ' ἡγεμόνευε Μέγης ἀτάλαντος Ἄρηϊ |  
 Φυλεΐδης, | ὃν τίκτε Διὶ φίλος ἱππότης Φυλεύς, |  
ὅς ποτε Δουλίχιονδ' ἀπενάσσατο πατρὶ χολωθείς |

*Iliad* 2.627-629

Them in turn led Meges, equal to Ares,  
 Phyleides, him bore the horseman Phyleus, beloved to Zeus,

who one day had moved to Doulichion, angry with his father.

It is clear that the resemblance between these two passages reaches beyond the repetition of the verb.<sup>152</sup> For the current purpose, it suffices to note that the information about Phyleus moving from Elis to Doulichion is necessary, yet clearly out of the current frame, as the use of *ποτε* confirms. I believe this justifies a similar reading of the passage from the *Odyssey* (t36): *ὅς ῥα* in line 254 introduces a piece of unframed discourse containing shared knowledge.<sup>153</sup> The passage preceding (t36) is a genealogy leading up to Polypheides and eventually his son, Theoclymenus. At this point in the genealogy, the family is in Argos, but it appears that the performer knows that Polypheides is connected to Hyperesia rather than to Argos. That would explain why he adds the line, with *ὅς ῥα*, to avoid a discrepancy between his performance and shared tradition.

§62 The combination *ὅ(ς) ῥα* thus serves two main purposes: (1) to introduce unframed discourse containing shared knowledge about a certain referent (accessing global discourse memory), and (2) to return to the frame after intervening unframed discourse of some sort (accessing local discourse memory). Moreover, there is a strong tendency for the performer to use the imperfect tense in unframed acts, and the aorist in framed acts.

### 5.3.4 *ὁ δὴ* and *ὅς δὴ*

§63 The combination *ὁ δὴ/ὅς δὴ* is not quite as flexible as *ὅ(ς) ῥα*. In chapter 3, I set out an analysis of the pragmatic functions of *δὴ* in Homer and Pindar.<sup>154</sup> There I noted that the particle is only used with a limited range of co-texts outside of direct speech: with temporal expressions, in certain combinations, and after pronouns. When used after pronouns, *δὴ*

<sup>152</sup> These are the only two instances of *πατρὶ χολωθεῖς* in Homer. Moreover, there is a strong phonetic resonance between *Φυλεΐδης* and *Πολυφείδης*; see Minchin 2001:88-90 for this kind of “auditory memory” in Homer.

<sup>153</sup> Other instances of *ὅ(ς) ῥα* apparently introducing unframed discourse with the aorist: *Iliad* 5.612 (in direct speech), 5.650 (in direct speech), 6.158, 16.328; *Odyssey* 3.161 (in a *σχέτλιος* comment).

<sup>154</sup> See chapter 3 §53-§64.

typically occurs in a relative clause.<sup>155</sup> The main functions of δή in early epic and lyric may be summarized as follows: (1) as a mobile (rare), it occurs in any position and has an intensifying force over the following word group (*de re*), or else in act-initial position has scope over the entire act (*de dicto*); (2) in peninitial position in the act, it generally has an intensifying force over the act it is in (*de dicto*), or over the preceding word group (*de re*), but sometimes still with scope only over the following word group (*de re*); (3) in narrator text, in peninitial position with a temporal marker of some sort, it marks larger narrative moves (*de re*).

§64 One might expect that δή in relative clauses would not mark larger narrative steps. This intuition is corroborated by the fact that of the twenty-seven instances of ὁ δή and ὅς δή in Homer only four are accompanied by a temporal adverb, and none of these occurrences appears to mark larger discourse steps.<sup>156</sup> Rather, the particle consistently intensifies either the entire act or the following word (group).<sup>157</sup> Before moving on to a discussion of the range of functions of δή in these clauses, let me establish some common characteristics of the clauses introduced by pronoun + δή. In contrast to δέ and δ' ἄρα, δή after pronouns rarely serves to introduce a new *event*. Rather, it provides information about the internal or external *state* of the referent in focus: like the majority of ὅ(ς) ῥα instances, ὁ δή and ὅς δή introduce unframed discourse. Unlike ὅ(ς) ῥα, ὁ δή and ὅς δή introduce information about a referent that the speaker regards as inaccessible to the audience.<sup>158</sup>

§65 Since both anaphoric and relative pronouns most commonly occur in initial position, there are no instances of act-initial δή with scope over the act (function (1) in the

<sup>155</sup> However, whether to read a pronoun as relative or demonstrative is always a subjective decision to some extent.

<sup>156</sup> ὁ δή occurs four times in the *Iliad* and five times in the *Odyssey*, ὅς δή eight and ten times, respectively. See my discussion of those four instances in §69 below; also compare the plural in *Iliad* 3.134 οἱ δὲ νῦν.

<sup>157</sup> About the latter combination, note Denniston 1950<sup>2</sup>:123 “The particle which normally stresses a relative relation is δή.”

<sup>158</sup> In Pindar this pattern does not hold, as τὸν δή in *Pythian* 11.17 starts a little embedded narrative.

list above) in this construction.<sup>159</sup> I have previously shown that there is a link between the position of δῆ in the act and the scope of the particle. When δῆ occurs in peninitial position, it has scope at the minimum over the entire act, whereas in any other position its scope is more restricted, over only the following word. I first consider the instances where δῆ appears to have act scope. Since ὁ and ὅς δῆ are always at act beginning, however, the fact that δῆ occurs in second position does not exclude the possibility of mobile δῆ. After a discussion of the instances of δῆ with act scope, I explore the possibility of small-scope δῆ in some borderline instances. Finally, I show that sometimes the intensifying function of δῆ reaches beyond the reported interaction between two characters (in direct speech), and touches instead upon the interaction between performer and audience.

§66 δῆ occurs with intensifying force over the act in instances when the speaker urgently wishes to underscore an assertion. In English, this is often best rendered by adding an intensifier to the verb phrase (as in t38).<sup>160</sup> This construction only occurs in direct speech in Homer. Consider the following exhortation by Ajax to the other Greeks:

(t38)

ἧ οὐκ ὀτρύνοντος ἀκούετε λαὸν ἅπαντα  
Ἑκτορος, ὅς δῆ νῆας ἐνιπρῆσαι μενεαίνει;

*Iliad* 15.506-507

Do you not hear Hector encouraging all his people?

He is fairly raging to raze the ships!

<sup>159</sup> In fact, even καί sometimes abandons its strict initial position (with scope over the act) for the sake of a pronoun, see IV.2 §70.

<sup>160</sup> ὁ δῆ/ὅς δῆ (and because of its frequency I include neuter ὁ δῆ) with act scope is paralleled in *Iliad* 1.388 ὁ δῆ τετελεσμένος ἐστί (Achilleus about Agamemnon's threat), 2.436 ἔργον ὁ δῆ θεὸς ἐγγυαλίζει, 17.202 ἄ δειλ' οὐδέ τί τοι θάνατος καταθύμιός ἐστιν / ὅς δῆ τοι σχεδὸν εἴσι (Zeus, as if to Hector); *Odyssey* 4.777 ἀλλ' ἄγε σιγῇ τοῖον ἀναστάντες τελέωμεν / μῦθον, ὁ δῆ καὶ πᾶσιν ἐνὶ φρεσὶν ἥραρεν ἡμῖν (Antinous about the suitors' plan), 10.514 Κῶκυτός θ', ὅς δῆ Στυγὸς ὕδατός ἐστιν ἀπορρώξ (Circe to Odysseus), and 15.490 ἠπίου, ὅς δῆ τοι παρέχει βρώσιν τε πόσιν τε. Compare Pindar *Isthmian* 2.27 τὰν δῆ καλέοισιν.

The Trojans are at the wall, and Ajax does all he can to get the Greeks to fight back and keep them from the ships. His rhetorical question has a note of incredulity, and in the next utterance he vehemently adds some information that his audience apparently does not yet know. Although I do not see *δή* as directly connected to what is evident and visible, I do believe that some of the utterance's tone of insistence comes from the implication that the speaker directly perceives what he is claiming.<sup>161</sup>

§67 In ten or eleven instances of *ὅς δή* / *ὅ δή*<sup>162</sup> the particle modifies first and foremost the following adverb or adjective, and is thus most likely unrelated to the preceding pronoun. This happens with forms of *πολύς*, for example in this passage from the *Odyssey*:<sup>163</sup>

(t39)

δὴ τότε Φοῖνιξ ἦλθεν ἀνὴρ ἀπατήλια εἰδώς,  
τρώκτης, ὅς δὴ πολλὰ κάκ' ἀνθρώποισιν ἑώργει·

*Odyssey* 14.289

And at that moment a Phoenician arrived, a man skilled in wiles,  
a greedy man, who had done very many evils to men.

This instance, like the majority of *ὅς/ὅ δή* instances, occurs in direct speech. Here Odysseus introduces a new character, a Phoenician (288), about whom he introduces several descriptions that his audience cannot yet know. One aspect of the “newness” inherent in relative clauses introduced by pronoun + *δή*, I submit, is that it generally contains an expression of stance, a personal judgment or feeling of the speaker.<sup>164</sup>

<sup>161</sup> Bakker 1997:75-76 argues that *δή* is primarily “evidential,” citing earlier literature.

<sup>162</sup> Ten or eleven depending on the reading of *Odyssey* 2.16.

<sup>163</sup> The parallels are *Iliad* 15.291 (*ὅς δὴ πολλῶν*), 2.117 (*ὅς δὴ πολλάων*), 9.24 (*ὅς δὴ πολλάων*). See chapter 3 §61n201 for more parallels of *δή* + *πολύς* and similar adjectives.

<sup>164</sup> *δή γάρ* also often introduces personal viewpoints of some kind, see chapter 3 §62 and chapter 4 §19. For the concept of stance and for its relevance to the use of *δή* in Herodotus and Thucydides, see IV.4.

§68 Similar is the use with superlatives, which occurs twice in the *Iliad*, both in Aeneas' boast to Achilles:

(t40)

Δάρδανος αὖ τέκεθ' υἱὸν Ἐριχθόνιον βασιλῆα,  
ὅς δὴ ἀφνειότατος γένετο θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων·

(...)

Ἴλός τ' Ἀσσάρακός τε καὶ ἀντίθεος Γανυμήδης,  
ὅς δὴ κάλλιστος γένετο θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων·

*Iliad* 20.219-233

Dardanus then begot a son, king Erichtonius,  
who was by far the richest of mortal men.

(...)

Ilus, Assaracus, and god-like Ganymedes,  
who was by far the fairest of mortal men.

Aeneas' intensified superlatives serve to strengthen his boast about his forefathers. The second of the two examples shows that the link between relative clauses introduced by δὴ and “new information” is relative. There can be no doubt that both the internal audience (Achilles) and the audience at the performance was expected to know that Ganymedes was the most beautiful man of all. However, the presence of δὴ here, rather than ἄρα or τε, presents the statement not so much as a foregone conclusion, but as an expression of a personal opinion, with a clear rhetorical goal.

§69 Finally, we find small-scope forward-oriented δὴ in four (or five) final instances in temporal phrases, where again δὴ serves to intensify the sense of the following word. Here Eumaeus speaks to Telemachus of his trip to the palace:



(t41)

ώμήρησε δέ μοι παρ' ἐταίρων ἄγγελος ὠκύς,  
κῆρυξ, ὃς δὴ πρῶτος ἔπος σῇ μητρὶ ἔειπεν.

Odyssey 16.469

There joined me a quick messenger from among your friends,  
a herald, who as the very first gave word to your mother.

Here, as in all the parallels,<sup>165</sup> the intensified expression occurs in direct speech. In all instances, the scope of δὴ is ambiguous, but here at least there seems to be a reference to a specific earlier scene (335-341). Eumaeus and the herald sent by Telemachus arrive at the palace at the same time, and the herald gives his news first (337). It is for this reason, I believe, that δὴ intensifies πρῶτος here: to render precisely what happened.<sup>166</sup>

§70 Finally, there is an instance of ὃς δὴ that appears to strongly appeal to the visual imagination of the audience. In narrator text, the performer introduces Dolon, a character central to the upcoming narrative, and gives a vivid description:

(t42)

ἦν δέ τις ἐν Τρώεσσι | Δόλων Εὐμήδεος υἱὸς |  
κῆρυκος θείοιο πολύχρυσος πολύχαλκος, |  
ὃς δὴ τοι | εἶδος μὲν ἔην κακός, | ἀλλὰ ποδώκης |

Iliad 10.314-316

There was someone among the Trojans, Dolon son of Eumedes,  
the godlike herald, rich in gold and rich in bronze.

<sup>165</sup> Parallels: *Iliad* 21.315 δὴ νῦν; *Odyssey* 1.49 δὴ δηθά and 2.48 δὴ τάχα; perhaps also *Odyssey* 2.16 δὴ γήραϊ κυφός “bowed through great age.”

<sup>166</sup> Compare the use of δὴ after τόσσον in *Iliad* 17.522, discussed in chapter 4 §42-§45.

And this guy – let me tell you – he was ugly of face, but quick of feet.

This is one of only two instances of δὴ τοι in narrator text, and one of the very few instances in Homer where τοι is clearly the particle rather than the dative second person pronoun. Just as in (t40), this piece of discourse introduces a character.<sup>167</sup> The difference is that the introduction here first mentions the father of the character in focus. The performer brings the attention back to Dolon with the priming act ὅς δὴ τοι.<sup>168</sup> The priming act also projects Dolon's importance in the upcoming long episode (316-457).<sup>169</sup> The presence of the particle τοι especially suggests that there may be one more factor at work in this passage. It is as if the performer turns to the audience and speaks to them directly, inviting them to imagine this Dolon, and to share the performer's opinion of him. Since it occurs in the priming act, I believe that δὴ may be regarded as having scope over the entire line, the entire description of this antagonist.

§71 Whether δὴ following an anaphoric pronoun has small scope or act scope, it generally introduces a subjective view of a character, either by another character or by the narrator. The difference between unframed discourse introduced by ὅς ῥα on the one hand and by ὁ δὴ and ὅς δὴ on the other can be put in the following terms: unframed discourse introduced by ὁ δὴ or ὅς δὴ contains information that the performer assumes to be as yet unavailable to the audience. As a result, the function of pronoun plus δὴ overlaps partly with that of γάρ introducing unframed discourse. In general, however, unframed discourse introduced by γάρ is more directly associated with the preceding discourse than that introduced by δὴ. The following passage from Pindar will serve as illustration:

<sup>167</sup> Compare also ὅς δὴ in *Odyssey* 7.156; the line recurs in *Odyssey* 11.343 (about the same character), but is there omitted by many manuscripts.

<sup>168</sup> The other instance is *Odyssey* 20.289, where ὅς δὴ τοι similarly forms a priming act, but where the visual component is not clearly present; Hainsworth 1993:186 notes the structural similarity of *Iliad* 10.314-318 and *Odyssey* 20.287-291.

<sup>169</sup> Book ten of the *Iliad* is often called the *Doloneia* after this episode; see e.g. Danek 1988, Dué and Ebbott 2010, and Finkelberg 2011:I.216-217.

(t43)

ἀπὸ Ταυγέτου πεδαιγάζων | ἶδεν Λυγκεὺς | δρυὸς ἐν στελέχει |  
 ἡμένων. | κείνου γάρ ἐπιχθονίων πάντων γένετ' ὀξύτατον  
 ὄμμα. |

Pindar *Nemean* 10.61-63

Peering down from the Taugetus, Lynkeus saw them in the trunk of an oak,  
 hidden. For of all the men on earth his was the sharpest  
 sight.

The use of γάρ after pronouns in both Homer and Pindar often introduces unframed discourse, as here.<sup>170</sup> Here γάρ introduces a fact about Lynkeus' sight, which is triggered by association with the preceding narrative. The difference between unframed discourse introduced by δὴ and γάρ is that δὴ typically introduces a personal judgment. This does not mean that γάρ cannot introduce a personal judgment, as δὴ γάρ in Homer illustrates (see chapter 4 §19). Unframed discourse introduced by ἄρα, conversely, is expressly presented as shared between performer and audience or between speaker and internal audience. The difference between ὅς ῥα on the one hand and ὁ/ὅς δὴ and ὁ/ὅς γάρ on the other may be represented quite well with the paraphrase “who of course” for ὅς ῥα and “who actually” for ὁ/ὅς δὴ and ὁ/ὅς γάρ.

#### 5.4 Participant tracking in a Pindaric ode: *Isthmian* 2

§72 Whereas until now I have limited my analysis to ὅς and ὁ, the masculine singular demonstrative or relative pronoun in the nominative, for my study of *Isthmian* 2 I take an

<sup>170</sup> Compare in Homer for example *Odyssey* 17.256-257: αὐτίκα δ' εἴσω ἔην, μετὰ δὲ μνηστῆρσι καθίζεν, / ἀντίον Εὐρυμάχου· τὸν γὰρ φιλέεσκε μάλιστα; “At once he went inside, and sat among the suitors, / across from Eurymachus; for him he liked most”; note especially the iterative φιλέεσκε which demonstrates the unframed nature of the act. The parallels in Pindar are *Olympian* 3.36, 6.25, 7.23, 9.28, 13.6; *Pythian* 4.281; *Nemean* 6.17; *Isthmian* 1.17.

more inclusive approach. Pronouns, nouns, and verbs all factor in the performer's efforts to guide the audience's attention. Within this overall process of participant tracking – that is, the cognitive process of monitoring which character is in focus and which others should be attended to – the specific role of particles bears close study.

§73 In mainstream commentaries, most entries concern nouns, adjectives, adverbs, and verbs. Moreover, the entries show a distinct focus on semantics over discourse progression or participant tracking.<sup>171</sup> This illustrates the point I make at the beginning of this chapter: participant tracking does not generally cause problems for comprehension. Nonetheless, the complex process of referring to people both inside and outside the direct performance context deserves close attention. In what follows I shall create a line-by-line commentary with a focus on referent tracking. I do not discuss every single reference to a (real or fictional) person, but I do consider most of them, focusing on changes of grammatical subject and frame transitions. My analysis visually highlights the elements of the discourse that guide the audience's referent tracking. All particles are underlined (also when combined with a negative). In green I have marked all relative and demonstrative pronouns, including articles, as well as all pronouns, and nouns (including names) referring to characters outside or inside the discourse. The verb forms (finite verbs and participles) are also in green, when they are instrumental in participant tracking. These form the majority of the items discussed in the entries. Finally, I have marked not only act boundaries (|) but also frame transitions, marked with a double vertical bar (||). After each metrical unit of strophe, antistrophe, or epode follows a translation, I include a list of the active participants in the passage, and a commentary on a selection of words, phrases, and constructions.

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<sup>171</sup> By way of example, in Verdenius' 1982 commentary on *Isthmian* 2 there are 138 lemmata, of which only 18 do not concern verbs, nouns, adjectives, or adverbs; 10 of these 18 lemmata concern particles. Out of the total 138, only 11 lemmata discuss problems concerning the referent of a (pro)noun or verb.

§74 Pindar's *Second Isthmian* is a special victory ode. Unlike most other odes written for an athletic victory, *Isthmian* 2 is addressed for the most part to the victor's (Xenocrates) son Thrasyboulus. The reason for this appears to be the fact that by the time the song was actually composed, Xenocrates had already died. The exact context of the song has been debated, especially the questions of whether Pindar makes reference to the occasion of *Pythian* 6, an earlier victory ode for Xenocrates (probably at least twenty years before), and whether at that time Pindar and Thrasyboulus may have been romantically involved.<sup>172</sup> Finally, opinions differ on the question of date, with proposals ranging from 474 BCE to 471 BCE. If the song was composed and performed after 472, this means that Xenocrates' brother Theron would have also passed away, and the reign of the Emmenids at Akragas would have ended.<sup>173</sup>

(t44)

οἱ μὲν πάλαι, | ὧ̃ Θρασύβουλε, | φῶτες, | οἱ χρυσαμπύκων  
 ἐς δίφρον Μοισᾶν ἔβαινον | κλυτὰ φόρμιγγι συναντόμενοι, |  
 ῥίμφα παιδείους ἐτόξευον μελιάρυας ὕμνους, |  
 ὅστις | ἐὼν καλὸς | εἶχεν Ἀφροδίτας  
 εὐθρόνου μνάστειραν ἀδίσταν ὀπώραν. ||

First strophe, 1-5

The ancients, Thrasyboulus, men who mounted  
 the chariot of the Muses with gold headbands, using the renowned lyre,  
 lightly shot honey-sounding hymns for boys.  
 Whoever, being beautiful, had

<sup>172</sup> Bury 1892:26-37 offers an excellent introduction on the song's context. Bury believes that there may have been an amorous connection between Pindar and the young Thrasyboulus (33), but he is not followed by Privitera 1982:29 or Verdenius.

<sup>173</sup> Bury 1892:31 prefers the later date, Privitera 1982:27-28 the earlier; Verdenius 1982:1 proposes 472 BCE, but does not discuss the implications.

the sweetest bloom reminiscent of fair-throned Aphrodite.

Participants: the ancients, Thrasyboulus, the Muses, ὅστις, Aphrodite | 1-2 οἱ...ἔβαινον: The first line has οἱ and οἷ, the first demonstrative and the second relative. The placement of the vocative (Thrasyboulus, see §74) between οἱ and φῶτες argues against reading οἱ as a definite article with φῶτες. This is supported by the fact that οἱ πάλοι on its own can mean “the ancients.”<sup>174</sup> φῶτες οἷ...ἔβαινον should then be read in apposition to οἱ πάλοι. | 2-3 συναντόμενοι...ἐτόξευον: Subject continuity, frame continuity: null anaphor. | 4-5 ὅστις...ὁπώραν: New grammatical subject introduced at line beginning with the relative ὅστις. Change of subject is accommodated by a possible pause before and/or after the independent participial phrase ἐὼν καλός. The relation between lines 3 and 4 is close at the semantic level, but loose on the syntactic one. The asyndetic beginning of line 4 suggests that 4-5 stand somewhat apart,<sup>175</sup> which complements the lack of a clear syntactic link. The semantic coherence of 1-3 and 4-5, however, is promoted by strophic contiguity, and there is no need to create a more integrated syntactical construction in the translation.<sup>176</sup>

(t45)

Ἄ Μοῖσα γὰρ | οὐ φιλοκερδὴς πω τότ' ἦν | οὐδ' ἐργάτις |  
οὐδ' ἐπέρναντο γλυκεῖαι | μελιφθόγγου ποτὶ Τερψιχόρας |  
ἀργυρωθεῖσαι πρόσωπα μαλθακόφωνοι ἄοιδαί. |  
νῦν δ' ἐφίητι <τὸ> τώργειου φυλάξαι |  
ῥῆμ' ἀλαθείας < ~ - > ἄγχιστα βαῖνον, |

First antistrophe, 6-10

For the Muse, she was then not yet profit-loving, nor for hire.

Not yet were they sold by honey-voiced Terpsichora,

<sup>174</sup> LSJ s.v. πάλοι I.2.

<sup>175</sup> See chapter 3 §49-§50 for asyndeton at move beginning.

<sup>176</sup> Bury, *ad* ὅστις: “The antecedent is παῖδες implied in παιδείους”; Race: “shot...at any boy who was beautiful”; Privitera 1982:35, “per chi era bello.”

sweet songs with silvered faces and lovely voices.

And now she [sc. the Muse] commands us to heed that of the Argive [sc. Aristodemus] an adage that comes closest to <...> reality.<sup>177</sup>

Participants: the Muse, Terpsichora, the Argive (Aristodemus) | 6 ἡ Μοῖσα γάρ: New grammatical subject introduced through article and noun, separated from the following in a priming act. γάρ accompanies the switch of grammatical subject, and serves to expand on the Muses mentioned before (line 2). The topic of the “mercenary Muse” persists throughout the first antistrophe. Although lines 6-8 appear to continue the frame of πάλαι based on the continuation of past tense, the string of negations foregrounds the current situation over the old. The discontinuity of orientation, of reference (the men of old are no longer in the frame), and the occurrence of γάρ all suggest that a frame switch co-occurs with the performative discontinuity of strophe end after line 5. | 7-8 γλυκεῖαι...ᾠοῖδαί: The adjective projects a noun, which will most likely fall within the semantic field of sound or music.<sup>178</sup> The grammatical subject of this passage is ᾠοῖδαί, but the logical subject is Terpsichora. | 9 νῦν δ’ ἐφίητι: Combined with the present tense, νῦν δέ marks a clear transition to the present. Commentators wish to see νῦν δέ as answering the οἱ μὲν πάλαι in line 1, but for the reasons given *ad* 6 I believe that the switch in orientation occurs between lines 5 and 6. On a more local level, νῦν interacts with τότε (6): the antistrophe concerns the Muse (announced in a priming act in 6), both in the past (τότε) and in the present (νῦν). Therefore I take the Muse as the subject of ἐφίητι. The anaphoric and cognitive continuity across line 8 and 9 suggests that there is no frame switch here. | 9 <τὸ> τῶργείου... βαῖνον: τό (conjectured) may be a demonstrative pronoun or an article. As in line 1, I read it as a demonstrative, with the following noun phrase ῥῆμα ... βαῖνον, as an appositive.<sup>179</sup>

(t46)

“χρήματα χρήματ’ ἀνὴρ” | ὅς φᾶ κτεάνων θ’ ἅμα λειφθεὶς καὶ φίλων. ||

<sup>177</sup> I follow the reading of line 10 suggested by Verdenius 1982:9.

<sup>178</sup> See Slater 1969 s.v. γλυκύς.

<sup>179</sup> For parallels for demonstrative τό followed by a genitive, yielding the meaning “that of...” or “that pertaining to...,” see e.g. Euripides *Ion* 742 and *Trojan Women* 43.

ἔσσι γὰρ ὧν σοφός | οὐκ ἄγνωτ' αἶδω |

Ἴσθμίαν ἵπποισι νίκαν, ||

τὰν Ξενοκράτει Ποσειδάων ὀπάσαις, |

Δωρίων αὐτῷ στεφάνωμα κόμῃ

πέμπεν ἀναδεῖσθαι σελίνων, |

First epode, 11-16

'Means, means make the man' says he who has been left by both possessions and friends.

You, of course, are well-versed in song. Nothing unknown to you do I sing,

<I sing> the Isthmian chariot victory.

Having granted that <victory> to Xenokrates, Poseidon

sent a wreath of Dorian wild celery to him

to put over his hair,

Participants: a man, friends, Thrasyboulus, the "I" persona, Xenokrates, Poseidon | 11 ὃς φᾶ...φίλων: ὃς can be a relative or demonstrative pronoun. Although the relative pronoun can be postponed in Pindar (see chapter 2 §42n113), here I do not follow Verdenius in reading it as postponed until after the quasi-direct speech here.<sup>180</sup> The performative discontinuity between antistrophe and epode is too strong for such a complex relative construction to be felicitous. ὃς is better read as demonstrative. Moreover, I do not think we should take ὃς as referring to Aristodemus here (the Argive, τῶργείου), but as indefinite. Of course there is room for ambiguity, so depending on the audience ὃς may be interpreted as either general or specific. | 12 ἔσσι...σοφός: The transition from generic discourse to the *hic et nunc* is immediately accomplished with ἔσσι. The interaction between performer and the specific addressee Thrasyboulus initiated with the vocative in line 1 is picked up again here. The role of γὰρ and ὧν in the transition has vexed commentators. I do not have the answer, but there are several things we can establish with a reasonable degree of certainty: (1) γὰρ

<sup>180</sup> Verdenius 1982:10.



ὥν in Pindar is not like the cluster γὰρ ὥν in Herodotus, where it tends to follow resumptive pronouns;<sup>181</sup> (2) γὰρ introduces some salient information to the discourse model—even if the distinction framed/unframed may not be the most helpful in this non-narrative context; (3) ὥν in Pindar only occurs in combinations with other particles, which complicates the understanding of its function.<sup>182</sup> I have read γὰρ ὥν as establishing common ground: any relation with the preceding must be inferred in English, as it is in the Greek. | 12 οὐκ...ἀείδω: ἔσσί, a few words before, establishes the *hic et nunc* as the relevant frame, which makes the “I” readily accessible: an act-final verb with null anaphor creates no difficulty. If ἄγνωτ’ is indeed to be read as ἄγνωτα, then it must be indefinite. Thus, it is an expansion of the thought expressed in the first part of line 12. | 13 Ἰσθμίαν...νίκαν: This accusative should also be constructed with ἀείδω. | 14-17 τὰν...φάος: τὰν is anaphoric, directly retrieving the νίκᾱ of line 13. The change in grammatical subject and the ring construction in lines 14 to 17 (participial clause – main clause – participial clause) suggest that 14 should be taken with the following rather than the preceding verse; thus I have rendered the line as beginning a new sentence. | 15 αὐτῷ: The anaphoric pronoun looks superfluous, since Xenocrates has already been established as the indirect object of the construction. Verdenius proposes that it is added “for the sake of clarity: it prevents us from connecting κόμᾱ with πέμπεν,” but this explanation is insufficient. Rather, use of the pronoun may be connected to the fact that αὐτός here refers to the *recently deceased* Xenocrates. Whereas the participle concerning the victory is in the aorist (ὀπάσαις), πέμπεν is in the imperfect, suggesting a change in perspective. This change may be from the victory at the Isthmian games to the more current event of his death. The σέλινον was associated with death and sickness: “persons dangerously ill were said δεῖσθαι τοῦ σελίνου.”<sup>183</sup> Pindar appears to combine this expression with that of crowning victors with σέλινον, to create a complex reference to the victory and to Xenocrates’ death. It is in this context that we may reconsider αὐτός, which has a special relationship with the body of a hero as a deictic center.<sup>184</sup>

<sup>181</sup> *Contra* Bury 1892:42.

<sup>182</sup> Unlike for other particles, Hummel 1993:410 does not offer any explanation for ὥν in Pindar.

<sup>183</sup> LSJ s.v. σέλινον I.1.

<sup>184</sup> See Bonifazi 2012:141-143; Bury 1892:43 also explains αὐτῷ with reference to Xenocrates’ recent death, but rather because the wreath was intended for Xenocrates *himself*, but once it arrived he was no longer alive to receive it.

(t47)

εὐάρματον ἄνδρα γεραίρων, Ἀκραγαντίνων φάος. ||  
 ἐν Κρίσᾳ δ' εὐρυσθενῆς εἶδ' Ἀπόλλων νιν | πόρε τ' ἀγλαΐαν ||  
 καὶ τόθι | κλειναῖς Ἐρεχθιδᾶν χαρίτεσσιν ἀραρώς |  
 ταῖς λιπαραῖς ἐν Ἀθάναις, | οὐκ ἐμέμφθη  
 ῥυσίδιφρον χεῖρα πλαξίπποιο φωτός, |

Second strophe, 17-21

honoring the man who knows the chariot well, a light for the Akragantines.

In Krisa mighty Apollo saw him, and gave him splendor.

And *there*, pleasing to the renowned favors of the Erechtheids,

in shining Athens,<sup>185</sup> he did not complain about

the chariot-saving hand of the horse-striking man,

Participants: Xenocrates, the Akragantines, Apollo, the Erechtheids, the charioteer | 18 ἐν

Κρίσᾳ...νιν: There is a change of grammatical subject, introduced by a name (Ἀπόλλων); the tense returns to aorist (εἶδε, as ὁπάσαις), and the object (Xenocrates) remains the same and can be picked up with the enclitic νιν. | 18 πόρε τε: Subject continuity, frame continuity: null anaphor. τε adds an entire clause, generally called “sentential τε” or “consecutive τε.” | 19 καὶ τόθι: There is discussion about whether this should be connected to the preceding (in which case τε is inserted after κλειναῖς): “And he [sc. Apollo] granted him glory, there too. And to the renowned...” or to the following: “And he [sc. Apollo] granted him glory. And there <he [sc. Xenocrates] was> pleasing to the renowned favors of the Erechtheids.”<sup>186</sup> Prior to answering the question of how καὶ τόθι should

<sup>185</sup> Pindar appears to denote Athens alternately with and without the article. The extant instances do not show a clear pattern; I have here not translated the article to avoid awkward English.

<sup>186</sup> Bury 1892:44 reads καὶ τόθι as forward looking, but retains τε and says that “τ’ connects τόθι and ταῖς λιπαραῖς ἐν Ἀθάναις ἀραρώς.” He translates: “And, both there and in rich Athens...” He offers no parallels of this use of καί...τε in Pindar, and he appears to translate καί twice: both as a sentence connective (“And...”) and as anticipating τε (“both...”); Hummel 1993:399 remarks that καί...τε only ever connects 3 items: X καί Y, Z τε.

be constructed, we need to consider the referential transition. In the middle of a symmetrical construction about gods granting Xenocrates victories, Xenocrates is here made an agent and grammatical subject himself. This kind of transition is unlikely after τόθι, since τε with a participial clause and no other marker would strongly suggest subject continuity (there is subject continuity in lines 18, 25, and 38; in 23 the relative in the oblique projects subject change: ὅν τε). Therefore I propose keeping the reading of the manuscripts (without τε), as do Fennell, Dornseiff, and Thummer, and I take καὶ τόθι as a transitional priming act,<sup>187</sup> projecting “there” forward. Thus there are three contextual frames: one in the Isthmus (introduced by [Ἰσθμίαν νίκαν] τάν 14), one in Krisa (near Delphi, introduced by ἐν Κρίσῃ δέ 17), and one in Athens (introduced by καὶ τόθι). That is to say, καί works *de dicto*, not *de re*. The reason for the variation in form may be that καὶ τόθι introduces a longer section of discourse, from line 19 to line 27. The length in turn may be because the Athenian victory was the most recent.<sup>188</sup> | 20 οὐκ ἐμέμφθη: The change in contextual frame effected by καὶ τόθι means by definition that there is a new pool of potential referents (there is no covert continuity across frame boundaries). In the preceding discourse, across the different frames, the only common element is Xenocrates. Therefore, he is the most accessible, and the only referent that can be retrieved with null anaphor (∅ ἐμέμφθη) at this point. | 21 φωτός: A new referent is introduced into the frame with a full noun and adjective. The full line devoted to introducing him – without naming him – at the end of the strophe projects his relevance into the antistrophe. φωτός thus works cataphorically: a name is expected and anticipated.

(t48)

τὰν Νικόμαχος κατὰ καιρὸν νεῖμ' ἀπάσαις ἀνίαις |  
 ὅν τε καὶ κάρυκες ὥρᾱν ἀνέγνον, | σπονδοφόροι Κρονίδα  
 Ζηνὸς Ἀλεῖοι, | παθόντες πού τι φιλόξενον ἔργον· |  
 ἀδυπνώ τ' ἐνὶν ἀσπάζοντο φωνᾷ |  
 χρυσέας ἐν γούνασιν πίτνοντα Νίκας |

<sup>187</sup> Privitera 1982:36 adopts καὶ τότε, but reads it like me as effecting a transition. This reading is attested only in a scholion, and I see no need for the emendation (*pace* Privitera 1982:161 who calls καὶ τόθι “*grottesco*”).

<sup>188</sup> Bury 1892:30–31. Both Xenocrates' *Pythian* and *Isthmian* victories are mentioned in the 476 Olympic odes for Theron (*Olympian* 2 and 3), while his Athenian victory is not.

## Second antistrophe, 22-26

that <hand> Nicomachus plied rightly to all the reins.

And him the heralds of the season also recognized, the truce-bearers of Cronus' son  
Zeus from Elis; they had probably experienced some deed of hospitality.

And they welcomed him with sweetly breathing voice,  
as he fell in the lap of golden Victory.

Participants: Nicomachus, the heralds from Elis, Zeus, Victory | 22 τάν Νικόμαχος: The relative only has one locally available referent: χεῖρ, and the name is automatically connected to the charioteer introduced in 21. His name at the very beginning of the antistrophe suggests that he will be its main topic (cf. ἃ Μοῖσα in line 6). | 23 ὃν τε: The pronoun retrieves the most accessible masculine referent: Nicomachus. Although τε occurs right after a relative pronoun, it appears to be at least partly copulative, in a bisyndetic construction with the τε in line 25.<sup>189</sup> | 23 καὶ κάρυκες: καί should not be connected with τε, but has small scope over κάρυκες.<sup>190</sup> This can mean either: “the heralds, too” (as Privitera 1982:37), or καί can have a pinning-down function,<sup>191</sup> perhaps to be rendered through prosodic emphasis: “the HERalds.” Since the introduction of the κάρυκες ὥρᾱν marks the transition to the Olympic games, “also” is not unfelicitous. | 24 παθόντες πού: The plural participle picks up κάρυκες, and I agree with Bury 1892:45 that the aorist participle places παθόντες before ἀνέγνον in time.<sup>192</sup> που might serve to interact with the audience at the performance, if we follow Koier’s argument that που with verbs of knowing marks something as shared between speaker and hearer.<sup>193</sup> Thus it serves to reinforce a sharedness in the praise of Nicomachus’ hospitality. | 25 νιν: The enclitic pronoun marks continuity of object. | 26 πίτνοντα: Co-referential with νιν. Despite the semantic difficulties in this line (see Verdenius 1982:22), it is clear that the referent concerned is Nicomachus. | 26 Νίκη: This ode is only marginally concerned with an athletic victory, but Pindar

<sup>189</sup> See chapter 4 §54-§57 about the rarity of so-called epic τε in Pindar.

<sup>190</sup> See chapter 4 §63 about τε καί in Pindar: it is never used as a combination with sentence scope (*pace* Thummer 1969:II.44 and Verdenius 1982:20).

<sup>191</sup> See IV.2 for this function of καί.

<sup>192</sup> Bury 1892:45.

<sup>193</sup> See Koier 2013:258-259.

still introduces personified Victory here. It is remarkable that the word Νίκη is so far separated from the names of Xenocrates and Thrasyboulus, and instead directly associated with the charioteer Nicomachus.

(t49)

γαῖαν ἀνὰ σφετέραν, || τὰν δὲ καλέοισιν Ὀλυμπίου Διός

ἄλσος | ἵν' ἀθανάτοισι Αἰνησιδάμου

παῖδες ἐν τιμαῖς ἔμιχθεν. ||

καὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἀγνώτες ὑμῖν ἐντὶ δόμοι |

οὔτε κώμων, | ὧ Θρασύβουλ', | ἐρατῶν, |

οὔτε μελिकόμπων ἀοιδᾶν. ||

Second epode, 27-32

in their land, which men actually call a sanctuary of Olympian

Zeus. There the descendants of Ainesidamus

joined in immortal honors.

And thus, your house is no stranger

to either beloved revels, Thrasyboulus,

or to sweet-sounding songs.

Participants: the heralds, <men>, Zeus, Ainesidamus' descendants, Thrasyboulus | 27 γαῖαν...

σφετέραν: Nicomachus won "in their land," σφετέραν still refers to the κάρυκες. | 27 τὰν δὲ: The

pronoun followed by δὲ consistently marks a new beginning of some sort in Pindar.<sup>194</sup> Here it

introduces unframed discourse, which allows for a new, generic referent "men."<sup>195</sup> The act

<sup>194</sup> In Pindar, δὲ occurs twice after a pronoun (here and in *Pythian* 11.17, I do not count *Olympian* 9.9 τὸ δὲ ποτε, since I believe that δὲ should there be taken with ποτε). In both cases it marks the introduction of a frame switch (into an embedded narrative at *Pythian* 11.17 and into unframed discourse at *Isthmian* 2.27). In *Pythian* 11.17 Pindar introduces the element that Arsinoe saved Orestes, which may have been an innovation by him. This could explain the intensification conveyed by δὲ.

<sup>195</sup> As Bury 1892:45, *contra* Verdenius 1982:22.

introduced by τὰν δὴ resolves any possible ambiguity in the preceding passage, where Olympia has only been referred to obliquely. | 28-29 Αἰνησιδάμου παῖδες: The new grammatical subject is introduced by a full noun phrase. The re-introduction of the descendants of Ainesidamus (his sons Xenocrates and Theron, but including grandson Thrasyboulus too, I believe; see note *ad* ὑμῖν 30) also accommodates the upcoming return to the *hic et nunc*. Only Theron won at the Olympic games, so I would take it as a generic statement that the family gained honor at the games.<sup>196</sup> | 30 καὶ γάρ...δόμοι: γάρ introduces the return to the present, and is best left untranslated. I disagree with Verdenius and Thummer that καὶ γάρ should be taken as affirmative and that the transition should be read as an asyndeton.<sup>197</sup> γάρ serves precisely to mark the associative link between the preceding move about the past and the current move about the present. I take καί as having scope over the entire act. | 30 ὑμῖν: The combination of ὑμῖν with the vocative Θρασύβουλε in the next line suggests that Pindar here takes all descendants of Ainesidamus together: Thrasyboulus, his father Xenocrates (deceased), and his uncle Theron (perhaps still alive). δόμοι “house,” the grammatical subject in this move, reflects this inclusiveness.

(t50)

οὐ γὰρ πάγος | οὐδὲ προσάντης ἅ κέλευθος γίνεται, |  
 εἴ τις εὐδόξων ἐς ἀνδρῶν ἄγοι τιμὰς Ἑλικωνιάδων. ||  
 μακρὰ δισκήσαις ἀκοντίσσαιμι τοσοῦθ', | ὅσον ὀργάν  
 Ξεινοκράτης ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων γλυκεῖαν  
 ἔσχεν. || αἰδοῖος μὲν ἦν ἀστοῖς ὁμιλεῖν, |

Third strophe, 33-37

For there is no obstacle, nor is the road steep,  
 if one brings honors of the Heliconians to <the house> of famous men  
 Having thrown the discus far may I cast the javelin just as far, as

<sup>196</sup> Thummer 1969:II.45-46, Privitera 1982:162, and Verdenius 1982:23 believe it only refers to Xenocrates and Theron, and is purposely vague in order to imply that Xenocrates won at Olympia too.

<sup>197</sup> Thummer 1969:II.46 and Verdenius 1982:24.

Xenocrates has a temperament sweeter than that of all other  
men. He was respectful in dealing with his townsmen,

Participants: one (= the “I” persona), famous men, the Heliconian Muses, Xenocrates, men, townsmen | 33 οὐ γὰρ πάγος: γάρ is directly followed by a new grammatical subject, which cannot naturally be connected to the preceding move. In combination with the strong performative discontinuity between epode and strophe, this would probably have created the expectation of a frame switch. Only in the course of the following line does it become clear that γάρ introduces a gnomic reflection on the preceding. | 34 τις: The indefinite pronoun is only nominally indefinite: it refers generically to poets who sing the praises of good men, but at the same time specifically to Pindar himself singing the praises of Thrasyboulus’ clan.<sup>198</sup> | 34 τιμὰς Ἑλικωνιάδων: The “honors of the Heliconian muses” here stand for Pindar’s song. | 35 μακρά... ἀκοντίσσαιμι: The tightly knit combination of participle and finite verb directly projects an athletic image onto the poetic activity. The first-person verb places the act firmly in the *hic et nunc*, however metapoetic the comment may be. | 35-37 ὅσον...ἔσχεν: The athletic image leads into further praise of Xenocrates, who is introduced by a full name, and in an integrated construction. | 37 αἰδοῖος μὲν ἦν: After the introduction in lines 35-36, a frame switch occurs in 37 with μὲν and a switch from aorist to imperfect. μὲν is used here, as often in Pindar, to project a topic (and a grammatical subject) across the performative boundary between strophe and antistrophe.<sup>199</sup>

(t51)

ἵποτροφίας τε **νομίζων** ἐν Πανελλάνων νόμῳ |  
καὶ **θεῶν** δαΐτας **προσέπτυκτο** πάσας | οὐδέ ποτε ξενίαν  
οὔρος ἐμπνεύσαις ὑπέστειλ’ ἰστίον ἀμφὶ τράπεζαν |  
ἀλλ’ **ἐπέρα** | ποτὶ μὲν Φᾶσιν θερείαις, |  
ἐν δε χειμῶνι **πλέων** Νείλου πρὸς ἄκταν. ||

Third antistrophe, 38-42

<sup>198</sup> Bury 1892:46 construes τις with Ἑλικωνιάδων.

<sup>199</sup> See chapter 2 §55 and chapter 3 §73 with note 241 for more on this function of μὲν.

practicing horsebreeding according to the Panhellenic ways,  
 and he welcomed all the feasts of the gods. And never did an  
 adverse wind furl his sail at his hospitable table;  
 no, he travelled on, toward Phasis in summer,  
 and in winter sailing to the shore of the Nile.

Participants: Xenocrates, the gods | 38 τε νομίζων: Without explicit marking to the contrary, τε suggests continuity of grammatical subject. | 39 καί: As in 19 (Ø, δέ, καί), καί introduces a third consecutive item: μέν, τε, καί.<sup>200</sup> | 39 οὐδέ ποτε: The linguistically more extensive transition introduces the fourth topic of hospitality, which will remain in focus until line 42. | 41-42 ἀλλά, μέν, δέ: The discourse progresses in clear steps. Because of constant subject continuity there are no (pro)nouns referring to the grammatical subject.

(t52)

μή νυν, || ὅτι φθονεραὶ **θνατῶν** φρένας ἀμφικρέμονται ἐλπίδες, ||  
 μήτ' ἀρετάν ποτε **σιγάτω πατρώαν**, |  
 μηδὲ τούσδ' ὕμνους· || ἐπεὶ **τοί**  
 οὐκ ἐλινύσοντας **αὐτοὺς ἐργασάμαν**. ||  
 ταῦτα, | **Νικάσιππ'**, | ἀπόνειμον, | ὅταν  
**ξεῖνον ἐμὸν** ἠθαῖον **ἔλθης**.

Third epode, 43-48

Now may he not, since envious hopes surround the minds of men,  
 may he never be silent about his paternal virtue,  
 nor about these hymns. Since, you know,  
 these I did not craft to remain idle.  
 Give him this, Nicasippus, as his due, when

<sup>200</sup> Thummer 1969:II.49 adduces *Olympian* 4.14-16 for the exact same sequence of particles.



you come to my trusted guest-friend.

Participants: men, Thrasyboulus, Xenocrates, Nicasippus | 43 μή νυν: Right after the discontinuity between antistrophe and epode we find νυν: even in its enclitic form it will have activated the *hic et nunc* after μή at the beginning of act, verse, and epode. | 43 ὅτι...ἐλπίδες: The unframed nature of this insertion gives it the sense of a parenthetical right after the beginning of the epode. The gnomic thought serves as a backdrop for the wish started by μή νυν. | 44 μήτε: The negative is repeated, and τε is probably to be understood as anticipatory in some sense. | 44 σιγάτω: One of the hardest forms in the song as regards referent tracking. Xenocrates has been the grammatical subject throughout the last passage, but that is no longer the case after the strong discontinuity marked by μή νυν. As soon as the frame of the here and now is activated, the most accessible referents are the performer (first person) and the audience or Thrasyboulus (second person). There is no logical referent for the third person imperative σιγάτω, however, since the wish is unlikely to refer to the dead Xenocrates. On the basis of sense, all commentators read σιγάτω as referring to Thrasyboulus, albeit in the third person. Bury rightly notes that πατρώαν immediately helps to disambiguate.<sup>201</sup> Verdenius suggests that the performer addresses Nicasippus from μή νυν onward (see the vocative in line 47).<sup>202</sup> This would certainly explain the shift to third person, and it may be supported by one more argument. Verdenius believes that ταῦτα refers to the present song,<sup>203</sup> but I believe Privitera rightly reads it as referring specifically to the two pieces of advice introduced by ταῦτα: “riferisci a Trasibulo questa mia raccomandazione di celebrare suo padre.”<sup>204</sup> If ταῦτα indeed refers to these specific elements, then it is likely that the performer already turned (mentally or physically) to Nicasippus with μή νυν in line 43, and σιγάτω refers to Thrasyboulus. | 45 μηδέ: Perhaps the second limb of μήτε...μηδέ is indeed more poignant than the first.<sup>205</sup> This asymmetry appears to be corroborated by the following line, which expands on the hymns. | 45 ἐπεὶ τοι: As in line 43 (ὅτι), a causal conjunction used *de dicto* introduces a motivation, in this case for the

<sup>201</sup> Bury 1892:48.

<sup>202</sup> Verdenius 1982:34.

<sup>203</sup> Verdenius 1982:35.

<sup>204</sup> Privitera 1982:166.

<sup>205</sup> Compare Thummer 1969:II.53, “das μή wird aufgegliedert in μήτε...μηδέ”; Verdenius 1982:34 further adduces Denniston 1950<sup>2</sup>:193 on οὔτε...οὐδέ “giving the effect of climax in the second limb.”

preceding wish. τοι must be the particle, since if it were the second person, it would only make sense if it referred to Thrasyboulus, which it cannot do here. | 46 αὐτούς: Since there is clear object continuity, Bury is probably right in regarding αὐτούς as emphatic, to imply a contrast with “other hymns.”<sup>206</sup> | 47 Νικάσιππε: Whoever this man was,<sup>207</sup> I believe his presence at the performance must be presupposed. If he was indeed a *chorēgós*, the last epode is apparently some kind of personal message. However, in performance the addressee of the chorus might then have been unclear to the audience. In any case, he must have been present at the occasion, and Nicasippus must have been an accessible referent for (the majority of) the audience. For σιγάτω to be easily understandable, a physical shift of gaze by the performer would have been helpful. I find it doubtful if Nicasippus was a mere professional of any kind: the position so close to the end of the song is extremely marked. | 48 ξεινον ἐμόν: The guest-friend must be Thrasyboulus, but the first-person reference is inherently ambiguous, referring at once to the composer Pindar and the current performer. The ambiguity may not have been felt by the audience at all, but a full understanding of the final expression depends again on the question of who Nicasippus was.

§75 Many of the passages discussed in the running commentary above may appear at first sight not to be problematic at all. However, it is my point to reveal how complex the process of referent tracking is, which normally works automatically in our minds as we read or listen. The focus in this section has not been to solve problems, but to attempt to explain why we have relatively few problems in following Pindar’s discourse. Along the way, I have discussed more general problems with the *Second Isthmian* from the perspective of anaphoric reference. The analysis only proposes an alternative road to solutions, arriving sometimes at conclusions similar to, sometimes different from, the commentaries. Finally, considering an entire discourse illustrates best how referent tracking and particle

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<sup>206</sup> Bury 1892:49; other commentaries do not discuss the pronoun.

<sup>207</sup> Bury 1892:49 believes that Nicomachus was a *chorēgós*, and is followed by Thummer 1969:II.53, and Verdenius 1982:35; Privitera 1982:165 says that he was perhaps “just a messenger.”

use mutually influence each other. Understanding better what particles do helps us to gain a fuller understanding of the process of reference tracking, and vice versa.

### 5.5 Concluding remarks

§76 In the discussion of particles that come after ὅς or ὁ in Homer, we must consider at least the following factors in order to perceive the relevant patterns. First, what is the exact referent of the anaphoric pronoun? That is, not its textual antecedent, but the mental representation of the referent at the moment that the pronoun is uttered. Second, does the anaphoric pronoun continue framed discourse, mark a transition from framed to unframed discourse, or a transition from unframed to framed? Third, who is the referent for the speaker or audience: is the referent present in the physical discourse context? Is there a particular emotional connection between speaker and referent? Does the referent have a particular relevance to the larger narrative or tradition? Do speaker and audience have the same referent in mind?

§77 As regards the difference between ὁ and ὅς, it is clear that they are used interchangeably in Homer. For both third-person pronouns the following pattern occurs: when ὁ/ὅς introduces framed discourse, all masculine singular referents within the frame are in principle accessible. When ὁ/ὅς introduces unframed discourse, conversely, the performer picks out one character who *must* be highly accessible: that is, the referent must be overt in the directly preceding discourse, typically as subject or as object. Therefore ὁ/ὅς introducing framed discourse more often marks change of grammatical (and logical) subject than ὁ/ὅς introducing unframed discourse.

§78 The different particles that follow the pronoun introduce very particular kinds of acts. ὁ δέ typically marks a continuation of framed discourse or a resumption of framed discourse after unframed discourse. The cluster ὅ γε can carry the force of γε to a greater or lesser extent, thus offering a functional continuum. At one end of the continuum ὅ γε serves to activate a referent who is completely or largely to be inferred, that is, who has not

been expressed linguistically in the preceding discourse. At the other end, ὅ γε is indistinguishable from the anaphoric pronoun ὅ itself, serving particularly to retrieve or pin down the character currently in focus near discursive transitions. As for Homer, neither the numbers nor current understanding of the anaphoric pronoun justify the widespread belief that ὁ δέ marks change of grammatical subject, whereas ὅ γε serves to mark grammatical subject continuity.

§79 Both ἄρα and δή after anaphoric pronouns have commonly been described as lending emphasis to the pronoun.<sup>208</sup> In translations, in fact, their presence is often not reflected at all, particularly in Homer. Thus, these particles go undiscussed, and patterns of use have remained unstudied. In the sections above I have provided one possible way of describing the differences between the use of ὅ/ὅς ῥα and ὁ/ὅς δή. When it introduces unframed discourse, ὅ/ὅς ῥα accompanies a verb in the imperfect tense that imparts a piece of shared or expected knowledge about the referent. In framed discourse, conversely, a verb in the aorist typically follows ὅ/ὅς ῥα, describing an action that is either already known or completely expected. ὁ/ὅς δή in Homer always introduces unframed discourse, barring one instance, mostly in direct speech, and offers new information about a referent. Often the newness of the act lies in the fact that it is a personal reflection of some sort. It is this last aspect that sets ὁ/ὅς δή slightly apart from ὁ γάρ. This last combination also typically serves to introduce new information, but γάρ, unlike δή, betrays no particular personal involvement, and can therefore be used freely by the narrator as well as by internal speakers.

§80 Both the corpus study of particle use after anaphoric pronouns in Homer and the “anaphora commentary” to Pindar’s *Second Isthmian* are meant as sorties into a huge field that has yet to be explored further. Building on the work of Bakker and Bonifazi I have attempted to demonstrate the importance of taking a discourse approach to anaphoric

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<sup>208</sup> See also Ruijgh 1971:435, “Après tout, ἄρα a donc a peu près la même valeur que δή, particule qui est moins fréquente chez Homère.”

reference. Not only does this offer a deeper understanding of the process of anaphoric reference itself, but it provides a solid basis for better explaining certain aspects of difficult Homeric particles like ἄρα and δή. The complexities of anaphoric pronouns are yet another element of discourse to take into account when searching for patterns of particle use in Homer and Pindar.

## 6. The Metalanguage of Performance

§1 The performances of Homeric epic and Pindar's songs cannot be recovered: all we have are the texts. However, it is insufficient to consider the language of epic and lyric as written discourse. Since we know that our texts are only the verbal component of a performance, we are in a good position to regard the texts not as the end, but as a means to better understand what lies behind it. We must attempt to understand epic and lyric language within the context of performance. By extension, we cannot comprehend particle use if we do not accept the primacy of the performative dimension.

§2 The five overarching goals of my thesis were the following: (1) to reveal patterns of particle use in Homer and Pindar by regarding particles as metalanguage in an interactive discourse; (2) to demonstrate the necessary complementarity of semantics, syntax, and pragmatics in describing discourse sensitive elements like particles; (3) to take a stand for the importance of understanding particles, *especially* when they seem inexplicable or superfluous to grammarians and translators; (4) to illuminate the links between particle use and the generic conventions of epic and lyric; (5) to make more of the continuum of particle studies accessible to the public, ranging from the earliest Homeric scholarship until now. Goals three and five are metascientific, and underlie my work throughout. In these concluding remarks, I briefly recapitulate how I have attempted to reach goals one, two, and four. To conclude, I propose some avenues for further research.

§3 Particles form an important part of the metalanguage of the performance. They allow the performer to smoothly navigate his multiple communicative goals. One function of particles in Homer and Pindar that until now has been studied relatively little is their marking of larger discursive steps: moves. In my thesis, I have argued that γάρ consistently marks a change of discursive direction, from narrating to explaining or from describing the action to giving the audience an insight into a character's motivation. What all γάρ moves in Homer and Pindar have in common is that they reveal the performer's discourse

strategies. One factor that is particularly helpful in identifying such discursive transitions is tense switch. When  $\delta\eta$  functions as a marker of steps in the narrative (typically along with a temporal marker), it always occurs in framed discourse. That is to say, unlike  $\gamma\alpha\rho$ ,  $\delta\eta$  marks the continuation of the current narrative discourse. It is worthwhile to note that both particles occur in similar patterns in the narrative discourse of other genres, such as the historiography of Herodotus and Thucydides.

§4 Whereas  $\delta\eta$  and  $\gamma\alpha\rho$  occur at discourse transitions,  $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$  can be used to signal continuity of discourse topic at points where the audience might expect otherwise, such as at the metrical break after strophe, antistrophe, and epode in Pindar. This use of  $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$  is a cognate of  $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$  used in dialogic discourse to mark that a speaker will not give up his turn at line end. We find this use in particular near verse end in tragic and comic dialogue.

§5 Beyond marking the macro-segmentation of discourse, particles allow the performer to monitor his interaction with the audience. That is to say, several particles mark the relation of the current discourse with the knowledge shared between performer and audience. Across the different contexts in which it is used,  $\alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha$  is always linked to an assumption by the performer that the current discourse act is an expected next step in the discourse. The expectedness of the act is not limited to content, but  $\alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha$  can also reflect that the *kind* of discourse act follows naturally from the preceding. For both reasons,  $\alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha$  often fulfills the discourse function of picking up the main thread of the narrative.

§6 Likewise relevant to the discourse memory,  $\tau\epsilon$  marks an assumption on the part of the performer that a certain constituent or event is part of the body of knowledge shared with the audience, most typically as a part of tradition. Despite the clear syntactic difference between so-called “epic”  $\tau\epsilon$  and copulative  $\tau\epsilon$ , the patterns of use in both Homer and Pindar suggest a strong link with the continuum of tradition. This supports my claim in the introduction that the syntactic function of a word does not necessarily represent the full range of its functions. The fact that particles are often syntactically superfluous and

always semantically unstable is exactly what makes them so likely to have multiple functions.

§7 The final goal that I set in the introduction was to illuminate possible links between particle use and the genres of epic and lyric. Genre convention certainly appears to be relevant in the recurring counterfactual construction of *καί νυ κεν...εἰ μή ῥα* (“and now X would have happened, if not for Y”), where *ῥα* marks the expected second half of the construction. The use of *μέν* at the end of metrical units, noted above, is likewise connected to genre expectations.

§8 More generally, Homeric epic has more particles than Pindaric lyric: they make up around 17.1% of words in the *Iliad*, 18% of words in the *Odyssey*, and 12.7% of words in Pindar. In Pindar *δέ*, *τε*, *καί*, *μέν*, *γάρ*, and *ἀλλά* make up the large majority of particle use, whereas in Homer this depends on the context of narrator text or direct speech. Consider the following numbers:<sup>1</sup>

Figure 1: Instances of particles per hundred lines

	<i>Iliad</i>		<i>Odyssey</i>		Pindar
	Narrator text	Direct speech	Narrator text	Direct speech	
<i>δέ</i>	50,5	23	53	21	24,7
<i>τε</i>	15,4	13,4	13,3	13	13,4
<i>καί</i>	14,3	23	17,4	20,9	16,9
<i>ῥα</i>	10,7	2,9	11,9	1,5	0,8
<i>μέν</i>	5,9	6,8	6,6	5	5,4
<i>γάρ</i>	3,2	7,6	2,7	7,9	4,9

<sup>1</sup> These numbers are the result of a statistical analysis of four books of the *Iliad* (4, 5, 6, and 17) and four books of the *Odyssey* (9, 10, 17, and 18), which amounts to 4917 lines, containing 6259 particles. The words I have considered are: *δέ*, *γάρ*, *δή*, *μέν*, *τε*, *καί*, *ῥα*, *ἤ*, *ἢ*, *ἀλλά*, *τοι*, *γε*, *αὖ*, *αὖτε*, *αὐτάρ*, *ἄταρ*, *νυ*, *ἄν/κε*, *περ*, *πω*, *που*, *πῃ*, *πως*, *ἡδέ*, *ἡμέν*, *οὖν*, *μάν*, *οὐδέ*, *οὔτε*, *μήδε*, *μήτε*; in the table I give the most frequent particles.



ἀλλά	2,8	7,3	4,2	8	3,5
γε	2,7	6,4	2,9	6,5	0,8
αὐτάρ	1,9	1,1	5,9	2	0
δή <sup>2</sup>	1,7	5,1	3,8	4,7	0,5

Qualitatively, δέ and ἄρα in particular appear more at home in narrator text. Beyond the most frequent particles, especially δή and γε occur more in direct speech than in narrator text. The numbers for Pindar's *Victory Odes*, especially for the most frequent particles, are remarkably close to those for direct speech in both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. What does not arise from this overview, but has been noted in chapter 3, is the fact that in Pindar δέ is particularly frequent in the embedded mythical narratives and ἄρα is practically limited to that context; this matches the difference between narrator text and direct speech in Homer.

§9 This brings me to a few suggestions for further research. Particle use in Homer is clearly different in narrator text than in direct speech, and I have discussed how these different discourse contexts are relevant to the use of δή. As arises from the same statistical analysis, καί is more frequent in direct speech, and δέ much less: what can this mean? And in general, what does it mean that the performer changes his metalanguage when he embodies a speaker within the narrative? Beyond further research into the use of particles, it is also worthwhile to consider their absence. First, there are significant stretches of discourse in Homer where little or no particles occur: can this be linked to the context or content? In Pindar, especially the beginnings of odes have few particles: what could the reason be for this tendency? Second, the absence of particles or any other kind of metalanguage at significant discourse transitions is a pattern worth exploring.

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<sup>2</sup> The analysis of δή is from an even more comprehensive corpus, based on an analysis of twelve books of the *Iliad* (13-24) and twelve books of the *Odyssey* (1-12).

§10 Besides the numbers, there are other questions that have arisen over the course of my research. In chapter 2 I propose that the discourse act is the relevant domain for the analysis of language and particle use. For Homer, the link between intonation units and metrical cola has already been proposed, but this possible match may also prove a valuable factor in reading Pindar. On the one hand, metrical cola in lyric have a wider range of forms than in epic, so we may find different matches and mismatches than in Homer. On the other hand, colometry in Pindar has often been a vexed subject, and perhaps a better understanding of discourse acts may aid in establishing the colometry of difficult passages.

§11 Chapter 5 presents a limited case study of particles after third-person pronouns that could be expanded in several ways. First, a full analysis of oblique forms may yield different patterns, because of the cognitive difference between nominative and non-nominative forms. Second, a study of first- and second-person pronouns followed by particles, in both Homer and Pindar, would most likely be very rich. As I note in chapter 4, the first- and second-person are cognitively loaded, and it will be informative to see how they interact with adjacent particles (e.g. ἔγωγε, καὶ σύ).

§12 Despite more than two millennia of scholarship, particles in Homer and Pindar still present the modern reader with difficulties. The current study is an attempt to offer a new perspective on these words that all deserve more scholarly attention. Because of the wealth of material, I have had to select issues to address, particles to discuss, and contexts to analyze. Nevertheless, I hope to have offered the reader at least a strong argument that the pragmatic approach to particle use in Homer and Pindar is not only fruitful, but in fact indispensable. If scholars keep explaining away particles by tagging on adjectives like “connective,” “anticipatory,” “limitative” or even “otiose,” we will never reach a fuller understanding of these crucial little elements of discourse. Only a careful analysis of particles that pays due attention to the co-text and context can hope to reveal the intricacy of the metalanguage of performance.

## Appendix A: From σύνδεσμος to *particula*

### 1 Introduction

§1 The group of lexical items generally called particles has never been clearly defined. Despite many attempts, no one has yet succeeded in isolating them based either on their form or their function.<sup>1</sup> The ancient grammarians had the same problem, barring the fact that they did not have to wrestle with the term particles, as it was not defined as a single word group yet. From the fourth century BCE onward, the lexical items under consideration were gathered among the conjunctions and in some cases the adverbs. Establishing the history of the scholarship on particles is complicated by the fact that our knowledge of the early study of grammar is sketchy at best. Therefore, the genesis of grammar as a field of study needs to be outlined, before I will attempt to reconstruct the ancient views on particles.

§2 This chapter is constructed as follows. First, I briefly outline the history of ancient Greek grammar in antiquity, presenting in broad terms the vexed nature of our evidence (2), and focusing on the discussion surrounding the *Téchnê Grammatiké* attributed to Dionysius Thrax (3). After that, I turn to descriptions of particles themselves. First I look at Aristotle's and Diogenes of Babylon's reported descriptions of the σύνδεσμος, the ancient word group closest to the modern notion of particle (4). Next come the discussion of σύνδεσμοι in the scholia (5), and in the ancient grammarians up to Apollonius Dyscolus (6). I then examine closely the only extant monograph on the word group from antiquity: Apollonius Dyscolus' *Περὶ συνδέσμων* (7). The next subsection discusses the ancient grammarians after Apollonius Dyscolus through late antiquity and the medieval period (8), leading up to the early modern discussions of particles (9).

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<sup>1</sup> As implicitly acknowledged, but summarily put to one side, by Sicking 1986:25-26, Schenkeveld 1988:81, and Duhoux 2006:520-523. Denniston 1934:xxxvii claims that he will attempt a definition, but what follows with a forty-five page description of those words that he regards as particles, not anything that qualifies as a true definition. See also Pinkster 1972:135n2 for problems with the term particle in general and I.3 for an overview of the discussion on particles and discourse markers in contemporary linguistics.

§3 Since it is my purpose to cover discussions of particles spanning almost two millennia, the chapter is necessarily selective. I have, however, tried to represent every kind of relevant source. Moreover, I have aimed to be thorough wherever the content warranted closer attention. Finally, this chapter is meant as a background for the “Guides to Scholarship” (part V) and the research presented in the individual parts. As such, it aims to offer both an idea of the starting point for early modern researchers, as well as a broader perspective on the degree of innovation – or lack of it – portrayed by later authors.

## 2 Early study of grammar

§4 It is now broadly agreed that the Stoic philosophers played a crucial role in developing thought on language and in defining the parts of speech.<sup>2</sup> In the third and second centuries BCE, the Alexandrian librarians Aristophanes of Byzantium and Aristarchus adopted the terms coined by the Stoics in their commentaries on ancient texts. Since direct sources for the Stoic philosophers are lacking, the Alexandrian commentaries form an important source for this early period. However, these commentaries did not survive directly, but eventually ended up as separate notes in the margin of manuscripts of literary texts. As a result, there is little certainty if the terminology found in these *scholia* can actually be traced back to the third- and second-century BCE.<sup>3</sup>

§5 In an important work on the grammatical thought of Aristarchus, Matthaïos argues that the Alexandrian librarian already distinguished the eight parts of speech that would become standard later.<sup>4</sup> This claim notwithstanding, the several layers through which the

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<sup>2</sup> Their activities are generally not regarded as linguistics, however, since if their starting point was always language as a reflection of the thinkable, i.e. the sayable, instead of instantiations of language, that is, actual texts or speech. Pagani 2011:23n27 gives the most relevant references regarding the Stoics and their influence on the study of linguistics.

<sup>3</sup> See Matthaïos 1999:193-198 with notes for an exposition of the problems.

<sup>4</sup> See Matthaïos 2002:163-169, the eight categories are: ὄνομα (noun), ῥῆμα (verb), μετοχή (participle), ἄρθρον (article), ἀντωνυμία (pronoun), πρόθεσις (preposition), ἐπίρρημα (adverb), σύνδεσμος (combiner). From the first grammars onward there appears to have been a constant discussion of the number of grammatical word categories, most grammarians arguing for eight or nine categories. See for instance Matthaïos 2002:171 for a

notes of the Alexandrian commentators are filtered keep us from establishing firmly how far they had progressed to an actual theory of grammar and/or syntax. In fact, the evidence from contemporary and later sources suggest that grammar was not yet established as an independent field of study in the third and second century BCE, neither as a theoretical exercise in philosophy nor as an *ad hoc* terminology in service of philology.<sup>5</sup>

§6 The scarcity of material between the Alexandrian commentators and the fully developed study of grammar by Apollonius Dyscolus in the second century CE (roughly four hundred years later), makes it practically impossible to know when exactly the decisive step to grammar as an autonomous field was taken. The evidence we do have has led scholars to posit an important shift in attitude in the first century BCE.<sup>6</sup> Taylor claims that Varro's *Lingua Latina*, composed in this period, is the first work to clearly show an application of the Stoic ideas in an independent study of grammar. But as we have lost all of the books on syntax, the part of his work that might best have substantiated or contradicted this claim, it is hard to agree or disagree with Taylor, even if his argument is persuasive.<sup>7</sup>

§7 The material from the second century CE shows that the study of grammar had been established by this point at the latest. The two crucial bodies of evidence from the first two centuries of our era are the grammatical papyri and the works of Apollonius Dyscolus.<sup>8</sup> The papyri contain basic short textbooks on grammar, often referred to as "school grammars." Although they differ from each other in form and content, they are all clearly part of a

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schema of the different grammarians and their particular system, and 171-213 for a discussion of the possible development. As far as Aristarchus is concerned, De Jonge and Van Ophuijsen 2010:496 take it from Matthaïos and regard it as the *communis opinio* that Aristarchus already used a system of eight word categories.

<sup>5</sup> Ax 1991:288 describes Aristarchus' approach to grammar as a "*Grammatik im Kopf*," a grammar in the mind.

<sup>6</sup> Di Benedetto 1958:196-206; 1959:118; he reiterates his argument in Di Benedetto 1973, Pinborg 1975:110-114, Siebenborn 1976:13, Fehling 1979:489, Taylor 1987:11; discussed in Schmidhauser 2010:508. Schenkeveld 1994:287 adds the rise of *hellenismos* as a factor in the development of grammar in the first century BCE.

<sup>7</sup> Varro, *Lingua Latina*, edited by Traglia 1974; of the originally twenty-five books, only Books 5-10 are partially extant. Taylor makes his argument in 1987:14-16.

<sup>8</sup> See Di Benedetto 1958:185-196 for discussions, Wouters 1979 for additional editions, and also Wouters 1995 for discussions of the grammatical papyri.

certain genre. The work of Apollonius Dyscolus stands at the other end of a methodological spectrum. Rather than little handbooks, his treatises are scholarly discussions of different aspects of grammar into the very details.<sup>9</sup>

§8 Current scholarship generally posits a roughly linear development from the pragmatic textual notes by third century BCE commentators to the full-fledged grammatical analysis in Apollonius Dyscolus. However, this hypothesis has two significant problems: the first is that it is based upon scanty evidence, and the second is that the evidence we do have is hard to date. Central to both issues is the *Téchnê Grammatikê* attributed to Dionysius Thrax. If this treatise is indeed accepted as the work of the second century BCE grammarian, it is proof of the early systematic study of language, but recently numerous scholars have challenged its authenticity, dating at least part of the *Téchnê* to after Apollonius Dyscolus. The question of the authenticity of this text is therefore a crucial point in any discussion of the development of the study of grammar. In the following section I discuss the most important primary and secondary material pertaining to the issue.

### 3 The *Téchnê* attributed to Dionysius Thrax

§9 Dionysius Thrax was a student of Aristarchus and worked from the second to first century BCE. Several works are attributed to him, but not a single treatise has survived in its entirety, except for the *Téchnê Grammatikê*, transmitted in multiple manuscripts and some papyri.<sup>10</sup> The *Téchnê* is a grammatical treatise that consists of twenty chapters: the first provides a definition of grammar, the second to fourth discuss prosody, the fifth traces the history and etymology of rhapsody, and the remainder of the work provides an overview of word classes and their forms and functions. In the second century CE, Sextus

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<sup>9</sup> Apart from his *Syntax*, treatises on adverbs, σύνδεσμοι (on which more below), and pronouns are (partially) extant.

<sup>10</sup> The earliest papyri date from the fifth or sixth centuries BCE: Pap. Hal. 55 a and PSI I 18, see Di Benedetto 1973:801-802.

Empiricus quotes from the first four chapters of the treatise. The fact that this part of the *Téchnê* was attributed to Dionysius Thrax suggests that it does actually go back to the second century BCE author. There is no such direct or indirect evidence for the rest of the treatise.<sup>11</sup>

§10 The *Téchnê*'s authenticity was doubted in antiquity, but these doubts were laid to rest in the nineteenth century.<sup>12</sup> The problem was not picked up again until the second half of the twentieth century. The current discussion is roughly divided into two camps, with several scholars attempting – with differing degrees of success – to reconcile the two. On one side are the scholars who rekindled the discussion of the *Téchnê*'s authenticity, led by Di Benedetto and including Pinborg, Siebenborn, and Fehling.<sup>13</sup> They argue that the *Téchnê* as we have it cannot have been a second century BCE composition. Instead, they believe that it obtained its current form only in the third or fourth century CE. Most strongly opposed to the idea that the *Téchnê* is a compilation, with different parts authored at different times, is Pfeiffer, Erbse, and more recently, Wouters.<sup>14</sup> Wouters bases his conclusions on grammatical papyri dating back to as early as the first century CE.<sup>15</sup> Schenkeveld, with help from Wouters' grammatical papyri, follows a middle road that has come to be the *communis opinio*.<sup>16</sup>

§11 Schenkeveld pays particular attention to the problems of the *Téchnê*'s internal coherence and concludes that a large part of the treatise (chapters 6-20) is more likely to

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<sup>11</sup> Sextus Empiricus quotes Thrax's definition of grammar in *Against the Mathematicians* I 57, with only a slight variation compared to the manuscripts of the *Téchnê*. A discussion of the variation can be found in Pagani 2011:18, with further bibliography in notes 6 and 7.

<sup>12</sup> Taylor 1987:8. The most recent editions are Kemp 1987, Lallot 1998, and Callipo 2011.

<sup>13</sup> Di Benedetto 1958-1959, 1973, and 1990, Pinborg 1975:103-106, Siebenborn 1976:12-13, and Fehling 1979:488-489. For a discussion of the most important discrepancies in the tradition, see Di Benedetto 1958:171-178, Pagani 2011:33, and the scholia to the *Téchnê*, Hilgard 1901:160.24-161.18.

<sup>14</sup> Pfeiffer 1968:267-272, Erbse 1980:244-258, and Wouters 1995:95-97. Frede 1977:52-54 believes in the *Téchnê*'s authenticity, though he does not argue for it, but he says (52) that it is generally accepted as genuine.

<sup>15</sup> See Wouters 1995:99, "the kernel of the *Téchnê* must have undergone clear changes between the moments of its composition and the copying in the first medieval manuscripts."

<sup>16</sup> Taylor 1987:8-9 and Schenkeveld 1994:266-269, who refers to Wouters 1979.

have been the product of third century CE scholarship than the work of Dionysius Thrax.<sup>17</sup> On the other hand, he regards it as beyond doubt that Thrax wrote a work on grammar that “was of a systematic character.”<sup>18</sup> In his view, the first four chapters of the *Téchnê* formed part of this work, but the rest of the *Téchnê* in its current form cannot be regarded as authentic. Robins has proposed that exactly because it was an actual grammar textbook the *Téchnê* developed and changed continuously.<sup>19</sup> He points out that modern-day textbooks are likewise constantly updated, while generally retaining the name of the original author; he uses this analogy to explain the discrepancies between the ideas expressed in the *Téchnê* and the time in which Thrax lived. Against Robins’ hypothesis, one might argue that one would expect continual development to grant more internal coherence to the work, especially between the first parts and the rest.

§12 In spite of remaining doubts, the most prudent conclusion appears to be that only the first four chapters of the *Téchnê* can be attributed to Dionysius Thrax with any certainty,<sup>20</sup> and the other parts are later additions or redactions. As Pagani notes, this is not a completely negative conclusion. If we accept part of the work as authentic, this means that Thrax did write a work on grammar in the second century BCE, albeit one that has largely been lost to us.<sup>21</sup> The existence of this grammatical work by Thrax reflects a growing interest in the theoretical aspects of language and linguistics, an interest that would continue to develop in the following centuries, and culminate in Apollonius Dyscolus’ works.<sup>22</sup>

§13 To conclude, language and its components steadily became more of an object of study from the third century BCE onwards. However, the establishment of grammar as an

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<sup>17</sup> Schenkeveld 1994:269 and 1995:50-52; see Di Benedetto 1973:802. In a recent handbook, Schmidhauser 2010:508 cites this view as the *communis opinio*.

<sup>18</sup> Schenkeveld 1995:42.

<sup>19</sup> Robins 1995:18-24.

<sup>20</sup> Although it is likely that chapter 5 was moved to its current position in the *Téchnê* from elsewhere.

<sup>21</sup> Pagani 2011:36.

<sup>22</sup> Pagani 2011 gives a neat summary of the development on 60-62.



object of study *per se* appears to have been a development of the first century BCE, leading eventually to Apollonius Dyscolus' seminal work.<sup>23</sup> The following material on the study of particles will reinforce the argument that Thrax's *Téchnê*, whatever its original form, was an important stage in the development of grammatical studies but not its culmination.

#### 4 Early Definitions of σύνδεσμοι

§14 The very first authors who wrote about the parts of speech referred to most of the words that we consider particles as σύνδεσμοι. Grammarians writing in Latin later rendered the term as *coniunctio*. However, despite the formal likeness this is not the equivalent of the English "conjunction." After all, in English grammar the word conjunction has very specific connotations that in many cases do not apply to the words that the Greeks and Romans gathered respectively under the terms σύνδεσμος and *coniunctio*. Instead, it is more productive to use Swiggers and Wouters' translation "combiner," since this term reflects the neutral nature of σύνδεσμος, something that "binds together."<sup>24</sup>

§15 Initially σύνδεσμος was used to cover anything from conjunctions to prepositions to interjections to noun phrases, in addition to the words we call particles. The term had such a wide application because it appears to have been coined to cover the words that were neither noun/adjective (ὄνομα), verb (ῥῆμα), nor adverb (ἐπιρρημα/μεσοτήτης). The σύνδεσμος was probably the fourth lexical category to be introduced, just before or at the same time as the ἄρθρον ("joint"), the category that would later become the article. Aristotle is the first we know of to distinguish the σύνδεσμος and ἄρθρον in addition to the

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<sup>23</sup> See Taylor 1987:11 and Schenkeveld 1994:267-269 and 1995:42-44. A similarly problematic work is the *Téchnê* that is signed Tryphonos *technê grammatikê* on a third century CE papyrus (P. Lond. 126, see §50n95 below). The extant part of the text gives the last four of the eight parts of speech as listed in the *Téchnê* attributed to Thrax, which suggests that the two works are part of a similar tradition.

<sup>24</sup> Swiggers 2002:102n7.

noun/adjective, verb, and adverb.<sup>25</sup> As the following definition shows, σύνδεσμος was by no means clearly defined – at least grammatically – at this point:<sup>26</sup>

(t1)

σύνδεσμος δὲ ἐστὶν φωνὴ ἄσημος ἢ οὔτε κωλύει οὔτε ποιεῖ φωνὴν μίαν  
σημαντικὴν ἐκ πλειόνων φωνῶν πεφυκυῖαν συντίτεσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων  
καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου ἢν μὴ ἀρμόττει ἐν ἀρχῇ λόγου τιθέναι καθ’ αὐτόν, οἷον μὲν  
ἦτοι δέ. ἢ φωνὴ ἄσημος ἢ ἐκ πλειόνων μὲν φωνῶν μιᾶς σημαντικῶν δὲ ποιεῖν  
πέφθκεν μίαν σημαντικὴν φωνήν.

*Poetics* XX, 6, 1456b38-1457a6

A combiner is a non-significant sound which neither precludes, nor brings about, the production of a single significant sound that by nature is composed of several sounds [i.e. an uttered sequence], and which can be used at either end and in the middle, but which it is not appropriate to place at the beginning of an utterance on its own,<sup>27</sup> e.g. μὲν ἦτοι, δέ. Or a non-significant sound, which by nature produces, as a result of [uniting together] several sounds that are significant, a single significant sound.

Swiggers and Wouters 2002:108

<sup>25</sup> *Poetics* 1456b20-21.

<sup>26</sup> Van Bennekom 1975:408 takes it one step further, referring to Simplicius (*Commentary in Aristotle's Categories* 10), who mentions that Theophrastus (fourth century BCE) “and his associates” had already dealt with the question of whether to include ἄρθρα and σύνδεσμοι among the parts of speech.

<sup>27</sup> Swiggers and Wouters take καθ’ αὐτόν to refer to λόγου, but I believe it must here be taken to refer back to σύνδεσμος (even though one might have expected a female form here, as φωνή is the actual antecedent. In this case the first latin translation (Moerbeke, 13<sup>th</sup> century) might be adduced, as it translates *ipsam*, to refer back to vox. This was followed by Kassel who emends αὐτήν 1965:32, which was then, wrongly I believe, thought by Swiggers and Wouters 2002:107 to refer back to ἀρχή, when it must also in Kassel be meant to refer back to φωνή), to mean: ‘on its own’ i.e. alone. After all, Aristotle has already said it can be found at the beginning, but not on its own. This would explain why he includes ἦτοι, which occurs only at the beginning of clauses, but of course always followed by another word.

The passage is broadly regarded as corrupt and highly opaque,<sup>28</sup> but what we may roughly deduce is that Aristotle here presents the σύνδεσμος as a word that can combine other significant (signifying) sounds into a significant whole. As is clear from the context, he is not discussing parts of speech (μέρη τοῦ λόγου) here, but parts of the lexis (μέρη τῆς λέξεως) – “diction” in Swiggers and Wouters’ translation – one of the six components of (good) tragedy. As such his focus is not to offer “a systematic treatment of word-classes, but [to offer] us a list of definitions of elements constitutive of the λέξις, (oral) poetic expression.”<sup>29</sup> A definition of ἄρθρον follows this passage; like the definition of σύνδεσμος it too shows that ἄρθρον is not yet conceived as denoting only the article. In view of the opaque nature of the passage, as well as Aristotle’s non-grammatical concerns here, it is unclear which words fall in the category σύνδεσμος.<sup>30</sup> Swiggers and Wouters conclude tentatively that the connective and disjunctive particles would be covered by the term σύνδεσμος, whereas expletive particles would fall under ἄρθρον.

§16 The next extant definition of σύνδεσμος appears to go back to Diogenes of Babylon, a Stoic philosopher who lived in the third and second centuries BCE. In his *Lives of the Philosophers* the third century CE biographer Diogenes Laertius reports that the Stoics Chrysippus (third century BCE)<sup>31</sup> and Diogenes of Babylon distinguished five parts of speech: ὄνομα (proper name), ῥῆμα (verb), προσηγορία (apellative), ἄρθρον (joint), and σύνδεσμος (combiner); the μεσότης (adverb) was added by Diogenes of Babylon’s student Antipater of Tarsus.<sup>32</sup> Diogenes Laertius then goes on to give definitions, introducing the first one as follows: Ἔστι δὲ προσηγορία μὲν κατὰ τὸν Διογένην (“the προσηγορία,

<sup>28</sup> For full discussions, see Dupont-Roc 1980:321-328, Laspia 1997:79-116, and a summary of the main points in Swiggers 2002:107-112.

<sup>29</sup> Swiggers 2002:110.

<sup>30</sup> Swiggers 2002:112. Van Bennekom 1975:406 lists μέν, δέ, ἤτοι (possibly corrupt), τε, καί, ἐπεὶ and γάρ as words expressly regarded by Aristotle as σύνδεσμοι.

<sup>31</sup> Schmidhauser discusses Chrysippus, the “first philosopher of language” in 2010:502-507.

<sup>32</sup> Diogenes Laertius *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.57: τοῦ δὲ λόγου ἐστὶ μέρη πέντε, ὡς φησι Διογένης τ’ ἐν τῷ Περὶ φωνῆς καὶ Χρύσιππος, ὄνομα, προσηγορία, ῥῆμα, σύνδεσμος, ἄρθρον· ὁ δ’ Ἀντίπατρος καὶ τὴν μεσότητα τίθησιν ἐν τοῖς Περὶ λέξεως καὶ τῶν λεγομένων.

according to Diogenes [of Babylon], is:”). The explicit attribution of this definition suggests that the subsequent definitions have their origin with Diogenes of Babylon as well. The definition of σύνδεσμος is as follows:

(t2)

σύνδεσμος δέ ἐστι μέρος λόγου ἄπτωτον, συνδοῦν τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου

Diogenes Laertius *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.58<sup>33</sup>

a combiner is an indeclinable part of speech, to bind together the parts of speech

Clearly, the category has been redefined, and a crucial step has been taken from Aristotle’s philosophical comments on what the lexical category is to Diogenes’ attempt to describe the morphology (ἄπτωτον) and function of its members. The description provided in the text, “indeclinable” (ἄπτωτον), is a characteristic of particles that seems natural to the modern reader, but barring the Stoic tradition the feature was, in fact, not a requisite part of the category’s definition in antiquity until Priscian (sixth century CE).<sup>34</sup>

§17 Apart from the definition transmitted by Diogenes Laertius, the sources from the period between Aristotle and Apollonius Dyscolus (second century CE) cannot be securely assigned to an author or even a certain period. There are two bodies of evidence to draw from: (1) the Homeric scholia, and (2) grammatical handbooks, such as the *Téchnê* and some grammatical papyri, authored before Apollonius Dyscolus’ work. In the following sections I will first discuss the scholia, then the grammatical handbooks; because of the problems of dating the material, it cannot be presented in a strictly chronological way.

<sup>33</sup> This is part of Diogenes of Babylon, fr. 22 in Von Arnim 1903:210-243.

<sup>34</sup> The one exception is the fourth to fifth century grammarian Theodosius of Alexandria, who gives a definition of σύνδεσμοι that is based almost fully on the one by Diogenes: σύνδεσμός ἐστι μέρος λόγου ἄπτωτον συνδοῦν τὰ μέρη τὰ λοιπὰ τοῦ λόγου (*Grammar* 17.21-23). See also §83 below, on a definition (with ἄκλιτον) found in Heliodorus, but attributed to Apollonius Dyscolus by Pecorella.

## 5 The scholia

### 5.1 Terminology

§18 The term σύνδεσμος is the closest thing to an equivalent of the modern “particle.” However, particle comes from the Latin *particula*, whereas σύνδεσμος became *coniunctio* in Latin. There is, then, a mismatch of terminology, and this led Schenkeveld to investigate the use of the ancient Greek equivalent of *particula*: μόριον. After examining the use of the term in early Greek works about language, he concludes that μόριον was in fact never used as *particula* would be.<sup>35</sup>

§19 The scholia to the *Iliad* may be adduced to illustrate this. The word μόριον, when applied to language, almost without exception denotes an affix or suffix, such as the alpha privans,<sup>36</sup> νη privans,<sup>37</sup> the suffix –θεν, and several other syllables at the beginning and end of words. Single words called μόρια include ὤς,<sup>38</sup> ἔτι,<sup>39</sup> εὖ,<sup>40</sup> articles or pronouns,<sup>41</sup> τῶς,<sup>42</sup> and μα.<sup>43</sup> The only case where μόριον is used in a description of a word that we consider a particle is in the scholion to A 210:

(t3)

A 210 ἀλλ’ ἄγε.

ἀλλὰ φέρε. ἔστι δὲ ἐπίρρημα παρακελεύσεως, ἢ ἐπιρρηματικὸν μόριον.

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<sup>35</sup> Schenkeveld 1988:83.

<sup>36</sup> 5.341; in the hypophyses to the following verses: 1.214, 3.267, 3.444, 4.489, 4.824, 5.402, 6.83, 10.570, and 16.57.

<sup>37</sup> In the hypophyses to the following verses: 4.439, 17.317, 19.498.

<sup>38</sup> 1.512b, 2.139b, 2.463b, 3.31b.

<sup>39</sup> 4.539a.

<sup>40</sup> Hypothesis to 17.28.

<sup>41</sup> 19.63b.

<sup>42</sup> 2.330.

<sup>43</sup> 1.234 (where it is read as the negation μή).

[this means] “but come”, and it is an exhortative adverb, or an adverbial μόριον.

This scholion hints at valuable insights, but the scholiast is not very helpful. First of all, it is not clear if his comment explains only ἀλλά or the whole construction ἀλλ’ ἄγε. The paraphrase ἀλλὰ φέρε suggests the latter, but it seems completely superfluous: surely ἄγε would be as natural as φέρε to the audience in later antiquity, if not more so. More problematic is the following description of “exhortative adverb.” Its sense is clear enough, but it is not entirely clear how ἐπίρρημα can be used to describe the combination ἀλλ’ ἄγε. ἀλλά on its own might be regarded as an adverb or “adverbial” in the sense that it co-occurs with a verb form (the imperative ἄγε). By extension the comment “or it is an adverbial μόριον” would refer just to ἀλλά, making this instance the only one in the scholia where μόριον describes a particle.<sup>44</sup> The weight of the evidence in the scholia, then, suggests that in early linguistic discussions σύνδεσμος was the normal term to refer to the words we would call particles. Note however, that although most particles were called σύνδεσμοι, not all σύνδεσμοι were what we would call particles.

## 5.2 σύνδεσμοι in the Scholia

§20 The *Iliad* scholia, marginal notes found in several manuscripts, display a wealth of insights on σύνδεσμοι.<sup>45</sup> These marginalia contain textual commentaries by Aristarchus, Aristophanes of Byzantium, and Zenodotus – among many named or anonymous others. These librarians of the great *Mouseion* in Alexandria edited the most important archaic and classical Greek texts in the third and second centuries BCE. They worked in the same period

<sup>44</sup> However, note the problematic use of μόριον in Trypho’s definition of the redundant combiners, §50-§51 below.

<sup>45</sup> The Homeric scholia to the *Iliad* form the source for most of the material in this paragraph. The scholia *vetera* to Pindar were also studied, and follow the same pattern. They will be referred to mainly in the footnotes, referenced in the main text only where they offer insights absent from the Homeric scholia.

as the stoic philosophers, by whom they seem to have been influenced.<sup>46</sup> As a source, the scholia are problematic for two reasons: first, only a small number of scholia can be traced back confidently to a specific author, and second, even if the author is established we have no way of knowing beyond doubt that the wording of the note is original. These issues make it hard to determine the date of the terminology used, which is an especially pertinent question in the current attempt to sketch the development of the study of σύνδεσμοι.

§21 It will be useful at the outset to analyze a single scholion in detail to give a general sense of the kind of discussions we find in the scholia. Consider the scholion to 1.219a.

(t4)

- 1 [ἢ καὶ ἐπ' ἀργυρέῃ] τοῦτο τὸ ἢ ψιλῶς λεγόμενον καὶ περισπωμένως  
δηλοῖ σύνδεσμον παραπληρωματικὸν τὸν ἥτοι, ἴσον τῷ  
δή, οἷον „ἐπειὴ πολὺ φέρτερόν ἐστι“ (1.169), καὶ παραλλήλως „ἢ δὴ  
λοιγία ἔργα“ (1.518). δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ ἀπορρηματικὸν σύνδεσμον· „ἢ οὐχ
- 5 Ἑλένης ἔνεκ' ἠϋκόμοιο; / ἢ μοῦνοι φιλέουσ' ἀλόχους μερόπων ἀν-  
θρώπων / Ἀτρεΐδαι;“ (9.339—41). δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ ἔφη· „ἢ καὶ κυανέῃσιν“ (1.528). |  
καὶ σεσημειώται Ἀρίσταρχος ὅτι ὁ μὲν Ὅμηρος ἀεὶ  
ἐπὶ προειρημένοις λόγοις ἐπιφέρει τὸ δηλοῦν τὸ ἔφη, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ προ-  
κειμένου, ὁ δὲ Πλάτων μετ' αὐτὸ ἐπιφέρει τὸν λόγον. |
- 10 ψιλούμενον δὲ καὶ βαρυτονούμενον δηλοῖ σύνδεσμον διαζευκτικόν· „ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς“ (2.253).  
ἔστι δὲ ὅτε καὶ ἀντὶ συναπτικοῦ τοῦ εἴ τίθεται, οἷον „οὐδ' ἀφα-  
μαρτοεπής, ἢ καὶ γένει ὕστερος ἦεν“ (3.215). ποτὲ δὲ παρέλκει· „ἀλλὰ  
τί με ταῦτα παρεξέρεσθαι ἔκαστα;“ (10.432). δασυνόμενον δὲ καὶ  
ὀξυτονούμενον ἄρθρον προτακτικὸν δηλοῖ· „ἢ δ' ἐτέρῃ θέρεϊ προρρέει
- 15 εἰκυῖα χαλάζῃ“ (22.151). δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ ἄρθρον ὑποτακτικόν, οἷον „ἢ  
μυρὶ Ἀχαιοῖς“ (1.2). δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ ἀναφορικὴν ἀντωνυμίαν· „ὥς ἢ γ'  
ἀμφιπόλοισι μετέπρεπεν“ (6.109).  
δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τὴν σύναρθρον  
ἀντωνυμίαν τρίτου προσώπου, συζυγοῦσαν τῇ ἐμῇ, σή. ὑποδείγματα
- 20 δὲ ταύτης παρ' Ὀμήρῳ οὐχ εὐρίσκεται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἀναλόγου νοεῖται·  
αἱ γὰρ πλάγιοι πᾶσαι δι' αὐτῆς παρ' Ὀμήρῳ σώζονται.
- 1 [ἢ καὶ ἐπ' ἀργυρέῃ] this unaspirated ἢ and with the circumflex  
is the filling combiner ἥτοι, similar to

<sup>46</sup> See Matthaios 2002:163-169 for a well-annotated argument that the Alexandrians already distinguished and used the eight word groups established by the stoics.

- δή, as in “ἐπειὴ πολὺ φέρτερόν ἐστι” (1.169), and elsewhere “ἦ δὴ  
λοίγια ἔργα” (1.518). It is also the interrogative combiner: “ἦ οὐχ  
5 Ἑλένης ἔνεκ’ ἠὲ κόμοιο; / ἦ μοῦνοι φιλέουσ’ ἀλόχους μερόπων ἀν-  
θρώπων / Ἀτρεΐδαι;” (9.339–41). And it also means ἔφη: “ἦ καὶ κυανέησιν” (1.528). |  
And Aristarchus noted that Homer always  
uses it to mean ἔφη after the words have been spoken, as in the  
current example, while Plato starts the speech after it [sc. ἦ]. |  
10 Unaspirated and with the grave accent, it is the disjunctive combiner: “ἦ εὖ ἢ ἐ κακῶς.” (2.253)  
And it happens that it is even placed instead of hypothetical εἰ, as in: “οὐδ’ ἀφα-  
μαρτοεπής, ἦ καὶ γένει ὕστερος ἦεν” (3.215). And sometimes it is redundant: “ἀλλὰ  
τί με ταῦτα παρεξέρεσθαι ἔκαστα;” (10.432). Aspirated and  
with the acute accent, it is the prepositive article: “ἦ δ’ ἑτέρη θέρεϊ προορρέει  
15 εἰκυῖα χαλάζῃ” (22.151). It is also the postpositive article, as in: “ἦ  
μυρὶ Ἀχαιοῖς” (1.2). And it is also the anaphoric pronoun: “ὥς ἦ γ’  
ἀμφιπόλοισι μετέπρεπεν” (6.109).  
It is also the possessive  
pronoun of the third person, to be added to ἐμή, σή. Signs  
20 of this are not found in Homer, but from analogy it may be reasoned,  
since all the oblique cases maintain that paradigm in Homer.

This long discussion of η (ἦ, ἦ, ἦ) is found as a whole in the Venetus A manuscript, but that does not mean it was conceived in its entirety by one person. It is typical of the scholia in containing an explicit references to a specific scholar, in this case Aristarchus (second century BCE). The embedded reference to a named scholar indicates that this scholion is probably a composite, that is, authored by someone who includes information from Aristarchus while adding other information drawn either from his own experience or, more likely, from other sources.<sup>47</sup>

§22 If the form of the scholion is typical, its content is not. As an exception among many literary and short linguistic notes, this scholion devotes a long discussion to a word that we would call a particle.<sup>48</sup> The reason for this inclusion illustrates a problem that is relevant to our work in any case. As opposed to most other particles, η is inherently ambiguous. Although small words were probably always vulnerable in the process of

<sup>47</sup> Erbse attributes the scholion in its current form to Didymus or Aristonicus, who worked in the first century BCE and CE, respectively.

<sup>48</sup> See for modern literature on ἦ V.ἦ.



transmission,  $\eta$  is a particularly unstable lexical item, because its possible force and function depend entirely on accentuation and breathings. In performance the audience must have had no problem distinguishing between  $\acute{\eta}$ ,  $\tilde{\eta}$ , and  $\grave{\eta}$ , but in the transition to written versions, this disambiguation was lost. Moreover, there seems to have been a significant period where nothing was done to resolve this problem.<sup>49</sup> It was not until the fourth or third century BCE that we find some accentuation added in papyri. Understandably, disambiguation for performance seems to have been the main reason for the first diacritical signs and accents.<sup>50</sup> It was not until the third or second century BCE that Zenodotus or Aristophanes of Byzantium introduced a comprehensive system to provide literary texts with accentuation throughout. In any case, there must have been a period of unaccented written versions of the Homer epics.

§23 Eventually, fully accented editions of most canonical texts – naturally including the Homeric corpus – circulated in antiquity, but that is not the end of the story. In the transition from papyrus roll to codex, a certain font, the so-called Biblical Uncial, became generally used, from around the fourth or fifth century CE. This type of writing, all in capitals, was not well-suited to accents, so accents fell out in many cases, until writing in minuscule around the ninth century CE brought back accentuation. Around this period it appears that accentuation was added to entire texts, following the Byzantine system.<sup>51</sup>

§24 At two separate moments then, then, a decision had to be made about the accentuation of the texts: first when the Alexandrian scholars produced the first fully accented editions, and later when the Mediaeval copyists made the transition from capital to minuscule. This means that we read the instances of  $\eta$  at a double remove, through the interpretations of at least two post-Homeric scholars. The problems with  $\eta$  are of course

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<sup>49</sup> This is a clear reflection of how written versions and oral performance must still have gone hand in hand.

<sup>50</sup> For early accentuation, see Probert 2006:48-50.

<sup>51</sup> See Probert 2006:49-50. In this second development, the possibility that the ninth century scribes were in possession of an earlier, fully accented papyrus must not be discounted. However, this will certainly not have been the case for every text.

not unique, but they serve as a concrete illustration of the challenges that the process of transmission posed, not only in the mediaeval and modern era, but even for scholars in antiquity.

§25 The scholion to A 219 shows that scholars in antiquity were aware of these ambiguities, and consciously made a decision to accentuate in a certain way, based on an analysis of the passage. For other particles these decisions are less problematic; exceptions are  $\tau\alpha\rho$ ,  $\delta\alpha\acute{\iota}$ , and elided particles that are ambiguous, like  $\tau'$  for  $\tau\epsilon$ ,  $\tau\omicron\iota$ , or the article  $\tau\acute{\alpha}$ . A large part of the scholia that concern σύνδεσμοι discuss exactly these questions of form.

§26 In two other respects, this scholion on ἦ is representative of the scholiasts' approach to particles. First, note that the word παραπληρωματικός occurs in line 2: the LSJ renders it as “expletive,” working as a “filler.” A typical way of describing σύνδεσμοι in antiquity, especially in the scholia, the term was used where the σύνδεσμος in question seemed redundant; I discuss the use of this term in greater detail below. Second, the scholiast of A 219 explains ἦ through analogy, comparing it to ἦτοι (l. 2) and δῆ (l. 2-3). Lacking a shared terminology, and probably also lacking any reason to offer in-depth analysis, giving a paraphrase or analogy is the scholiasts' preferred method to explain σύνδεσμοι.

§27 Before outlining the general tenor of discussions of particles in the scholia, I turn to the oldest traceable author in the scholia: Aristarchus. To keep up the attempt to present the material roughly chronologically, I first discuss the notes on σύνδεσμοι that Matthaïos ascribes to him.<sup>52</sup>

### 5.3 Aristarchus on σύνδεσμοι

§28 From the limited number of scholia attributed to Aristarchus, Matthaïos tries to establish the Homeric scholar's methods and terminology. His analysis of the complete corpus of Aristarchus' fragments allows him to establish better whether Aristarchus, and

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<sup>52</sup> The fragments are gathered in Matthaïos 1999:162-168, with an analysis on 566-585.

by extension the other librarians, study grammar for grammar's sake, or if he only uses it as a philological and exegetical tool. For the purpose of tracing the history of scholarship on particles, I focus only on his discussions of σύνδεσμοι.

§29 First there is the question of terminology. Praxiphanes, a fourth century BCE Peripatetic philosopher, reportedly already discussed redundant conjunctions,<sup>53</sup> but the term παραπληρωματικός probably does not go quite so far back. Similarly, when we find the term in Aristarchus' scholia, we cannot know if the scholia represent only his thoughts or actually his ipsissima verba. The same problem applies to Aristarchus' use of the term συμπλέκειν (Π 636a1) and συμπλεκτικός (copulative), which would later become another fixed category of σύνδεσμοι.<sup>54</sup>

§30 As regards the content of Aristarchus' scholia, his treatment of σύνδεσμοι is typical for the kind of comments we find in the scholia at large: they discuss σύνδεσμοι (1) as redundant or (2) in terms of interchangeability.<sup>55</sup> Although scholia most commonly mark particles as redundant,<sup>56</sup> Matthaios argues that it cannot be established that Aristarchus regards the παραπληρωματικοὶ σύνδεσμοι as a word category.<sup>57</sup> He solves other troublesome instances of particles by positing that one particle is used for another, like περ used instead of δὴ or γε, in the scholion to A 131. Elsewhere, Aristarchus is reported as regarding δαί as an equivalent of δέ and as a connective (συμπλεκτικός).<sup>58</sup> More remarkable is his note that in Homer a γάρ clause often comes first in causal constructions, commonly called anticipatory γάρ.<sup>59</sup> This argument may go back to his teacher and predecessor as

<sup>53</sup> Pseudo-Demetrius of Phaleron, *Style* 55 = Praxiphanes fr. 13 in Wehrli.

<sup>54</sup> Matthaios 1999:573 does not assume that Aristarchus already used the term συμπλεκτικός for copulative conjunctions.

<sup>55</sup> It is open to discussion whether this means that (1) many of the anonymous comments in the scholia should also be ascribed to Aristarchus, or that (2) Aristarchus' notes functioned as a model for later scholiasts.

<sup>56</sup> See Friedländer 1853:34; Aristarchus already discusses so-called apodotic δέ, see Matthaios 1999:571.

<sup>57</sup> For a discussion of the history of the category of σύνδεσμοι παραπληρωματικοί, see Sluiter (1997) 234-245.

<sup>58</sup> In the scholion to *Iliad* 10.408, Matthaios 1999:123, fragment 99:42-43, with commentary on pages 581-582.

<sup>59</sup> See Matthaios 1999:165 fr. 173 and the scholia in the notes for the relevant places, and page 574 for Aristarchus on γάρ. Also noted in Ax 1982:102-104 and Pagani 2011:43.

head of the *Mouseion*, Aristophanes of Byzantium.<sup>60</sup> In a similar vein, Apollonius Dyscolus reports that Aristarchus chooses the reading δαί over δ'αί (elided δέ + feminine nominative plural article αἱ), because Homer was wont to use δαί after question words.<sup>61</sup>

§31 Matthaïos concludes that Aristarchus and the other Alexandrian scholars did contribute to the development of a study of grammar, but that they never practiced it as a goal in and of itself;<sup>62</sup> the selection of scholia discussed below corroborates this view, and I discuss a range of examples concerning redundancy (2.5.4) and interchangeability (2.5.5). Then I give a brief overview what appears to have been a hot topic among scholiasts, namely the difference between ἄν and κεν (2.5.6). Finally, I turn to glimpses of deeper insight hidden among the many paraphrases and dismissals (2.5.7).

## 5.4 Redundancy

§32 By far the most frequent kind of comment on σύνδεσμοι in the scholia takes the form “X is redundant.”<sup>63</sup> Several words may be used to describe the function of many combiners as superfluous, or as a filler. In many scholia we find the term σύνδεσμος παραπληρωματικός, a “filling combiner.” The adjective παραπληρωματικός is also the term that would become the standard in grammar treatises to describe a certain group of σύνδεσμοι that appears (to the ancient grammarians before Apollonius Dyscolus) to have no clear function. In the scholia the words commonly used to describe redundant particles are περισσός (or -ττ-) and the verb περισσεύω (or -ττ-). The other options used regularly are forms of παρέλκω, πλεονάζω, παραπληρόω, and the phrase ἐκ πλήρους. Although the words clearly do not mean exactly the same thing, they appear to be used rather

<sup>60</sup> Matthaïos 1999:575, see also the scholion to Euripides *Phoenician Women* 886<sup>57</sup>.

<sup>61</sup> Apollonius Dyscolus, *Syntax* I 6, I 127; see Matthaïos 1999:581. A similar note may be found in the scholion to K 408. The scholia to the *Téchnê* repeat the observation: scholia to [Dionysius Thrax], in Uhlig's *Grammatici Graeci* I 3, 106.3-5 and 441.37.

<sup>62</sup> Matthaïos 1999:625 and 2001:90.

<sup>63</sup> As Friedländer noted too in his work on Aristonicus. Almost all his notes on *coniunctiones* found in the scholia concern redundancy: Friedländer 1853:33-35.

interchangeably. Particles that get the predicate ‘redundant’ or ‘filler’ most often are: κε,<sup>64</sup> δε,<sup>65</sup> περ,<sup>66</sup> πω/που,<sup>67</sup> and τε.<sup>68</sup>

## 5.5 Interchangeability

§33 In his work on the scholia by Aristonicus, Friedländer remarks about a note on περ used for δή: *Praeter illam particulae περ cum δή commutationem paucissimas conjunctionum enallagas notatas invenimus* (“Apart from this exchange of περ for δή, we have found very few exchanges of combiners noted”).<sup>69</sup> It is unclear if he is restricting himself only to scholia attributed to Aristonicus in this statement, but in any case offering a paraphrase in the form of another particle is a reasonably standard method in the scholia.

§34 The most frequent example of this type of comment is δε ἀντὶ τοῦ γάρ, δε used instead of γάρ, as in the scholion to β 6: ἔστι δ’ ὅτε καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ γάρ αἰτιολογικῶς λαμβάνεται [sc. δε] (“It also happens that [δε] is used instead of γάρ, with a causal sense”).<sup>70</sup> The terminology in this scholion is probably late, not Aristarchus or Aristonicus.<sup>71</sup> Similar is ἡδέ for καί (Z 149a, I 134a), and the other way around in O 670.

<sup>64</sup> For a list, see Erbse VI 1983:181. The listings given here and below are as complete as possible. The indices offered by Erbse are invaluable and in combination with the *TLG* give unheard-of access to the scholia, but even so some relevant notes will be missed. There is therefore no claim that the material is exhaustive, but we are confident that the themes and instances presented here at least form a good representation of the discussions of σύνδεσμοι in the scholia.

<sup>65</sup> For a list, see Erbse VI 1983:154.

<sup>66</sup> Erbse does not give a separate list, but see at least the following: A 352b, N 317, Ξ 1e, O 372-4, Y 21c, Φ 189 (where the scholiast compares ρ 46), X 416c, and Ω 750.

<sup>67</sup> For a list, see Erbse VI 1983:213 for πω and P 643a for που (παραπληρωματικός).

<sup>68</sup> For a list, see Erbse VI 1983:219.

<sup>69</sup> Friedländer 1853:35.

<sup>70</sup> See Erbse VI 1983:154 for an apparently exhaustive list of instances. To this may be added the list of *Odyssey* scholia in Matthaios 1999:164n1, and the scholia to Pindar: *Ol.* 2.106a[64] (quoted on the same page), *Ol.* 4.34b+c[22], *Ol.* 6.4b+c[3], *Ol.* 10.36-46[30], *Ol.* 10.47-50[39], *Ol.* 12.6-18[5-12], *Ol.* 13.83[60], *P.* 5.132[98], *P.* 6.38[38], *P.* 10.2-3[2], *N.* 4.95b[59].

<sup>71</sup> Matthaios 1999:573n43.

§35 In line with the discussions of δ', which could stand for δέ or δή, δέ is equated with δή.<sup>72</sup> In general, δή seems to have been a stable reference point in the centuries just before and after the beginning of the Common Era. In the scholion to E 258, γε is paraphrased as δή. In 1.131a, περ is said to be used instead of γε or δή. ἄρ' (or τ'ἄρ) is also equated with δή, in 18.6b. Likewise, ἄρα is simply rendered δή in the D scholion to 1.308,<sup>73</sup> which may be compared to the many glosses of the form: ἦ μάν (or ἦ μέν, or ἦ ῥα, or ἦ που, or ἦ μάλα, or ἦ θήν): ὁντως δή.<sup>74</sup> δή clearly had some kind of emphatic force at this time, and was thought to render the different nuances contained in this list of words. ἦτοι, ἄρα, ἔπειτα, δέ, μάν, μέν, γε, περ, and τ'ἄρ are all at one point or another paraphrased as δή.

§36 In the same way that the scholiasts substitute δή for a host of difficult particles, ἄρα is often noted as having an alternative reading in other manuscripts. In the scholion to 18.151 we find [οὐδέ κε] ἐν ἄλλω “οὐδ' ἄρα”; and likewise: 19.96a: [ἀλλ' ἄρα καὶ τόν] παρὰ Ἀριστοφάνει “ἀλλά νυ καὶ τόν” and 23.362 [ἄρα] γράφεται, {οἱ δ'} “ἅμα.” Finally, a scholiast observes that εἰ may be used as an equivalent of interrogative ἄρα (21.567a).

§37 The scholion to 7.89d (and 13.622b, 23.311c, 24.488a, 24.732a) explains an utterance-initial μέν thus: τὸ μέν ἀντὶ τοῦ μήν. A scholion to the same verse (H 89c) makes it a bit more complicated and argues that μέν is used instead of δέ, and that this hypothetical δέ would have the force of δή here, i.e. μέν = δή here.

§38 Another common interchange is found in the scholia to Pindar, which argue that ἀλλά is used instead of δέ: *Ol.* 3.40[23], *P.* 4.270a[152], *N.* 1.59[39], *N.* 2.32b[20], *I.* 6.47e[35]. One scholiast (to *P.* 8.20[15]) reverses the interchange: δέ for ἀλλά.

<sup>72</sup> For a list, see Erbse VI 1983:154, see also the scholia to Pindar, *Ol.* 2.102a[62] (δέ = δή), *Ol.* 9.33[21] (δέ τοι = δὴ οὖν), *Ol.* 10.63b[51] (δέ = δή), *Ol.* 13.69a[49] (δέ = δὴ οὖν).

<sup>73</sup> Note also the following scholia to Pindar *Ol.* 8.61-70[46], *Ol.* 10.51b[43] (ἄρα = δή), *P.* 4.337[189] (ῥα = δή),

<sup>74</sup> 1.77, 10.322 (ἦ μέν), 3.43 (ἦ που), 3.204, 8.102 (ἦ μάλα), 13.354 (ἦ μάν), 13.813 (ἦ θήν), 20.347 (ἦ ῥα).

## 5.6 ἄν and κε(v)

§39 Two other particles that were often treated as interchangeable are κε and ἄν. In discussing these words, the scholia are far from consistent. There is little doubt in my mind that the different scholiasts regarded κε and ἄν as words with different functions and possibilities, but it is unclear what these differences might have been, or if they would even have agreed on what distinguished the two. What the scholiasts appear to agree on is that κε is often redundant; by contrast, they say this much less often of ἄν. This tendency may well be a result of the obscure nature of κε, a word extremely rare in Greek literature outside of Homer and Hesiod, except in instances of allusive imitation. The confusion over the particle κε emerges from the scholia to 1.175a and 5.212:

(t5)

1.175 οἷ κε με τιμήσουσι

ὅτι<sup>75</sup> περισσὸς ὁ κέ σύνδεσμος, ἢ τὸ τιμήσουσιν ἀντὶ τοῦ τιμήσειαν.

[the sign] because the combiner κε is redundant, or τιμήσουσιν instead of τιμήσειαν.

5.212 εἰ δέ κε νοστήσω

ἀντὶ τοῦ νοστήσαιμι, ὥς “πληθὺν δ’ οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ ὀνομήνω” (2.488). περιττεύει δὲ καὶ ὁ κέ σύνδεσμος.

[νοστήσω] instead of νοστήσαιμι, like “I could not name the multitude” (*Iliad* 2.488). Also, the combiner κε is redundant.

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<sup>75</sup> In scholia ὅτι goes back to a construction like [ἢ διπλῇ] ὅτι (as preserved in example t8), explaining the critical sign in the edition; see Dickey 2007:122.

The authors of these scholia are rightly confused about the forms in these two constructions, arguing in both cases that the verb form should be replaced by an optative. In the first case the argument is understandable: “either κε is redundant, or the verb form should be optative.” The second, however, is confused: “[νοστήσω] instead of νοστήσαιμι, and κε is redundant.” Possibly the scholia do not regard κε as an equivalent of ἄν. The former is often discussed as being redundant (more than any other particle), whereas for ἄν redundancy is suggested only four times in the *Iliad* scholia.<sup>76</sup>

§40 In the scholion to I (9) 262a, the interchangeability is discussed in a typical way:

(t6)

9.262 ἐγὼ δέ κέ τοι καταλέξω

ἡ διπλῇ δὲ πρὸς τὸ σχῆμα, ὅτι ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐγὼ δ' ἄν σοι καταλέξαιμι, ἢ περισσὸς ὁ κέ.

the diplê placed at this construction, because [this construction] is instead of ἐγὼ δ' ἄν σοι καταλέξαιμι, or κε is redundant.

Either the construction is a variant for ἄν plus the optative, or it is a future, and κε is simply superfluous. For the scholiasts, clearly, ἄν was the standard particle that goes with the optative, and the standard means to explain the usage of κε. However, they seem to have believed that κε could be used simply as a filler too, without any bearing on the reading of the verb. The few notes on redundant ἄν (see note 27 below) fall in the same group, but the longer discussions suggest that the scholiasts had more trouble accepting a redundant instance of ἄν than of κε.<sup>77</sup>

<sup>76</sup> Erbse VI 1969:141, s.v. περισσὸς ὁ ἄν.

<sup>77</sup> See for Aristarchus on these particles Matthaios 1999:107-109, fr. 73-78 and pp. 363-373.



## 5.7 Noteworthy Readings of σύνδεσμοι

§41 Now that I have listed some of the most common discussions of σύνδεσμοι in the scholia, it is worthwhile to highlight some less common, and especially insightful comments. Among the repetitive kinds of comments discussed above, some others reveal a nascent awareness of the possible polyfunctionality of some σύνδεσμοι. These very few notes illustrate a broader interest in particles for which we have otherwise very little evidence outside of Apollonius Dyscolus' treatise.

§42 The quintessentially Homeric particle ἄρα clearly caused problems for the scholiasts, who knew the particle only in its classical “conclusive” sense; in most scholia the particle is simply ignored.<sup>78</sup> In the scholion to 16.147a, a scholiast paraphrases ἄρα as ὥς ἔοικεν, given it the force of rendering a realization by the speaker. For comparison the scholiast adduces Hesiod *Works and Days* 11: “οὐκ ἄρα μοῦνον,” adding that the realization marked by ἄρα may be contradictory to something previously stated or thought. Likewise, the scholion to 17.33 paraphrases οὐκ ἄρα σοί γε πατήρ ἦν with οὐκ ἦν ὥς ἔοικέ σοι πατήρ. These readings of ἄρα may well be much more productive than the explanations found in modern standard works, which regard marking “surprise” or “conclusion” as the main function of the particle.<sup>79</sup>

§43 The challenge of understanding ἄρα extends to the problematic particle or particle combination τ'ἄρ/ταρ.<sup>80</sup> Modern editors vacillate between spelling τ'ἄρ or τάρ, and this discussion goes back to the scholia. In the scholion to 1.93, τάρ is reported as one word (τέλειος), not from τε and ἄρ,<sup>81</sup> and the scholiast notes: οὐ δῆ, “it is not δῆ.” This is a puzzling note, as δῆ in this construction (οὐ τ'ἄρ, which would make οὐ δῆ) never occurs in

<sup>78</sup> In the scholion to 13.521, for example, οὐδ' ἄρα πω is rendered οὐδέπω, eliminating ἄρα in the paraphrase.

<sup>79</sup> See V.ἄρα and chapter 4 §34-§37.

<sup>80</sup> Katz 2007 argues that ταρ is one word, and that it might be a loanword from Luvian; see there for additional literature.

<sup>81</sup> In 1.65a this is echoed: οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὁ τέ σύνδεσμος; moreover, ταρ is described as a conclusive (ἐπιφερόμενος) enclitic combiner.

the *Iliad*, and only once in the *Odyssey* (7.239).<sup>82</sup> It does make sense if the scholiast normally takes (τ')ᾱρ as an equivalent of δῆ, to which this instance is an exception. This is supported by the scholion 18.6b, where τί τ'ᾱρ' αὖτε is paraphrased τί δὴ πάλιν. Another problem with τ'ᾱρ/ταρ is the palaeographic similarity to γάρ—majuscule τ and γ are easily confused. In the scholion to 18.182, Didymus discusses the variants γάρ and τάρ, and decides in favour of the former (*contra* Aristarchus) on the basis that Homer was wont to start with γάρ.<sup>83</sup>

§44 Another recurring discussion in the scholia is the concept of μέν *solitarium*, μέν used on its own. The scholiast on 4.301a finds a solitary μέν and asks simply: ποῦ ὁ δέ; “Where is the δέ?” This question is later integrated into the larger problem of the forms μέν (Ionic) – μήν (Attic, koinê) – μάν (Doric).<sup>84</sup> The scholion to 7.89d, mentioned above, explains an utterance-initial μέν as τὸ μέν ἀντὶ τοῦ μήν, but this comment reveals no awareness of the dialectal connection between the words. However, scholion 15.16a does remark that μάν is Doric.<sup>85</sup>

§45 Finally, the scholia contain some valuable notes on the position of σύνδεσμοι. Scholiasts, when confused about the sense of a passage, have recourse to rearranging the particles in the sequence, so that logical links between clauses are attained. 1.211-212a, for example, explains the sequence: ὥς ἔσεται περ, ὧδε γὰρ ἐξερέω with the paraphrase: ὥσπερ γὰρ ἔσται, οὕτω καὶ ἐρῶ. The scholiast speaks of a hyperbaton of γάρ, apparently to mean that γάρ is set far apart from its host clause.

§46 The comments selected above represent what I regard as the most remarkable discussions of σύνδεσμοι in the scholia. I have chosen them specifically because they

<sup>82</sup> This does leave instances of οὐδ' where the scholiasts may have wanted to read οὐ δ(ή).

<sup>83</sup> Elsewhere, in scholion 2.284a, Aristarchus himself argues for reading Ἀτρεΐδῃ, νῦν γάρ σε instead of Ἀτρεΐδῃ, νῦν δὴ σε (as most manuscripts), on the basis that in causal constructions Homer often starts with γάρ: ἔθος δὲ αὐτῷ (i.e. Ὀμήρῳ) ἀπὸ τοῦ γάρ ἄρχεσθαι; see Matthaios 1999:574-5 for a discussion. See chapter 3 §22-§29 and chapter 4 §11-§26 for more on γάρ beginning new parts of discourse in Homer and Pindar.

<sup>84</sup> Apparently first in Eustathius, see §87-§89 below.

<sup>85</sup> See also Haslam 2013:2-3 on a new scholion that reports Dionysius of Sidon preferring μήν over Aristarchus' μάν at *Iliad* 4.512.

anticipate a number of discussions about particles that still persist. The use of ἄρα in Homer still perplexes scholars, just as it confused the scholiasts, but their reading as “it appears” (ὥς ἔοικεν) may well be more helpful than the expression of a “lively feeling of interest” posited by Denniston.<sup>86</sup> The discussion surrounding τ’ἄρ/ταρ has recently revived because a particle “tar” has been found in Luvian. The word in Homer may thus be either a loanword or an inherited Indo-European word that has disappeared from later Greek. The scholia show that the possibility of a word ταρ was entertained even back then. The relation between μέν-μήν-μάν was discussed mostly in the nineteenth century, but our understanding of μέν in Homer still strongly depends on whether we assume a link with μήν or not.<sup>87</sup> Finally, the phrasing in the scholion to 1.211-212, “a hyperbaton of γάρ,” reveals an awareness of the link between a particle and its host act, or more precisely of the scope of particles.<sup>88</sup> The accumulated intuitions of several generations of scholiasts have thus laid the foundations for centuries of particle research.

## 6 The *Téchnê* and other early scholarship

### 6.1 A reference to Dionysius Thrax in the scholia

§47 The particle καί may serve as an illustration of the development of the study of particles from the scholia to the early grammarians. The scholia appear to have given little attention to καί. Whenever the scholiasts find καί in an unexpected position (particularly when it is in second position and not copulative) they merely comment only “καί is redundant.”<sup>89</sup> One possible exception is a comment in Eustathius (to *Iliad* 2.827), which Erbse believes might go back to a scholion: ἢ περιττὸς ὁ καί σύνδεσμος ἢ συμπλέκει καὶ ἕτερα θεόδοτα τῷ τόξῳ ἀγαθὰ (“either the combiner καί is redundant, or it conjoins also

<sup>86</sup> Denniston 1950<sup>2</sup>:33.

<sup>87</sup> See chapter 2 §46-§62 for μέν, in Homer and Pindar.

<sup>88</sup> See chapter 1 for more on scope; the concept is crucial throughout the research chapters.

<sup>89</sup> Erbse gives a list in part VI on page 179; Linke 1977:61 offers a few examples for the scholia to the *Odyssey*: 1.33, 8.154, 10.471, 11.453, 16.216.

other god-given goods to the bow”).<sup>90</sup> The comment indicates that *καί* is read as “also”. It is probable that in more cases “also” was a natural reading of *καί*, but we find this explanation only in one scholion.

§48 Even more exceptional is the scholion to *Iliad* 12.301. Its approach gives a glimpse into ways of describing more complicated uses of particles before Apollonius Dyscolus. The passage from the *Iliad* is as follows:

(t7)

βῆ ῥ' ἵμεν ὥς τε λέων ὄρεσίτροφος, ὅς τ' ἐπιδευῆς  
 δηρὸν ἔη κρειῶν, κέλεται δέ ἐ θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ  
 μήλων πειρήσοντα καὶ ἐς πυκινὸν δόμον ἐλθεῖν·

*Iliad* 12.299-301

And so he went, like a mountain-born lion that was without  
 meat for a long time, and whose proud spirit urges him  
 to go and attack καὶ the closely built sheep-fold.

About *καί* in line 301 the scholion adduces the analysis and paraphrase of Dionysius Thrax:

(t8)

...καὶ ὅτι ὁ *καί* περισσός ἐστιν. ὁ δὲ Διονύσιος [Dionysius Thrax] ὅτι δύναται  
 σημαίνειν τι πλεόν, οὕτως ἐνδεῆς τροφῆς ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ πεπυκνωμένον καὶ  
 ἡσφαλισμένον δόμον ἐλθεῖν.

Scholion to 12.301<sup>91</sup>

<sup>90</sup> The line is Πάνδαρος, ᾧ καὶ τόξον Ἀπόλλων αὐτὸς ἔδωκεν, the comment in Eustathius 354, 32.

<sup>91</sup> The scholion is attributed to Aristonicus.

...and because *καί* is redundant. Dionysius [Thrax], however, [argues] that it can signify something more: “so hungry for food that even to a fenced and secured fold he went.”

The scholiast proposes that *καί* is redundant here, meaning it should not be translated: “to go and attack the closely built sheep-fold.” Dionysius, conversely, proposes a paraphrase containing the construction *οὕτως...ὥστε* (so hungry...that) but without finding an adequate synonym for *καί*. I propose that we have here an attempt by Dionysius to render what we now call the scalar function of *καί* with the addition of *οὕτως...ὥστε*. With this paraphrase, then, Dionysius gives us a first attempt to express the force of *καί* as a scalar particle.<sup>92</sup>

§49 The scholion suggests that Dionysius’ analysis was a departure from the ideas of his predecessors, and illustrates that he was devoting time and energy to *σύνδεσμοι*. In his readings, Dionysius was both innovative and traditional, but his work is still a few steps removed from the analyses of Apollonius Dyscolus. Unfortunately, nothing more of Dionysius Thrax’ work on *σύνδεσμοι* is extant, so we will never know if he was an important precursor to Apollonius.

## 6.2 Trypho

§50 The first century BCE grammarian Trypho seems to have been a recognized authority in antiquity, as Apollonius Dyscolus refers to him most out of all his predecessors,<sup>93</sup> twenty times to discuss issues regarding *σύνδεσμοι*.<sup>94</sup> Trypho’s notes concern particles (43-46, 59-

<sup>92</sup> See IV.2 for a discussion of this function of *καί*.

<sup>93</sup> Fifty-two instances, for the numbers see Lallot 1997:I.16-17.

<sup>94</sup> Frr. 40-60, discussed in De Velsen [1853] 1965:34-45. De Velsen adds to Trypho’s fragments on *σύνδεσμοι* one note (fr. 61) by an anonymous grammarian on Trypho’s discussion of *ὥς*.

60) as well as words we now call conjunctions (ὅτι, τηνίκα, τοῦνεκα, διότι) or adverbs (ἔκρητι, χάριν).<sup>95</sup>

§51 The observations on σύνδεσμοι that we find in these notes are very much in line with those found in the scholia. Trypho comments on the interchangeability of σύνδεσμοι, as in the following note on *Odyssey* 10.501-2: τὸν γάρ ἀντὶ τοῦ δέ καὶ τὸν δέ ἀντὶ τοῦ γάρ.<sup>96</sup> Likewise, in another fragment he claims that μὲν γάρ is to be regarded as one particle, with the value of δέ.<sup>97</sup> Trypho also uses analogy to show that ἤ and δὴ are not different forms of the same word.<sup>98</sup> Most valuable, however, is the (partial) definition of redundant σύνδεσμοι that Apollonius attributes to Trypho:<sup>99</sup>

(t9)

Ὁ γοῦν Τρύφων ἐν τῷ ὄρω βουλόμενος καὶ αὐτοὺς (sc. τοὺς παραπληρωματικούς) ἐμπεριλαβεῖν φησί: “...καὶ τὸ κεχηνὸς τῆς ἐρμηνείας ἔστιν ὅπου παραπληρῶν”, ἀπέεικασε δὲ καὶ τινὰς αὐτῶν ταῖς καλουμέναις στοιβαῖς: “ὄν γάρ,” φησι, “τρόπον εἰς τὰς συνθέσεις τῶν ἀμφορέων εὐχρηστεῖ ἢ τῶν στοιβῶν παρένθεσις ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ καταθραύεσθαι τοὺς ἀμφορεῖς, τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὰ τῆς φράσεως μὴ τραχύνεσθαι ἥδε ἢ σύνταξις τῶν μορίων παραλαμβάνεται.

<sup>95</sup> Quite recently a *Téchnê* bearing the name of Trypho was found on a third century CE papyrus (P.Lond. 126). This text, like the one attributed to Dionysius Thrax, takes the form of a short (school) grammar. Towards the end of the extant part the section on conjunctions begins. The crucial first lines, containing a rough definition, are quite opaque, unfortunately. Whoever may have been the author of this papyrus, it is unlikely to have been the first century BCE grammarian.

<sup>96</sup> De Velsen [1853] 1965:40, fr. 52; the source is Apollonius Dyscolus, *Combiners* 240. In the same fragment, Trypho argues that γάρ can be redundant.

<sup>97</sup> De Velsen [1853] 1965:41, fr. 54 = Apollonius Dyscolus, *Combiners* 241.

<sup>98</sup> De Velsen [1853] 1965:44, fr. 59 = Apollonius Dyscolus, *Combiners* 257. Trypho notes that although the form of two words may be very similar, this does not mean anything for their meaning, adducing γαῖα - αἶα, μία - ἴα, and σῶς - ὤς.

<sup>99</sup> De Velsen [1853] 1965:35, fr. 41 = Apollonius Dyscolus, *Combiners* 247.23-29.

Trypho, for example, wanting to incorporate them [sc. the σύνδεσμοι παραπληρωματικοί] in the definition too, says: “it also happens that they fill the gap(s) of the utterance,” and moreover he compares some of them with what we call stuffings: “For,” he says, “in the way it is helpful, when putting amphoras together, to put stuffings in between so that the amphoras are not damaged, in just the same way, so that the constituents of the phrase do not become harsh, this combination of the μόρια<sup>100</sup> is used.”

Here we find a definition of σύνδεσμοι παραπληρωματικοί that resonates strongly with the definition of σύνδεσμοι in the *Téchnê*, but with a focus on filling the gaps (παραπλήρων, compare the variant reading πληροῦσα in the *Téchnê*). Trypho explains this with a metaphor of stuffing between amphoras: σύνδεσμοι παραπληρωματικοί serve to keep the other words from becoming “harsh.” It may remind us of the *Téchnê*’s definition of σύνδεσμοι παραπληρωματικοί, with its focus on metre and arrangement or euphony. Trypho further argues that σύνδεσμοι should be regarded as words (as opposed to syllables). Elsewhere, Trypho has posited: “[if] they are [words] they must mean something.”<sup>101</sup> If Trypho pursued this line of thought, his discussion is no longer extant. However, the combination of these two thoughts will form the basis of Apollonius Dyscolus’ discussion of σύνδεσμοι παραπληρωματικοί.

### 6.3 Apollonius the Sophist

§52 The author of a first century CE *Homer Lexicon* work appears to be of little significance in the development of the study of particles. However, his work has in places an overlap with the scholia, most notably with the scholion to 1.219 on η (quoted above on page 14-

<sup>100</sup> See above, §21-§22 for a short note on μόρια. Its use here is not entirely clear, and thus difficult to translate.

<sup>101</sup> *Combiners* 249.9-10: [εἰ λέ]ξεις, ὀφείλουσί τι δηλοῦν.

15).<sup>102</sup> Apollonius the Sophist gives a shorter version of the same note – omitting the references to Aristarchus, for example – so it is more likely that he incorporated this note from an earlier commentary on the *Iliad* than that the entry in his *Lexicon* was later incorporated into the scholia.

§53 Apollonius the Sophist’s work deserves some attention, however, because he notes diachronic development in the use of certain particles. In two instances he notes a difference in the use of a particle between Homer and “others,” as well as his own time. ἄρα, for example, is used for δὴ throughout Homer, but is in fact a syllogistic, conclusive particle in other authors.<sup>103</sup> Likewise, ἤτοι stands for μὲν in Homer, but is a disjunctive particle in other poets and in Sophistes’ time.<sup>104</sup> It is of paramount importance to understand that particle use changes over time, and Apollonius the Sophist is one of the first sources to bring up the topic.

#### 6.4 σύνδεσμοι in the *Téchnê*

§54 All of chapter 20 of the *Téchnê* is devoted to σύνδεσμοι. As I have discussed above, this part of the *Téchnê* probably does not go back to Dionysius Thrax, but looks like a later addition. Regardless of its exact date, perhaps somewhere between the first and third centuries CE, it is one of the few early discussions of σύνδεσμοι as a category. This systematic account of combiners begins with the following definition:

(t10)

Σύνδεσμός ἐστι λέξις συνδέουσα διάνοιαν μετὰ τάξεως καὶ τὸ τῆς ἐρμηνείας  
κεχηνὸς δηλοῦσα

<sup>102</sup> Apollonius Sophistes, *Lexicon Homericum* 81.27-82.8. The edition referred to is that by Bekker, published in 1833 and reproduced in 1967.

<sup>103</sup> Apollonius Sophistes, *Lexicon Homericum* 41.6, 43.13: ἄρα ἀντὶ τοῦ δὴ παρ’ Ὀμήρῳ διὰ παντός, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐν τῷ βίῳ συλλογιστικὸς σύνδεσμος.

<sup>104</sup> Apollonius Sophistes, *Lexicon Homericum* 85.5-7 καθ’ Ὁμηρον μὲν ἰσοδυναμεῖ τῷ μὲν συνδέσμῳ, (...) παρὰ δὲ ἡμῖν καὶ ἄλλοις ποιηταῖς διαζευκτικὸς σύνδεσμος.



*Téchnê* 20.1-2.

A combiner is a word that conjoins the thought through order and clarifies the gap{s} of the expression.

This definition assigns two functions to a σύνδεσμος: on the one hand a σύνδεσμος knits together units of thought (διάνοια) in an utterance by imposing order, and on the other it has an effect on gap(s) in the expression.<sup>105</sup>

§55 The first part is clear enough, but the second requires more discussion; the difficulty lies in κεχηνός δηλοῦσα: how can anything “clarify a gap”? In antiquity Heliodorus, in his commentary on the *Téchnê*, explains it as referring specifically to the disjunctive (διαζευκτικοί) combiners.<sup>106</sup> Modern editors do not lean that way. Swiggers and Wouters argue that it is because σύνδεσμοι have no propositional content that they can be said to “show the void in linguistic symbolization” (ἐρμηνεία).<sup>107</sup> Lallot, likewise, translates: “...et qui révèle l’implicite de l’expression.”<sup>108</sup> Kemp prefers the alternative reading πληροῦσα found in several manuscripts, a *lectio facilior* that allows him to translate: “...and fills up gaps in the expression.” In my translation I have followed the Greek as closely as possible, and aligned with Lallot as to the interpretation of δηλοῦσα. However opaquely, it appears that the definition in the *Téchnê* states that σύνδεσμοι serves to clarify what is unexpressed in language, such as those things implied, or perhaps the mode rather than the content of the utterance. Other definitions generally highlight the two functions of

<sup>105</sup> See Dickey 2007:239 for this translation of ἐρμηνεία.

<sup>106</sup> Commentary to Thrax’ *Téchnê*, attributed to Heliodorus, in: Hilgard, *Grammatici Graeci* 1.3:103 “Καὶ τὸ τῆς ἐρμηνείας κεχηνός δηλοῦσα.” Τοῦτό φησι διὰ τοὺς διαζευκτικούς συνδέσμους· ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ τὸ τῆς ἐρμηνείας, ὃ ἐστὶ τὸ τῆς διανοίας, διεζευγμένον καὶ διεστηκὸς δηλοῦσι·

<sup>107</sup> Swiggers and Wouters 1998:3.

<sup>108</sup> See Lallot 1998:231-241 for an extensive discussion of the definition. His definition is attractive because it highlights the importance of combiners with respect to the implicit or the “unsaid” in interaction. On the other hand, I am not sure if we can read quite as much into the κεχηνός of the definition.

σύνδεσμοι to impose order, and show some force (δύναμις).<sup>109</sup> The *Téchnê* does not express it in those terms, but its author may have been thinking of the same thing.

§56 The *Téchnê* continues with enumerating eight or nine subcategories groups of σύνδεσμοι: (1) συμπλεκτικοί (copulative),<sup>110</sup> (2) διαζευκτικοί (disjunctive),<sup>111</sup> (3) συναπτικοί (hypothetical),<sup>112</sup> (4) παρασυναπτικοί (continuative),<sup>113</sup> (5) αἰτιολογικοί (causal),<sup>114</sup> (6) ἀπορηματικοί (dubitative),<sup>115</sup> (7) συλλογιστικοί (conclusive),<sup>116</sup> (8) παραπληρωματικοί (filling/redundant),<sup>117</sup> the ninth subcategory, ἐναντιωματικοί (concessive), is reported as accepted only by “some.”<sup>118</sup>

§57 These subcategories, unfortunately, receive only cursory definitions, such as the following explanation of σύνδεσμοι παραπληρωματικοί:

(t11)

παραπληρωματικοὶ δὲ εἰσιν ὅσοι μέτρου ἢ κόσμου ἔνεκεν παραλαμβάνονται

*Téchnê* 20.24-25

...and fillers are those that are employed for the sake of metre or beauty<sup>119</sup>

Beyond such brief definitions, the *Téchnê* only gives a few examples for each subcategory; i.e. καί is συμπλεκτικός, ἢ is διαζευκτικός, ἵνα is αἰτιολογικός *et cetera*. This discussion of

<sup>109</sup> The term δύναμις is already applied to particles in the Homeric scholia, especially in forms of the verb ἰσοδυναμέω, e.g. in the scholion to *Iliad* 9.134 τὸ δὲ ἡδέ ψιλωτέον· σύνδεσμος γάρ ἐστιν ἰσοδυναμῶν τῷ καί (“ἡδέ has a smooth breathing. For it is a combiner with the same force as καί”).

<sup>110</sup> The *Téchnê* lists: μέν, δέ, τε, καί, ἀλλά, ἤμέν, ἡδέ, ἰδέ, ἀτάρ, αὐτάρ, ἥτοι, κεν, ἄν.

<sup>111</sup> ἢ, ἥτοι, ἡέ.

<sup>112</sup> εἴ, εἴπερ, εἰδή, εἰδήπερ.

<sup>113</sup> ἐπεί, ἐπείπερ, ἐπειδή, ἐπειδήπερ.

<sup>114</sup> ἵνα, ὅφρα, ὅπως, ἔνεκα, οὐνεκα, διό, διότι, καθ’ ὅ, καθ’ ὅτι, καθ’ ὅσον.

<sup>115</sup> ἄρα, κᾶτα, μῶν.

<sup>116</sup> ἄρα, ἀλλά, ἀλλαμήν, τοίνυν, τοιγάρτοι, τοιγαροῦν.

<sup>117</sup> δή, ῥα, νυ, που, τοι, θήν, ἄρ, δῆτα, περ, πω, μήν, ἄν, αὖ, νῦν.

<sup>118</sup> ἔμπης ὅμως.

<sup>119</sup> Kemp 1987 and Lallot 1985 translate κόσμου with “embellishment” and “ornament”, respectively; I have chosen a more neutral translation.

σύνδεσμοι reveals none of the insight or interest found in Thrax' comment quoted in the scholion to *Iliad* 12.301, and may serve as another argument that it is unlikely that chapter 20 of the *Téchnê* can be attributed to Thrax.

## 6.5 Pseudo-Demetrius' *Style*

§58 Before moving on to Apollonius Dyscolus I mention one more hard-to-date work, *Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας*, a treatise on *Style* traditionally attributed to the fourth to third century BCE philosopher Demetrius of Phaleron but whose authenticity has been questioned.<sup>120</sup> This work – now believed to have been written anytime in a five-hundred year time span (from third century BCE to second century CE) – is innovative because it discusses σύνδεσμοι with style, rather than grammar, in mind. The author's interest in style is apparent in the following passage on σύνδεσμοι παραπληρωματικοί:

(t12)

λαμβάνεται δὲ κἂν παθητικοῖς πολλάκις ὁ σύνδεσμος οὗτος [sc. δῆ], ὥσπερ  
ἐπὶ τῆς Καλυψοῦς πρὸς τὸν Ὀδυσσεά

Διογενὲς Λαερτιάδῃ πολυμήχαν' Ὀδυσσεῦ,  
οὕτω δὲ οἰκόνδε φίλῃν ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν... (*Odyssey* 5.204)

εἰ γοῦν τὸν σύνδεσμον ἐξέλοις, συνεξαιρήσεις καὶ τὸ πάθος.

Pseudo-Demetrius, *Style* 57

Also in emotional passages this combiner [sc. δῆ] is often used, as in the scene with Calypso in the *Odyssey*:

<sup>120</sup> Schenkeveld 1964:135-148 presents the discussion with relevant literature, and argues that the work must have been written in the first century CE or later. Morpurgo-Davies 1980:145 calls this a thesis born out of desperation. This is not the place to present the discussion, let alone join in, so I will focus only on the notes on σύνδεσμοι in the work.

Zeus-born Laertes' son, creative Odysseus,  
just like that, homeward to your beloved fatherland...

so if you were to take out the combiner, you would also take out the πάθος,

This explicit discussion of the πάθος that a σύνδεσμος contributes is unparalleled in early sources, other than Apollonius Dyscolus' discussion of γε.<sup>121</sup>

§59 Demetrius discusses these combiners only in the context of how they contribute to the “grand style,” he does not attempt to define them or categorize them. Perhaps exactly because of that reason, his notes contain a philological angle that is surprisingly rare in the scholia and early grammars. Because it falls outside the scope of his work, the author of *Style* does not make generalizations about σύνδεσμοι – for these, we have to go on to Apollonius Dyscolus.<sup>122</sup>

## 7 Apollonius Dyscolus

§60 The grammatical work done by Apollonius Dyscolus forms a watershed in the study of language, as far as can be established from the extant literature. Among his extant works I discuss in the present section first his *Syntax*, since in this general work he presents some general ideas about σύνδεσμοι. Then I turn to *Περὶ συνδέσμων*, the oldest extant study devoted entirely to combiners.

§61 Early on in his seminal work on *Syntax*, Apollonius attempts to define the category of σύνδεσμοι. He finds that these words tend to work in two important ways: first, they conjoin two or more phrases such that an essential connection is lost without their presence;<sup>123</sup> and second, like ἄρθρα (articles) and προθέσεις (prepositions), σύνδεσμοι can

<sup>121</sup> See below, §75. Elsewhere (Pseudo-Demetrius, *Style* 56) Demetrius notes that δὴ is used to mark a new beginning (*Iliad* 21.1), and that if the combiner had not been used, you might have thought Homer was still talking about the same thing.

<sup>122</sup> See IV.3 for Demetrius' discussion of *kôla* and *kómmata* in Greek prose.

<sup>123</sup> Apollonius Dyscolus, *Syntax* I.10.3–5. The edition used is Lallot 1997, vol. I.

only co-signify (συσημαίνειν), that is, they obtain meaning only when used in combination with nouns, verbs, and/or adverbs. Combiners co-signify in the following way:

(t13)

οἱ τε σύνδεσμοι πρὸς τὰς τῶν λόγων τάξεις ἢ ἀκολουθίας τὰς ἰδίας δυνάμεις  
παρεμφαίνουσιν

Apollonius Dyscolus, *Syntax* I 12.4-6

and the σύνδεσμοι, with respect to the positions or constructions of the  
phrases,<sup>124</sup> show<sup>125</sup> their individual forces<sup>126</sup>

Several different elements in this cryptic passage require explication. What is Apollonius saying here? Lallot interprets Apollonius to mean that σύνδεσμοι have their own force, but that context determines which specific σύνδεσμος should be used, as well as the particular force that the chosen σύνδεσμος acquires in the sentence.<sup>127</sup>

§62 The two aspects of context that determine a combiner's force are the τάξις and the ἀκολουθία of λόγοι. The meaning of τάξις here is clear: it refers to the order of phrases, as elsewhere in Apollonius.<sup>128</sup> Ἀκολουθία is more ambiguous. The term can be used to describe the succession of an argument, but this sense is unlikely given Apollonius' usage of the word: in general, ἀκολουθία in Apollonius refers either to agreement between words or to a pattern of regularity.<sup>129</sup> As an extension of this latter meaning I have translated ἀκολουθίας as "constructions": the relation between sequences of words and their specific

<sup>124</sup> On the difficult term λόγος in Apollonius Dyscolus, see Lallot 1997:II.10 and Dickey 2007:245.

<sup>125</sup> Or "add," as Lallot 1997:II.18 argues. The difference in sense is minimal, so I chose the more literal translation.

<sup>126</sup> Householder 1981:23 translates: "Conjunctions, too, may vary in force according to their position in the sentence or the context," which is a free translation amounting to the same thing.

<sup>127</sup> Lallot 1997:II.18, chapter 227.

<sup>128</sup> Consider, for example, *Syntax* I.96 ἐν δευτέρᾳ τάξει "in second position."

<sup>129</sup> See Dickey 2007:220; compare also the idiom ἐν ἀκολουθίᾳ in Apollonius Dyscolus, which means "regular" in the sense of regular versus irregular verbs or nouns.

meanings. Thus combiners co-signify not only with phrases, but also with the constructions that those phrases make up.<sup>130</sup>

§63 At first sight, Apollonius' definition of σύνδεσμοι may not appear to cover those combiners commonly gathered under the name σύνδεσμοι παραπληρωματικοί. Unlike his predecessors, however, Apollonius has concrete ideas about these “filling” combiners, and later in his *Syntax* he refers to the *Combiners*, the work in which he had developed these ideas more fully:

(t14)

οἱ γε μὴν καλούμενοι παραπληρωματικοί [sc. σύνδεσμοι] οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ  
δηλουμένου τὴν θέσιν ἔσχον. οὐ γὰρ ἀληθές ἐστιν, ὥς τινες ὑπέλαβον, μόνον  
αὐτοὺς ἀναπληροῦν τὸ κεχρηνὸς τῆς ἐρμηνείας καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰρῆσθαι  
παραπληρωματικούς· ὅτι γὰρ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν [sc. συνδέσμων  
παραπληρωματικῶν] ἔχει τινὰ δύναμιν, παρεστήσαμεν ἐν τῷ Περὶ  
Συνδέσμων.

Apollonius Dyscolus, *Syntax* III.127

However, those called filling [sc. combiners] do not get their name from their meaning. For it is not true, as some have understood it, that those [sc. filling combiners] only fill in the gaps of the expression, and it is because of this that they are called filling. That every one of them has some force, we showed in the work *Combiners*.

And further down:

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<sup>130</sup> This translation of ἀκολουθία would also work very well for Apollonius' discussion of the σύνδεσμοι παρασυναπτικοί in *Combiners* 82.13-16: ὁ καλούμενος παρασυναπτικός, ἔχων καὶ ἐπαγγελίαν τὴν τοῦ συμπλεκτικοῦ, ἐν οἷς <συμπλέκει λόγους>, ἔχων δὲ καὶ τὴν τοῦ συναπτικοῦ, ἐν οἷς ἀκολουθίας ἐστὶ παραστατικός (“the [kind of combiner] called παρασυναπτικός, which has both the meaning of the connective [sc. combiner], in that it connects words, and that of the hypothetical [sc. combiner], in that it is indicative of a <hypothetical> construction”).

(t15)

...σχεδὸν γὰρ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἰδιὸν τι ἐπηγγέλλετο

Apollonius Dyscolus, *Syntax* III.129

...for nearly each one of them signals something specific

These passages outline Apollonius' approach to those σύνδεσμοι he calls redundant, on which he expands in *Combiners*, the first and only work from antiquity known to be dedicated solely to σύνδεσμοι. The text of the treatise is damaged, apparently corrupt in places, and incomplete. Even so, it gives us more material on the subject than any other work. As Apollonius' definitions in the *Syntax* already suggest, his *Combiners* contains innovative insights about the workings of σύνδεσμοι in general and of specific instances.

§64 In *Combiners* 222.12, where he argues that negations are adverbs, not combiners,<sup>131</sup> Apollonius comes closest to defining combiners.<sup>132</sup> Later he argues that a combiner can be taken out and replaced with another, which is an important characteristic of words for Apollonius.<sup>133</sup>

§65 It is clear that Apollonius went much further than any of his predecessors in trying to grasp and define σύνδεσμοι. He gives many insightful discussions of individual σύνδεσμοι as a result. Apollonius discusses a number of words that we would consider conjunctions (ὅτι, ἔνεκα and cognates, διότι, ἵνα, ὅπως, ὅφρα) and the adverbially used

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<sup>131</sup> The five differences (between οὐ and ἤ, in this case) are the following: first, the two cannot be interchanged indiscriminately: οὐ is not the same as ἤ, even if the one can sometimes be placed instead of the other. Second, combiners co-signify, whereas negations have a clear inherent meaning. Third, combiners cannot form an utterance on their own, whereas negations can. Fourth, negations can have derived forms (οὐ and οὐχι), while ἤ cannot. Fifth, a negation with a verb forms a complete predicate, whereas ἤ with a verb needs another form, a second verb in this case.

<sup>132</sup> Although the very first part of the treatise (*Combiners* 214.4-215.26) discusses the form of the words briefly, an actual definition of the category is missing. This is striking, but this first part is so lacunose that we may posit that a concise definition was lost in transmission.

<sup>133</sup> See, for instance, *Combiners* 249.12-16. See also §70 on how Apollonius connects this with Trypho's thesis that "if they are words, they must mean something."

χάριν. The individual particles discussed are (in alphabetic order): ἄρα, ἄρα, αὐτάρ, γάρ, γε, δή, ἦρα, ἦ, ἦ, ἦτοι, θην, καίπερ, καίτοι, μέν, μέντοι, μών, νυ, οὐκοῦν, οὐκουν, οὖν, περ, που, τοίνυν, τοιγάρτοι, τοιγαροῦν, ὥν, as well as the combinations ἀλλὰ μήν, ἀλλὰ γάρ, ἄρα γε, δέ γε, καὶ μήν, μὲν γάρ. In the following subsections I first discuss Apollonius' notes on the subcategories of σύνδεσμοι that he identifies, and then I discuss his insights on individual σύνδεσμοι.

## 7.1 Subcategories

§66 As far as can be reconstructed from his damaged treatise, Apollonius uses roughly the same set of subcategories as can be found in the *Téchnê* although he adds a few and does not always use the same term. Unlike the *Téchnê*, he does not appear to discuss the subcategories one-by-one in a systematic order, but that lack of order may be a result of the state of the work. Probably for the same reason, not all of his definitions of the different subcategories are extant. For disjunctive, subdisjunctive, affirmative (Dalimier 2001:87 translates “manifestantes”), dubitative, syllogistic, and expletive conjunctions there are longer discussions; the other categories are mentioned only in passing.<sup>134</sup> In this section, I focus on Apollonius Dyscolus' definitions of the disjunctive, conclusive, and redundant combiners.

§67 Regarding disjunctive combiners, Apollonius makes a very pertinent observation. He asks the question: How can a word that combines, or conjoins (σύνδεσμος), be disjunctive (διαζευκτικός)? Is this not contradictory? His answer is that a disjunctive combiner conjoins words by presenting a disjunction in the words referred to:

(t16)

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<sup>134</sup> συμπλεκτικοί (copulative), διαζευκτικοί (disjunctive), παραδιαζευκτικοί (subdisjunctive), συναπτικοί (hypothetical), παρασυναπτικοί (continuative), διασαφητικοί (comparative), αἰτιολογικοί (causal), ἀποτελεσματικός (resultative), διαπορητικοί (dubitative), συλλογιστικοί (conclusive), παραπληρωματικοί (redundant).



εἰρηνται μὲν σύνδεσμοι ἔνεκα τοῦ συνδεῖν τὰς φράσεις (...) ἔνεκα δὲ τοῦ ἀπ’ αὐτῶν δηλουμένου διαζευκτικοὶ ὠνομάσθησαν, ὅλης γὰρ τῆς φράσεως <...><sup>135</sup>  
πράγματα διαζευγνύουσιν.

Apollonius Dyscolus, *Combiners* 216.2-6

The are called σύνδεσμοι because they join together the expression (...) and because of what they clarify they are called disjunctive, for of the entire expression they disjoin the facts.<sup>136</sup>

Apollonius’ explanation bears a striking resemblance to the definition given in the *Téchnê*:

(t17)

διαζευκτικοὶ δὲ εἰσιν ὅσοι τὴν μὲν φράσιν ἐπισυνδέουσιν, ἀπὸ δὲ πράγατος εἰς πᾶγμα διιστᾷσιν.

*Téchnê* 20.10-11

Disjunctive are those [sc. combiners] that conjoin the expression, but set one fact apart from another.

The resonance of the terms φράσις, συνδεῖν and most of all πράγματα must be significant.<sup>137</sup>

However the lacuna is resolved, the explanation in Apollonius is more extensive than the

<sup>135</sup> There is a lacuna in the text after φράσεως, Dalimier 2001:71n1 gives Schneider’s conjecture: ὅλης γὰρ τῆς φράσεως < ὄντες συνδετικοί, τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ > πράγματα διαζευγνύουσιν: “for, being conjoiners of the entire phrase, they disjoin the realities in them”; also giving a translation of Bekker’s proposal. Neither seems convincing to me, as what is expected in this sentence is not a revisiting of both sides of the σύνδεσμοι διαζευκτικοί, but (ἔνεκα δὲ) an explanation of why they are called διαζευκτικοί. In that sense, the lacunose clause as it stands is clear enough: “they disjoin the realities of the entire utterance.” Whatever is missing in the lacuna must be expected to only add clarity to the construction, no more.

<sup>136</sup> See De Kreij 2013 for a discussion of πᾶγμα in the definitions given in the *Téchnê* and in Apollonius’ *Combiners*; I follow Dalimier 2001:467, who reads πᾶγμα as “*Réalité pensée correspondant à un énoncé*,” which I translate as “fact.”

<sup>137</sup> Dalimier 2001:249n1+2 notes the similarities with definitions in the scholia to Dionysius Thrax, but fails to discuss the similarities with the definition in the *Téchnê*.

definition in the *Téchnê*, but its meaning is not as clear. Moreover, the term *δυστάσιν* in the *Téchnê*'s definition seems more advanced than *διαzeugnýousin*, as it explains the category (*διαzeugktikoi*) without resorting to the same root. The definition in the *Téchnê* appears to be further developed than that given by Apollonius; yet another argument to regard this part of the *Téchnê* as composed later than Apollonius Dyscolus.

§68 Apollonius Dyscolus discusses conclusive (*συλλογιστικοί*) *σύνδεσμοι* several times, and mentions they used to be called *ἐπιφορικοί* by the Stoics.<sup>138</sup> If the *Téchnê* was indeed written by Dionysius Thrax, we may have perhaps expected to find this term, but this is not the case. Rather, like Apollonius, the *Téchnê* uses the word *ἐπιφορά*, “conclusion,” in his definition, but never the adjective *ἐπιφορικός*.<sup>139</sup>

§69 Doubtlessly, Apollonius' most important contribution to the study of *σύνδεσμοι* is the contention that redundant combiners (*σύνδεσμοι παραπληρωματικοί*) are not only fillers. Recall that Trypho had compared *σύνδεσμοι* to pieces of cloth placed as buffers between amphorae.<sup>140</sup> Apollonius discusses the fact that some scholars say that *σύνδεσμοι παραπληρωματικοί* should not be called *σύνδεσμοι*, since they do not conjoin parts of the utterance as such.<sup>141</sup> While Apollonius concedes that not all *σύνδεσμοι παραπληρωματικοί* actually combine,<sup>142</sup> he leans toward the views of one author (conjectured to be the Stoic Chairemon)<sup>143</sup> who argues that since these words look like combiners formally (*τύπῳ*), they should be designated as such.<sup>144</sup>

<sup>138</sup> Apollonius Dyscolus, *Combiners* 251.28.

<sup>139</sup> See Dalimier 2001:411-412 for a discussion of the two definitions.

<sup>140</sup> See §51 for the text and the reference.

<sup>141</sup> *Combiners* 247.30-248.1 Ἔτι δὲ καὶ τινὲς φασιν οὐ δεόντως αὐτοὺς συνδέσμους εἰρῆσθαι, εἴγε συνδέσεως λόγων οὐκ εἰσὶν αἵτιοι, see §53-§54 above.

<sup>142</sup> *Combiners* 247.30-248.1: ἔτι δὲ καὶ τινὲς φασιν οὐ δεόντως αὐτοὺς συνδέσμους εἰρῆσθαι, εἴγε συνδέσεως λόγων οὐκ εἰσὶν αἵτιοι.

<sup>143</sup> On the conjecture <Χαιρήμων> (248.1) by Bekker, see Dalimier 2001:385-386. For the argument that Apollonius Dyscolus' work has much in common with the ideas of the Stoics, see Blank 1982.

<sup>144</sup> After adducing the examples of patronymics that may not give a father's name, but are still called patronymics, and of masculine words that do not actually denote something masculine, but are still called

§70 After reporting Trypho's discussion of σύνδεσμοι παραπληρωματικοί (see §51 above), Apollonius adds the following “for this we will plead too, having added something extra.”<sup>145</sup> The “something extra” Apollonius actually deduces from a premise by Trypho quoted earlier in the work: “[if] they are [words] they must *mean* something.”<sup>146</sup> What Apollonius is hinting at, and what he develops in his treatise *Combiners*, is that even expletive particles (can) contribute meaning to a sentence.<sup>147</sup> He argues that one characteristic of words is their interchangeability, the fact that they can be replaced by synonyms, such as αὐτάρ for δέ.<sup>148</sup> Moreover, even enclitics are actual words, as shown by the fact that they can bear the accent when placed next to each other. Thus, Apollonius concludes, if on formal grounds σύνδεσμοι may be regarded as words, they should mean something. Finally, he argues that just because a word is redundant in one utterance does not mean it ceases to be a word. He points out that an adjective λευκώλενος that is redundant in one passage is not redundant at all in another context.<sup>149</sup> Likewise, he argues, so-called fillers are not always redundant.

§71 Apollonius then moves on to another problem with the category. Unlike the copulative, disjunctive, or causal σύνδεσμοι, the παραπληρωματικοί cannot be said to all do roughly the same thing:<sup>150</sup>

(t18)

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masculine, he says οὕτω καὶ ἂν τύπῳ ἧ ὁ παραπληρωματικὸς κεχορηγημένος συνδεσμικῶ, μὴ μὴν δηλουμένῳ, εἰρήσεται σύνδεσμος, in Apollonius Dyscolus, *Combiners* 248.8-9.

<sup>145</sup> ὧ καὶ συνηγορήσωμεν, ἔτι τινὰ προσθέντες. De Velsen [1853] 1965:44 also notes this addition by Apollonius.

<sup>146</sup> *Combiners* 249.9-10: [εἰ λέ]ξεις, ὁφείλουσί τι δηλοῦν.

<sup>147</sup> Regarding the argument that Apollonius Dyscolus is the first to claim this, see Wouters 1979:85n55 and Pecorella 1962:187-188.

<sup>148</sup> Apollonius Dyscolus, *Combiners* 249.13.

<sup>149</sup> Apollonius Dyscolus, *Combiners* 249.21-30; he compares λευκώλενος in *Iliad* 6.377 (πῆ ἔβη Ἀνδρομάχη λευκώλενος;) and *Iliad* 1.55 (λευκώλενος Ἥρη).

<sup>150</sup> At the same time, some σύνδεσμοι παραπληρωματικοί have the same function and therefore need not be discussed separately: “It would be redundant to discuss ῥα after δὴ ... as we use them for the same thing [i.e. marking transitions]” (252.11-13).

οἱ μέντοι παραπληρωματικοὶ οὐχ ἔν ἐπηγγέλλοντο κατὰ τὸ δηλούμενον. εἴγε  
ὁ μὲν δὴ περιγραφὴν τινα ἐδήλου, ὁ δὲ πέρ ἐναντιότητά τινα μετ' αὐξήσεως,  
καὶ ἔτι ὁ γέ μειότητα ἢ ἐπίτασιν θαυμασμοῦ, καὶ εἰ διάφοροι κατὰ τὸ  
δηλούμενον, πῶς ἦν δυνατόν μίαν ὀνομασίαν ἀπὸ τοῦ δηλουμένου χωρίσαι;

Apollonius Dyscolus, *Combiners* 253.15-18

Still, the filling [combiners] do not say one thing as to their meaning. If δὴ  
signals a kind of summary,<sup>151</sup> περ indicates an opposition and amplification,  
and further γε signals limitation or underlines the amazement, and if they  
differ as to their meaning, how would it be possible to set them apart under  
one name [i.e. category] based on their meaning?

Apollonius answers this question by arguing that the majority of instances must have  
priority over the minority: copulative (συμπλεκτικοί) combiners often connect even if they  
are sometimes redundant – so they are rightly called copulative combiners. Similarly,  
σύνδεσμοι παραπληρωματικοί are filling in the majority of instances, hence their name.<sup>152</sup>

## 7.2 Important topics raised by Apollonius

§72 In the present section I focus on three discussions in the *Combiners* that coincide with  
three lines of research important to our monograph: (1) particles and prosody, (2) particles  
working above the sentence level, and (3) the polyfunctionality of particles.<sup>153</sup>

§73 First, on the issue of prosody, consider the following comment on καίπερ:

(t19)

ὑπεναντίωσιν γὰρ ἐδήλωσεν ὁ καί<περ>, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι διὰ τὸν πέρ, ὅπου γε  
καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν ὁ πέρ ἐναντιωματικός ἐστι μετ' αὐξήσεως.

<sup>151</sup> See the discussion in §74 below.

<sup>152</sup> Apollonius Dyscolus, *Combiners* 252.22-28.

<sup>153</sup> Notes on other particles by Apollonius will be referenced in the relevant places in the monograph.

Apollonius Dyscolus, *Combiners* 251.3.

καίπερ shows an opposition,<sup>154</sup> and it is clear that this is because of περ, as also on its own περ is concessive with amplification.

The combination καίπερ is described as getting its force from περ, as both combiners have the same function. The concessive force of περ is clear enough, and repeated in all later descriptions of the particle, but more notable is the comment on amplification (αὐξήσις). When he talks of “amplification,” Apollonius appears to be thinking of some form of emphasis: compare a similar comment in the *Syntax*, where Apollonius is more explicit: [σημαίνει] ἐναντιότητα ὁ πέρ μετ’ αὐξήσεως ἐμφατικῆς (“along with a concessive force, περ brings emphatic amplification”).<sup>155</sup> What Apollonius has in mind by “amplification” is not self-evident, but I envision some kind of prosodic emphasis resulting from the addition of the enclitic περ.<sup>156</sup>

§74 Apollonius touches upon another important dimension of the function of σύνδεσμοι παραπληρωματικοί in his attempt to describe the function of δή, often called redundant. He argues that it can effect a transition in discourse, having an effect similar to that of a περιγραφή, a summary, before one moves on to the next topic:

(t20)

Ἦτι ὁ δὴ ὥς μὲν παρέλκει, παντὶ προὔπτον· ὥς δὲ καὶ πολλάκις μετάβασιν  
λόγου ποιεῖται, σαφὲς ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων

<sup>154</sup> Dalimier translates “contrariété supposée,” with a discussion on page 407, but a quick look at the other 30-ish other instances of this word in the TLG shows there is no reason to translate it as anything other than simply: opposition or contradiction. The question remains why Apollonius chooses ὑπεναντίωσιν over ἐναντίωσιν. It is tempting to regard the ὑπ- part as an indication that καίπερ shows an *implied* opposition. καίπερ signals that the clause it is in will in some way contradict the clause that follows after or comes before (such as: *Even though he was a good man, he died a horrible death*).

<sup>155</sup> Apollonius Dyscolus, *Syntax* chapter 129.16.

<sup>156</sup> Out of the five instances of αὐξήσις and cognates in Apollonius three are in the description of περ, the other two in descriptions of the inflections of cases. As a result, they are not much help in explaining what Apollonius means here.

οἱ μὲν δὴ παρ' ὅχεσφιν ἐρητύοντο μένοντες (*Iliad* 15.3)

καὶ τῶν παραπλησίων. νοοῦμεν γὰρ λόγου ἔκλειψιν καὶ ἀρχὴν ἑτέρου, ὥς εἰ  
καὶ ἐν περιγραφῇ κατελιμπάνετο ὁμοίως τῷ

ὥς οἱ μὲν Τρῶες φυλακὰς ἔχον (*Iliad* 9.1)

ὥς ὁ μὲν ἔνθ' ἤρᾱτο (*Odyssey* 7.1).

∴

Also for δὴ, that it is redundant is obvious, but that it also often effects a transition of discourse is clear from the following

And they then were stopped around their chariots, waiting, (*Iliad* 15.3)

and similar [verses]. For we see a leaving off from [one part of] the discourse and the beginning of another, as if also leaving it with a summary, similar to:

Thus, the Trojans set up guards (*Iliad* 9.1)

Thus, he prayed there (*Odyssey* 7.1).

Apollonius compares the constructions οἱ μὲν δὴ and ὥς X μὲν, both occurring often in transitional passages in Homer. Both constructions signal to the reader that one episode is left behind, and another begins.<sup>157</sup> Apollonius' analysis of δὴ in this context shows a crucial new step in the study of σύνδεσμοι. Rather than discussing the function of a σύνδεσμος only with respect to the surrounding words or the host clause, he shows how important it is to consider the place of a σύνδεσμος, or string of σύνδεσμοι, in the larger discourse. Here he has noted the common occurrence (καὶ τῶν παραπλησίων) of δὴ in such summarizing verses just before a transition to a new episode.

<sup>157</sup> For more literature on δὴ, see V.δὴ.

§75 Finally, Apollonius shows a nascent awareness of the polyfunctionality of particles, that is, they can do different things depending on the context (remember his claim that combiners co-signify). When discussing σύνδεσμοι and the subcategories to which they are assigned, Apollonius often points out that categorization is not sacred: ἄρα, for example, though it generally has a conclusive force, can also be redundant, in clauses like ὥς ἄρα μιν εἰπόντα τέλος θανάτοιο κάλυψε (“so then, when he had spoken, the end of death enveloped him,” *Iliad* 16.502).<sup>158</sup> Likewise, γε is often used as a filler, but that is not the case in constructions like καλῶς γε, where it intensifies the emotion (ἐκπληξίς), nor in τοῦτό γε μοι χάρισαι, “grant me just this one thing.” He adds ἔμφασις ἱκανὴ μειότητος καὶ τοῦ μηδὲν ἀποφαινομένου, “the suggestion of limitation is sufficient, even if nothing expresses it explicitly.”<sup>159</sup> That is to say, τοῦτό γε μοι χάρισαι on its own is enough to convey “grant me just this one thing” rather than “grant me this one thing.” Here, Apollonius is in fact contemplating the polyfunctionality of certain combiners. This reminds us of the brief definition he gives in the *Syntax*,<sup>160</sup> where he argues that combiners can have different forces depending on context. Even though the examples in the *Conjunctions* describe combiners that can either have a function or be redundant, he is the first to attempt explanation of this phenomenon.<sup>161</sup>

§76 Apollonius’ *ad hoc* discussions of σύνδεσμοι contain several observations essential even for the modern student of particles. While his reading of περ may seem vague, it hints at an insight that is missing in all early and much of the modern literature. His observation that σύνδεσμοι may be connected to emphasis may be linked to prosody, an issue that we will pick up in several of the research chapters. His analysis of δὴ as a word that can effect transitions between larger stretches of narrative suggests that he thinks that σύνδεσμοι are

<sup>158</sup> Quoted in Apollonius Dyscolus, *Combiners* 254.22-25.

<sup>159</sup> Apollonius Dyscolus, *Combiners* 250.6-10.

<sup>160</sup> See §61 above.

<sup>161</sup> Compare for example the *Téchnê*, which simply list some particles under more than one category, without further explanation.

relevant not only to the current and preceding clause, but also to larger subdivisions of discourse.<sup>162</sup> Finally, Apollonius reminds us throughout that σύνδεσμοι need not be limited to doing or meaning one thing, but can have multiple functions, depending on the context. Although he never comes to an all-encompassing description of redundant σύνδεσμοι that does justice to the combiners he collects under that term, the multiple angles from which he approaches these words must have made the ancient reader nod to the rhetorical question he asks:

(t21)

Πῶς οὖν ἔτι οὐδὲν πληροῦσιν οἱ παραπληρωματικοί;

Apollonius Dyscolus, *Conjunctions* 250.11-12.

How can we then still [say] that fillers add nothing?

## 8 After Apollonius Dyscolus

§77 Apollonius' work was not preserved by chance; his work on grammar remained the standard work on Greek grammar all through the middle ages. Still, some later scholars deserve mention: first his son and pupil Aelius Herodianus, and second Priscian, who wrote a Latin grammar in the fifth century CE based strongly on Apollonius' work. In between these figures come the majority of the extant grammatical papyri. To these scholars and works I now turn.

### 8.1 Early Grammars

§78 Herodian, like his father, produced works on grammar himself, and these works include some notes on σύνδεσμοι.<sup>163</sup> The work's manner of organization enables us to establish

<sup>162</sup> See chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, IV.2, and IV.3.

<sup>163</sup> Aelius Herodianus, *General Prosody* 515-520.



what categories of σύνδεσμοι Herodian recognized.<sup>164</sup> Since most of his work is devoted to accents, however, his work does not yield any analyses of the function of σύνδεσμοι.<sup>165</sup>

§79 The oldest substantial extant grammatical papyrus (P.Yale I. 25, first century CE) discusses fewer subcategories of σύνδεσμοι than Apollonius and Herodian. The seven categories in the papyrus are, conversely, roughly the same as those listed in the *Téchnê* attributed to Thrax, though worded differently.<sup>166</sup> More importantly, the papyrus attempts a definition of σύνδεσμος:

(t22)

σύνδεσμος δ' ἐστὶν λέξις συνάπτουσα  
τὰ μέρη τῆς ἑρμενεύσεως.

P. Yale I 25, 54-55

and a combiner is a word that joins together  
the parts of the expression.

The simplicity of the definition is striking, especially compared to all the other extant definitions.<sup>167</sup> Scholars have therefore concluded that it is a simple school grammar, designed with the practical aim of listing and describing lexical categories rather than providing a philosophical foundation of the workings of language. This conclusion may be extended to most of the papyri from this genre, dating from the second to the sixth century CE.<sup>168</sup>

<sup>164</sup> συμπλεκτικοί, διαζευκτικοί, παραδιαζευκτικοί, συναπτικοί, παρασυναπτικοί, διασαφητικοί, αἰτιολογικοί, διαπορητικοί, συλλογιστικοί, παραπληρωματικοί.

<sup>165</sup> Many of his notes are also preserved in the scholia to the *Iliad*.

<sup>166</sup> παραλαμβάνεται (...) χάρις συνπλοκῆς, [χάρις] διαζεύξεως, [χάρις] ἀκολουθίας, [χάρις] αἰτίας, [χάρις] ἀπορίας, [χάρις] συλλογισμοῦ, [χάρις] τοῦ μὴ κεχρημέναι τὴν σύνθεσιν.

<sup>167</sup> See I.3 for the similarity between this simple definition and modern attempts at defining particles and discourse markers.

<sup>168</sup> See Di Benedetto 1958-1959 and Wouters 1979 and 1995; Wouters 1995:97 promises more papyri to be published in the Oxyrhynchus series, but as far as I have been able to establish, this has not happened yet.

§80 This brings us to the end of antiquity, and to a grammarian who flourished around 500 CE, Priscian. His *Institutions of Grammar* describes the Latin language and is strongly influenced by Appollonius. In the book devoted to combiners (book XVI), Priscian gives one of the most comprehensive definitions of combiners in antiquity:<sup>169</sup>

(t23)

*Coniunctio est pars orationis indeclinabilis, coniunctiva aliarum partium orationis, quibus consignificat, vim vel ordinationem demonstrans*

Priscian *Institutions of Grammar* XVI I.1-2 (Keil III.93.1-2)

A combiner is an indeclinable part of the expression, which connects the other parts of the expression, with which it co-signifies, signalling either a force [of its own] or the arrangement [of the parts of the utterance]

All separate aspects of Priscian's definition can be traced back to his predecessors, but this is the first time we find the elements combined. In book XVI of the *Institutions of Grammar*, Priscian discusses only a small selection of combiners, and often has recourse to giving Greek translations. The list of subcategories that Priscian identifies comes closest to that found in Herodian, but he has added a few categories not mentioned before. After listing all possible kinds of conjunctions,<sup>170</sup> Priscian devotes only a few lines to most kinds and none to some. Two apparent additions to the list, the *coniunctiones ablativae* and *praesumptivae*, remain undiscussed, which makes it hard to guess what he meant with them (hence the lack of translation) and which combiners he had in mind.

§81 In the centuries following Apollonius Dyscolus, grammars leaned heavily on his work, but there is little evidence for actual progress in the thinking about combiners. The

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<sup>169</sup> The edition used is Keil 1859 *Grammatici Latini*, volumes II and III.

<sup>170</sup> *Copulativa, continuativa, subcontinuativa, adiunctiva, causalis, effectiva, approbativa, disiunctiva, subdisiunctiva, disertiva, ablativa, praesumptiva, adversativa, collectiva vel rationalis, dubitativa, confirmativa, completiva*, see Keil III.93.13-16.

genre of the school grammar emerged, and several examples are extant. For all these papyri their function is directly reflected in a focus on categorizing and exemplifying rather than analyzing combiners. Priscian wrote an entirely different kind of work, but as far as the study of combiners is concerned, he presents a synthesis of earlier ideas rather than innovative analyses.

## 8.2 Late Antique Scholia to the *Téchnê*

§82 By the fourth century CE, the *Téchnê* attributed to Dionysius Thrax appears to have become a common and often-copied work, and its manuscripts gathered a mass of scholia and commentaries over the centuries.<sup>171</sup> These scholia and commentaries are some of the few grammatical sources we can date with certainty, falling between the fifth and tenth centuries. Overall, the additions they propose as regards the analysis σύνδεσμοι appear to be taken directly from Apollonius Dyscolus or other sources.

§83 Heliodorus,<sup>172</sup> in his commentary on the *Téchnê*, offers a revised definition of σύνδεσμος, which according to Pecorella is to be attributed to Apollonius.<sup>173</sup> The definition adds several characteristics in comparison with the definition in the *Téchnê*:<sup>174</sup>

(t24)

σύνδεσμος ἐστὶ μέρος λόγου ἄκλιτον, συνδετικὸν τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν, οἷς καὶ συσσημαίνει, ἢ τάξιν ἢ δύναμιν <ἢ καὶ τάξιν καὶ δύναμιν> παριστῶν.

Heliodorus *Commentary to Dionysius Thrax*<sup>175</sup>

<sup>171</sup> Pecorella 1962:186-196.

<sup>172</sup> These commentators are hard to date, but Heliodorus is certainly later than the sixth century, as he excerpts the sixth century grammarian Choeroboscus. Schmidhauser (2010:509) dates him to the ninth century.

<sup>173</sup> Pecorella 1962:188 posits that it would have figured in one of the lost parts of the *Syntax* (strikingly, not in the *Combiners*).

<sup>174</sup> See §57 above.

a combiner is an indeclinable part of speech, to bind together the parts of speech, with which it co-signifies, showing either order or force <or both order and force>.

Note the striking similarity with Priscian's definition, which I discuss above: "a combiner is an indeclinable part of the expression, which connects the other parts of the expression, with which it co-signifies, signalling either a force [of its own] or the arrangement [of the parts of the utterance]." <sup>176</sup> It is generally assumed, and may be observed in comparison, that Priscian based much of his *Institutions* on Apollonius Dyscolus' work, which supports Pecorella's hypothesis that this definition is in fact to be attributed to Apollonius. The definition combines different ideas in a way that fits well with our sense of Apollonius' approach to σύνδεσμοι. It is, in addition, more intricate than the definitions we find in the different *Téchnai*. Since a definition of σύνδεσμοι is extant in Apollonius' *Syntax*, <sup>177</sup> I find it more likely that the source both for Priscian and for Heliodorus was the definition of σύνδεσμοι in a lost part of Apollonius' *Combiners*.

§84 Apart from this definition, which is thus probably to be attributed to Apollonius, the scholia to the *Téchnê* cannot be said to offer new insights. Although the scholia expand upon their source text, the *Téchnê* attributed to Thrax, they do not form a body of innovative research when regarded in the broader scholarly context.

### 8.3 The Medieval lexicographers

§85 Other more or less datable sources are Hesychius' *Lexicon*, the *Suidas*, and Eustathius' commentary to Homer. Hesychius' lexicon, as we would expect from the genre to which it belongs, rarely offers more than synonyms for σύνδεσμοι, which in turn usually have an analogue in the scholia. However, the lexicon's value lies in the fact that it was readily

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<sup>175</sup> The edition used is Hilgard 1901, with this passage on page 102. The words between <...> are an emendation by Hilgard.

<sup>176</sup> Pecorella fails to mention this similarity in his commentary.

<sup>177</sup> Apollonius Dyscolus, *Syntax* I 12.4-6, quoted and discussed in §61 above.

available to early modern researchers, as opposed to the scholia that were by that period attested in only a few manuscripts and thus were hardly accessible. The lexicon's popularity is probably why we find regular references to Hesychius in works from the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth century.

§86 The *Suidas* lexicon from the tenth century generally gives some more information per lemma than Hesychius, but like Hesychius the *Suidas* does not so much add new knowledge as compile older knowledge.

§87 Moderately more significant are Eustathius' commentaries on the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, based in large part on the scholia. Indeed, Eustathius' explanations of σύνδεσμοι do not add much to the scholia. His classifications of individual σύνδεσμοι have a different focus than the scholia – he regards καί as redundant more often than δέ, for example – few of his comments on σύνδεσμοι are noteworthy, except for the following two on γάρ and μήν.

§88 On γάρ at *Iliad* 17.221, Eustathius remarks that it is either redundant, or gives the cause for something left out (“ἐλλειψεώς τινος”). The latter part of his comment adumbrates a whole tradition of positing ellipsis to explain the use of γάρ in problematic instances.<sup>178</sup> The topic of ellipsis returns in a discussion of γάρ in dialogue.<sup>179</sup> In this context implications and presuppositions are extremely relevant to particle use; as will become apparent, our approach acknowledges the value of these early views.

§89 On μήν, Eustathius is the first attested author to note its relation to μέν and μάν in other dialects, where μέν is Ionic, μάν Doric (which had already been noted in the scholia), and μήν is “most common,” presumably in the Greek that he knew.<sup>180</sup> This realization would later lead to a reassessment of μέν as more than just one part of a μέν - δέ construction.<sup>181</sup>

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<sup>178</sup> See V.γάρ for literature.

<sup>179</sup> See III.4.

<sup>180</sup> Eustathius, *Commentary* chapter 500.8-9.

<sup>181</sup> See V.μέν for more literature, and chapter 2 §46-§62 for an analysis of μέν in Homer and Pindar.

## 9 A renaissance of the particle

§90 The incomplete material left to us strongly suggests that after Apollonius Dyscolus not much innovative work on σύνδεσμοι was done until the sixteenth century. This is when Devarius wrote his *Liber de Graecae Linguae Particulis* (1588), a fully extant work on particles that would form the basis for all discussions of particles until well into the nineteenth century. He set a new standard on form, quantity, and quality, yet his definition illustrates his strong dependence on the ancient scholarship:

(t25)

Constitui de Graecae linguae vocibus quibusdam agere, quae tametsi rem ipsae per se nullam fere significant; tamen in aliarum vocum constructione positae vim aliquam habent, efficacitatemque: seu emphasim aut certe qualitatem aliam sermoni tribuunt. (...) modique alicuius aut ordinis veluti signa sunt; continuandique aut transeundi, aut interrogandi, aut dubitandi, aut ratiocinandi, aut qualitatem aliam referendi vim habent.

Devarius 1588:1

I have undertaken to discuss a number of Greek words, which, although they themselves signify almost nothing, still when put into constructions with other words have some force (*vis*) and power (*efficacitas*): they add either emphasis or some other quality to the utterance. (...) They are like signs of some mode or order, and have a continuative, transitional, interrogative, dubitative, or ratiocinative force, or a force that conveys some other quality.

Unlike Apollonius and his other predecessors, Devarius discussed the particles not in groups of functions, but rather per lexical item, roughly in alphabetical order.<sup>182</sup> This organization made for a much more systematic work, and required Devarius (the first to do this as far as we know) to decide which specific lexical items to include and exclude from the category he defined as *particulae*.<sup>183</sup>

§91 It is in fact the process of selection that would become a central point in many of the later works on Greek particles: there is hardly any agreement between the authors who worked from the sixteenth to the twenty-first century about the exact definition of the word “particle,” or the delineation of the group of words to be gathered under the term. Note, however, that it was not until the sixteenth century that delineation of the category was regarded as an actual problem.<sup>184</sup> Devarius’ landmark work led to a new appreciation for particles and laid the foundations for the important scholarly works by Hoogeveen (1769), Hartung (1832-1833), Klotz (1842), Bäumlein (1861), and Denniston (1934).

<sup>182</sup> The extremely inclusive list of particles and combinations that Devarius discusses are, in order: ἀλλά, ἀλλὰ γάρ, ἀλλ’ εἴπερ, ἀλλ’ εἰ ἄρα, ἀλλ’ ἦ, ἀλλ’ ἦ, ἀλλὰ μή, ἀλλὰ μήν, ἀλλά νή Δία, ἄλλοτι, ἀλλ’ ὅτι, ἄλλοτι ἦ, ἄλλοτι οὖν, ἄλλως τε καί, ἀμέλει, ἄν, ἄνθ’ ὧν, ἄνθ’ ὁτοῦ, ἄρα, ἀτάρ, αὐτάρ, ἄτινα, ἀτεχνῶς, αὖ, αὐτίκα, αὐτός, ἄχρι, μέχρι, γάρ, γε, γε δή, γέ τοι, γοῦν, δέ, δαί, δεῖνα, δή, δήπου, δῆθεν, δῆτα, Διά, δ’ οὖν, ἐάν, εἰ, εἰ βούλει δέ, εἰ δέ μή, εἰ καί, εἰ μή, εἴπερ, εἰς, εἴτα, ἐμοί, ἔνεκα ἐμοῦ, ἐπεί, ἐπειδή, ἔπειτα, ἐξ ὧν, ἀφ’ ὧν, ἔξω, ἐς, ἔστε, ἔτι τοίνυν, ἐφ’ ὅσον, ἐφ’ ὧ, ἐφ’ οἷς, ἐφ’ ὅ, ἔως, τέως, ἦ, ἦ, ἦ που, ἦ γάρ, ἦ γάρ ἄν, ἦδη, ἦ μάλα δή, ἦ μήν, ἦπου, ἦ οὐ [sic], ἦτοι, ἴνα, καθό, καθ’ ὅτι, καθ’ ὅσον, καί, καί μήν, καί μέντοι, καί μὲν δή, καί τοίνυν, καίτοι, καί δή, κἄν, κούδ’ οὖν, μά, μέν, μέντοι, μὲν οὖν, μέχρι, μέχρις, μή, μήν, μή γάρ, μή δῆτα, μή ὅτι, μή οὐ, μή οὐκ, μήποτε, μήτι, μήτις, μή τοι γε, μόνον οὐ, μόνον οὐκ, μῶν, ναί, νή Δία, νῦν δέ, ὁ, ὅδε, ἦδε, τόδε, ὃ δῆποτε, οἷος, οἷον, οἷμοι, ὅμως, ὅπη, ὅπου, ὁπότε, ὅπως, ὅς, ὅσος, ὅση, ὅσον, τόσος, ὅτε, ὅτι, ὅτι μή, ὅτι τοίνυν, οὐ, οὐκ, οὐ γάρ, οὐ γάρ δή, οὐ γάρ ἄν που, οὐ γάρ που, οὐ γάρ ἀλλά, οὐδ’ εἰ, οὐδέν, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον, οὐδὲ γάρ οὐδέ, οὐδὲ μήν, οὐ δῆτα, οὐκοῦν, οὐκουν, οὐ μέν, οὐ μέντοι ἀλλά, οὐ μή, οὐ μήν, οὐ γάρ ὅπως, οὕτως, οὐ μὴν οὐδέ, οὐ μὴν ἀλλά, οὐδέ, οὐ μὴν πω, οὖν, οὔτι, οὔ τοι, οὐχ ὅτι, οὐχ ὅπως, οὐχ οἷον, οὐχ ὅσον, οὐ τοίνυν, πάνυ γε, πάνυ τοι, πάλιν, παρ’ ὅ, παρ’ ὅσον, περ, πῆ, πλήν, ποῦ, πρίν, προς, πῶς, σχολῇ, τὸ μέν, τὸ δέ, τὰ μέν, τὰ δέ, ταῦτα, προ τοῦ, ταύτη, ταχύ, τί, τί δέ...εἰ μή, τί δή, τί μήν, ποιός, τὸ καὶ τό, τὸ μέν τι, τὸ δέ τι, τοιοῦτος, τοῦτο μέν, τοῦτο δέ, τοι, τοίνυν, τοῦ, τῷ, ὑπέρ, ὑπὲρ ὧν, φεῦ, ὦ, ὦν, ὡς, ὥστε, ἄγε, φέρε, ἴθι, δεῦρο, ἵτε, ἔστιν ὅτε, ἔστιν οὐ, ἔστιν ὡς, ἐστὶ, τί δέ, τί οὖν, ἄπαγε, οὐαί, ὦ.

<sup>183</sup> Both Budaeus and Stephanus already used the term, like the ancient Latin grammarians, but Devarius first treated it as an independent – if very diverse – group.

<sup>184</sup> This is not to say that there were no discussions about which grammatical category several lexical items belonged to, as we find these as early as in the Homeric scholia. However, there was no attention given to a normative definition of the category. As n. 1 shows, however, even in modern times there are more modern scholars who note the problem than those who attempt to tackle it.

## Appendix B: A Guide to Scholarship on μήν

### Etymology

HOOGVEEN 1769:774 suspects the same origin for μή, μά, and μήν. HARTUNG 1833:373 believes in a link with Latin *immo*, and the latter would then be a compositum. STEPHENS 1837:149-150 suggests an analogy between μήν, μάν, μέν, and the root μέν-ω and *man-eo*, to mean: “there still remains something to be said.” POTT 1836:323 believes μά is from μάλα, which is in turn a contraction from μεγάλα. μήν thus has a meaning like *maxime* and cannot be connected to *immo* (from *infimo*, suggesting a semantic value closer to *minime*), as HARTUNG would have it. However, the formation would be unclear; it might be a neuter comparative of μέγα, like *magis* in Latin. AHRENS 1859:357-359 follows POTT in connecting μήν to μά, and regarding them as linked to μάλα, which is also often found in affirmations. Against POTT, however, he sees no link with μέγας, but rather with Gothic *váila* and Latin reinforcing *vel*, as well as *mel-ior* and βέλτερος. μάν, finally, was originally μάλ, where the impossible final -λ either changed to a -ν or fell away, as in μά.

BRUGMANN 1885:I.119 and DELBRÜCK 1897:II.506-511 argue for a link with old-Indic *sma* (Indogermanic *sme* or *sma*), an idea discussed most elaborately by DELBRÜCK. Both *sma* and μέν emphasize the word preceding them: pronouns, demonstratives, nouns, verbs, and particles (including negations). Neither particle has anything to do with conjunction of sentences, except when it emphasizes a preceding conjunctive word. SCHWYZER 1950:569 adds that μέν, μά, μάν (and Attic μήν) form an etymological unit like κε(ν), κα, κᾶ. Especially after certain verb forms, μέν and old-Indic *sma* have an effect over the predicate. HUMBERT 1960:416 is also certain that μήν (μάν), μά, and μέν are to be connected to Sanskrit *sma*, meaning “*en vérité*.” The analogy is shown by similar combinations like *ma sma* = μὴ μήν, and *sa sma* = ὃ μέν. See CHANTRAINE 1968 (995), FRISK 1954-1972 (227), and BEEKES 2010 (944-945) for the same view.



BUDÉ 1529

1294-1300

[Notes in a work on the Greek language with material from **POETRY** and **PROSE**.]

μήν on its own is like γοῦν, but also like αὖ and ὅμως, meaning *tamen*. καὶ μήν means *atqui* or *et quidem*. γε μήν in **XENOPHON** is *vero*. οὐ μὴν ἀλλά, although it contains a negation, has an affirmative force. It can also be used in tmesis: οὐ μὴν – ἀλλά. οὐδὲ μήν and οὐτὲ μήν are both the same as οὐ μέντοι, meaning *nec tamen* or *nec vero*. μήν can also be adversative, as in the combination ὅμως μήν. **HOMER** writes οὐ μάν for οὐ μήν; the construction οὐκ μάν οἶδ' is like an affirmation. Sometimes, μήν is used instead of δέ or γε μήν.

ESTIENNE 1572

II, 1623-1626

[Alphabetic entry<sup>1</sup> in a thesaurus of the Greek language with material from all of Greek literature, ranging from **HOMER** to **THEMISTIUS**.]

μήν used on its own, answering a μέν clause, has the function of δέ. BUDAEUS translates this *caeterum*. μήν also often means *tamen* when μέν precedes. In some other cases BUDAEUS reads it as δή or γοῦν, but here too it might be translated *tamen*. μάν is the Doric form of μήν.

For ἀλλὰ μήν see [V.ἀλλά]. γε μήν means *vero* and *porro*,<sup>2</sup> but according to BUDAEUS it is similar to μέντοι. ἤ μήν means *certe quidem* or *profecto*, and is used often in oaths (**HOMER** uses both ἤ μήν and ἤ μάν). καὶ μήν in **HOMER** means *quinetiam*, both in direct speech and in narrative. BUDAEUS translates *et quidem* or *atqui* especially when a καί follows (καὶ μήν καί). Likewise, καὶ μὴν οὐδέ is *atqui neque* or *neque vero*. καὶ μὴν δή means *immo* or *enimvero*. καὶ μὴν εἰ is *quod si*, but might also be translated *atqui si*. καὶ μὴν που (καί) means *et quidem*, found in the assumption in **PLATO**. When used in questions, it is not adversative, but should

<sup>1</sup> The discussion of μήν and cognates is in fact to be found in the *Adiicienda* to the second volume.

<sup>2</sup> I have marked this observation, because the translation *porro* suggests Stephanus sees a progressive use for γε μήν.

be translated *quinetiam* or *praeterea*. μὴ μὴν (in HOMER μὴ μάν) and οὐ μὴν mean *non tamen*, but the latter can also be *verum non* or *sed non*.

DEVARIUS 1588

133

[Alphabetic entry in a monograph on particles with material from POETRY and PROSE]

μὴν is generally adversative, meaning ὅμως, unless added to other particles. BUDAEUS' belief that it can be read as γε/γοῦν or αὖ is unfounded. In some combinations, like ἀλλὰ μὴν, οὐδὲ μὴν, and καὶ μὴν it retains its full adversative force, but when added to affirmative particles like ἤ and ναί, it also becomes affirmative.

VIGER 1632

537

[Monograph on the Greek language.]

μὴν in combinations: ἀλλὰ τί μὴν; γε μὴν, καὶ μὴν, οὐ μὴν. οὐ μὴν means *neque tamen*. In the combination οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καί it is *verum enimvero*.<sup>3</sup>

HOOGEVEEN 1769

I, 774-778; II, 989-992; II,

1297-1299

[Alphabetic entry in a monograph on particles with material from POETRY and PROSE.]

μή, μά, and μὴν might have the same origin, since they have the same force, affirming the seriousness [of an utterance] (*“seriumque in confirmando animum”* 774), or affirming something in its own right, or placed between two opposed things, where it urges earnestly for the latter of the two. μὴν differs from τοί in that it simply affirms the part it is attached to; from δή in that it expresses triumph, almost, (*quasi triumphat*) in affirming something; from γε in that γε emphasizes (*urget*) what follows, but forces the preceding to the background (*remittendo*), while μὴν affirms what follows, and does not force back the preceding.

The affirmative force of μὴν is almost always accompanied by asseveration. The affirmative force (*βεβαιωτικός*) is primary, even where it is called adversative (HESYCHIUS

<sup>3</sup> Vigerus devotes no attention to single μὴν or μάν in his work, only to combinations; see V.ἀλλὰ, V.γε, V.καί.

confirms this, when he glosses ναὶ μήν as ὅντως δή,<sup>4</sup> so it means *revera, profecto*). It can also be rendered *tamen*.

When it is adjoined to a negation that itself follows a negation, it strengthens this negation. The affirmative force is augmented when it is added in an example used to make a point, where it might be rendered *quamquam* in Latin, or “trouwens” in Dutch.

STEPHANUS argues that μήν can be used for δέ, basing himself on a reading by BUDAEUS of *ALCIPHON*; this is not certain.

An adversative force is also attributed to μήν, but this should be regarded as a usage rather than a force. In itself it is not adversative, but in affirming something, it engenders an adversative relation. THOMAS MAGISTER<sup>5</sup> believes μήν can also be redundant (παραπληρωματικός), but none of his examples holds water.

As for combinations,<sup>6</sup> οὐ μήν or οὐδὲ μήν (– γε) are not, like μέντοι, always adversative, as DEVARIUS would have it. Rather, οὐδὲ picks up an earlier negation, adds another, and this new negation is then affirmed by μήν (“*stabilit*” 989), and γε has its conclusive (περιγραφικός) force; it may be translated *neque sane quidem*.<sup>7</sup> Of its possible uses, one is that of reigning in desire, “*ubi τὸ γὰρ usum προθυμητικὸν adjuvat adstringendo*” (991).

τί μήν is a concessive formula in affirmative responses, constructed out of interrogative τί and affirmative μήν. The affirmation is so strong, that it hardly differs from confirmation. ἀλλὰ τί μήν differs from τί μήν in that the former is used when one interlocutor has made a mistake and asks of the other one to tell him what the right thing is.

<sup>4</sup> See Appendix A for more information on HESYCHIUS, as well as similar paraphrases from the *Iliad* scholia.

<sup>5</sup> A 13<sup>th</sup>-14<sup>th</sup> century Byzantine scholar.

<sup>6</sup> For ἀλλὰ μήν see V.ἀλλά, for γε μήν see V.γε, for ἦ μήν see V.ἦ, and for καὶ μήν, see V.καί.

<sup>7</sup> Hoogeveen then lists five different ways of employing this combination, the differences between which are not entirely clear. In any case, he maintains the same force for the group.

ZEUNIVS<sup>8</sup> 1778

422; 537

[Alphabetic entry in the section on adverbs<sup>9</sup> in VIGERUS' work on the Greek language with material from POETRY and PROSE]

μήν is primarily affirmative (βεβαιωτικός), meaning *quidem, sane, revera*. It can also work as δέ and as such have an adversative force, and might be translated *tamen*. THOMAS MAGISTER claims μήν is redundant ([1832]:240 “τὸ μήν παρὰ μὲν ποιηταῖς ἄργόν, παρὰ δὲ ῥήτορσιν ἀντὶ τοῦ δέ” [ἄργός = idle]) but this is refuted by HOOGEVEEN.<sup>10</sup>

Instead of δέ, μήν can answer μὲν.

STURZ 1801

149

μήν in XENOPHON

[Alphabetic entry in a lexicon to XENOPHON]

μήν (THOMAS MAGISTER notes it is used instead of δέ and often with γε, preceding or following it) means *vero, at* (in responses), *at vero, tandem*, but also *igitur, quaeso*. In questions, it answers doubting or negating statements, πῶς μήν τάναντία ἐδιδάσκετε (XENOPHON *Education of Cyrus* 1.6.28). τί μήν is used like πῶς γὰρ οὐ, or τί γὰρ οὐ.

δὲ μήν is rendered *certe* by LEUNCLAVIS<sup>11</sup> καὶ μήν is *et vero* or *quin etiam*, or *at vero*, or *porro*; οὐ μήν is *neque tamen* or *atqui non*; οὐδὲ μήν or οὔτε μήν is *nec quidem* or *quin ne quidem*.

μὲν and μήν were often interchanged, as ERNESTUS<sup>12</sup> warns.<sup>13</sup>

THIERSCH 1826

549

μήν in HOMER

<sup>8</sup> These are notes given in the third edition (1822) of Vigerus' 1644 work, divided from the main text by square brackets, and signed at the end by the author. The date is the year given at the end of Zeunius' introduction to the work (page xvi).

<sup>9</sup> Although he does speak of the “particle” μήν: “Particulae μήν vis primaria est βεβαιωτική.”

<sup>10</sup> See above.

<sup>11</sup> Johannes LEUNCLAVIS, a German philologist who produced a Latin translation of XENOPHON'S works in 1569.

<sup>12</sup> Johannes August ERNESTUS, a German philologist who produced an edition of XENOPHON'S *Memorable thoughts of Socrates* in 1763.

<sup>13</sup> For ἀλλὰ μήν see ἀλλά V. ἀλλά, for ἤ μήν see ἤ V. ἤ.

[Alphabetic entry in a monograph on grammar with material from HOMER.]

μήν, like δῆ, serves to emphasize. For reasons of metre, it is sometimes found in the form of μέν, but it retains its meaning.

HARTUNG 1833

II, 372-390

[Thematic chapter in a monograph on particles covering μήν, μέν, and collocations, with material from POETRY and PROSE.]

μήν is one of the two emphatic (*bekräftigend*) particles in Greek, with ἤ. It is very close in meaning and use to *vero*, with the proviso that *vero*, in contrast to μήν, can form a sentence on its own, and that *vero* generally occurs on its own, whereas μήν is often accompanied by other particles, such as γέ, καί, τοί.

Where μήν appears to be used without answering to something preceding, this is only because what it responds to is hidden, elided; μήν never becomes an actual adverb. This shows in the fact it can never stand in first position. μήν always takes other particles with it unless it follows an imperative or an interrogative. In all other cases it follows an affirmative (ἤ), negative (οὐ, μή), copulative (καί), or adversative (ἀλλά) particle.

ἤ μήν is used in direct and indirect speech, and generally introduces oaths. οὐ μήν and μὴ μήν are used similarly, but less often.

In καὶ μήν, καί is sometimes conjunctive, for which the ATTIC<sup>14</sup> authors would use καὶ μέντοι. Most often in this combination, καί is simply responsive, as in καὶ γάρ and καὶ δῆ,<sup>15</sup> showing that a requirement is met, expressing willingness to meet a request, or fulfilling a request. Where the clause it answers is missing, a clause like ὥστερ καὶ λέγεις or ὥστερ καὶ δοκεῖ is to be supplied.

ἀλλὰ μήν expresses a request, a willingness, or a sudden realization.

<sup>14</sup> “Attic” is in a normal font when it refers to the dialect, and a special font only when it refers to the corpus of Attic prose and/or poetry.

<sup>15</sup> See for both combinations V.καί.

In cases where there is another clause the μήν clause answers to in accord, it becomes a responsive conjunction, since the related clause tends to come first. By adding μήν to the second clause of the pair, this clause is not only emphasized, but also intensified and amplified. In this transitional (*Uebergang-machend*, μεταβατικός) use it rarely occurs on its own, but rather more often in combinations.

οὐ μήν and οὐδὲ μήν are intensified negations (*negative Steigerungen*). Their positive counterpart are καὶ μήν (*und vollends* or simply an emphatically uttered *und, auch*), καὶ μὴν καί (*und vollends auch*), and καὶ μὴν οὐδέ (*und vollends auch nicht*). In καὶ μήν, καί is often linked to the word immediately following μήν, but it may also govern the entire sentence.

γε μήν differs from μήν only in that the first word is highlighted with special emphasis.

ἀλλὰ μήν is often used in the second premise of the syllogism in **PHILOSOPHY**, and in like connections.

In cases where the μήν clause contradicts another clause, it can either come first, as a concessive clause, or second, as an affirmative (*festhaltende*) assertion. The former of these two uses does not occur very often for μήν, but more clearly so in the combination καὶ μήν, and in certain **HOMERIC** uses of ἤ μήν and οὐ μήν.

Most common is the adversative meaning (*Bedeutung*) of μήν, again rarely occurring on its own in **EPIC** and **ATTIC** authors, apparently more often in its Doric form in **LYRIC**. It may also be employed at the entrance of a new character, although generally καὶ μήν is used in such cases. More commonly in this adversative meaning, we find the combination γε μήν. Alternatively, μήν follows ἤ (**HESYCHIUS** and the **SUDA** gloss ἤ μήν as ἀλλ'ὅμως or ἀλλ'οὕν), οὐ, or μή.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> For οὐ μὴν ἀλλά, see V.ἀλλά.

In καὶ μήν, καί is adversative like in καίτοι and καίπερ,<sup>17</sup> καὶ μήν relates to καίτοι roughly like μέν relates to ἦτοι (“Καὶ μήν verhält sich zu καίτοι etwa wie μέν sich verhält zu ἦτοι” 389). ἀλλὰ μήν speaks for itself.<sup>18</sup>

SPITZNER 1832-1836 (1833)	I.2 xx-xxxi	μήν in HOMER
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See [Guide to Scholarship on μέν]

NÄGELSBACH 1834	I, 153-175	μήν in HOMER
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[Notes on μήν, μάν, and μέν in a monograph on the ILIAD.]

The basic meaning of this μήν, μάν, and μέν (the forms are only dialectal variants) is not hard to establish, its use in oath formulas: ἦ μήν, μὴ μήν, μὴ μάν, ἦ μέν, μὴ μέν (the last two IONIC) clearly shows it has an affirmative (*betheuernde*) force.

There are more affirmative particles, in HOMER ἦ, τοι, and ἦτοι, so it is to be established what exactly μήν does. Its basic force is assertive, affirmative (*behauptend, versichernd, betheuernd*), and as a result the clause affirmed by μήν can enter into an opposition with either the preceding or the following.

μήν developed like *zwar* in German, from strengthening to concessive, and from there gaining a preparatory force, without an opposition necessarily following. Since μήν comes after the most important (*gewichtigste*) word in the clause, and serves this word, it can never come at the start of the sentence.

ἦ μέν<sup>19</sup> is used for oaths, for clauses that must not be taken as less than the preceding, and are often in direct opposition to it, and it can claim something that is contradicted in the following clause. In οὐ μέν, the particle strengthens the negation. It can stand in opposition to something preceding or following. This adversative force also comes back in

<sup>17</sup> For both combinations, see V.καί.

<sup>18</sup> The claim is Hartung's, but his examples do not speak for themselves. It may be expected that Hartung here supposes an adversative force for the combination, as it follows in the entry of its 'most common' adversative meaning.

<sup>19</sup> Nägelsbach makes no functional distinction between μέν, μάν, and μήν, so in the following, I will simply give the forms he uses.

οὐ μὲν δὴ and οὐ μὲν τοι. The opposition may also be with something implied, typically at the beginning of direct speech.

καὶ μὴν affirms the following, the new addition in the rest of the clause. Since it affirms not just something, but something new, it serves as a marker of the progression that the narrative makes with those new additions (“indem diese Partikel hier nicht überhaupt Etwas, sondern etwas Neues bekräftigt, dient Sie zum Merkzeichen des Fortschritts, den die Erzählung mit jenen neuen Angaben macht” 165).<sup>20</sup> Or the affirmation is emphasized by the placement of the different phrases: “[d]ie Betheuerung ist b) durch die örtlichen Verhältnisse der Stellen zum förmlichen Gegensatz gegen Anderes emporgetrieben worden.”

In ἀτὰρ μὴν, ἀλλὰ μὴν the particle serves to reinforce. Νῦν μὲν δὴ (without following δέ) is always used with the future tense, at the start of speeches, to introduce things that are sure to happen. The speeches announce the fulfilment of some action or research, which is signalled by δὴ. εἰ μὲν δὴ (without following δέ), occurring at the beginning of speeches, normally introduces assumptions to establish if assertions made earlier are true.

μὲν with the imperative (or other forms that “order”) marks the fervent hope that the thing commanded is actually done, to be translated *doch* (*endlich*).

After demonstrative pronouns with a recapitulating function, μὲν has a transitional function, similar to the one it has in καὶ μὴν, establishing the pronoun as the starting point for a new series of thoughts. In a similar function it is found in ἔνθα μὲν and ὥς μὲν. ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν is affirmative.

Although μὲν (outside of μὲν - δέ constructions) generally has nothing to do with sentence connection, sometimes it appears to be answered by καί or τε, as if by δέ. In practice, however, μὲν can always be shown to function independently in such instances.

<sup>20</sup> Nägelsbach calls this “eine äusserliche Verrichtung,” which might be translated “an external act.”



[Alphabetic entry in a grammar.]

μήν is an affirmative adverb, as HARTUNG 1833 and NÄGELSBACH 1834 noted, expressing emphasis, reinforcement, and has the same uses as Latin *vero*. It can never stand in first position, since it generally leans on another word, the most important word in the sentence, especially (“*namentlich*”) on particles. In requests it follows the imperative form; in questions it follows the interrogative word.

It has a threefold use: either (1) it simply affirms something, or it affirms something to oppose it either (2) to what precedes, or (3) to what follows. The two sentences in opposition can either be in accord with each other or in discord. In the case of accord μήν marks not just a reinforcement, but an amplification of what is said.

For combinations, the same three possibilities apply. ἤ μήν means “*wahrlich*,” “*traun*,” and is used especially in oaths. οὐ μήν, μὴ μήν mean “*wahrlich nicht*.” καὶ μήν is used in contexts where καί is a connecting conjunction: “*und wahrlich*,” though sometimes an unexpressed thought is to be supplied, like ὥσπερ καὶ λέγεις, and then it is to be translated “*ja wahrlich*.” When the καὶ μήν clause is in opposition to what precedes, καί either refers to the word directly following μήν, or to the entire sentences. The combination is used when a new declaration is made with force (“*wenn eine neue Angabe bekräftigend angeführt wird*” 392), in **DRAMA** specifically for the arrival of a new character. καὶ μήν καί is “*und vollends auch*,” καὶ μήν οὐδέ is “*und vollends auch nicht*.” ἀλλὰ μήν is used when the speaker is willing to grant a request: “*nun ja*.” When it occurs in a sentence that stands in opposition to the preceding, it means “*aber doch wahrlich*,” as such, it is often used in conclusions.<sup>21</sup> When used with the imperative, μήν marks a pushing towards realization of the request.

STEPHENS 1837

79-87

<sup>21</sup> For his note that the combination often occurs in conclusions, Kühner adduces Lucian, *Juppiter Tragoedus* 51.8. This instance is in fact the introduction to the second premise of a syllogism. Regardless, it is hard to see how in either of these two contexts ἀλλὰ μήν could be rendered “but still surely” (“*aber doch wahrlich*”).

[Thematic entry in a monograph on expletive particles with material from **POETRY** and **PROSE**.]

μήν “indicates the progress of the mind from the subject under consideration to some other subject.” It marks a “separation and distinction” (79) between the clause it occurs in and the preceding, giving notice to the hearer of an interruption or deviation from the train of thought. The transition can be less abrupt, as the progression to a new subject or argument, or a qualification of, confirmation of, or objection to an earlier statement.

In another signification, it is used in oaths, often in the form ἦ μήν. This use naturally flows from its original force of marking something as separate, distinct: oaths, promises, and declarations need to be marked clearly, set apart, and “possess a sense of complete and entire within themselves.” (86)

KLOTZ 1842

II, 669-671

[Notes on the alphabetic entry in DEVARIUS’ monograph on particles with material from **TRAGEDY** and **ATTIC PROSE**.]

μήν, like Latin *vero* contains a strong asseveration, and often also has an adversative force, like in ἀλλὰ μήν, γε μήν, καὶ μήν.<sup>22</sup> The same asseverative force is also found in those instances where μήν is used at the entrance of a new character, more often marked by the combination καὶ μήν. The use of μήν in questions and in exhortations is similar. The existence of the combination δὲ μήν has been doubted, but there is no real problem with it.

KRÜGER 1845

354-355

μήν in **ATTIC**

[Alphabetic entry in a grammar with material from **POETRY** and **PROSE**.]

μήν (“doch,” “allerdings”) is partly reinforcing and partly adversative, mostly the latter, and often in combination with other particles.

ἀλλὰ μήν is *at vero*. καὶ μήν is *et vero*, adding something new, “ferner aber.” After an interrogative, μήν is like the German “sonst”: τί μήν; is thus “was sonst?”

<sup>22</sup> See V.ἀλλά, V.γε, and V.καί, respectively.

PASSOW 1841-1857<sup>23</sup>

236-237

[Alphabetic entry in a dictionary with material from [POETRY](#) and [PROSE](#).]

μήν is an affirmative (“determinativ”) particle, like Latin *vero*.<sup>24</sup> In questions it always accompanies an interrogative, augmenting the interrogative force.

In the combination ἤ μήν it is a strong affirmation, often used to introduce oaths and pronounced somewhat separately: “und zwar theils selbstständig ausgesprochen.” (236)

καὶ μήν can mark that a request will be granted, or at least that something will be realized. When used with the imperative it reinforces the order or request. Often, καὶ μήν is used to bring something to the attention, a person (especially [DRAMA](#), rarely single μήν), item, or experience. It can also introduce a summary of a preceding list.

In the combinations ἀλλὰ μήν, ὅμως μήν, and οὐ μήν, μήν heightens the force of the preceding word.

In affirming (parts of) a sentence, μήν can create an adversative relation between clauses, sometimes preceded by μέν. In the combination γε μήν the opposition is emphasized more heavily, and it is used when something unexpected or apparently contradictory is brought up.

For οὐ μήν ἀλλά, see [V.ἀλλά]

THIERSCH 1852

421-422, 440-445

μήν in [HOMER](#)[Note in an article on asseverative and affirmative particles in [HOMER](#)]

μήν in an amplifying asseveration (*augescente asseveratione*) becomes μάν, like in solemn formulas the [ATTIC](#) authors use Doric-like forms for other words: “μήν augescente asseveratione ut monuimus μάν fit: eodem modo quo in solemnibus formulis apud Atticos Ἀθήνα, γᾶ, quae ad Dorismos jure non optimo referuntur, quamquam tali Doribus

<sup>23</sup> The relevant entry is in the third volume, published in 1852, hence its placement here.

<sup>24</sup> Passow describes the relationship between μήν and *vero* in exactly the same way as Hartung.

manserunt” (421-422). In oaths, shortened μάν, without the *v*, is found after ναί and οὐ: ναὶ μᾶ and οὐ μᾶ.

When μέν is used in disjunctions before affirmations and oaths it is amplified into μήν or μάν. μήν is like μέν in that it cannot stand at the head of the sentence. With imperatives we generally find μάν, the one instance of μήν should be changed.

μήν is found in combinations with ἤ, καὶ, and οὐ. καὶ μάν does not occur in HOMER. The one instance of οὐ μάν should be οὐ μήν. μὴ μάν, conversely, is not found in HOMER, but it is always μὴ μάν. If a long syllable is needed after ναί in oaths, the text gives ναὶ δῆ. In places where there is an asseveration, μέν should be changed to μήν, if metre allows it, for example in instances of ἤ μέν δῆ. The same thing holds for οὐ μέν δῆ.

NABER 1855	194-198	μήν in <u>HOMER</u>
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[Note on the forms μήν, μάν, and μέν in an article on textual problems in HOMER.]

On ἤ μήν used in oaths, the SCHOLION to *Iliad* A 77 says that HOMER always had ἤ μέν. However, SCHOLIASTS are wrong more than once. VAN GENT rightly discounts the scholiast’s reading. It may be hard to decide between μήν and μάν, but as a general rule μέν is written before consonants, and μήν before vowels.<sup>25</sup> However, in combinations like ἤ μέν and καὶ μέν the particle should be written μήν if metre allows it. In combinations with δῆ, conversely, μέν is the right spelling.

THIERSCH 1855	311-313, 319-320,	μήν in <u>ATTIC TRAGEDY</u>
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[Note in an article on asseverative and causal particles in ATTIC TRAGEDY]

μήν is not found on its own “except when some pointing underlies the passage” (“*nisi ἔνδειξις loco inest*” 311), or when it follows an imperative, in which case it is written as μάν; all of the latter occur in TRAGIC LYRIC.

<sup>25</sup> NABER discusses the 1851 edition of the first book of the *Iliad* by VAN GENT, and proposes to apply to the entire *Iliad* the same changes to μήν/μάν/μέν that BEKKER (see note 28 below) would incorporate in his edition 3 years later.

In combinations, there is ἀλλὰ μήν and γε μήν.<sup>26</sup> καὶ μήν is not only deictic (ἐνδεικτικῶς), such as at the entrance of characters in drama, but is used in every kind of asseverance. οὐ μήν, οὐδὲ μήν. In a question with τί μήν, μήν marks the asseverance.

ἦ μήν is asseverative and assertive (“*obtestantur*”), especially used in oaths. When it occurs with a question, it is to be regarded as separate from the question.<sup>27</sup>

FRIEDLÄNDER 1859

820-823

μήν in HOMER

[Note on μήν, μάν, and μέν in a discussion of several editions of HOMER.]

Overall, BEKKER is right to change μέν to μήν in Homer, but for a few instances.<sup>28</sup>

Note, for example: “Aber A 163 kann ich dazu keinen zwingenden Grund sehen, da das οὐ μὲν σοί (..) in dem ἀλλὰ τὸ μέν πλεῖον (..) seine volle Entsprechung findet.” (821)

As for the deletion of μάν in favour of μήν, which is part of BEKKER’S overall goal to normalize the morphology of his text, his choices are overly negative toward the sources; i.e. some variations in form should be allowed.

BÄUMLEIN 1861

153-159

[Alphabetic entry in a monograph on particles with material from POETRY and PROSE.]

μάν and μήν are only dialectally different forms, but they have the same meanings. μήν is closest to ἦ, being used to affirm and reinforce, used in oaths. μήν is less independent than ἦ, depending as it does on another word to come in first place, typically ἦ, καί, οὐ or a word that needs emphasis. Unlike ἦ, then, μήν cannot function to introduce a question.

μήν and μάν often occur with affirmative or negative particles, as well as after imperatives. ἦ μήν is especially used with the future infinitive or present after a verb of swearing, believing, or the like. In the combination οὐ μήν, μήν either reinforces the entire sentence it belongs to, or it enters into opposition to the preceding sentence, taking the meaning of “*doch*.” οὐ μήν ἀλλὰ is “*doch nicht, sondern*,” but often better rendered as

<sup>26</sup> Thiersch gives a list of loci but no discussion of the function of the combinations.

<sup>27</sup> See also V.ἦ.

<sup>28</sup> In his 1858 edition of Homer, Bekker decided to oust μάν out of the text, in favour of μήν, as well as changing μέν to μήν wherever sense demanded it and metre allowed it.

“dennoch,” “demungeachtet.” καὶ μήν means “und fürwahr,” “auch fürwahr,” though sometimes καὶ seems redundant, when no connection to the preceding sentence (“Anknüpfung des Satzes an das Vorgehende” 157) seems warranted. When introducing an opposition to the preceding, it is to be translated “und doch,” “nun aber.” As ROST already notes,<sup>29</sup> καὶ μήν also serves to announce new arrivals. In ἀλλὰ μήν, the two particles retain their own meaning. In τί μήν the particle appears to emphasize the interrogative. In γε μήν, γε has its normal function of emphasizing the word it follows, while μήν often marks an adversative relation to the preceding sentence.<sup>30</sup> In XENOPHON, γε μήν is used in places where only a light opposition is to be expressed, where we would normally expect to find (ἀλλὰ or) δέ.

KAYSER 1862	672-675	μήν in <u>HOMER</u>
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[Note on μήν, μάν, and μέν in an article on textual problems in HOMER.]

In HOMER, the manuscripts suggest that μάν was written wherever a heavy syllable was needed, and μέν where a light one was warranted. Contra BEKKER, μήν is not HOMERIC, but a later corruption that entered into the text as a result of its common use in later Attic.

KÜHLEWEIN 1870	93-96	μήν in the <u>HIPPOCRATIC</u> corpus
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[Thematic entry in a monograph on particles in the HIPPOCRATIC corpus.]

μήν is an affirmative particle, but it often has an adversative force, by emphasizing the new addition and thus creating opposition to the preceding. This force is strongest where it answers a μέν in the preceding sentence. Often adversative μήν is accompanied by a negation. In combinations, μήν mostly has its primary affirmative force.

<sup>29</sup> The reference is vague, but Bäumlein may refer to Rost’s 1831 edition of Damm’s *Novum Lexicon Graecum*, or to the new 1852 edition of Passow’s dictionary, of which Rost was the editor. The reference suggests Rost was the first to come up with this idea, which would mean he noted it before Hartung, but the 1831 entry does not specifically note a link between καὶ μήν and the entry of a character: “καὶ μήν Τάνταλον εἰσεῖδον (xi 582) (...) quae est adfirmatio per μήν, ne res ficta videatur” (747).

<sup>30</sup> Bäumlein appears to discuss the functions of γε and μήν in this combination in terms of scope: γε only has scope over the word it follows, while μήν has scope over the entire clause, marking a relation to the preceding.

ELLENDT 1872	452	μήν in <a href="#">SOPHOCLES</a>
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[Alphabetic entry in a lexicon to [SOPHOCLES](#).]

μήν is a particle of strong affirmation, meaning *vero* or *certe*, used mainly to set apart a decree or promise (“inprimis asseverando decreto vel pollicito constituta.”) It is rarely found on its own. When used with a deictic it can mean *ecce vero adest*.<sup>31</sup> For ἤ μήν and καὶ μήν see [V.ἤ] and [V.καί], respectively. μήν – γε and γε μήν occur several times, for ὅρα γε μήν translate *vide utique*.

DINDORF 1873	216	μήν in <a href="#">AESCHYLUS</a>
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[Alphabetic entry in a lexicon to [AESCHYLUS](#).]

μήν means *vero* or *tamen*. In questions, τί μήν means *quid vero*. ἤ μήν is *profecto vero*.<sup>32</sup> καὶ μήν is used very often, not rarely followed by γε, with one or more words intervening. It is also used at the introduction of a new character, but more often so in [SOPHOCLES](#).<sup>33</sup> [AESCHYLUS](#) also uses ἀλλὰ μήν, οὐ μήν, οὐ μήν – γε, and γε μήν.

HINRICHS 1875	75-76	μάν in <a href="#">HOMER</a>
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[Note in a monograph on Aeolicisms in [HOMER](#).]

BEKKER is wrong to oust μάν from his text of [HOMER](#), since it might be an Aeolic element, which is either a trace of the oldest form of the text or entered in the text during its wanderings. μάν survives in a decent number of places in the manuscripts, while μήν occurs much less.

COBET 1876	365-367	ἤ μήν/ ἤ μέν in <a href="#">HOMER</a>
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[Note on ἤ μήν/ ἤ μέν in [HOMER](#).]

<sup>31</sup> This is a translation for Antigone 627: ὅδε μὲν Αἴμων, an example that is often cited as a rare exception to the use of καὶ μήν at the arrival of new characters.

<sup>32</sup> See also V.ἤ.

<sup>33</sup> Dindorf refers to his own 1870 lexicon, pages 242a and 302a.

In Iliad A 76, BEKKER wrongly prints ἤ μὴν, since HOMER commonly has ἤ μὲν or μὴ μὲν in oaths, where the Attic authors would have ἤ μὴν or μὴ μὴν.<sup>34</sup> Likewise, γε μὲν and εἰ μὲν are HOMERIC, rather than BEKKER's γε μὴν and εἰ μὴν.

FUHR 1878	593-594	οὐ μὴν in ORATORY
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[Notes on οὐ μὴν an article on the Attic orators with material from ORATORY and other ATTIC PROSE.]

Whereas ISOCRATES uses οὐ μὴν quite often, THUCYDIDES prefers οὐ μέντοι, and DEMOSTHENES uses both. With either combination, γε can follow (with or without an intervening word), but can also be absent. Notably, THUCYDIDES never has οὐ μέντοι γε.

WETZELL 1879	8-10	μὴν in ANTIPHON
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[Thematic entry in a monograph on particles in ANTIPHON.]

μὴν differs from ἤ and νή in that it cannot stand at the beginning of the sentence, but leans on a preceding word, often particles or interrogatives. Of all the enclitic particles, it seems to be the most emphatic (“Von den Partikeln, welche nicht an die erste Stelle des Satzes treten, scheint μὴν die nachdrücklichste zu sein” 9). μὴν also differs from ἤ and νή in that it often influences more than one sentence and thus nears the status of a conjunction. As HARTUNG noted, there are three main contexts for μὴν: absence or repression of an opposite sentence (*Gegensatz*), mostly in requests or questions; accordance with the opposite sentence, mostly with the introduction of something more important (“zur Einführung eines steigernden Momentes” 9); or disagreement with the opposite sentence, in which case it is adversative, and often answers a μὲν in the preceding clause. All these three main uses can be found in the combinations.

DITTENBERGER 1881	323-326, 334-335	μὴν in PLATO and other ATTIC PROSE
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[Note on combinations with μὴν in an article on PLATO.]

<sup>34</sup> To corroborate μὲν in these constructions, Cobet adduces Herodotus. Since μὲν is the accepted Ionic form of μὴν, it is unclear what this proves.



μήν is used regularly in **PLATONIC** dialogues, but some combinations seem to be distributed unevenly through his works, and they may help establish a chronology.<sup>35</sup>

καὶ μήν can introduce an answer, or be used in the middle of a turn, but it always accompanies the transition to a new thought, emphasizing this new addition at the same time. ἀλλὰ μήν, with or without γε, does not differ much from καὶ μήν, but it brings the adversative force of μήν to the fore in that it introduces an objection against something said by the other speaker. τί μήν; is always used in the response, marking enthusiastic agreement by way of wondering how any other answer but the affirmative might be considered. (“Ausdruck lebhafter Zustimmung, indem der Redende durch die verwunderte Frage auf die Undenkbarkeit einer anderen als einer bejahenden Antwort hinweist” 325). Fragments from **EPICHRMUS** and **SOPHRON**, as well as σά μάν; in **ARISTOPHANES** *Acharnians*, may suggest that τί μήν; is an idiom picked up from the Dorians in Sicily. γε μήν is adversative, used like δέ and often interchangeable with it. The difference is that γε μήν emphasizes the word that it immediately follows. ἀλλὰ – μήν is less frequent, but note especially ἀλλὰ τί μήν, which differs from τί μήν in that it is not a simple affirmative answer, but rather an actual question that begs an answer (and generally gets it).

PALEY 1881	35-40	μήν in <b>ATTIC</b>
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[Alphabetic entry in a monograph on particles in **ATTIC** with material from **DRAMA**.]

μήν is a strengthened form of μέν. On its own, it means “but.”

The combination οὐ μήν – γε, means *nec tamen*. The combination γε μήν means *tamen*. τί μήν and τί μήν οὐ mean “of course,” with τί μήν we may supply an elided ἀλλό: “Why, what but this?” ἤ μήν has three meanings: in taking an oath “truly”; in expressing a threat; in the sense of *nihilominus*, or *crede mihi*. καὶ μήν is used when a new character is introduced

<sup>35</sup> The argument of the chronology is not relevant here, but the typologies of the 5 combinations he looks at are.

on the stage; with or without γε following, it means “well, but” or “well, then.” ἀλλὰ μήν and ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ μήν mean “yet neither.”

MONRO 1882	251-252	μήν in HOMER
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[Alphabetic entry in a grammar of Homer.]

μέν, μήν, and μάν are probably etymologically connected, and perhaps variants of the same original form.<sup>36</sup> Expressing strong affirmation, they can either prepare for an adversative clause, thus expressing concession, or react to another clause, thus expressing an adversative force, meaning “yet” or “nevertheless.”

μάν is restricted to the *Iliad*,<sup>37</sup> and has “an affirmative and generally hortatory or interjectional force” (251). ἤ μάν and οὐ μάν are used at the beginning of speeches to express surprise or triumph. μήν can have this same hortatory force, but ἤ μήν is concessive, admitting an objection or reply. In καὶ μήν, μήν emphasizes the new fact introduced by καί. μέν can likewise be affirmative, but generally marks an opposition, either to what follows, or to what came before (in which case the Attic authors would use μήν). ἤ μέν is a strong affirmation, μή μέν is its opposite, καὶ μέν is like καὶ μήν, and ἀτὰρ μέν is ἀλλὰ μήν. μέν marking an opposition to the preceding is also used in HOMER, after a pronoun, to mark a contrast between a digression and the main thread of the story that is picked back up.

MUTZBAUER 1884-1886	I, 8-13	μήν in HOMER
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[Note in a monograph on μέν in HOMER.]

The adverbs μάν and μήν partly occur in the same constructions as affirmative (“versichernde”) μέν, they always lean on another word, and they always affirm or reinforce something, without having the force to oppose this to something preceding or following, contra HARTUNG, NÄGELSBACH, and KÜHNER. Nothing adversative lies in the particle

<sup>36</sup> There is no mention of the sizeable body of literature on this issue already available at that time.

<sup>37</sup> It is unclear if this is an oversimplification (there are at least two instances of μάν in the Odyssey manuscripts) or if Monro knew another text of the Odyssey.

itself, as shown by the combination ἀλλ' οὐ μάν, but its emphatic force makes the hearer assume that it is opposed to something else that is emphasized less.

EBELING 1885	1016+1094	μήν in HOMER
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[Alphabetic entry in a lexicon to HOMER.]

KAYSER 1862 rightly corrected BEKKER about the forms of μάν, μήν, and μέν in HOMER, and we should read μά before consonant and μέν before vowel when a light syllable is needed, μέν before consonant and μάν before vowel when a heavy syllable is warranted.

μάν means *perfecto, re vera, sane*, found alone, or in the combinations (ἀλλ') οὐ μάν, μη μάν, and ἤ (δὴ) μάν.

μήν means *perfecto*. It is found in the combinations ἤ μήν, καὶ μήν, οὐ μήν, and with the imperative. Metrically, it is placed mostly in the first thesis, once in the second thesis, once in the second arsis, and thrice in the fourth arsis.

BODIN and MAZON 1902	354-355	μήν in ARISTOPHANES
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[Alphabetic entry in an index of particles attached to an edition of ARISTOPHANES and MENANDER.]

μήν is sometimes used to affirm something, to mean “certes,” as in the formula (*formule*) ἤ μήν. More often however, μήν marks an opposition, especially when used in negative clauses, to be translated “toutefois,” “cependant,” or “pourtant.”

It is commonly used in the combinations ἀλλὰ μήν<sup>38</sup> and καὶ μήν. καὶ μήν, like μήν, can mark either an affirmation or an opposition. A special use is at the beginning of the ἄγών, and at the entrance of a new character on stage.

WACKERNAGEL 1916	177-182	μήν, μάν, and μέν in HOMER
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[Note in an article on the language of HOMER.]

<sup>38</sup> On which, see V.ἄλλά.

In **HOMER** μέν, μάν, μήν compete in the same function.<sup>39</sup> Otherwise, μάν is the form outside of Attic-Ionic, μέν in Ionic (μήν forms are spurious), and μήν is the Attic form, unknown to the other dialects.

There are clear rules for use of μέν or μάν in **HOMER**: μάν is generally used before a vowel, μέν before a consonant. Where μάν is used before a consonant (E 765, E 895) there is a corruption. Where μέν is used before a vowel, this is a “fester Ionismus” (181), a part of the purely Ionic layer of the **EPIC** dialect. Every instance of μήν must be regarded as an **ATTIC** influence.

DENNISTON 1934

328-358

[Alphabetic entry in a monograph on particles.]

μήν, μάν, and μέν are dialectical variants of the same word, belonging to Attic, Doric/Aeolic, and Ionic, respectively. The μέν mentioned here is not “preparatory μέν”, as that form is shared by all dialects. **PINDAR** is an exception to the division by dialect, giving both γε μέν and γε μάν in his “mixed dialect.” Regarding **HOMER**, WACKERNAGEL’S analysis is probably right.

μήν is an emphatic particle, an adversative connecting particle, and a progressive connecting particle. The two connecting uses developed from the original emphatic one, like *vero* in the former (adversative) case and like *δή* in the latter (progressive). μήν (μάν) is foremost a Doric particle, found in **ATTIC LITERATURE** mainly in combinations.

In its emphatic use, μήν is hard to distinguish from the more commonly used *δή*. In **HOMER**, outside of combinations, μήν “perhaps emphasizes only negative, never positive statements” (330). In **DRAMA**, it hardly ever occurs alone, the few exceptions are in both

<sup>39</sup> Wackernagel does not state if and how μέν and μήν/μάν are connected, but does note that Attic μέντοι might have a cognate in Doric μάντοι found in the inscription Epidauros 3339.38 (in Collitz, *Sammlung der griechischen Dialekt-Inschriften* III.1 1899:153). About BEKKER’S and NAUCK’S decision to change μάν and μέν to μήν, he says: this “braucht heute nicht mehr bekämpft zu werden” (179n12), that is to say, it has already been refuted well enough.

emphatic and adversative uses. μήν with the imperative is restricted to EPIC and the Doric parts of TRAGEDY.

In questions, μήν can simply emphasize the question, ἀλλὰ τί μήν; after a (possibly implicit) rejection of the preceding, with μήν adding liveliness. Thence, (ἀλλὰ) τί μήν; comes to be an emphatic affirmative response, possibly picked up from the Sicilian Dorians, as DITTENBERGER claims.

In its adversative use, μήν is almost completely absent in HOMER, and occurs mainly in negative statements in DRAMA and the ORATORS. οὐ μήν is generally followed by γε, and οὐ μήν – γε is the negative counterpart of γε μήν. In PROSE, adversative μήν often follows a preparatory μέν. Less frequently, μήν is not just adversative, but implies the (almost) complete negation of the preceding, like ἀλλά or ἀτάρ.

In its progressive use, μήν either adds a new point, or marks a new step in the flow of thought.

In positive use, the progressive is found almost exclusively in PLATO, at the beginning of direct speech and in continuous discourse. As such it might mark the fulfilment of a condition (more often ἀλλά or ἀλλὰ μήν), the transition from a major to a minor premise (more often ἀλλὰ μήν or καὶ μήν), the transition from a problem to its discussion, in which function it might be called inceptive.

In negative use it knows three forms: οὐ μήν, οὐ μήν οὐδέ, οὐδέ μήν, all three are usually preceded by a negative clause. οὐ μήν in the sense “nor again” is rare. οὐ μήν οὐδέ means “again, not – either”; οὐδέ μήν can mean both “again, not – either,” with μήν connective, or “nor indeed,” with οὐδέ connective.

A supposed concessive use of μήν might be found in a few instances, but is never necessary, and appears in all dialects to have been reserved for μέν from the beginning.

ἀλλὰ μήν is rare in POETRY, common in PROSE, and can be both adversative (in this use sometimes to signal the arrival of a new character on stage, like καὶ μήν) and affirmative.<sup>40</sup> Likewise, it can substantiate a condition (as μήν above). Progressive ἀλλὰ μήν seems restricted to PROSE, generally marking a transition to a new sentence, rarely to a new clause or phrase (i.e. after a comma). Specifically, in PLATO ἀλλὰ μήν occurs at the transition from the major to the minor premise of a syllogism, or from minor to major.

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<sup>40</sup> All the examples Denniston cites are from dialogue, with ἀλλὰ μήν turn-initial, but Denniston does not note this feature.

The functions of γε μήν are the same as for μήν (although affirmative use is very rare) with the addition that γε adheres closely to the preceding word.

The combination is found overwhelmingly in **XENOPHON**, and rather sparsely elsewhere. In **XENOPHON** it generally marks progress to a new point, like ἀλλὰ μήν or καὶ μήν.

ἦ μήν “introduces a strong and confident asseveration, being used both in direct and indirect speech” (350). It is typically used in oaths (mostly in indirect speech), outside oaths its use is rare in **PROSE** and absent from **ORATORY**.

καὶ μήν is like καὶ δὴ on the one hand (only its adversative use is not shared by καὶ δὴ), and like μήν, γε μήν, and ἀλλὰ μήν on the other. καί in this combination is always copulative. Generally the combination introduces a new point or item in a series.

In **ATTIC**, the word or phrase directly following καὶ μήν is often emphasized additionally by γε. Normally the new point follows after a period (καὶ δὴ and variations being more common after weak stops). In **PLATO**, καὶ μήν can mark the transition from the major to minor premise of a syllogism, or vice versa. Also, it is sometimes split in his later works: καὶ – μήν.

Like μήν on its own, it can introduce the fulfilment of a condition posited before. In dialogue it generally marks a favourable reaction to the words of the interlocutor. It may also be adversative, however, like καί sometimes and καίτοι often does. It is generally a “balancing adversative. Very occasionally, however, it is as strong as ἀλλά or even μὲν οὖν” (358).

καὶ μήν calls attention to something just seen or heard, and specifically in **DRAMA**, it marks the entrance of a new character: scarce in **AESCHYLUS**, common in **SOPHOCLES**, **EURIPIDES**, and **ARISTOPHANES**.

POWELL 1938	219	μὲν in <b>HERODOTUS</b>
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[Alphabetic entry in a lexicon to **HERODOTUS**.]

μὲν<sup>41</sup> in **HERODOTUS** is the Ionic equivalent of Attic μήν, the latter of which is in fact often found in the manuscripts. μὲν is used to introduce strong assertions and oaths, also in the combination ἦ μὲν. μὲν can also be connective, as in the combination καὶ μὲν, οὐ μὲν οὐδέ, γε μὲν (meaning “however”), and μὲν ὦν.

LEUMANN 1949	85-89	μὲν/μήν and δέ/δή
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[Note in an article on μήν/μὲν and δή/δέ.]

<sup>41</sup> For so-called preparatory μὲν, a form shared by all the dialects, see V.μὲν.

μέν and μήν are similar in use, as is shown by their second position in the sentence, the emphasizing effect on the first word that this engenders, and in some more formulaic uses. In HOMER, the equivalence of μέν, μήν, and μάν emerges from their use in the same combinations with ἤ, οὐ, μή, and καί. There is no difference in weight (“Gewichtsunterschied”) between μήν and μέν.<sup>42</sup> When μέν and δέ in their later, corresponsive, use are not regarded as the original functions of the two particles, but rather as an end point in a development from independent μέν and δέ as weaker forms of μήν and δή (“μέν und δέ als funktions- und lautschwachen Entsprechungen zu μήν und δή” 87), many seemingly problematic instances become less so, especially in HOMER. μέν and δέ as a corresponsive pair originated in the Ionic dialect, and thence spread to the other dialects. This might explain how the forms μάν and μέν can coexist in some dialects, which is very hard to explain through linguistic laws.

LABEY 1950	39-40	μήν in ATTIC PROSE
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[Alphabetic entry in a monograph on particles with material from PROSE.]

Simple μήν is emphatic (*intensif*) and restrictive, μήν in combinations is emphatic and progressive. μήν is scarce, used only after interrogatives, pronouns, near μᾶλλον, and most often with οὐ or μή, meaning “pourtant ne – pas.” In dialogue it is emphatic, and in both dialogue and continuous discourse it is restrictive.

τί μήν basically means “quoi?” but in dialogue often functions as an affirmation.

SCHWYZER and DEBRUNNER	569-570
1950	

[Alphabetic entry in the chapter on particles of a grammar.]

Especially after certain verb forms, μήν has an effect (“erhalt eine Beziehung”) over the predicate. In Ionic μέν is both affirmative and conjunctive (*satzverbindend*), in Attic μήν is

<sup>42</sup> Leumann disagrees with Bekker’s choice to change μάν and μέν to μήν where possible, following Wackernagel 1916 in regarding μέν in Homer as an Ionic trace, μάν as an Aeolic trace, and μήν as an Atticism.

affirmative and μέν conjunctive. From early on, simple μήν is becoming sidelined by μήν in combinations: ἀλλὰ μήν, γε μήν, ἤ μήν, καὶ μήν.

SMYTH 1956<sup>2</sup>

658-659

[Alphabetic entry in a grammar with material from PLATO and TRAGEDY]

μήν is asseverative or adversative (especially after a negative). It can emphasize either a whole statement or a single word. μήν, μάν, μέν, and μά are all connected.

ἀλλὰ μήν is often used to add something more important, or in transitions when a new idea is opposed to the preceding. ἤ μήν often introduces an oath or threat. καὶ μήν often introduces something new, thus denoting transition, sometimes opposition. In tragedy, it marks the beginning of a new scene. In replies, it confirms the preceding, accedes to a request, or “denotes hearty assent,” sometimes adversative. καὶ μήν – γε marks something of greater importance than the preceding, with γε emphasizing the word (group) just before it, the combination is not as strong as καὶ μὲν δή. καὶ μήν καί is “and in truth also,” καὶ μήν οὐδέ is its negation. οὐ μήν is “surely not,” οὐ μήν ἀλλά is “nevertheless,” οὐ μήν οὐδέ is “nor again,” and οὐδέ μήν is “and certainly not.” τί μήν is “what indeed,” or *quid vero*, in PLATO often in assent, and τί μήν οὐ is “of course I do.”

HUMBERT 1960

416-418

[Alphabetic entry in a monograph on syntax.]

μήν is the strongest of the emphatic particles (“*instensives*”). μήν expresses solemn affirmations accompanying oaths. μά serves in ATTIC to attest a divinity. Just like μέν is stronger than δέ, μήν is stronger than δή.

The function of μήν marking a solemn affirmation is mostly attested in HOMER and PINDAR. In ATTIC PROSE, this use is almost restricted to the fixed expression ἤ μήν followed by an infinitive, to express not only the promise but also a personal guarantee to see it fulfilled. As such καὶ μήν may be translated “*et je vous assure que*.”



μήν often follows interrogative pronouns and adverbs, in which case the speaker is not satisfied with the answer she has been given, and demands “*impérieusement*” for more information. τί μήν on its own signals an affirmation without reply (“une affirmation sans réplique”), as in “What can one say to that?”<sup>43</sup>

By expressing affirmation, μήν also come to mean ‘still,’ “nevertheless,” (“*pourtant*,” “*malgré tout*”), affirmative and restrictive like μέντοι.<sup>44</sup> In this function it is often found with the negation, such as in the collocation οὐ μήν ἀλλά, which is elliptical and means “nevertheless” (“*néanmoins*”). In other cases μήν forms a springboard for the speaker’s thought, a basis for the following steps. This use, where it serves to link parts together, resembles certain functions of μὲν οὖν.

In the collocations with ἀλλά, γε, and καί the different particles retain their original functions. ἀλλὰ μήν brusquely introduces a new development, where μήν has its progressive function. γε μήν marks an opposition or a progression, and gets this force sometime from the one particle, sometimes from the other.<sup>45</sup> καὶ μήν draws the attention to a person or an object that is introduced, confirms an opinion, or introduces a restriction to something admitted before.

BLOMQUIST 1969	48-74	μήν in HELLENISTIC PROSE
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[Alphabetic entry in a monograph on particles in HELLENISTIC PROSE.]

μήν on its own, in CLASSICAL PROSE, occurs only in XENOPHON, PLATO, and HIPPOCRATES, in the last two as a connective. The three instances of simple μήν in HELLENISTIC PROSE are in fact instances of μή, so it has probably disappeared at this point, only to return due to Atticism.

<sup>43</sup> For SOPHOCLES *Ajax* 668 ἄρχοντές εἰσιν, ὥσθ’ ὑπεικτέον. Τί μήν; Humbert offers the translation “They are our leaders, so they are to be obeyed. No doubt.” “Ils sont nos chefs, il faut leur obéir. Point de doute!” 417.

<sup>44</sup> It is striking that here he does not use the term adversative. It is not easy to see how the terms affirmative and restrictive cover this particular function of μήν.

<sup>45</sup> This explanation mirrors Stephanus’ translation almost 400 years earlier: “γε μήν means *vero* (adversative) or *porro* (progressive).”

οὐ μήν is equally frequent as in **CLASSICAL PROSE**, or even more so, and has the same function: mostly adversative, seldom progressive or additional. οὐ μήν οὐδέ, mostly progressive in **CLASSICAL PROSE**, is generally adversative in **HELLENISTIC PROSE**. οὐδὲ μήν, conversely, is always progressive, or only additional. οὐ μήν ἀλλά can be a balancing adversative, but it can also introduce a modification of a previous statement, an objection to what precedes, or a new argument in a series. In **NARRATIVE**, it can function as a transition from an excursus back to the main theme, or introduce a summary before the transition to a new subject. ἀλλὰ μήν is generally progressive, introducing a new argument, but can also be adversative, expressing an objection to the preceding. καὶ μήν is very frequent in **CLASSICAL PROSE**, slightly less so in **HELLENISTIC PROSE**. It is more commonly progressive than adversative, and sometimes merely additional. γε μήν is mainly progressive and sometimes adversative.

SLATER 1969	311-312	μάν in <b>PINDAR</b>
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[Alphabetic entry in a lexicon to **PINDAR**.]

μάν can be connective, emphasising a new point, and as such is never negated. In other places it is adversative, meaning “yet.”

καὶ μάν (γε) emphasises a new point, with καί functioning as a connective. When used in the last entry of a list, καί “connects individual words, while μάν emphasises the last member of a series” (311). γε μάν is generally adversative, meaning “yet,” “but of course,” but it can also contain a notion of affirmation. ἤ μάν is used in strong affirmations. In οὐδὲ μάν, μάν emphasises the second member of a negative assertion.

RUIJGH 1971	197-199, 741-742
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[Notes in a monograph on “epic” τε.]

μήν, in its original adverbial use, serves to mark that the speaker assures her interlocutor of the truth of her assertion. This emerges in ἦ μήν, used to introduce oaths (in **HOMER**, we find ἦ μέν used outside of oaths as well). οὐ μήν is the negative counterpart

of ἤ μήν assuring the interlocutor that something is not the case. In later PROSE, μήν like μέντοι becomes adversative, meaning “*mais*,” “*cependant*,” or “*toutefois*.”

As regards μέν, μήν, and μάν in HOMER, μάν must be regarded as an Aeolicism retained by the Ionian singers (“*aèdes*,” ᾠδοί), μέν as the expected Ionian form, and μήν as Attic additions entered during the Attic redaction of the text. μά, which is found in invocations of gods must be connected to the use of ἤ μάν (μήν) in oaths. At the same time μά is found in Thessalian in the function of δέ, which may mirror the later adversative use of μήν and μέντοι. The etymological connection is not entirely clear, but such alternation (μάν, μά, μήν, μέν) is also found with δέ, δή and κα, κάν, κέν, κε, and is most easily explained if we assume these particles developed from interjections.

THYRESSON 1977

63-69

μήν in EPICURUS

[Alphabetic entry in a monograph on particles in EPICURUS with material from EPICURUS, ARISTOTLE, THEOPHRASTUS, and PTOLEMAIC PAPYRI.]

In EPICURUS, as is the rule in ATTIC, μήν is only found after negations or other particles. It can be emphatic, but this is rare in ATTIC PROSE, so it is generally connective, either with an adversative or a progressive force. οὐ μήν can be both progressive and adversative (balancing or modifying, as used by BLOMQUIST 1969). When it is used as a balancing adversative, it sometimes answers a preparatory μέν in the clause before. οὐ μὴν ἀλλά is always adversative. “After καὶ μήν, something new and important is said,” (68) as DENNISTON already noted. ἀλλὰ μήν, conversely, indicates a “new section within a subject field and is not used like καὶ μήν to introduce it.”

BLOMQUIST 1981

66-67

[Note on οὐ μήν in adversative coordination with no literary material.]

In the range of words used for adversative coordination in Greek, οὐ μήν (like πλήν) is used for the “modifying” adversative relation. As such, it introduces a constituent that only partially contradicts the preceding. οὐ μὴν, then, is used to “introduce corrections and

modifications of previous statements and to restrict the applicability of preceding assertions [sic]” (66).

SICKING 1986

132-133

[Thematic entry in an article on particles with material from [PLATO](#) and [ARISTOPHANES](#).]

μήν, like ἤ and πού, is a sentence particle, since it has an influence on the entire sentence it occurs in. With μήν, the speaker anticipates possible disbelief from his interlocutor, and personally guarantees the correctness of what he is saying.<sup>46</sup>

BAKKER 1993

13

μήν in [HOMER](#)

[Note in an article on [HOMER](#).]

μέν in Homer is a weakened version of the particle μήν, as a marker of assertions. Since expressing an assertion is not neutral, but implicitly suggests an addressee who needs to be persuaded, this creates involvement. “In the case of μέν in Homeric narrative this involvement consists in the creation of a basis on which both speaker and hearer agree” (13).

HUMMEL 1993

404

μέν in [PINDAR](#)

[Thematic entry in a monograph on syntax in [PINDAR](#).]

μέν can follow a pronoun, conjunction, adverb, or verb. In one case it occurs in a gnômê (Olympian 2.53). καὶ μέν is followed by a proper name or place name, and οὐδὲ μέν is its negative counterpart. It is also found in the combination γε μέν.<sup>47</sup>

SICKING 1993

52-55

μήν in [LYSIAS](#)

[Note in a monograph on particle use in [PLATO](#) and [LYSIAS](#) with material from [PLATO](#) and [ARISTOPHANES](#)]

μήν expresses the contrary of what the addressee might suppose or wish. This may also be a threat, especially when followed by the future tense, underlining a “firm intention on

<sup>46</sup> Compare HUMBERT 1960:416.

<sup>47</sup> For ἤ μέν, see V.ἤ.

the part of the speaker” (54). Some contexts in which μήν is used are similar to contexts in which we find μέντοι. The difference between δή and μήν is that the former “presents a statement as immediately evident,” (52) whereas μήν is used when the speaker is aware that her audience may not agree with the statement, but will insist upon it anyway.<sup>48</sup>

As regards the difference between single μήν and μήν in collocations, posited by DENNISTON, it would be more economical to find a value for μήν that “both *explains* its affinity with οὐ, with ἀλλά and with ἤ, and is *preserved* in its collocations with these” [emphasis original] (55).

WAKKER 1993 <sup>49</sup>	29-30	μάν/μήν in <span style="color: green;">ARCHAIC EPIC</span>
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[Alphabetic entry in the *Lexikon des Frühgriechischen Epos*.]

μάν was originally used to reinforce and affirm an utterance, later also to syntactically connect, introducing a new point in the line of thought. οὐ μάν suggests a contrast with the following clause, while ἀλλ’ οὐ μάν is placed where there is contrast with the preceding, or simply marks a break-off and switch of subject. In a positive utterance that contrasts with preceding, μάν can be regarded as an adversative coordinator, or as an adversative particle. It also occurs with imperatives and in negative wishes.

In combinations, ἤ μάν is a strong affirmation of an utterance or oath. καὶ μάν is “auch x wahrlich.” The combinations used to introduce new points are γε μήν and καὶ μήν, which marks the emphatic introduction of a new viewpoint.

<sup>48</sup> Sicking here explicitly argues against Denniston’s reading of μήν. He also qualifies Denniston’s statement about μήν being a Doric particle: “Denniston’s assumption that (single) μήν “is preeminently a Doric particle” is severely qualified by the observation that 115 instances of it are found in Aristophanes alone.” Denniston’s claim was, as Sicking seems to know, only for μήν used independently, outside of combinations. It appears, then, that Sicking has included in his number 115 all the instances of μήν, μάν, and μέν used independently. The difference of opinion between the two is then not so much about the nature of μήν but rather the question how many instances of “μέν the widower,” i.e. μέν without δέ, are in fact the Ionian variant for μήν rather than preparatory μέν.

<sup>49</sup> Entry in the lexicon is signed at the bottom, and on the colophon page it is noted this part of the work was received in 1993.

BLOMQUIST 1995	3-23	ἀλλὰ μήν in CLASSICAL and HELLENISTIC GREEK
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See [V.ἀλλά]

LÓPEZ EIRE 1996	126-127	ἤ μήν in ARISTOPHANES
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[Note in a monograph on colloquial language in ARISTOPHANES.]

The combination ἤ μήν is an asseverative phrase converted into an exclamative phrase, to be translated “ten por cierto que...” (you can count on it that...).

WAKKER 1997a	209-231	μήν in TRAGEDY
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[Notes in an article on μήν in TRAGEDY.]

μήν is a modal, attitudinal particle working mainly on the interactional level,<sup>50</sup> used by a speaker to vouch for the truth of her utterance, even in the face of possible disbelief by her interlocutor.

καὶ μήν can be used to signal reassuring assent to a request, often unexpected. In other contexts, it can introduce a diverging opinion.

RUIJGH rightly argued that ἤ and οὐ are counterparts, making ἤ in declarative sentences mean “it is true that.” As such, it functions at the representational level of discourse, whereas μήν works at the interactional level. The combination ἤ μήν, then, can be paraphrased “there is no denying, and I am myself very much convinced—in contrast to what you may suppose or wish—that...” making it a strong assurance. That is why it is so well-suited for use in oaths.

Outside dialogic contexts, μήν is used in the same way of anticipating a negative reaction, contradicting “the possible conclusions his addressee may draw from the facts that the speaker himself has presented just before” (224).

<sup>50</sup> Interactional level, introduced by Kroon 1995 in her monograph on Latin discourse particles, is juxtaposed to the representational level (the level of content), and the presentational level (the level of textual organization), to cover those uses of particles that are relevant primarily to the interaction between speaker and hearer.

Despite its frequent occurrence in adversative contexts, this adversativity is never part of the function of μήν itself: the function is always only affirmative on the interactional level. γε μήν, often called adversative, generally functions with γε marking a contrastive focus, and thus generating adversativity, while μήν marks this relationship, but also still has its attitudinal force. The same may be said of the progressive value of μήν: its primary value makes it suitable for contexts like enumerations, but it does not itself have a progressive force.

καὶ μήν at the entrance of new characters expresses the speaker's reaction to the unexpectedness of the arrival, while at the presentational level it highlights a new turn in the course of events. καὶ δὴ is used when the arrival is expected.

WAKKER 1997b	228-229	ἤ μήν in HERODOTUS and THUCYDIDES
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[Note in an article on modal particles.]

ἤ μήν expresses the speaker's attitude towards what she says, to be translated “truly,” or “really, I assure you.” The difference between the affirmative particles ἤ and μήν lies in the speaker's attitude towards the interlocutor's reaction. With ἤ the speaker expresses that her statement is “really” true, irrespective of possible reactions whereas with μήν she personally guarantees the truth of the statement,<sup>51</sup> since she expects her addressee to be surprised or displeased. The combination of the two, then, has the effect of a strong assurance, to be paraphrased: “you addressee, you will not perhaps believe me, but, in faith, I assure you...” In indirect speech, it is generally most natural to take ἤ μήν as belonging with the reported speech, as it more likely reflects the original speaker's attitude towards her words than the reporting speaker's attitude.

WIESNER 1999	285-291	μήν in ATTIC PROSE
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[Alphabetic entry in a supplement on particles, in the section “Adversative Partikeln” with material from ATTIC PROSE.]

<sup>51</sup> Note the similarity with HUMBERT'S description of ἤ μήν.

μήν is adversative, affirmative, or progressive. In its adversative use, μήν follows a positive or negative sentence, often containing μέν. In this use it is often accompanied by a negation. Affirmative μήν emphasizes a statement. It is often found in questions, where it emphasizes the interrogative. Elliptical τί μήν; functions as an assent, “wie denn sonst?” Progressive μήν marks transition to a new point, and occurs mainly in negated sentences. The three uses of μήν hold equally for the combinations, with a few notes: γε μήν is rarely affirmative, ἀλλὰ μήν in ORATORY marks the transition from the exposition of the facts to the evidence, καὶ μήν serves as an introduction to a new, decisive fact, and as such both γε μήν and καὶ μήν stand before the last and most important member of an enumeration. In syllogisms, ἀλλὰ μήν, γε μήν, and καὶ μήν can all occur at the transition from major to minor premise, or vice versa.

CUYPERS 2005	45-49	μήν in HOMER and APOLLONIUS OF RHODES
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[Notes in an article on interactional particles in narrator text in HOMER and APOLLONIUS OF RHODES.]

μέν, μάν, and μήν can represent the same word in HOMER, although μήν is probably a later intrusion into the text. The fact that μέν appears to be a single form representing two different words makes an exhaustive study of its use in HOMER nigh on impossible. APOLLONIUS OF RHODES uses μέν in the sense of μάν only in combinations taken from Homer, like καὶ μέν, οὐ(δὲ) μέν, and ἢ μέν).

SICKING 1993 captured the force of μήν well, when he described it as a word used to express the contrary of what the addressee expects or wishes. It is both adversative and defensive, which explains why it is rare in narrator text: the Homeric narrator can never be defensive. In all four instances of μήν/μάν/μέν in narrator text in HOMER, it is used to anticipate possible objections felt by the audience. APOLLONIUS OF RHODES has eight instances, where μήν has the same function of introducing remarks that are contrary to expectations.

VAN ERP TAALMAN KIP 2009	112-128	καὶ μήν in TRAGEDY and COMEDY
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[Notes in an article καὶ μήν, καὶ δὴ, and ἤδη in **TRAGEDY** and **COMEDY**.]

In **TRAGEDY**, καὶ μήν is much more often used to mark the entry of a new character than καὶ δὴ; with the former, there is “a shift in the focus of attention” (114), with the latter there is not. In **COMEDY**, both combinations are more evenly distributed to mark entries. The same difference holds true. Thus, the two combinations are not interchangeable, as DENNISTON suggests.

The difference can also be seen when καὶ μήν and καὶ δὴ do not mark the entry of a character. After a command or invitation, καὶ δὴ expresses agreement, while καὶ μήν corrects or eliminates (the implications of) the previous utterance, usually with a “combative tone” (125).

καί in these combinations was originally connective, signalling a link with the preceding. Later, καὶ δὴ was felt as a unit, and could be removed from the sentence-initial position. Καὶ μήν, on the other hand, always stays in initial position, because it “marks some kind of incision” (128).

VAN EMDE BOAS, HUITINK,	129-130
AND RIJKSBARON forthcoming	

[Thematic entry in a grammar with material from **SOPHOCLES** and **LYSIAS**.]

μήν is an “interactional particle”, which means it plays a role in “the attitudes and beliefs that speaker and hearer have towards what is said” (129). μήν expresses certainty on the part of the speaker, regardless of the addressee’s beliefs, often anticipating disagreement of the latter.

The combination ἤ μήν is often used in oaths, to mean “truly and honestly.”

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