

Diversification of Europe further: the more the merrier or too much of a good thing?

Introduction

Following a period of state endorsement for recognition and accommodation of minority groups, recent years have seen a huge wave of backlash against multicultural policies in Europe. Amidst growing public concern over the challenges of integrating large-scale immigrant populations, which became further complicated within the context of the ‘9/11 terrorism discourse’ and the ensuing worries about a thrusting radical Islamism (Connolly et al. 2015), the state chiefs of major migration destinations in Europe such as Germany, the UK, Spain and France finally announced the end of sponsorship for a multicultural society in their lands.¹

The root causes of this break of faith have long been addressed in scholarship. While liberal attitudes favouring ethnocultural heterogeneity are attributable to both the majority and minority groups, to the extent of economic and political conjunctures depending on how far they give grounds for more ‘newcomers’, negative attitudes are almost always associated with the resident citizens of the host society, for at stake here is often the power struggle between the two groups, insofar as the latter press for the same economic, social, cultural and political rights as enjoyed by the former (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010, Triandafyllidou et al. 2012, Crowder 2013, Uberoi and Modood 2015).

¹ Following German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who admitted failing to achieve a multicultural society through state policies in late 2010, British Prime Minister David Cameron criticised ‘state-sponsored’ multiculturalism similarly in favour of a stronger national identity in his country. Likewise, the Spanish and French counterparts Jose Maria Aznar and Nicolas Sarkozy joined in soon to announce the abortion of multicultural policies by holding them accountable for losing sight of national priorities (*The Telegraph* 2011).

For all that, however, those who feel threatened by an increasingly diversified ethnic landscape in Europe are not necessarily limited to the resident nationals only. As the issue is one of preserving ‘a reserved space’ in the host societies, which became quite evident with the sharp rise of asylum-seekers in several EU lands lately, it may well be the case that the resident non-nationals find it equally intimidating in meeting with the side-effects of further newcomers in their countries of residence.

Research aim, scope and methodology

This study intends to give a glimpse of the current debates on an increasingly diversified ethnic landscape in Europe by comparing the attitudes between nationals and non-nationals in some of the EU’s major immigration lands. Intended by non-nationals here are all persons other than citizens of the hosting EU Member States where the study is carried out. The research scope includes for this reason immigration with its both intra- and extra-EU dimensions, that is to say, inflows from not only other EU Member States but also the countries outside the EU.

For statistical assessment, this inquiry starts with offering a null-hypothesis which (when considered true) claims significant differences between the attitudes of nationals and non-nationals. The alternative hypothesis maintains that nationals and non-nationals may share more similarities than differences on that score:

h_0 : Negative attitudes towards further diversification of the ethnic landscape in EU Member States are attributable to their resident nationals in the first place.

h_a: The resident non-nationals may display as much negative concern over further diversification of the ethnic landscape in EU Member States as their resident nationals.

For hypothesis testing, a survey was carried out in Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands from 15 July to 14 October 2015. The selection of these lands was based on the OECD statistics (2012) indicating a cluster of Member States including these four hosted the highest non-national populations in Europe.

The questionnaire prepared for the survey interviews is made up of five closed questions: (1) It is a good thing for this country to make room for more immigrants; (2) The labour markets in this country are affected negatively by new arrivals of immigrants; (3) People from a non-immigration background should enjoy a privileged position in this country; (4) I would have serious concerns for this country's national and cultural values if more immigrants arrived in this country; and (5) Non-national cultural practices do not fit into the way of living in this society. As these are all yes/no questions, the responses they elicit are not meant to include the underlying reasons/justifications behind.

The areas these questions investigate are essentially delineated by the two core themes underlying the immigration debate across European societies today: first, whether or not the host societies perceive immigration as an asset/compensating feature for their own interests and, second, to what extent they are willing to accept further arrival of 'newcomers'. The answers to the questions are arranged to fall into six main categories: 'I strongly agree', 'I agree', 'I disagree', 'I strongly disagree', 'I neither agree nor disagree', 'I have no idea' and failure/refusal to respond. For data analysis, the responses 'I strongly agree' and 'I agree' are to be regrouped under a general category of 'agreement', just as 'I disagree' and 'I strongly

disagree' will be taken to represent responses of 'disagreement' and 'I neither agree nor disagree' and 'I have no idea/I do not want to answer' to be standing for the remaining choices under 'other'.

Given that the survey questions all call for responses of categorisation rather than numerical values, the statistical analysis is based on Pearson's Chi-Square test, with the level of significance being 5%, where $p < 0.05$.

Research design

For the target population of 100 participants in each selected country, the response rate was estimated as 60%. The number of household lists taken as samples were increased in accordance, demanding a total of 167 addresses to be contacted in advance (calculated by $100 \times 100 / 60$). Even if the intended number of 100 interviewed respondents could be achieved earlier, all precontacted addresses were visited (as a matter of courtesy). Some of the potential participants were away on the visiting days and some others declined to take part or did not qualify to respond for reasons of illness, underage etc. In the end, the target population was drawn from the first 100 of the entire number of successfully interviewed samples.

The survey was carried out in Berlin, Paris, Brussels and Amsterdam, the capital cities of the selected countries, with the distribution of their residents' demographic qualities in mind. To this end, the choice of primary sampling units (PSU) for household surveys was inspired by NUTS 2010/EU-27, informing where the resident profiles were mostly diversified. These were preset for this research as Neukölln in Berlin; Opéra/Pigalle in Paris, Ixelles in Brussels and Geuzenveld-Slotermeer in Amsterdam. The selection of research participants in these districts was systematic: for the private household, every third apartment/house number on a

randomly chosen street in these districts; for the identification of the research participants in each private household, the first person in alphabetical order.

A pre-notification letter was sent three weeks before visiting the 167 potential participants in the two randomly chosen streets of each capital city, informing briefly about the aim and coverage of the survey interview. The samples were drawn by random selection and assignment, in line with multistage cluster/area sampling whereby half of the participants (50) were to hold the citizenship of the EU country the survey was carried out and the other half (50) that of any other state. To maximise responses and interact with participants in the most natural way possible, native speakers with similar research experiences accompanied the survey interviews. The sample profile was reduced to only one resident person in each private household visited who could be 11 years or older, regardless of whether they were adolescents (aged between 15-17), young adults (aged 18-29) or adults (30 and above) or not, after stratification by the distribution of the nationals and non-nationals.

In the event of an inadequate level of English proficiency, which was necessary to fill in the survey questionnaire by the target household, the ‘back-translation’ technique was employed to optimise the survey interviews, as typically consulted in Eurobarometer public opinion surveys. To that end, a professional translator changed the questionnaire into the target language, depending on the target household’s profile. This text was then changed by another professional translator back into English, without having seen the original questionnaire. Comparison, and if needed modification, of the wording in both versions were made in the end so as to ensure the quality of translation in German, French and Dutch.²

² This would also serve for the Belgian case, given that the country is officially divided into four language areas: the French, Dutch, German and bilingual speaking areas (of Brussels in particular).

For reasons of dissimilar institutional services in the participating countries, a uniform sampling frame was far from being feasible. While the resources for demographic information were in Germany based on databases provided by the Statistical Offices at the state/federal levels and in France by INSEE (the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies), the sampling frames in the Belgian and Dutch cases were the National Registrar and PTT (postal delivery points), respectively.

Findings

Germany

For the 60% estimated response rate in Germany, to make it to the target population of 100, 130 private households were efficiently visited. On 12 visiting days in total, 18 of the potential participants were found to be away, 12 of them refused to take part in the survey, 7 others ill, too young, old or otherwise to be able to respond. This amounted overall to a response rate of 77.9%.

The three age groups according to which the final 100 samples were randomly distributed in Germany were represented by 30 adolescents, 22 young adults and 48 adults participants, respectively, of whom 44 were males and 56 females. Those who reported to have a higher level of education, that is, a tertiary degree from a vocational school or a university (including that of a post-graduate/doctorate) were 55, while the remaining 45 held a secondary or a lower degree of education. The number of the unemployed amongst these 100 participants in total was 24.

When reconsidered on the basis of citizenship, these counts presented a fairly diverse distribution. It appeared the nationals were represented by a relatively older population (28 to

20 of non-nationals), more males (28 to 16) and fewer employed (35 to 41). Yet, in terms of educational levels, participants of both groups were comparable with close frequencies:

Table1: Survey participants in Germany

Citizenship	Age groups			Gender		Level of education		Status of employment		Total
	Adolescents	Young adults	Adults	Male	Female	Secondary or lower	Tertiary	Employed	Unemployed	
Nationals	18	12	20	16	34	22	28	41	9	50
Non-nationals	12	10	28	28	22	23	27	35	15	50
Total	30	22	48	44	56	45	55	76	24	120

The findings of the survey's German leg showed comparable tendencies between the two sample groups' responses. While neither of these were significantly close to the mean, as the high standard deviations point out, the similar choices clustered around certain pre-given response categories did not go unnoticed:

Table 2: Distribution of responses on a six-category scale in Germany

Questions	Nationals								Non-nationals							
	I strongly agree	I agree	I do not agree	I strongly disagree	I neither agree nor disagree	I do not know/I do not want to answer	Mean	Standard deviation	I strongly agree	I agree	I do not agree	I strongly disagree	I neither agree nor disagree	I do not know/I do not want to answer	Mean	Standard deviation
1	13	11	3	6	8	9	8,33	3,56	8	14	7	7	5	9	8,33	3,08
2	8	12	6	7	8	9	8,33	2,07	10	11	5	9	6	9	8,33	2,34
3	14	17	3	6	5	5	8,33	5,72	8	21	3	8	4	6	8,33	6,53
4	7	14	2	3	7	17	8,33	5,99	12	6	3	4	12	13	8,33	4,50
5	12	15	4	6	6	7	8,33	4,41	14	14	4	7	5	6	8,33	4,50

Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the target responses to the survey questions were eventually to disclose three general feedback categories of agreement, disagreement and other choices suggesting abstention, failure and/or refusal to provide answers. Before interpreting the patterns of responses above, the six-response scale was for this reason first of all abridged under ‘agreement’, ‘disagreement’ and ‘other’:

Table 3: Responses in Germany

Questions	Categories	Nationals	Non-nationals	Total
1	Agreement	24	22	46
	Disagreement	9	14	23
	Other	17	14	31
	Total	50	50	100
2	Agreement	20	21	41
	Disagreement	13	14	27
	Other	17	15	32
	Total	50	50	100
3	Agreement	31	29	60
	Disagreement	9	11	20
	Other	10	10	20
	Total	50	50	100
4	Agreement	21	28	49
	Disagreement	5	7	12
	Other	24	15	39
	Total	50	50	100
5	Agreement	27	28	55
	Disagreement	10	11	21
	Other	13	11	24
	Total	50	50	100

Of all the response patterns observed in Germany, the second and fifth questions concerning negative impacts of further immigration and harmony between national and non-national cultural practices in the country showed the most similarities, with a total of just two varying responses of agreement and disagreement between the two sample groups, each. Likewise, the first and third questions asking whether or not it was a good thing for Germany to make room for more immigrants and if people with a non-immigration background should enjoy a privileged position in the country showed similar distribution of responses, where the variance

was maximum two more/fewer choices. The least similar choices came by contrast in response to the fourth question, inquiring about respondents' concerns for Germany's national and cultural values in the case of further arrivals of immigrants. Interestingly, the non-nationals' counts of agreement responses here turned out to outweigh those of the nationals.

The observed frequencies were then processed to obtain the expected counts, according to 'row total x column total / grand total', as the 3x4 shaded grids in Table 3 indicate. Based on the observed and expected data, the test statistic ' $\chi^2 = \sum (\text{observed} - \text{expected})^2 / \text{expected}$ ' brought out the P-values below, given the 95% level of confidence and 2 degrees of freedom (calculated through 'number of rows - 1 x number of columns - 1'):

Table 4: P-values in Germany

Questions	Categories	Nationals		Non-nationals		P-values
		Observed counts	Expected counts	Observed counts	Expected counts	
1	Agreement	24	23	22	23	0,48
	Disagreement	9	11,5	14	11,5	
	Other	17	15,5	14	15,5	
2	Agreement	20	20,5	21	20,5	0,91
	Disagreement	13	13,5	14	13,5	
	Other	17	16	15	16	
3	Agreement	31	30	29	30	0,88
	Disagreement	9	10	11	10	
	Other	10	10	10	10	
4	Agreement	21	19,5	18	19,5	0,75
	Disagreement	5	6	7	6	
	Other	24	24,5	25	24,5	
5	Agreement	27	27,5	28	27,5	0,89
	Disagreement	10	10,5	11	10,5	
	Other	13	12	11	12	

France

The second leg of the survey following Germany took place in France. It took 10 days to complete the interviews in Paris, Opéra/Pigalle. Of the pre-scheduled 167 visits during this

period, 21 ended with unanswered rings, 16 potential participants refused to take part in the survey, 17 others were ill, too young, old or otherwise to be able to respond. In the end, a total of 113 private households were successfully interviewed. This amounted to an overall response rate of 67.7%.

The classification of the final 100 participants according to the three age groups revealed 27 adolescents, 23 young adults and 50 adults, who were represented by 42 males and 58 females. Of these, 62 reported to hold degrees from an institution of tertiary level of education as opposed to 38 with a high school degree at the most. The rate of the unemployed participants was around one fourth, that is, 27 of them declared to be jobless.

For these findings, participation of similar age groups was observed (16 adolescents, 11 young adults and 23 adults of national participants versus 15, 9 and 26 of the non-nationals, respectively). In terms of gender, the non-national participants were represented by 24 males and 26 females, as opposed to 18 males and 32 females of French participants. The level of education in this latter group came to be slightly lower: 29 of them had a degree from a vocational school or university as opposed to 33 similar degree holders representing the non-national participants in France. Finally, the counts of the employed and unemployed were in both groups almost identical, revealing 37 employed and 13 unemployed nationals, compared to 36 and 14 of non-nationals:

Table 5: Survey participants in France

Citizenship	Age groups			Gender		Level of education		Status of employment		Total
	Adolescents	Young adults	Adults	Male	Female	Secondary or lower	Tertiary	Employed	Unemployed	

Nationals	16	11	23	18	32	21	29	37	13	50
Non-nationals	15	9	26	24	26	17	33	36	14	50
Total	31	20	49	42	58	38	62	73	27	100

Against a background of this spread of information, the counts of participant responses as observed during the French leg of the survey were:

Table 6: Distribution of responses in France

Questions	Nationals								Non-nationals							
	I strongly agree	I agree	I do not agree	I strongly disagree	I neither agree nor disagree	I do not know/I do not want to answer	Mean	Standard deviation	I strongly agree	I agree	I do not agree	I strongly disagree	I neither agree nor disagree	I do not know/I do not want to answer	Mean	Standard deviation
1	14	7	5	7	9	8	8,33	3,08	8	11	6	7	7	11	8,33	2,16
2	6	18	6	6	11	3	8,33	5,39	6	16	9	6	6	7	8,33	3,93
3	13	16	3	5	6	7	8,33	5,05	12	14	3	6	7	8	8,33	4,03
4	12	11	4	4	11	8	8,33	3,61	6	16	3	3	12	10	8,33	5,24
5	13	20	7	8	1	1	8,33	7,31	14	17	6	6	3	4	8,33	5,75

Like in the German case, the distribution of responses in France was to be reconsidered eventually on the basis of three categories only, that is, of ‘agreement’, ‘disagreement’ and ‘other’, prior to their assessment for statistical analysis decisively:

Table 7: Responses in France

Questions	Categories	Nationals	Non-nationals	Total
1	Agreement	21	19	40
	Disagreement	12	13	25
	Other	17	18	35
	Total	50	50	100
2	Agreement	24	22	46
	Disagreement	12	15	27

	Other	14	13	27
	Total	50	50	100
3	Agreement	29	26	55
	Disagreement	8	9	17
	Other	13	15	28
	Total	50	50	100
4	Agreement	23	22	45
	Disagreement	8	6	14
	Other	19	22	41
	Total	50	50	100
5	Agreement	33	31	64
	Disagreement	15	12	27
	Other	2	7	9
	Total	50	50	100

The data distribution in accordance indicated high sets of standard deviation for the two sample groups, while an obvious differentiation in their response preferences was far from being the case. The maximum variance as to responses of agreement related to the third question investigating whether or not people with a non-immigration background should enjoy a privileged position in this country. Here, the French nationals gave three more responses of agreement. Similarly, in the case of responses demonstrating disagreement, the second and fifth questions inquiring about further immigrant arrivals' negative impacts on the labour markets in France and whether or not non-national cultural practices fit into the French way of living brought out maximum three extra responses (given by 15 non-nationals to the second question versus 12 by nationals, which in the fifth question turned to be the other way around, i.e. the nationals' 15 responses of disagreement as opposed to 12 of the non-national participants). Aside from these findings, nonetheless, the other response preferences demonstrated fairly similar tendencies, whereby the two sample groups' patterns of agreement and disagreement differed from each other with two fewer/more choices at the most.

Based on the observed data above, the expected counts of responses were then identified to perform the test statistic. Accordingly, the P-values were:

Table 8: P-values in France

Questions	Categories	Nationals		Non-nationals		P-values
		Observed counts	Expected counts	Observed counts	Expected counts	
1	Agreement	21	20	19	20	0,92
	Disagreement	12	12,5	13	12,5	
	Other	17	17,5	18	17,5	
2	Agreement	24	23	22	23	0,80
	Disagreement	12	13,5	15	13,5	
	Other	14	13,5	13	13,5	
3	Agreement	29	27,5	26	27,5	0,83
	Disagreement	8	8,5	9	8,5	
	Other	13	14	15	14	
4	Agreement	23	22,5	22	22,5	0,77
	Disagreement	8	7	6	7	
	Other	19	20,5	22	20,5	
5	Agreement	33	32	31	32	0,20
	Disagreement	15	13,5	12	13,5	
	Other	2	4,5	7	4,5	

Belgium

The third stop of the survey was Belgium. The 9 visiting days required for the interviews in the two randomly selected streets of Brussels, Ixelles yielded 22 unanswered rings. 16 potential participants declined to take part in the survey, while 17 others were ill, too young, old or otherwise to respond. A total of 112 private households were interviewed in the end. Overall, this came to a response rate of 67.1%.

The participating adolescents, young adults and adults of the final 100 respondents were represented in Brussels by 29, 20 and 51 samples, respectively. The numbers of male and female participants here were 53 and 47. The two groups' levels of education were meanwhile relatively high, that is, more than half of the sample population (54) had a higher degree from a vocational school or university. The number of employed participants was even higher: 64 respondents in Belgium declared to have jobs.

When seen on the basis of citizenship, the counts of responses Belgian citizens gave and those of non-nationals were quite similar. The distribution of age groups in both cases was slightly biased towards adults, with more participation of females and those holding degrees from a school of tertiary level of education. The status of employment/unemployment was also similar. Accordingly, 19 nationals and 17 non-nationals reported to be jobless:

Table 9: Survey participants in Belgium

Citizenship	Age groups			Gender		Level of education		Status of employment		Total
	Adolescents	Young adults	Adults	Male	Female	Secondary or lower	Tertiary	Employed	Unemployed	
Nationals	13	13	24	24	26	24	26	31	19	50
Non-nationals	16	7	27	23	27	22	28	33	17	50
Total	29	20	51	47	53	46	54	64	36	100
Grand total	100			100		100		100		100

With this spread of information in the background, the distribution of responses the survey participants opted for in the Belgian case appeared as:

Table 10: Distribution of responses in Belgium

Questions	Nationals	Non-nationals
-----------	-----------	---------------

	I strongly agree	I agree	I do not agree	I strongly disagree	I neither agree nor disagree	I do not know/I do not want to answer	Mean	Standard deviation	I strongly agree	I agree	I do not agree	I strongly disagree	I neither agree nor disagree	I do not know/I do not want to answer	Mean	Standard deviation
1	9	11	3	8	12	7	8,33	3,20	11	7	5	6	11	10	8,33	2,66
2	13	9	7	7	6	8	8,33	2,50	10	9	9	10	3	9	8,33	2,66
3	17	14	5	6	4	4	8,33	5,68	12	20	3	6	3	6	8,33	6,59
4	9	10	5	10	9	7	8,33	1,97	9	8	10	8	8	7	8,33	1,03
5	13	17	3	6	7	4	8,33	5,50	12	13	6	6	6	7	8,33	3,27

which became after reducing the six response categories to three:

Table 11: Responses in Belgium

Questions	Categories	Nationals	Non-nationals	Total
1	Agreement	20	18	38
	Disagreement	11	11	22
	Other	19	21	40
	Total	50	50	100
2	Agreement	22	19	41
	Disagreement	14	19	33
	Other	14	12	26
	Total	50	50	100
3	Agreement	31	32	63
	Disagreement	11	9	20
	Other	8	9	17
	Total	50	50	100
4	Agreement	19	17	36
	Disagreement	15	18	33
	Other	16	15	31
	Total	50	50	100
5	Agreement	30	25	55
	Disagreement	9	12	21
	Other	11	13	24
	Total	50	50	100

Like in Germany and France, a thorough analysis of responses in Belgium indicated similar patterns between nationals and non-nationals, with high values of standard deviations applying to both groups. The exception here applied to the fifth question, investigating non-national cultural practices' fit into the Belgian way of living in the case of which the

distribution of agreement responses differed with 5 more national choices from those of the non-national participants. The question to which the two groups of participants appeared to respond almost identically was the third one inquiring about whether or not people with a non-immigration background should enjoy a privileged position in Belgium. While the non-nationals' responses of agreement were here just one ahead (32 versus 31 of nationals), the nationals' responses of disagreement outweighed with two extra choices (11 vs 9 of non-nationals). To be fair, responses to the other questions brought out also fairly similar tendencies, where the biggest variance concerned the second question on the new immigrant arrivals' negative impacts on the Belgian labour markets. The nationals' 14 responses of disagreement here differed to a certain extent from 19 of non-nationals, while preferences for disagreement were somewhat less: 22 of nationals vs 11 of non-nationals.

With the expected counts calculated on the basis of the observed data above, the test statistic introduced the P-values below:

Table 12: P-values in Belgium

Questions	Categories	Nationals		Non-nationals		P-values
		Observed counts	Expected counts	Observed counts	Expected counts	
1	Agreement	20	19	18	19	0,90
	Disagreement	11	11	11	11	
	Other	19	20	21	20	
2	Agreement	22	20,5	19	20,5	0,57
	Disagreement	14	16,5	19	16,5	
	Other	14	13	12	13	
3	Agreement	31	31,5	32	31,5	0,87
	Disagreement	11	10	9	10	
	Other	8	8,5	9	8,5	
4	Agreement	19	18	17	18	0,81
	Disagreement	15	16,5	18	16,5	
	Other	16	15,5	15	15,5	
5	Agreement	30	27,5	25	27,5	0,59
	Disagreement	9	10,5	12	10,5	

	Other	11	12	13	12	
--	-------	----	----	----	----	--

The Netherlands

The last round of the survey took place in the Netherlands. Here, a total of 11 days were spent to conduct the interviews in the two randomly chosen streets of Amsterdam's Geuzenveld-Slotermeer. 22 of the potential respondents turned out to be absent at their previously contacted addresses, while 25 of them refused to participate in the survey and 11 others were ill, too young, old or otherwise to be able to join in. In the end, a total of 109 private households were successfully interviewed. This amounted overall to a response rate of 65.3%.

The classification of the conclusive 100 participants in the Netherlands according to age, gender, level of education and status of employment revealed a distribution of 24 adolescents, 35 young adults and 41 adults, who were made up of 41 males and 59 females, with 34 of them holding a degree of secondary level of education and 66 that of tertiary, respectively. Of the total number of participants here, 20 were unemployed.

When viewed in terms of the two sample groups, these counts suggested fairly different rates. First, apart from the age groups which indicated almost no variance between the nationals and non-nationals, the two groups of participants diverged slightly in terms of gender: 22 males and 28 females of the former versus 19 males and 31 females of the latter. The levels of education were however quite close. While the number of those with degrees from schools of the tertiary level of education amongst nationals was 34, it was for non-nationals 32. Likewise, the number of the employed amongst the former was 41, compared to 39 non-national participants who reported to have jobs:

Table 13: Survey participants in the Netherlands

Citizenship	Age groups	Gender	Level of education	Status of employment	Total
-------------	------------	--------	--------------------	----------------------	-------

	Adolescents	Young adults	Adults	Male	Female	Secondary or lower	Tertiary	Employed	Unemployed	
Nationals	13	17	20	22	28	16	34	41	9	50
Non-nationals	11	18	21	19	31	18	32	39	11	50
Total	24	35	41	41	59	34	66	80	20	100
Grand total	100			100		100		100		100

Against a background of these participant profiles, the core task, that is, finding out the ways in which the selected two groups of citizens answered the survey questions introduced the following distribution of responses:

Table 14: Distribution of responses in the Netherlands

Questions	Nationals								Non-nationals							
	I strongly agree	I agree	I do not agree	I strongly disagree	I neither agree nor disagree	I do not know/I do not want to answer	Mean	Standard deviation	I strongly agree	I agree	I do not agree	I strongly disagree	I neither agree nor disagree	I do not know/I do not want to answer	Mean	Standard deviation
1	9	11	8	9	6	7	8,33	1,75	8	9	12	7	7	7	8,33	1,97
2	11	7	7	10	7	8	8,33	1,75	8	8	12	8	5	9	8,33	2,25
3	14	18	3	4	5	6	8,33	6,15	11	17	5	5	5	7	8,33	4,84
4	6	17	6	6	7	8	8,33	4,32	14	7	10	7	6	6	8,33	3,14
5	12	14	4	9	5	6	8,33	4,03	11	13	8	9	3	6	8,33	3,56

When reduced to three response categories, as formerly done in the former three cases of Germany, France and Belgium, the above-given distribution in the Netherlands appeared as:

Table 15: Responses in the Netherlands

Questions	Categories	Nationals	Non-nationals	Total
1	Agreement	20	17	37
	Disagreement	17	19	36
	Other	13	14	27
	Total	50	50	100
2	Agreement	18	16	34
	Disagreement	17	20	37
	Other	15	14	29
	Total	50	50	100
3	Agreement	32	28	60
	Disagreement	7	10	17
	Other	11	12	23
	Total	50	50	100
4	Agreement	23	21	44
	Disagreement	12	17	29
	Other	15	12	27
	Total	50	50	100
5	Agreement	26	24	50
	Disagreement	13	17	30
	Other	11	9	20
	Total	50	50	100

Accordingly, the responses in the Netherlands did not seem to be evenly distributed from the mean values. The lowest standard deviation was recorded in the case of the first question, investigating whether or not it was a good thing for the Netherlands to make room for more immigrants, whereby the values appeared to be close to each other (1,97 for non-nationals and 1,75 for nationals). As for the comparison of responses, there emerged, broadly speaking, fairly similar tendencies between the two sample groups. The biggest variance concerned the fourth question investigating concerns for the Netherlands' national and cultural values in case of more immigrants' arrival. The responses of nationals and non-nationals differed here with 5 more choices of the latter (17 versus 12 of nationals). For the third and fifth questions looking into privileges for people with a non-immigration background and non-national cultural practices' fit into the Dutch way of living, the responses of agreement and disagreement could show differences as many as four (the nationals' 32 agreement responses versus 28 of non-nationals to the third question and the non-national participants' 17 of

disagreement as opposed to 13 of nationals in the case of the fifth question). Other than these, variations between the two groups' preferences did not exceed three counts, as applicable to responses of disagreement to the second and third questions and the choices of agreement in relation to the first question. Put in brief, based on the preferences of respondents in the Dutch case, one could argue for largely symmetrical choices between the national and non-national survey participants.

Given the observed counts of responses and the expected frequencies calculated in accordance, the test statistic brought out the following P-values for the Dutch case:

Table 16: P-values in the Netherlands

Questions	Categories	Nationals		Non-nationals		P-values
		Observed counts	Expected counts	Observed counts	Expected counts	
1	Agreement	20	18,5	17	18,5	0,82
	Disagreement	17	18	19	18	
	Other	13	13,5	14	13,5	
2	Agreement	18	17	16	17	0,82
	Disagreement	17	18,5	20	18,5	
	Other	15	14,5	14	14,5	
3	Agreement	32	30	28	30	0,66
	Disagreement	7	8,5	10	8,5	
	Other	11	11,5	12	11,5	
4	Agreement	23	22	21	22	0,53
	Disagreement	12	14,5	17	14,5	
	Other	15	13,5	12	13,5	
5	Agreement	26	25	24	25	0,67
	Disagreement	13	15	17	15	
	Other	11	10	9	10	

Comparative assessment and discussion

To begin with the participant profiles first: for nationals, the youngest contribution was recorded in Germany (with 18 adolescents and 12 young adults out of 50 participants) where the status of employment was together with that in the Netherlands the highest (41 counts out

of 50), as well as female participation with more than twice as much of males (34 to 16). The oldest sample group in the category of nationals was in Belgium (with 24 adults). The highest level of education amongst the four sample groups of nationals turned out to belong to the Dutch (with 34 holders of a tertiary school degree). For non-nationals, on the other side, the youngest representation took place in Belgium (with 16 adolescents of survey participants) and the oldest in Germany (with 28 adults). The highest female participation in the non-national sample group was in the Netherlands (with 31 counts), where the level of education proved to be fairly high, close to its highest value for the nationals (32 out of 50 respondents). In this category, the widest contribution was noted in France with 33 participants having a degree from a university/vocational school at the least. Of the non-national samples, it was in the Netherlands where the ratio of the employed to the jobless was the biggest, almost 4 to 1 (with 39 employed versus 11 unemployed), which was followed in the second place by France's 36 reportedly working participants and 14 jobless.

Overall, including both nationals and non-nationals, majority of the participants belonged to the adult category (189 out of 400 samples in grand total of four countries), were mostly employed (293 versus 107 reportedly jobless) and of females (226 to 174 males). What's more, a higher rate of the respondents turned out to hold degrees from a tertiary level school than of secondary or lower level (237 to 163).

Table 17: Cross-comparison of sample groups

Citizenship	Selected case	Age groups			Gender		Level of education		Status of employment		Total
		Adolescents	Young adults	Adults	Male	Female	Secondary or lower	Tertiary	Employed	Unemployed	
Nationals	Germany	18	12	20	16	34	22	28	41	9	50
	France	16	11	23	18	32	21	29	37	13	50
	Belgium	13	13	24	24	26	24	26	31	19	50
	Netherlands	13	17	20	22	28	16	34	41	9	50

	Total	60	53	87	80	120	83	117	150	50	200
Non-nationals	Germany	12	10	28	28	22	23	27	35	15	50
	France	15	9	26	24	26	17	33	36	14	50
	Belgium	16	7	27	23	27	22	28	33	17	50
	Netherlands	11	18	21	19	31	18	32	39	11	50
	Total	54	44	102	94	106	80	120	143	57	200
Grand Total		114	97	189	174	226	163	237	293	107	400

The research hypothesis (the so-called null hypothesis) underpinning this study suggested that negative attitudes towards diversification of the ethnic landscape in EU Member States are attributable to their resident nationals in the first place. This point of departure was in line with the mainstream assumption, as observed for instance in the mass media, according to which nationals tend to be more critical of immigrants, which is why their attitudes towards ethnocultural diversification should be more dismissive than those of non-nationals. To be able to argue that the null hypothesis was agreeable on the basis of the population sample above, the adopted Pearson chi-square test of independence had to reveal significant differences between the responses of national and non-national participants. Given the 5% level of significance, this meant, the preset $\alpha:0.05$ alpha level could by no means be overreached. The test statistic performed for each of the five survey questions revealed, however, the following distribution of P-values:

Table 18: Comparison of P-values

Questions	P-values			
	Germany	France	Belgium	Netherlands
1	0,48	0,92	0,90	0,82
2	0,91	0,80	0,57	0,82
3	0,88	0,83	0,87	0,66

4	0,75	0,77	0,81	0,53
5	0,89	0,20	0,59	0,67

These values are obviously too high, in fact close to the probability level of 1 in some cases. Aside from variations from one country to the other, there is accordingly no considerable outcome to maintain that the observed differences between the national and non-national groups' responses in Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands are of statistical significance. Based on this finding, the study offers to reject the null hypothesis that negative attitudes towards diversification of the ethnic landscape further in EU member states are attributable to their resident nationals in the first place.

As a rule, feelings of aversion in this category are attached to the nationals, to the extent that non-nationals need to be in solidarity with the 'newcomers', for these are the people with whom they jointly constitute the minority population. And if there are similar patterns between the attitudes of nationals and non-national on this score, as it came out in this study, the underlying causes deserve careful scrutiny.

First, as the findings of this study confirmed it, the levels of education and employment status which the nationals and non-nationals currently hold in many EU Member States are contrary to popular belief not so differential (Keeley 2009; Benton et al. 2014). As the gap between the nationals and non-nationals became closer in recent times (the education levels of immigrants in some countries like Spain and the UK prove to be even higher than those of the natives at present), their attitudes towards ethnocultural diversification tended to verge on each other. Such patterns have been suggesting that the more the levels of education and job status

become comparable, the more similar the two groups' thoughts about demographic change turn out to be vis-à-vis immigration.

Then, one needs to make particular mention of the current terrorism discourse here. It has been around fourteen years since the so-called 9/11 events and matters concerning immigration are in Europe firmly tied to the security agenda. While a considerable number of immigrants have been developing closer sympathy with anti-European movements, with growing senses of marginalisation and discrimination in their countries of residence (Bawer 2007; Goodwin 2013), many others find this sort of liaison all but reconciliatory and choose to dissolve into their host societies instead (Laurence and Vaisse 2006; Alba and Foner 2015). Distancing themselves gradually from the stereotypical, unrecognised and most criticised associations with minorities, this latter group seek ways to alleviate the longstanding prejudice in the majority eyes by manifesting allegiance to their countries of residence (Zarembka 2006).

A frame of reference which could be cited in the same vein is 'queue-jumping'. With its solid grounds in international law, reception of political refugees into the EU lands for instance holds precedence over many other visa types or entry clearances. A relatively secure immigrant status as this may offer, the fact that some immigrants 'queue jump' some others by this means is not always well-received (Boldero and Whelan 2011). While the issue seems at first sight to relate to granting rights to one group by highjacking those of others, who might have been waiting for a longer period, it may in fact be one of competition at the labour markets (Thio and Taylor 2012). The newcomers are accordingly seen as potential rivals for limited job opportunities at the lower end of the scale (Blakely and Leigh 2010; D'Amuri et al. 2009).

It should be noted that these inferences are not entirely drawn from the survey findings. As formerly stated, the research aim was to compare attitudes between nationals and non-nationals towards an increasingly diversified ethnic landscape in Europe by way of a string of closed questions (yes/no). As the broader aim was to give a mere glimpse of the current debates in that regard, on the basis of five yes/no questions, there was no direct investigation of the whys and wherefores to the participants' responses. The above-given conjectural notes –which are partially based on empirical evidence, as the attached references are meant to stand for- could for this reason serve as no more than a guiding background for the observed similarities between nationals and non-nationals throughout the study.

Conclusion

The political climate in Europe is at present anything but congenial for further diversification of the ethnic landscape. The widespread public perception that the opportunities immigrants bring along are outnumbered by the repercussions they produce (German Marshall Fund 2013) renders multiculturalism as a state policy inimical to the interests of many EU lands for its 'misleading representations of culture, or the justification it can provide for sacrificing the rights and interests of the individual' (Phillips 2009, p. 72). With this permeating frame of mind, concerns for the ethnocultural status quo have started to reach out to a wider audience. The threats often perceived by nationals towards their cultural, linguistic and/or civic values startle now the non-national populations by the same token.

A most relevant point of reference to consider in this regard is the EU's latest rounds of enlargement. For the newest members, in particular the Central and Eastern European States (CEES), the end of the communist era was a much-awaited moment to re-establish their economic, political and cultural bonds with the rest of Europe. For the latter bit, however, the end of the Cold War was suggesting amongst others large-scale immigration from the CEES,

which -following numerous phases of *Gastarbeiter* recruitment and colonial immigration since the 1950s- was bound to diversify the ethnic landscape further. To be sure, in a host of old EU members to the north/west, there were serious concerns over not only the newcomers' impacts on the labour market dynamics -the resident nationals' reservations about losing their jobs- but also the complications immigrants could inflict on the societal cohesion. Amidst debates about which integration model should be most desirable on that score, there was soon in traditional traditional immigration countries like the UK, France, the Netherlands and Germany 'a backlash and retreat from multiculturalism, and a reassertion of ideas of nation building, common values and identity, and unitary citizenship — even a call for the “return of assimilation”’ (Kymlicka 2012, p.7).

Of all relevant matters relating to ‘the coexistence of different identities within a single nation, thus directly addressing issues about the limits of toleration within liberal democracies’ (Guibernau 2010, p. 6), at stake has almost always been preservation of the ethnocultural status, rather than expansion of shared values in quest of an all-embracing and cohesive society. Given the security-driven post-9/11 world order, the pervasive terrorism discourse and anti-immigrant mood across many EU lands currently, the resident non-nationals feel largely apprehensive about the arrival of further newcomers and the accompanying spread of ethnocultural heterogeneity. In an atmosphere of hate, witch-hunting and intensifying xenophobia, the non-national populations learn to live with and face up to the ultra-nationalists of their countries of residence, where it is now a question of time the far-right political parties could win the majority vote alone, their hitherto performances on the fringes notwithstanding.³

³ The Dutch and Austrian Freedom Parties, the French National Front or the Hungarian Jobbik are to name a few.

Overall, in analysing public attitudes towards the changing ethnic landscape in contemporary Europe, oversimplification of non-national residents may give a false colour to their patterns of behaviour. In the face of an unremitting immigration pressure over the last decades, many of these have been acting in alignment with the nationals and the accepted norms of their host societies. For future research, this tendency seems to offer challenges to reconsidering the processes of adaptation, acculturation, integration and/or assimilation within the broader context of immigration.

In the end, as noses alter faces and circumstances alter cases in Europe's current immigration context, the old stereotypes do not provide an accurate guide to predicting the non-nationals' patterns of behaviour, as far as issues concerning the ethnocultural status quo are concerned. It seems many of them simply conduct themselves along with the accepted norms of their host societies.

References

Alba, R. and Foner, N. 2015. *Strangers No More: Immigration and the Challenges of Integration in North America and Western Europe*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Bakens, J. et al. 2015. Cultural diversity: a matter of measurement. In: Nijkamp, P., Poot, J. and Bakens, J. eds. *The Economics of Cultural Diversity*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, pp. 17-51.

Bawer, B. 2007. *While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam is Destroying the West from Within*. New York: Anchor.

Benton, M. et al. 2014. *Moving Up, or Standing Still? Access to Middle-Skilled Work for Newly Arrived Migrants in the European Union*. Washington D.C. and Geneva . Migration Policy Institute.

Blakely, E. J. and Leigh, N. G. (2010). *Planning Local Economic Development: Theory and Practice* (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Boldero, J. and Whelan, J. 2011. Australians' attitudes toward culturally similar and culturally dissimilar migrants. In: Ruggerio, G.M. et al. eds. *Perspectives on Immigration and Terrorism*. Amsterdam: IOS Press, pp. 105-114.

Connolly, K. et al. 2015. Muslims in Europe fear anti-Islamic mood will intensify after Paris attacks. *The Guardian*, 9 January 2015. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/09/muslims-europe-fear-escalation-anti-islamism-paris-attacks> [Accessed: 22 April 2015].

Crowder, G. 2013. *Theories of Multiculturalism. An Introduction*. Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press.

D'Amuri, F. et al. 2010. The labor market impact of immigration in Western Germany in the 1990s. *European Economic Review* 54 (4), pp. 550–570.

German Marshall Fund. 2013. *Transatlantic Trends 2013. Key Findings*. Available at: <http://trends.gmfus.org/transatlantic-trends/> [Accessed: 28 September 2015].

Goodwin, M. 2013. *The roots of extremism: The English Defence League and the counter-jihad challenge*. Chatham House. Available at: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Europe/0313bp_goodwin.pdf [Accessed: 23 September 2015].

Guibernau, M. 2010. *Migration and the rise of the radical right*. London: Policy Network.

Keeley, B. 2009. *International Migration: The Human Face of Globalisation*. Paris: OECD Publishing.

Kymlicka, W. 2012. *Multiculturalism: Success, Failure, and the Future*. Washington D.C.: Migration Policy Institute.

Laurence, J. and Vaisse, J. 2006. *Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

OECD. 2012. *International Migration Outlook*. Paris: OECD Publishing. Available at: <http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/fulltext/8112071e.pdf?expires=1346509474&id=id&accname=ocid57016285&checksum=B6C78EF73CDC224BFA0C03F1546C9F7C> [Accessed: 12 September 2015].

Phillips, A. 2009. *Multiculturalism without Culture*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

The Telegraph. 2011. Nicolas Sarkozy declares multiculturalism had failed, 11 February 2011. Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/8317497/Nicolas-Sarkozy-declares-multiculturalism-had-failed.html> [Accessed: 21 September 2015].

Thio, A. and Taylor, J.D. 2012. *Social problems*. Sudbury, M.A.: Jones & Bartlett Learning.

Triandafyllidou, A. et al. eds. 2012. *European Multiculturalisms: Cultural, Religious and Ethnic Challenges*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Uberoi, V. and Modood, T. eds. 2015. *Multiculturalism Rethought: Interpretations, Dilemmas and New Directions*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Vertovec, S. and Wessendorf, S. eds. 2010. *The Multiculturalism Backlash*. London: Routledge.

Zarembka, P. ed. 2006. *The Hidden History of 9-11-2001. Research in Political Economy Vol. 23*. Amsterdam: Elsevier.