The Kids Are Alright: Neorealism and U.S. NATO Policy after the Cold War

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To my parents

It's not difficult—
but complicated!
—H. Berendsen

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Evaluate all your social relationships and end those not furthering your dissertation, one of the books I consulted when I first embarked on this project suggested. It seemed silly then, and even more so now, when so many have knowingly and unknowingly helped me complete this dissertation. I am deeply indebted to each and every one of you, and you would have passed the evaluation with flying colors!

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Abbreviations

ACE	Allied Command Europe
ACO	Allied Command Operations
ACTWARN	Activation Warning
ACTORD	Activation Order
AFSOUTH	Allied Forces Southern Europe
AMF	Allied Command Europe Mobile Force
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
EC	European Communities
EU	European Union
FPA	Foreign Policy Analysis
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HOSG	Heads of State and Government
IFOR	Implementation Force
IPP	Individual Partnership Program
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KVM	Kosovo Verification Mission
MAP	Membership Action Plan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PARP	Planning and Review Process
PFP	Partnership for Peace
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SFOR	Stabilization Force
STANAVFORMED	Standing Naval Force Mediterranean
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
VOPP	Vance-Owen Peace Plan
WEU	Western European Union
YPA	Yugoslav People's Army

1. Introduction

The United States emerged from the Cold War as the world's only superpower, militarily dominating any potential adversary or coalition. Interventions around the globe and the large margin between the United States and the next largest state in terms of military expenditure underscore this point. This global advantage translates into an unprecedented freedom of action following the demise of the bipolar structure of the Cold War. Nonetheless, the United States has remained active in what has arguably been the most successful alliance in history—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

While it is becoming increasingly hard to imagine in hindsight, the persistence and continued importance of NATO were far from preordained or uncontested.[1] Indeed, the changes in the international system wrought by the end of the Cold War and the quarter century since have been significant. Beginning in the early 1990s, the strategic vacuum after the collapse of the Soviet Union spawned a debate over the utility of alliances in general and NATO in particular. With the United States being the major actor in NATO, this debate was always led with an emphasis on U.S. strategy. For example, Rajan Menon in his 2009 book *The End of Alliances* predicted "a new turn in American strategy—one that abandons cold war alliances and the military commitments associated with them."[2] Menon

1 Robert P. Grant, "Sustaining the US Commitment to NATO," in *A History of NATO - The First Fifty Years*, ed. Gustav Schmidt, vol. 2 (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001), 43.

2 Rajan Menon, *The End of Alliances* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 19.

argues further that the United States would increasingly turn to ad-hoc coalitions and other flexible arrangements to pursue its aims.[3]

Regardless of whether one agrees with Menon's thrust, his argument serves as a useful reminder that alliances are but one way of pursuing foreign policy. States can just as well pursue their foreign policy goals unilaterally. This is especially true for the single-most powerful country in the current system, the United States, which has a range of alternative means to conduct foreign policy at its disposal. Indeed, the United States had not entered into a formal alliance for over 170 years before NATO was founded in 1949.[4]

1.1. Puzzle

The puzzle this dissertation seeks to address is the fact that the United States has remained an active member of NATO, despite emerging as the single-most powerful state in the international system after the end of the Cold War. Theoretically, this dissertation inquires whether neorealism's predictions for the unipole's behavior in alliances can help us understand U.S. behavior in NATO.

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3 For other skeptical views of the value of U.S. alliances, see e.g. Ted Galen Carpenter, *A Search for Enemies: America's Alliances After the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1992); Ted Galen Carpenter, *Smart Power: Toward a Prudent Foreign Policy for America* (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2008); Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," *International Security* 21, no. 4 (1997): 5–48; Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present*, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); Robert J. Lieber, *Retreat and Its Consequences: American Foreign Policy and the Problem of World Order* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Jennifer Lind, "Keep, Toss, or Fix? Assessing US Alliances in East Asia," in *Sustainable Security: Rethinking American National Security Strategy*, ed. Jeremi Suri and Benjamin Valentino (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Joseph M. Parent and Paul K. MacDonald, "The Wisdom of Retrenchment," *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 6 (2011): 32–47; Barry R. Posen, *Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014).

4 Not since the 1778 Treaty of Alliance with France.

To this end, this dissertation examines U.S. NATO policy from the end of the Cold War to the early presidency of George W. Bush. NATO's survival and the United States' continued engagement in it were not to be taken for granted—many prominent scholars and pundits predicted its demise or called for its dissolution, and several of the central theories of international relations, e.g. realism, suggested NATO would disintegrate.[5] I set out to answer the following theoretical and empirical questions: Have motives suggested by structural realism underpinned U.S. behavior in the alliance? How has U.S. policy with regard to NATO's mission, transformation, and expansion evolved after 1989? Have there been patterns of U.S. behavior? What constraints has NATO placed on U.S. foreign policy?

I try to answer these questions through a disciplined configurative single case study of U.S. NATO policy, analyzing both primary and secondary material.

1.2. Significance

As the review of the historical and international relations literature will demonstrate, individual countries' NATO policies have received scant attention—this is, as one historian of the alliance claims, "a largely uncharted field of research."[6] While general histories of NATO touch upon individual countries' roles, few investigate national policies beyond singular decisions.[7] There is some work on the major countries in the alliance,

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5 See e.g. the overview in David G. Haglund, "Must NATO Fail? Theories, Myths, and Policy Dilemmas," *International Journal* 50, no. 4 (1995): 651–74.

6 Klaus Schwabe, "Commitments to NATO and Domestic Politics," in *A History of NATO - The First Fifty Years*, ed. Gustav Schmidt, vol. 2 (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001), 225.

7 Lawrence S. Kaplan, "After Forty Years: Reflections on NATO as a Research Field," in *NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe*, ed. Francis H. Heller and John Gillingham (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).

e.g. the United States,[8] France,[9] and Germany.[10] The case of NATO has been a perennial battleground for competing theories, hence a neorealist contribution is vital and the dearth of single-country studies all the more puzzling.[11] While a research gap in and of itself is a weak justification for conducting research, several theoretical and empirical considerations buttress the relevance of this dissertation's subject matter.

1.2.1. Theoretical

Theories of international relations assert hypothetical links between independent and dependent variables, i.e. observable outcomes. Therefore, the end of the bipolar configuration of the international system results in changed predictions in the observable dependent variables for theories that use the structure of the international system as an independent variable. The most prominent structural theory of international relations is Kenneth Waltz's "neorealism" or structural realism.[12] NATO's persistence

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8 Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1988).

9 Frédéric Bozo, "Sarkozy's NATO Policy: Towards France's Atlantic Realignment?," *European Political Science* 9, no. 2 (2010): 176–88; Charles G. Cogan, *Forced to Choose: France, the Atlantic Alliance, and NATO - Then and Now* (London: Praeger Publishers, 1997); Anand Menon, *France, NATO and the Limits of Independence, 1981-97: The Politics of Ambivalence* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000).

10 Emil Joseph Kirchner and James Sperling, *The Federal Republic of Germany and NATO: 40 Years after* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992); Marco Overhaus, *Die Deutsche NATO-Politik. Vom Ende Des Kalten Krieges Bis Zum Kampf Gegen Den Terrorismus* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009).

11 Gunther Hellmann, "A Brief Look at the Recent History of NATO's Future," in *Transatlantic Tug-of-War: Prospects for US-European Cooperation (Festschrift in Honour of Helga Haftendorn)*, ed. Ingo Peters (Münster: LIT, 2006), 181–216; Thomas Risse-Kappen, "A Liberal Interpretation of the Transatlantic Security Community," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

12 Ashley first suggested the monicker "neorealism," one of several cases of theories being named by their critics (Richard Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," *International Organization* 38 [1984]: 225–86). Another example is the so-called "English School." This dissertation uses neorealism and structural realism interchangeably.

and the continued U.S. commitment is a key proving ground for structural realism given three considerations:

1.2.1.1. Neorealism's Explanatory Power

The persistence of NATO has been one of the ostensible failures of neorealist scholarship.[13] While initial predictions saw NATO as a "disappearing thing,"[14] it is still around, has expanded its membership to include former adversaries, and for the first time acted on the collective defense provision enshrined in Article 5. Competing theories, mainly institutionalist and constructivist, have been employed to explain the phenomenon of NATO outliving its original purpose. Scholars working in the neorealist paradigm, however, have—after initial efforts—largely conceded the field, retreating to a "time will tell" stance. Said Waltz: "NATO's days are not numbered, but its years are."[15] This claim is unsatisfactory over 25 years after the end of the Cold War, with the alliance being larger than ever and the United States remaining the decisive actor in it. The dearth of scholarship and its indeterminate predictions is compounded by the fact that NATO should be a prime case for neorealists. At heart, it is an organization of states cooperating on security. If neorealists cannot explain a sys-

13 Celeste A. Wallander and Robert O. Keohane, "Why Does NATO Persist? An Institutional Approach," *Center for International Affairs, Harvard University*, 1996, 2; Celeste A. Wallander and Robert O. Keohane, "Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions," in *Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space*, ed. Helga Haftendorn and Robert O. Keohane (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 21. Furthermore, NATO as such has been a battleground for constructivists and neorealists (cf. Risse-Kappen, "A Liberal Interpretation of the Transatlantic Security Community"; Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy* [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997]).

14 Kenneth N. Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory," *Journal of International Affairs* 44, no. 1 (1990): 21–37; quoted in Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO," *Security Studies* 3, no. 1 (1993): 17.

15 Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security* 18, no. 2 (1993): 76.

tem-level phenomenon in the realm of security politics, i.e. "high politics," structural realism's explanatory power is in dire straits.

1.2.1.2. Integrity & Theory Development

Kenneth N. Waltz's seminal work *Theory of International Politics* has been the subject of manifold critiques since its original publication in 1979, as has structural realism, the theoretical paradigm that developed in its wake.[16] The book has been a touchstone for innovation in international relations theory, both by authors working in the tradition of Waltz and authors rejecting his theory. The need for refinement of Waltz's propositions has sparked innovations within the neorealist paradigm over the last 30 years. Examples include Walt's balance of threat proposition, the debate on offensive versus defensive realism,[17] work on the offense-defense balance,[18] and work by scholars labeled "neoclassical realists."[19] Recently, neoclassical realists have been criticized for diluting realism by incorporating "assumptions and causal mechanisms [from] within alter-

16 As Banks notes, *Theory of International Politics* is "the single most widely read contribution to neorealism, establishing [Waltz] as the paradigmatic successor to Morgenthau." (Michael Banks, "The Inter-Paradigm Debate," in *International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory*, ed. Margot Light and Groom [London: Frances Pinter, 1985], 14).

17 Stephen G. Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," *International Organization* 51, no. 3 (1997): 445–78; Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1994): 50–90; Andrew Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other," *Security Studies* 7, no. 1 (1997): 114–55; Eric J. Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," *Security Studies* 6, no. 4 (1997): 1–49.

18 See James W. Davis et al., "Taking Offense at Offense-Defense Theory," *International Security* 23, no. 3 (1998): 179–206; Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?," *International Security* 22, no. 4 (1998): 44–82; Keir A. Lieber, "Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security," *International Security* 25, no. 1 (2000): 71–104; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," *Security Studies* 4, no. 4 (1995): 660–91; Stephan van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," *International Security* 22, no. 4 (1998): 5–43.

19 Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 51, no. 1 (1998): 144–72.

native paradigms."[20] Legro and Moravcsik paint a picture of neoclassical realists as plugging explanatory leaks in a sinking ship with ad-hoc variables drawn from competing paradigms.[21] This dissertation, however, supports the view that neorealism—especially in its recent incarnations—is a vibrant research program.

1.2.1.3. Hegemonic Behavior

Further, this dissertation contributes to the literature analyzing the foreign policy behavior of hegemons. Besides the general literature on hegemony and its implications, a healthy theoretical debate has emerged over the specific configuration of the international system after the end of the Cold War.[22] The debate gravitates around the questions whether there is something special about the nature of the U.S. hegemony that, contrary to balance of power predictions, makes it durable. One common line of argument is e.g. that U.S. hegemony is stable because the United States is seen as a benevolent hegemon. An inquiry into U.S. policy in and towards NATO contributes to this debate by investigating whether U.S. behavior in the crucial area of security policy is in fact that benevolent. Further, it will

20 Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?," *International Security* 24, no. 2 (1999): 7.

21 Interestingly, they seem to claim an exclusive right of paradigms to certain sets of variables.

22 Stephen G. Brooks, "Can We Identify a Benevolent Hegemon?," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 25, no. 1 (2012): 27–38; G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); G. John Ikenberry, *America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power*, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); G. John Ikenberry, "American Hegemony and East Asian Order," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 58, no. 3 (2004): 353–367; Norman Podhoretz, "Strange Bedfellows: A Guide to the New Foreign-Policy Debates," *Commentary Magazine* 108, no. 5 (1999): 19–31; Robert Kagan, "The Benevolent Empire," *Foreign Policy*, no. Summer (1999), http://carnegieendowment.org/1998/06/01/benevolent-empire; for an overview, see Daniel H. Nexon and Thomas Wright, "What's at Stake in the American Empire Debate," *American Political Science Review*, no. 2 (2007): 253–271.

shed light on specific patterns of behavior of hegemon in the alliance, helping us better understand the peculiarities of hegemonic behavior.

1.2.1.4. Alliances as a Key Phenomenon of International Relations

Alliances have been central to the study of international relations since the discipline first emerged. NATO, as the most durable and arguably most successful instance of an alliance in world history, is a particularly worthwhile subject of inquiry. This is all the more so given that the long-time dominant theory of international relations, realism, predicted a demise of the alliance after its raison d'être, the Cold War's confrontation between East and West, had ceased to exists. Further, realism's adherents actively contributed to the U.S. policy debate in the 1990s, advocating U.S. disengagement from the alliance and Europe.

1.2.2. Empirical

Several empirical considerations reinforce the theoretical significance of this dissertation.

1.2.2.1. Understanding U.S. NATO Policy

To date, very few studies of individual countries' NATO policy exist, including for its largest member, the United States. Understanding the hegemon's policy in the alliance, however, is vital for policymakers. Like no other ally, the United States' behavior and policies have the potential to shape NATO both organizationally and in terms of its substantive agenda. Likewise, U.S. material capabilities have been key to the alliance's functioning, as evidenced by the preponderance of U.S. assets in all of NATO's deployments to date.

1.2.2.2. A Changing Alliance

Never before has the alliance changed so dramatically across so many aspects than in the 1990s and early 2000s. Three areas in particular have

seen significant changes: NATO's membership, mission, and internal organization.

The dissertation proceeds as follows: I begin by reviewing the historical and theoretical literature on NATO and U.S. behavior in the alliance. The following sections then outline the research questions, approach, and methodology. I then turn to the two case studies on U.S. policy on NATO enlargement, and the alliance's changing mission.

2. Literature Review

Since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, a vast literature on NATO and transatlantic relations more generally has evolved in the historical disciplines and international relations. This body of literature focuses on NATO as an organization and how to explain the alliance's formation, maintenance, and persistence. It is striking that in spite of the enormity of this literature, there is little work on individual countries' NATO policies—the perspective has been one of looking at NATO as an institution, rather than at the parts that make up this institution. It is a truism that NATO members differ in their importance and influence in the alliance. It is therefore vital to take a more bottom-up perspective, examining individual countries' expectations and understandings of NATO's functions. I argue below that this is even more important in unipolar international systems, where structural incentives and disincentives are less easily discernable. In the following, I review the historical literature on NATO, theoretical work on alliances, and the implications of unipolarity for U.S. foreign policy and international relations theory.

2.1. History

Various aspects of NATO's history have attracted scholarly attention and generated a voluminous body of literature over the decades. Among the most prominent work is that on the making of the Atlantic Treaty and

NATO.[23] A large part of these accounts are historical and biographical works outside the remit of political science.[24]

A further focus has been NATO's viability, crises, and alleged imminent breakup, with Henry Kissinger judging the alliance in serious trouble in every decade of its existence.[25] This line of reasoning is far from extinct: the last twenty-or-so years have seen a renewed skepticism of NATO and alliances,[26] with scholars arguing that values and interests drive the United States and its allies apart.[27] Besides NATO's theoretical and practical viability, the better part of the post-Cold War literature has gravitated around three issues: NATO's 1999 and 2004 expansions,[28] its internal

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23 Don Cook, *Forging the Alliance: NATO 1945-1950* (New York: Arbor House/W. Morrow, 1989); Francis Howard Heller and John Gillingham, *NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992); Nicholas Henderson, *The Birth of NATO* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983); Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The United States and NATO: The Formative Years* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1984); Kaplan, *NATO and the United States*; Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO 1948* (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007); Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-1949* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977); Joseph Smith, ed., *The Origins of NATO* (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1990); Cees Wiebes and Bert Zeeman, "The Pentagon Negotiations March 1948: The Launching of the North Atlantic Treaty," *International Affairs* 59, no. 3 (1983): 351–63.

24 Harlan Cleveland, *NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).

25 Wallace J. Thies, *Why NATO Endures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 6. Or, as Robert Hunter puts it: "NATO has had about as many crises as birthdays." Robert E. Hunter, "Will the United States Remain a European Power?," *Survival* 30, no. 3 (1988): 210.

26 Rajan Menon, "The End of Alliances," *World Policy Journal* 20, no. 2 (2003): 1–20; Menon, *The End of Alliances*, 2009; Richard E. Rupp, *NATO After 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

27 Ivo H. Daalder, "The End of Atlanticism," *Survival* 45, no. 2 (2003): 147–66; Graham Hallett, *European Security in the Post-Soviet Age: The Case Against NATO* (York: William Sessions, 2007); Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness," *Foreign Affairs*, 2002; Hugh de Santis and Robert C. Hughes, "The Case for Disestablishing NATO," in *Security Arrangements for a New Europe*, ed. William D. Wharton (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1992).

28 Ronald D. Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); James M. Goldgeier, *Not Whether But When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO* (Washington, DC:

transformation,[29] and its engagements in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.[30]

As far as individual countries' NATO policies are concerned, the picture is much more bleak. While most of the general histories of NATO touch upon individual countries' roles, countries' policies are seldom investigated across time and issue areas from an international relations perspective.[31]

2.2. NATO in theory

Alliances—with NATO as an instance—have received considerable attention in international relations to the extent that one author claims that "the two often merge in all but name."[32] Alliances have been studied as

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Brookings Institution Press, 1999); Robert W. Rauchhaus, *Explaining NATO Enlargement* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001).

29 John R. Deni, *Alliance Management and Maintenance: Restructuring NATO for the 21st Century* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007); Philip H. Gordon, *NATO's Transformation: The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997); David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998).

30 Pierre Martin and Mark R. Brawley, eds., *Alliance Politics, Kosovo, and NATO's War: Allied Force or Forced Allies?* (New York: Palgrave, 2000); Ivo H. Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000).

31 Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004); Overhaus, *Die Deutsche NATO-Politik. Vom Ende Des Kalten Krieges Bis Zum Kampf Gegen Den Terrorismus*; Gustav Schmidt, *A History of NATO - The First Fifty Years* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).

32 George Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), 3.This point has become a mantra repeated in most major works on alliances (cf. Fred Chernoff, *After Bipolarity: The Vanishing Threat, Theories of Cooperation, and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance* [Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995], 11; Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances* [New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973], 1–2; Dan Reiter, *Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars* [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996], 12–13; Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power," *International Security* 9, no. 4 [1985]: 1–5). Morgan calls entering into an alliance "one of the oldest practices of

independent and intervening, but mostly as dependent variables and with considerable variance with regard to the specific aspect of alliances examined, e.g. their formation and maintenance, their institutional design, and the sharing of costs among allies. Most alliance-specific research has been conducted within the collective action framework first put forward by Olson.[33] While not a theory of alliances per se, public goods theory makes predictions about burden-sharing in NATO.[34] Another strand in alliance theory focuses on domestic determinants of the formation and maintenance of alliances. Authors in this group claim that systemic theories are unsuited for explaining alliance decisions and point to domestic factors, such as states' extractive capabilities and governments' power-preserving interests.[35] Others consider regime types and their effect on alliances, e.g. whether democracies are better or worse allies.[36]

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statecraft, one that can be traced back many hundreds of years before Christ" (Patrick M. Morgan, *Theories and Approaches to International Politics: What Are We to Think?* [New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1987], 208). Others note that "alliances are the central feature of of international political life" and among "the dozen or so key terms of International Relations" (Julian R. Friedman, "Alliance in International Politics," in *Alliance in International Politics* [Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1970]; George Modelski, "The Study of Alliances: A Review," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 7, no. 4 [December 1, 1963]: 773; both quoted in Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990], 1).

33 Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965); Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," *Review of Economics and Statistics* 48, no. 3 (1966): 266–79.

34 For applications to EU security policy, see e.g. Malcolm Chalmers, *Sharing Security. The Political Economy of Burdensharing* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); Han Dorussen, Emil J. Kirchner, and James Sperling, "Sharing the Burden of Collective Security in the European Union," *International Organization* 63, no. 4 (2009): 789–810.

35 Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments - the Case of Egypt, 1962-1973," *International Organization* 45, no. 3 (1991): 369; Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, "Alliance Formation, Domestic Political Economy, and Third World Security," *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 4 (1992): 19–40; Steven R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," *World Politics* 43, no. 2 (1991): 233–56; Steven R. David, *Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).

36 Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, "Democratic States and Commitment in International

The following section outlines the main strands in the theoretical literature, beginning with alliance-specific theories and then moving on to grand theories of international relations as they relate to U.S. NATO policy.

2.3. Alliance theory

If there is one thing scholars working in the field of alliance theory agree on, it is the immense and growing size of the literature: It is "enormous,"[37] "voluminous,"[38] and thus "[…] no one book could distill the alliance literature in its entirety […]."[39] Indeed, even in analyzing the evolution of a subset of alliance theory since the end of the Cold War, Oest finds that "[…] it is extremely difficult to get a general overview of the trends […]."[40] Part of the reason for the vast body of literature on alliances is the centrality of the concept to the discipline of International Relations. While one need not agree with Liska's claim that "the two often merge in all but name,"[41] the point has been made time and again in the introduction to every major work on alliances and need not be repeated here.[42]

Relations," *International Organization* 50, no. 1 (1996): 109–39; William Reed, "Alliance Duration and Democracy: An Extension and Cross-Validation of 'Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations,'" *American Journal of Political Science* 41, no. 3 (1997): 1072–78; Randolph M. Siverson and Juliann Emmons, "Birds of a Feather: Democratic Political Systems and Alliance Choices in the Twentieth Century," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35, no. 2 (June 1, 1991): 285–306.

37 Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 6.

38 Patricia A. Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War* (Stanford University Press, 2004), 13.

39 Ibid., 12.

40 Kasja Ji Noe Oest, "The End of Alliance Theory? A Literature Review of Realist Alliance Theory," *University of Copenhagen Institut for Statskundsab Arbejdspapir*, 2007, 6.

41 Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence*, 3.

42 Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances*, 1–2; Reiter, *Crucible of Beliefs*, 12–13; Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of

Besides its unwieldiness, further criticism of the alliance literature includes the scarcity of general theories[43] and the much-maligned lack of cumulative research, hypotheses testing, and work integrating these insights.[44] In sum, not much seems to have changed since Holsti et al. claimed that "even a generous appraiser must conclude that the alliance literature taken as a whole falls short of being satisfactory."[45]

This literature review seeks to provide an overview over the central strands of research on alliances. Economists, sociologists, historians, and political scientists alike have studied alliances. Given the volume and scope of work on alliances, it it useful to distinguish this body of research along two axes: as which variable alliances are considered, and whether the work focuses on NATO or other alliances. Along the first axis, alliances have been studied equally as independent, dependent, and intervening variables. The second axis splits the field according to the object of analysis. This cleavage separates work that addresses alliances in general (in particular historical alliances up to and including World War II), and work that focuses exclusively on NATO. The two seem to coexist rather than overlap—there are two significant bodies of work, but little exchange between NATO specialists and alliance theorists. Partially, this may be due to the prevalent notion of NATO being *sui generis* and not necessarily amenable to the same analyses as other alliances. Moreover, much of the development of political science and International Relations as disciplines occurred against the backdrop of the Cold War and the cen-

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Power," 1–5.

43 Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 1–3.

44 Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances*; Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 7–8; Michael Ward, "Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics," *Monograph Series in World Affairs* 19, no. 1 (1982): 1–101; Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances*, 11.

45 Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances*, 41.

trality of NATO to it, which likely further promoted a focus on NATO over other alliances. Overlaying this distinction are the grand theories of international relations, which, to differing degrees have generated predictions for alliances as well.

This review focuses on alliances as dependent variables and thus does not consider e.g. the literature on whether alliances promote peace.[46] Nonetheless, even in the work treating alliances as dependent variables, there is considerable variance with regard to the specific aspect of alliances studied, including inter alia the formation and maintenance of alliances, their institutional design, and the sharing of costs among allies. On the second axis, the bulk of of work has focused on NATO, not other alliances.

While not exhaustive, the following review aims to touch upon most of the central questions pursued, while focusing on the issue of the persistence of alliances generally and NATO specifically. It begins by discussing theories developed specifically with regard to explaining the formation and maintenance of alliances and then turns to the predictions of grand theories of international relations.[47]

2.3.1. Public Goods & Collective Action

Mancur Olson first put forward Collective Action theory in his 1965 *The Logic of Collective Action,* in which he examined why rational individuals often fail to cooperate to attain their goals,[48] and in later work with Zeckhauser.[49] One of their key findings was that cooperation is especially

46 David H. Bearce, Kristen M. Flanagan, and Katharine M. Floros, "Alliances, Internal Information, and Military Conflict Among Member-States," *International Organization* 60, no. 3 (2006): 595–625.

47 Notably, realists, both classical and structural, have focused considerable attention on alliances.

48 Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*.

49 Olson and Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances."

fraught when involving public goods. Public goods are such that are non-exclusive, i.e. "the exclusion of those who do not share the cost of the good is impractical or impossible."[50] Further, they are nonrival in that enjoyment of the good by one state does not diminish the supply for others. A common example is a lighthouse: Its beam of light is a navigational aid for all ships within its reach, and no ship can feasibly be excluded from enjoying this benefit. Moreover, the number of ships is irrelevant to the utility each ship derives from the lighthouse. However, public goods, such as the lighthouse's guiding beam in the above example, come with certain problems: Because they are nonrival and non-exclusive, actors can enjoy the goods' benefits without paying for or helping to supply them. Being rational, actors thus have strong incentives to freeride. While not a theory of alliances per se, public goods theory does make predictions about a very distinct aspect of NATO: burden-sharing between allies.

Public goods theory tackled the issue of alliances from the outset. Indeed, Olson and Zeckhauser's seminal 1966 article is entitled "An Economic Theory of Alliances." The authors assumed that the good alliances provide to their members is security, and that this good can be considered a public good.[51] Rather than focusing on the emergence of alliances, public goods theory looks at allies' defense burdens,[52] finding a strong correlation between it and the ally's economic size. In other words, states with larger gross domestic products (GDP) will devote a disproportionately high share of GDP to providing security in the alliance, whereas smaller members are prone to free-ride and enjoy the spoils without footing the bill (exploitation hypothesis). Olson and Zeckhauser's contribution has spawned a significant literature on burden-sharing in NATO that is mostly

50 Ibid., 273.

51 Olson and Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances."

52 Measured as the percentage of GDP devoted to military expenditures (ibid.).

situated in economics and policy-focused work rather than international relations theory.

Most of the criticism levied against public goods and collective action theory gravitates around its applicability to alliances, and the use of defense spending as an indicator for public goods provision. Firstly, it is unclear whether security indeed qualifies as a pure public good in Olson and Zeckhauser's sense. For example, while the U.S. nuclear guarantee for other NATO members may justifiably be considered public in that it is nonrival and non-exclusive, this is not true for conventional forces: It does matter where troops are based, as troops in country A cannot be used in country B. Moreover, armed forces can be used for other purposes than increasing the alliance's security, such as quelling domestic unrest or disaster relief, thus providing distinctly private, i.e. exclusive, benefits to host nations. This is illustrated by the change in NATO strategy from massive retaliation, which involved the immediate all-out use of U.S. nuclear weapons in case of attack, to flexible response in 1967. The latter envisioned a more gradual escalation from conventional to nuclear forces. Olson and Zeckhauser's predictions are generally accepted as more on-point until 1967, whereas the increased reliance on conventional forces—which are private and exclusive—meant that defense spending after 1967 was not directly correlated to GDP.[53] Hence, the value of collective action theory in accounting for NATO members' spending patterns remains unclear. It is now generally accepted that its predictions for NATO have

53 John R. Oneal and Mark A. Elrod, "NATO Burden Sharing and the Forces of Change," *International Studies Quarterly* 33, no. 4 (1989): 435–56.

been inaccurate since at least the late 1960s,[54] and even its relevance before that has been questioned.[55]

Secondly, the underlying assumption of public goods theory that defense spending by allies translates into public goods is dubious, as outlined above nations derive both public and private goods from defense spending. Turkey and Greece are cases in point: While their defense burden was above average in the 1970s and 1980s, this can be attributed mostly to their conflict and military rivalry, rather than providing collective goods for NATO.[56] The defense burden figure then tells us little about the nature of the good, i.e. whether it is public or private/exclusive in nature, and indeed most goods are joint in that they provide both public and private benefits. Furthermore, states can undertake measures to increase their contribution to the public good that do not necessarily result in increased state spending, such as improving elements of what van Creveld has called "fighting power," e.g. troop discipline, structure, and command.[57] Furthermore, Ringsmose has recently argued that the burden-sharing debate in NATO is moving towards being measured in terms of output, such as how much risk is assumed and which specialist capabilities are provided, rather than the input side of how much money is spent.[58]

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54 Bruce M. Russett, *What Price Vigilance? Burdens of National Defense* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970); Todd Sandler and Jon Cauley, "On the Economic Theory of Alliances," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 19, no. 2 (1975): 330–48.

55 Avery Goldstein, "Discounting the Free Ride. Alliances and Security in the Postwar World," *International Organization* 49, no. 1 (1995): 39–71.

56 Oneal and Elrod, "NATO Burden Sharing and the Forces of Change," 445–48.

57 Martin van Creveld, *Fighting Power: German and US Army Performance, 1939-1945* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982).

58 Jens Ringsmose, "NATO - Burden-Sharing Redux: Continuity and Change after the Cold War," *Contemporary Security Policy* 31, no. 2 (2010): 319.

In sum, Olson and Zeckhauser's work and the substantial literature it has generated[59] are of little help in answering the questions raised in this dissertation. While their work illuminates important aspects of intra-alliance burden sharing that have been at the forefront of policy and public debate and are likely to continue to do so in the future, it does not tackle the question of why alliances are formed or persist other than the generic rational assumption of members' positive cost-benefit calculus. Not least due to the practical importance of who pays how much, the burden-sharing literature remains one of the most vibrant and voluminous to this day.[60]

2.3.2. Domestic Influences

Another strain of work on alliances specifically focuses on domestic determinants of whether states form and maintain alliances. While much of the existing work looks at third world states, there is nothing in it that should preclude the utility of the suggested hypotheses for explaining other states' alliance behavior, as Morrow has done.[61] Domestic politics

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59 Beyond those mentioned above, cf. also Jyoti Khanna, Todd Sandler, and Hirofumi Shimizu, "Sharing the Financial Burden for UN and NATO Peacekeeping, 1976-1996," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 2 (1998): 176–95; Todd Sandler and John T. Tschirhart, "The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey," *Journal of Economic Literature* 18, no. 4 (1980): 1481–1521; Todd Sandler and Hirofumi Shimizu, "NATO Burden Sharing 1999–2010: An Altered Alliance," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 10, no. 1 (2012): 43–60; Hirofumi Shimizu and Todd Sandler, "Peacekeeping and Burden-Sharing, 1994-2000," *Journal of Peace Research* 39, no. 6 (2002): 651–68.

60 Stephen J. Cimbala and Peter K. Forster, *Multinational Military Intervention: NATO Policy, Strategy and Burden Sharing* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010); Songying Fang and Kristopher W. Ramsay, "Outside Options and Burden Sharing in Nonbinding Alliances," *Political Research Quarterly* 63, no. 1 (2010): 188–202; Ringsmose, "NATO - Burden-Sharing Redux"; Binyam Solomon, "NATO Burden Sharing Revisited," *Defence and Peace Economics* 15, no. 3 (2004): 251–58; Wallace J. Thies, *Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002); Benjamin Zyla, *Sharing the Burden?: NATO and Its Second-Tier Powers* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015).

61 James D. Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," *American Journal of Political Science* 35, no. 4 (November 1, 1991): 904–33; James D. Morrow, "Arms Versus Allies: Trade-Offs in

approaches generally share the assumption that alliances are but one of two fundamental means of increasing a state's external security, the second being increased armament (or "internal balancing" in neorealist parlance). What then determines the choice between those two options? Authors working in this strand hold systemic theories to be underdetermined and point to the importance of domestic considerations in deciding between armament and alliances.[62] This section proceeds by outlining Morrow's and Barnett and Levy's work on domestic variables in alliance formation.

Besides analyzing the differences between asymmetric and symmetric alliances with regard to allies' relative power positions,[63] Morrow's work also explores the trade-off between internal armament and forming alliances for major powers.[64] In responding to external threats, both are viable foreign policy options to attain the same goal, each with their own distinct internal and external consequences. Both thus impose certain domestic costs and benefits on the respective leadership, e.g. armament might lower the unemployment rate and boost domestic support, or foster criticism of the government.[65] When it comes to choosing between arming or forming an alliance, governments will pursue the course that has the lower marginal cost, i.e. the course that will provide the next increment of security at a lower cost than the respective other.[66] However, it is important to note that for both alliances and armaments, marginal

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the Search for Security," *International Organization* 47, no. 2 (April 1, 1993): 207–33.

62 Morrow, "Arms Versus Allies," 216, 231–33.

63 Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry."

64 Morrow, "Arms Versus Allies."

65 Ibid., 213, 215.

66 Morrow fully acknowledges the further differences between allying and arming, such as e.g. the timeframe, but his focus here is on the different costs and how they influence the mix of the two pursued by states (ibid., 215).

costs necessarily rise: Domestic resources and arms production capabilities are finite, and alliances cannot be infinitely tight or big. This should lead to states pursuing a combination of both courses at any given time.[67]

In contrast to Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) approaches, Barnett and Levy's and David's work looks into the state-society constellation to explain why alliances are attractive foreign policy options for third world states. For them and following Waltz, states have two means of generating fungible power in their external relations: Internal mobilization and forming alliances with other states. Much of the third world alliance literature reads like an add-on to systemic theories, and Barnett and Levy stress the importance of a multi-level approach: "A model limited to either domestic or systemic variables cannot provide an explanation for alliance behavior that is adequate or valid for all states."[68] For Barnett and Levy,[69] internal mobilization requires a high extractive capability of the state vis-à-vis society, allowing it to raise men and arms in adequate numbers. As third world states to a significant extent face constraints on their ability to mobilize internally, e.g. because of cronyism, the danger of coups, long-term damage to the economy and a weak governance apparatus, alliances become an attractive means of augmenting national power. Needless to say, both international mobilization and alignment carry risks —but the flexibility and rapid increases in power alliances make possible certainly are attractive when juxtaposed with the uncertain availability of resources domestically, the potentially detrimental effects on the economy, and the reduced ability to pursue other domestic goals, all of which com-

67 Ibid., 214.

68 Barnett and Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments - the Case of Egypt, 1962-1973," 395.

69 Barnett and Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments - the Case of Egypt, 1962-1973"; Barnett and Levy, "Alliance Formation, Domestic Political Economy, and Third World Security."

bine to potentially exacerbate the precarious situation of most third world governments. In short, Barnett and Levy challenge the realist assumption of all states being equally able to internally mobilize "men, money, and material,"[70] and point to the trade-offs third-world governments face that make alliances attractive.

David's work shares Barnett and Levy's focus on the third world and domestic variables.[71] However, he sees the leadership's power-preserving interest as the most important factor explaining third-world alliances, rather than Barnett and Levy's more economic/resource-extractive outlook. Contrary to established and fully-sovereign states, third-world governments face existential threats from the outside and inside and must seek to balance both.[72] From this constellation, David proffers three modifications of systemic balance of power theory: Firstly, leaders of third-world states will focus on balancing the primary threat and align with secondary threats. In the Third World, this frequently means aligning with other states and countering the more pressing domestic threats. Lastly, "Third World leaders […] will sometimes protect themselves at the expense of the interests of the state."[73] In sum, David challenges a purely systemic outlook and suggests a modified realist approach incorporating internal threats as variables in explaining alliance choices in the Third World. Furthermore, he takes issue with the capability-aggregation model of alliances, i.e. an understanding of alliances as motivated by the aggregation of allies' capabilities. Rather he sees alliances in the Third World as

70 Barnett and Levy, "Alliance Formation, Domestic Political Economy, and Third World Security," 28–29.

71 David, *Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World*; David, "Explaining Third World Alignment"; cf. also Steven R. David, "Why the Third World Still Matters," *International Security* 17, no. 3 (1992): 127–59.

72 David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," 238.

73 Ibid., 236.

motivated by the leadership's desire to stay in power, which can mean that leaders are more likely "to align with states that ensure their hold on power rather than with states that may increase their power, but at the risk of endangering their survival."[74]

A further strand of research has focused on the regime-type of states, and what role it plays in predicting the formation, maintenance, and dissolution of alliances.[75] Gaubatz looked into the issue of the stability of liberal democracies' commitments.[76] As a subset of the literature of democracies' disadvantages in foreign policy and warfare, the classical view holds that democracies are less able to stay committed to a certain course of action or treaty over extended period of times. This putative democratic fickleness is explained by a variety of factors, including frequent changes in government, and a public that has a say but is ill-informed about foreign policy and frequently changes its mind,[77] to name but two. Contrary to this view, Gaubatz finds that while some of the variables used to question democracies' ability to uphold long-term commitments exist (e.g. frequent changes in government), their impact is vastly overstated and other, positive attributes of liberal democracies are neglected. These include inter alia the significant number of domestic stakeholders and veto-players that have an interest in upholding agreements, and democracies' openness, which provides for added channels of communication and verification of whether agreements are kept, making it harder to cheat. Examining the case of alliances, Gaubatz finds that alliances between liberal

74 Ibid., 244.

75 Gaubatz, "Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations"; Reed, "Alliance Duration and Democracy"; Siverson and Emmons, "Birds of a Feather."

76 Gaubatz, "Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations."

77 William R. Caspary, "The 'Mood Theory': A Study of Public Opinion and Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review* 64, no. 2 (1970): 536–47; Ole R. Holsti, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus," *International Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 4 (1992): 439–66.

democracies last significantly longer than alliances of non-democracies and between democracies and non-democracies, with a median duration of 17 years for democratic alliances and seven for mixed and non-democratic alliances.[78]

2.3.3. Balancing This, Balancing That—Realism and Alliances

Having reviewed some of the most prominent approaches specifically dedicated to explaining the formation and maintenance of alliances, this section turns towards international relations theory more generally and realism in particular.

Alliances have been considered "central phenomena"[79] in realism, as they are one of the central tools at the disposal of states to ensure their security. Clearly, a major component of the realist understanding of alliances is the notion that alliances are a means for states to increase their individual capabilities (capability aggregation). Why and how states choose to pool their capabilities, however, differs between the distinct strands within the realist school of thought. The central cleavage runs between scholars seeing balancing—and hence alliances as a symptom thereof—as directed against the materially most powerful state or alliance, and those that claim states balance against the most threatening state or alliance.

Within this spectrum, however, there have emerged over the last 25 years or so a number of new approaches that eschew simple classification. These include e.g. Reiter's learning-based approach[80] and Weitsman's refinement of states' reactions to threats.[81] I begin by reviewing Kenneth N. Waltz's structural realism and the balance of threat approach proposed

78 Gaubatz, "Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations," 131.

79 Reiter, *Crucible of Beliefs*, 12.

80 Dan Reiter, "Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past," *World Politics* 46, no. 4 (July 1994): 490; Reiter, *Crucible of Beliefs*.

81 Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances*.

by Stephen Walt and then turn to more recent realist work on alliances generally and NATO more specifically.

2.3.3.1. Structural Realism

In its original Waltzian guise, structural realism frames alliances as directed against material capabilities. Hence, because of anarchy and the resultant self-help system, states guard against possible future threats by balancing against the most materially powerful state or alliance.[82] Accordingly, structural realism predicts a loosening of the intra-alliance ties in NATO as Soviet material capabilities wane.[83] While NATO may still exist on paper, for structural realists it is just that: a paper tiger. Any serious test of the alliance would unveil large divisions and minimal cohesion and eventual lead to its break-up.

2.3.3.2. Refining Structural Realism—Balance of Threat Theory

While this strictly materialist theory performs reasonably well in explaining NATO's foundation and maintenance during the Cold War,[84] it is generally considered to be underdetermined. Stephen Walt, in one of the major improvements of Waltz's theory, developed the balance of threat concept: States do not balance against the materially most capable state, but rather against states perceived as threatening. This threat perception is influenced by four variables: geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, overall capabilities, and perception of aggressive intentions.[85] NATO's

82 Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO," *Security Studies* 3, no. 1 (1993): 11.

83 Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics"; Kenneth N. Waltz, "NATO Expansion: A Realist's View," *Contemporary Security Policy* 21, no. 2 (2000): 23–38; Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," *International Security* 25, no. 1 (2000): 5–41.

84 John S. Duffield, "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Alliance Theory," in *Explaining International Relations Since 1945*, ed. Ngaire Woods (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 344.

85 Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power"; Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*.

continued existence thus depends on whether Russia—as the major successor state of the Soviet Union—keeps up the offensive and aggregate capabilities of the Soviet Union, and whether its behavior is continued to be perceived as aggressive in NATO countries.[86] Geographic proximity and threat perception open up the field for differing interpretations of the Russian threat within NATO, potentially fostering intra-alliance rifts. However, NATO's maintenance could also be due to the emergence of new, unforeseen threats that justify its existence. As Hellmann and Wolf argue, balance of threat theory actually leads us to expect an even faster break-up of NATO than Waltzian structural realism: The perception of hostile intentions and offensive capabilities can decrease faster than actual aggregate capabilities.[87] Furthermore, proximity encourages regional balancing of Russia by Soviet successor states, which catch the buck and take the burden off NATO.

2.3.3.3. Post-Cold War Trajectories of Realist Theories

With increasing intensity and frequency, both realism generally and Waltz's structural realism and Walt's balance of threat theory have been heavily criticized since the end of the Cold War. These critiques span the entire gamut from realism's explanatory power regarding the Cold War[88]

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86 Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances in Theory and Practice - What Lies Ahead?," *Journal of International Affairs* 43, no. 1 (1989): 8–9.

87 Hellmann and Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO," 1993, 19.

88 Richard Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism," *International Organization* 48, no. 2 (1994): 249–77; John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," *International Security* 17, no. 3 (1992): 5–58; Ted Hopf and John Lewis Gaddis, "Correspondence: Getting the End of the Cold War Wrong," *International Security* 18, no. 2 (1993): 202–10; Barry Buzan and Richard Little, "Waltz and World History: The Paradox of Parsimony," *International Relations* 23, no. 3 (2009): 446–63. For a realist rebuttal, see William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1994): 91–129; Stephen M. Walt, "The Gorbachev Interlude and International Relations Theory," *Diplomatic History* 21, no. 3 (1997): 473–79.

and the democratic peace phenomenon[89] to the veracity of its predictions, its theoretical integrity,[90] and its utility in explaining individual states' foreign policies.[91] Specifically, discussions in the realist camp have gravitated around three issues: the phenomenon of unipolarity, the theoretical and philosophical integrity of realism as a paradigm, and whether or not realism can and should make predictions regarding individual states' foreign policies.

2.3.3.3.1.Unipolarity

Since the end of the Cold War, criticism of neorealism has gravitated around a number of issues. While leading neorealists had claimed balancing would lead to a return to multipolarity within "the fairly near future, say ten to twenty years,"[92] critics maintain that realism has largely failed to explain international relations in the 1990s. A key debate has thus played out over the durability of unipolarity, with some claiming that the original balancing prediction will eventually be borne out.[93] Others, how-

89 Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80 (1986): 1151–70; Bruce Russett, "Why Democratic Peace?," in *Debating the Democratic Peace*, ed. Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant. The Myth of the Democratic Peace," *International Security* 19, no. 2 (1994): 5–49; Daniel Deudney, "Publius before Kant: Federal-Republican Security and Democratic Peace," *European Journal of International Relations* 10, no. 3 (2004): 315–56; David E. Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace," *International Security* 19, no. 2 (1994): 50–86.

90 Peter D. Feaver et al., "Brother Can You Spare a Paradigm? (Or Was Anybody Ever a Realist?)," *International Security* 25, no. 1 (2000): 165–93; John A. Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition," *American Political Science Review* 91, no. 4 (1997): 899–912.

91 For an overview, see Michael P Sullivan, "'That Dog Won't Hunt': The Cottage Industry of Realist Criticism, or Must You Play That Waltz Again?," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 8, no. 4 (2005): 327–54.

92 Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," 50.

93 Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," *International Security* 17, no. 4 (1993): 5–51; Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited," *International Security* 31, no. 2 (2006): 7–41; Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics."

ever, see this unipolarity as exceptional and thus durable,[94] or balancing as actually occurring, albeit in other shapes—a kind of proto-balancing called "soft balancing."[95] Not only were realist predictions for the post-Cold War international system challenged, but also its claims regarding much of the historical evidence have been severely criticized: Whereas realists see balancing as the prevalent response of states to threatening or powerful states, respectively, historian Schroeder claims that balancing is actually a rather less common course of action. More frequently, states actually bandwagoned with more powerful states, *pace* realism.[96]

2.3.3.3.2.Theoretical Integrity and Applicability to Foreign Policy

The second and third issues are closely linked: Do recent developments in neorealism violate the paradigm's core assumptions and thus render realism a degenerative paradigm?[97] Can and should neorealism be used to explain foreign policy?[98]

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94 Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment. Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," *International Security* 21, no. 4 (1997): 49–88; William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security* 24, no. 1 (1999): 5–41.

95 Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing," *International Security* 30, no. 1 (2005): 72–108; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, *World Out of Balance. International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); Robert A. Pape, "Soft Balancing Against the United States," *International Security* 30, no. 1 (2005): 7–45; T. V. Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy," *International Security* 30, no. 1 (2005): 46–71; Kai He and Huiyun Y. Feng, "If Not Soft Balancing, Then What? Reconsidering Soft Balancing and U.S. Policy Toward China," *Security Studies* 17, no. 2 (2008): 363–95.

96 Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality versus Neorealist Theory," *International Security* 19, no. 1 (1994): 108–48; Paul Schroeder, Miriam Fendius Elman, and Colin Elman, "History Vs. Neo-Realism: A Second Look," *International Security* 20, no. 1 (1995): 182–95.

97 Legro and Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?"

98 Colin Elman, "Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?," *Security Studies* 6, no. 1 (1996): 7–61; Brian Rathbun, "A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism," *Security Studies* 17, no. 2 (2008): 294–321; Kenneth N. Waltz, "International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy," *Security Studies* 6, no. 1 (1996): 54; Anders Wivel, "Explaining Why State X Made a Certain Move Last Tuesday: The Promise and Limitations of Realist Foreign Policy Analysis," *Journal of*

While neorealists have been on the defensive in the first two of these debates,[99] the third over neorealism's utility for explaining foreign policy has fostered wide-ranging theoretical innovation.[100] An emerging body of neorealist reasearch uses the structure of the international system and a state's position in it as independent variables, but argues that additional intervening variables are required to generate explanations for individual states' foreign policies.

Rose first identified this strand of research as "neoclassical realism."[101] Its hallmark is its insistence that there is no "perfect transmission belt linking material capabilities to foreign policy behavior."[102] Hence, states' positions in the international system do not neatly translate into specific foreign policies. Rather, systemic effects are mediated through intervening domestic variables. While maintaining the logical primacy of system-level independent variables, neoclassical realists incorporate intervening domestic variables that mediate systemic effects. Crucially, these do not have an independent causal role.[103] Thereby, neoclassical realists can make predictions for both how individual states will respond to the incentives presented by the international system in its anarchic self-help state, and for why states react differently to the same systemic pressures.

International Relations and Development 8, no. 4 (2005): 355–80.

99 Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War"; Legro and Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?"; Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition."

100 Elman, "Horses for Courses"; Rathbun, "A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism"; Waltz, "International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy"; Wivel, "Explaining Why State X Made a Certain Move Last Tuesday: The Promise and Limitations of Realist Foreign Policy Analysis."

101 Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy."

102 Ibid., 146–47.

103 Rathbun, "A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism."

The authors Rose considers neoclassical differ widely in the intervening variables used. This dissertation suggests loosely grouping the variables used into two sets: Ideational variables and domestic politics.[104] The first focuses on the role of perceptions and psychology for foreign policy. Examples include Taliaferro and Wohlforth,[105] both of whom focus on decision-makers' perceptions of relative power positions and changes thereof. Writing about East Asia, Victor D. Cha explains alliance behavior through elite perceptions of the United States' commitment to Japan and South Korea.[106] Domestic politics variables include state strength vis-à-vis society,[107] which determines the fungible power available to a state. Christensen tries to explain Chinese and U.S. policies by showing how elites in both countries used the respective other to pursue domestic aims.[108]

As argued above, domestic factors play a more prominent role in the post-Cold War world without the clear bipolar incentives. Since neoclassical realists employ a wide range of different intervening variables, a

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104 Authors, as opposed to variables, can and do cross this border. A notable example of this is Taliaferro, who uses regime-type and perceptual variables, respectively Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited," *International Security* 25, no. 3 (2000): 128–61; Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, *Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Power Politics and the Balance of Risk: Hypotheses on Great Power Intervention in the Periphery," *Political Psychology* 25, no. 2 (2004): 177–211.

105 Taliaferro, *Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery*; Taliaferro, "Power Politics and the Balance of Risk: Hypotheses on Great Power Intervention in the Periphery"; William C. Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).

106 Victor D. Cha, "Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and Korea," *International Studies Quarterly* 44, no. 2 (2000): 261–91; Victor D. Cha, "Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia," *International Security* 34, no. 3 (2010): 158–96.

107 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State," *Security Studies* 15, no. 3 (2006): 464–95; Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).

108 Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).

coherent set that applies outside the specific cases reviewed by the respective author has yet to emerge.

With regard to the historical accuracy of realism's balancing prediction, Weitsman has put forward an interesting refinement of the balance of threat approach.[109] In contrast to Walt, for her the relation between the level of threat a state faces and balancing behavior is not linear, but rather curvilinear. In other words, states are not more likely to balance the greater the threat. Rather, states balance only against medium-level threats. Once, however, a state's existence is threatened, it will bandwagon with the threatening state.[110] At the lower end of the threat level spectrum, states hedge by making low-commitment moves towards states "with which there is little or no conflict, yet little or no amity either" so as to remain flexible in the choice of future allies.[111] Vis-à-vis adversaries posing a low level of threat, states tether, that is form an alliance aimed at conciliating said adversary and thus reducing the likelihood of conflict.[112]

Tackling the issue of indeterminacy of realist approaches, Reiter looks into a key puzzle for balance of threat theory: While it sees alliances as responses to threat, some of the most threatened states in the 20th century chose to remain neutral, while some of the least threatened joined alliances. To resolve this puzzle, Reiter turns to learning from history as a crucial factor in determining whether small powers will ally or not. In his theory, states learn from their experience of either allying or remaining

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109 Patricia A. Weitsman, "Intimate Enemies: The Politics of Peacetime Alliances," *Security Studies* 7, no. 1 (1997): 156–93; Patricia A. Weitsman, "Alliance Cohesion and Coalition Warfare: The Central Powers and Triple Entente," *Security Studies* 12, no. 3 (2003): 79–113; Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances*.

110 Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances, 18–19.

111 Ibid., 20.

112 Ibid., 21, 23; For a discussion of the problems states face in discerning others' intentions, see Charles L. Glaser et al., "Correspondence: Can Great Powers Discern Intentions?," *International Security* 40, no. 3 (2016): 197–215.

neutral in world wars. Based on whether this experience was positive or negative, a small power will draw "the lesson that alliance is best or that neutrality is best and chooses alliance or neutrality in peacetime years following the war based on this lesson."[113]

2.3.4. The United States, Unipolarity, and International Relations Theory

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact, bipolarity gave way to a new international structure—unipolarity. Since much of the theorizing in international relations had occurred against the backdrop of the Cold War and its juxtaposition of the USA and the USSR, unipolarity has been puzzling scholars since. This goes beyond some of the more immediate issues, such as why the USSR collapsed and what the impact of the Reagan buildup was. To this day, it remains contested whether the structure of the international system ever was unipolar, and, indeed, whether it matters.[114] The "unipolar moment"[115] left the United States as the sole superpower—a historical novelty: Previously, great powers had become great by rising through the ranks, not by their main competitor disintegrating. Despite claims that the United States is in relative decline,[116] it can be seen as a unipole in the period under review here. This is especially true for military capabilities,[117] where the qualitative and quantitative gap between the United

113 Reiter, *Crucible of Beliefs*, 13.

114 See for example Brooks and Wohlforth, *World Out of Balance. International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy*; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty-First Century: China's Rise and the Fate of America's Global Position," *International Security* 40, no. 3 (2016): 7–53. While the distribution of power—and thus polarity—plays a role in neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, this is less clear in constructivism.

115 Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 1 (1991): 23–33.

116 For an overview, see Christopher Layne, "The Waning of U.S. Hegemony - Myth or Reality?," *International Security* 34, no. 1 (2009): 147–72..

117 In Paul Kennedy's words: "Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power

States and others has been growing: The United States spent more on defense than the next eight states combined in 2000, more than the next 25 in 2003, and for a time more than all other countries combined.[118] In 2014, the United States still accounted for 43 percent of global military expenditures—more than three times the share of the next biggest spender.[119] Within NATO, the United States has always held a supremely influential position. As Calleo points out, "[m]uch of NATO's internal history reflects the influence of American security policy."[120] This remains true after the Cold War, with NATO continuing to be "[…] an American-run show."[121] This basic truth is reflected institutionally e.g. in the alliance's highest military figure—the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)—always being an American.[122] In the period under review here, spanning the administrations of George H. W. Bush (1989–1993), Bill Clinton (1993–2001), and George W. Bush (2001–2009), the U.S. material position relative to its allies changed very little—the United States remains the central actor in NATO.

[between the United States and the rest of the world, DJR]; nothing. I have returned to all of the comparative defence spending and military personnel statistics over the past 500 years that I compiled in *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, and no other nation comes close" (Paul Kennedy, "The Eagle Has Landed," *Financial Times*, February 2, 2002).

118 Kenneth N. Waltz, "The United States: Alone in the World," in *Imbalance of Power: US Hegemony and International Order*, ed. I. William Zartman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009), 29.

119 SIPRI, "Trends in World Military Expenditure Data, 2014" (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2015), http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=496#.

120 David P. Calleo, *Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance* (New York: Basic Books, 1987), 27.

121 Robert W. Rauchhaus, "Conclusion: Explaining NATO Enlargement," in *Explaining NATO Enlargement*, ed. Robert W. Rauchhaus (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001), 175.

122 Who concurrently serves as Combatant Commander of the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), one of six regional Unified Combatant Commands of the U.S. Department of Defense.

Unipolarity, its durability, and NATO's persistence pose challenges for structural realist theories of international relations. Structural realism maintains that unipolarity is the least stable configuration of the international system. Other states are expected to balance against and eventually catch up with the unipole.[123] Realists thus expected the system to revert to multipolarity in "the fairly near future, say ten to twenty years," i.e. by the first decade of the 2000s.[124] However, there are few signs of hard, military balancing today. Two ways of explaining this puzzle have been suggested: This unipolarity is exceptional and thus durable, or that balancing is occurring, albeit as "soft balancing."[125]

For NATO, Waltz's structural realism predicts a loosening of the intra-alliance ties in NATO as Soviet material capabilities wane.[126] While NATO may still exist, any serious test of the alliance would reveal the deep fissures and result in its break-up. Similarly, in the balance of threat refinement of Waltz's theory, NATO's persistence depends on whether Russia as the successor of the Soviet Union maintains the offensive and aggregate capabilities of the Soviet Union, and whether NATO countries continue to perceive Russia's behavior as aggressive.[127] This, in turn, should result in

123 Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise"; Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited."

124 Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," 50.

125 Brooks and Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing"; He and Feng, "If Not Soft Balancing, Then What? Reconsidering Soft Balancing and U.S. Policy Toward China"; Keir A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander, "Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back," *International Security* 30, no. 1 (2005): 109–39; Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment. Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War"; Pape, "Soft Balancing Against the United States"; Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy"; Waltz, "The United States: Alone in the World," 29; Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World."

126 Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics"; Waltz, "NATO Expansion: A Realist's View"; Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War."

127 Walt, "Alliances in Theory and Practice - What Lies Ahead?," 8–9; *The Origins of Alliances*; "Alliances in a Unipolar World," *World Politics* 61, no. 1 (2009): 86–120.

renewed efforts to strengthen NATO. However, states could uphold NATO against new, unforeseen threats that justify its existence.

What are the implications of being the unipole for U.S. foreign policy generally, and policy in and toward NATO specifically? The commonly held view in the literature is that structural incentives and disincentives are less important for the dominant power in unipolar systems: It can do as it sees fit and need not worry about balancing a competitor.[128] Even for structural realists, domestic factors matter more in unipolarity: Under bipolarity, structural constraints are high and prescribe certain policies. In unipolarity, constraints are weaker; the United States has a larger freedom of action and domestic variables become more important.[129] What animates U.S. behavior is unclear from a structural perspective and one must still account for the domestic processes that led to one foreign policy outcome rather than another—the "spirit" moving the dominant power as Waltz calls it. [130]

The problem poses itself in similar form for the other two main theories of international relations, rational institutionalism and constructivism. In contrast to neorealism, both have generated a sizable and broadly optimistic literature on the subject of NATO.[131] In predicting NATO's persistence, institutionalists drew on NATO's uniquely high degree of institutionalization,[132] the adaptability of its institutional design,[133] and vested orga-

128 For one example of many, see e.g. Waltz, "The United States: Alone in the World," 31.

129 Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," 24; Waltz, "The United States: Alone in the World."

130 Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," 25.

131 Hellmann and Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO," 1993.

132 Duffield, "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Alliance Theory."

133 John S. Duffield, "NATO's Functions After the Cold War," *Political Science Quarterly* 109, no. 5 (1994): 763–88; Celeste A. Wallander, "Institutional Assets and

nizational interests.[134] Constructivist scholarship has examined the underlying community of values and established practices.[135] None of these three approaches has, however, investigated whether the utility, values, or functions they claim NATO retains actually play a role in the policies of individual allies.

Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War," *International Organization* 54, no. 4 (2000): 705–36; Wallander and Keohane, "Why Does NATO Persist? An Institutional Approach"; "Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions."

134 Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War," *International Organization* 50, no. 3 (1996): 445–75.

135 Emanuel Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation," *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 2 (2008): 195–230; Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism," *International Organization* 56, no. 3 (2002): 575–607; Risse-Kappen, "A Liberal Interpretation of the Transatlantic Security Community"; "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); *Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy*; Frank Schimmelfennig, "NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation," *Security Studies* 8, no. 2–3 (1998): 198–234; Michael C. Williams and Iver B. Neumann, "From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the Power of Identity," *Millennium* 29, no. 2 (2000): 357–87.

3. Theory & Approach

Structural Realisms proposes a coherent and parsimonious theory of international relations, aiming to explain particular configurations of the international system rather than individual states' foreign policies. It does so based on two assumptions: 1. The international system is anarchical. 2. States at a minimum seek to survive.[136] From these assumptions, structural realism deducts a tendency of the international system to balance.

Logically, the emergence of a state of balance of power in the international system can only be the result of state behavior. If states do not form coalitions, that is if they do not balance the strongest power or strongest coalition, the system would remain lopsided. Structural realists therefore do not per se discount the role of subsystemic factors in the form of state behavior. Rather, they purposely exclude the state level from their theoretical remit, arguing that a parsimonious and general theory of international relations would simply be impossible. Factors that shape state behavior and foreign policy are too diverse, too multifaceted, and cannot be generalized across cases, structural realists argue. Instead, they confine themselves to explaining which incentives and disincentives result from the international system's anarchical structure. Neorealists thus intentionally disregard how states react to these incentives and disincentives. All they set out to explain is which behavior the international sys-

136 Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 121.Whether or not Waltz's theory relies on states behaving rationally is debatable. In my opinion, the theory does not require rational actors for outcomes consistent with its predictions to emerge. If the system punishes suboptimal behavior, actors not complying with incentives are weeded out, regardless of their rationality.

tem rewards, and which it punishes. Whether or not and why states abide by structural incentives does not concern neorealists.

The tension between on the one hand predicting which behavior carries rewards and which behavior is detrimental, and on the other hand ignoring how states react to these pressures is manifest. Waltz notes his theory is intended to explain general phenomena, and that any such theory cannot explain specific events.[137] This section proceeds by briefly laying out Waltz's theory of international politics. I then elaborate on two central problems of Waltz's theory: first, his assumption regarding the goals states pursue, and second, and whether or not structural realism can (and should) be applied to individual states' behavior.

3.1. Waltz's Structural Realism

Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* puts forward a theory of the international system's incentives for state behavior and the system-level outcomes that result.[138] He aims at parsimony and a pure system-level theory to generate predictions for "[…] how the structure of the system, and variations in it, affect the interacting units and the outcomes they produce. International structure […] constrains [units] from taking cer-

137 Ibid., chap. 1.

138 This section builds on Jack Donnelly, "Realism," in *Theories of International Relations*, ed. Scott Burchill et al., 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). See also Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Colin S. Elman and Michael A. Jensen, eds., *Realism Reader* (Milton Park: Routledge, 2014); Joseph M. Grieco, "Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics," in *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*, ed. Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997); Martin Griffiths, *Realism, Idealism and International Politics. A Reinterpretation.* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992); Robert Jervis, "Realism in the Study of World Politics," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 971–91; Michael Joseph Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1986); Martin Wight, *International Theory: Three Traditions* (Leicester: University of Leicester Press, 1991).

tain actions while propelling them toward others."[139] Logically, this also allows for generating predictions for the optimal behavior in any given system: Acting in accord with the systems' incentive is optimal, all other behavior suboptimal. Said Waltz: "[T]hose who conform to accepted and successful practices more often rise to the top and are likelier to stay there."[140]

Waltz's point of departure is the international system. The system consists of a structure and units, and the two components are kept rigorously separated. Indeed, units are easily defined in *Theory of International Politics:* They are sovereign states.[141]

3.1.1. Structure

In keeping with his strict distinction between structure and units, Waltz seeks to "[…] leave aside, or abstract from, the characteristics of units, their behavior, and their interactions"[142] in his definition of structure. Waltz argues that any structure, be it in the domestic or in the international realm, can be defined using three elements: the ordering principle, the functional specification of units, and the distribution of capabilities.[143] These three elements suffice to characterize a structure, i.e. the positions of units relative to each other or the "arrangement of the parts of a system."[144]

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139 Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory," 29.

140 Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 92.

141 Ibid., 94.

142 Ibid., 79.

143 Ibid., 82.

144 Ibid., 88.

3.1.1.1. Ordering Principle

At heart, Waltz's understanding of the ordering principle of a structure is binary. Systems are either hierarchical or anarchical. Domestic political systems, for example, are ordered hierarchically. "Relations of super- and subordination" in which "[s]ome are entitled to command; others are required to obey"[145] characterize hierarchical orders. In contrast, anarchical orders know no relationships of super- and subordination. All parts of an anarchically ordered system are equals, with no binding relationships of authority. Waltz's theory does not stray from the assumption that in international politics—the systems level—anarchy is the rule of the game.

Nevertheless, anarchy is not the absence of order. On the contrary, anarchy is a form of order, as Waltz argues drawing on microeconomics, specifically the market. Assuming that states seek to survive,[146] states coexisting interact like firms on the marketplace and, purely by virtue of coexisting, are subjected to the same structural incentives and disincentives.

3.1.1.2. Functional Differentiation

The specialization of units on specific tasks is contingent on the first element of the definition of structures, the ordering principle. If one follows Waltz in assuming all units seek to survive, a division of labor between units can only arise if the structure guarantees a unit's survival. The ordering principle thus determines the potential for functional specialization. As outlined above, Waltz assumes anarchy is the ordering principle of the international system's structure. With no central authority, states in the international system live in a self-help system, meaning they must ensure their survival themselves. In this, all states are the same—they are

145 Ibid.

146 Ibid., 91–93.

"like units,"[147] or "unitary actors with a single motive—the wish to survive."[148] In contrast, hierarchical systems allow for functional differentiation. Since the ordering principle of a structure determines the potential for functional differentiation of units, it is more of an appendix to the ordering principle element than a definitional element in its own right.

3.1.1.3. Distribution of Capabilities

The third element of Waltz's definition of structure are the capabilities of units to perform certain tasks, or more specifically how one unit's capabilities compare to that of the others, i.e. the distribution of capabilities, a system-level phenomenon.[149] In Waltz's words: "States are alike in the tasks they face, though not in their ability to perform them,"[150] and thus "[t]he differences [between states] are in capability, not function."[151] Importantly, the focus on the distribution of capabilities allows Waltz to maintain the abstraction of the system-level. Specifically, the difference of units with regard to their relative capabilities is the only characteristic that matters. While seemingly a unit-level phenomenon, the capability of any given unit to perform a task is meaningless unless put in context by other units and their ability to perform the same task.

3.1.2. Theoretical Implications

Above we have seen how Waltz sets up his theory's independent variable, the international system, which comprises a structure and units. Three elements define a structure: its ordering principle, i.e. anarchy or hierarchy, the functional differentiation between units, and the distribution of

147 Ibid., 93.

148 Waltz, "International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy," 54.

149 Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 98.

150 Ibid., 96.

151 Ibid.

capabilities. As for the units, Waltz posits that states are the central actors in international politics.

3.1.2.1. Independent Variable Largely Static

These four elements of Waltz's definition of the international system are of different importance. Three of the four elements are considered largely static: Anarchy is unlikely to be overcome, and therefore the structure will remain functionally undifferentiated. Likewise, states will remain the central actors, and their desire to survive is a constant. The element that can change, however, is the distribution of capabilities in any given system.

3.1.2.2. Waltz's Key Predictions

Anarchy is a given in Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*. The nature of units and the functional differentiation are static and a function of anarchy, respectively. Waltz therefore relies on two factors to generate hypotheses about international politics: The anarchic order of the international system and the distribution of material capabilities between units.

As Waltz frequently noted himself, the predictions his theory can generate are indeterminate. Whether or not that is a problem depends to a considerable degree on one's view whether or not hard theories with definite predictions are possible in international relations and the social sciences more generally. For the sake of his theory's consistency and parsimony, Waltz intentionally limits the scope of what he seeks to explain. The central conclusions that can be drawn from neorealism is that states, by virtue of coexisting under anarchy, face structural pressures. The anarchical international system incentivizes states to pursue certain behaviors, while foregoing others. Crucially, Waltz lays no claim to there being a law-like link between the international system's structure and state behav-

ior. Whether or not states come to terms with these incentives is a different matter, and one Waltz consciously left out of his theory. Says Waltz:

> Actors may perceive the structure that constrains them and understand how it serves to reward some kinds of behavior and to penalize others. But then again they either may not see it or, seeing it, may for any of many reasons fail to conform their actions to the patterns that are most often rewarded an least often punished.[152]

Similarly, he posits states seek survival. Waltz's theory is thus not entirely abstract from all unit-level phenomena other than a state's capabilities: His theory is predicated on a certain motivation that is shared by all states, i.e. survival.[153] However, Waltz acknowledges many other motives are conceivable: "Beyond the survival motive, the aims of states may be endlessly varied; they may range from seeking to conquer the world to the desire merely to be left alone."[154] This opens the theory for any number of motives, which may result in entirely different dynamics of unit-to-unit interactions. Indeed, Waltz himself has at times asserted other motives states pursue may include economic prosperity,[155] "peaceful coexistence" or "mastery" over others,[156] autonomy and independence[157] as well as sovereignty.

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152 Ibid., 92.

153 Waltz, "International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy," 52.

154 Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 91. Or, as Waltz puts it elsewhere, states "at minimum, seek their own preservation and, at maximum, drive for universal domination" Ibid., 118.

155 Kenneth N. Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics. A Response to My Critics," in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 337; Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," 54.

156 Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 144.

157 Ibid., 204, 104.

3.1.2.3. The Problem of States' Likeness and Motives

Waltz's conceptualization of neorealism has been met with staunch criticism from a variety of angles, e.g. institutionalism,[158] and, more fundamentally, constructivism and post-positivist theory.[159] Above, I have shown that Waltz rests his argument on all states seeking to survive, but professes many other motivations can and do drive state behavior in actuality.[160] Within the neorealist school, however, disagreement over

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158 Pars pro toto for the institutionalist critique, see: Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); Robert O. Keohane, "International Institutions: 2 Approaches," *International Studies Quarterly* 32, no. 4 (1988): 379–96; Robert O. Keohane and Robert Axelrod, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," *World Politics* 38 (1985): 226–54; Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," *International Security* 20, no. 1 (1995): 39–51; Robert O. Keohane and Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Neorealist and His Critic," *International Security* 25, no. 3 (2000): 204–5. Institutionalists share neorealism's core assumptions to the extent that "institutional theory is the half-sibling of neorealism" Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "Institutional Theory, Endogeneity, and Delegation" (Progress in International Relations Theory: A Collaborative Assessment and Application of Imre Lakatos's Methodology of Scientific Research Programs, Scottsdale, AZ, 1999), 2.

159 The post-positivist turn in political sciences resulted in more fundamental criticism of neorealism and its epistemological underpinnings. See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 887–917; Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science* 4, no. 1 (June 2001): 391–416; Friedrich Kratochwil, "Constructing a New Orthodoxy? Wendt's 'Social Theory of International Politics' and the Constructivist Challenge," *Millennium* 29, no. 1 (2000): 73–101; Friedrich Kratochwil, "History, Action and Identity: Revisiting the 'Second' Great Debate and Assessing Its Importance for Social Theory," *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 1 (2006): 5–29; John Gerard Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 855–85; Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 391–425; Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *The American Political Science Review* 88, no. 2 (1994): 384–396; Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

160 For an instructive overview of assumed state motivations different strands of realism, see Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson, "Malign Autocracies and Major Power Warfare: Evil, Tragedy, and International Relations Theory," *Security Studies* 10, no. 3 (2001): 46–79; cited in Colin S. Elman, "Realism," in *International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century*, by Martin Griffith (Milton Park:

states' motives has been one of the core issues of debate in the wake of Waltz.[161] This debate has seen authors disagree whether states really only seek to survive, or whether other motives, including those suggested by Waltz, may be a better starting ground for explaining international politics. A variety of motives have been suggested, ranging from mere survival,[162] as posited by Waltz, to global domination at the other end of the spectrum. The two variants are commonly referred to as defensive and offensive realism, with Walt's balance of threat theory[163] and Mearsheimer's work being the most sophisticated statements, respectively.[164] Obviously, predicted outcomes and behavior vary greatly depending on which motives one assumes to drive states.

Routledge, 2007), 13.

161 Randall L. Schweller, "Tripolarity and the Second World War," *International Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 1 (1993): 75–77; Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisioist State Back in," *International Security* 19, no. 1 (1994): 92–99.

162 E.g. Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (1988): 485–507; Michael Mastanduno, David A. Lake, and G. John Ikenberry, "Toward a Realist Theory of State Action," *International Studies Quarterly* 33, no. 4 (1989): 457–474.

163 Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*; Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia: Balancing and Bandwagoning in Cold War Competition," in *Dominoes and Bandwagons Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland*, ed. Robert Jervis and Jack L. Synder (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances, Threats, and U.S. Grand Strategy: A Reply to Kaufman and Labs," *Security Studies* 1, no. 3 (1992): 448–82; Stephen M. Walt, "Revolution and War," *World Politics* 44, no. 3 (1992): 321–68; Stephen M. Walt, *Revolution and War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Stephen M. Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," *Survival* 39, no. 1 (1997): 156–79; Stephen M. Walt, "Containing Rogues and Renegades: Coalition Strategies and Counter-Proliferation," in *The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order*, ed. Viktor A. Utgoff (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000); Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World."

164 Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims"; John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future. Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *International Security* 15, no. 1 (1990): 5–56; John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1994): 10–11; John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001).

3.2. Expanding Beyond the Structure—Neorealist Predictions for Foreign Policy

The previous sections outlined Kenneth Waltz's theory of international politics, and showed that his ambiguity regarding states' motives has sparked debate over alternative assumed motives. A closely related albeit distinct issue is whether neorealism can and should generate predictions for individual states' foreign policies. There are two aspects to this question: One is whether expanding an originally structural theory to make predictions about foreign policy violates Waltz's strict separation of these levels of analysis. It is worthwhile considering whether doing so would open up a sparse, systemic theory to the Pandora's Box of subsystemic variables, jeopardizing its theoretical coherence and elegance. The second issue is whether neorealism must make predictions about state behavior as opposed to system-level outcomes in order to be policy relevant and to generate falsifiable hypotheses. Scholars working in the neorealist tradition have answered these questions by sacrificing some of Waltz's theory's parsimony to explain individual countries foreign policies.[165] Indeed, this move underpins most neoclassical realist work.

3.3. The Free and Easy Life? The United States after the End of the Cold War

Emerging from the Cold War as the unrivalled superpower, the United States appeared to be slated to enjoy "the free and easy life,"[166] with few if any constraints on its foreign and security policy. As argued above,

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165 Stephen E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffery W. Taliaferro, eds., *Neoclassical Realism, the State, Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Taliaferro, *Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery*; Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power*.

166 Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 96.

structural realist theories lay out an optimal behavior for the other states in a unipolar system—to balance, that is. Structural realist theories have, however, remained relatively silent on the issue of what the United States should do with its new position. Based on his balance of threat approach, Walt has suggested the United States should restrain itself in its foreign policy so as not to trigger balancing behavior by others.[167]

Implicit in the pessimistic forecasts put forward by writers in the realist tradition is the assumption that remaining in NATO comes with costs attached for the United States. The costs can occur across the bandwidth of policy, e.g. by requiring the United States to spend more, by dragging it into conflicts it would not otherwise have fought, or by limiting its freedom of maneuver. If on balance, remaining in the alliance comes at little or no cost, there is little reason for the United States to abandon it. The argument of those authors discarding NATO and calling for the United States to leave it thus relies on a negative cost calculation: costs for the hegemon would have to outweigh possible benefits. These benefits can mainly take two forms: material and political. Materially, alliances can serve to amalgamate their members' individual military capacities. Politically, alliances can help increase any given policy's legitimacy by garnering support of allies.

Flowing from the indeterminacy of structural realist theory's assumptions regarding states' motives is a spectrum of optimal behavior for the hegemon in its alliances. This ranges from the quest for hegemony suggested by offensive realists to the concern for maintaining one's status relative to other countries, as defensive realists argue. Separate from this split, Beck-

167 Stephen M. Walt, "Keeping the World 'Off-Balance': Self-Restraint and U.S. Foreign Policy," in *America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power*, ed. G. John Ikenberry (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); Stephen M. Walt, *Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005).

ley has identified two approaches to the costs and benefits of NATO for the United States in the U.S. academic debate: entanglement theory and freedom of action theory.[168] The former emphasizes the downsides of U.S. involvement in alliances, whereas the latter argues that because of its superior position, the hegemon can participate in alliances while foregoing any of the downsides. Whilst neither constitutes a full-fledged theory, both approaches make predictions concerning the costs of being in alliances for the United States. These predictions are consequential regardless of whether one adheres to an offensive or a defensive realist logic. If the costs are as dramatic as predicted by entanglement theory, both offensive and defensive realists would consider leaving the respective alliance as preferable. Likewise, both schools of thought would predict the hegemon remaining in an alliance in which it can extricate itself from the costly downsides.

3.3.1. Entanglement Theory

This approach warns of the dangers of entanglement, as first professed by the second president of the United States, Thomas Jefferson: "[…] peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none […]."[169] Jefferson's predecessor George Washington had voiced a similar sentiment in his 1796 farewell remarks:

> Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor or caprice?

168 Michael Beckley, "The Myth of Entangling Alliances. Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts," *International Security* 39, no. 4 (2015): 14–22.

169 Thomas Jefferson, "First Inaugural Address," March 4, 1801, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jefinau1.asp. The notion that NATO is such an entangling alliance is not uncommon, see Ronald E. Powaski, *Toward an Entangling Alliance: American Isolationism, Internationalism, and Europe, 1901-1950* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991); Ronald E. Powaski, *The Entangling Alliance: The United States and European Security, 1950-1993* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994).

> It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world; so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. [...] I repeat it, therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But, in my opinion, it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them.
>
> Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.[170]

Entanglement thus boils down to "loyalty trump[ing] self-interest: state is driven by moral, legal, or reputational concerns to uphold an alliance commitment without regard to, and often at the expense of, its national interests."[171] Being entangled is thus an intervening variable between the system pressures highlighted by neorealists and the observed outcomes. As such, an "entangling alliance" could contribute to states failing to appropriately heed the systemic incentives. Entanglement is a broad concept that arguably comprises Snyder's distinct conception of "entrapment."[172]

3.3.2. Freedom of Action Theory

In contrast to entanglement theory, this approach is optimistic about a great power's ability to successfully insulate and extricate itself from any negative impact of an alliance. Powerful states simply do not become entangled, but retain their "freedom of action." Great powers are expected to be able to shirk responsibilities within an alliance through a

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170 George Washington, "1796 Farewell Address," accessed April 27, 2016, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp.

171 Beckley, "The Myth of Entangling Alliances. Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts," 12.

172 Tongfi Kim, "Why Alliances Entangle but Seldom Entrap States," *Security Studies* 20, no. 3 (2011): 350–77; Snyder, *Alliance Politics*.

variety of means, e.g. "by inserting loopholes into alliance agreements, sidestepping costly commitments, maintaining a diversified portfolio of alliances, and using alliances to deter adversaries and restrain allies from initiating or escalating conflicts."[173] Missing from Beckley's description is the flip side of the ability to shirk alliance responsibilities: Great powers can vice versa use an alliance in which they hold superior influence towards their own ends, e.g. by shoring up political support and material contributions.

Beckley's work focuses on the military implications of alliances for the United States, i.e. whether alliances have drawn the United States into military engagements it would not have otherwise participated in. There is nothing, however, precluding the application to areas beyond immediate military conflict. In any given issue area, the mechanisms of entanglement or freedom of action theory should be observable.

Further, the spectrum of predictions Beckley presents at first glance seems to align neatly with the distinction commonly drawn between offensive and defensive neorealists. This distinction rests on the different motives the two groups assume for states. The initial impression is misleading, however. Beckley's classification does not operate at the motives level. Rather, his predictions are for observable effects of the United States power advantage within alliances. Strictly speaking, entanglement and freedom of action theory are both agnostic about state motives (as Waltz claims his theory is). The two approaches merely make different predictions as to the likelihood U.S. motives, whatever they are, will prevail within an alliance—for entanglement theory, the likelihood is lower than for freedom of action theory. Equally, the cost of alliances in terms of lim-

173 Beckley, "The Myth of Entangling Alliances. Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts," 18.

itations placed on the United States varies. It is high in entanglement theory—states cannot extricate themselves from their commitments and are drawn into conflicts—and low in freedom of action theory, which predicts powerful states will be able to forego any of the disadvantages of alliances.

The argument presented here is thus that the United States has remained an active member of NATO because the costs of its commitment have either been low or outweighed by advantages. The real issue, as Rauchhaus has correctly argued, is thus "how the United States managed to use NATO to advance its own agenda" and "whether NATO serves America's 'perceived or misperceived interests' in Europe."[174] The low-cost part of the argument works with both defensive and offensive realist theories as well as other theories of international relations. In contrast, the notion that benefits for the United States outweigh any disadvantages of NATO membership because the power differential allows the United States to forego any disadvantages is distinctly realist and squares with the predictions of freedom of action theory. This requires an assumption of what purpose the United States pursues in NATO. As discussed above, defensive approaches stress that states seek to avoid losses of relative power; they are defensive positionalists.[175] In contrast, offensive realists come to different conclusions regarding optimal behavior under anarchy. For them,

174 Rauchhaus, "Conclusion: Explaining NATO Enlargement," 13.

175 Joseph M. Grieco, "Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation: Analysis with an Amended Prisoner's Dilemma Model," *The Journal of Politics* 50, no. 3 (1988): 600–624; Joseph M. Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limitations of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory," in *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Joseph Grieco, Robert Powell, and Duncan Snidal, "The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation," *The American Political Science Review* 87, no. 3 (1993): 727–43.

any state must continually maximize its power relative to others and strive for the greatest possible amount of power.

3.3.3. Hypotheses

In the logic of structural realism, the following hypotheses could explain the U.S. commitment to NATO:

1. Costs and benefits of NATO membership are either equal or benefits outweigh costs. Costs can here be understood both in material and in policy terms, i.e. expenditures and pursuing policies not in line with U.S. interests, i.e. entanglement broadly understood as presented above.

2. Because of its power advantage, the United States has successfully used NATO to pursue national goals and kept costs for itself low. This includes the expectations of freedom of action theory that the United States can extricate itself from costly commitments.

3. NATO has buttressed the United States' relative position by giving the United States a way to maintain a hierarchical system and to influence allies' foreign policies. This prediction emphasizes the structuring function NATO has served for the United States.

4. Methodology

Specifically, the policy areas under review here are U.S. policy towards the enlargement of the alliance in the 1990s and early 2000s as well as U.S. policy on the alliance's strategy and missions on the Balkans. The following will apply the theoretical framework and hypotheses developed in the previous section to U.S. NATO policy, focusing on these instances. Whether these should be considered separate cases or not is a largely arbitrary decision, given that any single case could be broken down further. In my view, it is more useful to consider U.S. NATO policy as a single case that is analyzed with an emphasis on enlargement, missions abroad, and strategy developments, rather than considering these separate cases or considering the different administrations separate cases. Structural realist expectations would support this view, given that the decisive structural variable for them remained constant throughout.

This dissertation is a disciplined configurative single case study of U.S. NATO policy between 1989 and the early 2000s, providing an explanation of a single case using theory.[176] Harry Eckstein first identified the disciplined configurative type in a seminal 1975 classification of case studies,[177] characterizing it as a study that is guided by a well structured theoretical framework. This type of case study thus focuses on those aspects

176 Andrew Bennett, "Case Studies: Design, Uses, and Comparative Advantages," in *Models, Numbers & Cases*, ed. Detlef F. Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004); Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004); Stephan van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).

177 Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in *Strategies of Inquiry*, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, vol. 7, Handbook of Political Science (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 79–132.

of the case that are variables in the underlying theory, whilst sidelining aspects that fall outside the theory's theoretical remit. [178]

The single case study approach is suitable for several reasons. Firstly, it allows for exploring new or neglected variables in a specific case and give a historical explanation of this case. Given the novelty of this proposed dissertation, I expect to find new variables and hypotheses in the course of the research, which would be significantly harder in other research designs. Secondly, U.S. policy towards NATO is a best case for neorealist approaches. If realism failed to generate predictions about the unipole's behavior in history's most important alliance, this would cast serious doubt on the theory's continued relevance. As a best case, it can therefore make an important contribution to theory development by providing a crucial test. Thirdly, a detailed single case study allows me to conduct process tracing. Observing whether the causal mechanisms suggested by the theory operate by providing a continuous account in turn makes it possible to test and refine the original hypotheses.[179] Fourthly, choosing an intra-case design allows for minimizing the variance of third variables, while providing for variance in the independent, intervening, and dependent variables.

Several additional considerations support this dissertation's case selection. The availability of data and literature on U.S. foreign policy is generally high, both as regards primary and secondary sources. Indeed, U.S. policy may be one of the best studied areas in international relations. As for primary sources, most relevant documents in the United States remain classi-

178 Such case studies have also been described as "case-explaining" or "theory-guided" case studies, see Jack S. Levy, "Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 25, no. 1 (2008): 4; van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, 74–75.

179 Bennett, "Case Studies: Design, Uses, and Comparative Advantages," 19.

fied. While this may pose problems for writing diplomatic history of the topic at hand, this is less significant for international relations studies.[180] While single-case studies in international relations have certain similarities with works of diplomatic history, their goals are very different. Where historians aim for detailed and highly specific accounts, political science aims for generalizations, parsimonious explanations, and theory-based explanations. Further, political scientists strive to make their causal argument and assumptions explicit.[181] Through the available sources, including official, scholarly, and biographical literature, it will nevertheless be possible to generate meaningful answers to the questions raised here. Further, there is strong variation of the independent and intervening variables as outlined above.

Despite the aforementioned advantages, single-case studies face methodological concerns.[182] A frequent argument against single-case studies is the "trade-off between generalizability and specificity."[183] While single case studies may provide good explanations of individual cases, the study itself usually does not consider the generalizability of its findings, saying nothing about the question whether the examined case is a frequent one or an outlier: How often do cases such sufficiently similar to the one examined occur? Can the findings for one case be potentially applied to other cases

180 On the difference between approaches in political science and diplomatic history, see Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds., *Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001).

181 cf. Jack S. Levy, "Explaining Events and Developing Theories: History, Political Science, and the Analysis of International Relations," in *Bridges and Boundaries. Historians, Political Scientists and the Study of International Relations*, ed. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 39–84.

182 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

183 Bennett, "Case Studies: Design, Uses, and Comparative Advantages," 43.

as well, or are they case-specific?[184] This dilemma is mitigated by the fact that historically, unipolarity has been a rare phenomenon. Further, this dissertation makes no claims to generalizations across countries or time.[185] Instead, it seeks to provide a specific explanation for U.S. policies in a defined time frame.

One common way to address the problems of single-case studies outlined above is conducting comparative research, e.g. in focused studies comparing different countries' policies, the same country's policy in different cases, or in large-*n* studies. In the latter, the larger number of cases examined usually allows for much improved generalizability, which, however, comes at the cost of reduced detail. The United States' unique position within NATO means the comparative approach is of limited use here for lack of suitable comparative cases.[186] With the United States being the most powerful and influential country occupying key positions in NATO, a comparison between the NATO policies of the United States and other allies would be pointless—the differences are too significant for meaningful comparisons, and span the gamut of independent variables used in international relations theory.[187]

These problems could be addressed by comparing U.S. policy in different cases across time. For example, an alternative research design could have selected cases between which structural variables vary—in this case, the polarity of the system. Such a design would allow to focus more expressly

184 Ibid.

185 A common, albeit problematic theme in the alliance literature: "[T]here is limited theoretical mileage to be gained from efforts to spell out propositions purported to be valid for all alliances" (Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances*, 222).

186 In fact, some authors argue that NATO itself is "quite a unique alliance" and "difficult to generalize about" Chernoff, *After Bipolarity*, ix.

187 cf. also ibid., 3.

on the direct impact of structural variation and mitigate variations of intervening variables across cases. For example, an alternative design could have compared U.S. NATO policy in comparable instances during the Cold War and after. Arguably, another alternative would have been to compare U.S. post-Cold War policy to that of previous unipoles or that of other dominant actors in their respective alliance. A major problem for either is the nature of the current international system. While previous unipoles have risen through the ranks, the U.S. became the dominant actor in the international system when the Soviet Union eventually disintegrated. Rather than rising to displace other powers, the U.S. emerged as the unipole over night. This and the resulting unusually large power differential necessarily limit the insights that can be drawn from comparing such disparate cases. Likewise, a comparison to e.g. the Soviet Union's policy would be hampered by stark differences on the unit level as well as between the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

Equally, large-*n* studies, such as the one by Kaufman et al. on the balance of power, cannot be applied in a study of U.S. NATO policy under unipolarity.[188] Generally speaking, the timeframe chosen by Kaufman et al.—the last 3000 years of human history—is incompatible with the kind of in-depth research envisioned here. Further, a large-n study is not feasible for the simple fact that there have been very few if any historical precedents to the current unipolar structure of the international system, as Brooks and Wohlforth argue at length.[189]

188 Stuart J. Kaufman, Richard Little, and William Curtis Wohlforth, eds., *The Balance of Power in World History* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); William C. Wohlforth et al., "Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History," *European Journal of International Relations* 23, no. 2 (2007): 155–85.

189 Brooks and Wohlforth, *World Out of Balance. International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy*.

The following chapters will test the hypotheses generated in the previous section in a structured, focused comparison,[190] that is the hypotheses and research questions will be applied to each instance. The method is thus structured in that the same questions are asked in each instance, and focused, in that only aspects relevant to the theoretical framework outlined in the previous section will be considered.

Regarding operationalization, phenomena in line with entanglement theory would serve to heighten costs of NATO for the U.S., whereas phenomena predicted by freedom of action theory would lower them. Of the observable outcomes of freedom of action theory[191], "sidestepping costly commitments" should be particularly relevant in the case examined here.[192] Possible examples could include the U.S. avoiding being pulled into conflict, foregoing commitments in strategic concepts beyond its national interests, and managing to extricate itself or limit its contributions in NATO and its operations, e.g. in the Balkans missions. Further, evidence that the U.S. successfully used the alliance to influence other allies' —e.g. by convincing them to support U.S.-preferred policies and foregoing others—would also support freedom of action theory. On the flip side, evidence suggesting that allies successfully drew the U.S. into conflicts, significantly limited policy options available to the U.S., or successfully forced the U.S. to abandon strongly held positions would support entanglement theory. Neither theory's predictions are likely to be borne out exclusively, but per this dissertation's theoretical approach, dynamics predicted by freedom of action theory should prevail.

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190 George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 64–72.

191 See p. 50 (3.3.2).

192 Beckley, "The Myth of Entangling Alliances. Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts," 19.

5. The U.S. Role in NATO Expansion

I do not agree that NATO is dead.
—President Bill Clinton, June 17, 1994[193]

5.1. Czechoslovakia's, Poland's, and Hungary's Path to Membership

One of the most visible ways in which NATO has changed since the end of the Cold War is by expanding its membership to include the post-Soviet countries of Eastern Europe. Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty had from the outset envisioned that NATO would maintain an 'open door' towards new members:

> The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.[194]

Whilst the alliance was conceptually open to take in additional members, the East-West conflict meant that the provision was rarely invoked between NATO's inception in 1949 and the end of the Cold War. Only four new members joined during this time: Turkey and Greece in 1952, West Germany in 1955, and, after its successful restoration of democracy, Spain in 1982.

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193 William J. Clinton, "The President's News Conference. June 17, 1993," in *Book 1. Presidential Documents - January 20 to July 31, 1993*, ed. Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1994), 868.

194 NATO, "The North Atlantic Treaty," April 4, 1949, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm, accessed May 6, 2016.

In contrast, the two rounds of NATO enlargement in 1999 and 2004 have been "the most spectacular, in terms of numbers and political impact," as NATO's public diplomacy division claims.[195] Ten new members acceded to the alliance: the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in NATO's first round of post-Cold War enlargement in 1999, in time for the alliance's 50th anniversary that year. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia followed in 2004.

The idea that the newly independent states of Central and Eastern Europe could join NATO was first suggested not by the alliance or its members, but by the aspiring members themselves. The first Eastern European official to publicly avow his country's desire for closer ties with NATO was Hungary's then Foreign Minister Gyula Horn. In a series of public statements in February of 1990, he suggested Hungary could join NATO within a couple of years.[196] Other emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe followed suit.[197]

5.2. Extending "the Hand of Friendship"[198]

The alliance did not ignore these tentative expressions of interest in membership. Rather, it responded by expressing the principal willingness to reform NATO to better suit the "dramatic changes in the security environ-

195 NATO Public Diplomacy Division, *NATO Handbook* (Brussels: NATO, 2006), 183.

196 Celestine Bohlen, "Upheaval in the East: Hungary; Budapest Broaching a Role in NATO," *New York Times*, February 24, 1990, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/24/world/upheaval-in-the-east-hungary-budapest-broaching-a-role-in-nato.html, last accessed May 7, 2016.

197 Stanley R. Sloan, *Permanent Alliance?: NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to Obama* (New York: Continuum, 2010), 93–99; Jane Perlez, "Czech Leader Pushes for Open NATO," *New York Times*, October 22, 1993, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/22/world/czech-leader-pushes-for-open-nato.html.

198 NATO Heads of State and Government, "London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance," July 5, 1990, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900706a.htm, last accessed May 8, 2016.

ment"[199] the transitions in Central and Eastern Europe had wrought. At the July 5-6, 1990, meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in London, NATO Heads of State and Government (HOSG) issued the *London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance*.[200] A seminal document, the London Declaration emphasized the need for the alliance to reform: "Today, our Alliance begins a major transformation."[201]

In particular, NATO was

> […] to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe. The Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship[202]

and to work "[…] with all the countries of Europe, […] to create enduring peace on this continent."[203] To this end, cooperation with the six Warsaw Pact nations was to be intensified, and NATO invited them to establish diplomatic liaisons at NATO.[204]

Yet the aspirations of the newly independent states only gathered steam after NATO's former rival, the Warsaw Pact, dissolved in 1991. Before this juncture, no one considered NATO expansion a realistic possibility—neither in the West, nor in the East,[205] where the push for expansion first

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199 NATO, "20 Years Ago: London Declaration Marks Birth of New NATO," 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_64790.htm, last accessed May 8, 2016.

200 NATO Heads of State and Government, "London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance."

201 Ibid., nr. 23.

202 Ibid., nr. 4.

203 Ibid., para. 23.

204 The Warsaw Pact comprised the USSR, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Hungarian Republic, the Republic of Poland, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, and Romania.

205 Otto Pick, "The Demise of the Warsaw Pact," *NATO Review* 39, no. 2 (April 1991): 12–16.

emerged. NATO expansion "was simply beyond the scope of imagination even for anti-communist dissidents."[206] Only after Soviet troops had withdrawn and the Warsaw Pact dissolved did rapprochement with NATO become a realistic option for the newly independent states

To this end, the foreign ministers of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland—which later became known as the Visegrád Group—on January 21, 1991, called for "the quickest possible dissolution of the Warsaw Pact."[207] If no summit of the Warsaw Pact had been called by March 1991, the foreign ministers threatened their countries would withdraw unilaterally. Their hopes were borne out at the February 25, 1991, summit of the Warsaw Pact in Budapest. There, the foreign and defense ministers of the six members of the Warsaw Pact announced their decision to abandon the alliance's military structures by March 31, 1991.[208]

A flurry of trips by Central and Eastern European officials to Brussels ensued, with the implicit goal of sounding out possibilities for intensified cooperation with NATO. In March 1991, Vaclav Havel, president of Czechoslovakia, became the first head of state of the newly independent states to visit NATO headquarters in Brussels. He was keenly aware that full membership was not on the table. In remarks to the North Atlantic Council on March 21, Havel acknowledged that "for a number of differ-

206 Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door*, 7.

207 Dienstbier, Jirí, "Visegrad - The First Phase," September 12, 2006, http://www.visegradgroup.eu/the-visegrad-book/dienstbier-jiri-visegrad; Jacques Lévesque, *The Enigma of 1989. The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997), 250.

208 The text of the agreement is reprinted in Anatolii I. Gribkov, *Sudba Varshavskogo Dogovora: Vospominaniya, Dokumenty, Fakty [The Fate of the Warsaw Treaty: Recollections, Documents, and Facts]* (Moscow: Russkaya Kniga, 1998), 198–200; see also Celestine Bohlen, "Warsaw Pact Agrees to Dissolve Its Military Alliance by March 31," *New York Times*, February 26, 1991, sec. World. Somewhat ironically, this announcement came one day after a U.S.-led coalition launched a ground offensive into Kuwait.

ent reasons, our country cannot become a regular member of NATO for the time being." This notwithstanding, Havel also looked ahead, arguing that "an alliance of countries united by the ideals of freedom and democracy should not forever be closed to neighboring countries that are pursuing the same goals."[209] President Havel and his Polish counterpart Lech Wałęsa again emphasized their countries' desire to join the alliance when they visited Washington, DC, on occasion of the opening of the Holocaust Museum in late April 1993. President Clinton remembered his exchange with the Eastern European leaders months later. In a June 17 press conference, the president rejected the notion that NATO was dead, citing the newly independent states' enthusiasm for the alliance. Said Clinton: "When they [Eastern European leaders, DJR] came here a few weeks ago for the Holocaust dedication, every one of those Presidents said that their number one priority was to get into NATO."[210]

Meanwhile, U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, and German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher moved the debate on NATO outreach towards its new neighbors forward. During Genscher's visit to the United States, the two issued a joint statement on May 13, 1991, which laid out a set of proposals for the upcoming NATO ministerial in Copenhagen in June of 1991.[211] Notably, the two foreign ministers suggested NATO further expand the "liaison concept" enshrined in the London Declaration, which foresaw intensified contacts between NATO and its new

209 "Documentation: President Havel Visits NATO," *NATO Review* 39, no. 2 (1991): 29–35; William Drozdiak, "Havel Urges NATO to Seek Ties With East's New Neighbors," *Washington Post*, March 22, 1991, A18.

210 Clinton, "The President's News Conference. June 17, 1993," 868–69; see also Goldgeier, *Not Whether but When*, 19–21.

211 James A. Baker and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "Joint Statement: US-German Views on the New European and Trans-Atlantic Architecture," reprinted in *U.S. Department of State Dispatch* 2, no. 19 (May 13, 1991), http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1991/html/Dispatchv2no19.html, last accessed May 13, 2016.

eastern neighbors. Inter alia, Baker and Genscher called for stepping up civilian and military contacts at all levels, offering training for Eastern European military officers at NATO facilities, and having experts from these countries participate in NATO exercises.[212]

NATO made good on its offer of intensifying relations with the newly independent states by establishing the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) at its Rome summit in November of 1991. NATO's Secretary General Manfred Wörner hailed the summit "a watershed not only in the history of NATO but also of Europe."[213] Wörner was mainly referring to the upgrade of relations with Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania, and the three Baltic countries. NATO invited them "to join the Allies in an institutionalized framework of consultations"[214] to be held at NATO headquarters—the NACC.[215] The new body began its work shortly after the Rome summit, convening for the first time on December 20, 1991. Importantly, the NACC was not considered an avenue to full-fledged membership for the non-NATO participants. Rather, NATO envisioned the body to serve as a "more institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues"[216] at a ministerial level on an annual basis.[217]

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212 Ibid.

213 Manfred Wörner, "NATO Transformed: The Significance of the Rome Summit," *NATO Review* 39, no. 6 (1991): 3–8.

214 Ibid.

215 NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome, "Rome Declaration on Peace and Development," November 8, 1991, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911108a.htm, accessed May 10, 2016.

216 Ibid., para. 11; Rebecca R. Moore, *NATO's New Mission: Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 19.

217 Many considered the NACC a way to postpone eventual decisions on NATO expansion and derided the body as e.g. "a gigantic talking shop where the formal opening speeches usually filled up most of the time available and the conclusions of the proceedings merely restated the questions originally posed for debate." Jonathan

5.3. The Enlargement Debate Kicks Off

German Defense Minister Volker Rühe was the first official from a NATO country to publicly raise the option of expanding the alliance eastwards, breaking what was effectively a "public taboo."[218] In March 26, 1993, remarks at London's International Institute for Strategic Studies, Rühe stated emphatically that he did not see why Central and Eastern European countries should not eventually join NATO. Rühe warned: "The Atlantic Alliance must not become a 'closed shop'. I cannot see one good reason for denying future members of the European Union membership in NATO."[219] Going further, Rühe even questioned "whether membership in the European Union should necessarily precede accession to NATO."[220] Rühe's vision was met with skepticism both at home in Germany and abroad.

The thinking in Washington at the time remained focused on finding an arrangement that would ensure no security vacuum emerges in Central and Eastern Europe. Whilst full NATO membership for the newly independent countries remained hard to conceive, supportive voices within the United States was on the rise. Officially, however, the incoming administration of Bill Clinton continued to push for mechanisms to engage the aspirants and to foster closer cooperation short of putting them on track for membership. At the 1993 NATO ministerial in Athens, Secretary of State Warren Christopher clearly stated: "At an appropriate time, we may

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Eyal, "NATO's Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision," *International Affairs* 73, no. 4 (1997): 701.

218 Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door*, 30.

219 Volker Rühe, "Shaping Euro-Atlantic Policies: A Grand Strategy for a New Era (Alastair Buchanan Memorial Lecture at IISS, March 26, 1993)," *Survival* 39, no. 2 (1993): 135.

220 Ibid.

choose to enlarge NATO membership. But that is not now on the agenda."[221]

The most vivid illustration of this thinking was the launch of "a new programme [that] goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership—a Partnership for Peace."[222] The Partnership for Peace (PFP) aimed at stabilizing Eastern Europe and increasing cooperation with NATO on a number of civilian and military fields. Specifically, PFP envisioned the partner countries working alongside NATO in operations. Further, NATO promised to assist its partners in establishing civilian control over their militaries and in ensuring compatibility and interoperability with NATO countries. PFP was open to the NACC members and "other CSCE countries able and willing to contribute to this programme,"[223] which included Russia. The allies formally launched the program at their January 10-11, 1994, summit in Brussels. As Sloan argues, it was a "policymaker's dream."[224] It was a nod to Eastern European's ambitions without committing to membership offers or suggesting a timeline,[225] and, equally important, was a middle-of-the-road policy that players in the Clinton administration could agree on.

Besides creating PFP, the Brussels Summit document also for the first time included detailed language on the eventual possibility of NATO member-

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221 Warren Christopher, "U.S. Leadership After the Cold War: NATO and Transatlantic Security. Intervention at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial in Athens, Greece, June 10, 1993," *U.S. Department of State Dispatch* 4, no. 25 (June 21, 1993).

222 NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, January 10-11, 1994, "The Brussels Summit Declaration," January 11, 1994, para. 13, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24470.htm. Accessed May 10, 2016.

223 Ibid.

224 Sloan, *Permanent Alliance?*, 103.

225 Leading some who saw the PFP as a way of kicking the can down the road to suggest the acronym stands for "Policy of Postponement." Ibid., 104.

ship for Eastern European states: "We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe."[226] The message was dampened by the reference to security developments and by characterizing any admission process as a gradual, evolutionary one. Nevertheless, the Brussels Summit document did send an important message to Eastern European capitals—i.e. "that the Alliance remains open to the membership of other European countries."[227]

U.S. President Bill Clinton buttressed this message in a January 12, 1994, press conference with the Visegrád heads of state in Prague. For the first time, the president publicly supported enlargement: "While the Partnership is not NATO membership, neither is it a permanent holding room. It changes the entire NATO dialogue so that now the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members but when and how."[228] Held in Prague on the heels of Clinton's first participation in a NATO summit and on his first trip to Europe, his message carried particular weight. Clinton's posturing also sent an important message to his administration's officials, among whom the issue of NATO enlargement was contested.[229] Indeed, a majority in the U.S. bureaucracy was "almost completely opposed to expansion."[230] While Clinton and a handful of senior officials leaned towards supporting NATO enlargement, there were important holdouts

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226 NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, January 10-11, 1994, "The Brussels Summit Declaration," para. 12.

227 Ibid., para. 1.

228 William J. Clinton, "The President's News Conference With Visegrad Leaders in Prague, January 12, 1994," in *Book 1. Presidential Documents - January 1 to July 31, 1994*, ed. Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1995), 39–43.

229 Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door*, 61.

230 Goldgeier, *Not Whether but When*, 4.

among the upper echelons in the Department of State and the Department of Defense.[231] Effectively, the Clinton administration was "internally deadlocked"[232] on the issue, a state of affairs that was only gradually resolved over the course of the first half of 1994.[233]

5.4. From If to How and Who

At their January 1994 summit, the allies committed to expanding NATO. While the question of whether the alliance should expand had been settled, the how and when remained contentious. The NACC and PFP, which by year's end had attracted 24 members, including Russia, were not intended to serve as mechanisms resulting in eventual NATO membership. The alliance was thus confronted with the difficult questions of how many and which countries to take in as new allies, when to do so, and how to get there. For the United States, President Clinton continued to press the alliance on moving forward on enlargement. In a speech to the Polish Sejm in July of 1994, the president acknowledged Poland's participation in PFP and reiterated: "Bringing new members into NATO, as I have said many times, is no longer a question of whether, but when and how."[234] Poland would be among those new members, Clinton explained: "[…] [T]he United States believes that when NATO does expand, as it will,

231 E.g. soon-to-be Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, the State Department's Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs Steve Oxman, NSC Senior Director for European Affairs Jennone Walker Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door*, 27–28, 34–36, 44–46.

232 Ibid., 48.

233 cf. ibid., bk. III.

234 William J. Clinton, "Address to the Polish Parliament in Warsaw on July 7, 1994," in *Book 1. Presidential Documents - January 1 to July 31, 1994*, ed. Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1995), 1210.

a democratic Poland will have placed itself among those ready and able to join."[235]

To explore these issues further, the alliance embarked on a formal process of internal deliberation at the December 1-2, 1994, NAC ministerial. There, the NAC initiated a study on NATO expansion.[236] U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher hailed the prospect of "a measured process of NATO expansion" that is "steady, deliberate and transparent."[237] Christopher argued enlarging NATO would make an important contribution to European security, and urged the alliance to begin internal deliberations forthwith. To this end, the NAC initiated the enlargement study to explore the "why and how"[238] of enlargement.

Two important issues thus remained outside the scope of both offical NATO deliberations and the study commissioned at Brussels: The timeline for expansion as well as which countries were to join.[239] The study, which was published in September 1995, did, however, for the first time set out a list of criteria aspiring members should fulfill.[240] Regarding the why and how questions, the report suggested countries should accede to the

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235 Clinton, "The President's News Conference With Visegrad Leaders in Prague, January 12, 1994."

236 "Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels," December 1, 1994, para. 6, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c941201a.htm.

237 Warren Christopher, "Opening Statement of U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council on December 1" (1994), http://nato.int/docu/speech/1994/s941201a.htm.

238 NATO Public Diplomacy Division, *NATO Handbook*, 185–86.

239 "Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels," para. 7.

240 NATO, "Study on NATO Enlargement," 1995, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24733.htm, accessed May 11, 2016; John Barrett, "NATO's Year of Study: Results and Policy Implications," in *Will NATO Go East? The Debate over Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance*, ed. David G. Haglund (Kingston, Ontario: Queen's University Centre for International Relations, 1996), 95–96.

alliance as full members as envisioned by Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This forestalled alternative models such as a privileged partnership, and entailed that the aspirants would enjoy Article 5 protection after their accession. As for the "why," the study argued that the end of the Cold War had created both a "unique opportunity" for NATO to "enhance stability"[241] by taking in new members. Further, the authors saw a need to expand so as to respond to the security void that had emerged in Eastern Europe after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. The report also envisioned enlargement would strengthen the alliance and its ability to contribute to international security and stability.

However, hopes that the release of the study would give new momentum to the debate over whom to invite when did not materialize. For much of late 1995 and 1996, relations with Russia and the end of the war in Bosnia took up most of the attention of the United States and NATO. In fact, President Clinton had assured Russian President Yeltsin in May 1995 that he would "do nothing to accelerate NATO enlargement" and ensure "nothing is done to cause you a problem."[242] Specifically, Clinton pledged that if Russia joined the PFP and cooperated on NATO-Russia dialogue, he would "get [Yeltsin] past the next election with no discussion of 'who' [will be invited to join NATO, DJR] or 'when'." Yeltsin agreed, and Clinton had won Russia's participation in PFP at the cost of deferring a decision on which countries to invite to join NATO until after Russian parliamentary elections in 1996. Conveniently, this delay also meant the enlargement issue would not by default be a major issue in Clinton's campaign for reelection in 1996.

241 NATO, "Study on NATO Enlargement," chap. 1A, para. 1.

242 Quoted in Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door*, 116.

Clinton's agreement with Yeltsin did not, however, translate into silence of the entire U.S. administration. At the meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Brussels in December 1995, Secretary of State Christopher laid out the administration's course for the next year.[243] Christopher announced that in Brussels, NATO had begun "the next phase in the process of enlargement, a process that was launched by President Clinton at the NATO summit in January 1994," and that prospective members would begin consultations with the alliance in 1996.[244] At the heart of these consultations would be the alliance's expectations of any new members.

Clinton kept his promise: it was only after the Russian elections in June and July 1996 that he once more stepped up his public rhetoric arguing for enlargement. Eventually, NATO enlargement was to become a more prominent topic in Clinton's second term in office, with the president deciding "to adopt the enlargement of NATO as the emblem of his foreign policy."[245]

Meanwhile, Secretary of State Christopher delivered a major speech in Prague in the spring. There, Christopher on March 20, 1996, stated: "We are determined to move forward. NATO has made a commitment to take in new members and it must not and will not keep new democracies in the waiting room forever. NATO enlargement is on track and it will happen."[246]

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243 Goldgeier, *Not Whether but When*, 101.

244 Warren Christopher, "Building a New Security Structure for Europe. Opening Remarks in a Press Conference by Secretary of State Warren Christopher on December 5, 1995, NATO Headquarters, Brussels," *U.S. Department of State Dispatch* 6, no. 52 (1995).

245 William G. Hyland, *Clinton's World: Remaking American Foreign Policy* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 43.

246 Warren Christopher, "A Democratic and Undivided Europe in Our Time. Address by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Cernin Palace, Prague, March 20, 1996," 1996, https://fas.org/man/nato/offdocs/us_96/dos960320.htm.

Out of the eyes of the public, Clinton made the U.S. case for enlargement to the British, French, and German heads of government in an August 7 letter. In it, Clinton argued that NATO must make a decision on NATO enlargement in the course of the next year.[247] Publicly, Clinton himself only took up the issue of the timing of NATO enlargement shortly before the U.S. presidential election in November 1996. In a rare reference to foreign policy on the campaign trail, Clinton on October 22 in Detroit stated: "By 1999, NATO's 50th anniversary and 10 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the first group of countries we invite to join should be full-fledged members of NATO."[248]

Already in September, Clinton had directed U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher to call a NATO summit for "the spring or early summer"[249] of 1997, at which the allies should identify a first group of countries to join NATO. Christopher delivered that message publicly in a speech in Stuttgart on September 7, 1996, marking the anniversary of his predecessor James F. Byrne's speech promising U.S. assistance for German reconstruction after World War II. In his remarks, Christopher announced the alliance would invite new members at its 1997 summit. Said Christopher, using the same language as in his March speech in Prague: "NATO enlargement, too, is on track and it will happen."[250]

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247 Quoted in Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door*, 166.

248 William J. Clinton, "Remarks to the Community in Detroit, October 22, 1996," in *Book 2. Presidential Documents - July 1 to December 31, 1996*, ed. Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1998), 1890–96; Alison Mitchell, "Clinton Urges NATO Expansion in 1999," *New York Times*, October 23, 1996, sec. U.S., http://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/23/us/clinton-urges-nato-expansion-in-1999.html.

249 William J. Clinton, "Statement on the 1997 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Summit, September 6, 1996," in *Book 2. Presidential Documents - July 1 to December 31, 1996*, ed. Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1998), 1501–2.

250 Warren Christopher, "A New Atlantic Community for the 21st Century. Address at the State Theater, Stuttgart, Germany, September 6, 1996," in *In the Stream of*

In Detroit, Clinton had set out what his timeline was for enlarging NATO, and the North Atlantic Council adopted his schedule. On December 10, 1996, the NAC recommended that NATO Heads of State and Government

> invite at next year's summit meeting one or more countries which have participated in the intensified dialogue process, to start accession negotiation with the Alliance. Our goal is to welcome the new member(s) by the time of NATO's 50th anniversary in 1999. We pledge that the Alliance will remain open to the accession of further members in accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. We will remain ready to pursue consultations with nations seeking NATO membership, as we have done in the past.[251]

By year's end of 1996, the alliance had finally decided to take in one or more new members before its 50th anniversary in 1999—the question remained which country or countries to invite.

In the run up to the 1997 NATO summit in Madrid, which would formally invite one or more countries to join the alliance, the Clinton administration had to establish its position on whom to invite. Cognizant of the positions of the allies—which ranged from inviting three to five countries—the inter-agency process settled on the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. The NSC Deputies Committee agreed on May 19, and the principals committee, the highest inter-agency body consisting of the secretaries of defense and state as well as the national security advisor, formally endorsed the proposal on May 20.[252] The adminstration did not make

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History. Shaping Foreign Policy in a New Era, ed. Warren Christopher (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 460; Norman Kempster, "Christopher Calls for Charter That Would Link Old Foes NATO and Russia," *Los Angeles Times*, September 7, 1996, http://articles.latimes.com/1996-09-07/news/mn-41453_1_christopher-calls.

251 NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers, "Final Communiqué Issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at NATO HQ," December 10, 1996, para. 6, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-165e.htm, last accessed May 12, 2016.

252 Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door*, 218.

this decision public, in keeping with its approach of maintaining a degree of ambiguity on its position regarding enlargement. However, Secretary Albright was to convey at the upcoming meeting of NATO foreign ministers that the United States preferred a small first enlargement round. By the same token, however, Albright was to refrain from discussing individual countries' prospects and to note that the president's final decision was still pending.[253]

The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland emerged as the lowest common denominator for all NATO allies at the May 29-30, 1997, meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Sintra, Portugal. While all allies could support inviting these three, a majority of allies favored inviting more countries. At the Sintra meeting, this group of nine countries including France and Italy strongly argued for inviting Romania and Slovenia as well.[254] With less than a month to go until the NATO summit in Madrid, the question of how many countries to invite was thus left unresolved and for the heads of state and government to decide.

In the meantime, President Clinton on June 12 for the first time officially enunciated the U.S. position on whom NATO should invite at the Madrid summit:

> After careful consideration, I have decided that the United States will support inviting three countries—Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—to begin accession talks to join NATO when we meet in Madrid next month.

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253 Ibid.

254 Chris Hedges, "Slovenia Discards the Yoke That Was Yugoslavia," *New York Times*, May 31, 1997, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/31/world/slovenia-discards-the-yoke-that-was-yugoslavia.html, last accessed May 18, 2016; Steven Lee Myers, "U.S. Now at Odds with NATO Allies On New Members," *New York Times*, May 30, 1997, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/30/world/us-now-at-odds-with-nato-allies-on-new-members.html, last accessed May 18, 2016; Stanley R. Sloan, "NATO: July 1997 Madrid Summit Outcome," CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 14, 1997), 2.

> We have said all along that we would judge aspiring members by their ability to add strength to the alliance and their readiness to shoulder the obligations of NATO membership. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic most clearly meet those criteria—and have currently made the greatest strides in military capacity and political and economic reform.
>
> As I have repeatedly emphasized, the first new members should not and will not be the last. We will continue to work with other interested nations, such as Slovenia and Romania, to help them prepare for membership. Other nations are making good progress--and none will be excluded from consideration. [...][255]

The president thus reiterated that the process of NATO enlargement would remain an ongoing one, and specifically mentioned Romania and Slovenia as potential future candidates—a nod to the majority position among the allies and France in particular. Importantly, Clinton's remarks finally clarified the U.S. position, which until then had officially been ambiguous with regard to which aspirants NATO should invite.[256]

Clinton's June 12 statement was flanked the same day by newly minted Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen. In his press conference after his first NATO meeting of defense ministers, Cohen said:

> After extensive discussion with Allies and candidate countries, with members of Congress, and within the Administration itself, the President decided that the United States will support Poland, Hungray [*sic*], and the Czech Republic for the first round invitations.[257]

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255 William J. Clinton, "Statement on Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on June 12, 1997," in *Book 1. Presidential Documents - January 1 to June 31, 1997*, ed. Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1999), 724.

256 And intentionally so. For example, Asmus reports that National Security Advisor Anthony Lake expressly forbade official meetings to discuss who should join NATO during the run-up to Sintra in 1996. By the same token, a 1994 NSC memo tasked out by Lake suggested the United States retain a position of ambiguity for as long as possible. Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door*, 214, 73–74.

Cohen further stressed that while "[w]hat happens ultimately, of course is a matter of consensus," the president's position was "firm."[258] Eventually, the U.S. position President Clinton articulated would underpin the compromise wording found at the Madrid summit. NATO formally invited the three countries preferred by the United States, but also noted the possibility of inviting more allies, i.e. Romania, Slovenia, and the Baltic countries, later on.[259]

5.5. It's Settled—The 1997 Madrid Summit Invites Three Countries to Join the Alliance in 1999

The spring and summer of 1997 proved to be "a particularly lively and formative time"[260] for the alliance as it headed into "one of the most contentious summits"[261] in its history. It is important to recall that NATO takes decisions by unanimous vote and that, as outlined above, the United States had committed to a small-group approach to the first round of enlargement. That the United States faced a French-led majority going into the summit therefore did not mean the United States would have to seek compromise. On the contrary, because any decision would be a consensus decision, the situation ahead of Madrid worked in Washington's favor: The consensus—or rather lowest common denominator—reached in the first half of 1997 was for NATO to go forward and invite three countries. This was in line with the U.S. position. The question of inviting

257 William S. Cohen, "Press Conference at NATO Headquarters," June 12, 1997, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s970612c.htm.

258 Ibid.

259 NATO Heads of State and Government, "Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation," July 8, 1997, paras. 6, 8, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-081e.htm, last accessed May 12, 2016.

260 Paul Cornish, *Partnership in Crisis: The US, Europe and the Fall and Rise of NATO* (London: Pinter, 1997), 1.

261 Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door*, 213.

more countries beyond the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland remained unresolved, however. Both were left for heads of state and government to discuss at the Madrid summit in July 1997, where they were front and center.

By then, a total of twelve countries had expressed their interest in joining the alliance. Which of them to invite remained contested within the alliance, with the United States having maintained a public position of ambiguity during the run-up to the summit. As late as May 29, 1997, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had said: "The United States has come to no final conclusions about which nations should be invited to join NATO in Madrid."[262] In contrast, the U.S. position to keep the first round of enlargement small was well known. The position of other allies was even less equivocal, with France in particular arguing for a larger round of expansion including Romania and Slovenia.

In his remarks to the NAC, President Clinton made the case for three countries joining NATO: the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. He argued these three countries had "proved their readiness to join," "met the highest standards of democratic and market reform," and ensured confidence that these reforms are "irreversible." Clinton further sought to squash any notion that countries could be "disinvited."And, in line with the U.S. goal of keeping NATO enlargement an open process, the U.S. president noted that "the smooth and successful integration of these three countries will create momentum for others to follow" and that NATO

262 Madeleine K. Albright, "Press Conference Following North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting in Sintra, Portugal," May 29, 1997, http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/970529a.html.

must maintain an "open door" and "exclude no European democracy."[263] Said Clinton:

> [O]ur position is that we should decide today to admit three countries to the alliance. Since this is an irreversible step, we should offer membership to those countries that are irreversibly committed to democratic reforms, while keeping the door firmly open to the admission of other countries in the future.[264]

On July 8, the North Atlantic Council eventually adopted the *Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation.*[265] With it, the alliance invited the three countries identified by Clinton to commence membership negotiations with NATO. Ideally, the aspirants should sign the accession protocols by December of 1997. Allowing for the necessary ratification of the protocols by all NATO members, this was expected to ensure accession of the three new members at the 1999 NATO summit, where the alliance would celebrate its 50th anniversary.[266]

Besides extending three invitations, the declaration also expressly stated the possibility of further expansion in the future, with Romania, Slovenia, and the Baltic countries being named specifically. This wording was a compromise struck between the United States and a group including France and Italy that represented the majority of NATO members. The latter group preferred including Romania and Slovenia in the first round of

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263 William J. Clinton, "Remarks Prepared for Delivery to the North Atlantic Council in Madrid, July 8, 1997," in *Book 2. Presidential Documents - July 1 to December 31, 1997*, ed. Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1999), 922.

264 Clinton, "Remarks Prepared for Delivery to the North Atlantic Council in Madrid, July 8, 1997."

265 NATO Heads of State and Government, "Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation," July 8, 1997, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-081e.htm, last accessed May 16. 2016.

266 Ibid., para. 6.

NATO enlargement, whereas the United States, Britain, and Germany preferred taking in only three members.[267]

The compromise struck in Madrid meant the three aspirants could begin negotiations with the alliance on their respective accession protocols. These were concluded on December 16, 1997. Per the North Atlantic Treaty, all NATO allies had to ratify these three accession protocols. Only then would the secretary general of NATO invite the three aspirants to accede to NATO. In the United States, the advice and consent of the Senate were required.[268] The U.S. president submitted the protocols to the Senate on February 11, 1998. Ratification in the Senate was smooth, not least because the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Forces Committee had already held a number of hearings on the issue beginning in April 1997.[269] In the most prominent and final hearing on February 24, 1998, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Henry H. Shelton once more strongly made the administration's case for NATO enlargement.

On the whole, Congress solidly backed the course on NATO enlargement the Clinton administration had been charting since 1994. In particular, both houses of Congress supported the bids for membership of the Czech

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267 Myers, "U.S. Now at Odds with NATO Allies On New Members."

268 Whilst not a formal requirement, Senate advice and consent for NATO enlargements has been the standing practice since the Truman presidency. On occasion of the Senate giving its advice and consent on the North Atlantic Treaty, President Truman promised that future enlargements of the alliance would be subject to the same procedure. All administrations since have honored this commitment. See Michael John Garcia, "NATO Enlargement: Senate Advice and Consent," CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 16, 2009).

269 Four Senate Committees held a total of 12 hearings between them. See The White House Office of the Press Secretary, "Fact Sheet on NATO Enlargement," May 21, 1998, https://www.bu.edu/globalbeat/nato/whitehouse052198.html.

Republic, Hungary, and Poland. In fact, Congress put pressure on the Clinton administration to step up the speed of NATO enlargement and to commit to a timeline in 1994.[270] Further, the Republicans included swift enlargement of the alliance as a key building block among the bills outlined in their *Contract with America* plank for the 1994 midterm elections. NATO enlargement thus became one of the few issues enjoying widespread bipartisan support in the mid-1990s.[271] After taking control of both houses of the 104th Congress in the elections, Republicans became even more blunt in their criticism of the sluggish pace of enlargement. Said the newly minted Speaker of the House of Representatives, Newt Gingrich: "I am not sure that this administration is ever going to expand NATO."[272]

5.5.1. A "Collective Yawn"[273]—Ratification and Accession

Congressional discussion of the protocols was anti-climactic, a fact helped by the low interest both the better part of Congress and the American public took in the issue of NATO enlargement.[274] Indeed, an October 1997 Pew poll showed that while almost two-thirds of the American public supported NATO expansion in general, only ten per cent could identify

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270 As evidenced for example by the Senate's 1994 *NATO Participation Act* (title II of Public Law 103-447), which suggested new members be invited "at an early date," the House of Representative's 1994 *NATO Enlargement Act* (HR 4210), which suggested new members should join by January 10, 1999, at the latest, and the 1996 *NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act* (title VI of section 101(c) of title I of division A of Public Law 104-208).

271 Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door*, 79–86, 100; Sloan, *Permanent Alliance?*, 107–8.

272 David G. Haglund, "Introduction: The Debate over Enlarging NATO," in *Will NATO Go East? The Debate over Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance*, ed. David G. Haglund (Kingston, Ontario: Queen's University Centre for International Relations, 1996), 2.

273 Rauchhaus, "Conclusion: Explaining NATO Enlargement," 188.

274 As one Senate staffer interviewed by Goldgeier put it, the position of Congress regarding NATO enlargement was one of "favorable indifference." Goldgeier, *Not Whether but When*, 78.

even one of the three countries identified as potential members at Madrid.[275]

The situation was less clear cut among policy elites, where many opposed the idea of enlargement for a variety of reasons. These included in particular concerns of U.S. overstretch, the risk of alienating Russia, and NATO's continued viability. On the eve of the Madrid summit, George F. Kennan, doyen of the U.S. foreign policy community, warned that "expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold war era." He further deplored the "total lack of any necessity for this move."[276] His historian colleague John Lewis Gaddis was no less critical. In a 1998 op-ed, Gaddis bemoaned that he "had difficulty finding any colleagues who think NATO expansion is a good idea. Indeed, I can recall no other moment when there was less support in our profession for a government policy."[277] Major criticism was also voiced in an open letter to President Clinton authored by a bipartisan group of over forty former U.S. Senators, officials, and policy experts. The authors, which included such luminaries as former Senator Nunn, Paul H. Nitze, and former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, asserted that

> the U.S.-led effort to expand NATO […] is a policy error of historic proportions. We believe that NATO expansion will decrease allied security and unsettle European stability [...][278]

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275 Pew Research Center For The People & The Press, "America's Place in the World II," October 1997, 6, http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/102.pdf. See also Jeremy D. Rosner, "NATO Enlargement's American Hurdle: The Perils of Misjudging Our Political Will," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 4 (1996): 9–16.

276 George F. Kennan, "A Fateful Error," *New York Times*, February 5, 1997.

277 John Lewis Gaddis, "The Senate Should Halt NATO Expansion," *New York Times*, April 27, 1998, sec. Opinion, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/04/27/opinion/the-senate-should-halt-nato-expansion.html?scp=2&sq=&st=nyt.

278 Robert W. Rauchhaus, ed., "Open Letter to President Clinton," in *Explaining NATO Enlargement* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001), 203–6.

In the end, scholarly and elite opposition was not strong enough to halt the process at this stage.[279]

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 6, 1998, by a vote of 16 to 2 recommended the Senate ratify the three accession protocols. As expected, the Senate on April 30, 1998, voted in favor of expanding the alliance to include the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. With 80 votes in favor and 19 against, the draft protocols easily cleared the required two-thirds majority.[280] The U.S. ratification had knock-on effects throughout the alliance. Indeed, most allies had held off on initiating their respective ratification processes until after the United States had begun its domestic process.[281]

5.5.2. High Noon: Three Countries Officially Join the Alliance

Speaking in Independence, Montana, on March 12, 1999, Polish Foreign Minister Bronisław Geremek explained that today was "high noon" for his country. Geremek had brought with him a Solidarność campaign poster from Poland's semi-free elections in June of 1989. It showed a still from the classic 1952 movie *High Noon* with a grim-looking Gary Cooper bringing a ballot instead of revolver to the duel.[282] Geremek's ref-

279 For further examples of pundits opposing NATO enlargement, see James D. Boys, *Clinton's Grand Strategy: US Foreign Policy in a Post-Cold War World* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015), 144–45.

280 The missing vote was that of Senator John Kyl (R-AZ), an enlargement supporter. Sloan, *Permanent Alliance?*, 114.

281 Only Canada, Denmark, Germany, and Norway ratified before the United States began its process. See Jeanette Hamster, *President & Congress. The Making of the U.S NATO Enlargement Policy*, NATO-EAPC Fellowship Program 1998-2000 (Brussels: NATO, 2000), n. 2, http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/98-00/hamster.pdf, last accessed May 19, 2016.

282 Apparently a popular gift for Polish officials to give: President Komorowski gave the same poster to German President Gauck on occasion of the latter's first trip to Poland in 2012. See Gerhard Gnauck, "'High Noon'-Überraschungsgeschenk Für Gauck," *Welt Online*, March 27, 2012, sec. Politik, http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article13949299/High-Noon-Ueberraschungsgeschenk-fuer-Gauck.html.

erence to the 1989 elections and the revered Polish opposition trade union highlighted the historical significance of the moment for Central and Eastern European countries.

That day, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary attained their goal of NATO membership. After ratification by all 16 NATO countries, the three countries deposited their instruments of accession with the U.S. government per Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, making them full members of the alliance as of March 12, 1999. The ceremony was held at the Harald S. Truman Presidential Library in Independence, Montana—a site chosen as a nod to the president in office during NATO's birth. Besides the location, the Department of State also deliberately picked March 12 as the date. It marked the 50th anniversary of President Truman's address to a joint session of Congress announcing U.S. aid to Greece and Turkey—the first articulation of what came to be known as the 'Truman Doctrine' of providing aid to all democratic countries.[283]

U.S. Secretary of State Albright probably best characterized the jubilant atmosphere after the ceremony, tempting the otherwise staid diplomat to let a "Hallelujah!" slip.[284] After all, a major foreign policy goal of the Clinton administration had been achieved at Independence, Montana, and her native Czech Republic was among those joining that day. Albright's Central European counterparts were no less enthusiastic.

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283 Thomas W. Lippman, "NATO Embraces 3 From Warsaw Pact," *Washington Post*, March 13, 1999; Harry S. Truman, "Address of the President of the United States Delivered before a Joint Session of the Senate and the House of Representatives, Recommending Assistance to Greece and Turkey" (Washington, DC, March 12, 1949), https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/doctrine/large/index.php?action=pdf&documentid=5-9, last accessed May 21, 2016.

284 Jane Perlez, "Expanding Alliance: The Overview. Poland, Hungary and the Czechs Join NATO," *New York Times*, March 13, 1999, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/13/world/expanding-alliance-the-overview-poland-hungary-and-the-czechs-join-nato.html.

Poland's Foreign Minister Geremek noted that for his country, the Cold War ended today and that "Poland forever returns where she has always belonged—to the free World."[285] His Hungarian colleague, János Martonyi, echoed the sentiment of his country coming home: "At long last, […] Hungary has come home, we are back in the family."[286]

5.6. Towards Further Enlargement: The U.S. Role After 1999

The Clinton administration had scored an important foreign policy victory, both over domestic critics and reticent allies, when the first three Central and Eastern European states officially acceded to NATO at its 1999 summit in Washington. The alliance had reached an important waypoint, enlarging for the first time since the end of the Cold War by taking in three former Soviet states. Throughout the six years of discussing NATO enlargement, it had become clear that there was support among allies for enlarging the alliance further. Equally, there was a demand among other newly independent states to join the alliance.

NATO had reaffirmed its openness towards enlargement and hinted at possible future candidates in Madrid. In contrast to the previous round of enlargement, this time, the fundamental question whether NATO should expand did not pose itself. The alliance and the United States had repeatedly underscored the importance of the commitment to an 'open door' policy towards new members during the first eastern enlargement.

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285 Bronisław Geremek, "Address at the Ceremony of Deposition of Accession Protocols in Independence, MO," March 12, 1999, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1999/s990312d.htm.

286 János Martonyi, "Address at the Ceremony of Deposition of Accession Protocols in Independence, MO," March 12, 1999, http://nato.int/docu/speech/1999/s990312c.htm.

Beginning with his speeches committing the United States to a timeline for enlargement[287] and to supporting the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland (and only them) for the first round of enlargement,[288] President Clinton had voiced support for future rounds of enlargement. Said Clinton:

> I also pledged for my part, and I believe for NATO's part as well, that NATO's doors will not close behind its first new members. NATO should remain open to all of Europe's emerging democracies who are ready to shoulder the responsibilities of membership.[289]

In particular, U.S. officials made the case for inviting the three Baltic countries.

Legally, NATO's open door is enshrined in Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty.[290] In this vein, the Madrid communiqué notes "[t]he Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years […]"[291] and specifically identified the Baltic states, Romania, and Slovenia as aspirants for membership.[292] The main question after Madrid was thus "not *whether* but *to whom* the benefits and responsibilities of NATO membership will be extended."[293] NATO reavowed its open door at its anniversary summit in Washington in 1999. Paragraph 7 of the summit communiqué states:

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287 Clinton, "Remarks to the Community in Detroit, October 22, 1996."

288 Clinton, "Statement on Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on June 12, 1997."

289 Clinton, "Remarks to the Community in Detroit, October 22, 1996," 1894.

290 "The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty." NATO, "The North Atlantic Treaty", article 10.

291 NATO Heads of State and Government, "Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation," July 8, 1997, para. 8.

292 Ibid.

293 Gerald B. H. Solomon, *The NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990-1997: Blessings of Liberty* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1998), 140.

> We reaffirm today our commitment to the openness of the Alliance under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty and in accordance with Paragraph 8 of the Madrid Summit Declaration. We pledge that NATO will continue to welcome new members in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and contribute to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area[294]

and that

> [t]he Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance and that the inclusion would enhance overall European security and stability.[295]

At the Washington summit, the allies further agreed to revisit the next round of enlargement by 2002.[296]

5.6.1. The Membership Action Plan

To better structure the interactions between NATO and prospective members, the allies at the 1999 Washington Summit introduced the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to complement the PFP.[297] Building on the experience of working with the three countries that joined in the first round, the MAP was intended to help aspirants prepare for membership through a variety of practical cooperation offers. Not an automatic pathway to membership, the MAP is in essence a way for NATO to monitor the progress of aspirants towards self-set goals on a number of issue areas

294 NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, DC, "Washington Summit Communiqué. An Alliance for the 21st Century.," April 24, 1999, para. 7, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm.

295 Ibid.

296 Ibid.

297 Rupp, *NATO after 9/11*, 63.

including political, economic, defense, security, and legal issues.[298] To this end, the alliance offered "advice, assistance and practical support"[299] to the nine countries that had declared an interest in joining NATO at that time, the so-called 'Vilnius 9.'[300] The aspirants are to submit annual reports to the alliance setting out developments in five ares: Political and economic, budgetary, defense, security, and legal. In turn, the alliance promises "focused and candid feedback"[301] on their progress towards membership as well as annual meetings.

While similar to the PFP in that it promises cooperation and consultation between NATO and non-members, the two programs differ in important regards. Notably, the PFP is geared towards improving interoperability between the allies and non-members through Individual Partnership Programs (IPP) and the Planning and Review Process (PARP). PFP participants have chosen to pursue interoperability with NATO independent of their aspirations for NATO memberships. Then and now, many participants in the PFP have no intention to join NATO, but want to improve interoperability for a variety of reasons. In contrast, the MAP, whilst not offering a guarantee for membership, clearly aims to help aspirant members prepare for their possible accession.[302]

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298 NATO Public Diplomacy Division, *NATO Handbook*, 189.

299 NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, DC, "Washington Summit Communiqué. An Alliance for the 21st Century.," para. 7.

300 Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia, and Albania. Following a May 19, 2000, joint statement by the nine states' foreign ministers demanding NATO membership, the group has become known as the 'Vilnius 9' or 'Vilnius Group.' See the "Vilnius Statement," May 19, 2000, http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/security-policy/co-operation-with-nato-member-states-and-candidate-countries/conference-nato-s-role-in-the-changing-security-environment-in-europe-vilnius-statement, last accessed June 4, 2016.

301 NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, DC, "Washington Summit Communiqué. An Alliance for the 21st Century.," para. 7.

302 Steven Woehrel, Julie Kim, and Carl Ek, "NATO Applicant States: A Status Report,"

In the final years of the Clinton administration, NATO's further enlargement did not enjoy the same prominence as it did until the 1999 anniversary. Domestically, a sense of accomplishment after the first round conspired with the Lewinsky scandal that Clinton was embroiled in. Likewise, the Senate and administration officials preferred not charging forward with another round of enlargement immediately—rather, they considered it advisable to wait and see how the integration of the first three countries plays out.[303] Internationally, managing the alliance's Kosovo intervention and peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans took precedence. The agenda of the May 2000 meeting of NATO foreign ministers illustrates this vividly—its final communiqué sets out a full thirty-three concerns before reiterating the alliance's commitment to enlarge.[304]

Moreover, there was no European champion for immediate further enlargement. Germany, the premier advocate for the first round of eastern enlargement in Europe, was undergoing its own leadership transition after the 1998 elections ended 16 years of conservative governments. What is more, one of Germany's goals at Madrid had been preventing discord among the alliance. This did not translate into any urgency for Berlin to push for a swift implementation of the compromise solution reached in Madrid.[305] In similar fashion, the other allies awaited a signal from Washington as to the timeline for the next round of enlargement.

CRS Report for Congress, no. RL30168 (April 25, 2003): 2; Paul Gallis, "Partnership for Peace," *CRS Report for Congress*, no. 94–351 (August 9, 1994).

303 Sloan, *Permanent Alliance?*, 114.

304 Ryan C. Hendrickson, "NATO's Open Door Policy and the Next Round of Enlargement," *Parameters*, no. Winter (2000): 53–66; "Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held in Florence on 24 May 2000," accessed June 8, 2016, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2000/p00-052e.htm.

305 Overhaus, *Die Deutsche NATO-Politik. Vom Ende Des Kalten Krieges Bis Zum Kampf Gegen Den Terrorismus*, 164–65, 168–69.

After welcoming the three new allies, Washington remained in a wait-and-see mindset. Despite the frantic reading of tea leaves that follows international summits, the Clinton administration's position remained vague beyond supporting NATO's open door. On the eve of NATO's first post-Cold War expansion, President Clinton noted that the alliance would remain "[…] open to new members from the Baltics to the Black Sea […]"[306] and in June "that NATO membership will remain open to other responsible democracies from central and southeastern Europe."[307] But hopes in those regions for more specific support for membership were dashed for the time being. In fact, Clinton and his administration remained largely silent on the issue of expansion in their final years in office—and if they spoke out, their comments were non-committal and vague beyond reaffirming NATO's open door.

Indeed, Clinton did not even discuss the issue of NATO enlargement with European leaders during his farewell tour of Europe. European leaders and Clinton did not discuss the issue at a May 31 meeting in Portugal despite the Vilnius 9 having just come out calling for a 'big-bang' approach to enlargement, i.e. admitting them all in one go. Clinton casually told a reporter asking whether the topic had been discussed: "Well, the short answer to your question is, we didn't talk about further NATO enlargement."[308]

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306 William J. Clinton, "Remarks at a North Atlantic Treaty Organization Commemorative Ceremony, April 23, 1999," in *Book 1. Presidential Documents - January 1 to June 31, 1999*, ed. Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2000), 620.

307 William J. Clinton, "Commencement Address at the United States Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, June 2, 1999," in *Book 1. Presidential Documents - January 1 to June 31, 1999*, ed. Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2000), 869.

308 William J. Clinton, "The President's News Conference With European Union Leaders in Lisbon, May 31, 2000," in *Book 2. Presidential Documents - January 1*

Much as in the 1996 U.S. presidential elections, both major parties' candidates expressed general support for enlargement in the run-up to the 2000 elections. Vice President Al Gore and Governor of Texas George W. Bush—the Democratic and Republican contenders—had sent letters of support to the meeting of the Vilnius 9, offering general support for enlargement.[309] However, NATO enlargement figured much less prominently in 2000 compared to 1996, even bearing in mind that foreign policy issues generally take the backseat in U.S. elections. Only one question in the presidential debates between Gore and Bush touched tangentially upon NATO,[310] giving Bush the opportunity to express general support for the alliance:

> It's important for NATO to be strong and confident and to help keep the peace in Europe. And one of the reasons I felt so strongly that the United States needed to participate [in the Kosovo intervention, DJR] was because of our relations with NATO, and NATO is going to be an important part of keeping the peace in the future.[311]

While the alliance and allies had thus committed to enlarge in principle, there were no strong advocates for swift action in the outgoing 1990s. Indeed, "enlargement has been demoted from NATO's agenda and overwhelmed by other events."[312] Nevertheless, the alliance had publicly and

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to June 26, 2000, ed. Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2001), 1054–55.

309 William Drozdiak, "Nine Nations United in Bid to Join NATO," *Washington Post*, May 20, 2000, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2000/05/20/nine-nations-united-in-bid-to-join-nato/83b716cf-d196-4c8f-b08d-6dbf43687253/; Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 166.

310 "[…] [D]o you think that Milosevic would not have fallen if the United States and NATO had not intervened militarily?" Commission on Presidential Debates, "October 11, 2000 Debate Transcript," 2000, http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-11-2000-debate-transcript.

311 Ibid.

312 Hendrickson, "NATO's Open Door Policy and the Next Round of Enlargement."

repeatedly committed to enlarge, and reneging would have undermined its credibility. Lacking impetus, the allies would therefore—much as in the first round—have to agree on when to invite prospective members, and whom to invite of the countries given a nod at the Madrid and Washington summits. As the alliance headed into the new millennium, enlargement was thus "no longer a question of [whether or] when, but whom."[313]

Defining a U.S. position on the next enlargement round was left to George W. Bush. After his inauguration as president on January 20, 2001, the president and his new administration were comparatively quick to set out priorities for NATO. As it had for Clinton, the president's first trip to Europe became the action-forcing event that put U.S. positions on NATO and enlargement on the front of everyone's mind in the bureaucracy. Unlike Clinton, however, Bush's first trip to Europe came within months of his inauguration: Bush attended the mid-June 2001 NATO summit in Brussels, which he suggested NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson call. It was the first meeting of the North Atlantic Council in its highest formation since the alliance had welcomed the new members in 1999. In his brief remarks to the council, Bush commended NATO's past performance and explained that to succeed in the future, "we must extend our hands and open our hearts to new members, to build security for all of Europe."[314] The president was more specific in later remarks to the council, in which Bush outlined five challenges the alliance faced—overcoming Cold War thinking, reaching out to Russia, maintaining defensive capabilities, stabilizing the Balkans, and, lastly, expanding NATO. Said Bush:

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313 Adapted from James M. Goldgeier, "Not When but Who," *NATO Review*, no. March (2002), http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/Examining-Enlargment/Not-when-but-who/EN/index.htm.

314 George W. Bush, "Remarks at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO HQ, Brussels," June 13, 2001, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010613e.htm.

> We should continue to include new members able and willing to strengthen our Alliance. No state should be excluded on the basis of history or geography. And no third state should have a veto. [...] Based on the aspirants' progress to date, and the progress they should continue to make, I am confident we will be able launch [*sic*] the next round of enlargement when we meet in Prague.[315]

Whilst the allies released no communiqué at Brussels, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson reported there was consensus on reaffirming the commitment to invite new allies at the Prague Summit in 2002, as was enshrined in the 1999 Washington Summit communiqué and reiterated by President Bush that day.[316]

On the heels of Brussels and the U.S.-EU summit in Gothenburg, Sweden, the president visited Warsaw. In the Polish capital, Bush on June 15 delivered his first public comments strongly supporting enlargement:

> I believe in NATO membership for all of Europe's democracies that seek it and are ready to share the responsibility that NATO brings. The question of when may still be up for debate within NATO; the question of whether should not be. [...] Next year NATO's leaders will meet in Prague. The United States will be prepared to make concrete, historic decisions with its Allies to advance NATO enlargement. [...] The expansion of NATO has fulfilled NATO's promise, and that promise now leads eastward and southward, northward and onward.[317]

Bush's remarks ended the period of limbo that had ensued after the Washington Summit, and made clear that the new U.S. administration would

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315 George W. Bush, "Excerpted Remarks to the North Atlantic Council," June 13, 2001, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010613g.htm.

316 George Robertson, "Statement to the Press by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson," June 13, 2001, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010613d.htm.

317 George W. Bush, "Address at Warsaw University, June 15, 2001," in *Book 1. Presidential Documents - January 20 to June 30, 2001*, ed. Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2002), 678–79.

push for further enlargement of the alliance. Senior U.S. officials reiterated that point in the weeks after the president's trip.

The U.S. Congress also welcomed Bush's remarks. In a hearing held on June 20, 2001, Chairman Joseph R. Biden (D-DE) said he was "heartened" by the Warsaw speech and welcomed the president's promise to "rally support for further NATO enlargement at next year's Prague Summit."[318] The ranking Republican member, Jesse Helms (R-NC), was equally enthusiastic, praising the speech as "almost historic," "one of the defining moments of [President Bush's] administration." Helms further said the speech had "moved decisively forward the debate over NATO enlargement."[319] In his testimony to this hearing, Secretary of State Colin S. Powell reiterated President Bush's pledge to head into the Prague Summit "with a clear intent to advance the cause of freedom by enlarging NATO."[320]

Even prior to the new president's commitment, the Senate had maintained its pro-enlargement stance and called for action. Within weeks of the new 107th Congress convening for the first time, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relation's subcommittee on European affairs held a hearing on "The State of the NATO Alliance."[321] Subcommittee Chair Senator Gordon H. Smith (R-OR) deplored the "declined momentum of NATO enlargement over the last three and a half years," warned that "the Alliance's open door policy today stands on wobbly legs." Hence, Smith urged the Bush

318 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, "U.S. Security Interests in Europe. Senate Hearing 107-91." (2001), 3.

319 Ibid., 6.

320 Ibid., 10.

321 Subcomittee on European Affairs of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, "The State of the NATO Alliance. Senate Hearing 107-16." (2001), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107shrg71538/html/CHRG-107shrg71538.htm.

administration "to lead the effort to build a new and powerful consensus in support of enlargement."[322]

Despite the fundamental differences with the Clinton administration on many issues, continuity was to be the hallmark of U.S. NATO policy.[323] With his administration having come out in favor of further enlargement, consideration of candidates to invite in 2002 could begin in earnest. Looking back, the trajectory of the three new members since 1999 had proved satisfactory, with Poland in particular having made great strides forward. The allies thus saw no need for tightening membership criteria, which continued to gravitate around those set out in the 1995 NATO study. Moreover, with the MAP, the alliance had since 1999 a much better idea of the situation in the aspirant countries for the second round than it did for those in the first.

The MAP, with its structured reporting and feedback mechanism between NATO and aspirants, also clearly delineated the group from which candidates to be invited at Prague would be drawn. The nine countries participating in the MAP[324] performed very differently when measured against the standards laid out by NATO in 1995. Slovenia was considered the strongest candidate, and, together with Romania, it had already garnered strong support from France, Italy, and southern allies in the first round of enlargement.[325] Both countries had also been identified specifically in the 1997 and 1999 summit declarations, further buttressing their case.

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322 Ibid.

323 Philip H. Gordon and James B. Steinberg, "NATO Enlargement: Moving Forward; Expanding the Alliance and Completing Europe's Integration," Brookings Policy Brief (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, November 2001), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2001/11/globalgovernance-gordon.

324 Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

325 Sloan, *Permanent Alliance?*, 117; Ryan C. Hendrickson, "Expanding NATO: The Case for Slovenia," *Parameters* 32, no. 4 (2002): 64–76.

Treatment of the three Baltic countries proved to be a point of contention between the United States and its allies. Whereas the United States had been supportive of their NATO perspective since the Clinton administration and had fostered close relations, the Europeans—with the exception of Denmark, Norway, and Poland—were much more skeptical.[326] In particular, Europeans questioned the strategic rationale of inviting Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—the three small countries had no military capabilities to speak of and Russian opposition to them joining NATO was certain. Objectively, however, the three Baltic countries had a very strong case for a NATO bid, having made great strides towards meeting NATO membership criteria and boasting an impressive economic track record. Further, the alliance had also expressly recognized the Baltic states as candidates for membership in its Madrid and Washington communiqués.

The United States, on the other hand, had historically never recognized the three Baltic states' incorporation into the Soviet Union and had come out in support of the countries aspiration for integration into Euro-Atlantic structures during the Clinton adminstration.[327] Notably, President Clinton and his Baltic counterparts in 1998 signed a charter of partnership, the Baltic charter.[328] The United States offered explicit support for Baltic NATO membership,[329] and at the signing ceremony, President

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326 See e.g. Senator Biden's recounting of meetings in Europe, Subcomittee on European Affairs of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The State of the NATO Alliance. Senate Hearing 107-16.; F. Stephen Larrabee, *NATO's Eastern Agenda in a New Strategic Era* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 60.

327 Larrabee, *NATO's Eastern Agenda in a New Strategic Era*, 55.

328 Steven Erlanger, "Clinton and 3 Baltic Leaders Sign Charter," *New York Times*, January 17, 1998, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/01/17/world/clinton-and-3-baltic-leaders-sign-charter.html.

329 "The United States of America welcomes the aspirations and supports the efforts of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to join NATO." William J. Clinton et al., "A Charter of Partnership Among the United States of America and the Republic of Estonia, Republic of Latvia, and Republic of Lithuania. January 16, 1998," in *Book 1. Presidential Documents - January 20 to June 30, 1998*, ed. Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S.

Clinton said "NATO's door is and will remain open to every partner nation, and America is determined to create the conditions under which Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia can one day walk through that door."[330] Congress also had a long-standing record of supporting the Baltic states' accession to NATO,[331] as did policy elites.[332]

Given such a strong U.S. commitment, the concerns of some European allies were unlikely to win the day. At the end of the day, the nine MAP countries comprised those with strong U.S. and northern allies' support (the Baltics) and the clear-cut cases of the Central and Southeast European candidates (Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia) most strongly supported by southern allies, but acceptable to the others. Left out were two MAP countries that no one strongly supported—Albania and the FYROM.[333] Further, the nine MAP countries fared very differently when measured against NATO's 1995 guidelines for membership.[334] A widely

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Government Publishing Office, 1999), 72.

330 William J. Clinton, "Remarks at the Signing Ceremony for the Baltic Nations-United States Charter of Partnership, January 16, 1998," in *Book 1. Presidential Documents - January 1 to June 30, 1998*, ed. Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1999), 69.

331 See e.g. the remarks by House speaker Dennis Haster to the Lithuanian parliament in 1999, the 2001 Senate resolution introduced by Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R-CO), and the 2002 resolution sponsored by Representative John Simkus (R-IL). USIS Washington File, "House Speaker Hastert Before Lithuanian Parliament," March 30, 1999, https://fas.org/man/nato/national/990330_wlt.htm; Ben Nighthorse Campbell, "S. Con. Res. 116 (107th Congress). Congratulating the Baltic Nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on the Tenth Anniversary of the End of Their Illegal Incorporation into Soviet Union" (2001); John Shimkus, "H. Con. Res. 116 (107th Congress) Recommending the Integration of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)" (2002).

332 Antony J. Blinken, "NATO Needs to Grow," *New York Times*, April 2, 2001, sec. Opinion, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/02/opinion/nato-needs-to-grow.html.

333 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

334 cf. Thomas S. Szayna, "NATO Enlargement 2000-2015. Implications for Defense Planning" (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB62/index1.html; Thomas S. Szayna, *NATO Enlargement 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense*

read RAND report found Slovenia and Slovakia met the criteria, the Baltic states were "advanced,"[335] and Bulgaria and Romania fell short of NATO's preconditions. Albania and Macedonia fared even worse, and "their prospects for membership are distinctly long term."[336]

France became the first of the three major European allies to read the writings on the wall and draw the consequences from President Bush's Warsaw speech. In a reversal of policy, French President Jacques Chirac dropped his opposition and fell in line by supporting Baltic NATO membership on a July 2001 trip to the Baltics.[337] President Chirac expressed support for including them in a future enlargement round, saying that countries must be allowed to choose their own alliances.[338]

Germany, while arguably less enthusiastic about the second round of enlargement had not come out strongly against it, either. Rather, Germany had remained ambiguous while emphasizing the prospect of EU membership for most of the countries NATO considered.[339] Remarks by Chancellor Schroeder during a 2000 Baltics trip in which he played down the likelihood of NATO membership illustrate this position well.[340] In the wake of

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Planning and Shaping (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001); Woehrel, Kim, and Ek, "NATO Applicant States: A Status Report."

335 Szayna, "NATO Enlargement 2000-2015. Implications for Defense Planning."

336 Ibid.

337 Larrabee, *NATO's Eastern Agenda in a New Strategic Era*, 60.

338 "France for the Balts in NATO," *The Jamestown Foundation Monitor* 7, no. 145 (July 30, 2001), http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=23357&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=215&no_cache=1; "Chirac Affirme Son Soutien Aux Pays Baltes," *Le Nouvel Observateur*, July 27, 2001, http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/monde/20010727.OBS6858/chirac-affirme-son-soutien-aux-pays-baltes.html.

339 Paul E. Gallis, "NATO Enlargement," *CRS Report for Congress*, November 9, 2001, 4.

340 "Schröder Hält in Riga Ein Plädoyer Für Russland," *Welt Online*, June 7, 2000, http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article517556/Schroeder-haelt-in-Riga-ein-Plaedoyer-fuer-Russland.html.

Bush's Warsaw speech, Germany increasingly fell in line, eventually acquiescing to another round of enlargement at Prague. And it was no coincidence that President Bush chose Berlin to deliver another major speech calling for enlargement in 2002. In his speech before a special session of the German parliament, President Bush called on NATO to "act decisively"[341] and invite new members, and reiterated: "As our summit in Prague approaches, America is committed to NATO membership for all of Europe's democracies that are ready to share in the responsibilities that NATO brings."[342]

5.6.2. The 2002 Prague Summit Invites Seven New Members

Since the Washington Summit, the allies had emphasized the December 2002 summit in Prague would be the next reckoning point for enlargement. And it was—but other issues dominated the agenda in the wake of the 2001 terror attacks on the United States and the first invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in their wake. The alliance's invitation to seven states to commence accession negotiations, its biggest offer to date, was thus relegated to the depths of the summit communiqué and was "a secondary issue"[343] at best. Instead, when allies met in Prague November 21-22, 2002, the "transformation summit" was to cap the reform process ushered in at London more than a decade before, and the alliance thus focused on restating its mission and generating capability goals for allies to meet.

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341 George W. Bush, "Remarks to a Special Session of the German Bundestag, May 23, 2002," in *Book 1. Presidential Documents - January 1 to July 31, 2002*, ed. Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2003), 855.

342 Ibid.

343 Paul Gallis, "The NATO Summit at Prague, 2002," *CRS Report for Congress*, March 1, 2005, 3.

In Prague, the alliance then invited seven of the now ten[344] MAP countries to begin accession negotiations for full membership in NATO. Noting that consensus had emerged gradually, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson was able to put to a vote the invitation of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, which passed successfully.[345] Croatia, Albania, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia were left empty handed, but, as had become customary, the alliance reaffirmed its commitment to maintaining an open door.[346] NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson amplified this message further: "The message is: the door to NATO membership remains open. Today's the [*sic*] invitees will not be the last. Through the MAP process, we will continue to help you pursue your reform process, and we remain committed to your full integration into the Euro-Atlantic family of nations."[347]

As regards the seven countries invited, accession negotiations were to commence immediately, with an eye to completing the accession protocols by March 2003. The 19 allies were expected to ratify the protocols at the latest in time for the May 2004, so that NATO could welcome seven new members at its summit then.[348]

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344 Croatia joined the MAP in May 2002 after signing up to the "Vilnius 9" the year prior. See "NATO's Relations with Croatia," October 5, 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_31803.htm; Ryan C. Hendrickson and Ryan P. Smith, "Croatia and NATO: Moving Toward Alliance Membership," *Comparative Strategy* 25, no. 4 (2006): 297–306..

345 George Robertson, "Announcement on Enlargement," November 21, 2002, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021121c.htm; NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague on November 21, 2002, "Prague Summit Declaration," accessed June 13, 2016, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm.

346 NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague on November 21, 2002, "Prague Summit Declaration," para. 2.

347 George Robertson, "Closing Remarks, Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the Level of Heads of State and Government," November 21, 2002, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021121f.htm.

348 NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North

Negotiations with the seven invitees were concluded swiftly, and all accession protocols were signed by the 19 allies on March 26, 2003. President Bush forwarded the seven protocols to the Senate on April 10, which in turn unanimous voted to ratify the seven protocols on May 8, 2003.[349] Congressional turnaround was remarkably quick even when considering the unfailingly strong support in Congress for enlargement, and made the United States the third ally to ratify the accession protocols.

A year later, on March 29, 2004, the seven countries' prime ministers submitted their instruments of accession to the U.S. government in Washington, DC, making them full members of the alliance and completing the alliance's largest round of enlargement ever.

5.7. Interim Observations about U.S. Behavior

Having reviewed the first round of post-Cold-War NATO enlargement, some initial observations regarding the American role in the process can be made. I will group them around the three aspects outlined in the theoretical part of this work: Entanglement theory, freedom of action theory, and NATO as a hierarchical structure.

To recall, entanglement theory portrays the impact of alliances on U.S. foreign policy as a negative one. In particular, alliance membership forces the United States to pursue policies that are not in its national interest and that it would not otherwise have pursued. In contrast, freedom of action theory posits that given its preponderance of power and, in the

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Atlantic Council in Prague on November 21, 2002, "Prague Summit Declaration," para. 5.

349 Brian Knowlton, "Senate Votes Unanimously to Approve Expansion of NATO," *New York Times*, May 8, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/08/international/worldspecial/08CND-NATO.html.

case of NATO, unique position, the United States will be able to avoid the detrimental effects predicted by entanglement theory.

Beyond the basic observation that if the United States had not been in NATO, it would not have been party to the eastern enlargement of the alliance, entanglement theory's predictions do not appear to have been borne out in the first round of NATO enlargement. Rather, the episode underscores the supreme position held by the United States in the alliance. Throughout, the United States has been in the driver's seat of enlargement, accelerating or decelerating the process as it saw fit. The United States initiated the enlargement policy, steamrolled allies' criticism, and eventually prevailed with its position of letting the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary accede by 1999.[350] In Waltz's words: "The forward thrust of NATO was the doing of the United States; the Europeans showed little enthusiasm."[351] Like NATO as a whole, the alliance's expansion was "an American-run show."[352] Waltz's assertion that Europeans were unenthusiastic should be taken with a grain of salt, however. It only applies to western European countries—except Germany, which supported NATO enlargement from the outset. As outlined above, Central and Eastern European leaders were set on joining western institutions and NATO in particular. Indeed, the two most comprehensive analyses of U.S. decision-making on enlargement both note the crucial impact meetings with leaders from Eastern Europe have had on President Clinton's thinking on enlargement.[353]

While Eastern Europeans may have put the issue on the agenda, the United States remained at the helm. The United States "drove the alliance

350 Rauchhaus, "Conclusion: Explaining NATO Enlargement," 174.

351 Waltz, "The United States: Alone in the World," 35.

352 Rauchhaus, "Conclusion: Explaining NATO Enlargement," 175.

353 Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door*, 23–24; Goldgeier, *Not Whether but When*, 20.

throughout this process"[354] and "all of the key decisions were made in Washington.[355] As I showed above, U.S. decisions have resulted in a domino effect among the allies, causing them to fall in line e.g. in the ratification process.

Likewise, the United States led the way on establishing the formal criteria NATO would use to gauge any aspiring members' bids. Not for nothing did these benchmarks become known as the "Perry Principles." The eponymous U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry in 1995 presented a set of four principles for NATO he argued should guide enlargement: collective defense, democracy, consensus, and cooperative security.[356]

Without question, there has been opposition to U.S. positions, notably on the issue of how many new members the alliance should take in in the first round. Indeed, Goldgeier quotes Hermann von Richthofen, Germany's then Permanent Representative to NATO, as complaining

> Washington was riding roughshod over its allies, negotiating terms of possible membership with the Eastern Europeans and presenting NATO with accomplished facts instead of consulting with them.[357]

Several considerations are worth bearing in mind on this. First, this opposition did not foil U.S. policies. Rather, the U.S. position was a subset included in the opposing position. The opposition wanted to invite more countries, the U.S. fewer—but all U.S.-preferred countries were also supported by the opposition. At the end of the day, it was the U.S. position of inviting three members that the alliance eventually adopted.

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354 Goldgeier, *Not Whether but When*, 4.

355 Ibid., 5.

356 William J. Perry, *The Enduring Dynamic Relationship That Is NATO. Remarks to the Wehrkunde Conference on Security Policy, Munich, Germany, February 5, 1995*, 1995; Cited in Moore, *NATO's New Mission*, 59.

357 Quoted in Goldgeier, *Not Whether but When*, 85.

Throughout the debate and eventual implementation of the alliance's enlargement, U.S. officials were keenly aware of the risk of alienating its NATO allies. Given the United States' unparalleled military position and economic resurgence in the first Clinton term, Secretary Albright and her Deputy Talbott worried about the "hegemon problem."[358] Whilst this did not preclude the United States from pursuing its perceived interest in the intra-alliance debate on enlargement—note the above Von Richthofen quote—, these considerations did play a role in the U.S. acquiescence into the compromise wording at the Madrid Summit.

Taken together, the United States managed to steer clear of the pitfalls predicted by entanglement theory. While European allies put the issue of enlargement on the agenda initially, the United States was an early supporter, too. Indeed, it managed to steer the discussion in NATO and ensure the alliance adopts the U.S.-preferred course of a small first round of enlargement. It did so through established procedures in NATO and intra-alliance diplomacy. While there was allied opposition to aspects of U.S. policy, it did not constrain the United States to the extent expected by proponents of entanglement theory. Rather, the United States remained free of significants constraints, as freedom of action theory predicts.

Asserting that the United States dominated the enlargement process is one thing, explaining why it did another. Arguably, enlargement has served perceived U.S. interests both systemic and subsystemic. Systemically, the end of the Cold War resulted in a power vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe, at the latest with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. For offensive realist approaches, it comes as no surprise that the United States and the alliance it leads should rush in to fill the void. Removing the void by bringing the newly independent states into the United States' camp is a

358 Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door*, 221–22.

cheap and undangerous way of expanding power. No wars had to be fought, no territory conquered, and there was no counterweight after the Soviet Union had disappeared. From an offensive realist perspective, expanding NATO was the smart thing to do.

Defensive realists reject the notion that the drive to maximize power flows automatically from the anarchical nature of the international system. For them, the assumption shared with their offensive brethren that states care about their relative position thus does not translate into expansive behavior. States, they assume, are not automatically driven to seek domination or hegemony. Rather, states are content with the status quo most of the time.

Where does this leave us with regard to NATO expansion, at first sight a clear-cut case for offensive realists? I would argue that defensive realists likewise can explain the phenomenon, and that further, their predictions are better borne out by the record. While it is becoming more difficult to imagine today, vast parts of Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans were in disarray throughout the 1990s and in particular during the first half of the decade. The newly independent states were undergoing difficult transitions to democracy, Yugoslavia was disintegrating and the Balkans descending into war, and Russia was caught up in economic and political turmoil. Viewed from Washington, it was hard to make out a place without problems anywhere between St. Petersburg and Tirana. The one thing available in abundance seemed to be instability—an instability that threatened to radiate to the U.S.-led NATO countries and thus to affect directly a structure with the U.S. at the top in which the United States has a vested interest.[359] In other words, the instability throughout

359 See also Richard L. Kugler, *Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993), 554–57.

Central and Eastern Europe threatened a key U.S. interest: the security system it had established since the end of World War II, in which it commands supreme influence.

U.S. comments calling for stability can and should be read in this vein. Stability in Europe was a key plank in U.S. policy on Europe in the 1990s; a position that, unlike many, transcended the Bush and Clinton administrations. As Hutchings, a former staffer on the Bush NSC, notes in his analysis of U.S. foreign policy in the early 1990s, "no idea was more strongly and deeply held in the upper levels of the administration than the core conviction that the American presence was indispensable to European stability and therefore to vital American interests."[360]

Similarly, the Clinton administration's foreign policy in its first term gravitated around maintaining stability. This is best encapsulated in the congressionally mandated *National Security Strategy.* Since the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, U.S. administrations have been required to produce annually an outline of their grand strategy.[361] The Clinton administration presented its first National Security Strategy in July 1994, almost a year and a half after the president's inauguration.[362] Noting the "wrenching economic and political transitions"[363] in the successor states of the Soviet Union, the Clinton administration's first strategy highlights "promoting cooperative security mea-

360 Robert L. Hutchings, *American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider's Account of U.S. Policy in Europe, 1989-1992* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 157.

361 Don M. Snider, *The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision*, 2nd ed. (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, 1995), 2, http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Snider.pdf.

362 The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/1994.pdf.

363 Ibid., 1.

sures" as a "central component."[364] Specifically, it cites the establishment of the PFP as a tangible result of the administration's foreign policy. Further, the strategy emphasizes that "European stability is vital to our own security [...]"[365] and that "an unparalleled opportunity to contribute toward a free and undivided Europe"[366] exists for the United States. By maintaining its forward presence, the United States would further remain able "to prevent the development of power vacuums and dangerous arms races, thereby underwriting regional stability by precluding threats to regional security."[367]

Further, a 1997 report by the Department of State to Congress highlights the importance of NATO enlargement for stabilizing Europe. If the United States should fail to "seize this historical opportunity to help integrate, consolidate and stabilize Central and Eastern Europe, we would risk a much higher price later."[368] The report expressly notes that

> [h]istorically, when the security status of Central and Eastern Europe has been left unclear, the resulting uncertainty has exerted a strong and dangerously destabilizing influence for the whole of Europe. In the wake of such events, states to both the East and West of Europe's center have suffered. By fostering stability and confidence, NATO enlargement will advance the longer-term security interests not only of those states but of the United States, Western Europe, Russia, Ukraine and others throughout the region.[369]

364 Ibid., 2.

365 Ibid., 21.

366 Ibid.

367 Ibid., 8.

368 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, "Report to Congress on the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale, Benefits, Costs, and Implications" (Washington, DC, February 24, 1997), https://fas.org/man/nato/offdocs/us_97/wh970224.htm.

369 Ibid.

Moreover, "[t]he most efficient and cost-effective way to guarantee stability in Europe is to do so collectively with our European partners, old and new, through NATO" and "by admitting new members NATO will make itself better able to address Europe's new security challenges […] and help avoid a destabilizing zone of insecurity and instability in Europe […]."[370]

370 Ibid.

6. Out of Area or Out of Business? NATO's Changing Mission(s) and the Balkans Crucible

The North Atlantic Treaty sets out NATO's geographical purview by defining the scope of the Article 5 collective defense provision. Article 6 stipulates that an attack on allied territory north of the Tropic of Cancer as well as on allied forces, aircraft, and vessels in the Mediterranean and North Atlantic constitutes an attack under Article 5.[371] When founding NATO, the allies thus defined a core geographical area that the alliance would cover. Other areas—sizeable ones at that—were deliberately excluded. These included the colonial holdings of France and the United Kingdom, but also U.S. security commitments in Asia. Excluding these areas from the Article 5 commitment does not per se preclude the alliance from unanimously deciding to become active there. However, colonial wars of independence and in particular the U.S.-European disagreements during the Vietnam War helped establish the alliance consensus that such out-of-area operations remain outside of NATO's purview.[372]

The boundaries of NATO's area of operations shifted dramatically throughout the 1990s. While no new area of responsibility was defined or the limits of Articles 5 and 6 abandoned, the alliance increasingly took on missions and responsibilities that had been unthinkable during the Cold War—both functionally and geographically. It helped distribute humani-

371 NATO, "The North Atlantic Treaty," para. 6.

372 Powaski, *The Entangling Alliance: The United States and European Security, 1950-1993*, 81–82.

tarian aid to former Soviet republics, deployed ground forces to the Balkans, and engaged in a substantial air war in 1999. One factor that has widened the alliance's geographic scope was obviously its enlargement, which extended the territory of allies covered by Articles 5 and 6. Another was the changing notion of what NATO is for, which is encapsulated in two new strategic documents the alliance issued in the 1990s and which was backed up by its actual operations. This chapter will outline both developments and the U.S. involvement in them.

Viewed from Washington in 1990, America's engagement in Europe was a major financial and military burden. At the time, the United States deployed around 336,000 personnel in uniform to Europe, not including around 150,000 civilian employees and 296,000 dependents.[373] According to contemporary estimates, annual costs to the United States of maintaining this presence amounted to US$ 120 billion towards the end of the Cold War.[374]

While the disparity in defense expenditures between the United States and the NATO allies had been a bone of contention since the early days of the alliance, many saw the winding down of the Cold War as an opportunity to lower costs by scaling down the deployment to Europe. Commentators noted that with the Soviet Union in demise, smaller deployments to Europe would suffice, and ensuring stability in Europe's periphery could serve as a good incentive for Europeans to finally up their defense spending. Equally, domestic expectations in the United States for a "peace dividend" were pronounced, calling for savings in the face of lowered tensions in the Cold War. These calls gained more traction when the U.S.

373 Ibid., 182.

374 Ted Galen Carpenter, "The Case for U.S. Strategic Independence," *Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing*, no. 16 (1992): 1.

economy entered a recession in July 1990, which, albeit mild in macroeconomic terms, had an unusually severe impact on the job market.[375]

Against this backdrop, the United States committed to a cap on troop numbers in Central Europe of 195,000 and 30,000 in the rest of Europe by 1994 under the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which limited NATO and Warsaw Pact matériel in Europe.[376] Responding to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the United States ended up deploying half of its European ground forces to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Most of them would not return to Europe, and by October 1991, 260,000 troops remained in Europe.[377] This proved to be an interim step on the path towards the approximately 100,000 U.S. troops that remained deployed in Europe in the mid-1990s, despite previous assertions that 195,000 was the minimum number the U.S. government was prepared to agree to in Europe.[378] Meanwhile, the Soviet Union also underwent a series of cuts to its troop presence in Europe, which proportionately were even more significant than the U.S. cuts.

These moves on conventional forces went hand in hand with progress on reducing strategic and non-strategic nuclear arsenals on both sides. In May 1990, President Bush announced that the United States would not

375 Jennifer M. Gardner, "The 1990-91 Recession: How Bad Was the Labor Market?," *Monthly Labor Review* 117, no. 6 (1994): 3–11.

376 "Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe," November 19, 1990, http://www.osce.org/library/14087?download=true; Frank R. Douglas, *The United States, NATO, and a New Multilateral Relationship* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2008), 84–86.

377 Powaski, *The Entangling Alliance: The United States and European Security, 1950-1993*, 182.

378 Michael R. Gordon, "Scowcroft Asserts 195,000 Is Minimum for U.S. Troops," *New York Times*, February 4, 1990, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/04/world/upheaval-in-the-east-nato-scowcroft-asserts-195000-is-minimum-for-us-troops.html.

pursue the upgrade of the Lance missile system deployed to Europe.[379] European allies, in particular Germany, had long criticized the follow-on-to-Lance (FOTL) project, and they enthusiastically welcomed the decision to abandon the replacement program.[380] By May 1991, both the United States and the Soviet Union had fulfilled their obligations under the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty by withdrawing or scrapping the respective missiles. Four months later, President Bush announced the withdrawal of all tactical nuclear systems from Europe and a number of other arms reduction initiatives.[381] His Russian counterpart followed suit later that year, and this series of steps culminated in the negotiations and signature of the START and START II treaties in 1991 and 1993.[382]

Taken together, these developments amounted to a dramatic de-escalation of tensions in Europe and beyond, both in the conventional and the nuclear realm. This arguably translated into a diminished significance and prominence of NATO in the early 1990s. With the primary raison d'être—

379 New York Times, "Evolution in Europe; Excerpts From Session By Bush on Arms Talks," May 4, 1990, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/05/04/world/evolution-in-europe-excerpts-from-session-by-bush-on-arms-talks.html.

380 The Lance was a road-mobile short-range ballistic missile system that entered into service of the U.S. forces in 1972. It was capable of carrying low-yield nuclear warheads. Production ended in 1980, and the issue of whether and when to field a more capable successor proved contentious among allies. The United States and the UK initially preferred modernizing, whereas the German-led European allies wanted arms reduction talks before agreeing to modernize. The compromise struck at the 1989 NATO summit was to defer a decision on modernization until 1992. See Heinrich August Winkler, *Germany. The Long Road West.*, vol. 2: 1933-1990 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 420–21; Serge Schmemann, "NATO's German Woes; Deep National Rumblings and Gorbachev Behind Dispute on Missile Modernization," *New York Times*, February 15, 1989, sec. World; Richard H. Ullman, *Securing Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 87–88.

381 New York Times, "Bush's Arms Plan: Remarks by President Bush on Reducing U.S. and Soviet Nuclear Weapons," September 28, 1991, sec. U.S., http://www.nytimes.com/1991/09/28/us/bush-s-arms-plan-remarks-president-bush-reducing-us-soviet-nuclear-weapons.html.

382 Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance*, 2nd ed. (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994), 164–65.

defending the alliance against Soviet aggression—diminished, the alliance entered into a period of discussion and uncertainty over what its tasks should be in the new post-Cold War world. Besides the calls for abolishing the alliance altogether outlined in Chapter 1, a variety of conceptions for NATO's role emerged in the debate leading up to the 1991 Rome Summit, at which the alliance approved a new strategic concept.

It is worth bearing in mind that NATO's soul-seeking over its mission did not occur in a vacuum. Indeed, external factors were key in shaping the debate, most notably through the specter of instability and war on the Balkans, but also through the international reaction to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990. The two crises left distinctly different impressions of NATO. Largely sidelined in the international response to Saddam Hussein's aggression, the alliance gradually took on more and more functions on the Balkans. Indeed, NATO's series of operations in the Balkans—outside the alliance's traditional area of operations—proved to be formative. While NATO was not the default choice for addressing conflict in the Balkans, it did emerge as the sole organization materially and institutionally prepared to conduct large-scale military operations there. Maintaining stability in Europe was a challenge for the alliance that reemerged in the early 1990s,[383] whereas using NATO farther afield was not seriously discussed.

383 "Reemerged" because European stability was an important part of the alliance's initial rationale when it was founded, as enshrined in a quote ascribed to NATO's first Secretary-General, Lord Hastings Ismay. Asked what NATO's purpose is, Hasting is said to have replied: "To keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down." The quote (and variations on it) is the most common shorthand for NATO's functions, but its origins and veracity are uncertain.

6.1. Too Far Afield—The Allied Response to Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait

At first glance, little would lead one to expect NATO to play a role in countering Iraqi aggression against Kuwait in 1990, which did not involve an attack on an ally nor the prospect of one. Indeed, Iraq was well outside of NATO's area of responsibility. Nevertheless, the soul-searching at the alliance in the early 1990s allowed for considering even such a seemingly far-fetched mission. Further, there was the question of whether NATO's distinctive military command structure and infrastructure could be leveraged for missions outside its traditional remit.

Alas, any hopes for a NATO role in the Gulf region there may have been were dashed. As the alliance's preeminent historian notes, "[…] NATO appeared to be paralyzed by Saddam Hussein's sudden assault on Kuwait in August 1990. It stood aside, unable to take common action […]."[384] Whilst NATO endorsed the ensuing U.S.-led action against Iraq, its members only contributed on an individual basis—and not through NATO—to the coalition buildup of forces in Saudi Arabia and the 1991 operations to drive Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. Whilst NATO did not shift gears from a defensive to an expeditionary organization, the alliance did take steps to ensure the defense of its members. This pertained mainly to Turkey, the one ally bordering Iraq. To this end, NATO decided to launch its first-ever operation, Anchor Guard, to protect its southern flank against possible fallout from Saddam Hussein's aggression.[385] Within days of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the alliance tasked its Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) E-3A aircraft with surveying Turkey's border with Iraq and

384 Kaplan, *NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance*, 168.

385 NATO Allied Command Operations, "NATO's Operations 1949-Present," accessed June 18, 2016, http://www.shape.nato.int/resources/21/nato%20operations,%201949-present.pdf.

sea traffic in the eastern Mediterranean Sea.[386] The alliance also deployed up to seven of its NATO Airborne Early Warning Force E-3As to forward-operating locations in Greece, Italy, and Turkey.

NATO's second-ever mission, Operation Ace Guard, also sought to address implications of the second Gulf War. Reacting to a Turkish request for assistance under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the alliance deployed the air component of Allied Command Europe (ACE) mobile force (AMF)[387] as well as German and Dutch air defense systems to Turkey in early 1991. Despite its limited involvement, NATO's two missions related to the second Gulf War had an important effect on the debate on NATO's functions. As one NATO staffer notes in his history of Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH): "The term 'out-of-area,' for years a taboo if associated with NATO, became a matter of open discussion at [the] political level."[388]

That the 1991 Gulf War had demonstrated both the continued need for military alliances and the need for NATO to broaden its mission was a position held strongly by U.S. officials. While NATO had participated indirectly, it seemed desirable to formulate an official role for the alliance in crises outside its traditional regional scope. As U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) William Taft noted in 1991: "Despite the fact that the war took place on NATO's periphery, it has firm

386 Pat Dennis, "NATO AWACS: Alliance Keystone for Out-of-Area Operations," *Canadian Military Journal* 8, no. 4 (2007): 24–25; Magnus Petersson, "The Forgotten Dimension? NATO and the Security of the Member States," in *Pursuing Strategy: NATO Operations from the Gulf War to Gaddafi*, ed. Hakan Edström and Dennis Gyllensporre (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 128–29.

387 AMF (Air) consisted of Belgian, German, and Italian aircraft.

388 Franco Veltri, "AFSOUTH, 1951-2004: Over Fifty Years Working for Peace and Stability," 2004, https://web.archive.org/web/20080429054705/http://www.afsouth.nato.int/archives/history.htm; cited in Dennis, "NATO AWACS: Alliance Keystone for Out-of-Area Operations."

and, I think, important implications for European security," notably demonstrating the impact seemingly far-flung events could have. Taft went on to argue that despite its limited involvement, NATO had been key in ensuring the coalition's success, primarily through the consultative mechanism it provided for allies and through the high degree of interoperability between the allies among the coalition ensured by decades of training and standardization.[389] These assets could be used to address challenges beyond the traditional remit of the alliance, too.

6.2. The Alliance's First Post-Cold War Strategic Concept

Meeting in Rome in November of 1991, NATO heads of state and government adopted a new strategic concept for the alliance, its fifth overall.[390] Strategic concepts lay out the alliance's priorities and raison d'être. The 1991 Strategic Concept superseded the MC 14/3 Strategic Concept, which had been in effect for almost 25 years—by far the longest of any NATO strategic concept. With the changes wrought in Europe by the end of the Cold War and the specter of instability in Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Middle East, the need for a review was obvious. The allies also chose not to classify the strategic concept and to even publish it, an unprecedented step towards transparency.[391]

Substantively, the 1991 strategic concept had two major aspects. On the one hand, it reavowed the alliance's treaty foundations, i.e. the defense of allied states, while reducing the role of nuclear weapons. The concept reit-

389 William H. Taft, "European Security: Lessons Learned from the Gulf War," *NATO Review* 39, no. 3 (1991): 16–21.

390 "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept Agreed by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council," November 8, 1991, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm.

391 Needless to say, the accompanying military guidance, the MC Directive for Military Implementation of the Alliance's Strategic Concept (MC 400), remained classified.

erates the fundamental commitment of allies that is the cornerstone of NATO: "Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty."[392]

On the other hand, the document went beyond the traditional security concerns of the alliance. The 1991 Strategic Concept broadened the alliance's conception of the security challenges it faced substantially, reflecting the changed security environment in Europe in particular.[393] Specifically, the document notes that "the risk of a surprise attack [by the USSR on allied territory, DJR] has been substantially reduced."[394] The new threats to the alliance then are "are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional," and "[r]isks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from [...] serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes"[395] in Central and Eastern Europe. In this environment, the alliance identified four "fundamental security tasks" it faces:

> I. To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.

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392 "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept Agreed by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council," para. 12, see also para. 15.

393 Deni, *Alliance Management and Maintenance*, 32–33; Sten Rynning, *NATO Renewed: The Power and Purpose of Transatlantic Cooperation* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 41.

394 "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept Agreed by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council," para. 7.

395 Ibid., para. 8.

> II. To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.
>
> III. To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state.
>
> IV. To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.[396]

These four tasks amount to a "blend of old and new."[397] Tasks I and II reiterate fundamental provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty. Task IV, too, amounts to little more than a description of what NATO in its view had done for the previous four decades, but also implicitly acknowledges the continued risks to stability emanating from the still sizeable military forces to the East. Truly new is task I. By stipulating that NATO is but "one of the indispensable foundations" for security in Europe, the alliance had opened up space for alternatives. In the early 1990s, France and to a lesser extent Germany were the main drivers behind the notion that there can and should be European security institutions complementary to NATO.[398] Among the contenders for a role to play in European security were in particular the European Communities (EC), the Western European Union (WEU), and a possibly institutionalized Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

For the United States, maintaining primacy of NATO among these institutions was a clear policy objective, and the differences with France in particular over the role and relative standing of a European security contribution shaped the debate over NATO strategy in the early 1990s. Nation-

396 Ibid., para. 20.

397 Rynning, *NATO Renewed*, 41.

398 Ibid., 42.

ally, the United States had transitioned to a new National Security Strategy in 1991.[399] The new strategy placed less emphasis on direct confrontation with the Soviet Union, and instead identified region conflagrations as a key challenge for U.S. security policy. The regional challenges were to serve as the "organizing focus for American military capabilities."[400] The strategy also acknowledges the void that had emerged for NATO in the wake of the end of the Cold War:

> Politically, a key issue is how America's role of alliance leader —and indeed our alliances themselves—will be affected, especially in Europe, by a reduced Soviet threat. The positive common basis of our alliances—the defense of democratic values—must be reaffirmed and strengthened. Yet, differences among allies are likely to become more evident as the traditional concern for security that first brought them together diminishes in intensity. We need to consider how the United States and its allies can best respond to a new agenda of political challenges—such as the troubled evolution of the Soviet Union or the volatile Middle East—in the framework of the moral and political values we continue to share.[401]

Given these national priorities, the United States advocated for similar priorities for NATO and viewed the development of alternative institutional arrangements for security policy with skepticism.[402] In particular, the United States rejected the French-led project for a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), i.e. the establishment of independent European military structures. An exception was the WEU, for which U.S. offi-

399 The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C, 1991).

400 Snider, *The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision*, 9.

401 The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, 1.

402 Sebastian Harnisch, *Europa und Amerika: die US-amerikanische Haltung zur westeuropäischen Integration 1987 - 1994* (Sinzheim: Pro Universitate, 1996), 167–68.

cials initially considered a role in military missions outside NATO's traditional remit.[403]

6.3. Beyond the Comfort Zone: NATO Joins the Fray in the Balkans

> Yugoslavia will cease to function as a federal state within a year, and will probably dissolve within two. […] The violence will be intractable and bitter. There is little the United States and its European allies can do to preserve Yugoslav unity.
>
> —*U.S. National Intelligence Estimate 15-90*[404]

NATO was not the institution of choice to react to the violence in the Balkans in early 1990s. Rather, it was a last resort after European and United Nations efforts had faltered or run into serious troubles due to a lack of military capabilities. As Sten Rynning notes in his recounting of the 1992-1995 period, "NATO was *pulled* into Balkan affairs."[405]

The wars that erupted in the Balkans beginning in the early 1990s were the pinnacle of a decade-long economic decline and constitutional crisis. An amalgamate of different ethnicities that emerged out of World War I, Yugoslavia disintegrated amidst bloodshed not seen in Europe since World War II. The end of the Cold War and the wave of democratic change that swept across Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia's neighbor Albania brought to the fore ethnic rivalries and tensions that had slumbered under a facade of stability during the Cold War. President Josip Broz Tito's constitutional reforms before his death in 1980, which were

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403 For an overview over the ESDI debate, see Peter Barschdorff, *Facilitating Transatlantic Cooperation After the Cold War: An Acquis Atlantique* (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2001), 53–70.

404 U.S. Director of Central Intelligence, "Yugoslavia Transformed. National Intelligence Estimate NIE-15-90," October 18, 1990, iii, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1990-10-01.pdf.

405 Rynning, *NATO Renewed*, 28.

intended to balance Yugoslavia's six constituent republics,[406] failed to appease tensions. The northern states, Croatia and Slovenia, in particular were discontented and severed their commercial ties with the southern republics in 1990.

Croatia and Slovenia were also the first to break away by declaring independence on June 25, 1991. The proximate cause was the refusal by Serbia to accept a Croat for the rotating president of Yugoslavia the previous month, but as indicated above, the underlying causes were long-standing and manifold. Serbian President Slobodan Milošević reacted by dispatching the Serb-dominated Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) to the two renegade republics. In Slovenia, the attempt to foil the secession by force failed in the face of strong resistance and a well-planned defense. Not so in Croatia, which had suspended its June 25, 1991, declaration of independence under the Brioni Agreement, which ended the ten-day war in Slovenia. Croatia eventually severed all ties with Yugoslavia in October 1991 amidst escalating fighting between its army and ethnic Serbians. Croatia's significant Serb minority supported Belgrade's plans for a 'Greater Serbia,' and secured political and military support from Serbia. According to one estimate, more than 20,000 were killed and over 350,000 displaced during Croatia's breakaway war from the Yugoslav federation, resulting in a refugee crisis the likes of which Europe had not seen since World War II.[407]

The war in Croatia quickly spread to neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina, where fighting broke out in March of 1992—only months after NATO had issued its new strategic concept in Rome, which foresaw a more active

406 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Montenegro, as well as the two autonomous regions Kosovo and Vojvodina.

407 Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1995), 1.

role for the alliance in ensuring stability and peace abroad. As during the 1990/1991 Gulf War, NATO did not intervene in the Balkans and in Bosnia in particular as an organization at first. Rather, individual members contributed to United Nations efforts, to which NATO took the backseat.

The alliance remained largely absent from efforts to address the Balkans crisis in 1991/1992. This reflected the view of both sides of the Atlantic that the Balkans were a European problem that should be solved by the Europeans. As Jacques Poos, at the time foreign minister of Luxembourg and chairman of the EC Council of ministers, famously said regarding the escalating conflict in Yugoslavia: "This is the hour of Europe […] if one problem can be solved by the Europeans, it is the Yugoslav problem. This is a European country and it is not up to the Americans. It is not up to anyone else."[408] His colleague Jacques Delors, chairman of the EC Commission, echoed this sentiment: "We do not interfere in American affairs. We hope they will have enough respect not to interfere in ours."[409]

Initially, the Bush administration tried to push for a discussion of the situation in Yugoslavia in NATO. However, it was swiftly rebutted by France, which seemed bent on making Yugoslavia a test case for a more integrated European foreign policy.[410] Reportedly, France even accused the United States of "overdramatizing" the situation in the Balkans.[411] This rift was rooted in the starkly differing positions of the United States and a

408 Cited in Mark Almond, *Europe's Backyard War: The War in the Balkans* (London: Mandarin, 1994), 32.

409 Cited in Joshua Muravchik, *The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge to Neo-Isolationism* (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1996), 91.

410 Moore, *NATO's New Mission*, 20–21.

411 David C. Gompert, "The United States and Yugoslavia's Wars," in *The World and Yugoslavia's Wars*, ed. Richard H. Ullman (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), 127.

strong group within the EC, notably Austria and to a lesser degree Germany, regarding the viability of a peaceful breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Whereas U.S. Secretary of State James Baker warned of the dangers of letting Yugoslavia disintegrate when no peaceful separation seemed possible, Austria saw the federation as artificial to begin with, and Germany also pressed for swift recognition of Croatia and Slovenia.[412]

Further, the Bush administration considered Serbia the main culprit in Yugoslavia, noting in particular its actions in Kosovo. Europeans, on the other hand, were less swift to assign blame and were more heavily invested in the fate of Yugoslavia's northern republics.[413] With the United States headed into an election year, few in Washington considered the Balkans worth picking a fight over. Nor did many take issue with the Europeans taking the lead on the Balkans. As one contemporary observer, last U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmermann, noted: "[B]etween July 1991 and March 1992, the United States was not a major factor in the Yugoslav crisis. […] Yugoslavia had become a tar baby in Washington. Nobody wanted to touch it. With the American presidential elections just a year away, it was seen as a loser."[414] In fact, the Bush administration to an extent even welcomed European efforts to resolve the situation, encouraging its European partners "at the highest levels and at every turn" to engage.[415] However, as David Gompert noted,

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412 Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, 164. No episode illustrates the differences better than Secretary Baker's last-ditch effort to persuade Croatia and Slovenia to postpone their secessions by visiting Yugoslavia in June 1991. See Wayne Bert, *The Reluctant Superpower: United States' Policy in Bosnia, 1991-95* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 136.

413 Gompert, "The United States and Yugoslavia's Wars," 124.

414 Warren Zimmermann, "The Last Ambassador: A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 2 (1995).

415 Gompert, "The United States and Yugoslavia's Wars," 127.

the United States had "no vital interests" at stake in Yugoslavia, and Secretary of State James Baker famously agreed that "we have no dog in this fight."[416]

In hindsight, there existed a contradiction between the Bush administration's desire to maintain NATO as Europe's premier security organization as enshrined in the alliance's 1991 Strategic Concept, and its willingness to let Europeans take the lead on Yugoslavia outside NATO. As we have seen, the Rome Strategic Concept specifically envisioned a role for the alliance in addressing regional conflicts. Some observers have interpreted this conflicting U.S. behavior as a ploy to expose the Europeans' inability to cooperate militarily without U.S. involvement. For example, Brendan Simms quotes a State Department staffer recalling that Secretary of State Baker and his deputy Lawrence Eagleburger thought "the European bluff should be called." Moreover, Eagleburger reportedly expected: "[The Europeans] will screw it up," which "will teach them a lesson" and "teach them to burden-share."[417] More convincingly, the Bush administration was cautious to commit the United States to a region that, certainly with the end of the Cold War, had become a tangential interest at best. Strategically, becoming involved in the Balkans on the heels of the 1991 Gulf War also bore the risk of signalling that the United States would enforce Bush's "new world order" as a global policeman. Lastly, the political and economic costs of launching another large-scale war, requiring according to U.S. estimates 300,000 to 400,000 troops on the ground and a lengthy

416 Cited in Brendan Simms, *Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia* (London: Penguin Books, 2002), chap. 2. Baker later reiterated in his memoirs: "[O]ur vital interests were not at stake." James A. Baker, *The Politics of Diplomacy. Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992* (New York: Putnam, 1995), 636.

417 Simms, *Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia*, chap. 2.

occupation,[418] would have been exorbitant.[419] In sum, in the words of *The Independent's* commentator Neal Ascherson, NATO was "staying in its bunk with its polished boots on."[420]

Meanwhile, the United Nations Security Council had in late September 1991 unanimously passed resolution 713 imposing a "general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia."[421] This embargo became the avenue for the alliance's involvement in the Balkans amidst the failure of other institutions to redress the Yugoslav crisis. UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar also in October appointed former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance as his personal envoy for Yugoslavia. On November 27, 1991, the Security Council passed resolution 723. It noted that UN peacekeepers would not deploy until all parties respected the ceasefire brokered in Geneva the previous week.[422]

The alliance first commented on the situation in Yugoslavia at its December 1991 Rome Summit. The allies at Rome only expressed concern over the situation in the Balkans, but did not suggest any allied action in addressing the situation.[423] Rather, the allies condemned the use of force to move borders and expressed "support and appreciation for the efforts

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418 David Cohen and Fritz W. Ermarth, "Memorandum for National Foreign Intelligence Board Principals: Responses to Transition Team Questions on the Balkans" (National Intelligence Council, 1992), 38–39, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1992-12-28.pdf.

419 See e.g. Wayne Bert, *American Military Intervention in Unconventional War: From the Philippines to Iraq* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 117–18.

420 Cited in Jane Sharp, "If Not NATO, Who?," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 48, no. 8 (1992): 30.

421 UN Security Council, *Resolution 713 (1991). Adopted by the Security Council at Its 3009th Meeting on September 25, 1991*, 1991, para. 6.

422 UN Security Council, *Resolution 721 (1991). Adopted by the Security Council at Its 3018th Meeting on November 27, 1991*, 1991, paras. 2, 3.

423 Sloan, *Permanent Alliance?*, 151–52.

of the European Community, the CSCE and the Security Council of the United Nations to resolve this crisis."[424] In February 1992, the allied heads of state and government echoed UN Resolution 721, and called on all parties to respect the cease-fire so that United Nations peacekeepers could deploy. Peacekeepers eventually deployed to Croatia in the early summer of 1992 after the Security Council had authorized the deployment of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) on April 7, 1992.[425] Notably, the resolution coincided with the United States' decision to formally recognize the independence of Croatia and Slovenia as well as of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had declared its independence earlier in April after a referendum supported parting ways with Yugoslavia in February.[426] This brought the United States in line with the Europeans, which had recognized Croatia and Slovenia in January 1992 and Bosnia in April.

NATO first became actively involved in July 1992, when alliance forces began monitoring the arms embargo against Yugoslavia in the eastern Mediterranean.[427] Following a WEU decision to launch a naval monitoring mission, NATO foreign and defense ministers meeting in Helsinki in July

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424 NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome, "The Situation in Yugoslavia," November 8, 1991, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911108b.htm; Sloan, *Permanent Alliance?*, 151–52.

425 UN Security Council, *Resolution 749 (1992). Adopted by the Security Council at Its 3066th Meeting on 7 April 1992*, 1992, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/011/08/IMG/NR001108.pdf?OpenElement.

426 George H. W. Bush, "Statement on United States Recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republics. April 7, 1992," in *Book 1. Presidential Documents - January 1 to July 31, 1992*, ed. Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1993), 553; David Binder, "U.S. Recognizes 3 Yugoslav Republics as Independent," *New York Times*, April 8, 1992, http://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/08/world/us-recognizes-3-yugoslav-republics-as-independent.html.

427 Tarcinio Gazzini, "NATO Coercive Military Activities in the Yugoslav Crisis (1992-1999)," *European Journal of International Law* 12, no. 3 (2001): 393–94.

decided to follow suit and launch an operation.[428] Employing Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) assets, NATO remained within its established area of operations as set out in the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO forces were to operate independently of the WEU, but to coordinate and cooperate. NATO's Operation Maritime Monitor formally commenced on July 16, 1992, off the coast of Montenegro, where it was tasked with the "surveillance, identification and reporting of maritime traffic in areas to be defined in international waters in the Adriatic Sea."[429]

NATO foreign ministers had laid the groundwork for this mission at their June 1992 meeting in Oslo. There, the allied foreign ministers agreed that NATO would support CSCE missions on a case by case basis.[430] The alliance became gradually more involved in the course of 1992, which became a watershed for NATO's role in the Balkans and beyond. Adding to its naval assets, the alliance in October committed its AWACS airplanes to monitoring—but not enforcing—the military no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina imposed by UN Security Council Resolution 781.[431] As the

428 "Statement on NATO Maritime Operations. Helsinki, 10 July 1992," July 10, 1992, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c920710a.htm.

429 Allied Joint Forces Command Naples, "The Crisis in Former Yugoslavia," accessed June 30, 2016, https://www.jfcnaples.nato.int/page6322744/13-the-crisis-in-former-yugoslavia-. By the time the operation and its successors terminated when the Un embargo was lifted in mid-June 1996, it had challenged about 74,000 ships and inspected around 7,500 both at sea and in port (ibid.).

430 "The Alliance has the capacity to contribute to effective actions by the CSCE in line with its new and increased responsibilities for crisis management and the peaceful settlement of disputes. In this regard, we are prepared to support, on a case-by-case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise." NATO Foreign Ministers, "Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo, 4 June 1992," June 4, 1992, para. 11, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c920604a.htm.

431 UN Security Council, *Resolution 781 (1992). Adopted by the Security Council at Its 3122nd Meeting on 9 October 1992*, 1992, para. 1, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/781(1992).

UN toughened its approach to the Yugoslav crisis, so did NATO: In October 1992, Operation Maritime Fence replaced Operation Maritime Guard. The new operation had an expanded remit, which now included halting and inspecting all maritime traffic bound for or originating in any (former) Yugoslav republic.[432]

In December 1992, new UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali asked NATO Secretary-General Manfred Wörner to provide NATO support for UN resolutions.[433] As it had done for the CSCE, the North Atlantic Council on December 17, 1992, decided that the alliance would in principle be available for peacekeeping missions authorized by the UN Security Council. However, final decisions would only made on a case-by-case basis.[434] On January 17, NATO foreign ministers then decided in principle that the alliance would support efforts to enforce a no-fly zone over the former territory of Yugoslavia, should the United Nations launch such efforts.

6.3.1. Clinton Transition

Foreign policy played no major role in the 1992 presidential campaign. Where it did, the Democratic candidate Bill Clinton called for NATO enlargement, criticized the administration for not using force to resolve the Balkans situation, and expressed strong support for the UN-imposed no-fly zone over Yugoslavia. In particular, Clinton called for lifting the arms embargo and conducting airstrikes against Bosnian Serbs after

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432 Eric Victor Larson et al., *Interoperability of U.S. and NATO Allied Air Forces: Supporting Data and Case Studies* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2003), 72–74.

433 Deni, *Alliance Management and Maintenance*, 65.

434 This move reaffirmed the alliance's commitment made in the Rome Strategic Concept, see "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept Agreed by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council," para. 41.

reports of concentration camps and ethnic cleansing emerged over the summer of 1992.[435] In their confirmation hearings, senior members of his cabinet similarly called for turning the screws on the Serbs. Said designated Secretary of State Warren Christopher in his confirmation hearing before the Senate: "Europe and the world community in general must bring real pressures, economic and military, to bear on the Serbian leadership to halt its savage policy of ethnic cleansing."[436]

Yet the United Nations and by its authorization NATO had significantly expanded their involvement in the former Yugoslavia during the course of 1992. Likewise, the outgoing Bush administration had stepped up its rhetoric during its final days, culminating in the 1992 Christmas Day message threatening military action if Serbia moved against Kosovo. In sum, the stakes in the Balkans had signficantly increased in the year preceding Clinton's inauguration on January 20, 1993.

As Clinton was preparing for inauguration and throughout the first months of the new administration, "Topic A was always Bosnia" as National Security Advisor Anthony Lake recalled.[437] Clinton agreed that

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435 William J. Clinton, "Statement by Governor Bill Clinton on the Crisis in Bosnia, July 26, 1992," July 26, 1992, http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/academic/political-science/speeches/clinton.dir/c7.txtp; William J. Clinton, "Statement by Governor Bill Clinton on Killings in Serbian Camps, August 4, 1992," August 4, 1992, http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/academic/political-science/speeches/clinton.dir/c55.txtp; E.J. Dionne Jr., "Clinton Turns Sights to Foreign Policy," *Washington Post*, July 29, 1992, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/07/29/clinton-turns-sights-to-foreign-policy/af5bda94-0d08-43fa-8ea9-54e6010579b2/; Gwen Ifill, "Conflict in the Balkans: Clinton Takes Aggressive Stances On Role of U.S. in Bosnia Conflict," *New York Times*, August 10, 1992, http://www.nytimes.com/1992/08/10/us/conflict-balkans-clinton-takes-aggressive-stances-role-us-bosnia-conflict.html.

436 Warren Christopher, "Statement by Secretary-Designate Christopher before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, January 13, 1993," *U.S. Department of State Dispatch* 4, no. 4 (January 25, 1993).

437 Anthony Lake, Interview: Tony Lake, interview by Chris Bury, ABC News Nightline and PBS Frontline, September 2000, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/clinton/interviews/lake.html.

the issue took up "a good deal" of his time[438] and called Bosnia "the most frustrating and complex foreign policy issue in the world today."[439] In the same vein, Richard Holbrooke highlighted the significance of addressing the situation in Bosnia in a memorandum to the president-elect a week before the inauguration, advocating a break with the Bush policy of relative restraint:

> Bosnia will be the key test for American policy in Europe … inaction or a continuation of the Bush policies in Bosnia by the Clinton administration would be the least desirable course. Continued inaction carries long-term risks which could be disruptive to U.S.-European relations, weaken NATO, increase tension in Greece and Turkey, and cause havoc with Moscow.[440]

Holbrooke's plea did not go unheard and fell on open ears with President Clinton given his concern that the tide was turning against Muslims in Bosnia—due not least to the impact of the UN-mandated arms embargo. To Clinton (and many observers in the United States), the embargo advantaged the Bosnian Serbs, who could draw on weapons caches left behind by the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) and the support of the new Serbian-led Yugoslavia.[441]

As is customary for new administrations, the Clinton administration embarked on a review of Bosnia policy under Presidential Review Directive/NSC-1. Specifically, the review's "objective is to develop broad strategic goals and strategies that will guide our policies toward the former

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438 William J. Clinton, "Exchange with Reporters Prior to Discussions with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada, February 5, 1993," in *Book 1. Presidential Documents - January 20 to July 31, 1993*, ed. Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1994), 52.

439 Cited in Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, 6.

440 Richard C. Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: Random House, 1999), 50.

441 Bill Clinton, *My Life* (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 511, 527.

Yugoslavia."[442] For the new administration, Secretary of State Warren Christopher on February 10, 1993, released the first conclusions drawn from the review.[443] The most significant were the new administration's significant concerns with the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP). The eponymous UN envoy Cyrus Vance and EC negotiator David Owen had presented their plan in October 1992, just before the U.S. presidential elections. VOPP envisioned dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina into a loose confederation of cantons with a central government responsible predominantly for foreign and security policy. It had found widespread European support, whereas President Clinton had publicly expressed concern. In particular, he was wary of imposing a deal on the parties from the outside,[444] and worried that the VOPP "might work to the immediate and to the long-term further disadvantage of the Bosnian Muslims."[445] Instead, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced on February 10 the United States would become directly engaged in negotiations on a new plan, would be ready to enforce a deal, and called for enforcing the UN no-fly zone, and providing humanitarian assistance.[446] This not with-

442 Anthony Lake, "Presidential Review Directive/NSC-1: U.S. Policy Regarding the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia," January 22, 1993, 1, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1993-01-22.pdf.

443 John M. Goshko and Don Oberdorfer, "U.S. to Study Wider Options on Balkans," *Washington Post*, January 28, 1993, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/01/28/us-to-study-wider-options-on-balkans/01c27f08-8d48-4c16-b85f-67379ccb9c2f/; Ivo H. Daalder, *Getting to Dayton: The Making of America's Bosnia Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 10.

444 William J. Clinton, "The President's News Conference with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada, February 5, 1993," in *Book 1. Presidential Documents - January 20 to July 31, 1993*, ed. Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1994), 55.

445 Ibid., 56.

446 Warren Christopher, "New Steps Toward Conflict Resolution In the Former Yugoslavia. Opening Statement at a News Conference on February 10, 1993," February 10, 1993, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dossec/1993/9302/930210dossec.html;

standing, Christopher underscored "[t]he United States is not the world's policeman" and portrayed the Yugoslav crisis as a touchstone for the adaptation of NATO.[447]

The Clinton administration thus sought to make good on its campaign promise of doing more in the Balkans while steering well clear of committing ground troops. Clinton went to great lengths to emphasize that U.S. ground troops would not "in any way engage in the present conflict."[448] However, if an agreement was reached, the United States would contribute to UN measures to secure the arrangement.[449] The easiest measure with almost no risk to American troops' lives that was sure to garner public support was providing humanitarian aid. After coordinating with UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, President Clinton was able to announce the beginning of U.S. humanitarian airdrops into Bosnia-Herzegovina on February 25, 1993.[450] Clinton emphasized publicly that the airdrops would "have no combat connotations whatever," and be "purely humanitarian and quite limited."[451]

Clinton, *My Life*, 511.

447 Christopher, "New Steps Toward Conflict Resolution In the Former Yugoslavia. Opening Statement at a News Conference on February 10, 1993."

448 William J. Clinton, "The President's News Conference with Francois Mitterand of France, March 9, 1993," in *Book 1. Presidential Documents - January 20 to July 31, 1993*, ed. Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1994), 259.

449 Ibid.

450 William J. Clinton, "Statement Announcing Airdrops to Provide Humanitarian Aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina," in *Book 1. Presidential Documents - January 20 to July 31, 1993*, ed. Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1994), 206; Thomas L. Friedman, "Clinton Asks U.N. Chief to Meet On Plan for Airdrop to Bosnians," *New York Times*, February 23, 1993, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/02/23/world/clinton-asks-un-chief-to-meet-on-plan-for-airdrop-to-bosnians.html.

451 William J. Clinton, "Exchange with Reporters Prior to Discussions with United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, February 23, 1993," in *Book 1. Presidential Documents - January 20 to July 31, 1993*, ed. Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S.

6.3.2. The Lift-And-Strike Debate and NATO's First Steps Toward Involvement

Within three months of Clinton taking office, NATO airplanes were operating in the Balkans enforcing a UN-mandated no-fly zone. The United Nations had extended their flight ban on March 31, 1993, to include all flights not authorized by UNPROFOR, and had authorized members to use all means necessary to enforce the ban under Chapter VII of the UN Charta.[452] The NAC on April 9 agreed NATO would enforce the flight ban, and the United States committed 25 fighter jets and support planes to the effort beginning on April 12, 1993.[453] France and the Netherlands also committed airplanes for immediate deployment, and Turkey and the United Kingdom offered assets for later stages of the operation.[454] By the same token, the UN extended the scope of its naval blockade and also authorized the use of force to enforce it on April 17, 1993.[455]

Amidst Serbian advances on Srebrenica, the Clinton administration went through an acrimonious internal debate over its options to make good on its campaign promises and to get the Bosnian Serbs to sign on to the Vance-Owen plan. The debate pitted advocates for large-scale air strikes

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Government Publishing Office, 1994), 195.

452 UN Security Council, *Resolution 816 (1993). Adopted by the Security Council at Its 3191st Meeting on 31 March 1993*, 1993, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/781(1992).

453 William J. Clinton, "Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the No-Fly Zone over Bosnia, April 13, 1993," in *Book 1. Presidential Documents - January 20 to July 31, 1993*, ed. Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1994), 430; United Nations Department of Public Information, "United Nations Protection Force. Background," 1996, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unprof_b.htm.

454 United Nations Department of Public Information, "United Nations Protection Force. Background."

455 UN Security Council, *Resolution 820 (1993). Adopted by the Security Council at Its 3200th Meeting on 17 April 1993*, 1993, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/781(1992).

(Vice President Al Gore, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Madeleine Albright)[456] against those calling for lifting the arms embargo and conducting more limited air strikes (National Security Advisor Lake, Secretary of State Christopher). This "lift-and-strike" approach was also recommended by a fact-finding mission that had returned from the region in April.[457] The military brass, represented by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, noted that only a large deployment of ground troops would quell the conflict.[458]

The president came down in favor of the lift-and-strike approach in a five-hour meeting on May 1, despite well-known European concerns over the security of their troops deployed in the Balkans. Cognizant of these concerns, the president tasked Secretary Christopher with selling the policy to the Europeans. As Clinton said to Christopher: "[N]ow you've really got your work cut out for you."[459] Christopher left for Europe the same day Clinton had weighed in to sound out the European governments on their positions on lift-and-strike in light of the continued Serbian refusal to sign on to Vance-Owen. Christopher recalls he "ran into trouble from the moment I landed in Europe on May 2."[460] France and Britain, who were supplying the bulk of UNPROFOR troops,[461] rebuffed

456 Madeleine K. Albright, "Memorandum for the National Security Adviser: Options for Bosnia," April 14, 1993, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1993-04-14.pdf.

457 Clinton, "The President's News Conference With Visegrad Leaders in Prague, January 12, 1994," 512.

458 Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, 13.

459 Elizabeth Drew, *On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency* (New York: Touchstone, 1994), 156.

460 Warren Christopher, *In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 346.

461 Cf. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Troop and Police Contributors Archive (1990 - 2014)," accessed July 13, 2016, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml.

Christopher and expressed strong objections to any airstrikes.[462] Likewise, they rejected lifting the arms embargo, fearing this would mean more arms flowing to all sides.[463] While Christopher was touring Europe, the Bosnian Serbs on May 2 indicated they would sign on to the VOPP, undermining any case Christopher may have had even further.[464] By the time Christopher returned to Washington on May 8, a "sea change" had occurred with regard to lift and strike.[465] Support had crumbled, and the policy was not pursued any longer in the face of European opposition and what seemed like Bosnian Serbs' acquiescence. Instead, containing the conflict became the paramount concern of the Clinton administration, as Christopher testified before Congress in May.[466] This approach was enshrined in the Joint Action Program signed in Washington on May 22 by the foreign ministers of the United States, Russia, Spain, Britain and France.[467] Notably, the five countries pledged to work towards the implementation of safe areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina as envisioned by UN Security Council resolutions passed in April and May.[468]

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462 Clinton, *My Life*, 512. France reportedly indicated it would go along with air strikes if the United States committed ground troops, which amounted to as much as a straight-out no given Clinton's well-established refusal to deploy any U.S. troops. See Drew, *On the Edge*, 156–57. Christopher does not remember any such offer in his memoirs.

463 Bert, *American Military Intervention in Unconventional War*, 118.

464 In the end, the Bosnian Serbs did not follow through. Their parliament rejected the VOPP on May 5, and a May 15 referendum buttressed this position.

465 Warren Christopher, "Intervention by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council on December 1" (1994), 347, http://nato.int/docu/speech/1994/s941201b.htm.

466 Said Christopher: "[C]ontaining the conflict in the Bosnian area is one of the prime goals of President Clinton." Cited in Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. Goal on Bosnia: Keeping War Within Borders," *New York Times*, May 19, 1993, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/19/world/us-goal-on-bosnia-keeping-war-within-borders.html.

467 Warren Christopher, "Announcement of the Joint Action Program on Bosnia," *U.S. Department of State Dispatch* 4, no. 21 (May 24, 1993): 368–69.

468 UN Security Council, *Resolution 819 (1993). Adopted by the Security Council at Its 3199th Meeting on 16 April 1993*, 1993, para. 1, https://documents-dds-

On June 10, 1993, the NAC decided the alliance would offer its "protective airpower in case of attack against UNPROFOR in the performance of its overall mandate, if it so requests."[469] NATO thus effectively endorsed the Joint Action Program despite previous grumblings,[470] and readied airplanes for this scenario. This was necessary given a series of Bosnian Serbs' military successes, in which their forces had surrounded most of UNPROFOR's safe areas, including Sarajevo.[471] The next month, Tony Lake again tried to sell the French and the British on the idea of proactive airstrikes to break the siege of Sarajevo, taking a more direct approach than Christopher had before. As Daalder notes, Lake emphasized the president's backing for this approach and that "the future of the alliance was on the line."[472] In a series of continued discussion with French and British officials, enough common ground was reached to allow a NAC decision at its August 2 meeting. The NAC decided the alliance would "make immediate preparations for undertaking, in the event that the strangulation of Sarajevo and other areas continues, including wide-scale interference with humanitarian assistance, stronger measures including air strikes against those responsible, Bosnian Serbs and others, in Bosnia-Herzegovina."[473] However, any airstrikes would require authorization by

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ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/221/90/IMG/N9322190.pdf?OpenElement; UN Security Council, *Resolution 824 (1993). Adopted by the Security Council at Its 3208th Meeting on 6 May 1993*, 1993, para. 3, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/262/07/IMG/N9326207.pdf?OpenElement.

469 "Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Athens, Greece, 10 June 1993," June 10, 1993, para. 3, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c930610a.htm.

470 Roger Cohen, "NATO Talks Fail to Reach Accord on Bosnia Plan," *New York Times*, May 27, 1993, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/27/world/nato-talks-fail-to-reach-accord-on-bosnia-plan.html.

471 Sloan, *Permanent Alliance?*, 153.

472 Ivo H. Daalder, "A New Alliance for a New Century," *RUSI Journal* 155, no. 5 (2010): 21.

473 Manfred Wörner, "Press Statement by the Secretary General Following the Special Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 2 August 1993," August 2, 1993,

both the UN and NATO, giving each organization—and by proxy France and Britain in particular—a veto.[474] Whilst fighting eased somewhat in the aftermath of NATO's August decision, the Bosnian Serbs once more increased their pressure on the UN-mandated safe areas in the fall of 1993.

6.3.3. NATO Doubles Down And Moves Toward Enforcement

February of 1994 proved a momentous month for the alliance, with its forces seeing their first combat action ever and the NAC threatening air strikes over the siege of Sarajevo. Serbian forces' shelling of Sarajevo's Markale market place on February 5, 1994, proved to be an action-forcing event for the international community. The mortar attack killed 68 and injured close to 200, making it the deadliest but by no means the first incident of its kind.[475] Responding to the Markale shelling, the NAC on February 9, 1994, made three crucial decisions: First, NATO agreed to launch air strikes against artillery positions threatening Sarajevo at the request of the United Nations. Second, the NAC issued a ten-day ultimatum for the withdrawal of all heavy weapons from within 20 km of Sarajevo area not under UNPROFOR's control, and, third, threatened air strikes against any heavy weaponry not removed or placed under UNPROFOR control within ten days.[476] Serbian forces eventually complied with the ultimatum. On February 28, 1994, NATO saw its first-ever combat action.[477] Allied planes shot down four of six planes violating the UN no-

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http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c930802a.htm.

474 Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, 22–23.

475 Fiona Watson and Robert Ware, *Bosnia, the UN and the NATO Ultimatum*, House of Commons Research Paper 94/33 (London, 1994), 1.

476 North Atlantic Council, "Decisions Taken at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session on February 9, 1994," February 9, 1994, paras. 6, 10, 11, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940209a.htm#FN1.

477 Rynning, *NATO Renewed*, 26.

fly zone and dropping bombs in the area of Banja Luka, Bosnia's second city.[478] This historic event notwithstanding, the importance of the no-fly zone remained limited given that combat action was mainly conducted by ground forces. Continuing the well-established pattern of NATO supporting and enforcing United Nations efforts, NATO bombings in 1994 and the first half of 1995 thus focused mainly on preventing or rolling back the movement of Serbian heavy artillery into the vicinity of UN-declared safe areas.[479] For example, after Bosnian Serbs launched an offensive on the safe area of Goražde, the NAC on April 22, 1994, authorized airstrikes if Serbian forces did not withdraw immediately. Further, the NAC issued an ultimatum for the withdrawal of all heavy weapons from within a 20 km radius around Goražde by April 27.

Underpinning this increased role for NATO was the growing insight in Washington that military action was necessary to flank the administration's diplomacy and sanctions efforts. On the day of the NAC's decision, President Clinton highlighted the alliance's "resolve," saying "NATO is now set to act" on its threats of air strikes.[480] He added the United States "and the international community cannot and will not stand idly by in the face of a conflict that affects our interests, offends our consciences, and disrupts the peace."[481] This notwithstanding, Clinton maintained his previous position that the conflict would have to be resolved by the parties on the ground, and that the United States would only become

478 United Nations Department of Public Information, "United Nations Protection Force. Background."

479 Allied Joint Forces Command Naples, "The Crisis in Former Yugoslavia."

480 William J. Clinton, "Remarks Announcing the NATO Decision on Air Strikes in Bosnia and an Exchange With Reporters, February 9, 1994," in *Book 1. Presidential Documents - January 1 to July 31, 1994*, ed. Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1995), 219.

481 Ibid.

involved "proportionate to [its] interests, no more and no less."[482] To this end, the United States increased its military commitment by deploying assets in support of the February 9 NAC decision, and its political commitment by pledging to become more actively involved in the Geneva negotiations.[483] NATO's transition to a more active, enforcing role thus went hand in hand with an expanded U.S. role, marking a "turning point" for both.[484]

However, NATO airstrikes remained linked to the UN, leaving little room for an independent role for the alliance. This caused considerable problems, with the United States pushing for the expansion of air strikes against the objections of its European allies throughout 1994. Effectively, the U.S. position continued to focus on a lift-and-strike approach, despite Secretary Christopher's unsuccessful pitch of the plan to the Europeans in the spring of 1993. Meanwhile, the fighting in Bosnia continued after the Serbs refused to accept without caveats an agreement brokered by the Contact Group in July of 1994.[485] The Clinton administration faced an arduous choice between upping military pressure on the Serbs through (unilateral) air strikes and maintaining unity with the alliance given staunch European opposition to increased air strikes. The administration itself was divided on which course to pursue throughout most of 1993 and 1994, with Secretary of State Christopher and National Security Advisor Lake calling for air strikes and UN Ambassador Albright supporting the introduction of U.S. ground troops.[486]

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482 Ibid.

483 Watson and Ware, *Bosnia, the UN and the NATO Ultimatum*, 3, 18.

484 Joyce P. Kaufman, *NATO and the Former Yugoslavia: Crisis, Conflict, and the Atlantic Alliance* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 110.

485 Ibid., 112. The Contact Group, formed in May of 1994, consisted of France, Germany, Russia, the UK, and the United States.

486 David Mitchell, *Making Foreign Policy: Presidential Management of the Decision-Making Process* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2005), 153–54.

Intra-alliance relations reached a nadir as Bosnian Serbs attacked Bihać, a UN safe area, in November 1994, and when overall attacks picked up again and intensified in the spring of 1995. During the Bihać offensive, NATO airstrikes were being called in with increasing frequency.[487] They included two large operations against an airfield and missile batteries held by Bosnian Serbs in late November. In the aftermath, the Clinton administration again argued for expanding air strikes, while London and Paris threatened to pull out their troops should air strikes proceed. Daalder identified this fallout as "on par" with the 1956 Suez crisis, leading the Clinton administration to back down.[488] In the meantime, Clinton's opposition to the arms embargo further hurt transatlantic relations. Under intense congressional pressure, Clinton had earlier in 1994 unsuccessfully tried to get the Security Council to drop the embargo. On November 10, Clinton announced the United States would no longer enforce the arms embargo over resumed Serbian aggression.[489] In contrast, the NAC on November 15, 1994, upheld its support for the embargo.[490] The Clinton administration afterwards announced it would no longer share information pertaining to the enforcement of the embargo with its allies,[491] resulting in what *The Economist* called a

487 United Nations Department of Public Information, "United Nations Protection Force. Background."

488 Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, 7.

489 Clinton, *My Life*, 633. This announcement came despite the assessment of the U.S. intelligence community that suspending U.S. enforcement of the embargo "would intensify the fighting," "not make a substantial difference on the battlefield," preclude diplomatic solutions, and hurt "[a]llied confidence in US leadership ife prior agreement were not reached, especially with Britain and France."U.S. National Intelligence Council, "Special Estimate: Ending US Compliance With the Bosnian Arms Embargo: Military and Political Implications," August 1994, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1994-08-01.pdf.

490 Rob De Wijk, *NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium: The Battle for Consensus* (Brassey's, 1997), 111.

491 Ibid.

"bombshell" and the "first formal parting of the ways."[492] Tensions continued and were further accentuated when Serb forces shelled UN safe areas and took close to four hundred predominantly European UNPROFOR peacekeepers hostage after NATO had struck Serbian arms depots in late May 1995.[493] This included using the captured peacekeepers as 'human shields,' chaining them up in the vicinity of supposed NATO targets. All hostages were eventually released in mid-June in an unofficial trade-off for UNPROFOR abandoning the NATO-enforced heavy weapons exclusion zones established the year prior.[494] The episode led to a lot of soul-searching in Europe and Canada, which also had seen several of its troops kidnapped, over the purpose of UNPROFOR and the Balkans deployment. The UK and Canada were openly discussing pulling out their troops, and the French suggested either doubling down or getting out of the Balkans altogether.[495]

Maintaining allied unity was a key factor driving the Clinton administrations decision to abandon its push for lift and strike altogether, as illustrated by a November 10, 1994, memorandum from Tony Lake to the president which suggested focusing on rebuilding the United States' relations with its allies.[496] Likewise, Defense Secretary Bill Perry, recalling a

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492 Cited in Cornish, *Partnership in Crisis*, 3.

493 Joel Br, "Bosnian Serbs Seize More U.N. Troops," *Washington Post*, May 29, 1995, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/05/29/bosnian-serbs-seize-more-un-troops/991628ef-8469-436d-8759-470fe4ab11d4/; Joel Br, "Serbs Defy U.N. Demands to Free Hostages," *Washington Post*, May 31, 1995, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/05/31/serbs-defy-un-demands-to-free-hostages/f45025ed-f1df-48a1-ae9c-4b34e08728e2/; Kaufman, *NATO and the Former Yugoslavia*, 118; Sean Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 80; Mitchell, *Making Foreign Policy*, 157.

494 John Pomfret, "Last of Hostages Released by Serbs," *Washington Post*, June 19, 1995, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/06/19/last-of-hostages-released-by-serbs/c23ded0d-8d27-4168-aa0a-b81ec1957a7c/.

495 Kaufman, *NATO and the Former Yugoslavia*, 118–19.

496 Lincoln Mitchell, "Georgia's Story: Competing Narratives since the War," *Survival*

June 1995 NATO meeting, noted: "[…] NATO, paralyzed into inaction, was shown to be irrelevant in dealing with the Bosnian crisis. […] In sum, at that meeting, it appeared to me that NATO was in the process of unraveling."[497]

President Clinton was similarly troubled, and keeping the alliance together figured prominently in his thinking: "I also didn't want to divide the NATO alliance by unilaterally bombing Serb military positions, especially since there were European, but no American, soldiers on the ground with the UN Mission. And I didn't want to send American troops there, putting them in harm's way under a UN mandate I thought was bound to fail."[498] The president was also coming under increasing Congressional pressure to chart an American course on Bosnia independent of the Europeans. Indeed, Congress in July and August of 1995 voted to unilaterally lift the arms embargo if UN peacekeepers withdraw or the Bosnian government requests the embargo be lifted. This forced the president to use the second veto in his tenure.[499] Congressional assertiveness was driven in parts by the massacre in Srebrenica in July of 1995. Meanwhile, Serb forces in Bosnia were stretched thin in the wake of months of territorial gains, causing a reversal of their fortunes in western Bosnia, where Bosnian troops made significant advances in the summer of 1995.

51, no. 4 (2009): 157.

497 William J. Perry, "Six Postulates for a Future NATO. Prepared Remarks by Defense Secretary William J. Perry to the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, Seminar, Norfolk, Va., June 27, 1996.," *Defense Issues* 11, no. 56 (1996), https://web.archive.org/web/20091203012750/http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=995.

498 Clinton, *My Life*, 513.

499 Todd S. Purdum, "Clinton Vetoes Lifting Bosnia Arms Embargo," *New York Times*, August 12, 1995, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/12/world/clinton-vetoes-lifting-bosnia-arms-embargo.html; Elaine Sciolino, "Senate Vote to End Embargo May Prove a Pyrrhic Victory," *New York Times*, July 28, 1995, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/28/world/conflict-balkans-politics-senate-vote-end-embargo-may-prove-pyrrhic-victory.html.

NATO's role expanded again after the meeting in London of interested parties on July 20, 1995, called by British Prime Minister John Major. In the weeks preceding the emergency meeting, Bosnian Serbs had overrun Srebrenica and Zepa, two UN-mandated safe areas, and were now threatening Goražde, a third safe area and the last predominantly Muslim area in eastern Bosnia.[500] The allies decided to make a stand over Goražde, threatening substantial airstrikes should Serbs advance on the city. As Secretary Christopher recalls, "the meeting was a vital turning point […]: we finally committed to put some real muscle behind our rhetoric."[501] The meeting also decided that NATO air power should be used more offensively and more proactively. To this end, it was decided that the double authorization by the UN and NATO previously required for airstrikes would be scrapped for the safe areas. NATO authorization would suffice in the future.

The French, British, and Dutch had previously also upped the military stakes in the Balkans by dispatching a rapid reaction force of 10,000 in support of UNPROFOR.[502] NATO's Operation Decisive Force of August 1995 entailed an intermittent series of bombings of Bosnian Serbs' positions after they had shelled Sarajevo and continued with intermissions through most of September.

Against this backdrop, in particular the still very real prospect of UN withdrawal by year's end, the Clinton administration launched a diplomatic effort to secure a negotiated settlement for Bosnia-Herzegovina. The U.S. concept envisioned a 51%-49% split of territory between

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500 Samantha Power, "Bosnian Serbs Seize Safe Area," *Washington Post*, July 12, 1995, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/07/12/bosnian-serbs-seize-safe-area/a1e38168-e47f-42a2-bc0f-d8cb8f428984/.

501 Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, 348.

502 Rynning, *NATO Renewed*, 28.

Bosnian Muslims and Serbs under the roof of a common federal Bosnia-Herzegovina. Tony Lake pitched the idea to European capitals in mid-August, and in stark contrast to Warren Christopher's 1993 lift-and-strike tour, reactions were positive throughout. Said Christopher of the Lake trip: "Europe was finally ready to respond to unequivocal U.S. leadership."[503]

Combined with diplomatic pressure applied by the 'Contact Group for Yugoslavia,' the NATO air campaign and a Croat ground offensive into Bosnia-Herzegovina, the U.S. diplomatic offensive helped bring the Serbs to the negotiating table eventually. U.S. negotiators led by Assistant Secretary of State for Europe Richard Holbrooke secured a ceasefire agreement on October 5.[504]

6.3.4. Dayton, Paris, and Beyond

On December 14, 1995, the parties formally signed the 'General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,' the settlement better known as the Dayton Peace Agreement, in Paris.[505] With U.S. guidance, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Yugoslavia had hammered out the agreement throughout November in tense negotiations at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base outside Dayton, Ohio. Under the terms of the Dayton Peace Agreement, NATO would deploy a 60,000-strong force to implement the agreement.[506] The deployment would hence be called Implementation Force

503 Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, 349.

504 Alison Mitchell, "Bosnian Enemies Set a Cease-Fire; Plan Peace Talks," *New York Times*, October 6, 1995, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/06/world/conflict-balkans-overview-bosnian-enemies-set-cease-fire-plan-peace-talks.html.

505 "General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina," December 14, 1995, http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BA_951121_DaytonAgreement.pdf.

506 Ibid. I 1 b.

(IFOR). IFOR's mandate was to supervise the territorial division, and to keep the parties separate and to maintain the peace for one year after the signature of the Dayton accords.

The North Atlantic Council had voted to authorize military planning for IFOR on December 5, 1995, i.e. before the signature of the Dayton Peace Agreement. All NATO allies with armed forces pledged to contribute to the mission, as did fourteen non-NATO states, including aspirant members such as the Baltic countries and the Visegrád-4. With planning underway, the NAC gave the green light to IFOR on December 15, 1995, and deployment under Operation Joint Endeavor was to commence immediately.[507] UNPROFOR formally handed over responsibilities to IFOR on December 20, placing all NATO and non-NATO assets under the authority of IFOR Commander Admiral Leighton Smith. By mid-February, the alliance had completed the deployment of around 54,000 NATO and non-NATO troops to Bosnia. Of these troops, the United States provided 19,000—that is about a third of all IFOR troops.[508]

Whilst IFOR proved relatively successful in the year of its existence, it was clear to all in late 1996 that maintaining the peace in Bosnia would require a continued international presence. To this end, NATO under a UN mandate launched the Stabilization Force (SFOR) to succeed IFOR. SFOR was to maintain a military presence—at initially 31,000 just over half that of IFOR—in Bosnia for an initial period of 18 months after IFOR's expiration on December 20, 1996.[509] In the end, SFOR's mandate was

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507 Allied Joint Forces Command Naples, "The Crisis in Former Yugoslavia."

508 Steven R. Bowman, Julie Kim, and Steven Woehrel, "Bosnia Stabilization Force (SFOR) and U.S. Policy," *CRS Report for Congress*, January 29, 1998, 1, 3; Julie Kim, "Bosnia Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR): Activities of the 104th Congress," *CRS Report for Congress*, January 6, 1997.

509 NATO Public Diplomacy Division, *NATO Handbook*, 145–47. SFOR's size decreased over the course of its existence to 19,000 in early 2001, 12,000 by the end of 2002, and 7,000 by the time the EU mission replaced it in 2004. See NATO,

renewed continually, and it stayed in Bosnia for eight years before being replaced with a civilian-focused EU mission in 2004.

6.4. The 1998-1999 Kosovo Crisis and NATO's First War

While the international force led by NATO managed to secure the peace in Bosnia after the Dayton accords, all was not well in the former Yugoslavia in the second half of the 1990s. Several sources of potential instability remained besides the region's religious divides: the Dayton Peace Agreement could have collapsed, a sizeable Hungarian minority lived uneasily in Serbia, Montenegrins became increasingly alienated with Serbia, and Serbian forces for several years after Dayton remained in the Eastern Slavonia enclave in Croatia.[510]

Trouble eventually erupted in Kosovo, a region of Serbia predominantly inhabited by ethnic Albanians. Tensions there had been rife for the better part of a decade after the region lost its autonomy rights within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1989 consitutional reforms, stripping it of rights it had enjoyed since the mid-1970s. Indeed, the Bush administration was concerned enough over the possibility of an intervention in Kosovo by the Yugoslav central government that the outgoing administration threatened military action. In his 1992 'Christmas Warning' letter, President Bush warned Serbian President Slobodan Milošević that the United States "would employ military force against the Serbs in Kosovo and in Serbia proper" should its forces move on Kosovo.[511] Bush's statement was likely motivated by a desire to prevent

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"Peace Support Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina," September 7, 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52122.htm.

510 John W. Young and John Kent, *International Relations since 1945. A Global History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 641.

511 David Binder, "Bush Warns Serbs Not to Widen War," *New York Times*, December

the conflict in the Bosnia from spreading farther south—and towards U.S. NATO allies Greece and Turkey.[512] In subsequent years, the threat of the Bosnian war spreading south was contained, e.g. through the deployment of a small contingent of U.S. troops to Macedonia as a tripwire force.[513] Accordingly, the Dayton Agreement contained no provisions concerning Kosovo.

The international community only concerned itself with Kosovo when the situation there deteriorated dramatically in the spring of 1998. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)[514] and government forces clashed with increasing frequency, and first reports of grave human rights violations emerged. Meanwhile, Kosovo's moderate leader Ibrahim Rugova sought to negotiate the restitution of Kosovar autonomy within Serbia. However, the tide of popular support was turning away from Rugova toward the KLA as tensions with Serbia mounted. Drenica, the KLA's stronghold in western Kosovo, was the site of the first assault by Serbian police forces on alleged KLA operatives. Several dozen died in the attack, which also caused over 5,000 inhabitants of Drenica Valley to flee their homes.[515] With Albania in the throes of political turmoil itself and Albanians

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28, 1992, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/28/world/bush-warns-serbs-not-to-widen-war.html.

512 Gompert, "The United States and Yugoslavia's Wars," 137.

513 R. Cody Phillipps, *Operation Joint Guardian: The U.S. Army in Kosovo* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2007), 10–11; New York TImes, "300 U.S. Troops in Macedonia To Try to Contain Balkan War," July 13, 1993, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/13/world/300-us-troops-in-macedonia-to-try-to-contain-balkan-war.html.

514 Or *Ushtria Çlimitare e Kosovës* (UCK). The group carried out its first attacks against Serbs in Kosovo in April 1996—less than half a year after the signature of the Dayton Peace Agreement. See Misha Glenny, *The Balkans. Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999* (New York: Penguin, 2000), 652–53.

515 R. Jeffrey Smith, "At Least 46 Albanians Killed in Kosovo Fighting," *Washington Post*, March 10, 1998; R. Jeffrey Smith, "Eerie Quiet Follows Assault in Kosovo," *Washington Post*, March 9, 1998.

accounting for about a quarter of the population of neighboring Montenegro, the specter of war returned to the Balkans.

Given similarities to the situation in Bosnia before the outbreak of war there, the international community took notice and acted quickly. Already in December 1997, the NAC called for dialogue and political solution to the mounting ethnic tensions in Kosovo, noting the alliance's interest in maintaining stability.[516] On March 9, 1998, the Contact Group reconvened, having adopted a statement similar to that of the NAC in September 1997. Originally established in May 1994 during the Bosnian War, the group brought together France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Their statement issued on March 9 condemned actions by both Serbian forces and the KLA, called for the withdrawal of Serbian special police forces within ten days, and raised the possibility of imposing economic sanctions and an arms embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).[517] Further, the statement called for a United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) and an OSCE mission to Kosovo. Given Italian and Russian reticence, the meeting failed to commit to a timeline for imposing sanctions or indeed committing to do so.[518] Nevertheless, the increased western pressure did lead to Milošević withdrawing forces from Kosovo.

Having remained largely indifferent to events in Kosovo until then, the UN Security Council on March 31, 1998, passed resolution 1160 at the

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516 "Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 16 December 1997," December 16, 1997, para. 17, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-155e.htm.

517 Contact Group, "Statement on Kosovo Adopted at the Contact Group Meeting in London, 9 March 1998," March 9, 1998, http://secretary.state.gov/www/travels/980309_kosovo.html.

518 Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the UN: A Peculiar Relationship* (Columbia, MS: University of Missouri Press, 2010), 172.

initiative of the Contact Group.[519] The resolution provided for an arms embargo against Yugoslavia to include Kosovo, and called for a political process with the goal of maintaining the FRY's integrity.[520] However, resolution 1160 did not provide for any mechanism to monitor or to enforce the resolution beyond requiring monthly reports by the UN Secretary-General on its implementation. Lacking enforcement, Secretary-General Kofi Annan reported that the embargo was not being observed, based on information gleaned from the OSCE.[521]

NATO military planning began in April and June of 1998, focusing both on peacekeeping operations after a successful settlement and offensive military operations.[522] Ground troops were swiftly ruled out, with airstrikes emerging as the prefered option.[523] With no diplomatic solution in sight, the specter of an even worse humanitarian disaster hung over Kosovo in the summer and fall of 1998. The onset of winter would have spelled certain death for the hundreds of thousands displaced within Kosovo and to neighboring Albania and Montenegro, and large-scale fighting continued. The FRY summer offensive of 1998 killed an estimated 1,500 and displaced around 300,000.[524] Against this backdrop, NATO conducted a series of air, land, and naval exercises in the regions to

519 UN Security Council, *Resolution 1160 (1998). Adopted by the Security Council at Its 3868th Meeting, on 31 March 1998*, 1998, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/090/23/PDF/N9809023.pdf.

520 Ibid., paras. 8, 5.

521 See e.g. Kofi Annan, "Report of the Secretary-General Prepared Pursuant to Resolution 1160 (1998) of the Security Council (S/1998/470)," June 4, 1998, http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/1998/u980604a.htm.

522 Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo*, 32–34.

523 Bruce Nardulli et al., *Disjointed War: Military Operations in Kosovo, 1999* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 14.

524 Adam Roberts, "NATO's 'Humanitarian War' Over Kosovo," *Survival* 41, no. 3 (1999): 112.

demonstrate its resolve and readiness to react to any contingency there.[525] To increase the pressure on Milošević, NATO Secretary-General Solana on August 12 made public that the alliance had initiated contingency planning for military in Yugoslavia: "[…] [T]he Council today reviewed military planning for a full range of options to bring an end to violence and to create the conditions for negotiations. These include the use of ground and air power and in particular a full-range of options for the use of air power alone."[526] The UN Security Council in September passed resolution 1199, demanding under Chapter VII "that all parties, groups and individuals immediately cease hostilities and maintain a ceasefire in Kosovo" and determining the situation posed a threat to peace and security.[527]

The Clinton administration meanwhile pursued a two-track strategy of combined diplomatic and military pressure on the FRY to secure an agreement before the onset of winter. In May, the administration dispatched newly designated U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN Richard Holbrooke to Yugoslavia after imposing additional economic sanctions against the FRY.[528] Holbrooke succeeded in bringing the Albanian and Ser-

525 Operation Determined Falcon, an overflight of Albania and Macedonia by 80 planes drawn from 13 of the allies' air forces, took place on June 15, 1998. Allied Joint Forces Command Naples, "The Crisis In Kosovo," accessed June 30, 2016, https://www.jfcnaples.nato.int/page6322744/15-the-crisis-in-kosovo; Steven R. Bowman, "Kosovo and Macedonia: U.S. and Allied Military Operations," *CRS Report for Congress*, July 8, 2003, 1.

526 Javier Solana, "Statement by the Secretary General of NATO, 12 August 1998," August 12, 1998, http://nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p98-094e.htm.

527 UN Security Council, *Resolution 1199 (1998). Adopted by the Security Council at Its 3930th Meeting, on 23 September 1998*, 1998, para. 1, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1199(1998). Controversially, NATO SYG Solana on October 10, 1998, claimed that this resolution gave NATO legal authority for military action in Yugoslavia.

528 Philip Shenon, "U.S. Dispatches Its Balkans Mediator With a Warning to the Serbs," *New York Times*, May 9, 1998, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/09/world/us-dispatches-its-balkans-mediator-with-a-warning-to-the-serbs.html.

bian side to meet after offering significant incentives to both.[529] The meetings included first-ever talks between moderate Albanian leader Rugova and Milošević, and between KLA and FRY representatives in Switzerland in June. "The combined threat of the use of force and diplomacy is the best way of proceeding,"[530] Secretary Albright said after briefing U.S. Senators with Secretary of Defense Cohen on October 1, defending the administration's policy. She added "NATO is now prepared to act."[531] Cohen similarly stressed there is a "credible military threat" against Milošević.[532] Indeed, the alliance had begun contingency planning for military action after a decision of the defense ministers in June, and conducted air exercises over Albania and Macedonia that month.[533] U.S. Secretary of Defense Cohen welcomed the decisions, noting that the situation in Kosovo "threatens stability in the whole region"[534] and expressed his preference for a diplomatic solution. However, Cohen also welcomed the envisioned NATO exercises and initial planning for a NATO intervention aimed at "halting or disrupting a systematic campaign of violent repression and expulsion

529 Steven Erlanger, "Allies Upset as U.S. Eases Stance on Kosovo," *New York Times*, May 28, 1998, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/28/world/allies-upset-as-us-eases-stance-on-kosovo.html; Steven Erlanger, "First Bosnia, Now Kosovo," *New York Times*, June 10, 1998, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/10/world/first-bosnia-now-kosovo.html.

530 Cited in Helen Dewar and John M. Goshko, "Hill Signals Support for Airstrikes," *Washington Post*, October 2, 1998, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/10/02/hill-signals-support-for-airstrikes/601c6aad-b9f2-4d81-86a8-33d74e63fd08/.

531 CNN, "U.N. Demands Yugoslavs Punish Those Behind Kosovo Massacres," October 1, 1998, http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9810/01/kosovo.02/.

532 Ibid.

533 "Statement on Kosovo. Issued at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session," June 12, 1998, para. 4, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p98-077e.htm; Craig R. Whitney, "NATO to Conduct Large Maneuvers to Warn Off Serbs," *New York Times*, June 12, 1998, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/12/world/conflict-balkans-overview-nato-conduct-large-maneuvers-warn-off-serbs.html.

534 William S. Cohen, "Press Conference at NATO Headquarters, 11 June 1998," June 11, 1998, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s980611f.htm.

in Kosovo."[535] The United States also pushed for the alliance to issue an Activation Warning (ACTWARN), which NATO defense ministers approved during their informal September 23-24, 1998, meeting in Vilamoura, Portugal.[536] The first in NATO's multi-step mobilization procedure, an ACTWARN allows the SACEUR to ask allies to identify forces they would contribute to operations. Any pledges at this stage are politically but not legally binding.[537] The ACTWARN issued at Vilamoura was specifically for "a limited air option and a phased air campaign in Kosovo."[538]

On October 2, the Clinton administration again dispatched seasoned negotiator Richard Holbrooke to lead negotiations with the FRY. The main goal was to secure agreement on an international mission to monitor a troop withdrawal from Kosovo.[539] At the time, the FRY had—in partial compliance with UN Security Council resolutions—withdrawn about 60% of its special forces and troops from Kosovo.[540] The U.S. diplomatic initiative flanked the increasing military pressure applied by NATO at U.S. prodding. On October 9, Secretary-General Solana concluded in a letter to NAC permanent representatives "that the Allies believe that in the particular circumstances [...] there are legitimate grounds for the Alliance to threaten, and if necessary, to use force."[541] Further, Solana said publicly

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535 Ibid.

536 Javier Solana, "Statement by the Secretary General Following the ACTWARN Decision," September 24, 1998, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p980924e.htm.

537 Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat* (New York: Public Affairs, 2002), 135–36.

538 Solana, "Statement by the Secretary General Following the ACTWARN Decision."

539 Jane Perlez, "NATO Raises Its Pressure On the Serbs," *New York Times*, October 12, 1998, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/12/world/nato-raises-its-pressure-on-the-serbs.html.

540 Steven Erlanger, "NATO Plans to Intensify Its Pressure on Milosevic in Stages," *New York Times*, October 9, 1998, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/09/world/nato-plans-to-intensify-its-pressure-on-milosevic-in-stages.html.

541 Quoted in Bruno Simma, "NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects,"

on October 10 there was "a sufficient legal basis" for threatening and using force.[542] Solana thus floated the possibility of military action against the FRY without further UN resolutions, thereby paving the way for allied action circumventing Russian objections. Based on the probably flawed belief in the initial efficacy of the threat of airstrikes in Bosnia,[543] the NAC on October 13, 1998, issued an Activation Order (ACTORD) for airstrikes against Serbian forces. This moved the alliance a step further towards actual military action:[544] The alliance had for the first time formally threatened airstrikes within a possible 96-hours timeline.[545] U.S. officials backed up NATO's threat of force, which the Clinton administration had pushed for over weeks.[546] Analogies drawn to the successful threat of air strikes in Bosnia underlay this approach. Most prominently, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had publicly threatened the use of force repeatedly, hoping to pressure Milošević into an agreement.[547] On October 12, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger emphasized "that NATO is

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European Journal of International Law 10 (1999): 7.

542 Quoted in Kaufman, *NATO and the Former Yugoslavia*, 163.

543 Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo*, 92–93.

544 Javier Solana, "Statement to the Press by the Secretary General Following Decision on the ACTORD, 13 Oct. 1998," October 13, 1998, http://nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s981013a.htm; Roger Cohen, "NATO Nears Final Order To Approve Kosovo Strike," *New York Times*, October 11, 1998, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/11/world/nato-nears-final-order-to-approve-kosovo-strike.html.

545 Jane Perlez, "Milosevic Accepts Kosovo Monitors, Averting Attack," *New York Times*, October 14, 1998, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/14/world/conflict-balkans-overview-milosevic-accepts-kosovo-monitors-averting-attack.html.

546 This push included e.g. considerable pressure on the German government to commit, see Overhaus, *Die Deutsche NATO-Politik. Vom Ende Des Kalten Krieges Bis Zum Kampf Gegen Den Terrorismus*.

547 E.g., State Department Spokesman James Fowley explained the Secretary holds the "strong view that the ongoing Serb offensive and the unacceptable actions [...] only increase the chances of there being military action on the part of NATO; it increases the heat on […] President Milosevic." U.S. Department of State, "Daily Press Briefing," August 6, 1998.

ready to act" in a "complete NATO air campaign."[548] Berger had earlier stated: "The ball is in Mr. Milošević's court. He can come into compliance, or he can face NATO military action."[549] However, Berger expressly ruled out committing U.S. ground troops.

Diplomatic and military pressure payed off when Holbrooke secured two agreements with the FRY's Milošević on October 13, one with the OSCE, one with NATO.[550] The October agreements provided for the withdrawal or garrisoning of FRY troops in Kosovo, a 2,000 strong unarmed OSCE monitoring mission on the ground (Kosovo Verification Mission, KVM), a NATO air reconnaissance mission (Operation Eagle Eye) with the implicit threat of airstrikes in case of noncompliance, and a political process on Kosovo's autonomy.[551] The UN Security Council welcomed the agreements and urged the FRY to implement them in an October 24, 1998, resolution.[552]

Despite this, the FRY intensified its policy of "ethnic cleansing" throughout the fall and winter of 1998/1999. The massacre in Račak, a hamlet in

548 Quoted in R. Jeffrey Smith and George Lardner, "Accord on Kosovo Remains Elusive; Sixth Day of Top-Level Talks in Belgrade Fails to End Confrontation Over Province," *Washington Post*, October 12, 1998.

549 Cited in Perlez, "NATO Raises Its Pressure On the Serbs."

550 "Kosovo Verification Mission Agreement Between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," in *Letter Dated 22 October 1998 from the Chargé D'affaires A.i. of the Mission of the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council*, by A. Peter Burleigh, 1998, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/317/78/IMG/N9831778.pdf?OpenElement.

551 Steven Lee Myers, "2,000 Monitors to Go to Kosovo, but Their Power Is Unclear," *New York Times*, October 15, 1998, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/15/world/2000-monitors-to-go-to-kosovo-but-their-power-is-unclear.html; Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo*, 23.

552 UN Security Council, *Resolution 1203 (1998). Adopted by the Security Council at Its 3937th Meeting, on 24 October 1998*, 1998, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/321/21/PDF/N9832121.pdf.

central Kosovo, in mid-January became the symbol for the failure of the October agreements.[553] After days of shelling, Serb units entered the village, executing 45 Kosovar Albanians. An American diplomat serving on the OSCE's KVM who visited Račak within hours of the massacre described his "personal revulsion" at this "unspeakable atrocity," calling it "a massacre, a crime against humanity."[554]

Events in Račak compelled the international community towards further action, underlined that the October agreements had fallen apart, and helped proponents of increased military pressure win the upper hand in the Clinton administration. In short, Račak became a turning point in the international reaction to the unfolding events in Kosovo. Račak also seemed to help the United States and Russia bridge their differences, with the two countries' foreign ministers releasing a joint statement on January 26. In it, Albright and Igor Ivanov "reiterate their indignation at the massacre of Kosovar Albanian at Račak, which cannot be justified"[555] and called for a full investigation.[556] On January 29, the Contact Group agreed in London to "summon" the parties for negotiations in Rambouillet outside Paris beginning on February 6. Within one week, the parties were to negotiate based on a peace plan proffered by the Contact Group. The Contact Group foreign ministers further reiterated their established demands that the FRY comply with UN resolutions and cease offensive

553 David L. Phillips and Nicholas Burns, *Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U. S. Intervention* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012), 98–99.

554 R. Jeffrey Smith, "This Time, Walker Wasn't Speechless," *Washington Post*, January 23, 1999.

555 Phillips and Burns, *Liberating Kosovo*, 101.

556 "Transcript: Albright, Ivanov Press Conference in Moscow 1/26/99," January 26, 1999, https://fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/news/99012602_tlt.htm; Jane Perlez, "Russia and U.S. Urge Kosovo Talks; Albright Weighs Troops," *New York Times*, January 27, 1999, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/01/27/world/russia-and-us-urge-kosovo-talks-albright-weighs-troops.html.

actions against Kosovo.[557] The previous day, UN Secretary-General Annan had visited NATO headquarters, where NATO Secretary-General Solana stated the alliance's support for the Contact Group initiative to be announced the following day. The Contact Group's decisions, Solana said, would "be fully backed by NATO's military capabilities. We are ready to act, if necessary."[558] Likewise, Annan tacitly floated the possibility of using force against the FRY. In remarks to the NAC, Annan acknowledged "the need to use force, when all other means have failed" and added: "We may be reaching that limit, once again, in the former Yugoslavia."[559] A January 30 decision by the North Atlantic Council echoed these points, expressing support for the Contact Group and noting that the alliance "stands ready to act and rules out no option to ensure full respect by both sides in Kosovo for the requirements of the international community, and observance of all relevant Security Council Resolutions [...]."[560] Importantly, the allies further shortened the timeline for military action by placing the decision on the use of force solely in the hands of SACEUR Wesley Clark: "The Council has therefore agreed today that the NATO Secretary General may authorise air strikes against targets on FRY territory"[561] if the parties fail to respect an immediate ceasefire, agree on a peace agreement at Rambouillet by February 20, and do not comply with the October 1998 agreements.

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557 Stephen L. Burg, "Coercive Diplomacy in the Balkans," in *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, ed. Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).

558 Javier Solana, "Statement to the Press," January 28, 1999, http://nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-011e.htm.

559 Kofi Annan, "Statement to the North Atlantic Council," January 28, 1999, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1999/s990128a.htm.

560 "Statement by the North Atlantic Council on Kosovo," January 30, 1999, para. 1, http://nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-012e.htm.

561 Ibid., para. 5.

While negotiations in Rambouillet went ahead, guarded allied optimism based on the hope for a second Dayton soon proved to be misplaced. The FRY only sent low-level delegates to the talks,[562] which, after being extended twice, were suspended on February 26. Indeed, Daalder and O'Hanlon describe the Rambouillet negotiations as a U.S. effort to satisfy European demands for diplomacy despite low odds for success. The likely failure of talks would then strengthen the case for military action both within the Clinton administration and vis-à-vis European allies.[563] When negotiations eventually resumed in March, Albanian Kosovars were, after securing significant concessions, prepared to sign an agreement, whereas the FRY delegates objected to the deployment of a NATO-led peacekeeping force. Meanwhile, the FRY was massing troops at the Kosovar border while the Rambouillet talks collapsed within days after resuming on March 15. Serb forces intensified their operations in Kosovo immediately, displacing an additional 25,000 ethnic Albanians over the weekend of March 19 alone as the OSCE mission pulled out.[564]

For a last time, the United States tried to secure a diplomatic solution by dispatching its star negotiator Richard Holbrooke to the FRY on March 22 to impress on Milošević that the FRY would face a crushing air campaign if it did not agree to an immediate ceasefire. Concurrently, President Clinton weighed in publicly when talks broke down and on the day of Holbrooke's trip. "In dealing with aggressors in the Balkans, hesitation is a license to kill. But action and resolve can stop armies and save

562 Kaplan, *NATO and the UN*, 178.

563 Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo*, 88–89.

564 Jane Perlez, "NATO Authorizes Bomb Strikes; Primakov, in Air, Skips U.s. Visit," *New York Times*, March 24, 1999, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/24/world/conflict-balkans-overview-nato-authorizes-bomb-strikes-primakov-air-skips-us.html.

lives,"[565] Clinton explained on March 19, adding: "I think that the threshold [for military action, DJR] has been crossed."[566] While Holbrooke was in Belgrade, Clinton reemphasized his point on March 23: "If President Milošević continues to choose aggression over peace, NATO's military plans must continue to move forward."[567]

But the last-ditch diplomatic effort failed. Holbrooke returned to Washington empty-handed after briefing NATO Secretary-General Solana on the outcome of his meeting with Milošević. On March 23, Solana instructed SACEUR Clark to launch Operation Allied Force,[568] what was to become a 78-day air campaign against Yugoslavia that commenced on March 24.[569]

As NATO launched its air campaign against the FRY, more than 2,500 civilians had perished in the previous twelve months and an estimated 460,000 been displaced within Kosovo and throughout the region.[570] Yugoslavia intensified its attacks on Albanian guerillas and its policy of "ethnic cleansing" when airstrikes began, causing a steep increase in the number of casualties and displaced persons. A December 1999 report by the U.S. Department of State found that by the end of the Kosovo war in

565 William J. Clinton, "The President's News Conference. March 19, 1999," in *Book 1. Presidential Documents - January 1 to June 31, 1999*, ed. Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2000), 410.

566 Ibid., 414.

567 William J. Clinton, "Remarks on the Situation in Kosovo. March 22, 1999," in *Book 1. Presidential Documents - January 1 to June 31, 1999*, ed. Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2000), 427.

568 Javier Solana, "Press Statement. 23 March 1999," March 23, 1999, http://nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-040e.htm.

569 Javier Solana, "Press Statement Following the Commencement of Air Operations. 24 March 1999," March 24, 1999, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-041e.htm.

570 Steven Woehrel and Julie Kim, "Kosovo and U.S. Policy," *CRS Issue Brief for Congress*, January 10, 2001, 2; Roberts, "NATO's 'Humanitarian War' Over Kosovo."

June, 10,000 Kosovars had been killed and 1.5 million—or 90% of Kosovo's 1998 population—displaced.[571]

U.S. military capabilities were once more key to Operation Allied Force. The United States supplied two-thirds of the aircraft involved in the operation (725 of the roughly 1,100). Of these 1,100, 535 were capable of offensive action. The United States provided 323, or about 60% of all attack aircraft.[572] Of the 37,200 sorties under Operation Allied Force, U.S. planes flew 62%, dominating in particular intelligence and reconnaissance sorties (79% of which were conducted by U.S. planes). The figure for actual strike sorties are more balanced, with the United States conducting 52% of the 9,500 strike sorties.[573]

On June 3, Milošević accepted a G-8 peace proposal presented by EU envoy Martti Ahtisaari and Russia's Viktor Chernomyrdin, paving the way for the signature of a military technical agreement at Macedonia's Kumanovo air base on June 9.[574] The agreement provided for the phased withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo by June 20 and placed the province under international control. The following day, NATO suspended its air campaign as the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1244, which endorsed the peace agreement and "an international security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation"

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571 U.S. Department of State, "Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo: An Accounting," December 1999, http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/kosovoii/homepage.html. NATO figures are similar, listing one million refugees and half a million internally displaced persons within Kosovo. See Sergio Balanzino, "NATO's Humanitarian Support to the Victims of the Kosovo Crisis," *NATO Review* 47, no. 2 (1999): 9–13; Lois B. McHugh and Joyce Vialet, "Kosovo: Refugee Assistance and Temporary Resettlement," *CRS Issue Brief for Congress*, September 1, 1999.

572 Bowman, "Kosovo and Macedonia: U.S. and Allied Military Operations," i.

573 Ibid., 4–5.

574 Richard Norton-Taylor, Nicholas Watt, and Stuart Millar, "War Ends as Peace Deal Is Done," *The Guardian*, June 10, 1999.

to secure the peace.[575] Thus ended the 78-day campaign involving, at its peak, over 900 airplanes from 14 countries flying over 37,000 sorties out of 40 locations.[576] As in Bosnia, a NATO-led deployment followed the peace deal: On June 12, the Kosovo Force (KFOR) began moving into Kosovo.

6.5. The 1999 Strategic Concept

As the alliance fought its first war over Kosovo, the lag between what NATO was and had been doing—stabilizing a peripheral zone outside its traditional area of operations—and what its central strategic documents envisioned became increasingly clear. Indeed, the alliance had identified new, non-traditional challenges to security as early as the late 1980s and in its 1991 Strategic Concept.[577] Since the mid 1990s and clearly with the deployment of IFOR and SFOR, the alliance's primary focus had been on stabilizing the Balkans.[578] Whilst the 1991 Strategic Concept was touted as a wholly new concept for a new world, its successor proved to be more moderate in its ambitions.[579] Allied leaders at their 1997 summit in Madrid tasked the NAC with reviewing the strategic concept, and the NAC availed itself of the opportunity for "examination, and, updating as necessary" of the strategic concept.[580] In particular, two issues were front and

575 UN Security Council, *Resolution 1244 (1999). Adopted by the Security Council at Its 4011th Meeting, on 10 June 1999*, 1999, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf, annex 2, para. 4.

576 Allied Joint Forces Command Naples, "Operation Allied Force," accessed July 20, 2016, https://www.jfcnaples.nato.int/page6322744/16-operation-allied-force-.

577 Deni, *Alliance Management and Maintenance*, 56.

578 Ivo H. Daalder, "The United States and Europe. From Primacy to Partnership?," in *Eagle Rules? Foreign Policy and American Primacy in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Robert J. Lieber (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002), 77.

579 Rynning, *NATO Renewed*, 78.

580 Sten Rynning, "Shaping Military Doctrine in France: Decisionmakers Between International Power and Domestic Interests," *Security Studies* 11, no. 2 (2001): 78.

center in the intra-alliance debate: Whether and how far NATO's geographical scope should expand, and whether Kosovo was a model for future operations, in particular with regard to the absence of a UN authorization.[581] True to this conservative approach, NATO's tasks set out in the 1999 strategic document largely echo those in its predecessor. The exception is the addition to NATO's "fundamental security tasks" of "crisis management" and extending the alliance's partnerships. These two tasks aim at enhancing "the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area."[582] The inclusion of crisis management, while undoubtedly an apt description of the alliance's most visible undertakings in the 1990s, marked a break with established conceptions of NATO's functions.[583] In fact, the previous strategic document, while noting manifold new challenges, had expressly ruled out the use of force "except in self-defence."[584]

Notably, the new strategic concept contained no limitations on the geographical remit of the alliance's missions. This was the compromise struck between the Clinton administration, which during the deliberations had strongly pushed for a broad purview for NATO, and the European allies, which sought to place limitations on NATO's geographical responsibilities.[585] In particular since the summer of 1997, Albright's State Depart-

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581 Ted Galen Carpenter, "NATO's New Strategic Concept: Coherent Blueprint or Conceptual Muddle?," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 23, no. 3 (2000): 7–28.

582 "The Alliance's Strategic Concept Approved by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C.," April 24, 1999, para. 10, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27433.htm.

583 David S. Yost, "NATO's Evolving Purposes and the Next Strategic Concept," *International Affairs* 86, no. 2 (2010): 491.

584 "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept Agreed by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council," para. 35; Yost, "NATO's Evolving Purposes and the Next Strategic Concept," 491.

585 Carpenter, "NATO's New Strategic Concept: Coherent Blueprint or Conceptual Muddle?," 11–12, 14; William Drozdiak, "European Allies Balk at Expanded Role for NATO," *Washington Post*, February 22, 1998, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/02/22/european-allies-balk-

ment had pushed for the idea of significantly expanding the possibilities for NATO out-of-area missions.[586] This complemented the U.S.-driven expansion of the "in area" of NATO that occurred with the 1999 and 2002 rounds of enlargement. Said President Clinton in Berlin in May 1998: "Yesterday's NATO guarded our borders against direct military invasion. Tomorrow's alliance must continue to defend enlarged borders and defend against threats to our security from beyond them: the spread of weapons of mass destruction, ethnic violence, regional conflict."[587] Cognizant of allied concerns, Secretary of State Albright in 1998 downplayed the U.S. vision for what NATO can and should do, rejecting the notion that the Clinton administration was trying "to create some kind of new 'global NATO.'"[588] Rather, Albright explained, her goal was overcoming "any lingering sense of complacency caused by the Cold War's end"[589] and "using the flexibility the [North Atlantic, DJR] Treaty always offered to adapt this Alliance to the realities of a new strategic environment […]."[590] She dismissed concerns that this would fundamentally alter the nature of the alliance as "hogwash."[591]

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at-expanded-role-for-nato/436462d4-79db-4ee1-950e-3d33d735ab17/.

586 Jennifer Medcalf, *Going Global or Going Nowhere? NATO's Role in Contemporary International Security* (Oxford: Lang, 2008), 71–73.

587 William J. Clinton, "Remarks to the People of Germany in Berlin. May 13, 1998," in *Book 1. Presidential Documents - January 1 to June 31, 1998*, ed. Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2000), 751.

588 Madeleine K. Albright, "Statement to the North Atlantic Council. Brussels, Belgium, December 8, 1998," December 8, 1998, https://fas.org/man/nato/news/1998/98120802_tlt.html.

589 Madeleine K. Albright, "Press Conference, NATO HQ, 8 December 1998," December 8, 1998, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s981208x.htm.

590 Albright, "Statement to the North Atlantic Council. Brussels, Belgium, December 8, 1998."

591 Ibid.; William Drozdiak, "Albright Urges NATO to Take Broader Role," *Washington Post*, December 9, 1998, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/12/09/albright-urges-nato-to-take-broader-role/64e01e17-6b3f-4a8f-a9bf-7232ae6b73d9/.

6.6. Summary

Taken together, a mixed picture of U.S. policy towards NATO emerges in the Bosnia War, the Kosovo intervention, and the concomitant debate on expanding the alliance's geographical reach. Whereas the United States was reluctant to become involved in the wars immediately resulting out of the break-up of Yugoslavia, the Clinton administration was more forceful in committing the United States to action in Kosovo early on. Whilst U.S. leadership proved critical in the eventual resolution of both conflicts, the United States was certainly more forward-leaning on Kosovo, and successfully kept the European allies on board. In the revision of NATO strategy, the Clinton administration was less successful in pushing through the U.S. vision of an alliance with a scope going beyond Europe and its periphery. While this was not formally enshrined in the 1999 strategic concept, dropping the formerly prominent statements on geographical limitations of the alliance did open up room for debate. The United States thus managed to introduce an element of ambiguity into the alliance's self conception, paving the way for operations unthinkable a decade earlier, e.g. in Afghanistan and Libya in the 2000s as well as for a discussion of membership—remote as it may be—for countries such as Georgia.

Initially, the United States was unable to secure allied support for its preferred policy of lift-and-strike, under which the arm embargo against the territory of Yugoslavia would have been lifted and air strikes against the rump Yugoslavia conducted. As outlined above, the European opposition to the incoming Clinton administration's plans gravitated around the safety of the—predominantly European—UN peacekeepers on the ground in the Balkans. Whilst the United States could have acted unilaterally, this would have severely strained relations with "the NATO Allies, principally

Britain and France,"[592] as a contemporary U.S. intelligence report notes. Considerations for alliance cohesion were prominent in the Clinton administration, as was the notion that NATO should remain the premier security institution in the face of competing European schemes. Therefore, a public rift in the alliance had to be avoided to maintain an image of unity. Further, a role for NATO in the Balkans had to be carved out—standing by idly would have been hard to reconcile with the vision of NATO's enduring importance outlined by U.S. officials.[593] Thus, consideration for allies did initially preclude the United States from pursuing its preferred policy options in the Balkans. As the crisis deepened and European initiatives outside NATO faltered, however, the transatlantic alliance once more became a natural recourse for addressing the deteriorating situation in the Balkans. In the end, it was a NATO intervention with predominantly U.S. contributions that secured the Dayton agreement. The Bosnian crisis further does not corroborate entanglement theory's main prediction that the alliance drew the United States into unwanted conflict. Rather, the U.S. government pushed for a strong NATO role in responding to the breakup of Yugoslavia and eventually succeeded in securing it over the initial European opposition.

The lead-up to the 1999 intervention in Kosovo followed a similar pattern, albeit with important differences. Again, it is hard to see any evidence for the predictions made by entanglement theory. As in the Bosnian case, the United States from the outset envisioned an international inter-

592 "Lifting the Arms Embargo: Impact on the War in Bosnia. National Intelligence Council Memorandum," May 13, 1994, 9, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1994-05-13.pdf.

593 Cf. e.g. Secretary Christopher's rejection of the notion that Bosnia is breaking NATO: "I understand completely why the press has been filled in the last week with stories saying Bosnia is wrecking NATO. But is just not so. Bosnia is wrecking Bosnia. … We are not ignoring Bosnia." Christopher separately noted: "The crisis in Bosnia is about Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia; it does not diminish NATO's enduring importance." Both cited in Goldgeier, *Not Whether but When*, 86.

vention under NATO's auspices. In contrast to Bosnia, there was no period in which U.S. efforts took a backseat to European efforts. Apparently, one of the lessons learned in European capitals in the aftermath of Bosnia was the importance of NATO and thus American involvement. This view was buttressed by the haphazard progress on European defense and security cooperation in the 1990s.

The Balkans episodes also illustrate how the United States has used NATO for enshrining U.S. leadership and hierarchy in a unipolar system. Not least, NATO provides the United States and the allies with a forum for consultation. In this, NATO served as a two-way street—both for the United States to influence its partners, and for them to make their voices heard and enjoy privileged access to the hegemon. Compared to the issue of NATO expansion, intra-alliance coordination in formal channels played less of a role in the case of the alliance's Balkans operation. Instead, the U.S. government repeatedly resorted to consultations outside established channels to advocate its positions, as illustrated e.g. by Warren Christopher's and Tony Lake's tours of European capitals advocating a more aggressive policy towards the FRY. Vice versa, coordination outside NATO was paramount for the Europeans until the alliance committed to a more robust role in the Balkans in 1993/1994.

From an American perspective, the Clinton administration succeeded not only in securing its goal of a premier role for NATO in the post-Cold-War security sphere. The administration also managed to do so while keeping costs to the United States at an acceptable level. Against the backdrop of the Cold War, any U.S. commitment in Europe was bound to appear minor, regardless of its actual size. However, the Bush and Clinton administrations both successfully avoided committing U.S. ground troops to the

Balkans in an enforcing role, leaving that task to a largely European—in particular French, British, Dutch, and Danish—UN mission.

Nevertheless, the United States played a crucial role in applying military pressure on the FRY from the air. U.S. matériel made up for the bulk of aerial assets deployed by NATO both in support of the UN-mandated no-fly zone over the former Yugoslavia and in the 1999 Kosovo air campaign. However, U.S. contributions were not outsized. In fact, the U.S. contributed disproportionately little to the campaigns in absolute terms, and U.S. assets only accounted for about half of all strike sorties. Meanwhile, U.S. assets were critical, in particular for allied intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The Clinton administration also successfully limited the U.S. contributions to the international missions to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, respectively, despite the United States' outsized role in securing the diplomatic settlements ending the war in Bosnia and the air campaign against Serbia.

Taken together, the United States has thus employed NATO as a cost-effective way of securing international support and of maintaining an international system essentially beneficial to it. Pooling military capabilities and resources is evidently less important for the unipole, being by definition the most materially powerful international actor. Yet the transatlantic alliance has served the separate, important functions of legitimizing the U.S.-led international order, e.g. by serving as a formal consultation mechanism. In other words, NATO, through a history of cooperation and the constant invocation of its inherent value, has allowed the United States to shore up international support for its policies. Few instances illustrate this mechanism better than the U.S. preference for aerial combat against the FRY both over Bosnia and Kosovo. Despite initial European

resistance in the Bosnian case, the U.S. government eventually succeeded in convincing its European allies.

Pace entanglement theory, U.S. participation in combat action over Bosnia and Kosovo did not bog down the United States in open-ended commitments there. Rather, the Clinton administration only introduced ground troops after a settlement had been reached in 1995, and thereafter gradually extricated itself from IFOR and SFOR.[594] In 1996, the U.S. provided about 16,500 troops to IFOR, a number it swiftly cut in the following years.[595] In similar fashion, the United States contributed to KFOR, providing the largest national contingent until the 2003 handover to an EU mission. However, the European countries always provided the majority of KFOR troops. Further, the U.S. commitment was minor when considering e.g. population size—for example, in 2000 only Canada and Turkey contributed less than the United States when adjusted for population size.

In sum, freedom of action theory's propositions are better borne out by record, with the United States avoiding significant costs through sidestepping. It did so by not committing ground troops in the early, active phase of the conflicts, choosing instead to contribute aerial assets. These were considered as posing less of a risk of being drawn into the conflicts as well as offering lower odds of U.S. casualties. Further, U.S. contributions were disproportionately small in comparison to those of the European allies, both in numbers and in their participation in risky missions. While U.S. assets provided crucial capabilities in e.g. reconnaissance, Europeans carried a disproportionate share of strike sorties against enemy targets.

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594 Beckley, "The Myth of Entangling Alliances. Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts," 42–42.

595 Congressional Budget Office, *NATO Burdensharing After Enlargement* (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 2001), 13–14.

7. Conclusion: Whither Neorealism?

This dissertation set out with a twofold research interest—empirically describing and analyzing U.S. NATO policy after the end of the Cold War, and theoretically inquiring what if any contribution neorealism has to make to this topic. The following will review theoretical and empirical findings before drawing conclusions for the further development of neorealism.

At the outset, this dissertation presented two ways of thinking about costs imposed on the United States by NATO. One, called entanglement theory, suggests that because the United States is any ally, it will inevitably be drawn into conflicts it would not otherwise have entered. This approach highlights the dramatic costs of alliance membership for any state, including the hegemon. The second approach, freedom of action theory, instead suggests the United States could, because of its power advantage, successfully extricate itself from such commitments, reducing costs and increasing benefits of alliance membership. Whilst neither approach offers a full-fledged theory, both focus on a common issue: How do alliances affect the hegemon? This directly impacts neorealist predictions about NATO, which were uniformly gloomy in the early 1990s. Most scholars in the realist tradition then forecast that the U.S. would abandon NATO and/or that the alliance would crumble. Instead, it has flourished. However, these neorealist predictions are premised on the notion that NATO does indeed impose restrictive costs on the United States. If it does not, if, in other words, costs and benefits are balanced as freedom of action theory would suggest, NATO membership is neutral or even positive for the hegemon. In this line of reasoning, the United States

power advantage would allow it to leverage NATO to its advantage by reducing costs and using it to influence allies.

7.1. On the Offensive-Defensive Schism

The theoretical section noted the split between offensive and defensive variants of structural realism. The two approaches differ significantly in terms of what behavior is considered optimal—tragically striving for global hegemony, or preserving one's status relative to others. Vice versa, they differ in which state behavior is suboptimal and will, in a structural logic, be punished. The cases reviewed here remain ambiguous as far as offensive versus defensive expectations are concerned, notably because of the inherent vagueness of both approaches' predictions. Consider, for example, the enlargement of NATO. A largely U.S.-driven process, offensive realists would presumably argue that the inclusion of new members broadened the American sphere of influence. Thereby, additional countries are brought under overbearing U.S. influence. Moreover, offensive realists would expect NATO's structures and dealing to become increasingly hierarchical over time. Defensive realists in turn would point to the security vacuum that emerged in Central and Eastern Europe after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, arguing that the need to forestall instability on the alliance's perimeter drove its expansion.

The empirical evidence is not clear cut, as noted in the respective chapters. Nevertheless, the evidence on the whole would appear to point towards a status-quo driven U.S. policy, one that values stability while reducing defense burdens. Whilst the issue of NATO's organizational reform has remained outside the scope of this dissertation, there appears to be little evidence of the United States striving to make the organization

more hierarchical to its benefit. Nevertheless, U.S. positions have usually won the day, making the offensive realist case for increasing hierarchy questionable to begin with. Of the instances here, consider for example the successful drive for NATO expansion and its decisive influence on the size and scope of the two rounds of enlargement reviewed here. However, the United States has also had to compromise of some issues, especially on the push for a more global NATO with potential members such as Georgia. As outlined in the case study, U.S. suggestions of such an alliance were met with circumspection in Europe and appear to have been languishing since. Clearly, expanding NATO beyond its traditional geography is not a hot topic in European capitals.

Empirically, the cases reviewed in this dissertation presented mixed evidence for offensive and defensive logics. However, the evidence is clear on the expectations of freedom of action and entanglement theory. In the period reviewed here, there was little if any evidence of the alliance entangling the United States. Rather, the United States has successfully preserved its freedom of maneuver and indeed used the alliance towards its own goals as the hegemon. The crucial implication of this assessment is that it narrows the gap between offensive and defensive realist predictions for the U.S. role in NATO under unipolarity. If alliance membership comes with no strings attached, the unipole would be foolhardy to scrap the alliance. Offensive realists would consider the institution a springboard for increasing and expanding a U.S.-led hierarchy. Defensive realists in turn would emphasize the status-quo orientation of the United States, under which there simply would not be an incentive to scrap an institution that is potentially useful for political support and capability aggregation as long as it imposes no significant costs. When looked at this way, NATO's weakness may be its strength, and its persistence may have been overdetermined for realists.

Regardless of which structural logic one subscribes to, it is states that heed or ignore structural pressures. While structural realists make predictions about what constitutes optimal behavior, explaining why states do or do not heed the structural imperative has traditionally fallen outside the remit of realist works. This has begun to change over the past decade or so, which has seen a renewed interest in classical realist work, and a reintroduction of subsystemic variables into realist work. These scholars refer to themselves as neoclassical realists, highlighting their link to a rich realist tradition, from which structural realism and its parsimony constitute an exception rather than a rule. Their research interest lies in the mechanisms by which structural incentives are transposed into unit-level policies. In other words: Why do states behave optimally or suboptimally? Logically, any estimation of optimal behavior requires a benchmark against which to measure state behavior. In effect, the chasm between offensive and defensive realists that has emerged within the strictly structuralist camp is bound to also divide neoclassical realists. To date, this has not occurred with the same ferocity as it has among structuralists. This may have to do with the wholesale rejection of the neoclassical approach by many of offensive realism's prominent representatives. Nevertheless, the offensive-defensive schism is bound to emerge within neoclassical work, too.

Conceptually, this dissertation has argued that by virtue of being the dominant actor in NATO, the United States has been able to forego the negative effects of alliances predicted by entanglement theory. Rather, it has maintained its freedom of action, minimized costs imposed by the alliance, and successfully pursued national interests. The case of the alliance's eastward enlargement illustrated a successful U.S. push for a certain policy, despite considerable allied opposition—initially to enlargement itself, later the small-group approach advocated by the United

States for the first round. In the case of the Bosnia intervention, the United States was initially less successful in their advocacy of a specific policy, i.e. lift-and-strike. However, here, too, the alliance eventually adopted a U.S.-supported strategy of escalating air strikes. The episode also illustrated the essential role played by the hegemon as an enabler of allied operations: U.S. assets were crucial for both the Bosnia and the Kosovo campaigns. Meanwhile, the United States managed to keep costs to itself low, for example by conducting a proportionately smaller share of strike sorties. Likewise, the United States restricted its contributions to the possibly expensive post-intervention stabilization mission, and gradually extricated itself from them.

The cases reviewed here also highlighted the importance of subsystemic variables traditionally ignored by neorealism. In particular, the role of individuals and the influence of decision-making procedures played a decisive role in shaping U.S. policy. Any explanation of U.S. foreign policy would be incomplete without taking into consideration the president's views on the issue. Note for example the impact President Clinton's meeting with Eastern European leaders had on his stance on the issue of NATO enlargement. Likewise, individuals sitting in key positions of the administration have been key drivers of both enlargement and the Balkan interventions, e.g. Secretary Albright or National Security Advisor Lake. They successfully fought steered their policies through the inter-agency process, winning over many opposing players. This also points to the importance of the structure of decision-making, a long-time subject of Foreign Policy Analyis. Even the seemingly mundane issue of elections has affected some decisions on enlargement in particular, as evidenced by President Clinton's postponement of a public commitment to enlargement in 1995/1996. All this of course has been common sense for analysts of foreign policy and liberal scholars, but neorealists have until recently largely

ignored these variables. This has begun to change with the adoption of these and other variables by neoclassical realists. The next section will address theoretical challenges to neorealism and discuss neoclassical approaches as a promising avenue for theory development.

7.2. Added Variables, Added Benefits? The Promise Of Neoclassical Realism

Above, I have highlighted some of the central theoretical problems in contemporary neorealism, i.e. the rift between offensive and defensive structural imperatives and the need to include subsystemic variables for explaining an individual state's reaction to systemic pressures. Offensive and defensive logics are fundamentally at odds, and this split is likely to remain, as both arguments are logically sound and axiomatic. On the second count, however, innovative research has emerged that has sought to incorporate new, subsystemic variables into neorealism. This school has been labelled "neoclassical realism" (see Chapter 3).

As outlined in the theoretical part of this dissertation, the systemic pressures suggested by neorealism only stake out a broad playing field within which states act. Structural realism cannot explain why states fail to heed systemic pressures or why states in similar systemic positions act differently. While these cases are not within Waltz's original purview, neoclassical realists focus on explaining the foreign policies of states as opposed to general outcomes.[596] For them, structural realism is underdetermined.

Combining the structural and unit level of analysis, neoclassical realism

596 Liu Feng and Zhang Ruizhuang, "The Typologies of Realism," *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 1 (2006): 121.

icy.[597]Although neoclassical realists differ in which variables they add, they give systemic variables primacy over unit-level variables. The latter are only intervening and do not have an independent causal role. Rather, they act as a "filter" or "transmission belt" between systemic pressures and actual foreign policy behavior. Because of the focus on intervening variables at the unit-level, some refer to neoclassical realism as "state-centric realism." All in all, neoclassical authors share a commitment to a multi-level approach, incorporating domestic intervening variables while maintaining states' relative power positions and systemic pressures as independent variables.

Taken together, neoclassical work has made important contributions to the realist tradition and international relations more broadly:

7.2.1. Complementing Neorealism

By introducing intervening unit-level variables they manage to greatly improve neorealism's predictive and explanatory power. This move is complementary to Waltz's theory and does not violate its core assumptions. *Theory of International Politics* provides a theory of outcomes of state behavior that is compliant with the imperatives of the international system.[598] Furthermore, Waltz claims that non-compliant behavior is punished and eventually self-defeating. Yet he does not provide a theoretical account of why states fail to recognize these imperatives imposed by the system or act accordingly. This is where neoclassical realism brings in

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597 Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," 146; Taliaferro, "State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State," 466–68; Wivel, "Explaining Why State X Made a Certain Move Last Tuesday: The Promise and Limitations of Realist Foreign Policy Analysis," 357.

598 Rathbun, "A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism," 295–96; Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," 161–62; Randall L. Schweller, "New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, Not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing Proposition," *American Political Science Review* 91, no. 4 (1997): 927–30.

domestic variables, that explain the flawed transmission of systemic pressures into foreign policy in these cases:

> When states do not respond ideally to their structural situations, neorealism tells us we should find evidence of domestic politics and ideas distorting the decision-making process.[599]

Because it keeps the crucial role of systemic influences and the notion that misbehavior will eventually be punished, neoclassical realism falls squarely into the neorealist paradigm. In view of that, Rathbun sees it as a "logical extension of structural realism" that "vindicates Waltz" ideas.[600]

7.2.2. Crossing Levels of Analysis…

Stressing that the international system determines the broad, long-term framework in which states operate while incorporating domestic variables, neoclassical realism bridges the gap between two levels of analysis.[601] It is thus one of the few theories to take a genuinely multi-level approach, which Valerie Hudson sees as one of the hallmarks of Foreign Policy Analysis.[602] Neoclassical realism may thus narrow the gap between international relations theory and Foreign Policy Analysis.

7.2.3. …and Disciplinary Boundaries

Not only does it bridge the gap between two levels of analysis most other theories of international relations see as incommensurate, it also transcends the barriers between Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations. Especially concerning the theories employed in each, the two

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599 Rathbun, "A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism," 296.

600 Ibid.

601 Feng and Ruizhuang, "The Typologies of Realism," 122.

602 Valerie Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1 (2005): 2.

have in my opinion developed relatively independently of each other. Of course, there were and are many points of contact, but the body of knowledge within Foreign Policy Analysis has grown considerably more specialized over time. With neoclassical realism, for the first time there is a theory that can be employed both in International Relations and in Foreign Policy Analysis with equally satisfying results. Furthermore, the range of independent variables neoclassical realists have used in their work so far holds the promise that a fair amount of the theoretical and empirical work conducted in Foreign Policy Analysis can be incorporated into and used in neoclassical research.

In sum, the ease with which neoclassical realism can incorporate insights generated by Foreign Policy Analysis and other research focusing on the domestic level is its greatest strength and promises further innovative research in the years to come.

7.2.4. Problems

All of this, however, is not to gloss over the considerable difficulties and challenges neoclassical realism faces. While not insurmountable, they have to be acknowledged and addressed here.

Firstly, the very strength of being able to include many different independent variables can also be a weakness. With the variety of variables the authors discussed here use, it is all but impossible to tell which of them is decisive.[603] In the long run, the number of variables will have to be reduced if a feasible research program is to emerge. The plethora of different cases neoclassical authors examine exacerbates this problem. To remedy this, neoclassical realism has to develop a coherent research program with a competitive design: At least some of the cases should be ana-

603 Feng and Ruizhuang, "The Typologies of Realism," 123.

lyzed through several of the competing approaches in order to determine which variables matter when.

Secondly, and somewhat related, the diversity of different approaches makes it extremely difficult to falsify neoclassical realism.

Thirdly, future research might run the danger of developing a number of ad hoc fixes for all those cases neorealism cannot explain. [604] This would greatly diminish intellectual coherence and appeal of neoclassical realism.

Lastly, there remains the issue of ontological pureness: Can a theory based on the quintessentially positivist and materialist neorealism of Kenneth Waltz incorporate ideational elements such as decision-makers' perceptions without losing its coherence?

7.3. The Kids Are Alright

This dissertation has explored the ramifications of current neorealist thought and sought to address the case of U.S. NATO policy after the end of the Cold War. In doing so, I have argued that the initial neorealist predictions of NATO's demise rest on a certain assumption of the effect of NATO membership on the United States, i.e. that it has adverse effects and significant costs. Instead, the empirical record reviewed above suggests that the United States has managed to steer clear of the negative effects of alliances suggested by proponents of entanglement theory. In this light, both offensive and defensive realists would, albeit for different reasons, have expected NATO to persist. The empirical section has, however, also illustrated the need to include subsystemic variables into any account of an individual state's foreign policy. This, I argue, is the major contribution

604 Wivel, "Explaining Why State X Made a Certain Move Last Tuesday: The Promise and Limitations of Realist Foreign Policy Analysis," 365.

and promise of neoclassical realism. This school of thought faces several challenges, but on the whole offers a very promising mechanism for incorporating insights drawn from other research programs. The founding generation of neorealism may disagree, but the kids are alright after all.

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