Economic and Political Marginalization in Europe

A Comparative Analysis of Causes and Consequences

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Für Mutti

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List of Acronyms

ALMP	Active Labor Market Policies
CPD	Comparative Political Data Set
CUPESSE	Cultural Pathways to Economic Self-Sufficiency and Enterpreneurship
CWED	Comparative Welfare Entitlements Data Set
ESS	European Social Survey
EU	European Union
EURES	European Employment Services
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICC	Intraclass Correlation
ISCED	International Standard Classification of Education
NEET	Not in Education, Employment or Training
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NUTS	Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics
OMC	Open Method of Coordination
PLMP	Passive Labor Market Policies
PP	Political Participation

List of Publications

Weiss, J., Ferrante, L. and Soler-Porta, M. (2021). There is No Place Like Home! How Willing are Young Adults to Move to Find a Job? Sustainability, 13, 7494, 1-21.

Tosun, J., **Weiss**, J., Meyer-Hamme, A. and Katzlinger, M. (2021). Adaptability of the German Vocational Model to Mediterranean Countries. In: Jagannathan, R. The Growing Challenge of Youth Unemployment in Europe and America. A Cross-Cultural Perspective. Bristol: Bristol University Press, pages 165-202.

Weiss, J. and Hörisch, F. (2021). Security or Autonomy? A Comparative Analysis of Work Values and Labor Market Policies in Different European Welfare States. International Journal of Social Welfare, 1– 17.

Strohmeyer, R. and **Weiss**, J. (2021). Between Adaption and Rejection: Intergenerational Transmission of Resources and Work Values in Germany. In: Tosun, J., Pauknerová, D. and Kittel, B. Intergenerational Transmission and Economic Self- Sufficiency. Palgrave Macmillan, pages 129-158.

Warmuth, J.R., **Weiss**, J., Pauknerová, D., Hanzlík, J., Tosun, J. and Kittel, B. (2021). Methodological Framework. In: Tosun, J., Pauknerovà, D. and Kittel, B. Intergenerational Transmission and Economic Self- Sufficiency. Palgrave Macmillan, pages 57-76.

Parth, A., **Weiss**, J., Firat, R. and Eberhardt, M. (2020). "How dare you!" - The Influence of Fridays for Future on the Political Attitudes of Young Adults. Frontiers in Political Science, 2(1):1-12.

Weiss, J. (2020): What Is Youth Political Participation? Literature Review on Youth Political Participation and Political Attitudes. Frontiers in Political Science, 2(1):1-13.

Parth, A., Tosun, J. and **Weiss**, J. (2020): Solidarität mit überschuldeten EU-Mitgliedstaaten und Geflüchteten. Ein Vergleich von Einstellungen in West- und Ostdeutschland“. GESIS Informationsdienst Soziale Indikatoren (ISI), 65:15-21.

Chapter 1

Introduction

When, on 15 September 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code, few, if any, would have predicted that this would precipitate the greatest economic crisis since the 1930s. However, starting with the U.S. real estate crisis, it quickly developed into a banking crisis and spread from the financial sector to the real economy. What followed was the collapse of global trade and recessions in many economies. At the end of 2009, the global economic crisis culminated in the eurozone crisis, which meant sovereign debt and a banking crisis in the countries of the European Monetary Union (Parth and Weiss, forthcoming; Tosun et al., 2016b). Some countries suffered considerably as this crisis unfolded, while others were largely able to avoid its disastrous consequences.

Although several countries such as Germany were spared the worst effects of this economic crisis, the increase in unemployment rates in southern European countries such as Greece, Spain, and Italy, for example, as well as the decline of the gross domestic product (GDP) and the increase in public debt reached such proportions that these states came under close scrutiny within the EU. The impact of the crisis, however, varied not only between states (Grekousis, 2018; Guichard and Rusticelli, 2010), but also between social groups within states, as reflected, for example, by the enormous rise of youth unemployment (Tosun, 2017). The EU responded with policies to mitigate the effects of the crisis on hard-hit groups, such as young adults (Leschke and Jepsen, 2012; Tosun et al., 2014; Tosun and Hörisch, 2019). At the same time, the so-called Troika, consisting of the European Commission, the Central European Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, encouraged European governments to implement various austerity policies and measures (Giugni and Grasso., 2015; Papadopoulos, 2016). This affected not only the weakest members of society, but also the middle class, and resulted in forms of political protest and the loss of legitimacy among democratic institutions in many countries (Armingeon and Baccaro, 2012; Giugni and Grasso, 2016; Tosun et al., 2016b).

More than 10 years have now passed since that crisis and a wealth of research has emerged on its economic and political impact. Although existing research confirms that not all individuals in a society are equally affected by a crisis, several aspects still require investigation. Whilst there is ample research on the policies adopted by the EU to mitigate the effects of the financial crash (Pesquera Alonso et al., 2021; Marques and Hörisch, 2020; Piqué et al., 2016; Tosun et al., 2019b), little attention has been paid both in research and in actual policy creation to the target group of these policies. Policies to mitigate crisis effects can only be successful if they know and address the needs of the target group. Secondly, during an economic crisis, not only the number of those who are economically deprived, but for many also the risk of becoming economically deprived in the (near) future, increases. Although there is considerable research on the effects of actual economic deprivation (Filetti and Janmaat, 2018; Grasso and Giugni, 2019; Kern et al., 2015; Kurer et al., 2019), a closer look at the group of people whose risk of deprivation increases in the wake of a crisis remains open. The (potential) affectedness can then, for example, be expected to influence the process by which individuals communicate their interests back to the political sphere. For this reason, the following two overarching research questions guide this dissertation:

How does economic marginalization affect individuals' values and attitudes?

How does the political participation behavior of individuals change as a result of (potential) economic marginalization?

The articles of this dissertation are arranged into two parts. In the first part, two articles address the issue of economic marginalization in more detail. To this end, the first article considers the influence of the economic crisis and the constitution of the welfare state on individual work values in the range from security to autonomy. The second article then considers, in the context of high youth unemployment as an effect of the economic crisis, the motives of young adults to be willing to move abroad to get a job. The second part of the dissertation deals with the feedback process of individuals to the political sphere. Consequently, the third article lays a foundation by means of a comprehensive literature review on the political participation (PP) of young adults. The fourth and last article finally examines the extent to which not only actual economic deprivation but also the perceived risk of being economically deprived in the near future reduces PP and thus leads to political marginalization.

In the remainder of the introduction, I first give an overview of the central concepts considered in the dissertation. This is followed by a presentation of the theoretical arguments and an overview of the methodological approach. Next, I summarize the results of the four articles of this thesis,

before discussing their implications in the final section.

1.1 Overview of Central Concepts

In this section, I briefly introduce and define the central concepts of this dissertation. The empirical framework of three of the four articles is the *economic crisis*. Even though many people could intuitively formulate a description of this crisis, in the following I will clarify what exactly is meant by the term 'crisis' in the context of these analyses, what effects of this crisis could be observed, and how this can be demonstrated empirically.

Following Gallie (2013), one must distinguish between a recession in a technical sense and the comprehensive period of an economic crisis. Conventionally, a recession is technically defined as a period with a decline in the real GDP in at least two successive quarters (Abberger and Nierhaus, 2008). Figure 1.1[1] [2] illustrates how different the experiences of the countries studied in this dissertation were during the economic crisis of 2008.

The figure reveals the differences in the countries' experiences of the recession in terms of its depth and duration and the extent to which they had recovered from it by 2011. In three of the countries, namely Ireland, Greece and Lithuania, GDP fell by more than 20 percent and of them only Lithuania had moved in the direction of recovery by 2011. In Greece, on the other hand, there was still no improvement in the GDP decline by 2011. This contrasted sharply with countries such as Switzerland and Israel, which experienced only comparatively small declines in GDP and even recorded significant GDP growth in 2011. Finally, there is also a group of countries consisting of Sweden, Turkey, and Norway, which experienced an initial sharp drop in GDP, but returned to growth in 2011.

By contrast, the consequences of an economic crisis, for employees and employers, for example, are generally still felt longer after the technical end of a recession. One reason is that it takes a long time for production to return to pre-crisis levels, which can mean reduced markets for employers and continued job insecurity for employees (Gallie, 2013). In fact, the change in unemployment is probably the most tangible indicator of an economic crisis for the general population. Figure 1.2 shows how strongly the experience of unemployment change varied across the different European countries.

Except for Turkey and Poland, where the figures remained virtually unchanged, and Austria, Germany, Israel, and Belgium, where the rate fell,

[1] Figures 1.1 and 1.2 include those countries that are part of the sample in one or more of the dissertation analyses.

[2] The change from the GDP in 2008 to the GDP in a crisis year is shown in black. Depending on the country, the crisis year (2009 or 2010) is the year with the lower, i.e. more strongly deteriorated GDP. The change from the GDP in 2008 to the GDP in 2011 is shown in light gray.

Figure 1.1: Percentage Change of GDP per Capita from 2008 to a Year of Recession and from 2008 to 2011



Source: Own representation based on World Bank Data (2021).

Figure 1.2: Unemployment Rates 2007 and 2011



Source: Own representation based on World Bank Data (2021).

the unemployment rate rose in all other countries from 2007 to 2011. In Ireland, Lithuania and Greece, unemployment rose to over 15 percent and in Spain to over 20 percent. In all these countries, this meant a multiplication of the pre-crisis level. Compared with Figure 1.1, Lithuania in particular illustrates once again that even though the situation in terms of GDP improved by 2011, the unemployment rate, i.e. what people feel directly, did not automatically approach pre-crisis levels again. Overall, this shows that while there were countries in most regions of Europe that had suffered greatly from the initial decline in GDP in the wake of the recession, there were strong regional differences in the rates of unemployment over the long term (Cuadrado-Roura et al., 2016; Gallie, 2013). This crisis context now provides the explicit framework of inquiry for articles one and four and the implicit framework for the entire dissertation project.

Another central concept of this dissertation is *marginalization*, which can be described as the "peripheralization of individuals and groups from a dominant, central majority" (Hall, 1999). Marginalization is thus a relational statement, as one cannot be marginalized in and of him/herself but in relation to some other category. In this sense, marginalization has an impact on an individual's ability to participate in economic and political spheres of society. Several developments, such as the economic crisis, have been claimed to give rise to new cleavages between "winners" and "losers" both in economic and political terms (Kriesi et al., 2006; Oskarson, 2010). The institutional arena now has the task of implementing policy interventions to reduce the risk of marginalization. For example, in the context of the economic crisis, the EU addressed the topic of youth unemployment and implemented various policies such as the youth guarantee (Tosun, 2017). This kind of policy can be described as a curative response, while generally there would also be the option of preventative responses (Gallie, 2004), meaning the development of regulative controls to prevent people from becoming marginalized.

Political equality, as a fundamental concept for democracy, generally includes the formal rights and opportunities of citizens to participate in politics. Whether citizens participate is widely seen as an individual decision. Indeed, research shows that the state of political equality in a democracy is reflected in actual participation (Verba et al., 1995). Against this background, *political marginalization* indicates "a feeling of distance or 'non-includedness' to the political sphere of society" (Oskarson, 2010:7), hence marginalized groups are less likely to engage in any form of PP. Existing research in the context of the economic crisis shows, for example, how trust in the European Parliament has declined, particularly among individuals with low social status, and especially in the countries hit hard by the crisis (Dotti Sani and Magistro, 2016). Considering how important political trust is for PP, it becomes clear that economic changes can reinforce political marginalization (Dotti Sani and Magistro, 2016) and thus show how

economic and political inequality are intertwined (Shore, 2016).

Finally, the term *economic marginalization* describes the exclusion of a group of people from participating equally in the economic system. Existing research here often focuses on the vulnerability of individuals who are low educated. Since they are often at higher risk of unemployment and, if they do find a job, are more likely than other groups to end up in insecure and low-paying jobs, they represent an example of an economically marginalized group. The process of economic marginalization can then be further exacerbated in the wake of an economic crisis, since the concomitant loss of jobs not only results in higher unemployment, but also pushes higher-educated people down the economic ladder, compelling them to take jobs previously held by lower-educated people (Gesthuizen et al., 2011). In this sense, economic marginalization often results in poor pay, insecure employment contracts, or even unemployment.

1.2 Theoretical Arguments

In this section, I summarize some of the main theoretical arguments of this dissertation. Examining the questions of how economic marginalization affects individual's values and attitudes and how (potential) economic marginalization in turn influences the political participation behavior of individuals, the main argument of this dissertation is that individual-level as well as contextual-level factors influence these processes.

The constitution of a state and its institutions influences policies and politics by mere existence (Shore, 2019). The theoretical argument of classic institutionalism is that institutions manifest the rules of the game and are therefore of central importance. Following this, a wealth of existing research shows how formal rules and decision-making processes regulate the behavior of individuals. More recent institutional approaches, on the other hand, are concerned with informal rules that are less explicit but are still expected to encompass behavior or processes in societies. These newer theoretical approaches are based on the assumption that preferences can only be seen in the context of institutionally generated incentives and institutionally available options and thus structure decisions (Grofman, 1989). While classical institutional research focused on party systems or presidentialism, for example, newer approaches look at so-called secondary institutions (Piven and Cloward, 1977), including the welfare state. Individuals interact with their surroundings, and social surroundings can have a substantial impact on decisions and attitudes. Institutions promote behavior through incentives or discourage other behavior through sanctions (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Thus the inherent approach is that macro-level characteristics (institutional design) influence micro-level phenomena (individuals values and behavior) and thus the context structures individual attitudes and actions (Anderson and

Singer, 2008; Shore, 2019). In this sense, institutions do not determine attitudes and behavior but provide the context for actions, the consideration of which can help to understand why individuals act as they do (Immergut, 1998).

In the field of economic marginalization, with a focus on the labor market, the work values of individuals emerge as a central object of investigation. Work values – that is, what individuals want as a reward from their work – thereby reflect the individual's relationship to work in a particular context. Here, a distinction must be made between intrinsic work values, such as the opportunity to use skills, and extrinsic work values, such as the level of income (Gallie, 2019; Gesthuizen et al., 2019). From a theoretical perspective, one can assume that, in an economically prosperous country, extrinsic work values are largely fulfilled and thus individuals prioritize intrinsic work values. This is based on the hierarchy of human needs (Inglehart, 1977; Maslow, 1954) and, conversely, leads to the expectation that individuals focus more strongly on extrinsic work values in contexts of economic deterioration. I examine this relationship in more detail in the first article of this dissertation, as well as elaborate on the role of context. The context within a country should first be understood as an opportunity structure. The constitution of the welfare state plays a central role in this regard, as this can be designed differently with respect to the definition of economic security as a social right, and how individuals can maintain a livelihood in case of unemployment (Steiber, 2013). Again, one can expect that the greater the level of protection provided by the welfare state, the higher the level of mitigation against possible unemployment, making it likelier for an individual to prioritize intrinsic over extrinsic work values (Esser and Lindh, 2018).

Building on the topic of economic marginalization, the second article looks at the extent to which EU policies to combat youth unemployment can be successful. In the wake of the 2008 economic crisis, the effects of which led to youth unemployment rates of nearly 50 percent in some countries, young adults clearly represented a marginalized group (Eurostat, 2021b). The EU took this as an opportunity to adopt a host of policies aimed at alleviating this problem (Marques and Hörisch, 2020; Tosun and Hörisch, 2019). A central aspect of this was "Youth on the Move", i.e. the attempt to reduce youth unemployment through the targeted promotion of labor mobility within the EU (Cairns and Smyth, 2010; Eichhorst et al., 2013). For such a policy to be successful, however, it must fit the needs of the target group. Looking at the willingness of young people to move abroad for a job shows again that, from a theoretical perspective, both individual and contextual factors play a role here. The local structures of the region in which they live are an important influence. The more manifold the opportunities, for example in terms of education or work, the less willing people appear to move (Kirkpatrick-Johnson et al., 2005). At the same time, it is to be expected that the worse the economic situation, both individually and

contextually, the greater the willingness to “escape” the situation by moving (Van Mol, 2016). And finally, at the individual level, family ties play a role, since the more pronounced they are, the less likely it would seem that young adults would be willing to leave them spatially (Bjarnason and Thorlindsson, 2006).

Turning to the political sphere, the third article lays another foundation at the theoretical level. Looking in depth at the current state of research on youth political participation, it becomes clear that definitions can include or exclude aspects, and the decision on what to include has an impact on later research results (Van Deth, 2014, 2016). For example, whether one takes the engagement or disengagement thesis with respect to young people's participation in the political process also depends on the definition of PP (O'Toole et al., 2003a,b; Weiss, 2020). In this context, what researchers define as the "political" or PP may differ from what young people see as such (O'Toole, 2003; Pontes et al., 2018). This, of course, does not change levels of marginalization in the real world, but it makes a significant difference to what empirical results are obtained, which in turn can serve as the basis for policies to prevent or mitigate marginalization.

Finally, the fourth article explores how economic and political marginalization are potentially interrelated. Previous research assumes that marginalized individuals follow one of two paths. Either they leave the political arena, for example by not voting, or they take remedial action, for example by expressing their voice through non-institutionalized PP (Dahl et al., 2018; Hirschman, 1970). This can be justified with the help of grievance theory, which states that an individual reaction to deprivation strongly depends on how the individual assesses the situation (Kern et al., 2015). A discrepancy between what the individual expects, and he/she gets is the central mechanism for political mobilization (Gurr, 1970). If an individual feels deprived compared to the generalized other, this often leads to "exiting" (Kriesi, 2012), while if the individual feels part of an affected group, this can promote PP, especially in non-institutionalized forms. The argument made in the fourth article is that not only actual deprivation, but also the very perception of potential future deprivation has such an effect. Overall, the fourth article once again highlights, through inclusion of the 2008 crisis context, that both individual and contextual factors play a role in the mechanisms of marginalization (Ackermann, 2017; Giugni and Grasso, 2016).

1.3 Methodological Approach

This section introduces the data and methods used in the empirical analyses of this dissertation. In terms of case selection, and since the entire dissertation deals with the causes and consequences of economic and political marginalization in Europe, each of the four articles considers Europe or several European countries.

For this purpose, articles one and four use data from the European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS is an academically driven, representative, and transnational survey. It was launched in 2001 and, since then, face-to-face interviews have been conducted every two years in many European countries. Due to the high standards of its survey design and data collection (Schnaudt et al., 2014), as well as its coverage of a range of relevant indicators, the dataset is particularly suitable for the analyses within this dissertation. Of particular relevance is that, in addition to the core module, the ESS queries various rotation modules on specific topics in each wave. Two of these rotation modules form the basis of the investigations in this dissertation. Thus, the first article is based on the rotation module 'Family, work and well-being' (Gallie et al., 2010), which as the title already suggests, focuses on the interrelations between work, family, and well-being. The module was surveyed in 2004 and 2010 and therefore facilitates consideration of the economic and social situation that was dramatically transformed by the economic crisis in the period between the two surveys (Gallie et al., 2010). The dependent variable of the first article could thus become the different intrinsic and extrinsic work values of the respondents. This enabled me to examine major theoretical claims about the factors affecting work values and gave crucial insights into the extent to which different labor market structures and labor market policies can mediate the impact of economic crises.

The fourth article is based on the rotation module 'Welfare attitudes', which was surveyed in 2008 and 2016. These survey periods likewise facilitate consideration of the economic crisis: At the time of the first survey, the crisis was already in full swing in many states or was just beginning in some; by 2016, the acute crisis period was over. The rotation module essentially deals with attitudes towards, and perceptions and evaluations of welfare policies (Svallfors et al., 2008). This includes indicators of one's risk perception of becoming economically deprived in the near future, which forms the dependent variable of the fourth article. Thus, for both the first and fourth articles, the ESS provides the ideal database for considering the dissertation's research questions.

To study the relationship between individuals and their social context, which is based on the general notion that individuals interact with their social context and are influenced by the context in which they live, a hierarchical data structure is required. The most appropriate method of studying such a data structure is multilevel analysis, which has the goal of explain-

ing a variable on the individual level by other individual-level variables and variables located on higher levels. Thus, multilevel models are designed to analyze variables from different levels simultaneously by using a statistical model that includes the dependencies properly (Hox et al., 2018). This is necessary since standard statistical models assume that all observations are independent. In the case of the data used, however, this is not the case, since one can expect respondents from one country to be more similar to each other than to respondents from different countries. If the assumption of independence is now violated, this leads to extremely low estimates of standards errors within the framework of standard statistical tests, which in turn leads to falsely significant results (Hox et al., 2018).

The analyses conducted in articles one and four therefore use ESS data at the individual level. To be able to examine the contextual level, in this case the country level, data from various other sources were added. Data from the World Bank were used in both articles. The World Bank presents a collection of World Development Indicators that were compiled from officially recognized international resources (World Bank, 2021), making it the most current and accurate available data source on development indicators. The unemployment rate in the models of both articles came from this source. In the first article, the indicator of the industrial share as a percentage of GDP also came from the World Bank. In addition, data from the Comparative Political Data Set (CPD) and the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset (CWED) were examined in the first article. The CPD covers more than thirty democratic countries for the period of 1960-2019 and consists of a collection of political and institutional country-level data (Armingeon et al., 2019). In particular, the comprehensive and small-scale availability of data on the active labor market policies (ALMP) of the countries was of central importance for this analysis. Finally, the CWED provides the complementary data on passive labor market policies (PLMP). This dataset as well was compiled by researchers and includes information on the structure and generosity of social insurance benefits in over thirty countries (Scruggs et al., 2017).

Standard regressions based on the Cultural Pathways to Economic Self-Sufficiency and Enterpreneurship (CUPESSE) dataset were performed for the second article. The dataset originates from the associated research project and was collected in 2016. It is based on a survey of more than 20,000 individuals aged 18-35 years in eleven European countries (Tosun et al., 2019a)), and its wide range of indicators permits country-comparative assessments of young adults' perceptions of their socio-economic situations (Tosun et al., 2019a). Since the focus of the related research project is youth unemployment, especially in the wake of the economic crisis of 2008, the dataset contains items on what people would be willing to do to find a job. These form the basis for the dependent variable of the third article and have not been asked in this comprehensive form in any other survey.

In addition, the age range of the respondents considers the current state of research, which shows that the school-to-work transition takes longer for young people today than it did in past decades (Arnett, 2014). Overall, the dataset provides the ideal basis for addressing the research interest of the second article. Due to the limited number of countries, multi-level regressions could not be performed in this case; instead, classical regressions were performed. However, to do justice to the data structure of eleven different countries, country and post stratification weights as well as country fixed effects were applied.

A different methodology was adopted for the third article. With the aim of compiling a literature review on the current state of research on youth political participation in Europe, and similar to what Wolfswinkel et al. (2013) recommended, the overall work was guided by research questions. Based on keywords and with the help of various literature search engines a sample of articles was formed in the first step. After sorting out the duplicates, the sample was further reduced based on title and abstract and then reduced again after reviewing the respective full text. This was followed by forward and backward citation searching. This process was repeated until no further relevant article was found according to this scheme. In addition, the resulting overview was discussed with experts in the field and checked for completeness in order to present the lines of argumentation of the existing literature clearly and in relation to each other. The exchange of experts in the field as well as within the journal review process ensured scientific accuracy and completeness.

In summary, the articles in this dissertation use a broad range of data and methods, ensuring the highest quality and accuracy vis-à-vis the research interest. In addition, key contributions to the existing state of research could be made. For example, the first article was the first to examine in this form the relationship between labor market structure and labor market policies on individual work values. This was only made possible by using the method of multilevel analysis. Also, the response to the articles in this dissertation demonstrates their relevance to the state of research. For example, no comprehensive literature review on youth political participation had been published before in this form. The demand for this publication (over 35,000 views; over 1,300 downloads; 12 citations (as of September 2021)) illustrates the successful contribution to research.

1.4 Empirical Findings

This section briefly summarizes the empirical findings of the four articles within this cumulative dissertation. Table 1.1 additionally provides a systematic overview of them.

1.4.1 Security or Autonomy? A Comparative Analysis of Work Values and Labor Market Policies in Different European Welfare States

The first article examines whether and how individuals' work values differ between European Welfare states and change over time. Since many individuals, at least from a subjective perspective, spend most of their day working, the quality of work affects their well-being (Green and Tarek, 2012). From the state perspective, on the other hand, the focus is on the quantity of jobs, as they form the basis of economic development. If the economic situation deteriorates, as it did in the context of the 2008 economic crisis, the need to implement mitigation policies increases. Even though the EU plays a central role here and, for example, aims to strengthen the coordination of employment policies and multilateral surveillance at the EU level through several initiatives on increasing the flexibility of labor markets and expanding ALMPs (Tosun and Hörisch, 2019), both unemployment rates and policy responses continue to vary widely across European countries. The present study thus examines the way in which these different contextual factors affect individuals' work values. More specifically and based on several multilevel linear regressions using data from the ESS as well as different macro-indicator datasets, it examines whether labor market policies and changes in the overall economic situation have an impact on these values. Following the existing literature, a distinction is made between intrinsic and extrinsic individual work values (Gallie, 2019; Gesthuizen et al., 2019). Since the respondents of the ESS were not forced to contrast their preference dimensions directly, the difference from both scales is used as the dependent variable in this study. Thus, the difference between security (extrinsic values) and autonomy (intrinsic values) show the relative importance of the preferences.

The results of the study suggest that the preference for security over autonomy is substantially driven by the economic structure of a country and its labor market policies. As expected, where unemployment rates are high, the preference for security is also stronger. By analyzing data from 2004 and 2010, I could also show that economically turbulent times have an influence on the transition towards a preference for security over autonomy. Further, and regardless of this change, I showed that in terms of the general influence of labor market policies and structure on work values, security became more important than autonomy in countries with a high industry relevance for

Table 1.1: Contribution Overview

Title	Data	Type of Analysis	Main Research Question(s)
Security or Autonomy? A Comparative Analysis of Work Values and Labor Market Policies in Different European Welfare States (Julia Weiss and Felix Hörisch)	ESS (2004 and 2010) World Bank (2020) OECD (2020) CPD (2019) CWED (2017)	Multilevel Linear Regression	How do contextual level factors (labor market structure and labor market policies) influence the relationship between individuals' extrinsic and intrinsic work values?
There is No Place Like Home! How Willing are Young Adults to Move to Find a Job? (Julia Weiss, Livio Ferrante and Mariano Soler-Porta)	CUPESSE (2016)	Logistic Regression	What influences the general willingness of European youths to move to find a job? To what extent do young adults from areas with different levels of urbanization differ in their willingness to move for a new job?
What is Youth Political Participation? Literature Review on Youth Political Participation and Political Attitudes (Julia Weiss)	Self-generated dataset of over 200 articles	Literature Review	What defines political participation? How does youth political participation differ from adult political participation? How do young adults develop political attitudes? How does youth political participation differ across Europe? What methods are being used to analyze youth political participation?
Disengaged or Raising Voices? An Analysis of the Relationship Between Individual Risk Perception and Non-Institutionalised Political Participation (Julia Weiss)	ESS (2008 and 2016)	Multilevel Logistic Regression	Does the individual risk perception of becoming deprived influence political participation and, if so, does this depend on the economic context?

the overall GDP. Conversely, higher spending on ALMP reduces the relative preference for security, as it secures existing jobs and lowers the costs in case of unemployment. In contrast, the analysis of PLMPs provided a mixed picture. While employment protection did not yield significant results, the relative importance of security decreased in countries with high replacement rates in case of unemployment.

These results extend the existing literature by showing that individual work values are not only shaped by individual factors, such as socioeconomic factors or the intergenerational transmission of values and preferences (Cemalcilar et al., 2019; Tosun et al., 2019a), but also by the economic structure of a country and its labor market policies. Thus, the results of the study make it clear that both European and national labor market policymaking will only be successful if they take into account these different work values. This speaks to the literature on public policies as well as on policy learning and policy diffusion by arguing that labor market policymakers have to consider the preferences of their target group to combat unemployment successfully. At the same time, this provides impetus for further research, such as a deeper look at interactions between country-level variables and individual-level characteristics. This would provide the opportunity to see whether welfare state policies affect the various subgroups of the population equally or whether there are differences based on individual characteristics, thereby contributing to a better understanding of the chances and limits of policy diffusion and policy learning between different countries and welfare state systems.

1.4.2 There is No Place Like Home! How Willing are Young Adults to Move to Find a Job?

The second article examines the willingness of young adults in Europe to move to find a job. Since the economic crisis of 2008, which resulted in high youth unemployment rates in many European countries, combatting unemployment has been at the top of the European Union's agenda. A central element of the EU's fight against youth unemployment is the promotion of mobility; however, the young adults who are being encouraged to move to find new work have so far received little scholarly attention. This article fills this research gap by investigating which factors influence the willingness to move for a new job and whether this willingness differs between young adults from regions with different degrees of urbanization. By investigating these research questions, the article makes an important contribution to the literature on youth job mobility. Using the CUPESSE survey (Tosun et al., 2019a), which includes data on 18-35-year-olds in a sample of 11 European countries, several logistic regression models were performed. The unique data availability made it possible to compare the willingness of European youths to move within their own country and their willingness to

move abroad for a job.

The analyses clearly show that young adults are generally less willing to move to another country than to move within their own country to find a new job. The general willingness is influenced by various factors. For example, the willingness to move both within one's own country and to another country increases with the deterioration of one's personal economic situation. At the same time, coming from rural areas, or being married, reduces the willingness to move to another country. Two findings stand out in particular. First, the results show that family attachment has no influence on the willingness to move within one's own country or to another country for a job. Previous studies, which almost exclusively comprise studies of individual states or regions, often investigated more abstract general feelings of belonging, thus showing that these reduce the willingness to move (Pretty et al., 2006). But the fact that in a broad European analysis, the connection to the family no longer seems to be a decisive factor, provides impetus for further research. The second important finding is that rural youths are more willing to move within their own country than to move to another country to get a job. Since an empirical and comparative analysis between rural and urban youth has not yet been conducted elsewhere, this result can be justified primarily on theoretical grounds. Due to the nature of rural areas, young adults are often in a situation where they can only attend secondary school or university in urban areas. In addition, the jobs that are then suitable after this educational path are often not found in rural areas. For rural young adults, therefore, it no longer seems to be a big step to move within their own country, as so many have done it before them (Farrugia, 2015; Rye, 2011). At the same time, this also provides an impetus for further research to explore more deeply what aspects prevent rural youths compared to urban youth from moving abroad for work.

Overall, however, the results clearly show that European policies to combat youth unemployment must consider the perspective of the target group if they are to be successful. The generally low willingness of young adults to move to another country for a job contradicts the EU's approach of seeing intra-European mobility as the key to reducing unemployment. Policymakers should therefore take into account the various factors that both discourage and encourage young adults from relocating to find a new job, as these are evidently crucial to tackling youth unemployment. A fruitful avenue for future research may be to compare the results of this study with the motives of those who actually moved for a job. Within the framework of qualitative methods, it would then be possible to uncover causal mechanisms, which was not possible in the previous research design. Ultimately, it would also be useful in terms of target group-oriented policies for future research to explore the needs and willingness of the target group more closely. It is clear, not least because of the current Covid-19 pandemic and its economic consequences, that combatting youth unemployment will continue to require

detailed consideration and political measures.

1.4.3 What is Youth Political Participation? Literature Review on Youth Political Participation and Political Attitudes

The third article, a literature review, provides the reader with an overview of the different terminologies and logics used in existing research to discuss youth political participation. Based on five guiding questions, it both sheds light on the state of research on youth political participation in the European context and identifies potential gaps in research as well as opportunities for future research. The first guiding question here is what generally defines PP. A review of the existing literature shows that a wealth of small-scale definitions has emerged so far. The few existing broader definitions prove to be helpful, but they do not provide an independent definition of youth political participation. Even if existing definitions do cover youth political participation, they often fail to take into account new forms of participation. Particularly problematic is the fact that non-participation has hardly been considered so far, although it was identified as a relevant topic many years ago (O'Toole, 2003; Theocharis and van Deth, 2018a,b).

The second guiding question focuses on if youth political participation differs from adult political participation. Here, existing differences are either interpreted in the context of the engagement or disengagement thesis and thus differently by researchers. Another important finding was that the research design approach of a static comparison between young and old, which was often used in the past, has been carried out less frequently in the recent past. This can be attributed to an increasing awareness of the difference both between what youths and researchers and youths and adults define as "political". A static comparison of a single form of participation behavior that is probably only defined as political by one side thus does not appear to be meaningful.

The remaining guiding questions then addressed how young people develop political attitudes, how youth political participation differs across Europe, and what methods have been used to date to study youth political participation. After reviewing the existing research on political socialization, it became apparent that several different forms of PP are experienced by young people in Europe. The studies often show context-dependent behavior and underline which new arenas of PP young adults are conquering for themselves and how "old" arenas make participation more difficult for them. Consequently, the methods used in previous studies were as diverse as the forms of participation themselves.

Overall, the literature review revealed three important things. First, comprehensive definitions are needed to facilitate adequate research. For if youth political participation is subsumed under general PP and within

the framework of narrow definitions, there is a risk of postulating a disengagement thesis, although this does not necessarily correspond to the actual situation of young people. Second, and subsequently, future research is needed on what young people understand as "political" and then, derived from that, the formulation of comprehensive definitions is required. Third and finally, existing datasets need to be used with this insight in mind and future emerging datasets need to be developed accordingly.

1.4.4 Disengaged or Raising Voices? An Analysis of the Relationship Between Individual Risk Perception and Non-Institutionalised Political Participation

The fourth article examines the relationship between the individual risk perception of becoming deprived and reactions to this perception in the form of political participation behavior. The economic crisis of 2008 resulted in an economic downturn, which was directly experienced by people, for example, through high unemployment rates. People raised their voices in response, especially in countries that were particularly affected by the crisis (Kriesi, 2012), expressing their disillusion through protests and other forms of PP. Existing studies have examined the relationship between economic deprivation and political participation behavior in a variety of ways (Filetti and Janmaat, 2018; Grasso and Giugni, 2019; Kern et al., 2015). But what has received little attention so far is that such a crisis not only increases the number of people affected, but also increases the risk for many others to be affected in the (near) future. This study therefore investigates the influence that one's own risk perception of being deprived in the future has on political participation behavior. The corresponding analyses were carried out in the form of various multilevel logistic models based on data from the ESS and the World Bank, which made it possible to study a real economic collapse, namely the economic crisis of 2008.

The results show that as an individual's perceived risk of being economically deprived in the near future increases, the likelihood of non- institutionalized PP also increases. However, this participation-enhancing effect is diminished if the mean risk perception in the country is high and thus the economically weak situation prevails. In this case, only those individuals whose own risk perception is below the country's mean risk perception participate more. Overall, it appears that participation is increasing, especially among those who perceive themselves as at risk but live in a context in which an improvement of the situation still seems possible.

The results of this study highlight at least two important aspects. First, it becomes clear that economic downturns lead to new patterns of vulnerability, both on the individual and collective levels. Individuals who see themselves at risk of becoming deprived participate more. However, if a contextual situation arises, as in the course of an economic downturn, in

which individuals no longer see the possibility of improvement, they participate less. In this sense, both potential and direct economic deprivation can translate into political marginalization. Second, this shows that in times of crisis the underrepresentation of certain groups' interests can be further exacerbated. Considering concerns about the vitality and stability of a democracy (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005), the effect of potential crisis exposure on the expression of political interests should be examined in the context of the marginalization of different groups in the political process.

Finally, this contribution provides avenues for further research. Causal mechanisms could not be investigated within the present research design, which is why a deeper consideration of such mechanisms would be desirable in the future. This could be done by looking at specific groups (e.g., by class or salary group) and the context. Taking a closer look at the influence of the political culture in a country, similarly to how it was done in the first article of this dissertation, which considered the constitution of the welfare state, could also be fruitful.

1.5 Conclusion

This dissertation set out to investigate economic and political marginalization in the context of the economic crisis of 2008. To this end, the two overarching research questions were: How does economic marginalization affect individuals' values and attitudes? How does the political participation behavior of individuals change as a result of (potential) economic marginalization?

Taken together, the findings of this dissertation advance the current state of research in three ways. First, while existing research emphasizes the stability of work values (Clark, 2005; Esser and Lindh, 2018) and shows how labor values emerge and change through intergenerational transmission (Cemalcilar et al., 2019; Tosun et al., 2019a), the first paper was able to expand the literature by emphasizing the interplay of work values and labor market policies, both generally and in times of economic turbulences (Weiss and Hörisch, 2021). It thereby demonstrated that the variation of work values is substantially driven by both the country's economic structure and its labor market policies. It should be emphasized once again that the use of the multilevel approach, which has received little attention in this research area so far, made it possible to work out the significance of individual and contextual influences. This also provides an impetus for future research to investigate causal mechanisms and consider in detail cross-level interactions in relation to work values.

Second, I could show that EU policies to reduce the economic marginalization of young adults in the wake of the 2008 economic crisis did not meet the needs of the target group. If, with 'Youth on the Move', the EU saw the

solution in a better distribution of labor across the labor markets of different countries (Cairns and Smyth, 2010; Eichhorst et al., 2013), it simultaneously overlooked the willingness of young people to relocate for the sake of finding work (Weiss et al., 2021). The research in the second article of this dissertation made it clear that young adults appear to be rather unwilling to move abroad to find a job and that moving within one's own country or to another country is both associated with different levels of willingness and hurdles.

Until now, researchers have largely treated the sphere of factors that determine the risk of marginalization and the sphere of policies to prevent or mitigate against marginalization as separate spheres of research. Indeed, they have important implications for each other (Gallie, 2004). Policies designed to prevent or mitigate against marginalization involve crucial assumptions of the underlying mechanisms. This dissertation was able to show how important it is for policymakers to take into account these mechanisms if they are to develop successful, target group-oriented policies, thereby opening up avenues for future research in the areas of public policies, policy learning and policy diffusion.

Third, and with regard to the political sphere and the interplay between economic and political marginalization, I showed that individuals who are actually economically deprived do not constitute the only demographic at risk of being politically marginalized. During an economic crisis, the risk for many people of becoming economically deprived in the future increases, which in itself can lead to forms of political marginalization. Thus, the existing literature, which is limited to the consideration of actual deprivation (Filetti and Janmaat, 2018; Kern et al., 2015), could be extended by potential deprivation, which is a particularly relevant aspect in times of crisis. Since the political representation of interests is of central importance to the vitality and stability of a democracy (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005), the results of related research on populism underlines the relevance of studying the effects of status threat, as they show how status anxiety fuels support for right-wing populist parties, which can encourage a vicious cycle of democratic erosion (Gidron and Hall, 2017; Mutz, 2018; Portos, 2021).

There is a salient irony to the timing and content of this dissertation. When I began it in 2018, no one could have assumed that the next global crisis was right around the corner. The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic has led, first and foremost, to a health crisis that has cost and will probably continue to cost the lives of many people worldwide. At the same time, the pandemic is creating an economic crisis in many places and, as in 2008, it is having different effects on different population groups (Blustein et al., 2020). For example, young adults have been particularly affected by unemployment, and it shows that in all countries of the EU, except Greece, which had also struggled previously with high youth unemployment rates, youth unemployment has increased in the wake of the pandemic (Dietrich et al., 2021). While it is clear that a concept like 'Youth on the Move', for instance,

is certainly not a solution in a period of contact restrictions and travel limitations, existing social science research on the pandemic is prompting calls for a reimagining of the Youth Guarantee (Tamesberger and Bacher, 2020).

At the same time, previous studies did not conclude that the recent increase in support for populist parties is a short-term effect of the pandemic (Thum, 2021). However, it remains to be seen to what extent the approval of populists will increase as the pandemic's long-term economic effects unfold (Manow, 2020). Even if the economic crisis of 2008, being the object of investigation of this dissertation, and the current Covid-19 pandemic are not identical, it is clear that they will not be the last crises, thus making it all the more important for successful policies that aim to counter the marginalization of individuals to consider the underlying mechanisms. Although it may be obvious to the point of truistic, it is important to learn from the past and the present for the future.

Chapter 2

Security or Autonomy? A Comparative Analysis of Work Values and Labor Market Policies in Different European Welfare States

Abstract

This paper analyzes whether and how work values differ between European Welfare states and change over time. We proceed in three steps: First, we show that—despite EU harmonization endeavors, for example, via the Europe 2020 strategy—work values still vary substantially between European countries and welfare regimes. Second, by analyzing data from the ESS 2004 and 2010, we show how labor market policies, such as active and passive labor market policies, are associated with work values and how overall levels of work values changed over this period. Third, we discuss potential implications of the heterogeneity of work values for national as well as European labor market policy making. Altogether we are able to show that work values are substantially driven by the economic structure of a country and its labor market policy making.

Keywords

ALMP, Autonomy, Financial Crisis, Labor Market Policies, PLMP, Security, Welfare States, Work Values

Note: This chapter is identical to the article published as Weiss and Hörisch (2021) in the International Journal of Social Welfare.

2.1 Introduction

Work forms the basis for individuals and the state, albeit in very different ways. Although many individuals at least subjectively spend most of the time of the day working, the quality of work is of particular importance when it comes to their well-being (Green and Tarek, 2012). On the state side, however, jobs form the basis for economic development, what makes the quantity of jobs the main issue here. Economically turbulent times, such as the financial and economic crisis of 2008, combined with rising unemployment rates thus led the state side to a variety of policies to promote job quantity (Marques and Hörisch, 2020; Tosun et al., 2017). The European Union (EU), for example, subsequently took action to fight unemployment. To increase employment opportunities and harmonize labor market policies, it launched several initiatives, such as the Europe 2020 strategy (2010), the Employment Package (2012), and with a special focus on young people, the Youth Guarantee (2013) as well as the Youth Employment Package (2013) (Tosun, 2017). These aimed to increase the flexibility of labor markets, to expand ALMP and lifelong learning, and to strengthen the coordination of employment policies and multilateral surveillance at the EU level (Tosun and Hörisch, 2019).

Despite these endeavors, labor market policy crisis reactions as well as labor market regimes, unemployment rates, and labor market developments still vary substantially between European states (Blum et al., 2014; Starke et al., 2014). Furthermore, and as we will show in this article, different welfare state regulations and the varying opportunity structures of the labor market often produce different individual preferences with regard to work values. In addition to the European goal of increasing job quantity, the focus is now on the quality of work. Here, work values define both the general motivation for work and what kind of job one prefers (Gesthuizen et al., 2019). Within the literature the existing dimensions of work values are most commonly separated into intrinsic and extrinsic work values. Extrinsic work values capture what the individual prefers in terms of the constitution of a job, which can often be considered in the context of job security or income. Intrinsic work values instead capture the desired content of the work itself and are often associated with aspects such as a work–family balance and room for individual initiative within the job. So far, in the literature, work values are seen as relatively stable over time (Clark, 2005; Esser and Lindh, 2018; Gallie, 2007). At the same time, individuals differ with regard to their preferences on intrinsic and extrinsic work values.

This paper analyzes whether work values remained stable in recent years and how labor market policies and changes in economic conditions are associated with individual work values in European countries. The central question here is how contextual level factors influence the relationship between extrinsic and intrinsic work values. Using data from the ESS 2004/2010,

we assess whether economically turbulent times shift work values toward the relative importance of security, subsuming the preferences for a high income and high job security, compared with autonomy, which encompasses preferences for work-family balance as well as a higher leeway for individual initiative at work. In addition, we examine the influence of other contextual factors, more precisely of active and PLMPs as well as the industrial share of a country on the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic work values.

This study makes an original contribution to the literature in at least two relevant and topical areas. First, it highlights the impact of economically turbulent times on the formation of work values by using data from the ESS before the outbreak of the financial crisis (2004) and afterward (2010). We hereby show that —despite the EU's approaches to fighting unemployment and harmonizing labor market policies— work values with regard to the relative importance of security compared with autonomy still vary substantially between European countries. Second, we show how various labor market policies influence work values differently. Along these lines, we elaborate on possible implications of the heterogeneity of work values for national as well as European labor market policy making.

This paper unfolds as follows: We begin with the main theoretical argument, focusing on the effect of labor market policies as well as the economic structure of a welfare state on (the development of) work values. The third section considers methodological challenges making use of multilevel analysis in 19 European countries by applying data from the ESS 2004 and 2010. The fourth section presents our empirical findings and their possible implications for labor market policy making, both at the national and EU levels. Section five concludes.

2.2 Theory

Work is an important topic for most people because they spent (at least subjectively) a large part of their day working. Previous studies agree that work values contain different dimensions, which are most often described as intrinsic and extrinsic (Gesthuizen et al., 2019). Work values differ between individuals and refer to the rewards that people want from their work. Looking for self-fulfillment in a job, intrinsic work values cover aspects such as the use of skills, self-realization, or personal development. Whereas in the context of extrinsic work values the focus is on, for example, income and working hours, to achieve goals outside work (Gallie, 2019).

In the theoretical derivation to justify the development and change of individual preferences in relation to these work values, a distinction must be made between individual and contextual levels. At the individual level, the formation process of work values is linked to early socialization, the extent of economic deprivation, and the work environment itself (Gallie, 2007). So-

cialization processes include the varying experiences with, for example, the education system or early gendered socialization and can mold preferences toward personal autonomy and self-development (Esser and Lindh, 2018). Furthermore, work values can vary according to a hierarchy of human needs (Inglehart, 1977; Maslow, 1954). Here, extrinsic values mark the foundation. If these are fulfilled, for example, during times of economic prosperity, preferences can shift toward intrinsic values. This change is associated with a country's opportunity structures, that is, its level of economic development, how the labor market and welfare system promote employment, and if and how the structure provides basic income security (Esser and Lindh, 2018). Therefore, for the context of this study, a reverse expectation can be formulated. If economically prosperous times lead to a stronger preference for intrinsic values, a stronger preference for extrinsic values should be found in economically weaker times, such as during the course of the financial crisis of 2008/2009. Finally, work values can be shaped by the quality of the work itself. Here, previous studies showed that, for example, higher-quality jobs, which often allow more autonomy, are perceived as more meaningful and promote internal motivation (Esser and Lindh, 2018).

The development of work values is also dependent on the institutional context. Here it is argued that the lack of a basic human need, such as economic security, fosters the development of extrinsic work values (Gallie, 2007). The functioning of the welfare state in which one lives therefore has a central influence on personal preferences, as they differ in the degree to which a decent level of economic security is a social right and to what extent individuals can maintain a livelihood in case of unemployment (Steiber, 2013). In this sense, characteristics of welfare regimes influence work values via the provision of economic security, and it is assumed that in countries that provide basic security needs and social protection, individuals progress to intrinsic work values.

However, because the distribution of welfare state protection is not the same in all countries and for all groups within a country (Bonoli, 1997), a welfare-state institutional approach (Edlund and Grönlund, 2010; Gallie, 2007) is needed to examine changes in work values with regard to contextual factors. Here, "to the extent that more encompassing (generous) welfare states provide more extensive social protection, a shift in emphasis from extrinsic to intrinsic values can be expected" (Esser and Lindh, 2018, p. 147).

Building on this, we selected four contextual dimensions that we deem to be most essential for analyzing changes in work values and with regard to economically turbulent times. These are the impact of the financial crisis, the share of industry, ALMPs, and PLMPs, which are all part of the opportunity structure within which individual work values are formed.[1] The

[1]The central interest of the study lies in the effect of contextual factors on work values. The

aspects chosen represent the core areas of a country's labor market policy (ALMP and PLMP), the structural setup of the labor market (share of industry), as well as the largest external economic impact for all countries in the period under study (financial crisis, tested by the impact in the form of the unemployment rate).

Looking first of all at the time aspect, it becomes clear that the available observation dates are before and after the financial crisis of 2008/2009. So, if an increase in intrinsic work values is expected in economically good times (Esser and Lindh, 2018), the opposite expectation is to be made for our case (Riekhoff, 2017). In this case, an economic downturn triggered by the financial crisis is added to an ever-increasing globalization and dualization of labor markets (Buss, 2019). Accordingly, we assume that the sum of these processes leads to a larger degree of uncertainty for employees and thus results in a greater demand for job security compared with autonomy. Although it is difficult to separate long-term labor market effects at this point, based on the sum of the previously mentioned aspects, the following hypothesis can be stated:

Hypothesis 1 (H1). *In times of economic crisis the preference for security compared with autonomy increases.*

Beyond this time aspect, there are various labor market policies that influence work values. The industrial sector, as a proxy for the basic economic structure, inter alia controls for the export orientation of an economy. Because of its export orientation the industry sector is especially affected by globalization and financial crisis. As wages and job security within the industry usually are high, these processes challenge the high level of security of the labor market insiders working in the industry sector, who used to be sheltered from labor market risks to a higher degree compared with labor market outsiders, who did not enjoy such high protection levels (Duman and Kemmerling, 2020; Rueda, 2005; Schwander, 2019). Accordingly, we would expect that a higher industry share of a welfare state goes along with a higher demand of security as the labor market insiders want to defend their advantageous and beneficial position on the labor market.

Consequently, we expect that such changes are also reflected in work values, which leads to our second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2 (H2). *A high industrial share leads to an increased prefer-*

selection of the factors considered is limited due to the method used and the number of countries available, which results in a limited number of degrees of freedom. At the same time, it is clear that factors at the individual level can also have an influence. Conceivable here are aspects such as socialization, education or cultural differences. These other factors cannot be considered within this study and instead form the basis for further research.

ence for security compared with autonomy.

Furthermore, the generosity of labor market policies can have an influence. Here, employment insecurity provokes anxieties about the difficulty of finding a new job or alternative sources of non-work income (Carr and Chung, 2014). These aspects can be related to active and PLMPs. Previous research has shown that perceived labor market security is high if income protection or ALMPs are provided (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; Hipp, 2016). The EU also seems to have noticed this as they have made investments in ALMPs as a central component of their policies against unemployment (Bonoli and Liechti, 2018; Marques and Hörisch, 2020). This might have a substantial effect on the work values of the individuals because these measures prevent—at least to some degree—social exclusion in case of unemployment, which is also of central importance given the centrality of work for social inclusion (Lindsay, 2009). However, for individuals and their work values, these measures either help to secure existing jobs—for example with training programs and short-term work schemes—or they might lower the expected costs of becoming unemployed, for example by means of direct job-creation schemes on the second labor market (Dengler, 2019).[2] This leads to the following hypothesis regarding ALMPs:

Hypothesis 3 (H3). *Higher expenditures for ALMPs lead to a decreased preference for security compared with autonomy.*

For PLMPs, we can build on the argumentation for ALMPs because they might shape work values in a reasonably straightforward manner. PLMPs either lower the risk of becoming unemployed—at least for the large group of labor market insiders—by introducing employment protection regulations, or they lower the economic (but not per se social) costs of being unemployed by guaranteeing unemployment replacement rates. However, the conditions vary depending on the country, for example when it comes to eligibility rules for unemployment insurance. Different criteria for access, thus, lead to different coverage, which in turn means that individuals are either part of the protected or unprotected group in case of unemployment (Pfeifer, 2010). Furthermore, Wulfgramm (2014) has shown that different levels of PLMPs substantially impact the attitudes of respondents, particularly life

[2] Another relevant aspect, which unfortunately cannot be implemented at this point due to the limited data availability, are "demanding activation" policies. Existing research shows that, especially during economic downturns, countries introduce stronger sanctions for the unemployed in order to reconcile an increased need for social protection and lower tax revenues (Knotz, 2019). At the same time, however, it is also evident that such sanctions have hardly any positive effect on the labor rate. Instead, it turned out that requiring more active job search and the availability for a wider range of jobs leads to increased employment (Knotz, 2020). In the light of this research, an important next step is to consider how these frameworks affect work values.

satisfaction. Overall, we expect higher levels of employment protection in the event of unemployment to accompany work values, which exhibit a lower (relative) need for security. Accordingly, our fourth hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis 4 (H4). *Higher levels of PLMPs (stricter employment protection as well as higher replacement rates within unemployment insurance) lead to a decreased preference for security compared with autonomy.*

2.3 Data, Methods, and Measurement

In this study, we rely on data[3] from the ESS for individual-level data. The ESS is a representative transnational survey, which has been conducted in many countries every two years since 2001. The ESS is suitable for our study because of its high standards with regard to survey design and data collection and its coverage of several relevant indicators (Schnaudt et al., 2014). Furthermore, in the 2004 and 2010 rounds, questions were asked about work values, which facilitate our analysis. Thus, we created a pooled data set using these two rounds.

Comparing the situation before and after the start of the crisis, it cannot be assumed that the effects will be equally strong and timely in all countries. Nevertheless, the time periods of the two ESS waves allow a comparison. The ESS 2004 was surveyed from August 2004 to June 2005, which is well before the beginning of the crisis. The ESS 2010 was then surveyed from August 2010 to January 2012 (in Austria even from May to October 2013), which means that it can be assumed that the crisis has already come into effect in all countries in the sample.

In particular, we wish to shed light on changes of work values based on changes in economic and institutional indicators. Therefore, we require data on the country level for both years, which we draw from the World Bank, the OECD, the Comparative Political Data Set (CPD), and the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Data Set (CWED). To account for the fact that the surveys of the individual ESS waves, as just mentioned, each extend over a longer period than just one year, we have assigned the macro data to the respective interview time. That is, each individual interviewed has been assigned exactly the macro data values from the year in which the interview was conducted.[4] So, for example, if the interview took place in 2012, the

[3] Descriptive statistics for all variables used in this study is given in Appendices A.1 and A.2

[4] The only exception is the replacement rate. Because the CWED data set only lasts until 2011, the values from 2011 were assigned here for 2012–2013. In the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Switzerland, the data set only lasted up to 2010, which is why the values from 2010 were used here accordingly. We consider this procedure to be justifiable because the variance between countries is significantly larger than between

unemployment rate (macro level indicator) was assigned from 2012 and not from 2010 (official ESS round year).

Following this, our data set includes information from the 19 countries for which we have data for both the 2004 and 2010 rounds of the ESS as well as the country-level indicators. These are Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.This leaves us with 51.626 individuals, nested in 38 country-year, nested in 19 different countries. Such a structure requires multilevel modeling, as ignoring the hierarchical structure could result in the underestimation of standard errors, subsequently leading to "spuriously 'significant' results" (Hox et al., 2018, p. 4). Because the dependent variable is linear, we undertake multilevel mixed-effects linear regressions. Previous research has mainly focused on the individual level and often neglected the influence of macro-indicators on work values. The method of multilevel modeling helps us to bring both levels together, enabling us to investigate the influence of macro indicators on work values. Before discussing the structure of the models and their results in more detail, we present the variables they contain.

2.3.1 Dependent Variable

Following existing research in this area, we distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic work values (Kalleberg and Marsden, 2019; Kraaykamp et al., 2019). The ESS contains questions for both types of work values. Respondents were asked how important several aspects would be for them if they needed to choose a job. On a scale from 1 to 5 (not important at all to very important), they indicated how important a secure job, a high income, the opportunity to act of their own initiative, and the ability to combine work and family responsibilities were to them.

To be able to evaluate the dimensionality of these four indicators, we conducted an exploratory factor analysis. The results showed that a secure job and high income load on the first factor, whereas own initiative and the ability to combine work and family load on the second factor. Based on this, we constructed two scales, namely one for "autonomy" (including own initiative and the ability to combine work and family)[5] and one for "security" (including a secure job and high income).

the (short) time periods of these cases.

[5]Whether the ability to combine work and family can be subsumed under the category of intrinsic work values is being discussed in the literature. Based on the results of our factor analysis and to distinguish between extrinsic and more materialist (security including a secure job and high income) on the one hand and intrinsic and more postmaterialist work values (autonomy including own initiative and the ability to combine work and family) on the other hand, we decided to group the latter into one category.

Figure 2.1: Work Values of 18 to 65-year-olds in 2004.



Source: Calculated from ESS (2004) data.

It is worthwhile at this point to examine the work values of individuals in comparison over time. Accordingly, Figures 2.1 and 2.2 depict averages by country for 2004 and 2010, respectively.[6]

The first point of note is that work values vary substantially on both dimensions. In 2004 they varied by approximately one full point on a 5-point Likert scale on the dimension of security and 0.6 points on the dimension of autonomy. In 2010, the security dimension varied again, from a value of roughly 3.6 in Denmark (DK) to a value of 4.6 in Greece (GR), whereas on the autonomy score the range is between 3.5 in Slovakia (SK) and 4.3 in Greece (GR). Secondly, an overall change between the years can be depicted. Countries that were at the top right of the figure in 2004 tend to move slightly toward the bottom left in 2010, whereas countries that were at the bottom left in 2004 tend to move slightly toward the top right in 2010. A strong example for the first group is Portugal (PT), whereas Germany (DE), for example, belongs to the second group. Overall, the trend is a kind of compression, that is, toward homogenization of work values. The only exceptions to this trend are the Czech Republic (CZ) and Slovakia (SK). The general trend toward a slight homogenization could be generated by EU policies aiming at convergence.

[6]As recommended by the ESS, data are weighted with both poststratification and population weights.

Figure 2.2: Work Values of 18 to 65-year-olds in 2010.



Source: Calculated from ESS (2010) data.

With regard to the differences between the countries, a much more contrasted picture appears. Here, no trade-off, but a general aspiration level, is shown. This is reflected in the corresponding correlation values between the indices for security and autonomy, which are 0.556*** for 2004 and 0.301*** for 2010. No clear patterns according to welfare state regimes can be found.

However, it is interesting to note that the countries with the highest overall aspirations, namely Greece (GR), Spain (ES), and Portugal (PT), are also the countries that have had to contend with high unemployment. In countries where the level of unemployment has dropped, such as Germany (DE), the aspiration level is somewhat lower and has risen slightly from 2004 to 2010. Overall, there are strong differences, both in terms of security and autonomy, between the countries.

Instead of using these two variables as dependent variables in separate models, we calculate the difference from both scales, which as a dependent variable indicates the distance between the importance of security to the importance of autonomy. This approach is in line with previous studies, which argue that surveys on preferences often do not force the respondents to rank the relative importance of their preferences or to contrast the preference dimensions directly (Busemeyer et al., 2018; Esser and Lindh, 2018). This can result in respondents ascribing high importance to each preference, without seeing the preferences in relation to each other. To counteract this

possible overestimation, we therefore use the difference between security and autonomy as a dependent variable, showing the relative importance of the preferences. Thus, we investigate the extent to which the relevance of security changes, thereby following the latest developments in the literature on survey methodology.

2.3.2 Independent Variables

To assess the impact of labor market policies and changes in economic indicators on work values, we included five country-level measures.[7] First, we include the share of industry as percentage of GDP (World Bank, 2020a) to look at the structure of the labor market. Subsequently, we look at the level of protection against unemployment (OECD, 2020) and include the replacement rate under the unemployment insurance scheme (Scruggs et al., 2017). Third, we examine the role of political action, by including the spending on active market policies (Armingeon et al., 2019). Finally, we use a general assessment of the economic situation. For this purpose, we include the unemployment rate[8] (World Bank, 2020b). Here, previous research has found that "a country's unemployment level is decisive for the perception of job security" (Esser and Olsen, 2012, p. 447),in the sense that it influences the probability of finding an alternative job in case of unemployment. We use the unemployment rate both to examine the question of the influence of the economic situation and as a general control variable at the country level. For better comparability, all country-level variables have been standardized (Gelman and Hill, 2006).

2.3.3 Control Variables

We include five individual-level control variables in our analysis that were previously found to be related to work values, for which variances are expected.

First, in line with previous research (Esser and Olsen, 2012) and to check for a curvilinear relationship with work values, age is included.

Second, we control for the influence of gender (binary distinction between men (=1) and women). The literature has produced various findings on this topic in recent decades. In the early years of the expansion of women's participation in the labor market, it was assumed that women had different preferences to men. This assumption was characterized, for example, by a lower relevance of intrinsic work values for them (Gallie, 2019). In the

[7] A detailed description of the macro indicators and their respective sources is given in Appendix A.3.

[8] We also ran models with GDP as an alternative assessment of the economic situation. However, this did not yield significant results. Furthermore, we ran models in which we included the gender pay gap to control for a potentially different impact on men and women. These models did not yield significant results either.

following decades, some authors expected the preferences of men and women to converge (Gallie, 2019). However, more recent studies have not been able to prove this. Instead, it appears that differences in work values between women and men are relatively stable, as they are rooted in lifestyle choices, which are made by the individual within the opportunity structure they live in (Eagly and Wood, 2013). Recent research has shown that women show stronger preferences for intrinsic work values than men do (Cemalcilar et al., 2019; Esser and Lindh, 2018), which is what we expect to find in our study as well.

Third, we include educational level because this has repeatedly shown to be strongly correlated to intrinsic work values (Gallie et al., 2012). More specifically, differences in work values reflect the different experiences of individuals within the education system, in the sense that a stronger focus on intrinsic values can be expected to be associated with longer/higher education (Inglehart, 1977). Education is measured by the highest qualification level that respondents achieved, distinguishing between primary, secondary, and tertiary education.

Fourth, the current employment status of the respondents is included. A distinction is made here between respondents, who are employed, unemployed, in education, and inactive. It is assumed that work values differ according to the respective employment situation. For example, extrinsic work values are expected to decrease with more precarious or distant labor market positions (Esser and Lindh, 2018).

Fifth, socioeconomic classification is measured according to Oesch's class schema (Oesch, 2006) and included in the analysis as previous studies have shown that an individual's location in the employment structure affects their work values (Esser and Olsen, 2012; Oesch, 2006). This schema enables researchers to "differentiate between more or less advantageous positions within labor markets and production units" (Oesch, 2006, p. 265). Combining the hierarchical criterion of marketable skills and a distinction between different work logics (technical work logic, organizational work logic, and interpersonal service logic), the schema results in an eight-class categorization.

2.4 Empirical Results

As previously mentioned, we work on a hierarchical data set. We expect work values to be shaped by predictors both at the individual level and at the country-year level. We ran random intercept models (see Table 2.1), where M1 consists of explanatory variables at the individual level. Within M2-M5 explanatory variables at the country-year level are added. This results in separate models for each labor market policy indicator.

First of all, the results of the analysis clearly show that between 2004

Table 2.1: Results of the Models for the Difference between Security and Autonomy

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Year (2010=1)	0.146* (2.06)	0.142* (2.33)	0.150** (2.74)	0.148* (2.23)	0.143* (2.07)
Age	0.0140*** (4.12)	0.0140*** (4.11)	0.0142*** (4.16)	0.0140*** (4.12)	0.0140*** (4.12)
Sex (male=1)	0.0479*** (6.66)	0.0479*** (6.66)	0.0481*** (6.66)	0.0479*** (6.66)	0.0479*** (6.66)
Employment status[x]					
In education	-0.127*** (-7.82)	-0.127*** (-7.84)	-0.127*** (-7.81)	-0.127*** (-7.82)	-0.127*** (-7.82)
Unemployed	0.0189 (1.49)	0.0190 (1.50)	0.0190 (1.50)	0.0189 (1.49)	0.0189 (1.49)
Inactive	-0.132*** (-14.94)	-0.132*** (-14.94)	-0.132*** (-14.91)	-0.132*** (-14.94)	-0.132*** (-14.93)
Level of education[xx]					
Secondary education	-0.132*** (-7.88)	-0.134*** (-8.04)	-0.127*** (-7.67)	-0.132*** (-7.90)	-0.131*** (-7.85)
Tertiary education	-0.287*** (-15.35)	-0.290*** (-15.50)	-0.282*** (-15.19)	-0.287*** (-15.37)	-0.287*** (-15.32)
Oesch's class schema[xxx]					
Small business owners	0.172*** (7.22)	0.172*** (7.22)	0.172*** (7.22)	0.172*** (7.22)	0.172*** (7.22)
Technical (semi-)professionals	0.331*** (13.25)	0.331*** (13.25)	0.331*** (13.25)	0.331*** (13.25)	0.331*** (13.25)
Production workers	0.590*** (25.49)	0.589*** (25.47)	0.590*** (25.51)	0.590*** (25.49)	0.590*** (25.49)
(Associate) managers	0.306*** (13.23)	0.306*** (13.23)	0.306*** (13.23)	0.306*** (13.23)	0.306*** (13.24)
Clerks	0.435*** (18.12)	0.435*** (18.13)	0.435*** (18.13)	0.435*** (18.13)	0.435*** (18.12)

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	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals	0.276*** (11.76)	0.276*** (11.75)	0.276*** (11.77)	0.276*** (11.76)	0.276*** (11.76)
Service workers	0.484*** (20.92)	0.483*** (20.91)	0.484*** (20.94)	0.484*** (20.92)	0.484*** (20.92)
Unemployment rate	0.0875** (2.89)	0.105*** (3.89)	0.0762** (3.00)	0.0741* (2.50)	0.0884** (2.96)
Industry		0.111*** (3.73)			
Expenditures on ALMP			-0.116*** (-4.70)		
Replacement rate				-0.0799* (-2.46)	
Employment protection					0.0392 (1.13)
Constant	-0.293*** (-5.27)	-0.287*** (-5.80)	-0.293*** (-6.39)	-0.294*** (-5.58)	-0.292*** (-5.33)
Var (countryyear)	1.53e-13 (-0.97)	2.73e-13 (-0.81)	3.92e-13 (-0.91)	1.98e-13 (-1.04)	1.67e-13 (-0.99)
Var (country)	0.0466*** (-12.65)	0.0343*** (-14.04)	0.0278*** (-14.75)	0.0407*** (-13.29)	0.0448*** (-12.80)
Var (residual)	0.536*** (-100.19)	0.536*** (-100.19)	0.536*** (-100.18)	0.536*** (-100.19)	0.536*** (-100.19)
Observations	51626	51626	51626	51626	51626
AIC	114521.9	114511.7	114507.2	114518.1	114522.6
BIC	114698.9	114697.6	114693.1	114704.0	114708.5

t statistics in parentheses
[x] The reference category is in paid work.
[xx] The reference category is primary education.
[xxx] The reference category is 'Self-employed professionals and large employers'.
Source: Own calculations based on ESS data, World Bank data, the Comparative Political Dataset, and the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

and 2010, there has been a change in the dependent variable, that is, in the preference of security over autonomy. More precisely, the need for security has increased. This forms the basis for testing the first hypothesis. If we now look at the influence of the unemployment rate, we see a significant positive effect on preferences for security over autonomy. Evidently, the preference for security increases as unemployment rates rise. The results indicate that the first hypothesis can be confirmed. Thus, the result suggest that an increase in extrinsic work values can be expected in economically turbulent times.

A look at the general influence of labor market policies, independent of time and change, on work values now reveals further relevant results. First, with regard to the share of industry the hypothesis formulated above is also confirmed, as work values in countries with a higher industry share shift toward security. This is not about the direct effect on individual workers in the industry, but supports our expectations that a higher industry share in a country goes along with a higher demand for security. Reasons for this could be that not only the industry itself but also the suppliers (e.g., external IT services or consulting services for the industry) may be affected. A higher share of industry is accompanied by a higher share of exports, which in turn can increase safety expectations in the context of, for example, labor market challenges such as globalization, dualization, and the financial crisis.

Furthermore, our findings support our third hypothesis as the effect on ALMPs is strong and shows that the preferences for security declines as expenditures on ALMPs increase. This is not about the effect of a single policy but about general labor market patterns, that is, the differences between countries and their respective labor market policies. The empirical results show that employees' preferences in countries with higher expenditures for ALMPs are less orientated around security than autonomy. As ALMPs comprise a wide variety of measures (Fredriksson, 2021), this might be driven by several factors. For this reason, we calculated the impact of individual measures of ALMP as part of a sensitivity analysis. The detailed regression results of this can be found in Appendix A.5. On the one hand, every measure comprised within the concept of ALMPs share the aim of fighting unemployment effectively, for example, by securing existing jobs or by implementing short-term work schemes (Hörisch and Weber, 2014). On the other hand, they also might lower the expected costs of becoming unemployed by providing training programs or by means of direct job-creation schemes in case of unemployment. The results of the sensitivity analysis show that two measures have a significant influence in the way that they decrease the preference for security. These are, on the one hand, public employment services and administration, and on the other hand training programs. In contrast, job creation, start-up incentives and employment incentives show no significant influence. It should be noted, however, that at least direct job creation and start-up incentives are much smaller in their

(financial) scope than the two significant ALMPs. It could also be that they are simply used too little to have a (significant) impact. Nevertheless, the results suggest that, public employment services and administration as one aspect for lowering the costs of becoming unemployed, as well as training opportunities as a factor that helps to secure existing jobs, decrease the preference for security.In contrast, the findings for our fourth hypothesis on PLMPs that include employment protection and a replacement rate in case of unemployment are rather mixed. Employment protection does not show a significant influence on work values.

In contrast, the opposite effect is shown for the replacement rate. For countries with a higher replacement rate, the preferences for security becomes weaker. This finding —which is in line with our expectations— essentially corresponds with classical economic expectations as higher replacements rates per definition lower the (economic) costs of unemployment.

Concluding, the analysis of the influence of the variables on the individual level now shows the following results. With increasing age, also the preference for security over autonomy increases. More man than women prefer security over autonomy and the preference for security decreases with increasing education. Looking at the influence of class, all groups have a greater preference for security than the reference group, which consists of self-employed professionals and large employers. Here, small business owners constitute the group with the lowest effect size and production workers the group with the highest. A mixed picture emerges with regard to employment status. Those who were in education or inactive have a lower preference for security than those in paid work (reference group). Unemployment, on the other hand, has no significant impact.

It should be noted that we ran several checks to further assess the robustness of the presented effects. In a first step, we applied a manual jackknifing procedure to ensure that the results are not distorted by individual influential countries. We tested the influence of a single country by excluding a country when estimating the fully specified models.[9] The results indicate that some models could potentially be vulnerable to the exclusion of a country. However, the exclusion of a country and all observations in this country might cause a loss of statistical power in multilevel analyses. Thus, we ran further models in which instead of excluding those countries, we included dummies for the potential influential cases (Van der Meer et al., 2010). Following this, it became clear that the results of the model for the replacement rate seem to be vulnerable to the exclusion of the United Kingdom. Following the country dummy procedure, the presented effects for the replacement rate changed slightly to -0.118^{***} (see table Appendix D). Thus, the previously mentioned result is reinforced and does not change

[9] A detailed description of the jackknifing procedure can be provided on request from the authors.

the direction.

What are the policy implications that can be derived from the results reported above? Building on the research by Bredgaard et al. (2006) and Wilthagen and Tros (2004), who convincingly argued that successful diffusion and transferability of flexicurity policies depend heavily on the political institutional capacity, we would suggest that also work values of the individuals in a country have to complement the labor market policies implemented. For example, ALMPs in the form of start-up incentives can only be successfully implemented if there is a certain willingness to become self-employed or an entrepreneur because this implies that the value of autonomy is acknowledged compared with security—at least to a certain degree. Otherwise, start-up incentives offered by a country will miss the mark. The same applies to active labor market measures (Graham et al., 2010) that foster retraining for older employees or migration incentives offered by national welfare policy makers or the European Union, as these presuppose a certain degree of flexibility regarding the contents of the work and the willingness to move, respectively.

Accordingly, we argue that further research should consider thoroughly the work values of the target group when evaluating labor market policy measures. We would therefore expect the limited success, for example, of the EU's endeavors to harmonize the labor market—as well as the adoption, policy diffusion or shared policy learning of national labor markets—to be rooted at least to some degree in the negligence of the work values of the target group.

2.5 Conclusion

In this article, we have shown that despite EU harmonization endeavors work values regarding the relative importance of security compared with autonomy still vary greatly between European countries. Our results suggest that—in addition to the state of the literature on the micro level— the preference for security over autonomy is substantially driven by the economic structure of a country and its labor market policy making. Unsurprisingly, where unemployment is high, the preferences for security are stronger. In addition, our results underline the influence of ALMPs on work values as high expenditures on ALMPs reduce the relative importance of security either by securing existing jobs or by lowering the (social and economic) costs in case of unemployment. By analyzing data from 2004 and 2010, the results suggest that economically turbulent times are associated with the development of individuals' work values in different European countries. Here, we were able to show that work values changed toward a higher preference for security over autonomy. Further, and regardless of this change, we were able to show that in terms of the general influence of labor market policies

on work values, in countries with a high industry relevance for the overall GDP, security became more important than autonomy. The same effect was presented for expenditures on ALMP; in contrast, in countries with high replacement rates in case of unemployment, the relative importance of security decreased. Last but not least, we discussed the possible implications of the proven heterogeneity of work values for national as well as European labor market policy making by arguing that labor market policy making has to account for the work values of their target group to be implemented successfully.

With these findings, we hope to advance the literature in at least two ways. First, we hope to advance the literature on work values by emphasizing the interplay between work values and labor market policies. Our results stress that work values are not only driven by individual factors such as age, gender, education, employment status, or sector of employment. Besides these factors—and not to mention the vast body of literature that convincingly stresses both the prevailing relative stability of work values (Clark, 2005; Esser and Lindh, 2018; Gallie, 2007) as well as the importance of intergenerational transmission on work values and social policy preferences (Cemalcilar et al., 2019; Tosun et al., 2019a)—we show that the development of work values can be moderately influenced by economically turbulent times. Furthermore, we demonstrate that this variation is substantially shaped by the economic structure of a country as well as their labor market policies. Second, we hope to speak to the literature on public policies as well as on policy learning and policy diffusion by arguing that —to fight unemployment successfully— labor market policy makers have to consider the preferences of their target group.

Some limitations need to be mentioned. Because of the given number of countries and the resulting limited degrees of freedom only a limited number of macrovariables could be included in the models. The results can, therefore, only be considered in the context of European countries, and further analysis on a broader data basis that allows for more extensive models would be desirable. Furthermore, the use of crosssectional data brings the well-known problem of the limited possibility to examine causalities; especially to get closer to the question of causality, panel data would be particularly well suited for further analysis here. Thus, further research and additional data with more points in time would be required to gain a deeper understanding of the interplay between changes in labor market public policies, specific labor market reforms, and work values. In addition, it would be interesting to examine the interactions between country-level variables and individual-level characteristics. This would give the opportunity to see whether welfare state policies affect the various subgroups of the population equally or whether there are differences based on individual characteristics.

Nevertheless, by comparing data before and after the outbreak of the financial crisis, we were able to show that variation at the country level

in the form of economic structures and labor market policies do influence individual work values. Furthermore, it is worth noting that we were able to show that no trade-off between the two dimensions of security and autonomy existed. Instead, both dimensions are positively correlated and are thus more related in the sense of an overall aspirations level for work values. As can be seen in Figures 1 and 2, the countries with the highest aspiration levels are the southern European countries characterized by high unemployment rates, namely Greece (GR), Spain (ES), and Portugal (PT). On the other hand, the Netherlands (NL) and Denmark (DK) have the lowest aspiration levels. These two countries are usually seen as the forerunners of flexicurity (Arndt and Hörisch, 2015), a characteristic of labor market policies combining the command of flexibility with higher levels of security (Gallie, 2017). This overall impression can provide the basis for future research, for example in the form of in-depth country studies.

Besides, our results could facilitate future studies of whether and to what extent labor market policies were particularly successful (or failed) because they fitted (or did not fit) with the work values of the individuals in a specific country. This would also help us to better understand the chances as well as limits of policy diffusion and policy learning between different countries and welfare state systems.

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Chapter 3

There Is No Place like Home! How Willing Are Young Adults to Move to Find a Job?

Abstract

The EU has undergone significant economic crises in recent years. Therein, young people were amongst the hardest hit groups, with youth unemployment rising as high as 50 percent in some member states. Particularly high rates of youth unemployment were often observed in rural areas, where labour market supply in relation to demand were notably divergent. One of the core pillars of the EU's agenda is to tackle the persistent problem of youth unemployment. Since the recent crisis, this has been via the "Youth on the Move" initiative, which involves the promotion of intra- and international mobility of young adults in order to gain access to job opportunities. However, what has received little attention so far is the question of what the general willingness of young adults to move is like, and to what extent this varies, for example, depending upon the area they live in. This paper therefore asks if rural youth differ from youth in urban areas in relation to their willingness to move for a job within their country or to another country. Moreover, what influences the general willingness to be mobile? Based on the CUPESSE Survey, which includes data on 18–35-year-olds in a sample of 11 European countries, it is shown that living in a rural area is strongly associated with the willingness to move. Furthermore, it shows that rural youth are more willing to move within the country but less willing to move to another country. Based on the presentation of the various factors, which promote or curb mobility readiness, the results make it clear that the success of EU initiatives depends on the preferences and willingness of the target

group in question.

Keywords

Youth Unemployment, Job Mobility, Youth Mobility, Rurality, CUPESSE Survey

Note: This chapter is identical to the article published as Weiss et al. (2021) in Sustainability.

3.1 Introduction

In recent years, youth unemployment, particularly in Europe, has received considerable attention both in European Union (EU) policymaking and in academic debates. The sharp increase in youth unemployment rates in the wake of the 2008 economic crisis led the EU to deviate from its previous policy of simply making recommendations to extensive, concrete, and financially supported policies in order to combat youth unemployment head on. Conterminously, free movement is a core pillar of the EU: It is intended to create a single European labour market and increase its flexibility and efficiency. Moreover, increased mobility is expected to help match labour supply and demand, thus leading to a better utilisation of human capital and thereby increasing economic productivity in line with the Lisbon agenda (Emilsson and Mozetič, 2021). Hence, the promotion of mobility has also become a core element of European policy designed to combat youth unemployment.

Besides the fact that existing research on youth mobility critically addresses European transformations and their inequality-related effects on youth and youth transitions (Aksakal and Schmidt, 2019), European policy makers simply assume that young adults are willing to move internationally in order to escape unemployment. However, this ignores the reality that job mobility is not feasible for everyone and presents different people with different challenges. In order to gain a better understanding of the basic willingness of young Europeans to be mobile and the different factors that promote or hinder this willingness, this paper pursues two research questions. Firstly, what influences the general willingness of European youth to be mobile? Secondly, to what extent do young adults from areas with different levels of urbanisation differ in their willingness to move for a new job?

At the same time, migratory movement implies a transformation process for the regions that are left, which potentially results in economic, social, and demographic impacts on regions' sustainability. This is due to the fact that mobility intentions and decisions do not operate evenly across territories and social groups. Migration of those with stronger social and cultural capital has an impact on the region they are leaving. Decreasing numbers of inhabitants often lowers the local demand for services, resulting in fewer employment opportunities and unmet needs (Simões et al., 2021). These risks are often accompanied by a decline in productive activity in the primary sector and the rise of a consumption mode, resulting in a greater predominance of the tertiary sector (Rye, 2011). The challenges of mobility are particularly great for rural areas. A well-known phenomenon is the brain drain, which describes highly qualified people often leaving rural areas because they cannot find a suitable job there. This reduction in population also has other social consequences, such as the loss of volunteers who would

otherwise have contributed to strengthening the community and parents of future generations (Demi et al., 2009). From a demographic perspective, young people are needed in rural areas to enable generational renewal and thus prevent the aging of the population structure (Theodori and Theodori, 2015). Considering that in 2015 75 percent of the EU territory consisted of rural areas (Perpiña-Castillo et al., 2018), it becomes clear that the EU's promotion of young adult mobility should not be thought of without the context of spatial distribution. Thus, consideration of mobility intentions therefore represents a central element in the context of both combating youth unemployment and increasing regions' sustainable development.

Drawing on data from the CUPESSE survey (Tosun et al., 2019a), which includes a representative sample of 18–35-year-olds from 11 European countries, the various aspects influencing young adults' willingness to move within their own country or to another country to find a new job are examined. In doing so, it is shown that young adults are more willing to move within their own country than to another country for a new job. Furthermore, personal economic hardship and higher levels of education increase willingness, whereas being married and living in rural areas decrease the willingness of European youth to move internationally for a new job.

It is precisely this reluctance of young adults to move to another country in order to find a new job that contrasts with the EU's approach to promoting mobility. Therefore, it is argued that the EU needs to pay attention to young adults' motives, which foster or hinder their willingness to move for a new job, in order to create successful policies. The goal of reducing youth unemployment can only be achieved if more attention is directly paid to the nature of the target group.

By addressing the perspective of young adults and their willingness to be mobile, this paper represents a consistent continuation of the ongoing discussion on youth mobility in Europe (Emilsson and Mozetič, 2021; Aksakal and Schmidt, 2019; King and Williams, 2018; O'Reilly et al., 2015). Understanding these dynamics is highly pertinent since youth mobility not only represents one of the central pillars of the EU's youth unemployment policy to date, but will also be an important theme for this ongoing issue. At the latest juncture, given the COVID-19 pandemic and its many economic consequences, it has once again become clear that youth unemployment and successful ways to combat it will continue to be a central issue of European policymaking in the future.

The paper is structured as follows. The first section gives an overview of the development of youth unemployment in Europe in the context of the economic crisis of 2008, as well as the different policies of the EU designed to fight youth unemployment. This is followed by a theoretical overview of youth mobility, from which several hypotheses on the nature of young adults' willingness to move for a new job are derived. Subsequently, an analysis of the data and method used, as well as the empirical results, are

presented. The paper closes with a discussion of the key findings and a concluding section.

3.2 Youth Unemployment and the European Agenda to Combat it

Subsequent to the onset of the global economic crisis in 2008, the youth unemployment rate rose rapidly in a number of European countries. Although the impact of this crisis varied enormously across Europe, as can be seen from Figure 3.1, southern European countries were hardest hit, with the youth unemployment rate (i.e., amongst 15–29-year-olds) in Greece, for example, rising from 16.8 percent in 2008 to 48.6 percent in 2013 (Eurostat, 2021b). In other countries, however, such as Austria, there was only a slight increase (6.1 percent to 7.7 percent) during this period, and there was even a decrease (9.0 percent to 7.0 percent) in Germany.

Figure 3.1: Youth Unemployment Rates (15-29-year-olds)



Source: Eurostat 2021. Note: In addition to the rate for the EU 28, those states that are part of the sample of the later analysis are presented here. Eurostat has provided data on youth unemployment in Turkey only since 2012.

Previous research has shown youth unemployment was already a problem in many countries before the crisis (Tosun et al., 2017) and described various causes and aggravating factors thereof. Existing studies argue that

the period of youth unemployment considered here is unique due to several aspects (O'Reilly et al., 2015). One such aspect is that labour market flexibility makes it particularly difficult for young people to find permanent employment. Moreover, young adults are often amongst the first to be affected by downsizing and restructuring measures. Furthermore, the problem of overqualification and skills mismatch continued to grow. At the individual level, studies have also shown that long-term exposure to unemployment is part of a generational legacy (Warmuth et al., 2015). This means that parents shape their children's opportunities through the transmission of resources and values.

The economic crisis and its impact on youth unemployment rates resulted in an extension of EU-level efforts to promote youth employment (Tosun, 2017) and caused the EU to deviate from its usual path of common policies. As described by Tosun and Hörisch (2019), the fundamental orientation of the EU in this policy area began in 1997 with the Luxembourg Job Summit, which was the starting point of the EU employment policy framework. Here, both the European Employment Strategy and the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) were adopted. This initiated the so-called Luxembourg process, in which member states, based on a common set of objectives and goals, became part of an annual monitoring cycle for national labour market policies. At the same time, the Lisbon Strategy took place from 2000 to 2010, within which the European Employment Strategy was renewed twice according to the proven system. Part of this renewal was that young adults were explicitly included as a target group for the first time. This further resulted in a series of political measures to promote youth employment (see Table 3.1 for an overview).

Although for many years EU labour market policy was characterised by general policy recommendations based on the OMC, measures to combat youth unemployment have differed significantly. These measures became concrete and financially supported by EU funds. Thus, the EU developed a set of policies to tackle youth unemployment underpinned by the concept of social investment (Marques and Hörisch, 2020).

Elaborated before the outbreak of the crisis, Youth in Action provided the legal framework for promoting non-formal learning amongst young adults. Specifically, it included funding for projects in five areas: "youth for Europe" (including youth exchanges, initiatives, and democracy projects), the European voluntary service "youth in the world" (covering projects where European youth cooperate with youth from different countries of the world), youth support systems, and general support for European cooperation in the youth field (European Commission, 2012). The main targets of this action were youth themselves and youth workers.

Increasing young people's mobility lies at the heart of the Youth on the Move programme. Beyond promoting lifelong learning and higher education, its goal is to help young adults find a job. The programme includes

Table 3.1: Overview of EU Policies to Combat Youth Unemployment.

Policy Programme	**Policy Measures**
Youth in Action (2007)	Legal framework for supporting non-formal learning activities of young people (Decision N° 1719/2006/EC). It promotes mobility within and beyond EU borders, non-formal learning, and intercultural dialogue and encourages all young people regardless of their background.
Youth on the Move (2010)	Initiative (COM/2016/0940) for improving young adults' prospects to find a job. The focus is on lifelong learning, higher education, and very centrally on the promotion of mobility.
Youth Guarantee (2013)	Commitment by all member states to ensure that youth under the age of 30 receive a good-quality offer of employment, education, apprenticeship or traineeship within four months after leaving education or becoming unemployed.
Youth Employment Initiative (2013)	Is one of the main EU financial resources to support the implementation of the Youth Guarantee. It supports young people who are not in education, employment, or training exclusively.
European Alliance for Apprenticeships (2014)	Aims to help trainees acquire high-quality work experience under fair conditions and thereby increase their chance of finding a good-quality job.

both assisting countries to remove obstacles to mobility, and encouraging employers to create job openings for young mobile workers. At the same time, it directly helps young people to find a job in another country. For this purpose, the project "Your first EURES Job" was launched. This is supported by the European job mobility portal (EURES), which provides information, advice, and recruitment services to facilitate free movement of workers within the European Union.

Initiated by the European Parliament in 2010 and endorsed by the Council of the EU in 2013, the Youth Guarantee makes the member states responsible for providing young people with a good-quality job offer within four months after graduating or becoming unemployed. This offer can be a job, an apprenticeship, a traineeship, or continued education. Existing

studies show that EU member states implement this in very different ways (Tosun, 2017; Tosun et al., 2019b). Furthermore, the EU directly addressed young adults that are not in employment, education, or training (NEETs) with the Youth Employment Initiative in 2013. For this purpose, EUR 6.4 billion were made available for regions with youth unemployment rates exceeding 25 percent (European Commission, 2021). Finally, and in response to frequent criticism that precarious situations are being created for young people in traineeships under the Youth Guarantee, the Quality Framework for Traineeship was created (Council of the European Union, 2014). Additionally, and with the aim of improving the quality and supply of apprenticeships as well as spreading successful concepts across the EU, the European Alliance for Apprenticeships was announced.

Overall, youth unemployment became a central issue in most European countries in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis. The extent to which young people were affected varied greatly both between countries and within countries, depending on the degree of urbanisation of the region in question. The EU took this as an opportunity to deviate from the usual approach of recommendations and to take concrete, often financially supported, measures with the aim of reducing youth unemployment. This new approach also demanded flexibility from young adults in order to obtain education, training, or a job. The extent to which this flexibility exists on the side of young adults is examined in the following sections.

3.3 Young Adults' Willingness for Job Mobility

In the course of EU enlargement between 2004 and 2007, an unexpected level of intra-European migration of young adults in search of a job took place for the first time. This migration movement varied between countries, but was generally characterised by a movement of a high proportion of young adults with tertiary education from East to West (Favell, 2008). Since the economic crisis of 2008, the direction of most of the migration of young adults in the EU has changed. South–North migration emerged, in which mainly young adults from Spain, Greece, Italy, and Portugal moved to the more northern European countries in search of a job (O'Reilly et al., 2015).

The EU promotes labour mobility as an adjustment mechanism to ensure more efficient labour allocation across the EU (European Commission, 2010). Thus, intra-EU mobility can lower unemployment rates across the EU. However, this mobility might come at the cost of young migrants. Mobility can be an advantage for future jobs, for example from the employer's perspective through additional language skills or increased social capital, but mobility itself is no guarantee of finding a job in the future (Nienaber et al., 2020). Instead, for young adults, mobility can result in very short-term flexible contracts and force them to accept jobs for which they are

overqualified (Kahneman et al., 1999). Furthermore, it must also be acknowledged that moving within (or even to another) country to get a job is simply not feasible for everyone. Individuals differ, for example, in terms of their personalities and socio-economic backgrounds, and previous research indicates that individual perceptions and decisions with regards to employment are context-dependent (Rapp et al., 2018). It follows that the factors influencing the willingness to move for a new job can be contextual as well as personal.

A central contextual factor here is the structure and amenities of the region in which one lives. Here, the increasing importance of (large) cities poses a number of challenges to the rural regions surrounding them (Sroka et al., 2019). Exemplary of these challenges is the pressure on family-run farms. An increasing proportion of individuals work outside of agriculture, although it is still the central economic sector in rural regions. This development of employment out of agriculture can be an obstacle to successful succession on family farms. Especially with a view to maintaining food security and food sovereignty, it is of central importance to preserve small-scale food production (Korzenszky, 2019; Zmika et al., 2020). This is prompting countries to adopt various strategies to mitigate this problem, such as targeted support for the non-family transmission of farms (Korzenszky, 2019) or financial support programs to address the so-called "young farmers problem" (Eistrup et al., 2019). This development to work outside of agriculture and thus potentially also outside of rural areas is conditioned by the local structural conditions. For young adults in rural areas, it is often the case that the opportunities to develop their future lie in other regions, thus forcing them to migrate (Kirkpatrick-Johnson et al., 2005). This applies both to the educational path and to the path to employment. Secondary schools are only available in the next larger town or that it is often necessary to move to cities with universities for a tertiary education. Subsequently, the suitable jobs for the achieved education are then also found outside of rural regions. In line with this, Bjarnason and Thorlindsson (2006) were able to demonstrate that for the case of Iceland, the perception of job opportunities is the strongest predictor for rural youth being willing to migrate. Accordingly, a potential influence of the urbanisation level of the locality where an individual lives on the willingness to move for a job can be expected within the first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1 (H1). *The more rural the place one lives, the higher the willingness to migrate for a job.*

A look at the personal influencing factors then shows exiting native labour markets due to the experience of difficult economic conditions, constituting the main reason to migrate within international migration literature. In such circumstances, individuals want to move from a place with low em-

ployment opportunities and wages to places where more jobs and higher wages are available (Van Mol, 2016). Existing studies on youth provide evidence for such dynamics. Cairns et al. (2014), for instance, showed that Portuguese young adults consider international mobility a possible option when domestic labour market prospects are limited. Similarly, a study by Van Mol (2014) showed that Italian youth often move to another country due to economic circumstances, and in order to improve the chances of securing employment in the domestic labour market upon their return. These findings form the basis for the second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2 (H2). *The worse the individual economic situation, the greater the willingness to move in order to find a job.*

Finally, there is another personal influencing factor, which, however, is expected to tend to reduce the willingness to be mobile. This is mainly about being attached to the place one lives in through close family relations. The general idea here is that people value living closely to family, and take this into account when deciding about migrating or staying. On the one hand, young adults who receive greater help from their families show that they are less willing to migrate (Bjarnason and Thorlindsson, 2006). It is not only about families that share a household, but is expected to also apply to the context of non-resident family ties (Mulder, 2018; Thomas and Dommermuth, 2020). On the other hand, it can also be assumed that a stronger sense of obligation to the family is also associated with a lower willingness to migrate. Following this, the final hypothesis is formulated:

Hypothesis 3 (H3). *The closer the family ties, the less willing young people are to migrate for a job.*

Overall, various aspects promote or hinder young adults' willingness to migrate for a job. How these are operationalised within the study, as well as which effects can be reported in this respect, is described in the following sections.

3.4 Data and Method

This study is based on the CUPESSE dataset from 2016 (Tosun et al., 2019a). This dataset is the result of a survey amongst youth (aged 18 to 35) in 11 European countries, namely, Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The sampling frame was consistent across the countries, resulting in probability samples of individuals aged 18 to 35 representative of employment status, NUTS-2 region, age group, education, and migration

background for each country (Tosun et al., 2019a). Interviews took place online in nine of the 11 countries. Due to low internet coverage, the survey could not be conducted online in Hungary or Turkey. Instead, the Hungarian team used computer-assisted personal interviewing and in Turkey interviews were conducted face-to-face using paper and pencil (Tosun et al., 2019a). The surveys were conducted by professional polling firms such as Gallup, YouGov, and others (Tosun et al., 2019a). For a more detailed account of the dataset and information on the survey methodology, see Tosun et al. (2019a).

The age range surveyed reflects the current state of research on the transition from school to work. In contrast to official statistics (which often use age 25 as the end of youth), the survey includes up to 35-year-olds and thus takes into account the empirical evidence that current generations take significantly longer than previous generations to make the transition from school to work (Arnett, 2014). Furthermore, the countries in the sample reflect both important dimensions of economic variations within Europe (Tosun et al., 2016a) and variation with regards to political and welfare state systems (Bonoli and Natali, 2012). Overall, the survey includes questions about attitudes towards work, education, and the economic situation of young adults. Table 3.2 provides an overview of all variables used for this study as well as their statistical description. Appendix B.1 also contains the correlation matrix of the variables used. Appendix B.2 also provides an overview of questions and coding for the variables used from the CUPESSE Survey.

3.4.1 Dependent Variables

The central research topic of the present study is the willingness of young adults to move for a job. Respondents to the survey were asked, “What changes would you be willing to make to get a new job?” and had to indicate their answer (no/maybe/yes) to the following statements: “I would be willing to move within country [the respective survey country was inserted here],” and “I would be willing to move to a different country.” This makes it possible to examine in more detail the willingness to engage in both intra- and international mobility. Furthermore, these items are particularly suitable, since “behavioural intentions account for an appreciable proportion of variance in actual behaviour” (Ajzen, 2005). Additionally, migration intentions have been proven to be a good predictor of migration behaviour (De Jong, 2010). Finally, a study by Van Dalen and Henkens (2012) showed that for the Dutch context, forces triggering migration intentions are the same triggering actual migratory behaviour. The answers were coded binary given answers with those who were willing (=1) and those who were not or maybe willing (=0).

In order to test the hypotheses, a logit regression analysis separated for

Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics.

Variable	**Obs.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min**	**Max**
Move within country	17,406	0.41	0.49	0	1
Move to a different country	17,406	0.29	0.46	0	1
Rural index	17,406	1.64	0.58	1	3
Age	17,406	27.16	4.95	18	35
Female	17,406	0.52	0.50	0	1
Married	17,406	0.29	0.45	0	1
Medium education	17,406	0.21	0.40	0	1
High education	17,406	0.48	0.50	0	1
Employment status	17,406	0.59	0.49	0	1
Economic self-sufficiency	17,406	2.46	0.86	1	4
Social ties	17,406	2.22	1.01	1	5
Risk aversion	17,406	5.30	2.40	0	10
Work values	17,406	2.87	0.60	1	4
Familialism	17,406	3.14	0.60	1	4

the two forms of willingness to move for a job was applied. The estimation was based on the following regression:

$$Y_{ic} = \alpha_c + \beta X_{ic} + \delta Z_{ic} + \epsilon_{ic} \,, \tag{3.1}$$

where Y_{ic} represents either the willingness of an individual i to move within or to a different country c. The coefficients α_c allow country-fixed effects to be considered to control for country-specific factors that may influence our dependent variables, and X and Z are, respectively, sets of control and interest variables. Furthermore, country and post-stratification weights (based on gender, age, education, and NUTS-2 region) according to the CUPESSE data were implemented. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity in all analyses.

For a more in-depth descriptive look at the data, Table 3.3 shows the distribution of the answers, including the statistical significance of the t-tests in the differences among means separated for both dependent variables. This involves only those independent variables that were used to investigate the previously mentioned hypotheses. This shows a significant difference between the Yes and No responses to willingness to move for the economic situation variables. If one compares rural and non-rural young people here, one can see a significantly stronger refusal to move to another country amongst young people from rural areas. Finally, there was no significant difference for the variable on familialism.

Table 3.3: Response Distribution for the Two Dependent Variables.

Variable	Move within a Country			Move to a Different Country		
	No (Obs. 10,217)	Yes (Obs. 7189)	Diff.	No (Obs. 12,294)	Yes (Obs. 5112)	Diff.
Employment status	0.612	0.568	-0.044***	0.603	0.569	-0.034***
Economic self-sufficiency	2.479	2.429	-0.050***	2.49	2.381	-0.108***
Social ties	2.145	2.315	0.170***	2.159	2.352	0.193***
Rural index	1.631	1.643	0.012	1.646	1.611	-0.035***
Familialism	3.137	3.148	0.011	3.144	3.136	-0.008

Note: $^{***}p < 0.01$

3.4.2 Independent Variables

The influence of the environment in which one lives was considered in the first hypothesis. The data in the CUPESSE dataset were collected at the NUTS-2 region level. Since information on the degree of urbanisation is only available at the NUTS-3 level, it had to be calculated accordingly. The European Union provides information on the degree of urbanisation of all NUTS-3 regions. For this classification, they proceed in the following manner. Firstly, the population pattern in rural areas is determined based on two types of territorial units: “rural areas,” i.e., areas located outside urban clusters, and “urban clusters,” i.e., clusters of adjacent grid cells of 1 km2 with a density of at least 300 inhabitants per km2 and at least 5000 inhabitants. As a second step, NUTS-3 regions are classified based on the proportion of population living in rural areas as follows: “predominantly rural,” if the population share in rural areas is more than 50 percent; “intermediate,” if the population share in rural areas is between 20 percent and 50 percent; and “predominantly urban,” if the population share in rural areas is less than 20 percent. In order to avoid distortions caused by extremely small NUTS-3 regions, regions smaller than 500 km2 are grouped with one or more neighbouring regions for the purpose of classification. In the third step, the size of urban centres in a region is used as another classification criterion. A predominantly rural region containing an urban centre with more than 200,000 inhabitants, whose share is at least 25 percent of the regional population, is classified as intermediate. An intermediate region containing an urban centre with more than 500,000 inhabitants, whose share is at least 25 percent of the regional population, is classified as predominantly urban (Eurostat, 2021a). For the aim of this study and to use these data, the NUTS-3 regions were weighted by their population size and the NUTS-2 index was formed as the average of their NUTS-3 indices. This resulted in the rural index, which takes values between one and three, and the higher

the value, the more rural the region in which the respondent lives.

In the course of the second hypothesis, the aim was to investigate how personal economic situation affects willingness to move. This was operationalised via three concepts. The first look was taken at employment status. To do this, respondents were asked what they had mainly done in recent months. We used their answers in binary form, distinguishing between those in paid work or self-employment (=1), and those who were unemployed or engaged in unpaid education, community service, or others. Secondly, an assessment of the personal economic situation was considered. To this end, the question was how satisfied respondents were with their personal financial situation. This personal assessment represents the central link between the actual economic situation and personal attitudes. Existing research has repeatedly shown that personal perceptions act as a filter between the objective economic situation and various decisions, such as voting decisions (Debus et al., 2014; Weiss, 2020). The inclusion of this variable thus made it possible to look at underlying personal attitudes, which are often not measured by objective indicators (Tosun et al., 2019a). Thirdly, the social environment of the responders was considered. For example, in the wake of the economic crisis, it became apparent that youth unemployment varied greatly both across countries and within countries across regions. Individual behaviour is particularly influenced by the extent to which people are affected by being at risk of unemployment and by the extent to which their social environment is affected. Therefore, finally, the question of how many of one's friends were unemployed was included in the analysis to operationalise the economic situation.

In the third and last hypothesis, the strength of family relationships was considered. This was operationalised with two different concepts. Firstly was one's marital status. This binary variable indicated whether someone was married or not. Secondly, general attitudes towards family were considered. For this purpose, collective orientations were taken (Matsumoto et al., 1999) and formed into an index that took the average of the answers (strongly agree to strongly disagree) to the following three statements: "It is the duty of family members to take care of each other, even if they have to give up something they want themselves", "Family members should stick together, no matter what sacrifices are required", and "It is important that children respect the decisions made by their parents, even if they disagree with these decisions."

3.4.3 Control Variables

Personal characteristics also play a role in individual willingness to move. Thus, the analysis included a set of control variables. Previous studies show that men are more likely to have high migration aspirations for work than women (Vandenbrande et al., 2006). Accordingly, the same effect was

expected for this study. In addition, others have shown that older people are less willing to migrate than younger people are, which was also expected for this study.

Another reason that promotes the migration of young people is the level of education. The so-called "brain overflow" occurs when many young adults graduate from tertiary education, but their qualifications do not fit with the labour demand in their home country. The often resulting "brain drain" phenomenon, meaning the labour migration of highly skilled individuals, was already well known before the economic crisis of 2008, with scholarship on this topic dating back to the 1960s (Simões et al., 2021; Pethe, 2007). In the course of the economic crisis of 2008, a high number of highly educated young adults migrated from Southern European countries to Central and Northern European countries. This represented a phenomenon that was fostered by the crisis and, indeed, has continued since then (Staniscia et al., 2019). Many studies show that migrants are positively selected in terms of education [49] and that this applies particularly to young migrants (Braun and Arsene, 2009). To control for the level of education, a dummy variable for "medium education" was coded, indicating whether the highest level of education achieved by youths was equal to the Level 4 of the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED), whereas the dummy variable "high education" identified higher levels of education (which require achieving at least a tertiary education level). Accordingly, the reference group was represented by youths with low educational levels (ISCED level less than 4).

Furthermore, the willingness to migrate is also influenced by personality structure. Studies have shown that a general willingness to take risks also has a positive effect on the willingness to migrate (Van Mol, 2016). Accordingly, the item "On a scale from 0 to 10 would you say that in general you are a person who tends to avoid taking risks or are you fully prepared to take risks?" was used. To that end, an increasing willingness to migrate being accompanied by an increasing willingness to take risks was expected for this study. Finally, this study was controlled for individual attitudes towards work. Existing research has demonstrated that work values predict various work-related decisions, such as career choices or job selection (Braun and Arsene, 2009). Thus, an index that took the average of the answers (strongly agree to strongly disagree) to the following statements was created: "To fully develop your talents you need to have a job", "It's humiliating to receive money without having to work", "Work is a duty towards society", and "Work should always come first even if it means less spare time".

3.5 Empirical Results

The results of the analyses are presented in Table 3.4 with reference to willingness to move within one's own country and in Table 3.5 with reference to willingness to move to another country to find a job. The models presented are structured in the same way for both tables and are based on the hypotheses. The basic model (M0) contains only the previously named control variables. M1 to M3 contain the relevant independent variables for the corresponding hypotheses (H1 to H3).

Firstly, the aim was to investigate to what extent the degree of urbanisation of the area in which one lives has an influence on the willingness to move for a job. Due to the often poorer relationship between supply and demand on the labour market in rural regions, it was expected that the more rural the environment, the greater the willingness to move. The results show differences depending on the form of moving. The more rural the environment, the more willing young adults were to move within their own country. The opposite picture emerged, however, with regards to the willingness to move to another country. Here, the willingness to move decreased the more rural the area in which one lived. Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 report the changes in probability of moving within and to another country, respectively, when the independent variables increased by one unit given that all predictors were set to their mean values. The marginal effect of one additional point in the rural index increased the likelihood of moving within the country by more than 4 percent, whereas it decreased the willingness to move abroad by around 2.3 percent. This resulted in the picture that rural young people in particular are willing to move within their own country in order to find a new job. The "big step" to move to another country, on the other hand, does not seem to be desired by rural youth.

Furthermore, the results show that one's employment status had no effect on the willingness to move to a different country. Instead, when it came to moving for a job within one's own country, one's employment status had a negative effect. Thus, if one has a job, one is (as expected) less willing to move to find a new job. Similarly, for economic self-sufficiency, there was no significant effect on the willingness to move within one's own country. On the other hand, if one looks at the willingness to move to another country, it can be seen that the willingness to move decreased with increasing economic self-sufficiency. This seems plausible, since with decreasing economic pressure there is less incentive to take the "big step" and move to another country to find a new job. Furthermore, it can be seen that for both forms of moving, the willingness increased the more one's friends were unemployed. This underlines that young adults in an environment particularly affected by youth unemployment are even more willing to do whatever it takes and would move both within their own country and to another country to find a new job. Overall, hypothesis two can be confirmed on the basis of all three

Table 3.4: Estimation Results for Moving within the Country.

Willingness to Move to Another Country	(M0)	(M1)	(M2)	(M3)
Age	0.971***	0.971***	0.976***	0.971***
	(0.00519)	(0.00517)	(0.00545)	(0.00519)
Female	0.738***	0.738***	0.720***	0.739***
	(0.0334)	(0.0334)	(0.0329)	(0.0334)
Married	0.948	0.944	0.940	0.946
	(0.0526)	(0.0523)	(0.0523)	(0.0528)
Medium education	1.282***	1.291***	1.312***	1.284***
	(0.0937)	(0.0940)	(0.0971)	(0.0939)
High education	1.480***	1.495***	1.554***	1.482***
	(0.0794)	(0.0802)	(0.0839)	(0.0796)
Risk aversion	1.108***	1.109***	1.109***	1.108***
	(0.0110)	(0.0110)	(0.0110)	(0.0110)
Work values	1.398***	1.396***	1.403***	1.392***
	(0.0573)	(0.0572)	(0.0579)	(0.0594)
Rural index		1.185***		
		(0.0535)		
Employment status			0.895** (0.0476)	
Economic self-sufficiency			0.995 (0.0284)	
Social ties			1.104***	
			(0.0282)	
Familialism				1.015
				(0.0418)
Constant	0.272***	0.189***	0.208***	0.263***
	(0.0553)	(0.0421)	(0.0471)	(0.0590)
Country fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES
AIC	23,573.18	23,551.59	23,529.94	23,574.93
BIC	23,712.94	23,699.12	23,693.00	23,722.46
Observations	17,406	17,406	17,406	17,406

Note: Odds ratios with standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the NUTS-2 level. AIC= Akaike information Criterion. BIC= Bayesian information criterion. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table 3.5: Estimation Results for Moving to a Different Country.

Willingness to Move to Another Country	(M0)	(M1)	(M2)	(M3)
Age	0.976***	0.976***	0.975***	0.976***
	(0.00552)	(0.00552)	(0.00578)	(0.00552)
Female	0.801***	0.800***	0.793***	0.799***
	(0.0397)	(0.0396)	(0.0397)	(0.0396)
Married	0.882**	0.884**	0.889*	0.885**
	(0.0541)	(0.0542)	(0.0546)	(0.0544)
Medium education	1.196**	1.191**	1.231**	1.192**
	(0.0965)	(0.0962)	(0.100)	(0.0964)
High education	1.489***	1.480***	1.542***	1.485***
	(0.0888)	(0.0885)	(0.0932)	(0.0888)
Risk aversion	1.169***	1.169***	1.168***	1.170***
	(0.0132)	(0.0132)	(0.0132)	(0.0132)
Work values	1.183***	1.184***	1.180***	1.194***
	(0.0527)	(0.0527)	(0.0526)	(0.0549)
Rural index		0.890**		
		(0.0444)		
Employment status			1.053 (0.0625)	
Economic self-sufficiency			0.918*** (0.0295)	
Social ties			1.083***	
			(0.0309)	
Familialism				0.966
				(0.0424)
Constant	0.192***	0.246***	0.202***	0.208***
	(0.0424)	(0.0606)	(0.0505)	(0.0505)
Country fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES
AIC	20,948.81	20,941.53	20,915.93	20,949.64
BIC	21,088.57	21,089.06	21,078.98	21,097.16
Observations	17,406	17,406	17,406	17,406

Note: Odds ratios with standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the NUTS-2 level. AIC= Akaike information Criterion. BIC= Bayesian information criterion. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table 3.6: Marginal Effects of Moving within the Country.

Willingness to Move to Another Country	(M0)	(M1)	(M2)	(M3)
Age	-0.0071***	-0.0070***	-0.0059***	-0.0071***
	(0.0013)	(0.0013)	(0.0014)	(0.0013)
Female	-0.0735***	-0.0734***	-0.0795***	-0.0733***
	(0.0110)	(0.0109)	(0.0111)	(0.0110)
Married	-0.0130	-0.0139	-0.0150	-0.0134
	(0.0134)	(0.0134)	(0.0135)	(0.0135)
Medium education	0.0601***	0.0618***	0.0657***	0.0605***
	(0.0176)	(0.0176)	(0.0178)	(0.0176)
High education	0.0949***	0.0973***	0.1067***	0.0951***
	(0.0129)	(0.0129)	(0.0129)	(0.0129)
Risk aversion	0.0248***	0.0250***	0.0250***	0.0248***
	(0.0024)	(0.0024)	(0.0024)	(0.0024)
Work values	0.0810***	0.0808***	0.0820***	0.0801***
	(0.0099)	(0.0099)	(0.0100)	(0.0103)
Rural index		0.0411***		
		(0.0109)		
Employment status			-0.0268**	
			(0.0129)	
Economic self-sufficiency			-0.0011	
			(0.0069)	
Social ties			0.0239***	
			(0.0062)	
Familialism				0.0035
				(0.0100)
Country fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	17,406	17,406	17,406	17,406

Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the NUTS-2 level.
$^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table 3.7: Marginal Effects of Moving to a Different Country.

Willingness to Move to Another Country	(M0)	(M1)	(M2)	(M3)
Age	-0.0050***	-0.0050***	-0.0051***	-0.0050***
	(0.0011)	(0.0011)	(0.0012)	(0.0011)
Female	-0.0449***	-0.0451***	-0.0467***	-0.0453***
	(0.0100)	(0.0100)	(0.0101)	(0.0100)
Married	-0.0254**	-0.0250**	-0.0238*	-0.0246**
	(0.0124)	(0.0124)	(0.0124)	(0.0124)
Medium education	0.0361**	0.0353**	0.0420**	0.0355**
	(0.0162)	(0.0162)	(0.0163)	(0.0162)
High education	0.0804***	0.0791***	0.0874***	0.0798***
	(0.0118)	(0.0118)	(0.0119)	(0.0118)
Risk aversion	0.0316***	0.0315***	0.0314***	0.0317***
	(0.0022)	(0.0022)	(0.0022)	(0.0023)
Work values	0.0339***	0.0341***	0.0334***	0.0358***
	(0.0090)	(0.0090)	(0.0090)	(0.0093)
Rural index		-0.0235**		
		(0.0101)		
Employment status			0.0105	
			(0.0120)	
Economic self-sufficiency			-0.0173***	
			(0.0065)	
Social ties			0.0161***	
			(0.0058)	
Familialism				-0.0070
				(0.0089)
Country fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	17,406	17,406	17,406	17,406

Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the NUTS-2 level.
$^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

indicators, namely, that the willingness to move for a new job increases with a worsening economic situation.

Within the third and final hypothesis, the focus was on family relationships. In the context of marital status, being married appeared to be associated with a lower willingness to move to another country for a new job. At the same time, being married had no significant impact on the willingness to move within one's own country. Thus, as far as the influence of one's own nuclear family relationship is concerned, hypothesis three can

only be confirmed with regard to the willingness to move to another country. Hypothesis three, on the other hand, must be rejected when looking at the influence of collectivistic attitudes. Familialism had no significant influence on the willingness to move within or to another country for a new job.

The final look was directed at the results of the control variables. Here, all expectations were confirmed and showed significant effects for both forms of moving for a new job. It was confirmed that men were more willing than women to move for a new job. In the wake of the "brain drain" phenomenon frequently observed over the decades, as expected, as education increased, so did the willingness to move for a new job. The higher the level of education, the greater the willingness to move both within one's own country and to another country. Furthermore, the willingness to move decreased with increasing age and it was confirmed that the more one was willing to take a risk, the greater the willingness to move for a new job. Finally, the more central work was to one's own life, the higher the willingness to move for a new job, both within one's own country and to another.

3.6 Discussion

When comparing the results with previous studies, three aspects stand out as especially worthy of discussion.

First, a particularly striking finding is that rural youth are more willing to move within their own country than to move to another country to get a job. Existing studies cannot provide an empirical justification but only a theoretical justification for this differentiation. For example, Rye (2011) argued that physical distances for young people in rural areas have shortened in recent decades. It is no longer a big step for young rural adults to move into the unknown in the city, and many other young people have already done so before them. In order to receive an appropriate education, there is often no other option than to attend schools or move to universities in urban areas (Farrugia, 2015). Moving within one's own country has therefore become something rather commonplace for young people from rural areas. In addition, the individualization thesis states that in today's societies individuals are breaking with traditional preconceived scripts of how to live their lives. Even though class constraints are still present in this thesis, it is concluded that everyone is increasingly required to take their destiny into their own hands (Giddens, 1996; Beck, 2002). From this analytical perspective, young people from rural areas feel freer than previous generations to shape their life path.

Second, the present study confirms the findings of previous research that the willingness to move for a job increases with a worsening personal economic situation. However, the consideration of the influence of the personal environment represents a supplement to the state of research. Previous

studies on this aspect are rare and the result thus connects to the study by Salamonska and Czeranowska (2019), who showed that the willingness to migrate is higher among young adults who agree with the statement that young people are marginalized in the state in which they live. The finding that the unemployment of one's friends increases the willingness to find a new job is of particular relevance when thinking about economic crises. The recent past has impressively shown that in times of economic crisis, youth unemployment in particular often rises sharply, thus increasing the pressure on young people. It can be expected that the willingness of young people to move for a job also increases in crises such as the current COVID-19 pandemic. Third, the findings on the role of family attachment represent a contribution to the state of research. The finding that only being married has an influence on the willingness to move to another country, whereas family ties have no influence on moving within one's own country or to another country, provides an impetus for further in-depth studies. This depth is especially called for when comparing the result with existing studies examining similar topics. They often investigate on more abstract general feelings of belonging, thus showing that these reduced the willingness to move (Pretty et al., 2006). For instance, Theodori and Theodori (2015) showed that rural youth in Texas are unwilling to move due to community attachment and a sense of place-belonging.

A look at the strengths of the study shows that comparing willingness to move within a country to willingness to move to another country is a novelty in the state of research. Previous studies focused on the willingness to move within the country between rural and urban areas. Moreover, these studies usually focused on individual countries or regions (Demi et al., 2009; Theodori and Theodori, 2015). With the comparative view both between the forms of willingness and with a sample consisting of 11 European countries, the results now attain broader validity. This is also important considering that the EU focuses its policymaking on mobility across national borders.

Nevertheless, some limitations of this study need to be discussed. Limitations were already present from the data situation. A dataset with more countries would be desirable in order to obtain a larger picture of the situation in more European countries. In addition, it would be desirable to collect data that are more current. It is true that no other dataset than the CUPESSE dataset used here offers the possibility to investigate the willingness of young people to move within their own country or to another country in a European context in this form. Nevertheless, it would be worthwhile to collect such data again for further research. Likewise, it is clear that no conclusions can be drawn about causalities based on cross-sectional data. Therefore, panel data would be particularly suitable for further analysis. Finally, it would be desirable to collect data at the NUTSS-3 level in order to be able to examine the influence of the degree of urbanisation of the region in which one lives in more detail.

Equally, the study also provides impetus for future research. It would be particularly interesting to compare the findings of this study with the motives of young adults who have indeed moved to secure a new job. Additionally, within qualitative in-depth studies, one could explore the motives that make rural youth more willing to move within the country than moving to another country. Simões et al. (2021), who showed that emotional bonds play an important role and investigated the returning intentions of youth originating from rural regions, took an important first step in this direction.

3.7 Conclusions

In order to achieve smart, inclusive, and sustainable growth for Europe, young people are essential. This has been emphasised by the EU Commission in the introductory words of the Youth on the Move programme (European Commission, 2021). Although the economic crisis of 2008 led to devastating consequences in the form of unemployment, particularly for young people, the EU regards the issue of mobility as a core pillar of the solution to the problem. Thus, young adults are expected to move across national borders to find employment. In so doing, a better distribution and coverage of supply and demand on the labour market within the EU is to be achieved.

What the EU has failed to take into account, however, is the low level of willingness to be mobile amongst young people in order to find a job. Specifically, the low willingness to move to another country contradicts the aspirations of the EU policy. Within the present study, it was shown that young adults were less willing to move to another country than to move within their own country to find a job. The willingness to move was generally influenced by various factors. For example, a worse personal economic situation led to a higher willingness to move for a new job both within and to another country. Coming from a rural area, or being married, on the other hand, reduced the willingness to move to another country. It was particularly interesting to see that the more rural the environment in which one lived, the more willing one was to move within one's own country and the less willing one was to move to another country to find a job. Overall, the analysis clearly demonstrated that moving within one's own country and to another country is characterised by different levels of willingness and is associated with different hurdles. Here, many young adults appear unwilling to move to another country in order to find a job.

Existing research, however, recommends prioritising the barriers that account for the most non-compliance when thinking about what keeps the target group from complying with policies (Weaver, 2015). As has been shown, young European adults are rather unwilling to move to another country in order to find a job. Thus, immobility can be perceived as a major barrier to labour market integration. Despite the launch of Youth on the Move, the

EU has not made sufficient efforts to enhance the geographical mobility of youth (Tosun et al., 2019a).

The results of the study clearly point to necessary steps for successful policies in the future. Building on research from Weiss and Hörisch (2021), who argued that implemented labour market policies have to match with the work values of individuals in order to be successful, the results of the present study suggest that European policies to combat youth unemployment must take into account young adults' perspectives and, in this case, specifically address their (un)willingness to be mobile. Concurrently, it also shows that it is important for research on labour migration dynamics to consider the goals, motivations, and willingness of young adults more fully. The economic crisis of 2008 will not be the last phase of challenges for labour market policy. For example, the COVID-19 pandemic and its economic consequences mean that a new peak phase of youth unemployment already needs to be addressed. In this context, lessons should be learned from the past and policies geared towards the needs of the target group should be developed.

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Chapter 4

What Is Youth Political Participation? Literature Review on Youth Political Participation and Political Attitudes

Abstract

Looking at political participation behavior of young adults in contemporary Europe, this paper provides the reader with a map of different terminologies and logics that are used to discuss youth political participation. The existing literature is examined through the lens of five guiding questions: what defines youth political participation? How does youth political participation differ from adult political participation? How do young adults develop political attitudes? How does youth political participation differ across Europe? What methods are being used to analyze youth political participation? For those researching youth political participation for the first time, this paper offers a useful overview of the topic. At the same time, it gives researchers who are already well-informed the opportunity to reflect on the current state of research in this field. Finally, this paper indicates where future research is needed.

Keywords

Political Participation, Political Attitudes, Youth, Overview, Literature Review

Note: This chapter is identical to the article published as Weiss (2020) in Frontiers in Political Science.

4.1 Introduction

Looking at the political participation behavior of young adults in contemporary Europe, one is faced with a contradiction. Representatives of the disengagement paradigm within the literature underpin their argument with empirical findings, such as young adults being the least likely to vote in national elections, the drop of youth membership in political parties, and generally low levels of political interest. On the other hand, the literature on an engagement paradigm of youth participation represents a more optimistic view as it is based on findings in the context of new forms of political participation, which are more appealing to and are used more frequently by young adults.

Both perspectives raise questions about the role of young adults in European democracies. The two mentioned positions represent the respective end points of a much more nuanced line of research on this topic. Research in this area can appear confusing, but overall it is clear that a comprehensive picture of both the degree and the modes of youth political participation is lacking. This paper tries to take a first step in the direction of addressing this problem. The goal is to provide the reader with a map of the different terminologies and logics that are used to discuss youth political participation. To attain this goal, this paper presents insights from the existing literature on the following guiding questions:

- What defines political participation?
- How does youth political participation differ from adult political participation?
- How do young adults develop political attitudes?
- How does youth political participation differ across Europe?
- What methods are being used to analyze youth political participation?

The first step is to provide a structured inventory. On the one hand, this paper will be helpful for those encountering this research area for the first time as it provides an overview of the previous research in the field of youth political participation in Europe. On the other, it offers well-informed researchers the opportunity to reflect on the current state of research in this field. In addition, this paper clearly points toward where further research is needed.

With this in mind, I develop three main arguments within this paper. First, although existing definitions of political participation are adequate to capture youth participation, the current literature is inconsistent in the inclusion of new modes of participation that are increasingly common among

young adults. Second, there are both methodological and substantive problems within the existing literature, which emerge from young adults' different conceptions of politics as well as from their differing awareness to adults of what constitutes political participation. Third, and resulting from this, the current state of research in this area lacks larger cross-national studies that take into account an adequate conception of how the youth define political participation and that conduct comparative research on youth political participation behavior, which is necessary if we agree that young people hold the key for the future functioning of our political systems (Hooghe et al., 2004).

The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section gives an overview of the development of political participation research. In doing so, it includes a review of the definitions of political participation then and now and clarifies why it is important to be familiar with those definitions when looking at the political participation behavior of young adults. The following section deals with the (potential) differences between the political participation behavior of young adults and adults. Besides an overview of the ongoing debate on whether and, if so, what kind of differences there are, this chapter clearly indicates which role the question of measurement plays in this. The fourth section focuses on the political attitudes of young adults after reviewing political socialization research, for political socialization plays an important role in the formation of the political attitudes of young adults. After this, section 5 gives an overview of youth political participation across Europe. Section 6 then presents methods previously used in the context of youth political participation. As usual, the final section summarizes the previous sections and highlights which questions remain unanswered. It thereby tries to provide an answer to the question of youth political participation as it actually is and indicates where future research is needed.

4.2 The Development of Political Participation Repertoires and Research

Political Participation research has undergone significant developments over the course of the last few decades. Multiple disciplines have contributed to broadening our understanding of the field, but because of this multidisciplinary input it has become less clear what the underlying core assumptions and definitions are that make up the term PP. This section therefore sketches the development of the term and answers the core question of what defines PP.

Signing a petition, joining a party, or casting a vote are the most commonly accepted actions deemed as PP. But that's about as far as agreements go. To answer the question of how PP can be defined, one has to go back a

few decades. In 1973, Robert Dahl offered a first glimpse of what it might mean. In "Poliarchy: Participation and OPPosition" he declares PP an essential part of modern democracies as it enables citizens to hold their governments accountable (Dahl, 1973). However, Dahl didn't explicitly define his concept of participation. His definition only implicitly covered actions within the given institutional framework of a nation, meaning that actions such as consumerism (Stolle et al., 2005) or just hitting a "like" button wouldn't be categorized as participation, even though they could be seen as holding governments accountable. His works nevertheless contain some fundamental elements of our modern conception of PP—namely accountability as well as the dichotomy of private citizens and professional politicians, which can also be found in the well acknowledged works of Verba and Nie (1972).

To these researchers, political participation is *"those activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take"* (Verba and Nie, 1972, p. 2). According to Verba and Nie, private citizens have the ability to participate in politics not just by casting votes or joining parties but through numerous other activities. Their suggested typology consists of voting, campaign activity, contacting public officials, and cooperative or communal activities.

This definition has paved the way for the analysis of actions such as protests, strikes, or petitions as activities that participate in politics through other means than elections (Verba and Nie, 1972, p. 47). Similar concepts have been presented by Parry et al. (1992) or Pattie et al. (2004), who, in contrast to Verba and Nie (1972), stress that political participation does not necessarily have to address governments but could also target other institutions or even organizations. PP can therefore affect the policymaking process as well as services provided by governments, such as education or health care(Pattie et al., 2004; Fox, 2014). Brady (1998) adds that, in order to qualify as PP, actions taken by private citizens must be observable, manifest, and voluntary, but he also focuses on interactions between citizens and political elites.

Parallel to developments in participation-research, authors such as Flanagan (2013), Norris (2002), Putnam (2001), Zukin et al. (2006), or Daskalopoulou (2018) have been working on the concept of civic engagement, which has several intersections with PP research. The concept of civic engagement has been used to analyze all kinds of citizen behavior, including activities and actions, which can but don't necessarily have to be political. Putnam's "bowling alone," e.g., also includes going to a bowling alley as a vital indicator of engagement. The ever-growing repertoire of indicators has therefore led to accusations of conceptual stretching (Berger, 2009), meaning that the conception is too broad and therefore not suitable for researchers. Most authors' conceptions of PP from the first period of

research have three aspects in common: Actions have to be taken by private citizens, not politicians; these actions have to be voluntary, meaning structural forces that require citizens to take certain actions wouldn't count as participation; and their actions need to target governments, institutions, organizations or NGOs. These three aspects are at the *"hard core"* (Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970) of almost every single contemporary definition of PP.

Van Deth (2001) nicely summarizes the evolution of political participation repertoires between the 1940s and the 1990s by tracing the publication of landmark studies. In the 1940s and 1950s, PP was mainly restricted to voting and campaign activities. In the early 1960s, though, appeared the later so-called "conventional" modes of PP. At this time, *"political participation was broadly understood as activities concerned with traditional conceptualizations of politics as campaigning by politicians and parties, and with well-accepted contacts between citizens and public officials"* (van Deth, 2001, p. 5). During the 1970s, these conventional forms were expanded and "unconventional" forms, which were not in line with the societal norms of the 1970s, appeared. These unconventional forms included, among others, protest and rejection as well as new social movements, such as women's or pacifist movements (van Deth, 2001). Later, in the 1990s, the borderline between the political and non-political spheres of modern society disappeared as the political participation repertoire came to include "civil" activities such as volunteering and social engagement (Van Deth, 2001). Nowadays, further forms of PP have emerged and challenge PP research. The new forms use non-political behavior to express political opinions, and what was once defined as unconventional or elite-challenging is now commonplace. Therefore, these forms can no longer be captured by a distinction between conventional and unconventional PP (Teorell et al., 2007).

Furthermore, García-Albacete (2014) has found that citizens' political involvement has changed recently and argues that these changes characterize today's PP repertoire and have led to the distinction between institutionalized and non-institutionalized PP. First, *"the agencies or structures through which citizens are mobilized and participate have (...) been transformed, with the spread of new social movements and advocacy networks"* (García-Albacete, 2014, p. 15). Second, individualized patterns of participation are growing as ties to political and civic organizations become weaker (García-Albacete, 2014). The now widely used distinction between institutionalized and non-institutionalized PP capture forms of PP which happen within the institutional framework (e.g., voting or party membership) and those which happen outside of the institutional framework (e.g., protest or boycotting). This distinction between institutionalized and non-institutionalized PP is particularly important for any kind of research on youth participation, given the fact that young adults are disproportionately more likely to participate through non-institutionalized means.

Adapting to or being challenged by new forms of participation is a con-

tinuous process. One of the more recent developments in this regard is online participation. The debate about how and if online participation fits into existing concepts is ongoing and vibrant (Gibson and Cantijoch, 2013; Dayican, 2014; Halupka, 2014; Kristofferson et al., 2014). Authors such as Morozov (2009) declare it as an illusion of participation, whereas Rojas and Puig-i Abril (2009) see it as *"expressive participation"* which constitutes a *"subdimension"* (Rojas and Puig-i-Abril, 2009, p. 907) of political participation. Because of this heated debate and the numerous ways of integrating online participation into existing forms of participation, Theocharis (2015) warns that the entire concept of PP could face a risk of overstretching.

In order to avoid this fate, Van Deth (2014) has offered a distinct concept of PP, which should enable researchers to *"recognize a mode of participation if [they] see one"* (van Deth, 2014, p. 5). In order to *"see one"*, researchers should look for these characteristics of participation: it is an activity; it is voluntary and not ordered by a ruling class or required by law; it refers to people in their role as non-professionals or amateurs; and it concerns government, politics, or the state (Van Deth, 2014). This description represents the minimum definition to which further variants are added, namely *"two additional variants based on the target (politics/government/state or problems/community), and two based on circumstantial evidence (contextual and motivational)"* (Theocharis and van Deth, 2018a, p. 81). This conceptual map results in five analytically unambiguous modes of political participation (Theocharis and van Deth, 2018a). Thus, the first form (minimal definition) focuses on the arena of participation rather than its outcomes, while the second and third forms deal with the targets of the activities rather than relying on the goals or intentions of the people. In the fourth form, the political nature of the activities is based on contextual evidence, and only at the very last stage (form five) are the intentions/aims of the participants considered in order to identify a form of political participation. The authors therefore illustrate that *"the advantage of following these decision rules is not only that we can distinguish between political acts that fit into definitions with stricter or loser requirements, but also that we can systematically exclude those who do not meet the definitional requirements"* (Theocharis and van Deth, 2018b). Based on this concept, online PP could be recognized as a form of PP. However, this example also reveals that PP cannot be defined in a simple way, which is also reflected in the existing literature. Instead, it raises the question of whether a definition such as the one by van Deth does permit the development of means for unifying the existing discussion. At the same time, such a broad and yet clearly defined definition offers the possibility of being able to classify forms newly emerging in the literature. In the course of ever-changing social situations and behaviors, this seems to be a key aspect of developing a definition of PP, which can be used over the long term.

4.3 Differences Between Youth and Adult Political Participation

The previous section has already shown that there is no need for a separate definition of youth political participation; instead, the various forms of political participation used by young adults is of central importance. Following this, the question arises as to what extent the PP behavior of young adults differs from that of other groups. A look at the previous research shows a perceived gap between young adult and adults. Many studies show the lowest scores in almost all areas of political participation for young adults and thus the image emerges that young people are not sufficiently engaged in politics. This perception is based upon trends such as voting in elections, where young adults have the lowest rates, and these rates continue to decrease just as the level of youth membership in political parties is decreasing (Kimberlee, 2002; Hooghe et al., 2004; Fieldhouse et al., 2007; Cross and Young, 2008). To capture young people's disengagement in politics, it can be said that *"young people are less concerned with politics, less politically knowledgeable, do not participate in social or political activities, are more apathetic, and have low levels of political interest"* (Quintelier, 2007, p. 165). Even if this representation seems clear, the disengagement of young adults in politics remains a contested issue in the literature. At this point, three central questions need to be clarified. First, is there a real difference between the political participation behavior of young adults and adults? Second, which factors lead to a different behavior between young and old? Third, does this really mean that young adults are politically disengaged?

The first, and to some authors most important, reason for differences between youth and adult political participation is lifecycle. Here, one can find a curvilinear effect of age, which means that participation rises from youth until middle age, then decreases with old age. Scholars have been researching this trend for decades (Jennings, 1979), and it must be clearly differentiated between lifecycle effects and generational effects. In the context of lifecycle effects, what matters is the increase or decrease of political participation resulting from different stages of life (Nie et al., 1974).

In this sense, political participation is nobody's priority as it competes against more pressing personal concerns, especially for young people (Highton and Wolfinger, 2001). As people have a finite amount of time, engagement with politics is more costly for those who have not yet sorted out their lives (ibid.). In addition to the fact that young adults gain more experience with the electoral and political process as they age, some specific steps of adulthood have proven to have an effect on political participation behavior. These include, among others, settling down, marriage (Stoker and Jennings, 1995), graduating and getting a job. Some authors state that these results relate purely to the influence on voting turnout and that the in-

fluence of lifecycle effects on other forms of political participation can only explain minor differences (Quintelier, 2007). However, not all researchers share this view. Research in the area of non-institutionalized participation shows that lifecycle effects are also relevant here. Specifically, they concern personal availability and refer to *"the absence of personal constraints that may increase the costs and risks of movement participation, such as full-time employment, marriage, and family responsibilities"* (McAdam, 1986, p. 70). The social movement research shows relevant influences on young adults, in the sense that the absence of these kinds of constraints facilitates their participation (Beyerlein and Hipp, 2006; Saunders et al., 2012; Earl et al., 2017).

The theory of generation effects is based on the assumption that pre-adult socialization exerts enduring effects on political socialization. In this sense, the adolescence of each individual is the period relevant for the development of political thinking. Building on this argument, some authors assume that as today's young adults are less active, they will never reach the level of political participation of the current elderly (Martikainen et al., 2005). One explanation for this is that young adults today are having more difficulty in reaching the milestones of adulthood (Arnett, 2014; Tagliabue et al., 2014) and that this results in an irreversible delay in political participation. Studies show that young adults retain these characteristics that distinguish them from previous generations and that this will lead to a replacement of the current electorate by a more passive generation of political participants (Quintelier, 2007).

Another reason for the perceived different behavior between the age groups derives from the varying definitions of the political or of political behavior. Every researcher needs to base his or her research on a clear definition. At the same time, this definition of the political or what is defined as political participation must also be used and accepted by the survey population. This is exactly where differences between young adults and adults emerge. Do young adults and adults view the same activities as political? Generally, studies show a difference between the definitions of researchers and survey participants. For example, Parry et al. (1992) found that only 18 percent of their survey participants interpreted a list of activities as political, which the researchers also defined as political. For this reason, some researchers call for a broader definition, which would lead to higher noted levels of political engagement (Roker et al., 1999). The definition question is also relevant when thinking of non-institutionalized forms of political participation. Young adults might not define their actions as political, even though they are actually political. Therefore, it is both about the individual's conception of politics/the political as well as their awareness of doing something political. Only a few studies focus on young adults' definition of the political, but they show that young adults use a narrower definition than both researchers and adults (Bynner and Ashford, 1994; Andolina

et al., 2002). This results in young adults being less interested than adults in politics, because they do not view politics, in their narrow definition, as relevant to their lives (Andolina et al., 2002). In this sense, *"the low political participation rate among youth is a by-product of their narrow conception of politics and their impression that politicians do not truly care about their needs"* (Quintelier, 2007, p. 169). Hence, youth disengagement is a result of the organization of politics rather than of the youth's own lack of interest. For this reason, research is growing on how young adults define political participation and what they perceive as political participation (Henn et al., 2002, 2005; O'Toole, 2003; O'Toole et al., 2003a). They show that previous studies used a concept of participation that is too narrow and that, e.g., the topic of non-participation as an act of political action has so far not been sufficiently addressed (O'Toole, 2003).

Finally, a study by Quintelier (2007), which specifically examined the differences between the age groups, revealed that young adults and adults seem to be similar in their political attitudes, with the exception that young people have fewer opportunities to participate politically. Furthermore, they state that there are differences with regard to the engagement in specific forms of political participation as young adults tend to participate more in non-institutionalized forms. This leads to the conclusion that *"it seems as if the problem of youth political participation is less a matter of whether they participate, and more a matter of where they participate"* (Rainsford, 2017, p.2).

4.4 Political Attitudes of the Youth

Just like the research on political participation, contributions to the field of political attitudes have also broadened our understanding of how political attitudes develop and how the political attitudes of young adults differ from those of adults. This section takes the different approaches to socialization and the debated inputs from other fields and focuses on development, maturation, and the stability of attitudes in order to answer how young adults develop political attitudes.

Hyman (1959, p. 25) thought of political socialization as an individual's *"(...) learning of social patterns corresponding to his societal positions as mediated through various agencies of society."* Considering that it is one of the most commonly used definitions of political socialization, it is surprising that researchers had mostly analyzed family influence first and foremost and neglected various agencies of society. Furthermore, Sapiro (2004) points out that, in its early days, dedicated research on political socialization (Easton et al., 1969; Searing et al., 1973; Jennings and Niemi, 1974) mostly focused on shared party affiliations, participation in voluntary organizations, or the genuine political interest of children and their parents' possible influence on

it. However, scholars have repeatedly faced the same methodological challenge, since young children do not possess many issue beliefs at all (Searing et al., 1973). This makes it hard to identify inferences valuable to political science. Hess and Torney-Purta (1967), on the other hand, claim that children are able to express political opinions and partisanship. This uncertainty caused researchers (Hanks, 1981; Percheron and Jennings, 1981; Nieuwbeerta and Wittebrood, 1995) to shift their focal point toward adolescents and young adults instead of children, because their issue beliefs could be accessed more easily due to the wider scope of methods available for gathering data. The driving force behind socialization research until now has been a biologically sound core assumption: The neurological structure, senso-motoric skills, as well as temperament, reactivity, semantic networks and behavior of infants and adolescents differs from adults (Kagan, 2003, p. 6–8). Dollard and Miller (1950) argue that this difference slowly deteriorates through learning because *"human behavior is learned"* (Dollard and Miller, 1950, p. 25).

In the *"heyday"* (Niemi and Hepburn, 2010, p. 10; van Deth et al., 2011, p. 48) of political socialization research the Columbia school (Berelson et al., 1954; Butler and Stokes, 1974) and Michigan School (Campbell et al., 1960; Easton et al., 1969) dominated the discourse. Both schools found that political affiliation and attitudes toward institutions and the authorities strongly correlate with whatever interests one's parents had and that these interests didn't change much over the span of a lifetime. Socialization research was equal to research on preference or opinion inheritance; almost all research focused exclusively on the United States and also suffered from selection biases as they mostly included white middle-class Americans. Niemi and Sobieszek (1977) note that this bias was compensated for mainly by Abramson (1977) and García (1973), who tried to answer why people of color feel less politically efficacious throughout multiple generations. Researchers posed interesting questions but couldn't identify any causal mechanisms. Clarke (1978) and Percheron and Jennings (1981) dissected differences between American and French families, concluding that *"(...) the object of partisan socialization within the family is country specific"* (Percheron and Jennings, 1981, p. 434), which remains true today.

However, political socialization is not only country specific; it also depends on the respective political context. This raises the question of generational dependency, i.e., if it makes a difference whether young adults themselves or their parents have been socialized in a specific political context. The various studies on this question reveal that political socialization is influenced by the broader context both during one's own political socialization (Grasso et al., 2019b) and during the transmission from parents to children. In this way, researchers have shown that *"if parents are politically engaged and frequently discuss politics with the child, transmission rates rise substantially, particularly on topics of general political significance and*

salience" (Jennings et al., 2009). Here, regular political events, as well as more episodic events, offer socialization opportunities for parents (Valentino and Sears, 1998).

Furthermore, Jennings (1984) demonstrated that socialization can also be observed through social class and not just the direct transmission from parents to their children. This made a multitude of arguments part of the socialization process. According to Niemi and Hepburn (1995), up until the 1990s research had been suffering from two flawed implicit assumptions: Political attitudes, opinions and assumptions of today remain mostly the same tomorrow, and early learning is more important than learning in later life. Instead, they argue that adolescents' attitudes do change, often substantially, and do not necessarily settle just because they turned 18 and/or moved out. Only emerging longitudinal studies (Hanks, 1981; Alwin and Krosnick, 1991; Smith, 1999) made such findings possible. Niemi and Hepburn (1995) therefore demanded a revitalization of political socialization theory and research that would abandon these flawed assumptions. As if they had heard the call, Nieuwbeerta and Wittebrood (1995) challenged one of the cornerstones of socialization research: the idea of fathers being dominant in the transmission of party preferences. They found that there was a gender specific difference in the transmissions of these preferences, challenging decades of previous research. Their Dutch case showed that daughters were more likely to share their mother's party preference and sons were more likely to share their father's. With the focus on women, this influence of a mother on her daughter was also confirmed 15 years later in a Canadian context (Gidengil et al., 2010). Family settings change over time and different kinds of settings—such as stay-at-home parents, patchwork or single parenting—grow in numbers, which could lead to individualization and growing issue heterogeneity (Du Bois-Reymond et al., 2001; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). The realization that *"(...) socialization nowadays clearly occurs under different circumstances"* (van Deth et al., 2011, p. 148) has cast doubt on most previous findings regarding the influence of parents. Many of core assumptions of socialization theories could not be reproduced with more sophisticated methods (Sears, 1990; Jennings, 2007), and research therefore still suffers from significant blind spots. *"The questions, methods, and assumptions have been changed by 40 years of scholarship, political experience including regime change into and out of democracy, and altered political sensibilities"* (Sapiro, 2004, p. 19). Political socialization theory struggles to deliver on its promises:

> *"correlations between parents and their (mostly) biological children, with no way of separating the effects of the environment the parents provide from the effects of the genes they provide, and no way of separating the effects of the home environment from the effects of the environment outside the home. The evidence, in other words, is ambiguous."* (Harris, 2000, p. 626).

Thus, it cannot only be parents who exert influence. While most researchers still assume that family has some influence, they still do not know how much of an influence that is. Other places of socialization that receive a lot of attention are the school, peers, and the media (Blais and Carty, 1990). Research on the influence of school has existed for a long time, and from the beginning its results have been in the area of conflict between those who see an influence (Himmelweit and Swift, 1969; Palonsky, 1987) and those who do not (Hyman, 1959; Easton et al., 1969). A central problem here is the difficulty of isolating the school effect from other effects (Banks and Roker, 1994). For this reason, researchers especially in more recent studies, try to keep the framework conditions constant, e.g., by looking at samples that vary only in one characteristic, such as the type of school. This should facilitate the isolation of the influence of the various factors from each other. Examples for Finland (Koskimaa and Rapeli, 2015) and Belgium (Quintelier, 2015) show that school has an influence, without being the most central one. Instead, in addition to family influence, the influence of peers is in the foreground. It has even been shown that *"peers, through discussion and diversity, are even more influential and successful in creating greater political participation"* (Quintelier, 2015, p. 65) than the family. Nevertheless, the media are also assigned a relevant role here. While earlier studies dealt with the influence of different forms of media, such as television news or newspapers (Atkin and Gantz, 1978; Garramore and Atkin, 1986), researchers have only recently begun to assess the influence of social media on the process of political socialization. The argument in relation to social media would be that they are characterized by less distinct boundaries between non-political and political activities, thereby lowering the thresholds of political engagement (Ekström and Shehata, 2018). However, previous studies can only partially confirm this (ibid.). This research strand therefore requires supplementary studies.

In addition to studies on parental and other social as well as structural transmission, a branch of interdisciplinary research is steadily growing which focuses on the genetic inheritance of attitudes and norms (Martin et al., 1986; Bouchard et al., 1990; Bouchard and McGue, 2003; Alford et al., 2005; Bell et al., 2009; Hatemi et al., 2011; Kudrnáč and Lyons, 2017). These studies look at the development of attitudes, norms and values amongst twins or parents and their offspring either in a setting of continuous exposure to the parent/sibling or in a setting with deliberate discontinuities in their biographies. Moreover, the results appear promising: *"If father and mother both hold a highly intensive just-world belief, the probability that their child will also hold a strong belief in a just world is very high"* (Schönpflug and Bilz, 2009, p. 229). It is important to stress that researchers also warn that most genetic association studies greatly overinterpret their findings (Benjamin et al., 2012).

Beside these studies, and in the context of a more interdisciplinary view

of the topic, psychologists like to refer to attitudes as *"a person's general evaluation of an object (where 'object' is understood in a broad sense encompassing persons, events, products, policies, institutions and so on)"* (O'Keefe, 2015, p. 13). However, social scientists struggle with this definition as it is far too broad to operate with. (Batista-Foguet and Saris, 1997) would argue that the outcome of the aforementioned evaluation would have to be stable over time and that it would have to be consistent with previous evaluation in order to constitute an attitude. Researchers seem to agree on the fact that the backbone of an attitude is stability (Alwin and Krosnick, 1991; Wilson and Hodges, 1992; Zaller et al., 1992), even though critics argue that stability is not necessary for attitudes (Kahneman et al., 1999). But what happens to evaluation during maturation? Hooghe and Wilkenfeld (2008) argue that attitude development during maturation is not the same thing as changing an attitude: *"Attitude development requires change in the quality of thinking, rather than merely change in thinking"* (Hooghe and Wilkenfeld, 2008, p. 156). Previous authors had denied the existence of attitudes in young adults (Marsh, 1971; Searing et al., 1973).

Because of this maturation process, the attitudes of young adults differ from those of adults in many policy fields. But what attitudes are we talking about here? "Civic culture" by Almond and Verba (1963) is often (Galston, 2001; Sapiro, 2004; Dalton, 2008; Kam and Palmer, 2008; Quintelier and Hooghe, 2011; Hoskins et al., 2015) cited as encompassing a vital set of attitudes, including political interest and political trust, and, depending on the research design, researchers often measure civic culture by surveying interest and/or trust in politics. The stereotypical picture would be that young adults are less interested, more negative and that they don't trust political elites as such (Quintelier, 2007). As Rekker et al. (2015) has shown, multiple longitudinal studies reproduce the same result: Younger cohorts are less conservative on cultural issues but not on economic issues. Two specific fields of this are ethnocentrism and egalitarianism. Furlong and Cartmel (2012) confirmed these findings as well. Young adults also appear to be less materialistic (Rudig and Bennie, 1993). Alwin and Krosnick (1991) argue that the maturation process interfered with the core characteristic of attitude, namely stability. In their setting, the youngest group, whose members were aged between 18 and 25, was the least stable as far as their attitudes were concerned. Quintelier and Hooghe (2011), on the other hand, argue that attitudes among adolescents develop early and are likely to remain stable until adulthood. Eckstein et al. (2012) found common ground between both realms and argue that most young adults agree on aspects of good citizenship such as voting, helping others or taking part in organizations. But Henn et al. (2005) point toward a difference between attitude and action in the UK as young people are less likely to vote and less likely to even register for it in the first place. Eckstein et al. (2012) also mention a key issue of the entire field:

"(...) there is still a lack of studies explicitly investigating young people's orientations toward political behaviors over a longer period of time in order to depict development. Furthermore, longitudinal studies that did account for changes revealed no coherent pattern of results" (Eckstein et al., 2012, p. 491).

The scarce research shows that young people's attitudes appear to be somewhat different from those of adults. In particular, the relationship between development, maturation and the stability of one's attitudes seems to be one of the most researched topics, yet it offers only a few insights. Eckstein et al. (2012) can only be supported in their demand for more longitudinal studies in this field.

4.5 Differences in Youth Political Participation Across Europe

Having discussed the possible differences that exist between young adults and adults and the role that political socialization plays, the next step is to look at how young adults and their participation differ across Europe. This section aims to illustrate the diversity of participation of young adults, which has already been covered by existing research. Of course, this cannot be an exhaustive view of all existing studies. Instead, it offers a nuanced view into different regions of Europe and, together with the following section on methods, provides the basis for identifying the research gaps in this area. Generally, each of the EU-member states' polities offers distinct institutionalized ways of participating. In 26 of the 27 member states, citizens need to be at least 18 years old in order to be eligible to vote; Austria, with its active voting-age of 16, is the exception. Keeping in mind these structural differences, this overview will nevertheless look at both the institutionalized and non-institutionalized participation of young adults in different regions of Europe.

Research on Northern European countries has had a great impact on questions of association membership and its effects on political participation. Torpe (2003) indicates that, among Danish youth, membership in associations is becoming looser and that this membership don't necessarily influence the likelihood of political participation. Coe et al. (2016) took a different approach and directly surveyed 10 political activists aged between 17 and 19 in Northern Sweden. On the basis of this study, Coe et al. conceived the concept of *"Youth Politics as Multiple Processes"* (Coe et al., 2016, p. 6), which indicates that youth political participation is characterized by very distinct restrictions such as age limits, adults' disinterest in youth-demands, and state-centered definitions of politics. Nygard et al. (2016) focused on

variables deriving from *"resource models"* to explain different forms of political participation amongst Finnish 9th graders and found higher rates for alternative forms of political participation among this age group, given the right socio-economic resources. Wass (2007) emphasizes this by pointing out that the concepts of family socialization alone lack explanatory power, a point which was already discussed in section 4.

Youth political Participation in Eastern European countries has so far mostly been analyzed comparatively and with a focus on the anticipated effects of previous communist regimes in those countries. Slomczynski and Shabad (1998) argued for the polish case that democratic principles can be successfully taught in school in order to avoid extreme left or right tendencies which could result from a lack of democratic experience. Roberts (2003) partly contradicts these findings, arguing that, amongst other actions, political participation amongst young adults is deeply connected to the social environment as well as structural effects. Research on 10 eastern European countries conducted by Letki (2004) has shown that, in many cases, political participation in eastern European, post-communist countries is very similar to established western democracies. Association membership and established institutions also increase the chances of political participation in post-communist countries. In addition to this, Ådnanes (2004) found that young Bulgarians with a high degree of formal education consider migrating partly because they perceive their ways of participation as restricted and are unsatisfied with their political system, thereby confirming the importance of an established institutional framework. Burean and Badescu (2014) show that similar triggers of participation can be seen at the core of the protest movements against the Romanian government in 2012, where thousands of students took to the streets to protest against their government.

Apart from these countries, some EU-Member states, namely Greece, Spain, and Portugal, have been severely hit by the financial crisis and have also been suffering from a high degree of youth unemployment (Tosun et al., 2019a), which appears to go hand in hand with decreasing institutionalized and increasing non-institutionalized forms of political participation among young adults. As a result of this crisis and its severe effects on young adults, the research on southern European countries has, e.g., and beside other forms of political participation (Sloam, 2014), provided valuable insights into youth political participation online. Online participation is genuinely perceived as less costly and therefore more easily accessible even during times of crisis, which is when Pacheco and Plutzer (2008) expect decreasing levels of participation. Espinar-Ruiz and Gonzalez-Rio (2015) as well as Calenda and Meijer (2009) have shown through large-N surveys that there is a significant relation between multiple forms of political participation and time spent on the internet. Theocharis (2011) research on Greece partly contradicts these findings. He argues that while the online realm is more likely to cultivate a post materialist mindset, it is also the case that this

mindset seems to go hand in hand with a genuine disinterest in political participation. In addition to research on online participation, the financial crisis has granted remarkable insights into the relation of neoliberal policies and informal youth political participation (Sotiris, 2010; Sakellaropoulos, 2012; Zamponi and Gonzalez, 2017). This also applies to extremist positions (Koronaiou et al., 2015), showing that neoliberal policies often serve as the initial spark of protest or extremism, even though they do not represent the actual underlying cause.

Much like the research on northern European cases, research in central and Western Europe has significantly contributed to our knowledge of similarities between European nations in the forms of participation and political attitudes. These comparative studies (Timmerman, 2009; Cammaerts et al., 2014) show similarities in the participation of Europe's adolescents. Cammaerts et al. (2014) found that insufficient participation in the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Austria, Finland, and Hungary is due to the existing structural nature of the political systems and its discourse as adolescents mainly feel excluded from it. Within her research on municipalities in the UK and the Netherlands, Timmerman (2009) found that neither country offers enough entry points for young adults to contribute or participate in debates or the democratic process in general. Hooghe and Stolle (2003) found that adolescents in Germany, France and the UK are less likely to vote or participate through institutionalized means than adults, though their willingness to participate through non-institutionalized means is proportionally higher. Hooghe et al. (2004) and Quintelier and Hooghe (2011) also find this to be true for the Belgian case.

Previous research thus reveals a wealth of different forms of participation among young adults in Europe. The studies focused on very different areas, from membership in associations or voting behavior to political activism, e.g., in the form of protest. Here, young adults are exposed to different contexts, as, e.g., the case of Eastern Europe with many post-communist countries shows. The results of the studies also show which new spaces young adults use for participation and that participating in "older" spaces or institutionalized forms of participation can be problematic for them.

4.6 Previously Used Methods to Study Youth Political Participation

In this final step, the focus is on how and with which methods youth political participation has been investigated so far. In the past, some authors addressed one of the central questions - namely how young adults perceive and define politics and political participation - and developed tools for assessing youth definitions of politics. These consisted, e.g., of a three-year qualitative longitudinal study (Lister et al., 2003) and a quantitative survey

(Vromen, 2003) of young adults and their perceptions of citizenship or of qualitative focus group studies that examined young adults' understanding of political engagement (Pontes et al., 2018). Researchers also tried to get closer to the "vocabulary" of young adults with regard to political participation (O'Toole, 2003; O'Toole et al., 2003a,b).

Furthermore, a number of recent research projects have analyzed youth political participation. They mostly used a cross-national comparative design combined with a mixed methods approach to emphasize different focal points. Within the YOUNEX (Youth unemployment and exclusion in Europe) (Lorenzini and Giugni, 2012) project, e.g., researchers shed light on the consequences of long-term unemployment for youth political participation by both conducting in-depth interviews and original survey data. The EURYKA (Reinventing democracy in Europe: Youth doing politics in times of increasing inequalities) (Kousis and Giugni, 2019) project, meanwhile, conducted both panel survey analysis and biographical analysis to investigate how inequalities are experienced by young adults and how these conditions can stimulate youth political participation. A third project worth mentioning here is EUYOUPART (Political Participation of Young People in Europe) (Spannring et al., 2008), which was specifically concerned with the development of comparatively usable indicators that would facilitate the study of youth political participation. Here, three key points were identified that may limit the comparative usability of indicators. These limitations can stem from *"failed or inaccurate translations of central terms used in a question, different opportunity structures in the countries that facilitate or hamper a form of activity or different political cultures that embed an activity in a different institutional context"* (Ogris and Westphal, 2005). The importance of such an approach was also shown by later investigations using existing survey datasets. García-Albacete (2014), e.g., used data from the European Social Survey to show that indicators need to be tested for their usability both across countries and age groups.

When looking at the development of research on the political participation of young adults, the first thing that emerges is a clearly positive trend. Older studies mostly focused on establishing how adolescents are different from their adult counterparts in a descriptive manner. These studies therefore described youth participation behavior ex negativo in almost all designs. This begs the question of whether there is more to adolescents than just being non-adult. More recent studies have shown this to be the case and now hardly use this exclusive approach of comparison between young and old. Nevertheless, three points arise from this and the previous section that have so far received insufficient attention. First, recent studies do not always take into account our existing knowledge on the 'vocabulary' of young adults. At this point, it would also be worth discussing whether the existing knowledge is even sufficient or whether newer and updated studies are needed, since the possible fields of participation are constantly devel-

oping. Secondly, there is a lack of large cross-national studies that take several different contexts into account and thus explore how young adults resemble each other in their participation behavior or do not. Third, with few exceptions, the use of existing survey data sets not designed for young adults has so far paid insufficient attention to the suitability of the items used/developed for the study of young adult participation behavior.

4.7 Conclusion—What is Youth Political Participation?

This review article pursued several goals, among which were to give an overview of the landscape of definitions of the term political participation and to work out the specific features of youth political participation. Furthermore, it aimed to shed light on the state of youth political participation in the European context and the methods previously used to investigate this, in order to be able to identify gaps in the literature and to suggest avenues for further research.

In the first step, it became clear that the decades-long debate on the definition of political participation has produced many small-scale definitions. The (few) broader definitions seem to be more helpful, even when considering that there is no independent definition of youth political participation. Although these recent definitions of political participation are adequate for capturing youth political participation, the current literature is inconsistent in the inclusion of new modes of participation that are increasingly common among younger generations. Resulting from this one major shortcoming is the fact that non-participation has not yet been problematized adequately. Although this issue was addressed a long time ago (O'Toole, 2003), it is still the case that research so far has paid little careful attention to this (Theocharis and van Deth, 2018b). This results in the danger of more frequent support of the disengagement thesis, which does not necessarily correspond to the actual participation situation of young adults.

In the second step, this paper sought to answer the question of how youth political participation differs from adult political participation. In general, it was shown that existing differences are interpreted differently by researchers (engagement vs. disengagement thesis). In addition, it also became apparent that the classic research design of comparing young and old, which was mainly used in older studies, is used less frequently in more recent studies. This is due to the existence of differences between what young adults define as "political" and what researchers define and interrogate as such. These definitions can differ not only between young adults and researchers, but also between young adults and adults. Inconsequently, problems can emerge from young adults' varying conceptions of politics and the "political" as well as from their differing awareness to adults of what constitutes a political act.

Although some researchers tried to solve this problem by conducting research to get closer to the "vocabulary" used by young adults (O'Toole, 2003; O'Toole et al., 2003a,b), youth-specific explanations of what being politically engaged really means remain insufficient (Pontes et al., 2018). This results in a clear call for future research: It is necessary to develop further youth-specific explanations and definitions of what political participation means, which new studies should then employ accordingly. This aspect of youth-adequate definitions and measurements must also be considered when using existing datasets.

Another, third major shortcoming is the lack of larger cross-national studies that take into account a youth-adequate definition of political participation and conduct research on the political participation behavior of youths. This certainly results from the absence of a unified theoretical foundation for studying "European" youth political participation. This is unfortunate considering the enormous amount of data available, especially from the EU. In addition, implications for European policy research can only be made on the basis of cross-country consistent studies.

In conclusion, it can be said that the definition of youth political participation is currently nothing more than general political participation. However, the question remains regarding the use of forms of political participation by young adults. Hopefully, this article will trigger other researchers to spend more time on this topic and both to resolve the mismatch between the definition of political participation and the perception of young adults regarding what is "political" and to review existing and upcoming datasets so that they can scrutinize this concept.

Author Contributions
JW conceived and designed the article, wrote the manuscript, revised the manuscript, reread it, and finally approved the submitted version.

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Chapter 5

Disengaged or Raising Voices? An Analysis of the Relationship Between Individual Risk Perception and Non-Institutionalised Political Participation

Abstract

The economic crisis of 2008 resulted in rising levels of unemployment, which were accompanied by protests in many countries. This led to a scientific debate on the influence of grievances on political participation. Previous studies have shown that individual affectedness leads to 'exiting', whereas in times of crisis grievances lead to increased political participation. What all these studies have in common is that they solely investigate actual deprivation. The present study adds a new aspect and examines if the individual risk perception of becoming deprived influences political participation. Does the individual risk perception of becoming deprived influence political participation and, if so, does this depend on the economic context? Based on grievance theory, and using data from the ESS and the World Bank, this study shows that the personal risk of becoming deprived increases the likelihood of participation. This stands in contrast to previous studies, which showed that actual deprivation decreases participation. However, the participation-enhancing effect of one's own risk perception is diminished when individuals live in an economically weak country and thus see no chance of improvement. This underlines that context plays a role and

that economically deteriorating situations in the country can reduce participation rates.

Keywords

Risk Perception, Political Participation, Economic Grievances, Economic Crisis, Multi-level Modelling

Note: This chapter is submitted to European Societies and currently under review (revise and resubmit).

5.1 Introduction

The economic crisis that unfolded in 2008 resulted in negative economic growth, weak economic prospects for many European countries and high levels of unemployment. This economic downturn sparked protests in numerous countries, especially in those hit particularly hard by the recession, as people 'raised their voices' (Kriesi, 2012) to express their dissatisfaction. In this regard, personal dissatisfaction stimulated political participation.

Although participation in protests has become a more normal form of expressing opinions and political preferences over the decades (Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2001), existing research clearly shows that not all social classes in a society participate equally. Whereas in earlier decades political protests were mainly associated with the labour movement and the mobilization of the working class, today mainly well-educated members of the middle class participate (Hylmö and Wennerhag, 2015). At the same time, a look at those who nowadays do not participate shows that they are often materially deprived, lacking the resources for participation or simply needing their time to make ends meet. In times of crisis, when the number of people affected by economic deprivation increases, the participation of certain social groups is likely to decrease. Simultaneously, the risk of becoming economically deprived also increases for more people in times of crisis. However, it is still unclear how this affects the participation behaviour of this group. Against this backdrop, this article sets out to analyse the relationship between the individual risk of becoming deprived and reactions to this risk in the form of political participation behaviour, as well as the effect of the economic crisis on this. Several studies on how economic performance affects levels of political participation have focused on actual deprivation. Additionally, other scholars have shown that economic performance affects political participation differently in times of crisis compared to times of non-crisis. This article engages in the ongoing debate on the influence of deprivation on political participation behaviour (Filetti and Janmaat, 2018; Grasso and Giugni, 2019; Kern et al., 2015; Kurer et al., 2019) by addressing the following question: Does the individual risk perception of becoming deprived influence political participation and, if so, does this depend on the economic context?

Despite the fact that much is already known about the role of actual economic deprivation on an individual's participation behaviour, this analysis will provide new insights into the relationship between economic deprivation and participation behaviour considering those who are not yet deprived but perceive the risk of becoming deprived in the near future. Such an approach assumes that political participation is integral to a stable democracy, as individuals must make their demands heard, voice their grievances, and hold politicians and governments accountable. If there is any doubt that the state is capable of managing the risks produced by and challenges of an economic crisis, it may lead to lower levels of political participation.

The extent to which the perception of one's own risk of becoming deprived influences political participation has not yet been considered, although it is clear that deprivation has a strong subjective component (Galais and Lorenzini, 2017; Grasso et al., 2017). This article attempts to close this gap in the literature and shows that the individual risk perception of becoming deprived increases the likelihood of participation. Accordingly, this article argues that individuals who feel at risk participate more as they may (still) see the possibility of bringing about change, while those who are already deprived seem to have lost hope of improvement and thus participate less.

Even though there are various studies on how economic performance affects levels of political participation, only a few deal with a time of real economic collapse (Filetti and Janmaat, 2018; Kern et al., 2015). In general, a crisis adds intense uncertainty to the lives of all individuals. Using data from the ESS, this article examines the effect of this situation on political participation. The results show that, in non-crisis times, deterioration has a greater impact on personal perceptions of risk since improvement appears possible, increasing the likelihood of participation. However, in times of crisis, individuals seem to lose the hope of improvement and thus participate less. Political participation serves as a vehicle through which individuals communicate their interests and are able to put their public officials under pressure to take their interests into account. Thus, this finding leads to the alarming result that economic crises can further increase the political marginalisation of certain social groups. This article proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the existing literature and develops subsequent hypotheses. After the description of data and methods used, the main analysis is undertaken in three steps. The investigation of the general relationship between individual risk perception and political participation is followed by an examination of the role of the affection of other group members and the context of the crisis. The article closes with a critical discussion of the main findings.

5.2 Theory and Hypotheses

Political participation is essential for the legitimacy of a democracy (Verba et al., 1995), and high levels of political participation are preferable. Two central questions in the research on political participation concern why people become politically active and what prevents people from participating.

Previous studies dealing with deprivation are often based on grievance theory, which offers insights into the relationship between different forms of deprivation and non-institutionalised political participation (Barnes et al., 1979; Gamson, 1968). The reaction of an individual towards an objective circumstance heavily depends on his/her subjective way in which they judge

their situation (Walker and Smith, 2002). Hence the discrepancy between the value expectations and the value capabilities of an actor (Gurr, 1970) is the core mechanism that leads to political mobilisation. Within this context, value expectations are conditions of life to which a person thinks s/he is rightfully entitled, and value capabilities are the conditions s/he considers her-/himself capable of getting and keeping (Gurr, 1970; Lahusen and Kiess, 2019). Relative deprivation can therefore be based on different causes, such as rising unemployment during the economic crisis (Tosun et al., 2017). It is important that relative deprivations largely depend on the frame of reference in which they are conceived (Runciman, 1980). This reference frame also leads to the differentiation between individual and collective relative deprivation.

Individual relative deprivation means that a person is personally deprived in comparison to the generalised other. For example, one could be affected by the effects of the economic crisis and feel deprived in relation to others in general. Collective relative deprivation emerges when members of a group feel deprived because they feel they lack something to which they believe themselves legitimately entitled, compared to other groups. Smith and Ortiz (2002) have shown that feelings of collective deprivation promote political participation, whereas individual deprivation leads to personal reactions such as quitting one's job or psychological depression. In this sense, individual deprivation is expected to lead to 'exiting' (Kriesi, 2012), as previous research found that individual deprivation decreases the likelihood of participation.

Previous studies in this area, even if they are based on other theoretical approaches[1], only examine actual deprivation (Grasso et al., 2019a) – and none of them study individuals at risk of becoming deprived. This aspect, however, is especially important in today's 'risk society' (Beck, 1986), which is becoming increasingly preoccupied with notions of imposed risks, ranging from global warming to economic crises. Compared to other risks that individuals take voluntarily, understanding how individuals deal with these imposed risks, is the foundation of the relationship between individuals and their governance structures. An individual's behaviour shows whether s/he believes that the state is able to manage the risk. Existing studies on voting for populist parties have already shown the important role played by the fear of, rather than the actual experience of, economic hardship. The underlying mechanism identified here relates to the fear of job-loss due to automatization processes, which in turn increases support for right-wing populist parties, as they represent socially conservative values and want to turn back

[1] These range from the focus on resources within the civic voluntarism model (Verba et al., 1995), the role of institutional settings within the framework of political opportunity structures (Grasso and Giugni, 2016; Kitschelt, 1986), to theories of collective action (Olson, 1965; Opp, 1990), to those which deal with the willingness of people to contribute to a public good (Ackermann, 2017).

the clock to safer times (Kurer, 2020). Therefore, this study contributes to the existing literature by showing how participation behaviour is influenced by the individual risk perception of becoming deprived.

But what about those who are not yet exposed to direct deprivation, but who must fear that this will happen? Will those who are exposed to imminent threat also participate less? This article argues that this does not necessarily has to be the case. Research on emotions and politics has shown that, for example, anxiety and fear can prompt individuals to reconsider courses of action for dealing with the danger of becoming deprived (Brader and Marcus, 2013; Galais and Lorenzini, 2017; Jasper, 2014). Miller and Krosnick (2004) argued that individuals change their political behaviour in the face of economic, social, or political change in order to avert the threat. Similarly, Kurer (2020) investigates the political consequences of occupational change and argues that employment trajectories and relative shifts in the societal hierarchy are central to understand voting behaviour. His results show that relative societal decline and concerns about one's own position in the social hierarchy, instead of acute material hardship, drive support for right wing populist parties (Kurer, 2020). This is due to the voters' desire that their perceived descent in the social hierarchy be addressed by the government.

This article thus argues that individuals who feel at risk but are not yet deprived see the possibility of averting the situation and may hope to do so through participation. Therefore, instead of a decrease in the likelihood to participate, this study puts forward the hypothesis that an increase in risk perception is accompanied by an increase in the likelihood to participate:

Hypothesis 1 (H1) *Individual risk perception increases the likelihood of political participation.*

Furthermore, the relation between one's own situation and the situation of others must be considered. Here, some authors speak of double relative deprivation, which suggests that the likelihood of participating increases when people feel that deprivation not only affects themselves but also other members of their social group (Foster and Matheson, 1995; Grasso and Giugni, 2016; Walsh, 1981). This is not about simply adding deprivation, but about the interaction between individual and collective deprivation. Previous studies examined this as a cross-level-interaction with the expectation that in countries which were hit hard by the crisis the individuals who suffer become motivated to participate (Grasso and Giugni, 2016). For the individuals affected in this way, 'the personal become[s] political' (Foster and Matheson 1995:1168). The same could be expected of those who feel at risk of becoming deprived and also consider others in their country as being at risk. Following this line of reasoning, the second hypothesis considers this relationship:

Hypothesis 2 (H2). *Individual risk perception increases the likelihood of participating more strongly in a context where the mean risk perception on the collective level is high.*

Finally, it is important to examine the extent to which the (country) context plays a role here. Do the expected effects differ according to whether it is a crisis or a non-crisis period? Research on institutionalised participation in particular is increasingly concerned with this interaction of personal material circumstances and contextual economic conditions. However, the focus is exclusively on acute economic deprivation and not on the risk perception of becoming deprived in the (near) future. The basic mechanism of action here is stated by Arceneaux (2003), who insists that it is not the economic conditions per se that are decisive, but who is attributed responsible for them. Those who suffer economically and hold the government responsible are more likely to vote than those who suffer economically and do not hold the government responsible (Arceneaux, 2003). Subsequently, Incantalupo (2011) expects that individuals who lose their own jobs in times of high unemployment will perceive their situation as part of a larger social problem and that this will mobilize them to the ballot box. Finally, Aytaç et al. (2020) show that unemployment depresses participation, and it does so more powerfully under circumstances of low unemployment rates than under high unemployment rates. The finding is supported by a psychological argument similar to Arceneaux's, in which job loss at low unemployment rates leads to self-reproach. If, on the other hand, one experiences job loss in times of high unemployment, the political level is blamed, and anger promotes participation at the ballot box. Furthermore, and in the context of the economic crisis of 2008, Kern et al. (2015) have shown that only unusually high levels of grievances have an effect on participation level. More recently, Filetti and Janmaat (2018) showed that the economic crisis did not change the propensity to engage but influenced the within-country distribution of active citizens. Thus, from the literature on economic voting, it is known that individuals link their evaluations of the economic context to their votes (Hansford and Gomez, 2015), and thus the perception of the national economy is partly decisive for participation (Hernández and Kriesi, 2016). Subsequently, in the context of the present study, this aspect will find its way into the last hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3 (H3). *Individual risk perception increases the likelihood of participating more strongly in times of economic crisis than in non-crisis times.*

In sum, this study expects the individually perceived risk of becoming deprived to increase political participation. Regarding context, the economic

crisis can trigger this perceived personal risk. In the course of the economic deterioration, this leads to the expectation of a further increase in political participation within the crisis context.

5.3 Data, Variables and Methodological Approach

The analyses are based on the ESS (European Social Survey, 2008, 2016) for individual-level data, while country-level data were drawn from the World Bank. Waves 4 and 8 of the ESS contain the central independent variable for measuring individual risk perception. Wave 4 of the ESS was collected between August 2008 and March 2010 (European Social Survey, 2018a), while wave 8 was collected between August 2016 and December 2017 (European Social Survey, 2018b). The survey dates thus facilitate a comparison between the economic crisis and a time of greater prosperity. The dataset includes 19 countries, namely Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. These are the countries for which data are available for both waves.

Research on political participation has evolved over recent decades. As the forms of individual political participation have changed, so has research (Weiss, 2020). The clear categorisation of the forms of political participation often seemed to be the goal. Since the abundance of forms of participation can lead to confusion or conceptual stretching, it is necessary to use clear definitions. Theocharis and van Deth (2018b) offer a definition, whereby participation can be recognised as such if it is a voluntary activity that refers to people in their role as non-professionals and concerns government, politics or the state. The ESS contains several items for political participation. Following the multi-step classification according to Theocharis and van Deth (2018b), the following variables can be used to measure the concept of non-institutionalised political participation: displaying campaign badges/stickers, signing a petition, taking part in lawful public demonstrations, and boycotting certain products. This study uses these items to construct the dichotomous dependent variable of political participation. A distinction is made between whether a person partook in at least one form of participation within the last 12 months (coded 1) or whether a person did not participate in any form within the last 12 months (coded 0). The dependent variable varies quite substantially across the 19 countries (see figure 5.1).

Participation levels tend to be highest in the Scandinavian countries and lowest in the Southern and Eastern European countries. In some countries, participation rates change significantly over time. In Portugal, for example, the participation rate increased from 9.5 percent in 2008 to 31 percent in

Figure 5.1: Average Non-institutionalised Political Participation per Country in Percent



Source: Calculated from ESS data 2008 and 2016. Note: Data are weighted with population size weights.

2016. This comparison over time shows that the average participation rate for all countries increased slightly from 2008 to 2016 and that there have been some major changes in participation behaviour within the countries. On the one hand, this underlines the results of previous studies which showed that the crisis influenced the within-country distribution of active citizens (Filetti and Janmaat, 2018). On the other, it illustrates the starting point for taking a closer look at the effects that led to these changes.

To shed light on the role of individual risk perception on political participation behaviour, the central independent variable stems from the ESS. Respondents were asked how they assess their own risk of not having enough money for household necessities within the next 12 months. To measure the collective level, with the aim of testing the hypothesis on double deprivation, the next step was to calculate the mean personal risk perception by country. Previous studies have shown that comparisons with other countries play a less relevant role than the assessment of the national situation (Lahusen and Kiess, 2019), and thus this variable is used to capture the group membership at the collective level. This country mean variable is then used together with the individual risk perception to calculate the cross-level interaction. The risk variables have been standardised for this purpose (Gelman and Hill, 2006).

In order to examine the role of the crisis context, this study uses data from the World Bank (World Bank, 2020b). In line with other studies (Kroknes et al., 2015), this article argues that in order to get a better understanding of how economic changes influence political participation behaviour, it is important not only to look at individuals' perceptions of the economy, but also to look at the actual state of the economy. Thus, the macro-level variable for gauging problem pressure is the rate of unemployment.

Furthermore, a number of control variables are included. First, education is included (Berinsky and Lenz, 2011; Marien et al., 2010), as previous studies found that better educated citizens are more likely to participate in forms of political behaviour (Hillygus, 2005). Second, political interest is included, as high levels of political interest are linked to high levels of political participation. Third, gender forms part of the analysis, as women are expected to participate more often in non-institutionalised forms than men (Coffé and Bolzendahl, 2010; Stolle and Hooghe, 2011). Fourth, age is one of the control variables, as previous studies have shown that young adults are more likely to participate in non-institutionalised forms of political participation than adults (Fieldhouse et al., 2007; Quintelier, 2007). Finally, the position in the labour force of each individual is included, as those who are still in education are expected to participate more than those who are employed, and those who are unemployed to participate less (Kern et al., 2015).

Since the data structure is hierarchical and individuals are nested within countries, this study uses multilevel modelling. More specifically, as the dependent variable is binary (participation/ no participation), logistic multilevel models were employed. A description of all variables used within these models can be found in table C.1 in the appendix.

5.4 Empirical Findings

As this study utilises a hierarchical dataset, individuals (level 1) are clustered in countries (level 2). Furthermore, this study expects political participation to be shaped by both individual-level predictors and country-level predictors and by interactions between these variables. The intra-class-correlation (ICC) was calculated beforehand in order to decompose the variance between the individual and the country levels and to make sure that multilevel models were the appropriate method. The calculation of the ICC for ESS round 4 showed that 18.6 percent of the variance for non-institutionalised political participation were found on the country level. A similar trend was found for ESS round 8, as 17.8 percent of the variance for non-institutionalised political participation variance were found on the country level. This leaves room for further investigation of the extent to which the country level impacts political participation behaviour.

In total, seven models were calculated. Table 5.1 reports the first three models, which are based on the 2008 data. The 'individual-level model' includes all the variables on the individual level to test the main effects. This is followed by the 'risk country means model', in which the mean personal risk perception by country is added to level 2. The third model ('model with interaction') introduces the interaction between this variable and the personal risk perception. This is followed by table 5.2, which compares 2008 and 2016. The objective measure of the economic situation is introduced at level 2 within the 'model with unemployment rate'. The 'model with interaction' again presents the interaction between personal and country mean risk perception.

In a first step, this article examines the influence of individual risk perception on political participation behaviour. For this purpose, the individual-level model (see table 5.1) includes both the central independent variable of personal risk to lack financial resources as well as the aforementioned control variables. This clearly shows that individual risk perception increases the likelihood of participation. Previous research in this area dealt with actual deprivation and suggested that individual deprivation leads to 'exiting', thereby decreasing political participation (Kriesi, 2012). However, this study shows that the opposite mechanism is the case when it comes to potential deprivation. As the personal risk perception of becoming economically deprived in the near future increases, so does the likelihood of participating. Thus, as long as individuals see the possibility of change or improvement, they participate more to avert the risk. Consequently, hypothesis one is confirmed.

With regard to the control variables and in line with previous research, it is evident that politically interested people are more active and that women are more active than men. In addition, a look at the educational level of the respondents shows that a higher level of education corresponds to a higher likelihood of participation. In relation to age, the likelihood to participate decreases with increasing age. Finally, in terms of employment status, those in education are more likely to participate than working people, while the unemployed and the inactive participate less.

The second step is to test the double deprivation theory. From a theoretical viewpoint, those who are themselves affected and who also perceive the group to which they belong as being affected should participate more. In order to measure group affectedness, a variable that contains the respective means of the risk variable in the individual countries was constructed. Here, the countries are understood as the respective group and the average risk perception of the respondents from the countries is determined. The 'risk country means model', in relation to the variable for country risk means, shows that the likelihood of participating decreases for those respondents who live in a country in which the mean risk perception is high. Thus, hypothesis two cannot be confirmed. Instead, this supports the argument from

Table 5.1: Non-institutionalised Political Participation (ESS 2008)

	Individual-level Model		Risk Country Means Model		Model with Interaction	
Risk of lacking financial resources	0.0651	(0.0162)***	0.0667	(0.0162)***	0.0604	(0.0163)***
Risk perception-Country means			-1.896	(0.337)***	-1.875	(0.339)***
Interaction Risk Perception					-0.0454	(0.0155)**
Controls:						
Employment status ^{x}						
In education	0.197	(0.0519)***	0.198	(0.0519)***	0.196	(0.0519)***
Unemployed	-0.192	(0.0625)**	-0.191	(0.0625)**	-0.191	(0.0627)**
Inactive	-0.211	(0.0357)***	-0.211	(0.0357)***	-0.211	(0.0357)***
Age	-0.00925	(0.00102)***	-0.00923	(0.00102)***	-0.00915	(0.00102)***
Gender (Male=1)	-0.259	(0.0261)***	-0.259	(0.0261)***	-0.259	(0.0261)***
Political interest	0.590	(0.0164)***	0.589	(0.0164)***	0.589	(0.0164)***
Level of education ^{xx}						
Secondary education	0.476	(0.0486)***	0.474	(0.0486)***	0.473	(0.0486)***
Tertiary Education	0.983	(0.0520)***	0.983	(0.0520)***	0.980	(0.0520)***
Constant	-2.445	(0.215)***	1.517	(0.717)*	1.499	(0.721)*
Var (cons)	0.736	(0.240)	0.273	(0.0899)***	0.276	(0.0909)***
AIC	37424.3		37407.6		37400.9	
BIC	37517.6		37509.4		37511.2	
Observations	35568		35568		35568	
Number of countries	19		19		19	

Standard errors in parentheses
Note: ^{x}= The reference category is in paid work. ^{xx}= The reference category is primary education.
Source: Calculated from ESS data (2008)
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

previous studies that 'the relative inertia of inequality gives rise to a sentiment that not much can be done about it' (Filetti and Janmaat 2018:344). This becomes even clearer, when considering the interaction term between personal risk perception and mean country risk perception. The result (see also 'model with interaction') of this is plotted in figure 5.2, which presents the marginal effect of personal risk perception on non-institutionalised political participation conditional on the level of mean risk perception per country. The mean perception of risk in a country has a positive effect on non-institutionalised political participation if someone considers their own risk as being not very or not at all likely. In this sense, persons who assess their risk as lower than the respective country mean tend to participate more. The initial positive effect for those who perceive their risk as high is thus diminished if the mean risk perception in the country is high. This underlines that context plays a role (Ackermann, 2017; Grasso and Giugni, 2016) and that economically deteriorating situations in the country can reduce rates of participation. This is attributed to the fact that in the course of the 'risk society' a change in the relationship between the individual and the state has taken place (Curran, 2013). Dealing with risks is characterised by increasing institutionalisation, which goes hand in hand with a political disempowerment of the individual. In this sense, political disengagement is a manifestation of the doubt that the state can deliver control or security in a context that poses a particular challenge to individuals.

The third and final step continues with the analysis of the specific context of the economic crisis. Do the effects found differ between crisis and non-crisis times or do they remain the same? In order to examine this aspect, a measure of the general situation, namely the unemployment rate, is added at the country level. Thus, table 5.2 presents the results for both 2008 and 2016.

With regard to hypothesis three, it can be stated that personal risk perception increases the likelihood of participation in both survey years and is therefore independent of the crisis. However, differences can be found with regard to the measure of the general situation in the country. This shows that in times of crisis the likelihood to participate decreases as the rate of unemployment increases, while the opposite effect occurs in times of non-crisis. The result for 2016 clearly shows that as unemployment increases, so does the likelihood to participate. This contradicts previous studies that expect this effect of an increase in the likelihood to participate for times of crisis and not for times of non-crisis (Kern et al., 2015). Therefore, it cannot be assumed that in times of crisis an increase in deprivation is accompanied by an increase in political participation. Instead, it is again apparent that in times of crisis individuals lose hope that the state is able to bring about change and thus the necessary security for them. In non-crisis times, however, deterioration has a greater impact on the perceptions of the individuals. Since in this context improvement should be possible it

Table 5.2: Non-institutionalised Political Participation (ESS 2008 + 2016)

	2008				2016			
	Model with Unemployment rate		Model with Interaction		Model with Unemployment rate		Model with Interaction	
Risk of lacking financial resources	0.0665	(0.0162)***	0.0604	(0.0163)***	0.0685	(0.0157)***	0.0715	(0.0158)***
Unemployment rate	-0.0816	(0.0149)***			0.136	(0.0376)***		
Risk perception-Country means			-1.875	(0.339)***			-1.424	(0.528)**
Interaction Risk Perception			-0.0454	(0.0155)**			-0.0514	(0.0134)***
Controls:								
Employment status[x]								
In education	0.197	(0.0519)***	0.196	(0.0519)***	0.0631	(0.0526)	0.0628	(0.0526)
Unemployed	-0.192	(0.0625)**	-0.191	(0.0627)**	-0.0455	(0.0599)	-0.0480	(0.0600)
Inactive	-0.214	(0.0357)***	-0.211	(0.0357)***	-0.204	(0.0348)***	-0.205	(0.0349)***
Age	-0.00923	(0.00102)***	-0.00915	(0.00102)***	-0.00803	(0.000986)***	-0.00783	(0.000988)***
Gender (Male=1)	-0.260	(0.0261)***	-0.259	(0.0261)***	-0.231	(0.0255)***	-0.232	(0.0255)***
Political interest	0.590	(0.0164)***	0.589	(0.0164)***	0.584	(0.0155)***	0.583	(0.0155)***
Level of education[xx]								
Secondary education	0.478	(0.0486)***	0.473	(0.0486)***	0.646	(0.0515)***	0.645	(0.0515)***
Tertiary Education	0.985	(0.0520)***	0.980	(0.0520)***	1.142	(0.0562)***	1.141	(0.0562)***
Constant	-1.831	(0.228)***	1.499	(0.721)*	-3.280	(0.331)***	0.412	(1.036)
Var(cons)	0.607	(0.199)	0.276	(0.0909)***	0.673	(0.225)	0.485	(0.159)*
AIC	37397.0		37400.9		38657.8		38652.2	
BIC	37498.8		37511.2		38759.3		38762.2	
Observations	35568		35568		34786		34786	
Number of countries	19		19		19		19	

Standard errors in parentheses
Note: [x]= The reference category is in paid work. [xx]= The reference category is primary education.
Source: Calculated from ESS data (2008 and 2016)
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 5.2: Marginal Effect of Personal Risk Perception on Non - institutionalised PP Conditional on the Level of Mean Risk Perception per Country.



Source: Calculated from ESS data.

increases the likelihood of the participation of the individuals who demand this improvement.

In summary, the results clearly underline the relevance of the context. The increasing likelihood to participate is especially the case when one perceives a risk yet also lives in a context in which improvement still seems possible. In addition, the deterioration of the unemployment rate, with the possibility of improvement in mind, has a greater impact in economically calmer times. It is thus clear that context shapes the connection between personal risk perception and individual participation behaviour (Ejrnæs, 2017).

The survey data examined in this study highlights the need to take risk perceptions into account. However, only one form of risk perception could be considered due to data availability. Examining other risk perceptions, such as the risk of becoming unemployed[2], could further disentangle the mechanisms underlying the effect of potential deprivation on political participation. Finally, mixed-methods approaches including qualitative interviews would provide additional insights into the patterns found in the analyses. For example, a rough demarcation of the group had to be made

[2]This variable was included in the original questionnaire for the ESS rotation module 'Welfare attitudes', but was no longer asked in the 2016 wave. Therefore, this aspect could not be included in this analysis.

within the scope of this study. For further in-depth studies of the double deprivation theory, it would be important to consider other forms of group membership beyond that of the country.

Furthermore, the existing data situation results in an empirical strategy that does not allow for causal interpretations. Accordingly, there may be other interpretations of the mechanism of crisis on individual behaviour than the one presented here. For example, instead of the interpretation that individuals lose hope for improvement in times of crisis, one might consider whether individuals' priorities shift away from the political arena in bad economic times. Moreover, in this research design and with the available data, looking at the two points in time as well as the macro indicator of the unemployment rate, which was of central importance during the crisis period, can only provide initial interpretations in the direction of a crisis effect. Further research is needed here to examine in depth and further influencing factors of the crisis.

5.5 Summary and Discussion

Does the individual risk perception of becoming deprived influence political participation and, if so, does this depend on the economic context? The economic crisis that unfolded in 2008 provided the ideal framework for addressing this question empirically. Using data from the ESS and the World Bank, this study examined the role of the individual risk perception of becoming economically deprived on political participation behaviour.

The results showed that the likelihood of participation increases as the personal risk perception of becoming economically deprived in the near future increases. However, this initial positive effect for those who perceive their level of risk as being very high is diminished if the mean risk perception in the country is high and thus an economically weak situation prevails. In this situation, only individuals who assess their risk as lower than the respective country mean tend to participate more. Overall, the likelihood of participation particularly increases when one perceives a risk yet also lives in a context in which improvement still seems possible.

The analysis revealed that economic changes lead to new patterns of vulnerability, both on the individual and collective levels. If the context allows it, individuals who feel at risk participate more. The reason for this could be that these individuals (still) see the possibility of change, while those who are directly affected (e.g. by unemployment) seem to lose the hope of improvement and thus participate less. However, not only those directly affected participate less in times of economic downturn, but also those who perceive a high risk of becoming deprived for themselves. This result illustrates that instead of abstracts threats, such as the effects of climate change, risks in the immediate sphere of individuals are the main source of vulner-

ability in the current age (Lianos, 2012). In this sense, both potential and direct economic deprivation translates into political marginalisation. This is particularly relevant when it comes to the effects of macro-economic conditions on democracy. Here, scholars have often expressed concerns regarding the vitality and stability of democracy (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). This involves the underrepresentation of certain groups' interests, which are now being reinforced in times of crisis. It turns out that not only one's own affectedness, as shown by other studies, but also one's own perception of the risk of becoming deprived, providing this takes place within a context that offers no hope of improvement, decreases the likelihood of participation. In this way, interests of these groups become further marginalised in the political process. Political marginalisation can not only be triggered by actual deprivation, but can start earlier – more precisely, with the very risk of becoming deprived. Nevertheless, the findings of this study are not only important with respect to the specific case of the economic crisis analysed here, but suggest that future crises will further exacerbate the problem of political marginalisation of certain interests. The current Covid-19 pandemic in particular makes it clear that the economic crisis of 2008 will not have been the last crisis. There is therefore an explicit need for a discussion on how individuals become politically empowered again, since no political governance can substitute for politically empowered citizens.

Related research from the field of populism additionally shows why it is important to look at status threat in the context of political participation. For example, Gidron and Hall (2017) or Mutz (2018) present status anxiety as a proximate factor inducing support for populism. Kurer (2020) shows in a similar way and with a view on occupational change, how the susceptibility to automation creates status anxiety, which then fuels support for right-wing populist parties. Thus, the political alienation of disadvantaged groups can encourage a vicious cycle of democratic erosion, by favouring policies (e.g., right-wing populist) that are disadvantageous to the disadvantaged, further increasing economic inequality and reducing the participation of the less well-off (Portos, 2021).

Finally, this study provides an important starting point for further investigations. Further research on the influence of risk perceptions could be fruitful. For one, it would be important to investigate further the marginalisation of other groups (e.g. by class, similar to what Solt (2015) did for income groups). It would also be interesting to examine the perception of risk distinguished by the different institutional frameworks in which individuals live. This would entail the examination of what influence the respective welfare state regime has, for example, with regard to the question of whether the individual at risk of economic deprivation is more or less protected by the welfare state. Subsequently, new crises will provide the framework to study the robustness of the mechanisms identified in this study.

Chapter 6

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Appendix A

Appendix to Security or Autonomy? A Comparative Analysis of Work Values and Labor Market Policies in Different European Welfare States

Table A.1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Obs.
Individual-level variables					
Difference between security and autonomy (dependent variable)	0.061	0.80	-4	4	51.626
Age	42.85	12.81	18	65	51.626
Sex (male = 1)	0.48	0.50	0	1	51.626
Employment status					
Employed	0.67	0.47	0	1	51.626
In education	0.05	0.21	0	1	51.626
Unemployed	0.07	0.26	0	1	51.626
Inactive	0.21	0.41	0	1	51.626
Educational level					
Primary education	0.26	0.44	0	1	51.626
Secondary education	0.56	0.49	0	1	51.626
Tertiary education	0.18	0.38	0	1	51.626
Oesch's class schema					
Self-employed professionals and large employers	0.02	0.15	0	1	51.626
Small business owners	0.11	0.31	0	1	51.626
Technical (semi)professionals	0.06	0.24	0	1	51.626
Production workers	0.22	0.41	0	1	51.626
(Associate) managers	0.14	0.35	0	1	51.626
Clerks	0.11	0.31	0	1	51.626
Sociocultural (semi)professionals	0.12	0.33	0	1	51.626
Service workers	0.22	0.42	0	1	51.626
Country-level variables					
Industry	-0.004	0.99	-1.90	1.99	51.626
ALMP	0.04	1.01	-1.45	3.32	51.626
Replacement rate	0.013	1.01	-2.66	1.54	51.626
Unemployment protection	-0.02	0.99	-1.69	2.91	51.626
Unemployment rate	-0.03	0.99	-1.46	2.70	51.626

Note: The country-level variables shown here are the standardized values used for the analysis. The nonstandardized values by country and year can be found in Appendix A.2.

Table A.2: Descriptives of the Macro Indicators and Work Value Indices per Country and Year

	Unemployment rate		Industry		Expenditure on ALMP		Replacement rate		Employment protection		Security Index (mean)		Autonomy Index (mean)	
	2004	2010	2004	2010	2004	2010	2004	2010	2004	2010	2004	2010	2004	2010
Austria	5,63	5,34	27,07	25,52	0,60	0,75	0,73	0,73	2,37	2,37	4,10	4,25	4,15	4,17
Belgium	7,36 (8,44)	7,14 (8,29)	22,96 (22,57)	20,78 (20,89)	0,63 (0,65)	0,84 (0,76)	0,71	0,73	1,89	2,08	4,10	4,10	4,12	4,06
Czech Republic	8,21	6,71	34,08	33,41	0,23	0,26	0,52	0,52	3,31	3,05	4,20	4,09	3,83	3,70
Denmark	5,20 (4,83)	7,46 (7,57)	22,13 (22,24)	19,70 (20,06)	1,64 (1,53)	2,02	0,64	0,59	2,68	2,13 (2,20)	3,50	3,64	3,97	4,02
Finland	10,36	8,39	29,37	26,16	0,93	1,00	0,68	0,65	2,17	2,17	3,92	3,99	3,87	3,99
France	8,50 (8,91)	8,87 (8,81)	19,61 (19,96)	17,85 (17,98)	0,89 (0,95)	1,13 (0,93)	0,70	0,69	2,47	2,38	4,04	4,11	4,09	4,06
Germany	10,7 (11,17)	6,96 (5,82)	26,40 (26,35)	26,85 (27,07)	1,12	0,89 (0,77)	0,71	0,71	2,68	2,68	4,16	4,25	4,01	4,20
Greece	9,99	17,87	17,8	13,68	0,07	0,09	0,62	0,66	2,8	2,17	4,67	4,61	4,43	4,28
Hungary	7,12	11,17	27,13	25,32	0,32	0,63	0,51	0,61	2,00	2,00	4,41	4,46	3,99	3,99
Ireland	4,34	15,35 (15,45)	30,00	24,56 (24,50)	0,61	0,89 (0,88)	0,59	0,71	1,44	1,27 (1,40)	4,20	4,07	4,29	4,09
Netherlands	4,64 (4,72)	4,45 (4,97)	20,71 (21,02)	19,69 (20,06)	1,26 (1,18)	1,11 (1,02)	0,78	0,82 (0,78)	2,88	2,82	3,61	3,76	3,94	4,03
Norway	4,26 (4,38)	3,52 (3,21)	35,00 (37,97)	34,77 (37,03)	0,76 (0,72)	0,62 (0,56)	0,72	0,72	2,33	2,33	4,07	4,18	4,04	4,05
Poland	19,07	9,64	28,97	29,18 (29,83)	0,34	0,68	0,35	0,32	2,23	2,23	4,43	4,47	4,13	4,12
Portugal	7,58 (6,31)	12,67 (10,77)	21,38 (22,24)	19,34 (19,95)	0,65	0,58 (0,67)	0,76	0,77	4,42	4,13	4,51	4,27	4,37	4,01
Slovakia	18,6	14,38 (13,61)	32,04	30,67 (31,07)	0,23	0,32 (0,29)	0,51	0,55	2,22	2,22	4,07	4,15	3,78	3,48
Spain	11,09 (9,15)	21,39	27,0 (27,17)	22,08	0,73 (0,76)	0,87	0,75	0,77	2,36	2,21	4,51	4,51	4,27	4,23
Sweden	6,69 (7,49)	8,61 (7,80)	24,98 (24,82)	23,80 (23,56)	1,03 (1,10)	1,11 (1,16)	0,80 (0,78)	0,66 (0,64)	2,61	2,61	3,88	3,94	4,15	4,16
Switzerland	4,32 (4,43)	4,81 (4,40)	25,87 (26,00)	25,60 (25,96)	0,70 (0,67)	0,60 (0,55)	0,84 (0,83)	0,85	1,60	1,60	3,85	3,95	4,17	4,17
United Kingdom	4,60 (4,72)	7,79 (8,04)	20,26 (20,21)	18,87 (18,67)	0,41 (0,39)	0,38 (0,23)	0,42	0,44 (0,45)	1,26	1,26	3,95	4,06	4,07	4,14

Note: In some countries, the interviewees were surveyed in different years. Therefore, the number in parentheses indicates the value of the respective indicator at the time of the survey of the smaller group of each countries sample if the value differs from the other time point.
The macro indicators have been standardized before being included in the models.

Table A.3: Description of Country Level Variables

Name of variable	Source	Description	Link
Industry	World Bank	Industry (including construction), value added as % of GDP	https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.TOTL.ZS
Unemployment	World Bank	Unemployment rate (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate)	https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS
Employment protection (PLMP)	OECD	Employment protection index: The index incorporates 8 data items concerning regulations for individual dismissals.	https://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm
Unemployment insurance (PLMP)	CWED	Replacement rate: Family (100%/0%)	http://cwed2.org/
ALMP	CPD	Total public and mandatory private expenditure on active labor market programs as percentage of GDP	https://www.cpds-data.org/index.php/data
Employment services and administration (ALMP)	CPD	Public and mandatory private employment services and administration as a percentage of GDP	https://www.cpds-data.org/index.php/data
Training (ALMP)	CPD	Public and mandatory private expenditure on labor market training as a percentage of GDP	https://www.cpds-data.org/index.php/data
Employment incentives (ALMP)	CPD	Public and mandatory private expenditure on employment incentives (recruitment and employment maintenance incentives) as a percentage of GDP	https://www.cpds-data.org/index.php/data
Job creation (ALMP)	CPD	Public and private mandatory expenditure on direct job creation (usually in the public or nonprofit sector) as a percentage of GDP	https://www.cpds-data.org/index.php/data
Start-up incentives (ALMP)	CPD	Public and mandatory private support of unemployed persons (or closely related groups) starting enterprises or becoming self-employed as a percentage of GDP	https://www.cpds-data.org/index.php/data

Table A.4: Model for Replacement Rate with UK Country Dummy

	M Appendix
Year (2010=1)	0.149*
	(2.42)
Age	0.000908**
	(3.15)
Sex (male=1)	0.0483***
	(6.71)
Employment status[x]	
In education	-0.128***
	(-7.79)
unemployed	0.0187
	(1.47)
Inactive	-0.130***
	(-14.61)
Level of education[xx]	
Secondary education	-0.135***
	(-8.08)
Tertiary education	-0.291***
	(-15.56)
Oesch's class schema[xxx]	
Small business owners	0.172***
	(7.21)
Technical (semi-) professionals	0.330***
	(13.21)
Production workers	0.588***
	(25.43)
(Associate) managers	0.306***
	(13.21)

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	M Appendix
Clerks	0.434***
	(18.09)
Socio-cultural (semi-) professionals	0.275***
	(11.74)
Service workers	0.483***
	(20.87)
Unemployment rate	0.0589*
	(2.02)
UK(=1)	-0.391*
	(-2.51)
Replacement rate	-0.118***
	(-3.46)
Constant	-0.290***
Var (countryyear)	2.52e-13
	(-0.79)
Var (country)	0.0355***
	(-13.96)
Var (residual)	0.536***
	(-100.18)
Observations	51626
AIC	114521.1
BIC	114715.8

t statistics in parentheses
[x] The reference category is in paid work.
[xx] The reference category is primary education.
[xxx] The reference category is 'Self-employed professionals and large employers'.
Source: Own calculations based on ESS data, World Bank data, the Comparative Political Dataset, and the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.5: Sensitivity Tests with Differentiated ALMP Measures

	Employment services and administration	Training	Employment incentives	Job creation	Start-up incentives
Year (2010=1)	0.142*	0.147*	0.146*	0.146*	0.143*
	(2.50)	(2.36)	(2.06)	(2.06)	(1.98)
Age	0.0141***	0.0141***	0.0140***	0.0140***	0.0144***
	(4.14)	(4.14)	(4.12)	(4.12)	(4.13)
Sex (male=1)	0.0480***	0.0480***	0.0479***	0.0479***	0.0428***
	(6.68)	(6.67)	(6.66)	(6.66)	(5.81)
Employment status[x]					
In education	-0.127***	-0.127***	-0.127***	-0.127***	-0.126***
	(-7.80)	(-7.83)	(-7.82)	(-7.82)	(-7.60)
Unemployed	0.0191	0.0188	0.0189	0.0189	0.0207
	(1.51)	(1.48)	(1.49)	(1.49)	(1.61)
Inactive	-0.132***	-0.132***	-0.132***	-0.132***	-0.122***
	(-14.90)	(-14.93)	(-14.94)	(-14.93)	(-13.44)
Level of education[xx]					
Secondary education	-0.129***	-0.131***	-0.132***	-0.132***	-0.128***
	(-7.77)	(-7.85)	(-7.88)	(-7.88)	(-7.40)
Tertiary education	-0.284***	-0.286***	-0.287***	-0.287***	-0.277***
	(-15.27)	(-15.34)	(-15.35)	(-15.35)	(-14.30)
Oesch's class schema[xxx]					
Small business owners	0.172***	0.172***	0.172***	0.172***	0.186***
	(7.24)	(7.22)	(7.22)	(7.22)	(7.57)
Technical (semi-) professionals	0.332***	0.331***	0.331***	0.331***	0.334***
	(13.28)	(13.26)	(13.25)	(13.25)	(12.99)
Production workers	0.590***	0.590***	0.590***	0.590***	0.592***
	(25.51)	(25.50)	(25.49)	(25.49)	(24.89)
(Associate) managers	0.307***	0.306***	0.306***	0.306***	0.309***
	(13.25)	(13.24)	(13.23)	(13.23)	(12.95)

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	Employment services and administration	Training	Employment incentives	Job creation	Start-up incentives
Clerks	0.436*** (18.15)	0.435*** (18.13)	0.435*** (18.12)	0.435*** (18.12)	0.434*** (17.56)
Socio-cultural (semi-) professionals	0.276*** (11.78)	0.276*** (11.77)	0.276*** (11.76)	0.276*** (11.76)	0.278*** (11.52)
Service workers	0.484*** (20.95)	0.484*** (20.93)	0.484*** (20.92)	0.484*** (20.92)	0.488*** (20.50)
Unemployment rate	0.0791** (3.06)	0.0763** (2.71)	0.0875** (2.88)	0.0880** (2.90)	0.0620 (1.91)
Employment services and administration	-0.104*** (-4.63)				
Training		-0.0946** (-3.26)			
Employment incentives			0.000515 (0.02)		
Job creation				-0.00622 (-0.26)	
Start-up incentives					0.0516 (1.68)
Constant	-0.292*** (-6.21)	-0.295*** (-5.84)	-0.293*** (-5.26)	-0.293*** (-5.27)	-0.286*** (-5.02)
Var (countryyear)	3.44e-13 (-0.87)	2.49e-13 (-0.79)	1.85e-13 (-1.02)	1.53e-13 (-0.97)	1.78e-13 (-1.01)
Var (country)	0.0298*** (-14.59)	0.0363*** (-13.74)	0.0466*** (-11.94)	0.0467*** (-12.63)	0.0458*** (-12.38)
Var (residual)	0.536*** (-100.19)	0.536*** (-100.19)	0.536*** (-100.19)	0.536*** (-100.19)	0.532*** (-98.81)
Observations	51626	51626	51626	51626	48946

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	Employment services and adminis-tration	Training	Employment incentives	Job creation	Start-up incentives
AIC	114506.4	114514.4	114523.9	114523.8	108187.8
BIC	114692.3	114700.3	114709.7	114709.7	108372.6

t statistics in parentheses
[x] The reference category is in paid work.
[xx] The reference category is primary education.
[xxx] The reference category is 'Self-employed professionals and large employers'.
Source: Own calculations based on ESS data, World Bank data, the Comparative Political Dataset, and the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix B

Appendix to There Is No Place like Home! How Willing Are Young Adults to Move to Find a Job?

Table B.1: Correlation Matrix

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
(1) Move within country	1.000													
(2) Move to a different country	0.443*	1.000												
(3) Age	-0.093*	-0.079*	1.000											
(4) Female	-0.072*	-0.059*	-0.022*	1.000										
(5) Married	-0.079*	-0.081*	0.354*	0.044*	1.000									
(6) Medium education	0.015	0.019*	-0.242*	0.032*	-0.075*	1.000								
(7) High education	0.069*	0.063*	0.225*	-0.003	-0.024*	-0.485*	1.000							
(8) Risk aversion	0.127*	0.174*	-0.073*	-0.103*	-0.016*	0.037*	-0.004	1.000						
(9) Work values	0.070*	0.029*	0.007	-0.037*	0.112*	0.038*	-0.081*	0.082*	1.000					
(10) Employment status	-0.044*	-0.031*	0.305*	-0.161*	0.094*	-0.166*	0.181*	0.037*	0.085*	1.000				
(11) Economic self-sufficiency	-0.028*	-0.058*	-0.000	-0.055*	0.071*	-0.021*	0.093*	0.006	0.021*	0.244*	1.000			
(12) Social ties	0.082*	0.087*	-0.072*	0.040*	-0.020*	0.049*	-0.070*	0.053*	0.035*	-0.221*	-0.268*	1.000		
(13) Rural index	0.010	-0.028*	-0.018*	0.011	0.017*	-0.083*	-0.051*	-0.039*	-0.015*	-0.062*	-0.005	-0.027*	1.000	
(14) Familialism	0.009	-0.006	0.029*	-0.042*	0.155*	0.016*	-0.102*	0.059*	0.353*	0.033*	-0.030*	0.067*	-0.003	1.000

Note: The table contains the Pearson correlation and * denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level.

Table B.2: Overview of the Variables Used from the CUPESSE Dataset

Variable	Question	Range	Mean (SD)
Move within country	"What changes would you be willing to make to get a new job?" "I would be willing to move to within country" (1) No (2) Maybe (3) Yes Recoded towards: (0) No/Maybe (1) Yes	0–1	0.41 (0.49)
Move to a different country	"What changes would you be willing to make to get a new job?" "I would be willing to move to another country" (1) No (2) Maybe (3) Yes Recoded towards: (0) No/Maybe (1) Yes	0–1	0.29 (0.46)
Age	"How old are you?" (Blank field for respondents to fill in the answer)	18–35	27.16 (4.95)
Female	"Are you. . . " (0) Male (1) Female	0–1	0.52 (0.50)
Married	"Which one of the following descriptions best describes your current legal martial status today?" (0) Others (registered civil partnership, separated, divorced, widowed, single, none of the above) (1) Married	0–1	0.29 (0.45)

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Variable	Question	Range	Mean (SD)
Medium education	"What is the highest level of education you have successfully completed?" Recoded towards: (1) ISCED IV Reference category: ISCED I to III	0–1	0.21 (0.40)
High education	"What is the highest level of education you have successfully completed?" Recoded towards: (1) ISCED V or higher Reference category: ISCED I to III	0–1	0.48 (0.50)
Employment status	"Which of these descriptions applies to what you have been doing for the last month?" Recoded towards: (0) Unemployed/not having a job/not in paid work/in education/doing an internship/in training/unable to work because of health issues/doing civil service or compulsory military service/on parental leave/doing houswork, looking after children or other dependents/other (1) In paid work as an employee/self-employed	0–1	0.59 (0.49)
Economic self-sufficiency	"Thinking about your own financial situation, how satisfied are you right now?" (1) Very dissatisfied (2) Rather dissatisfied (3) Rather satisfied (4) Very satisfied	1–4	2.46 (0.86)

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Variable	Question	Range	Mean (SD)
Social ties	"Thinking about your friends, how many of them are unemployed?" (1) None of them (2) A few of them (3) Some of them (4) Most of them (5) All of them	1–5	2.22 (1.01)
Risk aversion	"On a scale from 0 to 10 would you say that in general you are a person who tends to avoid taking risks or are you fully prepared to take risks?" Scale ranging from (0) I tend to avoid risks (10) I am fully prepared to take risks	0–10	5.30 (2.40)
Work values	"Please read the following statements and tell us how much you agree or disagree with them." To fully develop your talents you need to have a job. It's humiliating to receive money without having to work. Work is a duty towards society. Work should always come first even if it means less spare time. For all statements: 1—strongly disagree/2—somewhat disagree/3—somewhat agree/4—strongly agree Recoded towards an index that takes the average of the answers to these statements.	1–4	2.87 (0.60)

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Variable	Question	Range	Mean (SD)
Familialism	"We would like to know your views about family relationships. To what extent to you agree of disagree with the follwing statements?" It is the duty of family members to take care of each other, even if they have to give up something they want themselves. Family members should stick together, no matter what sacrifices are required. It is important that children respect the decisions made by their parents, even if they disagree with these decisions. For all statements: 1—strongly disagree/2—somewhat disagree/3—somewhat agree/4—strongly agree Recoded towards an index that takes the average of the answers to these statements.	1–4	3.14 (0.60)

Appendix C

Appendix to Disengaged or Raising Voices? An Analysis of the Relationship Between Individual Risk Perception and Non-Institutionalised Political Participation

Table C.1: Variable Description

Variable	Description	Range	Mean (SD) 2008	Mean (SD) 2016
Dependent variable				
Non-institutionalised Political Participation	Index from participation variables: 'There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? Have you... - taken part in a lawful public demonstration? - boycotted certain products? - signed a petition? - worn or displayed a campaign badge/sticker?'	0-1	0.33 (0.47)	0.38 (0.48)
Independent variable				
Risk of lacking financial resources	'And during the next 12 months, how likely is it that there will be some periods when you don't have enough money to cover your household necessities?'	1-4	2.08 (0.90)	1.92 (0.88)
Controls				
Age	Age of respondent	15-105 (2008) 15-100 (2016)	47.86 (18.60)	49.43 (18.55)
Gender	0= female, 1= male	0-1	0.47 (0.50)	0.47 (0.50)

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Variable	Description	Range	Mean (SD) 2008	Mean (SD) 2016
Political interest	'How interested would you say you are in politics?'	1-4	2.39 (0.90)	2.44 (0.92)
Level of education	Highest level of education Primary education Secondary education Tertiary education	1-3	2.15 (0.63)	2.16 (0.57)
Employment status	Current employment status 1 = In paid work; community or military service 2 = In education 3 = Unemployed (looking for a job and not looking for a job) 4 = Permanently sick or disabled; retired; housework, looking after children or other persons; other	1-4	2.25 (1.38)	2.22 (1.39)
Country-level variables				
Unemployment rate	Unemployment, total (% of total labour force) (modelled ILO estimate). Unemployment refers to the share of the labour force that is without work but available for and seeking employment.	2.55-17.86 (2008) 3.75-17.22 (2016)	7.67 (3.09)	6.78 (3.05)
Riskperception-Countrymeans	Mean of risk of lacking financial resources calculated by country	1.55-3.05 (2008) 1.43-2.70 (2016)	2.08 (0.35)	1.93 (0.29)