The Obscure Statesman: History, Politics and Character in Plutarch's *Life of Phocion*

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Abbreviations

Plutarch's works

Moralia

Adv. Col. = Against Colotes (Adversus Colotem)
An seni resp. = Whether old men should engage in public affairs (An seni respublica gerenda sit)
Apophth. Lac. = Spartan sayings (Apophthegmata Laconica)
De coh. ira = On the control of anger (De cohibenda ira)
De cup. div. = On the love of wealth (De cupiditate divitiarum)
De cur. = On curiosity (De curiositate)
De ex. = On exile (De exilio)
De gen. Socr. = On the sign of Socrates (De genio Socratis)
De glor. Athen. = On the glory of Athens(De gloria Atheniensium)
De laud. ips. = On inoffensive self-praise (De laude ipsius)
De Stoic. rep. = On Stoic contradictions (De Stoicorum repugnantiis)
Prae. ger. reip. = Political precepts (Praecepta gerendae reipublicae)
Quom. adul. = How the young man should study poetry (Quomodo adolescens poetas audire debeat)
Quom. virt. = How a man may become aware of his progress in virtue (Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus)
Reg. et imp. apophth. = Sayings of kings and commanders (Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata)
Vit. dec. orat. = Lives of the ten orators (Vitae decem oratorum)

Parallel Lives

Ages. = Agesilaus
Alc. = Alcibiades
Alex. = Alexander
Arist. = Aristides
Brut. = Brutus
Caes. = Caesar
Cat. Ma. = Cato Maior
Cat. Min. = Cato Minor
Cleom. = Cleomenes
Cor. = Coriolanus
Cras. = Crassus
Dem. = Demosthenes
Demetr. = Demetrius
Eum. = Eumenes

Fab. = Fabian Maximus
Flam. = Titus Flamininus
Lyc. = Lycurgus
Lys. = Lysander
Marc. = Marcellus
Nic. = Nicias
Pelo. = Pelopidas
Per. = Pericles
Phil. = Philopoemen
Phoc. = Phocion
Pomp. = Pompey
Publ. = Publicola
Sol. = Solon
Them. = Themistocles

Other ancient authors
Ael. V.H. = Claudius Aelianus, Varia Historia
Aeschin. = Aeschines
And. = Andocides
Athen. = Athenaeus
Ath. Pol. = Athenaion Politeia
Arist. Pol. = Aristotle, Politics
Arist. Rhet. = Aristotle, Rhetoric
Aristoph. Cl. = Aristophanes, The Clouds
Aristoph. Kn. = Aristophanes, The Knights
Aristoph. Fr. = Aristophanes, The Frogs
Aristoph. Thesm. = Aristophanes, Thesmophoriazusae
Arr. Anab. = Arrian, Anabasis
Cic. Ad Att. = Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum
Cic. Brut. = Cicero, Brutus
Cic. De fin. = Cicero, De finibus
Cic. De leg. = Cicero, De legibus
Cic. De off. = Cicero, De officiis
Cic. Par. Stoic. = Cicero, Paradoxa Stoicorum
Curt. Ruf. = Curtius Rufus
D.L. = Diogenes Laertius
Dem. = Demosthenes
Dem. Ep. = Demosthenes, Epistles
Din. = Dinarchus
Diod. = Diodorus Siculus
Dion. Hal. Ad Amm. = Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ad Ammaeum
Dion. Hal. Din. = Dionysius of Halicarnassus, De Dinarcho
Dion. Hal. Is. = Dionysius of Halicarnassus, De Isaeo
Dion. Hal. Lys. = Dionysius of Halicarnassus, De Lysia

Front. Str. = Frontinus, Strategemata
Gell. Noct. Att. = Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae
Hdt. = Herodotus
Hyp. = Hypereides
Isoc. = Isocrates
Just. = Justin
Lucan Bell. Civ. = Lucan, De Bello Civili
Lys. = Lysias
Nep. Chabr. = Nepos, Chabrias
Nep. Epam. = Nepos, Epaminondas
Nep. Iphic. = Nepos, Iphicrates
Nep. Phoc. = Nepos, Phocion
Nep. Timoth. = Nepos, Timotheus
Paus. = Pausanias
Plat. Apol. = Plato, Apology
Plat. Crit. = Plato, Crito
Plat. Gorg. = Plato, Gorgias
Plat. Phaed. = Plato, Phaedo
Plat. Prt. = Plato, Protagoras
Plat. Rep. = Plato, Republic
Plat. Sym. = Plato, Symposium
Polyaen. = Polyaenus
Polyb. = Polybius
Phot. Bibl. = Photius, Bibliotheca
Schol. on Aeschin. = Scholion on Aeschines
Schol. on Aristoph. = Scholion on Aristophanes
Schol. on Lucian = Scholion on Lucian
Sen. Brev. vit. = Seneca, De brevitate vitae
Sen. De const. sap. = Seneca, De constantia sapientis
Sen. De ira = Seneca, De ira
Sen. De tranq. = Seneca, De Tranquillitate Animi
Sen. Ep. = Seneca, Epistulae
Strab. = Strabo
Suet. Dom. = Suetonius, Domitian
Tact. Ann. = Tacitus, Annales
Thuc. = Thucydides
Val. Max. = Valerius Maximus
Xeno. Anab. = Xenophon, Anabasis
Xeno. Hell. = Xenophon, Hellenica
Xeno. Hipp. = Xenophon, Hipparchikos
Xeno. Mem. = Xenophon, Memorabilia
Xeno. Oec. = Xenophon, Oeconomicus

Modern works

Acad. ind. Herc. = Mekler, S., Academicorum philosophorum index Herculanensis, Berolini.
Agora XV = Meritt, B.D. and Traill, J.S.(eds.), The Athenian Agora. Results of Excavations Conducted by the American School of Classical Studies at Athens. XV The Athenian Councillors, Princeton.
Agora XVI = Woodhead, A.G.(ed.), The Athenian Agora. Results of Excavations Conducted by the American School of Classical Studies at Athens. XVI The Decrees, Princeton.
APF = Davies, J.K., Athenian Propertied Families, Oxford.
FGrH = Jacoby, F., Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker, Berlin.
IG I^3 = Lewis, D.M., Jeffery, L.H., Erxleben, E., and Hallof, K.(eds.), Inscriptiones Graecae. Vol. I Inscriptiones Atticae Euclidis anno anteriores. Editio Tertia.
IG II/III^3 1 = Lambert, S.D., Osborne, M.J., Byrne, S.G., Bardani, V.N. and Tracy, S.V.(eds.), Inscriptiones Graecae. Vol. II et III. Inscriptiones Atticae Euclidis anno posteriores. Editio Tertia. Pars I. Leges et Decreta.
LGPN II = Osborne, M.J. and Byrne, S.G.(eds.), A Lexicon of Greek Personal Names. II: Attica, Oxford.
PA = Kirchner, J., Prosopographia Attica, 2 vols, Berlin.
PAA = Traill, J.S., Persons of Ancient Athens, Toronto.
RE = Pauly, A.G. and Kroll, W.(eds.), Real-encyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschafte, Stuttgart.
RO = Rhodes, P.J. and Osborne, R.(eds.), Greek Historical Inscriptions 404-323 B.C., Oxford.
OGIS = Dittenberger, W., Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae, Hildesheim.
SEG = Various eds., Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum.

Introduction

Studies of Athenian political and military history in the fourth century B.C. invariably concentrate on Athens's foreign policy, especially its relationship with Macedon. Particular attention has been paid to many of the great Athenians who played an important role in these events, since inscriptions and Athenian oratory provide a rich source of information about Athenian politicians. It is well-known that Demosthenes, with his outstanding oratorical skills, sought to preserve Athens's freedom and to establish an alliance against Macedon. His policy, however, was opposed by several others. One of them was Demades, whose influential status in Athens is attested both in his own orations and in the decrees on which his name appears as the author. There is another man, who alongside Demades provoked the Athenians to accept a policy of conciliation and negotiation rather than war. This is Phocion, the son of Phocus. Evidence relating to his military and political activities seems to be fragmentary and in some instances ambiguous. His name is rarely mentioned by the contemporary orators and poorly documented in the surviving inscriptions.

Contrasted with the obscurity in the contemporary evidence is the relative abundance in the later historical and biographical narratives. Much of the information for Phocion's political career and his relation with Macedon is provided by Diodorus of Sicily. The bulk of the historical and literary tradition concerning Phocion's life and character, however, derives substantively from his two biographers, Cornelius Nepos and Plutarch. Examination of their sources contributes to additional knowledge of Phocion's image in the works of contemporary authors. Nepos, though not identifying his authorities, possibly preserves the substance of the debate between Democharesand Demetrius of Phalerum, a debate which was significantly concerned with Phocion's personalities and policies. References to Phocion in some fourth-century and early third-century sources survive in the citations of Plutarch, such as Idomeneus of

Lampsacus and Duris of Samos, but Plutarch's main source is probably Demetrius of Phalerum, the former associate of Phocion. After Nepos and Plutarch there are a lot of authors who refer to Phocion in a variety of contexts, and we can at least mention Valerius Maximus, Aelian, Polyaenus and Stobaeus.

In modern times Phocion's role in the decline of Athens has understandably attracted the attention of the scholarly community, and his image, whether as a traitor or victim, has been widely discussed. Voltaire, for instance, made attempt to make the best of incidents from Hellenistic Athens, but he had to admit that Phocion's death was an act of judicial iniquity that stained Athens' reputation.[1] In the eighteenth century, Phocion was generally admired for his moral virtues, and his opposition to war with Macedon was interpreted as political wisdom and patriotism.[2] But in the nineteenth century, Phocion's image as a victim of democracy swiftly diminished in the face of the rehabilitation of Athenian democracy.[3] However, different voices could still be heard. The German historian Droysen praised Phocion as "the last gentleman of the better days", and regarded his fall as a symbol of Athens' decay after the death of Demosthenes. Droysen presented Phocion as a man with considerable insight, who foresaw that the decline of small independent Greek city-states was inevitable, and this positive judgment is in accordance with his understanding of Hellenimus which began with the Macedonian expansion.[4] The debate continued in the twentieth century, and Phocion has come to be seen as an elderly political conservative who naively placed his trust in the Macedonians and finally paid the price for his folly.[5]

Since the 1970s more scholars have paid attention to this obscure Athenian general. J.K.Davies briefly examines Phocion's lineage and family in his *Athenian propertied Families*. In 1976 H.-J.Gehrke published his *Phokion: Studien zur Erfassung einer historischen Gestalt*, which provides us with a detailed description of Phocion's political career and a review of the scholarly study on Phocion from eighteenth century to his times. Gehrke follows the ancient sources very closely, and he especially examines the

1 Roberts 1994, 170.
2 Gehrke 1976, 201f.
3 Bayliss 2011, 34f. Cf. Gehrke 1976, 207.
4 Droysen 1878, vol.2, 224-226. Cf. Gehrke 1976, 208.
5 Bearzot 1985; Bayliss 2011, 141-151.

anecdotes found in Plutarch's *Phocion*, clarifying many points concerning the origin and authenticity of anecdotal materials. While this work is the starting point for any study of the character and deeds of Phocion, Gehrke considers him too exclusively as a politician. Likewise, C.Bearzot is critical of the idealization of Phocion as a competent military commander as well as a philosopher in politics. Asking, in conclusion, who had the motive and opportunity for creating an ideal Phocion, Bearzot finds a ready candidate in Demetrius of Phalerum.[1]

Gehrke's doubt on Phocion's military competence is questioned by L.A.Tritle, who argues persuasively for Phocion's ability in the campaigns. Tritle focuses his study particularly on a critical analysis of the sources Plutarch reads and cites, and discusses Phocion's social milieu in details. Tritle's work has made some useful contributions towards a reappraisal of Phocion, but some opinions still seem to be controversial. For example, Tritle rejects the tendency of the division between general and orator in fourth-century Athens, and he regards the regime after the Lamian War as a moderate democracy instead of an oligarchy. The second view is particularly refuted by J.M.Williams, who in his *Athens without Democracy* calls the Athenian constitution after her surrender to Antipater as "a moderate oligarchy", in which Demades played a dominant role.[2] He argues that Phocion, on the contrary, was the individual guilty of treason, since he reacted incompetently to Nicanor's coup and advised Polyperchon's son Alexander to pursue a policy contrary to the autonomy of his native state. The leading role of Demades in this short-lived oligarchy can be well attested by inscriptions, but William's appraisal of Demades as a patriotic and altruistic democrat is based on conjectures. He rightly points out the inherent bias in Plutarch's *Phocion*, but pays little attention to reveal Plutarch's strong moral interests in this biography.

A comparison between Phocion's regime and that of Demetrius of Phalerum is recently made by A.J.Bayliss. Based his study on the ideology in Hellenistic Athens, Bayliss lists the oligarchic traits of these two regimes in the light of recent attempts by several modern apologists to rebrand them as democracies. For Bayliss, Phocion was no

1 Bearzot 1985, 242-255.
2 Williams 1982, 98.

doubt a traitor, or at least an elderly conservative who made a wrong decision to choose to collaborate with Macedon. Given the repressive character of the regime under Antipater's settlement, there is no wonder that the Athenians celebrated the downfall of Phocion.[1] Bayliss rightly observes Phocion's service under the oligarchic regime, but he ignores that Phocion was also an active orator under democracy. Finally, there are treatments of Phocion scattered in recent socio-historical studies of the fourth-century Athens. J.Ober holds on the opinion that the trials of Socrates and Phocion prove the fallibility of democracy. In his early book *Mass and elite in democratic Athens*, Ober judges that Phocion proved much inferior to Pericles, both as an orator and as a reader of the Athenian climate of opinion.[2] K.Trampedach examines Phocion's relation with Platon's Academy and argues that scholars like Bearzot and Tritle have falsely understood the influence of Platonic philosophy on Phocion's political activities.[3] Focusing on the public scrutiny of the courage of a public figure, M.R.Christ notes that Phocion, who was reluctant to take the Athenians out in the field, was regularly rebuked by his fellow citizens as cowardly and unmanly.[4] C.Mossé has recently doubted the traditional argument that Phocion was tried in an illegal and tumultuous manner. On the contrary, he assumes that the assembly continued to control Athens' legislative process as it had prior to the oligarchic reform. The trial, as well as the process of voting, reveals a procedure "qui semble respecter les règles traditionnelles".[5]

Plutarch provides us with the most detailed account of Phocion's life and career. In recent years much interesting work has been done on case studies in Plutarch's *Parallel Lives*, which explains the notions and methods Plutarch applies to sketch his instances of ethical teaching and learning (Tröster 2008 on the *Lucullus*; Beneker 2012 on the concept of "eros"; Ahlrichs 2005 on the *Coriolanus*; Xenophontos 2016 on a systematic investigation of Plutarch's moral education). However, the *Life of Phocion* still lacks enough attention. It is most evident in the absence of a detailed commentary, and few works have been concerned with Plutarch's notion of moral education and his literary

1 Bayliss 2011, 129-151.
2 Ober 1989, 120.
3 Trampedach 1994, 136-138.
4 Christ 2006, 130.
5 Mossé 2007, 206.

techniques in this biography.

The historians always find fault with Plutarch, because he would narrate only what will help to an understanding of his protagonist's character and disposition. As a result, the political or social conditions are often imperfectly described or even misunderstood. Indeed there are some examples in the *Life of Phocion*. For instance, Plutarch presents Chabrias as the military mentor of young Phocion, who assisted him both for learning military skills and for enhancing prestige. However, little evidence implies this kind of apprenticeship among Athenian generals. Likewise he claims that the Athenians knew how to make use of leaders with different characters, but it is well-known that most offices in Athens were elected by lot. Yet it seems too radical to deny the value of Plutarch's *Parallel Lives* for historians. Since the historical evidence about Phocion is meager and scattered, any study of Phocion must be based on Plutarch's *Life of Phocion*. The authenticity of remarks and anecdotes concerning Phocion may be either accepted as authentic or rejected as spurious, but they at least draw our attention to some aspects of fourth-century Athens that can be closely scrutinized. Meanwhile, the discussion of Phocion constitutes the background to many of the debates associated with the crisis of Athens in relation to the expansion of Macedon. The present study is not designed merely to correct what Plutarch ignores or misinterprets, but to make a contribution to the overall picture of Phocion as an active statesman in the fourth-century Athens, including his relationships with friends, political rivals, the multitude of citizens, and the Macedonian rulers.

At the same time, it will be necessary constantly to consider the form and purpose of Plutarch's biographical composition. Although this work does not concentrate on the notions and techniques of morality in Plutarch, it is obvious that a thorough understanding of the *Lives* can not be attained when ignoring their moral content. On certain occasions, the specific interest and intention underlying Plutarch's composition are worth exploring. At least, they could help to answer a basic question: Why does Plutarch choose Phocion, a relatively obscure figure in the history of Athens, as one of the protagonists in his *Parallel Lives*? To answer this question, I should also like to consider how Phocion attracts Plutarch's attention to his style of leadership and his

interaction with the common people, for the way of leadership is a common theme in Plutarch's biographies of statesmen. Moreover, the significance of the pair structure should be taken into consideration. Phocion and Cato the Younger, as Plutarch explicitly says, have much in common in their character, and this pair is also yoked by historical situation, because both of them witnessed and suffered political turbulences in their states. Apart from Plutarch's own explanation, what is worth noticing is that Plutarch's choice must be influenced by his times. Plutarch makes very few allusions to contemporary events in his works, but he surely witnessed a few token prosecutions under the reign of Domitian, especially among the victims was his friend Arulenus Rusticus. From Rusticus he must have heard the suicide of Thrasea Paetus under Nero, the source of his *Life of Cato*. When Cato has been idealized by Thrasea and other Romans who complained the tyranny of the emperors, and especially they refer to Cato's suicide as imitation of Socrates, it would be expected that Plutarch was keen on finding a Greek counterpart who can serve as parallel example of Cato's austerity, sternness and uprightness. More significantly, Phocion, at least in Plutarch's minds, had closer connection with Socrates than Cato. As regards Plutarch's choice of heroes, and the counterparts assigned to them, one shall not take it for granted that the Greeks was chosen first and a Roman counterpart was found, even if it seems to be a procedure natural to a Greek author like Plutarch. The choice of Phocion, which will be closely examined in Chapter 5, casts light on both Plutarch's purpose of moral education and his reaction to Roman literary society.

As for the scope and structure of this study, it consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 is mainly concerned with source analysis. I begin by analyzing the four authors Plutarch explicitly mentions in the *Life of Phocion*. These four authors surely provide useful information for Plutarch, but the very meager evidence suggests that they were not his main sources. I then suggest that Demetrius of Phalerum seems to be the most possible chief source for this *Life*, because Demetrius himself had personal ties with Phocion, and his political career was similar to the latter. In addition, I assume that Plutarch may have been influenced by the works of Hieronymus of Cardia, Diodorus and Nepos. In Chapter 2 I look at the private life of Phocion in particular. Extant evidence suggests that

Phocion came from a wealthy family, and his adherence to austerity should not be misunderstood as "poverty". From Plutarch we know that Phocion kept good relationship with Chabrias and other political friends. However, it is noteworthy that Phocion's friendship with Chabrias conforms to his purpose of moral education rather than historical fact. When Plutarch is discussing Phocion's assistance for Chabrias in moral improvement, he blames Chabrias' death as a result of passion. In correlation to this passage, I further explore Plutarch's criticism of the recklessness of military commanders, which is especially elaborated in the pair *Pelopidas-Marcellus*.

Chapter 3 discusses Phocion's military deeds. Phocion is known to have assumed the position of general for forty-five times. But the extant evidence of his military activities does not suggest that he was much more outstanding than other Athenian generals in military skills and achievements. Moreover, I notice that Phocion's military career after 340 B.C. is poorly known. This naturally leads to the question why the Athenians later preferred to choose a man who seldom took the command himself as their general? I note that there was no great warfare in the land of Attica between 336 and 323 B.C., therefore, the inactivity of an Athenian general during this peaceful period seems to be understandable. In addition, it is interesting to note that Plutarch emphasizes Phocion's contribution in pursuing both military and political activities. It seems that Plutarch notices the division of labor between orators and generals in the four-century Athens, but I doubt whether he exaggerates this tendency in order to place his hero at the center stage. This chapter shows that there were other fourth-century Athenian generals who performed both military and political activities as Phocion did. Relevant to the question why more generals in the fourth-century Athens kept distance from political participation is a passage in Nepos, in which he says that the envy of the Athenian people forced many prominent generals to leave the city. After exploring the career of those generals whom Nepos mentions as victims of the jealous people, I conclude that it was the rigid scrutiny of magistrates, rather than envy, that made the profession of general a risky form of employment in Athens.

I am concerned in Chapter 4 primarily with Phocion's political activities. I start with an examination of Phocion's political status in Athens. From the period between 338 and

322 B.C., Phocion was one of the active politicians in the city. But reputation does not necessarily mean influence. Plutarch's account, though eulogizing Phocion's moral characters, clearly shows that Phocion's policy seldom prevailed in Athens before 322 B.C. Only when an oligarchic regime was established in Athens after the Lamian War, Phocion became influential in the affairs of state. In recent years, the oligarchic character of this short-lived regime has been challenged by some scholars. Therefore, I aim to demonstrate that measures such as qualifying census, restriction of citizen numbers, limitation of the power of assembly and bloody purge of opponents clearly reveal how this regime contradicted with democratic ideology. The level of hostility it generated, exemplified by the trial and execution of Phocion, convincingly attests that the Athenians regarded it as oligarchy. Similarly, I doubt the view that the rule of Demetrius of Phalerum was a democratic one, because defense of such kind evidently overlooks the marked resemblance of Demetrius' regime to the earlier oligarchy installed by Antipater.

Chapter 5, finally, examines Phocion's death. I first focus on the power struggle between Cassander and Polyperchon after Antipater's death, which was the direct reason for Phocion's political downfall and execution. Then I turn to Plutarch's construction of Phocion's death scene, and examine how he judges the death of Phocion from a moral perspective. In other words, what kind of moral lesson does Phocion's failure reveal? In general, Plutarch thinks highly of Phocion, and on only one occasion he explicitly disapproves of Phocion's action. Phocion's blind trust in the Macedonian Nicanor, according to Plutarch, reveals a conflict between personal moral principles and the needs of statesmanship. Nevertheless, it is obviously in accordance with Plutarch's warning in the introduction of this *Life*, because Phocion's stubborn attitude caused the disfavor of the Athenians. This point is also elaborated in the *Life of Cato*, in which Plutarch presents Cato the Younger as a virtuous man whose harsh and stern attitude in public nevertheless caused his own death and ruin for his state. Plutarch claims that Phocion's death reminded the Greek of the fate of Socrates, and his account of Phocion's death scene is reminiscent of that of Socrates. Similarly, the Stoic Cato read Plato's *Phaedo* before his suicide, an action that evidently recalls Socrates. This similarity naturally emphasizes the parallels between Phocion and Cato, but I pay special attention to their

difference. Cato ended his life in passion and violence, so his end is presented by Plutarch as problematic and inferior to both Socrates' and Phocion's. The reason, I suggest, is probably Plutarch's response to contemporary literary tendency that crudely compared Cato with Socrates.

In short, this work is an attempt to save Phocion from obscurity. Despite being a study concentrated on an individual figure, the following investigation will be focusing on particular themes rather than providing a chronological narrative of Phocion's career. Inevitably, this method means that the selection of themes is highly subjective, but my study aims to highlight the links between interrelated evidence and ideas that has been separated in familiar chronological accounts on Phocion's lifetime. This attempt is in fact consistent with Plutarch's compositional technique, focusing on certain themes presenting the protagonist's virtues and vices. Plutarch's approach is generally considered as an intentional way of inspiring the reader to detect and consider the moral questions involved, but my work is committed to gain historical insights from the investigation of Plutarch's *Life of Phocion*. Meanwhile, some of these themes can also serve to structure the pair, which is particularly dealt with in this work.

1. A source analysis of Plutarch's *Life of Phocion*

But the fame of Phocion's virtue, which may be said to have found an antagonist in a grievous and violent time, the fortunes of Greece rendered obscure and dim…Yet much power must be granted to Fortune in her conflicts with good men: instead of the honor and the gratitude which are their due, she brings base censure and calumny upon some, and so weakens the world's confidence in their virtue.[1]

The introductory chapter of Plutarch's *Phocion* provides a thematic statement elucidating Plutarch's reason for choosing Phocion as one of his biographical subjects. Phocion, as he presents, was a man with good moral qualities, but succumbed in an unequal battle with Fortune. The literary depiction of Fortune's victory is based on an actual event, namely Phocion's condemnation and execution in 318 B.C. Sensational in tone, Plutarch makes it fairly easy for his readers to observe the danger of political life. In this way, he ascribes his motivation for writing a biography for Phocion to a desire of rehabilitation. In the following chapter of the introductory section, Plutarch presents a comparison of Phocion and his Roman counterpart Cato the Younger. Though he judges both men as old-fashioned in their virtues, incompatible in relation to contemporary times and political conditions, he still regards them as good politicians whose moral qualities were essentially appropriate to public life.[2] Plutarch's emphasis on moral virtues is not surprising, but what surprises us is his sympathetic attitude toward Phocion. Since Plutarch lived more than four centuries later than Phocion, his judgments of Phocion, as well as his understandings of the political conditions in Phocionic Athens, must be based on the sources he used. While the contemporary evidence concerning Phocion's life and policy is strikingly limited, whether in inscriptions or in orations, one may wonder which

[1] Plut. Phoc. 1.4-6: τὴν δὲ Φωκίωνος ἀρετήν, ὥσπερ ἀνταγωνιστῇ βαρεῖ καὶ βιαίῳ καιρῷ συλλαχοῦσαν, αἱ τύχαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀμαυρὰν καὶ ἀλαμπῆ πρὸς δόξαν ἐποίησαν…τοσοῦτον δὲ τῇ τύχῃ δοτέον ἀντιταττομένῃ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἰσχύειν, ὅσον ἀντὶ τῆς ἀξίας τιμῆς καὶ χάριτος ἐνίοις ψόγους πονηροὺς καὶ διαβολὰς ἐπιφέρουσαν τὴν πίστιν ἀσθενεστέραν ποιεῖν τῆς ἀρετῆς.

[2] Plut. Phoc. 3.

kinds of materials were available to Plutarch. More importantly, who could provide him with a sympathetic portrayal of Phocion?

1.1 The four mentioned authors

Any source analysis necessarily begins with the authors Plutarch explicitly cites in the *Phocion*. He mentions by name four different authorities, namely Idomeneus of Lampsacus, Polyeuctus of Sphettus, Chares of Mytilene and Duris of Samos. Of these named authors, who was likely to have dealt systematically with the activities of Phocion, both public and private? It is at first tempting to assume that Idomeneus, a man who lived some time between 325 and 270 B.C.[1] and is generally believed to have written a work *On the Athenian Demagogues* (περὶ τῶν δημαγωγῶν), may have furnished Plutarch with evidence about Athenian politics in the fourth century B.C.. It has been agreed that Idomeneus in this work scrutinized the actions of Athenian political leaders and attributed their accomplishments to selfish and base motives.[2] Although we now could only see some fragments of his work, they are enough to show that he made accusations directed at some contemporaries of Phocion like Aeschines, Demosthenes and Hypereides.[3]

Although the argument from silence is normally regarded as less convincing, I agree with L.A.Tritle's opinion that Plutarch's oblique reference to Idomeneus makes it unlikely that the latter was his primary source to compose the *Phocion*. The only evidence Idomeneus provides is a reference of Phocion's low birth as the son of a pestle-maker.[4] One may wonder whether Phocion was among those Athenian demagogues criticized by Idomeneus, because no remark on his political activities has ever been mentioned. It

1 Jacoby, "Idomeneus," RE 9.1(1914), 910; Cooper 1997, 455.

2 The extant fragments of *On the Athenian Demagogues* (FGrH 338 FF1-15) are characterizing anecdotes about some famous Athenian political leaders. But the impression left from these fragments is a work of polemic, which was a scandalous attack on the public and private life of Athenian politicians. For a discussion of Peripatetic influence in this work, see Leo 1901, 111f. Cf. Jacoby 1914, 910-912; FGrH 338 F15 (with commentary IIIb: 90). Recent scholarship see Tritle 1988, 19-21; Cooper 1997.

3 FGrH 338 F2 (= Lexeis Rhetoricae in Anecdota Graeca, 32); F10 (= Plut. Dem. 15.5-6); F12 (= Athen. 13.592e-593a); F13 (=Schol. on Aeschin. 2.1); F14 (= Athen. 13.590c-d= Plut. Vit. dec. orat. 849d-e). For a general discussion of Idomeneus, see Angeli 1981; Cooper 1997.

4 FGrH 338 F15 (= Plut. Phoc. 4.1); Tritle 1988, 20f.

seems indeed unlikely that Plutarch would deny a malicious portrait of Phocion in Idomeneus by deliberately omitting it. By contrast, he usually refutes the condemnation and insinuation that he disbelieved. In the case of Phocion he claims that both Phocion's education in Plato's Academy and the silence of his enemies suggested his notable origin. Similar cases can be easily found in other *Lives*. In the *Aristides* he disputes Idomeneus' record that Aristides was duped by the Spartan Ephors. While Idomeneus claimed that Aristides hold the office of archon not by lot but relying on demagogy, Plutarch defends that his hero was deemed worthy of that office in views of his valor and reputation. In the *Pericles* he rejects Idomeneus' accusation of Pericles' murder of Ephialtes as implausible. In the *Demosthenes* he apparently treats Idomeneus as an unreliable source, who untruly suggested that Aeschines got off by only thirty votes when he was charged of treacherous embassy. Moreover, he discredits Idomeneus' opinion that Alexander after the destruction of Thebes demanded the surrender of ten demagogues.[1] In short, whenever Plutarch disagrees with Idomeneus' descriptions of Athenian politicians, he usually presents these divergent views and refutes them. As Wardman remarks, "Plutarch was not much interested in source-criticism, but he had a quick eye for a hostile witness".[2] If Phocion did appear as a figure carefully scrutinized by Idomeneus in his *On the Athenian Demagogues*, it seems to be unlikely that Plutarch would not refer to it. Even if Plutarch's selection of sources could be essentially subjective, other authors might be expected to provide evidence for such a hostile attitude in Idomeneus. But in fact they are silent on this matter.

Apart from *On the Athenian Demagogues*, Idomeneus has written another book named *On the Socratics* (περὶ τῶν Σωκρατικῶν). The surviving fragments that are ascribed to this work contain references to Socrates and some of his pupils.[3] Like his treatment of Athenian demagogues, Idomeneus used anecdotes to malign the character

1 FGrH 338 F5 (= Plut. Arist. 1.2); F6 (= Plut. Arist. 10.7-9); F8 (= Plut. Per. 10.7-8); F10 (= Plut. Dem. 15.5-6); F11 (= Plut. Dem. 23.4).

2 Wardman 1974, 195.

3 For a general discussion of Idomeneus' work *On the Socratics* see Angeli 1981, 56-61. FGrH 338 F16-17 are certainly concerned with the Socratics. Tritle (1988, 20f.) argues that F 15 also comes from *On the Socratics*, since Idomeneus intended to compare Phocion's low birth with that of Socrates. There is no firm evidence proving that F 18 (= D.L. 4.2) belongs to this work as well. Angeli does not include it in her list of the fragments of Idomeneus.

of the Socratics. For example, he ridiculed Socrates as a man "clever in rhetoric matters", and those surrounding him are described as a quarrelsome group, in which even Plato was accused of his jealous actions towards Aeschines of Sphettos, known as Aeschines Socratikos.[1] It is not surprising that Idomeneus could add Phocion to this group, if there was much talk of Phocion and Socrates. It shall be remembered that Plutarch, in his concluding statement in the *Phocion*, implies a comparison of the trials of Phocion and Socrates. He says that Phocion's death revived the memory of Socrates, and there was a feeling that the Athenians made serious errors by sentencing them to death. Such a feeling might appear with the public rehabilitation for Phocion. It was said that the Athenians erected a bronze statue and held a state burial for his remains, and in addition his prosecutors were condemned.[2] These actions might be taken when Demetrius of Phalerum, a political associate of Phocion, came to power in Athens in 317 B.C., and public recantation of this sort was surely encouraged during his ten-year reign. Considering Idomeneus' interest in Athenian demagogues, he would have been familiar with these political events and with the popular discussion of the similarities between Phocion and Socrates. One may thus wonder whether Idomeneus followed this literary comparison from a negative perspective. Though the surviving fragments are as few as they are brief, they attest that Idomeneus' attitude towards Socrates was at least unfavorable. In this sense, Phocion's humble origin would resemble that of Socrates, whose parentage was obscure. In other words, Idomeneus compared Phocion to Socrates because both of them lacked distinguished birth.

Idomeneus' only reference to Phocion informs us little of his criticism of Phocion's moral characters, but it does in some degree bring his rhetoric technique into clearer focus. Both Athenian demagogues and Socrates' pupils are presented by Idomeneus as men pursuing their own interests, and their selfish desires finally led to jealousy and rivalry. Corresponding to these conspicuous moral faults, some of them were also uncouth in their background. The statement of Phocion's low birth recalls his attack on Aeschines. Aeschines' mother, as Idomeneus says, was named Empousa, because she

1 FGrH 338 F16 (=D.L. 2.19); F17b (=D.L. 3.36).
2 Plut. Phoc. 38.1f.

"would appear from dark allies to her initiates". By describing Aeschines' mother as a priestess presiding illicit gatherings, Idomeneus indicated that Aeschines in his youth lacked a good upbringing, which conforms to his suggestion that Aeschines was neither a pupil of Socrates nor of Plato.[1] It is probable that Demosthenes, who in his *On the Crown* attacked the illicit behaviours of Aeschines' mother, had furnished Idomeneus with this evidence, and we should not forget that Aeschines also called Demosthenes' father a cutler (μαχαιροποιός).[2] Accusing one's humble origin was a common technique of rhetorical invective in forensic oratory.[3] Clearly, this technique was picked up by Idomeneus, who applied it to a broader scope of attacking Athenian demagogues. But he was certainly not the first man to do so. Theopompus of Chios remarkably claimed that the father of Thucydides, namely the political rival of Pericles, was not the well-known Melesias, but an obscure Pantaeus. This is similar to his treatment of Hyperbolus, whom he regarded as the son of an unknown Chremes instead of the Antiphanes mentioned by the Atthidographer Androtion.[4] Both cases accord with what is known of Theopompus: Motivated by a desire to censure the actions and life-styles of demagogues, he was inclined to believe and seek out the accounts which put famous politicians in the worst possible light. It is thus not surprising that he challenged the accepted versions of their paternity.[5] When we observe that Idomeneus shared an interest in investigating the personal details of his subjects, as well as a penchant for malicious characterization, it naturally leads to the conclusion that Theopompus' approach had a significant impact on Idomeneus who came after him.[6]

Plutarch's appraisal of Phocion's oratory ability derives from the comment of

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1 FGrH 338 F2: ἐκλήθη οὖν ἡ μήτηρ Αἰσχίνου Ἔμπουσα…ὡς δὲ Ἰδομενεύς φησιν ἐν Περὶ τῶν Ἀθήνησιν Δημαγωγῶν, ἐπεὶ ἀπὸ σκοτεινῶν τόπων ἀνεφαίνετο τοῖς μυουμένοις; F13 (= Schol. on Aeschin. 2.1).

2 Aeschin. 2.93; Dem. 18.129f., 258f., 19.281.

3 If one notices that bad ancestry is a common theme in the Old Comedy (for example, see Aristoph. Kn. 334, 446; Thesm. 382. 825; Fr. 839.), one may suspect that attack of this kind was comic in origin. On the rhetorical invective of one's origin in Athens see Harding 1987, 29-31. Cf. Cooper 1997, 461 n.22.

4 FGrH 115 F91 (= Schol. on Aristoph. Wasps 947c); F95 (=Schol. on Lucian, Timon 30). Cf. Connor 1968, 38-43, 59-60.

5 For a general discussion of Theopompus, see Connor 1968; Shrimpton 1991; Flower 1997. For Plutarch's criticism of Theopompus, see Plut. Dem. 13.1-2; 21.1-2; Lys. 30.2-3. Cf. Wardman 172f.

6 Tritle 1988, 19f.; Cooper 1997, 459.

Polyeuctus of Sphettus,[1] who remarked that Demosthenes was a most excellent orator, but Phocion was a most powerful speaker. Plutarch explains it in his own words, "Phocion's language had most meaning in fewest words" (οὕτως ὁ Φωκίωνος λόγος πλεῖστον ἐν ἐλαχίστῃ λέξει νοῦν εἶχε). Although the brevity of his speech sometimes seemed to be "imperious, severe and unpleasant" (καὶ αὐστηρὰν καὶ ἀνήδυντον ἔχων βραχυλογίαν), it was powerful in effect.[2] While Polyeuctus introduced the comparison between Phocion and Demosthenes, Plutarch adds an anecdote that explicitly shows Phocion's superior position in this pair: Demosthenes, who was commonly regarded as a skillful orator and held the other orators in great contempt, admired Phocion's oration by remarking him as "the chopper of my words" (ἡ τῶν ἐμῶν λόγων κοπὶς πάρεστιν). It is worth noting that a similar passage appears in the *Demosthenes*, where Plutarch once again identifies Polyeuctus as the source and repeats the anecdote revealing Demosthenes' respect for Phocion.[3]

In both passages Plutarch depicts that Demosthenes admired Phocion's character more than his oration. It suits his method to see the speech as an illustration of the character. As he remarked in the *Phocion*, the speech from a good man, no matter how short and austere it would be, is of more convincing weight than long-winded speech.[4] Therefore, the power of word or gesture closely depends on the speaker's character. Also in the *Demosthenes* he claims that it is pointless to compare the speeches of Demosthenes and Cicero only for the purpose of determining which of the two was more pleasing and powerful.[5] Plutarch is not interested in analyzing speeches in the narrow sense of rhetorical skills and perfection, but uses them as evidence that guides the readers to have a better understanding of the subject's character. There is a sense in which Phocion's oratorical style, following the description of his austere appearance, is made to disclose his character. Considering Plutarch's general praise of the laconic

1 Polyeuctus of Sphettus was a fourth-century Athenian orator and politician. Plutarch (Vit. dec. orat. 841e, 845a, 846d; Phoc. 9.9) mentions that he was an opponent of Macedon, and he was probably an enemy of the orator Dinarchus who delivered several speeches against him (Dion. Hal. Din. 5, 10).

2 Plut. Phoc. 5.3-5.

3 Plut. Phoc. 5.5f.; Dem. 10.3f.

4 Plut. Phoc. 5.10: καὶ ῥῆμα καὶ νεῦμα μόνον ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ μυρίοις ἐνθυμήμασι καὶ περιόδοις ἀντίρροπον ἔχει πίστιν.

5 Plut. Dem. 3.1f.

utterances, the brevity he admires is the outward sign of a deep seriousness, which was obviously appropriate to one who was used to persuading the assembly and defending his country.[1]

Plutarch admits that he was accessible to Polyeuctus due to Ariston of Chios as an intermediate source.[2] But as Tritle points out, he evidently confuses Ariston of Chios with Ariston of Ceos who lived some time later than the former and was familiar with the work of Theophrastus on rhetoric.[3] By referring twice to Polyeuctus, whom he mentions as a contemporary Athenian of Demosthenes and Phocion, Plutarch impresses the reader that he made attempts to seek out the testimony of an eyewitness. Another instance for his fondness for contemporary evidence is his reference to Chares of Mytilene, who informed him of the good personal relationship between Phocion and Alexander. As Chares says, Alexander dropped his salutation of χαίρειν with all except Antipater and Phocion when corresponding. Although Chares' historical accuracy is sometimes doubted, he is known to hold an office for Macedonian courtly organization and administration, a position that necessarily makes him a valuable authority on the events and especially gossips at Alexander's court.[4]

Plutarch mentions that Duris of Samos was also his source for this story about Alexander's respect for Phocion. Since Chares was the earlier, it has been argued that Duris must have borrowed it from Chares.[5] Furthermore, Duris provided Plutarch with the information on Phocion's appearance. From him we know that no Athenian ever saw Phocion laugh or cry, or wash himself in the public bath-house. The Athenians talked about Phocion's hardy manner of dress in jest that it was a sign of severe winter when Phocion wore a cloak, because he usually held his hand outside his cloak and walked

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1 For Plutarch's general interest and appreciation of brevity in laconic speeches, see Plut. Lyc. 20; Apophth. Lac. 208b-236e, 240c-242d. This praise of Phocion shows that Plutarch's liking for oratorical simplicity is not confined to the Spartans. It can also be compared with a passage in the *Pelopidas* (30.13), where Plutarch mentions that the fame of a good man (Pelopidas) is more potent than any number of rhetorical discourses. Cf. Wardman 1974, 227.

2 Plut. Phoc. 5.5; Dem. 10.3.

3 Tritle 1988, 23-26.

4 Plut. Phoc. 17.10 (= FGrH 125 F10). On Chares' office, see Plut. Alex. 46.2; Gilhaus 2017, 79f. On Chares' incredibility see Tarn 1948, Vol. II, 70; Pearson 1960, 50. A different opinion see Payen 2007, 212f.; Gilhaus 2017, 81 n.10.

5 Plut. Phoc. 17.10 (= FGrH 76 F51). On Chares as a predecessor see Jacoby, FGrH II B (comment), 433; Kebric 1977, 42; Tritle 1988, 21.

without shoes or outer garment.[1] Plutarch's twice references to Duris in the *Phocion*, as in other *Lives* which contain information from Duris' work, on one hand undoubtedly prove his familiarity with this historian. It is further supported by his low assessment of Duris' historical reliability, for Plutarch must know this work well enough so that he could make judgment upon its quality.[2] While on the other hand, none of these citations suggest that Duris served as a major authority for Plutarch. As is often the case, he furnished Plutarch with details of the sort that were alternative versions. In the *Demosthenes*, for example, Plutarch cites him together with Idomeneus for a "less reliable" account of the list of Athenian politicians demanded by Alexander, and in the *Alexander* he is mentioned as one of those authors who regarded the story about the Amazon queen's visit with Alexander as a fiction.[3] In this sense, it is probable that Duris also provided Plutarch with evidence that was not found elsewhere. Perhaps Plutarch cited the story about Phocion's appearance due to his great interest for collecting anecdotal materials, but it seems more likely that he did so because Duris' description filled a void of his account.

Driven by a desire to seek for contemporary sources, Plutarch could hardly ignore the fact that Duris was a younger contemporary of Phocion. Athenaeus mentions that Duris and his brother Lynceus went to Athens to study under Theophrastus.[4] The exact year of Duris' arrival still remains uncertain, but the extant evidence suggests that he could hardly have been in Athens during Phocion's lifetime.[5] Even so, Duris must have heard stories about Phocion's life and character during his stay in Athens. Many

1 Plut. Phoc. 4.3-4 (= FGrH 76 F50).
2 Plut. Peri. 28.1-3; Alc. 32.2; Eum. 1; Dem. 23.4.
3 Plut. Dem. 23.4; Alex. 46.1-2.
4 Athen. 4.128a, 8.337d. Cf. Athen. 3.100e.
5 Okin (1974, 21-24) regards Duris' portrayal of Phocion as an idealized picture of philosopher, thus concludes that the historian himself had never met Phocion. Kebric (1977, 5f.), who assumes a general hostility in Athens against Samos before 307 B.C., deduces that Duris and his brother were in Athens only after Demetrius Poliorcetes had seized the city. He further suggests that Theophrastus' brief exile in 307/6 B.C. and the Four Years' War with Cassander may have postponed Duris' arrival until 304 B.C (see Kebric 1977, 5f.). Kebric's view was opposed by Billow (1990, 335f., esp. 335 n.15), who thinks that Kebric mistakably confused Antigonus Monophthalmos with his grandson Antigonus Gonatas, because Antigonus Monophthalmos cannot have been in Athens later than 321/0 B.C. Billows concludes that the presence of Duris and his brother in Athens, which proves nothing about their family links with the Antigonids, was in the 290s. My opinion is that Duris could hardly been in Athens at least before 307 B.C. Since his antipathy toward Demetrius of Phalerum is so strong as his work reflects, it is not likely that he would have lived in Athens under the regime of that very man.

Athenians, who had met Phocion or at least heard his speeches in the assembly, were still living. Moreover, there is no reason to assume that Duris was unaware of the public rehabilitation of Phocion, if we give credence to Plutarch's statement that it occurred soon after Phocion's death. Taken his critical depiction of Demetrius of Phalerum into consideration, one would expect him to provide judgment on Phocion's personality and political activities, because the latter was not only a leading politician in Athens, but also a political friend of Demetrius of Phalerum. From the remaining fragments of his work we can not precisely conclude what his feelings were about Phocion, but we could at least argue for some possibilities.

Duris appears to have thought highly of Phocion. Plutarch, as we have seen in the case of Idomeneus, kept a watchful eye on hostile sources and reported them, not just for showing his wide reading, but for explaining how he disbelieved them. Similarly, he accuses Duris of exaggerating the brutality of Pericles against the Samian prisoners during the Samian revolt of 441/0 B.C.[1] Even though Plutarch elsewhere admits that there were indeed some severe punishments on the Samians, such as tattooing the prisoners and destroying their defensive force,[2] he rejects Duris' tragic portrayal as sensational and implausible. There is reason to believe that Duris in general held a hostile attitude toward imperialistic Athens. His family, together with other Samians, was driven into exile after the Athenian general Timotheus had seized the island Samos in 366/5 B.C., and the bitterness engendered by the past conflicts between Athens and Samos must have had an important influence upon his formation of some negative impressions about Athens.[3] Furthermore, Plutarch mentions that other authors such as Thucydides, Ephorus and Aristotle were silent on the alleged brutality of Pericles,[4] which seemed to

1 Plut. Per. 28.1-3 (=FGrH 76 F67). For Duris' hostility toward Pericles and Aspasia see also FGrH 76 F65, F66. It is worth noting that Plutarch, in his *On the Malice of Herodotus* (De Herodoti malignitate, 855e-856a), mentions this very charge against Aspasia as the kind of statement of a writer who is uncharitable and malicious by believing the less creditable explanation.

2 Plut. Peri. 26.4; 28.1. There is also archaeological evidence for the existence of harsh punishment, such as binding to planks. For details see Keramopoullos 1923; Stadter 1989, 258f.

3 Duris must have blamed the Athenian occupation of Samos when he believed that he was a descendant of Alcibiades (FGrH 76 F70; Plut. Alc. 32.2). For Timotheus' expedition see Isoc. 15.111; Dem. 15.9; Nep. Timoth. 1-3. For a general history of Samos from the fifth century B.C. until the second century B.C. see Graham 1987. For the Athenian cleruchy on Samos, see Schweigert 1940; Kebric 1977, 3 n.16; Graham 1987, 138-43, 155-61, 165-8.

4 For Pericles' activities in Samos, see Thuc. 1.116f.; FGrH 70 F195. Cf. Diod. 12.27f.

strengthen his argument that Duris deliberately exaggerated the sufferings of his countrymen. By claiming that Duris usually distorted the truth "even in cases where he has no private and personal interest"(Δοῦρις μὲν οὖν οὐδ᾽ ὅπου μηδὲν αὐτῷ πρόσεστιν ἴδιον πάθος εἰωθὼς κρατεῖν τὴν διήγησιν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀληθείας), Plutarch ultimately regards him as a less reliable source. It is not uncommon to find that Plutarch is defensive of the figures he admires, and particularly in the *Phocion*, his admiration for Phocion is too evident to be ignored. If Duris preserved any slanderous or hostile description of Phocion, it seems unlikely that Plutarch would simply omit it without any further arguments. Admittedly the trivial remains of Duris' works restrict any elaborate discussion of its contents, and an argument from silence is largely conjectural. This silence, however, is persuasive when Plutarch's source criticism is examined in light of his argument that the reputation of some prominent figures was distorted by the authors who preferred slanderous and sensational style of writing.[1]

There is a more compelling reason for a favorable picture of Phocion in Duris. A close examination of the fragments shows Duris' fondness for criticizing demoralizing amusements and luxury practices. These fragments do not necessarily provide us with a complete picture of Duris' work, but they do reveal what kinds of materials would attract his interest. A man who was in particular attacked by him is Demetrius of Phalerum, who was said to have spent the state revenue on feasts and entertainment instead of on the management and defense of the city. He was also accused of having secret affairs with youths and women, disregarding the laws and besmirching his body with dyes and cosmetics. In this way Demetrius of Phalerum even surpassed the Macedonians with the expenses of his dinners and the Cypriotes and Phoenicians in his elegance.[2] In order to support his criticism of Demetrius of Phalerum, Duris provided some information to the extravagant and luxury life-styles of the Cypriotes and Macedonians. For instance, he condemned Pasikypros, the Cypriote king, for his profligacy, which eventually caused him to lose his kingship. To him most Macedonian kings and rulers were fond of

1 Cf. Plut. De Herodoti Malignitate, Per. 13.16.

2 Athen. 12.542b-e (= FGrH 76 F10). For a detailed discussion of Demetrius' military and political measures see Williams 1997; Fortenbaugh and Schütrumpf 2000; O'Sullivan 2009.

drinking and extravagance. Philip owned a gold drinking-cup weighing fifty drachmas which he even took to bed with him, while Alexander once seated 6,000 commanders on silver seats and spread purple cloaks upon them when he was hosting a feast. Polyperchon made a fool of himself by dancing after drinking, a behavior which was obviously unfitting in a man of his age and reputation.[1] Duris therefore criticized Demetrius of Phalerum for vices worse yet than the demoralizing practices of these men. He appeared to have a deep sense of the moral weaknesses of rulers, and in some cases he regarded them as the causal factors for personal misfortunes and political decline.[2] Besides the rulers, Duris also examined the life of some prominent men of the period. From him we know that Demosthenes was once not permitted to blow the sacred fire, because the orator Pytheas charged him of sexual impurity.[3]

By contrast, the stories about Phocion's austere appearance and preference to simple life-style would naturally attract Duris' special attention, even though he may have been influenced by some hostile sources. One possible source of this sort was Democharés, the nephew of the orator Demosthenes and a historian and politician in his own right. The extant evidence indicates that Democharés was a fervent critic of Demetrius of Phalerum.[4] Although no direct textual connection between Democharés and Duris can be found in the scanty fragments of their works, their common antipathy toward Demetrius of Phalerum suggests the possibility that Democharés may have shared with Duris a substantial body of information concerning the scandalous doings of the Phalerian. If Duris and his brother have come to Athens after the political fall of the Phalerian of 307/6 B.C., it even seems possible that he may have some personal contact with Democharés, who was a leader of the restored democracy after Demetrius Poliorcetes had liberated Athens.

Since Democharés adopted his uncle's anti-Macedonian stance, one would expect

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1 FGrH 76 F4 (=Athen. 4.167c-d); F12(=Athen. 4.155c); F37a-b(=Athen. 6.231b-c, Athen. 4.155d); F49(=Athen. 1.17f).

2 FGrH 76 F4, F15 (=Athen. 12.66.546c-d).

3 FGrH 76 F8 (=Suidas, s.v. Ὦι τὸ ἱερὸν πῦρ οὐκ ἔξεστι φυσῆσαι). For the rivalry between Demosthenes and Pytheas, see Plut. Dem. 27.4f., Vit. dec. orat. 846c; Dion. Hal. Is. 4.4.

4 Polyb. 12.13.7-12. Plutarch (Dem. 30.4) records that Democharés was the nephew of Demosthenes, and this view has been widely accepted by the modern scholars. An alternative source is Athenaeus (6.252f-253b), who says that Democharés was the cousin of Demosthenes.

that he was especially biased against Phocion, a celebrated political rival of Demosthenes who agreed to hand over him to the Macedonians and was partly responsible for his death. But Plutarch's references to Duris in his *Phocion* suggest that Duris did not share much of this hostility with Democharés.[1] A favorable portrait of Phocion does conform to Duris' fondness for moralism, as the remaining fragments reveal that his judgments on important political figures were greatly determined by their moral traits. As we have seen, his strong hostility towards Demetrius of Phalerum and other Macedonians does not bring a full eulogy of Demosthenes; on the contrary, he records an affair that is surely unfavorable to this great anti-Macedonian leader. Even if he may have found fault with Phocion's collaboration with the Macedonians, it seems likely that he was still impressed by the materials about the moral virtues of Phocion. It has been suggested Duris' portrayal of Phocion is reminiscent of the tradition on Socrates, with its emphasis upon "the image of the self-controlled, ascetic philosopher", and the interest of the Peripatetic school in biography may have had an influence upon him.[2] In addition, one shall suspect that his frustration and criticism of the demoralizing tendencies of his age was also a factor underlying his depiction of an austere and moderate Phocion.[3] In this Duris' moral lesson was consistent. While he criticized the dissolute behavior in all areas of life, he recommended self-control and moderation.

Though the works of Duris and Democharés survive only in the citations of later authors, they certainly indicate that there was a strong sense of antipathy against the reign of Demetrius of Phalerum, which prompted Demetrius himself to justify his rule in his own later works.[4] The need of apology would surely require the Phalerian to deal

1 A possible reason is that Duris may have been sympathetic to those friends of Macedon in Athens. Thanks to Alexander's decree to restore all exiles, which was enforced by Perdiccas, the Samians returned home in 322/1 B.C. Accordingly, they demonstrated their gratitude by instituting a festival to Philip Arrhidaeus and Alexander IV (Habicht 1957, n.1, 160f. Cf. Kebric 1977, 4), although it soon became clear that the independence of Samos was impossible in the Macedonian politics. Some scholars (e.g. Kebric 1977, 9, 19-28) describe Duris as an anti-Macedonian historian, but there is no firm evidence to support this view. His negative portrayal of various Macedonians and pro-Macedonian leaders such as Demosthenes is more plausibly based on their scandalous actions.

2 Okin 1974, 21-22; Tritle 1988, 21,32.

3 On morality in Duris' work, see also Pédech 1989, 382-389; Hau 2016, 136-141; Pownall (n.d.). Against Knoepfler (2000) argues that Duris' scandalous fragments simply served for entertainment value.

4 Even if Polybius (12.13.12) claims that Demetrius of Phalerum did not refute the allegations of

with the political turmoil before his own period of rule, the principal event of which was no doubt the trial and execution of Phocion. Demetrius was fully aware that the death of Phocion, as well as the allegations against him, was rooted in the subordination of Athens to the Macedonian hegemon. A discussion and justification of the necessity of collaboration with Macedon might be expected to figure in his lost works, in which Phocion's thoughts and deeds in these events could hardly be ignored.

1.2 Demetrius of Phalerum: Moral concerns and self-justification

The scholarship on Demetrius of Phalerum has concentrated on his political and moral programmes, his philosophical education, and his desire for self-justification.[1] The examinations of Demetrius' relationship with Phocion remain few, and the most extensive contribution has been the chapter devoted to source analysis for Plutarch's *Phocion* in Tritle. Tritle argues that Demetrius of Phalerum was "likely to be a chief source of Plutarch's portraits of Phocion, Demosthenes, and Demetrius Poliorcetes", because his works were available to Plutarch, and his contemporaneity to these men makes him an attracting source. In addition, Tritle argues that Demetrius of Phalerum was the man who created the literary comparison between Socrates and Phocion, which was based on his own political downfall and his connection with the Peripatetics.[2] There is no doubt that Plutarch was familiar with Demetrius of Phalerum, and it is likely that Phocion, due to his leading position after the Lamian War and his personal connection with Demetrius, would appear in Demetrius' apologetic writings. But a favorable picture of Phocion was not merely the result of apology. Considering the moral reforms under Demetrius' rule, one shall also notice that the image of an austere and incorruptible Phocion was compatible with Demetrius' interest in scrutinizing and regulating citizen

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Democharesit can still be argued that the antipathy after Demetrius' expulsion from Athens must have exerted some influence on his own writings. The remaining titles of his works do suggest that Demetrius was greatly concerned with his own period of rule and Athenian politics. Cf. O'Sullivan 2009, 307. For a complete list of Demetrius' works see D.L. 5.80f.

1 Gehrke 1978; Dreyer 1999; Fortenbaugh and Schütrumpf 2000; O'Sullivan 2009.

2 Tritle 1988, 29-33.

behavior. Finally, we shall question the significance of Demetrius for Plutarch. Even if he was responsible for a literary embellishment of Phocion, it does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that he was the main source for Plutarch's *Phocion*. In addition, there is no evidence to prove that Phocion became a popular topic among the Peripatos, though his death was reminiscent of the prosecution against philosophers like Socrates, Aristotle and Theophrastus. These questions will be examined in this chapter.

Plutarch explicitly cites Demetrius in six of his *Lives*. Apart from the *Phocion*, where he mentions Demetrius as a historical figure, in other five *Lives* he names Demetrius as a source.[1] Some of these references indicate that Plutarch cites Demetrius as a testimony to an alternative view of some opinions which were widely accepted. For instance, Demetrius challenged the widely held view that Aristeides and his family lived in poverty. He also argued that Lycurgus was a lawgiver who was not active in warfare but created the Spartan constitution in peace, which opposed to the traditional image of the Spartans as warlike people.[2] These two fragments imply that Demetrius' scholarly interest may have made him an attractive source to Plutarch, but Plutarch certainly has a more compelling reason for interest in him: Demetrius of Phalerum was an eyewitness of the early Diadoch period, even though his testimony could be biased. The significance of Demetrius' contemporaneity can be observed in a piece of reference in the *Demosthenes*, where Plutarch refers to Demetrius as his source because the Phalerian claimed that he had heard Demosthenes himself when the latter was an old man.[3]

For Plutarch and anyone who has interest in Phocion's life and career, Demetrius' personal relationship with Phocion is certainly more significant. The evidence in general supports their connection, yet the details still need to be carefully examined. The first political event, with which the name of Demetrius of Phalerum is connected, was the

1 For Demetrius of Phalerum as a historical figure in Plutarch, see also Quom. adul. 69c, Reg. et imp. apophth. 189d, De glor. Athen. 349a-b, De ex. 601f.

2 FGrH 228 F21 (= Plut. Lyc. 23.1), F43 (= Plut. Arist. 1.1-9). F22 (= Plut. Sol. 23.3) discusses the prices for select sacrificial animals in Solon's times. Although nothing conclusive can be deduced from an isolated fragment, when it is combined with the fact that Demetrius himself enacted some laws during his reign, it at least seems to suggest that he had special interest for old lawgivers. Diogenes Laertius informs us that Demetrius has written a work named *On Law-making at Athens/of the Athenians*.

3 FGrH 228 F17a (= Plut. Dem. 11.1).

Athenian embassy to Antipater after the Lamian War.[1] Both Diodorus and Plutarch agree that this embassy was headed by Phocion and Demades.[2] In addition, Plutarch informs us that Callimedon who was surnamed "the Crab" also served as an envoy. When the Athenians later sent the embassy back for a second round of negotiation, they added the philosopher Xenocrates in it.[3] Demetrius' participation, however, is not revealed by any sources except for some of his own rhetorical treatises. In his work *De Elocutione* he painted a picture, in which he implicitly rebuked the arrogance of Craterus towards the Greek ambassadors by using a figure of speech. Moreover, Philodemus cites a reference of Demetrius, in which the latter claimed to be a witness of the vocal opposition of Xenocrates to the harsh requirements of Antipater.[4]

Without firm evidence, one would suspect whether Demetrius in fact attended this embassy and expressed his dissatisfaction in the presence of the arrogant Craterus, or he fabricated these stories in order to stress his goodwill toward the Athenians in the past. In any case, he wished to create the impression that he, as well as other fellow envoys including Phocion and Xenocrates, could do nothing but tolerating the conditions Antipater dictated. Even if Demetrius told the truth, these scanty references do not hint at the reason of his inclusion in this embassy. Maybe we could focus on other fellow envoys. Phocion was conspicuous for his advocacy of appeasement and accommodation with Macedon. Demades, who had changed his political stance after his capture by Philip in the battle of Chaironeia, on several earlier occasions advised the Athenians to pursue peace instead of war.[5] A third envoy, Callimedon, is known to join the party of Antipater upon the outbreak of the Lamian War, and endeavored to advocate the Macedonian hegemony in Greece.[6] So it is likely to assume that Demetrius was appointed as a

1 Demetrius of Magnesia only says that Demetrius of Phalerum entered the political stage when Harpalos came to Athens in 324 B.C., but did not mention his activities at the very early beginning of his political career (D.L. 5.75-82).
2 Diod. 18.18.2; Plut. Phoc. 26.7.
3 On Callimedon, see Plut. Phoc. 27.7-9. On Xenocrates in this embassy, see Plut. Phoc. 27.1-2. Cf. Trampedach 1994, 141-143. For some negative comments of Xenocrates' role in this embassy, see Haake 2007, 64 n.222.
4 Fortenbaugh and Schütrumpf 2000, n.12, n.131A-C. Cf. O'Sullivan 2009, 32f.
5 Dem. 18.285; Plut. Phoc. 16.5, 22.5, Dem. 23; Diod. 17.15.3-5; Brun 2000.
6 Plut. Dem. 27.2. For Callimedon's close relationship with Antipater, see Gehrke 1976, 99 n.68; O'Sullivan 2009, 24-25, n.38. Gehrke's view, however, is rejected by Tritle (1988, 130f.), who argues that Callimedon's outburst to Antipater denied his alleged support of Macedon. But Callimedon's outburst

member of this delegation, because he shared similar political inclinations with other envoys. How Demetrius personally contributed to the negotiations is unknown, for our sources largely pass over his involvement. While Demetrius noted that Xenocrates expressed opposition to Antipater's decision in public, he himself presumably belonged to those who "were satisfied with these terms and considered them humane".[1]

Whether Demetrius of Phalerum assumed any official position under the oligarchic regime after the Lamian War, is not recorded anywhere. It is worth noting that none of those men, who were named by Plutarch as being condemned when Phocion fell, did appear as active or important politician during this period. The politicians who were known to come to prominence at this time, like Phocion, Demades and even Callimedon, were more or less linked by personal ties to Antipater. But there is good reason to believe that their friends would exert some influence on domestic politics. One might note the mechanism outlined by Plutarch, by which Phocion prevented the so-called "busybodies and innovators" from political participation but "kept the men of education and culture always in office". In other words, Plutarch suggests that Phocion could openly control over the selection of magistrates.[2] The accuracy of this passage calls for caution, because it seems impossible that Phocion could appoint anyone as he wished in the government.[3] Nevertheless, it appears to be possible that Phocion, whose authority in the city was greatly strengthened by the support of Antipater, could indirectly enhance the reputation of his friends by openly supporting them. The significance of political friendship remained unchanged, whether under democracy or oligarchy.

But when the regime collapsed after Antipater's death, such an association alone

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could merely prove that he was unsatisfied with Antipater's conditions. He, perhaps like Phocion, generally acknowledged that Athens was unable to risk war with Macedon, but on this occasion alone thought Antipater's terms as too harsh to accept. Demosthenes' charge against him (Din. 1.94) and particularly his own resistance to the Lamian War seem to justify Plutarch's judgment that he was "a hater of democracy".

1 Plut. Phoc. 27.6: οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι πρέσβεις ἠγάπησαν ὡς φιλανθρώπους τὰς διαλύσεις, πλὴν τοῦ Ξενοκράτους.

2 Plut. Phoc. 29.5.

3 Gehrke (1976, 102 n.85) warns that this passage can not be carelessly used as evidence for the abolishment of sortition. Meanwhile he guesses that there may be some indirect and unofficial influence over the selection of certain positions. Tritle (1988, 138) also suggests that Phocion could openly support the candidacy of his adherents, even though it was the extent of his influence. O'Sullivan (2009, 29 and n.50) focuses on the only three known archons during this regime, and she finds no firm evidence to prove their elections as the result of their relationships with Macedon. But the limited evidence makes this question still inconclusive.

was culpable enough to earn the condemnation. This is indicated in Plutarch's description of Phocion's trial that the furious people rejected Phocion's imploration for acquitting his friends.[1] However tragic and dramatic this scene looks in the biographical tradition, it may have really happened. What made this short-lived regime particularly odious to the Athenians was not just the restriction of citizen body and change of democratic institutions, but also the manifestation of the subservience to a foreign power. Demetrius would surely have experienced these events, and there was another severe charge for him. According to the settlement with Antipater, his own brother Himeraeus was demanded and slain by the Macedonians. With him perished also the renowned orator Hyperides.[2] If Demetrius, as he himself says, was indeed one of the Athenian envoys who participated in the negotiations with Antipater in 322 B.C., he was in fact responsible for his own brother's death. From Athenaeus we know that Demetrius was once accused of offering sacrifices for his brother's epiphany.[3] Though the passage itself does not hint at Demetrius' direct responsibility for Himeraeus' execution, it is not surprising if his opponents made use of this chance and emphasized his guilt in causing the execution of the leading opposite orators including his own relatives. In any case, the mention of Himeraeus' death would revive the memory of the Athenians of the harsh treatment they had received from Antipater, and stirred up their odium toward Phocion's regime.

After the deaths of Antipater and Phocion, Athens was soon to be drawn into the Diadochan turmoil. Antipater's son Cassander succeeded in ousting Polyperchon from Athens. As a result, Demetrius of Phalerum assumed the role as an intermediary between the city and Cassander, and he was elected as the overseer (ἐπιμελητὴς) of the city.[4]

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1 Diod. 18.67.2; Plut. Phoc. 34.

2 For the death of Himeraeus, see Plut. Dem. 28.4; Phot. Bibl. 92.69b34-40. For the death of Hypereides, see Plut. Phoc. 29.1; Vit. dec. orat. 849b.

3 Athen. 12.542e. For an analysis of this event on the public reputation of Demetrius, see O'Sullivan 2009, 33, 211.

4 Diod. 18.74.3; 20.45.2. An article from Stork, van Ophuijsen and Dorandi (Fortenbaugh and Schütrumpf 2000, n.16 A, n.4) points out that ἐπιμελητὴς was an elected office in democratic Athens and that the Macedonians provided it with special military overtones. It shall be noted that Plutarch (Phoc. 29.5) also depicts Phocion as a man who "managed the affairs of the city with mildness and according to the laws" (ἐπιμελόμενος δὲ τῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν πρᾴως καὶ νομίμως). O'Sullivan (2009, 41) argues that Cassander, both in the use of an overseer (ἐπιμελητὴς) and in the selection of a man with a prior association with Antipater, apparently followed his father's policy. But she (2009, 96 n.126) also admits that

Demetrius controlled the affairs of Athens for ten years before Demetrius Poliorcetes seized the city and stormed the garrison in 307 B.C. In 318 B.C. Demetrius along with Phocion was accused of treason and sentenced to death in absence, but ten years later he was granted a safe-conduct to Thebes. Nevertheless, this expulsion was a great personal blow to him.[1] Perhaps humiliated by it, Demetrius began to pursue scholarly interests, and much of his writings were presumably composed during this time abroad.[2] The suggestion that he was an influential advisor to the Ptolemaic court implies that he did not wholly withdraw from the public sphere, and his political experience was still in some degree appreciated.[3] But without honor in his own land, he must have wished to refute the allegations of his opponents by providing an apologetic account of his own political career.

It is certain that Demetrius of Phalerum was acquainted with Phocion the politician, but we still need to find more evidence to support the suggestion that Demetrius provided a favorable account of Phocion's life and career. Now we have, from fragmentary evidence in later antiquity, a suggestion that Demetrius enacted a few laws aiming at shaping the personal conduct of the Athenian citizens. The only direct source for Demetrius' legislation is Cicero, who informs us of his regulations on burial practices.[4] But indirect testimony can be strikingly found in Duris. After listing the

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the word ἐπιμελητὴς was widely and diversely used by Hieronymus of Cardia, without any special reference to Athens.

1 For Demetrius' exile to Thebes see Plut. Quom. adul. 69c-d; Demetr. 9.3; Fortenbaugh and Schütrumpf 2000, n.32-34. Plutarch (Quom. adul. 69c) mentions that Demetrius lived in poverty and humbly near Thebes. Perhaps he still hoped that Cassander would regain the control of Athens and reinstall him (Waterfield 2011, 141), but he certainly gave up this hope after Cassander's death in about 297 B.C.

2 Cicero (De fin. 5.19.53-54) took Demetrius as a model to pursue philosophy after withdrawing from the public realm, which implies that Demetrius wrote his works after his expulsion from Athens. Cf. Fortenbaugh and Schütrumpf 2000, 374; O'Sullivan 2009, 301. During his time in Egypt, Demetrius may have been instrumental in the foundation of the Library in Alexandria (Fortenbaugh and Schütrumpf 2000, n.38, 58, 59). Job of this kind seemed to be appropriate for a man who concentrated on scholarly writings. For Demetrius' influence on Ptolemaic legislation see Ael. V.H. 3.17; Frazer 1972, 114f.

3 Demetrius was involved in the rivals for the succession under Ptolemy I Soter. He advised Soter to choose Ptolemy Keraunos, son of Eurydice who was a sister of Cassander. When Soter died and another son of him became sole king, later known as Ptolemy II Philadelphos, Demetrius was banished and died soon after the bite of an asp (D.L. 5.78; Cic, Pro rabirio 23. Cf. Fortenbaugh and Schütrumpf 2000, 373). The retaliation of Philadelphos seems to suggest that Demetrius was in some degree influential under Soter, so that the new king was sufficiently angered by Demetrius' opposition to his succession. The accounts that he assisted Soter in collecting books evidently indicate the king's confidence and favor of him.

4 Cic. De leg. 2.66: Fuit enim hic uir (Demetrius of Phalerum), ut scitis, non solum eruditissimus, sed etiam civis e re publica maxime tuendaeque civitatis peritissimus. is igitur sumptum minuit non solum poena, sed etiam tempore; ante lucem enim iussit efferri. sepulchris autem novis finivit modum; nam

crimes of Demetrius such as profligacy, sumptuousness and indulgence, Duris complained that the Phalerian was keen on regulating the lives of other people, while organizing his own life with utter freedom from law.[1] Such claim, however biased it could be, was at least contemporary reaction to Demetrius' legislative programme. That Demetrius enacted a lot of legislative and moral programmes during his ten-year reign is now a communis opinio, and the most detailed treatment is the overview of moralizing reforms under Demetrius offered by O'Sullivan, which ends with a positive remark on his government. My discussion agrees with most of her findings, but goes further. When Demetrius appeared to be a ruler who was greatly concerned with the orderliness and decorum of the individual citizens, one could expect that he would have showed great interest in depicting or even creating a man of virtues, for example, Phocion.

From Cicero we know that the restriction of burial expenditure was a central concern in Demetrius' burial laws. He ordered that burials were to take place before the light of day, and especially limited the size of tombs. Nothing shall be erected above the mound of earth except a small column, not more than three cubits high, or a table or a basin. In order to enforce these practices, Demetrius not only imposed a penalty,[2] but also appointed a magistrate who specifically looked after this. Obviously, Demetrius saw the corruption of luxury and dissipation in his state, and it is understandable that the limitation of expenditure was out of economic considerations.[3] But this passage also implies Demetrius' concern for moral propriety. Cicero summarizes the earlier Athenian funerary legislation from Cecrops, the alleged first king and lawgiver of Athens, to the times of Demetrius, and his knowledge of Solon's funerary legislation was directly drawn from the work of Demetrius. As for the contents of the Solonian burial law, Cicero, or

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super terrae tumulum noluit quicquam statui nisi collumellam tribus cubitis ne altiorem aut mensam aut labellum et huic procurationi certum magistratum praefecerat. For other descriptions of Demetrius as lawgiver see also Plut. Arist. 27.3.

1 Athen. 12.542b-543a: καὶ ὁ τοῖς ἄλλοις τιθέμενος θεσμοὺς Δημήτριος καὶ τοὺς βίους τάττων ἀνομοθέτητον ἑαυτῷ τὸν βίον κατεσκεύαζεν.

2 Gehrke (1978, 149-193, esp. 163 n.71) suggests a penalty of 1,000 drachmas.

3 For extravagances in Athenian burial practice in the pre-Phalerean era, see Cic. De leg. 2.26.66; Engels 1998, 113-119, 121-128; Kurtz and Boardman 1971, 122. For the Macedonian influence on the Athenian funerary luxury, see O' Sullivan 2009, 58-66. The archaeological remains indicate a marked curtailment of funerary monuments in the post-Phalerean era. For instance, the limited height of the bland grave pillar (columella), see Engels 1998, 131; O' Sullivan 2009, 51. A general discussion of Hellenistic graves in Attica, see Kurtz and Boardman 1971, 162-169.

more exactly Demetrius, points out two aspects: the curbing of funerary expenses and the restriction of inappropriate behaviors of mourners: "In later time, after the burials had started to become more sumptuous and loaded with lamentation, as the Phalerian writes, they were abolished by a law by Solon."[1] It is thus claimed by Demetrius that Solon was concerned with the moral propriety, for he regulated the appropriate way of mourning.

A law quoted by Demosthenes appears to support Demetrius' claim, in which Solon prohibited a few practices and especially restricted the behaviors of women in the funerals.[2] But one may wonder to what degree did the moral aspect of Solon's burial laws influence that of Demetrius. Cicero only provides information on Demetrius' attempts to restrict burial expenses. Instructive for this question is perhaps a passage in Plutarch's *Solon*. After listing some Solonian provisions for funerals, Plutarch remarks that most of the practices outlawed by Solon are also forbidden by "our laws"(τοῖς ἡμετέροις νόμοις), while "our laws" contain the additional proviso that anyone who mourn "in unmanly and effeminate extravagances of sorrow" shall by punished by a board of "Censors for women" (γυναικονόμοι).[3] The expression "our laws" could refer to the laws either contemporary to Plutarch's sources or in his own times. But with the mention of the Censors of Women, Plutarch is likely to describe the situation of the late fourth-century Athens. The available references to the Censors for Women can not be fixed within precise temporal limits, but most scholars support its existence and significance during Demetrius' reign.[4] Thus the source of this passage of Plutarch appears to be a work contemporary to Demetrius, even from the Phalerian himself. It shows that Demetrius' burial laws retained from earlier Solonian laws, and he particularly regulated the practices of lamentation as Solon had done. But what seems to be special

1 Cic. De leg. 2.25.64: posteaquam, ut scribit Phalereus, sumptuosa fieri funera et lamentabilia coepissent, Solonis lege sublata sunt.

2 Dem. 43.62. Moreover, it required that the corpse shall be taken from the house before sunrise, which corresponds to Demetrius' restriction of funerals to the period before dawn.

3 Plut. Sol. 21.7: ὧν τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ τοῖς ἡμετέροις νόμοις ἀπηγόρευται: πρόσκειται δὲ τοῖς ἡμετέροις ζημιοῦσθαι τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιοῦντας ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικονόμων, ὡς ἀνάνδροις καὶ γυναικώδεσι τοῖς περὶ τὰ πένθη πάθεσι καὶ ἁμαρτήμασιν ἐνεχομένους.

4 For a list of scholars who argue for the introduction of these officials under Demetrius, see O'Sullivan 2009, 66 n.48. For Censors of women in other Greek cities regulating burial customs and religious affairs, see O' Sullivan 2009, 50 n.10; 72.

under his regime was the existence of a special magistracy who had the authority to punish the transgressors. This role of scrutiny naturally recalls the special magistrate mentioned by Cicero, whose chief concern was to enforce Demetrius' laws governing funerals. Due to the limited evidence, we could hardly know whether this sole magistrate worked in a similar way with the Censors of women, or he was actually a member of them. But in the establishment of one or more enforcement agents Demetrius obviously stood apart from Solon and other previous Attic legislators, since nowhere are officials regulating prior burial practices ever found in an Athenian context. Perhaps by invoking Solon and his legislation as a touchstone for moderate behavior to emulate, Demetrius succeeded in carrying such public scrutiny into effect.

The scrutiny of the Censors for women went well beyond a mere concern for funeral practices. A passage of Athenaeus gathers references to the Censors for women from some comic poets of the late fourth century, who attested that these censors restricted the number of guests permitted at feasts and wedding parties to thirty, in which they inspected the house of the host or inquired all cooks who catered at feasts.[1] As the term itself reveals, the Censors of women were primarily responsible for supervising the behaviors of women, so it is not strange that they would appear in all areas in which female conduct might be regulated. The restrictions on the behavior of women were not unprecedented in Athens. Restrictions on female behavior and participation in the funerals, as the law quoted by Demosthenes suggests, were enacted by Solon. In the *Solon* Plutarch especially attributed to this legislator a desire to make the Athenian women decent in their regular behaviors and mourning. Similarly, Lycurgus is said to prohibit women from journeying to Eleusis by carriage during the Mysteries. In addition, the lexicographer Harpocration makes mention of a law punishing women who behaved in a disorderly fashion.[2]

Demetrius perhaps adopted these laws that did exist in Athens prior to his regime; however, he looked consciously to their enforcement. The resentment caused by these censors' intrusion into the private lives of citizens was vividly described by the comic

1 Athen. 6.245a-c.
2 On these pre-Demetrian laws see O'Sullivan 2009, 71, 99f.

poets, which proves well that Demetrius' laws were actively and effectively enforced. The limitation on guest numbers is not simply a measure governing public behavior of citizens, but is further connected with Demetrius' legislation on banquets. Though no source gives explicit evidence for the content of such a law, the criticisms from his opponents implicitly suggest its existence. In the above mentioned passage of Athenaeus (12.542c) we find that Duris attacked Demetrius for squandering the state funds on entertainment and banquets.[1] Duris' accusation is closely followed by Carystius of Pergamon, whose criticism particularly highlighted the sharp contrast between Demetrius' own extravagant feasts and the hard living of individual citizens. Had Demetrius regulated the expense of feasts, it is understandable that Carystius intended to display the hypocrisy of Demetrius as legislator.[2] Perhaps like the burial laws, this restriction against sumptuous feasts was motivated both by economic and moral reasons. In the restriction of dissipation of individual wealth on banquets, it is also possible to see an attempt to promote orderly behavior of citizens in public, particularly of women.

Given Demetrius' interest in the orderly behavior of women, a like concern for the scrutiny of behavior of male citizens is inherently plausible. Pollux explicitly mentions a board of officials called "νομοφύλακες", namely the "Guardians of the Law", which was the new name of the eleven goaler (ἕνδεκα) under Demetrius' regime:[3]

> The eleven was composed of one man from each tribe, a secretary being included in this number. In the time of the Phalerian their name was changed to "Guardians of the Law". They took care of those in prison and arrested thieves, slave-dealers and robbers, to put them to death if they admitted their crime, and if they did not, to bring them before the courts of justice, and if they were convicted, to execute them.[4]

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1 Sollenberger (Fortenbaugh and Schütrumpf 2000, 316-317) argues that Duris, when criticizing the dissolute life of Demetrius of Phalerum, may have confused him with Demetrius Poliorcetes, because this hostile account is not repeated by Diogenes Laertius. But it seems quite possible that Duris' hostility led to exaggeration even distortion, which was not accepted by later authors.

2 Athen. 6.245a-c.

3 Pollux gives the only explicit association of Demetrius of Phalerum with the officials called νομοφύλακες. Therefore, Gagarin (Fortenbaugh and Schütrumpf 2000, 352f.) is cautious to say that Demetrius more likely reconstituted the Guardians of the Law. The discussion below suggests the possibility that he inherited the name νομοφύλακες from an earlier board.

4 Pollux 8.102: Οἱ ἕνδεκα, εἷς ἀφ᾽ἑκάστης φυλῆς ἐγίγνετο καὶ γραμματεὺς αὐτοῖς συνηριθμεῖτο.

From the *Athenaion Politeia* we know that the competence of the eleven goalers was not merely restricted to the supervision of the goal. They were concerned with punishment of wrongdoers like thieves, kidnappers and footpads. If the criminals denied the charge, they were brought by the Eleven before the jury-court. The Eleven discharged them if they were acquitted, but if not then executed them.[1] Obviously, the Guardians of the Law mentioned by Pollux at 8.102 in general assumed the same tasks as the Eleven prior to Demetrius' regime. But another question naturally follows: If these new officials under Demetrius did not function differently with those before them, why was their name changed to "Guardians of the Law"? In this situation, one would wonder whether the term νομοφύλακες had any special meaning at that time.

Interestingly, we find a total different meaning of the word νομοφύλακες elsewhere in Pollux. At 8.94 he defines νομοφύλακες as a board of officials, who were crowned with a white headband and conducted the procession to the goddess. They sat in the assemblies with the presiding officers (προέδροι), preventing the voting of anything disadvantageous. A similar definition, however, is found in the Atthidographer Philochorus.[2] The obvious similarity in substance easily leads to the conclusion that Pollux 8.94 derives from Philochorus, but there is still one point of difference. Philochorus clearly states that the Guardians of the Law "compelled the magistrates to follow the laws", while this function of magisterial supervision does not emerge in Pollux.

Philochorus' account, however, is at first glance not concerned with Demetrius'

νομοφύλακες δὲ κατὰ τὸν Φαλερέα μετωνομάσθησαν. ἐπεμελοῦντο δὲ τῶν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, καὶ ἀπῆγον κλέπτας, ἀνδραποδιστὰς, λωποδύτας, εἰ μὲν ὁμολογοῖεν, θανατώσοντες. εἰ δὲ μὴ, εἰσάξοντες εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια, κἂν ἁλῶσιν, ἀποκτενοῦντες.

1 Ath. Pol. 52.1.

2 Pollux 8.94: νομοφύλακες μὲν ἐστεφάνωνται στροφίῳ λευκῷ. τὴν δὲ πομπὴν πέμπουσι τῇ θεῷ. τοῖς δὲ προέδροις ἐν ἐκκλησίαις συγκαθίζουσιν, ἔνια διακωλύοντες ἐπιχειροτονεῖν, ὅσα μὴ συμφέρει. For Philochorus see FGrH 328 F64: νομοφύλακες ἕτεροί εἰσι τῶν θεσμοθετῶν, ὡς Φιλόχορος ἐν τῇ ζ'. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄρχοντες ἀνέβαινον εἰς Ἄρειον πάγον ἐστεφανωμένοι. οἱ δὲ νομοφύλακες στροφία χαλκᾶ ἄγοντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς θέαις ἐναντίον ἀρχόντων ἐκαθέζοντο. καὶ τὴν πομπὴν ἔπεμπον τῇ Παλλάδι, τὰς δὲ ἀρχὰς ἠνάγκαζον τοῖς νόμοις χρῆσθαι, καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ καὶ ἐν τῇ βουλῇ μετὰ τῶν προέδρων ἐκάθηντο, κωλύοντες τὰ ἀσύμφορα τῇ πόλει πράττειν. Ἑπτὰ δὲ ἦσαν. καὶ κατέστησαν, ὡς Φιλόχορος, ὅτε Ἐφιάλτης μόνα κατέλιπε τῇ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῇ τὰ ὑπέρ τοῦ σώματος. Cf. Harpocration, s.v. νομοφύλακες.

legislation.[1] It is clear that he talked about an institution initiated in the mid-fifth century: "There were seven (Guardians of the Law) and they were instituted, as Philochorus says, when Ephialtes left to the Areopagus only its competence for homicide". But the appearance of this term in Book 7 of Philochorus' *Attis*, a book generally agreed to have dealt with Demetrius' regime, seems to suggest its implicit relevance to Demetrius.[2] Moreover, we shall remember that Demetrius was a man who was interested in seeking historical resonances and parallels to justify his measures, as Cicero's statement on his burial laws shows. From Pollux we know that Demetrius' Guardians of the Law inherited the power of the Eleven for punishing wrongdoers. If they assumed any of the duties ascribed by Philochorus to an early board of officials with the same name, these men too would operate in a fashion analogous to that in the time of Ephialtes. Thus the name νομοφύλακες would evidently highlight a kind of continuity to a traditional Athenian political institution.

This argument, however, must remain a hypothesis, since the officials called νομοφύλακες have incredibly left meager evidence in the historical and literary sources found in Athens.[3] Thus it remains inconclusive whether Ephialtes introduced such an institution. It seems not impossible that Philochorus (or Harpocration, from whose lexicon this fragment of Philochorus derives) may have mistakably attributed the authorship of a later institution to an earlier lawgiver.[4] Moreover, the attribution of the creation of νομοφύλακες to Ephialtes is probably due to confusion over his role in depriving the Areopagus of its guardianship of the laws. Acceptance or rejection of Philochorus' testimony is thus largely a matter of historical probabilities, because our

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1 For a discussion of νομοφύλακες under Demetrius' regime see Ferguson 1911; Gehrke 1978, 151-162; Williams 1983, 1997, 331-342; Trampedach 1994, 253; Habicht 1997; O' Sullivan 2001, 72-86.

2 For a list of scholars who suggest Demetrius' significant role in the Book 7 of *Atthis*, see O' Sullivan 2001, 51 n.2.

3 For a general discussion of Plato's νομοφύλακες in his *Laws* see Morrow 1960, 195-211; Schöpsdau 2003, 363-367; Prauscello 2014, 68f.; Annas 2017, 141-148. Gehrke (1978, 155-162) argues that Demetrius' νομοφύλακες bears no clear relationship to the νομοφύλακες discussed by Plato, but this view is rejected by Williams (1997, 333f.).

4 O'Sullivan (2001, 55-57; 2009, 77) argues that Philochorus' νομοφύλακες could hardly be those under Demetrius, because Philochorus may have confused νομοφύλακες with θεσμοθέται. For the opinion (Wehrli 1949, 52; Williams 1997, 340 n.40) that Pollux has mistakenly wrote νομοφύλακες in a context about δεσμοφύλακες (gaol-guardians), she regards it as less plausible that Pollux replaced a more obvious term with a less congruent one.

knowledge of the officials existing in the time of Ephialtes is scanty. But one function of the alleged fifth-century Guardians of the Law was reconcilable with some officials described by Xenophon. In his *Oikonomikos* the speaker Ischomachus compared the household management to statecraft and claimed that well-ordered cities appointed Guardians of the Law as overseers to commend the law-abiding and chastise the lawbreakers.[1] This description is surely suggestive of officials responsible for promoting and enforcing lawful conduct among all citizens, which recalls the competence of νομοφύλακες mentioned by Philochorus for compelling the magistrates to follow the laws. This function of magisterial supervision, however, is also consistent with the duties of the early Areopagus as outlined in the Aristotelian *Athenaion Politeia*, whose authority of scrutiny was concerned with both magistrates and individual citizens. The very name of these officials νομοφύλακες corresponds closely to the early Areopagus' duty of supervision of the laws (νομοφυλακεῖν).[2] If we accept Philochorus' account that Guardians of the Law were established when Ephialtes greatly curtailed the power of Areopagus, it seems reasonable that they inherited the responsibility of magisterial supervision from the early Areopagus. Admittedly we lack evidence for the subsequent exercise of this power by these officials, yet it can be observed that the appearance of νομοφύλακες is always associated with the supervisory and disciplinary authority.[3]

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1 Xeno. Oec. 9.14: (…) ἐν ταῖς εὐνομουμέναις πόλεσιν οὐκ ἀρκεῖν δοκεῖτοῖς πολίταις, ἂν νόμους καλοὺς γράψωνται, ἀλλὰ καὶ νομοφύλακας προσαιροῦνται, οἵτινες ἐπισκοποῦντες τὸν μὲν ποιοῦντα τὰ νόμιμα ἐπαινοῦσιν, ἂν δέ τις παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ποιῇ, ζημιοῦσι.

2 The *Athenaion Politeia* records that before Draco's legislation the Council of Areopagus "had the official function of guarding the laws". When it administered the greatest number and the most important of the affairs of state, it had power to punish the offenders against public order without appeal (3.6: ἡ δὲ τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν βουλὴ τὴν μὲν τάξιν εἶχε τοῦ διατηρεῖν τοὺς νόμους, διώκει δὲ τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ κολάζουσα καὶ ζημιοῦσα πάντας τοὺς ἀκοσμοῦντας κυρίως). Under Draco their responsibility of observing the laws remained unchanged, but with an addition that they "kept a watch on the magistrates to make them govern in accordance with the laws" (4.4: ἡ δὲ βουλὴ ἡ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου φύλαξ ἦν τῶν νόμων καὶ διετήρει τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅπως κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ἄρχωσιν). Solon was said to appoint the Areopagus to the duty of guarding the laws, "just as it had existed even before as overseer of the constitution". Meanwhile it kept watch over the greatest and the most important of the affairs of state, "in particular correcting offenders with sovereign powers both to fine and punish" (8.4: (Solon) τὴν δὲ τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν ἔταξεν ἐπὶ τὸ νομοφυλακεῖν, ὥσπερ ὑπῆρχεν καὶ πρότερον ἐπίσκοπος οὖσα τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ τά τε ἄλλα τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν πολιτικῶν διετήρει, καὶ τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας ἠὔθυνεν κυρία οὖσα καὶ ζημιοῦν καὶ κολάζειν). Under Solon the Areopagus' guardianship included the scrutiny and punishment of wrongdoers. A general scrutiny of behavior was also attributed to the early Areopagus by some Atthidographers (FGrH 328 F196; FGrH 325 F10). For the relationship between Philochorus' νομοφύλακες and early Areopagus, see O' Sullivan 2001.

3 The officials with the same title for magisterial supervision are found in a law of Pergamon during the time of the Attalid kingdom (OGIS 483, col. I, 15ff.; Austin 2006, 439). However, the officials called

This function of scrutiny may well provide a context in which Demetrius' renaming of the eleven gaolers as νομοφύλακες does make sense. Though lacking firm evidence, one could still suppose that the change of name may indicate an extended competence of the Eleven under Demetrius. The supervision of gaol and punishment on wrongdoers remained as their responsibilities, as Pollux 8.102 says, but in addition to this they were probably appointed to assume the role of overseer, scrutinizing individual behaviors and enforcing the observance of laws. In this respect, Demetrius' Guardians of the Law were presumably exercising a function that had been a duty of pre-Ephialtes Areopagus, and they could have shared it with a board of fifth-century officials with the same name. This function accords reasonably well with Demetrius' concern for public morality, which has been identified above in other aspects of his legislation. The Guardians of the Law were concerned with checking wrongdoers, and they formed part of a coherent legislative programme when working together with other officials like Censors of women. Fundamental to this legislation was no doubt Demetrius' focus upon the moral behavior of the Athenians,[1] but the peripatetic tradition may have also played a significant role. In *Politics*, Aristotle especially mentions that various kinds of supervisory boards are vital to the functioning of a well-regulated state, because they enforce the observance of appropriate behavior of citizens. For this purpose he lists boards for supervision of women, laws, youth and gymnasia.[2] Aristotle's grouping seems to suggest that Guardians of the Law and Censors of Women are analogous in their common concern for observance of the law. Here he simply provides a general discussion of the necessity of superintendence, without special attention to a single institution. It was Demetrius who put his idea into practice, and pursued a kind of collaboration between different supervisory boards like Censors of Women and Guardians of the Law.[3]

νομοφύλακες are attested throughout the Greek world in a wide variety of application (Christophilopoulos 1968; O' Sullivan 2009, 75 n.69).

1 Some scholars, such as de Laix (1973, 71) and Vatai (1984, 118), unfavorably remark the Guardians of Laws of Demetrius as an institution that curtailed the power of the assembly and was intrusive. For them the moral concern of Demetrius must have threated the freedom of the Athenian citizens.

2 Arist. Pol. 1322b31: ἴδιαι δὲ ταῖς σχολαστικωτέραις καὶ μᾶλλον εὐημερούσαις πόλεσιν, ἔτι δὲ φροντιζούσαις εὐκοσμίας, γυναικονομία, νομοφυλακία, παιδονομία, γυμνασιαρχία.

3 For Demetrius' interest in the ephebeia and the orderliness of youth, see O'Sullivan 2009, 86-89. For the suspension of the ephebeia under Phocion, see Mitchel 1964, 346-348.

The reforms enacted by Demetrius, of course, were not solely motivated by moral consideration. The laws focusing on the restrictions of funerary and grave monument naturally reflect an attempt of financial management, although the dissipation of individual wealth in the Phalerean-period is still observable.[1] More importantly, Demetrius' regime was backed by the support of Cassander. When he introduced his reforms, it was necessary for him to act in a fashion consistent with patterns that had emerged in Athens and was widely accepted by its citizens. The previous lawgivers, like Solon and Lycurgus, seemed to have been pursuing an interest in public scrutiny of private behavior, and Demetrius' laws can be viewed as a development of the already established trends. The creation of new magistrates to enforce laws suggests that Demetrius was a man who paid close attention to the effectiveness of his reforms, and we can well imagine that these compulsory measures might be accompanied by some mild ones, for example, the propaganda of moral ideals worthy of adulation and emulation. Admittedly there is no sure evidence for this conjecture, but the rehabilitation of Phocion would seem appropriate for this situation, if we give credence to Plutarch who dated a full public restoration of Phocion shortly after his death. Past connection and recent popularity made Phocion a fitting candidate for Demetrius, who was eager to show how a decent and virtuous man served his state well. At first glance one would wonder that Demetrius' moral reforms seems to have no direct connection with Plutarch's biography, but a careful examination of his enthusiasm for morality indicates that he could be the man who underlined Phocion's moral virtures in his later writings and thus influenced Plutarch.

When Demetrius later went into exile and justified his rule in his own writings, one would expect that a literary rehabilitation of Phocion appeared in his self-justification. Phocion was a key figure whom he could hardly overlook in his account of his own political career. Demetrius' similar political views with Phocion, and particularly his motivation for apology, would lend to his account the very sympathetic tone toward Phocion's policy and death. For Demetrius, another aspect of self-justification was the

1 For a discussion of the prosperity of individual wealth in the Phalerean period, see Engels 1998, 142-145.

argument that he was done wrong by the Athenians, in which Phocion served well as a literary example.[1] Among Demetrius' works Diogenes Laertius mentions one named "*Socrates*" (Σωκράτης), and elsewhere he notes that a story of Democritus of Abdera was drawn ultimately from this work. It was said that Democritus of Abdera was a man who traveled the widest in his times but carefully avoided Athens. It is highly reminiscent of another remaining fragment of Demetrius, in which the philosopher Diogenes of Apollonia nearly lost his life in Athens because of the envy of the Athenians.[2] Obviously, both highlight the unjust treatment of the Athenians against the philosophers, and the case of Demecritos of Abdera in particular implies that the bad reputation of the Athenians against philosophers was well-known in Greece. There is no wonder that materials of this kind would appear in a work named "*Socrates*", since Socrates was the most typical example showing the uneasy relationship between philosophers and the Athenians. One thus gets the strong impression that the motif of this work was extended beyond a mere apology of Socrates, but was concerned to show Athens as a city hostile to philosophers. In order to achieve the greatest rhetorical effect, Demetrius may have added as many examples as he could find to catalogue the Athenian crimes against philosophers, as we see in the cases of Democritus and Diogenes.

An important event that seemed to motivate Demetrius' writing of this work is the antagonism between the Athenians and philosophers shortly after his political downfall. In 307 B.C., an Athenian Sophocles proposed a law to forbid the establishment of a philosophical school without the permission of the assembly and council. Even though this law was soon challenged and overturned, its short-term influence on the intellectual life in Athens was obvious. Demetrius' own teacher Theophrastus, for example, was forced to leave the city. The law itself can be interpreted as a forthright expulsion of the philosophers, but it is worth noting that it was supported by an important political figure, Demetrius' arch-critic Demochares. Athenaeus mentions that Demochares composed a

1 A passage found in Strab. 9.1.20, in which Demetrius was praised as a man who "improved" Athenian democracy instead of destroying it, is generally believed to be associated with Demetrius' apology. Both Gehrke (1978, 188) and Haake (2007, 79-81) interpret Demetrius' self-justification as a literary strategy stressing "gescheiterte Philosophenherrschaft", though both scholars deny the argument that Demetrius' political activities reflect his willingness to put philosophical doctrines into practice. This tradition of apology in autobiography, according to Haake, can be traced to Plato's *Seventh Letter*.

2 On Democritus see D.L. 9.37; On Diogenes of Apollonia see D.L. 9.57.

defense for Sophocles, and in views of his strong antipathy toward Demetrius, he would hardly miss such an opportunity to attack his political enemy.[1]

It is well-known that Demetrius received good philosophical education from Theophrastus. But this law appeared not merely to direct at Demetrius himself, focusing upon the actual influence of his philosophical background on his regime. Rather, the allegation particularly made sense, when those who were willing to take up Macedonian power were described as the products of the philosophical schools. It can be observed that some philosophers, who had cultivated close ties with the Macedon court, were liable to prosecution in the second half of the fourth century. Alexander's sudden death stirred up great uproar in Athens, to which his old tutor Aristotle became prey. Aristotle was charged of impiety, because he was supposed to have treated the Atarnean tyrant Hermias as a deity. But perhaps more significant, this Hermias was thought to have been a Macedonian collaborator.[2] Similarly, the prosecution against Theophrastus may well have been founded in his friendship with important Macedonian political figures, notably Cassander and Ptolemy. Although the information about Theophrastus' trial is shadowy, we know that his accuser was Hagnonides who acted as prosecutor of Phocion in 318 B.C. And it shall be noted here is that Demophilus, another prosecutor of Phocion, had played a leading role in the prosecution of Aristotle. The repeatedly appearance of these men in the trials against the so-called "pro-macedonian" figures may suggest the existence of a political agenda behind these prosecutions, but it is clear that before Demetrius' elevation to power, the political friendship of philosophers already became an avenue for prejudice and prosecution against them.[3] In this respect, Demetrius' regime exactly confirmed the impression that philosophers could gain political profit from their Macedonian connections.

Plutarch does not name his source for Phocion' trial and death. But we note that his

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1 For the law of Sophocles and its aftermath, see D.L. 5.38; Pollux 9.42; Athen. 13.610e-f. For scholarly literature, see Sonnabend 1996, 118-124; Korhonen 1997, 75-82; Thrams 2001, 106-108; Haake 2007, 16-43; O'Sullivan 2002; 2009, 213-215.

2 Gigon 1958, 178; Natali 2013, 61f.

3 On Hagnonides as prosecutor of Theophrastus, see D.L. 5.37; as Phocion's accuser see Plut. Phoc. 33.4. On Demophilus as prosecutor of Aristotle and Phocion, see D.L. 5.5; Athen. 15.696b; Plut. Phoc. 38.2. For an analysis of the political background behind the trials of Theophrastus and of Theodorus of Cyrene, another member of Lyceum, see O'Sullivan 1997, 136-146.

description of the death of Phocion closely follows Plato's description of the last hours of Socrates. Both men, for instance, showed calmness and grandeur of spirit before their execution. Socrates took the cup of hemlock "very gently, without trembling or changing color or expression"(λαβὼν καὶ μάλα ἵλεως, οὐδὲν τρέσας οὐδὲ διαφθείρας οὔτε τοῦ χρώματος οὔτε τοῦ προσώπου), and drank the poison "very cheerfully and quietly"(μάλα εὐχερῶς καὶ εὐκόλως). When those who were present wept and lamented, Socrates chided them that they behaved in a way as women did. With a desire to "die in religious silence"(ἐν εὐφημίᾳ χρὴ τελευτᾶν), Socrates' last word was merely a wish to pay a cock to Aesculapius, without any complaints about his own misfortune or the injustice of the Athenians.[1] Similarly, Plutarch describes that Phocion's countenance was the same as it used to be, while his friends lamented and shed tears. In particular Thudippus was the contrast, who bewailed his hard fate and complained that he was implicated in this affair due to his friendship with Phocion. For this Phocion merely asked: "Is it not satisfaction to you that you are put to death in company with Phocion?" By instructing his friends to face death in a rational way, Phocion here evidently played the role of Socrates. And like Socrates, he cherished no resentment against the Athenians and told his son to do the same.[2] One recognizes immediately these emotional scenes, which unmistakably owe their origin to the Platonic description of Socrates' last hours.

An even closer connection between Socrates and Phocion is made when both of them were said to have acted only as they thought best for Athens, regardless of popularity and personal gain. Plato, in the well-known words he gives to Socrates in the *Apology*, compares Athens to a large and well-bred horse, which was sluggish and needed to be aroused by the stinging of a gadfly. Socrates was proud of being a gadfly-like man, or in his own words "a kind of gift from the god", for his task was to urge the Athenians to care for virtue. Thus he warned the jurors that his death sentence would in fact inflict greater injuries on themselves.[3] The same discussion is found in the *Gorgias*, where

1 Plat. Phaed. 117b-118a. Cf. Xeno. Mem. 4.8.1-3. Ebert 2004, 459. For a reconstruction of Socrates' death scene see Ebert 2004, 459-460. On ἐν εὐφημίᾳ τελευτᾶν as a Pythagorean maxim, see Westerink 1977, 284.

2 Plut. Phoc. 36.4.

3 Plat. Apol. 30d-31a: ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὕτος μὲν ἴσως οἴεται καὶ ἄλλος τίς που μεγάλα κακά, ἐγὼ δ᾽ οὐκ οἴομαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ποιεῖν ἃ οὑτοσὶ νῦν ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα ἀδίκως ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτεινύναι. νῦν

Socrates explicitly claims that the man who is put to death unjustly is less pitiable and wretched than the one who puts him to death, because to suffer wrong is ultimately better than to do wrong.[1] In this sense, Socrates' efforts to reform the citizens' morals can be interpreted as a voluntary choice of suffering wrong. This is precisely the belief of Plutarch's Phocion. Plutarch tells an anecdote that during the Lamian War Phocion was required to make an expedition against the Boiotians, but he, regardless of the threat of death in case of opposition, insisted that it would be unjust if he simply ingratiated himself with what the Athenian people wished. More remarkably in Chapter 32, Plutarch employs similar vocabulary and picks up just the qualities set forth by Socrates: Phocion refused to arrest Nicanor, the Macedonian garrison commander at Munychia, because he believed Nicanor's goodwill toward the Athenians. By doing so he claimed that in any case he would rather be found suffering wrong than doing wrong.[2] Plutarch apparently ascribes to Phocion a role of moral supervisor response for managing the behavior of the people he led. In its application to politics, Phocion made the same choice as Socrates had done, and as in the case of Socrates, it ultimately cost him his life. Thus one might see that their similar characters lead to similar deaths, and these similarities can be well explained if the image of Phocion was exactly modeled after that of Socrates.

These similarities are strong enough to create an allusion that there was a literary comparison and discussion of the trials of Socrates and Phocion, which Plutarch obviously adopted in his biography. There is good reason to believe that Demetrius, after

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οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλοῦ δέω ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ὥς τις ἂν οἴοιτο, ἀλλὰ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, μή τι ἐξαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν ἐμοῦ καταψηφισάμενοι. ἐὰν γάρ με ἀποκτείνητε, οὐ ῥᾳδίως ἄλλον τοιοῦτον εὑρήσετε, ἀτεχνῶς—εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον εἰπεῖν—προσκείμενοντῇ πόλει ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ὥσπερ ἵππῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναίῳ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νωθεστέρῳ καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μύωπός τινος, οἷον δή μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθηκέναι τοιοῦτόν τινα, ὃς ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὀνειδίζων ἕνα ἕκαστον οὐδὲν παύομαι τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην πανταχοῦ προσκαθίζων.

1 Plat. Gorg. 469b-c. Cf. Xeno. Mem. 4.8.9-10.

2 Plut. Phoc. 24.3: ὡρμημένων δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς στρατεύειν πρῶτον μὲν ἀντεῖχε: καὶ τῶν φίλων λεγόντων ὡς ἀποθανεῖται προσκρούων τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, 'ἀδίκως,' εἶπεν, 'ἂν ποιῶ τὸ συμφέρον ἂν δὲ παραβαίνω, δικαίως.' 32.6: ὁ δὲ Φωκίων ἐπὶ τῷ προέσθαι τὸν ἄνδρα (Nikanor) καὶ μὴ κατασχεῖν ἐγκαλούμενος ἔφη πιστεύειν μὲν τῷ Νικάνορι καὶ μηδὲν ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ προσδοκᾶν δεινόν εἰ δὲ μή, μᾶλλον ἐθέλειν ἀδικούμενος ἢ ἀδικῶν φανερὸς γενέσθαι. Gehrke (1976, 141, 187f.) judges Phocion's words on justice as apocryphal, because such a discussion of justice and injustice is "im praktischen Kontext sinnlos", but exactly reflects the Platonic descriptions of Socrates (Cf. Plat. Gorg. 469c, 474b-475e; Crit. 49b-c; Apol. 30c-d, 41d). In all likelihood it can be used as evidence for a literary creation of a quasi-Socratic Phocion.

his expulsion from Athens, took serious consideration of this parallel, because he could ascribe his own political misfortune to the same injustice that Socrates and Phocion had suffered in the hands of the Athenians. Since Plato had characterized Socrates as an ideal, against which the injustice of his condemnation could be easily judged, a comparison between Socrates and another unfairly treated one did make sense by strengthening a repetition of Athens' sin against philosophers. This formulation of comparison with Socrates also recalls Aristotle's justification of his flight from Athens when facing the prosecution for impiety in 323 B.C.: Aristotle chose to leave the city, because he did not wish to allow the Athenians to sin twice against philosophy by convicting him. Whether this story is historically accurate or not, it certainly hopes to conjure up the specter of Socrates. Now we find this Aristotle anecdote in Aelian,[1] but one may wonder whether it was created and soon circulated among the Peripatos in the late fourth century B.C. If so, it is not surprising that Demetrius, with his Peripatetic affiliation, would have been familiar with the rhetorical method of this kind.

The Socrates/Phocion comparison may have been formulated in Demetrius' *Socrates*. Although the fragments are as few as they are brief, they do suggest that in this work Demetrius was keen on collecting examples showing how the Athenians repeatedly failed to recognize the true worth of philosophers. Though it seems to be more fitting that Phocion is given relevance as a symbol of a politician treated unfairly, we shall remember that he attended Plato's Academy, and through this relationship he can be indirectly linked to Socrates.[2] Demetrius could hardly ignore such an association, from which parallel between Socrates and Phocion could be easily drawn, so it is no surprising that Phocion would appear in a work discussing the hostility towards philosophers. This is not to argue, however, that the parallel between Socrates and Phocion could only appear in this single work. Demetrius is recognized as a prolific writer, and some of his works, with the title "On the ten years" or "A denunciation of the Athenians", certainly deal with his self-justification. Considering the apologetic nature of these works, the resonances between the attacks against Socrates, Phocion and Demetrius himself may

1 Ael. V.H. 3.36. Cf. D.L. 5.10; Dion. Hal. Ad Amm. 5.3-6.1; Natali 2013, 60-64.
2 Plut. Phoc. 4.2.

provide a powerful weapon of propaganda.

The influence of the Peripatos on the development of biography has, from Leo's and Dihle's thorough elaboration of the issue, been discussed in the scholarly literature.[1] Among the authors who provided Plutarch with information about Phocion's life, Demetrius of Phalerum was no doubt a member of Lyceum. Likewise his fervent critic Duris of Samos was said to be schooled by Theophrastus.[2] Plutarch's reference to Polyeuctus the Sphettian suggests that another Peripatetic scholar, Ariston of Ceos, was his source for Phocion's oratory.[3] In some ways, it is indeed tempting to assume that Phocion's character and career was a topic of Peripatetic scholarship. Moreover, the Peripatetic scholars were supposed to be interested in collecting anecdotes. Thus we are naturally inclined to think that the rich assembly of anecdotes in Plutarch's *Phocion* comforts to this tradition and may reflect a significant Peripatetic interest in Phocion.[4] But clearly there are problems with this approach. The references provided by Ariston and Duris are as few as they are brief, and there is no evidence suggesting that other Peripatetic scholars paid much attention to Phocion. The origins of many anecdotes found in the *Phocion* are in fact obscure, without firm attribution to the Peripatetic writers. Besides, there is good reason to believe that Demetrius' interest in Phocion was primarily driven by his propinquity to the latter and particularly by his similar political career. Likewise Duris' interest in Phocion can be well explained that his strong hostility toward Demetrius of Phalerum involved him in investigating those who enjoyed good relationship with the latter. Taken Aristotle and Theophrastus' trials into consideration, the unjust treatment of philosophers might be a topic in the Peripatetic circle that inspired Demetrius of Phalerum to create parallel between Socrates and Phocion, but it does not necessarily attest Phocion's influence among the Peripatos.

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1 Leo 1901; Dihle 1970; Momigliano 1971; Cooper 2002.

2 Gray 1987, 483; Pédach 1989, 261. For opposition see Kebric 1974; Dalby 1991, Pownall (n.d.).

3 For this list Tritle (1988, 32 n.85) also adds Idomeneus, whose description of Phocion's humble birth certainly recalls the origin of Socrates. Following Leo (1901, 111) and Jacoby (RE 19.1, 1914, 911), Tritle argues that Idomeneus was influenced by the Peripatetic literary style. Momigliano (1971, 71) suggests that Idomeneus' book *On the Socratics* was probably influenced by Phainias of Eresus.

4 Momigliano 1971, 72f.; Tritle 1988, 27, 32, 34f. For scholars who agree that Phocion emerges in the Peripatetic tradition as the ideal philosophers in politics, see Bearzot 1985; Cooper 1997, 460.

Demetrius of Phalerum was acquainted with the historical Phocion, and his later political downfall, which inspired his desire for self-justification, may have contributed to a literary embellishment of Phocion's moral characters, in particular paralleling him with Socrates. Whether for promoting Demetrius' moral programmes or for his later apology, Phocion may have served as a propagandatic model with good moral qualities. However, the assumption that Demetrius of Phalerum was the most possible chief source for Plutarch's *Phocion* is in fact a tentative and cumulative one, based on the tendencies observable in our surviving sources when taken together. Plutarch's explicit citations of different authors reveal that the *Phocion* is an artfully composed piece of literature of diverse origins. Except for Demetrius of Phalerum and those mentioned by Plutarch, we shall also pay attention to Nepos, who prior to Plutarch wrote a short biography of Phocion, and to Diodorus, whose historical narrative provides a different judgment on Phocion's last days.

1.3 Nepos and Diodorus: Other possible sources

Nepos' *Phocion* consists of a mere four chapters, but in two aspects it merits special attention. First, Nepos' narrative does not offer a summary of Phocion's deeds, but is confined to the outstanding events in the period following the Lamian War to the death of Phocion. In the first chapter he is primarily concerned with Phocion's moral integrity, especially his refusal of gifts from King Philip, while in the following three chapters, he only concentrates on the political turmoil in Athens after the Lamian War and explores the reasons why Phocion at the end of his life incurred the bitter hatred of his citizens. One would naturally ask why Nepos has chosen a limited period for treatment. Did he have no interest for Phocion's earlier life? Or did he possess little source for the events before the Lamian War? In other biographies such as *Themistocles*, *Cimon* and *Conon*, Nepos does introduce the family background and early political career of his subjects, which apparently shows that he is not a writer who would like to emphasize one important period at the expense of the remainder of his hero's life. Moreover, his

detailed description of the careers of Iphicrates, Chabrias and Timotheus suggests that sources concerning the military and political affairs of fourth-century Athens were securely available to him. It seems unlikely that Nepos had poor knowledge of the Athenian history before the Lamian War, so I would suppose that the first possible reason for the abbreviation of Phocion's career might be the emphasis of his sources. In other words, Nepos shows comparatively more interest in a bare four years before Phocion's death, because the sources he read for composing his *Phocion* particularly concentrated on this narrow period. It is understandable that the sources determine for biographer the key events surrounding his subjects and their fortunes.

The second reason is closely related to the second trait of Nepos' *Phocion*, namely his criticism of that Athenian general. At the end of the *Timotheus* he declares that "this era of Iphicrates, Chabrias and Timotheus was the very last of the era of Athenian commanders, and after their death not any general in that city was worthy of memory".[1] Although Phocion appears a few *Lives* later, Nepos makes it clear that Phocion's reputation mainly rests on his virtue rather than his military career. He adds that Phocion's virtue earned him the surname "the Good" (Bonus), while his military activities were so obscure that no one ever remembered them.[2] Clearly, Nepos does not regard Phocion as an outstanding military leader. Thus one may suspect that he ignores Phocion's earlier career, perhaps because Phocion's early military records seemed to be too mediocre to earn his interest. The assumption that *On Foreign Generals* was originally limited strictly to generals with prominent military achievements is unnecessary. As I would explain in Chapter 3, an Athenian general could seldom appear on the battlefield due to the labor division among the ten generals.

If the first chapter of the *Phocion* can be interpreted as doubt on Phocion's military capacity, the second chapter reveals how Phocion the politician made three serious mistakes that irritated the Athenians: He surrendered their city over to Antipater, in

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1 Nep. Timoth. 4.4: Haec extrema fuit aetas imperatorum Atheniensium, Iphicratis, Chabriae, Timothei, neque post illorum obitum quisquam dux in illa urbe fuit dignus memoria.

2 Nep. Phoc. 1.1: Phocion Atheniensis etsi saepe exercitibus praefuit summosque magistratus cepit, tamen multo eius notior est integritas vitae quam rei militaris labor. itaque huius memoria est nulla, illius autem magna fama, ex quo cognomine Bonus est appellatus. Strangely, Stem (2012, 28) sees inconsistency here with Nepos' remark at the end of Timotheus.

which he was responsible for the exile and death of Demosthenes who had greatly assisted him to political prominence. More importantly, Phocion gave no heed to the plot of Nicanor, which caused the fall of Piraeus. Among these three reasons, what seems to be strikingly significant for source analysis is the sympathy toward Demosthenes. The political and legal support that Demosthenes had given to Phocion, as well as Phocion's disloyalty and betrayal to him, is not found anywhere.[1] Doubtlessly, such content derives from a source praising Demosthenes and his policies. When this factor is considered, a tentative identification can be made that Nepos consulted Democharesʼ account. Though the preserved fragments of Democharesare few, this identification does conform to the known writing style of Democharesand to the above discussed time limitation.[2] Democharesʼ narrative, however biased it looks, at least provided much first-hand information.

Even if we identify Democharesas the ultimate source for the hostility discerned in Nepos' *Phocion*, however, he was certainly not the only source of this work. This becomes clear in the last two chapters where Nepos narrates Phocion's political downfall and execution. One would expect that Nepos, following his source Democharesshould have showed little sympathy for Phocion's fate. By listing the offences Phocion committed in the second chapter, Nepos does consider the bitter anger of the Athenians against Phocion as understandable. However, his tone is not totally critical. On the mishap that befell Phocion, Nepos describes that this renowned politician, already advanced in years, was taken to the court in a carriage. Some of the Athenians

1 The evidence for Demosthenes' political support of Phocion ostensibly appears in his *On the Crown* (18.88). In this speech Demosthenes claims that he advised the Athenians to deliver assistance to the Byzantines, when the latter was beleaguered by Philipp of Macedon in 340 B.C. The sources attest that the Athenians were persuaded and then sent a squadron to Byzantine, led by Phocion (Plut. Phoc. 14.6). Demosthenes surely played a conspicuous part in this event, but there is no way of deducing from this piece of evidence that he enhanced Phocion's political prominence. In my opinion, the Athenians appointed Phocion as a commander in the Byzantium expedition mainly due to his military experience and personal influence in Byzantium. Before this battle Phocion had been engaged in military operations in Naxos, Euboea and Megara (Plut. Phoc. 6, 12-15), and he was familiar with Leon of Byzantine, a former schoolmate in Plato's Academy and at that time a leader of the Byzantines (Plut. Phoc. 14.4). Moreover, Phocion seemed to enjoy good relationship with Aeschines. When Aeschines was accused by Demosthenes in 343 B.C., Phocion was known to appear as one of his defenders (Aeschin. 2.184). Thus it seems less likely that three years later Demosthenes would deliberately promote the political career of a man who sided with his ardent political enemy.

2 Cicero (Brut. 286) judged Democharesas a writer whose work was more oratorical than historical, and such a comment indicates a biased narrative in Democharés. Cf. Tritle 1988, 5f.

remembered his past glory and pitied his years, although the majority did not allow him to plead his cause and condemned him to death. When being led to execution, Phocion met a sorrowing friend Euphiletus and comforted the latter that this fate was not unexpected to him, because most distinguished men of Athens have met the same end.[1] Nepos' narrative is much shorter, but he, as Plutarch later, does portray Phocion as a noble and fearless man who was fully aware of the dangers in the political life. Even he presents Phocion' trial as a result of political rivalry, he appears to be sympathetic to Phocion's demise.

This resemblance to Plutarch's *Phocion* in describing the tragic end of Phocion suggests the possibility that Nepos and Plutarch used a common source that was surely sympathetic to Phocion. In addition, the story of Phocion's refusal of money gift is found both in Nepos and Plutarch. Though in Plutarch's version it is told in two separate passages, and Philip, the benefactor in Nepos' version, is replaced by Alexander and Menyllus, these three passages are very similar in substance: all state that Phocion repeatedly refused to take anything from the Macedonian part. As has been argued, Demetrius of Phalerum was the most plausible source for Plutarch's *Phocion*, and there is good reason to believe that the works of Demetrius of Phalerum were also accessible to Nepos. When Nepos preserved the substance of Democharesʼ account, he could hardly overlook the response of his contemporary opponent, especially because Demetrius was known as Phocion's intimate political associate. Despite their political differences, both Democharesand Demetrius are recognized authorities who provided eyewitness account of contemporary events. One can not be certain whether Plutarch has consulted the work of Nepos, because he admitted that his knowledge of Latin was poor.[2] So the most possible explanation for these similarities in their works is the common source.

Diodorus' book 18 preserves a good deal of information about the last years of

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1 Nep. Phoc. 4.1: Huc ut perventur est, cum propter aetatem pedibus iam non valeret vehiculoque portaretur, magni concursus sunt facti, cum alii, reminiscentes veteris famae, aetatis misererentur, plurimi vero ira exacuerentur propter proditionis suspicionem Piraei maximeque quod adversus populi commoda in senectute steterat; 4.3: hic cum ad mortem duceretur, obvius ei fuit Euphiletus, quo familiariter fuerat usus. is cum lacrimans dixisset "o quam indigna perpeteris, Phocion!" huic ille "at non inopinata," inquit; "hunc enim exitum plerique clari viri habuerunt Athenienses."

2 Plut. Dem. 2.2.

Phocion, and most importantly, he provides another version of Phocion's trial. Diodorus' account reveals a distinct sympathy for Phocion's misfortune, and his description of the process of trial is basically similar with the other descriptions in Nepos and Plutarch: The tumult of the people prevented Phocion from defending himself, and on his way to prison he was accompanied by some men who mourned and sympathized at his great misfortune. Diodorus does not further narrate Phocion's death scene. Instead, he uses Phocion as an example to illustrate the vicissitude of the fortune that was impartial to good and bad men alike. Phocion's fate reveals that a good man in adversity has to suffer the terrible results of hatred, even when such hatred "loses all human semblance in its rage against its object"(τὸ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις σιωπώμενον μῖσος, ὅταν ἐκ μεταβολῆς ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις ἐκραγῇ, ταῖς ὀργαῖς ἀποθηριοῦται πρὸς τοὺς μισουμένους). [1]In this passage, Diodorus explicitly argues that Phocion had been unfairly executed, thus warning the reader of the random fortune.[2]

From Plutarch we know that Phocion's trust in Nicanor ultimately caused his own political downfall.[3] If we carefully examine Diodorus' account of the conflicts between Nicanor and the Athenians, his sympathy toward Phocion is more confusing. Diodorus depicts Nicanor as an untrustworthy man, who at first deceived the Assembly and seized Piraeus in a raid. Being a friend of Nicanor, Phocion was sent to him to complain about what he had done, but this mission proved out to be fruitless. Nicanor refused to restore Munychia and Piraeus to the Athenians by constantly making excuses. When Alexander son of Polyperchon arrived in Attica with an army, some old friends of Antipater including Phocion feared the punishment brought by the victory of Polyperchon and then went to Alexander, trying to persuade him to hold the forts for himself and not deliver them to the Athenians until after the defeat of Cassander.[4] These actions, unmentioned by Nepos and Plutarch, could only justify the hatred of the Athenians

1 Diod. 18.66-67.

2 On Diodorus' moral didacticism see Hau 2016, 73-123. Hau (93f.) observes that divine justice was in general a favorable topic in Diodorus, while Hieronymus seems to have concerned random fortune rather than divine justice. Thus she argues that Diodorus has treated this difference with regard to his own didactic message about moderation and staying humble in success. But in the case of Phocion, what Diodorus presents is simply the human inability to resist the unexpected misfortune.

3 Plut. Phoc. 32.

4 Diod. 18.64-65.4.

toward these men, since they betrayed the interest of their state when pursuing their own safety. Even though Diodorus later emphasizes the unfair treatment Phocion suffered during his trial, the reason for his accusation seems to have been justified in the previous context. A plausible explanation for this apparent contradiction is that Diodorus' account was drawn from several sources, and some of them are unfavorable to Phocion. Diodorus seemed to be familiar with some local historians of Athens (Atthidographers), from whom the details concerning the deeds and downfall of an Athenian politician like Phocion are to be expected. [1]

It has been long argued that the main source of Diodorus' Book 18 is Hieronymus of Cardia. Diodorus was certainly familiar with him, as on four occasions he mentioned Hieronymus as a historical figure. [2] Moreover, it is reasonable to suppose that Hieronymus, because of his close connection to some Macedonians of distinction, had access to a large body of first-hand material and thus became a significant authority for the history of the Diadochi that the later authors could hardly overlook. Hieronymus was known to serve Eumenes and later the family of Antigonus for a long time, so it is not surprising that he did not care about the abolishment of Athenian democracy.[3] Thus Diodorus, closely following his source, records the Macedonian occupation of Athens in a positive light. He says that Antipater after the Lamian War "dealt humanely with the Athenians and permitted them to retain their city and their possessions and everything else"(ὁ δὲ φιλανθρώπως αὐτοῖς προσενεχθεὶς συνεχώρησεν ἔχειν τήν τε πόλιν καὶ τὰς κτήσεις καὶ τἆλλα πάντα). Even if in the following passage Diodorus admits that Antipater abolished the Athenian democracy, installed a garrison and deported more than 12,000 Athenians to Thrace, he concludes that the Athenians were satisfied with these "humane" treatments "beyond their hopes", and quickly "lived in peace and prosperity" (Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν οὖν παρ᾽ ἐλπίδα φιλανθρωπευθέντες ἔτυχον τῆς εἰρήνης καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἀταράχως πολιτευόμενοι καὶ τὴν χώραν ἀδεῶς

1 Diodorus (16.14.5, frag.21.5) clearly cites the Athenian historian Diyllos as one of his source. For the affairs of Athens between the years 323 until 265 B.C., he may have consulted another Athenian local historian Philochorus (see Billows 1990, 339f.).

2 For Hieronymus as a historical figure in Diodorus, see Diod. 18.42.1, 50.4; 19.44.3, 100.1; Plut. Eum. 21.1. For Hieronymus as Diodorus' source, see Hornblower 1981, 18-75; Billows 1990, 329-336.

3 For details of Hieronymus' life and his close relationships with some key figures of Macedon, see Hornblower 1981, 5-17, 196-233; Billows 1990, app.3, no.51.

καρπούμενοι ταχὺ ταῖς οὐσίαις προσανέδραμον).[1] Similarly, the settlement of 317 B.C. was in his opinion not oppressive. Cassander made peace with the Athenians and chose Demetrius of Phalerum as the overseer of the city. Likewise Demetrius of Phalerum ruled the city peacefully and with goodwill toward the citizens.[2]

Hieronymus' own standpoint on the question why the Greeks lost the Lamian War might find an expression in Diodorus' account, where it is argued that the Athenians had revolted too quickly before their preparations were complete, and the divisions of the allied forces finally caused the failure.[3] These might be Hieronymus' own comments, for he witnessed the divisions in Eumenes' army and probably gained some insight into the problem of disunity. But more significant here is his assessment of the timing of the revolt, because it recalls Phocion's cautious attitude at the beginning of the Lamian War. Plutarch describes Phocion's debate with Hypereides, in which Phocion argued that he would support the war only when he saw the young men willing to hold their ranks, the rich contributing to the war tax and the orators no longer robbing the treasury. Leosthenes' initial victories did not persuade him to change his mind, but warned him of the danger of the short of resources.[4] These remarks, focusing upon the military preparations of the Athenians, clearly reveal that Phocion judged the outbreak of war as untimely. In views of this similarity in substance, it is possible to think that Plutarch, when he was presenting Phocion as an experienced and cautious military man in this affair, was influenced by Hieronymus or indirectly influenced by him through Diodorus. Diodorus does not name Phocion as an opponent against warfare, but he does remark

1 Diod. 18.18.1-6. Plutarch provides a similar description of the peace and prosperity in Athens under Antipater, but he obviously ascribes the orderly life to Phocion's virtues and leadership. By contrast, Antipater is depicted as a harsh and hypocritical tyrant (Plut. Phoc. 29.1-3). This praise of Antipater's dealings with Athens, as well as the later praises of Cassander and Demetrius of Phalerum, does not necessarily attest that Diodorus (or more probably his source Hieronymus) regards the Lamian War as a matter of futility. As argued below, Hieronymus ascribes the failure of the Greeks to their untimely preparations and disunity, which may suggest a kind of ambiguity in his general sympathy toward Macedon. See also Hornblower 1981, 171-179.

2 Diod. 18.74.3. Cf. 75.2.

3 Diod. 18.10.4: κυρωθέντος δὲ τοῦ ψηφίσματος προχειρότερον ἢ συνέφερεν οἱ μὲν συνέσει διαφέροντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔφασαν τὸν δῆμον τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὰ μὲν πρὸς εὐδοξίαν εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι, τοῦ δὲ συμφέροντος διημαρτηκέναι: προεξανίστασθαι γὰρ αὐτὸν τῶν καιρῶν καὶ πρὸς ἀνικήτους καὶ μεγάλας δυνάμεις ἐπιβάλλεσθαι διακινδυνεύειν μηδεμιᾶς ἀνάγκης κατεπειγούσης καὶ φρονήσει δοκοῦντα διαφέρειν μηδὲ ταῖς περιβοήτοις τῶν Θηβαίων συμφοραῖς νενουθετῆσθαι. For Diodorus' criticism of the disunity among the Greeks at Crannon, see Diod. 18.17.1.

4 Plut. Phoc. 23.4.

that there were some Greeks who were "superior in understanding" commended the Athenians' ambition for glory but chided their strategic inexpediency.

Although the fourth-century oratory and inscriptional sources provide us little information about Phocion, he seemed to be a disputable figure appearing in the works of some contemporary authors like Democharés, Duris of Samos, Idomeneus of Lampsacus, and most significantly, Demetrius of Phalerum. This attention attests Phocion's influence as a politician, but even more as a paradigm whose virtues and life-style became the object of literary scrutiny. Duris' assessment of Phocion's character and person may be influenced by moral judgments, while Demetrius of Phalerum presumably promoted his policies by introducing Phocion as a good moral example. Past judgments have identified Demetrius as a possible source of Plutarch, but usually ascribed this authorship to Demetrius' own political experience and his peripatetic background. It is argued, then, that the moral concerns of Demetrius as a ruler ought be accorded serious consideration, when Plutarch's biography overwhelmingly presents the moral superiority of Phocion. The literary rehabilitation of Phocion was preserved in Roman times, which explains the sympathetic tones expressed by Nepos. Plutarch not only recognized the value of primary sources and relied on them whenever possible, but also integrated the past bias of his sources into his own moral programme. Thus Phocion, in his minds, was not simply a virtuous man with Socratic allusions, but an active statesman whose virtues doubtlessly served his city.

2. Phocion's private life and political friendship

When he was a young man, Phocion attached himself to Chabrias the general as a close follower, profiting much thereby in military experience...Wherefore Chabrias, who was a good-natured and worthy man, made much of him and advanced him to enterprises and commands, making him known to the Greeks, and employing him in most affairs of moment.[1]

I take this passage from Plutarch's *Phocion* as the starting point for a discussion of Phocion's private life and social activities. It reveals that the Athenian general Chabrias assisted his young follower Phocion to learn military skills and to obtain political prominence. Any politician, whether ancient or modern, may agree that friends and advocates play a crucial role in promoting his success in public affairs. In a city like Athens where the democratic constitution allowed every citizen to freely express his opinions, the reliance on political friendship became more obvious. However, one shall first ask why Chabrias, a man well-known for his prestige and wealth,[2] chose to form friendship with an obscure Phocion. Plutarch's account of Phocion's private life, though scattered, does suggest that Phocion was a man with the same economic status as Chabrias, and like Chabrias, he cultivated social connections with other men of wealth and distinguished birth. What interests me, however, is Plutarch's ethical purposes in this aspect. Careful examination of Plutarch's narration reveals that he does not present Phocion as a poor man, but a man who preferred to live like the poor. This image corresponds to Plutarch's treatment of wealth within his programme of moral education. Likewise it is worthy of exploring the ethical principles that lie behind Plutarch's

1 Plut. Phoc. 6.1: νέος δὲ ὢν Χαβρίᾳ προσέμιξεν ἑαυτὸν τῷ στρατηγῷ καὶ παρείπετο, πολλὰ μὲν εἰς ἐμπειρίαν τῶν πολεμικῶν ὠφελούμενος. 6.4: ὅθεν εὐμενὴς ὢν ὁ Χαβρίας καὶ χρηστός, ἠγάπα καὶ προῆγεν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ πράξεις καὶ ἡγεμονίας, γνώριμον ποιῶν τοῖς Ἕλλησι, καὶ τὰ πλείστης ἄξια σπουδῆς ἐκείνῳ χρώμενος.

2 On Chabrias' wealth, see Nep. Chabr. 2-3; Dem. 59.33; APF 560f. On Chabrias' relationship to Eryximachos, who married a daughter of the wealthy and reputed Polyaratos, see Dem. 40.24. Cf. PA 11907; APF 462; LGPN II 469 Χαβρίας(2).

presentation of the friendship between Phocion and Chabrias. It certainly reflects Plutarch's belief in the value of old age, but more importantly, it reveals the significance of moral instruction in any form of education.

2.1 Phocion, a "poor" man

Plutarch judges Phocion's lineage as "not altogether ignoble or lowly"(μὴ παντάπασιν εἶναι γένους ἀτίμου καὶ καταπεπτωκότος), but he has very little to say about Phocion's family background. From him we merely know that Phocion's father was Phocus who, according to Idomeneus of Lampsacus, worked as a pestle-maker.[1] Plutarch refutes this view by emphasizing the silence of sources: Why did other authors, including the bitterest enemies of Phocion, not preserve at least some part of the description of Phocion's dishonorable birth? Moreover, he assumes that Phocion's education at Plato's Academy could support the argument for his notable origin. It has been argued that Plutarch's disapproval of Idomeneus is in accordance with his criticism of the scandalous description of the famous Athenian leaders, which was established by Theopompus of Chios and was inherited by Idomeneus.[2] Plutarch's familiarity with the work of Idomeneus is well attested, and to judge from the way in which he refutes Idomeneus' statements in other *Lives*, this view seems to be persuasive.[3] But what surprises us is that Idomeneus only furnished Plutarch with this one passage. If there were more accusations against Phocion, it seems unlikely that Plutarch would simply omit them. It is worth noting that Nepos has nothing to say about Phocion's childhood and upbringing, and Plutarch likewise may have a difficult time collecting material pertaining to the early days of Phocion. Even Idomeneus, who usually ridicules the Athenian politicians even fabricates stories, provided him only meager information. Apart from this discussion of Phocus' occupation, his activities in daily life and his role

1 Plut. Phoc. 4.1-2. On Phocus, Phocion's father, see PA/APF 15080; LGPN II 468 Φῶκος(3).
2 Tritle 1988, 19f. For a general discussion of Plutarch's reliance on Theopompus and the way he transformed the materials critical of his heroes, see Connor 1968, 112-116.
3 See above p. 16.

in his son's upbringing are not indicated anywhere. Moreover, nothing is known about the maternal side of Phocion's family.

L.A. Tritle suggests that the trierarch Phocion, whose name was recorded in an inscription dated in 412/1 B.C., may have been the grandfather of the general Phocion.[1] The general Phocion was a member of the tribe Leontis, which is supported by two separate references. A bouleutic inscription of 336/5 B.C. lists a councilor named Phocion who represented the deme Potamioi (ποτάμιοι) of the tribe Leontis.[2] In view of the date and Phocion's enthusiasm in political affairs, it is possible that this Phocion is the general himself. In a list of second century which records Athenian dedications, we find a man named "Περιγένης Φωκίωνος Εὐπυρίδης".[3] The deme Eupyridai also belonged to the tribe Leontis. Though the second Phocion belonged to a different deme, it is not impossible that he could be a descendant of Phocion the general, because an Athenian could change his ancestry deme due to adoption or the selection of bouleutai.[4] This second Phocion might be the archon who held office in 121/0 B.C..[5] Moreover, it is known that Phocion owned a house, which was located in the deme Melite that belonged to the tribe Kekropis, but this information attests nothing about his demotic.[6]

Phocion married twice. The only surviving detail about his first marriage is that his wife was a sister of the sculptor Cephisodotus of the deme Sybridai.[7] His brother-in-law was an artist who contributed to the building of the sanctuary of Zeus, surnamed Savior, in Megalopolis.[8] Another member of this family, Praxiteles, was also reputed to be an excellent artist, and Praxiteles' success probably enabled his son Cephisodotus to enjoy a high economical position among his contemporaries. The younger Cephisodotus was known to be one of the 300 richest citizens of Athens before 325/4 B.C., for he

1 IG I^3 1190, 3; Tritle 1988, 36. Cf. APF 15076, PAA 967525.
2 SEG 19, 149; Agora XV 42, 206. Cf. PAA 967705.
3 Tritle 1988, 37 n.12.
4 Lacey 1968, 146; Tritle 1988, 38. For illegal bouleutic complement, see also Ath. Pol. 62.1; Bicknell 1972, 5. Presumably, Phocion' involvement in such illegal affair was at odds with his reputation of probity, and a study of the quota variations of deme representation shows that the bouleutic representation of the tribe Leontis was remarkably stable in the fourth century, see Bicknell 1972, 4; Traill 1975, 18. Thus it seems possible that Phocion's descendants changed their deme due to some unknown reasons.
5 On the archon Phocion, see PA 15075; Ferguson 1899, 89; Dinsmoor 1931, 33, 223, 272; also Dinsmoor 1938, 25, 199, 201; Pritchett and Meritt 1940, table xxxiii; LGPN II 468 Φωκίων(4); PAA 967560.
6 Plut. Phoc. 18.8.
7 Plut. Phoc. 19.1.
8 Paus. 8.30.10.

remarkably served as syntrierarch for at least five times.[1] The prosperity of this family in later generation, however, informs us little about the reason for their early connection with Phocion. More obscure is Phocion's second marriage. The name and identity of his second wife remain unknown, and Plutarch only praises her sobriety and simple lifestyle. She was still alive when Phocion was executed in 318 B.C.[2]

Phocion had a daughter who was married to a certain Charicles whose family background is obscure to us. Charicles is only known for his trial in the Harpalus-affair. After Harpalus, a Macedonian noble and friend of Alexander, had run away out of Babylon with a large sum of money and landed in Attica, Charicles became his intimate associate and was trusted in everything. He was once responsible for building a very expensive monument for Harpalus's beloved courtesan Pythonice, and charged thirty talents for this work.[3] When the Athenians were dealing with the corruptive conduct of Harpalus, Charicles was brought to trial. As he appealed to his father-in-law to appear in court with him, Phocion rejected by claiming that he made association with Charicles only for just proposes.[4] As for the result of this trial, we know that Demosthenes and Demades were convicted of guilty, while another defendant Aristogeiton was acquitted.[5] Since Plutarch records that Phocion and Charicles jointly took care of the upbringing and education of the daughter of Harpalus, it is likely that Charicles after the trial still remained in Athens, and Phocion's refusal to defend did not result in the estrangement between both men. Their good relationship may be further proved by the fate of Charicles in 318 B.C., who was condemned to death in absentia at the time of Phocion's

1 The relationship between Cephisodotos and Praxiteles is uncertain due to the lack of evidence. Kirchner (PA 8333) has reconstructed the stemma of Cephisodotos' family and conjectured that Praxiteles was his younger brother. It has also been argued that Cephisodotos might be Praxiteles' father. Referring from the birth-date of Cephisodotos and Praxiteles' demotic, Davies (APF 286-289) argues that Cephisodotos was probably the latter's father-in-law.

2 Plut. Phoc. 19, 37.5.

3 Paus. 1.37.5; Plut. Phoc. 22.1. For the luxury funerary monument of Pythonice, see Engels 1998, 123.

4 Plut. Phoc. 22.4. Plutarch undoubtedly cites this anecdote to portray the incorruptible character of Phocion. Badian (1961, 31f.) calls Phocion a "shrewd politician" who, in spite of his intimate relationship with Harpalus, avoided involving himself in this affair. Likewise Singh (1971, 230) takes Phocion's disapproval of Charicles' association with Harpalos as a parallel to Eubulus, who refused to defend his cousin Hegesilaos when the latter was accused of supporting the traitor Plutarch in the Euboean campaign.

5 On Demosthenes' fine, see Plut. Dem. 26.2; Vit. dec. orat. 846c; Din. 1.60; Goldstein 1971, 20f. On the exile of Demades, see Din. 1.29. Badian (1961, 35 n.146) suggests that Demades went into exile due to panic, for Dinarchus mentions that his flight preceded his trial. On Aristogeiton's acquittal see Dem. Ep. 3.37.

execution.[1] Presumably he remained politically associated with his father-in-law and thus fled into exile.

The scanty evidence of Phocion's family background supplies little information about his origin, and his two marriages, as well as that of his daughter, do not suggest any affiliation with known noble families. Nevertheless, fragmentary evidence does bear witness to his wealth. To begin, Phocion's service as a trierarch illuminates his financial standing. After the battle of Naxos, Chabrias sent Phocion to collect the contributions of islanders and bring the money back to Athens. For this purpose he offered Phocion twenty trieremes, but Phocion rejected it and argued that such a large force would not be needed for conferring with allies. Instead he sailed out only with his own trireme (τῇ αὐτοῦ τριήρει) and successfully accomplished his mission.[2] The expression "with his own trireme" indicates that Phocion provided a voluntary contribution which was based on his capacity of financing a ship. The expenditure for a trireme usually included the maintenance of ship equipment and the pay and provisions of crews, both of which entailed huge costs.[3] In the fourth century the Athenian individual trierarchs were more heavily burdened than before, since the state frequently provided them with inadequate funds, or sometimes none at all.[4] Therefore, Phocion's service with his own ship was certainly an expensive business, which suggests that his family at least belonged to the liturgical class. This evidence would reconcile the assumption that his grandfather once served as a trierarch, thus continuing a tradition of trierarchic service in his family. The death of Phocion the elder and the long duration of the Peloponnesian War did not impoverish this family, while many Athenian families, including those of propertied, became poor during the course of that war. Rather, Phocion lived with considerable wealth and continued to make liturgical contribution to the state.

The report of Phocion's reputation for generosity also supports the credibility of his wealth. From the *Suidas* we know that the Athenian assembly bestowed the epithet "the Good" (χρήστος) upon him, because he provided financial assistance to his fellow

1 Plut. Phoc. 33.4, 35.4; Singh 1971, 229.
2 Plut. Phoc. 7.2.
3 Jordan 1975, 91-93; Gabrielsen 1994, 111, 125.
4 Gabrielsen 1994, 114-118. For general discussion about liturgy in Athens, see also Wilson 2000; Christ 2006; Liddel 2007.

citizen Phrynon.[1] Phocion's enthusiasm for charity is also reflected in his benefaction to the orphan daughter of Harpalus, whom he raised with great care.[2] The word "χρήστος" can be interpreted as "good", "useful" or "serviceable", and this epithet may simply have been alluding to a reputation for active service for the interest of city.[3] Hypereides, in his oration *In Defense of Euxenippus*, describes a "good citizen" as one who cared for the public interest and the harmony of citizens rather than pursuing his own profits.[4] This epithet may reflect that Phocion's charitable act was so well-known in Athens that he was awarded in public. If so, it could provide certain insight into Phocion's economic status. He must have been a man with substantial wealth, because a poor family was unable to support these benefactions which sometimes did not demand corresponding repayment.

There is an anecdote in Plutarch, in which Phocion was many times asked by the Athenians to contribute to a public sacrifice, and he refused it on the ground that he was still indebted to Callias the money-lender. This anecdote, without any information indicating the date and the occasion of the event, simply suggests that Phocion was a man of means that all Athenians learned of it and repeatedly required him to make contributions.[5] It was regarded as the duty of the "good demagogue" (ἀγαθῶν δημαγωγῶν) to donate money to the state,[6] but it seems unlikely that the Athenians would insist on compelling a poor one to do so. Rather than emphasizing Phocion's poverty, this anecdote, if it were true, attests that his property was rich enough for spending on liturgies, but at that time he obviously met financial hardship. It was not uncommon that a wealthy Athenian had to borrow money for spending on certain

1 Suidas, 4. 769, Φρύνων καὶ Φιλοκράτης: Φωκίων δὲ ὁ Φώκου πολλοῖς χρήματα ἔδωκε καὶ θυγατέρας συνεξέδωκε καὶ πᾶσιν ἀνίει τὰ αὑτοῦ. χρηστὸς οὖν ἐκλήθη κοινῇ ψήφῳ ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ: δικάζων δὲ ἀεὶ τὴν σῴζουσαν ἔφερεν. ὃ δὲ ἐπὶ Σατύρου φησὶν ὁ Δημοσθένης ἕνεκα τῶν Ἀπολλοφάνους θυγατέρων, τοῦτο εἰς Φωκίωνά τινες ἀναφέρουσι καί φασιν ὅτι λαβὼν αὐτὰς εἰς Ἀθήνας ἤγαγε καὶ ἐξέδωκεν. For the story of Satyrus, see Dem. 19.194-5. Diodorus (17.15.2), Nepos (Phoc. 1.1) and Plutarch (Phoc. 10.4) only mention Phocion's epithet, but none of them offers explanation for it. Erskine (2018, 249 esp. n.74) doubts this explanation in Suidas on the ground that it receives no support from the surviving inscriptions in which the term does not appear, but his opinion that this epithet reflects an endorsement of Phocion's conservative political stance is also speculative.

2 Plut. Phoc. 22.3.

3 Tritle 1988, 143 n.21.

4 Hyp. 4.37; Tritle 1988, 143.

5 Plut. Phoc. 9.1; Gehrke (1976, 137) doubts the authenticity of this anecdote.

6 Lys. 27.10.

expensive expenditures.[1]

Additional information about Phocion's wealth might be expected from the life of his son Phocus. The existing evidence portrays a disreputable image of Phocus. Diogenes of Babylon presents the notoriety of the young man's dissolute life: Every Athenian loathed him and abused him as disgrace to his family. This was because he used up his entire ancestral inheritance on profligate behavior, and he was unable to resist the pleasure of drinking.[2] Plutarch agrees that Phocus was fond of wine and ostentatious display of luxury. After his victory in equestrian vaulting at the Panathenaic festival, Phocus became popular in Athens and was invited to numerous banquets. In a particular banquet the preparations were magnificent, and the guests were offered foot-basins of spiced wine as they entered the house. Such a scene shocked Phocion, who called his son over and warned him that his friends were spoiling his victory. Fearing that Phocus might be corrupted by dissolute and licentious conduct, Phocion even took the young man off to Sparta and required him to be disciplined with the Spartan "agoge".[3] This conduct not only vexed the Athenians, as they rebuked Phocion for despising and looking down his native custom, but also proved out to be useless in terms of Phocus' bad reputation in later times. After his father's death, Phocus proved himself to be an incompetent man who achieved nothing of lasting significance. Plutarch only mentions that he was captured by his passion for eros and ransomed a slave-girl who was kept in a brothel.[4] In general, Phocus' dissolute life and incompetence are sharply contrasted with the virtue and achievements of his father.

These negative accounts of Phocus, of course, are used by Plutarch to fit the aim of narrative, highlighting the character and virtues of Phocion. It is worth noting, however, that Phocus' activities reveal the economical status of his family. Phocus was allowed to compete in equestrian vaulting, because his father hoped that the care and training of the body might make him a better man.[5] In other words, his family could afford the costs of

1 Cf. Dem. 50.7; Dion. Hal. Is. 13. Jones (1957, 57f.) says that erratic incidence of taxation may cause temporary embarrassment of the rich.
2 Athen. 4.168e-169a.
3 Plut. Phoc. 20.4-5.
4 Plut. Phoc. 38.3-4.
5 Plut. Phoc. 20.1. Phocus's victory is also mentioned by Athenaeus (4.168f-169a). On the young age of

horse keeping and competition. In Athens the breeding and training of horses and other aspects of horsemanship would have required ample resources, and owning horses was usually viewed as a form of wealth. Early in the sixth century B.C. when the lawgiver Solon divided the Athenian citizens into four classes, the members of the second class were those whose land could produce annually three hundred measures of grain or who could furnish themselves with horse.[1] A list of the Athenian competitors in the four- and two-horse contests at Panhellenic Games from 600 to 300 B.C. shows that those who participated in chariot racing were the members of only fourteen families, twenty-five of whom came from three aristocratic families (Alcmeonidai, Philaidai/Cimonids, Cleinias-Alcibiades).[2] The small group of competitors corresponds to the high costs of horse keeping. Evidence in both Aristophanes and Lysias suggests that the merely buying a horse cost as high as 1,200 drachmae,[3] and more expenditure would have been spent on selecting brilliant horses, daily feeding and proper training.[4] In this respect, Phocus' victory supports the view that he lived in a family belonging to the propertied class, from which he could get the best resources for an illustrious performance in the competition. Phocus was still a rich man after his father's death. His bad reputation for consuming his ancestral property certainly indicates that Phocion left a large sum of inheritance for him to squander recklessly. Moreover, Plutarch indicates that Phocus, like his father Phocion, had leisure time for indulging in philosophical lectures.[5] After he had heard the discourse of the philosopher Theodorus of Cyrene in the Lyceum, who claimed that ransoming a woman beloved is no more disgraceful than ransoming a man, he purchased that slave-girl.[6] This piece of evidence supports the view that Phocus was a man of considerable means which freed him from the necessity of working.

Phocus as well as the date of his contest, see Kyle 1987, 213 n.A70; Shear 2001, 301f.

1 Ath. Pol. 7.4.

2 Davies 1984, 167f. (Appendix III). Cf. Kyle 1987, 195ff. (Appendix B).

3 Aristoph. Cl. 21-23; Lys. 8.10. Cf. Davies 1984, 100 n.15 and 101. Isaeus (5.43) mentions a certain Dicaeogenes who possessed no horse worth more than 300 drachmae, so that he "did not ruin himself by keeping horses".

4 Anderson 1961, 92-97.

5 Phocion's attendance at Academy also implies his wealth. Although Plato did not charge tuition fees, it is clear that only those who could afford to provide themselves with a livelihood would be able to be members of his school for a long time.

6 Plut. Phoc. 38.3.

Considering these pieces of evidence, it at first seems surprising that Plutarch describes Phocion as a poor man. In chapter 30 Plutarch praises Phocion as a man who "displayed the poverty as a virtue"(ὡς ἀρετὴν ἐπεδείκνυτο τὴν πενίαν).[1] The word πενία originally means "poverty" or "need", but it is necessary to interpret a single word in combination with the context. In this chapter Plutarch highlights the incorruptibility of Phocion and especially compares him with Demades, a man who was also an influential politician in Athens but who, as Plutarch has claimed in the proemial opening of this *Life,* failed to equal him precisely in virtues.[2] Plutarch introduces the comparison by citing the words of Antipater, who admitted that Phocion was the one he could never persuade to take anything, while he treated Demades as a none too greedy man who could never be satisfied with gifts. Furthermore, Plutarch explains the greed of Demades for gratifying his vanity. Demades was so keen on making a great parade of his wealth, even though he was violating the laws to do so. Phocion, on the contrary, neither received money gifts nor pursued lavish displays of luxury and wealth, and as a result, he was naturally poorer than Demades. Demades' superiority in wealth exactly reflects his inferiority in moral virtues. This passage, therefore, is highly moralizing. Plutarch is referring to Phocion's simple life-style and how he rejected to gain wealth by yielding to selfish and base desires. There is little to show the real family background of Phocion.

Phocion's refusal of gift is a story repeatedly told by his two biographers. Nepos claims that Phocion "was always in moderate circumstances", because he was a man of righteousness and refused to make his wealth through "the frequent offices and commissions which the people conferred upon him". From the outset of biography Nepos makes it clear that Phocion was better known as an upright politician than a capable general, and the anecdote that he refused to accept the gift of King Philip appears to be deliberately chosen to support this view.[3] The same story is also told by Plutarch, but in two separate passages.[4] Instead of Philip, it was King Alexander who

1 Plut. Phoc. 30.5.
2 Plut. Phoc. 1.1-3.
3 Nep. Phoc. 2: fuit enim perpetuo pauper, cum divitissimus esse posset propter frequentes delatos honores potestatesque summas, quae ei a populo dabantur. For the story of Phocion's refusal of Philip's money gift, see Nep. Phoc. 1.3-4.
4 Plut. Phoc. 18.1-6; 30.1-4.

sent envoys to Phocion and made attempts to persuade him, and on another occasion a Macedonian Menyllus tried to offer Phocion money gift by stressing the needs of his children. Under all circumstances Phocion refused to take anything. The similarity in substance suggests the possibility that Plutarch may have borrowed these stories from Nepos. Even so, they surely served his purpose of presenting Phocion's moral virtues.

Yet what interests me here is a scene which has been usually taken as evidence of Phocion's poverty. According to Plutarch, Alexander's envoys accompanied Phocion to his home and witnessed that Phocion himself drew water from the well and washed his feet, while his wife kneading bread. Impressed by what they had seen, they were indignant and claimed it as intolerable that a friend of Alexander should live in such poverty, and persuaded him more urgently to accept the gift of the king. There are two points that needed to be further explained. First, the absence of servants in this passage is questionable. Plutarch, in the later context, certainly indicates that Phocion and his wife lived with several servants.[1] Second, the act of refusal undoubtedly reflects Phocion's incorruptibility, and probably suggests his preference to simple lifestyle, but it is unrelated to his economic status. Like the contrast with Demades, Plutarch simply implies that Phocion gave up the chance of enriching himself. If we assume that Phocion was indeed a rich man, as evidence pertaining to his and his son's activities suggests, it seems not illogical that he would refuse money gifts and prefer to pursue a simple manner of life. The envoys of Alexander, as well as the modern readers, might be deceived by such pursuit of simplicity.

It is not necessary to know whether Plutarch was aware of Phocion's wealth. On the contrary, what he intended to do is to employ austerity and simplicity, or in his moralizing language "control of passions", as a theme in characterizing Phocion. Evidence can also be found in *Moralia*. *De Cupiditate Divitiarum* is an essay which warns the reader of the detrimental effects of wealth, in which we find a contrast between an austere Phocion on the one hand and a lavish Demades on the other.[2] Unlike the

1 Plut. Phoc. 19.3; 37.5. Cf. Tritle 1988, 44.

2 Plut. De cup. div. 525c: ὁ γοῦν Δημάδης ἐπιστὰς ἀριστῶντί ποτε Φωκίωνι καὶ θεασάμενος αὐτοῦ τὴν τράπεζαν αὐστηρὰν καὶ λιτήν,'θαυμάζω σ᾽ ὦ Φωκίων' εἶπεν 'ὅτι οὕτως ἀριστᾶν δυνάμενος πολιτεύῃ.' αὐτὸς γὰρ εἰς τὴν γαστέρα ἐδημαγώγει, καὶ τὰς Ἀθήνας μικρὸν ἡγούμενος τῆς ἀσωτίας

contrast at the beginning of the *Life* of Phocion, where Plutarch frames the contrast of two men, here Demades himself observes their different attitudes toward wealth. He despises Phocion's austerity and plainness as insufficient for political engagement, but clearly, it is he who should be criticized for his passions for wealth and gluttonous. Plutarch calls Demades "a demagogue to full his belly", and to reinforce his point, as in the *Life* of Phocion, he introduces Antipater as witness for character assessment: The old Demades was compared to a carcass when the butchers had finished, as nothing remained but his tongue and gut. The reason for such a sarcastic remark was Demades' own greed, for his desire for prodigality could not be satisfied by Athens alone, but even called for supplies from Macedon. Although Plutarch here does not explicitly express any praise for Phocion, the moral judgment seems to be delivered through the contrast itself. The proud Demades was in fact afflicted by irrational desires, whereas Phocion, whose austere and simplistic lifestyle distinguishes him from the former, is thus a positive ethical model.

Lastly, the refusal of gifts occurs also in the *Lives* of Marcus Cato and his great grandson, Phocion's counterpart Cato Uticensis. Marcus Cato's frugal meal, simple raiment and humble dwelling were well-known and admired in Rome, and he kept his mode of life unaltered to the last. With preference to self-restraint and simple mode of life, he refused the gifts of the ambassadors of the Samnites.[1] Similarly, Cato the Younger not only refused to receive anything from Deiotarus the Galatian, but also prevented his friends to do so.[2] These tales are narrated when they help to manifest the heroes' austerity and moderation as moral virtues; however, it is misleading to argue that Plutarch despises the acceptance of any gift. The action itself is not wrong if the receiver used the gifts in a proper and noble way. The *Life* of Aristides starts with the reference to the hero's reputation as a poor man, in which Plutarch also mentions Epaminondas and Plato the philosopher as examples who lived in poverty and received the money from rich friends. But these men, as he argues, spent it for public performances rather than

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ἐφόδιον ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονίας ἐπεσιτίζετο: καὶ διὰτοῦτ᾽ Ἀντίπατρος εἶπε θεασάμενος αὐτὸν γέροντα καθάπερ ἱερείου διαπεπραγμένου μηδὲν ἔτι λοιπὸν ἢ τὴν γλῶσσαν εἶναι καὶ τὴν κοιλίαν.

1 Plut. Cat. Ma. 2.2, 4.2f., 6.1-3.

2 Plut. Cat. Min. 15.

increasing their wealth as ignoble and mean, so Epaminondas and Plato are established here as sources of inspiration for Plutarch's readers.[1] Plutarch may not give lengthy discussions of the family background in each life, sometimes due to the lack of evidence, but nonetheless in the *Parallel Lives* domestic circumstance is a moralizing space in which his heroes can reflect on their character and virtue, especially their attitude toward wealth.[2]

Though the evidence is limited, it indicates that Phocion was a rich man. The substantial wealth not only provided him with ample resources for political activities, but also enabled his son to consume with profligacy. Given the demand of leisure time and the necessity of prestige, it would not be difficult to presume that those who played a much more significant role in Athenian politics were mostly the citizens of means. We have no way of knowing how exactly Phocion built up the relationship with Chabrias, but it is likely that his family's wealth enabled him to be free from hard labour and attend the Academy, where he probably met Chabrias. Phocion's simple lifestyle, which creates the misleading impression that he lived in poverty, conforms to Plutarch's concern for the proper attitude towards wealth, which he repeatedly stresses in other *Lives* and in *Moralia*.

2.2 Social activities and relations

In the *Phocion* Plutarch mentions that Phocion "was still a stripling" (μειράκιον ὤν) while being a pupil of Plato, and in *Adversus Colotem* he names Chabrias and Phocion among those who "came out of the Academy" and took active part in the affairs of state.[3] This list not only provides us with additional information about the pupils of

1 Plut. Arist. 1.4.

2 Plutarch has a particularly sharp focus on wealth, because it easily leads to corruption in both personal morality and public affairs. Considering the Platonic influence on his political and moral thought, it is interesting to connect his concerns with Plato's shaping of the characters of "the guardians" in terms of resistance to wealth (Rep. 416e-417a).

3 Plut. Phoc. 4.2; Adv. Col. 1126c. Tritle (1988, 51) compares this list with that provided by Diogenes Laertius (3.24), who omits both Chabrias and Phocion as the pupils of Plato. Instead Diogenes Laertius (6.76) mentions Phocion as a hearer to Diogenes of Sinope.

Plato, but also argues that the Academy did focus on the practical effects of philosophy in politics.[1] Though it was quite possible that Phocion through his close relationship with Chabrias became acquainted with Plato and attended the Academy,[2] this view is still conjectural due to the lack of convincing evidence. Neither Plutarch nor any other sources indicate any direct assistance Chabrias provided Phocion for socializing. It is also mistaken to suggest that they often studied philosophy together. Considering Chabrias' active military service during the early years of the Academy, it is chronologically unlikely that he frequently indulged himself in philosophical pursuits. Chabrias made his first appearance in history in 393 B.C., when he was appointed by the Athenians as general and was sent to Corinth to replace Iphicrates.[3] During a period from 386 until 380 B.C. he served as a mercenary leader for the king of Egypt in revolt from Persia.[4] After his return he was engaged in the warfare against the Spartans, and Phocion also participated in the battle of Naxos in 376 B.C.. The Oropus trial in 366 B.C. forced Chabrias into temporary obscurity, but in 363/2 B.C. he was again elected as general, and soon he was recruited by King Tachos of Egypt for an expedition against Persia.[5] In 359 B.C. Chabrias returned to Athens and was elected general, and two years later he died in Chios. Being an experienced and prominent general who served both his homeland and foreign kings, Chabrias would have had little time for more than occasional lecture or symposium.

To attend the lectures at the Academy may be Phocion's own decision, and Chabrias' appearance, though rather infrequently, probably made them more familiar with each other. Just as the political clubs of ancient Athens where men could extend their social network outside their own families, the Academy fulfilled a role for enhancing association among its members. Apart from Chabrias, Phocion's link with the Academy brought him into contact with a number of prominent figures. Foremost

1 Lynch 1972, 59 n.32.
2 Some scholars assume that Chabrias may be related to Plato on onomastic grounds. Cf. APF 561; Tritle 1988, 50f.
3 Diod. 14.92.2.
4 Diod. 15.29.1-4. Cf. Dem. 20.76.
5 RO 39, 18; Nep. Chabr. 2.3; Diod. 15.92.3; Plut. Ages. 37.1, 5.

among them was Leon of Byzantium.[1] Their good relationship was clearly demonstrated in the alliance between Athens and Byzantium against Philip of Macedon in 340 B.C..[2] When an Athenian force under the command of Phocion arrived at Byzantium, Leon, who was said to be "the first among the Byzantians for virtue" (ἀνὴρ Βυζαντίων πρῶτος ἀρετῇ) and thus was influential, was willing to make surety for Phocion with his city. Although Plutarch remarks that Phocion at that time "was held in high repute" (ἦν μὲν γὰρ ἤδη μεγάλη δόξα τοῦ Φωκίωνος) in Byzantium, Leon's assistance obviously enhanced his reliability as an ally, so that the Athenian force was allowed to enter the city and garrison it. With such trust and support from the local inhabitants, Phocion succeeded in saving the city from Philip's siege, and pursued the retreating Macedonians until he was wounded.

Except for the influence of Leon, the goodwill the Byzantians showed to Phocion might derive from another reason. Before Phocion the Athenian general Chares was dispatched to aid Byzantium, but he in fact achieved nothing. According to Plutarch, this hostility was not only inspired by Chares's ineffectiveness in military actions, but also by his extortion of money from the allies. Thus Byzantium, as well as other cities, rejected to receive the Athenian army into their harbors.[3] Such ungrateful attitude greatly enraged the Athenians who debated to recall their force, while Phocion alone pleaded for the Byzantians by claiming that the Athenians should be angry with their generals for being so distrusted by allies. Eventually the Athenians were persuaded and voted to send him with another force to the relief of Byzantium, and in Plutarch's opinion, it was an action that "contributed more than anything else to the salvation of Byzantium" (ὃ μεγίστην ῥοπὴν ἐποίησε πρὸς τὸ σωθῆναι τὸ Βυζάντιον).

Plutarch was evidently concerned to show Phocion as a savior of Byzantium, both in political and military fields. He remarkably refers to some "orators" (οἱ ῥήτορες), who at first strove to have Chares sent out as commander, and after his failure instigated the people against their allies. Compared with these men, Phocion not only had the insight

1 For a general discussion of Leon and Academy, see Trampedach 1994, 97-100.
2 Plut. Phoc. 14.
3 It shall be remembered that Byzantium was one of the revolting cities in the Social War, thus their hostility toward Athens was understandable.

into the significance of an alliance against a strong enemy, but also was courageous to array himself against the anger and impulse of the Athenians. As a politician he acted as he thought the best for Athens, irrespective of personal gain or popularity. While being a general, Phocion showed his military capacity by repulsing Philip's attack and even applying pressure on the enemy's position. Here Plutarch is presenting the military sphere as a setting for displaying the strength of political friendship: Chares was no doubt responsible for the failure of the first expedition, because he impressed the allies that the Athenian force was interfering in an area of considerable interest to her rather than helping them. While having the right friend as a spokesman, Phocion found the support he needed to operate effectively.

Another member of the Academy who was probably familiar with Phocion was Xenocrates.[1] Plutarch reports that Phocion later also became a pupil of him.[2] Such contact could be easily maintained, if Phocion occasionally attended lectures and symposia of Xenocrates. Phocion and Xenocrates commonly appeared in an embassy to Antipater in 322 B.C., but the most important reason for adding Xenocrates to the embassy, as Plutarch says, was the hope of the Athenians that Antipater would pay respect to him and then offer mild terms to them. Nevertheless, Antipater's arrogant reaction disappointed both Xenocrates and the Athenians.[3] Later it was said that after the establishment of the oligarchic regime Phocion offered to enroll Xenocrates as an Athenian citizen, so that the philosopher could be exempted from paying the resident alien tax. But Xenocrates refused it on the ground that he could not take part in an administration for the prevention of which he had served. The story that Xenocrates was unable to pay the alien tax is told in different versions. A similar description is found in

1 For Xenocrates and Academy, see D.L. 3.46, 4.6-15; Trampedach 1994, 141-143. For Xenocrates' relationship with Macedon, see Heckel 2006, 271.

2 Plut. Phoc. 4.2.

3 Plutarch (Phoc. 27) reports that Antipater insulted Xenocrates by ignoring him and then forced him to keep silence. The philosopher regarded the terms of peace as appropriate for slaves instead of free men and directly told Antipater so. Diogenes Laertius, on the contrary, suggests that Xenocrates was held in high regard in Macedon. Antipater not only sent him present, but also did him a favor by releasing the Athenians who were taken prisoners in the Lamian War. Accordingly, the scene of negotiation was totally different with that described by Plutarch. When Antipater came to Athens and greeted Xenocrates, the latter did not address him in return until he finished what he was speaking (D.L. 4. 8, 9, 11). By portraying Antipater as an insolent victor, Plutarch is likely stressing the desperate situation with which the Athenians had to face and justifying Phocion's inability to save his state from being occupied.

Vitae Decem Oratorum and in the *Flamininus*, where Lycurgus the orator assumed the role of benefactor, and his favor was received and praised by Xenocrates.[1] While in the *Phocion*, Xenocrates' refusal can be explained as a strong disfavor against the peace with Antipater, which he had explicitly expressed at the presence of the latter.[2]

Plutarch's narration of Phocion's trial informs us that Phocion was supported by some friends, though their names were unknown to us. One of them risked his life in his effort to assist Phocion, for he advised the people that the slaves and foreigners should be excluded from the assembly. His opinion was roughly rebuffed by the uproarious mass who cried out to stone the oligarchs and the haters of the people, so that no one else had the courage to speak in behalf of Phocion.[3] Similarly, Diodorus notes that those who made efforts to plead on Phocion's behalf were driven off with shouts and jeers.[4] After Phocion was condemned to death, some men still accompanied him to the prison, and one of them was the Euphiletus mentioned by Nepos.[5] Tritle supposed that these unnamed friends were probably Phocion's clubsmen, as it was popular in Athens that a politician was a member of one or more political clubs. Scholarly works on the Athenian political clubs have agreed that a basic principle of the club life was the mutual assistance between clubmen.[6] In his monograph on Athenian clubs, G.M.Calhoun particularly lists a variety of methods the clubmen employed to assist other members in lawsuits, including money contributions, counter-suits against the accusers or creating positive sentiment on the jury.[7] Such political friendship was certainly popular in Athens, but it is also possible that these so-called clubmen were simply sympathizing with Phocion. Diodorus and Plutarch agreed that they were only threatened by the furious people, but no evidence indicates that they were punished with those who were widely recognized as Phocion's political friends. Even if they were really Phocion's clubsmen, they seemed not to be his most intimate political friends.

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1 Plut. Phoc. 29.6. On Lycurgus see Plut. Flam. 12.7; Vit. dec. orat. 842b. Other sources see Acad. ind. Herc., col. VIII, 2, in which Demades rescued Xenocrates. Diogenes Laertius (4.14) says that Demetrius of Phalerum purchased the liberty of Xenocrates by making twofold restitution.
2 Cf. Trampedach 1994, 142f.
3 Plut. Phoc. 34.5; Tritle 1988, 48f.
4 Diod. 18.67.2.
5 Plut. Phoc. 36.1; Diod. 18.67.3; Nep. Phoc. 4.3-4.
6 Connor 1971, 26f.; Tritle 1988, 48f.
7 Calhoun 1913, 40-96.

Lastly, it is necessary to identify those who were accused and punished together with Phocion in 318 B.C.. It is likely that these men, according to Plutarch seven in total, formed a group that supported Phocion politically and socialized with him privately.[1] The friends who chose to die with him included Nicocles, Thudippus, Hegemon and Pythocles. Plutarch twice describes Nicocles as the dearest friend of Phocion, and their close relationship was first demonstrated in 355 B.C.. When Alexander destroyed Thebes und demanded the surrender of some Athenian politicians whom he believed to be agitators, Phocion counseled the Athenians to obey the demand. In order to spare the city from the same catastrophe as that Thebes had suffered, he declaimed that he would be willing to hand over Nicocles even himself to Alexander. The intimate relationship between Phocion and Nicocles existed at least seventeen years long from 355 to 318 B.C., yet of Nicocles' own political activities nothing is known.[2]

If this Thudippus who was executed in 318 B.C. could be identified with Thudippus of Araphen, such an association may indicate Phocion's acquaintance with a wealthy Athenian family. Thudippus's father Cleon had been a treasurer of Athena in 377/6 B.C., and he himself served as trierarch in 323/2 B.C.. [3] His uncle Anaxippos was also politically active, who was overseer of the dockyards in 356/5 B.C..[4] The other two adherents, Pythocles and Hegemon, are known as active politicians and adversaries of Demosthenes.[5] Since Pythocles served as a syntrierarch, his family was obviously of considerable wealth.[6] Such evidence supports the argument that an Athenian politician usually derived political support from those of the same economic status and social standing.

Demetrius of Phalerum, Callimedon and Phocion's son-in-law Charicles took refuge

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1 Plut. Phoc. 35.4. Diodorus does not mention the names of Phocion's fellows.

2 Plut. Phoc. 17.3; 36.5. On Nicocles see also PA 10892; LGPN II 336 Νικοκλῆς (8).

3 On Thudippus' family see PA 7252, 7253, 8669; APF 228f; LGPN II 226 Θούδιππος (2). Aristotle (Pol. 1282a31) mentions that treasury officials, generals and the holders of the highest magistracies were chosen from among persons of large property. But a passage in *Athenaion Politeia* (47.1) suggests that the ten treasurers of Athena were actually elected by lot. At that time a law of Solon was still in force, according to which these ten men should be chosen from the Five-hundred-bushel class. Nevertheless, a quite poor man on whom the lot fell was still allowed to hold that office.

4 PA 815; LGPN II 29 Ἀνάξιππος (1).

5 Dem. 18.285; 19.225, 314. Cf. PA 6290; Cawkwell 1963, 54 n.48; Tritle 1988, 106f.

6 PA 12444; APF 485; LGPN II 387 Πυθοκλῆς(17).

in flight and thus escaped the death penalty. It is worth noting that Callimedon, a relative (either nephew or cousin) of the mid-fourth-century prominent politician Callistratus of Aphidna, was also a member of Phocion's political circle. Plutarch records that after the Lamian War Callimedon appeared as an envoy, together with Phocion and Demades, for peace negotiation with Antipater. Antipater insisted that a Macedonian garrison must be imposed in Athens and ridiculously questioned Phocion whether he would guarantee that the Athenians would remain peaceful and stir up no trouble. At that time Callimedon, surnamed "Crab", jumped up and cried loudly to Antipater: "Even if he should prate such nonsense, will you trust him and give up what you has planned to do? " Callimedon's outburst suggests that he strongly opposed the harsh demand of Antipater, while Plutarch describes him as "an arrogant man" and "a hater of democracy".[1] Evidence elsewhere shows that Callimedon advocated a policy conciliating and cooperating with the Macedonians. When Leosthenes held Antipater in siege in Lamia, Callimedon not only fled from Athens and joined the party of Antipater, but also made attempt to prevent the Greeks from revolting and attaching themselves to Athens. After the oligarchic government had taken power in 322 B.C., Callimedon appeared as one of the leading politicians in Athens until 318 B.C..[2] In spite of the above mentioned anecdote that describes his complaint against Antipater, he was in fact an ardent supporter of a policy bowing to Macedon's overwhelming military power.

More significant than Phocion's association with Callimedon was his early relationship with Callistratus. Being politically active in the first half of the fourth century, Callistratus aimed at making Athens the leading city of Greece by maintaining a balance of power. He at first united Thebes against the supremacy of Sparta. But when Thebes won the battle of Leuctra and became the new leading power in the Greek world, he opted for an alliance with Sparta. The Theban occupation of Oropus, a border town between Attica and Boeotia, resulted in Callistratus's fall from power in 366 B.C.. He and

1 Plut. Phoc. 27.9: ἀναπηδήσαντα Καλλιμέδοντα τὸν Κάραβον, ἄνδρα θρασὺν καὶ μισόδημον, εἰπεῖν: ‘ἐὰν δὲ οὗτος, ὦ Ἀντίπατρε, φλυαρῇ, σὺ πιστεύσεις καὶ οὐ πράξεις ἃ διέγνωκας;’

2 Plut. Dem. 27.2; Plut. Phoc. 33.4, 35.2. Athenaeus also mentions Callimedon as an active politician in the time of Demosthenes, but he was more famous for his gluttony. Cf. Athen. 3.100c-d, 104d, 6.242d, 8.338f, 339f, 340c, 13.614e. His son Agyrrhios, however, supported the leadership of Democharesthe nephew of Demosthenes, rather than following the policy of his father (PA 180; LGPN II 8 Ἀγύρριος(2)).

Chabrias were accused of treason, but both men were acquitted due to Callistratus's eloquent oratory.[1] Phocion seemed to give support to them during the Oropus controversy, because a passage from Plutarch's *Phocion* suggests that there was once a question of territory between Athens and Thebes, for which the Athenians preferred war to arbitration. During this discussion, Phocion counseled the Athenians not to fight with the Boeotians with arms, but with words.[2] This piece of evidence is in accordance with the account of Xenophon, who informs us that the Athenian generals had agreed to leave Oropus in the possession of the Thebans pending a judicial decision,[3] and such a decision would naturally be heatedly debated in the assembly. By arguing for peace instead of war, Phocion obviously made defense for the decision of both generals. In light of the political friendship between Callistratus and Chabrias, Phocion's open support for Callistratus derived in part from his good relationship with Chabrias. Perhaps through Chabrias, Phocion approached the political circle of Callistratus and extended his social connections.[4] Nearly forty years later after the death of Callistratus, this link further contributed to the political friendship between Phocion and Callimedon.

Our knowledge of Phocion's social connections is limited almost entirely to Plutarch's scattered references to it. The reference that both he and Chabrias joined Plato's Academy provides a possible reason for their association. Phocion may have made extensive use of his relationship with Chabrias to extend his social relations, but his political friends were not confined to the social circle of Chabrias and to the other members of the Academy. I have focused exclusively on the historical evidence supporting the friendship between Chabrias and Phocion, but taken Plutarch's purpose of moral education into account, it is necessary to analyze his interpretation of their relationship through a moral lens. In the next section, I argue that the friendship between Chabrias and Phocion was subtly constructed by Plutarch to illuminate the benefit of political apprenticeship. In views of Plutarch's emphasis on moral improvement,

1 On the trial see Dem, 21.64; Arist. Rhet. 1364a19-23, 1411b6-10; Plut. Dem. 5.1-4. For the relationship between Callistratus and Chabrias see Gehrke 1976, 18. For a detailed analysis of Callistratus' life and policy see Gehrke 1976, 19-22; Hochschulz 2007.
2 Plut. Phoc. 9.6.
3 Xeno. Hell. 7.4.1.
4 Gehrke 1976, 17-24.

however, it is unusual enough to merit special attention, because the old one was instructed by the young.

2.3 Political friendship: A form of moral education

Plutarch's presentation of the friendship between Chabrias and Phocion can be regarded as a kind of apprenticeship, because young Phocion learnt military experience from old Chabrias, and Chabrias, in return, enhanced his young adherent's reputation by employing him in enterprises and entrusting commands to him. It is certainly ethical rather than historical, because we rarely hear such kind of "teacher-pupil" relationship among Athenian generals. It is quite possible that young men with aspirations would attach themselves to respected generals to enhance their popularity, but political friendship was not equal to apprenticeship. For Plutarch, however, apprenticeship is a necessary step for the young, because he believes that the experienced old public men were capable of guiding the younger ones in their public praxis.[1] In *On whether old men should engage in public affair*s, Plutarch explicitly states the value of political apprenticeship by adhering to an old politician, who could assume the role of teacher and instruct the younger ones how to handle with public affairs. In order to support his view, Plutarch lists some famous pairs of old teachers and young pupils in politics, among whom are Chabrias and Phocion.[2] In *Life of Phocion*, Plutarch especially refers to the victory at Naxos in 376 B.C. as evidence for success of such learning. He states that Chabrias in this battle gave Phocion the command of the left wing, where "the battle raged hotly and the issue was speedily decided" (καθ᾽ ὃ καὶ τήν μάχην ὀξεῖαν εἶχεν ὁ ἀγὼν καὶ κρίσιν ἐποίησε ταχεῖαν). Entrusting such a crucial position to Phocion, Chabrias in fact put his young adherent in public limelight. This victory brought the Athenian commanders with good opportunity of advancing their political career. While

1 The notion that experienced public men could provided moral guidance can be traced to Plato (Prt. 317b-c, 320b; Rep. 328d-e). Cf. Xenophontos 2016, 143.
2 Plut. An seni resp. 791a.

acknowledging that Chabrias was praised and honored by his fellow-citizens,[1] Plutarch especially points out the Athenians' recognition of Phocion's contribution, whom they regarded as "a man fit for command" (ὡς ἀνδρὸς ἡγεμονικοῦ λόγον ἔσχεν).[2] In this passage, Plutarch makes it clear that Phocion benefited much from his affiliation with Chabrias, not merely in military skills and experience, but more remarkably in fame and popularity.

Before we further discuss Plutarch's notion of political apprenticeship, the accuracy of his account of the battle of Naxos comes under question. It is natural to assume that Plutarch eagers to emphasize the heroism of Phocion, which is reflected in his distortion of the sequence of events. His statement that Chabrias entrusted command of the left wing to Phocion appears to be ambiguous, because Diodorus' account informs us that Cedon was the initial commander of the Athenian left wing, who was killed by the Spartan naval admiral Pollis. Diodorus gives only a glimpse of this battle, but he does mention that Chabrias after the death of Cedon ordered a relief squadron to the left. While Diodorus does not reveal who commanded the reinforcements, Plutarch's remark allows us to infer that it was Phocion. Plutarch is also guilty of creating a misleading impression that Phocion's skill for commanding was immediately recognized by the Athenians. After this victory, however, he seemed not to be given any important command for a long time. Phocion hold the command again in the mid-fourth century. Polyaenus mentions his defeat in a battle against Athendorus, a general of the Persian king. Moreover, an Attic decree honoring the Persian satrap Orontes clearly shows that he shared command of an expedition with two other generals, Chares and Charidemus.[3] In the spring of 348 B.C., Phocion is known to have been general in command of Athenian forces in Euboea.[4] It is likely that the frequent changes in the political climate, such as Oropus trial and the personal rivalries between Callistratus, Chabrias and

1 On the honors see Aeschin. 3.243; Dem, 24.180; Tritle 1988, 61 n.29. From this victory Chabrias brought back to Athens much booty, but more remarkable was his prompt rescue of his own soldiers. Warned by what had happened to the generals after the battle of Arginousai, he would rather save his own men from the wrecks than pursue the defeated enemies.

2 Plut. Phoc. 6.6.

3 Polyaen. 5.21; IG II/III^3,1 295, frg.b-d, 29. Gehrke (1976, 43 n.19) dates the battle against Athendorus in 342/1 B.C., while Tritle (1988, 68) argues for an earlier date of 361/0 B.C. For the disputation on the date of the decree honoring Orontes, see Osborne 1971; Moysey 1987; Weiskopf 1989, 76-79.

4 Plut. Phoc. 12-13. Cf. Gehrke 1976, 32-36.

Timotheus, exerted much influence on Phocion's temporary absence from the Athenian political scene until mid-fourth century B.C.

Such obscurity, however, does not mean that Phocion during this period abstained from military affairs. Chabrias was still active. Shortly after the battle of Naxos he saved Abdera from the Triballians, and in 372 B.C. he was chosen by Iphicrates as one of his colleagues for an expedition in Corcyra.[1] In 369 B.C. he appeared as commander of an Athenian army to hold the Isthmos and defeated Epaminondas.[2] As we have seen, even after the Oropos trial he was again elected as general and served the Egyptian king Tachos. Phocion may have participated in any of these campaigns with his military mentor. His adherence to Chabrias did not bring him immediate political advancement, but he certainly benefited from it by gaining much military experience, which became the foundation of his later career as general. Perhaps Phocion's performance in these campaigns impressed the Athenians, so that in the mid-fourth century he is recorded as a commander. The death of Chabrias and Timotheus and the retirement of Iphicrates in mid-350s made a man of his military competence indispensable to Athens.

The friendship between Chabrias and Phocion undoubtedly conforms to Plutarch's conception of the value of the old man, but what seems to be striking in this pair is the reversed teacher-pupil relationship in views of their characters. Plutarch apparently warns the reader that good moral qualities do not necessarily come with old age and experience, when he presents Chabrias as an experienced general with obvious character deficiencies:

(Phocion attached himself to Chabrias)…sometimes also rectifying that general's temperament, which was uneven and violent. For though Chabrias was sluggish and hard to move at other times, in actual battle his spirit was excited and all on fire, and he would rush on with the boldness at too great a hazard, just as, without doubt, he actually threw away his life at Chios by being the first to drive his trireme to shore and trying to force a landing. So then Phocion, who allowed himself at once safe and active, would put ardor into Chabrias when he

1 On the battle of Abdera see Diod. 15.36.4. On the expedition in Corcyra see Xeno. Hell. 6.2.39.
2 Diod. 15.69.1-4; Xeno. Hell. 7.1.18-19.

delayed, and again would take away the unseasonable intensity of his efforts.[1]

Either sluggishness or rashness is the opposite of moderation; in other words, Chabrias lacked the ability to control his passions. By yielding to his own impulses rather than reason, Chabrias lowed himself to a level which is unfitting to his advanced age and accumulated military experience. Particularly, the circumstances of his death are at odds with the manner in which he should have conducted himself over a long military career. In the case of Chabrias, Plutarch makes it fairly easy for his readers to observe how his appreciation of the old age and experience is closely linked with moral virtues. Age is not the sole criterion determining who is the teacher. An old man who lacks moral training is evidently incapable of assuming the task of instruction; on the contrary, he himself needs moral guidance even from a younger man.

In *On whether old men should engage in public affairs*, Plutarch remarkably notes that the old man's instruction on the younger is in part determined by their superiority in moral virtues. Therefore, the old man's task is not only the teaching of practical experience, but also the character forming of his young follower. This task, according to Plutarch, conveys the Platonic notions pertaining to the subjugation of irrational emotions through rational activities. "Wherefore, even for the young men's sake, as has been said, ought an old man to act in the government of the state; that, as Plato said of pure wine mixed with water, that an insane God was made wise when chastised by another who was sober, so the caution of old age, mixed among the people with the fervency of youth, transported by glory and ambition, may take off that which is furious and over-violent."[2] The wisdom of old age is thus related with the obligation, which

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1 Plut. Phoc. 6.1-3: (…) ἔστι δὲ ἐν οἷς ἐπανορθούμενος τήν ἐκείνου φύσιν ἀνώμαλον οὖσαν καὶ ἄκρατον. νωθρὸς γὰρ ὢν ὁ Χαβρίας καὶ δυσκίνητος ἄλλως ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀγῶσιν ὤργα καὶ διεπυροῦτο τῷ θυμῷ καὶ συνεξέπιπτε τοῖς θρασυτάτοις παραβολώτερον, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ κατέστρεψε τόν βίον ἐν Χίῳ πρῶτος εἰσελάσας τῇ τριήρει καὶ βιαζόμενος πρὸς τήν ἀπόβασιν. ἀσφαλὴς οὖν ἅμα καὶ δραστήριος ὁ Φωκίων φαινόμενος τήν τε μέλλησιν ἀνεθέρμαινε τοῦ Χαβρίου, καὶ πάλιν ἀφῄρει τήν ἄκαιρον ὀξύτητα τῆς ὁρμῆς.

2 Plut. An seni resp. 791b-c: διὸ καὶ τῶν νέων ἕνεκα δεῖ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, πολιτεύεσθαι τὸν πρεσβύτην, ἵνα, ὃν τρόπον φησὶ Πλάτων ἐπὶ τοῦ μιγνυμένου πρὸς ὕδωρ ἀκράτου, μαινόμενον θεὸν ἑτέρῳ θεῷ νήφοντι σωφρονίζεσθαι κολαζόμενον, οὕτως εὐλάβεια γεροντικὴ κεραννυμένη πρὸς ζέουσαν ἐν δήμῳ νεότητα, βακχεύουσαν ὑπὸ δόξης καὶ φιλοτιμίας, ἀφαιρῇ τὸ μανικὸν καὶ λίαν ἄκρατον. For a list of Plato's own remark for the wisdom of old age, see Xenophontos 2016, 143.

prompts the old man to undertake to guide the younger one's moral progress. Inspired by the separate duties of the Vestal Virgins and by the sequence in the naming of the priestesses of Artemis, namely "prospective priestess", "priestess" and "ex-priestess", Plutarch divides the political life in three stages: learning, performing and teaching.[1] Accordingly, the moral education is presented as a lifelong process, during which the young learner later becomes the elder instructor.

The moral instruction of the old man is apparently described in Phocion's education of Ctesippus, the son of Chabrias. The nature of the young man was said to be "capricious and intractable" (ἔμπληκτος καὶ ἀνάγωγος). Although Phocion persisted in forming his character and correcting his wrongdoings, there seemed to be little moral progress in Ctesippus. Plutarch describes that the young man's disgraceful conducts once greatly troubled Phocion, so that he cried how large a return he made for his friendship with Chabrias in enduring Ctesippus.[2] Although Phocion failed to achieve his goal, his actions suggest that he was a good guardian and teacher who not only cared for Ctesippus' living, but paid enough attention to the development of the young man's character. This story also recalls Phocion's efforts to protect his own son Phocus from negative influence that could lead to moral deterioration.

Chabrias' death in Chios manifests the disastrous result of his character deficiencies. There are two reasons, I suggest, why Plutarch stresses the rashness of Chabrias in his fatal battle. First, Chabrias in other historical sources that were known to Plutarch is generally praised as a brave hero who sacrificed his own life for the sake of Athens. For example, Demosthenes describes Chabrias as "a staunch patriot" (φιλόπολις) and "the most cautious of commanders"(ἀσφαλέστατος στρατηγὸς ἁπάντων), who forgot all his caution in Chios because he was so devoted to his city and was unwilling to tarnish the honors the Athenians had granted him. Demosthenes delivered this speech on behalf of Ctesippus the son of Chabrias, since the young man would be required to perform liturgies due to a law proposed by Leptines, according to which no one shall be exempt except the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. By glowing terms on the exploits

1 Plut. An seni resp. 795d-e.
2 Plut. Phoc. 7.3-4.

and bravery of Chabrias, he intended to prove that the orphan son of that successful general deserved the exemption, while the law of Leptines unjustly took away the honors of those who promoted the state's interests.[1] The fall of Chabrias and its underlying cause are also positively narrated in Nepos and Diodorus. Both authors agree that the heroic deed of Chabrias was sharply contrasted with the cowardice of his soldiers, who withdrew and saved themselves by swimming. Thinking that a death with glory preferable to a shameful life, Chabrias did not abandon his position and was slain.[2] Plutarch's task, however, is to highlight the moral strength of Phocion, so he is required to reinterpret these positive narratives about Chabrias through the filter of moral virtue. He does not refer to the comparison between the brave trierarch and the coward soldiers, but only emphasizes the desire of Chabrias to excel. By using vocabulary that indicates Chabrias' ambition, such as πρῶτος εἰσελάσας τῇ τριήρει and βιαζόμενος πρὸς τήν ἀπόβασιν, Plutarch builds his picture of Chabrias' moral weakness. The old general was driven on by irrational passions and eventually died.

Technically, such reconstruction does not contradict with any of the historical narratives. But in giving Chabrias's emotional action prominence and in emphasizing Phocion's attempts to correct him, Plutarch brings to the front Phocion's superiority in his innate character and more significantly, his desire for moral rectification. Later on in the text Phocion was admired by the Athenians and chosen by them most frequently as general, not for his family background, popularity or fame, but for his role as a moral instructor in particular:

Men of little understanding are amazed at the conduct of the Athenian people. For Phocion opposed them more than anybody else, and never said or did anything to win their favor; and yet, just as kings are supposed to listen to their flatterers after dinner has begun, so the Athenians made use of their more elegant and sprightly leaders by way of diversion, but when they wanted a commander they were always sober and serious, and called upon the severest and most sensible

1 Dem. 20.81f.; Plut. Dem. 15.3. Plutarch was skeptical of the story that Demosthenes agreed to speak for Ctesippus because he was wooing this young man's mother.
2 Nep. Chabr. 4.2-3; Diod. 16.7.3f.

citizen, one who alone, or more than the rest, arrayed himself against their desires and impulses.[1]

The passage quoted above conveys the main theme of the pair *Phocion-Cato Minor*, namely the pedagogic function of a virtuous politician. Plutarch establishes it in the prologue of the *Phocion* and carries it through to the death of Cato the Younger. Both Phocion and Cato were virtuous men who devoted themselves to their states. They would never employ compliments to gain the goodwill of the people, but sought instead to improve their fellow-citizens on a higher moral level. It is common practice in Plutarch's biographies of great men to depict the hero's prominence from his surroundings in his youth.[2] By drawing attention to this reversed teacher-pupil relationship between the old Chabrias and the young Phocion, Plutarch highlights his hero's pursuits of moderation and self-restraint, through which Phocion obviously distinguished himself and served as an exceptional case to the traditional view that the young men were more susceptible to passions. Moreover, these were the very qualities that enabled him later to advise caution and resist the pressures of popular will in the political affairs of the state. In order to describe the early manifestation of Phocion's statesmanlike qualities, it would be natural for Plutarch to adapt the sources concerning Chabrias' death, reinterpreting it as the consequence of passions and affirming his moral weakness by deliberately drawing a comparison with Phocion.

Second, the negative description of Chabrias' death scene reflects Plutarch's disapproval of the thoughtless daring in battle. This notion is most clearly demonstrated in the proem of the pair *Pelopidas-Marcellus*. Plutarch starts with a remark of Cato the Elder, who admonished that there was a critical difference between valor and recklessness, and in this sense disregard for one's personal safety was not identifiable with courage. Inspired by this distinction, Plutarch further directs the reader's attention

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1 Plut. Phoc. 8.3: ὥστε θαυμάζειν τοὺς οὐκ εὖ φρονοῦντας τὸν δῆμον ὅτι, πλεῖστα τοῦ Φωκίωνος ἀντικρούοντος αὐτῷ καὶ μηδὲν εἰπόντος πώποτε μηδὲ πράξαντος πρὸς χάριν, ὥσπερ ἀξιοῦσι τοὺς βασιλεῖς τοῖς κόλαξι χρῆσθαι μετὰ τὸ κατὰ χειρὸς ὕδωρ, ἐχρῆτο οὗτος τοῖς μὲν κομψοτέροις; καὶ ἱλαροῖς ἐν παιδιᾶς μέρει δημαγωγοῖς, ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀεὶ νήφων καὶ σπουδάζων τὸν αὐστηρότατον καὶ φρονιμώτατον ἐκάλει τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ μόνον ἢ μᾶλλον ταῖς βουλήσεσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ ὁρμαῖς ἀντιτασσόμενον.

2 See Plut. Them. 2.1-3; Fab. 1.4f.; Alex. 4-5; Cat. Min. 1-3.

to the duty of the general: As the head of an army, to what extent should the general himself expose to danger? If the general takes the same risk as a common soldier, which detrimental effect would arise from it? After quoting several anecdotes which illustrate the need for the general to preserve his life, Plutarch points out the underlying reason for pairing Pelopidas and Marcellus: They were great men who nevertheless rashly fell in battle. One could recognize the similarity between the character of Chabrias and these two men, but in *Pelopidas-Marcellus* Plutarch has given the topic of rash general a wider scope than in other *Lives*. By acting rashly, a general not only brought about their own deaths, but also endangered the safety of the entire army and even the city as a whole.[1] In this respect, Plutarch clarifies the need to discipline the excessive spiritedness of military men, in spite that they, like Pelopidas, Marcellus or Chabrias, have already achieved great renown for their military service and leadership in many previous campaigns.

Unlike Chabrias, whose death is generally depicted as heroic deed, both Pelopidas and Marcellus appear in the historical narratives which reflect their authors' judgment against the reckless generals. Polybius, for example, refers to both men as examples of those commanders who endangered the state by taking unnecessary risks. Nepos writes that Pelopidas was eager to challenge his arch-enemy Alexander tyrant of Pherae, because he was severely insulted by that man and was "inflamed with wrath" (incensus ira) at the very first sight of Alexander. As for the fatal battle of Marcellus, Livy highlights the role of "a great desire for contending with Hannibal" (tanta cupiditas dimicandi cum Hannibale) in Marcellus' fatal decision, and judges his death as "pitiable"(miserabilis). His rash action was at odds with both his age and his experience as a veteran, and worse still, his death was detrimental to the whole army and the entire state. A similar commentary is found in Valerius Maximus, who suggests that Marcellus was "inflamed by glory" (gloria inflammatus).[2]

In composing the death of Pelopidas, Plutarch may have also followed the narration

1 Plut. Pelo.1-2.

2 Polyb. 10.32.7-12; Nep. Pelo. 5.4; Livy, 27.27.1, 11; Val. Max. 1.6.9. On the contrary, Diodorus (15.80.5) praises the death of Pelopidas as heroic deed. Cf. Beneker 2012, 67f.

of Xenophon of the fall of Cyrus the younger. Cyrus caught sight of the King Artaxerxes II, his elder brother as well as his enemy, and on the instant he was unable to control himself. With a cry "I see the man", he rushed upon him and struck him in the breast. After Cyrus delivered his stroke, he himself was attacked and killed.[1] The reader will find the narrative familiar, when a Pelopidas was inflamed by the sight of his enemy and could not resist his anger. Similarly, he sprang out and rushed with challenging cries upon Alexander the tyrant.[2] It seems certain that Xenophon's Cyrus inspired Plutarch's depiction of a hero destroyed by his passion. In his moral essay *On lack of anger*, Plutarch explicitly introduces Cyrus as a parallel to Pelopidas, both of which suffered the disastrous result of their anger before they could take revenge.[3] Compared with Cyrus, Pelopidas' spirit was running higher. Instead of noticing his enemy by chance, he made efforts to survey the scene and sought Alexander himself. Xenophon simply writes that Cyrus "was unable to control himself", without assuming any larger ethical context. While by choosing vocabularies conveying emotions and loss of self-control (such as ὀργή, θυμός, οὐ κατέσχε and παραδούς), Plutarch creates the impression that Pelopidas' actions were wholly determined by his own impulse. Because of his lack of self-control, the fighting process portrayed here involves only two actions: there was the unrestrained impulse of passion and the resulting action, but no due consideration which helped him to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of his risk-taking decision.

It shall be noticed, however, that Plutarch judges Pelopidas' boldness more favorably elsewhere. Plutarch's praise of Pelopidas' bold valor, especially in comparison with the cowardice and the hesitance of the others, is apparent in his narration about the

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1 Xeno. Anab. 1.8.26: σὺν τούτοις δὲ ὢν καθορᾷ βασιλέα καὶ τὸ ἀμφ᾽ ἐκεῖνον στῖφος: καὶ εὐθὺς οὐκ ἠνέσχετο, ἀλλ᾽ εἰπὼν τὸν ἄνδρα ὁρῶ ἵετο ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν καὶ παίει κατὰ τὸ στέρνον καὶ τιτρώσκει διὰ τοῦ θώρακος, ὥς φησι Κτησίας ὁ ἰατρός, καὶ ἰᾶσθαι αὐτὸς τὸ τραῦμά φησι. παίοντα δ᾽ αὐτὸν ἀκοντίζει τις παλτῷ ὑπὸ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν βιαίως: καὶ ἐνταῦθα μαχόμενοι καὶ βασιλεὺς καὶ Κῦρος καὶ οἱ ἀμφ᾽ αὐτοὺς ὑπὲρ ἑκατέρου, ὁπόσοι μὲν τῶν ἀμφὶ βασιλέα ἀπέθνῃσκον Κτησίας λέγει: παρ᾽ ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ἦν: Κῦρος δὲ αὐτός τε ἀπέθανε καὶ ὀκτὼ οἱ ἄριστοι τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν ἔκειντο ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ.

2 Plut. Pelo. 32.8-9: ὁ δέ Πελοπίδας ἀπὸ τῶν ἄκρων κατιδὼν ἅπαν τὸ στρατόπεδον τῶν πολεμίων οὔπω μὲν εἰς φυγὴν τετραμμένον, ἤδη δὲ θορύβου καὶ ταραχῆς ἀναπιμπλάμενον, ἔστη καὶ περιέβλεψεν αὐτὸν ζητῶν τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον. ὡς δ᾽ εἶδεν ἐπὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ παραθαρρύνοντα καὶ συντάττοντα τοὺς μισθοφόρους, οὐ κατέσχε τῷ λογισμῷ τὴν ὀργήν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν βλέψιν ἀναφλεχθείς καὶ τῷ θυμῷ παραδοὺς τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῆς πράξεως, πολὺ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐξαλόμενος ἐφέρετο βοῶν καὶ προκαλούμενος τὸν τύραννον.

3 Plut. De coh. ira 458e.

risky enterprise of overthrowing the Spartan tyrants.[1] Less than fully certain is Pelopidas' leading role in later Theban military actions, especially in the decisive battles at Tegyra and at Leuctra, but it is certain that his boldness served as a positive motivating force in these victories. In the synkrisis Plutarch regards the recklessness of Pelopidas as "somewhat excusable" (τὸν Πελοπίδαν ποιεῖ συγγνωστόν), because his desire for revenge is understandable. In this sense, Pelopidas' expedition against Alexander is demonstrated by Plutarch as a worthwhile accomplishment. Alexander was known as "an abandoned and blood-stained wretch"(ἐξώλη μὲν ὄντα καὶ μιαφόνον), who, regardless of the inviolability of ambassadors, arrested Pelopidas and threw him into prison.[2] Pelopidas' fierce hatred towards the tyrant is justified due to this insult. Plutarch further recalls the opinion in the proem that the best thing for a general is to gain a safe victory, but he soon concedes that the next best thing is to "conclude his life with virtue" (εἰς ἀρετὴν καταλύσαντα βίον). The results of Pelopidas' expedition were satisfying, because it led to victory on the battlefield and finally inspired the assassination of tyrant. He sacrificed his own life, while achieving greater honor for his country. In this respect, Plutarch reproaches Marcellus more fiercely. His spiritedness for battle with Hannibal no doubt furnishes a semblance of Pelopidas' hatred of the tyrant, but Plutarch concludes that it was totally out of the fulfillment of personal ambition and in fact brought nothing beneficial for the state. Marcellus' reckless attitude in war, therefore, is more destructive.[3] To judge from these concessions in favor of Pelopidas, it is very likely that the *Pelopidas*, probably also the lost *Epameinondas*, to a great extent conveys Plutarch's local patriotism and admiration for his Boeotian compatriots. Throughout the biography he shows a pronounced tendency to illuminate the contribution of Pelopidas' bold valor in building up the Theban hegemony. Though labeling Pelopidas' death as παραλόγως,[4] Plutarch eventually acknowledges that it is the fall of a hero, a fitting demise for a man who has overthrown the mighty power of Sparta in his native land and has won many illustrious

1 Plut. Pelo. 7-9. Pelopidas is presented as the man who took both military and political initiative for the liberation of his state, and Plutarch notably mentions how the courage of a certain Charon saved the conspirators from exposure.

2 Plut. Pelo. 27.2; Nep. Pelo. 5.2.

3 Plut. Syn. Pelo-Marc. 3.6-7.

4 Plut. Pelo. 2.10; Syn. Pelo-Marc. 3.1. Cf. Pelo. 32.9: οὐ κατέσχε τῷ λογισμῷ τὴν ὀργήν.

victories on the battlefield. Had Pelopidas successfully controlled his excessive spiritedness when encountering Alexander, he would be a more admirable figure.

Recalling Pelopidas' refusal to the training of lectures and philosophy, his rashness can be partly explained as the result of an over-emphasis on military exercises and trainings, and Plutarch makes the point by introducing Epaminondas as an ideal. Known as a prominent general as Pelopidas, Epaminondas preferred philosophical education and showed its good effect by enduring the attacks and slanders in the court, while Pelopidas, on the same occasion, was unable to remain calm.[1] Marcellus' career runs a similar course. Although he had an appreciation for Greek culture, his constant occupation with military affairs in fact deprived him of the chance of learning. Ultimately, he was subject to "a juvenile passion" (μειρακιῶδες αὐτῷ προσπεπτώκει καὶ φιλοτιμότερον πάθος) in his fatal battle and thus suffered the similar fate as his Greek counterpart.[2] The same reason may also yield insight into Chabrias' death. In this sense, his attendance at the Academy helped little for the formation of a roundly developed character.

While Plutarch is certainly capable of seeing the drawbacks of unlimited spiritedness and the benefits of its opposite, does he hold critical attitude toward all military men who were so eager to expose themselves to danger? No reader would fail to mark that Alexander's spiritedness played a crucial role in his military career. In Plutarch's narration Alexander made his first appearance on the battlefield in 338 B.C., when Philip's advance

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1 For Pelopidas' lack of interest in intellectual matters, see Plut. Pelo. 4.1. For Epaminondas' keenness on philosophical learning, see Plut. Pelo. 4.1; De gen. Socr. 592f. Cf. Nep. Epam. 3.1-3. For their different behaviors during the trial, see Plut. Pelo. 25.3-4. In her commentary on Plutarch's *Pelopidas*, Georgiadou notes that Plutarch relates this trial differently in different contexts in *Moralia* (De laud. ips. 540e; Reg. et imp. apophth. 194a-c; Prae. ger. reip. 817f). Especially in De laud. ips. 540e Pelopidas is presented as a man who gained his acquittal by weeping and throwing himself on the mercy of the court, while Epaminondas showed fortitude by questioning his trial as unjustified. Georgiadou suggests that Plutarch seems to have known a hostile tradition of Pelopidas, so he intentionally suppresses any descriptions that would damage Pelopidas' personality in the comparison with Marcellus. For details see Georgiadou 1997, 185. In my opinion, the need to maintain a balance with the image of Marcellus has probably influenced Plutarch's adaptation of historical sources. But more significantly, his portrayal of Pelopidas' anger and his inability to control it apparently echoes his criticism of the rash general in the prologue and foreshadows the death of Pelopidas. Epaminondas appears in other works by Plutarch with the same roundly educated character (Phil. 3.1; De gen. Socr. 585d), however, Nepos (Epam. 9.1) criticizes his death in the battle of Mantineia as "too boldly"(audacius). Xenophon and Diodorus do not find fault with him, but agree that he was so eager to fight (Xeno. Hell. 7.5.23; Diod. 15.86.4). Since Plutarch's *Epaminondas* has lost, we could not judge whether he portrayed him in his own biography in the similar way as in the *Pelopidas*.

2 Plut. Marc. 1.2-3; 28.6.

was opposed by an alliance of Greek states led by Athens and Thebes. Plutarch is conscious to cite a reference, in which Alexander was said to have been the first to break the ranks of the Sacred Band, namely the Thebans' elite fighting corps. The crisis after his succession, that the neighboring tribes of Barbarians and the Greeks revolted, prompted the Macedonian counselors to prefer a policy of conciliation with mild measures. The young king, however, put a speedy stop to the disturbances and wars by "boldness and a lofty spirit"(τόλμη καὶ μεγαλοφροσύνη).[1]

Alexander's desire to compete with Darius was no less than the passion of those above mentioned generals for battle. This becomes clear from Plutarch's description of the battle of Granicus, where Alexander did not encounter Darius himself. Although the place was crucial for entrance into Asia, most of the Macedonian officers were afraid of the difficulties derived from natural circumstances. The river was deep, and they had to climb up the rough banks while fighting. The time was also unfavorable, because it was a customary practice for the Macedonian kings not to lead an army in the month of Daesius. Unmoved by these difficulties, Alexander not only disobeyed the custom by changing the name of the month, but also reproached the hesitance of his officers in face of a river as unfitting for an army which had crossed Hellespont. Plutarch expresses explicitly his disapproval at the way Alexander attempted to cross the river. "And since he was charging against hostile missiles and precipitous positions covered with infantry and cavalry, and through a stream that swept men off their feet and surged about them, he seemed to be acting like a frenzied and foolish commander rather than a wise one." After Alexander had gained the opposite banks with difficulty, he was nearly slain by two enemies and was eventually saved by Cleitus. Then he once more charged a group of Greek mercenary soldiers, "driven by his spirit rather than by a rational plan".[2] But this passage seems to be perplexing. Plutarch is at first critical of Alexander's rashness, but the narration that followed in fact helps the reader to develop a clear sense of the positive effects of this victory. He writes that Alexander received the submission of many

1 Plut. Alex. 9.2, 11.4.

2 Plut. Alex. 16.4: καὶ διὰ ῥεύματος παραφέροντος καὶ περικλύζοντος, ἔδοξε μανικῶς καὶ πρός ἀπόνοιαν μᾶλλον ἢ γνώμῃ στρατηγεῖν; 16.14: ὁ δὲ θυμῷ μᾶλλον ἢ λογισμῷ πρῶτος ἐμβαλὼν τόν τε ἵππον ἀποβάλλει ξίφει πληγέντα διὰ τῶν πλευρῶν.

cities, which made a great change in the situation of his advantage. Plutarch probably meant to say that Alexander's rash actions, though somewhat dangerous, appear successful and beneficial.

The positive influence of Alexander's spiritedness is more evident in Plutarch's narration of the final decisive battle at Gaugamela. Again he describes a divergence of views between commander and subordinates before the battle. Some older of Alexander's companions, in particular Parmenion, were afraid of the superior number of the enemy and advised the king to take a night attack; while Alexander answered with the celebrated words "I will not steal my victory". Arrian explains the wisdom of Alexander's decision from a strategic perspective, for a battle in the night could be more dangerous. Plutarch, however, reconstructs the events in moral terms. He first cites two different interpretations for Alexander's answer. While introducing some authors' opinion that the king might jest in the presence of so great a peril, he in fact directs the reader's attention to the second, more complimentary explanation for Alexander's purpose. By emphasizing Darius' cowardice in previous battles, Plutarch presents an Alexander who was certainly confident in his military strength, though the Macedonian army was inferior in number. More significantly, a victory in broad daylight could effectively destroy the morale of enemy. In other words, Alexander was pursuing a victory which would force the Persians to recognize him as a conqueror rather than a victor of a single battle.[1]

Following this explanation, Plutarch devotes the following two chapters to describing how Alexander was eager to challenge Darius himself. The large amount of enemies, and the bad news about loss of baggage troubled him not at all, for his only goal was to capture Darius. Plutarch seems eager to press the comparison between two kings, as he characterizes Darius as a coward who made no attempts to attack, but was in great need of protection. The scene that Darius was surrounded by a large amount of guards did not terrify Alexander, on the contrary, it inspired him to rush towards the position where his enemy was. Darius once again took the flight, and by doing so he eventually handed over the empire to Alexander. Plutarch portrays the events vividly and

1 Arri. Anab. 3.10.3f.; Plut. Alex. 31-33.

creates the impression that Alexander's character was the determining factor in his final victory. In this sense, both his own subordinates and his opponent serve to highlight his superiority in virtues. Alexander's fierce desire for battle reflected his confidence and decisiveness, which distinguished him from other Macedonians and convince the reader of his capacity as commander. Repeatedly depicting the cowardice of Darius, Plutarch presents Alexander's courage as a necessary and admirable quality in a great king fit to rule a greater empire. There is no doubt that Alexander's desire for battle with Darius is passionate, if one recalls the earlier chapter where Plutarch depicts how Alexander at a young age wished to compete only with kings.[1] But what distinguishes him from Pelopidas or Marcellus is the final result. His passion once again proves to be a positive force.

The most striking effect of Alexander's spiritedness appears in Chapter 26, in which Plutarch describes how fortune yielded to the king's spiritedness. The journey through the Egyptian desert was usually perilous enough that any traveler may lose his life because of the dearth of water or the occurrence of sandstorm, while Alexander was assisted by the Heaven. The abundant raining removed the danger of thirst, and ravens served as guides, who even waited for Alexander's army when they marched slowly and lagged behind. Plutarch certainly wonders at these miracles and remarks that fortune made Alexander's purpose obstinate, nonetheless, he explicitly states that it was Alexander's high spirit that "rendered his ambition invincible, so that it subdued not only adversaries in war, but also times and places".[2] At the beginning of the *Alexander,* Plutarch presents the spiritedness as a motivating force in Alexander's character that made him "impetuous and eager towards everything else",[3] and in this instance, he shows how difficult it was to persuade the king to give up the thing upon which he had once set out. Driven on by his resolve to visit the temple of Ammon, Alexander was

1 Plut. Alex. 4.10.

2 Plut. Alex. 26.14: ἥ τε γὰρ τύχη ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς ὑπείκουσα τὴν γνώμην ἰσχυρὰν ἐποίει, καὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς ἄχρι τῶν πραγμάτων ὑπεξέφερε τὴν φιλονεικίαν ἀήττητον, οὐ μόνον πολεμίους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τόπους καὶ καιροὺς καταβιαζομένην.

3 Plut. Alex. 4.8: ἔτι δὲ ὄντος αὐτοῦ παιδὸς ἥ τε σωφροσύνη διεφαίνετο τῷ πρὸς τἆλλα ῥαγδαῖον ὄντα καὶ φερόμενον σφοδρῶς ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ταῖς περὶ τὸ σῶμα δυσκίνητον εἶναι καὶ μετά πολλῆς πραότητος ἅπτεσθαι τῶν τοιούτων, ἥ τε φιλοτιμία παρ᾽ ἡλικίαν ἐμβριθὲς εἶχε τὸ φρόνημα καὶ μεγαλόψυχον.

unmoved by the fate of Cambyses that a strong wind had raised great billows of sand and buried up his whole army, fifty thousand men in number. The spiritedness of Alexander, as Plutarch views it, was undoubtedly responsible for his successful passage through the desert. As a strong motivating force, it was always directed towards new glory and certainly contributed to Alexander's accomplishments.

Similarly, we see another passage where the king himself asserted his superiority over fortune. During the expedition to India Alexander encountered many perils. "Still, he was eager to overcome fortune by boldness and force by valor, and thought nothing invincible for the courageous, and nothing secure for the cowardly."[1] The Indian expedition occurred in a time, when some negative changes in Alexander's character had already appeared. Driven by a fervent pursuit of glory and reputation, Alexander has become cruel and obstinate towards anyone who slandered him or dared to frustrate his wishes, and the execution of Parmenion in particular made him fearsome to his friends. The murder of Cleitus is usually interpreted as a sign for Alexander's moral deterioration, for it signifies a significant lapse in his self-restraint that was remarkable in his previous career, and now his spirited nature led directly to rash behaviors.[2] When narrating Alexander's expedition further eastward, Plutarch illustrates the negative side to an unlimited ambition and the spiritedness for new glory that lies behind it. It tempted the king to pursue the conquest of new territories without acceptable boundaries and eventually caused the disaffection of his army.[3] In this sense, Alexander's desire to overcome fortune during the Indian expedition is contrasted unfavorably with his earlier courage for the conquest of the Persian Empire, because the former blinded him to anything but the gratification of ambition.

Nevertheless, it shall be observed that Alexander's performance on the battlefield is still positively demonstrated by Plutarch. By conquering many citadels and cities he drove deep into India, especially defeated Porus. On his way back he fought so boldly with the most warlike Indian people called Mali that he nearly lost his life. It seems to be

1 Plut. Alex. 58.1: αὐτὸς δὲ τόλμῃ τὴν τύχην ὑπερβαλέσθαι καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἀρετῇ φιλοτιμούμενος, οὐδὲν ᾤετο τοῖς θαρροῦσιν ἀνάλωτον οὐδὲ ὀχυρὸν εἶναι τοῖς ἀτόλμοις.
2 Whitmarsh 2002, 182f.; Buszard 2008, 189f.; Beneker 2012, 134-136.
3 Plut. Alex. 62.

surprising that Plutarch, in his narration of these events, never explicitly criticizes Alexander for his bold exposure to danger, even when the king threw himself into the midst of the enemies only with few companions.[1] In spite of his moral deterioration, Alexander was still a victor on the battlefield. Although he was increasingly susceptible to irrational emotions in the fulfillment of his ambition, he was still succeeded in employing his spiritedness in service to his military objective. Plutarch does observe the detrimental effect of the king's natural spiritedness, as his remark for the battle of Granicus shows, but he does it obliquely and does not elaborate on the matter. He appears not to attach Alexander to those rash generals who died in a passionate way, not because Alexander was less susceptible to the temptation of passions, but probably from his observation that the Macedonian king neither failed on the battlefield nor achieved a victory at the cost of his own life. The biographer seems to have based his evaluation in part on the final outcome of each commander's enterprise, and in this sense Alexander was a man without equal.

While recognizing the wisdom of old age for guiding the younger ones in political and military praxis, Plutarch's emphasis remains on the moralizing influence of such instruction. In this respect, there is really no surprise that the old Chabrias received moral education from his young adherent Phocion, because he was unable to control his passions within limit. More significant in this reversed teacher-pupil relationship, however, is the earliest manifestation of Phocion's desire and ability to discipline his fellow-citizens. The moral influence of a virtuous politician is the main concern of this *Life*, and this thematic motive prompts Plutarch to reinterpret the historical sources which have praised the fall of Chabrias as heroic deeds. In views of his criticism of rash generals in the proem of pair *Pelopidas-Marcellus*, Plutarch's disapproval of Chabrias' rashness is also affected by his view on the ethical regulation of military life that decisions in battles should always be determined by reason. But taken his treatment of Alexander's spiritedness into consideration, his judgment on moral qualities appears to

1 Plut. Alex. 63.3-5. Plutarch mentions that Alexander leapt down within the wall with only two guards, and likewise Arrian (Anab. 6.9.3) says that three others went up following him. While the Vulgate authors remark that Alexander at first fought alone.

be partly influenced by their effectiveness. When Alexander's impetuous character in the phase of his moral deterioration still appeared beneficial for achieving military victories, Plutarch merely narrates the events without any remark on the king's boldness.

Plutarch's accounts of Phocion's family and private life are fragmentary, and particularly in the passage concerning his relationship with Chabrias, the language is highly moralizing. Nevertheless, they still provide useful information on Phocion's social and economic status. Although little evidence indicates that Phocion came from a noble family, I suggest that he was at least a wealthy man.[1] Wealth provided him with the foundation of public career, because it enabled him to associate with notable figures in Athens. Political friendship, in return, supported him to act effectively in public affairs. In this sense, Phocion followed the common pattern of Athenian statesman for political prominence. But what still strikes us is his repeated elections to the strategia. Apart from Phocion's wealth and social connections, were there other factors that prompted the Athenians to elect him so many times as general? Was Phocion's military ability outstanding among his contemporaries? How does Plutarch assess his military achievements and to what extent do they contribute to Phocion's image as a virtuous man? In the next chapter I examine Plutarch's depiction of Phocion's military activities, and explore the political circumstances that lied behind them.

1 For a detailed discussion of Phocion's family background and social standing see also Gehrke 1976, 1-5.

3. Phocion: An "Atypical" General of Athens?

A major difficulty in measuring Phocion's military competence is the scarcity of information available at him. The evidence in his two major biographers, Nepos and Plutarch, is not only few but also contradictory. Nepos claims that Phocion was an ordinary commander whose military actions were unknown during the later generations, while Plutarch's biography of Phocion is a eulogy of his life and moral characters, in which he is presented as a skilled military leader. However, it should be noted that Plutarch's description of Phocion's military activities is restricted to a bare thirty-six years from the battle of Naxos (376 B.C.) to the Byzantine expedition (340 B.C.). In Athens Phocion was second to none in his career longevity, but one may cast doubt on the reason of his consecutive election to generalship, when little is known of his later military career.[1] Plutarch says that the Athenians usually entrusted the offices to their "severest and most sensible citizen",[2] but it still sounds strange that they chose Phocion simply due to his moral qualities. Phocion's re-election, on one hand, attests his military experience, and it is perhaps better to link the obscurity of his later military career with the command structure in Athens. On the other hand, it reflects his popularity. For this we shall note that Plutarch depicts Phocion as a man who combined the roles of general and politician, which was outstanding among his contemporaries. This remark implies that Phocion's reputation may have been more based on his active political participation. The judgment itself is to some extent misleading, when some contemporary generals are known to perform the same range of activities as Phocion did, but it probably resulted in part from the fact that many generals of fourth-century Athens shunned political participation even stayed away from the city.

1 Gehrke (1976, 6-17), for examples, doubts Phocion's ability as a soldier and military commander due to the scarcity of sources.

2 Plut. Phoc. 8.3: ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀεὶ νήφων καὶ σπουδάξων τὸν αὐστηρότατον καὶ φρονιμώτατον ἐκάλει τῶν πολιτῶν (...).

3.1 Phocion's military activities

Phocion's first military exploit of note occurred in 376 B.C., when his military tutor Chabrias commanded the Athenian navy in Naxos in order to guard the grain in transit from the Spartan attack. There are few details about this battle, and only Plutarch mentions Phocion's participation in it. Xenophon's brief account merely informs us that the Spartans intended to capture Athens by starvation, and for this purpose Pollis was made admiral of a fleet consisting of sixty triremes. His task was to blockade the grain transportation to Athens. The Athenians, however, joined battle with Pollis under the leadership of Chabrias and were eventually victorious in the battle. Xenophon does not report any details of the warfare, nor does he name any other Athenian generals in this great naval battle except Chabrias.[1] Diodorus adds that Chabrias laid the island Naxos under siege and took the city by using siege-engines. When Pollis sailed into port to assist the Naxians, both sides engaged in a sea-battle. Diodorus simply gives a glimpse of the battle, but it is worth noting that he provides information on the battle formations. The Spartans first attacked the Athenian triremes on the left wing and slew the Athenian commander Cedon, while Chabrias, at this critical moment, dispatched a squadron of the ships and successfully brought support to the men who were hard pressed. Finally the Athenians won the battle in a valiant struggle.[2] Polynaeus provides another version of Chabrias' strategy. According to him, Chabrias ordered all Athenian ships to lower their flags. Because no ships carried Attic flags, the Spartans were confused when they approached, so that they simply sailed on by. As a result, the Athenians proceeded to make a double ramming attack against any ships with flags and thus won the victory.[3]

When all these stories are taken together with Plutarch's account, Chabrias' tactical arrangements can be well reconstructed. He at first ordered that the distinctive flags flown from each ship be lowered, then made a ramming attack against the Spartan ships. When the left wing of the Athenians was fiercely attacked, he dispatched a relief

1 Xeno. Hell. 5.4.60f.
2 Diod. 15.34.3-35.2.
3 Polyb. 3.11.11.

squadron, probably commanded by Phocion, to execute a counter-attack. If so, Plutarch is right to claim that Phocion engaged himself on the left, where "the battle raged hotly and the issue was speedily decided".[1] It is clear, however, that Plutarch desires to place his hero at the center stage, so he creates an erroneous impression that Chabrias gave Phocion command of the left wing. Diodorus clearly notes that Cedon was the initial commander of the left wing. Only when Cedon was slew and Pollis' attack overwhelmed the Athenian left, Phocion was sent for reinforcements.[2]

Moreover, Plutarch erroneously assumes that Phocion's ability for commanding was immediately recognized by the Athenians after the battle of Naxos. In this victory Phocion did play important role for reversing the initial success of Pollis, but his disappearance from the public scene in Athens until mid-fourth century B.C. suggests that his military competence was not so outstanding to draw his fellow citizens' attention. Such obscurity of a young commander seems to be not surprising, if we note that some prominent generals such as Iphicrates, Timotheus and Chabrias were active during this decade. Little is known of the name of the elected generals for these years, but there is good reason to believe that the Athenians would like to entrust the commandership to those experienced and brilliant men. It is likely that Phocion continued to follow his military mentor Chabrias and participated in some campaigns, but this adherence did not bring him immediate political advancement.

A passage from Polyaenus is held to be evidence for Phocion's military activities in the mid-fourth century B.C. But more significant, it shows a tactic error that Phocion committed. Polyaenus reports that Phocion at first defeated Athenodorus, a mercenary leader who served the Persian king, at Atarneus in Asia Minor. But Athenodorus then asked his men to swear oaths to fight as long as they were able to stand, and under the constraint of their oath, those who should be conquered finally became the victors. Evidently, this passage demonstrates a successful counter-attack of Athenodorus.

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1 Plut. Phoc. 6.5: τήν μάχην ὀξεῖαν εἶχεν ὁ ἀγὼν καὶ κρίσιν ἐποίησε ταχεῖαν.

2 Tritle (1988, 58) also doubts the accuracy of Diodorus' account, in which Chabrias was said to dispatch the relief squadron from those forces under his own command. In views of the fierce struggle on the right side and the difficulty of communications in ancient warfare, Tritle argues that Phocion's advance to the left was not a temporary reaction to the pressure, but was probably "dictated by contingency plans which covered a variety of situations".

Though Polyaenus does not hint at the reason of Phocion's defeat, it can be supposed that he pursued the enemies too vigorously and forced them to counter-attack. Phocion's vigorous pursuit of retreating enemies is clearly described by Plutarch in the expedition at Byzantium in 340/39 B.C. According to him, Phocion was sent for assisting the Byzantines to resist the attack of Philip the king of Macedon. When the Byzantines and their Greek allies controlled the Hellespont and forced the Macedonian fleet to retreat, there was in fact no need of fighting. Phocion, however, launched a vigorous pursuit of the retreating Macedonian along the Thracian coast, until he was wounded in some engagement.[1] The reason of this operation is unclear, probably Phocion felt angry for Philip's successful extrication,[2] but by this action he evidently proved his personal bravery. If Phocion appeared to be a courageous fighter in battle, his pursuit of the retreating Athenodorus is not surprising. Perhaps being too ambitious, he underestimated the determination and combat effectiveness of the desperate enemies.[3]

This is not to argue, however, that Phocion was an incompetent commander. The extant evidence suggests that he did archive victories in several campaigns. Phocion's knowledge of encampment can be attested in his service in Cyprus (351/0 B.C.), where he set up a palisade and fortified the encampment to besiege Salamis, the largest city in Cyprus.[4] Though the city itself was not taken by force, the despoliation in the countryside was in itself sufficient to intimidate the local habitants to fall into a state of anxiety and fear, which led to their later surrender.[5] As for Phocion's tactic skills, more striking is the success of his stratagem of delay at Tamynae in Euboea. Athenian intervention in Euboean affairs was due to the petition of Plutarch, the tyrant of Eretria, because his rule was seriously threated by the opposition of his political rival Clitarchus

1 Plut. Phoc. 14.8.

2 Cf. Front. Str.1.4.13; Polyaen. 4.2.21.

3 These references of Phocion's personal courage, however, are reminiscent of his military mentor Chabrias, whose bravery is well attested by ancient authors. Plutarch (Phoc. 6.2f.) criticizes the rashness of Chabrias by introducing Phocion as a good example of restricting passions, but this account, as well as that passage from Polyaenus, does suggest that Phocion was sometimes also susceptible to emotions in battle.

4 Diod. 16.42.3-8, 46.1.

5 Diodorus (16.42.9) notes that the chief reason for submission was the increasing number of mercenary soldiers, who were attracted by the tales of the rich booty in Cyprus. Within a short time, the original force of eight thousand men doubled. In other words, what ultimately induced the Cypriote kings to surrender was not the besieging itself, but the plundering it caused. Cf. Parke 1970, 166.

and the invasion of Philip of Macedon.[1] In spite of the dissenting voice of Demosthenes,[2] an Athenian expeditionary force was dispatched to Plutarch's assistance in 348 B.C. According to Plutarch, it was "a small force" commanded by Phocion,[3] for the Athenians were in the belief that they would win the local support. Upon his arrival, however, Phocion found that their assistance to Plutarch was interpreted by the Euboeans as an act of aggression, and the entire land was in a position of great peril. Under this circumstance, he stationed his force near Tamynae and waited for battle.[4]

Plutarch's account of the battle of Tamynae is evidently marked with heroism, but it does reveal several aspects of the competence of an Athenian general. When the enemies came up against the Athenians, Phocion assembled his men and ordered them to remain quietly under arms before he finished sacrificing. Plutarch interprets this action in two ways: Either because the omen of sacrifice was bad, or because Phocion wished to confuse the enemy and draw them nearer. While Phocion was busy with sacrificing, Plutarch the tyrant impatiently charged out of the camp with his mercenaries whose action set into motion the Athenian cavalry as well. Such an impetuous attack was soon beat back by the Euboeans, who now advanced on the Athenian camp and regarded themselves as victors, while Plutarch took to flight. At this point the sacrifices were completed, and the Athenians, bursting out of their camp, launched an effective counter-attack. Ordering his phalanx to stand ready and to receive the troops that had been scattered in the previous flight, Phocion immediately engaged himself with the picked elite against the main body of the enemy. A fierce battle finally ended with the glorious victory of the Athenians.[5]

Phocion's delay, which was caused by sacrifices, has been suspected as a prearranged stratagem.[6] But clearly such an interpretation ignores the important role of religion in Greek military affairs. The sacrifice before battle is frequently mentioned by

1 Dem. 5.5; Plut. Phoc. 12.1; Schol. on Aeschin. 3.86. Cf. Gehrke 1976, 7; Tritle 1988, 76 n.1.
2 Dem. 5.5; 21.110, 200.
3 For a discussion of the actual size of this "small force", see Tritle 1988, 77-80.
4 For a topographical introduction of Tamynae, see Trittle 1988, 83-85.
5 Plut. Phoc. 13.1-6.
6 Tritle (1988, 88) explains Phocion's sacrifices merely from a strategical perspective. Arguing that Phocion "was not playing the part of the superstitious man", Tritle evidently ignores the religious and tactical significance of pre-battle rites in ancient Greek warfare.

ancient authors. Herodotus, for example, mentions that the Athenians were sent forth and charged the enemies at Marathon when the sacrifices were favorable. In addition, we find six examples of pre-battle sacrifices in his reference to the battle of Plataia.[1] This custom was evidently not peculiar to the Athenians. Herodotus describes that the Spartans sacrificed as many sheep and goats as they wished at the start of their expeditions.[2] Similarly, there are three examples in Thucydides, where the unfavorable omens prevented the Spartans from military actions. [3] In many cases, the sacrifices were made by commanders when they were faced with new or unexpected situations,[4] and they usually abandoned the proposed military actions when the omens were unfavorable. Of course, one could repeatedly make sacrifice until the favorable omen appeared, but no more than three times a day.[5]

Disobeying the will of gods would cause punishments, and examples of such kind are not infrequently documented. Xenophon, in particular, pays special attention to the matter of sacrifice. At the very beginning of his *On the Cavalry Commander* (Ἱππαρχικός), he warns that the first duty of cavalry commander was to sacrifice to gods. The goodwill of gods, he notes, would bring glory and advantage to individual commander and their city.[6] Xenophon's interest to the sacrificial matters is in keeping with his personal experience as general. As we shall see, Xenophon highlights his own piety and the good results it brought in an episode in *Anabasis*. The army of the Ten Thousand fell into a difficult situation at the harbor of Kalpe, because their provisions had become exhausted. Worse still, the omens that would sanction their marching forth from the camp in quest of provisions were repeatedly unfavorable. Under this terrible circumstance Xenophon would not lead forth, even if there were rumors that he had induced the soothsayer to declare unfavorable omens in order to found a city at this spot, and the impatient soldiers were even coming to his tent and complaining. Then another

1 Hdt. 6.112.1; 9.35, 36, 41, 45, 61, 62.
2 Hdt. 6.56; Paus. 9.13.4.
3 Thuc. 5.54.2, 5.55.3, 5.116.
4 Cf. Lonis 1979, 106f.; Trampedach 2015, 154. Employing divination does make sense when the army was led by a group of generals instead of a single one. When disagreements appeared under the principle of collegiality, the decision from gods could bring objectivity into human conflicts and thus reconcile the opposing and mutually exclusive points of view.
5 Cf. Popp 1957, 66; Trampedach 2015, 158.
6 Xeno. Hipp. 1.1.

general Neon was impatient and took matters into his own hands. Claiming that he would go in search of provisions with all who wished, Neon set out with about two thousand men. Neon's plundering, however, turned out to be a great disaster. They were caught by the cavalry of the Persian satrap Pharnabazos, and no fewer than five hundred men were killed. After Xenophon had rescued the survivors, the Greeks were attacked again by some of the Bithynians. On the next day a vessel arrived from Heracleia, bringing barley meal, sacrificial victims and wine, and Xenophon soon sacrificed with a view to an expedition. With the first offering the omens turned out favorable, they began their advance, and the sacrifice they made shortly before their conflict with the Persian horsemen was also favorable. The whole episode ends with a victory of the Greeks, but perhaps more importantly, it indicates the importance of interpretation and observation of divine will. It is clear that gods, through the results of sacrifices, guided men what they shall do, and misgivings can be well explained as punishment of violation.[1]

In addition, there are several passages in which the pre-battle sacrifices are mentioned by Plutarch. Agesilaus, as he says, was asked by the goddess to make sacrifice before his expedition to Asia. Similarly, Alexander had favorable signs before his capture of Tyre. Later before the battle of Gaugamela, he sacrificed to the god Fear.[2] Thus it will cause no surprise that Phocion did the same thing at Tamynae, and it was inauspicious omens that prevented him from taking further actions. Plutarch is certainly concerned to highlight his hero's accomplishments, but it is difficult to see that his account of Phocion's sacrifice merely indicates a well-devised scheme. Clearly he provides two explanations for the delay, and a religious reason is not excluded. Moreover, the terrible results that Plutarch and the Athenian cavalry suffered conform to the Greeks' general belief that unexpected military failure could be caused by ignorance of bad omens, namely divine punishment. Religion facilitated decisive action in cases where individuals might be at a loss to act, and particularly in the field, it guided the commander who wanted to know whether it was a good time to fight or take other actions. The frequent

1 Xeno. Anab. 6.4.10-6.5. For a detailed analysis of the mantic elements in this episode see Trampedach 2015, 162-165.

2 Plut. Ages. 6.7-9; Alex. 25.1, 31.9. For other examples of pre-battle sacrifices in Plutarch's *Lives*, see Pritchett 1971, 114 Table 2.

appearance of pre-battle sacrifices in our sources suggests that the function of religion in military affairs shall not be ignored or underestimated.

Upon Phocion's arrival, the island Euboea was in confusion and the local habitants were hostile to the Athenians. At the same time there was a disciplinary problem within Phocion's army, because the approach of the festivals Anthesteria and Dionysia induced some men to return to Athens.[1] Phocion did not punish these deserters. By contrast, he considered that the army was better off without such unreliable men and bade his officers give no heed to them. Phocion's decision was understandable, as the disunity was ultimately detrimental to an army fighting in a foreign and hostile land. But it is worth noting that Plutarch adds another reason for Phocion judgment: He feared that punishment upon deserters would cause malicious accusations at home. The implication of this is that Phocion was commanding a citizen army. Though temporarily subordinate in authority to Phocion in the field, the soldiers were in fact politically equal to him. It is true that the Athenian generals had certain disciplinary authority in the field, and in extreme cases they could even execute the disobedient soldiers.[2] But the question is whether the generals were willing to severely discipline their troops at the price of their public reputation. The soldiers naturally had the right to accuse the general whom they considered to be unduly strict upon returning to Athens, and the jurors were easily influenced by the testimony of disgruntled witnesses, who accompanied the generals in the course of expedition.

The threat that the soldiers posed to their generals is well expressed by Nicias, when he was confronted with many difficulties during the Sicilian expedition in 414 B.C. Against his colleague Demosthenes' proposal that the Athenian army withdrew from Sicily at once, Nicias was afraid that the generals would be censured at Athens and even accused of treason by their own soldiers.[3] One may argue that Nicias was a man who was extremely cautious of public informers,[4] but the Arginusae trial in 406 B.C. does testify how the generals themselves were subject to the disciplinary authority of the

1 Plut. Phoc. 12.3. For the reason of desertion see also Dem. 39.16. Cf. Christ 2006, 94f.
2 Hamel 1998, 60.
3 Thuc. 7.48.4. Similar complaint see also Dem. 4.47.
4 Plut. Nic. 5.

Athenian people. More significantly, this trial shows how the disgruntled subordinate officials and soldiers, acting in their capacity as witnesses, lent assistance to litigation against their former commanders. In 406 B.C. a Spartan fleet leading by Callicratidas attacked the Athenian general Conon and forced the Athenian fleet to flee to Mytilene. In the battle of Mytilene, Conon was blockaded with his fleet and was only barely able to slip a messenger ship out to Athens to ask for assistance. A relief force was soon sent out, commanded collaboratively by eight generals. The Athenian fleet sailed to the Arginusae islands, where they met the Spartans and won a victory.

In the immediate aftermath of the battle, however, the Athenian generals had to discuss their next step. Conon was still blockaded at Mytilene by fifty Spartan ships, while many survivors from the Athenian ships sunk or disabled in the battle remained afloat. Under this circumstance, all eight generals decided to sail with the majority of the fleet to relieve Conon, and two trierarchs Thrasybulus and Theramenes were left behind with a smaller force to rescue the survivors. Both missions, however, was prevented by a sudden storm. Xenophon tells us that the generals sent a letter to the Athenian people and council, in which they ascribed their failure to save their countrymen to the storm. But after Thrasybulus and Theramenes' return to Athens, the Athenians' joy at their reprieve was soon replaced by grief and discontent. When the generals heard this, they assumed that Thrasybulus and Theramenes were responsible for this hostility, so they sent another letter in which they clearly stated that these two trierarchs were assigned with the task of picking up the dead. Thrasybulus and Theramene, however, successfully turned the anger of their fellow citizens again to the generals, and as a consequence the generals were deposed from their office and were ordered to return to Athens to stand trial. Six of the eight generals sailed home from Samos, and their issue was quickly brought before the assembly.

On the first day of the debate, the Athenian people were moved by the generals' defense that the storm was to be blamed for the misfortune, especially when they brought forward as witnesses a number of men who had served at Arginusae. But the approach of the festival of the Apaturia, at which families met together, stoked the Athenians' sense of loss over their family members who were not timely rescued and

drowned in the sea battle. Thus a politician named Callixenus proposed that the assembly should vote on the guilt or innocence of the generals without further debate. When Callixenus' proposal was introduced at the assembly meeting, a man who claimed to have saved himself after the battle by clinging to a tub of barley appeared as a witness. In addition, he told the assembly that those who were dying had tasked him with delivering a message to the Athenian people, for the generals failed to pick up those "who proved themselves best in service to their country". Emotional testimony of the sort, in particular from a veteran who was present, made it increasingly unlikely that the generals would win the Athenians over. There were certain men who opposed Callixenus' proposal in public, among whom were Euryptolemus who charged this proposal as illegal, and the philosopher Socrates, who presided the prytaneis at that day and claimed that he would judge only according to the laws. These objections, however, could not prevent Callixenus' proposal from being conducted, and six generals were finally executed.[1]

Once a general of an Athenian citizen army laid down his command, his relationship with his soldiers was reversed. The soldiers assumed their share of the collective authority of the Athenian people for audit, and the testimony of witnesses could easily influenced the mood of the Athenians, whether in good or bad effect. In the case of the Arginusae trial, the generals at first had been on the verge of winning the Athenians over, and it can be well imagined that the testimony of their fellow sailors had the desired effect. The appearance of that guy on the barley tub, however, surely created negative impression on them, particularly when his emotional testimony was delivered before an audience whose grief for the dead was still raw after Apaturia. Whether he was telling the truth or not, his speech certainly irritated popular sentiment.[2] Apart from the soldiers, colleagues and subordinate officials were also potential prosecutors for generals. It is clear in the Arginusae trial that the trierarch Theramenes spoke out against the generals. Xenophon tells us that Theramenes required the generals to rend an account

1 Xeno. Hell. 1.6-7; Diod. 13.97-102. For modern scholarly literature see Andrews 1974; Roberts 1977; Due 1983; Rood 2004; Gish 2012; Hamel 2015.
2 Hamel (2015, 82) judges his testimony as unhistorical.

because they had not picked up the shipwrecked, and the generals, when defending themselves before the people, called Theramenes and Thrasybulus their accusers.[1] It does make sense for Theramenes to stress the generals' responsibility in abandoning the shipwrecked, if we believe Diodorus' account that the generals in their second letter home clearly pointed out that Theramenes and Thrasybulus had been tasked with rescue and recovery after Arginusae.[2] Thus Theramenes seemed rather to defend himself. The fear of the wrath of populace, of course, was an important motivation for Theramenes' attack against the generals, even if we admit that he was calling for them to undergo a procedure to which they would have been subjected according to the laws.[3] The Arginusae trial is just one of the incidents in which an Athenian general's colleagues and subordinates participated directly in trials arising from their shared campaigns.[4] Another famous example is Conon, who accused Adeimantus in 393/2 B.C. in connection with their shared command at Aigospotami in 405/4 B.C.[5] Later two generals Iphicrates and Timotheus were deposed and prosecuted after the battle of Embata (356/5 B.C.) because of the charges of Chares, a former colleague of them.[6] Judging from these facts, there is no wonder that some experienced generals like Nicias and Phocion were fully aware that the men who now followed them in the battlefield later would have the capacity to do them injury.

Even though a general was acquitted from prosecution, we may imagine that the dissatisfaction of his fellow citizens would have negative influence on his public reputation, upon which his re-election depended. Fearing the threat of potential prosecutors, the Athenian generals were likely to exercise their authority with moderation,

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1 Xeno. Hell. 1.7.4-6: καὶ οὐχ ὅτι γε κατηγοροῦσιν ἡμῶν, ἔφασαν, ψευσόμεθα φάσκοντες αὐτοὺς αἰτίους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ χειμῶνος εἶναι τὸ κωλῦσαν τὴν ἀναίρεσιν.

2 Diod. 13.101.2f. Diodorus especially remarks that this second letter turned out to be the principal cause of the generals' misfortune, for it irritated Theramenes who was not only an influential orator in the city but also a witness to the battle. Such a statement does indicate the threat of prosecution from disgruntled subordinate officials. Xenophon (Hell. 1.7.5-6) suggests that the generals in the first assembly meeting still blamed the ferocity of the storm as the principal reason preventing the rescue, but they made it very clear that Theramenes and Therasybulus were the very men who had been given the job and whom they should blame.

3 On scrutiny of Athenian generals see Ath. Pol. 59.2; Pollux 8.87f. For a discussion of the date and procedure of generals' scrutiny see Hignett 1952, 244; Ostwald 1986, 79; Hamel 1998, 126-130. On scrutiny of other Athenian magistrates see Ath. Pol. 54.2.

4 For other examples of this kind, see Hamel 1998, 119.

5 Dem. 19.191, 20.68; Xeno. Hell. 4.8.16.

6 Diod. 16.21.4; Nep. Timoth. 3.4.

and a consequence was that they could not discipline their men effectively. The disciplinary problem of citizen troop is explicitly expressed in Thucydides' account of the complaint of Nicias, who in a letter delivered to the Athenian people wrote that the Athenians were by nature difficult to command.[1] This complaint suggests that either Nicias feared his men, or his authority as general was insufficient to deter the disobedience and laxity of his army. A similar attitude is found in the conversation between Socrates and the younger Pericles, when the latter claims that Athens' hoplites and cavalrymen are disobedient when on military service.[2] Since Xenophon himself was a general, it seems possible that he was inspired by his personal experience and put his own feelings in the mouth of the younger Pericles. The tale that Iphicrates killed a sentry whom he found asleep at his post is striking, but one shall notice that a similar story was told about Epameinondas, which implies that the savage discipline of Iphicrates was probably unhistorical.[3] When all these factors are taken into consideration, Phocion's mildness toward the deserters appears to be a considerable decision rather than negligence.[4]

There is scanty evidence to Phocion's military activities after the Euboean campaign. Only from Plutarch we know that he was involved in campaigns in Megara (343 B.C.), Euboea (341/0 B.C.) and Byzantium (340/39 B.C.). Plutarch's heroic portrait of Phocion, of course, distorts his descriptions of several events. For instance, he does not mention any colleagues of Phocion in these three campaigns, thus creates the impression that Phocion was entrusted solely with the command.[5] This evidently contradicts the principle of collegiality in Athenian military command structure. In addition, Plutarch

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1 Thuc. 7.14.2.

2 Xeno. Mem. 3.5.18f. Interestingly, Xenophon regards men serving in the navy as well disciplined.

3 Front. Str. 3.12.2-3. Cf. Nep. Iphic. 2.1-2. It has been argued that Iphicrates was perhaps a mercenary commander, see Tritle 1988, 82. But there is no other explicit reference to Athenian general's punishment of mercenary soldier in extant sources. Moreover, the author of the *Athenaion Politeia* simply lists the types of punishments that generals of fourth century might impose on their troops, while making no distinction between citizen troops and mercenary armies. We hear again that Iphicrates executed two officers who were involved in a conspiracy, but at that time he was probably a mercenary commander serving under the Persian Pharnabazos (Hamel 1998, 63 n.17).

4 Gehrke (1976, 12) levels criticism at Phocion for allowing desertion of his soldiers, and he obviously ignores the fact that Phocion was commanding a citizen army. But Gehrke still believes that Phocion was a brave fighter who proved his personal courage when fighting with the remaining elite part of his force.

5 Pausanias (1.36.4) tells us that Molottus, whom Plutarch (Phoc. 14.2) mentions as Phocion's successor in his second Euboean campaign, shared the commandership with Phocion in his first Euboean campaign.

reserves for Phocion the honors of having saved Megara and Byzantium. According to him, the Megarians once made a secret appeal to Athens for aid, and Phocion proposed the Megarian expedition to the assembly. Immediately after his proposal was approved, Phocion led out the Athenian force to Megara. Similarly, Plutarch describes that Phocion's speech before the Athenian assembly and his good personal relationship with Leon of Byzantium contributed much to the relief of Byzantium from Macedonian expansion. From a historical viewpoint, Plutarch's exaggeration of Phocion's heroism on one hand calls for examination and correction of details; while on the other hand, his accounts do suggest that Phocion was an active commander in the mid-fourth century B.C. In the cases of Athenian expeditions to Megara and Byzantium, Phocion's military activities were obviously related to his participation in Athenian politics. But it may be too effusive to regard Phocion's political participation as proof of his leadership in contemporary politics. He simply made speech at assembly and successfully persuaded his fellow citizens. The mechanism of democracy allowed even an obscure man to influence public opinion and the course of Athenian policies.[1]

Phocion seemed not to appear on the battlefield of Chaeroneia. Plutarch reports that other generals were chosen to conduct the war when Phocion still conducted naval operations in the northern Aegean.[2] After his return to Athens, Phocion advised his fellow citizens to accept the negotiation Philip offered, but clearly his voice was overwhelmed by the enthusiasm for warfare. Immediately after the defeat at Chaeroneia, however, Phocion was entrusted with the defense of Athens. His appointment suggests that his military competence and experience were recognized by the Athenians, who believed that he could defend the city against Philip as he did in Byzantium. But this decision was more significant in its political meaning. Before Phocion's appointment there was a brief effort made to entrust the city to Charidemus, who was presumably an

1 Tritle (1988, 110) considers Phocion's successful defense of Byzantium as evidence for his significant stature in contemporary politics, but success of this kind does not necessarily indicate political eminence. Demosthenes (18.87f.) was known to play an important role in promoting this expedition, and Plutarch's heroic description is misleading. Perhaps the most striking example of how an obscure man changed Athenian policy is Diodotus son of Eucrates, who prevented Cleon's cruel treatment of the Mytilenians from being executed in 427 B.C. (Thuc. 3.42-49).

2 Plut. Phoc. 16.1; Dem. 18.345.

ardent enemy of Macedon.[1] Had Charidemus managed the affairs of the city, Philip would get the impression that the Athenians were not willing to ask for terms despite their recent defeat, and his troops could reach Athens' frontier in three days.[2] In this critical situation, the public support of Phocion can be well considered as a desire to compromise, for the Athenians placed the city's defenses in the hands of a man who was seriously prepared to negotiate.

Taken Phocion's forty-five tenures of the strategia into consideration, it is at first glance surprising that evidence relating to his military activities after Chaeroneia is merely an oblique reference in Plutarch's account of the Lamian War. After Macedonian victory at Crannon (322 B.C.), a Macedonian force commanded by Micion descended on Attica for invasion. At the advanced age of eighty, Phocion led out the Athenian home guard and defeated the Macedonians. The little that is known of Phocion's later military career naturally leads to a question: If he was consecutively elected as general,[3] which kind of task did he assume during such a long time from 338 B.C. until his death in 318 B.C.? According to the *Athenaion Politeia*, the Athenian generals of fourth century were ten in total. Among them one was appointed to command the heavy infantry on foreign expeditions, one was responsible for domestic defense and commanded in any war that took place in the country. There were also two generals who were particularly concerned to the protection of Piraeus.[4] Clearly, there was a labor division among the ten generals, and we find no evidence indicating that anyone among them was superior in authority to his colleagues, though the hoplite generals appearing in the literary sources were much more prestigious.[5] In this sense, it should be noted that a few references indicate that Phocion was assigned with the task of home defense. When the principle of collegiality

1 Charidemus' strong hostility toward Macedon may be deduced from the fact that he was demanded by Alexander after Thebe's destruction, and he was the only one who suffered punishment (Arr. Anab. 1.10.6).

2 Dem. 18.195.

3 Evidence for Phocion's recurrent appointment comes from a saying of his wife, who said that he was now for the twentieth year a general of Athens (Plut. Phoc. 19.4).

4 Ath. Pol. 61.1. From Ath. Pol. 22.2 we know that in 501/0 B.C. the Athenians began to elect ten generals, but there is no clear evidence for division of posts at that time. N.G.L. Hammond suggests that the partitioning of the generalship began shortly after the Persian Wars, but this view is rejected by P.J.Rhodes (1985, 678), who finds no evidence for assignment of particular posts before 410/09 B.C. M.Chambers (1990, 408) suggests that the partitioning was surely later than 479 B.C., but it can hardly be exactly dated.

5 Hamel 1998, 84-93, 194f. For the increasing importance of the hoplite general in Hellenistic times and the Roman era see Oliver 2007, 160-164.

limited each individual general's authority to a special range, there is no question that one who was always concerned to home defense did not appear in the campaigns outside Athens.

Evidence for Phocion's responsibility of defense is scattered but clear. As has been discussed earlier, Phocion was appointed to the defense of city shortly after the defeat of Chaeroneia. In the Lamian War the Boeotians were hostile to the Athenians, for they feared that the Athenians would seize their land, and such fear were stronger when at the early war they were defeated by Leosthenes. After the Macedonian success at Crannon, it can be well imagined that the Boeotians were eager to display their support for the Macedonians. From Plutarch we learn that the Athenians were bent on making an expedition against them and for this purpose they asked Phocion to lead them out. Phocion initially opposed this plan,[1] probably because he was the general organizing home guard and thus feared that the invasion into Boeotia would leave Athens defenseless. Finally, the fact that Phocion effectively organized the force of defense against Micion's invasion indicates that he was the territorial general at this time.

In addition, one shall notice that from Chaeroneia to the outbreak of the Lamian War, the land of Attica never suffered warfare even serious enemy incursion. It can be strikingly contrasted with the period between 396 to 338 B.C., during which the Athenians regularly fought battles.[2] Also when compared with the later, more turbulent decades of the late fourth century and much of the third century, life in Athens was relatively peaceful before the Lamian War. Even in whole Greece during this period warfare was rare. The most influential open warfare was perhaps the revolt of the Spartan king Agis III against Macedon in early 331 B.C., but it was soon crushed by Antipater in the decisive battle at Megalopolis. Athens notably stood aloof in this affair.[3]

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1 On the hostility of the Boeotians toward Athens see Diod. 18.11.3-5. On Phocion's reaction see Plut. Phoc. 24.3; Tritle 1988, 128.

2 Pritchard (2019, 18, 157) argues that the Athenians "campaigned non-stop from 396 to 386 B.C. and then from 378 to 338 B.C. with only one-year periods of peace".

3 Aeschin. 3.165f., 254; Hyp. 1.col.17; Din. 1.34f.; Diod. 17.62.7; Plut. Dem. 24.1; Cleom 48(27).1; Prae. ger. reip. 818e. Cf. Arr. Anab. 3.6.2; Engels 1989, 209-214; Schmitt 1992, 5f. It was pointed out by de Ste. Croix and followed by some other scholars that a number of Athenian citizens served on the twenty ships that Alexander retained in his service (Diod. 17.22.5) and thus were in fact hostages, so the Athenians would not have exposed them to retaliation (de Ste. Croix 1972, 378; Badian 1989, 60 n.3; Engels 1989, 214.).

Presumably, events such as Philip's victory at Chaeroneia and Alexander's destruction of Thebes may have frightened the most Greeks states that it was not in their best interests to fight Macedon at this time. This temporary period of peace also suggests that the disputes and conflicts between the Greek states were not acute in the shadow of the overwhelming military power of Macedon. At any rate, the less turbulent circumstance could partly explain Phocion's rare participation in campaigns by this time, and it seems reasonable that domestic safety was his chief task.

3.2 Generals of fourth-century Athens: Political participation and rivalry

For Plutarch, Phocion was surely a brave and able general. However, as useful as the discussion of Phocion military career may be, it can hardly conceal the fact that Plutarch in this biography concentrates more on Phocion's political concerns. This literary emphasis, of course, is partly due to Phocion's later obscurity in military affairs. But on the other hand, Plutarch is certainly interested in Phocion the politician. Such an interest is well reflected in his remark that Phocion was outstanding among his contemporaries in pursing both military and political activities. Phocion, as he says, recognized the trend of professionalism in his times: some of the public men merely spoke before the people and made proposals, while others were only interested in military affairs and kept away from political participation. Plutarch praises that Phocion devoted himself equally to both fields, for he was driven by a desire to resume and restore the public service rendered by some earlier illustrious public men like Solon, Aristides and Pericles, who combined in their persons the tasks of being demagogue and general.[1]

This argument of Plutarch has been cited by some scholars for arguing for the juxtaposition of *rhetores* and *strategoi* in the fourth century, particularly when the contrast is made with the fifth century.[2] It is true that most known and named orators in

1 Plut. Phoc. 7.5.

2 Connor 1971, 143-147; Hansen 1984, 55-58; Ober 1989, 120. As for the topic of professionalism in groups of orators and of generals of the fourth-century Athens, Tritle (1992a) suggests that such a

the fourth century were not elected generals, while the famous military men appeared rarely in the Assembly as speakers and proposers of decrees. However, Plutarch's expression creates a misleading impression that Phocion was the only man who followed the old style of the fifth century. For one, even though Phocion is described by Plutarch as the most "atypical" general among his contemporaries, his name does not appear as proposer of any extant decree. Of course, proposing decree was not the only way of political participation in Athens, but in other aspects of political life such as serving as ambassadors or delivering speeches in the jury-courts, some other fourth-century generals were no doubt active. Plutarch informs us that Phocion served twice as envoy to Macedon, in 335 and 322 B.C respectively,[1] but it is not difficult to find similar cases.[2] A remarkable example is Callistratus of Aphidnai, who at first shared generalship with Timotheus and Chabrias in warfare against Sparta, but later in 372/1 B.C. attended the Athenian embassy sent to Sparta to treat for peace.[3] Callistratus was a man of importance in both political and military sphere in the first half of the fourth century. He was well-known for his contribution to the establishment of the Second Athenian Confederacy and for his eloquence at the Oropus trial. Less known but significant for our present discussion is the fact that he prosecuted Timotheus the general in 373/2 B.C. When Timotheus was deposed from office, Callistratus was elected general for the second time.[4]

Callistratus' prosecution against Timotheus shows that generals served as readily in

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distinction is in fact a modern conception, stemming from the Scottish conjecturalists especially Adam Smith, who were interested in idea of specialization of occupations. In another article (1992b) he even believes that there was no division of labor between orators and generals in fourth-century Athens. Yet our sources indicate that in the fourth century Athens fewer generals spoke in the assembly and proposed measures than before, while most proposers of decrees, as the extant inscriptions show, were men without distinguished military careers. Equally misleading as overestimation is the tendency of underestimation.

1 Plut. Phoc. 17.6; 26.4f. Tritle (1987, 113 n.94) suggests that Phocion probably also served on the embassy to Philip after Chaironeia, for he was in a leading position in Athens at that time. But he admits that this view is not directly supported by historical sources which refer explicitly only to Demades and Aeschines (Diod.16.87; Dem. 18.282, 285; Aeschin. 3.227). In addition, Diodorus (18.64.4f.) is the only source that refers to a fruitless embassy in which Phocion participated to the Macedonian commander Nicanor in 318 B.C.

2 For generals as envoys see Mosley 1973, 43. Hansen (1983, 52 n.53) names eleven generals in total. Cf. Kralli 1996, 28f., 39.

3 On Callistratus' generalship, see Diod. 15.29.7. On his participation in the embassy see Xeno. Hell. 6.3.2f. Cf. Gehrke 1976, 20. For a detailed discussion of Callistratus' public activities in 370s, see Hochschulz 2007, 71-127. Gehrke (1976, 17-24) suggests that Callistratus' policy had exerted great influence on Phocion.

4 Dem. 49.13; Xeno. Hell. 6.2.13, 39; Diod. 5.47.3.

the judicial administration of Athens as any other citizen. In a city like Athens where political battles were frequently fought in jury courts, there is no wonder that some political trials were concerned with generals, either brought by them or brought against them. As we have seen earlier, it was not rare in Athens that a general prosecuted his former colleagues, and we can say that a general of this kind was prepared to appear and perform active roles in law courts. There were naturally others who were just soldiers and no more, not interested in using their position for political eminence. Even so, those "quiet" men could not avoid being involved in litigations. Like other Athenian magistrates, all generals were subject to scrutiny and thus easily became the targets of accusations. Finally, in some cases the general was neither prosecutor nor defendant, but appeared as advocate (συνήγορος) in the court. For instance, Aeschines identified among his advocates the politician Eubulus and two generals Phocion and Nausicles.[1]

These above mentioned cases attest that Phocion was not the unique general of his day in Athens who undertook a role beyond the purely military realm. Either appearance in law court or participation in embassies was an element of political activity about which there is explicit evidence of other generals in our sources. Admittedly, our sources may ignore some obscure generals, because their political participation did not greatly influence the course of events.[2] However, there is an Athenian general who was a significant figure in Athenian politician life in late fourth century, in particular was instrumental in the formulation and implementation of Athenian foreign policy before the Lamian War. This is Leosthenes, whom Plutarch regards as responsible for plunging Athens into warfare.[3] Leosthenes initially appeared as the command-in-chief (στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ) of a large band of mercenary soldiers assembled at Taenarum in Laconia in 324 B.C.[4] Diodorus describes him as "a man of unusually brilliant mind and thoroughly opposed to the cause of Alexander". He further informs us

1 Aeschin. 2.170, 184. For a list of generals as συνήγορος see Hansen 1983, 53 n.54.
2 Nausicles served on the embassy to Philip in 346 B.C. (APF, 396; Mosley 1973, 43). Cf. APF, 396-398. Diodorus (18.64.5) mentions that his son Clearchus was an envoy, along with Phocion and Conon, to Nicanor in 318 B.C.
3 Plut. Phoc. 23.1. Leosthenes' image in ancient sources seems to be ambiguous. Both Hypereides (*The Funeral Speech,* ἐπιτάφιος) and Pausanias (1.25.5) praise him as a hero fighting for the freedom of Greece.
4 Diodorus (17.108.7) says that Harpalus shipped his troops off to Taenarum when Athens at first refused to accept him.

that Leosthenes made secret contact with the council at Athens and was granted fifty talents and a stock of weapons. Subsequently Leosthenes made secret contact with the Aetolians who were also hostile to Alexander and made attempt to establish an alliance with them.[1]

Why did Leosthenes make secret contact with the Athenian council?[2] And for what purpose did he make alliance with the Aetolians? In his eighteenth book Diodorus tells us that at the Olympic Games of 324 B.C. Alexander entrusted Nicanor to announce a decree ordering the restoration of most exiles to their homes, a measure which would seriously affect Aetolia and Athens, for the latter it meant that the Athenian cleruchs on Samos would have to evacuate the island.[3] If we accept Diodorus' view, Leosthenes' secret contact with the Athenian council and his subsequent mission to Aetolia can be well understood as a hostile reaction of Athens to Alexander's Decree of Exile. In other words, the Athenians feared the loss of Samos and thus began to prepare themselves for a breach in their relations with Alexander which might cause armed conflict, in which their council secretly operated together with Leosthenes.

It still remains unclear whether the possession of Samos was the most crucial factor that attributed the Athenians a will to resist by warfare, since Diodorus is the only source for this.[4] But other authors such as Curtius Rufus and Justin do agree that Alexander's decision to restore exiles was unwelcome in Athens.[5] Such a hostile attitude also conforms to the fact that Leosthenes was elected as general for home defense (στρατηγός ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας) in 324/3 B.C.[6] Although his entire public career had

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1 Diod. 17.111.3: τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον Λεωσθένην τὸν Ἀθηναῖον, ἄνδρα ψυχῆς λαμπρότητι διάφορον καὶ μάλιστ᾽ ἀντικείμενον τοῖς Ἀλεξάνδρου πράγμασιν, εἵλοντο στρατηγὸν αὐτοκράτορα. On Leosthenes' leading position among the mercenary soldiers, see Diod. 17.111.3; Paus. 1.25.5. Cf. Badian 1961, 27.

2 Cf. Schmitt (1992, 14) argues that the contact between Leosthenes and the Athenian council could hardly be secret, for there were many spies of Macedon in the city.

3 Diod. 18.8.2-7.

4 Cf. Schmitt 1992, 23-34.

5 Curt. Ruf. 10.2.5f.; Just. 13.5.3-6.

6 This information comes from an ephebic dedication found at Oropus, which Reinmuth (1971, Nr.15, col.1, see also 65f.) dates in 324/3 B.C. Tritle (1988, 124) uncritically accepts this view. I agree with the argument of some other scholars (Jaschinski 1981, 51-54; Bosworth 1988, 293f.; Tracy 1995, 25f.) that Leosthenes could not have served as Athenian general and also have been active with the mercenaries at Tainaron in 324/3 B.C. As for the more possible date of his service as general, Tracy argues for the year 329/8 B.C. when the Athenian ephebes participated in the competitions during the festival at the sanctuary of Amphiaraos. It seems possible that there was a dedication which listed Leosthenes as a general on this

nothing to do with Athens up to that moment, the Athenians were likely to be attracted by his leading position in a large group of mercenary soldiers, which indicates his reputation as a competent military man, and perhaps more importantly, his value for manpower in case of war. The relationship between Athens and Alexander was further complicated by the king's desire for deification. There was a debate in Athens and some orators such as Hypereides and Pytheas openly opposed it.[1] Although the fact is that the Athenians finally passed the decree proposed by Demades for granting divine honor to Alexander, the unwillingness in their minds may be reflected in their later punishment of Demades.[2] In short, our sources suggest that the contact between Leosthenes and the Athenian council resulted from some measures of Alexander which provoked an unfavorable reaction in Athens. Although Diodorus' account implies that Leosthenes' contact with the Aetolians was an action on his own initiative, the political situation allows us to believe that Leosthenes could act in behalf of the Athenians. This is not to suggest, however, that the Athenians already had a clearly aggressive policy against Macedon before Alexander's death.[3] Diodorus' emphasis on secrecy implies that the Athenians by that time were still hesitant to resort to open revolt and were waiting for appropriate opportunity. Leosthenes' mission to Aetolia simply suggests that he made connection with the Aetolians, without any indication of a formal agreement at this time.[4]

The Athenians' attitude appeared to be much more clear when the news of Alexander's death was spread, and they even instructed Leosthenes to employ a diplomatic trick: "They (the Athenians) therefore gave secret instructions about these to Leosthenes the Athenian, ordering him at first to enroll them (the mercenaries) as if acting on his own responsibility without authority from the city, in order that Antipater, regarding Leosthenes with contempt, might be less energetic in his preparations. And the

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occasion.

1 Plut. Prae. ger. reip. 804b, Vit. dec. orat. 842d; Hyp. 6.21f. Cf. Engels 1989, 296; Schmitt 1992, 39-41.

2 Athenaeus (6.251b) mentions that the Athenians fined Demades ten talents because he thought Alexander a god.

3 Dinarchus (1.81) mentions a meeting between Demosthenes and Nicanor, because Demosthenes was leading an Athenian sacred embassy at the Olympic games in 324 B.C. It is quite possible that the Decree of Exile was a primary issue discussed in the meeting. Undoubtedly, the Athenians knew that they were no match for military forces of Alexander, so negotiation was the first step for solving this problem.

4 Kralli 1996, 53f.

Athenians, on the other hand, might gain leisure and time for preparing some of the things necessary for the war".[1] After some witnesses from Babylon attested the death of Alexander, the Athenians no longer acted in secrecy but asked Leosthenes to hire the mercenaries assembled at Taenarum and armed them. At this point Leosthenes went to Aetolia for a second time for common action. When the Aetolians were inclined to ally with him, he further sent to the Locrians and the Phocians and the other neighboring peoples and urged them to participate in the warfare against Macedon.[2] These missions may take place at the same time when the Athenians dispatched a series of embassies to various Greek cities after they had decided for war. Plutarch's account of Phocion's open debate with Leosthenes in the assembly suggests that Leosthenes was probably in Athens when the Athenian people were voting.[3]

Diodorus makes it quite clear that Leosthenes was the key figure in Athens' war preparations, and his several missions to other cities suggest that he could employ diplomatic skills in behalf of the Athenians. Plutarch, though in a critical tone, confirms Leosthenes' leading position. Diodorus' account of Leosthenes' activities remarkably marks the lack of participation on the part of the orators. Plutarch mentions that Hyperides supported Leosthenes, and the extant speeches of that orator clearly attest this. But perhaps more significant is his description of the verbal conflict between Leosthenes and Phocion. Such a fierce debate in the assembly suggests that not all Athenian generals of fourth century were men who simply carried out orders laid down by the orators. On the contrary, Leosthenes and Phocion participated actively in the process of decision-making when the Athenians did not irrevocably make up their minds for war. The absence of two famous orators may also create the impression that the generals were primarily engaged in the decision-making process that led to Lamian War. Demosthenes

1 Diod. 18.9.2: διὸ καὶ τούτους προσέταξαν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις Λεωσθένει τῷ Ἀθηναίῳ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀναλαβεῖν αὐτοὺς ὡς ἰδιοπραγοῦντα χωρὶς τῆς τοῦ δήμου γνώμης, ὅπως ὁ μὲν Ἀντίπατρος ῥᾳθυμότερον διατεθῇ πρὸς τὰς παρασκευάς, καταφρονῶν τοῦ Λεωσθένους, οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι σχολὴν λάβωσι καὶ χρόνον προκατασκευάσαι τι τῶν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον χρησίμων. Cf. Plut. Phoc. 23.3: θαυμαζόντων δὲ πολλῶν τὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ Λεωσθένους συνηγμένην δύναμιν (…)

2 Diod. 18.9.3.

3 Plut. Phoc. 23.2f. Diodorus (18.10.1) agrees that a fierce debate took place in the assembly, but his opinion that the Athenians divided along class lines seems implausible to some modern scholars (Tritle 1988, 125; Schmitt 1992, 62-64).

was exiled after his conviction in the Harpalus process and was said to vigorously debate with Pytheas over the war in Arcadia.[1] Demades was also found guilty in the Harpalus process, and after that he was more than once accused of introducing illegal decree. Consequently, he was deprived of the citizen rights and was unable to address the people.[2] But at any rate, one would have expected the generals to assume increased responsibilities under circumstances of war, and the cooperation between orators and generals, like Hyperides and Leosthenes, was not uncommon in Athenian political life.[3]

In his narrative Plutarch emphasizes Phocion's public career as a speaker and envoy, but our sources do attest that he was merely one of the generals of his day who combined military, political and even diplomatic functions at Athens. This conclusion, of course, does not contradict with the fact that the distinction between political and military leaders became clear in the fourth century. Compared with the great Athenian generals of the fifth century like Themistocles, Aristides, Cimon, Pericles and Nicias, many named and known generals in the fourth century are not known as public speakers or envoys. In view of this tendency of role differentiation, there is an interesting passage in Theopompus that deserves to be mentioned. A citation of Theopompus by Athenaeus suggests that Chabrias and several contemporary reputed generals were unwilling to live in Athens. The reason underlying their choice, as Theopompus explicitly states, was the hostility of the Athenian people toward the eminent men. When the evidence of fourth-century authors shows that complaints against malicious prosecutions had become a common theme to law-court speeches and political essays, it seems plausible to assume that the fear of political rivalries and litigations could deter these generals from political participation even presence in public. Under this circumstance, of course, they would have no interest in domestic politics. But was this true in the fourth-century Athens?

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1 Plut. Dem. 27.4.

2 Diodorus (18.18.2) says that Demades was convicted three times, while the number of convictions is given as seven by Plutarch (Phoc. 26.3). It should be noted that the deprivation of his citizen rights must have happened after Alexander's death, because he was still politically active when the first reports of the king's death fell on Athens (Plut. Phoc. 22.5f.).

3 Cf. Hansen 1983, 52; Ober 1989, 120f.

3.3 The fear of generals: Jealousy of people or punishment of failure

In his *Life of Chabrias*, Nepos records that some Persian envoys once came to Athens to protest that the Athenian general Chabrias served in Egypt and was waging war against the Persian King. Since the Athenians had an alliance with King Artaxerxes, they ordered Chabrias to return home. Chabrias obeyed the order and returned, but remained there no longer than was absolutely necessary, because he feared that his extravagant life would cause the suspicion and jealousy of the Athenians. Fearing the danger of condemnation, Chabrias preferred to live abroad. By doing so he was not the only one, for some famous figures like Conon, Iphicrates, Timotheus and Chares chose to leave Athens as well.[1]

Interestingly, we find a similar passage in Theopompus, who in the thirteenth book of his *Philippica* speaks of Chabrias:

> But Chabrias was unable to live in the city, partly on account of his licentiousness, and partly because of the extravagant habits of his daily life, and partly because of the Athenians. For they are always unfavorable to eminent men. Their most illustrious citizens preferred to live out of the city. For instance, Iphicrates lived in Thrace, and Conon in Cyprus, and Timotheus in Lesbos, and Chares at Sigeum, and Chabrias himself in Egypt.[2]

Both Theopompus and Nepos mentioned that Chabrias, as well as four other Athenian generals, were unwilling to live in Athens. In the case of Chabrias, they agree that his extravagance caused resentment from his fellow citizens, but a more important reason was the Athenians' general unfavorable attitude toward the eminent men. These similarities in substance suggest that Nepos' account may have derived from

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1 Nep. Chabr. 3.

2 FGrH 115 F105= (Athen. 12.43): οὐ δυνάμενος δὲ ζῆν ἐν τῇ πόλει τὰ μὲν διὰ τὴν ἀσέλγειαν καὶ διὰ τὴν πολυτέλειαν τὴν αὑτοῦ τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον, τὰ δὲ διὰ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἅπασι γάρ εἰσι χαλεποί: διὸ καὶ εἵλοντο αὐτῶν οἱ ἔνδοξοι ἔξω τῆς πόλεως καταβιοῦν, Ἰφικράτης μὲν ἐν Θρᾴκῃ, Κόνων δ᾽ ἐν Κύπρῳ, Τιμόθεος δ᾽ ἐν Λέσβῳ, Χάρης δ᾽ ἐν Σιγείῳ, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Χαβρίας ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ.

Theopompus, and he apparently shares the view with Theopompus that the Athenians were harsh to their leaders. While Theopompus considered Chabrias' choice of living abroad as a reaction to the hostility of his fellow citizens,[1] Nepos points out that the cause of such hostility was jealousy, which, as he says, was "a common fault of great states which enjoy freedom" (est enim hoc commune vitium in magnis liberisque civitatibus). Jealousy is a common emotion motivated by a feeling of inequality, which particularly aims at those who possess power, honor and wealth. Using Chabrias as an example, Nepos claims that the average Athenian citizens could hardly tolerate those who were superior in glory or wealth.

At first sight it seems not surprising that the story of Chabrias is one of the numerous examples that describe the conflict between the rich and poor in fourth-century Athens. However, the historical accuracy of this story evidently calls for caution. Since envy and jealousy are normal psychological reactions toward inequality, it is interesting to ask whether these so-called "victims" were in fact responsible for creating such an inequality. There is explicit testimony from the fourth century. Demosthenes, for example, complains that the Athenian generals extorted money from provincial cities in the guise of "goodwill". In *Life of Phocion* we also find that Phocion replaced Chares as the commander for assisting the Byzantians, because Chares had exacted money from the allies and hence was unwelcome. These pieces of evidence suggest that Athenian generals would have opportunities to enrich themselves from allies and subject cities, though these cities, as Demosthenes tells the Athenians, may be willing to pay in order to "buy protection for their traders, safe passage, convoy, that sort of thing".[2] If the post of generalship was considered as a source of profit, it seems unsurprising that Athenian democracy was watchful for malversation of their generals. The point is not the question of fair treatment of the generals collectively, rather the principle of egalitarianism that was central to Athenian democracy. The more profit the generals earned from their post, the more envy and jealousy from average citizens they had to suffer. Once a general's enemy put the jury into an envious state of mind, he

1 For other discussion of this passage in Theopompus, see Flower 1997, 151f.
2 Dem. 8.24; Plut. Phoc. 14; Carter 1986, 34-36.

would not be able to win pity and leniency from them.

More importantly, we need to explore whether these named generals were really victims of malicious prosecutions, or at least whether the envy and jealousy of the Athenian people were the primary reason for their distance from Athens. Furthermore, both Theopompus and Nepos claim that many other illustrious men felt as Chabrias did, and the implication to be drawn from this is that the prosecution against leaders, in this context more exactly against generals, was prevalent in Chabrias' day. Thus it is necessary to examine whether Nepos' characterization of the Athenian people as essentially envious and capricious is in accord with other sources. For this purpose, Plutarch's *Phocion* also provides certain useful information.

A close examination begins with Conon, the first man mentioned by Theopompus. In 405 B.C. the Athenian fleet was defeated by the Spartan navy at Aegospotami. While most of the Athenian crew was captured, only nine ships succeeded in escaping and Conon was on one of these ships. Then Conon set sail to Cyprus and found refuge at the court of Evagoras, the king of Salamis on Cyprus and an ally of Athens. Among our sources Xenophon and Plutarch simply say that Conon sailed away to seek refuge with Evagoras,[1] but Diodorus' account is remarkably different: "Of the triremes only ten escaped. Conon, the general, who had one of them, gave up any thought of returning to Athens, fearing the wrath of the people, but sought safety with Evagoras, who was in control of Cyprus and with whom he had relations of friendship".[2] On Conon's flight to Cyprus, some scholars have accepted Diodorus' explanation that he did not want to be the victim of a wave of popular anger,[3] which does make sense if we recall that Conon witnessed Alcibades' political downfall and the trial of the generals who served at Arginusae.[4] Especially at the trial of the Arginusae generals, some sources indicate that

1 Xeno. Hell. 2.1.29; Plut. Lys. 11.8, Alc. 37.4.

2 Diod. 13.106.6: τῶν μὲν οὖν τριήρων δέκα μόνον διεξέπεσον, ὧν μίαν ἔχων Κόνων ὁ στρατηγὸς τὴν μὲν εἰς Ἀθήνας ἐπάνοδον ἀπέγνω φοβηθεὶς τὴν ὀργὴν τοῦ δήμου, πρὸς Εὐαγόραν δὲ τὸν ἀφηγούμενον τῆς Κύπρου κατέφυγεν, ἔχων πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλίαν.

3 Kagan 1987, 393; Fornis 2008, 33.

4 After the navy defeat at Notium in 407/6 B.C., the angry Athenians soon removed Alcibiades from the post of commander, though a few months earlier they had warmly welcomed Alcibiades' return and elected him to the board of generals for 407/6 B.C. Conon was one of his colleagues, and after Alcibiades' deposition he was instructed to take over the command of the fleet at Samos. On the Battle of Notium, see Xeno. Hell. 1.5.11-15; Diod. 13.71.3f. Cf. Bommelaer 1981, 90-95; Russell 1994; Lazenby 2004, 220-224;

Conon, who was blocked at Mytilene and evidently bore no responsibility for the failed rescue of the shipwrecked after the battle, was also put to trial alongside his colleagues.[1] Though Conon was finally freed of guilty, the conviction of other eight generals must have warned him how defeat, or even the failure of meeting the expectations of the Athenian people, could easily make a general the target of wrath and accusation. Rather than reflecting the envy of the Athenian people against a prominent general, Conon's flight was reasonably driven by the fear that the defeat would have cost him his life if he had returned.[2] Not until after his great navy victory at Cnidus in 394 B.C. did he return to Athens.[3] Conon's fear of juridical retaliation is also reflected in his attempt to turn the wrath of the people away from himself toward Adeimantus, his former colleague at Aegospotami.[4]

Theopompus said that Timotheus, the son of Conon, was also a victim of the public suspicion in Athens and consequently he had to live in Lesbos. Likewise Nepos, in his *Life of Timotheus*, claims that Timotheus was accused and fined with 100 talents by the Athenians, so he withdrew to Chalcis due to "indignation at his country's ingratitude".[5] This report of Timotheus' stay in Chalcis is unattested elsewhere and conflicts with his statement in the *Chabrias* that Timotheus took refuge at Lesbos, but one thing is at least certain that Timotheus after this trial was forced to exile himself. The trial was caused by a failed military operation at Embata in 356 B.C. During the

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Asmonti 2015, 39-43.

1 Asmonti 2015, 79f.

2 Asmonti (2015, 104-107) explains Conon's flight as fear of the victorious Spartans than of his fellow citizens. He argues that democracy could not last for very much longer after the defeat at Aegospotami, so "there was no suitable atmosphere for a political-judicial operation like the Arginusae trial". But there were in fact a few months after the battle of Aegospotamoi until Athens' surrender. During this time the democratic institutions still functioned as usual. For example, the Assembly endorsed various embassies to Sparta (Xeno. Hell. 2.2.16-22; Asmonti 2015, 96f.). However, the crisis caused by the shortage of grain and the ensuing siege of the Spartans certainly spurred the emotionality of the masses. They at first put Archestratus into prison, who advised them to tear down a portion of the long walls, and passed a decree forbidding making proposal like this (Xeno. Hell. 2.2.15). But when the Spartans insisted on their harsh terms, the Athenians condemned Cleophon and sentenced him to death, a man who had spoken against peace negotiations with Sparta (Lys. 30.10f.). In such a desperate situation, a defeated general like Conon would easily be a favorite target of the people's fickleness and anger.

3 Xeno. Hell. 4.8.7; Diod. 14.85.2.

4 On Adeimantus' suspicion of treason, see Lys. 14.38. Among the Athenian prisoners who were captured by Lysander after Aegospotamoi, Adeimantus was the only one who was exempted and freed (Xeno. Hell. 2.1.32), a fact that evidently provided Conon with the chance of self-preservation. The context in which Demosthenes mentions the trial (19.191) suggests that Adeimantus was found guilty, but the final result of trial remains unknown. On this trial see also Hamel 1998, 148; Asmonti 2015, 164.

5 Nep. Timoth. 3.5: Ille odio ingratae civitatis coactus, Chalcidem se contulit.

campaign a conflict arose between Chares and other three commanders of the Athenian fleet, namely the three defendants Timotheus, Iphicrates and Menestheus. While Chares persisted in carrying out a plan of attack, the others refused to fight because of the coming of a severe storm. In spite of the danger, Chares attacked alone but failed and lost many ships. Soon after the defeat, Chares charged his colleagues of shirking the battle. Since Chares himself was not in Athens, Aristophon of Azenia brought formal charges and prosecuted Timotheus, Iphicrates and Menestheus with the crimes of treason and corruption.[1] While two other defendants, Iphicrates and his son Menestheus, were acquitted, Timotheus alone was found guilty and was fined 100 talents, a sum he was unable to pay.[2]

In his *Antidosis* Isocrates attributes Timotheus' conviction primarily to his unpopularity among the jurors, for he was notorious for his proud bearing. While praising Timotheus as an illustrious general, Isocrates claims that he has entirely neglected his public image. In this way, he argues that Timotheus himself was in some degree responsible for his own misfortune. But Isocrates also identifies envy as the reason why Timotheus was attacked and harshly treated. In the popular democracy that he presents the city as being, people are mild to those who used to gratifying them, while they despise those who make great contribution to the city but not sing their praises. In spite of his warnings, Timotheus was unmoved and was unable to lower himself to the level of people "who were intolerant of those who are naturally superior to them".[3] It is well imagined that Timotheus' wealth and personal prestige would have contributed to the resentment of the poor citizens. Worse still, his failure to curry favor with the mass would easily be interpreted as an intentional demonstration of his superiority. Such envy and resentment were brought into play, when the ordinary and poor Athenians were asked to sit as jurors. When they were not satisfied with Timotheus' daily behaviors, they would naturally have the perception that for any misdeeds he might commit he should

1 On the military operation at Embata, see Diod. 16.21.1-4; Nep. Timoth. 3. Cf. Cawkwell 1981, 41; Burich 1994, 152-160.

2 On Timotheus' trial and fine, see Isoc. 15.129; Din. 3.17. Cf. Polyaen. 3.9.29. Diodorus (16.21.4) says that both Iphicrates and Timotheus were fined, and he does not mention Menestheus in this trial. Some modern studies of the trial after Embata see Harris 1988, 44-52; Sinclair 1988, 151; Worthington 1992, 155f.; Burich 1994, 186.

3 Isoc. 15. 132-138.

pay the penalty. Isocrates makes explicit the idea that Timotheus' numerous contributions to the city were disregarded to the point of unjustly being put on trial and punished, and the feeling of envy is manifested in this case.

It is not surprising that Isocrates enthusiastically offered a defense for Timotheus, because Timotheus was a former pupil of him, and the old orator was at that time charged of corrupting the youth he had taught.[1] But shall we understand the conviction of Timotheus, as Isocrates says and Theopompus later describes, simply as a political retaliation against a hubristic man, whose attitude of superiority was not tolerated by men who believed in the validity of egalitarian political principles? This question may be asked in another way: What kind of disadvantages did the defeat at Embata bring to Athens? Byzantium detached itself from the Second Athenian League since the late 360s, and it actively assisted other cities like Rhodes, Cos and Chios to rebel against Athens. Especially in 357 B.C., they ravaged three islands Imbros, Lemnos and Samos, on which there were Athenian cleruchs.[2] Thus the operation at Embata has to be supposed as an action of retaliation against Byzantium. Moreover, Byzantium was located at a critical position on the Bosporus, whose hostility inevitably disturbed the grain supply to Athens. Some scholars argue for its interference with Athenian grain ships in 362/1 B.C.[3] It is also reported that there was a general grain crisis in Greece in 357 B.C. due to drought.[4] Thus there is good reason to believe that Athens, fearful as always of its Pontic grain supply, made attempt to ensure the safety of its grain fleets.

However, the defeat apparently disappointed the Athenians who wished to restore Byzantium and its neighbors to functioning League membership, and the threat to grain supply remained unsolved. Worse still, Athens' financial problems were acute at that time. According to Demosthenes, the revenues of the state did not exceed 130 talents, and the treasury is said to be insufficient for a single day's expenditure.[5] The bad economic condition in Athens was well attested by the way the war came to end: When Chares was

1 Too 2008, 1. Cf. Isoc. 15.84-242, where he offers a justification of his identity as a teacher.
2 On Byzantine separation from Athens, see Nep. Timoth. 1.2. Cf. Cawkwell 1972, 273; Sealey 1976, 433f.; Cargill 1981, 169. On the ravage of the islands, see Diod. 16.21.2.
3 Cargill 1981, 169; Hornblower 1982, 203.
4 Dem. 20.33. Cf. Isoc. 8.21.
5 Dem. 10.37, 23.209. Cf. Isoc. 7.9, 8.19-21.

in need of money for further war preparations, he was obliged to hire out the services of his mercenaries to the revolted Persian satrap Artabazus, an action that irritated the Persian king Artaxerxes III Ochus who then threated to support for the revolting cities. Driven by military pressure and financial difficulties, the Athenians were forced to recognize the autonomy of Chios, Rhodes, Cos and Byzantium in 355 B.C.[1] Whether the trial of three generals is dated before or after the end of the war,[2] it is sure that under these difficult conditions they were exposed to the anger of the Athenians. Timotheus particularly paid a heavy price for his bad reputation among his fellow citizens.

As to the career of Iphicrates, Theopompus and Nepos mention his sojourn in Thrace. We know that he was deposed and replaced by Timotheus in 365/4 B.C., because he spent four fruitless years trying to recover Amphipolis. Instead of returning to Athens to face trial, Iphicrates went into exile at the court of the Thracian king Cotys. According to Demosthenes, Iphicrates later refused to join with Cotys in an attack on certain Athenian possessions, an action that infuriated the king, so that he had to withdraw to Antissa and then to Drys.[3] These facts clearly reveal Iphicrates' fear of the Athenian people. On one hand, he was unwilling to return Athens. Even if he no longer felt welcome at Cotys' court, he still chose to stay abroad. While on the other hand, his refusal to join in offensive action of Cotys against Athenian strongholds implies that he did not want to be viewed as treacherous, and the motivation behind it is better understood as a desire that the Athenians would eventually forget about his failure to take Amphipolis and make it safe for him to return home. Fortunately, the outbreak of the Social War provided him a good opportunity, for Athens was certainly in need of experienced commanders. However, the failure at Embata once again forced Iphicrates to make a choice. This time he obeyed the summons of the people to return, and at his

1 Diod. 16.22.1-2.

2 Sealey (1955, 74) dates the trial before the end of the war, supported by a remark made by Iphicrates (Plut. Reg. et imp. apophth. 187a) and a reference of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Lys. 12). But Dionysius (Din. 13) also says that it took place after Timotheus have his accounts audited during the archonship of Diotimus (354/3 B.C.). Some modern scholars like Schäfer (1956, 153-163) and Cawkwell (1962, 48) believe that there was a delay before the trial.

3 Dem. 23.149. On Iphicrates' journey to Thrace and his later exile, see Dem. 23. 130-32, 135, 156. Cf. Kallet 1983; Harris 1989.

trial he won the acquittal.[1] But it shall be noted that Iphicrates after this trial never again commanded the Athenian forces until his death. The return of Iphicrates suggests that the Athenians were willing to pardon past failure when they were in great need of military talent, but more strikingly, the obscurity of his later career after 355 B.C. demonstrates that military defeat, though on this occasion did not bring about severe punishments, did bring him into disfavor.

The trial after Embata also reflects political rivalry in Athens. Timotheus' and Iphicrates' accuser was Chares, a man who was formerly their colleague. After the defeat the generals were supposed to know what kind of harsh treatment was waiting for them, and it is understandable that Chares urgently looked for scapegoats to blame for the failed military operation. Yet it would be simplistic to conclude that his behavior was driven by a desire of self-preservation alone. This trial evidently led to the advancement of Chares. With the other generals were deposed and recalled to Athens, he was in sole command of Athenian fleet in the northern Aegean until the Athenians became intimidated by the prospect of Persian interference and recalled him.[2] There were rumors that Aristophon, the actual prosecutor of three generals, were bribed to act on Chares' behalf.[3]

After the Social War, Chares had a reasonably respectable military record in Athens at least until Philip's victory at Chaironeia in 338 B.C.[4] It is understandable, because three prominent generals were unable to compete with him any longer: Chabrias perished at Chios in 357 B.C. After the defeat at Embata Timotheus went into exile and soon died.[5] The aging Iphicrates, without any record of commandership in Athens after 355 B.C., actually retired from public life. When judging Chare's contribution to Athens, one could hardly ignore the dismissive hostility of his contemporaries, which was

1 As to the reason of Iphicrates' acquittal, Nepos (Iphic. 3.1) says that Iphicrates' appearance inspired admiration. Polyaeneus (3.9.29) ascribes it to Iphicrates' popularity and particularly to the presence of large number of his armed soldiers in Athens.

2 Diod. 16.22.1. Dem. 23.173.

3 Salmond 1996, 47.

4 For a list of Chares' military activities and victories during this period, see Hilgard, "Chares", RE 3.2(1899), 2126-2128. Cf. Pritchett 1974, 77-85; Salmond 1996.

5 Isocrates (15.101) suggests that Timotheus was already dead when he finished his *Antidosis* in 353 B.C. On the date of Isocrates' speech, see Burich 1994, 160 n.163.

uncritically inherited by some later authors.[1] Chares was described as a corrupt warmonger, who was specifically brutal and greedy toward the allies and engaged in some expedition of plunder, but criticism of this kind was reasonably based on the fact that the Athenians preferred Chares for expeditions. According to Demosthenes, Chares was repeatedly accused, but more striking was the result that he was always acquitted.[2] This argument also fosters the suggestion that Chares was an influential man in Athens. Perhaps he maintained his popularity due to his military successes, and the action of extortion and plunder was in effect favorable to Athens. If the benefits had not accrued to Athens, he would hardly have been re-elected as general and repeatedly escaped conviction. Clearly, during the late 350s and early 340s Chares had been able to achieve military victories and enhance his personal prestige to a remarkable degree.

Diodorus records that Chares and Lysicles were the Athenian generals at the battle of Chaironeia.[3] After the defeat Chares probably remained in Athens, for he was one of those who were demanded by Alexander after the destruction of Thebes in 335 B.C.[4] Then Chares left Athens and went to Sigeum, from where he came to meet Alexander in Ilium and crowned the king with a golden wreath.[5] Chronologically, our next bit of information comes from Arrian and Curtius Rufus, both of whom agree that Chares served under the Persians and held command in Mytilene in 333/2 B.C.[6] In the mid-320s he was with mercenaries in Tainaron, and he probably died in 324/3 B.C. The date of his death must be before Demosthenes' third letter, because it speaks of him as though dead.[7] In views of Chares' later career, no evidence notably ascribes his exile to the jealousy and hostility of the Athenians. As for Chares' motive to leave his hometown,

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1 Chares was clearly the unnamed object of wrath in Isocrates' *On the Peace* (περί εἰρήνης), especially when Isocrates' close association with Timotheus was taken into consideration. This is explicitly recognized by Aristotle (Rhet. 1418a). On other condemnations of Chares' behavior, see Aeschin. 2.71; Polyb. 9.23.6; Diod. 16.34.3; Plut. Phoc. 14.2-4, Reg. et imp. apophth. 188b. The ambivalent attitude toward Chares is obviously expressed by Nepos. On one hand he charges Chares as the very man responsible for Timotheus' exile (Timoth. 3.4f.), while on the other hand he admits that Chares, though differing from other generals in actions and character, was both honored and influential in Athens (Chabr. 3.4). For Chares' corrupt life and his popularity in Athens, see also Athen. 12.532b.

2 Dem. 19.332. On prosecutions against Chares see also Aeschin. 2.71; Arist. Rhet. 1411a, 1376a.

3 Diod. 16.85.2.

4 Arr. Anab. 1.10.4; Suidas, s.v. Ἀντίπατρος.

5 Arr. Anab. 1.12.1.

6 Arr. Anab. 3.2.6; Curt. Ruf. 4.5.22.

7 Dem. Ep. 3.31. Chares is mentioned with Nausicles, Diotimus and Menestheus as men carried off by death. For Chares in Tainaron, see Plut. Vit. dec. orat. 848e.

he must have found himself in a much more dangerous position when the Athenians were warned by the fate of Thebes and men like Phocion agreed to deliver the named ones. Though Alexander finally gave up the demand, it can be well imagined that the political situation was not as favorable to him as before. In addition, Chares' military talent was well appreciated, so it was not difficult for him to make a living abroad. In any case, it seems safe to infer that Chares' exile was connected with the Macedonian victory over Athens rather than with domestic political conflict.

Finally we turn to Chabrias. Nepos simply says that Chabrias was recalled when he was serving in Egypt, without any indication of the accurate date of the event. In Diodorus, however, Chabrias is mentioned twice in connection with his commandership in Egypt. Chabrias first went to Egypt because he accepted service with the Egyptian king Acoris. Diodorus specifically states that he did so without having first consulting the assembly, and finally he was recalled under pressure from Pharnabazus.[1] But after his return from Egypt Chabrias surely served for Athens, for he served on the boundary of Attica in the winter of 379/8 B.C. Then he participated in the defense of Thebes against the invasion of the Spartan king Agesilaus.[2] The extant sources do suggest that Chabrias was not infrequently in command of Athenians during the 370s and the early 360s.[3] In 362/1 B.C. Chabrias came to assist King Tachos of Egypt against Persia. According to Diodorus, it was once more an action on his own, but there is no record whether he was recalled again by the Athenians.[4] Thus it is supposed that the third chapter of Nepos' *Chabrias* was concerned with that general's first service in Egypt, and Nepos' description of the jealousy and fickleness of the Athenian demos is unattested in terms of Chabrias' later activities.

As for the generals mentioned by Theopompus, only in the case of Timotheus the envy of the Athenian demos may have played a role in his conviction. It should be noted that Conon, Timotheus and Iphicrates left Athens, primarily because they were

1 Diod. 15.29.1-4. Diodorus dates this event in 377/6 B.C., but at that time the king of Egypt was Nectanebo I, the successor of Acoris. Presumably Diodorus has confused the two kings (Pritchett 1974, 73 n.73; Bradley 1991, 66f.).
2 Xeno. Hell. 5.4.14. On the defense of Thebes see Xeno. Hell. 5.4.54; Diod. 15.32.5; Nep. Chabr. 1.1f.; Polyaen. 2.1.2.
3 For a list of Chabrias' military activities during this period, see Pritchett 1974, 72-77.
4 Diod. 15.92.3.

responsible for military failure. In the case of Chares, it can also be explained that the Athenian defeat at Chaironeia forced those who had been hostile to Philip to leave the city. Some scholars have accepted the view that the profession of general was a rather hazardous form of employment in Athens, because military failure easily led to political disgrace.[1] It is known that all Athenian magistrates were subject to regular scrutiny, which usually took place at the end of their term. The scrutiny of generals could not be so regularly scheduled as other magistrates, for they frequently hold office repeatedly and could not reasonably have been expected to return to Athens from the field to submit audit. However, the deposition of generals during their term of service is well attested in our sources. According to D.Hamel, between a third and a half of the trials of generals for which we now have evidence from 404/3 to 322/1 B.C. were preceded by deposition.[2] Like other magistrates, the generals were liable to scrutiny and prosecution both at the end of their term and at any time during their year in office. The decision of deposition usually resulted from military failure or fruitless campaign. The deposed general had to make a choice between voluntary exile and return, because unsuccessful military action could easily be interpreted by his opponents as result of bribery or treason.

If one examines the known trials of Athenian generals in the fourth century B.C., one may conclude that the sentences they received were usually severe. As for the twenty-six of the thirty trials for which we know the result between 404 and 321 B.C., only seven ended in acquittal. Among the nineteen trials ended in conviction, nine were surely sentenced to death, while six were certainly or probably fined.[3] The statistic outcome appears to be consistent with the suggestion that the fear of prosecution significantly influenced a general's behavior, as the cases of Conon, Iphicrates and Chares show. When a defeated general was well aware of the previous severe punishments others had received, and he had no confidence in his own power of eloquence, he would naturally choose to flee or accuse other colleagues in order to avoid the trial. It may also

1 Pritchett 1974, 4-33; Harris 1989, 264f.; Hamel 1998, 122-157; Asmonti 2015, 62-65.
2 Hamel 1998, 126. She concludes that during this period there were thirty attested trials against generals, of which twelve defendants were certainly or probably deposed.
3 Hamel 1998, 137 Fig. 2.

be noted that the passage of time did not relieve a general from being accused. When Conon returned home ten years after the battle of Aegospotami, he could still bring his former colleague Adeimantus to trial.[1] There are indeed examples showing that the Athenians pardoned the past failure and welcomed the exiled generals when they later made great contribution to the city,[2] but the outcome of the known trials indicates that more generals paid heavy price for their failure.[3]

When the Athenian people were able to exercise the authority of scrutiny over generals, especially those from noble and wealthy families, it seems possible that the feeling of jealousy may have influenced their judgments. But in most cases for which we have evidence, the wrath of failed operation was obviously the primary reason for their harsh attitude. For this Phocion' s trial could also be used as evidence. When Antipater's death was finally became known in Athens, Dercylus of Hagnous, the general who was at that time responsible for home defense, intended to arrest Nicanor, the commander of the Macedonian garrison at Athens. The plan failed and Nicanor fled. Plutarch says that Phocion was unaware of this affair, but he was suspected of complicity in the escape of Nicanor. When Nicanor seized Piraeus and firmly entrenched in Munychia, Phocion's repeated refusal to arrest Nicanor infuriated the Athenians and convinced them that he collaborated with the Macedonians. As a result, the Athenians removed Phocion from office and later accused him of treason. For this event Diodorus tells a different story that Phocion failed to persuade Nicanor to restore Piraeus, but he agrees that the Athenians were angry at Phocion's inactivity toward Nicanor's plot.[4] Whether Phocion's refusal to arrest Nicanor was intentional or simply due to his trust in the latter, his failure to prevent Nicanor's coup was no doubt the direct reason that irritated the Athenians.

Nevertheless, we should be cautious when observing the frequency and harshness of prosecution in the sources. Firstly, the figures for which we have evidence may not be representative for the entire group of generals in this period. Our list of the

1 Two other generals, Leocrates (Aeschin. 3.252; Plut. Vit. dec. orat. 843e) and Theomnestus (Lys. 10.22, 25), were known to be accused several years after the battle. Both were acquitted.
2 Apart from Iphicrates, we could still find examples like Demosthenes (Thuc. 4.29.1), Alcibiades (Xeno. Hell. 1.4.20f.; Plut. Alc. 32) and Conon (Xeno. Hell. 4.8.9f.; Dem. 20.68-70; Asmonti 2015, 161f.).
3 For a full list of trials of generals from 501/0-322/1 B.C., see Hamel 1998, 140-157.
4 Plut. Phoc. 32-33; Diod. 18.64-65. Cf. Nep. Phoc. 2.4f.

fourth-century Athenian generals is still incomplete, and we do not know how many generals who were ever prosecuted are neglected by extant sources. Secondly, our sources may mention disproportionately the trials in which harsh punishments were imposed. Particularly for the law-court speeches, it sometimes served the interests of the orators or speech writers to only refer to trials ended with severe penalties. Although the theme of the harsh and intractable temper of the Athenian people is not infrequently found in our sources, but strictly speaking, the frequency of prosecution and the rate of conviction among the entire group of fourth-century generals remain inconclusive. Theopompus puts his remark on Chabrias' fear in a general form, applying it to all the eminent men of Chabrias' time, but we actually lack details that are essential to support this view.

Judgment of Phocion as a "political general" certainly ignores the military competence he demonstrated in several campaigns. His forty-five tenures of the strategia also suggest the public recognition of his ability as a military leader, though the division of labor among ten Athenian generals made him more obscure than those who always commanded expeditions. At the same time it has to be noted, however, that Phocion's reputation shall not be overestimated. Compared with other illustrious generals of his day, such as Iphicrates, Timotheus, Chares and his military mentor Chabrias, Phocion's military accomplishments were not particularly noteworthy. Except for his repeated election to generalship, Phocion's military career does not appear atypical and outstanding from other fourth-century Athenian generals. The fact that he was deposed and condemned after his failure to hinder Nicanor's occupation of Piraeus reveals the harsh attitude of the Athenians toward military failure, as many generals prior to him had suffered. But the anger of the Athenians in this affair should be more understood as political: Phocion was a leading figure of an oligarchic regime that ruled Athens for more than three years, and his refusal to act against Nicanor was easily interpreted as a desire to maintain the status quo, namely peace with Macedon even at the expense of democracy.

4. Phocion the Politician: Democratic orator and oligarchic leader

Plutarch praises Phocion as a man who wished to resume and restore the public service rendered by old politicians such as Pericles, Aristides and Solon, and in emulating them he pursued both military and political activities. From Plutarch's biography we have a suggestion that Phocion was politically active, for he frequently appeared and spoke before the Athenian people. Yet we must recognize that this activity does not necessarily mean influence. What kind of policies did Phocion advocate? Were there any changes in his policies? Did he play a significant role in determining or changing public opinion and the course of Athenian policies? The answer to these questions is fundamental to any understanding of Phocion's stature in contemporary politics. It is well-known that Phocion was a head of an unpopular oligarchic regime subordinate to the Macedonian hegemon Antipater, and the resentment of this government finally led to his death. But in recent years the oligarchic character of this regime has been doubted even rejected by some scholars. Our evidence for the measures which Antipater carried out clearly proves the oligarchic traits of that constitution, and we should observe that Phocion, in spite of Plutarch's moral embellishment, played a considerable role in enforcing oligarchic reforms. Phocion's execution only led to a shortly restoration of democracy. One of his political associates, Demetrius of Phalerum, was soon appointed by Antipater's son Cassander as the new governor of Athens, and in several areas Demetrius acted in accordance with the constitutional changes under Antipater. Since both regimes were backed by Macedon, and Demetrius himself witnessed the establishment and downfall of Antipater's oligarchy, such similarities seem not to be coincidence, but offer us an insight into the level of Macedonian control in Athens in both pragmatic and ideological aspects.

4.1 Phocion as orator in Plutarch's literary embellishment

It remains unknown when Phocion first entered into Athenian political field. Plutarch describes that there was once a quarrel of territory between the Athenians and the Boeotians. Phocion made a speech in the assembly, advising them to fight with words instead with arms, because the Athenians were militarily inferior to the Boeotians. Though the date and occasion of this debate are not revealed by any source, Phocion's remark implies an Athenian defeat to the Boeotians. Moreover, it is known that Phocion's military mentor Chabrias was accused of treason after the Theban occupation of Oropus in 366 B.C. There is no wonder that Phocion would give public support to Chabrias by arguing for peace, since Chabrias was held accountable for military failure.[1] Scanty as the evidence is, it seems reasonable to date this debate to the time of the Oropus trial. Phocion only played an insignificant role in this debate: He was certainly not the unique one speaking before the assembly, and he was apparently unable to calm the anger of the Athenians, because Chabrias did not escape the trial. But this event, as far as we know, appears to be his earliest known political participation.

Phocion's close relationship with Chabrias suggests that he was likely to be affiliated with Chabrias and his political circle at the early stage of his political career. After the Oropus affair Phocion was known to engage in an expedition, during which the Persian satrap Orontes sold grain to the Athenian army. Inferring from this fact, L. Tritle argues that Phocion's service in this campaign "may reflect his affiliation with the imperialist policies of Timotheus", who was the leading figure in Athens after the political downfall of Callistratus and Chabrias. Furthermore, he supposes that Phocion's association with Timotheus resulted from Timotheus' kinship with Chabrias.[2] Such an interpretation collides with several objections. First, it lacks any support in our sources. Phocion's participation in this expedition is only attested by a fragmentary inscription, which

1 Plut. Phoc. 9.6. On Oropus-trial, see Dem. 21.64; Arist. Rhet. 1364a19-23, 1411b6-10; Plut. Dem. 5.1-4. Cf. Hochschulz 2007, 150-171. For the relationship between Callstratus and Chabrias see Gehrke 1976, 18.
2 Tritle 1988, 105f.

informs us nothing except for Phocion's position as military commander.[1] It remains unknown whether he initially supported this expedition, or he was simply entrusted with this task. Also there is no evidence proving that Phocion served in this campaign due to his association with Timotheus. As for Timotheus, he was an ambitious general who contributed much to the expansion of Athenian power in the Aegean, but there is no direct testimony of his role in this campaign that led by Phocion.

Second, the relationship between Timotheus and Chabrias was complicated. Philochorus says that both of them were Plato's kinsmen,[2] but the kinship itself could not prevent them from competing with each other. Chabrias' popularity in Athens must have been increased since his victory at Naxos, and it can be supposed that his political ascendance would rival the position of Timotheus. In the late 370s B.C. Chabrias, along with Callistratus and Iphicrates, were appointed to aid the Corcyeans, and he actually took over this task from Timotheus, who was prosecuted by Callistratus and Iphicrates for treason in 373 B.C. Though acquitted, Timotheus was out of favor, because he soon left Athens and withdrew into Persian service in Egypt.[3] This is not to illustrate, however, that Chabrias collaborated with Callistratus and Iphicrates for accusing Timotheus, but it would be reasonable that he benefited much from Timotheus' loss of prestige. However, after the military failure at Oropus Chabrias suffered a similar blow. With he and Callistratus removed from active service, Timotheus was able to return to Athens and regained his influence. In short, the argument that Phocion associated with Timotheus through Chabrias seems to be unconvincing.

Phocion's early military service may create an impression that he was advocating a policy against Macedon in the period preceding Chaironeia. According to Plutarch, the Megarians made a secret appeal to Athens for assistance,[4] and the secrecy is well explained that there was a faction in the city. It is noted that Demosthenes once said that

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1 IG II/III³, 1 295, frg.b-d. 24.

2 FGrH 328 F223 (=Vit. Aristot. Marc.): οὕτω Φιλόχορος ἱστόρησε, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲ εἰκὸς ἦν Ἀριστοτέλη ξένον ὄντα τοῦτο δύνασθαι ποιεῖν κατὰ Πλάτωνος πολίτου τυγχάνοντος καὶ μέγα δυναμένου διὰ Χαβρίαν καὶ Τιμόθεον τοὺς Ἀθήνησι στρατηγήσαντας καὶ κατὰ γένος αὐτῷ προσήκοντας. But Philochorus' statement lacks support in other sources. Cf. Trampedach 1994, 135f.

3 On Timotheus' deposition and trial, see Dem. 49.9; Diod. 15.47.2f. On his service under Persia, see Dem. 49.25.

4 Plut. Phoc. 15.1.

there were political troubles in Megara, because some of their citizens attempted to deliver the city into the power of Philip.[1] Though Demosthenes did not refer to any Athenian expedition to Megara, it is traditionally believed that the critical situation he described conforms to Phocion's decisiveness to render assistance.[2] Phocion's two Euboean expeditions also resulted from Philip's invasion into that island. The first expedition of 348 B.C. took place after Plutarch the Eretrian had begged the Athenians for resisting Philip's invasion, while the second one of 341/0 B.C. was directed against Cleitarchus, a tyrant who acted in league with Philip.[3] In particular, Phocion engaged in the campaign against Philip at Byzantium and pursued the retreating Macedonian fleet. But these actions do not necessarily reflect Phocion's policy, because the assembly exercised final control over Athens' military decision-making, so the appointed generals had to obey the public decision. For this a good example is Nicias, who was unable to reject the commandership in spite of his strong opposition to the Sicilian expedition.[4] Therefore, Phocion's active participation in these campaigns can be interpreted to mean that he was loyal to the policy of his city, which at that time aimed at assisting Greek cities to resist Philip.

After the Battle of Chaironeia, Phocion was more active in advising the people. Plutarch, our main source for Phocion's political career, makes great efforts to present Phocion as a patriotic, shrewd and "realistic" politician, who always realized what policies and actions were of interest to Athens. Shortly after Chaironeia Phocion appeared as one of the leaders of Athens, for he was responsible for city's defenses.[5] Upon the completion of his settlements with the Greeks, Philip summoned the representatives of Greek cities to Corinth to discuss the organization of a new league. The issue was discussed in the Athenian assembly, and on this occasion, according to Plutarch, Phocion warned his fellow citizens not to act too hastily until Philip's real demands were known. This warning indicates that Phocion's willingness to keep peace with Macedon, but it

1 Dem. 19.295, 334.
2 Meyer, "Megara", RE 15.1(1931), 193; Gehrke 1976, 40; Legon 1981, 292f.; Tritle 1988, 90f.
3 On Cleitarchus as Philip's friend, see Dem. 9.33, 58; 18.71, 295. On Phocion's second Euboean expedition, see FGrH 328 F160 (=Didymus, in Dem. col.1); Diod. 16.74.1.
4 Thuc. 6.24-25; Plut. Nic. 14.1f.
5 Plut. Phoc. 16.4.

does not mean unconditional compliance. Here Plutarch presents Phocion as a shrewd man who cautiously measured the risk that Athens might face in this affair. Philip's later demands of the Athenian triremes and cavalry confirmed Phocion's judgment, and the Athenians regretted their ratification. But Phocion soon changed his opinion, because at this time fulfilling the obligations was evidently the only alternative for Athens if they hoped to avoid war.[1]

Nepos tells us that Philip of Macedon once made attempt to bribe Phocion, but Phocion refused to take anything from him. The same story is told twice by Plutarch, who replaces Philip with Alexander and Menyllus. Like most anecdotes about Phocion, the date and the occasion of these stories are unknown, and their historical accuracy is thus seriously doubted.[2] The association between Phocion and Philip is poorly attested in our sources. It remains unclear whether he attended in the Athenian embassy to Philip shortly after the battle of Chaironeia.[3] Only the friendly attitude of Alexander implies that Phocion may have enjoyed a good reputation among the Macedonians, and Plutarch says that Alexander's admiration for Phocion was partly due to the influence of his father Philip.[4] Though we lack evidence that directly proves the communication between Philip and Phocion, we shall remember that Philip was a man who regarded the bribery as an effective way of achieving his goals.[5] There is no wonder that he would bribe some leading men of Athens to secure his position in the first years of his domination in Greece. The politicians who refused his offers of money and gifts are few, and his admiration for Phocion was probably due to the latter's incorruptible integrity.

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1 On Philip's Common Peace and the League of Corinth, see Ryder 1965, 102-106; Dmitriev 2011, 73-78. On Phocion's opposition, see Plut. Phoc. 16.5. Will (1983, 18 n.116) considers Phocion's opposition as surprising. He argues that Phocion, as well as his supporters who had persuaded the Areopagus for appointing him with city defense, would benefit much from the peace with Philip. But apparently, Phocion's opposition was based on the unclearness of the terms for peace. What he feared was that the Athenians, due to their gratitude to Philip for his leniency, would carelessly accept any demand from Philip. Given Phocion's inclination to peace before Chaironeia, he would agree with participation in an alliance with Philip had he found Philip's terms acceptable.

2 For these anecdotes of Phocion's incorruptibility, see Nep. Phoc. 1.3-4; Plut. Phoc. 18.1-6, 30.1-4. Gehrke (1976, 145f.) doubts the authenticity of these stories on the ground that they do not imply any historical details, but only serve as examples to strengthen Phocion's poverty and philosopher-like incorruptibility.

3 Will (1983, 13) mistakably lists Phocion among the envoys sent to Philip after Chaironeia, for which it lacks firm evidence.

4 Plut. Phoc. 17.6.

5 Dem. 18.51, 295; 19.139; Hyp. 4.29. Cf. Kulesza 1995, 27f. Perlman (1976, 226-228, 232) suggests that it was customary for Persian and Macedonian kings to send gifts on ambassadors.

Again, Plutarch's Phocion demonstrated his calmness when the news of Philips' assassination reached Athens. While the Athenians celebrated it and even decreed honors for the assassin, Phocion argued that the army that had defeated them at Chaironeia was diminished by only one person.[1] But in Athens, as well as in other Greek cities, the death of Philip and the rumor of the death of his successor Alexander encouraged the hope for throwing off the Macedonian yoke. The Thebans rebelled openly, while in Athens Demosthenes urged the people to provide military support for Thebes. Plutarch records that Phocion opposed Demosthenes' policy for assisting Thebes and openly rebuked the latter's abuses upon Alexander, for he thought such actions would only provoke the retaliation of Macedon.[2]

This debate between Phocion and Demosthenes is only found in Plutarch, and his account creates an impression that Phocion was the only one to raise the objection. However, the fact that Athens did not send out force to support Thebes suggests that some others shared the cautious attitude with Phocion. Phocion's remark that he himself "was bearing the burdens of command with this object in view" indicates that he held the position of general of 335/4 B.C. Perhaps his reputation as an experienced veteran finally convinced the Athenians, who believed that keeping distance from the Theban revolt was preferable to a policy of fighting argued by Demosthenes.[3]

Thebe's destruction confirmed Phocion's foresight. The Athenians immediately changed their policy by sending an embassy to Alexander to congratulate him on his recent victories over the Thracians and Thebans.[4] Alexander did not attack Athens, but he demanded the surrender of some politicians whom he regarded as hostile to Macedon. Among them was of course Demosthenes. This demand sparked a heated debate in the Athenian assembly. Both Diodorus and Plutarch mention that Phocion spoke on this

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1 Plut. Phoc. 16.8.

2 Plut. Phoc. 17.1: Δημοσθένους δὲ λοιδοροῦντος τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ἤδη προσάγοντα ταῖς Θήβαις ἔφη: 'σχέτλιε, τίπτ᾽ ἐθέλεις ἐρεθιζέμεν ἄγριον ἄνδρα καὶ δόξης μεγάλης ὀρεγόμενον; ἢ βούλει πυρκαϊᾶς τηλικαύτης οὔσης ἐγγὺς ῥιπίσαι τὴν πόλιν; ἀλλ᾽ ἡμεῖς οὐδὲ βουλομένοις ἀπολέσθαι τούτοις ἐπιτρέψομεν, οἱ διὰ τοῦτο στρατηγεῖν ὑπομένοντες.'

3 Diodorus (17.8.6) says that Demosthenes persuaded the Athenians to vote to support Thebes, which may suggest his victory over Phocion in the debate. However, Athens did not take further action but was waiting to see how the war would go. It is only recorded that Demosthenes personally supported the Thebans with weapons (Diod. 17.8.6; Plut. Dem. 23.1).

4 Arr. Anab. 1.10.3.

occasion, but their descriptions of the content of his speech are rather different. Diodorus says that Phocion exhorted the Athenians to recall the examples of the daughters of Leos and Hyacinthus, who sacrificed themselves for the common good of their city. For those who were unwilling to do so, he chided them as faint-hearted and coward. This speech, however, only aroused the jeer of the people, who riotously drove him from the stand. By contrast, the Athenians were moved by a carefully prepared discourse delivered by Demosthenes, and they were determined to disobey the request of Alexander.[1]

According to Plutarch, Phocion did not make a speech on his own initiative, but the Athenian people turned their eyes upon him and called upon him many times by name. He did not refer to any previous examples, but drew an intimate friend Nicocles to his side and claimed that he would like to sacrifice this friend even himself when necessary for the common good. In spite of his sympathy for those Theban exiles, Phocion argued that the Greeks should no longer mourn the fate of Thebes, but shall make attempt to entreat and negotiate for peace.[2] In the *Phocion* Plutarch does not mention the reaction of the audience, nor the defense of the demanded. In the *Demosthenes* he cites Aristobulus of Cassandria as his source, who says that Demosthenes in a speech compared himself to the sheep dog that the sheep was giving to the wolf now. Moved by his plead, the Athenians agreed not to surrender them.[3]

Both sources agree that Phocion advocated compliance rather than rejection,[4] but the images of Phocion in two accounts are quite different. Though self-sacrifice is a common theme, Diodorus presents Phocion as a harsh man who showed little sympathy toward the fate of his fellow citizens. Rather, he urged the demanded men to surrender themselves for the sake of the city. It is illustrative of political rivalries in Athens, and Phocion was delighted at the prospect of eliminating his political enemies, whom he

1 Diod. 17.15.2.
2 Plut. Phoc. 17.2-4.
3 FGrH 139 F3 (=Plut. Dem. 23.5f.).
4 In spite of the textual differences between Diodorus and Plutarch, Gehrke (1976, 70f.) suggests that in both versions Phocion's speech reflects "eine realistische Einschätzung der Lage". He further observes that the choice between self-sacrifice and refusal to surrender was also a "moralische Bewährungsprobe" for the demanded, because their action was related to moral remarks such as ἀνανδρία, δειλία (Diod. 17.15.2) and εὐτυχία (Plut. Phoc. 17). See Gehrke 1976, 161.

blamed for the present plight of the city.[1] Plutarch, however, depicts Phocion's willingness to sacrifice himself. Although his Phocion too judged those who were demanded as the men responsible for present difficult situation, he did not gloat over their misfortune or urge their self-sacrifice, but tried to persuade the people that appeasing Alexander was the only alternative for Athens if they wished to avoid the fate of Thebes. For this purpose, he would like to sacrifice his close friend Nicocles even his own life to save the city. Phocion's proposal to surrender remained unchanged, but the way of his expression seemed to be more gentle and acceptable. No one who has read this passage can fail to observe Plutarch's eulogizing tone. This event, remarkably, reminds the reader of Plutarch's characterization that Phocion was in nature a most gentle and kind man.[2] He did not take advantage of this chance to urge the people to surrender in order to eliminate his political rivals. More important than his kindness was his patriotism. Phocion stressed that his decision was based on a cautious calculation of Athen's future, and his willingness for self-sacrifice made his loyalty and commitment to Athens unchallenged.

Plutarch tells us that Phocion later attended the embassy sent to Alexander, and Alexander pardoned the Athenians he demanded except Charidemus. It is clear that Plutarch highlights Phocion's role in this negotiation, which was based on Alexander's admiration of him. For this he adds another anecdote, in which Phocion favored Athenian support for Alexander when the king was in need of triremes. Not unlike his attitude toward Athens' obligations in Philip's League of Corinth several years earlier, Phocion once again argued that it was in the best interests of Athens to be friend with those who were superior in arms.[3] During Alexander's expedition into Asia Phocion's political activities are obscure. It is only known that Alexander's fugitive treasurer Harpalus failed to bribe him, and Phocion refused to help his son-in-law Charicles when the latter was brought to trial for his dealings with Harpalus.[4] Shortly after the uproar of

1 Cf. Plut. Phoc. 10.7. Will (1983, 45 n.305) interprets Phocion's willingness for self-sacrifice as a political propaganda for winning popularity.

2 Plut. Phoc. 5.1: τῷ δὲ ἤθει προσηνέστατος ὢν καὶ φιλανθρωπότατος.

3 Plut. Phoc. 21.1.

4 Plut. Phoc. 21-22. Tritle (1988, 119-122) argues that the Harpalus affair actually reflects the partisan nature of Athenian politics, because among the accused were both "pro-" and "anti-" Macedonian

Harpalus affair, the news of Alexander's sudden death in Babylon fell on Athens. Just as thirteen years earlier they greeted Philip's death with public celebrations, the Athenians once again raised the hope of autonomy and freedom. Phocion viewed the news cautiously and advised the people to keep calm. Along with him was Demades, who proclaimed that the whole world could smell the corpse had Alexander really perished.[1]

When the king's death was confirmed, talk of warfare soon began in Athens. The large sum of money left by Harpalus could be used for war preparations, and shortly before Alexander's death the Athenians had opened communication with an army of unemployed mercenaries assembled at Taenarum. Especially Leosthenes, the commander-in-chief of the mercenary army, was a key figure in opening the way of warfare. Diodorus tells us that Leosthenes was entrusted by the Athenians with the task of secret war preparations, not only securing a considerable number of mercenary soldiers ready for action, but also making contact with the Aetolians. After the death of Alexander was certainly known, Leosthenes acted openly for organizing an anti-macedonian alliance led by Athens. During these war preparations there was a debate in Athens over the issue, and opposition against war came notably from Phocion, who assessed the military capacity of Athens as weak in comparison to Macedon. Unfortunately, the Athenians did not follow his advice. In spite of the initial victories of Leosthenes, Antipater succeeded in escaping from Lamia and won a decisive victory at Crannon. Even though Phocion successfully resisted a Macedonian force commanded by Micion, he could hardly save Athens from the Macedonian invasion by land and sea. When the Athenians had no other choices but to ask for peace negotiation, Phocion had to serve as envoy to Antipater. Though his old friendship with Macedon earned certain concession from Antipater, Athens had to accept harsh requirements such as the reform of constitution, the imposition of garrison and the surrender of several prominent citizens.[2]

The above summary of Phocion's political activities shows that Phocion spoke not

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politicians. He further argues that the prosecution of Charicles was probably an abortive attempt to implicate Phocion in the scandal. But this argument lacks firm evidence.

1 Plut. Phoc. 22.5.

2 On Phocion's activities in the Lamian War, see Plut. Phoc. 22-27; Gehrke 1976, 77-87; Tritle 1988, 123-131.

infrequently in the assembly, and he usually changed his views in accordance with the changes of political situations. These changes are positively described by Plutarch as a kind of realism.[1] The key to such realism, as Plutarch implies, was Phocion's deep concern for the best interests of Athens. Yet Plutarch's arguments are not as clear as they may seem. He does refer to Phocion as an active politician in Athens, but he conspicuously fails to recognize that Phocion was not in a position to influence his fellow citizens. One can easily count how many times Phocion's advice was ignored or rejected by the Athenians. Before the Battle of Chaironeia he advised the Athenians not to fight against Philip. Later when Philip summoned the Greeks to discuss a Common Peace and the organization of the League of Corinth, Phocion's objection was overruled by the euphoria of peace. On learning of Philip's death, he remarked that any kind of celebration was meaningless and even dishonorable, but the Athenians decreed honors for the assassin Pausanias. Later when Alexander demanded the surrender of those who were hostile to Macedon, Phocion was apparently unable to persuade his fellow citizens to comply with the demand of Alexander. Plutarch ascribes Alexander's leniency toward Athens to the king's admiration for Phocion, but details are obscure. For example, it remains unclear whether Phocion attended the embassy sent to Alexander. Diodorus only names Demades as the man who changed Alexander's mind, while Arrian simply says that an Athenian embassy changed the king's heart. Plutarch himself even provides two conflicting stories. In the *Alexander* it was the king himself who decided to give up the demand, while in the *Demosthenes* Demades brought about reconciliation with the king because Demosthenes had bribed him. Evidently, Plutarch changed his descriptions according to the circumstances and thus can hardly be regarded as a reliable source.[2]

Finally, the death of Alexander led Athens immediately to think about autonomy

1 Tritle (1988, 108-128) uncritically admits Phocion's "political leadership" in Athens and his "realism" under different circumstances.

2 Diod. 17.15.3-5; Arr. Anab. 1.10.6; Plut. Phoc. 17.4f., Alex. 13.1f., Dem. 23.5. Demades' contribution is further attested by the honors he received, such as erecting statue and sharing entertainment in the Prytaneum (Din. 1.101). In spite of Plutarch's exaggeration, the testimony of Chares does suggest the friendship between Alexander and Phocion. The king was said to drop from all his letters the word of salutation except those to Antipater and Phocion. For Antipater such an action was quite understandable, because he was one of the closest men surrounding Alexander and was his regent in Macedon. While for Phocion, the esteem of this kind perhaps results from Alexander's admiration for his personality. Compared with Demades, Phocion seems not to be a most suitable person whom Alexander could employ as his spokesman in Athens.

and freedom, and Phocion advised against the war. Although Plutarch highlights Phocion's affirmative response to the attacks from Leosthenes and Hyperides in the debates, it is clear that he failed again to prevent his fellow citizens from engaging in war. The literary embellishment of Plutarch creates the impression that Phocion always adapted his policies to the needs of the state, but what underlying these changes was the fact that he was unable to exert much influence on Athenian politics. Active as he was, it must be noticed that in most cases his suggestions were not accepted. Nevertheless, the reason of rejection seems not to be unpopularity, because the Athenians continued to elect Phocion as general and entrusted him with crucial tasks such as peace negotiation with Alexander and Antipater. In view of this contradiction, one would ask why the Athenians did not follow Phocion's advice, even if the events such as the defeat at Chaironeia and the destruction of Thebes justified his judgments?

This question perhaps could be asked in another way: Did the military victories of Macedon bring political disgrace to those who advised for war? It was said that Demosthenes deserted his position at Chaironeia, and after his return to Athens he was soon accused by his political opponents.[1] However, he was not only acquitted, but was soon after assigned with the honor of addressing a funeral speech at the public burial of those who had fallen at Chaironeia.[2] Such an action did not necessarily mean that the Athenians indirectly continued their efforts to oppose Philip. Rather, it accords with the Athenian tradition for honoring those who devoted their lives for the sake of city,[3] and it seems likely that the appointment of Demosthenes was simply based on his oratorical skills.[4] Later Demosthenes was entrusted with several offices. From Aeschines we know that Demosthenes held the office of Superintendent of the Theoric Fund as well as the office of commissioner for the Repair of Walls, and the tribe Pandionis also appointed

1 Aeschin. 3.152,181; Din. 1.12; Plut. Dem. 20.2; Gell. Noct. Att. 17.21. For Aeschines' accusation, see also Christ 2006, 135-141.

2 Dem. 18. 249f.; Plut. Dem. 21.2.

3 Cf. Dem. 20.141. For a general discussion of the significance of funeral oration in Athens, see Loraux 2006.

4 It is to be noticed that Demosthenes in the funeral oration simply ascribes the failure at Chaironeia to misfortune (60.19, 22). Evidently, he was reluctant to admit Athens' military inferiority to Macedon, and feared that such a perception would discourage his fellow citizens. Moreover, it can be observed that Demosthenes makes no mention of Philip's name in this speech, perhaps because he feared that his encouraging words would arouse the suspicion of the king.

him a Builder of Walls, for which he received from the general treasury nearly ten talents.[1] These facts attest that Demosthenes was still politically influential in Athens after Philip's decisive victory. In addition, it is worth noting that Lysicles, one of the commanders of the Athenian force at Chaironeia, was condemned and executed.[2] Clearly, the Athenians did not ascribe the defeat at Chaironeia to their decision on war, but to the military incompetence of their generals. Under this circumstance, it is well imagined that Phocion's suggestion for peace would not be agreed by most Athenians, or at least they did not think that a policy of conciliation was the only choice.

However, there were some changes after Alexander's destruction of Thebes. The disaster that struck Thebes showed the Athenians the overwhelming military power of Macedon. Though Alexander retracted his request for the surrender of Athenian politicians, in the first years of his domination little is heard about the political activities of those opponents of Macedon. The king himself, however, desired to strengthen his relationship with Athens. After his victory against Persia at the river Granicus, he sent to Athens three hundred of the captured shields to be set up to Athena in the acropolis, with attached inscriptions "Alexander son of Philip and the Greeks, except the Lacedaemonians, set up these spoils from the barbarians dwelling in Asia" (Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Φιλίππου καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες πλὴν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων τῶν τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικούντων).[3] Plutarch explains it as a kind of propaganda. By doing so, as he says, the king wished to share his victory with the Greeks (κοινούμενος δὲ τὴν νίκην τοῖς Ἕλλησιν) and thus stressed the participation of the Greeks in his Asian expedition. But there is good reason to believe that such an action, at least in part, aimed at confirming Alexander's domination in Greece. His absence on Asian campaign would have encouraged Greek hopes of independence, and the difficulties and dangers of campaigning in such remote areas could easily produce an illusion that the king would never return.

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1 Aeschin. 3.27, 31; Dem. 18.113.

2 Diod. 16.88.1f. It shall be noticed that the accuser of Lysicles was Lycurgus. Although there is no clear record of Lycurgus' enthusiasm for war with Macedon as Demosthenes did, the ancient authors agree that he was demanded by Alexander after Thebe's destruction, which may indicate his hostility toward Macedon (Arr. Anab. 1.10.4; Plut. Dem. 23.4, Phoc. 17.2; Diod. 17.15.1).

3 Arr. Anab. 1.16.7; Plut. Alex. 16.18.

In 333 B.C., there were two affairs that may have caused opposition to Alexander in Athens. In the battle of Granicus Alexander captured some mercenary Greeks who served Persia. He harshly punished these men by sending them in chains to Macedon to hard labor, because he thought that they fought for the barbarians against Greece. Among the prisoners were some Athenians. Thus an Athenian embassy was sent to the king to beg him to release the captured Athenians, but the king rejected it on the ground that the time and circumstance were unfavorable. The Athenian embassy returned, achieving nothing except for a promise of Alexander that they were to approach him again on the same subject when circumstances became favorable.[1] Soon after Alexander wrote asking the Athenians to send him triremes, and this request was openly opposed by some orators.[2] The discontent of the Athenians was probably in part due to the kings' recent refusal to release Athenian prisoners, and it was not the first time that the king summoned contributions of triremes. Like his father Philip, Alexander summoned the Greeks to Isthmus to discuss a declared war against Persia in 336 B.C., and for this purpose he requested contributions of twenty triremes from Athens as part of the allied contingent.[3] While Alexander's additional demand aroused voice of opposition, the Athenians were also aware of the risk of war. Phocion, in particular, advised to grant Alexander's request, because Athens' military capacity was evidently inferior to Macedon. Though the final result of this debate remains unknown to us, complaint of such kind must have been temporary, for Athens' relationship with Alexander remained friendly in the next following years.

Alexander's victory at Issus (333 B.C.) muss have exerted great influence on his domination in Greece. The hope that the Greeks could revolt against the Macedonian hegemony by making alliance with the Persian King began to dissipate. Under this circumstance, it is no wonder that Demosthenes, the most well-known opponent of Macedon in Athens, did little to promote Athenian support for the revolt of the Spartan

1 Arr. Anab. 1.16.6. On this Athenian embassy see Arr. Anab. 1.29.5f.; Curt. Ruf. 3.1.9.
2 Will (1983, 66) dates Alexander's request in early summer of 333 B.C. On this debate see Plut. Phoc. 21.1.
3 On the assembly at Isthmus, see Arr. Anab. 1.1.2; Diod. 17.4.9; Plut. Alex. 14.1. On the Athenian contribution of twenty triremes see Diod. 17.22.5.

King Agis in 331 B.C.[1] Apparently, he thought it would hardly succeed, and by doing so he admitted that it was not in the best interests of Athens to wage war on Macedon at this time. Moreover, Aeschines claimed that Demosthenes pursued personal contact with Alexander through Aristion son of Aristobulus the apothecary, and he finally secured reconciliation with the king.[2] The attack of Aeschines might be scandalous, but it seems not wholly impossible that Demosthenes began to orientate his policy to the increasing power of Macedon, especially when we notice that others who were known to have been hostile to Macedon were also silent at this time. Hypereides, for example, was in Elis, for he was appointed to negotiate with the Eleans who prohibited the Athenians from participating in Olympic Games due to a scandal of bribery in 332 B.C.[3]

Lycurgus spent most time in Athens, because a dozen-year period of recovery in the aftermath of Chaironeia is usually ascribed to his leadership. Lycurgus was responsible for a fairly coherent set of internal reforms including legislative reforms and building programs, and in particular, he was influential in matters of finance. Among his construction projects we especially see some works on the city's defenses: The city's walls were repaired and reinforced, while in Piraeus the docks were expanded, an arsenal constructed and the fleet steadily enlarged. Finally, Lycurgus required that all young male citizens between eighteen and twenty must take part in the ephebic training, which became a kind of full-time national service. It was concern with Macedon that provoked much of the effort to strengthen the city's defenses, but in acknowledging this, we need equally to recognize that there is little sign of an open confrontational approach to Alexander that these programs imply. On the contrary, it can be well imagined that the enforcement of internal reform and reorganization would largely depend on peace and political stability.[4] Even though Lycurgus looked consciously to pursue a pose of military preparedness, his opposition to Macedon must have been more subdued and

1 Plut. Dem. 24.1.
2 Aeschin. 3.162.
3 On the prohibition against Athens, see Paus. 5.21.5. On Hypereides in this affair, see Plut. Vit. dec. orat. 850b; Engels 1989, 195f.
4 On Athens' wall repairment, see Aeschin. 3.27-31. On the building of ship-sheds and the arsenal, see Plut. Vit. dec. orat. 852c. On the ephebic reform under Lycurgus, see Ath. Pol. 42.2-4. Cf. Rhodes 1985, 493-510; Faraguna 1992, 274-280; Habicht 1997, 16f. Surveys of the building programs of Lycurgus are provided by Will 1983, 79-93; Faraguna 1992, 257-69; Hintzen-Bohlen 1997, 11-73. A discussion of the relationship between Lycurgus' financial management and democracy see Burke 2010.

implicit.

In short, the relationship between Athens and Alexander was generally calm and friendly during the period from 335 to 324 B.C. Even though there were some affairs that may have temporarily aroused the discontent of the Athenians, there is no evidence of the Athenians' willingness to revolt. The loyalty of Athens to Alexander was first put to the test in 324 B.C., when the king announced a decree ordering the restoration of Greek exiles to their homes. Evidently, this request had an immediate impact on Athens' interests in Samos, and our sources suggest its unpopularity in Athens. In addition, the arrival of Harpalus caused as much concern for the Athenians as for Alexander, since he set out for Attica with thirty ships, bringing six thousand mercenaries and five thousand talents from the Babylonian treasury.[1] Alexander seemed to be satisfied with Athens' final treatment of Harpalus, but this affair nevertheless was complicated. Soon after Harpalus' flight from Athens, his past activities in the city touched off a political scandal in which many leading politicians of Athens were involved. A third event that affected the Athenian support for Alexander was the king's request for deification. This issue was fiercely discussed in which one group represented by Hypereides and Pytheas evidently expressed opposition. If these events are understood as causes that may have weakened the stability of the Athenian-Macedonian cooperation, their good relationship certainly came to end when Alexander suddenly died in Babylon in 323 B.C. The euphoric reaction that prevailed in Athens demonstrates the Athenians' perception that the power of Macedon was greatly due to Alexander's personal qualities, and their past obedience to Macedon was only based on their fear of Alexander. Now there seemed to be no obstacle for them to pursue autonomy and freedom again. Under this circumstance, there is no wonder that Phocion's admonition was ignored. The king's sudden death obviously relieved the Athenians, and what set them in motion was probably the belief that the resources for war was sufficient because of the large amount of money left by Harpalus as well as the service of Leosthenes' mercenary force.

1 Diod. 17.108.6; Curt. Ruf. 10.2.1. For a general discussion of Harpalus' flight to Athens, see Badian 1961; Worthington 1986; Heckel 1992, 219-221.

Plutarch's *Phocion* is surely a eulogy, in which he is always eager to place his hero at center stage. But it is clear that during the period between 338 and 322 B.C. Phocion did not exert great impact on the course of Athenian civil and foreign policies. He did frequently appear and speak in the assembly, but his opinions seldom prevailed. This fact only demonstrates that Phocion actively participated in Athenian politics, but strictly speaking, he could hardly be regarded as an influential statesman. Nevertheless, the Athenian defeat in the Lamian War apparently promoted Phocion's political position. Not only he was entrusted by the Athenians with the task of peace negotiation, his friendly attitude toward Macedon also made him a preferable candidate for Antipater to govern the city under a regime which was in the interest of Macedon.

4.2 Phocion the oligarch

It is usually thought that the government that Antipater imposed in 322 B.C. had oligarchical characters, but this argument has been challenged. The most notable case is L.Tritle, who argues that this constitution was essentially democratic, though based on a property qualification.[1] He claims that the property qualifications for holding office was a constant feature of the Athenian democracy, and the restriction banning the lowest class from office was in force in the fourth century. Another argument for democracy is that the council and assembly continued to function during this period, even though the assembly suffered the loss of authority due to the restricted number of citizens and the abolishment of pay for attendance. Tritle concludes that this regime is similar to that of the Five Thousand of 411 B.C., both of which were intrinsically democratic. Under Antipater's regime there were no cabals of ruling oligarchs, which were represented by the Four Hundred in 411 B.C. or the Thirty in 404 B.C.[2]

The evidence that exists, in my opinion, clearly supports the traditional

1 Scholars like Lehmann (1991, 58f.), Tracy (1995, 18) and Liddel (2007, 90f.) suggest that in the years between 322 and 318 B.C. there was a considerable element of continuity in the polis-institutions like the assembly, council, tribal system and the allocation of magistracies by sortition. In this sense, they seem to support Tritle's vision of Antipater's "democracy".
2 Tritle 1988, 133-138.

interpretation. Diodorus explicitly remarks that Antipater "changed the Athenian government from a democracy".[1] Obviously there are problems with Tritle's approach. First is the question of the qualifying census. When defining different kinds of constitutions, Aristotle warns that it is not right to regard the oligarchy simply as a constitution in which a few are sovereign over the government. A basic character of oligarchy, as he says, is the rule of the rich and the more well-born. Aristotle lists four kinds of oligarchy, and the first one is "for the magistracies to be appointed from property-assessments so high that the poor who are the majority have no share in the government".[2] In short, Aristotle explicitly refers to the restricted citizenship by wealth as a feature of oligarchy. This kind of government is exactly the one in 322/1 B.C. According to Diodorus, Antipater required that the citizenship under the new regime was restricted to those possessing property worth two thousand drachmas,[3] and only nine thousand men met this requirement. As a result, more than twenty-two thousand men ceased to be Athenian citizens. Plutarch, however, put this figure of disfranchised at twelve thousand. Assuming Diodorus' figure to be correct,[4] we can see that at least 60 percent of the population of Athens was disfranchised due to their poverty. Therefore, Tritle's description of this regime as a "moderate form of democracy" seems to be unconvincing.

From the *Athenaion Politeia* we know that Solon divided the Athenians into four groups based on a valuation of property, and the magistracies were allocated only among the members of the top three classes.[5] Tritle notices that by the time the *Athenaion Politeia* was written nobody would admit being a member of the lowest group when drawing for office. He thus interprets it as a continuity of the old restriction banning the

1 Diod. 18.18.4: (…)τὴν δὲ πολιτείαν μετέστησεν ἐκ τῆς δημοκρατίας (...)
2 Arist. Pol. 1290a-b; 1292a-b.
3 According to the calculation of Bayliss (2011, 72), two thousand drachmas is roughly equivalent to 666 medimnoi of barley, which was sufficient to feed a family of four for 14.5 or 24 years respectively. His calculation is based on Ober's conclusion (1989, 131) that twenty-eight medimnoi of barley were sufficient to feed an ordinary family of four for a year.
4 Diod. 18.18.5; Plut. Phoc. 28. Modern demographic studies suppose a total Athenian citizen body of more than thirty thousand (Rhodes 1980, 191-7; Hansen 1986, 66, 1991, 92f.; Rhodes with Lewis 1997, 39 n.29; O'Sullivan 2009, 110) before Antipater's property qualification. Moreno's calculations (2007, 28-31) amount to a total population for the last half of the fourth century of more than twenty thousand people.
5 Ath. Pol. 7.2-3.

poorer from office.[1] However, what this statement reveals is that the restriction was effectively invalid in the fourth century. For those candidates coming from the lowest census class, the tradition only caused a sense of shame, but had no actual limitation on their candidacy. Moreover, Tritle mistakably interprets the census in 322/1 B.C. as a parallel to that of Solon. What is important is the fact that those whose property was less than two thousand drachmas became the disfranchised. Diodorus explicitly says that they were deprived of citizenship, while Plutarch refers to the presence of "disfranchised citizens" at the trial of Phocion.[2] Solon's property qualification was conducted among the Athenian citizens. Although men belonging to the lowest class were excluded from office, there is no evidence that they were deprived of citizen rights and were in a position equally as metics and alien residents. When attending the assembly and sitting in the jury-courts, they were as equal as the citizens from the top three classes. It is clearly wrong to call them ἄτιμοι. The property census in 322/1 B.C., however, did not aim at dividing different groups among the citizens, but at separating the citizens possessing full rights from the disfranchised. In this respect, the attempt to connect it with the property qualification of Solon's time does not make sense.

For the disfranchised Antipater provided land in Thrace, an action that Plutarch unfavorably interprets as a kind of banishment. Even though there were some who remained at home, they were excluded from office and were taught by Phocion to be content with farming. Although Plutarch depicts Phocion in a favorable light, praising his efforts to mollify the resentment of the disfranchised, it shall be noticed that Phocion played a significant role in enforcing the property qualification. He encouraged those of the disfranchised, described by Plutarch as "busybodies and innovators" (πολυπράγμονας καὶ νεωτεριστάς), to delight in tilling the toil and thus kept quiet. The implication of this passage is that Phocion did not wish to see their political

1 Ath. Pol. 7.4: τοὺς δ᾽ ἄλλους θητικόν, οὐδεμιᾶς μετέχοντας ἀρχῆς. διὸ καὶ νῦν ἐπειδὰν ἔρηται τὸν μέλλοντα κληροῦσθαί τιν᾽ ἀρχήν, ποῖον τέλος τελεῖ, οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἷς εἴποι θητικόν. Cf. Tritle 1988, 134.

2 Diod. 18.18.4: τοὺς δὲ κατωτέρω τῆς τιμήσεως ἅπαντας ὡς ταραχώδεις ὄντας καὶ πολε μικοὺς ἀπήλασε τῆς πολιτείας (...); Plut. Phoc. 33.2: οἵ τε γὰρ φυγάδες αὐτῷ συνεισβαλόντες εὐθὺς ἦσαν ἐν ἄστει καὶ τῶν ξένων ἅμα καὶ τῶν ἀτίμων πρὸς αὐτοὺς εἰσδραμόντων. Bayliss (2011, 70) calls those who had been exiled to Thrace as ξένοι, while those remained in Athens as ἄτιμοι. Such a division seems to be far-fetched.

participation. By contrast, Phocion kept the "men of education and culture" (ἀστείους καὶ χαρίεντας) always in office.[1]

But who were "men of education and culture"? Surely, they were among the nine thousand citizens after the property qualification, and they should be at least friendly to Macedon. There was presumably a significant minority of wealthier Athenians who would have preferred a government which limited political participation to a smaller group, because under democracy they had financial obligations like regular performance of liturgies and the payment of the war taxation (εἰσφορά), and their wealth easily made them the targets of prosecution. Although these rich men must have been a minority, they represented a force which Antipater was able to exploit to his advantage. In addition, it seems possible that pay for state service was abolished, because the exclusion of the poorest citizens would have made payment unnecessary. Then only the wealthy could afford to assume offices.[2] But these men were not necessarily Phocion's political friends or adherents. Tritle is certainly right to argue that under democracy nobody could appoint magistrates as he wished, and he is probably right to say that Phocion could not keep the people of his choice in the government.[3] Although Diodorus singles Phocion out above all those who held office during the oligarchy and calls him the one who "held the supreme authority under Antipater",[4] there is no evidence indicating that his closest companions, in particular those who were later condemned with him, assumed any office in this oligarchic regime. Plutarch's language implies that Phocion perhaps used his public influence to help "men of education and culture always in office", which probably means that these men were re-elected for certain offices. But this was the extent of his influence.

Second, Tritle cites some inscriptions to support his view that the council and assembly still existed and worked, but he has to admit that the assembly's power was significantly diminished during this period. Accepting W.S. Ferguson's view that the pay

1 Plut. Phoc. 29.4. For labeling the disfranchised as disturbers of peace see also Diod. 18.18.4.
2 Ferguson 1911, 23. Green (1990, 42) argues for the abolishment of payment on ideological grounds, considering it as an "anti-populist" measure.
3 Tritle 1988, 138.
4 Diod. 18.65.6: Φωκίων ὁ ἐπ᾽ Ἀντιπάτρου τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἀρχὴν ἐσχηκώς.

for jury duty and attendance in the assembly was cancelled, Tritle supposes that the newly organized assembly surely demoralized many Athenian citizens.[1] Another result of the reduced number of citizens was the disruption of the sortition. The rotation of the magistracies was a crucial feature of Athenian democracy, because the use of lot ensured that everybody had an equal chance.[2] But the underlying principle of lot was that as many citizens as possible would be able to regularly participate in the governing of the city. The limited franchises and the outside intervention suggest very strongly that the rules of sortition were no longer applied, or were at least manipulated. Phocion's endeavor to "keep the men of education and culture always in office" would be evidently incompatible with the principle of sortition.

Tritle argues that a careful reading of Plutarch and Diodorus does not suggest that the newly disfranchised were prohibited from attending the assembly or jury-courts, but he does not provide clear evidence for their apparent presence.[3] If we assume that the disfranchised were still allowed to attend the assembly, it is obviously impossible for those who resided in Thrace to go back to Athens, then the assembly with limited number of participators can only be seen as restrictive. Diodorus records that Demades was asked by the "Athenian demos" to go to Macedon for the purpose of persuading Antipater to remove the Macedonian garrison. This is cited by Tritle as evidence for the power and independence of the assembly.[4] Here the phrase "Athenian demos" suggests that Demades' mission was authorized by the Athenian assembly, but it does not provide any support for the attendance of the newly disfranchised in the meeting. Clearly, Antipater's settlement greatly humiliated the disfranchised men, but there is good reason to believe that some of the nine thousand citizens also shared in the discontent over the presence of garrison, which was undoubtedly a symbol of Athens' loss of power and independence. This event alone does not make possible any certain conclusions, if we think of the possibility that the disgruntled ones among the nine thousand citizens called

1 Tritle 1988, 135.
2 Ath. Pol. 62.3; Arist. Pol. 1317b.
3 Tritle 1988, 134.
4 Diod. 18.48.3: (...) τοῦ Δημάδου κατὰ τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου δεδομένας (…). Plutarch (Phoc. 30.8) refers simply to "the Athenians". Cf. Tritle 1988, 137f. Williams (1989, 28) sees it in a similar way.

upon Demades to negotiate with Antipater. In addition, Plutarch tells us that the assembly decided to send Demades to Antipater, because this request had been consistently rejected by Phocion. Rather than reflecting the autonomy of the assembly, this event would be better seen as evidence for its impotence. Phocion showed that he was willing and was able to ignore the decision made by the assembly, while under democratic rules no politician could so openly challenge the sovereignty of assembly.

Third, Tritle notably ignores the fact that the new regime began with a bloody purge of the leading democrats. At least four prominent politicians, namely Demosthenes, Hypereides, Aristonicus of Marathon and Himeraeus the brother of Demetrius the Phalerean, were executed. Demosthenes took his own life before arrest, while the other three ones were dragged out from the sanctuary of Aeacus at Aegina where they sought refuge, and were put to death by Antipater at Cleonae.[1] Clearly, it was an official suppression of dissidents, which naturally aimed at stabilizing the new regime. The bloody removal of enemies was obviously in the interests of the new leaders of oligarchy. The order for execution must have been originated with Antipater, and Plutarch says that Demades proposed the sentence of death upon these men in the assembly. It is clear that Plutarch evidently wished to absolve Phocion of responsibility by depicting Antipater as a tyrant and Demades as an accomplice.[2] However, our sources provide no indication that Phocion or any other envoys ever opposed this demand of Antipater during the negotiation of peace. A more notable figure in this affair is Demetrius of Phalerum. If we believe his own statement that he served as envoy in this embassy,[3] it at first glance seems quite surprising that he was indifferent to the death of his own brother. But it seems to be explicable that Demetrius sacrificed the life of his brother for his own political ascendency. In addition to the slaughter of democratic leaders, Antipater also required the exile of many. But according to Plutarch, some of

1 Plut. Dem. 28-29; Phoc. 29.1.

2 Remarkably, Nepos (2.3) criticizes Phocion as an ungrateful man who repaid Demosthenes' help with betrayal and disloyalty. This may reflect that there was some suspicion that Phocion participated in the condemnation of Demosthenes. Given that Phocion had earlier advocated the surrender of democratic leaders, it is indeed possible that he did the same to Antipater. However, one shall not ignore the possibility that such abuse may have originated from Democharesm, who committed himself to a literary rehabilitation of his uncle Demosthenes by reviling all his enemies.

3 Fortenbaugh and Schütrumpf 2000, n.12, n.131A-C. Cf. O'Sullivan 2009, 32f.

them were saved by Phocion who pleaded with Antipater for the exemption.[1] The persecution of democrats at the beginning of Antipater's oligarchy obviously recalls the violence of the Thirty in 404 B.C., who embarked on a reign of terror in which they executed more than one thousand citizens and also put many into exile.[2] A similarity of both regimes is the close connection of oligarchic coup and violence.

Was there a cabal that ruled Athens after 322/1 B.C.? Tritle denies it by arguing that some prominent Athenians shared in this regime, such as Demades and Dercylus of Hagnous. It is clear that he understands the "ruling cabal" as a group of men surrounding Phocion. Since Phocion's sole authority is denied by the presence of other politicians, he denies the existence of such a "ruling cabal". But to the question of "ruling cabal" it is less relevant who was the most influential politician in this regime; what is more relevant is whether there was a small group of men that dominated Athenian affairs in these years, in principle including all leading figures. For this A.J. Bayliss cites a passage from Polybius, who, as he says, called the leaders of Athens by this time "Antipater's friends"(πολλοὶ τῶν Ἀντιπάτρου φίλων).[3] Bayliss' view seems to be supported by an anecdote from Plutarch's *Phocion*, in which Antipater explicitly called Phocion and Demades his friends.[4] But we ought be cautious for this issue, because some men who can be plausibly linked with Antipater were not recorded to be politically active during this period. Demades is known to have proposed at least six decrees in the assembly and acted as an envoy to Antipater, while Phocion influential status can be well attested by the fact that he was repeatedly requested by the people to deal with Antipater.[5] The comic writer Archedicus of Lamptrae is also noteworthy, because he is known to have proposed a decree honoring Antipater and other royal officials when Antipater was in control of mainland Greece. Moreover, he assumed the office called ἀναγραφεύς in 320/19 B.C. Nevertheless, other "Antipater's friends" were obscure in the sources that we possess now.[6] Meager as the evidence is, it suggests that the nine

1 Plut. Phoc. 29.4.
2 Isoc. 7.67, 20.11; Aeschin. 3.235. Cf. Diod. 14.5.7.
3 Polyb. 12.13.8; Bayliss 2011, 74-77.
4 Plut. Phoc. 30.2.
5 On Demades' proposals see IG II/III^3 1, 384, 358, Agora XVI, 100.
6 For the decree honoring Antipater see IG II/III^3 1, 484. Bosworth (1993, 420-427) dates this decree in

thousand citizens, at least nominally, shared the political rights equally.

By now it should be clear that the government under Antipater's settlement have much in common with the undoubtedly oligarchic regime of the Thirty in 404 B.C. In both cases were limited number of citizens based on property qualification, the disruption of many of the democratic institutions, and the bloody removal of the opponents. More significantly, both regimes were backed by foreign powers. The Thirty came to power after Athens fell into the hands of Lysander, while the presence of Macedonian garrison always reminded the Athenians of their submission to Antipater. Another aspect of their similarities is the proclaimed restoration to "ancestral constitution" (πάτριος πολιτεία). In 404 B.C. after the defeat at Aegospotami Lysander required that Athens should be governed under the "ancestral constitution", and this requirement provoked a division among the Athenians. The democrats endeavored to preserve the democracy, while the members of political clubs and returned exiles wanted oligarchy. A third party, led by Theramenes, was aiming at the ancestral constitution. Only when Lysander sided with the oligarchical party, the people were cowed and were forced to vote for the oligarchy. Diodorus, on the other hand, indicates a twofold division, in which the oligarchs asked for a return to the ancient dispensation, while the democrats championed the "constitution of their fathers" which in their minds was a form of democracy. In spite of the different versions for political parties, there was evidently a debate as well as a struggle for power, in which the "ancestral constitution" became a topic.[1] When the oligarchy came to an end and the democracy was restored again, the talk of tradition remained. Andocides reports that the old laws of Draco and Solon were to be in force when Athens was under an interim government of Twenty, and the use of these laws was normally authorized by the assembly when a man called Tisamenus proposed a decree.[2]

This is not the first time that the term "ancestral constitution" was used by

322/1 B.C., while Tracy (1993, 250) dated it in 338/7 B.C. On the life of Archedicus, see also Habicht 1993, 253-256. As for other alleged friends of Antipater, including the notorious Callimedon of Collytus and Demetrius of Phalerum, Bayliss (2011, 75f.) does not provide any clear evidence for their political activities in the Antipater's oligarchy.

1 Ath. Pol. 34.3; Diod. 14.3.2-3. For a general discussion of the term "πάτριος πολιτεία" and its political meanings in Athens, see Fuks 1953; Ruschenbusch 1958; Walters 1973; Rhodes 2011.

2 And. 1.82-83.

Athenian politicians as a slogan to lend credibility and respectability to the constitutional changes. In 411 B.C. Cleitophon advised the Athenians to look for the traditional laws which Cleisthenes enacted when he established the democracy, because Cleisthenes' democracy "was not populist but much like the constitution of Solon".[1] Later the reformers talked of a council of four hundred "in accordance with tradition"(κατὰ τὰ πάτρια). It was believed that there was a council of Four Hundred by Solon, and that is why the oligarchs of 411 B.C. instructed the Athenians to make so.[2] It is interesting to note that the men who disliked what was happening claimed that the Four Hundred "were at fault in abolishing the traditional laws".[3] When there were objections that the Four Hundred was not a real restoration of the traditional constitution, both sides were in fact trying to demonstrate that they intended to return to a past which was evidently better than Athens' current constitution and laws.

What part did appeals to the past play in these two reforms? The significance of tradition was probably nothing more than propaganda. The politicians did not seriously intend to go back to the earlier constitution of Draco, Solon or Cleisthenes and abandoned all subsequent developments. The focus of debate was not how Athens had been governed well in the past, but how that related to the government in the present, namely how the present constitution should adhere to the traditional constitution rather than departing from it. The connection between past and present can be observed in the forensic speech as well. The fourth-century orators usually ascribed some laws they cited to Solon, but they did not provide adequate evidence to prove whether these laws were really originated in Solon's times or were simply older laws to them. Evidently, they simply wanted to distinguish between the present and past laws. When the Athenians in the fourth century generally believed that the past had been better than the present, it

1 Ath. Pol. 29.3: Κλειτοφῶν δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ Πυθόδωρος εἶπεν, προσαναζητῆσαι δὲ τοὺς αἱρεθέντας ἔγραψεν καὶ τοὺς πατρίους νόμους, οὓς Κλεισθένης ἔθηκεν ὅτε καθίστη τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ὅπως ἂν ἀκούσαντες καὶ τούτων βουλεύσωνται τὸ ἄριστον, ὡς οὐ δημοτικὴν ἀλλὰ παραπλησίαν οὖσαν τὴν Κλεισθένους πολιτείαν τῇ Σόλωνος. Cleitophon meant that the democracy of Cleisthenes was better than the democracy under which he was living now. In appealing to the origins of the democracy, he made their revolution seem as respectable as possible. Cf. Rhodes 1985, 376f.

2 Ath. Pol. 31.1. For a council of four hundred men in Solon's time, see Ath. Pol. 8.4; Plut. Sol. 19.1f.

3 Thuc. 8.76.6: μήτε βούλευμα χρηστόν, οὗπερ ἕνεκα πόλις στρατοπέδων κρατεῖ: ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τούτοις τοὺς μὲν ἡμαρτηκέναι τοὺς πατρίους νόμους καταλύσαντας, αὐτοὶ δὲ σῴζειν καὶ ἐκείνους πειράσεσθαι προσαναγκάζειν.

seems not surprising that the orators strengthened their arguments on the ground that the laws of the past better regime ought to be obeyed and to be upheld.

The invocation of the past once again appears in the accounts of the regime of 322/1 B.C. Diodorus states that the new regime was governed "according to the constitution of Solon". Similarly, Plutarch records that Antipater required the Athenians to revert to their "ancestral constitution" based on property qualification.[1] We shall not fool ourselves by assuming that Antipater restored the Solonian constitution in Athens. There is no sign that Antipater was fond of the government of Solon, and it is also unlikely that he would be interested in seeking out which kind of constitution was the best for Athens. What he really cared was that the new one would be better able to collaborate with Macedon. Remarkably, the defeat at Chaironeia did not lead to a change of constitution in Athens as the defeat in the Peloponnesian War had done. With the preservation of democracy, an emphasis on Athens' past achievements was notable in Lycurgan Athens.[2] Although Alexander's personal ambition and military power must have discouraged most Athenians from revolting against him, the intensity of interest in the past implied an aspiration of the Athenians to restore their city of its glory days, which also had implication for their unwillingness to accept a dominant external power. They did not really give up the hope that Athens ought to be ready to reassert its independence and leading position when appropriate opportunity arose, so there is no wonder that the rebellion soon took place after the death of Alexander.

The reason for Antipater's request for constitutional change was obviously due to the hostility of the present regime against Macedon. Perhaps in his mind, the form of

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1 Diod. 18.18.5: οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ὄντες πλείους τῶν δισμυρίων καὶ δισχιλίων μετεστάθησαν ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος, οἱ (...) κύριοι τῆς τε πόλεως καὶ χώρας καὶ κατὰ τοὺς Σόλωνος νόμου ἐπολιτεύοντο; Plut. Phoc. 27.5: τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸν Φωκίωνα διαλεχθέντων ἀπεκρίνατο φιλίαν ἔσεσθαι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ συμμαχίαν (...) πολιτευομένοις δὲ τὴν πάτριον ἀπὸ τιμήματος πολιτείαν.

2 Rhodes (2011, 28f.) and Lambert (2018, 108, 134) stresses Lycurgus' patriotism in his only preserved speech *Against Leocrates* (κατὰ Λεοκράτους). This speech is a prosecution of a man who had fled Athens after Chaironeia, and more than a third of its content (47-50, 68-73, 75-77, 80-82, 84-88, 98-109, 112-126) is concerned with the good examples from the past. Lambert (2010; 2019, 107-110) points out that the intense focus on the past glory, especially the fifth-century, is a marked feature of the text of the decrees from the Lycourgan Athens. Other significant changes observable in the epigraphical sphere, such as an increasing number of decrees honoring city officials and grain traders and promoting the regeneration of religious and festival life, are supposed to strengthen the commemoration of the past achievements of the city. But meanwhile we shall also notice that they in fact reflect a sense of contemporary decline in relation to those glorious days.

democracy had come to be identified with opposition to Macedon. This is entirely in keeping with the facts that Antipater on one hand demanded the surrender of Demosthenes, Hypereides and other democratic leaders; while on the other hand he narrowed the basis of citizen body through property qualification. The crucial feature of Classical Athenian democracy was popular participation. The council, assembly and jury-courts depended upon large-scale participation by all Athenian male citizens regardless of their qualifications. When Antipater was able to seize control of Athenian affairs, it should come as no surprise to find that he would prevent the poorer citizens whom he thought as troublesome and warlike rabble from political participation. Antipater certainly had no mood for negotiation, and the situation in 322/1 B.C., at first glance, was even worse than 404 B.C. The request of Lysander at least provoked a discussion among the Athenians, while nobody dared to question the factual meaning of the "ancestral constitution" imposed by Antipater. But it shall be noticed that the internal discussion in 404 B.C. played little role for the Athenians' final decision to vote for oligarchy. Rather, they did so because they feared Lysander who sided with the oligarchs.[1]

Finally, the oligarchical character of this regime is attested by the level of hostility it generated. It is first to be noticed that when the Athenians decided to revolt from the regime imposed by Antipater, they deposed those who were holding offices in this regime and replaced them with new ones "from among the democrats".[2] If that is not enough, the outrage with which the Athenians condemned Phocion and his adherents undoubtedly testified to their bitterness against that regime. Diodorus specifically tells us that Phocion and his fellows were put on trial for "the enslavement of fatherland and the overthrow of the democratic constitution and laws"(παραίτιοι γεγένηται τῆς τε δουλείας τῇ πατρίδι καὶ τῆς καταλύσεως τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῶν νόμων). Phocion made attempt to defend himself, but the crowd rejected him to do so. Diodorus claims that among the crowd were "many supports of democracy"(τὸ πλῆθος τῶν

1 Ath. Pol. 28.3.

2 Diod. 18.65.6: ὁ δὲ δῆμος εἰς ἐκκλησίαν συνελθὼν τὰς μὲν ὑπαρχούσας ἀρχὰς κατέλυσεν, ἐκ δὲ τῶν δημοτικωτάτων τὰ ἀρχεῖα καταστήσας τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας γεγονότας ἄρχοντας.

δημοτικῶν), who had lost their citizenship under Antipater.[1]

The hatred of oligarchs can also be detected from Plutarch's account, though his purpose was to present Phocion as a victim of the hysterical violence of the mob. According to Plutarch, the crowd rejected to hear any defense but "cried out to stone the oligarchs and haters of the people". Moreover, one shall notice that most of the Athenians in the assembly were wearing garlands, an action which not only reflects their joy over the restoration of democracy, but also indicates the degree of hatred felt by the mass toward the oligarchy and its leaders.[2] Phocion acted admirably when he tried to save his friends by admitting his own guilt, but it should not prevent us from acknowledging his extreme unpopularity among his fellow citizens. The tumultuous trial was the natural outcome of the intense resentment which those who had suffered under Antipater's oligarchy felt toward those who had served in that regime and even made efforts to maintain its rule. Perhaps the Athenians genuinely believed that Phocion could facilitate the recovery of Athenian freedom, so that they steadfastly requested him to petition Antipater for the removal of garrison. Even though he rejected to take any action against Nicanor, the majority of the Athenian people still considered him neither a traitor nor a bungler since they left him in office. His experienced leadership was still in great need. When reports came in that Nicanor was planning a plot against Athens, the Athenians grew so desperate that they approved a motion made by Philomelus of Lamptrae that all Athenians should stand under arms and wait orders from Phocion their general. However, Phocion continued to pay no heed to the matter, until Nicanor seized Piraeus by a sudden attack. By this time the Athenians were aware that things were going against them, and they began to make their displeasure toward Phocion clear.

Plutarch reproaches Phocion for placing individual honor and friendship above the welfare of the state, but he evidently accepts Phocion's ethical excuses that he would rather be found suffering wrong rather than doing wrong. As to the aftermath of Nicanor's coup, he says that Phocion now intended to assume the responsibility of a

1 Diod. 18.66.4-6.

2 Plut. Phoc. 34.6: οὐκ ἀνασχομένων δὲ τῶν πολλῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνακραγόντων βάλλειν τοὺς ὀλιγαρχικοὺς καὶ μισοδήμους; Phoc. 35.4.

general and tried to lead the Athenians into battle, but his advice was rejected.[1] Plutarch's intention to defend and eulogize Phocion is rather obvious, thus one must doubt whether his account was reliable, especially when there are two very different accounts. Nepos's account is far more critical of Phocion, who says that the Athenians united to recover Piraeus by force, but Phocion refused to do so even when the people had armed themselves. If we follow Diodorus, Phocion went on a diplomatic mission to Nicanor but failed. When Alexander son of Polyperchon arrived in Attica with an army, Phocion even made final attempt to preserve the present constitutional arrangement including the garrison.[2] If this is the case, he was surely guilty of treason. It seems difficult to reconcile these three different accounts in details, but in general they agree that the Athenians' attempts to recover Piraeus proved to be fruitless. Now the Athenians were tired of Phocion's consistent opposition to their decisions, which they easily interpreted as a hindrance to their autonomy. Antipater, the man who imposed and backed the oligarchic regime, was dead, and now it was Phocion who prevented them from restoring democracy and regaining freedom. The discontent of the Athenians must have been stronger, when the disfranchised men burst into the city. Even if Phocion, as Plutarch describes, was outstanding in his moral virtues, his personality and forty-five years of excellent service could hardly annul these years of political oppression that the disfranchised Athenians suffered. The violence of mass at Phocion's trial testifies eloquently to the outrage the majority of the Athenians felt under oligarchy. In this sense, the anger and harshness that Phocion suffered in his trial are justified, and Plutarch's account, which gave a moral flavor to Phocion's politics, can be misleading.

1 Plut. Phoc. 32-33.

2 Nep. 2.4f.; Diod. 18.64-65.4. Several modern scholars (Ferguson 1911, 30; Heckel 1992, 196; Williams 1982, 146; Bayliss 2011, 143f.) have suggested that Phocion was collaborating with Nicanor in order to secure the oligarchic rule, and his behavior can only be seen as treachery.

4.3 The ten-year rule of Demetrius of Phalerum: Another example of oligarchy under Macedon

The joy over the death of oligarchs did not last long in Athens. Sooner after Phocion's execution Demetrius of Phalerum came to power with the support of Cassander son of Antipater. Our sources are largely negative toward Demetrius, in particular criticizing him for overthrowing the Athenian democracy.[1] These kinds of attacks seem convincing, when one recalls that Demetrius was politically associated with Phocion and was condemned as an accomplice of the latter by the Athenians. Moreover, his rule was backed by Cassander, who inherited his father Antipater's distaste and fear for Athenian democracy. These two factors reasonably explain Demetrius' preference for oligarchy, but in recent years there are some scholars who downplay the significance of this anti-democratic sentiment and rebrand the rule of Demetrius as democratic.[2] Defense of such kind not only ignores how Demetrius' institutions were incompatible to those under democracy, but also overlooks the marked resemblance of his regime to the earlier one installed by Antipater. In a space of less than five years there were in Athens two oligarchic regimes imposed by the Macedonians, so there is good reason to believe that the first one offered the model for the second. When Demetrius found himself in a similar leading position as Phocion had been, he not only needed to emulate from his predecessor how to govern Athens well under the Macedonian domination, but perhaps more significantly, to avoid the strong resentment that brought about the execution of Phocion and the rapid downfall of the precedent oligarchy.

An unquestionable reflection of the oligarchic character of Demetrius' regime was the limited citizenship. Demetrius set the property qualification for citizenship at one thousand drachmas and enforced it with a census.[3] This measure doubtlessly recalls the notorious property qualification of two thousand drachmas imposed by Antipater, which

1 FGrH 328 F66(= Dion. Hal. Din. 3); Plut. Demetr. 10.2; Paus. 1.25.6; Strab. 9.1.20. In contrast see Suidas, s.v. Δημήτριος calls him a demagogue (ἠκροάσατο δὲ Θεοφράστου καὶ δημαγωγὸς Ἀθήνησι γέγονε).
2 Tracy 2000, 337-345; O'Sullivan 2009. Cf. Waterfield 2004, 276.
3 Diod. 18.74.3; Athen. 6.272c.

deprived around twenty-two thousand Athenians of their full citizenship and forced many of the disfranchised to leave their homeland. But unlike Antipater, Demetrius' census appeared to be more lenient. The sum was exactly half that imposed by Antipater. If we give credence to the report of Athenaeus, twenty-one thousand Athenians retained their citizenship after the census. As has been argued earlier, at the end of the fourth century a total population of Athenian citizens is thought to be a little more than thirty thousand, thus approximate 30 percent of the Athenians lost their citizenship under Demetrius' regime. The figure itself indicates a significant reduction of the citizen body; however, it was nowhere near the enrollment of mere nine thousand citizens under Antipater's settlement. The relative leniency of Demetrius, compared to Antipater, may have been felt in more than simple numbers. No official requirement of exile of the disfranchised was recorded in 317 B.C., while the enforced exile accompanying Antipater's property census must have greatly fuelled the anti-macedonian sentiment. By lowering the limit from two thousand to one thousand drachmas, Demetrius and Cassander must have been anxious to minimize the number of enemies and to avoid the revolution that overthrew the Antipatrian oligarchy. One shall not forget that Demetrius himself witnessed the instability of an overly restrictive oligarchy. Had he not fled to Nicanor in the Piraeus, he would be put to death with Phocion by the outrageous mass. When viewing against its predecessor of 322 B.C., Demetrius' property qualification was less oppressive. Yet we must keep in mind that any restriction to men of property of political rights once enjoyed by all Athenian citizens would inevitably be perceived as an oligarchic measure. The property qualification was one of the terms for peace demanded by Cassander, and by doing so he evidently adhered himself to his father's model of settlement.[1]

In consequence, the normal functioning of the assembly and jury-court was disrupted. The assembly under Demetrius excluded approximate nine thousand Athenians who had once been eligible to participate in the decision-making process, and the limited franchise also disqualified them from jury service. Though this number was

1 Diod. 18.74.3.

much lower than the twenty-two thousand men under Antipater, it was doubtlessly a restriction when compared to the time of full democracy. The disruption of assembly may also be reflected in the paucity of published decrees. Now we possess only one substantial decree that is at present dated to the years of Demetrius' rule. This is IG.II^2.450, an honorary decree for Asander the satrap of Caria.[1] Another decree (IG.II^2.453) survives only in its beginning lines and probably belongs to this period.[2] Surprisingly, some scholars underplay the significance of this change. S.V.Tracy, for example, treats the fact that only two Athenian decrees survived from Demetrius' regime as "no unusual irregularities".[3] C.W.Hedrick believes that the traditional forms of the democratic government were largely preserved in Demetrius' regime, and for this argument he lists four possibilities to explain the dearth of published decrees, including the hostility to the sharing information, the frugality of the regime, the oversight exercised by Demetrius and the destruction of decrees of this period after the restoration of democracy.[4] O'Sullivan accepts the argument of limited expenditure, and she further argues that the lack of inscriptions may not itself be indicative of the status of the institutions. Little is known about the council and the ephebeia from Demetrius' regime, but the existence of the institutions to which they relate is affirmed by three decrees. Similarly, the absence of published assembly decrees does not necessarily mean the curtailment of the assembly. On these grounds she maintains that Demetrius of Phalerum allowed the council and assembly to function as normal.[5]

Unfortunately, these arguments appear to be unconvincing. If the lack of published decrees can be attributed to hostility to share information, the oversight of Demetrius and the later vengeance of the democrats, the regime can only be seen as incompatible with democracy. O' Sullivan is probably right when she argues that the consideration of limited expenditure might be a reason why so few decrees from this period are extant.

1 For a discussion of this decree see Osborne 1981, 109-111; O'Sullivan 2009, 118-120.
2 Rhodes (with Lewis 1997, 42) rejects to date IG II^2 453 to the period of Demetrius' rule. O'Sullivan (2009, 117, 123) accepts this possibility, and she has made attempt to date four more inscriptions (II^2 418, 585, 592, 727) to Demetrius' regime. But she has to admit that these four decrees only "possibly" belong to this period.
3 Tracy 2000, 338.
4 Hedrick 2000, 328.
5 O'Sullivan 2009, 117f.

When we observe that there is no mention of the payment provisions in the honorary decree for Asander, it is tempting to conjecture that Asander may have paid for this himself.[1] Nevertheless, the lack of public fund for publishing decrees clearly indicates change from democracy rather than continuity to it. Apart from the lack of any mention of payment provisions, the absence of the prytany secretary (γραμματεὺς κατὰ πρυτανείαν) in this honorary decree is also significant. According to the *Athenaion Politeia*, the prytany secretary was responsible for keeping the passed decrees and supervising the transcription of all other documents, and his name was documented in the headings of monumental slabs on which alliances, proxenies and citizenship grants are inscribed.[2] A notable feature of Athenian democracy is the so-called "secretarial cycles", namely a rotation among the ten Attic tribes from which the prytany secretary was chosen each year.[3] Remarkably, this tribal cycles seems to have been disrupted during the years under Antipater's settlement. Instead we find the "inscriber" (ἀναγραφεύς) as a prominent official in the superscripts and prescripts of decrees from the period between 321/0 and 319/8 B.C. It has been thought that the role of this office was significantly expanded at the expense of prytany secretary, who did not disappear from our sources, but was chosen for limited periods of one prytany.[4]

The briefly restored democracy after Phocion's death resumed the secretarial rotation where it had been broken off in 322 B.C.,[5] but the omission of prytany secretary in the only extant decree from Demetrius' regime suggests that the role of prytany secretary may be once again diminished. There was also some sort of disruption to the secretarial cycle. In the year in which Demetrius began his rule, the prytany secretary had been drawn from tribe Aigeis. But in the year in which Demetrius was driven out of Athens, the prytany secretary was drawn from tribe Aiantis, which was numbered ninth

1 Lambert (2000, 488) suggests that decrees and statues might have been set up only at private expense. Rhodes (with Lewis 1977, 44) supposes that the public fund which paid for assembly inscription had already disappeared by 307 B.C.

2 Ath. Pol. 54.3.

3 Ferguson 1898, 32-38; Dinsmoor 1931, 351 n.4; Rhodes 1985, 602; O'Sullivan 2009, 120f.; Bayliss 2011, 80f.

4 On the changes about principal secretary under oligarchy, see Dow 1963, 40; Rhodes 1972, 140; Henry 1977, 50; Bayliss 2011, 85f. Rhodes (with Lewis 1997, 52) comments that during the period between 321 and 318 B.C. the principal secretary "bore an unusual title".

5 Rhodes with Lewis 1997, 41.

before the addition of a new tribe Demetrias.[1] This fact would not permit a continuous tribal rotation for the ten years of Demetrius' rule. When all these elements are combined together, it seems tempting to suppose that the insignificant position of prytany secretary was a common feature of both Antipater's oligarchy and Demetrius' regime.[2] If the re-establishment of secretarial cycle in two periods of restored democracy reflects its importance within the framework of the democratic constitution, its absence in two regimes imposed by the Macedonians, as seems likely, reveals the non-democratic character of both.[3] O'Sullivan is right to point out that the scanty evidence significantly limits the study of Demetrius' regime, and these perceived anomalies may simply betoken the unofficial nature of the text, or are simply "individual variations possible within inscriptions of any era".[4] Even if this were the case, the absence of prytany secretary and the disruption of secretarial cycle at least show that the Athenians sometimes did not follow the established assembly forms of the uncurtailed democracy. The dearth of evidence does not preclude the possibility of Demetrius' regime bearing the hallmarks of oligarchy.[5]

In 309/8 B.C., Demetrius assumed archonship in Athens. This fact is usually accepted as evidence that his regime abandoned the sortition for selecting officials of state.[6] Moreover, two of the ten eponymous archons who served between 317/6 and 307/6 B.C., Democlides and Polemon, are thought to be close adherents of Demetrius,

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1 O'Sullivan 2009, 121. In the year in which democracy was restored after Demetrius' exile, the secretary was drawn from the new created tribe Demetrias, an action doubtlessly intending to flatter Demetrius Poliorcetes.

2 A slight difference is that Demetrius is not recorded to create new office to replace the prytany secretary, as the ἀναγραφεύς did in Phocion's time.

3 O'Sullivan (2009, 122f.) argues against the oligarchic character of Demetrius' regime with the assertions that the known epigraphical evidence from Demetrius' time is too scanty and that the secretary occasionally disappear from some decrees dated to indisputably democratic periods. But for the latter point she does not provide any examples.

4 O'Sullivan, 119f.

5 Bayliss (2011, 81f.) argues for the oligarchic character of Demetrius' regime on the ground that the proposers of these two known decree had been politically active under the earlier Antipater's oligarchy. It is true that Thrasycles of Thria, the proposer of IG II^2 450, acted as ἀναγραφεύς in 321/0 B.C.(Dow 1963, 44f.), and Telocles of Alopece, the possible proposer of IG II^2 453, proposed an honorary decree in 319/8 B.C. (Agora XVI, 102). But O'Sullivan (2009, 129) is probably right to argue that Thrasycles was not so implicated in the earlier oligarchy as to suffer condemnation in 318 B.C. His survival in the bloody collapse of that regime seems more likely to indicate that he was relatively insignificant in the government.

6 On Demetrius' archonship see Diod. 20.27.1. Williams (1982, 196; 1997, 341f.) disbelieves that Demetrius' archonship was by chance; so too Gehrke 1978, 152f.; Hammond and Walbank 1988, 137; Tracy 2000, 337.

so their archonships seem to confirm the use of election. The identification of two archons seems to be highly speculative, because both names were common among the contemporaries. Even if these two archons were equated with the orator Democlides and the philosopher Polemon, their "pro-Demetrius" stance is not positively supported by our sources.[1] Nevertheless, it is worth considering that the replacement of sortition with election would have been in accordance with the interests of a regime which was based on limited franchise and supported by Macedon. Since the mechanism of sortition ensured that every body had an equal chance of being chosen, it might have allowed men who were adamantly hostile to Macedon to occupy important offices which they could then have used as bases for attempts at overthrowing Demetrius' regime. It is difficult to imagine that Cassander and Demetrius would have trusted the Athenians with such freedom. Instead the use of election allowed some manipulation over the selection process to impose a preferred candidate, and the political elevation of sympathizers would naturally be encouraged by Demetrius and his Macedonian backer. The election of magistrates had been applied by Antipater, if we remember that Phocion "kept men of education and culture always in office". It is surely too much of a coincidence that these "men of education and culture" just happened to be chosen as magistrates by lot. Without sufficient evidence, we could not further speculate whether Demetrius assumed a similar task as Phocion had done to manipulate the selection of magistrates, but his own archonship is far more likely to be the result of election or even direct appointment from Cassander.

When arguing that "there is no support for regular or sustained interference by Demetrius in the mechanism for the selection of archons", O'Sullivan admits that there may be some "informal manipulation" in the selection process of archon, because the initial process was made from only those who offered themselves for this position. Thus she conjectures that Demetrius' register for the tribal lot "could have induced other prudent hopefuls to withdraw their names, leaving him as the unchallenged nominee for office".[2] Here O'Sullivan refers to the personal prestige of Demetrius as a kind of

1 O'Sullivan 2009, 132-138.
2 O'Sullivan 2009, 132, 138.

"manipulation", because it was unrivaled in Athens. But for the ardent supporters of democracy, a man with such great personal influence must have been a threat to them, especially because Demetrius was "made" by Cassander as the overseer of the city. There is no wonder that a man who was managing the city on behalf of an external power would put much pressure on other candidates, but the reason was more likely to be fear rather than admiration.

As has been discussed in Chapter 1, a board of officials called νομοφύλακες appeared under Demetrius' regime, and they were presumably responsible for scrutinizing individual behaviors and enforcing the observance of laws.[1] The disciplinary authority of these officials was in accordance with Demetrius' own concerns for public decorum, but was inconsistent with the principles of democracy. The testimony of Philochorus informs us that the law-guardians sat in the council and the assembly in order to prevent the enactment of measures disadvantageous to Athens. Philochorus says that these officials were a fifth-century phenomenon, but as far as the evidence permits us to determine, they were more likely to be introduced by Demetrius, or at least they became prominent in the ten years of his rule. If the law-guardians resided in the assembly, as Philochorus says, to ensure that no illegal motions were carried, their existence would have been tantamount to the abolition of the procedures of impeachment for illegal proposals (γραφὴ παρανομών). No one would deny that the γραφὴ παρανομών had been a vital part of the Athenian democracy, which was a potent political weapon used by the Athenians to oppose and prosecute any proposer of an assembly resolution. Since the mechanism of the γραφὴ παρανομών could repeal any measures that were dangerous to democracy or deemed in conflict with the interests of the Athenian people, and it entrusted the final determination to the jury-court consisting of jurors chosen by lot from all Athenian citizens, there is no wonder that Demosthenes once claimed that its abolishment meant the overthrow of democracy itself.[2] Moreover, Philochorus also mentions that magisterial supervision was a duty of

1 For νομοφύλακες in Philochorus, see FGrH 328 F64.

2 Dem. 58.34. Cf. Aeschin. 3.5-8. This argument is well confirmed by the abolition of the γραφὴ παρανομών during the two periods of oligarchy in the fifth century (For 411 B.C., see Ath. Pol. 29.4; Thuc. 8.67.2; For 404 B.C., see Aeschin. 3.191).

the law-guardians, and on this basis one could even further speculate that they may have authority for the accountability of officials. If so, this must be seen as a reversal of democracy. After Ephialtes' reform the supervision of officials was partly entrusted to the council, and any prosecution related to the accountability of officials was decided in the jury-courts.[1] If the law-guardians did function exactly as Philochorus describes,[2] they would have curbed the power and independence of the council and jury-court. These changes, if they did happen, doubtlessly favored limiting political participation to a smaller group and indicated nothing more than the ideology of oligarchy.[3] The jury-court, like the assembly, may well have been compromised in practice by Macedonian hegemony.

Finally, it is observed that the rule of Demetrius began with similar prosecution of democratic leaders. From Plutarch we know that the orator Hagnonides was condemned and put to death, while two other men, Epicurus and Demophilus, fled Athens and were killed by Phocus son of Phocion. Phocus' slaying of Epicurus and Demophilus can be well understood as an act of vengeance, because these two men were prosecutors of his father. Similarly, the condemnation of Hagnonides was probably motivated by the public rehabilitation of Phocion, because it was accompanied by other actions such as a dedication of a bronze statue of Phocion and a public burial for his bones. Plutarch makes it clear that the Athenians regretted for their condemnation of Phocion, because the events after Phocion's death showed them the value of Phocion's moderation and justice.[4] But we ought to be suspicions of the role of Demetrius in these affairs. On one

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1 On the council's responsibility for checking on a man's qualification (δοκιμασία) for archonship, see Ath. Pol. 45.3; 55.2-4; Rhodes 1972, 176-178. On the supervision of magistrates by council, see Ath. Pol. 45.2; Rhodes 1972, 148. The author of the *Athenaion Politeia* makes it clear that the council prepared verdicts of the accused officials for the jury-court and assembly. Though the council was not sovereign, its involvement in the trial of officials was sure. On the accountability of Athenian magistrates (εὔθυναι) in the jury-court, see Ath. Pol. 48.3-5; 54.2. According to Ath. Pol. 48.3, the council only slightly involved in the process of examination by electing ten accountants (λογισταί), ten auditors (εὔθυνοι) and twenty assistants of auditors (πάρεδροι).

2 Scholars who accept this view include Ferguson 1911, 44f.; Wolff 1970, 25; Gehrke 1978, 154; Hansen 1991, 211; Williams 1997, 331; cautiously accepted by Tracy 1995, 38; doubted by O'Sullivan 2009, 140f.

3 O'Sullivan (2009, 141) believes that Demetrius imposed the law-guardians for the enforcement of public decorum rather than supervising the assembly. Even though, the law-guardians clearly had the authority to interfere in the daily lives of ordinary Athenians. When our sources reveal that the contemporary Athenians regarded the γυναικονόμοι (the Censors of women) of Demetrius as intrusive, it can be well imagined that the law-guardians would exercise a greater power by regulating the behavior of all citizens.

4 Plut. Phoc. 38.1.

hand, Demetrius was known to be a close political friend of Phocion, and shortly before Phocion's death he fled for his life. Now Demetrius' accession to power must have warned the Athenians of the danger of political retaliation. On the other hand, even if Demetrius himself did not require an official suppression of dissidents, the removal of opponents must have been in accordance with the interests of the new regime and may be indirectly encouraged by him.

In sum, Demetrius of Phalerum's regime imposed a limited franchise of one thousand drachmas, which limited the number of citizens eligible to participate in Athenian politics. As a consequence, the limitation of citizenship must have impeded the regular functioning of the assembly. The few extant assembly decree dated to this period reveals the absence of prytany secretary, which was evidently inconsistent with the democratic tradition. Under Demetrius the officials called νομοφύλακες were responsible for enforcing the observance of laws and supervising magistrates, while the power of the council and jury-court was probably curtailed. Demetrius' position of power in Athens was obviously based on his relationship with Cassander, thus it is difficult to imagine that his archonship in 309/8 B.C. was only a coincidence due to sortition. It is far more likely that the sortition was abolished during these ten years, for Demetrius was clearly more than willing to select "pro-macedonian" magistrates in order to stabilize his rule. Lastly, the execution of three democratic leaders at the start of Demetrius' reign is also a reminiscence of the bloody purge of leading democratic orators under Antipater, though the personal vengeance of Phocus must be taken into consideration. By now it should be clear that Demetrius' regime bear many hallmarks of oligarchy and had much in common with the undoubtedly oligarchic regime in which Phocion acted as a leader. Any assumption that there was no significant disruption of the democratic processes under the Phalerean regime thus appears ill founded.[1]

Interestingly, O'Sullivan compares the position of Demetrius to that of Pericles,

1 Although Demetrius of Phalerum was certainly associated with the Peripatetic school, it seems too far-fetched to suggest that Demetrius' policies like property qualification and offices for supervision were motivated by the *politeia* constructed by Aristotle or even by Plato. See Gehrke 1978; O'Sullivan 2001, 50-59; Haake 2007, 67-78. Furthermore, it remains unclear whether these policies were really designed by Demetrius himself, or they were initially the requirements of Cassander.

when she describes Demetrius as a competent politician whose personal influence gave him prestige and power. "Plutarch's assessment of Demetrius' power, in which he describes the Athenian state after 317 as 'in theory an oligarchy, but in practice a monarchy', is a conscious reminiscence of Thucydides' portrayal of fifth-century Athens under Pericles as being 'in name a democracy, but in reality a rule by the foremost individual'". Moreover, she argues that both Demetrius and Pericles were able to employ largesse to secure popularity.[1] What Thucydides means is that Athens was in name a democracy but in fact was ruled by a most influential individual, and this inconsistency between form and reality echoes Plutarch remark that Demetrius' rule was nominally oligarchy but in reality monarchy. Demetrius, like Pericles, enjoyed unrivaled leading position, but he achieved such great power only through the support of an external power. Pericles' Athens was an independent and prosperous state, while Athens under Demetrius was a city subordinate to Macedon. This difference is most clearly manifested in the attitudes of the Athenians toward both leaders: They followed Pericles until his death and kept his policies unchanged for a long time.[2] On the contrary, Demetrius of Phalerum's reign was immediately overthrown when Demetrius Poliorcetes announced that he had come to give the Athenians their freedom.

Plutarch portrays Phocion as a "realistic" politician, who saw collaboration and compliance as only alternatives for Athens in relation to Macedon. Nevertheless, Plutarch was a writer who was more interested in moral education than historical fact, thus his eulogy of Phocion seems to be contradictory: Phocion's moral virtues were acknowledged even admired by his fellow citizens, but he had little influence on Athenian politics until he became a leader of an oligarchic regime imposed by Antipater. It is clear that Plutarch wrote this biography to explore the relationship of personal morality with public leadership, in which the image of Phocion is carefully crafted to make him conform to the model of Socrates, namely how a virtuous man suffered under the

1 O'Sullivan 2009, 127f.
2 For the Athenians' adherence to Pericles' policies after his death in the Peloponnesian War, see Mann 2007, 75-87.

blindness and outrage of mass. But the Athenians' anger against Phocion is explicable on the basis of their hatred of the oligarchic measures of Antipater's regime. The oligarchic nature of this regime is unquestionable, which is further testified by a comparison between it and that of Demetrius of Phalerum, though the latter ruled more leniently. On the other hand, we shall not go too far by calling Phocion a hater of democracy.[1] In spite of the tendency of moral embellishment, Plutarch's account does inform us that before 322 B.C. Phocion was an active politician who frequently made speeches in the assembly and insisted on advising the Athenians to avoid war. Though his view did not prevail, he enthusiastically performed the basic role of an Athenian politician as others did under democracy. Even if some anecdotes demonstrate Phocion's criticism of the fickleness and blindness of the demos, there is no clear evidence suggesting that his support for the oligarchic regime subordinate to Antipater was determined by a pure disfavor of democracy.

1 Duff (2000, 145), for example, judges Phocion as "an ardent oppose of democracy".

5. Phocion's death: Historical facts and moral lessons

In 19 Munychion (early May) 318 B.C., Phocion drank the hemlock in the prison of Athens. The old general was sentenced to death by his fellow citizens, and it is clear that the political turbulence in Athens was closely related to the most important affair in Macedon, namely the death of Antipater. At any rate, Phocion was thought to be one of Antipater's old associates. But for Plutarch, Phocion's death is an affair which had special moral significance, because it recalled Socrates. In this Chapter I first explore the political changes after the death of Antipater in Macedon, and how these led to the trial and execution of Phocion. Then I examine what kind of moral lesson that the political failure of Phocion shows. Phocion's is known for his sternness and justice, but in the *Phocion* Plutarch points out that the proper functioning of virtue depends on the right circumstances. The conflict between private morality and common interests is revealed in the *Phocion*, and it is a theme which provides a substantive link between the pair *Phocion-Cato Minor*. Plutarch recognized the heroism and patriotism of Cato who died for his principles, but from the pragmatic perspective Cato was also an example of extremism. Finally, I argue that the Socratic elements can be found in both *Lives*, especially at their deaths, but one could easily observe that the resemblances between Phocion and Socrates are much more straightforward and clearer. This preference partly casts light on how Plutarch arrived at the pairing. It seems that the contemporary idealized picture of Cato as a second Socrates prompted him to compose his own narrative of Cato and to choose Phocion to match.

5.1 The reasons for Phocion's death

In the autumn of 319 B.C. Antipater died. Upon his death, he named Polyperchon to succeed him as regent, and appointed his own son Cassander as Chiliarch, namely the

second-in-command of Polyperchon.[1] This decision, however, soon stirred up opposition and uproar in Macedon, and has been criticized by some modern commenters. J.M. Williams, for example, says that "only Antipater's ill health can justify these poor selections", for Polyperchon lacked prestige and military force and Cassander was too ambitious to take second place to anyone. Similarly, N.G.L. Hammond calls Polyperchon "a brave highlander, a scion of the Tymphaean royal family, a marvelous dancer and a good drinker", who nevertheless had no standing in the eyes of some reputed marshals such as Antigonus, Ptolemy or Peucestes.[2] A new round of civil war was started on the initiative of Cassander, and the conflicts among the Macedonian marshals inevitably exerted much influence on Greek cities, Athens in particular.

Why did Antipater choose Polyperchon? Unfortunately, our sources do not provide any answer. From ancient authors we merely know that Polyperchon was a veteran of Alexander's campaigns. He perhaps was born between 390 and 380 B.C.,[3] but during Philip's rule nothing was heard about him. He made his first appearance after Alexander's victory at Issus in 333 B.C., when he replaced Ptolemaeus son of Seleucus who fell in this battle to command the Tymphaian battalion. Then he is recorded to command the Stymphaeans at Gaugamela.[4] There is a story in Curtius Rufus that Parmenion advised Alexander to make a surprise night attack on the Persians, a strategy that was agreed by other generals and in particular supported by Polyperchon. Alexander, however, rejected this advice but thought that he had criticized Parmenion excessively, so he instead reproached Polyperchon for recommending to him a plan of robbers and thieves. Alexander's rejection of a night-attack is found in other sources as well, but other authors do not mention Polyperchon by name. Plutarch, for example, briefly says that Parmenion and other older hetairoi (ἑταῖροι) favored a night-attack.[5] It remains unclear why Curtius chose to insert Polyperchon into the story. Polyperchon seemed to have a good relationship with the family of Parmenion, but a more plausible reason is

1 Diod. 18.47.4, 48.4f.; Plut. Phoc. 31.1. Justin (8.8) evidently confuses Polyperchon with Craterus.
2 Williams 1982, 139f.; Hammond 1988, 130.
3 Heckel 1992, 189.
4 On Polyperchon's appearance at Issus, see Arr. Anab. 2.12.2. At Gaugamela, see Diod. 17.57.2.
5 Curt. Ruf. 4.13.7-10; Plut. Alex. 31.10; Arr. Anab. 3.10.2. The story of the discussion for night-attack is omitted entirely by Diodorus.

that Curtius himself was influenced by some hostile sources that brought charges against Polyperchon in the early years of the Diadochic age.[1] In views of the power struggle between Polyperchon and Cassander, it is not surprising that there were slanderous charges in which both men were said to have fallen out of favor with Alexander.[2] It is unlikely that Alexander disliked Polyperchon, because there are records of his subsequent service under Alexander at the Persian Gates and during Alexander's campaigns in Sogdiana.[3] Alexander's severe reproach of Polyperchon is probably an invention.

Polyperchon also participated in Alexander's Indian campaign. Arrian tells us that he joined in the battle against the Assacenians, and Curtius Rufus adds that he was sent to attack Ora.[4] When Alexander fought with Porus, his most formidable adversary in India, Polyperchon remained with Craterus in the main camp. Then he accompanied Hephaistion for a short time, but soon rejoined Craterus.[5] Whether he served under Alexander through Gedrosia is uncertain, but in 324 B.C. he was among the prominent veterans sent home from Opis under the leadership of Craterus.[6] Since Craterus was in a very poor health, Polyperchon was appointed as his second-in-command, so that the veterans would not lack a leader if Craterus could not survive the journey. However, the role Polyperchon played in this affair may not simply be an alternative military leader. Craterus was designated by Alexander as the new regent of Macedon. If the king was aware that Craterus' health was questionable, the appointment of Polyperchon probably meant that he was an alternative regent favored by the king.

It is impossible to know the real intention of Alexander, because Craterus and the veterans did not advance beyond Cilicia at the time of his death. In 322 B.C., they were called by Antipater to return to Macedon and Thessaly and attended the battle against the Greeks at Crannon.[7] It is not sure whether Polyperchon participated in the Lamian War, but he was known to win a victory over the Aetolians who invaded Thessaly and

1 Heckel 1992, 190; 2007, 123-125.
2 Both Polyperchon and Cassander, for example, were said to have been roughly treated by Alexander for ridiculing the scene of obeisance, but on different occasions. On Polyperchon, see Curt. Ruf. 8.5.22f. On Cassander, see Plut. Alex. 74.2.
3 Curt. Ruf. 5.4.20, 30; Arr. Anab. 4.16.1.
4 Arr. Anab. 4.26.6; Curt. Ruf. 8.11.1.
5 Arr. Anab. 5.11.3, 6.5.5. Cf. Heckel 1992, 192.
6 Arr. Anab. 7.12.4; Just. 12.12.8.
7 Diod. 18.16.4.

threatened Macedon.[1] Diodorus says that Polyperchon was left in Macedon as general after Antipater and Craterus had been involved in the political struggle with Perdiccas, and it is clear that he was in charge of the defense of Macedon. Notably, Athens did not join the rebellion of the Aetolians. On one hand, it did not recover from the loss of the Lamian War and politicians such as Phocion and Demades must have prevented any action that would cause suspicion from Antipater. On the other hand, Athens must have been restrained by the Macedonian garrison on Munychia.

It could be seen that Polyperchon's story is predominantly military, and he seemed not to have any tested ability on governing. Even in military affairs he merely played an inferior role, for he usually served under the leadership of a more reputed one, on most occasions Craterus. But it was this man that inherited from Antipater the political and military leadership of Macedon. Although Diodorus tells us that the new regent was held in high regard by the Macedonians,[2] Polyperchon soon found it difficult to keep his position. Cassander would naturally not favor this appointment, because he had already been chiliarch of cavalry under Antigonus since 320 B.C. Interestingly, Diodorus tells us that Antipater gave Cassander this position under Antigonus because his son "might not be able to pursue his own ambitions undetected".[3] But it seems unlikely that Antipater had no intention to limit the power of Antigonus, a man who lacked neither ambition nor the resources to gain supremacy. At the conference at Triparadeisos in 320 B.C. Antigonus was elevated to a position which made him in effect the overseer of Asia. Moreover, he was given charge of the kings, and the army formerly under Perdiccas was also put at his disposal. With these appointments, Antigonus was second only to Antipater in age, experience and power, and there is nowhere explicit stated that his position had a time limit.[4] In this sense, it is well imagined that Cassander's appointment would ensure that Antigonus might not pursue an independent course without Antipater's knowledge.[5] But Antipater did not want to see an open rift between him and

1 Diod. 18.38; Just. 13.6.9.
2 Diod. 18.48.4, 54.2.
3 Diod. 18.39.7.
4 Diod. 18.39.7.
5 Billow (1990, 69f.) suggests that Cassander's appointment implied that Antigonus "was intended to become Antipater's successor", for Cassander assumed the same position when Polyperchon became the

Antigonus, so he strengthened their relationship by a policy of marriage: Antipater's daughter Phila, the widow of Craterus, became the wife of Demetrius son of Antigonus.[1]

Perhaps due to his father's former alliance with Antigonus, Cassander made approach to Antigonus and asked for his support. It is difficult to believe that Cassander was that naive as to think that he believed that Antigonus would assist him simply due to loyalty to his dead father. More probably, he knew that Antigonus would welcome a conflict in Macedon and Greece. Antigonus heard the news of Antipater's death after he had completed the war against the remnants of the faction of Perdiccas. As a powerful man who had no match in Asia, Antigonus unsurprisingly rejected the succession of Polyperchon to the regency. Diodorus informs us that Antigonus was the head of armed forces totaling sixty thousand infantry, ten thousand cavalry and seventy elephants, and he could muster as many mercenaries as he wished from Asia.[2] Cassander, after he had sent Nicanor to Athens to replace Menyllus as the commander of garrison, managed to escape to Asia, where he met Antigonus and invited him to take part in the venture against Polyperchon. Other important members of this coalition included Ptolemy, brother-in-law of Cassander, and Lysimachus.[3]

After Polyperchon had assumed the guardianship of the kings, he invited Olympias, the mother of Alexander, to return to Macedon for taking care of her infant grandson. Olympias had fled from Macedon to Epirus because of her quarrel with Antipater,[4] and now there is no wonder that she sided with Polyperchon to act against Antipater's son. In addition, Polyperchon ordered Eumenes to stir up trouble for Antigonus in Asia, promising him that he would take over the satrapy and all the prerogatives that

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actual successor. But this interpretation does not explain why Antipater finally chose Polyperchon instead of Antigonus as the new regent. Cassander's appointment is less likely a measure that simply strengthened the alliance between Antipater and Antigonus, leaving Antigonus in Asia unsupervised. The role of Cassander is well attested by his accusation against Antigonus when the latter was reluctant to wage on war against Eumenes. Cassander's testimony surely planted suspicion in his father's minds, so that Antigonus had to come to Antipater to defend himself.

1 Plut. Demetr. 14.2f.

2 Diod. 18.47.4. On Antigonus' military power, see Diod. 18.50.3.

3 For the marriage of Ptolemy and Eurydice the daughter of Antipater, see Paus. 1.6.8. For Ptolemy's alliance with Cassander and Antigonus, see Diod. 18.49.3, 54.3, 55.2. On Lysimachus, see Diod. 18.72.9, 19.56.4.

4 Diod. 18.57.2. Polyperchon had written to Olympias immediately after becoming regent (Diod. 18.49.4). But Olympias hesitated to accept this invitation, not only because Cassander remained in Macedon, but also because Polyperchon was the successor chosen by Antipater himself.

Antigonus had ever possessed in Asia.[1] Meanwhile Polyperchon, realizing that Cassander would seek for support from the Greek cities where there were garrisons left by his father and oligarchs whom Antipater had supported, decided that it was essential to seek to develop a counterweight among the democrats in these cities to the support for Cassander from the oligarchs. He then, in the name of the king Philip Arrhidaeus, proclaimed a decree which promised to re-establish democratic governments throughout Greece.

The context of this decree, found in Diodorus,[2] gives an adequate treatment of the motives of Polyperchon. First, it distinguished him from "the generals" who brought "many bitter things and hardships" to the Greek cities in the Spartan and Lamian wars. Though the decree itself does not mention these generals by name, it is clear that they refer to Antipater and his adherents. Polyperchon proclaimed that king Philip Arrhidaeus permitted the Greek cities to restore their governments to those during the reigns of Philip and Alexander. The king and his supporters were "far away" when the struggle against Alexander's Decree of Exiles and the Lamian War happened, and now they wished to "hold fast to the original policy".[3] In particular, those who had been exiled from the time of Alexander's campaign in Asia, except those guilty of bloodguilt, impiety and treason, were allowed to return to their native cities, with complete restoration of citizen rights and property.[4]

It is clear from these statements of the decree that Polyperchon wished to stress the continuity between his policies and those of Philip and Alexander. The contrast was

1 Diod. 18.57.3f.

2 Diod. 18.56.

3 Diod. 18.56.3: ἐπεὶ δὲ συνέβη, μακρὰν ἀπόντων ἡμῶν, τῶν Ἑλλήνων τινὰς μὴ ὀρθῶς γινώσκοντας πόλεμον ἐξενεγκεῖν πρὸς Μακεδόνας καὶ κρατηθῆναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων στρατηγῶν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ δυσχερῆ ταῖς πόλεσι συμβῆναι, τούτων μὲν τοὺς στρατηγοὺς αἰτίους ὑπολάβετε γεγενῆσθαι, ἡμεῖς δὲ τιμῶντες τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς προαίρεσιν κατασκευάζομεν ὑμῖν εἰρήνην, πολιτείας δὲ τὰς ἐπὶ Φιλίππου καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ τἄλλα πράττειν κατὰ τὰ διαγράμματα τὰ πρότερον ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων γραφέντα.

4 As for the political function of this decree, scholars' opinions differ. Several state that contrasting Antipater's policies to both Philip's and Alexander's policies only served to an ideological return to the status of 323 B.C. (Hammond 1988, 134; Habicht 2006, 82). Other scholars consider that the decree restored the situation in Greece as in Alexander's last years (Billows 1990, 199; Blackwell 1999, 149-157; Heckel 1999, 489-498), and that it was adhered to the Common Peace and the League of Corinth under Philip (Rosen 1968, 64-68; Dixon 2007, 151-178. Against see Anson 2014, 87f., who points out several differences between this decree and Philip's League of Corinth). Finally, Poddighe 2013 contributes to a discussion of how this decree obscured Alexander's responsibility for exiling Greeks and changing constitutions in some Greek cities by putting the blame on Antipater.

Antipater's violation of the political line of the previous two kings, because he was responsible for the present feelings of resentment on Macedon, or more exactly, for the resentment on the installed oligarchies in the Greek cities. The implication is that the king and Polyperchon's opposition to Cassander was an opposition against the rebels who did not act in conformity with the original settlements of the two previous kings in Greece. In origin, the desire to restore the policies of Philip and Alexander may not be Polyperchon's idea. Plutarch records that in Athens man yearned passionately for Philip and Alexander after Antipater had executed some democratic orators.[1] This mood, originated from Antipater's harsh settlements, must have been stronger when Antipater's death brought the hopes of eliminating oligarchy and regaining freedom. It seems reasonable, then, that Polyperchon took advantage of this emotion to enhance his popularity, in which he presented himself as a man who adhered to the goodwill of Philip and Alexander toward the Greeks. By claiming that "no one shall engage either in war or in public opposition to us" and "anyone who disobeys" would be severely punished,[2] Polyperchon made clear that this decree was in essence a call to arms against those who continued to lead their states as Antipater's allies.

Second, Polyperchon made special efforts to win Athens' support. Athens is particularly mentioned in the decree, and more significantly, Polyperchon offered it the control over Samos. After the Lamian War Perdiccas enforced the Athenians to allow the Samians to return home, who had been exiles for forty-three years from Timotheus' capture of that island in 366/5 B.C.[3] Now Polyperchon provided Athens with the possession of Samos as an additional inducement, and the decree had an immediate impact in the city. Both Diodorus and Plutarch agree that Nicanor, the agent of Cassander, soon found himself in a position under greatly increasing pressure, so that he had to seek assurances from the Athenians that they would remain loyal to Cassander. Nicanor at first made a diplomatic approach. When a council had been convened in Piraeus, he came before it with the hope of persuading them to continue to favor

1 Plut. Phoc. 29.1.

2 Diod. 18.56.7: ποιήσασθαι δὲ δόγμα πάντας τοὺς Ἕλληνας μηδένα μήτε στρατεύειν μήτε πράττειν ὑπεναντία ἡμῖν: εἰ δὲ μή, φεύγειν αὐτὸν καὶ γενεὰν καὶ τῶν ὄντων στέρεσθαι.

3 On Timotheus' expedition, see Nep. Timoth.1; Dem. 15.9. On Perdiccas' restoration, see Diod. 18.18.9.

Cassander. Although it seemed rather risky for him to appear personally at a meeting in an increasingly hostile city, Nicanor chose to do so on the ground that Phocion had assured his personal safety. For him Phocion's guarantee was necessary precaution, and another reason was probably that the meeting was held in Pireaus, near to his force on Munychia. When Nicanor arrived at the meeting, however, he was nearly captured by Dercylus of Hagnous, the general for home defense at that time. It is not difficult to understand Dercylus' intention: If he seized Nicanor, he could hold him as a hostage to compel the Macedonian garrison to be removed. At this critical moment Phocion intervened with the affair and allowed Nicanor to go unharmed.[1]

Why did Phocion assist Nicanor? Plutarch claims that Phocion acted in accordance with his moral principles, since he would rather be found suffering wrong than doing wrong. Even in that situation, he still believed that Nicanor would not do any damage to the Athenians. But we shall be cautious before accepting this defense, because it is difficult to believe that the Athenians could tolerate Phocion's refusal to seize Nicanor simply due to their respect for his moral virtues. In other words, were there other political considerations which caused Phocion's decision? Given Phocion's caution, he must have feared that the seizure of Nicanor would arouse the turmoil of the Macedonian garrison, who may react to the capture of their commander by raiding Piraeus. Although Polyperchon proclaimed that the democratic government and exiles were restored, he did not make explicit promise that the Macedonian garrison would be removed. Moreover, for Phocion it certainly seemed risky to break with Cassander at such an early time, especially when Cassander was backed by vital military support from Ptolemy and Antigonus.

Nicanor did not trust the Athenians any longer and planned to seize Piraeus secretly. The Athenians quickly learned of Nicanor's activities and sent envoys to Polyperchon to ask for assistance, but they failed to persuade Phocion to take any effective action. In effect, they not only failed to recapture Munychia but also lost the Piraeus. Diodorus

1 Plut. Phoc. 32.4-6. It is noted that Diodorus (18.64.1f.) simply says that Nicanor asked the Athenians to continue to favor Cassander, but nobody approved. Perhaps Nicanor twice appealed to the Athenians, and what Plutarch records was the second time.

briefly says that Nicanor took the walls and the harbor boom, while Plutarch writes that Nicanor's troops ran trenches around the Piraeus.[1] It seems that Nicanor fortified the Piraeus, the vital port where the Athenian navy was stationed and through which the city imported much of its grain. That means a strategy of encampment could do him little damage, because he could easily get food and reinforcements by sea. Not surprisingly, when an Athenian embassy came to him, led by some alleged friends of him such as Phocion, Conon and Clearchus, Nicanor refused to give any concession. Even the Athenians was supported by queen Olympias whom Nicanor feared, he still managed to delay the restoration.

Now Polyperchon replied the appeal of the Athenians by sending an army to Attica, which was led by his son Alexander, accompanied by many Athenians exiled under Antipater's settlement. Both Diodorus and Plutarch agree that Alexander's real intention was to gain control of Athens, but their accounts diverge in details. Plutarch vaguely says that Nicanor held a secret conference with Alexander, and that Phocion, after he had been deposed from his office, went to Polyperchon to plead his cause.[2] Whether Phocion played an intermediary role for promoting the meeting between Nicanor and Alexander is not attested in our sources. It is, however, likely, because Phocion would have been eager to prevent the possibility of the ravaging of the city from either part of them, and their peace negotiation must be favorable for consolidating his political position, which after Nicanor's coup was no longer stable.

Diodorus also writes that Alexander secretly negotiated with Nicanor for his personal interests. Meanwhile Phocion, as well as other supporters of Antipater, feared the harsh punishments from the Athenian people, so they went to Alexander and advised him to control the forts rather than returning them to the Athenians.[3] Plutarch, of course, rejects a malicious portrait of Phocion as a traitor. At this time the angry Athenians deposed Phocion and other magistrates under the oligarchy, replacing them with men with strong democratic convictions. For the exiles who just returned to the city,

1 Diod. 18.64.4; Plut. Phoc. 32.10.
2 Plut. Phoc. 33.4f.
3 Diod. 18.65.4f.

Phocion's behaviors since Antipater's death undoubtedly proved him guilty either of incompetence or treason. Our only evidence of the Athenians' dealings with the deposed men comes from Diodorus, who tells that some of them were condemned to death, and others were exiled and deprived of property. Phocion belonged to the latter group, and now he had no choice but leaving the city. Demetrius of Phalerum took refuge with Nicanor in Piraeus, while Phocion, with his close friends, went to Alexander's camp for a second time to seek assistance.[1] Plutarch does not mention Phocion's flight to Alexander, but refers to his travel to Polyperchon, which was related to Hagnonides the orator, who openly assailed him and denounced him as a traitor. Plutarch has mentioned Hagnonides by name that he was among the men whom Phocion saved from being exiled by Antipater, thus his later accusation against the old general naturally creates an impression of ingratitude.[2]

Phocion's party, joined by Solon of Plataea and Dinarchus of Corinth who were reputed to be intimate friends of Polyperchon, started earlier than another embassy, but they arrived at the same time due to the severe illness of Dinarchus. Thus Polyperchon was faced with a difficult decision in supporting which party. On one hand, he was naturally keen to occupy Munychia and the Piraeus, for which he needed the assistance of Phocion and other old associates of Antipater. While on the other hand, he was bound by his own propaganda to restore the autonomy and freedom of Greek cities. If he now gave heed to Phocion, his reputation would be severely damaged. Thus it is unsurprising that he ordered Dinarchus to be seized and put to death as soon as the latter came forward.[3] This action of brutality is an indication of his determination to maintain his image as defender of the freedom of Greece, and it also demonstrates Polyperchon's break with the policy of Antipater.

Driven by this desire, his hearing of both sides' presentation was in no way impartial. When Phocion made attempt to plead his case before king Philip Arrhidaeus,

1 Diod. 18.66.1. It seems strange that Phocion did not seek refuge with Nicanor, with whom he was said to have good relationship, but fled to Polyperchon. For an analysis of this choice see Gehrke 1976, 117. I agree with Gehrke that Phocion's choice was based on his recognition of Polyperchon, who "war der Vertreter des gesamten makedonischen Reiches", because what Phocion pursued was not personal safety, but re-enhancement of his popularity in Athens.

2 Plut. Phoc. 29.4, 33.4.

3 Plut. Phoc. 33.8.

Polyperchon incessantly interrupted his speech. In the end, he agreed to yield Piraeus to the Athenians if his troops could recapture it, and he ordered that Phocion and those who came with him to be arrested and sent to Athens for trial. In addition, he sent a letter to the Athenians, which stated that he believed these men guilty of treason but left the final verdict to the judgment of their fellow citizens. It can be seen that Polyperchon had done all he could to win back the support from the democratic leaders of Athens, in which he sacrificed Phocion, a man whose pervious services to Macedon were generally perceived by all.

Not long after the execution of Phocion, Cassander reached Athens with a thirty-five ship fleet supplied by Antigonus. His arrival forced Polyperchon to move to Megalopolis, a central Peloponnesian city which had another oligarchy installed by Antipater. Alexander the son of Polyperchon was left in Attica with a small force. However, Polyperchon's failure to occupy Megalopolis, especially his inglorious abandonment of the siege, exerted a negative influence on his reputation in the eyes of the Greeks. Meanwhile, his fleet was defeated by Cassander at Hellespont. This naval superiority of Cassander must have had an adverse impact in Athens where the democracy was newly restored.[1] When Polyperchon showed no intention to assist Athens or even march south, his real purpose for supporting the Athenian democracy may have been called into question. The removal of the garrison was impossible, and by mid-317 B.C. Athens was compelled to seek an accommodation with Cassander again. Demetrius of Phalerum served as the city's intermediary and soon became the overseer of Athens. With the execution of Phocion the Athenians restored their democracy, yet the death of oligarchs did not bring independence and freedom to them as they had expected. By contrast, a second oligarchic regime backed by Macedon was soon established, and Athens' fate was more closely bound with the individual fortunes of Macedonian diadochoi.

1 On Cassander's military successes, see Diod. 18.68-72, 74f. Cf. Heckel 1992, 197.

5.2 Plutarch's interpretation of Phocion's death

Plutarch's record of Phocion's trial and death provides much information on these turbulent years in Athens. However, one shall not forget that Plutarch focused more on ethics than history. In this sense, it remains to ask how Plutarch understands Phocion's political fall. The *Phocion* ends with a parallel between Socrates and Phocion. In Plutarch's mind, Phocion was by no means a traitor of Athens who deserved such punishment, but a victim of public violence as Socrates was. The Athenians was culpable of executing a virtuous statesman; however, was Phocion himself also responsible for his disfavor among the Athenians? In other words, what kind of lesson can the reader learn from Phocion's failure? For this question we shall return to the introductory section of the *Phocion*, in which Plutarch provides a thematic statement of Phocion's fate. In Chapter 2 of the *Phocion*, Plutarch talks about the risks of political participation. The people are usually fickle and irritable when there are calamities that fall upon them, and they are sensitive and intolerant of any frank speech, even if the candid advice may be beneficial to them. So in the administration of a city, a politician who takes a too straight course and opposes in all things to the popular desires would ruin himself due to the anger of the people. This part evidently anticipates the sternness of Phocion, who was said to never say or do anything to win the favor of the Athenians.[1]

Pragmatic in tone, this passage implies that a politician, if he wants to serve his country while keeping himself safe, should get to know the character of the people he is leading. This is one of the suggestions that Plutarch provides for the young and inexperienced politicians in his political treatise *praecepta gerendae reipublicae*. Plutarch admits that understanding the character of the citizens is a tedious and time-consuming task. But only when a politician knows what his people like and dislike, he could employ the most fitting means to bring them under his leadership. To strengthen this view, Plutarch provides examples of character traits pertaining to different peoples. The Athenians, as he says, were easily moved by emotions. They were kind to the humble

1 Plut. Phoc. 8.3. Here a stern and unflattering Phocion is reminiscent of Socrates whose speeches are "not aimed at gratification (οὐ πρὸς χάριν)". See Plat. Gorg. 521d-522e.

persons and took delight in those who praise them, but were terrible to their own magistrates. In Plutarch's opinion, the Athenians were strict to their own officials, and were readier to hear flattery rather than frank speaking.[1] This instruction can partly act as a guide for understanding Phocion's political career. The fact that he did not effectively influence the foreign policies of Athens is certainly based on the Athenians' strong desire for independence and autonomy, but it also seems reasonable that his sternness and refusal to flatter may sometimes have made him unfavorable in the eyes of the Athenians.

Throughout the *Phocion* Plutarch shows himself a fervent admirer of Phocion's moral virtues, but there is still negative remark. Plutarch is certainly critical of Phocion's inactivity toward the reports of Nicanor's plot against Athens. Although he seems to accept Phocion's ethical excuses that his refusal to arrest Nicanor was based on his conformity to good faith and trust between friends, he could not deny the fact that such an action endangered Athens' safety. Plutarch comments that Phocion's behavior was justified if he was an ordinary citizen, but as a political leader, he was obliged to place the state above individual honor and friendship. Here Plutarch makes it clear that Phocion's stubbornness was unfitting for his position as a leader.

The detrimental effects of harshness and sternness in politics are also observable in the *Cato Minor*. There are two places where Plutarch refers to the incompatibility of Cato's rigidity in relation to contemporary political situations. First is his refusal of the marriage connection with Pompey. Pompey provided this alliance of marriage after Cato had played a significant role in preventing one of his adherents Metellus Nepos to assume the position of tribune. The tribune was an office of great importance and power in Rome. If all the tribunes save one should vote for a measure, the power lies with the one who will not give his consent or permission. Metellus made efforts to obtain this office, not only because he desired to gain more power, but also because he wished that through his election Pompey could control the affairs of the city. He thus proposed a law that Pompey the Great should hasten with his forces to Italy and then undertake the

1 Plut. Prae. ger. reip. 799c-d.

preservation of Rome. Cato was alarmed by this and at first tried to persuade Metellus to give up his plan. Metellus, however, judged Cato's mild words as representation of his timidity, and intended to carry everything through in spite of the senate. At this time Cato changed his looks and vehemently rebuked the boldness of Metellus. It is clear that Cato was defending the interests of Rome, but the reaction of the senate was not such positive: It judged that neither Metellus nor Cato was in his right mind. The policy of Metellus would surely lead to the destruction of the state, while Cato's opposition, though in behalf of right and justice, was expressed in a wild and passionate way.[1] In other words, the senate considered that Cato was excessive in his harshness.

From the first several chapters of the *Cato Minor* one recognizes immediately the similarities between the character of Phocion and Cato: Cato was by nature "inflexible, imperturbable and altogether steadfast", and these traits were observable from his very childhood. Like Phocion he was severe and strict in personal habits. His speech was marked with straightforwardness and harshness,[2] which recalls Phocion's oration which sometimes seemed to be imperious, severe and even unpleasant. But Cato's quarrel with Metellus shows that he possessed a more spirited nature than Phocion, and this kind of spiritedness, as the judgment of the senate shows, appeared not to be praiseworthy in the eyes of his fellow citizens. However, the situation immediately changed when Metellus made attempt to achieve his goal through violence. Cato won much esteem, because he was fearless toward the threat of the armed partisans of Metellus, and his courage and determination encouraged many men to stand with him. In narrating Cato's fight against violence Plutarch does not find fault with him, reporting instead that his harsh character played a vital role in saving Rome from confusion even political upheaval. But this does not mean that Cato's stern character is unconditionally worthy of imitation. Even if Plutarch does not explicitly mention the connection, one would wonder whether Cato's

1 Plut. Cat. Min. 26.5: ἐκεῖνο τῇ βουλῇ παρέστησεν, ὡς οὐδέτερος μὲν καθέστηκεν οὐδὲ χρῆται λογισμοῖς ἀσφαλέσιν, ἔστι δὲ ἡ μὲν Μετέλλου πολιτεία μανία δι᾽ ὑπερβολὴν κακίας φερομένη πρὸς ὄλεθρον καὶ σύγχυσιν ἁπάντων, ἡ δὲ Κάτωνος ἀρετῆς ἐνθουσιασμός ὑπὲρ τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων ἀγωνιζομένης.

2 Plut. Cat. Min. 1.3: λέγεται δὲ Κάτων εὐθὺς ἐκ παιδίου τῇ τε φωνῇ καὶ τῷ προσώπῳ καὶ ταῖς περὶ τὰς παιδιὰς διατριβαῖς ἦθος ὑποφαίνειν ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἀπαθὲς καὶ βέβαιον ἐν πᾶσιν. On Cato's personal habits, see 3.9, 5.6-8; on the style of his speech, see 5.3-5.

earlier excessive sternness may have precipitated Metellus' desire to use violence.

Even when Pompey himself returned, Cato was unmoved by his high reputation and the potential threat brought by his armed force, but persuaded the senate to reject Pompey's demand of the postponement of the consular elections. Now Pompey began to recognize that Cato would be a great stumbling-block in his way to power unless he were made a friend, so he claimed that his family shall be connected with that of Cato through marriage. Cato replied that he could be a friend of Pompey only when the latter acted in accordance with justice. Plutarch explicitly expresses his disagreement with this reply: Cato "was wrong" in not accepting the marriage connection with Pompey, because his refusal allowed Pompey's alliance with Caesar, an alliance that united the powers of the two men and eventually destroyed the republic constitution. Cato was intolerant of Pompey's some slight transgressions, but indirectly allowed him to commit the greatest of all.[1]

Plutarch's argument is that Pompey would not make alliance with Caesar so quickly, had Cato attached himself to Pompey. Compared with the civil war, Metellus' bold proposal and Pompey's intervention in the consular elections are "slight transgressions" that Cato should have forgiven when Pompey provided him with a chance of cooperation. Following this interpretation, Cato was partly responsible for the overthrown of the republican regime that he himself thrived to defend. Plutarch admits that he is to judge by the results, because Cato could not foresee what would happen in the future, but this judgment is consistent with Plutarch's perception that the hostility between individual politicians could be reconciled for the sake of the common good. Once again in the *praecepta gerendae reipublicae*, Plutarch notes that a statesman should not regard any fellow citizen as an enemy, unless some men indeed sacrifice the common

1 Plut. Cat. Min. 30.9: τοῦ παντὸς ἔοικεν ὁ Κάτων ἁμαρτεῖν τὴν οἰκειότητα μὴ δεξάμενος...ὧν οὐθὲν ἂν ἴσως συνέπεσεν, εἰ μὴ Κάτων τὰ μικρὰ τοῦ Πομπηΐου φοβηθεὶς ἁμαρτήματα τὸν μέγιστον περιεῖδεν, αὐτὸν ἑτέρῳ δύναμιν προσγενόμενον. Later Cato steadfastly opposed Caesar's request for entering the city to celebrate a triumph, which, according to Plutarch (Cat. Min. 31), was another reason that led to the alliance between Pompey and Caesar. According to Pelling (1986, 164), the view that the alliance of Pompey and Caesar caused the civil war (see also Plut. Caes. 13.5f.; Pomp. 47.4) is derived originally from the work of Asinius Pollio. But Cato's responsibility for this alliance seems to be Plutarch's own, which justifies his criticism of over-rigid adherence to moral principles. For the clash between morality and practicality in this affair see also Pelling 1989, 228f.; Frazier 1995, 159; Duff 1999, 152f.

good for personal interests. Interestingly, in this treatise both Phocion and Cato are mentioned as good examples who were stern and inexorable in public affairs, but treated their political opponents kindly and without anger in private. Cato, in particular, had opposed Pompey severely, but it is he who advised to put the affairs of the city into the hands of Pompey when the civil war broke out, with a saying that the men who can bring about great evils can also end them.[1]

On this occasion Plutarch interprets Cato's words simply as evidence of the frankness of his speech. This remark on one hand points out Pompey's responsibility for the competition between him and Caesar which finally led to civil war; on the other hand, it implicitly admits that Pompey was the only man who had the power, reputation and ability to save his country from destruction. So Plutarch concludes that it is blame mingled with praise. The same remark appears again in the *Cato Minor*, but in the biography it reflects a difficult situation in which Cato had no other choices but following Pompey. Caesar was reported to be marching against the city with an army, and all Romans were waiting for Cato's answer, because he alone had from the outset foreseen the unfettered ambition of Caesar. Cato, however, only advised them to turn to Pompey, the very man who was responsible for these perils and should now put a stop to them.[2] Even though Pompey had no forces in readiness and soon forsook Rome, Cato still set out himself in pursuit of Pompey, because he was wholly intolerant of Caesar who pursued power at the expense of peace and the republic constitution. This compelling adherence to Pompey in the crisis does make sense, when one recalls his earlier resolute refusal to side with Pompey through marriage connection. In this way, Plutarch ascribes a sense of causality and inevitability to Cato's sufferings in the civil war, which highlights Cato's rigidity that led him to make such a decision, or in Plutarch's own words, a mistake. Just like in the *Phocion*, where Phocion's blind trust in Nicanor could be justified in moral sense but in effect endangered Athens' safety, Plutarch presents a similar dilemma between morality and politics in the *Cato*: Cato felt himself justified in refusing to ally with a man whose design he thought aimed at corrupting him,

1 Plut. Prae. ger. reip. 810c.
2 Plut. Cat. Min. 52.3.

and he wished that his conformity to justice would bring benefits for his country. But the result was just the reverse. Ironically, Cato thought that his alliance with Pompey would be detrimental to both himself and Rome, but what proved to be more detrimental was his refusal.

The second lesson in Cato's political career is reflected in a debate between him and Cicero. Since Caesar employed money gifts to increase his power in Rome, Cato determined to stand for the consulship, so that he could deprive Caesar of his armed forces or convict him of hostile designs. For this purpose he persuaded the senate to pass a decree that candidates for office should canvass the people in person, and not solicit nor confer with the people through the agency of another going about in their behalf. Such an action exasperated the Roman people, because Cato prevented them from receiving money and gratitude from the candidates. In addition, Cato was not persuasive himself when canvassing the people, nor did he permit his friends to do so.[1] He therefore failed to obtain the office, and showed no desire for regaining it. For this Cicero found fault with him, because Cato refusal to win the favor of the people was inappropriate when the affairs of the state demanded a man like him for office. Cato replied, accordingly, that the Roman people were already corrupted, and any man of sense would not change to please them.[2]

Plutarch does not make any comment on this debate. But I suspect that when Plutarch introduced this debate between Cicero and Cato, he had in mind that Cato's passive reaction did not conform to the image of his ideal politician. Cato was right when he observed that the Roman people had been corrupted by flattery and bribery, and it is understandable that he was so disappointed with the contemporary politics. Even at the cost of his own political career, Cato would not court the favor of the people through such an unjust way. When reading this passage simply from the moral perspective, one would admire Cato's determination to act in a just and honorable way, which distinguished him from his contemporaries. But Cicero's rebuke does make sense against

1 This, of course, recalls Phocion's refusal to canvass for office (Plut. Phoc. 8.1).
2 Plut. Cat. Min. 50.2f. Cf. Cat. Min. 32.8-11, where Cicero successfully persuaded Cato to give up opposing Caesar's measure for the sake of the state. But Cato's compromise did not last long.

the background of contemporary politics, for the magisterial election greatly relied on the favor of the Roman people, even though they had been corrupted. Cato gave up the efforts to obtain the consulship, and he, as a result, could not effectively prevent Caesar's ambition as he had promised. In short, Cato's protest against the corruption of his fellow citizens had no practical effects, and his failure in consular election in fact damaged the Republican side.

Cato's rigidity in this affair echoes Plutarch's notion in the proem that the old-fashioned character of Cato enjoyed great repute and fame, but was not suited to the needs of the immediate times.[1] Citing Cicero's words that Cato acted as if he lived in Plato's commonwealth, Plutarch implicitly expresses his dissatisfaction with Cato's lack of adaptability. He would always expect the politician to be upright, but he was also aware that politics is a complicated matter. Plutarch's treatise *praecepta gerendae reipublicae* lists a number of suggestions for the challenges and risks in political life, and it can also be considered as his depictions of the ideal politician. For Plutarch, a good politician is the one who not only serves his country well, but also reforms the morals of the citizens. When stressing the application of moral pedagogy to politics, Plutarch must have been in mind that the good character of a politician is not enough to gain the trust of the people and to substantiate his influence. This is explicitly expressed through a number of suggestions of how to effectively bring the unruly citizens under the politician's leadership. Knowing the character of the people, as has been discussed earlier, is one of the useful methods. In addition, he advises the politician to improve oratory skills, so that the citizens should be impressed and persuaded through the persuasive power of their leader rather than through the materialistic pleasures. When a politician employs rebuke or ridicule in his speech, he must keep in mind the need not to cause pain to his audience. The politician should also use some sort of roundabout and circuitous methods when necessary, because there are some cases in which the politician

1 Plut. Phoc. 3.3: ἐμοὶ δὲ ταὐτὸ δοκεῖ παθεῖν τοῖς μὴ καθ᾽ ὥραν ἐκφανεῖσι καρποῖς. ὡς γὰρ ἐκείνους ἡδέως ὁρῶντες καὶ θαυμάζοντες οὐ χρῶνται, οὕτως ἡ Κάτωνος ἀρχαιοτροπία διὰ χρόνων πολλῶν ἐπιγενομένη βίοις διεφθορόσι καὶ πονηροῖς ἔθεσι δόξαν μὲν εἶχε μεγάλην καὶ κλέος, οὐκ ἐνήρμοσε δὲ ταῖς χρείαις διὰ βάρος καὶ μέγεθος τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀσύμμετρον τοῖς καθεστῶσι καιροῖς.

could not avert the people's interest from unprofitable things by direct means.[1] The practical nature of these suggestions reveals Plutarch's warning that political life is highly competitive and risky, in which failures and opposition are common and inevitable, so he is keen to teach his reader how to react properly when dealing with voice of dissent. Of course, the emphasis on moral training in this treatise shows that Plutarch inherited the Platonic political philosophy, in which a political leader was required to exert progressive influence over his people through his own moral characters,[2] but these practical suggestions do attest Plutarch's concern for the moral of the community rather than simply that of the politician. The ultimate task of a politician, as Plutarch explicitly says, is to train the character of the citizens, "leading them toward that what is better".[3] For him the moral progress is by no means a private issue, but public benefits. In this sense, Cato was surely right in not yielding himself to the unjust desires of the populace, but he lacked the ability to make his rebukes acceptable, and more significantly, useful to his state.

Another politician who was excessive in harshness is Coriolanus. This man is known for his valor and courage in military affairs, and like Phocion and Cato, his character was marked with self-discipline, fortitude and justice. Coriolanus' harshness in personal relationships becomes clear from the very opening of the *Life of Coriolanus*, where Plutarch says that his vehement temper and unswerving pertinacity made the intercourse with him difficult.[4] As the narrative proceeds, Plutarch tells us that Coriolanus was living in a state where the conflict between the rich and poor was acute, and Coriolanus, in behalf of the noble and wealthy citizens, opposed to make concessions to the poor multitude. His repeatedly opposition to the desires of the common people naturally caused resentment, which consequently led to his failure in the

1 Plut. Prae. ger. reip. 801e-802e, 803d, 818e-819b.

2 Cf. Plat. Gorg. 521d.

3 Cf. Plut. Prae. ger. reip. 800b: τὸ μὲν οὖν τῶν πολιτῶν ἦθος ἰσχύοντα δεῖ καὶ πιστευόμενον ἤδη πειρᾶσθαι ῥυθμίζειν ἀτρέμα πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ὑπάγοντα καὶ πράως μεταχειριζόμενον.

4 Plut. Cor. 1.4: τὸ γὰρ ἰσχυρὸν αὐτοῦ πρὸς ἅπαντα τῆς γνώμης καὶ καρτερὸν ὁρμάς τε μεγάλας καὶ τελεσιουργοὺς τῶν καλῶν ἐξέφερε, θυμοῖς τε αὖ πάλιν χρώμενον ἀκράτοις καὶ φιλονεικίαις ἀτρέπτοις οὐ ῥᾴδιον οὐδ᾽ εὐάρμοστον ἀνθρώποις συνεῖναι παρεῖχεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐν ἡδοναῖς καὶ πόνοις καὶ ὑπὸ χρημάτων ἀπάθειαν αὐτοῦ θαυμάζοντες καὶ ὀνομάζοντες ἐγκράτειαν καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν, ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς αὖ πάλιν ὁμιλίαις ὡς ἐπαχθῆ καὶ ἄχαριν καὶ ὀλιγαρχικὴν ἐδυσχέραινον.

election for consulship. In addition, Coriolanus vehemently attacked the tribunes for allowing the power of the people to grow without limit, and after his words had greatly aroused their wrath, he even made open denunciation of the multitude. Consequently, the penalty assigned to him was perpetual banishment, and the people rejoiced over this result as if they won a victory in battle over enemies.[1]

These affairs focus on the passionate and contentious side of the character of Coriolanus. In the opening chapter of the *Coriolanus* Plutarch makes it clear that the central issue of this *Life* is the significance of philosophical education for controlling excessive passions, and Coriolanus is the opposite example of moderation due to his lack of philosophical training. Apart from the ethical perspective, we shall also notice that Coriolanus' lack of moderation had important negative effects in politics. Coriolanus' excessive pursuit of bravery and valor is contrasted with his ignorance of gravity and mildness, which, according to Plutarch, "are the chief virtues of a statesman".[2] Thus Coriolanus exacerbated the common people and caused his lifelong banishment, which deprived him the chance of serving his country any longer. Worse still, this shame resulted to his adherence to the Volscians who waged the war against Rome, an action that caused great threat for his state and ultimately led to his own death. The *Coriolanus*, like the *Phocion* and the *Cato Minor*, demonstrates that virtue does not always guarantee success in public life. Significantly, in these *Lives* Plutarch raises the question of how a politician should make his opposition acceptable to the public, and what is related is the necessity and fitting way that the virtuous politician makes efforts to reform the citizens' morals.

S. Swain is right to say that the Roman people favored demagogues such as Caesar,

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1 Plut. Cor. 12-15.

2 Cf. Plut. Cor. 15.4f.: αὐτὸς δ᾽ ἐκεῖνος (Coriolanus) οὐ μετρίως ἔσχεν οὐδ᾽ ἐπιεικῶς πρὸς τὸ συμβεβηκός, ἅτε δὴ πλεῖστα τῷ θυμοειδεῖ καὶ φιλονείκῳ μέρει τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς ἔχοντι μέγεθος καὶ φρόνημα, κεχρημένος, τὸ δ᾽ ἐμβριθὲς καὶ τὸ πρᾷον, οὗ τὸ πλεῖστον ἀρετῇ πολιτικῇ μέτεστιν, ἐγκεκραμένον οὐκ ἔχων ὑπὸ λόγου καὶ παιδείας, οὐδὲ τὴν ἐρημίᾳ ξύνοικον, ὡς Πλάτων ἔλεγεν, αὐθάδειαν εἰδὼς ὅτι δεῖ μάλιστα διαφεύγειν ἐπιχειροῦντα πράγμασι κοινοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις ὁμιλεῖν, καὶ γενέσθαι τῆς πολλὰ γελωμένης ὑπ᾽ ἐνίων ἀνεξικακίας ἐραστήν. ἀλλ᾽ ἁπλοῦς τις ὢν ἀεὶ καὶ ἀτενής, καὶ τὸ νικᾶν καὶ κρατεῖν ἁπάντων πάντως ἀνδρείας ἔργον ἡγούμενος, οὐκ ἀσθενείας καὶ μαλακίας, ἐκ τοῦ πονοῦντος καὶ πεπονθότος μάλιστα τῆς ψυχῆς, ὥσπερ οἴδημα, τὸν θυμὸν ἀναδιδούσης, ἀπήει ταραχῆς μεστὸς ὢν καὶ πικρίας πρὸς τὸν δῆμον.

but he certainly goes too far by claiming that "Cato simply annoys them".[1] Plutarch clearly says that Cato inspired respect in his contemporaries, although the Romans had no real desire to imitate him.[2] Ironically, Plutarch records an episode that describes how Cato encouraged his soldiers to imitate his virtues when he was military tribune in Macedon, and in this discussion Plutarch remarks that a virtuous man is useless, unless he inspires respect in those who observe him.[3] However, it is to this negative image that Cato will later in his biography increasingly conform. T.Duff observes that the pair *Phocion-Cato Minor* reveals the problem between a commitment to virtue and expediency, but it is also far-fetched to suggest that injustice can be excused, even if the result proves to be beneficial for the state. For Duff, Phocion seems to be better than Cato because he accepted the fact of Macedonian dominance over Athens, while Cato refused to compromise and his obstinate actions did not effectively prevent the demise of the Roman Republic.[4] Indeed, Cato's inflexibility to the circumstances in which he lived is easily to be observed in Plutarch's depiction, but in terms of the conflict between private morality and the demands of statesmanship, Phocion's blind trust in Nicanor was equally detrimental to the common good of Athens.

5.3 Phocion and Cato Minor: The significance of parallelism

In the last part of this Chapter, I would discuss the significance of reading the *Phocion* and *Cato Minor* of a pair together, for which the death scenes of both subjects

1 Swain 1990, 200.

2 Plut. Cras. 7.7. Cf. Phoc. 3.3.

3 Plut. Cat. Min. 9.10: ἀρετῆς γὰρ ἀληθινὸς οὐκ ἐγγίνεται ζῆλος ἢ δι᾽ ἄκρας τοῦ παραδιδόντος εὐνοίας καὶ τιμῆς: οἱ δὲ ἄνευ τοῦ φιλεῖν ἐπαινοῦντες τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς αἰδοῦνται τὴν δόξαν αὐτῶν, οὐ θαυμάζουσι δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν οὐδὲ μιμοῦνται.

4 Duff 1999, 146f. It is noteworthy that Duff (1999, 132) cites Aristides as one of the instances that shows Plutarch's tolerance of injustice in case that the result is beneficial for the interests of state. For example, Aristides supported the transfer of the Delian League treasury to Athens in 454 B.C., which, as he himself declared, was unjust but expedient (Plut. Arist. 25.3). Nevertheless, it is inconsistent with 22.3f., where Aristides claimed Themistocles' plan to burn the Greek fleet as "nothing more unjust (ἀκικωτέραν)" and finally the Athenians prevented Themistocles from his purposes. Moreover, Aristides was famed for his justice in assessing the contribution of allies for war (Plut. Arist. 24.1f.). Duff admits that "Plutarch gives no clear authorial guidance on how to view Aristides' policy", and it shall also be noted that the notion of putting expediency before justice is evidently contradictory to the ethics of Plato, who had great influence on Plutarch.

provide some clues. Unfortunately, the synkrisis of this pair is lost. But it is one of the thirteen extant pairs of *Lives* which have formal proems. The formal proems in Plutarch's *Lives*, as P. Stadter claims, usually provide the reader with the motivations and purposes of the author, and in eleven pairs of *Lives* one could find Plutarch's justification for his decision to compare these two persons.[1] The *Phocion-Cato Minor* obviously belongs to this group. At the first two chapters of the proem Plutarch confronts the issue of why the good men do not always win: Though Phocion was said to have been of great virtue, he was ultimately unsuccessful in his public career and even suffered unfair treatment from his fellow citizens. Plutarch first ascribes Phocion's failure to "the grievous and violent time" (ἀνταγωνιστῇ βαρεῖ καὶ βιαίῳ καιρῷ συλλαχοῦσαν) he lived. The fortunes of Greece, as he says, made the virtue of Phocion dark and obscure, and the failure of Phocion even weakens the world's confidence in his virtue. The last argument implies a worry, or more probably a recommendation of Plutarch, that the virtue of good men is always worth imitating, regardless of the favorable or adverse circumstances. Then he goes on to discuss the effects of misfortune on political life. The calamities make people bitter and irritable toward the frankness of their politician, and a wise statesman, therefore, should combine a mixture of firmness and softness in dealing with the people.

These principles, Plutarch continues in the next chapter, "found an illustration in Cato the Younger also"(ταῦτα δὲ καὶ Κάτωνι τῷ νέῳ συνέβη). Like Phocion, Cato is said to have given fortune a long but ultimately unsuccessful fight, and his manners were not winning nor pleasing to the populace. Here Plutarch explicitly says that Cato's old-fashioned nature was ill-suited to his times, and there is no doubt that Cato is another opposite example of the wise statesman he mentions above. It is in both subjects' political failure that the parallel is clear.

The proem ends with a summary of the similar characters of the two men, and with Plutarch's emphasis on the need of discovering the subtle differences between their similar characters. "But the virtues of these men, even down to their ultimate and minute

1 Stadter 1988, 275f.

differences, show that their natures had one and the same stamp, shape and general colour. They were an equal blend, so to speak, of severity and kindness, of caution and bravery, of solicitude for others and fearlessness for themselves, of the careful avoidance of baseness and, in like degree, the eager pursuit of justice. Therefore we shall need a very subtle instrument of reasoning, as it were, for the discovery and determination of their differences."[1] The similarities in the two persons' characters reinforce the parallelism of the two *Lives*, and thus encourage the reader to make a comparison between them. But in the proem Plutarch does not mention a significant theme which in fact runs through both *Lives*. This is the reflection of Socratic paradigm. For this, T. Duff is right to say that comparison of both men with Socrates emphasizes the parallels between Cato and Phocion themselves, and it may well have been the Socratic theme which provided Plutarch with the impetus above all to compare the two men.[2] But Duff overlooks the point that Cato's end is presented by Plutarch as philosophically problematic and inferior to both Socrates' and Phocion's, the significance of which I shall explain below.

As has been discussed in Chapter 1, Phocion's connection with Socrates is indirect but clear. Phocion was said to have attended Plato's Academy, and his relationship with Leon of Byzantium and Xenocrates, two important members of Academy, is well attested in the sources. Demetrius of Phalerum may have contributed much to the literary tendency to parallel Phocion with Socrates, when his political career and acquaintance with Phocion were taken into consideration. The contextual parallel is evident. The picture of a Phocion who claimed that he acted only as he thought best for Athens is reminiscent of Plato's gadfly-like Socrates, and Phocion's self-justification for

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1 Plut. Phoc. 3.8f.: τούτων δὲ τῶν ἀνδρῶν αἱ ἀρεταὶ μέχρι τῶν τελευταίων καὶ ἀτόμων διαφορῶν ἕνα χαρακτῆρα καὶ μορφὴν καὶ χρῶμα κοινὸν ἤθους ἐγκεκραμένον ἐκφέρουσιν, ὥσπερ ἴσῳ μέτρῳ μεμιγμένου πρὸς τὸ αὐστηρὸν τοῦ φιλανθρώπου καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀσφαλὲς τοῦ ἀνδρείου, καὶ τῆς ὑπὲρ ἄλλων μὲν κηδεμονίας, ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν δὲ ἀφοβίας, καὶ πρὸς μὲν τὸ αἰσχρὸν εὐλαβείας, πρὸς δὲ τὸ δίκαιον εὐτονίας συνηρμοσμένης ὁμοίως: ὥστε λεπτοῦ πάνυ λόγου δεῖσθαι καθάπερ ὀργάνου πρὸς διάκρισιν καὶ ἀνεύρεσιν τῶν διαφερόντων.

2 Duff 1999, 141. Moreover, Duff observes that the last sentence in the *Phocion* begins with a μέν (ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν περὶ Φωκίωνα πραχθέντα τῶν περὶ Σωκράτην πάλιν ἀνέμνησε τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ὡς ὁμοιοτάτης ἐκείνῃ τῆς ἁμαρτίας ταύτης καὶ δυστυχίας τῇ πόλει γενομένης), while the next sentence begins in the *Cato* with a δέ (Κάτωνι δὲ τὸ μὲν γένος ἀρχὴν ἐπιφανείας ἔλαβε καὶ δόξης ἀπὸ τοῦ προπάππου Κάτωνος). Such a structure, as he argues, not only makes explicit the *Cato*'s link with the preceding *Life*, but also sets the expectation that Cato too will be similar to Socrates.

suffering wrong rather than doing wrong is exactly the opinion expressed by Socrates in *Gorgias*. The Socratic feature is most obvious in the death scene of Phocion. Like Socrates, Phocion remained calm as usual despite the emotion of others, and he cherished no resentment of the unjust treatment imposed by the Athenians. By drinking hemlock, he died in the same way as Socrates.

Plutarch highlights the parallel between Socrates and Phocion by referring to the regret that Phocion's death caused: "What had been done to Phocion reminded the Greeks again of what had been done to Socrates, for they thought that the sin and the misfortune which had happened to the city in this case was very similar to the sin and misfortune of that previous case."[1] But a careful reading of the *Phocion* suggests that Phocion suffered more injustice than Socrates. During the trial he was not allowed by the angry Athenians to make defense for himself, nor for his friends, and on his way to prison he was insulted by one of his enemies. Socrates had died surrounded by his friends, while Phocion was killed along with his friends. In addition, Socrates' execution was delayed because of the sacred embassy to Delos, but the Athenians executed Phocion and his associates regardless of the festival which was taking place at that very day. These differences evidently emphasize the degree of the injustice and unfairness Phocion suffered, thus reinforcing the theme of the sufferings of virtuous men.[2]

Plutarch, at least three times, calls Cato a philosopher,[3] and in his biographical narrative Cato is clearly linked to the Stoicism. Cato was a friend of Antipater of Tyre, a Stoic philosopher.[4] It is also recorded that he was delight in his friendship with another Stoic philosopher Athenodoros. Cato's fondness for Stoicism must have been well known among his contemporaries, because Cicero once ridiculed him in court and such a jest made others laugh. Finally, Cato was said to have discussed the so-called "paradoxes" of the Stoics shortly before his suicide, namely that the good man alone is free while the bad are all slaves. Cato, of course, in this discussion justified his determination to fight against Caesar's tyranny, and consciously pointed out that it was the Stoic doctrine that

1 Plut. Phoc. 38.5.
2 Cf. Duff 1999, 144.
3 Plut. Cat. Ma. 27.7; Brut. 2.1; Pomp. 40.2.
4 Plut. Cat. Min. 4.2.

instructed his action.[1] These references are in accordance with the image of Cato as a Stoic in other works.[2]

Nevertheless, one shall notice that there are obvious reminiscences of Socrates in Cato's conduct. For example, the picture of Cato wearing fewer clothes in winter and walking without shoes not only recalls Plutarch's description of Phocion, but also is similar to the image of Socrates presented by Aristophanes and Xenophon.[3] Moreover, one could easily find some allusions to Socrates in the *Symposium* in Plutarch's *Cato Minor*. Cato walked and conversed with his friends who rode, a picture recalls Socrates' conversation with Alcibiades. Like Socrates, Cato refused to accept prize of valor for his service in the war. Furthermore, Cato's calmness during the violence instigated by Caesar in 59 B.C. may also be reminiscent of Socrates' calm retreat in the midst of enemies in the battle of Delium.[4] Apart from these implicit parallels, on two occasions Cato is directly linked to Socrates. Plutarch says that Marcus Favonius was a companion and ardent disciple of Cato, and he compares their close relationship to that between Apollodorus of Phalerum and Socrates. More significantly, before his suicide Cato twice read Plato's *On the Soul*, namely the *Phaedo*, a dialogue that describes Socrates' death scene and his discussion about the soul's immortality preceded it. It also worth noting that Cato's son and friends have made attempt to prevent him from suicide, in which they took his sword from him. This is probably meant to recall Socrates' refusal of the chance of survival that Crito provided for him.

The connection between Socrates and Cato was probably already to be found in Plutarch's sources. Immediately after his suicide, Cato's connection with Socrates was established by Cicero, who considered Cato's behavior as more suitable to Plato's ideal Republic. This remark may have circulated in Cicero's literary debate with Caesar about

1 On his friendship with Athenodoros, see Plut. Cat. Min. 10.1-3, 16.1; On Cicero's ridicule, see Cat. Min. 21.7; On the philosophical discussion shortly before his death, see Cat. Min. 67.2.

2 Cic. Par. Stoic. 2; Sen. De const. sap. 2.1, 7.1. Cf. Lucan, Bell. civ. 2.380-391. For opposition see Drogula (2019, 298-303), who regards Cato's simplicity and self-control as adherence to Roman tradition rather than pursuit of Stoic ideal *apatheia*, and he links Cato's passionate and bloody death scene with the noble suicides in the Roman tradition.

3 On Cato's appearance, see Plut. Cat. Min. 6.6, 44.1, 50.1. On similar appearance of Socrates, see Aristoph. Cl. 102-104; Xeno. Mem. 1.2.1, 1.3.5-13, 1.6.2.

4 On conversation with friends, see Plut. Cat. Min. 5.7; Plat. Sym. 221a. On refusal of prize, see Plut. Cat. Min. 8.3; Plat. Sym. 220e. On fearlessness and calmness, see Plut. Cat. Min. 32.4; Plat. Sym. 221b. Cf. Duff 1999, 143; Zadorojnyi 2007, 217 n.6.

Cato.[1] Caesar's victory in the civil war and his sole domination led many Romans to begin remembering more about Cato, who had often warned the Romans of Caesar's tyrannical ambitions, so the pamphlets that Cicero and Brutus composed magnifying Cato's virtues and philosophical values first contributed to the idealization of Cato. Under Caesar's dictatorship, Cato's suicide was naturally interpreted as a philosophical act of liberty, as both men became symbolic archetypes of political opponents. The elevation of Cato was still flourishing in early imperial times that even Emperor Augustus, the heir of Caesar, sought to promote the virtues of Cato, which can be observed in the positive treatment of Cato by Augustan authors.[2] Cato was held in high esteem as the champion of traditional Republican values, and perhaps as a great Stoic due to the influence of Cicero. By the time that monarchy was firmly established, however, it is questionable whether Cato's values and in particular his suicide were still closely related to his rivalry with Caesar.

It is under the reign of Nero that Cato became the Stoic ideal. The main source for Plutarch's *Cato Minor*, as he explicitly says, was Thrasea Paetus,[3] and Plutarch himself was acquainted with Thrasea's friend and follower Arulenus Rusticus.[4] Thrasea was a reputed senator and Stoic who lived under the reign of Nero, and he was sentenced to death in 66 AD because of his principled opposition to the emperor.[5] It is thus possible

1 Cic. Ad Att. 2.1.8; Plut. Phoc. 3.1. Cf. Trapp 1999, 496. For scholarly discussion on this famous literary controversy see Geiger 1979, 48, 54-57. It is not impossible that Cicero, fearing the power of Caesar, disguised his praise of Cato's policy by presenting it in the guise of philosophy. Cf. Jones 1970, 194-196; Drogula 2019, 304f.

2 Goar 1987, 23-31; Drogula 2019, 310f.

3 Plut. Cat. Min. 25.2, 37.1. Thrasea's account of Cato was probably based on the eyewitness memoirs of Munatius Rufus, a close friend of Cato. Conant (1954, 31f.) and Scardigli (1979, 136-140) argue that Plutarch may have also consulted Cicero's *Cato* and Caesar's *AntiCato*, but this view has been refuted by Tschiedel (1981, 34 n.101). Geiger (1979, 49-57) also insists that Munatius and Thrasea Paetus are two major sources for Plutarch. For other analysis of sources see also Fehrle 1983, 7-18; Duff 1999, 142 n.41; Gäth 2011, 84f.

4 Plutarch (De cur. 522e) tells us that Arulenus Rusticus was a hearer of him, which suggests their acquaintance. Cf. Fehrle 1983, 8.

5 Tact. Ann. 16.21ff. For an analysis of the so-called "philosophical opposition" to the Principate, represented by persons like Cato, Thrasea Paetus and Arulenus Rusticus, see Trapp 2016, 226-230. Trapp calls for attention that the tradition of opposition is "almost exclusively confined to Stoics", and the prosecution of emperors does not reflect their general negative attitude toward philosophy itself, but a reaction against particular moments for their endangered position. Even from the perspective of the Stoics, as Trapp argues, the target of philosophical opposition was bad emperors, not the Principate more generally. I may add that the same attitude can also be observed in the Platonist Plutarch, who has no general antipathy to the imperial system, but to those whom he perceived as tyrants. Especially in his treatise *Maxime cum principibus philosopho esse disserendum*, Plutarch promotes political participation of philosophers with the task of moulding the character of men in power.

that Thrasea, just as Demetrius of Phalerum in the case of Phocion, may have modeled his description of Cato's death on his own political experience. By doing so, Thrasea encouraged his reader to measure his political conduct against the model of Cato. The death of Cato not only reveal his firm adherence to virtue and justice, but also imply a sense of political opposition, which was in accordance with Thrasea's own advocate of senatorial freedom against Nero. The death scene of Thrasea, which is preserved in Tacitus, evidently contains allusions to Socrates, for the old senator spent his last night in philosophical discussion and died with calmness and dignity. When these facts are considered, Thrasea seems to be a fitting person to construct the parallel between Socrates and Cato, and he carefully arranged his own death to recall their last hours. Thrasea was not the only man who paid special attention to the connections between Socrates and Cato. Seneca the Younger compares them at least four times in his *Epistula*, and it was said that he particularly admired Cato's endurance of pain.[1] It is tempting to suppose that Tacitus' description of the death scene of Thrasea may have derived from Arulenus Rusticus, who was later executed by Domitian because he published a treatise in praise of Thrasea.[2] There is good reason to believe that Arulenus Rusticus would inherit the literary comparison between Socrates and Cato from Thrasea, thus underlining Thrasea's similarities to them. Such is the environment when Plutarch started his biography of Cato, in which Cato's memory has been greatly transformed from a patriotic politician to an idealized philosopher.

But a careful reading of Plutarch's narrative clearly shows that Cato's manner of dying was troublesome and passionate. During the philosophical discussion the Peripatetic Demetrius made objections, while Cato "broke in with vehemence" and "in loud and harsh tones" he maintained his argument. Before withdrawing to read the *Phaedo*, Cato embraced his son and each of his friends "with more than his wonted kindness". Both actions, as Plutarch says, awakened the suspicions of his friends of what he was prepared to do.[3] While Cato was reading the *Phaedo*, he suddenly discovered that

1 Sen. Ep. 67.7; 71.16f.; 98.12; 104.27-33. For Seneca's admiration of Cato's endurance of pain, see Edwards 2006, 206; Drogula 2019, 311f. For Cato in the works of Seneca, see Alexander 1946.
2 Suet. Dom. 10.3.
3 Plut. Cat. Min. 67.3: ἀντιβάντος τοῦ Περιπατητικοῦ, σφοδρὸς ἐμπεσὼν ὁ Κάτων καὶ τόνον

his sword had been removed. Being angry at the sluggishness of all his servants to bring the sword, Cato hit a slave on the mouth and bruised his own hand, crying loudly that his son and servants were betraying him. When his son and friends came, he chided them to hide his sword as if he was a madman. After that he stayed with two philosophers alone, the Peripatetic Demetrius and the Stoic Apollonides, and he promised to consult more with them in the nearest future. But judged from his later actions, this promise was a deception. After they left him alone, Cato slept until midnight. Then a freedman Butas came and reported him that a heavy storm delayed the departure of some of his comrades. For this Cato groaned with pity. When Butas came again and told them that the harbors were quiet, he ordered him to leave the room, then stabbed himself in the stomach. However, he failed to kill himself straight away, and made a loud noise in his death struggle by overturning a geometrical abacus. His son and friends came, and were terribly shocked when seeing that he was smeared with blood. The physician was called, but Cato pushed the physician away, tearing the wound open and finally died.[1]

This suicide-scene is surely un-Socratic. Plato's Socrates ended his life in dignity and tranquility, while Plutarch's Cato was obviously unable to handle his emotions. Although Cato persisted in reading the *Phaedo*, his death scene is marked with suspicion, deception and even violence. He hardly resembles Socrates as he shouted loudly to his son and friends, deceived them and in particular punched the slave. This strong emotionalism is not only inconsistent with the Platonic doctrine, but also contradicts with the Stoic ideal of the total absence of emotion (ἀπάθεια).[2] At least, Cato's anger toward his friends and servants undermines his adherence to the Stoic doctrine. Seneca, for example, calls the anger as a force with "self-destructive violence", and "there is no passion that is more frantic, more destructive to its own self".[3] Interestingly, the absence of emotion is

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προσθεὶς καὶ τραχύτητα φωνῆς ἀπέτεινε πορρωτάτω τὸν λόγον, ἀγῶνι θαυμαστῷ χρησάμενος, ὥστε μηδένα λαθεῖν ὅτι τῷ βίῳ πέρας ἔγνωκεν ἐπιθεὶς ἀπαλλάττεσθαι τῶν παρόντων; 68.1: ἀπιὼν εἰς τὸ δωμάτιον ἤδη, τόν τε παῖδα καὶ τῶν φίλων ἕκαστον μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον εἰώθει προσαγαγόμενος καὶ φιλοφρονηθείς, πάλιν ὑποψίαν παρέσχε τοῦ μέλλοντος.

1 Plut. Cat. Min. 68-70.

2 For a general discussion of the Stoic doctrines of emotions and ἀπάθεια, see Sorabji 2000, 181-193; Sorabji 2002, 229f.; Brennan 2007, 90-114.

3 Sen. De ira, 3.1.3-5: Ceteri enim adfectus dilationem recipient et curare tardius possunt, huius incitata et se ipsa rapiens violentia non paulatim procedit sed, dum incipit, tota est…Nulla itaque res urget magis attonita et in vires suas prona et, sive successit, superba, sive frustratur, insana. Cf. Plut. De coh.

ascribed by Seneca to Socrates, as the latter went to his death. "He (Socrates) maintained this attitude up to the very end, and no man ever saw Socrates too much elated or too much depressed. Amid all the disturbance of Fortune, he was undisturbed."[1] In addition, Seneca praises Socrates that he always kept his anger firmly under control.[2] In this sense, Socrates' behavior does come near the ideal for the Stoics.

The question why the death of Plutarch's Cato is so flawed has been discussed by some scholars. M. Trapp, in a work comparing Plutarch's Cato to Sophocles' Ajax, provides two possible explanations. First is Plutarch's bias toward the Roman figures. He is skeptical about the Romans' ability to attain the same sublimity of moral behavior and education that the Greeks have mastered. But Trapp himself opts for a second one: Plutarch is familiar with the Roman literary tendency to present Cato as a second Socrates, but he objects to such mythologized readings of Cato by exploring a more complex one.[3] A. Zadorojnyi believes that Plutarch would carefully select the sources he used, so it seems unlikely that the brutality of Cato's suicide results from the influence of some hostile accounts, such as Caesar's *AntiCato*. He further assumes that the image of a less perfect Cato reveals Plutarch's fundamental opposition to the negative effects of Stoic doctrines on great nature, which is observable in his several moral writings. Moreover, Zadorojnyi suggests that Cato's imitation of Socrates is absurdly literal, which may reflect Plutarch's agreement with Plato's criticism of excessive dependence on written discourse.[4] Finally, Drogula argues that Plutarch, after receiving the idealized Cato from contemporary Roman writers, made attempt to "place the idealized Cato back within the very real events of the late Republic", which in fact created an inconsistent narrative of Cato who sometimes deviated from Stoic doctrines.[5]

These scholars have looked for intertextual clues to Cato's death scene, but they overlooked its connection to the *Phocion*. It has been agreed that each pair of *Lives*

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ira, 453e-f, 455e, 463a.

1 Sen. Ep. 104.28: Haec usque eo animum Socratis non moverant, ut ne vultum quidem moverent. O illam mirabilem laudem et singularem! Usque ad extremum nec hilariorem quisquam nec tristiorem Socraten vidit. Aequalis fuit in tanta inaequalitate fortunae.

2 Sen. De ira, 3.13.3. Cf. Plut. De coh. ira, 455b.

3 Trapp 1999, 496f.

4 Zadorojnyi 2007, 220-227.

5 Drogula 2019, 312.

should be read as a unit, in which the first *Life* may establish themes or questions which are developed or resolved in the second. Sometimes we also need to pay attention to the rationale behind Plutarch's choice of which figures to compare with which. For example, in the synkrisis of *Solon-Publicola* Plutarch refers to a relationship of imitation, in which "the second (Publicola) imitated the first (Solon), and the first bore witness for the second".[1] Plutarch calls Solon "the wisest", because he acted as a moral teacher for the Athenians by interweaving many political and moral teachings in his poems. Most famous is the story of his interview with Croesus the king of Lydia, in which he warned the king of the vicissitude of Fortune. Solon told Croesus that a happy man was the one who enjoyed prosperity until the end of his life, and one shall notice that in the synkrisis Publicola is called "the most happy of men", because he not only won "what Solon prayed for as the greatest and fairest of blessings", but also continued to enjoy them until his death.[2] In other words, Publicola put the virtues that Solon praised into practice, and in this sense he "imitates" Solon. It is generally thought that theory guides practice, and especially at the very beginning of the *Publicola* Plutarch writes that "such was Solon, and with him we compare Publicola", a statement which indicates that he chose Solon first and Publicola to match.[3]

Could we also be sure which *Life* between the *Phocion-Cato* was chosen first? In the proem Plutarch simply points out some similarities which led him to pair the two subjects, but they do not indicate which person he chose first. However, some possibilities can be guessed. It seems that he may have started with Cato, a choice which was consistent with contemporary literary interest.[4] As has been discussed earlier, some Roman writers like Thrasea Paetus and Arulenus Rusticus present Cato as a martyr who

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1 Plut. syn. Sol-Pub. 1.1: ἆρ᾽ οὖν ἴδιόν τι περὶ ταύτην τὴν σύγκρισιν ὑπάρχει καὶ μὴ πάνυ συμβεβηκὸς ἑτέρᾳ τῶν ἀναγεγραμμένων, τὸν ἕτερον γεγονέναι μιμητὴν τοῦ ἑτέρου, τὸν ἕτερον δὲ μάρτυν.

2 Plut. syn. Sol-Publ. 1.8: ὥστ᾽ εἰ σοφώτατος ἁπάντων ὁ Σόλων, εὐδαιμονέστατος ὁ Ποπλικόλας. ἃ γὰρ εὔξατο τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐκεῖνος ὡς μέγιστα καὶ κάλλιστα, ταῦτα καὶ κτήσασθαι Ποπλικόλᾳ καὶ φυλάξαι χρωμένῳ μέχρι τέλους ὑπῆρξεν.

3 Plut. Publ. 1.1: τοιούτῳ δὴ γενομένῳ τῷ Σόλωνι τὸν Ποπλικόλαν παραβάλλομεν (…)

4 Pelling (1979) argues that the *Life of Cato*, together with other five *Lives* (Crassus, Pompey, Caesar, Brutus and Antony) in which Plutarch describes the final years of the Roman Republic, was composed as a group and rest upon the same store of source material. Duff (1999, 249) further assumes that in the case of these six *Lives* Plutarch must have started with the Roman figures and chosen the Greek ones to match, but he does not give detailed explanation for this statement.

sacrificed his own life in defense of justice and liberty, and talking of such kind must have certain influence so that it annoyed the emperor. It is said that Cossutianus Capito accused Thrasea before Nero, because there was talking of Nero and of Thrasea, "as it talked once of Caius Caesar and Marcus Cato".[1] One may further speculate that Domitian later sentenced Arulenus Rusticus to death due to his eulogy of Thrasea, because in this work Thrasea and probably Cato functioned as representatives for opposition to the emperor.

It could be imagined that Plutarch would also be influenced by this tendency, given his friendship with Arulenus Rusticus. In the *Cato Minor* he in fact admits that Cato's opposition to the coming monarchy was justified, even if his lost in the battle against Fortune was inevitable. Cato is the hero, while Caesar and Pompey are described as typical demagogues who used bribery even violence to achieve their goals. But it seems radical to argue that Plutarch was also a critic of monarchy. As a landed gentleman, Plutarch moved in a cultivated circle of Roman friends, and tradition said that he had known Emperor Trajan.[2] From his treatises it can be seen that he is a shrewd politician who has recognized that peace and prosperity were gradually taking place in Greece under the Roman Emperor, thus he warned the contemporary Greek statesman to present themselves and their city blameless in the eyes of the Roman governors and to make attempt to earn the goodness of those in power.[3] Moreover, Plutarch is a skilled writer who usually adapts the same source material for different purposes in different *Lives*. In the *Cato Minor* Caesar and Pompey are villains, but in their own *Lives* they are presented as ambitious politicians with certain merits.

Behind the form of parallel *Lives* lies Plutarch's belief that events and figures in Greek history have parallels in Roman history, and vice versa. The Roman tendency to idealize Cato as a parallel to Socrates must have inspired him to find a Greek hero that can serve as parallel example of Socrates as well. Cato lived more than four hundred

1 Tac. Ann. 16.22.2: "ut quondam C. Caesarem" (Cossutianus Capito) inquit "et M. Catonem, ita nunc te, Nero, et Thraseam avida discordiarum civitas loquitur."
2 For Plutarch's good relationship with Emperor Trajan see Barrow 1969, 45-50. For the recognition of Emperor Trajan and Hadrian for Plutarch's "intermediary" role in connecting Greek and Roman literary world see Fein 1994, 169, 172f.
3 Plut. Prae. ger. reip. 814a-e.

years later than Socrates, and as a Stoic, his connection with Socrates was distant and intermittent. By contrast, Phocion was a young contemporary of Socrates, and his attendance at Plato's Academy made this connection much closer. More significantly, Plutarch's Latin predecessors were generally favorable to Cato, and perhaps as a response, he composed his own death of Cato to suggest the more controversial facets of Cato's character and career. Cato's imitation of Socrates was laborious and artificial, because his character was unbalanced and flawed. At the beginning of the *Cato* Plutarch remarks that Cato had a nature "that was inflexible, imperturbable and altogether steadfast". He was not quickly nor easily moved to anger, but "once angered he was inexorable".[1]

Cato's lack of gentle qualities not only creates problems at his death. On numerous occasions in Plutarch's narrative we see Cato behaving affectively rather than philosophically. For instance, in his youth he abused Metellus Scipio in iambic verse, because the latter took the girl whom he prepared to marry. Later when his brother Caepio died, Cato's grief was so great that some people criticized him of acting with "more passion than philosophy".[2] After his entry into public life, his sternness showed itself in outbursts of anger and passion. As has been discussed earlier, the senate thought that Cato was not in his right mind because of his anger against the tribune Metellus Nepos. In his earlier prosecution of Lucius Murena, he was fierce and terrible in his defense of justice, though afterwards he looked kind and humane to everyone. Once again, in the debate over the punishment of the Catilinarian conspirators, Cato spoke "with anger and passion".[3] Cato's inability to control his emotions have already been demonstrated in these political incidents, so there is no wonder that shortly before his death he hit his slaves in such a rage that he even bruised his own hand. Of course, Cato's emotional behaviors in public reflect his commitment to justice and in effect defensed the common interests, but Plutarch's purpose is to draw attention to the way in which Cato departs from the model set by the philosophical training he was expected to have received. Unlike Cato, Phocion's sternness, at least in Plutarch's account, is never

1 Plut. Cat. Min. 1.4: πρὸς ὀργὴν οὐ ταχὺς οὐδὲ ὀλισθηρός, ὀργισθεὶς δὲ δυσπαραίτητος.
2 Plut. Cat. Min. 7.2, 11.3.
3 On Cato's persecution of Murena, see Plut. Cat. Min. 21.4. On his denunciation of Caesar, see Cat. Min. 23.1: ὁ Κάτων πρὸς τὴν γνώμην ἀναστὰς εὐθὺς ἵετο τῷ λόγῳ μετ᾽ ὀργῆς καὶ πάθους.

described as a trait opposed to his philosophical pretensions. Phocion was said to be harsh to anyone who damaged the common interests of Athens,[1] and he was steadfast in pursuing a policy of peace and conciliation with Macedon, in which his determination may have showed itself in sternness against the desires of the Athenians that he judged as inappropriate or unrealistic. But Plutarch's Phocion never expressed his opposition in an excessive passionate way as Cato did.

As has already been noted in the second part of this Chapter, both Phocion and Cato are criticized by Plutarch because of their harshness in political life. But one shall notice that only on one occasion Plutarch disapproves of Phocion, namely his blind trust in Nicanor which caused the fall of Piraeus. In the proem Plutarch states that an ideal statesman should develop a well-balanced character, pursuing a mixture of stern and gentle qualities. Plutarch indeed depicts Phocion's sternness, while in the same *Life* one could also observe this kind of meanness that he appreciates. For instance, Phocion's countenance was "forbidding and sullen", while his nature was "most gentle and most kind".[2] A contrast is drawn with the general Chabrias, who is characterized as either sluggish or fiery in spirit. Due to his moderation, Phocion even assumed the role of moral teacher for advising the old Chabrias to take right actions. The mixture of gentleness and sternness is clear in Plutarch's description of the regime between 322 and 319 B.C. On one hand, Phocion guarded the political and social stability by preventing the troublesome men from political participation. In addition, he was steadfast in refusing the Athenians' appeal for removing the Macedonian garrison. After Antipater's death he made great efforts to avoid direct conflict with the Macedonians, regardless of the suspicion of the Athenians. On the other hand, Plutarch describes Phocion's rule as "gentle and lawful"(πράως καὶ νομίμως).[3] He did not use mean of violence, but persuaded those who were disfranchised to be content with private life. Especially he pleaded with Antipater for the exemption of many from exile, and provided the philosopher Xenocrates the chance of enrolling as an Athenian citizen. It is clear that

1 Plut. Phoc. 10.7.

2 Plut. Phoc. 5.1: τῷ δὲ ἤθει προσηνέστατος ὢν καὶ φιλανθρωπότατος ἀπὸ τοῦ προσώπου δυσξύμβολος ἐφαίνετο καὶ σκυθρωπός.

3 Plut. Phoc. 29.5.

Plutarch's narrative underlines the harmony and good order which Phocion brought to his country at this time.

Furthermore, Phocion is praised by Plutarch as a good example for applying roundabout methods in dealing with others. In his *praecepta gerendae reipublicae*, Plutarch explicitly commends Phocion's wisdom when he rejected the Athenians' request for invading Boeotia at an inopportune time. Instead of rejecting it in a direct way, Phocion issued a proclamation calling all those from the age of military service up to sixty years to join the ranks. As a result, the older Athenians were unwilling to engage themselves in expedition, and in this way they gave up the plan. A similar case can be found in the *Life of Phocion*. When dealing with Alexander about the treatment of those orators who were thought to be hostile to Macedon, Phocion was said to advise the king to pay more attention to the barbarians rather than the Greeks, and to "say many things that suited well with Alexander's nature and desires". In this way, he successfully persuaded the king to soften his feelings against Athens.[1] Although in the proem Plutarch have already pointed out that untimely rigidity in politics is the lesson that will be developed in both *Lives*, he seems not to make Phocion into a negative paradigm.

One may argue that there are several passages in the *Cato Minor* where Cato's moderation and compromise are striking. As has been discussed earlier, in 62 B.C. Cato prevented the tribune Metellus Nepos from inviting Pompey to return to Rome. Metellus failed to frighten Cato even through violent measures, so he had to flee to join Pompey. Cato, however, prevented the senate from disgracing Metellus by deposing him from office. This action was thought by the Romans as an act of humanity and moderation, and Plutarch praises that it is "right and expedient" not to irritate Pompey.[2] But the problem is that Cato's moderation was temporary and played little role in changing the course of the events. Sooner later he harshly rejected Pompey's offer to form a marriage

1 Plut. Prae. ger. reip. 818e-819b. Cf. Plut. Phoc. 24.3-5. For Phocion's meeting with Alexander after Thebe's destruction, see Plut. Phoc. 17.6: καὶ πολλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου φύσιν καὶ βούλησιν εὐστόχως εἰπών οὕτω μετέβαλε καὶ κατεπράυνεν αὐτόν ὥστε εἰπεῖν ὅπως προσέξουσι τὸν νοῦν Ἀθηναῖοι τοῖς πράγμασιν.

2 Plut. Cat. Min. 29.4: οἵ τε γὰρ πολλοὶ φιλανθρωπίας ἐποιοῦντο καὶ μετριότητος τὸ μὴ ἐπεμβῆναι τῷ ἐχθρῷ μηδὲ ἐνυβρίσαι κατὰ κράτος περιγενόμενον, τοῖς τε φρονίμοις ὀρθῶς ἐφαίνετο καὶ συμφερόντως μὴ παροξῦναι Πομπήιον.

alliance with him. Later Cato compromised to take the oath for supporting Pompey's law offering distribution of land to the poor, then accepted the appointment of Pompey as sole consul, because he alone could not change the increasing lawlessness in Rome resulted from the growing power of Caesar. Unlike Pompey, Cato was fully aware of the danger of Caesar's ambition, and his change of mind should be seen as a matter of expediency.[1] But when Cato decided to stand for the consulship in order to deprive Caesar of his armed forces, he once again refused to compromise his dignity in the canvassing, which caused his failure of election. These affairs suggest that Cato did not regard compromise as a necessary method in politics, because his compromise never lasted long. Whenever there were opportunities for expressing opposition, he immediately showed himself in straightforwardness and rigidity.

Plutarch's criticism of Cato's excessive harshness and emotionalism can be seen as a criticism of extremism. Related to this is that Plutarch, on occasion elsewhere, attacks the Stoics for their extreme views. For example, in the treatise *Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus*, Plutarch reproaches the Stoic belief that all men except the perfectly virtuous are equally vicious. By contrast, the Platonic doctrine is sounder, because it admits the different degrees of evil and the possibility of change from bad to good. Similarly, in *De Stoicorum repugnantiis* he attacks Chrysippus' view that a man who is of bad become good should think that vice is still within him.[2] By denying the gradation in virtue, the Stoics actually deny the pedagogic function of morality, the very basis of Plutarch's own literary program. Such extremism would naturally be dangerous for Plutarch's heroes and should be regarded as a reason responsible for their failures. A striking example is the Spartan king Cleomenes III, a pupil of the Stoic Sphairos of Borysthenes. Plutarch explicitly comments that the Stoic doctrine had the effect of "kindling his love of honor", and it is "somewhat dangerous and risky for great and sharp natures".[3] The lesson of Cleomenes III significantly reveals another moral focus of Plutarch, namely his warning of great natures gone wrong. One shall recall that Cato's

1 Plut. Cat. Min. 32.8-11.

2 Plut. Quom. virt. 75f-76b; De Stoic. rep. 1042e-1043a.

3 Plut. Cleom. 2.3: ὁ δὲ Σφαῖρος ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐγεγόνει τῶν Ζήνωνος τοῦ Κιτιέως μαθητῶν, καὶ τοῦ Κλεομένους ἔοικε τῆς φύσεως τὸ ἀνδρῶδες ἀγαπῆσαί τε καὶ προσεκκαῦσαι τὴν φιλοτιμίαν.

nature was "unbending and steadfast in everything", so it is understandable that he, by nature liable to extreme positions, was dangerously driven in his extremism by the extreme Stoic doctrines.[1]

In his *De Stoicorum repugnantiis*, Plutarch states that the Stoicism is not an ideal philosophy to which the statesman should adhere himself. On one hand, many Stoic scholars did not engage themselves in politics, though they had written discourses concerning the way of government. On the other hand, some of the Stoics did intermeddle in state affairs, but they acted contradictorily to their own doctrines. In addition, Chrysippus himself even confessed that his speeches were impolitic, and his doctrines were "unsuitable for the uses and actions of human life".[2] However, to suggest that Plutarch was absolutely opposed to Stoic doctrine risks giving a false impression. In these moral writings Plutarch focus on the early representatives of the Stoa, Zeno and Chrysippus, while he never mentions more recent representatives such as Panaetius and Seneca the Younger. Moreover, some basic features of Plutarch's biography seem to be consistent with the practice of the Stoics. For example, the Stoics encourage the imitation of models by presenting exemplary figures from other philosophical schools and from the past, which resonates well with Plutarch's use of ancient heroes as personal examples of virtue and vice.[3] Panaetius' stress on individual particularity was inherited by Cicero, who claims that men vary from one another in family background and circumstances, and the same action can be judged differently due to different circumstances.[4] These differences in personal background and circumstances are also important for evaluation of Plutarch's subjects. For example, the same decision to obey Macedon was praiseworthy in the case of Phocion, but was dishonorable in the case of Aratus.[5]

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1 Cf. Duff 1999, 155f.

2 Plut. De Stoic. rep. 1034b: Χρύσιππος…ὁμολογεῖ τοὺς λόγους αὐτῶν ἀνεξόδους εἶναι καὶ ἀπολιτεύτους καὶ τὰ δόγματα ταῖς χρείαις ἀνάρμοστα καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν.

3 As has been noted earlier, Seneca repeatedly mentions Socrates and Cato as examples. See also Sen. Brev. vit. 14.5-15.2, 17.6.; Ep. 64.10; De tranq. 1.12.

4 Cic. De off. 1.107-118. For a discussion of Panaetius's discourse on individual particularity, see Niehoff 2012, 387. For the difference between the Stoic and Platonic theories on soul, see also Reydams-Schils 2005, 20-25; Sorabji 2006, 115-136.

5 Plut. Cleom. 16. After his defeat in war against the Spartan king Cleomenes, Aratus invited the Macedonian force into Greece, an action that Plutarch criticizes as "most shameful and unworthy of his

One can thus conclude that Cato, when compared with Phocion, was more passionate and behaved less moderately. One might be tempted then to read these obvious inferiorities of Cato as Plutarch's bias against his identity as a Roman, but it might be better to see here instead that Plutarch, when surveying Roman writings about Cato, disagreed with the simple and artificial comparison between Socrates and Cato. Even if the claim to be following in Socrates' footsteps at the end originated with Cato himself, Plutarch could hardly believe that in his last hours Cato suddenly changed his temper and died in Socratic serenity. Rather, a suicide with passions is consistent with the lack of moderation and compromise that Cato has sufficiently displayed in public life. Cato's end remains in Plutarch's telling a noble one, but not unconditionally a model for imitation. To strengthen this effect, Plutarch takes full advantage of the form of parallel biography: He uses a second, contrasting figure to cast light on the extremism in Cato's character and its negative effects in politics, for which Cato's Stoic background is also implicitly criticized. Of course, Phocion is not a perfect man, but at least in Plutarch's narrative he made fewer mistakes than Cato. But to be sure, I am not suggesting that Plutarch had wanted to make Cato into a simply negative paradigm. At any rate, he never denies that Cato was a man of great virtue, and was a patriot who devoted himself to the preservation of the Roman Republic.

From a historical perspective, Phocion's death resulted from the competition for power between Cassander and Polyperchon, in which Polyperchon took full advantages of the Athenians' desire for restoration of democracy in order to overthrow the oligarchs who were intimate to Antipater's family. But Plutarch naturally views these historical events through a moral lens, because he has to deal with the problem of why a virtuous man like Phocion ultimately failed. On one hand, Plutarch ascribes it to the divine will. On the other hand, Phocion was partly responsible for his own fate because his untimely

career as soldier and statesman"(αἴσχιστον δ᾽ ἐκείνῳ καὶ τῶν πεπραγμένων ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ πεπολιτευμένων ἀναξιώτατον). In Plutarch's view, Aratus sacrificed the freedom of Greece in order to escape the rule of Cleomenes, and in this way he would rather entrust the leadership to a notorious Macedonian Antigonus than to a Greek Cleomenes. But Plutarch also makes explicit that his does not want to denounce Aratus, but uses this affair to show that nobody is absolutely free from blame. In general, Plutarch's attitude to his subjects is one of judicious sympathy and generosity (Cf. Pelling 1997, 237-242).

rigidity in his trust in Nicanor. The negative effects of harshness and rigidity in politics are more clearly demonstrated by Phocion's Roman counterpart Cato the Younger. Plutarch's narrative, however, clearly suggests that he is more favorable to Phocion, not only because Phocion was a Greek, but more probably because he wishes to make a response to the crude comparison between Socrates and Cato which has been established in the Latin literature, and to present a less perfect portrait of Cato as a critique of the Stoics doctrines as a radical, unrealistic, even dangerous system for the politician.

Concluding remarks

The aim of this work has been to provide a systematic exploration of Plutarch's *Life of Phocion*. Scholarly neglect of Phocion has resulted in misinformation about him. His humble origin, impoverished life, immediate political ascendency after battle of Naxos, and outstanding position among the contemporary generals in pursuing both military and political activities should not be carelessly accepted without an inquiry into the historical sources. By contrast, his long tenure of generalship seems not to be exaggeration resulted from Plutarch's heroism, but is in accordance with the principle of collegiality in Athenian generalship. It is thought that Plutarch's stylistic aims sometimes lead to distortions of historical facts, but it is these problems that invite the reader to consider the truth.

My study begins with an investigation of the sources concerning Phocion that were available to Plutarch. After his death, Phocion did not soon become obscure. Rather, he appears to be a disputable figure in the works of some contemporary authors. In Chapter 1 I have showed that Idomeneus of Lampsacus scrutinized the actions of Socrates and his disciples in a work called *On the Socratics*, and Plutarch's remark that Phocion's father was a pestle-maker may derive from this book. There is no wonder that Idomeneus would refer to Phocion in a book aimed at ridiculing Socrates. As a younger contemporary of Phocion, Idomeneus must have been familiar with Phocion's career as well as his connection with Plato's Academy. Moreover, Plutarch mentions that Phocion's death soon reminded the Greeks of the fate of Socrates, and popular discussion of such kind may have encouraged Idomeneus to find similarities between both men. Idomeneus' attitude toward Socrates was unfavorable, and he likewise presented Phocion as a man with humble origin.

Plutarch tells us that Duris of Samos, another younger contemporary of Phocion, was his source for Phocion's austere appearance. It seems unlikely that Duris himself has

ever met Phocion, but he must have heard some stories of that general during his stay in Athens. One would expect Duris to be biased against Phocion, because he was in general hostile to Athens, and especially because Phocion was a political friend of Demetrius of Phalerum whom he criticized severely. But the fragment that Plutarch cites does not suggest any sense of hostility. I suppose that a favorable portrait of Phocion conforms to Duris' own fondness for moralism. The remaining fragments of Duris' work indicate that he was particularly critical of demoralizing practices of prominent men, regardless of their political stances. For example, his strong antipathy against Demetrius of Phalerum and other Macedonians did not prevent him from recording the scandalous doing of Demosthenes. In this sense, it is understandable that an austere and moderate Phocion would attract Duris' interest. Even if Duris may have found fault with Phocion's policies under the influence of Democharés, the nephew of Demosthenes and probably a critic of Phocion, his judgment on Phocion's moral virtues may be favorable.

Phocion is given a very positive treatment in Plutarch. Therefore, one would suspect that Plutarch had access to a source that was surely favorable to Phocion. In fact, there is a man who was not only acquainted with Phocion, but also contributed much to his literary embellishment. This is Demetrius of Phalerum, who, after Phocion's political downfall, ruled Athens for ten years from 317 to 307 B.C. In 307 B.C., the Athenians welcomed Demetrius Poliorcetes' declaration for liberating the city and expelling the Macedonian garrison which had been installed in Athens since 322 B.C., and Demetrius of Phalerum was immediately compelled to leave Athens. During his exile Demetrius of Phalerum devoted himself to writings, and a desire for self-justification is expected to figure in his works. The need of apology would surely require Demetrius of Phalerum to persuade his reader that Athens' collaboration with Macedon was necessary and advantageous. When he narrated the political events before his own period of rule, it is highly possible that he has dealt with Phocion's thoughts and deeds.

For Demetrius of Phalerum, Phocion was not only an important statesman who shared similar political views with him, but also was a victim of public violence. Like Demetrius of Phalerum himself, Phocion was done wrong by the Athenians. There is good reason to believe that the literary parallel between Socrates and Phocion originally

derived from the work of Demetrius of Phalerum, most likely his *Socrates*. Socrates is the most well-known example of how the Athenians treated the good man unjustly. By encouraging the reader to compare the similar deaths between Socrates and Phocion, Demetrius of Phalerum actually alluded to his own flight from Athens. In addition, the *Socrates* was probably a work responding to the problematic relationship between philosophers and the Athenians. Diogenes Laertius tells us that this book contained some examples of the prejudice and prosecution against philosophers in Athens, and one shall notice that shortly after Demetrius of Phalerum's exile the Athenians passed a law aimed at expelling philosophers out of the city. Although Phocion is usually thought to be an example of a politician treated unfairly, it shall be remembered that he attended Plato's Academy when he was young, from which an indirect link to Socrates can be made.

In Chapter 1 I have also attempted to show that a favorable image of Phocion was consistent with Demetrius of Phalerum's concern for moral regulation. His burial laws echoed Solon's restrictions on burial practices. The establishment of agents such as the Censors of Women (γυναικονόμοι) and the Guardians of the Law (νομοφύλακες) aimed at scrutinizing the daily behavior of citizens. Our sources attest that this rigid scrutiny aroused resentment among the Athenians, which implies that Demetrius of Phalerum attached importance to the effectiveness of his reform. Apart from these compulsory measures, he may have introduced other mild ones to calm the disgruntled Athenians. In this sense, it seems quite possible that he presented Phocion as a virtuous man and thus a model of imitation. Plutarch mentions that there was public recantation of Phocion when Demetrius of Phalerum ascended to power, which he would like to encourage during his ten-year reign.

I discussed Phocion's family background in Chapter 2. In the *Life of Phocion* Plutarch creates an impression that his hero, though lived in poverty, displayed it as a virtue. The stories that Phocion repeatedly refused to take money gifts from others indeed emphasize his indifference to wealth, but in my opinion, they could not be used as firm evidence for his family background. The refusal was Phocion's own choice. In other words, he simply gave up the chance of enriching himself. Closer scrutiny of the

sources gives support for the wealth of Phocion's family. For example, he once served as a trierarch with his own trireme, and the Athenians were said to bestow him the epithet "the good" (χρήστος) due to his generosity and benefaction to his fellow citizen. In particular, his son Phocus once won a competition of equestrian vaulting, and that young man was later notorious for his dissolute life. Both affairs sufficiently attest that Phocus came from a rich family.

The remainder of Chapter 2 is concerned with Phocion's social activities. During his study in Plato's Academy Phocion associated with some prominent figures. A good example is Leon of Byzantium, who later assisted him to form an alliance between Athens and Byzantium against the invasion of Philip of Macedon. The fact that Phocion was condemned to death with some friends suggests that there might be a group of men who supported him politically and socialized with him privately. For Phocion, Chabrias was no doubt a man of significance in his social circle. Their good relationship is further attested in Phocion's care for Chabrias' orphan son Ctesippus. But it is noteworthy that Phocion's military and political apprenticeship to Chabrias, as Plutarch in this *Life* describes, is rarely heard in contemporary Athens. The story is moral rather than historical, but it has special value in exploring Plutarch's notion of moral education. In the *Moralia* Plutarch emphasizes the role of old man in politics, advising the young politician to gain experience and receive moral guidance by adhering to old statesman. For this kind of political apprenticeship he mentions some historical examples, including Chabrias and Phocion. But in the *Life of Phocion*, this "teacher-pupil" relationship is reversed. The young Phocion is praised for his moderation, while the old Chabrias, the one who should have assumed the task of moral rectification, was susceptible to passions like young man. In the *Moralia* Plutarch's praise of the value of the elder statesman presupposes that good qualities come with experience. The case of Chabrias, however, warns the reader that old age does not always guarantee appreciation and imitation in the reality of public life. Chabrias paid heavy price for his moral deficiencies, for his recklessness led to his death in Chios. With regard to the lesson of Chabrias, I have ended this chapter by discussing Plutarch's criticism of unlimited spiritedness in the *Lives* of well-known military men, especially in the pair *Pelopidas-Marcellus*. Plutarch points

out that both Pelopidas and Marcellus failed to control their passions due to their lacking of proper philosophical education. But one shall not conclude that Plutarch is always critical of bold actions on the battlefield. No reader would fail to observe that Plutarch's Alexander was marked with ambition and spiritedness in his military career, but my reading of the *Life of Alexander* has shown that Plutarch believes Alexander's impetuous character was always beneficial for achieving military victories. In the case of Alexander, his judgment on spiritedness is significantly influenced by its outcome.

In chapter 3, I examined in some detail Phocion's competence as a military leader. Our evidence attests that Phocion was a good commander who achieved victories in several campaigns. In his account of the battle of Tamynae in Euboia, Plutarch provides us with the most detailed description of Phocion's commandership. In this battle Phocion showed himself as a composed and experienced commander. Neither the hostility of local habitants nor the aggression of enemies troubled him, and the importance of such composure is highlighted by the military failure that fell upon his impatient and reckless ally. I have also shown that Phocion's delay is not merely a matter of tactics, but also reflects the Greek custom of pre-battle sacrifices. In this sense, Phocion's victory could be well understood as reward for his piety and observance of the divine will. Another aspect that shows Phocion's experience as a general is his tolerance of the deserters. On one hand, he feared that harsh punishments on the deserters would cause disunity of his army, which was particularly dangerous in a foreign and hostile land. On the other hand, he must have been aware that the profession of general was a hazardous form of employment in Athens. The soldiers and subordinated officials were politically equal to the general. Upon their return to Athens, they naturally had the right to accuse the general of unduly strictness or improper behaviors. Fearing the threat of potential prosecutors, the Athenian generals were likely to exercise their disciplinary authority with moderation.

The second part of chapter 3 focused on the question why there was few record of Phocion's military activities after 340 B.C. Plutarch indirectly answers this question by arguing that Phocion devoted himself to both military and political affairs, and by doing so he was outstanding among his contemporaries. I first cited some examples to show

that there were other fourth-century Athenian generals who engaged themselves in political and diplomatic affairs. A good example is Leosthenes, who played a vital role in the formulation and implementation of Athenian foreign policy before the Lamian War. When referring to these generals, I did not deny the fact that fewer generals in the fourth century engaged themselves in political affairs as their fifth-century predecessors, but argued that the tendency of role differentiation between orator and general in fourth-century Athens should not be overestimated. As for this division, what is also of great interest is a passage in Nepos, where he names some prominent generals who were forced to leave Athens due to the jealousy of the Athenian people. Jealousy, of course, could have influenced the mood of the jurors, but in the cases of these generals, the envy of multitude is unattested in our sources. Rather, it seems safe to infer that their exile was connected with military failure, of which the Athenian people were known to be intolerant. In this respect, it is understandable that the Athenians were indignant at Phocion's failure to prevent Nicanor's seize of Piraeus.

I argued that there are two possible reasons explaining why Phocion later seldom appeared on the battlefield. The first one is the labor division between the ten Athenian generals. We only know that Phocion was elected for general for forty-five times, but there is no explicit record of what kind of generals he was. The *Athenaion Politeia* tells us that among the ten generals one was primarily responsible for commanding heavy infantry, while another one was entrusted with the task of home defense. I noticed that some pieces of evidence do imply that Phocion was appointed to the defense of city, so his obscurity can be explained as the result of collegiality, which limited each individual general's authority to a special range. The second reason is that there was a short period of peace between 338 and 322 B.C. During this time the land of Attica did not suffer warfare even serious enemy incursion. It thus seems possible that Phocion rarely participated in campaigns abroad, but chiefly engaged himself in domestic defense.

Chapter 4 dealt with Phocion's political activities. After Athens' defeat at Chaironeia, he appeared frequently in the assembly and spoke before the people. While noticing Phocion's active political participation under democracy, I stressed the limited influence of his policies. In most cases, his suggestions were not accepted by the Athenians, even if

the events such as the defeat at Chaironeia and the destruction of Thebes justified his judgment. It seemed unlikely that Phocion was unpopular, for the Athenians continued to choose him as general. The Athenian people, I suggest, simply thought his suggestions less preferable. Examining the political status of his opponents shed light on this question. Athens' defeat at Chaironeia did not immediately bring political disgrace to those who advised for war. Rather, Demosthenes was entrusted with significant tasks such as addressing a funeral speech at the public burial and assuming several offices. The execution of Lysicles further attests that the Athenians ascribed their military failure to the incompetence of generals rather than their decision for war. Alexander's ambition and power must have exerted great influence on domestic politics of Athens, since most opponents of Macedon were silent during his rule. But when Alexander later announced a decree ordering the restoration of Greek exiles to their homes and requested the Greek cities to deify him, there was surely voice of opposition in Athens. At this time, the sudden death of Alexander removed the last obstacle for war. In general, during the period between 338 and 322 B.C. the Athenians did not regard a policy of conciliation as their only choice, and their obedience were chiefly based on the fear of Alexander. Thus it is unsurprising that they would not favor Phocion's policy. In spite of Plutarch's eulogizing language for Phocion's political "foresight", one could easily observe that Phocion was not an influential politician in Athens until he became a leader of the oligarchic regime imposed by Antipater.

Chapter 4 also bore witness to the oligarchic character of the regime imposed by Antipater in 322 B.C. A careful reading of sources gives support for great alterations to the institutions of government. For example, the full citizenship was restricted to those possessing property worth two thousand drachmas, and only nine thousand men met this requirement. The limited number of citizens necessarily curbed the power of the assembly and courts. As for any personal control of state affairs, Plutarch's account tells us that Phocion played a significant role in selecting magistrates. It seems unlikely that Phocion had so much power that he could appoint officials as he wished, but his personal relationship with individual candidates may have partly influenced the outcome. Under this circumstance, sortition might be replaced by election for selecting magistrates.

Finally, the establishment of new regime was accompanied by the prosecution of opponents. Demosthenes, Hypereides and other prominent politicians who had been hostile to Macedon were prosecuted. All these constitutional changes recall the oligarchic regime of the Thirty in 404 B.C., and in both cases the oligarchic regime did not last long due to the level of hostility they generated among the Athenians. On the conventional interpretation of the outrage that the Athenians demonstrated at Phocion's trial, it violated the principle of justice that the democratic judicial practices labeled. But for those who had lost their citizenships under Antipater's regime and had to leave their homeland under compulsion, there was no sense of injustice when condemning an old stubborn oligarch to death, who, in their eyes, betrayed the interests of Athens by collaborating with Macedon and was responsible for all the suffering that had then ensued.

It is also noted that the ten-year rule of Demetrius of Phalerum had much in common with the regime of Antipater. The limited citizenship, the abolishment of sortition and prosecution of democratic leaders convince us that Demetrius' regime bear the hallmarks of oligarchy. But compared with the former oligarchy imposed by Antipater, Demetrius' measures seemed to be more lenient. He lowered the limit of the property census, and did not enforce the disfranchised to leave Athens. These changes indicate that Demetrius, who witnessed the political downfall of Phocion, must have been anxious to avoid an overly restrictive oligarchy. Based on these observations, I rejected the recent views that have considered the regimes under Phocion and Demetrius as essentially democratic, but I also claimed that we should not mistakenly regard Phocion as a hater of democracy. Under democracy he actively assumed the role of orator as others did.

Chapter 5 finally concentrated on the death of Phocion. The direct reason for Phocion's trial and execution was the power struggle between Cassander and Polyperchon after Antipater's death. Like Alexander, Antipater was a figure who was able to keep the Athenians under control when he was living, and his death once again gave the Athenians new hope of freedom and independence. This mood was further instigated by Polyperchon, the succeeding regent whom Antipater himself chose, because

the new regent soon found himself threated by an alliance between Cassander, Antigonus and Ptolemy. In order to prevent Cassander from winning support from the oligarchs of some Greek cities, Polyperchon sought for the assistance of democrats by proclaiming a decree that promised to re-establish democratic governments throughout Greece. Athens, of course, was a city whose support Polyperchon made special efforts to win. Unsurprisingly, the Athenians quickly became hostile to Cassander's partisan Nicanor, and Phocion's refusal to arrest Nicanor, in particular the lost of Piraeus, finally aroused the Athenians' suspicion of his treachery. Polyperchon rejected to hear Phocion's defense, but handed the judgment over to the Athenians. Since Polyperchon must maintain his image as defender of the freedom of Greece, the sacrifice of Phocion was necessary, even if this old man's past services to Macedon were perceived by all.

After exploring the historical background, I turned to Plutarch's interpretation of Phocion's death. At the very beginning of the *Phocion* Plutarch warns the reader that a too harsh way of governance would irritate the people and ultimately ruin the politician himself. The implication of this warning is that a politician should get to know the character of the people he is leading, and in some cases roundabout methods are necessary. Plutarch tells us that Phocion was stern und unflattering when dealing with the Athenians, especially he was stubborn when rejecting to arrest Nicanor, the commander of Macedonian garrison, because he would rather suffer wrong than doing wrong. Though Plutarch claims that Phocion's trust in Nicanor was driven by his belief in good faith and justice, he has to admit that such a moral excuse was unfitting for contemporary political situation. Subsequent events proved that Phocion's stubborn attitude not only caused the loss of Piraeus, but also resulted to his own trial and execution. However, I did not mean that Plutarch made Phocion into a negative paradigm. By contrast, his attitude toward Cato the Younger, the Roman counterpart of Phocion, is clearly more unfavorable. Like Phocion, Cato had no intention to win popularity through flattering the people or unconditionally obeying their will. But in Plutarch's opinion, it was his excessive sternness that led to the demise of the Roman Republic. For example, his refusal to connect with Pompey allowed the latter's alliance with Caesar, an action that finally caused the outbreak of civil war. Later Cato was

indignant at the corruption of the Roman people and gave up the efforts to obtain the consulship, and his disappointment toward political failure could help nothing but increasing Caesar's ambition. For the negative effects of excessive harshness and sternness in politics we could add *Life of Coriolanus* to this group, but Plutarch makes it clear that the tragedy of Coriolanus was ultimately due to his lack of philosophical training. Apart from these examples, Plutarch provides several suggestions in his moral treatise *praecepta gerendae reipublicae* in order to teach the reader how to properly deal with the opposition even failures in political life. The *Parallal Lives* and *Moralia* function in complementary ways in their presentation of moral instructions, thus illuminating how important it is for Plutarch to provide the reader with practical advice, not so much on how to govern as on how to behave as an effective political leader.

In the same chapter, I have claimed that the death scenes of Phocion and Cato recall that of Socrates, but it is the difference rather than similarity that is worthy of special consideration. By drinking hemlock, Phocion died in the same way as Socrates did. And like Socrates, he ended his life in dignity and tranquility, without fear of death nor grudge against the Athenians. By contrast, Cato hardly resembled Socrates as he deceived his son and friends, loudly chided them and especially punched a slave. Such strong emotionalism is not only incompatible with the Platonic ideal, but also contradicts with the Stoic doctrine, to which Cato notably adhered himself. In this study I have tried to explain Cato's inferior image in contrast to Socrates and Phocion as Plutarch's response to the crude comparison between Socrates and Cato in early and contemporary Roman writers. For these Roman writers, the deaths of Socrates and Cato represented a form of political opposition, which stressed the spirit of martyr in defense of freedom and then became a weapon of propaganda. But for Plutarch, Cato's passionate manner of dying was consistent with his less moderate behaviors in the political life, both of which exactly reflected his inflexible and imperturbable nature. Cato's inferiority to Phocion does not necessarily mean that Plutarch has a prejudice against the Roman figures, but may imply his disagreement with contemporary artificial Socrates/Cato comparison and his skeptical attitude toward the practical value of the Stoicism. The mirage of Cato that had been established in Latin literary-moral reflection prompted him

to compose a new account of Cato, then for the purpose of emphasizing Cato's character deficiencies, he chose a Greek Phocion to match, who was not perfect but evidently made fewer mistakes than Cato.

Although, in Plutarch's representation, Phocion repeatedly failed to persuade the Athenians to favor a policy of peace and conciliation with Macedon and was ultimately executed, he was by no means a complete failure. In fact, we find in the *Phocion* a portrait of a statesman who distinguished himself in moral virtues such as austerity, incorruptibility and uprightness. This focus is consistent with Plutarch's promise to reveal a man's character rather than narrating his deeds. The *Phocion* is particularly valuable for Plutarch's readers who seek practical advice on political leadership, in which the proper method of persuasion is emphasized. The *Phocion* is marked with anecdotes, but it is unfair to call Plutarch a mere compiler of contemporary accounts and later biographical treatments. Beyond his purpose of moral education, there are also passages in which he shows himself to be aware of the problems contradicting historical truth. In conclusion, Plutarch's *Life of Phocion* is a most detailed and most influential source dealing with this obscure Athenian statesman, which shall be carefully analyzed in order to foster a better understanding of Phocion's career, the political history of Athens in the shadow of Macedon, and the reception of Socratic paradigm in Plutarch's own times.

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