

# **Under the Shadow of Army Domination: Defense Transformation in Indonesia**

Dissertation

zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades Dr. rer. pol.  
an der Fakultät für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften  
der Ruprecht-Karls Universität Heidelberg



vorgelegt von

Aditya Batara Gunawan

im Oktober 2021

Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Aurel Croissant

Zweitgutachter: Prof. Dr. Marco Bünte



## **Abstract**

This dissertation analyzes the effect of civilian control over the military amid the defense transformation agenda in Indonesia's nascent democracy. Studies on civil-military relations and democratization has reached a consensus that civilian control of the military positively influences the democratic consolidation process. Well-institutionalized civilian control contributes to the entrenchment of democratically-elected civilians as the ultimate decision-makers in democratic regime. Nevertheless, systematic analysis on the relationship between the degree of civilian control of the military and policy change in the defense sector remains an understudied topic. In order to fill this lacuna, the author offers an integrative framework that is primarily derived from the institutional change theory approach. Accordingly, the scope of policy change in the defense sector is perceived as a function of two factors: the veto player configuration in the political decision-making arena; and the level of policy discretion in the national defense institution. This dissertation finds that the civilian government in post-Reformasi Indonesia was able to initiate limited change on promoting military jointness within the future orientation of national defense. Under the condition of multiple veto players and military domination in the defense institution, civilian government established new foundations of military warfighting integration. However, the civilian government was unable to replace the status quo of the total people defense doctrine that is heavily influenced by the army-strategic way of thinking. Ultimately, the Army domination in the defense institution influences the scope of policy change that could be afforded by the civilians.

**Keywords:** Indonesia; civil-military relations; TNI; defense transformation; military jointness; army domination.



## Glossary

ABRI	Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Indonesian Armed Forces)
ALKI	Alur Laut Kepulauan Indonesia (Indonesia Archipelagic Sea Lanes)
Babinsa	Bintara Pembina Desa (Village level junior/non-commissioned officer)
Baleg	Badan Legislasi (legislation committee)
Bamus	Badan Musyawarah (deliberation council)
Banggar	Badan Anggaran (budget committee)
Bappenas	Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (National Development Planning Agency)
Cadek	Catur Dharma Eka Karya (ABRI's Doctrine)
DIM	Daftar Inventarisasi Masalah (inventory list of issues)
DIPA	Daftar Isian Pelaksanaan Anggaran (List of Budget Implementation)
DPD	Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (Regional Representatives Council)
DPN	Dewan Pertahanan Negara (State Defense Council)
DPR	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representatives)
Golkar	Golongan Karya (Functional Group)
Hanura	Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (The People's Heart party)
ICMI	Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals)
Kasad	Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat (Army Chief of Staff)
Kasal	Kepala Staf Angkatan Laut (Navy Chief of Staff)
Kasau	Kepala Staf Angkatan Udara (Air Force Chief of Staff)
Kasopol	Kepala Staf Sosial Politik (Chief of Staff for Social and Political Affairs)
Kastaf	Kepala Staf (Chief of Staff)
Koarmabar	Komando Armada Barat (Western Fleet Command)

Koarmatim	Komando Armada Timur (Eastern Fleet command)
Kogabwilhan	Komando gabungan wilayah pertahanan (Joint Regional Command)
Koopsau	Komando Operasi Angkatan Udara (Air Force Operation Command)
Kopassus	Komando Pasukan Khusus (Army Special Forces)
Kopkamtib	Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order)
Kostrad	Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat (Army Strategic Reserves Command)
Koter	Komando Teritorial (Army Territorial Command)
Kodam	Komando Daerah Militer (Regional Military Command)
Kodim	Komando Distrik Militer (District level Army Command)
Koramil	Komando Rayon Militer (Sub-district Army Command)
Korem	Komando Resor Militer (Sub-regional/city-level Army Command)
MPR	Majelis Pemusyawaratan Rakyat (People's Consultative Assembly)
Muspida	Musyawaharah Pimpinan Daerah (Regional Leadership Forum)
Panja	Panitia Kerja (Working Committee)
Pansus	Panitia Khusus (Special Committee)
Perpres	Peraturan Presiden (Presidential Regulation)
Polri	Kepolisian Republik Indonesia (Indonesian National Police)
Prolegnas	Program Legislasi Nasional (National Legislation Program)
PAN	Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party)
PBB	Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Star Party)
PD	Partai Demokrat (Democrat Party)
PDIP	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party Struggle)
PKI	Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)
PKB	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party)

PPP	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party)
PK	Partai Keadilan (Justice Party),
PKS	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party)
PKPI	Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia (Indonesian Justice and Unity Party)
Raker	Rapat Kerja (Working Meeting)
Rapim	Rapat Pimpinan (Leaders Meeting)
RDPU	Rapat Dengar Pendapat Umum (Public Hearing)
RPJMN	Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional (National Middle-term Development Plan)
Seskoad	Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat (Army School of Staff and Command)
Sishankamrata	Sistem Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta (Total People Defense and Security System)
Sishanta	Sistem Pertahanan Semesta (Total Defense System)
Supersemar	Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret (Instruction Letter of March 11, 1966)
Timcil	Tim Kecil (Small Team)
Timmus	Tim Perumus (Formulation Team)
Timsin	Tim Sinkronisasi (Synchronization Team)
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Military)
TNI AD	Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat (Indonesian Army)
TNI AL	Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Laut (Indonesian Navy)
TNI AU	Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Udara (Indonesian Air Force)





## Acknowledgement

Writing a dissertation is a long and challenging journey that takes patience and determination – including the contributions of many parties to its completion.

First, and foremost, I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Aurel Croissant, who consistently supported me from the outset, guiding me into the scientific adventure, exploring my research interest and challenging my intellectual capacity. My co-supervisor, Professor Marco Bünthe, provided invaluable comments, input and support. My dissertation project would not have been possible without the DAAD scholarship and Universitas Bakrie that allowed me to study in the wonderful city of Heidelberg. I am thankful for their trust in me.

My friends and colleagues were on hand during my dissertation journey. In particular, Rodon Pedrason and Faishal Aminuddin stepped up to give helpful advice and encouragement. Additionally, my colleagues at the Defense Committee of the Indonesian Parliament, the Ministry of Defense and Indonesia's SSR epistemic community selflessly helped me to connect with key figures in Indonesia's defense policy-making sphere for my research.

To all of the interviewees, my highest gratitude for sharing your priceless insight. To my research assistants, I appreciate your diligent assistance in verifying the collected data. I also thank Bruce Emond for proofreading services. Warm thanks are also due to Diah Yulianti, Marc Dubslaff, Arin, Ibi, Irma and other Indo-HD family members for contributing to the memorable experience of living in Heidelberg.

Finally, none of this could have been possible without my family. I extend my deepest gratitude to them for everything they have done for me. My parents, who have always believed in me. To my wife, Savitri Putri Natasukma, for her profound belief in me throughout my years of study and the prolonged process of researching and writing. Without your untiring support, this dissertation would have never been completed. Finally, to my children, Agrasatria and Kalandra, who were my inspiration to embark on this long journey; this dissertation is lovingly dedicated to you both.

Aditya Batara Gunawan.

# Contents

Abstract.....	i
Glossary .....	iii
Acknowledgement .....	vii
Contents.....	viii
List of tables and figures .....	xi
1. Introduction.....	1
1.1. Civilian control of the military in emerging democracies .....	7
1.2. Defense transformation.....	11
1.3. Outline of the study .....	14
2. Institutional change and defense transformation .....	19
2.1. The outcome of change: defense transformation and military jointness	23
2.1.1. What is defense transformation? .....	24
2.1.2. The importance of military jointness in defense transformation ..	27
2.2. The change strategy of defense transformation .....	37
2.3. Institutional determinants of change in defense transformation .....	42
2.3.1. Veto player configuration .....	46
2.3.2. Level of discretion in defense institution .....	56
2.4. Summary of argument and hypotheses.....	61
3. Research Design.....	65
3.1. The selection of process-tracing method.....	66
3.2. Methodological limitations.....	68
3.3. Selecting the case .....	69
3.4. Data collection and analysis.....	72
4. Army domination and the status quo in national defense.....	77
4.1. The rise of Army domination over socio-political and defense establishments.....	77
4.2. Military reform during the <i>Reformasi</i> period.....	92
4.3. Retaining the Army-centric total people's defense doctrine during <i>Reformasi</i> .....	96
4.3.1 Historical development of total people's defense doctrine .....	97
4.3.2. The survival of the total people's defense doctrine .....	102
4.4. Summary.....	107

5.	Reshaping the orientation of national defense policy .....	109
5.1.	President Yudhoyono and the idea of military professionalism .....	109
5.2.	Transition from military reform to defense transformation agenda.....	112
5.2.1.	Preserving the status quo of total people's defense doctrine.....	113
5.2.2.	Introducing the Integrated Tri-Service and the MEF.....	115
5.3.	Summary .....	124
6.	Implementing policy change in national defense .....	125
6.1.	Preparing the implementation of MEF and Integrated Tri-Service Concepts.....	126
6.2.	Implementing policy change under the shadow of Army dominance... 130	
6.2.1.	The controversial case of MBT Leopard procurement.....	134
6.2.2.	The derailing of joint regional command establishment.....	139
6.3.	Summary .....	149
7.	Veto player configuration and policy change in the legislative arena .....	153
7.1.	Veto player configuration in post- <i>Reformasi</i> Indonesia .....	153
7.1.1.	What is the number of veto players?.....	153
7.1.2.	Policy distance .....	165
7.1.3.	Internal cohesion .....	176
7.2.	The legislative process.....	181
7.3.	Veto player configuration and the lack of defense reform policies.....	190
7.4.	Summary .....	197
8.	The level of discretion in the defense institution after <i>Reformasi</i> .....	199
8.1.	The mode of relationship between the MoD and the TNI leaders. ....	199
8.1.1.	Coordination rather than subordination.....	199
8.1.2.	Dualism of leadership and status-quo preference in the defense sector .....	202
8.2.	Civilian presence within the defense bureaucracy.....	205
8.2.1.	Domination of military officers in MoD.....	205
8.2.2.	The Army influence within the MoD .....	212
8.3.	Summary .....	214
9.	Conclusion.....	215
9.1.	Multiple veto players and lack of discretion in national defense.....	216
9.2.	Towards a coordinated model of military jointness .....	220
9.3.	Post-2014 developments .....	227

9.4. Study limitations and avenue for future research.....	229
References .....	232
Appendix 1. List of interviewees.....	276
Appendix 2. Interview guideline.....	278

## List of tables and figures

Table 2.1. Indicators of military jointness model .....	31
Table 2.2. Strategy of institutional change .....	38
Table 2.3. Veto player configuration and policy stability.....	55
Table 2.4. Level of discretion in defense institution.....	60
Table 4.1. Army officers serving as Minister of Interior 1966-1999 .....	83
Table 4.2. Army officers in top-level defense-related positions 1966-1999 .....	88
Table 4.3. Evolution of Indonesia's defense doctrine .....	106
Table 6.1. Outcome of military jointness in Yudhoyono Administration .....	150
Table 7.1. Veto player configuration of Indonesia's Presidential System (1999-2014) ..	155
Table 7.2. Election results and legislative seat distribution (1999-2009) .....	160
Table 7.3. Expected number of veto players in post-Suharto Indonesia (1999-2014) ..	164
Table 7.4. Proportion of votes between secular parties and Islamic parties .....	168
Table 7.5. Expected policy distance in national defense .....	175
Table 7.6. Incentive for personal vote in the legislative elections .....	179
Table 7.7. Policy stability levels from 2004 to 2019 .....	190
Table 8.1. The core responsibilities of Minister of Defense and TNI Commander.....	200
Table 8.2. Civilians and military in key positions of Indonesia's MoD (1999-2019) .....	209
Table 8.3. The level of discretion in the defense institution after Reformasi.....	214
Figure 2.1. Defense transformation, military effectiveness and military jointness .....	30
Figure 2.2. Framework for explaining institutional change in national defense .....	62
Figure 4.1. Trends in Indonesia's Defense Budget 1968-1998 (Billion IDR) .....	86
Figure 4.2. Composition of TNI personnel from 1966 to 1998.....	99
Figure 6.1. Composition of TNI Personnel from 1999 to 2019.....	133
Figure 6.2 Trend of middle-ranking officer surplus within the Army (2010-2014) .....	147
Figure 6.3 Trend of upper-ranking officer surplus within the Army (2010 -2014). .....	147
Figure 7.1. Evaluation of ideological position of post-Suharto parties 1999-2014 .....	171
Figure 7.2. Legislative process in post-Suharto Indonesia .....	184
Figure 8.1. The president, the minister of defense and the TNI commander .....	201
Figure 8.2. The organizational structure of MoD 2004-2014 .....	206



# 1. Introduction

After the fall of Suharto's autocratic regime in 1998, Indonesia embarked on the path of democratization, a process widely known as the *Reformasi* period (often translated as "Reformation" in English).<sup>1</sup> With the advent of *Reformasi*, the new guard of democratically elected civilians in post-authoritarian Indonesia were successful in dismantling the military's pervasive role in the political arena (Crouch 2010; Mietzner 2013b; Croissant et al. 2013). Mainly driven by political powers in the parliament and relentless civil society support, civilian decision-makers successfully passed two laws that worked towards removing the extensive military prerogatives in the political arena: State Defense Law No. 3/2002 and the Indonesian Military Law No. 34/2004 (known as TNI, for *Tentara Nasional Indonesia*, Indonesian Military) (Mietzner 2009; Rüländ and Manea 2013).

Following enactment of both laws, the TNI's reserved representation in the national and sub-national parliaments was abolished. The military law prohibits active officers from participating in politics or business activities, often a source of criticism of the institution in the past. Military officers were required to retire from active service in order to join a political party or run for election. In regard to domestic security, the State Defense Law mandates the TNI to function as the state defense apparatus, curbing its previous role in maintaining civic order.<sup>2</sup> These impressive successes of civilian control institutionalization in the political arena are in contrast to limited success achieved in the sphere of defense affairs (Haseman 2006; Mietzner 2009; Aspinall 2010; Rüländ and Manea 2013; Croissant et al. 2013). Specifically, civilian decision-makers have failed to establish stronger civilian authority in defense policy-making and policy implementation through the State Defense Law and the TNI law (Gunawan 2017; 2019). Rather than putting the military directly under the command of the Ministry of Defense

---

<sup>1</sup> *Reformasi* was a popular term coined by political activists and the student movement during the people's power protests against Suharto's 32-year authoritarian regime in 1998. Later, the term was widely used to identify the period of major political reform in post-Suharto Indonesia from 1999 to 2004.

<sup>2</sup> Previously, Article 26 of the State Defense Law No. 20/1982 mandated the military with two-intertwined roles: serving as both the defense apparatus and internal security apparatus.

(MoD), the law stipulates the military commander holds an equal position with the defense minister, wherein both are responsible directly to the president in regards to defense policy. In other words, the TNI commander position is similar to a cabinet post with the scope of relations between the TNI Headquarter and the Ministry of Defense limited to coordination. The TNI law also permits active officers to fill civilian posts in particular government agencies if required by the respective agencies.

This regulation consequently hinders the effort to civilianize the defense bureaucracy and improve civilian influence in the defense policy. Virtually all the top-to middle-level bureaucratic positions in the Ministry of Defense have been occupied by active officers since 1999 (Gunawan 2017, 137–38). Overall, civilian authority in the decision-making process and implementation of defense policy in post-*Reformasi* Indonesia remains limited. In contrast, the TNI is able to steer the defense policy in Indonesia through the strategic position of its commander in the cabinet and predominance of its members in the defense bureaucracy.

An often-overlooked issue is the fact that the defense policy in post-*Reformasi* Indonesia continues to be dominated by the Army-centric approach (Gindarsah 2016; Raymond 2017; Arief and Kurniawan 2018). Historically, the dominance of the Indonesian Army (known as TNI AD for *Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Angkatan Darat*) in politics, defense affairs and over the other two branches of the Armed Forces – the Indonesian Navy (TNI AL, *Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Angkatan Laut*) and the Indonesian Air Force (TNI AU, *Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Angkatan Udara*) – can be traced back to the Army's leading role during the Independence War. The Army originated as a guerilla force formed to resist the return of Dutch colonial forces from 1945, when the Republic of Indonesia was proclaimed, to 1949 when The Hague finally recognized its independence (Crouch 2007). After independence in 1949 and under the leadership of (civilian) President Sukarno, the army successfully consolidated into a political force. Sukarno allowed the army leadership to fill civilian posts after the imposition of martial law in 1957. General Abdul Haris Nasution, the charismatic Army leader, introduced the so-called



*konsep jalan tengah* (middle-way doctrine) that advocated the active role of Army officers in government without them becoming dominant (Rinakit 2005).

The 1965 uprising blamed on the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) opened up the opportunity for the Army's assumption of a central position in state power. The PKI was considered responsible for the kidnapping and murder of several top Army generals, including Army Commander General Ahmad Yani. The killings sparked widespread protests against founding president Sukarno, who had become increasingly aligned with the PKI. Army Lieutenant General Suharto led a successful anti-communist campaign nationwide that played out into his takeover of the national leadership from Sukarno. Other services in the Armed Forces took little role in quelling the unrest; in fact, the Air Force and Navy were considered Sukarno loyalists (Ricklefs 2008). The Air Force, in particular, was said to have several pro-communist battalions and Air Marshall Omar Dani was sentenced to death for supporting the PKI abortive coup.

With the Army's Suharto ensconced as president, Army officers became even more influential in Indonesian politics. The *dwi fungsi* (dual function) doctrine was introduced during the Army seminar in August 1966 (Jenkins 1983). The doctrine stipulated that the military play a role as both a military and socio-political force, giving it free rein to actively participate in non-defense affairs such as on ideology, politics, social, economic, cultural and religious aspects. For more than three decades, Suharto's autocratic regime remained in power thanks to the *dwi fungsi* doctrine and Army loyalty that persisted even after he resigned.

Army domination also permeated national defense matters. From 1968 to 1999, the minister of defense position was also the *ex-officio* armed forces commander, all of whom Suharto appointed from Army. In 1966, the Army also developed *sishankamrata* (*Sistem Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta*, Total People's Defense), a land-centric defense strategy as part of the *dwifungsi* doctrine. Later, the *sishankamrata* was officially adopted as the Armed Forces doctrine in 1988 (Widjajanto 2010). At the operational level, the territorial warfare doctrine allows the Army to maintain nationwide structures of Komando Teritorial (Koter, Army

Territorial Command) which involving up to 150,000 personnel in 1995, making it the largest service in the Indonesian Armed Forces (Raymond 2017).

The *Reformasi* movement halted Suharto's autocratic regime in 1998, but Army dominance in national defense continued under his successor and former vice president BJ Habibie. President Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001) was the first civilian president who attempted to ease Army omnipotence (Mietzner 2006). In his first year in office, President Wahid made the historic decision to appoint Admiral Adi Sutjipto Widodo from the Navy as the TNI commander, replacing Army General Wiranto.<sup>3</sup> President Wahid also broke with tradition by naming Juwono Sudarsono, an academic and diplomat with no military background, as defense minister.

Unfortunately, Wahid's initiatives to lessen the Army's dominance was met with resistance from within its ranks that "*orang sipil*" (civilians) could never comprehend pressing defense matters. Wahid's decisions therefore were not institutionalized and existed as one-offs. After the Wahid presidency, the Army regained its prominent position by contributing four of its top brass as the TNI commander while it has been held only twice by Navy and Air Force members. Moreover, the Law No. 3/2002 on State Defense did not stipulate that the position of minister of defense must be filled by civilians (Gunawan 2017). Three retired army generals had occupied the defense minister position since 2002 and an active army general was appointed as the deputy minister for the Ministry of Defense in 2010.

More importantly, the current defense doctrine of *Sishanta* (the acronym for *Sistem Pertahanan Semesta*, Total Defense) is no more than a cosmetic change to the Army-centric *Sishankamrata* doctrine that simply removes the words "security" and "people" to signal military intention in moving away from the dual-function role. The core element of *Sishanta* remains the same: Indonesia will keep its territorial warfare strategy with mobilization of people to fight any threats.

---

<sup>3</sup> There was no regulation requiring the president to rotate the commander position among the three services.

Consequently, the Army territorial command remains intact albeit without a socio-political role or intelligence function.

Of course, civilians may attempt to challenge the Army domination in defense institutions by pursuing defense transformation. However, institutionalizing civilian control over the military in an emerging democracy is challenging, if not frustrating. Not only do new civilian regimes have to consider the possibility of a military backlash when pursuing control of a military interest, but the changing structural context from an authoritarian type into a democratic one is highly decisive for the overall process (Pion-Berlin 1997). A common feature of the democratic system is the separation of powers among political institution to avoid monopolies by a single political institution in terms of the policy-making process (Cox and McCubbins 2001). For new democracies, separation of powers is irrefutable since the preceding authoritarian regime usually concentrated decision-making power in the hands of the executive, and democratization opens up the opportunity to remove this disparity. The transition to democracy usually leads to the establishment of a new institution, or the enforcement of institutions that were formerly sidelined by the authoritarian regime. As a consequence, the concept of “civilian” control in a democratic system is not attributed to the civilian executive alone but also encompasses “organizations and non-military members of the government and the legislature with the authority to formulate, implement and oversee political decisions” (Croissant et al. 2013, 12). Empirically, this expanded scope of civilian control suggests a more challenging environment for elected civilians in new democracies, as they must deal with the political consequences of decision-making power distribution between the government branches and at the same time establish control over the military.

The case of post-*Reformasi* Indonesia, arguably, corresponds to the dilemma of institutionalizing civilian control in an emerging democracy. The limited political participation during Suharto’s authoritarian New Order regime was replaced with the emergence of various political actors when the regime collapsed in 1998. During the 32-year Suharto presidency, only two opposition parties and Golkar – de facto the ruling party but technically a so-called functional group – were

allowed to participate in elections. For the first democratic election in 1999, 148 political parties registered, with 48 parties actually participating in the vote and nine winning seats (Ambardi 2008, 101).<sup>4</sup>

This increased number of parties in the parliament had dramatic implications on the institutional changes of the presidential system in Indonesia. After the 1999 election, parties pushed through a series of constitutional amendments that expanded the legislature's authority in policy and the executive oversight. In practice, the Indonesian parliament thereby became more powerful than the president from 1999 to 2004 (King 2003; Ziegenhain 2008). Following the impeachment of President Wahid in 2001, parties in parliament agreed to amend the Constitution and balance the power between the president, the parliament and the constitutional court from 2004 onward (Ziegenhain 2008; Kawamura 2013).<sup>5</sup> Theoretically, the proliferation of political institutions and political parties within the government suggests that enacting policy change became more complicated and costly because of the difficulty in creating consensus between the actors in the different institutions (Cox and McCubbins 2001; Tsebelis 2002; MacIntyre 2003). For this reason, removing the established practices in Indonesia's defense matters has proved almost impossible.

Considering the above conditions of limitations on civilian control in the sphere of national defense, along with the Army's determination to uphold the status quo and the multiplicity of political actors, the central question in this study is: how did civilian decision-makers pursue defense transformation in post-*Reformasi* Indonesia?

---

<sup>4</sup> Golkar stands for *Golongan Karya* or the functional group. It is a mass organization established by prominent Army figures in 1964. The organization declared itself to be non-partisan, although it was established by the Army elites to balance the growing influence of the communist party at the grassroots level. As a mass organization, Golkar comprises a number of small organizations that hold no clear ideological position, except a shared strong support for Pancasila, the state ideology.

<sup>5</sup> President Wahid, popularly known as Gus Dur, was impeached by the parliament after he announced its dismissal through a presidential decree on July 21, 2001. Within a few hours, the parliament held a plenary session that ruled Gus Dur had violated the Constitution through his action. He was replaced by his vice president, Megawati Soekarnoputri.

This study finds that the ability of civilian decision-makers to pursue defense transformation was influenced by the multiplicity of veto players in the political arena and the level of policy discretion in the defense sector. Consequently, civilian decision-makers were only able to implement layering strategy to pursue policy change in the defense sector, which introduces new elements without succeeding in replacing the status quo. Before addressing the main issues of this dissertation, it is important to clarify two key concepts, namely civilian control of the military and defense transformation.

### **1.1. Civilian control of the military in emerging democracies**

The first concept in this dissertation is civilian control of the military. Based on the aforementioned research question, the focus is on civilian control in the context of emerging democracies. Historically, the civilian control concept has been rooted in the study of civil-military relations. The study of civil-military relations as a subfield of political science has undergone remarkable development since the publication of Huntington's 1957 book *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Scholars focused on the military aspect in the early years of the debate, suggesting various explanations for why militaries interfere with state politics and favor autocratic regimes in newly independent countries (Perlmutter 1969; Nordlinger 1977). Throughout the 1980s, the so-called "third wave democratization" in several Latin American countries significantly shifted the focus of civil-military relations. The progressive elimination of powerful military regimes in Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil and Chile led to the subject of civilian control of the military moving to the center of scholarly debates (Stepan 1988; Przeworski 1991; Valenzuela 1992; Hunter 1997; Pion-Berlin 1997; Fitch 1998). Civilian control soon became one of the most important discussions in the study of democratization; scholars offered various theoretical formulations and empirical evidence of civilian ability to establish institutional frameworks of civilian control, which constitutes, as Przeworski (1991, 29) argued, "the neuralgic point of democratic consolidation".

In the following decades, the number of countries adopting democratic systems significantly increased and continued to shift scholarly attention to civilian control

of the military. The complexity of the new democracies, however, raised concerns among scholars of civil-military relations that the traditional perspective on civilian control was limited. These concerns created a new paradigm, the so-called “democratic civilian control of the military”, which suggested expanding the traditional focus on the “civilian executive” in the study of civil-military relations (Kohn 1997). Nonetheless, taking only the “civilian executive” as the explanatory actor of civilian control is seen as problematic, since empirically civilian control can also be found among non-democratic regimes (Dahl 1989; Croissant et al. 2011). To resolve this issue, proponents of democratic civilian control propose that instead of only focusing on the subordination of the military under civilian rule, the study of civil-military relations must also incorporate the practice of good governance in managing military and defense affairs (Kohn 1997; Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster 2002; Bruneau 2005).

Accordingly, democratic control of the military has two important objectives, which Cottey, Edmund, and Forster (2002) term “the two generations challenges” in civil-military relations. First, the establishment of institutional arrangements, which subordinates the military under the civilian regime, is the traditional goal of civilian control over the military. The second objective highlights the application of good governance in civil-military relations. It concerns the functionality of all state institutions, as well as other non-state actors that emerge within the democratic system, to manage the military and national security policies in an effective manner. In other words, the “civilian” dimension of control must be conducted under a democratic framework, which suggests the possible contributions of other state institutions such as the legislature, judiciary, ministries and societal actors like civil society (Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster 2002; Bruneau and Matei 2008).

This new formulation of challenges in civil-military relations has several consequences for the current study of civil-military relations. First, more studies now emphasize that the objective of civilian control is not only to put the military under the subordination of democratically elected civilian governments, but democracies also need to concurrently maintain sufficient capacity of the military

in order to protect national sovereignty. Democratic civilian control of the military therefore must be balanced with military effectiveness and efficiency in fulfilling its assigned roles and missions in the current strategic environment (Bruneau 2005; Bruneau and Matei 2008; Bruneau and Croissant 2019).

This argument corresponds with the paradox of the modern state, which struggles “... to create a military that [is] strong enough to protect the nation-state from external and internal threats but at the same time [to] prevent it from dominating the state or becoming an instrument for internal repression” (Alagappa 2001, 29). Second, the multiplicity of civilian actors that control the security actors also brings attention to international development agencies and the United Nations. This leads to the emerging policy frameworks of Security Sector Reform (SSR) for new democracies and post-conflict societies that involve agendas such as strengthening the parliamentary and civil society role in overseeing security policies (Born, Fluri, and Johnsson 2003; Giraldo 2006).

Although the study of civil-military relations has been expanded, the field is still limited in two significant ways: the civilian control of the military and the role of state institutions. Establishing civilian control over the military is an extremely challenging task in new democracies, especially in those formerly dominated by strong militaries. Studies show that democracies that were preceded by military dictatorships are more prone to collapse, with a survival rate of approximately 20 years after the transition (Cheibub 2007, 22). While establishing civilian control of the military may include contributions from various civilian actors in a polity, only those with authority can directly perform the task (Croissant et al. 2013). As such, legitimation is the key feature for the civilian effort to control the military. Institutionalizing this control can only be performed by authorized civilians within state institutions that are perceived as politically and legally legitimate, not only by the military but also by the wider society.

The emergence of civil society as a political actor in new democracies has newfound importance, and scholars may be tempted to postulate its role in establishing civilian control. Civil society can contribute to civilian control of the

military by influencing policy-makers' decisions in certain policy stages or by establishing pressure on the policy-makers by raising public awareness on the military or defense issues, as was the case in Indonesia's emerging democracy (Scarpello 2014; Lorenz 2015). Importantly, civil society does not automatically possess legitimate authority, and a comparative study of South Korea, Venezuela and Thailand suggests that its actual contribution to the establishment of civilian control is mixed and depends on the political circumstances (Innanchai 2012).

Scholars have defined civilian control of the military in various ways. Agüero (1995, 19) considered civilian supremacy (or control) as the ability of civilians, democratically elected governments to conduct general policy without interference from the military, to define the goals and the general organization of national defense, to formulate and conduct defense policy and to monitor the implementation of military policy. Meanwhile, Trinkunas (2001, 163) suggested "civilian control exists when government officials have authority over decisions concerning the missions, organization and employment of a state's military means ... civilian control also requires that officials have broad decision-making authority over state policy free from military interference". In a more comprehensive viewpoint, Croissant et al. (2011, 77) proposed civilian control of the military as "civilians having exclusive authority to decide on national policies and their implementation. Under civilian control, civilians can freely choose to delegate decision-making power and the implementation of certain policies to the military while the military has no autonomous decision-making power outside those specifically defined by civilians. Furthermore, it is civilians alone who determine which particular policies, or policy aspects, the military implements, and civilians also define the boundaries between policy-making and policy-implementation."

Taken together, these various definitions suggest that civilian control of the military involves two core elements: first, distribution of decision-making power between the civilian regime and the military as the explanatory dimension and, second, unrestricted civilian decision-making power in all policy matters as the expected outcome. Although a civilian democracy can enjoy some degree of control over the military through informal mechanisms (e.g. personal networks),



democratic systems require political power to be allocated solely by formal institutions, rather than power being built upon informal foundations (Croissant et al. 2013). As Pion-Berlin (1997, 20) suggested, “to institutionalize a relation is to normalize it: to make it predictable, to adhere to acceptable, indeed legitimate, conventions of political life ...”. The informal control model may fulfill the behavioral dimension of military compliance to some extent, but it does not constitute that compliance will be regularized or that civilian supremacy will always be the expected outcome, regardless of who comes into power in the civilian leadership.

Even in non-democratic regimes, adopting “personalistic” models of civilian control over the military increases the possibility of regime collapse rather than employing the institutionalized one (Slater 2009). The opportunities to institutionalize civilian control of the military mainly exist during the transition to democracy, when elected civilians and the military negotiate to what extent civilian control over the military should be inserted into the new institutional arrangement of the polity (Agüero 2001). Most importantly, these the new arrangements must be formally institutionalized through legislation and resulting legal orders in order to achieve, as mentioned above, the legitimacy and predictability of civilian control over the military.

## **1.2. Defense transformation**

Failure to institutionalize civilian control in the political arena would raise the possibility of the derailing of the democratic transition process and the military’s return to politics. To this end, all literature agrees that military prerogative in the political decision-making process must be removed (Pion-Berlin 1992; Agüero 1995; Hunter 1997; Kohn 1997; Alagappa 2001; Trinkunas 2005; Croissant et al. 2013). Nevertheless, the relationship between civilian control of the military and defense policy in emerging democracies still receives little scholarly attention (Bruneau and Matei 2008; Croissant and Kuehn 2017; Bruneau and Croissant 2019). Defense institutions are often viewed as the least important path for institutionalizing civilian control of the military in the context of new democracies (Trinkunas 2005). Defense-related issues are considered to not substantially

influence the structure of incentives among civilian politicians to compete for political office and formulate public policy for constituents. A study in post-militarism Latin American countries shows that defense policy is not promising either as public or private good to attract voters and maintain constituency (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2007). Moreover, the national defense and military organization that make up the defense sector is viewed as closely linked to the core function of the military as state defense apparatus (Trinkunas 2005; Kuehn 2013). As such, a certain degree of organizational autonomy of the military is assumed as compatible with civilian control, even in the case of consolidated democracies (Croissant et al. 2013, 35).

This dissertation proposes that institutionalizing civilian control in the defense institution is no less important for the future of democratic rule and better defense policy. Thus, the study aspires to what Cottey et al. coined as the second-generation problem in democracy and civil-military relations, namely the question of “democratic management and implementation of defense and security policy” (Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster 2002, 32). Weak civilian control in defense-related policy-making will foster military autonomy in national defense. Such autonomy would pose greater danger to the legitimacy of a democratically-elected civilian government, particularly when some policy instruments in the existing defense institutions echo the practice of military intervention in politics during the autocratic regime in the past (Hunter 1997).

For instance, the preservation of the Army’s Koter, which was the hallmark of Suharto’s autocratic regime, remains crucial for the TNI to maintain its presence at each level of administration in post-*Reformasi* Indonesia. It therefore allows the military to keep its network of influence in socio-political dynamics across the country (Haripin 2020). Moreover, military autonomy in the defense sector can also hinder effort to improve state defense capability in responding new security challenges (Rosen 1988). Often, new threats and changes in the regional security environment demand major overhaul in the defense sector. For example, increasing security threats in the maritime environment require doctrinal adaptation, force restructuration and different weapon procurement in defense

planning to safeguard interests. These modifications are often described as defense transformation (Grissom 2006), the second key concept in this dissertation.

Following Farrel and Terrif (2002, 5), this dissertation defines defense transformation as “changes in the goals, actual strategies, and/or structure of a military”. At the operational level, defense transformation may be understood as a policy change in the defense sector that allows military organization to adapt with new strategic challenges. The expected outcome of such change is military effectiveness, or the ability of the military to carry out its core task as assigned by the decision-makers (Stulberg and Salomone 2007; Croissant and Kuehn 2017). Nevertheless, the military, like other organizations, is principally resistant toward change (Pion-Berlin 2005). Change will always induce uncertainty to the structure of benefit provided by the existing institution to the actors within it.

Given such a condition, this study follows the argument proposed by strategic studies scholars that civilian intervention in the defense sector is imperative to initiate change within the military organization (Posen 1984; Avant 1994; Cohen 2004). Principally, this study is influenced by recent works on the theoretical nexus between political control of the military and military effectiveness in various political regimes (Bruneau and Matei 2008; Croissant and Kuehn 2017; Bruneau and Croissant 2019). Specifically, the study focuses on the relationship between civilian control and defense transformation in new democracies. Scholars have pointed out that the involvement of more civilians in the defense policy of new democracies is assumed to hold significant impact for the effectiveness and efficiency of the defense sector. For example, Neto (2019) found that growing civilian direction in Brazilian defense policymaking had contributed to improved interoperability within the armed forces, outward-looking military operations and improvement in the coordination between the defense sector and foreign affairs.

### **1.3. Outline of the study**

In order to explain the effort by civilian decision-makers to change the status quo in the defense institution, the subsequent chapters are divided into several focuses of discussion. Chapter 2 elaborates on the theoretical model of institutional change in the defense institution as a whole. This is done in three steps. First, the dependent variable in this study is the type of change that can be done by civilians towards the status quo – Army dominance – in the defense institutions of post-*Reformasi* Indonesia. To clarify the conceptual and empirical parameters for successful change towards the status quo in defense policy, two concepts are discussed: defense transformation and military jointness. The defense transformation concept considers that political leaders play an indispensable role to initiate military innovation within the defense affair (Posen 1984). Viewed as such, innovation or change in the defense policy is influenced by the degree of authority hold by civilian decision-makers in the defense institution. The expected outcome of defense transformation is military effectiveness, or the ability of military to take advantage of its own resources in achieving battlefield victory.

Drawing from recent work on the indicators of military effectiveness, this study decides to focus on the military jointness factor in the defense transformation process, which suggests the integration of separated elements within the military to get maximum combat capability (Brooks 2007). As such, military jointness becomes the dependent variable in this dissertation. Empirically, two types of jointness will be observed: the coordination model and the integration model. The observation is conducted across three dimensions of defense transformation: doctrinal adaptation, organizational structure and resources allocation (Posen 1984; Rosen 1991; Farrell and Terriff 2002).

The next part attempts to provide an analytical framework on the question of what kind of change strategies are available for civilians to initiate institutional change in the defense institution. Most importantly, under what circumstances are civilians able to deploy a different strategy? To answer both questions, I review institutional accounts of civilian control over the military in existing civil-military relations literature to evaluate how scholars view the factors that drive civilian

efforts to change the status quo. While the existing literature reached strong consensus on two important variables that link the causal relationship between political institutions and the degree of civilian control – the concentration of decision-making power and civilian unity – it offers no specification of the causal mechanism that captures the empirical process. Structural explanations predominate in the literature concerning the institutional account of civil-military relations yet there exists a theoretical gap between institutions and civilian action in explaining civilian control of the military. As such, existing theories are insufficient in providing detailed arguments that integrate the interaction between institution and actor in clarifying change in civil-military relations for new democracies.

To address these issues, the study adopts a mechanistic-based explanation by utilizing the framework of gradual institutional change (Mahoney and Thelen 2009). The theory of gradual institutional change offers robust explanation on the nexus between political contexts, institutional characteristics of targeted institution and modes of change. The political context dimension can be useful to capture the effect of the concentration of decision-making power and/or civilian unity variables on the possibility of institutional change through measuring the veto possibilities in a polity decision-making process. Meanwhile, the institutional characteristics dimension focuses on the impact of rules discretion within the targeted institution to the potential for changing the status quo. This dimension contributes to the explanation of how properties of defense institutions in emerging democracies affect civilian attempt to change the status quo in the defense sector. In order to explain the mechanism and the direction of policy change in defense affairs, the theory of gradual institutional change offers a set of strategies – i.e., displacement, layering, drift and conversion – that can be employed by the change agents to initiate institutional change corresponding to different veto player configuration and the level of discretion in targeted institutions. Drawing from this mechanism, Chapter 2 concludes with hypotheses for the analytical framework.

Chapter 3 explains the research design of this dissertation such as the methodology, case selection, and data collection. To test the hypothesized mechanisms, I employ a process-tracing method. The process-tracing method is a strong methodological tool for small-n studies that focus on within-case analysis. Specifically, I use the case-centric variant of process-tracing (Beach and Pedersen 2013). In this variant, the researcher performs in-depth investigations on all sequences of the political process to confirm whether the proposed causal mechanism actually exists. It should be noted, however, the case-centric process-tracing is focusing on the usefulness of theory rather than testing the accurateness of theory in explaining the outcome of a case study. Regarding the case selection, I observe the two five-year presidential terms from 2004 onward – the consecutive terms of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono – in the post-*Reformasi* context. Following the explanation of the case selection, I discuss the two main sources of the data: the official records of the defense policy process or outcome and interviews with key actors. Other data, such as previous scholarly works related to civil-military relations in Indonesia and media reports, are also used, but only to cross-validate the observation results from the previous two main sources. I collected the data during my fieldwork in Jakarta from November 2015 to January 2016, and from July to November 2019.

Chapter 4 provides an overview of Army dominance and the status quo in the defense sector. The chapter is expected to deliver a deeper understanding of the institutional context of national defense in post-*Reformasi* Indonesia. The chapter begins with the discussion of the Army stranglehold on the defense sector before, during and after the *Reformasi*. Based on the discussion, the analysis in the second part explores the preservation of Army-centric total defense doctrine in the defense sector during and after Reformation. Later, the third part summarizes the findings.

Chapters 5 to 8 are organized based on the proposed analytical framework. Chapters 5 and 6 are designated to trace civilian government attempts to shape policy change in the defense sector after the *Reformasi* together with the outcomes. Accordingly, each chapter is organized as follows. Chapter 5 focuses on

Yudhoyono's first term in office from 2004 to 2009. The analysis discusses the formulation process of defense transformation agenda through the introduction of the integrated tri-service (*trimatra terpadu*) concept that was intended to nurture military jointness within the TNI, as well as the MEF (minimum essential force, *kekuatan pokok minimum*) concept that was deemed a long-term defense modernization agenda. Chapter 6 provides empirical analysis on the implementation of both new concepts by the Ministry of Defense and the TNI. It concludes by summarizing the empirical findings on the Yudhoyono strategy and outcome in pursuing military jointness in Indonesia.

Based on the proposed analytical framework, chapters 7 and 8 focus on the analysis of contributing factors in Yudhoyono's selection of change strategies in defense transformation and their outcomes. Chapter 7 discusses in two parts the contribution of the veto player configuration in the political arena towards the Yudhoyono strategies. First, it extrapolates on the veto player configuration based on the model discussed in Chapter 2 during President Yudhoyono's terms in office. It then traces the implication of the configuration on the lack of defense reform policy in the legislative arena from 2004 to 2014. Chapter 8 traces the impact of the level of discretion in Indonesia's defense institutions towards the selection of change strategy by President Yudhoyono in transforming the defense sector. The chapter comprises two analytical parts: The MoD-TNI relationship in the national defense policy-making process after *Reformasi*, and the level of civilian presence within the defense bureaucracy of MoD.

Finally, Chapter 9 summarizes the findings from the preceding chapters in their entirety. Accordingly, this concluding chapter is organized into three parts. The first part provides evaluation of the proposed causal factors for policy change in Indonesia's defense sector under the Yudhoyono leadership. Subsequently, the second part assesses the plausibility of veto player and level of discretion as the causal factor for the selection of policy change strategy carried out by the Yudhoyono administration. It concludes by addressing the limitations of the study and avenues of future research.





## **2. Institutional change and defense transformation**

Once regime transition from authoritarianism to democracy takes place, the immediate task of a civilian government is to remove previous military prerogatives or uproot the civil-military relations status quo. Stepan (1988) suggests that reducing the military's institutional prerogatives that existed during the authoritarian regime is key to successful institutionalization. Depoliticizing the military and demilitarizing policy processes are the objectives of institutional change of civil-military-relations during democratic transitions (Honna 2003). In order to do so, civilians need to identify what types of prerogatives are held by the military and remove those that are incompatible with the democratic political system.

From a broader perspective, military prerogatives can take the form of institutional autonomy, which is drawn from the military profession itself, and/or political autonomy, which refers to the ability of the military to disobey civilian control (Pion-Berlin 1992). While both forms of autonomy are taken into account in scholarly discussions, the latter is more prevalent in the early literature of civil-military relations. The main issue of civilian control once revolved around the political autonomy of the military since this form of autonomy poses a direct threat towards civilian power to govern. Thus, analysis of civilian control of the military often falls prey to the so-called "fallacy of coup-ism," which merely observes the existence or absence of military coups (Croissant et al. 2010b). Recently, this dominant perspective has changed substantially due to the global decline in the number of military coups. In turn, scholars have become aware that the scope of military autonomy cannot be deduced to political aspects but all military-related activities must be approved by democratically elected civilians.

Even if the political autonomy of the military is successfully eliminated, institutional autonomy may promote insularity and later aggressiveness of the military towards a legitimate civilian government if or when "civilian control" in their corporate matters is seen as "interference" (Pion-Berlin 1992). Of course, the military requires some degree of autonomy to maintain its professionalism.

Nevertheless, in democratic political systems, it must be civilians – and not the military – who decide the scope of such autonomy through delegation and, most importantly, all decisions regarding the military, must be subject to the rule of law (Siaroff 2009; Chambers and Croissant 2010a).

Since its emergence, the study of civil-military relations in new democracies has been fertile ground for the debate between “structural” and “agential” explanations in the social sciences (Pion-Berlin 2011). Based on these perspectives, theories of civil-military relations generated various arguments regarding civilian control of the military in emerging democracies. The structural perspective focuses on the impact of environmental factors on the ability of civilians to establish control as well as on the military’s abilities to contest civilian control. As such, the underlying argument is that political actions do not emerge in vacuums, and that agents are not fully independent from their environments. Environment in this context encompasses macro-structural, institutional and ideational factors and includes the level of socioeconomic development; the structure of external or internal threats; institutional autonomy; regime type (presidentialism or parliamentary) and the military’s self-perception (Huntington 1957; Desch 1999; Pion-Berlin 1997; Avant 1994; Loveman 1999; Honna 2003; Rüländ and Manea 2013). In contrast, the agent perspective regards an actor’s behavior as the central variable in explaining the variation of civilian control in new democracies. The rational choice theory is highly influential in this approach. Agents (political actors) are treated as independent from their environment, and their political actions result from rational calculations or self-interest (Hunter 1997; Feaver 2003). The literature’s theoretical development is largely dominated by the structural approach (Kuehn 2013, 55).

Of course, each perspective has its own strengths and weaknesses in explaining civilian control. The structural perspective can capture the impact of the surrounding environment on civilian control to certain degree. Similarly, the agency perspective offers theoretical clarity on civilian actions in terms of establishing control of the military. Nevertheless, in some cases, the approaches were unable to explain why empirical conditions worked against their

prescriptive arguments. The immediate solution to this issue was to integrate the explanatory elements of each approach, and this is precisely what has been recently attempted by several scholars (Agüero 1995; Alagappa 2001; Trinkunas 2005; Croissant et al. 2011; 2013). Merging the elements of both perspectives is not a simple task, however, as scholars must cautiously refrain from providing over-deterministic explanations (Pion-Berlin 2011). Consequently, while these integrative accounts aimed to explain the interplay between structural factors and agency, a closer look at the suggested propositions indicate significant trade-offs between the structural and agency perspectives (Kuehn and Lorenz 2011, 244).

Some theoretical arguments link the combination of environmental factors (macro, institutional, and ideal) to the degree of civilian control but leave the corresponding actor behavior in the dark (Agüero 1995; Alagappa 2001). On the other hand, others propose a set of civilian actions to control the military while placing the environmental factors in distance (Trinkunas 2005; Croissant et al. 2013). Hence, it is reasonable to argue that the “integrative” elements of these recent explanations were not substantially integrative at all. Instead, recent scholarship has merely specified the broader structural factors and the concrete civilian actions separately. The most important step of building a coherent argument based on the structure-agency perspective, which is “defining the relationship between environment and actors by outlining the process through which the environment influences the actions of the relevant agents in producing a specific outcome” (Kuehn and Lorenz 2011, 245) has yet to be done.

By focusing on the process, any effort to link the structure and agent behavior must be performed through a “mechanism-based explanation”. Accordingly, a mechanism-based explanation seeks “to provide a fine-grained as well as tight coupling between the *explanans* and *explanandum*” (Hedström and Swedberg 1998, 25). There is no single definition of “causal mechanism” in social science literature (Mahoney 2001, 579–80). In fact, several scholars doubt that it is even possible to explain such a mechanism theoretically. Nevertheless, scholars principally agree that causal mechanisms operative at the lower level of causal effects (Rohlfing 2012, 33). While this may assign causal mechanisms to

methodological individualism, a mechanism-based explanation aims to establish explicit theoretical and empirical links between the macro and micro levels of causal relationships (Demeneulenaere 2011). In order to do so, mechanisms in social science can be explained by three inter-related mechanisms: the situational mechanism, the action-formation-mechanism, and the transformational mechanism (Hedström and Swedberg 1998). The situational mechanism indicates how social structures shape individual actions or the “opportunity generating mechanism” for actors (Hedström and Swedberg 1998, 23; Rohlfing 2012, 42). This mechanism disaggregates the causal link at the macro level, or the *explanans*, into the micro level. The situational mechanism then produces action-formation mechanism, which suggests specific behaviors are generated by existing opportunities (Hedström and Swedberg 1998). Finally, the transformational mechanism refers to the interaction process between actors, and the specific nature of this interaction leads to collective outcomes (Hedström and Swedberg 1998, 23). Such mechanisms reintroduce the micro level causal links into the macro level, which is the expected *explanandum*. Following these elements of mechanism-based explanations, how can we explain institutional change in the defense policy sector? Ideally, any attempt to analyze institutional change is credible if one explains the relationship between three important factors: institutions, actors, and the environment (Mahoney and Thelen 2009; Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 130).

Borrowing from Mahoney and Thelen’s theory of gradual institutional change (2009), I propose a theoretical model which seeks to explain institutional change through defense transformation as the function of three intervening variables: veto barriers, level of discretion in targeted institution and actor’s change strategy that affects certain output of defense transformation. To explain the argument, the next section begins by detailing the theoretical and empirical foundations of institutional change in the defense through the concept of “military jointness” in the defense transformation as the outcome variable. This dissertation proposes that the key driver for establishing jointness within the military is the state of civil-military relations. To be more specific, the transition towards jointness between

the service branches would require civilian interference either from outside or inside the military (Posen 1984; Rosen 1991; Mukherjee 2017).

However, there is still a lack of theoretical proposals on what kind of strategies can be utilized by civilian decision-makers to establish jointness in the military and what kind of output can be expected from such strategies. As such, the subsequent part offers several change strategies which can be employed by civilian decision-makers, and corresponds with the specific outcomes of jointness in the military. The next part elucidates two causal factors that contribute to the civilian decision of using different strategies to pursue jointness in the military: the veto player configuration in the political arena and level of discretion in the defense institution. Finally, the last part of this chapter summarizes the hypotheses of this study.

## **2.1. The outcome of change: defense transformation and military jointness**

What kind of institutional change can be expected in the defense sector? First of all, it is important to clarify what is meant by institution and institutional change in this research. Institution can be defined as “formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity” (Hall and Taylor 1996, 938). Institution provides the template of permissible or constrained human interaction by structuring behavioral incentives (North 1991, 4). Put simply, institution is the various rule of game within the society that limits human action. Institutional change, then, refers to what extent change on rules of the game or the status quo of certain institution can be achieved by the change agents.

To explain the concept of defense institution, I utilize the national defense and military organization decision-making areas in civil-military relations, as formulated by Croissant et al. The core issue in national defense refers to the way state provides the ultimate guideline for the military to fulfill its core function: war-fighting against external aggression. Meanwhile, the military organization

area covers issues such as military values, force structure, defense procurement and personnel management (Croissant et al. 2013, 34–35). Ultimately, we can infer the status quo of a defense institution in a given polity from its defense policy and military organization policy, centering on the government effort to guarantee state survival through the military force. Consequently, change in the status quo in the defense institution can be analyzed by carefully examining the process when government prepares its military to deal with the existing and future threats.

### **2.1.1. What is defense transformation?**

The strategic studies literature has long been interested in attempting to explain change in the defense sector, centering on the discussion about the concept of defense transformation. Historically, defense transformation was a policy term coined by US defense practitioners in the 1990s. Defense transformation is closely related to the term “Revolution in Military Affairs” or RMA that emphasizes the importance of information technology with the conduct of warfare among policy-makers in the US Department of State during early 1990s (Gray 2006). The RMA concept supports the idea that the technological revolution – e.g. information technology, communication technology, and space technology – changes the conduct of warfare to attain victory on the battlefield (Krepinevich 1994a; Cohen 1996; Gray 2002). In the scholarly literature, the term RMA is often interpreted as “the application of new technologies into a significant number of military systems combines with innovative operational concepts and organizational adaptation in a way that fundamentally alters the character and conduct of conflict (Krepinevich 1994b, 30). In 1997, the term defense transformation officially entered the policy debate when the National Defense Panel, commissioned by the US Secretary of Defense, recommended the US government take “a broad transformation of its military and national security structures, operational concepts and equipment” in its report (Metz 2006, 6). At this point, while the RMA exclusively focused on the advent of information technologies, the defense transformation was centered on the “new agility in doctrinal thinking, organizational form, and operational approach” (Farrell and Terriff 2010, 3). The US quest for defense transformation then diffuses to other parts of the world, particularly US counterpart states in Europe. The US defense transformation agenda significantly shapes the

reorientation of defense policy and military change in NATO countries such as Britain, Germany, France, Netherlands, Spain and Poland (Farrell, Terriff, and Osinga 2010). More importantly, such a policy diffusion process also prompted growing research interest and scholarly works on defense transformation in various contexts and different parts of the world (Covarrubias 2004; Petersson 2011; Tan 2011; Ji 2016). Gradually, the term defense transformation superseded the RMA in the scholarly literature and policy practice.

Nevertheless, there remains no definitive meaning of defense transformation. Some scholars defined defense transformation as “changes in the goals, actual strategies and/or structure of a military” organization (Farrell and Terriff 2002, 5). Such changes usually involve “developing new technologies, operational concepts and organizational structures to conduct war in dramatically new ways” (Binnendijk 2002, xvii). Considering the far-reaching consequence of the change, some scholars emphasize that defense transformation would perform best during peacetime rather than wartime since major change often take years to formulate and are later well-implemented by the military (Rosen 1991). It should be noted, however, some scholars often view defense transformation only from its technological aspect (Cohen 2004). There has been a tendency to ignore the fact that the dramatic impact of technology advancement on the conduct of warfare depends on the “quality of ideas for its [technology] employment” and “the fitness of military organizations to exploit the new technical possibilities” (Gray 2006, 26). In regard to the ideational characteristic, defense transformation must be understood as a process that involves paradigmatic “shift” in a nation’s conduct of warfare (Farrell, Terriff, and Osinga 2010, 3). Regarding the organizational aspects, Stullberg and Salomone (2007, 15) posited that defense transformation concerns on “changes in both the efficiency and flexibility of organizations to acclimate to new task environments.” From the definitions above, this study posited defense transformation as *a process of change within the military to adapt with its strategic environments, which involves ideational, organizational and technological attributes during the peacetime.*

Unlike the problem of a definitive definition, scholars have reached consensus on the objective of defense transformation. The expected outcome of defense transformation is greater military effectiveness (Grissom 2006, 907). As Krepinivich (1994b, 30) argued, the defense transformation should result in “dramatic increase – often an order of magnitude or greater – in the combat potential and military effectiveness of armed forces”. Accordingly, an effective military is “one that derives maximum combat power from the resources physically and politically available” (Millett, Murray, and Watman 1986, 37).

The next question is, where did the transformation come from? In studying the source of defense transformation, scholars are divided into two main approaches. The first and the most dominant approach is the *top-down* approach. According to this approach, change in the military organization comes either from individuals within the military (senior officers) or outside the military (Cohen 2004; Farrell, Terriff, and Osinga 2010). The military’s sole purpose is to protect society against any threats, and thus the military mission shall reflect society’s need as represented by the elected politicians (Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960; Avant 1994; Desch 1999). An important argument proposed by scholars in this approach is that the defense transformation process is more likely to come from civilian leaders rather than from the military leadership. As noted by Lang, military innovation is “largely promoted by civilians, who have often shown themselves more sensitive to changing needs than the professional military” (Lang 1965, 857). The seminal work by Posen (1984) supported the argument through the experience of the British Air Force, the German Army and French Army during the period between the world wars in regard to doctrinal change. Posen (1984, 224) postulates that military innovation can happen only when ... the [military] organization registers a large failure, or when civilians with legitimate authority intervene to promote [military] innovation.” He found that there was no convincing evidence about the internal source of transformation in the respective cases. In contrary, he identified civilian elites as those who worked directly or indirectly to push for innovation in the doctrine of the military (Posen 1984, 224). Overall, the top-down approach treated defense transformation as a function of



civil-military relations in a polity. As such, the research interest in this dissertation corresponds to the top-down approach.

The second approach in defense transformation is the bottom-up approach. This approach treats defense transformation as a process that originates from inside the military (Cohen 2004; Dombrowski 2018). The central idea is that cultural aspects inside the military, similar to other public organization, work as the sources and driver of change (Snider, Watkins, and Matthews 2002, 6). In other words, change in the military is internally initiated by the military as a response to its surrounding environment, new technology or other operational practices.

So far, the above discussion has proposed the definition, objective and approach of defense transformation that is utilized in this dissertation. Nevertheless, the defense transformation concept alone remains insufficient to explain the interest of this dissertation, i.e., the problem of single-service domination as status quo in the defense sector, and how did civilian decision-makers change the status quo. In order to do so, the following section discusses the pivotal role of the “military jointness” concept in defense transformation.

### **2.1.2. The importance of military jointness in defense transformation**

As mentioned previously, the widely accepted objective of defense transformation is military effectiveness in performing its core task in defending the nation. Brooks (2007) proposed that the level of military effectiveness can be gauged from four key attributes of the military: integration, responsiveness, skill and quality. These four attributes hold significant importance for military effectiveness (Brooks 2007, 13). The absence of one attribute would degrade the effectiveness of a military organization in combat situation. It should be noted, however, this dissertation is not intended to explain the whole features of military effectiveness. The domination of the service parochial interest in national defense is the main intent of the dissertation and, thus, only the attribute of integration of military effectiveness would be the major focus (see Figure 2.1 below). The integration

attribute refers to the “degree to which different military activities are internally consistent and mutually reinforcing” (Brooks 2007, 10). Without proper integration, even a well-equipped, skilled and responsive military may lose its internal capacity to cooperate in a synergistic manner (Brooks 2007, 13). In practice, an integrated military is one that maintains coherence across strategic-, operational- and tactical-level activity, including those activities related to the force development. Through integration, the military avoids the problem of resources duplication. Viewed as such, integration prevents the action taken by one unit in the military at a tactical and strategic level from being futile compared to another unit’s actions (Brooks 2007, 13-14).

The importance of integration as a critical part of military effectiveness was not new among the scholars. In fact, the early formulation of military effectiveness already captured the significance of integration. As Millet et al. (1986, 52) elucidated “the operationally effective military organization is one that derives maximum benefit from its components and assets by linking them together for mutual support ... the greater the integration of these disparate elements, the better a military organization will generate combat power from its available resources.” At the empirical level, the “integration” attribute of military effectiveness is closely linked to the term “military jointness” that was an inextricable part of the defense transformation policy debate. Historically, military jointness is an invented term among defense practitioners in the US defense sector. The term jointness gains importance in the scholarly debate after the US Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, long before the defense transformation debate began. The watershed legislation mandates the reorganization of defense and military institutions through various strategic and operational measures in order to prioritize “jointness” among services in the US Armed Forces (McInnis 2016; Jackson 2018). Since then, the term jointness has been discussed by US scholars and defense practitioners.

However, the largely technology-oriented RMA was more dominant in the discussion of defense transformation in the early 1990s. It was not until the late 1990s that the term reemerged in the scholarly debate. In his criticism of the


dominant technological-oriented approach of defense transformation in the United States, MacGregor (2000, 2) proposed transformation as “effectively combining and integrating service capabilities within new joint operational structures.” In 2003, the Department of Defense under George W. Bush Administration released Transformation Planning Guidance as the policy reference for defense transformation. Within the document, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld outlined that the expected outcomes of defense transformation are “fundamentally joint, network-centric, distributed forces capable of rapid decision superiority and massed effects across the battlespace” (DoD USA 2003, 1). Later, the term military jointness was more frequently discussed in scholarly literature as part of defense transformation in the US and also in other countries (Blasko 2016; Zapfe 2016; Wuthnow 2017; Mukherjee 2017). Military jointness continues to be used to express the critical aspect of a modern military, particularly in the defense and strategic studies literature.

Nevertheless, there is no widely accepted definition of military jointness. In fact, there is no definition of jointness in the dictionaries. The US joint doctrine, for example, encapsulates military jointness as “cross-service combination wherein the capability of the joint force is understood to be synergistic, with the sum greater than its parts (the capability of individual components)” (JCS USA 2017, ix). Some authors define jointness as effective integration of the combat capabilities of the services in a country (Snider 2003; Paget 2016). Mukherjee (2017, 9) considered it “the ability of the three services to plan, train and operate in a ‘synergistic’ manner”. Another proposal highlights the cultural aspect of jointness, formulating the term as “the military circumstance enabled by trust and understanding transcending the core beliefs and assumptions of any single service and exemplified by the effective integration and employment of the different service capabilities and competencies” (Davis 2017, 19).

From these definitions, one can understand that jointness does not mean that all services must leave their core competencies and aspire to homogeneity in the armed forces (Deptula and Adams 2009). Rather, jointness follows the axiom that the “whole is greater than the sum of its parts”, leading to the need for synergizing

different competencies of each service in the armed forces into a common goal (Strain 1993). In the words of Mukherjee (2017, 13), the prerequisite for military jointness is the “subordination of parochial service interests to a transition to a more efficient and effective joint effort” within the military. Viewed as such, the objective of jointness is to synchronize the capabilities of each service when dealing with different types of war (Vitale 1995). Drawing from the above definitions, this study refers to military jointness as *the condition when the branch services in the armed forces are capable of cooperate and integrating their unique capabilities in a “synergistic” manner for defending the state against any threats.*

**Figure 2.1. Defense transformation, military effectiveness and military jointness**



Source: author’s compilation.

The next issue is how to gauge certain arrangements in a state defense sector as the indicators for different level of jointness. Borrowing from Mukherjee (2017, 9-10), jointness may take form in two models: *coordination* and *integration*. The *coordination* model of jointness preserves the maximum autonomy of each service. There is no institutionalized mechanism to resolve problems of jointness in the field. Consequently, the implementation of jointness in the coordination model follows “the discretion of each service commander” (Mukherjee 2017, 9). In practice, it remains possible for all command and control of each service to be kept under its own commander though inter-services cooperation. Viewed as

such, the coordination model can be viewed as A “pseudo” type of jointness. Since the model allows the autonomy of each service, it provides significant space for the single-service approach to dominate the existing interpretation of jointness. In contrary, the *integration* model involves the *unification* of the services under single command at the strategic and operational levels (Mukherjee 2017). The unification entails that the single-service approach domination is fully restricted and, thus, a multi-service approach binds the whole aspects of the military. Empirically, we can observe the difference of these jointness models from the three forementioned attributes of defense transformation: ideas, organization and technology (Table 2.1).

**Table 2.1. Indicators of military jointness model**

<b>Attributes</b>	<b>Integration model</b>	<b>Coordination Model</b>
<b>Ideational</b>	Multi-services approach of warfare; clear stipulation in the defense doctrine that promotes joint-force capability within the military, and refusing single-service domination;	Single-service approach of warfare; lack of clarity in the defense doctrine on the promotion of joint-force capability within the military;
<b>Organizational</b>		
<i>Size</i>	Less disproportionate military composition.	Highly disproportionate military composition; favoring larger size for particular service branch.
<i>Force structure</i>	The existence of well-institutionalized joint-command structure	Absence or lack of well-institutionalized joint command structure.
<b>Technological</b>	Interoperability of weapon systems as the key principle in the defense procurement process.	Absence or the lack of interoperability of weapon systems as the key principle in the defense procurement process.

Source: Author’s compilation

*First*, the ideational attribute concerns the military doctrine (Posen 1984; Rosen 1991; Farrell and Terriff 2002; Jackson 2018). The doctrinal feature of defense transformation receives the most attention in the literature since doctrine is the center of gravity in any military organization. Posen (2016, 159) defines doctrine to be “a set of institutionalized principles about how to fight [for the military]”. Høiback (2016, 3) views doctrine as “institutionalized beliefs about what works in war and military operations”. Both definitions emphasize that doctrine is the “institutionalized” code of conduct for the military in preparing and waging war. There are two core functions of doctrine in the defense affairs: setting-up priorities for the national defense, and providing the ideal military structure to respond to such priorities (Posen 1984, 8). Of course, there are various forms of doctrine. Each service in the armed forces may have its own tactical doctrine (Jackson 2018). Doctrine in this study is understood as the high-level doctrine which encompasses all of a state’s military power (Posen 2016, 159). Thus, I refer this type of doctrine as the national defense doctrine, which can be observed empirically from official documents on defense policies such as defense-related legislation, the national security strategy and/or the defense white paper (Bruneau and Matei 2008; Høiback 2016; Croissant and Kuehn 2017).

The anatomy of defense doctrine is important for explaining level of jointness in the military. As noted by Posen, doctrine principally includes “the preferred mode of a group of services, a single service or a subservice for fighting wars” (Posen 1984, 14). This argument illuminates defense doctrine as a continuum whereas the multi-services approach of warfare stands on one pole and single-service approach stands on the opposite pole. For example, the UK Defense Doctrine stipulates that “military strategy is inherently joint ... it also sits above single-service interests, tying together military capabilities to deliver an effect that meets the short-term requirement, but is firmly rooted in a clear understanding of the long-term policy ends” (DCDC MoD UK 2014, 11). The UK defense doctrine clearly stipulates the importance of jointness among its services and excludes any single-service interest at the strategic and operational levels. Hence, the UK doctrine follows the logic of integration model of jointness at the strategic level.

It should be noted that, however, not all defense doctrines clearly stipulate the jointness term in its content. Often, defense doctrine treats jointness in different terms. In addition, it is also possible that defense doctrine incorporates jointness terms but its understanding of jointness actually creep the single-service paradigm as the case in the coordination model of jointness. To deal with this issue, effort to gauge jointness also depends on explaining the “theory of victory” in the defense doctrine. Defense doctrine is principally centered on assumptions about what works and what leads to victory (Rosen 1991; Høiback 2011; 2016). The key success for defense transformation is comprehensive understanding of future warfare (Roxborough 2002). The theory of victory itself is “an explanation of what the next war will look like and how officers must fight if it is to be won” (Rosen 1991, 20). Consequently, the argument whether a doctrine adheres to the coordination model (with the potential domination of single-service) or the integration model (multi-service approach) must be inferred by closely scrutinizing the doctrine assumptions about the nature of (future) war and the strategy required to win the war.

The second attribute is the military organization. The doctrinal element itself is insufficient to explain jointness. Often, change in the defense doctrine does not automatically manifest in the military organization and vice versa (Rosen 1991). The above discussion emphasizes doctrine as an “institutionalized choice” between competing ideas on how to fight in war (Herbert 1988). The choice may include single-service or integrating multi-service ideas which, at best, is mirrored in the way the state organizes its military. In short, doctrine is the *software* of a military power and military organization is the *hardware*. Hence, it is also important to scrutinize how jointness takes place in the organizational aspect of the military. Treating the military organization as hardware brings our analytical focus regarding jointness to the “material aspects” of the organization that can be interfered in by the civilian actors: military size and force structure (Croissant et al. 2013, 35).<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> The authors also include budget allocation, military justice and ideational aspect as part of the *hardware* of military organization. But the budget allocation and military justice are not part of the explanation in this study. For the budget allocation, there are still debates whether the budget allocation contributes to jointness and later increased military effectiveness. On the one hand, a

The size of a military can reflect different models of jointness. At its heart, jointness means effectiveness of the military resources. When the state imposes jointness on its military, overlapping capabilities between services would be removed, leading to the rationalization of personnel and unit (Snider 2003; Blasko 2016). This would lead to the proportional composition between services. Under the integration model of jointness, the composition of services will be less disproportionate (Mukherjee 2017). In contrary, the composition of the military would be disproportionate under the coordination model of jointness. Empirically, we would observe that there is a considerable gap of personnel and unit between the branch services. This condition is particularly evident when single-service approach dominates the defense doctrine. Accordingly, the dominant service gradually shows larger distribution of personnel and unit compares to other services. It should be noted, however, that even if the doctrine promotes jointness, the actual composition of military may be disproportionate. For example, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) composition. Despite the Chinese government's priority to accelerate the PLA vision of a joint-force in 2020, around 70 percent of PLA personnel remained from the Army service branch (PLAA) (Saunders and Chen 2018). Army officers continued to occupy strategic positions within the PLA.

In addition, level of military jointness can be gauged from the military force structure. Under the integrated model of jointness, the military organization incorporates a fully institutionalized joint command and control structure (Blasko 2016; Mukherjee 2017). Empirically, the integrated model of force structure "appoints Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) or Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, [who] have theatre commands and have a Joint Headquarters at the operational level" (Mukherjee 2017, 9). In the coordination model, we would observe the absence of joint structure command since cooperation between services largely depends on

---

higher military budget is considered as the proxy for lack of jointness in the armed forces since jointness may reduce the military budget by cutting down the overlapping units. On the other hand, a higher military budget is often imperative for jointness as far as the technological advancement included as the variable of interoperability between services. For military justice, it remains impossible to deduce a logical explanation on the role of military justice towards military effectiveness in the battlefield. Meanwhile, the ideational aspect has been explained through the prior discussion on defense doctrine.



the decision of each service commander. Nevertheless, there are some cases where joint command structure exists but the scope of its authority over the branch services remains strictly limited, for example the structure of Chief of Joint Staff in Chile after the 2010 defense reform law (Dreisbach 2015). If this is the case, then the jointness model must be gauged as coordination rather than integration. While inter-services cooperation is possible under the coordination model, it remains unclear how the selected form of cooperation would resolve contentious issues in regard to command and control between the services (Mukherjee 2017). As such, cooperation between services merely takes the *ad hoc* basis rather than is well-institutionalized.

The third and final attribute is technology. The technological aspect of a military organization concerns the capability of the military to gain victory with the existing weapon systems. The term “weapon system” refers to major item of military equipment or platform, e.g. tanks, ships, aircraft and missiles, and its subsystem, e.g. power plants, armaments, navigation equipment, maintenance facilities, communication, training, spare parts (Fox 2011, 5). The early RMA discussion emphasized the central role of technology advancement in winning the war, but such a normative argument has changed gradually (Gray 2006). Ultimately, without a clear strategy, even possessing the most advanced weaponry will not automatically transform a military to change its conduct of warfare (Hundley 1999, 27). Lessons learned from the experience of the US RMA on its weapon system reflects that “the ability to exercise military control is shifting from forces with the best or the most individual weapons systems toward forces with better information and greater ability to quickly plan, coordinate, and accurately attack” (Van Atta and Lippitz 2003, 5–6). This indicates that, in order to achieve greater effectiveness in the battlefield, the modern military organization must integrate its weapon system rather than promoting single high-technology weapon. Of course, explaining the technical aspects of weapon technology is beyond the scope of this dissertation. But the question of what and how military acquire such technology has become part of the recent research agenda of civil-military relations study and defense studies, specifically under the discussion of defense procurement (Lockyer 2013; Reykers and Fonck 2019).

Defense procurement can be understood as “the processes by which states acquire goods and services required by their armed forces” (Uttley 2018, 72). Such a process may contribute to the integration attribute of military effectiveness by “aligning resource allocations and weapon capabilities to doctrine and tactics” (Brooks 2007, 20). This dissertation proposes that the defense procurement process can be utilized as a proxy to indicate different type of military jointness in terms of technological attribute. In the technologically-driven RMA debates, the term jointness is often used interchangeable with the term “interoperability” (Paget 2016). The interoperability of the weapon system here is defined as “the compatibility of equipment and interchangeability of parts, fuel and ammunition” (Taylor 1982, 95). As such, the core issue is to what extent the defense procurement process actually encourages and results in the interoperability of weapon system between services (Lockyer 2013).

The argument between the procurement process and military jointness in this study is straightforward. Under the integrated model of jointness, the defense planner adheres to acquire a weapons platform that increases interoperability between services. As such, the mechanism for procurement is guided by the principle of interoperability. For example, under the long-dominant threat-based approach, each service in the US armed forces was allowed to identify the threat and develop its own weapon systems to respond accordingly. This has resulted in a lack of interoperability between the weapon systems. In 2003, the US defense procurement process underwent a major overhaul to include three layers of requirement mechanisms for purchases. The interoperability of weapon systems was then attached to the defense procurement process through the first layer: the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) mechanism. The JCIDS formulates specific requirements for the weapon system that transforms the old threat-based approach into a capabilities-based (Schwartz 2014). The mechanism works according to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01H and follows the Manual for the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System.

In practice, the JCIDS mechanism promotes “a more collaborative method of identifying capability gaps across services instead of each service developing its own response” in the defense procurement process (Schwartz 2014, 4). In contrast, the defense procurement process under the coordinated model of jointness is far from promoting interoperability of weapons between services. It is not the core interest for each service to acquire weapons that increase the likelihood of interoperability, and thus we would empirically observe the procurement process is in a rather isolated manner among the services. Even if there is an effort in the procurement process to support weapon interoperability, such an effort is usually made on an ad hoc basis, or involves only certain services, not all of them.

From the institutional change perspective, the coordination model and integration model of military jointness in the defense sector envisage two different outcomes. At one hand, the coordination model shows institutional change in national defense that not necessarily replaces the status quo i.e., single-service domination or the absence of the multi-service approach. On the other hand, the integration model of jointness indicates the replacement of the aforementioned status quo with a new one i.e., replacing the old single-service approach with a new multi-service approach in regard to national defense policy orientation. The section below elaborates several change strategies that correspond to different outcomes above that can be employed by the civilian change agents.

## **2.2. The change strategy of defense transformation**

The theory of gradual institutional change proposes four strategies of change: displacement, layering, drift, and conversion. The core difference between these strategies is based on their behavior towards the existing rules or status quo in an institution (see table below).

**Table 2.2. Strategy of institutional change**

	<b>Displacement</b>	<b>Layering</b>	<b>Drift</b>	<b>Conversion</b>
Removal of old rules	Yes	No	No	No
Neglect of old rules	-	No	Yes	No
Changed impact/enactment of old rules	-	No	Yes	Yes
Introduction of new rules	Yes	Yes	No	No

Source: Mahoney and Thelen (2009, 16).

*Displacement* refers to the removal of existing rules and the introduction of a new one (Mahoney and Thelen 2009, 15). Displacement can take the form of a rapid breakdown of institution and its replacement with a new institution or a slow-moving process which involves effort by disadvantaged actors under the old rules (Pierson 2003; Streeck and Thelen 2005). In both cases, the “traditional arrangements are discredited or pushed to the side in favor of new institutions and associated behavioral logics” (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 20). In *layering*, actors introduce new rules, yet without removing the old one. Layering only amends, revises or adds new rules to existing ones (Schickler 2001; Streeck and Thelen 2005; Falleti and Lynch 2009; Rocco and Thurston 2014). Later, the new rules change the way existing institution structures behavior (Mahoney and Thelen 2009, 16).

Meanwhile, *drift* does not remove the old rules nor introduces new ones. In this mode of institutional change, actors hold the old rules constant and allow the environment to change the impact of the rules (Mahoney and Thelen 2009; Hacker, Thelen, and Pierson 2013). In this regard, drift highlights actor inaction in paving the way for institutional change. Finally, the *conversion* mode does not remove the old rules, neglect or replace them, but only changes the impact. Conversion emphasizes actor activeness to exploit the ambiguous rule so that the impact becomes more favorable to them (Mahoney and Thelen 2009; Hacker, Thelen, and Pierson 2013; Rocco and Thurston 2014). Conversion recalibrates the existing institution or policy through its authoritative redirection, reinterpretation, or re-appropriation (Hacker, Thelen, and Pierson 2013, 8).

In summary, the strategy suggests that institutional change may result from four possible actions: removing the status quo and replacing it with a new one; keeping the status quo while adding new rules; recalibrating the enactment of existing status quo; or no action at all. Nevertheless, the interest of this study is to investigate what kind of action was taken by the civilian change agent to initiate change in the defense sector. Thus, the drift strategy is dropped from consideration since the strategy is inherently based on the view that change is caused by exogenous factors and actor's inaction. This leaves only three possible strategies: displacement, layering and conversion.

The three strategies of institutional change substantially correspond to the proposed strategies of defense reform in the defense transformation literature. Accordingly, the literature on defense transformation proposes two main strategies of transforming or reforming the defense sector (Binnendijk 2002; Lira 2004; Park 2014). The first strategy of defense transformation entails the revolution, revolutionary change and leap ahead approach in the defense policy, later termed Change and Adjust Strategy (CAS) by Park (2014, p. 385). The core objective of CAS strategy is the discontinuation of the existing status quo in a rapid manner (Park 2014; see also, Binnendijk 2002). As such, the CAS strategy follows the logic of displacement strategy of institutional change.

Meanwhile the second strategy of defense transformation is Plan and Change Strategy (PCS) that is understood as a "reform, evolutionary change, steady-as-you-go" approach in pursuing defense reform (Park 2014, p .385). Unlike the former strategy, PCS does not necessarily discontinue the existing status quo but allows for revision and incorporation of new elements in an evolutionary process (Park 2014). In this regard, PCS aspires to the layering and conversion strategies.

The displacement, layering and conversion strategies of institutional reform can also be associated with the expected outcome of jointness. The displacement strategy substantially aspires to the integration model since the displacement strategy abruptly removes the status quo, and replaces it with a new one. Empirically, civilian change agents replace the existing status quo (single-service

approach) with a new rule (multi-service approach) in the doctrinal, organizational and technological aspects of the national defense. Regarding the defense doctrine, the civilian party can replace the existing doctrine with a new one that clearly incorporates or promotes military jointness between the services.

The US experience is an illustrative case in this aspect. The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 clearly stipulates that the US Armed Forces must be reorganized to achieve jointness in military capability (Jackson 2018). After replacing the old doctrine with jointness doctrine, civilian leaders established structure and process at the organization level to implement the jointness. Another example is the Brazilian defense reform. The Brazilian ministry of defense established the Armed Forces Joint Staff in 2010 to promote the concept of jointness among the service branches, both in planning and operational terms after the major change of its defense doctrine in 2008 (Cepik and Licks Bertol 2016; Dreisbach 2016).

Meanwhile, the *coordination* model outcome of jointness is highly relevant with the layering strategy and conversion strategy. Both strategies do not replace the existing status quo in the defense but rather, add new rules or change implementation of rules to achieve jointness between services. Empirically, the layering strategy takes form as the addition of new instrumental layers – i.e. regulation or actors – to enact the existing rules (van der Heijden 2011). These layers, as Cash and Bridge (2018, 4) note, “add to procedures in a way that transforms the operational capacities, decision-making or mission of an institution”. While formal integration of jointness in the doctrinal and organizational aspect is difficult to achieve, civilian decision-makers could foster jointness through the addition of regulations or actors that intensify coordinative efforts between services. These may include, for example, assigning a new standard on aggregate military power with emphasis on joint capability, encouraging regular joint military training between services regularly or establishing a coordination forum between services in regard to defense procurement.

The case of China's doctrinal evolution matches the layering strategy. Until now, the China defense doctrine keeps the "people's war" concept as its center of gravity. Changing the doctrine to support jointness between services is a challenging project since the historical value of "people's war" is inextricably linked to Mao's ideological construct, and thus any radical change of the doctrine is strictly prohibited, if not taboo (Joffe 1987; Huang 2001). In the 1980s, President Deng Xiaoping cautiously added a new element in the people's war doctrine by introducing the "people's war under modern conditions" which paved the way for the military modernization agenda and establishment of joint command in the PLA (Wang 1984; Joffe 1987). At the organizational level, an example of layering strategy to promote jointness was utilized by President Michelle Bachelet of Chile through the enactment of a new defense law in 2010. Accordingly, the Chilean Armed Forces (FAC) were largely fragmented, with each service maintaining autonomy on strategic and operational matters. The new defense law then put another layer in the existing defense institution by mandating the establishment of a joint chief of staff with limited authority only to command the whole services during wartime/crises without any power to promote jointness during peacetime (Dreisbach 2015).

In contrast to layering, conversion does not add new rules onto an existing one. Layering reconfigures the way the institution implements its existing rules to promote fundamentally different goals (Falleti 2010; Mahoney and Thelen 2015). For example, the doctrine of the Colombian Armed Forces was influenced by an internal armed conflict yet with lack of reference on inter-agency cooperation (Guevara 2017). In 2011, the Colombian government established 12 joint task forces involving all the services under the Armed Forces to fight against the narco-terrorist group the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (Bruneau 2011). These efforts were part of the military strategy adjustment devised by the defense ministry, which emphasized innovation, interagency coordination, joint operations and precision strikes against the narco-terrorist groups nationwide (Pinzón 2016). Due to its effectiveness in destroying the group networks, the joint task force was gradually "upgraded" into the area joint commands structure in the armed forces (Bruneau 2011).

Overall, the discussion above shows three different strategies – displacement, layering and conversion – that can be utilized by civilian decision-makers to promote jointness in the military. It also specifies how the application of each strategy would result in a different model of jointness as mentioned previously. The next question is how can we explain what factors affect the civilian change agent’s decision to select each strategy? This is the objective of the following section.

### **2.3. Institutional determinants of change in defense transformation**

As outlined above, this research suggests that civilian intervention is the crucial factor in the defense transformation process. Viewed as such, civilian control of the military becomes the theoretical parameter for explaining the explanatory variables. It has been widely accepted within the theories of civil-military relations that strong civilian cohesion is imperative for the probability of establishing civilian control of the military (Huntington 1957; Stepan 1988; Agüero 1995; Desch 1999; Trinkunas 2005; Croissant et al. 2013). Borrowing from this consensus, theories of civil-military relations have attempted to explain the particular conditions in which political institutions of a polity can enhance or undermine civilian cohesion vis-à-vis the military to establish control.

Huntington was the first scholar to offer an explanation. He suggested that the separation of powers among political institutions has a negative effect on civilian control of the military and military professionalism because it increases the opportunity for military leaders to intervene in the political arena (Huntington 1957, 177). However, there was little interest among scholars to further develop this institutional perspective, mainly due to the strong influence of behavioral perspectives in political science in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1990s, the emergence of the so-called “new institutionalism” approach renewed scholarly interest to expand the explanatory power of institution in the study of politics (Hall and Taylor 1996). This new development made significant contributions to the institutional perspective within the study of civil-military relations.



Analyzing institutions means explaining how the “rules of the game” in a polity that influenced civilian attempts to institutionalize or exercise control of the military. For Avant (1994; 2007), the governance system of a polity-parliamentary (unified) or presidential (divided) yields significant impact on civilian attempts to influence military organization and doctrine. Accordingly, for a unified system of governance, like the British parliamentary system, it is expected to be easier for civilians to make decisions on national defense (Avant 1994). The higher the chance for civilian politicians to establish agreement on national policy, the more capable civilians are to communicate their preferences to the military (Avant 2007, 82). At the same time, preference fulfilment also increases the likelihood of civilians to establish institutional mechanisms to prevent military transgressions.

In contrast, divided systems, such as the US presidential system, must bear the cost of conflict and competition among civilian institutions (executive branch of the president and the Congress), rendering it more difficult for civilians to make a unanimous decision. Consequently, competing interests between civilian principals afford the military the opportunity to select policy closer to its interest or to play the competing civilians against each other to obtain more favorable policy (Avant 2007, 82). More importantly, divided systems also increase mistrust between civilians, which in turn restricts civilian control strategies by selecting strategies that preserve civilian political powers rather than an effective measure for long-term (Avant 2007, 83). While not making a clear attribution to any particular government system, Agüero also suggests that institutional configuration is a decisive factor in establishing control of the military (Agüero 1995; 2001). He argues that the ability of political parties and other organizations to coalesce around formal agreements on institutions and basic rules of governance is as important as the bargaining power of civilians vis-à-vis the military during the transition to democracy (Agüero 2001, 204). In line with Avant, such strong inter-institutional civilian consensus will restrict the military’s ability to resist civilian directive.

Hunter’s (1997) analysis on civil-military relations in post-authoritarian Brazil, while claiming to be motivated by the rational choice approach, also considered

how political institutions (electoral and party system) in the South American nation contributed to the incentives of civilian politicians to challenge military prerogatives. The candidate-centered electoral system, the fragmented party system and the lack of internal party cohesion were the institutional features that personalized politics in Brazil (Hunter 1997, 17-19). In order to survive in such a highly personalized political environment, Brazilian politicians increasingly sought to expand their financial and political resources. Consequently, civilians challenged the military by cutting its budget to increase its pork-barrel fund to maintain an electoral patronage network (Hunter 1997,10). Moreover, in order to boost their electoral popularity among poor citizens, politicians frequently blocked military legislative proposals to restrict labor protests or popular mobilization.

Pion-Berlin (1997) added to the discussion through his institutional analysis on different outcomes of civilian control efforts in post-authoritarian Argentina. Principally, Pion-Berlin contended that the real outcome of civil-military relations is ultimately mediated by the institutions that enable and constrain the ability of the military to exercise power. In this regard, two institutional features deserve closer scrutiny: concentration of decision-making authority and decision-making autonomy. The former refers to “the number of actors or unit involved in formulating and implementing policy” (Pion-Berlin 1997, 36). Higher concentration concerns the allocation of power under a single decision-maker whose preference will always prevail in the policy outcome. Meanwhile, decision-making autonomy refers to the ability of an agency to insulate itself from external pressures, for example, the military (Pion-Berlin 1997, 37). In this regard, higher autonomy requires an agency to restrict access to its institutional decision-making process from the military. Furthermore, agency autonomy is also higher when its ability to act independently from the military is codified and civilians improve their knowledge of military affairs (Pion-Berlin 1997, 38-39). Following these two institutional variables, the proposed causal effect between institutions and civilian control of the military is that the higher the concentration of decision-making power and autonomy, the more likely policy outcomes of civilian control will succeed.

The major contribution of Pion-Berlin's institutional model is its ability to predict the impact of institutional arrangements on the specific outcomes of civil-military relations in emerging democracies. Accordingly, the model fittingly captures why civilians were more successful in cutting the military budget rather than resolving human rights issues or pursuing defense reform. From these studies, it can be deduced that recent theoretical discussions in the study of civil-military relations had suggested that institutions have an unquestionable impact on civilian control of the military. To be more specific, the scholarly literature offers the *concentration of decision-making power* and *civilian autonomy* as the part of political institutions that influence the outcome of civilian control (Huntington 1957; Avant 1994; Agüero 1995; Pion-Berlin 1997; Desch 1999).

In the following discussion, I start by proposing that the answer to the questions of who can be involved in the policy-making process in the defense sector, who can change the contents of policy proposal as well as whose consent is needed to pass the policy proposal are the most important indicators that reflect the opportunities and constraints derived from existing political institutions. Theoretically, these questions refer to the number of decision-makers, their policy position and their internal cohesion, which can be summarized as the "veto player configuration" in the policy-making process of a polity (Tsebelis 2002). This configuration then results in different levels of "policy stability", or the difficulty of significantly changing the status quo (Tsebelis 2002; see also Mahoney and Thelen 2009). I refer to this theoretical proposition as *the veto player configuration* variable that denotes the concentration of decision-making power in civilian control as aforementioned.

Nevertheless, the level of policy stability only explains the possibility of enacting policy change, and not the direction of such change (Tsebelis 2002). To explain the latter, I include the *level of discretion or enforcement in the targeted institution* as another intervening variable (Mahoney and Thelen 2009). Measuring *the level of discretion* allows us to understand the scope of change that can be afforded by civilian decision-makers towards the existing status quo. In other words, the question is to what extent civilians hold autonomy from military interference

within the defense institution regarding defense policy-making and policy implementation.

### **2.3.1. Veto player configuration**

The configuration of veto player conveys whether opportunities for formal revision of policies or institutions through legislation are limited or not (Hacker, Thelen, and Pierson 2013). The veto player approach provides the analytical tools for explaining such opportunities (Mahoney and Thelen 2009). During the last two decades, scholars have utilized veto players analyses to explain the possibility of policy change across issues and regimes. Its main advantage is that it allows researchers to compare the impact of political institutions on decision-making processes in a variety of institutional settings, from a presidential to a parliamentary system or from a one-party to a multi-party system (Hallerberg 2011). Before explaining the theoretical framework of veto player analysis, it is important to clarify what type is employed in this study. Principally, there are two approaches of veto player analysis. *First*, there are “veto points” (Immergut 1990; Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993) or “veto gates” (Shugart and Haggard 2001), both of which focus only on the institution or the constitutional structure of a polity responsible for enacting policies. *Second*, there is a variant of veto players analysis, which refers to the aggregation of institutional (veto points) and partisan (political party) veto players, and their preferences (Tsebelis 1995; 2002). This study applies the latter since the framework suggested by Tsebelis can explain the possibility of policy change in a more complex situation and with greater detail. Tsebelis’s veto player theorem moves beyond the argument of veto points and veto gates by acknowledging that in many cases, different institutional veto players may have identical partisan composition groups or that a single veto player may be composed of multiple partisan players. The theory suggests that policy change is a function of the complex interaction of three factors: the number of veto players, their ideological positions and their internal cohesion (Tsebelis 1995; 2002). The basic proposition is straightforward: increasing the number of veto players, increasing their ideological distance between them and increasing cohesion of each of the veto players to contribute to ‘policy stability’, or the

difficulty of effecting significant change in the status quo (Tsebelis 1995; 2000; 2002). The main features of each factor are explained as follows.

The first factor is the number of veto players. Tsebelis proposes that political institutions shape the constellation of veto players in a polity and later define the likelihood for policy change. Accordingly, veto players are “individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo” (Tsebelis 2002, 19). Tsebelis (2010, 4) contends that “as the number of veto players increases, policy stability does not decrease (a change of the status quo does not become easier, though it may not become more difficult).” Veto players can be divided into two types: institutional and partisan. An institutional veto player obtains its powers from the constitutional arrangements of the country, such as the president, parliament, constitutional court and central bank (Tsebelis 2002). Meanwhile, a partisan veto player is the consequence of a political game between institutional veto players, for example, political parties inside the executive or legislative branches (Tsebelis 2002; Croissant 2003). There is a two-step guide for counting the number of veto players. In the first step, one needs to identify the number of institutional veto players from the constitutional arrangements. A presidential system is assumed to establish more veto players than a parliamentary system. The constitutional design of presidentialism demands a so-called as “transactional” legislative-executive relationship, which mandates that the consent of both the president and the legislature is required to pass laws (Shugart 2008). Nevertheless, not all presidents hold formal veto power. Empirically, this can be observed by using Shugart and Carey’s index of presidential legislative powers (Shugart and Carey 1992).

Another important factor to consider in counting the number of institutional veto players is the existence of bicameralism. A polity with a second chamber adds another institutional veto player, whose approval is also often needed to pass legislation. Once the institutional veto players have been identified, the following step is to disaggregate the institutional players into the partisan players that constituted them (Tsebelis 2002, 80). It should be noted that the veto player theory assumes that all partisan veto players are distinct from each other and that

all parties should therefore be counted as different veto players, including those comprising a coalition government (Tsebelis 2000, 309). Accordingly, the number of partisan veto players can be observed from two aspects: the level of fragmentation of the party system and the size of the coalition government (Tsebelis 1995, 304–5; Croissant 2003, 75).

Fragmentation of the party system refers to number of political parties that effectively operate within a polity. The term “effective” refers not only to the need to calculate the number of parties within a system but also their relative size. Regarding legislation, this means only counting the number and seat distribution of parties inside the parliament. Principally, a party system is considered fragmented if the number of parties exceeds two and no majority prevails in the parliament (Karvonen 2011, 1823). The most widely used tool of political scientists to measure party system fragmentation is the Laakso-Taagepera Index of the effective number of parliamentary parties (Laakso and Taagepera 1979). Once calculated, higher numbers of ENPP refer to a higher fragmentation of a party system, and indicate the existence of multiple veto players. The next aspect is *coalition size*. The veto player theory treats members of the coalition government as partisan veto players since any government initiatives must be approved by them (Tsebelis 1995, 302).

Principally, government coalitions are considered to be important for parliamentary systems but not for presidential systems due to the separation of the survival of executive and legislative bodies. As such, the number of institutional veto players tends to be greater for countries with presidential systems, which demand inter-branch negotiation. On the other hand, the application of partisan veto players fits with the “hierarchical” legislative-executive relationship of a parliamentary system that does not necessitate inter-branch negotiation. Nevertheless, this is not always the case for a presidential system, particularly in multiparty presidential systems where a minority president needs strong support from a wide array of parties in parliament to pass his or her policy agenda into legislation. In fact, lessons learned from multiparty presidential systems like those in Latin America show that government coalitions

are favorable, and significantly stabilized the region's governments (Pereira and Melo 2012).

Regarding coalitions, it is important to take into account the "absorption rule" in counting the number of veto players. According to this rule, institutional veto players are replaced by partisan veto players if a stable coalition and/or ideological congruence between the players exists (Tsebelis 2002, 19). For example, policy-making in the United States formally requires the agreement of one individual player (president) and two collective players (the House and the Senate). In the United Kingdom, there is only one veto player (parliament) since one party can control the majorities and establish the government. But the counting result changes when parties in the United States are highly cohesive and a coalition government emerges in the United Kingdom. In the case of the United States, if the Democratic Party controls the presidency and the House, and the Republican Party controls the Senate, then we expect only two (partisan) veto players (Democratic and Republican). In contrast, in the UK's case, the number of veto players is two (partisan) as a result of a coalition. It should be noted, however, that the absorption rule is not always applicable to presidential systems since its separation of powers does not invariably contribute to coalition discipline in the parliament. It should be noted that agreement between these partisan veto players is neither necessary nor sufficient for policy change since the constitution is the only institutional veto player with the authority to enact law (Tsebelis 1995). Such a situation is evident in the case of non-enforceable coalitions – either in parliamentary or presidential systems – when a policy proposal approved by a government coalition may be blocked in parliament. This is the reason why veto player analysis separates the internal cohesion of each veto player as another factor, which will be explained later.

Another important consideration in defining the number of veto players is the study magnitude. If veto players analysis is applied to the case studies model, then all relevant players – including the courts, referenda and even single legislator – must be counted (Hallerberg 2011). Indeed, Tsebelis also suggests to include the military as a veto player, even if they only hold an informal role as an armed forces

representative in the policy making process (Tsebelis 2002, 81). Tsebelis (1995) also mentions that interest groups can be a potential veto player, but he does not explain how such actors can influence the policy process without being granted formal veto powers. Stoiber (2006) attempts to fill this research lacunae by proposing that societal actors such as civil society organization and international agencies can be veto players in specific policy issues, naming them “situational veto players”. Nonetheless, the conceptual definition of civilian control of the military in this study limits the actors to those civilian decision-makers possessing authority and legitimacy to enact policies.

To summarize, the veto players theory emphasizes that the institutional properties of a polity such as constitutional arrangement and party system hold the possibilities for policy change. Initiating change demands policy decisiveness, which is equivalent to the concentration of decision-making powers (Haggard, McCubbins, and Shugart 2001). Political institutions that distribute power in a highly fragmented fashion may hinder policy change opportunities (Cox and McCubbins 2001; MacIntyre 2003). But the number of veto players is not itself sufficient to explain the possibility of policy change. It is also essential to measure another variable: the ideological distance between veto players.

The second factor is ideological distance between veto players. As mentioned previously, veto player analysis assumes that increasing the ideological distance between partisan veto players will impede changing the status quo. Tsebelis (2010, 4) postulates two aspects regarding party distance: “first, common knowledge of the location of the different veto players in the policy space, and second, that they exercise their veto only on the basis of their policy preferences, not on the basis of other considerations (such as electoral goals, appeal to their constituency, etc.)”. In other words, the veto player theorem assumes actor preferences are “fixed” (Ganghof 2003).

How does the distance influence the possibility of policy change? Suppose that the current policy status quo is 50. There are three veto players whose agreement is required to change it, and each have different preferences: 51, 53 and 55. In this



situation, the possibility of changing the status quo is high since the preference distance of the veto players is relatively small. When one of the players has a preference of 60, however, the distance between the players widens, and it becomes more difficult to change the status quo. Following the preference distance, veto players analysis proposes the redistributive advantage of the “agenda-setter”, or the player who makes the first proposal. Veto players theory claims that agenda setting power, specifically nonfinancial bills, is usually controlled by the parliament in a presidential system and the government in a parliamentary system. Agenda setters can consider certain points from the other players’ preferences before making proposals. Hence, it is not necessary for them to negotiate too far from their ideal points. Nevertheless, this advantage will be reduced if the “number of veto player[s] increases and the position of [the] agenda setter is located centrally within the veto players” (Tsebelis 2002, 37). Veto player analysis suggests two main steps to gauge the ideological distance between parties. *First*, it is important to identify the number of dimensions regarding the respective policy space. For example, one can employ a single policy dimension, like Bawn (1999) does to explain Germany’s budget change from 1961 to 1989 or Tsebelis (1995, 2002) does to explain why significant labor legislation occurred in 16 European countries, based on a left-right continuum. Meanwhile, Tsebelis and Chang (2004) apply two policy dimensions: first, they utilize the left-right continuum and the foreign policy dimension of a party’s position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union to explain the budget changes in 19 advanced industrial countries from 1973 to 1995. It is important to note that in single-policy dimensions, ideological distance is measured through use of a “range”, or the distance between the two most extreme veto players (Jahn 2010; Tsebelis 2010).

Once the policy dimension is established, the *second* step is to define the ideological positions of the veto players. Veto player analysis considers the definition of these positions a matter of empirical measurement. Hence, Tsebelis (2010) suggests one can benefit from several existing methods to perform this task: expert survey assessments; party manifesto projects that evaluate the policy positions of parties during elections; or the use of computerized programs based on party documents.

And finally, the third factor is internal cohesion of each veto player. Following the number of veto players and the ideological distance between them, the internal cohesiveness of each veto player must also be taken into account. Tsebelis (2002, 84-85) postulates that “the lower the party cohesion, the lower is the policy stability”, which means policy change becomes more abrupt and vice versa. As aforementioned, the internal cohesion of parties also defines whether the application of the “absorption rule” is necessary or not in counting the number of veto players. What happens if the internal cohesion of parties is low? In this case, Tsebelis (2002, 85) contends that the study must be restricted to the analysis of institutional veto players. Cohesion is considered the level of party discipline (Tsebelis 2002, 84). The internal cohesion of veto players is high when party discipline is high and vice versa. If a political party is able to discipline its members in the legislative arena, then coordinating policy change becomes easier (Croissant 2003). How can we infer party discipline? While acknowledging that the dominant perspective in the literature contends that a parliamentary system is more likely to increase party discipline than a presidential one, veto player analysis suggests that efforts to measure the internal cohesion of partisan veto players should be gauged from the degree of personal vote incentives in the electoral system (Tsebelis 2002, 84). It follows that electoral systems promoting the importance of the personal reputation of representatives to win parliamentary seats will discourage legislators from following party directives, thus lowering the internal cohesion of each partisan veto player. In contrast, if building party reputation is the main ticket to winning elections, then legislators will always follow party lines to increase their chances of future re-election, resulting in strong party cohesion.

Studies on electoral systems suggest that if electoral systems encourage a greater role of the party in deciding the electoral fate of a legislative candidate, then less autonomy can be exercised by the elected representative to pursue his or her own preferences, conversely translating into higher party discipline in the legislative arena (Carey and Shugart 1995; Cox and McCubbins 2001; Norris 2004; Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008). Scholars have proposed several indicators to define the degree of a party – or candidate – centered electoral system. These indicators are list-systems, district magnitude, candidate selection and campaign finance

(Geddes 1994; Carey and Shugart 1995; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Crisp et al. 2004; Cheibub 2007; Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008; Crisp et al. 2009). The most widely used tool to measure the degree of personal incentive is Carey-Shugart's rank ordering of the electoral system based on four variables: ballot, pool, vote and district magnitude (Carey and Shugart 1995, 420–23). Each variable – except district magnitude, which will be explained later – is measured using an ordinal scoring system ranging from 0-2.

The ballot variable measures two elements of party leaders' control of the ballot: party endorsement and ballot-rank (Carey and Shugart 1995, 420). A score of 0 reflects that party leaders control candidate nomination as well as the nominee's rank on the ballot list. In addition, voters refrain from "disturbing" the list to define the winning candidate, which means voters vote for parties rather than candidates (Carey and Shugart 1995, 421). In this context, parties monopolize the electoral fate of candidates as well as the future re-election of incumbent legislators (Geddes 1994; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). Consequently, there is little incentive for candidates to cultivate personal reputations prior to elections. A score of 1 also means party leaders hold the authority to endorse legislative candidates and their ranks on the ballot list. However, voters may disturb the list and their vote will decide which candidate gets elected, indicating a higher incentive for cultivating personal reputations. On the other hand, a score of 2 for the ballot variable means party leaders do not endorse or rank candidates, thus maximizing the value of generating personal reputations for candidates.

The pool variable concerns "whether votes cast for one candidate of a given party also contribute to the number of seats won in the district by the party as a whole" (Carey and Shugart 1995, 421). If all votes are pooled under the party label to allocate the number of seats gained by a party based on the list, then the pool score is 0. In practice, this means incentives to cultivate personal reputations are low since electoral success depends primarily on the total vote gathered by a party. Such incentives increase when the pool score is 1, which indicates votes are pooled at the sub-party level (individual/faction in the same list) rather than across entire parties. This in turn increases the value of personal reputations in the election.

The pool variable score is 2 whenever there is no pooling at all in the electoral system, which means seat allocation is purely calculated based on a candidate's total personal vote. For the *vote* variable, each score is divided as follows. A score of 0 means voters may only cast votes for a party, as is the case in closed-list systems. Clearly, there is little value of building personal reputations in such a system. A score of 1 allows voters to cast multiple votes for multiple candidates from similar lists or across party lists, which usually take place in *panachage* variants or in multi-seat plurality systems. In such circumstances, the value of candidates to cultivate personal reputations increases. A score of 2 denotes voter casts single vote for candidate. This reflects an open-list system and simultaneously encourages intraparty and interparty competition (Shugart and Carey 1995, 423).

From these variable scores, Shugart and Carey establish 13 possible configurations. Each configuration indicates a different level of incentive to cultivate personal reputations in elections (for details see Table 1, Shugart and Carey 1995, 425). Finally, the district magnitude, that is, the number of allocated seats for a single district, also contributes to the degree of incentives to cultivate personal votes. For closed-list systems, that is,  $\text{ballot}=0$ , higher district magnitude lowers the incentives to cultivate personal votes for candidates and/or incumbent legislators (Shugart and Carey 1995, 431). Other than closed-list system, higher district magnitude encourages larger incentives for developing personal reputations (see also Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). In practice, larger district magnitudes in open-list systems means more candidates will join the competition and therefore establishing strong links with constituents becomes indispensable.

Although Tsebelis emphasizes that the three variables above are important for a comprehensive analysis, some scholars only apply the number of veto players as an explanatory tool (Hallerberg and Basinger 1998; Shugart and Haggard 2001; MacIntyre 2003). For this study, I employ all three variables since each of them possesses distinctive explanatory power regarding the implications of institutions on the legislative process of institutionalizing civilian control. Accordingly, the number of veto player variables can indicate whether decision-making power is

concentrated in a single political institution or is fragmented. The ideological distance and internal cohesion of veto players can approximate the degree of civilian unity. Empirically, it can be observed that a veto player configuration comprising multiple veto players, a widening ideological distance, and strong internal cohesion suggest fragmented decision-making powers and weak civilian unity in the legislative process. Consequently, these conditions yield greater policy stability and make it more difficult to enact policy change regarding the status quo since civilians are unable to act cohesively. On the other hand, if the veto player configuration shows that the number of veto players is represented by a single entity, closer ideological distance, and strong internal cohesion, then decision-making power is concentrated and civilian unity is strong. Consequently, smaller policy stability exists, increasing the likelihood of policy change because civilians are able to act cohesively (see Table 2.3. below).

**Table 2.3. Veto player configuration and policy stability**

If the veto players configuration is comprised of...	Then policy stability (status quo) is...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Multiple veto (institutional and/or partisan) players (more than one)</li> <li>• Farther ideological distance between players (dispersing position)</li> <li>• Strong internal cohesion of each player</li> </ul>	high
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A small number of veto (institutional and/or partisan) players (closer to one)</li> <li>• Closer ideological distance between players (converging position)</li> <li>• Weak internal cohesion of each player</li> </ul>	low

Source: author's compilation.

Principally, veto player theory proposes a parsimonious explanation of how political institutions (constitutional structure, party system and electoral system) constitute actors and structure their interactions in the policy-making process. For Mahoney and Thelen (2009), a high veto barrier means that supplanting the existing status quo with a new one is difficult to achieve. It would be impossible for the change agents to mobilize political resources or political coalition that

strong enough to displace the existing status quo (Mahoney and Thelen 2009, 19). Under such circumstances, the layering strategy is more likely to prevail. In contrast, if the existing political context indicates low veto barriers, then it would be easier to replace the existing status quo. As a result, displacement strategy or conversion strategy becomes more likely. Nevertheless, Tsebelis (2002) makes it clear that his veto player approach only describes the *possibility* of policy change in different political settings. Similarly, Mahoney and Thelen (2009) stress that in order to analyze the direction of institutional change based on the existing change strategies, the argument on veto possibilities itself is not sufficient. For the entire picture of change strategy mechanism, one must take into account the level of discretion in the targeted institution, as explained below.

### **2.3.2. Level of discretion in defense institution**

Institutions are attributed as resources that provide opportunity as well as constraint on the actors' actions on possible political projects (Mahoney and Snyder 1999, 24–25). The level of discretion in a targeted institution refers to the question whether “the targeted institution affords actors opportunities for exercising discretion in interpretation or enforcement” (Mahoney and Thelen 2009, 18). Consequently, one approaches the discretion issue by explaining actor's compliance with the existing rules inside the targeted institution. With respect to the veto configuration-status quo relations above, the causal argument between level of discretion and change strategy is straightforward. If the level of discretion in the targeted institution is low, then change can be conducted by putting additional rules or displacing the status quo with a new one. As such, the layering and displacement strategies are more likely to be taken by civilian decision-makers in transforming the defense sector.

Restricted discretion means that the change agents can only pursue change either by adding new rules (layering) without changing the status quo or, if they hold enough political resources against the status quo defenders, supplanting the status quo (displacement) with a new one. On the other hand, high level of discretion in the targeted institution affords the change agents with institutional change that taking the benefit of disjuncture between rules and enforcement. As

such, the agents may benefit from the ambiguity of rules to induce change by influencing the rule's implementation which corresponds to the conversion strategy. Rather than replacing the status quo, change agents may benefit from high discretion to redirect the existing rules in such a manner that conforms to their interests.

While providing a convincing argument on the effect of discretion level to direction of change, Mahoney and Thelen (2009) do not explain in detail about the empirical sources of discretion. The authors highlight the centrality of administrative capacities to enforce rules in a targeted institution as the most observable indicator on the scope of discretion (Mahoney and Thelen 2009, 21). In other words, if the organizational capacity of the targeted institution to enforce the existing status quo is robust, then we would observe the level of discretion is low, and vice versa. For the purpose of this study, the causal argument directs us to investigate the organizational structure of "defense bureaucracy" as the proxy for measuring an institution's capacity in enforcing status quo in national defense. The literature of civil-military relations highlights that the national defense and military organization areas are located at the top priority of military preference when juxtaposed with civilian intervention (Trinkunas 2005; Croissant et al. 2013). The military's preference is influenced by its basic interest of organizational survival, which is closely linked to the military's core function of defending the state from threats (Bland 1999; Alagappa 2001; Hunter 2001; Trinkunas 2005).

To pursue organization survival, military behavior is motivated by three concerns: how the military is utilized in regard to national policy; how its behavior is interpreted; and how its relationship (with civilians) is monitored (Feaver 2003, 63). *First*, the military is concerned with victory over any threats. Empirically, the military is assumed to favor policy regulations that place it at an advantage in dealing with threats and allows it to control the tempo and scope of the conflict. This includes the capability to inflate threats and countermeasures in reducing the possibility of being conquered through surprise attacks.

*Second*, the military concerns itself with the way its behavior is perceived by others. The military as an institution and profession prefers policy outputs that honor and respect its role within society. Only with honor and respect can the military justify its actions and positions within the state and society to fulfil its core functions (Feaver 2003, 64). Indeed, public respect for the military is likely to foster cohesion within the officer corps (Hunter 1997, 21).

Finally, the military seeks autonomy in order to be able to decide which policies enable it to fulfil the military's core functions and to manage its own internal resources with minimum civilian interference (Finer 1962, 47; Alagappa 2001, 35). Principally, war-fighting knowledge and skills are integral elements of the military as an organization and profession. Consequently, maintaining autonomy in war-fighting is vital for the future survival of military as state apparatus in national defense. Furthermore, autonomy in resource distribution also helps prevent internal conflict and, similar to the role of honor, fosters stronger cohesion within the officer corps.

Altogether, the military would prefer an institutional arrangement that maximizes its victory potential; its public honor and respect; and its institutional autonomy to implement its core function to defend the state. Only through these aspects can the organizational survival of the military be maintained. In the context of regime transitions, such preferences may be observed through the military's strong persistence to protect its privileges in the policy area of defense. Incentives to maintain prerogatives beyond the military's core function to defend the state may also be valuable for the military, particularly during the early years of regime transition where political uncertainty is high. Maintaining extra-jurisdictional prerogatives inherited from the authoritarian regime, such as cabinet positions or reserved legislative seats, can increase the potential of the military to constrain civilian attempts at retrenching military prerogatives. Indeed, such prerogatives can prevent external attempts to divert or reduce state resources for the military that may harm the military's efforts to implement its core function. For the military, institutional survival can only be secured if it holds significant decision-making powers in the policy-making areas that directly affect its core function,



that is, defense and military policy (Croissant et al. 2013). In practice, the military strives to establish control over the defense bureaucracy. Such control would give considerable leeway for the military to prevent radical change by civilian decision-makers towards the defense policy status quo that protects the military preference.

Consequently, the indicator of discretionary level in this study follows the question on to what extent the military controls the defense bureaucracy. The most important feature of defense bureaucracy is procedural advantage, which allows the actors who control the organization to determine the policy decision-making process and scope of policies in national defense (Pion-Berlin 2009). When the military effectively controls the defense bureaucracy, we would expect a low level of discretion in the national defense. This condition means that major policy change will be less likely to take place. Conversely, if civilians are fully in charge within the defense bureaucracy, then the level of discretion is high, increasing the probability of civilians to pursue major policy change.

It should be noted, however, that the national defense and military organization policy area basically represent low-level discretion in the implementation and enactment of the status quo. Civilian ability to introduce change in national defense would always meet strong resistance from the military, actors who hold specialized skills in waging war. Empirically, to gauge the level of discretion, two important aspects of defense organization in the literature of civil-military relations merits attention: the relationship between the minister of defense and the military leaders, and the degree of the civilian presence in defense bureaucracy (Pion-Berlin 2009) (see Table 2.4).

**Table 2.4. Level of discretion in defense institution**

<b>Indicator</b>	<b>High level of discretion</b>	<b>Low level of discretion</b>
Position between minister of defense and the military leader	<i>Military leaders under the direct subordination of civilian-led MoD</i>	<i>Both officials are seconded to the president</i>
Civilian presence in the defense bureaucracy	<i>Civilians control minister position and/or key positions in MoD</i>	<i>Military control minister position and/or key positions in MoD</i>

source: author's compilation.

The first indicator is *the minister of defense relationship with the military leader*. The core issue in this indicator is whether the minister of defense holds key defense-related powers in defense compared to the military commander (Pion-Berlin 2009). This can be reflected in the position of minister of defense vis-a-vis the military commander. When the minister and the commander are both seconded to the president, then the military commander hold the potential to “crowd out the civilian point of view, pressuring presidential decisions in a direction that is all too self-serving for the military institution” (Pion-Berlin 2009, 568). The military commander in such a position has privileged access to the national leadership and commensurate political power that can be used to counter challenges to military preference over the status quo. When the president hails from a military background, the opportunity for a civilian perspective and direction in national defense diminishes. Thus, we would expect a lower level of discretion in national defense when the military commander is in an equal position with the minister or both are seconded to the president (table 2.4). If the military commanders are subordinated to a civilian-led defense ministry, then the military will have less power to shape the policy direction in the defense policy since the latter is obliged to focus only on operational matters. Under such circumstances, the level of discretion in the defense institution is higher.

The second indicator is *civilian presence in defense bureaucracy*. The indicator emphasizes “having civilian elected president and non-uniformed personnel in key leadership positions along the chain of command and within advisory and oversight relations as well” (Pion-Berlin 2009, 567). The positions must include

the non-permanent position or political appointment – such as the president, minister of defense, legislative members – and permanent position which is part of the defense bureaucracy (Weeks 2012). It is important to note that “should military officers, either active duty or retired, occupy top positions within the defense sector, they inevitably exhibit divided loyalties” (Pion-Berlin 2009, 567). This indicates that uniformed officers are more loyal to the military, the institution they have long served, than following orders from a democratically elected government (Pion-Berlin 2009; Yildiz 2014). Having a civilian president would reduce the possibility of such a “defect” rather than having a military of or retired general as the president. At the cabinet level, if civilians control the key position in the ministry of defense, it would be easier to translate civilian government preference into defense policies, indicating a high level of discretion. Meanwhile, lower level of discretion in the defense institution would take place when the minister position and/or top-level positions in the defense bureaucracy are controlled by military officers, either active duty or retired (Table 2.4). Under such circumstances, the military controls the policy-making process and the scope of its outcome, allowing military preference of status quo in national defense to prevail.


#### **2.4. Summary of argument and hypotheses**

The main interest of this study is explaining how civilian decision-makers in post-*Reformasi* Indonesia pursue defense transformation through military jointness. In order to answer such a question, this chapter proposes two different models of military jointness – i.e., integration and coordination models – as the outcome of civilian attempts to challenge single-service domination in the defense sector. Both models function at the level of veto barrier in the political arena and the level of discretion in the defense institution, which mediated by different change strategies (Figure 2.1).

As such, the three key hypotheses of this study are as follows. The first one posits that the *integration model of military jointness is more likely to occur under the condition of lower policy stability and low level of discretion* (H1). The integration model means that the whole arrangement in national defense must be organized

under the principle of a multi-service approach. If a single-service approach prevails as the status quo, then civilian change agents can pursue the integration model of jointness by replacing the status quo with a multi-service approach in doctrinal, organizational and technological aspects. Replacing the status quo with new status quo fits with the theoretical expectation of displacement strategy that requires two causal factors: low level policy stability in the political arena, and low level of discretion in the defense institution. Lower policy stability means larger potential for civilian change agents to garner political support for major change without any interruption in the political arena. The low level of discretion in the defense institution means that civilian change agents cannot pursue change by exploiting the “disjuncture” between the status quo and its implementation. Given both factors, the only possible way to pursue institutional change is by utilizing the displacement strategy that replace the existing status quo (single-service approach) in the arrangement of national defense with a new one (multi-service approach).

**Figure 2.2. Framework for explaining institutional change in national defense**



Source: author's compilation

Meanwhile, *the coordination model of military jointness is more likely to emerge under the condition of high policy stability and low level of discretion (H2a)*. In contrast to the integration model, the coordination model is not fully devoted to a multi-service approach in national defense. The coordination model suggests that there is a mechanism for inter-services cooperation within the military but each

service keeps its maximum autonomy from the other service. In essence, the status quo of single-service remains intact under the coordination model. This model emerges when civilian change agents decide to add new rules or mechanisms that promote inter-service cooperation without removing the existing status quo, which corresponds to the layering strategy. The selection of layering strategy is influenced by two conditions: the high level of veto barriers in the political arena and low level of discretion in the defense institution. A high-level policy stability prevents civilian change agents from orchestrating radical change since it is impossible to mobilize political support in the political arena. In addition, the low level of discretion within the defense institution also limits the space for agents to promote change by exploiting ambiguities in the rule enforcement. Consequently, the only logical option for the civilian change agents to challenge the single-service approach of the status quo is by adding new rules that promote military jointness alongside the status quo.

*Alternatively, the coordination model of military jointness is more likely to emerge under the condition of high policy stability and high level of discretion (H2b). Civilian change agents deal with high level veto barrier and therefore the status quo of single-service approach is still in place. Nevertheless, the agents can benefit from the high level of discretion in the defense institution to promote military jointness. High level discretion affords civilian change agents with the greater opportunity to exploit the rule implementation towards change. Under such conditions, civilian change agents would resort to the conversion strategy. To summarize, the suggested framework in this chapter offers an integrative approach to explain the causal mechanisms at work between institutions, actors, and the environment with the expected output of military jointness within defense transformation process. Based on this model, the following chapter explains the research design.*



### 3. Research Design

Research design refers to the way a researcher establishes the most appropriate method for evaluating the truth of the theoretical propositions gathered from empirical data. It is guided by the questions of how we know if the suggested proposition is true, and how to best demonstrate the degree of its truth (Gerring 2001, 155). Selecting the most suitable methodological approaches for testing one's propositions ultimately hinges on the theoretical expectation of the study, or as Hall (2006, 26) writes, "the overarching assumptions made about the structure of causal relations in the cases at hand". As pointed out previously, this study's ultimate aim is to explain how civilian interest in establishing civilian control of the military is successfully translated into legislation. In order to achieve this objective, the theoretical model outlined in Chapter 2 offers a "mechanistic" approach to infer the causal relationship between the explanatory variables and the outcome.

Traditionally, causal inference in the social sciences is categorized into two models of research design: a *large-N study* investigates a large number of cases and usually employs quantitative analysis; or *l-n study* or a *case study* explores a small number of cases (as few as one) by employing qualitative analysis (Evera 1997). However, the differences between these two models goes beyond the number of cases being investigated or the quantitative or qualitative analysis used. The main difference lies in the way each model regards the causal relationship between independent and dependent variables. In large-N studies, the causal relationship is explained by "causal effects", or by confirming that the changed value of the dependent variable has resulted from the changed value of the independent variable (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 76–82). Yet case study research design not only concerns itself with "causal effects", but also assigns importance to "causal mechanisms" (George and Bennett 2005; Rohlfing 2012). Case study research design does not only seek to verify that the value of the dependent variable is a function of the independent variable, as large-N studies do, but it also strives to explain that such relations have plausible qualitative explanations (Gerring 2007).

Based on these different assumptions of causal relationships, case study research design is more relevant to the theoretical expectation of this dissertation.

### **3.1. The selection of process-tracing method**

Inferring a causal relationship in case studies is further divided into two levels of analysis, again based on a study's theoretical interest: cross-case analysis and within-case analysis (Rohlfing 2012). While cross-case analysis is mainly interested in causal effect, within-case analysis primarily tests mechanism-based theoretical arguments (George and Bennett 2005; Beach and Pedersen 2013). Based on this differentiation, my study utilizes the latter within-case comparison type of case study, meaning a within-case analysis that examines the theoretical propositions of more than one case (Rohlfing 2012, 15; Mahoney 2003, 360). Within-case analysis offers two methodological tools for testing theories: the congruence method and the process-tracing method. On the one hand, the congruence method starts with theories to establish the relationship between differing values of variables and determines whether empirical findings confirm the relationship or not. In short, the congruence method does not require the researcher to explain the causal mechanism between the independent and dependent variables (George and Bennet 2005, 182).

On the other hand, the process-tracing method attempts to unpack the "black box" of causality of political processes (Beach and Pedersen 2013). It disputes that the causal relationships between variables can be inferred simply by the consistency of the theoretical predictions with the empirical outcomes, as the congruence method does. Rather, process-tracing urges the researcher to focus on the sequential process that actually connects the independent variables with the perceived outcomes. Thus, it is the strongest tool of within-case analysis – and thereby also in the broader case study methods – to test hypothesized causal mechanisms. Considering the theoretical interest of this study, I selected the process-tracing method to test whether the level of veto barriers, the level of discretion in defense institution and the selection of change strategy empirically influences the output of jointness within the military in the case of post-*Reformasi* Indonesia.



Pioneered in the study of psychology, process-tracing denotes “techniques for examining the intermediate steps in cognitive mental processes to understand better the heuristics through which humans make decisions” (Bennett and Checkel 2015, 5). In the study of politics, process-tracing can be defined as a qualitative method that focuses on the causal mechanisms or the process that can explain the causal relationship between the explanatory variables and the outcome (George and McKeown 1985, 35; George and Bennett 2005, 206; Collier 2011, 824; Beach and Pedersen 2013, 1; Bennett and Checkel 2015, 6). It should be noted that the term “causal mechanism” cannot be reduced to the existence of empirical events that sequence the relationship between the explanatory variables and the outcome, or the intervening variables that connect both. Rather, it must be understood as a “complex system, which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts” (Glenann 1992 cf. Beach and Pedersen 2013, 1).

Following Beach and Pedersen (2013), this study utilizes the case-centric process-tracing variant to understand the process that led towards certain type of military jointness emerge in post-*Reformasi* Indonesia. The case-centric process-tracing aims to “explain particularly puzzling historical outcome by building minimally sufficient explanation in case study” (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 21). As such, case-centric process-tracing focuses on the *usefulness* of theory rather than testing its *accurateness* in explaining the outcome of a case study. Specifically, this study follows the deductive path of case-centric process-tracing (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 19-20). At the theoretical level, this study has outlined a systematic causal mechanism in the previous chapter to explain the effects of political institution and national defense institution towards different outcomes of military jointness. In the following analytical chapters, this study begins by explaining the outcome of military jointness in post-*Reformasi* Indonesia. Subsequently, the analysis moves into looking at the most sufficient explanation of the outcome based on the proposed causal mechanism.

The “minimally sufficient explanation” of case-centric process-tracing is achieved when the empirical record confirmed the main parts of the outcome (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 20-21). If the process-tracing analysis in the analytical chapters

shows that the core features of the military jointness as the result of the proposed veto player configuration and level of discretion in defense institution, then a minimally sufficient explanation can be deduced. Consequently, the analytical chapters would reflect an iterative process of updating the proposed model based on the empirical record to get the best possible explanation. It should be noted, however, that the process-tracing method cannot infer the plausibility of a mechanism beyond its own case, meaning that the findings cannot be generalized. This generalization issue as well as other limitations of the process-method is discussed in the following section.

### **3.2. Methodological limitations**

Before detailing the case selection and data collection, it is important here to address several potential limitations of the methodology of this study. Within-case analysis of the process-tracing method has been criticized for its inability to generalize its findings to other cases. It is true that most researchers apply process-tracing with the intention to develop simple yet strong theory-guided explanations of phenomena in a small number of cases. The researcher aims to achieve a higher degree of explanatory richness, but does this at the expense of generalized findings across a range of cases (George and Bennett 2005, 31). Consequently, the theoretical development of this method is only capable of partial generalizability (Bennett and Checkel 2015). Such a trade-off does not discount the great theoretical advantage process-tracing possesses in causal inference. In fact, focusing on detailed explanations actually gives inferential leverage to the process-tracing method compared to cross-case studies or large-N studies. Process-tracing increases confidence by testing the least likely case and has a high level of conceptual validity, a large number of “causal process observations” and a careful description of causal inference (Rueschemeyer 2003; George and Bennett 2005; Collier 2011). In this regard, the process-tracing method should be seen as mediating the generalization ambition of large-N or cross-case studies by testing the robustness of theories at lower levels of empirical analysis.

The next limitation is the scope of the causal mechanism. There is skepticism on whether process-tracing method can actually observe the “causal mechanism”, as there is still no standard measurement of such a model of causal relation. Even prominent proponents of case study methods conceptualize the causal mechanism as something that is “ultimately unobservable” (George and Bennett 2005, 137). Nevertheless, this skepticism is actually the objective or challenge of the theory-testing variant of process-tracing (see Bennet and Checkel 2015, 13). The hypothesized causal mechanism in this variant is derived from theories that were already tested at the cross-case level. The process-tracing method tests whether the explanatory power of the theories can be empirically confirmed through a detailed explanation of the mechanistic approach.

Finally, another critique of the process-tracing method is its danger of “infinite regress”. This risk is particularly related to the case-centric process-tracing that is utilized in this study. The danger of infinite regress is more apparent for the explaining-outcome model of process-tracing, which allows the researcher to explore eclectic explanation (see Beach and Pedersen 2013: Chapter 2). Nevertheless, this study minimizes the effect of such a danger by establishing a systematic causal mechanism rather than the so-called case-specific combination of systematic causal mechanism (eclectic theoretization) (Beach & Pedersen 2013, 20). Consequently, establishing a careful research design is important for the case-centric variant. Thus, the selected case must be guided by the theories and the data collected, and must have the highest probative value to differentiate between alternative explanations (Bennett 2010; Rohlfing 2012). These two important elements are explained in the following sections.

### **3.3. Selecting the case**

As an implication of focusing on the causal mechanism, selecting cases in process-tracing employs intentional selection rather than random selection as is common in large-N studies (George and Bennet 2005; Rohlfing 2012). This deliberated model of case selection is criticized for selection bias but this criticism is based on the logic of causal inference at the cross-case level and implicitly owe to statistical analysis (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Mahoney 2003; see also Collier and

Mahoney 1996). Be this as it may, the case study researcher needs to proceed cautiously in selecting the case. In testing hypotheses with the process-tracing method, the researcher must select a solid case – one that can approximate the actual instances of the proposed theories – to test the hypothesized mechanism (Rohlfing 2012; Beach and Pedersen 2013, 147).

A case is “an intermediate product in the effort to link (theoretical) ideas and evidence” (Ragin 1994, 225). It is an empirical entity that is systematically defined through certain boundaries (Rohlfing 2012, 24). Based on these conceptualizations, the general rule for selecting a case in a case study has two important boundaries: temporal and substantive boundaries (Rohlfing 2012). On the one hand, the temporal boundary of this study confines the observation to series of government policies since 2004 which is often viewed as the end of the *Reformasi* period.<sup>7</sup> The starting point of 2004 is selected because by that time Indonesia had mostly completed the “first generation reform of civil-military relations” under the interest of depoliticizing the military (Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster 2002; Mietzner 2006). In the following years, the debates on the civil-military relations in post-*Reformasi* Indonesia indicating a shift of focus from military role in politics towards the capacity of existing democratic institutions to manage the defense sector (Laksmana 2010; Sebastian and Gindarsah 2013; Rüländ and Manea 2013). Taking 2004 as the starting point, the empirical observation ends in 2014. In general, this dissertation focuses on the President Yudhoyono’s consecutive terms in office, from 2004 to 2009 and from 2009 to 2014. The time span was selected because this period marked a significant transition within the government agenda, from military reform towards defense transformation and the focus shifted from first-generation issues of civilian control to the challenge of improving military professionalism (Haseman 2006). It was under the Yudhoyono administration that the civilian government initially

---

<sup>7</sup> *Reformasi* movement in 1998. Followed by major political reforms from 1999-2004 that removed remaining political institutions of Suharto’s authoritarian regime. The reforms were, among others, removing the ban on political parties, empowering the legislative branch, institutionalizing direct presidential elections, providing more autonomy for sub-national governments, removing TNI’s reserved seats in parliament and prohibiting TNI officers from taking various civilian government positions.

promoted military jointness or interoperability as part of the national defense policy (Widjojo 2017; Haripin 2019; Pasha 2019).

On the other hand, the substantive boundaries concern the empirical manifestation of the conceptualization of the outcome as specified by the theoretical arguments (Rohlfing 2012). Following the proposed theoretical argument in Chapter 2, the selected case must suggest civilians attempt to change the status quo in national defense i.e., the army dominance. This means there should be an existing status quo that preceded the policy change attempt by civilian actors. Accordingly, the army dominance in national defense has been preserved through the inclusion of total people defense doctrine in Law No. 3/2002 on State Defense. Consequently, replacing the status quo requires civilian actors to amend the respective law through the legislative process. The Yudhoyono administration was unable to remove Army dominance in national defense through revising the state defense law. Instead, President Yudhoyono kept the status quo while also introducing policies that promote military jointness.

These policies are the analytical focus of the study. *First*, the introduction of integrated tri-service (*trimatra terpadu*) concept and MEF (minimum essential force) concept in the strategic defense documents during President Yudhoyono's first term in office. The second case is the implementation of MEF through modernization of TNI weaponry system and establishment of new joint-regional command structure of the TNI during his second term. In addition, the above cases represent government initiatives that were introduced under the circumstances of high veto barriers and low level of discretion in the defense institution as will be explained later in the empirical chapters. Consequently, these two cases are more like to provide a stronger level of confidence regarding the effect of veto barriers and discretion level on civilian preference of change strategy in promoting military jointness that later led to the coordination model of military jointness.

### 3.4. Data collection and analysis

Principally, the process-tracing method works best when the collected materials provide a complete picture of the targeted process with as much detail as possible. A difficulty is that such materials are rarely always available or easily accessible. In order to anticipate the high requirement of empirical evidence, process-tracing allows the researcher to maximize the benefits of using various sources of information, as they can provide “observable fingerprints” for the hypothesized causal mechanism (George and Bennett 2005, 6; Beach and Pedersen 2013, chapter 2). In employing such a combination strategy, however, the researcher may end up with massive observations of the process. This can be avoided by being selective and focusing only on those materials that can establish empirical links with the hypotheses (Bennett 2010).

In order to establish the causal narrative for each case, I precede with two main data observations: official records of the policy-making process and subsequent interviews with the key actors. The former material includes meeting record, legislation draft, passed laws, policy documents and other government regulations. These materials are mainly collected from the Office of Secretary of the State, Ministry of Defense, the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR, House of Representatives), and the National Archive Body (ANRI). While official records are the ideal type of information, the researcher still needs to be aware of its reliability and keep in mind issues such as authenticity, pre-selected public records and classified information (Rohfling 2012, 170; Beach and Pedersen 2013). In the case of Indonesia, there is a tendency to keep information regarding the military and defense issues at even lower levels of transparency, which influences the transparency of the whole policy-making process (Susilo 2014; Hasanuddin 2015; Aliabbas 2019). This is also supported by the vague terminology of defense-related information in Article 17 of the Law on the Freedom of Public Information No. 14/2008. In practice, the terminology allowed MoD and TNI Headquarter to autonomously define the scope of limited information (Hasanuddin 2015).<sup>8</sup> This

---

<sup>8</sup> Article 5 of the MoD Regulation No. 14/2011 on the Public Information Service Standard, stipulates that the MoD has the right to limit public access towards information that may harm the state defense, or related to the doctrinal, tactical, and operational of the national defense.

has caused a significant impediment for public access regarding national defense. Consequently, there may likely be a considerable gap in explaining the causal narrative.

To address this issue, I complement the official sources with interviews from actors who were involved in the policy-making process or those who hold information on the process. In addition to such positional criteria of selecting respondents, I also used the snow-balling technique during interviews to identify other respondents considered influential in the policy-making process by their peers. I also attempted to interview such potential respondents as well (Tansey 2007; Tracy 2013). Interviewing participants of the process can help the researcher “shed light on the hidden elements of political action that are not clear from an analysis of political outcomes or other primary sources” (Tansey 2007, 767). It is expected that the personal and interactive elements of the interview method can increase the probability of being able to collect sensitive information regarding the political process.

During two fieldwork projects in Jakarta in 2015 and 2019, I conducted interviews with 24 persons (see Appendix 1). Their backgrounds were presidential staff, legislators, Indonesian Ministry of Defense officials, active military officers, retired military officers, academics/researcher and civil society activist. Some of the interviewees were directly involved in the process of change in the national defense sector from 2004 to 2019. Others had connections with the relevant actors in the process. It should be noted that careful description is the foundation of the process tracing method, since it analyzes the trajectories of change and causation (Collier 2011). Interviews were semi-structured; it allowed them to capture not only specific observations following each part of the hypothesized causal mechanism; but also left the possibility for the emergence of other relevant information not addressed in the list of questions. For each personal interview, I asked the interviewees several open-ended questions based on the parts of the hypothesized mechanism (Appendix 2). Due to the sensitivity of defense issues in Indonesia, some of the respondents declined to be recorded (see notes on Appendix 1). In such cases, I made written notes to collect important information.

In practice, there were 19 recorded interviews. The recorded interviews, once transcribed, resulted in a total of 35,402 words of interview data. The data was then manually coded and categorized by the author.

Nevertheless, interviews can also be questioned as to their reliability. Political actors can sometimes only choose to share certain information, overstate their role or not fully describe the dynamic of the political process, especially when they are part of the winning faction or vice versa (George and Bennett 2005; Kay and Baker 2015, 13–14). Another issue is related to the temporal distance between the targeted process and the interview. Longer intervals can increase the possibility that respondents may suffer from memory loss on the details of the process and, to compensate, they may reinterpret the process or provide information stemming from others (Kramer et al. 1990). The only feasible way to deal with these issues is through careful triangulation with various sources (interviews with other respondents, archival records and other materials) to cross-validate the given information (Yin 2009; Rohlving 2012, 170–71; Beach and Pedersen 2013, 135; Bennett and Checkel 2015, 31).

In addition, I also draw on previous academic work on civil-military relations and defense reform in Indonesia as sources. These scholarly works are mainly used to provide general background information on the topic of my study (Rohlving 2012, 171). These sources can also be used to further complement the gap in the causal narrative, but only after careful triangulation with other sources (Kay and Baker 2015, 14). Finally, the use of newspaper sources can also be helpful in gaining more information on the political process (George and Bennett 2005). The researcher needs to proceed with caution the manifested issue of the reliability in this type of data. Newspapers tend to repeat what the political actors want the public to know and journalists in general rarely scrutinize political actors (Beach and Pedersen 2013). Newspaper sources, similar to the scholarly works and other sources cited in this study, are used for background information of the policy process and to complement the causal narrative, but only when its empirical value is cross-validated with other sources. Furthermore, the selection of newspapers and magazines as sources in this study is based on their credibility and their



frequent use in the academic works of other scholar of Indonesian politics. Major newspapers (both in their print and online formats) and online mass media that fulfil these requirements in Indonesia are *Kompas*, *The Jakarta Post*, *Detik News*, *Republika*, *Media Indonesia* and *Berita Satu*, as well as state news agency *Antara* and investigative news magazines such as *Tempo*.



## **4. Army domination and the status quo in national defense**

This chapter investigates Army dominance of Indonesia's national defense sphere before, during and immediately after the *Reformasi* period. It begins with a section on the historical development of Army domination in socio-political and defense establishments from the early independence period until the dawn of Suharto's autocratic regime. The chapter's following section discusses the military reform agenda during the *Reformasi* period and its effect upon the long-established Army dominance. The final section is divided into two parts to explain the anatomy of the status quo in national defense. The first part is an overview of the historical development of the total people's defense doctrine, while the second part discusses events that led to the survival of the doctrine during the *Reformasi* period until now.

### **4.1. The rise of Army domination over socio-political and defense establishments**

Indonesia's modern military known as the Badan Keamanan Rakyat (BKR, People's Security Body) was established on August 22, 1945, by President Sukarno, only a few days after he and other Indonesian revolutionary leaders proclaimed independence. Members of the BKR included officers who were trained by Dutch and Japanese colonists as well as local militia groups that fought against the colonialists. Sukarno renamed the BKR into Tentara Keamanan Rakyat (TKR, People's Security Army) on October 5, 1945, a date that is observed as the founding anniversary of Indonesia's Armed Forces. Since its establishment, the military has been exposed to the political arena. The majority of the militia members came from party-affiliated youth organizations or were charismatic local leaders (Mietzner 2009, 39; Kimura 2013, 40). Furthermore, the Japanese-educated officers were influenced by the idea that the military should play a large role in politics (Bhakti, Yanuarti, and Nurhasim 2009, 5).

From 1945 to 1949, the newly proclaimed state was fragile as its former colonial power of the Netherlands refused to recognize its sovereignty. Government capacity as well as resources to govern were highly limited, especially at the sub-national level. To counteract this problem, the government relied on military resources to defend Indonesia's territorial unity and run local administrations (Rinakit 2005; Crouch 2007). This decision then stimulated the expansion of Army service in terms of size and network compared to other services within the Indonesian military. To a large extent, these functions of the newly established military fostered the belief among Army officers that their fundamental role was to be the "guardian of the nation" above the other armed services (Lev 1964; Widjojo 2017). Dutch invasions in 1947 and 1948 and the Army's role in combatting them further consolidated this perception (Lev 1964).

During the 1948 invasion, prominent civilian leaders were captured and forced into exile on remote islands by the Dutch troops. Other civilian leaders resorted to diplomatic means to resolve the invasion. In contrast the military responded to the invasion by employing the tactics of guerrilla warfare, utilizing its Japanese-inherited military territorial command and obtaining logistical support from locals. While it is still debated whether this approach ended the Dutch invasions, it did stave off the troops from gaining Indonesia's territory for several months. Their success fueled a distrust among Army officers towards civilian capacity and effectiveness in political negotiations (Crouch 2007). Nevertheless, the UN Security Council and its resulting resolution (UNSC Resolution 67) demanded the discontinuation of the Dutch occupation of Indonesia and urged peaceful negotiations between the two sides in January 1949. This resulted in the transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to the Indonesian government in December 1949.

The military's reputation as the "guardian of the nation" during the revolutionary war did not fully translate into it taking an expanded role in the early post-independence political architecture. The Indonesian elites decided to experiment with parliamentary democracy that concentrated power in the hands of political parties within the legislature (Lev 1966; Jenkins 1983). Over the years,

parliamentary democracy – combined with a fragmented multiparty system – caused unstable cabinet coalitions. This, in turn, increased military skepticism towards the ability of civilian elites to run the country (Mietzner 2009, 43). Skepticism turned into open confrontation when a faction within the military and political parties promoted a policy proposal to downsize the Armed Forces in 1952. Several Army officers protested this proposal by mobilizing civilian demonstrators and deploying tanks and artillery troops in front of the Presidential Palace; this confrontation became known as the Peristiwa 17 Oktober (Seventeenth of October Affair) (Ricklefs 2008). The protesting officers felt that politicians interfered with the military's internal affairs and demanded that President Sukarno dismiss parliament. Even though the protest failed to gain Sukarno's support, mounting dissatisfaction towards the parliamentary system further consolidated the belief in the role of "guardian of the nation" among military officers and a readiness to intervene when the political situation became unstable in their opinion (Crouch 2007). This conviction was manifested in military interference that led to a political crisis in 1955. The military collectively rejected and boycotted the appointment of a new chief of staff to Prime Minister Ali Sastroamijoyo's cabinet, leading to the cabinet's dismissal in 1955 (Feith 1962; Crouch 2007; Kingsbury 2003).

The military, particularly the dominant Army service, increasingly believed that it possessed substantial leverage in terms of influencing the political direction of the country. This was evident in the introduction of the Konsep Jalan Tengah, the so-called "middle-way" concept by the Army's charismatic leader, General Abdul Haris Nasution, during a speech on the anniversary of the National Military Academy in November 1958 (Jenkins 1983). The middle-way concept contends that the Indonesian Military is not solely an instrument of the state like in the majority of Western countries but it is also not a political activist as with militaries in many Latin American countries (Jenkins 1983; Kingsbury 2003). Instead, the military's role should be that of the nation's guardian because it gained legitimacy from the people during the independence struggle. Thus, the military's contribution in various policy areas and state institutions should be supported by the society and the government alike.

This concept was little more than rhetoric until President Sukarno, backed by the Army's leadership, issued a decree dismissing the parliament and cabinet in 1957 and returning the country to the tenets of the 1945 Constitution (Mietzner 2013b, 90). This decree resulted in the instalment of an extremely powerful presidential system, known as Demokrasi Terpimpin (Guided Democracy) principle in 1959 (Lev 1966; Jenkins 1983). Under Sukarno's Guided Democracy, the Army gained even greater political influence through cabinet posts as well to gubernatorial and other sub-national leadership appointments (Sebastian 2006; Crouch 2007). However, the Army's involvement in the political decision-making process was never institutionalized by Sukarno. In fact, Sukarno feared the expansion of the Army's power and tried to offset it by cultivating support from the burgeoning Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Indonesian Communist Party) (Jenkins 1983).

The ensuing rivalry between the Army and the PKI resulted in reduced military influence in Sukarno's decision-making circle and government (Sebastian 2006; Mietzner 2013b, 93). In fact, government policies during the Guided Democracy period became more leftist-oriented and focused on building strong ties with Moscow, Beijing and Pyongyang. Understanding that the elite arena was becoming less conducive for its influence, the military leadership under General Nasution switched its focus to the grassroots level. In 1962, the Army developed a territorial warfare doctrine which was subsequently manifested through the establishment of the Komando Teritorial (Koter, Army Territorial Command) structure. It ran parallel to the civilian bureaucracy from provincial to village levels and was hoped to contain the PKI's growing influence (Rinakit 2005, 22). As the rivalries became more hostile, the PKI and its faction within the military launched a bloody coup to quash military influence by targeting high-ranking Army generals in late September 1965. Several generals were kidnapped and killed, but the Army quickly neutralized the coup threat under the leadership of Major General Suharto, the Commander of the Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat (Kostrad, Army Strategic Reserves Command).

The failed coup generated widespread public hostility toward the PKI that extended to Sukarno and his left-leaning policies. In addition, the faltering economy triggered massive student protests demanding regime change. By early 1966, the Sukarno administration was unable to control the increasingly chaotic security situation. The controversial Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret 11, 1966 document (Instruction Letter of March 11, 1966, known by the acronym Supersemar) mandated temporary transfer of power from Sukarno to Suharto in order to normalize security conditions. Following the mandate, Suharto and the parliament passed a decree (TAP MPR No.XXV/MPRS/1966) that banned the PKI and prohibited all activities promoting Communism, Marxism and Leninism. Members of the PKI in the cabinet and parliament were discharged from their positions, and became either political prisoners or were forced into exile. At the grassroots level, hundreds of thousands of PKI members and supporters were massacred through the Army-led anti-communist operations that to this day remain a dark chapter in Indonesia's modern history (Robinson 2018). Suharto's ability to normalize the post-coup security situation was finally rewarded when he was installed as the new president by the National Assembly in March 1968.

With Suharto at the helm of national leadership, the Army took a commanding role in the nation. The popularity of the anti-PKI campaign, deteriorating economic conditions and the Army's ability to manipulate the power transfer as constitutionally legitimate gave little incentive for the remaining civilian powers in the government to prevent or challenge the military's expansion in state governance (Mietzner 2009, 51). Under Suharto's regime, Army elites were united for the first time, and their interest in the political arena was institutionalized without any substantial challenge. Central to this process was the sharpening of the *dwifungsi* (dual function) doctrine during the second Army Seminar of senior and middle-level officers at the Sekolah Komando Angkatan Darat (Seskoad, Army School of Staff and Command) on 25-31 August, 1966 (Notosusanto 1984).<sup>9</sup>

---

<sup>9</sup> The basic idea of the dual function doctrine was first discussed by the military at the first Army seminar in April 1965, only months before the failed Communist party coup attempt in September 1965 (See also Reeve 1985, 144).

During the seminar, the old “middle-way” concept of power sharing was criticized for being ambiguous and more of an option rather than an obligation for the military to be involved in politics (Harisanto 1993; MacFarling 1996). This reasoning served as a justification among the Army officers as to why the military had failed to prevent the PKI’s bloody attempted coup in 1965. The seminar then firmly endorsed the *dwifungsi* doctrine, the Army-sponsored political ideology of the military that solidified the military’s dual functions in state defense and socio-political realms. It also proclaimed the military to be the sole guardian of the nation’s Pancasila ideology and the 1945 Constitution. By manufacturing this political ideology, the Army transformed itself into a ruler in the post-Sukarno political system (See for example, Nordlinger 1977, 26).

Military praetorianism then institutionalized and entrenched itself across several decision-making areas that bolstered Army officers’ domination of the socio-political and defense establishment. Initial institutionalization of praetorian officers was the leading role of the military, in elite recruitment in state, politics and economy. The *dwifungsi* doctrine was firmly incorporated in new laws governing the election and legislative bodies, namely Law No. 15/1969 and Law No. 16/1969. Both laws stipulated that the military was entitled to hold reserved seats in the legislative body (at the national and sub-national level) as part of the implementation of the dual-function doctrine to safeguard Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Consequently, around 15-20 percent of seats in the DPR were occupied by active officers in the 1971 to 1999 period (Croissant et al. 2013, 110). The military was also accorded a central role in the national election process. Elections were held regularly, but were effectively controlled by the Army. The election committee was headed by the Ministry of Interior, which was occupied by active and retired army generals since 1966 (Table 4. 1).



**Table 4.1. Army officers serving as Minister of Interior 1966-1999**

Year	Minister of Interior
1966-1968	Maj.Gen. Basuki Rachmat
1968-1982	Lieut. Gen. Amir Machmud
1982-1983	Lieut.Gen (ret). Sudharmono
1983-1988	Lieut.Gen (ret) Supardjo Rustam
1988-1993	Gen (ret). Rudini
1993-1998	Lieut.Gen (ret). Yogi Suardi Memet
March-May 1998	Gen (ret). Raden Hartono
1998-1999	Lieut.Gen (ret). Syarwan Hamid
October 1999	Gen (ret). Faishal Tanjung (ad-interim)

Source: Author's compilation.

In addition, the Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces (Panglima ABRI) also served as a member of the leadership council in the election committee (King 1994, 11). Apart from the organizational structure of the election committee, Army officers were a dominant part of the candidate selection process. Before qualifying to be listed on the ballot, all candidates had to pass the *penelitian khusus/litsus*, the so-called special investigation mechanism organized by the Army-controlled election committee. In practice, the mechanism was conducted by Army personnel through questionnaires and personal interviews with candidates (Eklöf 2003, 145–46). The government claimed that the objective of the investigation was to ensure that candidates were not connected to the PKI, the 1965 coup and other leftist organizations (Nishihara 1972, 26). However, this mechanism was nothing more than a control measure by the Army and Suharto to prevent critical politicians from entering the legislative body (Haris 2004, 28).

To balance the allocation of reserved seats within the legislative body, military personnel were prohibited from voting and running as party candidates in elections. This failed to wholly prevent military influence in political decision-making. Uniformed officers were involved in the establishment and management of a quasi-party called Golkar (an acronym of *golongan karya*, functional group), a political instrument within the parliament to support Suharto (Vatikiotis 1998). In the 1971 election, Golkar took more than 60 percent of the seats in the national parliament thanks to the military's intervention and intimidation in the election process (Mietzner 2009, 53). Backed by Golkar and military factions within

parliament, Suharto subsequently passed a law on party fusion (Law No. 3/1975) that allowed for only three contestants in elections: the Indonesian Democratic Party/PDI, representing nationalist parties; United Development Party/PPP, representing religious (Islamic) parties, and Golkar.<sup>10</sup>

From 1977 to 1997, Suharto and the Army were able to secure Golkar victories in every election. Election committee leaderships from the national to the sub-national level were occupied by government officials (minister of home affairs, governor and city mayor) who also served as Golkar members (Haris 2004, 26). Golkar was undefeated in election campaigns in part due to massive financial support from government officials. Finally, the Army's Koter structure heavily monitored the electoral campaign and the voting process down to the village level, ensuring Golkar's domination in the elections through intimidation and coercion if necessary (Honna 2003). After securing its influence in the electoral and legislative arenas, the military expanded into the executive branch. By the end of the 1970s, approximately 53.5 percent of central government positions (ministers, top-level echelon officials and ambassadors) and 70 percent of governor positions were occupied by the military who virtually all came from the Army (Notosusanto 1984, 378–79). More importantly, four of the six vice presidents during Suharto's rule were retired Army generals. The belief that military officials should occupy civilian posts in the government was actually enshrined in Nasution's middle-way concept since 1958 (Jenkins 2010). However, it was only institutionalized under Suharto's regime through the so-called *Kekaryaan* program, which was endorsed by presidential decree in 1969 as part of the Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI, Indonesian Armed Forces) reorganization.<sup>11</sup> Accordingly, the program served as an effective instrument of

---

<sup>10</sup> The Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) was established as a fusion of the three secular-nationalist parties: the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), the League of the Supporters of Indonesian Independence (IPKI) and the Party of the Masses (Partai Murba), and two Christian parties: the Indonesian Christian Party (Partindo) and the Catholic Party (Partai Katolik); and three secular parties: the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), the League of the Supporters of Indonesian Independence (IPKI), and the Party of the Masses (Partai Murba). Meanwhile, PPP was a fusion of four Islamic parties: the Nahdlatul Ulama party (PNU), the Muslim Party of Indonesia (Parmusi), the Islamic Association Party of Indonesia (PSII) and the Islamic Educational Movement (Perti).

<sup>11</sup> Under the *Kekaryaan* program, military headquarters assigned thousands of their personnel to non-military posts within various government institutions (Notosusanto 1984).


patronage for Suharto to foster military loyalty and discourage potential resistance within the officer corps by controlling appointments to prestigious and lucrative civilian positions (MacDougall 1982; Crouch 2007).

Of course, the institutionalization of the military's role in the electoral process and executive branches had significant consequences for public policy. In practice, there was no policy-making process at the national level that escaped military approval. Although policy formation was centralized under Suharto, decisions were only made after consultation with his "inner circle" of Army generals who occupied key cabinet positions (Jenkins 2010, 45–46). At the local level, it is important to highlight the role of Army officers in the *Musyawah Pimpinan Daerah* (Muspida, regional leadership forum), stretching from the provincial to the regency levels (Haripin 05.09.2019). This forum was comprised of leaders from the government, the Army command, the police and the prosecutor's office at the local level (Crouch 2010, 164). The Army regional commander – who also served as chairman for Golkar's Regional Supervision Board – chaired the regional leadership forum and exerted massive influence on local governance (Hasanuddin 2015; Widjojo 2017). In practice therefore, the decision-making process and the supervision of government policies at the local level were effectively conducted through the Muspida forum rather than through formal consultation between local executives and the legislature (Widjojo 2017). The forum was modified in 1986, placing a local executive as the chairman. The change was rather cosmetic in nature, as maintaining close cooperation with local military commanders remained indispensable for local executives to promote their policies or to stay in office (Mietzner 2013b, 254). Furthermore, the so-called *Kekaryaan* program allowed military officers to hold local executive positions to be succeeded by local Army commanders, fostering military hegemony in local politics under Suharto's regime (Crouch 2010, 164).

Given the military's significant influence within the government's institutions and policy-making process, one would expect that defense spending would be a greatly inflated portion of the state budget. In fact, the proportion of the defense budget

within the overall state budget under Suharto's regime consistently declined from 1968 to 1997 (See Figure 4.1. below).

**Figure 4.1. Trends in Indonesia's Defense Budget 1968-1998 (Billion IDR)**



Source: Gunawan 2017, 132.

The figure depicted above shows the significant reduction of military spending in the national budget. The military enjoyed more than 20 percent of the overall state budget in 1974. A decade later, this number was reduced to half, and continued to be under 10 percent until Suharto's resignation in 1998. This decreasing trend raises a question: why did a military that was powerful enough to influence the policy process and output not defend its interests in a larger budget share? One explanation can be derived from the inward-looking orientation of national defense under Suharto's leadership.

In 1962, President Sukarno integrated the three military services and the national police under the single institution of the ABRI, placing himself as the supreme commander. The decision was mostly an endeavor to contain the growing influence of General Nasution within the officer corps rather than an attempt to pull the military into the domestic security arena (Woo 2011, 77). Nonetheless, Suharto maintained ABRI's organizational structure. Unlike his predecessor, he

encouraged the militarization of internal security, leaving the police with a limited role to play. This was obvious in the existence of the Komando operasi pemulihan keamanan dan ketertiban (Kopkamtib, Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order). The command was established and headed by Suharto following the Supersemar instruction that authorized him to normalize the post-1965 coup security situation (Kingsbury 2003, 129). When Suharto took power, the command became the backbone of military intelligence and covert operations to uphold internal security and public order. According to a 1969 Presidential Decree, Kopkamtib was tasked to “surmount other extreme and subversive activities in order to safeguard Pancasila and the UUD 1945 (Constitution)”. (Honna 2003, 91). The Kopkamtib commander was headed by a military general who was virtually always appointed from the Army, and directly answered to the president. The structure of Kopkamtib was integrated with the army structure from the national to the sub-national level, allowing the commander the full support of Koter resources. Accordingly, several positions within ABRI Headquarter were filled by Kopkamtib commander assistants, especially regarding intelligence, operations and territorial affairs (Tanter 1990, 222). At the regional level, Koter commanders held the position of Kopkamtib Area Special Executives (Tanter 1990, 223).

To perform its duties, Kopkamtib exerted significant powers: surveillance; the arrest of suspected individuals without a warrant; use of torture during investigations and; if necessary, unlimited detention not beholden to police authorities or legal channels (Tanter 1990, 218; Kingsbury 2003, 129). Even though PKI members were the early targets, Kopkamtib later labeled journalists, students, Islamic leaders, labor activists and even dissenting officers as “subversives” and targeted them for the sake of “political stability” (Honna 2003, 91). The massive power of Kopkamtib had a significant effect on the military’s dual function. Although the initial design of the dual-function doctrine entrusted the officers with roles in the political arena and state defense, fostering officer expertise and the maintenance of domestic security and public order gradually became the underlying principle of the doctrine (Jenkins 1983; MacFarling 1996). Without exception, the defense sector also adhered to this logic. Throughout

Suharto's autocratic regime, there were no civilian defense ministers. The position was either designated to a member of the military or coupled with the ABRI commander position as part of ABRI's restructuring policy in 1969. This decision placed national defense and the military's policy-making process under the effective control of the military, enforcing its internal security role. It should be noted that the ABRI commander position was always occupied by active generals from the Army service, and thus gradually entrenched the Army dominance in the defense sector during Suharto's autocratic regime (see Table 4.2 below).

**Table 4.2. Army officers in top-level defense-related positions 1966-1999**

Year	Minister of defense	Year	ABRI Commander
1966-1971	Lieut. Gen. Suharto*	1966-1971	Lieut.Gen. Suharto*
1971-1978	Gen. Maraden Panggabean*	1971-1978	Gen. Maraden Panggabean*
1978-1983	Gen. M. Jusuf Amir*	1978-1983	Gen. M. Jusuf Amir*
1983-1988	Gen. Poniman	1983-1988	Gen. L.B. Moerdani
1988-1993	Gen. L.B. Moerdani	1988-1993	Gen. Try Sutrisno
1993-1998	Gen. Edi Sudrajat*	March-May 1993	Gen. Edi Sudrajat*
1998-1999	Gen. Wiranto*	May 1993-March 1998	Gen. Faisal Tanjung
		1998-1999	Gen. Wiranto*

\*Concurrently served as Minister of Defense and ABRI Commander

Source: author's compilation.

In the 1980s, the Army-sponsored dual-function doctrine was stipulated by the 1982 State Defense Law and the 1988 ABRI Law as the main reference for the military role. In addition to explicit inclusions of the Army's dual function, the 1982 state defense law also stipulated the importance of the military as a social force to stabilize the government's long-term development agenda.<sup>12</sup> Prior to the enactment of the laws, the linkage between the military's dual function and the government's development agenda was enforced internally. The military – under Army leadership – also undertook to dominate the direction of defense policy and maintain military autonomy through inclusion of the doctrine of Sistem pertahanan keamanan rakyat semesta (Sishankamrata, total people's defense and security), an Army-centric approach of defense strategy, within the state defense

<sup>12</sup> "Pembangunan nasional", see Article 28, points 1 and 2, Law No. 20/1982.

law.<sup>13</sup> In tandem with the military's dual function role, the doctrine emphasized the concept of military's alignment (*Kemanunggalan*) with the Indonesian people as the main instrument against external and internal threats. In the actuality of lacking external threats, this doctrine really only had one aim. In theory, the national defense policies and military organization under Suharto's regime were directed to increase the social function of the military by maintaining its presence in every aspect of the government's decision-making process and society for the purpose of supporting the national development agenda. In practice, however, the state's defense doctrine of *Sishankamrata* allowed the Army to uphold its vast territorial command structure.

Over the years, the Army service gradually expanded its influence within the socio-political arena and the defense establishments. The expansion significantly raised Suharto's concern for his regime's survival, which was becoming overly dependent on the support of the Army (Honna 2003, 10). Suharto therefore orchestrated gradual changes in the character of his regime, moving from praetorian rule towards a more personal one through three means. The first strategy was a divide-and-rule strategy towards the military (Croissant et al. 2013, 100). The number of military officers in the cabinet, regional governments and other non-military posts was significantly reduced from the mid-1970s to the late 1990s (Mietzner 2009, 59). Suharto also dismissed the prominent Kopkamtib, replacing it with the Badan koordinasi bantuan pemantapan stabilitas nasional (Bakorstanas, Coordinating Body for National Stability) in 1988. Although this was an essentially superficial change – by making the name more “civilian” – the move was used by Suharto to disassemble the Army intelligence structure that served as a bargaining chip for the institution. Specifically, this action was taken to contain the Army's consolidation under General L.B. “Benny” Moerdani, the ABRI commander who had showed resistance towards Suharto's attempt to personalize the regime (Kingsbury 2003, 130).

---

<sup>13</sup> Articles 1, 4, 7, 8, 9, and 10, Law No.20/1982

Together with shrinking the Army's opportunities to consolidate room for political maneuvers, Suharto personally awarded leadership positions in the military as well as non-military positions to his relatives or trusted cronies (Mietzner 2009, 60). This contributed to factionalizing in the military and allowed Suharto to exert greater influence by establishing incentives for military elites to participate in a "loyalty race". Suharto's relationship with the Army deteriorated in 1993 when the military faction in the national parliament demanded he accept their proposed vice-presidential candidate, Army General Try Sutrisno, as compensation for reducing the number of military officers in the cabinet (Rabasa and Haseman 2002, 37; Honna 2003, 17). Suharto accepted the demand but retaliated by further cutting the number of military representatives in the cabinet, initiating a law to reduce the military's representative proportion in the national parliament and pushing through massive rotations within the Army from 1994 to 1996 (Rabasa and Haseman 2002; Honna 2003; Kammen and Chandra 2010).

Another strategy to counteract the military's autonomy was to erode Army influence in the economic sector by personalizing and centralizing resources under Suharto's control. Indonesia's business sector in the late 1970s witnessed the gradual concentration of profits to Suharto relatives and cronies. State banks were instructed to allocate 8 percent of their profits directly to Suharto's foundations in 1978 (Robison and Hadiz 2004, 55). By acting as a patron for Chinese-Indonesian tycoons, Suharto and his relatives maintained a large portion of stocks and shares in a wide range of companies (Vatikiotis 1998).

In the early 1980s, Suharto further institutionalized his wealth concentration by establishing Team 10, an inter-ministerial team authorized to manage governmental procurements in all sectors. The team was headed by the state secretary, Sudharmono, a Suharto loyalist who operated as the main tool for distributing rents, mainly to Suharto's children and cronies (Elson 2001, 249). Consequently, the personalization and centralization over the private sector and fiscal policies by Suharto limited Army access to the business sector and therefore became more dependent on the president's favor. The last strategy to balance the power of the Army was by cultivating support from other political forces. This was



mainly conducted by controlling Golkar's leadership composition, manipulating the politics of *keterbukaan* (openness) in discourse and establishing relations with moderate Muslim leaders (Honna 2003, 13–14; Mietzner 2009, 59; Slater 2009, 153–60). During the Golkar congress of 1978, Suharto imposed an “adjustment” to the internal procedure of the quasi-party. This gave Suharto greater power to challenge Army domination by installing loyalists on Golkar's supervisory council and strengthening his power to appoint or dismiss its executive board (Slater 2009, 154).

The politics of openness refers to a series of conflicts between Suharto and military elites starting in the early 1990s (Honna 2003; Aspinall 2005). Several members of the military faction in the national parliament raised the issue of openness in hearings and mass media, exposing the regime's repressive approach in handling public criticism. In addition, the military leadership also publicly addressed the openness issue, which was perceived as official policy of the military by political community (Aspinall 2005, 37). Responding to this pressure, Suharto softened his strict control of the press. Nevertheless, Suharto strategically manipulated these “politics of openness” to trigger public debate regarding the military's dual-function in political decision-making, which posed a threat to his regime's survival. During a speech after ABRI leadership meeting, he asserted that *tut wuri handayani* – a Javanese saying meaning “gaining moral support from the rear” or being the backbone – should be the ABRI's role within society (Honna 2003, 13). This statement expanded the scope of the conflict, sparking intense public debate about the future of the military's dual-function. The debate also triggered a series of internal discussions within the Army Academy's Seskoad, which was dominated by groups of intellectual officers who aimed to redefine the military's dual-function to fit with the changing political environment (Honna 2003, 74).

Suharto never intended to remove the military's dual function completely. However, the debates were carefully crafted to consolidate his network of political support in the parliament and maintain public support against the military's influence in political-decision making. In 1995, Suharto introduced a bill to reduce

military presence in the parliament. With mounting public criticism towards the military's dual function, Suharto was able to garner support in the national parliaments and passed the bill into law, slashing the number of seats of military representatives from 100 to 75. While this reduction was not significantly enough to limit Army influence, the politics of openness had signaled to the Army that they were still dependent on Suharto to maintain their dual-function (Honna 2003, 25). After the Army's defeat of Suharto in the politics of openness, the intellectual discussions inspired the military to reinterpret the dual-function during the 1996 Army Seminar, and later instigated military initiatives for internal reform during regime transition (Wirahadikusumah 1999; Honna 2003).

#### **4.2. Military reform during the *Reformasi* period**

Mass demonstrations and student protests filled media headlines during the wake of the Asian financial crisis in 1998.<sup>14</sup> Suharto's cronyism, extensive family businesses and corrupt elites in his power circle were targeted by protests and blamed for Indonesia's economic meltdown in 1997. In addition, the protests also demanded the military's withdrawal from politics (Crouch 2010, 135). Suharto ordered the military to suppress the protests, but the ABRI commander, Army General Wiranto, and other senior officers were hesitant to follow the order (Lee 2009, 655). Such military defections constituted officer dissidence – and more specifically disaffection – towards Suharto's personalized control within military leadership (Lee 2014, 4). Deteriorating economic conditions and persistent violent demonstrations forced Suharto to resign on May 21, 1998, transferring power to his closest ally, Vice President B.J. Habibie.

Suharto's resignation put even more public pressure on the new government to enact political reforms. Habibie sponsored significant reforms during his early days in office, such as removing limitations on the establishment of political

---

<sup>14</sup> In mid-1997, Indonesia faced abrupt change in market confidence due to the rapid fall in the value of the rupiah that was part of the currency contagion from Thailand's weakening baht. President Suharto decided to request assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the form of a bailout. In early 1998, the macroeconomic condition worsened drastically as the country's GDP plummeted from approximately US\$1,200 to US\$300. In May 1998, the government's lifting of its fuel subsidy policy as part of the IMF's bailout package requirements caused an increase the price of basic commodities, triggering massive public protests.

parties, releasing political prisoners and revoking laws restricting press freedom (Singh 2000, 165–69; Crouch 2010, 27). Reform of the military progressed rather differently. Apart from being a Suharto loyalist, Habibie's Road to power was far removed from elite consensus and popular support. With Suharto's patronage network left in tatters after the financial crisis, Habibie was forced to ally with the Army senior officers, who were disillusioned by his former status as a Suharto loyalist (Crouch 2010, 21). Consequently, Habibie allowed the military to initiate and control the pace of military reform as a concession for the military's support for his regime's survival during the transition (Mietzner 2009, 200).

The first reform initiative undertaken by the military was introduction of the "new paradigm" after a military seminar in September 1998 (Wirahadikusumah 1999). The new paradigm comprised of several key principles that resonated with the 1996 Army seminar results (Honna 2003, 64). Above all, the military would refrain from acting at the forefront of politics. It amended the military's position from an "occupying" role towards an "influencing" role in politics, and through exerting this influence in "indirect" ways. To support these shifts, the military agreed to a "shared" role in the government alongside civilians (Honna 2003, 166; Crouch 2010, 132-133). In an attempt to conform to the new paradigm, General Wiranto as the ABRI commander and his inner circle of "reformist" officers promoted several policies that curtailed the military's political function. The first step was dissolving the position of Kepala Staf Sosial Politik (Kasospol, Chief of Staff for Social and Political Affairs), which was responsible for supervising the military's socio-political function. This was followed by a ban on active officers holding civilian positions, reducing the number of military representatives in the national and regional legislatures. Most importantly, General Wiranto instructed military officers to take a neutral stance prior to the 1999 parliamentary elections, which also meant cutting their long-term relationship with Golkar (Mietzner 2009, 202; Crouch 2010, 134).

Principally, the aforementioned internal military regulations contributed to reducing the influence of the military in elite recruitment and public policy during the transition. Nevertheless, civilian control of the military was still far from being well-institutionalized, since the reforms were mainly established through military

internal regulations. As such, there was no warranty that the military would not revoke their own regulations and return to the old socio-political function if the political situation worsened. In addition, there was no strong consensus within the officer corps to support future reforms (Crouch 2010, 136). This was exemplified by the debate between the “reformist” and “status quo” camps within the military on the need for further reforms (Widjojo 2017). The reformist officers, represented by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Agus Widjojo and Agus Wirahadikusumah, attempted to pursue a major overhaul of the military structure with the objective of transforming the TNI into modern armed forces (Honna 2003; Widjojo 2017). Among these ideas were dismantling the Sishankamrata doctrine, limiting the military’s role in internal security, replacing the TNI headquarters with a joint chief of staff command and abolishing territorial command (Honna 2003, 172). The proposals met with strong resistance from the group of status quo Army officers (Widjojo 2017).

The situation changed after the 1999 election brought many reform-minded legislators to DPR. The initial attempt to reform the military through elected representatives was implemented through the Majelis Pemusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR, People’s Consultative Assembly) decree on the separation of the military and Police in 2000 (Mietzner 2009, 202). The decree dismissed the ABRI and assigned different mandates to the TNI and Kepolisian Republik Indonesia (Polri, Indonesian National Police). Two years later, the Indonesian Police Law and the State Defense Law were passed to establish the Police as a civilian law enforcement body and the TNI as state defense apparatus. In 2004, a new TNI law was enacted after relentless effort by the legislators and civil society activists, further cementing TNI as a professional military institution. The *Reformasi* period, to some extent, had contributed significantly to depoliticizing the military in post-Suharto Indonesia. The military reform agenda ended military political adventurism by dismantling its prerogatives in the political arena. The constitutional amendments in 2002 removed the military’s reserved seats in the national and sub-national parliament. The 2004 TNI law mandated the military as an apolitical and professional institution. Altogether, these reform advances allowed for more competitive elections and more power for the elected civilians

to set the tone for public policy in general. At this point, the level of civilian control within the area of elite recruitment and public policy as postulated by Croissant et al. (2013) was high in post-*Reformasi* Indonesia.

The military reform process during the *Reformasi* also established a clear line between the role of TNI and Polri. Maintaining public order fell under the sole responsibility of the Polri, a fully civilian law enforcement body. The TNI law mandated the military's role in domestic security as part of its non-defense mission and would only be carried out at the official request of the Polri for TNI back-up. The conditions were fundamentally different from occurrences during Suharto's autocratic regime when the military leadership could simply circumvent the Police and deploy its own personnel to handle domestic security issues. However, there remained a regulatory gap in the mechanism of TNI assistance to the Polri. In some cases, TNI crossed the line by taking the initiative or compartmentalizing its active role in domestic security for conflict-ridden areas such as Papua province (Araf et al. 2011). From the analysis, it can be argued that establishing civilian control of the military in the domestic security area remains a challenge in Indonesia's civil-military relations. While the TNI is legally barred from direct involvement in maintaining public order, there has yet to be an institutionalized mechanism for elected civilians to control military actions. Consequently, we can observe a medium level of civilian control in the domestic security area of post-*Reformasi* Indonesia.

The parallel situation can also be observed from civilian control of the military in the areas of national defense and military organization (Gunawan 2017). Until now, civilian influence in the defense policy-making is still limited. Principally, there is no legal basis for the MoD to be a civilian body; it is not necessary to have a civilian defense minister. The MPR decree separated the Police and military, making both the national chief of Police and the TNI commander directly responsible to the president. Consequently, the TNI commander became a member of the cabinet which is equal to ministerial position, giving him significant power in policy making process within the cabinet. Moreover, the TNI commander was able to represent the government in the legislative process in the parliament,

especially regarding defense and the military. Finally, the TNI Law allows military personnel to occupy bureaucratic positions in some government agencies that are responsible for defense and/or security matters, particularly the MoD. In practice, uniformed officers were still promoted to top-level positions at the MoD.

Overall, the military reform agenda during the *Reformasi* period had limited success. While the political arena was neutralized from military interference, the defense-related area remains under the firm control of the military. This condition seems to be an unintended consequence of civilian attempts to depoliticize the military. During the *Reformasi* period, the military reform agenda was strongly motivated by the widespread interest in curtailing military prerogatives in political arena and returning it to its core function as state defense apparatus (Susilo 2014). Unfortunately, such a belief became the underlying logic for civilian politicians to tolerate military interest in retaining autonomy in defense affairs as long as the military willing was to dismantle its political role (Susilo 2014; Danusubroto 2015; Choirie 2016; Widjojo 2017). The problem is that it allowed the Army service to continue its dominance in shaping the direction of defense policy in post-Suharto era. The stranglehold was illustrated by the preservation of the Army-centric total people's defense doctrine as the status quo in national defense orientation.

### **4.3. Retaining the Army-centric total people's defense doctrine during *Reformasi***

The defense doctrine holds the upper position in national defense policy. It guides decision-makers and the military on how to deal with threats to state existential interests. Depending on the historical and socio-political dynamics in a given state, defense doctrine mainly reflects the desired approach of conducting war. Such an approach may favor the perspective of subservice, single service or group of services in the military (Posen 1984). In the case of post-*Reformasi* Indonesia, the preservation of the Army-centric defense doctrine is manifested through the Sistem Pertahanan Semesta (Sishanta, Total Defense System) doctrine within the 2002 State Defense Law. Principally, the Sishanta doctrine is no more than a

superficial change of the Army-developed Sishankamrata doctrine in Suharto's autocratic regime. The Sishanta doctrine simply removes the words security (*keamanan*) and the people (*rakyat*) from Sishankamrata to adapt to the military decision to abolish the dual-function doctrine for the *Reformasi* period (Hafidz 2006, 199). As such, the Sishanta doctrine retains the total people's defense as its basic principle which favors the Army-centric approach in the way TNI conducts warfare and organizes its stance.

#### **4.3.1 Historical development of total people's defense doctrine**

Indonesia's defense doctrine has historically been shaped by Army strategic thinking since the early independence era (Widjajanto 2006; 2010; Arief and Kurniawan 2018). The Army perspective in the defense doctrine flourished after the 1965 coup and was further institutionalized during Suharto's New Order regime. Principally, the doctrine emphasizes inward-looking orientation of defense strategy and the strengthening of the land-based defense posture. The defense doctrine originated in Dewan Pertahanan Negara (DPN, State Defense Council) Decree No. 85 in 1947 as a response to the Dutch colonial power's attempt to re-occupy Indonesian territory (Widjajanto 2010; Reza 2017). The decree envisioned the "total people defense" (*pertahanan rakyat total*) concept, defined as the involvement of all people in defending the nation. The total people defense doctrine encapsulates the formation of territorial basis of defense, particularly on the land. During that time, the selection of such land-based defense strategy was desirable since resources of the Navy and Air Force were insufficient (Bhakti, Yanuarti, and Nurhasim 2009).

In 1954, the concept was further adopted as the state defense doctrine through Article 4 of Law No. 29/1954 on state defense. It declared: "the state defense of the Republic of Indonesia holds the characteristic of people's defense", popularly known as the people's defense doctrine. During an Army Seminar in mid-1966, the concept of total people warfare (*Perata/Perang Rakyat Semesta*) was developed to guide the military effort in eradicating communist party supporters after the 1965 communist rebellion (Anggoro 2008). The concept was enshrined in the Army doctrine of Tri Ubaya Cakti which, among other aspects, emphasized the

military capability to conduct internal security operations through total warfare, intelligence and territorial development. The Army's total warfare approach was adopted as the state defense doctrine through Law No. 20/1982 on the Principal of State Defense, the aforementioned Sishankamrata. It holds three core characteristics.<sup>15</sup> First, it is citizen-based fighting, referring to the participation of all citizens. Second, Sishankamrata is a total war strategy, emphasizing the mobilization of all national resources against external or internal threats. Finally, Sishankamrata is territorial, placing all state territory as the warfighting base to provide continuous struggle against threats.

The 1982 law envisaged that the three characteristics are implemented in two ways. The first way is to arm the people with Pancasila (ideologically) and with military conscription training (physically) organized by the government. The second way is by integration of the TNI with the people as the main source of the defense force. Consequently, as Article 26 of Law No. 20/1982 stipulated, TNI is mandated with two functions: TNI as defense/security forces; and TNI as social forces. After the 1982 law's enactment, the ABRI commander published the Catur Dharma Eka Karya (Cadek) as the ABRI doctrine (Widjajanto 2010). The Cadek doctrine highlighted the utilization of intelligence operations, territorial operations, guerilla-warfare operations and internal security operations to deal with the external and internal threats (Widjajanto 2006; Anggoro 2008). Based on this doctrine, then defense minister, General Moerdani, established the ABRI security and defense doctrine (Doktrin Hankam ABRI) in 1991, which was used as the operational reference for implementation of Sishankamrata. The Hankam ABRI doctrine introduced the layered-defense strategy to develop the future defense posture. With Suharto's priority on internal security issues, the layered-defense strategy emphasized the major role of the Army in military operations (Widjajanto 2010). At this point, the domination of the Army-centric approach in the state defense doctrine was fully institutionalized (Lowry 1996).


---

<sup>15</sup> Article 8, Law No. 20/1982



At the policy level, the Sishankamrata doctrine contributed to the development of an Army-centric defense posture. Under Suharto's regime, the Army service-maintained dominance in the TNI personnel composition (Figure 5.1). The Army remained the top contributor of TNI personnel, ranging from 180,000-300,000 personnel. It put the Army as the largest service within the TNI for six decades consecutively. The Navy took second position with 30,000-65,000 personnel, followed by the Air Force's contingent of 20,000 to 50,000.

**Figure 4.2. Composition of TNI personnel from 1966 to 1998**



Source: author's compilation from the annual IISS Military Balance 1966-1998

The continuous gap between the Army and the other services was the logical consequence of Sishankamrata. At the operational level, the Sishankamrata and Cadek were manifested through several defense strategies such as layered defense, territorial defense and guerilla warfare (Arief and Kurniawan 2018). These strategies were then translated by the TNI into the development of the Koter structure that stretched from the provincial to village levels. As such, the bulk of Army personnel were distributed in the Koter structure that took form in the operation of Regional Military Commands (Kodam, Komando Daerah Militer). For example, around 81 percent (191,500 of 235,200 officers) of the Army service in 1996 were deployed in various Kodam branches (IISS 1996, 182). In 1958, the

number of Kodam was 17. The ABRI reorganization policy in 1985 then decreased the Kodam number to nine regional commands plus one Jakarta regional command. Operationally, each Kodam is led by a two-star Army general, equipped with at least one infantry battalion as a rapid-reaction unit (Rabasa and Haseman 2002). The structure of Kodam is hierarchical. Accordingly, Kodam supervises Komando Resor Militer (Korem, Sub-regional/city-level army command), Komando Distrik Militer (Kodim, District level army command), Komando Rayon Militer (Koramil, Sub-district army command) and Bintara Pembina Desa (Babinsa, Village level junior/non-commissioned officer) (Rabasa and Haseman 2002; Rinakit 2005). As of 2020, there were 15 Kodam oversee 34 provinces in Indonesia.

The posture of the Navy and the Air Force was therefore relatively minor compared to the Army. The Navy, as the second largest service, was divided into two main operational commands based on geographical demarcations in the archipelago: Komando Armada Barat (Koarmabar, Western fleet command) and Komando Armada Timur (Koarmatim, Eastern fleet command). Historically, the naval posture had been centralized in the western part of Indonesia. In 1985, the ABRI commander reorganized the Navy command, dividing the fleet into Koarmabar and Koarmatim. Each fleet supervises several naval bases (lantamal). Accordingly, Koarmabar oversees five bases and Koarmatim oversees nine bases (Agastia 2016). The reorganization was targeted at the expansion of the Navy role in maritime law enforcement rather than improving its external defense capability (Laksmana 2014; Arief and Kurniawan 2018). Such an expansion turned out to be imperative for limiting the Navy influence in the development of outward-looking national defense posture. Similar to the Navy, the Air Force had two main commands: the Komando Operasional Angkatan Udara I (Koopsau I, Air Force Operation Command I) and Komando Operasional Angkatan Udara II (Koopsau II, Air Force Operation Command II). The latter command was also established following the ABRI reorganization policy in 1985.

The implementation of an inward-looking defense strategy and land-based defense posture was translated into the mode of military operations under

Suharto's autocratic regime. Of 39 military operations conducted by the TNI from 1965 to 1998, 20 operations targeted internal threats such as from communist party supporters, the Papua separatist group, Aceh separatists and also those in East Timor (Pinatih 2010, 59). Most of these operations involved the Kodam and Kostrad units with minor contributions from the Navy and Air Force (Kingsbury 2003; Laksmana 2014). Their limited role in military operations was also caused by the outdated weapons and attendant lack of weapon procurement in both services (Haripin 2019). It is attributable to Suharto's action of ousting both services from the political arena after the 1965 communist rebellion. Before the abortive coup, President Sukarno gave significant attention to the Air Force and the Navy in an effort to balance the emerging Army power. The defense capabilities of both services were significantly improved. In the 1950s, Sukarno established good close relations with the Soviet Union, which resulted in the bulk of Soviet military aid channeled to Indonesia, particularly for the Navy and the Air Force (Derkach 1965). For example, the Air Force received 60 jet fighters and 20 bombers. Meanwhile, the Navy acquired two destroyers, submarines and various cruisers from Moscow (Leifer 1983, 61). Their increasing capabilities were later utilized by Sukarno to support various military operations in the early 1960s. Indeed, the boosted Navy and Air Force posture also contributed to Sukarno's preference for emphasizing joint-force strategy in the military operations, as evident in the Trikora and Dwikora operations (Pinatih 2010). Over time, the two services were deemed to be among Sukarno's loyalists together with the PKI.

After the failed communist coup, Suharto established a government committee mainly comprised of Army officers to investigate alleged communist supporters and their activities (Van der Kroef 1970). From the Army perspective, the Navy and Air Force were nothing more than bases for communist supporters in the military due to their close relationship with Sukarno (Haripin, 05.09.2019). Many Air Force and Navy officers were targeted by the Army in the communist purge, with the Air Force totally "cleansed". As mentioned in the first chapter, the Air Force chief, Air Marshall Omar Dani, was tried as a supporter of the communist rebellion and received a death sentence (it was subsequently commuted to life imprisonment and he was released from prison in 1995). Meanwhile, the Navy

was slowly sidelined by the Army from the political and national defense sector (Kingsbury 2003).

Under Suharto's autocratic regime, the Navy and the Air Force suffered from lack of equipment and weapon modernization. Although the overall defense budget decreased under Suharto's leadership, the effects on defense capability were most severe for the Navy and the Air Force that are highly dependent on advanced technology for their operations. Defense procurement for the two services was low; the Soviet and Eastern Bloc-made equipment acquired during Sukarno's rule was left to rust and grounded. Major procurement for the Navy was 39 vessels (Frosch and Corvette type) from the former East Germany fleet in the early 1990s (Laksmana 2014). Meanwhile, 12 US F-16 jetfighters purchased in the late 1980s were the major procurement for the Air Force (Kingsbury 2003).

#### **4.3.2. The survival of the total people's defense doctrine**

As part of the military reform agenda during the *Reformasi* period, amendments were made to Law No. 20/1982 on the main principles of state defense. On February 14, 2001, President Wahid sent the government draft of the state defense bill to the chairman of the DPR. The government draft, comprising 28 articles, was prepared by TNI Headquarters with little involvement from the Ministry of Defense (Lorenz 2015). President Wahid mandated the defense minister, Mahfud MD, to represent the government in the deliberation process. A week later, the DPR chairman held a meeting with all parties and decided that the bill would be deliberated by a 67-member special committee (Pansus) drawn from Committee I (defense affairs) and Committee III (law enforcement). The DPR leadership decided to involve Committee III in the committee since the National Police bill – which fell under the committee's responsibility in the law enforcement sector – had also been introduced by the government. It was hoped that the DPR could coordinate the progress on both state defense and police bills smoothly (Choirie 2016). The decision was imperative for the deliberation process of the bill. The process was largely dominated by the debate on the divisive role of the TNI and the Police, TNI-MOD relationship, the military function, the definition of threats and the oversight function of the parliament (See Lorenz 2015, 89-95). All

of these issues were actually related to the parallel deliberation process for the National Police bill in Committee III. The deliberation process of state defense bill took place in DPR from 6 May 2001 until 6 December 2001. The process was temporarily interrupted in July when President Wahid was impeached by the MPR. Nevertheless, talks on the state defense bill between the government and DPR continued, and the bill was officially passed on December 10, 2001, during the DPR plenary session. Accordingly, the final draft retained the core principle of total people's defense as the state defense doctrine (Choirie 2016). There were revisions in the Sishankamrata doctrine, with the removal of the words "people" (*rakyat*) and "security" (*keamanan*). It gave way to the new label of the Sishanta doctrine. The removal was a direct implication from the promulgation of Law No. 2/2002 that mandates the Police as the civilian institution for overseeing internal security and public order. However, the doctrinal adaptation was artificial and consistently indicated the Army strategic way of thinking (Choirie 2016; Haripin 2019; Aliabbas 2019).

Subsequently, civilian politicians attempted to dismantle Army's domination in national defense during the deliberation process of the TNI bill in 2004. The government proposal on TNI posture was viewed as problematic and vague by the legislators for two reasons. It included "to improve state security" as the objective of TNI posture. Second, it stated that "the TNI posture shall be organized according to the state defense strategy and Indonesia's geographical context". As such, the proposal raised suspicion among the legislators that the Army was insidiously attempting to keep its domination in the future TNI posture by sustaining the KOTER structure (Bainus 2009). In fact, such a suspicion was raised before the onset of the deliberation process (Danusubroto 2015; Choirie 2016). President Megawati instructed the Coordinating Minister of Politics, Security and Law (Menkopolhukam), Minister of Defense and the TNI Commander to represent the government in the deliberation process. Upon closer inspection, the government representatives all came from a military background, notably from the Army. Menkopolhukam Hari Sabarno was a retired Army general. The defense minister, Matori Abdul Djilil, was a civilian politician, but was unable to perform his duties after suffering a stroke in 2003. President Megawati designated Hari Sabarno as

the ad interim minister of defense. In the deliberation process, the MoD was mostly represented by its director general of defense strategy, Maj. Gen. Sudrajat, from the Army (Sudrajat 2016; Choirie 2016). Finally, the TNI commander at the time, General Endriartono Sutarto, also served in the Army.

In the first hearing, several activists and academics broached the abolition of the Army's Koter in the TNI bill (Aliabbas 2019). Majority legislators then proposed removal of the word "security" from the TNI posture objective and to replace it with "to fight against military threat and armed threat" (Bainus 2009; Danusubroto 2015). At this point, legislators viewed the inclusion of security objectives in the TNI posture would keep the Army's Koter and its security function intact (Danusubroto 2015; Choirie 2016). In regard to the organization of the TNI posture, some legislators proposed to add the clause, "Indonesia geographical status as archipelagic state." Meanwhile, others proposed adding a new article that stipulated the TNI posture shall be organized in the form of joint command that involves the integration of all services (DPR RI 2004b). In principle, the archipelagic state outlook and the joint command proposals were aimed to loosen the Army's domination in the future TNI force structure (Choirie 2016). The government representation refused to include the archipelagic state proposal which Army officers perceived as an attempt to remove Koter (Bainus 2009). Sudrajat believed that abolition of Koter was not the main issue in TNI reform but the political use of Koter structure as happened during Suharto's regime (Detik News 04.08.2004). He flatly refused the proposal to abolish KOTER (Sudrajat 2016). On several occasions TNI Commander Endriartono commented that abolition of Koter structure could only be considered an option only if the government was willing to allocate more financial resources to modernize the military, an idea that was highly unlikely at that time (Tempo Newspaper, 11.12.2004). Similarly, the joint command proposal was rejected by the Army-dominated government representative (Choirie 2016).

During the deliberation hearings, Sabarno referred to Indonesia's experience in maintaining joint commands in the 1970s which were dissolved in the 1980s due to high costs involved (Bainus 2009, 261). Agreement was eventually reached on

the clauses defining TNI posture. First, TNI posture shall be organized as part of state defense posture against military threat and armed threat. Second, it is established according to the state defense policy. To accommodate House concerns about the reoccurrence of army territorial command function as happened under Suharto's autocratic regime, the explanation section includes the prohibition of a TNI posture that follows civilian bureaucracy structure (Bainus 2009; Danusubroto 2015; Choirie 2016). In fact, any explicit reference to the territorial command was removed when it was passed into law at the end of September 2004. While civilian politicians were able to remove any direct reference to the Koter structure in the overall TNI law, the agreement on the establishment of the TNI posture remained vague. The agreed clause left the posture development to the government defense policy without any specific reference on what it entailed. Thus, at the operational and strategic level, the TNI posture development remains open to the influence of the Army strategic way of thinking. The situation would be different if, for example, the DPR proposals to include the archipelagic outlook or the establishment of joint-command as the main reference of TNI posture development were approved. This would have allowed civilian reformers to pursue new policy objectives in national defense with the support of a strong legal foundation.

**Table 4.3. Evolution of Indonesia's defense doctrine**

<b>Doctrine</b>	<b>Pertahanan Rakyat</b>	<b>Sishankamrata</b>	<b>Sishanta</b>
<b>Source</b>	Law No. 29/1954 on the state defense of the Republic of Indonesia	Law No. 20/1982 on the main principles of state defense	Law No.3/2002 on state defense.
<b>Political context</b>	anti-colonialism	military socio-political role	democratization; military professionalism
<b>Core features</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. People defense (article 4)</li> <li>2. Total or full involvement of the national resources. Emphasizing the role of citizens in state defense either voluntarily (militias) or as member of the military (article 5).</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The integration of defense (against external threats) and security (against internal threats) as the objective of state defense (article 1).</li> <li>2. Three characteristics: People-based defense, total defense, territorial defense (article 8).</li> <li>3. The armed forces dual function: as defense-security force and social force (article 26).</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Emphasizing defense of the state in order to maintain state sovereignty, state survival and territorial integrity (article 1).</li> <li>2. Total people's defense, based on the people's right and obligation to defend the state (article 2).</li> <li>3. The TNI sole function as state defense apparatus against military threat (article 7 and 10).</li> </ol>
<b>Operational level</b>	Layered defense; guerilla warfare; active-defense strategy	Military role in politics and internal security; layered defense; guerilla warfare;	Military core function in national defense; layered defense; guerilla warfare.

Source: author's compilation.



#### **4.4. Summary**

Ultimately, the deliberation process for the new state defense law failed to revamp the Sishankamrata doctrine in 2001. While Indonesia's defense doctrine has undergone several name changes since its inception in 1947, the latest changes were still far from substantial (Table 4.3). The defense doctrine after the *Reformasi* period remains based on the total people's defense principle that is historically shaped by the Army strategic way of thinking, emphasizing inward-looking orientation of defense strategy, and strong preference for land-based defense posture. In addition, the newly promulgated TNI law was beset by loopholes that could be used for the Army to exert its dominance in the future direction of defense policy. Considering that the military remains to be influential in the post-*Reformasi* national defense policy-making, it can be expected that civilian decision-makers would face significant barriers in their quest for substantial change. This condition will be discussed in the following empirical chapters.



## **5. Reshaping the orientation of national defense policy**

This chapter analyzes President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's attempt to promote military jointness in the TNI during his first term in office from 2004 to 2009. Accordingly, the chapter begins with discussion of President Yudhoyono's background and his commitment to military professionalism. The analysis moves into the introduction of new elements by the Yudhoyono administration within future defense development of post-*Reformasi* Indonesia. As will be explained subsequently, Yudhoyono endeavored to introduce policy change through the inclusion of concepts of the Integrated Tri-Service (Trimatra Terpadu) and the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) as new elements of defense policy orientation within the 2007 national strategic documents. The tri-service concept envisages developing joint war fighting capability among TNI services through the establishment of Joint Regional Command (Kogabwilhan, Komando Gabungan Wilayah Pertahanan), and the MEF emphasizes the government long-term TNI modernization agenda by increasing the strike force of each service branch within the military to deter threats. The final part of the chapter summarizes the findings.

### **5.1. President Yudhoyono and the idea of military professionalism**

President Yudhoyono was the first president elected through popular national elections after the *Reformasi*. Previously, he served as a member of Megawati's cabinet as the coordinating minister for political and security affairs. A 1973 graduate of the Military Academy, Yudhoyono is a retired three-star Army general. When Suharto resigned in 1998, Yudhoyono and several progressive TNI officers initiated a series of discussions within the TNI on the pathway of military internal reform (Widjojo 2017). They subsequently promoted the so-called "New Paradigm" that endorsed ABRI withdrawal from the political arena (Honna 2003, 164). Principally, national defense was one of the major interests of Yudhoyono during his electoral campaign. In his electoral platform, Yudhoyono proposed to develop a military professionalism identity within the TNI, modernize the weaponry system and improve the living standards of TNI personnel (Yudhoyono

and Kalla 2004, 47). Consequently, for the *Reformasi* activists and politicians, Yudhoyono was perceived to be a progressive military officer and likely to be keen to resolve the unfinished TNI reform agenda during his term as president (Haripin 2019; Aliabbas 2019).

On his first days as president, Yudhoyono showed his commitment to promote TNI professionalism and to steer the TNI away from the political arena. He broke new ground politically by appointing Juwono Sudarsono as the minister of defense. Previously, Juwono Sudarsono served as the first civilian minister of defense under the Wahid administration, when Yudhoyono also served as the energy and natural resources minister. When Megawati replaced the impeached Wahid, Juwono was made the Indonesian ambassador to the UK. Juwono came from a distinguished academic background. He was a professor of International Relations at the University of Indonesia, and a well-respected figure within the military and defense community. Among military officers, Juwono was recognized as reform-minded intellectual in regard to national defense and strategic thinking (Sudrajat 2016; Susanto 2015; Ate 2019; Basuki 2019). Before his appointment as Yudhoyono's minister of defense, Juwono frequently emphasized in various public forums that the Indonesia's defense posture needed a major overhaul to keep up with the current geostrategic environment, particularly in air and maritime defense capability (Rieffel and Pramodhawardani 2007, 87).

Yudhoyono's decision to designate Juwono as minister of defense was seen by observers as evidence of his strong commitment to maintain a military professionalism identity within the TNI, and keep civilian actors in charge of defense sector policy-making (Haripin 2019; Aliabbas 2019). In fact, Juwono publicly revealed that he was picked by Yudhoyono with the special mandate to improve TNI professionalism and keep the military out far of the political arena (Tempo 17.10.2006). Yudhoyono's attempt to pursue policy change in the defense sector is also reflected in his decision to rotate the TNI Commander position among each service. In 2006, he appointed Air Chief Marshal Djoko Suyanto as the TNI Commander. It was historic because Suyanto was the first Air Force officer appointed to the position. Analysts viewed it as displaying Yudhoyono's strong

commitment to maintain the *Reformasi* policy of Wahid to rotate the TNI leadership and curb the long-held Army dominance (Widjojo 2017; Aliabbas 2019).

Nevertheless, it was not all smooth sailing for Yudhoyono. Public criticism greeted his decision to promote a senior Army officer, Lieutenant General Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, as the MoD secretary-general. Sjafrie was a controversial figure as a member of the Army hardliners led by Prabowo Subianto, Suharto's son-in-law, that were involved in mass riots during the final days of the New Order regime in May 1998 (Mietzner 2006). Human rights activists condemned Sjafrie for human rights abuses during the riots as he was the commander of Kodam in the capital (Tempo 15.04.2005). In fact, the official 1998 riots investigation indicated that Sjafrie was involved in orchestrating the social unrest in Jakarta that resulted in hundreds of deaths (Honna 2003). Following the release of the investigation findings, Sjafrie was removed as commander and assigned to the post of territorial assistant for the TNI chief of general staff. In this position, Sjafrie engaged in intensive collaboration with Yudhoyono in his capacity as TNI chief of territorial staff (Widjojo 2017). He then served as TNI Headquarters spokesman before Yudhoyono named him to the MoD.

Yudhoyono's selection of senior Army officers such as Sjafrie appeared to be part of his strategic plan to pursue major overhaul in the defense sector. As such, there was a perception in the MoD and Yudhoyono's circle that Sjafrie would be able to bridge the government interest of defense reform with the TNI interest, particularly the Army (Sudrajat 2016; Widjojo 2017; Ate 2019; Basuki 2019). As a senior Army officer, Sjafrie was highly respected in Army and military circles (Sudrajat 2016; Basuki 2019). In fact, Sjafrie was the strongest candidate for the Army Chief of Staff to replace General Djoko Santoso when he was promoted to TNI commander in December 2007. Sjafrie reportedly received full backing of the Army top leaders to take the position (Detik News 27.12.2007). Nonetheless, Yudhoyono decided to retain Sjafrie as the MoD secretary-general and give the Army Chief of Staff position to Major General Agustadi Sasongko, Sjafrie's classmate in the Military Academy. In several cases, Sjafrie lived up to his role as

the TNI “middleman” within the MoD. For example, he publicly opposed Juwono’s plan to include TNI cooperatives and foundations in the TNI business take-over plan, claiming that “if an enterprise runs for internal and soldier welfare purposes, it can’t be categorized as a business” (Mietzner 2009, 55). TNI leadership took a stance that concurred with Sjafrie. The pressure from TNI forced Juwono to abandon the government plan by acknowledging that TNI cooperatives and foundations did contribute to the welfare of soldiers (Tempo Newspaper 06.11.2008).

## **5.2. Transition from military reform to defense transformation agenda**

Overall, the civilian government’s capability to enact policy change in the defense sector was poor in the period 2004 to 2009 (Widjajanto 2009; Haripin 2019). (All government-sponsored bills failed to pass in the legislature due to opposition of political parties and criticism from influential civil society organizations (CSO) (Aliabbas 2019). More importantly, the poor legislative performance was also caused by Yudhoyono’s inability to manage the competing interests of his large coalition of parties in the DPR (Hanan 2012). Given the difficulty to enact substantial policy change in the legislature, Yudhoyono strategically pursued policy change without changing the status quo of the emphasis on total people’s defense in national defense.

When the deliberation process of the military justice bill was stalled in early 2007, Yudhoyono switched his focus from military reform issues to the defense transformation agenda (Widjojo 2017; Basuki 2019). Unlike the military reform agenda that focused on major policy change in the legislative arena, Yudhoyono took a different strategy for the defense transformation agenda. He implemented incremental steps to reshape the future national defense orientation by avoiding policy change through the legislative arena (Widjojo 2017). The steps were manifested with the publication of the first ever strategic documents for national defense and the regulatory document of state defense policy since the *Reformasi*. Yudhoyono orchestrated the formulation and publication of four strategic

documents on national defense: the state defense doctrine book (Buku Doktrin Pertahanan Negara); the defense strategy book (Buku Strategi Pertahanan Negara); the defense posture book (Buku Postur Pertahanan Negara), and Indonesia's defense white paper (Buku Putih Pertahanan Indonesia). All of these documents were considered pivotal for national defense after the *Reformasi* period since they carried core trajectories for future TNI professionalism (Sudrajat 2016; Ate 2019).

### **5.2.1. Preserving the status quo of total people's defense doctrine**

The formulation process of these documents began in August 2007 and fell under the responsibility of the MoD's Directorate General of Defense Strategy (DGDS, Direktorat Jenderal Strategi Pertahanan), specifically the Directorate for National Strategic Policy (Ditjakstra) (MoD RoI 2005; Susanto 2015; Ate 2019). At the time of formulation, the head of DGDS was an active two-star Army general, and the director of Ditjakstra was an active one-star Army general (Susanto 2015). Overall, the formulation process was dominated by the uniformed officers as members of the drafting team (Susanto 2015; Ate 2019). Meanwhile, Juwono and MoD Secretary-General Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin provided the guidance and directives in the substance and material for the strategic documents (Susanto 2015). According to a member of the drafting team, the influence of civilians was minor in the drafting process (Ate 2019). There were consultations with civilian actors such as academics, defense analysts and NGO activists but mostly in an informal context and on an irregular basis (Susanto 2015; Tippe 2016; Ate 2019). These conditions contributed to the lack of significant change in the status quo of the existing total people's defense doctrine.

Revising the total people's defense doctrine would mean opening an opportunity for restructuring the Army's Koter structure (Widjojo 2017). It was not an option to rejuvenate national defense from Yudhoyono's perspective, even before he was elected president. During the 2004 presidential campaign, Yudhoyono publicly opposed the idea of abolishing Koter. Yudhoyono made it clear to the public that, "Koter is legally part of the total people's defense system" (Tempo 01.08.2004). For Yudhoyono, Koter was not the problem during the autocratic New Order

regime, but rather the political function of the military (Tempo 01.08.2004). His conviction that Koter must be preserved was later translated to the strategic documents by the drafting team (Susanto 2015; Tippe 2016; Ate 2019). The belief was manifested in the state defense doctrine book. In general, the document retained the core features from its outdated predecessor with the only significant change being the removal of the military socio-political function. In fact, there was no initiative among the drafting team members to promote doctrinal innovation during the formulation process of doctrine book (Susanto 2015; Ate 2019). For example, the concept of “total” (*kesemestaan*) remained the ultimate model for state defense. The concept envisages total involvement of the people (*rakyat*) for state defense based on their rights and obligation to defend the country from any threats as stipulated by the Constitution. As such, the concept emphasized three principles: people-based defense, total defense and territorial defense (Widjojo 2017; Ate 2019). Upon closer inspection, these principles were basically unchanged from the outdated 1982 state defense law.

The Army-centric concept of guerilla warfare (*perang gerilya*) was also conserved in the new state defense doctrine and the defense strategy documents. Accordingly, both documents envisage guerilla warfare as part of the integration between military defense (*pertahanan militer*) and non-military defense (*pertahanan nirmiliter*) (MoD RoI 2007a, 79; 2007c, 69). For the latter, the TNI is mandated to coordinate the contribution of the people – hereafter termed as reserve component/*komponen cadangan* – and the involvement of national resources – termed supporting component/*komponen pendukung* – to defend the state. However, the non-military defense model re-emphasizes the Suharto’s regime interpretation of ideology, politics, economy, socio-cultural and technology as part of non-military defense instruments (MoD RoI 2007a, 49). The Army-developed concept of layered defense was also entrenched in the 2007 defense doctrine and the 2007 defense strategy documents with some minor changes. In the old Doktrin Hankamneg 1991, the layered defense concept was understood as three layers of defense strategy: defense/military layer; domestic security layer; and the socio-political layer (Widjajanto 2010). In the new document, the socio-political layer is removed but the military defense layer and



the security layer changed were retermed as “military defense” and “non-military defense” (MoD 2007a; MoD 2007c). The nexus between guerilla tactics and layered defense is further explained in the 2007 defense strategy document. When the military defense and non-military defense fail to deter external aggression, then Indonesia would implement the “protracted war strategy” (*strategi perang berlarut*) that emphasizes the deployment of guerilla tactics as the final layer of defense (MoD RoI 2007c, 78–79).

The preservation of the guerilla warfare concept and layered defense in the defense doctrine and the defense strategy documents actually echoed the old concept of “kemanunggalan” (alignment) of military that placed the TNI as the people’s Army (McGregor 2007). The alignment concept means that the military, as the main component of national defense, bears the responsibility to maintain close contact with the people as part of the total people’s defense doctrine and strategy (Hasanuddin 2015; Widjojo 2017). In practice, the only service within the TNI that has been successful in performing such a crucial task is the Army through the Koter network and its territorial supervision function (Crouch 2010; Widjojo 2017). The problem is that the alignment concept was built upon an inward-looking defense strategy, placing greater emphasis on the military role in tackling domestic security issues (Haripin 2019). The 2008 defense white paper further provided the justification for the military to keep its role in domestic security issues by claiming that military threats from external aggressors are unlikely in the near future (MoD RoI 2008, 7). Consequently, the existing Koter maintains its operational importance as the backbone of the total people’s defense doctrine and inward-looking defense posture (Haripin 2020).

### **5.2.2. Introducing the Integrated Tri-Service and the MEF**

Nevertheless, Yudhoyono decided to add new elements to the existing Army-centric approach of layered defense through the new defense posture document. In contrast to the formulation process of the state doctrine book, President Yudhoyono instructed Juwono to ensure that the future development of TNI posture would focus on service interoperability and mobility (Sudrajat 2016; Susanto 2015; Ate 2019). It was reported that Yudhoyono had been impressed by

Juwono's ideas of reforming the defense sector in 2001 (Sudrajat 2016; Widjojo 2017). At the time Juwono had expressed to President Wahid the urgency of establishing an integrated approach in the management and planning on the defense sector, only to receive an indifferent response from the leader (Lesmana 2008, 208). After his election to the presidency, Yudhoyono requested that Juwono disseminate the integrated approach in the national defense policy (Widjojo 2017).

In 2005, Yudhoyono signed the national middle-term development plan (RPJMN, Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional) that serves as the national policy guidance for all ministries in formulating their policies. One of the main RPJMN programs in defense was the development of integrated defense (Gunadi 2015). The objective of the program was to "establish TNI readiness involving the Army, the Navy and the Air Force in an integrated manner to conduct integrated state defense" (MoSS RoI 2005, Section II.7-4). In early 2006, Juwono publicly introduced the Integrated Tri-Service as part of the MoD future policies after a meeting on defense planning with the TNI Headquarter, finance ministry and State Development Planning Agency (Bappenas). Juwono noted that the high-level meeting agreed to "implement a defense concept that is based on, among others, integrated tri-service planning" but no further details were divulged (Detik News 25.01.2006). Almost two years later, a more detailed explanation of the integrated tri-service concept reappeared in the defense posture book. The concept was adopted as part of the deep-defense (*pertahanan mendalam*) area in the layered defense strategy against external aggressors. Accordingly, the Integrated Tri-Service concept is perceived by defense planners as a joint military operation involving the Army, the Navy and the Air Force that covers the area from the outer Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) line to the land areas (MoD RoI 2007b, 77). Thus, the Integrated Tri-Service Concept provides the penultimate defense layer before the final layer of guerrilla warfare (Susanto 2015). To implement the concept, policy-makers must prepare so-called "layer of defense area" that comprises the units of the Army, Navy and Air Force (Ate 2019). In doing so, the "layer of defense area" depends on the joint-strength between the TNI services that is organized in

several territories and expected to be manifested in the form of the Defense Area Command (MoD RoI 2007b, 78).

During the formulation process for the strategic documents, the idea of having an integrated force structure positively corresponded with the drafters' concerns on the existing TNI posture (Susanto 2015; Tippe 2016; Ate 2019). Before the formulation, most of the drafters informally discussed among themselves the unbroached issue of interoperability between the TNI services (Sudrajat 2016). Concerns were raised that each service was long known to be indifferent, even dismissive to the capabilities of the others (Susanto 2015; Gunadi 2015; Ate 2019). The concerns were exemplified by, among others, the lack of joint training and scant coordination on interoperability between purchased weapon platforms (Susanto 2015). When the drafters brought their concerns to Juwono, he promised to discuss the issue with Yudhoyono (Sudrajat 2016; Susanto 2015). The President's standpoint on the issue was explicitly outlined during his speech at the 62<sup>nd</sup> anniversary of the TNI's founding in early October 2007. In the speech, SBY made it clear that the military must focus on its war fighting capabilities by improving interoperability of weapon platform and personnel between the three services. Specifically, Yudhoyono demanded the TNI must conduct large scale military joint-training before the 63<sup>rd</sup> anniversary (MoSS RoI 2007).

After Yudhoyono's speech, Juwono briefed the drafters about the President's stipulation that the future projection of TNI posture must be developed under the integrated Tri-Service Concept based on capability-based defense and budget availability (Susanto 2015; Ate 2019; see MoD RoI 2007b, 69). Later, the new defense posture document stressed that "the reorganization [of TNI] must be aimed towards the establishment of military strategy of Trimatra Terpadu" (MoD RoI 2007b, 74).

At the operational level, the reorganization was projected towards the establishment of a new structure of joint command within TNI, known by the term Kogabwil (*Komando gabungan wilayah*, Joint-regional command) (Tippe 2016). The defense planners claimed Kogabwil would serve as the integrated mechanism

against the complexity of military threats. Kogabwil would integrate the activities of area command (i.e. Naval fleet or Air Force base) and the Army's territorial command (Susanto 2015; Tippe 2016). The expected output is the integration of military operations under the combined tri-service approach in the form of joint military operation (MoD RoI 2007b, 76).

Historically, the idea of implementing a joint forces command such as Kogabwil was not new in Indonesian national defense. In 1969, Indonesia had four joint commands, known as Kowilhan (*Komando wilayah pertahanan*, Defense Regional Command). In 1983, the commands were revamped by then ABRI Commander General LB Moerdani as part of the Armed Force reorganization policy. Moerdani wanted to rationalize the number of military personnel (Laksmana 2019). The idea of reactivating the joint military command emerged during the deliberation process of the TNI bill in 2004. At the time, the National Awakening Party (PKB, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa) proposed the TNI posture is organized towards the integration of units from each service under one command on a territorial basis, known as Kodahan (*Komando daerah pertahanan*) (Choirie 2016). The PKB proposal met strong resistance from the Army-dominated government representative that cited the past issue of inefficiency (Bainus 2009, 261). This potential stumbling block was anticipated by Juwono and the drafters by incorporating the so-called "zero-growth policy" for military recruitment in the 2007 defense posture and the 2008 defense white paper (Susanto 2015). The policy envisages a balanced composition between the quantity of newly recruited officers and the number of retired officers during the implementation of the Integrated Tri-Service Concept within the TNI organizational structure (MoD RoI 2007b, 74; 2008, 120).

The idea was further elaborated upon in the roadmap of TNI posture development as outlined in the defense posture document. The roadmap envisages that military defense capacity is constructed through the establishment of four (4) Kogabwil. Each of them directly reports to the TNI Commander and includes units from the Army (Kodam, Kostrad and Kopassus), the Navy (Armada/fleet), and the Air Force (Koops/operational commands) (MoD RoI 2007b, 114). Kogabwil placements

were to be organized as follows: Kogabwil I and II would cover the western part of the country, namely Sumatra, West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan and Java Island. Meanwhile, Kogabwil III and IV would cover the eastern part of the country i.e., South Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara Islands, Maluku and Papua. In order to support the establishment of Kogabwil, the defense planners would expand the Army's Kostrad into four divisions from two divisions. Regarding the Navy, the existing two fleets would be expanded into four. Similarly, the existing two operational commands under the Air Force would be doubled. The document specifies that the Kogabwilhan structure would be established in a long-term defense posture development program, spanning 2010 to 2029 in four phases. More importantly, the 2008 defense white paper asserted that the future implementation of the concept not only targets the TNI organizational structure but also military training and education, military logistic system and military C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) (MoD RoI 2008, 133).

The Army considered the concept a threat to its domination of national defense. A member of the drafting team recalled that Army representatives perceived the approach as the pretext to reduce the number of Koter nationwide and potentially curtail the Army's influence in the future trajectory of national defense strategizing (Ate 2019). The Koter were of particular meaning to the Army because the majority of its personnel were stationed within its structure (Kodam, Kodim and Koramil). In 2007, for example, this accounted for approximately 150,000 of the 233,000 personnel, a full 64 percent (IISS 2007, 352). The stakes were raised higher with the barring of active officers from taking government posts and the extension of the retirement age from 55 to 58 years old under the new TNI law. Both clauses contributed to the problem of "officer surpluses" with "too many officers and too few positions available for them" (Laksmana 2019, 14). Therefore, the Army's survival as an institution hinged on maintaining or even expanding the Koter structure (Widjojo 2017).

As a retired Army officer himself, Yudhoyono naturally understood the Army's concern on Koter (Widjojo 2017; Pasha 2019). As mentioned previously,

Yudhoyono was keen to state his commitment to preserve Koter during the presidential campaign in 2004. President Yudhoyono strategically anticipated Army resistance towards the new integrated tri-service element by incorporating the MEF concept to complement the integrated tri-service concept in the new strategic documents (Pasha 2019; Widjojo 2017; Susanto 2015). Historically, the MEF concept can be traced back in the 2003 defense white paper. Back then, the minimum standard of force was termed by the defense planners as “minimum required essential force”. However, there were no clear details on what it meant or substantial discussion on the concept afterwards (Sudrajat 2016). The MEF was claimed to be conceptualized by Juwono and then introduced by Yudhoyono in 2005 (RSIS 2011, 5). Accordingly, Yudhoyono requested Juwono to develop the MEF concept as part of the government defense agenda as the bargaining chip for Army support towards integrated tri-service concept (Widjojo 2017; Pasha 2019).

The MEF agenda in the 2007 defense posture book entails development of each service that focuses on expansion of existing structure and the weapon modernization program under the umbrella of establishing Integrated Tri-Service posture. For the Army service, the MEF agenda mandates the preservation of the Koter structure. Moreover, as part of the Kogabwil projection and posture development outside Java, MEF plans to add three new Kodam in Kalimantan, Sulawesi and West Papua (MoD RoI 2007b, 78). In total, there would be 15 Kodam as the minimum standard of future Army force. As such, the development of new KODAM within the MEF agenda would defuse any tension between Yudhoyono’s ambitions within the integrated tri-service concept of the Army (Susanto 2015; Ate 2019). The MEF also targets the modernization of the Army’s existing weapon system through restoration of old weapons and acquisition of new types to improve its capabilities in airborne, cavalry, mechanized infantry and raiders. Indeed, the MEF agenda outlines significant posture development for the Navy and the Air Force (Gunadi 2015). The Navy fleets, for example, would be doubled to a total of four. Accordingly, the Navy force is set to acquire 274 vessels as the minimum standard (MoD RoI 2008, 127). Meanwhile, the Air Force would establish 10 fighter squadrons and 10 transport squadrons to support the transformation of two Air Force operational commands into four. To fulfil the MEF

target, the defense planner aimed to increase the defense budget ratio above 1 percent of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in the next 2-3 years after 2008. It was also expected that the ratio of the defense budget would reach a minimum 2% of GDP in the next 15-20 years (MoD RoI 2008, 166). Essentially, the MEF agenda offers incentives for the military to initiate its defense transformation agenda (Widjojo 2017; Haripin 2019). Most importantly, the Army obtains the greater incentive for two reasons. First, the MEF agenda sets out the expansion of the Army's Kodam; this may provide a short-term solution for the problem of "officer surpluses" that arose in the Army following *Reformasi*. Second, the weapon modernization program in the MEF agenda would generate an even larger defense budget share for the Army due to its status as the largest service within the TNI.

Once the MoD released the new strategic documents, President Yudhoyono then signed the Presidential Regulation No.7/2008 (Perpres No.7/2008) on the General Principle of State Defense. Substantially, the new presidential regulation consisted of elements that were already included in the MoD's strategic documents. The regulatory document incorporates minimum essential force and integrated tri-service as the main parameter for TNI force development. Likewise, the total defense doctrine and layered defense concept as discussed in the 2007 defense doctrine book were included. The Yudhoyono administration then disseminated the government defense transformation agenda to the TNI. The initial step was to introduce the new strategic documents to the TNI leadership (Tippe 2016; Gunadi 2015). On January 24, 2008, MoD presented the strategic documents at the annual TNI leaders meeting (Rapim, Rapat pimpinan). The presentation ranks as a benchmark in the history of MoD-TNI relations as the first time the civilian-led MoD unveiled its strategic documents at a high-level TNI forum (Tippe 2016).

In addition to the presentation, Yudhoyono reiterated the government plan to conduct armed forces joint training before the TNI 63<sup>rd</sup> anniversary commemoration in October 2008. On the day before the TNI leaders meeting, SBY convened a coordination meeting with the newly appointed TNI Commander General Djoko Santoso, Defense Minister Juwono and the three chiefs of staff to

discuss the 2008 defense budget, including implementation of the plan for joint training (Detik News 23.01.2008). After the TNI leaders meeting, Santoso publicly mentioned the plan to conduct large scale military training in 2008 involving the three services, and proposing around Rp 50 billion/USD 5 million to finance the plan (Okezone News 24.01.2008). In the following month, Yudhoyono and his cabinet organized a meeting at the MoD. The meeting was also attended by Vice President Jusuf Kalla, Minister of Political and Security affairs Widodo, Coordinating Minister of Economy Boediono, Minister for Public Welfare Aburizal Bakrie and several technical ministers (Tempo 04.02.2008). During the following press conference, Yudhoyono revealed that the meeting discusses the MoD's program in 2008 and government budget allocation. He emphasized that the government was committed to implement the MEF agenda as outlined in the newly released strategic documents, but given budgetary constraints, military operation and training would be prioritized (MoSS RoI 2008a).

Months later, the TNI launched its first ever joint training in the post-*Reformasi* period, and the first since 1996. The 2008 joint training, coded Yudha Siaga, involved more than 30,000 personnel and was held at the four locations of Natuna Island, Batam Island, West Kalimantan and East Kalimantan. Yudhoyono attended the TNI joint training, accompanied by the TNI commander and the chief of staff from the three services. During his visit, Yudhoyono was directly involved in evaluating the training scenario, with an emphasis on the importance of services interoperability to deter threats (Tippe 2016; Basuki 2019). The exercises, ultimately costing more than Rp 55 billion, were criticized by civil society organization activists for being insensitive to the nation's economic downturn. Juwono responded to the flak by arguing the training was needed as part of the government determination to promote integrated the tri-service approach among the three TNI services (Kompas 18.06.2008).

Yudhoyono subsequently embarked on another strategic move to ensure the government effort to promote military jointness was well understood by the TNI leaders, particularly the Army. He realized that his ambition to implement the Integrated Tri-Service and MEF agenda cannot be viewed by the Army as being at



the expense of its own institution. In his capacity as the TNI commander-in-chief, it was strategically important to consolidate the Army service as the largest branch of TNI with his future plan in national defense (Tippe 2016). In a bid to do so, Yudhoyono ordered the MoD and TNI Commander to organize a national seminar on defense (Tippe 2016; Ate 2019). In September 2008, Yudhoyono gave the keynote speech at the national seminar at the Army Seskoad. Historically, Seskoad has been the intellectual center for the Army's strategic thinking and possesses considerable influence on national defense policy and military elites (McFetridge 1983). For example, the Army's conception of Dwifungsi was invented during the inaugural Seskoad seminar in 1965. The 2008 Seskoad seminar was organized under the theme "Indonesia's Defense System in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century" and attended by key cabinet members, the TNI commander and the chiefs of staff for the three services. The seminar was organized by Seskoad but several members of the organizing committee were civilians, among others, Andi Widjajanto, a reform-minded defense analyst (Tippe 2016; Ate 2019).

In his keynote speech, Yudhoyono began by praising the success of the recent TNI joint-training and cited the seminar as part of the TNI commitment to conduct internal reform in the last decade. He called upon the audience to recognize the rapid changes in the security environment that was forcing countries around the world to update their strategic assessments periodically (MoSS RoI 2008b). He warned the participants to discard the outdated Cold War paradigm as the reference for the current strategic assessment. Finally, Yudhoyono emphasized that the future of Indonesia's national defense depended on the establishment of a minimum essential force (MoSS RoI 2008b). After the Seskoad address, the Yudhoyono administration continued to deliver the message to the public that the government had gradually changed its focus from the military reform agenda towards defense transformation. For example, in October 2008, Juwono claimed that the TNI reform drive launched in 1998 had met 85 percent of its targets, leaving only two unresolved issues: military justice reform and the takeover of TNI businesses (Kompas 09.10.2008).

### **5.3. Summary**

During his early years in office, President Yudhoyono dealt with the problems of pursuing major policy change in the legislative arena, especially the national defense sector. Maintaining solid support from the coalition parties for the government-sponsored bill was extremely difficult. He was unable to push forward unfinished business in the military reform agenda, and then turn his focus to defense transformation agenda through incremental ways. In doing so, he utilized the layering strategy to pursue military jointness in the post-*Reformasi* defense sector. Yudhoyono retained the status quo of total people's defense doctrine as the basis for the national defense posture. He also added two policy layers along with the status quo – the Integrated Tri-Service concept and the MEF concept – to push forward military jointness.

## 6. Implementing policy change in national defense

Chapter 5 described Yudhoyono's initial attempt to promote military jointness by introducing the Integrated Tri-Services and MEF concepts through the newly published state strategic documents. Nevertheless, Yudhoyono also preserved the outdated total people's defense doctrine as the strategic vision for the national defense policy. Consequently, the future path of TNI development in post-*Reformasi* Indonesia remained under the influence of the Army way of strategic thinking that favors inward-looking defense orientation and the land-based defense posture development. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze how these conditions influenced the implementation of the Integrated Tri-Service and MEF concepts during President Yudhoyono's second term from 2009 to 2014.

Yudhoyono's decision to appoint Purnomo Yusgiantoro as defense minister was a bold and controversial move. Purnomo was an experienced technocrat and energy minister in the previous Yudhoyono government. Although Purnomo was from a civilian background like his predecessor Juwono, his appointment was widely lambasted. Some analysts highlighted Purnomo's lack of experience in dealing with defense issues and doubted his capacity to bridge the gap between civilian expectations for the military and the military's needs in the defense sector (Detik News 22.10.2009). But Purnomo's appointment got strong support from the elites. Juwono was among those supporting the appointment of his successor, arguing that Purnomo could utilize his expertise in energy to enhance energy security awareness in the future defense policy (Kompas 19.10.2009). Purnomo's appointment also supported by General Agum Gumelar, one of the top figures from the Army retirees (Kompas 21.10.2009). Support also came from the chairman of House Committee I, Tifatul Sembiring. Sembiring, a member of Yudhoyono's coalition party, stressed that Purnomo's technocrat background would help the TNI to ensure the government plan on the defense sector was implemented properly (Kompas 20.10.2009). To assist Purnomo in managing the national defense sector, President Yudhoyono promoted the MoD secretary-general, Lieut. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, to the position of deputy minister in January 2010. Of course, as with the previous appointment of Sjafrie to the MoD,

the civil society organization activists were outraged (Aliabbas 2019). They questioned Sjafrie's suitability as an active officer to occupy the vice minister position, arguing that the position is a political appointment.<sup>16</sup> The activists contended that Yudhoyono's plan was not an urgent matter and he should appoint more civilians to MoD top level bureaucrats to avoid public suspicion of "militarization" of the ministry (Kompas 06.01.2010). Nevertheless, Yudhoyono was unswayed and both Purnomo and Sjafrie remained in their positions to the end of his term.

### **6.1. Preparing the implementation of MEF and Integrated Tri-Service Concepts**

Yudhoyono's commitment to continue the defense transformation agenda in his second term began with establishing various policy regulations to support the integrated tri-service and MEF implementation that were already included in the strategic documents (Pasha 2019). In December 2009, the President ordered newly appointed Minister Purnomo to formulate the Strategic Defense Review (SDR) document as the foundation for the MEF agenda (Tippe 2016; Gunadi 2015).

Once again, the formulation process was carried out by the Army-dominated Defense Strategy Directorate of the MoD (Tippe 2016; Ate 2019; Gunadi 2015). The 2009 SDR document introduces a new concept called "flash-point defense" as the main reference for MEF policy (MoD RoI 2010a). The document identifies two types of threats for Indonesia predicted until 2029. The first is actual threat, covering issues such as terrorism, separatism, border disputes, natural disaster, illegal smuggling, horizontal conflicts and energy scarcity. To a large extent, the actual threats are shaped by inward-looking defense orientation. In contrast, the next threat typology mostly refers to threats involving external defense such as global warming, violations in the sea lanes of transportation, environmental degradation, pandemics, financial crisis, cyber-attacks, foreign aggression and food and water crisis. Several threat scenarios then developed, and the flash-point

---

<sup>16</sup> In total, there were 20 deputy minister positions at various ministries during Yudhoyono's second term.

defense divides Indonesian territory into 12 “flash-point zones” with different threat scenarios. Accordingly, the government strived to establish a minimum standard of force that would be able to cope with the actual threats while gradually able to deal with the potential threats (MoD RoI 2010a; 2012b). The problem was that this approach was still heavily influenced by the “layered defense” perspective of the Army (Laksmana 2011). As exemplified by the formulation of actual threats, the current geostrategic consideration of the defense planner is still grounded in the role of military for internal security issues in its interpretation of actual threats. Legally, the SDR process, in terms of threat definition assessment, falls under the responsibility of the National Defense Council (DPN) as mandated by Article 15 of the 2002 State Defense Law. Ironically, the council was not yet established. Yudhoyono delegated the national defense formulation to Army-dominated MoD. Minister Purnomo acknowledged the council’s absence from the threat assessment process, and even stipulated in an official regulation that the existing threat assessment product was prone to bias (MoD RoI 2012). Still, the 2009 SDR document subsequently led to the MEF agenda becoming the policy tool in the defense posture development.

For Yudhoyono’s inner circle and the MoD, Sjafrie’s appointment to deputy minister was an important strategy for implementation of the government’s MEF goals by the TNI (Pasha 2019; Ate 2019; Soepandji 2015). The position of MoD deputy minister was regulated by the Ministry of Defense Regulation No.1/2010. Therefore, the position is regulated as a government career official, not cabinet appointment (MoD RoI 2010c). As such, the deputy minister is a direct subordinate of the minister. However, the regulation delegates the vice minister with day-to-day function of the MoD and to assume the role of “de facto” minister of defense as necessary, such as during his absence, coordinating MoD function in state defense, establishing coordination with other ministers and government officials as well as carrying out administrative functions within the MoD (Susanto 2015). Indeed, after being sworn in by Yudhoyono, Sjafrie declared to the mass media that his new position was part of the “decision-making anatomy” within the MoD (Detik News 06.01.2010). For his part, Yudhoyono had strategically placed a senior, well-respected Army officer as one of the top decision-makers in the MoD.

By doing so, he was able to maintain the Army service's perception that its interest in defense policy was highly valued by the government (Pasha 2019; Basuki 2019).

The SDR's introduced in December 2009 provided a bulwark for the MEF policy, while Sjafrie's appointment in early January 2010 was set to safeguard Yudhoyono's interests for the policy within the TNI. Yudhoyono then moved forward to retrench his defense transformation agenda as part of the national development agenda. At the end of January 2010, Yudhoyono signed Presidential Regulation No. 5/2010 which outlines the government's five-year development program. The regulation – better known as the Government Mid-term Development Plan (RPJMN 2010-2014) documents functions as the point of reference for all government ministries in developing their programs for the next five years. The RPJMN 2010-2014 document stipulates ensuring the capacity of the TNI to conduct joint military operations as one of the objectives in national defense sector, namely “the establishment of defense posture and force that comprises of 25-27.5% of the MEF standard in order to be able to conduct joint operations and display deterrent effect” (Bappenas 2010, II.7-20). In working to achieve this objective, the Yudhoyono administration proposed an integrative approach of defense posture development. At the operational level, the integrative approach is implemented under the framework of *Tri Tunggal Matra* that is interpreted as the ability to conduct joint operations and the striking force capability (Bappenas 2010, II.7-24). TNI positively responded to the RPJMN focus on the integrative approach to develop defense posture (Tippe 2016). One week after the promulgation of RPJMN, a TNI leader meeting was organized, involving more than 150 high-ranking military officers. For the first time, the high-level meeting took the theme of “improving Integrated Tri-Service within the TNI,” and Yudhoyono was present to give the opening speech (Antara News 25.01.2010).

With the TNI seemingly on track to support the integrated tri-service concept, the government then focused its attention on the reorganization of the military (Pasha 2019). President Yudhoyono signed Presidential Regulation No.10/2010 (Perpres 10/2010) on the Organizational Structure of TNI. The regulation replaces the

outdated 1983 presidential regulation on ABRI organizational structure. In the new regulatory document, the military socio-political office is revoked in keeping with the TNI law's ban on the military's involvement in the political arena. The principal section of the new presidential regulation emphasizes *keterpaduan* (integration) between military services as one of the main principles in TNI defense posture. Several new TNI organs were introduced, such as the formation of future reserve components, the establishment of eight operational commands and the formation of Disaster Relief Rapid Reaction Force (PRC-PB) under the TNI Commander. The idea of promoting military jointness was reflected through the establishment of the joint regional command or Kogabwilhan. According to Perpres 10/2010, Kogabwilhan is a new force structure mandated to act as the first responder and deterrent force to threats regarding TNI role in a military operation of war (MOW) or military operation other than war (MOOTW). The new command is set as one of the TNI main operational commands. At the operational level, Perpres 10/2010 envisages that each Kogabwilhan is led by commander that directly answers to the TNI Commander. The inclusion of new structures and Kogabwilhan in the new TNI organizational structure was seen by analysts as attesting to Yudhoyono's strong commitment to defense transformation agenda in his second term (Laksmana 2010). Most importantly, the Kogabwilhan signals his keen interest to encourage the Integrated Tri-Service Approach in developing the future TNI future along with the MEF modernization agenda (Pasha 2019; Haripin 2019).

Once the Integrated Tri-Service Approach became the legal foundation of the TNI's reorganization, Yudhoyono's next move was to match the approach with the government's objective to initiate MEF policy in the defense sector. In working toward this goal, Yudhoyono signed into law Presidential Regulation No. 41/2010 (Perpres 41/2010) on the General Policy of State Defense. The preceding Perpres No.7/2008 lacked clear definition on how the state would develop the MEF ambition. It proposed a "*kebijakan pertahanan terintegrasi*" (integrated defense policy) but failed to provide clear guidance on its implementation (Tippe 2016; Gunadi 2015; Silaen 2016). The new regulatory document provides clearer articulation on the integrative approach in the military defense policy. The

Integrated Tri-Service concept figures at the core of the government's integrative defense policy. Specifically, the policy will involve the "integration of managerial and operational policies" that show the unification of command between the Army, the Navy and the Air Force (Tippe 2016; Silaen 2016).

In short, the new articulation of the integrative approach encourages the interoperability of TNI services (Tippe 2016; Silaen 2016). The regulation reaffirms its predecessor's outlining of the MEF agenda as part of state policy in defense posture development, but it also provides detailed explanations on MEF and its strategic objectives. Accordingly, MEF is viewed as the absolute standard of TNI force posture that serves as the minimum requirement for TNI capacity in conducting its missions. As such, the first phase of MEF from 2010 to 2014 was to increase the mobile capacity of each service, to be followed by the improvement of TNI rapid reaction force (PPRC) together with the establishment of Disaster Relief Rapid Reaction Force (PRC-PB) (MoD RoI 2010a). At this point, the legal foundations of Integrated Tri-service Concept and MEF agenda had been established, and the process moved into the MoD to prepare the implementation guidelines and strategy.

## **6.2. Implementing policy change under the shadow of Army dominance**

In principle, the implementation of the MEF agenda by the MoD and the TNI HQ was reflected in two processes: defense posture planning and defense procurement (Tippe 2016; Silaen 2016). Nevertheless, the pattern of the relationship between the MoD and the TNI was legally mandated as "coordination" by the 2004 TNI law (see further, chapter 8). At the technical level, the mandate provides significant contributions on the "independency" of TNI in the decision-making process of TNI force development, specifically Army dominance in MEF policy formulation within the MoD. The planning program of the national defense policy is implemented through the "bottom-up" and "top-bottom" principles as regulated by Article 4 of Minister of Defense Regulation No. 10/2009 (Silaen 2016). The article states that the formulation of defense posture development



policy is conducted through bottom-up mechanism, that is by incorporating inputs from the lowest unit in the TNI (operational unit in each service). The input is then translated into national policy as the control mechanism for implementation within each level (MoD RoI 2009). Thus, all program and budget proposals are formulated by each service independently (Silaen 2016; Hasanuddin 2015; Siddiq 2019). Once finalized, the proposals are approved by the chief of staffs in each service (Kasad, Kasau and Kasal) and brought before the TNI Headquarters.<sup>17</sup> At this level, the TNI Commander reviews the proposal and, once he has given his approval, transfers it to the MoD. It will then be discussed at a cabinet meeting for approval as part of the state policy in the defense sector. Overall, there is no mandate in the process for the TNI Commander to disapprove of the proposal or the defense minister to reject the TNI Commander's recommendation (Hasanuddin 2015; Siddiq 2019). In practice, the designated planning process allocates substantial policy discretion to each service to interpret and formulate its own posture structure. It is of particular benefit to the Army, as the largest service, in its bid to protect its parochial interest in national defense. Moreover, the regulation stipulates that the main formulation process of state defense posture in the MoD is carried out by the Army-dominated DGDS (MoD RoI 2009).

Army dominance over the MEF policy inevitably shaped the MEF policy documents. At the MoD level, the MEF agenda was regulated in detail through Minister of Defense Regulation No 2/2010 on the Development of State Defense posture and Minister of Defense Regulation No.19/2012 on the harmonization of MEF (Tippe 2016; Silaen 2016). As a policy instrument, MEF is claimed by the government as the development of military defense force in terms of weapons systems, infrastructure, organization and human resources (Tippe 2016). The MEF agenda is planned to achieve its target within three phases: first phase from 2010-2014; second phase 2015-2019; and the third phase 2019-2024 (MoD RoI 2012a). Operationally, the MoD regulated that MEF would deploy four policy instruments/strategies: rematerialization; revitalization; relocation and procurement. Additionally, these strategies are complemented by the "zero


---

<sup>17</sup> These chiefs of staffs are Kasad (Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat, Army Chief of Staff), Kasal (Kepala Staf Angkatan Laut, Navy Chief of Staff) and Kasau (Kepala Staf Angkatan Udara, Air Force Chief of Staff).

growth” policy in personnel composition (MoD RoI 2012a, 6). Rematerialization, revitalization and procurement involve improvement of capacity building of TNI personnel and weapon system modernization. Meanwhile, relocation focuses on the restructuring of TNI organs to adapt to the flash-point defense in the 2009 SDR.

However, the MoD formulation of MEF strategies failed to include the establishment of Kogabwilhan. During a hearing with Committee I in 2012, Deputy Minister Sjafrie announced to that the government’s MEF strategy would involve improving personnel capacity, restructuring TNI organization, revitalizing the TNI weapon system and preparing defense infrastructure; he never specified the establishment of Kogabwilhan (Hasanuddin 2015; Siddiq 2019). With the Army’s dominance in the MoD, the MEF policy was largely translated by the MoD and TNI as a weapons modernization program, with scant regard for the Integrated Tri-Service element (Gunawan 2017). On the zero-growth policy, President Yudhoyono convened a closed-door meeting with the defense minister and the TNI HQ in May 2010. After the meeting, Purnomo said that the MoD and TNI HQ agreed to implement the zero-growth policy starting in 2010. The policy means that the number of new TNI recruits will be balanced with the number of retiring TNI officers, allowing for a larger budget for the MEF weapon procurement (Silaen 2016). Still, the policy was unable to create a more balanced composition between the services within the TNI that favored the Army domination during and after the *Reformasi* (See Figure 5.1).

**Figure 6.1. Composition of TNI Personnel from 1999 to 2019**



Source: The Military balance, IISS 1966-2018

In addition, the military also kept its discretionary powers in the MoD’s weapon systems procurement process as regulated in Minister Regulation No34/2011 on the Guidelines of Weapon System Procurement. The discretionary powers of the military cover the following aspects. *First*, the planning process of weapon procurement is delegated to the “central organization that virtually made the minister of defense as the only civilian decision-maker among the uniformed officers. *Second*, the procurement committee structure is decentralized. Each service in TNI has its own procurement committee that holds the authority to decide the technical specification of the weapon and appointing the supplier, either through open bidding process or direct appointment mechanism (Tippe 2016; Silaen 2016; Hasanuddin 2015). The above military-dominated central organization only checks the paperwork of the procurement process at the service level (Hasanuddin 2015). Finally, the monitoring of the procurement process is carried out by so-called HLC (High-level Committee). The HLC is led by the deputy minister of defense and comprises first echelon officials (minimum rank of two-star general) from the TNI HQ and each service (Silaen 2016). In the new body, the deputy minister holds the authority to control and monitor the financing and acquisition scheme of TNI weapon procurement. Principally, these regulatory frameworks put the exclusive process of weapon procurement at the MoD

squarely in the hands of active officers (Hasanuddin 2015; Siddiq 2019). Upon scrutiny, the Army service controls the key position and stages in the procurement process through the strategic HLC; it was headed by Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, an Army senior officer.

More importantly, interoperability was not fully institutionalized as the core principle of weapon system procurement mechanism, an observation made by members of House Committee I (Hasanuddin 2015; Mengga 2015; Kartasasmita 2016). In practice, the responsibility of carrying out evaluation of interoperability in defense procurement is under the TNI Headquarters (Yusgiantoro 2014, 762; Silaen 2016). In reality, the authority of the TNI Headquarters to review interoperability of the weapon platform was limited and, more importantly, there was the lack of institutionalized mechanisms (Silaen 2016). During one meeting with DPR Committee I in 2012, the TNI Headquarters representative admitted that they only checked the operational readiness of the proposed weapon system from each service rather than inspecting the technical details of the system for joint operation (Hasanuddin 2015; Tamtomo 2016). It was often the case that TNI Headquarters only acted as the “rubber stamp” for the proposed weapon system without the option to refuse the item (Tamtomo 2016). According to MoD official, there was lack of consideration in the interoperability aspect of weapon procurement during the first implementation of MEF; he emphasized that interoperability was nothing more than a buzzword for the TNI leaders (Gunadi 2015). The situation was caused by a significant degree of resistance from each service to disclose the technical details of its proposed weapon system with other services (Tippe 2016; Gunadi 2015; Silaen 2016). A prime example of this occurred with the Army’s major defense procurement of the MBT (Main Battle Tank) Leopard.

### **6.2.1. The controversial case of MBT Leopard procurement**

The lack of interoperability requirement in the MEF-related defense procurement was best illustrated by the case of MBT (Main Battle Tank) Leopard procurement by the MoD and the Army (Aliabbas 2019; Haripin 2019). At the end of 2011, rumors surfaced in the media that the Army planned to acquire the MBT Leopard.

In early 2012, Purnomo officially announced the government plan to purchase the decommissioned MBT Leopard from the Netherlands for the Army. The problem was, however, that the procurement was not part of the TNI shopping list for the 2010-2014 fiscal years (Pramodhawardani 2012). The list only mentioned the procurement of 44 Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AVF) through the credit export scheme (Siddiq 2019). Legislators also questioned the plan, stating that the DPR never approved a budget proposal for MBT procurement for FY 2012 (Kompas 21.01.2012). Moreover, several legislators opposed the plan since MBT Leopard has technical specifications that do not conform to Indonesia's geographical landscape (Tempo 11.01.2012). Hasanuddin, the outspoken vice-chairman of the DPR defense committee from opposition party PDIP and a retired Army general, asserted, "ideally, the tank [leopard] is deployed on flat terrain such as a desert area, not a tropical area like Indonesia" (Hasanuddin 2015). Within days, the issue became headline news in national media and Hasanuddin was not alone in opposing the plan. Most legislators in the defense committee concurred, including those who had retired from the Army service. One of the legislators was Maj. Gen (ret) Salim Mengga from Yudhoyono's Democratic Party. Salim spent his military career in the Army Cavalry, eventually ascending to the position of the division's national commander (Mengga 2015). In fact, he was the first legislator to question the MBT Leopard plan in December 2011 with the same argument that it was ill-suited to Indonesia's geographical conditions (Republika 16.12.2011; Mengga 2015).

The MoD responded to the criticism through public statements and private "negotiations". Minister Purnomo acknowledged that the MBT had not been on the proposed MoD shopping list (Tribunnews 20.01.2012). The projected purposes included enlisted light tanks, medium tanks and heavy tanks. Purnomo admitted that the medium and heavy tanks were better suited to the geographical characteristics of Indonesia but the issue was a limited defense budget (Tribunnews 20.01.2012). Meanwhile, deputy minister Sjafrie convened a private meeting with several legislators from House Committee I on defense at a hotel in South Jakarta, including outspoken critic Salim Mengga (Mengga 2015; Hasanuddin 2015). Mengga described the meeting as an attempt by the MoD to

defuse the committee's opposition to the planned purchases (Berita Satu 19.01.2012). He was then transferred from the committee to another one by the Democratic Party (Mengga 2015; Siddiq 2019).<sup>18</sup> On another occasion, Purnomo explained that the MBT plan came from the Army service and followed the bottom-up process of weapon procurement within the MoD. Accordingly, the entire technical specifications and interoperability issues of MBT Leopard were already discussed at the Army and TNI HQ levels, while the MoD was only involved in processing the budget proposal (Tribunnews 20.01.2012; Silaen 2016).

At the end of January 2012, the House Committee on defense convened a hearing with Army Chief of Staff General Pramono. He conceded that there had been no MBT acquisition plan for FY 2012, but attributed the furor to a "communication" issue between the MoD and the legislature (Liputan6 News 2012, 25.01.2012; Hasanuddin 2015; Siddiq 2019). Pramono, who is President Yudhoyono's brother-in-law, claimed that the MBT acquisition plan was motivated by the fact Indonesia, along with the Philippines and Timor Leste, were the only nations in Southeast Asia lacking a main battle tank. Pramono declared, "we [Army] do not want an arms race but only want to be equal in terms of [defense] technology with them [SEA countries with MBT tanks], so we can be at the same level during joint training" (BBC News 24.01.2012). It was the reiteration that the Army was only interested in remaining on par with other army powers in neighboring countries, instead of a strategic consideration of increasing force mobility as targeted by the first phase of MEF (Aliabbas 2019; Haripin 2019).

Meanwhile, human rights activists warned that there was the risk the tanks may be used by the government to deal with internal security issues involving public order, such as demonstrations or riots (Aliabbas 2019). In February 2012, the Dutch parliament officially rejected its government's plan to sell the 100 decommissioned MBT Leopards to Indonesia. In another meeting with the legislature, General Pramono insisted on obtaining the Leopard from its sole manufacturer, the German's Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (Berita Satu 26.03.2012;

---

<sup>18</sup> Six years later, Mengga publicly claimed that he had in fact been "threatened" by someone in the MoD and the Democratic Party for opposing the acquisition (see, Medcom 14.08.2018).

Hasanuddin 2015). At the end of April 2012, 14 members of Committee I embarked on a fact-finding visit to Germany. They met with the Bundestag defense committee and visited the Leopard manufacturer in Munich (Kartasasmita 2016). One legislator said that they asked the German government to help facilitate a reduction in price of the MBT Leopard and proposed the ToT (transfer of technology) scheme in the procurement process (Kompas 07.05.2012; Kartasasmita 2016). Hasanuddin remained opposed to the MBT Leopard plan but disclosed that the MoD had approached members of the defense committee from both coalition and opposition parties to gain support (Hasanuddin 2015). He recalled there were meetings in mid-August 2012 between the MoD – led by Sjafrie – and leaders of party caucus (Kapoksi) in the defense committee to discuss the committee position on the acquisition from Germany (Hasanuddin, 2015). After months of public debate, President Yudhoyono finally commented on the Leopard acquisition plan after a meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in July 2012. President Yudhoyono declared the vehicles were needed to improve Indonesia's defense capability and the acquisition process was transparent (Republika 10.07.2012). In early August 2012, Yudhoyono convened a private meeting with MoD and TNI officials at the TNI Headquarters. During a subsequent press conference, Yudhoyono mentioned that he warned the MoD and TNI to promote interoperability in the weapon system procurement. Specifically, Yudhoyono said he briefed the two parties to consider the interoperability aspect of the weapon platform between services to support joint-warfighting operations (MoSS RoI 2012).

At the end of August, Committee I announced its approval of the government plan to purchase 103 units. It came with the condition of a government guarantee that the procurement process would be conducted in the G to G (government to government) basis and involve transfer of technology in its maintenance by state-owned defense company PINDAD (Kompas 23.08.2012; Siddiq 2019; Hasanuddin 2015). In October 2014, the first batch of Leopard tanks arrived and gradually revealed the careless implementation of the MEF policy. *First*, the Army plan for MBT Leopard deployment was markedly different from the government MEF plan objective. As outlined earlier, the government MEF is developed based

on the flash-point defense concept, placing greater emphasis on force readiness against actual scenarios in border areas (Laksmana 2010; MoD RoI 2012a). For the Army, such improvement would focus on empowering the Army posture along the border between Indonesia (Eastern Kalimantan) and Malaysia (Tippe 2016). Moreover, the Malaysian Army had recently stationed newly purchased PT-91 Polish-made tanks (Tempo 12.04.2012). The commander of the Indonesian Army base in the border area of Banjarbaru had requested that several tanks be stationed in the area to bolster TNI deterrence against Malaysian tanks (The Jakarta Post 28.12.2013). Nevertheless, the Army later announced its plan for the MBT Leopard tanks to be stationed in five bases; of these all were in Java except for one in Sumatra (Kompas 31.03.2014). In fact, no MBT Leopard has been deployed in the Indonesia-Malaysia border in East Kalimantan as of the writing of this dissertation. The plan continued to draw criticism even in the months immediately before the tanks' arrival. Former president B.J. Habibie, a German-trained engineer, weighed in on the controversy by stating that the tanks were not suitable for a maritime nation, but for a continental one. (Kompas 26.03.2014).

*Second*, the acquisition ignores the Integrated Tri-Service approach encapsulated within the MEF policy. This issue was exemplified by the lack of comprehensive understanding on the MBT Leopard interoperability with other service platforms. An MoD official admitted that the MBT Leopard plan was poorly planned as there was no infrastructure within the TNI services to transport the heavy tanks (Ate 2019). When the tanks arrived in 2014, the Navy and the Air Force were not equipped to provide transport vehicles for the new tank deployment outside Java (Hasanuddin 2015). For example, several legislators inspected the Leopard tank base in East Java on 2016. They found that the TNI training facility for MBT Leopards was limited, and the Navy did not possess a transport ship able to deploy the tanks outside Java, particularly in Kalimantan as originally requested by the Army (Media Indonesia 24.02.2016).

The convoluted process of the MBT acquisition eventually exposed the problem of MEF implementation within the MoD. In August 2012, the MoD evaluated the MEF process. The evaluation report found that the decision-making process – in fact,



the entire defense management – was still implementing the “traditional” mechanism by advancing individual considerations over a systemic approach (MoD RoI 2012a, 12). Moreover, the oversight mechanism of MEF implementation proved mostly ineffective to compel the decision-makers to follow procedural rules. Consequently, the evaluation recommended that “the MEF shopping list should be enforced legally through Presidential Decree” (Silaen 2016; see also, MoD RoI 2012a, 12).

### **6.2.2. The derailing of joint regional command establishment**

Yudhoyono was fully aware that the idea of establishing the Integrated Tri-Service would be challenged by the Army (Widjojo 2017). Resistance would be stronger because an Army officer was the TNI Commander. A window of opportunity to push forward the plan emerged when the commander entered mandatory retirement. As part of the post-*Reformasi* tradition initiated by President Wahid, the TNI commander position was to be rotated among the three services although the tradition was never legally established (Haripin 2019; Siddiq 2019). According to the rotation, it was time for a Navy officer turn to take the TNI commandership. In September 2010, Yudhoyono proposed Admiral Agus Suhartono, the Navy Chief of Staff, to the House for approval (Kompas 06.09.2010). During the fit-and-proper test before House Committee I, Suhartono stressed his priority to implement the government’s Integrated Tri-Service doctrine (Siddiq 2019). The DPR plenary session ultimately ratified Suhartono as the new TNI commander, and he publicly reiterated his top priority to promote the doctrine (Tribunnews 27.09.2010).

Once Suhartono assumed his role, President Yudhoyono exerted pressure on TNI leaders to develop the doctrine as soon as possible (Pasha 2019). During a speech at the Military Academy in July 2011, Yudhoyono gave a stern warning to the assembled middle and high-ranking officers that the existing total defense doctrine was obsolete. He underlined that the future of the military depended on its capacity to promote integration between services. He also criticized the Army-developed Sishanta guerilla-style doctrine as no longer relevant and cost-inefficient for the defense sector (Republika 13.07.2011). He further called the TNI to reformulate of the doctrine by focusing on the integration of all military power

in smarter way, which he claimed as the main objective of defense policy in his second term (Republika, 13.07.2011).

The MoD and TNI HQ subsequently revised the 2009 SDR to accommodate Yudhoyono's aspiration for an integrated approach of defense posture (Santoso 2016; Ate 2019). The idea of the Kogabwilhan establishment was discussed during the revision process. Nevertheless, the Army subtly resisted the idea. It was reported that General George Toisutta, the Army Chief of Staff at the time, was mostly absent from SDR-related meetings, slowing the revision process (Soepandji 2015; Ate 2019). The MoD officials recognized the growing Army suspicion that joint regional command or Kogabwilhan would favor the role of the Navy and the Air Force because new command emphasizes securing the Indonesia Archipelagic Sea Lanes, known by the Indonesian acronym ALKI (Alur Laut Kepulauan Indonesia) (Ate 2019; Soepandji 2015). The Army perceived the joint regional command as a threat towards the privilege of KOTER in the current defense architecture. The Koter structure was long the cornerstone of the Army service, if not its "heart" (Haripin 2019). First and foremost, more than 60 percent of the Army manpower was stationed in KOTER (IISS 2011, 242). Koter largely comprised of infantry, the predominant unit within the Army. In fact, the Army chief of staff position is traditionally reserved for officers from the infantry unit with the minimum requirement of having served as Koter commander (Tippe 2016; Ate 2019; Aliabbas 2019; see also Tempo 14.06.2011). Consequently, Koter holds special status for the Army service (Tippe 2016; Susanto 2015; Haripin 2020).

Approval from the Army ranks was crucial for the establishment of Kogabwilhan. Presidential Regulation No.10/2010 stipulated that Kogabwilhan shall be established through a TNI Commander Regulation (Peraturan Panglima). Considering the Army dominance, it would be highly difficult for the TNI Commander to promulgate such a regulation without securing the Army's approval first, even if an Army general is in the position (Haripin 2019). In finding a way to navigate the problematic situation, Yudhoyono appointed Lieutenant General Pramono Edhie Wibowo, the Kostrad commander, to the top position of

Army Chief of Staff. Pramono was also Yudhoyono's brother-in-law, sparking allegations of nepotism. Members of the cabinet came to the President's defense by saying it was his attempt to promote regeneration in the Army's upper echelons (Detik News 29.06.2011). They also cited his background; Wibowo was a 1980 graduate of the Military Academy, the largest class in the Army service, and had served as commander of the Army's Special Force (Kopassus, Komando Pasukan Khusus), the most respected unit within the Army.

Pramono's appointment positively contributed to the consolidation of the Army support for government's Kogabwilhan plan (Santoso 2016). In early 2012, the Army-dominated MoD and TNI finally released a revision of the 2009 SDR that was dubbed the 2011 SDR. The new 2011 SDR outlined the integration of defense forces at the regional level as one of policy priorities in the MoD and TNI. Operationally, the integration policy includes the establishment of Kogabwilhan for the TNI and the posture is based on the TNI posture development as outlined within the MEF. In addition, the joint-regional command put strong emphasis on command effectiveness as its main advantage to improve TNI deterrent capability, particularly in safeguarding the ALKI (MoD RoI 2012b, 37). At this point, the Kogabwilhan future projection revealed growing maritime awareness among the defense planners in MoD, which to a large extent, was congruent with the Navy and Air Force core mission (Ate 2019). Unfortunately, the SDR was not a regulatory document in the context of Indonesia's defense sector but rather was "guidance"; in the terminology of the MoD, it stood as "the center of gravity for the formulation of defense policy" (MoD RoI 2012b, 6). In reality, the implementation of SDR directives largely depended on the interest and consensus of policy makers within the MoD and the TNI (Tippe 2016; Santoso 2016).

With the lack of a legal mandate, there was no significant development in the government plan to establish Kogabwilhan as recommended by the new SDR. Despite the delay in the formulation process of the Kogabwilhan structure, Yudhoyono ordered Admiral Suhartono to prepare a multi-level joint operation training that incorporated a level of interoperability as the main objective (Pasha 2019). Through the training, the President hoped to cultivate the level of trust

between services in regard to support of Kogabwilhan establishment (Santoso 2016; Pasha 2019). In the first step, TNI HQ conducted brigade level joint training from October 26-November 30, 2012, in East Kalimantan, followed by inter-division training the subsequent year. In an official statement, Admiral Suhartono said the exercises were meant to evaluate the doctrinal implementation and interoperability between TNI brigades under the joint military operation scenario before proceeding into the larger scale of joint training (Kompas 16.11.2012).

A few months before the division level training was to be held, Suhartono announced the plan to establish the Kogabwilhan as a multi-services command structure at the TNI Headquarters. Interestingly, he cautiously informed the press that it would not take over the Army's territorial command. He emphasized that despite involving personnel from Army's Kodam, the Kogabwilhan would focus only on operational command for joint operations conducted at the TNI HQ level. Meanwhile, the supervision aspect of Kodam personnel remained under the full authority of the Army Regional Commander (Antara News 16.01.2013). His statement underlined to the Army that the Kogabwilhan establishment would not be implemented at the expense of the current existing Koter's prerogative in personnel management. Meanwhile, President Yudhoyono also reportedly reiterated in several closed meetings with the TNI leadership that Koter remained crucial for the future defense posture despite the Kogabwilhan plan (Widjojo 2017; Pasha 2019).

After Suhartono's announcement, TNI geared up in May 2013 for the inaugural inter-division training involving more than 16,000 personnel (Kompas 16.04.2013). Suhartono previously signed TNI Commander Decision Letter No. Kep/258/IV/2013 on the joint operation doctrine as the point of reference for the training. The training locations corresponded to Kogabwilhan projection as multi-service command in securing the ALKI. The locations were East Kalimantan, West Nusa Tenggara, and East Java provinces situated in ALKI II and ALKI III (The Jakarta Post 16.04.2013).

President Yudhoyono and several cabinet members visited the TNI joint training site in Situbondo, East Java, to observe different joint operation exercises (Pasha

2019; Santoso 2016). To journalists, Yudhoyono raised the importance of military jointness because a military campaign, as a series of military joint operations, could last months and therefore required military preparedness (Kompas 02.05.2013). Two weeks after the visit, Yudhoyono convened a cabinet meeting to update the Kogabwilhan plan with Minister Purnomo, Deputy Minister Sjafrie and Admiral Suhartono (Detik News 15.05.2013) The President hoped the regional command could be finalized before his term ended in 2014, concurrently with the end of the MEF first phase (Santoso 2016). After the meeting, Purnomo publicly announced that the MoD and TNI would first establish one Kogabwilhan structure for the western part of the country as mandated by the Presidential Regulation No.10/2010 on TNI organizational structure. However, he stressed that the final structure of the new joint regional command remained under discussion by the two parties (Berita Satu 15.05.2013).

An MoD official recalled that the Army leader and representatives continued to display indifference to the Kogabwilhan plan during discussions (Ate 2019). The talks were postponed in August 2013 when the transfer of the TNI commandship took place (Santoso 2016). Suhartono was set to retire and Yudhoyono proposed Army General Moeldoko as his replacement. Suhartono stated that he recommended Moeldoko and emphasized that the change in leadership was according to the rotation of candidates among the three services, in this case, from the Navy to the Army (Liputan6 News 30.08.2013). For Yudhoyono, the appointment of Moeldoko was strategic in pushing through the interoperability agenda in the military (Moeldoko had replaced General Pramono Edhie Wibowo, Yudhoyono's brother-in-law, as Army chief of staff in May 2013)(Pasha 2019).

Legislators knew Moeldoko's reputation as a reform-minded officer who, most importantly had no historical record of human rights violations (Hasanuddin 2015; Siddiq 2019). During the fit-and-proper hearing before House Committee I, Moeldoko expressed his commitment to promote interoperability within the TNI, not only in the military's chain-of-command but also in the realms of weapon system interoperability and officer career supervision (Kompas 21.08.2013;

Siddiq 2019). The committee swiftly approved Moeldoko's appointment. Lieutenant General Budiman then replaced Moeldoko as the new Army chief of staff.

Yudhoyono's selection of Moeldoko as the new TNI commander proved to be vital in paving the way for Army acceptance of the Kogabwilhan proposal. Government insiders said Yudhoyono believed in Moeldoko because he expressed his commitment to support the establishment of the joint commands and promote military interoperability (Santoso 2016; Pasha 2019). This was manifested only a few days after Moeldoko assumed his new position. During the induction of new officials at the TNI HQ, Moeldoko warned the TNI officers to take serious efforts to update the national military strategy and establish the interoperability of the Integrated Tri-Service concept. The TNI, according to Moeldoko, must prepare its organization and personnel to anticipate the establishment of three joint forces command that promote the concept and interoperability capacity between the services (Berita Satu 30.09.2013).

In early 2014, Purnomo reported that he had finalized the Kogabwilhan structure (Detik News 17.01.2014). Next up would be Yudhoyono's approval. Indeed, Kogabwilhan's establishment was stipulated as one of MoD targets for 2014 in the ministerial regulation on the 2014 state defense policy (MoD RoI 2014, 17). Purnomo expected that a presidential decree on Kogabwilhan formation would be ready in June 2014 (The Jakarta Post 22.01.2014). The new command is prepared as rapid-reaction force comprised of personnel and resources from the three services. Accordingly, each Kogabwilhan will have its own army unit, warship fleet and jet-fighter squadron (Santoso 2016). To enhance its effectiveness in rapid deployment, it would be under the command of a three-star general who answered directly to the TNI commander (Santoso 2016; Ate 2019). The Kogabwilhan commander can swiftly deploy the multi-service forces to deter threats under the direct order of the TNI commander. As such, Kogabwilhan would circumvent the existing bureaucratic red tape at the TNI Headquarters in terms of joint service operation (The Jakarta Post, 22.01.2014).

The TNI responded positively to the MoD announcement of the Kogabwilhan (Santoso 2016). During a session with House Committee I, Moeldoko also announced the TNI plan to establish the commands and appealed for the committee's support (Berita Satu 10.02.2014). As with the MoD, Moeldoko also expected they would be established in July 2014. TNI's growing commitment to the Kogabwilhan establishment shown when it hosted the largest joint operation training in May-June 2014. Unlike previous exercises, this focused on implementing specific procedures for military joint operations in the form of joint command establishment. As Moeldoko outlined in his opening speech at the training was that its objective was to test the effectiveness and efficacy of a TNI joint military force that integrated inter-services capacity (Republika 19.05.2014).

To achieve its objective, the TNI Headquarters prepared a joint force command scenario during the training, led by Gatot Nurmantyo, the Kostrad commander. In the field, Nurmantyo supervised six commanders that led units from each service (Antara News 19.05.2014). The joint-training took place from May to June 2014 in two locations: Indian Ocean (Aceh province) and Situbondo (East Java province). The training document stipulated that the operational target of the training was to evaluate the ability of the joint force commander and its staff to implement the joint operational doctrine that was established in 2013 by Admiral Suhartono (TNI HQ 2014, 7). More specifically, the document emphasized that the training aims at developing capacity of the joint force commander to translate the TNI commander directives into battlefield joint operation, and evaluates the decision-making process within the joint-force command (TNI HQ 2014, 7). Overall, the 2014 joint training was designed to prepare TNI readiness for the establishment of the Kogabwilhan as Yudhoyono had long planned (Santoso 2016). At this point, Army leaders appeared to be supportive of the President's goal to promote interoperability between services in the TNI (Santoso 2016; Pasha 2019).


These signs all boded well for the establishment, particularly because the support came from a TNI commander with an Army background for the first time. Of course, it also led to the question why the Army leaders had suddenly reversed their traditional opposition. Closer scrutiny revealed that personnel issues

weighed heavily in the Army's considerations. Specifically, there was the worrisome trend of officer surpluses within the TNI, with the Army the most affected as the largest of the three services. The number of Army officers and those who did not hold a structural position in the upper and middle-ranking levels soared since 2011 (Hasanuddin 2015). According to the MoD's evaluation, the number of Army colonels without position more than triple from 83 officers in 2011 to 286 officers in 2014 (Figure 5.2.). Among upper-ranking officers, the surpluses of Army general increased from 7 generals in 2011 to 32 in 2015 (Figure 5.3.). In recent years, the military has admitted that officer surplus was its main issue since 2011, but it did not want it to become a matter for public consumption (CNN Indonesia 06.02.2019)(CNN Indonesia, 06.02.2019).

Two conditions were considered the contributing factors (Sisriadi 2018, 8-9). *First*, the new TNI law regulation on the extension of the age of retirement for officers from 55 to 58 years old. In practice, this allows higher-ranking officers to remain in office longer while at the same time limiting the vertical mobility of the middle-ranks below. *Second*, the limitation on civilian posts for uniformed officers after the promulgation of the TNI law. As mentioned earlier, it restricted positions in the government ministry and defense-related agencies following the abolishment of the Dwifungsi doctrine. This means that officer rotation in the post-*Reformasi* period mainly occurred within the TNI itself with more limited positions. Laksmana (2019, 9) argued that the "promotional logjam" in the Indonesian Army also contributed by the lack of institutionalization in personnel policies. In practice, the promotion of senior officers is "haphazardly decided based on patrimonial considerations or the intervention by politicians" (Laksmana 2019, p.9).




**Figure 6.2 Trend of middle-ranking officer surplus within the Army (2010-2014)**



Source: Sisriadi 2018, 7-8

**Figure 6.3 Trend of upper-ranking officer surplus within the Army (2010 -2014).**



Source: Sisriadi 2018, 7-8

In reality, such a practice often created gaps between members of Military Academy classes. For example, the new Kasad, Budiman, graduated from the class of 1978 while his ranking superior, TNI Commander Moeldoko, was an alumnus of the class of 1981. As an officer himself, Yudhoyono understood the officer surplus issues within the Army, and provided short-term solutions to the problem by establishing the new KODAM in Tanjung Pura and several KOREM in 2010 (Widjojo 2017).

Moeldoko also took steps to deal with the problem. From the beginning of 2014, he enthusiastically signed memorandums of understanding with various civilian institutions (ministries, government agencies and state-owned enterprises) to provide TNI personnel and equipment in supporting various government programs. In total, there were 12 MoU signed in 2014, a dramatic increase from a total of 3 the previous year (Gunawan 2019, 153). It signaled the growing assertiveness of TNI in its nondefense mission after *Reformasi*, drawing criticism from the public and activists (Aliabbas 2019; Haripin 2019). Despite the measures taken by Yudhoyono and Moeldoko, the surplus continued to grow. It created mounting pressures for the Army to find a new organization in the TNI that could accommodate the surplus personnel (Hasanuddin 2015; Santoso 2016; Ate 2019). Consequently, the establishment of the Kogabwilhan command was touted as the solution.

Nevertheless, a conflict suddenly arose between Yudhoyono and the Army in mid-2014. In June, Yudhoyono unexpectedly gathered all upper-ranking military and police officers a meeting at the MoD office. In his address to them, he expressed his ire that there were TNI generals who were becoming involved with political parties and bidding for the executive position in the upcoming 2014 presidential election (Kompas 02.06.2014). He denounced the officers as “unworthy for the nation, and there is no place for them in the TNI”, saying their behavior was insubordination towards the commander-in-chief (Pasha 2019). The next day, the President cancelled his plan to visit the 2014 TNI joint training in short notice and ordered Purnomo to represent him (Santoso 2016; Detik News 03.06.2014). Yudhoyono chose instead to meet with provincial government heads and before

them reiterated his disappointment over what he considered the lack of TNI neutrality in the political arena (Pasha 2019).

The tense meeting at the MoD signaled a marked deterioration in Yudhoyono's relationship with the TNI, particularly the Army. Members of his inner circle reported that he had become deeply disgruntled with reports of military officers dabbling in politics in the run-up to the election (Basuki 2019; Pasha 2019). Prominent among them was the meeting only a month before of Army Chief of Staff General Budiman and Puan Maharani, the daughter of Megawati Soekarnoputri, the head of opposition party PDIP and former president who had a frosty relationship with Yudhoyono (Pareira 2016; Hasanuddin 2015). The meeting was reportedly meant to discuss Budiman's prospects as a running mate for presidential candidate Joko Widodo (Tempo 16.05.2014). Budiman was unexpectedly dismissed by Yudhoyono in July 2014, only two months before his retirement, and replaced by Lieutenant General Gatot Nurmantyo. The timing of the decision sparked political rumors that Budiman was the subject of Yudhoyono's annoyance in his address to the MoD meeting (Kompas 22.07.2014). Budiman did not attend Nurmantyo's induction at the Presidential Palace, something that analysts called an unheard-of occurrence in the history of such ceremonies in Indonesia (Haripin 2019; Aliabbas 2019). Ultimately, the fractured relationship between Yudhoyono and the Army derailed the Kogabwilhan plan that had appeared set for realization. Yudhoyono did not end up signing the presidential decree on its establishment as his term came to a close.

### **6.3. Summary**

From 2004 to 2014, President Yudhoyono had embarked on a series of actions to transform the defense sector by promoting military jointness. In considering the poor record of success in defense-related legislation, he decided to take policy changes outside the legislative arena. Specifically, Yudhoyono utilized the layering strategy to pursue change in the Army-dominated national defense institutions. In practice, the layering strategy took form as the addition of the Integrated Tri-Service and the MEF concepts to promote military jointness within the TNI. Nevertheless, Yudhoyono preserved the status quo of total people's defense

doctrine as the foundation of national defense orientation. Yudhoyono’s decision to use the layering strategy had significant implications on the outcome of military jointness within the TNI that corresponds to the coordination model (see Table 6.1).

**Table 6.1. Outcome of military jointness in Yudhoyono Administration**

Attributes	Coordination Model
<b>Ideational</b>	Single-service approach (the Army) of warfare; lack of clarity in the defense doctrine on the promotion of joint-force capability within the military;
<b>Organizational</b>  <i>Size</i>    <i>Force structure</i>	Highly disproportionate military composition; favoring larger size for particular service branch (the Army).  Absence or lack of well-institutionalized joint command structure i.e., the failure to establish <i>Kogabwilhan</i>
<b>Technological</b>	Absence or the lack of Interoperability of weapon systems as the key principle in the defense procurement process.

Source: Author’s compilation

For the ideational attribute of military jointness, the status quo of the Army-centric total people defense doctrine was never replaced. As such, the post-*Reformasi* defense doctrine was still dominated by the Army’s strategic way of thinking. However, Yudhoyono added two new rules alongside the status quo which promoted military jointness within the TNI. Yudhoyono administration introduced the Integrated Tri-Service and the MEF as the policy reference of defense posture development. Both concepts were successfully incorporated in the newly published strategic documents during Yudhoyono’s first term in office.

In principle, both concepts bore significant consequences for the future reorganization of the TNI. However, the personnel composition of the military continuously indicated serious gap between the three services of Army, Navy and

Air Force. Yudhoyono's decision to implement zero growth policy in 2010 failed to significantly decrease the Army's dominant size. Moreover, Yudhoyono mandated MoD and TNI to establish new joint-force command called Kogabwilhan. The new joint command would integrate units from each service to deter external aggression under a single command and therefore allow the TNI to hold better joint warfighting capability. Nevertheless, after series of Army resistances and Yudhoyono conflict with the Army leadership, the new command was never been established.

Finally, the principle of interoperability remains missing from the MEF procurement mechanism. There was no legal foundation for interoperability in the weapon procurement system as indicated by the MoD procurement process and the MBT Leopard case. Overall, the analysis above indicates that Yudhoyono's decision to utilize layering strategy in promoting military jointness was influenced by the vote player configuration in the legislative arena and the level of compliance in national defense institutions. These will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapters.



## **7. Veto player configuration and policy change in the legislative arena**

Based on the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2, this chapter explains to what extent the post-*Reformasi* veto player configuration contributed to higher or lower policy stability in the defense-related legislative process during Yudhoyono's two terms in office. The explanation starts by measuring three core features of the veto player theory: the number of veto players, policy distance and internal cohesion of veto players both during and after the *Reformasi* period. Subsequently, the chapter analyzes the legislative process in Indonesia to provide the operational context of veto player configuration. The analysis moves into tracing the effect of the existing veto player configuration and the legislative process towards the lack of defense reform policies under the Yudhoyono administration from 2004 to 2014. The chapter concludes by summarizing the findings with the proposed research hypotheses.

### **7.1. Veto player configuration in post-*Reformasi* Indonesia**

#### **7.1.1. What is the number of veto players?**

The number of de facto veto players is deduced from two features of a polity: *the legislative powers granted by the Constitution to institutional veto players* (president and parliament) and *the partisan composition of each institutional player*. After President Suharto resigned, a series of constitutional amendments were directed to balance the formal power held by the president in Indonesia's legislative process. The first and second constitutional amendments affirmed the role of the parliament in the legislative process by granting a stronger legislative mandate to the House. The 1945 Constitution stipulated that the president held the sole authority to enact law, with the DPR relegated to a minor role (Article 5.1). The amendments brought about the formation of the Regional Representatives Council (DPD, Dewan Perwakilan Daerah), a senate-like body that comprises directly elected non-partisan representatives – based on provincial distribution – as a new chamber within the DPR. The amended Constitution granted the DPD the authority to propose and deliberate laws, yet these laws are limited and only

address regulations that concern central-regional government relations (Danusubroto 2015). They include regional autonomy; the creation, partitioning or merging of administrative regions; management of natural resources and other economic resources; and matters related to financial balance between the central and regional governments (Febrian 2009, 19).

The amended Constitution neither specifies a package veto or item veto of the president over the legislation. The Constitution clearly stipulates that the president must sign bills resulting from and approved by the deliberative process within the legislature. In addition, the approved bills can be promulgated into law within 30 days, even without the president's signature. Nevertheless, the amendments overall did not significantly downgrade presidential power in the legislative process (see Table 7.1. below). The only significant change was the president's authority to exclusively introduce certain bills, with the condition it was only for a temporary period. The 1945 Constitution gave the government the authority to propose the state budget each year. The article was removed by the First Amendment but later reinstated by the Third Amendment. The president's package veto, rather than being removed, was rephrased during the first constitutional amendment to accommodate the increasing role of the DPR in the legislative process (King 2004, 231). Accordingly, bills require formal "joint approval" between the president and the House before being promulgated into law (Article 20.1). In theory, this means that the president retains full veto power in the legislative process.



**Table 7.1. Veto player configuration of Indonesia's Presidential System (1999-2014)**

**Institutional configuration**

Period	1999-2004				2004-2009	2009-2014
	First amendment (10/19/1999)	Second amendment (8/18/2000)	Third amendment (11/9/2001)	Fourth amendment (8/10/2002)	The 1945 Constitution (fourth amendment)	
<b>Constitution</b>						
<b>Unitary or Federal</b>				Unitary State		
<b>President's legislative powers index*</b>						
<i>package veto</i>	4	4	4	4	4	
<i>partial veto</i>	0	0	0	0	0	
<i>decree</i>	2	2	2	2	2	
<i>exclusive introduction</i>	0	0	1	1	1	
<i>budgetary powers</i>	1	1	1	1	1	
<i>proposal of referenda</i>	0	0	0	0	0	
<i>Sum of index value</i>	7	7	8	8	8	
<b>President term duration</b>		5 years			5 years	
<b>Number of legislative chambers</b>		1 (DPR)			2 (DPR and DPD)	
<b>Legislative term duration</b>		5 years			5 years	
<b>Electoral system</b>						
<i>Presidential election</i>		Assembly-elected			Direct election	
<i>Legislative election</i>		PR, closed-list.			PR, open-list.	
<b>Constitutional court</b>	No	Yes (established since 16 August 2003), 5 years office term with possibility of re-appointment				
<i>Composition of judges</i>	-	President nominee (3 judges); DPR nominee (3 judges); Supreme Court nominee (3 judges).				

## Partisan configuration

Period	1999-2004		2004-2009	2009-2014
<b>President</b>	Abdurrahman Wahid	Megawati Soekarnoputri**	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
<i>Office terms</i>	20 October 1999 - 22 July 2001	23 July 2001-19 October 2004	1st (20 October 2004-19 October 2009)	2nd (20 October 2009-19 October 2014)
<b>Legislative composition (DPR)</b>	5,5		7,1	6,1
<i>Effective number of parliamentary parties***</i>	5,5		7,1	6,1
<i>Proportion of president's party (%)</i>	11 (PKB)	30.6 (PDIP)	10 (PD)	26.4 (PD)
<i>Proportion of government coalition parties (%)</i>	97,3	93,3	72,8	75,3
<i>Number of government coalition parties</i>	7 parties and 1 functional group	6 parties and 1 functional group	8 parties	6 parties
<i>Coalition members</i>	PKB; PDIP; Golkar; PAN; PPP; PBB; PK; Military/police representatives.	PDIP; PKB; PPP; PBB; PAN; Golkar; Military/police representatives.	PD; Golkar; PKS; PAN; PBB; PKPI; PPP, PKB.	PD; Golkar; PKS; PAN; PPP; PKB.

Source: Author's compilation from King 2004; Croissant and Lorenz 2018; Kawamura 2013.

### Notes

\* Coding by author, based on Shugart-Carey index of president's legislative power (Shugart and Haggard, 1992, 150). The value of each indicator is distributed into score interval from 0 to 4. Maximum value is 24.

\*\*Previously Vice President. Abdurrahman Wahid was impeached by the parliament on 23 July 2001.

\*\*\*Calculated based on Laakso and Tagapeera, 1979. The figures from 1998 to 2004 included the military/police representative caucus in the parliament before it was abolished in 2004.

Abbreviation: MPR for Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People's Consultative Assembly); DPR for Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representatives); DPD for Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (Regional Council); PR for Proportional Representation; MMD for Multi-Member Districts; Golkar for Golongan Karya (Functional Groups); PPP for Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party); PKB for Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party); PDIP for Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle); PAN for Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party); PBB for Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Star Party); PK for Partai Keadilan (Justice Party), which was renamed after the 2004 general elections as PKS for Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party); PKPI for Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia (Indonesian Justice and Unity Party); PD for Partai Demokrat (Democrat Party); and Hanura for Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (The People's Heart party).

In practice, such joint authority in the legislative process is a means for the president to influence the fate of a bill in three ways. *First*, at the beginning of the legislative process, the president can refuse or suspend representatives from partaking in the deliberation process (Pasha 2019; Siddiq 2019). Since there are no formal rules on how long the president can hold an official appointment, this action effectively delays a bill's passage into the deliberation stage at the committee level (Siddiq 2019). *Second*, if the president agrees to name a representative, this representative can utilize a "line-item veto" during the deliberation process to influence legislative output (Choirie 2016; Siddiq 2019). The consensus-based mechanism allows significant room for the president to propose amendments and revisions on the content of a bill during the deliberation process, and is part of the president's bargaining strategy (Choirie 2016; see also, Sherlock 2012). Finally, the president can interrupt the legislative process by ordering a representative to be absent in the ongoing deliberation process within the DPR (Pareira 2016; Choirie 2016; Hasanuddin 2015). This provides significant leverage for the president and his/her bargaining position in the deliberation process if the revision proposal is rejected by the party groups. Of course, such actions can incur significant risks for the president. For example, they can be exploited by party caucus (*fraksi*) within DPR as a weapon to diminish the president's public credibility. Yet based on the aforementioned influence of the president, the legislative powers of post-Suharto presidents remain strong.

Other institutional features that need to be taken into account when considering institutional veto players are the presence of bicameralism, federalism and institutions of judicial review (Cox and McCubbins 2001, 31–32). Since 2004, Indonesia's parliament comprises two chambers: the DPR and DPD. As mentioned previously, DPR's mandate in the legislative process has been relatively strong following the constitutional amendments. Even though the DPD holds legislative power, it is strictly limited to certain policy areas (regional autonomy issues); more importantly, its legislative proposals and participation in the legislative process is subject to DPR approval. In other words, the legislative process is essentially dominated by the DPR (Danusubroto 2015; Kartasasmita 2016). Furthermore, the strong elite consensus to retain the unitary system of

government after Suharto continues to hinder the development of a greater role for the DPD in the legislative process (Danusubroto 2015). For these reasons, I discount the DPD as an institutional veto player.

The third constitutional amendment included a provision regarding the Constitutional Court, which was effectively established in 2003. The new court is mandated with several functions: conducting judicial review; deciding inter-government authority disputes; dismissing political parties; resolving election disputes, and; deciding whether or not a president is guilty of violation of the law before impeachment by parliament (Article 24). Due to its ability to nullify laws, the court can constitutionally be considered another institutional veto player. However, the Constitution indirectly restricts a judge's position as an independent veto player due to the provision on the composition of the court. The Constitutional Court is comprised of nine judges who are nominated in a proportional manner by the president, the DPR and the Supreme Court. The term limit for each judge is five years – with the possibility of re-appointment – or if the judge reaches 70 years of age. These provisions give the president and DPR considerable leeway to influence judges' positions when dealing with a dispute on the promulgated law (Choirie 2016). As such, I sided with Tsebelis's assertion that the Constitutional Court is not a veto player because even if it has the potential to be one, its preferences are largely absorbed by other veto players (i.e., the president and parliament) (Tsebelis 2002). Ultimately constitutional arrangements in the post-Suharto period establish two institutional veto players in the legislative process: the president and DPR.

From an institutional perspective, we now turn to identifying partisan veto players. This is principally conducted by disaggregating institutional players into partisan players (Tsebelis 2002, 80). Following the theoretical discussion of Chapter Two, three criteria are observed to identify the number of partisan veto players: the degree of fragmentation in the party system; the size of government coalition in the parliament; and the decision-making rules in the legislative process (Tsebelis 2002; Croissant 2003, 75). Following the first criteria, it is expected that *the more fragmented the party system in a polity, the greater the number of partisan veto players required to pass legislation*. If we look at the party's

composition within the DPR, Indonesia's multiparty system can be categorized as moderately fragmented (5 parties) to extremely fragmented (6-8 parties), as shown by the high number of effective parties in the parliament (ENPP) and that no single party has enjoyed a majority in the four post-Suharto elections (see Table 7.2 below). The largest determinant of how fragmented the party system is comes through the proportional representation (PR) system, which was influenced by the cleavage structure of Indonesian society and also the preference of political elites. The PR system is regarded as the best mechanism to accommodate the pluralism found within Indonesia, as there are multiple ethnic, religious and regional cleavages (Feith 1962, 123; Danusubroto 2015; Choirie 2016). In addition, the less restrictive PR system was strategically picked by smaller parties during several revisions to the electoral laws in order to minimize the risk of losing seats in the parliament following elections (Susilo 2014; Choirie 2016; see also, Shin 2013, 109).



Number of parties gain legislative seats	21	16	9
Effective number of electoral parties (ENEP)	5.1	8.5	9
Effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP)****	5.5	7.1	6.1

---

Source: Author's calculation based on the National Election Commission (KPU) official documents on election results.

Notes

\*Electoral threshold, party can participate in the election with min. 2.5 percent based on the previous election result. Alternatively, party can participate by: merging with previous contestants to achieve 3 percent; establishing new party (new name, logo, etc) but should pass the verification process.

\*\*electoral threshold, min. 3.5 percent on the previous election result. The 44 parties are further divided into 38 national level parties and 6 local parties in Aceh (mandate of special autonomy law)

\*\*\* first implementation of parliamentary threshold (min. 2.5 percent of electoral vote to secure legislative seat)

\*\*\*\*the ENPP index is calculated based on Laakso and Tagapeera (1979)

As shown by Table 7.1., post-Suharto presidents established large coalitions, composed of more than five parties, within the DPR. During President Wahid's term the coalition constituted a near absolute majority. Most of the government coalitions were formed prior to presidential elections. Before the direct presidential election in 2004, coalition building was crucial to getting elected and ensuring the government's survival against the threat of impeachment, the fate suffered by Wahid (Choirie 2016). Subsequently, establishing coalitions became even more important. The change towards direct presidential elections demanded massive political support at the grassroots level for every presidential candidate, and required resources from parties other than just the president. Furthermore, for the nomination process, each presidential candidate had to garner the formal support of a minimum of 15 percent of parliamentary seats in the 2004 election, and 20 percent in the 2009 election. Given the fragmented multiparty system, most presidential candidates invited as many political parties as possible to establish coalitions (Hanan 2012). This was done not only to fulfill legal requirements, but more importantly, to reduce the number of contenders in the election (Meliala 2015; Hasanuddin 2015). Nevertheless, the effect of the coalition size on the number of veto players also depends on the internal cohesion within each partisan veto player, as will be explained later in section 7.1.3.

Finally, legislative seat composition does not inform the whole picture of partisan veto player configuration. As postulated by Tsebelis's veto player theorem, it is important to take into account partisan veto players as a function of decision-making rules (unanimity, simple majority or qualified majority), especially in terms of collective veto players, such as the parliament. As such, the unanimity rule increases the number of veto players, since every party's approval is necessary for passing legislation. Although the DPR holds strong institutional veto power, its decision-making power is actually distributed among party caucuses (*fraksi*) (Hanan 2012; Susilo 2014; Danusubroto 2015; Meliala 2015). As will be discussed in the legislative process section, the long-established DPR procedural rule in essence places the unanimity rule above the majoritarian rule to make collective decisions, including legislative proposals. Unanimous decisions, in this case, simply signal that no parties in DPR are in disagreement with a bill (Susilo



2014; Pareira 2016). This rule has two direct implications for partisan veto player configuration in Indonesia's parliament. *First*, if unanimous decision-making rule takes place, then the number of partisan veto players also includes parties outside the coalition government. *Second*, if majority rule prevails, then members of the coalition government are partisan veto players. Either way, unanimous and simple majority modes of decision-making foster a high number of veto players since, as discussed above, the post-Suharto party system is highly fragmented and perpetuates the need for large coalition governments for legislative terms.

Once the institutional and partisan veto players have been identified, the final step is to count the de facto veto players by using the "absorption rule" if there is identical partisanship between institutional veto players. In a presidential system, this rule applies when a president's party is able to secure a single majority of legislative seats, resulting in the absorption of parliament (either both chambers or only one chamber) as a partisan veto player. However, as mentioned, such a condition was not evident in the post-Suharto electoral results. Legislative seats obtained by a president's party never surpassed one-third of legislative composition, let alone achieving a legislative majority (Table 7.1 and Table 7.2). Consequently, the expected number of de facto veto players in post-Suharto Indonesian politics is illustrated by the distribution of party seats in parliament, coalition size and decision-making rules in the legislative process (see Table 7.3 below).

Table 7.3. Expected number of veto players in post-Suharto Indonesia (1999-2014)

Time period	1999-2004		2004-2009	2009-2014
<b>President</b>	Abdurrahman Wahid	Megawati Sukarnoputri	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (1st)	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2nd)
<b>Institutional veto players</b>	president and DPR	president and DPR	president and DPR	president and DPR
<b>Partisan veto players</b>	high (ENPP 5.5)		extreme (ENPP 7.1)	high (ENPP 6.1)
<i>Degree of party system fragmentation*</i>	large (7 parties and 1 functional group)		large (7 parties)	large (6 parties)
<i>Coalition size*</i>	large (7 parties and 1 functional group)		large (7 parties)	large (6 parties)
<i>Decision-making rule (unanimous/simple majority)</i>	Unanimity or simple majority			
<b>Absorption rule</b>	No	No	No	No
<b>Expected number of veto players</b>	<i>High</i> , i.e., all-party groups in the legislature (unanimity rule) or coalition members (simple majority rule)	<i>High</i> , i.e., all-party groups in the legislature (unanimity rule) or coalition members (simple majority rule)	<i>High</i> , i.e., all-party groups in the legislature (unanimity rule) or coalition members (simple majority rule)	<i>High</i> , i.e., all-party groups in the legislature (unanimity rule) or coalition members (simple majority rule)

Source: Author's compilation

Overall, the political system of Indonesia's nascent democracy includes many veto players (Table 7.3). The highly fragmented party system contributed to the absence of a majority party in parliament, even the president's party. This is exaggerated by the large government coalitions – that is, comprising more than five parties – of three post-Suharto presidents. Under different decision-making rules, every decision needs to gain approval from a large number of veto players (members of large coalition or all-party caucuses in the parliament). At this point, it can be assumed that pursuing policy change in the post- is complicated and likely to end in deadlock due to the multiplicity of veto players. Still, this argument needs to be contrasted with other variables, such as the policy distance between veto players and their internal cohesion.

### **7.1.2. Policy distance**

Policy distance between veto players is expected to be small if the centripetal character of a party system is high, and becomes larger when the centrifugal character is high. As noted in Chapter Two, gauging these types of incentives in a party system requires two observations: counting the number of parties, and identifying a party's ideological position (Sartori 1976). Following the observations of party numbers, the post-Suharto Indonesia party system is susceptible to a centrifugal character due to its highly fragmented party system, as discussed in the previous section (see Table 7.3). To what extent such a high number of parties actually contribute to larger centrifugal incentives requires clarification from the ideological profiles of each party. In order to measure party ideological position, this research proceeds as follows.

The literature on ideological position of post-Suharto parties reached consensus on two arguments (Baswedan 2004; Liddle and Mujani 2007; Mietzner 2008; 2013a; Ufen 2006; 2008). *First*, the most salient left-right dimension regarding party and voter behavior in the literature is difficult to apply in Indonesia's post-Suharto polity. Above all, communist and/or any leftist ideologies are still forbidden in Indonesia, making it less likely for a leftist party to compete in

elections since 1966 or establish strong support in society (Mietzner 2008).<sup>19</sup> It is also possible that not all Indonesians understand the left-right ideological scale. Data from the World Value Survey from 2000 to 2009 showed that approximately 18-19 percent of Indonesian respondents were unable to indicate their ideological positions according to the left-right differentiation (Inglehart et al. 2014; 2018). Moreover, several left-leaning parties failed to secure parliamentary seats in the post-Suharto context (Mietzner 2013, 53-54). The economic platforms of most post-Suharto parties appeared to be uniform, as all stressed their commitment to improving welfare among the lower-class and promulgated a protectionist stand (Liddle and Mujani 2007, 850; Ufen 2008, 19). Consequently, an economy-based cleavage was less likely to be significant in post-Suharto inter-party competition.

*Second*, most of the literature is in agreement that religion acts as a basis for ideological cleavage in post-Suharto Indonesia (Baswedan 2004; Ufen 2006; Mietzner 2013a; Fossati 2019; Aspinall et al. 2020). But this argument needs to be weighed carefully. Religious cleavages were evident among political parties during the first democratic election of modern Indonesia in 1955, and were further manifested during the protracted debate between secular/nationalist parties and Islamic parties in the parliament, especially over the inclusion of Sharia principles in the new constitution (Feith 1957; Mietzner 2008, 436–39). The debate ended abruptly in 1959 when President Sukarno turned the conflict-ridden parliamentary system into a full presidential system, which also resulted in the re-introduction of the secular 1945 Constitution. When Suharto replaced Sukarno, the religious cleavage was preserved but the number of parties was reduced significantly in the mid-1970s. Secular and nationalist parties were fused under the PDI, the Islamic parties were synthesized under the PPP and Golkar took a pragmatic position at the center (Reeve 1985; Eklöf 2003). For more than three decades, religious cleavage was embedded in the ideological differentiation of Indonesian political parties and society.

---

<sup>19</sup> As regulated through the TAP MPRS No 25/1966 on the dissolution of the Indonesian Communist Party and prohibition of the promotion and development of communism and Marxism-Leninism in Indonesia.

Scholars claim that the religious cleavage – that is, *aliran* politics – emerged in the 1955 election and remained a relevant parameter for ideological polarization between political parties in the post-Suharto era (King 2003; King, Baswedan, and Harjanto 2005).<sup>20</sup> King (2003, 129-131) and King et al. (2005) found that there was a significant correlation between the 1955, 1999 and 2004 election outcomes in terms of the distribution of votes based on a secularist/nationalist-Islamic cleavage. For the Islamic parties, the cleavage was further divided by modernist and traditional bases (King 2003; Baswedan 2004; King, Baswedan, and Harjanto 2005).

Recent statistical analysis on the electoral data confirms that religious cleavages remain relevant. *First*, although high electoral volatility was evident in the 2004 election, block volatility from each group was significantly low, indicating that votes fluctuated among Islamic parties or secular parties themselves (see table 7.4). In the 2009 election, block volatility was increased; it should not be construed that Islamic voter opted instead for secular parties, since the vote share of secular parties did not increase accordingly (Higashikata and Kawamura 2015, 11–14). *Second*, the vote share of Islamic parties since the 1999 election has been relatively constant, approximately 20-30 percent of the total (table 7.4). *Finally*, there is a positive statistical correlation between Islamic piety level – operationalized as the ratio of mosques per 1,000 inhabitants – and the vote margin for Islamic parties at the district level in the 2004 and 2009 elections (Higashikata and Kawamura 2015, 17). At this point, one can argue that religious cleavages remain relevant for inter-party competition in Indonesian politics.

---

<sup>20</sup> The term *aliran* was developed from the seminal study by American anthropologist Clifford Geertz on Javanese society. He found that Javanese society was made up of three main socio-cultural streams (or *aliran* in Indonesian): *santri* (Islamic-oriented, urban inhabitants); *abangan* (Hindu-Islam syncretism, village people), and *priyayi* (Hindu-Javanese belief, upper class/bureaucratic elites). During the early independence era, political parties were divided into two opposite camps based on the cultural streams. On one side, the Santri community became loyal supporters of Islamist parties such as Partai NU, Perti, PSII, and Masyumi. On the other side was the *abangan* community with loyalty to nationalist and secularist party such as PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party), PKI (Indonesia Communist Party) and PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party).

**Table 7.4. Proportion of votes between secular parties and Islamic parties**

Election	1999-2004		2004-2009		2009-2014	
	vote share	seat share	vote share	seat share	vote share	seat share
PDIP	33.7%	30.6%	18.5%	19.8%	14.0%	16.8%
Golkar	22.5%	24.0%	21.6%	23.1%	14.5%	18.9%
Demokrat	n.a.	n.a.	7.5%	10.2%	20.9%	26.4%
Gerindra	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	4.5%	4.6%
Hanura	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	3.8%	3.0%
PPP	7.1%	6.8%	8.2%	10.6%	5.3%	6.8%
PKB	12.6%	10.2%	10.6%	9.5%	7.9%	5.0%
PAN	7.1%	6.8%	6.4%	9.6%	6.0%	8.2%
PKS	1.4%	1.4%	7.3%	8.2%	7.9%	10.2%
Others	9.1%	8.4%	16.1%	9.1%	15.6%	0%
<b>Secular parties total*</b>	62.4%	62.8%	61.7%	57.6%	70.8%	69.8%
<b>Islamist parties total*</b>	37.6%	37.2%	38.3%	42.6%	29.2%	30.2%
<b>Volatility</b>						
<i>Total volatility</i>				23.0		26.6
<i>Total volatility without others</i>				20.1		20.7
<i>Block volatility</i>				1.5		9.2
<i>Within block volatility (TV-BV)</i>				21.5		17.4
<i>Share of WBV in TV</i>				93.7%		65.4%

Source: Higashikata and Kawamura 2015, 36.

Notes

\*The secular parties are: Golkar PDIP, PD, Hanura, and Gerindra. Meanwhile, the Islamic parties are PPP, PKB, PAN and PKS.

Nevertheless, scholars also acknowledge some signs of erosion in parties' ideological affinities (Baswedan 2004; Tanuwidjaja 2012; Mietzner 2013a). One argument supports the salience of religious cleavage in post-Suharto Indonesia but claims that political Islam has significantly transformed (Baswedan 2004; Tanuwidjaja 2012). Accordingly, political Islam nowadays is not represented exclusively by parties with explicit "Islamic" platforms as was the case during parliamentary democracy in the 1950s. Rather, Muslim aspiration is represented by so-called "Islam-friendly parties", which indicate greater diversity between the parties and the growing pragmatism of political Islam in post-Suharto Indonesia (Baswedan 2004). The Islam-friendly parties can be grouped into three categories based on their platforms, support bases and/or leadership backgrounds: Islamist; Islam-inclusive; and secular-inclusive (Baswedan 2004, 678-680). Parties such as PPP, PBB and PKS are considered to be in the first category. These parties explicitly adopted Islam in their ideological platforms, and to considerable degree,

support integrating Sharia into the Constitution. PAN and PKB are Islam-inclusive parties and oppose the incorporation of Sharia in the constitution. Although these parties adopted Pancasila in their platforms, their organizational infrastructure and grassroots support are primarily derived from the two largest Muslim organizations in Indonesia: Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah (See, Baswedan 2004, 680; Mietzner 2008, 447; Tomsa 2010, 146; Higashikata and Kawamura 2015, 42).

The last category comprises “secular-inclusive” parties that are considered to be open to “Muslim” voices while retaining a secular stance. This category was represented only by Golkar, as it allowed the inclusion of Islamic scholars and activists into its ranks pre-1998. Suharto’s experiment with moderate Islamic groups, particularly the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) at the end of the 1980s, resulted in the cooptation of such groups into Golkar leadership during the party’s national convention in 1998 (Baswedan 2004, 677). In a similar stance to PKB and PAN, Golkar strongly opposed Sharia in the Constitution but was open to the development of a Muslim society. Even though these parties held different views on the formal relationship between the state and Islam, they in principle welcomed “Muslim’ aspirations”. Consequently, the ideological categories of Islamic parties should be treated as a continuum rather than restrictive classifications (Baswedan, 2004, 680). In addition, the author suggested that maintaining intransigent positions on the integration of Sharia and state governance disadvantages Islamist parties, since electoral support for the issue remains low (Baswedan 2004, 689). This indicates the potential of Islamist parties moving their ideological positions closer to Islam-inclusive parties. Similarly, Mietzner (2008, 2013) found evidence showing the gradual erosion of a religious cleavage. Instead of focusing exclusively on Islamic parties, as Baswedan did, Mietzner revealed that it was actually secular-based parties such as PDIP, Golkar and PD that have played a focal role in this erosion (Mietzner 2008). Drawing on Green-Pedersen’s work on the centripetal direction of the multiparty system in Europe, Mietzner (2008) shows that major parties such as those mentioned above have significantly concentrated inter-party competition at the center of ideological space. These three parties were commonly categorized as

pivotal “centrist parties”, since it was impossible to establish a stable coalition and pass legislation without relying on the participation and approval of at least one of them.

The effect of centrist parties on overall inter-party competition is pervasive. They increase the incentive for wing parties – mostly Islamic parties – at the periphery of the ideological spectrum to move closer to the center in return for coalition membership or expanding electoral support (Mietzner 2008, 447–51). This was evident in the race between Islamic parties to present a more moderate face of political Islam in policy issues and electoral strategies. For example, the Islamist PPP accepted Megawati as the first female president of Indonesia in return for the appointment of its chairman, Hamzah Haz, as vice president (Danusubroto 2015). This showed a significantly more tolerate stance, or even erosion, of the PPP’s Islamic conservatism (Mietzner 2008, 448). Another example is when PKS openly declared Islam as its ideological foundation but later moved to a centrist position (Siddiq 2019). The move of PKS towards the center could be deduced from the transformation of its electoral strategies – for example, publicly distancing the party from Islamism, allowing women to take on leadership positions, relaxing party membership requirements (non-Muslim member) and the like – to attract median voters (Tomsa 2011; Tanuwidjaja 2012; Buehler 2012; Siddiq 2019). Altogether, inter-party competition in the post-Suharto polity was characterized by centripetal orientation that encouraged the moderation of ideological profiles from all parties, bringing them closer together in the center.

Essentially, religious cleavages are presumed to be relevant in the post-Suharto polity. Analysis on voting behavior indicates that *aliran* politics was observable during the post-Suharto elections and, to some extent, in the legislative arena. Nevertheless, the politics of coalitions and party interests for electoral survival have decreased ideological differences across the cleavages, allowing the converging pattern of ideological polarization (Susilo 2014; Danusubroto 2015; Choirie 2016; Sambuaga 2016; Siddiq 2019). Based on these circumstances, I developed a proxy for party positions between the three post-Suharto elections (see Figure 7.1 below).



**Figure 7.1. Evaluation of ideological position of post-Suharto parties  
1999-2014**

Ideological continuum	Secularist	Secular-inclusive	Center	Islam-inclusive	Islamist
<b>Legislative period 1999-2004 (<i>Reformasi</i> period)</b>		PDIP*	Golkar*	PKB*	
				PAN*	
					PPP*
					PBB*
	PKPI**				PKS**
<b>Legislative period 2004-2009 (post-<i>Reformasi</i> period)</b>		PDIP**	Golkar*	PKB*	
			PD*		
	PKPI*			PAN*	
		PDS*			PPP*
					PKS*
					PBB*
					PBR*
<b>Legislative period 2009-2014 (post-<i>Reformasi</i> period)</b>			PD*		
			Golkar*		
		PDIP**		PAN*	
					PPP*
	Hanura**			PKB*	
	Gerindra**				PKS*

Source: Author's compilation

\*President party/coalition member

\*\*not member of coalition/opposition

PD declared itself to be a nationalist-religious party (*nasionalis religius*). The term “nationalist” seems to be inappropriate for this context since usually it was used in the economy-based spectrum i.e., nationalist versus liberalist views on state economy. However economic cleavage, as mentioned previously, was mainly absent for inter-party competition during post-Suharto period. It appears that the term nationalist here refers to the secularist position or the view that religion should be fully detached from state governance.

Principally, the left-right scale of the ideology spectrum is replaced with a secular-Islamic scale (Baswedan 2004, 681; Ufen 2008, 15; Mietzner 2008, 452; Mietzner 2013a, 169-176). This is explained as follows. At one extreme, secularist refers to party positions that strongly defend the separation of state and Islam, either through formal or informal means. Thus, religious orientation is completely irrelevant to the political agenda of the party. Next to secularist is the secular-inclusive position that leans closer to the center. This position is evident when a secular-based party shows accommodation on the development of Muslim society (Baswedan 2004, Mietzner 2008). At the opposite end, the Islamist position reflects Islamic-based parties that strongly support the full integration of Islamic values into the state, particularly the inclusion of Sharia principles in the Constitution. Next to the extreme Islamist position is the Islam-inclusive one. This position supports the idea that Islamic moral values should be reflected in state policies but not necessarily through the formalization of Sharia (Baswedan 2004, 679). Viewed as such, the Islamic-inclusive position indicates some pluralist values (Fossati 2019). Nevertheless, pluralism is constructed upon the fact that Indonesia is a Muslim-majority country, which Mietzner (2013a, 171) referred to as “protection of minorities in an otherwise Islamized society”. Finally, the center position reflects party agendas that attempt to balance both sides of the ideological spectrum, or even pragmatism. This position is evident when a party openly declares itself a “nationalist-religious” party or refuses to take a distinct position at either side of the ideological spectrum (Mietzner 2013a, 174-175).

From the ideological profile for each post-*Reformasi* party, the next step is to understand each party position towards the military. Ideally, gauging party position on various issues is done by analyzing the electoral manifesto of each party for the respective legislative period. For example, the widely used Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) dataset – currently MARPOR – evaluates party preference on the military as positive and negative. Positive preference on the military can be deduced when the party’s electoral manifesto indicates a supporting statement for larger military expenditure, boosting military strength or the need for rearmament and self-defense (Krause et al. 2019, 10). On the other hand, a party’s negative position on the military is interpreted from the manifesto

statement that include references towards decreasing military expenditures, disarmament and reduced or discontinued conscription (Krause et.al 2019, 11). Nevertheless, establishing an electoral manifesto was not a common mechanism for political parties in Indonesia (Susilo 2014; Choirie 2016; Sambuaga 2016; Siddiq 2019).<sup>21</sup> Furthermore, the relationship between political parties and defense policy in Indonesia remains an understudied topic.

Alternatively, I decided to analyze the deliberation of the TNI bill in 2004 during the *Reformasi* period as a proxy of the party position on the military in the post-*Reformasi* context. The TNI bill deliberation process was selected since the process was widely considered as critical point for the post-Suharto civil-military relations (Danusubroto 2015; Choirie 2016; Haripin 2019; Aliabbas 2019). This approach proceeds in the following two steps.

The first step establishes the relationship between core party ideology and its potential support towards the TNI. If we scrutinize the ideological profile of each party, then the secular parties such as PDIP, PKPI, Hanura and PDS would be more likely to display a positive preference to the TNI compare to the Islamist parties like PPP, PBB, PKS and PBR. The secular parties are commonly associated with their adherence to Pancasila and favor the strong demarcation between Islam – and other religion – and the Indonesian state (Mietzner 2013a; Danusubroto 2015; Meliala 2015; Sambuaga 2016; Fossati 2019). Such an ideological affinity fits with the long-standing function of the TNI to safeguard Pancasila and the Constitution (Kingsbury 2003). Consequently, it is sufficient to postulate that the secular parties would be more supportive in regard to the role of the military as the guardian of the state; they are more likely to provide political support for the military attempt to protect its institutional interest (Danusubroto 2015; Meliala 2015; Hasanuddin 2015; Sambuaga 2016). In contrast, the Islamist parties are more likely to challenge the military's institutional interest, especially those related to the military role within society (Susilo 2014; Choirie 2016; Siddiq 2019; see also, Mietzner 2009). Finally, I propose the centrist and pluralist parties would

---

<sup>21</sup> Only PKS regularly published their party manifesto (1999,2004,2008) (Siddiq 2019).

be more pragmatic regarding their position on the military role in the state due to their ideological leaning (Danusubroto 2015; Mengga 2015; Sambuaga 2016).

In the second step, the assumed party positions on TNI then contrasted with the TNI bill deliberation process from August-September 2004 within the DPR. Proceedings were held with House Committee I on August 2, 2004, to September 29, 2004 (DPR RI 2004a). It began with a two-day public hearing on August 2-4. On August 26, the process proceeded into committee internal meetings, working group meetings and smaller meetings to finalize the draft before it was brought before a plenary session on September 30 (DPR RI 2004a). During the almost two-month deliberation process, four core issues emerged: TNI identity; TNI role and position; TNI command structure; and military business/economic activities (DPR RI 2004a; 2004b; Bainus 2009; Danusubroto 2015; Choirie 2016).

Regarding the first issue of TNI identity, PDIP proposed removing the term “TNI alignment with the people (*kemanunggalan* TNI dengan Rakyat), replacing it with a clarification of professional military (Danusubroto 2015; Meliala 2015). Interestingly, the proposal was supported by the Islamist party PPP and two centrist parties PAN and PKB (Choirie 2016). Meanwhile, Golkar and PBB supported the inclusion of TNI alignment (*kemanunggalan*) with the people term (DPR RI 2004a; Bainus 2009). After series of negotiation, all parties agree to the term “professional military” being explicitly included in the clause on TNI identity (Bainus 2009). In regard to the second issue of role and position, the main focus of deliberation was to determine who holds the authority to deploy TNI forces. PDIP and the TNI caucus (*fraksi TNI*) in DPR supported the clause that the TNI must be under the direct authority of the president and the military commander equally positioned as cabinet member (DPR RI 2004b; Meliala 2015). Meanwhile, PKB, Golkar, PBB, and PAN proposed TNI should be under the direct supervision of the MoD (DPR RI 2004b; Choirie 2016). The negotiation process between the parties finally reached consensus that TNI is under the direct supervision of the president in regard to force deployment, but it is under the coordination of MoD in regard to defense policy and administrative matters (DPR RI 2004b; Bainus 2009; Danusubroto 2015; Meliala 2015; Choirie 2016).

On the issue of command structure, all parties agreed to remove territorial supervision (*pembinaan teritorial*) word from the government-sponsored draft (DPR RI 2004a). Most of the parties expressed their concern that the term represented the problematic military role in politics under Suharto's autocratic rule (Bainus 2009, 320). Eventually, parties in House Committee I reached consensus to replace territorial supervision with empowering defense area (*pemberdayaan wilayah pertahanan*) as the function of TNI command (DPR RI 2004b; Danusubroto 2015; Choirie 2016). Finally, the government-sponsored bill draft did not include the clause on TNI business. However, PKB proposed that it should be included, further proposing clauses on the future takeover of any TNI-related business activities or units in the draft (Choirie 2016). The government representative and military representatives in DPR claimed that the TNI still needed business units because the defense budget allocation was always insufficient to finance TNI operational expenditures (Bainus 2009). As such, the takeover idea was seen as a threat to TNI institutional interests (Danusubroto 2015; Meliala 2015). However, all parties in Committee I opposed any retention of the business units due to the potential conflict of interest and threat to the TNI professional identity as state apparatus (Bainus 2009, 326). In the final hearing, all parties agreed to support the PKB proposal that the government should take over the TNI business units and assets within five-year period after the TNI law was enacted in September 2004 (DPR RI 2004b; Danusubroto 2015; Meliala 2015).

**Table 7.5. Expected policy distance in national defense**

Legislative Term President	1999-2004		2004-2009	2009-2014
	Wahid	Megawati	Yudhoyono (1st)	Yudhoyono (2nd)
Party numbers (ENPP)	5.5		7.1	6.1
Pattern of Ideological polarization	converge	converge	converge	Converge
Centripetal or Centrifugal incentive	Centripetal	Centripetal	Centripetal	Centripetal
Expected policy distance	small	small	small	Small

Source: Author's compilation

The deliberation process of TNI law indicated that there was significant space for negotiation between parties in the legislative process on the national defense

sector. Although multiple partisan veto players may suggest that the legislative process is prone to deadlock, this is not necessarily the case if one takes into account the converging ideological distances between the post-Suharto parties. In fact, such convergence indicates that achieving policy change is not unimaginable. Converging ideological distance allows significant room for negotiation and bargaining, thereby increasing the probability of reaching consensus regarding legislative proposals. In essence, it can be expected that the policy distance in national defense among the post-reformasi parties would be relatively small (Table 7.6). Still, this expectation depends on the level of cohesion of each party, which is addressed in the section below.

### **7.1.3. Internal cohesion**

The degree of internal cohesion of each veto player is expected to be strong when the incentives to cultivate personal votes in the election are low (Tsebelis 2002, 84). The electoral system in Indonesia's nascent democracy has undergone several adjustments between elections, but one common feature remains: the proportional system. Accordingly, the biggest adjustment to the post-Suharto election system was made by switching from a full closed-list to a full open-list system. During the 1999 elections, the closed-list system utilized during Suharto's regime was preserved, which resulted in the strong authority of party leaders to decide a candidate's place on the ballot and hence the candidate's probability of success. Accordingly, voters could only vote for the party. The vote tally gained by each party was then proportionally distributed to the pre-ordered party list of the candidates in order to select the successful candidates for DPR seats. The problem was, however, that party leaders often ignored whether listed candidates actually held electoral support at the local level, and this resulted in public pressure to change the voting mechanism (Crouch 2010, 63). In response, an open-list system was introduced for the 2004 election. This system was a partial open-list rather than a full open-list. Under this system, voters may assign their vote to a party or any candidate on the list.

Nevertheless, it is extremely difficult for single candidates to win legislative seats through personal votes, since they need to fulfill or exceed large party quotas for

each seat (see Shin 2013, 113; Aspinall and Sukmajati 2016, 12). Furthermore, the majority of voters – especially in rural areas – simply opted for parties rather than individual candidates (Crouch 2010, 64). In practice therefore, the 2004 election resulted in only two candidates securing DPR seats based on personal votes; the remaining 548 DPR seats were drawn from party lists (Crouch 2010, 65). This seat distribution changed during the 2009 election when a full open-list system was utilized. The change resulted from a decision by the Constitutional Court and not DPR policy-makers. The 2008 electoral law retained the 2004 voting mechanism (personal or party votes), however, it reduced the margin for candidates to win by the personal vote to only 30 percent of the party quota level (Ziegenhain 2015, 96). A few weeks before the election was held, the Constitutional Court declared the voting mechanism of “personal vote or party vote” unconstitutional, essentially deciding that legislative seats would be predominantly distributed based on personal votes. This unexpected decision effectively changed the 2009 election results. Many incumbent legislators failed to be re-elected, resulting in a House composition of 70 percent newly-elected legislators DPR (Sukma 2009, 322).

To what extent did this change in Indonesia’s electoral system affect incentives to cultivate personal reputations in the election? As explained in Chapter 2, the personal-reputation incentive is gauged by using Carey-Shugart's rank ordering of electoral systems through four variables: ballot, pool, vote and district magnitude (Carey and Shugart, 1995, pp.420-423). For the *ballot* variables, national party leaders retain significant power in composing candidate lists, since each candidate needs to gain formal approval from national party leaders (Article 41.5 and 44.1, Law No.3/1999). This changed slightly in 2004, when the electoral law introduced a “semi open-list system”(Shin 2013). As mentioned previously, this allowed voters to vote for party or a candidate, and was a response to public pressure to better link the voters and their DPR representatives. The semi open-list system slightly increased candidate incentives to cultivate personal reputations since voters can “disturb” the lists, even though party leaders still control the nomination and rank ordering of candidates (see Carey and Shugart 1995, 421). Although a full open-list system was introduced in 2009, national

party leaders still control the nomination and candidate rank until now, indicating that party endorsement remains important in the election process (Shin 2013; Aspinall and Sukmajati 2016).

In contrast, the *pool* variable constantly scored 0. Thus, vote for any candidate of a given party is counted first as a vote for the whole party list for the purpose of determining how many seats are to be allocated to the list (Carey and Shugart 1995, 421). In three elections, electoral laws stipulated that valid vote would be pooled at the party level to define party quotas in the districts.<sup>22</sup> This party quota was calculated by the number of valid votes gained by a party – for the 2009 election, parties also needed to pass a parliamentary threshold of 2.5 percent of the national vote – divided by the total seats in a respective district (Aspinall 2014). Subsequently, the seat allocation of parties was distributed based on a candidate's rank. For the 2004 election, a candidate had to fulfill the party quota to land a legislative seat through personal votes, otherwise the allocation was based on the party list's rank (Shair-Rosenfield 2019, 147). Following the Constitutional Court's decision to implement a full open-list system, the seat allocations in the 2009 election were simply inferred from who received the most personal votes of any candidate on the list. Either way, the vote first goes to the party level to define seats quota of each party quota and then to the candidate (Choi 2010; Shair-Rosenfield 2019).

For the vote variable, the gradual adjustment from a closed to a full open-list system resulted in significant score differences between the 1999 and the 2004 elections. In the 1999 election, voters cast their ballot for a party, leading to a score of 0. Besides the different implications of the open-list system utilized from the 2004 election onwards – as explained earlier – the score of the vote variable for post-1999 elections are 2, since voters were allowed to cast votes either for a party or a single candidate.

---

<sup>22</sup> See Article 67, Law No.3/1999; Article 105, Law No. 12/2003.; Article 205, Law No.10/2008.



The last variable of personal vote incentives is *district magnitude*. The perpetuation of the proportional representation system in the post-Suharto elections resulted in medium to high figures of average district magnitude ( $m > 1$ ). On average, there were 17.5 seat allocations per district in the 1999 election. This average figure significantly decreased to 8 in the 2004 election and to 7.3 in the 2009 election and the 2014 election (Choi 2010, 672; Shair-Rosenfield 2019, 136). According to Carey and Shugart (1995, 431), the effect of district magnitude on the incentives to cultivate personal votes was different from the other variables: as  $M$  (district magnitude) rises in closed list systems (where *ballot* = 0), the value of personal reputation declines; as  $M$  rises in all other systems, the value of personal reputation increases. Based on the measurement of these variables, we can now infer several conclusions on the level of incentives to cultivate personal votes in post-Suharto elections (see Table 7.7 for details).

**Table 7.6. Incentive for personal vote in the legislative elections**

<b>Election time</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2009</b>
<b>Electoral system</b>	Proportional representation; closed-list.	Proportional representation; open-list.	
<b>Incentive to cultivate personal vote in election*</b>			
<i>Ballot (party leader control over nomination and rank order)</i>	0	1	1
<i>Pool</i>	0	0	0
<i>Votes</i>	0	2	2
<i>Average district magnitude</i>	17,5	8	7,3
<i>Degree of incentive</i>	Low	moderate	Moderate
<b>Legislative organization</b>			
<i>Party leaders control agenda setting</i>	yes (bamus)	yes (bamus)	yes (bamus)
<i>Party leaders control distribution of committee membership</i>	yes (bamus)	yes (bamus)	yes (bamus)
<i>Party leaders can dismiss individual legislator</i>	yes	yes	yes
<b>Expected party discipline</b>	strong	moderate	moderate
<i>Campaign orientation</i>	national issue/party reputation	national issues/party reputation and narrow interest	
<b>Expected internal cohesion of veto player</b>	stronger	weaker	

Source: Author's calculation based on coding by Carey and Shugart (1995).

The degree of expected party discipline in Indonesia can be divided into *strong* party discipline for the 1999-2004 legislative term (the *Reformasi* period) and *moderate* party discipline for the 2004-2009 and 2009-2014 legislative terms (the post-*Reformasi* period). The 1999 election mirrored an electoral formula that offered a lack of incentives for the candidates to cultivate personal votes since party leaders controlled the ballot composition (nomination and rank order), the vote was pooled at the party level, and voters could only cast votes for parties (Carey and Shugart 1995, 424). In this full closed-list system, the electoral successes of candidates depended heavily on their relationships with party leaders and party reputation and less on building strong personal ties with constituents. Indeed, the limited value of personal ties was nurtured by the high district magnitude. In contrast, the 2004 and 2009 elections increased incentives to cultivate personal votes since voters were able to “disturb” party lists by casting votes either for a party or a candidate. This incentive was fostered by the preservation of multi-member districts in both elections, which did not increase intraparty competition (see Shugart and Haggard 2001, 86). Nevertheless, party reputation remains essential since all votes are pooled at the party level, and this is imperative as the number of personal votes is going to be meaningful for any legislative seat. Under such circumstances, the *pool* variable score had a moderating effect on personal votes and the electoral success of candidates in the two elections.

Consequently, the effect of low personal incentives in the 1999 election led to strong party discipline during the first post-Suharto legislative term of 1999-2004. On the other hand, a moderate level of personal incentives from 2004 onwards would slightly reduce party discipline. Post-Suharto parties still possess a significant degree of party discipline, as indicated by the *pool* variable. This further supports the notion that there are many partisan veto players in the post-Suharto polity, as discussed earlier. Different degrees of personal incentives between elections are also expected to influence preference distributions in the legislative process. Under low incentives for personal vote, building party reputation and being responsive to national issues would on the top list position of legislator agenda during the first post-Suharto legislative period of 1999-2004. Indeed, this

period marked the early years of regime transition, and was supposedly characterized by extensive pressure to pass legislation on political reforms, particularly at the national level. After the 2004 elections utilized a partially open-list system, it was expected that building nationwide party reputations would remain relevant during the legislative term of 2004-2009. Nevertheless, legislators showcasing narrower interest was also evident, particularly in order to anticipate the 2009 election, which was likely to preserve an open-list system.

After the Constitutional Court removed the legal barriers to enact a full open-list system for the 2009 election, I expected that this leaning towards narrower interest would be even stronger among legislators. Accordingly, during the 2009 election, such change contributed to an increasing “personalization of politics” and increased forms of money politics to win legislative seats (Aspinall 2014, 103–9; see also, Aspinall and Sukmajati 2016). Thus, it was not necessary for legislators to improve their party reputations, as their future electoral fate largely depended on utilizing personal resources and patronage networks (Hellmann 2011, 137). Altogether, the expectation of the post-*Reformasi* polity is characterized by *multiple veto players, smaller policy distance and the weak cohesion of veto players*. Of course, before we infer any conclusions, these findings need to be contrasted with observations regarding the institutional properties of the legislative process in the post-Suharto period.

## **7.2. The legislative process**

The House legislative process is practically embodied within its original procedural rules (*Tata Tertib DPR*) (Febrian 2009; Danusubroto 2015; Sambuaga 2016). These rules have not undergone substantial change since the establishment of DPR GR VIII (minus the communist party), which marked the beginning of the New Order Regime in 1966 (Katharina 2005; Mahesa 2020). Since then, procedural rules have often been inherited from previous DPRs. This assumed customary practice within the House has contributed to its institutional stability for decades. When Suharto resigned, the House made only two changes to its procedural rules: the establishment of a new DPR organ called the Legislation Committee (*Baleg/Badan legislasi*), which assists DPR members in legal drafting;

and streamlining the legislative process from four levels to two levels for efficiency reasons (Mahesa 2020).

Each year, the president and House speakers hold a meeting to discuss which bills should become legislation priorities (Febrian 2009, 7; Croissant and Lorenz 2018, 84). The meeting outcome is a list called the national legislation program (*prolegnas*), which compiles drafts from the DPR and government ministries as a reference for upcoming legislative sessions (Danusubroto 2015; Choirie 2016). Prior to 2004, there was no legal obligation to produce such a list. In practical terms, House member and the government could propose bills at any session and whenever they considered them necessary (Danusubroto 2015). This changed when Law No.10/2004 demanded that the DPR and government establish annual *prolegnas*, which were to be publicly announced for the upcoming year. However, the law allowed the House and the government to introduce bills outside the approved list under “specific circumstances”. Before 2004, the president and the House were able to propose legislation. After 2004, the DPD was granted the constitutional right to propose legislation but needed to obtain formal approval from the House for its deliberation (see Section 7.1.1 above). In practice, the DPD proposed several pieces of legislation, but the House often claimed that it had made similar law proposals on its own or had received comparable proposals from the government. During the legislative term of 2004-2009, no single legislation came from DPD initiatives, and only one arose in the subsequent 2009-2014 period (DPR RI 2015, 2). Consequently, only the president and DPR had de facto proposed bills.

All bills originating from the president and DPR (and DPD, if any) are brought into the opening plenary session by House leaders (see Figure 7.2.). During the session, DPR leaders announce the bill to be deliberated in the following parliamentary session and distribute the draft bill to all members (Croissant and Lorenz 2018). Although there is no formal rule for this, DPR leaders often ask fellow House members whether to accept the draft and continue with the deliberation or not (Danusubroto 2015; Choirie 2016). House members predominantly agree to accept the draft since the announcement by the house speaker means the bill


received the de facto approval from party group leaders in the deliberation council (*Bamus/Badan Musyawarah*) (Siddiq 2019). Indeed, the deliberation council's meetings also decide which DPR organs will be responsible for the deliberation process of a respective bill: standing committee (*Komisi*); legislation committee (*Baleg/badan legislasi*); budget committee (*Badan anggaran*) or special committee (*Pansus/panitia khusus*) (Croissant and Lorenz 2018; Siddiq 2019; Hasanuddin 2015). Usually, this decision follows the president's selection of a government representative for the deliberation process. For example, if the president appoints the minister of defense to discuss a defense-related bill, then Committee I will conduct the deliberation process, since defense policy falls under its responsibility within the DPR. If the president appoints more than two ministers as the government's representatives, then the deliberation process goes to the legislation council or special committee (Hasanuddin 2015).

Subsequently, the selected DPR organ establishes a working committee (*Panja/Panitia kerja*) with the responsibility to formulate a detailed content of the bill.<sup>23</sup> Each party is represented proportionally in the working committee. The deliberation process begins when the committee conducts a working meeting (*Raker/rapat kerja*). The first working meeting usually discusses the mechanisms of the deliberation, such as the timetable and rules for the next meetings (Febrian 2009; Siddiq 2019; Hasanuddin 2015; Kartasasmita 2016). In addition, the committee is allowed to invite external parties, such as academics, legal experts, professionals and/or civil society organizations, through the public hearing mechanism (*RDPU/Rapat Dengar Pendapat Umum*) upon approval by its members (Hasanuddin 2015). The decision about public hearings (when and who is invited) is mostly decided during the first working meeting and the hearings conducted before the working meetings. If necessary, the committee can hold public hearings in between working meetings.

---

<sup>23</sup> In case the bill is assigned to a special committee, the committee's authority is similar to the authority of the working committee.

**Figure 7.2. Legislative process in post-Suharto Indonesia**



Source: Croissant and Lorenz 2018, 85

In practice, working meetings are the most crucial for the deliberation process. During these meetings, party caucuses and the government (the appointed minister[s]) express their positions and general views on the bill (Siddiq 2019). If there is no general consensus – which rarely happens – the meetings proceed to another step. In the following step, the meetings discuss the inventory list of issues (DIM/*Daftar Inventarisasi Masalah*) regarding the bill’s content (Danusubroto

2015; Choirie 2016; see also, Croissant and Lorenz 2018, 84). The DIM comes from parties if the proposal comes from the government and vice versa. During the DIM discussion, party groups and government representatives express their agreement with, opposition to, or suggestions for every aspect (clauses, and even wording) of the bill's content (Hasanuddin 2015). If necessary, both sides are able to produce their own DIMs during the deliberation process, regardless of who initiated the proposal. Once the DIM reaches general consensus on the bill's content, the draft goes to several teams (formulation team/*timmus*, synchronization team/*timsin* or smaller team/*timcil*), which was established by the working committee for the final wording (Hasanuddin 2015; Siddiq 2019). These teams are comprised of party group representatives and minister representatives (minimum top-level echelon), and are supported by legal or technical experts from House or the respective ministry (Siddiq 2019).

Like other decision-making processes within House meetings, the legislative process encourages a consensus-based mechanism. This "deliberation for consensus" (*musyawarah untuk mufakat*) mechanism emphasizes that every decision by the DPR should be based on unanimity (Danusubroto 2015; Sambuaga 2016; Siddiq 2019). The idea of a consensus-based mechanism was taken from the state ideology Pancasila, which has been increasingly institutionalized within the DPR decision-making procedure since 1971 (Hanan 2012, 118-120).<sup>24</sup> Empirically, a consensus prevails when no party expresses disagreement with the bill's content (Danusubroto 2015). If parties fail to reach a consensus, then a voting mechanism with simple majority rule takes place (Febrian 2009). In reality, voting rarely takes place in Indonesia's legislative process (Danusubroto 2015; Sambuaga 2016; Siddiq 2019; Hanan 2012, 115). It is much favored by the House to decide upon a candidate for state officials, that is, commissioners, or to decide the utilization of House oversight instruments such as interpellation (Sambuaga 2016). In addition, deadlock at the committee level does not necessarily lead to majority voting. Rather, the issue is first often brought into a plenary session for further deliberation. If deadlock still prevails, then the majority voting mechanism

---

<sup>24</sup> Specifically, this is reflected by the fourth pillar of Pancasila i.e., democracy guided by the inner wisdom of deliberation (*musyawarah*) amongst representatives (see Kawamura 2011, 5).

will take place (Sambuaga 2016; Siddiq 2019). The consensus-based mechanism often causes serious delays in the legislative process since parties – especially minority parties and government representatives – can stall for a long time and thereby have the opportunity to influence others to take on a position closer to their own (Sherlock 2010, 169).

To address this problem, the House often utilizes informal channels, such as “lobbying” meetings, to establish consensus. These meetings allow DPR parties and government representatives to negotiate their differences regarding the contents of bills outside of formal meetings (Sherlock 2007, 13–14; Kawamura 2011, 4; Danusubroto 2015; Choirie 2016). Since these forums and negotiations are informal, it is very difficult to establish party positions; moreover, records of the meetings are practically unavailable (Ziegenhain 2008, 163; Sherlock 2010, 174; Choirie 2016). Essentially, lobbying meetings allow minority parties to prevent decisions that may easily curtail their preferences (Choirie 2016; Siddiq 2019). If there are no more disputes between the parties, the deliberation process concludes with several ceremonial activities, including: introduction from the committee chairman, the working committee report, the reading of the final bill; the reading of smaller reports (*pendapat akhir mini*) from each party group and government representative; the signing of the final draft; and the announcement to bring the draft into the second reading in the plenary session (Choirie 2016; Siddiq 2019).

Before entering the plenary session, the deliberation council holds a meeting to reinforce the parties’ consensus on the bill and schedule the plenary session for the second reading (Danusubroto 2015; Sambuaga 2016; Siddiq 2019). The plenary session begins with the committee’s report on the deliberation process and is followed by each party group expressing their own final view of the bill. In addition, the government – represented by the initiator ministry and the ministry of law and justice – also articulates its final opinion. Subsequently, the House leadership asks its members whether the bill can or cannot be enacted into law. If there is no interruption from members, the House leader can formally promulgate the bill into law by banging the speaker’s gavel (Danusubroto 2015). Principally,



the plenary session is a ceremonial event, since all parties already agreed to the bill's content during the committee and the deliberative council (Hanan, 2012, 153). Thus, it is rare for House members to express discontent during the second reading (Choirie 2016). After the second reading, the bill goes to the president and must be signed within 30 days to take effect as a new law. If, however, the president and House fail to reach consensus during the first and second readings, the bill cannot be deliberated in the same parliamentary session (Siddiq 2019).

Regarding previous expectations of veto player configuration, analysis of the legislative process in the post-Suharto polity supports the multiplicity of veto players, as anticipated. Institutional adherence to consensus-based mechanisms increases the number of partisan veto players, since all parties in the House participate and need to give their approval to pass legislation. This mechanism also reduces policy distance between parties as previously explained in the deliberation process of TNI law. The lobbying meeting allows party groups to negotiate their opposing positions. With the expectation of converging ideological positions between parties, this "exceptional" consensus-based mechanism increases the prospective of reducing policy distance between parties during the legislative process. Strong party discipline is also reflected in Indonesia's legislative process, but this must be inferred carefully. In practical terms, the deliberation council is a party group leaders' forum and plays a gatekeeper function by approving and distributing bills to certain House organs (Danusubroto 2015). It also gives final approval of the bill after committee deliberation and before entering the second reading. In fact, mechanisms for consensus in the legislative process itself only involve party leaders, and not individual House members (Sherlock 2012, 561). Consequently, the fate of a bill in the House fundamentally depends on the approval of each party's leader.

In addition, House procedural rules give significant power to party caucus over their members and member distribution within the DPR organs. This is performed by assigning members into certain committees or special committees; transferring members to other committees during a legislative term; and replacing member in the committee chairmanship (Danusubroto 2015; Sambuaga

2016; Choirie 2016; Siddiq 2019). More importantly, legislators can be expelled from DPR through “recall” mechanisms proposed by their own parties whenever considered necessary; this is a significant disincentive for legislators to act against party direction (Ufen 2006, 19; Ziegenhain 2008, 43; Choirie 2016). Expelled legislators brought this recall mechanism to the attention of the Constitutional Court for judicial review (Choirie 2016). However, the court ruled that the recall mechanism is constitutional since the constitution stipulates a political party as an election participant, and thus, the party has the right to replace its members in the House (Choirie 2016; see also Butt 2018, 215). In sum, these various mandates of parties and their leaders further support the expectation of strong party discipline in the post-Suharto polity.

Nevertheless, the power of parties does not entirely diminish the role individual members have in influencing the legislative process. This is due to three factors. *First*, key decisions regarding a bill’s content are mostly made at the lower committee level within the House (Sherlock 2012, 561). This institutional feature allows for a significant degree of freedom for individual members to pursue distinct and individual preferences vis-à-vis their own party (Danusubroto 2015; Hasanuddin 2015; Sambuaga 2016). Moreover, each individual member is guaranteed to speak during the deliberation process (Kawamura 2013, 182). Consequently, we would expect prolonged debates and time-consuming processes during the deliberation of bills. Indeed, individualism is fostered by a gradual increase of incentives to cultivate personal reputations, especially since the 2004 election (Hasanuddin 2015). The *second* factor is the “balkanization” of the House as a legislative institution (Sherlock 2012, 560). As the locus of decision-making power within the House, each committee establishes its own regulations and strong committee-based loyalties (Sherlock 2010; 2012; Siddiq 2019). Accordingly, members of a committee often have little interest in the issues discussed by other committees, as long as these issues do not relate to their committee’s scope of work (Hasanuddin 2015; Kartasasmita 2016; Siddiq 2019). The concentration of decision-making power in each standing committee fosters committee members to defend their committee’s interest to specific issues vis-à-vis other committees, even with their own party acquaintances (Hasanuddin

2015; Kartasasmita 2016; Siddiq 2019). If a bill is deliberated through a special committee that is comprised of members from different committees, then the number of veto actor is multiplied. Such a “balkanized” character of post-Suharto DPR further indicates the weak influence of parties over its members.

The *third* factor is related to the technicalities of bills. If the legislation requires complex technical issues, then party leaders rarely monitor the deliberation process at the committee level or predetermine the party’s position on the bill (Sherlock 2012, 556; Hasanuddin 2015; Kartasasmita 2016; Siddiq 2019). It is a different matter when issues are controversial or when voting takes place in plenary sessions, party leaders often maintain strict party lines over its rank-and-file members (Mietzner 2013a, 164; Hasanuddin 2015; Siddiq 2019). Under these spotlight events, upholding party discipline becomes vital because, as Sherlock (2012, 558) writes, “all such controversial matters bear directly on the standing and popularity of the president and/or his ministers or involve appointments that might have an immediate material or political effect on the interests of party leaders”.

Altogether, these distinct elements of Indonesia’s legislative process have weakened the president’s ability to discipline coalition partners. In fact, legislators from coalition parties often side with opposition members and against the policy preferences of the president (Mietzner 2013, 154). Conversely, legislators of the opposition may express their acceptance of the president’s policy preferences, while those within the coalition oppose them (Hasanuddin 2015; Choirie 2016; Siddiq 2019). Moreover, the conditions foster the claim that presidential coalitions in post-Suharto Indonesia are merely concessions for party support during presidential elections rather the establishment of a “government party” within parliament (Sherlock 2010, 174). For one author, this blurry delineation between the “government coalition” and the “opposition” within the DPR indicated a “Philippinization” of the post-Suharto political parties (Ufen 2006, 25–26). Whatever the term is, the post-Suharto president’s capability to consolidate his or her coalitional partners – except those from his or her own party – is seriously diluted, rendering coalition partners of little value in the House.

### 7.3. Veto player configuration and the lack of defense reform policies

Based on the properties of veto player theory above, the post-*Reformasi* Indonesian polity was characterized by multiple veto players, smaller policy distance, and the weak internal cohesion of veto players that was rather conducive to maintain high policy stability (status quo) (Table 7.9).

**Table 7.7. Policy stability levels from 2004 to 2019**

Indicator	High policy stability	Low policy stability
Number of institutional/partisan veto players	Multiple veto players	-
Policy distance	-	Smaller policy distance
Internal cohesion of veto player	Weak cohesion	-

Source: Author's compilation

In practice, the passage of legislation involves complex interactions between individual members of parties, government representatives, and in certain circumstances, party leaders. Following the consensus-based mechanism, these actors hold significant veto powers during deliberation processes. The level of party discipline was higher in the early years of the democratic transition. The institutional features of parliament, which concentrate decision-making processes at the committee level, complicate the ability of parties to maintain cohesiveness during the legislative process. Furthermore, changes to the electoral system from 2004 onwards has gradually increased personal incentives among the legislators, which means the ability of parties to discipline their legislators should be moderate though not necessarily weaker. These conditions have influenced the legislative process during the post-*Reformasi* period in a number of ways. Deliberation processes are inevitably time-consuming and involve considerable bargaining, since individual members at committee level may express their own positions. With it comes the heightened prospects of deadlock.

The above characteristic of the post-*Reformasi* veto player configuration had contributed to the government inability to pursue any policy change in the defense

sector during the two terms of the Yudhoyono administration from 2004 to 2014. In the first term of the administration from 2004 to 2009, the government was unable to secure political support to pass two defense-related bills during the deliberation process within the House. These bills were the military justice bill (RUU peradilan militer) and the state secrecy bill (RUU rahasia negara). The government earlier planned to propose two more defense-related bills: the national security bill (RUU Keamanan Nasional) and the defense reserves component bill (RUU Komponen Cadangan Nasional). The bills were dropped before being submitted to the DPR due to the conflict between the MoD and the Police, and strong criticism from the CSOs in the mass media (Widjajanto 2009; Scarpello 2014; Lorenz 2015).

The multiple veto player problem emerged during the early preliminary hearing of the military justice bill in February 2006. In the hearing, the government and the party caucuses in DPR had already failed to reach agreement on the scope of the ordinary crime, and who holds the authority to investigate military officers for ordinary crime (Tempo 11.02.2006; Pareira 2016). According to the legislators, each party caucus had different positions on the issues but they all agreed to promote consensus-based mechanism during the deliberation process with government (Susilo 2014; Pareira 2016). After lobbying process between party caucuses, the special committee chairman, Andreas Pareira from PDIP mentioned that all fractions – including the government coalition member – agreed to put uniformed officers under the investigation of law enforcement agency and prosecution of civilian court for ordinary crime (Detik News 10.03.2006; Pareira 2016). However, the MoD as government representative insisted that the investigating authority shall be under the military police; it used the argument that the military is “psychologically unprepared” to be taken into civilian court jurisdiction (Mietzner 2009, 310). The different standpoint between the House and the MoD on the investigating authority issue then suspended the deliberation process of military justice bill for more than a year (Pareira 2016; Sambuaga 2016).

In September 2008, the government and the House restarted the negotiations, and it seemed that the bill would pass directly. During a meeting with the House, defense minister Juwono reiterated government support for the House position that active officers must be prosecuted in civilian court for ordinary crime (Detik News 18.09.2008). However, when the deliberation process entered the harmonization team level in February 2009, the longstanding issue recurred. The government representative and some of the House members once again debated who would be in charge of investigating ordinary crime alleged to have been committed by officers (Meliala 2015; Sambuaga 2016). Several party caucuses (Golkar, PKS, Demokrat, Bintang Reformasi, and Damai Sejahtera) agreed with the government position to refuse the involvement of the Police (KontraS 2009, 104; Sambuaga 2016). From the government's viewpoint, the investigation should remain under the jurisdiction of the Military Police and not the law enforcement agency (Police) (Tippe 2016). Others, including legislators from Yudhoyono's grand coalition party in the House such as PKB, PAN and PBB, opposed the government standpoint (Susilo 2014; Choirie 2016). The issue led to protracted discussions that dragged on until the end of the 2004-2009 House term in September 2009 (Pareira 2016; Sambuaga 2016). Ultimately, the military justice bill was never brought before the plenary session for approval.

Another empirical manifestation of multiple veto player problem in the decision-making process was the deliberation process of the state secrecy bill. In mid-September 2006, President Yudhoyono proposed the state secrecy bill through Presidential Letter No. R72/pres/IX/2006 to House. As the government representative, the President appointed the defense minister to participate in the deliberation process. The bill was drafted by the MoD in February 2006 (Susanto 2015). Before being officially submitted to the parliament, Juwono claimed that the government would propose a state secrecy bill in order to protect some of its policies from unwanted intervention (Detik News, 27.04.2006). The state secrecy bill was introduced by the government even though parliament had started the deliberation of the House-sponsored freedom of information bill since 2005 (Susanto 2015). For CSOs and outspoken legislators, the introduction of the state secrecy bill was widely perceived as government attempt to curb the scope of

freedom in the freedom of information bill (Susilo 2014; Pareira 2016). In addition, the government frequently expressed its conviction that the state secrecy bill must be prioritized over the freedom of information bill in order to stop confidential or strategic information from the government agencies being leaked to the public (Scarpello 2014). Groups of CSOs, activists and journalists tirelessly warned the public that the state secrecy bill presented a major threat to democracy and human rights (The Jakarta Post 25.07.2009; Aliabbas 2019).

In May 2008, House Committee I started the first public hearing (RDPU) on the bill, and decided to return the government draft for revision (The Jakarta Post 26.05.2008). Several months later, government proposed a revised draft. The new draft received a negative response from the majority of party caucuses in Committee I, including members of the Yudhoyono coalition, and stalled (Susilo 2014; Tippe 2016; Sambuaga 2016). After a few more months, the government and Committee I agreed to resume the deliberation process. Nevertheless, five party caucuses (PAN, Bintang Pelopor Demokrasi, Bintang Reformasi, PKS, PDS) refused to submit their DIM on the government's draft, stating that it did not display sufficient revisions (Tempo 20.10.2008; Choirie 2016; Sambuaga 2016). Without the DIMs, the leaders of Committee I decided to postpone the deliberation process until the government revised the draft again (Sambuaga 2016). After almost a year, the government submitted the revised draft and the deliberation process recommenced in August 2009. Nevertheless, the party caucuses in Committee I and the MoD failed to reach agreement on the scope of the state secrets and the government withdrew the bill from the deliberation process in mid-September 2009 (Tippe 2016; Sambuaga 2016).

In the 2009 presidential election, Yudhoyono won handily over the other presidential candidates. With his running mate of Boediono, the incumbent leader secured more than 60 percent of the popular vote over the tickets of Jusuf Kalla-Wiranto pair and Megawati-Prabowo. Yudhoyono's Democratic Party also gained a substantial increase in House seats from only 10 percent in the previous term to 26 percent in the 2009-2014 term. Nevertheless, the veto player configuration and political context in the legislative arena had not changed dramatically. Nominally,

Yudhoyono was no longer a minority president but still need to maintain large coalition of six parties (Democrat, Golkar, PKS, PAN, PPP and PKB) in the House with a 75 percent share of legislative seats. As with his previous term, Yudhoyono and his cabinet were unable to secure government-sponsored bills in the defense sector. From 2009 to 2014, the Yudhoyono administration only proposed two defense-related bills: the defense reserves component bill (RUU Komponen Cadangan Pertahanan Negara) and the national security bill (RUU Keamanan Nasional). The bills failed to pass after a lengthy deliberation process.

The government introduced the defense reserves bill to the House in 2007 (Tippe 2016). The massive protests that ensued from CSOs forced the House to abruptly postpone the bill (Lorenz 2015). In December 2009, Committee I and MoD agreed to deliberate the defense reserve component bill in the 2010 plenary session (Kompas 06.12.2009). In a repeat of the reaction to the previous attempt to introduce the bill, massive protests were orchestrated by CSOs against the bill (Aliabbas 2019). Committee I held several public hearings and identified serious issues with the bill (Hasanuddin 2015; Kartasasmita 2016). Tubagus Hasanuddin, the Vice Chairman of Committee I from PDIP, said that all party caucuses found that the government draft was undermined by a “lack of clarity on legal foundation, unclear mobilization mechanism for the reservists and lack of urgency to deal with the nation’s future threats” after the hearings (Hasanuddin 2015). All party groups in Committee I agreed to postpone the deliberation and returned the draft to the government (Hasanuddin 2015).

Three years later, the government reintroduced the revised draft to the House. On May 2013, House Committee I agreed to schedule the bill deliberation (Kompas 30.05.2013). However, opposition party PDIP orchestrated a public campaign against the defense reserve component bill by working with CSOs and the human rights activist network (Hasanuddin 2015; Aliabbas 2019). PDIP’s core argument was that, “rather than spending our national budget for recruiting reservists, it would be better if the money goes first to improve our soldier welfare” (Hasanuddin 2015). Amid the endless criticism in the mass media, some members of Yudhoyono’s coalition party slowly changed their position and opposed the bill.



For example, PAN began questioned the urgency of the bill since maintaining reservists would require a larger budget (Detik News 31.05.2013). Another member of Committee I from Golkar also publicly stated that the bill was not the committee's priority (Kompas 04.06.2013). Eventually, the bill was never been approved by DPR (Hasanuddin 2015; Kartasasmita 2016).

In contrast to the short-lived deliberation process for the national reserve component bill deliberation process, the national security bill deliberation process was more intense. In June 2011, the Yudhoyono administration officially introduced the national security bill to the legislature. The drafting of the bill had begun five years previously. At the time, defense minister Juwono asserted that the national security bill was urgently needed to synchronize three existing laws (State Defense Law, TNI Law and Police Law) that regulate the security and defense sector (Detik News 28.12.2006). Furthermore, he expected that the bill would be deliberated with the House in early 2007 involving the MoD, the Ministry of Interior and the Police HQ (Susanto 2015). The government plan was eventually postponed due to strong public criticism and, more importantly, growing opposition from the Police (Susilo 2014; Susanto 2015).

In February 2007, Police Chief General Sutanto declined to participate in the House plan to deliberate the national security bill, arguing that the MoD perception of national security was contrary to the spirit of *Reformasi* and more importantly, reduced the role of police (Detik News 05.02.2007). Police officers viewed the bill as a TNI orchestrated attempt to subordinate the Police under the Ministry of Interior (Susanto 2015). Amid the strained situation, the DPR decided to refuse the deliberation process until the government side shared common perspective on the bill (Sambuaga 2016; Pareira 2016). When the government reintroduced the bill in 2011, the issue remained unresolved but the drafting process was transferred to the coordinating ministry of politics, security, and law to avoid inter-agency conflict (Lorenz 2015). Yudhoyono then mandated the MoD as the government representative to deliberate the bill, and the House chairman authorized Committee I as the legislative partner through a working committee (Hasanuddin 2015; Siddiq 2019). The committee then invited CSOs, think tanks,

and academics for preliminary public hearings. Hasanuddin stated that the majority of invited experts took a negative view of the bill, arguing that it was hobbled by a lack of accountability, lack of urgency and was a threat to the existing democratic system (Hasanuddin 2015).

After the meeting, the DPR went into recess from late 2011 to early 2012. During the break, several legislators publicly mentioned that the bill is most likely not a priority for the committee legislation agenda, further saying that they are more committed to deliberate the DPR-sponsored defense industry bill for next year (Kompas 14.01.2012). After the recess period, Committee I held an internal meeting to discuss the fate of bill in early 2012. Mahfudz Siddiq, the Chairman of Committee I from the PKS party, noted that majority of party caucuses in the committee agreed to return the draft to the government for major revision (Siddiq 2019). A few days later, without consultation with the Committee I, the deliberation council of DPR decided the bill to be deliberated by a special committee that comprises legislators from three committees in House (Committee I, II and III) (Hasanuddin 2015; Siddiq 2019; see also, Kompas 28.02.2012).

The first internal meeting of special committee agreed to return the draft to government for revision (Siddiq 2019). The decision was supported by seven party caucuses, consisting of all the members of the Yudhoyono coalition (PDIP, Golkar, PKS, PPP, PAN, PKB and Hanura); the President's own Democratic Party was alone in pushing for a continuation of the deliberation process without revision (Kompas 20.03.2012). The MoD then submitted the bill again to special committee, but without revision (Solechah 2012). Several committee members publicly expressed their disappointment at the government commitment to deliberate the law (Hasanuddin 2015; Siddiq 2019). Concurrently there was growing public opposition towards the bill.

At the end of October, the MoD submitted a revised draft of the bill to special committee. Minister Purnomo said that the new draft had been formulated jointly among the Ministry of Defense, TNI, Police, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Law and Justice, Ministry of State Secretariat and the Coordinating Ministry for Politics,

Security and Law (Kompas 23.10.2012). Nevertheless, the bill was beset by a protracted deliberation process and was never finalized before the term ended. In 2013, Purnomo again asked Committee I to broach the discussion on the national security bill again. Nevertheless, Committee I said that the decision to continue the state security bill was dependent on a collective decision among the committee members, and it was focused on the House-sponsored military discipline bill (DPR RI 2013). The bill was shelved for good when Yudhoyono's term in office ceased.

#### **7.4. Summary**

Overall, the multiple veto players and weak internal cohesion of veto players in post-reformasi Indonesia politics had caused the inability of government to drive its own preference on policy change through legislation. All of government-sponsored bills for the defense sector were failed to passed from 2004 to 2014, indicating high level of policy stability in the legislative arena. With regard to the empirical findings in chapter 5 and 6, the high policy stability situation in this chapter partially confirmed the theoretical expectation from hypothesis 2 in this research, that is *the coordination model of military jointness is more likely to emerge under the condition of high policy stability* (Hypothesis 2). The next question is, whether the level of discretion in the national defense also contributed to the establishing of a coordination model of military jointness under Yudhoyono presidency. This subject will be explained in the next chapter.



## **8. The level of discretion in the defense institution after *Reformasi***

In adhering to the theoretical framework in Chapter 2, this chapter seeks to explain the level of discretion in the post-*Reformasi* defense institution, and whether the identified level actually contributed to the selection of a layering strategy by President Yudhoyono in pursuing military jointness. Accordingly, the chapter is divided into three sections. The first section analyzes the MoD-TNI relationship in the national defense policy-making process after reform. The second section analyzes the civilian presence in the defense bureaucracy of MoD. The third and final section summarizes the findings and analysis based on the proposed research hypotheses.

### **8.1. The mode of relationship between the MoD and the TNI leaders.**

#### **8.1.1. Coordination rather than subordination.**

Article 13 of Law No.3/2002 on state defense stipulates the president as the highest authority and the personal responsible for the management of the national defense system. In carrying out the attendant duties, the president is supported by two key actors: the minister of defense and the TNI commander. The defense minister is directly appointed by the president as a member of the cabinet. Similarly, the TNI commander is appointed by the president contingent on approval from the House. In practice, the president furnishes the name of the TNI candidate to the House leadership. House Committee I is tasked with conducting a fit-and-proper test of the candidate. The fit-and-proper test itself is typically a closed hearing session to explore the candidate's knowledge and vision to develop the TNI institution (Hasanuddin 2015; Siddiq 2019). If Committee I collectively approve the candidate, then the House plenary session announces the official approval of the legislature. The legal status of TNI Commander in the cabinet is a ministerial-level official (*pejabat negara setingkat menteri*), similar to the head of National Police and the attorney general. As such, the commander is considered a

cabinet member and participates in the cabinet-level meeting (Pasha 2019; Siddiq 2019).

The responsibilities of minister of defense and TNI commander are stipulated in two laws: the 2002 state defense law and the 2004 TNI Law (Table 8.1).


**Table 8.1. The core responsibilities of Minister of Defense and TNI Commander**

Minister of Defense	TNI Commander
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Leading the Ministry of Defense;</li> <li>• establishing national defense policy implementation based on the president's general policy on national defense;</li> <li>• preparing defense white paper and establish defense cooperation with other states;</li> <li>• establishing general policy on TNI force deployment and other defense component; establish policies on budgeting, procurement, recruitment, resources management and supervision of technology for defense industry;</li> <li>• establishing cooperation with other ministries/agencies, and;</li> <li>• formulating and implementing strategic plan for national defense resources.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Leading the TNI;</li> <li>• implementing national defense policy;</li> <li>• implementing military strategy and military operation;</li> <li>• developing the TNI Doctrine;</li> <li>• deploying TNI force for military operation;</li> <li>• supervising TNI forces and maintaining operational readiness;</li> <li>• providing advice to the minister of defense in regard to the establishment of national defense policy;</li> <li>• providing advice to the minister of defense in regard to the establishment of policy on fulfilment of needs of TNI and other defense components;</li> <li>• providing advice to the minister of defense in regard to the formulation and implementation strategic planning of national resources for national defense;</li> <li>• employing defense reserve component for military operation;</li> <li>• employing defense support component for military operation, and;</li> <li>• implementing other duties and responsibilities as stipulated by the laws.</li> </ul>

Source: Article 13, Law No.3/2002 on State Defense and Article 15, Law No.34/2004 on TNI

The 2002 State Defense Law mandates the minister of defense with the authority to assist the president in the formulation of defense policy. Nevertheless, the law also extends the authority to the TNI Commander to decide on military strategy, personnel career supervision and personnel deployment. It is evident that the national defense policy-making and policy implementation in post-*Reformasi* Indonesia is characterized by separation of authorities between the ministry of defense and TNI commander.

**Figure 8.1. The president, the minister of defense and the TNI commander**



Source: Article 13, Law No.3/2002 on State Defense and Article 15, Law No.34/2004 on TNI.

The enactment of the TNI law in 2004 then further institutionalizes separation of authorities in national defense policy-making and implementation between the minister and TNI commander. According to Article 3 of the TNI law, the military is placed under the direct supervision of the president in regard to force deployment and under the coordination of the MoD on the matters of defense policy and administrative support. In principle, the TNI law regards the relationship between the MoD and TNI Headquarters as “coordination” rather than “subordination” (Gunawan 2017, 136). The minister of defense acts as coordinator in the formulation of national defense strategy and providing administrative support for the TNI Headquarters (Anggoro 2007). Meanwhile, the TNI commander retains the authority in the management, supervision and deployment of the TNI personnel. Both leaders answer directly to the president (Figure 8.1).

While Article 3 of the TNI law also stipulates that TNI shall be integrated within the ministry of defense in the future for efficiency reasons, there is no comprehensive explanation on what integration refer to, nor the specific deadline for such integration (Sudrajat 2016; Haripin 2019). At the operational level, the coordination mode of relationship between the ministry of defense and the TNI Headquarters was conducted through MoD-TNI meetings and informal communication between MoD leaders and TNI leaders (Gunadi 2015; Susanto 2015; Sudrajat 2016). MoD and TNI conducted its own annual leadership meeting but involved top-level officials from both as observers in the host meeting (Susanto 2015). It should be noted, however, there was no government regulation regarding the mechanism of coordination between both institutions (Anggoro 2007; Susanto 2015; Sudrajat 2016; Pasha 2019).

### **8.1.2. Dualism of leadership and status-quo preference in the defense sector**

The coordination mode of the relationship between the minister of defense and TNI commander drew strong criticism. In fact, newly installed Minister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono was among the first to express his unhappiness. A few days after being inducted by Yudhoyono, Juwono expressed his resolve to amend the TNI law and put the TNI under the direct supervision of MoD since the law granted no authority for the MoD on TNI personnel supervision and deployment (Tempo 28.10.2004). (Nevertheless, the amendment proposal never reached the House (Sudrajat 2016). More importantly, the coordination mode of relationship between the minister of defense and TNI commander had contributed to the problem of dualism within the defense policy making and policy implementation in the post-reformasi period (Widjojo 2017; Haripin 2019).

Such dualism was evident since the early period of the Yudhoyono presidency. For example, prior to the TNI leadership meeting in early 2006, the newly inaugurated TNI Commander Djoko Suyanto mentioned the military's internal aspiration to propose the rehabilitation of voting rights for its personnel in the 2009 election



(Antara News 20.02.2006).<sup>25</sup> Juwono quickly responded to the military plan by saying that the TNI personnel still could not use their rights to vote in the 2009 election due to the fragility of socio-economic conditions (Detik News 20.02.2006). The military eventually postponed the plan to revitalize its personnel voting rights (Widjojo 2017). Further evidence of dualism between the minister of defense and TNI commander was also present in the defense policy-making process in the legislative arena. During the deliberation process of the military justice bill in October 2007, Juwono mentioned government support of public trials for military personnel involved in ordinary crime (Susilo 2014; Pareira 2016). TNI Commander Djoko responded that the military would demand its personnel be involved as investigator, defense counsel, prosecutor or judge in such a public trial. He said the military would be uneasy about being prosecuted in a public trial (Detik News 11.10.2007). As noted in Chapter 7, the standoff between the two sides led to significant delays in military justice bill deliberation.

The minister of defense-TNI commander dualism persisted in Yudhoyono's second term in office. In April 2014, mass media reported the involvement of a high-ranking general as commissioner in a company owned by Melinda Dee, a suspect in the Citibank money laundering case. TNI Commander Agus Suhartono made a statement that the senior officer did not violate the law because the TNI internal rule allows its personnel to work in the private sector within a one-year period before retirement (Detik News 09.04.2011). In contradicting his statement, Minister of Defense Purnomo Yusgiantoro declared that the senior general had violated the TNI law since Article 39 of the law prohibits an active officer's involvement in business activities. He stressed that Agus should sanction the senior officer as part of the TNI commander's responsibility to supervise TNI personnel (Kompas 13.04.2011). Paradoxically, another problem caused by the coordination mode between the minister of defense and TNI Commander was the lack of coordination in the defense planning. For example, during a press briefing in February 2012, a journalist asked Purnomo about the TNI plan to acquire UAV

---

<sup>25</sup> The right to vote for TNI and Polri personnel was banned from the 1999 election. Article 30 of Law No.3/1999 on Elections stipulates that member of the armed forces are prohibited from using their voting rights. A similar clause was adopted in several amendment election-related laws in 2003, 2008 and 2012.

(unmanned aerial vehicles). However, Purnomo professed that he did not know about the plan and demanded TNI commander Agus Suhartono to provide an explanation. Agus responded to the question by saying that the military did plan to acquire UAVs and was considering the providers (Detik News 02.02.2012).

According to top-level MoD officials, the opposing positions of the defense minister and commander contributed to an ineffective decision-making process in the national defense sector with imminent threat of gridlock (Susanto 2015; Sudrajat 2016). As such, leaders within both institutions often favored the status quo policy in order to avoid inter-agencies rivalry or competition (Susanto 2015). The approach always predominated when the ministry and TNI headquarters discuss the policy issue on military doctrine, TNI personnel management and weapon procurement (Susanto 2015; Gunadi 2015; Sudrajat 2016). For the TNI commander, the issues were seen as part of her authority. Meanwhile for the minister of defense, the issues were also part of her responsibility in formulating defense policy. Eventually, the minister of defense often came to view the issues as part of the core competency of the TNI as the state defense apparatus and therefore left them to be decided by the uniformed officers themselves (Susanto 2015).

Principally, the coordination mode of relationship between minister of defense and the TNI commander had established strict division of decision-making authority in the post-reformasi defense sector. According to the parliamentarians, the strained coordination mode relationship between the MoD and TNI was often viewed as evidence of the long-standing issue of sectoral-ego (*ego sektoral*) between the government agencies in policy-making process (Hasanuddin 2015; Tamtomo 2016; Siddiq 2019). In practice, there was no room or lack of incentive to influence the policy-making process in other agencies for policy change (Hasanuddin 2015; Susanto 2015). Each government agency always protects its own institutional interest and existing authority from interference by other agency (Hasanuddin 2015). The strong motivation to protect institutional interest nurtured a low level of policy discretion among decision-makers inside the MoD and the TNI (Susanto 2015; Hasanuddin 2015). President Yudhoyono's decision


to appoint a minister of defense from a civilian background during his two terms may indicated the window of opportunity for civilian influence and, later, policy discretion in the national defense policy-making process. However, this proposition needs to be treated carefully by analyzing whether civilians actually control the day-to-day operation of the defense organization. Determining this issue is the objective of the following section.

## **8.2. Civilian presence within the defense bureaucracy**

### **8.2.1. Domination of military officers in MoD**

As discussed in Chapter 2, the civilian presence in defense organizations refers to “having civilian elected president and non-uniformed personnel in key leadership positions along the chain of command and within advisory and oversight relations as well” (Pion-Berlin 2009, 567). Based on this definition, this subsection investigates to what extent civilians are able to occupy key position in the defense bureaucracy by focusing on the executive body (the president and the ministry of defense). It should be noted that civilians refer to individuals who neither currently serve in the military nor military retiree. From 1999 to 2014, the government was led by three different presidents. two of whom were civilians and one with a military background. The latter is two-term President Yudhoyono, a retired three-star Army General. As such, we can deduce that the top decision-maker in Indonesia’s defense sector from 2004 to 2014 was the military. Under the supervision of the president, planning and implementation of the national defense policies are carried out by the ministry of defense and its directorates at the top-level (Article 16, Law No.2/2002 on State Defense) (See Figure 8.2 below).

**Figure 8.2. The organizational structure of MoD 2004-2014**



Source: MoD RoI 2005; 2010b.

**Abbreviations:**

DGDS, Directorate General of Defense Strategy (Direktur Jenderal Strategi Pertahanan); DGDP, Directorate General of Defense Planning (Direktur Jenderal Perencanaan Pertahanan); DGDPot, Directorate General of Defense Potential (Direktur Jenderal Potensi Pertahanan); DGDF, Directorate General of Defense Force (Direktur Jenderal Kekuatan Pertahanan); DGDI, Directorate General of Defense Infrastructure (Direktur Jenderal Sarana Pertahanan); ARD, Agency for Research and Development (Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan); AET, Agency for Education and Training (Badan Pendidikan dan Pelatihan); ADI, Agency for Defense Infrastructure (Badan Sarana Pertahanan); CF, Center for Finance (Pusat Keuangan); CDI, Center for Data and Information (Pusat Data dan Informasi); CPC, Center for Public Communication (Pusat Komunikasi Publik); CR, Center for Rehabilitation (Pusat Rehabilitasi); RO, MoD Regional Office (Pelaksana Tugas Pokok Kemhan di Daerah)

**Notes:**

\* The deputy minister position was established by President Yudhoyono in 2010.

\*\*In 2010, the minister of defense officially removed the institution of the Directorate General of Defense Infrastructure (DGDI) and transformed it into the Agency for Defense Infrastructure (ADI) with an enhanced focus on operational function.

On the top rung of the MoD leadership is the minister of defense. In carrying out her duties, the minister is supported by a deputy minister. According to Presidential Regulation No. 60/2012, the deputy minister position is responsible to, and under the direct subordination, of the respective minister. The scope of duties for the deputy minister was to assist the minister in policy-making or policy implementation, and coordinating the policy performance across the top echelons within the ministry (Tippe 2016). Under such circumstances, the status of vice minister is not a cabinet member (Pasha 2019). However, the regulation stipulates

that the president holds the sole authority to appoint vice ministers. Furthermore, the Presidential Regulation stipulates that one of the vice minister core functions is to execute, if necessary, direct orders from the president. In practice, the role of deputy minister within MoD was almost similar to the minister itself. With the granted authority to coordinate the function of all directorate general offices, the deputy minister often influences the policy direction within each directorate (Tippe 2016; Santoso 2016).

The secretariat general acts as the coordinator of administrative support to all MoD units (Sudrajat 2016). Meanwhile the inspectorate general conducting internal oversight function to all MoD units. The core function of MoD was carried out by its five directorates. Each directorate is led by a director general. According to Government Regulation No.9/2003, the president holds the highest authority to approve who will be the director general. In regard to defense policy formulation, the DGDS holds the central position (Susanto 2015; Gunadi 2015; Sudrajat 2016). The DGDS is tasked with the objective to formulate and implement policies regarding the defense strategy, such as strategic documents, defense force deployment, strategic defense review, international cooperation and defense area (Sudrajat 2016; Ate 2019).

Principally, the future orientation of the national defense sector was driven by the DGDS through its function in the drafting of strategic documents (Susanto 2015). The MoD regulations on the planning system of defense development (sisrenbanghan) stipulate that the strategic documents (doctrine, strategy and posture) produced by DGDS become the main policy reference for MoD defense planning (MoD RoI 2009; Gunadi 2015). Bestowed with such authority, the DGDS was the most important branch of MoD that provides the entry point for defense transformation agenda (Susanto 2015; Gunadi 2015; Silaen 2016). Once the minister approves the DGDS-drafted strategic documents that set the future development of Indonesia's defense force, the DGDP coordinates and synchronizes the formulation of a national defense program and budgeting plan within the MoD units and the TNI Headquarters (Gunadi 2015; see also Laksmana, Gindarsah, and Maharani 2020, 128). The result of the DGDP coordination was an

official document called the DIPA (Daftar Isian Pelaksanaan Anggaran, List of Budget Implementation) that contains a list of programs, budget proposals and allocation plans for the defense sector annually (Silaen 2016). The DIPA document was then brought before the Ministry of Finance for budget evaluation before being proposed to the House for parliamentary approval (Gunadi 2015; Silaen 2016).

Based on the structure and mechanism of defense policy formulation above, it is evident that the MoD serves as the main locus for policy change in the defense sector. However, the core issue with the post-*Reformasi* MoD is the lack of a civilian presence within its organizational structure. For many years, the ministry has been dominated by active officers although it was not always the case. Shortly after Indonesia declared its independence from the Netherlands in 1945, revolutionary force commander Supriyadi assumed the position of minister of defense position. He only lasted a month, and civilian politicians occupied the position in the ensuing years (Laksmana, Gindarsah, and Maharani 2020, 69). When the experiment with parliamentary democracy failed in 1957, Indonesia's political system became an autocratic presidential system. In return for military support of his decision to dismiss the parliament, President Sukarno appointed Army General A.H. Nasution as the minister of defense (Crouch 2007). Military control over the minister of defense position continued for decades; most tellingly, the post was consistently occupied by high-ranking officers from the Army service. The advent of *Reformasi* ended such domination; from 1999 to 2019, five of the nine defense ministers were civilians and the rest were military retirees (Table 8.1.). The civilian ministers came from backgrounds including university professor, technocrat, to civilian politician. Meanwhile, the military retirees were dominated by officers from the Army.

**Table 8.2. Civilians and military in key positions of Indonesia's MoD (1999-2019)**

Minister of Defense			Inspector General			Secretary General			DGDS <sup>a</sup>		
Year	C/M	Rank	Year	C/M	Rank	Year	C/M	Rank	Year	C/M	Rank
1999-2000	C	n/a	1999-2002	M	LG (Mar)	1999-2001	M	LG	2001-2005	M	MG
2000-2001	C	n/a	2002-2006	M	LG	2001-2002	M	LG	2005-2010	M	MG
July-August 2001	M (ret) <sup>b</sup>	G	2006-2007	M	VA	2002-2005	M	AM	2010	M	MG
August 2001-August 2003	C	n/a	2007	M	VA	2005-2010	M	MG	2010-2013	M	MG
August 2003-2004	M (ret) <sup>b</sup>	LG	2007-2009	M	LG (Mar)	2010-2013	M	AM	2013-2014	M	MG
2004-2009	C	n/a	2009	M	VA	2013-2014	M	LG	2014-2018	M	MG
2009-2014	C	n/a	2010	M	AM	2014-2016	M	LG	2018	M	MG
2010-2014 (Vice Minister) <sup>c</sup>	M (ret)**	LG	2010-2012	M	VA	2016-2017	M	VA	2018-2019	M	MG
2014-2019	M (ret)	G	2012-2014	M	VA	2017-2019	M	AM	2019-...	M	MG
2019-...	M (ret)	LG	2014-2016	M	AM	2019-...	M	RA			
			2016-2017	M	AM						
			2017-2018	M	LG						
			2018-2019	M	LG						
			2019-...	M	VA						

*(continued)*

DGDP <sup>a</sup>			DGDPot <sup>a</sup>			DGDF <sup>a</sup>			DGDI <sup>a,d</sup>		
Year	C/M	Rank	Year	C/M	Rank	Year	C/M	Rank	Year	C/M	Rank
1999-2001	M	RA	2001-2003	M	RA	1999-2001	M	AVM	1999-2001	M	MG
2001-2005	C	n/a	2003-2005	M	RA	2001-2002	M	AVM	2001-2005	M	MG
2005-2007	M	RA	2005-2011	C	n/a	2002-2005	M	AVM	2005-2007	M	AVM
2007	M	RA	2011-2014	C	n/a	2005-2010	M	MG	2007-2009	M	AVM
2007-2010	M	RA	2014-2016	C	n/a	2010-2011	M	RA	2010-2011	M	RA
2010-2012	M	AVM	2016-2017	C	n/a	2011-2012	M	RA	2011-2013	M	MG
2012-2013	M	AVM	2017-2018	C	n/a	2012-2016	M	RA	2013-2015	M	RA
2013-2014	M	AVM	2018	M	MG	2016-2019	M	MG	2015-2017	M	RA
2014-2017	M	AVM	2018-...	C	n/a	2019-...	M	MG	2017-2019	M	RA
2017	M	AVM							2019-...	M	MG
2017-2018	M	AVM									
2018-...	M	AVM									

Source: Adapted from Gunawan 2017, 137-138 with updates on recent rotation from TNI Commander Decision Letters (Skep Panglima TNI).

Abbreviation: DGDS Director General of Defense Strategy (Direktur Jenderal Strategi Pertahanan); DGDP Director General of Defense Planning (Direktur Jenderal Perencanaan Pertahanan); DGDPot Director General of Defense Potential (Direktur Jenderal Potensi Pertahanan); DGDF Director General of Defense Force (Direktur Jenderal Kekuatan Pertahanan); DGDI Director General of Defense Infrastructure (Direktur Jenderal Sarana Pertahanan); C Civilian; M Military; G General (Jenderal); LG Lieutenant General (Letnan Jenderal); MG Major General (Mayor Jenderal); VA Vice Admiral (Laksamana Madya); RA Rear Admiral (Laksamana Muda); AM Air Marshal (Marsekal Madya); AVM Air Vice Marshal (Marsekal Muda)

Notes:

<sup>a</sup>Previously, there were three directorates (Dir. Gen. Planning and Budgeting; Dir. Gen. Material and Facility; Dir. Gen. Human Resources) within the ministry. In 2000, the structure expanded into five directorate generals. See, Presidential Decree No.165/2000 and Ministry of Defense decree No. KEP/19/M12/2000

<sup>b</sup>Acting Minister of Defense, also holds the position of Coordinating Minister of Politics, Law and Security

<sup>c</sup>The deputy minister position was established by President Yudhoyono in 2010.

<sup>d</sup>In 2011, the minister of defense removed the institution of the Directorate General of Defense Infrastructure and transformed it into the Agency for Defense Infrastructure (Baranahan).



The presence of more civilians in the minister position was no guarantee that civilians may gain more influence in defense policy-making (Soepandji 2015; Widjojo 2017). Active officers continued to dominate top-level positions in the MoD, such as deputy ministers/director generals, even after *Reformasi*. The first civilian minister of defense in the post-Suharto era, Juwono Sudarsono, a professor of international relations from the University of Indonesia, understood the civilian deficit in the ministry and announced a plan to put more civilians in top bureaucratic level of MoD in 1999 (Sudrajat 2016). His plan was derailed by President Wahid's expansion of the MoD structure by adding new directorates and placing more active officers in the new posts (The Editors 2003, 11). Three years later, a new state defense law was passed, yet failed to stipulate the MoD as civilian-led institution. Consequently, key positions within MoD continues to be occupied by active TNI officers and retired military officers (Table 8.1.). Over time, the plan to "civilianize" the ministry faded from concerns.

Table 8.1 shows that from 1999 to 2014, there were only three civilians among the 45 individuals in top-level positions in the MoD. Most of the civilians were allocated to manage the DGDP. The directorate itself was responsible for establishing government policy on the involvement of non-military personnel or civilians as national defense resources; it had only a minor contribution in future development of TNI (Soepandji 2015). The domination of active officers in the MoD was made possible by Article 47 of the TNI Law (Soepandji 2015; Widjojo 2017). The article stipulates active officers can fill positions in several state agencies, namely the coordination of politics and state security, state defense, president military secretary, intelligence body, state encryption agency, national resilience, national defense council, search and rescue agency, narcotics agency and the Supreme Court. In addition, the law stipulates that the appointment of active officers in those agencies can be processed under the request of host agencies to the TNI commander. In practice, the minister of defense sends an official letter to the TNI commander to request the services of active officers to fill certain positions within the MoD (Sudrajat 2016; Ate 2019). The commander then selects the officers and submitted their names to the MoD for administrative processing (Ate 2019). The appointment of active officers to the MoD is not final

until the TNI Commander issues the decision letter (Surat Keputusan Panglima/Skep Panglima) on TNI personnel rotation (Ate 2019; Laksmana, Gindarsah, and Maharani 2020, 127). However, the practice gradually changed when the surplus of officers occurred due to the limitation on civilian posts for officers in the TNI law. The surplus resulted in a ballooning number of high-ranking and middle-ranking officers without any position inside the TNI. To offset the glut of personnel, the rotation of active officers within the MoD was mostly initiated from the TNI rather than at the request of the MoD (Ate 2019).

The government regulation on TNI personnel administration No. 39/2010 further strengthened the role of the TNI commander in the appointment of active officers for top positions within the MoD. According to Article 32 of the regulation, the TNI commander's approval is the main requirement for active officers before assuming a position outside the TNI organizational structure. Moreover, the regulation also stipulates that career supervision of those active officers was under the full responsibility of the commander. Viewed as such, the commander wields "tacit control" over the future career of TNI personnel within the MoD top bureaucracy (Anggoro 2007). Under such circumstances, the active officers within the MoD would have stronger incentives to maintain a position and decision that are compatible with the TNI institutional interests (Susanto 2015; Ate 2019). This means limited discretion can be taken by officers in terms of formulating national defense policy through the MoD.

### **8.2.2. The Army influence within the MoD**

Bolstered by its status as the largest service in the TNI, the Army has entrenched its influence in the MoD's top leadership and strategic branches at the central and sub-national levels (Haripin 2019). At the MoD central office, the strategic position of deputy minister of defense was filled by a senior army general, Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, from 2010 to 2014. He had previously served as the MoD secretary-general from 2005 to 2010. During the latter period, Sjafrie was also involved in supervising the drafting process of strategic documents within the MoD's DGDS (Sudrajat 2016; Ate 2019). In becoming deputy minister of defense, Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin played a pivotal role in bridging the TNI interests with the MoD

decision-making process of national defense (Tippe 2016). More importantly, Army officers continuously occupied the director general position of DGDS. As explained previously, the DGDS functioned as the center of MoD's defense planning and future directions of defense policy. Given the Army-domination of DGDS, it was possible for it to impose an Army-centric approach in shaping the future trajectories of national defense (Susanto 2015; Ate 2019). In following on from chapters 5 and 6, the formulation process of new strategic documents by DGDS during the Yudhoyono first term excluded the discussion of the revision of the state defense doctrine, resulting in the preservation of the Army-centric total people defense doctrine.

In addition, the Army service controls the MoD branch at the sub-national level through the MoD Regional Office (known as Pelaksana Tugas dan Fungsi Kemenhan/PTF) (see figure 8.2). Historically, the Minister of Defense Regulation No. Kep/012/VIII/1988 established the MoD Regional Office and mandated the Army's Kodam to carry out the office's tasks. Based on the regulation, the Army's Kodam was tasked with the core objective to implement MoD policy on the management and supervision of defense resources at the sub-national level (Tamtomo 2016). During the *Reformasi*, the 2002 Law on State Defense stipulates MoD as the leading actor in the national defense policy. Consequently, the role of Kodam as caretaker of regional office must be removed, and MoD must establish a new structure of regional office under the direct control of MoD (Santoso 2016). In 2012, Minister Purnomo attempted to take over Kodam control over the Regional Office by establishing a task-force unit known as the Central Supervision Office for Regional Office (PPKP), through Minister of Defense Regulation No Kep/216/M/III/2012 (Santoso 2016). The new unit was authorized to manage and supervise the existing regional office. Nevertheless, the minister regulation put the director general of DGDS as the chairman for the new unit. Since Army officers controlled the director general position for years, the regional office remained to be under the Army influence in carrying out its duties. According to a legislator, the Desk PPKP was a superficial change for the management of regional office (Hasanuddin 2015). Based on parliamentary observation, an Army officer from Kodam still carried out the function of regional office at the sub-national level

because the DPR rejected MoD budget proposal for the new regional office unit in 2013 (Hasanuddin 2015; Tamtomo 2016; Siddiq 2019).

### 8.3. Summary

The above discussion highlights that the overall post-*Reformasi* shaping of defense policy remains influenced by the military, particularly the Army branch. President Yudhoyono, as the top-level decision-maker for defense policy from 2004-14, was a retired Army general. The defense minister was not the leading actor in defense policy-making since the TNI Commander holds the full authority in the management, supervision and operational command of TNI personnel. Both leaders hold an equal position as cabinet members. Despite the fact that the minister position was allocated to civilians from 2004 to 2014, the top levels of the MoD were entirely occupied by the active officers.

**Table 8.3. The level of discretion in the defense institution after Reformasi**

Indicator	High level of discretion	Low level of discretion
Position between minister of defense and the military leader	-	<i>Both the minister of defense and TNI Commander are seconded (cabinet member) to the president with coordination mode of relationship.</i>
Civilian presence in the defense bureaucracy	-	<i>TNI control key positions/top-echelons in MoD</i>

Source: author's compilation

In regard to the research hypotheses, the above institutional arrangements of post-*Reformasi* national defense have fostered lower policy discretion in the defense institution (Table 8.2). In addition, the low level of policy discretion in the defense institution was further aggravated by the strong influence of the Army in defense bureaucracy. DGDS, as the strategic branch of MoD in the formulation of defense policy, was consistently headed by Army officers, allowing the perpetuation of Army service preference in the policy outcome. As such, the development of defense doctrine, defense strategy and defense posture within the MoD would favor the preservation of status quo, more specifically the Army's strategic thinking of the total people defense.

## 9. Conclusion

The main objective of this dissertation is to explain the theoretical and empirical link between civilian control of the military and policy change in the defense sector for emerging democracies. The importance of civilian control for the future of democratic survival of emerging democracies is widely accepted in the existing literature. In a democratic regime, only democratically-elected civilians can act as the ultimate decision-makers. The military, similar to other state apparatus, must refrain from entering the arena of political decision-making. When these tenets are upheld, democratically-elected civilians can exercise their legitimation and full authority to formulate, decide and implement policies in various sectors. On this matter, studies on democratization and civil-military relations agree that the institutionalized civilian control of the military becomes one of the main components of a well-functioning democratic system.

Nevertheless, the existing literature has less to offer regarding the causal relationship between civilian control of the military and defense policy, especially in the context of emerging democracies. To address this gap, this dissertation proposed a theoretical framework that conceived the scope of policy change in the defense sector as a function of two factors: the veto player configuration in the political decision-making arena; and the level of policy discretion in the national defense institution. In this final chapter, the proposed theoretical framework and its empirical findings in the context of post-*Reformasi* Indonesia are further reevaluated. For this purpose, Chapter 9 is comprised of three parts. The first part evaluates the proposed causal factors for policy change in the defense sector and its empirical manifestation in the case of post-*Reformasi* Indonesia. Subsequently the second part evaluates the plausibility of veto player and level of discretion as the causal factor for the selection of policy change strategy carried out by the Yudhoyono administration. Finally, the last part elucidates the limitation of the research and avenue of future research.

## **9.1. Multiple veto players and lack of discretion in national defense**

Yudhoyono's victory in the 2004 presidential election provided hope for the future of civilian control of the military. After the success of the bid to curtail military involvement in the political arena through the TNI Law, the military reform agenda in post-*Reformasi* Indonesia set a new course of reforming the defense sector. For many analysts, the combination of Yudhoyono's military background and strong commitment to the democratic system was seen as the important element for expanding the TNI reform agenda into the policy area that mostly affects TNI corporate interests. As a well-respected retired Army general, Yudhoyono holds technical knowledge of military affairs and it could be assumed would win the trust of TNI leaders when intervening in the institution's internal affairs. This dissertation proposed that veto player configuration in the political arena can be used to gauge the concentration of decision-making power among democratically-elected civilians to pursue policy change in the defense sector. Strong concentration of decision-making power means that the veto player configuration would have less veto players, closer policy distance among the coalition parties and strong party discipline inside the legislative body. It follows that this would provide better prospects of substantial policy change through the legislative arena.

During his two terms in office, Yudhoyono struggled to consolidate political support from the large coalition of parties in the House. In his first term, Yudhoyono established a coalition of eight political parties in the DPR and the situation was further complicated by the fact that Yudhoyono was a minority president. During his second term, his Democratic Party gained a significant increase in votes but the six-party coalition in the House remained large. Despite the large number of partisan veto players in the House, the ideological distance within the coalition parties, and all parties in the legislature, indicated a converging trend. The nationalist and Islamist parties gradually moved to the center of ideological cleavage as the consequence of coalition-making practices during the presidential election. While the trend indicates potential resources for Yudhoyono to consolidate his coalition partners, changes in the electoral law

decreased the level of party discipline in the parliament and further complicated the legislative process. The 2004 legislative election replaced the closed-list system with the open-list PR system, and increased the motivation for candidates to cultivate their personal reputation during the electoral campaign. Elected politicians realized that the reputation of their political party was less of a contributor in their electoral success, including for reelection. This condition moderates the level of party control over its members in the House and gradually weakens the power of parliamentary party leaders to dictate policy stances to their legislators. In addition, the legislative process in post-*Reformasi* Indonesia was characterized by the decentralization of decision-making power at the committee level. In practice, the fate of a bill was ultimately decided through the deliberation process in the committee. Meanwhile, the decision-making process for a bill at the plenary session level was nothing more than ceremonial. All bills approved at the committee passed without incident in the plenary session. Emboldened by the powerful authority of passing laws, each House committee established its own committee-based identity and was thus able to keep party leaders from interfering in the committee agenda.

Overall, the introduction of the open-list system in the 2004 election and the strength of committee decision-making power allowed the individual House member to promote her own view on a bill during the deliberation process or to the mass media. In practice, legislators from the coalition parties often showed strict opposition to the government-sponsored bill, especially when the issue became mass media attention. Lawmaking in the post-*Reformasi* context became a conflict-ridden process, weighed down by negotiations at the committee level involving the individual members, parliamentary party group leaders and the government side. Consequently, the legislative process is always prone to deadlock. Yudhoyono inevitably encountered difficulties in advancing his policy preferences in the legislative process. During his two terms in office, no government-sponsored bill in the defense sector was successfully passed the DPR. Pursuing radical policy change in the legislative arena thus proved to be almost a mission impossible for the Yudhoyono administration. The empirical analysis of veto player configuration confirms the first causal factor of *high policy stability*

from hypotheses H2a and H2b as outlined in the sub chapter 2.4. As such, this study found no empirical support on the causal factor of lower policy stability from hypotheses H1.

Further complicating matters was the lack of policy discretion within the national defense institution. Concerning the latter, this dissertation proposed that the scope of policy change depends on the level of policy discretion in the targeted institution. A higher level of policy discretion in the defense institution affords civilian decision-makers better opportunities to replace the policy status quo on national defense with a new approach. In contrast, a lower level of discretion would result in the difficulties of replacing the status quo in national defense or limited policy change at best. In order to gauge the level of discretion in the national defense institution, this research analyzed the distribution of decision-making power between civilians and the military leaders at the cabinet level, and civilian presence within the defense bureaucracy.

Inside the cabinet, President Yudhoyono, as the ultimate decision-maker in national defense, had spent most of his career in the Army. This ensured that he always carefully considered the Army's corporate interest when pursuing policy change within the defense sector, as discussed in chapters 5 and 6. Under the direct subordination of Yudhoyono, the defense sector was managed by the minister of defense and the TNI commander. Both officials were members of the cabinet and shared responsibility in regard to national defense. The defense minister led the ministry of defense office and was responsible for policy formulation for the defense sector. This included proposing defense-related bills and budget proposal to the House. Meanwhile, the TNI commander as the leader of TNI Headquarters oversees personnel management, supervision and deployment. In practice, the minister of defense and the TNI commander work together under the coordination mechanism. In principle, the mechanism establishes dualism of authority in the defense sector management. Empirical analysis found, however, that such dualism did not lead to open competition between the ministry of defense and the TNI commander. Rather, both leaders avoided influence or intervention towards the other authority or its scope of duty



that ultimately resulted in the perpetuation of status quo policy. In other words, the institutional arrangement of defense policy-making at the cabinet level was characterized by lack of policy discretion.

Under Yudhoyono, the minister of defense position was fully allocated to civilians. However, strategic posts within the bureaucratic composition of the MoD were virtually controlled by the military. From 2004 to 2014, more than 90 percent (42 of 45 individuals) in the MoD top-level positions were active officers. This condition was made possible after the TNI Law permitted active officers to hold position in government agencies in the defense-related sectors, especially the MoD. In addition, due to the issue of a surplus of officers in the TNI, the appointment of active officers to positions in the MoD structure became inevitable. This development withheld opportunities for civilian bureaucrats to attain upper echelon positions in the MoD. The TNI commander holds full authority over the supervision of TNI personnel and therefore the appointment of active officers to MoD falls under the commander's responsibility. Through the requirement for this approval, the TNI implicitly controlled the TNI personnel within the MoD structure. In addition, military control over the defense bureaucracy of MoD also highlighted the domination by Army officers of the MoD's DGDS. Accordingly, the director generalships of DGDS were always held by Army officers. DGDS is the main branch of the MoD that is specifically designed to formulate and implement the national strategic documents. In addition, the director general of DGDS also acts as the task-force coordinator for the MoD regional representatives at the sub-national level. Furthermore, these representatives were largely occupied by officers from the Army. Under these circumstances, the Army continuously upholds the strategic-level formulation process of national defense that became the main policy reference for future defense planning. It has allowed the Army to preserve its corporate interest of total people defense doctrine in the post-*Reformasi* national defense orientation. Based on the proposed hypotheses, empirical analysis confirms the second causal factor of *low policy discretion* in the national defense organization as proposed in hypotheses H1 and H2a. Thus, the hypotheses H2b was failed to be confirmed by this study.

Overall, President Yudhoyono's two terms in office encountered significant challenges to attempts to pursue radical policy change in the defense sector. The large numbers of veto players and moderated party discipline in the legislative area were favorable conditions for the perpetuation of policy status quo. At the same time, the military leader remains the key player in national defense formulation at the cabinet level, and active officers hold a virtual stranglehold on positions within the defense bureaucracy. Consequently, lower discretion in the policy-making of national defense institution was of particular urgency and fostered strong military interest in maintaining the policy status quo in national defense. Altogether, these empirical findings confirm the existence causal factors as outlined in hypotheses H2a, *the condition of high policy stability and low level of discretion*.

## **9.2. Towards a coordinated model of military jointness**

Based on the empirical findings from the two causal factors above, the research hypotheses postulate that layering is the most likely strategy of policy change can be carried out by civilian change agent. Through layering, policy change is employed by adding new layers or elements alongside the existing status quo. In the case of post-*Reformasi* Indonesia, President Yudhoyono cautiously attached new policy elements in the defense sector without necessarily replacing the policy status quo, which is the total people defense doctrine. The doctrine was historically developed by Army intellectuals and represented the Army's strategic preference on land-based defense strategy. The doctrine encompasses the layered defense strategy and guerilla warfare tactics that were continuously used by the Army to justify the employment of the territorial command structure across Indonesia. Unlike the dual function doctrine, the total people defense doctrine survived the military reform agenda during the *Reformasi* period. Legislators attempted to replace the doctrine by proposing the removal of Army's territorial command structure in the state defense bill and TNI bill deliberation process. However, during negotiations the Army-dominated government representatives and legislators failed to reach agreement removal of the territorial command structure from TNI future force development. Consequently, national defense

continues to emphasize an inward-looking orientation of defense strategy, and the dominant preference for land-based defense posture development for TNI.

As a former of Army general, Yudhoyono recognized the importance of total people defense for the Army. He proceeded carefully in promoting gradual policy change in the defense sector during his first term in office. His administration revamped the existing total people defense doctrine without necessarily dismantling it. It tested the waters by adding two new elements within the new strategic documents as part of a concerted effort to push for TNI transformation towards a modern force. The first element is the Integrated Tri-Service (*trimatra terpadu*) concept as a new approach to develop TNI warfighting capabilities. The concept encourages defense planners to develop a future defense posture that promotes inter-services warfighting capabilities through joint military operations. Yudhoyono expected that through the implementation of Integrated Tri-Service in defense development policy, the entire services of TNI would be nurtured with the sense of military jointness in carrying out the core duty to defend the country. In practice, the concept aims for the establishment of joint regional commands (*Kogabwilhan*) with warfighting units from each service under one command. The concept adapted the “collectivism” norm in national defense which is the core of the total people defense doctrine. However, the concept put forward collectivism in regard to inter-services relation within the TNI rather than between TNI and the people. Accordingly, it received little resistance in the Army-dominated process of formulation of strategic documents within the MoD’s DGDS because it was viewed as a minor change that did not threaten the upholding of the total people defense doctrine. In fact, during the formulation process, the strategic document drafters were cognizant of the issue of lack of inter-service cooperation within the TNI during Suharto’s authoritarian regime. However, the Army officials among the drafters also expressed their concern regarding the manifestation of the concept, particularly on the future plan for establishment of joint regional commands. The officials worried that the new command would reduce the role of the existing Army territorial command structure in the national defense posture.

In order to deal with the Army concern, and to also promote the defense transformation agenda of TNI, the Yudhoyono administration also introduced the MEF (minimum essential force) concept as the future defense sector orientation. MEF was positioned as the government's long-term commitment in developing the defense sector by improving the striking force capability of each service. In practice, MEF offers each service the opportunity to expand its force posture and modernize its obsolete weapon platform through three staggered phases of policy implementation from 2010 to 2024. For the weapon modernization program, the government allocated the multi-year MEF budget of up to Rp 450 trillion (approximately US\$32 billion) divided into the three phases. The drafters welcomed the MEF concept, especially Army officials. Strategically, the Army service would be the main beneficiary of the MEF policy. Under the MEF concept, the Army service had the opportunity to propose the expansion of territorial commands nationwide as part of its MEF agenda. More importantly, MEF would mean more defense procurement for the Army as the largest service. Nevertheless, the Yudhoyono administration designed the MEF as part of the integrated tri-service vision. This means that the reorganization of the TNI posture and modernization of the weapon platform under the MEF agenda must be focused towards enhancing interoperability between TNI services, specifically, the capacity to conduct large-scale joint service operations.

Overall, during his first term in office, Yudhoyono was able to include two new elements alongside the status quo of the total people defense doctrine for the future orientation of Indonesia's defense sector. Yudhoyono laid the foundation to establish military jointness within the TNI by promoting the Integrated Tri-Service as the policy reference in the future development of TNI. In addition, the MEF program was also added in the strategic documents to support the transformation of TNI as an integrated modern armed force.

Yudhoyono's re-election in 2009 paved the way for the implementation of the integrated tri-service and the MEF concept as part of government policy. President Yudhoyono appointed Purnomo Yusgiantoro, a civilian technocrat, to devise the implementation of MEF within the MoD. In addition, Yudhoyono also appointed a

senior Army general to a new position within the defense ministry bridge the government interest with the TNI and make sure that the interest was well accepted by the military, especially the Army. During the early months of his second term in office, President Yudhoyono ensured that the MEF and the Integrated Tri-Service concept were atop his administration policy agenda. Accordingly, the MoD renewed the Indonesian SDR in 2009. The formulation of new SDR was practically carried out by the Army-dominated Directorate of Defense Strategy within the MoD but the MEF concept was later merged in the new SDR document. From the 2009 SDR, the MEF concept was included in the government long-term development plan document as the reference for future development in national defense.

After the inclusion of MEF in the government policy agenda, President Yudhoyono moved into the next step of accelerating the implementation of the tri-service concept through establishment of Kogabwilhan. In early 2010, Yudhoyono signed a new regulation on the reorganization of the TNI structure that had been in place for more than 25 years. Several new structures were established to support the government interest in transforming TNI into a modern force. Most importantly, the new regulation includes the joint regional commands as the new unit within the TNI structure with operational function. Finally, President Yudhoyono included the MEF policy and Kogabwilhan establishment under the 2010 presidential regulation on national defense policy that outlines the five-year term plan in the defense sector. In the regulation, the Yudhoyono administration introduced the implementation of the MEF policy for the first phase from 2010 to 2014. Another important feature of the regulation was the government commitment to establish a TNI force capable of conducting joint operations.

At the operational level, the implementation of the MEF policy and establishment of Kogabwilhan was largely driven by the military side rather than civilian policy makers, particularly the Army service. The MEF policy was narrowly translated by uniformed officers within the TNI and the MoD as a TNI weapon modernization project. Each service within the TNI established its own weapon shopping list and failed to discuss the future interoperability of the purchased weapon platforms.

Moreover, the coordination mode of relationship between the MoD and the TNI Headquarters played a major role in the careless formulation and implementation of the MEF policy. The entire MEF policy formulation was drafted by each service within the TNI with minimum supervision from the MoD. In fact, TNI Headquarters itself was unable to influence the formulation process within each service and promote the importance of interoperability. Each service developed its own defense posture without necessarily obtaining input from the other services. Thus, the MEF policy formulation was manifested as an isolated process in each service.

The isolated process of policy formulation affected the implementation of the first phase of MEF. The ultimately messy case of major defense procurement by the Army service indicated the lack of an integrated planning in Indonesia's defense sector. The Army plan to acquire the MBT Leopard was not part of the MEF shopping list for the first phase. Moreover, the MBT Leopard was considered by many legislators and analysts as technically inappropriate for the geographical conditions of Indonesia. Army leaders consistently defended the plan, including deputy minister Sjafrie. The Army chief also claimed that the tanks would be stationed on the Indonesia-Malaysia border in northern Borneo to act as a counter to the Malaysian Army tank force. Minister Purnomo showed his support for the Army plan, declaring that it was in keeping with the decentralized process of MEF formulation and defense procurement in MoD. However, his position actually indicated that the MoD had less authority to drive the TNI decision-making process in regard to MEF formulation and implementation. President Yudhoyono finally weighed in on the public debate of MBT Leopard procurement plan. He said the tanks were needed for the Army to improve its warfighting capability, especially in the border areas. However, Yudhoyono also warned the MoD and military leaders to verify that the acquired tanks would fulfill the interoperability aspect of the TNI weapon platform. When the tanks were delivered in 2014, the TNI lacked the vital infrastructure to station the tanks in the Indonesia-Malaysia border. The Navy had no ship that could transport the large tanks, and there was also no military landing dock that could accommodate the heavy vehicles. Similarly, the Air Force also had no large military transport aircraft that could

deliver the new tanks. These post-procurement issues clearly show that the TNI never utilized an integrative approach in developing its defense posture and President Yudhoyono was unable to drive the service interest in the MEF implementation.

Along with the problematic MEF implementation, the government also dealt with the serious delay in the establishment of the Kogabwilhan. In 2010, Yudhoyono instructed the MoD and TNI to amend the 2009 SDR and include the joint-regional command establishment as the strategic needs of national defense. However, the amendment process was stalled due to the Army leader's opposition to the function of the commands to secure the archipelago's borders. The Army feared Kogabwilhan would assign a greater role to the Navy and the Air Force. By doing so, it was wary that Kogabwilhan would gradually replace the dominant land-based defense strategy of TNI and decrease the role of the Army existing territorial command in national defense. Yudhoyono countered the Army opposition by appointing his brother-in-law as the new Army commander and worked to consolidate Army support for the establishment within the new 2011 SDR.

The move did not appear to assuage the Army's suspicion of the potential threat of Kogabwilhan towards its territorial command authority. For more than a year, there were painfully slow negotiations between the MoD and TNI on the establishment. The Army's unease was reflected in the TNI commander's statement in early 2013 that the Kogabwilhan establishment would not remove Army's territorial authority. To reduce the Army's distrust and improve confidence among the TNI services, President Yudhoyono then ordered the TNI commander to conduct a large-scale joint-training in May 2013. Yudhoyono and members of his cabinet visited the training site, and the president was directly involved in the command simulation training. After the training, Yudhoyono attempted to fast-track the Kogabwilhan establishment by personally instructing the leaders of MoD and TNI Headquarters to prepare a detailed description of Kogabwilhan as soon as possible and before his second term in the office ended in September 2014. In addition, Yudhoyono appointed one of his trusted officers

from the Army as the new TNI commander in a bid to facilitate the formulation process.

In early 2014, the MoD publicly revealed the detailed description of Kogabwilhan that was already included in the annual MoD policy plan for 2014. The MoD expected the President would sign the decree on the establishment in June 2014. Nevertheless, the Army's ultimate decision to accept the establishment of the Kogabwilhan was primarily motivated by its own interests rather than a magnanimous commitment to improve interoperability with other services. Instead, it was considered a way to combat the issue of a surplus in officers since 2011. As the largest service, the Army held the highest number of middle-ranking officers and generals without structural position, reaching more than 300 individuals in 2014. Army leaders expected the establishment of Kogabwilhan would open more structural positions for the non-structural officers. With only months before the expected establishment of the commands, there was a sudden deterioration in the relationship between Yudhoyono and the Army. There were widespread media reports that the Army commander met with a political party's leaders to discuss the possibility of being a vice presidential running mate in the 2014 presidential election. An outraged Yudhoyono convened a meeting with TNI generals to express the importance of neutrality and the avoidance of any dabbling in politics. The commander was summarily replaced and the plan for the commands fell by the wayside.

Substantially, President Yudhoyono decision to implement layering strategy in pursuing military jointness within the TNI resulted in the coordination model of military jointness. The formulation of MEF and Integrated Tri-Service concept in the strategic documents was not directed as a replacement for the outdated total people defense doctrine that largely represented the Army interest of land-based defense strategy. Consequently, the MEF policy and the Kogabwilhan establishment were hastily implemented by the MoD and TNI. Since both policies were positioned as additional elements to the total people defense strategy, then there was no obligation for the military-dominated MoD and the TNI to pursue substantial change in the defense sector. In fact, empirical analysis indicates the



capacity of the TNI, especially the Army service, to bargain with the government in the implementation process. The results were the lack of an integrative approach in the MEF policy implementation and a serious delay, and then cancellation, in the establishment of Kogabwilhan. These outcomes contributed to the preservation of each service autonomy within the TNI. The MEF procurement process lacked the institutionalized mechanism that can ensure interoperability of a platform between services. Meanwhile, the establishment of Kogabwilhan structure that had the potential to serve as the sought-after institutionalized mechanism for military jointness did not come to fruition.

Consequently, the achievement of military jointness within the TNI depends on the discretion of each service commander despite the fact that inter-services cooperation remains possible as exemplified by the implementation of joint services military training in 2010-2014. All in all, the empirical chapters confirm the proposed hypotheses H2a that *the coordination model of military jointness is more likely to emerge under the condition of high policy stability and low level of discretion.*

### **9.3. Post-2014 developments**

This study provides theoretical and empirical support concerning the impact of civilian control on the orientation of national defense policy. The level of policy stability in the post-Reformasi political arena and government dependence on military personnel to run the national defense policy-making institutions hindered the ability of civilian decision-makers to implement radical change through a defense transformation agenda. These conditions remain evident in post-2014 Indonesia's civil-military relations.

In September 2014, Joko Widodo was victorious in the presidential election and was duly inaugurated. Five years later, he was re-elected for a second term. Unlike his predecessor Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President Widodo hails from a civilian background. During his first presidential campaign, he introduced the so-called "global maritime fulcrum" (GMF) that was praised by many analysts as a breakthrough in reorienting Indonesia's defense posture towards a maritime

focus. However, the president's efforts were hindered by his lack of interaction with the political elite and military elite at the national level since he spent most of his political career at the sub-national level (Muhtadi 2015). This in turn significantly contributed to his ability to manage the political arena and the defense sector. During his first term in office, President Widodo struggled to secure majority support in the parliament and dealt with balanced opposition. Inevitably, this exerted significant impact on the lack of government capability to pursue policy change for the defense sector through the legislative arena. In regard to national defense institutions, Widodo's lack of network with the military elites partly resulted in his hands-off approach to defense management, allowing greater domination of the military, especially the Army (Laksmana 2019a).

During his first term in office, he appointed retired Army General Ryamizard Ryacudu as the minister of defense; he was known as an avid proponent of military leadership during the Reformasi period. Upon his re-election in 2019, he appointed retired Army General Prabowo Subianto as his minister of defense. Moreover, key positions within the MoD continue to be occupied by uniformed officers (see Table 8.2 above). Overall, civilian efforts to pursue defense transformation during Widodo's consecutive terms in office faced the same stumbling blocks as the Yudhoyono presidency. Unlike his predecessor, however, President Widodo decided to set aside the military jointness issue. During his early years in office, he launched the GMF concept to improve Indonesia's maritime awareness in the defense sector (Arief and Kurniawan 2018). Nevertheless, the policy was neither seriously developed nor implemented by the Army-dominated MoD as the future defense policy orientation (Javadi 2019). Strategic documents published by the MoD rarely discussed the GMF. In fact, the MoD documents promoted *bela negara* (defend the state) concept that was dubbed by many analysts as the new Army political thinking, in the MoD policy orientation (Haripin, Priamarizki, and Marzuki 2020).

Military domination in the defense policy-making also contributes to the military capacity to expand its role in a non-defense mission. Case in point is the government policy response towards the Covid-19 pandemic. It incorporated

Army officers and network as the backbone under the vague mechanism of the MOOTW mission. At the national level, the Coronavirus Disease Response Acceleration Task Force was led by an active Army general and senior Army officers occupied positions of key decision-makers within the taskforce (Honna 2020). At the sub-national level, approximately 85 percent of the commanders from Army's territorial command were assigned as the deputy chiefs of local Covid-19 taskforce (Laksmana and Taufika 2020). These recent developments cast an even dimmer light on the potential for civilian-led defense transformation in democratizing Indonesia.

#### **9.4. Study limitations and avenue for future research**

In regard to the analytical framework, this dissertation has two limitations. First, this study assumes that the ideological position of the veto players relatively can be identified. The proposed framework adopts the veto players approach that presumes the left-right scale of ideological position is applicable in the context of an emerging democracy. However, some new democracies often suffer from the low level of party institutionalization which may cause inconsistent policy position of the parties. In the case of Indonesia, political parties rarely produce an electoral platform to signal their policy position to the voters, and rather depend on the personality of party leaders. Consequently, party position in the policy-making process is often difficult to deduce, or can be manifested to varying degrees.

For example, some parties i.e., the nationalist-secular leaning parties, were assumed to be the loyal supporter of military role and privilege in regard to national defense. Meanwhile, the Islamist parties were assumed to demand stronger oversight over the military. In reality, both type of parties often behaved in contradictory ways to their expected political position. Second, the proposed analytical framework discounted the drift strategy in explaining policy change in the defense sector. This may reduce the explanatory power of the framework in other case of policy change that strongly influenced by the rapid change in the strategic environment and actor's inaction. Proponents of military change theory highlight the potential for military change after the loss during periods of war or

armed conflict rather than initiated by the military or civilians in times of peace. Such argument can be tested in the case of new democracies with higher level of external threats such as Taiwan and South Korea.

Another limitation is the scope of the study. This study ignores the possibility that leadership background may also contribute to the capability of change actors in pursuing change strategy. President Yudhoyono's background as an Army general proved to be an advantage for him to carefully craft the degree and scope of change for the defense sector. From the outset, Yudhoyono understood that transforming the TNI into a modern and integrated force must be conducted without removing the total people defense doctrine. Most importantly, Yudhoyono knew that the defense transformation process within the TNI would face the strongest challenge from the Army as the largest service. Consequently, during the implementation of the MEF policy and Kogabwilhan, Yudhoyono provided incentives in order for the Army service to gradually accept his proposed change. With this in mind, the role of the leadership background of change actors in the defense sector merits scholarly attention. The main question is, to what extent the military or non-military background of a democratically elected leader defines the degree of change in the defense sector. This puzzle can be explained by comparing the leadership of Yudhoyono with his successor President Joko Widodo leadership in the defense sector transformation of post-*Reformasi* Indonesia.

The study of the defense transformation process in emerging democracies holds the potential to improve our understanding of the dynamics of civilian control in the defense sector. Democratic transition often retains military prerogative in the policy formulation and policy-making in the national defense sector, which is considered to be the integral part of the military profession and core expertise. Ideally, national defense should not be discounted as the policy sector in establishing civilian capacity to govern legitimately. Keeping unfettered military prerogative in national defense potentially may harm the future of democratic consolidation. The military will have great leeway to utilize its resources and violent means against the democratically elected government or to exploit public freedom for its own corporate or leaders' interests when a political crisis erupts.

In practice, establishing civilian control of the military in national defense is a challenging undertaking. The transition to a democratic regime always nurtures multiple political actors who can act as the veto players in the policy decision-making process, thus contributing to a lack of policy decisiveness. Moreover, the military as the dominant actor in the national defense sector is always resistant to change. This resistance may influence the scope and outcome of the policy change implementation. In conclusion, there are wider research opportunities to improve our understanding on the causal factors, process and outcome of establishing civilian control in national defense that is directly related to the military core interest and profession.

## References

- Agastia, IGB. Dharma. 2016. "Uphill Battle for Indonesia's Defense Modernization." *The Jakarta Post*. 2016.  
<http://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2016/11/01/uphill-battle-for-indonesias-defense-modernization.html>.
- Agüero, Felipe. 1995. "Democratic Consolidation and the Military in Southern Europe and South America." In *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*, edited by Nikiforos Diamondourous and Hans Juergen Puhle, 124–65. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.
- . 2001. "Institutions, Transitions, and Bargaining: Civilians and the Military in Shaping Post-Authoritarian Regimes." In *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives*, edited by David Pion-Berlin, 194–222. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- Alagappa, Muthiah. 2001. "Investigating and Explaining Change: An Analytical Framework." In *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia*, edited by Muthiah Alagappa, 29–68. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Aliabbas, Anton. 2019. "Personal Interview with Anton Aliabbas, Senior Fellow of Human Rights Group Imparsial 2018-2020." 02.08.2019. Jakarta, Indonesia, 02 August 2019. 2019.
- Ambardi, Kuskridho. 2008. "The Making of the Indonesian Multiparty System: A Cartelized Party System and Its Origin." The Ohio State University.
- Anggoro, Kusananto. 2007. "The Department of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia: Civil Supremacy without Effective Control." In *Almanac on Indonesia Security Sector Reform*, edited by Beni Sukadis, 45–67. Jakarta: Lesperssi and DCAF Geneva.
- . 2008. "Unravelling Total Defense: Territorial Structure, Democracy and Non-Military Defense." In *Total Defense and Military Conscript: Indonesia's Experience and Other Democracies*, edited by Beni Sukadis and Eric Hendra, 1st ed., 11–24. Jakarta: Lesperssi and DCAF Geneva.

- Antara News. 2006. "TNI Masih Kaji Penggunaan Hak Pilih (TNI Still Analyze the Utilization of Voting Rights)." 20.02.2006. 2006.  
<https://www.antaraneews.com/berita/28367/tni-masih-kaji-penggunaan-hak-pilih>.
- . 2010. "Presiden Beri Pengarahan Di Rapim TNI 2010 (President Gives His Direction in the 2010 TNI Leadership Meeting)." 25.01.2010. 2010.  
<https://www.antaraneews.com/berita/171092/presiden-beri-pengarahan-di-rapim-tni-2010>.
- . 2013. "TNI Segera Bentuk Kogabwilhan (TNI Soon Establishing Joint-Regional Command)." 16.01.2013. 2013.  
<https://kalbar.antaraneews.com/berita/309570/tni-segera-bentuk-kogabwilhan>.
- . 2014. "Skenario Latihan Gabungan TNI 2014 (The 2014 TNI Joint-Training Scenario)." 19.05.2014. 2014.  
<https://www.antaraneews.com/berita/434972/skenario-latihan-gabungan-tni-2014>.
- Araf, Al, Anton Aliabbas, Bhatara Ibnu Reza, Cahyadi Satriya, Ghufron Maburri, Jaky Nurhasya, Junaidy Simun, Muchamad Ali Safa'at, and Poengky Indarti. 2011. *Sekuritisasi Papua, Implikasi Pendekatan Keamanan Terhadap Kondisi HAM Di Papua (The Securitization of Papua: Implications of Security Approach towards Human Rights in Papua)*. Jakarta: Imparsial Press.
- Arief, Muhammad, and Yandri Kurniawan. 2018. "Strategic Culture and Indonesian Maritime Security." *Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies* 5 (1): 77–89.
- Aspinall, Edward. 2005. *Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- . 2010. "Indonesia: The Irony of Success." *Journal of Democracy* 21 (2): 20–34.
- . 2014. "Indonesia's 2014 Elections: Parliament and Patronage." *Journal of Democracy* 25 (4): 96–110.
- Aspinall, Edward, Diego Fossati, Burhanuddin Muhtadi, and Eve Warburton. 2020. "Elites, Masses, and Democratic Decline in Indonesia." *Democratization* 27 (4): 505–26.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2019.1680971>.

- Aspinall, Edward, and Mada Sukmajati. 2016. "Patronage and Clientelism in Indonesia." In *Electoral Dynamics in Indonesia: Money Politics, Patronage and Clientelism at the Grassroots*, edited by Edward Aspinall and Mada Sukmajati, 1–38. Singapore: NUS Press.
- Ate, Jan Pieter. 2019. "Personal Interview with Maj.Gen. (Retd). Jan Pieter Ate, Former Director of International Cooperation MoD 2014-2017." 17.07.2019. Jakarta, Indonesia, 17 July 2019. 2019.
- Atta, Richard H. Van, and Michael Lippitz. 2003. "Transformation and Transition: DARPA's Role in Fostering an Emerging Revolution in Military Affairs, Vol. 1, Overall Assessment." P-3698. IDA Paper. Alexandria, VA.
- Avant, Deborah. 1994. *Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- . 2007. "Political Institutions and Military Effectiveness: Contemporary United States and United Kingdom." In *Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness*, edited by Risa A. Brooks and Elizabeth A. Stanley, 80–105. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Bainus, Arry. 2009. "Proses Deliberasi Pembuatan Undang-Undang No.34 Tahun 2004 Tentang Tentara Nasional Indonesia Dalam Rangka Reformasi Sektor Keamanan (The Deliberation Process of TNI Law as Part of Security Sector Reform)." University of Indonesia.
- Bappenas. 2010. *RPJMN 2010-2014 Buku II Memperkuat Sinergi Antar Pembangunan. Bab VII. Pertahanan Dan Keamanan*. Jakarta: Bappenas.
- Basuki, Ahmad Yani. 2019. "Personal Interview with Maj. Gen. (Retd). Ahmad Yani Basuki, Former Presidential Special Staff." 10.09.2019. Jakarta, Indonesia, 10 September 2019. 2019.
- Baswedan, Anies Rasyid. 2004. "Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory." *Asian Survey* 44 (5): 669–90.  
<https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2004.44.5.669>.
- Bawn, Kathleen. 1999. "Money and Majorities in the Federal Republic of Germany: Evidence for a Veto Players Model of Government Spending." *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (3): 707–36.  
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2991832>.



- BBC News. 2012. "KASAD: Pembelian Senjata Untuk Imbangi Kekuatan Negara Lain (Army Commander: Weapon Procurement Is Intended to Balance Other Country Military Power)." 24 January 2012. 2012.  
[https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita\\_indonesia/2012/01/120124\\_tnidpr](https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2012/01/120124_tnidpr).
- Beach, Derek, and Rasmus Brun Pedersen. 2013. *Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Bennett, Andrew. 2010. "Process Tracing and Causal Inference." In *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*, edited by Henry E. Brady and David Collier, 2nd ed., 207–19. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Bennett, Andrew, and Jeffrey T Checkel. 2015. "Process Tracing." In *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool*, edited by Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T Checkel, 3–38. Strategies for Social Inquiry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1017/CB09781139858472.003>.
- Berita Satu. 2012a. "Diam-Diam, Kemenhan Lobi Fraksi PD Loloskan Tank Leopard (Quietly, MoD Lobbying Demokrat Faction to Approve Leopard Tank)." 19.01.2012. 2012.  
<https://www.beritasatu.com/nasional/26890/diam-diam-kemenhan-lobi-fraksi-pd-loloskan-tank-leopard>.
- . 2012b. "Kalau Belanda Menolak, RI Langsung Beli Leopard Ke Jerman (If Netherlands Refuse, Indonesia Directly Buy Leopard from Germany)." 26.03.2012. 2012. <https://www.beritasatu.com/nasional/39073/kalau-belanda-menolak-ri-langsung-beli-leopard-ke-jerman>.
- . 2013a. "Pemerintah Akan Membentuk Kogabwilhan (Government Will Establish Joint-Regional Command)." 15.05.2013. 2013.  
<https://beta.beritasatu.com/amp/nasional/113876/pemerintah-akan-membentuk-kogabwilhan>.
- . 2013b. "TNI Serius Sempurnakan Strategi Militer Nasional (TNI Pledges to Improve National Military Strategy)." 30.09.2013. 2013.  
<https://www.beritasatu.com/nasional/141309/tni-serius-sempurnakan-strategi-militer-nasional>.
- . 2014. "Komisi I Dukung Pembentukan Komando Gabungan Wilayah Pertahanan (Comm 1 Support Joint-Regional Command Establishment)."

- 10.02.2014. 2014. <https://www.beritasatu.com/nasional/165491/komisi-i-dukung-pembentukan-komando-gabungan-wilayah-pertahanan>.
- Bhakti, Ikrar Nusa, Sri Yanuarti, and Mochamad Nurhasim. 2009. "Military Politics, Ethnicity and Conflict in Indonesia." 62. CRISE Working Paper. Oxford.
- Binnendijk, Hans. 2002. "Introduction." In *Transforming America's Military*, edited by Hans Binnendijk, xvii–xxxii. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press.
- Bland, Douglas L. 1999. "A Unified Theory Of Civil-Military Relations." *Armed Forces & Society* 26 (1): 7–25.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X9902600102>.
- Blasko, Dennis J. 2016. "Integrating the Services and Harnessing the Military Area Commands." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 39 (5–6): 685–708.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1208613>.
- Born, Hans, Philipp Fluri, and Anders Johnsson, eds. 2003. *Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Principles, Mechanisms and Practices*. Geneva: IPU and DCAF Geneva.
- Brooks, Risa A. 2007. "Introduction: The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions, and International Forces on Military Effectiveness." In *Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness*, edited by Risa A. Brooks and Elizabeth A. Stanley, 1–26. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Bruneau, Thomas C. 2005. "Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: The Hedgehog and the Fox Revisited." *Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad* 19 (1): 111–31.
- . 2011. "An Analysis of the Implications of Joint Military Structures in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia." 25.  
<https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/whemsac/25>.
- Bruneau, Thomas C, and Aurel Croissant. 2019. "Civil-Military Relations: Why Control Is Not Enough." In *Civil-Military Relations: Control and Effectiveness Across Regimes*, edited by Thomas C Bruneau and Aurel Croissant, 1–18. Boulder, CA: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Bruneau, Thomas C, and Florina Cristiana Matei. 2008. "Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations."

- Democratization* 15 (5): 909–929.
- Buehler, Michael. 2012. "Revisiting the Inclusion-Moderation Thesis in the Context of Decentralized Institutions: The Behavior of Indonesia's Prosperous Justice Party in National and Local Politics." *Party Politics* 19 (2): 210–29. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068812462933>.
- Butt, Simon. 2018. "Indonesia's Constitutional Court and Indonesia's Electoral Systems." In *Constitutional Courts in Asia: A Comparative Perspective*, edited by Albert H Y Chen and Andrew Harding, 214–39. Comparative Constitutional Law and Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1017/9781108163903.010](https://doi.org/DOI:10.1017/9781108163903.010).
- Carey, John M, and Matthew Sørberg Shugart. 1995. "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas." *Electoral Studies* 14 (4): 417–39. [https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/0261-3794\(94\)00035-2](https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/0261-3794(94)00035-2).
- Cash, Jordan T, and Dave Bridge. 2018. "Donald Trump and Institutional Change Strategies." *Laws* . <https://doi.org/10.3390/laws7030027>.
- Cepik, Marco, and Frederico Licks Bertol. 2016. "Defense Policy in Brazil: Bridging the Gap between Ends and Means?" *Defence Studies* 16 (3): 229–47. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2016.1180959>.
- Chambers, Paul W, and Aurel Croissant. 2010. *Democracy Under Stress: Civil-Military Relations in South and South East Asia*. Bangkok: ISIS.
- Cheibub, Jose Antonio. 2007. *Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Choi, Jungug. 2010. "District Magnitude, Social Diversity, and Indonesia's Parliamentary Party System from 1999 to 2009." *Asian Survey* 50 (4): 663–83. <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2010.50.4.663>.
- Choirie, Effendy. 2016. "Personal Interview with Effendy Choirie, Former Member of Commission I DPR RI 2004-2009." 12.02.2016. Jakarta, Indonesia, 12 February 2016. 2016.
- CNN Indonesia. 2019. "Puspen Ungkap Akar Persoalan Kelebihan Perwira Di Tubuh TNI (TNI Explains about the Officer Surplus Issue)." 06.02.2019. 2019. <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20190206135659-20-366830/puspen-ungkap-akar-persoalan-kelebihan-perwira-di-tubuh-tni>.

- Cohen, Eliot A. 1996. "A Revolution in Warfare." *Foreign Affairs*, 1996.
- . 2004. "Change and Transformation in Military Affairs." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 27 (3): 395–407.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/1362369042000283958>.
- Collier, David. 2011. "Understanding Process Tracing." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 44 (4): 823–30. [https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1017/S1049096511001429](https://doi.org/DOI:10.1017/S1049096511001429).
- Collier, David, and James Mahoney. 1996. "Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative Research." *World Politics* 49 (1): 56–91.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/25053989>.
- Cottey, Andrew, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster. 2002. "The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations." *Armed Forces & Society* 29 (1): 31–56.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X0202900103>.
- Covarrubias, Jaime Garcia. 2004. "New Threats and Defense Transformation: The Case of Latin America." *Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement* 12 (3): 144–55. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662840500072664>.
- Cox, Gary W, and Mathew D McCubbins. 2001. "The Institutional Determinants of Economic Policy Outcomes." In *Presidents, Parliaments and Policy*, 21–63. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Crisp, Brian F, Maria C Escobar-Lemmon, Bradford S Jones, Mark P Jones, and Michelle M Taylor-Robinson. 2004. "Vote-Seeking Incentives and Legislative Representation in Six Presidential Democracies." *The Journal of Politics* 66 (3): 823–46. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2004.00278.x>.
- . 2009. "The Electoral Connection and Legislative Committees." *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 15 (1): 35–52.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13572330802666786>.
- Croissant, Aurel. 2003. "Legislative Powers, Veto Players, and the Emergence of Delegative Democracy: A Comparison of Presidentialism in the Philippines and South Korea." *Democratization* 10 (3): 68–98.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340312331293937>.
- Croissant, Aurel, and David. Kuehn. 2017. *Reforming Civil-Military Relations in New Democracies. Reforming Civil-Military Relations in New Democracies.*

- Heidelberg: Springer VS. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53189-2>.
- Croissant, Aurel, David Kuehn, Paul W. Chambers, and Siegfried O. Wolf. 2010. "Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-Is: Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the Military in Emerging Democracies." *Democratization* 17 (5): 950–975.
- Croissant, Aurel, David Kuehn, Philip Lorenz, and Paul W. Chambers. 2013. *Democratization and Civilian Control in Asia*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Croissant, Aurel, David Kühn, Paul W Chambers, Philip Völkel, and Siegfried O Wolf. 2011. "Theorizing Civilian Control of the Military in Emerging Democracies: Agency, Structure and Institutional Change." *Zeitschrift Für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft* 5 (1): 75–98. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12286-011-0101-6>.
- Croissant, Aurel, and Philip Lorenz. 2018. *Comparative Politics of Southeast Asia*. Heidelberg: Springer International Publishing.
- Crouch, Harold. 2007. *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*. An Equinox. Singapore: Equinox Publishing Asia Ltd.
- . 2010. *Political Reform in Indonesia after Suharto*. Singapore: ISEAS.
- Dahl, Robert. 1989. *Democracy and Its Critics*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Danusubroto, Sidarto. 2015. "Personal Interview with Sidarto Danusubroto, Former Vice Chairman of Commission I DPR RI 2004-2009." 11.11.2015. Jakarta, Indonesia, 11 November 2015. 2015.
- Davis, Charles Mark. 2017. "Jointness, Culture, and Inter-Service Prejudice: Assessing the Impact of Resident, Satellite, and Hybrid Joint Professional Military Education II Course Delivery Methods on Military Officer Attitudes." Old Dominion University.
- DCDC MoD UK. 2014. *Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01 UK Defence Doctrine*. 5th ed. Swindon: The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Ministry of Defence Shrivenham.
- Demeneulenaere, Pierre. 2011. "Introduction." In *Analytical Sociology and Social Mechanisms*, edited by Pierre Demeneulenaere, 1–32. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Deptula, David A, and Harold Adams. 2009. "Joint's True Meaning." *Armed Forces Journal* 146 (10): 38–39.

- Derkach, Nadia. 1965. "The Soviet Policy towards Indonesia in the West Irian and the Malaysian Disputes." *Asian Survey* 5 (11): 566–71.  
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2642136>.
- Desch, Michael C. 1999. *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.
- Detik News. 2004. "Jangan Kaitkan Pembinaan Teritorial TNI Dengan Trauma Lama (Do Not Link TNI Territorial Supervision with the Old Trauma)." 04.08.2004. 2004.
- . 2006a. "Dephan Targetkan RUU Kamnas Dibahas DPR Awal 2007 (MoD Targets National Security Bill Deliberation by DPR in Early 2007)." 28.12.2006. 2006. <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-724928/dephan-targetkan-ruu-kamnas-dibahas-dpr-awal-2007>.
- . 2006b. "Menhan: Hak Pilih TNI Belum Bisa Digunakan (Defense Minister: TNI's Voting Right Is yet to Be Utilized)." 20.02.2006. 2006. <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-542797/menhan-hak-pilih-tni-belum-bisa-digunakan->.
- . 2006c. "Menhan Ajak DPR Dan Pers Kontrol RUU Rahasia Negara (Defense Minister Asks DPR and the Press to Oversee State Secrecy Bill)." 27.04.2006. 2006. <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-583533/menhan-ajak-dpr-dan-pers-kontrol-ruu-rahasia-negara->.
- . 2006d. "Pembahasan RUU Peradilan Militer Alot (Military Justice Bill Deliberation Is Not Smooth)." 10.03.2006. 2006. <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-555979/pembahasan-ruu-peradilan-militer-alot>.
- . 2006e. "Sinkronisasi Pertahanan Digodok, Clearing House Dibentuk (Defense Synchronization Is on Progress, Clearing House Established)." 25 January 2006. 2006. <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-526205/sinkronisasi-pertahanan-digodok-clearing-house-dibentuk->.
- . 2007a. "Calon KSAD Mengerucut Pada Letjen Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin (KSAD Candidate Focuses on L.G. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin)." 27.12.2007. 2007. <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-871387/calon-ksad-mengerucut-pada-letjen-sjafrie-sjamsoeddin>.
- . 2007b. "Kapolri Tolak Bahas RUU Kamnas (Police Chief Refuses to

- Deliberate the National Security Bill).” 05.02.2007. 2007.  
<https://news.detik.com/berita/d-738211/kapolri-tolak-bahas-ruu-kamnas>.
- . 2007c. “Soal RUU PM, TNI Ingin Militer Terlibat Dalam Peradilan Umum (Regarding Military Justice Bill, TNI Wants Its Officer Involved in Civilian Court).” 11.10.2007. 2007. <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-840851/soal-ruu-pm-tni-ingin-militer-terlibat-dalam-peradilan-umum>.
- . 2008a. “Bahas Kebijakan & Anggaran, SBY Beri Arahan Peserta Rapim TNI (Discussing Policy & Budget, Yudhoyono Gives Direction to Participants of TNI Leadership Meeting).” 23.01.2008. 2008.  
<https://news.detik.com/berita/d-882867/bahas-kebijakan--anggaran-sby-beri-arahan-peserta-rapim-tni>.
- . 2008b. “Pemerintah Setuju Peradilan Umum Untuk Anggota TNI (Government Approves Civil Court for TNI Officers).” 18.09.2008. 2008.  
<https://news.detik.com/berita/d-1008729/pemerintah-setuju-peradilan-umum-untuk-anggota-tni>.
- . 2009. “Jabatan Purnomo Sebagai Menhan Dinilai Paling Kontroversial (Purnomo’s Position as Minister of Defense Is Seen as the Most Controversial).” 22.10.2009. 2009. <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-1226047/jabatan-purnomo-sebagai-menhan-dinilai-paling-kontroversial->
- . 2010. “Sjafrie Janji Perkuat Posisi Menhan (Sjafrie Promises to Strengthen Minister of Defense’s Position).” 06.01.2010. 2010.  
<https://news.detik.com/berita/d-1272892/sjafrie-janji-perkuat-posisi-menhan>.
- . 2011a. “Jadi KSAD, Nasib Baik Jatuh Ke Pramono (Becoming Army Commander, Good Fortune Comes to Pramono).” 29.06.2011. 2011.  
<https://news.detik.com/berita/d-1671263/jadi-ksad-nasib-baik-jatuh-ke-pramono>.
- . 2011b. “Panglima TNI: Rio Mendung Tak Langgar Aturan TNI, Sebentar Lagi Pensiun (TNI Commander: Rio Mendung Does Not Violate TNI Rule, He Will Retired Soon).” 09.04.2011. 2011. <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-1612423/panglima-tni-rio-mendung-tak-langgar-aturan-tni-sebentar-lagi-pensiun>.
- . 2012. “Menhan Tak Tahu Soal Rencana TNI Beli Pesawat Intai Dari Israel

- (Defense Minister Does Not Know about TNI's Plan to Purchase Drone from Israel)." 02.02.2012. 2012. <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-1832875/menhan-tak-tahu-soal-rencana-tni-beli-pesawat-intai-dari-israel>.
- . 2013a. "PDIP Tolak Wajib Militer Bagi Rakyat Sipil (PDIP Rejects Military Conscript for Civilians)." 31.05.2013. 2013. <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-2261428/pdip-tolak-wajib-militer-bagi-rakyat-sipil>.
- . 2013b. "Presiden SBY, Menhan Dan Panglima Rapat Bahas Peta Kekuatan TNI (President, Defense Minister, and TNI Commander Held a Meeting on TNI Force)." 15.05.2013. 2013. <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-2247187/presiden-sby-menhan-dan-panglima-rapat-bahas-peta-kekuatan-tni>.
- . 2014a. "Menhan Didampingi Panglima TNI Pantau Latihan Gabungan Dari KRI Makassar (Minister of Defense and TNI Commander Observes TNI Joint-Training)." 03.06.2014. 2014. <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-2598074/menhan-didampingi-panglima-tni-pantau-latihan-gabungan-dari-kri-makassar>.
- . 2014b. "Struktur Baru Kogabwilhan Segera Diputuskan Presiden (New Joint-Regional Command Structure Will Be Decided by President Soon)." 17.01.2014. 2014. <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-2469989/struktur-baru-kogabwilhan-segera-diputuskan-presiden->.
- DoD USA. 2003. "Transformation Planning Guidance." Department of Defense United States of America.
- Dombrowski, Peter. 2018. "Military Transformations." In *Routledge Handbook Of Defence Studies*, edited by David J. Galbreath and John R. Deni, 327–38. London and New York: Routledge.
- DPR RI. 2004a. *Buku 1 Proses Pembahasan RUU TNI (Book 1 The Deliberation Process of TNI Bill)*. Jakarta: Secretary General of DPR RI.
- . 2004b. *Buku 2 Proses Pembahasan RUU TNI (Book 2 The Deliberation Process of TNI Bill)*. Jakarta: Secretary General of DPR RI.
- . 2013. "Laporan Singkat Rapat Kerja Komisi I-Kementerian Pertahanan 21 Mei 2013 (MoM Working Meeting Commission I-MoD May 21, 2013)." Jakarta.



- . 2015. *Langkah DPR Menuju Parlemen Moderen Dalam Demokrasi Indonesia: Ringkasan Laporan Kinerja DPR RI 2014-2015 (DPR Steps into Modern Parliament in Indonesia's Democracy: Summary of DPR Performance 2014-2015)*. Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal DPR RI.
- Dreisbach, Tristan. 2015. "Civilians at the Helm: Chile Transforms Its Ministry of National Defense, 2010–2014." Case Study. Innovations for Successful Societies. <https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/publications/civilians-helm-chile-transforms-its-ministry-national-defense-2010-2014>.
- . 2016. "Civilians Get a Foot in the Door: Reforming Brazil's Defense Ministry, 2007–2010." Case Study. Innovations for Successful Societies. <https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/publications/civilians-get-foot-door-reforming-brazil's-defense-ministry-2007-2010>.
- Eklöf, Stefan. 2003. *Power and Political Culture in Suharto's Indonesia*. Copenhagen: NIAS Press.
- Elson, R.E. 2001. *Suharto: A Political Biography*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Evera, Stephen Van. 1997. *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Falleti, Tulia G. 2010. *Decentralization and Subnational Politics in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Falleti, Tulia G, and Julia F Lynch. 2009. "Context and Causal Mechanisms in Political Analysis." *Comparative Political Studies* 42 (9): 1143–66. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414009331724>.
- Farrell, Theo, and Terry Terriff. 2002. "The Sources of Military Change." In *The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology*, edited by Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, 3–20. Boulder, CA: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- . 2010. "Military Transformation in NATO: A Framework for Analysis." In *A Transformation Gap?: American Innovations and European Military Change*, edited by Theo Farrell, Terry Terriff, and Frans Osinga, 1–13. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Farrell, Theo, Terry Terriff, and Frans Osinga. 2010. *A Transformation Gap?: American Innovations and European Military Change*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

- Feaver, Peter D. 2003. *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Febrian. 2009. *Buku Panduan Tentang Proses Legislasi DPR RI (Guidance on the Legislation Process DPR RI)*. Jakarta: DPR RI & UNDP.
- Feith, Herbert. 1957. *The Indonesia's Elections of 1955*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- . 1962. *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Finer, Samuel E. 1962. *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*. London: Pall Mall Press.
- Fitch, Samuel J. 1998. *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
- Fossati, Diego. 2019. "The Resurgence of Ideology in Indonesia: Political Islam, Aliran and Political Behaviour." *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 38 (2): 119–48. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1868103419868400>.
- Fox, J. Ronald. 2011. *Defense Acquisition Reform, 1960–2009: An Elusive Goal*. Washington D.C.: Center of Military History US Army.
- Ganghof, Steffen. 2003. "Promises and Pitfalls of Veto Player Analysis." *Swiss Political Science Review* 9 (2): 1–25. <https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1662-6370.2003.tb00411.x>.
- Geddes, Barbara. 1994. *Politician's Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America*. Berkeley: The University of California Press.
- George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- George, Alexander L., and Timothy J. McKeown. 1985. "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making." *Advances in Information Processing in Organizations* 2.
- Gerring, John. 2001. *Social Science Methodology A Criterial Framework*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2007. *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gindarsah, Iis. 2016. "Strategic Hedging in Indonesia's Defense Diplomacy." *Defense & Security Analysis* 32 (4): 336–53.

- <https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2016.1233695>.
- Giraldo, Jeanne Kinney. 2006. "Legislatures and National Defense: Global Comparisons." In *Who Guards the Guardians and How*, edited by Thomas C Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson, 34–70. Austin: Texas University Press.
- Gray, Colin S. 2002. *Strategy for Chaos Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History*. London: Frank Cass Publishers.
- . 2006. "Technology as a Dynamic of Defence Transformation." *Defence Studies* 6 (1): 26–51. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14702430600838461>.
- Grissom, Adam. 2006. "The Future of Military Innovation Studies." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 29 (5): 905–34. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390600901067>.
- Guevara, Pedro Javier Rojas. 2017. "Damascus: The Renewed Doctrine of the National Army of Colombia." *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 17 (4): 263–72.
- Gunadi. 2015. "Personal Interview with Vice Adm. (Retd). Gunadi, Former Director General of Defense Planning MoD 2007-2010." 06.11.2015. Jakarta, Indonesia, 6 November 2015. 2015.
- Gunawan, Aditya Batara. 2017. "Civilian Control and Defense Policy in Indonesia's Nascent Democracy." In *Reforming Civil-Military Relations in New Democracies*, edited by Aurel Croissant and David. Kuehn, 129–150. Heidelberg: Springer VS.
- . 2019. "Indonesia: The Military's Growing Assertiveness on Nondefense Missions." In *Civil Military Relations: Control and Effectiveness Across Regimes*, edited by Thomas C Bruneau and Aurel Croissant, 141–56. Boulder, CA: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Hacker, Jacob S., Kathleen Thelen, and Paul Pierson. 2013. "Drift and Conversion: Hidden Faces of Institutional Change." APSA 2013 Annual Meeting Paper. Chicago. [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=2303593](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2303593).
- Hafidz, Tatik. 2006. *Fading Away: The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia's Transition to Democracy 1998 – 2001*. Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies.
- Haggard, Stephan, Mathew D McCubbins, and Matthew Sørberg Shugart. 2001. "Conclusion: Policymaking in Presidential Systems." In *Presidents*,

- Parliaments and Policy*, edited by Stephan Haggard and Mathew D McCubbins, 319–24. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hall, Peter A. 2006. "Systematic Process Analysis: When and How to Use It." *European Management Review* 3: 24–31.
- Hall, Peter A, and Rosemary C R Taylor. 1996. "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms." *Political Studies* 44 (5): 936–57.  
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00343.x>.
- Hallerberg, Mark. 2011. "Empirical Applications of Veto Player Analysis and Institutional Effectiveness." In *Reform Processes and Policy Change: Veto Players and Decision-Making in Modern Democracies*, edited by Thomas König, Marc Debus, and George Tsebelis, 21–42. New York: Springer New York. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5809-9\\_2](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5809-9_2).
- Hallerberg, Mark, and Scott Basinger. 1998. "Internationalization and Changes in Tax Policy in OECD Countries: The Importance of Domestic Veto Players." *Comparative Political Studies* 31 (3): 321–52.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414098031003003>.
- Hanan, Djayadi. 2012. "Making Presidentialism Work: Legislative and Executive Interaction in Indonesian Democracy." Ohio State University.  
<https://etd.ohiolink.edu/>.
- Haripin, Muhammad. 2019. "Personal Interview with Muhammad Haripin, Researcher Center for Political Studies, Indonesian Institute of Science." 05.09.2019. Jakarta, Indonesia, 05 September 2019. 2019.
- . 2020. *Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia: The Politics of Military Operations Other Than War*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Haripin, Muhammad, Adhi Priamarizki, and Keoni Indrabayu Marzuki. 2020. *The Army and Ideology in Indonesia From Dwifungsi to Bela Negara*. London: Routledge.
- Haris, Syamsuddin. 2004. "General Elections Under The New Order." In *Elections in Indonesia: The New Order and Beyond*, edited by Hans Antlöv and Sven Cederroth, 18–37. London: Routledge.
- Harisanto, Eddy S. 1993. "The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces (Dwifungsi ABRI)." The US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey.  
<http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a277237.pdf>.

- Hasanuddin, Tubagus. 2015. "Personal Interview with Maj. Gen. (Retd). Tubagus Hasanuddin, Former Vice Chairman of Commission I DPR RI 2009-2014." 12.12.2015. Jakarta, Indonesia, 12 December 2015. 2015.
- Haseman, John B. 2006. "INDONESIAN MILITARY REFORM: More Than a Human Rights Issue." *Southeast Asian Affairs*, April, 111–25.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/27913306>.
- Hedström, Peter, and Richard Swedberg. 1998. "Social Mechanisms: An Introductory Essay." In *Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory*, edited by Peter Hedström and Richard Swedberg, 1–31. Studies in Rationality and Social Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
[https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511663901.001](https://doi.org/DOI:10.1017/CBO9780511663901.001).
- Heijden, Jeroen van der. 2011. "Institutional Layering: A Review of the Use of the Concept." *Politics* 31 (1): 9–18. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9256.2010.01397.x>.
- Hellmann, Olli. 2011. *Political Parties and Electoral Strategy: The Development of Party Organization in East Asia*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Herbert, Paul H. 1988. *Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations*. Fort Leavenworth: US Army Command and General Staff College.
- Higashikata, Takayuki, and Koichi Kawamura. 2015. "Voting Behavior in Indonesia from 1999 to 2014: Religious Cleavage or Economic Performance?" No. 512. IDE Discussion Paper.  
<https://doi.org/https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2620455>.
- Høiback, Harald. 2011. "What Is Doctrine?" *Journal of Strategic Studies* 34 (6): 879–900. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2011.561104>.
- . 2016. "The Anatomy of Doctrine and Ways to Keep It Fit." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 39 (2): 185–97.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1115037>.
- Honna, Jun. 2003. *Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia*. London: Routledge.
- . 2020. "Military Politics in Pandemic Indonesia." *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 18 (15): 1–9.
- Huang, Alexander Chieh-cheng. 2001. "Transformation and Refinement of

- Chinese Military Doctrine: Reflection and Critique on the PLA's View." In *Seeking Truth from Facts: A Retrospective on Chinese Military Studies in the Post-Mao Era*, edited by James C Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang. Arlington: Center for Asia Pacific Policy RAND.  
[https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf\\_proceedings/2007/C F160.pdf](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/2007/C F160.pdf).
- Huber, Evelyne, Charles Ragin, and John D Stephens. 1993. "Social Democracy, Christian Democracy, Constitutional Structure, and the Welfare State." *American Journal of Sociology* 99 (3): 711–49.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2781288>.
- Hundley, Richard O. 1999. *Past Revolutions, Future Transformations: What Can the History of Revolutions in Military Affairs Tell Us about Transforming the U.S. Military?* Washington D.C.: RAND Corporation.
- Hunter, Wendy. 1997. *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians against Soldiers*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- . 2001. "Reason, Culture, or Structure? Assessing Civil-Military Dynamics in Brazil." In *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives*, edited by David Pion-Berlin, 36–58. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1957. *The Soldier and The State*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
- IISS. 1996. "East Asia and Australasia." *The Military Balance* 96 (1): 170–201.
- . 2007. "East Asia and Australasia." *The Military Balance* 107 (1): 331–84.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/04597220601181097>.
- . 2011. "Chapter Six: Asia." *The Military Balance* 111 (1): 195–292.  
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2011.559837>.
- Immergut, Ellen M. 1990. "Institutions, Veto Points, and Policy Results: A Comparative Analysis of Health Care." *Journal of Public Policy* 10 (4): 391–416. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4007450>.
- Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin, and B. Puranen. 2014. *World Values Survey: Round Four - Country-Pooled Datafile*. Edited by R. Inglehart, C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E.

- Ponarin, and B. Puranen. Madrid, Spain & Vienna, Austria: JD Systems Institute & WWSA Secretariat.  
<http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV4.jsp>.
- . 2018. *World Values Survey: Round Five - Country-Pooled Datafile*. Edited by R. Inglehart, C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin, and B. Puranen. Madrid, Spain & Vienna, Austria: JD Systems Institute & WWSA Secretariat.  
<http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV5.jsp>.
- Innanchai, Yanyong. 2012. "The Roles of the Legislature and Civil Society in Civil-Military Relations." Northern Illinois University.
- Jackson, Aaron P. 2018. "The Four Aspects of Joint A Model for Comparatively Evaluating the Extent of Jointness in Armed Forces." 2. Joint Studies Paper Series. Canberra.
- Jahn, Detlef. 2010. "Conceptualizing Left and Right in Comparative Politics: Towards a Deductive Approach." *Party Politics* 17 (6): 745–65.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068810380091>.
- Janowitz, Morris. 1960. *The Professional Soldier : A Social and Political Portrait*. Glencoe: The Free Press.
- Javadi, Tiola. 2019. "Jokowi's Global Maritime Fulcrum: 5 More Years?" *The Diplomat*, 2019. <https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/jokowis-global-maritime-fulcrum-5-more-years/>.
- JCS USA. 2017. "Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States." the US Joint Chief of Staff Office.
- Jenkins, David. 1983. "The Evolution of Indonesian Army Doctrinal Thinking: The Concept of 'Dwifungsi.'" *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science* 11 (2): 15–30. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24490795>.
- . 2010. *Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975–1983*. An Equinox. Singapore: Equinox Publishing Asia Ltd.
- Ji, You. 2016. *China's Military Transformation*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Joffe, Ellis. 1987. *The Chinese Army After Mao*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Kammen, Douglas A., and Siddharth Chandra. 2010. *A Tour of Duty: Changing Patterns of Military Politics in Indonesia in the 1990s*. An Equinox. Singapore:

Equinox Publishing Asia Ltd.

- Kartasasmita, Agus G. 2016. "Personal Interview with Agus G. Kartasasmita, Former Vice Chairman of Commission I DPR RI 2009-2014." 16.02.2016. Jakarta, Indonesia, 16 January 2016. 2016.
- Karvonen, Lauri. 2011. "Party System Fragmentation." In *International Encyclopedia of Political Science*, edited by Bertrand Badie, Dirk Berg-Schlosser, and Leonardo Morlino, 1823–24. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc. <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412994163>.
- Katharina, Riris. 2005. *Pemetaan Masalah Parlemen Ditinjau Dari Peraturan Tata Tertib DPR: Rekomendasi Perbaikan Kinerja DPR Melalui Revisi Tata Tertib (Parliamentary Problem Mapping from the Perspective of Internal Procedure)*. Jakarta: Forum Politisi-Friedrich Naumann Stiftung.
- Kawamura, Koichi. 2011. "Consensus and Democracy in Indonesia : Musyawarah-Mufakat Revisited." No. 308. IDE Discussion Paper. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2280935>.
- . 2013. "President Restrained: Effects of Parliamentary Rule and Coalition Government on Indonesia's Presidentialism." In *Presidents, Assemblies and Policy-Making in Asia*, edited by Yuko Kasuya, 156–93. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. [https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137315083\\_8](https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137315083_8).
- Kay, Adrian, and Phillip Baker. 2015. "What Can Causal Process Tracing Offer to Policy Studies? A Review of the Literature." *Policy Studies Journal* 43 (1): 1–21. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12092>.
- Kementerian Pertahanan RI. 2015. *Buku Putih Pertahanan Indonesia*. Jakarta: Ministry of Defense Republic of Indonesia.
- Kimura, Ehito. 2013. *Political Change and Territoriality in Indonesia: Provincial Proliferation*. London: Routledge.
- King, Blair. 2004. "Empowering the Presidency: Interests and Perceptions in Indonesia's Constitutional Reforms 1999-2002." Ohio State University.
- King, Dwight Y. 1994. *"White Book" on the 1992 General Election in Indonesia: Body for the Protection of the People's Political Rights Facing the 1992 General Election (BPHPR)*. Translated. Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project.
- . 2003. *Half-Hearthed Reform: Electoral Insitution and Struggle for*



- Democracy in Indonesia*. Westport and London: Praeger.
- King, Dwight Y., Anies Rasyid Baswedan, and Nicolaus Harjanto. 2005. "The Relative Importance of Social Based Voting in the 2004 Indonesia's Election." Chicago.
- King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kingsbury, Damien. 2003. *Power Politics and the Indonesian Military*. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203987582>.
- Kohn, Richard H. 1997. "How Democracies Control the Military." *Journal of Democracy* 8 (4): 140–53.
- Kompas. 2008a. "Menhan: Latgab Bagian Pertahanan RI (Minister of Defense: Joint-Training Is Part of RI's Defense)." 18.06.2008. 2008. <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2008/06/18/14351057/~Nasional>.
- . 2008b. "Menhan Klaim Reformasi TNI Capai 85 Persen (Minister of Defense Claims TNI Reformation Reaches 85 Percent)." 09.10.2008. 2008. <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2008/10/09/02014223/menhan.klaim.reformasi.tni.capai.85.persen>.
- . 2009a. "Agum: Purnomo Tepat Jadi Menhan (Agum: Purnomo Is the Right Person for Minister of Defense)." 21.10.2009. 2009. <https://lifestyle.kompas.com/read/2009/10/21/23570331/NaN?source=autonext>.
- . 2009b. "Juwono: Isu Energi Dan Pertahanan Sangat Terkait (Juwono: Energy and Defense Issues Are Strongly Connected)." 19.10.2009. 2009. <https://tekno.kompas.com/read/2009/10/19/21114668/juwono.isu.energi.dan.pertahanan.sangat.terkait>.
- . 2009c. "Purnomo Menhan Karena Pertimbangan 'Engineering' (Purnomo as Minister of Defense Is Because of 'Engineering' Consideration)." 20.10.2009. 2009. <https://otomotif.kompas.com/read/2009/10/20/13302358/~Nasional>.
- . 2009d. "RUU Komcad Masuk Lagi Di Prolegnas Tahun 2010 (Reserve Component Bill Reappear in the 2010 Legislation Priority)." 06.12.2009.

2009.

<https://lifestyle.kompas.com/read/2009/12/06/04360421/~Nasional?source=autonext>.

———. 2010a. "Agus Suhartono Calon Tunggal Panglima (Agus Suhartono Is the Only TNI Commander Candidate)." 06.09.2010. 2010.

<https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2010/09/06/1432125/~Nasional>.

———. 2010b. "Koalisi LSM Tolak Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin (CSO Coalition Rejects Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin)." 06.01.2010. 2010.

<https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2010/01/06/16305061/koalisi.lsm.tolak.sjafrie.sjamsoeddin>.

———. 2011. "Menhan: Rio Menyalahi UU TNI (Defense Minister: Rio Violates TNI Law)." 13.04.2011. 2011.

<https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2011/04/13/02510961/menhan.rio.menyalahi.uu.tni>.

———. 2012a. "Batalkan Pembelian Tank Leopard (Cancel Leopard Tank Acquisition)." 21.01.2012. 2012.

<https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2012/01/21/03440455/Batalkan.Pembelian.Tank.Leopard..>

———. 2012b. "Draf RUU Kamnas Diubah (National Security Bill Draft Was Changed)." 23.10.2012. 2012.

<https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2012/10/23/18100691/Draf.RUU.Kamnas.Diubah>.

———. 2012c. "Ini Alasan Komisi I Setujui Pembelian Tank Leopard (This Is the Reason Why Commission I Approves Leopard Tank Acquisition)." 23.08.2012. 2012.

<https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2012/08/23/22201367/ini.alasan.komisi.i.setujui.pembelian.tank.leopard>.

———. 2012d. "Komisi I Minta Tank Leopard Dipermurah (Commission I Asks for Cheaper Leopard Tank)." 07.05.2012. 2012.

<https://money.kompas.com/read/2012/05/07/17185354/~Nasional>.

———. 2012e. "Komisi I Tak Prioritaskan RUU Kamnas (DPR Commission I Does Not Prioritize National Security Bill)." 14.01.2012. 2012.

<https://money.kompas.com/read/2012/01/14/11030178/komisi.i.tak.prio>

ritaskan.ruu.kamnas.

- . 2012f. "Latgab TNI Tingkat Brigade Di Sangatta (TNI Brigade Level Joint-Training in Sangatta)." 16.11.2012. 2012.  
<https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2012/11/16/23170943/NaN?source=autonext>.
- . 2012g. "Pansus Kembalikan RUU Kamnas Ke Pemerintah (Sp. Comm. Returns National Security Bill Draft to the Government)." 20.03.2012. 2012.  
<https://properti.kompas.com/read/2012/03/20/17471815/pansus.kembalikan.ruu.kamnas.ke.pemerintah>.
- . 2012h. "Pansus RUU Kamnas Disahkan (Special Committee on National Security Bill Was Established)." 28.02.2012. 2012.  
<https://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2012/02/28/1204339/pansus.ruu.kamnas.disahkan>.
- . 2013a. "3 Catatan Untuk Jenderal Moeldoko (3 Notes for General Moeldoko)." 21.08.2013. 2013.  
<https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/08/21/2223495/3.Catatan.untuk.Jenderal.Moeldoko>.
- . 2013b. "Bukan Prioritas, Realisasi Wajib Militer Masih Lama (Not a Priority, Implementation of Military Conscription Is Still Far Away)." 04.06.2013. 2013.  
<https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/06/04/15015391/bukan.prioritas.realisasi.wajib.militer.masih.lama>.
- . 2013c. "Presiden Minta TNI Siap Hadapi Serangan Mendadak (President Demands TNI Is Ready to Anticipate Swift Attack)." 02.05.2013. 2013.  
<https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/05/02/10245076/Presiden.Minta.a.TNI.Siap.Hadapi.Serangan.Mendadak>.
- . 2013d. "RUU Komponen Cadangan Atur Pendidikan Militer Untuk Sipil (Reserve Component Bill Regulates Military Education for Civilians)." 30.05.2013. 2013. <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-2259977/ruu-komponen-cadangan-atur-pendidikan-militer-untuk-sipil>.
- . 2013e. "Sistem Logistik Tentukan Kemampuan TNI Hadapi Serangan (Logistic System Defines TNI Capability against Threat)." 16.04.2013. 2013.  
<https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/04/16/02481712/.Sistem.Logisti>

- k. Tentukan. Kemampuan. TNI. Hadapi. Serangan.
- . 2014a. “103 Tank Leopard Bakal Disebar Di 5 Wilayah (103 Leopard Tanks Will Be Deployed in 5 Regions).” 31.03.2014. 2014.  
<https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2014/03/31/2114523/103.Tank.Leopard.Bakal.Disebar.di.5.Wilayah>.
- . 2014b. “Habibie Kritik Rencana Pembelian Tank Leopard (Habibie Criticizes Leopard Tank Acquisition Plan).” 26.03.2014. 2014.  
<https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2014/03/26/2322409/Habibie.Kritik.Rencana.Pembelian.Tank.Leopard>.
- . 2014c. “PDI-P: Pencopotan Budiman Menunjukkan SBY Konsisten (PDIP: Budiman’s Dismissal Indicates Yudhoyono’s Consistency).” 22 .07.2014. 2014.
- . 2014d. “SBY Marah Ada Pihak Yang Menarik Dukungan Jenderal Aktif (Yudhoyono Angry to Some Groupsthat Attract Active General Support).” 02.06.2014. 2014.  
<https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2014/06/02/1223571/SBY.Marah.Ada.Pihak.yang.Menarik.Dukungan.Jenderal.Aktif>.
- KontraS. 2009. *Menerobos Jalan Buntu: Kajian Terhadap Sistem Peradilan Militer Di Indonesia (Passing through Dead End: Analysis on the Military Judicial System in Indonesia)*. Jakarta: Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan. <https://kontras.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/menerobos-jalan-buntu.pdf>.
- Kramer, Mark, Bruce J Allyn, James G Blight, and David A Welch. 1990. “Remembering the Cuban Missile Crisis: Should We Swallow Oral History?” *International Security* 15 (1): 212–18. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2538987>.
- Krause, Werner, Pola Lehmann, Jirka Lewandowski, Theres Matthieß, Nicolas Merz, and Sven Regel. 2019. *Manifesto Project Dataset – Codebook (Version 2019a)*. Berlin: Berlin: WZB Berlin Social Science Center.  
[https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/down/data/2019a/codebooks/codebook\\_MPDataset\\_MPDS2019a.pdf](https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/down/data/2019a/codebooks/codebook_MPDataset_MPDS2019a.pdf).
- Krepinevich, Andrew F. 1994a. “Keeping Pace with the Military-Technological Revolution.” *Issues in Science and Technology* 10 (4): 23–29.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/43312704>.

- Krepinevich, Andrew F. 1994b. "Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions." *The National Interest*, no. 37 (May): 30–42.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/42896863>.
- Kroef, Justus M Van der. 1970. "Interpretations of the 1965 Indonesian Coup: A Review of the Literature." *Pacific Affairs* 43 (4): 557–77.  
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2754905>.
- Kuehn, David. 2013. "Institutionalizing Civilian Control in New Democracies: A Game -Theoretic Contribution to the Development of Civil -Military Relations Theory." Heidelberg University.
- Kuehn, David, and Philip Lorenz. 2011. "Explaining Civil-Military Relations in New Democracies: Structure, Agency and Theory Development." *Asian Journal of Political Science* 19 (3): 231–49.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2011.628145>.
- Laakso, Markku, and Rein Taagepera. 1979. "'Effective' Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe." *Comparative Political Studies* 12 (1): 3–27. <https://doi.org/10.1177/001041407901200101>.
- Laksmana, Evan A. 2010. "Dari 'Reformasi Militer' Menuju 'Transformasi Pertahanan': Tantangan Dan Prospek Ke Depan (From Military Reform to Defense Transformation: Prospects and Challenges Ahead)." *Indonesian Review* 1: 1–12.
- . 2011. "The Enduring Strategic Trinity: Explaining Indonesia's Geopolitical Architecture." *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region* 7 (1): 95–116.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/19480881.2011.587333>.
- . 2014. "Rebalancing Indonesia's Naval Force: Trends, Natures, and Drivers." In *Naval Modernization in Southeast Asia: Nature, Causes and Consequence*, edited by Geoffrey Till and Jane Chan, 175–203. London: Routledge.
- . 2019a. "Civil-Military Relations under Jokowi: Between Military Corporate Interests and Presidential Handholding." *Asia Policy* 26 (4): 63–71. <https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2019.0047>.
- . 2019b. "Reshuffling the Deck? Military Corporatism, Promotional Logjams and Post-Authoritarian Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia." *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 49 (5): 806–36.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2019.1613556>.

- Laksmana, Evan A, Iis Gindarsah, and Curie Maharani. 2020. *75 Tahun TNI: Evolusi Ekonomi Pertahanan, Operasi, Dan Organisasi Militer Indonesia, 1945- 2020 (75 Years of TNI: The Evolution of Defense Economy, Operation, and Militari Organization of Indonesia 1945-2020)*. Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
- Laksmana, Evan A, and Rage Taufika. 2020. "How 'Militarized' Is Indonesia's Covid-19 Management? Preliminary Assessment and Findings." DMRU-075-EN. CSIS Commentaries. Jakarta. <https://www.csis.or.id/publications/how-militarized-is-indonesias-covid-19-management-preliminary-assessment-and-findings/>.
- Lang, Kurt. 1965. "Military Organizations." In *Handbook of Organizations*, edited by James G March, Rand McNal, 856–85. Chicago.
- Lee, Terence. 2009. "The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Explaining the Role of the Military in 1986 Philippines and 1998 Indonesia." *Comparative Political Studies* 42 (5): 640–69.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414008328640>.
- . 2014. *Defect or Defend: Military Responses to Popular Protests in Authoritarian Asia*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
- Leifer, Michael. 1983. *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Lesmana, Tjipta. 2008. *Dari Soekarno Sampai SBY: Intrik Dan Lobi Politik Para Penguasa (From Soekarno to SBY: Intrigues and Political Lobbying)*. Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama.
- Lev, Daniel. 1964. "The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia." *Pacific Affairs* 36 (4): 349–64.
- . 1966. *The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics 1957-1959*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Liddle, R. William, and Saiful Mujani. 2007. "Leadership, Party, and Religion: Explaining Voting Behavior in Indonesia." *Comparative Political Studies* 40 (7): 832–57.
- Liputan6 News. 2012. "Soal Tank, KSAD Sudah Minta Maaf Ke DPR (About the Leopard Tank, Army Commander Already Apologize to DPR)." 25 January 2012. 2012. <https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/373931/soal-tank->

- ksad-sudah-minta-maaf-ke-dpr.
- . 2013. "Sertijab Moeldoko Sebagai Panglima TNI Digelar Senin (Moeldoko Inauguration as TNI Commander Will Be Held on Monday)." 30.08.2013. 2013. <https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/679054/sertijab-moeldoko-sebagai-panglima-tni-digelar-senin>.
- Lira, Leonard L. 2004. "To Change an Army: Understanding Defense Transformation." Paper Presented at ISSS/ISAC Annual Conference 2004.
- Lockyer, Adam. 2013. "The Logic of Interoperability: Australia's Acquisition of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter." *International Journal* 68 (1): 71–91. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002070201306800106>.
- Lorenz, Philip. 2015. "Principals, Partners, and Pawns: Indonesian Civil Society Organizations and Civilian Control of the Military." Heidelberg University.
- Loveman, Brian. 1999. *For La Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America*. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc.
- Lowndes, Vivien, and Mark Roberts. 2013. *Why Institutions Matter: The New Institutionalism in Political Science*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Lowry, Robert. 1996. *The Armed Forces of Indonesia*. Australia: Allen & Unwin.
- MacDougall, John A. 1982. "Patterns of Military Control in the Indonesian Higher Central Bureaucracy." *Indonesia*, no. 33 (May): 89–121. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3350927>.
- MacFarling, Ian. 1996. *The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces Military Politics in Indonesia*. Sydney: Australian Defence Studies Center.
- Macgregor, Douglas A. 2000. "Transformation and the Illusion of Change." *National Security Studies Quarterly*, no. 6: 1–8.
- MacIntyre, Andrew. 2003. *The Power of Institutions: Political Architecture and Governance*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctv3mtbct>.
- Mahesa, Desmond J. 2020. *Fungsi-Fungsi DPR-RI: Teks, Sejarah, Dan Kritik (DPR Functions: Text, History and Criticism)*. Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas.
- Mahoney, James. 2001. "Beyond Correlational Analysis: Recent Innovations in Theory and Method." Edited by Peter Hedström, Richard Swedberg, and Charles C Ragin. *Sociological Forum* 16 (3): 575–93. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/684726>.

- . 2003. "Strategies of Causal Assessment in Comparative Historical Analysis." In *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, edited by Dietrich Rueschemeyer and James Mahoney, 337–72. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
<https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511803963.011>.
- Mahoney, James, and Richard Snyder. 1999. "Rethinking Agency and Structure in the Study of Regime Change." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 34 (2): 3–32. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02687620>.
- Mahoney, James, and Kathleen Thelen. 2009. "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change." In *Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power*, edited by James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, 1–38. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2015. *Advances in Comparative-Historical Analysis*. Edited by James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Mainwaring, Scott, and Mathew Sørberg Shugart. 1997. *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- McFetridge, Charles D. 1983. "Seskoad—Training the Elite." *Indonesia* 36: 87–98.
- McGregor, Katharine. 2007. *History in Uniform: Military Ideology and the Construction of Indonesia's Past*. Singapore: NUS Press.
- McInnis, Kathleen J. 2016. "Goldwater-Nichols at 30: Defense Reform and Issues for Congress." Washington D.C.
- Medcom. 2018. "Pengakuan Salim S. Mengga: Korupsi Di DPR Dan Restu Tak Tertulis Partai (Salim Mengga's Confession: Corruption in DPR and Informal Party Directives)." 14.08.2018. 2018.  
<https://www.medcom.id/telusur/medcom-files/3NOnpm0K-korupsi-di-dpr-dan-restu-tak-tertulis-partai>.
- Media Indonesia. 2016. "Kasus Leopard Diminta Jangan Terulang (The Leopard Case Must Not Be Happened Again)." 24.02.2016. 2016.  
<https://mediaindonesia.com/politik-dan-hukum/30478/kasus-leopard-diminta-jangan-terulang>.
- Meliala, R.K. Sembiring. 2015. "Personal Interview with Maj.Gen. (Retd). R.K. Sembiring Meliala, Former Member of Commission I DPR RI 2004-2009." 09.11.2015. Jakarta, Indonesia, 09 November 2015. 2015.



- Mengga, Salim. 2015. "Personal Interview with Maj.Gen. (Retd). Salim Mengga, Former Member of Commission I DPR RI 2009-2014." 22.12.2015. Jakarta, Indonesia, 22 December 2015. 2015.
- Metz, Steven. 2006. "America's Defense Transformation: A Conceptual and Political History." *Defence Studies* 6 (1): 1–25.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14702430600838511>.
- Mietzner, Marcus. 2006. *The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism and Institutional Resistance*. Washington: East-West Center.
- . 2008. "Comparing Indonesia's Party Systems of the 1950s and the Post-Suharto Era: From Centrifugal to Centripetal Inter-Party Competition." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 39 (3): 431–53.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/27751535>.
- . 2009. *Military Politics, Islam and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation*. Singapore: ISEAS.
- . 2013a. *Money, Power, and Ideology: Political Parties in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia*. Singapore: NUS Press.
- . 2013b. "Veto Player No More? The Declining Political Influence of the Military in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia." In *Democracy and Islam in Indonesia*, edited by Mirjam Kunkler and Alfred Stepan, 89–108. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Millett, Allan R, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H Watman. 1986. "The Effectiveness of Military Organizations." *International Security* 11 (1): 37–71. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2538875>.
- MoD RoI. 2005. *Peraturan Menteri Pertahanan No. PER/01/M/VIII/2005 Tentang Susunan Organisasi Dan Tata Kerja Departemen Pertahanan (Minister of Defense Regulation No. PER/ 01/M/VIII/2005 on the Organizational Structure and Governance of MoD)*. Ministry of Defense Republic of Indonesia.
- . 2007a. *Buku Doktrin Pertahanan Negara (The State Defense Doctrine Book)*. Jakarta: Ministry of Defense Republic of Indonesia.
- . 2007b. *Buku Postur Pertahanan Negara (The State Defense Posture Book)*. Jakarta: Ministry of Defense Republic of Indonesia.

- . 2007c. *Buku Strategi Pertahanan Negara (The State Defense Strategy Book)*. Jakarta: Ministry of Defense Republic of Indonesia.
- . 2008. *Buku Putih Pertahanan Negara (Defense White Paper)*. Jakarta: Ministry of Defense Republic of Indonesia.
- . 2009. *Peraturan Menteri Pertahanan No.100/2009 Tentang Sistem Perencanaan Pembangunan Pertahanan (Ministry of Defense RoI Regulation No.100/2009 on the System of Defense Development Planning)*. Indonesia.
- . 2010a. *Minimum Essential Force Komponen Utama (Minimum Essential Force of the Main Component)*. Jakarta: Ministry of Defense Republic of Indonesia.
- . 2010b. *Peraturan Menteri Pertahanan No.16 Tahun 2010 Tentang Susunan Organisasi Dan Tata Kerja Departemen Pertahanan (Minister of Defense Regulation No. 16/2010 on the Organizational Structure and Governance of MoD)*. Ministry of Defense Republic of Indonesia.
- . 2010c. *Peraturan Menteri Pertahanan Republik Indonesia Nomor 01 Tahun 2010 Tentang Kedudukan, Tugas Dan Fungsi Wakil Menteri Pertahanan (Minister of Defense Regulation No.1/2010 on the Position, Task, and Function of the Deputy Minister of Defense)*. Ministry of Defense Republic of Indonesia.
- . 2012a. *Peraturan Menteri Pertahanan Republik Indonesia No.19 Tahun 2012 Tentang Kebijakan Penyelarasan Minimum Essential Force Komponen Utama (Minister of Defense Regulation No.19/2012 on the Harmonization Policy of MEF Main Component)*. Ministry of Defense Republic of Indonesia.
- . 2012b. *Peraturan Menteri Pertahanan Republik Indonesia Nomor 08 Tahun 2012 Tentang Kaji Ulang Strategi Pertahanan 2011 (Minister of Defense Regulation No.08/2012 on the 2011 Strategic Defense Review)*. Ministry of Defense Republic of Indonesia.
- . 2014. *Keputusan Menteri Pertahanan No. KEP/25/M/ I/2014 Tentang Kebijakan Pertahanan Negara 2014 (Minister of Defense Decision Letter No. KEP/25/M/ I/2014 on the 2014 Defense Policy)*. Ministry of Defense Republic of Indonesia.
- MoSS RoI. 2005. *Peraturan Presiden No 7 Tahun 2005 Tentang Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional Tahun 2004-2009 (Presidential*

- Regulation No.7/2005 on the National Mid-Term Development Plan 2004-2009*). Indonesia: Ministry of State Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia.
- . 2007. “Amanat Presiden RI Pada Acara Peringatan HUT Ke 62 TNI (Presidential Speech on the Commemoration of TNI 62th Anniversary).” Jakarta: Ministry of State Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia.  
[https://setneg.go.id/baca/index/amanat\\_presiden\\_ri\\_pada\\_acara\\_peringatan\\_hut\\_ke\\_62\\_tni](https://setneg.go.id/baca/index/amanat_presiden_ri_pada_acara_peringatan_hut_ke_62_tni).
- . 2008a. “Keterangan Pers Presiden Rapat Kemhan 04.02.2008 (President Press Statement on MoD Meeting 04.08.2008).” 04 February 2008. 2008.  
[https://www.setneg.go.id/baca/index/presentasi\\_dari\\_menteri\\_pertahanan\\_ri\\_di\\_gedung\\_departemen\\_pertahanan](https://www.setneg.go.id/baca/index/presentasi_dari_menteri_pertahanan_ri_di_gedung_departemen_pertahanan).
- . 2008b. “Sambutan Presiden, Seminar Pertahanan RI Seskoad 19.08.2008 (Opening Speech of the President, Seskoad’s Defense Seminar 19.08.2008).” 19 August 2008. 2008.  
[https://www.setneg.go.id/baca/index/seminar\\_nasional\\_âesistem\\_pertahanan\\_negara\\_ri\\_abad\\_21â\\_di\\_bandung\\_19\\_september\\_2008](https://www.setneg.go.id/baca/index/seminar_nasional_âesistem_pertahanan_negara_ri_abad_21â_di_bandung_19_september_2008).
- . 2012. “Keterangan Pers Presiden, Rapat Koordinasi Pertahanan Mabas TNI 09.08.2012 (President’s Press Statement, Defense Meeting at TNI HQ 09.08.2012).” 09 Agustus 2012. 2012.  
[https://www.setneg.go.id/baca/index/keterangan\\_pers\\_presiden\\_ri\\_pada\\_rakor\\_bid\\_pertahanan\\_jakarta\\_9\\_agustus\\_2012](https://www.setneg.go.id/baca/index/keterangan_pers_presiden_ri_pada_rakor_bid_pertahanan_jakarta_9_agustus_2012).
- Muhtadi, Burhanuddin. 2015. “Jokowi’s First Year: A Weak President Caught between Reform and Oligarchic Politics.” *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 51 (3): 349–68.
- Mukherjee, Anit. 2017. “Fighting Separately: Jointness and Civil-Military Relations in India.” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 40 (1–2): 6–34.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1196357>.
- Neto, Octavio Amorim. 2019. “The Impact of Civilians on Defense Policy in New Democracies: The Case of Brazil.” *Latin American Politics and Society* 61 (3): 1–28. [https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1017/lap.2019.3](https://doi.org/DOI:10.1017/lap.2019.3).
- Nishihara, Masashi. 1972. *Golkar and the Indonesian Elections of 1971*. Monograph. Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project.
- Nordlinger, Eric. 1977. *Soldier in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*. New

- Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Norris, Pippa. 2004. *Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- North, Douglass C. 1991. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Notosusanto, Nugroho. 1984. *Pejuang Dan Prajurit: Konsepsi Dan Implementasi Dwifungsi ABRI (Fighter and Soldier: Conception and Implementation of ABRI's Dwifungsi)*. Jakarta: Penerbit Sinar Harapan.
- Okezone News. 2008. "TNI Anggarkan Rp50 M Untuk Latgab 2008 (TNI Allocates Rp. 50 Billion for the 2008 Joint-Training)." 24.01.2008. 2008. <https://news.okezone.com/read/2008/01/24/1/77844/tni-anggarkan-rp50-m-untuk-latgab-2008>.
- Paget, Steven. 2016. "Interoperability of the Mind." *The RUSI Journal* 161 (4): 42–50. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2016.1224496>.
- Pareira, Andreas. 2016. "Personal Interview with Andreas Pareira, Former Member of Commission I DPR RI 2004-2009." 05.01.2016. Jakarta, Indonesia, 05 January 2016. 2016.
- Park, Hwee Rhak. 2014. "South Korea's Failure to Implement 'Defense Reform 2020.'" *The Korean Journal of International Studies* 12 (2): 379–401.
- Pasha, Julian Aldrin. 2019. "Personal Interview with Julian Aldrin Pasha, Former Presidential Spokesperson 2009-2014." 16.09.2019. Depok, Indonesia, 16 September 2019. 2019.
- Pereira, Carlos, and Marcus André Melo. 2012. "The Surprising Success of Multiparty Presidentialism." *Journal of Democracy* 23 (3): 156–70.
- Perlmutter, Amos. 1969. "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Polities." *Comparative Politics* 1 (3): 382–404.
- Petersson, Magnus. 2011. "Defense Transformation and Legitimacy in Scandinavia after the Cold War: Theoretical and Practical Implications." *Armed Forces & Society* 37 (4): 701–24. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X10382216>.
- Pierson, Paul. 2003. "Big, Slow-Moving, and ... Invisible: Macro-Social Processes in the Study of Comparative Politics." In *Comparative Historical Analysis in*

- the Social Sciences*, edited by Dietrich Rueschemeyer and James Mahoney, 177–207. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Pinatih, Ni Komang Desy Setiawati Arya. 2010. "Variasi Doktrin Pertahanan Indonesia Periode Demokrasi Terpimpin (1959-1965) Dan Orde Baru (1966-1998)/Variation of Indonesia's Defense Doctrine during the Guided Democracy and New Order Period." University of Indonesia.
- Pinzón, Juan Carlos. 2016. "Colombia Back from the Brink." *PRISM* 5 (4): 2–9. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26459207>.
- Pion-Berlin, David. 1992. "Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America." *Comparative Politics* 25 (1): 83–102. <https://doi.org/10.2307/422098>.
- . 1997. *Through Corridor of Power: Institutions and Civil-Military Relations in Argentina*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- . 2005. "Political Management of the Military in Latin America." *Military Review* 85 (1): 19–31.
- . 2009. "Defense Organization and Civil—Military Relations in Latin America." *Armed Forces & Society* 35 (3): 562–86. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X08322565>.
- . 2011. "The Study of Civil-Military Relations in New Democracies." *Asian Journal of Political Science* 19 (3): 222–30. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2011.628143>.
- Pion-Berlin, David, and Harold Trinkunas. 2007. "Attention Deficits: Why Politicians Ignore Defense Policy in Latin America (Falta De Atención: ¿Por Qué Los Políticos Ignoran Las Políticas de Defensa En América Latina?)." *Latin American Research Review* 42 (3): 76–100. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4499390>.
- Posen, Barry. 1984. *The Sources of Military Doctrine*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- . 2016. "Foreword: Military Doctrine and the Management of Uncertainty." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 39 (2): 159–73. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1115042>.
- Pramodhawardani, Jaleswari. 2012. "Why Should The Leopard Tanks Purchase Be Rejected?" *The Jakarta Post*, February 9, 2012.

- Przeworski, Adam. 1991. *Democracy and the Market*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Rabasa, Angel, and John Haseman. 2002. *The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.
- Ragin, Charles C. 1994. "'Casing' and the Process of Social Inquiry." In *What Is a Case? Exploring the Foundations of Social Inquiry*, edited by Charles C. Ragin and Howard S. Becker, 217–26. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Raymond, Gregory V. 2017. "Naval Modernization in Southeast Asia: Under the Shadow of Army Dominance?" *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 39 (1): 149–177.
- Reeve, David. 1985. *Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System*. Singapore: Oxford University Press.
- Republika. 2011a. "Panglima TNI: Terlampau Dini Nilai Leopard Tak Cocok Untuk Indonesia (TNI Commander: It Is Too Soon for Saying Leopard Is Unfit for Indonesia)." 16.12.2011. 2011. <https://www.republika.co.id/berita/lwakaq/panglima-tni-terlampau-dini-nilai-leopard-tak-cocok-untuk-indonesia>.
- . 2011b. "SBY: Saat Ini Perang Gerilnya Tak Relevan Lagi (Yudhoyono: Guerilla Warfare Is Not Relevant Anymore)." 13.07.2011. 2011. <https://www.republika.co.id/berita/lo9mbl/sby-saat-ini-perang-gerilnya-tak-relevan-lagi>.
- . 2012. "Presiden: Pengadaan Leopard Jerman Terbuka Dan Transparan (President: German's Leopard Procurement Is Transparent and Open)." 10.07.2012. 2012. <https://www.republika.co.id/berita/m6y1b1/presiden-pengadaan-leopard-jerman-terbuka-dan-transparan>.
- . 2014. "Panglima TNI Buka Latgab 2014 (TNI Commander Opens the 2014 Joint-Training)." 19.05.2014. 2014. <https://republika.co.id/berita/n5swdw/panglima-tni-buka-latgab-2014>.
- Reykers, Yf, and Daan Fonck. 2019. "No Wings Attached? Civil–Military Relations and Agent Intrusion in the Procurement of Fighter Jets." *Cooperation and Conflict* 55 (1): 66–85. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836719850203>.
- Reza, Bhatara Ibnu. 2017. "The Total People's Defense and Security System: Problems of the State-Sponsored Militia in Indonesia." *Indonesia Law Review*

- 2: 155–277.
- Ricklefs, Merle Calvin. 2008. *A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200*. Fourth. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Rieffel, Lex, and Jaleswari Pramodhawardani. 2007. *Out of Business and On Budget: The Challenge of Military Financing in Indonesia*. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
- Rinakit, Sukardi. 2005. *Indonesian Military after the New Order*. Singapore: ISEAS.
- Robinson, Geoffrey B. 2018. *The Killing Season: A History of the Indonesian Massacres, 1965-66*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Robison, Richard, and Vedi R. Hadiz. 2004. *Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets*. London: Routledge.
- Rocco, Philip, and Chloe Thurston. 2014. "From Metaphors to Measures: Observable Indicators of Gradual Institutional Change." *Journal of Public Policy* 34 (1): 35–62. <https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1017/S0143814X13000305>.
- Rohlfing, Ingo. 2012. *Case Studies and Causal Inference: An Integrative Framework*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Rosen, Stephen Peter. 1988. "New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation." *International Security* 13 (1): 134–68. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2538898>.
- . 1991. *Winning the Next War*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctv2n7k6j>.
- Roxborough, Ian. 2002. "From Revolution to Transformation The State of the Field." *Joint Forces Quarterly* 32: 68–78.
- RSIS. 2011. "Conference Report: Transforming The Indonesian Armed Forces Prospects and Challenges." Singapore. [https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/ER111125\\_Transforming\\_Indon\\_Armed\\_Forces.pdf](https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/ER111125_Transforming_Indon_Armed_Forces.pdf).
- Rueschemeyer, Dietrich. 2003. "Can One or A Few Cases Yield Theoretical Gains?" In *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, edited by Dietrich Rueschemeyer and James Mahoney, 305–36. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511803963.010>.
- Rüland, Jürgen, and Maria-Gabriela Manea. 2013. "The Legislature and Military

- Reform in Indonesia." In *The Politics of Military Reform: Experiences from Indonesia and Nigeria*, edited by Jürgen Rüländ, Maria-Gabriela Manea, and Hans Born, 123–45. Heidelberg: Springer VS.
- Sambuaga, Theo. 2016. "Personal Interview with Theo Sambuaga, Former Chairman of Commission I DPR RI 2004-2009." 03.02.2016. Jakarta, Indonesia, 03 February 2016. 2016.
- Santoso, Puguh. 2016. "Personal Interview with Maj.Gen. (Retd). Puguh Santoso, Former Director General of Defense Strategy MoD 2010-2013." 12.03.2016. Jakarta, Indonesia, 12 March 2016. 2016.
- Sartori, Giovanni. 1976. *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Saunders, Phillip C., and John Chen. 2018. "Is the Chinese Army the Real Winner in PLA Reforms?" *Joint Forces Quarterly* 83: 44–48.
- Scarpello, Fabio. 2014. "Stifled Development: The SSR — Civil Society Organizations Community in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia." In *Security Sector Reform in Southeast Asia: From Policy to Practice*, edited by Felix Heiduk, 131–58. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.  
[https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137365491\\_6](https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137365491_6).
- Schickler, Eric. 2001. *Disjointed Pluralism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7rr34>.
- Schwartz, Moshe. 2014. "Defense Acquisitions: How DOD Acquires Weapon Systems and Recent Efforts to Reform the Process." Washington D.C.
- Sebastian, Leonard C. 2006. *Realpolitik Ideology: Indonesia's Use of Military Force*. Singapore: ISEAS.
- Sebastian, Leonard C., and Iis Gindarsah. 2013. "Assessing Military Reform in Indonesia." *Defense & Security Analysis* 29 (4): 293–307.  
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2013.842709>.
- Shair-Rosenfield, Sarah. 2019. *Electoral Reform and the Fate of New Democracies: Lessons from the Indonesian Case*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Sherlock, Stephen. 2007. "The Indonesian Parliament after Two Elections: What Has Really Changed?" 2007/I. CDI Policy Papers. Canberra.  
[http://archives.cap.anu.edu.au/cdi\\_anu\\_edu\\_au/.IND/2006-](http://archives.cap.anu.edu.au/cdi_anu_edu_au/.IND/2006-)



- 07/D\_P/2007\_04\_PPS\_3\_INDO\_Sherlock/2007\_04\_PPS3\_Sherlock\_Final.pdf.
- . 2010. “The Parliament in Indonesia’s Decade of Democracy: People’s Forum or Chamber of Cronies?” In *Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society*, edited by Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner, 160–78. Singapore: ISEAS. <https://doi.org/DOI: undefined>.
- . 2012. “Made by Committee and Consensus: Parties and Policy in the Indonesian Parliament.” *South East Asia Research* 20 (4): 551–68. <https://doi.org/10.5367/sear.2012.0121>.
- Shin, Jae Hyok. 2013. “Electoral System Choice and Parties in New Democracies: Lessons from the Philippines and Indonesia.” In *Party Politics in Southeast Asia Clientelism and Electoral Competition in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines*, edited by Dirk Tomsa and Andreas Ufen, 101–19. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Shugart, Matthew Søberg. 2008. “Comparative Executive–Legislative Relations.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, edited by Sarah A. Binder, R. A. W. Rhodes, and Bert A. Rockman, 344–65. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shugart, Matthew Søberg, and John M. Carey. 1992. *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Shugart, Matthew Søberg, and Stephan Haggard. 2001. “Institutions and Public Policy in Presidential System.” In *Presidents, Parliaments and Policy*, edited by Stephan Haggard and Mathew D. McCubbins, 64–104. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Siaroff, Alan. 2009. *Comparing Political Regimes: A Thematic Introduction to Comparative Politics*. Toronto: Toronto University Press.
- Siavelis, Peter M, and Scott Morgenstern. 2008. *Pathways to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America*. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Siddiq, Mahfudz. 2019. “Personal Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, Former Chairman of Commission I DPR RI 2010-2014.” 20.08.2019. Jakarta, Indonesia, 20 August 2019. 2019.
- Silaen, Bonggas. 2016. “Personal Interview with Air Vice-Marshal (Retd.)

- Bonggas Silaen, Former Director General of Defense Planning MoD 2010-2012." 09.01.2016. Jakarta, Indonesia, 09 January 2016. 2016.
- Singh, Bilveer. 2000. *Habibie and the Democratisation of Indonesia*. Singapore: Crescent Design Associates.
- Sisriadi. 2018. "Upaya Menyelesaikan Masalah Kelebihan Pati Dan Kolonel Secara Menyeluruh Dan Permanen (Comprehensive and Permanent Efforts to Resolve the Officer Surplus Issue)." *Wira Magazine*, 2018.
- Slater, Dan. 2009. "Altering Authoritarianism: Institutional Complexity and Autocratic Agency in Indonesia." In *Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power*, edited by James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Snider, Don M. 2003. "Jointness, Defense Transformation, and the Need for a New Joint Warfare Profession." *Parameters* 33 (3): 7–30.
- Snider, Don M, Gayle L Watkins, and Lloyd J. Matthews. 2002. "Introduction." In *The Future of the Army Profession*, edited by Don M Snider, Gayle L Watkins, and Lloyd J. Matthews, 3–18. Boston: McGraw-Hill.
- Soepandji, Budi Soesilo. 2015. "Personal Interview with Budi Soesilo Soepandji, Former Director General of Defense Potential MoD 2005-2011." 17.11.2015. Depok, Indonesia, 17 November 2015. 2015.
- Solechah, Siti Nur. 2012. "Kontroversi Rancangan Undang-Undang Tentang Keamanan Nasional (The Controversy of National Security Bill)." *Info Singkat Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri IV* (20): 17–20.
- Stapan, Alfred. 1988. *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Stoiber, Michael. 2006. "Different Types of Veto Players and the Fragmentation of Power." Paper Presented at the 64th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, .  
<https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.521.8217&rep=rep1&type=pdf>.
- Strain, Frederick R. 1993. "The New Joint Warfare." *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 17–24.
- Streeck, Wolfgang, and Kathleen Thelen. 2005. "Introduction. Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies." In *Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies*, 1–39. Oxford: Oxford University

- Press.
- Stulberg, Adam N., and Michael D. Salomone. 2007. *Managing Defense Transformation Agency, Culture and Service Change*. Burlington: Ashgate.
- Sudrajat. 2016. "Personal Interview with Maj. Gen. (Retd) Sudrajat, Former Director General Defense Strategy MoD 2001-2005." 08.01.2016. Jakarta, Indonesia, 08 January 2016. 2016.
- Sukma, Rizal. 2009. "Indonesian Politics in 2009: Defective Elections, Resilient Democracy." *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 45 (3): 317–36. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00074910903301647>.
- Susanto, Dadi. 2015. "Personal Interview with Maj.Gen.(Retd). Dadi Susanto, Former Director General of Defense Strategy MoD 2005-2007." 15.11.2015. Jakarta, Indonesia, 15 November 2015. 2015.
- Susilo, Djoko. 2014. "Personal Interview with Djoko Susilo, Former Member of Commission I DPR RI 2004-2009." 21.11.2014. Manila, The Phillipines, 21 November 2014. 2014.
- Tamtomo, Tri. 2016. "Personal Interview with Maj.Gen.(Retd). Tri Tamtomo, Former Member of Commission I DPR RI 2009-2014." 13.01.2016. Jakarta, Indonesia, 13 January 2016. 2016.
- Tan, Andrew. 2011. "East Asia's Military Transformation." *Security Challenges* 7 (3): 71–94. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26467109>.
- Tansey, Oisín. 2007. "Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-Probability Sampling." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 40 (4): 765–72. <https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1017/S1049096507071211>.
- Tanter, Richard. 1990. "Intelligence Agencies and Third World Militarization: A Case Study of Indonesia, 1966-1989." Monash University. <https://nautilus.org/network/associates/richard-tanter/indonesian-intelligence/thesis/thesis-toc/>.
- Tanuwidjaja, Sunny. 2012. "PKS in Post-Reformasi Indonesia." *South East Asia Research* 20 (4): 533–49. <https://doi.org/10.5367/sear.2012.0127>.
- Taylor, Phillip. 1982. "Weapons Standardization in NATO: Collaborative Security or Economic Competition?" *International Organization* 36 (1): 95–112. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706503>.
- Tempo. 2004a. "Menteri Juwono Usulkan Amandemen Dua Undang-Undang

- (Minister Juwono Proposes Revision on Two Laws)." 28.10.2004. 2004.  
<https://nasional.tempo.co/read/50059/menteri-juwono-usulkan-amandemen-dua-undang-undang>.
- . 2004b. "SBY Tolak Penghapusan Komando Teritorial TNI (Yudhoyono Rejects the Elimination of TNI's Territorial Command)." 01.08.2004. 2004.  
<https://nasional.tempo.co/read/45804/sby-tolak-penghapusan-komando-teritorial-tni>.
- . 2005. "Sjafrie Resmi Sekjen Dephan (Sjafrie Is Officially the Secretary General of MoD)." 15.04.2005. 2005.  
<https://koran.tempo.co/amp/nasional/38182/sjafrie-resmi-sekjen-dephan>.
- . 2006a. "Juwono Sudarsono: Saya Lebih Sipil Daripada Orang Sipil (Juwono Sudarsono: I Am More Civil than Civilian)." 17.10.2006. 2006.  
<https://gaya.tempo.co/read/86187/juwono-sudarsonosaya-lebih-sipil-daripada-orang-sipi>.
- . 2006b. "RUU Peradilan Militer Dukung Reformasi TNI (Military Justice Bill Supports TNI Reform)." 11.02.2006. 2006.  
<https://nasional.tempo.co/read/73809/ruu-peradilan-militer-dukung-reformasi-tni>.
- . 2008a. "Anggota Dewan Minta Pembahasan RUU Rahasia Negara Dihentikan (Legislators Demand the Deliberation of State Secrecy Bill to Be Halted)." 20.10.2008. 2008.  
<https://nasional.tempo.co/read/141187/anggota-dewan-minta-pembahasan-ruu-rahasia-negara-dihentikan/full&view=ok>.
- . 2008b. "Presiden Gelar Rapat Bidang Pertahanan (President Convenes Meeting on Defense Sector)." 04.02.2008. 2008.  
<https://nasional.tempo.co/read/116885/presiden-gelar-rapat-bidang-pertahanan>.
- . 2011. "Ipar SBY Kandidat Terkuat KSAD (Yudhoyono's Brother-in-Law Is the Strongest Candidate for Army Commander)." 14.06.2011. 2011.  
<https://nasional.tempo.co/read/340600/ipar-sby-kandidat-terkuat-ksad>.
- . 2012a. "DPR Tolak Tank Leopard (DPR Rejects Leopard Tank)." 11.01.2012. 2012. <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/376774/dpr-tolak-tank-leopard/full&view=ok>.

- . 2012b. "Malaysian Tanks Lined Up at Border." 12.04.2012. 2012.  
<https://en.tempo.co/read/396484/malaysian-tanks-lined-up-at-border>.
- . 2014. "KSAD Budiman Mencuat Di Daftar Cawapres Jokowi (Army Commander Budiman Emerges in the List of Vice President Candidate for Jokowi)." 16.05.2014. 2014. <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/578160/ksad-budiman-mencuat-di-daftar-cawapres-jokowi/full&view=ok>.
- Tempo Newspaper. 2004. "Melengkapi Persenjataan TNI, Syarat Dibubarkannya KOTER (Completing TNI Weaponry Needs, the Requirement for Territorial Command Displacement)." 11.12.2004. 2004.  
<https://koran.tempo.co/read/nasional/28978/melengkapi-persenjataan-tni-syarat-pembubaran-koter>.
- . 2008. "Juwono Setuju Primer Koperasi Tentara Dipertahankan (Juwono Agrees to Keep the Military Cooperation Unit)." 06.11.2008. 2008.  
<https://koran.tempo.co/read/nasional/147167/juwono-setuju-primer-koperasi-tentara-dipertahankan>.
- The Editors. 2003. "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite." *Indonesia*, no. 75 (May): 9–60. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3351307>.
- The Jakarta Post. 2008. "MPs Divided over State Secrecy Bill." 26.05.2008. 2008.  
<https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/05/26/mps-divided-over-state-secrecy-bill.html>.
- . 2009. "State Secrecy Bill, 'a Step Back' for RI." 25.07.2009. 2009.  
<https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/07/25/state-secrecy-bill-a-step-back039-ri.html>.
- . 2013a. "Leopard Tanks Needed to Safeguard Kalimantan Borders." 28.12.2013. 2013.  
<https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/12/28/leopard-tanks-needed-safeguard-kalimantan-borders.html>.
- . 2013b. "National Scene: TNI Launches Joint Military Exercise." 16.04.2013. 2013.  
<https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/04/16/national-scene-tni-launches-joint-military-exercise.html>.
- . 2014. "TNI Gears up, Sets Sights on Foreign Threats." 22.01.2014. 2014.  
<https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/01/22/tni-gears-sets-sights->

foreign-threats.html.

- Tippe, Syarifuddin. 2016. "Personal Interview with Maj.Gen. (Retd). Syarifuddin Tippe, Former Director General of Defense Strategy MoD 2007-2010." 10.02.2016. Jakarta, Indonesia, 10 February 2016. 2016.
- TNI HQ. 2014. *Dokumen Rencana Garis Besar Latihan Geladi Posko LATGAB TNI Tahun 2014 (Document on The 2014 TNI Joint-Training Scenario)*. Jakarta: TNI Headquarter.
- Tomsa, Dirk. 2010. "The Indonesian Party System after the 2009 Elections: Towards Stability?" In *Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society*, edited by Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner, 141–59. Singapore: ISEAS.
- . 2011. "Moderating Islamism in Indonesia: Tracing Patterns of Party Change in the Prosperous Justice Party." *Political Research Quarterly* 65 (3): 486–98. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912911404566>.
- Tracy, Sarah J. 2013. *Qualitative Research Methods: Selecting Evidence, Crafting Analysis, Communicating Impact*. West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell.
- Tribunnews. 2010. "Agus Suhartono Bersyukur Terpilih (Agus Suhartono Is Grateful Becoming the New TNI Commander)." 27.09.2010. 2010. <https://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2010/09/27/agus-suhartono-bersyukur-terpilih>.
- . 2012. "Menhan: Pembelian Tank Leopard Ajuan TNI AD (Minister of Defense: Leopard Tank Acquisition Is Army's Proposal)." 20.01.2012. 2012. <https://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2012/01/20/menhan-pembelian-tank-leopard-ajuan-tni-ad>.
- Trinkunas, Harold A. 2001. "Crafting Civilian Control in Argentina and Venezuela." In *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives*, edited by David Pion-Berlin, 161–93. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- . 2005. *Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela. Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. [https://doi.org/10.5149/9780807877036\\_trinkunas](https://doi.org/10.5149/9780807877036_trinkunas).
- Tsebelis, George. 1995. "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism."

- British Journal of Political Science* 25 (3): 289–325.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/194257>.
- . 2000. “Veto Players and Institutional Analysis.” *Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration* 13 (4): 441–74.
- . 2002. *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- . 2010. “Veto Player Theory and Policy Change: An Introduction.” In *Reform Processes and Policy Change: Veto Players and Decision-Making in Modern Democracies*, edited by Thomas König, Marc Debus, and George Tsebelis, 3–18. New York, NY: Springer New York.  
[https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5809-9\\_1](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5809-9_1).
- Tsebelis, George, and Eric C C Chang. 2004. “Veto Players and the Structure of Budgets in Advanced Industrialized Countries.” *European Journal of Political Research* 43 (3): 449–76. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2004.00161.x>.
- Ufen, Andreas. 2006. “Political Parties in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Between Politik Aliran and ‘Philippinisation.’” No.37. GIGA Working Paper. Hamburg.
- . 2008. “From ‘Aliran’ to Dealignment: Political Parties in Post-Suharto Indonesia.” *South East Asia Research* 16 (1): 5–41.
- Uttley, Matthew. 2018. “Defence Procurement.” In *Routledge Handbook Of Defence Studies*, edited by David J. Galbreath and John R. Deni, 72–86. London and New York: Routledge.
- Valenzuela, J. Samuel. 1992. “Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Setting: Notion, Process and Facilitating Conditions.” 150. *Working Paper*. Working Paper.
- Vatikiotis, Michael R.J. 1998. *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of the New Order*. Third. London.
- Vitale, Michael C. 1995. “Jointness by Design, Not Accident.” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 9: 25–30.
- Wang, Robert S. 1984. “China’s Evolving Strategic Doctrine.” *Asian Survey* 24 (10): 1040–55. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2644218>.
- Weeks, Gregory. 2012. “Civilian Expertise and Civilian–Military Relations in Latin America.” *Latin American Policy* 3 (2): 164–73.

- <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-7373.2012.00068.x>.
- Widjajanto. 2009. "Kegagalan Politik Legislasi Pertahanan 2004-2009 (the Failure of Defense Legislation Politics 2005-2009)." *KOMPAS Daily Printed*, October 5, 2009.
- Widjajanto, Andi. 2006. "Evolusi Doktrin Pertahanan Indonesia." In *Kaji Ulang Pertahanan: Pendekatan Substantif*, edited by Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, 1–31. Jakarta: LIPI Press.
- . 2010. "Evolusi Doktrin Pertahanan Indonesia, 1945-1998 (The Evolution of Indonesia's Defense Doctrine, 1945-1998)." *Prisma* 1 (1).
- Widjojo, Agus. 2017. "Personal Interview with Liut. Gen. (Retd). Agus Widjojo, Former Deputy of the Presidential Unit for Program and Reformation Monitoring (UKP3R) 2006-2009." 06.12.2017. Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, 06 December 2017. 2017.
- Wirahadikusumah, Agus. 1999. *Indonesia Baru Dan Tantangan TNI: Pemikiran Masa Depan (The New Indonesia and TNI's Challenge: Future Thinking)*. Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan.
- Woo, Jongseok. 2011. *Security Challenges and Military Politics in East Asia: From State Building to Post-Democratization*. London: Continuum.
- Wuthnow, Joel. 2017. "A Brave New World for Chinese Joint Operations." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 40 (1–2): 169–95.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1276012>.
- Yildiz, Uğur Burç. 2014. "Rethinking Civil–Military Relations in Turkey: The Problems of the Democratic Governance of the Defense and Security Sectors." *Turkish Studies* 15 (3): 386–401.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2014.954744>.
- Yin, Robert K. 2009. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. 4th ed. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Yudhoyono, Susilo B, and M. Jusuf Kalla. 2004. *Membangun Indonesia Yang Aman, Adil, Dan Sejahtera: Visi, Misi, Dan Program (Developing Secure, Justice, and Welfare in Indonesia: Vision, Mission, and Program)*. Jakarta.
- Yusgiantoro, Purnomo. 2014. *Ekonomi Pertahanan: Teori Dan Praktik*. Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama.
- Zapfe, Martin. 2016. "Strategic Culture Shaping Allied Integration: The



Bundeswehr and Joint Operational Doctrine." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 39 (2): 246–60. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1115044>.

Ziegenhain, Patrick. 2008. *The Indonesian Parliament and Democratization*.

Singapore: ISEAS.

———. 2015. *Institutional Engineering and Political Accountability in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines*. Singapore: ISEAS.

## Appendix 1. List of interviewees

No	Name	Position & affiliation	Place & Date of interview
1	Liut. Gen. (retd). Agus Widjojo	Former Chief of TNI Territorial; Former Deputy of the Presidential Unit for Program and Reformation Monitoring (UKP3R) 2006-2009	Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, 06 December 2017.
2	Maj. Gen. (retd). Ahmad Yani Basuki	Former Presidential Special Staff 2009-2014	Jakarta, Indonesia, 10 September 2019
3	Julian Aldrin Pasha	Former Presidential Spokesperson 2009-2014	Depok, Indonesia, 16 September 2019
4	Maj. Gen. (retd) Sudrajat	Former Director General of Defense Strategy MoD 2001-2005	Jakarta, Indonesia, 08 January 2016
5	Maj.Gen.(retd). Dadi Susanto	Former Director General of Defense Strategy MoD 2005-2007	Jakarta, Indonesia, 15 November 2015
6	Maj.Gen. (retd). Syarifuddin Tippe*	Former Director General of Defense Strategy MoD 2007-2010	Jakarta, Indonesia, 10 February 2016
7	Maj.Gen. (retd). Puguh Santoso*	Former Director General of Defense Strategy MoD 2010-2013	Jakarta, Indonesia, 12 March 2016
8	Maj.Gen. (retd). Jan Pieter Ate	Former Director of International Cooperation MoD 2014-2017	Jakarta, Indonesia, 17 July 2019
9	Vice Adm. (retd). Gunadi*	Former Director General of Defense Planning MoD 2007-2010	Jakarta, Indonesia, 6 November 2015
10	Air vice-marshal (retd.) Bonggas Silaen*	Former Director General of Defense Planning MoD 2010-2012	Jakarta, Indonesia, 09 January 2016
11	Budi Soesilo Soepandji*	Former Director General of Defense Potential MoD 2005-2011	Depok, Indonesia, 17 November 2015
12	Theo Sambuaga	Former Chairman of Commission I DPR RI 2004-2009/Golkar Party	Jakarta, Indonesia, 03 February 2016
13	Djoko Susilo	Former member of Commission I DPR RI 2004-2009/PAN Party	Manila, The Philippines, 21 November 2014
14	Maj.Gen. (retd). R.K. Sembiring Meliala	Former member of Commission I DPR RI 2004-2009/PDI-P Party	Jakarta, Indonesia, 09 November 2015
15	Sidarto Danusubroto	Former member of Commission I DPR RI 1999-2004, 2004-2009/PDI-P Party	Jakarta, Indonesia, 11 November 2015
16	Andreas Pareira	Former member of Commission I DPR RI 2004-2009/PDI-P Party	Jakarta, Indonesia, 05 January 2016
17	Effendy Choirie	Former member of Commission I DPR RI 1999-2004, 2004-2009/PKB Party	Jakarta, Indonesia, 12 February 2016

18	Mahfudz Siddiq	Former Chairman of Commission I DPR RI 2010-2014/PKS Party	Jakarta, Indonesia, 20 August 2019
19	Agus Gumiwang Kartasasmita	Former Vice chairman of Commission I DPR RI 2009-2014/Golkar Party	Jakarta, Indonesia, 16 January 2016
20	Maj. Gen. (ret'd). Tubagus Hasanuddin	Former Vice chairman of Commission I DPR RI 2009-2014/PDI-P Party	Jakarta, Indonesia, 12 December 2015
21	Maj. Gen. (ret'd). Tri Tamtomo	Former member of Commission I DPR RI 2009-2014/PDI-P Party	Jakarta, Indonesia, 13 January 2016
22	Maj. Gen. (ret'd). Salim Mengga	Former member of Commission I DPR RI 2009-2014/Demokrat Party	Jakarta, Indonesia, 22 December 2015
23	Muhammad Haripin	Researcher at the Center for Political Studies, Indonesian Institute of Science (P2P-LIPI)	Jakarta, Indonesia, 05 September 2019
24	Anton Ali Abbas	Senior Fellow of human rights group Imparsial 2018-2020	Jakarta, Indonesia, 02 August 2019

Notes:

\*Unrecorded interviews

## Appendix 2. Interview guideline

No	Topics	Expected evidence	Resource person	Core questions
1	Veto player configuration in the legislative arena	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Number of veto players.</li> <li>2. Party position towards the military/national defense issue.</li> <li>3. Level of party discipline in the legislative process.</li> <li>4. Policy stability in the defense sector.</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Legislators</li> <li>• Researcher/Academics</li> <li>• Activists</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Based on your experience, to what extent the number of political parties in the parliament affects the legislative process?</li> <li>2. In regard to TNI/defense-related policy, do you see any differences regarding party position?</li> <li>3. What do you think about the overall party discipline in the parliament, and specifically during the legislative process?</li> <li>4. Legislative performance in the defense sector was really poor during the SBY administration period (2004-2014), do you have any comments about it?</li> </ol>
2	Level of policy discretion in the defense institution	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Institutional relationship between minister of defense and TNI commander</li> <li>2. Civil-military relations within the MoD policy-making process</li> <li>3. Opportunity for policy discretion within the defense institution</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• MoD officials</li> <li>• Legislators</li> <li>• Researcher/Academics</li> <li>• Activists</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. How do you describe the Coordinative style of relationship between minister of defense and the TNI commander in regard to defense policy?</li> <li>2. Based on your observation, to what extent decision-making process within the MoD incorporates (internal/external) civilian influence?</li> <li>3. Do you see the institutional setting of MoD or the TNI HQ allows for policy discretion in the defense sector?</li> </ol>
3	Establishing military jointness	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Doctrinal adaptation in the national defense</li> <li>2. Military organizational change</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Presidential staffs</li> <li>• MoD officials</li> <li>• Legislators</li> <li>• Researcher/Academics</li> <li>• Activists</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. To what extent the transformation of total people defense doctrine promotes military jointness/interoperability between the TNI services</li> </ol>

		3. Integrated defense procurement process		<p>during and after the reformasi period?</p> <p>2. Do you see any change within the TNI organization that support military jointness under the SBY administration period?</p> <p>3. How far the defense procurement process in the MoD and/or TNI HQ incorporates the issue of military jointness/interoperability between services?</p>
--	--	---	--	---

\*\*\*