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Adam’s Animal Farm: A Fresh Reading of the Anthropological-Hamartiological Framework of the Apocalypse of Moses

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Abstract: A commonly recognized feature of the Apocalypse of Moses is its ethical-inferential orientation. However, the present article seeks to show that this does not just manifest itself in retrospective reflection, but is also exemplified narratologically in the attacks on Cain, Abel, and Seth. Far from being superfluous to the main narrative, these incidents provide us with a paradigm for understanding the Apocalypse’s anthropological-hamartiological framework in the post-paradisiacal world: The one who does what is good will send both devil and beast into flight, but the one who does not will be overcome by them. In order to substantiate this thesis, the article compares the Apocalypse to the works of Philo and the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs.


Keywords: Apocalypse of Moses, Greek Life of Adam and Eve, Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, Philo, Animal Attack, Hamartiology

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1 Introduction

The Apocalypse of Moses, also called the Greek Life of Adam and Eve, not only represents a narration of the post-paradisiacal affairs of the first couple, thereby filling the narratological void left by Genesis 4, but also contains an intricate reflection on the events of Genesis 3, normally dubbed ‘the Fall.’ In fact, the retrospective aspect of the document, combined with its elaborate description of death and burial, has led many to associate the document with the genre of ‘testament,’ as classically exemplified in the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs.\(^1\)

Notwithstanding the differences between the Apoc. Mos. and the ‘standard’ testament, a characteristic both definitely share is their ethical-inferential outlook. Just as the biographies of say Reuben or Simeon serve as lessons for their children, so Eve calls on her offspring to draw an inference from her own misdoing: “Now then, my children, I have shown you the manner in which we were deceived. You however should guard yourselves not to leave the good” (ὑμεῖς δὲ φυλάξατε ἑαυτούς, μὴ ἐγκαταλιπεῖν τὸ ἀγαθόν, 30:1).\(^2\)

However, what has until now been overlooked is the fact that this inference is not just based on Eve’s reflections concerning her own failure to uphold God’s command, but also on the parallel and antithetical figures that represent her direct offspring, namely Cain, Abel and Seth. This research paper will argue that, far from being incidental and secondary to the main narrative, the two attacks on the sons of Eve, succeeding her ‘own’ attack, represent the narrative exemplification of the Apocalypse’s anthropological-hamartiological underpinning. In order to substantiate this thesis, the article will not just explore the traditio-historical background and interpretative relevance of said attacks, but will also seek to further illuminate them through a comparison with the T. 12 Patr. and the works of Philo. It will be concluded that in the Apoc. Mos. Cain, Abel and Seth together

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1 See the discussion in Jan Dochhorn, Die Apokalypse des Mose: Text, Übersetzung, Kommentar, TSAJ 106 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 112–122, who rightly characterizes the document as an ‘exegetical narrative’ (‘exegetische Erzählung’). His edition of the Greek text will be used in this research paper. See for a different recent edition Johannes Tromp, The Life of Adam and Eve in Greek: A Critical Edition, PVTG 6 (Leiden: Brill, 2005). English translations of the Apoc. Mos. generally reflect the sense of Dochhorn’s German translation. As regards the literary-critical division of the Apoc. Mos., see Dochhorn, Apokalypse, 124–138. This article presents a synchronic reading of the Apoc. Mos. and therewith presupposes a relatively ‘strong’ final redactor, which is consistent with Dochhorn’s analysis.

typify the two ways of life that vulnerable human beings are confronted with: Doing good or not and overcoming or being overcome by that without and within.

2 The Second Attack

Right at the start of the narrative of the Apocalypse of Moses, the story of Adam and Eve is tied to their offspring and their fate. After their exit from paradise, Eve becomes pregnant and bears two sons, “Diaphotos, who is called Cain, and Amilabes, who is called Abel” (1:3). However, in narrating the life of these two sons, the focus remains firmly on their parents, as Eve is said to have had a fatal dream. Sharing the vision with her husband, she claims to have seen the blood of her son Abel in the mouth of his brother, who drank it without mercy (2:2). Abel begged him to leave him some (συγχωρέω), but he ingested it all. Yet, it did not remain in his stomach, but, throwing it up, it came out of his mouth again (2:3). Thereupon, Adam says to his wife: “Let us arise and go and see what happened to them, lest the enemy should be making war against them” (ἀναστάντες πορευθῶμεν καὶ ἴδωμεν, τί ἐστι τὸ γεγονὸς αὐτοῖς, μήποτε ὁ ἐχθρὸς πολεμῇ τι πρὸς αὐτούς, 2:4). However, as the two arrive on the scene of the crime, they find their son dead and the enemy’s war won (3:1).

At first sight, what stands out the most is the succinctness of the portrayed attack. The narrative quickly continues with the promise and birth of Seth. Accordingly, instead of interpreting the attack on Cain and Abel as a pivotal text with regard to the ethical framework of the document, many have characterized the passage as consisting of largely superfluous exegetical material integrated into the main storyline. Dochhorn, who assigns the pericope to the final redactor (in contrast to the earlier ‘Testament of Eve’), sees in Apoc. Mos. 2:1–3:1, against the background of Apoc. Mos. 40:3–5 (cf. Gen 4:10), a testimony to the fact that “man noch Material hatte, das unterzubringen war.” Tromp identifies the introduction of Seth as the sole purpose of Apoc. Mos. 2:1–3:1. Similarly, Knittel clas-

3 For a discussion of the names of the two, see Dochhorn, *Apokalypse* (see n. 1), 197–198.
4 Dochhorn, *Apokalypse* (see n. 1), 138.
5 See Johannes Tromp, “Cain and Abel in the Greek and Armenian/Georgian Recensions of the *Life of Adam and Eve*,” in *Literature on Adam and Eve: Collected Essays*, ed. Gary Anderson, Michael Stone, and Johannes Tromp, SVTP 15 (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 277–296, here 287: “It appears that the roles Cain and Abel have to fulfil do not entail much more than to kill, and to be killed respectively, thus explaining the pivotal role Seth will have to fulfil. In other words: the story of Cain and Abel serves mainly to introduce Seth as one of the protagonists in GLAE.” More
sifies chs. 1–4 macrostructurally as revolving around the birth of Seth, to a large degree neglecting them in the remainder of his work.⁶

However, upon closer inspection, Gen 4:10 may not be the only traditio-historical background to Apoc. Mos. 2:1–3:1. At least on the face of it, the mention of a (satanic) enemy attacking (one of) the sons of Eve (2:4) can also be connected to a particular interpretation of an already in those times ambiguous and controversial text, namely Gen 4:7.⁷ In the Masoretic Text, the Lord says to Cain: “If you do good/well (יטב), will your face not be lifted up? Yet, if you do not do good/well, sin (חטאת) is crouching (רבץ) at the door. Its desire is toward you, but you must rule over it.”⁸ While this verse is riddled with ambiguity, it suffices for now to identify an interpretative avenue, in which a personified form of evil (i.e., sin) is, almost like an animal, lurking at the door, desiring his prey (i.e., Cain) and, implicitly, seeking to rule over him. Vulnerability to this personified form of evil would then arise in one who does not do ‘good.’

That this is not the only possible interpretation of Gen 4:7 shows itself especially on the basis of the translation provided in the Septuagint. Remarkably, the LXX’s rendition carries with it a completely different sense, yet does remain ‘faithful’ to its template. God here says to Cain: “Have you not sinned if you offer rightly but do not divide rightly? Be still! His recourse will be to you, and you will rule him” (LES) (οὐκ, ἐὰν ὀρθῶς προσενέγκῃς, ὀρθῶς δὲ μὴ διέλῃς, ἠμαρτες; ἡσύχασον, πρὸς σὲ ἡ ἀποστροφὴ αὐτοῦ, καὶ σὺ ἄρξεις αὐτοῦ). With this translation, a reason is provided for the denial of Cain’s offering: He did not divide

nuanced is the approach of Levison, who at least identifies a number of “negative themes” introduced in chs. 1–5 and states regarding 2:1–3:1: “Immediately the author lays before the reader the presence of the (Satanic) enemy.” See John R. Levison, Portraits of Adam in Early Judaism: From Sirach to 2 Baruch, JSPSup 1 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1988), 164–165.


⁸ Note that the Hebrew text carries with it an incongruity between the masculine רון and the (normally) feminine נון. Cf. on the issue and corresponding interpretative options Georg Fischler, Genesis I–II, HThKAT (Freiburg: Herder, 2018), 276, 289; Johanna Erzberger, Kain, Abel und Israel: Die Rezeption von Gen 4,1–16 in rabbinischen Midraschim, BWANT 192 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2011), 50–52. Cf. also the interesting midrashic tradition in Gen. Rab. 22, cited by Erzberger (ibid., 61, 77), according to which the change from feminine to masculine represents the increasing strength and influence of sin.
rightly. Nevertheless, while this translation differs markedly from the normal sense attributed to the MT, one can observe superficial correspondence with the unaccented Hebrew. תָּשַׁא is, along the lines of נְשָׁא, interpreted as the bringing of an offering. The same goes for the mentioned division (רָחָמִים, ‘to open’, i.e. to divide). תַּחַת is not taken to be a substantive, but a perf. 2 m. sg. instead, and broken off from הבין (cf. Job 11:19), which for its part is interpreted as an imperative.

However, problems arise in the second half of the verse, as αὐτοῦ now lacks a clear subject. Whose recourse will be to Cain? A possibility would be to look back to the last ‘him’ in the storyline, namely Abel. Abel will return to Cain and Cain will rule over him. It could then even be significant that instead of κυριεύω (cf. Gen 3:16b), ἄρχω is found, a possible allusion to the fact that Cain is the firstborn son. Some have denied such a reading, instead identifying it as an implicit reference to sin. However, this interpretation struggles with the oddity of the translator maneuvering an explicit mention of ‘sin’ out of the text, only to leave one in implicitly. Also, one would then ideally expect the feminine personal pronoun, even though this issue is to a lesser degree also present in the Hebrew text itself. In any case, while the translation of the Septuagint somehow ‘works,’ a satanological/demonic interpretation is either consciously or unconsciously excluded.

That this move was not uncontroversial shows itself when looking at later Greek translations of the Hebrew. Some follow the LXX’s rendering, while others seem to disagree, maybe even correcting it in favour of what would later become the vocalized Masoretic Text. Aquila starts off with οὐκ ἐὰν ἀγαθύνῃς, ἀρέσεις; (“Is it not so, that if you do good, you will please?”). Symmachus simi-

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11 Alternatively, Wevers theorizes whether the translator might have read נתח (i.e. to divide) instead of פתח (cf. Lev 1:12). See Wevers, Notes (see n. 10), 55.

12 A number of commentators similarly interpret the MT in this manner. Cf. the overview in Erzberger, Kain, Abel und Israel (see n. 8), 51.

13 See Wevers, Notes (see n. 10), 55–56; Brayford, Genesis (see n. 9), 252.

larly offers a translation clearly closer to the MT: ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν ἁγαθύνῃς, ἀφήσω ἑὰν δὲ μὴ ἁγαθύνῃς, παρὰ θύραν ἁμαρτία ἐγκάθηται καὶ πρὸς σὲ ἡ ὁρμὴ αὐτῆς, ἀλλ᾽ ἔξουσισες αὐτῆς ("But if you do good, I will forgive. Yet if you do not do good, sin is lying at the door. Towards you is her desire, but you shall have authority over her."). To this one can also compare the more ambivalent rendering of the Theodotion: οὐκ ἂν ἁγαθῶς ποιήσῃς, δεκτόν; καὶ ἂν μὴ ἁγαθῶς, ἐπὶ θύρᾳ ἁμαρτία ἐγκάθηται καὶ πρὸς σὲ ἡ ἀποστροφὴ αὐτοῦ, καὶ σὺ ἄρξεις αὐτοῦ ("Is it not so, that if you do good, it is acceptable? Yet, if you do not do good, sin is lying at the door. Towards you is his recourse, and you will rule over him.").

That then takes us to our main thesis at the moment: Apoc. Mos. 2:4 testifies to the adoption of a specific interpretation and textual version of Gen 4:7. Such a knowledge and employment of multiple (competing) versions of biblical texts can be found elsewhere in the Apocalypse and may here even carry with it an implicit polemic against a differing (Septuagint) translation. Accordingly, the Apoc. Mos. would then take up a biblical tradition in which God preemptively warns Cain against an attack by a personified creature dubbed ‘sin,’ which animalistically lurks at the door, and seeks to rule over him (Gen 4:7b). Furthermore, preventing (the success of) such an attack is given an ethical dimension (i.e., ‘doing good,’ Gen 4:7a). Lastly, the personified motif of rule carries with it the dynamic of a sort of path dependent dominion: Rather than giving in to temptation to do a certain stand-alone act (i.e., ‘to sin’), the personified element of being overcome by an entity ‘sin’ most likely entails a lifestyle dominated by ‘sin’ (as an act), and grave sin for that matter, as seen in the quickly following fratricide.

Even though the legitimacy of posing such an exegetical connection between Apoc. Mos. 2:4 and Gen 4:7 depends in part on its linkage with the Apocalypse’s two other ‘attacks,’ a number of arguments in its favour can be presented here. First of all, Gen 4:7 stands out as the most suitable traditio-historical textual candidate of the satanic attack portrayed in Apoc. Mos. 2:4, in that it connects Cain (and Abel) to the (purposed) attack of some kind of evil entity. No other (para-) biblical text directly associates any type of demonic attack with Cain and/or Abel. Even a later midrashic text, Gen. Rab. 20, which associates Cain with a more internal demon, the evil urge, derives this directly from Gen 4:7. While it could be the case that the Apoc. Mos. simply imaginatively embellished the Genesis narrative,

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16 On the text and interpretation, see Erzberger, *Kain, Abel und Israel* (see n. 8), 61–62, 77–80. Note the fact that Gen. Rab. shares a number of traditions with the Apoc. Mos. Cf. e.g., Apoc. Mos. 40:3–5 with Gen. Rab. 22:9, in which the latter is said to be dependent on the former. See Dochhorn, *Apokalypse* (see n. 1), 537–538.
the instances of careful exegetical work standing behind other ‘parabiblical’ elements in the Apocalypse (cf. e.g., Apoc. Mos. 40:3–5) make this seem unlikely. The only viable traditio-historical alternative would be the establishment of a direct connection between Apoc. Mos. 2:4 and Gen 3:15, which speaks of enmity between the serpent’s and Eve’s offspring and which the Apocalypse will later tie to the figure of Seth (chs. 10–12). On the one hand, it may prove very relevant that Gen 3:15 speaks of Eve’s offspring in general and thus, in the Apocalypse’s interpretation, might not be restricted to Seth (cf. 26:4). On the other hand, however, Gen 3:15 not only presupposes a victory on the part of Eve’s offspring, which is not easily reconciled with the enemy’s evident success, but also lacks a direct satanological and ethical component, which is (potentially) present in Gen 4:7.

Secondly, the Apocalypse of Moses would not be the only document connecting a traditional and personified form of sin to some type of animalistic and/or demonic attack. Two suitable parallels can for instance be found in the book of Sirach. Sir 21:2 states: “Flee from sin (ἀπὸ ἁμαρτίας) as from the face of a serpent; for if you approach it, it will bite you; its teeth are lion’s teeth, destroying the souls of humans” (LES). Furthermore, Sir 27:10 compares the work of sin to that of a lion: “As a lion lies in wait for prey, so does sin for those who work unrighteousness” (λέων θήραν ἐνεδρεύει, οὕτως ἁμαρτία ἐργαζομένους ἄδικα). The latter text neatly connects this attack of sin with a certain ethical standing: It is the worker of unrighteousness who has to fear its lurking figure. Reference can even be made to the Apostle Paul, who seems to at least associate a personified form of sin not only with some form of (demonic) influence and instrumentalization, but also with the events of Genesis (cf. Rom 7).

Thirdly, Gen 4:7 and the Apoc. Mos. find common ground in their connection of vulnerability to said attack with ethics. While this is in large part illustrated by statements outside of chs. 2–3, it can at this point be stressed that Abel and Cain traditionally function as an antithetical pair of righteousness vs. unrighteousness, of doing well vs. not doing well. In the writings of Philo, Cain is on

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the one hand presented as one of the supreme examples of self-love (φιλαυτία/φιλαυτος, Sacr. 3, 52, 58; Det. 32, 68, 78; Post. 21; QG 1.62), godlessness (ἀσέβεια/ἀσεβής, Cher. 65; Sacr. 71; Det. 50, 103; Post. 12, 35, 42; Fug. 61; cf. ἄθεος: Det. 103, 119; Post. 42), evil (κακία, Post. 172; Fug. 64), and an uncontrolled desire of possession, including a belief that everything belonged to him (cf. Cher. 57, 65; Sacr. 2; Post. 42). He honored himself more than God (Sacr. 71–72) and offered to himself, rather than to God (Sacr. 51; cf. Sacr. 53; Det. 32). In reality, he killed himself (Det. 47–48, 50; cf. 69–70), yet will never die, because evil will always live in the mortal race (Fug. 64; cf. Det. 165, 178; Post. 39). On the other hand, Cain’s wicked status is accompanied by a clear lack of (doing) good. He is permanently separated and banished from that which is virtuous (Det. 47, 70) as well as good (Det. 149; cf. Sacr. 4–5). Philo also seems to interpret God’s question to Cain as to what he has done (τί ἐποίησας [Gen 4:10]; cf. Det. 69–70) in this manner: He has not actually done anything good. This is not so much explicated with regard to Cain itself, but reveals itself on the basis of a similar question Philo believes one could ask the sophists. While speaking at length of virtue and goodness, one can ask them: ‘What good have you actually done (τί εἰργάσασθε αὑτοὺς ἀγαθόν; Det. 74)?’

However, Cain is not just an example of wickedness (and absence of good) per se, but is also associated with the passion-driven lack of self-control which often takes center stage in Philo’s anthropology and hamartiology (e.g., Opif. 158; Leg. 3.109; Det. 174). Accordingly, in consistency with the fact that Cain is described as a worker of the earth (ἐργάτης γῆς) and not a passion-eradicating and virtue-cultivating farmer (γεωργός), as Noah was (cf. Det. 104–119; Agr. 3–26), Philo portrays him as focused only on the pleasures of his earthly body (Agr. 22). In a characterization resembling that of the Apoc. Mos., Cain is said to open his mouth wide for everything external and prays “to receive them in an insatiable

as ‘allegorical’ should not prevent one from comparing the traditions contained in his works to more ‘historical’ or ‘literal’ treatments of figures such as Cain and Abel. Cf. on the somewhat misleading contrast between allegory and typology in this regard Hindy Najman, “Cain and Abel as Character Traits: A Study in the Allegorical Typology of Philo of Alexandria,” in Eve’s Children: The Biblical Stories Retold and Interpreted in Jewish and Christian Traditions, ed. Gerard P. Luttikhuiizen, TBN 5 (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 107–118, here 108–110.

19 This belief is tied to Cain’s name, ‘possession’ (κτῆσις). Cf. Cher. 52, 65; Sacr. 2; Det. 32. See on the ‘sinfulness’ of Cain’s self-love Roberto Radice, “Philo and Stoic Ethics: Reflections on the Idea of Freedom,” in Philo of Alexandria and Post-Aristotelian Philosophy, ed. Francesca Alesse, SPhA 5 (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 141–167, here 166: “The principle of philautia (egoism) is thus what transforms the perfect universe of Paradise into a source of sin, both altering the axiological order of things and attributing to it what is really the work of God.”
manner and to contain them, to the utter destruction of the God-loving doctrine, Abel” (ἐπικέχηνε πᾶσι τοῖς ἐκτός, εὐχόμενος δι’ ἀπληστίαν δέξασθαί τε αὐτὰ καὶ χωρῆσαι ἐπ’ ὀλέθρῳ τοῦ φιλοθέου δόγματος Ἄβελ, Det. 103, cf. Det. 100–101, 113; Sacr. 61). As such, while the Apoc. Mos. does not substantially ‘develop’ the character of Cain, the fact that it mentions the blood of Abel being in the mouth of Cain (2:2), who mercilessly drank everything of it, yet could not contain it (2:3), may testify to more than just exegetical work regarding Gen 4:10–11. It may also serve to characterize Cain as precisely the unrighteous (cf. Gen 9:4), gluttonous, greedy, passion-driven, and control-lacking figure which parts of parabiblical tradition consider him to be (cf. Wis 10:3; T. Benj. 7:3–5; Josephus, Ant. 1.53–54, 60–61; 1 John 3:12; Jude 11).20 Cain did not do well and was ruled by his selfish desires.

However, Gen 4:7 and Apoc. Mos. 2:4 do not seem to share their implicated number of participants. Whereas the warning of Gen 4:7 appears to be directed exclusively towards the enraged Cain, Apoc. Mos. 2:4 explicitly mentions the enemy warring against ‘them,’ i.e., against both Cain and Abel. One could argue that the enemy wars against both of them, in the sense that the enemy’s conquest of Cain directly affects Abel, which it does. Yet, especially in light of the two following attacks, another interpretative avenue also presents itself. In Gen 4:7, God, after having no regard for his offering, warns an angered Cain that if he does not do good, sin is lurking at the door. It could well be that Abel is not warned not so much because he could not be attacked at all, but rather because he (implicitly) lacks the vulnerability that could make such an attack successful, since he actually does what is good. Precisely this idea might be presupposed in the Apocalypse: The enemy also wars on Abel, yet, due to his ethical status, unsuccessfully. While such an interpretation remains hypothetical on the basis of Apoc. Mos. 2:1–3:1 itself, it conforms with the traditional image of Abel, according to which he is a lot more than just a victim, but a righteous and holy servant of God, whose offering was accepted (cf. T. Iss. 5:4; T. Benj. 7:4; Josephus, Ant. 1.53; Matt 23:35; Heb 11:4; 1 John 3:12). For Philo, Abel serves as an image of (the doctrine of) the love of virtue and of God (cf. Det. 48, 103), as well as that which is good (Sacr. 5, 10; Det. 52, 62, 69; cf. Det. 37–38). In particular, the reference to Abel’s being a shepherd (cf. Sacr. 11, 51) contrastively juxtaposes him with Cain: A shepherd has control. He rules over both body and soul, including its senses, which seek to be overtaken, and the passions, which seek to overtake it, steering everything in the right direction, like a charioteer (Sacr. 49, cf. Sacr. 45, 104–105; further Post.

20 Cf. on the motif of vomiting, which Philo at times associates with intemperance, Ebr. 131, 221; Contempl. 45.
67–68, 98; Somn. 2.150–154). His being a shepherd can even be connected to a similar semantic contrast as was expressed with regard to Cain’s profession: A shepherd controls the cravings of his senses, a cattle-feeder (κτηνοτρόφος) does not (Agr. 27–66, esp. 30–40).

3 The Third Attack

Up to this point, this research article has focused on identifying an interpretative avenue, in which Gen 4:7 could serve as a traditio-historical background to the enemy’s attack on Cain and Abel. At this point, it may prove beneficial to broaden this article’s analysis to include the two other attacks found in the narrative. On the one hand, this serves the purpose of further underlining the legitimacy of associating Gen 4:7 with the Apocalypse in the first place. On the other hand, it also expands its interpretative potential with regard to the Apocalypse’s anthropological-hamartiological underpinning. A look at these two incidents widens not just the profile of the enemy of Apoc. Mos. 2:4 (cf. 7:2; 15:1; 25:4; 28:4), an epithet representing the evil being also dubbed διάβολος (15:3; 16:1, 2, 5; 17:4; 21:3), but also narratologically introduces two ways of conduct, by which the influence of said evil being is either increased or can be withstood.

One is confronted, first of all, with an attack launched against Seth, ironically the son destined to replace not just Abel, but also Cain (cf. 3:2; 4:2). Seth and Eve set out for paradise in order to acquire healing oil (9:3) and, in the vicinity of paradise, Eve again sees one of her sons under attack, this time by an animal (καὶ εἶδεν Εὔα τὸν υἱὸν αὐτῆς καὶ θηρίον πολεμοῦντα αὐτόν, 10:1). Upon seeing this, Eve confronts the animal with its former subordination, in reaction to which the animal aptly counters that the ‘reign of the animals’ originated from Eve (ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν θηρίων ἐκ σοῦ ἐγένετο, 11:1; cf. 24:3). However, with a wordplay regarding the opening of the mouth, Seth commands the animal to ‘shut it’ and remove itself from the image of God (12:1). The animal astoundingly obeys, flees, and leaves Seth wounded (12:2).

Initially, the scene seems as puzzling as the attack on Cain. This time, an actual animal attacks, appears to have the argumentative upper hand as well, yet then suddenly flees without explicit cause. Moreover, even though the incident

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22 Cf. Dochhorn, Apokalypse (see n. 1), 215–218.
can be tied to an interpretation of Gen 3:15 with relative certainty, a number of questions remain. Is there a narratological link between the animal attacking Seth and the enemy tied to the two other attacks in the Apocalypse, the devil? If so, what constitutes this relationship? To what does Seth owe his success? And, most importantly, did the author – or the final redactor – of the Apocalypse mean to connect the episode to the enemy attack on Cain and Abel?

With regard to the last question, a comparison of the two episodes yields one unmistakable difference: The attack on Seth is carried out by an animal, whereas that on Cain and Abel is directly connected to the devil. Notwithstanding the possible implicit animalistic imagery present in its presupposed traditio-historical background, Gen 4:7, Apoc. Mos. 2:1–3:1 lacks any explicit connection to an animal. Nevertheless, a number of remarkable parallels can also be observed. First of all, in both scenes the sons of Adam and Eve are confronted by a warring entity. In fact, the author uses πολεμέω (‘to make war’) to describe both attacks (2:4/10:1, 3), a verb exclusively found in the context of these two episodes (yet cf. 28:4: ἔχῃς δὲ τὸν πόλεμον ὃν ἔθετο ὁ ἐχθρὸς ἐν σοί). Two of the mentions even carry with them a similarly structured verbal context: In Apoc. Mos. 2:4, Adam suggests that he and his wife should go (πορεύω) and see (ὁράω) what happened to their sons, lest the enemy should be making war against them. In Apoc. Mos. 10:1, Eve and Seth come (πορεύω) into the vicinity of paradise and Eve sees (ὁράω) her son and an animal warring against him. The combination of these verbs is exclusively found in these two situations. Secondly, both episodes feature the motif of the opening of the mouth, albeit with varying connotations: Cain opens his mouth to receive and to dispose of Abel’s blood (2:2–3), the animal opens his mouth against Seth (10:3), Eve opens her mouth to eat of the tree (11:2), and Seth commands the animal to close its mouth (12:1). Lastly, as will be observed below, both passages can be connected to the story of their parents, albeit in different ways. Apoc. Mos. 2:1–3:1 is told from the perspective of Adam and Eve in the first place and features a reference to an enemy clearly known to them from past experience (2:4). Chs. 10–12 for their part explicitly connect animal rebellion with Eve’s failure to keep. It is Eve who is in some way responsible for her sons’ vulnerability. Because of her deed, all who sin will say:

“Cursed be Eve, since she has not kept God’s commandment” (ὅτι οὐκ ἐφύλαξεν τὴν ἐντολὴν τοῦ θεοῦ, 10:2). It is because of the opening of her mouth that the animal has opened his (11:1–3).

Accordingly, a number of aspects point to a possible association of chs. 2–3 and 10–12. However, not only may it be warranted to connect the two attacks on the sons of Eve, but their comparison already directs us to the attack to which they are both tied, namely the attack on the serpent, Eve, and Adam (chs. 15–30). The look towards these chapters may not only throw light on the two remaining questions regarding chs. 10–12 posed above, but will also serve to both clarify and solidify the link to and between chs. 2–3 and 10–12 and will allow for the formulation of the more systematic interpretative paradigm proposed in this article.

4 The First Attack

That then takes us to the temporally initial three-pronged attack of the enemy, namely his deception of snake (16:1–17:1a), Eve (17:2b–20:5a) and Adam (20:5b–21:6), as well as its consequences (chs. 22–30). First of all, in their aetiological description of the uprising of the animals of the field, as well as the culprit responsible for it, chs. 15–30 provide for a narratological link with the animal attack on Seth. On the face of it, two frameworks for its interpretation present itself, namely that of satanic instrumentalization and that of satanic association. As regards the former, in ch. 16, the devil wins the serpent over for himself and consequently uses it as his instrument (16:5: μὴ φοβοῦ, γενοῦ μοι σκεῦος, κἀγὼ λαλήσω διὰ στόματός σου ῥῆματα). Even though the animal speaks, the devil

24 Note the different version of 10:2 in Tromp, The Life of Adam and Eve in Greek (see n. 1), 132: πάντες οἱ ἁμαρτήσαντες καταράσονται μοι λέγοντες ὅτι οὐκ ἐφύλαξεν Εὕα τὴν ἐντολὴν τοῦ θεοῦ.
26 As can be gleaned from Apoc. Mos. 26:1 (‘an unthankful vessel’), a certain degree of irony is present in the devil using someone or something as his vessel. In fact, as created beings, both the serpent and the human being are not vessels of the devil, but of God. Cf. the different version in Tromp, The Life of Adam and Eve in Greek (see n. 1), 140: κἀγὼ λαλήσω διὰ στόματός σου ῥῆμα ἐν πρός το ἐξαπατήσαι αὐτούς.
talks (cf. 17:4). However, chs. 15–30, in continuation of a motif already present in chs. 10–12, also provide two related and alternative avenues in relating ‘Seth’s’ animal to the devil, namely cooperative and resultative association. On the one hand, the devil may not actively have to use an animal with an explicit purpose, but is at least allied to it in a mutual fight against the human being. On the other hand, the devil’s previous deception of serpent, Eve and Adam carried with it a certain result: It heralded in the animals’ uprising and their reign.

Can either of these paradigms be tied to chs. 10–12? The evidence seems to favour the paradigm of dual association. There is simply no indication of the animal’s passivity and its manipulation by a different warring entity: It is presented as actively and independently agitating against the son of Eve. Furthermore, in contrast to the instrumentalized serpent of ch. 16, the author here consistently speaks of a generic animal (θηρίον), which is especially peculiar in light of its exegetical background (i.e., Gen 3:15). Even the elements which chs. 10–12 share with ch. 16, such as the issue of subordination (cf. 10:3; 11:2–3; 16:3) and the opening of the mouth (10:3: πῶς ἠνοίγη τὸ στόμα σου; 16:5; 17:4; cf. further 16:3), focus on a resultative status. The serpent was made envious of Adam’s superior position and authority (16:3), and now, mention is made of a ‘reign of the animals’ and a foregone subordination (11:1). The devil manipulated the serpent into opening its mouth (16:5; 17:4), and now, animals’ mouths have been opened (10:3). Accordingly, does the animal attack of chs. 10–12 serve solely as a testimony to the ‘change of nature’ (11:2) the animals underwent?27 While this element is definitely present, and is in itself resultatively linked to the enemy’s activity in the Apocalypse, restricting the narratological meaning to this aetiological element would undervalue the relevance of the already identified parallel use of πολεμέω in ch. 2 and 10. The animal is carrying out an activity which until now has solely been linked to the devil. Said connection does not entail identifying or instrumentally associating the animal with the devil, but does point to some sort of mutuality in the fight against a common enemy. As such, while there is no sign of the devil’s work in chs. 10–12, the independently agitating animal is itself a sign of the devil’s (previous) work and (present) cause. The episode points not only to the animal’s new status and attitude in relation to humankind, but also to

27 Cf. Knittel, Das griechische ‘Leben Adams und Evas’ (see n. 6), 113–114, who sees in the animal a representative of the “Gesamtheit der Tiere” and accordingly, the central theme being humanity’s reign over animals.
the ‘partner in crime’ who made this change possible in the first place, the devil, on whose side the animals now fight.28

Such an interpretation is consistent with another important result of the events illustrated in chs. 15–30, namely that the post-fall devil doesn’t actually need ‘external’ animals anymore. He now has an animal on the inside, which provides for a link with the other attack on Eve’s sons, namely that on Cain and Abel. In a first step, satanic instrumentalization is extended beyond the animal realm in ch. 17. As such, it serves as an important result of the success of this particular animal attack: Just as the serpent was used as a σκεῦος of the devil, so too Eve essentially becomes an instrument in his hands.29 Commentators here rightly point to the parallel structure of the three attacks on the serpent, Eve, and Adam.30 This is not motivated by exoneration per se, but rather to structurally display the importance of the devil as the central (attacking) agitator.31 Correspondingly, while implicit in ch. 17 itself, the devil’s instrumentalization of Eve clearly shows itself in ch. 21: She is said to have opened her mouth and the devil spoke (ήνοιξα τὸ στόμα μου, καὶ ὁ διάβολος ἐλάλει, v. 3). Just as the serpent did the devil’s bidding by tempting Eve, so too Eve is now doing his bidding (cf. 21:5), which entails, first and foremost, the eating of the forbidden fruit.32 In some sense, Eve is therewith said to have opened her mouth in two senses: She opened it to speak the devil’s words and to consume that which was forbidden.33

This act leads to an internalization of that which up to this point remained external: It leads to outside attack becoming internal attack. Mention is made of the serpent laying on the piece of fruit “the poison of his wickedness, which is (the poison of) desire,” further specified as “the desire for every (kind of) sin” (καὶ ἔθετο ἐπὶ τὸν καρπόν [...] τὸν ἴδων τῆς κακίας αὐτοῦ, τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, ἐπιθυμία γάρ ἐστι πάσης ἁμαρτίας, 19:3). Without doubt, the mention of ἐπιθυμία

29 Cf. Marinus de Jonge and Johannes Tromp, The Life of Adam and Eve and Related Literature, Guides to Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1997), 54.
30 Dochhorn, Apokalypse (see n. 1), 292–293. Cf. also Levison, “Exoneration” (see n. 25), 147–148; ibid., Portraits of Adam (see n. 5), 168; Bertrand, La vie grecque (see n. 2), 51.
31 Cf. Dochhorn, Apokalypse (see n. 1), 293: “Adam und Eva haben einen Feind, den Teufel, der durchgängig als der eigentliche Akteur des Geschehens dargestellt wird.” Levison, “Exoneration” (see n. 25), 139: “She was the unwilling vessel of the voice of Satan.”
32 Cf. the similar thought in Rom 7:20b: οὐκέτι ἐγώ κατεργάζομαι αὐτὸ ἀλλ’ ἡ οἰκοῦσα ἐν ἐμοί ἁμαρτία.
33 Note the existence of another wordplay in Apoc. Mos. 19:1, where Eve is said to have ‘opened’ paradise for the serpent.
testifies to detailed exegesis not just of Gen 3:6 (MT), but also of Exod 20:17/Deut 5:21.\textsuperscript{34} Moreover, its train of thought certainly closely corresponds to the Pauline exegesis of Gen 3 in Rom 7 (cf. esp. v. 8 ἡ ἁμαρτία [...] κατειργάσατο ἐν ἐμοὶ πάσαν ἐπιθυμίαν).\textsuperscript{35} As such, while its connection to Apoc. Mos. 25:3 (Eve exclaiming: “I won’t return to the sin of the flesh” [καὶ οὐ μὴ ἐπιστρέψω εἰς τὴν ἁμαρτίαν τῆς σαρκός]) could tempt one to primarily relate the meaning of ἐπιθυμία to the ‘fleshly’ domain, it should be stressed that its standard meaning – especially in Hellenistic Judaism – is relatively broad.\textsuperscript{36} While cryptic, it introduces an important ‘internal’ consequence of the events of Gen 3: It heralded in the phenomenon of ἐπιθυμία, which now leads to all kinds of sin, in both man and woman (cf. also 6:1).\textsuperscript{37} Corresponding to this is the later mention of enmity (ἔχθρα, 25:4) as well as war (πόλεμος, 28:4), “which the enemy placed inside of you” (ἣν/ὃν ἔθετο ὁ ἔχθρος ἐν σοί, 25:4; 28:4).\textsuperscript{38} Humans are now, to put it poignantly, under internal attack.

This result, the additional rise of internal rebellion and war invites for a comparison with the enemy’s attack on Cain and Abel. On the face of it, chs. 2–3 and 15–30 contain a number of similarities. Whereas chs. 2–3 mention an enemy as well as the making of war (2:4), chs. 15–30 not only refer to an enemy, but also to internal enmity and war (25:4; 28:4). Moreover, Cain explicitly shares a motif with the serpent, Eve, and Adam, namely that of wrath. All three initially hesitate to give in to the proposal of their tempter, expressing their fear of God’s wrath (φοβοῦμαι, μήποτε ὀργισθῇ μοι ὁ θεός, 16:4; 18:2; 21:4; cf. 26:1; 31:4). It is this motif of wrath, which is also found in Apoc. Mos. 3:2, where Cain is dubbed a

\textsuperscript{34} Dochhorn, Apokalypse (see n. 1), 346.


\textsuperscript{36} Cf. for a ‘sexual’ interpretation of Apoc. Mos. 25:3 Dochhorn, Apokalypse (see n. 1), 393–407. While he rightly points to the subordinate nature of Apoc. Mos. 25:3 in relation to Apoc. Mos. 19:3 (ibid., 396–397), it is questionable whether the Apocalypse really condemns sexual intercourse per se, rather than in more ‘mainstream’ fashion its (lustful) potentiality. Cf. on Apoc. Mos. 25 also Levison, Portraits of Adam (see n. 5), 169: “If the transgression is sexual, then the designation of the serpent, an unadorned phallic symbol, as an ‘ungrateful vessel’ (26) is appropriate.” Cf. ibid., 187.

\textsuperscript{37} Cf. on the breadth of the concept, e.  g., Philo, Spec. 4.84.

‘son of wrath’ (ὅτι ὀργῆς υἱός ἐστιν). If they share the (feared) wrath, they could well also share the tempter. Additionally, all of them opened their mouth in some form or manner: Either to manipulate or to consume. Accordingly, it may well be the case that the enemy wages his war on Cain and Abel not so much through the temptation of an external animal, but rather through the internal one introduced in their lives due to the misstep of their parents. In any case, the implicit result is the same: Both Cain and his parents were tempted, both were confronted with the devil’s war and became his σκέυος, both were made to consume something with (literally) fatal consequences. In this regard, the interpretative background of Gen 4:7 may again prove highly relevant in interpreting what exactly ‘happened’ to Cain, not only in that it speaks of sin’s desire (cf. תשוקה) towards him, but also in introducing a regnal dimension into the process: He is supposed to rule over it, which could well mean that, if he should fail at this, sin may end up ruling over him. Precisely this idea of some kind of path dependent reign of the devil may be linked to the concept of desire (ἐπιθυμία). Eve and Adam allow themselves to be tempted by the enemy and eat that which was forbidden, i.e., they sin, which leads to an embedded desire for more sin. The devil now has an agent, a warring animal on the inside, through which he at least in some sense has a lasting influence on his victims, and this animal is very rightly named ‘desire.’

In Philo’s treatment of the passions, the animal-like influence of ἐπιθυμία is predominantly oriented towards the future, in contrast to the more present concept of pleasure (ἡδονή), which he actually identifies with the serpent of Gen 3 (see below) and which is said to cause desire (esp. Leg. 3.113; Praem. 71; cf. Somn. 2.210; Jos. 153; Mos. 2.23). This future orientation is of central importance in correctly interpreting Philo’s concept of desire. Useful is in this regard the distinction between two modes or aspects of desire, namely between ‘dynamic’ desire, which principally denotes an excessive and misdirected version of emotive desire.

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39 Note that the interpretation of the Hebrew is controversial (cf. LXX ἀποστροφή/ἐπιστροφή, Gen 3:16; 4:7; Song 7:11) and should not be directly connected to ἐπιθυμία. Nevertheless, the two terms may have some semantic overlap. Cf. on a related language game with נפש Dochhorn, Apokalypse (see n. 1), 404–407.

40 On the animalistic nature of desire, see Leg. 1.69; Agr. 73; Ebr. 223; Abr. 160; Spec. 1.148; Contempl. 74. On the working of pleasure inside the soul, cf. esp. Decal. 143. Cf. on the relationship between pleasure and desire in Plato and Aristotle Hans Svebakken, Philo of Alexandria’s Exposition of the Tenth Commandment, SPhiloM 6 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2012), 52: “Plato had understood pleasure (ἡδονή) to be the ultimate aim of ἐπιθυμία, and Aristotle added technical precision to this idea by defining ἐπιθυμία as an ὀρέξις τοῦ ἡδέος, or appetite for the pleasant.” For this, he cites De an. 414b5–6; Eth. nic. 1119b6–8. Cf. as regards the interplay between desire and pleasure in Philo Svebakken, Exposition, 73, 75–76, 81, 88, 94, 131–132, 149. Cf. also his definition of desire as a “motivating disposition” (ibid., 149).
and which fights with the mind over the supremacy over the soul, and ‘kratic’ or ‘dynastic’ desire, a state in which ἐπιθυμία has completely overpowered the mind and dictates a soul’s every move, pushing it towards the never-ending pursuit of pleasure. It is this reign which is characterized by an unceasing and insatiable hunger for that which is not present, which is always left unfulfilled, and, in Tantalean fashion (cf. Her. 269; Decal. 149; Spec. 4.81), never really reaches its goal (Agr. 36, Decal. 142–150; cf. Leg. 3.148–149; Det. 113; Ebr. 4, 6, 206–207; Her. 109, 269–270; Fug. 91; Mut. 171; Mos. 2.139, 185; Spec. 1.150, 192; 4.80–82, 113, 129; Virt. 9; Contempl. 55, 61, 74; Legat. 14). It spreads through the soul in disease-like fashion (Spec. 4.83) and causes a hunger and thirst for an ever-widening scope of illegitimate and ‘fake’ goods (Spec. 4.82). Fitting in this context is the motif of the war of the soul (cf. Apoc. Mos. 28:4), which Philo often uses to describe the activity of the passions (i.a. ἐπιθυμία) in seeking to rule over the mind (Opif. 81, 164; Leg. 3.116–117, 186–187; Sacr. 17, 35; Ebr. 75, 97–98; Her. 243–245; Somn. 2.147, 166; cf. Leg. 1.86; 3.14, 116, 134; Det. 110; Ebr. 104; Abr. 29, 105, 242; Decal. 142). Desire can be characterized as the fountain (πηγή) of all unrighteous acts, destroying and consuming everything (Decal. 173; cf. Spec. 4.84, 85; Virt. 100; cf. additionally Det. 174; Decal. 150–153; Spec. 4.83, 130). It is driven away and exiled from the region of virtue (Spec. 1.150). As such, similar to the Apocalypse, it is said to have an explicitly poisonous quality. Everything it touches (προσάπτω) changes for the worse, like venomous animals or deadly poison (Spec. 4.86; cf. Legat. 89). This idea is even explicitly tied to the serpent of Gen 3. Both pleasure (Opif. 157) and the lover of pleasure (φιλήδονος, Opif. 158) carry poison in their teeth (cf. also Apoc. Mos. 10:3), since these are servants of insatiate desire (ἀπληστία), leading human beings to consume more than they can stomach (Opif. 159). The influ-

41 This distinction relates to that propagated by Svebakken, Exposition (see n. 40), between ‘passionate’ and ‘tyrannical’ desire. Cf. on ‘passionate’ desire ibid., 65–70, 177. On ‘tyrannical’ desire 71–79, 168, 179–180. Cf. ibid., 75: “Tyrannical desire (ἔρως) thus represents the terminal stage of a disastrous process that begins with reason outmatched by ἐπιθυμία and ends with reason enslaved by ἐπιθυμία.” While his proposal has some merit, especially in its preservation of some form of ‘checked’ desire and in its differentiation between a battered and a conquered soul, it suffers from the ambivalence of the term ‘passionate’ as well as the concept of ἔρως in Plato, Middle Platonism, and Philo. Even Her. 269 and Spec. 4.85 do not conclusively portray the latter as ἐπιθυμία’s “terminal stage.” Not only is the term used flexibly in both Plato and Philo, but Svebakken also has to admit to ἔρως’s notable absence (and ἐπιθυμία’s presence), where it would, under his interpretation, be expected (cf. ibid., 77 [n. 148], 138–139, 149, 179–180). Rather, it seems preferable to refer directly to a reigning and therewith ‘kratic’ or ‘dynastic’ state of desire (cf. Her. 269: κρατέω) as well as a more unsettled state, in which the attractive power of desire is stressed (cf. Her. 270: ἐπιθυμία μὲν γὰρ ὄλκόν έξουσία δόναμιν), yet not its having overpowered the mind. 42 Cf. Svebakken, Exposition (see n. 40), 75–77, 128, 131–132, 149.
ence of desire can even be described in terms resembling the acts of Cain in the Apoc. Mos. In Fug. 31, Philo mentions an intemperate man, who falls on his belly and, even prior to opening his mouth, opens his insatiate desire (ὁ μὲν γὰρ πεσὼν ἐπὶ γαστέρα καὶ πρὸ τοῦ στόματος τὰς ἀπλήστους διοίξας ἐπιθυμίας). He inappropriately fills himself to the brink (ἀκόσμως ἐμφορήσεται), is drawn to that of his neighbour (τὰ τοῦ πλησίον ἐπισπάσεται) and licks up (ἐπιλιχμάω) everything without blushing.

This fatal fight with and reign of animalistic desire may well be present in the Apocalypse’s reading of Gen 3. On the one hand, something or someone (falsely) convinced the senses that something is ‘good’ (i.e., desirable), which, if done successfully, raises future-oriented (‘dynamic’) desire. On the other hand, upon acting, the vicious cycle of capturing the uncaptrable is heralded in. Powerful desire is increasingly converted into overpowering desire and the interplay of (‘dynastic’) desire and pleasure can commence, especially if recollection, or (vague) perception of the desirable object is at hand (Decal. 146; cf. T. Reu. 2:4). This second aspect can be linked to the poison of evil placed on/in the fruit: Once consumed, it will cause a near-unstoppable craving for more. In this connection, statements such as Apoc. Mos. 13:5, presupposing ‘sinning’ humanity (cf. 10:2), as well as Apoc. Mos. 32:2, where all sin is said to have arisen through Eve, confirm the influence of this internal animal beyond the figures of Adam and Eve themselves (cf. also 20:1–2; 21:5–6). Moreover, it may be very relevant that the animal attacking Seth states: “Because of this, our natures were changed as well” (καὶ ἡμῶν αἱ φύσεις μετηλλάγησαν, 11:2), which could presuppose that a change in human nature also took place, most likely concerning the uprising of desire within it. It is this internal animal, this unending enmity on the inside, which the devil might also have employed in making his war on Cain and Abel.

Returning to the discourse of chs. 15–30, what is in any case unambiguously provided is the reason both sons of Eve came under attack: It is the result of their parents’ transgression, which led to their vulnerability. As already observed in chs. 10–12, Eve links the attack on Seth to her own failure to keep God’s commandment (10:2). Where in the past animals were subordinated to the image

43 Cf. on the link between desire and self-love Svebakken, Exposition (see n. 40), 182–183.
44 Cf. Svebakken, Exposition (see n. 40), 128: “Obsessed with a false good, the moral agent continually brings an image of that ‘good’ to mind, and because that ‘good’ promises pleasure, ἐπιθυμία remains in a state of continual arousal in pursuit of that pleasure.”
of God, their mouth is now opened against humankind (10:3), both in speech and in desire. In fact, mention is made of a ‘reign of the animals’ (11:1) as well as a change in their nature (11:2). Furthermore, Eve’s transgression also led to inward vulnerability, namely to the uprising of poisonous desire (19:3), leading to inward enmity and war (25:4; 28:4). However, chs. 15–30 also narratologically expand on this new vulnerability by introducing a geographical change, which might not only have had external consequences: Humankind now no longer lives in God’s protected garden, but on the field, i.e., the place on which the serpent (i.a.) is said to reside (Gen 3:1). Humankind now lives in a theatre of war, a theatre which might not only be ‘external.’ It could well be relevant, in this connection, that Cain murdered Abel precisely here: On the field (שדה, Gen 4:8). For Philo, the field represents a symbol or sign of “strife and contention” (σύμβολον/ σημεῖον ἁμίλλης καὶ διαμάχης, Det. 1, 32, cf. 3: φιλονεικία; further 28–29), of war and peace (Det. 2), which, especially in the Allegorical Commentary, predominantly take place in the human soul, particularly in its interaction with the body and its desires (cf. Det. 3–6, 9). It is on the field that the love of self and the love of God (and virtue) clash (cf. Det. 32). In chs. 15–30 then, a dimension of vulnerability is combined with the already introduced rebellion motif. The animals


47 Cf. Dochhorn, Apokalypse (see n. 1), 317–318. An interesting tension can in this connection be identified with regard to the ‘place’ of the serpent. In Apoc. Mos. 15:3, it appears to be inside of paradise, whereas ch. 16 seems to take place outside of paradise. Cf. ibid., 293–295; ibid., “Adam als Bauer oder: Die Ätiologie des Ackerbaus in Vita Adae 1–21 und die Redaktionsgeschichte der Adamviten,” in Literature on Adam and Eve: Collected Essays, ed. Gary Anderson, Michael Stone, and Johannes Tromp, SVTP 15 (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 315–346, here 331. While a certain degree of incoherence is undeniable, biblical ambivalence (cf. Gen 3:1) combined with a similar tension in the work of Philo can make the tension more intelligible. In Leg. 1.60–63 (as well as § 100), Philo struggles with the problem of the tree of knowledge of good and evil being in paradise (as it implies the possibility of good) as well as outside of it (as it implies the possibility of evil). He solves it on the one hand through an exegesis of Gen 2:17 and on the other hand by posing a distinction between essence (inside) and power (outside) (60: οὐσία μὲν ἐν αὐτῷ, δύναμιν δὲ ἐκτός). In fact, κακία in general is said to be both in and outside of paradise (62). See on the problem Radice, “Philo and Stoic Ethics” (see n. 19), 155–158. In similar fashion, could it not be that as a docile animal, the serpent was inside paradise, yet as regards its serving as an instrument of the devil, as something leading to vice, it was outside of paradise?
over which humankind formerly had authority, both in- and external, shall rise up in rebellion against them, as they have not kept the commandment (καὶ τῶν ἐκυρίευες θηρίων, ἐπαναστήσονται σοι ἐν ἀκαταστασίᾳ, ὅτι τὴν ἐντολήν μου οὐκ ἐφύλαξας, 24:3).

Finally, chs. 15–30 also present us with a possible explanation as regards the success or failure in the fight the sons of Eve have become engaged in. On numerous occasions it is stressed that the animals’ rebellion constitutes a direct result of a failure to ‘keep’ (φυλάσσω, 10:2; 23:3; 24:4; 28:4). In fact, on a broader level, it was Adam and Eve’s God-appointed task to ‘keep’ paradise (15:2; 17:3), including the animals inhabiting it. Nevertheless, past failure does not annul the call to future φυλάσσειν (cf. 28:4: ἐὰν φυλάξῃς ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ παντὸς κακοῦ). It is this call which Eve passes on to her children: “Guard yourselves, that you do not leave the good” (ὑμεῖς δὲ φυλάξατε ἑαυτούς, μὴ ἐγκαταλιπεῖν τὸ ἀγαθόν, 30:1).

Accordingly, rather than locating the reason for Seth’s success solely in some kind of implicit image theology, or in the victory implied in Gen 3:15, it seems at least possible that Seth’s victory, as does Cain’s defeat (cf. Gen 4:7), could also be tied to his implicit ethical standing. Philo associates Seth with human virtue and righteousness (cf. Post. 170; further Sir 49:16; Josephus, Ant. 1.68). His seed may not be identical to that of Abel, who actually left that which is mortal, but, being virtuous, slowly rises to perfection nonetheless, culminating in the figure of Moses (Post. 173–174). Even though Seth is not directly lauded to this degree in the Apocalypse, he is certainly portrayed in a positive light (cf. 38:4). What else

48 Mention is made of keeping the garden (15:2; 17:3), keeping commandments (10:2; 23:3; 24:3; 39:4; cf. 25:1) as well as keeping ‘oneself’ (28:4; 30:1). Potential for another implicit wordplay may be present in comparing Adam and Eve’s failure with Cain’s: Just as they failed to ‘keep’ paradise, so too Cain failed to ‘keep’ his brother (Gen 4:9). Cf. for an ethical interpretation of Cain’s failure to keep Philo, Det. 62–68.


51 Cf. on the two former interpretations Anderson, “The Penitence Narrative” (see n. 23), 36; Nir, “The Struggle” (see n. 28), 331–336.

52 Cf. Bauckham, “Jesus and the Wild Animals” (see n. 46), 11: “Evidently, Seth is a righteous person.” Najman, “Cain and Abel as Character Traits” (see n. 18), 117: “For Seth […] continues to exemplify the type of goodness and holiness exemplified by his dead brother.”
would one expect of the ‘image’ of God (10:3; 12:1, 2)? Seth did what was good, which shielded him from his external animalistic environment.

Yet, with regard to both Cain and Seth, this ethical standing may have had (implicit) in- and external consequences as well.³³ Interesting as regards the one who did not do good, Cain, is another Philonic tradition. By advocating a particular reading of Gen 4:11, Philo portrays the earth as actively cursing Cain (QG 1.71), leading him to fear the attack of beasts and reptiles (QG 1.74).⁵⁴ Accordingly, he is said to have lost control not only over his internal, but also over external animals. Might the same also apply, in antithetical fashion, to Seth? Did his goodness lead to control over his internal animals as well? On a preliminary note, this would explain the oddity of Eve seeing the warring animal and exclaiming that all who have sinned will curse her (10:2). The statement’s hamartiological dimension might point to the fact that the animal attack represented something more, namely an additional vulnerability to internal attack. Moreover, in Post. 42, Philo characterizes Cain as one who was unable to rule over himself (κρατέω), “yet dared to assert that he had absolute possession of all other things.”⁵⁵ Yet, the direct contrastive figure here is not Abel, but Seth, who is portrayed as the author (ἀρχηγέτης) of the race of those who love virtue (φιλάρετος). Again, the wordplay regarding the opening and closing of the mouth might be significant: Maybe the ‘good’ Seth’s silencing of the animal of the field (12:1) reflects and is accompanied by his having silenced his own internal animals, having shut the mouth of his desires. At the end of a list of entities opening their mouths, Seth is the one who finally manages to close one (or two).

With all of this in mind, a provisional attempt at systematization can be made. Far from representing isolated episodes in the lives of Adam, Eve, and their offspring, the three attacks narratologically exemplify a certain hamartiological and anthropological framework, dependent on two levels of association. On the one hand, the Apocalypse presents a consequential system of ethics: Doing good (i.e., ‘guarding oneself’) is not solely a stand-alone requirement, but carries with it a promise, namely the ability to withstand attack from within and without.

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³³ Even though the writings of Philo lack this connection between ‘doing good’ and controlling one’s urges, he does at times refer to the idea of virtues (cf. Leg. 1.45, 73) or commandments (cf. e.g., Spec. 4.170) being helpful in the fight against the passions. Cf. on the latter Svebakken, Exposition (see n. 40), 103, 106, 188.


⁵⁵ Cf. on the motif of ‘ruling’ (κρατέω) over one’s passions Svebakken, Exposition (see n. 40), 82–84.
The former can be associated with Cain, whose lack of it led him to progressively lose control over his internal ‘animal,’ through whom the victorious enemy now rules over him. The latter can be associated with Seth, whose doing ‘well’ leads to control, authority and victory over external animals, as well as, implicitly, internal animals. Both of these facets are connected to the events of chs. 15–30 (and therewith Gen 3): The three-pronged attack portrayed in them resulted in a vulnerability to both in- and external animal attack. On the other hand, the devil can be associated with both the animal of the field and that of the soul: He caused both of them to rise up against the now-vulnerable human being.

5 The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs

This proposed systematized narratological hamartiology can be further reinforced by looking beyond the Apoc. Mos. itself. Remarkably, the above expressed framework finds explicit parallels in the ethical exhortation of the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs. In fact, the resemblances between the Apoc. Mos. and this set of documents are so striking that the latter may be considered a more systematic explication of what the former implies narratologically.Similarities center especially on the theme of parallel mastery by/over the devil and/or animals.\footnote{See for the connection between the Apoc. Mos. and the T. 12 Patr. with regard to animal attack already Friedrich Spitta, “Beiträge zur Erklärung der Synoptiker,” ZNW 5 (1904): 303–326, here 323–326; Wilhelm August Schulze, “Der Heilige und die wilden Tiere: Zur Exegese von Mc 1 13 b,” ZNW 46 (1955): 280–283, here 283; Erich Gräßer, “ΚΑΙ ΗΝ ΜΕΤΑ ΤΩΝ ΘΗΡΙΩΝ (Mk 1,13b): Ansätze einer theologischen Tierschutzethik,” in Studien zum Text und zur Ethik des Neuen Testaments: Festschrift zum 80. Geburtstag von Heinrich Greeven, ed. Wolfgang Schrage, BZNW 47 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1986), 144–157, here 146–147.}

In T. Iss. 7:7, after a characterization of Issachar’s positive ethical standing (cf. 7:1–6), he commands his children to do ‘these things,’ as a result of which “every spirit of Beliar will flee from you […] and every wild beast you will subdue” (καὶ πᾶν πνεῦμα τοῦ Βελιὰρ φεύξεται ἀρ’ ὧμῶν […] καὶ πάντα ἄγριον θῆρα καταδουλώσεσθε).\footnote{Cf. Harm W. Hollander and Marinus de Jonge, The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs: A Commentary, SVTP 8 (Leiden: Brill, 1985), 255: “On the virtuous man the spirits of evil, wicked men and beasts have no hold.” See for the Greek version of the T. 12 Patr. Marinus de Jonge, The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs: A Critical Edition of the Greek Text, PVTG 1,2 (Leiden: Brill, 1978). Unless stated otherwise, the English translation of Hollander/de Jonge is used.} In a similar vein, T. Dan 5:1 admonishes the children to ‘observe’ (φυλάσσω) the Lord’s command, to keep his law, to leave wrath and hate the lie, “so that the Lord may dwell among you and Beliar may flee from you” (ἡν κύριος κατοικήσῃ
ἐν ὑμῖν καὶ φύγῃ ἄφ’ ὑμῶν ὁ Βελιάρ). To this can be added T. Benj. 3:5, in which someone fearing the Lord and loving their neighbour is said to be free from the dominion of “the plot of men or beasts” (καὶ ὑπὸ ἐπιβουλῆς ἀνθρώπων ἢ θηρίων οὐ δύναται κυριεύθηναι, cf. 3:3), as well as T. Benj. 5:2, where it is stated: “If you do well, both the unclean spirits will flee from you and even the beasts will fear you” (εάν ἦτε ἀγαθοποιοῦντες, καὶ τὰ ἀκάθαρτα πνεύματα φεύξεται ἄφ’ ὑμῶν καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ θηρία φοβηθήσονται ὑμᾶς).

Especially illustrative is T. Naph. 8, in which a dichotomy is found resembling that between Cain/Eve and Seth. Naphtali exclaims: “If you work that which is good [...] the devil will flee from you, and the wild beasts will fear you” (εὰν ἐργάσησθε τὸ καλὸν, [...] ὁ διάβολος φεύξεται ἄφ’ ὑμῶν, καὶ τὰ θηρία φοβηθήσονται ὑμᾶς, 8:4). Yet, as regards him that does not do good (τὸν δὲ μὴ ποιοῦντα τὸ καλὸν), “the devil will appropriate him as his own peculiar instrument, and every wild beast will master him” (ὁ διάβολος οἰκειοῦται αὐτὸν ὡς ἴδιον σκεῦος, καὶ πάν τὰ θηρία κατακυριεύσει αὐτοῦ, 8:6). Similarities to the Apoc. Mos. are here too great to be incidental. T. Naph. 8 rather represents the theological framework for which the Apoc. Mos. is the narrative explication. Just as the devil used the serpent (as well as Eve and, implicitly, Cain), in essence a σκεῦος of God (Apoc. Mos. 26:1; 31:4), as if it were his (Apoc. Mos. 16:5), so too the devil is here said to instrumentalize him who does not do good. Yet, someone who does what is good will make the devil (and his spirits) flee and will rule over animals as well.

58 Hollander and de Jonge, Testaments (see n. 57), 283, here translate with ‘in’ instead of ‘among’. Cf. T. Dan 4:7: “and when the soul is disturbed continually, the Lord departs from it and Beliar rules over it.”

59 Alternative reading here: καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ θηρία φεύξεται ἄφ’ ὑμῶν φοβηθέντες. See Hollander and de Jonge, Testaments (see n. 57), 421–422: “Any certainty cannot be reached.” Cf. also T. Benj. 6:1: “The disposition of the good man is not in the hand of the deceit of the spirit of Beliar.” Hollander and de Jonge (Testaments [see n. 57], 419) cite Job 5:22–23 as a biblical parallel to T. Benj. 3:5 (cf. v. 23 [LXX]: θηρίς γὰρ δόμηρε διηνεύοντα νου καὶ μνημίζει αὐτοῦ) and mention the animosity of animals especially in connection with God’s judgment of unrighteousness (Lev 26:22; Philo, QG 1.74; Josephus, Ant 1.59).

60 See for the meaning of οἰκειόω Henry George Liddell et al., A Greek-English Lexicon, 9th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), 1202 (cf. esp. 2. c. acc.: “make or claim as one’s own, appropriate”). Cf. on Beliar/the devil ruling over someone T. Dan 4:7; T. Ash. 1:8. Interestingly, a similar irony is present in the T. 12 Patr. as has been observed with regard to the Apoc. Mos. Here too, God is presented as the true ‘owner’ of his vessels. See Stefan Opferkuch, Der handelnde Mensch: Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von Ethik und Anthropologie in den Testamenten der Zwölf Patriarchen, BZNW 232 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018), 289, n. 3. Cf. on the connection between T. Naph. and the Apoc. Mos. Piñero, “Angels and Demons” (see n. 21), 212–213, who reads a kind of “prophetic inspiration” into the phenomenon.
6 The Testaments and the Envy of Cain

Accordingly, the T. 12 Patr. strengthen the link between on the one hand ‘doing good’ and observing the Lord’s commands and on the other hand mastery over both animals as well as the devil and his evil spirits, which they share with the Apoc. Mos. Yet, they also offer a more detailed explanation as to how the evil entity (the devil/Beliar/prince of deceit) gets the vulnerable (i.e., those who do not do ‘good’) into his lot, which may serve as an interpretative bridge to connect two of the wars proclaimed over the sons of Eve, on the one hand the internal war tied to passions such as desire and on the other hand the mention of the devil directly warring against a human being. In the Testaments, the devil is said to have at his disposal an army of evil spirits, in part tied to the negative emotions or actions they effectuate in humans. For instance, ‘desire’ is not so much solely one of the primary passions, but may also represent an evil spirit (T. Jud. 16:1; cf. T. Reu. 3:3: πνεῦμα ἀπληστείας ἐν τῇ γαστρί, whose semi-independent destructive activity within a human being increasingly draws it into the devil’s sphere of influence.

The teaching as regards these spirits can be characterized as ‘open.’ At times, mention is made of a single or multiple ‘spirit(s) of error,’ or of a single or multiple ‘evil spirit(s).’ Accordingly, it would be very appropriate to speak of the devil making war on human beings, including Cain and Abel, through an army of ‘irregular’ vice-oriented evil spirits. Nevertheless, there is one specific vice beyond the rather broad category of ‘desire,’ which, in light of its traditio-historical connection to Cain and Abel, invites closer inspection, namely envy (φθόνος). Whereas the biblical tradition cryptically leaves the reason for the fratricide (as well as the rejection of Cain’s offering) implicit, some elements of later extrabiblical tradition tie his action to being overcome with envy. God looked upon the

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61 Cf. on a discussion as regards the ‘ontological status’ of these spirits Opferkuch, Der handelnde Mensch (see n. 60), 293–295, who states (ibid., 294): “Für die Anthropologie der TestXII ist damit festzuhalten, dass der Mensch unter dem Einfluss externer, dämonischer Mächte steht, die ihn auf ihre Seite zu ziehen versuchen – und das bedeutet: weg von Gott, hin zu seinem Widersacher Beliar.” On their semi-independent nature, see ibid., 294.
62 Opferkuch, Der handelnde Mensch (see n. 60), 291: “Eine detaillierte Auflistung dieser Geister trägt hier nichts aus und würde lediglich anschaulich machen, dass die ‘Geisterlehre’ der TestXII nicht kohärent und systematisch durchdacht ist.” Cf. Hollander and de Jonge, Testaments (see n. 57), 50.
63 Cf. Angela Y. Kim, “Cain and Abel in the Light of Envy: A Study in the History of the Interpretation of Envy in Genesis 4.1–16,” JSP 12, no. 1 (2001): 65–84, here 65, who mentions “the lack of contact between the brothers (the lack of a murder motive).” Cf. ibid., 74: “The reader can only infer that Cain’s violent action arose from an envious anger.”
offering (or gift) of his brother, yet had no regard for his own, and this led to the violent killing of Abel. Such an interpretative tendency may already be hinted at in the LXX.\(^{64}\) In fact, positing a connection between Cain and envy may even have arisen from a wordplay already set up in the Hebrew between קָנָה (‘to acquire’) and קֶנָּא (‘to be jealous’), which is further strengthened by the thematic link between envy and greed.\(^{65}\) The enviousness of Cain can even be tied to the reason for his rejected offering: By withholding what was best (cf. Philo, \textit{Sacr.} 72; \textit{QG} 1.64), which could well have been the original connotation of φθόνος/φθονέω, Cain is in a sense actually envious of God.\(^{66}\)

The Testaments for their part contain elaborate traditions regarding envy. Relevant is especially the Testament of Simeon, in which φθόνος can be considered the “central theme,” being used in a roughly interchangeable fashion to ζῆλος.\(^{67}\) Within the autobiography given to his children, Simeon describes himself as being jealous of Joseph (ἐν τῷ καιρῷ ἐκείνῳ ἐζήλωσα τὸν Ἰωσήφ, 2:6) because of the love their father had for him. As a result, he, being without compassion, decided to kill him, because “the prince of deceit sent the spirit of jealousy and blinded my mind, so that I did not regard him as a brother” (ὅτι ὁ ἄρχων τῆς πλάνης, ἀποστείλας τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ ἰζήλου, ἐτύφλωσέ μου τὸν νόον, μὴ προσέχειν αὐτῷ ὡς ἀδελφῷ, 2:7). After his hand withered, he repented, and asked God that he might keep away “from all pollution and envy and all folly” (ἀπὸ παντὸς μολυσμοῦ καὶ φθόνου καὶ ἀπὸ πάσης ἀφροσύνης, 2:13), as he knew that he had been wrong in envying his brother (φθονήσας αὐτῷ, 2:14).

This autobiographical description of the envy Simeon had for his younger brother is followed by a call to guard oneself against and a description of the spirits of deceit and envy (καὶ νῦν, τέκνα μου, φυλάξασθε ἀπὸ τῶν πνευμάτων τῆς διανοίας τοῦ ἀνθρώπου), not

\(^{64}\) Kim, “Cain and Abel” (see n. 63), 75–77.

\(^{65}\) Cf. Kim, “Cain and Abel” (see n. 63), 71, 77.

\(^{66}\) See on this meaning F.G. Herrmann, “φθόνος in the world of Plato’s Timaeus,” in \textit{Envy, Spite and Jealousy: The Rivalrous Emotions in Ancient Greece}, ed. David Konstan and N. Keith Rutter, Edinburgh Leventis Studies 2 (Edinburgh: University Press, 2003), 53–83, esp. 73–75, 80. Cf. ibid., 78: “The semantics of φθόνος could be: ‘a barring, debarring; withholding; hindering; denial, refusal; envy’; φθονέω ‘hinder, deny, refuse.’” The presence of the motif of envy (i.e., withholding the good) towards God could receive support in the Apocalypse considering the motif of God’s accused ‘envious’ state in Apoc. Mos. 18:4 (ὁ θεός [...] ἐφθόνησεν ὑμῖν), which actually makes a lot more sense if interpreted along the lines of withholding something good, rather than actively portraying God envying Adam and Eve.

\(^{67}\) Hollander and de Jonge, \textit{Testaments} (see n. 57), 109: “with little difference of meaning.” Cf. Opferkuch, \textit{Der handelnde Mensch} (see n. 60), 116–117.
letting him “eat or drink or do any good thing” (3:2). Instead, it continually suggests killing the object of one’s envy (3:3). Its spirit “makes savage the soul and destroys the body; it gives anger and war to the mind and stirs (it) up to deeds of blood, and leads the mind into frenzy, and does not allow prudence to act in men” (4:8). As if that were not enough, a form of evil jealousy (τις ζῆλος κακίας) is said to devour someone in his sleep, disturbing him greatly (4:9). One taken up by envy looks as if “having an evil and poisonous spirit” (ὡς πνεῦμα πονηρόν καὶ ιοβόλον ἔχων, 4:9). Simeon however learnt “that deliverance from envy comes by the fear of God” (3:4), and that “if a man flees to the Lord, the evil spirit runs away from him” (ἐάν τις ἐπὶ κύριον καταφύγῃ, ἀποτρέχει τὸ πονηρόν πνεῦμα ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, 3:5) and that envy will reside (3:6). A little later, he again warns his children to be on their guard against “all jealousy and envy” (φυλάξασθε οὖν, τέκνα μου, ἀπὸ παντὸς ζήλου καὶ φθόνου), instead prompting them to put the spirit of envy away (ἀφίστημι) (cf. 6:2), to walk with a good heart, and to love their brother (4:5–7).

A number of inferences can be drawn from this text. Firstly, it neatly portrays how the devil, in this case the ‘prince of deceit,’ wages his war on human beings by sending them spirits, here the spirit of envy, which, gaining dominion over someone, generate the connected vice in said person. Secondly, the recommended defence in this war consists of guarding oneself, fearing the Lord and doing ‘good,’ in this case loving your brother. If one does this, the spirit of envy will flee, just as the animal fled from Seth. However, if one fails to do so, thirdly,

68 See Opferkuch, Der handelnde Mensch (see n. 60), 123: “[S]o ist die Annahme, Neid führe zum Mord, hellenistisches Allgemeingut.”
69 Opferkuch notes the presence of a vicious circle in this regard: “Die beiden Verse stellen die negativen Effekte des Neides auf das menschliche Personzentrum dar, aus denen dann wiederum schlechtes Handeln folgt.” See Opferkuch, Der handelnde Mensch (see n. 60), 131.
70 Cf. Opferkuch, Der handelnde Mensch (see n. 60), 125: It is a “Motiv, das sich öfter in den TestXII findet: Wer zum Herrn flieht, wer sich also an ihm orientiert, den verlässt der Neid.”
(the spirit of) envy will take them over, not letting go until one kills the envied object.

Nonetheless, while the motif of envy leading to the (attempted) murder of a more successful younger brother connects the T. Sim. to the story of Cain and Abel, it misses an explicit reference to it. However, this connection is found in another text regarding envy. In T. Benj. 7, Benjamin calls upon his children to “flee the malice of Beliar, because he gives a sword to those who obey it” (φεύγετε τὴν κακίαν τοῦ Βελιάρ, ὅτι μάχαιρα δίδωσι τοῖς πειθομένοις αὐτῇ, 7:1). This sword for its part is described as the “mother of seven evils” (ἡ δὲ μάχαιρα ἑπτὰ κακῶν μήτηρ ἐστί, 7:2). Before listing these evils, mention is made of the mind ‘first’ conceiving through Beliar (πρῶτον συλλαμβάνει ἡ διάνοια διὰ τοῦ Βελιάρ, 7:2). Afterwards, a list of seven is given, primed by envy (φθόνος), followed by ruin, tribulation, captivity, dearth, confusion and ending in desolation (ἐρήμωσις).72 What seems to be described is the fact that obeying/trusting in Beliar will lead to violence (i.e., being given a sword) and envy, which in turn will lead to desolation. Interestingly, this thought is subsequently tied to the figure of Cain. Making a causal connection, the author states: “Therefore (διὰ τοῦτο) was also Cain delivered over to seven vengeances by God” (7:3). Yet, in the end, he was “destroyed (ἐρημώω) at the Flood on account of Abel his righteous brother” (7:4). In fact, this framework of envy leading to desolation does not only apply to Cain, but “those who are like Cain in envy which leads to hatred of brothers will be judged with the same punishment” (οἱ ὁμοιοῦμενοι τῷ Κάιν ἐν φθόνῳ εἰς τὴν μισαδελφίαν τῇ αὐτῇ κολάσει κριθήσονται, 7:5). Accordingly, Benjamin’s children are called to “flee evil, envy and hatred of brothers and cleave to goodness and love” (ἀποδράσατε τὴν κακίαν, φθόνον τε καὶ τὴν μισαδελφίαν, καὶ προσκολλᾶσθε τῇ ἀγαθότητι καὶ τῇ ἀγάπῃ, 8:1).

Here at last, there seems to be a direct link between envy, the devil, and Cain: Through the devil, the mind has conceived envy and became dominated by it (cf. T. Sim. 3:2), which led to the fratricide as well as the curses that followed. However, how can this idea be seen to implicitly stand behind the narrative of Apoc. Mos.? On the one hand, while envy is at times primarily tied to λύπη, in that it constitutes the experience of pain due to another’s (relative) well-being (cf. Aristotle, Rhet. 2.9–11), the concept carries with it an open and compounded orientation that does not preclude its link with the innate desire for sin mentioned in the Apocalypse.73 Even as a matter of common sense, one would expect envy

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72 See on these evils Hollander and de Jonge, Testaments (see n. 57), 432.

73 It is important to note here that Aristotle, among others, differentiates between envy (φθόνος) and jealousy (ζῆλος). While the latter implies a desire for active acquisition, the former primarily
resulting in one’s desire to end the envied subject’s said well-being (both with or without personal profit), just as a desire for being ‘like’ someone can, upon failed achievement, result in bitter envy. On the other hand, what may be very relevant in this connection is one of the scant pieces of information given regarding Cain in the Apoc. Mos. In Apoc. Mos. 1:3, alternative names are provided for Cain and Abel, the former’s being Διάφωτος. This name is viewed by Dochhorn as a corruption of διὰ φθόνον (‘out of envy’), which is to be considered a viable option especially due to the wordplay then present with the Hebrew קָנָה/קָנָא. It was because of the devil’s envy that Cain killed his brother, that death came into the world.

7 Philo’s Animal Farm

With all of this in mind, it might be profitable to return to Philo once more in a more systematic fashion, since his writings contain three aspects that give some further ‘colour’ to the arguments presented above. First of all, it was argued above that Seth’s authority over external animals may be implicitly accompanied (or even preceded) by his control over internal animals, over the passions of his soul. The writings of Philo may offer an interesting thought in this regard,

entails a desire to dispossess the envied person (2.11). Cf. David Konstan, “Before Jealousy,” in Envy, Spite and Jealousy: The Rivalrous Emotions in Ancient Greece, ed. David Konstan and N. Keith Rutter, Edinburgh Leventis Studies 2 (Edinburgh: University Press, 2003), 7–27, here 13–14. Such a differentiation was, however, not universal, as can already be observed in the T. 12 Patr., and should, even in the case of Aristotle, not be pressed. Cf. on the open and compound nature of the concept Cristina Viano, “Competitive Emotions and Thumos in Aristotle’s Rhetoric,” in Envy, Spite and Jealousy: The Rivalrous Emotions in Ancient Greece, ed. David Konstan and N. Keith Rutter, Edinburgh Leventis Studies 2 (Edinburgh: University Press, 2003), 85–97, here 95; Thomas Harrison, “The Cause of Things: Envy and the Emotions in Herodotus’ Histories,” in Envy, Spite and Jealousy: The Rivalrous Emotions in Ancient Greece, ed. David Konstan and N. Keith Rutter, Edinburgh Leventis Studies 2 (Edinburgh: University Press, 2003), 143–163, here 151: “The association of envy (phthonon) with desire for land (himeron) […] suggests an important point: Herodotus is no Aristotle. He may, incidentally, provide useful evidence in our attempt to define the semantic field of words such as phthonos, but he is not, for the most part, concerned to demarcate the boundaries of the various human emotions.”


75 Dochhorn, Apokalypse (see n. 1), 197. See for other proposals Tromp, “Cain and Abel” (see n. 5), 278–280: ἀδιάφωτον, yet not original.
since, while lacking a clear satanological component, they establish a connection between these two types of animals. In *Praem.*, dealing with the εὐλογίαι of Deut 28–30, Philo speaks of the first reward of keeping the commandments as consisting in victory over enemies (νίκην κατ’ ἐχθρῶν, 79). He continues by describing two kinds of enemies, human beings on the one hand and animals on the other (85). The latter are our ‘natural’ enemies, as they are hostile (δυσμενής) not to one city or people, but to the entire human race, and this not for a limited time, but for eternity. In fact, the war with the animals is truceless (ἄσπονδος γὰρ καὶ ἀκήρυκτος εἰς πόλεμος οὕτως, 87). Only God can do away with it, “when he selects some persons as worthy to be the saviors of their race [...] with whom envy has either absolutely never had any connection at all, or else it has speedily departed from them” (87). Yet, Philo exclaims, if there were to be a future in which the wild animals have become docile, long before that the wild animals in the soul will have to have been tamed (τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ θηρία τιθασευθήσεται, 88). Only when the animals of our mind have been tamed, those of the field will follow (ὅτι ἐξημερωθέντων τῶν κατὰ διάνοιαν καὶ τὰ ζῷα ἠμερωθήσεται, 88). In fact, in that case all animals will yield to humankind as their natural masters (89–90, cf. *Opif.* 83–88, *Deus.* 47; *Agr.* 8; *Abr.* 45; *Mos.* 2.22; *QG* 1.94; 2.9). Peace with both animals and human beings will happen for those “who obey God, and who at all times and in all places observe his commandments” (*Praem.* 98).

Secondly, Philo provides us with a wealth of animalistic images in describing the activities of the passions themselves. In *Leg.*, he explicitly likens animals of the field to the passions. They, the passions of the soul (τὰ θηρία, τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ πάθη), constitute a class of ‘helpers’ (cf. Gen 2:18), next to sense-perception (*Leg.* 2.9). However, deeming them helpers actually denotes a ‘misuse of language’ (καταχρηστικός), as they constitute enemies (πολέμιοι, *Leg.* 2.10). Moses likens the passions to beasts and birds, because they harm the mind, being untamable and wild (θηρίοις δὲ καὶ πτηνοῖς ἀπεικάζει τὰ πάθη, ὅτι σίνεται τὸν νοῦν ἀτίθασα

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76 Cf. the OT motif of eschatological peace with animals, as portrayed i.a. in Isa 11:6–9; Hos 2:18. See Bauckham, “Jesus and the Wild Animals” (see n. 46), 10–17, who explicitly cites *Praem.* 85–90 in conjunction with the T. 12 Patr. and the Apoc. Mos. as well as OT Texts such as Isa 11. He connects Philo’s account here esp. to Job 5:22–23, in which the assertion is made that “the righteous person will be protected from all natural threats to human life, including that from wild animals” (ibid., 11).

καὶ ἀνήμερα ὄντα, Leg. 2.11). A similar general association of the passions with animals occurs in QG. 2.56, 57, dealing with Gen 9:2–3 (cf. QG 1.94; 2.9, 27).78

That this animalistic characterization of the passions is not incidental in the Philonian corpus is confirmed by a host of other texts. Especially common is equestrian allegory. A mix between Platonic and Stoic ideas as well as a dependence on the biblical narrative under discussion lead to a certain fluidity in the imagery used in this regard.79 At times, Philo connects the Stoic fourfold division of the passions (ἡδονή, ἐπιθυμία, λύπη, φόβος, cf. e. g. Leg. 3.250; Conf. 90; Abr. 236) to the image of the four legs of a horse (Leg. 2.299; Agr. 83, 92; Ebr. 111–112; cf. Leg. 3.139; Agr. 109; Migr. 62; Mos. 1.25–26; Spec. 4.113). At other times, influenced rather by the Platonic idea of the charioteer (Phaedr. 246a–254e) and driven by his biblical Vorlage, Philo portrays the epithymētikon (or just ἐπιθυμία), together with the thymoeides (or just θυμός), as two horses, which the logical part of the soul then has to steer as a kind of figurative charioteer (Leg. 1.63–73; 3.118, 128; Agr. 72–73; Virt. 13; cf. Leg. 3.223–224; Sacr. 45; Migr. 67; Virt. 113).80 Next to the equestrian allegory, Philo also employs imagery more directly at home in the biblical narrative, as well as in the Apoc. Mos., namely in his interpretation of the serpent of Genesis 3. He deems it a symbol (or a representation) of pleasure (ἡδονή) (Opif. 157; Leg. 2.72, 74, 81; 3.68, 75–76, 114, 246; Agr. 97, 108; cf. Leg. 2.84). It was the serpent, i. e., pleasure, which misused and deceived sense-perception (Opif. 165–166; Leg. 3.61, 66, 108–109; cf. Abr. 238) in order to turn the mind towards evil. Together with that other animal, ἐπιθυμία, it figures as Philo’s deadly duo. The serpent, and therewith symbolically ἡδονή, ‘attacks people’ (ἀνθρώπῳ [...] ἐπιτίθεται, Agr. 108; cf. Gig. 43) and is “eager to kill with its poisonous but painless bite” (ἰοβόλοις καὶ ἀνωδύνοις γλιχομένην δήγμασιν ἀποκτεῖναι, Agr. 97; cf. Leg. 2.84, 93; Gig. 35).

78 Cf. on the “internalization” of “man’s conflict with the wild beasts” Peter Borgen, Philo of Alexandria: An Exegete for His Time, NovTSup 86 (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 234.
79 Cf. Gretchen Reydams-Schils, “Philo of Alexandria on Stoic and Platonist Psycho-Physiology: The Socratic Higher Ground,” in Philo of Alexandria and Post-Aristotelian Philosophy, ed. Francesca Alesse, SPbA 5 (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 169–195, here 170–171, who argues that the central importance of the “soul-body opposition” implies that Philo “has the flexibility to choose a soul model based on the exegetical demands of the Scripture passage at hand. Stoic and Platonist influences have [...] a doxographical dynamic”; Winston, “Philo of Alexandria on the Emotions” (see n. 77), 202: “The fusion of Platonic and Stoic terminology and conceptuality in Middle Platonism enabled Philo to superimpose the monistic Stoic analysis of the passions, which he found so appealing, on his dualistic Platonic understanding of the human psyche.”
80 Philo’s horses, in contrast to Plato’s, are both portrayed negatively, yet in uneven measure. Cf. on the Middle-Platonic background of this change Svebakken, Exposition (see n. 40), 88–93.
Accordingly, Philo gives the mind nothing less than a call to arms in this animalistic and truceless war on the inside (Leg. 2.106). In fact, this motif of war serves as an important interpretative bridge with regard to the Apocalypse: For Philo, it is waged both with animals of the field and of the soul. In fact, it’s truce- and limitnesslessness is something both wars share (cf. Opif. 164; Sacr. 17, 35; Her. 245; Praem. 87). Accordingly, just as humankind is described as a charioteer over all external animals (Opif. 87–88), so too are they to master their own internal animals. It is their duty to be a skilled charioteer (ἡνίοχος) (Leg. 1.72–73; 3.118, 128, 136, 223–224; Sacr. 45, 49; Agr. 72–73; Spec. 2.163; 4.79; Virt. 13) or horseman (ἱππεύς) (Agr. 69–71). In fact, Philo even connects this imagery to a tension present in the philosophical discourse of his day as regards the war against the passions, namely between moderation and extirpation.81 While controlling a horse (i.e., being a ἱππεύς) is preferable to simply being dragged along (i.e., being an ἀναβάτης), the best course of action would be to actually get of the horse altogether (Leg. 2.103–104). This going beyond merely controlling the passions is made explicit in a comparison between Moses and Aaron (Leg. 3.128–136, 140–150), of whom the former is also confronted with an instance of animal attack, namely in the context of the incident with the staff of Exod 4 (Leg. 2.88–93). After he throws it to the ground, it changes into a serpent, sending Moses into flight. Yet, God commands him to catch it by his tail, upon which the serpent turns into a rod once more (vv. 3–4). Now Philo, citing this passage, interprets fleeing away from the serpent (i.e., from ἡδονή) as a right course of action, yet not for the perfect man, Moses (cf. Her. 102–103).82 He should rather persevere in his war against it and master it (91–92; cf. Mos. 1.25–26).

Thirdly, Philo’s works also contain a number of relevant traditions concerning the motif of envy. In a political context, he presents envy, which hates all that is good, (ὁ μισόκαλος φθόνος), as that dreaded evil which forced him out of his philosophical contemplation into political life, lying in wait for and viciously attacking him like some kind of animal (cf. ἐφεδρεύω, Spec. 3.3). A similar animalistic image of envy is painted in Legat. 48: It “lurks in holes like a venomous reptile” (ιοβόλου τρόπον ἑρπετοῦ φωλεύει). In more general terms, envy is characterized as a fierce enemy, which is hard to get rid of (ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ φθόνος βαρὺς καὶ δυσαπότριπτος ἐχθρός, Somn. 1.223; cf. Ios. 5). Moreover, as in Spec. 3.3, envy is often juxtaposed to goodness and virtue (cf. Migr. 183: μισάρετος καὶ μισόκαλος; further Mut. 269; Abr. 191; Virt. 170) and is said to be banished or dis-

81 Cf. Winston, “Philo of Alexandria on the Emotions” (see n. 77), 203–204.
82 Cf. Ebr. 102–103: The perfect man ignores the voices of pleasure and desire.
tanced from goodness or the godly realm (cf. Migr. 183: ἀπελαύνω; Spec. 1.320: φθόνος γὰρ ἀρετῆς διώκεται; Spec. 4.75: ἐλαύνω).

Standing behind this association is most likely the saying, which Philo explicitly attributes to Plato (Phaedr. 247a), that envy stands outside of (or leaves) the divine company (φθόνος ἔξω θείου χοροῦ ἵσταται, Prob. 13; cf. Spec. 2.249 [βαίνω]). Philo can also in a more general sense speak of evil being banished thereof (ἡ δὲ κακία πεφυγάδευται θείου χοροῦ, Leg. 1.61; cf. Fug. 62, 74). The same even applies to the bad (φαῦλος) human being (ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος πεφυγάδευται θείου χοροῦ, Leg. 3.7; cf. further Post. 177).

In Fug. 62–64, Philo expands on this Platonic motif of ungrudging godly generosity and goodness in two directions. On the one hand, he quotes a related Platonic statement (Theaet. 176a–b) to express two ideas: Evil will never cease to exist (ἀπόλλυμι), since there must always be an opposite to good, and it is not seated among the divine, but will wander about among that which is mortal (Fug. 63).

On the other hand, on the basis of this, Philo considers it very appropriate that Cain, the symbol of evil, will not die, since it will always live in the mortal race of humankind (εἰκότως οὖν ὁ Κάϊν οὐκ ἀποθανεῖται, τὸ κακίας σύμβολον, ἣν ἀεὶ δεῖ ζῆν ἐν τῷ θνητῷ γένει παρ’ ἀνθρώποις, Fug. 64). It is this contrast between the goodness and generosity of God with the evil and selfishness of Cain, the exile, which further reinforces his characterization as one who envies, for whom there is no place in the divine realm. Accordingly, it might not be incidental that Philo categorizes the ruler of both in- and external animals among those, with whom envy has either not dwelt at all (ἐνοικέω) or quickly migrated from them (μετανίστημι, Praem. 87; cf. further Virt. 223; Wis 6:23). Envy does not belong to the image of God.

8 Conclusion and Outlook

This research article has sought to lay out a new narrative-oriented interpretative paradigm for understanding the hamartiological-anthropological underpinning of the Apocalypse of Moses. It revolves around three attacks. Constitutive is the temporarily initial three-pronged attack on the serpent, Eve, and Adam. On a narratological level, it displays how the real culprit, the satanic enemy, instrumentalizes both animal and human being, enticing them to open their mouths to

84 Cf. Koskenniemi, Greek Writers (see n. 83), 104–105.
receive and to tempt. On a resultative level, it leads to a geographical change from a protected garden to the vulnerable field, as well as the uprising of an (additional) external enemy, the animal, as well as an internal one, desire. Finally, on a causative level, it was Adam and Eve’s failure to ‘keep’ that led to their fate and which motivates Eve’s paraenetic plea for her children not to leave the good, since only this will protect them. All of these three levels reappear in the paired attacks on Adam and Eve’s sons. On the one hand, the devil’s attack on Cain and Abel, traditio-historically based on Gen 4:7, illustrates precisely what happens when one leaves the good. It gives the devil, lurking at the door, the opportunity to wage his internal war on his vulnerable victim, employing the rebel animal of desire, and turning him into his akratic instrument, to the utter destruction of his righteous brother. On the other hand, the unsuccessful animal attack on Seth exemplifies what happens when one sticks to the good: It leads to peace on the field and in the soul. It leads to nothing less than a restoration of the image of God, the one who sends both devil and beast into flight.

This proposed paradigm is strengthened by remarkable parallels in the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs and in the writings of Philo. The former feature multiple instances where a threefold connection is made between the devil and his army of evil spirits, animals, as well as (not) doing good. The one who does good will force both the devil, his spirits, as well as animals into flight, whereas the one who does not will be overcome by them and eventually turned into the devil’s own instrument. As such, the Testaments may even shed more light on how the devil ‘got’ to Cain. Cain killed his brother not just through desire, but through (a spirit of) envy. Not only is the theme of envy linked to him in the Testaments, but it may also be tied to the name given to him in the Apoc. Mos. Moreover, the works of Philo not only display precisely this connection between peace with in- and external animals, but also provide a host of examples in which the passions of the human soul are not just portrayed in an animalistic fashion, but as actively making war on the mind. It is this war which has to cease, this animal which has to be tamed, in order for the one of the field to follow. Philo even elaborates on the concept of envy, especially in its antithesis to virtue and goodness and possibly in connection with the figure of Cain. It is against the background of these two sets of documents that the narratological significance of the Apoc. Mos.’ two antithetical sons fully comes to the fore: They represent the human being over whom an unrelenting in- and external war has come. Yet, Seth overcame and Cain was overcome.

This article has herewith set forth an interpretative avenue into the Apocalypse of Moses’ hamartiological framework that is not just relevant for the document itself, but which may also instigate research on a number of broader issues and discussions. On the one hand, the interpretative framework promoted above
illustrates the need for a reevaluation of the relationship between Philo and the Apoc. Mos. A more nuanced understanding of their shared exegetical traditions as well as methodology is needed, rather than speaking of the Apoc. Mos. as having “a consistently non-Philonian approach to biblical interpretation, with no trace of allegorization or symbolic treatment of biblical figures.” On the other hand, the proposal can serve an illuminative function with regard to a number of issues surrounding biblical hamartiology, especially concerning the writings of Paul, as well as isolated controversial texts such as Wis 2:24a (φθόνῳ δὲ διαβόλου θάνατος εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον). It may even shed new light on an episode in the life of another prominent biblical figure, the Markan Jesus, who also came under attack by the devil for as many as forty days, but of whom it is said assuredly: καὶ ἦν μετὰ τῶν θηρίων (Mark 1:13).

85 Johnson, “Life of Adam and Eve” (see n. 35), 252.
86 Interesting is in this regard especially the first epistle of Clemens to the Corinthians, who appears to cite Wis 2:24 in connection with the envy of Cain. Problematic is however the unlikeliness of interpreting διάβολος as a human adversary. The majority opinion is still the interpretation of Wis 2:24 along the lines of Gen 3 as a reference to the envy of the devil towards either God or, more likely, Adam and Eve (cf. Josephus, Ant 1.40). However, could it not be the case that the author of Wis intended 2:24 as a reference to the envy stemming from the devil, which arose in Cain? Cf. on the verse e. g. Jason M. Zurawski, “Separating the Devil from the Diabolos: A Fresh Reading of Wisdom of Solomon 2.24,” JSP 21, no. 4 (2012): 366–399, here 368–376; Jan Dochhorn, “Mit Kain kam der Tod in die Welt: Zur Auslegung von SapSal 2,24 in 1 Clem 3,4; 4,1–7, mit einem Seitenblick auf Polykarp, Phil. 7,1 und Theophilus, Ad Autol. II, 29,3–4,” ZNW 98 (2007): 150–159; Joseph Reider, The Book of Wisdom: An English Translation with Introduction and Commentary, JAL (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), 70.