

Democracy promotion and presidential term limits

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Summary

The end of the Cold War saw an unprecedented diffusion of democracy. This diffusion went hand in hand with the emergence of international democracy promotion. Through democracy promotion, democratic states attempt to support and protect democratic institutions around the world by means of bilateral and multilateral international cooperation as well as development cooperation. Yet, the 'wave of democratization' has ebbed away since the Cold War. Rather than an unabated spread of democracy, many countries that seemed on a transition-path to democracy are now stuck in a political state between autocracy and democracy, where democratic institutions *formally* exist but are compromised by authoritarian practices. Moreover, populist movements, illiberalism, and non-democratic institutional changes seem to challenge democracy as a political system even in countries where it was long since regarded as historically and socially consolidated. This as well as the increasing confidence of authoritarian regimes threaten to jeopardize the strides that worldwide democratization has made in the past three decades.

Against this setting, the present thesis investigates the effectiveness of international democracy promotion in supporting and guarding the democratic institutionalization of political power. The research presented here zooms in on presidential term limits, a political institution meant to prevent the personalization of political power and ensure rotation in presidential office. While it was characteristic for countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, that began transitioning to democracy at the end of the Cold War to introduce presidential term limits in their newly designed constitutions, many of these provisions have since been challenged by incumbent presidents. Research shows that the evasion of term limits is associated with a worsening of the general state of democracy in a country. Evasion of presidential term limits is thus seen as an important manifestation for the weak institutionalization and further de-institutionalization of democracy. Although presidential term limits and in particular their circumvention have hence become a subject matter of interest to political scientists, many scholars do not focus in this regard explicitly on the role of international democracy support. I address this gap by studying the influence that international democracy promotion has on the evasion and introduction of presidential term limits.

The first chapter provides a conceptual and theoretical introduction to presidential term limits and their relation to the weak institutionalization of democracy. Democracy promotion and the different forms it may take is also introduced before a brief outlook on the thesis is presented. In chapter two

my co-author and I present a broad perspective on how democracy aid, which is the implementation of democracy promotion as foreign aid in development cooperation, is associated with the risk that presidents attempt to evade term limits as well as that they actually succeed in doing so.

In chapter three, my co-author and I undertake a qualitative paired comparison of two cases where incumbent presidents attempted to circumvent a term limit but failed at different stages during the process. We compare the role that different means, or 'instruments' of democracy promotion played in both cases and how their effectiveness was predicated on favourable domestic conditions, particularly popular pro-democratic attitudes.

In chapter four, I provide an 'in-depth' description of one of the two cases. The chapter employs a qualitative methodology designed to trace closely the influence of different factors for an outcome. I make use of this by systematically assessing how different democracy promotion instruments acted alone and in conjunction with domestic factors on the case's outcome.

Finally, chapter five shifts the focus from the evasion of term limits to the introduction of term limits. Interested in the 'on-the-ground' practice of democracy promotion during *ad hoc* emerging reform episodes, I study the interactions between on the one hand domestic civil society and political opposition parties and on the other hand external embassies and international organizations.

The research results show that international democracy promotion often has a limited, conditional influence on preventing the de-institutionalization of democracy. While it is evident according to a presented statistical analysis that democracy promotion through foreign aid is associated with lower risks of term limit evasions, this relation is substantial in effect size only for medium to high *per capita*-amounts of democracy aid. Furthermore, results of the qualitative case studies show that democracy promotion operates through largely two mechanisms, a 'hard power' mechanism functioning according to a logic of consequentiality, conditionality, and leverage; and a 'soft power' mechanism functioning according to a logic of appropriateness and linkage. However, both work best in tandem, and are predicated on domestic conditions, particularly on favourable popular (pro-)democratic attitudes and a civil society that is free to mobilize. Finally, the research presented here also emphasizes the quandaries to which democracy promoters themselves are subject, especially when they need to respond *ad hoc* to a push for political liberalization in an hitherto (semi-)authoritarian country context.

The thesis contributes to two interesting research fields, one on the evasion of presidential term limits, and the other on the role that international democracy support can play in preserving and promoting democratic institutions. Its results suggest policy implications particularly for the practice and implementation of democracy promotion. Foremost among these are that the level of spending of democracy aid in development cooperation as well as its temporal continuation can have substantial effects on guarding democratic institutions (chapter two); that 'hard power' and 'soft power' approaches of democracy promotion need to be used wisely in complementarity to one another (chapter

three and four); that foreign states and international organizations need to react decisively against the curbing of the civic space, and also need to defend institutions integral to 'democracy as democracy' against transgressions and violations (chapters three to five); and finally, that democracy supporters, particularly foreign governments as democracy supporters, need to critically reflect on self-imposed internal restraints besides encountered external constraints in the practice of international democracy promotion.

On rigor in science

by Jorge Luis Borges (Translation by Diego Doval)

. . . In that Empire, the Art of Cartography attained such Perfection that the map of a single Province occupied an entire City, and the map of the Empire, an entire Province. In time, these Excessive Maps did not satisfy and the Schools of Cartographers built a Map of the Empire, that was of the Size of the Empire, and which coincided point for point with it. Less Addicted to the Study of Cartography, the Following Generations understood that that dilated Map was Useless and not without Pitilessness they delivered it to the Inclemencies of the Sun and the Winters. In the Deserts of the West endure broken Ruins of the Map, inhabited by Animals and Beggars; in the whole country there is no other relic of the Disciplines of Geography.

Suárez Miranda: Viajes de varones prudentes, libro cuarto, cap. XLV, Lérida, 1658.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The fifteen years after the Cold War's end were likely the most favourable times for the diffusion and, hence, international promotion of modern democracy. Authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe, Latin America, and East and South Asia broke down during the second half of the Cold War in the 1970s and 1980s. This was the setting against which the demise and eventual collapse of the USSR in the early 1990s happened, followed by a decline in authoritarianism in sub-Saharan Africa and parts of the Middle East. This 'third wave' of democratization (Cranmer, Desmarais, & Campbell, 2020; Huntington, 1991; O'Loughlin et al., 1998) carried the optimistic anticipation of a democratically consolidated future world order in its wake. The developments were seen as a "democratic moment" (Plattner, 1991) signifying an "unprecedented movement towards democracy" (Diamond, 1992, 25). The triumph of liberal democracy as an unsurpassed ideal-type of all political systems, some argued, heralded the "end of history" (Fukuyama, 1989).

The global shift to democracy created an ideal environment for the promotion of democracy through international development cooperation and foreign policy. The 'third wave of democratization' and the end of the Cold War were seen as a "critical turning point" in which, by promoting democracy, Western democracies had the historical opportunity to "bring into being for the first time in history a world composed mainly of stable democracies" (Diamond, 1992, 27). World regions that so far lacked behind in democratization were expected to catch up soon (Ake, 1991). Throughout the 1990s, democracy assistance programmes proliferated in international development cooperation (Carothers, 1999). High-politics accompanied the spread of democracy assistance, when, for instance, in 2000 more than one hundred and twenty countries formed the Community of Democracies and signed the Warsaw Declaration to affirm their "determination to work together to promote and strengthen democracy" (Community of Democracies, 2000). Democracy had established itself as an international norm by the early 2000s (Franck, 1992; Rich, 2001). Accordingly, democracy promotion, too, was argued to have become a legitimate foreign policy objective and, due to its universal acknowledgement as a consequential notion in international relations, a "world value" (McFaul, 2004).

Anticlimactically, the democratic momentum lost steam in the mid-2000s. The number of democracies worldwide peaked around 2006, and then waned (Diamond, 2021). Many of the political systems that had begun their transition to democracy during the 'third wave' did not move closer to democratic consolidation. Instead, their suspension in transition from closed autocracy to basic, electoral democracy characterise them as one of "electoral authoritarian" (Schedler, 2002), "semi-authoritarian" (Ottaway, 2013), "hybrid" (Diamond, 2002) or "competitive authoritarian" (Levitsky & Way, 2010) political regimes. They have adopted formally democratic institutions, the functioning of which, however, is either undermined by or just a window-dressing for authoritarian politics. Democratic institutions, like elections, the right to vote, political rights and civil liberties, a parliament, a judiciary etc., exist, but their proper operation is violated and repressed. Hence, although democratic institutions are formally in place, importantly they are lacking in their institutionalization (Haggard & Kaufman, 2016). The increase in the number of electoral autocracies led to a questioning of the 'transition paradigm' that full consolidated democratization would occur in many countries around the world as a quasi-natural consequence. By the same token, this led to a rethinking of the approaches of international democracy promotion and assistance¹ which were criticised for a superficial and unidirectional understanding of democratization (Carothers, 2002).

Rather than halting in its spread, it now appears that democracy is actually in retreat. The subsiding of worldwide democratization has turned into a "democratic rollback" (Diamond, 2008) and the occurrence of "backsliding" (Haggard & Kaufman, 2016; Mechkova, Lührmann, & Lindberg, 2017) in which democratic institutions in non-democracies are not only repressed or circumvented but abolished. The "de-consolidation" (Foa & Mounk, 2017) of democracy is now observed to also take place in established democracies which has given rise to the notion of autocratization to describe the spread of autocratic institutions and politics throughout the world. Since the mid-2010s, the chances for "democratic breakdowns" are greater than the chances for "democratic transitions", suggesting, according to some, that the political world has entered a "democratic recession" (Diamond, 2015, 2021). Three decades after the 'democratic moment' and the 'third wave of democratization' in the early 1990s, autocracy now resurges and researchers detect waves of autocratization (Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019; Pelke & Croissant, 2021).²

The new international conditions mean for democracy promotion that it finds itself at a crossroads (Carothers, 2015). Should democracy supporters push back or pull back, should they intensify or reduce efforts to promote and support democracy? Likewise, needs democracy promotion a re-orientation of its methods and approaches, away from the *promotion* of democracy and towards the *protection* of democracy (Leininger & Nowack, 2021), and if so, what would such a re-orientation entail? Actors and proponents of democracy promotion find themselves in a difficult situation while they have to tackle

¹On the distinction between democracy promotion and assistance, please see section 1.1.3.

²However, see Skaaning (2020) on whether there really is a 'wave of autocratization'.

these questions. The high-profile failures of the military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan which were also often justified by the intention to promote democracy damaged the reputation of democracy promotion policies. In addition, democracy supporting state agencies and non-state organizations are increasingly facing an hostile environment in the country contexts in which they are active (Bouchet, Godfrey, & Youngs, 2022). Moreover, a "patchy record" (Dodsworth & Cheeseman, 2018, p. 1) on its effectiveness and a poor evidence base make both the practice as well as the justification of democracy support more difficult. Scholars and observers nonetheless contend that democracy as a political system is still in high demand around the world, and that democracy has not lost its allure (Carothers, 2020; Dodsworth & Cheeseman, 2018; Fukuyama, 2022).

A crucial aspect of trends towards competitive authoritarianism is the adoption or keeping of formal democratic institutions that, however, do not 'bite' (Capoccia, 2016). Formal democratic institutions may be in place, but they are subverted or disrespected. A lack of sufficient democratic institutionalization seems to be a major factor in the democratic 'backsliding' and 'deconsolidation' that is occurring in electoral autocracies and electoral democracies for the last two decades (Haggard & Kaufman, 2016). The research literature identified such 'weak institutionalization' as symptomatic of competitive authoritarian systems (Levitsky & Murillo, 2009). However, in spite of being subverted, scholars emphasize the importance of having institutions that are formalised in writing, sometimes also called "parchment institutions" (Carey, 2000). By formally writing down institutional rules, they become 'red lines' the crossing of which is highly visible and, hence, becomes an easy-to-identify transgression against democracy. Haggard and Kaufman (2016, p. 134) point out that presidential term limits - constitutional articles that limit the number of times a person can run as president - are among the most important and effective 'parchment institutions'. Yet, because they limit the exercise of political power in a very direct way, presidential term limits are also among those political institutions that have become a prime target for political leaders with authoritarian aspirations in electoral autocracies and electoral democracies alike. A vibrant research literature has therefore evolved around the topic of presidential term limits and the way they institutionalize political power (e.g. Baturo & Elgie, 2019; Heyl & Llanos, 2022).

Therefore, the chapters presented in this thesis are all grouped around the question:

Focusing on presidential term limits as an example, what is the role of international democracy promotion in preventing the de-institutionalization and supporting the institutionalization of political power?

Therefore, this thesis asks whether international democracy promotion matters, and if so, when and how it matters and what its scope conditions are. Several chapters focus on the role of international, external democracy promotion in avoiding the circumvention or abolition of presidential term limits, thus, on what role it plays for protecting democratic limitation of political power

from de-institutionalization. One chapter, however, also investigates the role external democracy promotion had in the institutionalization of a term limit. In this introductory chapter, I proceed as follows. I first provide a discussion on three concepts central to the thesis: institutions and institutionalization, presidential term limits, and democracy promotion. I then describe the theoretical frame that surrounds all chapters. After that, I briefly summarize the breadth of methods applied, before I present a brief overview on each chapter. I close the introductory chapter with a conclusion of the thesis' central findings and the policy implications they carry.

1.1 Central concepts

A few central concepts form the core focus of this thesis. Term limits are one central concept. Since they are instantiations of the institutionalization of political power, any discussion of term limits necessarily also includes discussing what institutions are and what strong or weak institutionalization entails. Therefore, I first discuss the conceptualization of institutions and institutionalization, and then term limits and the research on them. Democracy promotion and the various forms and approaches in which it materializes are the second central concept that necessitates a discussion.

1.1.1 Institutions and institutionalization

Within the theoretical research literature, conceptualizations of institutions either describe them as constraining rules or as behavioural equilibria. Recent works, however, (Aoki, 2011; Greif & Kingston, 2011; Hindriks & Guala, 2015, 2021) unify both conceptual approaches.

North (1990, p. 3) famously conceptualized institutions as "rules of the game in a society or, more formally, [...] humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction". As constraining rules, institutions provide a stable structure in which human interaction can take place, and thereby reduce uncertainty. North's conceptualization of institutions-as-rules proved influential in the wider institutionalist social science literature, and particularly in rational-choice institutionalism. However, although it facilitates an understanding how institutions can enable cooperation by reducing uncertainty, it leaves open the question why institutions vary in the extent to which they become established, a quality that can be understood as the 'strength' of an institution or, alternatively, its degree of institutionalization.

This proves to be a critical question, particularly with regard to institutional transitions between democracy and autocracy and the many different forms that can be found in between, like electoral autocracy. In an overview article, Levitsky and Murillo (Levitsky & Murillo, 2009, p. 117), following historical institutionalism, provide a theorization of formal institutional strength and weakness along two dimensions, stability with which they mean durability, and enforcement with which they mean both compliance as well as a high risk of punishment in case of non-compliance without discriminating between the latter two. According to this framework, formal institutions that are durable

and enjoy a high rate of compliance and/or punishment are strong. As a result, they narrow the strategic behaviour of actors through their constraining effect and reduce uncertainty (O'Donnell, 1994). In contrast, institutions that have deficiencies on either one or both of the two dimensions of durability and enforcement are weak. They fail to constrain the strategic choices of political actors who thus may resort to "extrainstitutional options", and as the number of available options increases, so does uncertainty which "narrows time horizons and erodes trust" (Levitsky & Murillo, 2009, p. 124).

Levitsky and Murillo's (2009) categorization of strong and weak institutions provides valuable orientation in pinpointing the institutional weakness of hybrid regimes, such as semi-democracies or competitive authoritarian regimes. In many such regimes, it seems that institutions are not weak because they are low on both durability as well as enforcement, but mostly rather because they are particularly weak on either one of these two dimensions. Institutions are either enforced, but are constantly subject to change and, hence, cannot 'lock-in', for instance when political rivals overturn priorly established institutions (Levitsky & Murillo, 2009, p. 123); or they are durable but not enforced, ignored even, but and are 'kept on the books' as 'window-dressing' in order to keep a veneer of democratic legitimacy (Levitsky & Murillo, 2009, p. 120). However, although Levitsky and Murillo put forth many plausible factors how such weak institutions come about, most of these are exogenous factors, e.g. power imbalances and, hence, they cannot fully account for the *endogenous logic* of institutionalization and de-institutionalization. The same is true for the wider conceptualization of institutions-as-rules in general. In this account, institutionalization is a result of external enforcement, such that actors' strategies converge on strategies that enable cooperation even though these strategies might not be dominant.³ Institutions, because they are exogenously enforced rules, preclude pursuing certain strategies even if these are dominating (Greif & Kingston, 2011). O'Donnell emphasizes this logic when he writes that the alternative to functioning institutions was a "hell of a colossal prisoner's dilemma" (1994, p. 59).

In contrast to the institutions-as-rules concept that exogenizes institutionalization, others (Calvert, 1998; Greif & Kingston, 2011; Schotter, 1981) argue that it is more insightful to conceptualize institutionalization through endogenizing actors' motivations. They juxtapose the idea of institutions-as-rules with the idea of institutions-as-equilibria. Institutionalization, hence, comes about through the anticipation of the behaviour of others and one's own best-response behaviour to this anticipation. In other words, strong institutions are self-enforced behavioural equilibria. This conceptualization shifts the emphasis in explaining the 'lock-in' of strong institutionalization from enforcement of rules towards self-enforced collective action. The strength of an institution hence becomes the stability of the behavioural equilibrium that this very institution constitutes or as Jepperson (1991, pp. 145-151) argues

"an institution is highly institutionalized if it presents a near insuperable collective action threshold, a formidable collective ac-

³In game theory, 'dominant strategies' are strategies that are always a best response to the action of others, i.e. irrespective of what actions others choose.

tion problem to be confronted before affording intervention in and thwarting of reproductive processes”.

Although that the notion of institutions-as-equilibria brings motivations of human actors back in and thus provides an endogenous view on institutionalization, it does not provide answers to important remaining questions concerning institutions and institutionalization (Aoki, 2007; Hindriks & Guala, 2015). For one, it leaves open the question of institutional change. If institutions are behavioural equilibria, why is institutional change observed at all, and how exactly does one equilibrium replace another? Another open question concerns equilibrium selection. Institutions obviously help to bring about cooperation and coordination, but problems of cooperation and coordination such as the *Stag Hunt* or the *Iterative Prisoners’ Dilemma* are often characterized by multiple equilibria. How is one equilibrium chosen over another in such settings or, put differently, if there is a multiplicity of possible institutions, how does rather this particular one evolve instead of that other one? Both questions pertain critically to weak institutionalization which may arise as a consequence to ‘faulty’, ‘interrupted’ or ‘blocked’ institutional change that leads to a situation in which two institutions exist somehow ‘side by side’. Finally, critics argue that the conceptualization of institutions-as-equilibria puts an implausible requirement of constant cognitive rationalizing upon humans who are actually best thought of as ‘bounded rational’ (Aoki, 2007).

Theorists therefore try to unify the two different rational choice-institutionalist accounts of institutions and improve its explanatory power by integrating the role of culture in the form of shared beliefs and cultural representations. Aoki (2007), for instance, puts forth a notion of “institutions-as-cognitive-media”. In this approach, institutions mediate between larger-scale patterns of social interaction and individual beliefs which are informed by culture as a common prior. Institutionalization is thus a gradual, slow-moving and evolutionary process that involves both individual-levels belief-updating and societal-level mediation and representation. This process may lead to social tensions and only comes to an end when societal-level mediation and representation has gained a sufficient “status of salience in that they appear increasingly persuasive, reasonable and dominant” to lead to a convergence of individual-level beliefs, and “only then may we say that new rules of societal games, or institutions, have emerged” (Aoki, 2011, p. 33).

Similarly and related to Aoki’s conceptualization, Hindriks and Guala (2015) theorize that institutions can be understood as symbolically represented rules of correlated equilibria, hence as ‘rules-in-equilibrium’. According to their framework, institutions are symbolically represented ‘constitutive rules’ (Searle, 2005) that function as correlation device in correlated equilibria.⁴ It follows that weak institutionalization or de-institutionalization may be conceptualized as when the constitutive rule that makes up the institution is not collectively

⁴Correlated equilibria is a solution concept in game theory that was conceptualized by Aumann (1974). They emerge when players receive ‘strategy recommendations’ from a third party resulting in a correlation of players’ strategies which then creates an equilibrium. For instance, the role of traffic lights at intersections is often referred to as a correlated equilibrium.

accepted any more, and thus cannot create sufficient coordination for the emergence of a correlated equilibrium (Hindriks & Guala, 2021).

Myerson (Myerson, 2004, 2006, 2008) provides a similar conceptualization of institutionalization. Building upon Schelling's (1960) notion of focal points as shared beliefs that help coordinating on a particular equilibrium among multiple equilibria, Myerson (2006; 2008) theorizes that in autocracies and democracies different reputation mechanisms function as focal points. While in autocracies support rests upon a closed and narrow group of supporters who profit from neopatrimonialism in return, democrats draw on party and ultimately electoral support. Weak democratic institutionalization may thus be explained by the persistence of focal points that facilitate coordination on the autocratic reputation and support strategy.

As this discussion illustrates, the conceptualization of institutions and institutionalization has progressed a lot since North's description of institutions as 'rules of the game'. According to the strands of the rational choice-institutionalist literature presented here, in order to be *strong*, institutions need to be self-enforcing behavioural equilibria rather than mere exogenously imposed constraints. This however begs the question of how self-enforcing equilibria come about in the full complexity of reality. To answer this, theorists integrate the important roles played by cultural notions such as shared beliefs, norms, and values into rational choice models. As such, various related conceptualizations of institutions as 'institutions-as-cognitive-media', 'rules-in-equilibria', or 'focal coordination' open up rational choice-institutionalism to sociological institutionalism (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Levitsky, 1998; Peters & Pierre, 2020). According to this view, institutions exist as multiple equilibria possible for human behaviour to converge upon. Institutionalization then becomes a function of the social processes according to which humans as societal actors 'select' among equilibria.

1.1.2 Presidential term limits

A presidential term limit is a political institution that most times, although not always, is a constitutional stipulation that limits an incumbent's tenure as president. While term limits concern the (non-)consecutiveness of terms, other limiting stipulations typically are the length of a term and age limits for (re-)eligibility. This thesis focuses on presidential tenure limitation through term limits, rather than through term length or age limits. Regardless of whether they are written down in a country's constitutional charter or are left to non-constitutional law, term limits are always part of a country's constitutional order. Elkins, Ginsberg, and Melton (2009, pp. 38 - 39) provide an important discussion on the differences between a constitution-as-function and a constitution-as-form. The understanding of a constitution-as-function describes the constitutional order of a country. It *constitutes* the very political system of a country by limiting government behaviour, establishing the institutions of government, and defining a country's nation. The 'thinner' understanding of a constitution-as-form, in contrast, delineates the actual written charter of a country. Hence, the constitutional order encapsulates a larger set

of which the constitutional charter is just one element, albeit an essential one. As part of the constitutional order, term limits play an important part in the institutionalization, or respectively de-institutionalization, of political power.

In contexts of weak institutionalization, presidential term limits can act as important lower thresholds, or 'floors', to the deterioration of rule-based political competition. Institutions regulate behaviour and create solutions to cooperation problems (Bowles, 2004; Ostrom, 1990). Weak institutionalization, however, means that no credible commitment to 'play according to the rules' exists, which erodes trust and hence creates a security dilemma among actors. In anticipation that their opponents will not adhere to the rules, political actors will themselves not adhere to the rules. The security dilemma triggered by weak institutionalization incentivizes political actors to resort to ever more extreme coercive and violent strategies and tactics if they wish to compete politically, creating a 'race to the bottom'. In the context of this dynamic, term limits, if effective, can provide a 'floor' to the political 'race to the bottom' by institutionalizing and regulating the access to power. They can function as a "red line" (Haggard & Kaufman, 2016, p. 134), or as a "demarcation line" (Baturu, 2014, p. 12).

In order to achieve this, term limits need to be formally written down and documented, that is, they need to be so-called "parchment barriers" (Carey, 2000). Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton (2009, p. 77) note three important conditions for the self-enforcing capacity of institutions. First, a clear, possibly unambiguous specification of the institution needs to facilitate an understanding of the institution. Only then can possible enforcers of an institution identify when a transgression happens. Second, possible enforcers must be sufficiently attached to the institution. Their devotion must motivate them intrinsically to enforce the institution. Finally, enforcers must anticipate that other possible enforcers share both their understanding of and their devotion to the institution. Parchment, the formal recording of an institution, therefore is important as it provides both an understanding of an institution as well as the anticipation that it is publicly shared, and may be publicly enforced. It is a crucial characteristic to enable self-enforcement of an institution, or in other words its 'strong' institutionalization.

The historical evolution of the US American presidential term limit illustrates this well. The founders of the US American constitution saw the constraints that a term limit would put upon the president critical, thus the original US constitution did not contain a presidential term limit. By declining a third term, George Washington, however, set an influential precedent that may have played a role in deterring support for a non-consecutive term of Ulysses S. Grant, and in motivating the attempted assassination of Theodore Roosevelt during his candidacy for a third term. The first, and only US president who served more than two terms was Franklin D. Roosevelt who won a third term in 1940, and a fourth in 1944. However, the US amended the constitution and introduced a presidential two terms-limit after World War Two in 1951. The US case serves well in illustrating the importance of parchment. A strong informal two-terms norm existed, yet it is difficult to judge whether the cases of Grant, Theodore Roosevelt, and Franklin D. Roosevelt would have

violated the norm at closer inspection. Grant’s third term would have been non-consecutive; Theodore Roosevelt had entered his first presidential term as vice president taking over after James McKinley’s death; Franklin D. Roosevelt won his third, and later fourth, term during a period when war was threatening, or ongoing. Any of these cases can be argued to have been part of extraordinary circumstances not covered by the informal two terms-norm (Elkins et al., 2009, pp. 46-47).




Figure 1.1: Term limits of Heads of States, 1780-2020. Note that the data include all types of governmental systems and is not restricted to presidential systems only. Author’s compilation based on Elkins and Ginsburg (2022).

Historical evolution of presidential term limits

Historically, the evolution of presidential term limits as a political norm is a modern, and their widespread diffusion a quite recent phenomenon of the ‘third wave of democracy’ (figure 1.1). The idea to limit the tenure of rulers temporally did already exist, and was practised, in antiquity as well as throughout history in many parts of the world (Baturu, 2014). However, it was never a norm as widespread as today. Likewise, up to the end of colonialism in the late 1950s to early 1960s, most political systems did not include limits for the number of terms of the Head of State. However, a sizeable minority specified a one term limit with non-consecutive re-election, so that Heads of States were allowed to serve only one term and additional terms only with one term in interruption. As the number of independent states rose during the end of colonialism, so did the shares of constitutions that did not specify or explicitly ruled out term limits. Only with the beginning of the ‘third wave of democratization’ in roughly 1975 did the number of two terms limits, either consecutive or non-consecutive, increase - first gradually then, during the late stages of the ‘third wave’ as the Soviet Union collapsed, sharply. By 2020, the majority of countries that *did* mention a limit of the terms of Head of States specify a two terms-limit without the option of a non-consecutive return.

Figure 1.2 provides the spatial dimension to the historical evolution of limits on how often Heads of States may serve. Apart from historical snapshot-




Figure 1.2: Term limits of Heads of States worldwide. Note that the data include all types of governmental systems and is not restricted to presidential systems only. Author’s compilation based on Elkins and Ginsburg (2022).

path dependencies of individual countries, two particular aspects stand out and are worth mentioning. The first is the concentration of strict one term-limits in Latin America from the 1950s onwards. Indeed, the history of term limits in Latin America is peculiar in that the interplay of republicanism and *caudillo*-dictatorship during the nineteenth century led to the diffusion of a strict one term limit-norm in Latin America (Marsteintredet, 2019). This norm has been softened since the 1990s. Second, targets of the diffusion of two terms-limits in the course of the 'third wave of democratization' has been especially post-communist countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia and African countries, and less so countries in East and South East Asia despite some notable exceptions such as the People's Republic of China and Indonesia. Particularly striking is the diffusion of two consecutive terms-limits in Africa (Cassani, 2021).

This has indeed been well recognized in the research literature. The 'third wave of democracy' swept over Africa belatedly after the breakdown of the USSR, but did so rapidly in only three to four years. Introducing term limits was a distinct characteristic of the 'third wave'-transitions in African states and "went to the heart of regime transitions in Africa, driven as they were by a mass consensus that old-guard leaders had outstayed their welcome" (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997, p. 113). The phenomenon of national conferences that drew up new constitutions for democratic transitions played an important role in the diffusion of the two terms-limit norm in Africa, particularly in francophone Africa.

However, scholars have also put forth additional explanatory factors. Kirschke (2000) argues that a confluence of diffusion dynamics of the 'third wave of democracy', international donor pressure as well as internal opposition demands played the key role. Although largely in line, Baturo (2014) also mentions that authoritarian leaders might have acceded to term limitation almost by mistake. Since the introduction of term limits at the time was not with retrospective enforcement, their actual constraining effect would have materialized only two terms ahead. This suggests that had authoritarian leaders not discounted their future in the same way, most states would not have instituted term limits as they eventually did. McKie (2017) provides a rational choice explanation in order to address the variance of the introduction of term limits in African states during 'third wave'-transitions. According to her theory and findings, term limits were introduced as an insurance against electoral uncertainty. As political actors were uncertain whether they could be victorious in elections, they acceded to the introduction of term limits to increase the chances for a rotation in the presidential office. This finding emphasizes the function of term limit rules as credible commitment-mechanisms for ensuring access to political power.

Functions of term limits in democratic and autocratic regimes

The diffusion of presidential term limits, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, points at the intricate linkage between 'third wave'-transitions, term limits, and weak institutionalization. Perhaps due to this, research on presidential term limits often focuses on their potential to act as a counterweight against

personalization of political power and hence to serve the institutionalization of democracy (e.g. Posner & Young, 2007; Tull & Simons, 2017). However, research suggests that term limits create credible commitment also in non-personalized autocracies. Credible commitment for a rotation in access to political power has great importance in non-personalized autocracies in which the demands and ambitions of rival factions need to be met, such as in military or party dictatorships. By regulating the access to power, term limits can serve as stabilizing institutions in such regimes (Ezrow, 2019). A quantitative survival analysis on the longevity of constitutions shows that the existence of a presidential term limit reduces the hazard for a constitution's termination in both an overall sample comprised of constitutions of democratic as well as authoritarian states and in a restricted sample comprised only of constitutions of authoritarian countries. This finding does not hold for a restricted sample of constitutions of democratic countries (Elkins et al., 2009). Case studies second this finding. The presidential term limit of the People's Republic of China played an important role in institutionalizing the transfer of power from one generation of party and state leaders to the next. Its introduction in 1982 under Deng Xiaoping was motivated by the tumultuous conditions of political uncertainty during Mao's later rule (Wang & Vangeli, 2019). Similarly, a presidential term limit was critical in stabilizing succession of power during Brazil's military dictatorship (Neto & Acácio, 2019). Against this background, the abolishment and circumvention of term limits in authoritarian regimes, such as in China in 2018 and in Russia in 2020, may indicate an increase in personalization of political power, a movement from different authoritarian variants towards personalist autocracy (Maboudi, P. Nadi, & Eisenstadt, 2021; Osei, Akinocho, & Mwombela, 2020).

Regardless of their role in closed autocracies, term limits are likely to play an important part in averting democratic backsliding in weakly institutionalized contexts, such as competitive authoritarian regimes. Their function as 'red lines' that signal deterioration of the state of democracy in a country and thereby provide a focal point for enforcers is seen as particularly crucial in countering personalization of political power (Elkins et al., 2009). Haggard and Kaufman (2016, p. 134) argue that term limits are "an example of an apparently small institution that can have substantial effect". Due to their supposed brevity and clarity in written form, the transgression and violation of term limits is highly visible to domestic and external actors. Hence, term limits are effective not so much because they are always complied with, but rather because the visibility of their breach provide a clear focal point for enforcers to coordinate and cooperate a 'democratic backlash'.

This focal point-property of term limits notwithstanding, Baturo (2014, pp. 74-75) also emphasizes the various formal constraints that term limits put additively upon incumbents in electoral autocracies and that contribute to the 'red line'-signal inherent in term limits. First, incumbents need to secure the support of their own party if they want to abolish or circumvent a term limit. Second, following this, they need to pass the formal hurdles in changing or scrapping the actual term limit stipulation. This often includes obtaining assent from either the legislature or the judiciary, if not both. In

some cases, a constitutional amendment or the passing of a new constitution will also necessitate a popular referendum. Finally, the new term limit rule needs to be actually implemented by running for the presidential office and winning the election. However, the incumbent might face popular protests forcing him to withdraw, or he might just not win the election. A recent study shows that popular support for presidential tenure limitation tends to increase after attempts to abolish or circumvent a term limit (McKie & Carlson, 2022). Historical cases second this and show that popular extra-legal opposition, as in Zambia in 2001 (Cheeseman, 2019; Lumina, 2020), or electoral defeat, as in Senegal in 2011-2012 (Heyl, 2019), can stop an incumbent from pursuing an additional, constitutionally not sanctioned term. In sum, term limits can put considerable impediments upon incumbents to prolong their tenure.

When presidential term limits are evaded or abolished, this often although not always foreshadows a worsening of democratic quality. The evasion of term limits as 'parchment' institutions is often part or can trigger a "non-compliance cycle" (Elkins, 2021). Transgressing the 'red line' symbolized by a term limit breaks down credible commitment and hence promotes non-compliance with other institutions. Such a non-compliance cycle presents a positive feedback loop of not respecting and complying with institutional rules which in turn aggravates weak institutionalization. Research illustrates that this dynamic applies at least to some cases. Heyl and Llanos (2022) employ sequence analysis to study profiles of within-country cases of term limit reform sequences in Africa and Latin America. They find that these sort into three different paths. The majority of reform sequences falls into a *stability*-path in which term limits were introduced and never challenged. In the *continuismo*-path in contrast, term limits are challenged and tenure extended. These instances represent about one fifth of the cases studied by Heyl and Llanos. One third of the cases, however, fall into a *high reform frequency*-path in which evasion, reinstatement, and failed attempts of term limit reform succeed one another. Remarkably, for some countries a protracted 'tug of war' of up to five reform events between extending and restraining term limits emerges.

The varieties of patterns that emerge in Heyl and Llanos' (2022) study mirror the mixed record of the effect of term limit evasion and abolishment on democracy and autocratization found by the extant research literature. In general, estimating the effect of term limit circumvention on the quality of democracy and autocratization is difficult due to possible endogeneity of term limit rules (Baturu & Elgie, 2019). From a technical, methodological perspective, aggregated democracy indices often draw upon executive turnover, or even on instances of term limit evasion such as in the case of the *Polity* dataset (Marshall & Gurr, 2020) as indicators. This is not surprising from an epistemological perspective, since term limit evasions are likely both consequence of initial as well as cause of exacerbated weak institutionalization of democracy. Quantitative as well as qualitative analyses hence need to take possible endogeneity into account.

Against the backdrop of this cautionary remark, extant evidence suggests that there is a general but not necessary association between term limit circumvention and ensuing autocratization. Specific country cases refute that term

limits necessarily lead to a worsening of democratic quality. The extension of Brazil's and Argentina's one term limits to two consecutive, respectively two non-consecutive, terms in the 1990s, for instance, were not associated with a deterioration in democracy in the two countries. Rather, these reforms are best understood as "constitutional adjustments" to increase the effectiveness of presidential tenure (Cheibub & Medina, 2019, p. 521). Nonetheless, research that attempts to gauge the effect of possible immediate presidential re-election finds that, at least for a sample of Latin American countries, it is negatively associated with overall liberal democracy as well as horizontal and vertical accountability (Kouba & Pumr, 2021). Similarly, term limit manipulations seem often to go hand in hand with autocratization processes in sub-Saharan African countries (Cassani, 2020; Reyntjens, 2020), while related evidence on the electoral prospects of successors of presidents who abided by term limits suggests that term limit compliance does lead to political liberalization (Baturu, 2022). In sum, as in line with the theory of term limits as important 'red line'-institutions, evidence indicates that term limit evasion and abolishment are positively associated with autocratization while term limit compliance is associated with stronger democratic institutionalization.

Strategies to circumvent term limits

The relation between term limit evasion and abolishment and autocratizing processes infuses the question which factors can explain term limit circumventions with importance. Accordingly, a burgeoning empirical literature focusing on term limit evasion and abolishment has evolved. Empirically, incumbents employ a broad diversity of strategies to circumvent term limits which can be sorted into a threefold classification (Baturu, 2019; Versteeg, Horley, Meng, Guim, & Guirguis, 2020).⁵

Term limit avoidance describes a class of strategies in which incumbents do not change the actual term limit provision which hence remains intact. Instead, incumbents find ways to formally enact a new constitution, on the grounds of which they can claim to re-start their presidential tenure anew, a strategy that Versteeg et al. (2020) call the "blank slate"-strategy and that Baturu (2019) calls "grandfathering". An alternative strategy is to put a successor as placeholder into formal power while incumbents keep power informally, and may return as presidents if the constitution allows multiple non-consecutive terms. Other approaches are possible, too. Continuously delaying or suspending elections, for instance on grounds of security concerns, also keeps the actual term limit provision intact while extending the incumbents time in office.

Term limit extension describes attempts to extend the permitted number or time in office by changing the term limit provision itself, usually by amending the actual constitutional article. As Versteeg et al. (2020) note, this is the most often used strategy. Incumbents mostly extend the number of permitted terms, but alternatively the length of terms

⁵This thesis uses terms like term limit 'evasion', 'circumvention', 'manipulation', 'relaxation' etc. as broad synonyms describing the general phenomenon.

may be extended. In another strategy of this class, incumbents seek an exemption from the term limit by court ruling, such as Abdoulaye Wade in Senegal in 2011-2012, or by introducing an additional exemption article in the constitution like Vladimir Putin in 2020.

Term limit removal , finally, describes the wholesale elimination of the term limit provision from the constitution, either by passing a new constitution without a term limit, or by striking the existing term limit from the constitution by amendment.

Although the scholarly literature does not strictly adhere to this threefold classification (put forth by Baturo, 2019), the individual strategies contained in them are broadly regarded as term limit circumventions. Common to most of them is that they outwardly operate within the formally prescribed constitutional order to retain a veneer of legitimacy (Versteeg et al., 2020), although this may be debatable for some of them, such as for the continuous delay of elections. Some scholars therefore argue that incumbents' strategic choice to achieve term limit circumvention, and its general tendency in which this choice changed throughout the last decades, counter-intuitively reflects an increased respect for legitimate constitutional order and formal institutions, hence in a way mirrors the institutionalization of political power (Posner & Young, 2007, 2018; Vandeginste, 2016; Versteeg et al., 2020).

Approaches to explain (un)successful term limit evasion

In explaining when and how term limit evasion occurs, many studies provide actor-centred approaches and focus on incumbents' rational strategic calculus. According to these, attempts to circumvent term limits are more likely in contexts characterized by corruption and rent-seeking. In such contexts, the 'spoils' of the presidential office are great so that incumbents can enrich themselves through remaining in office. At the same time, concerns about being incriminated and losing immunity post-tenure incentivize incumbents to hold on further to the presidency in cases in which they have illegitimately enriched themselves (Baturo, 2010, 2014). A similar logic might be at play concerning repression. Research indicates that incumbents' bad human rights records are positively associated with the risk of attempted term limit circumventions (Cassani, 2020). Among the actor-centred approaches to explaining term limit circumventions, political psychology research investigated the influence of incumbent presidents' personality traits (based on expert surveys) and found that openness to experience and neuroticism seemed positively and conscientiousness seemed negatively associated with the risk of attempts to circumvent term limits (Arana Araya, 2022). In a similar study, Baturo (2014) investigated personal traits of incumbents and their relation with the risk of attempts to evade term limits. Although his data shows a positive association between risk of attempts and political outsider-roles as well as a negative association with having obtained higher education in 'Western' countries, he cautions against inferring too much from this and that many personality traits may in fact rather reflect the general contexts in which incumbents operate. Concerning not the risk of attempts, but the likelihood that incumbents actually do circumvent term limits, research suggests that at least for African

cases the loyalty of an army that recruits largely from the same ethnicity as the incumbent can play a decisive role (Harkness, 2017). Similarly, findings for a sample of Latin American cases show that popular support of the incumbent as measured by approval ratings, which might be a proxy for charisma, correlate with incumbents' success to relax term limits. However, the strength of this relation is modified by the extent to which incumbents' enjoy support from their co-partisans (Corrales, 2016).

Shifting the focus away from actor-centred approaches and towards more structure-centred explanations, the literature has identified the electoral dynamics as well as the internal cohesion of an incumbent's party, its relative strength and its degree of institutionalization as playing important roles in influencing the success of term limit evasions. Strong party institutionalization, for example, may lengthen the incumbent's time horizon by putting the party's future performance above the incumbent's personal political career. It also makes the provision of successors to the incumbent more likely and puts additional checks on the incumbent, as he has to garner sufficient support from his party and a strong party might refuse this to an overreaching incumbent (Kouba, 2016). However, the direction of findings partly diverge. Fruhstorfer and Hudson (2022) as well as Kouba (2016), for instance, find that corruption and the potential of rent-seeking through a rich natural resource endowment are positively associated with the presidents successfully removing term limits. However, both draw opposite conclusions concerning the relation with party institutionalization. Using an aggregated index, Fruhstorfer and Hudson find that party institutionalization is associated with a greater risk of term limit removal for a worldwide sample. Kouba, in contrast, approximates party institutionalization with the age of the incumbent's party and finds that it is negatively related to term limit removals for a sample of cases from Latin America. Perhaps one explanation for these divergent findings is provided by party fractionalization which might be the actual phenomenon driving these results, i.e. the erosion of a party's internal cohesion. As Von Doepp (2005a) shows in a qualitative comparative study of Malawi, Zambia and Namibia, party fractionalization can play an important role in forsaking necessary support for an incumbent's success in removing term limits. Such fractionalization may be driven by the overall institutionalization of a country's party as well as electoral system. McKie (2019) argues convincingly that electoral uncertainty and the extent of electoral competition may make the incumbent's co-partisans unwilling to support a term limit circumvention via a cost-benefit calculus on their part. Statistical evidence indicates that a more competitive electoral context is related with a reduced risk of term limit removal (McKie, 2019). The evidence on the role played by the incumbent's party thus suggests that it is partly conditional on the institutional overall context. In a recent study, Negretto (2022, p. 47) finds that the relative superior strength in parliament of ruling parties is conditional on a "legacy" of weak institutionalization of democracy when estimating the risk of term limit removals.

The interaction between party support, electoral uncertainty and institutional 'legacies' is further supported by qualitative evidence. Focusing on cases of the 'third wave of democracy' in Africa, Hartmann (2022) provides an histor-

ical institutionalist account of the removal of or compliance with term limits that focuses on the path-dependence created by a political system's earlier record of authoritarian regime-type. Earlier single-party regimes experienced a breakdown of the ruling party and an increase in electoral uncertainty which incentivized the imposition of term limits. In contrast, in former personalist authoritarian regimes political liberalization during the 'third wave' was often controlled by autocrats who created an institutional environment conducive to the removal of term limits (Hartmann, 2022; McKie, 2017). Additional evidence for such path-dependent propensities is provided by Osei, Akinochi and Mwombela (2020) who present qualitative evidence suggesting that the chance of successful term limit removal is greater in personalist than in other authoritarian as well as democratic regimes.

Although findings partly converge on showing that the interplay of electoral uncertainty, ruling party support and institutional authoritarian legacy play an important role in explaining term limit evasions, other additional explanatory factors have not been addressed extensively, yet. Qualitative case studies, for instance, emphasize the part that civil society mobilization played in many attempts to circumvent term limits in sub-Saharan states (Dulani, 2011). Scholars also note that civil society movements have emerged in countries across sub-Saharan Africa in response to attempts by incumbents to prolong their tenure. Removing term limits has been a focal point for the mobilization of this 'New Civic Activism' (Yarwood, 2016). The research literature, however, does not provide apprehensible findings for the role of civil society mobilization and the risk of term limit removals. Another open subject is the interpretability of actual term limit provisions. The actual wording of term limit provisions often supports a variety of interpretations. Unclear interpretation of term limit provisions may be aggravated by their interlinking with other articles of a constitution, for instance when a constitution unclearly specifies whether a term limit rule falls into the unamendable section of a constitution and hence is a so-called 'eternity clause' (Ginsburg & Elkins, 2019). Such 'interpretative leeway' often creates loopholes for incumbents that can be exploited to prolong their tenure (Dawson & Young, 2020; Vandeginste, 2016). Therefore, the actual wording of term limit provisions often plays an important role in empirical cases, such as in Togo in 2019, as the wording often implies a term limit's extent or strength. However, scholarly attention has not fully engaged with this aspect, yet.

External influences on term limit circumvention is another *lacunae* in the research literature. This is despite that presidential term limits seem to have emerged as a democratic norm regarded with importance by international governmental as well as non-governmental organizations (Murray, Alston, & Wiebusch, 2019). Since much attention is paid to the institution of presidential term limits in international and domestic politics, it is argued that 'Western', democratic donor governments can and should use their leverage, for instance through foreign aid, to make attempts to circumvent term limits costly and thereby help protect democratic institutions abroad (Carter, 2016). However, coherent evidence for the influence, or non-influence, of foreign aid on term limit evasion is actually scarce. Fruhstorfer and Hudson (2022) as well as

McKie (2019) for instance do not find any clear, certain relation between foreign aid and the risk of term limit removals. Yet, descriptive and associational statistical evidence for presidents of African states suggests that the governments of those who attempted to evade a term limit received less foreign aid than the governments of those who did not (Cassani, 2020; Posner & Young, 2018). It is open whether this association is fully generalizable to samples including other world regions. Although a negative relation between the amount of foreign aid and removal attempt can be discerned, this relations seems to be conditional on the recipient state's quality of democracy (Baturu, 2014). These findings are interpreted as showing that international donor leverage through aid dependence can help preventing incumbents from attempting to remove term limits, or make their success less likely if they do attempt a removal. However, this external leverage-mechanism is often only approximated with a highly aggregated measure like Official Development Assistance (ODA) as a percentage of gross national income (GNI) (e.g. Cassani, 2020; Posner & Young, 2018). Dietrich and Wright (2013) provide an analysis of foreign aid on the risk of term limit removals and differentiate between economic and democracy aid. They do not find any certain relation between either type of aid and term limit removals. However, they use only a restricted sample and their analysis does not distinctively focus on term limit removals, but is part of a bigger overall analysis of the effect of aid on various measure of the quality of democracy. Hence, a detailed analysis of the influence of external actors on term limit evasion differentiating between different means of influence, such as democracy support as foreign aid and democracy promotion as diplomatic intervention, is missing.

1.1.3 Democracy promotion

Besides presidential term limits, international democracy promotion is the thesis' second major concept. It describes "the intended - violent or non-violent - effort of international and transnational actors to proactively support the opening of authoritarian regimes, transitions to democratic order, and the deepening of democratic regimes" (Leininger, 2019). In this its broadest form democracy promotion is part of both foreign policy and development cooperation policy (Burnell, 2011). Research conceptualizes the instrumentality of democracy promotion often along a spectrum of coercive to consensual measures (Krasner & Weinstein, 2014; Leininger, 2019). Coercive measures include for instance foreign imposed regime changes through military intervention such as the prominent examples of Iraq and Afghanistan; political conditionality, either *ex ante* like the European Union (EU) political criteria for admission, or *ex post* like the imposition of sanctions; as well as political and diplomatic pressure. Consensual measures of democracy promotion in contrast are any measures which necessitate the active approval, or consent, of the target state. Generally, this includes anything falling into the areas of development cooperation and international cooperation. Election monitoring by international governmental or non-governmental organizations, international agreements on democracy, but also trade agreements such as Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) or Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) belong to the latter category

of general international cooperation.

Classifying trade agreements as consensual democracy promotion may seem to demand a very extensive scope of what counts as democracy promotion. However, conceptualizing democracy thus broadly follows from taking into consideration the different channels of *leverage* and *linkage* through which the promotion of democracy may work. Following Way and Levitsky (2005) *leverage* broadly overlaps with coercive measures of democracy promotion. *Linkage* in contrast conceptualizes the manifold economic, geopolitical, social, communicational as well as transnational ties and relationships that may exist between a democracy promotion sender state and a target state and through which the diffusion of democracy may take place.

Within the research literature on democracy promotion, a tacit nomenclature exists according to which 'democracy promotion' and 'democracy support' tend to describe the overall phenomenon as well as the foreign policy dimension of it, while 'democracy aid' and 'democracy assistance' often is used to denote democracy promotion through projects and programmes of development cooperation (e.g. Burnell, 2011; Heinrich & Loftis, 2019; Krasner & Weinstein, 2014). This thesis follows this convention and uses 'democracy assistance' and 'democracy aid' as synonyms in describing those projects and programmes of development cooperation, i.e. foreign aid, specifically designed to support democracy in recipient states. Senders of such aid can be either bilateral donor governments, or international organizations, like the United Nations (UN) or the World Bank, or non-governmental organizations, like the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). In order to operationalize and measure democracy aid, many studies draw on the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of official development aid. Through this database, all members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) report their bilateral as well as multilateral foreign aid flows on individual programme and project level. Purpose codes are mapped unto the reported programmes and projects and earmark them according to a thematic target sector of development cooperation. The research literature conventionally uses purpose codes 150 to 152 (e.g. Heinrich & Loftis, 2019; Jones & Tarp, 2016) as measure for democracy aid. These encompass any programmes and projects broadly targeted at the sector of "Government and civil society" (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2022), but carefully note that sub-codes of code 151 also include programmes to improve general governance, such as economic analysis and planning, and that code 152 also encompasses "conflict, peace, and security", hence for instance peacebuilding programmes.

The relative worldwide distribution of democracy aid has not changed much since the mid-1990s (see figure 1.3). Particularly Latin America and sub-Saharan African are major recipient regions receiving about 40 per cent of all ODA-democracy aid in most years between 1995 and 2020. While Latin America was the largest recipient region in the second half of the 1990s and the early 2000s, the flow of democracy aid to this world region has decreased somewhat since then.




Figure 1.3: Proportion of democracy aid (commitments in 2020-USD, CRS purpose code 150) per world region, 1995-2020. Author’s compilation based on stats.oecd.org.

Approaches and target areas of democracy aid

Following an influential conceptualization by Carothers (2009), democracy assistance can be sorted into two ideal-type approaches, ‘political’ and ‘developmental’ democracy aid. ‘Political’ democracy aid is conceptualized as more confrontational than ‘developmental’ democracy aid. It targets political actors and institutions as supporting them in their struggle for democracy. The ‘developmental’ approach to democracy aid, in contrast, is more indirect and technocratic with a focus on technical assistance and good governance. Whereas the ‘political’ approach tends to conceptualize democratization as a political struggle, the ‘developmental’ approach conceptualizes it more as an iterative process linked to general socio-economic development. However, it should be stressed again that both approaches merely reflect ideal-types, although Carothers (2009) argues that the ‘developmental’ approach was - originally - more prominent among European democracy promoting states, while the ‘political’ approach was more typical for US democracy assistance. In either case, democracy aid instruments focus largely focus on three distinct areas of the a recipient state’s political sphere. The first sphere broadly encompasses political competition. Electoral assistance in the form of election monitoring, assistance to electoral commissions or establishment of voter registration systems and the like, as well as assistance to political parties, for in stance in campaigning or inter-party dialogue, focus on supporting and enhancing political competition. In the second sphere, democracy aid may target state institutions and good governance of the recipient state directly, for instance through legal assistance in lawmaking or technical assistance to parliaments, as well as through assistance to judiciary reform, decentralization, anti-corruption reform or civil service reforms. Third, a large area of democracy aid encompasses a recipient state’s civic space and civil society. Democracy supporters aim to support

civil society through funding and technical assistance, media support as well as civic education (Burnell, 2011; Leininger, 2019).

Trade-offs in international democracy aid

The diversity of target areas that democracy assistance addresses often necessitates trade-offs. Dodsworth and Cheeseman (2018) provide a framework which conceptualizes these trade-offs along two dimensions. On the dimension of *focus*, practitioners of democracy assistance need to decide on whether to concentrate their efforts on a particular issue or event, for instance a particular election, or whether they should alternatively rather focus on a particular institution or process, such as on supporting the parliament of a recipient state. On the dimension of *scope*, practitioners need to decide between including a broad variety of actors or individuals as beneficiaries, or alternatively narrowing the circle of beneficiaries. For instance, in case of parliamentary assistance, a broad scope may include both technical staff as well as Members of Parliament (MP) as beneficiaries, while a narrow scope would be restricted to the Parliament's technical staff. Decisions on each dimension come with trade-offs. Including only the technical and administrative staff in a parliamentary assistance programme, for example, will likely result in a less political, more technical project intervention. Broadening the circle of recipients may make the programme more political, however, it may then as well lack critical support by the recipient government due to this more political set-up.

Dodsworth and Cheeseman's (2018) conceptualization of trade-offs in democracy promotion joins a strand of the research literature that investigates, conceptually and empirically, the internal and external constraints of democracy promotion. Internally, scholars have begun to conceptualize and acknowledge the important role of conflicting objectives (Bush, 2015; Grimm & Leininger, 2012; Wolff & Spanger, 2017). Conflicting objectives may arise intrinsically to democracy promotion. For instance, if different goals of democracy promotion become mutually exclusive such as promoting elections versus negotiated power-sharing. Other conflicting objectives may arise when democracy promotion seems to collide with other policy objectives, such as regime stability or security (Grimm & Leininger, 2012). Externally, democracy promoters are constrained by the consent and support of recipient governments, particular in consensual democracy promotion like democracy assistance. Like most foreign aid, democracy assistance is agreed upon by donor and recipient states in bilateral government talks, and despite that these talks may be characterized by an asymmetric power relationship, they nonetheless may resemble a negotiation setting. As a consequence, democracy assistance also is subject to negotiation between donor and recipient state which constrains the extent to which donors may be able to support democracy (Poppe, Leininger, & Wolff, 2019). This realization speaks to the broad consensus extant in the research literature that consensual means of democracy promotion, and particularly democracy assistance, cannot 'go against the grain'. Put differently, democracy aid can only strengthen efforts of democratization that already exist domestically in the recipient state (Gisselquist, Niño-Zarazúa, & Samarin, 2021; Leininger, 2019).

Effects of democracy promotion

Research on democracy promotion so far has largely focused on the effect of democracy aid. The reason for this may be that there are considerable although imperfect data for democracy aid in the form of the CRS data collected by the OECD. By the same token, most of the analyses investigating the effectiveness of democracy aid on the quality of democracy in recipient states use quantitative approaches (e.g. Finkel, Pérez-Liñán, & Seligson, 2007; Grimm & Mathis, 2018; Heinrich & Loftis, 2019; Savun & Tirone, 2011; J. M. Scott & Carter, 2020; Steele, Pemstein, & Meserve, 2021). In a recent meta-study, Gisselquist, Niño-Zarazúa and Samarin (2021, p. 17) find that most analysis results in the research literature show a positive relationship between democracy aid and democracy. Their analysis also shows that many studies find that aid modality plays a particular important role for the effectiveness of democracy aid. Aid modality concerns the questions of how aid is issued to recipient states, for instance but not limited to aid paid as budget support to a recipient government, being 'channelled' through the recipient government, or being paid directly to non-governmental actors without involving the recipient state's government. However, they also stress that the influence of democracy aid modality is still underresearched.

A similar diagnosis applies to the role of donor characteristics in democracy assistance. Studies show that a more diverse set of democracy supporting donors and democracy aid by multilateral donors is associated with greater improvements in the quality of democracy (Gisselquist et al., 2021; Ziaja, 2020). However, the exact mechanisms behind these findings are still understudied. Gisselquist et al. (2021) caution that for many such findings it is not clear whether omitted background variables, such as political alignment between donor and recipient state, play the actually decisive role or not.

Many quantitative studies of democracy aid face the challenge to assign causality to the statistical relationships they find (Steele et al., 2021). In response to this challenge, scholars increasingly apply (quasi-)experimental methods to the evaluation of democracy assistance projects and programming (e.g. Fearon, Humphreys, & Weinstein, 2009; Finkel & Lim, 2021; Hyde, Lamb, & Samet, 2022; Mvukiyehe & Samii, 2017). Many of these studies suggest that democracy aid projects and programmes of development cooperation positively impact the quality of democracy in the localities in which they are implemented. However, until now only a restricted set of (quasi)experimental studies also takes place in authoritarian or (semi)authoritarian contexts, despite that democracy aid is often primarily targeted at such contexts (Hyde et al., 2022). A thin evidence base for the effectiveness of democracy aid hence poses one of the current main challenges of democracy assistance (Dodsworth & Cheeseman, 2018). This is also partly due to the inherent challenges of carrying out project and programme evaluations in general, but which are aggravated in authoritarian contexts when the evaluated programme is a democracy aid project (Green & Kohl, 2007).

Quantitative studies of democracy promotion necessarily focus a lot on democracy assistance through development cooperation in their analyses. Qual-

itative studies in contrast often try to combine a focus on democracy assistance with other means of democracy promotion, such as political conditionality. Such qualitative studies often take the form of single case or comparative studies, either of the influence of democracy promotion for a particular recipient state or by looking at the effectiveness of democracy promotion practiced by a particular donor state (e.g. Fiedler, Grävingsholt, Leininger, & Mross, 2020; Holthaus, 2019; Leininger, 2010; Mross, 2022).

1.2 Contributions

The overview on the key concepts of term limits, their role in the institutionalization of political power, and on democracy promotion points towards a *lacuna* that opens up at the intersection of both subject matters. The research literature on democracy promotion has so far not explicitly focused on the circumvention of presidential term limits, despite its relevance for the phenomenon of weakly institutionalized democratic institutions, and despite that instances of term limit evasions are a much politicized issue in 'third wave' countries (cf. Mangala, 2020). In turn, the research literature on term limit evasions has not distinctively studied the role external democracy promotion may play. Among the numerous quantitative studies on term limit circumventions, only one differentiates democracy aid from other foreign aid, but does so only for a restricted sample and focuses on term limit evasions only as an approximation for the actual outcome variable of interest, namely democratic consolidation (Dietrich & Wright, 2013). By the same token, many qualitative studies on presidential term limit circumventions do not focus explicitly on external actors. Since analyses often cannot investigate all factors in the depth of their real-world complexity but have to prioritize, the role of external, international actors is often only a sentence- or paragraph-long mentioned side-finding (e.g. Dulani & van Donge, 2005; Saliu & Muhammad, 2020; von Doepp, 2019). Hence, the scope conditions and mechanisms for effective democracy promotion in instances of term limit reforms remain in the dark.

The thesis attempts to fill this gap by explicitly concentrating in depth on the role of external actors in democracy promotion during term limit reforms. It aims to trace and uncover the mechanisms through which democracy promotion may exert influence. By doing so it provides three core contributions. First, by focusing on the disaggregated influence of foreign external actors it contributes to the research literature on term limits. Second, by focusing on presidential term limits it contributes to the literature on democracy promotion and its role for weakly institutionalized democracy in countries of the 'third wave of democratization' (Haggard & Kaufman, 2016). Third and as a result, it contributes policy-relevant findings for future foreign policy and democracy promotion.

In its more specific sub-contributions, the thesis brings in the domestic context beyond a more narrow focus on conventional political actors like parliaments and the judiciary in the study of term limit evasions and democracy promotion. In addition to these, it strongly focuses on the role of the domestic civil society and its interaction with external democracy supporters. It also

explores the role that localization of political norms and values plays and how these form the scope conditions of external democracy promotion. Since the research presented here differentiates between democracy aid and other instruments of democracy promotion like conditionality and other diplomatic means as well as the logics to which they function, it is able to investigate and draw conclusions on their separate and complimentary influences. The thesis provides a theorization of one particular understudied instrument of democracy promotion, namely of on-the-ground democracy diplomacy, that helps to understand democracy supporters' quandaries in constitutional reform episodes. It also provides for the first time quantitative network data and an analysis of the supportive and collaborative interactions between external democracy supporters and domestic civil society organizations and political opposition parties. Finally, the thesis makes use of a variety of methodological approaches in both theory and empirical analysis. Zooming in on the same subject matter from different vantage points will hopefully provide a clearer overall picture.

1.3 Theoretical frame

Since this thesis focuses on how the *international* phenomenon of democracy promotion influences the phenomenon of *domestic* institutional change, it is located at the intersection of the fields of comparative politics and international relations. Its dedicated epistemological focus, however, is on domestic change and how it is influenced from abroad. Therefore, it relies more on theories from comparative politics than from international relations.

Much research on democracy promotion is 'undertheorized'. It draws upon "theoretical pragmatism", the consequence of which is that "no 'grand theories of democracy promotion have been developed" (Leininger, 2019). This is partly due to its fragmentation and internal diversity as a research field, and partly also due to that any democracy promotion theory were required to draw on a theory of democratization. The coherence of a possible democracy promotion theory hence becomes a function of the coherence of democratization theory. An analytical, theoretical framework can nevertheless be defined. Gisselquist et al. (2021) provide such a tentative framework in a recent study. This framework is a cross-conceptualization of Carothers' (2009) two approaches of political and developmental democracy aid with three broad "theory camps" (Gisselquist et al., 2021, pp. 5-6) of democratization. The first encompasses structuralist explanations of democratization of which modernization theory features most prominently. The second comprises theories focusing on "institutional" factors, particularly new institutionalist frameworks of historical institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and new institutional economics (Voigt, 2019). Finally, they call the third "camp" agency-based theories of democratization, and here reference particularly rational choice approaches. Gisselquist et al. argue that developmental aid, which in their conceptualization comprises any foreign aid other than political democracy aid, for instance including governance aid, influences mainly explanatory factors stressed by modernization theory and other structuralist theoretical approaches. In contrast, political democracy aid by targeting political actors and institutions addresses

factors and mechanisms investigated by the latter two democratization-theory "camps", namely institutionalism and what they call "agency-based theories".

Gisselquist et al.'s (2021) analytical framework provides a useful theoretical orientation, but applies to this thesis' theoretical frame only with a minor *caveat*. Their analytical framework focuses exclusively on democracy assistance, while the focus here is on both democracy assistance and other instruments of democracy promotion. This notwithstanding the thesis' theoretical outlook can be located in their analytical framework without conceptual loss. The research presented here positions itself theoretically between what they term "institutional" theories and "agency-based" theories of democratization. More specifically, as this thesis advocates "theoretical pluralism" (Checkel, 2013; Kollmorgen & Merkel, 2019), it is situated in the intersecting set of sociological institutionalism and rational-choice institutionalism (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Peters & Pierre, 2020).

Rational-choice institutionalism rests upon methodological individualism, a reductionist approach in social science according to which social phenomena can be explained by investigating how individual-level interactions aggregate. Rational-choice institutionalism approaches the subject matter of institutional formation and change from the assumptions of decision theory which in turn applies the rational-actor model of human behaviour. This assumes that individuals form preferences which are transitive, i.e. non-circular, and complete, i.e. exhaustive over actions and outcomes, which form individuals' preference relations. Based on these, individuals choose actions that maximize their expected utility.

On the one hand, rational-choice institutionalism provides a theoretically coherent framework that advances institutionalist analysis by identifying institutional formation and change as collective action dilemmas and enabling researchers to focus on the strategic interactions between actors. On the other hand, the assumptions of the rational-actor model imply a few disadvantages for which rational-choice institutionalism has been criticised (Hall & Taylor, 1996). First, rational-choice explanations of institutions tend to be very functionalistic. While this provides explanatory power for explaining the persistence of efficient institutions, it fares poorly in explaining the formation and persistence of inefficient institutions and institutional formation 'off-the-equilibrium-path'.

Second, the rational-actor model rests on a very intentionalist premise of human behaviour in which actors can foresee the expected outcomes of their actions. Yet, this demands cognitively farsighted strategic calculus and the knowledge of the entire set of possible actions, while in reality political events often unfold in complex, contingent processes. Finally and following from the two former aspects, rational-choice explanations of institutional formation and change often take a voluntaristic and contractual point of view. Institutions form and change almost 'by agreement', and asymmetric power relations are modelled as exogenous (Hall & Taylor, 1996).

Contrary to rational-choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism takes a more holistic perspective. According to methodological holism, so-

cial phenomena are emergent, socially constructed facts. Social norms, values, beliefs, routines, and symbols are inter-subjectively defined, hence socially constructed, and are crucial in shaping preferences of individuals in the first place, and consequentially inform their choice of action. March and Olsen (1983; 1989) influentially contrasted the theory of social action according to sociological institutionalism with the premises of rational-choice approaches. While rational-choice approaches are premised on a 'logic of consequentiality' according to which actors go through the various consequences of their actions and then choose those actions that maximize their individual benefit, sociological institutionalism espouses a 'logic of appropriateness'. Following this logic, actors choose their behaviour according to what they perceive as socially 'appropriate' routines given situations in which they find themselves. Hence, actors' perceptions of social expectations, their own norms, values, and identities are crucial in shaping behavioural choice.

Sociological institutionalism introduces the role of culture, of norms, beliefs, and values, to the study of institutions. Applications of conventional rational-choice institutionalism often treat these factors as exogenous. Sociological institutionalism thus provides a way to investigate why and how institutions change, and in particular why inefficient institutions prevail or emerge. Critics, however, argue that, culture and institutions blur into each other in sociological institutionalism due to broad and conceptually fuzzy definitions and concepts, such as 'cultural meaning', 'frames', 'scripts', 'norms', 'beliefs', or 'values'. Additionally, applications of sociological institutionalism are criticized to focus too much on the macro-structure of social phenomena, resulting in a theory of "action without agents" (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 954). In consequence, sociological institutionalist analyses may miss the role of political conflict and struggle.

Despite that rational-choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism have traditionally often been juxtaposed, they are actually not mutually exclusive. Rather, their complementarity offers potential for synergism. Rather than that one logic of social action dominates the other, it is likely that they apply as valid theoretical lenses under different circumstances. Hence, argue March and Olsen (2011, p.491) that "it is difficult to deny the importance of each of them (and others) and inadequate to rely exclusively on one of them". Likewise, rational-choice scholars have recognized the merit inherent in sociological theories of human behaviour. Various experimental evidence does not conform well with theoretical predictions premised on a strict rational-actor model (e.g. Fehr & Fischbacher, 2002; Fehr & Gächter, 2000, 2002; Henrich & Muthukrishna, 2021). Instead of being guided by self-interested preferences as according to the conventional rational-actor model, individual behaviour often exhibits reciprocity, altruism, and inequality aversion.

Rational-choice proponents therefore argue that the standard rational-actor model needs a reformulation which is more in line with empirical evidence (Bowles, 2004). According to this reformulation, individual behaviour is firstly informed by 'social preferences' that factors in not only self-interest but the well-being of others as well. Secondly, individuals are "boundedly rational" and hence "rule-following adaptive agents" (Bowles, 2004, p. 97). In other words,

individuals in a way 'externalize' the demanding cognitive costs of constant strategic assessment to social norms of appropriateness, norms which are both internalized as well as subject to social sanction. Finally, individuals' preferences are therefore situation-dependent and endogenous to social institutions which "influence who we meet, to do what, and with what rewards" (Bowles, 2004, p. 97). Integrating this reconfigured actor model into rational-choice theory does not posit problems. Boundedly rational actors still maximize utility, yet their utility is socially and situation-dependently informed. In that sociological institutionalism provides an empirically more resonant account of human preferences and in that rational-choice institutionalism provides a theoretically coherent and parsimonious account of how such human behaviour interacts, both theoretical frameworks enrich each other and jointly provide a deeper account of institutional evolution.

Following this discussion, the chapters in this thesis follow a theoretical framework according to which the different instruments of democracy promotion attempt to influence behaviour of addressees by targeting either the logic of appropriateness or the logic of consequentiality. Consensual democracy promotion instruments and democracy promotion through linkage, such as international agreements, civic education, diplomatic statements etc., attempt to instil democratic ideas, values, attitudes, and identities in a target country's political elites and population. Such instruments target both individual and social behaviour that follows a logic of appropriateness. Their goal is to turn behavioural choices into a function of internalized democratic convictions.

In contrast, coercive instruments of democracy promotion and democracy promotion through leverage, such as conditionality, political and diplomatic pressure and, in the extreme, foreign imposed regime change, attempt to change actors' preference relations by rendering some outcomes costlier, or less costly, than others. Such instruments target individual and social behaviour that follows a logic of consequentiality, according to which behavioural choices will be a function of outcomes that are changed externally through coercive democracy promotion, or leverage.

However, note that to the extent that not all means of democracy promotion can be mutually exclusively distinguished to be either consensual or coercive, the logics through which a democracy promotion instrument works primarily might also not be exclusively distinguished. Public diplomatic statements are a case in point to illustrate this 'grey area'. On the one hand, they could simply be attempts by democracy supporters to call their target actors their democratic role identities into mind. On the other hand, they may, and often do, imply political pressure.

1.4 Methodology

This section sketches the methodological approaches of the chapters ahead. The employed methods span from game-theoretic formal modelling through empirical qualitative case comparison and single-case process tracing to quantitative regression analysis. While all chapters share a common focus on the

influence of democracy promotion on term limit reform, the exact dependent and independent phenomena vary slightly. Chapters two to four all investigate whether and how democracy promotion influences the likelihood that term limits are subject to circumvention or circumvention attempts. However, while chapter two focuses exclusively on democracy assistance, chapters three and four focus on the entire spectrum of democracy promotion instruments. Chapter five takes a slightly different focus than prior chapters. It examines the collaborative and supportive interactions between democracy supporters and domestic civil society and opposition parties during a constitutional reform episode in which the introduction of a term limit was a central reform demand.

Chapter two statistically investigates the relationship between the volume of democracy assistance measured in dollar of official development assistance declared as democracy aid that countries receive and the likelihood that incumbent presidents *attempt* to circumvent term limits as well as the likelihood that they actually successfully *evade* term limits. The data used for the analysis was compiled by the author based upon existing data sets and partly expanded for additional years. As a method, it utilizes survival analysis, i.e. event history analysis (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004). Survival analysis is a regression technique based upon logistic regression models. However, in contrast to logistics regression models it takes duration dependence inherent in the analysed data into account. This means that, unlike logistic regression, it estimates the odds of a change in the dependent variable conditional upon for how long the dependent variable has already persisted without a change. With regard to term limits, the risk for an attempt to circumvent or abolish them is likely dependent on for how long they already have been complied with. As a term limit endures, it becomes more accepted over time. Alternatively, a recently introduced term limit might be less accepted and more prone to being challenged. A converse relationship might be possible, too, however. A state that had a term limit for a long time already might grow weary of it and attempt to innovate by abolishing it; and a recently introduced term limit might be more stable and robust since not much time has passed since its introduction, and motivations and support for the term limit might still be high. Therefore, the survival model specified in chapter one does not priorly assume any particular shape of the baseline duration dependence of term limits. Finally, survival analysis also has the advantage over logistic regression models that it takes the censoring and truncation of data into account, for instance that observations may have persisted prior, as well as may persist beyond the time frame of analysis.

Like all statistical regression techniques, survival analysis is limited in that it can only discern correlational patterns in the analysed data. Despite specifying the survival analysis model in chapter one carefully in order to take all possible confounding by unobserved and unobservable data into account (cf. Pearl, Glymour, & Jewell, 2016), it cannot establish causality and is mute on the mechanisms underlying the relations it uncovers.

Chapter three hence presents a qualitative paired comparison case study. The analysed cases are attempted term limit evasions in Senegal in 2011 to

2012 and in Malawi in 2001 to 2003. Following the case selection strategies theorized by Gerring and Cojocaru (2016), these cases present typical cases for failed term limit evasion attempts. However, the incumbent presidents were able to pass different institutional hurdles in their attempts (Baturu, 2014, pp. 74-75). The varied patterns of failure between the two cases renders them informative for a qualitative paired comparison of the role that external democracy promotion and domestic factors play in shaping the course of failed attempts to circumvent term limits. Despite this, the paired comparison necessarily remains descriptive and, to a certain degree, exploratory. It highlights possible mechanisms of how external democracy promotion can play a role in preventing term limit evasion and which other domestic context factors play important parts. Nonetheless, it bears the *caveat* that it only illustrates the tendency that possible explanatory factors may exert in term limit evasion attempts that ultimately fail. The paired comparison draws upon primary media sources as well as semi-structured interview data collected during research trips to Senegal and Malawi.

After the paired comparison in chapter three, chapter four further sharpens the focus. It revisits the case of a failed evasion attempt in Malawi in 2001 to 2003 and presents a qualitative deductive process tracing analysis. Process tracing is a method of qualitatively assessing explanatory hypotheses (Bennett & Checkel, 2014; Collier, 2011; Mahoney, 2012). Here, *deductive* process tracing is juxtaposed with more inductive, exploratory approaches and is meant to describe the formulation of prior primary and rival hypotheses retrieved from extant literature which are then assessed empirically using process tracing (Trampusch & Palier, 2016). Process tracing is suited well as a method for single-case studies. It provides a thick case description during which empirical evidence is systematically accounted for based on their conditional likelihood in various process tracing tests. These tests and the assessment of qualitative evidence draw on causal and counterfactual reasoning by the researcher. The assessment of the evidence is therefore subjective to the researcher which hence necessitates that the researcher presents it in a transparent, detailed account. While the thick, detailed description and systematic assessment of evidence in process tracing can potentially uncover causal mechanisms, it comes as a trade-off for generalizability to other cases. Like the paired comparison in chapter two, the process tracing analysis builds upon semi-structured interview data collected during a research trip to Malawi in April 2017 and upon a qualitative analysis of primary media sources.

Chapter five diverges from the previous chapters in its focus on the subject matter. While chapters two to four examined the influence of democracy aid and democracy promotion on term limit evasions, chapter five studies democracy diplomacy during a constitutional reform episode in the course of which term limits may be abolished or introduced. Theoretically, it uses game theory to construct a formal model of democracy diplomacy during reform episodes. Game theory furnishes a useful theoretical tool to model the strategic behaviour of actors under uncertainty and risks. It therefore is able to incorporate relevant aspects of the strategic dilemma that democracy supporters face when deciding whether or not to engage in democracy promotion during

a reform episode in a target country. The formal model abstracts from reality in order to reveal an explanatory logic that provides generalizable insight into other similar cases of democracy promotion during reform episodes.

After presenting and discussing the model, the chapter then proceeds with an empirical quantitative analysis of network data for a single country case. The selected country case is Togo's constitutional reform crisis in 2017 to 2019. The network data was collected through interviews with foreign state, international organization, civil society, and opposition party representatives during a research trip to Togo in November to December 2019. The Togolese network of foreign democracy supporters, domestic civil society and opposition parties is analysed through, first, comparing measures of network centrality across actor-types, and second, exponential random graph modelling (ERGM). Exponential random graph models are based upon logistic regression analyses and estimate the statistical probability of interactions, so called ties or edges, between actors, so called nodes or vertices, in a network (Cranmer, Leifeld, McClurg, & Rolfe, 2017). Unlike more conventional regression techniques, exponential random graph modelling can account for the structural as well as dyad-wise non-independence of network data. As it draws on data simulation using Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo maximum likelihood estimation it can facilitate statistical inferences which, however, account only for the class of networks as according to the model specification. Therefore, the network analysis is complemented with qualitative data drawn from semi-structured interviews with representatives of democracy supporting external actors. Nonetheless, the findings of the network analysis are case-specific and limited in their generalizability to other cases.

1.5 Summaries and findings

This section briefly summarizes the main arguments and findings of the individual thesis chapters. For chapters two and three, each summary also contains a short description of the author's individual contribution to the co-authored journal articles on which the chapters are based.

1.5.1 Chapter 2

Chapter two poses the research question whether democracy aid first, helped deterring attempts to circumvent term limits, and second, helped preventing actual successful circumventions in African and Latin American states between 1990 and 2014. The chapter presents two theoretical main arguments. First, the mechanisms through which democracy aid exerts its influence in a target country can be conceptualized according to March and Olsen's (1989) logic of consequentiality and logic of appropriateness. Second, term limit evasions can be divided into different phases, or steps. In a first step, an incumbent and their supporters begin an the actual attempt to circumvent a term limit drawing on a variety of possible strategies (Versteeg et al., 2020). Step one ends with this choice of strategy. Step two begins with the resulting output of the incumbent's chosen strategy. This output, for instance a court ruling or a

constitutional amendment among others, may clear the incumbent to re-run for the presidential office or simply stay in power. Whether he accomplishes either of the two successfully determines the outcome of the evasion attempt.

The findings present negative associations between the amount of democracy aid that states received and the risk for term limit circumvention attempts as well as actual successful term limit circumventions. However, while the association with the risk of circumvention attempts is statistically uncertain, the association with the risk of actual successful circumventions is statistically significant and substantial in size. Yet, for the association to be substantial, the amount of democracy aid that a target country receives *per capita* needs to medium to high. Nonetheless, the results show that despite that democracy aid makes no difference for the risk of term limit evasion *attempts*, on average it reduces the risk for *actual* term limit evasions.

I acted as lead-author for this co-authored journal article. Data compilation based upon extant data sets, expansion of the country-year data regarding term limit provisions and term limit evasion instances as well as specifying and implementing the statistical analysis were my major contributions. While the initial theoretical idea of dividing term limit evasions into steps of attempts, outputs, and outcomes stemmed from my co-author, I contributed in jointly developing this idea further. In addition, I extensively commented and edited sections written by my co-author as did my co-author regarding the sections written by me.

1.5.2 Chapter 3

After the large-n analysis of chapter two, chapter three zooms in on the domestic conditions conducive for the effectiveness of democracy promotion. In addition, in contrast to chapter two which focused only on one subset of democracy promotion instruments, namely democracy aid, chapter three widens the scope and investigates the influence that the entire range of democracy promotion instruments can have.

The chapter deals with the research question how democracy promotion and attitudes of the domestic population on presidential term limits amplify each other. Like chapter two, it posits that democracy promotion can work through both the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 1983). However, its theoretical angle is more explicitly derived from social institutionalism by addressing domestic attitudes on term limits as important scope conditions for democracy promotion effectiveness. Yet, this focus is combined with an actor-centred rational-choice theorization. According to its main argument, domestic and external actors can be conceptualized as pro- and anti-reform groups in an actor constellation. Contentious negotiation over political reform plays out between these actor groups against the background of popular political attitudes. Domestic attitudes favouring presidential term limits create large audience costs for incumbents that seek to prolong their tenure through term limit circumvention. As a consequence, the effectiveness of democracy promotion depends strongly on whether the position of the supported domestic actor group, e.g. the pro term limit-group, has a greater

intersection with popular attitudes. In addition, the relative strength of actor groups in the form of organizational resources will influence which group prevails in the domestic debate on political reform.

The results of the chapter's qualitative paired comparison indicate that a complementarity of democracy promotion instruments, a capable civil society, and pro-term limit attitudes in the wider population may be important scope conditions for democracy promotion effectiveness. Combining pressure and conditionality exerted on the political elites with general civil society support as well as capacity building through democracy aid were important mechanisms in both cases. Further descriptive evidence on the strength of attitudes, both on democratic institutions and about the respective incumbents, provided favourable conditions for these mechanisms to play out.

As second author, my main contribution to this journal article was the analysis of the term limit contravention attempt in Malawi in 2001 to 2003. Additionally, after conceptually identifying the set of cases that would make up our case universe together, I compiled the actual universe of cases as well as the respective data that situate our selected cases in the universe of cases. I extensively commented and edited on the sections written by my co-author as she did comment and edit on those written by me.

1.5.3 Chapter 4

Chapter four of this thesis provides a deeper analysis of the failed term limit evasion attempt in Malawi in 2001 to 2003. Using process tracing, I investigate in this single case analysis which role external democracy promotion played in comparison to domestic factors identified by the extant case-relevant literature. Second, I evaluate the part that different instruments of democracy promotion played vis-a-vis each other. As a methodology, process tracing is well suited for this type of comparative evaluative assessment of different factors, since it traces and then systematically evaluates evidence for rival hypotheses.

As in chapters two and three, I theorize that democracy promotion works through the two logics of social action, the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences, framed here as a logic of conditionality respectively (March & Olsen, 1989). However, in this chapter I emphasize their concordance with the mechanisms of linkage and leverage as conceptualized by Levitsky and Way (2005). In addition, I also account for party fractionalization and the function of the domestic judiciary as veto player as rival domestic explanatory factors. For each explanatory factor, I formulate assessable hypotheses and causal process observations before compiling and assessing evidence for all rival hypotheses through process tracing.

The results of the analysis show a complex interaction between external democracy promotion and the domestic factors of civil society mobilization, judiciary safeguarding, and the fractionalization of partisan support. Civil society mobilization against the term limit evasion as well as judiciary vetoing, however, were mediate factors, while party fractionalization was the immediate, proximate factor that prevented the incumbent from successfully circumventing Malawi's presidential term limit. In assessing these factors and their

interactions, the chapter concludes that democracy promotion influenced civil society mobilization and the fractionalization of partisan support. Democracy promotion, rather than having an influence separate from domestic factors, therefore played a reinforcing role.

In contrast to chapters two and three, this chapter is single-authored.

1.5.4 Chapter 5

The final chapter takes a slightly different epistemological viewpoint than the preceding chapters. Instead of investigating the part that democracy promotion, here in the specific form of democracy diplomacy, played in attempted and actual term limit evasions, the chapter examines the interactions between democracy supporters and domestic actors during a reform episode in which the re-introduction of presidential term limits played a divisive role.

I present a formal model of the strategic dilemma faced by democracy supporters in reform episodes in target and recipient countries. The model formulation is based upon the recognition contained in the extant literature on democracy promotion that risks, uncertainty, and conflicting objectives act as internal restraints and external constraints upon democracy supporters. Through abstraction, it identifies testable implications and hypotheses that can be examined in further research. Overall, the formal model leads to the conjecture that democracy supporters are unlikely to interact with and extensively support domestic civil society organizations and opposition parties during reform episodes in authoritarian contexts.

I then explore this conjecture using network data on the interactions between bilateral and multilateral democracy supporters with domestic civil society organizations and opposition parties. The results of a centrality analysis of actor types and of an exponential random graph model illustrate first, that democracy promoters were more likely to collaborate with each other than with domestic actors, and second, that multilateral democracy supporters engaged more actively with domestic actors than bilateral democracy supporters. Qualitative interview data illustrates further how uncertainty and skepticism about the domestic political opposition made democracy supporters wary about the reform prospect.

Like chapter four, this chapter is single-authored.

1.6 "So what?": Conclusion and policy implications

Thirty years ago the world seemed ripe for a worldwide, unremitting diffusion of democracy. Yet, the euphoria of the 'third wave of democracy' subsided. In many states that began their democratic transition at the end of the 20th century, democracy is only weakly institutionalized. Two decades into the 21st century we observe that autocracy seems to resurge as authoritarian tendencies unfold even in countries where democracy was believed to be well consolidated. The 'end of history' by far does not seem near.

Focusing concretely on presidential term limits, this thesis investigates the question, if and how external democracy promotion can play a role in preventing the de-institutionalization and supporting the institutionalization of political power.

Why should we care about this question? Because first, democracy as a political regime is not for granted. If it can be challenged and possibly rolled back in country contexts where it seemed well established, then this is even more true in country contexts where democracy is only partly or weakly institutionalized. Second, if a world in which people live democratically together is still and truly a vision that humanity aspires to, then we need to understand how we can protect and promote this vision. High-level diplomacy initiatives like the 2021-Summit for Democracy of the US American Biden-administration suggest that this vision still exists. High support for democracy around the world detected by surveys suggests as much, too (Asunka & Gyimah-Boadi, 2021; Mauk, 2022; Wike, Simmons, Stokes, & Fetterolf, 2017). By the same token, the financial volume that has been spent in the form of democracy aid is increasing for years (cf. figure 5.1 in chapter 4). Given all this demand, motivation, and effort for democracy, we ought to be interested in how it can be effectively promoted and protected.

The research results presented in this thesis naturally come with a general *caveat*. They only rest upon four studies, and their findings, the conclusions following from them, and the implications they bear need to be examined with critical discretion. Furthermore, since research progresses iteratively and gradually, they all should be subject to further validation by future research. That said, the results of the individual papers can be summarized into four major contributions. First, as the evidence in chapter two demonstrates, democracy assistance is associated with a lower risk that incumbents succeed in prolonging their presidency beyond the number of terms according to which they should maximally remain when they entered office. However, this negative association accounts substantively only for medium to high amounts of per capita-democracy aid.

Second, the evidence in chapters three and four demonstrates that the different coercive and consensual instruments of democracy promotion need to be employed in tandem in order to be effective. The two logics of social action, the logic of consequentiality and the logic of appropriateness, stress different pathways of behavioural motivation. Accordingly, democracy promotion which essentially has the goal to propel and sway behaviour into the direction of (pro-)democratic behaviour has to run the whole gamut of mechanisms to motivate such behaviour.

Third, also based on the qualitative case studies in chapter three and four, effective democracy promotion is predicated on favourable domestic conditions, particularly with regard to (pro)democratic attitudes. The same accounts for a (pro)democratic, supportive civic space which is to a certain critical extent free and protected from harassment and persecution from an authoritarian government.

Finally, following the theoretical model and analysis in chapter five, it seems

unlikely that governmental, bilateral democracy supporters react to *ad hoc* emerging possibilities for democratically liberalizing reforms by determinedly supporting domestic pro-democracy actors. Rather, they are exposed to strategic predicaments. The uncertainties, risks, and conflicting objectives they face raise the stakes for them too high. This might also generally be true for multi-lateral democracy supporters, but possibly to a lesser extent. This last finding comes with an important qualification that needs to be stressed. The finding applies to reform episodes which in general tend to be highly volatile and tense, and the finding may hence not apply to the same degree to contexts outside of such episodes. The results of the research presented here carry implications for the practice and policy of democracy promotion.

Level of spending The evidence in chapter two suggests that the level of ODA spent on democracy aid has implications for its substantive effectiveness. Hence, spending on democracy aid in international cooperation should be kept, or depending on current spending, be raised to at least what can under current circumstances be called a medium per capita-amount. However, it is also paramount that it be spent *wisely*. To achieve this, more scientifically rigorous evidence is needed on what type of programme and project interventions work in democracy assistance. Impact assessment and evaluations of democracy assistance will help to define better 'theories of change' of future democracy assistance-projects and -programmes in development cooperation.

Be patient It is important to be aware that democracy assistance plays out on a long time horizon. Promoting the internalization and localization of democratic norms and their institutionalization as rules-in-equilibria works through the logic of appropriateness which is a process of social learning. Therefore, policy-makers, the design of democracy promotion policies as well as the evaluation and assessment of democracy assistance need to take a long-term view.

Protect the civic space Domestic civil society played important parts in promoting and protecting democratic institutions in the analyses in chapters three to five. By restricting and 'closing' both legally and extralegally the civic space in which civil society operates, authoritarian regimes extinguish the potential for future regime change. Therefore, democracy supporters and particularly foreign governments that claim to promote democracy need to come out strongly against any 'closing of the civic space'.

Defend 'red line'-institutions Democracy as a political system has a breaking point. When too many 'red lines' are crossed, i.e. too many inherently democratic institutions are violated or circumvented, democracy is altered to such an extent that it is not democracy any more. Just as democracy supporters need to come out against the closing of civic spaces, they need to guard the 'red line', or 'parchment' institutions, that are intrinsic to the function of democracy as democracy.

Where these 'red lines' of democracy run, which occurrences of violations or circumventions of democratic institutions call for strong, or stronger,

reactions is an intricate definition problem. In reference to a story according to which the Roman emperor Caligula bestowed a senator's rank upon a horse in order to mock the politically disempowered senate of Rome, Guala and Hindriks (2020) call this the 'Caligula problem'. They suggest a functionalist solution according to which institutions cease to be, when their change makes them incapable of fulfilling the functions that typically are fulfilled by institutions of their kind. With regard to democracy this may single out any institutional changes as autocratizing if they threaten to overturn the essence of basic democracy as "limited self-governance" (Ober, 2017, p. 59). Ober provides a conceptualization and model of basic, minimum democracy 'before liberalism' that may help identifying the bare essential functions of democracy and its institutionalized 'red lines' that cannot be crossed lest a democracy ceases to be a democracy.

Face external constraints as well as self-restraints Democracy supporters need to identify and reflect where they are subject to both external restrictions and self-restraint. Ways to overcome such limitations on the part of democracy supporters need to be found. This would certainly be a matter of a larger, and still open, or not yet opened policy debate. However, perhaps overcoming constraints and self-restraints may entail strengthening multilateral organizations and institutions and their role in democracy promotion.

Chapter 2

*Protecting Democracy from Abroad: Democracy aid against attempts to circumvent presidential term limits**

Abstract This chapter addresses the question of whether international democracy aid helps to protect presidential term limits – a commonly accepted but increasingly challenged safeguard for democracy. According to our analysis, democracy aid is effective in countering attempts to circumvent term limits, thus, it contributed towards protecting democratic standards in African and Latin American countries between 1990 and 2014. Democracy aid helps to fend off term-limit circumventions, but it is not as effective in deterring presidents from trying to circumvent presidential term limits. Our analysis furthermore suggests that there is double the risk of an attempt to circumvent term limits in Latin American than in African states. Although our results confirm prior findings that “targeted aid” such as democracy aid makes a difference for maintaining democratic institutions, it challenges studies that argue democracy assistance has become “tame”. Our findings furthermore support previous indications that more refined theories on the effects of democracy aid in different phases of domestic processes are necessary, in particular in the face of global autocratization trends.

2.1 Introduction

Limiting the terms of heads of state is an institutional safeguard for democracy. These limits shall prevent abuse and the extension of executive power

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in political regimes⁶, especially in (semi-)presidential systems (Baturu, 2019; McKie, 2017). In the context of recent global autocratization trends, circumventing presidential term limits has become one part of the toolbox of pseudo-democrats who seek to extend their political power (Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019). During the last decade, incumbents in Africa and Latin America – two regions with predominantly presidential systems – increasingly attempted to extend their mandates beyond the term limits foreseen in the respective constitutions. In most cases, they opted for legal reforms such as constitutional changes or re-interpretations of legal norms to extend term limits (Versteeg et al., 2020). African and Latin American presidents attempted to circumvent roughly every second instated term-limit rule between 1990 and 2014; they successfully circumvented 30 term limits and remained in power for a third (or more) term.

This article sets out to better understand this widespread practice of expanding executive powers and to explain if international democracy aid may counter term extensions. Despite the increase in literature on the driving forces of attempts to extend term limits in comparative politics, studies have acknowledged international factors but have hardly studied them in depth. Analysed factors span from the relevance of specific actor groups, such as the military or political parties (Harkness, 2017; Kouba, 2016; von Doepp, 2005a), to institutional arrangements such as government capacities or the relationship between the legislature and executive (McKie, 2019; Reyntjens, 2016), to political corruption (Baturu, 2010). Although support to promote democracy has become a standard element of the foreign policies of “Western” countries (Carothers, 2009), we hardly know anything about the effects of democracy aid on protecting democracies from autocratization trends. More specifically, empirical evidence on democracy aid’s influence on the (un)successful outcomes of attempts to circumvent presidential term limits is still scarce and limited to country case studies (Hulse, 2018) and one cross-national study of sub-Saharan Africa (Dietrich & Wright, 2013). Our analysis addresses this gap by providing a comprehensive cross-national and inter-regional study by answering the following research question:

Did democracy aid help to protect presidential term limits in Africa and Latin America between 1990 and 2014?

We approach this question by splitting it into two further questions, which do justice to the two typical steps of circumventions of presidential term limits. Each step has different implications for international actors’ involvement, as we outline below.

1. Does democracy aid help to deter incumbents from trying to circumvent

⁶Although this is the predominant view of term limits in the political science literature, there is also an opposite view that largely, though not exclusively, originates from US legal studies. According to this, term limits constrain voter choice illiberally (Jacob, 1994). They would also artificially weed out experienced and talented political leaders and would permit moral hazard (Cain, 1994), or even incentivise graft and corruption (Ginsburg, Melton, & Elkins, 2011). A similar argument holds that presidents with limited terms are “lame ducks”, as successful implementation of economic and social reforms requires more time than two presidential terms (Paul, 2011)

term limits?

2. Does democracy aid help to fend off term-limit circumventions?

Theoretically, this article contributes towards refining the explanations of the role of democracy aid in the “tug-of-war” between democratic consolidation and autocratic backsliding by integrating two strands of literature. It draws, first, on International Relations theories of foreign aid and democracy promotion, which focus on international effects on domestic political processes. We combine this literature with the growing research on presidential term limits in developing regions. *Conceptually*, it introduces a temporal dimension by systematically distinguishing two steps in the sequence of attempts to circumvent term limits. This distinction allows us to identify the typical dynamics, which have different implications for the strategies applied by donors of democracy aid. *Empirically*, this contributes generalisable empirical evidence on democracy aid’s influence on term limits because it provides the first quantitative analysis with a cross-regional sample. The analysis includes 49 attempts to extend presidential term limits between 1990 and 2014 in Africa and Latin America. It combines secondary data with primary data collected by the authors. *Methodologically*, this article applies a survival analysis, which is able to model the “lifespans” of term limits, and thus, the resistance of democratic institutions. This allows us to also account for censored and truncated data as well as the duration dependence of term-limit circumventions.

In the remainder of this paper, we first introduce the key concepts and build hypotheses in part two. They are based on socialisation and rational choice-based theories, which link democracy aid to the likeliness of success or failure of attempts to extend presidential term limits. In the third part of this article, we explore the advantages and limits of survival analysis to address the research question and introduce the dataset built for the empirical analysis. In the fourth part, we discuss the results. We find that democracy aid is effective in countering attempts to circumvent term limits, thus, it contributed towards protecting democratisation in African and Latin American countries between 1990 and 2014. We find consistent results that democracy aid lowers the risk of there being a successful circumvention, whereas the effect of democracy aid on the risk that presidents might attempt to circumvent term limits is somewhat uncertain. The article concludes with a summary of the findings and an outlook on future research to enhance theory-building on democracy protection.

2.2 Theoretical framework and hypotheses: Protecting term limits with democracy aid

Democracy aid as a targeted form of foreign aid has been proven to enhance the democratic quality of political regimes (Fiedler et al., 2020; Finkel et al., 2007; Gisselquist et al., 2021; J. M. Scott & Steele, 2011). Whereas most scholars focused on supporting the establishment and consolidation of democratic institutions and behaviours, analyses paid less attention to protecting

democracy from anti-democratic influences.⁷ However, in light of global autocratization trends, it is relevant to know if past efforts to support democracy helped to counter anti-democratic forces. This empirical analysis contributes towards closing this research gap by analysing whether democracy aid can help to protect one of democracy's most relevant "safeguards" – presidential term limits. Although "pseudo-democrats" carefully weight their probabilities of "overstaying", presidents frequently fail to extend their terms: 38 per cent of circumvention attempts were unsuccessful between 2000 and 2018 (Versteeg et al., 2020).

Applying a broad understanding of presidential term limits, we define them as "a constitutional restriction on the number of fixed terms – consecutive or otherwise – the head of state may serve" (Ginsburg et al., 2011, pp. 1833-1834). Term limits are thus a democratic norm that serves to limit executive political power. Term-limit *circumventions* describe instances in which term limits are either extended or abolished. Conceptually, we differentiate two stages in the process of term-limit circumventions. First is the *initial* attempt to circumvent a presidential term limit, which is the moment an incumbent resolves and proceeds to extend or abolish a term limit. Second, the *de facto* outcome of an attempt to circumvent term limits can be successful or unsuccessful. Staying in office through either electoral or non-electoral means signifies a successful outcome, while leaving office implies the contrary for the incumbent. In such processes of circumvention, successful democracy aid should work towards maintaining term limits and electoral governmental change.

Democracy aid targets core political institutions and actors, especially elections and electoral commissions, pro-democratic civil society groups, parliaments, media organisations, the judiciary, and human rights commissions (Carothers, 2009). It supports institutional reforms such as electoral management or parliamentary oversight to improve accountability. To foster and implement these reforms, it addresses the behavioural and attitudinal changes of officeholders by providing advice and trainings (Leininger, 2019). In addition, it supports pro-democratic actors such as activists, advocacy groups, social movements, and political leaders by providing trainings and organisational funding. Timing matters in democracy aid. It directs aid at gradual change processes such as institutional and legal reforms and their implementation as well as flexible assistance during critical junctures, such as instances of regime change and democratic transitions. Actor-centred approaches become more relevant during critical junctures, as change-makers are decisive for creating a new political order, for instance through social mobilisation and constitution-building.⁸ Although donors of democracy aid have established "toolboxes" to support democratisation, they still lack explicit approaches to counter gradual autocratization processes. Regional organisations with democracy clauses are an exception – they are purported to serve as safeguards for democracy in their member states, particularly in Europe, Latin America, and Africa (Börzel &

⁷A recent exception is (Niño-Zarazúa, Gisselquist, & Horigoshi, 2020).

⁸Carothers distinguishes between political and developmental democracy assistance, which refers to flexible support during critical junctures for democratization (*political*) and to gradual reform processes (*developmental*). We use the term "democracy aid", which covers both types of assistance.

van Hüllen, 2015; Closa & Palestini, 2018; Hawkins, 2008; Pevehouse, 2016). However, there are several reasons to suggest that the democracy aid of bilateral and multilateral donors contributes towards protecting presidential term limits, and hence democracy.

Democracy aid works along two mechanisms of political action that are usually complementary in practice. First, following the socialisation-based logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 2011), democracy aid fosters learning processes, which contribute towards institutional reforms and behavioural and attitudinal changes through civic education, seminars, capacity-building, and persuasion by arguing (Hawkins, 2004; Risse, 2004; Risse & Babayan, 2015).⁹ Such activities can influence the direction of a circumvention attempt. Where democracy aid builds capacities to foster vertical and horizontal accountability – such as investments in a strong and lively civil society or a knowledgeable and critical parliament – it prepares oppositional actors to counter anti-democratic reforms such as attempts to circumvent term limits (Finkel, 2003; Freyburg, 2015; Heinrich & Loftis, 2019). Persuading the political establishment that supports an incumbent’s attempt to circumvent the term limit is a first step towards discretely signalling a donor’s disapproval of the intended institutional reform. However, arguing with a pseudo-democrat who has decided to stay in power at all costs is certainly not the most promising approach. Here, the second mechanism of democracy aid comes in (Hyde, 2011).

A rational choice-based logic of consequences foresees that democracy aid goes along with costs and benefits for sitting governments and the political establishment (March & Olsen, 1998; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). According to this logic, target states receive financial and reputational rewards from donors if they foster democratisation; or, in the opposing scenario, they are punished with financial conditionality or sanctions if they counter democratisation or reverse democratic achievements such as term limits. Then why should pseudo-democrats accept democracy aid at all? Because they can hardly avoid receiving democracy aid completely since it is part of a broader political economy of aid. Incumbents of target countries rely on aid and consider the costs of non-democratic behaviour in their relationships with “Western” donors. Furthermore, donors often integrate democracy aid in their aid negotiations with sitting governments (Poppe et al., 2019). Such aid negotiations are important communication channels and often set standards for democratic conditionalities. The latter are enforced once an agreed democratic reform fails or if sitting governments counter democratisation (Faust, 2010). Although arguing and persuasion are “toothless”, they can be important complements once conditionality is factored in.

In line with previous research, we acknowledge that the democracy level of the target regime as well as its political-historical relation with donors influences both strategic donor allocation as well as the effectiveness of democracy aid (Dietrich & Wright, 2015; Jawad, 2008; Richter, 2012; van Cranenburgh, 2012). For instance, if there were no, or very weak, civic or parliamentary

⁹Opposed to (Risse, 2004), we subsume persuasion and argue to the logic of appropriateness because the objective of democracy aid is to contribute to learning democratic behaviours and attitudes through arguments.

opposition or institutional safeguards against a term-limit circumvention attempt, democracy aid would lack addressees. It is furthermore less likely that donors would fiercely support opposition actors or apply sanctions or conditionalities if a target state has strategic importance or aligns ideologically with the donor.

Conceptually, we take a procedural perspective and distinguish two steps in the process of circumvention attempts, namely the attempt (step 1) and the attempt’s outcome (step 2), as depicted in figure 2.1.




Figure 2.1: Process steps in term-limit circumventions. Source: Authors.

Our approach is a refinement of research by Dietrich and Wright (2013), which only focused on democracy aid’s influence on actual term-limit circumventions. However, distinguishing between circumvention *attempts* and *successful* circumventions offers additional insight into democracy aid effectiveness. It indicates the relevance of timing and whether democracy aid helps in preventing presidents from attempting circumventions at all, or whether it contributes towards protecting term limits as soon as presidents make their attempt.

Despite differences between the two steps described below, they have an important commonality. They are driven by a simple actor constellation, which consists of pro- and contra-reform groups (Leininger & Nowack, 2022). Although motivations within each group might differ from case to case, each side’s objectives are generalizable across cases. On the one hand, the contra-reform group objects to the reform of term limits and the incumbent’s continuation in office. On the other hand, pro-reform actors support the incumbent’s attempt to stay in power. Donors who provide democracy aid are part of the contra-reform group. Our analysis covers all sources of democracy aid, spanning from donor countries and international organisations to foundations (see also Section 2.3, “Method, data, and operationalisation”).

2.2.1 Attempts to circumvent presidential term limits and democracy aid

In a first step, incumbents announce their intentions to either run another time for office, notwithstanding other legal provisions, or to reform the term-limit provision. We identify these attempts by assessing whether incumbents take formal measures to prolong their rule, despite a constitutionally prescribed term limit; or by checking whether sufficient consensual information exists in the media and the research literature that an incumbent intends to do so. The latter becomes important only in a few cases in which incumbents face so much opposition that they stop their attempt early on (Corrales, 2016).

Prior to any such official attempt at a term-limit reform, however, the incumbent will assess their chances of success. If the continuous democracy support provided in the past has bolstered democracy sufficiently – by, for instance, increasing the capacity and power of civil society, the media, the political opposition, the parliament, or the judiciary – the incumbent will already have experienced headwinds in prior years. They will therefore judge their chances for success to be slim and refrain from making any official attempt at reform. Furthermore, they might anticipate their weak or strong position vis-à-vis donors and their foreign policy interests. If donors have vested foreign policy interests that the incumbent can use as political leverage, such as regional security interests, the incumbent would judge it to be unlikely that donors will intervene (Grimm & Leininger, 2012; Pogodda, 2012). If, however, donors have already intervened or exerted pressure in the name of democracy protection in the past, or if – by providing a lot of democracy aid – they have signalled that democracy is dear to them, they would draw the opposite conclusion. This reasoning leads to our first hypothesis:

Hypothesis one: The more democracy aid a recipient country receives, the lower the risk that an incumbent will attempt to circumvent a term limit.

2.2.2 Outcomes of presidential term-limit circumventions and democracy aid

Donors of democracy aid face wider latitude in opposing a term extension more openly when the incumbent has kicked-off an institutional reform process officially and the manipulation of the term-limit provision has become transparent. They invest in democracy assistance to enhance the capacities of social movements and civil society organisations to influence the reform path and offer legal advice to shift the contents of institutional reforms in a democratic direction. They are more likely to apply a logic of consequences such as rhetorical condemnations and aid conditionalities than before (Nowack, 2021). When incumbents nonetheless succeed in enforcing a new provision, they stand officially for another term in office in national elections and run electoral campaigns. After this second step, the objective of the anti-reform group changes. Opposition groups ally to prevent the incumbent’s electoral success. Belonging to the anti-reform group, donors of democracy aid change their strategies, too, and focus more on electoral support to foster clean and fair elections. This is

an important contribution for legitimising the electoral process (Hyde, 2010), particularly if the incumbent eventually fails. Yet, donors of democracy aid also need to take care not to help in legitimising an incumbent who stays in power. Supporting the electoral campaigns of non-state actors and the political opposition to sensitise voters to the idea that yet another term for the same incumbent is not legitimate democratically can flip the coin during the electoral process. For illustration, consider the case of Senegal. The incumbent president, Abdoulaye Wade, reaffirmed in 2011 an earlier announcement he had made to run a third time for president in the upcoming February 2012 elections, despite a two-term limit. Since the constitutional court green-lighted his candidacy, Wade indeed was able to run for president but was eventually defeated (Heyl, 2019). Throughout this episode, donors increased support to the domestic civil society and media opposing his attempt (Demarest, 2016; Leininger & Nowack, 2022). For instance, in 2011 the United States funded the Senegalese civil society organisation RADDHO (Rencontre Africaine Pour la Defense des Droits de l'Homme) – a key player in the social mobilisation against Wade's third term – through the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) with the following goal:

To promote a credible election process in February 2012, RADDHO will promote the constitution among ordinary Senegalese and generate constructive dialogue on its provisions. RADDHO will also encourage participation among eligible voters in the elections through a voter education campaign and election observation. The campaign will include eight conferences in high schools and universities, 42 radio programs, one debate to air on national television, and a capacity building workshop for supporters of the movement against constitutional changes to presidential term limits (AidData, 2017).

Donors complemented this with pressure on Wade to refrain from his course of action, both publicly as well as behind closed doors. This leads to our second hypothesis:

Hypothesis two: Democracy aid helps to protect democracy by reducing the risk that an incumbent can successfully circumvent a presidential term limit.

2.3 Method, data, and operationalisation

Our main interest is in the resistance of democratic institutions, or more specifically, how long a term-limit rule can survive without being extended or abolished. Additionally, we want to know whether particular incumbents remain in office following their attempts to change the term limit. Hence, our unit of analysis consists of two elements – the actual term-limit stipulation in the constitution and the extension of the incumbent's mandate. This novel approach adds value to previous studies, which use the incumbent presidents as the unit of analysis because it combines an institutional and behavioural perspective.

We investigate the hypotheses by fitting a survival model to our data

(Baturu, 2010; Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004; Dietrich & Wright, 2013). Survival models estimate the risk – more specifically the “hazard” – of an event during the course of “survival” of the observed unit. The unit of analysis “fails to survive” when the failure event occurs. We are interested in circumventions as well as attempted circumventions of presidential term limits, which, in methodological terms, are the failure events in our data. Our independent variable, the hazard rate, reports the rate at which each of these failure events takes place. The hazard rate reports the risk that term limits, which have survived without circumvention or attempted circumvention so far, face in each additional year of their “lifespan”.

An important advantage of survival models is that they take “left-truncation” and “right-censoring” into account. Left-truncation occurs when the onset of a unit of analysis happens *before* the time period of analysis. Right-censoring, in contrast, describes when a unit of analysis survives *until* or *beyond* the end of the analysis period. In our case, all term limit-rules that were already instated pre-1990 are left-truncated; all term-limit rules that were not circumvented up to 2014 are right-censored. Another advantage is that we can stratify our data according to the sequence of the term limits instated after one another in one state, which allows for discriminating between sequentially related risks for circumvention (attempts).

The start of the analysis period, 1990, is a cut-off point for studying democracy aid. After the Cold War, the dynamics of international relations and, hence, the practice of providing foreign aid changed (Bermeo, 2016; Fleck & Kilby, 2010). Democracy aid became a common element of official development assistance (ODA) (J. M. Scott & Carter, 2016). Whereas in most African states democratic transitions and the introduction of presidential term limits took place post-Cold War, many Latin American states already had term limits in place or (re-)introduced them during the 1980s (McKie, 2019, p. 1504). Regarding the endpoint of the analysis, 2014, we face the limitation that data for our main explanatory variable (democracy aid) are only available until 2013.¹⁰

We collected data on the term limits of 63 African and Latin American countries during our period of analysis, resulting in 1,380 country-years as units of observation. Data were drawn from the Constitute Project (Elkins & Ginsburg, 2022) which presents constitutions collected online and by media outlets. We coded 93 term-limit rules for the period 1990–2014.¹¹ Term limits that were circumvented and then reinstated do not count as one term limit, as they face different risks of (attempts of) circumvention. Hence, we operationalise them as separate units of analysis. In order to keep the risks between these repeated term-limit rules separate, we specify a conditional gap

¹⁰As we use democracy aid as a lagged variable in our model, we use data from 2013 for the year 2014, hence extending our period of analysis by one year.

¹¹The data was coded and cross-checked by two coders. The instructions according to which the data were coded were subject to iterative processes of adjustment. Data can be accessed at heiData (<https://heidata.uni-heidelberg.de/dataverse/root>), the data repository of the University of Heidelberg: <https://doi.org/10.11588/data/EMUXDX>.

time Cox model:

$$h_{k(t)} = h_{0k} \exp^{\hat{\beta}x_{kj}}$$

Where $h(t)$ describes the hazard rate, k describes three strata of whether the term limit is the first, second, or third and above term limit in country j , and x represents a vector of explanatory variables. Hence, we stratify the model by term limit, and cluster by country (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004, p. 160).

We run two model specifications, each with a different dependent variable. In our first model, we estimate the hazard that an attempt to circumvent a term limit is made, regardless of its result. In our second model, we estimate the hazard that a term limit is actually successfully circumvented. Each time, the sample includes all term limits in African and Latin American presidential systems between 1990 and 2014. Hence, the sample for the second model includes not only term limits that presidents attempted to circumvent, but also term limits for which no circumvention attempt was made. In operationalising the attempts of term-limit circumventions, our coding follows the criteria introduced by Versteeg et al (2020). They identify five term-limit circumvention strategies:

- Amending the constitution, the most common strategy
- Putting in place a new constitution without term limits
- Using the judiciary to re-interpret a term limit
- Delaying elections
- Making a placeholder person the new president

We use all except the last strategy in operationalising term-limit circumventions, as in this strategy a new person takes over the presidency *de jure*.

To take account of different steps in term limit circumventions, we define a *successful* circumvention as one in which the incumbent actually enters the next presidential term. Hence, cases in which an incumbent has secured for himself the opportunity to run for president again but was eventually electorally defeated, as in Senegal in 2012, do not count as successful circumventions in our data. We observe 49 attempts to circumvent term limits between 1990 and 2014, of which 30 were successful.

Our interest is in the effect of democracy aid on the risk that presidents might attempt to circumvent term limits as well as on successful circumventions. We take data on democracy aid from AidData (AidData, 2017; Tierney et al., 2011). AidData provides the most comprehensive project-level data of foreign aid, and it is commonly used in research on democracy aid (Heinrich & Loftis, 2019; Ziaja, 2020). We operationalise democracy aid as a four-year moving average to smooth out year-to-year fluctuations. This also accounts for the long foreign aid disbursement schedules. Additionally, we adjust democracy aid by population to gauge its relative magnitude and use a square-root transformation to account for large values (see appendix B for information) (Heinrich & Loftis, 2019, p. 148).

We include a set of covariates that we regard as a sufficient minimum to block any confounding between democracy aid and term-limit circumventions. Hence, we do not include covariates affecting term-limit circumventions that are otherwise unrelated to democracy aid (Pearl, 2009). First, to account for endogenous democratic development not caused by democracy aid, we include the recipient state's democracy level using V-Dem's Liberal Democracy Index (Coppedge et al., 2020).

Second, as donors allocate democracy aid strategically according to their foreign policy interests and the recipient's democracy level, democracy aid and term-limit circumventions could be associated through a backdoor pathway. Including no covariates that capture donors' strategic allocation of democracy aid would create endogeneity through omitted variable bias (Dietrich & Wright, 2015). Recent research shows that democracy aid allocation, at least regarding the United States, depends on the extent of democratisation in the recipient state, its strategic importance, and its ideological alignment with donors' foreign policy (Peterson & Scott, 2018; J. M. Scott & Carter, 2020). To account for the extent of democratisation, we apply V-Dem's Liberal Democracy Index one year prior to the four-year moving average of democracy aid, hence it is lagged by five years. To proxy the recipient states' strategic importance for donors, we count the security alliances between the respective recipient state and its donors in each year in the Correlates of War data (Gibler, 2009). To measure the ideological alignment between the recipient and donor states, we include a covariate that reports the mean difference between the recipient and its donors' positions towards the liberal world order based on United Nations General Assembly voting (Bailey, Strezhnev, & Voeten, 2017).

Third, most democracy aid is part of ODA. Although prior analyses have not found a clear association between ODA and term-limit circumventions (Baturu, 2010; Dietrich & Wright, 2013; McKie, 2019), some nevertheless suggest a relation between the two (Posner & Young, 2018). Donors might use ODA commitments for political conditionality, undermining the political support that an incumbent attempting to circumvent a term limit has. Therefore, we include a square-root transformed four-year moving average of non-democracy aid ODA per capita taken from AidData.¹²

Fourth, we include a count of previously failed circumvention attempts. Through its stratification, our model takes into account that a term limit has a different risk if a previous term limit has been circumvented successfully (Posner & Young, 2018, p. 272). To account for a similar effect of unsuccessful attempts, we include the number of previously failed attempts. In total, we count 21 failed attempts.

Finally, we include a regional dummy that reports zero for Africa and one for Latin America. This allows us to identify regional differences. It is practice to lag time-varying variables in survival analysis models to ensure that the explanatory variable's change *actually* happens before the failure event (Box-

¹²Because some ODA values can take on a negative value, we centered shifted the data on its minimum value prior to the its transformation, so that the new minimum value became 0.

Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004, p. 187). Therefore, all time-varying variables are lagged by one year.

2.4 Empirical analysis and interpretation of the effects of democracy aid on protecting term limits

This is the first analysis, to the authors' best knowledge, that distinguishes an explanation for mere attempts to circumvent term limits as well as successful circumventions. Overall, democracy aid helps in protecting term limits. This effect is stronger and statistically more significant for actual term-limit circumventions (model two in table 2.1) than for whether incumbents make attempts (model one in table 2.1). To probe these results, we carry out a number of robustness tests, which are presented in the appendices to this chapter.¹³ In the following interpretation of the empirical results, we focus only on the influence of *Democracy Aid* and *Region* because, first, our model is constructed in such a way so as to only assess hypotheses on democracy aid, whereas the additional covariates serve to isolate the relationship between democracy aid and term-limit circumventions; and because, second, the regional dummy variable nonetheless indicates an interesting side finding that flags the need for additional research on interregional differences.

| | (1) (DV = attempt) | | | (2) (DV = successful circumvention) | | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|----------|--|----------------------|----------|
| | Coeff (SE) | p[95%-Conf.] | %-change | Coeff (SE) | p[95%-Conf.] | %-change |
| Democracy aid | -0.14 (0.11) | .18 [-0.35 , 0.07] | -20.07 | -0.39 (0.19) | .04 [-0.75 , -0.03] | -46.42 |
| ODA | -0.03 (0.06) | .63 [-0.16 , 0.09] | -5.57 | 0.01 (0.1) | .96 [-0.2 , 0.21] | 1.93 |
| Liberal democracy | -4.33 (1.55) | .01 [-7.37 , -1.28] | -61.43 | -6.11 (2.62) | .02 [-11.25 , -0.97] | -73.93 |
| Liberal democracy _{t-5} | 2.74 (1.61) | .09 [-0.41 , 5.89] | 82.72 | 3.88 (2.47) | .12 [-0.97 , 8.72] | 134.81 |
| Failed bid | -0.1 (0.66) | .88 [-1.4 , 1.2] | -9.52 | -1.64 (0.57) | .00 [-2.75 , -0.53] | -80.6 |
| Region | 0.61 (0.46) | .19 [-0.29 , 1.5] | 84 | 0.8 (0.47) | .09 [-0.12 , 1.71] | 122.55 |
| Political distance | 0.54 (0.51) | .28 [-0.45 , 1.54] | 28.89 | 1.03 (0.63) | .1 [-0.19 , 2.26] | 62.27 |
| No. of alliances | 0.05 (0.2) | .81 [-0.35 , 0.44] | 5.13 | -0.06 (0.17) | .7 [-0.39 , 0.26] | -5.82 |
| N | | 1,146 | | | 1,199 | |
| Failures | | 49/49 | | | 30/30 | |
| Countries | | 62/63 | | | 62/63 | |
| LL | | -131.81 | | | -77.06 | |

Table 2.1: Cox regression; the column %-change reports the change in the hazard rate in percent for a 1 standard deviation change in the explanatory variable, except for *Failed bid*, *Region*, and *No. of Alliances* where the change in explanatory variable is 1. *Source:* Authors' calculations.

Focusing first on attempts to circumvent term limits (model 1), we find that democracy aid has a negative effect on the hazard for term-limit circumvention

¹³We check the robustness of our models in appendix A-C by (1) using a variety of different operationalisations of democracy aid, (2) including a calendar time trend, (3) including a frailty term to check for unmeasured country effects, (4) replacing the liberal democracy index covariate with a variety of different democracy variables, and (5) running the model specified as a random-effects logit regression.

attempts. An increase in democracy aid by one standard deviation (i.e. an increase from no democracy aid at all to \$2.50 per capita) is associated with a 20 per cent decrease in the hazard rate. However, the standard error for this association is comparably large, so one cannot put too much confidence into this result. Although it suggests that democracy aid more often than not helps to protect democracy by reducing the risk of an incumbent's attempt to formally prolong their term (hypothesis 1), there is a need to analyse further the varying circumstances creating the uncertainty about the effectiveness of democracy protection in this regard.

With regard to the differences between Latin America and Africa, our model suggests that being a Latin American state raises the hazard for an attempt to circumvent term limits by a factor of 1.8, a side finding that we evaluate in more depth later.

Turning to our second dependent variable, we find that democracy aid lowers the risk of actual successful term-limit circumventions (model 2). The negative effect of more democracy aid conditional on all other covariates in our model is statistically significant and substantial in size. In states where international actors spend on average \$2.50 per capita in democracy aid during a four-year period, the risk that the incumbent *de facto* circumvents the presidential term limit in the fifth year is only about half as that of a state that received no democracy aid. This stronger effect of democracy aid on the outcome of term-limit circumventions is plausible because of the process' particularities once an attempt has officially been made (figure 2.1, outcome). In such instances, donors of democracy aid, who oppose changes in the term-limit rule, face less ambiguity and have more direct entry points for their assistance. Anti-reform groups built alliances to contest the incumbent and the irregularities during institutional reform processes. Donors can align with these oppositional forces, support them, launch additional initiatives, and pressure the incumbent more legitimately.

With regard to the regional dummy variable, the risk for term-limit circumventions in Latin American states is twice as great as in African states when taking into account the effects of all other covariates included in our model. This sizeable effect is in line with the results of the first model investigating the hazard for attempts only, and it is also corroborated by robustness checks. Finding this difference between the two regions prompts the need for future exploration and analysis. The finding may reflect the antagonistic interplay between the historical evolution of rigid term-limit regimes and strong presidentialism in Latin America. Throughout our period of analysis, the proportion of Latin American states with term limits is quite high at about 90 per cent, and thus it exceeds the proportion of African states by about 20 percentage points. This finding seems to be driven by the particular historical path dependence in Latin America. Presidential term limits played an important role much earlier than in Africa, where they were introduced mainly during the third wave of democratisation at the end of the 1980s. Historical experiences with *caudillismo* in the 19th and the first half of the 20th century led to the evolution of rigid term-limit regimes during the second half of the 20th century up until the 1990s, when the pendulum swung back and the "constitutional

adjustment” of term limits led to an extension of presidential tenures in many states. Tenure constraints on the executive were often deemed a means to remedy weak legislatures and judiciaries that provided only ineffective checks on executive power (Marsteintredet, 2019). Up to the start of our period of analysis, the great majority of Latin American countries had quite rigid term-limit rules in place, often allowing for no immediate re-election. Starting in the early mid-1990s, many Latin American states then transitioned to regimes allowing one subsequent re-election. Prominent examples include, for instance, Peru (Fujimori in 1993), Brazil (Cardoso in 1996), and Colombia (Uribe in 2006). Some scholars therefore argue that these are examples of “constitutional adjustments” rather than presidential power-grabbing, as in these cases term limits rendered presidential tenures too short for effective policy-making, and extensions therefore presented a solution for “short-termism” (Cheibub & Medina, 2019, p. 527). However, this does not mean that many Latin American states do not feature strong executives and “presidential hegemony” (Pérez-Liñán, Schmidt, & Vairo, 2019). Starting from the mid-1990s onwards, many presidents who extended their tenures in office by one term also attempted – or at least flirted with – a third term later (e.g. Fujimori). An increase in the proportion of Latin American states that abolished term limits entirely – states where presidents can hence be re-elected without limitation since about 2009 (starting with Chavez in Venezuela) – can be seen simultaneously as an indication and consequence of increases in presidential hegemony.

In sum, the empirical analysis shows that democracy aid helps in protecting term limits. Its influence on reducing the risk of attempts being made to circumvent term limits, however, is smaller than its influence on reducing the risk of an actual circumvention. The latter finding is statistically also more certain than the former. To showcase the practical implications for the effect of democracy aid on successful term-limit circumventions, we estimated the survivor functions of term limits for a plausible country case (figure 2.2). This plausible country case represents an electoral democracy that receives a minimum amount of ODA and is politically rather close to its donors, but it is not allied with any of them and has not experienced an attempt to circumvent a term limit before.¹⁴

We plot three different democracy aid scenarios in which the state receives (1) zero, (2) \$1.50 per capita, and (3) \$27 per capita in democracy aid (please see appendix B for our choice of values). Defining the median “life expectancy” of term limits as the point in time until which for each curve 50 per cent of the term limits still survive, we see that a small democracy aid amount of \$1.50 extends the “life expectancy” by only a few years, whereas a large amount of \$27 extends it by 23 years. Conditional on a medium to large amount of democracy aid, a much larger estimated proportion of term limits survives at any point in time compared to the other two functions. The shaded and overlapping confidence intervals caution against taking these estimates too literally. Due to the limited nature of our data – which provides only 30 failures for the successful circumvention model, and 49 failures for the attempt model

¹⁴We have eliminated the effect of *Region* in this figure by recoding it to -0.5 (Africa) and 0.5 (Latin America).

– much statistical uncertainty accompanies the estimated survivor functions. The analysis shows nonetheless that especially a medium to large amount of democracy aid can make quite a difference.

2.5 Conclusion

The article investigated whether democracy aid helps to protect presidential term limits. This question is relevant, as term limits are an important barrier to the personalisation and aggrandizement of political power. Being one of the symptoms of global autocratization trends, attempts have been increasing in recent years, especially in Africa and Latin America. The answer to the question of whether democracy aid makes a difference in protecting term limits would not only help address a research gap, it would also provide relevant knowledge for informed political decision-making.

Overall, our results confirm prior studies that “targeted aid” such as democ-




Figure 2.2: Estimated survivor functions for term limits with 95%-confidence intervals. Dependent variable is successful circumventions with no prior attempts. All covariates are held constant at the 25th percentile value except for *Region*, *Failed bid*, and *No. of alliances* (constant at zero), while *Democracy aid* varies as shown in the figure. To retrieve the log-log transformed confidence intervals, the model’s standard errors were estimated using the observed information matrix instead of clustered sandwich estimation which has implications for the independence of observations. Please see appendix A for a presentation of the model as well as separately presented survival functions and confidence intervals. *Source:* Authors’ compilation.

racy aid works and that its effects vary according to the phases of institutional reform processes. Democracy aid in 62 African and Latin American countries between 1990 and 2014 had positive effects and contributed towards protecting term limits according to our empirical analysis. Even moderate amounts of democracy aid can have a sizeable influence. More specifically, democracy aid substantially reduced the risk of incumbents circumventing term limits, whereas it had less effect on the attempts at circumvention. In other words, our findings suggest that democracy aid helps to fend off term-limit circumventions, whereas it is more uncertain that democracy aid helps to deter presidents from trying to circumvent term limits. This variety in the findings proves that our introduction of a novel conceptual distinction between the attempt to circumvent a term limit and the outcome of such an attempt allows for a more refined understanding of the effects of democracy aid on protecting term limits than previous studies.

What can explain this difference in the effectiveness of democracy aid in the two steps for attempting to circumvent term limits? First, the findings emphasise the temporal dimension of aid effectiveness, which has often been overlooked in the study of democracy promotion. Democracy aid aims at capacitating domestic actors and strengthening institutions that defend and protect democracy. Pro-democratic actors such as NGOs might have received democracy aid before an attempt to circumvent term limits was made. Explicit action against the term-limit circumventions of these actors takes place only after the incumbent has embarked on the attempt to evade or abolish the term limit. It is at that point when the additional capacities of these actors due to democracy aid become important. This implies that democracy aid may not necessarily have immediate results, but it may still make the difference in protecting democracy down the line. In addition, attempts to circumvent term limits cause strong reactions in pro-democratic actors, for instance when forming social movements with low levels of organisation. In these situations, international actors provide ad hoc assistance and adjust their aid programmes. This combination of longer-term support that helps to create capacities already before an attempt has been made and the ad hoc support of international actors seems to be crucial in tense times of term-limit circumventions. Second, the type and range of mechanisms employed for the direct protection of democracy vary according to each step in the attempt to circumvent term limits. The greater the opposition against the attempt to circumvent term limits and the greater the indication of manipulation by the incumbent, the more international actors can intensify their direct and ad hoc action. For instance, once the rule or procedure is changed despite large-scale societal opposition, international actors are more likely to sanction the sitting government or incumbent.

Looking at the broader picture, our findings can inform theories of international democracy protection. We prove that democracy aid can repel attempts to erode democratic institutions effectively and that it makes a difference for pro-democratic political struggles. These results challenge recent findings that democracy assistance has become tame towards autocrats (Bush, 2015). Bush concludes that transnational democracy assistance shies away from political

struggles for more democracy. Based on our cross-national research, which we complemented with qualitative case studies published elsewhere, we argue that democracy aid is not as tame as suggested. However, we require more nuanced evidence for knowing under which conditions democracy aid effectively deflects autocratic trends. First, as other studies have suggested already (Gisselquist et al., 2021), we need to learn more about the effects of different types of mechanisms or “aid modalities” of democracy aid. Although we can confidentially conclude that democracy aid based on the logic of appropriateness supports pro-democratic forces, it is less certain how it interplays with measures based on the logic of consequences such as conditionalities. Given the scarce and only case study-based data on conditionality and sanctions during attempts to circumvent term limits, no systematic assessment of the interplay between instruments of the logic of consequences and instruments of the logic of appropriateness is possible at this point.

Second, it is necessary to identify typical patterns of historical contexts. Our analysis is the first one that took a cross-regional perspective in the study of democracy aid and its success in circumventing term limits. There is a greater risk for circumvention attempts of presidential term limits in Latin American than in African states. This indicates the need to compare the political evolutions of presidentialism and term limits more systematically. Against this finding, investigating cases as paired comparisons with two case pairs from Latin America could help to identify typical path dependencies (Gisselquist, 2014).

Third, the conceptual foundations and findings of this analysis speak to a broader global phenomenon, namely the global autocratization trend. In this context, protecting democracy will become more important in the future. Knowing that democracy aid can support domestic pro-democratic actors is not only an encouraging signal for policy-makers, but also an incentive to build more knowledge about the “dos” and “don’ts” of democracy protection. The conceptual distinction of the sequences of political reform processes – as proposed in this analysis – is a promising point of departure for further research on that matter. Autocratization processes unfold in certain sequences. Learning how democracy aid works best in each of these sequences is of great interest for this research and an important step towards protecting democracy worldwide.

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Chapter 3

*Protection against autocratization: How international democracy promotion helped preserve presidential term limits in Malawi and Senegal**

Abstract This chapter analyses the conditions under which international democracy support contributes to protecting presidential term limits. As autocratization has become an unwelcome global trend, researchers turned to the study of the toolboxes of would-be autocrats, including their attempts to circumvent term limits. Through paired comparison of failed attempts in Malawi (2002) and Senegal (2012), we find that external democracy support can assist domestic actors and institutions in deflecting challenges to term limits. We offer a novel qualitative analysis that posits that international democracy support can only be effective if sustained by popular democratic attitudes and behaviours of actors in the recipient state. On the one hand, a mix of conditioning relations with the incumbent government while capacitating pro-democratic opposition is a successful strategy in aid-dependent political regimes with a minimum democratic quality. On the other, societal attitudes factor into decision-making at domestic and international levels. Our results suggest that popular pro-democratic attitudes encouraged international democracy support during critical junctures in the two countries, i.e. when incumbents attempted to circumvent term limitation. Donor investments had positive re-

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sults when donors had directed resources toward building up civil society organizations long before any attempts at circumventing term limits were made.

3.1 Introduction

Much has transpired in global politics since Francis Fukuyama predicted the “end of history,” which was to give way to a liberal world order after the end of the Cold War (Fukuyama, 1989). In response to the unwelcome global trend of autocratization, researchers have turned to the study of aggrandizing executive powers (Hellmeier et al., 2021). This includes attempts to circumvent presidential term limits, a commonly used tool in the toolbox of would-be autocrats (Dresden & Howard, 2016). Since constitutional safeguards, political barriers, and public visibility make it difficult to extend term limits, it is unlikely that would-be autocrats would select such a tool if they did not believe success was highly likely. However, presidents do frequently fail to extend their terms; 38 per cent of attempts to extend term limits during 2000 and 2018 were unsuccessful (Versteeg et al., 2020). Even so, scholars pay less attention to failed attempts to seize executive power than successful ones, although failed attempts present prime examples of how democratic backsliding can be halted. One part of the explanation for why such attempts fail involves opposition to such attempts by international actors. This is where our empirical analysis begins. We focus on the contributions of international democracy support in instances where an executive seeks – yet fails – to extend power by extending term limits. These moments are important in that they illustrate means by which democracy can survive. As the outcomes result in either the erosion or the continued consolidation of democracy, they are comparable to instances of democratic transition (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997).

Accordingly, we address two specific gaps in the research. First we explore the often overlooked international dimension of attempts to circumvent presidential term limits. Although existing research on the promotion of democracy addresses different reform areas including elections, free media, and parliaments, most have paid no special attention to executives’ circumventions of term limits, despite the relevance of such to the direction a given democracy takes.¹⁵ The literature on term limits for its part focuses on domestic drivers and their varying outcomes (Baturo & Elgie 2019). Scholars have investigated the relevance of specific actor groups, such as the military forces and political parties, (Harkness, 2017; Kouba, 2016); of institutional arrangements such as government capacity or the relationship between the legislature and executive; of ambiguities in the legal interpretations of constitutions (Reyntjens, 2016; Vandeginste, 2016); and of social factors such as education (Oglesby, 2017). Few acknowledge the relevance of international factors such as official development assistance (ODA) (McKie, 2019; Baturo, 2014; Posner & Young 2007) or donors’ responses in specific countries (Vandeginste, 2016).

The second gap lies in the lack of qualitative analyses that systematically

¹⁵One exception is Dietrich and Wright (2013).

combine international and domestic factors impacting the success or failure of attempts to circumvent term limits. International democracy support can help prevent term-limit circumvention, and thus hinder autocratization. However, effective democracy support can be a necessary condition but never a sufficient one (Leininger, 2010). What largely determines the effectiveness of democracy support is how it interplays with domestic factors. We focus on two such factors. First, to be effective, democracy support must build on pro-democratic societal attitudes. International actors can ally with pro-democratic domestic actors to foster processes already underway, but they cannot create such processes in the absence of local ownership. Accordingly, most analyses assume that effective democracy promotion requires that the values and attitudes of the given state's political elites converge with those of its overall society (Bridoux & Kurki, 2016; Dupuy, Ron, & Prakash, 2016). However, there is still a lack of empirical evidence on the relevance of such soft power factors in democracy promotion. In thwarting incumbent's attempts to circumvent term limits, public attitudes play a notable role. For instance, in order to justify their attempts, incumbents often claim that their actions are driven by "the will of the people." Yet, survey data suggests that popular support for term limits is consistently high in Africa (Dulani, 2015).

Second, for public attitudes to matter, they must be translated into action such as through social mobilization, public discourse, and interest aggregation. Social and political actors need organizational resources to translate their attitudes and goals into such political action (Mueller, 2018). Democracy support can make a decisive difference by capacitating social mobilization and interest aggregation. Against this background, this paper explores the following research question:

How do international support for democracy and domestic attitudes amplify one another to counter incumbents' attempts to circumvent presidential term limits?

This article makes three primary contributions to the study of effective democracy promotion. Theoretically, it contributes to an enhanced understanding of when international democracy support is a necessary condition for societies to protect themselves from autocratization. Conceptually, it offers an integration of the interplay between specific international mechanisms and domestic factors; specifically, it analyses the combination of the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences, whereas previous studies have focused on one or the other. Empirically, it reveals factors behind unsuccessful attempts by incumbents to circumvent presidential term limits; such unsuccessful attempts have been under-researched in the study of democracy promotion. Overall, our analysis suggests that democracy support can help thwart challenges to democracy by providing organizational resources to un-repressed yet under-resourced civil society actors who need such resources to mobilize domestic attitudes that align with their causes.

Empirically, we focus our analysis on attempts to circumvent term limits in Africa, as such attempts have become a "foreign policy challenge" (Hen-gari, 2015, p. 1). Between 1990 and 2016, incumbent presidents in African

countries reached constitutional term limits in 59 instances. Twenty-five such cases were accompanied by an attempt to circumvent term limits, 20 of which were ultimately successful (see appendix D). In addition, Africa receives the highest levels of aid in the world and has a colonial heritage, making targeted international influence on domestic affairs likely. From the universe of cases described above, we selected two, Malawi and Senegal, both of which saw a *failed* attempt at circumventing presidential term limits and had substantial international support in thwarting it. Each case presents distinctive outcome patterns and interactions between international and domestic actors, as revealed by in-depth analysis based on in-country field research and textual analysis of primary and secondary sources. We conducted 217 semi-structured interviews between 2013 and 2017 in Malawi and Senegal,¹⁶ and we rely on survey data in our exploration of societal attitudes.

In what follows, we outline our theoretical framework, hypotheses, research approaches, and case selection method. Empirical analyses of these two cases constitute the bulk of this text. We first assess the effectiveness of democracy promotion in each case. We then address the question of the effectiveness of international interventions in domestic debates on presidential term limits and look at how societal attitudes influence the effectiveness of democracy promotion. We conclude with a summary of the findings and an outlook on the implications for future research.

3.2 Theoretical framework: When and how domestic attitudes and organizational resources matter in democracy promotion

3.2.1 Democratization and term limits

Democratization is the process of institutional, behavioral, and attitudinal changes from an authoritarian to a democratic regime. It is a non-linear, open-ended, and reversible process emerging from the interactions between primarily domestic but also international factors (Whitehead, 2009). We conceive of democratization as a negotiation process (Poppe et al., 2019) characterized by the presence of pro- and contra-actor constellations who are defined by opposing political goals on a particular issue and who compete and negotiate to impose their respective versions of political order (figure 3.1).

Presidential term limits (usually of two terms) are important for democracy to thrive. They impose constitutional restrictions on how long a president can serve. They are beneficial in (semi-)presidential political systems as they prevent the consolidation and personalization of political power, particularly in countries where institutional checks and balances are weak (Maltz, 2007). Term limits lower the barriers of entry for new candidates, increase political turnover, and prevent political competition from devolving into a zero-sum game (Cheeseman, 2010). In recognition of the value of term limits, many

¹⁶Detailed information on interviews is available upon request.




Figure 3.1: Conceptual model of actor constellations, societal attitudes and negotiations on democratisation. Note: This illustration of our model can be used to depict actor constellations in any type of political reform.

African countries - with the assistance of external democracy supporters - enacted two-term limit provisions in their constitutions during the 1990s (Posner & Young 2007). From 1990 to 2010, African countries enacted 49 constitutional provisions on term limits. Although several of those have since been rolled back, during that 20-year period, the number of presidents leaving office through electoral means increased by four, and the average stay in office decreased from 13 to 7 years (Dulani, 2011).

3.2.2 International support for presidential term limits

International democracy promotion influences domestic democratization and autocratization processes, and, accordingly, term limit protection (Burnell, 2007; Grimm & Leininger, 2012). Although usually united in their support of liberal democracy, democracy promoters do not always agree on which strategies to take (Zamfir, 2016). Scholars have categorized democracy promotion “tools” according to their respective social mechanisms (Börzel & Risse, 2012; Schimmelfennig, 2015). Instruments that operate via a logic of consequences - such as sanctions and other legal impositions, financial incentives, and (credible) threats - induce behavioral change by appealing to actors’ rational cost-benefit analyses of a given situation. It is assumed that targeted actors will weigh options rationally and make relevant decisions based on the expected payoffs (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). By contrast, logic of appropriateness appeals to actors’ perceived appropriate responses to a given situation, regardless of material benefit considerations (Börzel & Risse, 2012; Checkel, 2005). It includes instruments such as long-term socialization through training programs, capacity development, etc., of elites and the people. Both logics address the calculations of elite decision-makers. However, the literature neglects societal values in recipient countries and how these factor in these logics. Democracy diffusion literature does approach the perspective of the

populace, arguing that there is often a gap between the values and attitudes of norm senders and those of norm receivers and that norm receiving countries localize norms to fit “cognitive priors and identities” in the receiving country (Acharya, 2004). However few scholars have investigated whether and how such pre-existing attitudes might condition the effectiveness of democracy support. In the present piece, we integrate consideration of domestic attitudes as mechanisms of democracy promotion into our analyses.

3.2.3 Attitudes and audience costs in (de-)democratization processes

At the domestic level, negotiating democracy takes place in an arena with prevailing popular political attitudes. An actor constellation that reflects majority views can argue that it defends national values against a less representative opposing group, a point likely to bolster its status in debate. Accordingly, we assume that with strong popular support for term limits, attempts at circumventing such limits are less likely to succeed. Despite presidents’ claims that they wish to stay in office due to popular demand, citizen support for term limits is high across Africa, on average 75 per cent, including in countries where term limits had never been enacted or where they were repealed in the recent past (Afrobarometer, 2016/2018). That being said, when we juxtapose cases of successful attempts to repeal term limits with cases of failed attempts, marked differences are observed in terms of levels of popular support for term limits. Although support for term limits is high in all cases, it tended to be higher in countries where term limits were maintained after challenge (figure 3.2). Although these data are to be regarded with the usual circumspection, we assume here that high levels of support for term limits lessen the likelihood that incumbents will succeed in attempts to circumvent term limits.

In keeping with the logic of consequences, most donors condemn attempts to circumvent term limits. Following research on the effects of foreign aid, we assume here that the more aid dependent a country is, the greater the influence external donors who promote democracy will be able to exert on elites (Kersting & Kilby, 2014; Mkandawire, 1999). Democracy promoters can therefore help states prevent the removal of term limits by ensuring through conditionalities that the benefits to executives of adhering to term limits outweigh the costs they will accrue in removing or circumventing them (Carter, 2016).

Democracy promotion that follows the logic of appropriateness often focuses on long term efforts whereby existing norms are supplanted by democratic norms that are internalized in new generations of leaders. In the short term, international democracy supporters can still intervene in domestic democratization. Donors’ public rhetoric in support or condemnation of domestic political elites’ actions often signal whether donors perceive such actions as appropriate, which may alter domestic actors’ behavior or undermine their domestic positions. However, in many cases, neither a country’s elites nor its broader population place much stock in the opinions of international actors and dismiss such judgments as foreign meddling. If overall society does not hold the given democracy promoters in high regard, then the (dis)approval of




Figure 3.2: Juxtaposition of successful and failed attempts to remove term limits by level of popular support for term limits prior to outcome. Data from Afrobarometer (2021). The x-axis reports the sum of the percentages of respondents who agreed and strongly agreed that a presidential two-term limit should remain in place prior to the respective outcomes. due to a lack of data, not all cases in our universe of cases are included (compare figure 3.3). Year figures report the year the respective afrobarometer surveys were carried out. *Source:* authors’ compilation.

such democracy promoters will be inconsequential to domestic elites, who will likewise be less concerned about losing legitimacy or the risks attending such “shaming” (Fish, 2009).

For the elites shaping democratization, societal attitudes matter. When faced with a donor intervention, political decision-makers such as Members of Parliament and justices trade off *material* and *immaterial* social costs and benefits based on their understanding of their society’s values and attitudes. Based on such calculations, such actors may be willing to support an incumbent seeking another term and incur costs such as aid cuts but only to the extent to which these cuts are perceived as illegitimate by the wider domestic population. Otherwise, such actors would face additional immaterial social costs in the form of lost political support. In this way, societal attitudes can amplify the effectiveness of democratic support. The above reasoning leads to our first hypothesis:

H1: The greater the match between international actors’ positions and prevailing political attitudes at the societal level, the more likely it is that an (internationally supported) actor constellation will succeed in a debate over term limits.

H1 factors societal attitudes into an externally supported negotiation pro-

cess. We reason that both material and rhetorical interventions by external actors are less likely to be effective if there is a gulf between the objectives of external democracy supporters and prevailing societal attitudes in the recipient country. If the attitudes of the population and external democracy supporters converge, then external interventions are more likely to be effective, as international interventions resonate with domestic public opinion, adding domestic audience costs to costs incurred internationally.

However, alternative explanatory factors influence the likelihood of whether certain actors succeed in their reform attempts. Analyses of the political economy of reforms and social movements highlight the importance of organizational resources for successful social mobilization (Jenkins, 1983; Mueller, 2018). The resource mobilization framework identified in literature on social movements conceptualizes how such movements and other civil society actors access resources through mechanisms from which particular exchange relations arise. The donor–civil society exchange relationship builds upon a patronage mechanism that potentially supplies material, human, social-organizational, and cultural resources as well as moral resources (Edwards, McCarthy, & Mataic, 2019). Such resources - and the exchange relations that provide access to them - are crucial to civil society actors in achieving their goals (Weipert-Fenner & Wolff, 2019). This leads to our second hypothesis:

H2: The more organizational resources an actor constellation controls, the more likely it is to achieve its aims in a debate over term limits.

H2 does not deal directly with societal attitudes. However, it is important for evaluating the effectiveness of donor interventions, particularly where such interventions focus on supporting non-state actors that oppose the circumvention of term limits. Groups that can draw on greater resources are more likely to mobilize people and influence the reform process. Social mobilization links up with attitudes because protests and other forms of mobilization rely on shared attitudes (C. Scott & Harell, 2019). In turn, societal attitudes only matter for political processes if they translate into political action, such as protesting or voting. Resources supplied by external democracy promoters are particularly important in term-limit debates, as they can be used to counter incumbents' misappropriation of state resources.

3.3 Research approach: Selecting two cases from Africa

In selecting cases, we first identified all attempts to circumvent presidential term limits in Africa between 1990 and 2016. Building on Posner and Young (2007), we identified instances where incumbents reached the limits of their term and made attempts to prolong it. We classified an attempt as successful when an incumbent circumvented term limits and/or stayed in power. Term limits were reached in 59 instances (see figure 3.3). Presidents attempted to prolong term limits in 25 of these cases, and were successful in 20. Of the 5 unsuccessful cases, we selected two: Malawi in 2002 and Senegal in 2012.

Both attempts present the same outcome, failure to circumvent term limits, but the patterns by which the two attempts were carried out present some variety.¹⁷ Although Malawi's Bakili Muluzi failed to maneuver his bid through institutional barriers, President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal succeeded in doing so, and he subsequently ran for another presidential terms but lost the election.

Universe of cases: 1990–2016




Figure 3.3: Universe of cases. Source: Authors' compilation extending Posner and Young (2007). See appendix D for additional information. CAR = Central African Republic.

¹⁷For a chronology of events in each country, see appendix D.

Concerning our dependent variable, i.e., the outcome of the circumvention attempt (see table 3.1), Muluzi failed to persuade parliament alter the term limit and did not run for a third term in 2003. Rumors that he would run for a third term began surfacing after his re-election in 1999 (Morrow, 2006). These were corroborated in 2002, the last year of his final term, when his United Democratic Front (UDF) party unsuccessfully attempted to change the procedure for making constitutional amendment from two-thirds to a simple majority (Hussein, 2004). Civil society organizations (CSOs) mobilized protests against a third term, and the government issued a ban on demonstrations. This was ruled unconstitutional by the High Court, but the ruling was later overturned due to political pressure (von Doepp, 2019). In July 2002, Muluzi's party tabled a bill to abolish the term limit entirely, but it was narrowly defeated. Two months later, the UDF introduced another bill, the Third Term Bill, this one proposing to extend the limit by one term. However, domestic opposition had already gathered momentum, and intra-party ruptures further suppressed support for Muluzi. By early 2003, the Third Term Bill was sent to the parliamentary Legal Affairs Committee for revision, which never revised it, which constitutes a *de facto* withdrawal.

The Senegalese case is more ambiguous. Wade followed a different strategy. Rather than seeking to remove the term limit from the constitution, he sought to legalize his desired circumvention of term limits through Senegal's Constitutional Court using international lawyers. In 2011, nearing the end of his second term, Wade proposed constitutional amendments that would directly affect the presidential tenure, among them the establishment of a presidential election ticket¹⁸ and the lowering of the threshold for presidential run-offs. His proposals were withdrawn after intense public protests against them in June 2011 (Hartmann, 2012; Mueller, 2018). Wade nonetheless announced his intention to run for a third term, arguing that the term limit enacted in 2001 did not retroactively apply to his first term, which began in 2000. The Constitutional Council initially ruled in his favor in January 2012 (Heyl, 2019), which sparked another round of intense demonstrations. This did not stop Wade from winning in the first round of the presidential election. However, he lost the run-off election and conceded to Macky Sall.

Foreign aid, our independent variable, is relevant to the economies of Malawi and Senegal. Although ODA is lower in Senegal, it is still one-tenth of the gross national income (GNI). In 2002, Malawi was highly aid dependent, with ODA making up almost a quarter of its GNI. Democracy support, an element of ODA, played a relevant role in both countries at the time the respective incumbents attempted to seek a third term.¹⁹ Popular support for term limits is high in both countries (table 3.2), as is the case across Africa. However, each case presents distinct socio-economic structures and political regimes. For example, where Malawi is a predominantly rural society, a large segment of Senegal's population (45 per cent in 2012) lives in cities. This has implications

¹⁸President and vice-president would run together on that election ticket - an attempt to install Wade's son Karim Wade as his successor.

¹⁹Democracy aid does not seem very high at first glance. Compared to other types of aid (such as infrastructure investments), democracy support has low material costs (Leininger, 2019).

| | Pre-existing presidential term limit? | Successful bid to circumvent constitutional rules on term limits? | Won subsequent election? |
|---------|---|---|---|
| Malawi | Yes, Two-term limits; 1994 Constitution | No, Parliament does not pass legislation | No, Muluzi did not run but suggested presidential candidate |
| Senegal | Yes, Two-term limit; 2001 Constitution | Yes, Constitutional Court rules for exceptional third term | No, Wade defeated by Macky Sall in 2nd round in 2012 |

Table 3.1: Outcomes of attempts to circumvent term limits and of elections. *Source:* Authors’ compilation.

for peoples’ capacity to mobilize, which is higher in cities (Fox & Bell, 2016). Senegal is the more democratic and open regime (table 3.2). Corruption, however, is endemic and strong in both cases. For ease of comparison of all failed attempts to supplant term-limit in our case universe, we offer the data on Nigeria (2006), Niger (2009), and Burkina Faso (2014) in table 3.2. Although an in-depth assessment of these cases is beyond the scope of this article, we briefly present them vis-à-vis our theoretical framework and the implications for our findings in the conclusion.

Malawi and Senegal represent two “typical” cases in the context of our theoretical expectations of the relationship between aid dependency, regime characteristics, domestic attitudes, and donor preferences (Gerring & Cojocaru, 2016). In 2012, Senegal was the more open society, was less dependent on foreign aid, and presented high levels of support for term limits. This combination of factors would theoretically result in less pressure on the incumbent from international actors but higher domestic audience costs, which are more salient than in a less democratic case. We would not, accordingly, expect a third-term bid to be successful. The actual outcome only partly conforms to our expectations. In 2002, Malawi was less open than Senegal but still presented high levels of support for term limits. Nonetheless, as it is highly aid dependent, we would expect a third-term bid to have both high international audience costs and high domestic audience costs, and we would not expect a third-term bid to be successful.

To show that our two selected cases are typical for countries with failed attempts in our universe of cases, we depict their similarities in table 3.2. Malawi resembles Niger in the economic context, while Senegal shares more similarities with Nigeria and Burkina Faso, in terms of the selected indicators. Comparing aid dependence yielded mixed results. Nigeria presents an odd case because it is a regional power with substantially higher economic independence, but its patterns are similar to those we see in Senegal. In contrast, Niger and Burkina Faso share characteristics with both Malawi and Senegal, but they stand out regarding the ratio of ODA to government revenue. Concerning political space, Senegal is more generally representative of the other three cases than Malawi. Support for term limits is high in all countries, but the

Malawi case is somewhat closer to the Nigeria case, and the Senegal case is somewhat closer to the Burkina Faso case.

| | Malawi (2002) | Senegal (2011) | Nigeria (2006) | Niger (2009) | Burkina Faso (2014) |
|--|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-----------------|------------------------|
| Economic | | | | | |
| GDP/capita in 2010 US dollars ¹ | 361 (↓27) | 1,264 (↓1) | 1,910(↑245) | 456 (↑9) | 1,827 (↑52) |
| Under-5 mortality ¹ | 144 (↓37) | 63 (↓12) | 151 (↓16) | 131 (↓29) | 104 (↓13) |
| Urban population as % of total ¹ | 15 (0) | 44 (↑1) | 40 (↑3) | 15 (0) | 27 (↑2) |
| Development Cooperation | | | | | |
| Net ODA received, % of GNP | 11 (↓12) | 6 (↓<1) | 5 (↑4) | 6 (↓5) | 8 (↓1) |
| Net ODA dollar received per \$1 of government revenue ³ | 30 (↑7) | 32 (↓3) | 22 (n.a.) | 54 (↓44) | 47 (↓12) |
| Democracy aid per capita in 2011 US dollars ⁴ | 7 (↑2) | 4 (↓3) | 1 (↑<1) | 2 (↓2) | 9 (↓1) ⁺ |
| Political (min: 0, max: 1) | | | | | |
| Electoral democracy ² | .48 (↓.05) | .74 (0) | .44 (↓.02) | .62 (↓.07) | .64 (↑.04) |
| Freedom of expression ² | .65 (↑.02) | .83 (↓.01) | .81 (0) | .86 (↓.03) | .88 (↑.05) |
| Political corruption ² | .62 (0) | .62 (↑.02) | .85 (0) | .64 (0) | .4 (↓.12) |
| Civil society participation ² | .71 (↓.03) | .8 (0) | .89 (0) | .89 (↓.01) | .93 (↑.08) |
| Political Attitudes | | | | | |
| % of citizens supporting principle of term limits ⁵ | 76 | 73 | 86 | - | 64 |

Table 3.2: Comparison of African cases of failed attempts to circumvent presidential term limits by characteristics. Dark gray: greater similarity to Malawi than to Senegal; light gray: greater similarity to Senegal than to Malawi; white: no sufficient similarity to Malawi or Senegal. Data are for the year given in the header row, excepting “Political Attitudes”; see figure 3.2 for the respective survey years. Figures and arrows in parentheses indicate the increase or decrease in one specific year compared to the arithmetic mean of the preceding five years. +Data for democracy aid in Burkina Faso are for the period 2008–2012 (mean) and 2013; no data for 2014 were available. *Sources:* ¹<https://www.data.worldbank.org>; ²v-dem.net; ³<https://www.wider.unu.edu/project/government-revenue-dataset>; ⁴<http://aiddata.org> (version 3.1); ⁵Afrobarometer (2021).

3.4 Empirical analysis

We base the comparative analysis on two case studies that trace democracy support in Malawi and Senegal in-depth.²⁰ These qualitative analyses have allowed us to better understand how the instruments of democracy promotion interact with domestic attitudes to produce particular outcomes.

²⁰See Nowack (2021) and Fiedler et al. (2019).

3.4.1 Democracy support - a general assessment

In both cases, the major OECD donors - and in Senegal a regional organization as well - were opposed to extending presidential term limits, and they intervened in the domestic process to varying degrees.

Malawi's relations with major donors had been worsening throughout Muluzi's run-up to a third-term bid for the presidency. Multiple donors, namely the EU, the US, and the UK, had already cut budget support in response to allegations of corruption in the state (Africa Research Bulletin, 2001). The country was also facing a food crisis (Africa Research Bulletin, 2002e) and as Muluzi's intentions to circumvent term limits became clearer, economic and financial pressures on the country were increased. The most powerful democracy promoters, especially Norway and the UK but also the US and the EU, publicly condemned Muluzi's actions multiple times, both individually and jointly. The four donors had taken on leading roles in Malawi's large-scale Democracy Consolidation Programme, with Norway in particular being strongly represented as a democracy promoter. The first phase of this program had ended by 2000 and was under evaluation. A second phase, in the form of the Democracy Consolidation Programme II, which came under the aegis of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Norway, was about to begin (Scanteam, 2010). Other donors that were either not particularly strong democracy promoters, such as Germany, or that had a middle-sized presence, such as Italy, joined the condemnations. For instance, in September 2002, Norway, the UK, the US, the EU, and Germany coalesced in a joint statement to "strongly urge" Muluzi to consult the electorate "in accordance with democratic principles" and noted with "regret" the rise in political violence associated with Muluzi's bid to hold onto power (Agence France Press, 2002c). An EU spokesperson castigated Muluzi for making a "useless bid [...] to remain in power" (The Chronicle, 2002b). In addition to rhetorical condemnations and appeals, donors and international financial institutions also made credible threats to further cut aid (Resnick, 2013). Specifically, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank asked Muluzi to clarify his position on term limits before they entered into negotiations on Malawi's forthcoming aid programs. Bilateral donors' decision to make future aid to Malawi dependent on IMF and World Bank's assessment lent additional gravity to the pending negotiations (Gama, 2002). It is telling that with the onset of talks among Malawi, the IMF, and the World Bank, and shortly after the joint statement of major bilateral donors issued in September 2002, the term-limit issue was scrapped from the October parliamentary session agenda (Agence France Press, 2002e). According to triangulated interviews with opposition politicians, representatives of civil society, Malawian academia, and journalists, international pressure coupled with civil society's opposition to Muluzi's bid was the main reason for the gradual erosion of parliamentary support for Muluzi's bid over the course of 2002 (The Chronicle, 2003).

Senegal's donor relations, like Malawi's, were already deteriorating in the period leading up to Wade's attempts to extend his hold on the office. Despite being celebrated as a democratic reformist at one time, Wade had fallen out of favor by the late 2000s (Kelly, 2012; Mbow, 2008). Although most

OECD donors had shied away from criticizing electoral irregularities or political corruption, including Senegal’s strategic ally France, such actors increasingly perceived Wade’s actions as threats to democratic consolidation (Fiedler et al., 2019). When Wade announced that he would run for a third term and effectively legalized his candidacy in 2011, donors—particularly the US, the EU, Germany, and the UK—aimed to dissuade him (Africa Research Bulletin, 2011). France, the EU, and the US brokered solutions but negotiations failed, and they publicly condemned his bid (Mission d’Observation Electorale de l’Union européenne, 2012) (interviews 2 and 4 June 2014), demanded a change in the country’s leadership, and warned that a third term for Wade would be “[...] a danger to democracy and political stability [...]” (Jeune Afrique, 2012). France and the EU negotiated a security zone for protests in Dakar, the Senegalese capital. Moreover, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) closely followed political events (Hartmann & Striebinger, 2015). In this pre-electoral period, donors combined informal talks with the government and opposition leaders with public condemnations and weighty contributions to electoral management (interviews 31 May 2014).

Donors pivoted to “the carrot and the stick” strategy when Wade officially launched his electoral campaign. On the one hand, the US, the EU, and Germany applied a logic of consequences by sanctioning government officials for corruption and threatening the government with cutting budget support. This could have led to a breakdown of the Senegalese state budget (interviews 27 and 29 May; 3 June; and 5 November 2014). On the other hand, donors supported Senegal’s electoral process - e.g., the EU’s electoral observation mission to Senegal during the period - and actively supported civil society in its opposition role. When violence escalated in Dakar prior to the election, donors raised their concerns publicly. For instance, France announced its anxiety about such instability and emphasized its commitment to freedom of speech and assembly (Ambassade de France à Dakar, 2012); likewise, the UN Secretary-General “raised concerns [...] and called for peaceful elections” (Voice of America, 2012b). ECOWAS deployed an AU/ECOWAS electoral observation mission (African Union, 2012). The mission called for a compromise between the government and the opposition (Voice of America, 2012a).²¹ Overall, this was an uncommonly risky donor strategy for use in Senegal, and it seemed at times likely that urban protests would further escalate into violent conflict. In that case, donors could have been accused of fueling domestic conflict. However, Wade lost the run-off and conceded power. Wade accepted his defeat because of the high legitimacy in the Senegalese electoral process, the state’s bankruptcy, and pressure from donors and ECOWAS peers (Ba & Bate, 2012).

Overall, we conclude that democracy supporters have effectively contributed to preserving term limits in Malawi and Senegal. They successfully combined logics of appropriateness and of consequence term limits.

²¹ECOWAS proposed that if Wade won, he should only stay in office for two years and step down after that period. Neither the opposition nor Wade agreed.

3.4.2 Domestic attitudes and audience costs

To gauge attitudes and the role of organizational resources in the two cases in the context of challenges to term limits, it is useful to group the actors involved in the negotiations into competing constellations: those in favor of the attempts and those opposed. Those in favor typically comprise the incumbent president, MPs of the ruling party, captured state institutions, and certain societal actors. Those opposed typically comprise opposition MPs, civil society groups and NGOs, and external democracy promoters (see appendix D).

External democracy support interacted with domestic opposition and political attitudes to amplify negative audience costs for incumbents. Over three-quarters of Malawian and Senegalese citizens supported presidential term limits, an attitude in line with donor preferences. In theory, democracy promotion efforts to prevent the removal of term limits should amplify such attitudes and sufficiently pressure incumbents from above and below. In Malawi and Senegal, external democracy support did amplify domestic attitudes and did raise audience costs for Muluzi and Wade, respectively.

In Malawi, CSO and donors' negative stances aligned with popular attitudes not only regarding term limits but also regarding Muluzi and democracy in general. The proportion of respondents who (strongly) disapproved of abolishing elections and the parliament stood at around 80 per cent from 1999 to 2014 (except for 2005 with 65 per cent) (Afrobarometer, 2021). Muluzi was not popular with the electorate at that time; only half of the Malawians surveyed reported that they trusted the president (Afrobarometer, 2002/2003).²² The aforementioned food crisis played a large part in Muluzi's low popularity. It came about because the government sold off the nation's entire reserve of maize; consequently, allegations of corruption ran high (Africa Research Bulletin, 2002e). Some 68 per cent of Malawians opined that the government handled corruption very badly or fairly badly (Afrobarometer, 2002/2003). Popular attitudes against Muluzi's third-term bid were met with mobilization efforts by CSOs. Externally funded NGOs and church organizations were key in mobilizing protests as well as in sensitizing the population to the issues at hand. This concerted action eventually swayed political elites, such as MPs, who began withdrawing their support for Muluzi's plans when protests intensified (Dulani & Van Donge, 2005; Nowack, 2021). It is unlikely that CSOs could have garnered the same levels of public attention without the donor resources provided. CSOs also drew support from their historical roles as "democratic watchdogs" in Malawi; the earned legitimacy of such CSOs placed them center-stage in guarding the new political order (Ihonvbere, 1997).

In Senegal, attitudes toward term limits and Wade's candidacy aligned with the democratic norms of donors and ECOWAS. Although silent diplomacy did not persuade Wade not to run, "the carrot and the stick" approach amplified domestic attitudes and raised Wade's domestic audience costs. International audience costs within West Africa and the donor community added

²²We use data on trust in the president as a proxy for data on the president's popularity in recognition of the phenomenon that although citizens may support the abstract principle of term limits, they may be willing to make exceptions for popular presidents.

to the total. Public opinion against his third-term attempt was very strong. By 2012, social movements had already built a social base for a new social contract against corruption and poor services delivery (Mouvement Y en a Marre, 2011). Bilateral donors and ECOWAS reinforced this pro-democratic discourse. Domestic and international demands were connected to broader attitudes, which showed massive support for the “more active citizen” (71 per cent) (Afrobarometer, 2008/2009). Meanwhile, mistrust in Wade increased from 20 per cent in 2005/06 to 49 per cent in 2008/09. Seven in ten Senegalese people surveyed reported that Wade performed poorly as president, 79 per cent that he and his government managed the economy very or fairly badly, and 53 per cent that he disregarded Senegalese law (Afrobarometer, 2008/2009). Wade’s supporters tried to counter these opposition movements. For instance, one influential religious leader emphasized Wade’s support for Senegalese values to his followers and asked them to vote for him. The religious message was disseminated repeatedly via state-owned radio in March 2012 (Loum, 2013). Wade decried Western interference and argued that Senegal would not let external powers “dictate” to the country (Arieff, 2012).

3.4.3 External support to protect term limits and provide organizational resources for relevant actors

The extent to which domestic opposition actors are organized, mobilized, and resourced varies between the actor constellations in Malawi and those in Senegal. In Malawi, domestic opposition to Muluzi’s bid was well-mobilized. Most religious leaders expressed their opposition and were joined by human rights NGOs and other CSOs such as the Law Society and the Malawi Association of Lawyers. Despite the government’s protest ban and other political repression, civil society actors formed the Forum for the Defense of the Constitution - an umbrella organization - and organized multiple protests that resulted in clashes with police. Media coverage of the issue was generally high, with Malawian newspapers including the *Nyasa Times*, the *Daily Times*, and *The Nation* frequently publishing on the topic. Moreover, as the country’s literacy rate was low, radio programs played a paramount role in disseminating information. Such programs were often broadcast by NGOs. External support was critical here, too; for instance, the Democracy Consolidation Programme included funding from Norway for capacity-building for the media in general and for radio broadcasting in particular (AidData, 2017; Tierney et al., 2011).

In Senegal, the M-23 movement, the grassroots Y’en a marre! (“We had enough”) movement, and the human rights NGO the African Meeting for the Defense of Human Rights (RADDHO) spearheaded the opposition. Economic grievances had begun earlier and were only amplified when Wade attempted to circumvent term limits. Despite their “spontaneous birth,” movements in opposition to Wade’s attempt soon grew well-organized and were effectively mobilizing the population (Diome, 2013, p. 366). Although protests were strongest in Dakar, the presence of M23 and Y’en a marre! extended to all major cities in Senegal. Oppositional political parties that had joined the movement after the first round of elections facilitated this decentralization. Wade’s regime, supported by a militant branch of his party, reacted by sup-

pressing civil society through the banning of protests and arresting protesters (Mission d'Observation Electorale de l'Union européenne, 2012, p. 13). Wade's regime refrained from more extensive repression, ostensibly because the international community was observing the situation closely (Sy, 2012).

In both cases, incumbents misappropriated state resources, which provided them with substantive advantage over opposing domestic actors. In Malawi, opposition MPs were bought off with cash, land holdings, and promises of political positions in the next government (Morrow, 2006), and some traditional leaders supported Muluzi after their stipends were raised (IRIN, 2002a). In Senegal, Wade used state resources to increase the salaries of members of the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Council, and the Court of Auditors and also outfitted them with luxury cars (Heyl, 2019; Kelly, 2012). A pro-Wade group was accused of paying voters around €50 to vote for Wade (Alakhbar, 2012), and Senegal's state-owned television reported in favor of Wade.

External democracy support provided important organizational resources to the extra-parliamentary opposition in this respect. In Malawi, funding and capacity transfers provided the necessary organizational resources for mobilizing civil society. The budgets of the organizations that constituted the core opposition were mainly foreign-funded. Interviewees from these organizations doubted that they would have been operational without foreign funding (interviews 13, 14, 21 April 2017). Funders included the EU, the UK, Norway, and Denmark (interviews 20 and 25 April 2017). Malawian CSO's raised awareness "so that people would know the real agenda behind this [Muluzi's third-term bid]" (interview, 24 April 2017). In that respect, donor support was crucial: "For us to carry out the awareness campaigns, they [the donors] were pumping financial resources, so that we keep on going [raising awareness]" (interview 24 April 2017).

In Senegal, donors - excluding ECOWAS - supported M-23 as long as their protests were peaceful. Additional funding was sent to local NGOs for electoral observation. For example, whereas the EU's previous support was focused on sector-oriented NGOs, such focus shifted to political CSOs during protests against Wade (Caffin & Zarlowski, 2016). The EU funded RADDHO²³ held a meeting with the relevant opposition groups to advise on organizing peaceful demonstrations. According to interviewees, Y'en a marre! received support from France and UNDP, and the Open Society Foundation for West Africa (OSIWA) invested in capacity-building for M-23 (interview 30 May 2014).²⁴ Generating international attention to increase pressure on Wade was one goal of the opposition. First, they opted for violent action such as vandalism to raise media attention and foreign interest (Demarest, 2016, p. 16). Second, they traveled abroad to gain pro-democracy support from OECD governments and the diaspora (Diop, 2013).

Support from donors against Wade's candidacy as well as the critical stand

²³According to interviewees, the EU stopped funding RADDHO when they were part of protests that turned violent during the election period of February and March 2012 (interviews 5 June and 4 November 2014).

²⁴According to Y'en a marre!, most of their funding stems from private donations and private fundraising in rap circles in the United States (Awenengo-Dalberto, 2011).

by ECOWAS were important to the successful social mobilization of civil society. According to an interviewee, “international financial support from donors is vital for the survival of civil society, which makes NGOs generally vulnerable” (interview 5 June 2014); this corroborates that “civil society in Senegal is not known for its strong organizational capacities [...]” (Africa Governance, Monitoring and Advocacy Project and Open Society Initiative for West Africa, 2013, pp. 74-75). The donors’ strategy of providing long-term support to pro-democracy NGOs prior to any specific perceived threat allowed NGOs to oppose Wade’s third term. Additional targeted support provided to social movements fostered oppositional activities during the electoral period.

3.5 Conclusion: Empirical findings and outlook

This analysis aimed at understanding conditions under which international democracy support contributes to protecting presidential term limits. This question is relevant because attempts to circumvent term limits are critical junctures that can determine the direction a political regime will take. Identifying strategies that help protect political regimes from democratic backsliding not only contributes to theory-building but can also inform policy-making.

Overall, the results of our empirical analysis support and refine findings of previous studies. Our paired comparison constitutes one of the first steps toward research that aims to analyze the effect of democracy support in combating democratic backsliding and even autocratization (Niño-Zarazúa et al., 2020). It supports findings from cross-national analyses indicating that democracy support made a difference in protecting term limits in certain cases (Dietrich & Wright, 2013). While those studies presented the effects of democracy support, they did not analyze *how* such support made a difference in the cases in question. Our paired comparison refined such findings by demonstrating that actions based on a mix of the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness can prove successful in political regimes where certain democratic qualities are present and where foreign aid is critical for the state budget. More specifically, conditioning relations with the incumbent government while capacitating pro-democratic opposition turned out to be effective strategies for preserving presidential term limits in Malawi in 2002 and Senegal in 2012. This supports previous findings that social protests rather than courts (Versteeg et al., 2020) are important drivers in protecting term limits. In addition, as reflected in the international donor perspective, opportunity structures, which foster high levels of public awareness, increase the likelihood of international support being effective. For instance, the elections in Senegal made political struggles around term limits more visible, and the corruption scandal coupled with Malawi’s aid dependence presented an opportunity for international democracy support to assist in effectively protecting term limits.

Second, domestic attitudes matter greatly for international democracy support when they are translated into action such as social mobilization. Popular attitudes factor into the decision-making of the recipient country’s political

elites and of the donors, who seem to take cues from domestic dynamics (*H1*). In Malawi and Senegal, pre-existing attitudes favoring term limits amplified donors' support for opposition groups and condemnation of the respective incumbents. Regional pro-democracy norms matter as well. We observed that ECOWAS regional norms reinforced societal attitudes in Senegal and legitimized the strategies of other international donors.

Our findings furthermore highlight how the standing of an issue in civil society and strategic framing influence an incumbent's chances of success. Social movements and NGOs in Malawi and Senegal used framing that resonated with attitudes in the broader population in their campaigns. For instance, the calls for a new, more active citizen reflected the attitudes of a majority group in Senegal. In Malawi, the opposition of the church organizations was most crucial in civil society, as such organizations are held in high regard by many Malawians and have played a prominent role in the history of Malawi's transition to democracy.

Third, we showed that the organizational capacity of the opposition matters (*H2*). Where donors have invested in contributions to build up political CSOs prior to the attempt to extend term limits, their investments tend to play out positively. In Malawi and Senegal, NGOs and social movements became crucial during protests against incumbents' seeking third terms. Most interviews with members of relevant organizations indicate that they survived only because of international funding. In Malawi and Senegal, the alignment of an established political class further fostered opposition success. In Malawi, MPs dropped their support for legal reform due to public pressure, and in Senegal political parties supported the social movements rhetorically and provided infrastructure for protests outside Dakar. Nevertheless, from a counterfactual perspective, we can confidently conclude that in both cases opposition could not have delivered the same impact without reliable donor funding. Accordingly, we argue that international democracy support for civil society is a necessary condition in more democratic regimes where civil society is not co-opted or repressed by the government, and where the state is nonetheless dependent on external funding.²⁵

Our findings do present limitations when set against the other three failed term-limit extension attempts in our universe of cases (figure 3.3). In Niger, international actors were absent, and it was the military that eventually prevented the incumbent from taking a third term (Baudais & Chauzal, 2011). In Burkina Faso and Nigeria, civil society and social movements played decisive roles, despite the absence of strong international public response (Gillies, 2007; Moestrup, 2019). Looking beyond our universe of cases, strong international public pressure as well as domestic civil society opposition were crucial in averting Kabila's third term in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2018 (Reyntjens, 2020). Against this background, we suggest assessing additional cases with more outcome variation. More particularly, to better understand

²⁵This is corroborated by cases where the regime was autocratic and the domestic civil society was not strongly supported by the donor community - either through diplomatic rhetoric or organizational resources - and incumbents successfully abolished term limits, as in the case of Uganda (Hulse, 2018).

the circumstances in which international support to protect democracy is effective, more attention should be paid to the different levels of aid dependence among civil society actors. This would be an important contribution to further theory-building on necessary conditions for effective international democracy protection.

Several research gaps remain in the study of international dimensions of term limits. First, there is a need to link up micro-perspectives and macro-dynamics. How are democratic norms diffused through, for instance, democracy promotion among elite political decision-makers such as MPs and justices? In turn, how do individual attitudes influence international support for democracy? Although we can rely on representative data for the nations in question, we know little about the attitudes of the international and domestic elites who make decisions and shape support for democracy. Surveys of such elites could improve our understanding of the relevance of attitudes in these processes. Second, the funding of watchdog organizations and movements such as CSOs can make democracy “fitter” for times of crisis. However, further evidence is needed on what allows CSOs to endure long term without donor funding and how donors can support civil society in autocratic contexts. Third, we must not overlook the private funding of pro-democratic social movements by diasporas and other like-minded groups.

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Chapter 4

*Process tracing the term limit struggle in Malawi: The role of international democracy promotion in Muluzi's bid for a third term**

Abstract Attempts to circumvent presidential term limits in African countries show a puzzling variation of success or failure. This variation is due to both international and domestic factors. However, how these interact is not yet well understood. This article analyses how international donors and organisations intervened in the attempted term limit circumvention in Malawi from 1999 to 2003. It differentiates between different types of instruments used by donors in democracy promotion, and, by doing so, contributes to the question whether donors in term limit struggles can contribute to genuine democratic consolidation. It employs deductive process-tracing based on an analysis of primary media sources and interviews conducted during field research. The results show that erosion of party support as a proximate and a strong civil society response as a mediate factor were important in saving Malawi's term limit. Aid conditionality and democracy promotion by donors and international organisations exerted influence on both factors.

4.1 Introduction

Term limits are of special interest in the study of African politics. African countries have introduced term limits into their constitutions increasingly since the early 1990s (McKie, 2017). This has reduced the average duration that

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African presidents stay in office (Dulani, 2011). Observers have taken this as a strong indicator for the end of personalist rule and the institutionalisation of political power (Posner & Young, 2007). Yet for all that, a worrying trend of attempts to remove or circumvent term limits has recently been observed (Tull & Simons, 2017).

International actors, such as international organisations and especially donor governments, often intervene in domestic attempts to remove term limits in order to promote democracy. The research literature on democracy promotion acknowledges two basically different ways of how they do this. They either pursue a rationalist strategy if they use, for instance, aid conditionality to exploit the *leverage* they have over a country. Or they pursue a social-constructivist strategy if they use public statements and democracy assistance to rather exploit their *linkage* to a country (Levitsky & Way, 2006). Both leverage and linkage build upon different logics of social action. Earlier contributions trace how external democracy promotion using both strategies developed over time on a macro level for individual countries or regions (e.g. Resnick & Van De Walle, 2013). This article complements these accounts by providing an issue-focused in-depth investigation of how both strategies complemented one another on the meso level in a specific case of constitutional reform. The specific issue of an attempted term limit circumvention is ideal for such an investigation as it directly concerns a country's democratic consolidation.

Posner and Young (2007, p. 135) opened the question on the role of foreign donors in term limit circumventions. They hypothesised that aid dependency enables donors to pressure incumbents into abandoning attempts to circumvent term limits. Statistical evidence indeed shows that aid dependency is negatively associated with the likelihood of a term limit removal (Baturu, 2010; Posner and Young, 2018). Findings deduced from case studies corroborate this (Dulani & Van Donge, 2005). Yet others suggest that donors also exert influence through linkage. Carter (2016) forcefully argues that foreign aid also emboldens democratic actors in recipient countries to safeguard term limits besides merely affecting the cost-benefit calculations of incumbents. Statistical evidence also suggests that democracy promotion, rather than economic foreign aid, lowers the likelihood of term limit circumvention, but this evidence is provisory (Dietrich and Wright, 2012, 2013). In-depth case study evidence provides a mixed picture by showing that donors, in their pursuance of strategic interests, often play a rather ambiguous role (Vandeginste, 2016).

The case of Malawi offers a prime example to study different instruments of democracy promotion in attempts to circumvent a term limit. First, Malawi belongs to only the handful of cases in Africa in which a circumvention of a term limit was unsuccessful. Second, democracy promotion could have worked through both rationalist leverage and constructivist linkage in Malawi's case. At the time of analysis, Malawi was highly aid-dependent (Resnick, 2013). Likewise, it was in the midst of its democratic transformation (Chinsinga, 2008). Muluzi indeed was the first democratically elected president after autocratic rule had ended in 1994. Third, Malawi does not play an important geostrategic role in Africa for donors. Hence, strategic donor interests beyond the case of Malawi itself are unlikely to have confounded donor responses to

Muluzi's attempted term limit circumvention. Finally, analyses of Muluzi's attempted third term have focused on the roles that party fractionalisation (Dulani & Van Donge, 2005; Von Doepp, 2005a), civil society (Dulani, 2011), and judiciary institutions (Von Doepp, 2005b) played, while an in-depth analysis of the role of external donors has not been undertaken so far. Generally, scholars acknowledge that donors played some role in Muluzi's third term bid. Dulani and Van Donge (2005) assert the influence of donors on Malawi's democratic consolidation generally, and Dulani (2011, pp. 196–198) briefly sketches that donors exerted pressure during the third term bid. Von Doepp (2019, p. 297), too, acknowledges that “the donor community became increasingly involved” and intervened on behalf of important veto players such as the judiciary Von Doepp (2005b, p. 288), and Resnick (2013, p. 115) also reports that donors influenced Muluzi and “may have influenced MPs.” However, she also cautions that the exact impact of donors is not clear as Muluzi attempted to go through with his bid. Hence, an important question is still open: What part did external democracy promotion play compared to domestic factors in Muluzi's attempt for a third term? More specifically, what part did different instruments of democracy promotion play?

This question has important implications for the contribution of democracy promotion to democratic consolidation. Democratic consolidation consists of both preventing democracy from breakdown or erosion and facilitating the completion, organisation, and deepening of democracy (Schedler, 2002). While the former concerns the survival of democratic core institutions, the latter concerns the enhancement of those democratic institutions and actors that reinforce vertical and horizontal accountability and political competition (Resnick & Van De Walle, 2013). Different instruments of democracy promotion fulfil different functions in this regard. While rationalist instruments of leverage can help prevent breakdown or erosion, because they rely on coercion they are less effective in helping genuine completion, organisation, or deepening of democracy (Resnick & Van De Walle, 2013, p. 38). Instruments of linkage seem to be more important for this positive side of democratic consolidation. This article thus contributes to the larger literature on democracy promotion and democratic consolidation by providing an in-depth process tracing analysis of both instruments in the short-term case event of a term limit bid.

The analysis finds that both leverage and linkage by external donors augmented domestic drivers obstructing Muluzi's third term bid in Malawi. While an erosion of intra- and inter-party support explains the failure of Muluzi's third term bid as a proximate factor, international intervention, strong civil society opposition, and, to a lesser extent, judiciary safeguarding were mediating factors causing this erosion. A vivid, foreign-funded civil society that upheld democratic values, norms, and standards exerted pressure on parliamentarians to such a degree that political support for Muluzi's third term bid eroded. Rhetorical statements and donor conditionality further bolstered the opposition stance towards a removal of term limits.

The next section reviews the theory of donor interventions in democracy promotion – how different democracy promotion instruments work according to different logics – and deduces assessable theoretical mechanisms. The section

titled “Analysis: Muluzi’s Attempted Term Limit Circumvention, 1999–2003” presents the analysis, its findings and a brief discussion.

4.2 Theory and assessable mechanisms

Term limits are important rules of democratic political systems. Through lowering the entry barrier, they ensure that political competition does not devolve into a zero-sum game (Cheeseman, 2010). Because they are increasingly challenged (Tull & Simons, 2017), term limit rules are also a salient topic for the study and practice of democracy promotion. Democracy promotion comprises all the activities of external actors that seek to enable internal actors of a country to establish democratic institutions (Poppe et al., 2019). Its goal is to disseminate and defend democratic norms, attitudes, behaviour, and standards globally. As stated previously, democracy promotion instruments can be sorted broadly into two categories (Levitsky & Way, 2006). If a democracy promoter exploits the vulnerability of another country – for instance, through economic sanctions, political conditionality, and aid withdrawal or even military intervention – this is leverage. If, in contrast, an external democracy promoter uses his ties with another country, such as transnational civil society exchange, multi- or bilateral aid including democracy assistance, or international fora and agreements, this is linkage. Leverage and linkage function according to two different causal logics: the rationalist logic of conditionality and the constructivist logic of appropriateness. Both mechanisms stem from different epistemological traditions. The logic of conditionality, also often known as logic of consequentiality, originates from rationalism that models human behaviour as guided by individualistic rational choice reasoning. The logic of appropriateness, in contrast, originates from social constructivism that models human behaviour as guided by socially constructed norms and expectations. Both epistemologies merit their value, especially concerning the analysis of democracy promotion. While donor–recipient interactions are often characterised by conditionality, democracy promotion is also inherently normative. Hence, there is the need to see both epistemological perspectives as complementary.

Their respective mechanisms both use loss of political support and capital as the ultimate lever. First, the logic of conditionality regards domestic actors in recipient countries as acting rationally in relation to their subjective desires. They assess costs and benefits of their behaviour and act accordingly (Beichelt, 2012). According to this logic, domestic actors need to be incentivised to act democratically. Promising aid in return for a specific policy, or, conversely, threatening to withdraw aid in case a specific political course is undertaken raises or diminishes pay-offs of recipient governments. Resource constraints or gains following from this leads to political elites, such as parties of incumbent governments, withdrawing their support for the removal of a term limit, or alternatively to enduring a resource loss and risk loosening political capital and support.

Second, the socially constructive logic of appropriateness, in contrast, emphasises the importance of socialisation, social learning, and normative per-




Figure 4.1: Mechanisms of the logic of conditionality and the logic of appropriateness.

suation (Börzel & Risse, 2012). Actors' behaviour is less explained through rationally fulfilling their subjective desires but more through their socially constructed role obligations. Instead of being incentivised, actors act in accordance with their social identity (March & Olsen, 1989). In the long term, instruments that use the logic of appropriateness attempt to nurture democratic role identities through training and diffusing democratic norms. In the short term, the logic of appropriateness may work through addressing the democratic identity of a recipient government or its population through rhetoric approval or disapproval, or through appeals and references to norms, standards, and rules. Condemning or supporting a course of action, democracy promoters can thus mobilise the political elites of a recipient country or its wider domestic population, which then demands democratic behaviour on the part of the political elites. If these demands go unheard, political elites suffer a loss of political capital and support.

The logic of conditionality and the logic of appropriateness broadly describe two different toolboxes donors may use in response to an attempted term limit removal. Following the logic of conditionality, the donor would use her leverage to threaten to withdraw, and eventually indeed withdraw aid; at the same time, she would promise aid in return for keeping the term limit. Following the logic of appropriateness, the donor would use her ties with the country and rhetorically condemn the term limit removal, and support opposing domestic actors both financially and rhetorically.

Because both logics work according to different mechanisms, they come with different observable implications for the cases in which donors employ them (figure 4.1). In cases where they employ leverage instruments of the rationalist logic of conditionality, researchers should be able to observe a shifting cost–benefit perception among political elites and the domestic population. This should work best if the recipient country is highly aid-dependent, as this creates greater leverage on the part of donor countries. In contrast, where foreign donors employ linkage instruments of the constructivist logic of appropriateness, researchers should be able to observe domestic demand or mobilisation that calls the incumbent president to act according to his democratic role obligation and to step down.

The two logics of social action are not without problems, however. Although

scholars working on donor–recipient country interactions make an analytical distinction between the logic of conditionality and the logic of appropriateness (e.g. Koch, 2015), empirically they are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, as humans and their motivations vary, donors in fact often use both logics as complementary – for instance, when they withdraw aid and justify this by condemning non-democratic behaviour of the recipient regime in a press statement. Similarly, implied conditionality might lurk behind every public donor appeal to democratic behaviour. How then to separate leverage from linkage and conditionality from appropriateness? The evidence found by the process tracing analysis should make this separation clear as it is gathered to document the entire mechanism and not only donor behaviour, for example, by showing whether opposing domestic actors framed the term limit removal as a breach of democratic standards rather than as something that might provoke donors. Finding evidence that domestic actors emphasised the need to satisfy donors’ demands would hint towards the logic of conditionality. Finding evidence that domestic actors emphasised political elites’ democratic role obligations in contrast would hint towards the logic of appropriateness. Of course, finding both would hint to both logics simultaneously.

In order to evaluate the effectiveness of international democracy promotion, it is necessary to also assess how the logic of conditionality and the logic of appropriateness interacted with domestic explanatory factors. Two major explanations stand out from the scholarly literature on Muluzi’s term limit circumvention bid. First, the literature highlights the importance of within- and between-party power play. In a cross-case comparison of party coherence and fractionalisation, Von Doepp (2005a) shows that political parties in Zambia and Malawi fractionalised and reduced the chances for a successful term limit circumvention, while the contrary holds for Namibia. His analysis is seconded by other studies (Dulani & van Donge, 2005; Meinhardt & Patel, 2003). The general theoretical implication emanating from this is that political support within the ruling party as well as among the ruling party and its allied parties eroded and ended Muluzi’s third term bid.

Second, judiciary institutions played a role during Malawi’s term limit struggle. Although Dulani and Van Donge (2005) and Von Doepp (2005b) see the role of the Malawian High Court as less pronounced overall, Meinhardt and Patel (2003, p. 17) indicate that Malawi’s courts acted as important safeguards during the third term debate. This suggests the theoretical implication that judiciary institutions act as important veto players in term limit struggles.

4.2.1 Methodological approach: Process tracing

The goal of this case study is to assess to what extent donors effectively employed instruments of the logic of appropriateness and of the logic of conditionality in Muluzi’s third term bid. In order to investigate the role of international actors, this case study employs deductive process tracing as “an analytic tool for drawing descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence – often understood as part of a temporal sequence of events or phenomena” (Collier, 2011, p. 824). It follows the approaches presented by Trampusch and

Palier (2016) and Mahoney (2012), as applied by, for example, Busetti and Vecchi (2018).

Table 4.1 presents causal process observations (CPOs) from the theoretical framework of the logic of conditionality and the logic of appropriateness as well as from the rival explanations based on party fractionalisation and veto player role of judiciary institutions. CPOs are observable implications derived from the theoretical framework and can be seen as its operationalisation (Mahoney, 2012, p. 571). They specify the events and phenomena that theoretically should be observed and vary according to whether they are necessary or sufficient conditions – or both or neither – to confirm the theoretical explanation. Based on this variation, the CPOs are then checked against the case evidence during the analysis. Assessing the CPOs in light of their evidence provides the foundation for the overall assessment of the theoretical framework and its explanatory power. Appendix E provides additional information on how the CPOs in table 4.1 as well as their categorisation as necessary or sufficient were derived.

The next section analyses the case evidence for these CPOs. Data used to carry out the process tracing analysis stem from a text analysis of primary media sources. Additional data were retrieved from semi-structured interviews conducted in Malawi in April 2017 with representatives of civil society organisations (CSOs), church leaders, politicians, and state officials (see appendix E).

4.3 Analysis: Muluzi’s term limit bid, 1999–2003

Malawi transitioned peacefully from autocracy to democracy in 1994. The constitution enacted at that time specified in Article 85 that the President of the Republic of Malawi may serve only for two five-year consecutive terms. Muluzi, co-founder of the political party United Democratic Front (UDF), became the first president of the new republic. Malawi’s voters re-elected him in 1999 for a second, final term.

Muluzi’s attempted term limit circumvention can be structured into three distinct phases. The first phase ranges from 1999 to April 2002 and concerns the preparations Muluzi and his supporters carried out to set up a favourable institutional environment beforehand. During the second phase, from May to July 2002, Muluzi and his supporters started their first attempt by introducing the Open Term Bill, a bill to abolish the constitutional term limit provision entirely. The third and final phase connects to the failure of this attempt. It starts in July 2002 and ends in March 2003. During this final phase, Muluzi and his supporters pushed a recycled version of the Open Term Bill. The so-called Third Term Bill would have changed the constitutional term limit provision from a two-term limit to a three-term limit.

One of the goals of process tracing is to interweave clear and transparent reasoning on causal mechanisms with the temporal chain in which events unfold. Hence, the following analysis is structured by the different temporal phases of the term limit circumvention attempt. The major events taking place

| | CPO | Necessary? | Sufficient? |
|---|--|------------|-------------|
| Panel A | | | |
| Instruments of the logic of conditionality changed the cost–benefit perception of political elites | | | |
| A1 | Did donors make credible threats of sanctions or withdraw aid with reference to Muluzi’s term limit circumvention? | Yes | No |
| A2 | Did political elites opposing Muluzi’s third term refer to possible loss of aid? | No | Yes |
| A3 | Did Muluzi publicly respond to donor pressure? | No | Yes |
| A4 | Did party support fractionalise after donors made credible threats? | No | No |
| Panel B | | | |
| Instruments of the logic of appropriateness raised demands to act appropriate to democratic norms | | | |
| B1 | Did donors condemn Muluzi’s term limit circumvention? | Yes | No |
| B2 | Did donors support actors opposing Muluzi’s term limit Yes circumvention? | Yes | No |
| B3 | Did actors opposing Muluzi’s term limit circumvention demand behaviour appropriate to Muluzi’s democratic role obligation? | No | Yes |
| B4 | Did the political opposition publicly refer to or ask for donor support? | No | Yes |
| B5 | Did donor- funded civil society mobilise against Muluzi’s term limit circumvention? | No | No |
| Panel C | | | |
| Party fractionalisation within and between parties eroded legislative majority | | | |
| C1 | Did opposition and ruling party members voice decreasing support for Muluzi’s term limit circumvention? | Yes | No |
| C2 | Did party members leave the ruling party? | No | Yes |
| C3 | Did Muluzi and his supporters punish “party renegades”? | No | No |
| Panel D | | | |
| Strong judiciary institutions acted as veto players | | | |
| D1 | Did judiciary institutions rule against legislative measures that had supported Muluzi’s term limit circumvention? | Yes | No |
| D2 | Did Muluzi and his supporters try to disempower judiciary institutions? | No | No |

Table 4.1: Theoretically derived CPOs. *Note:* CPO = causal process observation. *Source:* author.

are briefly described for each phase.

4.3.1 The set-up phase (1999–April 2002)

Soon after Muluzi’s re-election in 1999, first rumours circulated that he planned to run for a third term (Morrow, 2006). In the two and a half years leading up to Muluzi’s circumvention attempt, he and his supporters tried to alter Malawi’s institutional landscape in such a way to make constitutional changes easier. An important step in this was to give the speaker of Parliament the power to expel MPs if they joined any political organisation after being elected, even if outside of Parliament. This would ensure party cohesion of the UDF. In June, Parliament passed the respective Amendment Act, and the speaker of Parliament expelled seven renegade UDF MPs who had formed the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), a pressure organisation with the expressed goal of lobbying against another term for Muluzi. When the

Malawian High Court turned this, Parliament passed a motion in November to remove three of its judges (Dulani & Van Donge, 2005). Throughout these first developments, Muluzi did not officially announce his intent to run a third time for president. But eventually, in March 2002, Muluzi supporters officially formed a committee with the goal to advocate for the removal of the term limit (Banda, 2002).

Conditionality instruments Throughout the set-up phase for Muluzi’s term limit circumvention, the relationship between donors and Malawi had gradually worsened. Donors had started to demand more transparency and accountability on the side of Muluzi’s government in the late 1990s (Brown, 2005). Because they did not see their demands met, they started to withdraw aid. The United States and Great Britain suspended sizeable amounts of their development assistance at the end of 2001, and so did the European Union (EU), who also demanded a refund of aid that had already been disbursed. After a diplomatic fallout with the Government of Denmark about how the Muluzi government used aid, the Danish envoy was forced to leave and Denmark decided to withdraw all its aid (Africa Research Bulletin, 2001). Resnick (2013, p. 114) estimates that donors suspended US\$23 million in total in 2001. From March to April 2002, the International Monetary Fund and the African Development Bank (AfDB) also decided to withhold funds due to a lack of transparency and allegations of corruption (Africa Research Bulletin, 2002a). However, only Great Britain and the AfDB linked their withdrawal – although vaguely – to Muluzi’s attempts to twist the institutional landscape of Malawi during this phase. All other donors linked their aid cuts to general mismanagement and corruption. While the AfDB referred to attempts by Muluzi and his supporters to curb the authority of the judiciary (Gama, 2002), Great Britain cited general “political violence” (Africa Research Bulletin, 2001, p. 15007c) and the impeachment of the High Court judges that Parliament had sanctioned earlier (Daily Times, 2002).

Appropriateness instruments In general, evidence for the effectiveness of appropriateness instruments during the first phase of the circumvention attempt is weak. Throughout the first phase, donors did not issue any statements that approved or disapproved of Muluzi’s course. However, the logic of appropriateness in democracy promotion does not work only through official statements by donor governments. In fact, a large part of it concerns the support of democratic actors within countries. Through this channel, donors indirectly played a role in this first phase through supporting CSOs and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) through funding. Interviewed civil society representatives argued that their organisations would be incapable of carrying out their work without foreign funding (personal interviews 6, 14). An interviewed civil society activist summarised it by stating that “for us to carry out the awareness campaigns, they [the donors] were pumping financial resources, so that we keep on going” (personal interview 11). Already in this first phase, many civil society actors, and especially faith-based organisations (FBOs),

kept a close watch on political developments. They became aware that “what we [CSOs] need to do now is to go on the ground, raise public awareness so that people can know what is the real agenda behind this [Muluzi’s third term bid]” (personal interview 11). Among other instances, the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian (CCAP) – which had also played a major role in Malawi’s democratic transition – issued a letter cautioning against the erosion of democracy in general, and a softening of the presidential term limit more specifically, in April 2001 (Morrow, 2006, p. 93). Civil society also reacted to the removal of the seven renegade UDF MPs. For instance, the Public Affairs Committee (PAC), an umbrella CSO for civic affairs comprising several FBOs across different congregations, called on the High Court to take a ruling on the Amendment Act that had given the speaker of Parliament the power to expel MPs in the first place (Dulani & Van Donge, 2005).

Party fractionalisation and judiciary institutions The founding of the NDA by the UDF party members attests to the fact that first rifts within the UDF had already appeared in the set-up phase to Muluzi’s circumvention attempt. The founding of the NDA was traced back to a reshuffle of Muluzi’s cabinet. The NDA’s founder was among the ministers who were sacked (Agence France Presse, 2001). The Amendment Act, which vested the power of declaring vacant the seats of MPs who joined political organisations even if these organisations were outside of Parliament, was a measure directed against the NDA (von Doepp, 2005b). Just after the enactment of the amendment, seven MPs who had joined NDA were expelled from Parliament, indicating that Muluzi and his supporters sensed that party fractionalisation could destroy the necessary majority needed to pass the Open Term Bill.

Judiciary institutions played an important role during the set-up phase. In a strongly articulated ruling, the High Court vetoed the Amendment Act, and reinstated the MPs who had joined the NDA to their parliamentary seats (Dulani & Van Donge, 2005). As Von Doepp (2005b) emphasises, this effectively meant that Muluzi had to fear for parliamentary majority when tabling the Open Term Bill later; because of the High Court’s ruling, a pressure group with the expressed goal to prevent a third term was now represented in Parliament. Because the Open Term Bill was defeated in July 2002 only by a slim margin – it was only three votes short – the fact that the High Court did not give way proved crucial a few months later.

Nevertheless, at the same time, the vulnerability of the High Court also surfaced in this first phase. It was not able to veto an act that restricted NGOs from engaging politically and required them to register, for instance. Most importantly, Parliament passed a motion to remove three of its judges in November in retaliation (Dulani & Van Donge, 2005). This emphasises the vulnerable position of judiciary institutions in the Malawian political context back then, as echoed by broader analyses (e.g. Von Doepp, 2005b).

4.3.2 The open term bill (May–July 2002)

Muluzi’s term limit circumvention started in earnest in late May 2002 when the Open Term Bill was officially gazetted (Mponda, 2002), and when Muluzi declared all demonstrations concerning the term limit question illegal (IRIN, 2002a). At the same time, Muluzi and his supporters started to buy the support of opposition MPs and other influential public figures such as traditional authorities (personal interview 11). The Open Term Bill was eventually tabled in Parliament in early July; however, its passing fell short on a very small margin of three votes.

Conditionality instruments At the time of the gazetting and tabling of the Open Term Bill, Malawi’s major donors had already suspended much of their assistance to Malawi. Malawi’s Minister of Finance acknowledged publicly that the Muluzi government was hit hard by the withdrawal of donor aid. In July, he stated before Parliament and on air that the government’s budget would last only until December (Agence France Press, 2002b). Despite this, the EU exerted more pressure in demanding back aid that had been allocated previously but had been misused (Associated Press, 2002b). Opposing CSOs specifically asked donors to exert such pressure on Muluzi’s government. Knowing that

Malawi is donor- dependent, we [Malawian CSOs] started influencing the donors who fund government to also start speaking the language of our Constitution. So they [the donors] can add pressure to the campaign [against a third term]. [...]. They were able to meet with the government. They would threaten not to pour out funding and that was adding some pressure. (Personal interview 11)

In this dire situation, the Malawi government publicly stated that it aimed to decrease dependency on traditional donors (Xinhua, 2002). At the same time, traditional donor governments and organisations could not entirely ignore the disastrous famine that held most Southern African countries in its grip. Hence, project-targeted aid and aid for humanitarian relief was forwarded. Between June and July, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) issued US\$14.6 million to cope with the famine situation in Malawi. Germany and Italy cancelled parts of Malawi’s debt, but linked this with a warning towards the Muluzi government to adhere to democratic practices (Africa Research Bulletin, 2002b).

Despite this, there is not much indication that donor conditionality already played an important role in the political calculus of the MPs. During the session in which Parliament discussed and voted on the Open Term Bill, only one speaker warned: “Yes, let us be constructive in our positions. But we must never allow ourselves to be donor driven” (National Assembly, 2002, p. 81).

Appropriateness instruments While donors scarcely made use of public statements during the set-up phase, this changed during the second phase. Donor statements, however, focused on the manner in which

the Open Term Bill was rushed to legislation rather than on the actual content of the bill. Donors thus reacted more to Muluzi's ban on demonstrations than to the Open Term Bill itself.

The United States was the first to issue a public statement that strongly urged "a process of careful consideration of this proposal that provides for the open and unhindered peaceful participation and expression of views of all Malawians" (Africa Research Bulletin, 2002c, p. 14889A). This was followed, days later, by calls of the British High Commissioner to enable a wider debate. About a week later, the EU also publicised an official statement that acknowledged the right of Malawi to amend its constitution, but urged the Muluzi government to ensure a "wide and informed debate on this important issue conducted openly and with full freedom of expression" (IRIN, 2002c). Muluzi responded in public that the "third term issue" was not the "business" (Associated Press, 2002a) of donor governments, and that he refused to be dictated to. This defiant reaction indicates that he saw the donor statements as threatening to the success of his third term bid.

In the initial aftermath of the defeat of the Open Term Bill in early July, the relationship between donors and the Muluzi government relaxed slightly. Great Britain declared through the British High Commissioner that European donor governments would at some point resume their assistance. However, he also stressed that bilateral donors were reluctant to disburse aid not because of lacking programme implementation, but foremost because of Malawi's bad record of governance and accountability (Chafunya, 2002).

Civil society actors, too, played a role in this second phase. They reacted strongly negatively towards Muluzi's move to ban demonstrations. As in the first phase, it was mostly FBOs that led the movement against Muluzi's third term (African Church Information Service, 2002), but more NGOs and CSOs followed suit this time. Church organisations as well as CSOs issued statements that sharply condemned the Open Term Bill, and reminded of the role of civil society during Malawi's democratic transition. Like donors, they particularly attacked the ban on demonstrations, calling for a broader and open debate (Ross, 2004). Muluzi's ban on demonstrations became a crucial issue in the term limit debate when the Roman Catholic Church in Malawi and the Law Society – a non-governmental association of legal experts – called on the High Court to produce a ruling concerning the ban (Mponda, 2002).

Opposition by civil society played an important role for the political calculus of the MPs of Malawi's parliament. That the role of the civil society as a voice of the interests of the people was a bone of contention during the discussion in Parliament indicates this. MPs arguing against the bill justified their opposition by stating that "it has been rejected by the entire civil society" (National Assembly, 2002, p. 32). Another MP argued that the civil society voiced the interests of the people and as such should be taken into consideration by the MPs:

We should be able to look after the interests of the people of Malawi. The whole country is listening. They have come to suggest. The civil society, Law Society of Malawi, the Churches and all the stakeholders have spoken. The Public Affairs Committee and all those that were in the initiation of this Constitution have come on to plead with us and everybody not to change the Constitution. [...]. We use our power wrongly and as a result we end up with wrong conceptions. (National Assembly, 2002, p. 49)

MPs in favour of the bill countered these arguments by arguing that the “clergy, academic, single issue NGOs and other un- elected leaders from civil society” have no “higher political entitlement in a democratic society than elected representative[s]” (National Assembly, 2002, p. 59). They stated that “there is danger and fear being instilled in the minds of the people of this country by some of the organisations” (National Assembly, 2002, p. 63), and further, that CSOs do not voice the popular preferences but “are targeting their pay master. The donors. And not the people of Malawi to give them more reason to fund them. Most of our NGOs are money driven” (National Assembly, 2002, p. 81). In conclusion, the extent to which the role of the civil society was discussed in Parliament testifies to the relevance its opposition had for many MPs.

Party fractionalisation and judiciary institutions Party fractionalisation actually played into Muluzi’s hand during this second phase. The slim margin by which the Open Term Bill failed speaks to the contingency with which complex social network dynamics infuse political processes. As noted, the Open Term Bill fell only three votes short of its necessary majority. Party coherence was forcibly upheld within the UDF, to ensure that all UDF MPs voted in favour (Von Doepp, 2019, p. 296). Additionally, a rigorous vote- buying campaign (personal interview 11) ensured fractionalisation of the two opposition parties. Heavy weight MPs of the opposition parties, Alliance for Democracy (AforD) and Malawi Congress Party (MCP), joined those who spoke out in favour of a removal of term limits despite earlier statements to the contrary (Mnela, 2002). That the Open Term Bill was moved as a Private Member’s Bill from an opposition party member (Mponda, 2002) and that its vote was only three votes short testify to how much Muluzi and the UDF had successfully coopted political opposition.

Just as in the first phase, the role played by judiciary institutions in the second phase emphasises the fragility of formal law in preventing democratic backsliding. After CSOs had called upon the High Court to rule on Muluzi’s ban of demonstrations, the High Court was not slow to react and judged the ban unconstitutional in early June (Agence France Press, 2002a). However, only two days later, the High Court threw out its initial ruling on the application of a Muluzi supporter, citing irregularities (IRIN, 2002b). These had manifested when the applicants for the initial injunction had demanded a new judge after the first judge, to whom they had presented their claims, had refused them. In either

case, this serves as an indicator for how easily the judiciary institutions of Malawi could be swayed at the time of Muluzi's term limit attempt.

4.3.3 The third term bill (July 2002–March 2003)

Despite the defeat of the Open Term Bill, UDF cadres already agreed in July to push Muluzi's third term bid through, with a revised bill that would increase the constitutional limit from two to three presidential terms (Dulani & Van Donge, 2005). From July to September, the political climate in Malawi turned more tense as political violence and intimidation was on the rise. A campaign of "political silencing" was initiated by the UDF, "whereby everyone who had stood up to advocate against the agenda [that is, the third term], would have been threatened, would have been beaten up" (personal interview 11). Much of the political violence and intimidation was perpetrated by the Young Democrats, a militant youth wing of the UDF. In August, they clashed with supporters of the NDA in Southern Malawi and attacked the NDA leader at a roadblock (Africa Research Bulletin, 2002d). In mid-September, Muluzi renewed the demonstrations ban, and the police oppressed anti-third term protesters, but spared protests by Muluzi supporters (US Department of State, 2003).

As political support for Muluzi further crumbled, a surprise ensued in October. The Third Term Bill had been officially gazetted on 6 September to be discussed at the next parliamentary session starting in October, but in a surprising move, Muluzi, in his opening speech, asked MPs to defer discussions on the bill (Agence France Press, 2002e). Eventually, the parliamentary session closed in the beginning of November without having tabled the Third Term Bill (Agence France Press, 2002g). After the parliamentary session, it was widely expected that the UDF was still busy buying political support and would rush the bill through in an emergency session (the Malawian Parliament meets regularly only twice a year) in December (Namingha, 2002). However, the expected emergency session did not take place during December. To the surprise of the political and civil society opposition, Muluzi eventually called an emergency session on 27 January (Mponda, 2003a). However, two days of heated debate proved that the bill could not garner enough support and was sent back for revision without a specified time frame to Parliament's Legal Affairs Committee (IRIN, 2003). In early March 2003, Muluzi began denouncing publicly that he ever wanted to run a third time for president and instructed the Young Democrats to stop political violence (Agence France Presse, 2003a). The defeat and failure of Muluzi's third term bid became final on 30 March, when he announced Bingu wa Mutharika as the sole UDF presidential candidate (Agence France Press, 2003b).

Conditionality instruments In the final phase of Muluzi's circumvention attempt, donor pressure became stronger due to better general joint coordination between donors. Because they had suspended their aid already, donor governments had not much to cut back on. However, they were able to exert indirect leverage through the IMF and the World Bank. Malawi had been in assessment with these since April, and bi-

lateral donors had announced they would make their own assessment dependent on these results (Gama, 2002). There were talks between the Muluzi government and the IMF and the World Bank in September, and according to Malawian media and opposition politicians, Muluzi stopped the discussion of the Third Term Bill in Parliament's October session because of these talks (Namingha, 2002; *The Chronicle*, 2002d).

Anticipation of international and bilateral donors' reactions played a more overt role in Parliament during discussions on the Third Term Bill than in the earlier discussions on the Open Term Bill. One MP outlined what role it played for his political calculus, clearly stating that he

was interested in the [TV news] yesterday when we were assured by the Resident Representative of the IMF that he will not interfere in any political aspirations [...]. Mr Speaker, Sir, with this fact, I stand with conviction that [the constitution] will be amended by having the two terms replaced by three terms. (National Assembly, 2003, p. 23)

Another MP favouring the Third Term Bill argued that "nobody, [...], outside this Honourable House should dictate on us what to do or on what to follow. Not even our donors. We are poor yes [...], but that should not mean that we can be dancing to their tune every now and then" (National Assembly, 2003, p. 22). Contrasting the earlier discussions on the Open Term Bill, a recurrent motive in the discussions on the Third Term Bill was the allegation that in fact Malawian opposition was behind donor conditionality. The opposition would "lie to donors and tell them not to give money because they want Malawi to go to dogs" (National Assembly, 2003, p. 37) and the opposition would be "assisted by people from outside [donors] by threatening people not to vote what they want to vote" (National Assembly, 2003, p. 38).

Aid conditionality also played a more overt role in the public debate during this final phase. Leading figures of Malawian public discourse, representatives of CSOs, as well as political analysts agreed in their judgement that Malawi's economy "will [...] be plunged into further turmoil with donors pulling out [...] should the third term bill be tabled and passed" (*The Chronicle*, 2003). Finally, statements of former UDF MPs, who feared that the passing of the Third Term Bill would halt aid and hence declared their opposition (IRIN, 2002d), provide another strong indication that aid conditionality played a role especially in the final phase of Muluzi's third term attempt. Thus, even if Muluzi had not factored donor responses into his own decision-making, it seems that this was at least one of the factors that exerted pressure upon the UDF's cohesion as a political party in the final phase.

Appropriateness instruments Just as during the Open Term Bill phase, bilateral country donors disapproved of Muluzi's course of action during the Third Term Bill phase. However, their statements were sharper this time and gave more explicit support to civil society actors protesting against Muluzi's term limit circumvention.

When Muluzi renewed his ban on demonstrations, donors reacted quickly after only one day with a statement. Jointly released by the EU, the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and Norway, it “strongly urge[d]” that the government followed a consultation process free of intimidation “in accordance with democratic principles,” noted with “regret” the rise in political violence and intimidation, and “encourage[d] all those involved in Malawi’s democratic development to play their part in curbing political violence and intimidation [...]” (Agence France Press, 2002c). However, such “appropriateness statements” worked not entirely in and of themselves, but implicitly drew on conditionality for impact. As one interviewee summarised: “From the comments that the donors were making – discouraging Parliament from going ahead assenting that [that is, the Third Term Bill] – you could read into them withdrawing their support” (personal interview 11).

Civil society, too, reacted more strongly. Under the leadership of the CCAP, numerous CSOs, NGOs, and FBOs, came together and formed the Forum for the Defence of the Constitution (FDC) (Dulani, 2011). Jointly they organised a massive demonstration on 1 November in Blantyre just as Parliament was finalising its October session. Despite police presence, Muluzi supporters clashed with the anti-third term protesters, and riot police dispersed the demonstration (Agence France Presse, 2002h). Demonstrations were also held during the course of January in Malawi’s major cities, particularly during the emergency session of Parliament in which it debated the Third Term Bill (Mponda, 2003b). Protests in this third and final phase were generally broader and referred to democratic norms and standards. Academia staff issued sharp statements against “anti- democracy forces” (The Chronicle, 2002c), and students marched in protest (Associated Press, 2003). Comments in the media demanded that “democracy needs to take place” (Makaniki, 2002), and Church organisations emphasised the harm a change of the term limit would do to political competition and called Muluzi a “dictator” (Mumia, 2002).

The increased activity by civil society clearly played a role for the MPs when they discussed the Third Term Bill. While the MPs were discussing the Third Term Bill during Parliament’s emergency sitting, they noted the large FDC demonstration against the Bill close to the parliament building. According to the House’s Hansard, the MPs acknowledged the FDC demonstration with “loud applause” (National Assembly, 2003, p. 50). According to their statements during the parliamentary discussion, many MPs thought that donors and Malawian CSOs influenced popular attitudes against the Third Term Bill considerably. Donors for instance went “into the village, collect all chiefs together [...] and tell them what they want to tell them, including material on the Third Term” (National Assembly, 2003, p. 36), and “churches are becoming partisans and taking side and incite people not to do that and do that” (National Assembly, 2003, p. 64). Of all parts of Malawian civil society, the MPs concerned themselves during their discussion especially with the role of religious organisations. The opposition of church organisations made many of the

MPs uncomfortable. MPs in their discussion contributions noted that representatives of civil society, especially of the church organisations, were attending the parliamentary session in the gallery stand, and that “they have come here because they feel concerned about this Bill” (National Assembly, 2003, p. 11). Another MP stated: “I don’t want us to appear to be against the church because we are part of the church and we are the church” (National Assembly, 2003, p. 69).

Muluzi responded to the increased pressure by lashing out towards donors and domestic civil society during rallies of his country tour for grassroots support (Mwase, 2002). In one instance, he stated that “donors should keep their money if they want to cause chaos and commotion by funding demonstrations” (Agence France Press, 2002d). Public announcements by opposition parties that they were now lobbying donor countries for support also signify that Muluzi lost considerable political support in the third phase (Namingha, 2002).

Party fractionalisation and judiciary institutions After the defeat of the Open Term Bill in July, Muluzi’s support within his own party as well as within the opposition parties crumbled. The loss of party support had already started in August, when a prominent founding member of the UDF resigned from the party (The Chronicle, 2002a). However, it accelerated in October, after pressure from domestic civil society and international partners had mounted in September. In early October, the UDF MPs formed an informal within-party group opposing Muluzi’s third term bid (Jamieson, 2002). When the FDC issued a statement against Muluzi’s circumvention attempt, a number of UDF MPs also signed it (Dulani & Van Donge, 2005). They were expelled from Parliament; at least ten more UDF MPs allegedly opposed the Third Term Bill but were too afraid to voice this publicly (IRIN, 2002d). In early October, a leading figure of the faction of the opposition party MCP, who had voted in favour of the Open Term Bill in July, changed tack and declared his opposition in public, citing the popular will (Jamieson, 2002).

Opposition to Muluzi’s third term attempt grew broader towards the end of its final phase, when top-ranking politicians, such as the Party Vice President and the State Vice President, attempted to convince him to back down (Matonga, 2016). Finally, during the emergency session in January 2003, scuffles disrupted the debate on the second day, indicating how much political support for Muluzi had eroded since July (IRIN, 2003).

The role of judiciary institutions during the third phase of Muluzi’s attempted term limit circumvention was somewhat less prominent than during the first two phases, but also more clearly against the course of Muluzi’s actions. An important action of the High Court in the third and final phase was its clear injunction against Muluzi’s ban on demonstrations as “unconstitutional and unreasonable” in late October (Agence France Press, 2002f). This was an important signal for civil society that

then started to ramp up protests and demonstrations. The court ruling propelled the FDC's decision to organise the massive demonstrations of early November (Associated Press, 2002c), and also cleared protest activity later. The High Court was also active in reinstating expelled MPs back to their parliamentary seats, which was important in ensuring that Parliament was not cleansed by third term-supporters. The internal rifts within the UDF as well as between the UDF and opposition parties remained until January, so that no majority on the Third Term Bill could be gained.

4.4 Discussion

The evidence gathered through process tracing shows that international actors played an important role within a "chain of causes" connecting all the investigated factors. Clearly, party fractionalisation was the proximate cause in this "chain of causes" that prevented Muluzi's term bid from success. However, the radical difference between the near passing of the Open Term Bill and the complete withdrawal of the Third Term Bill even before voting on it suggests that Muluzi had lost much political influence in between. More mediating factors must explain this proximate cause, and this is where the influence of international actors comes into play. First, the erosion of party support was at least partly due to donor conditionality. Second, to another extent, it was due to strong civil society opposition, which in turn was materially dependent and normatively supported by donors. This testifies to the mechanism of the logic of appropriateness. Third, while judiciary institutions had no proximate influence, through, for instance, vetoing the proposed constitutional amendments outright, they nonetheless played the mediate role of shielding opposing MPs from being expelled from Parliament and thus enabled further erosion of intra- and inter-party support.

There was not the one decisive factor that determined in a mechanistic fashion the outcome of Muluzi's attempted term limit circumvention. However, the analysis found evidence that international intervention, civil society opposition, and judiciary safeguarding were mediate and party fractionalisation proximate causes. Table 4.2 provides an overview of the assessment of the evidence that is discussed in more detail in appendix E.

The analysis finds that international donors played a role through both leverage based on the logic of conditionality and linkage based on the logic of appropriateness. However, what role did linkage with international donors play for civil society, and how exactly did international donors second and encourage their mobilisation? Interviews with Malawian civil society representatives suggest three ways in which the linkage with donors played out. First, donor funding was key in keeping CSOs operational. Several interviewees of local CSOs stated that the vast majority of their funding comes from donors (e.g. personal interviews 11; 1). This of course also applies for CSOs that are Malawian chapters of international NGOs and even applies for FBOs where one interviewee put the estimate of donor funding at 80 per cent to 90 per cent, even though FBOs can rely more on member funding

| CPO | Empirical result |
|---|------------------|
| Panel A | |
| Instruments of the logic of conditionality changed the cost–benefit perception of political elites | |
| A1 Did donors make credible threats of sanctions or withdraw aid with reference to Muluzi’s term limit circumvention? | Passed |
| A2 Did political elites opposing Muluzi’s third term refer to possible loss of aid? | Passed |
| A3 Did Muluzi publicly respond to donor pressure? | Passed |
| A4 Did party support fractionalise after donors made credible threats? | Partly passed |
| Panel B | |
| Instruments of the logic of appropriateness raised demands to act appropriate to democratic norms | |
| B1 Did donors condemn Muluzi’s term limit circumvention? | Passed |
| B2 Did donors support actors opposing Muluzi’s term limit Yes circumvention? | Passed |
| B3 Did actors opposing Muluzi’s term limit circumvention demand behaviour appropriate to Muluzi’s democratic role obligation? | Passed |
| B4 Did the political opposition publicly refer to or ask for donor support? | Passed |
| B5 Did donor- funded civil society mobilise against Muluzi’s term limit circumvention? | Passed |
| Panel C | |
| Party fractionalisation within and between parties eroded legislative majority | |
| C1 Did opposition and ruling party members voice decreasing support for Muluzi’s term limit circumvention? | Passed |
| C2 Did party members leave the ruling party? | Partly passed |
| C3 Did Muluzi and his supporters punish “party renegades”? | Partly passed |
| Panel D | |
| Strong judiciary institutions acted as veto players | |
| D1 Did judiciary institutions rule against legislative measures that had supported Muluzi’s term limit circumvention? | Partly passed |
| D2 Did Muluzi and his supporters try to disempower judiciary institutions? | Passed |

Table 4.2: Assessing the evidence. *Note:* CPO = causal process observation. *Source:* author.

than single-issue CSOs (personal interview 14). Much of this funding was supplied in the course of democracy assistance projects. Organisations that took over leading roles in the civil society opposition to Muluzi’s third term bid received such funding through, for instance, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)-coordinated Democracy Consolidation Programme (Scanteam, 2010). For CSOs, it was important that such funding was earmarked sufficiently broadly: “The funding was not entirely like ‘This is what you are supposed to do’, but they gave us funding to strengthen democracy. Then we could actually take it and apply it in our context” (personal interview 14). Such funding helped to pay costs for materials like poster, leaflets, and flyers, but also financed venues for meetings, conferences, and prayers during which FBOs spoke out against a third term. They also financed community awareness-raising and sensitisation, especially via the radio, as well as community consultation: “Their [donors’] funding is what helped us to go around and solicit the views of the people” (personal interview 14).

Second, but to a lesser extent, donors provided technical assistance and expertise to some CSOs that were particularly central like the PAC: “Apart

from that [funding], the technical assistance is also what helped to build the capacity of our people, for example to do research. [...]. Especially bodies like PAC received such help” (personal interview 14). Of course, technical assistance in the case of the third term debate was more limited than technical assistance in less politicised issues, and at times only came down to networking (personal interview 4) and advice: “We could have meetings with them [donors] and they would advise us on what steps we should take” (personal interview 11).

Third, through issuing statements and appeals, donors provided additional weight and shielding to civil society. Therefore, CSOs like PAC were proactively and publicly asking for donor support (The Chronicle, 2002b), as an interviewed civil society representative argued: “We were also soliciting the support of national and international partners just to add their voice. When donors are speaking [out] well, it actually gives more voice” (personal interview 11). In addition, from the perspective of CSOs, having ties and access to donors also “acts as a shield, it protects you” (personal interview 4). According to this rationale, knowing that organisations could report to donors, the government would refrain from actions against them that are too overt or violent.

In sum, although it is difficult to assess exactly what role democracy promotion based on linkage and the logic of appropriateness played, like public statements and civil society support through democracy assistance, there is evidence that it was important besides donor leverage. Linkage especially came in through democracy aid in the form of funding and technical assistance as well as by providing additional weight and “shielding” to civil society opposition. The extent to which the relation between donors and the Malawian civil society opposition was discussed in public media (e.g. Ligomeka & Kang’ombe, 2002) as well as by MPs attests to the importance that civil society had during the third term bid, and international support, in turn, had for civil society.

A brief look at other cases where term limit circumventions failed puts some restrictions on the result that donors are crucial in struggles over term limits. In many cases, donors did not play a large role. In Burkina Faso in 2014, donors did not take a strong stance and Compaoré’s bid was thwarted by newly emerged social movements instead (Moestrup, 2019). In Niger in 2009, international condemnation had little effect and former president Tandja was eventually ousted by the military (Baudais & Chauzal, 2011). In Nigeria in 2006, strategic interests in the region and the country overrode stronger reactions to Obasanjo’s term limit bid and, in the end, civil society and opposition parties played crucial roles (Gillies, 2007). However, there are some contrasting cases, too. First, in Zambia in 2001, pressure by civil society supported and encouraged by international donors was important in preventing Chiluba from running for a third term, although lack of party support played an important proximate role, too, as was the case in Malawi (Cheeseman, 2019). In the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2018, former president Kabila stepped down under the pressure of both social movements and international donors (Reyntjens, 2020). This comparison does not give cause for much enthusiasm. However, it also suggests that civil society, and especially less formalised social

movements, can act as focal points for popular protest and opposition, and the case of Malawi provides insight into how important support by international actors for these can be.

4.5 Conclusion

The support by external donors was important in championing the role of the Malawian CSOs as “bulwarks against presidential usurpation of power” (Dulani, 2011). A logic of appropriateness through linkage, especially via civil society support, assisted the internalisation and defence of democratic norms, attitudes, behaviour, and standards. In addition, the anticipation of a worsening relation with donors through leverage and instruments of the logic of conditionality changed the cost perception of political actors. For all the same, in a situation in which donors had already cut back much aid citing general mismanagement, support for domestic democratic actors proved to be crucial.

An important lesson emanating from this case study is that donors should not cut back on long-term instruments that function according to the logic of appropriateness. Supporting democratic actors in partner countries, such as democratic civil society and non-government organisations and associations, democratic parties, and the media, financially and rhetorically, in order to help disseminating democratic ideas, norms, attitudes, behaviour, and standards, plays an important role in defending and deepening democracy.

Finally, concerning the dynamics around struggles over term limits specifically and political reform in general, the analysis points to the need for more rigorous research on the social networks in which political action and decisions – the networks of civil society representatives and policymakers – emerge in order to fully discriminate between deep causal and proximate factors. In the case of Malawi, for instance, the analysis shows that eroding party support was only a proximate factor that was substantially increased by strong civil society opposition and a negative response from international donors. More micro- and meso-level analyses are needed for teasing out how and when international democracy promotion, domestic political, and civil society opposition interact with one another.

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Chapter 5

Foreign donors, domestic activists: Democracy promotion during Togo's constitutional reform crisis

Abstract Research on the promotion of democracy suggests that foreign donor states often do not wish to engage with those opposition actors that demand democracy most vehemently. In this chapter I, first, present a formal model on the risks and uncertainties that governmental and intergovernmental democracy supporters face in *ad hoc*-reform episodes in other countries. The model suggests that there are only narrow conditions under which democracy supporters will fully engage with democracy activists. I then investigate this conjecture in an inferential network analysis. The data used for the analysis describes a cooperation network (N=72) between foreign donor states and domestic political opposition parties, NGOs, and social movement organizations during Togo's constitutional reform crisis (2017-2019). The results suggest that democracy supporters were more likely to interact with each other than with domestic actors, and that multilateral democracy supporters, like international organizations, played a more central role than bilateral democracy supporters, like foreign governments. I further present qualitative interview data that illustrates the predicaments and uncertainties that democracy supporters were facing.

5.1 Introduction

Observers and scholars provide pessimistic assessments of the global state of democracy. Democracy is in decline in most parts of the world and the number and share of the world population that lives in authoritarian regimes is on the rise (Boese et al., 2022). The crisis of democracy and the surge of autocratization come despite that democracy is still demanded by peoples and supported

by democratic governments around the world. Surveys show that most people around the world actually do support democracy (Carothers, 2020). Besides this, people in many countries also prove that they are willing to risk their immediate well-being by putting their demand for democracy to the streets. From Venezuela to Hong Kong to Tunisia, people protest for democratic change.

Likewise, in response to surging autocratization many democratic governments as well as international organizations around the world renewed their pledges to promote democracy. US president Biden launched the 2021-Summit for Democracy and announced the Presidential Initiative for Democratic Renewal (US Department of State, 2022). Germany and the US jointly signed the Washington Declaration pledging to uphold democracy around the world (White House, 2021). For the UK democracy promotion is one way to be a “force for the good in the world” (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, 2021). Likewise, the United Nations (UN) claim democracy as their core value and to have “done more to support democracy around the world than any other global organization” (United Nations, 2022); and the EU launched the EU Action Plan for Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024 (European Commission, 2020).

Yet, this does not comprise a ‘U-turn’ in democracy promotion policy but rather a boost for the continuation of established efforts. International democracy promotion took off in the 1990s, when many democratic governments as well as international organizations around the world began promoting democracy through official development assistance (ODA) and related cooperation policies and programmes (Carothers, 2020). These have since seen steady and substantial growth. The financial volume of development cooperation programmes and projects officially designated as democracy support increased by almost one magnitude from about 4 to almost 30 billion US dollar between 1995 and 2020 (figure 5.1).

In light of this increase it would be consistent and plausible to expect that foreign donors that argue to promote democracy not only do so through their development cooperation policies and programmes as well as high-level initiatives, but also through more direct diplomatic support to pro-democratic activists during reform episodes in other countries.

If they did not, it would not be for want of requests. Pro-democracy activists often approach foreign governments and international organizations with requests for support and protection. For instance, when in 2015 in Thailand an activist student group faced legal prosecution on the count of a prohibited political gathering, the student activists turned to the UN and to the British embassy in Thailand for support and protection (Prachatai, 2015). During the pro-democratic anti-coup protests in Myanmar in 2021, demonstrators surrounded the US embassy and specifically called for intervention in their country’s affairs (Dutton, 2021). In both these cases, foreign actors responded to the activists’ calls although probably less fervently as protesters and activists had hoped for.

Indeed, many observers and scholars who study democracy and its promotion rather attest external actors a poor record when it comes to supporting




Figure 5.1: Democracy aid, 1995 to 2020 (in 2020-US dollar).

Shown are all ODA (Official Development Assistance) grants and loans as well as Other Official Flows (OOF) earmarked with purpose code 150 according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Creditor Reporting System (CRS). Author’s own compilation based on OECD (2022).

and defending pro-democratic protesters in other countries (e.g. Hahn-Fuhr & Worschech, 2014; van Cranenburgh, 2019; Youngs, 2015). A prominent scholar on democratization diagnosed on a panel during the International Studies Association Conference 2022 that

“There are many citizens in countries around the world that go to the streets to protest and for a long time they could count on the support of Western actors. This is changing, Western states are pulling out of the domestic arena now.”

Her fellow panellist agreed and stated that “the incentives for Western states to push for grass-roots movement democracy are just not there”²⁶. Likewise, Carothers (2015, 71) observes that despite the growth in democracy aid spending and high-level initiatives for democracy, “if a government cracks down on civil society aid from abroad, the diplomatic response from affected Western governments may be weak”, and consequentially diagnoses that “the ‘low policy’ of democracy support remains in place, but it often cannot count on the ‘high-policy’ side for backing when it matters”. Similarly, in a recent opinion piece Bouchet, Godfrey, and Youngs (2022) acknowledge that democracy supporters are becoming more creative in supporting and protecting pro-democracy actors in other countries through “workarounds”, including funding

²⁶ Authors’ personal notes. The respective scholars did in principle agree to be named but had no chance to see the draft version of this paper, yet. Therefore, the quotations remain anonymous for now.

through intermediaries and emergency relocations out of countries; yet, they also criticize that this is symptomatic for a less political and confrontational democracy support approach. It seems that there is a discrepancy between high-level democracy promotion pledges and the extent of democracy support funding on the one hand, and actual on-the-ground diplomatic support on the other hand. For the research literature on democracy promotion, this raises the challenge to shift focus from the macro-level of funding streams and high-level politics to on-the-ground interactions between democracy supporters and pro-democracy activists and parties.

I approach this issue by investigating the question to which extent democracy supporters, particularly bilateral and multilateral foreign donors, support and cooperate diplomatically with political and civil society opposition during democratic reform episodes in authoritarian countries. I extend insights on which conflicts of interests and uncertainties foreign donors face in democracy promotion to one rarely studied part of democracy promotion, namely '(pro-)democracy diplomacy'. Building upon this, I present a theoretic model of democracy diplomacy during reform episodes in authoritarian countries. The model suggests a pessimistic conjecture, namely that democracy supporters will typically not support pro-democratic civil society and political parties in authoritarian or competitively authoritarian contexts.

I then analyse the theoretically derived conjecture using original data on a support and collaboration network of civil society actors, political parties and international actors during Togo's constitutional reform crisis 2017 to 2019. The case of Togo is typical and representative for many authoritarian contexts around the world. The network analysis indicates that international democracy supporters indeed were rather unlikely to collaborate and support domestic civil society organizations and political parties. To illuminate the reasons for this, I present qualitative interview data gathered during semi-structured interviews with representatives of Togo's most important bilateral and multilateral democracy supporters. The results of the analysis seem not to refute the theoretical conjecture, but also show intriguing differences between actor-types of democracy support, particular between multilateral international organizations as democracy supporters and governmental democracy supporters. Nonetheless, they can only serve as the hypothesis-groundwork for more generalizable research.

5.2 Theory

The research literature defines democracy promotion as "any activities by external actors to enable internal actors to establish and develop democratic institutions that play according to democratic rules" (Grimm & Leininger, 2012, 396). Democracy promotion hence encompasses a wide array of actors and activities. Democracy supporters are either foreign governments or international intergovernmental organizations like the UN or the World Bank or regional organizations like the EU. Non-governmental actors also work as 'democracy support organizations' (DSOs) to promote democracy abroad. Prominent ones are for instance international NGOs like the Open Society Foundations, but

also political foundations that are more closely linked to political actors such as the German political party-foundations, the US-based National Democratic Institute, or the EU's European Endowment for Democracy.

Instruments of democracy promotion are similarly diverse as the set of democracy supporters. They are usually arranged from 'hard' instruments like foreign-imposed regime change by military intervention, through coercive instruments like economic sanctions and conditionalities to 'soft' instruments that necessitate consensual agreement between the sender state and the target state (Krasner & Weinstein, 2014). Foreign aid projects and programmes to strengthen democracy but also election monitoring and international treaties fall into this latter category which is often labelled 'democracy aid' or 'democracy support' (Carothers, 2015; Heinrich & Loftis, 2019). Although knowledge gaps still exist, democracy aid is probably the most researched of all the instruments along the democracy promotion spectrum. Findings show that democracy aid and the promotion of democracy through foreign policy and diplomatic interaction need to complement and amplify each other (Leininger & Nowack, 2022). However, the study of democracy promotion through means other than democracy aid is comparably thin. One reason for this might be the lack of sufficient and easily accessible data. For instance, large data sets on sanctions are rather rare, and data on diplomatic efforts and interactions, which often happen behind closed doors, are even rarer. In addition, and as a consequence, there is a conceptual void of what foreign policy and diplomatic efforts of democracy promotion are beyond international agreements, summitry, conditionalities and sanctions. Although terms like "(pro)democracy diplomacy" are used in the literature (e.g. Carothers, 2020), their definition and conceptualization are still existing *lacunae*.

Esposito and Gharavi (2011, 360) put forth the term 'transformational diplomacy' for describing diplomatic means to "transform, in whole or in part, elements of a foreign government's structure, policies, or laws". The term itself originates from a diplomatic initiative by former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice who defined the initiative's objective originally as "to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people - and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system" (US Department of State, 2006). The initiative entailed a repositioning, localization and regionalization of US embassy staff as well as a greater integration of foreign and development policy. Although Rice's 'transformational diplomacy'-initiative evidently started off as democracy promotion, and hence serves as an instance of democracy diplomacy, equating 'democracy diplomacy' with 'transformational diplomacy' would implicate democracy diplomacy with the political history of the Rice initiative which some argue has been a "coercive" (Esposito & Gharavi, 2011) endeavour.

Any conceptualization of democracy diplomacy will have to pay sufficient consideration to both scale and mode of what would be termed (pro)democracy diplomacy. Differences in scale juxtapose high-level diplomatic initiatives, like summit diplomacy, with what could be called 'frontline diplomacy'. 'Frontline diplomacy' is used by some scholars to describe the practice, work and context of 'day-to-day' diplomacy, for instance the working of embassy staff 'on the

ground' (Cooper & Cornut, 2019). Diplomats certainly are constrained by the agendas, guidelines, and policies of their foreign ministries. Nevertheless, they might still enjoy a great deal of autonomy in how they fulfil their diplomatic role, thus allowing leeway in the transfer of policies from the higher to the lower tiers of the diplomatic system. Accordingly, connected to issues of scale are issues of the mode of diplomacy. The autonomy from headquarters that embassy staff have means that while some may restraint their activities to fulfilling consular services, others may seek more active roles, for example in information gathering, or may engage in democracy diplomacy as public diplomacy in which an embassy proactively engages with a host country's population for instance via social media (Cooper & Cornut, 2019; Cornut, 2015).

A second dimension may be needed to describe the mode democracy diplomacy can take. Multi-track diplomacy describes the combination of official governmental diplomacy, as 'track one', with additional parallel consultations on 'track two', 'track three' and so on, that include other actor groups, for instance civil society organizations. Although typically employed in conflict-contexts as a format for mediation and dialogue, multi-track diplomacy may also be an important diplomacy mode during political crises (Dudouet, Es-haq, Basilaia, & Macharashvili, 2018). Other important differences in mode are whether diplomacy takes a direct form, that only includes consultation and persuasion, or a mixed form in which direct diplomacy is combined with instruments from other policy sectors, like economic sanctions or military threats. Because of the necessary discretion needed to engage in them, both these modes are more situated on high-level diplomacy rather than frontline diplomacy. In line of these reflections, 'democracy diplomacy' could be loosely defined as any diplomatic activities that enable actors of a host country to establish and preserve democratic institutions. Democracy diplomacy can be bilateral or multilateral high-level or frontline diplomacy, and may take various modes of operation, such as direct, mixed, public, or multi-track diplomacy.

The democracy promotion literature has identified two major constraints in the scope conditions of democracy promotion. These two major constraints can also be extended to democracy diplomacy as one form that democracy promotion takes. First, democracy supporters are confronted with conflicting objectives of various sorts. Second, depending on the respective target country at hand, democracy supporters may anticipate different forms of risk, or costs, of democracy promotion.

Conflicting objectives in democracy promotion mirror the general intrinsic and extrinsic dilemma of democracy (Grimm & Leininger, 2012; Wolff, 2014). In intrinsic conflicts of objectives, democracy supporters are forced to trade-off supporting and promoting different aspects or dimensions of democracy. For instance, although a decision in a partner country may be arrived at by democratic rules like a free and fair referendum, its result might still violate basic principles of democracy, like political competition. In contrast, in extrinsic conflicts of objectives promoting democracy may clash with other important interests of the respective democracy supporter. For instance, when the democracy supporter is a foreign donor-government, such conflicts can "emerge when

democratic decisions in a recipient country are perceived as negatively affecting donor interests” (Wolff, 2014, 77). A prime example might be that democratization in a partner country is likely to lead to a change in government and that the new government will follow policies that run against the democracy supporter’s foreign policy goals; or if the democracy supporter anticipates that democratization in a partner country and the political uncertainty coming with it will undermine stability in the region. Wolff and Spanger (2017) comparatively investigated a number of case studies to find out how foreign donors in their role as democracy supporters deal with conflicts between the norm to promote democracy and other policy interests. They observed among other things that the trade-off between interest and democracy promotion is positively biased towards other democracies and rests upon a defensive standpoint:

“the constraining effects of democracy-related norms are much stronger when interest-driven policies would suggest confronting a democratic government than they are when would-be democracy promoters have a strong interest in cooperating with an autocratic government”. (Wolff & Spanger, 2017, 101)

Although they conclude that democracy promotion need not always clash with other policy interests, when it does governments often enough relegate it to secondary importance.

Besides the predicaments democracy supporters face due to conflicting objectives, they can also be subject to costs. Many country contexts around the world are becoming increasingly hostile towards democracy support. It is in this regard central to realize that democracy supporters are only in an abstract sense external to a hostile country context. In a much more direct sense, the staff of democracy supporters find themselves fully within a hostile environment and face respective threats, or “risks” (Bouchet et al., 2022). Dodsworth and Cheeseman (2018) identify three different forms of such “risks”. Although their focus is on development cooperation generally and on ODA-allowable democracy aid specifically, two of the risk forms they identify help locating potential costs that democracy supporters also have to anticipate when engaging in democracy diplomacy.²⁷ First, institutional risks are internal according to the democracy supporter’s and her in-country partners’ perspectives. They include risks for operational security, e.g. that staff is harassed, threatened or attacked in retribution; financial risks, e.g. to facilitate corruption; reputational risks, e.g. to support inappropriate actors or to be cast as illegitimate foreign agents; and political risks, e.g. when the actor supported in fact pursues an adverse political cause. Second, besides these institutional risks democracy promoters face programmatic risks. These describe the negative consequences arising from ‘programme failure’, or in other words failure of the diplomatic intervention to achieve its objective, and from the potential harm arising from this. Failure could for example result from not identifying most relevant stakeholders or veto players, from exposing and de-legitimizing

²⁷The third risk form, “contextual risks”, describes adverse external developments that may affect democracy aid-programmes. It is excluded here as their character is very contingent (cf. table 1 of Dodsworth & Cheeseman, 2018). However, note that the model in section 5.2.1 takes context understood as regime context into account.

supported actors like civil society organizations, or from triggering or fuelling repression by the regime. It is important to note, that from the democracy supporter's perspective these costs do not automatically arise. Instead, the democracy supporter faces uncertainty about these costs, and this uncertainty depends on the type of authoritarian regime she is engaging in.

5.2.1 Model of democracy diplomacy

Conflicting objectives, institutional and programmatic risks and the uncertainty about those risks may provide important answers to why democracy supporters restrain themselves. However, so far these constraints have not been formalised into a model. This section will present such a model attempting to incorporate these insights. The model's aim is to formalize and thereby illustrate the predicament that democracy supporters face when having to decide to pursue democracy diplomacy during reform episodes in other countries. As a research contribution, the model summarizes already existing insights and it attempts to spell out their implications.

As argued in the previous section, the democracy promotion literature has identified major sources of uncertainty that democracy supporters are exposed to. First, they may have conflicting objectives. Second, they themselves or the actors they support may face institutional and programmatic risks that can be conceptualized as potential costs. Finally, related to these costs, is uncertainty about the type of regime that democracy supporters face. In order to capture all these forms of uncertainty, the democracy supporter's strategic situation can be modelled as a simple static Bayesian game with a terminal lottery. The structure of a Bayesian game can be used to model the uncertainty about costs and the type of the regime the democracy supporter operates in (Harsanyi, 1967; Tadelis, 2013), while a terminal lottery at the end of the game can capture the uncertainty about the (future) counterpart-government's political stability in case of a successful reform.

The model's setting is a reform episode. It begins with a push for a democratizing reform in a non-democratic country exerted either by domestic civil society, political opposition parties or international actors. The reform episode ends with the implementation or non-implementation of the reform. It is important to note, that the reform if implemented would 'open' the country to democracy, hence, would bring the political system 'closer' to democracy. However, it would not facilitate a complete democratic transition right away. The political science literature has realized that such incremental reform episodes, even if unintended, play an important role in democratization (e.g. Maerz, Edgell, Wilson, Hellmeier, & Lindberg, 2021; Treisman, 2020).

There are two players, the democracy supporter, i.e. player 1, and the regime, player 2. Crucially, while in this simple model there is only one type of democracy supporter, θ_1 , there are two different types of regimes, θ_2 , the democracy supporter may face. The first type of regime is a reformist regime, while the second type is an entrenched regime. Hence, there are two states of nature, $\theta_1\theta_2 \in \{DR_R, DR_E\}$ where D stands for the democracy supporter, R_R for the reformist regime, and R_E for the entrenched regime. As is the char-

acteristic of static Bayesian games, the type of player 2, the regime's type, is chosen by nature through a probability distribution p . The probability distribution is common knowledge to both players, but while the regime obviously knows its own type, the democracy supporter does not know which type of regime she faces.

Each player gains and loses utility in the extent to which they value the *status quo*, $SQ \in \{0, 1\}$, in comparison to a potential implementation of the reform, $R \in \{0, 1\}$. Crucially, however, they also gain utility or dis-utility from the regime's governmental political stability, $S \in \{0, 1\}$. In line with Dowding and Kimber (1983, 238), political stability is here defined as the "state in which a political object exists when it possesses the capacity to prevent contingencies from forcing its non-survival". With regard to the model setting, the relevant political object the stability of which both the regime as well as the democracy supporter is concerned with is the regime's government. The regime will want a government that is stable and predictable enough to be controlled in one way or another. The democracy supporter will want a stable and predictable regime government because it depends on the government's future cooperation regarding other policies, for instance foreign or security policy objectives. A predictable and stable government is a more reliable partner than a government whose composition is in constant flux due to political violence and unrest or factional strife for political power. Therefore, the democracy supporter's utility function is $U_D = S(SQ - \gamma) + RS(1 - SQ)$, in which γ ($\in \{0, 1\}$, $< SQ$)²⁸ are the costs and risks the democracy supporter may face conditional on her chosen action and whether the regime is of the reformist or entrenched type. The reformist regime's utility function is similarly structured as the democracy supporter's utility function with the difference that it obviously does not face risks or retribution costs, $U_{RR} = S(SQ) + RS(1 - SQ)$. The entrenched regime's utility function in contrast is $U_{RE} = SQ - R + \delta S$, in which δ ($0 < \delta < 1$) is the extent to which the entrenched regime is willing to discount political order by blocking the reform. The model's setting leads to three discrete outcomes, and the players' utility functions create rational preference relations over the outcomes for each of them. Table 5.1 presents a plausible parametrization of the players' utility functions and the resulting preference orderings.

Note that the democracy supporter and the reformist regime both share a preference for the introduction of the reform, however, not at the cost of giving up governmental political stability. It is exactly this preference mapping that differentiates the reformist regime from the entrenched regime. The reformist regime's preference for reform might, but need not be intrinsically motivated. For instance, it could be that a reformist faction within the regime supports the reform, but it could also be the case that domestic or external pressure has become so strong that the reformist regime regards the reform as conditional for its survival. Treisman (2020) notes many cases that fit either setting. Contrary to the reformist regime, the entrenched regime favours the *status quo* and is willing to accept a certain amount of domestic unrest and/or foreign

²⁸Setting $\gamma < SQ$ ensures that the democracy supporter in principle and irrespective of the strategic setting is willing to bear costs in order to promote democracy, i.e. her preference relation does not change.

| Player | Utility function & parametrization | Preference relation |
|---|---|---------------------|
| D | $U_D = S(SQ - \gamma) + RS(1 - SQ)$ $SQ = .3, \gamma = .1$ | $A \succ B \succ C$ |
| R_R | $U_{RR} = S(SQ) + RS(1 - SQ)$ $SQ = .4$ | $A \succ B \succ C$ |
| R_E | $U_{ER} = SQ - R + \delta S$ $SQ = 1, \delta = .3$ | $B \succ A \succ C$ |
| Outcomes: A: Reform is implemented ($R = 1$), government is politically stable ($S = 1$) B: Reform is not implemented ($R = 0$), government is politically stable ($S = 1$) C: Reform is implemented ($R = 1$), government is politically unstable ($S = 0$) | | |

Table 5.1: Players' utility functions and preference relations.

pressure for resisting to introduce the reform.

Each player can choose from an action set with two actions. The democracy supporter can choose to *support* the civil society or political opposition that calls for the political reform, or to *de-escalate*. Support would include that she engages in some form of democracy diplomacy that bolsters the opposition actors from civil society and the political opposition parties that demand political reform. Such support could happen through official support statements and officially or unofficially pressuring the regime, but also through meeting opposition parties and protesters and advising them or potentially facilitating networking between them. *De-escalate* in contrast would mean that the democracy supporter does not engage in democracy diplomacy, for instance presents itself as rather neutral, does not engage with non-state actors and at the utmost states that political conflict needs to stay within non-violent boundaries as prescribed by international law. With regard to the regime player, both types of regimes can choose from the same action set. They can either *consent* or *block* the reform.

Figure 5.2 presents the structure of the game with the parametrization presented in table 5.1. It is important to note that this is a simultaneous game and that the structure serves only to illustrate the information imbalances and uncertainty inherent in the strategic setting. A few aspects are worthwhile to be emphasized. First, the democracy supporter has one information set discriminating between whether she faces a reformist (p) or entrenched regime ($1 - p$). Although she knows p she will not know at which node of here information set she is. Although democracy supporters typically have some information about the regime they work in, information about the inner workings and the factional strife within a regime may be hard to get at and if it can be gathered it comes with uncertainty itself: How strong is the reformist wing within the regime's ruling party? Does the military side with the ruling party? What if there are different factions within the military? To which side do paramilitary organizations lean? These are only a few of the uncertainties a democracy supporter faces when assessing the opposing regime. Therefore, a democracy supporter can never be absolutely sure whether she faces a reformist regime




Figure 5.2: Structure of the model of democracy diplomacy.

or an entrenched regime.

Second, if the regime-player has chosen to *consent*, government stability will ensue only with probability q . This is not the case if the regime chooses to block the reform, as there will be no reform of political institutions and no opportunity for the redistribution of political power.²⁹ Importantly, the democracy supporter's action influences the probability for government instability after reform by a value of α ($0 < \alpha < 1$). If she chooses to support the civil society and political opposition in their strife for political reform, she lowers the probability for government stability as her support will further empower those opposition actors to which the regime had to cede political power when consenting to the reform. The re-distribution of political power between the regime and the opposition may destabilize government, for instance by making a change in government more likely. If such a change occurs, it will not be necessarily the case that a stable government emerges as political parties and actors that now enjoy a greater access to political power may lack unity and compete with each other. Additionally, receiving support from and thereby being empowered by foreign democracy supporters may also delegitimize both the supported actors as well as the reform project itself (Dodsworth & Cheeseman, 2018). It is plausible to assume that both players do not regard the democracy supporter's influence on the likelihood of governmental political stability after reform very large. Hence, assuming that the democracy supporter's *support*-strategy reduces the probability for governmental political stability by a factor of $\frac{4}{5}$ is conservative.

Solving the model for pure-strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibria shows that *de-escalate* is the democracy supporter's dominant strategy for different values of q (figure 5.3). Likewise, to *block* the reform is the entrenched regime's

²⁹Note, however, that this does not mean that mobilization and demands for the reform may wane. Rather, ongoing and increased political unrest due to the blocking of the reform can be modelled as a repetition of the game.




Figure 5.3: Equilibrium strategies of players for different values of q ($\alpha = \frac{4}{5}$, $p = \frac{1}{2}$).

dominant strategy. In contrast to that, the reformist regime’s equilibrium strategy shifts with the values of q . If the likelihood for governmental political stability remains under a critical threshold, the reformist regime will block the reform. Above the threshold it will consent to the reform provided the democracy supporter *de-escalates*. Eventually, if $q > \frac{1}{2}$ the reformist regime will always consent, irrespective of the democracy supporter’s action.³⁰

Three reasons compel the democracy supporter to play *de-escalate*. First and foremost, by supporting the opposition actors who demand the reform she actively intervenes in domestic politics and lowers the chances for a endogenously emerged, politically stable outcome after the reform. Therefore, she chooses *de-escalate* even when the reformist regime will consent to the reform irrespective of the democracy supporter’s strategy, i.e. when $q > 0.5$. Second, by choosing *de-escalate* she enlarges the window-of-consent, that is the range of q in which the reformist regime consents to the reform. Finally, by choosing *de-escalate*, the democracy supporter foregoes the retribution costs she may encounter if the regime is indeed an entrenched regime. It needs to be emphasized that this latter reason does not reflect selfishness, but that the regime’s retribution costs may also fall upon the domestic actors supported by the democracy supporter (Bob, 2002; Chen & Moss, 2018).

The conjecture that follows from the model is that democracy supporters rather confine themselves to observing and conciliating than attempt to play an active role among those domestic political actors that demand a pro-democratic reform. They will have a low probability of supportive and collaborative interactions with civil society groups and political parties of the opposition, and will not occupy central positions within the network of domestic actors pushing for reform.

However, it is important to note a few of the model’s most important *caveats*. First, the model is predicated on the assumption that democracy supporters and the regime judge the probability for governmental political stability lower when democracy supporters play a more active, central role in supporting reform demands. When reversing this assumption, i.e. discounting

³⁰These equilibrium strategies also emerge for different values of α although at different values of q .

the probability for governmental political instability when the democracy supporter not chooses *support*, but when she chooses *de-escalate*, alters the model results. Instead of an equilibrium in which the democracy supporter plays *de-escalate* and the regime plays *consent-block*, a new equilibrium emerges in which the democracy supporter plays *support* conditionally on p and q (while the regime's play remains the same). However, the α parameter as well as q do not reflect any empirically 'true' phenomenon, but rather the judgements of the model's players. Against this, it is more plausible to assume that both the democracy supporter and the regime judge the democracy supporter's intervention to exert an exogenous, de-stabilizing influence.

Second, unlike with regard to the type of regime-player, the model does not differentiate between types of democracy supporters. Scholars observe different approaches to democracy promotion. For instance, the US approach to democracy promotion is often regarded more political in that its democracy aid programmes and projects sometimes buttress pro-democratic actors involved in a political struggle and that democracy promotion is also more explicitly a part of US foreign policy. In contrast, Germany's approach to democracy promotion is largely regarded as apolitical or "developmental" (Carothers, 2009). Likewise not only does the model not distinguish between different 'styles' of democracy promotion, it also does not account for the large organizational diversity among them. It instead treats bilateral, multilateral and non-governmental democracy supporters the same, although there may be good reasons not to do so.

Third, the model treats democracy supporters as unitary, 'black-boxed' actors which is an abstraction from reality. In reality, while the embassy of a bilateral foreign donor might be cautiously conciliating between the regime and political opposition, another actor closely linked to the foreign donor government, such as a political foundation or a development cooperation agency, might financially or non-financially support opposition groups.

Finally, the model does not include the civil society and political party opposition as actors themselves. This is important as the democracy supporter might find support of some particular civil society actors or some particular political parties more accessible and beneficial. For instance, well established political opposition parties might have a better reputation than recently established political opposition parties. Likewise, a formally organized civil society organization with a representative is more accessible than an amorphous social movement that may even have multiple factions and hence multiple spokespersons. Such differences demand a different model-type altogether, for instance a cooperative game theory model of network formation. However, the model presented here nonetheless helps to reason through and explain the strategic rationale and predicament that democracy supporters like foreign bilateral donors, multilateral organizations or non-governmental organizations face when considering their course of action during reform episodes in target countries.

5.3 Empirical analysis

The theoretical model presented in the previous section suggests the conjecture that in contexts characterized by uncertainty democracy supporters do not support and engage with those political actors that demand political reforms in favour of democracy most strongly. In order to explore and evaluate the theoretically derived conjecture, this section presents data of a collaboration- and support-network of civil society organizations, political parties, and foreign actors during a constitutional reform episode in Togo in 2017 to 2019.

5.3.1 Selected case: Togo's constitutional reform crisis (August 2017 - May 2019)

Togo represents a typical case of a former closed autocracy that has transitioned to a competitive authoritarian regime (Levitsky & Way, 2002). As such, it is representative for a large class of political systems that pose current challenges to democracy promotion (Hyde, 2020). During the Cold War, Togo has been ruled as a personalist one-party autocracy built around the former military Coup d'Etat leader Gnassingbé Eyadema. In his rule as an autocrat, Eyadema relied upon the loyalty of the military which he stacked with members of his own Northern ethnicity (Morency-Laflamme, 2018). The collapse of the Soviet Union and the accompanied wave of democratization triggered pushes for democratic reforms also in Togo. After initial concessions such as the reintroduction of a multiparty-system, however, the autocratic regime violently suppressed and reversed democratization. When Gnassingbé Eyadema surprisingly died in 2005, his son Faure Gnassingbé quickly assumed power in a legal coup, relying on the same personalized power networks and the backing of the army as his father had done (Osei, 2018). However, international and domestic pressure forced a gradual democratic opening of the regime that resulted in a Global Political Accord (GPA) in 2006 and subsequently in the first parliamentary elections for decades in 2007. Further substantial democratization of Togo's political system has stalled however. Presidential and parliamentary elections, as well as local elections in 2019, the first for decades, take place, but are often marred by irregularities and allegations of manipulation. Political and civil society opposition exists only in the regime's shadow. Political opponents, civil society activists and the media have to endure both legal as well as extra-legal persecution and harassment (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2022). Togo thus belongs to the large class of hybrid regimes caught in the transition from closed autocracies to minimum and basic democracy, variously called electoral autocracies (Boese et al., 2022), contested autocracies (Van de Walle, 2002) or competitive authoritarian (Levitsky & Way, 2002). An important defining feature particular to Togo, however, is the regime's strong reliance on elite networks of personalized power. Faure Gnassingbé cannot count on a cult of personification to the same degree as his father did before him. Instead his autocratic regime relies more on promoting persons close and loyal to him, both relatives and non-relatives, to powerful and influential positions re-creating and sustaining an elite captured limited-access order (North, Wallis, & Weingast, 2009; Osei & Wigmore-Shepherd, 2022).

The constitutional reform crisis of 2017 to 2019 is the most recent bout in challenging this limited-access order. The demand to reform the constitution to again include a presidential term limit took centre stage during the crisis. A presidential two-term limit had been introduced to Togo's constitution during the aborted transition to democracy in the 1990s, but had then later been scraped by Gnassingbé Eyadema in 2002 (Heilbrunn, 2019). By 2017, however, presidential term limits had evolved as an important focal point for political change in West Africa. After repeated struggles around the issue of presidential term limits, Burkina Faso's long-term ruler had been forced from office in 2014. This led to emulated attempts by political and civil society opposition in Togo where a bill to re-institute term limits had been introduced but defeated due to the ruling party's parliamentary majority the same year (Ahlin, Dionne, & Roberts, 2015). Months later Faure Gnassingbé was re-elected for a third time in the 2015-presidential elections. Yet, presidential term limits had proliferated as a tentative, unstable norm among West African countries. This went so far even that the members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) discussed instituting presidential term limits as an obligatory rule, a motion that failed due to The Gambia's and Togo's opposition (BBC, 2015). The demand for term limits in Togo was hence poised to re-emerge. Togo's constitutional reform crisis was eventually sparked in 2017 when an hitherto less noticed opposition party, the Pan-African National Party (PNP), led by a charismatic party leader organized large street protests. The Northern part of Togo was initially the origin of the protests which then however quickly spread to other parts of the country. This resulted in the formation of a large unified front of civil society organizations and political opposition parties (C14) in the run-up to the next legislative elections in late-2018. The opposition demanded a return to Togo's 1992-constitution that included a presidential term limit that, in its strong phrasing, would have applied retroactively and barred Faure Gnassingbé from running for president once more. The regime responded to the opposition protests with violent repression by security forces causing several deaths that fuelled further protests (CIVICUS, 2018). To address the unstable situation, ECOWAS tasked the presidents of Guinea and Ghana as facilitators for a mediated negotiation between the regime and the political and civil society opposition which led to an agreed-upon roadmap for constitutional reform, including the re-instatement of a presidential two terms-limit (ECOWAS, 2018). However, distrusting the electoral process, the major political opposition parties decided to boycott the upcoming legislative elections, a decision that resulted in a National Assembly overwhelmingly dominated by the regime's ruling party, the Union Pour la République (UNIR). Thus, in May 2019, with only a few minor opposition parties represented in Parliament, the regime easily introduced a minimum constitutional reform that included a presidential two terms-limit that would not apply retroactively and allow Faure Gnassingbé to run as presidential candidate until 2030.

Several factors render Togo and its constitutional reform crisis from 2017-2019 a typical and representative case for the predicaments that democracy supporters face. First, as an electoral autocracy, Togo represents a large share of currently existing political systems relevant to democracy promotion. Sec-

ond, like many countries of the global South, Togo is highly aid dependent. Its five largest donors, in Togo commonly known as the G5, are the US, the United Nations (UN, in country officially represented by United Nations Development Programme [UNDP]), the UK and its former colonial powers France and Germany. Third, while Togo is highly aid dependent, within the West African region it is nonetheless also an important strategic partner for foreign governments. Islamist terrorism and banditry pose a security threat in the Northern part of the West African region (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2022). Likewise, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has the potential to disturb global container shipping (European Union External Action Service, 2021). Togo is involved in multiple regional fora concerning economic integration and security cooperation (Gnanguenon, 2020). Therefore, while it is aid-dependent, as an important security partner in the region Togo's regime also has some leverage over its donors.

5.3.2 Data collection

Data on support- and collaboration ties were collected in Togo in November and December 2019. Prior to the field research, a desk research using web-based media databases was undertaken in order to identify a first set of actors, i.e. international and national civil society organizations, political parties, international organizations and agencies, and governmental bilateral foreign donors, who were important and relevant during Togo's reform episode. During the research trip qualitative interviews were conducted with representatives of the first set of actors, and from there on respondent-driven snowball sampling was used to identify and saturate the entire support- and collaboration network. In total, network data of 81 national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations (CSOs), social movement organizations (SMOs), foreign embassies and representations of international and regional organizations were collected.

Almost all actors that protested and demanded democratic change during Togo's reform crisis were civil society actors. An actor-centred understanding of civil society, like a structure-centred understanding of civil society as an intermediary civic space, too, however, comprises a diverse set of actors. As Carothers and Barndt (1999, 19) note, "properly understood, civil society is a broader concept, encompassing all the organizations and associations that exist outside of the state (including political parties) and the market". I adopt Carothers' and Barndt's broad definition of civil society here, which still necessitates clarifying how and why each organization interviewed during data collection was classified as it is eventually presented here. First, during each interview, interviewees were asked as what type of organization their respective organization sees itself. Second, this was then checked against pre-defined classification criteria. According to these, political parties are all those organizations that in the past used to take part in Togolese political elections.³¹ Concerning domestic actors, organizations that in their main activities were implementing and carrying out issue- and topic-based projects, often within the

³¹'Usually' here is owed to the fact that many of the opposition parties in Togo as described earlier had boycotted the last legislative elections.

context of development cooperation, classified as NGOs. Organizations who mainly worked as non-implementing advocacy organizations, such as labour unions, or whose essential objective were more directly purely associational, such as faith-based organizations, classified as CSOs. Organizations with a decidedly less organizational structure who stated as their main goal to coordinate collective action in order to contest the political *status quo* classified as social movement organizations. Conflicts between actors' self-portrayal and the pre-defined criteria emerged only in a limited number of cases (<5). These most often arose due to either vague distinctions between the definitions of non-governmental organizations and civil society organizations, or because organizations would play double-roles, for instance when a NGO plays a central role in a social movement. Decisions on whether to give the self-portrayal or the pre-defined criteria decisive weight in solving these conflicts were cross-checked with an assisting Togolese researcher. Concerning foreign actors, while classifying their organizational type posed fewer difficulties as compared to domestic actors, identifying them as democracy supporters necessitated careful assessment. In this regard, actors that expressed pro-democratic objectives publicly, i.e. on official webpages, documents or in public statements, were classified as democracy supporters.

The data was collected by using a hybrid of fixed lists and name generator-lists. At the end of each qualitative interview, an electronic tablet was handed over to the interviewees. On the tablet, interviewees could mark names of respective actors, e.g. 'organization x', 'embassy y' and so on, by 'ticking them off'. Each interviewee was presented with three different lists: one containing non-governmental organizations and other civil society actors, one containing domestic political parties, and one containing international organizations and foreign states. Interviewees filled out these lists privately, but with the researchers present in the room in case of questions. At the end of each list, interviewees were asked and encouraged to name and write down additional actors that they had interacted with in an open form-field at the bottom of the list. Actors that interviewees newly named were added to the list for all subsequent interviews. The initial set of actors on the list had been identified through desk research before the commencement of field research. For the lists of political parties and civil society actors, interviewees had the option to specify six different interactions. For the list of international and regional organizations and bilateral foreign donor states, interviewees could specify five different interactions³².

5.3.3 Network analysis

The collected data sheds light on the characteristics of collaboration and support relations between domestic and foreign actors during political reform episodes. To the author's best knowledge, such data focusing on a network of domestic and foreign organizations engaged in democratic reform has not been collected before. The data thus provides a unique insight on a specific kind of inter-organizational networks, that is networks of organizations en-

³²See table F.1 for the types of support and collaboration ties that interviewees could specify.

gaged in democratization. On the same token, this limits the extent to which the data is comparable to that already collected for other inter-organizational networks.




Figure 5.4: Collaboration and support network of Togo's domestic civil society and foreign actors during the constitutional reform crisis, August 2017 to May 2019. Panel (a): Node colors represent different organizational actor-types. Panel (b): Node Colors represent membership in respective k-shell. Node size is scaled according to degree in both panels. Edges are present if at least one node unilaterally reported a tie. Edge width represents an ordinal tie strength (1 = 'occasional exchange/non-financial support', 2 = 'frequent exchange/financial support', 3 = 'close cooperation/financial and non-financial support').

The data exposes some interesting characteristics of the collaboration and support interactions among domestic and foreign organizations (figure 5.4, panel A). Compared to inter-organizational networks on global level (e.g. Murdie, 2014), interactions between organizations were rather dense as 15 per cent of all network ties in the overall network were realised³³. This is in line with comparable domestic policy networks (e.g. Heaney, 2014; Luke et al., 2010). Likewise, collaboration and support between organizations in the Togolese case was tightly integrated. With an average shortest path (i.e. geodesic) for the overall network of 2.18 and a longest shortest path of 5, any two organizations of the network were connected to each other on average by only one and at maximum by four other organizations. The network correspondingly exhibits a thinly tailed degree distribution with a mean degree of 11, a low heterogeneity parameter of 1.9 and slight degree disassortativity (see figure F.1 in the

³³Networks tend to be very sparse. Murdie (2014, 16) for instance finds a density parameter of .0028 for a global network of Human Rights advocacy organizations. Densities of most other kinds of networks are in the same range (Menczer, Fortunato, & Davis, 2020, 21).

appendix for the network's cumulative degree distribution)³⁴. In other words, the number of interactions per each organization was not broadly distributed across the entire network. Rather, most organizations had similarly many collaboration ties as all other organizations, and only very few organizations were exceptionally well-connected and dominated (parts of) the network as prominent hubs.

In spite of this seemingly heterogeneous integration, the network shows a clustering and core-periphery structure that is distinctive of inter-organizational networks (Heaney, 2014; Held, Hawe, Roberts, Conte, & Riley, 2021). A relatively high clustering coefficient of .61 illustrates that more than half of all triads, i.e. 'triangle-interactions' that the organizations in the network could have formed, did actually materialise. Much of this clustering took place in the network's inner core consisting of the yellow-coloured nodes in figure 5.4, panel (b) where the network's density is greatest.³⁵ Compared to the network's overall density, the core's density is almost five times greater. Seventy-one per cent of all theoretically possible ties within the network's core were realized. As figure 5.4 shows, the network's core consisted mostly of domestic Togolese organizations, particularly political opposition parties, NGOs as well a social movement organizations (SMOs). However, three foreign actors also belonged to the network's core, two of which were democracy-promoting multilateral intergovernmental organizations. The remaining democracy-supporting actors who were all either foreign governments or non-governmental organizations belonged to the network's more peripheral shells, i.e. layers.

To explore the role that democracy supporters played for Togo's domestic civil society it is worthwhile to look into centrality measures. Centrality is a graph-theoretical concept that aims at quantifying the importance and influence of nodes in a network. The greater a node's score on a given centrality measure, the more influential and/or integrated is that node in the network (Das, Samanta, & Pal, 2018). The many different centrality measures that have been developed over the years often correlate closely. Degree, betweenness and eigenvector centrality, however, are among the most common and useful centrality measures (Oldham et al., 2019).

Degree centrality is a simple measure of centrality as the number of degrees, i.e. ties, of a node. It provides insight into how well the node is integrated into the overall network structure (Freeman, 1978).

Betweenness centrality is a measure of how many shortest paths traverse a given node. In contrast to degree centrality, betweenness centrality is a measure for the node's importance concerning the flow of some quantities through the network, for instance information (Freeman, 1978).

Eigenvector centrality is an enhanced measure of degree centrality based

³⁴A node's, here organization's, degree is its number of ties to other nodes.

³⁵The network's core is identified through *k-core* decomposition. *K-core* decomposition defines *k* subsets of the network's nodes such that every node in the respective subset has at least *k* ties to other nodes. As a result, the different *k* subsets surround the network's core as layers, so called *k-shells*. Core decomposition is one of the two major methods to identify and analyse the core-periphery structure of networks (Gallagher, Young, & Welles, 2021).

on the eigenvectors of a network in matrix form. In contrast to degree centrality, eigenvector centrality also takes into account to which extent a given node is connected to other nodes with high degree (Bonacich, 2007).

When comparing the centrality of different democracy supporting actors with each other as well as with domestic actors in the Togolese network, interesting variations can be observed (figure 5.5). Democracy supporting actors did not score particularly high on either centrality measure in overall comparison, but multilateral democracy supporters scored systematically higher than governmental and non-governmental democracy supporters.³⁶ Multilateral democracy supporters ranked among the highest nodes when comparing degree centrality within the network (panel a). Particularly in regard to betweenness centrality, multilateral democracy supporters were at least as central as some of the most central domestic political opposition parties (panel b). However, eigenvector centrality scores qualify these findings (panel c). They show that all types of democracy supporters, or generally foreign actors for that matter, ranked low with regard to their connectedness to other central and, hence, important and influential organizations. Despite this, multilateral democracy supporters still ranked higher than all other foreign actors. This is consistent with the position of multilateral democracy supporters in the network's inner core (figure 5.4).

To further explore the conjecture that democracy supporters were unlikely to engage with Togo's civil society extensively, it is possible to model the probability to observe ties between foreign democracy supporting actors and domestic actors. A widely applied approach for modeling the probability of ties in networks is to specify an exponential random graph model, known as ERGM (Cranmer et al., 2017). ERGMs essentially model the probability of the empirically observed network among all possible network configurations with the same number of network nodes. In contrast to other regression models, ERGMs take endogenous network-structures into account and thus account for structural non-independence of observations. ERGMs can be understood as an augmented logistic regression for network data in which the dependent outcome variable is the probability of tie formation within networks. Indeed, ERGMs reduce to logistic regression if network-structural statistics, such as the extent of transitivity within a network, is not accounted for in model specification (Wassermann & Pattison, 1996). Besides allowing the specification of network-structural predictors, relational variables, i.e. dyad-specific variables in which an already existing tie in another network predicts a tie in the network under study, as well as node-specific variables can also be included as covariates. This makes it possible to investigate more intricate patterns of interaction between actors of a network.

A much studied pattern of interaction in human and humanly devised net-

³⁶The boxplots in figure 5.5 also display the large variation and data scarcity that underlie this observation. However, note that the low-scoring multilateral democracy supporter is ECOWAS, which is conventionally not regarded as a 'traditional' democracy supporter *per se*.




Figure 5.5: Centrality scores by actor-type. DS = 'Democracy supporter'.

works is known as *homophily*, or more technically as *assortative mixing*.³⁷ Homophily describes the phenomenon that humans are more likely to form ties with other humans that are, according to one or more specific characteristics, self-similar, a phenomenon sometimes also called preferential attachment. This is particular true for individual-level, intimate relations between humans. Concerning organizational-level relations, it seems that at least in firm-to-firm networks ties between dissimilar-others are more often the norm (Rivera et al., 2010). From an economic perspective, such diversity in the connections between firms makes much sense. Patterns of homophilous-heterophilous mixing between organizations in political networks is unfortunately less researched and the research that does exist suggests that the mixing patterns are more complex (Victor et al., 2017). Research by Heaney (2014) on advocacy and interest group lobbying for instance does not find clear homophily or heterophily with respect to multiple characteristics among organizations. Luke (2010) researching NGO-lobbying for tobacco control policies comes to similar conclusions.

Results of an ERGM for the network of domestic and foreign actors during Togo's constitutional reform crisis show that there was homophily among foreign democracy supporters and that they had a lower probability to interact

³⁷*Homophily*, and its antonym *heterophily* are widely used in the sociological network literature, but also become more prominent in the political science literature concerned with networks (Rivera, Soderstrom, & Uzzi, 2010; Victor, Montgomery, & Lubell, 2017). *Assortative mixing* and its antonym *disassortative mixing* are used as technical terms in graph theory (Newman, 2003).

with others in the network compared to all other organizations (table 5.2). The baseline ERG model in table 5.2 estimates only network-structural predictors, i.e. the number of ties within the network, its core-periphery structure, and the network's extent of transitivity. Model one adds a relational covariate to the model specification. *Importance* takes on a value of 'one' if at least one of the organizations in a dyad perceived the other organization as an important actor within the network and throughout the reform episode. Unsurprisingly, the odds of collaboration or support were substantially larger (by 40 to 46 per cent) if one of the organizations was perceived as an important actor. However, note first, that the statistical uncertainty of this estimate increases in models two to four (i.e. the significance level lowers to less than .1), and second, the causality might as well run the other way around such that organizations were simply more likely to describe their collaborating and supporting partner organizations as more important.

Models two to four are more informative with regard to the conjecture that democracy supporting actors were unlikely to thoroughly interact supportively with domestic civil society. Model two investigates democracy supporters' so-called uniform homophily and heterophily in the network. Uniform homophily, or heterophily respectively, are terms to delineate mixing patterns over an entire class of nodes that share a particular characteristic. Differential homophily, or heterophily, in contrast differentiates a class further into sub-categories. In general, the odds for a tie between two democracy supporters is about five to six times greater than the odds for a tie between any other actors (coefficient A1 in table 5.2). Similarly, there is a decrease of 43 per cent in the odds for a tie between two actors if one of the actors is a democracy supporter (B1).³⁸ Model three provides a more detailed look into these patterns by investigating differential heterophily of democracy supporters. Network ties in which one of the dyad-partners is a governmental or multilateral democracy supporter have substantially lower odds than ties in which neither dyad-partner is a democracy supporter. However, note that this is not statistically significant for governmental democracy supporters. No such decrease in odds is found with regard to non-governmental democracy supporters, but the coefficient's estimation is highly uncertain (i.e. insignificant). This uncertainty is very likely due to the low number of non-governmental actors (as well as ties involving them) in the network data (see figure 5.4). Final model four looks into differential homophily of democracy supporters while retaining the model terms for heterophily.³⁹ Although homophily is common among all types of democracy supporters, it seems most pronounced among governmental democracy supporters. The odds for ties exclusively shared by democracy supporting foreign governments are greater than the odds for ties between any other domestic or foreign actors by a factor of sixty two. In comparison, the odds for ties exclusively

³⁸Note that homophily does not necessarily preclude heterophily. It is theoretically possible that an organization forms many ties with self-similar others as well as with self-dissimilar others.

³⁹As the number of multilateral and non-governmental democracy supporters in the network is quite low, the model would not converge properly when differentiating for homophily between all types of democracy supporters. Hence, they were specified as a joint category in model four.

| | Baseline model | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
|------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| Structural predictors | | | | | |
| Edges | 0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) |
| k-core | 1.43*** (0.03) | 1.43*** (0.03) | 1.43*** (0.03) | 1.45*** (0.03) | 1.46*** (0.03) |
| GWDSP | 1.10*** (0.03) | 1.10*** (0.03) | 1.10*** (0.03) | 1.10*** (0.03) | 1.11*** (0.03) |
| Network covariate | | | | | |
| Importance | | 1.46* (0.28) | 1.44+ (0.28) | 1.44+ (0.28) | 1.40+ (0.28) |
| A. Homophily | | | | | |
| A1. All DS types | | | 5.45*** (2.24) | 6.37*** (2.73) | |
| A2. Governmental DS | | | | | 61.70*** (47.86) |
| A3. All other DS | | | | | 4.21** (1.94) |
| B. Heterophily | | | | | |
| B1. All DS types | | | 0.57** (0.11) | | |
| B2. Governmental DS | | | | 0.61 (0.21) | 0.62 (0.22) |
| B3. Multilateral DS | | | | 0.48** (0.12) | 0.49** (0.12) |
| B4. Non-governmental DS | | | | 1.08 (0.44) | 1.07 (0.45) |
| AIC | 1352.29 | 1350.49 | 1328.90 | 1329.79 | 1323.72 |
| BIC | 1369.83 | 1373.87 | 1363.98 | 1376.56 | 1376.33 |
| Log Likelihood | -673.15 | -671.24 | -658.45 | -656.90 | -652.86 |

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; + $p < 0.1$. Odds ratios; standard errors in parentheses.
 Fitted with Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MCMC-MLE) with a sample size = 10,000.
 DS: 'Democracy supporter'.
 Edges: a statistic for the number of ties in the network.
 k-core: a statistic for a node's k-shell membership.
 GWDSP (geometrically weighted dyad-wise shared partnerships): a statistic for the number of dyads (linked or not linked) that are connected to the same third node.
 Reference category for homophilous (A) and heterophilous (B) mixing of democracy supporters are any ties (homophilous or heterophilous) between domestic civil society organizations, political parties and foreign actors who are not strictly democracy-supporting. The latter include for instance international human rights organizations, international faith-based organizations, or foreign embassies not engaged in democracy support.

Table 5.2: Exponential Random Graph Model (ERGM) for the probability of ties in the Togolese support and collaboration network (figure 5.4).

shared by either multilateral or non-governmental democracy supporters were only four times greater. However, diagnostics of the MCMC sampling caution that the odds ratio for homophily among governmental democracy supporters might be slightly overestimated, hence, qualifying this stark contrast to a degree (more on this below).

The models presented in 5.2 have a reasonably good fit. The Akaike information criterion (AIC) is a conventionally employed measure for assessing model fit. However, it can serve this purpose only approximately with regard to assessing the goodness-of-fit of ERGMs. This stated, note nonetheless that there is a decrease in AIC between the baseline model and model four. Contrary to using AIC as a measure for model selection and assessment of model fit, however, it is advised and common practice in network analysis to assess model fit by comparing the distribution of higher order network structures, e.g. closed triads, as predicted by the specified model to the observed data (Goodreau, 2007; Hunter, Goodreau, & Handcock, 2008). Plots for assessing the goodness-of-fit of model four are shown in the appendix (F.2). The model performs sufficiently well, although it does at times over- or underestimate the observed degree distribution (panel B, figure F.2). Despite of underestimating the number of edge-wise as well as dyad-wise shared partnerships (measures for transitivity in a network) at the greater end of the distribution, the model captures the overall distributions adequately (panels C and D). It likewise performs sufficiently in predicting the number of shortest paths in general, although it slightly underestimates them in the medium range (panel F). The appendix also includes trace and density plots to assess the performance of the MCMC maximum likelihood estimation. Overall, the MCMC sampling seems to explore the parameter space sufficiently widely for all specified parameters. Note, however, that the trace plot for the A2 parameter, i.e. for homophily among governmental democracy supporters, shows a somewhat poorer performance than the other trace plots. The accompanying density plot shows that the sampling procedure 'leaned' slightly towards the lower parameter space which cautions that the estimated coefficient in table 5.2 might be slightly overestimated. However, since the MCMC sampling converged, and the sampling chains mixed sufficiently without any of them getting stuck in the parameter space, the model's estimation of parameter A2 should be comparably accurate.

5.3.4 Evidence from qualitative interviews

The theoretical model presented earlier in section 5.2.1 illustrates the strategic predicament that democracy supporters face when reform periods take place in target countries. Conflicting objectives, uncertainty about the prospects for actual regime change, as well as the costs and risks of engaging with civil society and political party opposition put democracy supporters into a position from which they traverse the political situation cautiously. According to the model, democracy supporters would not diplomatically engage thoroughly with the political and civil society opposition in a target country, even if that target country is partially open to reform. The inter-organizational network data from the case of Togo's constitutional reform crisis and the ex-

ponential random graph model presented in section 5.3.3 support this conjecture. Although democracy supporters were collaborating with and supporting some organizations in the network, their importance and influence as measured by different centrality measures was not particularly high. Additionally, the chance of observing collaboration ties between democracy supporters and domestic, or foreign non-democracy supporting, actors was low. In contrast, the chance of observing collaboration ties exclusively among democracy supporters was large. Nonetheless, the network data and the presented model also show intriguing differences between multilateral and governmental democracy supporters. Multilateral democracy supporters were part of the network's inner core. Governmental democracy supporters in contrast belonged to one of the network's higher-degree shells, but were still located more peripherally in the network. The data, however, is mute on the reasons underlying democracy supporters' restraint. Insights from the qualitative interviews conducted while collecting the network data can provide a glimpse into the predicaments that democracy supporters faced according to their own view during the constitutional reform crisis.⁴⁰

First, democracy supporters, in particular the G5, perceived a clear need for exchange among each other as well as for coordinating their positions which is in line with the homophily found among democracy supporters generally, and among governmental democracy supporters particularly. The need for exchange bore from the uncertainty that democracy supporters faced suddenly at the beginning of the reform crisis:

"This group [the G5] were [...] somewhat less active before, but we instantly realized at the beginning of the crisis, that it is an important forum for us in order to get a picture of the situation, not only internally [...], but also with [the other G5 members]."
(Interview 27)

This was particularly crucial to those foreign actors who acted as embassies or delegations and as such were subject to information inquiries from their respective ministries and other higher-tiered organizational units of their home countries. Due to their monitoring and reporting duties, these actors reflected their own role to a large extent as distant observers who gather and pool information among themselves:

"You then [in a situation like the constitutional reform crisis] hear all kinds of things and at first you don't know: Is this accurate information or rumour or deliberate misinformation? [...]. So, you try to meet as many people with different opinions as possible, to get a picture, and the G5, [...] - is useful to put the information together. One says 'I met this person and she told me this', but another says 'Alright, but this other person says that about this.'"
(Interview 27)

⁴⁰Interview citations will be identified with the node IDs in this section (cf. figure 5.4). A list of all nodes, their IDs, organizational type as well as the dates when interviews were conducted is included in the appendix. Interviews were variously held in French, English or German and appear here in the author's own translation.

The role of distant observers also included that foreign actors were keen to present themselves as apolitical, as "neutral actors" that "don't do politics" (interview 60). Contrary to an assertive position in favour of democracy and its support, they referred to Togo's sovereignty and state autonomy as well as ownership, emphasizing that the reform crisis "was, in the end, an internal Togolese affair" and that they got involved only "to strengthen the facilitation by ECOWAS, ensuring that regional facilitation takes place and that own solutions are found" (interview 33).

Second, the need for exchange was heightened by the course of action particularly of the political opposition parties which foreign actors perceived as at once extreme and intransigent in their demands, yet, also as back-peddalling and flip-flopping when it came to carrying out a constitutional referendum as well as, later on elections (interviews 27, 32, 33, 60). The opposition's "mixing of different demands that all were pursued maximally, like either this will be fulfilled or we won't show up at all, [...] that led to much polarization, and at the same time the government did not give in" (interview 33). This led to a situation in which "there was the tendency to draw on less peaceful means, on both sides" (interview 27) causing the G5 to "try to have a harmonized position, very diplomatic, very neutral, but always calling for appeasement and for dialogue" (interview 60).

At the same time, this gave external democracy supporters cause to doubt the opposition's sincerity, integrity and capability for implementing political change. They had the perception that when the ECOWAS mediation facilitated the roadmap to solve the crisis, the opposition "at bottom regretted [this] and there was again this radical wish to manage the affair not through elections, but by taking it back to the streets" (interview 27). Foreign actors found it challenging that the "civil society is very diversified, [and that] the political party landscape as well is extremely diverse" (interview 33) which at times led to an intermeshing of both:

"You talk to a movement, but then some of their members are also founders of political parties. So, you have to be careful who you deal with, because I think the society in Togo is very politicized."
(Interview 60)

Nonetheless, some stated the impression that "except for that the civil society was on the streets and mobilized, the entire dialogue [to resolve the crisis] took place without the civil society, but instead with the old political opposition parties that we know since the 80s" (interview 33). It was felt that the different opposition actors would rather "stake out their turf and maintain their interests, even if this can mean that there is no cooperation, but higher transaction costs since they keep working alone" (interview 33). Foreign democracy supporters, hence, partly felt to face programmatic risks by being unable to identify capable and sincere counterparts among political opposition parties and civil society. Some, for instance, were concerned to become instrumentalised and several times communicated to civil society and opposition that their "programmes for plurality and democratization [...] had as a final objective the change of the political landscape, and henceforth were not created

[solely] for this or that party or actor” (interview 33). On the same token, they had reservations that ”the opposition would eventually have been much too weak to carry out such a solution, [namely] establishing an interim government” (interview 27). Against this, interviewees often expressed that they found the opposition’s civil society’s conduct short-sighted:

”The term limits [issue] crystallises a lot of [...] the discontent from the average Togolese who projects the problems we have in the country into one single problem; which is that the regime has been there for that long; so, if we basically change the term limits, then we get rid of the regime. But removing one person does not remove a regime as such.” (Interview 60)

Besides the uncertainty and reservations that constrained democracy supporters in engaging thoroughly with domestic civil society and opposition, their stance also was cautious due to conflicting objectives and interests that they faced. Despite heading a competitive authoritarian government, Faure Gnassingbé was seen by the foreign actors as an important, promising and reliable partner for economic reforms and development (interview 27). Several interviewees confided that interests in economic development cooperation as well as the need for a politically stable security partner within the West African region were powerful constraints that tamed down the wording of the statements issued by the G5:

”When you have five donors [...] who *de facto* have different interests in the country - we are probably the only ones who are neutral - [...], given the the closeness to the sea, and the probable insecurity from the North, despite the small size of the country, there is a lot of interest to keep it stable for everyone, for so many reasons. So, I think the call for appeasement et cetera is not just political. It draws obviously from other interests as well.” (Interview 60)

5.4 Discussion

Both the network analysis as well as the qualitative evidence suggest that democracy supporters were subject to both to external constraints and internal restraint. Externally, uncertainty and reservations about which counterpart actor among the domestic civil society and political parties is credible and reliable constrained them. Internally, their restraint was fed by that they understood their role primarily as apolitical observers, but also had to trade-off a more assertive democracy promotion stance with the conflicting objective to having a politically stable and with regard to regional security and economic development important counterpart government. The findings are mainly in line with the theoretical model of democracy diplomacy presented in section 5.2.1. Uncertainty about the capabilities of the political party and civil society opposition as well as conflicting interests put powerful constraints on democracy supporters. Where the findings and the model disagree is in the importance of retribution costs exerted by the regime on democracy supporters. According to the qualitative interviews, these did not play a role in

restraining external actors in the reform episode studied here. This might be particular to the country context. Future research into the predicaments of democracy promotion will be needed to explore this issue further.

The analysis comes with some limitations that necessitate discussion. First, the network analysis does not take different intensities of collaboration and support into account. Although data on different intensities was collected (see table F.1 in the appendix), computational complexity so far prohibited making use of the full depth of data. Although models have been developed to model not only the occurrence of ties but also their strength, i.e. quantitative value, they are still demanding a lot of computing time and resources, particularly when the model includes multiple structural dependency terms (Caimo & Gollini, 2020; Desmarais & Cranmer, 2012). Additionally, as it was not possible to interview representatives of all organizations in the network, many although not all ties are based only on unilateral recalls, i.e. recalls by only one dyad-partner. The network data and the analysis thus do not illustrate which actors and organizations were objectively important, but rather reflect the perceptions of the interviewed actors of who was important. Having data from all organizations on all other organizations would allow a much more detailed analysis in which the direction of ties could be taken into account. Disagreement about ties, i.e. when one dyad-partner reports a (valued) tie but the other not or a differently valued tie, would likewise add insight. For instance, this would provide a way to gauge whether there was systematic deviance in the perception of interactions between domestic actors and foreign actors. Finally, one might be concerned about false-positive ties. Some interviewees have failed to correctly recall the collaborations and support interactions their organization had with other organizations. On the same token, they might want to overstate the importance of their organization. Regarding the first concern, the data was collected fairly recent to the reform episode under study, therefore it is unlikely that many interviewees recollected their organizations' ties wrongly. With regard to the second concern, there is no way to fully address it. However, none of the interviewees knew at the commencement of the interview which other organizations had already been interviewed and what they had reported, and therefore risked being refuted. Although not eliminating the risk of overstated importance, this likely has mitigated it somewhat.

Finally, its focus on a single case puts an important scope condition on the analysis' findings. As every case is unique, the findings from the analysis of Togo's constitutional reform crisis cannot be generalized to other cases without carefully pondering their similarities and dissimilarities. This is where the model in subsection 5.2.1 adds its value. It aims at serving as an instrument to achieve abstract generalization for understanding the strategic predicament in democracy support, as faced particularly by governmental and multilateral democracy supporters. The analysis of the role of democracy supporters in Togo's constitutional reform crisis supports the general logic of the model and its conjecture, namely that democracy supporting actors will act cautiously and with restraint during reform episodes in authoritarian countries. Analyses of additional cases, especially of cases that are extreme in some regard, for instance in their strategic importance or non-importance of foreign democracy-

supporting actors, promises to shed more light on the scope conditions of strategic predicaments in democracy promotion.

5.5 Conclusion

The global diffusion of democracy has stalled. Regardless of the exact timing of democratization and autocratization waves, many scholars and researchers come to the conclusion that democratization globally shows signs of waning (Boese, Lindberg, & Lührmann, 2021; Diamond, 2021; Pelke & Croissant, 2021; Skaaning, 2020). Many of the late transitions of the 'third wave' of democratization happened during an extraordinary time and were carried by the collapse of the one hegemonic authoritarian antagonist of a bipolar world order. However, many of those transitions have eventually come to a grinding halt.

If autocratization and competitive authoritarianism indeed will become a new conceptual frame of political change, it will be pertinent to understand the hindrances to the promotion of democracy. This is particularly true for efforts of democracy promotion during reform episodes. Reform episodes are windows-of-opportunity for democracy promotion, yet, for democracy promotion of a particular kind, namely (pro-)democracy diplomacy. As reform episodes cannot be foreseen, democracy diplomacy, for the most part and apart from high-level initiatives and summits, is like 'rapid-response' democracy promotion. It has to "respond to the unexpected even when conditions appear unfavorable" (Haggard & Kaufman, 2016). However, in spite of that, not much research exists about on-the-ground democracy diplomacy and the constraints that personnel of democracy supporting external actors face. Rather, scholars attest democracy supporters a lack of enthusiasm to engage with pro-democratic domestic actors in authoritarian contexts. This is despite renewed high-level initiatives and official pledges to support democracy abroad. It is therefore relevant to study diplomatic collaborative and supportive interactions of external democracy supporters with domestic pro-democracy activists and proponents in authoritarian country contexts.

To study such interactions, I made use of original network data as well as qualitative interview data on the interactions between external democracy supporters and domestic civil society and opposition parties during Togo's reform crisis from 2017 to 2019. The analysis of the network data shows that most democracy supporters did not occupy very central and important roles in a network of domestic and international actors that collaborated and supported each other. Instead, interaction *among* democracy supporters was greater than interaction between them and domestic actors. Qualitative interview data enlightens the findings from the quantitative network analysis. They show that democracy supporters were restrained by their own understanding of their role as monitoring observers, but that they also perceived domestic opposition actors as intransigent and inconsistent, making support of and collaboration with them difficult. Additionally, interviewees indicated that conflicting interests restrained democracy supporters actions. These findings are largely in line with the implications drawn from a theoretical model. The model will

hopefully serve as a hypothesis-generating instrument to extend the analysis further to other cases of democracy promotion. Additionally to the overall results, the analysis also suggested intriguing differences between multilateral and governmental democracy supporters. Multilateral democracy supporters occupied more central and relevant roles in the network. They entertained more interactions with domestic actors and were part of the networks inner core. Even though they were, as members of the network core, all else equal significantly less active than other actors, they were the most integrated and most central external actors of the network. Unfortunately, for the particular case studied here, these insights cannot be extended to non-governmental democracy supporters as they were simply too few.

The results presented here lead to a question of some import for democracy promotion: To which degree and under which conditions are foreign states actually ready to promote and protect democracy? To be ready here means that they need to be free of the limitations put upon them externally, but also internally by themselves through conflicting objectives and role perceptions. Strictly speaking, democracy supporters need to be able to neutralise those of their interests that may stand in the way of democracy promotion. They would also need to be willing and able to accept the risks, costs, and uncertainties connected to democracy promotion. It is difficult to imagine how governmental democracy supporters could achieve such an externalisation on their own. In contrast, such an externalisation could likely be only obtained through delegation. Yet, delegation to whom and how? Multilateral international organizations and non-governmental actors seem less prone to having interests that may stand in the way of democracy promotion. However, non-governmental actors have no leverage and are very vulnerable vis-a-vis authoritarian governments, and most multilateral organizations often understand themselves as apolitical. Nonetheless, a few multilateral, intergovernmental organizations that are specifically dedicated to promoting and protecting democracy exist, such as International IDEA, The Warsaw Community of Democracies or the Inter-Parliamentary Union as well as many subordinate bureaus and agencies of larger international organizations, like the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the African Union's Democracy and Electoral Assistance Unit or ECOWAS' Network of Electoral Commissions. High-level democracy promotion strategies like Biden's Presidential Initiative for Democratic Renewal or the EU's Team Europe Democracy Initiative provide opportunities to strengthen existing as well as to endorse the set-up of new multilateral structures of democracy promotion and protection.

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Appendix A

*Appendix to: "Protecting
democracy from abroad:
Democracy aid against
attempts to circumvent
presidential term limits"*

| Variable | N | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max | |
|--|-----------------------|------|--------------|------|-------------------|---------------------|
| <i>Democracy aid/Cap</i> | $\frac{1,146}{1,199}$ | 2.4 | 1.6 | 0 | 14.5 | <i>Lagged</i> |
| <i>Democracy aid/GDP</i> | $\frac{1,113}{1,166}$ | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0 | 0.3 | <i>Lagged</i> |
| <i>Democracy aid/Gov. rev.</i> | $\frac{982}{1,016}$ | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0 | 1.2 | <i>Lagged</i> |
| <i>ODA</i> | $\frac{1,146}{1,199}$ | 13 | 2 | 0 | 26 | <i>Lagged</i> |
| <i>Liberal democracy</i> | $\frac{1,146}{1,199}$ | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0 | 0.9 | <i>Lagged</i> |
| <i>Liberal democracy_{t-5}</i> | $\frac{1,146}{1,199}$ | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0 | 0.9 | <i>Lagged (t-5)</i> |
| <i>Horizontal accountability</i> | $\frac{1,146}{1,199}$ | 0.3 | 0.8 | -1.8 | 1.94 | <i>Lagged</i> |
| <i>Core Civil Society</i> | $\frac{1,146}{1,199}$ | 0.7 | 0.2 | 0 | 1 | <i>Lagged</i> |
| <i>Opposition strength</i> | $\frac{1,108}{1,161}$ | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0 | 10.7 | <i>Lagged</i> |
| <i>Freedomhouse</i> | $\frac{1,146}{1,199}$ | 7.3 | 3.1 | 2 | 14 | <i>Lagged</i> |
| <i>Political distance</i> | $\frac{1,146}{1,199}$ | 1.8 | 0.5 | 0.47 | $\frac{3.6}{3.5}$ | <i>Lagged (t-5)</i> |
| <i>No. of alliances</i> | $\frac{1,146}{1,199}$ | 0.9 | 1.3 | 0 | 7 | <i>Lagged (t-5)</i> |
| <i>Failed bid</i> | $\frac{1,146}{1,199}$ | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0 | 2 | |
| <i>Region</i> | $\frac{1,146}{1,199}$ | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 | |

Table A.1: Summary statistics are reported for both the attempt- and the successful circumvention-estimation samples. Where values differ, the upper number reports the value for the attempt- and the lower number the value for the successful circumvention-estimation sample.




Figure A.1: Estimated survivor functions for term limits with 95%-confidence intervals. Dependent variable is successful circumventions with no prior attempts. All covariates are held constant at the 25th percentile value except for *Region*, *Failed bid*, and *No. of alliances* (constant at zero), while *Democracy aid* varies as shown in the figure. To retrieve the log-log transformed confidence intervals, the model's standard errors were estimated using the observed information matrix instead of clustered sandwich estimation which has implications for the independence of observations. Please see table A2 for a presentation of the model.

Source: Authors' compilation.

| | <i>DV = successful circumvention</i> | | |
|--|--------------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|
| | <i>Coeff (SE)</i> | <i>p [95%-Conf.]</i> | <i>%-change</i> |
| <i>Democracy aid</i> | -0.39 (0.22) | .09 [-0.83 , 0.06] | -46.42 |
| <i>ODA</i> | 0.01 (0.15) | .97 [-0.28 , 0.29] | 1.93 |
| <i>Liberal democracy</i> | -6.11 (2.44) | .01 [-10.9 , -1.32] | -73.93 |
| <i>Liberal democracy_{t-5}</i> | 3.88 (2.42) | .11 [-0.86 , 8.62] | 134.81 |
| <i>Failed bid</i> | -1.64 (1.28) | .2 [-4.16 , 0.87] | -80.6 |
| <i>Region</i> | 0.8 (0.69) | .25 [-0.55 , 2.14] | 122.55 |
| <i>Political distance</i> | 1.03 (0.6) | .08 [-0.13 , 2.2] | 62.27 |
| <i>No. of alliances</i> | -0.06 (0.26) | .8 [-0.57 , 0.44] | -5.82 |
| <i>N</i> | | 1,199 | |
| <i>Failures</i> | | 30/30 | |
| <i>Countries</i> | | 62/63 | |
| <i>LL</i> | | -77.06 | |

Table A.2: Model results for estimation of covariate-adjusted survivor functions. Cox regression with variance-covariance matrix estimated with the observed information matrix (OIM) in order to estimate covariate-adjusted survivor functions.

Source: Authors' calculations.

| | (15A) | | | (16A) | | |
|--|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|
| | <i>DV = attempt</i> | | | <i>DV = successful circumvention</i> | | |
| | <i>Coeff (SE)</i> | <i>p [95%-Conf.]</i> | <i>%-change</i> | <i>Coeff (SE)</i> | <i>p [95%-Conf.]</i> | <i>%-change</i> |
| <i>Democracy aid</i> | -0.1 (0.09) | .3 [-0.28 , 0.09] | -14.79 | -0.23 (0.16) | .15 [-0.54 , 0.08] | -30.79 |
| <i>ODA</i> | -0.1 (0.07) | .16 [-0.23 , 0.04] | -17.39 | -0.05 (0.26) | .84 [-0.56 , 0.46] | -9.11 |
| <i>Liberal democracy</i> | -5.54 (1.34) | .00 [-8.17 , -2.91] | -70.44 | -6.9 (5.49) | .21 [-17.65 , 3.85] | -78.09 |
| <i>Liberal democracy_{t-5}</i> | 4.62 (1.26) | .00 [2.16 , 7.08] | 176.32 | 4.86 (2.92) | .1 [-0.87 , 10.59] | 191.31 |
| <i>Failed bid</i> | 0.16 (0.66) | .81 [-1.14 , 1.47] | 17.35 | -1.1 (1.62) | .49 [-4.28 , 2.08] | -66.71 |
| <i>Region</i> | 0.34 (0.45) | .45 [-0.54 , 1.22] | 40.5 | 0.73 (1.81) | .7 [-2.82 , 4.28] | 107.51 |
| <i>Political distance</i> | 0.55 (0.55) | .32 [-0.53 , 1.64] | 29.5 | 1.31 (1.09) | .23 [-0.81 , 3.44] | 85.1 |
| <i>No. of alliances</i> | 0.28 (0.13) | .03 [0.02 , 0.53] | 32.31 | 0.14 (0.47) | .77 [-0.78 , 1.05] | 15.03 |
| <i>N</i> | | 1,146 | | | 1,199 | |
| <i>Term Limits</i> | | 101 | | | 88 | |
| <i>Countries</i> | | 62/63 | | | 62/63 | |
| <i>LL</i> | | -188.74 | | | -126.27 | |

Table A.3: Random effects logit regression with standard errors clustered on country; the column %-change reports the percentage change in odds for a 1 standard deviation change in the explanatory variable, except for *Failed bid*, *Region* and *No. of alliances*, where the change in explanatory variable is 1. Parameters for constant and time as a cubic polynomial included but not reported; random effects drawn from a Gaussian distribution. *Term Limits* reports the number of term limit cross-sections included in estimation. *Source:* Authors' calculations.

| | (1) | | | (2) | | |
|--|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|
| | <i>DV = attempt</i> | | | <i>DV = successful circumvention</i> | | |
| | <i>Coeff (SE)</i> | <i>p [95%-Conf.]</i> | <i>%-change</i> | <i>Coeff (SE)</i> | <i>p [95%-Conf.]</i> | <i>%-change</i> |
| <i>Democracy aid</i> | -0.14 (0.11) | .18 [-0.35 , 0.07] | -20.07 | -0.4 (0.18) | .03 [-0.75 , -0.05] | -47.27 |
| <i>ODA</i> | -0.03 (0.06) | .63 [-0.16 , 0.09] | -5.57 | 0.01 (0.1) | .91 [-0.19 , 0.21] | 1.93 |
| <i>Liberal democracy</i> | -4.33 (1.55) | .01 [-7.37 , -1.28] | -61.43 | -6.08 (2.58) | .02 [-11.14 , -1.02] | -73.75 |
| <i>Liberal democracy_{t-5}</i> | 2.74 (1.62) | .09 [-0.44 , 5.91] | 82.72 | 4.01 (2.47) | .11 [-0.83 , 8.85] | 141.62 |
| <i>Failed bid</i> | -0.1 (0.66) | .88 [-1.4 , 1.2] | -9.52 | -1.63 (0.57) | .00 [-2.74 , -0.52] | -80.51 |
| <i>Region</i> | 0.61 (0.46) | .19 [-0.29 , 1.5] | 84 | 0.8 (0.46) | .08 [-0.09 , 1.7] | 122.55 |
| <i>Political distance</i> | 0.55 (0.5) | .27 [-0.43 , 1.52] | 28.89 | 1.01 (0.62) | .1 [-0.2 , 2.22] | 60.75 |
| <i>No. of alliances</i> | 0.05 (0.2) | .82 [-0.35 , 0.45] | 5.13 | -0.07 (0.16) | .7 [-0.38 , 0.25] | -6.76 |
| <i>Civil conflict</i> | -0.02 (0.34) | .95 [-0.68 , 0.64] | -1.98 | 0.18 (0.45) | .68 [-0.69 , 1.06] | 19.72 |
| <i>N</i> | | 1,146 | | | 1,199 | |
| <i>Failures</i> | | 49 | | | 30 | |
| <i>Countries</i> | | 62/63 | | | 62/63 | |
| <i>LL</i> | | -131.81 | | | -76.99 | |

Table A.4: Including *Civil Conflict* as a measure for political instability. Cox regression; the column %-change reports the change in the hazard rate in percent for a 1 standard deviation change in the explanatory variable, except for *Failed bid*, *Region*, *No. of alliances*, and *Civil conflict* where the change in explanatory variable is 1. *Civil conflict* is a dummy variable indicating whether the country under observation experienced a civil conflict in the respective year, taken from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset 20.1 (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg & Strand, 2020; Petersson & Öberg, 2002).

Source: Authors' calculations.

| | (1) | | | (2) | | |
|---------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|
| | <i>DV = attempt</i> | | | <i>DV = successful circumvention</i> | | |
| | <i>Coeff (SE)</i> | <i>p [95%-Conf.]</i> | <i>%-change</i> | <i>Coeff (SE)</i> | <i>p [95%-Conf.]</i> | <i>%-change</i> |
| <i>Democracy aid</i> | -0.17 (0.12) | .14 [-0.4 , 0.06] | -23.82 | -0.42 (0.18) | .02 [-0.78 , -0.07] | -48.93 |
| <i>ODA</i> | -0.03 (0.07) | .66 [-0.16 , 0.1] | -5.57 | 0.003 (0.11) | .98 [-0.21 , 0.22] | 0.58 |
| <i>Liberal democracy</i> | -2 (0.79) | .01 [-3.55 , -0.44] | -35.6 | -2.8 (1.2) | .02 [-5.14 , -0.46] | -45.99 |
| <i>Failed bid</i> | -0.17 (0.68) | .81 [-1.5 , 1.2] | -15.63 | -1.82 (0.59) | .00 [-2.97 , -0.67] | -83.8 |
| <i>Region</i> | 0.62 (0.45) | .17 [-0.26 , 1.5] | 85.89 | 0.84 (0.46) | .07 [-0.07 , 1.75] | 131.64 |
| <i>Political distance</i> | 0.46 (0.49) | .35 [-0.5 , 1.41] | 24.14 | 0.86 (0.58) | .14 [-0.28 , 2.01] | 49.81 |
| <i>No. of alliances</i> | 0.1 (0.18) | .58 [-0.25 , 0.45] | 10.52 | 0.001 (0.14) | .99 [-0.27 , 0.27] | 0.1 |
| <i>N</i> | | 1,150 | | | 1,203 | |
| <i>Failures</i> | | 49 | | | 30 | |
| <i>Countries</i> | | 62/63 | | | 62/63 | |
| <i>LL</i> | | -133.25 | | | -78.42 | |

Table A.5: Excluding *Liberal Democracy Index_{t-5}*. Cox regression; the column %-change reports the change in the hazard rate in percent for a 1 standard deviation change in the explanatory variable, except for *Failed bid*, *Region*, and *No. of alliances* where the change in explanatory variable is 1.

Source: Authors' calculations.

APPENDIX A. CHAPTER 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS & COVARIATES

| | <i>DV = Circumvention attempt</i> | | | |
|----------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|
| | <i>(7A)</i> | <i>(8A)</i> | <i>(9A)</i> | <i>(10A)</i> |
| <i>Democracy aid</i> | -0.17 (0.11) | -0.14 (0.11) | -0.17 (0.11) | -0.17 (0.11) |
| <i>ODA</i> | 0.01 (0.07) | -0.06 (0.07) | -0.02 (0.06) | 0.01 (0.07) |
| <i>Failed bid</i> | -0.23 (0.68) | -0.06 (0.64) | -0.24 (0.68) | -0.34 (0.66) |
| <i>Region</i> | 0.71 (0.5) | 0.62 (0.43) | 0.45 (0.43) | 0.34 (0.4) |
| <i>Freedomhouse</i> | 0.15 (0.06)* | | | |
| <i>Horizontal Account.</i> | | -0.69 (0.21)** | | |
| <i>Core Civil Society</i> | | | -1.45 (0.85)+ | |
| <i>Opposition Strength</i> | | | | -0.004 (0.13) |
| <i>Political distance</i> | 0.38 (0.46) | 0.39 (0.47) | 0.52 (0.46) | 0.85 (0.53) |
| <i>No. of alliances</i> | 0.12 (0.18) | 0.02 (0.18) | 0.1 (0.17) | 0.19 (0.17) |
| <i>N</i> | 1,155 | 1,155 | 1,155 | 1,117 |
| <i>Failures</i> | 49 | 49 | 49 | 48 |
| <i>Countries</i> | 62/63 | 62/63 | 62/63 | 60/63 |
| <i>LL</i> | -133.3 | -130.69 | -134.09 | -131.21 |
| | <i>DV = Successful circumvention</i> | | | |
| | <i>(11A)</i> | <i>(12A)</i> | <i>(13A)</i> | <i>(14A)</i> |
| <i>Democracy aid</i> | -0.4 (0.18)* | -0.38 (0.18)* | -0.39 (0.18)* | -0.42 (0.2)* |
| <i>ODA</i> | 0.04 (0.11) | -0.04 (0.11) | 0.01 (0.1) | 0.08 (0.09) |
| <i>Failed bid</i> | -1.75 (0.53)** | -2.03 (0.63)** | -1.73 (0.63)** | -1.44 (0.72)* |
| <i>Region</i> | 1.02 (0.52)* | 0.75 (0.46) | 0.6 (0.51) | 0.47 (0.41) |
| <i>Freedomhouse</i> | 0.25 (0.08)** | | | |
| <i>Horizontal Account.</i> | | -0.79 (0.26)** | | |
| <i>Core Civil Society</i> | | | -1.8 (1.14) | |
| <i>Opposition Strength</i> | | | | -0.25 (0.56) |
| <i>Political distance</i> | 0.66 (0.51) | 0.8 (0.57) | 0.99 (0.55)+ | 1.25 (0.6)* |
| <i>No. of alliances</i> | 0.02 (0.13) | -0.06 (0.14) | 0.01 (0.15) | 0.1 (0.13) |
| <i>N</i> | 1,208 | 1,208 | 1,208 | 1,170 |
| <i>Failures</i> | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 |
| <i>Countries</i> | 62/63 | 62/63 | 62/63 | 60/63 |
| <i>LL</i> | -76.34 | -76.71 | -79.43 | -80.59 |

Table A.6: Models with alternative democracy covariates, 1990-2014. Cox regression, coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, +p < 0.1

Source: Authors' calculations.

Appendix B

*Appendix to: "Protecting
democracy from abroad:
Democracy aid against
attempts to circumvent
presidential term limits"*

This appendix serves to (1) describe the composition of our democracy aid variable in more detail and present results of replicating our analysis with a stricter composition of democracy aid, (2) present results for models with alternative operationalizations of democracy aid that use different time lags and alternative data for adjustment, (3) re-run our analysis without as well as with an alternative transformation of democracy aid, (4) provide context for the values of democracy aid chosen by us when interpreting the results, and (5) probe the robustness of the results against extreme values of democracy aid.

Composition of democracy aid

To measure democracy aid, we use AidData, version 3.1, provided by Tierney et al. (2011). The AidData project classifies aid flows by purpose codes to attribute them to particular sectors of development cooperation. We follow what has become a standard in the quantitative literature on democracy aid by classifying all aid flows that have the purpose codes 15000 to 16000, as well as 92000 and 93010 as democracy aid (Dietrich & Wright, 2015; Heinrich & Loftis, 2019; Jones & Tarp, 2016). Table B.1 provides the titular purposes that are covered by these codes, and that are included in our main explanatory variable *Democracy aid*.

Government and civil society

Economic and development policy/planning
Government administration
Legal and judicial development
Public sector financial management
Strengthening civil society
Government and civil society, combination of activities
Government and civil society, purpose unspecified or does not fit under any other applicable codes

Support to non- governmental organisations (NGOs) and government organizations

Support to international NGOs
Support to local and regional NGOs
Support to national NGOs
Support to non-governmental organizations and government organizations, combination of purposes
Support to non-governmental organizations and government organizations, purpose unspecified or does not fit under any other applicable codes

Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security

Child soldiers (Prevention and demobilisation)
Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution

Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security, combinations of activities
 Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security, purpose unspecified or
 does not fit under any other applicable codes
 Land mine clearance
 Post-conflict peace-building (UN)
 Reintegration and SALW control
 Security system management and reform

Table B.1: AidData sector and purpose titles included as democracy aid.

Concerning some of these purpose codes, it is debatable whether and to which extent they actually capture democracy aid activities. This might for example concern all project activities falling under the code “Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security” (purpose codes greater than 15200), as these capture peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities, which often but not exclusively contain democracy support. Similarly, the code “Economic and Development Policy/Planning” (purpose code 15110) under the heading “Government and Civil Society” may not contain what is strictly understood as democracy aid, but rather the more technical form of governance support. However, when querying the activity descriptions provided in the AidData dataset, it becomes clear that one would need to assess case by case on project level if the activities describe democracy aid. For instance, the purpose code “Economic and Development Policy/Planning” contains a project funded by the African Development Fund in 2007 that aimed at “strengthen[ing] capacities in economic management and financial governance with a view to achieving sustained economic growth and reducing poverty” with the expected outcomes of “enhanced accountability in economic and financial governance” (AidData ID 2411651). Such a project might be labelled support to financial governance rather than democracy support. However, it might nevertheless include measures to improve accountability mechanisms, which, in turn, contribute to democratic quality. The same purpose code, however, also contains numerous projects that rather fall into the area of democracy support, such as a US-funded legislature support project in Kenya in 2007 that aimed to “improve the way the legislature and legislative processes work to uphold democratic practices” and to “focus on the quality and effectiveness of legislation including the constitution codes laws” (AidData ID 82170000). Due to the uncertainty what the purpose codes include, and as a case-by-case assessment is not feasible given the multitude of projects in the data, we opted to replicate our analysis with a variable that operationalizes a strict understanding of democracy aid. This strict measure of democracy aid excludes all project data subsumed under the purpose codes “Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security” (15200 to 15261) and “Economic and Development policy/planning” (15110). Re-running our models with this strict measurement of democracy aid corroborates the findings from the main text (table B.2).

| | <i>(B.2.1)</i> <i>DV = attempt</i> | | | <i>(B.2.2)</i> <i>DV = successful circumvention</i> | | |
|--|---------------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|--|----------------------|-----------------|
| | <i>Coeff (SE)</i> | <i>p [95%-Conf.]</i> | <i>%-change</i> | <i>Coeff (SE)</i> | <i>p [95%-Conf.]</i> | <i>%-change</i> |
| <i>Strict democracy aid</i> | -0.39 (0.19) | .04 [-0.76 , -0.02] | -33.66 | -0.59 (0.29) | .05 [-1.17 , -0.01] | -47.12 |
| <i>ODA</i> | -0.06 (0.08) | .42 [-0.09 , 0.22] | -10.83 | 0.1 (0.1) | .32 [-0.1 , 0.31] | 21.05 |
| <i>Liberal democracy</i> | -3.72 (1.77) | .04 [-7.2 , -0.24] | -55.89 | -5.87 (2.91) | .04 [-11.57 , -0.18] | -72.51 |
| <i>Liberal democracy_{t-5}</i> | 1.44 (1.7) | .4 [-1.9 , 4.77] | 37.27 | 3.12 (2.6) | .24 [-2.04 , 8.28] | 98.66 |
| <i>Failed bid</i> | -0.21 (0.75) | .78 [-1.67 , 1.26] | -18.94 | -1.48 (0.55) | .01 [-2.55 , -0.41] | -77.24 |
| <i>Region</i> | 0.27 (0.45) | .55 [-0.61 , 1.14] | 31 | 0.73 (0.47) | .12 [-0.2 , 1.65] | 107.51 |
| <i>Political Distance</i> | -0.07 (0.5) | .89 [-1.05 , 0.91] | -3.24 | 0.72 (0.52) | .17 [-0.3 , 1.74] | 40.27 |
| <i>No. of Alliances</i> | 0.16 (0.18) | .38 [-0.2 , 0.52] | -14.79 | -0.05 (0.18) | .77 [-0.4 , 0.3] | -4.88 |
| <i>N</i> | | 1,026 | | | 1,078 | |
| <i>Failures</i> | | 46/49 | | | 28/30 | |
| <i>Countries</i> | | 62/63 | | | 62/63 | |
| <i>LL</i> | | -117.16 | | | -68.65 | |

Table B.2: Results of the Survival Analysis of presidential term limits in Africa and Latin America using a strict measurement of democracy aid, 1990-2014. Cox regression; the column %-change reports the change in the hazard rate in percent for a 1 standard deviation change in the explanatory variable, except for *Failed bid*, *Region*, and *No. of Alliances* where the change in explanatory variable is 1.

Source: Authors' calculations.

Alternative time lags and adjustment of democracy aid

In order to probe, whether our results are due to our choice of lags and averages of the democracy aid data, we re-ran the analysis with a number of different lags and averaging periods. First, we explored model results using a different averaging period. Table B.3 presents the results using a 3-years as well as a 5-years average period prior to the year under observation. In these models, democracy aid was averaged for instance over the years 1987 to 1989, and 1985 to 1989 respectively, for country observations in 1990.

| | <i>DV = attempt</i> | | | <i>DV = successful circumvention</i> | | |
|--|--|----------------------|-----------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|
| | <i>Coeff (SE)</i> | <i>p [95%-Conf.]</i> | <i>%-change</i> | <i>Coeff (SE)</i> | <i>p [95%-Conf.]</i> | <i>%-change</i> |
| | <i>Democracy aid = 3-years moving average</i> | | | | | |
| <i>Democracy aid</i> | -0.26 (0.13) | .04 [-0.52 , -0.01] | -34.03 | -0.4 (0.19) | .04 [-0.78 , -0.03] | -47.27 |
| <i>ODA</i> | 0.04 (0.08) | .62 [-0.12 , 0.2] | 7.94 | 0.06 (0.11) | .59 [-0.15 , 0.26] | 12.14 |
| <i>Liberal democracy</i> | -4.07 (1.57) | .01 [-7.15 , -1] | -59.16 | -6.12 (2.6) | .02 [-11.22 , -1.03] | -73.98 |
| <i>Liberal democracy_{t-5}</i> | 2.08 (1.6) | .19 [-1.05 , 5.21] | 58.03 | 3.74 (2.44) | .13 [-1.05 , 8.52] | 127.69 |
| <i>Failed bid</i> | -0.18 (0.69) | .8 [-1.53 , 1.18] | -16.47 | -1.67 (0.55) | .00 [-2.75 , -0.59] | -81.18 |
| <i>Region</i> | 0.39 (0.49) | .43 [-0.57 , 1.35] | 47.7 | 0.83 (0.47) | .08 [-0.09 , 1.75] | 129.33 |
| <i>Political Distance</i> | 0.35 (0.56) | .54 [-0.75 , 1.45] | 17.88 | 1.1 (0.62) | .07 [-0.11 , 2.31] | 67.7 |
| <i>No. of Alliances</i> | 0.14 (0.2) | .49 [-0.26 , 0.53] | 15.03 | -0.05 (0.15) | .74 [-0.35 , 0.25] | -4.88 |
| <i>N</i> | | 1,059 | | | 1,112 | |
| <i>Failures</i> | | 48/49 | | | 30/30 | |
| <i>Countries</i> | | 62/63 | | | 62/63 | |
| <i>LL</i> | | -124.54 | | | -75.15 | |
| | <i>Democracy aid = 5-years moving average</i> | | | | | |
| <i>Democracy aid</i> | -.33 (0.14) | .02 [-0.6 , -0.06] | -41.02 | -0.54 (0.24) | .03 [-1.02 , -0.07] | -57.85 |
| <i>ODA</i> | 0.04 (0.08) | .61 [-0.12 , 0.2] | 7.94 | 0.12 (0.12) | .31 [-0.11 , 0.35] | 25.76 |
| <i>Liberal democracy</i> | -4.04 (1.7) | .02 [-7.38 , -0.71] | -58.89 | -6.34 (3.01) | .04 [-12.24 , -0.43] | -75.21 |
| <i>Liberal democracy_{t-5}</i> | 1.87 (1.63) | .25 [-1.34 , 5.07] | 50.89 | 3.37 (2.68) | .21 [-1.89 , 8.63] | 109.89 |
| <i>Failed bid</i> | -0.17 (0.72) | .81 [-1.58 , 1.23] | -15.63 | -1.65 (0.52) | .00 [-2.67 , -0.62] | -80.8 |
| <i>Region</i> | 0.24 (0.48) | .62 [-0.7 , 1.18] | 27.13 | 0.62 (0.46) | .18 [-0.29 , 1.53] | 85.89 |
| <i>Political Distance</i> | 0.12 (0.51) | .82 [-0.89 , 1.12] | 5.8 | 0.76 (0.5) | .13 [-0.23 , 1.74] | 42.93 |
| <i>No. of Alliances</i> | 0.17 (0.2) | .4 [-0.23 , 0.57] | 18.53 | -0.05 (0.16) | .77 [-0.37 , 0.27] | -4.88 |
| <i>N</i> | | 1,001 | | | 1,052 | |
| <i>Failures</i> | | 45/49 | | | 28/30 | |
| <i>Countries</i> | | 61/63 | | | 62/63 | |
| <i>LL</i> | | -113.24 | | | -67.93 | |

Table B.3: Robustness test for democracy aid as 3- and 5-years moving averages. Cox regression; the column %-change reports the change in the hazard rate in percent for a 1 standard deviation change in the explanatory variable, except for *Failed bid*, *Region* and *No. of Alliances*, where the change in explanatory variable is 1.

Source: Authors' calculations.

This robustness check confirms the results of our models presented in the main text. For a few parameters, and particularly for democracy aid, our variable of interest, statistical uncertainty of the estimation reduces and effect sizes stay largely the same.

The variables of democracy aid presented in table B.3 only vary in their averaging period, but technically still use a lag of 1 year. It is possible, that this 1-year lag is still too close to the respective years of observation. Incumbents do usually not attempt to prolong their term out-of-the-blue. Rather they probe the public climate well beforehand, introducing the question of term prolongation cautiously to public debate. Donor states ideally observe such developments, but often might be surprised by the quick dynamics of a term limit attempt, and therefore react only after the fact, that is, increase democracy aid after an incumbent's term circumvention has succeeded. As, due to data availability, we use aid commitments rather than aid disbursements to measure democracy aid, the data might capture some of these belated donor reactions. In order to explore whether this is an issue for our analysis, we re-ran our models with two alternative operationalizations of democracy aid using, first, the two-years average two years prior to the year of observation and second, the two-years average three years prior to the year of observation. We assume that these choices reflect the cycle of government negotiations over development cooperation projects, including democracy aid, and that greater lags would extend too far into the past.

| | <i>DV = attempt</i> | | | <i>DV = successful circumvention</i> | | |
|--|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|
| | <i>Coeff (SE)</i> | <i>p [95%-Conf.]</i> | <i>%-change</i> | <i>Coeff (SE)</i> | <i>p [95%-Conf.]</i> | <i>%-change</i> |
| | <i>2-years lag</i> | | | | | |
| <i>Democracy aid_{t-2}</i> | -0.14 (0.12) | .24 [-0.38 , 0.1] | -61.09 | -0.33 (0.19) | .09 [-0.71 , 0.05] | -41.02 |
| <i>ODA</i> | 0.01 (0.07) | .9 [-0.13 , 0.15] | 1.93 | 0.05 (0.1) | .65 [-0.16 , 0.25] | 10.02 |
| <i>Liberal democracy</i> | -4.31 (1.62) | .01 [-7.49 , -1.13] | -61.26 | -6.4 (2.63) | .02 [-11.55 , -1.25] | -75.54 |
| <i>Liberal democracy_{t-5}</i> | 2.37 (1.65) | .15 [-0.86 , 5.6] | 68.44 | 4.11 (2.47) | .1 [-.74 , 8.95] | 147 |
| <i>Failed bid</i> | -0.17 (0.67) | .8 [-1.48 , 1.14] | -15.63 | -1.61 (0.56) | .00 [-2.71 , -0.5] | -80.01 |
| <i>Region</i> | 0.39 (0.49) | .43 [-0.57 , 1.35] | 47.7 | 0.83 (0.46) | .07 [-0.08 , 1.74] | 129.33 |
| <i>Political Distance</i> | 0.44 (0.55) | .43 [-0.64 , 1.51] | 22.97 | 1.12 (0.63) | .1 [-0.11 , 2.35] | 69.28 |
| <i>No. of Alliances</i> | 0.13 (0.2) | .5 [-0.25 , 0.51] | 13.88 | -0.03 (0.14) | .8 [-0.3 , 0.25] | -2.96 |
| <i>N</i> | | 1,074 | | | 1,127 | |
| <i>Failures</i> | | 48/49 | | | 30/30 | |
| <i>Countries</i> | | 62/63 | | | 62/63 | |
| <i>LL</i> | | -125.92 | | | -76.06 | |
| | <i>3-years lag</i> | | | | | |
| <i>Democracy aid_{t-3}</i> | -0.11 (0.12) | .39 [-0.35 , 0.14] | -16.14 | -0.31 (0.19) | .1 [-0.67 , 0.06] | -39.1 |
| <i>ODA</i> | 0.01 (0.07) | .83 [-0.12 , 0.15] | 1.93 | 0.1 (0.11) | .36 [-0.11 , 0.31] | 21.05 |
| <i>Liberal democracy</i> | -4.39 (1.69) | .01 [-7.7 , -1.09] | -61.93 | -6.31 (2.82) | .03 [-11.83 , -0.8] | -75.05 |
| <i>Liberal democracy_{t-5}</i> | 2.19 (1.64) | .18 [-1.03 , 5.41] | 60.9 | 3.47 (2.57) | .18 [-1.57 , 8.51] | 114.56 |

| | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|--------------|--------------------|--------|--------------|---------------------|--------|
| <i>Failed bid</i> | -0.16 (0.69) | .82 [-1.51 , 1.19] | -14.79 | -1.45 (0.57) | .01 [-2.57 , -0.32] | -76.54 |
| <i>Region</i> | 0.22 (0.47) | .65 [-0.7 , 1.14] | 24.61 | 0.54 (0.49) | .26 [-0.41 , 1.5] | 71.6 |
| <i>Political Distance</i> | 0.15 (0.51) | .78 [-0.86 , 1.15] | 7.3 | 0.89 (0.54) | .1 [-0.17 , 1.95] | 51.94 |
| <i>No. of Alliances</i> | 0.14 (0.18) | .44 [-0.22 , 0.5] | 15.03 | -0.01 (0.16) | .96 [-0.31 , 0.3] | -1 |
| <i>N</i> | | 1,058 | | | 1,110 | |
| <i>Failures</i> | | 46/49 | | | 28/30 | |
| <i>Countries</i> | | 62/63 | | | 62/63 | |
| <i>LL</i> | | -119.61 | | | -70.24 | |

Table B.4: Robustness test for democracy aid as 2-years averages with different lags. Cox regression; the column % change reports the change in the hazard rate in percent for a 1 standard deviation change in the explanatory variable, except for *Failed bid*, *Region* and *No. of Alliances*, where the change in explanatory variable is 1.

Source: Authors' calculations.

Table B.4 shows that using a greater lag and a shorter averaging period for democracy aid increases the statistical uncertainty that democracy aid has an effect on our outcomes. This is particularly true for the attempt-model. Although statistical uncertainty also increases for the successful circumvention-model, the model's parameter estimate is still within, or at, a 10%-significance level, and its size remains robust.

In the main text, we choose to adjust democracy aid by population size. To show that results do not alter substantially when using alternative data to adjust democracy aid, we replicate our analysis adjusting democracy aid by first, GDP, and second, by the recipient state's government revenue. Data on both GDP and government revenue were taken from the UNU-WIDER's Government Revenue Dataset (GRD; <https://www.wider.unu.edu/about-grd>).

| | <i>(B.5.1)</i> | | | <i>(B.5.2)</i> | | |
|--|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|
| | <i>DV = attempt</i> | | | <i>DV = successful circumvention</i> | | |
| | <i>Coeff (SE)</i> | <i>p [95%-Conf.]</i> | <i>%-change</i> | <i>Coeff (SE)</i> | <i>p [95%-Conf.]</i> | <i>%-change</i> |
| <i>Democracy aid/GDP</i> | -5.35 (2.54) | .04 [-10.32 , -0.37] | -27.46 | -13.51 (5.04) | .01 [-23.39 , -3.64] | -55.54 |
| <i>ODA</i> | -0.05 (0.06) | .37 [-0.17 , 0.06] | -9.11 | -0.08 (0.1) | .44 [-0.27 , 0.12] | -14.17 |
| <i>Liberal democracy</i> | -5.1 (1.56) | .00 [-8.17 , -2.04] | -67.44 | -7.57 (2.86) | .01 [-13.19 , -1.96] | -81.09 |
| <i>Liberal democracy_{t-5}</i> | 3.19 (1.73) | .06 [-1.19 , 6.58] | 101.74 | 4.74 (2.71) | .08 [-0.58 , 10.06] | 183.72 |
| <i>Failed bid</i> | -0.41 (0.7) | .56 [-1.77 , 0.96] | -33.64 | -1.76 (0.64) | .01 [-3.01 , -0.51] | -82.8 |
| <i>Region</i> | 0.2 (0.38) | .6 [-0.54 , 0.94] | 22.14 | 0.14 (0.49) | .78 [-0.82 , 1.09] | 15.03 |
| <i>Political distance</i> | 0.21 (0.47) | .66 [-0.72 , 1.14] | 10.37 | 0.76 (0.53) | .15 [-0.28 , 1.8] | 42.93 |
| <i>No. of alliances</i> | 0.12 (0.17) | .5 [-0.22 , 0.46] | 12.75 | -0.01 (0.15) | .97 [-0.29 , 0.28] | -1 |
| <i>N</i> | | 1,113 | | | 1,166 | |
| <i>Failures</i> | | 46/49 | | | 28/30 | |
| <i>Countries</i> | | 61/63 | | | 61/63 | |
| <i>LL</i> | | -121.69 | | | -66.95 | |

| | <i>(B.5.3)</i> | | | <i>(B.5.4)</i> | | |
|--|----------------|---------------------|--------|----------------|---------------------|--------|
| <i>Democ. aid/Gov. rev</i> | -2.11 (0.96) | .03 [-3.99 , -0.23] | -33.03 | -3.92 (1.46) | .01 [-6.79 , -1.05] | -52.52 |
| <i>ODA</i> | -0.09 (0.08) | .24 [-0.24 , 0.06] | -15.79 | -0.08 (0.14) | .56 [-0.36 , 0.19] | -14.17 |
| <i>Liberal democracy</i> | -5.71 (1.88) | .00 [-9.4 , -2.01] | -71.53 | -8.73 (5.04) | .08 [-18.6 , 1.14] | -85.35 |
| <i>Liberal democracy_{t-5}</i> | 2.91 (1.88) | .12 [-0.77 , 6.59] | 89.69 | 4.42 (4.4) | .32 [-4.21 , 13.04] | 164.43 |
| <i>Failed bid</i> | 0.17 (0.81) | .84 [-1.41 , 1.75] | 18.53 | -1.04 (0.62) | .09 [-2.26 , 0.17] | -64.66 |
| <i>Region</i> | 0.69 (0.65) | .29 [-0.58 , 1.96] | 99.37 | -0.62 (1.02) | .54 [-2.61 , 1.38] | -46.21 |
| <i>Political distance</i> | 0.36 (0.58) | .53 [-0.77 , 1.49] | 18.44 | 1 (0.59) | .09 [-0.15 , 2.16] | 60 |
| <i>No. of alliances</i> | -0.34 (0.33) | .3 [-0.98 , 0.3] | -28.82 | -0.26 (0.22) | .24 [-0.68 , 0.17] | -22.9 |
| <i>N</i> | | 982 | | | 1,016 | |
| <i>Failures</i> | | 36/49 | | | 21/30 | |
| <i>Countries</i> | | 58/63 | | | 58/63 | |
| <i>LL</i> | | -88.27 | | | -42.24 | |

Table B.5: Models with alternative adjustments of democracy aid, 1993-2014. Cox regression; the column %change reports the change in the hazard rate in percent for a 1 standard deviation change in the explanatory variable, except for *Failed bid*, *Region* and *No. of alliances*, where the change in explanatory variable is 1. Democracy aid/GDP: square root-transformed 4-year moving average of democracy aid in relation to Gross Domestic Product; Democ. aid/Gov. rev.: square root-transformed 4-year moving average of democracy aid in relation to government revenue of recipient country.

Source: Authors' calculations.

Data transformation of democracy aid

Like most data on foreign aid, democracy aid data is strongly positively skewed. The transformed democracy aid data, for instance, has a mean of about US\$ 7, with a standard deviation of about US\$ 16, and a maximum value of about US\$ 210 per capita. Such skewness is not uncommon but natural in the case of democracy aid data, and makes it necessary to transform the data and check the robustness of models given transformation choices. In our choice of data transformation, we follow Heinrich & Loftis, who use a square-root transformation of democracy aid.¹ Compared to the more common logarithmic transformation, the square-root transformation has the advantage that values of 0 can be defined. However, one may argue that a logarithmic transformation acts stronger on the skewness of a distribution than a square-root transformation, necessitating robustness checks with logarithmic transformations. In the presence of many zero values – as is the case with democracy aid data –, a common solution is to add a random constant to the data and then take the logarithm. However, a cleaner solution is given by transforming the data to its inverse hyperbolic sine (arcsinh). The arcsinh transformation has the advantage that it is defined for zero as well as negative values (although we do not have the latter in our case), and approximates the logarithm very closely. Furthermore, Bellemare & Wichman (2020) have recently shown, that the arcsinh transformation often performs better than ad hoc transformations of the $\ln(x+1)$ -sort (Bellemare & Wichman, 2020).




Figure B.1: Different transformations for democracy aid. *Source:* Authors' compilation.

Figure B.1 displays the US\$ values of democracy aid data against its percentiles (1) without any transformation, (2) with a square-root transformation, and (3) with an arcsinh transformation in lieu of a logarithmic transformation. Panel one of figure B1 illustrates the extreme skewness of the democracy aid data. The great mass of the data distribution is compressed by a few extreme values in the uppermost percentiles. Panel two and three illustrate that the square-root transformation somewhat and the arcsinh transformation somewhat stronger mitigate the skewness of the untransformed data. To probe the implications for our analysis, we present result of our models using the untransformed and the arcsinh transformed democracy aid data in table B.6.

| | <i>DV = attempt</i> | | | <i>DV = successful circumvention</i> | | |
|--|---------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|
| | <i>Coeff (SE)</i> | <i>p [95%-Conf.]</i> | <i>%-change</i> | <i>Coeff (SE)</i> | <i>p [95%-Conf.]</i> | <i>%-change</i> |
| | <u><i>No transformation</i></u> | | | | | |
| <i>Democracy aid/Cap</i> | -0.03 (0.02) | .12 [-0.07 , 0.01] | -38.75 | -0.08 (0.04) | .06 [-0.17 , 0.00] | -72.94 |
| <i>ODA</i> | -0.03 (0.07) | .64 [-0.177 , 0.1] | -5.57 | -0.00 (0.11) | .98 [-0.22 , 0.21] | -0.57 |
| <i>Liberal democracy</i> | -4.23 (1.56) | .01 [-7.29 , -1.17] | -60.57 | -6.07 (2.66) | .02 [-11.29 , -0.85] | -73.7 |
| <i>Liberal democracy_{t-5}</i> | 2.68 (1.62) | .1 [-0.5 , 5.86] | 80.33 | 3.81 (2.52) | .13 [-1.12 , 8.75] | 131.22 |
| <i>Failed bid</i> | -0.12 (0.66) | .85 [-1.42 , 1.18] | -11.31 | -1.65 (0.57) | .00 [-2.77 , -0.54] | -80.8 |
| <i>Region</i> | 0.58 (0.46) | .21 [-0.32 , 1.48] | 78.6 | 0.82 (0.47) | .08 [-0.11 , 1.74] | 127.05 |
| <i>Political Distance</i> | 0.54 (0.51) | .29 [-0.47 , 1.54] | 28.89 | 1.08 (0.63) | .09 [-0.15 , 2.31] | 66.13 |
| <i>No. of Alliances</i> | 0.07 (0.2) | .74 [-0.33 , 0.46] | 7.25 | -0.05 (0.17) | .77 [-0.39 , 0.29] | -4.88 |

| <i>N</i> | | 1,146 | | | | 1,199 |
|--|--------------|---------------------|--------|--------------|----------------------|--------|
| <i>Failures</i> | | 49/49 | | | | 30/30 |
| <i>Countries</i> | | 62/63 | | | | 62/63 |
| <i>LL</i> | | -131.41 | | | | -76.97 |
| <i>Arcsinh transformation</i> | | | | | | |
| <i>Arcsinh(Democr. aid)</i> | -0.11 (0.13) | .38 [-0.37 , 0.14] | -11.59 | -0.4 (0.19) | .03 [-0.76 , -0.03] | -36.11 |
| <i>ODA</i> | -0.03 (0.06) | .58 [-0.15 , 0.08] | -5.57 | 0.01 (0.1) | .94 [-0.18 , 0.2] | 1.93 |
| <i>Liberal democracy</i> | -4.43 (1.55) | .00 [-7.47 , -1.39] | -62.27 | -6.21 (2.58) | .02 [-11.27 , -1.14] | -74.49 |
| <i>Liberal democracy_{t-5}</i> | 2.81 (1.61) | .08 [-0.35 , 5.96] | 85.56 | 3.98 (2.42) | .1 [-0.77 , 8.72] | 140.03 |
| <i>Failed bid</i> | -0.09 (0.66) | .9 [-1.38 , 1.2] | -8.61 | -1.62 (0.57) | .00 [-2.73 , -0.51] | -80.21 |
| <i>Region</i> | 0.63 (0.46) | .17 [-0.27 , 1.53] | 87.76 | 0.79 (0.47) | .09 [-0.13 , 1.7] | 120.34 |
| <i>Political Distance</i> | 0.57 (0.5) | .26 [-0.42 , 1.56] | 30.72 | 1.03 (0.63) | .1 [-0.21 , 2.26] | 62.27 |
| <i>No. of Alliances</i> | 0.03 (0.2) | .87 [-0.36 , 0.43] | 3.05 | -0.08 (0.16) | .64 [-0.39 , 0.24] | -7.69 |
| <i>N</i> | | 1,146 | | | | 1,199 |
| <i>Failures</i> | | 49/49 | | | | 30/30 |
| <i>Countries</i> | | 62/63 | | | | 62/63 |
| <i>LL</i> | | -132.12 | | | | -77.31 |

Table B.6: Robustness test for democracy aid without and with an alternative transformation. Cox regression; the column %change reports the change in the hazard rate in percent for a 1 standard deviation change in the explanatory variable, except for *Failed bid*, *Region* and *No. of Alliances*, where the change in explanatory variable is 1.

Source: Authors' calculations.

This robustness test confirms the results of our main models and highlights the need to transform the democracy aid data. The substantially larger parameter sizes in the models employing the untransformed democracy aid data are likely due to the greater variance and skewness vis-à-vis the transformed data. The models using the arcsinh transformation confirm our findings from the models using the square-root transformation, namely a substantial and significant effect of democracy aid on the hazard for successful term limit circumventions, and a weaker and much more uncertain effect of democracy aid on the hazard for term prolongation attempts irrespective of success.

Choice of plausible values for democracy aid

For the substantive interpretation of our results, we chose three values of democracy aid per capita that we think are plausible. First, in table 1 in the main text we present the percentage change in the hazard for a one standard-deviation change in democracy aid per capita which equals to an amount of US\$ 2.50 per capita. Second, for the interpretation of figure 1 in the main text we regard countries with US\$ 1.50 per capita as cases with low, and countries with US\$ 27 per capita as cases with high amounts of democracy aid. Figure B1 already provides some perspective on these

values. The chosen values of US\$ 1.50, US\$ 2.50, and US\$ 27 roughly equal the 25th, 40th, and the 95th percentile of our democracy aid data. In order to further contextualize these values, figure B2 plots the amount of democracy aid for each state in our sample throughout the period of analysis.




Figure B.2: Democracy aid per state, 1990-2014. The red line depicts median democracy aid.
Source: Authors' compilation.

The median value of democracy aid per capita varies from US\$ 1.50 to US\$ 9, and to US\$ 4 for a strict measurement of democracy aid. The value chosen by us to indicate a large amount of democracy aid, US\$ 27, provides some sort of outer fringe threshold for democracy aid broadly measured for most of the time, while strictly measured democracy aid only rarely reaches to or beyond US\$ 27. Recall that the major difference between the broad and the strict measure of democracy aid are whether governance support and peacebuilding are included or not.

Robustness test for extreme values

Figure B.4 of the previous section also shows a peculiar pattern of our democracy aid data. For both democracy aid measured broadly and strictly, there are striking sudden increases after around 2009. Comparing these to the level of most other countries in our data, these striking increases may be responsible for much of the large variation in our democracy aid data. It is sensible to identify these cases and exclude them from the analysis for a robustness test that probes whether they drive the association between democracy aid and the risk for term limits that we find.

We define these extreme cases as those states in which per capita democracy aid is, for more than a single year, above US\$ 64 for the broad measure, and above US\$ 27 for the strict measure of democracy aid. This is true for six states (Botswana, Cape Verde, El Salvador, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Uruguay). The majority of these

cases are small (island) states with low population figures which explains part of why our democracy aid per capita measure varies so much for them. Nonetheless, the data reflects that these cases experienced a sudden influx of democracy aid. For a few of them, this is due to the start of mammoth foreign aid programmes with one or multiple components that can be regarded as democracy or governance aid. For instance, in Uruguay, the World Bank issued the Second Programmatic Reform Implementation Development Policy Loan (PRIDPL II) totalling US\$ 431 million in 2009. This included large-scale reforms of the tax and the social security systems, classified as governance support in the sector “Public Administration, Law, and Justice” in AidData (AidData ID: 2416571). For some of the other cases, such as El Salvador, the sudden increase is due to multiple medium sized programmes. In El Salvador, this included a large World Bank governance support project for the sectors of public finance and social security in 2009 (AidData ID: 2416579), followed by another medium-sized European Union funded public finance project and a medium-sized support project to local governments in 2010 (AidData IDs: 96554893, 40661833), and an additional large to medium-sized project to support the justice and legal sector by the US in 2012 (AidData ID: 119351634).

Table B.7 presents our analysis excluding these six states from our sample. While the parameter for democracy aid becomes weaker and its strength and direction more uncertain in the attempt model, both parameter strength and significance barely change in the successful circumvention model.

| | <i>(B.7.1)</i> | | | <i>(B.7.2)</i> | | |
|--|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|
| | <i>DV = attempt</i> | | | <i>DV = successful circumvention</i> | | |
| | <i>Coeff (SE)</i> | <i>p [95%-Conf.]</i> | <i>%-change</i> | <i>Coeff (SE)</i> | <i>p [95%-Conf.]</i> | <i>%-change</i> |
| <i>Democracy aid</i> | -0.09 (0.14) | .5 [-0.36 , 0.18] | -13.41 | -0.38 (0.2) | .06 [-0.77 , 0.02] | -45.56 |
| <i>ODA</i> | -0.01 (0.08) | .86 [-0.18 , 0.15] | -1.89 | 0.04 (0.12) | .72 [-0.19 , 0.27] | 7.94 |
| <i>Liberal democracy</i> | -3.96 (1.47) | .01 [-6.84 , -1.07] | -58.16 | -5.72 (2.56) | .03 [-10.74 , -0.7] | -71.59 |
| <i>Liberal democracy₆₋₅</i> | 2.62 (1.6) | .1 [-0.51 , 5.75] | 77.96 | 3.68 (2.48) | .14 [-1.17 , 8.53] | 124.7 |
| <i>Failed bid</i> | -0.25 (0.69) | .71 [-1.6 , 1.09] | -22.12 | -1.61 (0.59) | .01 [-2.77 , -0.44] | -80.01 |
| <i>Region</i> | 0.62 (0.47) | .19 [-0.3 , 1.53] | 85.89 | 0.84 (0.46) | .01 [-0.07 , 1.74] | 131.64 |
| <i>Political Distance</i> | 0.47 (0.49) | .34 [-0.5 , 1.44] | 24.72 | 1 (0.63) | .11 [-0.23 , 2.23] | 60 |
| <i>No. of Alliances</i> | 0.05 (0.2) | .79 [-0.33 , 0.44] | 5.13 | -0.07 (0.17) | .7 [-0.4 , 0.26] | -6.76 |
| <i>N</i> | | 1,035 | | | 1,088 | |
| <i>Failures</i> | | 49/49 | | | 30/30 | |
| <i>Countries</i> | | 57/63 | | | 57/63 | |
| <i>LL</i> | | -128.69 | | | -76.04 | |

Table B.7: Robustness test, excluding extreme values of democracy aid. Cox regression; the column %-change reports the change in the hazard rate in percent for a 1 standard deviation change in the explanatory variable, except for *Failed bid*, *Region*, and *No. of Alliances* where the change in explanatory variable is 1. Excluded from the analysis sample are Botswana, Cape Verde, El Salvador, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Uruguay. *Source:* Authors’ calculations.

Appendix C

*Appendix to: "Protecting
democracy from abroad:
Democracy aid against
attempts to circumvent
presidential term limits"*

This appendix serves to check our results for possible unobserved heterogeneity. In particular, we carry out robustness tests for unobserved country and year effects.

Unobserved country effects

One concern with our model might be that it does not sufficiently capture heterogeneity between states. It could be that term limits are more prone to be circumvented in some states than in others due to idiosyncratic country effects. As we specified our model as a conditional gap time model, it corrects for this possibility. Conditional gap time models belong to the class of variance-corrected survival models. By correcting the variance-covariance matrix based on residual within-group variance, variance-corrected survival models in conditional gap time specification take account of event dependence as well as heterogeneity.¹ However, one concern with this approach is that heterogeneity is not directly estimated during the estimation stage but only corrected for after estimation, and that some unobserved heterogeneity will be ‘missed’. This is in contrast to another class of survival models, shared frailty models, which estimate unobserved heterogeneity directly. The shared frailty model is similar to a random effects model in regression analyses with panel or time-series-cross-section data. Unobserved heterogeneity causing some observations to be more ‘frail’, or prone to the failure event under study, is directly modelled by additionally specifying a frailty parameter. The frailty parameter is estimated based on random draws from a parametric distribution chosen beforehand, usually the gamma distribution. This is often presented as a weakness of frailty models as there are no good theoretical reasons to favour the gamma distribution over other distributions. A second weakness of frailty models is that, while they are modelling heterogeneity directly, they usually do not take event dependence into account.

In the case of our analysis, as with probably most processes that political science deals with, it is plausible to assume that there might be both, event dependence as well as possible unobserved heterogeneity. For this reason, we favour the conditional gap time model over a shared frailty model in our main text. However, as noted before, it could be that the conditional gap time model specification ‘misses’ some additional heterogeneity. To test for this, we compare our original conditional gap time model against (1) a shared frailty model specification, and (2) a conditional frailty model specification based on Box-Steffensmeier and colleagues.² The conditional frailty model combines the frailty and the conditional gap time model, but is less parsimonious.

Table C.1 presents the results of the shared frailty and the conditional frailty models. Comparing these results to the results of the conditional gap time model in the main text, one finds differences both with regard to parameter size and significance between the shared frailty model and our original main model. Parameter strengths differ and statistical uncertainty about the estimated parameters are in

general higher for many variables in the shared frailty model. However, as noted earlier, the shared frailty model ignores the event dependence given in our data. In contrast, the conditional frailty model models both event dependence and additional unobserved heterogeneity not taken into account by the conditional gap time model. The comparison, however, shows that there are barely any deviations in the conditional frailty model's results from the results of the conditional gap time model in table 1 in the main text. Importantly, both likelihood ratio tests for frailty (indicated by theta, θ) between first, the shared frailty model and our original model, and second, the conditional frailty model and our original model are not significant, suggesting that these models do not capture any additional heterogeneity beyond our original model.

| | <i>Shared Frailty Model</i> | | | <i>Conditional Frailty Model</i> | | |
|--|-----------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|
| | <i>Coeff (SE)</i> | <i>p [95%-Conf.]</i> | <i>%-change</i> | <i>Coeff (SE)</i> | <i>p [95%-Conf.]</i> | <i>%-change</i> |
| | <i>DV = attempt</i> | | | | | |
| <i>Democracy aid</i> | -0.07 (0.13) | .61 [-0.32 , 0.19] | -10.6 | -0.14 (0.15) | .33 [-0.43 , -0.14] | -20.07 |
| <i>ODA</i> | -0.09 (0.11) | .42 [-0.3 , 0.12] | -15.79 | -0.03 (0.11) | .78 [-0.25 , 0.18] | -5.57 |
| <i>Liberal democracy</i> | -6.58 (1.8) | .00 [-10.11 , -3.05] | -76.49 | -4.33 (1.72) | .01 [-7.7 , -0.95] | -61.43 |
| <i>Liberal democracy_{t-5}</i> | 4.75 (1.77) | .01 [1.27 , 8.22] | 184.34 | 2.74 (1.69) | .11 [-0.58 , 6.06] | 82.72 |
| <i>Failed bid</i> | -0.43 (0.68) | .53 [-1.76 , 0.9] | -34.95 | -0.1 (0.68) | .89 [-1.43 , 1.23] | -9.52 |
| <i>Region</i> | 0.62 (0.48) | .2 [-0.32 , 1.55] | 85.89 | 0.61 (0.55) | .27 [-0.46 , 1.68] | 84.04 |
| <i>Political Distance</i> | 0.37 (0.46) | .42 [-0.54 , 1.28] | 18.99 | 0.54 (0.48) | .26 [-0.4 , 1.49] | 28.89 |
| <i>No. of Alliances</i> | 0.11 (0.15) | .48 [-0.19 , 0.41] | 11.63 | 0.05 (0.2) | .81 [-0.34 , 0.43] | 5.13 |
| <i>N</i> | | 1,146 | | | 1,146 | |
| <i>Failures</i> | | 49/49 | | | 49/49 | |
| <i>Countries</i> | | 62/63 | | | 62/63 | |
| <i>Theta (θ)</i> | | 0.21 | | | 0.00 | |
| <i>LR Test (χ^2) for θ</i> | | -0.23 | | | 0.00 | |
| <i>I-Likelihood</i> | | -163.67 | | | -131.81 | |
| <i>LL</i> | | -155.73 | | | -131.81 | |

| | <i>DV = successful circumvention</i> | | | | | |
|--|--------------------------------------|---------------------|--------|--------------|--------------------------|--------|
| <i>Democracy aid</i> | -28 (0.23) | .21 [-0.72 , 0.16] | -36.11 | -0.39 (0.23) | .09 [-0.845 , 0.06] | -46.42 |
| <i>ODA</i> | -0.06 (0.16) | .7 [-0.38 , 0.25] | -10.83 | 0.01 (0.15) | .97 [-0.28 , 0.29] | 1.93 |
| <i>Liberal democracy</i> | -8.71 (2.5) | .00 [-13.6 , -3.81] | -85.28 | -6.12 (2.44) | .01 [-10.91 , - 1.33] | -73.98 |
| <i>Liberal democracy_s</i> | 5.72 (2.53) | .02 [0.76 , 10.67] | 251.98 | 3.88 (2.42) | .11 [-0.86 , 8.62] | 134.81 |
| <i>Failed bid</i> | -1.26 (1.11) | .25 [-3.43 , 0.9] | -71.64 | -1.64 (1.28) | .2 [-4.15 , 0.87] | -80.6 |
| <i>Region</i> | 0.85 (0.68) | .21 [-0.49 , 2.19] | 133.97 | 0.8 (0.69) | .24 [-0.55 , 2.14] | 122.55 |
| <i>Political Distance</i> | 1.00 (0.6) | .1 [-0.18 , 2.18] | 59.25 | 1.03 (0.6) | .08 [-0.13 , 2.2] | 62.27 |
| <i>No. of Alliances</i> | 0.01 (0.23) | .98 [-0.44 , 0.45] | 1.01 | -0.06 (0.26) | .8 [-0.57 , 0.44] | -5.82 |
| <i>N</i> | | 1,199 | | | 1,199 | |
| <i>Failures</i> | | 30/30 | | | 30/30 | |
| <i>Countries</i> | | 62/63 | | | 62/63 | |
| <i>Theta (θ)</i> | | 0.48 | | | 0.00 | |
| <i>LR Test (χ^2) for θ</i> | | -0.62 | | | 0.00 | |
| <i>I-Likelihood</i> | | -95.17 | | | -77.06 | |
| <i>LL</i> | | -84.95 | | | -77.01 | |

Table C.1: Results of alternative model specifications: Shared frailty and conditional frailty. Cox regression; the column %-change reports the change in the hazard rate in percent for a 1 standard deviation change in the explanatory variable, except for *Failed bid*, *Region* and *No. of Alliances*, where the change in explanatory variable is 1. θ describes the random variance (i.e. shared frailty) within countries using a gamma distribution. I-Likelihood describes the frailty term integrated out and is used in calculating the model's likelihood ratio with and without frailty (i.e. twice the difference between the model without the frailty term and the model with the frailty term integrated out).

Source: Authors' calculations.

Year effects

Our model captures duration dependence and through its stepwise definition of time-dependent risk-sets also additional year-specific effects. However, one might worry that our analysis nonetheless captures a spurious correlation between democracy aid and attempts to circumvent term limits as both are systematically increasing over time. In addition, it could be that there are particular year-specific effects in our data, that we do not capture.




Figure C.1: Democracy aid and term limit circumvention attempts over time. The shaded area around the median of democracy aid marks the 95th and the 5th percentile.

Source: Authors' compilation.

Figure C.1 plots democracy aid and the number of circumvention attempts over our period of analysis. Throughout this period, the median of democracy and the variance of the data are increasing. The number of circumvention attempts meanwhile shows a ragged pattern. One of the years without any circumvention attempts, 2012, co-occurs with an extreme increase in democracy aid. However, we have already dealt with these extreme values in the democracy aid data elsewhere (appendix B). To test whether our results are influenced by a calendar time trend, we replicated our analysis including (1) a continuous calendar time variable, and (2) year dummies. The results presented in table C.2 confirm our initial findings.

| | <i>DV = attempt</i> | | | <i>DV = successful circumvention</i> | | |
|----------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|
| | <i>Coeff (SE)</i> | <i>p [95%-Conf.]</i> | <i>%-change</i> | <i>Coeff (SE)</i> | <i>p [95%-Conf.]</i> | <i>%-change</i> |
| | <i>Continuous calendar time</i> | | | | | |
| <i>Democracy aid</i> | -0.25 (0.14) | .07 [-0.52 , 0.02] | -32.97 | -0.51 (0.2) | .01 [-0.89 , -0.13] | -55.78 |
| <i>ODA</i> | -0.02 (0.07) | .84 [-0.16 , 0.13] | -3.75 | 0.05 (0.11) | .67 [-0.16 , 0.25] | 10.02 |

| | | | | | | |
|--|--------------|---------------------|--------|----------------------------|----------------------|---------|
| <i>Liberal democracy</i> | -3.9 (1.67) | .02 [-7.16 , -0.63] | -57.6 | -5.34 (2.76) | .05 [-10.74 , 0.07] | -69.11 |
| <i>Liberal democracy_{t-5}</i> | 2.19 (1.67) | .19 [-1.09 , 5.46] | 61.9 | 2.98 (2.56) | .25 [-2.04 , 7.99] | 92.63 |
| <i>Failed bid</i> | -0.55 (0.62) | .38 [-1.77 , 0.67] | -42.31 | -2.24 (0.67) | .00 [-3.56 , -0.93] | -89.35 |
| <i>Region</i> | 1.38 (0.63) | .03 [0.15 , 2.61] | 297.49 | 1.73 (0.63) | .01 [0.5 , 2.97] | 464.07 |
| <i>Political Distance</i> | 0.83 (0.52) | .11 [-0.19 , 1.86] | 47.71 | 1.42 (0.55) | .01 [0.34 , 2.51] | 94.92 |
| <i>No. of Alliances</i> | -0.1 (0.21) | .64 [-0.52 , 0.32] | -9.52 | -0.22 (0.14) | .13 [-0.5 , 0.07] | -19.75 |
| <i>Calendar time</i> | 0.09 (0.04) | .03 [0.01 , 0.17] | 9.42 | 0.11 (0.05) | .03 [0.01 , 0.22] | 11.63 |
| <i>N</i> | | 1,146 | | | 1,199 | |
| <i>Failures</i> | | 49/49 | | | 30/30 | |
| <i>Countries</i> | | 62/63 | | | 62/63 | |
| <i>LL</i> | | -129.43 | | | -74.77 | |
| | | | | <u><i>Year dummies</i></u> | | |
| <i>Democracy aid</i> | -0.25 (0.15) | .09 [-0.54 , 0.04] | -32.97 | -0.63 (0.26) | .01 [-1.14 , -0.13] | -63.51 |
| <i>ODA</i> | -0.07 (0.09) | .45 [-0.25 , 0.11] | -12.52 | 0.15 (0.13) | .25 [-0.1 , 0.39] | 33.18 |
| <i>Liberal democracy</i> | -5.54 (1.79) | .00 [-9.04 , -2.03] | -70.44 | -6.1 (2.44) | .01 [-10.89 , -1.31] | -73.87 |
| <i>Liberal democracy_{t-5}</i> | 3.85 (1.87) | .04 [0.2 , 7.51] | 133.26 | 4.22 (2.43) | .08 [-0.54 , 8.98] | 153.05 |
| <i>Failed bid</i> | -0.76 (0.6) | .2 [-1.93 , 0.41] | -53.23 | -2.31 (0.78) | .00 [-3.84 , -0.79] | -90.07 |
| <i>Region</i> | 0.72 (0.64) | .26 [-0.53 , 1.97] | 105.44 | 2.43 (0.95) | .01 [0.57 , 4.3] | 1035.89 |
| <i>Political Distance</i> | 0.57 (0.6) | .35 [-0.62 , 1.75] | 30.72 | 2.1 (0.76) | .01 [0.62 , 3.59] | 168.32 |
| <i>No. of Alliances</i> | 0.23 (0.24) | .34 [-0.24 , 0.69] | 25.86 | -0.38 (0.24) | .12 [-0.85 , 0.1] | -31.61 |
| <i>N</i> | | 1,146 | | | 1,199 | |
| <i>Failures</i> | | 49/49 | | | 30/30 | |
| <i>Countries</i> | | 62/63 | | | 62/63 | |
| <i>LL</i> | | -115.78 | | | -59.17 | |

Table C.2: Robustness test for calendar time trend. Cox regression; the column %-change reports the change in the hazard rate in percent for a 1 standard deviation change in the explanatory variable, except for *Failed bid*, *Region* and *No. of Alliances*, where the change in explanatory variable is 1. Year dummies (1991-2014) included but not reported in lower panel.

Source: Authors' calculations.

Appendix D

Appendix to: "Protection against autocratization: how international democracy promotion helped preserve presidential term limits in Malawi and Senegal"

D.1 Universe of cases (1990–2016)


Figure 3.3 in the main text is an extension of Posner and Young (2007, p. 132), and it illustrates our universe of cases. As their analysis stops in 2005, we identify more cases than Posner and Young. We also provide the case years for easier identification. Differences exist between the list of cases we compiled and the list of cases Tull and Simons (2017) compiled in the most recent attempt to identify all cases of attempts by presidential incumbents in Africa to seek a third-term. They identify only 39 instances of presidents who reached the end of their final term, and we identify 59. We do employ the same formalistic criterion for identifying when an attempt to exceed term limits takes place, namely, the introduction of formal measures to suspend term limits (Tull & Simons 2017, p. 84). However, discrepancies exist for three reasons. First, whereas Tull and Simons (2017) restrict their sample to sub-Saharan Africa, we look at all African countries, including Algeria and Tunisia. Second, we count a term limit as being reached as soon as the incumbent enters his final term. Our choice is guided by the rationale that, from that moment onwards, political systems are at greater risk for third-term bids by presidential incumbents. It does not make sense for incumbents to estrange their constituents by starting a bid for a third term during their first term; with such a move they could risk losing the second term election. Similarly, they might start their bid not too late into their second term when they are still, ostensibly, enjoying popular support. As such, whereas Tull and Simons (2017) exclude, for instance, the Seychelles on the grounds that term limits have never been reached, according to our coding, the term limits have twice been reached in Seychelles, even though the respective incumbents (René in 2001 and Michel in 2015) did not complete their final terms. Third, while Tull and Simons (2017) focus on the formal outputs of third-term bids to determine the success or failure of such bids, we differentiate between outputs and outcomes. Outputs are formal measures to suspend term limits, such as constitutional amendments or court rulings. In contrast, either remaining in office for a third term or exiting the office are outcomes marks outcomes for an incumbent president seeking to extend term limits. This has implications; for example, Niger and Senegal are considered successful in terms of output. Presidents Mamadou Tandja and Abdoulaye Wade both pushed through their bids for a third term—the former by dissolving parliament, the latter through a court decision. However, neither of them actually entered a third term. Tandja was ousted by the military, and Wade lost the subsequent presidential election. Similarly, contrary to Tull and Simons (2017), we do not consider Paul Kagame’s 2015 bid in Rwanda as having been successful. Rather, we counted his bid as still underway (as of 2016), and so it is not included in our universe of cases. By differentiating between output and outcome, we also capture cases where no formal output is present. This is of particular importance when considering political systems with strong authoritarian tendencies such as Sudan. According to our coding, in Sudan, Omar Bashir was already in his second term when term limits were introduced in the country in 1998, thus rendering his second term also his final term. Nonetheless, he was re-elected in 2000 without a formal bid to change term limits. We can then consider his re-

election in 2000 as the outcome of a term-limit circumvention without output. This also comes into play when considering Blaise Compaoré’s 2010 to 2014 term. Finally, we count a subsequent term after a successful circumvention of term limits as a president’s final term if the circumvention output does not abolish the term limit entirely. For instance, Compaoré was cleared for re-election in 2005 by Burkina Faso’s constitutional court, which rendered his previous term (2000 to 2005) his first since the introduction of term limits; however, we still count the term for which he was cleared (2005 to 2010) as his second term, and we count his re-election in 2010 as a term-limit circumvention. In the interest of transparency, we disclose all 20 of the cases that we identified but that Tull and Simons (2017) did not where incumbent presidents reached their final terms (see table D.1 below).


| | |
|--|----------------------------|
| Algeria 2004 (Bouteflika) | Seychelles 2001 (René) |
| Angola 1992 (Dos Santos) | Seychelles 2015 (Michel) |
| Burkina Faso 2000 (Compaoré) | Sierra Leone 2012 (Koroma) |
| Burkina Faso 2005 (Compaoré) | South Africa 2004 (Mbeki) |
| Botswana 2013 (Ian Khama) | South Africa 2014 (Zuma) |
| Democratic Republic of the Congo 2011 (Kabila) | Sudan 1998 (Bashir) |
| Guinea 2015 (Conde) | Sudan 2010 (Bashir) |
| Malawi 2009 (Mutharika) | Sudan 2016 (Bashir) |
| Mali 2007 (Touré) | Tunisia 1995 (Bin Ali) |
| Niger 2016 (Issoufou) | Tunisia 2000 (Bin Ali) |

Table D.1: Cases where term limits were reached that were identified by the present authors but not by Tull and Simons (2017). Year indicates the first year of the incumbent’s final term.

D.2 Actor constellations in third-term bids for the presidency in Malawi and Senegal



(a) Malawi



(b) Senegal

Figure D.1: Actor constellations in third-term bids for the presidency in Malawi and Senegal.

D.3 Chronology of third-term bids

| Date | Event |
|------------------|---|
| 1994 | Muluzi wins Malawi's first democratic presidential election and enters his first term as president |
| Mid-1999 | Presidential election: Muluzi is re-elected as president; initial rumors that Muluzi plans to secure a third term circulate |
| 2001 | Withdrawal of direct budgetary support by the EU, the UK, and US due to allegations of government corruption |
| 25 March 2001 | Catholic bishops publicize a pastoral letter cautioning against manipulations of Malawi's constitution without soliciting broad-based political attitudes of the populace |
| April 2001 | Church of Central Africa Presbyterian issues a pastoral letter emphasizing Malawi's democratic culture |
| January 2002 | Denmark suspends all aid to Malawi |
| Early 2002 | Failed attempt to change the constitutional provision for amendments to the constitution from two-thirds to a simple majority |
| April 2002 | Catholic church warns against amendments to the constitution without public consultation in its Lenten Pastoral Letter |
| May 2002 | The Muluzi government issues a ban on demonstrations |
| Early June 2002 | High Court rules the ban on demonstrations unconstitutional; Muluzi counters the ruling publicly, and the High Court overturns it |
| July 2002 | The Open Term Bill is tabled in parliament but narrowly defeated |
| July 2002 | Muluzi's UDF party meets and concludes that the Third Term Bill will be tabled later in the year |
| August 2002 | The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Malawi publicly condemns Muluzi's attempts to secure a third presidential term |
| 6 September 2002 | The Third Term Bill is officially announced for tabling in Parliament |
| September 2002 | IMF and World Bank discuss further aid programs with the Muluzi government and allegedly demand clarification of Muluzi's position on the Third Term Bill |

| | |
|---------------------|---|
| Early October 2002 | Muluzi government institutes another ban on rallies and demonstrations against the Third Term Bill |
| 26 October 2002 | Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace issues a statement condemning the Third Term Bill |
| Early November 2002 | Street fights between police and protesters against the Third Term Bill take place in Blantyre |
| Early 2003 | Third Term Bill is sent to the parliamentary Legal Affairs Committee for revision (i.e., de facto withdrawal) |
| February 2003 | PAC petitions Legal Affairs Committee to withdraw the Third Term Bill officially |
| March 2003 | Muluzi announces his nomination of Bingu wa Mutharika as the UDF candidate in the upcoming presidential elections |

Table D.2: Chronology of events in the Malawi case. *Sources:* Authors' compilation based on Dulani and Van Donge (2005), Morrow (2006), Dulani (2011), and Von Doepp (2019).

| Date | Event |
|-------------------|--|
| 2008 | Constitutional amendment to extend presidential term from 5 to 7 years |
| 18 September 2009 | Wade announces that he will run for office in 2012 elections (http://tinyurl.com/lfvlad) |
| 18 January 2011 | Social movement <i>Y'en a marre!</i> is founded in Dakar and launches a nationwide campaign to mobilize young people into becoming "responsible citizens" and taking part in the elections |
| 19 March 2011 | <i>Y'en a marre!</i> manifesto for "Un Nouveau" (New Senegalese Citizenship) released at rally |
| 21 March 2011 | Alleged coup against the Wade government |
| 24 March 2011 | Protests against "political practices," including corruption and economic grievances, by different established NGOs and new actors from creative industries |
| 17 June 2011 | Wade government proposes reform of electoral law (<i>projet de loi no 13/2011</i>) to Parliament (introducing the office of vice-president, to be elected on same ticket as president; 25 per cent relative majority of vote cast in first round sufficient for election), which is interpreted as an attempt by Wade to enable access to power for his son Karim Wade |

| | |
|-----------------------|--|
| 23 June 2011 | Civil society organizations and opposition parties protest in front of the National Assembly in Dakar (and in St. Louis, Koalack, Kolda, and Ziguinchor) to oppose adoption of Wade's electoral law proposal. The protests became known as <i>Touche pas à Constitution</i> ("Don't touch my constitution"); Controversial election law not adopted; withdrawn after protests. Foundation of civil movement "M-23" initiated by Macky Sall and opposition parties, which are joined by social movements (incl. <i>Y'en a marre!</i>), NGOs, journalists, and labor unions |
| End June 2011 | Violent urban protests against Wade; creation of June 23rd Movement against a third term |
| 15 July 2011 | Wade's televised declaration that he will not run for office |
| 24 July 2011 | Government supporters rally in Dakar for a third term for Wade |
| 13 August 2011 | Restructuring and defining goals of M-23 under the leadership of Alioune Tine and Amath Dansokho |
| 09 October 2011 | Wade reaffirms that he will seek a third term |
| 22 December 2011 | Open letter from US Congress asks Wade to step down to avoid instability |
| 23 December 2011 | PDS declares Wade as its 2012 presidential candidate. <i>Y'en a marre!</i> launches "Faut pas forces" campaign against Wade's candidature |
| December 2011 | France, the UK, and the US openly ask Wade to retire and not to stand in the election |
| December 2011 | AU calls for compromise between government and opposition |
| 27 January 2012 | Constitutional Court confirms Wade's candidacy but refrains from interpreting article 104 of the Senegalese Constitution of 2001 (CC-108/2012) |
| Days after verdict | The Constitutional Court's verdict is met with protests and low intensity violence |
| 29 January 2012 | Other presidential candidates (including Macky Sall and Idrissa Seck) petition the Constitutional Council; Wade's first term was not adjusted to five years after the constitutional reform in 2001, and he argued that the length of term could not then be disassociated from the counting of the terms (CC-109/2012) |
| January-February 2012 | Court ruling sparks protests and riots in urban centers; six people die; <i>Y'en a marre!</i> announces it will continue protests until Wade leaves office |

| | |
|------------------|--|
| 02 February 2012 | The February 2 Compact is entered into by various pro-democratic non-state groups that agree to critically observe the electoral campaign in order to safeguard the constitution and electoral law |
| 26 February 2012 | First round of presidential elections (Wade 34.8 %; Sall 26.6 %) |
| 25 March 2012 | Second round of presidential elections (Sall 65 %; Wade 35 %) |
| 25 March 2012 | Wade calls Sall to congratulate him and acknowledges defeat |
| 1 July 2012 | Parliamentary elections; the Macky Sall coalition (<i>Bennoo Bokk Yaakaar, BBY</i>) is declared the winner of the elections (119 of 150 parliamentary seats) |

Table D.3: Chronology of events in the Senegal case. *Sources:* Authors' compilation based on Kelly (2012), Heyl (2019), and Mueller (2018).

Appendix E

Appendix to: "Process tracing the term limit struggle in Malawi: The role of international democracy promotion in Muluzi's bid for a third term"

E.1 Operationalisation of causal process observations

This appendix operationalises CPOs from the theoretical framework under analysis. CPOs are observable implications that should hold if an explanation derived from a theory holds true. A CPO can be necessary, sufficient, or neither. If a CPO is a necessary condition, evidence must be found for it in order for the theoretical framework from which the CPO is derived to hold. Lack of evidence for the necessary CPO strongly disconfirms the underlying theoretical framework, but finding such evidence does not provide confirmation. In contrast, if a CPO is a sufficient condition, finding evidence for it provides some confirmation for the underlying theoretical framework, while not finding such evidence does not necessarily disconfirm the underlying theoretical framework. In other words, the necessary condition CPO has a high true positive and a high false positive rate (known as the “hoop test” in process tracing vocabulary), while the sufficient condition CPO has a low true positive and a low false positive rate (known as “smoking gun test” in process tracing vocabulary). A CPO that is neither necessary nor sufficient is suggestive only (known as a “straw-in-the-wind test” in process tracing vocabulary). For a more detailed explanation, please refer to Buseti and Vecchi (2018, p. 569).

The theorised mechanisms of the logic of conditionality and of the logic of appropriateness lead to two different observable general implications. According to the hypothesised mechanism of the logic of conditionality, the general theoretical expectation is that external conditionality instruments raised the cost-benefit perceptions of the Malawian political elite. Similarly, for the logic of appropriateness, the general theoretical expectation is that appropriateness instruments mobilised domestic actors opposing a third term to demand that Muluzi adhere to democratic norms, standards, and role obligations. From these two general expectations, a number of more precise CPOs can be derived (see table 4.1).

CPOs of the logic of conditionality should show that opposition to Muluzi’s term limit circumvention was fuelled by anticipated and perceived loss of foreign aid (panel A of table 4.1). An important necessary CPO for the logic of conditionality is that donors actually made the credible threat to and/or actually withdrew aid (A1). Public statements by opposing political elites that refer to a possible loss of aid in consequence to a circumvention of the term limit are not a necessary indication that conditionality actually worked. They constitute, however, sufficient evidence that conditionality did indeed play a role (A2). The same accounts for public statements to donor pressure made by Muluzi. It is possible that donors exerted pressure on Muluzi without him responding to it publicly. If he did however, it is sufficient evidence that such pressure was indeed put upon him (A3). Finally, if party support for Muluzi fractionalised after donors withdrew or credibly threatened to withdraw aid, this would constitute some evidence that aid conditionality changed the cost-benefit perception of political elites (A4). This would, however, be only suggestive, as the timing could just as well have been coincidental.

CPOs of the logic of appropriateness should in contrast show that donor

interventions supported and fuelled demands on Muluzi and his supporters to act appropriately to their democratic role obligations (panel B). For the logic of appropriateness to work, it would have been necessary that donors actually issued condemning statements (B1), and/or that they supported actors opposing Muluzi's term limit circumvention (B2). If actors opposing Muluzi's term limit bid made statements calling him and his supporters to their democratic role obligations, this would constitute sufficient and not necessary evidence as alternative explanations, apart from the logic of appropriateness which could explain such statements (B3). Public reference and request by political opposition parties for support from donors would provide ipso facto evidence for an alignment between domestic opposition and external donors (B4). Finally, if donor-funded civil society mobilised against Muluzi's term limit circumvention, this would constitute suggestive evidence for the logic of appropriateness (B5). Such mobilisation would suggest a localisation of democratic norms that, however, does not exclusively depend on external democracy promotion.

CPOs of party fractionalisation should map the erosion of intra- and inter-party support for Muluzi's term limit circumvention (panel C). As a necessary implication, public statements about decreasing support of members of the UDF and of opposition parties allied with it should culminate over time (C1). If party members of the UDF left, this would individually provide sufficient evidence for party fractionalisation (C2). If Muluzi and his supporters punished such party renegades, this would suggest that they indeed felt threatened by a loss of party support, but it alone would not prove that party fractionalisation was decisive for the outcome (C3).

Finally, the rival explanation that emphasises judiciary institutions as decisive veto players should necessarily provide evidence that judiciary institutions actually ruled against any measures that aided Muluzi's third term bid (D1). Similar to the reasoning on C3, if Muluzi and his supporters attempted to disempower judiciary institutions, this would suggest that they regarded a successful bid threatened by them (D2).

E.2 Assessment of evidence

This Appendix assesses the evidence presented in the analysis against the CPOs derived in appendix E.1 and presented in table 4.1. The reader may consult table 4.2 as a reference.

Concerning the logic of conditionality, the evidence shows that donors did make both credible threats and actually withdrew aid (panel A). Although some of the aid cuts were related to general governance issues and had happened already before the term limit circumvention entered the domestic agenda, some were clearly timed according to developments in the third term struggle. According to donor statements, these aid cuts were in reference to bad handling of the third term debate by the Muluzi government, such as the ban on demonstrations (A1). Political elites referenced the loss of aid as a negative consequence of a term limit circumvention especially at a later stage (A2). Muluzi, too, responded sharply in public to donor interference,

suggesting that he felt pressured (A3). Finally, the CPO that party support eroded after donors had issued credible withdrawal threats passed only partly (A4). The split within the UDF and the founding of the NDA occurred well before donors responded to Muluzi's third term bid; however, party fractionalisation accelerated especially at a later stage in October 2002 after donors more expressly condemned Muluzi's attempt to pass the Third Term Bill.

All CPOs concerning the application of a logic of appropriateness pass (panel B). Donors did condemn Muluzi's attempted term limit circumvention and the increase in political violence to which it led (B1). They supported CSOs and NGOs opposing a third term before as well as during the third term struggle (B2). These organisations mobilised especially during the later stage of the third term bid (B5). They lobbied donors for support in the third term struggle and even the political opposition publicly stated to ask donors for help (B4). Finally, especially during the final stage in which Muluzi tried to pass the Third Term Bill, CSOs framed their demands in terms of respect for democratic norms (B3).

Party fractionalisation clearly played a role for the outcome of Muluzi's third term bid (panel C). Increasing lack of support in Parliament was the final proximate factor that stopped both the Open and Third Term Bills from being passed (C1). However, a comparison between the slight margin by which the Open Term Bill was defeated with the total loss of support for the Third Term Bill a bit more than half a year later indicates how decisive an internationally supported domestic civil society opposition was. Importantly, a split on the term limit circumvention had occurred already much earlier when a few UDF renegades founded the NDA before Muluzi started his bid in earnest. This, however, did not effectively deter Muluzi and his supporters from trying to abolish the term limit (C2). Additionally, the punishment of these UDF renegades had already happened early on, and actually seemed to have solidified UDF party coercion during the vote on the Open Term Bill (C3). Likewise, large parts of the political opposition had been swayed into voting in favour of the Open Term Bill. It was only when civil society more vehemently protested against the Third Term Bill and the political violence unleashed by Muluzi's supporters, and when donors responded jointly with sharper disapproval, that intra- and inter-party support crumbled.

Finally, although judiciary institutions were not strong veto players, they fulfilled an important function of keeping the power balance in Parliament. The CPO that judiciary institutions vetoed legislative measures that eased Muluzi's third term bid passes only partly (D1). On the one hand, the High Court played an important role in re-instituting expelled dissenting MPs to their parliamentary seats. On the other hand, it was insecure in its judgment on Muluzi's demonstrations ban and did let Parliament pass a law restricting the scope of political action by NGOs. In addition, the High Court itself, too, was subject to measures to curb its power passed by Parliament (D2).

E.3 Interviews overview

| Interview no. | Type of actor | Date |
|----------------------|----------------------------|-------------|
| Interview 1 | Malawian CSO | 13 Apr |
| Interview 2 | Malawian CSO | 14 Apr |
| Interview 3 | Government of Malawi | 18 Apr |
| Interview 4 | Malawian CSO | 19 Apr |
| Interview 5 | Malawian CSO | 19 Apr |
| Interview 6 | Parliament of Malawi | 20 Apr |
| Interview 7 | Malawian CSO | 20 Apr |
| Interview 8 | International organization | 21 Apr |
| Interview 9 | Government of Malawi 21 | 25 Apr |
| Interview 10 | Malawian CSO | 21 Apr |
| Interview 11 | Malawian CSO | 24 Apr |
| Interview 12 | Government of Malawi | 24 Apr |
| Interview 13 | International organization | 24 Apr |
| Interview 14 | Malawian CSO | 25 Apr |
| Interview 15 | International organization | 26 Apr |
| Interview 16 | OECD donor | 27 Apr |
| Interview 17 | Government of Malawi | 27 Apr |
| Interview 18 | Parliament of Malawi | 27 Apr |
| Interview 19 | Government of Malawi | 28 Apr |
| Interview 20 | OECD donor | 28 Apr |

Table E.1: List of interviews. All interviews were conducted in Lilongwe, Malawi. CSO = civil society organisation; OECD = Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. *Source:* Authors' compilation.

Appendix F

Appendix to: "Foreign donors, domestic activists: Democracy promotion during Togo's constitutional reform crisis"

| |
|---|
| <p>Questions for the lists of civil society actors and political parties</p> <p>(a) This organization played an important role.</p> <p>(b) This organization worked against us.</p> <p>(c) We closely cooperated or coordinated on certain activities – for instance organized a joint declaration, a protest, a march etc.</p> <p>(d) We did not coordinate on joint activities, but exchanged frequently – for instance through personal meetings, via telephone, E-Mail, WhatsApp etc.</p> <p>(e) We exchanged occasionally – for instance through personal meetings, via telephone, E-Mail, WhatsApp etc.</p> <p>(f) We are officially co-members of an alliance/a coalition/an association.</p> |
| <p>Questions for the list of international actors</p> <p>(g) This donor played an important role.</p> <p>(h) We contacted this donor but did not obtain support or collaborated with them.</p> <p>(i) We received financial support from this donor.</p> <p>(j) We received non-financial support from this donor – for instance public support, information exchange, a contact to another organization.</p> <p>(k) We received both financial and non-financial support from this donor.</p> |

Table F.1: Types of collected collaboration and support interactions.




Figure F.1: Cumulative degree distribution of the collaboration and support network in Togo

| ID | Actortype | Degree | Betweenness | Eigenvector | Interview date |
|----|---------------------|--------|-------------|-------------|------------------|
| 1 | NGO | 16 | 17.94 | 0.58 | |
| 2 | Political party | 30 | 76.83 | 1.00 | 9 January 2020 |
| 3 | Foreign NPO | 17 | 91.77 | 0.49 | 8 November 2019 |
| 4 | CSO | 1 | 0.00 | 0.01 | |
| 5 | Political party | 23 | 21.87 | 0.79 | 13 November 2019 |
| 6 | NGO | 3 | 0.00 | 0.11 | 4 November 2019 |
| 7 | NGO | 1 | 0.00 | 0.03 | |
| 8 | NGO | 22 | 48.80 | 0.80 | 4 November 2019 |
| 9 | NGO | 3 | 0.43 | 0.06 | |
| 10 | NGO | 28 | 61.70 | 0.81 | 6 November 2019 |
| 11 | Political party | 20 | 65.23 | 0.67 | 14 November 2019 |
| 12 | CSO | 1 | 0.00 | 0.03 | |
| 13 | Foreign NPO | 2 | 0.00 | 0.05 | |
| 14 | NGO | 34 | 399.15 | 0.60 | 8 November 2019 |
| 15 | Political party | 16 | 5.98 | 0.63 | 14 November 2019 |
| 16 | CSO | 9 | 7.49 | 0.31 | 7 November 2019 |
| 17 | Political party | 2 | 0.28 | 0.03 | |
| 18 | NGO | 33 | 417.59 | 0.47 | 4 November 2019 |
| 19 | Political party | 4 | 1.13 | 0.04 | |
| 20 | NGO | 1 | 0.00 | 0.01 | |
| 21 | Political party | 21 | 46.37 | 0.73 | 18 December 2019 |
| 22 | NGO | 1 | 0.00 | 0.03 | |
| 23 | Multilateral DS | 3 | 0.63 | 0.06 | |
| 24 | CSO | 1 | 0.00 | 0.01 | |
| 25 | SMO | 31 | 257.90 | 0.97 | 15 November 2019 |
| 26 | SMO | 14 | 11.69 | 0.62 | 31 October 2019 |
| 27 | Multilateral DS | 19 | 28.19 | 0.46 | 12 November 2019 |
| 28 | SMO | 35 | 264.25 | 0.96 | 2 November 2019 |
| 29 | Political party | 32 | 241.32 | 0.98 | 6 November 2019 |
| 30 | Non-Governmental DS | 1 | 0.00 | 0.00 | |
| 31 | NGO | 2 | 0.00 | 0.06 | |
| 32 | Governmental DS | 6 | 0.00 | 0.11 | 19 November 2019 |
| 33 | Governmental DS | 8 | 3.49 | 0.14 | 11 November 2019 |
| 34 | NGO | 19 | 121.72 | 0.48 | 15 November 2019 |
| 35 | Governmental DS | 4 | 0.44 | 0.06 | |
| 36 | NGO | 4 | 0.11 | 0.16 | |
| 37 | Non-Governmental DS | 1 | 0.00 | 0.02 | |
| 38 | CSO | 1 | 0.00 | 0.07 | |
| 39 | NGO | 20 | 23.17 | 0.80 | 15 November 2019 |
| 40 | CSO | 1 | 0.00 | 0.05 | |

| | | | | | |
|----|---------------------|----|--------|------|------------------|
| 41 | SMO | 22 | 32.10 | 1.00 | 3 December 2019 |
| 42 | Political party | 2 | 0.00 | 0.07 | |
| 43 | Non-Governmental DS | 2 | 0.44 | 0.05 | |
| 44 | Political party | 9 | 6.53 | 0.12 | |
| 45 | Governmental DS | 3 | 0.00 | 0.04 | |
| 46 | SMO | 3 | 0.00 | 0.10 | 11 November 2019 |
| 47 | Non-Governmental DS | 6 | 1.97 | 0.17 | 16 January 2020 |
| 48 | Political party | 1 | 0.00 | 0.07 | |
| 49 | Political party | 17 | 9.81 | 0.58 | |
| 50 | Political party | 16 | 7.39 | 0.72 | |
| 51 | NGO | 1 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 19 November 2019 |
| 52 | NGO | 25 | 144.93 | 0.43 | |
| 53 | NGO | 12 | 61.46 | 0.34 | |
| 54 | Political party | 10 | 2.44 | 0.32 | |
| 55 | Foreign government | 1 | 0.00 | 0.01 | |
| 56 | SMO | 2 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 18 November 2019 |
| 57 | Political party | 8 | 2.26 | 0.37 | |
| 58 | Political party | 10 | 7.25 | 0.19 | |
| 59 | CSO | 1 | 0.00 | 0.01 | |
| 60 | Multilateral DS | 22 | 63.04 | 0.30 | |
| 61 | Political party | 8 | 24.01 | 0.12 | |
| 62 | NGO | 1 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 7 November 2019 |
| 63 | Governmental DS | 7 | 2.94 | 0.13 | |
| 64 | NGO | 13 | 28.18 | 0.43 | |
| 65 | NGO | 10 | 31.23 | 0.22 | |
| 66 | NGO | 3 | 0.26 | 0.12 | |
| 67 | NGO | 32 | 170.93 | 0.66 | 23 December 2019 |
| 68 | NGO | 8 | 7.39 | 0.21 | 23 December 2019 |
| 69 | SMO | 18 | 46.83 | 0.50 | |
| 70 | CSO | 6 | 1.63 | 0.08 | 13 November 2019 |
| 71 | CSO | 8 | 71.96 | 0.13 | 4 December 2019 |
| 72 | CSO | 5 | 71.52 | 0.07 | |

Table F.2: Organizations represented in the network with their IDs, centralities, and respective interview dates. DS = Democracy supporter; CSO = Civil Society Organization; NGO = Non-Governmental Organization; SMO = Social Movement Organization.




Figure F.2: Goodness-of-fit statistics for model four in table 5.2.







Figure F.3: Trace- and density-plots of the Markov-Chain Monte Carlo Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MCMC-MLE) of model 4 in table 5.2.




(d) Importance




(e) A2. Governmental DS




(f) A3. All other DS



(g) B2. Governmental DS



(h) B3. Multilateral DS



(i) B4. Non-governmental DS

Figure F.3: Continued - Trace- and density-plots of the Markov-Chain Monte Carlo Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MCMC-MLE) of model 4 in table 5.2.

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