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Regime Defense:
Internal Threats and Explaining Regime Responses to Ethnonationalist Challengers

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[1] Heinkel and deVillafranca (2016, 63).

List of Abbreviations

Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League	AFPFL
Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army	ARSA
Balochistan Liberation Army	BLA
Balochistan Liberation Front	BLF
Balochistan People's Liberation Front	BPLF
Burma Independence Army	BIA
Chief Martial Law Administrator	CMLA
Chief of Army Staff	COAS
East Pakistan Rifles	EPR
Federally Administered Tribal Areas	FATA
Frontier Corps	FC
General Headquarters	GHQ
General Officer Commanding	GOC
Intelligence Bureau	IB
Inter-Services Intelligence	ISI
Jamhoori Watan Party	JWP
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam	JUI
Kalat State National Party	KSNP
Legal Framework Order	LFO
Martial Law Administrator	MLA
Mayu Frontier Administration	MFA
Movement for the Restoration of Democracy	MRD
Muttahida Majlis–e–Amal	MMA
Member of the National Assembly	MNA
Member of the Provincial Assembly	MPA
National Assembly	NA
National Awami Party	NAP
National Democratic Party	NDP
National League for Democracy	NLD
National Security Council	NSC
Northwest Frontier Province	NWFP
Pakistan Air Force	PAF

Pakistan International Airlines	PIA
Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz)	PML(N)
Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid)	PML(Q)
Pakistan Muslim League (Qayyum)	QML
Pakistan People’s Party	PPP
Rohingya Patriotic Front	RPF
Rohingya Solidarity Organization	RSO
Round Table Conference	RTC
United Democratic Front	UDF
Unilateral Declaration of Independence	UDI

Chapter One
Regime Variation in Response to Ethnonationalists

Introduction

Pakistan has failed to end an on-again, off-again rebellion by members of the ethnic Baloch since 1948. While Pakistan's policies towards the Baloch have varied over the years, the continued use of repression and nonaccommodative responses are counterproductive and thus puzzling. The policies further motivate rebels and contribute to the cycle of violence while damaging the state's reputation and economic progress. Why engage in a seemingly failing (ed) policy? How and why do Pakistan's policies toward the minority ethnic Baloch vary with periods of peace (non-violence) and violence? In sum, what explains temporally varying regime security responses to ethnonationalists? Why do regimes peace respond peacefully to groups sometimes and violently toward the same group at other times? This study seeks to answer these overarching questions.

State response to ethnonationalism and secession has seen relatively little scholarship, particularly compared to explanations for why groups rebel or attempt secession.[2] Moreover, variation in state response against minority groups across space and time has focused primarily on the nation-state level of analysis. An unpacked causal mechanism needs to be included for why and how regimes decide to respond to ethnonationalists. What is missing is a more refined analysis of regime decision-making, including the ruling elite's perception of threats to their rule. This focuses on regime perceptions and responses to ethnonationalists, providing a more rigorous treatment of the empirical record by unpacking the 'black-box' of decision-making. My argument builds on and argues against alternative explanations that focus primarily on external factors determining nation-state response to minority, ethnonationalist, and secessionist challengers (Butt 2017a; Mylonas 2012). I contend a multi-level analysis explanation including structural and individual levels of analysis. Weak states engender internal wars because these states are divided into ethnic factions. Within these factions, as the ruling regime, one group tends to dominate the state, whose interest is to remain in power. This study posits that regime security response variation to

[2] Notable exceptions on state response literature include Butt (2020, 2017), Griffiths (2016), Grigoryan (2015), Cunningham (2014), Ker-Lindsay (2014), Mylonas (2012), Walter (2009), and Kohli (1997).

ethnonationalists is predicated on the perceived threat that an ethnonationalism group poses to the regime. The regime comprises political elite(s) that are the state's primary decision-maker(s), who are self-interested and want to retain power (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003, 21; Haas 2005, 20). These structural constraints (weak state) and preferences (political survival) influence the actor-specific (individual) regime that has the agency to respond to ethnonationalists (Hudson and Day 2020; George 2003; Waltz 2001). I argue that threats the ruling regime perceives impact the regime's response, which can vary from nonviolent to violent.

Chapter Laydown

The chapter contains definitions, a literature review, a puzzle, an argument, a research design, a methodology, a case studies overview, limitations, relevance, contribution, and a study layout. I first define relevant terms used throughout this study. Regime refers to the ruling, political, or military elites who determine government response (Feraru 2018, 103; Carey 2010). The regime is used interchangeably with terms like political leaders/leadership, ruling elites, political elites, or government (Feraru 2018). "Regime security [is the] condition where governing elites are secure from violent challenges to their rule" (Jackson 2016, 201). Regime defense refers to the regime's activities to protect itself from nonviolent or violent challengers to its rule. A perceived threat means that the incumbent ruling group believes they are facing a challenge for government control and a hold on power, whether violent or nonviolent, internal or external (Mahoney-Norris 2000, 71). Ethnonationalists are "proportionally large, regionally concentrated peoples with a history of organized political autonomy … [who are motivated by the] political objective 'exit,' that is they proactively pursue independent statehood or extensive regional autonomy" (Gurr 2015, 83-84). This study focuses on ethnonationalism.[3]

[3] Ethnonationalism as defined by Tambiah as "the generation of regional or subnational reactions and resistances to what is seen as an overcentralized and hegemonic state, and their drive to achieve their own regional and local sociopolitical formations" (Tambiah 1996, 16-17). Separately, secession is 'the withdrawal, from an existing state and its central government, of part of this state, the withdrawing part consisting of citizens and the territory they occupy" (R. Ganguly 1997, 5; Beran 1984, 21). "The ultimate objective of a secessionist movement is to acquire international acceptance and recognition as a sovereign member of the community of states" (R. Ganguly 1997, 5). "Demands can also shift from autonomy to independence and back again, depending on the state of negotiations between central governments and separatists" (Horowitz 2000, 232). R. Ganguly identifies secessionism as "a narrower sub-category of the broader concept of separatism—which includes irredentism, devolution, autonomy, and other types of limited self-determination" (R. Ganguly 1997, 5). This study uses secessionism and separatism interchangeably, thus including "movements seeking a separate region within an existing state and those seeking a separate and independent state" (Horowitz 2000, 232). For an excellent review of secession strategies and how and why secession succeeds or fails, see Coggins (2014); Sorens (2012); Griffiths and Muro (2020); and Griffiths (2021).

Literature Review

This study builds on and contributes to research that analyses government responses to challengers, explicitly exploring the variation in regime response to ethnonationalists, which has been mostly ignored in the literature (Blaydes 2018; Davenport 2007a).[4] This section provides an overview of the relevant literature on multiple political science fields, including comparative politics, internal war, political violence, state strength/weakness, ethnic conflict, state/regime responses, secession, decision-making, international relations, threat perception, and South Asia studies. This literature is organized around the relevance of internal war, structural impacts on weak states, the importance of ethnicity, and various explanations of how and why states respond to challengers.

Why study state and regime policies toward ethnonationalists? Intra-state violence often results from conflict over nation-building policies (Mylonas 2012, 9; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Intra-state violence, or internal war, is more prevalent and destructive than interstate war (Tang 2015).[5] Internal war is not only a policy concern but it can also impact the regime's "political survival, and [the] expectation of these consequences influences" (Ritter 2014, 147) the regime's response.[6]

Where does internal war occur? Internal wars occur mainly in weak states, often in the Third World.[7] "Weak states lack empirical sovereignty and their governments often act contrary to societal or state interests" (Feraru 2018, 102).[8] This is especially apparent "when the very survival of the political leadership comes under threat" (Feraru 2018, 104).

[4] This study builds off notable exceptions, including Staniland (2021), Butt (2017), and Mylonas (2012).
[5] "By the year 2000, over three-quarters of violent political conflicts were fought either by groups seeking to establish a separate nation-state or to change the ethnic balance of power within an existing state" (Muro and Woertz 2018, 14). "Ethno-national wars for independence are commonly considered to be the main threat to international peace and regional security in the post-Cold War period (Marshall and Gurr 2003)" (Muro and Woertz 2018, 14).
[6] Ritter argues that "holding power provides political officials with significant benefits, such as influence over policies, the distribution of rents, and even power itself, that they prefer to retain (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Prevalent challenges destabilize governmental control over policies, imposing costs and disrupting society, especially if violent or multidimensional (Davenport 1995). Furthermore, dissent undercuts authorities' legitimacy to rule, suggesting to interested observers that they cannot control the population (Davenport 1995). If a leader's supporters come to believe that the leader cannot control policy outcomes or rule effectively, they become less likely to support the leader's position in office, shifting to support a challenger instead (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). A leader concerned that they may lose power therefore faces incentives to" (Ritter 2014, 147) counter challenges which may include the decision to repress.
[7] Third World and weak states are often used interchangeably, like Feraru this study prefers 'weak state' "as it reflects an all-encompassing, straightforward assessment of the concept's core features" (Feraru 2018, 102-103).
[8] This study uses Feraru's definition of state weakness as "the relationship between state and society, not the size of the state in terms of territory, population, military, or economic prowess" (Feraru 2018, 103). State

Muhammad Ayoob (1995) explains the Third World is in the "early stage of state making, … [becoming a] late entry into the system of states" (Ayoob 1995, 4). "The artificiality of the Third World state created a situation in which groups owe allegiance to and act [for] interests other than the national interest. Instead of identifying with the state, individuals identify with ethnic, religious, or regional groupings. This [narrow seeking] of [interests] perpetuates itself by preventing the formation of a national consciousness" (David 1991b, 239). Those that hold power are "often simply the representative of the group that holds power in the capital" (David 1991b, 12) or has the strongest institutions, such as the military. "In this situation, the leadership becomes just one other contender in a struggle for power that knows few constraints" (David 1991b, 12). Third World states and their substate actors tend to operate in the structural realism paradigm of an anarchic system (Jackson 1990; Waltz 1976). Those in power are insecure and live in a self-help world, much like states in the international system (Christia 2012). Moreover, autocratic policymakers, like democratic ones, may care deeply about policy substance. However, they cannot afford to ignore how their decisions will affect the regime's survival and their survival (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018, 66). The ruler's imperative is political survival (Wriggins 1969).

Myron Weiner notes that Third World states are characterized by "hegemonic rather than accommodative ethnic politics ... A single ethnic group has taken control over the state and used its powers to exercise control over others" (Weiner and Huntington 1994, 35).[9] Hegemonic states contrast with neutral states that seek to regulate conflict within their sovereignty versus the hegemonic state that promotes the interests of the dominant ethnic group (Peleg 2004; Jesse and Williams 2011). Once gaining hegemony, the ruling elites find preventing the rise of potential challengers paramount (Mearsheimer 2014). A weak state fails to abide by Max Weber's definition of a state, holding a "monopoly of [the] legitimate use of force" (Dreijmanis 2008, 156). This is particularly true for ethnically heterogenous

strength can fall along a weak-strong continuum that includes "two dimensions: (1) the ability of the state apparatus to control the population and territory of the state and (2) its level of legitimacy among the population" (Feraru 2018, 103). "This generates a certain level of coherence between societal and regime interests, as the only accepted way of change in government is winning free and fair elections. However, in the case of weak states, vulnerable leaders cannot rely exclusively on state structures to exercise control and often find themselves dependent on patronage networks or military support. Moreover, legitimacy tends to be conditional on performance, mostly economic and/or support for a ruling ideology. Even when states hold elections on a regular basis, results are often contested, and discontent sometimes leads to protests and violence (Omotola 2010). Under such circumstances, the attempts of political elites to consolidate their power base generate societal, state, and regime needs and interests that sometimes clash" (Feraru 2018, 104).

[9] "The process of state-building has rendered many ethnic groups devoid of power and influence" (Weiner and Huntington 1994, 36).

states with vestiges of precolonial or colonial institutions with competing political authority bases and where the central government cannot reach. "Because weak states lack legitimacy, they face continual threats to their rule" (David 1991b, 240), such as ethnonationalism, which represents a competing source of legitimacy and thus challenges the legitimacy of the central state (Mitra and Lewis 1996, 6).

Why does ethnicity matter compared to other identities, and why does it threaten the ruling elite in a weak state? Ethnic groups are individuals who identify as and are identified as members of the same ethnic group. Ethnicity is ascriptive and cannot be chosen like one's political views and opinions (Roessler 2016, 66).[10] Ethnicity is crucial as it represents the networks that rival groups of violence specialists mobilize as they compete for power (Roessler 2016, 82).[11] Ethnonationalists, by their very existence, challenge the hegemonic state's balance of power, and if they become secessionists, they pose a significant threat to the regime. Strong states do not face the same challenges from ethnonationalist groups, and their primary concern is not security for the ruling elite.

Explanations for Regime Response

Ethnic identity does not explain the fluctuations in peace and violence between regimes and ethnic groups. "Ethnic-based conflict [studies] continue to be dominated by a focus on grievances[12] or opportunity structure[13], often failing to consider how rulers assess competing

[10] "One's ethnicity cannot be easily chosen or changed by individuals, makes it hard for those outside the winning coalition to 'switch' their identity to gain access to state spoils" (Roessler 2016, 66).

[11] In South Asia, "the rival claims to legitimacy from the territorial state and those challenging its authority on the basis of separate nationhood have traditionally been based on appeals to a separate identity based on language, race, ethnicity, history, and geography" (Mitra and Lewis 1996, 6-7).

[12] Much of the civil war literature has focused on the motives of "potential rebel's decisions to fight" (Hendrix 2010, 274) either through societal grievance, also known as relative deprivation, or economic greed (Hendrix 2010). These arguments are better known as grievance versus greed. Grievance theories are socio-psychological and hold that minority groups are 'justice-seeking' (Webb 2017, 13). "Groups are more likely to mobilize against the center when they harbor significant resentment toward the dominant group or central government owing to economic disparities or political exclusion" (Jenne, Saideman, and Lowe 2007, 544; Gurr 2011; Gurr 2000). In contrast, greed theories emphasize a rational actor approach where groups are 'loot-seeking' (Collier and Hoffler 2005; Webb 2017, 13). In other words, greed theories assume "that rebels act in pursuit of self-interested material gain" (Regan and Norton 2005, 319). Korf (2005) notes "that the two models … are not mutually exclusive and may be causally linked" (Webb 2017, 13). Collier (2000) also suggests "that civil wars are rooted in causes that reflect a combination of 'greed and grievance'" (Regan and Norton 2005, 319). However, "there is limited and often inconclusive statistical evidence to support these claims" (Webb 2017, 16), and further research has found them both lacking in explanatory power (Christou 2009; Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009).

[13] Another debate is on the "political opportunity structure that affects potential rebels' decisions to fight" (Hendrix 2010, 273). "Political opportunity structure theories tend to highlight the role of specific changes or events that may provide windows of opportunity for protesters in achieving collective action or capitalize on weaknesses on the government side (see, e.g., McAdam, 1982; Meyer, 2004; Tarrow, [2011])" (Gleditsch and

threats and why they are unable to simply increase concessions in the face of an aggrieved population while having weakened capacity to repress" (Roessler and Ohls 2018, 4). While underlying structural conditions can predict which countries are more vulnerable to civil war than others by focusing on conflict escalation, they do not explain the outbreak of large-scale political violence (Roessler 2016, 41). For instance, Gulawar Khan notes that Pakistan's incomplete federalism project is the main reason for continuing Baloch nationalism (Khan 2014, iii). While this structural factor contributes to the Baloch-Pakistan conflict, it does not explain how or why the state opts to vary their response to Baloch nationalists, for example, by accommodation and, other times, with repression.[14]

Moreover, Rosenau points out in one of the founding articles on foreign policy analysis, "identify[ing] factors is not to trace their influence. To uncover processes that affect external behavior is not to explain how and why they are operative under certain circumstances and not others" (Hudson and Day 2020, 194; Rosenau 1966, 98). Past literature "highlights certain conditions that increase the likelihood of violence and war, but there are no firm causal connections because [they cannot] satisfactorily explain variance in the dependent variable" (Holsti 1998, 112).[15] Thus, causal mechanisms for internal war are mostly probabilistic, lack parsimony, and fail to open the black box of a detailed explanatory causal story.

In sum, the state has the power to accommodate and repress. The regime has a say in instigating internal war with ethnonationalists.[16] Why do regimes respond to ethnonationalists

Ruggeri 2010, 300). "Most of the literature on mobilization has focused on the role of an observed decline in state strength as an indicator of political opportunity structures (see, e.g., Skocpol, 1979; Tilly, 1978)" (Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010, 300). In other words, as Hendrix (2010) highlights "the political opportunity model (Tilly, 1978) places state capacity at the center. The decision to rebel takes into account the government's capacity for repression and accommodation. If the state is capable of repressing, then the likelihood of capture will be higher, and rebellion will be less likely. If the state is capable of accommodating grievances via institutionalized channels, such as redistribution, the granting of autonomy rights, or the incorporation of dissident movements within the party system, then the motivation for violent rebellion will be lessened and conflict will be less likely. In either the repressive or accommodative response scenario, state capacity is central. For a state to repress, it must identify potential rebels and apply coercion. For a state to accommodate, it must redistribute resources and power" (Hendrix 2010, 273).

[14] Fearon adds that "simply noting that some factor makes rebellion more likely to succeed or be self-sustaining does not explain why it would occur" (Fearon 2010, 41).

[15] Such as Van Evera (1994).

[16] Grigoryan identifies that "a common error in state-minority conflicts … is [that] minority mobilization [is treated] as a sufficient cause of violence" (Grigoryan 2015, 207) and "a good theory of violent state-minority conflict must account for states' responses to these mobilizations" (Grigoryan 2015, 207). Amin "suggests the policy of the state is the primary factor in changing the course of [ethnonationalist] movements. If the state evolves a mechanism of sharing power with all ethnic groups, the ethnonational movements are bound to

in different ways? How do regimes decide to respond to ethnonationalists? Several literature explanations explore government responses, including reputation, signaling, deterrence, ideology, institutions, veto, behavior, regime type, and external state influences.

One "school of thought explains the reaction(s) of states to ethno-nationalists with reference to the concepts of reputation, signaling, and deterrence" (Butt 2017a, 5; Walter 2009; Toft 2003). "Scholars from this school argue that by fighting hard against ethno-nationalist group[s] …, they therefore acquire 'hard' reputations … [in which] governments can deter future would-be nationalists from even trying to secede" (Butt 2017a, 5; Walter 2009). Butt summarizes that "this theory expects ethnically heterogenous states to fight harder than relatively homogenous - especially binational - states because the former's relative diversity implies a greater number of potential secessionists that need to be deterred" (Butt 2017a, 5) however, this "struggles to explain internal variation in state response" (Butt 2017a, 6).

Scholars have examined variations in state response to ethnonationalists and secessionists, focusing on factors internal to the state (Butt 2020 and 2017). Kohli suggests that levels of violence "typically follow the shape of an inverse 'U' curve … in developing-country democracies" (Kohli 1997, 326) such as India. This occurs "when state authority is well institutionalized and when national leaders act in a firm but accommodating manner, [during] ethnic conflicts" (Kohli 1997, 343) and particularly towards self-determination movements. However, this argument does not apply to weak states.[17] In contrast to India, Pakistan cannot accommodate these movements because it does not have a federal framework nor a democratic culture to do so (Jaffrelot 2016b, 512). Cunningham's theory of self-determination politics, veto-power theory, argues "that although there are many differences across [self-determination] groups and states, the structure of competition within these actors can be examined systematically, and this internal structure critically affects the interaction between states and [self-determination] groups in a number of ways" (Cunningham 2014, 2). Butt states that this "argument is valid only in those situations when decision makers wish to make concessions but cannot do so for institutional reasons" (Butt 2017a, 80). However, as

decline. In the absence of power-sharing arrangement the movements are likely to rise" (Amin 1988, xxvii). In state responses to secessionists, Butt (2020) argues that groups are responsible for separatism, the state for separatist war and "it is thus usually the state, not the secessionist group, that compels war in such interactions" (Butt 2020, 69).

[17] Sumit Ganguly and William R. Thompson (2017) note that India is neither strong nor a weak state, but rather falls along the continuum as an "inbetweener".

Butt notes for Pakistan in the 1970s, there were no issues within regime decision-making even when regimes changed (Butt 2017a, 80). On state reputations, Griffiths' theory of metropolitan response argues "that metropoles rely on administrative lines and categories when determining which groups can secede without fear of setting a precedent and who they must deny and potentially fight to maintain a credible reputation" (Griffiths 2016, 17). However, "since states do not generally create differentiated administrative boundaries as empires did, this argument is less applicable to modern separatist conflict than the independence struggles of native nationalists against colonial rule" (Butt 2017a, 7).

This study builds on Tilly's work and examines regime perceptions of actors and their actions. Tilly theorized that the government's response is predicated on the behavior of those that pose a challenge which is based on the acceptability of the action taken and the acceptability of the actor, or group involved (Davenport 2012, 6-7). "Tilly did not believe that all governments [respond] to the same challenges in comparable ways, rather, different types of regimes responded [to behavior] in different ways" (Davenport 2012, 7).[18] Tilly's theory does not show state agency and argues that specific regimes respond to a particular behavior in certain ways, which misses why the same regimes respond to the same challengers differently over time. This explanation does not unpack how the regime decides whether an action or an actor is acceptable.

Several scholars have focused on the role of external actors in state responses. Horowitz notes that "secession lies squarely at the juncture of internal and international politics, but for the most part the emergence of separatism can be explained in terms of domestic ethnic politics" (Horowitz 2000, 230). Mylonas argues that other theories cannot account for essential shifts "in nation-building policies across space and over time" (Mylonas 2012, 187).[19] He identifies "conditions under which the ruling political elites of a state target non-

[18] Tilly "believed that [four] types of regimes responded in different ways" (Davenport 2012, 7). These types are repressive, totalitarian, tolerant, and weak (Davenport 2012, 7; Davenport 2009; Tilly 2000; Tilly 2006). Davenport notes that Tilly's model is relatively complex and shows that "one's understanding of repression is intricately connected with who is challenging political authorities, who the specific political authorities are (i.e., what type of government they exist within and at what level or capacity), how the two are or are not connected with one another and what alternatives exist for both actors" (Davenport 2009, 380). Later, Tilly (2005) updated his views, "arguing instead that the influence of dissent on repression is likely to [vary] according to the presence/absence of diverse mechanisms" (Davenport 2015, 18).

[19] "Nation-building, sometimes used interchangeably with national integration, is the process through which governing elites make the boundaries of the state and the nation coincide" (Mylonas 2012, xx).

core groups[20] with assimilationist policies instead of granting them minority rights or excluding them from the state" (Mylonas 2012). State "policies toward non-core groups are influenced by both its foreign policy goals and its relations with the external patrons of these groups" (Mylonas 2012). "The presence of external support for a non-core group and the interstate relations between the external power and the host state determine whether the group will be perceived as threatening or not" (Mylonas 2012, 47).[21] This argument, however, aggregates violent and non-violent responses together and cannot see when states opt to vary between peaceful and violent approaches.

Butt's argument is like Mylonas's but analyzes state responses to secessionist movements and argues that a secessionist movement's external security implications "determine a state's strategy, guiding whether, and how much, it coerces separatists" (Butt 2017a, 2). It is "the large and immediate shift in the balance of power that would accompany a change in its borders" (Butt 2017a, 17) that drives a state's decision-making. The independent variable, the likelihood of war, is based on two factors. First, "if there is a deep identity division between the [state] and the [separatists]" (Butt 2017a, 2), and second, if the regional neighborhood has a militarized history. If border changes are acceptable and thus not an external security threat, then the result is negotiations and concessions with separatists. However, if border changes are unacceptable, "third-party support [to separatists] pushes the state to climb the escalatory ladder" (Butt 2017a, 18). "As perceived external threats to the state increase, so does the weight of the state's response: more serious threats are dealt with more violently. The extent of the external threat, in turn, depends on the state's evaluation of future war, either against the seceded state or an existing rival, and the degree of third-party support for the secessionists" (Butt 2017a, 18). Butt argues that "when a state … believes a group is enjoying third-party support [the state] behaves very differently to when it merely alleges such support for domestic gain" (Butt 2017, 36). "The severity of the [perceived] external threat is what compels states to escalate to [their response to secessionists]" (Butt 2017a, 41). This argument assumes that the state's leaders act in what they believe is in its best interest, avoiding future war. However, as I argue in chapters two and three, the argument fails to

[20] Non-core groups are defined as "any aggregation of individuals perceived as an unassimilated ethnic group by the ruling political elites of a [state]" (Mylonas 2012, 26).
[21] "A non-core group supported by an enemy external power and residing in a revisionist host state is more likely to be excluded than targeted with assimilation or accommodation; if a similar group were to reside in a status quo state, it would most likely be targeted with assimilationist policies; taking the form of colonization by core group members and internal displacement of non-core group members" (Mylonas 2012, 47).

explain variation in Pakistan's response to the Baloch over time and neglects the impact of domestic politics.

In sum, previous scholarship on state response often avoids opening the 'black box' of the state (Jervis 2017b, 3). Thus, the literature misses understanding why regimes decide to respond to ethnonationalists as well as how the decision-making process occurs and why the type of response changes and varies over time.[22]

Decision-Making and Threat Perception

Why examine decision-making? "To understand human behavior we have to examine how people think, interpret their environments, and reach decisions" (Jervis 2017b, 2).[23] An example of why leaders matter was U.S. President Donald Trump, whose leadership led to significant discontinuity in American foreign policy and international relationships (Drezner 2020; Hudson and Day 2020, 31, 39).[24] This study agrees with the field of political psychology, foreign policy analysis, and the empirical realities that leaders do matter.[25] In turn, it is vital to understand how they make decisions (Hudson and Day 2020, 71).
Jervis states, "We need to look inside the 'black box' of the state to study the goals, beliefs, and perceptions of the decision-makers" (Jervis 2017b, 3). In short, we cannot understand "why states respond to [groups] in different ways without looking inside these actors" (Cunningham 2014, 18). Decision-makers can vary in many ways— including their goals, means, psychological biases, and political effectiveness. Like Saunders (2011), I focus on how decision-makers differ in their substantive beliefs about threats' origin. This claim is more specific than arguing that ideas matter: regime decision-makers determine which threat perception dominates at a particular moment (Saunders 2011, 4).

[22] This paper agrees with Staniland (2021), Staniland, Mir, and Lalwani (2018), Straus (2015), and Davenport (2007a) that "state preferences and perceptions [are not] given and static, but … are historically constructed and variable" (Staniland et al. 2018, 3).
[23] Further, "if one wishes to probe the 'why' questions underlying the events, conditions, and interaction patterns which rest upon state action, then decision-making analysis is certainly necessary. … *the 'why' questions cannot be answered without analysis of decision making* (R. Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1962, 33; emphasis in original)" (Hudson and Day 2020, 8).
[24] Trump's rhetoric also incited a siege of the U.S. Capitol by partisans trying to overturn Trump's 2020 presidential election loss, resulting in the deaths of five Americans (Fandos, Cochrane, Sullivan, Thrush, Kanno-Youngs, and Martin 2021).
[25] Humans, including decision-makers, "frequently err in how they process information, their calculations of relative power, their identification of the options at their disposal, and their assessments of the likely consequences of their actions. … Therefore, a state's behavior may have more to do with its leaders' personality, beliefs, and images than objective systemic constraints and opportunities" (Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell 2016, 20; Jervis 2017a).

The regime policy-making process is part of an action-reaction process between the regime and its opponents, who may take actions that the regime perceives as threatening. [26] Scholars have noted that threat perception remains under studied (Jervis 2017b, xvi; Staniland et al. 2018, 39). The outbreak of large-scale regime violence against internal challengers is not an inevitable byproduct of structural weakness but a strategic choice rulers make in a highly uncertain environment (Roessler 2016). Focusing on how a regime qualifies as a threat relative to other threats helps explain variations in regime behavior. "Ideas shape the deep structure of regime threat assessments and determine the political space governments perceive for bargaining with different types of groups" (Staniland et al. 2018, 9; Staniland 2021). Regimes "try to assess, [or perceive] which groups can be politically tolerated, which are sympathetic, and which are existential threats" (Staniland et al. 2018, 10) rather than power calculations alone (Staniland 2021; Tankel 2018; Christia 2012). This is not to say that state response is objective or infallible in considering threats. Regimes can, and do, certainly misperceive the level of threat a political challenger poses regardless of whether the threat should normatively require a softer or harder touch. Helen Fein identifies that "regardless of how irrational policy decisions based on exaggerated or even fictionalized accounts of political reality, they should be considered 'goal oriented acts from the point of view of their perpetrators.' Mass murder is always a calculated choice by policy makers based upon the pursuit of specific objectives" (Pion-Berlin and Lopez 1991, 67-68; Fein 1979). As Straus finds, strategies of violence have ideational foundations (Straus 2015, 329).

Mahoney-Norris (2000) suggests that threats are not exclusively endogenous phenomena within nation-states alone. Instead, threats are defined by external and internal factors (Davenport 2000, 15). The degree of threat is a judgment based on the historical context that each regime encountered, including military, political, economic, and psychological elements (Mahoney-Norris 2000, 75). Poe, Tate, Keith, and Lanier (2000, 32) conceptualize domestic threats to regimes using multiple cues, exploring causes of the subset of human rights about the person's integrity. One important cue for a decision maker considering responding to an

[26] "One of the arguments guiding this research is that threat and repression are inextricably linked; it would be impossible to fully understand the impact of threat on repression without also considering the question, 'what is the impact of repression on threat?' Decision-making models seeking to explain the linkage between dissent and repression commonly portray causation as flowing in both directions (e.g., DeNardo, 1985; Lichbach, 1987; Moore, 1995; Gartner and Regan, 1996). Since threats are a subset of all dissenting activities, they too are inextricably linked to repression, with causation, likely, traveling in both directions" (Poe, Tate, Keith, and Lanier 2000, 30). This is like the "'conflict/dissent-repression nexus' (e.g. Lichbach, 1987)" (Davenport and Loyle 2012, 76).

event is whether an organized opposition effort is staging such events. A second cue that regime leaders would perceive is related to the nature and extent of an organized opposition's grievance against the government. Finally, like Davenport (1995), Poe et al. assume that the presence of violence will be an essential factor affecting decision-makers' threat perceptions (Poe et al. 2000, 32).

Staniland (2021) and Staniland et al. (2018) provide "a theoretical framework for explaining regime perceptions of armed groups and the strategies state security managers pursue toward different types of groups" (Staniland et al. 2018). They argue that the critical regime institution for Pakistan is the military, which assigns "armed groups to different political roles reflecting both their ideological affinity with the military and the operational benefits they can provide to the army" (Staniland et al. 2018). "Ideology shapes regime threat perception, driving assessments of the relative hostility, tolerability, and compatibility of non-state armed groups" (Staniland et al. 2018). "Ideologies shape the level of threats to … the … interests of states' leaders" (Haas 2005, 2). Ideologies are the "actors' foundational principles of domestic political legitimacy" (Haas 2005, 1). Pion-Berlin and Lopez (1991) find that ideology is a motivating factor in state repression.[27]

Staniland (2021) and Staniland et al. (2018) note that Baloch mobilization in Pakistan is seen as more threatening since it promotes ethno-separatist cleavages, which are perceived as less manageable than certain Islamist-related groups that are potentially compatible with the military's version of Pakistani nationalism (Staniland et al. 2018, 37). Staniland's theory (2021, 147) expects a hardline response against ethnolinguistic groups as they ideologically oppose the state and a far more heterogenous armed politics with Islamist militant groups. However, in the case of the Baloch, the theory underpredicts the primacy of regime nonviolent responses (Staniland 2021, 171). Ideological explanations can help explain regime responses but cannot explain why regime responses have changed over time (David 1991, 31). My study agrees with Staniland (2021), Staniland et al. (2018), Straus (2015), and Pion-Berlin and Lopez (1991) on the importance of ideology in threat perception and regime

[27] Pion-Berlin and Lopez "argue that Argentine state terror was induced by the ideological beliefs of the junta leaders" (Pion-Berlin and Lopez 1991, 64-65). "In sum, the regime employed a process of ideological deduction. It began with the premise that national security is the state's paramount objective. It then defined the security dilemma within the framework of permanent war. From there, particular views about the polity and the opposition were formulated, as were the problems and threats associated with the state of permanent war. Given these premises and the perception of threat that they generated, the decision to use coercion became a logical conclusion" (Pion-Berlin and Lopez 1991, 71).

response. I build off these works, explaining how regime threat perception and response to ethnonationalists changed while their ideology was perceived as threatening. However, these groups mostly did not face government repression.

International relations theory moved into the realm of state response to threats with Walt and David, building off Waltz's balance of power theory. Waltz's theory "was based on the assumptions that the world was anarchic and states wished to survive, and led to the conclusion that cooperation, except against common enemies, was rare, war frequent, and the states formed recurrent balances of power" (Kydd 2015, 8; Waltz 1976). Walt later argues that "states form alliances primarily to balance against threats. Threats, in turn are a function of power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions" (Walt 1987, vi; Walt 1985).[28] Foley modifies Walt's theory by focusing solely on perceptual indicators; perceived capability of the enemy, perceived proximity, and perceived intentions (Foley 2013).[29] David's international relations theory on omnibalancing moves beyond Walt's balance of threat theory. He "focuses on the efforts of Third World leaders to ensure their political survival (rather than focusing on efforts to ensure the state's survival) by including internal as well as external threats to the leadership (as opposed to external threats alone) in explaining the decision to align [with outside states]" (David 1991a, 7; David 1991b).[30] Likewise, understanding the response to internal groups "requires focusing on the interests of the leadership over those of the state" (David 1991a, 7). However, omnibalancing focuses mainly on the relations between weak and strong states rather than on how states respond internally to domestic challenges (Henderson 2017, 174-175). In another modified realist argument, Clark claims that regimes are more interested in their survival, also known as regime security.[31] Clark applies this to African states and in the context of understanding foreign policy behavior, particularly foreign interventions (Henderson 2017, 173-174; Clark 2001, 95).

[28] Haas notes the evolution of Walt's balance of-threat theory that "downplays the impact of ideological variables … in affecting politicians' perceptions of threat" (Haas 2005, 22; Walt 1987). "Walt's understanding of the role of ideological variables in affecting leaders' perceptions of threat and related foreign policy choices changed significantly … in [the] second version of balance-of threat theory, [asserting] that changes in the defining ideologies of states tend to increase their leaders' perceptions of threat and thus the likelihood of conflict by creating new interests in states" (Haas 2005, 22; Walt 1996).

[29] I further modify Walt and Foley's conceptions of threat perception by removing geographic proximity. Geography is left out of assessing the threat environment because this study assumes the regime's coercive capacity is not limited against domestic actors.

[30] Tankel (2018) also notes the importance of omnibalancing and its focus on internal threats.

[31] To survive, regimes require "the good will or tolerance of those who are in a position to directly threaten regime control over the state apparatus" (Henderson 2017, 173-174; Clark 2001, 95).

This study agrees with David's argument that internal threats rather than external threats are more dangerous and more likely to threaten the ruling elite and their power distribution in weak states. While external threats are a regime concern, the threat within one's own house (state) is the most dangerous and, thus, of paramount importance. Internal threats to regime security are more immediate and dangerous to regime survival than external threats. Regime strategy and response are contingent upon the threat posed to the ruling elite. While the internal threat can include support from an external actor, the primary strategy for regime response is not that the internal threat will later turn into an external threat to the state or leave the state in an overall weakened position, but instead threatens the position of the regime and the leadership itself. "Variation in how states approach responses over time cannot be explained by theories that rely on stable or slow-changing factors such as the structure of the international system or regime type" (Saunders 2011, 3). This study builds off structural realism, also moving from the focus on power to that of threat and how regimes respond to internal challengers based on their perceived threat.

Balochistan

Why study Balochistan?[32] Pakistan's biggest and poorest province, Balochistan, is home to a seemingly endless internal violent conflict (Heinkel 2019, 397). "Since 1948, the Pakistan-Baloch conflict has seen several Baloch rebellions and repressive state policies against the Baloch ethnic minority" (Heinkel 2020, 537), with the latest bout of political violence resuming in the early 2000s and continuing through the present (Heinkel 2020, 538).

Earlier South Asia case studies of sub-nationalism[33] missed theoretical frameworks and comparatively oriented research (Mitra and Lewis 1996, 12).[34] In examining Pakistan's variation in response to the Baloch, there are limitations in the empirical and theoretical approaches used in existing studies. Most studies on Balochistan are primarily descriptive, anthropological, and historical. They focus on the tribes, British colonialism, Baloch

[32] Transliteration Note: Before 1990, Baloch was spelled in many ways, including most commonly 'Baluch.' "In 1990, the [Balochistan] provincial government decreed the official English spelling to be 'Baloch.' This has become the accepted standard in Pakistan" (Axmann 2012a).

[33] "Sub-nationalism describes a nationalist movement expressed within the boundaries of an existing nation state, drawing support mainly from a region whose inhabitants are distinguished by a relatively high degree of cultural and historical identity" (Mitra and Lewis 1996, 5). In this study, I use sub-nationalist and ethnonationalist interchangeably.

[34] These case studies tended "to consist of either the description of specific cases or [grouped] all challenges to the national state under broad labels" (Mitra and Lewis 1996, 12). Notable exceptions include Baruah (1994), DeVotta (2004), and S. Ganguly (1997).

nationalism, or Balochistan strategic importance and do not develop or test arguments.[35] Moreover, most authors tend to side with either the state or the ethnonationalist perspective with little middle ground (Heinkel 2019, 397; Wirsing 2010, 100).[36] Additional scholarship on the Pakistan-Baloch conflict looks at the various causes of ethno-political violence from the substate ethnonationalist Baloch perspective taking into account relative deprivation, also known as grievance or greed (Siddiqi 2015; Dashti 2017; Qadir 2016). Webb's comparative study of separatist movements in South Asia found many competing explanatory paths for leading to internal conflict; however, there is no master narrative or dominant variable. Moreover, ethno-political movements, including separatist movements, are characterized and driven by a range of divergent features that transform over time (Webb 2017).

In the early 1980s, journalist Selig Harrison posited that Pakistani ruler Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's flip-flop from a soft line to a hardline in dealing with the Baloch in the 1970s was based on political opportunism (Harrison 1981, 157). In this explanation for variation in regime response, Harrison states that Bhutto felt that he had a tacit understanding with Baloch leadership that would preserve his control. He saw the Baloch as allies in his efforts to counter the army's power. When Bhutto surmised that the ethnic Baloch-led Balochistan provincial government "could not control the province, Bhutto reversed course, calculating that he had more to gain politically from pursuing the repressive policies favored by the army" (Harrison 1981, 157). While Bhutto's behavior can certainly be considered opportunistic,[37] this does not explain the reasoning behind taking action. I argue that Bhutto was primarily interested in retaining and expanding his political power to include neutralizing potential threats to his power.

Zeb analyzes the Baloch nationalist narrative in its conflict with Pakistan, "arguing that narratives play a significant role in ethnopolitical conflicts, particularly in explaining the timing and eruption of violence" (Heinkel 2020, 538).[38] Narratives are essential, with ethnic elites rationalizing group positions and actions in conflict to mobilize the masses. Zeb asserts

[35] These include Axmann (2012a), Dunne (2006), Breseeg (2004), S. I. Ahmad (1992), and Baloch (1987).
[36] Notable exceptions include Zeb (2019), Sheikh (2018), and Butt (2017).
[37] "Opportunism is a common charge against any politician" (Blood 2002, 47).
[38] "Zeb posits that the most important driver of ethnopolitical conflicts is the conveyance of narratives by elites and leaders of ethnic groups that are based on the collective memory of an actual or perceived injustice to the ethnic group. The goal of the conflict-supportive narrative is not to provide an objective and accurate account but rather to unite the group for a struggle. However, this narrative can only be used to politicize an ethnic group when an actual or perceived injustice is happening to the ethnic group at that time. The existence of ethnic difference and consciousness cannot lead to violent conflict by itself" (Heinkel 2020, 538).

that relative peace between the Baloch and Pakistan occurred "because there was no actual or perceived injustice occurring to the Baloch" (Heinkel 2020, 538) during these periods (Zeb 2019). Conflict resumed between the sides when interests later clashed. However, the ethnic elite are not the only side which decides whether a politically active ethnicity turns violent. The regime has a say as well (Heinkel 2020).

Sheikh argues that the Pakistan-Baloch conflict continues because of Islamabad's "failure to accommodate political diversity, a failure compounded by ideological, political, and military interventions. These interventions laid the foundation for oppressed political movements to evolve and seek greater autonomy, eventually leading to independence movements in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) and now in Balochistan" (Heinkel 2019, 397; Sheikh 2018). "Ideological and political interventions do not explain the causation of the multiple Baloch armed resistance movements. Instead, Sheikh argues that state military action led to Baloch armed resistance breaking out [between the late 1940s and 1970s]" (Heinkel 2019, 398; Sheikh 2018). In short, it was state repression that resulted in a fierce backlash from the Baloch and hardened Baloch nationalist positions over time (Heinkel 2019, 398; Sheikh 2018).

The Puzzle

Continuing state-ethnonationalist conflicts and variation in regime responses are puzzling for several reasons. In the Baloch-Pakistan conflict, Pakistan has responded to the minority ethnic Baloch by accommodating or trying to assimilate them – while at other times, the regime politically excludes ethnonationalists and, in some cases, uses violent repression (Butt 2017a, 1). While Pakistan's policies towards the Baloch have varied over the years, the continued use of repression and nonaccommodative responses are seemingly counterproductive and, thus, puzzling as the policies further motivate the rebels and contribute to the cycle of violence while damaging the state's reputation and economic progress. This is the puzzle of repressive persistence (Davenport and Loyle 2012). Second, Pakistan's responses are not all-encompassing and target different ethnic Baloch over time in different ways by different Pakistani regimes. As chapters three and four examine, following the dismissal of the first Balochistan provincial government in 1973, the chieftain of the Bugti tribe sided with the regime and was appointed Balochistan's provincial governor. He later served in various government positions. In 2006 he was killed in a major military operation by a different Pakistan regime, sparking the continuing low-level insurgency. In

some instances, policies were sustained between regime shifts, and in other instances, policies changed following a regime change. Finally, scholars argue that external security implications, including foreign support, result in harsher regime responses toward secessionist and non-core groups (Butt 2017a; Mylonas 2012). However, the Baloch have consistently received limited external support, at best, yet the regime response to the Baloch has fluctuated over time. It is puzzling as these causal stories do not reflect empirical realities. Moreover, without addressing Baloch grievances and continued government repression, a harmonious settlement with Pakistan seems unlikely, and thus counterintuitive as the Baloch-Pakistan conflict continues to distract the state from a sustained host of political, military, and socio-economic issues (Heinkel and deVillafranca 2016).

The Argument

Why do regime responses to ethnonationalists vary temporally, and what causes this variation? Past theoretical explanations do not ask what is threatened (e.g., government, sovereign state, regime, individual rulers, or something else) which directly impacts regime decision-making. Moreover, Staniland et al. note that political violence studies should focus on politics (Staniland et al. 2018, 3). Regime responses to ethnonationalist challengers are dynamic and vary over time. An unpacked causal mechanism needs to be improved for how regimes respond to ethnonationalists. Regimes change their perceptions of groups, impacting their decision-making and resulting in different policy outputs. How and why does this happen?

Table 1.1 Multi-Level Analysis of Regime Defense

Structural Level	
Weak States	The regime lacks legitimacy; divided into ethnic factions.
Individual Level	
Regime	Top leader (s) and primary decision-maker (s) of the state determine threats and make policy decisions; preferences: political survival; views ethnonationalism as a threat.

I suggest a theory of regime defense. I define regime defense as the activities the regime uses to protect itself from nonviolent or violent challengers to its rule. I contend a qualitative multi-level analysis explanation, including the structure and individual levels of analysis (see Table 1.1). Structural conditions cannot explain policy variation over time, as regime's also have agency (Rotberg 2010, 43). Weak states engender internal wars because these states are divided into ethnic factions. Within these factions, as the ruling regime, one group tends to dominate the state, whose interest is to remain in power. The regime is made up of political elite(s), who are self-interested (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 21). Weak states operate in anarchy, similar to the international system, and hegemonic states fail to address ethnonational grievances because they fear losing power. These structural constraints (weak state) and preferences (political survival) influence the actor-specific (individual) regime that has the agency to respond to ethnonationalists (Hudson and Day 2020; George 2003; Waltz 2001).

Weak states' regime policies to groups are based on the perceived threats that the groups pose to the regime's political survival. Threat perception includes a confluence of factors. Taking a page from international relations' omnibalancing theory, I argue that internal threats are the most serious and vital to weak states. This is like the external security argument on state response to secessionists but posits that internal security implications are more important than external security implications in regime decision-making to respond to ethnonationalists (Butt 2017a). These groups trigger differing perceptions based on their behavior in an action/reaction process. Threat perception is based on perceived intentions, capabilities, and past behavior toward the regime. Threat perception influences the regime's policy output to the ethnonationalist group, including nonviolent (political) and violent responses.



Figure 1.1. Three-stage framework for analyzing regime response.

Figure 1.1 is a modification of Beach and Pedersen's three-stage framework of analysis for foreign policy, showing here a three-stage framework for analyzing regime response (Beach and Pedersen 2020, 69). This provides the conceptual framework for process tracing regime

decision-making in making policies on responding to ethnonationalists. The first stage is what regimes want and their interests/preferences.[39] As shown here, weak state regimes want to maintain hegemonic control of the state and stay in power. The second stage, the causal process, is decision-making, which consists of information collection/processing and making decisions/making choices. The focus of this study is on this decision-making process. The final stage, what regimes do, is the policy output, which is the regime's response to internal challengers (Beach and Pedersen 2020).

This theory of regime defense is ideational, borne out of regime decision-making, and, when examined, is the product of how the regime perceives groups as a threat (Parsons 2010; Beach and Pedersen 2019). How to operationalize threat perception? It is crucial if decision-makers perceive an activity presents a real threat to their rule. Therefore, it is essential to devise measures sufficient to capture the concept of threat (Poe et al. 2000, 30-31).[40]

Regime threat perception, used here, builds on the international relations theory of structural realism, precisely Walt's balance of threat theory and David's omnibalancing. However, instead of aligning with external states to balance against internal threats in the field of international relations, I take a comparative politics perspective focusing on regime response to internal challengers. I posit that the regime threat perception of a group influences differing regime responses internally. This argument, like David's omnibalancing, "is conditional on regimes being weak and illegitimate, and on the stakes for domestic politics being very high" (David 1991, 7).

Building from David's structural conditions and regime primacy of internal threats, I further take a page from Walt's (1985, 1987) state balance of threat theory and Foley's (2013) modification of Walt's theory in its application to internal state responses by further suggesting that state's views of internal political challengers as threats consist of perceived intentions and perceived capabilities. Perceived intentions, specifically opportunist, ethnonationalist, and secessionist ideology, are suggested here as a consideration of regime threat perception and its corresponding political responses. This study agrees with Staniland

[39] Interests and preferences is used here interchangeably for what regimes want.
[40] Beach and Pedersen note the difficulty in studying elites' perceptions as "we cannot reason backwards from behavior … that the country did not view as a threat as this would create a faulty tautological argument. Instead, … [investigating] factors such as the historical perceptions that [the regime] holds about [the group] or [individuals in question is needed]" (Beach and Pedersen 2020, 107).

that "ideological threats that governments perceive from armed groups drive state responses" (Staniland 2021, 2). It builds upon it by focusing on the perceived threat of ethnonationalist ideology. Perceived capabilities (material), defined here, refer to the group's political power (such as control of state institutions) and military power (the ability to inflict physical harm against the regime).

What is more critical to threat perception, intentions, or capabilities? Former U.S. Department of Defense senior intelligence analyst Grabo notes that "it is not a question of intentions versus capabilities, but of coming to logical judgments of intentions in the light of capabilities" (Grabo 2002, 22). "Governments respond differently to different kinds of demands. They do not appear to simply be reading off relative capabilities or group size" (Staniland 2021, 69), suggesting a political dynamic in regime response. Military capabilities alone are unlikely to threaten the state if a group's intentions are supportive or complementary to the regime (Staniland 2021; Staniland et al. 2018).[41] Conversely, those intending to harm the regime but lacking capabilities will likely be perceived as a minor nuisance. Neither intentions nor capabilities alone are enough to explain regime response variation (Staniland et al. 2018). In sum, both intentions and capabilities are essential in aggregate.

The regime aims to mitigate perceived threats from groups that may threaten its rule. Groups such as ethnonationalists change their intentions and capabilities and the regime's perception of the threat that these ethnonationalist groups may pose to the regime's political power. Perceptions change, including whether one is a threat as well as the extent of the threat. Regime threat perception can also vary across the same ethnic group. For instance, the regime could treat one political party differently from others, accommodating one while politically excluding another based on if one is perceived as having opportunist or benign intentions and the other ethnonationalist.

What types of responses does a regime employ against political challengers? Regime responses are dynamic and vary by type and over time. This disaggregates the commonly held perspectives on state responses that are either violent or nonviolent, showing four

[41] Straus states that "material conditions … matter for how threat is experienced, but ideological frames show how elites understand the terms and stakes of a conflict" (Straus 2015, 11).

response values along an ordinal scale (Ripsman et al. 2016, 112).[42] Using Mylonas' (2012) typology as a starting point, this includes *accommodation* (nonviolent), *assimilation* (nonviolent), *exclusion* (nonviolent), and *repression* (violent).

On one end is *accommodation,* "where the 'differences' of a non-core group are more or less respected and institutions that regulate and perpetuate these differences are put in place" (Mylonas 2012, 22). Accommodative policies may include providing concessions or acting neutral or indifferent to the group.

Assimilation is a regime response referring to "educational, cultural, occupational, matrimonial, demographic, political, and other state policies aimed at the adoption of the core group culture and way of life by the targeted non-core group" (Mylonas 2012, 21). The definition here also includes the concepts of co-optation, buck-passing, and balancing. Those who are co-opted were brought into a beneficial relationship with the regime, often through corporatism or clientelism. Co-optation is also known as the 'divide and rule' strategy many colonial powers used to control indigenous groups. Balancing refers to balancing with other political communities/groups against a threat. Looking within states, regimes do not always balance against adversaries when threatened; sometimes, they buck-pass or free-ride on the balancing behavior of another substate group (Mearsheimer 2014; Christia 2012).[43]

Exclusion is "the intentional non-appointment of members of a given group from positions of 'real political power' (i.e. those who control key levers of state power, such as the military, security, and the flow of economic rents)" (Roessler 2016, 64-65).[44] This form of political exclusion focuses on the regime's use of state institutions to remove or ban ethnonationalist groups. Examples of political exclusion include the regime removing elected officials, bureaucrats, legislatures, and judicial bodies or banning political parties. I find that after a group is politically excluded if the regime continues to perceive the ethnonationalists as a threat, it will likely escalate its response with repression.

[42] Other scholars note that state response is not dichotomous; Gartner and Regan (1996); Mylonas (2012); Staniland et al. (2018); and Staniland (2021). On spectrums of peace/violence, see Davenport, Melander, and Regan (2018); Kurtz and Smithey (2018).
[43] "The claim that fragile elites often bandwagon with secondary adversaries to counter their principal domestic threats is consistent with Walt's general argument that states balance against the most dangerous threat to their survival" (Schweller 1994, 78; Walt 1987).
[44] "Exclusion is a universal feature of politics, occurring in both autocracies and democracies" (Roessler 2016, 63).

The last stage in regime response, *repression*, is the physical coercion of challengers (Tarrow 2011) to weaken their ability to oppose or dissent from governmental policies (Mahoney-Norris 2000, 75). This study adds repression as a particular response type, differentiating from Mylonas (2012), who combines violent and nonviolent responses. I argue that Mylonas' definition of core group exclusionary policies is too broad, and that repression is a violent response and should be considered a different type of response. Repression is the only type of regime response differentiated here that includes political violence, which are attacks against a political community by the regime. Repression also includes physically removing ethnonationalists from the state, imprisonment, and death (e.g., targeted or mass killings).

What does threat perception level or intensity mean for state response? The perception of a significant internal threat should result in a higher level of state response. Scholars who have analyzed the causes of repression and state violence concur "that the higher the level of threat faced by a regime, whether from an external or internal source, normally the greater will be the amount of coercion in response" (Mahoney-Norris 2000, 71-72; Duff and McCamant 1976; Gurr 1986; Stohl and Lopez 1986; Bushnell, Shlapentokh, Vanderpool, and Sundaram 1991; Pion-Berlin and Lopez 1991; Poe and Tate 1994). The greater the threat perception, the greater the regime response and the increasing likelihood of internal war; thus, a lower threat perception means a lighter regime response. This is known as Davenport's Law of Coercive Responsiveness (Davenport 2007a).[45] This study also expects that a group perceived as a more significant threat to a regime is more likely to receive a more intense regime response.[46] Figure 1.2 shows the expected nonviolent regime responses to perceived threats of group intentions and capabilities. These responses are not mutually exclusive, with the case studies showing that assimilation responses often continue through exclusion or repression. After a group is politically excluded it does not mean it is now considered less of a threat. To the contrary, I find evidence that regime political exclusion of ethnonationalist groups is often

[45] In the 'Law of Coercive Responsiveness' "leaders are more likely to use repression as the perceived level of threat against the regime increases" (Hendrix and Salehyan 2017, 1657; Davenport 2007a, 7).

[46] In further scholarly treatments of threat perception, "protest movements that are large, that directly challenge government institutions or threaten the economy, and/or that use violent tactics or espouse extreme ideologies are likely to be seen as threatening to the incumbency of political elites, strengthening incentives to repress" (Hendrix and Salehyan 2017, 1657). Mahoney-Norris (2000, 72), in examining specific cases and comparing what might be assumed to be similar levels of threats, finds that recorded amounts of repression vary significantly between regimes and not necessarily in conjunction with the observed severity of the threat. According to Hendrix and Salehyan, "threat perception is especially useful since characteristics of the opposition can be directly incorporated into models of repression and can account for variation within a single regime over time" (Hendrix and Salehyan 2017, 1657).

later followed by repression due to a persistent threat posed by the ousted ethnonationalist group, which has further mobilized against the regime. If political exclusion does not remove the perceived threat or lower its threat level from high, regime repression of ethnonationalists likely follows.



Figure 1.2. Internal Threat Perception and Regime Response.

Research Design and Methodology

This study is theory-focused on building a theory of regime defense. To build and test this regime defense theory, I use several case-based studies and process tracing to trace the threat perception causal mechanism (Beach and Pedersen 2019). Threat perception links the cause, regime interest, and the regime response to internal groups (outcome). This study traces HOW a process works empirically in a case where it could have been present.[47] Thus, this study is not variance-based and does not have independent or dependent variables.

The method of abduction is used here, in which there is a continual and creative juxtaposition of empirical material and theories (Tavory and Timmermans 2014).[48] Claims about

[47] Process tracing does not assess "the difference that changes in values of X make for values of Y across a set of cases. Instead, inferences are made using the correspondence between the hypothetical empirical fingerprints that might have been left by the operation of a mechanism and the actual empirical observations found in a case" (Beach and Pedersen 2019, 4).

[48] Abduction differs from induction and deduction methods. "Induction refers to the process of collecting new data and using it to strengthen or problematize well-established theories. Deduction, on the other hand, suggests a hypothesis about specific observations that is already based on existing theory" (Tavory and Timmermans 2014, 5). "Abduction occurs when [encountering] observations that do not neatly fit existing theories and [finding] ourselves speculating about what the data plausibly could be a case of" (Tavory and Timmermans 2014, 5). "This approach uses iterative processes of working with empirical materials in relationship with a broad and diverse social science theoretical literature" (Tavory and Timmermans 2014).

sufficiency are made after pragmatically accounting for the significant events in the cases; in essence, the explanation engages in what can be termed 'inference to the best explanation.' Using abduction, the interaction of theory and empirics enables the convergence on the best explanation in the particular case (Beach and Pedersen 2019; Peirce 1955; Swedberg 2014; Timmermans and Tavory 2012; Tavory and Timmermans 2014).

This study sought out surprising findings considering what would have been expected based on various fields within political science literature. This search for unexpected findings was facilitated by reviewing historical documents and memoirs, descriptive and scholarly accounts, and note-taking. Through this analytical process, I determined that a critical ongoing concern was the differences in regime response to ethnonationalists. I examined the variation of this phenomenon within several cases in Pakistan, explicitly exploring how regime responses to ethnonationalists varied across the data, over time, and across situations, at each point redefining the characteristics of the regime response considering similarities and differences. I traced the processes through which such variation emerged; provided a mechanism-based explanation of why regime response changed towards ethnonationalists (Tavory and Timmermans 2014).[49]

In this theory-building and testing process tracing, I test whether the predicted evidence (proposition) is present. Information is not cherry-picked to fit a favored hypothesis, such as confirmation bias, but rather strategically aimed at collecting "empirical material that would enable us to determine and document whether or not the proposition about evidence was present" (Beach and Pedersen 2019, 198). Observations are collected that enable putting the causal process to a critical test. Observations collected are evaluated to determine whether the proposition was present (Beach and Pedersen 2019, 198).

[49] The "process-tracing evidence helps show that a given stimulus caused a given response rather than was merely associated with it" (Clary 2022, 6).



Figure 1.3. Causal story of regime threat perception and response to ethnonationalist groups.

The causal process model (see Figure 1.3) includes the cause, causal mechanism, and outcome. What links the triggering event (cause) to the regime response (outcome) is the minority ethnonationalist group signally to the regime through their reaction or behavior following a triggering event. The regime then decides whether the group is a threat (decision-making) and responds accordingly. Regime interest can vary by the individual regime but used for the cases here, regime interest is defined as political survival, and the outcome is the regime's response to ethnonationalists. First, the regime in each case is defined, such as a single leader, military elite, junta, political party, institution, or another organization. In the first part of decision-making, threat perception, the perceived intentions of the group are defined as benign or threatening. Ethnonationalist groups are not necessarily unitary. Some may be unified and, at other times, maybe split by elites, political parties, factions, or tribes. The second part of threat perception is perceived capabilities. Within capabilities, this study focuses on political power, specifically if the group has gained power or control of a significant political institution such as provincial or national legislatures, bureaucracies, executive government agencies, the military, or other influential organizations. Regime responses include multiple options ranging from *accommodation*, *assimilation*, *exclusion*, and *repression*.

Case Studies

I use several case-based studies to build and test regime defense theory. This research uses one unit of analysis, center-minority dyads, consisting of longitudinal analysis, periodizing the cases of a longstanding conflict by splitting the periods of violence and peace up over time and using process tracing to explain the different center strategies toward minorities

(Gerring 2017). The cases trace the causal process, beginning with the regime's view of the group, the group's behavior, action/reaction process, triggering the causal mechanism, threat perception in decision-making, and its potential impact on the regime response to ethnonationalist groups (outcome).

To demonstrate why the reasoning behind alternative theories is faulty "requires an in-depth examination of the cases, including the consideration of subtle interactions between threats that employing a large number of cases cannot provide" (David 1991a, 26). How are cases selected? Noting Jervis's methodological concerns, "to determine what leads states to perceive others as threats one needs to examine cases in which this perception is absent as well as cases in which it is present" (Jervis, Lebow, and Stein 1989, 13). However, these concerns are not warranted in examining causal mechanisms. Negative cases where a cause is absent are irrelevant for process tracing. After all, no mechanism is triggered when the cause is not present, which means there will be no mechanistic evidence left because the mechanism itself, by definition, cannot be present.[50] Therefore, in process tracing, defining what attributes must be present for a case to be a member of the given causal concept is required (Beach and Pedersen 2019, 62). A difference in kind demarcates a change in causal properties. Cases that are members of the positive pole of a concept are expected to have the causal properties that the theory hypothesizes. In contrast, cases outside the set have either different or no causal properties (Beach and Pedersen 2019, 62). Here Mill's method of agreement is used where a set of 'positive' cases of the outcome are selected (Beach and Pedersen 2020; Beach and Pedersen 2019).

Decision processes and actual choices are shaped by who makes the decision, also known as the decision unit (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 18). Determining whose opinions were consequential matters and the composition of decision-makers "varies across states and within states over time" (Ripsman et al. 2016, 124). While institutions such as bureaucracies may provide competing and contradictory information to the regime, it is critical to understand the principal decision-makers' reasoning (Ripsman et al. 2016, 125). This study relaxes the unitary actor assumption and examines regimes focusing on the individual level. I focus on the primary decision-maker(s), which varies in each case, potentially including a

[50] "In case-based understanding, attempting to trace a process in a case where it is not present tells us nothing about how the process works in cases where the cause is present" (Beach and Pedersen 2020, 55).

single leader, a military junta, the ruling elite, and the primary decision-makers' close advisors (Yarhi-Milo 2014, 9).

My argument on regime defense is based on cases that consist of the following scope conditions.[51] First, a hegemonic group, usually the most populous ethnic group, controls a multi-ethnic state and thus has out-groups attempting to gain power.[52] Second, the state is weak (Feraru 2018, 103).[53] Finally, each case consists of a regime varying its policies to groups over time, including nonviolent and violent responses. The outcome is reflected in the specific regime response, which is focused on political *exclusion* (nonviolent) and the follow-on *repression* (violent) in the form of arrests and significant military operations.

Having met the scope conditions above, I trace regime threat perception and the resulting regime response to ethnonationalists in the case studies. When to start tracing regime threat perception and regime response to ethnonationalists within a case study? Mylonas notes that "if our aim is to understand policy choices by the ruling political elites of a state, our efforts should focus on the period of policy planning immediately after a critical event such as an annexation, a war, or a regime change" (Mylonas 2012, 98). In this study, each case starts at a critical (or triggering) juncture or event, including elections or a regime change (Mylonas 2012, 98). "Regime changes have the greatest potential to radically reshuffle threat perception across the entire ideological spectrum, while incremental changes are more likely to move groups only partially across the spectrum" (Staniland 2021, 47; Straus 2015, 63). Each case has standardized, general questions (David 1991a, 26; George 1979). Who or what makes up the regime? Who is/are the principal regime decision-maker(s)? Who makes up the minority ethnonationalist group? Is the group unitary? If not, who are the various subgroups

[51] According to Mahoney and Goertz, "scope conditions refer to the parameters within which a given theory is expected to be valid" (Mahoney and Goertz 2004, 660). Also cited in Ripsman et al. (2016, 121).
[52] Regime type is briefly examined in chapter five. The weak states studied here are mostly democratically elected but have attributes of more autocratic regimes such as illiberal and repressive domestic policies. In other words, the cases here could be referred to as "semi-democracies [which] are regimes that fall between democracies and autocracies and show characteristics of both types" (Carey 2010, 174). The focus is on regime decision-makers' perceptions, and decision-makers are likely to be more constrained in democracies than in nondemocracies (Yarhi-Milo 2018, 42). Also, there is much less analysis on authoritarian decision-making because dictatorial decision-making often occurs in secret, "while policy-making and leadership choice in democracies are relatively transparent" (Geddes et al. 2018, 2; Lewis 1978, 622). Geddes et al. (2018, 2-3) note another reason for the difficulty in developing a systematic understanding of authoritarian politics is the great heterogeneity across autocracies in the way decisions are made, and leaders are chosen, which groups influence these decisions and who is excluded, who supports the dictatorial elite, and who benefits from their decisions.
[53] This does not refer to state capacity, as discussed earlier. As Staniland et al. note, "Simply having capacity does not explain how it is used" (Staniland et al. 2018, 7).

and essential players? How did the regime perceive the group? What were the regime's past views and interactions with the group?

"Operationalization of leaders' perceptions of threat … [include] which [groups] were the principal objects of a particular group of leaders' security fears [and at] what [level] were these other [groups] feared" (Haas 2005, 34). Did the same group pose a threat or threats over time? If so, how? What were the threats confronting the regime? What was the relative importance of internal versus external threats to the regime response? What was the regime's response? What if any impact of a political exclusion response was there on the minority group? How did the regime's response to the group fit alternative theories? How did the regime's response change with a regime or leadership transition (David 1991a, 26)?

Table 1.2 Regime Response Case Studies

	Country	**Regime**	**Group(s)**	**Time**
In-Depth Case Studies	Pakistan	Yahya Khan	Bengalis (Awami League)	1971
	Pakistan	Zulfikar Ali Bhutto	Baloch (National Awami Party)	1973
	Pakistan	Pervez Musharraf	Baloch (Bugti and Marri tribes)	2005
Case Studies	Myanmar	Aung San Suu Kyi	Rohingya	2017
	Mali	Moussa Traoré, Alpha Oumar Konaré	Tuareg	1991-1992

This study uses focused comparison across a set of five similar cases (all meeting scope conditions). Using multiple cases increases our confidence that a candidate cause and process is not case-specific (Beach and Pedersen 2019, 269-270; Beach and Pedersen 2016: 241–45; Rohlfing 2008). See Table 1.2 for a breakdown of the cases, regimes, groups, and the respective date of the regime response examined. These are "typical cases where the hypothesized cause, outcome, and contextual conditions are all present" (Beach and Pedersen 2019, 90). A causal mechanism systems understanding is sought for the Pakistan cases, which unpack "explicitly the causal process that occurs in-between a cause (or set of causes) and an outcome and trace each of its constituent parts empirically" (Beach 2017).[54]

[54] Systems understanding is different from "the minimalist understanding of [causal] mechanisms [where] the causal arrow between a cause and outcome is not unpacked in any detail, either empirically or theoretically" (Beach and Pedersen 2020) with the actual causal links in-between remaining implicit (Beach and Pedersen 2020; Beach and Pedersen 2019). To operationalize "the observable manifestations of a causal mechanism, empirical evidence of the operation of mechanisms takes the form of the empirical traces left by the activities of entities in each part of a mechanism within a case" (Beach and Pedersen 2020, 56). "Activities are products of change or what transmits causal forces through a [causal] mechanism" (Beach and Pedersen 2019, 3-4).

The three in-depth case studies focus on Pakistan's response to several ethnonationalist groups. Weiner identifies Pakistan as a Third World hegemonic state, with Punjabis as the hegemonic ethnic group (Weiner and Huntington 1994). In Pakistan, state "decision-making processes tends to be highly centralized and personalized in the chief executive" (LaPorte 1975, 8). Thus, my analysis examines these individuals as the regime, their perceptions, decision-making, and responses. The three Pakistan case studies include tables showing details of the regime's types of responses to ethnonationalists. Each of these cases concludes with a timeline of important events for tracing the regime's decision-making process and responses to ethnonationalists.

The first case study explores the temporal variation in Pakistan regime's perception and response to Bengali ethnonationalists in the run-up to the Bangladesh Liberation War. This period saw General Ayub Khan's regime replaced by General Yahya Khan in 1969, who ruled until late December 1971. The Yahya Khan regime examination looks at important political influencers, including Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and their perceptions of East Pakistan, the Awami League, and its leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, before and after the December 1970 national elections with the overwhelming Awami League party victory, leading to the significant Pakistan military crackdown in East Pakistan in late March 1971.

Next, I focus on two periods within the Baloch cases: 1971-77 and 1999-2013. This traces the Baloch in the 1970s with Balochistan achieving provincial status, the first elections in Balochistan, and the relationship between Baloch political elites and Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.[55] Bhutto, a Sindhi, despite his political platform for the masses, was in every respect an elite.[56] Analysis of this period includes examining President (and then later Prime Minister) Bhutto's views of the Baloch political party, the National Awami Party (NAP), and its leaders, impacting his decision-making in how to respond to the NAP, which eventually led to his dismissal of the Baloch provincial government in February 1973. Bhutto later banned the NAP in 1975, arresting and imprisoning its leaders. These events contributed to the 1973-77 Baloch insurgency, which ended after Chief of Army Staff General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq deposed Bhutto in 1977. I argue that Bhutto's principal political

[55] Commonly misspelled, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto spelled his first name with a 'k', not with a 'q' (Raza 1997, 288).
[56] LaPorte notes Bhutto's "socioeconomic status … family background … [and] educational experiences abroad in the United States and Great Britain identified him as a patrician, a member of the political elite" (LaPorte 1975, 99).

objective was the establishment and maintenance of his power and authority in Pakistan, and it was perceived threats to his power consolidation that influenced his decision-making (LaPorte 1975) and thus regime response towards the Baloch, rather than external security implications (Butt 2017a). I also compare this case study with the Bengalis in East Pakistan because they posed different types of threats to the regime and encountered different regime responses. This case variation is helpful because it holds several structural factors constant (Roessler 2016, 23; Butt 2017a, 45), specifically a somewhat similar regime apparatus around the same period. Focusing on the same region allows for controlling alternative hypotheses (Mylonas 2012, 115). This cross-case difference heralds Mill and his method of difference (George and Bennett 2005; Van Evera 1997). Moreover, the conclusions of the 1970s Baloch and Bengali conflict with Pakistan were vastly different, with a defeated and exhausted Baloch rebellion and the latter the creation of the new state of Bangladesh following India's intervention. Aside from Butt (2017), there is minimal scholarly treatment comparatively showing the explanation for variation in Pakistan's response to the Baloch and Bengalis in the 1970s.

The subsequent Pakistan case study picks up in 1999 with General Pervez Musharraf's military coup against Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the rigged 2002 elections, the outbreak of violence between Pakistan and Baloch tribes, the death of the Bugti tribal leader, and the emergence of a sustained Baloch secessionist movement and low-level insurgency that continues for over a decade later. This case study includes the return to democracy in 2008 and concludes with the end of President Asif Ali Zardari's government in 2013. Mylonas (2012, 191) notes that the time horizons affect the results obtained. Hence, these case studies cover periods of varying regime responses and overlapping with periods of changes in regime leadership, such as between military and civilian heads of government. Also, the shadow of past decisions probably plays some role in subsequent decisions.[57]

A causal mechanism minimalist understanding for the other smaller case studies is used for testing external validity.[58] These cases outside of Pakistan test if this developing middle-

[57] Discussion with Derek Beach regarding causal processes, observables, and mechanistic evidence, March 2020.

[58] Beach and Pedersen note that "to make insights travel to other cases, process tracing case studies need to be nested into broader cross-case comparisons, where the studied case is compared with other cases to enable the generalizing inference that the mechanism(s) found in the examined case(s) should also be present in similar targeted cases" (Beach and Pedersen 2019, 89).

range theory on regime defense shows external validity, making the conclusions more generalizable and not limited to a region, single case, or event. These cases include Myanmar in Southeast Asia and Mali in West Africa. Both regimes have a history of exclusionary and repressive policies towards ethnonationalist groups. Why has Myanmar conducted mass killings and forced displacement of the Rohingya? The Myanmar case study follows the regime's decision-making process from 2012 to 2017, with the beginning of the outbreak of communal violence in 2012 to the government's genocidal response to the Rohingya in 2017. Why have Mali's policies to the Tuareg varied since independence from France in 1960? The Mali case study traces Bamako's policies toward the Tuareg in the early 1990s.
This study uses abductive analysis (Tavory and Timmermans 2014).[59] To determine what evidence can explain, questions for each observable manifestation are asked about the evidence's certainty as well as "whether there are any plausible alternative explanations for finding the empirical material, [the] uniqueness of evidence" (Beach and Pedersen 2020, 56). This study employs two types of mechanistic evidence, sequence and account (Beach and Pedersen 2019, 172).[60]

Looking for observables of threat perception includes a rigorous examination of the regime's perception of the group from available material. Sources for empirical fingerprints of threat perception examine regime speech acts based on primary sources, including archival data, official documents, doctrines, correspondence, testimonies, biographies, memoirs, and conferences. These are supplemented by secondary sources such as scholarly journals and academic accounts.[61]

Total access to the empirical record is difficult to account for. Empirical certainty, for the case studies I examine, mainly consists of regimes that face either current public unrest, armed conflict, or repressive regimes. Chapter four details Islamabad's continued policy on

[59] Abductive analysis "can be evaluated with three criteria: fit (are the theoretical claims supported by the empirical materials?), plausibility (are the theoretical claims stronger than competing theories?), and relevance (do the theorizations matter in the broader intellectual community?)" (Tavory and Timmermans 2014).
[60] "Sequence evidence deals with the temporal and spatial chronology of events that are predicted by a hypothesized causal mechanism. … [and] account evidence deals with the content of empirical material" (Beach and Pedersen 2019, 172).
[61] The "evaluation of the theoretical uniqueness of each piece of found mechanistic evidence [asks] whether finding the evidence can be explained by any other plausible explanation" (Beach and Pedersen 2019, 44). According to Beach and Pedersen, "multiple causes might be present but can be disentangled by developing empirical fingerprints of a given mechanism that are relatively unique—in particular, if the mechanism is unpacked into its constituent parts" (Beach and Pedersen 2019, 44).

the 'Balochistan problem,' which includes disinformation, disrupting access to information, and denial. Empirical uniqueness is assessed on whether alternative explanations exist for a found fingerprint and whether the found observation can be trusted (Beach and Pedersen 2019, 155-156). Political blustering and information operations/propaganda pose problems with determining empirical uniqueness.[62] Case studies relying on "public statements or observed behavior … to make inferences about the actor's motivation" (Mylonas 2012, 195) can result in the "revealed preferences problem. Studying the decision-making process that led to policies helps differentiate between the intentions of the administration toward a particular non-core group and the actual policy that it eventually adopts. … However, if we want to understand why state officials choose particular nation-building policies and not others, studying only the observed outcomes will not suffice" (Mylonas 2012, 191). Mylonas further notes that using archival research, with historical contextualization through process tracing, can mitigate this issue (Mylonas 2012, 192). Archival research can also pose problems, especially when studying areas wracked with violence and lacking open societies. Additionally, "journalistic accounts are often quite biased, as participants usually have the agenda of portraying events in a manner that puts their own role in the best possible light" (Beach and Pedersen 2020, 178). To deal with potentially inaccurate measures, triangulation is used, rigorously cross-checking individual sources with independent sources by "collecting observations either from different sources of the same type … or of different types, if available" (Beach and Pedersen 2019, 212) to evaluate measurement accuracy (Beach and Pedersen 2019, 212).

Regime response can be observed by examining the group's position and treatment by the regime. For instance, is the group influential and does it hold powerful political positions? Do they receive preferential treatment, curry favor with the regime, or are they ignored, assimilated, politically excluded, repressed, or is it some combination of the above? Measuring the regime's response type, including the level of violence, towards ethnonationalists uses violence databases, NGO reports, and press reports. To determine the ultimate level of coercion, and lethal action, the number of killed ethnonationalists by the state is counted (Hendrix and Salehyan 2017; Byman 2002). This study counts reported deaths. However, there may be unobserved violence as well as uncorroborated reports. To

[62] For example, "writers on the Pakistan-Baloch conflict usually reflect the divergent Pakistani narrative or the Baloch nationalist narrative, displaying heavy bias and missing a much-needed scholarly treatment" (Heinkel 2019, 397).

mitigate this, I use 'overlap analysis,' as defined by Hoover Green, overlapping between datasets to consider whether the pattern of variation is likely to be accurate, as a sort of triangulation (Hoover Green 2018, 150-151).

Within each case, I analyze "both where my argument is consistent with the evidence as well as where it is contradicted by it, pointing to the importance of elements outside [the] theoretical framework" (Butt 2017a, 12), as well as applying alternative explanations and other theories of state response to each case period and the comparative case study (Butt 2017a; George and Bennett 2005; Bennett and Checkel 2015). Each case study concludes with a comparison of competing regime response explanations, specifically, exogenous factors (Butt 2017a; Mylonas 2012), and chapter five compares regime types across the case studies. The better regime defense theory "performs compared to those alternatives, the greater confidence we can have in its explanatory value" (Clary 2022, 7).

Limitations

There are several potential complications with studying regime decision-making and the resulting regime response. Finding within-case evidence in favor of one cause does not necessarily disconfirm that other causes also matter except when causes are individually sufficient and mutually exclusive (Beach and Pedersen 2019; Rohlfing 2014). If it can be shown in these cases that threat perception does not explain regime response, then this requires additional 'soaking and probing' of the case empirics rather than simply disputing this theory-building of regime defense (Beach and Pedersen 2019). Beach and Pedersen (2019) argue that Popper's widely used understanding in political science, that a theory is either 'falsified' or not is naïve (Popper 2005). Falsification means 100 percent confidence that it is disconfirmed, which can never occur with nontrivial relationships because of the intrinsic messiness of empirical evidence (Beach and Pedersen 2019, 174).[63] Therefore, when empirically evaluating a claim in which substantial evidence suggests that our mechanism did not work as theorized, the theory is revised (Beach and Pedersen 2019, 174; Ripsman et al. 2016, 137). This study follows a soft positivist epistemology and revises the theory of regime defense as necessary (Beach and Pedersen 2019; Ripsman et al. 2016). A revision is needed if perceived threats are not a significant factor in the decisions of regimes to respond to

[63] As Lakatos notes, "no finite sample can ever disprove a universal probabilistic theory" (Ripsman et al. 2016, 107; Lakatos 1970).

ethnonationalists (David 1991a, 190) or if the evidence points to a tautology. For instance, if the research found that regime decisions to choose violent conflict or more peaceful interactions with ethnonationalists was a personal preference or choice by the state's ruling elite unrelated to threat perceptions or is contingent upon solely external factors (Butt 2017a; Mylonas 2012).

Scholars have addressed the potential endogeneity of individual-level motivations (Christia 2012; Kalyvas 2006). Individual motivations can be multidimensional and highly complex. Since many possible factors could lead to various regime responses to ethnonationalists, there is the possibility that the study could suffer from omitted variable bias (Roessler 2016). This is particularly true in the search for parsimony in a causal mechanism. However, if needed, rigorous process tracing, the treatment of alternative explanations, and revising the theory should deal with potential missing factors.[64]

Determining whether violence occurred because of state policy could be an example of principal-agent problems. It is difficult to know whether a central policy is implemented by the regime (principal) or whether others, including subordinates (agents), pursue independent policies (Mylonas 2012, 193). The central administration or regime affiliates might not have ordered violent events. For instance, it could have been the result of criminality or inter or intra-tribal conflict. This study posits that the regime decides and is responsible for the overall state response, not the agent that carries out the order.[65] As with all theories, there are limits to their explanatory power, and where contradictions to the theory in the cases are discovered, they are noted and analyzed (Mearsheimer 2014, 10; Butt 2017a).[66]

[64] "Process tracing and cross-case comparisons, though fallible, may help identify which interactions are causal and which are spurious" (Bennett and George 1997). A deviant case can be "useful for detecting omitted causal and/or contextual conditions when the cause (or set of causes) should be sufficient to produce an outcome" (Beach and Pedersen 2020, 59). When selecting a deviant case, an attempt is made "to trace the mechanism until it breaks down in order to gain information on when and why the mechanism failed" (Beach and Pedersen 2020, 59).

[65] Ritter and Conrad observe that "human rights violations are the result of a principal-agent relationship, with the state or military leader (principal) making the executive decision to order or allow violations to prevent or halt dissent and police or military members (agents) carrying out those decisions" (Ritter and Conrad 2016, 90).

[66] To echo Staniland et al., "this work cannot provide a definitive test of any theory, given concerns about external validity and the limits of publicly available data, but it can usefully improve our confidence about the explanatory power of the argument" (Staniland et al. 2018, 14).

Relevance and Contribution[67]

This research draws on and contributes to comparative politics, international relations, peace studies, political violence, regime security, ethnic conflict, internal war, repression, and secession literature by explaining variations in regime response to perceived threats.[68] This research deeply explores a long-running ethno-political conflict between a regime and an ethnic group and explains variations between peace and internal war. These case studies provide actor-specific models.[69] Along with those who are interested in the study of political violence, a potential normative dimension of these findings is that by understanding how and why regimes respond to political challengers and opt for nonviolence or violence, those in conflict management will be better equipped to prevent or stop violence (Gurr 2015, 4; Mahoney-Norris 2000, 76). Moreover, this provides a possible parsimonious explanation for the regime's treatment of ethnonationalists and how this perpetually contributes to the regime's continued insecurity. This research indicates that regime response to potential challengers is predominantly influenced by internal threat perception, specifically domestic political challengers, and thus, regime response will likely change when perceptions change. This implies that regardless of potential exogenous factors, such as external pressure on regimes, a regime's perceptions are unlikely to change concerning ethnonationalists unless internal threat perceptions change, and regime insecurity and domestic factors are addressed. While structural conditions set the stage for threat perceptions, primarily domestic conditions drive regime response variation to ethnonationalists. Understanding the influences and perceptions of regimes and their constraints helps inform how decisions are made. Although scholars are often advised never to speculate on ongoing events, the threat perceptions in decision-making highlighted here could indicate the potential and likelihood of political violence (Christia 2012, 232).

[67] According to Parsons, a valuable contribution to political science has three components (Parsons 2010, 166-167). "First, it accounts for what many people see as a major variation in something important, telling us why one thing happened and others did not. Second, it accounts for variation in reasonably specific ways. Third, it must do better than competitors at demonstrating its claims empirically" (Parsons 2010, 166-167).

[68] Much of the existing research on causal mechanisms for ethnic conflict – whether individual, group, or state response, uses "large-n statistical studies based on [several] popular datasets" (Butt 2017a, 10).

[69] According to George, actor-specific models are applicable for practitioners to "grasp the different internal structures and behavioral patterns of each state and leader with which they must deal" (George 1993, 9; Hudson and Day 2020, 224).

Study Layout

Chapter one provides the background, literature review, theoretical framework, argument, research design, and layout for the following chapters. Chapter two provides an overview of Pakistan as a weak state, its strategic culture, and the context of the Bengali-Pakistan conflict. It conducts the first in-depth case study, Pakistan's response, under General Yahya Khan and the junta, to the Bengalis in East Pakistan, leading to the bifurcation of East and West Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. Chapter three begins with an overview of the Baloch-Pakistan conflict and consists of a case study of the 1973-1977 Baloch insurgency. Additionally, it provides a comparative case study to chapter two's study of the Bengali ethnonationalist movement in East Pakistan. The fourth chapter examines the Baloch conflict between 1999 and 2013, under both a military dictatorship and then under a democratically elected government and uses multiple datasets to determine specific levels of state-sanctioned violence toward the Baloch. Chapter five provides short case studies outside of South Asia, including the Rohingya in Myanmar and the Tuaregs in Mali. It further compares the various regime types across the case studies. Chapter six concludes with results, limitations, areas of future study, and implications.

Chapter Two
The Bengalis and Pakistan in the 1970s

1971 saw a Pakistan civil war (the Bangladesh Liberation War) and Indo-Pakistan War resulting in Pakistan's bifurcation, with Pakistan's East Wing, dominated by ethnic Bengalis, becoming the independent state of Bangladesh. This chapter explains the decision-making process of Pakistan's regime, its threat perception, and why its responses varied toward the Bengalis, ultimately resulting in military repression starting the evening of 25 March 1971. This chapter begins with a look at the Pakistani state, including its creation, and how ideology and Pakistan as a weak state influence regime perception and treatment of ethnonationalists. Next, I examine Pakistan's relationship with the Bengalis from the early days of Pakistan's creation. This follows with the in-depth case study of Pakistan's regime, led by General Yahya Khan, and the decision-making and variation in regime response to the Bengalis in East Pakistan, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his political party, the Awami League. After the case study, I examine alternative explanations, including context-specific arguments, paying particular attention to exogenous factors, and I end with case study conclusions.

Background

Pakistan is considered a weak state (Nayar 2010; Paul 2010; Ziring 2010).[70] A weak state is not to be confused with the state's ability to summon coercive capacity which Pakistan certainly can with one of the largest military's in the world (Staniland et al. 2018, 7).[71] For all its military might, however, Pakistan lacks the ability to manage all of its land and people, as well as lacks legitimacy amongst multiple vital groups.[72] How did Pakistan become a weak state? This goes back to the roots of Pakistan's creation. The Pakistani state was established following the British withdrawal and bloody partition with India in 1947. Pakistan's creation was predicated on the Two-Nation theory, separate from India's Hindu majority, a secure

[70] For an analysis of South Asia's weak states see T.V. Paul's edited volume (Paul 2010).
[71] "The weak state may be weak in legitimacy, welfare, and ultimately security, but it has substantial coercive power. Due to its lopsided coercive capacity, it would use force to suppress internal dissidence but, in the end, not become much stronger" (Paul 2010, 7). "State capacity … can be judged on the basis of the ability of a state to develop and implement policies in order to provide collective goods such as security, order, and welfare to its citizens in a legitimate and effective manner untrammeled by internal or external actors" (Paul 2014, 12).
[72] For instance, Islamabad struggles to influence and control parts of the northwestern areas, several key ethnic groups demand autonomy from the Punjabi-dominated country, and "extremist Islamic groups including the Taliban have become key players in the political system" (Paul 2014, 13).

place where India's Muslims could determine their own fate (Cohen 2004, 2). The Pakistan Muslim League party articulated a nationalist ideology primarily defined negatively, in opposition to rule by the Hindu-dominated Indian National Congress, which remained largely instrumental throughout its pre-independence struggle, and consequently never came to motivate party supporters on its terms (Tudor 2013a, 207). "The lack of a political vision for the new state was also closely linked to the internal organisation and support base of the League" (Ganguly and Fair 2013, 133). The Muslim League "built support for Pakistan by reinforcing the socioeconomic power of the rural landed aristocracy in [Punjab] and by allying with a peasant movement in the [Muslim-majority province of Bengal]" (Tudor 2013b, 269). The coalition between these groups within the Muslim League was tenuous as they held "conflicting distributive interests" (Tudor 2013b, 269).

The deaths of Pakistan's two key leaders, the founder of the Muslim League and Pakistan, 'Quaid-e-Azam' (Great Leader), first President and Speaker of the Constituent Assembly, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and Liaquat Ali Khan, further hampered nation-building in "the process of political and ideological consolidation" (Ganguly 2016, 14). Because "of party weakness and lack of leadership, Pakistan's civilian bureaucracy and military slowly aggrandized power" (Tudor 2013b, 269). Jinnah unexpectedly named himself Governor-General[73] and, in this position, expanded unconstitutional political powers, which were later used by his successors (McGrath 1996, 40).[74] 'Bureaucratic coups' occurred in 1953 and 1954. A military coup in 1958 formally ended Pakistan's democratic experiment (Tudor 2013a, 200-202). Pakistan would suffer three additional military coups (1969, 1977, and 1999).

Aside from Pakistan's autocratic political beginnings, the country was left with several disadvantages upon breaking away from the British Indian Empire. This included a disproportionate amount of refugees, a smaller share of resources, and a massive geographical separation between Pakistan's East and West wings. In the West wing, Pakistan consisted of the major areas of Punjab, Sindh, Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), Balochistan, and Kashmir. The major ethnic groups in West Pakistan include the Punjabis,

[73] Governor-General was an unelected holdover position from British India and precursor to the position of president established in 1956 (McGrath 1996).
[74] For a treatment of Pakistan's early days and the run-up and aftermath of the 1953/1954 bureaucratic coup, see McGrath (1996).

Sindhis, Mohajirs (Muslim 'migrants' from India), Pashtun, Baloch, and Kashmiris (Amin 1988, 60). See Figure 2.1 for a map showing the locations of Pakistan's (formerly West Pakistan) major ethnic groups.[75] The Punjabis are the largest ethnic group in the West and the overall hegemonic ethnic group for all of Pakistan (Weiner and Huntington 1994, 36). East Pakistan predominately consisted of Bengalis, who numerically outnumbered the entire population of West Pakistan. This chapter examines the relationship between East and West Pakistan, particularly the decision-making by Pakistan's regime that led to the breakaway of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh. Ethnonationalists undermine the Punjab-dominated Pakistani state and its unifying ideology, Two Nation Theory, thus delegitimizing its rule and raison d'être.[76]



Figure 2.1. Major Ethnic Groups of Pakistan

Soon after partition, Pakistan engaged in the first war over Kashmir with India from 1947-1948. Pakistan fought three other wars with India, two more over Kashmir (1965 and 1999), and the 1971 war that led to Pakistan's bifurcation. Christine Fair (2014) and Sumit Ganguly (2016) argue that Pakistan is a revisionist state. This stems from Pakistan's irredentist claim and commitment to incorporate the Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir, beginning

[75] CIA (1980).
[76] As Aqil Shah argues, "in this exclusionary view of nationhood, recognizing intra-Muslim differences would mean the symbolic undoing of the Pakistan project" (Shah 2014, 56; Staniland 2015, 785).

with Pakistan's initiation of the 1947-1948 war with India over Kashmir (Ganguly 2016, 20-21). Pakistan's revisionism includes undermining the territorial status quo of Kashmir and India's position in the region and across the world. This claim draws from Glaser, who suggests that Pakistan may be a purely greedy state (Glaser 2010, 40). Pakistan as a greedy state perceives threats from India as less-security related and is instead related to ideology (Fair 2014, 4; Ganguly 2016).[77] Pakistan's strategic culture, weak in the ability to control its people, territory, and ability to project legitimacy, is also ideological in responding to perceived internal and external threats. What helps explain Pakistan's policy to different internal groups over time? The following section unpacks Pakistani regime decision-making.

Pakistan's Decision Making

Pakistan's response to ethnonationalists groups varies along a spectrum from accommodating, assimilating, and exclusionary to repressive policies and is not static. The Pakistani state "is not a unitary actor" (Ganguly 2016, 121), and as noted earlier decision-making is centralized, occurring within regime senior leadership (LaPorte 1975, 8). Since the first military coup in 1958, "the history of Pakistan has been that of a garrison state, [with national decision-making dominated by the military which was] broken by civilian rule intermittently (1972–1977, 1988–1999, [and] 2008–). Even when there has been civilian rule, behind its veil is the reality of the overpowering presence of the military" (Nayar 2010, 103), routinely exerting its influence and views indirectly behind the scenes.[78] Almost from Pakistan's first moments as a state, the Punjabi-dominated army has viewed itself as best suited to protect Pakistan's borders and its founding principles. It has been the preeminent and most respected institution in Pakistan.[79] This military influence has contributed to stunted and ineffectual civilian governance.

[77] A greedy state is defined as "fundamentally dissatisfied with the status quo, desiring additional territory even when it is not required for security" (Glaser 2010, 4). Greed is used to describe nonsecurity motives (Glaser 2010, 36). "Purely greedy states pursue revisionist policies to increase their prestige, to spread their ideology, or to propagate their religion" (Fair 2014, 4). Greedy states are different from "states that are motivated only by security, [Glaser refers to] as security seekers" (Glaser 2010, 35). Ganguly argues that the Indo-Pakistani relationship is not a security dilemma as Pakistan's "fundamental goal of wresting Kashmir from India" (Ganguly 2016, 122) undermines Pakistan's security in provoking its more powerful neighbor (Ganguly 2016, 122).

[78] "The security establishment within the state continues to define, shape, and implement what it deems to be the country's national security interests" (Ganguly 2016, 121).

[79] "The military … sees itself as the guardian not just of the nation's territory but also of its ideological frontiers" (Nayar 2010, 103).

Other scholars have treated Pakistan's military as a unitary actor (Staniland et al. 2018). This is based on the sustained indoctrination of the military's worldview and the military having no indications of deep factional cleavages, in contrast to other militaries (Staniland et al. 2018, 14). Though helpful in generalities about the military's perception, this does not explain variation in regime response to ethnonationalists. Military decision-making is not unitary, with various regimes and personalities holding outsized roles, such as the dictators Ayub Khan and Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. Other regimes, such as Yahya Khan, who began as Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) under Ayub Khan, surrounded himself with an army officer 'caucus' on whom he could personally rely (Feldman 1975, 146-148).[80] While the regime's principal decision-maker(s) is the most critical unit of analysis in this study, there are also several endogenous sources of possible influence, such as the bureaucracy, legislature, and political parties. However, none of these dominate state decision-making.[81]

Staniland et al. explain why there was variation in how the Pakistani military responded to internal armed groups in the North-West Frontier. They argue that the Pakistan military "assigned armed groups to political roles reflecting both their ideological affinity with the military and the operational benefits they can provide to the army" (Staniland et al. 2018, 1). The "military does not attack all groups that attack it, or the weakest or strongest groups, but instead carefully responds to the political stances of armed groups" (Staniland et al. 2018, 3).[82] Ethnonationalist groups do not pose an operational benefit to the army or have an instrumental role unless used in a pro-government mercenary role. Finally, ethnonationalist groups undermine Pakistan's overall reason to exist (Staniland 2015, 786; ICG 2014, 22).[83] While ethnonationalists can be considered an ideological threat to Pakistan, this does not

[80] Though often treated as unitary, Pakistan's military is "never fully unanimous or uncontested—assessment of threats and interests" (Staniland et al. 2018, 18).
[81] "Pakistan was an elite-based personal movement, not one with a broad, organized mass base capable of long-term, effective, durable struggle against the British colonial question" (LaPorte 1975, 40). Because of this, LaPorte notes that Pakistan "has had no political institution comparable in organizational terms to [India's all-encompassing] Congress Party" (LaPorte 1975, 40), and thus, the Western model of mass democracy is useless in analyzing Pakistan (LaPorte 1975, 40).
[82] Similarly, Tankel argues that "Pakistan's approach to armed groups was predicated on the utility that militants provided and the perceived threats they posed relative to other threats" (Tankel 2018, 131; Staniland et al. 2018, 3).
[83] There is "broad analytical consensus that the military selectively represses, cooperates, and tolerates groups to manage 'the dual challenge of containing some militant proxies while instrumentalizing and supporting others'" (Staniland et al. 2018, 2; Fair 2014, 81; Tankel 2018; Ganguly and Kapur 2010).

explain the variation in state responses.[84] The following section explains the background of studying the Bengali-Pakistan conflict and the regime's response variation over time.

East Pakistan

Why study the Bengalis in Pakistan? Out of the many ethnonationalist challenges that Pakistan has faced, the ethnic Bengalis in East Pakistan were ultimately successful in achieving their aims in 1971, albeit at a high cost and not without the help of neighboring India. This case study looks at Pakistan's regime decision-making and the variation in responses to ethnonationalist Bengalis and argues that the regime's escalation to severe repression was caused by the high political threat that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his Awami Party posed to the ruling military regime, led by Yahya Khan.

At Pakistan's inception, the country comprised two wings, East and West, separated by 1,600 kilometers of Indian territory (Nawaz 2008, xxvii). The two wings were separated geographically as well as ethnically, linguistically, and culturally. West Pakistan was dominated by the Punjabi ethnic majority. Despite being the most populous ethnic group in Pakistan, with 75 million Bengalis (out of the entire country of 135 million), the Bengalis in East Pakistan held long-standing grievances with the state (Bass 2013, 21). While the Bengalis dominated East Pakistan, ethnic Punjabis in West Pakistan dominated the state's power centers.[85]

Former Prime Minister of Bangladesh and lawyer for Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Moudud Ahmed, wrote, "These imbalances between the two wings were further aggravated by the class character and vested interests of the political forces of the two regions. In West Pakistan, politics continued to be feudal-based with big landlords of the Punjab and Sindh in collaboration with the rich merchant class, bureaucracy, and the army dominating the scene.

[84] "Regime ideology shapes beliefs about political threat and thus affects the choices of [decision-makers]" (Staniland 2015, 779).

[85] After Pakistan's creation, conflict soon "broke out over the equitable distribution of resources, both material and symbolic" (Guhathakurta and Schendel 2013, 178-179). "The highly centralized, often authoritarian, structure of Pakistan's government, headquartered in the West Wing, resulted in West Pakistan getting the lion's share of foreign assistance and internal development funds" (Blood 2002, 2). "East Pakistanis became intensely resentful toward Pakistan's military government, headed by Ayub Khan. They understood that they had to take care of their own military and economic security. This fueled the dream of a federated state that would give East Pakistan almost complete control over its resources. The Awami League's Six Point [program] was the outcome of this process" (Guhathakurta and Schendel 2013, 208), which is later covered in the overview of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

In East Pakistan where virtually no upper class existed, the bureaucracy was weak and the army non-existent, and politics were dominated by the middle and lower middle-class groups having direct roots in the rural peasantry. This made the social and philosophical bias of the politicians and political parties of the two wings different from each other creating different levels of political consciousness and producing conflicting aspirations" (Ahmed 1978, 301). "Added to these imbalances was the racial attitude of the ruling class of West Pakistan towards the people of East Pakistan" (Ahmed 1978, 301-302). Pakistan's President Ayub Khan (1958-1969) noted that the West Pakistanis comprised the 'conquering races' and the people in East Pakistan were of 'down-trodden races' (Ahmed 1978, 301-302).

After Pakistan's creation, the question of the state's official language needed to be resolved (Guhathakurta and Schendel 2013, 179). East Pakistani students soon demonstrated against Urdu becoming Pakistan's national language. Pakistan's founder, Muslim League party leader, and Governor-General at the time, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, in a visit to Dhaka, East Pakistan's capital, was uncompromising in Pakistan having only one state language and the language being Urdu. In response, East Pakistanis viewed this as treacherous as it privileged other groups while Bengalis were the largest ethnic group and put them at a disadvantage living and working in the state (Guhathakurta and Schendel 2013, 181).[86] Pakistan's government was dominated by non-Bengalis who knew little about East Pakistan (Guhathakurta and Schendel 2013, 178).[87]

The 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War against Pakistan is said to have roots in the 1952 Dhaka visit by Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin. He similarly echoed Jinnah's earlier comments Pakistan's state language would only be Urdu. Demonstrations broke out, sharply denouncing the language decision. Widespread protests and a general strike (hartal) commenced across East Pakistan resulting in the deaths of five Bengali students by police. The 1952 events demonstrated the state's repressive nature and exacerbated Bengali grievances (Guhathakurta and Schendel 2013, 181-183).

[86] "Urdu-speaking candidates were preferred for jobs in the state bureaucracy, and, in East Pakistan, this excluded almost all locals (fewer than 1 percent spoke Urdu as a second language) and [favored] North Indian immigrants" (Guhathakurta and Schendel 2013, 181), also known as Muhajirs, which included Pakistan's key leaders Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan.

[87] Ziring notes that after Jinnah, "all subsequent political personalities, despite their claim to represent the larger polity, represented little beyond their immediate kin. Bereft of national constituencies, political leaders grasped for power that belied their real intentions: to amass personal eminence and influence at the expense of their rivals" (Ziring 2010, 174).

Pakistan's wing's outlook on foreign affairs was also quite different. East Pakistan had more commonalities with India as it was known as East Bengal before partition, neighboring India's West Bengal, and had a 10 million Hindu population (Blood 2002, 2; Bass 2013, 82).[88] On the other hand, West Pakistan sought control of Kashmir and was resolutely anti-India (Blood 2002, 2). West Pakistan strongly favored the country's military while in East Pakistan they viewed the military poorly, particularly after feeling deserted during the 1965 India-Pakistan war (LaPorte 1975, 114).[89]

Figure 2.2. Pakistan's Administrative Divisions

In 1955, the One Unit plan came into effect, merging the western provinces of Balochistan, NWFP, Punjab, and Sindh into one province.[90] Even though most of the country's population

[88] Hindus make up "about 13 percent of East Pakistan's population" (Bass 2013, 82).
[89] The 1965 Indo-Pakistan war "had important consequences in East Pakistan. The war was fought on the western front—on the border of India and West Pakistan. However, the Pakistani armed forces left East Pakistan largely undefended, and an attack there by India could not have been warded off" (Guhathakurta and Schendel 2013, 208). "The Pakistani military's national defense plan revolved around the strategic concept that the defense of East Pakistan lay in West Pakistan. … [which meant] it was essential to maintain maximum force levels in the western wing" (Shah 2014, 103).
[90] Figure 2.2 shows Pakistan's administrative divisions in what was previously known as West Pakistan. East Pakistan was known as East Bengal from 1947-1955 until One Unit renamed the province. In December 1971, East Pakistan gained independence from Pakistan, becoming the state of Bangladesh. The figure does not reflect

resided in East Pakistan, West Pakistan was "to have 'parity' with … East Pakistan, in terms of representation in a new National Assembly [(NA)]" (Sisson and Rose 1990, 16). "The Muslim League had essentially become a party of the western wing of the country, and the other parties had only minimal support outside their own provinces" (Sisson and Rose 1990, 14).[91]

In 1958, Pakistani C-in-C General Ayub Khan successfully conducted a coup and ruled under a military system until 1962. He introduced a quasi-constitutional and civil regime; however, power resided in the top bureaucrats and army generals, effectively excluding the Bengalis from the country's decision-making process (Choudhury 2018, 17, 43). Domestic pressure built against Ayub Khan with the unsuccessful 1965 Indo-Pakistan War and the perceived failings of the 1966 Tashkent Declaration that resolved the war. Ayub Khan fell ill in 1968 and his health failed to return (Raza 1997, 8). Political opposition against Ayub Khan continued, resulting in large-scale protests and the deaths of over two hundred civilians. Facing political pressure from the populace and from within the military, Ayub Khan resigned, ceding power to the Army's C-in-C, General Yahya Khan (Jalal 1995, 61).

The Case: 1971

This case study examines Yahya Khan's regime's perception and response to Bengali ethnonationalists in 1971, which included political exclusion and culminated in massive military repression. This repression resulted in a civil war, the Bangladesh Liberation War, and only ended when an Indian intervention defeated Pakistani forces, turning the province of East Pakistan into the new state of Bangladesh. From 1969 to 1971, General Yahya Khan served as Pakistan's President and primary decision-maker. Yahya took over the presidency from the previous military ruler, Ayub Khan, and lacked legitimacy aside from military support and the widespread public support for the removal of Ayub Khan. Yahya Khan's regime decision-making is examined, including several influential military junta members.[92]

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the 2018 merger between Federally Administered Tribal Areas into neighboring Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (CIA 2010).

[91] "The 1956 constitution imposed the preferences of West Pakistani groups over those of the east" (Sisson and Rose 1990, 15). "The absence of a cohesive national leadership and a consensus on constitutional norms made the political system susceptible to incursions of administrative and military power in decision making and to governmental instability. Fragmentation of the political body and provincialization became permanent features of Pakistani politics that divided east and west" (Sisson and Rose 1990, 16).

[92] As noted earlier, "secessionist movements may deploy violence, but in a strategic interaction with states; they would be unlikely to escalate to this step if they could receive their demands-independence or autonomy-

On the Bengali side, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, leader of the Awami Party, is examined along with the varying regime responses in East Pakistan in 1971. The case study begins with the triggering event, the Awami League's dominant win in the December 1970 national and provincial elections, surprising nearly everyone, especially the regime. This chapter explains how and why the regime's response varied, shifting to political exclusion and repressive policies against the Bengalis on 25 March 1971.[93]

Regime – Yahya Khan

In 1966, General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan became the Pakistan military's C-in-C, replacing retired General Muhammad Musa. Following sustained public pressure and mass protests, on 25 March 1969, Ayub Khan retired from the presidency, appointing Yahya as Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA). On 1 April 1969, Yahya retroactively proclaimed himself Pakistan's president after abrogating the 1962 Constitution, instituting martial law, banning all political activity, and dismissing the NA and provincial assemblies as well as the provincial governments (LaPorte 1975, 73).

Yahya had a rough and candid persona with no patience for politicians. Yahya's 'I'm just a simple soldier' routine worked well on some U.S. officials, notably President Richard Nixon, as it had for Ayub Khan (Blood 2002, 42). Yahya was not an intellectual and was known for frequent alcohol consumption (Bass 2013, 7-8). Yahya had a more personalized style of rule, in contrast to the typically hierarchical approach in a totalitarian regime (Raja 2012, 3). Yahya would tell subordinates to respect the chain of command (Siddiqi 2020, 7); however, he would often act to the contrary (Siddiqi 2020, 70).

LaPorte notes that the extent to which Yahya was a 'strong man' is debatable, as the junta effectively and collectively controlled the government during its reign (LaPorte 1975, 15). Yahya had a military or inner cabinet apart from a civilian one. G.W. Choudhury, a constitutional expert and adviser to Yahya Khan, attended inner cabinet meetings and knew how the decision-making process operated during Yahya's reign. He states that while Yahya was the ultimate decision-maker, Yahya consulted with his inner circle for crucial decisions,

completely peacefully. It is thus usually the state, not the secessionist group, that compels war in such interactions" (Butt 2020, 69).

[93] As Henry Kissinger noted, "what prompted Yahya to his reckless step on March 25 is not fully known" (Kissinger 1979, 852).

which differed from Ayub Khan's approach (Choudhury 2018, 155-156; Clary 2022, 168; Waseem 1994, 237–239).

Yahya's regime centered around himself but also key military and civilian advisors.[94] All key military leaders knew one another for the duration of their careers; however, this did not mean they were all on good terms. This worked to Yahya's benefit as he faced no unified opposition within his inner circle (Raghavan 2013, 25). As this chapter shows, most of the military leadership located in East Pakistan remained outside Yahya Khan's inner circle and disagreed with the regime's decision-making throughout the 1971 crises (Khan 2017, 250).

Ethnonationalists - Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Awami Party, East Pakistan

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the first President and later Prime Minister of Bangladesh until his assassination in 1975, was born into a Bengali Muslim family in 1920 in East Bengal. He began his political career by founding the Muslim Students' League in 1948 at Dhaka University. After Pakistan's Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin declared in February 1948 that East Pakistan would be required to use Urdu as the state language, Mujib rose in protest. Mujib worked to build a strong movement establishing contacts with students and political leaders. After his arrest in March 1948, Mujib spent almost ten years in Pakistani jails (Rahman 2012).

The Lahore convention was held on 5 February 1966, consisting of Mujib and the opposition parties. Mujib announced his Six Point program, which called for greater parity between East and West Pakistan and was considered a threat by some in West Pakistan to Punjabi hegemonic rule.[95] Mujib was elected the president of the Awami League in early 1966 and

[94] "The key military leaders involved in decision-making were Lieutenant General S. G. M. M. Peerzada, principal staff officer to the president; Lieutenant General Abdul Hamid, the Army chief; Major General Ghulam Umar, secretary of the National Security Council (NSC); Lieutenant General Gul Hassan Khan, the Chief of General Staff; and Major General A. O. Mitha, the Quartermaster General" (Raghavan 2013, 25). The primary way to meet with Yahya was through Peerzada's office and Yahya's military secretary (Sisson and Rose 1990, 25). The "military secretary, a position that had continued from the days of the British Raj. Officers with a long and informal association with Yahya could reach him through the military secretary [because] of their relationship. … Civil service secretaries of the various civilian cabinet ministries could also contact the president-[CMLA] through these channels, circumventing the ministers under whose charge they served" (Sisson and Rose 1990, 25).

[95] The Six Point program sought "[a] constitutional solution of East Pakistan's problems with West Pakistan through the establishment of full regional autonomy for both East Pakistan and West Pakistan. East Pakistanis looked at the Six Points as a kind of Magna Carta that would free them from domination by West Pakistan. In West Pakistan, the Six Points were derided as a blueprint for the disintegration of Pakistan" (Blood 2002, 50). This program "for maximum provincial autonomy with its confederal overtones was anathema to the West

soon after that, he traveled across Pakistan to gain support for the Six Points, often drawing the ire of authorities resulting in multiple detainments and arrests (Rahman 2012). On 2 January 1968, Islamabad alleged that India supported a plot for East Pakistan's secession (Sisson and Rose 1990, 22; Choudhury 2018, 22). Twenty-eight Bengali civil and military officers, including Mujib, who had been in jail since 1966, were arrested for allegations of being engaged in anti-state activities and were reported to have contacted Indian officials to get arms and other material aid into Agartala, an Indian border town (Choudhury 2018, 22). The trial began on 19 June, and demonstrations occurred across East Pakistan, which called for Mujib's freedom. "After months of protests, the government imposed a ban on meetings and processions under Section 144 and resorted to curfews and indiscriminate shooting by the police and the East Pakistan Rifles (EPR)" (Rahman 2012),[96] resulting in multiple casualties. Due to mounting political pressure, Ayub Khan convened a Round Table Conference (RTC) of politicians and called for Mujib's release but Mujib shunned the proposition (Rahman 2012).

On 22 February 1969, Ayub Khan yielded to the political pressure and mass protests, releasing Mujib and fellow political prisoners, and withdrew the Agartala case (Rahman 2012). The accusations during the extensively publicized trial further increased misgivings between the Bengalis and other ethnic groups in the Pakistan military (Siddiqi 1996, 134-135).[97] The conspiracy case was Ayub's attempt to discredit Mujib using trumped-up charges. However, it backfired (Blood 2002, 52-53; Choudhury 2018, 24).[98] Allowing Mujib to attend the RTC then was a desperate effort to ensure Ayub's political survival. However, it failed, and within four weeks Ayub Khan stepped down and Yahya Khan took control of Pakistan (Blood 2002, 52-53).

The Run-Up to the 1970 Elections

In mid-May 1968, as Army C-in-C, Yahya made remarks during an Army regimental dinner that showed his intention for potential indefinite military-rule, and as a harbinger for the

Pakistani dominated establishment, but it won the enthusiastic support of Bengali middle-class professionals, students, small and medium scale businessmen and industrial [laborers]" (Jalal 1995, 61).

[96] The EPR was a paramilitary border protection force that was renamed the Bangladesh Rifles following Bangladesh's creation. After a violent mutiny in 2009, the Bangladesh Rifles were renamed the Border Guards Bangladesh in 2011.

[97] "West Pakistanis in general, soldiers as well as civilians, came to doubt -the basic loyalty of the perceived volatile Bengalis to the country and to the armed forces" (Siddiqi 1996, 134-135).

[98] It "served to discredit Ayub himself and confer a martyr's aura about Mujib" (Blood 2002, 52-53; Choudhury 2018, 24).

future mass repression in East Pakistan he disparaged the Bengalis (Siddiqi 2020, 64).[99] After taking over from Ayub in 1969, lacking legitimacy, Yahya sought to hold elections and mitigate potential opposition by engaging in discussions with political parties (Sisson and Rose 1990, 1-2, 25-26). On 28 November 1969, the political timetable was announced by Yahya (LaPorte 1975, 78).[100] Yahya announced the Legal Framework Order (LFO) on 28 March 1970, laying out the plans for the elections (Raza 1997, 29). Following elections, the new NA, after its first meeting, would have 120 days to author the constitution (Sisson and Rose 1990, 1-2; A.R. Siddiqi 2004, 225).[101] These would be Pakistan's first direct elections. Yahya granted the East Wing's request for a nationwide popular vote. Making the elections one-person-one-vote ensured that East Pakistan would receive a majority of votes. The LFO also dissolved One Unit, reestablishing the provinces in West Pakistan, each of equal status with East Pakistan. Yahya pledged 'maximum autonomy' to both wings, indirectly referring to the East Pakistani demand in the Six Points but warned that autonomy would have to be compatible with Pakistan's integrity and solidarity (Blood 2002, 33-34).[102]

In East Pakistan, Mujib's Awami League consisted of multiple constituencies but was galvanized around Bengali nationalism (Blood 2002, 53-54). In West Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto founded the Pakistan People's Party (PPP).[103] While Bhutto was disliked and mistrusted in East Pakistan, Mujib was feared in West Pakistan (Blood 2002, 46).[104] In the

[99] Yahya stated "We are there to stay for as long as the country needs us to. … Let's be prepared to rule this unfortunate country for the next fourteen years or so. I am damned if I am going to throw this country to the wolves" (Siddiqi 2020, 64). Yahya spoke of Mujib as "a Bengali fanatic through and through" (Siddiqi 2020, 64).

[100] This included "full political activity, subject to 'certain guidelines,' would be permitted after January 1, 1970, and general elections would be held on October 5, 1970" (LaPorte 1975, 78).

[101] "If they failed to draft a constitution within this strict time frame, the assembly would stand dissolved and new elections would be held" (Blood 2002, 33-34).

[102] "He said that he could see no reason why it should not be possible to work out a satisfactory relationship between the central government and the provinces, giving the regions, notably East Pakistan, control over their own resources and development without affecting overriding national interests controlled at the center" (Blood 2002, 33-34).

[103] "While espousing a leftist, populist philosophy, the PPP drew much of its strength from the wealthy, landed elite of which Bhutto himself was a prime example" (Blood 2002, 45). "The PPP's support base included middle-sized Punjabi farmers, landed notables from [Sindh] and the Multan districts of the Punjab, Punjabi urban middle-class professionals, the newly organized industrial labor in Karachi and the Punjab, rural-urban migrants, and the Punjabi rural underprivileged" (Jalal 1995, 61-62). "Bhutto an excellent speaker soon began to win broad support for such policies as land reform to help the peasants, nationalization of industries to lessen the power of the industrialists, and administrative reforms to curb the power of the bureaucracy" (Blood 2002, 45).

[104] "In West Pakistan, … the political parties … also focused upon the questions raised by the Awami League concerning the organization of the state. The Muslim League (Qayyum)(QML), [led by Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan], was the most critical and alarmist of the West Pakistani parties" (Sisson and Rose 1990, 30-31). Qayyum charged "Mujib and the Awami League of launching 'a campaign of hatred against West Pakistan'" (Sisson and Rose 1990, 30-31).

run-up to elections, the Bengalis felt even more marginalized following Pakistan's inadequate disaster relief efforts to the wrought brought on by a cyclone and mass flooding in East Pakistan (Sisson and Rose 1990, 29-30; Jalal 1995, 61).

December 1970 Elections

On 7 December 1970, Pakistan's first free and fair democratic election was held (Bass 2013, xiv-xv). Mujib's Awami Party dominated, acquiring an absolute majority nationally and provincially. The Awami League secured 160 NA seats out of 162 and 288 Provincial Assembly seats out of 300. Bhutto's PPP acquired 81 out of the 138 seats in West Pakistan. The PPP did not attempt any seats in East Pakistan, and the Awami League failed to gain any of the seven seats they contested in West Pakistan (Blood 2002, 129).

Yahya and his inner circle underestimated the Awami League's strength and thought the election would go their way (Raghavan 2013, 34).[105] The regime believed that the results would be split.[106] The Awami League, having won a mandate in the election, was more determined than ever to push through its Six Points. Following the elections, Mujib made his first significant policy statement on 3 January 1971 at the Dhaka race grounds, the city's largest-ever political rally, with a crowd of at least one million (Blood 2002, 135-136). The rally concluded with an oath-taking ceremony for newly elected members of the National Assembly (MNA) and members of the Provincial Assembly (MPA). The oath-taking resulted in a hardening of attitudes against the Bengalis in the West Pakistan civil and military establishments (Siddiqi 2004, 53-54).[107]

[105] In early 8 December, Yahya exclaimed, "'What in the devil's name is happening here? … Where on earth has your assessment gone?' Yahya had sat up all night watching the election coverage on television and demanded an explanation from General Umar of the NSC" (Raghavan 2013, 34). Umar cultivated relationships between various political parties and West and East Pakistan leaders. He reportedly had a suitcase full of money, which was used to gain political support at the expense of the Awami League (Siddiqi 2020, 79).
[106] "Such a fractured [NA], they believed, would render the task of constitution-making within 120 days impossible, and [thus] necessitate a fresh election. 'This process, they hoped,' recalled a member of the martial law administration, 'would go on indefinitely, allowing martial law to remain in force.' Or, alternatively, compel the politicians to come to terms with the military about future political dispensation" (Raghavan 2013, 34). In East Pakistan, Headquarters 14th Division, the only army division in the province, sent intelligence updates to senior military leadership, including the CMLA and Pakistan military headquarters, General Headquarters (GHQ) (Raja 2012, 23). According to 14th Division assessments, the Awami League would get at least "a minimum of 75 percent of the [NA] seats from East Pakistan" (Raja 2012, 23). The General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the 14th Division, Major General Khadim Hussain Raja, noted their assessments were ignored and Yahya's inner circle "stuck to their earlier estimates and fed [Yahya] information accordingly" (Raja 2012, 23).
[107] The ceremony affirmed "a 'movement' would be initiated if any attempt were made to obstruct the implementation of the Awami League program. Mujib enjoined the audience to promise to punish any member

In Dhaka, on January 12 and 13, Yahya had meetings with Mujib and while the meetings seemed amicable, Yahya complained about Mujib after each one (Sisson and Rose 1990, 63).[108] Then U.S. Consul General in Dhaka Archer Blood recounted from a conversation with East Pakistan Governor Vice Admiral Syed Mohammad Ahsan, who was present at the second meeting, that Mujib reportedly sought Pakistan's continued integrity and as much consensus as possible in the development of the country's constitution (Blood 2002, 138). Major Siddiq Salik, the Pakistan Army public relations officer in Eastern Command, which is the Pakistan military command in East Pakistan, noted that Ahsan told him that Yahya accepted the six points, and Mujib agreed to work with West Pakistan (Salik 2017, 33-34). That night, Yahya stated that he planned to talk to Bhutto and convey to West Pakistani politicians the need to speak to Mujib in Dhaka (Choudhury 2018, 151).[109]

Prior to Yahya's departure from Dhaka's airport on 14 January, Yahya told the press that he was content with the Mujib talks and that Mujib would be Pakistan's prime minister (Blood 2002, 139). Yahya further hinted that he was meeting with Bhutto upon his return to West Pakistan (Blood 2002, 139). Early in his career, Bhutto had built longstanding relationships with the most senior ranks of the military (Khan 2017, 62-64).

On 17 January, Bhutto hosted Yahya and his inner circle on his property in Larkana, Sindh Province. Bhutto let Yahya know that Bhutto was dissatisfied with Yahya stating that Mujib would become Pakistan's new ruler.[110] Further, Yahya said the political crisis would be blamed on Bhutto and the PPP if Bhutto did not visit Mujib in East Pakistan. This resulted in Bhutto's reticent approval (Raghavan 2013, 38; Khan 2017, 56-57). Following the Bhutto-

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of the party, including himself, who betrayed the oath … [and] the mass audience responded by a show of hands to Mujib's plea that they carry on the struggle if he should be assassinated" (Blood 2002, 137).

[108] "The first was a private meeting between Yahya and Mujib, after which each expressed sincere hopes for the prompt return of civilian rule" (Sisson and Rose 1990, 63). Choudhury recollects that immediately following the meeting, he "received and answered a summons from the President's House to see Yahya, … [finding] him bitter and frustrated. [Yahya] told [Choudhury]: 'Mujib has let me down. Those who warned me against him were right; I was wrong in trusting this person" (Choudhury 2018, 149-150). The second meeting consisted of Yahya, Mujib, and their respective delegations (Sisson and Rose 1990, 63).

[109] Choudhury asked Yahya, "'Have you reminded Mujib about his pledges made on the eve of the elections?' Yahya's reply was made with deep anguish. 'You and I are not politicians—-it is difficult for me to understand their mind and way of thinking. Let us pray and hope for the best" (Choudhury 2018, 151).

[110] "Yahya replied that it was for Bhutto to work toward an arrangement with Mujib. Bhutto argued that the transfer of power involved three parties: the Awami League, the PPP, and the army. The Awami League's assurances were worth nothing; yet it was imperative to reach a consensus on the constitution prior to convening the [NA]. In other words, the opening of the [NA] would have to be delayed. Bhutto … added that the postponement would also serve as a test of Mujib's fidelity to a united Pakistan: 'if there is no reaction then Mujib is loyal but if he disobeys and starts an agitation, then he is disloyal.' He further indicated that his party would support Yahya's efforts to preserve the unity of Pakistan" (Raghavan 2013, 38).

Yahya Larkana discussion, the Bengalis saw Bhutto as a representative of the military regime (Choudhury 2018, 154).[111] On 27 January, the PPP delegation reached Dhaka, and three days of talks were inconsequential (Raghavan 2013, 39).[112] The critical divergence was on power sharing (Khan 2017, 57).[113] Bhutto adopted several approaches to avoid being in the minority party, (Nawaz 2008, 263)[114] as he ultimately sought to rule the country himself (Sisson and Rose 1990, 57-58). [115]

Air India Hijacking

Figure 2.3. Pakistan map before Bangladesh independence

[111] This visit was referred to by some as the 'Larkana Conspiracy,' which accused Bhutto and Yahya of plotting to work together to prevent Mujib from coming to power, thus setting the stage for the brutal civil war and eventual Indian military intervention (Niazi 1998, 220).
[112] "The Awami League team insisted on the Six Points as the basis for a new constitution; the PPP harped on socialist policies but had no concrete alternatives to present" (Raghavan 2013, 39).
[113] Mujib and the Awami League "refused to accept that they had to agree to share power before they framed the constitution" (Khan 2017, 57). Choudhury notes from various personal sources that Mujib made it clear to Bhutto that "he was not prepared to modify the Six Points, while Bhutto made it clear that his party could not agree to a veiled scheme of secession under the plan" (Choudhury 2018, 153). Bhutto recounted that "Mujib's strategy was to bring the national assembly to session without loss of time in order to give legal sanction to his Six Points—to thrust a six-point constitution on the country before full awareness of its implications could grow in West Pakistan or, for that matter, in the East wing itself. He sought to pressure the people of the country into submission, to leave no time for reflection" (Choudhury 2018, 153).
[114] "He tried to build a consensus among the West Pakistani parties against the Six Points and for the inclusion of his party in the future government" (Raghavan 2013, 39) and cultivated close ties with senior West Pakistan military officers. Bhutto also "sought to sow doubts about the Awami League's commitment to a united Pakistan, and so undermine its credibility in West Pakistan" (Raghavan 2013, 39).
[115] Sisson and Rose provide an overview of Bhutto's impetus which was ultimately his pursuit of power (Sisson and Rose 1990, 57-58).

On 30 January 1971, a hijacked Air India flight was flown from the capital of Indian-held Kashmir, Srinagar, to Lahore in West Pakistan, where the hijackers blew it up. Islamabad did not respond to the hijacking, and West Pakistan celebrated the plane's destruction.[116] India sought recompense for the plane, but Pakistan declined and in response India banned Pakistani aircraft from flying over Indian airspace. This meant that flights from West to East Pakistan took nearly triple the time and planes had to stop over in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in order to refuel enroute to Dhaka (Blood 2002, 141-143).[117] In March 1971, Islamabad created a commission of inquiry to examine the circumstances of the hijacking, completing and submitting its report in April (Williams 1972). Subsequently, Islamabad accused the hijackers of spying for India and had them jailed (Blood 2002, 141-143).

Post-Election Talks

Talks continued between the three sides: Yahya and his inner circle, Bhutto and his PPP, and Mujib and the Awami League.[118] In early February, after receiving a report of his meetings with Awami League leaders from Bhutto, Yahya invited Mujib to West Pakistan. Mujib refused, and Yahya was furious (Zaheer 1994, 344). Blood surmises that Mujib made a grave mistake as Yahya had previously visited Dhaka to talk with Mujib, and those talks were inconclusive and only preliminary (Blood 2002, 141).[119]

[116] "Bhutto visited the hijackers, applauded their heroism, and supported their request for asylum. He declared that this heroic action was a sign that no power on earth could stop the Kashmiri struggle and that the PPP would contact the Kashmiri National Liberation Front to offer its cooperation and assistance, which would also be given to the hijackers. Mujib, in contrast, expressed his abhorrence of the hijacking and urged the government to take 'effective measures to prevent interested quarters from exploiting the situation for their nefarious ends.' It was, he said, an attempt to distort the process of the transfer of power" (Sisson and Rose 1990, 75-76). "[Bhutto] was able fortuitously to dramatize his policy of confrontation with [India] and to encourage a perception in … West [Pakistan] of Mujib's untrustworthiness with respect to India" (Sisson and Rose 1990, 75-76).

[117] Figure 2.3 shows Pakistan's East and West Wings before Bangladesh gained independence (Dummett 2011).

[118] Blood notes that "if the elections had been less conclusive, with no one party winning a majority in either wing, the possibility of compromise and for maneuvering by Yahya in an intermediary role would have been created. As it was, each of the three main figures seemed locked into a rigid position: Yahya by his insistence on sticking to the letter of the [LFO], Mujib by insisting on implementation of his Six Points, and Bhutto, although to a somewhat lesser degree, by the constraints of his personality, particularly his unwillingness to play a secondary role to anyone, whether it be Mujib or Yahya or the Army" (Blood 2002, 134).

[119] "A few days later Ahsan received a telegram from Yahya directing him to inform Mujib of his dissatisfaction with his refusal to visit Rawalpindi and say that if Mujib did not do so as soon as possible, he would be entirely responsible for the serious consequences that would follow" (Sisson and Rose 1990, 76-77). During the meeting with Mujib, Ahsan "received a telephone call from the President's House instructing him to withhold the [threatening] message. Ahsan then merely renewed his plea that Mujib visit [Yahya]. … Ultimately, [Mujib planned] a short visit to West [Pakistan], but it was dropped because of subsequent events" (Sisson and Rose 1990, 76-77).

Rao Farman Khan, who oversaw the East Pakistan military-civil administration as a major general, met with Yahya on 10 February and was unable to persuade him to relinquish power to Mujib and the Awami League (Khan 2017, 64).[120] On 13 February, Yahya announced that on 3 March, the NA would convene in Dhaka (Choudhury 2018, 155). After the Awami League's working committee meeting on 14 February, party leaders expressed their pleasure with the president's announcement (Sisson and Rose 1990, 78). The last Pakistan Commander of East Pakistan, General A. A. K. Niazi, noted that after the announcement, Umar began putting pressure on politicians to boycott it (Niazi 1998, 220). In Peshawar, from 12 to 15 February, Bhutto held meetings with West Pakistan's main political parties which failed to find common group (Sisson and Rose 1990, 74-75).[121] On 15 February, Bhutto declared that he and his party would not attend the planned 3 March NA inauguration (Sisson and Rose 1990, 78-79).

On 19 February, Bhutto and Yahya met (Zaheer 1994, 143), and Yahya amended the LFO the next day giving credence to the accusation of Yahya having a close relationship with Bhutto (Sisson and Rose 1990, 82-83). The amendment permitted MNAs to resign prior to the start of the NA on 3 March (Blood 2002, 149). On 21 February, Bhutto's PPP MNA's vowed to support Bhutto and resign if needed. In response the Awami League repudiated the announcement (Sisson and Rose 1990, 83). The next day, 22 February, Yahya dissolved his civilian cabinet of ten members, indicating that a political solution was less likely (New York Times 1971; Blood 2002, 150).[122]

Following the Governor's Conference, held on the same day, which included governors and martial law administrators of all the provinces, Yahya told the East Pakistan military officials

[120] Earlier, Yahya expressed his dismay to Farman about Mujib, saying "that he could not trust [Mujib]. … [Additionally, Yahya stated] 'I am not afraid for myself. West Pakistan is my base. I have to look after it" (Khan 2017, 62). Farman believed senior military officers in Yahya's regime were pressuring Yahya to support Bhutto (Khan 2017, 62).

[121] Bhutto's goal was "to develop a West Pakistani consensus on constitutional issues, common opposition to certain of the six points, and a commitment not to agree to the transfer of power until the Awami League agreed to modify the Six Points to accommodate West Pakistani views. Another element of Bhutto's strategy was to deny Mujib access to the support of any West Pakistani party. Mujib would thus become increasingly vulnerable to the charge among West Pakistanis of being nothing more than the leader of the majority party in East Pakistan, and Bhutto, would emerge as the leader of the majority party of West Pakistan and [overall spokesperson for West Pakistan]" (Sisson and Rose 1990, 74-75).

[122] Choudhury notes, "Yahya invited some of its members, including [himself], to continue as his advisers. Instead of a council of ministers he wanted to have a council of advisers. But the Bengali members of the proposed council— with one exception, Ahsan-ul Huq—declined to continue any longer" (Choudhury 2018, 154). Yahya's "action was widely interpreted as the Army's determination to tighten its grip and ready itself for possible strong measures in the face of the impending crisis" (Blood 2002, 150).

that he intended to delay convening the NA.[123] Lieutenant General Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, the then East Pakistan MLA, and East Pakistan Governor Ahsan disagreed with Yahya, noting the furor this would cause (Raghavan 2013, 41-42).[124]

Military Planning

According to Choudhury, shortly after the 7 December 1970 elections, the regime began preparations for action in East Pakistan (Choudhury 2018, 148; Nawaz 2008, 263). On 11 December, Yaqub signed and issued a top-secret operation directive, Operation Blitz, which permitted the military to seize East Pakistan, control all aspects of governance as well as give the military absolute leeway in accomplishing its mission (Nawaz 2008, 264).[125] Major General Khadim Hussain Raja, General Officer Commanding (GOC) 14th Division, East Pakistan's only division, would oversee the operation, which allowed the military to detain East Pakistanis it saw as threats (Raja 2012, 42).[126]

Yaqub and Ahsan returned from the Rawalpindi conference on 25 February. The next day, Yaqub convened a Martial Law conference. Yaqub informed the group that on 1 March

[123] During the conference "Ahsan found the atmosphere in Rawalpindi one of crisis and military intervention" (Zaheer 1994, 143).

[124] "Yahya was also keen 'to impose open sword martial law to roll back the situation to what it was in 1969.' Yaqub and Ahsan impressed upon Yahya the impossibility of doing so; for postponement of the Assembly would result in a major upheaval in East Pakistan. But Yahya was adamant. At a private meeting the next morning, when Ahsan and Yaqub yet again presented their case, Yahya continued to insist that enforcing order would not be a problem: 'a whiff of the grapeshot' would suffice. He told them that he intended to announce the postponement on 1 March and directed them to inform Mujib 24 hours before then" (Raghavan 2013, 41-42). Yahya purportedly stated, "kill three million of them and the rest will eat out of our hands" (Hensher 2013). Salik received news following the Rawalpindi discussions "that Mujib would be given one more opportunity to prove his good intentions otherwise 'Martial Law would be reimposed (that is, enforced) in its classical role.' This implied two things. One, that renewed efforts for a political dialogue with Mujib would be made. Two, that military plans for regaining control would be finalized. Work on both commenced simultaneously in [Dhaka] immediately after the return of [Yaqub] and Ahsan" (Salik 2017, 39).

[125] The directive "was available in only six numbered copies which were distributed to senior military officials in Dhaka and Rawalpindi. The operation could only be put into effect on the 'recommendation from MLA [Martial Law Administrator] Zone B', that [was] Yaqub Khan, after personal clearance of the CMLA, Yahya Khan, conveyed through the martial law headquarters. [The] operation would [commence following] the declaration of an emergency in East Pakistan which could occur under [several] conditions" (Nawaz 2008, 265). "Operation Blitz would follow the declaration of an emergency in East Pakistan under the following conditions "a) Open defiance of martial law and/or declaration of 'Independent Bengal,' rejection of the [LFO] ending up in a 'mass movement' similar to the sporadic outbreaks which shook the Province in the period January 69-March 69; b) An anarchist movement sparked off by extremist Naxalite/Communists [Indian separatist movements] or even NAP [National Awami Party of Maulana Bhashani] and other groups of province-wide dimensions; c) If frustrated in their designs, the majority party [Mujib's Awami League] may resort to a mass movement for enforcing their (sic) will outside the Assembly, to the jeopardy of the integrity of Pakistan" (Nawaz 2008, 265).

[126] For further details on Operation Blitz and Operation Searchlight planning, see Nawaz (2008, 265-266), Salik (2017), and Raja (2012).

Yahya planned to indefinitely postpone the opening of the NA. Yaqub told his subordinates to be ready for military operations (Raja 2012, 42).[127] Khadim was told that a brigade was already moving from West Pakistan, and he said it should be sent immediately to Dhaka to be used as a deterrent (Raja 2012, 42-43).[128]

Blood noted that an indication of the Army's willingness to take massive military measures included any steps taken to reinforce Army strength in East Pakistan. Mujib had already expressed concern over the reported repositioning of Army units and demanded an end to reinforcements coming to East Pakistan. The U.S. Defense Attaché's Office in Embassy Islamabad summarized the Pakistani military's order of battle in East Pakistan, including additions made in the two years since Yahya assumed power. Before the March 1969 Declaration of Martial Law, the Pakistani regular army's combat and combat support forces in East Pakistan consisted of one division with three infantry brigades, an armored cavalry troop, and a commando battalion for a total of approximately 14,500 troops. Separately, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and Navy had about 1,000 personnel. Since March 1969, the Army added approximately 8,500 men. The combat effectiveness of the Pakistani Army in East Pakistan was further increased by the issue of more up-to-date equipment, including automatic rifles. Another military force was the EPR, with a total strength of about 13,000 men, which covered all or most of East Pakistan. However, at least half of the lower ranks were Bengali and thus could not be trusted in a conflict with fellow Bengalis in East Pakistan. The U.S. Consul General corroborated the sudden influx of troops by air to Dhaka airport. Blood, on several occasions, watched as troops debarked from Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) aircraft, and as March wore on, the flights noticeably increased (Blood 2002, 176-179).[129]

[127] "On 27 February, [Khadim] gave formal orders to [his] brigade commanders to be prepared to put Operation Blitz into action, at short notice, on a given codeword. This could be expected any time after midday on 1 March" (Raja 2012, 42-43). With Khadim's order, the military moved to multiple locations across East Pakistan on 27 February (Raja 2012, 43).

[128] From 27 February until 1 March, PIA flew into Dhaka two infantry battalions—-22 Baluch and 13 Frontier Force (Salik 2017, 40).

[129] General Niazi, the head of Eastern Command from April 1971 until his surrender to Indian forces in December 1971, noted that by April the total Pakistan Army fighting strength had grown to 45,000 in East Pakistan which consisted of approximately "34,000 from the army, plus 11,000 from civil armed forces, West Pakistan civilian police, and armed non-combatants" (Niazi 1998, 52; Nawaz 2008, 267).

Talks Breakdown

On 28 February, Bhutto threatened those who attended the upcoming 3 March convening of the NA, declaring that he would raze all of West Pakistan 'from the Khyber to Karachi' in violent protest (Blood 2002, 152; Nawaz 2008, 263).[130] That evening, Governor Ahsan met with Mujib, his top aides, Tajuddin, and Dr. Kamal Hossain, and told them that the opening of the NA was indefinitely postponed by Yahya (Khan 2017, 67).[131] On 1 March, Yahya declared that the opening of the NA was postponed indefinitely (Blood 2002, 153-154). However, then-newscaster Shuja Nawaz read Yahya's announcement for him because Yahya was reportedly inaccessible (Nawaz 2008, 263-264).[132] East Pakistan erupted with the postponement announcement.[133] The Bengalis were outraged, feeling betrayed (Khan 2017, 68).

On 2 March, the Awami League responded by calling a hartal, closing all shops and businesses (Blood 2002, 157). Pakistani authorities, including the military, lost all control (Sisson and Rose 1990, 91). The Pakistani military came out of the garrison to aid the civil power, resulting in clashes with mobs, and several civilians were killed or injured (Siddiqi 1996, 184). Mujib called for peaceful protest and the military returned home a few days later. In the absence of Pakistani authorities, the Awami League assumed control (Sisson and Rose 1990, 91-92). From 3 to 25 March, Mujib had taken over East Pakistan with a parallel

[130] Blood argues that "Yahya was now 'boxed in.' If he went along with Mujib's wishes and kept to the March 3 date, Yahya could face an upheaval in his home base of West Pakistan. If he bowed to Bhutto's threat, Mujib's angry reaction could range anywhere from a non-violent Gandhian-like movement to an outright declaration of independence. He was damned if he did, and damned if he didn't" (Blood 2002, 152). Bhutto "knew his bargaining strength; powerful members of the junta were with him rather than with Yahya" (Choudhury 2018, 155). Choudhury states that from January, the regime's decision-making process had changed. "Yahya had a free hand in formulating his scheme for the transfer of power and holding elections, but the junta adopted a policy of 'wait and see'; if Yahya were successful in maintaining the unity of the country, by whatever constitutional device, well and good, but from late January, when Yahya had had his abortive talks with Mujib, the junta was not prepared to remain as a passive spectator of political and constitutional issues" (Choudhury 2018, 155).

[131] "Tajuddin's reaction was sharp and violent. He said, 'We knew all along that you will not hand power over to us through constitutional means.' Given the gloom and depression that everyone now felt, a lengthy discussion was not possible. After a pause, Mujib asked his two colleagues to go out and, when he was alone, requested a new date, stating that he would be able to control the crowd" (Khan 2017, 67).

[132] Blood notes that by postponing "sine die the convening of the [NA] Yahya had succeeded in greatly worsening an already exceedingly difficult situation. Of the "Big Three," the soldier had been the first to crack under pressure. By placating Bhutto, he had pushed Mujib to launch a movement that gave the Bengalis a heady sense of being close to realizing their goal of emancipation from West Pakistan. It would be difficult, perhaps impossible, for the movement toward independence to be checked now. Later, in a conversation with a close associate in West Pakistan, Yahya was to admit that he had erred in his action of 1 March" (Blood 2002, 163).

[133] People immediately "filled the streets of Dhaka and the district towns with what was described by government, journalistic, and diplomatic sources alike as a demonstration of collective anguish rather than of anger. The spontaneity and intensity of this response, like the electoral verdict three months before, surprised many political leaders in both east and west" (Sisson and Rose 1990, 91).

government and the military authorities in East Pakistan struggled in formulating a response (Choudhury 2018, 158; Khan 2017, 85-87).

Eastern Command Leadership Change

Meanwhile, Yahya and his MLA called out the troops to check the rioting. On 2 March, Ahsan was officially removed as East Pakistan's Governor and East Pakistan's MLA, Yaqub, took over East Pakistan's civil administration. The Bengalis were alarmed by Ahsan's removal, who was considered a friend and had provided support after the disastrous cyclone in late 1970. Ahsan, however, was seen by West Pakistanis as going easy on the Bengalis (Blood 2002, 159-161). Four days after becoming governor, an embattled and isolated Yaqub followed Ahsan and resigned (Nawaz 2008, 264). Yahya had both removed for disagreeing with the regime's uncompromising approach towards the Bengalis (Blood 2002, 161; Nawaz 2008, 264).

Yahya Khan replaced Yaqub to lead the Pakistan military's Eastern Command with Lieutenant General Tikka Khan who was well-known for his military achievements and for his obedience, thoroughness, and his understated demeanor (Raja 2012, 42, Nawaz 2008, 266).[134] The introduction of Tikka into East Pakistan represented a change to a more hardline military approach (Raja 2012, 42).[135] Blood states that Tikka's arrival as the replacement for Governor Ahsan horrified the Bengalis (Blood 2002, 160-161).

Until 2 March 1971, army leadership in East Pakistan was clueless about what was happening with army leadership in Rawalpindi. In East Pakistan, Major General Farman oversaw civil affairs and Brigadier Ghulam Jilani Khan oversaw martial law, however, their roles were irrelevant with the Awami League taking control (Khan 2017, 96). Farman notes that they were also seen as Bengali sympathizers, similar to Ahsan and Yaqub (Khan 2017, 86).[136]

[134] Tikka "was given the sobriquet of 'Butcher of Balochistan' for his vigorous prosecution of military action in 1958 against dissident [Baloch] tribesmen" (Nawaz 2008, 266). Later, Tikka fought Indian troops in the Rann of Kutch and during the 1965 War. Tikka "was known to be a stern man of action and few words" (Raja 2012, 42). Farman noted that the Tikka he "knew was a straightforward, honest, and obedient soldier, a man with determination and a strong will. [Tikka] sounded very optimistic and thought he could handle the situation [in East Pakistan]. He was not, however, the politician the situation demanded, and when appointed governor [of East Pakistan], could not show flexibility even when he wanted to, because of a habit of obeying his superior's orders" (Khan 2017, 80).

[135] Tikka "was expected to get the job done in short order. With both Ahsan and Yaqub out of the way, the regime had nobody to provide a counter balance to its chosen path of military action" (Nawaz 2008, 266).

[136] They "were dubbed 'doves' by the hawks of West Pakistan. [They] felt that the election results should be accepted; Mujib had secured a majority in the [NA] and therefore should be allowed to form a government.

Knowing that Khadim and Farman were against operations, two of Yahyas inner circle were sent to possibly take over their commands if they faltered in fulfilling their duties (Khan 2017, 102).

Tensions increased and the army was challenged to exercise restraint against the protesters (Blood 2002, 181; Khan 2017, 87). Through Mujib's non-cooperative movement, merchants refused to sell food supplies to the Army, and routine military convoys were harassed by a hostile population and were blocked by crowds. Blood believed that the military in Dhaka had acted with restraint in the face of multiple provocations and questioned how long it would last (Blood 2002, 181-182, 189). On 5 March, during White House policy discussions on the impending Pakistani clampdown on the Bengalis in East Pakistan, U.S. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger was told that the Pakistan military's probable attack would be futile (Bass 2013, 30).[137]

Final Discussions

On 6 March, Yahya declared the NA opening would now occur on 25 March in Dhaka. He also threatened Mujib and the Awami League (Nawaz 2008, 264).[138] On 7 March, Mujib was widely expected to announce a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) but instead called for a peaceful political struggle (Blood 2002, 172-173).[139] Farman attributes Mujib not

[They] firmly believed that the Pakistan Army should not be made to look like a West Pakistani Army and a supporter of only West Pakistani leaders and their interests. The problem, [they] felt, was a political one and should be resolved through political means alone" (Khan 2017, 96).

[137] The White House senior aide for South Asia, Harold Saunders, "recommended a government report that argued for threatening to stop economic aid to Pakistan to prevent bloodshed. He emphasized the crucial decision: 'The tough question is whether to make a major effort to stop West Pakistani military intervention.'" (Bass 2013, 30). The following day, "in [this] last high-level overview of U.S. policy before [Pakistani military repression on 25 March]—a final opportunity for the United States to use its considerable influence to dissuade its ally from violence. A senior State Department official warned, 'The judgment of all of us is that with the number of troops available to Yahya (a total of 20,000, with 12,000 combat troops) and a hostile East Pakistan population of 75 million, the result would be a blood-bath with no hope of West Pakistan reestablishing control over East Pakistan.' Another senior official warned of a possible 'real blood-bath … comparable to the Biafra situation'" (Bass 2013, 30). Biafra was a state that seceded from Nigeria from 1967 to 1970 until Nigeria forced Biafra's reunification during a bloody civil war.

[138] Yahya elaborated, "I will not allow a handful of people to destroy the homeland of millions of innocent Pakistanis. It is the duty of the Pakistan Armed Forces to ensure the integrity, solidarity and security of Pakistan—a duty in which they have never failed" (Nawaz 2008, 264).

[139] "He did not, as some feared and some hoped, declare an independent Bangla Desh. Instead, he called for a peaceful, non-cooperation movement to continue the struggle for independence and the emancipation of the Bengalis" (Blood 2002, 172-173). "Mujib refuted Yahya's charge that the Awami League was primarily responsible for the present situation and said he had placed a call to Yahya the previous week urging the President to visit East Pakistan in order to see personally how [the] military [was] killing Bengali civilians. [Mujib] said he would consider attending the [rescheduled NA opening] on 25 March if three preconditions were met" (Blood 2002, 173). These were the "(1) withdrawal of the Army to its barracks, (2) an end to martial law, and (3) the transfer of power to the people (presumably he meant the provincial assembly for East

making a UDI to Khadim threatening Mujib the day before. The CMLA HQ feared a UDI, and nothing less than that was acceptable (Khan 2017, 82; Salik 2017, 53).[140]

On 15 March, Yahya arrived in Dhaka for more negotiations. The next day talks between Yahya and Mujib ended inconclusively. The meeting on 17 March failed to progress, only lasting one hour (Blood 2002, 190). That same evening, Yahya reportedly told Tikka, 'The bastard is not behaving. You get ready.' Tikka rang up Khadim, the GOC. at 10 p.m. to say, 'Khadim, you can go ahead' (Salik 2017, 61). Tikka told Khadim and Farman to prepare for operations as the Mujib talks were faltering (Raja 2012, 45).

On 18 March, Major General Khadim Raja and Major General Rao Farman Khan met in the morning to draft the basic operational plan which sought Mujib's removal and control of East Pakistan returned to the regime (Raja 2012, 45).[141] Farman and Khadim authored the new plan, christened 'Operation Searchlight.'[142] The operational plan including arresting Mujib and other senior leadership in the Awami League (Salik 2017, 63; Raja 2012, 45-47). The plan was approved that evening, and the East Pakistan commanders were ready (Raja 2012, 47).[143]

On 19 March, Yahya and Mujib held a third meeting together.[144] That same day, outside of Dhaka, the military shot at civilians who got in their way (Bass 2013, 34; Blood 2002, 182).

Pakistan). Subsequently, Mujib added two more demands: (4) an inquiry into the Army killings, and (5) an end to reinforcement of the Army in East Pakistan" (Blood 2002, 173).

[140] From the Bengali perspective, "although Mujib's speech was disappointing for those who expected a [UDI], it made a tremendous impact in the prevailing context containing the elements of both confrontation and negotiation" (Ahmed 1978, 263).

[141] "Both … agreed that the basis of operation 'Blitz', that is, the people's cooperation, was no longer relevant, as had been amply demonstrated since 1 March. They also agreed that the aim of Operation 'Blitz,' to enforce martial law in its classical role, had likewise been superseded by events. Now, if and when any action was taken, it would have to aim at overthrowing Mujib's de facto rule and re-establish government authority" (Salik 2017, 63).

[142] The operation "presumed that all Bengali troops, including regular East Bengal battalions, would revolt in reaction to its execution" (Salik 2017, 63), assuming loyalty of the Bengalis in civil and army establishments to the Awami League (Zaheer 1994, 159). Concern over the loyalty of the Bengalis was not ill-founded, as every Bengali military and security force unit revolted during Operation Searchlight, which began on 25 March (Khan 2017, 107).

[143] They also "struggled with divulging the plan "to subordinate commanders without compromising security" (Raja 2012, 47). There were further "constraints … as there was not enough time and negotiations were barely dragging on and [they] had to get on with things quickly so that all the relevant military elements were ready for action throughout the province" (Raja 2012, 47; Khan 2017, 97-101).

[144] "Each expressed disillusionment concerning an event that had occurred the previous day, and each advanced a new issue for negotiation. Their disillusionment resulted from the creation of the commission to inquire into the actions of the police and army during early March" (Sisson and Rose 1990, 114). "The two leaders also continued their discussions about the formation of an interim government. It was after this meeting that Mujib

That evening, one of Mujib's aides told Blood that the military's recent actions against Bengali civilians made a settlement arduous (Blood 2002, 182). The following morning, discussions continued and seemed to make progress on the plan for making an announcement when they reached a compromise (Sisson and Rose 1990, 117-118).

Bhutto arrived in Dhaka on 21 March to join in the talks at the behest of Yahya (Blood 2002, 190-191). The next day, all three leaders met and squabbled, making no progress (Sisson and Rose 1990, 122). Talks turned for the worse on 23 March, when Bengalis held a Resistance Day on Pakistan's Independence Day.[145] The Bangladesh flag was flown in East Pakistan while Pakistan's flag was desecrated.[146] Parades and demonstrations for Bangladesh independence ensued (Sisson and Rose 1990, 122-123). During negotiations that day, the Awami Leaguers presented their draft proclamation. However, several differences persisted. Yahya's team had issues with the name of the body of NA members that would meet to formulate a new constitution and the phrasing of a confederation of Pakistan rather than a federation (Sisson and Rose 1990, 127-128). These activities were perceived by the regime as verification of the Awami League's deceit (Raghavan 2013, 49; Sisson and Rose 1990, 122-123).

Blood noted, incorrectly, that Yahya and Mujib were possibly nearing agreement on a solution to the constitutional crisis despite the Awami League's incendiary actions on 23 March. One of Mujib's aides told Blood on 24 March that Mujib had been confident as of the evening of 23 March that he had reached an agreement with Yahya on a solution (Blood 2002, 193).[147] The last encounter between Yahya and Mujib occurred on 22 March while the

informed a senior military officer that he and Yahya had tentatively agreed on the formation of a national government" (Sisson and Rose 1990, 116). "When the negotiating teams met later that day, Justice A. R. Cornelius, Yahya's constitutional adviser, forcefully argued that abrogating martial law without adopting a constitution would result in the abolition of the presidency and other basic laws governing the country. The Awami League team shot down this argument on the grounds that the issue at hand was not legal but political. There was no reason why Yahya could not divest himself of the powers of the [CMLA] while retaining the powers of the president" (Raghavan 2013, 47-48).

[145] On 23 March 1940, "the Muslim League meeting in Lahore adopted a resolution [(also known as the Lahore Resolution)] that the areas of Muslim majority in northwestern and eastern India should be grouped together to constitute independent states" (Blood 2002, 191). 23 March is thus known as Pakistan Day, a national holiday in Pakistan.

[146] "Hundreds of the new [Bangladesh] flags were flying in Dhaka, including over Mujib's house. The portrait of [Pakistan's founder] Jinnah was burned by demonstrators outside Mujib's home, as was the Pakistan national flag" (Blood 2002, 192).

[147] "Only a final meeting of the principals was required before Yahya made an announcement, but Mujib feared that Yahya, under pressure of the 'hawks' in the military, might renege on the agreement. Mujib hoped that the United States could 'stiffen' Yahya by letting him know how much Washington favored a political solution.

last meeting between the two sides occurred on the evening of 24 March (Choudhury 2018, 178).

Military Response – Operation Searchlight

Following the events of 23 March, the regime decided to respond militarily to Mujib and the Awami League (Raghavan 2013, 51).[148] There were no newspapers on 24 March, as the 23rd was a national holiday. On the 25th, the Dhaka papers were full of Resistance Day news and photographs. The first pictures of the Bangladesh Flag appeared prominently in all the papers causing Yahya to lose his patience (Siddiqi 1996, 190-191).[149] The military prepared for operations that evening, trying to keep their plans a secret, and Yahya Khan departed Dhaka without informing Mujib and the Awami League.[150] With the lack of communication from the regime and the growing expectation of impending military action "the Awami League cadre swung into action, felling large trees, putting up barricades, and erecting roadblocks to prevent the army from getting out of the cantonment. The army command responded by advancing the H hour. At 11:30 PM on 25 March 1971, Operation Searchlight began" (Raghavan 2013, 51).

However, Blood was noncommittal. In a cable to the embassy in Islamabad, [Blood] opined that, at the brink of an agreement, Mujib was nervous that it might fall through" (Raghavan 2013, 50; Blood 2002, 194).

[148] Zaheer notes that Farman stated, "Till the 21st, we did not know whether action will be taken. On the 22nd, Tikka informed us to be ready" (Zaheer 1994, 159). Farman, in his book, states that "early on the morning of 23 March, [Tikka] said, 'Oh kuch ho raha hai, tayari mayari karo' (something is likely to happen, prepare yourself). This was the only instruction given by the corps commander to GOC 14[th] Division" (Khan 2017, 97). Tikka "was ordered by Yahya on 24 March to be prepared to impose security and order—'I received the order to intervene on March 24 on the understanding that I would begin action at dawn on March 25'" (Choudhury 2018, 184). When the West Pakistani leaders were catching a PIA flight from East Pakistan, Khadim and Farman "boarded two helicopters to pass the instructions verbally to the brigade commanders (outside [Dhaka]) to get ready for army action" (Salik 2017, 68-69) while maintaining operational security. "Until then, the plan for Operation Searchlight, though approved, had not been issued" (Salik 2017, 68-69). Khadim "was instructed to put Operation Searchlight into action on the night between 25 and 26 March 1971. The 'go ahead' signal was given soon after midday on 25 March" (Raja 2012, 51).

[149] "Yahya, normally indifferent to such peevish display, remarked: 'This is the limit'" (Siddiqi 1996, 190-191).

[150] On the 25th, "Khadim and Farman came to know that [Yahya] was going to visit Tikka. Except for [those] two, all senior officers—Hamid, Mitha, Iftikhar, [Khudadad], and [Umar] were present in Tikka's house" (Khan 2017, 104). According to Salik, Khadim "was brooding over the possible outcome of political talks when his telephone rang at about 11 [AM]. … Tikka was on the line. He said, 'Khadim, it is tonight'" (Salik 2017, 71). Khadim and Farman "were … told at about 6 [PM] that the operation was to be launched that night but not before 1 [AM] as the president was flying out and no action was to be taken before he was in Karachi's reception zone. Orders were issued by sending out the codeword and the time. Troops started moving after sunset but were not allowed to enter the city. [Yahya's] move was kept a secret. He drove to the airport in a small car unescorted to maintain secrecy" (Khan 2017, 104). However, PAF Wing Commander A. K. Khondkar stood "on the tarmac to wave [Yahya] off and promptly went to inform Mujib" (Khan 2017, 104). "Yahya flew out of [Dhaka] for West Pakistan, abandoning the talks once and for all" (Bass 2013, 49).

The Bengalis suffered greatly with the commencement of Operation Searchlight (Bass 2013, 50).[151] A commando platoon from the Army's elite special forces, the Special Services Group, arrested Mujib from his house at 1:30 AM on 26 March (Zaheer 2017, 167; Khan 2017, 105). Mujib was flown to West Pakistan as a prisoner three days later. Later on the 26th, Yahya announced that the Awami League was banned and that Mujib was a traitor (Rahman 2012, xxv). There are several accounts of when Mujib and the Bengalis reportedly first declared East Pakistan's independence from Pakistan.[152] Regardless of when the UDI occurred, the Pakistan military's repression was already well underway when the UDI was announced.

Pakistan information operations were in full force, blaming much of the violence on the Bengalis, defending the army's professionalism, denying the massacre of Bengali civilians, and claiming the army's innocence from human rights abuse allegations (Williams 1972).[153] Most foreign journalists were rounded up on the night of 25 March and forced to leave Dhaka. Those journalists who hid were the first to internationally expose the military's brutality in East Pakistan (Blood 2002, 199). The MLA soon began after 25 March to put out its account of the events which had plunged East Pakistan into chaos. In May, the Government of Pakistan made a clumsy attempt to rewrite history to justify the military action. The Army's pre-emptive strike theory was that the Awami League was planning to attack on 26 March, but the Army stopped it by launching Operation Searchlight. Blood noted this theory was false, and the announcement for independence only occurred after the military crackdown commenced and the Awami League had no other option. Further, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and his party were unaware by the military's operation (Blood 2002, 249-

[151] "Truckloads of Pakistani troops drove through the city, only barely slowed by Bengali barricades" (Bass 2013, 50).

[152] Mujib and members of the Awami party stated that shortly before the Pakistani army stormed Mujib's house, arresting and detaining him, Mujib declared Bangladesh's independence "at midnight on 25 March" (Rahman 2012, x). "The second declaration, which got much wider publicity, was by Major Ziaur Rahman, [of the East Bengal Regiment,] who declared independence in his own name [the evening] of 27 March" (Zaheer 1994, 178). The third account was the April independence proclamation by the government in exile in India (Guhathakurta and Schendel 2013, 222). Moudud Ahmed argues that Mujib neither made nor signed a formal UDI. The declaration of independence claims on the night of 25 March by Mujib and his supporters "was only to cover [up] … that Mujib instead decided to give in to the Pakistan Army in order to achieve a negotiated settlement" (Ahmed 1978, 291-292). Further, it was unclear who specifically made the announcement (Ahmed 1978, 291-292; Zaheer 1994, 178). Earlier on 25 March, Mujib, instead of declaring independence, called for a province-wide strike scheduled for March 27. In August, Islamabad published a White Paper which did not allege that Mujib made any such declaration on 25 March (Ahmed 1978, 291).

[153] "The official view from Pakistan's military rulers was … the atrocity stories were fabrications, and Pakistani unity would be restored in a matter of days or weeks. As Yahya wrote to Nixon, East Pakistan 'was well under control and normal life is being restored.' There was no mention of the violence in the press, which was censored under martial law" (Bass 2013, 62-63).

250).[154] Farman confirms this, stating that the Bengalis were not preparing to revolt and that the order for military operations came from Yahya and his inner circle (Government of Pakistan 2000, 414).

The military's venture to come to a political solution in East Pakistan was feeble and unproductive. Rather than talking to Sheikh Mujibur Rehman following his arrest, the regime jailed him, sentencing him to death for treason.[155] The revolting Bengali military and security forces that were able to flee to India eventually formed the core of what would become the principal resistance force against Pakistan military forces, known as the Mukti Bahini (liberation force) (Niazi 1998, 69; Sisson and Rose 1990, 143).[156] India militarily intervened in East Pakistan on 21 November, leading to Pakistan's war declaration on 3 December. Less than two weeks later, on 16 December, the Pakistani troops in East Pakistan surrendered to Indian forces (Sisson and Rose 1990, 5-6). The surrender resulted in East Pakistan's independence and left 90,000 Pakistani soldiers and civilians in India's custody (Niazi 1998, 237).[157]

On the same day of the surrender, Yahya's draft constitution was given to the press with instructions that it would not be published until publication was authorized. The never promulgated constitution named Yahya president and stated he would remain Army C-in-C

[154] Blood identifies the Awami League's surprise as "barricades were hastily put upon only after it was learned that Yahya had broken off its talks and departed" (Blood 2002, 249-250).
[155] At the same time, Mujib told his attorney "that a political solution was possible" (Khan 2017, xvi–xvii).
[156] "Although the army was successful in its mission in most major urban centers within ten days of the first strike, it took six weeks before the martial law authorities gained control over the entire province" (Sisson and Rose 1990, 158). "From 25 March to 10 May, the rebels controlled most of East Pakistan's territory" (Khan 2017, 111). "Although the military operation to reassert central authority was considered successful, efforts to arrest the Awami League elite and to disarm the Bengali units of the armed forces were not. The plan of military action was neither carried out in the sequence anticipated nor achieved its main objectives. Nearly all the Awami League leaders escaped, even though prior to the crackdown in Dhaka, government agents had marked their houses with chalk to assist the army units charged with arresting them. The army was able to capture only those leaders who, for whatever reason, had decided not to try to escape into India. Those who sought to avoid arrest were able to do so" (Sisson and Rose 1990, 158-159). "The Army's actions, particularly Tikka's and subsequently Niazi's policy of 'collective punitive actions', under which village after village was burnt and destroyed, turned the entire population of East Bengal against the Pakistan Government" (Choudhury 2018, 187-188).
[157] The Pakistan Army commanders in East Pakistan pinned much of the blame on Yahya Khan and GHQ for the results of the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War. For instance, Yahya and his circle were remarkably absent, specifically in providing orders or guidance to its subordinate unit, Eastern Command (Niazi 1998, 80). With Indian forces quickly enroute to Dhaka, Yahya's communications indicated that it was up to Eastern Command to decide what to do, to include a potential surrender. The vague instructions and lack of communications was likely intended "to place the responsibility for surrender on the governor and the commander in East Pakistan. If and when the occasion arose, the rulers in Islamabad could go on ruling in West Pakistan by blaming the governor and commander for the East Pakistan debacle" (Khan 2017, 172).

for no more than five more years, indicating Yahya had no intention of transferring power (Government of Pakistan 2000, 120-121). Following Pakistan's surrender in West Pakistan, violent demonstrations demanded the end of military rule (Blood 2002, 336). Internal dissension plagued the military ranks (Sisson and Rose 1990, 273; Zaheer 1994, 431).[158]

On 20 December, four days after Pakistan's surrender to India, Yahya resigned and was later sentenced to five years of house arrest (Blood 2002, 336). The same day Yahya resigned, Bhutto arrived in Rawalpindi, was sworn in as president, and became CMLA of what was left of Pakistan following East Pakistan's secession. On 8 January 1972, Mujib was released by Bhutto's new regime, and following Mujib's 12 January return to Dhaka, Mujib became Bangladesh's first president (Rahman 2012, xvi – xxvi).

Analysis - 1971 Regime Threat Perception

From the onset of Pakistan's creation, structural conditions contributed to its emergence as a weak state. Built on the Two-Nation theory, a unifying concept as a separate homeland for the Muslims in South Asia, Pakistan's regimes viewed ethnonationalism as a threat to this ideology. An ideological threat to the state posed a potential threat to the regime's rule and all its accompanying privileges provided by holding power. However, ethnonationalism alone is insufficient to explain variation in state response. Explaining the variation requires understanding the regime and how it perceives threats which requires understanding who the regime's principal decision-makers are. This section addresses several questions about the case. How did the regime perceive Mujib and the Awami League as a threat? When did the military start preparing to repress the Bengalis? When did the regime decide to repress Mujib and the Awami League?

Pakistan's regimes initially sought to assimilate the Bengalis into Pakistan. The regime's assimilation tools included co-optation, buck-passing, and balancing against the ethnonationalist group. Yahya's regime repeated many of the same types of assimilation strategies as his predecessor Ayub Khan (Jalal 1995, 55-56). During the analysis period, Pakistan's regime, from December 1970 to March 1971, consisted of President Yahya Khan

[158] "Power was ultimately transferred in the form of an anticipatory military mini-coup" (Sisson and Rose 1990, 273). "From 18 to 20 December there was intense jockeying for power in the senior command in the GHQ, which was reluctant to allow transfer of power to the civilians" (Zaheer 1994, 431). The middle cadre of the army and the civil service leadership reportedly supported Bhutto, "which was the only viable and realistic course of action" (Zaheer 1994, 431).

and his military inner circle. Yahya's regime continued Ayub's assimilationist policies to weaken political threats. As noted earlier, political parties in West Pakistan, such as Bhutto's PPP and the QML, reflected the views and perceptions of much of the Pakistan military. However, the unexpected Awami League domination and the thrashing of the pro-regime East Pakistan parties showed that regime assimilation strategies were ineffective in countering the upsurge of Awami League support. Yahya's regime was initially shocked that the December 1970 elections resulted in Mujib's Awami League dominance. The regime expected the vote to be split, with the military regime likely continuing to play a leading role within the regime's decision-making process. Following its election win, the Awami League was set to take control of the NA, leading the drafting of the new constitution, and Mujib poised to become Pakistan's new prime minister. Mujib and the Awami League posed a significant domestic threat to Yahya and the ruling military regime's political survival. Some military officers were also worried that with Mujib coming into power, he could find out their role in the Agartala Conspiracy (Salik 2017, 25-26).

Siddiqi highlights that the Pakistani armed forces suffered a deep sense of irrelevance after the 1970 elections. Since October 1958, the military held power through martial law, and with the Awami League set to take control of the government this meant the military's loss of power and identity (Siddiqi 1996, 182). The regime started military planning days after the elections, proffering several potential threat scenarios and a plan to take direct control over East Pakistan. Two of these three scenarios would lead to the implementation of Operation Blitz, which would institute a declaration of an emergency centered around provocations by the Awami League through mass movements similar to those in January-March 1969, jeopardizing the integrity of Pakistan (Nawaz 2008, 265).

As negotiations remained stymied between the regime, Mujib, and Bhutto, the pressure within the military junta and from Bhutto built on Yahya to not allow Mujib and the Awami League to take power. With Mujib still expected to implement the Six Point plan, Bhutto aggravated the situation by acting as a spoiler. Bhutto's electoral victory in West Pakistan, with the support of the army's base in Punjab, undercut the legitimacy of the military regime. Aside from widespread public support for Ayub Khan's removal in 1969, Yahya came into power lacking legitimacy. Bhutto sought to carve out a significant role in the new government. Bhutto's mid-February announcement that he would not attend the NA and his demand to other West Pakistani politicians to boycott the convening of the assembly further

signaled to the regime that not accommodating Bhutto would further cut into the regime's base of support.

Yahya relied on a handful of civilian advisors. However, his decision-making became more fluid and focused on his military inner circle after Yahya dissolved the civilian cabinet in late February 1971. This occurred shortly before the decision to indefinitely postpone the 3 March convening of the NA, at Bhutto's behest. Khadim noted that the army started preparing to implement Operation Blitz following the Governor's Conference and the decision on the NA (Raja 2012, 41-42). Another indication of planning potential military action was the steps taken by Islamabad to move forces from West to East Pakistan (Blood 2002, 176-177). This started on 27 February with two infantry battalions flying via PIA to East Pakistan (Salik 2017, 40).

Yahya's 1 March announcement of the indefinite postponement of the NA, catered to Bhutto's demands but resulted in rallying East Pakistan's public against the military. Siddiqi states that Yahya was expected to turnover power after the elections but did not, in order to remain in power (Siddiqi 1996, 183-184). This postponement politically excluded Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the Awami League, who rightly deserved to form the new regime in Pakistan after their commanding win in the December 1970 elections.[159] This political exclusion galvanized the Bengali population, who took de facto control of the province under the Awami League, undermining Pakistan, the regime, and the military's writ. Yahya's later announcement on 6 March of the NA opening rescheduled for 25 March probably helped decrease some of the Bengali anger and seemingly made Mujib's expected UDI during the 7 March mass rally less likely. In early March, the regime signaled that repression was a potentiality by removing the top military leadership in East Pakistan, who were on good terms with the Bengalis, and bringing in the 'Butcher of Balochistan,' Tikka Khan (Nawaz 2008, 266).

[159] See Table 2.1 for Yahya's various regime responses to Mujib and the Awami League.

Table 2.1 Regime Response: Yahya Khan and the Bengalis

Exclusion	1 March 1971: Yahya declared the NA opening's indefinite postponement, previously scheduled for 3 March in Dhaka. 22 March 1971: Rescheduled assembly session for 25 March was postponed again. 26 March 1971: Yahya declared Mujib, a traitor and publicly announced the Awami League ban.
Repression	25/26 March 1971: Military Operation Searchlight commenced in East Pakistan. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was arrested and imprisoned by the regime and sustained military operations and a terror campaign against Bengalis.

By mid-March, Yahya had determined that talks with Mujib were not progressing satisfactorily and directed the army to prepare to deal with the Awami League. Khadim and Farman, on 18 March, updated the Operation Blitz plan, named Operation Searchlight, to reflect the evolving political and security situation, including the questionable loyalty of Bengali military personnel to Pakistan and a plan to arrest senior Awami League leaders who had been in de facto control of East Pakistan since early March (Zaheer 1994, 159). While a plan was put together, that does not mean that the decision had been made (Salik 2017, 61).[160]

Yahya's regime decided on 23 March to launch military operations against the Bengalis. This was to occur after Yahya had departed East Pakistan on the evening of 25 March. According to Blood, Mujib and the Awami likely badly miscalculated the regime's response thinking they held the advantage after winning the general elections and based off the belief that the people toppled the previous military regime and could do so once again (Blood 2002, 210).

Bengali independence from Pakistan in 1971 was not a foregone conclusion. Raghavan argues that the breakdown of negotiations, repression, and eventual Bengali independence was not path dependent (Raghavan 2013, 12, 265-267). Who was to blame for the deeply traumatizing breakup of Pakistan remains a contentious issue—often named the 'trio' of

[160] As Major Salik notes, "preparations do not necessarily indicate intentions" (Salik 2017, 61), as militaries have multiple plans for offensive and defensive actions.

Yahya Khan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, with some accounts assigning blame to one more than the others (Raja 2012; Niazi 1998). Bhutto, though, was set to become head of the political opposition and had no role in the regime which meant he could not order the country to delay the opening of the NA nor order a crackdown on the Bengalis (Shah 2014, 116-117). Military repression would almost certainly not have happened without the principal regime decision-maker, Yahya Khan, and the perceived threat that Mujib and the Awami League posed to Yahya and his regime's political survival.

Alternative Explanations

This case study examined domestic factors contributing to regime threat perception and decision-making. This section explores several competing explanations including institutional and exogenous factors for why Pakistan's Yahya Khan regime opted to repress the Bengalis in 1971.

Shah argues that institutional interests led to military repression with the military and West Pakistan Punjabi elite seeing the Awami League as a threat to their interests (Shah 2014, 109). While accurate that Punjabi elites mistrusted the Awami League, the military was not unanimous in the hardline approach to the Bengalis. For instance, Eastern Command military leadership objected and was replaced due to their disagreements with Yahya's policies toward the Bengalis. Furthermore, Yahya Khan appeared initially sincere in his negotiations with Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and had not decided on military action until late March 1971. I found that it was Yahya's high level of threat perception towards the Awami League which was about take replace Yahya's regime that led to Bengali political exclusion and, eventually, military repression.

What about exogenous factors that could have played a role in Yahya's decision-making and policies toward the Bengalis? These factors could include international political pressure, external support to the Bengalis, and regime foreign policy (Butt 2017a; Mylonas, 2012). According to Butt's external security theory, a revisionist state, like Pakistan, will never be conciliatory towards separatists, allowing a section of the country to break off (Butt 2017b, 324). Pakistan continues to strive to integrate all of Kashmir into the state, supporting armed confrontation and proxy groups against India since 1947. For Pakistan, an ethnonationalist group started as a concern, posing a potential threat to the state's ideology, the Two-Nation theory. If a state is already revisionist, such as Pakistan, then an ethnonationalist group,

specifically a secessionist group, is already considered a threat by the state. However, Pakistan's response to ethnonationalists has varied across regimes and over time.

Exogenous factors likely impacted the level of repression the military inflicted upon the Bengalis in a 'collective repression' strategy (Butt 2017a, 51). Pakistani accusations of Bengali mass killings in East Pakistan probably incited brutal military tactics but did not bring about the decision for a repressive response in the first place (Oldenburg 1985, 728). Exogenous factors do not explain when and how the regime decided to vary its response. Nor does it explain the split in military leadership over the regime response to Mujib and the Awami League. Several senior military officers, particularly those stationed in East Pakistan, sought a political solution and were against military action. However, these officers did not belong to the inner circle, lacked influence, and could not persuade Yahya. A unitary state explanation of external security implications cannot account for this difference in perception within the regime.

While the military frequently cited India as a threat, little evidence suggests that India played a significant or direct role in threatening Pakistan's regime through the Awami League before the late March 1971 crackdown. Moreover, Yahya and his inner circle were later faulted for drifting the country into war with India by conducting military operations against the Bengalis, not seeking a political resolution in East Pakistan, and disregarding the increasing Indian threat, which led to East Pakistan's independence (Government of Pakistan, 2000). Pakistan military officers detailed to East Pakistan during the conflict noted that internal Pakistani politics were more significant concerns, rather than possible Indian aggression (Government of Pakistan 2000). The military and West Pakistan propaganda characterized Mujib's Six Points as a threat to Pakistan's integrity and the mechanism for its occurrence was the Agartala Conspiracy (Salik 2017, 1-2). Deep-seated hatred toward India, or the Hindu other, almost certainly played a role in the brutal tactics that the military employed against the Bengalis beginning the evening of 25 March 1971.[161] Pakistan military officers noted widespread general feelings of hatred against Bengalis across the ranks (Siddiqi 1996, 188). Senior Pakistan military leadership in East Pakistan reportedly provided orders to eliminate Hindus and asked how many were killed by soldiers (Bass 2013, 83).

[161] In East Pakistan, the "anti-army propaganda in East Pakistan had provoked and annoyed the cantonment-based soldiers … For all they cared, Bengalis were aliens, hostile, and aggressive like a real enemy" (Siddiqi 1996, 188).

Brigadier A.R. Siddiqi was the director of Inter-Services Press Relations (ISPR), the media and public wing of the Pakistan armed forces, from 1967 to 1973. Siddiqi notes that the military's focus on blaming external influence was primarily an attempt to divert attention from the grim situation in East Pakistan. West Pakistanis allowed themselves to be duped by their propaganda as it grew and expanded (Siddiqi 1996, 204). On 5 August 1971, Pakistan published a 'White Paper on the Crisis in East Pakistan' (Siddiqi 1996, 208). The white paper's preparation started three months after the military's late March crackdown (Siddiqi 1996, 208).[162]

The regime gave Mujib a death sentence after arresting and jailing him, accusing Mujib of treason (Khan 1992, xvii). Oldenburg questioned the regime's accusation logic, asking if Mujib really planned independence from Pakistan going back to the 1966 Six Point plan, why was there no UDI at the 7 March rally where Mujib was widely expected to announce East Pakistan's separation. Oldenburg responds that Mujib sought to lead all of Pakistan, as he and his party were elected with the most votes in the state. Moreover, East Pakistan was in poor shape compared to West Pakistan and prudence dictated ruling an undivided Pakistan (Oldenburg 1985, 713-714).

Yahya's regime sought no political solution after 25 March with Mujib (Khan 2017, xvi-vii). Mujib and the Bengalis were branded traitors by the regime and West Pakistan. According to the West Pakistan narrative, the Bengalis had rebelled, engaged in mutiny, and required punishment (Siddiqi 2004, 113). However, despite the earlier alleged provocations by Mujib, Yahya actively engaged in talks with Mujib, flying to East Pakistan multiple times, stated Mujib would be Pakistan's future prime minister, and continued talks up right up until a day before launching the military operation (Siddiqi 2004, 120-121). Before the late March military crackdown, Yahya's actions did not support the argument that the regime considered the Bengalis a secessionist existential threat to the Pakistani state.

The Government of Pakistan's official Hamoodur Rehman Commission of Inquiry into the East Pakistan fiasco faulted Yahya Khan, stating that he sought to retain power and the Awami League's election victory posed a threat to his continued rule (Government of

[162] Siddiqi notes that "the White Paper — a document of dubious value historically — was a belated attempt at vindicating the military action in East Pakistan" (Siddiqi 1996, 208).

Pakistan 2000, 340).[163] The Commission noted that Yahya's decision for military repression "was clearly an internal and domestic matter" (Government of Pakistan 2000, 135).[164]

I argue that unpacking regime decision-making, especially the impact of perceived threats, provides greater explanatory power than arguments that solely focus on the state. While exogenous factors probably played a role in the severity of repression, endogenous domestic politics and the fear of losing power led to the variation in regime policies from assimilation to political exclusion, culminating in repression. Moreover, there was no change in foreign policy or evidence of a change in external support to the Bengalis to precipitate a causal link to the regime's military repression on the night of 25 March 1971. The evidence shows that the more likely reason power and response variation was not external security considerations but instead that the Bengalis in East Pakistan were the largest ethnic group in all of Pakistan, legitimately won democratic elections, and were set to take power in West Pakistan, threatening the West Pakistan regime's hold on power, and was considered by some parts of the regime as an existential threat to Pakistan.[165] Thus, internal threat perception by the regime was a driving cause for Pakistan's response, which was not just a hypothetical future likelihood of war with a Bengali state (Butt 2017a).

Conclusion

This chapter examined the decision-making process of Pakistani President General Yahya Khan and his junta in deciding how to respond to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his Awami League following their dominant win in the December 1970 elections. Pakistan's regime was dominated by Yahya Khan and other senior military officials and heavily influenced and

[163] Shortly after coming to power, President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, on 26 December 1971, "appointed the present Commission of Inquiry and charged it with the duty of inquiring into the circumstances in which the commander, Eastern Command, surrendered and the members of the armed forces of Pakistan under his command laid down their arms and a ceasefire was ordered along the borders of West Pakistan and India and along the ceasefire line in the State of Jammu and Kashmir" (Government of Pakistan 2000, 11). The initial report was completed in 1972, and a supplementary report was added in 1974, including testimonies from the Pakistani prisoners of war released by India (Government of Pakistan 2000, 340).

[164] According to the Commission's findings "[Yahya's]his culpable failure to arrive at a political settlement with the Awami League during the crucial months preceding the war that completely alienated the sympathies of the population of East Pakistanis, confirming their suspicion that the Generals were not prepared to part with political power in favour of the elected representatives of the people" (Government of Pakistan 2000, 530). "The refusal of Gen. Yahya Khan to negotiate with the Awami League becomes all the more significant when we remember that two of its top leaders, namely, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Dr Kamal Hossain were in his custody in West Pakistan, and that almost all the friendly countries had advised him to arrive at a political settlement in view of the looming Indian threat of military action" (Government of Pakistan 2000, 530).

[165] Staniland argues, and I agree that "this is a case of state repression preceding large-scale insurgent mobilization; … driven by a deeply political threat perception" (Staniland 2021, 175).

pressured by West Pakistani politician Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. During continued negotiations, the regime decided to politically exclude the Bengalis with the indefinite postponement of the NA, which the Bengalis were set to control. Almost immediately following the postponement announcement, the Bengalis took control of East Pakistan away from the central Government. After continued negotiations, the regime decided on a military crackdown against the Bengalis. This ultimately resulted in India's intervention, Pakistan's military defeat, East Pakistan's independence, Bangladesh's creation, and the Yahya regime's fall. By examining Yahya Khan and the military junta's decision-making, the causal process shows that the perceived internal threat to the regime's political survival is the likeliest explanation for the variation in Pakistan's policies toward the Bengalis. The Bengalis posed a significant threat to the rule of the Yahya regime. The regime responded with first political exclusion and, when that failed, military repression without the option of a political solution. The next chapter examines the 1973-1977 Baloch insurgency, including a comparative case study to this chapter's study of the Bengali ethnonationalist movement in East Pakistan.

Table 2.2 Timeline: Yahya Khan and the Bengalis

25 March 1969	Ayub Khan resigned and transferred military dictatorship to Commander-in-Chief General Yahya Khan (1969-1971).
28 March 1970	Yahya announced the Legal Framework Order (LFO), laying out the plans for the elections.
Oct/Nov 1970	Floods and cyclones devastated parts of East Pakistan.
7 December 1970	Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Awami League party in East Pakistan dominated elections acquiring an absolute majority nationally and provincially to the shock of Yahya's regime.
11 December 1970	The Eastern Command put together Operation Blitz, an operational plan for the military to take control of East Pakistan.
3 January 1971	In a rally at Dhaka race grounds, Mujib held an oathtaking ceremony for Awami League's newly elected national and provincial assembly members.
14 January 1971	Yahya called Mujib the 'Future Prime Minister of Pakistan,' following talks with Mujib in Dhaka.
17 January 1971	Bhutto hosted Yahya and his inner circle on his estate in Larkana.
30 January 1971	Air India flight was hijacked by Kashmiris and destroyed after arriving in Pakistan. Bhutto praised the hijackers. India retaliated by banning all flights by Pakistani aircraft over Indian territory, thus almost tripling the flight time from West to East Pakistan by forcing an over the water route requiring a refueling stop in Sri Lanka.
Early February 1971	Mujib declined Yahya's invitation for continued discussions in West Pakistan. Yahya was furious at Mujib.
13 February 1971	Yahya announced that on 3 March, the NA would meet in Dhaka.
15 February 1971	Bhutto declared that he and the PPP would not travel to the scheduled 3 March opening of the NA.
20 February 1971	LFO was amended to permit newly elected NA members to resign before the first NA session.
22 February 1971	Yahya dissolved the civilian cabinet, retaining a council of advisers. Yahya holds a Governor's conference and tells officials afterward his intention to postpone the NA opening.
27 February 1971	Eastern Command directed subordinates to be ready to put Operation Blitz into action at short notice. Additional troops arrived by plane on 1 March.
28 February 1971	Bhutto demanded postponement of the NA opening and threatened physical harm to any West Pakistani that attended the opening session scheduled for 3 March in Dhaka.

1 March 1971	Yahya declared the NA opening's indefinite postponement, previously scheduled for 3 March in Dhaka. East Pakistan erupted. East Pakistan Governor Vice Admiral Ahsan was replaced by General Yaqub.
2 March 1971	Awami League general strikes paralyzed the central government's authority in East Pakistan.
3 March 1971	Awami League assumed de facto control of East Pakistan. Mujib refused Yahya's request to hold an all-political parties conference.
6 March 1971	Yahya announced the 25 March NA opening session and used the speech to attack the Awami League.
7 March 1971	At a Dhaka rally, Mujib announced the conditions for attending the NA. Widely expected to announce a unilateral declaration of independence but did not.
15 March 1971	Yahya returned to Dhaka for several days of talks with Mujib.
17 March 1971	After the day's talks, Yahya told Lieutenant General Tikka Khan to prepare for military action.
18 March 1971	Major General Khadim and Major General Farman revised Operation Blitz. They renamed it Operation Searchlight, which focused on removing Mujib and the Awami League from de facto rule, reestablishing power, as well as anticipating the revolt of ethnic Bengalis in Pakistan's military and security forces.
22 March 1971	The first meeting was between Yahya, Bhutto, and Mujib. NA session postponed again.
23 March 1971	Pakistan's Independence Day, renamed Resistance Day by the Bengalis, had widespread demonstrations, parades, and students demanded independence —and called for armed resistance, with the Bangladesh flag flown widely and Pakistan's flag seen only on military installations. Mujib believed they reached an agreement with Yahya following the 23 March meeting.
24 March 1971	The final meeting between Yahya's team and the Awami Leaguers.
25 March 1971	Yahya secretly left Dhaka. Military Operation Searchlight commenced in East Pakistan—the start of long-term military operations and a terror campaign against Bengalis.
26 March 1971	Mujib was arrested and imprisoned by the regime. Yahya declared Mujib a traitor and publicly announced that the Awami League was banned.
16 December 1971	East Pakistan Command surrendered to Indian forces in Dhaka—creating the new state of Bangladesh.
20 December 1971	Yahya Khan resigned, and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became president and CMLA.
January 1972	Mujib was released from imprisonment. Upon return to Bangladesh became the new country's first president.

Chapter Three
The Baloch and Pakistan in the 1970s

The ethnic Baloch have had a troubled relationship with Pakistan, going back as early as Pakistan's creation in 1947. This chapter explains the decision-making process of Pakistan's regime and why its responses varied towards the Baloch in the 1970s. I argue that Pakistan's response to the Baloch was dominated by domestic considerations, with perceived internal threats to regime political power more critical than external security implications in explaining Pakistan's response to the Baloch. I find that regime repression of the Baloch followed regime political exclusion, which failed to remove the ethnonationalist threat to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's regime and led to the four-year insurgency. The chapter examines the relationship between Pakistan and Balochistan and why the regime's response to the Baloch is puzzling. The case study focuses on regime decision-making that led to widespread state repression in 1973 and includes a section on why repression against the Baloch ended following a regime change in 1977. After the case study, I analyze alternative explanations, including context-specific arguments, paying particular attention to exogenous factors (Butt, 2017a; Mylonas, 2012). I also compare the Bengali and Baloch ethnonationalist movements in the 1970s and show that while these two cases are sometimes lumped together, these cases are mostly different. The chapter ends with the overall case study conclusions.

Why Balochistan?

The Baloch-Pakistan conflict and the variation in regime responses are puzzling for several reasons. First, Pakistan has responded to the minority ethnic Baloch sometimes with nonviolent and violent responses. This latest bout of violence has continued since 2005. While Pakistan's policies towards the Baloch have varied over the years, the continued use of repression and nonaccommodative responses are seemingly counterproductive and thus puzzling, as the policies further motivate the rebels and contribute to the cycle of violence while also damaging the state's reputation and economic progress, also known as the puzzle of repressive persistence (Davenport and Loyle 2012, 78; Davenport 2012, 92). Second, Pakistan's responses are not all-encompassing, targeting different ethnic Baloch over time and in different ways by different Pakistani regimes. Finally, scholars argue that external security implications to include foreign support result in harsher regime responses towards internal groups. However, the Baloch have consistently received limited external support, at

best, yet the regime response to the Baloch has fluctuated over time (Butt 2017a; Mylonas 2012). I argue in this chapter that Pakistan's regime response to the Baloch varied because of regime concerns for the political threat to the regime's rule and was not precipitated due to external security concerns.

During the colonial period, Balochistan, vastly underdeveloped and located on the periphery of the British Raj, was ruled indirectly by the British by investing powers into local tribal leaders (Axmann 2012a, 32-33). Years later, many of these tribal institutions remain, although weakened, and have contributed to Pakistan's limited writ of law in Balochistan, which only encompasses five percent of the vast Balochistan province, consisting of major towns, and are called 'A Areas.' The other ninety-five percent are known as 'B Areas' and are controlled by local militias (Khosa 2017, 16).[166]

The Baloch insurgency against Pakistan is marked by periods of relative peace and enhanced violence, going through five periods of heightened conflict (1948, 1958-1959, 1963-1969, 1973-1977, and 2005-), with the longest consecutive period of violence continuing through today. Balochistan, Pakistan's largest and poorest province, holds significant energy supplies (Heinkel and deVillafranca 2016, 64). Over 70% of people in Balochistan live in poverty, and the province's literacy rate is stagnant at 44% (Ahmed 2016; The Express Tribune 2016). Balochistan province, with its namesake, the Baloch, makes up around 3.6% or about 8 million out of Pakistan's total population of 230 million (CIA 2020).[167] Punjabis make up 44.7% percent of the total population, or about 103 million. The province also includes Brahui and Pashtun ethnicities, with a small population of Hazaras in the capital, Quetta. The Baloch are not limited to Pakistan in South Asia but are also located in neighboring Afghanistan and Iran. There are smaller numbers of Baloch in Oman, Tajikistan, and East Africa. Some Baloch nationalists refer to the area encompassing the Baloch population in Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan as 'Greater Balochistan.' A Baloch ethnonationalist rebellion never emerged in Afghanistan,[168] and Baloch uprisings were brutally repressed in Iran,

[166] The local militias are also known as levies.
[167] The Government of Pakistan only released the provisional results of the 2017 population census, ~208 million total population, which does not include the totals by ethnic group. The previous census was completed in 1998.
[168] The Afghan Baloch have not been able to mobilize themselves into an ethnic collective movement, possibly because of their overall lower numbers (200,000), the process of detribalization, remaining largely isolated from the Pakistani and Iranian Baloch movements, and Kabul's inability to control much of Afghanistan (Orywal 1996).

posing little to no threat to either Kabul or Tehran. Only the Baloch in Pakistan has posed a recurring threat to the integrity of the Pakistani state. This case is limited to the Baloch in Pakistan.



Figure 3.1 Political Divisions in British Balochistan

The British Partition Plan of 3 June 1947 divided British India into India and Pakistan and, in theory, allowed the approximately 562 Indian princely states, among them Makran, Kalat, Kharan, and Las Bela, located in present-day Balochistan Province, the choice of joining either Pakistan or India or to remain independent (Axmann 2012a, 194). Despite this official provision of options, however, neither Pakistan nor India respected the independence option and later subsumed the princely states. In 1948, after nearly one year of independence following a partition from India, the princely state of the Khanate of Kalat acceded into the new Pakistani state (Khan 1975, 162).[169] Shortly after that, the brother of Khan of Kalat Ahmad Yar, Abdul Karim, led a revolt against the accession (Axmann 2012a, 234-235; Awan 1985, 211-212). This initial revolt started what would become years later a low-level ethnic Baloch insurgency against the ethnic Punjab-dominated Pakistani state and Pakistan's longest-lasting internal violent conflict (Heinkel and deVillafranca 2016, 64; Heinkel 2019, 397). The Baloch, like many other ethnic groups, found themselves upon decolonization spread across multiple newly created states in which they had little to no affinity with their

[169] See Figure 3.1 map showing political divisions in British Balochistan, including Kalat (Lewis 2011).

host state. Abdul Karim emerged from prison in 1955 and formed a group that opposed the Pakistani Government's new One Unit policy. The One Unit policy was instituted in 1955 to create a single provincial entity by merging the four provinces (Balochistan, Northwest Frontier Province, Punjab, and Sindh) and all administrative units into a single polity under unitary authority. One Unit sought to combine the strength of the Western provinces, further solidifying Punjabi control over both Pakistani wings and as a counterbalance to the more populous Bengali East Pakistan (Harrison 1981, 27).[170]

Ahmad Yar and Abdul Karim were later arrested under accusations of treason.[171] These allegations helped set the stage for the nationwide imposition of martial law in October 1958, paving the way for Pakistan's first military coup, conducted by General Ayub Khan (Axmann 2012a, 285). On 6 October 1958, the military deployed to Kalat and a hastily assembled Baloch guerrilla force soon emerged in response (Harrison 1981, 27; Siddiqi 2012, 62; Khan 1975, 181; Axmann 2012a, 285-287).[172]

Political violence,[173] or more specifically ethno-political violence,[174] between Pakistan and the Baloch, has evolved from a few Baloch political leaders and tribes with particular goals and grievances to the idea of Baloch nationalism. The Baloch have sought greater autonomy, access to institutions, greater financial control of Balochistan's resources, more development and employment opportunities, as well as the cessation of state repression. Balochistan's secession from Pakistan has become an objective for the current iteration of Baloch insurgents and their nationalist leaders (Heinkel and deVillafranca 2016, 64). The Baloch conflict is one of the many critical issues Pakistan faces, including Islamic extremism, ethno-sectarian violence, the continual potential for violent conflict with the much larger and powerful India, and multiple social, economic, and institutional dysfunctions. The periods of peace and violence between Baloch rebels and Pakistan are inconsistent, with variations in

[170] One Unit is discussed in chapter two.
[171] These accusations included "approaching the Shah of Iran to admit Kalat as an autonomous region, of secretly negotiating with Afghanistan to support a full-scale Baloch rebellion, and of raising the old state flag of the khanate on his fort in Kalat" (Axmann 2012a, 285; Mazari 2004, 83; Harrison 1981, 27-28).
[172] For more on Baloch nationalism and accounts of Baloch rebellions against Pakistan, see Zeb (2019), Sheikh (2018), Axmann (2012a), Breseeg (2004), Dashti (2012), Baloch (1987), and Harrison (1981).
[173] "Political violence refers to all collective attacks within a political community against or by the political regime, its actors – including competing groups as well as its incumbents – or its policies" (Gurr 2011, 3-4).
[174] Ethno-political violence is the "political contestation in which one or more parties mobilizes support based on appeals to communal identity and aims to protect or improve the group's status vis a vis the state or other groups" (Gurr 2017, 34).

the drivers of the conflict, internal and external factors, actors, and degrees of violence. Instead of addressing the drivers of the violent conflict with Baloch rebels, Pakistan has often ignored or exacerbated the problem. Similar past policies led to an internal war between West Pakistan and East Pakistan, resulting in the latter breaking away and becoming Bangladesh.

The Case: 1973

This case study examines Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's regime perception and response to Baloch ethnonationalists in 1973, including assimilation, exclusion, and repression. This repression resulted in the 1973-1977 Baloch insurgency, which only ceased after Bhutto's regime ended in 1977. I argue that Bhutto's principal political objective was establishing and maintaining his power and authority in Pakistan. Perceived threats to his power consolidation influenced his decision-making and, thus, his regime's response toward the Baloch. In late 1971, the Pakistan regime shifted from primarily senior military officers to civilian control. Yahya Khan came to power in March 1969 when Ayub Khan, who assumed control in a military coup in 1958, resigned following mass protests and military pressure. Yahya Khan and the ruling military junta, already lacking legitimacy, were discredited in December 1971 following Pakistan's military loss to India and the separation of East Pakistan that resulted in the state of Bangladesh (Hasan 2000, 1). Prior to the Bangladesh crisis, the military, particularly the army, was highly prestigious and well-organized (LaPorte 1975, 115). The December 1971 war with India and the loss of East Pakistan radically altered this image. This led to an attempted military mutiny against Yahya Khan, anti-army public demonstrations, and the stoning of army vehicles and personnel in the army's Punjab heartland. Yahya Khan was forced to resign, and the military found a suitable replacement in Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (Zaheer 1994, 428-431).

Regime - Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

Historically, the regimes in Pakistan have sometimes been mixed with several individuals and groups of political elites that have influenced decisions or were the regime's principal decision-makers (LaPorte 1975). The military has not always made Pakistan's decisions in responding to internal groups. During this analysis period, from 1971 to 1977, Pakistan's primary national decision-maker was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Born into a feudal Sindhi family and educated in the West, Bhutto studied at the University of Southern California. He then transferred and received his bachelor's at the University of California, Berkeley (Bennett-Jones 2020, 40). Bhutto then completed his law degree at Christ Church, Oxford. After

becoming a lawyer in 1957, Bhutto caught the eye of Pakistan's President Iskander Mirza, who sent him to represent Pakistan at the United Nations (Bennett-Jones 2020, 45). In October 1958, Mirza and Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) General Ayub Khan abrogated the constitution and declared martial law, assuming dictatorial powers with Mirza as president and Ayub Khan as prime minister. Mirza appointed Bhutto to the office of Minister of Commerce and Industries. Shortly after the cabinet was inducted, Ayub Khan deposed Mirza and personally assumed the title of president. Ayub Khan, hesitant to produce further shocks, retained Mirza's cabinet (Taseer 1979, 40). In 1960, Bhutto became the Minister of Water and Power, Communications, and Industry, and in 1963 was appointed Foreign Minister. Gaining Ayub Khan's ear, in 1965, Bhutto advocated for Operation Gibraltar, the covert infiltration of Pakistani troops into Kashmir seeking to lead an indigenous Muslim uprising against Indian rule (Bennett-Jones 2020, 52; Taseer 1979, 60). The ruse failed, and India responded in force resulting in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 that ended in a stalemate. As the ultimate decision-maker, Ayub Khan shouldered much of the blame. However, Bhutto was vulnerable due to his role and proximity to the fiasco (Bennett-Jones 2020, 54). After the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, the Tashkent Declaration ended the war and was castigated by many politicians, including Bhutto, as an unnecessary capitulation to India by Ayub (Blood 2002, 50). Bhutto was sent away from the cabinet, dismissed, and created his party in 1967, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) (Nawaz 2008, 588).

Bhutto was able to galvanize significant support across multiple constituencies in West Pakistan.[175] Ayub Khan, fearing Bhutto as a growing threat, responded with repression by having Bhutto and PPP members arrested and detained in November 1968 (Hasan 2000, iii). Bhutto and his PPP performed well in West Pakistan in the 7 December 1970 elections, gaining 81 NA seats (the Awami League in East Pakistan gained 160 seats out of the 300 total NA seats). Bhutto played an important role in the breakdown in talks between Pakistan's central government and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his Awami League, culminating in Pakistan's military crackdown in East Pakistan in March 1971, leading to India's intervention, an Indo-Pakistan War, and the creation of Bangladesh.[176] During the 3 to 16 December 1971 India-Pakistan War, Bhutto argued on Pakistan's behalf at the United Nations (Bennett-Jones 2020, 54-55). In the 15 December UN Security Council meeting,

[175] This consisted of a coalition "of middle-class professionals, [Sindh] and Punjab landlords, industrial workers, students, agrarian proletariat, and selected industrialists" (LaPorte 1975, 99).
[176] This was explored in chapter two.

Bhutto infamously tore up his notes and stormed out in a dramatic performance intended for his domestic audience (Raza 1997, 128-129; Bennett-Jones 2020, 66). After East Pakistan's surrender to India on 16 December, the military and junta were left reeling, leaving Bhutto as the most popular figure in what was left of Pakistan.

On 20 December 1971, Bhutto was installed as president, becoming Pakistan's first civilian head since the parliamentary period (Burki 1988, 109).[177] Bhutto and the PPP came into power perceiving threats across Pakistan's various elites, and especially from the senior ranks of the civil and military bureaucracies (Hasan 2000, 21). Bhutto's sought to consolidate power and remove probable threats early on (LaPorte 1975, 102). Also on 20 December, he announced the immediate retirement of senior military generals, including Yahya Khan, Abdul Hamid, Peerzada, Umar, Khudadad Khan, and Mitha (Hasan 2000, 5-6). The military remained influential but lost its dominance in national decision-making (LaPorte 1975, 116). In early March 1972, Bhutto did away with the C-in-C positions in the army, air force, and navy, replacing them with chiefs of staff for each service that would report to Bhutto (LaPorte 1975, 102). Bhutto appointed General Tikka Khan as the first Chief of Army Staff (COAS). His hand-picked military leadership appointments and Bhutto's primacy over defense and security issues, marked the first and only time this has occurred in Pakistan's history (LaPorte 1975, 117; Shafqat 1997, 167). Bhutto also addressed potential threats in the bureaucracy by removing over a thousand civil servants (LaPorte 1975, 103).

Bhutto was the ultimate decision-maker during his administration reign from 1971-1977. Moreover, Bhutto's party, the PPP, revolved around Bhutto. While Bhutto did have an inner circle, it was clear that Bhutto was the decision-maker. His inner circle evolved throughout Bhutto's rule, initially consisting of senior members of the PPP. These people knew Bhutto the best, spending most of most time with him, mainly as he thought through and made his decisions. This group initially included Rafi Raza, Mubashir Hasan, Mustafa Khar, and Hayat Sherpao (Hasan 2000, 8).[178] For example, Rafi Raza was Bhutto's most influential adviser

[177] "With the adoption of the August 1973 Constitution, Bhutto assumed the Office of Prime Minister; under the parliamentary form of government which this constitution reintroduced in Pakistan, the prime minister position became the then real power position" (LaPorte 1975, 99). However, power has continued to fluctuate between the prime minister and president in Pakistan over time, with military dictators favoring the presidency. In 2010, the 18th Amendment to the 1973 Constitution decreased powers of the presidency, once again moving Pakistan from a presidential form of government to a parliamentary one.

[178] This case study includes accounts from Mubashir Hasan and Rafi Raza. See Hasan (2000) for a review of Bhutto's relationship with his inner circle. J.A. Rahim was also initially close to Bhutto (Hasan 2000, 8).

and privy to most of Bhutto's decisions (Hasan 2000, 8). Raza resigned in June 1973, with the events in Balochistan personally affecting him and contributing to this decision (Raza 1997, 272). Most of Bhutto's original inner circle would resign or be driven out during his reign due to policy differences and Bhutto's paranoia, reportedly driven by the intelligence services. Pakistan's intelligence community regularly provided Bhutto with reports on the political opposition, protestors, and his own political party (Hasan 2000, 144). By 1974, Bhutto's inner circle had moved away from the left-leaning PPP stalwarts, centering on those with long-standing ties to the civil and military establishments (Hasan 2000, 198).

Ethnonationalists – National Awami Party - Balochistan

This case traces the regime's decision-making process, which begins with a triggering event (cause), with the minority group signaling to the regime through their reaction or behavior. The regime then decides whether the group is a threat (decision-making) and responds accordingly (outcome). This chapter examines the 1970s, beginning with the triggering event, the first elected provincial government in Balochistan, which came into power in early 1972.

The Baloch players during this period consisted of the National Awami Party (NAP) and tribal leaders. In 1957, the NAP was created in Dhaka, then East Pakistan, by leftist Maulana Bhashani to protest against Ayub Khan's One Unit (Newberg 1995, 111). The NAP was formed out of multiple parties with different constituencies in East and West Pakistan. Of specific note, Ustoman Gal, a Baloch nationalist party, joined the NAP (Awan 1985, 236). Bhashani, a demagogue, contributed to the NAP's organizational problems, which also included "the presence in the NAP of members of the banned East Pakistan Communist Party, who brought with them their sectarian—pro-Moscow and pro-Beijing—schisms. In 1966, the NAP split, and Bhashani assumed leadership of the pro-Beijing faction, the NAP (B). … The pro-Soviet NAP (R) was led by Khan Abdul Wali Khan of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP)[179] and by Muzaffar Ahmad in East Pakistan" (Raghavan 2013, 30). Wali Khan, a Pashtun, his base was in the Pashtun tribal areas of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the NWFP. Wali Khan called for the decentralization of power at the center and greater autonomy to the provinces but lacked a base in East Pakistan. Wali Khan was also the son of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, known as the 'Frontier

[179] The NWFP was renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province in 2010 with the 18th Amendment to Pakistan's Constitution. Through the 25th Amendment in 2018, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas merged with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province.

Gandhi', and a veteran leader of the Pashtunistan movement, which called for an independent state of Pashtunistan, and opposed Pakistan's creation. The NAP (B) was besieged by rampant factionalism and was overtaken by the Awami league as the most powerful and popular political party in East Pakistan (Raghavan 2013, 30).

Within the Wali Khan-led NAP in West Pakistan, his focus was on his base in NWFP, while the NAP in Balochistan was led primarily by three ethnic Baloch; Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Khair Bakhsh Marri, and Ataullah Mengal, also known as the Baloch 'triumvirate' (Mazari 2004; Awan 1985; Harrison 1981). This chapter examines the Pakistan regime led by Bhutto's response to the NAP and these three Baloch leaders' activities in the 1970s.

While the Baloch are sometimes stereotyped as primitive (Ahmed 2019, x), the tribal elite were particularly well-off compared to their tribespeople. Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, lacking a tribal following, was a shrewd political operator, gifted orator, and mediator (Mazari 2004, 104).[180] After the Khanate of Kalat declared its independence in 1947, a parliamentary election was held for the new Kalat government on a non-party basis. In the Dar-ul-Awam (House of Commons), members of Bizenjo's party, the Baloch nationalist Kalat State National Party (KSNP), received most of the seats.[181] Bizenjo was elected to the Dar-ul-Awam and, in its first session, was elected its leader (Kutty 2007, 60; Harrison 1981, 54). Despite Kalat's parliament voting against the accession of Kalat into Pakistan, the Khanate of Kalat acceded in 1948. Following accession, the KSNP was banned, and its members were arrested, including Bizenjo (Kutty 2007, 68). Arrests and imprisonment were a recurring theme with Bizenjo and other Baloch leaders (Mazari 2004, 103; Rehman 2017).[182]

Khair Bakhsh Marri, the sardar of the Marri tribe, one of the largest Baloch tribes, studied at Aitchison College in Lahore, Punjab Province, along with several other high-profile Baloch tribal leaders.[183] Known as a 'shy and withdrawn' student, Marri would go through a

[180] Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo belonged "to the ruling Hamalani wing of the Bizenjo tribe but lacked the solid base of tribal power that Marri and Mengal had as [chiefs of their entire tribes] (sardars). Although his father was sardar of the tribe, … [Bizenjo] was too young when his father died to become sardar, and his first cousin was chosen instead" (Harrison 1981, 52).
[181] The KSNP "won 39 out of 52 seats" (Kutty 2007, 60).
[182] This includes in 1966 when Bizenjo "was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment for possessing a currency note on which somebody had stamped a slogan against One Unit. The Lahore High court ordered his release after two years" (Rehman 2017).
[183] Sherbaz Mazari, a Baloch tribal leader and politician, studied at Aitchison College at the same time as Marri, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, and Bugti's brother younger brother Ahmed Nawaz (Mazari 2004, 4).

transformation, becoming profoundly religious and a 'firebrand Marxist' (Mazari 2004, 5). Marri was elected to the National Assembly (NA) in 1962 and arrested by the government in July 1963 (Kutty 2007, 105).[184]

In 1954, Ataullah Mengal became the sardar of the Mengal tribe, one of the largest Baloch tribes (Baloch 2018).[185] In 1962, Mengal was elected to the NA as an independent out of Kalat (Kutty 2007, 105). The Ayub regime soon sought Mengal's removal for speaking out against the dictatorship and for seeking Balochistan provincial autonomy (Harrison 1981, 62). The regime appointed Ataullah Mengal's distant cousin as the new Mengal sardar, but the cousin was murdered on his inauguration day. Mengal was jailed for complicity in the murder and was released after two months. Mengal was again recognized as sardar by the regime in a ploy to make Mengal less problematic. However, he was imprisoned from 1963 to 1967 for allegedly inciting violence (Harrison 1981, 62). Afterwards he "joined Marri and Bizenjo in organizing the Balochistan branch of the NAP and in campaigning for the unification of the Baloch areas in Balochistan province, a demand formally granted by Yahya Khan" (Harrison 1981, 62).

Tripartite Agreement

After taking power in newly bifurcated Pakistan, Bhutto had several issues to contend with, including attempting to unify the state, negotiating with India for the release of the 90,000 captured Pakistani soldiers and civilians during the 1971 India-Pakistan War, dealing with the new provincial governments, opposition political parties, and developing a constitution (Dawn 2012b; Amin 1988, 124). Bhutto's PPP controlled Sindh and Punjab provincial governments but did not control the governments in Balochistan and the NWFP (LaPorte 1975, 104).[186] In the latter provinces, the opposition, Wali Khan's NAP, was the primary partner in the coalition government with Mufti Mahmood's Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), a religious party (the NAP had 8 members and JUI 2 members in the Balochistan Assembly's 20-member house, and the NAP had 13 members and JUI 4 members in the NWFP

[184] Marri was "charged with inciting people to 'commit acts of violence and rioting'" (Mazari 2004, 103). "He was also [temporarily] deposed as Sardar of the [Marri tribe] but it was thought wise not to appoint a replacement" (Mazari 2004, 103), as government selected tribal leader replacements wound up dead (Zeb 2019, 87).
[185] Mengal "was blunt, outspoken, and seemed to have scant regard for the consequences" (Mazari 2004, 104).
[186] "Bhutto's PPP had majority in two provinces (119 members in Punjab Assembly's 186-member house and 36 seats in Sindh Assembly's 62-member house)" (Dawn 2012b).

Assembly's 40-member house) (Dawn 2012b).[187] Bhutto could not claim to speak for all of Pakistan (Syed 1992, 181).[188]

On 20 December 1971, Bhutto removed Yahya Khan's ban on the NAP and sought their partnership in his new government (Kutty 2011, 159).[189] However, as this chapter shows and LaPorte argues, Bhutto sought to further consolidate power by removing perceived political threats and replacing them with more friendly and pliable groups.[190] Following NAP and JUI discussions with the PPP, "a Tripartite Agreement was reached among the three parties on [6] March 1972" (Dawn 2012b).[191] "The 10-clause agreement set the agenda for Bhutto and a ground for forming [Pakistan's] constitution" (Dawn 2012b). "Bhutto was President and [CMLA], with the total power of the state vested in his person" (Hasan 2000, 60). "Without a constitution, the government held no legitimacy" (Hasan 2000, 60). The Tripartite Agreement said that "the government of the country was to be carried on the basis of an interim constitution based on the Government of India Act of 1935 and the Indian Independence Act of 1947" (Amin 1988, 124). The Acts provided a strong center with residual powers vested in the provinces. "The three parties settled for the PPP rule at the [center] and in Punjab and [Sindh], and the NAP-JUI rule in [NWFP and Balochistan]. As a compromise, the center would appoint governors in consultation with the majority party in … [NWFP] and [Balochistan]" (Amin 1988, 124). These governors would be installed on 1 April (Mazari 2004, 251).

Bhutto "sought to convince the leaders of the … [NAP] and … JUI to participate in the NA for just a few [days] session on 14 April" (Wolpert 1993, 188). "In return for these gestures

[187] Bhutto "made several unsuccessful efforts to build the PPP-dominated coalition majorities in [the NWFP and Balochistan]" (Amin 1988, 124).
[188] Bhutto won "only three seats in the NWFP assembly and none in [Balochistan]" (Syed 1992, 181).
[189] "The quest for regional autonomy, rejection of a 'strong center,' and restoration of democracy have been persistent themes in the political opposition's discourse. When he was not in power, Bhutto identified with these quests and argued that they were essential to the promotion and preservation of national unity and integrity" (Syed 1992, 17).
[190] "Bhutto's strategy was to circumscribe the NAP's ability to govern, to replace NAP governments in both [Balochistan and NWFP] provinces. Political harassment by PPP officials, a fair amount of 'touring' by PPP central government officials, and accusations by PPP officials of 'plotting' and 'disloyalty to Pakistan' on the part of NAP and Wali Khan were some of the tactics employed" (LaPorte 1975, 104-105).
[191] "This agreement was the result of [concessions] on both sides. Bhutto had an expressed preference for the presidential type of system but settled for a parliamentary form of government in response to the demand of the opposition parties" (Amin 1988, 124). "The NAP which had won the election on the basis of maximum provincial autonomy (leaving only three subjects with the center, namely [defense], foreign affairs and currency) softened its stance and was willing to accept a strong center in exchange of the parliamentary system and the choice of provincial governors" (Amin 1988, 124).

[the] NAP and JUI would support [Bhutto's extension] of martial law until 14 August 1972 and vote accordingly in the government's [favor] if this matter [were] ever raised in the [NA]" (Mazari 2004, 251). The Tripartite Agreement was not as generous as it seemed because Bhutto tried to persuade the NAP to back his interim constitution. From the outset, Bhutto tried to limit the authority he had to give up (Bennett-Jones 2020, 96).

Arguments emerged with Wali Khan over the dates for installing provincial governors.[192] Wali Khan also "maintained that the NAP-[JUI] were not required to vote for the continuation of martial law [until] 14 August" (Raza 1997, 154). Mazari said this was because of "Bhutto's use of martial law in the large-scale dismissal of civil servants" (Mazari 2004, 251), many of whom worked for the provinces and had no recourse. The NAP viewed this as an extreme overstepping of authorities, especially into the province's purview (Mazari 2004, 251-252).[193] "Bhutto was deeply concerned about any curtailment of his martial law, but even more imperative was the need for consensus on a constitution" (Raza 1997, 154). Rafi Raza notes that he persuaded Bhutto "to put forward a new 'Basis for Negotiations' … [and] on 8 April, Bhutto absolved the NAP-[JUI] 'from their commitment' to vote for the continuance of martial law. [Bhutto] remained prepared to respect the NAP-[JUI] coalition as the majority in the [NWFP and Balochistan] provinces but expressed unwillingness to have their nominees as governors" (Raza 1997, 154).

On 17 April, Bhutto had enough support was able to pass the "interim constitution reinforcing many of the martial law powers and special privileges he had enjoyed— more than [earlier ruler] Ayub Khan" (Wolpert 1993, 188).[194] The interim constitution came into effect on 21 April, putting "an end to the question of the legitimacy of the government, the rump assembly, and to the demand for early elections in the recently truncated country"

[192] "Bhutto's concern was to maintain both [NWFP and Balochistan] provinces within the Pakistani union without having to share his authority and power; that is, to avoid a shift of power from the center to the provinces. The drafting of the constitution was concerned with this issue, and eventually a compromise was reached whereby a division of powers (including taxation) took place with the authentication of the constitution" (LaPorte 1975, 105).

[193] Wali Khan was angry that the 1 April date that was agreed on for the installation of the governors came and went "resulting in what he termed an 'April Fool' joke on Arbab Sikandar and Bizenjo, the two prospective governors. Lengthy correspondence and public controversy followed, mainly involving Wali Khan and [Rafi Raza]" (Raza 1997, 154).

[194] "In the provinces, ministries were established that were responsible not to the provincial legislatures but to the governors. The governors, appointed by the president, were responsible only to [Bhutto] and not the legislature" (Burki 1988, 91; Mazari 2004, 254).

(Raza 1997, 156). Martial law also ended that day, and not 14 August, which is when Bhutto wanted, likely because of growing criticism and court challenges (Sterba 1972).

On 26 April, a new Tripartite Agreement resolved the issue of the governors in NWFP and Balochistan (Raza 1997, 154). Bhutto sought several assurances from Bizenjo including the preservation of security in Balochistan and that the provincial government would not intrude on the central government's authority (Bennett-Jones 2020, 96; Government of Pakistan 1974). Bhutto offered one federal cabinet position each to the NAP and JUI (Raza 154, 1997). Bizenjo replied to Bhutto, assuring him that he accepted the stipulations (Bennett-Jones 2020, 96; Government of Pakistan 1974).

On 29 April 1972, Bizenjo was selected as Balochistan's governor by Bhutto as was NAP—stalwart Arbab Sikandar Khan Khalil, to oversee the NWFP (Dawn 2012b). On 1 May, "JUI chief Mufti Mahmood formed a coalition government in [NWFP] while [NAP leader] Mengal, became the head of the coalition government in Balochistan" (Dawn 2012b; Kutty 2007, 166).[195] After the NAP and JUI agreement, Bhutto joined the NAP's rival political forces in NWFP and Balochistan. "Bhutto made use of the traditional division between the [Baloch] and the [Pashtuns] and began to patronize Abdus Samad Khan Achackzai, leader of a splinter faction of the NAP, who was struggling for the [Pashtun] rights in [Balochistan]" (Amin 1988, 124). Ethnic Baloch hold a slight majority in Balochistan Province, but Pashtuns make up the majority in northern Balochistan. In Quetta, the provincial capital, the Baloch may represent as little as a quarter of the population, with Pashtuns in the majority (Lieven 2011, 347). Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti,[196] a rival Baloch sardar and head of the Bugti tribe, "was in league with other anti-NAP tribal chiefs and Abdus Samad Khan Achackzai, to destabilize the NAP government in Balochistan" (Amin 1988, 127).[197]

[195] "Bhutto wrote to congratulate them on 1 May. A week later Mengal replied, appreciating the central government's economic support of [Balochistan's] development, especially Bhutto's approval of that backward, impoverished region's request to use its own Sui gas" (Wolpert 1993, 202).

[196] Akbar Bugti served in various government positions and was killed in a major military operation in 2006, sparking the continuing low-level Baloch insurgency, examined in chapter four. For a biographic overview of Akbar Bugti, see *Dawn* (2006d).

[197] Akbar Bugti was "arrested by the Ayub Khan government on charges of murder of his uncle Haybat Khan and a military court awarded him a death sentence. But later Ayub Khan commuted the sentence and released him. [Akbar Bugti] could not contest elections in 1970 as he was disqualified by a military court for holding any public office … [but] did play an active role in the election campaign of the NAP and his younger brother Mir Ahmed Nawaz Bugti was elected member of the first Balochistan Assembly in 1970. [Akbar Bugti] soon developed serious differences with the NAP government [in Balochistan]" (Dawn 2006d).

The PPP allied with the leader of the Pakistan Muslim League (Q) (QML)), Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, who had been a traditional rival to the NAP in the NWFP, and an enemy of Wali Khan, was made a cabinet minister at the center, and was entrusted with the interior ministry (Amin 1988, 124; Syed 1992, 183).[198] Qayyum Khan was crucial in engineering political problems in Balochistan and NWFP, especially in inciting NAP party splits in the NWFP (Amin 1988, 127).

Baloch Control of Balochistan

The debut of Balochistan's first-ever elected provincial government was cut short, only lasting nine months. According to Raza, aside from the beginnings of its reign, "[center]-province confrontation became a regular feature. This was partly due to the Baloch leaders' inexperience of formal government, though they were natural administrators. More important, however, was Bhutto's failure to accept this NAP-dominated 'government of sardars' with their proud traditions, who rejected his assumption of superior wisdom and leadership. He only got on with, Bizenjo who, although pragmatically accepting the concept of Pakistan, was no less a believer in the rights of the Baloch. … Mengal lived up to his people's expectations" (Raza 1997, 267). "He promised land reforms and the abolition of the sardari system and sought to strengthen the cultural and ethnic heritage of the Baloch. He allowed freedom in the province by withdrawing both press restrictions and Section 144" (Raza 1997, 267), which prohibited the public assembly of persons for political purposes (Nawaz 2008, 348). "The NAP government in [Balochistan] … adopted Urdu as the official language of [Balochistan]" (Amin 1988, 125). However, Mengal's notorious stubbornness did not help with center government relations "nor did reports of threats to throw out Punjabi government officials from Balochistan" (Raza 1997, 267).

[198] "Qayyum Khan and Wali Khan's rivalry conflicts were both personal and ideological. Qayyum Khan was chief minister of the NWFP from 1948 to 1954 and was credited with the authoritarian nature of the pattern of economic development in the province. He was autocratic in dealing with Wali Khan's father, Ghaffar, and brutally suppressed Ghaffar's 'Red Shirts' during his rule. Ideologically, Qayyum Khan was the center of the right and he believed in a 'strong center.' As a leader of the Muslim League, he had a national following and was respected as a nationalist" (Shafqat 1997, 93). In his interior ministership, Qayyum Khan "had access to police and intelligence reports, and kept Bhutto informed of everything Wali Khan and his 'treacherous' NAP supporters (all of whom he considered 'pro-Indian' and 'pro-Russian') did, both at home and abroad" (Wolpert 1993, 203).

The NAP-led Baloch government "sought to redress [Baloch] grievances by giving preferential treatment to the [Baloch] in the provincial services" (Amin 1988, 125).[199] The Baloch provincial government also refused "to allow the Coast [Guard], a federal force, to patrol the Makran coast," (Zeb 2019, 100) forcing the Coast Guard "to seek permission from the provincial government" (Jetly 2004, 15). Islamabad blamed the provincial government for arms trafficking and smuggling (Jetly 2004, 15; Government of Pakistan 1974). These provincial actions "were perceived by the Bhutto regime as 'tampering' with law enforcement agencies and defying the central authorities" (Shafqat 1997, 102).

According to Bhutto, the Pakistan-owned land in the productive Pat Feeder area was encroached upon by Balochi sardars that opposed the PPP and the regime sought to take the area and allow poverty-stricken peasants to use the land (Wolpert 1993, 181).[200] Islamabad alleged in November 1972 that a thousand Marri tribespeople attacked Punjabi settlers in the Pat Feeder area (Siddiqi 2012, 66).[201] Bizenjo accused the central government of staging this conflict as a provocation.[202]

While decisions by the NAP-led provincial governments in NWFP and Balochistan created a rift between provinces and Islamabad, Bhutto sought to undermine them with the eventual goal of replacing the provincial governments with a PPP-dominated coalition. This included attempting to buy the loyalties of the NAP-JUI provincial assembly members and, having failed at this, resorted to creating an excuse for dismissing the provincial governments. Islamabad instructed federal civil servants not to cooperate with the provincial governments. It took advantage of petty ethnic squabbles and rival political forces, making them a pretext for the center's interference in provincial matters (Amin 1988, 127). The situation in Balochistan was overseen by the Interior Ministry, led by the NAP foe Qayyum Khan at Bhutto's direction (Hasan 2000, 116). Baloch nationalists note that in May 1972, just a

[199] The provincial government repatriated "5,500 (mostly Punjabis) civil servants from Balochistan. Out of these, [2,880] were serving in the police force. According to the Mengal government, out of the [12,000 total] government employees, only [3,000] were Baloch" (Zeb 2019, 100). The paramilitary Frontier Corps (FC) personnel were made up of 90 percent non-Baloch. Probably noting the ethnicity disparity, the provincial "government created a new police force" (Zeb 2019, 100).
[200] "Some 30,000 acres were reserved for [defense] personnel, and the remainder was to be divided between those who had been in continuous possession of the land since 1953, tenants in cultivating positions and landless peasants" (Jetly 2004, 12).
[201] However, the fighting was actually between "the Kahloies, tenants of Punjabi settlers, and the Marris" (Siddiqi 2012, 66; Government of Pakistan 1974).
[202] To provoke "the army [to] attack the Marris. The [Marris] would certainly retaliate which could then be used as yet another piece of 'evidence' against the NAP-led Balochistan government" (Kutty 2007, 181).

couple weeks after the NAP took control of the province, the Shah of Iran's sister, Princess Ashraf, conducted a state visit to Pakistan in Quetta. Armed clashes between the supporters of Pakistan's Interior Minister Abdul Qayyum Khan and the NAP resulted in the killing of one person (Kutty 2007, 167; Janmahmad 1989, 301; Ali 1983, 113).

In August 1972, multiple politicians, including Akbar Bugti, Wali Khan, Mengal, and Akbar Bugti's younger brother Ahmad Nawaz Bugti, were in London at the same time (Awan 1985, 266). It was claimed that during the same time, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, was also in London for medical treatment (Zeb 2019, 101). In September, pro-government Pakistani newspapers reported that the opposition politicians met with Mujib and plotted to topple Bhutto's regime and break up Pakistan, coining this conspiracy 'The London Plan' (Zeb 2019, 101; Awan 1985, 267). Bhutto reportedly summoned Bizenjo to Rawalpindi for talks on this conspiracy, in which Bizenjo denied the charges (Awan 1985, 267). Bhutto's regime used this allegation based on circumstantial evidence to assert that the NAP had an anti-Pakistan agenda (Zeb 2019, 101; Kutty 2007, 182-183; Awan 1985, 266).

Raza noted that Bhutto approved this publicity campaign, feeling that "this would serve to discredit the NAP while applying pressure on them to accept a constitutional arrangement, which he regarded as essential in the national interest. At the same time, [Bhutto] played on tribal rivalries and ambitions, both supporting and being encouraged by opposing factions" (Raza 1997, 267-268).[203] A Baloch tribal leader, Doda Khan Zarakzai's father-in-law was Nauroz Khan, who had led the Baloch rebellion against Pakistan in 1958 (Ali 2015b). Ali Muhammad Mengal, an old outlaw, shifted his loyalties from his tribal chief to Zarakzai. Armed groups under Zarakzai threatened to disrupt a national highway, and criminality continued to increase (Awan 1985, 274). By early October 1972, Bizenjo told the press that "Zarakzai had formed a 'parallel government' in Jhalawan area of Kalat district and was in a state of near rebellion. A force of Kalat levies was sent to deal with the situation" (Mazari 2004, 287).[204]

[203] "[Bhutto] placed great reliance on the advice of Said Ahmed Khan, his Chief Security Officer, who sent him a note from London, [in] September 1972, suggesting that Akbar Bugti should be utilized to break the Bizenjo-Mengal government with the assistance of [Sardar] Doda Khan Zarakzai and Ali [Muhammad] Mengal, and financial support from Nabi [Bakhsh] Zehri" (Raza 1997, 267-268).

[204] "When Governor Bizenjo accused Nabi Bakhsh Zehri of providing arms and ammunition to Doda Khan and declared that the provincial government would soon take steps against Doda Khan, Doda Khan responded with a promise of a bloodbath if the provincial government moved against him" (Zeb 2019, 112).

In early December 1972, Salim Bugti, Akbar Bugti's oldest son, with his tribespeople surrounded and broke into the Baloch provincial secretariat in Quetta. He sought his uncle Ahmed Nawaz Bugti, to remove him from his position as the provincial minister of finance. Akbar Bugti earlier expressed his anger that Ahmed Nawaz decided to stay with the NAP government and ordered Salim to make Ahmed Nawaz step down (Mazari 2004, 287). Salim Bugti's father-in-law, Nabi Bakhsh Zehri, also monopolized marble quarrying in Balochistan. Zehri, a member of QML, opposed the NAP, and in retaliation, "the provincial government had cancelled a large number of his leases, antagonizing [him]. By 3 December over a hundred Bugti tribespeople had been arrested by the government" (Mazari 2004, 287).[205] Zarakzai, "Zehri, and Salim Bugti fled to Karachi to escape arrest [and] requests for their extradition were [denied] by the Sind[h] government" (Lodhi 1980, 334).

Additionally, in December, events in Las Bela further destabilized Balochistan. Jam Yusuf, the son of Jam Ghulam Qadir Khan of Las Bela, was arrested by Balochistan's provincial government. In response, his tribespeople cut off communication from the area and threatened a jailbreak to free the Jam (Kutty 2007, 188). Areas in Kalat were in disarray and the NAP-led provincial government resorted to building its own militia to end the Jamote uprising. The regime alleged that the Mengal-led provincial government was party to a tribal clash and that Mengal raised his private lashkar (armed force). On 9 February, Bhutto sent the military in to handle these forces (Mazari 2004, 290; Government of Pakistan 1974).[206] By 14 February, the army expanded across Balochistan (Mazari 2004, 291).

In January 1973, Akbar Bugti publicly claimed that while he was in London with other Baloch NAP leaders they conspired to partition Pakistan and they were trafficking weapons in pursuit of this goal (Mazari 2004, 289).[207] The next month, Pakistan found weapons in the

[205] "After the arrest of [Salim's] people Salim [withdrew] to Bugti House, Quetta, and surrounded himself with a dozen armed men" (Mazari 2004, 287). The Baloch "government refrained from taking direct action against Salim out of respect for his father," Akbar Bugti (Mazari 2004, 288).

[206] According to some accounts, "Bizenjo had requested the federal government to intervene, but Bizenjo later stated that he only asked for security forces and not the army" (Zeb 2019, 100). "The Mengal government and the NAP leadership sharply criticized the federal government's intervention into the provincial matters. Bizenjo openly accused the federal interior minister, Qayyum, who encouraged the Jam of Las Bela to go on this path. The NAP leadership claimed that the main reason behind this episode was the refusal of the Jamotes to implement reform measures introduced by the Mengal government in their areas. Wali Khan in a statement declared the federal government's action a breach of the constitutional right of the provincial government and interference in the internal affairs of Balochistan" (Zeb 2019, 100).

[207] Bugti was irritated when a Baloch friend and colleague said he was unwittingly serving as Bhutto's tool (Mazari 2004, 289-290).

Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad which it alleged was for Baloch militants who planned to use against the state (Haqqani 2013, 196). Bhutto accused Baloch leaders of conspiring with Iraq and its patron, the Soviet Union, to dismantle Pakistan and Iran. However, the alleged plot lacked credibility and was likely fabricated (Amin 1988, 128; Haqqani 2013, 196; Raza 1997, 269).

NAP Provincial Government Dismissed

On 15 February, Bhutto used the discovery of the arms, the deterioration of the security situation, uncooperativeness with the central government, and allegations of conspiring with foreign powers to foment armed rebellion and secede from Pakistan as justifications for dismissing the NAP-led Balochistan provincial government (Amin 1988, 127-128; Raza 1997, 269).[208] The NWFP governor was also removed, followed by Bhutto taking direct control of the province for a brief period (Mazari 2004, 292). More than a year after losing East Pakistan in 1971, Bhutto's allegations resonated with the dominant Punjabis in Pakistan (Haqqani 2013, 195). The NAP-led NWFP provincial government quit in outrage a day after the dissolution of the NAP's government in Balochistan (Amin 1988, 128). Three army divisions were soon reported passing through Quetta with soldiers moving towards mountainous areas in Balochistan. Bhutto replaced the two governors, Arbab Sikandar, in NWFP with Aslam Khattak, and Bizenjo was replaced by Akbar Bugti in Balochistan (Mazari 2004, 292).

In response to Bhutto sacking the Balochistan provincial government, in Islamabad, on 28 February 1973, several opposition group leaders met and formed an alliance known as the United Democratic Front (UDF) (Mazari 2004, 293; Dawn 2012a). Bhutto soon started a campaign against the UDF with intimidation tactics and arrests. On Pakistan Day, 23 March 1973, the UDF held its first rally at Liaquat Bagh in Rawalpindi. In an operation named 'Pastry,' the Punjab Governor Ghulam Mustafa Khar, supported by Bhutto, sent large numbers of people to disrupt the rally leading to violence with eleven civilians killed and eighty wounded (Mazari 2004, 293-297; Arif 1995, 123). Raza noted that Bhutto used the rally to test his new personal internal security force, the Federal Security Force, and was likely in revenge against the opposition for the disruption of Bhutto's earlier PPP-rally, also

[208] The regime "failed to substantiate its arms charge against the NAP leaders and chose to deemphasize the whole [Iraqi Embassy] episode after the dismissal of the provincial government" (Amin 1988, 128).

held at the Liaquat Bagh in late 1972 (Raza 1997, 278). Violence worsened and the regime further restricted political activities (Shafqat 1997, 104).

Baloch militants started attacking military transports, a month and half after the NAP government was removed. Bhutto's reaction consisted of gaining financial and military aid from Iran and then reinforcing Balochistan military positions (Harrison 1981, 36). On 29 April, the military launched operations (Hasan 2000, 118).

By May, Bugti was hounded by Baloch leaders who sought the removal of Jam Ghulam Qadir Khan, who was appointed by Akbar Bugti as Balochistan's CM. Bhutto never trusted Bugti and believed the Jam was selected by Bugti because of his obedience (Wolpert 1993, 217).[209] By July, there were 60,000 Pakistan army troops in Balochistan, and the military was depriving tribespeople and their families of food (Mazari 2004, 316-317). Mubashir Hasan notes that the regime sought to publicly conceal the military operations in Balochistan and almost nothing about the conflict was published by Pakistan's press (Hasan 2000, 119).

On 14 August 1973, Pakistan's Independence Day, Bhutto's new constitution was promulgated, and his title was changed from president to prime minister.[210] The following day, the Baloch triumvirate of former Governor Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, former Chief Minister Ataullah Mengal, and Khair Bakhsh Marri was arrested on the orders of Bhutto (Wolpert 1993, 219-220). By October 1973, Bhutto had the Constitution pertain to Balochistan Province which moved power from the governor to the CM (Mazari 2004, 326). Akbar Bugti increasingly became upset with Bhutto, regarding the NAP problem as an internal Baloch issue, and for losing power in his position as governor. On 31 October, Akbar Bugti resigned but continued in this role until he was replaced in January 1974 by the former Khan of Kalat, Ahmad Yar Khan (Mazari 2004, 326; Wolpert 1993, 230).

On 2 December 1973, Pashtun political leader Abdul Samad Achakzai was assassinated in Quetta (Dawn 2012c). According to rumors, he had sided with Bhutto and had a fraught

[209] Bhutto delayed the reconvening of the Baloch provincial assembly for months, attempting "through the services of Bugti to convert his super-imposed minority government of Jam Ghulam Qadir into a 'majority' one … [before] the new constitution took effect on 14 August 1973" (Mazari 2004, 316).
[210] "Superficially at least the new constitution appeared to be responsive to the smaller provinces. It gave them equal representation with the Punjab in the Senate, the upper house of a two-chamber legislature. But under the 1973 constitution the Senate had no financial powers, a serious defect from the … view of the non-Punjabi provinces" (Jalal 1995, 188-189).

relationship with Baloch tribal leaders. Shafqat states that Achakzai's death damaged Bhutto's machinations for Balochistan (Shafqat 1997, 104). However, through 1974, as the regime imprisoned NAP MPAs, the PPP could fill those empty seats with their people (Syed 1992, 188).

The Insurgency

Bhutto's removal of the NAP-led Balochistan provincial government and the arrest of the Baloch tribal leaders caused the 1970s Baloch insurgency (Titus and Swidler 2000, 61).[211] The Baloch tribespeople who rebelled were also joined by the 'London Group,' which consisted of a handful of Marxist Punjabis (Nawaz 2008, 334). Part of the guerrilla's finances was allegedly provided by Mir Hazar, one of the leftist students within the London Group (Akbar 2011, 275).

On 3 September 1974, the military conducted a large-scale military operation in Chamalang against Marri tribe families which drew the fighters in from the hills (Siddiqi 2015, 69; Harrison 1981, 38; Mazari 2004, 361). The situation for the rebels deteriorated following this brutal six-day battle (Mazari 2004, 361). In explaining the center's position, in October 1974, the Government of Pakistan released a 'White Paper on Baluchistan' providing the background and reasoning for the military intervention, declaring a turning point had been reached in the conflict and the withdrawal of the military from Balochistan (Government of Pakistan 1974). However, the military did not withdraw.[212]

The insurgency started to abate in 1975 (Harrison 1981, 74). Later that year, the Baloch Parari[213] leaders concluded that the only way for their movement to survive was to abandon their camps in Balochistan and operate from sanctuaries in southern Afghanistan (Harrison 1981, 37).[214] By late 1976, the Pararis and the leaders of the other organized guerrilla groups

[211] "As with the Baloch ethnonationalist movement in general, there were two groups among the guerrillas: those with tribal ties to the imprisoned leaders (particularly Marri and Mengal) and those with an ideological commitment to the nationalist cause" (Titus and Swidler 2000, 61). "In the Marri area the fighters were virtually all Marri, and in Jhalawan they were mostly Mengal, while in other areas they were mixed" (Titus and Swidler 2000, 61).

[212] As Raza noted, "White papers are only issued when they suit those in power, and often merely result in witch-hunts and the pursuit of political rivals under guise of accountability" (Raza 1997, 384).

[213] In the 1960s Baloch-Pakistan conflict, the Baloch guerrillas went by the name 'parari.' In Balochi this "is used to describe a person or group with grievances that cannot be solved by talk" (Harrison 1981, 30).

[214] "The Mohammed Daoud Khan-led regime in Afghanistan permitted the Pararis to set up two large encampments and several smaller ones relatively close to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Officially, they were

engaged in the struggle, who fell under tribal commanders, operating locally and separately from each other, held differing goals (Harrison 1981, 34, 71). The Pararis was reconstituted as the Balochistan People's Liberation Front (BPLF) (Harrison 1981, 74). Independence was not an initial objective for the BPLF, but the younger Baloch nationalists who became alienated from the 1970s conflict further adopted independence as a goal (Grare 2006, 7; Ahmed 1998, 176). By 1977, widespread involvement in Baloch guerrilla activity had declined (Harrison 1981, 39).

Pakistan's Neighbors

Iranian Balochistan was severely underdeveloped and the Shah faced a low-level rebellion (Kutty 2011, 160). The Shah feared Pakistani Baloch support for Baloch insurgents within Iran and reportedly pressured Bhutto to oust the new provincial government. However, this was likely in part due to their mutual dislike for each other (Bhutto 2010, 117; Wolpert 1993, 210). Further, the Shah did not seem particularly worried about the NAP Baloch leadership while discussing the situation in a 1978 conversation (Mazari 2004, 504-505).[215]

Afghanistan was historically a haven for Baloch rebels from Pakistan and kept its role during the 1970s insurgency. On 17 July 1973, Afghanistan's King Zahir Shah was removed in a palace coup by his cousin and brother-in-law, Mohammad Daoud Khan (Wolpert 1993, 219). Bhutto worried about Daoud's support for Pashtun nationalism, which further harmed Bhutto's relationship with the NAP (Shafqat 1997, 104). In June 1976, Bhutto visited Daoud in Afghanistan to ease tensions between the two countries (Syed 1992, 157).[216] Daoud asked Bhutto to end internal security operations in Balochistan and inquired about the arrest of the NAP leaders. Bhutto blamed the situation on the negative attitude of Pashtun and Baloch

described as refugee camps to forestall objections from Islamabad [but] in practice … [the] encampments functioned as guerrilla base camps" (Harrison 1981, 39).

[215] The Shah told Bizenjo, "I suppose that there is a general impression among the Baloch that I was fully supporting Bhutto in suppressing your rights in Balochistan. Let me make it clear that it was nothing of the kind. As far as we were concerned we were helping your government maintain law and order in a province bordering on Iran. The stability of Pakistan is of vital importance to Iran. It had nothing to do with Mr. Bhutto!" (Mazari 2004, 504-505).

[216] "Daoud, who was under pressure from the … Shah of Iran to make peace with Pakistan, only grudgingly admitted the Baloch. He then refused to grant the guerrillas political asylum, giving them a more uncertain status as refugees. His government also declined to recognize the [BPLF] as the legitimate representative of the Baloch in the camps. Throughout his regime, he continued to give monthly subventions to the Baloch who had come in 1975. However, as a gesture to Pakistan, Daoud withheld food and other assistance from Baloch guerrillas and their families who came to join the Pararis in mid-1976, forcing them to live in a makeshift camp, just inside the border. He hoped they would go back voluntarily" (Harrison 1981, 81).

leaders and the Pakistan Army's generals. A stalemate continued between Afghanistan and Pakistan through the end of Bhutto's reign (Arif 1995, 300-301).

Hyderabad Conspiracy Case

While the fighting continued in Balochistan, on 8 February 1975, the PPP Senior Minister in the NWFP provincial government and Bhutto's close friend, Mir Hayat Muhammad Khan Sherpao, was killed in an explosion (Rizvi 2000, 155-156). The Bhutto government accused the NAP of the murder and arrested its top leadership (Wolpert 1993, 249). Two days later, on 10 February, Bhutto dissolved the NAP, closed its offices, and took control of all its and its members' assets (Wolpert 1993, 249; Raza 1997, 276; Mazari 2004, 372).[217] By 10 February, over 800 NAP members were reportedly arrested. The NWFP provincial governor and government were dismissed shortly after resulting in the regime governing the NWFP directly (Mazari 2004, 372).[218] Kabul denied Islamabad's accusations that Afghanistan was involved with interfering in Pakistan's domestic issues.[219]

On 24 February 1975, Pakistan's Supreme Court received a reference hostile to the NAP, from the regime, as a requirement under law for the dissolution of a political party (Arif 1995, 166). Some of the allegations against the NAP included that it had been preaching the doctrine of nationalities in an attempt to erode Pakistan's national cohesion; it was seeking and receiving support from foreign powers hostile to Pakistan; advocating violence to subvert the constitution, the rule of law, and democratic institutions; working towards the disintegration of Pakistan with the active support in the name of independent Pashtunistan and Azad (free) Balochistan; and with the help of hostile foreign powers, organized and supported large-scale terrorist and subversive activities to threaten Pakistan's security and unity (Awan 1985, 289-290). The reference resulted in the Hyderabad Conspiracy Case, named because of the place of the trial (Newberg 1995, 148). The NAP defendants faced high treason with a punishment of either death or life imprisonment (Awan 1985, 290-291). The

[217] "The First Amendment to the 1973 Constitution allowed the federal government to ban political parties formed or those 'operating in manner prejudicial to the sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan'" (Mazari 2004, 372) but required a judicial validation.

[218] "All the opposition parties … unanimously agreed to boycott all further [NA] sessions in protest against the banning of the NAP" (Mazari 2004, 373).

[219] Bhutto's regime declared that "by interfering in Pakistan's internal affairs, a neighboring foreign power was 'totally betraying the principles of peaceful coexistence of sovereign states.' Interior Minister Abdul Qayyum Khan threatened to take 'counter-measures,' if compelled. In a sharp reaction, Afghanistan termed the Pakistan action 'politically motivated' and suggested that the solution lay in respecting the 'aspirations of the Balochi and the Pashtun people'" (Arif 1995, 166).

trial commenced in 1975 and was dissolved on 1 January 1978, after Bhutto was toppled (Arif 1995, 167).

Regime Response Shift Under General Zia-ul-Haq

After four years of military operations against the Baloch that started in 1973, Pakistan's repression against the Baloch ended after President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was removed from office in a military coup d'état conducted by COAS General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq on 5 July 1977. Zia implemented a policy of 'non-provocative' firmness or 'velvet glove' approach towards the Baloch, avoiding confrontations with the more militant tribes, forging good relations with pro-government sardars, and pushing development policies that slowly undermined the traditional hold of the sardars (Harrison 1981, 150; CIA 1983, 8).[220] On 1 January 1978, Zia disbanded the Hyderabad Tribunal, released NAP leaders and an estimated 6,000 Baloch prisoners, and declared a general amnesty for Baloch militants (Awan 1985, 302; Arif 1995, 167; Harrison 1981, 40). However, Zia did not address Baloch autonomy issues, like previous Pakistani leaders, and continued to curtail civil liberties by abrogating the constitution and declaring martial law.

Why the shift in regime policy toward the Baloch belligerents? I argue that Zia's regime did not perceive the Baloch ethnonationalists as a severe threat. First, Bhutto was removed from power, and thus, any perceived threats to Bhutto's political power were now irrelevant. Second, Zia came to power with differing threat perceptions. Zia was the final decision-maker as a military dictator, ruling Pakistan as its longest-serving head of state from 1978 until he died in 1988. After removing Bhutto from office in July 1977, Zia declared martial law and, within two weeks, was visiting Baloch leaders and promising to release NAP leaders from prison and to end military operations in Balochistan (Mazari 2004, 481-485).

After four years of fighting, the Baloch fighters and leadership had lost momentum and were exhausted. Moreover, Bhutto instigated the conflict by dissolving the Balochistan government, arresting NAP leadership, deploying troops, and conducting military operations, followed by the dissolution of the NAP. Zia sought to avoid the provocative policies that Bhutto implemented towards the Baloch, assessed Baloch grievances would eventually

[220] The regime offered Baloch tribal chiefs "highly lucrative business opportunities in the form of ship-breaking contracts, incentives for industrialization, and funding for development projects" (Amin 1988, 177).

recede, and did not believe the Baloch leaders were secessionists, nor did they threaten his regime (Harrison 1981, 154). Zia primarily used an exclusionary and assimilationist approach towards the Baloch, including co-opting political leaders (Amin 1988, 176).

By 1978, a split over ideological differences occurred in the NAP between Wali Khan's Pashtun faction and the Baloch (Mazari 2004, 486-487). Following release from jail, Bizenjo joined the National Democratic Party (NDP), which was formed in 1975 and led by Sardar Sherbaz Mazari, after Bhutto's ban of the NAP (Ahmed 1998, 1; Kutty 2007, 14). After Wali Khan's release from jail, he rescinded his views on substantive NAP stipulations, such as greater provincial autonomy (Newberg 1995, 142). Wali Khan's anger mainly centered around Bhutto after four years of imprisonment rather than the military regime which had deposed Bhutto. The Baloch, however, bore the brunt of Bhutto's military response thus distrusted Zia's military dictatorship (Mazari 2004, 502). In 1979, Bizenjo, Mengal, and others broke from their former Pashtun allies, forming the Pakistan National Party (PNP) (Ahmed 1998, 176; Kutty 2007, 17). Following the cessation of hostilities, the Baloch leaders were unsure how to proceed (Harrison 1981, 39, 45).

On 29 March 1978, Zia altogether banned all political activities. This forced most Baloch leaders to keep quiet or operate privately. In 1979 and through early 1981, regime arrests of critical political leaders continued, including targeting the Baloch Students Organization, a Baloch nationalist/activist group. As regime political exclusion continued, Baloch moderates, including Bizenjo, struggled in their attempts at reconciling with the state (Harrison 1981, 40).

In 1979, Marri and Mengal went into self-imposed exile in Europe, purportedly for medical treatment. In 1981, Mengal and Marri pursued external support for Balochistan's independence while keeping the possibility of negotiations with Islamabad alive (Harrison 1981, 40). This was the first time these Baloch leaders openly advocated independence (Harrison 1981, 188). Marri relocated to Afghanistan, where a few thousand of his armed tribespeople were located (Ahmed 1998, 177). In 1983, Mengal, from self-imposed exile in London, issued a declaration of independence for Balochistan (Lifschultz 1983; Ahmed 1998, 176). Mengal and Marri's activities continued to keep alive the idea of Baloch nationalism and eventual independence. However, they played no role in the 1980s in countering Zia's rule (Ahmed 1998, 177).

The Baloch were perceived as less of a threat to Zia's regime for the above reasons, but what was considered a more significant threat if the Baloch were less of a threat? Zia had more significant concerns domestically as well as some international concerns.[221] Zia was very skillful in managing military colleagues who differed from his personal preferences and policies, which blunted the potentiality of dissent within the military. Zia's primary political strategy was preventing the return of Bhutto's party, the PPP, and his family, to politics.[222] According to General K. M. Arif, the Vice Chief of Army Staff under Zia, a return of the PPP for Zia was intolerable (Shafqat 1997, 218; Arif 1995, 252). The most significant political threat to Zia was the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), an opposition political alliance established in February 1981, consisting of the NDP and PNP (Zeb 2019, 124).[223] The MRD's attempts to remove Zia gained traction in inner Sindh Province, which was pro-Bhutto and anti-Punjabi, in August 1983. The regime's security ruthlessly quashed the MRD agitation (Rizvi 2000, 179).[224]

Zia faced an international crisis that would last through his entire reign. On December 24, 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, conducted a coup, installed a puppet regime, and occupied the country. While military operations against the Baloch had ended, Zia kept the military in Balochistan out of the public eye. He argued that military cantonments dated back to the British colonial days. The military was needed in Balochistan due to the proximity of the Soviet Union (Harrison 1981, 154). This stemmed from a geo-strategic concern that the 'Baloch problem' was a potential Soviet invasion of Pakistan (Zeb 2019, 122, 130).[225] Despite this speculation and the Pakistani and Western fear of a potential Soviet intrusion into Balochistan, this never materialized. Balochistan, however, did not escape the conflict unscathed, having several million refugees moving in.[226] Following Zia's death in a

[221] For one, "Zia ruled Pakistan without any serious threat to [his regime's] hold on power" (Shah 2014, 151).
[222] See Rizvi (2000, 179-180) for multiple strategies that Zia's regime implemented against competing domestic threats.
[223] "As a group of different political parties belonging to various sides of the political divide, the MRD had only one uniting factor: opposition to Zia's regime. However, the MRD soon got bogged down with internal rivalries and political jealousies" (Zeb 2019, 124).
[224] Further, "Zia exploited festering ethnic tensions between Muhajirs and Sindhis as a counterpoise to the PPP. This divide-and rule policy helped the emergence of the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM), [an urban Sindh party] claiming to represent the rights of the Urdu-speaking migrant community" (Shah 2014, 160).
[225] "Balochistan could then become the focal point of a superpower confrontation if the Afghan struggle should escalate, since it [was] the 'Baloch card' that Moscow would be most likely to play in retaliation for U.S. assistance to the Afghan resistance or for expanding U.S. military links with Pakistan" (Harrison 1981, viii).
[226] "Nearly three million Afghan refugees poured into Pakistan, one-third of whom settled in Balochistan. This migration drastically altered the [provincial] ethnic balance in favor of the Pasht[u]ns and against the Baloch" (Ahmed 1998, 177).

plane crash on 17 August 1988, a 'decade of democracy' ensued, bringing Baloch leaders back into national-level politics (Zeb 2019, 122).[227]

Analysis - 1973 Regime Threat Perception

The December 1970 election brought Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his PPP to the forefront of politics in West Pakistan and Pakistan in late December 1971 when East Pakistan became Bangladesh. While not a member of West Pakistan's hegemonic group, the ethnic Punjabi, Bhutto, a Sindhi feudal lord highly educated in the West, belonged to the political elite and strived for absolute power. The powerful military's disgrace following Pakistan's military defeat to India, resulting in the loss of the most extensively populated section of the country, East Pakistan, left an opening for Bhutto to take over the reeling rump left of Pakistan. Bhutto saw an opening and his rule became the only era where a civilian leader in Pakistan held supremacy over the military (Clary 2022, 9).

LaPorte highlights that ascertaining Bhutto's prior planning about what he could do or where he would begin upon taking power is problematic; examining Bhutto's early moves and their consequences led him to conclude Bhutto and other Pakistani regimes sought power first and then figured out what to accomplish (LaPorte 1975, 99). Bhutto almost immediately began consolidating power. Bhutto's desire for national prominence is well-documented, as well as his demand to wield executive authority (Syed 1992, 95; Sisson and Rose 1990, 58).

Anxious from the outset that the army was the main threat to his holding on to power, Bhutto moved fast (Bennett-Jones 2020, 99). Bhutto removed several senior military officers and abolished the positions of C-in-C of the army, air force, and navy. Instead, chiefs of staff for each service would report to the president. Bhutto also promoted General Tikka Khan as the first Pakistan COAS. Tikka previously served in Balochistan, known as the 'Butcher of Balochistan' during earlier counter-Baloch guerrilla operations, and served as Governor and GOC in East Pakistan in 1971, where he was also known as the 'Butcher of Bengal.' Tikka Khan was known for obeying orders and playing a supportive role in the government. With these moves, the military was no longer involved in senior-level decision-making (Burki 1988, 71). Under Bhutto, Pakistan's Civil Service influence waned significantly (LaPorte

[227] Chapter four further discusses this relative calm in Balochistan that occurred until the early 2000s and how and why Pakistan's regime response to the Baloch changed under General Pervez Musharraf.

1975, 118). At the time the interim constitution passed in April 1972, Bhutto had removed or curtailed perceived threats from the military and federal government, co-opting and adding others who were perceived as posing little threat to his power (LaPorte 1975, 103). While Bhutto did not get martial law extended through the interim constitution in April 1972, the constitution and its provisions further set up his ability to curb political opponents.

Bhutto politically excluded the Baloch ethnonationalists by dismissing the NAP-led Balochistan government.[228] The Bhutto regime also co-opted NAP rivals, specifically Bugti, using him as an effective foil against Bizenjo, Mengal, and Marri (Wolpert 1993, 217). Following Baloch political exclusion, Bhutto repressed the Baloch through military operations.

Bennett-Jones noted that Bhutto's 15 February 1972 proclamation dismissing the NAP government in Balochistan read similarly when past military officers took power in Pakistan through coups (Bennett-Jones 2020, 97; Bhutto 2010, 118-119).[229] Bhutto reportedly once told Wali Khan that the domination of Punjab could only be broken if Pashtuns and the Baloch were united against it. For this reason, he kept the Army mostly comprised of Punjabis engaged in internal security duties in Balochistan. Also, Bhutto told Wali Khan that Bhutto meant to keep the Baloch-Pakistan conflict ongoing to preoccupy Pakistan's military as well as the Shah of Iran (Arif 1995, 143). Bhutto precipitated the political crisis in this case study, creating a situation where military advice was needed. Baloch fighters mounted actions against the Pakistan Army, which, in turn, responded with force.[230]

[228] See Table 3.1 for Bhutto's various regime responses to the NAP and the Baloch.
[229] "Citing the 'national interest', he declared that he would 'assume . . . all functions and powers of the Government of that Province.' Some of those close to [Bhutto] … tried to shift the blame for what happened onto the military, arguing that no civilian leader in Pakistan can ever ignore military advice, which is almost always to shoot first and think about the politics later" (Bennett-Jones 2020, 97; Bhutto 2010, 118-119).
[230] Bhutto described "the Baloch rebels as 'miscreants', caused many to draw parallels with what had happened in East Pakistan when the army was given a free hand to restore control" (Bennett-Jones 2020, 97).

Table 3.1 Regime Response: Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the Baloch

Assimilation	• Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan: Pro-regime, Pakistan Muslim League (Q) (QML)) party founder, a traditional rival to the National Awami Party (NAP) in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), an enemy of NAP leader Wali Khan, and served as Interior Minister under Bhutto. • Nawab Akbar Bugti: Baloch tribal leader of the powerful Bugti tribe, dispute with NAP leadership, including brother Ahmad Nawaz. Alleged NAP destabilization and secessionist plans. Installed by Bhutto as Balochistan Provincial Governor following February 1973 NAP dismissal, disillusioned about Bhutto by October 1973, he resigned in early 1974. • Ahmad Yar Khan: last Khan of Kalat. Leader of a Balochistan princely state which acceded to Pakistan after eight months of independence in 1948. Brother led the first Baloch rebellion against Pakistan shortly after Kalat's accession. Bhutto appointee as Balochistan Governor, replacing Bugti in January 1974. • Sardar Doda Khan Zarakzai: Baloch tribal leader whose father-in-law led the Baloch rebellion against Pakistan in 1958. In Kalat district, created a rival government and challenged the provincial government, which sent levies (local militias) in response. • Nabi Bakhsh Zehri: a member of QML and an active opponent of the NAP in Balochistan. Father-in-law of Salim Bugti, Akbar Bugti's oldest son. Held a monopoly in marble quarrying in Balochi. However, the NAP canceled many of his leases. • Jam Ghulam Qadir Khan: Earlier ruled Las Bela princely state. Son had close ties to Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and was arrested by the NAP-led government. Jamote tribe members rebelled, and local militia, instead of supporting the Balochistan government, sided with Bhutto. The Federal government sent the army in response. Appointed by Governor Bugti as Chief Minister of Balochistan after the NAP government was dismissed.
Exclusion	15 February 1973: NAP-led Balochistan government dismissed by Bhutto. 10 February 1975: NAP banned.
Repression	8 February 1973: Army ordered into Las Bela to counter-provincial levies. In late February, three army divisions reportedly moved into Balochistan. April 1973: Baloch guerrillas begin attacks on military convoys. Military operations continued until Bhutto was removed in a 1977 military coup. 15 August 1973: Baloch NAP leaders (Bizenjo, Mengal, and Marri) were arrested, imprisoned, and later tried under the Hyderabad Tribunal. 10 February 1975: NAP leaders in NWFP arrested and imprisoned.

With the NAP Baloch leadership in detention and military operations continuing in Balochistan, the NAP in NWFP continued to threaten Bhutto. A contrast began to develop among the masses.[231] The opposition, led by NAP leader Wali Khan exploited the situation by organizing mass campaigns in Punjab and Sindh to build party organizations in these two provinces.[232] With the difficulties of Sindh's government and the NAP attempting to make in-roads in both Sindh and Punjab provinces. Bhutto then saw Wali Khan and his faction of the NAP as a threat (Amin 1988, 126-127).[233] Bhutto used Sherpao's assassination as the impetus to arrest Wali Khan and other leaders of the NAP's Pashtun-wing which brought comparisons to Bhutto's removal of the Balochistan Provincial government in February 1973 (Mazari 2004, 372).

What about the regime's response to other domestic challengers? In the 1977 national elections run-up, Bhutto used his executive power to find and exploit weakness in his potential challengers.[234] Pakistan's traditional elite were dissatisfied with the regime but lacked public and legislative support (Hasan 2000, 123). Threatening intentions were high,

[231] "Participatory politics was seriously compromised by the government's response to threats to its undiluted power. The PPP government's increasingly brutal repression against its critics helped them to organize an effective, if not democratic, opposition. Legislators were frequently disregarded in policymaking, removed from [NA] sessions when they disagreed with [Bhutto] and harassed if they parted company with the party, which used the resources of the state to impose its will. At times, only violence - like that which broke out in Sind[h] in 1972 when the PPP provincial government under Mumtaz Ali Bhutto enforced a law-making Sindhi the official language in Sind[h Province], despite a plurality of non-Sindhi speakers in the province - convinced the government to change direction. Dismay with the PPP mounted, even though the government had come into office with popular good will" (Newberg 1995, 142). "The NAP governments in NWFP and Balochistan controlled by the opposition parties were seen displaying a more patriotic and Pakistani nationalist image whereas the party in power in Sind[h], which was the ruling PPP at the center appeared championing ethno-national cause of a province" (Amin 1988, 126).

[232] Wali Khan considered neither Bhutto nor his PPP as "truly national in character and had a regional support base only in Sindh and Punjab [provinces]" (Shafqat 1997, 95). "Bhutto found this situation both embarrassing and dangerous" (Amin 1988, 126).

[233] Bhutto "did not have the same pressing internal and external constraints which had forced him to enter the [earlier] Tripartite Agreement [with the NAP and JUI]. … [Bhutto] consolidated his power by purging the top military-bureaucratic elite, successfully negotiated the Simla Accord with India following the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War and was firmly in control of the country. From Bhutto's perspective, the agreement had not only outlived its utility, but was giving his political opponents a chance to further consolidate their position at the national level as a serious alternative to the PPP" (Amin 1988, 126-127). "The government's evolving practice of limiting political debate was reflected in the passage of the first constitutional amendment restricting free association which covered the dissolution of the [NAP in February 1975], and the imprisonment of many of its leaders [in the NWFP]" (Newberg 1995, 148).

[234] Bhutto utilized "reports from the intelligence agencies and the civil administration about the political work and loyalty of each candidate. He was personally aware of the factions and rivalries among the feudal, within their fiefdoms, and within their families. Bhutto was keen to maintain a balance and not allow any group or family to become dominant" (Hasan 2000, 212). "In the provinces, the [political] right as well as the left wanted to topple [Bhutto's regime]" (Hasan 2000, 123). The regime had Sindhi nationalist G.M. Syed confined to his house. "Some [JI] workers were also arrested on allegations of breaching the peace. There were [labor strikes and] landlord tenant clashes" (Hasan 2000, 123).

however, Bhutto's challengers lacked capabilities.[235] I argue that the Baloch ethnonationalists, mobilized after gaining then losing provincial power, were ideologically opposed to Pakistan, thus posing a more significant threat to the regime, resulting in military repression. The Baloch posed a high threat based on their intentions and their capabilities to Bhutto's power consolidation.

Bhutto's successor Zia's response to the Baloch contrasts sharply. Zia sustained a policy of assimilation along with political exclusion while avoiding repression. Internal co-optation, balancing, and buck-passing were quite effective due to the multiple competing power centers within Balochistan, between and within tribes.[236] When the Baloch leadership started to call for independence from Pakistan implicitly and explicitly, the Zia regime followed an exclusionary political response and not repression, unlike the Bhutto regime (Harrison 1981, 154). Zia further noted more significant concern for the Soviet threat in 1980.[237] Despite the new intention of an independent Balochistan from key Baloch leaders, which threatened the regime's rule and the whole Pakistan state, the leaders were in exile. They lacked the capability to make good on their intentions for Balochistan's separation.

Much of what led to Bhutto's downfall was his own doing. In pursuing power consolidation and continued rule, by 1977, Bhutto had alienated almost all of Pakistan's important constituencies.[238] He further alienated his political party[239], rightist parties, intelligentsia, students, working-class, the press, the Baloch, and the Muhajir (immigrants from northern India) in Sindh while further antagonizing the opposition by abusing the parliamentary system and rigging the 1977 elections. Bhutto also brought the military back into politics,

[235] Mubashir Hasan noted "for a civilian government, a political solution with an ethnic or any other group capable of offering armed resistance and demanding autonomy or independence amounts to condoning rebellion. Any dissent which casts a shadow on the sovereign power of the real ruling elite is not to be tolerated" (Hasan 2000, 119).
[236] "Rather than bargaining with the largest opposition group, some autocrats survive by keeping the most challenging opposition divided from more easily co-opted moderates who are allowed legislative seats and the private benefits that go with them" (Geddes et al. 2018, 149).
[237] In a conversation with Bizenjo, Zia said, "'A revolution has taken place in Afghanistan. Soviet troops have entered that country. The situation poses a grave threat to Pakistan's security. What do you think about it?' [Bizenjo replied] 'General Sahib, Pakistan faces no danger from Afghanistan, the Soviet Union, India, or anyone else. If at all there is any such threat it might come from the people of Sindh, Balochistan, and the NWFP where national rights have been trampled underfoot by successive governments for the last more than forty years. Rectify that situation and there will be no threat to Pakistan'" (Kutty 2007, 244-245).
[238] "Bhutto pointed out that Islamabad had 'four major power blocs: (a) the military, (b) the bureaucracy, (c) big business, and (d) the politicians'. … he antagonized each of them and enabled them to capitalize on his weakened position, which subsequently led to his fall from power" (Raza 1997, 380).
[239] Within a couple years of his reign, Bhutto had pushed out all founding members of the PPP (Bhutto 2010, 120).

heavily relying on it to suppress Baloch ethnonationalist agitation, inadvertently strengthening the greatest threat to his political survival (Bennett-Jones 2020, 97; Raza 1997, 380-382).[240] The following section explores other explanations for Pakistan's regime variation to the Baloch during this period.

Alternative Explanations

This case study examined domestic factors contributing to regime threat perception and decision-making regarding the variation in Bhutto's response to the NAP-led provincial government in Balochistan. What exogenous factors could have played a role in Bhutto's decision-making and policies toward the Baloch? These international factors could include international political pressure, external support to the Baloch, and regime foreign policy (Butt 2017a; Mylonas 2012). Iran likely put some pressure on Bhutto to get his side of the border in Balochistan Province under control. Due to the ongoing U.S. arms embargo, it supplied Pakistan with gunships and funds for anti-Baloch guerrilla operations. Afghanistan later played a role in the Baloch insurgency when the Baloch guerrillas lost ground to the Pakistan military and needed safe-havens. Anti-Indian rhetoric, including accusations of foreign meddling, was a recurring theme from Bhutto and regularly espoused by Pakistani nationalists, especially the military. Also, several NAP leaders, specifically Bizenjo and Marri, held Marxist-Leninist leanings. It would not be unexpected that the United States would have been against the NAP for fear of potential ties to the Soviet Union.

Suppose international political pressure or external security issues determined the state's response to the Baloch. In that case, the empirical footprint should include evidence of the regime's increasing concern about foreign pressure or external support, such as through decision-maker comments, meeting notes, and witness accounts from those involved or near state decision-making before the regime implemented the repressive response. Despite some foreign support rhetoric for the Baloch from the Bhutto regime, this lacks credibility. Afghanistan supported the NAP-JUI coming to power in the provincial governments of NWFP and Balochistan (Syed 1992, 157). However, this did not include material support, nor was this perceived as a threat based on the evidence from those near Bhutto's decision-making. Afghanistan's President Daoud came to power in July 1973, after Bhutto had

[240] The counterinsurgency operations in Balochistan were "described as 'Bhutto's waterloo' because it allowed the army to carry out its field operations autonomously of the government, which helped the generals regain their foothold in national politics" (Shah 2014, 139).

dismissed the NAP-led provincial government and started military operations against the Baloch. Daoud, a proponent of Pashtunistan, a form of state revisionism, could be seen as a potential external security threat by supporting the Wali Khan-led NAP in NWFP. While foreign relations were tense between Afghanistan under Daoud and Pakistan under Bhutto, this does not explain why Bhutto's regime failed to escalate its response to the Pashtun in NWFP as Bhutto did with the Baloch in Balochistan Province. Instead of moving to conduct military operations against the Pashtuns in NWFP, Bhutto opted for assimilationist and exclusionary policies, as well as arresting NAP leaders and personnel in NWFP. Bhutto's allegations of Iranian pressure on him to conduct military operations against the Baloch lacked credibility, as these allegations were presented after the operations and were likely used by Bhutto to deflect blame after his enemies removed him from power in 1977.

Moreover, external security was not a primary concern by Bhutto regarding the Baloch, as they were not viewed or treated like secessionists.[241] During the 1973-1977 Baloch insurgency, Bhutto and government emissaries would visit the imprisoned NAP Baloch leaders in search of a political solution to the fighting (Mazari 2004, 364; Syed 1992, 187). Holding recurring discussions with persons accused by the regime of wanting to destroy Pakistan (Government of Pakistan 1974) does not sound like the group posed an existential threat to the state. With the change in Pakistan's regime, the regime's response to the Baloch also changed, which cannot be explained by the external security theory. Later, in the 1980s, when Baloch ethnonationalists started espousing secessionist rhetoric after Bhutto was removed, his successor, General Zia, was nonplussed. Zia did not consider the Baloch a high threat, keeping the regime response of assimilationist and exclusionary policies towards the Baloch, despite the external security concern that a world power, the Soviet Union, who occupied neighboring Afghanistan, could potentially support the Baloch.

Bhutto rationalized the military operations in Balochistan by telling the NA that sometimes nation-rebuilding required violence. However, this argument was likely insincere as his various policies including the removal of democratically elected politicians, co-opting rivals

[241] The Bhutto regime accused the NAP leaders and their Baloch supporters of attempting to disintegrate the Pakistani state through secessionism (Zeb 2019, 111). However, "the NAP Balochistan leadership categorically rejected the claim that the Baloch insurgents were fighting for independence or separation of Balochistan from Pakistan. … [they sought] a province in which they have full provincial autonomy and control of their wealth and a federal system in which the center would only take care of defense, foreign affairs, communication, and currency" (Zeb 2019, 111).

of his political opponents, and failing to find political solutions to a conflict that he instigated provides little support for this explanation. Further, Bhutto's actions backfired, weakening the state and contributing to his demise (Syed 1992, 190).

Military senior leadership resisted ceasing Balochistan military operations and ending the Hyderabad tribunal (Shah 2014, 143; Arif 1995, 82). However, after the military removed Bhutto, the regime acquiesced to the opposition's demands.[242] Regardless, Bhutto's allegation of military pressure for continued operations in Balochistan and trying the opposition occurred years after Bhutto's initial decision to repress the Baloch and NAP.

Alternatively, was it multiple factors that caused the Pakistan-Baloch conflict in the 1970s, such that Harrison suggests.[243] While it is possible that external pressure motivated Bhutto, the empirical record indicates that Bhutto viewed the NAP as a persistent internal threat, to varying degrees, to his power consolidation throughout the 1970s. The evidence shows that the Pakistan-Baloch conflict should be seen primarily through a domestic lens (Butt 2017a, 63, 69).[244] Thus, the domestic situation must be unpacked to explain the regime's response. Treating the state as a unitary actor (Butt 2017a; Mylonas 2012) does not explain why Pakistan's treatment of the Baloch varied with assimilation, exclusion, and repression in 1973. A state-centric approach misses the decision-maker along with their motivations and preferences, thus failing to unpack the 'black box' of regime decision-making leading to a particular regime response.

Bangladesh versus Balochistan

The Bangladesh Liberation War (1971) and the third Baloch insurgency (1973-1977) make an interesting comparison. For one, there is a minimal scholarly comparison of these two

[242] "It remains unclear whether the army deliberately impeded the final resolution of the deadlock with the opposition before the military coup or whether Bhutto used military objections to stall the [opposition]" (Shah 2014, 143).
[243] "The specifics of the constitutional controversy between Islamabad and the Baluch were not decisive importance in themselves. Bhutto's larger political objectives in Pakistan, pressures on Islamabad from the Shah of Iran, Iraqi-Iranian tensions, and Soviet support for Baghdad in its conflict with Teheran were also key factors that contributed to the outbreak of hostilities" (Harrison 1981, 34).
[244] As Syed notes, "political conflict in NWFP and Balochistan … was more likely a clash of rival political wills, initiated by Bhutto's repression of the [Baloch] politicians" (Syed 1992, 190). The Bhutto years "were dominated by a power struggle between the nationally based groups led by Bhutto and the regionally entrenched groups and classes led by Wali Khan" (Shafqat 1997, 96), including the NAP.

cases.[245] This is despite both cases occurring within Pakistan in the early 1970s, focused on major ethnic groups, ethnonationalism, military repression, and repression leading to an insurgency. However, differences include the level of threat perception and regime response, number of military forces, insurgency strength, military constraints, external support to ethnonationalists, and the ultimate result of the conflict. This section concurs that these cases are not analogous but also because the East Pakistan crisis was a secessionist conflict while Balochistan was not.

The Yahya Khan and Bhutto regimes both perceived ethnonationalists as political threats. In the case of Yahya, his regime viewed the Bengali ethnonationalists as a direct threat to his regime's political survival. The Bengalis, long excluded from the upper echelons of political power in Pakistan, despite having the largest population of any ethnic group in Pakistan, were set to rule the state with their commanding win in the 1970 December elections. Yahya did not expect the Awami League election domination and had no intention of allowing the Bengalis to rule all of Pakistan rightfully. Soon after the election results, Yahya and the military started planning for potential operations in East Pakistan, including a scenario in which the Awami League took control of the province. Yahya and his regime worked with political parties across East and West Pakistan to prevent the Awami League from taking over. Yahya's indefinite delay of the transfer of power, and the political exclusion of the Awami League, resulted in the public eruption in East Pakistan and the Awami League taking de facto control. With the Awami League ruling the province, pressure from within the military and the military's base in Punjab Province, and the failure of the regime to assuage the Awami League's rightful demand for forming the government led Yahya to execute Operation Searchlight on 25 March 1971. Following the military crackdown and Mujib's arrest, Yahya did not attempt to reconcile or come to a political solution with the Awami League by banning the party, sustaining military operations, not visiting Mujib in prison, branding him a traitor, and bringing him to trial. Yahya's pursuit of regime survival resulted in severing any potential reconciliation with the Bengalis and, ultimately, the bifurcation of Pakistan with Bangladesh's independence following India's military intervention.

[245] Notable exceptions of comparisons to the Pakistan conflicts with the Bengalis and Baloch in the 1970s include Jain (2021), Butt (2017), Heinkel (2015), and Dunne (2006).

In dealing with a country reeling from losing its Eastern Wing, Bhutto sought to consolidate power quickly and counter potential political challengers. Bhutto perceived the Baloch NAP as threatening his power consolidation with its hold on Balochistan's provincial politics. Bhutto co-opted various rivals of the NAP, including former Baloch NAP allies, such as Akbar Bugti, to challenge the NAP. The delay in approving the first governor of Balochistan Province and Bhutto's letter to Bizenjo setting his expectations for the NAP government set the stage for future conflict between the provincial government and Bhutto and the eventual provincial government's dismissal. Bhutto politically excluded the Baloch by dismissing the provincial government, after only nine months, in February 1973, following the central government's manufactured security crises in Balochistan. Military forces moved into the province, leading to Baloch militants ambushing convoys and culminating in military operations until Bhutto was removed by his COAS General Zia in 1977. The Baloch, while perceived as a high threat to Bhutto's regime power consolidation, were not perceived as severe as a threat that the Bengalis had earlier posed to Yahya's regime. Bhutto, for one, sought a political solution with the NAP Baloch leaders, sending government representatives to meet with the imprisoned Baloch leaders.

The level of military presence varied between the two conflicts. In the East Pakistan case, by 25 March 1971, the Pakistani military forces numbered 45,000 (Nawaz 2008, 267; Niazi 1998, 52).[246] Eastern Command leaders were concerned about their lack of employable forces.[247] The military presence and defenses in East Pakistan were light compared to West Pakistan.[248] Pakistani military forces reportedly had 80,000 troops at the height of the 1973-1977 conflict with the Baloch (Harrison 1980/81, 153; Mazari 2004, 357). Niazi, the disgraced last commander of Pakistan's Eastern Command in Dhaka, derided Tikka's use of

[246] Internal White House discussions soon after Pakistan's repression started against the Bengalis mentioned a military force of 30,000. On 29 March, "Kissinger told Nixon, 'Apparently Yahya has got control of East Pakistan.' 'Good,' said the president. 'There're sometimes the use of power is …' Kissinger completed the thought: 'The use of power against seeming odds pays off. Cause all the experts were saying that 30,000 people can't get control of 75 million. Well, this may still turn out to be true but as of this moment it seems to be quiet'" (Bass 2013, 64).

[247] They stated that the "headquarters had only one infantry division [the 14th] and the logistical area under its command. It lacked the military resources of a proper corps headquarters and there should have been at least two more divisions, besides the complement of corps troops like armor, artillery, signals and engineers, and supporting services" (Raja 2012, 14).

[248] "Given the significance of West Pakistan's strategic location from an international and geopolitical standpoint, it was decided that the main forces would remain in West Pakistan. As a corollary to this decision, it was decided in the planning that East Pakistan's defense would lie in West Pakistan. In [other words], in the event of an [India] attack on East Pakistan, a massive and powerful attack would be launched from West Pakistan, so that [India] was forced to withdraw [from the East]. A situation where East Pakistan forces would be left to defend themselves was never visualized" (Khan 2017, 144).

three divisions in Balochistan to crush the rebelling tribespeople (Niazi 1998, 43).[249] The Pakistan army faced a hostile population in East Pakistan, and Bengali military, security, and police forces mutinied and defected to create a resistance.[250] Despite the more significant number of troops in Balochistan, the military's operations focused on specific tribes and militants (Butt 2017a, 68).[251] Bhutto's regime, rather, did not have to worry about military and security forces defecting and supporting the Baloch. Over the 1973-1977 conflict, 55,000 Baloch were involved, 11,500 as organized combatants (Harrison 1980/81, 153-154). Butt notes that the levels of violence committed by the Pakistan military are not comparable between East Pakistan in 1971 and Balochistan in 1973 (Butt 2017a, 68).[252]

Freedom of movement for the military is another difference between the conflicts. In East Pakistan, the troops had to travel extensively, lacked transport, air cover, and long-range artillery or tanks, and faced a determined opposition that blocked communications. In Balochistan, military forces had no communication issues and faced little opposition within the cities (Niazi 1998, 201).[253] Aside from the mountainous and sometimes treacherous terrain, logistical issues were not as severe in Balochistan as in East Pakistan. Following the Air India hijacking that resulted in India banning Pakistan from using Indian airspace, Pakistani military forces and equipment had to be flown into East Pakistan via a stop in Sri Lanka or transported over water (Blood 2002, 178).[254] Military forces in East Pakistan also

[249] Harrison notes that in April 1973, Bhutto dispatched four divisions to reinforce the skeleton garrisons in Balochistan (Harrison 1981, 36).
[250] Niazi sought to show the overwhelming military threat that his Eastern Command forces faced (Niazi 1998). Niazi (1998) and Siddiqi (2004, 121) stated that the total number of Bengali armed forces who rebelled after 25 March 1971 was around 160,000. In addition, Niazi says that the number of civilians later trained by Indians (in stages) was about 125,000, bringing the total number of Bengalis in Mukti Bahini to 287,500. Niazi further states that 50,000 Indian Army personnel directly supported the Mukti Bahini, and thousands of armed Bengali dissidents also helped Mukti Bahini activities. Also, there would later be twelve divisions of the Indian Army (Niazi 1998, 69, 201).
[251] In Balochistan, according to the Government of Pakistan's White Paper, there were "originally about 400 Mengals and about 500 Marris" (Government of Pakistan's White Paper 1974) tribespeople who were hardcore enemies. Niazi notes that in Balochistan, there were 300 to 400 hard-core guerrillas (Niazi 1998, 201).
[252] In East Pakistan there were "hundreds of thousands dead (at least) in less than a year, [in Balochistan], several thousand over four years" (Butt 2017a, 68). In East Pakistan, the U.S. "C.I.A. and State Department conservatively estimated that roughly two hundred thousand people had died (the official Bangladeshi death toll is three million). Some ten million Bengali refugees fled to India, where untold numbers died in miserable conditions in refugee camps" (Bass 2013). Casualty estimates for the 1973-1977 Pakistan-Baloch conflict "ran as high as 3,300 Pakistani soldiers and 5,300 Baloch guerrillas killed" (Harrison 1980/81, 154), with civilian casualties in the hundreds (Harrison 1980/81, 154).
[253] To counter Baloch guerrilla attacks and their hiding spots in the mountains, Pakistan used helicopters "to ferry troops … [and] to conduct combat operations in mountainous areas" (Harrison 1981, 37).
[254] Infantry personnel "were sent by air, … also had to leave heavy weapons behind" (Khan 2017, 111).

had to contend with recurring guerrilla attacks across the border with India, and sometimes with Indian support (Sisson and Rose 1990, 211).

Levels of external support mark a significant difference between these two conflicts. India surrounded East Pakistan, while India does not border Balochistan, which hinders its ability to support Baloch militants (Jain 2021, ix).[255] Balochistan received little external support aside from safe havens in Afghanistan. India's support of the Bengali resistance and its military intervention in late 1971 was critical in defeating Pakistan and establishing Bangladesh (Nawaz 2008, 249). Butt's comparative case study between the Baloch and East Pakistan Bengali rebellions against Pakistan in the 1970s argues that the state variation in violent response is based on the state's perception of foreign support to these groups. The Baloch were considered a lesser threat than the Bengalis to the Pakistani state. Thus, the state responded to the former by 'militarization' and the latter by 'collective repression' (Butt 2017a, 44).[256] However, this does not explain the initial variation in state response to the Bengalis, which went from political exclusion to repression, but rather only explains why the level of repression is much greater in the Bengali case compared to the Baloch case.

In 1971, the Bengalis formed a secessionist movement. However, in 1973, the ethnonationalist Baloch did not. Mujib, the Awami League, and the Bengalis ultimately achieved independence from Pakistan following a brutal civil war and the intervention of Indian forces. Immediately following the military crackdown on late 25 March 1971, the Bengalis declared independence from Pakistan. The Baloch conflict was not a secessionist movement, even though the state portrayed the Baloch rebellion as such.[257] A Baloch secessionist movement developed in the early 2000s that continues through the present (Ahmed 1998, 176; Grare 2006, 7; Sheikh 2018, 174). The Baloch conflict centered around Bhutto removing the elected NAP and its leaders from the provincial government, later arresting and imprisoning them from 1973 until General Zia released them in early 1978. During the Baloch conflict, Bhutto and government emissaries would visit the imprisoned NAP Baloch leaders to seek a political solution to the fighting (Mazari 2004, 364). For instance, in 1974, Bhutto removed Bizenjo from detention and took him to the prime

[255] See chapter two for a discussion on external support to the Bengalis in the 1970s.
[256] Butt (2017) argues that "Third-party support pushes the state to climb the escalatory response ladder, from what [Butt] term[s] 'policing' to 'militarization' to 'collective repression'" (Butt 2017a, 18).
[257] "Its instigation by forces which seek to cause the disintegration of Pakistan" (Government of Pakistan 1974).

minister's house for discussions. The possibility of a political solution stayed alive with these talks (Syed 1992, 187). Many Baloch who fought Pakistan were tribe members from the predominantly Marri and Mengal tribes. This also reflects the nature of the conflict, which was limited to these areas and not the entire province or populace. Baloch rebels did not directly threaten the regime's hold on power, nor were they perceived as an existential threat. However, Baloch nationalist politicians had cut into the Bhutto regime's hold on power, resulting in Baloch political exclusion and driving some Baloch tribespeople to rebel, especially after the regime jailed their tribal chieftains. The Baloch only faced relief when Zia deposed Bhutto in a coup, who later released Baloch political leadership and captured fighters. In sum, the Baloch case was driven by domestic politics (Butt 2017a, 73).

Conclusion

This chapter sought to answer several questions on the regime's response to ethnonationalist challengers by examining Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's regime's decision-making concerning its response to the ethnonationalist Baloch in the early 1970s. Bhutto dismissed Balochistan's first elected provincial government, later arrested Baloch leaders, banned the main opposition party, the NAP, and launched military operations that lasted until Bhutto's ouster by his COAS General Zia-ul-Haq in 1977. By examining Bhutto's decision-making, the causal process shows that the perceived threat to his political survival is the likeliest explanation for the variation in Pakistan's policies towards the Baloch. Pakistan's regime was dominated by Bhutto, who came into power at the end of 1971 when the military lost influence after their defeat to India and East Pakistan achieved independence. Bhutto's primary motivation was to retain and consolidate power, and the NAP challenged his regime's authority.

Comparing the differing Pakistani regime responses to the Bengalis and the Baloch in the 1970s is a valuable exercise to show how and why the Bengalis received a much harsher response than the Baloch. This chapter argued that domestic considerations dominated Pakistan's response to the Baloch in the 1970s, and perceived internal threats to regime political power were more important than external security implications in explaining Pakistan's response to the Baloch. Moreover, the Baloch were not separatists and were not considered a more serious threat, such as the Bengalis in East Pakistan. External influences, such as pressure from the Shah of Iran and concern for Baloch rebel safe havens in Afghanistan, possibly played a minimal role in Bhutto's perception of the Baloch. Zia modified the regime's response to the Baloch after removing Bhutto from power. This

included ending military operations in Balochistan, releasing NAP leadership and Baloch prisoners from jail, and increasing development in the province. Zia continued an assimilationist response, co-opting various political parties, tribal groups, and individuals while declining to address Baloch autonomy issues. Zia's dictatorial regime politically excluded most of the country, holding general elections only in 1985, which were held on a nonpartisan basis and boycotted by the opposition. The next chapter reviews Pakistan's response, under Pervez Musharraf, to the Baloch in the early 2000s. This period picks up after 23 years of relatively little violence between Pakistan and the Baloch. A low-level Baloch insurgency was launched against the state then and continues nearly 20 years later, with no end in sight.

Table 3.2 Timeline: Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the Baloch

20 December 1971	Zulfikar Ali Bhutto becomes Pakistan's President and Chief Martial Law Administrator (1971-1977). Removed ban on National Awami Party (NAP), previously imposed by President Yahya Khan (1969-1971).
6 March 1972	Tripartite Agreement was reached between the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), NAP, and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI).
21 April 1972	Interim Constitution came into effect and ended martial law, which had been in effect since 1969.
26 April 1972	The new Tripartite Agreement settled the delay in appointing governors in NWFP and Balochistan. Bhutto and NAP leader Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo exchanged letters regarding Bhutto's expectations for Balochistan's provincial government.
29 April 1972	Bizenjo was appointed as Governor of Balochistan, and Arbab Sikandar Khan Khalil as Governor of NWFP.
1 May 1972	NAP-JUI provincial governments formed with Ataullah Mengal as chief minister of Balochistan and Mufti Mahmood as chief minister of NWFP.
May 1972	During Shah of Iran's sister Princess Ashraf's state visit to Quetta, Balochistan, armed clashes broke out between the supporters of Pakistan's Interior Minister Abdul Qayyum Khan and the NAP.
August 1972	NAP and other opposition politicians visited London and were accused by pro-regime media in September that while in London, these regime opposition members met with Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to organize a coup and destroy Pakistan, coining this conspiracy the 'The London Plan.'
October 1972	Levies (local militias) deployed to counter Sardar Doda Khan Zarakzai's rival government in the Kalat district.
November 1972	Islamabad alleged that a thousand Marri tribespeople attacked Punjabi settlers.
December 1972	A family feud within the Bugti tribe led to the arrest of over one hundred Bugti tribespeople.
December 1972	NAP government resorted to raising levies to quell a Jamote tribe members rebellion in Las Bela because the local militia commander, a Bhutto-loyalist, refused to support the provincial government.
January 1973	Akbar Bugti launched a public campaign against the Balochistan provincial government, claiming senior NAP leaders were gathering arms in preparation to secede from Pakistan.
9 February 1973	Bhutto ordered the military to confront the levies in Las Bela.
10 February 1973	Iraq's embassy in Islamabad was raided by military forces, which found an arms cache that the regime alleged was for Baloch militants.

15 February 1973	Bhutto dismissed the NAP government in Balochistan and replaced Bizenjo as the Balochistan Governor with Akbar Bugti.
16 February 1973	NAP government in NWFP resigns in protest.
Late February 1973	Three army divisions reported passing through Quetta, Balochistan's capital, with soldiers moving towards mountainous areas in Balochistan.
28 February 1973	The United Democratic Front (UDF), a coalition of opposition political parties, including the NAP, was formed to counter Bhutto and the PPP.
23 March 1973	UDF held its first rally at Liaquat Bagh in Rawalpindi. The Punjab Governor, supported by Bhutto, disrupted the rally with large-scale violence using Bhutto's internal security force, the Federal Security Force.
Early April 1973	Baloch guerrillas began to ambush army convoys.
29 April 1973	Military action started in Balochistan.
14 August 1973	Pakistan's Independence Day. New Constitution was promulgated. Bhutto moved from the President to Prime Minister.
15 August 1973	NAP senior leaders Bizenjo, Ataullah Mengal, and Khair Bakhsh Marri were arrested on Bhutto's order.
October 1974	Islamabad released a 'White Paper on Baluchistan' which explained the conflict's background and reason for the military intervention, declared a critical moment had been reached, and announced the military's withdrawal. However, the military did not withdraw, and operations continued.
8 February 1975	PPP Senior Minister in the NWFP provincial government and Bhutto's close friend, Mir Hayat Muhammad Khan Sherpao, was killed. The Bhutto regime accused the NAP of the murder and arrested its top leadership in NWFP.
10 February 1975	Bhutto banned the NAP, sealed its NWFP offices, and seized NAP leaders' funds and property. Arrested leaders were held in Hyderabad jail, known as the Hyderabad Tribunal/Conspiracy. Central government allegations against NAP included advocating violence; subverting the constitution, supported by foreign powers; working towards Pakistan's disintegration by creating independent lands for the Pashtuns and Baloch.
5 July 1977	Chief of Army Staff General Zia-ul-Haq removed Bhutto in a coup d'état named Operation Fairplay. The new regime ceased military operations in Balochistan.
1 January 1978	Zia disbanded the Hyderabad Tribunal, released NAP leaders and 6,000 Baloch from prison, and granted amnesty for Baloch fighters to return home.

Chapter Four
The Baloch and Pakistan in the 2000s

Twenty-three years after the end of Pakistan's military repression of the Baloch in 1977, tensions again flared between the state and the minority ethnic Baloch. This chapter explains the decision-making process of Pakistan's regime and why its responses varied towards the Baloch, with the period of relative peace finally ending and ultimately resulting in military repression in 2005. I argue that Pakistan's response to the Baloch was dominated by domestic considerations, and perceived internal threats to the regime's political power were more important than external security implications in explaining Pakistan's response to the Baloch. This case picks up where the previous chapter left off; after General Zia-ul-Haq's death, a return to democracy in Pakistan lasted until Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Pervez Musharraf conducted a military coup against Prime Minister (PM) Nawaz Sharif. This chapter studies Pakistan's regime, led by Musharraf, and its decision-making and variation in regime response to the Baloch, who were primarily led by Bugti tribal chieftain Akbar Khan Bugti, who earlier sided with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's regime against the Baloch-led National Awami Party (NAP) in 1973. I also examine when Pakistan's regime changed from Musharraf to a democratically elected Asif Ali Zardari of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and why the repressive regime response continued against the Baloch. After the case study, an examination of alternative explanations follows, including context-specific arguments, paying particular attention to exogenous factors. The chapter ends with case study conclusions.

Background

In 1988, Zia-ul-Haq's death in a mysterious plane crash precipitated Pakistan's decade of democracy. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's eldest child, Benazir Bhutto of the PPP, was elected PM.[258] This decade of democracy alternated between Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif regimes, lasting until the head of Pakistan's Army, General Musharraf, toppled Nawaz Sharif in 1999. During this period, the central government did not consider Baloch ethnonationalism a significant or severe threat.[259] Baloch leaders ran in elections, with several Baloch politicians

[258] COAS Zia-ul-Haq deposed PM Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1977 and had him executed in 1979.
[259] Ethnic tensions with the state "had greatly diminished, thanks to robust representative participatory institutions. Nationalist [political] parties emerged as significant forces" (Grare 2013, 10).

participating in national-level politics for the first time in Pakistan's history.[260] While relations between the Baloch and Islamabad remained problematic this epoch was conflict-free (Grare 2013, 10).

The Case: 2000s

This case study examines Musharraf's regime's perception and response to Baloch ethnonationalists in the 2000s. This repression resulted in a continuing yet mostly low-level Baloch insurgency. From 1999 to 2008, General Musharraf served as Pakistan's President and primary decision-maker. Musharraf took control of the country by removing PM Nawaz Sharif in a military coup. The analysis focuses on the regime, Musharraf, his decision-making, threat perception, and response to Baloch ethnonationalists. On the Baloch side, Akbar Khan Bugti, the Bugti tribal chieftain and founder of the Jamhoori Wattan Party (JWP), is examined along with the varying regime responses to the Baloch in the 2000s (Dawn 2006d). The case study begins with Musharraf coming into power and attempting to consolidate his rule. This chapter explains how and why the regime response varied, shifting from assimilation to political exclusion, then to repressive policies against the Baloch. There are several limitations to studying the most recent and ongoing Baloch-Pakistan conflict. In the 1970s, conflicts pitting the state against the Bengalis and the Baloch, many of the principals involved, including regime decision-makers, ethnonationalist leadership, or those close to either side, published detailed accounts of the events, as seen in chapters two and three. This is not so in the 2000s, however. Musharraf, for example, barely mentioned the Baloch in his autobiography (Musharraf 2006). Pakistan has sought to limit international awareness of the situation in the strategically important Balochistan Province. This is likely part of its strategy to prevent perceived external interference, including possible international recognition or support to potential Baloch secessionists and their agenda. Pakistan's strategy uses disinformation, disruption, and denial tactics to minimize international discussion on

[260] "In the 1988 election, the combined vote for nationalist parties totaled 47.8 percent. It reached 51.74 percent in the 1990 elections, and Baloch nationalist parties dominated the elections again in 1997 and formed the Balochistan provincial government. Baloch leaders also were represented in the mainstream [PPP and PML(N) parties]" (Grare 2013, 10). Zeb (2019) notes three political trends developed in Balochistan during this time. "First, politicians in Balochistan, regardless of their party affiliation, demonstrated their eagerness to stay in power. At times in Balochistan, parties that opposed each other in the National Assembly [(NA)] were coalition partners in the Balochistan provincial assembly. Second, [several] prominent Baloch politicians such as Bugti, Zafarullah Khan Jamali, and Bizenjo emerged as national-level politicians and actively participated in the national politics of Pakistan. Third, the sons of staunch nationalist leaders [Ataullah] Mengal and Khair [Bakhsh] Marri, with their father's approval, actively participated in Balochistan politics. Akhtar Mengal [for instance] served as the chief minister [(CM)] of Balochistan" (Zeb 2019, 128-129) from 1997-1998.

Balochistan. Islamabad often uses disinformation about the 'Balochistan problem' by delegitimizing the secessionist movement as a foreign conspiracy or attempting to link Baloch groups to Islamic terrorism (Grare 2013, 16).[261] The state further attempts to disrupt the discussion of Balochistan by intimidating, threatening, or sometimes killing journalists, academics, Baloch activists, and nationalists, as well as protesting events and conferences and pressuring foreign governments (Walsh 2020; The Economist 2014).[262] Traveling to, or in and around Pakistan and Balochistan Province is often complicated and dangerous (U.S. Department of State 2021). Denial refers to the international media blackout in Balochistan, denying foreign access to issues about military and security forces activities, human rights, and Baloch nationalism (Zurutuza 2014). Thus, this chapter relies on available official documents, journalistic accounts, human rights organization reports, and narratives from each side, Pakistan and the Baloch.

Regime – Pervez Musharraf

PM Nawaz Sharif, leader of his Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz (PML(N)) political party, selected General Pervez Musharraf as COAS in October 1998, after shocking the military by firing COAS General Jehangir Karamat, shortly before he was due to retire (Shah 2014, 176). In selecting Musharraf, Nawaz Sharif bypassed two senior generals, believing that Musharraf's ethnic Muhajir background would make him more amenable.[263] However, Musharraf's relationship with Sharif quickly deteriorated, particularly over the embarrassing mid-1999 Kargil War (Yamin 2015, 117). One year after becoming COAS, Musharraf removed Sharif in a military coup after Nawaz Sharif attempted to dismiss Musharraf as COAS in October 1999 (Cohen 2011, 2-3).

As the President and COAS, Pakistan's fourth military ruler, Musharraf was responsible for regime decision-making (Yamin 2015, 114; Schaffer and Schaffer 2011, 145). Musharraf was a quick decision-maker and relied on gut feelings (Yamin 2015, 114; Jan 2006, 26-31). This

[261] "Most military officers in Pakistan, used to the control of media outlets in their own country, held a strong belief [that foreign governments such as the United States] guided and shaped newspapers in their coverage of overseas issues" (Nawaz 2020, 272).
[262] Pressure on foreign governments; for instance, Switzerland acquiesced to Pakistani pressure in late 2017 by instituting an entry ban for Mehran Marri, the Baloch representative to the UN, and denied political asylum access to Brahamdagh Bugti (Shah 2017a; Shah 2017b; Chandrasekhar 2017a; Chandrasekhar 2017b). Both Baloch tribal and nationalist leaders are in self-imposed exile, likely overseeing Baloch militant groups fighting against Islamabad, and if returned to Pakistan, would almost certainly face severe repercussions.
[263] Musharraf "was perceived as lacking a constituency in the army that he could mobilize against the government" (Shah 2014, 177).

was probably influenced by his special forces training, having served in the Pakistan Army's Special Services Group (Yamin 2015, 114).[264] Musharraf claimed that he was an objective analytic thinker, referring to his decision-making in the face of pressure from the United States after the Al-Qa'ida terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 (Musharraf 2006, 201; Yamin 2015, 115). His acquiescence to the United States was probably an attempt to gain legitimacy and to protect the military's interests, although it resulted in significant domestic pressure (Faruqui 2003, xxii). Musharraf received advice from senior Pakistani army commanders but he retained primacy in regime decision-making (Yamin 2015, 115; Shah 2014, 188).

Ethnonationalists – Akbar Khan Bugti and the Baloch

Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, the leader of the Bugti tribe, became the face of Baloch ethnonationalism in the 2000s. Akbar Bugti, well-educated in the West, served Pakistan at both the provincial and national level (Ahmed 2013, 141). Akbar Bugti, derided by fellow Baloch as an establishment stooge for decades, emerged as a spearhead of anti-government agitation. He supported the province's amalgamation with Pakistan in 1947. He served as governor in 1973 during the Baloch uprising, as discussed in chapter three, while fellow Baloch tribal chiefs were in prison and the Baloch were repressed through military operations (Walsh 2020, 234).

During Zia's martial law period (1977-1988), Akbar Bugti avoided politics (Dawn 2006d). Other paramount Baloch tribal chiefs such as Ataullah Mengal and Khair Bakhsh Marri, both of whom discussed earlier, had had enough of an unjust Pakistan, flirting with outside forces, and even talking of Baloch separatism. Akbar Bugti, charismatic and volatile, held grievances against Islamabad but was not a proponent of Baloch independence (Ahmed 2013, 140). With the start of the decade of democracy in 1988, Akbar Bugti returned to politics, serving in multiple roles including Balochistan's CM, MPA, and MNA.[265]

[264] Musharraf's "lucky escapades, dash and enterprise engendered in him the confidence to make snap decisions based on his personal judgment" (Yamin 2015, 114).

[265] In 1988, Akbar Bugti "formed the Balochistan National Alliance and took part in the general elections. He was elected [MPA] Balochistan Assembly and when the Balochistan High Court restored the Balochistan Assembly that had been dissolved by the then [CM] Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali, he was elected provincial [CM] till dissolution of the assemblies in 1990" (Dawn 2006d). One of his sons served as a Balochistan MPA and Balochistan education minister (Ahmed 2013, 140). In August 1990, Akbar Bugti "formed the [JWP] … and was again elected MPA and despite obtaining a majority his party was not allowed to form the government in Balochistan" (Dawn 2006d). He was then elected opposition leader in the Balochistan Assembly. In 1993, "[Akbar] Bugti became an MNA … and supported the Benazir Bhutto government but later his differences with

Musharraf Takes Over

Following the October 1999 military coup, Musharraf declared a state of emergency, instituted martial law, suspended the constitution, and dissolved the NA and provincial assemblies (Dugger and Zulfikar 1999). In late October, Baloch nationalist leaders initially defended the dismissal of PM Nawaz Sharif's regime, welcoming the appointment of a new army-led government (Axmann 2012b, 261-262).

The calm in Balochistan did not last long. On 13 December 1991, the Bijarani faction of the Marri tribe revolted against the Marri sardar, Khair Bakhsh, and his Ghazeni faction, refusing to accept him as their chief. In the Bijarani area oil was found leading to the Bijaranis inviting the government to start oil exploitation against Khair Bakhsh's opposition (Baloch 2002; Axmann 2012b, 262). Musharraf's regime required further drilling and exploration in Balochistan as the exploited gas deposits were expected to be exhausted by 2012 (Grare 2006, 5). On 14 January 2000, Khair Bakhsh was arrested, accused of the murder of Mohammad Nawaz Marri, a notable figure in the rival Bijarani faction of the Marri tribe and a pro-exploration judge of the Balochistan High Court (Jain 2021, 121-122; Axmann 2012b, 263).[266] The arrest likely had more to do with Khair Bakhsh's fierce opposition to the regime's resource extraction plans of coal from his tribal lands (Siddiqi 2015, 68).[267]

the [PM] forced him to play an active role against Benazir Bhutto. Akbar Bugti was again elected as an MNA in 1997. He formed a coalition government in Balochistan with the Balochistan National Party [(BNP)] of Sardar Akhtar Mengal but later differences forced him to withdraw his party's support" (Dawn 2006d).

[266] Khair Bakhsh Marri's detention lasted 18 months (Jain 2021, 121).

[267] Two weeks before his arrest, Khair Bakhsh stated that "the preservation of the mineral wealth of the Marri tribal area to be his life mission and stated firmly that as long as he is alive he would do his utmost to prevent any such exploitation" (Axmann 2012b, 263). Khair Bakhsh's "followers [further] blame[d] the [government] for creating a rift between the two factions of the Marri tribe and for 'exploiting the strained relations between the two factions to their advantage'" (Baloch 2002). Khair Bakhsh Marri "reiterated that during his arrest he was not questioned on the murder … but was rather interrogated on his exile in Afghanistan in the 1980s and the arms and training he received there" (Siddiqi 2015, 68).

Figure 4.1. Present Day Balochistan Province with Historic Kalat and its Former Dependent Territories

The following months saw the unexpected revival of Baloch nationalist militancy, not seen since the end of the 1973-1977 insurgency.[268] The previously unknown Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) claimed responsibility for multiple attacks targeting government buildings, police stations, and vehicles that extracted coal from Balochistan.[269] The BLA was widely suspected to be Khair Bakhsh's militia (Axmann 2012b, 262).

Musharraf weakened provincial authority by retaining center primacy over the provinces and transferring power from the provinces to the districts (Breseeg 2004, 346). Baloch leaders objected (Jain 2021, 121). On 22 August 2000, Ataullah Mengal stated that Musharraf's proposed local government was like the One Unit scheme which eventually led to East Pakistan's secession and the creation of Bangladesh (Breseeg 2004, 345-346).

[268] See Figure 4.1 for a map of present day Balochistan by "Adam Schlessmeier, this image was generated using ArcGIS software, Version 10.3.1. Copyright © 2016 Esri" (Heinkel and deVillafranca 2016, 63).
[269] "The BLA professed its actions were aimed at ending the Punjabi ruling forces' exploitation of Balochistan's natural resources" (Axmann 2012b, 262).

Lacking legitimacy for his rule, Musharraf sought to establish a political base and hold and win national elections (Razvi 2009, 178). After the PML(N) was removed following Musharraf's coup, the party split and Musharraf fostered a new breakaway party, the PML-Quaid (PML(Q)) (Ali 2020, 183).

In April 2002, Musharraf held a countrywide referendum on his rule. It was approved with 97.5 percent in Musharraf's favor, providing a sense of legitimacy, however, it was found to have been extensively manipulated. Musharraf announced in August the Legal Framework Order (LFO), which gave him extraconstitutional powers, reminiscent of Pakistan's previous military rulers. Musharraf's regime severely restricted political activities in the runup to the elections (HRW 2002). The 10 October 2002 national and provincial elections were widely reported as rigged, preventing Baloch nationalists from standing in the elections and "helping the six-party Islamist alliance, Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), come to power in NWFP … in Balochistan, a coalition between the MMA and Musharraf's PML(Q) took office" (Jain 2021, 127).[270] The Baloch and Pashtun nationalist parties were crushed in the elections (Jain 2021, 128).[271] With the disqualification of many candidates, the PML(Q) won elections, gaining control of the National Assembly and the Punjab Provincial Government (Ali 2020, 183). Also coming to power were Baloch who were co-opted by Pakistan's ruling regimes; Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali, as the first Baloch PM and Jam Mohammad Yousaf as Balochistan's CM (Axmann 2012b, 265). Fazlur Rehman's Islamist Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI(F)) cabinet controlled all major provincial portfolios, including development (Jain 2021, 128-129). Musharraf's election rigging brought Islamist parties to power in Balochistan and NWFP, helping placate the intense criticism that Musharraf received for supporting the United States following the 9/11 attacks.[272] The regime increased the military's power and presence in Balochistan by putting Pakistan Army 12 Corps in control of provincial security

[270] "The Election Observation Mission of the European Union reported vote tampering before, during, and after the elections. The Election Commission of Pakistan was accused of diluting strongholds of parties opposing the regime and the eligibility criteria for candidates was changed to require university degrees, but madrasa (Islamic religious school) diplomas were given equivalence. Nationalist leaders who did not have university degrees, even those who had previously held high office in the province, such as Akbar Bugti, were prevented from contesting, thus giving significant advantage to the MMA" (Jain 2021, 127). "At the time of Musharraf's coup in 1999, half of the [Balochistan MPAs] were nationalists complaining about Punjabi 'colonisation' of their province" (Bennett-Jones 2009, 69).

[271] Similar to elections "during the decade of democracy from 1988 to 1999, the Baloch nationalists stood divided during the [2002] elections" (Axmann 2012b, 265).

[272] Pakistan allowed the United States to use Pakistani military bases at Dalbandin, Shamsi, and Pasni in Balochistan and Jacobabad in Sindh Province (Khan and Ricks 2002). "The Taliban also often used [Balochistan's capital] Quetta, as a cross-border haven and training area" (Jain 2021, 128).

and by establishing military garrisons (Jain 2021, 128).[273] Conflict soon resurfaced with senior Baloch tribal leaders opposing the regime's activities in Balochistan, centering on the Sui gas fields in the Bugti tribal area and the Gwadar deep seaport on the Makran coast (Walsh 2020, 232-233).

Sui Gas Fields

The Sui gas field, located in Akbar Bugti's tribal area, provided over 35 percent of the state's total gas consumption, and was additionally contentious over profits and employment opportunities (Bennett-Jones 2009, 69).[274] In June 2001, 40 Bugti engineers were rejected from employment in Sui. Bugti tribe members responded by attacking the Sui Northern and Southern Gas Companies by firing rockets at gas installations and the airport to protest the recruitment of personnel outside Balochistan. An ensuing deal to give employment partiality to locals was ineffective and the Baloch remained aggrieved (Axmann 2012b, 266-267).

In June 2002, this conflict escalated at Sui with Bugti tribespeople challenging the state by destroying gas pipelines that supplied the richer and more populous areas of Pakistan and the military, in response, moved forces into Akbar Bugti's home in Dera Bugti resulting in clashes between the state and the Baloch.[275] Once again, the calm was temporary. On 24 and 25 January 2003, following an escalation in the decade-long Bugti-Mazari tribal feud, the gas pipeline from Sui to Punjab was destroyed, impacting millions of Pakistanis nationwide (Axmann 2012b, 267-268).

[273] 12 Corps, headquartered in Quetta, is also home to the Pakistan Army's infantry training center and the Command and Staff College (Jain 2021, 128; Heeg 2013, 16).

[274] Akbar "Bugti long demanded greater revenue from, if not control of, the gas plant there. He had been bought off over the years with various bribes … but never accepted the right of [the state] to take his gas" (Bennett-Jones 2009, 69). "Throughout the 1990s Sui saw periodic conflict and armed clashes, usually related to labor disputes between Bugti tribesmen employed or eager to be employed at the local gas fields, and paramilitary personnel protecting the gas installations" (Axmann 2012b, 266).

[275] The military's deployment "backfired as hundreds of [armed] Bugti tribesmen … poured into Dera Bugti to defend their chieftain, [and attacked] Pakistan paramilitary forces. … Without precedent, armed Marri tribesmen loyal to [Khair Bahksh] entered Dera Bugti from neighboring Kohlu to support [Akbar] Bugti and participate in fighting against government forces. Other neighboring Baloch tribes in Sindh and Punjab provinces, … similarly, expressed their full support of Akbar Bugti. … [He] defused the situation by asking his tribesmen to stop damaging pipelines in the wake of fresh assurances that the June 2001 agreement would be implemented" (Axmann 2012b, 267-268). Akbar Bugti emerged with a higher provincial and even national profile. By "gaining armed support from [oft-]feuding neighboring tribes, … vocal support from almost all political parties of Balochistan, several important sardars, and even some politicians at the national level" (Axmann 2012b, 268).

Gwadar Port

Gwadar Port, located in Balochistan Province, on the Arabian Sea, is a massive development project which is "intended to ease sea traffic to the southern port of Karachi and attract foreign investment to strengthen the country's economy" (Masood 2004). Baloch nationalists were early opponents to Gwadar Port's assembly, accusing the state of attempting to erase the Baloch identity and its people by moving other groups into the province (Masood 2004). Moreover, the port's construction failed to provide jobs for the local Baloch; instead, the work was conducted by Chinese personnel. Musharraf held the Gwadar port ground-breaking ceremony on 23 March 2002 (Axmann 2012b, 271).[276]

Beginning in early 2004, Baloch militants attacked security forces, Gwadar authorities, and those involved in the port's assembly (Axmann 2012b, 273). The BLA killed three Chinese engineers enroute to work at Gwadar on 3 May and after the attack, Balochistan provincial leadership sought improved security to protect the Chinese nationals and enhance Balochistan's stability (Talbot 2012, 187; Dawn 2004b).

In July 2004, the Army, backed by the Frontier Corps (FC), responded to bombings in Gwadar with an operation in Makran, arresting political activists and launching air strikes on alleged BLA camps. The BLA likely retaliated by attacking CM Jam Mohammad Yousaf's motorcade in response to the Makran operation. In October 2004, PM Shaukat Aziz announced that Gwadar Port's inauguration would occur with Musharraf and China's prime minister in attendance, however, the precarious security situation delayed the event (Axmann 2012b, 273).

In 2004, the quotidian Baloch attacks targeted symbols of the government's rule to include security forces and energy infrastructure, with most attacks claimed by the BLA (Bennett-Jones 2009, 71).[277] In response the military increased its search operations for those suspected of supporting Baloch militancy. Baloch political parties objected to these military activities and various Baloch nationalists claimed terrorist attacks were valid in the Baloch struggle for liberation from Punjabi-dominated Islamabad (Axmann 2012b, 273). On 3

[276] The first phase was completed in 2005 and employed 450 Chinese engineers and workers (ICG 2006, 14).
[277] Ataullah Mengal claimed "that half of the population in Balochistan was behind the insurgents, although he acknowledged that only a few hundred people in each area were actively fighting Pakistani forces" (Bennett-Jones 2009, 70).

August, leaders of four Baloch nationalist parties warned the government against the use of force. They said it would harm the country's integrity if the political dialogue did not resolve issues. They called for an immediate end to army actions and demanded the immediate release of all persons arrested in these operations, including the rounding up of Baloch political activists (Dawn 2004a).

On 19 August 2004, Musharraf announced military cantonments would be constructed in Balochistan, including Sui, Gwadar, and Kohlu, which would provide security, support development efforts, and improve forces' operational readiness (Dawn 2004c). Civil society, human rights groups, and Baloch nationalist leaders, including Akbar Bugti protested the military's plan.[278]

Parliamentary Committee Responds

In September 2004, Pakistan's Senate formed a parliamentary committee to find a resolution to the Balochistan conflict (ICG 2006, 19).[279] Simultaneously while warrants for Khair Bakhsh Marri and his sons were issued, Islamabad began negotiations with Akhtar Mengal and Akbar Bugti (Axmann 2012b, 275).[280] Grare notes that prior to talks with members of the parliamentary committee the regime sought to kill Akbar Bugti (Grare 2013, 10). On 22 September 2004, Akbar Bugti sent several demands to the regime including provincial autonomy, greater access to resources and revenue, the removal of military forces from Balochistan, and the release of political prisoners (Dawn 2004d).[281]

The parliamentary committee addressed some Baloch grievances by offering the Baloch greater provincial autonomy, additional gas royalties, and jobs (Rashid 2008, 284-285). However, this did not address core Baloch complaints such as the military presence in

[278] "The move was described as an attempt to suppress the Baloch nationalist movement, and their demands for [a] share in natural resources and more political power for their province" (Shahid 2009).
[279] "Parliament gave the committee, which included members of the Baloch opposition, 90 days to submit its report. There were two subcommittees, headed by PML(Q) senators. The subcommittee headed by Senator Wasim Sajjad was tasked with making recommendations 'to promote interprovincial harmony and protect the rights of the provinces with a view to strengthening the federation.' The subcommittee headed by Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed was mandated 'to examine the current situation in Balochistan and make recommendations thereon'" (ICG 2006, 19).
[280] In November 2004, they were each sentenced to three-year imprisonment, and their property was ordered confiscated for not appearing before the court (Dawn 2004e).
[281] See *Dawn* for Akbar Bugti's full list (Dawn 2004d).

Balochistan and Gwadar Port control (ICG 2006, 19-20). Senator Hussain said army hardliners thwarted his efforts (Walsh 2020, 240).[282]

Trigger

The catalyst for the Bugti tribe's attacks against Pakistan occurred on 3 January 2005 when a female Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL) company doctor at the Sui gas plant accused an army officer who was head of security at the plant of breaking into her quarters and raping her (Walsh 2005). Instead of investigating the doctor's complaint, the military drugged her and sent her to a psychiatric hospital in Karachi. The military declared that a Bugti tribesman was responsible, and the Bugtis took this as an insult to their honor (Walsh 2005).[283] On 11 January, the Bugtis, led by Akbar Bugti's favorite grandson Brahamdagh (Weaver 2010, 129), attacked Pakistan's largest gas refinery, located in Sui, with rockets. Musharraf threatened the Baloch and responded by sending additional troops and ground and air military support to protect the facility (Walsh 2020, 230; Walsh 2005).[284] Baloch nationalist leaders then cautioned that the regime was close to manufacturing the same circumstances in 1971 that led to Bangladesh's independence (Hussain 2005). The dispute, however, was not just about tribal nobility and may have had more to do with control over Sui's resources.[285]

In February 2005, the Punjabi commander of a small FC base in Dera Bugti noted his frustration with Akbar Bugti because shopkeepers refused to serve soldiers, locals refused to work on the base, and the army-run school next door was deserted because the children were instructed to boycott classes. Further, armed Bugti fighters in a pick-up truck subverted military control by driving past the FC (Walsh 2020, 234). The military and security forces were sent to guard key facilities in the Bugti areas as attacks against pipelines brought production to a temporary halt (Axmann 2012b, 267).

[282] Senator Hussain stated, "there is a mind-set in the Pakistani establishment that is unwilling to concede the legitimate rights of the smaller provinces" (Walsh 2020, 240).

[283] For more on the importance of Baloch honor, see Baloch (1987) and Titus (1998).

[284] Musharraf threatened, "Don't push us. It isn't the 1970s when you can hit and run and hide in the mountains. This time you won't even know what hit you" (Hussain 2005).

[285] "The Sui gas company paid several million dollars in rent to [Akbar Bugti] every year and provided him with several" (Walsh 2020, 230) privileges, including vehicles, lavish housing, and use of the company airplane. "The trouble started when Musharraf, hoping to expand production at Sui, sent a two-star general to negotiate terms with [Akbar Bugti, who] rejected the general's initial offer [and insulted him]. Enraged by Akbar Bugti's insolence, Musharraf accused him of orchestrating the rocket attack on Sui as a way of strengthening his hand in those talks. [The army then] positioned a pair of field guns on a hilltop overlooking Dera Bugti, pointed directly at [Akbar Bugti's] fort" (Walsh 2020, 230).

By March 2005, Dera Bugti exploded in violence between Bugti's tribespeople and government forces. On 17 March, during a day-long series of rocket attacks, Akbar Bugti's tribe members pounded the FC base with gunfire, who responded by firing on Akbar Bugti's fort. The violence resulted in the deaths of dozens of civilians and the relocation of nearly all of Dera Bugti's population (Walsh 2020, 235-236; Axmann 2012b, 277).

That same month, as security worsened in the Bugti tribal areas, civilian political leaders and Akbar Bugti reportedly reached a consensus (ICG 2006, 19). Akbar Bugti welcomed the civilian-led committees and supported the recommendations of the sub-committee, but neither was the parliamentary committee allowed to conclude its final report, nor did Musharraf practically implement the recommendations of the sub-committee (Haidar 2012). The committee attempted brokering peace talks and made significant progress in compiling a report on Baloch grievances, but a potential peace deal collapsed after Musharraf ordered the committee to cease discussions, choosing confrontation instead (Rashid 2008, 285; ICG 2006, 19). This further hardened Baloch views that it was the military, and not civilian members of government that controlled Pakistan's policymaking (ICG 2006, 20). In early April, an informal 'gentleman's agreement' between Akbar Bugti and Islamabad resulted in both sides relocating and a temporary peace (Axmann 2012b, 277). Between mid-April and the end of June, no incident occurred in Dera Bugti because of the agreement (HRCP 2006, 30; Bennett-Jones 2009, 71). However, in mid-May, Baloch tribal leaders said peace with the government had collapsed. The Secretary General of the JWP stated that the government disregarded the most important demands of the Baloch, the cessation of new military cantonments in the province, and that the Gwadar port development project be given to the Baloch (Khan 2005).

Once again, peace in Balochistan Province was short-lived, and the stage was set for a major confrontation (Bennett-Jones 2009, 72). On 14 December 2005, in Kohlu, Marri area, Musharraf announced an Rs. 1.5 billion development package for the region, BLA militants fired rockets at the gathering (Dawn 2005; Axmann 2012b, 277). The Marris vehemently rejected the military's plans to drill for oil and build a new military base on their land (Walsh 2020, 236). The next day, a military helicopter was attacked and its occupants were injured, including FC Balochistan leadership (ICG 2006, 9; Shahid 2005). Musharraf responded by ordering a significant offensive where hundreds of guerrillas and civilians were killed

(Rashid 2008, 285).[286] As many as 200,000 people were displaced from the Marri (Kohlu) and Bugti (Dera Bugti) tribal areas (ICG 2007, 6). On 31 December 2005, Akbar Bugti fled his fort, pushing deep into the mountains (Walsh 2020, 236). Violence spread from the Bugti and Marri tribal areas to throughout Balochistan. On 1 January 2006, Baloch government officials and nationalists demanded the cessation of military operations and activities in the conflict areas (Dawn 2006a).[287] On 16 January, Pakistan's Information Minister briefed that the government was looking into possible al-Qa'ida involvement in the Sui incidents (HRCP 2006, 44). In February, three Chinese engineers working at a concrete factory in Balochistan were killed by the BLA several days before Musharraf planned to visit China (Al Jazeera 2006).

This conflict marked a departure from previous Baloch-Pakistan conflicts, which were dominated by a few Baloch tribes. In 2002, Dr. Allah Nazar founded the Baloch Students Organization–Azad ("free" or "liberated"). From the non-tribal middle class in southwestern Balochistan, Nazar was abducted and tortured by Pakistani security forces in March 2005 for his involvement in the Baloch student movements (Ahmad 2014, 54). In July 2006, he was released and became the face of resistance for many young angry Baloch (Jain 2021, 131; Ahmad 2014, 54; Walsh 2020, 239). Nazar led the separatist Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), which was known to have coordinated with other Baloch separatist groups, including the BLA, which sought an independent state including the Baloch areas of Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, called 'Greater Balochistan' (Asghar 2014; Grare 2006, 7). The BLF aimed to end Punjabi domination and establish an independent Baloch nation-state (Axmann 2012b, 280). Nazar was the only prominent separatist leader who did not come from a long tribal line of insurrection.

Along with large-scale military operations, Islamabad continued plans to increase development in Balochistan and put additional pressure on the Baloch militants. On 24 March 2006, PM Shaukat Aziz announced a Rs 2.8 billion special package for Balochistan for the district development projects as part of Musharraf's plan to bypass provincial

[286] "Although the government denie[d] it, regular troops [conducted] operations [in Balochistan] alongside mainly FC forces" (ICG 2006, 9). According to Musharraf, only 1,000 army personnel assisted the paramilitary and other security forces there (Dawn 2006c). However, by February 2006, "six Pakistani army brigades, plus paramilitary forces totaling some 25,000 men, [were battling BLA guerrillas] in the Kohlu mountains and surrounding areas" (Harrison 2006b).

[287] "MNA Abdul Rauf Mengal of BNP rejected the establishments of cantonments in Balochistan by saying that the provincial assembly had already passed a resolution against it" (Dawn 2006a).

government authorities (Fazl-e-Haider 2006). The regime proceeded to target Khair Bakhsh Marri's family.[288] On 7 April, Islamabad declared the BLA a terrorist organization.[289] Balach Marri, leader of the BLA and eldest son of Khair Bakhsh Marri, lost his seat in the Balochistan provincial assembly. With the group banned, its name could no longer appear in the media (Raza, 2006). By April, Balach Marri was with Akbar Bugti in the mountains (Walsh 2020, 237).

In late April, Musharraf played down the Balochistan unrest.[290] The government then imposed a travel ban on Baloch nationalist leaders Akbar Bugti, Attaullah Mengal, Akhtar Mengal, Khair Bakhsh Marri, and a dozen others. Their names were added to the Exit Control List, which prevented them from leaving Pakistan (Dawn 2006b; The News International 2006). On 20 July, Musharraf stated that all Bugti commanders had surrendered, Akbar Bugti had fled, and it was solely three Baloch sardars that were against the regime, out of a total of 77 tribal leaders (Dawn 2006c).

Brahamdagh Bugti began to suspect that the military had locked onto the signal from his grandfather's satellite phone as the PAF bombing in the mountains became closer and closer. Brahamdagh pleaded with him to flee to Afghanistan, where President Hamid Karzai had reportedly offered sanctuary, but Akbar Bugti refused (Walsh 2020, 236). On 26 August, the military killed Akbar Bugti, cornered in the mountains, after a standoff. The circumstances leading to his death are disputed (Musharraf 2012). By some accounts, the soldiers fired first; by others, it was Akbar Bugti. Regardless, with the news of Akbar Bugti's death, Balochistan erupted (Gall 2006b). Across the province, protesters hurled rocks, blocked roads, burned tires, and tore down symbols of Pakistan, including a billboard with a photo of Pakistan's founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Meanwhile, on 1 September, Akbar Bugti was hurriedly

[288] In late March, his son "Gazin Marri, who was provincial home minister from 1993-96, was arrested in Dubai on the charge of money laundering" (Raza 2006), according to Balochistan's police chief.
[289] "The decision was made after the government cancelled the arms licenses issued earlier to main Baloch nationalist leaders in Balochistan" (Raza 2006). "Anyone associated with the BLA or supporting its terrorist activities would be tried under the Anti-Terrorism Act … [and BLA offices operating anywhere in] Pakistan would be sealed and bank accounts associated with it [were] frozen" (Raza 2006).
[290] Musharraf ""described the rebels as 'mercenaries' and their attacks as 'pin pricks', and said the disturbances were confined to one-twentieth of the province's area. 'So what revolt are you talking about? People talk about an East Pakistan situation,' he said, referring to the secession of Bangladesh in 1971. 'I understand strategy. These people are pygmies.' Criticism of his military-driven strategy came from 'people who sit in drawing rooms and talk', he said, but added that a political solution was also being sought" (Walsh and Tisdall 2006).

buried in a secretive ceremony, near Dera Bugti, without his family, and officials refused to allow the viewing of his body (Walsh 2020, 237).

Protests broke out in Balochistan which intensified after the government refused to return Akbar Bugti's body to his family (Rashid 2008, 285), an affront against Baloch tradition (Akbar 2011, 278). The government tried to convene a grand assembly (loya jirga) of all the sardars, but they refused to attend. Instead, a month after Akbar Bugti's death, the 15th Khan of Kalat, Mir Suleiman Daud, called a jirga in September, attended by 400 tribal chiefs and elders. They claimed that the state of Kalat had acceded to Pakistan only under duress and that treaty assurances of Baloch autonomy were regularly dishonored (Axmann 2012a, xvii). Furthermore, they condemned the army and sought to take their grievances to the international courts (ICG 2007, 12).

The army also hoped to kill Akbar Bugti's grandson Brahamdagh, and the head of the BLA, Balach Marri, but the two escaped Pakistan (Rashid 2008, 285). Brahamdagh relocated to Afghanistan and then to Switzerland, where he led the Baloch Republican Party, the political successor to his grandfather's JWP. Brahamdagh is also the suspected chief of the separatist Balochistan Republican Army. On 21 November 2007, Balach Marri was killed in Afghanistan under mysterious circumstances (Shahid 2007). His brother, Hyrbyair Marri, allegedly became the new BLA head and lived in London (Ali 2015a).

Musharraf's victory was short-lived, breathing new life into the Baloch cause. Akbar Bugti's past nationalist failings ended with his death, creating a modern Baloch nationalist martyr. The fifth Baloch uprising echoed earlier violent conflicts with insurgent tribespeople from major Baloch tribes conducting guerrilla-type attacks, ambushing army check posts, and planting bombs on railway tracks. However, this rebellion was different (Walsh 2020, 238). Unrest spread from the mountains to the sea, spreading from sections of the Marri and Bugti tribes to the urban Baloch-educated youth (Leghari 2012).

The state continued repressive policies against the Baloch and co-opted rivals of Baloch nationalists.[291] According to Baloch leaders several hundred political supporters were

[291] In December 2006, "the Chamalang Coal Mines – reportedly the second largest coal mine in Asia" (Siddiqi 2015, 65) – and located in the Marri area of Balochistan returned as a contentious point between Khair Bakhsh and the central government (Dawn 2006g). As discussed in chapter three, in 1974, Chamalang was the location

arrested by the government (Masood 2008).[292] After the brief spike in outrage following Bugti's death, Baloch insurgent activities declined, with insurgent leaders withdrawing to Afghanistan and security forces arresting thousands of Baloch (Rashid 2008, 286). The 2005-2007 phase of the insurgency and the regime's response deepened the rift between Islamabad and Baloch ethnonationalists. This resulted in a surge of support for a new generation of hardline Baloch nationalists (Akbar 2011, 118).

Like previous military rulers in Pakistan, Musharraf's regime suffered severe legitimacy problems, and attempts to consolidate power backfired. None of Musharraf's military predecessors – Ayub, Yahya, or Zia – left voluntarily (Faruqui 2003, 36). Following the March 2007 Musharraf firing of the Supreme Court chief justice, public backlash reached a tipping point leading to his loss of support within the military (Shah 2014, 215). Musharraf had further lost support within the military ranks because of Musharraf's military rule and internal opposition to Musharraf's support for United States' counterterrorism policies which tarnished the Pakistan military's reputation (Shah 2014, 219).[293] Once COAS General Kayani distanced himself from Musharraf, the president was isolated politically (Nawaz 2020, 15).

The PML(N) and the PPP allied in 2008 to impeach Musharraf and try him for treason for upending the Sharif government in 1999. On 18 August 2008, Musharraf succumbed to pressure from home and abroad, negotiated a departure to avoid impeachment, and went into self-imposed exile (Nawaz 2020, 15). After Musharraf's fall, he faced multiple court cases, including charges of murder and treason.[294] Less than a month later, the head of the PPP, Asif

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of a significant battle and turning point in the 1973-1977 Baloch insurgency. "Subsequently, fear of continued instability – the mines were also the subject of a land dispute between the Marris and a Pashtun tribe, the Lunis – put a dampener on further exploitation of the mines for the next 30 years. The extraction of coal from Chamalang was restarted after an agreement was signed on 6 December 2006 between the … [leader of the Bijarani faction of the Marri tribe], elders of the Luni tribe, and the government of Balochistan" (Siddiqi 2015, 65-66; Butt 2011). Islamabad proceeded to "bypass Khair Bakhsh Marri and engage in divide-and-rule tactics to get work started at the coal mines … [This resulted] in 310 coal mine workers being killed or wounded between 2005–2010. Furthermore, the mines corroborate[d] Khair Bakhsh Marri's claim that Balochistan's resources were put to the use of other provinces as more than 90 percent of the coal was dispatched to the rest of Pakistan" (Siddiqi 2015, 66).

[292] "[Akhtar] Mengal was arrested in November 2006 and charged with treason and manhandling two officers of [MI] whom he accused of harassing his children on their way to school" (Masood 2008).

[293] Shah cites a senior Pakistan military officer, that "there was a growing sense of anxiety in the officer corps about the army's continued association with Musharraf. Hence, the corps commanders decided that they could 'no longer stand by Musharraf and provide him institutional cover,' especially when he had become the main target of collective rage in political and civil society" (Shah 2014, 219).

[294] In 2016, an anti-terrorism court in Pakistan acquitted Musharraf of the killing of Akbar Bugti in 2006 (BBC News 2016).

Ali Zardari,[295] was elected PM. The following section examines the Zardari regime's response to the Baloch.

Regime Response after Musharraf

Musharraf defended his actions towards the Baloch, denying that human rights violations ever occurred in Balochistan, and tried to protect his image and that of the army, FC, and the state. While denying the human rights abuses, Musharraf rationalized the regime's response to the Baloch.[296] He characterized Baloch nationalists as anti-Pakistan and anti-Balochistan, advocating for a hardline approach towards Baloch nationalists and that military operations against the Baloch were not unique and historically occurred under several regimes. Musharraf rejected the widespread reports of alleged human rights abuses committed by government forces and stated that Pakistan's accusers, including journalists, were doing this for political or personal gain and threatened the solidarity and unity of Pakistan. He clamored that the international community noticed Balochistan but failed to condemn Indian alleged human rights violations against ethnonationalists in Kashmir and Assam and made accusations of foreign conspiracies.[297] Musharraf called out the media and human rights organizations for failing to understand Balochistan's complexity and to stop giving Baloch nationalists a platform (Musharraf 2012). These attempts at disinformation and denial regarding the situation in Balochistan came shortly before Musharraf's 2013 return to Pakistan to reenter politics after four years of self-imposed exile following his loss of power in 2008. Numerous court challenges awaited Musharraf before his arrival, including criminal charges — in the deaths of former PM Benazir Bhutto and Akbar Bugti (Masood 2013). Military repression against the Baloch did not end with the fall of Musharraf's military dictatorship but increased during the democratically elected Zardari and the PPP's 2008 to 2013 rule (Akbar 2011, 332).[298]

[295] Zardari is the widower of former PM Benazir Bhutto, who was assassinated in December 2007.
[296] Musharraf's stated the Baloch "need[ed] to be dealt with an iron hand," (Musharraf 2012) further "brutal suppression of demonstrations for public rights by citizens within a state does come under the purview of human rights, but the use of modern weapons to kill innocent people of a different ethnicity, undertake terrorist activity to disrupt/damage national infrastructure, launching a guerrilla war for separation against government forces, openly challenging the writ of the government by a small minority of the population is intolerable for any state and needs to be dealt with an iron hand" (Musharraf 2012).
[297] According to Musharraf, foreign countries sought to "destabilize Pakistan through Afghanistan and Balochistan" (Musharraf 2012).
[298] Figure 4.2 uses data compiled using ESOC (2011) and examines the number of Baloch ethnonationalists and militants killed by the state and the number of government forces killed by Baloch militants. This data was "derived from press reports in *The Dawn*, the major English language newspaper in Pakistan. There is another [violence] dataset on Pakistan, which is maintained by the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), an Islamabad non-governmental organization" (Bueno de Mesquita, Fair, Jordan, Rais, and Shapiro 2011). PIPS



Figure 4.2. Total Baloch Nationalists and Government Forces killed 1999-2011

This section examined why regime repression continued against the Baloch rather than shifting to a nonviolent response with Pakistan's regime change from Musharraf's military dictatorship to a democratically elected government. Baloch nationalists boycotted the elections in 2008 to protest the killing of Akbar Bugti. Baloch leaders initially welcomed Zardari's electoral win, similar to the welcome after the change in the Nawaz Sharif regime to Musharraf in 1999 (UNPO 2008). In late 2008, Zardari introduced the 'Balochistan Package' which addressed several Baloch concerns.[299] Baloch nationalists, seeking even more autonomy than the plan offered, rejected it. The Baloch feared the package would be used as government and military cover to continue targeting Baloch activists. While the package addressed all initial Baloch grievances, it was never fully implemented (Grare 2013, 12).[300]

data is available from 2008 onwards, and it found that Balochistan was the country's most volatile region in 2010 (PIPS 2011).

[299] The package "included the return of exiled political leaders and withdrawal of army from some areas, changing the criteria of federal resources distribution, [the] creation of jobs for Baloch youth, and more provincial autonomy regarding natural resources. Parliament approved the plan in December 2009" (Jain 2021, 134).

[300] Zeb notes that it probably failed because of "the package's lack of privatization, accountability, and focus it failed to have any desired impact" (Zeb 2019, 173).

The 7th National Finance Commission in December 2009 changed the criteria for resource allocation to population, giving Balochistan a greater share in the national pool. However, the increased funding failed to improve the province's economy. Balochistan continued to suffer from poor education, infrastructure, health, and sanitation conditions (Jain 2021, 135; HRCP 2012). In 2010, the Eighteenth Amendment to Pakistan's 1973 Constitution was passed and it improved power redistribution away from the executive (Bennett-Jones 2020, 259). By 2011, the situation was not better and violence between the opposing sides endured (Jain 2021, 135).[301]

The military and intelligence services involved in suppressing the insurgency in Balochistan continued to commit gross human rights violations. Baloch nationalists and civilians disappeared, were killed, and found their bodies dumped along the roads (Green 2013; HRW 2013). The post-Musharraf civilian governments failed to change this policy (Shah 2014, 274).[302] Familial and tribal disputes continued to improve the government's ability to co-opt senior Baloch tribe members after Musharraf's resignation. For instance, Marri tribal leadership remained split. After Khair Bakhsh Marri's death at age 86 in June 2014, his son Mehran was elected as the new Marri tribal chieftain by tribal elders loyal to Khair Bakhsh. However, tribal leaders in Quetta elected a different brother, Changez, as the new tribal chief. Changez's brothers and other Khair Bahksh loyalists objected that Changez was co-opted by the regime (Shahid 2014). In self-imposed exile in the United Kingdom, Mehran is tied to the United Balochistan Army (UBA), a reported offshoot of the BLA. For nearly twenty years Mehran attended the United Nations Human Rights Council, in Geneva, as Balochistan's unofficial representative (Shah 2017b) until Swiss authorities, under pressure from Pakistan in 2017, placed a lifetime ban on Mehran's entry (Shah 2017a). While Changez, a PML(N) stalwart and Balochistan provincial minister, was recognized by the central government as the Marri chieftain, Baloch nationalists consider Mehran the true chieftain who continues Khair Bakhsh's legacy (Yusufzai 2014).

[301] "The provincial leaders were hesitant to trust the government again so soon. PM [Yousaf Raza] Gilani invited the Baloch for talks and offered additional economic and employment opportunities" (Jain 2021, 135; Dawn 2011a; Dawn 2011b). "He moved some forces and checkpoints and replaced the Army with FC units" (Jain 2021, 135).

[302] The Government of Pakistan's official Abbottabad Inquiry Commission "noted … that there was no accountability of the military's intelligence agencies for their repeated failures, which only reinforced presumptions of military impunity" (Shah 2014, 274; Government of Pakistan 2013, 187). In 2011, Major General Obaidullah Khan Khattak, Inspector General FC-Balochistan, brushed off a journalist's questions about alleged human rights violations committed by Pakistani security forces, rationalizing that despite its illegality "you feel less pain in your heart if a murderer is killed" (Walsh 2020, 239).

The army curtailed Zardari and his civilian successor's decision-making (Shah 2014, 224). This helps explain why Pakistan's repressive response to Baloch ethnonationalists has not changed despite the shift from a military dictatorship to a democratically elected civilian-led government, as Pakistan's decision-making regime remains dominated by the military. The military often determines foreign and national security policies. Suppose the institution feels threatened by the civilian leadership. In that case, it uses its power behind the scenes to undermine the civilian government and, if needed, has the civilian regime replaced by other, more amenable civilians.

Analysis – 2000s Regime Threat Perception

After two decades of relative peace between the central government and the Baloch, why did hostilities erupt? Shortly after removing PM Nawaz Sharif from office, COAS General Musharraf installed himself as Pakistan's new ruler. He quickly sought to consolidate power, lacking legitimacy, having unconstitutionally removed the democratically elected PM. This first consisted of establishing a political base with the PML(Q), a breakaway faction of the PML(N), and filling it by convincing various locally influential politicians to defect. Musharraf further emphasized local government, which would have to depend on the federal government for support at the province's expense. After preventing opposition political rallies, Musharraf gained political legitimacy by winning a referendum that extended his rule. Musharraf further announced the LFO which provided legal cover for the 1999 military coup and his policies as a military ruler to include those that impugned on people's freedoms and rights. Musharraf announced elections but lifted the ban on political rallies a month before the vote, giving opposition political parties little time to campaign (HRW 2002). The October 2002 national elections were rigged, and with the disqualification of many candidates, the PML(Q) won the elections and formed the national government and the Punjab provincial government. The election fixing helped bring to power the Islamist alliance, the MMA, in the NWFP, and a coalition between the MMA and PML(Q) in Balochistan. The Baloch again found themselves politically excluded, like 1973, when the central government dismissed the Baloch nationalist-led provincial government.[303]

[303] See Table 4.1 for Musharraf's various responses to Akbar Bugti and the Baloch.

Table 4.1 Regime Response: Pervez Musharraf and the Baloch

Assimilation	• Bijarani faction of the Marris tribe: revolted against Khair Bakhsh Marri and his Ghazeni faction in December 1991. The Bijarani's invited the government to start oil exploitation in their area, straining intratribal relations. Khair Bakhsh blamed the government for exploiting the rivalry. • Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali: The first ethnic Baloch prime minister, continued his family's historical support of various pro-establishment Muslim League parties against Baloch nationalist aspirations. • Jam Mohammad Yousaf: Ruler of the former princely Baloch state of Las Bela, made CM of Balochistan, continued his family's tradition of supporting pro-regime Muslim League parties. • MMA: Six-party Islamist alliance, led by JUI(F) party, a Pashtun-majority Islamist party used to counter Baloch opposition.
Exclusion	October 2002: Major political parties and multiple politicians prevented from contesting elections, including Akbar Bugti. Elections were rigged in favor of Musharraf's PML(Q) party and MMA alliance.
Repression	Mid-December 2005: BLA militants fired rockets at an event with Musharraf, who responded by ordering a major military offensive in Marri (Kohlu) and Bugti (Dera Bugti) tribal areas. 26 August 2006: Akbar Bugti, head of the Bugti tribe, was killed in the mountains during a standoff with the military.

Musharraf was familiar with the Baloch, having served with the 206th Infantry Brigade in Karachi, which fought against Baloch militants in the 1970s. According to Musharraf's autobiography, he sought to establish a government writ in 95 percent of Balochistan province where the government did not exercise absolute authority (Musharraf 2006, 58-59). Baloch alienation worsened under Musharraf's regime (Shah 2014, 208). Baloch leaders denounced Musharraf's devolution from provincial to local government as a ploy for provincial autonomy (Shah 2014, 209).

Musharraf's development of the vast seaport at Gwadar was long opposed by the Baloch who saw it as taking jobs away from local Baloch by Chinese workers and as a foreign occupation by Punjabi settlers in an effort to replace the Baloch within Balochistan Province (Shah 2014, 208). With gas deposits expected to run out by 2012, the regime took advantage of rivalries

within the Marri tribe to find a partner to exploit untapped mineral wealth within the Marri tribal areas in Kohlu. The killing of a rival pro-government Marri tribal leader resulted in Khair Bakhsh's imprisonment, which spurred the creation of the Marri-dominated BLA and its campaign against the state. Musharraf's attempts to expand gas production in Sui, located in the Bugti tribal areas, impugned the tribe's honor and triggered fighting between Akbar Bugti and Pakistan. Musharraf's regime repudiated accusations of issues in Balochistan and instead accused the Baloch sardars of causing trouble (Shah 2014, 209; Walsh 2020, 232-233). However, most Baloch tribal leaders supported Musharraf's regime (Walsh 2020, 232).

In this round of conflict, the military and security forces' operations targeted militant hiding places, defended infrastructure, and the ISI committed gross violations of human rights (Lieven 2017, 183). Like the 1971 regime response to the Bengalis, this regime response opted to forego a political solution with Senator Mushahid Hussain, from Musharraf's negotiation team, noting that Akbar Bugti was willing to talk (Baloch 2017; Dawn 2006f). However, Musharraf's military regime expended little sincere effort to find a political solution (Wirsing 2010, 106). With the regime's targeting of Baloch nationalist leadership, Baloch ethnonationalist willingness to compromise waned (Grare 2013, 10). Following Akbar Bugti's death, senior military leadership had complete confidence in and justified Musharraf's actions in Balochistan (Dawn 2006e).

Pakistan's nominal transition from a military dictatorship to democracy in 2008 dashed hopes for ending violence in Balochistan between Baloch ethnonationalists and Islamabad. Government-sanctioned violence escalated with enforced disappearances and killings of Baloch activists. Several Pakistani heads of states over the years repressed Baloch ethnonationalism (Wani 2016). Many Baloch want the state to address various grievances; however, most do not want a separate state, nor have they taken up arms against Pakistan. The rise of the urban, middle-class Baloch in the 2000s had no allegiance to tribal leaders. Thus, it was harder to placate and balance against, resulting in political exclusion and repression. Furthermore, this explains why many Baloch have failed to balance against Pakistan. Some of the Baloch who have not joined against the state but instead sided with it see the state as a lesser threat because internal threats from within the Baloch, such as cleavages in and across tribes or local political parties, pose the greatest threat to their political power.

At the same time the Baloch insurgency occurred, another internal threat emerged with numerous armed Islamic militant groups in northwestern Pakistan, however, Musharraf's regime saw Baloch ethnonationalism as a greater threat (Staniland et al. 2018).[304] Musharraf had survived several separate assassination attempts outside Balochistan against Islamist extremists and did not launch major military operations afterward but instead arrested the suspected culprits and cut deals with the groups (Reuters 2007). Musharraf's peace deals were a mechanism to contain the growing violence. However, this allowed militants to consolidate and expand their control over territory in the tribal areas where Pakistan's security forces struggled to project power. By the middle of the decade, Islamic extremist militants expanded their writ into parts of the NWFP (Tankel 2018, 139-141; Lieven 2017, 171). On 1 January 2006, Senator Sanaullah Baloch criticized the Musharraf regime with questioning why Islamic extremist groups were not targeted with operations like the Baloch militants as the former groups had threatened Musharraf and PM Shaukat Aziz (Dawn 2006a).[305] Sanaullah Baloch further argued that the criminals should be arrested and stated that it was Musharraf's inauguration of the military garrison in the Marri tribal area which provided an excuse to launch military operations (Dawn 2006a).

Musharraf attempted to quash the perceived Baloch ethnonational threat by co-opting various Baloch leaders, tribes, and tribal factions. After politically excluding Baloch nationalists, the regime's coercive efforts led to multiple rebellions traversing several tribal areas and mobilizing the educated and nontribal Baloch youth. Pakistan's nation-building efforts continue to struggle.[306] Despite little support for independence in Balochistan, the longer the conflict continues without resolution, the greater the costs inflicted on the state (ICG 2006, 2; Heinkel and deVillafranca 2016, 72).

[304] Staniland et al. (2018) note that "Baloch mobilization is seen as more threatening since it promotes ethno-separatist cleavages perceived as less manageable than … [certain Islamist-related groups] that are potentially compatible with the military's version of Pakistani nationalism. Like Bengali regionalist militants in 1971, Baloch mobilization ma[d]e claims on the state that highlight ethnic and regional difference and contest the central role of Islam as a binding force of the nation" (Staniland et al. 2018, 37).
[305] Advocate Kashkol Ali, the Balochistan Assembly opposition leader, "said that if the rocket attack on … Musharraf was the cause for bombing Kohlu then Islamabad and Rawalpindi should also be subjected to shelling as two attempts were previously made on the life of the president in [those] cities" (Dawn 2006a).
[306] As Akbar Bugti stated, "I have been a Baluch for several centuries . . . I have been a Pakistani for just over fifty [years]" (Bennett-Jones 2009, 43; Miller 2010, 89).

Alternative Explanations

This case study examined domestic factors contributing to regime threat perception and decision-making regarding the variation in responding to Akbar Bugti and the Baloch in Balochistan. This section examines several competing explanations for why Musharraf's regime responded with repression toward the Baloch.

External threat considerations unlikely factored into the regime's decision to repress the Baloch. Such as, in the 1971 Bengali case, external support only started to play a role after the regime responded to ethnonationalists with repression, spurring an insurgency. The conflict soon became internationalized, which each side attempted to use for their benefit. Journalist Declan Walsh notes that at the beginning of the conflict "a senior Western intelligence official told [him], it was an open secret that India's [external intelligence agency] Research and Analysis Wing" (Walsh 2020, 240) was funding the Baloch rebels. Vijay Nambiar, a senior Indian security official, informed an American diplomat that it gave Pakistan 'a taste of their own medicine' for Pakistan's support to extremists in Kashmir (Walsh 2020, 240). Musharraf accused India of supporting the Baloch without any evidence, and India rejected these conjectures (Harrison 2006b). India, years later, in 2016, publicly called out Pakistan's repressive approach to the Baloch (Jain 2021, ix). While publicly rebuking Pakistan, India, and other countries are unlikely to provide Baloch ethnonationalists with military assistance or to intervene militarily, such as India during the Bangladesh Liberation War (Jain 2021, ix; Heinkel and deVillafranca 2016, 72).

Another argument is that the conflict between Musharraf and Akbar Bugti was a war of egos (Baloch 2017). However, regime repression was not limited to Akbar Bugti and his tribal followers but also to the Marris, Mengals, and other nationalists and activists. Political exclusion and repression also spurred young, educated, and non-tribal Baloch to rebel against the state. While animosity between Musharraf and Akbar Bugti was likely, this does not explain why regimes following Musharraf's reign continued repressive policies towards Baloch ethnonationalists.

An institutional argument could be made that the ethnonationalists threaten the military's dominance, hence, the movement of regime responses to repression.[307] Within the military the most important aspect is protecting the institution and thus it matters not here its personnel were from or their particular political or religious views but rather protecting the military as an institution (Shah 2014, 274). However, in these cases of the military interjecting and conducting repression, they also were the primary decision-makers in these regimes and does not explain the variation in response over time. Pakistan's strategic culture, revisionist and anti-Indian, takes part in the regime's decision-making calculus, however, by itself does not explain response variation (Heinkel 2022, 88). In sum, Musharraf precipitated the conflict with the Baloch (Staniland 2021, 169), likely to consolidate power and stamp out a perceived threat to his illegitimate rule.

Conclusion

This chapter examined the decision-making process of Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf in deciding how to respond to Akbar Bugti and the Baloch. Lacking legitimacy after the 1999 military coup, Musharraf attempted to consolidate power, which included politically excluding Baloch nationalists. Despite Musharraf's attempts to coerce Baloch nationalists and certain tribal leaders and co-opt their rivals, Baloch ethnonationalists mobilized, fighting against the state. After perfunctory negotiations, the regime opted for troop buildup and a crackdown on the Baloch, ultimately leading to Bugti's death. A former official serving under previous Pakistan governments, Akbar Bugti's death turned him into a Baloch nationalist martyr, further mobilizing the Baloch against Pakistan and contributing to a low-level but long-standing insurgency. By examining Musharraf's decision-making, the causal process shows that the perceived internal threat to the regime's power consolidation is the likeliest explanation for the variation in Pakistan's policies toward the Baloch. The Baloch threatened Musharraf's power-consolidating efforts, damaging the regime's legitimacy, and the regime responded with political exclusion and, when that failed, military repression. The military regime quashed limited political efforts to address long-standing Baloch grievances. This fifth iteration of the insurgency persists and has evolved from the initially tribal areas and respective militias to include middle-class/non-tribal groups spread

[307] Shah notes that "in any bureaucratic organization, where one stands depends primarily on where one sits" (Shah 2014, 274).

across Pakistan's largest province. The next chapter examines the regime's response to ethnonationalist groups in two short case studies outside Pakistan.

Table 4.2 Timeline: Pervez Musharraf and the Baloch

12 October 1999	Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf removed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (1997-1999) in a military coup.
January 2000	Khair Bakhsh Marri was arrested and detained for 18 months because of alleged involvement in the murder of a rival within the Marri tribe.
June 2001	Bugti tribe members attacked gas installations and an airport after being denied employment in the Sui gas fields in the Bugti tribal area. A tenuous deal was struck to end the conflict.
30 April 2002	A nationwide referendum on a five-year extension for Musharraf's presidency.
June 2002	A violent showdown resumed at Sui as the army and paramilitary forces confronted armed Bugti tribe members.
22 August 2002	Musharraf issued a Legal Framework Order, increasing his power and providing legal cover for his rule since the coup.
10 October 2002	The regime manipulated the national and provincial elections. Musharraf's PML(Q) and the six-party Islamist MMA alliance dominated elections.
24/25 January 2003	Militants blew up a gas pipeline from Sui to Punjab during the Bugti-Mazari tribal feud, which cut the gas supply to industry and millions of domestic consumers.
2 May 2004	A BLA remote-controlled bomb killed three Chinese engineers on their way to work in Gwadar.
July 2004	Military operation launched against Baloch militants and nationalists in Gwadar in response to attacks.
September 2004	Pakistan's Senate formed a parliamentary committee to address the ongoing Balochistan conflict.
3 January 2005	In Sui, Bugti tribal area, a female doctor accused a Pakistan Army officer of rape. Poor treatment of the victims and Army accusations against tribe members lead to Bugtis attacking the Sui gas refinery.
April 2005	An uneasy calm began following the 'gentlemen's agreement' between Akbar Bugti and the federal government, lasting for two months.
14 December 2005	BLA militants fired rockets at Musharraf, who addressed a rally at Kohlu. Major military operations were launched in response.
7 April 2006	Pakistan declared BLA a terrorist organization.
26 August 2006	Akbar Bugti, the 79-year-old Bugti tribal leader and former government official, was killed by the military.
September 2006	Jirga, attended by Baloch tribal chiefs and elders, held in support of Akbar Bugti, rallied against Pakistan policies towards the Baloch.

November 2006	Tribal chief Akhtar Mengal was arrested and charged with treason.
21 November 2007	BLA leader Balach Marri, Khair Bahksh Marri's eldest son, was killed in Afghanistan.
18 August 2008	Musharraf resigned and went into self-imposed exile.

Chapter Five
Myanmar and Mali Case Studies

Weak state regime responses to perceived ethnonationalist threats are not limited to Pakistan. This chapter shifts focus to short case studies outside of Pakistan. These cases were selected by meeting the scope conditions for regime defense against ethnonationalists. First, a hegemonic group, usually the most populous ethnic group, controls a multi-ethnic state and thus has out-groups attempting to gain power. Second, the state is weak, meaning state strength is the relationship between the state and society, not its coercive capacity (Feraru 2018, 103). Finally, each case consists of a regime varying its policies to groups over time, including nonviolent and violent responses. This chapter attempts to convey external validity with this developing middle-range theory on regime defense against ethnonationalists. External validity makes the conclusions more generalizable and shows that regime defense decision-making towards ethnonationalist challengers is not a regional, solitary case, or event phenomenon.

The cases studied in this chapter are Myanmar (Burma) in Southeast Asia and Mali in Sub-Saharan West Africa. These cases involve weak states with a history of exclusionary and repressive policies towards ethnonationalist groups. Why has Myanmar conducted mass killings and forced displacement of the Rohingya? Why did this practice continue under the democratically elected Aung San Suu Kyi? The Myanmar case study follows the regime's decision-making process leading to the regime's 2017 mass repression of the Rohingya (Staniland 2021, 227). Why have Mali's policies to the Tuareg varied since the state's independence from France in 1960? Why the shift from repression to accommodation towards the Tuaregs in the 1990s? This period covers the Tuareg uprising in the 1990s, which includes two regime changes. Mali differs from the other cases discussed in this paper as it is outside of South and Southeast Asia, and its colonial background is French. In contrast, the other cases were born out of British colonialism. In these shorter cases, much like Pakistan, studying ethnic conflict poses a challenge with war-torn borderlands, many of which remain inaccessible to most international observers, including scholars, journalists, diplomats, and humanitarians (Brenner 2019, 2; Holt 2019, xv). Furthermore, these conflicts between the state and the minority ethnic groups remain unresolved. The chapter closes by comparing the various regime types across the case studies and provides overall conclusions.

Myanmar

Myanmar consists of multiple ethnonationalist groups that the dominant ethnic Bamar (or Burman) have considered political challengers to their rule. Close to 90 percent of the country is Buddhist, including most Burman (Wade 2019, 57). Myanmar's independence in 1948 was wracked in political violence which continues through the present (Staniland 2021, 206). Regime response to these groups have varied across different regimes and over time. This section first provides an overview of Myanmar's continuing nation-building process and its persistent conflict with perceived threats to regime rule. This follows with an overview of the Rohingya, a Muslim ethnic minority located in Rakhine (Arakan) State, bordering Bangladesh in western Myanmar, and examines Myanmar regimes' responses to the Rohingya.

In 1885, the British Empire took the area known as Myanmar following the third Anglo–Burmese War.[308] Most of Myanmar's ethnic minorities were apathetic with being merged together while others held felt wronged by outstanding injustices inflicted upon them by the majority Burman. The British Empire preferred soldiers from ethnic minorities and these troops were used against the dominant and rebellious Burman (Brenner 2019, 32-33). This led to Burman resentment of the minority collaboration with imperial rule, particularly against Muslims and ethnic Bengalis, and played a part in clashes between the groups (Lee 2021, 50).

In the 1940s, the "Burman elites sided with the Japanese Imperial Army; they trained in Japan and established the Burma Independence Army (BIA) that drove the British out of Myanmar along with the Japanese. During this campaign the BIA and adjunct local militias committed reprisal attacks and several massacres on ethnic minority communities" (Brenner 2019, 33). This sparked the conflicts between Myanmar's center and the many ethnic groups in the periphery (Brenner 2019, 33).

[308] "Compared to neighboring India, British Burma remained peripheral to imperial core interests. Britain sought to rule it with minimal effort and cost" (Brenner 2019, 32). "The Myanmar-Bangladesh frontier represents a political division that is traditionally regarded as separating South from Southeast Asia. This area is often identified as Myanmar's … 'western gate,' a reference to the Rakhine State area that links Myanmar with the Indian subcontinent and is separated from the remainder of Myanmar by a mountain range" (Lee 2021, 33).

The anticolonial resistance was united under the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), led by the Burman elite, including the BIA leader and independence hero Major General Aung San. Post-independence, the BIA became Myanmar's armed forces, the Tatmadaw (Brenner 2019, 37). In the Panglong Agreement of 1947, between Aung San and ethnic minority groups, it "stipulated equal treatment of all ethnic groups and power-sharing arrangements, including regional autonomy provisions under a federal constitution" (Brenner 2019, 2). However, it did not provide a plan for a new post-colonial state (Staniland 2021, 206). Several months later, Aung San was assassinated, and his death splintered his political party (Brenner 2019, 37).

Fundamental functional challenges preoccupied Myanmar's political and military leaders in its earliest days. When the British left Myanmar on 4 January 1948, the new government was already confronting various rebel communist and ethnonationalist groups. U Nu, the prime minister for the AFPFL government during most of 1948-62, faced multiple militant group crises covering much of Myanmar's territory.[309] In 1962, as U Nu attempted talks and accommodation with armed groups, General Ne Win, the head of the Tatmadaw since 1949, and other senior military leaders feared the potential move to federalism. The Tatmadaw prevented U Nu's speech on this sensitive subject by deposing him and installing Ne Win (Staniland 2021, 220).[310] The coup terminated Myanmar's limited experiment with parliamentary democracy (Wade 2019, 47-48).

Ne Win's regime primarily responded against ethnonationalists and other perceived threats with mass repression through decades of war. He was removed by the Tatmadaw in 1989 in response to Burman democratization demands (Staniland 2021, 209). The new regime changed the country's name from Burma to Myanmar, likely to maintain support from the Buddhist-Burman majority (Myint-U, 43-44).[311]

[309] "By the early 1950s, however, there was enough state coercive capacity to start making political choices about how to deal with armed groups" (Staniland 2021, 207). U Nu's regime "pursued a complex blend of strategies, mixing a Burman nationalism with extensive amnesties and cease-fires with ethnic groups, and continuing to hold out space for the armed Left to integrate itself into 'mainstream' politics while also attacking them with the military. U Nu's position was viewed as veiled ethno-majoritarianism by many ethnic groups while [being] seen as too soft by the military" (Staniland 2021, 207).
[310] "The army had feared that U Nu would give ground to ethnic groups …, leading to secession and disintegration" (Staniland 2021, 220).
[311] The change "of Burma in English to the ancient Burmese-language ethnonym, Myanmar. … The justification offered was that the name 'Myanmar' incorporated all the country's indigenous peoples and claimed to end a colonial legacy. But 'Myanma' refers only to the majority Burmese people, … signaling the revival of a nationalism centered squarely on a Burmese–Buddhist racial and cultural core" (Myint-U 2020, 43-44). Myint-

Rohingya

Upon Burma's independence in 1948, the Rohingya, the Muslims of northern Rakhine State, were integrated into the new state, socially and politically (Lee 2021, 3). Following independence, a Muslim insurgency waged a civil war that ended in 1961 (Ware and Laoutides 2018, 15). For an abbreviated period, the militants held territory in Rakhine. In 1961, the regime recognized Rohingya political aspirations and tempered Rohinyan militant grievances through the creation of the Mayu Frontier Administration (MFA) which had the central government oversee the Rohingya rather "than by a majority ethnic Rakhine Buddhist administration in [Sittwe]," (Lee 2021, 59) the capital of Rakhine State. However, this caused a backlash among the ethnic Rakhine, heightening their anxiety of a Muslim takeover (Lee 2021, 59). Despite the substantially weakened militancy, the Burman-Buddhist majority believed a Muslim threat may return (Lee 2021, 68).

In the democratic period before the 1962 coup, the Rohingya could vote in elections and held elected positions in parliament and government office (Lee 2021, 60). Following the coup, Ne Win increasingly worried about the state fracturing if ethnic minorities gained political power and to prevent this his regime responded with exclusionary and assimilationist responses. Many ethnic groups saw the assimilation policy as the 'Burmanization' of the country (Ware and Laoutides 2018, 15-16). The Rohingya lost their rights as citizens (Lee 2021, 63).[312]

The MFA was abolished by Ne Win's regime in 1964. In 1974, Rakhine became a state and incorporated the Rohingya. This new state was led by ethnic Rakhine who made up two-thirds of its population (Lee 2021, 8, 67). The Buddhist Rakhine and Muslim communities long struggled against the Burman-dominated country. In the view of the Buddhist Rakhine, the Muslim Rohingya posed a foreign threat to their land (Holt 2019, 17). The Rohingya suffered as a minority with the majority ethnic Rakhine prioritizing policies that supported their own kind. The military regime sought to remove groups it considered as alien to the state and in the 1960s this resulted in the widespread forced migration of hundreds of

U notes that the real motive behind the name "change was that the government of the time was moving in a nativist direction and looking for easy wins to burnish its Burman ethnonationalist credentials" (Myint-U 2020, xii).

[312] "The junta "promoted the ideas of a fixed '135 National Races' that authentically belonged to the broader Myanmar nation-these *taingyintha* 'were at the very center of the state narrative.' This conceptualization excluded the Rohingya, seen 'as immigrants and not natives deserving special protection and special rights'" (Staniland 2021, 227; Myint-U 2020, 107).

thousands of Indians and Chinese from Myanmar (Lee 2021, 68). The regime further prevented the Rohingya from moving within Rakhine province (Ware and Laoutides 2018, 16).

In 1974, the Rohingya Patriotic Front (RPF) attempted to launch an armed insurgency. In 1978, military operations in north Rakhine targeted the Rohingya, the Rakhine, and communist militants, employing the Tatmadaw's 'four cuts' counterinsurgency strategy.[313] Civilians were displaced to flush out insurgents and their sympathizers. Simultaneously, the Tatmadaw launched Nagamin to check identity papers in the border regions ahead of the country's census, leading to widespread military repression (Ware and Laoutides 2018, 16; Lee 2021, 69). These operations resulted in some 200,000 Muslim refugees who fled to Bangladesh. Most were allowed to return following the 1978 Repatriation Agreement between Bangladesh and Myanmar; however, they were not recognized as Myanmar citizens (Lee 2021, 70). The Burma Citizenship Law (1982) excluded Rohingya Muslims from a list of 'indigenous' groups and thus were not eligible for full citizenship (Holt 2019, 11). The RPF's successor, the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), was established that same year, however, its impact was limited (Wade 2019, 128-129).[314]

Ne Win resigned, and a new military regime took over following the quashing of the 1988 democratic uprising[315] (Ware and Laoutides 2018, 17). The regime instituted a strategy known as Na Ta La in response to Islam's perceived threat to the Buddhist majority, which converted Muslims and other members of religions to Buddhism (Wade 2019, 116-117).[316] The Rohingya voted in and dominated the elections in northern Rakhine state in 1990, however, the military regime failed to recognize the results. The following year the military sent in additional forces, resulting in forced relocations and abuses which was further exacerbated by a humanitarian disaster caused by a cyclone. Following a military regime change in April 1992, military operations across the country surprisingly ended, including in Rakhine, which defused tensions with Bangladesh over the status of refugees (Ware and

[313] The four cuts include cutting militant "access to food, funds, intelligence, and recruits" (Ware and Laoutides 2018, 16).
[314] The RSO goals included "securing citizenship and greater political rights for Rohingya, had bases in Bangladesh, and carried out cross-border attacks on police and army posts in northern Rakhine State in the 1980s and early 1990s. Although it greatly exacerbated fears among Rakhine that a militant Rohingya movement would [target] the Rakhine, the RSO never posed much of a security threat, and by the late 1990s it was considered largely defunct" (Wade 2019, 128-129).
[315] Protests began on 8 August 1988 and thus became known as the 8888 Uprising (Lee 2021, 84).
[316] This "scheme was intended to weaken rather than assimilate the Rohingya" (Wade 2019, 130).

Laoutides 2018, 17). In 1997, restrictions on internal movements restarted in Rakhine (Wade 2019, 140).

In the early 2010s, Myanmar's nominal democratization shift helped bring about the return of Rohingyan combativeness (Staniland 2021, 227).[317] In November 2010, the Tatmadaw-led regime gave way to civilian-led government supported by the military. Later, the National League for Democracy (NLD) won the April 2012 by-elections. It was led by Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of Aung San, who became a member of parliament after she spent 15 years over 21 years under military house arrest. She finally collected her Nobel Peace Prize in Norway twenty years after receiving the award (BBC News 2015). However, the NLD faced legitimacy challenges, contending with the powerful Tatmadaw (Ware and Laoutides 2018, 21).

Long-simmering communal tensions in Rakhine state erupted into open violence in June 2012.[318] The likely trigger for communal violence was the brutal rape and murder of an ethnic Rakhine woman by Muslim men on 28 May (Ware and Laoutides 2018, 36; Lee 2021, 90). On 10 June, Rakhine Buddhists called for 'Bengalis' expulsion out of Myanmar (Ware and Laoutides 2018, 37-38).[319] In response, the government imposed a state of emergency, deployed the military across Rakhine State, instituted a curfew, and banned unauthorized meetings (Ware and Laoutides 2018, 38; Myint-U 2020, 182). By the end of June, violence killed around one hundred with the displaced at 100,000 people (Myint-U 2020, 182).

By mid-October, the military operations mandate was to conclude; however, violence exploded again across Rakhine State on 21 October (Ware and Laoutides 2018, 39).[320]

[317] "Myanmar's claimed transition to democracy took place within a legal framework constructed by the military to cement their ongoing influence on the country's government and avoid civilian oversight. The military-drafted 2008 Constitution ensured the armed forces' commander-in-chief … could directly appoint the government ministers for Border Affairs, Defence and Home Affairs, as well as a quarter of the parliament's members …, giving the military a veto over future constitutional change" (Lee 2021, 83).

[318] "Communal tensions had been high for months, escalating ever since the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party made promises to woo the Muslim vote in the 2010 election campaign, trying to lock out the local Rakhine nationalist party" (Ware and Laoutides 2018, 36). "Around 700,000 Rohingya, mostly long-term holders of 'White Card' temporary identification documents" (Lee 2021, 84) were able to cast votes, and the election of Rohingya MPs "gave Rohingya community leaders cause for cautious optimism" (Lee 2021, 103).

[319] The Rohingya, inside Myanmar, are often called 'Bengali' which " impl[ies] they are recent, if not illegal, immigrants from Bangladesh, and thus" (Ware and Laoutides 2018, xvii) delegitimized their claims to Myanmar citizenship (Lee 2021, 186).

[320] This differed from the previous bouts of violence as "these appeared to be well planned and coordinated, targeting Muslims. … The military response resulted in far stricter segregation of Muslim and Buddhist

During the 2012 communal riots, images of international Islamic terrorist group atrocities, including al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State, were shared over social media. People were frightened of an imminent attack, with stories circulating that terrorist cells were active in the state. Additionally, maps were posted that showed the spread of Islam over the centuries, displaying Myanmar surrounded by the Muslim-majority states of Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Indonesia (Myint-U 2020, 207-209).[321] In 2013 anti-Muslim violence began outside of Rakhine (Myint-U 2020, 185).[322]

In early 2014, a new Burman-Buddhist nationalist organization emerged called the Ma Ba Tha (Association for the Protection of Race and Religion) (Myint-U 2020, 208). In late March, Rakhine Buddhists announced a boycott of the first nationwide census in over thirty years because Muslims would be allowed to identify themselves. Under pressure, the government announced the night before the census that the Rohingya could only identify as 'Bengalis.' In response, the Rakhine Buddhists dropped their boycott (Myint-U 2020, 210). In 2015, the anti-Muslim 'four-race and religion laws,' with the support of the Ma Ba Tha, was passed by the Tatmadaw's political party in the parliament (Holt 2019, 10; Myint-U 2020, 208).[323]

The government's authorization for the Rohingya to vote using the 'white card' was met with public protests in February 2015. However, the Rohingya were left without official identification when the 'white card' was canceled in May 2015 (Holt 2019, 11). The

communities than had previously existed, implemented by placing stringent travel restrictions on the Muslims" (Ware and Laoutides 2018, 39-40). Ware and Laoutides argue that "these mobility restrictions reinforced conflict dynamics, preventing Muslims who might relocate from doing so, exacerbating Muslim grievances, and isolating the situation in Rakhine State where the national government could portray it as a local issue requiring its intervention to resolve" (Ware and Laoutides 2018, 39).

[321] Holt argues that the 2012 riots were a "major watershed moment that set off the" (Holt 2019, xv) modern period of "strife and deepened alienation between … [the Rakhine Buddhists, Burman Buddhists, and Rohingya Muslim] communities (Holt 2019, xv). The 2012 violence "was the first major wave of conflict between Buddhists and Muslims to strike Myanmar as it transitioned away from military rule" (Wade 2019, 43). Furthermore, this was the "first serious outbreak of violence in [Rakhine State] in two decades" (Ware and Laoutides 2018, 36) and claimed the lives of about two hundred people with 140,000 displaced (Lee 2021, 90).

[322] Wade notes that "the dynamics and nature of the violence differed as time went on. Unlike the first outbreak in Rakhine State in 2012, where ethnicity was a major cleavage, the Buddhist-on-Muslim unrest that began in central Myanmar the following year often saw communities from the same ethnicity that had experienced no prior conflict pitted against one another" (Wade 2019, 44).

[323] These "plac[ed] severe restrictions on Buddhist-Muslim marriages, ma[de] conversion from one religion to another extremely difficult, limit[ed] the number of children who might be born to women under certain demographic circumstances, and formally bann[ed] polygamy" (Holt 2019, 10). The Rohingya were accused of having significantly high numbers of children and were considered a threat to Burman-Buddhist-dominated Myanmar (Wade 2019, 141-142).

Rohingya were now fully politically excluded, lacking voting rights and political representation (Wade 2019, 361). On 8 November 2015, the NLD decisively won national elections.[324] Notwithstanding high expectations that ethnic conflict would end after Aung San Suu Kyi was elected, it actually worsened (Brenner 2019, 2). Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD ignored the Rohingya, leaving Muslims out of the government. In August 2016, Aung San Suu Kyi appointed former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to lead an advisory commission to find a lasting solution to the crisis in Rakhine, despite the Tatmadaw's criticism of including foreigners in Myanmar's domestic issues (Myint-U 2020, 231).

After the 2012 communal violence in Rakhine, the militant Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) was stood up by Rohingya exiles in Saudi Arabia, whose senior command was rumored to have received training in Pakistan (Wade 2019, 17). The ARSA sought to control Rakhine territory and then claimed to be an Ethnic Armed Organization, giving it political influence to negotiate with the government. On 9 October, the ARSA, consisting of several hundred Rohingya men armed with homemade weapons, attacked three police posts, killing several police officers and capturing firearms and ammunition. The army leadership was surprised and in response launched a counterinsurgency operation, sealed off the area, burned down villages, displaced civilians, and cut off access to humanitarian aid organizations. The state then acquiesced to Rakhinese Buddhist's longstanding demand for an armed militia. The Tatmadaw's military operations drove thousands of Rohingya to flee across the border to Bangladesh, with 70,000 arriving by February 2017 (Myint-U 2020, 232-235).

The Tatmadaw demanded that the president convene the National Defense and Security Council. This constitutional body included senior leadership from the Tatmadaw and the executive and legislative branches of government, a move that would give the army wide-ranging powers. Aung San Suu Kyi refused to convene the council, attempting to avoid a constitutional coup d'état. Opposition and pro-Tatmadaw parties called for convening the council and declaring a local state of emergency and harsh response to the ARSA. Following reports of continued ARSA killings in early August, Rakhine Buddhist politicians requested that the Tatmadaw provide increased protection (Myint-U 2020, 236-237). Within days, the Tatmadaw deployed the elite 33rd and 99th Light Infantry Divisions, notorious for their aggressiveness and abuses towards ethnic minorities (Holt 2019, 32; Lee 2021, 164).

[324] This was "the first peaceful transfer of power to an elected government since 1960" (Myint-U 2020, 224).

On 24 August, Kofi Annan submitted his report warning that Myanmar needed to take adequate measures to prevent the return of violence. Aung San Suu Kyi promised to fully implement the report's recommendations; in northern Rakhine, a few hours later, just after midnight on 25 August, the ARSA launched simultaneous assaults on thirty police posts as well as an army base across three townships. The assaults included hundreds of lightly armed Rohingya (Myint-U 2020, 237).[325]

The ARSA's small-scale attacks against security forces triggered brutal state repression in 2017 (Staniland 2021, 227). Paranoia against the Rohingya and rhetoric linked them to foreign terrorist groups. Further fueling anti-Muslim sentiment, in July, Al-Qa'ida's Bangladesh offshoot Ansar al-Islam urged Muslim youths of Bangladesh to join the fight. The Tatmadaw's brutal response probably included collective punishment through large-scale massacres and the destruction of villages in areas linked to the ARSA (Myint-U 2020, 235-238).

Fighting continued through the first days of September, and by the middle of the month, nearly 400,000 refugees crossed the border into Bangladesh.[326] On 19 September, Aung San Suu Kyi finally spoke, questioned the Western narrative, denied the presence of ongoing military operations, and stated that most of the Muslim population of Rakhine had not fled, but those who did were welcome to return. Her staunchest Western allies and the international community were disappointed and unsatisfied by Aung San Suu Kyi's inactions toward the violence (Myint-U 2020, 238-241).

Most Burmese believed, and the Tatmadaw propagated, that the ARSA was an existential threat and committed atrocities against the non-Muslim communities in Rakhine (Myint-U 2020, 241).[327] Many Burmese denied allegations of the Tatmadaw's abuses and saw the West as biased and siding with the ARSA (Myint-U 2020, 241-242). By the end of 2017, over 700,000 Rohingya had arrived in Bangladesh (Lee 2021, 1). The UN reported that the

[325] By the end of the month, the Rohingya communities "were locked down and food and medical supplies were blocked – many feared a repeat of the one-sided violence of 2012, or potentially a massacre by the recently arrived Tatmadaw troops" (Lee 2021, 164).
[326] "It was the biggest single flight of refugees in modern times" (Myint-U 2020, 240).
[327] In late 2017, "the army commander-in-chief, General Min Aung Hlaing, delivered a series of uncompromising speeches, justifying the army's actions with promising to do his duty and finish the 'unfinished business of 1942'—meaning the twin threats of 'Bengali' immigration and Muslim insurrection" (Myint-U 2020, 241).

violence perpetrated on the Rohingya by the Tatmadaw was systematic and potentially a genocide (Holt 2019, 36). In early 2022, the United States accused Myanmar of committing genocide against the Rohingya (Jakes 2022).

Regime Response to the Rohingya

Why did the ruling regime repress the Rohingya, who were mainly nonviolent and wholly excluded from Myanmar's political life? Why did mass repression occur under Nobel Peace Prize winner and democratically elected Aung San Suu Kyi? This section explains the varying regime responses to the Rohingya by examining Myanmar's nation-building project, the threat perception of the Rohingya, as well as the role external actors played.

The regime's response to the Rohingya has included denied citizenship, discriminatory government policies, complete political exclusion, and gross human rights violations (Lee 2021, 160-161; Holt 2019, 9). I argue that the Rohingya posed a negligible military threat to the regime. After complete exclusion from Myanmar's political processes, it was unsurprising that the ARSA was created and conducted political violence in 2016 and 2017 against the state. The brutal military response to the Rohingya in 2017 was likely due to a perceived ideological threat. The Tatmadaw and Aung San Suu Kyi's ruling regimes likely feared a loss of their legitimacy, threatening their political survival if they did not remove the perceived Muslim threat to the Burman-Buddhist-dominated country.

Following half a century of recurring counterinsurgency and repression against perceived threats to Myanmar's regime, the Tatmadaw still failed to control the state's periphery (Myint-U 2020, 111). As Staniland notes, the military power of ARSA was relatively marginal, especially compared to other ethnonationalist groups, and a material or military capabilities threat perception is unlikely to explain the military's brutal reprisal (Staniland 2021, 228).[328] Staniland argues that Myanmar's counterproductive repressive policies are confounding unless ideology is considered (Staniland 2021, 212).

[328] "The pattern of violence has been efficiently carried out as a strategic policy by a heavily armed state against a thoroughly outmanned and almost defenseless minority population" (Holt 2019, 2-3).

The Panglong Peace Agreement showed initial promise, but subsequent rulers sought to consolidate power around the hegemonic group.[329] The Buddhist-Burman regime sought to assimilate or exclude those, such as the Rohingya, who did not fit their vision of Myanmar (Lee 2021, 211).[330] Myanmar's regimes responded differently to the Rohingya over time than the state's many other ethnonationalist groups. Earlier governments acknowledged the Rohingya's rightful place in Myanmar (Lee 2021, 185). Beginning in the 1960s, Myanmar regimes started assimilationist and exclusionary policies against the Rohingya (Lee 2021, 211-212; Staniland 2021, 228). The Rohingya differed from the other ethnic groups by mostly rejecting violence and did not seek to take territory (Lee 2021, 106, 177). Following the 2012 violence, some Rohingya likely became sympathetic to political violence and worked with the ARSA as they lacked peaceful alternatives because of the Rohingya's complete political exclusion and the continued abuse by the regime (Lee 2021, 106-107). An attack by the ARSA triggered the 2017 violence and resulting refugee crisis stemming from the military's crackdown (Ware and Laoutides 2018, 19).

The Tatmadaw employed 'brutal tactics' against other minorities, but this differed in scale compared to the military's response to the Rohingya (Lee 2021, 212).[331] The Rohingya were seen differently than Myanmar's other groups[332] and the Tatmadaw played a crucial role in promoting state-sponsored anti-Rohingya material (Lee 2021, 193). Travel restrictions and deportations removed interactions between the Rohingya and others, further portraying the Rohingya as outsiders (Lee 2021, 212). The regime's mass repression was widely supported

[329] There was no vision of Myanmar as a genuinely multiracial, multicultural place … and no history, other than nationalist mythology, had been taught in schools or universities for generations" (Myint-U 2020, 187-188). For Myanmar, like other post-colonial weak states, "ethnicity became the major cleavage between, and an instrument of exclusion of, different groups" (Wade 2019, 85). The new state of Myanmar was "captured by an ethnocratic military elite comprised of the ethnic [Burman] majority, who are predominantly Buddhist" (Brenner 2019, 2). The regime's perception towards ethnonationalist groups was "conceptions by key Tatmadaw and government figures that the Myanmar state ought to be [Burman] dominated and to privilege the Buddhist religion" (Lee 2021, 211). Ware and Laoutides note that the conflict is "primarily about the extent of inclusion in or exclusion from the Myanmar polity" (Ware and Laoutides 2018, 22).

[330] "The underlying structure of [Burman]-Buddhist nationalism has helped to drive a highly conflictual and repressive set of orders. This underlying threat perception led to counterproductive but sustained military crackdowns and a striking lack of meaningful political accommodation" (Staniland 2021, 212).

[331] "In Myanmar, political violence has been a commonly adopted strategy of ethnic minorities – many among Myanmar's dozens of ethnic armed groups are acknowledged as legitimate participants in the country's political life" (Lee 2021, 152-153).

[332] "The Rohingya occupy a particular place in the nationalist imaginary of the military and many civilians-they are seen by many as outsiders, not legitimately part of any conception of nation of Myanmar. This is one reason that they are consistently referred to as 'Bengali,' framing them as from Bengal rather than 'authentically' from Rakhine state. This links them to the Indian influx under British colonialism that was so intensely resented by Bamar nationalists of the 1920s through the 1940s, and which contributed to the Ne Win regime's targeting of the remaining Indian community after taking power in 1962" (Staniland 2021, 227).

domestically (Staniland 2021, 228). Aung San Suu Kyi, a Burman nationalist, and her NLD administration remained silent about the atrocities committed by the Tatmadaw and actively defended the military's response (Staniland 2021, 228; Brenner 2019, 112).[333] While the NLD did not carry out physical violence in Rakhine State, neither was it a neutral mediator (Ware and Laoutides 2018, 21).

The Rohingya who advocated for political violence were likely to be branded terrorists rather than legitimate political actors, like other ethnic minority militants (Lee 2021, 152-153). The ARSA fought to defend the Rohingya and denied any transnational extremist connections or motivations (Lee 2021, 168). The ARSA's emergence further alarmed the Burman-Buddhist population, that Islamic extremism had arrived, and Muslims sought to takeover (Lee 2021, 106). The Tatmadaw harsh response to the Rohingya 'Muslim threat' was likely influenced by the perceived threat it posed to Myanmar's Burman-Buddhist disposition. The Buddhist-Burman dominated state targeted other non-Buddhists, including Christian groups. However, Christians were not treated as an existential threat to the state's Buddhist identity and they did not face the same level of repression as the Rohingya. Other ethnic communities also were forcefully deported by the military. The Karen experienced displacement to Thailand, and the Kachin to China. However, this was not as violent or on as large of a scale as the military's response to the Rohingya (Lee 2021, 212).

Jack Snyder argues that countries in the early stages of democratization are increasingly at risk of nationalist exclusionary policies (Snyder 2000).[334] Any democratic opening which could then empower the Rohingya to assert their claims to the state further threatened the nationalist ideology of the Burman elite (Wade 2019, 185). Brenner notes that Myanmar's

[333] "Prior to the 2015 election, her NLD party had already demonstrated an unwillingness to risk alienating nationalists – the NLD bowed to nationalist pressure and did not field a single Muslim among its candidates nationwide" (Lee 2021, 194). Once in office, "Aung San Suu Kyi's administration had similarly avoided confrontation with nationalists by choosing not to revoke the 'race and religion' laws (which discriminate on the basis of religion and sex), and had again, in late 2016, avoided being on the wrong side of nationalist opinion (risking a potential confrontation with the Tatmadaw) by endorsing the military's approach in northern Rakhine State" (Lee 2021, 194).

[334] The "adaptability of elite interests and the strength of the country's political institutions during early democratization, determine the intensity of the democratizing country's nationalism and the form that nationalist exclusions are likely to take" (Snyder 2000, 38). One of these forms of nationalism, ethnic nationalism, bases "collective appeals on common culture, language, religion, shared historical experience, and/or the myth of shared kinship, and they use these criteria to include or exclude members from the national group" (Snyder 2000, 70).

weak political institutions are an essential reason for continued political violence.[335] Since Myanmar embraced political reforms in 2011, the ethnic minorities have received harsher treatment by the military.[336] Myanmar's ethnic minorities lost trust in the country's political transition, hardening the resolve of ethnic armed groups to continue to take up arms against the state (Brenner 2019, 112).

External threat perceptions played a minor role in influencing the regime's repressive response to the Rohingya. Myanmar does not face an actual or perceived external military threat, although Myanmar's neighbors have supported various groups along its borders.[337] The international community has become another actor in the Myanmar-Rohingya conflict as the regime perceives foreign discussion of the situation as interference in a domestic issue and a sovereignty violation. Moreover, international condemnations of the Tatmadaw and verbal support for the Rohingya further casts the group as foreign supported and unwelcome in Myanmar's polity (Ware and Laoutides 2018, 21; Lee 2021, 160).[338]

The Buddhist-Burman dominated state continues its quest for self-preservation to the detriment of ethnic and religious minorities and the overall country (Holt 2019, 272). Following the 8 November 2020 general election, in which Aung San Suu Kyi's NLD party won in a landslide, the Tatmadaw conducted a coup on 1 February 2021. After removing Aung San Suu Kyi, the Tatmadaw charged and sentenced her to six years in jail (BBC News 2022). The coup brought protests, which a year later spread across the country (Paddock, 2022).

Mali

This section explores regime response variation in Mali, a landlocked country in West Africa, which is near twice the size of Afghanistan, towards the ethnic Tuareg. The previous cases

[335] Myanmar's government "exerts limited control over the country's armed forces. Because Tatmadaw generals have long profited from perpetuating conflict it is doubtful they would simply give up their sources of power and wealth. The political reform process did not significantly alter the violent, ethnocratic character of Myanmar's state institutions and elites" (Brenner 2019, 112).
[336] "This is reflected in the ongoing discrimination against and marginalization of ethnic minorities across the country, the continuation of brutal counterinsurgency campaigns that indiscriminately target civilians in Kachin, Karen and Shan States, and the large-scale ethnic cleansing campaign in Rakhine State" (Brenner 2019, 112).
[337] China supported communists, and Thailand supported several ethnic rebel groups, "but the regime's long wars with these armed groups predated the high point of external support they received" (Staniland 2021, 222).
[338] "The more that outside activists, governments, and media insisted on using the term 'Rohingya,' the more many non-Muslims in Myanmar suspect an international conspiracy" (Myint-U 2020, 207), as they consider the name fabricated lest it provided Muslim recognition (Wade 2019, 181).

involved states in South and Southeast Asia that were British colonies, while Mali was a French colony until becoming independent in 1960. The Tuareg primarily reside in Mali's northern regions. Located in the Sahara Desert, this area constitutes about 66 percent of Mali's physical territory but only holds 9 percent of Mali's total population. Mali's largest ethnolinguistic grouping is Mande speakers, which includes the Bambara and Malinke groups. Together, they include about half the population, with the Tuaregs comprising around 7.5 percent of the Malian population (Straus 2015, 173). While there are many ethnic minority groups in Mali, only the ethnic Tuareg have rebelled against the capital, Bamako. The Tuaregs have staged successive rebellions since independence, the major ones in the early 1960s, 1990, 2006, and 2012 (Kone 2017, 54).

France's colonial policy was known especially for its use of co-optation in its assimilationist approach resulting in local ethnic groups perceiving the Tuareg as favorites of the French (Dunn 2019, 371; Lecocq and Klute 2019, 25). Following the decolonization of French West Africa, the Tuareg were spread across multiple newly created states (Lecocq and Klute 2019, 25). In independent Mali, government-Tuareg relations quickly deteriorated. Mali's regime, represented mainly by the politically dominant Bambara from southern Mali, discriminated against the Tuareg, kept them out of the government, and failed to develop the Tuareg areas in northern Mali (Lecocq and Klute 2019, 27-28; Gaasholt 2015, 199).

Tuareg elites in Mali and Niger sought their independence from France in 1958 by contacting President Charles de Gaulle. When independence failed to materialize, the Tuareg of Mali launched a rebellion in 1961 known as the Alfellaga (Englebert 2009, 183). The revolt of a small group of ill-equipped Tuareg in northern Mali led to the army's revenge against the populace. Aided by the rebels, large parts of the population fled to Algeria, where most stayed after the end of the conflict. In October 1963, Tuareg political leaders were arrested in neighboring states while trying to build international support and were extradited to Mali (Lecocq and Klute 2019, 28-29). Malian authorities crushed the rebellion by August 1964, and those left fled to neighboring countries.

At the same time, the Tuareg-populated areas in northern Mali were placed under military control. The Malian regime tried to impose a nationalist culture, partly denying the Tuareg the use of their Tamasheq language. These efforts ended with the overthrow of President Modibo Keita in 1968 by General Moussa Traoré, who 'civilianized' his military junta into a

one-party regime in 1979 (Jusu-Sheriff 2004, 276). However, Traoré's new regime continued to politically exclude the Tuareg (Gaasholt 2015, 199; Straus 2015, 177-178). The Tuareg were further aggrieved over central government disregard for the Tuareg, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, during droughts and food shortages (Gaasholt 2015, 199-200).

The drought left many of the Tuareg pastoralists destitute, forcing them out of Mali (Gaasholt 2015, 200). In Libya, some young male Tuaregs enlisted in Colonel Muammar Qaddafi's foreign legion and became the core of an armed revolt against the Malian state (Jusu-Sheriff 2004, 276-277). While exiled, they organized and promoted Tuareg autonomy and were joined by the Nigerien Tuareg, who had also suffered oppressive rule and neglect from their central authorities (Gaasholt 2015, 199).

1990s Tuareg Rebellion

In the 1980s, Tuareg rebels began planning for an uprising in Mali. In early 1990, Malian security forces discovered the rebels, arrested some of its members, and confiscated their weapons. At the end of June 1990, a group of lightly armed rebels attacked a town in northern Mali, freed those arrested, and captured weaponry from the Malian Armed Forces' barracks. The military responded by deploying most of its forces, resulting in noncombatant deaths which galvanized Tuareg civilians to side with the rebels (Lecocq and Klute 2019, 31-32).

The Malian regime under Moussa Traoré encountered a democratic opposition movement in Bamako that hardened as the conflict continued (Lecocq and Klute 2019, 32). Civil society organizations, professional associations, the fledgling independent press, and newly formed opposition parties intensified their protests, demanding an end to the Traoré regime with mass antigovernment demonstrations held in December 1990. Traoré and his regime initially responded with repression to the Tuareg crisis and the widespread protests (Jusu-Sheriff 2004, 276).

To address the northern crisis, Traoré signed a ceasefire with the Tuareg rebels in January 1991 with the help of Algeria. In the Tamanrasset Accord, the signatories agreed to a 'special status,' which provided autonomy for the Tuareg and economic concessions for the North (Lecocq and Klute 2019, 32). However, the ceasefire was especially criticized in the South,

leading to violent cycles with militant criminality and government forces assaults on Tuareg noncombatants (Straus 2015, 180).

In Bamako, protests and violence erupted. The army, led by Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré and with the support of civic groups, staged a coup against Traoré on 26 March 1991 (Lecocq and Klute 2019, 32; Jusu-Sheriff 2004, 276). The new regime turned towards a more inclusive approach but continued to face public pressure to return Mali back to civilian rule. The transitional government was further pushed to show more commitment to resolving the northern conflict. Touré convened a national conference between 29 July and 12 August 1991, which paved the way for creating a new constitution and holding national elections in April 1992. The transition government gave way to a democratically elected government led by President Alpha Oumar Konaré. Konaré worked with Mali's civil society groups and the Tuareg northern armed groups (Jusu-Sheriff 2004, 276-277). He penned a new peace accord with the Tuareg rebels, the National Pact of Reconciliation, which sought to address some Tuareg grievances. Afterward, former rebels left groups party to the National Pact and either joined separate groups or created new movements (Lecocq and Klute 2019, 33).

Despite the Malian government and most rebel Tuareg's leadership commitment to peace, the conditions on the ground did not improve materially (Straus 2015, 181). Continued infighting amongst the Tuareg rebels reflected social and tribal differences and resulted in further movement fractures. Meanwhile, criminality spiraled, Tuareg noncombatants were killed based off their ethnicity, and ethnic militias committed atrocities against Tuaregs and others (Lecocq and Klute 2019, 33-34; Straus 2015, 169).

Elites and street protestors regularly contested Konaré's authority. The currency was devalued by 50 percent, and the president appointed his third prime minister in less than two years. However, Konaré had a track record of emphasizing dialogue (Straus 2015, 169-171).[339] The prime minister toured northern Mali to encourage peace. The state initiated a series of regional and local community meetings in which locals aired differences, particularly between pastoralists and farmers. The government reshuffled the armed forces, removed units with poor discipline, and appointed a new defense minister who requested

[339] The political leadership "consistently and unequivocally voiced support for a peaceful solution. They also consistently disavowed attacks against civilians and the use of militias" (Straus 2015, 184).

media not publish articles that could incite ethnic hatred.[340] This led to a cessation of fighting in 1995 (Straus 2015, 184). Tired from conflict, the interested parties met resulting in the Bourem Pact, culminating in a ceremony on 26 March 1996 with peace lasting nearly ten years (Lecocq and Klute 2019, 34).

The Malian state remains weak and faces an uncertain future with a military junta lacking legitimacy and its continued inability to extend its writ across the country due to the unresolved conflict with ethnonationalist Tuaregs and the expansion of Islamic extremist groups. Following another outbreak of violence in 2012, resulting in a military coup, intervention by the French military, and a United Nations peacekeeping mission in northern Mali, in August 2020, a group of colonels removed Mali's President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita in a coup. In May 2021, the junta conducted another coup removing the transitional president and prime minister and installing the coup leader Colonel Assimi Goita as president. Lacking political legitimacy and attempting to remain in power amidst deteriorating security and socioeconomic woes, the junta blamed France, turned away from Western-backed security assistance, and turned to the Wagner Group, a Moscow-backed mercenary group (Gbadamosi 2022). According to the UN, the year 2021 saw more extremist attacks in Mali than any year prior, and the UN Mission in Mali suffered its most casualties since 2013 (UN News 2022; BBC News 2021).

Regime Response to the Tuareg

This case study examined the Malian regime's response to the Tuaregs in the early 1990s. After gaining independence, African leaders embarked on a course to ensure their political survival, as internal threats posed a more significant threat than foreign invasion (Henderson 2017, 122-123; Jackson 1990, 168). Mali is a geographically large, weak state dominated by ethnic groups in the South that exercised minimal control in its peripheral regions, specifically in the North (Straus 2015, 57).[341]

[340] "The Army also tried to change internal attitudes toward Tuaregs by initiating community meetings and delivering aid. Those who had family ties to Tuaregs and Arabs were also promoted into positions of leadership" (Straus 2015, 184).

[341] Straus provides an illuminating discussion on this case, arguing that Mali's political and military crisis could have turned out much differently than it did because of influential leaders, such as Konaré, that impacted Mali's response to the Tuareg (Straus 2015, 65, 177). During this period, there was a high risk of heavy-handed repression because of "extreme political instability in the form of a new regime, street protests, a coup, and significant turnover within the first administration" (Straus 2015, 184). Repression appeared likely for several reasons. For one, there formed a "racist, nativist language of 'national belonging' among some armed actors" (Straus 2015, 185). The post-colonial Malian state held "a nationalist vision built on the image of a primary

What explains the regime variation in the 1990s? The Tuareg were divided and had no goals for complete independence, but rather greater autonomy (Straus 2015, 171-172; Lecocq and Klute 2019, 11-12).[342] External factors contributed to increasing Tuareg military capabilities and shifting their focus to grievances against the Malian government.[343] However, the regime in southern Mali faced little military threat from the rebel Tuareg in the North (Straus 2015, 172). The regime's repressive response was mostly reactive to the Tuaregs and was not predicated on ideology. The dictator Traoré likely saw the Tuareg rebellion a threat to his legitimacy. He then sought relief to mounting domestic pressure against his rule by ending Tuareg repression, however, it came too late, and he was removed in a coup.

The military regime and successor democratically elected government led by Konaré in 1992 shifted to an accommodationist policy which followed an inclusive agenda and did not prioritize regime political survival (Straus 2015, 171).[344] While significant violence against civilians was low compared to other cases of heavy regime repression in Africa, it was the regime's policy that moved away from repression that stabilized the situation (Straus 2015, 203). This case is markedly different from the previously analyzed cases where the regimes saw ethnonationalism threatening the regime's political survival.

Regime Type

What, if any, impact did regime type have on regime response variation to ethnonationalists? As noted in chapter one, the weak states studied here are mostly semi-democracies (also

political community that does not explicitly include and arguably excludes [the Tuareg]" (Straus 2015, 177). The Tuareg were "a racialized and marginalized minority relegated to second-class status" (Straus 2005, 177). Further, during past rebellions, the regime response included "government forces and militias kill[ing] with impunity civilians based on their ethnic identity, collectively categorizing civilians and rebels alike" (Straus 2015, 185). "The Malian state was weak, possessing limited infrastructural and military capacity, but with enough weapons and political support local actors would have seemed willing to carry out mass violence against the 'white' populations associated with the rebellion" (Straus 2015, 203). However, the Malian regime "emphasized dialogue, democracy, national unity, and a multiethnic inclusive vision of the nation. Touré's vision was one of mutual understanding, integration, and negotiation, rather than one of exclusion" (Straus 2015, 190).

[342] Furthermore, it was not until the 2012 independence movement that the Tuareg first "formally expressed pursuit of independence" (Lecocq and Klute 2019, 24).

[343] In Libya, beginning in the 1960s, Qaddafi included Tuaregs in his forces, and Tuaregs, in turn, were deployed to multiple war front "where they gained military experience. However, in Libya, the contraction of oil prices in the 1980s as well as Libya's battlefield losses in Chad led to a decommissioning of Tuaregs from the armed forces. Compounded with economic difficulties led the Tuaregs to leave Libya and to assert demands within Mali" (Straus 2015, 178).

[344] Straus argues that "Mali's political leadership in the 1990s explicitly fashioned and championed an ideological vision around the values of democracy, dialogue, and a multiethnic national community" (Straus 2015, 171).

known as anocracies).[345] This section briefly compares the different regime types in the case studies. It shows that repressive policies occurred across various regime types. Thus, conveying regime type had a minimal impact on weak state response variation.

In Myanmar, a civilian government supported by the military came to power after decades-long rule by the Tatmadaw military regime in 2010 (BBC News 2015). However, the Tatmadaw had already cemented its role in government with the 2008 constitution. Communal violence with the Muslim Rohingya exacerbated long-simmering tensions with the Burman-Buddhist dominated state in 2012. Contrary to expectations after the NLD's 2015 national elections victory, the ethnic conflict did not end but escalated with the military conducting mass repression against the Rohingya in 2017. The military maintained significant control over Myanmar's government despite NLD rule; the NLD simultaneously condoned the brutal military response to the Rohingya, which was likely due to the perceived ideological threat the Rohingya posed to Burman-Buddhist domination. The Tatmadaw removed the NLD-led government in a military coup in 2021, ending Myanmar's experiment with a semi-democracy.

The Malian regime response has varied through military dictatorships and interim periods of democracy. In Mali, an increasingly unpopular repressive military regime switched to an accommodative response toward the Tuareg in the early 1990s. However, it was not enough to appease the regime's opponents, who toppled it in a military coup shortly after that. The new military regime oversaw a transition to a democratically elected government. This democratic transition continued with accommodative policies for the Tuareg, initiating a ten-year period of peace that lasted through another democratic transition. A Tuareg insurgency resumed against Bamako from 2006 to 2009, and the further deterioration in security following the Tuareg insurgency in 2012 brought about a military coup.

Pakistan, the focus of most of this study, has mostly oscillated between military dictatorships and quasi-civilian regimes since its existence in 1947. Yahya Khan's military regime initiated brutal repression against the Bengalis. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's regime thus far is the lone civilian-led Pakistani regime to maintain primacy over the military. However, his time in

[345] These "are regimes that fall between democracies and autocracies and show characteristics of both types" (Carey 2010, 174).

office was cut short by a military coup. Bhutto's repression of the Baloch only ended after he was removed from office and his usurper Zia-ul-Haq took a more assimilationist approach to the Baloch. Military dictator Pervez Musharraf brought back repressive policies to the Baloch in the early 2000s following a relatively peaceful decade under several semi-democratic regimes. After Musharraf stepped down in 2008, follow-on democratically elected governments continued repressive policies against the Baloch, which continues through this writing. Despite the fall of Musharraf's military dictatorship, the Pakistan military continues to dominate foreign policy and national security decision-making. Pakistan's semi-democratic regimes persist as the state fails to consolidate democracy with the outsized military role.

Conclusion

This chapter examined the variation in regime response following regime changes in Myanmar and Mali. In Myanmar, the Burman-Buddhist dominated military completely politically excluded the Muslim Rohingya in Rakhine State as they sought to maintain domestic support despite lacking political legitimacy. A small group of Rohingya insurgents lashed out against the state, and the regime responded with a brutal military response. Despite the nominal democratic transition to long-time Tatmadaw opposition figure Aung San Suu Kyi, she maintained the military's heavy-handed response against the Rohingya regardless of international pressure to end the repression. I argue that the Rohingya were perceived as a high threat to the majority Burman-Buddhists and their exclusionary vision of Myanmar. Following years of growing grievances against the Malian government, including political exclusion, in the early 1990s, many Tuaregs returned to Mali. They rebelled after serving under Qaddafi's regime in Libya. A Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali was responded to militarily but did not stop the insurgents and further enflamed ethnic tensions. The repressive Traoré regime initiated an accommodative posture towards the Tuaregs to stave off mounting domestic political pressure. However, it came too late, and he was removed in a military coup by Touré. The successive regimes perceived the Tuaregs as a low threat. Traoré's transitional government further sought accommodation with the Tuaregs. He voluntarily stepped down, bringing about a democratically elected government by Konaré. Konaré would go on to serve two presidential terms and, to date, is the only Malian president to leave the office at the end of his term. The states discussed here remain weak, with the state dominated by a hegemonic ethnic group, continued center-versus-peripheral issues with variation in regime response to ethnonationalist groups, including political exclusion and, at times, repression. The next

chapter concludes the study with an overview of the argument, case study findings, study limitations, and areas for further research.

Chapter Six
Conclusion

Regime responses to ethnonationalist political challengers are dynamic, vary across a spectrum, and vary over time. Theories that rely on stable or slow-changing factors cannot explain this variation (Saunders 2011, 3). An unpacked causal mechanism is lacking for how regimes decide to respond to ethnonationalists. This paper sought to explain variation in regime response to ethnonationalists by examining the decision-making processes of several regimes ahead of bouts of significant repression. I argued that weak states engender internal wars because these states are divided into ethnic factions. Within these factions, one group tends to dominate the state as the ruling regime, whose interest is to remain in power.[346] The weak state's regime policies to ethnonationalist challengers are based on the perceived threat that the group poses to the regime's political survival.

I posited a theory of regime defense which is ideational, borne out of regime decision-making, and when examined, is the product of how the regime perceives groups as a threat (Parsons 2010; Beach and Pedersen 2019).[347] Building from the international relations omnibalancing theory premise, I contend that internal threat perceptions are more important than perceived external threats to regimes. Within these case studies, I found that external factors such as perceived threats from neighbors had little-to-no impact on regime decision-making towards ethnonationalists. While external threats can be influential, the threat within one's own house (state) is the most dangerous and, thus, of paramount importance. Internal threats to regime security are more immediate and dangerous to regime political survival than external threats (Clary 2022, 33-34).

Regime strategy and response are contingent upon the perceived threat posed to the ruling elite. Threat perception is based on perceived intentions, capabilities, and past behavior toward the regime. Threat perception, in turn, influences the regime's policy output to the ethnonationalist group. This study asserted that perceived intentions, specifically

[346] "The origins of a state … do not predispose to, or fully account for, failure. [But it is] human agency [that] drives and accounts for failure" (Rotberg 2010, 43).
[347] I agree that historically rooted "ideational factors play a central role in how governments manage violence" (Staniland 2021, 11). As Staniland notes, regime ideologies "…play a central role in how they understand politics and respond to threats. These are deeply contextual and historically contingent, but can still be systematically compared along key dimensions…," to include ethnicity (Staniland 2021, 278).

ethnonationalist, are essential considerations in regime threat perception and its corresponding political responses. I argue that for weak states, ethnonationalism is considered a high threat level for perceived intentions. Ethnonationalism threatens regime legitimacy in weak states, and legitimacy is essential in holding political power (Jost and Major 2001; Brenner 2019, 19). Thus, regime output to perceived threatening ethnonationalist intention is assimilationist policies. However, threatening intentions alone do not pose a high threat to the regime overall.

Perceived capabilities refer to the group's political power (such as control of state institutions) and military power (the ability to inflict physical harm against the regime). Military capabilities alone are unlikely to threaten the state if a group's intentions are supportive or complement the regime (Staniland 2021; Staniland et al. 2018). Neither intentions nor capabilities alone are enough to explain regime response variation (Staniland et al. 2018; Straus 2015). I find that ethnonationalist intentions and perceived high capabilities lead to a significant threat perception level, likely resulting in political exclusion. Both intentions and capabilities are essential, in aggregate.

In regime defense, a weak state's regime policies towards minority groups are based on a group's signaling to the regime and the perception of whether the group threatens the regime's political survival. These groups contribute to differing perceptions based on their behavior in an action/reaction process. Threat perception is based on perceived intentions, capabilities, and past behavior toward the regime. Threat perception influences the regime's policy output to the ethnonationalist group.

The perception of a significant internal threat should result in a higher level of state response. The greater the threat perception, the greater the regime response and the increasing likelihood of internal war; thus, a lower threat perception means an expected lighter regime response. This study expected and found that a group perceived as a more significant perceived threat to a regime is more likely to receive a more intense regime response. Groups such as ethnonationalists' intentions and capabilities change, as well as the regime's perception of the threat that the groups may pose to the regime's political power. The regime aims to mitigate perceived threats from groups that may threaten its rule. Perceptions change to include whether one is a threat and to what extent that threat is. Regime threat perception can also vary across the same ethnic group. In these cases, I found that a repressive regime

response often only ended after a regime change, indicating that the perception of a threat to the ruling regime drove the response.

After a group is politically excluded due to ethnonationalist intentions, it does not mean the group is now considered less of a threat. On the contrary, I find evidence that regime political exclusion of ethnonationalist groups is often later followed by repression due to a persistent threat posed by the ousted ethnonationalist group, which has further mobilized against the regime, increasing the ethnonationalists perceived capabilities. If political exclusion does not remove the perceived threat or lower its threat level from high, regime repression of ethnonationalists likely follows. This is likely part of the puzzle of repressive persistence (Davenport and Loyle 2012) because ethnonationalist groups who are politically excluded are more likely to take up arms against the state as they lack political recourse.

The regime defense theory performed with mixed results in the cases. I focused on several Pakistan and ethnonationalist conflicts, explaining the varying temporal regime responses to ethnonationalists. I examined the empirical record closely, unpacking the causal process of regime decision-making, and demonstrated that perceived internal threats to political survival are essential in explaining regime responses to ethnonationalists. In sum, the Bengali case study fit the regime defense theory the closest with perceived high ideological and material threats to the regime's rule. The Myanmar case performed well as the Rohingya posed an ideological threat, and armed Rohingya may have fed the belief of a threat of high capabilities. The other cases were mixed with ethnonationalism as well as capabilities probably having little impact on the regime's decision to repress. The states discussed here remain weak, with the state dominated by a hegemonic ethnic group, and continued center-versus-peripheral issues.

In the first case, structural conditions emanating from the onset of Pakistan's creation contributed to its emergence and continued status as a weak state. Built on the Two-Nation theory, a unifying concept as a separate homeland for the Muslims in South Asia, this raison d'etre faltered when East Pakistan gained independence in 1971. Pakistan's regimes have been primarily responsible for this continued weakness. Yahya Khan's response to the Bengalis was predicated on Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and the Awami League's threatening intentions (ethnonationalist) and their high capabilities once they won the general elections and were set to takeover Pakistan's government. Yahya Khan politically excluded the

Bengalis by indefinitely postponing the opening of the new Awami League-led National Assembly. Yahya Khan decided to repress the Bengalis after they had taken de facto control of East Pakistan and Yahya Khan saw the ongoing negotiations as futile. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and the Awami League were perceived as a high threat to the regime and thus dealt with accordingly.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto treated the Baloch-led National Awami Party (NAP) provincial government as a threat to his power consolidation in the second case. Bhutto sought to consolidate his power and, in the process, ostracized various power bases in Pakistan, to include members of his own party, the Pakistan People's Party. After the NAP was politically excluded, their leader's respective tribespeople took up arms against the state. Ideology had little role in this case as Bhutto was mostly concerned about consolidating power.

In the third case study, Pervez Musharraf politically excluded Baloch groups and many political opponents in 2002 with sham elections. Musharraf's response to the Baloch was likely predicated on his attempts at power consolidation and to shore up legitimacy following his 1999 military coup. Moreover, the bout of repression against the Bugti and Marri tribes probably had more to do with resource extraction in their resource rich tribal areas. While Musharraf had experience with the Baloch in earlier conflicts and seemed to have a grudge against at least Akbar Bugti, ethnonationalism likely factored little in the decision to repress. Additionally, the Baloch had not gained in capabilities and did not initiate conflict with the government, but rather responded to provocations.

In the shorter cases, the Burman-Buddhist dominated military completely politically excluded the Muslim ethnic minority Rohingya because they sought to maintain domestic support despite lacking political legitimacy. A small group of Rohingya insurgents lashed out against the state following complete political exclusion and the regime responded with a brutal military response. The Rohingya were used as a scapegoat, as paranoia against the Rohingya was coupled with rhetoric linking them to foreign Islamist terrorist groups. The nominal democratic transition to long-time opposition figure to the military, Aung San Suu Kyi, maintained the military's heavy-handed repression against the Rohingya despite international pressure to end it. Aung San Suu Kyi likely sought to avoid the wrath of Burman nationalists and the powerful military. The regime likely perceived the Rohingya as a high threat to the majority Burman-Buddhists and their exclusionary vision of Myanmar.

The Mali case fit the regime defense theory the least out of the case studies. The Tuareg had been politically excluded and armed Tuareg groups took up arms against the state after returning from supporting Qaddafi in Libya. The Tuareg had gained in military capability, but they initiated the conflict with the state. The regime, led by dictator Moussa Traoré, ended repression against the Tuareg to shore up his flailing domestic support, however, this failed, and he was removed in a military coup. Shortly thereafter, the democratically elected regime of Alpha Oumar Konaré showed inclusivity towards the Tuareg, paving the way for a 10-year peace deal. The regime's repressive response toward the Tuareg was likely based on a threat to its legitimacy, and not a threat to the regime itself. In sum, the Bengali case study fit the regime defense theory the closest with perceived high ideological and material threats to the regime's rule.

Limitations

As discussed earlier, analyzing regime decision-making can be problematic. This is even more so when analyzing decision-making in autocratic or weak states where the regime's primary objective is political survival. These regimes are unlikely to be transparent and share public insight into their decision-making processes, especially insight that they may view as politically damaging. The declassification of government documents, improved security, and the opening of conflict zones to international journalists and scholars, as well as memoirs from those directly involved in decision-making, will significantly contribute to future studies on regime decision-making.

This research conducted an in-depth analysis of several case studies. While time-consuming, understanding the decision-making on the variation of regime response by type and over time would benefit from additional in-depth case studies covering the entirety of a state and its regimes' perceptions and responses to various ethnonationalist movements.

Implications

This argument gives agency to the regime as well as the ethnonationalist group. Understanding the historical and political context is vital to understanding why and how political violence occurs (Brenner 2019, 13). Understanding another's threat perceptions can

aid in one's decision-making, potentially providing a decision advantage in policymaking.[348] Such as how regime decision-makers in weak states view potential threats to their political survival. This research indicates that regime response to potential challengers is primarily influenced by internal threat perception and thus regime response will likely change when perceptions change. This implies that regardless of potential exogenous factors, such as external pressure on regimes, the regime's perceptions are unlikely to change for ethnonationalists unless internal threat perceptions change. While structural conditions set the stage for threat perceptions, primarily domestic conditions drive regime response variation to ethnonationalists. In short, who leads matters (Hudson and Day 2020, 216), who is considered a threat, and what makes up the regime's threat perception. Understanding the influences and perceptions of regimes and their constraints helps to inform how decisions are made. Thus, the threat perceptions in decision-making highlighted here could indicate ensuing political violence. Furthermore, I found that political exclusion is often an indicator of future state repression which may provide warning of a future conflict. Along with scholars, policymakers, activists, and students who are interested in the study of political violence, a potential normative dimension of these findings is that by understanding how and why regimes respond to political challengers and opt for repression or violence, those in conflict management will be better equipped to prevent or stop violence (Gurr 2015, 4; Mahoney-Norris 2000, 76).

[348] As Paul notes, elites in weak states should "be understood as operating under very difficult constraints" (Paul 2010, 306).

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