

Voting against the Party Line.

How Career-Related Characteristics of Members of Parliament Shape their Legislative Behaviour

Dissertation

in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the academic degree
Doctor rerum politicarum (Dr. rer. pol.)

at the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences
of Heidelberg University

submitted by
Philipp Mai

Heidelberg, 1st August 2023

Advisors:

Prof. Dr. Reimut Zohlnhöfer
Prof. Dr. Jale Tosun

Contents

Preface	v
List of Figures	vii
List of Tables.....	ix
List of Abbreviations	xi
Acknowledgements	xiii
A. Summary Report	1
1. Introduction and Research Question.....	1
2. The Real-World Phenomenon: Votes against the Party Line.....	4
3. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework of the Dissertation	9
4. Literature Review	12
4.1 Determinants on the System Level.....	13
4.2 Determinants on the Party Level.....	15
4.3 Determinants on the Vote Level.....	17
4.4 Determinants on the MP Level.....	18
4.4.1 Preference-Based Approaches to Party Unity.....	18
4.4.2 Loyalty-Based Approaches to Party Unity.....	20
4.4.3 Discipline-Based Approaches to Party Unity.....	22
4.5 Voting Behaviour in Unwhipped Votes	29
4.6 State of Research: Summary	32
5. Methodological Framework of the Dissertation	33
6. Arguments and Empirical Results of the Articles	36
6.1 Division of Labour and Dissenting Voting Behaviour of MPs in a ‘Working Parliament’ (Article 1).....	37
6.2 Voting Behaviour in the 19 th German Bundestag and Beyond: Between the Daily Business of Unity and a Special Vote of Conscience (Article 2).....	39
6.3 Loyal Activists? Party Socialisation and Dissenting Voting Behaviour in Parliament (Article 3).....	42
6.4 Whose Bread I Don’t Eat, his Song I Don’t Sing? MPs’ Outside Earnings and Dissenting Voting Behaviour (Article 4).....	44
7. Conjunctions of the Articles and Outlook.....	47
8. References	50

B. Division of Labour and Dissenting Voting Behaviour of MPs in a ‘Working Parliament’	77
1. Introduction	77
2. State of the Art: Party Unity and Parliamentary Committees	78
3. Theory	80
4. Data and Methods	85
5. Results	89
6. Conclusion.....	94
7. References	96
8. Appendix	104
A1: Measurement and Descriptive Statistics of the Variables	104
A2: Descriptive Statistics: Votes against the Party Line	112
A3: Robustness Checks.....	114
A4: References.....	121
C. Voting Behaviour in the 19th German Bundestag and Beyond: Between the Daily Business of Unity and a Special Vote of Conscience	123
1. Introduction	123
2. Voting Behaviour in Whipped Votes	125
2.1 Theoretical Expectations.....	125
2.2 Data and Methods.....	127
2.3 Empirical Results.....	129
3. Voting Behaviour in the Unwhipped Vote on Organ Donation	132
3.1 The Value Conflict: Self-Determination vs. Collective Interests.....	132
3.2 Theoretical Expectations.....	134
3.3 Data and Methods.....	137
3.4 Empirical Results.....	138
4. Conclusion.....	140
5. References	142
6. Appendix	148
A1: Variable Description - Analysis of Whipped Votes	148
A2: Descriptive Statistics - Analysis of Whipped Votes.....	151
A3: Descriptive Statistics: Dissenting Votes.....	152
A4: Robustness Checks (Whipped Votes).....	153
A5: Inclusion of MPs’ Family Background, Age and Gender as Controls.....	160
A6: Variable Description - Votes on Organ Donation.....	161
A7: Descriptive Statistics - Votes on Organ Donation.....	163
A8: Robustness Checks (1) - Unwhipped Votes.....	164
A9: Robustness Checks (2) - Unwhipped Votes.....	166
A10: Robustness Checks (3) - Unwhipped Votes.....	168
A11: Robustness Checks (4) - Unwhipped Votes.....	170

A12: Overview of the Hypotheses	172
A13: References.....	173

D. Loyal Activists? Party Socialization and Dissenting Voting Behavior in

Parliament	175
1. Introduction.....	175
2. Party Loyalty and Legislative Behavior.....	177
2.1 State of the Art.....	177
2.2 Main Argument.....	179
3. Study Design.....	183
4. Results.....	187
5. Conclusion	192
6. References	193
7. Appendix.....	201
A1: Measurement, Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics of the Variables.....	201
A2: Correlation Matrix of the Independent and Control Variables.....	205
A3: Robustness Checks.....	206
A4: References.....	208

E. Whose Bread I Don't Eat, his Song I Don't Sing? MPs' Outside Earnings and Dissenting Voting Behaviour

209	
1. Introduction.....	209
2. State of Research: Party Unity and Moonlighting.....	210
3. The Argument: Impact of Outside Earnings on Dissenting Voting Behaviour.....	211
4. Study Design.....	214
5. Results.....	218
6. Conclusion	222
7. References	223
8. Appendix.....	230
A1: Studies with Outside Activities or Earnings as a Dependent Variable	230
A2: Voting Behaviour in Parliamentary Free Votes (2013-2017).....	230
A3: A Note on Roll-Call Votes as a Data Source	233
A4: Distribution and Clustering of the Dependent Variable.....	234
A5: Measurement of the Dependent Variable.....	236
A6: Measurement and Summary Statistics of Variables.....	237
A7: Robustness Checks.....	241
A8: References.....	252

Preface

This cumulative dissertation consists of the following four research articles, all of which have already been published in peer-reviewed and SSCI-listed journals:

Article 1:

Mai, Philipp (2023). 'Division of Labour and Dissenting Voting Behaviour of MPs in a 'Working Parliament', *European Political Science Review* (First View), <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773923000152>.

Article 2:

Mai, Philipp, Moritz Link, and Fabian Engler (2023). 'Voting Behaviour in the 19th German Bundestag and Beyond: Between the Daily Business of Unity and a Special Vote of Conscience', *German Politics* (Online First), <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2023.2191317>.

Article 3:

Mai, Philipp, and Georg Wenzelburger (2023). 'Loyal Activists? Party Socialization and Dissenting Voting Behavior in Parliament', *Legislative Studies Quarterly* (Early View), <https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12416>.

Article 4:

Mai, Philipp (2022). 'Whose Bread I Don't Eat, his Song I Don't Sing? MPs' Outside Earnings and Dissenting Voting Behaviour', *Party Politics*, 28:2, 342–53.

Apart from the standardisation of the citation rules and the numbering of the chapters and appendices, the articles are unchanged in terms of content and language compared to the published versions.

The dissertation starts with a Summary Report (Part A) which outlines the overarching research question, the real-world phenomenon of votes against the party line, the state of research, the theoretical and methodological framework of the dissertation as well as the main arguments, findings and conjunctions of the articles.

List of Figures

A. Summary Report

Figure 1: Average defection rates, by legislative term (1949-2021)	6
Figure 2: Average defection rates, by roll-call vote (1949-2021)	8
Figure 3: Average defection rates, by MPs (1949-2021)	8
Figure 4: Sequential model of party unity	10
Figure 5: Number of journal articles on the determinants of dissenting voting behaviour	13

B. Division of Labour and Dissenting Voting Behaviour of MPs in a ‘Working Parliament’

Figure 1: Predicted probabilities for the conditional effect of policy spokespersons (model 3)	91
Figure 2: Predicted probabilities for the conditional effect of vote type (model 4)	92
Figure 3: Effect of committee membership, conditioned by issue salience (model 5)	93
Figure 1-Appendix: Distribution of defection rates (quantiles), by MPs	112
Figure 2-Appendix: Distribution of defection rates (quantiles), by roll-call votes	112
Figure 3-Appendix: Defection rates by party	113

C. Voting Behaviour in the 19th German Bundestag and Beyond: Between the Daily Business of Unity and a Special Vote of Conscience

Figure 1: Determinants of organ donation regulation voting behaviour	138
Figure 1-Appendix: Defection rates by legislative term (all parties)	152
Figure 2-Appendix: Defection rates by legislative term and by party	152

D. Loyal Activists? Party Socialization and Dissenting Voting Behavior in Parliament

Figure 1: Proportion of MPs without party socialization, by party	187
Figure 2: Proportion of MPs without party socialization, by legislative term	187
Figure 3: Average marginal effect of party socialization, by parliamentary experience	189
Figure 4: Substantial size of the party socialization effect	190

E. Whose Bread I Don’t Eat, his Song I Don’t Sing? MPs’ Outside Earnings and Dissenting Voting Behaviour

Figure 1: Distribution of raw outside earnings per year	216
Figure 2: Average marginal effects of outside earnings on dissenting voting behaviour	221
Figure 1-Appendix: Proportion of dissenting votes by each MP, grouped by party	234
Figure 2-Appendix: Mean percentage of dissenting votes by party group and type of motion	234

List of Tables

A. Summary Report

Table 1: Determinants of average defection rates per legislative term (1949-2021)	7
Table 2: Overview of the articles	36

B. Division of Labour and Dissenting Voting Behaviour of MPs in a ‘Working Parliament’

Table 1: Results of the logistic regression analysis	90
Table 1-Appendix: Operationalisation, data sources and descriptive statistics of the variables	104
Table 2-Appendix: Committees: number of related roll-call votes and Manifesto items	110
Table 3-Appendix: Topics of the 20 roll-call votes with the highest defection rates	113
Table 4-Appendix: Robustness Check – Government party instead of party dummies	116
Table 5-Appendix: Robustness Check – Candidacy mode instead of mandate type	117
Table 6-Appendix: Robustness Check – broader measurements of committee membership	118
Table 7-Appendix: Robustness Check – MP absences coded as non-dissent	119
Table 8-Appendix: Robustness Check – MP absences coded as dissent	120

C. Voting Behaviour in the 19th German Bundestag and Beyond: Between the Daily Business of Unity and a Special Vote of Conscience

Table 1: Determinants of dissenting voting behaviour	129
Table 1-Appendix: Operationalisation and data sources of the variables (whipped votes)	148
Table 2-Appendix: Descriptive statistics of the variables (whipped votes)	151
Table 3-Appendix: Determinants of voting behavior in whipped votes – robustness checks (different variables)	156
Table 4-Appendix: Determinants of voting behavior in whipped votes – robustness checks (temporal variances)	158
Table 5-Appendix: Operationalisation and data sources of the variables (unwhipped votes)	161
Table 6-Appendix: Descriptive statistics of the variables (whipped votes)	163
Table 7-Appendix: Determinants of organ donation regulation voting behavior – opt-out option – including party affiliation	164
Table 8-Appendix: Determinants of organ donation regulation voting behaviour – opt-out option – without party affiliation	166
Table 9-Appendix: Determinants of organ donation regulation voting behaviour – opt-in option – including party affiliation	168
Table 10-Appendix: Determinants of organ donation regulation voting behaviour – opt-in option – without party affiliation	170
Table 11-Appendix: Expected and actual effects (whipped votes)	172
Table 12-Appendix: Expected and actual effects (free votes on organ donation)	172

D. Loyal Activists? Party Socialization and Dissenting Voting Behavior in Parliament

Table 1: Regression results for the chance of casting a dissenting vote	188
Table 1-Appendix: Operationalisation of the variables	201
Table 2-Appendix: Pearson correlation coefficients (r) for the variables	205
Table 3-Appendix: Results of the logistic regression analyses – robustness checks	206

E. Whose Bread I Don't Eat, his Song I Don't Sing? MPs' Outside Earnings and Dissenting Voting Behaviour

Table 1: Results of the logistic panel regression analysis	219
Table 1-Appendix: Studies on the extent of moonlighting and their main findings	230
Table 2-Appendix: Party unity in morality policy votes during the 18 th Bundestag term (2013-2017)	231
Table 3-Appendix: Results of logistic regressions – determinants of voting dissent in morality policy votes	232
Table 4-Appendix: Operationalization, data sources and descriptive statistics of the variables	237
Table 5-Appendix: Results of the logistic panel regression analysis (Robustness Checks) – different measurements of outside earnings	244
Table 6-Appendix: Results of the logistic panel regression analysis (Robustness Checks) – mandate divide, candidacy divide, electoral vulnerability	248
Table 7-Appendix: Results of the negative binomial regression analysis (Robustness Check) – MPs as units of analysis	250
Table 8-Appendix: Results of the multilevel logistic regression analysis (Robustness Check)	251

List of Abbreviations

AfD	Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany)
AME	Average Marginal Effect
BZgA	Bundeszentrale für gesundheitliche Aufklärung (Federal Centre for Health Education)
CDU	Christlich-Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union)
CSU	Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian Social Union)
e.g.	exempli gratia (for example)
EKD	Evangelische Kirche Deutschlands (Protestant Church of Germany)
EU	European Union
FAZ	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
FDP	Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDR	German Democratic Republic
i.e.	id est (that is)
log.	logarithmised
MP	Member of Parliament
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares
PDS	Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Party of Democratic Socialism)
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
SSCI	Social Science Citation Index
U.S.	United States (of America)
UK	United Kingdom

Acknowledgements

Diese Dissertation markiert das Ende eines längeren Weges, auf dem mich eine Reihe von Menschen begleitet haben, denen ich hiermit danken möchte.

Mein erster Dank gilt dem Erstgutachter dieser Arbeit, Prof. Reimut Zohlhöfer. Du hast mich nicht nur in die Wissenschaft geholt, sondern auch mein Denken darüber geprägt, was gute empirisch-analytische Forschung ausmacht. Ich weiß sehr zu schätzen, dass ich an deinem Lehrstuhl arbeiten durfte und du mir dabei die Freiräume eingeräumt hast, die ich bei meiner Arbeit gebraucht habe. Danken möchte ich ebenfalls Prof. Jale Tosun, nicht nur für die Übernahme der Zweitbegutachtung, sondern auch dafür, dass du mich als Geschäftsführende Direktorin im Sommersemester 2018 als akademischer Mitarbeiter am IPW eingestellt und meine Arbeit immer wohlwollend begleitet hast. Ausgesprochen dankbar bin ich außerdem Prof. Georg Wenzelburger – du hast mich während meiner Promotion so herzlich in dein Team an der RPTU Kaiserslautern aufgenommen und damit auch die Fortsetzung meiner Arbeit finanziell abgesichert. Danke auch an Frank Bandau, mit dem ich während seiner Professurvertretung in Kaiserslautern gerne zusammengearbeitet habe.

Ohne die zahlreichen gemeinsamen Mittagessen, Büro-Gespräche, Ausflüge, Kaffee- oder Cocktailrunden mit Kolleginnen und Kollegen aus Heidelberg und Kaiserslautern hätte meinem Arbeitsalltag etwas gefehlt. Danke an euch alle für die schöne Zeit und die Unterstützung, die ich jederzeit von euch erfahren habe! Ich danke auch meinen wissenschaftlichen Hilfskräften sowie dem nicht-wissenschaftlichen Personal an beiden Standorten, die mir meine Arbeit sehr erleichtert haben.

Diese Dissertation hat sicherlich auch davon profitiert, dass ich in meinem Leben außerhalb der Universität so vielfältigen Ausgleich dazu gefunden habe. Ich danke meinen Freunden, die mich teils schon seit Schul- oder Studienzeiten begleiten. Dankbar bin ich auch meinen Vereinskollegen aus dem Segelflugverein Mannheim, die mich an das vermutlich schönste Hobby herangeführt haben, um die Wissenschaft vorübergehend weit hinter (oder unter) mir zu lassen. Danke an Jorge – für die tolle gemeinsame Zeit und dass du immer das Gute in mir siehst. Ich bedanke mich außerdem bei meiner Familie, insbesondere bei meiner Oma, dafür, dass sie meinen (für sie neuen) beruflichen Weg immer unterstützt hat und ich mich auch sonst uneingeschränkt auf sie verlassen kann.

A. Summary Report

1. Introduction and Research Question

“Nahles wants to sideline critics” (Spiegel Online 2019)

“Punishment of Hartz-IV Rebel: CDU MP Whitaker demoted” (BILD 2014)

“Why a Green Dissenter is shaking up Hamburg’s coalition” (Die Welt 2023)

“Euro Dissenter in the CDU: Bosbach experienced ‘toughest moments’ of his career” (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2011)

Parliaments are the core institutions of the democratic constitutional state. The daily business within parliaments is dominated by parties, which has led observers to call parliaments like the German Bundestag a 'party group parliament' (Ismayr 2012). Much of what happens in a parliamentary system of government depends on the ability of party groups and its Members of Parliament (MPs) to act coherently: both the government's and its supporting parties' stability and ability to act and the credibility of the opposition parties (Saalfeld 1995a). This applies in particular to the adoption of public policies (Knill and Tosun 2020; Wenzelburger and Zohlnhöfer 2022) which relies on majorities and thus on roughly unified parliamentary party groups. For instance, the cohesion of veto players (in this case, of parliamentary parties) has been formulated as one of the conditions that affect the stability of policies, and thus implicitly the likelihood of policy change (Tsebelis 1995 and, in conjunction with parties and globalisation, Zohlnhöfer 2009).

Because political actors are well aware of those interrelationships, party unity often originates not from coercion but is rather the institutionalised result of self-interest in successful competition by the parties involved and their deputies, as Patzelt (1998) has put it. From a normative point of view, too, there are convincing arguments in favour of party unity, not least because it facilitates the attribution of political accountability by making MPs act predictably (Saalfeld 1995a). It is therefore an important precondition of 'responsible party government' (Bowler et al. 1999), whereas dissenting voting behaviour has been discussed as one of several agency problems within the constitutional chain of delegation (Müller 2000). However, representing their voters by sticking to what their party promised at the last election ('promissory representation') or what their party decides as part of the government or the opposition might be at odds with other forms of representation, e.g. squinting at the current opinion of the

constituents or at principles associated with their personal background (Mansbridge 2003; on the different views on the role of parties for MPs' responsiveness, see Weber and Parsons 2016). This might explain why parliamentary scholars acknowledge party unity as an important prerequisite for the functioning of the parliamentary system, whereas many citizens view it rather as a defect of parliamentarism (Patzelt 2003).

The decisions of parliamentary groups on policies, organisation and personnel usually guide the actions of the individual MPs and thus ensure stability in a body composed of hundreds of different characters. This reduces but not completely relieves MPs from the task of choosing between these different forms of representation in each parliamentary vote. It is not surprising, though, that the rare violations of the 'norm' of party unity regularly find their way into the media, as the (translated) headlines of German newspaper articles above illustrate. Correspondingly, a bunch of empirical studies has shown that voting against the party line affects the careers of individual MPs in many ways: Electorally, dissenting voting behaviour potentially decreases MPs' chances of (list) re-nomination (Baumann et al. 2017; Schmuck and Hohendorf 2022; but see Frech 2016 and Kauder et al. 2017) and affects their name recognition (Kam 2011) and their perception by the voters (Besch and López-Ortega 2023; Bøggild and Pedersen 2020; Campbell et al. 2019; Duell et al. 2023). Whereas MPs as candidates seem to profit electorally from dissenting votes (Canes-Wrone et al. 2002; Carson et al. 2010; Crisp et al. 2013; Kirkland and Slapin 2017; Rowlands and Vander Wielen 2021; Vivyan and Wagner 2012; Wagner et al. 2020; but see Cowley and Umit 2023; Donnelly 2019), their parties in the aggregate are punished by the voters for their disunity (Kam 2011; Lehrer et al. 2022). Additionally, it is harder for citizens to evaluate the congruence between them and their MPs (Dancey and Sheagley 2016) as well as to build up party attachments (Huber et al. 2005) if the MPs vote frequently against the party line. Merkley (2020) even finds that dissenting votes by legislators of the governing parties decrease the voters' support for government policies. Vote defections also matter for MPs' office-seeking aspirations: Loyal MPs are rewarded with the assignment to pet committees (Friedman 1993; Leighton and López 2002; Mason 2001; McElroy 2008; but see Fernandes et al. 2022; Whitaker 2019) or might even be appointed to committee chairs (Cann 2008; but see Chiru 2020; Treib and Schlipphak 2019). Additionally, MPs in general have higher chances of obtaining parliamentary or executive offices (Eggers and Spirling 2016; Schobess and de Vet 2022; Piper 1991 for most periods; but see Kam 2006) as well as other legislative responsibilities (Yordanova 2011) if they toe the party line in most cases. Their overall legislative success is also higher (Hasecke and Mycoff 2007). Even after their political career, loyal MPs have better chances to profit from party patronage to (semi-)public sector offices

(Kopecky et al. 2016; Palmer and Vogel 1995). Party-compliant voting behaviour of MPs even facilitates the distribution of federal money to their constituencies (Cann and Sidman 2011). Moreover, unity levels of party groups affect the number of parliamentary questions they submit to the government (Dandoy 2011). Lastly, dissenting votes by MPs are regarded as a first step towards party switching (Martin 2023): MPs with a noticeable but not exuberant number of dissenting votes have the highest probability of switching the party, probably because extreme dissenters do not find a party that takes them in. However, party switching as an extreme form of dissent apparently crosses a line in the voters' minds and is, in contrast to dissenting votes, considered unpopular (McAndrews et al. 2020). Against the backdrop of these findings, understanding the factors that drive or impede dissenting voting behaviour on the individual level is relevant for other political phenomena that point far beyond legislative research.

This dissertation aims to explore precisely those individual-level determinants of party unity (and breaches thereof). The overarching question of its constituent articles is to what extent certain components of their career influence the propensity of MPs to vote against the party line in parliament. We understand career-related characteristics of MPs in a broad sense: They include both offices and other political socialisation experiences that MPs have made before their mandate (for example, party offices, which are commonly regarded as part of the 'Ochsentour' that brings MPs into parliament, Hellmann 2020), their functions in the highly specialised decision-making process of their parliamentary group as well as outside activities that some of them pursue in addition to their mandate. Political careers are characterised by a high degree of uncertainty and therefore require a variety of strategies from MPs to gain access to desired offices or to remain in them (Borchert and Stolz 2003). We argue that parliamentary voting behaviour is part of those strategies and expect, as the overarching argument of this thesis, that career-related characteristics of MPs have a significant impact on whether MPs toe the party line in legislative votes. Depending on the particular career characteristic, rational choice considerations, i.e. looking at possible gains or losses of the dissenting vote for their further career, and/or socialisation effects, which lead to the internalisation of certain norms, irrespective of immediate gains or losses, are responsible for MPs' behaviour. The single articles refine this argument, sometimes subjecting it to be conditioned by further contextual factors. Hypotheses derived from these arguments are tested using roll-call vote data and observed MP characteristics for the German Bundestag, controlling for alternative explanations. Depending on data availability for the independent variables, the observation periods of the articles range from the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany (1949) to the present (2021).

The remainder of this report is structured as follows: Chapter 2 takes a look at the empirical phenomenon and provides an overview of the frequency and variance of votes against the party line at different levels of observation. Chapter 3 outlines the theoretical framework of the dissertation that conceptualises vote defections as the result of an (up to) four-stage sequential decision-making process by MPs. In chapter 4, a comprehensive review of the determinants of vote defections at the system, party, vote and especially the MP level, which were discussed in the (mainly quantitative) literature, is provided. Chapter 5 illustrates the methodological framework of the thesis, including the most critical decisions concerning the study design. In chapter 6, the main arguments, findings and implications of the four articles are summarised. Chapter 7 discusses the conjunctions of the articles and possible conclusions to be drawn.

2. The Real-World Phenomenon: Votes against the Party Line


Certainly the most visible and politically consequential cases of dissenting voting behaviour concern investiture votes of heads of government. Three prominent cases in post-war German history are remembered in which candidates failed due to a lack of unity in their party or coalition: In 1972, the leader of the Christian Democrats, Rainer Barzel, was unsuccessful in his attempt to be elected chancellor through a constructive vote of no confidence although observers expected him to win a majority in the Bundestag. Whether his election failed because of a lack of votes from his own party or a lack of votes from (expected) renegade MPs of the coalition parties, and to what extent corruption was also involved, has never been fully clarified (Grau 2009). In 1976, Ernst Albrecht surprisingly became Prime Minister of Lower Saxony after three dissenters of the ruling SPD/FDP coalition denied their own candidate the decisive votes and supported the Christian Democrat instead (Decker 2018). In 2005, the long-serving Prime Minister of Schleswig-Holstein, Heide Simonis, fell one vote short of re-election in each of four rounds of voting after she had formed a minority government that should have been tolerated by the party of an ethnic minority. Until today, it is unknown which MP denied her re-election (Decker 2018). Despite their importance, defections in those votes are largely eluded from social science research, as those investiture votes are conducted by secret ballot and the dissenters can often not be identified with certainty.

However, recorded votes on policies offer a fruitful ground for analyses of MPs' individual-level behaviour and are politically significant as well. Especially when the government parties exhibit a substantial amount of vote defections in a highly salient vote, then the motives of the

dissenters and the consequences they face for doing so as well as for the government are temporarily discussed in public. These questions became particularly virulent when Gerhard Schröder's government had to put the Bundeswehr's mission in Afghanistan to a parliamentary vote in 2001. There were numerous opponents of a German participation not only among the pacifist-minded Greens at that time, but also within the governing Social Democrats. After a higher number of dissenters was emerging than the coalition's narrow majority, the chancellor linked the issue to a confidence vote. Since the continuation of the government was at stake and early elections loomed, enormous pressure rested on the possible dissenters. They reported daily talks with their parliamentary group leadership, demands to step down from their mandate and threats from the Social Democrats to replace the Greens with the FDP as their new coalition partner. Finally, the remaining eight sceptics among the Green MPs made a strategic choice: Four of them opposed and four supported the motion, thereby ensuring the absolute majority for the confidence vote and the issue at stake (Der Spiegel 2001; Döring and Hönnige 2006).

During Angela Merkel's chancellorship (2005-2021), the votes on measures against the Eurozone crisis were certainly the cases with the politically most visible vote defections. In August 2015, more than 20 percent of the Christian Democratic MPs who took part in the vote did not support a third bailout package for Greece, although Angela Merkel as the chancellor and CDU party leader as well as her Minister of Finance Wolfgang Schäuble (himself former party leader, party group leader and long-standing federal minister) strongly advocated further credits for the country struggling with state bankruptcy. What is more, the Christian Democratic party group leader, Volker Kauder, threatened the dissenters with consequences for their career, e.g. demotion from prestigious parliamentary committees (Die Welt 2015). The financial aids were highly polarized also in the electorate (Tagesschau 2015), although the government responded much more closely to public preferences than often assumed (Degner and Leuffen 2019). However, the fact that the government made up of Christian and Social Democrats had a comfortable parliamentary majority, which was never at stake despite the expected high number of dissenters, also contributed to the comparatively high defection rates (Degner and Leuffen 2016). In an earlier vote on a similar bailout package during the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition (2009-2013), the (only symbolically meaningful) absolute majority of the MPs was only reached with the support of the opposition parties and thus by an informal "grand coalition for the Euro" (Zimmermann 2014: 322). In a parliamentary debate on this issue, two dissenters from the governing parties had even been given separate speaking time by the President of the German Bundestag after their parties had denied them access to the floor (FAZ 2012). These circumstances show how far intra-party conflicts may escalate in the run-up to a critical vote.

Figure 1: Proportion of dissenting votes, by legislative term (1949-2021)



Own calculation with data by Sieberer et al. (2020) for the 1st-17th term and own data (18th-19th term).

However, such visible cases of dissent are exceptional. Some other legislative projects during recent legislative terms, which one of the coalition partners wanted more than the other, were also accompanied by a noticeable number of vote defections without being widely discussed in public, for example the tightening of asylum laws, the introduction of the minimum wage, the (later stopped) road user charges, Covid-19 policies as well as military missions abroad (Der Spiegel 2019). Those individual cases aside, empirical data show that votes against the party line are basically a rather rare phenomenon. Comparing all completed terms of the German Bundestag, the proportion of dissenting votes ranges between 0.4 and 5.5 percent of all votes cast by individual MPs (see figure 1). The overarching trend is downwards, with the lowest defection rates already reached in the 1970s. However, the figures might be slightly biased due to the varying number of roll-call votes per legislative term: Whereas in most legislative terms until the first-time election of the Greens into the Bundestag (1983), the number of votes taken by roll-call was below 50, their number raised up to 275 during the second Merkel government 2009-2013 (Bergmann et al. 2016). Accordingly, single contested votes have a higher weight if the sample consists of fewer roll-call votes.

The variance in the defection rates among legislative terms can be attributed to a series of institutional features: First, party discipline is likely to be stronger if only some rebelling MPs could overthrow the majorities in parliament. Accordingly, the seat share of the governing parties is a likely predictor of the average defection rates of each term (Stecker 2015). Second, defection rates are likely to be lower if parliamentary professionalisation increases. A (crude) indicator for this phenomenon would be the average parliamentary experience of MPs in a given term, which is likely to be lower for terms with newly institutionalised party groups. Third, since votes in parliamentary democracies are, in essence, choices between government policies and oppositional alternatives, a high ideological distance between government and opposition parties should facilitate cohesion within each camp (Stecker 2015). The results of an OLS regression support two of those three propositions (see table 1): Whereas defection rates significantly increase with more comfortable government majorities, they decrease the more experienced the MPs are in aggregate. In contrast, the ideological distance, measured by the weighted left-right position of the respective parties (as given in the *rile* variable of the Manifesto dataset, Lehmann et al. 2022), does not exhibit a statistically significant effect on the defection rates. More than a quarter of the variance among the aggregate defection rates can be explained by only those three variables. The findings imply that institutional variables should be controlled for if dissenting voting behaviour is analysed comparatively over several legislative terms.

Table 1: Determinants of average defection rates per legislative term (1949-2021)

Independent Variables	Effect on average defection rate (%)
Government seatshare (%)	0.067* (0.032)
Average parliamentary experience of MPs (years)	-0.458** (0.189)
Ideological distance between government and opposition (<i>rile</i>)	-0.011 (0.205)
Intercept	2.494 (2.256)
N	19
Adjusted R ²	0.268

Unstandardised coefficients of an OLS regression are shown, with standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, *: $p < 0.1$

Next, defection rates vary considerably among votes. While some votes show a clear-cut government-opposition divide without a single dissenter (often in votes on budget bills), there are also occasionally votes that are quite contentious in one or more parliamentary party groups. Figure 2 illustrates this clustered structure of the data: About 25 percent of all roll-call votes show perfect unity of all party groups, whereas 10 percent of the votes exhibit defection rates of more than 5 percent. 1 percent of the votes even have defection rates exceeding 20 percent.

Figure 2: Average defection rates, by roll-call vote (1949-2021)





Figure 3: Average defection rates, by MPs (1949-2021)



A similar clustering of dissenting votes can be detected among the MPs (see figure 3): Whereas about 25 percent of the MPs did not vote against the party line once during their whole parliamentary career, five percent of the MPs defected in 10 percent of the votes and more. Note, however, that the exceedingly high values for some MPs often stem from their short membership in a party group (due to exclusion from or change of the party group as well as due to an abridged Bundestag membership) and the respective high weight of single votes.


The descriptive statistics have shown that dissenting voting behaviour is a phenomenon whose prevalence is highly clustered at least among legislative terms, roll-call votes and MPs. Therefore, explanations of the phenomenon must be provided at all these levels in order to explain as much variance as possible. That the overall share of dissenting votes is rather low does not imply that the phenomenon is politically irrelevant and not worth studying. The opposite is likely to be true: Because the “pathways to party unity” (Andeweg and Thomassen 2011) that research has identified work in real-world politics, the share of votes against the party line (as breaches of the norm of party unity) is rather low.

3. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework of the Dissertation

The literature on party unity lacks conceptual clarity, as the same terms are used for the outcome and its determinants (Andeweg and Thomassen 2011). In accordance with the recent literature, we define *party unity* as the outcome at the aggregate level, i.e. the situation when the MPs of a party vote largely in unison and according to the position as defined by the party group leadership. Correspondingly, we speak of *toeing the party line*, *party-compliant voting behaviour* or, conversely, of *voting against the party line*, *dissenting votes* or *vote defections* when referring to the respective individual-level actions of MPs.

At least since the early 1970s, the literature explicitly recognises that party unity in parliaments is the result of several distinct phenomena. Ozbudun (1970) and, later, Krehbiel (1993) differentiate between homogeneity of preferences as a ‘voluntary’ and discipline as an ‘involuntary’ reason for MPs toeing the party line in legislative votes. Andeweg and Thomassen (2011) expand on this and discuss four “pathways to unity”: *sanctions*, *loyalty*, *homogeneity and division of labour*. The authors present survey evidence for the effectiveness of each of those, however least for discipline. This is consistent with the findings of other empirical studies which conclude that the discipline pathway works less through sanctions actually imposed, but rather through their anticipation (Bailer 2018).

Figure 4: Sequential model of party unity



Own visualisation, based on van Vonno et al. (2014).

Van Vonno and co-authors (2014, 2019) then further developed the idea of multiple pathways to unity into a sequential model of MPs’ decision-making process (see figure 4). Such a sequential understanding was not entirely new, as already John W. Kingdon (1977) chose such an approach in his integrated model of legislative behaviour in the U.S. Congress. Accordingly, the different pathways to unity potentially become effective one after the other: Prior to each legislative vote, it depends on whether MPs have their own opinion on a topic at all. In most cases, the high workload of MPs combined with a functioning *division of labour* facilitates that MPs do not have their own opinion on every issue and simply follow the suggestions of the MPs specialised on that issue. This is then associated with party-compliant voting behaviour. If MPs have their opinion on an issue, then the question arises whether they *agree* with their party on the given topic. At the aggregate level, this pathway to unity is referred to as *cohesion* or *homogeneity of preferences*. If this is the case, then the MP will follow the party line.¹ If MPs disagree with their party, then two other, not policy-related pathways to unity come into play that might nevertheless ensure party unity. First, MPs might toe the party line out of *loyalty*. Party loyalty, i.e. “a strong feeling of support or allegiance not directly related to agreement, or any immediate expected gain or loss, resulting from association with the object of loyalty” (Dickinson 2018: 344), originates from a socialisation process that takes place during MPs’ membership in their party or in parliament. During this process, which can, psychologically, be regarded as a group experience (Russell 2014), MPs develop attitudes and acquire norms that are conducive to party unity, e.g. the insight in the merits of collective action (Patzelt 1999, 2003). Loyalty leads to MPs

¹ The model does not consider the (however rare) case when MPs themselves agree with a given motion but their principals (their voters in the first instance) disagree. This might also lead to dissenting votes if MPs give higher weight to the preferences of their constituents than to their own ones.

voluntarily toeing the party line despite policy disagreement. Finally, if the loyalty pathway to unity is ineffective, then the party leadership tries to push the MPs to comply by means of *party discipline*. The party groups in the German Bundestag expect the MPs who intend to vote against the party line to inform the leadership in due time (e.g. CDU/CSU 2017; FDP 2009). In a subsequent personal discussion, the party group leader or chief whip then tries to convince the MP of the party's position, if necessary also with reference to the consequences that a dissenting vote might have for the party's fate and the MP's career (Schindler 2019: chapter 6). To discipline its MPs, the party group leadership has various 'carrots and sticks' at their disposal, from controlling access to the media, office space, attractive business trips up to assigning speaking time on the floor or leadership offices (Bailer 2018; Patzelt 2003). However, particularly harsh sanctions such as an exclusion from the parliamentary group are subject to strict legal restrictions in Germany (Kasten 1985). How effective those disciplinary means are depends on how powerful the party as the MP's principal is, also vis-à-vis other principals such as the voters in the constituency. If MPs perceive that they have chances of reaching higher offices or depend fully on their party for career advancement or re-election, then the threat of sanctions for votes against the party line is effective and MPs will consider voting in accordance with the party line. If also this last pathway to party unity is ineffective, e.g. for MPs who do not aim to be promoted or who are electorally and financially independent, then the MP will ultimately vote against the party line.²

Consequently, there are basically four pathways to unity and only one pathway to a dissenting vote (after all four pathways to unity failed to be effective). This provides an explanation for the fact that dissenting votes occur rarely in parliamentary democracies. In many instances, at least one pathway to unity is effective: Division of labour is a core feature of 'working parliaments' like the German one. MPs follow the position of the policy experts of their working group in most of the cases (von Oertzen 2006). Since parties are regarded, according to a Burkean understanding (Zohlnhöfer 2005), as groups of like-minded people, resulting from self-selection (e.g. Klein 2006; Willumsen 2017) and candidate selection mechanisms (e.g. Berz and Jankowski

² Note that those four pathways to unity refer primarily to the case when MPs are confronted with a particular motion that has made its way to the parliamentary agenda. In general, an additional means of ensuring unity would be to hold motions off the agenda that might endanger intra-party unity (Carey 2007; Döring 2003). Agenda control varies only among countries or over time, not among MPs, though. In the German case, the parliamentary groups indeed dominate the setting of the parliamentary agenda (Loewenberg 2003). However, they cannot prevent other parties from introducing motions and requesting roll-call votes on them to expose others' lack of unity. Moreover, the government does not have similarly far-reaching privileges concerning agenda control in the German Bundestag as in other countries (Koß and Tan 2019; Sieberer 2006b).

2022; Cordes and Hellmann 2020), MPs agree with their party in ideological terms in most instances. If this is not the case, most of the MPs made plenty of political experiences at different levels of government where they have learned that disunity hurts the party's image in the electorate and thus the probability that MPs will ultimately transfer their preferences into public policies. If all this does not help, there are repeated examples of more or less harsh punishments of rebelling MPs (see the newspaper headlines above), which displays only a fraction of all cases where MPs refrain from defection in anticipation of those sanctions.

The pathways to unity were rarely tested explicitly against each other (see, however, Kam 2011, Willumsen 2017 and von Vonno 2019 as notable exceptions). In those cases, the authors found that each pathway makes its contribution to explaining the phenomenon. Which of the pathways is most effective also varies between political systems or levels of government. For instance, discipline as a pathway to unity was found to be less important on the subnational than on the national level since MPs there are, due to a lower level of intra-party competition, less concerned with office and votes (van Vonno 2019). However, most of the empirical studies focus on a particular pathway to unity and explore in how far the effectiveness of the pathway varies with system-, party-, vote- or MP-level characteristics.


4. Literature Review

Explaining the varying probability of votes against the party line constitutes a rapidly growing field of research. It has evolved from a niche phenomenon to a topic regularly covered in major political science journals. Figure 5 illustrates the number of articles on the determinants of vote defections in whipped votes that were published in SSCI-ranked journals.³ Beginning in the mid-1990s, the number of articles published per year increased from 1-2 to about 15 in recent years. Those studies are situated at different levels of analysis, among them political system (mainly country), parliamentary party group, MP and roll-call vote. However, the problem of adequately modelling this data structure rarely becomes virulent, as not all of these levels are

³ The search was conducted in late December 2022 via *Web of Science* with the terms “party unity”, “party loyalty”, “party discipline”, “party cohesion”, “defect”, “legislative behavio(ur)” and “dissent”. The results were restricted to articles published in political science journals ranked in the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) of 2021 plus in the *Journal of Legislative Studies* which is no longer ranked but still an influential outlet of parliamentary research. Out of >3,000 results, 216 articles were selected that analyse the determinants of actual or intended vote defections (at any unit of analysis) in whipped (not free) votes as a dependent variable. For the literature review in the subsequent chapter, the results of selected publications in non-SSCI journals (as known to the author) and books are additionally reported.

usually examined simultaneously. Many studies are limited to the examination of voting decisions of MPs during one legislative term and, especially in recent times, prevalently situated at the MP level.

Figure 5: Number of journal articles on the determinants of dissenting voting behaviour



N=214 articles published in SSCI journals (plus The Journal of Legislative Studies)
 Only articles are counted that analyse voting against the party line in whipped votes as a dependent variable.

Due to this growing research interest, the only published stand-alone literature review (Fritzsche 2009) misses large parts of the (especially empirical) work done in the last 15 years. Against this backdrop, this chapter aims at providing an overview of the determinants of party unity found in empirical studies, sorted by the level of observation. Regarding the MP level, the findings were classified into the stages of a sequential decision-making process by the author (as described in chapter 3), without the underlying studies themselves having to refer explicitly to this sequential model.

4.1 Determinants on the System Level

Studies situated at the level of a political system mainly investigate the impact of institutional characteristics on the level of vote defections. Institutions matter because they affect how close the relationship between MPs and their party principals are, compared to other principals,

especially voters in the constituency (Coman 2015). The more MPs are dependent on their party and its leaders to reach their career-related goals in a country, the higher the party unity levels there. Electoral systems are crucial for this triangular relationship between parties, voters and MPs. Many studies posit that defection rates are lower in systems with proportional representation, compared to plurality systems with single-member districts, due to a stronger dependence of MPs from their party for re-selection and re-election and a stronger centralisation of candidate selection (e.g. Carey and Shugart 1995; Cox et al. 2019; Hix 2004). However, this effect was found to be conditional on the party-centeredness and intra-party competitiveness of candidate selection (Carey 2007; Coman 2015; Itzkovitch-Malka and Hazan 2017; Shomer 2016, 2017; Sieberer 2006a). Additionally, the existence of a confidence procedure, although rarely used, increases party unity levels (Coman 2015; Diermeier and Feddersen 1998; Fritzsche 2019), as well as a credible threat of government alternation (Curini and Zucchini 2012). A bipolar party system, as in Italy after the transformation in the 1990s, shows higher unity levels than the former, more centrally located party system (Newell 2000). Government parties are more unified than opposition parties in parliamentary, but not in presidential systems of government (Carey 2007). Presidential systems of government generally show lower defection rates (Kailitz 2008). There are also differences between presidential and semi-presidential regime types, but depending on the president's legislative powers (Borges and Ribeiro 2023). Semi-presidentialism in France, combined with the two-round electoral system reinforcing a left-right cleavage, is conducive to high unity levels despite a directly elected president and the candidate-centred political system (Sauger 2009).

Moreover, party unity levels are lower in federal countries, compared to more unitary systems of government, since they impose competing pressures upon the MPs from the national party level, which is responsible for maintaining unity in legislative voting, and the subnational party level, which is responsible for candidate nomination (Carey 2007). Interstate conflicts impose further threats to party unity in federal systems (Desposato 2004). Within federal systems, party unity is higher in those subnational state parliaments where the governing coalitions are congruent with the coalition that governs on the national level (Schukraft 2011). Powerful committee systems decrease party unity levels in the respective countries because, as was argued, they provide MPs with an additional arena besides their party group to exert policy influence (Sieberer 2006a). However, this argument ignores the fact that committee work is prepared and steered by parties (Mickler 2019). Lastly, Coman (2015) finds that in systems where parties rely to a large extent on state subsidies for their campaign spending and less on private donors vote more unified in parliaments since the distribution of campaign funds to the candidates is

centralised in the hands of the national party leadership and MPs have no interest in representing the interests of their donors by dissenting votes.

To conclude, in line with the aforementioned institutional features, party unity varies between political systems. However, in essence, those macro-level characteristics display clustered individual-level effects in that they affect the number and effectiveness of different principals and thus the incentive structures for MPs when taking voting decisions in parliament.

4.2 Determinants on the Party Level

Party unity was found to differ among parties as well. MPs from parties with a high degree of intra-party democracy show a higher willingness to cast dissenting votes, probably because they are used to assert dissenting opinions within their party (Close et al. 2019). Party unity correlates with candidate selection methods and criteria as well. Parties with formalised candidacy eligibility criteria, e.g. demanding prior party membership or encouraging MPs to establish networks within the party, have lower defection rates in parliament (Rehmert 2020), whereas parties with inclusive and decentralised candidate selection processes obtain higher defection rates (Cordero and Coller 2015). Party family might also play a role: Whereas especially radical right parties prioritise party loyalty, green parties are ready to accept higher levels of self-fulfilment, both of which is reflected in the legislative behaviour of its MPs, respectively (Close 2018). Ideologically extreme as well as left-wing parties generally obtain higher unity scores than right-wing or centrist parties (Dingler and Ramstetter 2023; Otero-Felipe and Rodríguez 2023; Rahat 2007). For newly democratised countries like the post-Soviet states it was also shown that parties with a high level of institutionalisation, including ties to societal groups and a strong party organisation, exhibit higher levels of voting unity since they control means and the MPs have the willingness to be disciplined, in exchange for other goods like campaign support or offices (Thames 2007; Tavits 2012). Additionally, parties obtain higher unity scores the larger their seat share in parliament is (Close et al. 2019; Coman 2015; Rehmert 2020; Zittel and Nyhuis 2019). Although larger parties might obtain a higher ideological heterogeneity and thus might have higher defection rates, single vote defections have a greater weight within small parties, which might disproportionately lower their unity scores. In contrast, and rather counter-intuitively, older parties have lower unity scores than newer parties (Rehmert 2020).

Because a defeat in a parliamentary vote politically endangers government survival and as government parties have more disciplinary means (i.e. the assignment of executive offices) at

their disposal and a “collective access to policy” (Zittel and Nyhuis 2019: 411), there are good reasons for the often-found lower defection rates of government parties (e.g. Bergmann et al. 2016; Dingler and Ramstetter 2023; Rehmert 2020; Willumsen and Öhberg 2017; Zittel and Nyhuis 2019). According to Stecker (2011a, 2015), government parties vote more unified than opposition parties particularly in important legislative votes. Tight government majorities further increase the higher cohesion of government parties (Bergmann et al. 2016; Crowe 1980; Stecker 2011a, 2015). Based on their micro-level findings, Benedetto and Hix (2007) conclude that the longer the government participation of a party, the higher is the share of demoted ministers and unpromoted backbenchers and thus the higher the probability that some of those disappointed MPs vote against the party line. Bøggild and Pedersen (2023) take a closer look at those ‘costs of governing’ and support their hypothesis that electoral losses of governing parties translate into a higher probability of their MPs to cast dissenting votes, probably due to the MPs’ wish to distinguish themselves from their less appealing party brand. However, *higher* defection rates for government parties would be conceivable as well, given that they are, in contrast to opposition parties, sometimes in a position of having to initiate unpopular or polarising bills in order to solve problems (Bauer-Blaschkowski and Mai 2019; Crowe 1980; Rahat 2007; Willumsen and Goetz 2017; Willumsen and Öhberg 2017). As a way out, Sieberer (2015) found that government MPs have a higher probability of submitting explanations of their votes, without ultimately defecting in the respective roll-call vote.

The ideological heterogeneity of a party group does also play a role: Taking the European Parliament as a pertinent case, Bailer et al. (2009) show that party unity decreases with higher ideological fractionalisation. The same is true for the existence of powerful party factions that cannot be contained by strong whipping resources of the party group leadership (Ceron 2015). Finally, a considerable part of the party group unity can be attributed to leadership effects, among them their experience, career prospects, methods of convincing or directing dissenters or own ideological positions (Barber 1966; Bailer et al. 2009; Field 2013) – an effect which has often been treated as part of the residual.

Finally, there are numerous studies dealing with party unity under special circumstances. Studies of parties in the European Parliament investigate how national parties enforce discipline within the transnational party groups of the European Parliament or which (career) incentives or domestic-level factors drive MPs to support their transnational party group’s position instead (e.g. Dafydd 2019; Faas 2003; Finke 2014; Font 2020; Hix 2002, 2004; Klüver and Spoon 2015; Koop et al. 2018; Lindstädt et al. 2011, 2012; Meserve et al. 2009, 2017; Meyerrose 2018;

Willumsen 2022). Some studies shed light on party unity in historical times, e.g. prior to World War II (Eggers and Spirling 2016, Rasmussen 1971; Sinclair 1977), during wartime (Rasmussen 1970) or even in the mid-19th century Frankfurt Assembly (Sieberer and Herrmann 2020).

4.3 Determinants on the Vote Level

On the vote level, it was found that the party group which requested the roll-call vote (as an alternative to an unrecorded vote as the standard voting procedure in the Bundestag) vote more unified than the other parties (Bergmann et al. 2016; Stecker 2011a, 2015). On the one hand, this is rooted in the fact that roll-call votes are a means for the party group leadership of disciplining its members. On the other hand, blaming other parties for their disunity is only effective if the requesting party itself is unified (Bergmann et al. 2016). Similarly, if the party group introduced the motion itself, this often results in higher unity scores of that party in the given vote (Bailer et al. 2009; no effect found by Bergmann et al. 2016). Bauer-Blaschkowski and Mai (2019) show that the effect of origin is conditional on government status: Opposition parties vote more unified on motions which were introduced by themselves, presumably because they introduce motions only on those matters which are internally undisputed. In contrast, government parties vote less unified on bills introduced by themselves, compared to motions of the opposition, probably due to the fact that some of the bills are unpopular among voters or display painful compromises among the coalition parties. The closeness of the vote also affects defection rates: Votes that are decided by small margins exhibit lower defection rates, compared to votes which were not close, presumably because the party group leadership exerts lower disciplinary pressure in the latter (Willumsen and Öhberg 2017). Additionally, increasing ideological distance between government and opposition parties boosts party unity in parliaments (Stecker 2015).

Policy-related differences in the defection rates are also well documented: Votes on economic policies usually exhibit higher unity scores since, for most parties, those policies are highly salient and relevant for party competition (Bergmann et al. 2016; Sieberer 2010). In contrast, foreign policies, especially deployments of German armed forces in peace-keeping missions abroad which are, by informal consensus, always votes by roll-call, are disputed in many parties, especially within the Social Democrats and the Greens, which results in higher defection rates (Bauer-Blaschkowski and Mai 2019; Mai et al. 2022; Sieberer 2010). Skjæveland (2001) and Leston-Bandeira (2009) report lower unity scores for EU, local and morality issues (if the latter

are not decided by free vote). More generally, party unity levels are higher when consequential legislative issues (Rahat 2007; Stecker 2015) or issues that are salient in the party's platform or to the voters (Traber et al. 2014) are on the floor. The same is true for most votes on pork-barrel projects (Shin and Lee 2017).

Apart from government-opposition dynamics, election cycle effects were found. Legislative politics receives greater attention as the election approaches. Whereas Skjæveland (1999), Traber et al. (2014), Weber and Parsons (2016) as well as Willumsen and Öhberg (2017) find that party unity is higher close to elections as parties try to make sure that they send unambiguous signals to their voters, Bauer-Blaschkowski and Mai (2019) as well as Lindstädt and Vander Wielen (2014) report the opposite, presumably because individual MPs aim at distinguishing themselves among their constituents with dissenting votes.

4.4 Determinants on the MP Level

4.4.1 Preference-Based Approaches to Party Unity

The preference-driven approach to party unity has its origins in the literature on the U.S. Congress (e.g. Krehbiel 1993). In this context, it is regarded as a counterpart to 'party pressure' as the main driver of MPs' voting behaviour. In general, disagreement in terms of policy is the most plausible reason for votes against the party line. The higher the ideological distance from the party mean, the higher the probability that MPs vote against the party line in parliament (Benedetto and Hix 2007; Burke et al. 2021). Compared to other pathways to unity, the survey data of van Vonnö (2019) indicate that ideological agreement with their party accounts for the largest share of MPs' propensity to toe the party line in legislative votes. Both the self-selection of MPs into their parties and the selection of ideologically compatible candidates account for the fact that most MPs' preferences overwhelmingly fit to their party's position and MPs vote, without the threat of disciplinary means, with their party (Willumsen 2017). Kam (2001), Willumsen and Öhberg (2017) as well as Willumsen (2022) also explicitly measure policy incentives to defect by using survey data. Whereas those policy incentives are substantial, they clearly exceed the actual level of dissenting votes, which hints at the fact that party unity is driven by alternative pathways such as division of labour, loyalty and discipline as well. However, Close and Núñez (2017) highlight that the 'objective' ideological distance, measured by survey items, not necessarily translates into disagreement with the party line on a given policy issue. Instead, the subjective or conscious ideological distance as perceived by the MPs themselves was a better

predictor of the frequency of disagreement with the party. Slapin et al. (2018) find that ideologically extreme MPs tend to vote with their party when in opposition, whereas those MPs show higher defection rates when their party is in government. This supports the interpretation that MPs use vote defections to distinguish themselves from their party in particular circumstances that appear suitable to them and that preference dissimilarity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for vote dissent.

Apart from explicitly measured MP preferences, some studies investigate dissenting voting behaviour in situations where MPs have either strong or especially congruent preferences. Dingler and Ramstetter (2023) find that within MPs' focus area, i.e. policies which most of their parliamentary questions are related to, they are more likely to deviate from the party line. Since they have expertise and an increased interest in those topics, they are assumed to be more willing to raise their voice against positions of their party that contradict their own convictions. In contrast, and more related to MPs' influence on certain policies, Willumsen and Öhberg (2017) find that MPs have lower defection rates on topics deliberated in committees which they are member of because they presumably helped shaping the party line on those policies.

Additionally, some studies aim at approximating the role of constituency preferences for MPs' legislative behaviour. Concerning the Brexit votes in the British House of Commons, it has been shown that, in addition to MPs' personal position, the preferences of their voters in the district are related to whether they defected from the party line (Aidt et al. 2021). Stiller (2023) reports that MPs have a higher probability to defect in votes on trade agreements if their party's position runs counter to the economic interests of their constituency (i.e. whether the constituency is composed of highly/lowly educated workers and characterised by high/low productivity). Similarly, Murillo and Pinto (2022) find that, even in a party-centred electoral system, MPs' decision to vote against their party on a trade policy issue primarily reflects the economic interests of their constituency. Constituency work also affects ideological disagreement of MPs with their party (prior to dissenting votes as a behavioural result) if voter preferences are incongruent with the policy positions of an MP's party (Bundi et al. 2023). Those studies supplement the large strand of literature dealing with geographic representation in more general terms, apart from the question whether this implies voting against the party line (e.g. Anderson et al. 2023; Butler and Nickerson 2011; Geese and Martínez-Cantó 2022; Hanretty et al. 2017; Lancaster and Patterson 1990; Schürmann 2023; Schürmann and Stier 2023; Zittel et al. 2019).

4.4.2 Loyalty-Based Approaches to Party Unity

Whereas rational-choice approaches (related to career-related punishments and rewards for MPs) dominate the literature on party unity (Russell 2014), loyalty-based determinants thereof are much less frequently studied. In doing so, political science profits from the inclusion of concepts and findings of social psychology, especially on social identity and group behaviour. As those feelings of allegiance by MPs are hard to observe, most studies are confined to easy approximations of socialisation processes. Exploiting the special situation of two separate political systems prior to the German reunification, several studies deal with behavioural differences between MPs in subnational parliaments in the Western part (with a long-standing democratic tradition) and the Eastern part of the country (where the socialist regime lacking democratic parties collapsed in 1989). Stecker (2015) argues that the lower party unity levels in Eastern German state parliaments in the first two terms after unification originate from the lacking loyalty of MPs towards their parties (which they have joined only shortly before their election into parliament) or political parties in general. Davidson-Schmich (2003: 99f.) draws a different conclusion: Although “anti-party norms, low ideological cohesion, and both weak party organisation and identification” prevail, the party groups in Eastern German parliaments vote rather unified. Although sociological factors might account for the lower unity scores in Eastern German state parliaments in their first legislative term, the quickly rising unity scores support, according to her conclusion, that voting behaviour is mainly driven by institutional factors like electoral incentives instead of sociological factors. The interviewed party whips stated that, instead of socialising their fellow MPs into norms of party unity, their main job was to confront them with the “hard logic of parliamentary realities”, meaning the electoral incentives of appearing united.

Another, more common operationalisation of loyalty is the length of parliamentary service. It could be assumed that the longer MPs are members of their party group, the more have they internalised norms such as loyalty or the value of unity for the party’s success which are conducive to party-compliant voting behaviour. However, only a minority of studies support the hypothesis that longer parliamentary experience coincides with lower defection rates (Delius et al. 2013; Gherghina and Chiru 2014; Kam 2011). Contrary to what one would expect, many studies find that defection rates even increase the longer MPs serve in parliament (Bauer-Blaschkowski and Mai 2019; Benedetto and Hix 2007; Bhattacharya and Papageorgiou 2019; Dingler and Ramstetter 2023; Garner and Letki 2005; Heuwieser 2018; Sieberer and Ohmura 2021; Slapin et al. 2018; Stratmann 2000; Willumsen and Goetz 2017; Willumsen and Öhberg

2017; Zittel and Nyhuis 2019). This might be interpreted as that, with growing parliamentary experience, MPs get more independent-minded or know when to dissent strategically from the party line. A series of additional studies do not detect a clear-cut effect of tenure on MPs' propensity to defect (Clayton and Zetterberg 2021; Gherghina and Chiru 2014; Saalfeld 1995a).

The lacking effect of parliamentary experience could have at least two causes: On the one hand, the length of membership might be a poor proxy for party loyalty (Kam 2011). However, a series of studies using MP surveys or interviews as a data source confirm that with growing experience, MPs increasingly acquire unity-inducing norms: Dickinson (2018: 344) finds that receiving advice from experienced party actors increases the reported loyalty of British MPs during their first years in parliament. Party loyalty, and, ultimately, party unity thus emerges as the “product of the social learning process” by newly elected MPs. Skjæveland (2001) identifies “moral commitment to the party”, in addition to the absence of ideological disagreement, as the major reason for the high degrees of party unity in the Danish parliament. Also the remarkably high unity of the European Parliament prior to its first direct election in 1979, lacking most disciplinary tools usually available to national-level party groups, was attributed to group solidarity norms, personal connections as well as similar preferences (Roos 2019). Rebellious backbenchers in the British House of Commons was ascribed a weaker socialisation into party identities and group orientations (Schwarz and Lambert 1971). Willumsen's (2017) analysis of MP attitudes towards party unity in various Nordic and the Visegrád countries indicates that “pragmatic fidelity”, i.e. MPs toeing the party line voluntarily since they know about the long-term benefits that a unified legislative party provides them, is the most important reason for unity in case of preference dissimilarity. MPs thus accept that they cannot always get an outcome matching their own preferences. Crowe (1986: 182) concludes in his study on the role of social control and authority in the British House of Commons that “internalized agreement, feelings of loyalty, and a sense of obligation are the principal elements of the ‘hidden consent’ that undergirds the authority of parliamentary leaders”. According to this study, party unity is not the result of MPs being forced to vote in line but a consensually achieved result of socialisation processes. In his study of the “discipline-free environment” of the British House of Lords, Norton (2003: 57, 70) attributes the high unity scores to a sort of “tribal loyalty”, meaning an “emotional or intellectual commitment” to the peers' party bloc. Russell (2014) supports those findings with survey data when she describes that unified voting is primarily driven by the MPs' wish not to damage their own group, if they feel involved in the decision-making process or if they regard their group membership as an important part of their social identity. According to the author, the necessity of including social-psychological insights in models of legislative

behaviour is obvious given that politics is, by definition, a group activity. Concerning differences among levels of government, van Vonna (2019) finds that the loyalty pathway to party unity has more explanatory power on the national than on the subnational level.

On the other hand, the frequently unsupported effect of parliamentary experience could also be rooted in MPs' pre-parliamentary socialisation experiences (Kam 2011). MPs are usually not elected to parliament without any political experiences. Instead, most of them were members of their parties for a long time and held party or public offices at various levels of government prior to their election into the national parliament (Bailer et al. 2013). Whereas Gherghina and Chiru (2014) do not detect an effect of how long MPs are already members of their party for their dissenting voting behaviour in the Romanian parliament, Rehmert (2022) finds that MPs vote less frequently against the mainstream of their parties in morality policy votes the longer the length of their party membership (prior to their first election into the Bundestag). However, those results yield the same measurement problem as with parliamentary experience: A long membership in their party alone (potentially without a substantial involvement in party work) is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for MPs' internalisation of norms conducive to party loyalty.

4.4.3 Discipline-Based Approaches to Party Unity

Electoral incentives

As re-election is regarded “the primary instrumental goal of legislators” (Strøm 2012: 90), perhaps the most frequently discussed question in the literature in the context of party unity is whether electoral characteristics of the MPs affect their propensity of toeing the party line. Most commonly, it is hypothesised that MPs who have the highest incentives of cultivating a personal vote (Carey and Shugart 1995) defect from the party line more frequently. Those incentives are high in systems where MPs are elected in single-member districts since the electoral fortunes of nominal candidates are to a certain extent decoupled from the party's election result. Candidate-centred electoral systems thus impose, in addition to their party, a second principal (the voters in the constituency) to the MPs since electoral success is the prerequisite for MPs' office- and policy-seeking success (Zittel and Nyhuis 2019). Mixed-member electoral systems where MPs are able to run both in single-member districts as well as on party lists provide a promising setting for testing the hypothesis of a ‘mandate divide’ while holding constant other system-level incentives and constraints that the MPs are confronted with. Empirically, the studies by

Sieberer (2010, 2015), Batto (2012), Dingler and Ramstetter (2023), Kunicova and Remington (2008) and Liao (2022) indeed find higher defection rates for nominally elected MPs, compared to list MPs. Thames (2005) supports this pattern only for the weakest institutionalised party system in his comparative study. According to a later study, especially those single-member district MPs are more likely to defect who are non-partisans (Thames 2016). However, such MPs exist only in a few parliaments to a greater number, for example in Ukraine. Exploiting temporal variance, Olivella and Tavits (2014) show that a change of MPs' mandate type from list to single-member district coincides with higher defection rates, but not vice versa. In contrast, many studies deny a general 'mandate divide' (Bhattacharya and Papageorgiou 2019; Born and Janssen 2022; Herron 2002; Rich 2014; Sieberer and Ohmura 2021; Zittel and Nyhuis 2019). A plausible explanation for this non-finding is the 'contamination' thesis (Ferrara et al. 2005): As a result of the practice that most MPs run on both tickets and that it is not always predictable which mandate type they will ultimately achieve (Manow 2015), behavioural differences between the mandate types are unlikely. Some studies report even higher defection rates for list MPs (Becher and Sieberer 2008; Crisp 2007; Jun and Hix 2010), at least for some party groups (Bauer-Blaschkowski and Mai 2019; Rueckert and Crane 1962), and account this to differing career paths and candidate selection processes (Jun and Hix 2010). As Fritzsche (2009) concludes, the image of the rebellious nominal MP contrasted with the loyal list MP does not correspond to reality in many cases.

In the light of the ambiguous findings on a 'mandate divide', additional studies focused more on the precise electoral situation and vulnerability of MPs. Ohmura (2014) reports lower defection rates for MPs who run solely on the party list and thus have no incentives of dissenting for reasons of personal vote-seeking. Similarly, Preece (2014) reports that MPs who are particularly dependent on the party leadership in terms of their nomination have the lowest defection rates in legislative votes. In contrast, double candidates have higher defection rates as they have to reconcile the demands of multiple principals (Papp 2021). Other studies approximate MPs' electoral vulnerability by incorporating re-election probabilities (see Stoffel and Sieberer 2018 on their estimation): Becher and Sieberer (2008) find higher defection rates for electorally vulnerable MPs (which they use to campaign for personal votes). Sieberer and Ohmura (2021) argue that a 'conditional mandate divide' is at work: According to their study, electoral incentives for casting a dissenting vote exist only for a specific type of MPs: those who both run solely in a district and whose re-election there is highly uncertain. Other types of MPs, both electorally secure nominal candidates as well as list MPs in general have no reason to make their mark by vote defections since they only have to please their party principals who decide

on the allocation of offices and, in the case of list MPs, on their re-selection. On the other hand, electoral vulnerability can also discipline MPs if the decision on their re-nomination and election is centralised in the hands of the party leadership. This is the case in Italy where MPs are able to run in multiple districts simultaneously and the party leadership thereafter decides on the vacant seats (Pinto 2017). Herron (2002) and Jung (2022) report lower defection rates for MPs with unsafe seats as well (since those MPs aim to improve their re-selection prospects on the party list or because voters in the district value party unity). Relatedly, patterns of partisan dealignment affect MPs' legislative behaviour: André et al. (2015) show that MPs running in districts where electoral volatility is high (as an observable implication of dealignment) have a higher propensity to defect if their party's position contradicts their own convictions. This is due to the lower importance of the party label for their electoral success and its replacement by incentives of cultivating a personal vote.

A special case for investigating electoral incentives are flexible list systems where voters are allowed to change the order of the party lists by preference votes. In such a setting, Crisp et al. (2013), Stegmaier et al. (2016) and Willumsen and Öhberg (2017) report higher defection rates for MPs who receive a higher share of preference votes. Dissenting voting behaviour can, as the Competing Principals Theory predicts, thus be regarded as a personal vote earning strategy. In contrast, Smrek (2023) does not find a preference vote effect. Additionally, Zittel and Nyhuis (2021) show that German MPs who ran personalised campaigns vote more frequently against the party line once they are in parliament, whereas Papp (2018) does not confirm such an effect for Hungary. Accordingly, the party leadership obviously is unable to successfully discipline MPs who owe their election to their personal popularity. However, it is difficult to figure out what is cause and effect here and whether it was the dissenting voting behavior or the personal popularity that came first.

The effect of candidate selection methods at the individual level is contested: The early study of Schwarz and Lambert (1971) finds that MPs vote more frequently against the party line if they are hardly vulnerable to re-nomination challenges. Concerning different nomination methods, Rombi and Seddone (2017) find no effect of inclusive or centralised candidate selection procedures. In contrast, Sozzi (2023) reports higher defection rates for MPs who are nominated by more inclusive methods such as party primaries (where MPs are incentivised to distinguish themselves from competitors), as opposed to a centralised candidate selection controlled by the party leadership. Moreover, less inclusive candidate selection procedures limit the effect of politicians' career ambitions on dissenting voting behaviour (Kerneckner 2017).

Related to electoral incentives, localness of MPs (e.g. local-level political experience) increases their propensity of casting dissenting votes as those ‘Local Heroes’ are, due to a strong local support base and recognition, more independent from the national party leadership (Bailer et al. 2013; Sozzi 2023; Tavits 2009, 2010). Relatedly, MPs from districts with a strong local party organisation have a higher probability of voting against the party line (Tavits 2011). In contrast, MPs who received a new district (after a redistricting) with a higher proportion of broadband internet providers direct their voting behaviour to a stronger extent to their national party at the expense of their local voters, thereby adapting their legislative behaviour to a changed media environment. This pattern might be explained by electoral incentives since this effect was observed especially for MPs with marginal districts (Trussler 2022).

To conclude, electoral incentives certainly play a role in MPs’ decision-making calculus prior to a legislative vote. Slapin and Kirkland (2020) speak of a particular “sound of rebellion” when they find that MPs use simpler, first-person language to explain their upcoming dissenting vote in parliament. This underscores that distinguishing themselves and appealing to local voters are important motivations for vote defections (see also Slapin et al. 2018). Whereas the dichotomy of a ‘mandate divide’ appears outdated in light of newer empirical findings, the relevance of local-level selectors and electors (in the case of MPs who won their districts by tight margins) vis-à-vis national-level principals who decide on MPs’ career advancement likely influences MPs’ decision of toeing the party line.

Office- and career-related incentives

A broad strand of research examines how MPs’ career prospects as well as current or past offices affect how they vote in parliament. Survey data indicate that many MPs are driven by progressive ambition, i.e. the desire to keep prestigious offices (especially in the executive branch) or to get promoted to even higher ones (Sieberer and Müller 2017). Progressive ambition most likely reduces the MP’s propensity to defect – a hypothesis that Eggers and Spirling (2016) already supported for the 19th century House of Commons. Treul (2009) shows for the U.S. case that senators who later run for the presidency toe the party line more frequently than their colleagues without those ambition. This is rooted in their motivation to please the support base within their parties who they depend on in the primaries in the run-up to the nomination. Similarly, MPs who are ambitious to reach executive offices have lower defection rates (Kerneckner 2017). According to Herrick and Moore (1993), MPs who aim to reach leadership positions in their current institution (what the authors call ‘intra-institutional ambition’) defect less frequently

from the party line. Meserve et al. (2009) find that Members of the European Parliament defect more frequently from the party line of their transnational party group if they aim at higher offices in their home state. Career-related dependence on multiple principals thus leads MPs to orient themselves towards the principal that helps them reaching their primary career-related goals (see also Rosas and Langston 2011).

One of the most robust findings in the literature is that MPs who currently hold offices in parliament or the government have a lower probability of voting against the party line (e.g. Bauer-Blaschkowski and Mai 2019; Bhattacharya and Papageorgiou 2019; Clayton and Zetterberg 2021; Dingler and Ramstetter 2023; Kanthak 2009; Mai et al. 2022; Sieberer 2010, 2015). Zittel and Nyhuis (2019) state that voting behaviour on the floor, if compared to vote explanations, is to a greater degree driven by office-seeking than by vote-seeking concerns. Martin (2014) supports this interpretation even for the candidate-centred electoral system of Ireland. On the one hand, the so-called ‘mega-seats’ (Martin 2014) like parliamentary offices (policy spokespersons, committee chairs, party group leadership) or executive offices (chancellor/prime minister, ministers, junior ministers) provide the MPs with increased influence on policies as well as additional resources like staff, salary, media attention and, more generally, increased status. On the other hand, MPs are disciplined to adhere meticulously to the party line and not to make their mark by dissenting votes in order not to risk losing their office-related privileges (Zittel and Nyhuis 2019).

However, office aspirations as a means of disciplining MPs are effective only as long as MPs perceive that they have a chance of being promoted to those offices. Indeed, MPs who were demoted from important offices (the ‘ejected’ MPs) as well as those who have been refused ministerial promotion (the ‘rejected’ MPs) have a higher probability of voting against the party line (Benedetto and Hix 2007; Grimmer and Powell 2013; Kam 2006; Schwarz and Lambert 1971). Since ex-ministers rarely return to the cabinet and MPs who were not promoted to an executive office after their party had led government for a significant period of time have a low chance to reach those offices in the future, party discipline is not effective for those MPs if their preferences are at odds with their party (Benedetto and Hix 2007).

Apart from the ‘Local Heroes’ mentioned above, Bailer et al. (2013) as well as Ohmura et al. (2018) differentiate among further career types. ‘Career Changers’ as well as ‘Highflyers’, i.e. MPs who have a short pre-parliamentary political career and are elected into the Bundestag early in life, have rather low defection rates, which the authors attribute to their limited ties to a local

constituency. In contrast, the highest defection rates were found among the ‘Land Legislators’ and the ‘Local Heroes’, which points to the representation of local matters being at least one of the several reasons for vote defections. ‘Late Bloomers’, often MPs from Eastern Germany who started their political career late in life, as well as ‘Party Animals’ who held a series of party offices already before their national parliamentary mandate, show roughly average defection rates. Somewhat contrarily, Heuwieser (2018) found that ‘career politicians’, i.e. MPs who spent their career mostly in political or interest group jobs, have a higher probability of voting against the party line. According to the author, their self-image as assertive political actors obviously outweighs their career-related dependence from their party, which was often supposed to bind them closer to it. Party switching, which rarely takes place in the German parliament (Patzelt 2003), also demonstrably impacts MPs’ voting behaviour: MPs who switch parties have higher defection rates before they leave their former party and lower defection rates in their new party (Gherghina and Chiru 2014; Mainwaring and Liñán 1997).

Another strand of research looks at the end of MPs’ political careers. Inspired by the literature on the U.S. Congress (Carey 1994; Zupan 1990), it has been asked whether a ‘last-period problem’ exists when MPs reduce their parliamentary effort and change their voting behaviour after they had decided not to run again for re-election. The results are ambiguous, though: Frech et al. (2021) report some evidence for shirking of term-limited politicians in the federal chambers, but not in the cantonal parliaments in Switzerland. However, Heuwieser (2018), Willumsen and Goetz (2017), Willumsen and Öhberg (2017) as well as Bauer-Blaschkowski and Mai (2019) do not report changed defection rates of MPs in the face of impending retirement. The results for a ‘last-period problem’ concerning other types of parliamentary activities, e.g. attendance rates, rapporteurships or parliamentary questions, is mixed as well (Bailer and Ohmura 2018; Geys and Mause 2016; Frech et al. 2021).

To conclude, MPs’ pre-parliamentary career tracks, going along with different experiences and degrees of attachment to their own party, as well as the incentive structure at their current career stage in politics thus affect the extent to which they toe the party line in parliament.

Personal characteristics as a determinant of party unity

The most frequently discussed purely personal characteristic is whether MPs differ in their voting behaviour depending on gender. That women, on average, have lower defection rates than men is an often-found pattern in empirical studies (e.g. Clayton and Zetterberg 2021;

Cowley and Childs 2003; Sieberer and Ohmura 2021). Cowley and Childs (2003) and Childs (2004) were the first to examine the gender gap in defection rates systematically. By ruling out alternative explanations (e.g. experience, offices or age) and by including insights from interviews with newly elected Labour women exhibiting significantly lower defection rates, the authors support the often-stated hypothesis of a different style of politics that women pursue: more team-oriented and being aware that rebelling is not an effective strategy for altering political outputs. In their analysis of survey data for various African legislatures, Clayton and Zetterberg (2021) corroborate this basic mechanism: On the one hand, their findings indicate that views on proper legislative behaviour is gendered. Whereas for men, it is accepted to be assertive political actors, women are more expected to behave loyally towards their party. On the other hand, whereas clientelism allows even undisciplined men to be nominated as candidates, women often do not profit from those structures and are selected as candidates only if they are party loyalists and thus supported by the party leadership. Dingler and Ramstetter (2023) argue as well that role expectations and thus a higher risk constrain women in their voting behaviour. According to their findings for the German Bundestag, there is no general difference in the defection rates of male and female MPs, though. However, female MPs only vote significantly more against the party line if their re-election is secure or if topics are concerned which are particularly important to women. Additionally, the authors object that other political factors have a higher explanatory power than MPs' gender. Several other studies do not detect significant gender differences in the defection rates in most models (e.g. Bauer-Blaschkowski and Mai 2019; Heuwieser 2018; Mai et al. 2022; Shomer 2016). Jun and Hix (2010) even find higher defection rates for female MPs elected in single-member districts, compared to men. The gender differences revealed are linked to findings in other areas of legislative research, e.g. regarding the descriptive representation of women in parliament (e.g. Stegmaier et al. 2014), the substantive representation of women's interests (e.g. Höhmann and Nugent 2022; Wängnerud 2009) or other aspects of legislative behaviour like speechmaking or parliamentary questions (e.g. Bäck et al. 2014; Karlsson et al. 2023; Kroeber and Krauss 2023; Rittmann 2023).

Age as another personal characteristic has been frequently included in models of dissenting voting behaviour as well, although often as a control. Net of parliamentary experience and career stage, which is correlated with age, there rarely remains a pure positive age effect (e.g. Nemoto et al. 2008). Higher defection rates of older MPs could be traced back to a higher self-confidence or career-related independence from their party. Most studies report insignificant results for age, though (Bauer-Blaschkowski and Mai 2019; Gherghina and Chiru 2014; Heuwieser 2018; Mai et al. 2022; Rich 2014; Willumsen and Goetz 2017).

A few studies investigate an effect of MPs' educational or occupational background on their voting behaviour, although the role of those variables is hardly theorised. Clayton and Zetterberg (2021) report that higher formal education is significantly related to more vote defections in African legislatures. Similar to Heuwieser (2018) who found that 'career politicians' have higher defection rates than MPs with other pre-parliamentary career trajectories, Gherghina and Chiru (2014) found that MPs coming from professions like the showbusiness, trade unions or journalism have lower defection rates than career politicians. The latter authors state that career politicians could engage more in log-rolling in legislative votes since they have more connections to members of other parties due to their longer experience in politics. In contrast, members of the Russian Duma who held executive positions in large companies prior to their mandate have higher defection rates than other MPs in votes on budget bills (Dasanaïke 2022). The author views the businesspersons' higher interest in ensuring short-term economic prosperity for themselves and their former business, compared to maintaining party unity and long-term electoral success, as the main reasons for this pattern. Conversely, Rueckert and Crane (1962) report that businessmen have the lowest defection rates within the CDU/CSU party group in the 1950s, whereas labour representatives defect most frequently, presumably due to the latter's low influence on the party line to that time. Even the role of physical attractiveness has been tested in the literature, with the result that (especially directly elected) MPs whom voters regard as good-looking have a slightly greater leeway of voting against the party line (Potrafke et al. 2020). In sum, those purely personal characteristics are clearly less important for MPs' decision of toeing the party line than electoral or office-related incentives.

4.5 Voting Behaviour in Unwhipped Votes

Even though the literature is not quite as broad, many studies have now also looked at voting behaviour and its determinants in *unwhipped* votes. As no such thing as a party line exists there, the phenomenon of interest changes from 'who votes against the party line' to 'who votes for or against a certain bill' which is situated on a particular line of conflict (e.g. liberal vs. conservative policies). Although 'free votes' are held on various policies and often strategically imposed when parties are internally split, most empirical analyses either exclude or ignore those votes from/in a larger sample or restrict the analysis to single votes (as critically discussed by Ohmura and Willumsen 2022). Most of those studies focus on morality policy votes, i.e. votes on policies in which "the regulation of value conflicts rather than conflicts over tangible resources constitutes the core feature" (Heichel et al. 2013: 320). Most of those votes concern

the regulation of 'life and death questions' (e.g. abortion, assisted dying) or issues of sexual behaviour (e.g. same-sex marriage, prostitution). Some studies are also available on addictive behaviour as well as on other limitations of individual self-determinations (matching the four subtypes of morality policies by Heichel et al. 2013). Because no party line is enforced there, most of the career-related factors which affect MPs' voting behaviour in whipped votes have no explanatory power when it comes to unwhipped votes. Broadly, the literature distils out three factors which drive MPs' voting behaviour there: personal preferences, constituency preferences and party effects.

First, since those decisions are regarded as 'votes of conscience', MPs might actually vote according to their own preferences. Those preferences have either been captured directly with the help of MP surveys and interviews (Mondo and Close 2018; Raymond 2017a, 2017b; Raymond and Overby 2016; Raymond and Worth 2017) or approximated using sociodemographic characteristics of the MP, such as religious denomination, age, gender, family status, professional background or affiliations with activist groups of the respective policy field (Arzheimer 2015; Baumann et al. 2013, 2015; Bauer-Blaschkowski and Mai 2019; Burden 2007; Engler and Dümig 2017; Hibbing and Marsh 1987; Mai et al. 2022; Overby et al. 1998; Plumb 2015a; Preidel 2016; Rolfes-Haase and Swers 2022; Warhurst 2008; Washington 2008; Wenzelburger and Fehrenz 2018). According to most studies, MPs' ties to the Christian churches are a major determinant of their (more conservative) voting behaviour on morality policies (but see Read and Marsh 1997).

As aligning with preferences or interests of the constituency is no longer regarded as a breach of party unity and since morality policies often constitute matters which are highly salient and polarised in the electorate, several studies tested constituency effects on MPs' voting behaviour. As with MP preferences, they do that by either directly measuring voter preferences (Hanretty et al. 2017) or by taking the sociodemographic composition of an MP's constituency as a proxy (Baughman 2004; Baumann 2018; Baumann et al. 2013; Chressantis et al. 1991; Haider-Markel 1999; Hibbing and Marsh 1987; Kauder and Potrafke 2019; Oldmixon 2002; Overby et al. 2011). The most frequent finding is that the more urban, highly educated or less religious the MPs' constituencies are, the more liberal is their voting behaviour. However, there are also studies which do not find any effect of constituency characteristics on free voting behaviour (e.g. Overby 1996 for the subnational level).

In addition, the literature has repeatedly shown that MPs' party affiliation is a significant predictor of whether they vote for permissive or restrictive morality policies (Baughman 2004; Cowley and Stuart 1997, 2010; Engler and Dümig 2017; Hibbing and Marsh 1987; Mondo and Close 2018; Mughan and Scully 1997; Overby et al. 1998; Pattie et al. 1998; Plumb 2015a; Plumb and Marsh 2013; Raymond 2017a, 2017b; Raymond and Overby 2016; Raymond and Worth 2017; Read and Marsh 1997; Warhurst 2008). Consequently, MPs of the same party still vote largely in unison even when the party whips do not explicitly expect them to do so. This party effect was found to be weaker on the subnational than on the national level (Plumb 2015b). The literature offers different explanations for this kind of party unity in 'free' votes: First, according to Engler and Dümig (2017: 548), the significant effect of party membership on MPs' voting behaviour supports the "claim that parties are groups of people who share common values", i.e. party unity results from similar preferences according to an agency-based approach to party politics (Wenzelburger and Zohlnhöfer 2021). Especially Christian Democrats have distinct policy preferences on most morality policy issues, which are opposed to the positions of the secular parties, since morality policies touch on the Christian belief of God's creation (Euchner and Preidel 2018; for a similar argument on the regulation of genetically modified organisms, see Tosun 2014). Second, in contrast, Baumann et al. (2015) refer to a kind of discipline effect even in unwhipped votes by stating that MPs of the same party are likely to act together since cohesive actors are rewarded electorally. Third, after controlling for policy preferences as well as personal and constituency factors, Raymond and Overby (2016: 319) conclude that unified voting behaviour in free votes has to be traced back to a "social identity shared among co-partisans". However, whether the significant partisan effects are actually loyalty effects can only be verified if the ties between MPs and parties are measured more directly than via party dummies (Raymond and Worth 2017). Rehmert's (2022) study marks a step in this direction since the author approximates party loyalty by the length of MPs' party socialisation process. He finds that MPs who joined their party early in life and MPs who have been party members for many years have a higher probability of voting with the mainstream of their party in morality policy votes in the German Bundestag – which supports the loyalty pathway to unity.

Apart from party membership, other characteristics related to their political socialisation (instead of purely personal characteristics) were rarely tested in the context of free votes. Engler and Dümig (2017) include MPs' socialisation in Eastern Germany, but do not find an effect on their voting behaviour in various morality policy votes. Raymond and Worth (2017) find limited effects of MPs' left-right self-positioning on their voting behaviour regarding same-sex marriage.

Beyond morality policies, there are some empirical investigations of single free votes on other issues, e.g. Raymond's (2017b) study of votes on a House of Lords reform. A series of qualitative studies on those non-morality policy free votes do not systematically disentangle the factors driving the individual MPs' legislative behaviour there, e.g. on the Bonn/Berlin decision of the Bundestag (Pyta 2022; von Beyme 2019). Additionally, the sociodemographic composition of the constituency or party differences do not only matter for MPs' voting behaviour but also for the implementation of morality policies, as studies on the varying fees for church exits or gay marriage on the subnational level have shown (Debus et al. 2012, 2013).

4.6 State of Research: Summary

A series of general observations and conclusions can be drawn from the above literature review:

- (1) Individual-level voting behaviour of MPs is subject to rapidly increasing scholarly attention, especially in the last two decades. The geographical focus of the parliaments which have been studied is in Europe and Northern America. However, there have appeared also some studies of party unity in Latin America, Asia and Africa. Studies are not restricted to parliamentary systems of government, where party unity is a widely accepted norm and prerequisite for the functioning of those systems. There are also numerous studies on party unity in (semi-)presidential systems of government.
- (2) Most studies in recent years are situated at an individual level of observation, i.e. the single MPs. However, party- and vote-related factors are frequently accounted for in the controls.
- (3) The bulk of studies still focuses on various electoral incentives of dissenting or toeing the party line. Indeed, office- and other career-related characteristics as well as other factors are usually included in multivariate models of dissenting voting behaviour, although often not as thoroughly theorised as electoral incentives.
- (4) An overarching, empirically supported and widely accepted theory of vote defections is still lacking. Most studies acknowledge the existence of several pathways to unity as described in chapter 3. Especially for deducting hypotheses on the discipline pathway, most studies explicitly or implicitly rely on a principal-agent framework or the Competing Principals Theory (Carey 2007, 2009) as the most prominent adaptation of this framework to legislative studies. Rational choice approaches thus still dominate the literature on dissenting voting behaviour. Notwithstanding, a series of studies include insights from psychology and norm-based approaches to theorise the loyalty pathway to unity.

- (5) When party discipline is suspended in ‘free votes’, mainly MPs’ personal and constituency characteristics (mostly approximated by sociodemographic characteristics, respectively) as well as party membership proved to be the major determinants of MPs’ voting behaviour.

In the literature review above, we did not consider the literature on ‘party pressure’ in the United States (e.g. Cox et al. 2010; Holt 2023; Jenkins 2006, 2008; Kirkland and Slapin 2017; Nokken 2000; Norpoth 1976; Schechter and Hedge 2001; Volden and Bergman 2006; Ward 1993) since, due to the presidential system of government in connection with more loosely organised parliamentary parties (Weber and Parsons 2016), party unity is not that kind of a binding rule like in parliamentary democracies.

5. Methodological Framework of the Dissertation

In order to hold system-level characteristics constant and to facilitate the comparability of the findings, all of the articles examine MPs’ behaviour within the same parliament: the German Bundestag. The case selection is not only rooted in the fact that the Bundestag is regarded as one of the most well-documented and powerful parliaments in Europe (Sieberer 2011; less definitely Sebaldt 2009) – which makes it a particularly interesting case to study. However, its suitability for studies of vote defections rather stems from the observation that the institutional setting favours a high effectiveness of most pathways to unity: First, the Bundestag, more a ‘working’ than a ‘debating’ parliament (Steffani 1979), delegates the bulk of its legislative work to comparatively powerful committees (Martin and Vanberg 2011; Zubek 2021). Consequently, since division of labour on the institutional level and issue specialisation on the individual level are rather pronounced in the Bundestag, the respective pathway to unity is worth to be further explored. Second, the same is true for the loyalty pathway. In the literature, Germany was called a “party state” (Schmidt 2008: 71). Although the party system has changed considerably over time (e.g. Niedermayer 2020), three out of six parliamentary party groups in the 20th Bundestag (elected in 2021) already existed in the 1st Bundestag (1949-1953), including the two largest ones (Christian Democrats and Social Democrats), and party switches of incumbent MPs are comparatively rare. The ties between MPs and their parties appear rather close, which suggests that the loyalty pathway to unity works particularly well in the German case. Nevertheless, individual-level variance in this respect is worth to be further explored. Third, the Bundestag is known as a ‘party group parliament’ (Ismayr 2012), given the central role of parties in legislative politics. That MPs are unlikely to reach any of their goals without their party (group) disciplines

most of them in their legislative behaviour. To conclude, the institutional setup in Germany offers a most-likely case for empirical analyses of most of the pathways to unity. If no empirical evidence for the pathways is found for the German case, then those pathways will not work in less likely cases as well. Finally, there is also a methodological reason for choosing the Bundestag: In spite of its high unity scores, there is still sufficient variance left to be explained. If unity scores are even higher, like in the Dutch or Swedish parliament with more than 99 percent (Louwerse et al. 2018; Willumsen and Öhberg 2017), then finding significant predictors of dissenting voting behaviour becomes even more challenging than for the German case.

All of the articles use observational data for the test of their hypotheses. Compared to survey or interview-based data, this is linked to certain advantages, but also disadvantages (see, for the following, Sieberer and Müller 2017): On the one hand, the use of survey data would allow parliamentary researchers to explore the connection between certain experiences or attitudes of MPs (e.g. perceived loyalty towards their party) and their (asserted) behaviour, e.g. party unity (see the studies of Kam 2011, van Vonno 2019 and Willumsen 2017 for such an approach). On the other hand, it is difficult to generate high response rates in surveys since MPs are a particularly busy professional group. This bears the risk of drawing inferences based on a potentially unrepresentative sample of MPs. Additionally, effects of social desirability could affect MPs' responses. More fundamentally, surveys often include a self-assessment of how MPs would act if a particular scenario occurred. Contrary to observational data, we cannot learn something about how the MPs actually behaved in real-world situations, whereas observed legislative behaviour directly leads to certain policy outcomes. Due to those restrictions and for efficiency reasons, we opted for an observational study design. However, insights from MP surveys are repeatedly used for the deduction of the hypotheses.

This dissertation relies on a methodological individualism, i.e. on the understanding that legislative behaviour has first and foremost to be explained by the attitudes, actions and interactions of individual actors, in this case the MPs (Sieberer 2023). Consequently, it exploits maximally disaggregated data on how a single MP decides in a single parliamentary vote, while controlling for party-, vote- and, if applicable, time-related characteristics. Only MPs who were members of a party group at the time of a vote are included in the sample because only for such MPs something like a party line applies. The few MPs who left their party group during a legislative term are included in the analyses up to the date of their withdrawal (for analyses of how MPs who do not belong to any party group vote in parliament, see Cowley and Stuart 2009; Wimmel 2021).

The analyses of the articles are restricted to roll-call votes (*namentliche Abstimmungen*) since they constitute the only source of recorded individual-level voting behaviour in the German parliament. In contrast to the majority of democratic legislatures (Hug et al. 2015), recorded votes are not the standard voting procedure in the Bundestag and have to be explicitly requested by a party group or 5 percent of the MPs (§ 52 *Geschäftsordnung des Deutschen Bundestages*). Because roll-call votes constitute only a small share of all parliamentary votes, in the case of the Bundestag about 5 percent (Sieberer et al. 2020), there is a considerable scientific debate on whether they can be regarded as a representative sample of all parliamentary votes. As they have to be explicitly requested, roll-call votes might serve a series of strategic purposes: monitoring (and thus disciplining) the legislative behaviour of MPs, signalling the party's position to the voters or interest groups and unveiling disunity of opponent parties – which could lead to selection effects if only recorded votes are studied (Ainsley et al. 2020; Carrubba et al. 2006, 2008; Crisp and Driscoll 2012; Finke 2015; Hug 2010; Saalfeld 1995b; Stecker 2010, 2011b). However, this strategic component does not necessarily have to question the results of roll-call vote analyses. On the one hand, the effects mentioned could cancel each other out, e.g. higher party unity due to a better observability by the party group leadership vs. lower party unity due to the often-contentious issues voted by roll-call. On the other hand, some of these strategic incentives can also be modelled, for example by including in the regression analysis which parliamentary group requested the roll-call vote. Apart from this, a lack of representativeness of roll-call votes, in terms of selection and salience of issues or concerning the cohesiveness of the parliamentary groups, does not necessarily translate into a bias of behavioural effects observed in those votes. For example, a yet unpublished study shows that despite the lack of representativeness of roll-call votes, compared to all votes in the German Bundestag, there is hardly any difference between these two vote types when it comes to the voting behaviour of opposition parties vis-à-vis the government (Anonymous 2023). Additionally, a rule change in the European Parliament from a possible request to a mandatory roll-call vote on the final passage of legislation did not lead to a clear change in the unity scores of the party groups (see the contradictory results of Hix et al. 2018 as well as Yordanova and Mühlböck 2015 on this question). Consequently, and as there is any alternative lacking for observing individual-level voting behaviour of MPs in Germany, we stick to the use of roll-call votes for our analyses.

All of the four articles have the same dichotomous dependent variable: whether or not MPs vote against the party line in a single voting decision. In addition, the direction of MPs' voting behaviour (voting for or against a given proposal) is explored in the analysis of the unwhipped votes on organ donation in Article 2. No differentiation is made concerning the degree of

defection. Some studies differentiate ‘soft’ (when the MP votes ‘abstention’ and the party votes ‘yes’ or ‘no’) and ‘strong’ (e.g. when the MP votes ‘no’ and the party votes ‘yes’) deviations and argue that MPs strategically choose between those two options as the former does not endanger the passage of a bill (e.g. Ceron 2015; Willumsen and Öhberg 2017). However, we do not adopt this differentiation since in both cases, the MPs voice visible dissent which potentially harms the party’s image in the electorate. Similarly, we do not treat absences as strategic voting decisions either. Even though there are some indications in the literature that not attending the vote is a means of not disappointing demands by multiple principals (Ceron 2015; Fazekas and Hansen 2022; Font 2020; Rosas et al. 2015), being absent will also have non-political reasons in many instances, e.g. illness, pregnancy or scheduling reasons. Since we are unable to differentiate between strategic and non-strategic absences, we stick to the mainstream of the literature (e.g. Benedetto and Hix 2007; Sieberer and Ohmura 2019; Willumsen and Öhberg 2017) and code absences as missing observations.⁴ Following the described operationalisation of the dependent variable, the voting patterns are then analysed with logistic regression analyses which account for the clustered nature of the data (repeated votes by MPs). The independent variables stem from a variety of sources, starting from parliamentary documentation (for committee memberships or outside earnings), MP biographies (for personal characteristics as well as party and public offices) up to saliency measures of the Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001).

6. Arguments and Empirical Results of the Articles

Table 2: Overview of the articles

Article	Pathway	Empirical Approximation	Case Selection
1	Division of Labour	Membership in parliamentary committees and intra-party working groups	Whipped votes, 19 th legislative term (2017-2021)
2	Party Agreement	Sociodemographic characteristics of the MPs and their constituencies	Unwhipped vote on organ donation (2020), additionally whipped votes 16 th -19 th legislative term (2005-2021)
3	Party Loyalty	Party offices at the local/regional level (“Ochsentour”)	Whipped votes, 1 st -18 th legislative term (1949-2017)
4	Party Discipline	Outside earnings	Whipped votes, 18 th legislative term (2013-2017)

⁴ However, in the context of robustness checks within Article 1, we re-estimated the models with absences coded as either deviations or non-deviations. Broadly, the hypothesised effects keep their direction and statistical significance, but decrease in size.

Each of the four articles focuses on (at least) one pathway to unity. In each case, a particular MP characteristic is discussed which, according to our argument, approximates the effectiveness of the respective pathway empirically. Its effect on an MP's probability of casting a dissenting vote is then empirically tested (by controlling for empirical manifestations of the alternative pathways, respectively) using data for one, several or all legislative terms of the German Bundestag, depending on data availability (see table 2).

Article 2 marks an exception in two respects: On the one hand, it analyses not only the determinants of vote dissent in whipped votes but also the direction of MPs' voting behaviour in a free vote. The importance of preferences can best be tested in the context of a single vote on a particular policy area where no party discipline applies. On the other hand, this article consists of y-centred analyses in which other pathways to unity are addressed even-handedly, including MP characteristics which were tested for their explanatory power for the first time (e.g. socialisation in the 'German Democratic Republic' as another indicator of party loyalty).

6.1 Division of Labour and Dissenting Voting Behaviour of MPs in a 'Working Parliament' (Article 1)

Division of labour is not only one of the pathways the literature has found to secure party unity, but also one of the key principles that structures the daily business of many parliaments, at least of those labelled as 'working parliaments' (Lord 2018; Steffani 1979). Due to the increasing workload and complexity of topics modern parliaments are concerned with, MPs are unable to deal in depth with all the issues that are deliberated in parliament. Instead, they specialise on a few topics related to the parliamentary committees they were assigned to by the party group leadership at the beginning of a legislative term. Consequently, the Bundestag can be described as a 'parliament of experts', as the title of von Oertzen's (2006) book suggests. This expert role is filled by discussing the issues in intra-party working groups, establishing a policy position on behalf of the whole party and defending it in the relevant parliamentary committee and vis-à-vis the other parliamentary party groups. That MPs, on the one hand, are involved in shaping the party line on certain topics, and, on the other hand, are not concerned with some topics at all before the plenary vote might affect their legislative behaviour.

Against this backdrop, article 1 first hypothesises that MPs have a lower probability of voting against the party line regarding issues which they have worked on in the responsible

parliamentary committee and the corresponding body of their party group. The main reason for this expected pattern is that MPs had the opportunity to shape the party line on those issues, which is why ideological differences between MPs and the bill being voted on are less likely. The hypothesised effect might be further strengthened by the fact that there is also an increased expectation of mutual loyalty among MPs who work on the same issues within their parliamentary group over a longer period of time, making it more difficult for them to vote against the party on ‘their’ issues. Second, we hypothesise that not only the current but also past memberships in the responsible committee increase MPs’ propensity to support their party on a given motion. Due to their past work on those topics, MPs became familiar with the party’s position and there might have taken place a convergence between the party line (which they have used to shape themselves in former times) and their own preferences. Additionally, MPs might still exhibit a sense of loyalty towards their former working group and its members due to their prior collaboration. Third, it is hypothesised that the negative effect of being member of the responsible committee on MPs’ defection rates is stronger for policy spokespersons, compared to ordinary committee members. Since they lead the intra-party working group on a given topic, they have better means of shaping the party line, especially in the case of intra-party conflicts. In addition, such office holders are expected to behave in a particularly compliant manner. Fourth, we argue that the committee membership effect on MPs’ voting behaviour is not equal among all issues put to the vote. Especially in important votes, i.e. those on bills which bring about changes in legal norms (in contrast to non-legislative motions) or those on topics which are salient to an MP’s party, it is likely that the decision-making process moves away from policy specialists in parliamentary committees to the party group leadership or the government (in the case of governing parties). Consequently, we expect the unity-inducing effect of voting on issues of MPs’ own committees to appear primarily in non-legislative votes and concerning issues that are not particularly salient in the manifesto of an MP’s party.

Regression analyses using data on the 19th legislative term (2017-2021) support all of the five hypotheses. Thus, the article demonstrates that party unity also originates from issue specialisation (on the MP level) and from division of labour (on the parliamentary level) and cannot be regarded solely as a hierarchical problem, as it is often presented (see also von Oertzen 2006). It underscores what Garner and Letki (2005) found in their qualitative study whereupon lacking influence on the party group’s position ultimately gives way to dissenting votes.

With those results, the article is one of the rare accounts on the division of labour pathway to party unity. Based on the initial work of Willumsen and Öhberg (2017), it defines important

scope conditions of when this division of labour effect decreases MPs' defection rates to an especially large extent: for policy spokespersons as well as in votes on non-legislative and non-salient matters. Beyond that, the article connects several strands of the literature with studies on voting behaviour in parliaments: It adds to the literature on parliamentary committees that, on the one hand, heavily focuses on patterns of committee assignments (see, most recently, Kroeber 2023 as well as Martin and Mickler 2019 for a review), and that, on the other hand, sheds light on various functions of committees and its implications for party competition (e.g. Cross et al. 2021; Fortunato 2019; Kim and Loewenberg 2005; Martin and Vanberg 2005; Norton 2019; Siefken 2018; Strøm 1990). Additionally, it establishes a connection to the literature on issue competition, saliency and issue ownership (Budge 2015; Dennison 2019) in that the division of labour effect on dissenting voting behaviour is conditioned by the salience of the respective issue for the MP's party. Earlier analyses have found that issue ownership affects other aspects of legislative politics as well, such as legislative agenda-setting (Debus and Tosun 2021; Green and Jennings 2019; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010) or the use of parliamentary questions (Green-Pedersen 2010; Otjes and Louwerse 2018). Only Klüver and Spoon (2015) used the saliency approach before to explain when MPs defect from their national party in the European Parliament. More broadly, the findings imply that combining MP- and issue-based characteristics is a fruitful approach to explain vote defections more accurately.

6.2 Voting Behaviour in the 19th German Bundestag and Beyond: Between the Daily Business of Unity and a Special Vote of Conscience (Article 2)

As part of a Special Issue which deals with the politics and policies during the fourth Merkel government (Zohlnhöfer and Engler 2023), the second article of the dissertation has, theoretically and empirically, two different foci.

Against the backdrop of a considerably changed party system, two newly formed parliamentary party groups in parliament (AfD and FDP) and a high MP turnover rate after the 2017 election, the first part of the article explores whether the determinants of MPs' legislative behaviour have also changed in this context. In a y-centred analysis, all whipped votes during the 19th legislative term (2017-2021) are studied and the determinants of MPs' dissenting voting behaviour were compared with the three previous terms of Merkel governments (2005-2017). As expected, mostly career-related factors account for MPs' varying defection rates. Holding important executive or parliamentary offices decreases MPs' probability to defect, just as electoral security

of directly elected MPs and the membership in a governing party do. In contrast and quite surprisingly, both the length of parliamentary experience and if the MP grew up in the autocratic ‘German Democratic Republic’ (GDR) (still) correlate with higher defection rates.

The most recognisable differences between the 19th electoral term and the three previous terms of Merkel governments are that, in the former, a ‘last-period effect’ (i.e. higher defection rates during the last years of MPs’ parliamentary career) was no longer found and that the effect of being member in a governing party became markedly stronger. Both differences can be related to the changed political context during Angela Merkel’s last term: As re-election probabilities became more difficult to predict, there are no longer measurable differences between MPs who plan to leave parliament and the others (who could unexpectedly lose their seat). Additionally, as the government majority shrunk, the MPs of the government parties had to toe the party line to a greater extent to ensure that their majority holds. Notwithstanding, the other predictors keep their explanatory power across legislative terms, which highlights that MPs’ considerations in the run-up to legislative votes are quite stable. In contrast, purely personal characteristics, such as age and gender, do not exhibit a significant influence on MPs’ probability of toeing the party line.

The second part of the article focuses on MPs’ voting behaviour in the only free votes of this legislative term, which concerned the reform of the organ donation system. As with previous morality policies, party discipline was released and MPs drafted and voted on two cross-partisan bills: According to the presumed consent option (*Widerspruchslösung*), everyone would be regarded as an organ donor as long as he/she or his/her relatives do not contradict. The opposing strict consent option (*Entscheidungslösung*) provides amendments to the current rule that only people will be organ donors who have, during their lifetime, actively agreed.⁵ Organ donation policy has been neglected both in the literature on morality policies (where it is not even included in an exclusive list of 37 morality policies (Tatalovitch and Wendell 2018) and in the literature on free votes in parliament (where we were, to the best of our knowledge, the first to publish an individual-level study of MPs’ voting behaviour on that issue). Supported by an inductive text analysis of all parliamentary speeches held before the vote, we argue that the decision on organ donation policy is structured by a different value conflict than other, more

⁵ The AfD did not take part in the cross-party initiatives and drafted an own bill (*Vertrauenslösung*), which was not voted on by roll-call vote.

prominently discussed morality policies like abortion or assisted dying, namely by the conflict between self-determination of the individual and collective health interests.

In general, we expect that the proven triad of MP characteristics, constituency characteristics and party membership have explanatory power also for this vote. However, the special cleavage underlying this vote likely results in only certain of these characteristics being influential. Among the MP characteristics, a Christian (however only Protestant, not Catholic) denomination, potentially going along with scepticism towards far-reaching interferences in questions of life and death, and female gender decrease MPs' support for the presumed consent option, whereas union membership (according to some of the models) increases MPs' support for presumed consent, most likely due to the collectivist attitudes associated with the membership in those organisations. Additionally, MPs with a high share of Christians in their constituency (however only Catholics, not Protestants) as well as those from urban and highly educated constituencies have a higher probability of opposing the presumed consent option, presumably due to the prevalence of individualist attitudes in such constituencies. Concerning the partisan effects, Green and Liberal MPs (due to the individualist ideology of their party) as well as AfD MPs (since their party initiated an own proposal), but also (contrary to our expectations) Socialist MPs have a higher probability of voting against presumed consent, compared to Christian Democratic MPs as the baseline category.

However, it must be acknowledged that several MP characteristics and constituency characteristics, which we associated with collectivist or individualist attitudes and thus with support for or opposition against the presumed consent or strict consent option, respectively, showed no statistically significant effect in our regression models. Possible explanations are, first, that the theorised value conflict underlying the decision has to be supplemented by additional dimensions or that, second, the nearly unanimously partisan vote of the AfD MPs distorts the results for the MP- and constituency-related variables. The latter is also a likely explanation for the observation that the findings for the vote on the strict consent option are not the mere inversion of the findings for the presumed consent option and support fewer of our hypothesised effects. Because much of the debate centred on the advantages and disadvantages of the presumed consent option, a non-support of the presumed consent option is clearly related to an opposition against the underlying paradigm shift in the organ donation policy. Conversely, not supporting the strict consent option could have two different reasons: either opting for a more far-reaching change in the organ donation policy (i.e. support of the

presumed consent option) or favouring other changes in the donation system (i.e. support of the AfD's draft).

The findings have several implications for legislative studies and beyond: Being the first published analysis of MPs' voting behaviour in the 19th Bundestag term, it showed that characteristics of the MPs that concern their political career and socialisation are related to their voting behaviour both in the whipped vote as well as in this special free vote – different ones, though. In this context, some of the MP characteristics used (GDR socialisation in the analysis of whipped votes and union membership in the analysis of the unwhipped vote) have, to the best of our knowledge, not been empirically tested in previous studies. Purely personal characteristics of the MPs, such as religion or gender, do only matter if MPs are given the opportunity to vote without the disciplining force of a party line. Additionally, since the analysis of the unwhipped vote concerned a single topic that could be related to particular constituency preferences (approximated by its sociodemographic composition), our findings suggest that MPs are indeed responsive towards their voters (similarly Hanretty et al. 2017). Contrarily, the evidence for substantive representation, i.e. MP behaviour targeting at a particular group that shares certain attitudes with the MP like gender, age, ethnicity or social background (e.g. Bailer et al. 2022; Bönisch 2022; Hemingway 2022; Höhmann 2020), is rather weak. On the one hand, the proposed reforms of the organ donation system do not benefit particular sociodemographic groups of society. On the other hand, the MP characteristics indicating such a group membership mostly do not show statistically significant effects on their voting behaviour. Lastly, the once again strong partisan effects in a morality policy vote bridge the gap between legislative studies and public policy analysis. That MPs of a given party vote together in parliament even if the whip is off supports an agency-based view on political parties and the policies that they implement (Wenzelburger and Zohlnhöfer 2021).

6.3 Loyal Activists? Party Socialisation and Dissenting Voting Behaviour in Parliament (Article 3)

The third article focuses on the loyalty pathway to unity, i.e. MPs toeing the party line voluntarily due to feelings of commitment towards their party. Earlier studies have viewed loyalty mainly as the result of a long membership in parliament which they ascribed possible socialisation effects (e.g. Delius et al. 2013). However, MPs enter parliament not as politically unsocialised individuals (e.g. Clarke and Price 1977). Two recent studies of dissenting voting behaviour focus

on the length of party membership as an additional source of socialisation effects (Gherghina and Chiru 2014; Rehmert 2022). Our article chose a different approach and conceptualises MPs' loyalty as the result of a thorough socialisation process into the organisational structures of their extra-parliamentary party. MPs have often gained political experience before they were elected to parliament. Cross-over careers of politicians at the national level without former political engagement do exist, but are a rare phenomenon (Küpper and Wenzelburger 2013; Lorenz and Micus 2009). Only about 10 percent of the MPs between 1949 and 2017 did not pursue the so-called 'Ochsentour', i.e. a process of intra-party proving by formal (offices) and informal (hanging posters, supporting the election campaign) engagement at the local or regional level (Hellmann 2020), before they were elected into the Bundestag for the first time. We argue that MPs lacking this kind of in-depth party socialisation differ from their colleagues regarding their legislative behaviour. Having held party offices at the local or regional level increases the probability that MPs have internalised norms such as loyalty, mutual trust and the advantages of collective action. It is also plausible from a social-psychological point of view that participation in organisational bodies promotes loyalty to one's own party (Russell 2014). Those norms increase the probability that MPs vote with their party even if they disagree with it on policy grounds and without the need of being disciplined by the threat of sanctions or the promise of rewards (Crowe 1986). In contrast, MPs who did not hold party offices prior to their first election into parliament consider themselves more independent-minded when forming their opinion on certain issues (Bailer et al. 2013). Consequently, we hypothesise that MPs lacking the 'Ochsentour' experiences have a higher probability of voting against the party line than their colleagues who were party-socialised before entering parliament.

However, we further qualify this argument in that we expect the party socialisation effect to be conditional on parliamentary experience: As newcomers to parliament, MPs are not familiar with the institutional norms and the functioning of intra-parliamentary processes. With growing parliamentary experience, they get used to the norms structuring parliamentary work, including the need for party unity (Delius et al. 2013; Patzelt 1999). MPs are thus politically socialised not only in their party, but also in parliament (Mughan et al. 1997; Reiser et al. 2011; Rosenblatt 2007; Wüst 2009). Consequently, the two socialisation processes overlap and parliamentary socialisation is likely to gradually replace party socialisation as a pathway to party-compliant voting behaviour. Accordingly, our second hypothesis is that the positive effect of a lacking party socialisation on defection rates is strongest at the beginning of MPs' parliamentary career and decreases with longer parliamentary service.

We test those propositions quantitatively against an extensive dataset of all roll-call votes and biographical data for MPs over nearly 70 years (1949-2017). Regression analyses support both hypotheses while controlling for discipline-related MP characteristics as well as characteristics of the vote and electoral term. Defection rates are higher for MPs who did not hold party offices prior to their first election into the Bundestag, and this effect gets weaker the longer MPs serve in parliament. After the sixth year in parliament, a behavioural difference between MPs with or without party socialisation experiences is no longer detectable. The results show that MPs' legislative behaviour is not only a product of the notorious 'carrots and sticks' as suggested by the dominating rational-choice approaches but that party unity in parliaments might also originate from MPs' feelings of loyalty, even in votes where party discipline is enforced.

Our study has implications for various strands of the literature: First, it complements the literature on politicians' socialisation experiences and their consequences. The results provide further evidence that an effective socialisation process does not begin with the election into parliament but that politicians' involvement in substantive party work has a socialising effect as well (Crowe 1986). Second, it adds another piece to the literature on behavioural effects of MPs' ties to their party and pre-parliamentary career paths. According to recent studies, how close politicians are connected to their party also matters for their focus of representation (Bailer et al. 2013; Binderkrantz et al. 2020), candidate nomination (Cordes and Hellmann 2020; Rehmer 2020; Reiser 2023), career paths (Allen 2013; Ohmura et al. 2018) or individual influence on public policy-making (Alexiadou 2015). More generally, our study connects with numerous studies investigating the effect of pre-parliamentary experiences on parliamentary behaviour (e.g. Francis and Bramlett 2017). Finally, the interaction effect between party socialisation and parliamentary experience adds to a series of other studies indicating that legislative behaviour and its determinants vary with MPs' seniority (e.g. Bailer and Ohmura 2018; Bailer et al. 2022).

6.4 Whose Bread I Don't Eat, his Song I Don't Sing? MPs' Outside Earnings and Dissenting Voting Behaviour (Article 4)

Party discipline as the ultimate pathway to party unity is the focal point of the fourth article of this dissertation. It chooses a rather unconventional approach of approximating the varying effectiveness of party discipline among the MPs: the amount of their outside earnings. By law, German MPs are allowed to pursue side jobs and earn additional money as long as their mandate remains centre-stage (§ 44a *Abgeordnetengesetz*). Outside earnings are repeatedly the subject of

public criticism and calls to tighten the regulations on such income or to expand the transparency rules (Geys and Mause 2022; Gründler et al. 2021; von Arnim 2006). Nevertheless, in the 18th legislative term (2013-2017), about 20 percent of the MPs received outside earnings. The types of outside activities ranged from paid speeches to mandates in the supervisory boards of companies to running one's own agricultural business or law firm. Whether MPs have remunerated side jobs depends on which party they belong to, their gender, education, their electoral vulnerability and the timing within the election cycle as well as on their physical appearance (Becker et al. 2009; Geys 2013, 2015; Geys and Mause 2014; Hurka et al. 2018a). After several studies have found that outside earnings affect MPs' parliamentary effort, i.e. attendance rates or the usage of instruments such as questions, although with mixed directions of an effect (Arnold et al. 2014; Fedele and Naticchioni 2015; Gagliarducci et al. 2010; Hurka et al. 2018b, Staat and Kuehnhanss 2017, Weschle 2022; Wochner 2022), this article aims to investigate whether outside earnings also affect MPs' probability of casting a dissenting vote.

Based on the Competing Principals Theory (Carey 2007), we argue that outside earnings change MPs' relationship to their principals. First, outside earnings relieve MPs from electoral pressures since their personal income does not fully depend on successful re-election. Dissenting votes as a means of making their mark in the constituency in order to increase the chances of re-election should therefore carry less weight – especially since the empirical evidence is mixed anyway as to the extent to which dissenting votes actually occur for electoral reasons (see the literature review in chapter 4). Second, concerning the party as their most important principal, MPs with high outside earnings are more insulated from the pressures of party discipline. Party discipline originates from the 'carrots and sticks' that the party group leadership imposes to close the ranks among its MPs. Most of those disciplinary means are related to MPs' office-seeking aspirations. Consequently, ambitious MPs usually have large incentives to gear their legislative behaviour towards their party principal in order to reach their office-related goals (e.g. Schlesinger 1966; Sieberer and Müller 2017). However, the costs of disciplinary sanctions are not equal among all MPs (Slapin et al. 2018). Even if moonlighting MPs would also like to advance their political career, possible sanctions resulting from dissenting votes, e.g. the non-promotion to prestigious and better remunerated offices, do not affect their standard of living or their overall professional life as negatively as in the case of MPs without something to fall back on. Third, MPs' preferences could be pulled towards their outside interests as an additional principal for those MPs. This could lead to more frequent situations of incongruence between the party line and those MPs' preferences. However, research on a direct effect of outside activities on MPs' preferences is scarce (Geys and Mause 2013; see also the discussion below). To conclude, we

argue that high outside earnings of MPs lower the effectiveness of party discipline as a pathway to unity. Thus, our empirical hypothesis is that MPs with high outside earnings have, all else being equal, a higher probability of voting against the party line than MPs with low or negligible additional income.

We test this hypothesis quantitatively against roll-call vote data for the 18th German Bundestag (2013-2017), as this was the last completed term at the time of writing the article. For the main independent variable, we first computed the sum of MPs' (minimum) outside earnings per year, according to their published self-declarations. Second, in order to prevent biased results due to the highly skewed earnings data and to account for a decreasing effect of additional earnings in the case of already high outside income, we dichotomised the variable and regard MPs as having 'high' outside earnings if those exceed the yearly parliamentary salary (without further allowances) of about 108,000 Euro (at that time). Logistic panel regressions with cluster-robust standard errors on the MP level are estimated, by including common controls on the MP and vote level. The results support our hypothesis that MPs having high outside earnings show a significantly higher probability of voting against the party line. Additionally, the findings are robust against different model specifications and varying transformations of the outside earnings data. Although this correlative analysis cannot ultimately prove our hypothesised causal mechanism, two additional analyses hint at the changed effectiveness of party discipline as a plausible reason for the found patterns. First, we find that the positive effect of high outside earnings on vote defections is markedly more pronounced in votes on government bills, i.e. in cases where especially strong party discipline applies since those votes are more salient and consequential than other votes, e.g. on motions of the opposition parties. Second, we tested for the contra-indication of free votes where no party discipline is exerted and thus our argument should not hold. Indeed, MPs with high outside earnings do not differ from their colleagues with no or negligible earnings in their legislative behaviour, meaning that they do not show a higher or lower probability of diverging from the mainstream position of their party on those three votes which concerned morality policies. Consequently, our results underscore the importance of party discipline as a pathway to unity in whipped votes and of outside earnings as an important predictor of the effectiveness of party discipline.

A later study by Weschle (2022) using data for the British House of Commons confirms our findings for another country, but only for the Conservative, not for the Labour Party. Apart from theorising and empirically supporting a new correlate of party unity, the findings add to the literature that focuses on other forms of outside interests and their effects on MPs' legislative

behaviour. For the U.S. case, several studies indicate that donations from companies or interest groups affect MPs' voting behaviour on topics related to those organisations (e.g. Bergan 2010; Bishop and Dudley 2017; Fleisher 1993; Grier et al. 2023, see also the literature review by Roscoe and Jennings 2005). Conversely, MPs who finance their election campaign to a higher degree by contributions from their party show a more party-compliant voting behaviour after the elections (Leyden and Borrelli 1990, 1994). However, outside earnings have to be kept distinct from donations and interest group contacts, i.e. lobbying, since the bulk of MPs' outside earnings are generated by running own businesses instead of receiving payments from other organisations. More broadly, our findings also speak to the research on the link between MPs' career paths and their legislative behaviour (e.g. Ohmura et al. 2018).

7. Conjunctions of the Articles and Outlook

The four articles of this cumulative dissertation are held together by looking at one or more pathways to party unity, using career-related characteristics to approximate the varying effectiveness of these paths for individual MPs and finally testing their explanatory power with roll-call vote data. That all of the four articles focus on the German Bundestag, albeit with different periods of observation, ensures that, on the one hand, the results of the different articles can be compared without regard to institutional differences, and, on the other hand, the results are not equally driven by peculiarities of a particular legislative term. The findings of the articles support the overarching proposition of this dissertation, namely that career-related characteristics of MPs are significantly related to their propensity of voting against the party line. However, different aspects and stages of their political career tie in at different points in MPs' decision-making process in the run-up to a parliamentary vote: Concerning the *loyalty* pathway to unity, MPs' pre-parliamentary socialisation in organisational bodies of their party at the local or regional level, on the positive side, as well as a political socialisation in the GDR, on the negative side, appear to have a stronger impact on their propensity of toeing the party line than their seniority in the national parliament. The *division of labour* pathway favours party-compliant voting behaviour on issues which MPs work on in committees and intra-party working groups and can thus help shaping the party line. This pathway is more effective for those MPs who bear greater responsibility in the specialised decision-making process of their parliamentary group, such as the spokespersons for certain issues. The effectiveness of the *discipline* pathway to unity is strengthened by currently held offices in parliament and government, but weakened by extensive outside earnings in addition to their parliamentary

mandate. Finally, the influence of *agreement* in terms of policy preferences was tested in the different setting of a free vote on organ donation as a morality policy issue. The results show that both the MPs' personal and, to a stronger extent, sociodemographic characteristics of their constituency are related to their voting behaviour, which suggests that not only personal preferences but also the preferences of their voters account for their voting behaviour when unconstrained by party discipline. Even after controlling for those factors, party membership remains important for MPs' legislative behaviour.

Even if the results attribute a distinct explanatory power to all pathways to unity, it cannot be deduced from the findings which of the paths is most influential. However, this is hardly in the sense of the underlying theoretical model which does not consider the pathways to be unrelated to each other but rather sequentially arranged one after the other. Only if, for example, division of labour is not effective, then the other explanatory factors come into play. In addition, the paths cannot always be clearly distinguished. While the lower defection rates for ordinary committee members can be rather easily attributed to the effect of the division of labour, several factors come together in the case of policy spokespersons: Of course, they have more influence on the content of policies, but they are also disciplined by the increased expectation of compliant behaviour and the fear of losing their office. As they are often long-standing members of their parliamentary group and have numerous interactions with colleagues in the context of their role, loyalty effects could also be a factor. Apart from those conceptual ambiguities, this dissertation has identified, theoretically discussed and empirically tested several characteristics of MPs that both contribute to a more complete ex-post explanation of the already well-researched phenomenon of dissenting voting behaviour and allow for more accurate predictions on the future behaviour of MPs, depending on characteristics of their political careers. A broader conclusion that can be drawn from the findings is that MPs are well aware of their current role within their party group and how to balance their party's interests with the demands of other principals, depending on the stage of their career. However, the findings on the behavioural effect of party socialisation show that MPs are not driven by rational-choice considerations alone but fulfil their role also out of a certain sense of duty and driven by intrinsic motives. The findings thus underscore that MPs are not mere marionettes of the party group leadership but follow the party line unsolicitedly in most of the cases.

In principle, these findings are transferable to defections during other forms of legislative activities where MPs are expected to follow the party line, such as parliamentary speeches (Bhattacharya 2023; Bäck et al. 2019; Proksch and Slapin 2012; van Kleef et al. 2023) and, to a

lower extent, to vote explanations since MPs are more autonomous in deciding if and with which content they use this tool (Bhattacharya and Papageorgiou 2019; Sieberer 2015). Future research may therefore further explore those tools of individual-level behaviour related to certain policy positions (in contrast to, e.g. attendance rates) and shed light on one of the following questions that have remained open so far: First, despite the tremendous evidence for the particular pathways to unity and their correlates, there are only a few attempts of explicitly testing the pathways against each other (but see Willumsen 2017 and van Vonno 2019) or of modelling precisely the sequential nature of MPs' decision-making process. Second, even if the impact of particular career-related characteristics (e.g. pre-parliamentary career or currently held offices) are well explored (see chapter 4 as well as the articles' findings), a comprehensive view on dissenting voting behaviour that integrates the MPs' political experiences into career types or the like and testing their effect against alternative explanations is still lacking.⁶ Similarly, the intra-MP temporal variance of dissenting voting behaviour has received comparatively little attention yet (see, e.g., Bailer and Ohmura 2018 for parliamentary effort). Third, large parts of the literature, including three of the four articles of this dissertation, suffer from the lacking inclusion of MPs' preferences (or approximations thereof), although they are a major determinant of dissenting voting behaviour (Willumsen 2017). If these could be measured validly for numerous policy fields, the importance of non-policy-related incentives of toeing the party line (such as career-related ones) could be even better assessed. Fourth, an important precondition for political careers and legislative behaviour beneficial for the advancement of those careers is personal ambition (Schlesinger 1966; Herrick and Moore 1993; Sieberer and Müller 2017). Why some MPs are more ambitious than others is rooted in certain personality traits (Dynes et al. 2019). However, those psychological roots of legislative behaviour, especially vote defections, are virtually unexplored and should play a more prominent role in future studies (but see Russell 2014 for first insights from social psychology). MPs are first and foremost human beings, so there is a strong case for interpreting dissenting or party-compliant voting behaviour as a human reaction to social processes.

⁶ Bailer et al. (2013) and Ohmura et al. (2018) actually integrate the stages of MPs' career into several career types. However, they deal only marginally with dissenting voting behaviour, describing defection rates of different career types. For other kinds of MPs' activities, such as vote attendance or legislative work, the impact of such career types has already been tested in multivariate studies (e.g. Høyland et al. 2019; van Geffen 2016).

8. References

- Aidt, Toke, Felix Grey, and Alexandru Savu (2021). 'The Meaningful Votes: Voting on Brexit in the British House of Commons', *Public Choice*, 186:3-4, 587–617.
- Ainsley, Caitlin, Clifford J. Carrubba, Brian F. Crisp, Betul Demirkaya, Matthew J. Gabel, and Dino Hadzic (2020). 'Roll-Call Vote Selection: Implications for the Study of Legislative Politics', *American Political Science Review*, 114:3, 691–706.
- Alexiadou, Despina (2015). 'Ideologues, Partisans, and Loyalists: Cabinet Ministers and Social Welfare Reform in Parliamentary Democracies', *Comparative Political Studies*, 48:8, 1051–86.
- Allen, Peter (2013). 'Linking Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience and the Career Trajectories of the 1997 General Election Cohort', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 66:4, 685–707.
- Anderson, Sarah E., Daniel M. Butler, Laurel Harbridge-Yong, and G. Agustin Markarian (2023). 'Driving Legislators' Policy Preferences: Constituent Commutes and Gas Taxes', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 48:1, 203–18.
- Andeweg, Rudy B., and Jacques Thomassen (2011). 'Pathways to party unity: Sanctions, loyalty, homogeneity and division of labour in the Dutch parliament', *Party Politics*, 17:5, 655–72.
- André, Audrey, Sam Depauw, and Stefanie Beyens (2015). 'Party loyalty and electoral dealignment', *Party Politics*, 21:6, 970–81.
- Anonymous (2023). 'Recorded votes as attention booster: How opposition parties use roll-calls and non-recorded votes for position-taking in the German Bundestag, 2017-2021', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*.
- Arnold, Felix, Björn Kauder, and Niklas Potrafke (2014). 'Outside earnings, absence, and activity: evidence from German parliamentarians', *European Journal of Political Economy*, 36, 147–57.
- Arzheimer, Kai (2015). 'Strange bedfellows: the Bundestag's free vote on pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) reveals how Germany's restrictive bioethics legislation is shaped by a Christian Democratic/New Left issue-coalition', *Research & Politics*, 2:3, 1–7.
- Bäck, Hanna, Marc Debus, and Jochen Müller (2014). 'Who Takes the Parliamentary Floor? The Role of Gender in Speech-making in the Swedish Riksdag', *Political Research Quarterly*, 67:3, 504–18.
- Bäck, Hanna, Markus Baumann, Marc Debus, and Jochen Müller (2019). 'The unequal distribution of speaking time in parliamentary-party groups', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 44:1, 163–93.
- Bailer, Stefanie (2018). 'To use the whip or not: Whether and when party group leaders use disciplinary measures to achieve voting unity', *International Political Science Review*, 39:2, 163–77.

- Bailer, Stefanie, and Tamaki Ohmura (2018). 'Exploring, Maintaining, and Disengaging-The Three Phases of a Legislator's Life', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 43:3, 493–520.
- Bailer, Stefanie, Christian Breunig, Nathalie Giger, and Andreas M. Wüst (2022). 'The Diminishing Value of Representing the Disadvantaged: Between Group Representation and Individual Career Paths', *British Journal of Political Science*, 52:2, 535–52.
- Bailer, Stefanie, Peter Meißner, Tamaki Ohmura, and Peter Selb (2013). *Seiteneinsteiger im Deutschen Bundestag*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
- Bailer, Stefanie, Tobias Schulz, and Peter Selb (2009). 'What Role for the Party Group Leader? A Latent Variable Approach to Leadership Effects on Party Group Cohesion in the European Parliament', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 15:4, 355–78.
- Barber, James D. (1966). 'Leadership strategies for legislative party cohesion', *The Journal of Politics*, 28:2, 347–67.
- Batto, Nathan F. (2012). 'Differing mandates and party loyalty in mixed-member systems: Taiwan as a baseline case', *Electoral Studies*, 31:2, 384–92.
- Bauer-Blaschkowski, Svenja, and Philipp Mai (2019). 'Von 'Abweichlern' und 'Überzeugungstätern'. Eine Analyse des Abstimmungsverhaltens im 18. Deutschen Bundestag', in: Reimut Zohlnhöfer and Thomas Saalfeld (eds.), *Zwischen Stillstand, Politikwandel und Krisenmanagement: Eine Bilanz der Regierung Merkel 2013–2017*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 219–56.
- Baughman, John (2004). 'Party, constituency, and representation: Votes on abortion in the British House of Commons', *Public Choice*, 120:1-2, 63–85.
- Baumann, Markus (2018). 'Turning Liberal: Legislators' Individual Preferences and the Regulation of Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis in Switzerland', *Swiss Political Science Review*, 24:1, 16–40.
- Baumann, Markus, Marc Debus, and Jochen Müller (2013). 'Das legislative Verhalten von Bundestagsabgeordneten zwischen persönlichen Charakteristika, Wahlkreisinteressen und Parteilinie', *Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft*, 23:2, 177–211.
- Baumann, Markus, Marc Debus, and Jochen Müller (2015). 'Personal Characteristics of MPs and Legislative Behavior in Moral Policymaking', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 40:2, 179–210.
- Baumann, Markus, Marc Debus, and Tristan Klingelhöfer (2017). 'Keeping one's seat: the competitiveness of MP renomination in mixed-member electoral systems', *The Journal of Politics*, 79:3, 979–94.
- Becher, Michael, and Ulrich Sieberer (2008). 'Discipline, Electoral Rules and Defection in the Bundestag, 1983–94', *German Politics*, 17:3, 293–304.
- Becker, Johannes, Andreas Peichl, and Johannes Rincke (2009). 'Politicians' outside earnings and electoral competition', *Public Choice*, 140:3–4, 379–94.

- Benedetto, Giacomo, and Simon Hix (2007). 'The Rejected, the Ejected, and the Dejected: Explaining Government Rebels in the 2001-2005 British House of Commons', *Comparative Political Studies*, 40:7, 755–81.
- Bergan, Daniel E. (2010). 'Estimating the Effect of Tobacco Contributions on Legislative Behavior Using Panel Data', *Social Science Quarterly*, 91:3, 635–48.
- Bergmann, Henning, Stefanie Bailer, Tamaki Ohmura, Thomas Saalfeld, and Ulrich Sieberer (2016). 'Namentliche Abstimmungen im Bundestag 1949 bis 2013: Befunde aus einem neuen Datensatz', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 47:1, 26–50.
- Berz, Jan, and Michael Jankowski (2022). 'Local preferences in candidate selection: Evidence from a conjoint experiment among party leaders in Germany', *Party Politics*, 28:6, 1136–49.
- Besch, Johannes, and Alberto López-Ortega (2023). 'Do all voters appreciate rebels? Ideology moderates valence benefits from factional dissent', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 29:1, 113–34.
- Bhattacharya, Caroline (2023). 'Restrictive rules of speechmaking as a tool to maintain party unity: The case of oppressed political conflict in German parliament debates on the euro crisis', *Party Politics*, 29:3, 554–69.
- Bhattacharya, Caroline, and Achillefs Papageorgiou (2019). 'Are Backbenchers Fighting Back? Intra-Party Contestation in German Parliament Debates on the Greek Crisis', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 72:2, 425–44.
- BILD (2014). 'Strafaktion gegen den Hartz-IV-Revolutioner', <https://www.bild.de/geld/wirtschaft/cdu/strafaktion-gegen-hartz-4-revolutioner-38430388.bild.html>.
- Binderkrantz, Anne Skorkjær, Marie Kaldahl Nielsen, Helene Helboe Pedersen, and Mathias Wessel Tromborg (2020). 'Pre-parliamentary party career and political representation', *West European Politics*, 43:6, 1315–38.
- Bishop, Brad. H., and Mark R. Dudley (2017). 'The Role of Constituency, Party, and Industry in Pennsylvania's Act 13', *State Politics & Policy Quarterly*, 17:2, 154–79.
- Bøggild, Troels, and Helene Helboe Pedersen (2020). 'Voter reaction to legislator dissent across political systems', *Electoral Studies*, 68.
- Bøggild, Troels, and Helene Helboe Pedersen (2023). 'The legislative cost of ruling: Voter punishment of governing parties fuels legislator party dissent', *European Journal of Political Research* (Early View), <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12609>.
- Bönisch, Lea E. (2022). 'What factors shape the substantive representation of lesbians, gays and bisexuals in parliament? Testing the impact of minority membership, political values and awareness', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 75:4, 843–66.

- Borchert, Jens, and Klaus Stolz (2003). 'Die Bekämpfung der Unsicherheit: Politikerkarrieren und Karrierepolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 44:2, 148–73.
- Borges, André, and Pedro F. Ribeiro (2023). 'Presidents, Prime Ministers and Legislative Behaviour: The Conditional Effect of Presidential Legislative Powers on Party Unity', *Government and Opposition*, 58:2, 227–48.
- Born, Andreas, and Aljoscha Janssen (2022). 'Does a district mandate matter for the behavior of politicians? An analysis of roll-call votes and parliamentary speeches', *European Journal of Political Economy*, 71.
- Bowler, Shaun, David M. Farrell, and Richard S. Katz (1999). 'Party Cohesion, Party Discipline, and Parliaments.', in: Shaun Bowler (ed.), *Party discipline and parliamentary government*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 3–22.
- Budge, Ian (2015). 'Issue Emphases, Saliency Theory and Issue Ownership: A Historical and Conceptual Analysis', *West European Politics*, 38:4, 761–77.
- Budge, Ian, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, and Eric Tanenbaum (2001). *Mapping Policy Preferences. Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments, 1945-1998*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bundi, Pirmin, Frédéric Varone, Peter Loewen, and Christian Breunig (2023). 'Conscientiousness of representatives and agreement with their party positions', *The Journal of Legislative Studies* (Online First), <https://doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2023.2233207>.
- Burden, Barry C. (2007). *Personal Roots of Representation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Burke, Richard, Justin H. Kirkland, and Jonathan B. Slapin (2021). 'Party Competition, Personal Votes, and Strategic Disloyalty in the US States', *Political Research Quarterly*, 74:4, 1024–36.
- Butler, Daniel M., and David W. Nickerson (2011). 'Can Learning Constituency Opinion Affect How Legislators Vote? Results from a Field Experiment', *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 6:1, 55–83.
- Campbell, Rosie, Philip Cowley, Nick Vivyan, and Markus Wagner (2019). 'Legislator dissent as a valence signal', *British Journal of Political Science*, 49:1, 105–25.
- Canes-Wrone, Brandice, David W. Brady, and John F. Cogan (2002). 'Out of Step, out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members' Voting', *American Political Science Review*, 96:1, 127–40.
- Cann, Damon M. (2008). 'Modeling Committee Chair Selection in the U.S. House of Representatives', *Political Analysis*, 16:3, 274–89.
- Cann, Damon M., and Andrew H. Sidman (2011). 'Exchange Theory, Political Parties, and the Allocation of Federal Distributive Benefits in the House of Representatives', *The Journal of Politics*, 73:4, 1128–41.

- Carey, John (1994). 'Political shirking and the last term problem: Evidence for a party-administered pension system', *Public Choice*, 81:1, 1–22.
- Carey, John M. (2007). 'Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting', *American Journal of Political Science*, 51:1, 92–107.
- Carey, John M. (2009). *Legislative Voting and Accountability*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Carey, John M., and Matthew S. Shugart (1995). 'Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas.' *Electoral Studies*, 14:4, 417–39.
- Carrubba, Clifford J., Matthew Gabel, Lacey Murrah, Ryan Clough, Elizabeth Montgomery, and Rebecca Schambach (2006). 'Off the record: Unrecorded legislative votes, selection bias and roll-call vote analysis', *British Journal of Political Science*, 36:4, 691–704.
- Carrubba, Clifford, Matthew Gabel, and Simon Hug (2008). 'Legislative voting behavior, seen and unseen: A theory of roll-call vote selection', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 33:4, 543–72.
- Carson, Jamie L., Gregory Koger, Matthew J. Lebo, and Everett Young (2010). 'The Electoral Costs of Party Loyalty in Congress', *American Journal of Political Science*, 54:3, 598–616.
- CDU/CSU (2017). 'Arbeitsordnung der CDU/CSU-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag, 19. Wahlperiode, Beschluss vom 17. April 2018', https://www.cducsu.de/sites/default/files/2018-05/WP19%20Arbeitsordnung_17.04.2018_0.pdf.
- Ceron, Andrea (2015). 'Brave rebels stay home: Assessing the effect of intra-party ideological heterogeneity and party whip on roll-call votes', *Party Politics*, 21:2, 246–58.
- Childs, Sarah (2004). 'A Feminised Style of Politics? Women MPs in the House of Commons', *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 6:1, 3–19.
- Chiru, Mihail (2020). 'Loyal soldiers or seasoned leaders? The selection of committee chairs in the European Parliament', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 27:4, 612–29.
- Chressantis, George A., Kathie S. Gilbert, and Paul W. Grimes (1991). 'Ideology, Constituent Interests, and Senatorial Voting: The Case of Abortion', *Social Science Quarterly*, 72:3, 588–600.
- Clarke, Harold D., and Richard G. Price (1977). 'A Note on the Pre-Nomination Role Socialization of Freshmen Members of Parliament', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 10:2, 391–406.
- Clayton, Amanda, and Pär Zetterberg (2021). 'Gender and Party Discipline: Evidence from Africa's Emerging Party Systems', *American Political Science Review*, 115:3, 869–84.
- Close, Caroline (2018). 'Parliamentary party loyalty and party family: The missing link?', *Party Politics*, 24:2, 209–19.
- Close, Caroline, and Lidia Núñez (2017). 'Preferences and agreement in legislative parties: testing the causal chain', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 23:1, 31–43.

- Close, Caroline, Sergiu Gherghina, and Vivien Sierens (2019). 'Prompting Legislative Agreement and Loyalty: What Role for Intra-Party Democracy?', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 72:2, 387–405.
- Coman, Emanuel E. (2015). 'Institutions and Vote Unity in Parliaments: Evidence from 33 National Chambers', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 21:3, 360–89.
- Cordero, Guillermo, and Xavier Coller (2015). 'Cohesion and Candidate Selection in Parliamentary Groups', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 68:3, 592–615.
- Cordes, Malte, and Daniel Hellmann (2020). 'Wer ist der ideale Kandidat? Auswahlkriterien bei der Kandidatenaufstellung zum Deutschen Bundestag', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 51:1, 68–83.
- Cowley, Philip, and Mark Stuart (1997). 'Sodomy, Slaughter, Sunday Shopping and Seatbelts', *Party Politics*, 3:1, 119–30.
- Cowley, Philip, and Mark Stuart (2009). 'There was a Doctor, a Journalist and Two Welshmen: the Voting Behaviour of Independent MPs in the United Kingdom House of Commons, 1997–2007', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 62:1, 19–31.
- Cowley, Philip, and Mark Stuart (2010). 'Party Rules, OK: Voting in the House of Commons on the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 63:1, 173–81.
- Cowley, Philip, and Resul Umit. (2023). 'Legislator Dissent Does Not Affect Electoral Outcomes', *British Journal of Political Science*, 53:2, 789–95.
- Cowley, Philip, and Sarah Childs (2003). 'Too Spineless to Rebel? New Labour's Women MPs', *British Journal of Political Science*, 33:3, 345–65.
- Cox, Gary W., Jon H. Fiva, and Daniel M. Smith (2019). 'Parties, Legislators, and the Origins of Proportional Representation', *Comparative Political Studies*, 52:1, 102–33.
- Cox, Gary W., Thad Kousser, and Mathew D. McCubbins (2010). 'Party Power or Preferences? Quasi-Experimental Evidence from American State Legislatures', *The Journal of Politics*, 72:3, 799–811.
- Crisp, Brian F. (2007). 'Incentives in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: General Election Laws, Candidate Selection Procedures, and Cameral Rules', *Comparative Political Studies*, 40:12, 1460–85.
- Crisp, Brian F., and Amanda Driscoll (2012). 'The Strategic Use of Legislative Voting Procedures', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 37:1, 67–97.
- Crisp, Brian F., Santiago Olivella, Michael Malecki, and Mindy Sher (2013). 'Vote-earning strategies in flexible list systems: Seats at the price of unity', *Electoral Studies*, 32:4, 658–69.
- Cross, James P., Rainer Eising, Henrik Hermansson, and Florian Spohr (2021). 'Business interests, public interests, and experts in parliamentary committees: their impact on legislative amendments in the German Bundestag', *West European Politics*, 44:2, 354–77.
- Crowe, Edward W. (1980). 'Cross-Voting in the British House of Commons: 1945-1974', *The Journal of Politics*, 42:2, 487–510.

- Crowe, Edward W. (1986). 'The Web of Authority: Party Loyalty and Social Control in the British House of Commons', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 11:2, 161–85.
- Curini, Luigi, and Francesco Zucchini (2012). 'Government Alternation and Legislative Party Unity: The Case of Italy, 1988-2008', *West European Politics*, 35:4, 826–46.
- Dafydd, Einion (2019). 'Party discipline and intraparty accountability: Finnish parties in the European Parliament', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 25:4, 466–88.
- Dancey, Logan, and Geoffrey Sheagley (2016). 'Inferences Made Easy: Partisan Voting in Congress, Voter Awareness, and Senator Approval', *American Politics Research*, 44:5, 844–74.
- Dandoy, Régis (2011). 'Parliamentary Questions in Belgium: Testing for Party Discipline', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 17:3, 315–26.
- Dasanaïke, Noah (2022). 'Businessperson Deputies and Party Cohesion: Evidence from the Russian State Duma', *Party Politics*, 28:5, 879–88.
- Davidson-Schmich, Louise K. (2003). 'The Development of Party Discipline in New Parliaments: Eastern German State Legislatures 1990-2000', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 9:4, 88–101.
- Debus, Marc, and Jale Tosun (2021). 'The manifestation of the green agenda: a comparative analysis of parliamentary debates', *Environmental Politics*, 30:6, 918–37.
- Debus, Marc, Christoph Knill, and Jale Tosun (2012). 'Drum zahle, wer sich ewig bindet: Eine Analyse der Gebührenhöhe für eingetragene Lebenspartnerschaften in Baden-Württemberg', *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 53:1, 1–28.
- Debus, Marc, Christoph Knill, and Jale Tosun (2013). 'Verwaltungsgebühren als Instrument symbolischer Steuerung: Kirchengabengebühren in badenwürttembergischen Kommunen', *der moderne staat – Zeitschrift für Public Policy, Recht und Management*, 6:1, 191–209.
- Decker, Frank (2018). 'Öffentlichkeit ohne Offenheit? Warum die geheime Wahl der Regierungschefs in den Parlamenten gegen das Demokratieprinzip verstößt', in: Lutz Haarmann, Robert Meyer, and Julia Reuschenbach (eds.), *Von der Bonner zur Berliner Republik. Politik im Spiegel praktischer Wissenschaft*. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 371–84.
- Degner, Hanno, and Dirk Leuffen (2016). 'Keynes, Friedman, or Monnet? Explaining Parliamentary Voting Behaviour on Fiscal Aid for Euro Area Member States', *West European Politics*, 39:6, 1139–59.
- Degner, Hanno, and Dirk Leuffen (2019). 'Crises and Responsiveness: Analysing German Preference Formation During the Eurozone Crisis', *Political Studies Review*, 18:4, 491–506.
- Delius, Martin F., Michael Koß, and Christian Stecker (2013). '„Ich erkenne also Fraktionsdisziplin grundsätzlich auch an...“ – Innerfraktioneller Dissens in der SPD-Fraktion der Großen Koalition 2005 bis 2009', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 44:3, 546–66.

- Dennison, James (2019). 'A Review of Public Issue Salience: Concepts, Determinants and Effects on Voting', *Political Studies Review*, 17:4, 436–46.
- Der Spiegel (2001). 'Jenseits der roten Linie. Anatomie einer Schicksalswoche', <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/jenseits-der-roten-linie-a-8c1bebe5-0002-0001-0000-000020794716>.
- Der Spiegel (2019). 'Parlamentarischer Ungehorsam', <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundestag-diese-abgeordneten-stimmen-oft-gegen-die-eigene-fraktion-a-1279893.html>.
- Desposato, Scott W. (2004). 'The impact of federalism on national party cohesion in Brazil', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 29:2, 259–85.
- Dickinson, Nicholas (2018). 'Advice Giving and Party Loyalty: An Informational Model for the Socialisation Process of New British MPs', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 71:2, 343–64.
- Die Welt (2015). 'Kauder geht mit Abweichlern hart ins Gericht', <https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article144968562/Kauder-geht-mit-Abweichlern-hart-ins-Gericht.html>.
- Die Welt (2023). 'Warum eine Abweichlerin der Grünen Hamburgs Koalition ins Wanken bringt', <https://www.welt.de/regionales/hamburg/plus245048908/Miriam-Block-Warum-eine-gruene-Abweichlerin-Hamburgs-Koalition-ins-Wanken-bringt.html>.
- Diermeier, Daniel, and Timothy J. Feddersen (1998). 'Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure', *American Political Science Review*, 92:3, 611–21.
- Dingler, Sarah C., and Lena Ramstetter (2023). 'When Does She Rebel? How Gender Affects Deviating Legislative Behaviour', *Government and Opposition*, 58:3, 437–55.
- Donnelly, Christopher P. (2019). 'Yea or Nay: Do Legislators Benefit by Voting Against Their Party?', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 44:3, 421–53.
- Döring, Herbert (2003). 'Party discipline and government imposition of restrictive rules', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 9:4, 147–63.
- Döring, Herbert, and Christoph Hönnige (2006). 'Vote of confidence procedure and Gesetzgebungsnotstand: Two toothless tigers of governmental agenda control', *German Politics*, 15:1, 1–26.
- Duell, Dominik, Lea Kaftan, Sven-Oliver Proksch, Jonathan Slapin, and Christopher Wratil (2023). 'Communicating the Rift: Voter Perceptions of Intraparty Dissent in Parliaments', *The Journal of Politics*, 85:1, 76–91.
- Dynes, Adam M., Hans J. G. Hassell, and Matthew R. Miles (2019). 'The Personality of the Politically Ambitious', *Political Behavior*, 41:2, 309–36.
- Eggers, Andrew C., and Arthur Spirling (2016). 'Party Cohesion in Westminster Systems: Inducements, Replacement and Discipline in the House of Commons, 1836-1910', *British Journal of Political Science*, 46:3, 567–89.

- Engler, Fabian, and Kathrin Dümig (2017). 'Political Parties and MPs' Morality Policy Voting Behaviour: Evidence from Germany', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 70:3, 548–68.
- Euchner, Eva-Maria, and Caroline Preidel (2018). 'Dropping the curtain: The religious-secular party cleavage in German morality politics', *Politics and Religion*, 11:2, 221–48.
- Faas, Thorsten (2003). 'To defect or not to defect? National, institutional and party group pressures on MEPs and their consequences for party group cohesion in the European Parliament', *European Journal of Political Research*, 42:6, 841–66.
- FAZ (2012). 'Mein Widerstand war grundsätzlich. Norbert Lammert im Gespräch', <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/im-gespraech-norbert-lammert-mein-widerstand-war-grundsatzlich-11725505.html>.
- Fazekas, Zoltán, and Martin Ejnar Hansen (2022). 'Incentives for non-participation: absence in the United Kingdom House of Commons, 1997-2015', *Public Choice*, 191:1-2, 51–73.
- FDP (2009). 'Geschäftsordnung der FDP-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag in der Fassung vom 26.10.2009', <https://www.yumpu.com/de/document/read/3665450/geschäftsordnung-der-fdp-fraktion-im-deutschen-bundestag-in-der->.
- Fedele, Alessandro, and Paolo Naticchioni (2015). 'Moonlighting politicians: motivation matters!', *German Economic Review*, 17:2, 127–56.
- Fernandes, Jorge M., Thomas Saalfeld, and Carsten Schwemmer (2022). 'The Politics of Select Committee Assignments in the British House of Commons', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 47:2, 329–60.
- Ferrara, Federico, Erik S. Herron, and Misa Nishikawa (2005). *Mixed electoral systems. Contamination and its consequences*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Field, Bonnie N. (2013). 'Resolute Leaders and "Cardboard Deputies": Parliamentary Party Unity in the New Spanish Democracy', *South European Society and Politics*, 18:3, 355–74.
- Finke, Daniel (2014). 'Domestic-level Parliamentary Scrutiny and Voting Behaviour in the European Parliament', *Government and Opposition*, 49:2, 207–31.
- Finke, Daniel (2015). 'Why do European political groups call the roll?', *Party Politics*, 21:5, 750–62.
- Fleisher, Richard (1993). 'Explaining the Change in Roll-Call Voting-Behavior of Southern Democrats', *The Journal of Politics*, 55:2, 327–41.
- Font, Nuria (2020). 'Competing Principals and Non-Vote Decisions in the European Parliament', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 73:1, 166–85.
- Fortunato, David (2019). 'Legislative Review and Party Differentiation in Coalition Governments', *American Political Science Review*, 113:1, 242–7.
- Francis, Katherine, and Brittany Bramlett (2017). 'Precongressional Careers and Committees: The Impact of Congruence', *American Politics Research*, 45:5, 755–89.

- Frech, Elena (2016). 'Re-electing MEPs: The factors determining re-election probabilities', *European Union Politics*, 17:1, 69–90.
- Frech, Elena, Niels D. Goet, and Simon Hug (2021). 'Shirking and Slacking in Parliament', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 46:2, 493–523.
- Friedman, Sally (1993). 'Committee Advancement of Women and Blacks in Congress: A Test of the Responsible Legislator Thesis', *Women & Politics*, 13:2, 27–52.
- Fritzsche, Erik (2009). 'Innerfraktionelle Geschlossenheit im Spiegel der Politikwissenschaft. Stand der Forschung und notwendige Weiterführungen', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 40:3, 661–82.
- Fritzsche, Erik (2016). *Fraktionsgeschlossenheit und Regierungssysteme. Empirische und normative Einsichten aus weitgespannten Vergleichen*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
- Gagliarducci, Stefano, Tommaso Nannicini, and Paolo Naticchioni (2010). 'Moonlighting politicians', *Journal of Public Economics*, 94:9–10, 688–99.
- Garner, Christopher, and Natalia Letki (2005). 'Party structure and backbench dissent in the Canadian and British parliaments', *Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue Canadienne De Science Politique*, 38:2, 463–82.
- Geese, Lucas, and Javier Martínez-Cantó (2022). 'Working as a team: Do legislators coordinate their geographic representation efforts in party-centred environments?', *Party Politics* (Online First), <https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688221098157>.
- Geys, Benny (2013). 'Election cycles in MPs' outside interests? The UK House of Commons, 2005–2010', *Political Studies*, 61:2, 462–72.
- Geys, Benny (2015). 'Looks Good, You're Hired? Evidence from Extra-Parliamentary Activities of German Parliamentarians', *German Economic Review*, 16:1, 1–12.
- Geys, Benny, and Karsten Mause (2013). 'Moonlighting politicians: a survey and research agenda', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 19:1, 76–97.
- Geys, Benny, and Karsten Mause (2014). 'Are Female Legislators Different? Exploring Sex Differences in German MPs' Outside Interests', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 67:4, 841–65.
- Geys, Benny, and Karsten Mause (2016). 'The limits of electoral control: evidence from last-term politicians', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 41:4, 873–98.
- Geys, Benny, and Karsten Mause (2022). 'Politiker-Nebentätigkeiten als Einflusskanal für Lobbying', in: Andreas Polk and Karsten Mause (eds.), *Handbuch Lobbyismus*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 1–21.
- Gherghina, Sergiu, and Mihail Chiru (2014). 'Determinants of legislative voting loyalty under different electoral systems: Evidence from Romania', *International Political Science Review*, 35:5, 523–41.

- Grau, Andreas (2009). 'Auf der Suche nach den fehlenden Stimmen 1972. Zu den Nachwirkungen des gescheiterten Misstrauensvotums Barzel/Brandt', *Historisch-Politische Mitteilungen*, 16:1, 1–18.
- Green, Jane, and Will Jennings (2019). 'Party Reputations and Policy Priorities: How Issue Ownership Shapes Executive and Legislative Agendas', *British Journal of Political Science*, 49:2, 443–66.
- Green-Pedersen, Christoffer (2010). 'Bringing Parties into Parliament: The Development of Parliamentary Activities in Western Europe', *Party Politics*, 16:3, 347–69.
- Green-Pedersen, Christoffer, and Peter B. Mortensen (2010). 'Who sets the agenda and who responds to it in the Danish parliament? A new model of issue competition and agenda-setting', *European Journal of Political Research*, 49:2, 257–81.
- Grier, Kevin, Robin Grier, and Gor Mkrtchian (2023). 'Campaign Contributions and Roll-Call Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives: The Case of the Sugar Industry', *American Political Science Review*, 117:1, 340–6.
- Grimmer, Justin, and Eleanor N. Powell (2013). 'Congressmen in Exile: The Politics and Consequences of Involuntary Committee Removal', *The Journal of Politics*, 75:4, 907–20.
- Gründler, Klaus, Armin Hackenberger, Niklas Potrafke, Fabian Ruthardt, and Timo Wochner (2021). 'Für mehr Transparenz: Deutscher Bundestag verschärft die Regeln für Nebeneinkünfte von Abgeordneten', *ifo Schnelldienst*, 74:9, 66–9.
- Haider-Markel, Donald P. (1999). 'Morality Policy and Individual-Level Political Behavior. The Case of Legislative Voting on Lesbian and Gay Issues.' *Policy Studies Journal*, 27:4, 735–49.
- Hanretty, Chris, Benjamin E. Lauderdale, and Nick Vivyan (2017). 'Dyadic Representation in a Westminster System', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 42:2, 235–67.
- Hasecke, Edward B., and Jason D. Mycoff (2007). 'Party loyalty and legislative success: Are loyal majority party members more successful in the U.S. House of Representatives?', *Political Research Quarterly*, 60:4, 607–17.
- Heichel, Stephan, Christoph Knill, and Sophie Schmitt (2013). 'Public Policy Meets Morality: Conceptual and Theoretical Challenges in the Analysis of Morality Policy Change', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 20:3, 318–34.
- Hellmann, Daniel (2020). 'Der mühselige Weg zum Mandat – aber welcher? Empirische Untersuchungen zu Inhalt und Bedeutung der Ochsentour', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 51:1, 49–67.
- Hemingway, Alexander (2022). 'Does class shape legislators' approach to inequality and economic policy? A comparative view', *Government and Opposition*, 57:1, 84–107.
- Herrick, Rebekah, and Michael K. Moore (1993). 'Political Ambition's Effect on Legislative Behavior – Schlesinger's Typology Reconsidered and Revised', *The Journal of Politics*, 55:3, 765–76.

- Herron, Erik S. (2002). 'Electoral influences on legislative behavior in mixed-member systems: Evidence from Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 27:3, 361–82.
- Heuwieser, Raphael J. (2018). 'Submissive Lobby Fodder or Assertive Political Actors? Party Loyalty of Career Politicians in the UK House of Commons, 2005–15', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 43:2, 305–41.
- Hibbing, John R., and David Marsh (1987). 'Accounting for the Voting Patterns of British MPs on Free Votes', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 12:2, 275–97.
- Hix, Simon (2002). 'Parliamentary Behavior with Two Principals: Preferences, Parties, and Voting in the European Parliament', *American Journal of Political Science*, 46:3, 688–98.
- Hix, Simon (2004). 'Electoral institutions and legislative behavior: Explaining voting defection in the European Parliament', *World Politics*, 56:2, 194–223.
- Hix, Simon, Abdul Noury, and Gerard Roland (2018). 'Is there a selection bias in roll-call votes? Evidence from the European Parliament' *Public Choice*, 176:1–2, 211–28.
- Höhmann, Daniel (2020). 'When Do Female MPs Represent Women's Interests? Electoral Systems and the Legislative Behavior of Women', *Political Research Quarterly*, 73:4, 834–47.
- Höhmann, Daniel, and Mary Nugent (2022). 'Male MPs, electoral vulnerability and the substantive representation of women's interests', *European Journal of Political Research*, 61:3, 762–82.
- Holt, Jacob (2023). 'What explains party unity? A test of competing theories', *Party Politics*, 29:2, 294–305.
- Høyland, Bjørn, Sara B. Hobolt, and Simon Hix (2019). 'Career Ambitions and Legislative Participation: The Moderating Effect of Electoral Institutions', *British Journal of Political Science*, 49:2, 491–512.
- Huber, John D., Georgia Kernell, and Eduardo L. Leoni (2005). 'Institutional context, cognitive resources and party attachments across democracies', *Political Analysis*, 13:4, 365–86.
- Hug, Simon (2010). 'Selection Effects in Roll Call Votes', *British Journal of Political Science*, 40:1, 225–35.
- Hug, Simon, Simone Wegmann, and Reto Wüest (2015). 'Parliamentary Voting Procedures in Comparison', *West European Politics*, 38:5, 940–68.
- Hurka, Steffen, William T. Daniel, and Lukas Obholzer (2018a). 'Determinants of moonlighting in the European Parliament', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 24:1, 127–47.
- Hurka, Steffen, Lukas Obholzer, and William T. Daniel (2018b). 'When time is money: sideline jobs, ancillary income and legislative effort', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 25:5, 651–69.
- Ismayr, Wolfgang (2012). *Der Deutsche Bundestag*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

- Itzkovitch-Malka, Reut, and Reuven Y. Hazan (2017). 'Unpacking Party Unity: The Combined Effects of Electoral Systems and Candidate Selection Methods on Legislative Attitudes and Behavioural Norms', *Political Studies*, 65:2, 452–74.
- Jenkins, Shannon (2006). 'The impact of party and ideology on roll-call voting in state legislatures', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 31:2, 235–57.
- Jenkins, Shannon (2008). 'Party influence on roll call voting: A view from the US states', *State Politics & Policy Quarterly*, 8:3, 239–62.
- Jun, Hae-Won, and Simon Hix (2010). 'Electoral Systems, Political Career Paths and Legislative Behavior: Evidence from South Korea's Mixed-Member System', *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 11:2, 153–71.
- Jung, Hoyong (2022). 'Effects of electoral margins on party loyalty in the roll call votes: Evidence from the 20th National Assembly in South Korea', *Party Politics* (Online First), <https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688221122284>.
- Kailitz, Steffen (2008). 'Ein Unterschied wie Tag und Nacht? Fraktionsgeschlossenheit in Parlamentarismus und Präsidentialismus', *Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft*, 18:3, 291–324.
- Kam, Christopher J. (2001). 'Do Ideological Preferences Explain Parliamentary Behaviour? Evidence from Great Britain and Canada', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 7:4, 89–126.
- Kam, Christopher J. (2006). 'Demotion and dissent in the Canadian Liberal Party', *British Journal of Political Science*, 36:3, 561–74.
- Kam, Christopher J. (2011). *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kanthak, Kristin (2009). 'U. S. State Legislative Committee Assignments and Encouragement of Party Loyalty: An Exploratory Analysis', *State Politics & Policy Quarterly*, 9:3, 284–303.
- Karlsson, Christer, Moa Mårtensson, and Thomas Persson (2023). 'Is Oppositional Behaviour in European Union Affairs Gendered? Evidence from Plenary Debates and Committee Deliberations in Four Legislatures', *Journal of Common Market Studies* (Online First), <https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13507>.
- Kasten, Hans-Hermann (1985). 'Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Disziplinierung des Abgeordneten durch seine Fraktion: Fraktionsdisziplin, Fraktionszwang und Fraktionsausschluss', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 16:4, 475–84.
- Kauder, Björn, Niklas Potrafke, and Marina Riem (2017). 'Do parties punish MPs for voting against the party line?', *CESifo Economic Studies*, 63:3, 317–32.
- Kauder, Björn, and Niklas Potrafke (2019). 'Conservative politicians and voting on same-sex marriage', *German Economic Review*, 20:4, 600–17.
- Kernecker, Theresa (2017). 'Ambition as a micro-foundation of party loyalty', *Party Politics*, 23:5, 538–48.

- Kim, Dong-Hun, and Gerhard Loewenberg (2005). 'The Role of Parliamentary Committees in Coalition Governments: Keeping Tabs on Coalition Partners in the German Bundestag', *Comparative Political Studies*, 38:9, 1104–29.
- Kingdon, John W. (1977). 'Models of Legislative Voting', *The Journal of Politics*, 39:3, 563–95.
- Kirkland, Justin H., and Jonathan B. Slapin (2017). 'Ideology and strategic party disloyalty in the US house of representatives', *Electoral Studies*, 49, 26–37.
- Klein, Markus (2006). 'Partizipation in politischen Parteien. Eine empirische Analyse des Mobilisierungspotenzials politischer Parteien sowie der Struktur innerparteilicher Partizipation in Deutschland', *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 47:1, 35–61.
- Klüver, Heike, and Jae-Jae Spoon (2015). 'Bringing salience back in: Explaining voting defection in the European Parliament', *Party Politics*, 21:4, 553–64.
- Knill, Christoph, and Jale Tosun (2020). *Public Policy. A New Introduction*. London: Macmillan.
- Koop, Christel, Christine Reh, and Edoardo Bressanelli (2018). 'When politics prevails: Parties, elections and loyalty in the European Parliament', *European Journal of Political Research*, 57:3, 563–86.
- Kopecky, Petr, Jan-Hinrik M. Sahling, Francisco Panizza, Gerardo Scherlis, Christian Schuster, and Maria Spirova (2016). 'Party patronage in contemporary democracies: Results from an expert survey in 22 countries from five regions', *European Journal of Political Research*, 55:2, 416–31.
- Koß, Michael, and Miryam Tan (2019). 'Beeinflussen Regierungen die parlamentarische Tagesordnung? Agendakontrolle und Zeitverteilung im britischen Unterhaus und im Deutschen Bundestag', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 50:2, 368–84.
- Krehbiel, Keith (1993). 'Where's the Party?', *British Journal of Political Science*, 23:2, 235–66.
- Kroeber, Corinna (2023). 'Gendered Patterns of Committee Assignments – To What Extent Are Women in Parliamentary Party Groups Game Changers?', *Parliamentary Affairs* (Online First), <https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsad011>.
- Kroeber, Corinna, and Svenja Krauss (2023). 'Whose bread I eat, their song I sing? How the gender of MPs influences the use of oversight mechanisms in government and opposition', *European Political Science Review* (Online First), <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773923000061>.
- Kunicova, Jana, and Thomas F. Remington (2008). 'Mandates, parties and dissent: Effect of electoral rules on parliamentary party cohesion in the Russian State Duma, 1994-2003', *Party Politics*, 14:5, 555–74.
- Küpper, Moritz, and Georg Wenzelburger (2013). 'Seiteneinsteiger in den Bundestag. Eine Analyse von Cross-Over-Karrieren 1949 bis 2009', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 44:3, 526–45.
- Lancaster, Thomas D., and W. David Patterson (1990). 'Comparative pork barrel politics: perceptions from the West German Bundestag', *Comparative Political Studies*, 22:4, 458–77.

- Lehmann, Pola, Tobias Burst, Theres Mattheiß, Sven Regel, Andrea Volkens, Bernhard Weßels, and Lisa Zehnter (2022). *The Manifesto Data Collection*. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Version 2022a. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), <https://doi.org/10.25522/manifesto.mpd.2022a>.
- Lehrer, Roni, Pirmin Stöckle, and Sebastian Juhl (2022). ‘Assessing the relative influence of party unity on vote choice: evidence from a conjoint experiment’, *Political Science Research and Methods* (Online First), <https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2022.45>.
- Leighton, Wayne A., and Edward J. López (2002). ‘Committee Assignments and the Cost of Party Loyalty’, *Political Research Quarterly*, 55:1, 59–90.
- Leston-Bandeira, Christina (2009). ‘Dissent in a Party-Based Parliament: The Portuguese Case’, *Party Politics*, 15:6, 695–713.
- Leyden, Kevin M., and Stephen A. Borrelli (1990). ‘Party Contributions and Party Unity: Can Loyalty Be Bought?’, *Western Political Quarterly*, 43:2, 343–65.
- Leyden, Kevin M., and Stephen A. Borrelli (1994). ‘An Investment in Goodwill: Party Contributions and Party Unity Among U.S. House Members in the 1980s’, *American Politics Quarterly*, 22:4, 421–52.
- Liao, Yue-Ceng (2022). ‘Party leadership, electoral reform, and mandate-divide’, *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 23:3, 209–30.
- Lindstädt, René, and Ryan J. Vander Wielen (2014). ‘Dynamic Elite Partisanship: Party Loyalty and Agenda Setting in the US House’, *British Journal of Political Science*, 44:4, 741–72.
- Lindstädt, René, Jonathan B. Slapin, and Ryan J. Vander Wielen (2011). ‘Balancing Competing Demands: Position Taking and Election Proximity in the European Parliament’, *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 36:1, 37–70.
- Lindstädt, René, Jonathan B. Slapin, and Ryan J. Vander Wielen (2012). ‘Adaptive behaviour in the European Parliament: Learning to balance competing demands’, *European Union Politics*, 13:4, 465–86.
- Loewenberg, Gerhard (2003). ‘Agenda-setting in the German Bundestag: origins and consequences of party dominance’, *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 9:3, 17–31.
- Lord, Christopher (2018). ‘The European Parliament: a working parliament without a public?’, *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 24:1, 34–50.
- Lorenz, Robert, and Matthias Micus (2009). *Seiteneinsteiger. Unkonventionelle Politiker-Karrieren in der Parteiendemokratie*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Louwerse, Tom, Simon Otjes, and Cynthia M.C. van Vonno (2018). ‘The Dutch Parliamentary Dataset’, *Acta Politica*, 53:1, 149–66.
- Mai, Philipp, Moritz Link, and Fabian Engler (2022). ‘Individuelles Abstimmungsverhalten im 19. Deutschen Bundestag zwischen alltäglicher Fraktionsdisziplin und vereinzelt Gewissensentscheidungen’, in: Reimut Zohlnhöfer and Fabian Engler (eds.), *Das Ende der Merkel-Jahre. Eine Bilanz der Regierung Merkel 2018-2021*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 101–29.

- Mainwaring, Scott, and Aníbal P. Liñán (1997). 'Party discipline in the Brazilian Constitutional Congress', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 22:4, 453–83.
- Manow, Philip (2015). *Mixed Rules, Mixed Strategies. Candidates and Parties in Germany's Electoral System*. Colchester: ECPR Press.
- Mansbridge, Jane (2003). 'Rethinking Representation.', *American Political Science Review*, 97:4, 515–28.
- Martin, Aaron R. (2023). 'This too in moderation: Evaluating the effect of delegate dissatisfaction on ambitious party group switching in the European Parliament', *Party Politics*, 29:4, 726–40.
- Martin, Lanny W., and Georg Vanberg (2005). 'Coalition Policymaking and Legislative Review', *American Political Science Review*, 99:1, 93–106.
- Martin, Lanny W., and Georg Vanberg (2011). *Parliaments and Coalitions. The Role of Legislative Institutions in Multiparty Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Martin, Shane (2014). 'Why electoral systems don't always matter: The impact of 'mega-seats' on legislative behaviour in Ireland', *Party Politics*, 20:3, 467–79.
- Martin, Shane, and Tim A. Mickler (2019). 'Committee Assignments: Theories, Causes and Consequences', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 72:1, 77–98.
- Mason, John Lyman (2001). 'Majority party leadership in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1977-96: Speakers, committee assignments, and institutional context', *Social Science Quarterly*, 82:3, 569–82.
- McAndrews, John R., Feodor Snagovsky, and Paul E. J. Thomas (2020). 'How Citizens Judge Extreme Legislative Dissent: Experimental Evidence from Canada on Party Switching', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 73:2, 323–41.
- McElroy, Gail (2008). 'Committees and Party Cohesion in the European Parliament', *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft*, 37:3, 357–73.
- Merkley, Eric (2020). 'Learning from Divided Parties? Legislator Dissent as a Cue for Opinion Formation', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 73:2, 342–62.
- Meserve, Stephen A., Daniel Pemstein, and William T. Bernhard (2009). 'Political Ambition and Legislative Behavior in the European Parliament', *The Journal of Politics*, 71:3, 1015–32.
- Meserve, Stephen, Joseph Robbins, and Frank Thames (2017). 'Multiple Principals and Legislative Cohesion', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 42:4, 515–48.
- Meyerrose, Anna M. (2018). 'It is all about value: How domestic party brands influence voting patterns in the European Parliament', *Governance*, 31:4, 625–42.
- Mickler, Tim A. (2019). 'What Happens after Assignments? The Room for Manoeuvre of Committee Members in the Bundestag and the Tweede Kamer', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 72:2, 445–63.

- Mondo, Emilie, and Caroline Close (2018). 'Morality politics in the European parliament. A qualitative insight into MEPs' voting behaviour on abortion and human embryonic stem cell research', *Journal of European Integration*, 41:1, 105–22.
- Mughan, Anthony, and Roger M. Scully (1997). 'Accounting for Change in Free Vote Outcomes in the House of Commons', *British Journal of Political Science*, 27:4, 640–7.
- Mughan, Anthony, Janet Box-Steffensmeier, and Roger Scully (1997). 'Mapping legislative socialisation', *European Journal of Political Research*, 32:1, 93–106.
- Müller, Wolfgang C. (2000). 'Political parties in parliamentary democracies: making delegation and accountability work', *European Journal of Political Research*, 37:3, 309–33.
- Murillo, María Victoria, and Pablo M. Pinto (2022). 'Heeding to the Losers: Legislators' Trade-Policy Preferences and Legislative Behavior', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 47:3, 539–603.
- Nemoto, Kuniaki, Ellis Krauss, and Robert Pekkanen (2008). 'Policy dissension and party discipline: The July 2005 vote on postal privatization in Japan', *British Journal of Political Science*, 38:3, 499–525.
- Newell, James L. (2000). 'Turning over a new leaf? Cohesion and discipline in the Italian parliament', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 6:4, 29–52.
- Niedermayer, Oskar (2020). 'Die Entwicklung des Parteiensystems bis nach der Bundestagswahl 2017', in: Uwe Jun and Oskar Niedermayer (eds.), *Die Parteien nach der Bundestagswahl 2017: Aktuelle Entwicklungen des Parteienwettbewerbs in Deutschland*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 1–41.
- Nokken, Timothy P. (2000). 'Dynamics of congressional loyalty: Party defection and roll-call behavior, 1947-97', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 25:3, 417–44.
- Norpoth, Helmut (1976). 'Explaining Party Cohesion in Congress: Case of Shared Policy Attitudes', *American Political Science Review*, 70:4, 1156–71.
- Norton, Philip (2003). 'Cohesion without discipline: Party voting in the House of Lords', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 9:4, 57–72.
- Norton, Philip (2019). 'Post-legislative scrutiny in the UK Parliament: adding value', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 25:3, 340–57.
- Ohmura, Tamaki (2014). 'When your Name is on the List, it is Time to Party: The Candidacy Divide in a Mixed-Member Proportional System', *Representation*, 50:1, 69–82.
- Ohmura, Tamaki, and David M. Willumsen (2022). 'Free votes and the analysis of recorded votes: evidence from Germany (1949–2021)', *West European Politics* (Online First), <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2022.2114651>.
- Ohmura, Tamaki, Stefanie Bailer, Peter Meißner, and Peter Selb (2018). 'Party animals, career changers and other pathways into parliament', *West European Politics*, 41:1, 169–95.
- Oldmixon, Elizabeth A. (2002). 'Culture Wars in the Congressional Theater: How the U.S. House of Representatives Legislates Morality, 1993–1998', *Social Science Quarterly*, 83:3, 775–88.

- Olivella, Santiago, and Margit Tavits (2014). 'Legislative Effects of Electoral Mandates', *British Journal of Political Science*, 44:2, 301–21.
- Otero-Felipe, Patricia, and Leticia M. Ruiz Rodríguez (2023). 'Party Discipline in Latin America: The Role of Party Ideology', *Political Studies Review* (Online First), <https://doi.org/10.1177/14789299231176699>.
- Otjes, Simon, and Tom Louwse (2018). 'Parliamentary questions as strategic party tools', *West European Politics*, 41:2, 496–516.
- Overby, L. Marvin (1996). 'Free voting in a provincial parliament: The case of 'same-sex' legislation in Ontario, 1994', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 2:3, 172–83.
- Overby, L. Marvin, Christopher D. Raymond, and Zeynep Taydas (2011). 'Free Votes, MPs, and Constituents: The Case of Same-Sex Marriage in Canada', *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 41:4, 465–78.
- Overby, L. Marvin, Raymond Tatalovich, and Donley T. Studlar (1998). 'Party and Free Votes in Canada: Abortion in the House of Commons', *Party Politics*, 4:3, 381–92.
- Ozbudun, Ergun (1970). *Party Cohesion in Western Democracies. A Causal Analysis*. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Palmer, Harvey D., and Ronald J. Vogel (1995). 'Political Opportunity for Federal Appointment: The Case of Departing Members of the U.S. House of Representatives, 1961-1992', *The Journal of Politics*, 57:3, 677–95.
- Papp, Zsófia (2018). 'Do Personalised Campaigns Hint at Legislator Activities? The (Lacking) Relationship Between Campaigns and Legislator Behaviour in Hungary', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 71:4, 908–29.
- Papp, Zsófia (2021). 'Dual candidacy as a source of legislator behaviour. The re-election and the mandate incentive under mixed-member electoral rules', *Acta Politica*, 56:1, 26–48.
- Pattie, Charles, Ron Johnston, and Mark Stuart (1998). 'Voting Without Party?', in: Philip Cowley (ed.) *Conscience and Parliament*. London: Frank Cass, 146–76.
- Patzelt, Werner J. (1998). 'Wider das Gerede vom ‚Fraktionszwang‘! Funktionslogische Zusammenhänge, populäre Vermutungen und die Sicht der Abgeordneten', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 29:2, 323–47.
- Patzelt, Werner J. (1999). 'Parlamentarische Rekrutierung und Sozialisation. Normative Erwägungen, empirische Befunde und praktische Empfehlungen', *Zeitschrift für Politik*, 46:3, 243–82.
- Patzelt, Werner J. (2003). 'Party Cohesion and Party Discipline in German Parliaments', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 9:4, 102–15.
- Pinto, Luca (2017). 'Candidacy rules and party unity: The impact of multiple candidacies on legislative voting behaviour in Italy', *Acta Politica*, 52:1, 43–63.

- Piper, J. Richard (1991). 'British Backbench Rebellion and Government Appointments, 1945-87', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 16:2, 219–38.
- Plumb, Alison (2015a). 'How Do MPs in Westminster Democracies Vote When Unconstrained by Party Discipline? A Comparison of Free Vote Patterns on Marriage Equality Legislation', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 68:3, 533–54.
- Plumb, Alison (2015b). 'Free Vote Patterns in the New South Wales State Parliament', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 21:4, 574–84.
- Plumb, Alison, and David Marsh (2013). 'Beyond party discipline: UK Parliamentary voting on fox hunting', *British Politics*, 8:3, 313–32.
- Potrafke, Niklas, Marcus Rösch, and Heinrich Ursprung (2020). 'Election systems, the "beauty premium" in politics, and the beauty of dissent', *European Journal of Political Economy*, 64.
- Preece, Jessica R. (2014). 'How the Party Can Win in Personal Vote Systems: The "Selectorial Connection" and Legislative Voting in Lithuania', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 39:2, 147–67.
- Preidel, Caroline (2016). 'Ist der Katholizismus noch entscheidend?', in: Antonius Liedhegener and Gert Pickel (eds.), *Religionspolitik und Politik der Religionen in Deutschland: Fallstudien und Vergleiche*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 83–107.
- Proksch, Sven-Oliver, and Jonathan B. Slapin (2012). 'Institutional Foundations of Legislative Speech', *American Journal of Political Science*, 56:3, 520–37.
- Pyta, Wolfram (2022). 'Berlin statt Bonn: Die Hauptstadtentscheidung des Bundestags vom 20. Juni 1991 als Ergebnis überfraktioneller Willensbildung', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 53:2, 409–33.
- Rahat, Gideon (2007). 'Determinants of party cohesion: Evidence from the case of the Israeli parliament', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 60:2, 279–96.
- Rasmussen, Jorgen S. (1970). 'Party discipline in war-time: Downfall of chamberlain government', *The Journal of Politics*, 32:2, 379–406.
- Rasmussen, Jorgen S. (1971). 'Government and intra-party opposition: Dissent within conservative parliamentary party in 1930s', *Political Studies*, 19:2, 172–83.
- Raymond, Christopher D. (2017a). 'Simply a matter of context? Partisan contexts and party loyalties on free votes', *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 19:2, 353–70.
- Raymond, Christopher D. (2017b). 'Voting Behaviour on Free Votes: Simply a Matter of Preferences?', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 70:3, 489–506.
- Raymond, Christopher D., and L. Marvin Overby (2016). 'What's in a (Party) name? Examining preferences, discipline, and social identity in a parliamentary free vote', *Party Politics*, 22:3, 313–24.
- Raymond, Christopher D., and Robert M. Worth (2017). 'Explaining voting behaviour on free votes: Solely a matter of preference?', *British Politics*, 12:4, 555–64.

- Read, Melvyn D., and David Marsh (1997). 'The Family Law Bill: Conservative Party splits and Labour Party cohesion', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 50:2, 263–79.
- Rehmer, Jochen (2020). 'Candidacy Eligibility Criteria and Party Unity', *Comparative Political Studies*, 53:8, 1298–325.
- Rehmer, Jochen (2022). 'Party membership, pre-parliamentary socialization and party cohesion', *Party Politics*, 28:6, 1081–93.
- Reiser, Marion (2023). 'The informal rules of candidate selection and their impact on intra-party competition', *Party Politics* (Online First), <https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688231172336>.
- Reiser, Marion, Claudia Hülsken, Bertram Schwarz, and Jens Borchert (2011). 'Das Reden der Neulinge und andere Sünden. Parlamentarische Sozialisation und Parlamentskultur in zwei deutschen Landtagen', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 42:4, 820–34.
- Rich, Timothy S. (2014). 'Party Voting Cohesion in Mixed Member Legislative Systems: Evidence from Korea and Taiwan', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 39:1, 113–35.
- Rittmann, Oliver (2023). 'Legislators' Emotional Engagement with Women's Issues: Gendered Patterns of Vocal Pitch in the German Bundestag', *British Journal of Political Science* (Online First), <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123423000285>.
- Rolfes-Haase, Kelly L., and Michele L. Swers (2022). 'Understanding the Gender and Partisan Dynamics of Abortion Voting in the House of Representatives', *Politics & Gender*, 18:2, 448–82.
- Rombi, Stefano, and Antonella Seddone (2017). 'Rebel Rebel. Do Primary Elections Affect Legislators' Behaviour? Insights from Italy', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 70:3, 569–88.
- Roos, Mechthild (2019). 'Intra-Party Group Unity in the European Parliament Prior to its First Direct Elections in 1979', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 72:2, 464–79.
- Rosas, Guillermo, and Joy Langston (2011). 'Gubernatorial Effects on the Voting Behavior of National Legislators', *The Journal of Politics*, 73:2, 477–93.
- Rosas, Guillermo, Yael Shomer, and Stephen R. Haptonstahl (2015). 'No News Is News: Nonignorable Nonresponse in Roll-Call Data Analysis', *American Journal of Political Science*, 59:2, 511–28.
- Roscoe, Douglas D., and Shannon Jenkins (2005). 'A Meta-Analysis of Campaign Contributions' Impact on Roll Call Voting', *Social Science Quarterly*, 86:1, 52–68.
- Rosenblatt, Gemma (2007). 'From One of Us to One of Them: The Socialisation of New MPs', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 60:3, 510–7.
- Rowlands, Laurent M., and Ryan J. Vander Wielen (2021). 'Time-dependent legislative behavior and election outcomes', *Party Politics*, 27:3, 565–80.
- Rueckert, George L., and Wilder Crane (1962). 'CDU Deviancy in the German Bundestag', *The Journal of Politics*, 24:3, 477–88.

- Russell, Meg (2014). 'Parliamentary party cohesion: Some explanations from psychology', *Party Politics*, 20:5, 712–23.
- Saalfeld, Thomas (1995a). *Parteisoldaten und Rebellen. Eine Untersuchung zur Geschlossenheit der Fraktionen im Deutschen Bundestag (1949-1990)*. Opladen: Leske+Budrich.
- Saalfeld, Thomas (1995b). 'On Dogs and Whips: Recorded Votes', in: Herbert Döring (ed.), *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 528–65.
- Sauger, Nicolas (2009). 'Party Discipline and Coalition Management in the French Parliament', *West European Politics*, 32:2, 310–26.
- Schechter, David L., and David M. Hedge (2001). 'Dancing with the one who brought you: The allocation and impact of party giving to state legislators', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 26:3, 437–56.
- Schindler, Danny (2019). *Politische Führung in Fraktionenparlament. Rolle und Steuerungsmöglichkeiten der Fraktionsvorsitzenden im Deutschen Bundestag*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Schlesinger, Joseph A. (1966). *Ambition and Politics*. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Schmidt, Manfred G. (2008). 'Germany: The Grand Coalition State', in: M. Josep Colomer (ed.), *Comparative European Politics*. London: Routledge, 58–93.
- Schmuck, David, and Lukas Hohendorf (2022). 'Loyal lists, distinctive districts: how dissent-shirking and leisure-shirking affect mixed-candidate selection', *West European Politics* (Online First), <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2022.2137310>.
- Schobess, Richard, and Benjamin de Vet (2022). 'The good, the loyal or the active? MPs' parliamentary performance and the achievement of static and progressive career ambitions in parliament', *European Political Science Review*, 14:4, 600–17.
- Schukraft, Stefan (2011). 'German Subnational Party Unity in Multi-Level Context – Federalism and Party Unity in the German Länder', *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 52:4, 688–713.
- Schürmann, Lennart (2023). 'Do competitive districts get more political attention? Strategic use of geographic representation during campaign and non-campaign periods', *Electoral Studies*, 81, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2022.102575>.
- Schürmann, Lennart, and Sebastian Stier (2023). 'Who Represents the Constituency? Online Political Communication by Members of Parliament in the German Mixed-Member Electoral System', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 48:1, 219–34.
- Schwarz, John. E., and Geoffrey Lambert (1971). 'Career objectives, group feeling, and legislative party voting cohesion: British conservatives, 1959-1968', *The Journal of Politics*, 33:2, 399–421.
- Sebaldt, Martin (2009). *Die Macht der Parlamente. Funktionen und Leistungsprofile nationaler Volksvertretungen in den alten Demokratien der Welt*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

- Shin, Jae Hyeok, and Hojun Lee (2017). 'Legislative Voting Behaviour in the Regional Party System: An Analysis of Roll-Call Votes in the South Korean National Assembly, 2000-8', *Government and Opposition*, 52:3, 437-59.
- Shomer, Yael (2016). 'The electoral environment and legislator dissent', *Comparative Politics*, 48:4, 557-75.
- Shomer, Yael (2017). 'The Conditional Effect of Electoral Systems and Intraparty Candidate Selection Processes on Parties' Behavior', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 42:1, 63-96.
- Sieberer, Ulrich (2006a). 'Party unity in parliamentary democracies: A comparative analysis', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 12:2, 150-78.
- Sieberer, Ulrich (2006b). 'Agenda setting in the German Bundestag: A weak government in a consensus democracy', *German Politics*, 15:1, 49-72.
- Sieberer, Ulrich (2010). 'Behavioral consequences of mixed electoral systems: Deviating voting behavior of district and list MPs in the German Bundestag', *Electoral Studies*, 29:3, 484-96.
- Sieberer, Ulrich (2011). 'The institutional power of Western European parliaments: a multidimensional analysis', *West European Politics*, 34:4, 731-54.
- Sieberer, Ulrich (2015). 'Using MP statements to explain voting behaviour in the German Bundestag: An individual level test of the Competing Principals Theory', *Party Politics*, 21:2, 284-94.
- Sieberer, Ulrich (2023). 'Der Bundestag als Arena: Institutionelle Macht, Akteursanreize und selektive Nutzungsmuster', in: Lisa H. Anders and Dorothee Riese (eds.), *Politische Akteure und Institutionen in Deutschland: Eine forschungsorientierte Einführung in das politische System*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 135-54.
- Sieberer, Ulrich, and Michael Herrmann (2020). 'Short-lived Parliamentarisation in 19th-century Germany: Parliamentary Government in the Frankfurt Assembly of 1848/1849', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 73:3, 603-26.
- Sieberer, Ulrich, and Tamaki Ohmura (2021). 'Mandate type, electoral safety, and defections from the party line: The conditional mandate divide in the German Bundestag, 1949-2013', *Party Politics*, 27:4, 704-15.
- Sieberer, Ulrich, and Wolfgang C. Müller (2017). 'Aiming higher: the consequences of progressive ambition among MPs in European parliaments', *European Political Science Review*, 9:1, 27-50.
- Sieberer, Ulrich, Thomas Saalfeld, Tamaki Ohmura, Henning Bergmann, and Stefanie Bailer (2020). 'Roll-Call Votes in the German Bundestag: A New Dataset, 1949-2013', *British Journal of Political Science*, 50:3, 1137-45.
- Siefken, Sven T. (2018). *Parlamentarische Kontrolle im Wandel: Theorie und Praxis des Deutschen Bundestages*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Sinclair, Barbara Deckard (1977). 'Determinants of Aggregate Party Cohesion in U.S. House of Representatives, 1901-1956', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 2:2, 155-75.

- Skjæveland, Asbjørn (1999). 'A Danish party cohesion cycle', *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 22:2, 121–36.
- Skjæveland, Asbjørn (2001). 'Party Cohesion in the Danish Parliament', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 7:2, 35–56.
- Slapin, Jonathan B., and Justin H. Kirkland (2020). 'The Sound of Rebellion: Voting Dissent and Legislative Speech in the UK House of Commons', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 45:2, 153–76.
- Slapin, Jonathan B., Justin H. Kirkland, Joseph A. Lazzaro, Patrick A. Leslie, and Tom O'Grady (2018). 'Ideology, Grandstanding, and Strategic Party Disloyalty in the British Parliament', *American Political Science Review*, 112:1, 15–30.
- Smrek, Michal (2023). 'Mavericks or Loyalists? Popular Ballot Jumpers and Party Discipline in the Flexible-List PR Context', *Political Research Quarterly*, 76:1, 323–36.
- Sozzi, Fabio (2023). 'Rebels in Parliament: The Effects of Candidate Selection Methods on Legislative Behaviours', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 76:2, 341–59.
- Spiegel Online (2019). 'Nahles will Kritiker kaltstellen', <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/spd-andreanahles-will-kritiker-florian-post-kaltstellen-a-1257947.html>.
- Staat, Christian, and Colin R. Kuehnhanss (2017). 'Outside earnings, electoral systems and legislative effort in the European Parliament', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 55:2, 368–86.
- Stecker, Christian (2010). 'Causes of Roll-Call Votes Supply: Evidence from the German Länder', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 16:4, 438–59.
- Stecker, Christian (2011a). 'Determinants of Party Unity. A Comparative Analysis of the German State Parliaments', *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 52:3, 424–47.
- Stecker, Christian (2011b). 'Namentliche Abstimmungen als Wahrung individualisierter Repräsentation', *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft*, 5:2, 303–28.
- Stecker, Christian (2015). 'How effects on party unity vary across votes', *Party Politics*, 21:5, 791–802.
- Steffani, Winfried (1979). *Parlamentarische und präsidentielle Demokratie. Strukturelle Aspekte westlicher Demokratien*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Stegmaier, Mary, Jale Tosun, and Klára Vlachová (2014). 'Women's Parliamentary Representation in the Czech Republic: Does Preference Voting Matter?', *East European Politics and Societies*, 28:1, 187–204.
- Stegmaier, Mary, Kamil Marcinkiewicz, and Michael Jankowski (2016). 'The Effects of Electoral Rules on Parliamentary Behavior: A Comparative Analysis of Poland and the Czech Republic', *East European Politics and Societies*, 30:4, 885–906.

- Stiller, Yannick (2023). 'Why do legislators rebel on trade agreements? The effect of constituencies' economic interests', *European Political Science Review*, 15:2, 272–90.
- Stoffel, Michael F., and Ulrich Sieberer (2018). 'Measuring re-election prospects across electoral systems: A general approach applied to Germany', *West European Politics*, 41:5, 1191–207.
- Stratmann, Thomas (2000). 'Congressional Voting over Legislative Careers: Shifting Positions and Changing Constraints', *American Political Science Review*, 94:3, 665–76.
- Strøm Kaare (2012). 'Roles as strategies: towards a logic of legislative behavior', in: Magnus Blomgren and Oliver Rozenberg (eds), *Parliamentary Roles in Modern Legislatures*. London: Routledge, 85–100.
- Strøm, Kaare (1990). *Minority Governments and Majority Rule*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Süddeutsche Zeitung (2011). 'Bosbach erlebte "schwerste Momente" seiner Karriere', <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/euro-abweichler-in-der-cdu-bosbach-raet-zu-gelassenheit-und-bleibt-beim-nein-1.1155269>.
- Tagesschau (2015). 'Griechenland-Hilfe polarisiert', <https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/deutschlandtrend/deutschlandtrend-363.html>.
- Tatalovitch, Raymond, and Dane G. Wendell (2018). 'Expanding the Scope and Content of Morality Policy Research: Lessons from Moral Foundations Theory', *Policy Sciences*, 51:4, 565–579.
- Tavits, Margit (2009). 'The Making of Mavericks: Local Loyalties and Party Defection.' *Comparative Political Studies*, 42:6, 793–815
- Tavits, Margit (2010). 'Effect of Local Ties on Electoral Success and Parliamentary Behaviour: The Case of Estonia', *Party Politics*, 16:2, 215–35.
- Tavits, Margit (2011). 'Power within Parties: The Strength of the Local Party and MP Independence in Postcommunist Europe', *American Journal of Political Science*, 55:4, 923–36.
- Tavits, Margit (2012). 'Party organizational strength and party unity in post-communist Europe', *European Political Science Review*, 4:3, 409–31.
- Thames, Frank C. (2005). 'A house divided: Party strength and the mandate divide in Hungary, Russia, and Ukraine', *Comparative Political Studies*, 38:3, 282–303.
- Thames, Frank C. (2007). 'Discipline and party institutionalization in post-Soviet legislatures', *Party Politics*, 13:4, 456–77.
- Thames, Frank C. (2016). 'Electoral Rules and Legislative Parties in the Ukrainian Rada', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 41:1, 35–59.
- Tosun, Jale (2014). 'Agricultural Biotechnology in Central and Eastern Europe: Determinants of Cultivation Bans', *Sociologia Ruralis*, 54:3, 362–81.

- Traber, Denise, Simon Hug, and Pascal Sciarini (2014). 'Party Unity in the Swiss Parliament: The Electoral Connection', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 20:2, 193–215.
- Treib, Oliver, and Bernd Schlipphak (2019). 'Who gets committee leadership positions in the European Parliament? Evidence from the 2014 selection process', *European Union Politics*, 20:2, 219–38.
- Treul, Sarah A. (2009). 'Ambition and Party Loyalty in the US Senate', *American Politics Research*, 37:3, 449–64.
- Trussler, Marc (2022). 'The Effects of High-Information Environments on Legislative Behavior in the US House of Representatives', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 47:1, 95–126.
- Tsebelis, George (1995). 'Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism', *British Journal of Political Science*, 25:3, 289–325.
- van Geffen, Robert (2016). 'Impact of Career Paths on MEPs' Activities', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 54:4, 1017–32.
- van Kleef, Charlotte, Tim Mickler, and Simon Otjes (2023). 'The partisan foundations of parliamentary speech. How parliamentary party groups decide who gets to speak for them', *Party Politics* (Online First), <https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688231185673>.
- van Vonno, Cynthia M. C., Reut Itzkovitch Malka, Sam Depauw, Reuven Y. Hazan, and Rudy B. Andeweg (2014). 'Agreement, Loyalty, and Discipline. A Sequential Approach to Party Unity', in: Kris Deschouwer and Sam Depauw (eds.), *Representing the People. A Survey among Members of Statewide and Substate Parliaments*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 110–36.
- van Vonno, Cynthia M.C. (2019). 'Achieving party unity in the Netherlands: Representatives' sequential decision-making mechanisms at three levels of Dutch government', *Party Politics*, 25:5, 664–78.
- Vivyan, Nick, and Markus Wagner (2012). 'Do voters reward rebellion? The electoral accountability of MPs in Britain', *European Journal of Political Research*, 51:2, 235–64.
- Volden, Craig, and Elizabeth Bergman (2006). 'How strong should our party be? Party member preferences over party cohesion', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 31:1, 71–104.
- von Arnim, Hans H. (2006). 'Der gekaufte Abgeordnete – Nebeneinkünfte und Korruptionsproblematik', *Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht*, 25:3, 249–54.
- von Beyme, Klaus (2019). *Hauptstadt Berlin. Von der Hauptstadtsuche zur Hauptstadtfindung*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
- von Oertzen, Jürgen (2006). *Das Expertenparlament. Abgeordnetenrollen in den Fachstrukturen bundesdeutscher Parlamente*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Wagner, Markus, Konstantin Glinitzer, and Nick Vivyan (2020). 'Costly Signals: Voter Responses to Parliamentary Dissent in Austria, Britain, and Germany', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 45:4, 645–78.

- Wängnerud, Lena (2009). 'Women in Parliaments: Descriptive and Substantive Representation', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 12:1, 51–69.
- Ward, Daniel S. (1993). 'The Continuing Search for Party Influence in Congress: A View from the Committees', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 18:2, 211–30.
- Warhurst, John (2008). 'Conscience Voting in the Australian Federal Parliament', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 54:4, 579–96.
- Washington, Ebonya L. (2008). 'Female Socialization: How Daughters Affect Their Legislator Fathers', *American Economic Review*, 98:1, 311–32.
- Weber, Till, and Craig Parsons (2016). 'Dynamic party unity: the US Congress in comparative perspective', *European Political Science Review*, 8:4, 637–62.
- Wenzelburger, Georg, and Reimut Zohlnhöfer (2021). 'Bringing Agency Back Into the Study of Partisan Politics: A Note on Recent Developments in the Literature on Party Politics', *Party Politics*, 27:5, 1055–65.
- Wenzelburger, Georg, and Reimut Zohlnhöfer (2022). *Handbuch Policy-Forschung*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
- Wenzelburger, Georg, and Sabrina Fehrenz (2018). 'Die Union und die 'Ehe für Alle'. Bestimmungsfaktoren des Abstimmungsverhaltens in der CDU/CSU-Fraktion im Bundestag', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 49:3, 512–30.
- Weschle, Simon (2022). 'Politicians' Private Sector Jobs and Parliamentary Behavior', *American Journal of Political Science* (Early View), <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12721>.
- Whitaker, Richard (2019). 'A Case of 'You Can Always Get What You Want'? Committee Assignments in the European Parliament', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 72:1, 162–81.
- Willumsen, David M. (2017). *The Acceptance of Party Unity in Parliamentary Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Willumsen, David M. (2022). 'Policy preferences, unity, and floor dissent in the European parliament', *Journal of European Public Policy* (Online First), <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2022.2107047>.
- Willumsen, David M., and Klaus H. Goetz (2017). 'Set Free? Impending Retirement and Legislative Behaviour in the UK', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 70:2, 254–79.
- Willumsen, David M., and Patrik Öhberg (2017). 'Toe the line, break the whip: explaining floor dissent in parliamentary democracies', *West European Politics*, 40:4, 688–716.
- Wimmel, Andreas (2021). 'Abkehr von der Ex-Partei? Über das Abstimmungsverhalten fraktionsloser Abgeordneter im Bundestag', *GWP – Gesellschaft. Wirtschaft. Politik*, 70:3, 326–34.
- Wochner, Timo (2022). 'Part-time parliamentarians? Evidence from outside earnings and parliamentary activities', *European Journal of Political Economy*, 75, 1–11.

- Wüst, Andreas M. (2009). 'Zur Sozialisation von Neuparlamentariern im 15. Deutschen Bundestag', in: Oscar W. Gabriel, Bernhard Weßels, and Jürgen W. Falter (eds.), *Wahlen und Wähler: Analysen aus Anlass der Bundestagswahl 2005*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 328–45.
- Yordanova, Nikoleta (2011). 'Inter-institutional Rules and Division of Power in the European Parliament: Allocation of Consultation and Co-Decision Reports', *West European Politics*, 34:1, 97–121.
- Yordanova, Nikoleta, and Monika Mühlböck (2015). 'Tracing the selection bias in roll call votes: party group cohesion in the European Parliament', *European Political Science Review*, 7:3, 373–99.
- Zimmermann, Hubert (2014). 'A Grand Coalition for the Euro: The Second Merkel Cabinet, the Euro Crisis and the Elections of 2013', *German Politics*, 23:4, 322–336.
- Zittel, Thomas, and Dominic Nyhuis (2019). 'Two Faces of Party Unity: Roll-Call Behavior and Vote Explanations in the German Bundestag', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 72:2, 406–24.
- Zittel, Thomas, and Dominic Nyhuis (2021). 'The Legislative Effects of Campaign Personalization. An Analysis on the Legislative Behavior of Successful German Constituency Candidates', *Comparative Political Studies*, 54:2, 312–38.
- Zittel, Thomas, Dominic Nyhuis, and Markus Baumann (2019). 'Geographic Representation in Party-Dominated Legislatures: A Quantitative Text Analysis of Parliamentary Questions in the German Bundestag', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 44:4, 681–711.
- Zohlhöfer, Reimut (2005). 'Globalisierung der Wirtschaft und nationalstaatliche Anpassungsreaktionen. Theoretische Überlegungen', *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen*, 12:1, 41–75.
- Zohlhöfer, Reimut (2009). 'How Politics Matter When Policies Change: Understanding Policy Change as a Political Problem', *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice*, 11:1, 97–115.
- Zohlhöfer, Reimut, and Fabian Engler (2023). 'Angela Merkel's Last Term – An Introduction', *German Politics* (Online First), <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2023.2188585>.
- Zubek, Radoslaw (2021). 'Committee strength in parliamentary democracies: A new index', *European Journal of Political Research*, 60:4, 1018–31.
- Zupan, Mark A. (1990). 'The Last Period Problem in Politics: Do Congressional Representatives Not Subject to a Reelection Constraint Alter Their Voting Behavior?', *Public Choice*, 65:2, 167–80.

B. Division of Labour and Dissenting Voting Behaviour of MPs in a ‘Working Parliament’

Abstract

In the literature on the determinants of party unity, one pathway has remained largely neglected: division of labour. Given their workload, members of parliament (MPs) are only thoroughly concerned with a subset of policies. We argue that this results in MPs casting fewer dissenting votes on matters within their area of specialization since they have had the opportunity to shape the party line there. Regression analyses using data for the German Bundestag support this hypothesis, including four important refinements: Not only the current but also past membership in the responsible committee reduces an MP’s defection probability. Additionally, this pattern is more pronounced for policy spokespersons and for less consequential, i.e., non-legislative votes as well as for issues less salient to the MP’s party. The results have implications for our understanding of MPs’ legislative behaviour, the functioning of parliaments as institutions and for the relationship between parties, MPs and voters.

1. Introduction

Party unity is an important prerequisite for much of what happens politically in parliamentary democracies (Andeweg and Thomassen 2011). Theories of party competition, e.g., on issue ownership and how parties make use of it in campaigns, treat parties as monolithic blocks that are bound to their party platforms (Budge 2015). In elections, citizens often identify with, but at least vote for parties whose relative strength usually decides on the composition of parliament. Thereby, voters expect party representatives to feel committed to the policy positions with which they ran for election (‘promissory representation’, Mansbridge 2003). Party unity is thus considered a precondition for responsible party government (Bowler et al. 1999). A lack of party unity is punished at the ballot box (Lehrer et al. 2022) and, on the member of parliament (MP) level, with lower chances of career advancement (Schobess and de Vet 2022). Moreover, hypotheses on the formation of minimal winning coalitions would be meaningless if parties could not rely on the support of all their MPs. Finally, in order to exert measurable effects on public policies (Hibbs 1977; Wenzelburger and Zohlnhöfer 2021), parties have to act cohesively, both vis-à-vis coalition partners and the opposition. Therefore, exploring what drives or impedes the unified legislative behaviour of parties and their MPs points far beyond parliamentary research.

Division of labour has been described as one of several pathways to party unity, meaning a factor conducive to MPs of the same party overwhelmingly voting together in parliament (Andeweg and Thomassen 2011). On the individual level, division of labour means that MPs are not concerned with all policies in detail but specialize on certain issues which they work on in parliamentary committees and preparatory bodies of their party group. On the institutional level, committees are considered the ‘workhorses’ of the legislative process (Siefken 2021: 117). They fulfil various functions in representative democracies: For opposition parties, committees are a means of introducing new ideas, criticism or modifications of bills in the decision-making process that is, apart from that, dominated by governing parties (Strøm 1990). Governing parties use committees for shadowing, monitoring and overriding their coalition partners and to modify government bills (Kim and Loewenberg 2005; Fortunato 2019). In both respects, committee deliberations serve as a ‘test stage’ for the plenary debate and decision (von Oertzen 2006). Moreover, committees and their corresponding bodies within the party groups are targets of interest group influence (Cross et al. 2021). Finally, committees are concerned with scrutiny and oversight activities (Siefken 2018; Norton 2019).

Division of labour and MPs’ issue specializations have implications for their roles within their party groups and for their legislative behaviour, including their varying propensity to toe the party line. However, empirical tests of this argument using observational data, i.e., measures of actual MP behaviour, are rare. In this paper, several behavioural manifestations of this argument are deducted and transferred into testable hypotheses. In a first step, we argue that MPs have lower defection rates when motions are on the floor which they were concerned with during their committee work (policy-shaping hypothesis). In a second step, several refinements are discussed: whether also past committee memberships are effective and whether the committee membership effect is conditioned by having a leadership position or by the importance of the vote for an MP’s party. After outlining the study design, the results of panel regression analyses using data for the German Bundestag (2017–2021) are presented. The article concludes with a discussion of the findings’ implications for the nexus between parties, MPs and voters.

2. State of the Art: Party Unity and Parliamentary Committees

The question of why MPs overwhelmingly vote together in parliamentary democracies has been subject to empirical studies especially for the last two or three decades. Theoretically, the literature identified a set of ‘pathways to party unity’ (Andeweg and Thomassen 2011), among

them (1) homogeneity of preferences, (2) loyalty and (3) discipline. Voting unity is not determined by preference similarity among the MPs alone (Willumsen 2022), although MPs' own ideological stances demonstrably affect their voting behaviour in certain policy areas (e.g., Degner and Leuffen 2016). The loyalty path to unity has been conceptualized as the result of MPs' party socialization (Rehmert 2022; Mai and Wenzelburger 2023). To capture the varying effectiveness of party discipline, the career-related dependence of MPs on their party, compared to other principals (e.g., voters), has been approximated. Empirically, holding or ambitions to reach powerful offices (Kerneckner 2017; Bhattacharya and Papageorgiou 2019; Zittel and Nyhuis 2019) strengthen, whereas an MP's need for personal votes in the general election (Sieberer 2010; Sieberer and Ohmura 2021) or in intra-party primaries (Sozzi 2023), personalized campaign styles (Zittel and Nyhuis 2021), local ties (Tavits 2009), economic interests of an MP's constituency (Stiller 2023), outside earnings (Mai 2022), a low prospect of being promoted to higher office (Benedetto and Hix 2007), career ambitions at another political level (Meserve et al. 2009), party switching (Gherghina and Chiru 2014), impending retirement (Mai et al. 2023, but Willumsen and Goetz 2017 for non-results) or being a 'career politician' (Heuwieser 2018) weakens an MP's propensity to toe the party line, arguably due to a changed effectiveness of party discipline compared to the baseline MP.

In contrast, empirical implications of division of labour as a fourth pathway to unity have rarely been included in observational studies of vote defections (Andeweg and Thomassen 2011; van Vonno 2019). The division of labour principle in parliaments can be observed most clearly in MPs' committee work. MPs' issue specialization has effects on their re-election chances (Frech 2016), bill co-sponsorship patterns (Baller 2017), participation in parliamentary debates (Fernandes et al. 2019), communication with voters (Meyer and Wagner 2021), further career advancement (Cirone and van Coppenolle 2018), attention towards particular issues (Borghetto et al. 2020) and their overall level of activity (Louwerse and Otjes 2016). However, few studies focus on a connection between committee work and party unity. Based on interviews with German and Dutch MPs, Mickler (2019) describes how the intra-party working groups develop their positions and why the whole party group usually follows them. Fujimura (2012) illustrates, for the Japanese case, that committee assignments are used to reconcile the party's need for unity and MPs' electoral concerns. For the U.S. case, Kanthak (2009) shows that MPs having received plum committee assignments toe the party line more frequently than other MPs. Additionally, Grimmer and Powell (2013) find that legislators who were involuntarily removed from preferred committees have significantly higher defection rates. Conversely, MPs overwhelmingly toeing the party line receive more attractive committee seats or even chair

positions, compared to more rebellious colleagues (Leighton and López 2002; Cann 2008; Whitaker 2019; but see Chiru 2020 and Fernandes et al. 2022 for non-results).

Although those findings are related to division of labour, not the MPs' specialization itself but a changed effectiveness of party discipline after having gained or lost desired committee seats seems responsible for the variation of party unity. Committee assignments are one of the 'carrots and sticks' the party leadership uses to enforce discipline (Bailer 2018). Only Willumsen and Öhberg's (2017) study of the Swedish case explicitly links MPs' issue specialization to their voting behaviour and finds that MPs vote less frequently against the party line concerning issues that have been dealt with in the parliamentary committee they belong to. We will complement their argument in three crucial respects: First, we argue that not only the current but also past committee memberships are likely to affect individual legislative behaviour. Second, we expect behavioural differences between policy spokespersons and ordinary committee members. Third, we posit that the effect of committee membership is conditional on the importance of the vote. In the subsequent section, we theorize on those aspects and derive five falsifiable hypotheses.

3. Theory

In its 19th term (2017–2021), 870 draft bills and hundreds of other motions (e.g., amendments, resolutions) were introduced and (most of them) adopted or rejected during votes in the German Bundestag. The MPs were provided with more than 31,000 documents as a technical basis for their decisions. However, they are only able to take note of a small subset of those documents and to form their opinion on only some of the motions brought to the floor (Ismayr 2012). Most obviously, time constraints prevent them from doing so – as described by a leading MP cited in Searing (1995: 680): 'The volume is so great that most of the time they would be completely lost, they wouldn't know which way to vote'. In order to keep the amount of information to process manageable, MPs usually join one or two standing committees that, broadly, resemble the jurisdictions of the government departments and deal with bills and other motions related to them (Siefken 2021). Within each parliamentary party, the committee structure is reflected by working groups (*Arbeitsgruppe*) in which the MPs collaborate in defining their party's position. In smaller parties, the working groups consist of MPs from multiple committees with similar topics, e.g., foreign, defence and development aid policy (*Arbeitskreis*; Mickler 2019). The positions of the party's working groups mark an important predecision for a motion's prospect to be passed. Suppose MPs or party factions aim to modify a proposal: In

that case, not the plenary, the committee or the party group meeting but the responsible working group of the parliamentary party is the suitable arena for such an undertaking (Schöne 2010). If its members have agreed on a common position, a discussion in the whole party group is 'preferably avoided' (Mickler 2019). Consequently, membership in those working groups is the most promising avenue for backbench MPs to pursue their policy-seeking goals.

There are several reasons why MPs do not often disagree with the other policy specialists of their party regarding their own topics. Besides other factors, committee assignments and, consequently, MPs' 'own' topics often reflect their educational or occupational background (Mickler 2018). In the German parliament, for example, members of the agricultural committee are to a disproportionately higher share farmers themselves; most of the members of the justice committee are lawyers (Ismayr 2012). Additionally, according to the distributive theory of legislative organization, MPs systematically join committees related to constituency characteristics: MPs from poor districts are often members of social policy committees, whereas members from constituencies with an increased demand for construction activity join infrastructure committees (Martin and Mickler 2019 with further references). Both the personal and electoral reasons for their committee membership might favour a common understanding of problems and, possibly, even a rough homogeneity of preferences among the policy specialists of a party group. Within the cooperative structures of their working group, the single MPs are described as 'busy, well-informed, often experienced, more or less knowledgeable policy workers who develop and evaluate parliamentary motions' (von Oertzen 2006: 256, own translation). Within their role, they are able to introduce their personal preferences into the decision-making process of their party group – in some cases, even proactively and not only related to substantiating, modifying or impeding government motions (Schöne 2010). Consequently, because those policy specialists are involved in shaping their party's position, they could reduce the policy distance between them and the responsible working group of the party and, finally, the whole party group. Since the MPs thus helped to shape the party line within their area of specialization, they have fewer reasons to vote against it (Willumsen and Öhberg 2017). Dingler and Ramstetter's (2023) inverted finding whereby MPs have *higher* defection rates within their focus area might be rooted in that the authors measure MPs' interest (by parliamentary questions) and not their capability of shaping policies.

The negative effect of committee membership on defection rates could be amplified by the fact that among the policy specialists who have often worked together for many years there is an increased expectation of mutual loyalty and not to distinguish oneself by dissent from the

responsible working group (Schöne 2010). After some Christian Democratic MPs had voted against measures to resolve the Eurozone crisis in 2015, the leader of the party group threatened them with their removal from the respective committees:

“Those who voted ‘No’ cannot keep their seats in committees where it is essential to keep the majority, e.g., in the budget or the EU committee [...]. The party group sends MPs into committees so that they represent their party’s position there.” (Die Welt 2015, own translation).

In the year before, another member of this party lost his rapporteur position after publicly proposing social policy reforms that were not coordinated with his working group (BILD 2014). Both examples illustrate that the leadership expects MPs not to take deviating stances on topics which they work on in their respective committees.

Hence, most dissenting votes are likely to happen outside their areas of specialization. MPs not familiar with a policy field might lack the expertise to have their own view on a particular motion (van Vonno 2016). Besides that, MPs might also not have the same interest in every decision and may ignore certain topics (Schöne 2010). If they do not have an opinion on an issue, MPs take voting cues from the policy specialists of their party. However, if MPs actually have an opinion and are not members of the respective committee and intra-party working group, they have a greater leeway to dissent. Additionally, there are more substantive reasons for defections, as these MPs were not involved in shaping the party line.

Hypothesis 1 (policy-shaping hypothesis): MPs have a lower probability of voting against the party line in matters inside their area of specialization.

That said, we expect that not only the current committee membership but also which topics MPs have specialized on in the past influences their legislative behaviour. Former committee membership indicates interest in the policy area, and MPs keep at least parts of the expertise gained in the past. Therefore, if MPs have been committee members one or two legislative terms ago and, after that, turned to another policy area, they most likely still have an opinion on topics of their former committees. Additionally, during their former membership in a committee and the respective intra-party working group, a convergence might have taken place between the MPs’ preferences and the party line which those MPs used to shape in former times. Lastly, MPs might still feel a sense of loyalty towards their former working group and its members whom they know from their prior collaboration. To conclude, we expect the policy-shaping

hypothesis to be valid not only for MPs' current but also for their past committee memberships – which has not been empirically tested before.

Hypothesis 2 (former specialist hypothesis): MPs have a lower probability of voting against the party line in matters which they were specialized on in former terms.

As insiders of the parliamentary business (von Oertzen 2006), the main tasks of policy spokespersons are to lead the working group concerning a particular policy area and to express the working group's position vis-à-vis the committee, the media and, secondarily, the policy spokesperson of the coalition partner (Ismayr 2012; Mickler 2019). One of their primary duties is to advocate the position of their working group within the whole parliamentary party (von Oertzen 2006). In this respect, policy spokespersons have, compared to ordinary MPs, significantly better means to shape the party line. Acting as a first filter, they can push certain initiatives or delay others (von Oertzen 2006). Additionally, since they are members of the party group leadership, they have an informational advantage and a certain leeway in settling conflicts with other intra-party working groups. Their informational advantage is also rooted in the fact that they have privileged access to the parliamentary staff of their party and are able to use its expertise for their purposes (Petersen and Kaina 2007). If the working group is divided on an issue, the policy spokesperson most likely has the authority to resolve conflicts with their decisive vote. This is reflected by the MPs' own perceptions: 68% of the German MPs who took part in the survey support the statement that the spokespersons define the position of the (whole) party group (van Vonno 2016). However, coalition agreements, the party platform or (rarely) a resolution of the whole party group constrain the spokesperson's room for manoeuvre.

In addition to the power of significantly defining the party's position, Schöne (2010) describes that, in exchange for the privileges those policy speakers have (e.g., media attention), they are expected to strictly represent their party group's position and not dissenting opinions of their own. A recent example illustrates possible role conflicts: Whereas his party group was sceptical, the Social Democratic spokesperson for defence policy, Fritz Felgentreu, supported the claim of its coalition partner to purchase armed drones for the German military. After his party had postponed a decision once again, he resigned from office in 2020 and explained his decision on Twitter as follows (own translation):

“Either I could stick to the position [of my party] vis-à-vis the public and the military although everyone knows that I have another opinion [...] or I could dissociate myself from the parliamentary group and my party. As a member of both, I expect more loyalty

and more solidarity with the leadership and the majority. Therefore, I have resigned from my office as the spokesperson for defence policy.”

Consequently, both the spokespersons’ greater influence on the decision-making process and their stronger attachment to the majority position leads to expect the following:

Hypothesis 3 (spokesperson hypothesis): The unity-inducing effect of votes inside their area of specialization is stronger for policy spokespersons compared to ordinary committee members.

Many studies find that defection probabilities differ by policy issues (e.g., Skjæveland 2001; Stecker 2015; Bergmann et al. 2016). However, this issue-based approach is only an approximation of where those differences actually stem from: a varying salience of the respective issue either for the party’s brand name (Traber et al. 2014) or the electorate (Ohmura 2014). Accordingly, we expect that the importance of an issue conditions the explanatory power of division of labour as a pathway to unity. We focus on two dimensions of importance: the type of the vote and issue salience.

Not every vote is equally consequential. Owens (2003) argues that the politics of party unity is affected by the type of document which is put to the vote. In votes that are crucial for the functioning of the government (e.g., budget), party unity is expected to be higher than in less momentous votes (Rahat 2007). According to Stecker (2015), the vote type moderates also the *determinants* of unity, and he differentiates between legislative and non-legislative matters. Whereas the former exerted direct policy implications through changes in legal rules, the latter had a more symbolic value by being political expressions of intent without direct consequences – although the documents vary in importance within those categories as well.

Beyond vote type, the literature on issue ownership assumes that topics are not equally important to parties, their activists and voters (Budge 2015). This connection between parties and particular issues affects their strategies in election campaigns (Wagner and Meyer 2014), legislative agenda-setting (Green and Jennings 2019) and in government (Jensen and Seeberg 2015). Since MPs are not only agents of their constituency but, primarily, of their parties whose success decides, for the most part, on their electoral and other career-related fortunes, the connection between parties and issues might also affect its MPs. Consequently, we expect a behavioural difference between high- and low-salience topics. The latter include those hardly covered in the election manifesto or technical issues difficult to grasp without specific policy knowledge (Andeweg and Thomassen 2011). Those topics are unlikely to be politicized since

they do not relate to the party's identity or the core interests and values of its voters. In such a setting, less constrained by the party manifesto and without creating facts by legislation, the policy-making process leaves enough room for parliamentary actors to substantially influence those policies. Accordingly, we expect division of labour to be particularly effective here, with lower defection rates of committee members.

In contrast, especially when consequential or salient issues are on the floor, parties must reckon with their actions being closely watched by voters. Electoral research has shown that voters indeed react to MPs' legislative behaviour (Papp and Russo 2018; Wagner et al. 2020; Duell et al. 2023). Disunity as a negative valence signal endangers the party's issue ownership and, for government parties, their policy-making capability and will ultimately be punished by voters (Greene and Haber 2015; Lehrer et al. 2022). Accordingly, the party group leadership is inclined to use the whip to a stronger extent during consequential and salient votes in order to prevent harm to the party (Owens 2003). Consequently, for legislators, party unity hinges much more on a trade-off between their preferences, the interests of their constituency (Stiller 2023) and the incentives of party discipline. In such a setting where parties and MPs have a clear opinion, taking voting cues from policy specialists becomes largely meaningless (Andeweg and Thomassen 2011; van Vonnno 2016). Moreover, it is less necessary since intra-party preferences are more homogeneous than on less salient issues (Sieberer 2010). What is more, for legislative matters and salient issues, policy formulation transfers from the bottom-up process through committees more into a top-down process driven by top representatives of the coalition parties and the government bureaucracy (Schindler 2019). Possible conflicts are then resolved elsewhere, which further limits the scope of committee members for shaping the party line. This leads to another two conditional hypotheses:

Hypothesis 4 (vote type hypothesis): The unity-inducing effect of votes inside their area of specialization is stronger in non-legislative compared to legislative votes.

Hypothesis 5 (issue salience hypothesis): The unity-inducing effect of votes inside their area of specialization is stronger for low-salient compared to highly salient issues.

4. Data and Methods

The propositions are tested quantitatively using data from the German parliament. First, the Bundestag is regarded as a 'party group parliament' (Ismayr 2012), i.e., a parliament with

powerful party groups which dominate parliamentary work. Second, it is considered a ‘working parliament’ with a high degree of issue specialization among the MPs (Steffani 1979; Lord 2018) and with the most policy-influential committees in Western Europe (Zubek 2021). Therefore, Germany is a suitable (and certainly a most-likely) case for an argument based on the nexus between parties and committees. However, the findings should be generalizable to other parliaments in Europe with strong parties and at least a moderate influence of committees (and preparatory bodies of the party groups) on parliamentary decisions.

We collected data on all roll-call votes in the most recent 19th parliamentary term (2017–2021). Despite the discussion on their representativeness and its consequences for the observed level of unity (Ainsley et al. 2020; Yordanova and Mühlböck 2015), roll-call votes are the only source of individual-level voting behaviour for our case. Free votes, i.e., votes where MPs were released from party discipline, are, in principle, not restricted to morality policies but could be tactically imposed by the party group leadership if the party line is difficult to enforce (Ohmura and Willumsen 2022). In the legislative term under study, three unwhipped votes were held on a reform of the organ donation system and, thereby, a classical issue of conscience. Since the determinants of MPs’ behaviour systematically differ between whipped and unwhipped votes on morality policy issues, an exclusion of the latter from the sample is justified (see Mai et al. 2023 on MPs’ voting behaviour in those votes). Finally, the models consist of 241 roll-call votes on various kinds of documents (e.g., bills, amendments, motions or resolutions).

The unit of analysis is an MP’s voting decision in a single recorded vote. This highly disaggregated data structure is necessary given that the main independent variable, ‘own committee: at the time of the vote’, measures dichotomously whether an MP votes on a document that has been deliberated in a committee he/she belongs to. Consequently, this variable varies both on the MP and the vote level – such variance could not be explored if aggregated unity scores for MPs or votes were used. Initially, this variable is coded 0 for all votes on motions that were not assigned to at least one committee or, in the case of amendments, are not related to a bill assigned to a committee. This concerns about a quarter of all votes. For the remaining motions, on the vote level, we only consider the leading (*federführend*) committee since only in those committees, a thorough discussion takes place, possibly including expert hearings, and a voting recommendation for the plenary is resolved (§63 *Geschäftsordnung des Deutschen Bundestages*). Other committees having only an advisory function in the deliberations are not considered in the main analysis. On the MP level, we only take ordinary committee memberships into consideration for our main models. Even though most MPs are deputy members of

additional committees, they only attend their meetings when ordinary members are absent. More importantly, those deputy members are usually not involved in the discussions within the intra-party working groups. Consequently, our policy-shaping hypothesis does not apply to deputy members. In robustness checks, we will explore how the results change if those two restrictions are relaxed (Appendix A3). For now, at the descriptive level, 5.4% of the observations are cases where MPs vote on a document that has been dealt with in their committee(s).

For the variable ‘own committee: before the time of the vote’, the ordinary membership in the respective leading committee during the past two legislative terms, as well as in the current term until the day before the vote, is counted. We chose two past terms as a cut-off point because we assume that policy knowledge and connections to the former working group shrink the longer an MP is not a member anymore. In order to disentangle the effects of past and current membership, the variable is coded 0 if an MP is still a member of the respective committee. The dichotomous variable ‘policy spokesperson (all subjects)’ takes value 1 if an MP at the time of the vote leads a working group of the parliamentary party which is related to the work of one or more committee(s) – irrespective of whether the vote is pertaining to those issues. If the party has elected deputy group leaders who are responsible for certain (broader) topics, they are counted as spokespersons as well since they are actively involved in settling conflicts between different working groups and, as a connection between the leadership and working level of the parliamentary party, have significant powers in the decision-making process (von Oertzen 2006). To compare the spokespersons’ behaviour across votes, we interact this variable with the variable ‘own committee’ in model 3. For investigating the conditional hypothesis 4, we dichotomized the votes by the respective documents into legislative (bills and amendments) and non-legislative matters (various kinds of motions and resolutions), following Stecker (2015). In order to test H5, we interacted committee membership with issue salience for the MP’s party. We draw on Manifesto Project data (Lehmann et al. 2022) which quantifies the percentage of ‘quasi-sentences’ a party dedicates to one of several dozens of issues in its election programme. Its focus on relative issue emphasis aligns with the assumptions of saliency theory (Budge 2015) and thus renders it the most suitable data source for our purposes. For ‘issue salience’, we summed up all manifesto items that are linked to the committee’s jurisdiction (irrespective of the party’s position on the issue). For the main analysis, we accept the huge differences among the salience scores since they represent the overall importance of the topics for the parties. Another option, which we pursue in the robustness checks, is to z-standardize the salience scores among the parties. The result would indicate then which party emphasizes a topic to an above- or below-average extent – irrespective of whether it is generally an important topic. The

salience variables were coded ‘missing’ if no manifesto items fit to the committee’s jurisdiction. This reduces the number of observations in model 5 compared to models 1–4.

In order to isolate the hypothesized effects, we control for other factors that affect MPs’ defection rates. Most of them are approximations of the varying effectiveness of party discipline – since the national-level party leadership is the major principal for progressively ambitious MPs (Sieberer and Müller 2017). To capture electoral incentives, we include whether an MP was elected in the nominal or list tier of Germany’s mixed-member electoral system (Sieberer 2010). Especially, list candidates are punished by party selectorates for dissenting votes through less promising list positions (Schmuck and Hohendorf 2022), whereas MPs, as individual candidates, tend to profit from vote defections, especially if justified with representing voter concerns (Duell et al. 2023). We also include dichotomous variables measuring whether an MP holds an executive office (chancellor, minister, junior minister) or another important parliamentary office (party group leadership, whip, Bundestag presidency, committee chair¹ to account for higher disciplinary pressures (Zittel and Nyhuis 2019). Moreover, we consider parliamentary experience which was regarded as a proxy for MPs’ parliamentary socialization (Delius et al. 2013), policy influence (Tavits 2009), policy convergence with one’s party group (Saalfeld 1995) or expertise within ‘their’ policy area (von Oertzen 2006). MPs’ gender and age are also included especially since recent studies detect, under particular circumstances, lower defection rates for women MPs (Clayton and Zetterberg 2021; Dingler and Ramstetter 2023). Finally, parties differ in their defection rates – a pattern which is also reflected in our data. Whereas the Christian Democrats show an average defection rate of 0.58%, the Green MPs cast 2.86% of their votes against the party line (Appendix A2, figure 3). Those inter-party differences were attributed to, among others, party group size (Bergmann et al. 2016), candidacy eligibility criteria (Rehmer 2020), intra-party democracy (Close et al. 2019), party organizational strength (Tavits 2012) or party family (Close 2018). Since only one term is analysed and thus sufficient variance is lacking, we include party-fixed effects to account for possible party differences.

Our dichotomous dependent variable takes value 1 whenever an MP’s voting behaviour differs from the majority of their party group. We do not differentiate between different degrees of dissent (i.e., between voting ‘abstention’ or ‘no’ if the party votes ‘yes’) since, in both mentioned

¹ Whereas committee chairs are said to hold the more prestigious office, compared to policy spokespersons, they do not exert any comparable influence on policies (Petersen and Kaina 2007). Sieberer and Höhmann (2017) report one of the lowest power scores for German committee chairs, compared to other Western democracies. Therefore, their office is only included in the controls instead of being equated with spokespersons.

cases, the MP does not ultimately support the party line. If an MP does not attend a vote, we code this as a missing observation in the main analysis. Although some absences might be strategically motivated in order not to dissent visibly from the party line (Font 2020), they probably mostly have non-political reasons (e.g., time constraints, illness). Due to the dichotomousness of our dependent variable and a data structure that is clustered into multiple voting occasions of MPs, we estimate logistic panel regressions with standard errors clustered by MP.

Details on the measurement, data sources and descriptive statistics of all variables are listed in Appendix A1 (Table 1). Distributional graphs show that the defection rates vary strongly both among MPs and votes (Appendix A2, figures 1+2). Whereas about 50% of the MPs and 22% of the votes do not exhibit a single defection, some MPs have a much higher propensity to defect (up to 27%). Among the 20 votes with the highest defection rates (up to 10%), there are numerous decisions on military missions, but also on measures against the pandemic and other domestic policies (Appendix A2, Table 3).

5. Results

To evaluate our hypotheses, we estimated five regression models (Table 1). According to model 1, MPs defect less frequently if policy matters are concerned which they dealt with during their committee and party group work. This effect is statistically highly significant and supports the policy-shaping hypothesis (H1). However, this does not imply that MPs do not take any cues from policy specialists on other topics. Actually, it shows that the effect of shaping a motion within their issue specialization or following the position of their own working group outweighs the cue-taking effect on other matters if tested against each other.

According to model 2, not only the current but also former memberships in a committee related to the vote affect MPs' voting behaviour. Both exert a statistically significant negative effect on casting a dissenting vote. Whereas the coefficient is even larger for past membership, the statistical significance of the current membership is higher. This supports our former specialist hypothesis (H2).


Table 1: Results of the logistic regression analysis

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Independent variables</i>					
Own committee: at the time of the vote	-0.499*** (0.137)	-0.507*** (0.137)	-0.392** (0.145)	-0.658** (0.202)	-0.619** (0.217)
Own committee: before the time of the vote		-0.900** (0.326)			
Policy spokesperson (all subjects)			-0.690*** (0.135)		
Policy spokesperson x own committee (interaction)			-0.708 (0.445)		
Legislative matter (bill/amendment)				-0.387*** (0.053)	
Own committee x legislative matter (interaction)				0.403 (0.274)	
Issue salience for MP's party (unstandardised)					-0.005 (0.005)
Own committee x issue salience (interaction)					0.019 (0.019)
<i>Control variables</i>					
Direct mandate	0.044 (0.224)	0.044 (0.224)	0.046 (0.223)	0.038 (0.224)	-0.142 (0.244)
Executive office	-3.684*** (0.766)	-3.679*** (0.766)	-3.802*** (0.767)	-3.687*** (0.766)	-3.592*** (0.788)
Parliamentary office	-0.805*** (0.155)	-0.805*** (0.156)	-0.676*** (0.156)	-0.791*** (0.155)	-0.695*** (0.178)
Parliamentary experience	0.042*** (0.011)	0.042*** (0.011)	0.046*** (0.011)	0.044*** (0.011)	0.058*** (0.012)
Gender (female)	0.190 (0.140)	0.188 (0.140)	0.179 (0.139)	0.190 (0.140)	0.118 (0.153)
Age	0.013* (0.006)	0.013* (0.006)	0.013* (0.006)	0.014* (0.006)	0.018** (0.007)
Party: CDU/CSU	reference category				
Party: SPD	0.425 (0.224)	0.425 (0.224)	0.469* (0.224)	0.425 (0.224)	0.502* (0.248)
Party: FDP	1.641*** (0.295)	1.635*** (0.295)	1.954*** (0.301)	1.651*** (0.295)	1.583*** (0.323)
Party: Greens	2.138** (0.289)	2.136** (0.290)	2.091*** (0.289)	2.137** (0.290)	2.106** (0.315)
Party: The Left	1.210*** (0.288)	1.207*** (0.288)	1.179*** (0.288)	1.210*** (0.289)	1.107*** (0.315)
Party: AfD	2.042*** (0.290)	2.033*** (0.290)	2.160*** (0.291)	2.052*** (0.291)	2.166*** (0.317)
Intercept	-7.113*** (0.403)	-7.096*** (0.403)	-7.074*** (0.402)	-7.003*** (0.404)	-7.512*** (0.449)
N	152,022	152,022	152,022	152,022	122,743

Logit coefficients are displayed, with standard errors in parentheses.

Levels of significance: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 1: Predicted probabilities for the conditional effect of policy spokespersons (model 3)




Predicted probabilities of voting against the party line are shown, with 95% confidence intervals displayed by spikes.

In the third model, the defection probability is compared both between policy spokespersons and ordinary committee members as well as between subjects within/beyond MPs’ issue specialization. The interaction term is not statistically significant at conventional levels ($p = 0.11$). However, both constitutive variables, which were also included in the models (Brambor et al. 2006), exert statistically significant effects. To explore its substantial size, we plotted the effect of voting on a topic within one’s area of specialization both for all MPs and separately for MPs holding a spokesperson function and those who do not (Figure 1). Overall, voting on a topic that an MP is familiar with reduces the defection probability by 37%. In addition to the lower baseline level, this pattern is considerably more pronounced for spokespersons: Their defection probability is 65% lower regarding issues which they are responsible for. The confidence intervals do not overlap in this comparison. For MPs without a spokesperson position, the difference between the defection probabilities is ‘only’ 30%. This substantial difference between spokespersons and ordinary committee members clearly supports H3.

Model 4 tests whether the committee membership effect is conditional on the type of document which is voted on. Figure 2 shows that committee membership exerts an effect on MPs’ defection rates only in votes on motions which do not result in direct legal changes. Non-legislative matters include also votes on military missions abroad. Even if they do not have legal consequences for the citizens, they constitute meaningful decisions both for the soldiers’ lives

and the federal budget. Regarding those votes, it has been reported that the leadership of at least some party groups relaxes party discipline for those who cannot support those missions for conscience reasons (Delius et al. 2013). On those non-legislative matters, MPs who are responsible committee members have statistically as well as substantially significant lower defection rates. In contrast, when bills and amendments are put to the vote, committee membership is no longer a statistically significant predictor of MPs' behaviour. In those highly consequential votes, division of labour might be replaced by other pathways to unity, most likely discipline imposed by the party group leadership.

Figure 2: Predicted probabilities for the conditional effect of vote type (model 4)




Predicted probabilities of voting against the party line are shown, with 95% confidence intervals displayed by spikes.

A similar conditional effect is found for issue salience. Again, the interaction term is not statistically significant (model 5). However, a marginal effects plot shows that the effect of voting on an issue within the jurisdiction of one's committee indeed varies with issue salience (Figure 3): The unity-inducing effect of committee membership is strongest for topics which are hardly salient to the MP's party. With increasing salience, the difference in the defection probabilities between committee members and non-members becomes weaker and, ultimately, statistically insignificant. Supporting H5, it appears that the division of labour principle applies mainly to issues of minor importance to the party, whereas parties monitor and guide the parliamentary behaviour of their MPs more closely on issues that are fundamental to the party's

identity – which, in turn, constrains the committee members’ ability of shaping policies and thus the major reason for toeing the party line.

Figure 3: Effect of committee membership, conditioned by issue salience (model 5)



Regarding the controls, we see that holding parliamentary and, even more, executive offices goes along with lower defection rates – which could be interpreted as a discipline effect. Both a longer parliamentary experience and a higher age correlate with a higher probability to defect. Additionally, we see significant party differences: All parties (except for the Social Democrats) show higher defection rates than the Christian Democrats, with the Greens and the right-wing populist AfD showing the highest defection probabilities. In contrast, whether the MP was elected via the district or the list tier and his/her gender do not matter.

Robustness checks show that the results do not depend on the operationalization of certain controls or the treatment of MPs’ non-participation in roll-call votes. Additionally, they reveal that the more the measurement of MPs’ issue specialization moves from active participation to mere formal consultation, the lower its explanatory power (Appendix A3). Although a correlative analysis cannot ultimately prove it, this substantiates our causal argument that

shaping policies and, thus, potentially minimizing the policy distance to the party line is the plausible reason for lower defection rates of committee members.

6. Conclusion

We investigated how the issue specialization of MPs affects their probability of casting votes against the party line. Like other so-called ‘working parliaments’ (Lord 2018), the Bundestag delegates large parts of its work to standing committees. Since MPs are members of only one or two committees, they are concerned with a subset of all policies in detail. Consequently, there might be differences in MPs’ voting behaviour between issues which they are specialized on and others which they do not get in touch with before the party group meeting or the plenary vote. Empirically, the analysis of roll-call vote data for the German Bundestag (2017–2021) supports our policy-shaping hypothesis, i.e., that MPs have lower defection rates concerning issues inside their area of specialization, probably because they actively participate in determining what later becomes the party line (H1). Proceeding from this, four refining propositions were deducted that had not been empirically tested before and are now backed by the data: First, MPs who formerly were members of the responsible committee show lower defection rates as well (H2). Second, the negative effect on vote defections is stronger for policy spokespersons than for ordinary committee members since the former have enhanced possibilities to shape the party line (H3). Third, the explanatory power of the policy-shaping hypothesis is lower for important decisions, meaning for votes that have a direct effect on legislation (H4) or that are highly salient to the MP’s party (H5). The described effects support the understanding of division of labour as a powerful pathway to party-compliant behaviour, especially for MPs responsible for the given topic. Thus, the findings add to the more prominently featured discipline- and loyalty-related accounts of how parties reach unified action in parliament.

The results have several implications for the relationship between parties, voters and MPs. First, if votes against the party line become more unlikely for MPs who are concerned with a proposal, this might be used strategically by the party group leadership. Instead of denying an MP with diverging views a seat in the respective committee (which would resemble the partisan theory of legislative organization, Cox and McCubbins 1993), it is also conceivable to dissuade the MP from vote defections by involving him/her in the substantive policy work. This would provide an explanation for Mickler’s (2018) finding that policy distance is not a predictor of committee assignments in the German case. However, disciplining by involvement only works for MPs

ideologically not too far away from the party mean who occasionally use deviations to raise their own profile. In contrast, the involvement of staunch preference outliers in the committee work could weaken the overall party position more than just one dissenting voice on the floor. Second, the findings add to the literature on issue competition and issue ownership in that defection rates are not equal among all policy issues. The more salient an issue is for a party, the more centralized appears the policy-making process and the more party discipline restricts the policy-shaping possibilities of individual MPs. Third, that the behavioural differences between committee members and other MPs disappear in the highly consequential legislative votes points to the dominance of political parties and the executive in public policy-making within parliamentary systems like the German one. However, although they centralize policy-making on important matters, legislative parties might also take an independent stance towards their government from time to time and our results underlined that MPs are quite capable of shaping the party line on some issues (von Oertzen 2006). Fourth, our findings could be read as dissenting votes are reduced when the division of labour principle is invigorated. This carries two different implications for the major theoretical debate on representation. On the one hand, reducing votes against the party line mitigates an agency problem within the constitutional chain of delegation (Müller 2000) and strengthens promissory representation (Mansbridge 2003), i.e., that MPs support the party on whose platform they were elected to parliament. It would also support the notion that parties increase the transparency and predictability of policy outcomes and are thus the best means of facilitating accountability between voters and their representatives (Kölln 2015). On the other hand, citizens explicitly prefer constituency representation over partisan representation (Bøggild 2020), and the division of labour principle has been alleged to impair MPs' responsiveness to their constituents (von Oertzen 2006). Their specialization on a few issues necessarily results in a lack of overview and knowledge on other issues. However, the inputs MPs receive from their constituency are not limited to their area of specialization. Since it is considered bad style to chime in when other topics are concerned (Schöne 2010; Ismayr 2012), MPs' responsiveness is restricted to 'their' topics. It is true that MPs can pass on concerns from the constituency to responsible committee members. However, the chances that these will be taken up are low. Therefore, the insufficient internal responsiveness of the specialized MPs to each other weakens the external responsiveness of parliament to society (von Oertzen 2006). This problem gains additional weight in times of declining classical cleavages and partisan dealignment, because supporters and members of parties (including MPs) are increasingly less united on policy core beliefs and, at the same time, the parties' policy specialists shield themselves from each other.

Our findings provide several avenues for future research. Because this study focused on the ‘division of labour’ path to unity, we conceptualized MPs’ connection to particular issues by their involvement in the committee and intra-party group deliberations. However, this might not be the only way in which MPs’ defection probabilities vary among issues. First, MPs might have an interest in topics not related to their committee membership, be that based on their former occupation or personal curiosity – without them joining the respective committee or despite being denied the assignment to those committees. Second, MPs might also connect to particular topics based on earlier stages of their political career, be that executive offices at the federal or subnational level, committee memberships in other parliaments or engagement in NGOs. Future studies ought to shed light on those possible advances or replicate our findings for further parliaments.

7. References

- Ainsley, Caitlin, Clifford J. Carrubba, Brian F. Crisp, Betul Demirkaya, Matthew J. Gabel, and Dino Hadzic (2020). ‘Roll-Call Vote Selection: Implications for the Study of Legislative Politics’, *American Political Science Review*, 114:3, 691–706.
- Andeweg, Rudy B., and Jacques Thomassen (2011). ‘Pathways to party unity: Sanctions, loyalty, homogeneity and division of labour in the Dutch parliament’, *Party Politics*, 17:5, 655–72.
- Bailer, Stefanie (2018). ‘To use the whip or not: Whether and when party group leaders use disciplinary measures to achieve voting unity’, *International Political Science Review*, 39:2, 163–77.
- Baller, Inger (2017). ‘Specialists, party members, or national representatives: Patterns in co-sponsorship of amendments in the European Parliament’, *European Union Politics*, 18:3, 469–90.
- Benedetto, Giacomo, and Simon Hix (2007). ‘The Rejected, the Ejected, and the Dejected: Explaining Government Rebels in the 2001–2005 British House of Commons’, *Comparative Political Studies*, 40:7, 755–81.
- Bergmann, Henning, Stefanie Bailer, Tamaki Ohmura, Thomas Saalfeld, and Ulrich Sieberer (2016). ‘Namentliche Abstimmungen im Bundestag 1949 bis 2013: Befunde aus einem neuen Datensatz’, *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 47:1, 26–50.
- Bhattacharya, Caroline, and Achillefs Papageorgiou (2019). ‘Are Backbenchers Fighting Back? Intra-Party Contestation in German Parliament Debates on the Greek Crisis’, *Parliamentary Affairs*, 72:2, 425–44.
- BILD (2014). Strafaktion gegen den Hartz-IV-Revoluzzer, <https://www.bild.de/geld/wirtschaft/cdu/strafaktion-gegen-hartz-4-revoluzzer-38430388.bild.html>.

- Bøggild, Troels (2020). 'Politicians as Party Hacks: Party Loyalty and Public Distrust in Politicians', *The Journal of Politics*, 82:4, 1516–29.
- Borghetto, Enrico, José Santana-Pereira, and André Freire (2020). 'Parliamentary Questions as an Instrument for Geographic Representation: The Hard Case of Portugal', *Swiss Political Science Review*, 26:1, 10–30.
- Bowler, Shaun, David M. Farrell, and Richard S. Katz (1999). 'Party Cohesion, Party Discipline, and Parliaments.', in: Shaun Bowler (ed.), *Party discipline and parliamentary government*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 3–22.
- Brambor, Thomas, William R. Clark, and Matt Golder (2006). 'Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses', *Political Analysis*, 14:1, 63–82.
- Budge, Ian (2015). 'Issue Emphases, Saliency Theory and Issue Ownership: A Historical and Conceptual Analysis', *West European Politics*, 38:4, 761–77.
- Cann, Damon M. (2008). 'Modeling Committee Chair Selection in the U.S. House of Representatives', *Political Analysis*, 16:3, 274–89.
- Chiru, Mihail (2020). 'Loyal soldiers or seasoned leaders? The selection of committee chairs in the European Parliament', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 27:4, 612–29.
- Cirone, Alexandra, and Brenda van Coppenolle (2018). 'Cabinets, Committees, and Careers: The Causal Effect of Committee Service', *The Journal of Politics*, 80:3, 948–63.
- Clayton, Amanda, and Pär Zetterberg (2021). 'Gender and Party Discipline: Evidence from Africa's Emerging Party Systems', *American Political Science Review*, 115:3, 869–84.
- Close, Caroline (2018). 'Parliamentary party loyalty and party family: The missing link?', *Party Politics*, 24:2, 209–19.
- Close, Caroline, Sergiu Gherghina, and Vivien Sierens (2019). 'Prompting Legislative Agreement and Loyalty: What Role for Intra-Party Democracy?', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 72:2, 387–405.
- Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins (1993). *Legislative Leviathan. Party Government in the House*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Cross, James P., Rainer Eising, Henrik Hermansson, and Florian Spohr (2021). 'Business interests, public interests, and experts in parliamentary committees: their impact on legislative amendments in the German Bundestag', *West European Politics*, 44:2, 354–77.
- Degner, Hanno, and Dirk Leuffen (2016). 'Keynes, Friedman, or Monnet? Explaining parliamentary voting behaviour on fiscal aid for euro area member states', *West European Politics*, 39:6, 1139–59.
- Delius, Martin F., Michael Koß, and Christian Stecker (2013). '„Ich erkenne also Fraktionsdisziplin grundsätzlich auch an...“ Innerfraktioneller Dissens in der SPD-Fraktion der Großen Koalition 2005 bis 2009', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 44:3, 546–66.

- Die Welt (2015). Kauder geht mit Abweichlern hart ins Gericht, <https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article144968562/Kauder-geht-mit-Abweichlern-hart-ins-Gericht.html>.
- Dingler, Sarah C., and Lena Ramstetter (2023). 'When Does She Rebel? How Gender Affects Deviating Legislative Behaviour', *Government and Opposition*, 58:3, 437–55.
- Duell, Dominik, Lea Kaftan, Sven-Oliver Proksch, Jonathan Slapin, and Christopher Wratil (2023). 'Communicating the Rift: Voter Perceptions of Intraparty Dissent in Parliaments', *The Journal of Politics*, 85:1, 76–91.
- Fernandes, Jorge M., Max Goplerud, and Miguel Won (2019). 'Legislative Bellwethers: The Role of Committee Membership in Parliamentary Debate', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 44:2, 307–43.
- Fernandes, Jorge M., Thomas Saalfeld, and Carsten Schwemmer (2022). 'The Politics of Select Committee Assignments in the British House of Commons', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 47:2, 329–60.
- Font, Nuria (2020). 'Competing Principals and Non-Vote Decisions in the European Parliament', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 73:1, 166–85.
- Fortunato, David (2019). 'Legislative Review and Party Differentiation in Coalition Governments', *American Political Science Review*, 113:1, 242–7.
- Frech, Elena (2016). 'Re-electing MEPs: The factors determining re-election probabilities', *European Union Politics*, 17:1, 69–90.
- Fujimura, Naofumi (2012). 'Electoral incentives, party discipline, and legislative organization: manipulating legislative committees to win elections and maintain party unity', *European Political Science Review*, 4:2, 147–75.
- Gherghina, Sergiu, and Mihail Chiru (2014). 'Determinants of legislative voting loyalty under different electoral systems: Evidence from Romania', *International Political Science Review*, 35:5, 523–41.
- Green, Jane, and Will Jennings (2019). 'Party Reputations and Policy Priorities: How Issue Ownership Shapes Executive and Legislative Agendas', *British Journal of Political Science*, 49:2, 443–66.
- Greene, Zachary David, and Matthias Haber (2015). 'The consequences of appearing divided: An analysis of party evaluations and vote choice', *Electoral Studies*, 37, 15–27.
- Grimmer, Justin, and Eleanor N. Powell (2013). 'Congressmen in Exile: The Politics and Consequences of Involuntary Committee Removal', *The Journal of Politics*, 75:4, 907–20.
- Heuwieser, Raphael J. (2018). 'Submissive Lobby Fodder or Assertive Political Actors? Party Loyalty of Career Politicians in the UK House of Commons, 2005–15', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 43:2, 305–41.
- Hibbs, Douglas A. (1977). 'Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy', *American Political Science Review*, 71:4, 1467–87.

- Ismayr, Wolfgang (2012). *Der Deutsche Bundestag*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
- Jensen, Carsten, and Henrik Bech Seeberg (2015). 'The Power of Talk and the Welfare State: Evidence from 23 Countries on an Asymmetric Opposition-Government Response Mechanism', *Socio-Economic Review*, 13:2, 215–33.
- Kanthak, Kristin (2009). 'U. S. State Legislative Committee Assignments and Encouragement of Party Loyalty: An Exploratory Analysis', *State Politics & Policy Quarterly*, 9:3, 284–303.
- Kernecker, Theresa (2017). 'Ambition as a micro-foundation of party loyalty', *Party Politics*, 23:5, 538–48.
- Kim, Dong-Hun, and Gerhard Loewenberg (2005). 'The Role of Parliamentary Committees in Coalition Governments: Keeping Tabs on Coalition Partners in the German Bundestag', *Comparative Political Studies*, 38:9, 1104–29.
- Kölln, Ann-Kristin (2015). 'The value of political parties to representative democracy', *European Political Science Review*, 7:4, 593–613.
- Lehmann, Pola, Tobias Burst, Theres Matthieß, Sven Regel, Andrea Volkens, Bernhard Weßels, and Lisa Zehnter (2022). *The Manifesto Data Collection*. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Version 2022a. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), <https://doi.org/10.25522/manifesto.mpds.2022a>.
- Lehrer, Roni, Pirmin Stöckle, and Sebastian Juhl (2022). 'Assessing the relative influence of party unity on vote choice: evidence from a conjoint experiment', *Political Science Research and Methods* (Online First), <https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2022.45>.
- Leighton, Wayne A., and Edward J. López (2002). 'Committee Assignments and the Cost of Party Loyalty', *Political Research Quarterly*, 55:1, 59–90.
- Lord, Christopher (2018). 'The European Parliament: a working parliament without a public?', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 24:1, 34–50.
- Louwerse, Tom, and Simon Otjes (2016). 'Personalised parliamentary behaviour without electoral incentives: the case of the Netherlands', *West European Politics*, 39:4, 778–99.
- Mai, Philipp (2022). 'Whose bread I don't eat, his song I don't sing? MPs' outside earnings and dissenting voting behaviour', *Party Politics*, 28:2, 342–53.
- Mai, Philipp, and Georg Wenzelburger (2023). 'Loyal Activists? Party Socialization and Dissenting Voting Behavior in Parliament', *Legislative Studies Quarterly* (Early View), <https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12416>.
- Mai, Philipp, Moritz Link, and Fabian Engler (2023). 'Voting Behaviour in the 19th German Bundestag and Beyond: Between the Daily Business of Unity and a Special Vote of Conscience', *German Politics* (Online First), <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2023.2191317>.
- Mansbridge, Jane (2003). 'Rethinking Representation.', *American Political Science Review*, 97:4, 515–28.

- Martin, Shane, and Tim A. Mickler (2019). 'Committee Assignments: Theories, Causes and Consequences', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 72:1, 77–98.
- Meserve, Stephen A., Daniel Pemstein, and William T. Bernhard (2009). 'Political Ambition and Legislative Behavior in the European Parliament', *The Journal of Politics*, 71:3, 1015–32.
- Meyer, Thomas M., and Markus Wagner (2021). 'Issue Engagement Across Members of Parliament: The Role of Issue Specialization and Party Leadership', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 46:3, 653–78.
- Mickler, Tim A. (2018). 'Who gets what and why? Committee assignments in the German Bundestag', *West European Politics*, 41:2, 517–39.
- Mickler, Tim A. (2019). 'What Happens after Assignments? The Room for Manoeuvre of Committee Members in the Bundestag and the Tweede Kamer', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 72:2, 445–63.
- Müller, Wolfgang C. (2000). 'Political parties in parliamentary democracies: Making delegation and accountability work', *European Journal of Political Research*, 37:3, 309–33.
- Norton, Philip (2019). 'Post-legislative scrutiny in the UK Parliament: adding value', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 25:3, 340–57.
- Ohmura, Tamaki (2014). 'When your Name is on the List, it is Time to Party: The Candidacy Divide in a Mixed-Member Proportional System', *Representation*, 50:1, 69–82.
- Ohmura, Tamaki, and David M. Willumsen (2022). 'Free votes and the analysis of recorded votes: evidence from Germany (1949–2021)', *West European Politics* (Online First), <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2022.2114651>.
- Owens, John E. (2003). 'Explaining party cohesion and discipline in democratic legislatures: purposiveness and contexts', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 9:4, 12–40.
- Papp, Zsófia, and Federico Russo (2018). 'Parliamentary Work, Re-Section and Re-Election: In Search of the Accountability Link', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 71:4, 853–67.
- Petersen, Anne S., and Viktoria Kaina (2007). '„Die Fäden habe ich in der Hand“: Arbeitsgruppenvorsitzende der SPD- und CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktionen', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 38:2, 243–60.
- Rahat, Gideon (2007). 'Determinants of party cohesion: Evidence from the case of the Israeli parliament', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 60:2, 279–96.
- Rehmert, Jochen (2020). 'Candidacy Eligibility Criteria and Party Unity', *Comparative Political Studies*, 53:8, 1298–325.
- Rehmert, Jochen (2022). 'Party membership, pre-parliamentary socialization and party cohesion', *Party Politics*, 28:6, 1081–93.
- Saalfeld, Thomas (1995). *Parteisoldaten und Rebellen. Eine Untersuchung zur Geschlossenheit der Fraktionen im Deutschen Bundestag (1949-1990)*. Opladen: Leske+Budrich.

- Schindler, Danny (2019). *Politische Führung in Fraktionenparlament. Rolle und Steuerungsmöglichkeiten der Fraktionsvorsitzenden im Deutschen Bundestag*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Schmuck, David, and Lukas Hohendorf (2022). 'Loyal lists, distinctive districts: how dissent-shirking and leisure-shirking affect mixed-candidate selection', *West European Politics* (Online First), <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2022.2137310>.
- Schobess, Richard, and Benjamin de Vet (2022). 'The good, the loyal or the active? MPs' parliamentary performance and the achievement of static and progressive career ambitions in parliament', *European Political Science Review*, 14:4, 600–17.
- Schöne, Helmar (2010). *Alltag im Parlament. Parlamentskultur in Theorie und Empirie*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Searing, Donald D. (1995). 'The Psychology of Political Authority: A Causal Mechanism of Political Learning through Persuasion and Manipulation', *Political Psychology*, 16:4, 677–96.
- Sieberer, Ulrich (2010). 'Behavioral consequences of mixed electoral systems: Deviating voting behavior of district and list MPs in the German Bundestag', *Electoral Studies*, 29:3, 484–96.
- Sieberer, Ulrich, and Daniel Höhmann (2017). 'Shadow chairs as monitoring device? A comparative analysis of committee chair powers in Western European parliaments', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 23:3, 301–25.
- Sieberer, Ulrich, and Tamaki Ohmura (2021). 'Mandate type, electoral safety, and defections from the party line: The conditional mandate divide in the German Bundestag, 1949–2013', *Party Politics*, 27:4, 704–15.
- Sieberer, Ulrich, and Wolfgang C. Müller (2017). 'Aiming higher: the consequences of progressive ambition among MPs in European parliaments', *European Political Science Review*, 9:1, 27–50.
- Siefken, Sven T. (2018). *Parlamentarische Kontrolle im Wandel: Theorie und Praxis des Deutschen Bundestages*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Siefken, Sven T. (2021). 'No paradise of policy-making. The role of parliamentary committees in the German Bundestag', in: Sven T. Siefken and Hilmar Rommetvedt (eds.), *Parliamentary Committees in the Policy Process*. London: Routledge, 116–36.
- Skjæveland, Asbjørn (2001). 'Party Cohesion in the Danish Parliament', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 7:2, 35–56.
- Sozzi, Fabio (2023). 'Rebels in Parliament: The Effects of Candidate Selection Methods on Legislative Behaviours', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 76:2, 341–59.
- Stecker, Christian (2015). 'How effects on party unity vary across votes', *Party Politics*, 21:5, 791–802.
- Steffani, Winfried (1979). *Parlamentarische und präsidentielle Demokratie. Strukturelle Aspekte westlicher Demokratien*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.

- Stiller, Yannick (2023). ‘Why do legislators rebel on trade agreements? The effect of constituencies’ economic interests’, *European Political Science Review*, 15:2, 272–90.
- Strøm, Kaare (1990). *Minority Governments and Majority Rule*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tavits, Margit (2009). ‘The Making of Mavericks: Local Loyalties and Party Defection’, *Comparative Political Studies*, 42:6, 793–815.
- Tavits, Margit (2012). ‘Party organizational strength and party unity in post-communist Europe’, *European Political Science Review*, 4:3, 409–31.
- Traber, Denise, Simon Hug, and Pascal Sciarini (2014). ‘Party Unity in the Swiss Parliament: The Electoral Connection’, *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 20:2, 193–215.
- van Vonno, Cynthia M.C. (2016). *Achieving Party Unity. A Sequential Approach to Why MPs Act in Concert*. Leiden: Leiden University Repository.
- van Vonno, Cynthia M.C. (2019). ‘Achieving party unity in the Netherlands: Representatives’ sequential decision-making mechanisms at three levels of Dutch government’, *Party Politics*, 25:5, 664–78.
- von Oertzen, Jürgen (2006). *Das Expertenparlament. Abgeordnetenrollen in den Fachstrukturen bundesdeutscher Parlamente*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Wagner, Markus, and Thomas M. Meyer (2014). ‘Which Issues Do Parties Emphasise? Saliency Strategies and Party Organisation in Multiparty Systems’, *West European Politics*, 37:5, 1019–45.
- Wagner, Markus, Konstantin Glinitzer, and Nick Vivyan (2020). ‘Costly Signals: Voter Responses to Parliamentary Dissent in Austria, Britain, and Germany’, *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 45:4, 645–78.
- Wenzelburger, Georg, and Reimut Zohlnhöfer (2021). ‘Bringing Agency Back Into the Study of Partisan Politics: A Note on Recent Developments in the Literature on Party Politics’, *Party Politics*, 27:5, 1055–65.
- Whitaker, Richard (2019). ‘A Case of ‘You Can Always Get What You Want’? Committee Assignments in the European Parliament’, *Parliamentary Affairs*, 72:1, 162–81.
- Willumsen, David M. (2022). ‘Policy preferences, unity, and floor dissent in the European parliament’, *Journal of European Public Policy* (Online First), <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2022.2107047>.
- Willumsen, David M., and Patrik Öhberg (2017). ‘Toe the line, break the whip: explaining floor dissent in parliamentary democracies’, *West European Politics*, 40:4, 688–716.
- Willumsen, David M., and Klaus H. Goetz (2017). ‘Set Free? Impending Retirement and Legislative Behaviour in the UK’, *Parliamentary Affairs*, 70:2, 254–79.

- Yordanova, Nikoleta, and Monika Mühlböck (2015). 'Tracing the selection bias in roll call votes: party group cohesion in the European Parliament', *European Political Science Review*, 7:3, 373–99.
- Zittel, Thomas, and Dominic Nyhuis (2019). 'Two Faces of Party Unity: Roll-Call Behavior and Vote Explanations in the German Bundestag', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 72:2, 406–24.
- Zittel, Thomas, and Dominic Nyhuis (2021). 'The Legislative Effects of Campaign Personalization. An Analysis on the Legislative Behavior of Successful German Constituency Candidates', *Comparative Political Studies*, 54:2, 312–38.
- Zubek, Radoslaw (2021). 'Committee strength in parliamentary democracies: A new index', *European Journal of Political Research*, 60:4, 1018–31.

8. Appendix

A1: Measurement and Descriptive Statistics of the Variables

Table 1-Appendix: Operationalisation, data sources and descriptive statistics of the variables

Variable label	Description	Operationalisation	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Source
<i>Dependent variable</i>						
Dissent	Does the MP vote against the majority position of his/her party group in a single roll-call vote?	dummy variable (1=dissenting vote, 0=no dissenting vote) Votes on morality policy issues (own coding) are excluded. Absences and invalid votes are coded as missing observations (in the main models and all robustness checks except for models R14-R23).	0.012	0	1	website of the German Bundestag (www.bundestag.de)
<i>Independent variables</i>						
Own committee: at the time of the vote	Does the vote concern an issue within the jurisdiction of a committee that an MP is member of at the time of the vote? Only leading (<i>federführend</i>) committees in the decision-making process are considered. Only ordinary memberships in the respective committee are considered. Apart from that, value 1 for deputy party group leaders with responsibility for the jurisdiction of the committee. Although they usually are only deputy members of the committees they are responsible for, they attend committee meetings whenever necessary (von Oertzen 2006).	dummy variable (1=MP votes on matter of own committee, 0=MP votes on other issue)	0.054	0	1	editorial office of the Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages (upon request)

Own committee: before the time of the vote	Does the vote concern an issue within the jurisdiction of a committee that an MP was member of before the time of the vote? Previous memberships in the 17 th (2009-2013) and 18 th (2013-2017) legislative term as well as in the 19 th term are considered if the membership ended before the time of the vote. Only leading (<i>federführend</i>) committees in the decision-making process are considered. Only ordinary memberships in the respective committee are considered. Apart from that, value 1 for deputy party group leaders with responsibility for the jurisdiction of the committee.	dummy variable (1=MP votes on matter of past own committee, 0=MP votes on other issue)	0.017	0	1	data provided by editorial office of the Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages (upon request)
Own committee: including advisory committees at the time of the vote	Does the vote concern an issue within the jurisdiction of a committee that an MP is member of at the time of the vote? Leading (<i>federführend</i>) as well as advisory (<i>mitberatend</i>) committees in the decision-making process are considered. Only ordinary memberships in the respective committee are considered. Apart from that, value 1 for deputy party group leaders with responsibility for the jurisdiction of the committee.	dummy variable (1=MP votes on matter of own committee, 0=MP votes on other issue)	0.204	0	1	data provided by editorial office of the Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages (upon request)
Own committee: including deputy membership at the time of the vote	Does the vote concern an issue within the jurisdiction of a committee that an MP is member of at the time of the vote? Only leading (<i>federführend</i>) committees in the decision-making process are considered. Ordinary as well as deputy memberships in the respective committee are considered. Apart from that, value 1 for deputy party group leaders with responsibility for the jurisdiction of the committee.	dummy variable (1=MP votes on matter of own committee, 0=MP votes on other issue)	0.096	0	1	data provided by editorial office of the Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages (upon request)

Own committee: including advisory committees and deputy membership at the time of the vote	Does the vote concern an issue within the jurisdiction of a committee that an MP is member of at the time of the vote? Leading (<i>federführend</i>) as well as advisory (<i>mitberatend</i>) committees in the decision-making process are considered. Ordinary as well as deputy memberships in the respective committee are considered. Apart from that, value 1 for deputy party group leaders with responsibility for the jurisdiction of the committee.	dummy variable (1=MP votes on matter of own committee, 0=MP votes on other issue)	0.274	0	1	data provided by editorial office of the Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages (upon request)
Policy spokesperson	Can the MP be regarded as a policy spokesperson for an issue that corresponds with the jurisdiction of at least one standing committee? For the large parties (CDU/CSU and SPD) and the AfD with working groups resembling exactly the jurisdictions of the Bundestag committees, the leaders of those working groups are considered. For CDU/CSU and SPD, additionally the deputy party group leaders with responsibility for several of those working groups are considered. For the smaller parties where virtually every MP speaks for small subsets of committee jurisdictions (FDP, Greens, The Left), only the deputy party group leaders are considered as fulfilling the role of policy spokespersons comparable to larger parties (in order to also enable comparisons to ordinary committee members). This variable does not vary between the single votes as long as MPs keep their spokesperson office. This variable is interacted with the variable 'Own committee: at the time of the vote' in order to enable comparisons of the	dummy variable (1=MP holds a policy spokesperson office at the time of the vote, 0=MP does not hold a spokesperson office)	0.209	0	1	primarily Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages (chapter 5.8), secondarily Kürschners Volkshandbuch (various editions during the 19 th legislative term), websites and press releases of the party groups

	spokespersons' voting behaviour inside/outside their areas of specialisation.					
Legislative matter (bill/ amendment)	Does the vote concern a document that has direct legal consequences (if adopted)? The variable is coded by the type of motion as named in the vote title of the respective Bundestag roll-call vote document. Legislative matter = 1 if vote type is draft bill ('Gesetzentwurf') amendment ('Änderungsantrag') directive ('Verordnung') Legislative matter = 0 if vote type is motion ('Antrag') resolution ('EntschlieÙung') appeal ('Einspruch') and others	dummy variable (1=vote on legislative matter, 0=vote on non-legislative matter)	0.427	0	1	website of the German Bundestag (www.bundestag.de)
Issue salience for MP's party (standardized)	How prominently was the topic of the vote featured in the election manifesto of the MP's party in the last federal election (2017) - compared to the other parties?	summed percentage like for the unstandardized variable (see above), but then z-standardized. Interpretation: Value 0: Issue has, compared to other German parties, an average salience for the MP's party. Value 1: Issue has a one standard deviation higher salience for the MP's party, compared to other parties. Value -1: Issue has a one standard deviation lower salience for the MP's party, compared to other parties. The mean value is different from 0 due to the varying number of observations among the party groups (variable is not weighted by party size or absence rates).	0.197	-1.650	1.905	Manifesto Project dataset (Lehmann et al., 2022)

Issue salience for MP's party (unstandardized)	How prominently was the topic of the vote featured in the election manifesto of the MP's party in the last federal election (2017)?	summed percentage of 'quasi-sentences' related to the jurisdiction of the respective committee in the party manifesto (see table 2 of this appendix for the respective Manifesto items for each committee) For those committees for which no relevant items could be found, the variable was coded 'missing'. This reduces the number of observations in model 5 compared to models 1-4.	8.577	0.1	51.561	Manifesto Project dataset (Lehmann et al., 2022)
<i>Controls</i>						
Mandate type: direct mandate	Was the MP directly elected in the constituency or via party list (irrespective of dual candidacies) in the previous federal election (2017)?	dummy variable (1=district mandate, 0=list mandate)	0.421	0	1	website of the German Bundestag (www.bundestag.de)
Direct candidacy only	Did the MP run only in the district for election in the last federal election (2017)?	dummy variable (1=direct candidacy only, 0=candidacy on both tiers or list candidacy only)	0.102	0	1	data provided by federal election commissioner (Bundeswahlleiter) (upon request)
List candidacy only	Did the MP run only on the party list for election in the last federal election (2017)?	dummy variable (1=list candidacy only, 0=candidacy on both tiers or direct candidacy only)	0.034	0	1	data provided by federal election commissioner (Bundeswahlleiter) (upon request)
Parliamentary office	Does the MP hold one of the following offices in parliament (at the time of the vote): party group leader, deputy party group leader, whip, member of the executive party group leadership, leader of a Bundestag standing committee, Bundestag president or vice president?	dummy variable (1=parliamentary office, 0=no parliamentary office)	0.154	0	1	websites of the parliamentary groups; Kürschners Volkshandbuch; MPs' personal websites

Executive office	Does the MP hold one of the following offices in the federal government (at the time of the vote): chancellor, minister or junior minister (Parlamentarischer Staatssekretär)?	dummy variable (1=executive office, 0=no executive office)	0.059	0	1	website of the German Bundestag (www.bundestag.de); Federal Government and Ministries (www.bundesregierung.de) and Kürschners Volkshandbuch; MPs' personal websites
Parliamentary experience	How long did an MP serve in the German Bundestag until the year of the vote?	number of years (irrespective of how many months/days the MP was member in a given year) example: first elected in September 2013, vote in January 2020: 7 years	7.936	0	49	own calculation; for MPs first elected before 2013 based on Bergmann et al. 2018 (variables <i>mandate_start</i> , <i>mandate_end</i>)
Age	MP's age in the year of the vote	number of years between an MP's birth year and the year of the vote	51.653	25	81	website of the German Bundestag (www.bundestag.de)
Female	MP's sex	dummy variable (1=female; 0=male)	0.309	0	1	website of the German Bundestag (www.bundestag.de)
<i>Party affiliation</i>						
SPD	Is the MP a member of the parliamentary group of the SPD (at the time of the vote)?	dummy variable (1=yes; 0=no)	0.216	0	1	website of the German Bundestag (www.bundestag.de)
FDP	Is the MP a member of the parliamentary group of the FDP (at the time of the vote)?	dummy variable (1=yes; 0=no)	0.114	0	1	website of the German Bundestag (www.bundestag.de)
Greens	Is the MP a member of the parliamentary group of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (at the time of the vote)?	dummy variable (1=yes; 0=no)	0.096	0	1	website of the German Bundestag (www.bundestag.de)
The Left	Is the MP a member of the parliamentary group of Die Linke (at the time of the vote)?	dummy variable (1=yes; 0=no)	0.091	0	1	website of the German Bundestag (www.bundestag.de)
AfD	Is the MP a member of the parliamentary group of the AfD (at the time of the vote)?	dummy variable (1=yes; 0=no)	0.125	0	1	website of the German Bundestag (www.bundestag.de)
Government Party	Is the MP member of the party group of a governing party (at the time of the vote)? Governing parties: CDU/CSU, SPD	dummy variable (1=yes; 0=no)	0.574	0	1	website of the German Bundestag (www.bundestag.de)

Most descriptive statistics refer to the n=152,022 observations included in models 1-4.

The descriptive figures for the salience scores refer to the reduced sample (n=122,743) in model 5.

Table 2-Appendix: Committees: number of related roll-call votes and Manifesto items

Name of Committee	Number of roll-call votes (only leading deliberations)	Variables of Manifesto dataset for salience scores
Foreign Affairs ¹	46	per101 (Foreign Special Relationships: Positive) per102 (Foreign Special Relationships: Negative) per103 (Anti-Imperialism) per104 (Military: Positive) per105 (Military: Negative) per106 (Peace) per107 (Internationalism: Positive) per109 (Internationalism: Negative)
Internal Affairs and Community	28	per303 (Governmental and Administrative Efficiency) per601 (National Way of Life: Positive) per602 (National Way of Life: Negative) per605_1 (Law and Order: Positive) per605_2 (Law and Order: Negative) per607_2 (Multiculturalism: Immigrants Diversity) per608_2 (Multiculturalism: Immigrants Assimilation)
Budget ²	26	per402 (Incentives: Positive) per406 (Protectionism: Positive) per407 (Protectionism: Negative) per409 (Keynesian Demand Management) per414 (Economic Orthodoxy)
Finance ²	21	per402 (Incentives: Positive) per406 (Protectionism: Positive) per407 (Protectionism: Negative) per409 (Keynesian Demand Management) per414 (Economic Orthodoxy)
Health ³	18	per504 (Welfare State Expansion) per505 (Welfare State Limitation)
Legal Affairs and Consumer Protection	11	per203 (Constitutionalism: Positive) per204 (Constitutionalism: Negative) per403 (Market Regulation) per603 (Traditional Morality: Positive) per604 (Traditional Morality: Negative) per605_1 (Law and Order: Positive) per605_2 (Law and Order: Negative)
Environment, Nature Protection and Nuclear Safety	11	per416_2 (Sustainability: Positive) per501 (Environmental Protection)
Food and Agriculture	10	per703_1 (Agriculture and Farmers: Positive) per703_2 (Agriculture and Farmers: Negative)
General Affairs ⁴	10	<i>no appropriate Manifesto items</i>
Labour and Social Affairs	9	per405 (Corporatism/Mixed Economy)

¹ Votes on military missions abroad are usually taken by roll-call (which explains the high number of motions compared to other issues). Thereby, the Foreign Affairs committee (not the Defense committee) leads the legislative deliberations on those matters.

² The same Manifesto items are considered for the Budget and the Finance committee because both share the responsibility for the jurisdiction of the Federal Ministry of Finance.

³ There is no separate manifesto item for health. However, 'health care' is mentioned in a list of policies which were summarised under 'welfare state'.

⁴ The General Affairs Committee (*Hauptausschuss*) replaced all regular standing committees until their investiture on January 17, 2018. No Manifesto items could be assigned to it, as this committee has dealt with all issues that were put to the vote.

		per412 (Controlled Economy) per503 (Equality: Positive) per504 (Welfare State Expansion) per505 (Welfare State Limitation) per701 (Labour Groups: Positive) per702 (Labour Groups: Negative) per704 (Middle Class and Professional Groups)
Economic Affairs and Energy	6	per401 (Free Market Economy) per402 (Incentives: Positive) per403 (Market Regulation) per404 (Economic Planning) per405 (Corporatism/Mixed Economy) per406 (Protectionism: Positive) per407 (Protectionism: Negative) per408 (Economic Goals) per409 (Keynesian Demand Management) per410 (Economic Growth: Positive) per412 (Controlled Economy) per413 (Nationalisation) per414 (Economic Orthodoxy) per416_1 (Anti-Growth Economy: Positive)
Education, Research and Technology Assessment	3	per506 (Education Expansion) per507 (Education Limitation) per411 (Technology and Infrastructure: Positive)
Defense	2	per104 (Military: Positive) per105 (Military: Negative) per106 (Peace)
Scrutiny of Elections, Immunity and the Rules of Procedure	2	<i>no appropriate Manifesto items</i>
Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth	1	per503 (Equality: Positive) per504 (Welfare State Expansion) per505 (Welfare State Limitation) per603 (Traditional Morality: Positive) per604 (Traditional Morality: Negative) per606 (Civic Mindedness: Positive) per706 (Non-economic Demographic Groups)
Cultural and Media Affairs	1	per502 (Culture: Positive)
Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid	1	per201_2 (Human Rights)
Transport and Digital Affairs	1	per411 (Technology and Infrastructure: Positive)
Economic Cooperation and Development	1	per103 (Anti-Imperialism) per107 (Internationalism: Positive) per109 (Internationalism: Negative) per201_2 (Human Rights)
Housing ⁵ , Urban Development, Building and Local Government	1	per504 (Welfare State Expansion) per505 (Welfare State Limitation)
European Union Affairs	0	per108 (European Community/Union: Positive) per110 (European Community/Union: Negative)
Sports ⁶	0	per502 (Culture: Positive)
Tourism	0	<i>no appropriate Manifesto items</i>
Digital Agenda	0	<i>no appropriate Manifesto items</i>

⁵ There is no separate Manifesto item for housing. However, 'social housing' is mentioned in a list of policies which were summarised under 'welfare state'.

⁶ There is no separate Manifesto item for sports. However, 'sports' and 'public sport clubs' are mentioned in the description of the 'culture' item.

A2: Descriptive Statistics: Votes against the Party Line

Figure 1-Appendix: Distribution of defection rates (quantiles), by MPs




Figure 2-Appendix: Distribution of defection rates (quantiles), by roll-call votes




Figure 3-Appendix: Defection rates by party




Table 3-Appendix: Topics of the 20 roll-call votes with the highest defection rates

Topic of the vote	Date of the vote	Defection rate (%)
Military mission Resolute Support (Afghanistan)	2020/03/13	10.11
Military mission Resolute Support (Afghanistan)	2019/03/21	9.47
Introduction of Measles Protection Act (including mandatory vaccination for students)	2019/11/14	9.08
Military mission Resolute Support (Afghanistan)	2021/03/25	7.04
Military mission Atalanta (Somalia)	2020/05/27	6.90
Better Enforcement of Deportations Act	2019/06/07	6.72
Military mission Resolute Support (Afghanistan)	2017/12/12	6.60
Military mission Resolute Support (Afghanistan)	2018/03/22	6.55
Military mission in Iraq	2017/12/12	6.45
Military mission on the evacuation from Afghanistan	2021/08/25	6.19
Military mission Atalanta (Somalia)	2019/05/09	6.08
Military mission Atalanta (Somalia)	2018/04/26	6.07
Amendment of the Animal Welfare Act (including longer permission for castration of piglets without anaesthesia)	2018/11/29	5.71
Population Protection Act in the event of an epidemic situation of national dimension	2021/04/21	4.92
Military mission Atalanta (Somalia)	2021/04/21	4.58
Ratification Act on the EU's Own Resources Resolution	2021/03/25	4.07
Determination Act on the continuing epidemic situation of national dimension	2021/08/25	3.99
Military mission against the terrorist organisation IS	2017/12/12	3.87
Opening of EU accession negotiations with the Republic of Northern Macedonia	2019/09/26	3.82
Admission of alternative procedures for the nomination of parliamentary candidates due to the Covid-19 pandemic	2021/01/14	3.63

A3: Robustness Checks

To check the robustness of the results, the models were re-estimated with slight modifications:

- (1) The MPs' membership in a particular party group (party dummies) was replaced by the membership in a governing party since the roles of MPs within parliamentary committees differ between government and opposition MPs. The literature found rather ambiguous results for this variable (e.g. André et al. 2015). To prevent collinearity issues, government status and party membership cannot be included simultaneously in the models. After this modification of the models, the coefficients of the independent variables keep their statistical significance, and their size hardly changes (see table 4 of this appendix).
- (2) The variable 'mandate type', i.e. whether an MP actually won a constituency or a list mandate, was replaced by two variables ('direct candidacy only' and 'list candidacy only') indicating on which tier(s) the MP ran for election – in order to cover another aspect of MPs' electoral vulnerability (Ohmura 2014). Again, the statistical significance as well as the substantive effect size of the independent variables hardly changes (see table 5).
- (3) More fundamentally, we chose more comprehensive measures of MPs' 'own' issues. According to model R11 (see table 6), there is no longer a behavioural difference between topics inside and outside MPs' area of specialisation if those topics are not measured only by the committee that leads the legislative deliberations but if also advisory committees are considered. In contrast, the effect of 'own' committee remains statistically significant if deputy committee memberships are considered in addition to the ordinary membership (model R12). If the broadest operationalisation of MPs' involvement in the legislative deliberations is chosen, i.e. leading committees and advisory committees *as well as* MPs' ordinary and deputy memberships (model R13), the effect is again statistically insignificant. Accordingly, the measurement of the 'division of labour' effect must be oriented towards the possibility of actually shaping the party line (instead of merely being consulted) for an effect on MPs' voting behaviour being materialised.
- (4) Lastly, we changed the measurement of our dependent variable (vote defection). According to the mainstream of the literature (e.g. Benedetto and Hix 2007; Sieberer and Ohmura 2019; Willumsen and Öhberg 2017), we coded an MP's non-participation in a roll-call vote as a missing observation and excluded the respective cases from the main models of the paper. This relies on our assumption that non-voting can have manifold, mainly non-political reasons (e.g. illness, scheduling reasons, outside activities or pregnancy). However,

it could also be argued that non-vote decisions are not random and thus correlated with MPs' preferences. Two competing claims could be made that have implications for our findings:

On the one hand, it could be argued that in each vote, the responsible committee members as well as those non-committee members who have a dissenting opinion attend a vote, whereas the non-committee members who are not interested in the topic or do not have a dissenting opinion do not attend the vote. Indeed, the absence rates of non-committee members (11.2 percent) are higher than the rate for MPs who are members of the responsible committee (7.5 percent). This view implies that non-participation indicates non-dissent in the first place.

On the other hand, some studies assume or present empirical evidence that non-vote decisions are taken strategically by MPs in order not to disappoint their party principal or to balance competing demands from multiple principals (Ceron 2015; Fazekas and Hansen 2022; Rosas et al. 2015). It follows from this that non-participation indicates primarily dissent.

Consequently, we re-estimated our five regression models with MP absences either coded as non-dissent (table 7, models R14-R18) or as dissent (table 8, models R19-R23). The unconditioned effect of committee membership as well as all conditional effects (at the hypothesised values of the respective conditioning variable) keep their direction and statistical significance. However, the coefficients lose about half of their size if absences are coded as dissent. Interestingly, some of the controls (especially holding a government or parliamentary office) also lose their explanatory power in this case. To conclude, even if non-participation might not be a random event or related to our independent variable (voting on a document which was deliberated in a committee which the MP is member of), our substantial conclusions do not depend on the treatment of MP absences.

Table 4-Appendix: Robustness Check – Government party instead of party dummies

	(R1)	(R2)	(R3)	(R4)	(R5)
<i>Independent variables</i>					
Own committee: at the time of the vote	-0.499*** (0.137)	-0.506*** (0.137)	-0.389** (0.145)	-0.657** (0.202)	-0.615** (0.216)
Own committee: before the time of the vote		-0.901** (0.326)			
Policy spokesperson (all subjects)			-0.646*** (0.131)		
Policy spokesperson x own committee (interaction)			-0.720 (0.445)		
Legislative matter (bill/amendment)				-0.387*** (0.053)	
Own committee x legislative matter (interaction)				0.402 (0.274)	
Issue salience for MP's party (unstandardized)					-0.005 (0.005)
Own committee x issue salience (interaction)					0.019 (0.018)
<i>Controls</i>					
Direct mandate	-0.223 (0.190)	-0.223 (0.190)	-0.262 (0.190)	-0.231 (0.191)	-0.469* (0.208)
Executive office	-3.677*** (0.768)	-3.673*** (0.768)	-3.753*** (0.768)	-3.679*** (0.768)	-3.567*** (0.792)
Parliamentary office	-0.799*** (0.157)	-0.799*** (0.157)	-0.670*** (0.157)	-0.785*** (0.156)	-0.679*** (0.180)
Parliamentary experience	0.038*** (0.010)	0.039*** (0.010)	0.038*** (0.010)	0.040*** (0.010)	0.052*** (0.011)
Gender	0.164 (0.135)	0.164 (0.135)	0.109 (0.135)	0.161 (0.135)	0.062 (0.148)
Age	0.014* (0.006)	0.013* (0.006)	0.014* (0.006)	0.014* (0.006)	0.020** (0.007)
Government party	-1.450*** (0.181)	-1.446*** (0.181)	-1.484*** (0.181)	-1.454*** (0.181)	-1.374*** (0.194)
Intercept	-5.316*** (0.320)	-5.304*** (0.320)	-5.165*** (0.319)	-5.202*** (0.321)	-5.766*** (0.356)
N	152,022	152,022	152,022	152,022	122,743

Logit coefficients are displayed, with standard errors in parentheses.

Levels of significance: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 5-Appendix: Robustness Check – Candidacy mode instead of mandate type

	(R6)	(R7)	(R8)	(R9)	(R10)
Own committee: at the time of the vote	-0.499*** (0.137)	-0.507*** (0.137)	-0.391** (0.145)	-0.658** (0.202)	-0.619** (0.217)
Own committee: before the time of the vote		-0.901** (0.326)			
Policy Spokesperson (all subjects)			-0.682*** (0.135)		
Policy spokesperson x own committee (interaction)			-0.708 (0.445)		
Legislative matter (bill/amendment)				-0.387*** (0.053)	
Own committee x legislative matter (interaction)				0.404 (0.274)	
Issue salience for MP's party (unstandardized)					-0.005 (0.005)
Own committee x issue salience (interaction)					0.019 (0.019)
Direct candidacy only	-0.025 (0.258)	-0.031 (0.258)	-0.031 (0.258)	-0.026 (0.259)	0.051 (0.285)
List candidacy only	-0.476 (0.325)	-0.477 (0.325)	-0.395 (0.324)	-0.471 (0.325)	-0.315 (0.346)
Executive office	-3.690*** (0.765)	-3.685*** (0.766)	-3.807*** (0.766)	-3.693*** (0.766)	-3.583*** (0.787)
Parliamentary office	-0.809*** (0.155)	-0.809*** (0.155)	-0.682*** (0.155)	-0.796*** (0.154)	-0.707*** (0.178)
Parliamentary experience	0.041*** (0.011)	0.042*** (0.011)	0.046*** (0.011)	0.043*** (0.011)	0.057*** (0.012)
Gender	0.205 (0.140)	0.203 (0.140)	0.191 (0.140)	0.205 (0.140)	0.148 (0.153)
Age	0.013* (0.006)	0.013* (0.006)	0.013* (0.006)	0.013* (0.006)	0.018** (0.007)
Party: CDU/CSU			baseline category		
Party: SPD	0.386* (0.197)	0.385 (0.197)	0.428* (0.197)	0.390* (0.197)	0.587** (0.217)
Party: FDP	1.589*** (0.224)	1.581*** (0.224)	1.895*** (0.232)	1.605*** (0.224)	1.719*** (0.250)
Party: Greens	2.078*** (0.220)	2.075*** (0.220)	2.031*** (0.220)	2.082*** (0.221)	2.229*** (0.242)
Party: The Left	1.181*** (0.230)	1.177*** (0.230)	1.145*** (0.229)	1.186*** (0.230)	1.240*** (0.254)
Party: AfD	2.072*** (0.229)	2.063*** (0.229)	2.172*** (0.230)	2.087*** (0.230)	2.354*** (0.253)
Intercept	-7.036*** (0.347)	-7.018*** (0.346)	-6.997*** (0.346)	-6.933*** (0.348)	-7.648*** (0.394)
N	152,022	152,022	152,022	152,022	122,743

Logit coefficients are displayed, with standard errors in parentheses.

Levels of significance: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 6-Appendix: Robustness Check – broader measurements of committee membership

	(R11)	(R12)	(R13)
<i>Independent variables</i>			
Own committee: including advisory committees at the time of the vote	0.087 (0.062)		
Own committee: including deputy membership at the time of the vote		-0.405*** (0.097)	
Own committee: including advisory committees and deputy membership at the time of the vote			0.005 (0.056)
<i>Controls</i>			
Direct mandate	0.048 (0.224)	0.045 (0.224)	0.047 (0.224)
Executive office	-3.639*** (0.766)	-3.700*** (0.766)	-3.660*** (0.766)
Parliamentary office	-0.813*** (0.156)	-0.808*** (0.155)	-0.812*** (0.156)
Parliamentary experience	0.041*** (0.011)	0.042*** (0.011)	0.041*** (0.011)
Gender	0.191 (0.140)	0.191 (0.140)	0.191 (0.140)
Age	0.013* (0.006)	0.013* (0.006)	0.013* (0.006)
Party: CDU/CSU		baseline category	
Party: SPD	0.426 (0.224)	0.423 (0.224)	0.425 (0.224)
Party: FDP	1.638*** (0.295)	1.640*** (0.295)	1.641*** (0.295)
Party: Greens	2.143*** (0.290)	2.136*** (0.290)	2.141*** (0.290)
Party: The Left	1.215*** (0.289)	1.210*** (0.288)	1.214*** (0.289)
Party: AfD	2.043*** (0.290)	2.045*** (0.290)	2.044*** (0.290)
Intercept	-7.152*** (0.403)	-7.111*** (0.403)	-7.139*** (0.403)
N	152,022	152,022	152,022

Logit coefficients are displayed, with standard errors in parentheses.

Levels of significance: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 7-Appendix: Robustness Check – MP absences coded as non-dissent

	(R14)	(R15)	(R16)	(R17)	(R18)
<i>Independent variables</i>					
Own committee: at the time of the vote	-0.461*** (0.136)	-0.468*** (0.136)	-0.347* (0.144)	-0.626** (0.202)	-0.582** (0.217)
Own committee: before the time of the vote		-0.873** (0.325)			
Policy spokesperson (all subjects)			-0.658*** (0.134)		
Policy spokesperson x own committee (interaction)			-0.745 (0.445)		
Legislative matter (bill/amendment)				-0.369*** (0.052)	
Own committee x legislative matter (interaction)				0.413 (0.274)	
Issue salience for MP's party (unstandardised)					-0.005 (0.005)
Own committee x issue salience (interaction)					0.019 (0.019)
<i>Control variables</i>					
Direct mandate	0.266 (0.214)	0.264 (0.214)	0.270 (0.214)	0.258 (0.214)	-0.121 (0.240)
Executive office	-3.696*** (0.762)	-3.692*** (0.762)	-3.808*** (0.763)	-3.700*** (0.762)	-3.629*** (0.781)
Parliamentary office	-0.781*** (0.153)	-0.779*** (0.153)	-0.660*** (0.154)	-0.767*** (0.152)	-0.671*** (0.174)
Parliamentary experience	0.035*** (0.011)	0.036*** (0.011)	0.039*** (0.011)	0.037*** (0.011)	0.053*** (0.012)
Gender (female)	0.169 (0.137)	0.167 (0.137)	0.160 (0.137)	0.168 (0.137)	0.108 (0.150)
Age	0.012* (0.006)	0.012 (0.006)	0.012 (0.006)	0.012* (0.006)	0.016* (0.007)
Party: CDU/CSU	reference category				
Party: SPD	0.732*** (0.209)	0.729*** (0.209)	0.773*** (0.209)	0.728*** (0.209)	0.467 (0.243)
Party: FDP	1.863*** (0.284)	1.854*** (0.284)	2.162*** (0.292)	1.867*** (0.285)	1.512*** (0.317)
Party: Greens	2.403*** (0.280)	2.399*** (0.280)	2.362*** (0.280)	2.399*** (0.280)	2.068*** (0.308)
Party: The Left	1.373*** (0.279)	1.367*** (0.279)	1.347*** (0.279)	1.368*** (0.279)	0.984** (0.309)
Party: AfD	2.231*** (0.278)	2.221*** (0.278)	2.346*** (0.280)	2.236*** (0.278)	2.049*** (0.311)
Intercept	-7.366*** (0.394)	-7.348*** (0.393)	-7.328*** (0.393)	-7.252*** (0.394)	-7.460*** (0.439)
N	170,841	170,841	170,841	170,841	136,601

Logit coefficients are displayed, with standard errors in parentheses.

Levels of significance: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 8-Appendix: Robustness Check – MP absences coded as dissent

	(R19)	(R20)	(R21)	(R22)	(R23)
<i>Independent variables</i>					
Own committee: at the time of the vote	-0.336*** (0.043)	-0.339*** (0.043)	-0.319*** (0.049)	-0.404*** (0.059)	-0.392*** (0.073)
Own committee: before the time of the vote		-0.250*** (0.068)			
Policy spokesperson (all subjects)			-0.412*** (0.055)		
Policy spokesperson x own committee (interaction)			-0.044 (0.102)		
Legislative matter (bill/amendment)				-0.191*** (0.017)	
Own committee x legislative matter (interaction)				0.165 (0.086)	
Issue salience for MP's party (unstandardised)					-0.002 (0.001)
Own committee x issue salience (interaction)					0.012 (0.006)
<i>Control variables</i>					
Direct mandate	-1.797*** (0.153)	-1.800*** (0.154)	-1.793*** (0.153)	-1.817*** (0.154)	0.017 (0.138)
Executive office	0.089 (0.111)	0.088 (0.111)	0.044 (0.112)	0.089 (0.111)	0.367** (0.138)
Parliamentary office	-0.132* (0.065)	-0.132* (0.065)	-0.030 (0.066)	-0.124 (0.065)	0.006 (0.072)
Parliamentary experience	0.063*** (0.007)	0.063*** (0.007)	0.066*** (0.007)	0.066*** (0.007)	0.052*** (0.007)
Gender (female)	0.012 (0.119)	0.011 (0.119)	0.002 (0.119)	0.011 (0.120)	0.226* (0.094)
Age	0.027*** (0.006)	0.027*** (0.006)	0.027*** (0.005)	0.028*** (0.006)	0.014** (0.004)
Party: CDU/CSU	reference category				
Party: SPD	-1.283*** (0.150)	-1.286*** (0.150)	-1.250*** (0.150)	-1.297*** (0.151)	0.441** (0.134)
Party: FDP	-1.057*** (0.212)	-1.066*** (0.212)	-0.864*** (0.213)	-1.060*** (0.213)	1.043*** (0.190)
Party: Greens	-1.292*** (0.224)	-1.297*** (0.224)	-1.314*** (0.224)	-1.307*** (0.225)	0.857*** (0.192)
Party: The Left	-0.991*** (0.218)	-0.997*** (0.218)	-1.006*** (0.218)	-1.007*** (0.220)	0.996*** (0.188)
Party: AfD	-2.138*** (0.157)	-2.150*** (0.157)	-2.051*** (0.156)	-2.151*** (0.157)	1.359*** (0.188)
Intercept	-2.683*** (0.303)	-2.668*** (0.303)	-2.671*** (0.303)	-2.643*** (0.305)	-4.250*** (0.258)
N	170,841	170,841	170,841	170,841	136,601

Logit coefficients are displayed, with standard errors in parentheses.

Levels of significance: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A4: References

- André, Audrey, Sam Depauw, and Stefanie Beyens (2015). 'Party loyalty and electoral dealignment', *Party Politics*, 21:6, 970–81.
- Benedetto, Giacomo, and Simon Hix (2007). 'The Rejected, the Ejected, and the Dejected: Explaining Government Rebels in the 2001-2005 British House of Commons', *Comparative Political Studies*, 40:7, 755–81.
- Bergmann, Henning, Stefanie Bailer, Tamaki Ohmura, Thomas Saalfeld, and Ulrich Sieberer (2018). *BTVote MP Characteristics, V1*. Harvard Dataverse, <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/QSFXLQ>.
- Ceron, Andrea (2015). 'Brave rebels stay home: Assessing the effect of intra-party ideological heterogeneity and party whip on roll-call votes', *Party Politics*, 21:2, 246–58.
- Fazekas, Zoltán, and Martin Ejnar Hansen (2022). 'Incentives for non-participation: absence in the United Kingdom House of Commons, 1997-2015', *Public Choice*, 191:1-2, 51–73.
- Lehmann, Pola, Tobias Burst, Theres Matthieß, Sven Regel, Andrea Volkens, Bernhard Weßels, and Lisa Zehnter (2022). *The Manifesto Data Collection*. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Version 2022a. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), <https://doi.org/10.25522/manifesto.mpds.2022a>.
- Ohmura, Tamaki (2014). 'When your Name is on the List, it is Time to Party: The Candidacy Divide in a Mixed-Member Proportional System', *Representation*, 50:1, 69–82.
- Rosas, Guillermo, Yael Shomer, and Stephen R. Haptonstahl (2015). 'No News Is News: Nonignorable Nonresponse in Roll-Call Data Analysis', *American Journal of Political Science*, 59:2, 511–28.
- Sieberer, Ulrich, and Tamaki Ohmura (2021). 'Mandate type, electoral safety, and defections from the party line: The conditional mandate divide in the German Bundestag, 1949–2013', *Party Politics*, 27:4, 704–15.
- von Oertzen, Jürgen (2006). *Das Expertenparlament. Abgeordnetenrollen in den Fachstrukturen bundesdeutscher Parlamente*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Willumsen, David M., and Patrik Öhberg (2017). 'Toe the line, break the whip: explaining floor dissent in parliamentary democracies', *West European Politics*, 40:4, 688–716.

C. Voting Behaviour in the 19th German Bundestag and Beyond: Between the Daily Business of Unity and a Special Vote of Conscience

Abstract

The literature on the voting behaviour of members of parliament (MPs) has two prominent strands: the study of dissenting voting behaviour in whipped votes and of voting behaviour in votes of conscience. This article examines both aspects for the 19th German Bundestag (2017–2021). First, we assess the determinants of dissenting voting behaviour in all whipped votes in this term and compare them to the three previous terms of Angela Merkel’s chancellorship. Logistic multi-level regressions show that mostly political factors account for lower (offices, electoral security) or higher (parliamentary experience, GDR socialisation) defection rates. Second, we assess the determinants of voting behaviour on the organ donation reform in 2020. Theoretically, we identify a value conflict between self-determination and collective health interests that substantially differs from earlier free votes. Logistic regression analyses reflect this conflict: Besides individual religious denomination and union or party membership, it is especially constituency characteristics such as the share of Catholics that affect voting behaviour. Consequently, voting on free votes is affected by both political and personal characteristics of the MP. Overall, we show that MPs are exposed to various and, depending on what the vote is on, different influences that have to be reconciled.

1. Introduction

Examining MPs’ voting behaviour is a wide-ranging area of research for which at least two strands of literature can be identified: the study of MPs’ ‘daily business’ with votes being whipped by party group leaders and the study of unwhipped, free votes on issues that are considered as matters of conscience. With this article, we provide the first comprehensive assessment of both types of votes for the 19th German Bundestag and compare this legislative term with its three predecessors, spanning the four terms of Angela Merkel’s chancellorship.

Firstly, as in other parliamentary systems, German governments depend on the support of a majority in parliament. A lack of unity both among and within governing parties threatens the ability of a government to enact its policy agenda. For example, in the previous Merkel governments, some of the controversial decisions during the Eurozone crisis had only achieved an (at least symbolically meaningful) absolute majority (*Kanzlermehrheit*) with the help of opposition parties (Degner and Leuffen 2016; Zimmermann 2014). During the 19th Bundestag, the governing parties’ unity again became crucial, as Merkel’s fourth coalition relied on a much smaller majority: After the 2017 election, only 56 per cent of MPs were in the parties of the governing coalition whereas between 2013 and 2017 it was 80 per cent. Additionally, the composition of the Bundestag substantially differed from previous terms: With the AfD, a new

party had entered parliament, and after the FDP's re-entry, six parliamentary groups were formed. That represented the highest number since 1953. In addition, after 2017, the Bundestag was larger than ever before with 709 MPs. These developments contributed significantly to the fact that the proportion of MPs entering parliament for the first time (37 per cent) was the highest since 1953 (Schindler 1999; Deutscher Bundestag 2019). Consequently, the conditions for ensuring unity changed markedly and it does not seem self-evident that mechanisms leading to unity in established party groups are also effective in newly founded ones and in the face of high turnover.

Secondly, it is usually not the 'daily business votes' but a few others that are regarded as parliament's finest hours: the rare occasions when MPs are released from party discipline and encouraged to draw-up cross-partisan proposals, mostly on morality policies. In such votes during earlier Merkel governments, e.g. on abortion (2009), assisted suicide (2015) or same-sex marriage (2017), MPs were often confronted with either conservative/restrictive or liberal/permissive policies (Engler and Dümig 2017; Wenzelburger and Fehrenz 2018; Bauer-Blaschkowski and Mai 2019). During Merkel's fourth term, only one issue was decided by 'free vote': the reform of the organ donation system. In early 2020, MPs voted against the controversial presumed consent policy. Instead, they supported a moderate reform of the strict consent system. The choice between both options differs from other (and repeatedly analysed) morality policies in that it cannot be traced back to a simple conservative versus liberal dichotomy but relates to another kind of value conflict between self-determination and collective interests – with presumably different determinants of MPs' voting decisions.

Only taking together the daily business of whipped votes and special 'free votes' provides a complete picture of all policy-relevant voting behaviour in the German Bundestag. Our analysis is guided by the research question: Do individual-level (political and/or personal) characteristics of MPs significantly affect their legislative behaviour? More specifically, the first part deals with whipped votes and investigates which MP characteristics account for their varying propensity to toe the party line. Here, we provide the first analysis of whipped votes during the 19th term (2017–2021) and compare its results to the first three Merkel governments when the political context was rather different. The second part investigates the 'free vote' on organ donation. Since no party line exists here, the empirical phenomenon of interest is which of MPs' characteristics affect the way that they voted. This is, to our knowledge, the first study of individual-level legislative behaviour in a vote on organ donation, within and beyond the German case. Our overarching expectation is that whether to dissent from the party line (in whipped votes) is first and foremost connected with *political* characteristics (i.e. those related to

political career or political socialisation) of the MP. In contrast, how MPs vote on the issue of organ donation – regarded as a ‘matter of conscience’ – is, besides *political* features like the composition of their constituency, presumably at least partly dependent on their *personal* characteristics (i.e. sociodemographic background).

In what follows, for each part, we theoretically reflect on the incentives driving MPs’ behaviour concerning the particular kind of vote and deduct empirically testable hypotheses. Preceded by short descriptions of the data and methods being used, the results of regression analyses are presented. Finally, the conclusion discusses the implications of the findings for parliamentary research.

2. Voting Behaviour in Whipped Votes

Party unity varies in many dimensions – and so do its determinants and the units of analysis: Studies discuss institutional, party group, MP, and vote characteristics to explain why party unity differs among countries (e.g. Carey 2007), party groups (e.g. Bergmann et al. 2016), MPs (e.g. Mai 2022), and votes (e.g. Stecker 2015), respectively. Since our unit of analysis are MPs’ individual voting decisions, we focus theoretically on MP-related variables. Confronted with the norm of party discipline, voting against the party line is a highly political decision. Therefore, we expect that primarily characteristics related to MPs’ political career and political socialisation account for their varying propensity to defect.

2.1 Theoretical Expectations

Electoral vulnerability. According to Competing Principals Theory, MPs direct their behaviour to the principal that helps them reaching their political goals – re-nomination, re-election, office and policy. Especially if they are dependent on multiple principals, vote defections become more likely (Carey 2007). We assume that their specific electoral situation affects MPs’ behaviour. In this context, competing predictions were made: For one thing, MPs that won their constituency by big margins are, to a higher extent, independent from their party group leadership which could, at best, hold them off higher offices, but not prevent their re-election (Ismayr 2012). Contrariwise, Sieberer and Ohmura (2021) argue that only pure direct candidates in contested districts have an incentive to distinguish themselves by dissenting votes. In contrast, MPs with safe seats do not have any benefit from defections. Pure list MPs with unsafe list positions do

not profit from dissenting votes either since they are fully dependent from their party's support (for re-nomination) and success (for re-election). Following this latter line of thought, hypothesis 1a reads as follows: MPs' probability to defect increases with their electoral vulnerability.

Offices. Holding powerful parliamentary or executive offices possibly has an even stronger effect on MPs' behaviour than electoral factors (Zittel and Nyhuis 2019). Offices increase the effectiveness of party discipline since the withdrawal of office-related privileges (like policy influence, visibility, staff, or material resources, Bailer 2018) would severely harm an MP's career. Additionally, leading MPs in parliament or government have a significant impact on policies anyhow, so policy disagreement becomes rare, particularly as well-known MPs do not profit as much electorally from defections as backbenchers (Delius et al. 2013). Consequently, we expect MPs holding parliamentary and, to a higher extent (Becher and Sieberer 2008), executive offices to have a lower probability of vote defection (hypothesis 1b).

Parliamentary socialisation. First-time parliamentarians initially have little influence on and are not familiar with decision-making processes within the party group (Saalfeld 1995). Due to socialisation into the party group, MPs get used to the norms that structure parliamentary work (Dickinson 2018) – a collective identity of MPs emerges (Saalfeld 1995). It includes the norm to behave loyally towards one's party group, even if this means to act contrary to one's own preferences (Andeweg and Thomassen 2011). Accordingly, due to a longer process of parliamentary socialisation, we hypothesise that experienced MPs vote less frequently against the party line (hypothesis 1c).

Last-period effect. Previous studies find that MPs' legislative behaviour varies between different career stages. For instance, Bailer and Ohmura (2018) show that German MPs significantly reduce their parliamentary activity (e.g. attending votes or holding rapporteurships) at the end of their career. However, previous studies didn't find such an effect on vote defections in Germany (e.g. Bauer-Blaschkowski and Mai 2019). Nevertheless, we hypothesise that MPs who do not run for another term vote more frequently against their party since they do not need to prove their loyalty anymore (hypothesis 1d).

GDR socialisation. Based on survey data, Patzelt (2000) reports less understanding of the need for party discipline by eastern German, compared to western German MPs. Higher defection rates are traced back both to diverging policy preferences and to a less partisan but pragmatic view on problems by MPs from eastern Germany. Studies for subnational German parliaments

report ambiguous results, though (Davidson-Schmich 2003; Stecker 2015). 30 years after the German reunification, it appears likely that eastern and western German MPs' attitudes have converged. Accordingly, our hypothesis 1e is that MPs socialised in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) do not show a voting behaviour that differs from their western German colleagues.

Government party. Members of a governing party have higher chances to be promoted to influential offices since, additional to parliamentary offices, also executive offices can be allocated to those MPs. Not least, the achievement of MPs' policy-related goals is easier in majority parties (Sieberer 2010). Additionally, vote defections are more consequential in governing parties in that they could prevent policy changes from becoming law. A parliamentary defeat could destabilise the government, with the threat of early elections (Carey 2007). Accordingly, since the leaders of governing party groups command more 'carrots and sticks' (Stecker 2015) and enforce party discipline to a stronger extent, especially in times of slim government majorities (Saalfeld 1995) like in the 19th term, hypothesis 1f is the following: MPs belonging to governing parties have a lower probability of dissenting votes than opposition MPs.

2.2 Data and Methods

We test our arguments quantitatively using data for all whipped roll-call votes during the 19th electoral term and compare them to the three former terms during Merkel's chancellorship. Despite the pandemic, legislative activity remained high (Siefken 2022). Roll-call votes constitute the only source of observable individual-level voting behaviour in the Bundestag. Therefore, their use is inevitable, despite doubts about their representativeness (Ainsley et al. 2020). Parties use roll-call votes strategically to signal their own positions or to uncover internal disputes of other parties and thus are instruments of party competition (see Zohlnhöfer and Engler 2023 on the role of party competition for policy outputs). Morality policy votes, where no party discipline is enforced, are excluded.

Our analysis comprises all MPs (including resigning and succeeding ones) who participated at least in one vote as member of a party group. The dichotomous dependent variable is coded '1' whenever an MP votes against the majority position of his/her party group on a single motion. This highly disaggregated unit of analysis allows us to test the impact of both constant and time-variant MP characteristics as well as of vote characteristics – which would remain unconsidered

when using defection rates/frequencies, resulting in an omitted variable bias (Sieberer 2010). (Un-)Excused absences and invalid votes are coded as missing data. This results in up to 513,964 individual voting decisions. Logistic multi-level regressions are estimated to account for the fact that the observations are not independent from each other but clustered both by MPs (level 2) and votes (level 1).

We control for a set of personal MP and vote characteristics. Older MPs was ascribed a higher propensity for defections (Kam 2011). Moreover, some studies report a lower probability of female MPs to vote against their party (Sieberer and Ohmura 2021 and, under certain conditions, Dingler and Ramstetter 2023). We include both attributes as controls, although we expect those personal characteristics to be of minor importance in whipped votes. Additionally, we control for vote characteristics that are likely to induce different baseline levels of dissent. Bergmann et al. (2016) report higher defection rates in foreign policy votes. Most of those votes concern missions of the German armed forces abroad. Those are, at least in some parties, internally disputed, as they are in the public (Bauer-Blaschkowski and Mai 2019; Vignoli et al. 2022; Oppermann and Brummer 2023). Additionally, diverging views of SPD and Greens MPs on those missions for conscience reasons are tolerated (Delius et al. 2013). To account for this combination of more heterogeneous preferences and less party discipline, we control for votes on defence policies. Conversely, parties are likely to be particularly unified when voting on economic and social policies. Those issues are highly salient in the public, which makes it particularly important for parties to stand united (Bergmann et al. 2016). Moreover, most parties have unambiguous positions on those topics shared by most of their members and MPs. Additionally, in the model for the 19th term, we control for votes on measures against Covid-19, which were both among politicians and the public more polarising than most policies adopted in pre-pandemic times (see Wurster et al. 2022 and the respective Special Issue of *German Politics*). Lastly, we control for whether the motion was introduced by the MP's own party group (or the federal government in the case of governing parties).

We collected our own data for the 18th/19th terms (2013–2021) and relied on Sieberer et al.'s (2020) BTVote data with its three datasets for the 16th/17th terms (2005–2013). Details on the measurement, sources and descriptive statistics can be found in the Appendices 1–2. With 1.2 per cent of all votes cast against the party line, the 19th term has the lowest average defection rate during Merkel's chancellorship. The highest rate was recorded for Merkel's first grand coalition, 2005–2009 (for descriptive graphs, see Appendix 3).

2.3 Empirical Results

Table 1: Determinants of dissenting voting behaviour

	16 th -18 th term (2005-2017)	19 th term (2017-2021)
	(1)	(2)
<i>Political characteristics of the MP</i>		
Margin district vote	-2.686*** (0.360)	-2.924** (0.988)
Parliamentary office	-0.524*** (0.069)	-0.672*** (0.151)
Executive office	-2.966*** (0.262)	-3.499*** (0.765)
Parliamentary socialisation	0.046*** (0.007)	0.036*** (0.011)
Last-period effect	0.136* (0.058)	0.076 (0.108)
GDR socialisation	0.347** (0.129)	0.529** (0.185)
Government party	-0.378*** (0.050)	-1.427*** (0.157)
<i>Controls: Personal and vote characteristics</i>		
Age	0.110 (0.094)	0.117 (0.133)
Female	-0.000 (0.005)	0.008 (0.006)
Defence policy	0.546*** (0.027)	1.248*** (0.056)
Economic and social policy	-1.142*** (0.049)	-0.789*** (0.106)
Covid-19 policy		0.630*** (0.080)
Own motion	0.433*** (0.030)	0.210** (0.067)
17 th term	-0.724*** (0.042)	
18 th term	-0.743*** (0.054)	
Constant	-4.298*** (0.234)	-5.541*** (0.322)
McKelvey&Zavoina Pseudo-R ²	0.4296	0.4754
N	361,942	152,022

Logit coefficients are displayed and standard errors in parentheses.

Levels of significance: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

To facilitate comparisons between the fourth and previous Merkel governments (2005–2017), separate regression models were estimated. Broadly, the findings for the 19th term resemble those of earlier terms (Table 1): In both periods, as expected, MPs' political characteristics significantly affect their propensity to cast a dissenting vote. Parliamentary and, to a higher extent, executive offices strongly reduce MPs' probability to defect (hypothesis 1b), which can be interpreted as a high effectiveness of party discipline. Additionally, the higher the vote margin of directly elected MPs, the lower their defection probability (hypothesis 1a). Consequently, the more secure MPs' re-election is, the lower might be the importance of constituency interests as

their principals and the (relatively) higher the incentives to focus on their party to promote their career (Stoffel 2014). Government MPs showing significantly lower defection rates than MPs belonging to opposition parties indicates that, as expected in hypothesis 1g, disciplinary pressures are perceived as stronger by those MPs. This is reasonable, as the successful implementation of government policies depends on the unity of the majority parties. For the 19th term, the coefficient of ‘government party’ is considerably higher than for the earlier Merkel governments. This might be due to at least two causes: First, the fourth Merkel government relied on a smaller majority than two of its three predecessors, increasing the disciplinary pressure on the government MPs not to risk a parliamentary defeat. Second, the higher defection rate of the opposition parties might reflect that two out of four opposition party groups were newly formed and unity-inducing mechanisms might not have been immediately established therein.

Against our expectations (hypothesis 1c), the probability of vote defections *increases* significantly the longer MPs serve in parliament. Therefore, this experience effect cannot be interpreted as a parliamentary socialisation effect (which suggested decreasing defection rates). Instead, MPs might have already been socialised into their party outside parliament much earlier, which substitutes or outweighs possible effects of parliamentary socialisation (Rehmert 2022; Mai and Wenzelburger 2023). Once in parliament, a longer tenure might come along with higher self-confidence and a sense of independence vis-à-vis the party group leadership. This positive experience effect is mirrored in other recent studies (Bhattacharya and Papageorgiou 2019; Zittel and Nyhuis 2019) and independent from a mere age effect that was tested simultaneously, but has to be rejected for all terms.

Perhaps the most unexpected finding is that, even 30 years after the German unification, behavioural differences persist: MPs who were socialised in the GDR have, over the whole period of observation, a significantly higher defection probability than their colleagues from western Germany – which runs against our hypothesis 1e. This result ties in with current findings on persisting East–West differences in citizens’ political attitudes (Reiser and Reiter 2023 and the respective Special Issue of *German Politics*). To our knowledge, this is the first time such an effect has been detected at the federal level and for recent terms. Whether it can be ascribed to differences either in policy preferences or regarding party loyalty between western and eastern German politicians cannot be clarified with our observational data and should be taken up in future survey studies.

The most striking difference between the terms relates to the ‘last-period effect’ (hypothesis 1d): MPs who do not run for re-election have, in the election year and the year before, a significantly higher defection probability during the first three Merkel governments. In contrast, the coefficient is not statistically significant for the 19th term. One can only speculate about the reasons: As election results have become more volatile and the composition of parliament has already changed significantly at the beginning of the term, many MPs who stand for re-election may not be able to count on re-election. This uncertainty could level out behavioural differences between MPs who stand again and those who do not. Anyway, a non-finding is not unusual, given that Willumsen and Goetz (2017) also disprove a ‘last-period effect’ for British MPs.

Purely personal characteristics like MPs’ age and gender do not exhibit any unconditioned effect on their voting behaviour. This contradicts some studies of earlier terms (Sieberer and Ohmura 2021) or other parliaments (Clayton and Zetterberg 2021). The significant effects for the vote characteristics show that there are different baseline levels of dissent, depending on the topic and the origin of the motion: Whereas votes on outside deployments of the *Bundeswehr* and, in the 19th term, on Covid-19 policies show higher defection rates, MPs vote more unified on economic and social policies. Somehow surprisingly, MPs have higher defection rates when voting on motions that were introduced by their own party group or, in the case of governing parties, by the government. This finding contradicts the non-finding for own motions by Bergmann et al. (2016) and is potentially driven by the fact that many bills introduced by the government reflect compromises among the coalition partners which often are internally disputed (Bauer-Blaschkowski and Mai 2019). Considering the general conditions of the vote via the contents and origin of the motion thus leads (as shown in the fairly high Pseudo-R² values of more than 0.4), in addition to MPs’ political characteristics, to a more comprehensive understanding of their voting behaviour.¹

Robustness checks reveal that the results are robust against replacing MPs’ vote margin by other electoral variables (mandate type, candidacy mode). However, the electoral variables themselves have a rather poor explanatory power for vote defections especially in the 19th term. Moreover, in a joint model for the four terms, all political characteristics of MPs show significant effects. Additionally, we estimated separate models for each term that essentially reflect our main models’ results (see Appendix 4 for full results and a thorough discussion).

¹ We computed McKelvey&Zavoina Pseudo-R² values using the Stata ado by Langer (2021).

3. Voting Behaviour in the Unwhipped Vote on Organ Donation

The longstanding shortage of organs for transplantation triggered a new public debate on reforms of the system in the 19th term.² Since government as well as most opposition parties were internally divided on that issue, they took up the tradition of declaring a morality policy decision to a ‘vote of conscience’ and released MPs from party discipline. Two inter-party motions were initiated (Deutscher Bundestag 2020): first, an opt-out option or presumed consent policy (*doppelte Widerspruchslösung*) according to which everyone is regarded as an organ donor as long as he/she or his/her relatives (based on the braindead person’s will) do not contradict; second, a modification to the current opt-in option or strict consent policy (*Entscheidungslösung*) in order to increase the number of people who actively agree during their lifetime to become organ donors, e.g. by confronting them with organ donation more frequently.³ The presumed consent policy was the most far-reaching of the proposals – supported, among others, by the federal minister for health, Jens Spahn (see Hornung et al. 2023 on Spahn’s activist role in the German health policy). However, in separate votes, only the strict consent option reached a majority and became law after the final passage vote.

3.1 *The Value Conflict: Self-Determination vs. Collective Interests*

The politics of organ donation regulation is based on value rather than redistributive conflicts and, therefore, according to common definitions (Knill 2013; Mooney 2001), qualifies itself as morality policy. This classification is not precluded by some instrumental arguments in the debate (Tatalovitch and Wendell 2018) – for instance, regarding the effectiveness of the proposals. As long as at least one of the participants in the debate refers to moral arguments, then the policy can be regarded as morality policy – which is definitely the case here.⁴ For example, carrying an organ donor card in the current system has already been ascribed a “moral significance” (Wainwright and Hanser 2014: 139).

However, the arguments for the presumed or strict consent policies cannot be placed on the same conflict dimension as most other morality policies adopted during earlier Merkel

² Earlier attempts to change the conditions when a braindead person becomes an organ donor date back to the 1970s, the 1990s and the early 2010s (FAZ 2019; Wainwright and Hanser 2014).

³ The AfD parliamentary group initiated an own motion which aimed at the foundation of a new institution to coordinate the donation process. However, after the successful vote on the opt-in option, this motion was not put to the vote anymore.

⁴ Surprisingly, a list of 37 issues of morality policy collected by Tatalovitch and Wendell (2018) does not contain organ donation.

governments. The debate is not entirely comparable with pure questions of 'life and death' like assisted dying or abortion which constitute a major subtype of morality policies (Heichel et al. 2013). In contrast to these policies, it does not include a decision on life or death of the people directly concerned by the reform (i.e. potential organ donors) but on the conditions of when already braindead people are regarded as organ donors. In fact, organ donation fits better to the fourth subtype of morality policies as defined by Heichel et al. (2013) that includes policies restricting individual self-determination for the protection of other goods, e.g. the freedom and security of others.

An analysis of the parliamentary speeches delivered at the day of the vote (Bundestag plenary protocol 19/140) shows that MPs favouring the opt-out option justify their position with the following objectives (in descending order by frequency):

- (1) the (supposed) effectiveness of the opt-out option in order to increase the number of transplanted organs
- (2) the appropriateness of forcing people to concern themselves with the possibility of an opt-out instead of letting them ignore the issue without further consequences
- (3) that the opt-out option serves the common good and reflects the grace of charity and the principle of reciprocity

In contrast, advocates of a modification of the opt-in option most frequently mention:

- (1) the right of self-determination which they consider to be restricted by the opt-out option
- (2) the (supposed) ineffectiveness of the opt-out option
- (3) an altered relationship between the individual and the society/state, caused by the opt-out option which they deem problematic

Consequently, the two options are located at different ends of the following value conflict: At one end, the opt-in option reflects (according to the view of its supporters) the preservation of personal rights, especially the right of self-determination on what happens with one's body after death and on whether to concern oneself with the issue in life. At the other end, the opt-out option is interpreted as serving collective interests, especially the responsibility of the state to protect life and health of its citizens.⁵ Therefore, we assume that individualist attitudes impede

⁵ The debate mirrors the one in 2012 which Wainwright and Hanser (2014: 142) describe as a "principled ethical discussion about state power, personal freedom, altruism and social solidarity".

and collectivist attitudes foster the support of the presumed consent option (vice versa for the strict consent option).

3.2 Theoretical Expectations

MPs' voting behaviour in earlier 'free votes' was explained by both their own beliefs (approximated by personal characteristics) and political factors such as the preferences of their constituency (approximated by its sociodemographic composition) and their party membership, although the MPs were released from party discipline (for the German case, see Baumann et al. 2015; Engler and Dümig 2017; Wenzelburger and Fehrenz 2018; Bauer-Blaschkowski and Mai 2019; for the British case Raymond and Overby 2016). For the vote on organ donation, we expect as well that, in principle, both MPs' personal and political characteristics affect their legislative behaviour, although their selection likely differs from earlier morality policy votes.

MPs' Personal Characteristics

Religion. In survey studies, religious respondents especially name the need of maintaining body wholeness for afterlife and not wanting to interfere in God's creation to justify their scepticism about organ donation as such (Irving et al. 2012). On the organisational level, in an open letter to all MPs, both major Christian churches substantiated their positive attitude on organ donation but opposed the presumed consent option. They expressed 'considerable legal, ethical and spiritual concerns' against it and complained about a disproportionate restriction of self-determination (EKD 2019, own translation). Therefore, we expect that MPs with a Catholic or Protestant denomination tend to vote against the presumed consent option.

Academic background. Survey data indicate that academics exhibit more positive attitudes towards organ donation than people with a lower educational level (Irving et al. 2012; Tackmann and Dettmer 2021). However, more generally, two reasons account for the fact that higher education is said to be linked with individualist attitudes (Mishra 1994): First, the process of acquiring higher education degrees favours (or even necessitates) individualism. Second, well-educated people usually work in professions where they are confronted with people having individualist attitudes for their part (Arzheimer 2012). Accordingly, we hypothesise that MPs with an academic background have a higher probability to vote against the presumed consent policy.

Occupational background. MPs' professional background might have an impact on what they think about certain policies, too. Regarding organ donation, such an effect is especially likely for physicians, theologians and lawyers. Survey studies indicate that medical professionals have more positive attitudes on organ donation and more often carry an organ donor card than the average population (Inthorn et al. 2014; Söffker et al. 2014). Additionally, knowledge on and trust in the donation process correlates positively with attitudes on organ donation (Irving et al. 2012; Katz et al. 2019). It can be assumed that medical professionals have an above-average knowledge on and trust in the organ donation system. Presumably, they were already confronted with patients waiting for an organ donation and are, therefore, particularly aware of the problems in the system. Consequently, we expect medical professional MPs to support the presumed consent system rather than the minor reform of the opt-in system. Conversely, we expect MPs who studied Christian theology to follow the critical stance of their church and to support the strict rather than the presumed consent option. Finally, MPs who studied law should be, by profession, particularly sensitive towards (potential restrictions of) civil liberties. Accordingly, such MPs should vote against the presumed consent option.

These expectations on personal characteristics can be condensed in the following hypothesis 2: MPs with a Catholic or Protestant denomination, an academic background and/or those who studied theology or law vote against the presumed consent option, while MPs with a medical profession vote in favour of it (vice versa for the opt-in option).

Despite their relevance in other 'free votes', no clear-cut expectations can be formulated for MPs' family background, age and gender with regard to the value conflict discussed above which is why we treat these indicators as controls (see Appendix 5 for a further discussion).

MPs' Political Characteristics

GDR socialisation. People in eastern Germany who were socialised in the GDR experienced a socialist political system and were, also in their everyday-life, confronted with collectivist values (Arzheimer 2012). In surveys, they tend to prioritise equality over self-fulfilment if they had to choose. Similarly, postmaterialist values are less prevalent among eastern Germans (Meulemann 2002). Additionally, the GDR itself adopted a presumed consent policy in 1975 (Section 4 paragraph 1 of the directive on organ transplantations at that time). Hence, we assume that people who were socialised in the GDR got used to this policy and might deem the presumed consent option more justified, whereas people who have lived their entire lives in western

Germany are not familiar with this policy. Hence, we expect that MPs with a socialisation in the GDR have a higher probability to vote in favour of the presumed consent option than their western German colleagues.

Union membership. Members of trade unions support higher levels of government intervention when it comes to both redistributive and regulative policies (Engler and Voigt 2023). Consequently, they favour a strong role of the state via the individual, at least in the economy. More generally, union members familiarise themselves with the cooperative structures of their organisation and realise the merits of collective action. As a result, union membership increases individuals' awareness for collective interests and the needs of their fellow human beings (see also Putnam 2000). Such socialisation effects might result in union members valuing solidarity with others higher than individual freedom. Self-selection effects might also matter insofar as primarily people holding collectivist attitudes join unions. Therefore, union members should be more likely to vote for the presumed consent option.

Constituency characteristics. Previous literature teaches us that MPs do not only consider their own convictions but also their voters' attitudes when it comes to votes of conscience (Hanretty et al. 2017). Since voting behaviour in 'free votes' has a measurable effect on election outcomes in the constituency (Kauder and Potrafke 2021), MPs have at least career-related incentives to consider constituency preferences. Corresponding to our individual-level arguments on religion, we argue that MPs from constituencies with a high share of Catholics or Protestants commit themselves to the sceptical position of the Christian churches and vote against the presumed consent option. Moreover, in constituencies with a high share of college degrees, individualist attitudes are more prevalent than collectivist attitudes. Additionally, individualist attitudes are more widespread in urban areas (Mishra 1994). Consequently, we expect that MPs representing such constituencies have a higher probability to vote against presumed consent. Contrarily, and in accordance with our individual-level line of reasoning, MPs of constituencies in the former GDR territory should be more likely to vote for the presumed consent option.

Party affiliation. As mentioned before, MPs still tend to vote according to the majority position of their party group even when its leadership does not urge them to. This fact can either be traced back to similar policy preferences with (Engler and Dümig 2017) or loyalty towards their party (Raymond 2017). Concerning the discussed value conflict, we expect FDP and Green MPs to speak up for self-determination. The FDP's position stems from its liberalist roots. The party opposed the presumed consent option already in 1997 (Wainwright and Hanser 2014). In its party platform, it claims that self-determination on one's own body should be weighted higher

than welfare matters of others (FDP 2012). The Greens advocate self-determination on one's own body in other morality policy areas as well, e.g. concerning abortion (Engler and Dümig 2017). Hence, MPs of both parties should prefer the opt-in to the presumed consent option. Next, we posit that MPs of the AfD reject both options since it initiated its own proposal which it presumably expects its MPs to support. Conversely, we hypothesise that Social Democratic and Socialist MPs support the presumed consent option because their parties promote collective interests, solidarity and responsibility for others, especially regarding economic and social policies. For CDU/CSU MPs, our expectations are ambiguous: On the one hand, Christian Democrats advocate pro-life positions and oppose extensive self-determination regarding questions of life and death (Engler and Dümig 2017). This could be interpreted as a sign of support for the presumed consent option which particularly aims at the protection of human lives. On the other hand, the German Christian Democrats have a liberal programmatic root as well, stressing individual responsibility and self-determination. The critical stance of the Christian churches might also push CDU/CSU MPs in this direction. Correspondingly, the draft of the CDU's new party platform hints at a conflict between the right to live and individual self-determination - without resolving this conflict (CDU 2021). Therefore, we posit no distinct hypothesis for CDU/CSU MPs.

The expectations on political characteristics can be condensed to hypothesis 3: MPs from districts with a high share of Catholic, Protestant, urban and/or well-educated population as well as FDP, Green and AfD MPs vote against the presumed consent option, while MPs with a GDR socialisation, union members and/or those from eastern German districts as well as SPD and Die Linke MPs vote in favour of it (vice versa for the opt-in option).

3.3 Data and Methods


Our dependent variable is MPs' voting behaviour concerning the votes after the second reading for the opt-out system and the modified opt-in system, respectively. We code '1' for MPs supporting a bill and '0' for MPs rejecting it as well as for those abstaining.⁶ As independent variables, we include indicators for the various factors discussed above (for operationalisation details and descriptive statistics, see Appendices 6–7). Since our dependent variables are dichotomous, we run logistic regressions. To account for repeated values of the constituency variables in case of several MPs representing the same district, we cluster the standard errors by

⁶ Nonetheless, our results are robust when excluding abstentions from the analysis.

electoral districts. Multicollinearity is an issue when it comes to the academic background and the profession indicators, to the Catholic and Protestant population shares as well as to the degree of urbanisation and the share of population with higher education entrance qualification. Accordingly, we include these variables in separate models.

3.4 Empirical Results

Figure 1: Determinants of organ donation regulation voting behaviour



Note: The figure is based on the respective regression models in appendices 8 and 10. The lines show the 90-percent confidence interval.

Opt-out option. The results for the rejected presumed consent policy are reported in Figure 1⁷ (left-hand side plot). Some of them question the empirical relevance of personal characteristics (hypothesis 2). Across various specifications, neither an academic background in general nor a particular profession affect MPs’ voting behaviour. The same holds true for age and family status. Only two individual-level indicators have a robust statistically significant effect: First, Protestant (but not Catholic) MPs have a lower probability to vote for the opt-out system. This finding differs from that for several ‘life and death’ morality policies during previous Merkel governments, when Catholic rather than Protestant denomination shaped MPs’ voting decisions

⁷ We have run additional model specifications for various combinations of the reported correlating variables (see Appendices 8–9).

(Baumann et al. 2015; Engler and Dümig 2017). Second, female MPs are less likely to vote for presumed consent than men. Even though women have more positive attitudes towards organ donation (Decker et al. 2008), they may not want to donate by default.

Concerning political factors condensed in hypothesis 3, GDR socialisation does not affect MPs' voting behaviour on the presumed consent policy. In contrast, evidence partially substantiates that union members indeed favour the more collectivist opt-out option – however, this result is contingent upon the exclusion of the party affiliation indicators (see Appendix 9). Additionally, our findings corroborate several hypotheses for constituency characteristics: As expected, MPs' probability to vote for the opt-out system decreases with rising degrees of urbanisation, shares of Catholic population, and (at least at the 10 per cent level of statistical significance) shares of population holding a higher education entrance qualification. Moreover, for some specifications, we find that MPs from electoral districts in eastern Germany tend to vote in favour of presumed consent, too. Conversely, increasing shares of Protestant population raise the probability of supporting this bill. This finding not only contradicts our expectations but also conflicts with the micro-level finding for Protestant denomination. Overall, organ donation regulation appears to deviate from the pattern identified for other morality policy votes in Germany: While constituency variables were of minor importance for MPs' voting behaviour on abortion, stem-cell research, and assisted dying (e.g. Engler and Dümig 2017; Bauer-Blaschkowski and Mai 2019), they robustly affect MPs' choice here. This behaviour is quite rational for re-election-seeking MPs, given that in nation-wide polls, Germans are equally divided on this issue (BZgA 2017). Turning to party affiliation, our findings are in line with others and stress the importance of this factor (e.g. Engler and Dümig 2017). As expected, MPs of the AfD, the Liberal and the Green party groups have a higher probability to reject the opt-out system than Christian Democrats. However, Socialist MPs rather consistently opposed this bill, too, while Social Democrats' support was not as strong as expected. The explanatory power of party affiliation is substantial, considering the decrease in the model fit when excluding it (Appendices 8-9). What is more, party affiliation affects the impact of personal and constituency characteristics, e.g. by decreasing the statistical significance of the higher education qualification shares and union membership.

Opt-in option. Turning to the finally adopted reform of the strict consent policy (see Figure 1, right-hand side plot), the findings are not the mere mirror image of the opt-out system vote. Overall, our independent variables explain MPs' voting behaviour concerning this bill much worse (Appendices 10–11): Among those personal characteristics (hypothesis 2) that we expected to be major drivers of these votes of conscience, none reaches conventional levels of

statistical significance. Only MPs' gender, which we considered as a control, consistently unfolds a statistically relevant effect with female MPs having a higher probability to vote for the opt-in system reform. In addition, MPs who are married and/or have children tend to vote for this bill although we expected the reverse effect.

Of the political factors (hypothesis 3), GDR socialisation and union membership have no explanatory power. The findings for constituency characteristics are weaker, too. The only passably robust district-level predictor is the share of population with higher education entrance qualification: MPs from districts with a higher educational level are more likely support the strict consent policy reform. Turning to party affiliation, we corroborate that MPs from the Greens and the FDP have a higher probability to support the opt-in bill than their Christian Democratic colleagues. In addition, evidence clearly suggests that SPD and AfD MPs tend to oppose the strict consent option. Although there is no evidence supporting our expectation for MPs of Die Linke, again, party affiliation in total substantially contributes to the model fit (Appendices 10-11).

4. Conclusion

With this article, we provide the first comprehensive picture of voting behaviour in the 19th German Bundestag. Guided by the question on the relevance of MPs' individual-level characteristics, we examined both whipped and unwhipped votes during the last term of Angela Merkel's chancellorship.

Concerning the daily business of whipped votes, we investigated MPs' varying propensity to toe the party line under the special circumstances of 2017–2021: an all-time sized Bundestag, the highest number of parliamentary groups since 1953 and a substantially shrunk government majority. In accordance with our overarching expectation, we identified a number of MPs' political characteristics as major determinants of dissenting voting behaviour: MPs who are particularly dependent on the party (group) leadership to reach their career-related goals have a lower probability to defect. This applies to office holders, unexperienced MPs whose national-level career is just about to start, electorally secure MPs who lack incentives to make their mark by vote defections and MPs of governing parties in general. Conversely, experienced MPs and those socialised in eastern Germany appear more independent-minded. Broadly, the results do not markedly differ from earlier Merkel governments (2005–2017). Accordingly, MPs' decision-making calculi appear stable beyond legislative terms. Nevertheless, some of the political

characteristics gained (membership in government party) or lost (last-period effect, electoral variables) explanatory power for the 2017–2021 period – a finding that could be related to the strongly changed political context.

Concerning the special vote of conscience on the organ donation reform, we provided the first empirical study of MPs' voting behaviour in a policy field that is based on a systematically different value conflict than previous free votes during Merkel's chancellorship such as abortion or assisted dying. Matching our overarching expectation, the analysis proves both groups of explanatory factors as empirically meaningful: personal characteristics *and*, to a higher extent, political factors (including constituency preferences and party affiliation). Above all (and besides party affiliation), it is MPs' religious denomination but also the social structure of their constituencies that correspond with their voting behaviour. Overall, most of these findings are clearly indicative of the value conflict that we assumed to be at work here, namely the collective interest of providing health vs. self-determination of the individual. Comparing these findings with other free votes during previous terms suggests an increasing importance of political, constituency-level factors compared to personal characteristics.

Our findings point to some broader implications for the relationship between MPs, voters and parties. First, despite the importance of rational-choice incentives not to defect from the party line, our findings underscore the relevance of MPs' political socialisation, culminating in a clear GDR socialisation and a union membership effect on legislative behaviour. Second, the fact that MPs are to some extent guided by the composition of their constituency aligns with the growing literature on responsiveness in morality policy votes (Hanretty et al. 2017) and beyond (Anderson et al. 2023). Third, the largely insignificant effects of MPs' purely personal characteristics indicate that organ donation policy is an unlikely case for substantive representation, in contrast to morality policies like abortion (Swers 1998) or other issues targeted at particular social groups (Bailer et al. 2022). Fourth, the fact that MPs vote roughly along party lines even in a free vote supports an agency-based view on public policy research. Accordingly, partisan differences regarding adopted policies not only stem from a different composition of parties' electorate but from distinct (and shared) ideological preferences of their politicians, including MPs (Wenzelburger and Zohlnhöfer 2021).

Overall, our results for the 19th Bundestag (see Appendix 12 for a tabular overview) clearly substantiate the relevance of individual-level, especially political characteristics when explaining MPs' voting behaviour. Across different types of votes and their varying logics, we provide evidence that German MPs might have adopted quite swiftly to the changes in the political and

electoral context by giving more weight to political motives and strategic considerations in their legislative behaviour – both in whipped and unwhipped votes. Looking at the coalition of Social Democrats, Greens and Liberals formed after the 2021 election, its greater ideological heterogeneity that requires substantial compromises might not only result in disappointments within these parties but also in a higher number of vote defections among the governing parties' MPs. This level effect could be amplified by two reasons: First, the Green party group, which traditionally has above-average defection rates (Appendix 3), became substantially larger. Second, the salience of issues that induce significantly higher defection rates, namely Covid-19 as well as defence policies, remained the same or even increased. However, the post-2021 government's narrow parliamentary majority restricts the acceptability of vote defections to a comparable extent as for its predecessor. Votes of conscience in the 20th Bundestag could be a fruitful case to study, too. Not only because there will be more of those votes than in the previous term – on compulsory vaccination against Covid-19 in early 2022 and on the new regulation of assisted dying (expected in 2023). What is more, these new cases substantiate our argument that there are issues of conscience that go beyond classical 'life and death' questions (such as assisted dying) but exhibit a 'collective-interest-vs-self-determination' conflict (such as compulsory vaccination). Therefore, the 20th Bundestag allows for an explicit test whether votes with different underlying value conflicts indeed follow different explanatory patterns.

5. References

- Ainsley, Caitlin, Clifford J. Carrubba, Brian F. Crisp, Betül Demirkaya, Matthew J. Gabel, and Dino Hadzic (2020). 'Roll-Call Vote Selection: Implications for the Study of Legislative Politics', *American Political Science Review*, 114:3, 691–706.
- Anderson, Sarah E., Daniel M. Butler, Laurel Harbridge-Yong, and G. Agustin Markarian (2023). 'Driving Legislators' Policy Preferences: Constituent Commutes and Gas Taxes', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 48:1, 203–18.
- Andeweg, Rudy B., and Jacques Thomassen (2011). 'Pathways to Party Unity: Sanctions, Loyalty, Homogeneity and Division of Labour in the Dutch Parliament', *Party Politics*, 17:5, 655–72.
- Arzheimer, Kai (2012). 'Europa als Wertegemeinschaft? Ost und West im Spiegel des 'Schwarz Value Inventory'', in: Silke I. Keil and Jan W. van Deth (eds.), *Deutschlands Metarmorphosen. Ergebnisse des European Social Survey 2002 bis 2008*. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 73–98.
- Bailer, Stefanie (2018). 'To Use the Whip or Not: Whether and When Party Group Leaders Use Disciplinary Measures to Achieve Voting Unity', *International Political Science Review*, 39:2, 163–77.

- Bailer, Stefanie, Christian Breunig, Nathalie Giger, and Andreas M. Wüst (2022). 'The Diminishing Value of Representing the Disadvantaged: Between Group Representation and Individual Career Paths', *British Journal of Political Science*, 52:2, 535–52.
- Bailer, Stefanie, and Tamaki Ohmura (2018). 'Exploring, Maintaining, and Disengaging-The Three Phases of a Legislator's Life', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 43:3, 493–520.
- Bauer-Blaschkowski, Svenja, and Philipp Mai (2019). 'Von 'Abweichlern' und 'Überzeugungstätern'. Eine Analyse des Abstimmungsverhaltens im 18. Deutschen Bundestag', in: Reimut Zohlnhöfer and Thomas Saalfeld (eds.), *Zwischen Stillstand, Politikwandel und Krisenmanagement: Eine Bilanz der Regierung Merkel 2013–2017*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 219–56.
- Baumann, Markus, Marc Debus, and Jochen Müller (2015). 'Personal Characteristics of MPs and Legislative Behavior in Moral Policymaking', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 40:2, 179–210.
- Becher, Michael, and Ulrich Sieberer (2008). 'Discipline, Electoral Rules and Defection in the Bundestag, 1983–94', *German Politics*, 17:3, 293–304.
- Bergmann, Henning, Stefanie Bailer, Tamaki Ohmura, Thomas Saalfeld, and Ulrich Sieberer (2016). 'Namentliche Abstimmungen im Bundestag 1949 bis 2013: Befunde aus einem neuen Datensatz', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 47:1, 26–50.
- Bhattacharya, Caroline, and Achillefs Papageorgiou (2019). 'Are Backbenchers Fighting Back? Intra-Party Contestation in German Parliament Debates on the Greek Crisis', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 72:2, 425–44.
- BZgA (2017). 'Data from: Wissen, Einstellung und Verhalten der Allgemeinbevölkerung zur Organ- und Gewebespende, Zeitreihe 2010-2016, Version 1.0.0', *GESIS Data Archive*, doi: 10.4232/1.12803.
- Carey, John M. (2007). 'Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting', *American Journal of Political Science*, 51:1, 92–107.
- CDU (2021). 'Report. Auf dem Weg zum neuen Grundsatzprogramm', https://www.cdu.de/system/tdf/media/dokumente/bericht_zum_grundsatzprogramm_0.pdf?file=1&type=field_collection_item&id=21480.
- Clayton, Amanda, and Pär Zetterberg (2021). 'Gender and Party Discipline: Evidence from Africa's Emerging Party Systems', *American Political Science Review*, 115:3, 869–884.
- Davidson-Schmich, Louise K. (2003). 'The Development of Party Discipline in New Parliaments: Eastern German State Legislatures 1990–2000', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 9:4, 88–101.
- Decker, Oliver, Merve Winter, Elmar Brähler, and Manfred Beutel (2008). 'Between Commodification and Altruism: Gender Imbalance and Attitudes Towards Organ Donation. A Representative Survey of the German Community', *Journal of Gender Studies*, 17:3, 251–255.

- Degner, Hanno, and Dirk Leuffen (2016). 'Keynes, Friedman, or Monnet? Explaining Parliamentary Voting Behaviour on Fiscal Aid for Euro Area Member States', *West European Politics*, 39:6, 1139–59.
- Delius, Martin F., Michael Koß, and Christian Stecker (2013). '„Ich Erkenne Also Fraktionsdisziplin Grundsätzlich Auch an...“ – Innerfraktioneller Dissens in der SPD-Fraktion der Großen Koalition 2005 bis 2009', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 44:3, 546–66.
- Deutscher Bundestag (2019). 'Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages. Onlineausgabe seit 1990', <https://www.bundestag.de/datenhandbuch>.
- Deutscher Bundestag (2020). 'Organspenden: Mehrheit für die Entscheidungslösung', <https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2020/kw03-de-transplantationsgesetz-674682>.
- Dickinson, Nicholas (2018). 'Advice Giving and Party Loyalty: An Informational Model for the Socialisation Process of New British MPs', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 71:2, 343–64.
- Dingler, Sarah C., and Lena Ramstetter (2023). 'When Does She Rebel? How Gender Affects Deviating Legislative Behaviour', *Government and Opposition*, 58:3, 437–55.
- EKD (2019). 'Organspenden: Kirchen schreiben Brief an Abgeordnete', <https://www.ekd.de/organspende-brief-abgeordnete-bundestag-52544.htm>.
- Engler, Fabian, and Kathrin Dümig (2017). 'Political Parties and MPs' Morality Policy Voting Behaviour: Evidence from Germany', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 70:3, 548–68.
- Engler, Fabian, and Linda Voigt (2023). 'There is Power in a Union? Union Members' Preferences and the Conditional Effect of Labour Unions on Left Parties in Different Welfare State Programmes', *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 61:1, 89–109.
- FAZ (2019). 'Darum ist die Widerspruchslösung immer gescheitert', <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/organspende-bundestag-stimmt-ueberwiderspruchsloesung-ab-16559185.html>.
- FDP (2012). 'Verantwortung für die Freiheit. Karlsruher Freiheitsthesen der FDP für eine offene Bürgergesellschaft', <https://www.fdp.de/media/358/download?inline>.
- Hanretty, Chris, Benjamin E. Lauderdale, and Nick Vivyan (2017). 'Dyadic Representation in a Westminster System', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 42:2, 235–67.
- Heichel, Stephan, Christoph Knill, and Sophie Schmitt (2013). 'Public Policy Meets Morality: Conceptual and Theoretical Challenges in the Analysis of Morality Policy Change', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 20:3, 318–34.
- Hornung, Johanna, Nils C. Bandelow, and Lina Y. Iskandar (2023). 'The Winds of Winter: COVID-19 and Punctuations Without Policy Change in German Health Care Policy', *German Politics* (Online First), <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2023.2198214>.
- Inthorn, Julia, Sabine Wöhlke, Fabian Schmidt, and Silke Schicktanz (2014). 'Impact of Gender and Professional Education on Attitudes Towards Financial Incentives for Organ

- Donation: Results of a Survey among 755 Students of Medicine and Economics in Germany', *BMC Medical Ethics*, 15:56.
- Irving, Michelle J., Allison Tong, Stephen Jan, Alan Cass, John Rose, Steven Chadban, Richard D. Allen, Jonathan C. Craig, Germaine Wong, and Kirsten Howard (2012). 'Factors that Influence the Decision to be an Organ Donor: A Systematic Review of the Qualitative Literature', *Nephrology Dialysis Transplantation*, 27:6, 2526–33.
- Ismayr, Wolfgang (2012). *Der Deutsche Bundestag*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
- Kam, Christopher J (2011). *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Katz, Hagai, Maria Blekher, and David A. Bosch (2019). 'It is All About Control: Understanding Reluctance to Register for Organ Donation', *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 48:3, 665–80.
- Kauder, Björn, and Niklas Potrafke (2021). 'Rewarding Conservative Politicians? Evidence from Voting on Same-Sex Marriage', *ifo Working Paper*, No. 355, Ifo Institute – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
- Knill, Christoph (2013). 'The Study of Morality Policy: Analytical Implications from a Public Policy Perspective', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 20:3, 309–17.
- Langer, Wolfgang (2021). 'Stata Page', <https://langer.soziologie.uni-halle.de/stata/index.html>.
- Mai, Philipp (2022). 'Whose Bread I Don't eat, his Song I Don't Sing? MPs' Outside Earnings and Dissenting Voting Behaviour', *Party Politics*, 28:2, 342–53.
- Mai, Philipp, and Georg Wenzelburger (2023). 'Loyal Activists? Party Socialization and Dissenting Voting Behavior in Parliament', *Legislative Studies Quarterly* (Early View), <https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12416>.
- Meulemann, Heiner (2002). 'Werte und Wertwandel im Vereinten Deutschland', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 52:37–38, 13–22.
- Mishra, Ramesh C. (1994). 'Individualist and Collectivist Orientations Across Generations', in: Uichol Kim, Harry C. Triandis, Cigdem Kagitcibasi, Sang-Chin Choi, and Gene Yoon (eds.), *Individualism and Collectivism: Theory, Method, and Applications*. London: Sage Publications, 225–38.
- Mooney, Christopher Z (2001). *The Public Clash of Private Values. The Politics of Morality Policy*. New York: Chatham House.
- Oppermann, Kai, and Klaus Brummer (2023). 'German Foreign Policy Under the Merkel IV Government: The Role of Party Political Contestation Within the 'Grand Coalition'', *German Politics* (Online First), <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2023.2195170>.
- Patzelt, Werner J. (2000). 'Seiteneinsteiger, Neulinge, Ossis...: Die Integration Ostdeutscher Abgeordneter in 'Gesamtdeutsche' Parlamente', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 31 :3, 542–68.

- Putnam, Robert (2000). *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Raymond, Christopher D (2017). ‘Simply a Matter of Context? Partisan Contexts and Party Loyalties on Free Votes’, *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 19:2, 353–70.
- Raymond, Christopher D., and Marvin L. Overby (2016). ‘What’s in a (Party) Name? Examining Preferences, Discipline, and Social Identity in a Parliamentary Free Vote’, *Party Politics*, 22:3, 313–24.
- Rehmer, Jochen (2022). ‘Party Membership, Pre-Parliamentary Socialization and Party Cohesion’, *Party Politics*, 28:6, 1081–93.
- Reiser, Marion, and Renate Reiter (2023). ‘A (New) East-West-Divide? Representative Democracy in Germany 30 Years After Unification’, *German Politics*, 32:1, 1–19.
- Saalfeld, Thomas (1995). *Parteisoldaten und Rebellen. Eine Untersuchung zur Geschlossenheit der Fraktionen im Deutschen Bundestag (1949-1990)*. Opladen: Leske+Budrich.
- Schindler, Peter (1999). *Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages 1949-1990*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Sieberer, Ulrich (2010). ‘Behavioral Consequences of Mixed Electoral Systems: Deviating Voting Behavior of District and List MPs in the German Bundestag’, *Electoral Studies*, 29:3, 484–96.
- Sieberer, Ulrich, and Tamaki Ohmura (2021). ‘Mandate Type, Electoral Safety, and Defections from the Party Line: The Conditional Mandate Divide in the German Bundestag, 1949–2013’, *Party Politics*, 27:4, 704–15.
- Sieberer, Ulrich, Thomas Saalfeld, Tamaki Ohmura, Henning Bergmann, and Stefanie Bailer (2020). ‘Roll-call Votes in the German Bundestag: A New Dataset, 1949–2013’, *British Journal of Political Science*, 50:3, 1137–45.
- Siefken, Sven T. (2022). ‘The Bundestag in the Pandemic Year 2020/21 – Continuity and Challenges in the Covid-19 Crisis’, *German Politics* (Online First), <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2021.2024806>.
- Söffker, Gerold, Michael Bhattarai, Tobias Welte, Michael Quintel, and Stefan Kluge (2014). ‘Einstellung des Intensivmedizinischen Fachpersonals zur Postmortalen Organspende in Deutschland’, *Medizinische Klinik – Intensivmedizin und Notfallmedizin*, 109:1, 41–47.
- Stecker, Christian (2015). ‘How effects on party unity vary across votes’, *Party Politics*, 21:5, 791–802.
- Stoffel, Michael F. (2014). ‘MP Behavior in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems’, *Electoral Studies*, 35, 78–87.
- Swers, Michele L. (1998). ‘Are Women More Likely to Vote for Women’s Issue Bills Than Their Male Colleagues?’, *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 23:3, 435–48.

- Tackmann, Elisa, and Susanne Dettmer (2021). 'Entwicklung der Akzeptanz der Postmortalen Organspende und Ihre Einflussfaktoren in Deutschland', *Medizinische Klinik – Intensivmedizin und Notfallmedizin*, 116:1, 41–49.
- Tatalovitch, Raymond, and Dane G. Wendell (2018). 'Expanding the Scope and Content of Morality Policy Research: Lessons from Moral Foundations Theory', *Policy Sciences*, 51:4, 565–579.
- Vignoli, Valerio, Falk Ostermann, and Wolfgang Wagner (2022). 'Ideological Talk, Strategic Vote: German Parties' Positions on the Military Intervention in Afghanistan in Parliament', *German Politics* (Online First), <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2022.2137497>.
- Wainwright, David, and Anne Christine Hanser (2014). 'The Formation of Organ Donation Policy in Germany: Evidence, Politics and Public Opinion', *Universal Journal of Public Health*, 2:5, 137–146.
- Wenzelburger, Georg, and Sabrina Fehrenz (2018). 'Die Union und die 'Ehe für Alle'. Bestimmungsfaktoren des Abstimmungsverhaltens in der CDU/CSU-Fraktion im Bundestag', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 49:3, 512–30.
- Wenzelburger, Georg, and Reimut Zohlnhöfer (2021). 'Bringing Agency Back Into the Study of Partisan Politics: A Note on Recent Developments in the Literature on Party Politics', *Party Politics*, 27:5, 1055–65.
- Willumsen, David M., and Klaus H. Goetz (2017). 'Set Free? Impending MP Retirement and Legislative Behaviour in the UK', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 70:2, 254–79.
- Wurster, Stefan, Markus B. Siewert, Sebastian Jäckle, and Janina Steinert (2022). 'Introduction to the Special Issue: The First Year of the COVID-19 Pandemic in Germany', *German Politics* (Online First), <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2022.2103544>.
- Zimmermann, Hubert (2014). 'A Grand Coalition for the Euro: The Second Merkel Cabinet, the Euro Crisis and the Elections of 2013', *German Politics*, 23:4, 322–336.
- Zittel, Thomas, and Dominic Nyhuis (2019). 'Two Faces of Party Unity: Roll-Call Behavior and Vote Explanations in the German Bundestag', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 72:2, 406–24.
- Zohlnhöfer, Reimut, and Fabian Engler (2023). 'Angela Merkel's Last Term – An Introduction', *German Politics* (Online First), <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2023.2188585>.

6. Appendix

A1: Variable Description - Analysis of Whipped Votes

Table 1-Appendix: Operationalisation and data sources of the variables (whipped votes)

Variable label	Description	Operationalisation	Source
<i>Dependent variable</i>			
Dissent	Did the MP vote against the majority position of his/her party group?	dummy variable (1=dissenting vote, 0=no dissenting vote) Votes on morality policy issues (own coding) are excluded. Absences and invalid votes are coded as missing observations.	16 th /17 th terms: Bergmann et al. 2018a-c (variable <i>vote_deviate</i> , but without the distinction of different degrees of dissent), 18 th /19 th terms: website of the German Bundestag (www.bundestag.de)
<i>Political characteristics of the MP</i>			
Mandate type: direct mandate	Was the MP directly elected in the constituency or via party list (irrespective of dual candidacies)?	dummy variable (1=district mandate, 0=list mandate)	16 th /17 th terms: Bergmann et al. 2018a-c (variable <i>mandate</i>), 18 th /19 th terms: website of the German Bundestag
Candidacy mode: direct candidacy only	Did the MP run solely in the constituency in the last election?	dummy variable (1=direct candidacy only, 0=dual candidacy or list candidacy only)	16 th /17 th terms: Bergmann et al. 2018a-c (variables <i>mandate</i> , <i>dualcand</i>), 18 th term: website of the federal election commissioner (no longer online available) 19 th term: data provided for research purposes by federal election commissioner (Bundeswahlleiter).
Candidacy mode: list candidacy only	Did the MP run solely on the party list in the last election?	dummy variable (1=list candidacy only, 0=dual candidacy or direct candidacy only)	16 th /17 th terms: Bergmann et al. 2018a-c (variables <i>mandate</i> , <i>dualcand</i>), 18 th term: website of the federal election commissioner (no longer online available) 19 th term: data provided for research purposes by federal election commissioner (Bundeswahlleiter).
Electoral vulnerability: margin district vote	Was the MP elected in a 'safe' district (i.e. with a huge margin)?	Winning margin in the constituency (percentage points). MPs elected via list (i.e. who have lost the district race or run only for a list mandate) are coded with '0'.	federal election commissioner (Bundeswahlleiter); https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/bundestagswahlen/2005.html ; https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/bundestagswahlen/2009.html ; https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/bundestagswahlen/2013/ergebnisse.html ;

			https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/bundestagswahlen/2017/ergebnisse.html
Parliamentary office	Does the MP hold one of the following offices in parliament (at the time of the vote): party group leader, deputy party group leader, whip, member of the executive party group leadership, leader of a Bundestag standing committee, Bundestag president or vice president?	dummy variable (1=parliamentary office, 0=no parliamentary office)	16 th /17 th terms: Bergmann et al. 2018a-c (variables <i>parlpres</i> , <i>commchair</i> , <i>ppgchair</i> , <i>whip</i>) 18 th /19 th terms: website of the German Bundestag; websites of the parliamentary groups; Kürschners manual; MPs' personal websites
Executive office	Does the MP hold one of the following offices in the federal government (at the time of the vote): chancellor, minister or junior minister (Parlamentarischer Staatssekretär)?	dummy variable (1=executive office, 0=no executive office)	16 th /17 th terms: Bergmann et al. 2018a-c (variables <i>minister</i> , <i>junminister</i>), 18 th /19 th terms: website of the German Bundestag; Federal Government (www.bundesregierung.de) and Kürschners manual; MPs' personal websites
Parliamentary socialisation	How long did an MP serve in the German Bundestag until the year of the vote? (Since the actual internalisation of the loyalty norm during an MP's parliamentary career cannot be measured with observational data, we approximated it by the length of the parliamentary socialisation process.)	number of years (irrespective of how many months/days the MP was member in a given year) example: first elected in September 2013, vote in January 2020: 7 years	own calculation; for MPs first elected before 2013 based on Bergmann et al. 2018a-c (variables <i>mandate_start</i> , <i>mandate_end</i>)
Last-period effect	Does the MP abstain from running in the next federal election or was not re-nominated?	dummy variable (1=no more candidacy, 0=candidacy; coded only in the election year and the year before an election, otherwise coded 0 for all MPs)	Data provided for research purposes by federal election commissioner (Bundeswahlleiter).
GDR socialisation	An MP is socialised in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) if he/she was born and/or grew up in the GDR; in addition, he/she should have lived a substantial part of his/her life in the GDR	dummy variable (1=MP was born and grew up in the GDR between 1949 and 1974 OR MP was born in the German Reich and grew up in the GDR; 0=MP was not born or did not grow up in the GDR OR MP was born in the GDR but in 1975 or afterwards)	website of the German Bundestag; Kürschners manual; MPs' personal websites
Government Party	Is the MP member of the party group of a governing party (at the time of the vote)? Governing parties: 16 th , 18 th , 19 th terms: CDU/CSU, SPD 17 th term: CDU/CSU, FDP	dummy variable (1=yes; 0=no)	16 th /17 th terms: Bergmann et al. 2018a-c (variable <i>ppg</i>), 18 th /19 th terms: website of the German Bundestag

<i>Personal characteristics of the MP</i>			
Age	MP's age in the year of the vote	number of years between an MP's birth year and the year of the vote	16 th /17 th terms: Bergmann et al. 2018a-c (variable <i>year_birth</i>), 18 th /19 th terms: website of the German Bundestag; Kürschners manual; MPs' personal websites
Gender (female)	MP's sex	dummy variable (1=female; 0=male)	16 th /17 th terms: Bergmann et al. 2018a-c (variable <i>gender</i>), 18 th /19 th terms: website of the German Bundestag
<i>Vote characteristics</i>			
Subject: defence policy	Did a vote concern an outside deployment of the German armed forces?	dummy variable (1=vote on defence policy, 0=no vote on defence policy)	16 th /17 th terms: Bergmann et al. 2018a-c (variables <i>policy1</i> , <i>policy2</i> , <i>policy3</i> , net of votes on defence policy matters not related on deployments of the armed forces) 18 th /19 th terms: website of the German Bundestag
Subject: economic and social policy	Did a vote concern economic policy or social policy?	dummy variable (1=vote on economic/social policy, 0=no vote on economic/social policy)	all terms: Bergmann et al. 2022 (variable <i>policy1</i>), categories 'macroeconomics (including budget)' and 'social welfare'
Subject: Covid-19 policy	Did a vote concern measures against the Covid-19 pandemic or its consequences? Votes that are coded as economic and social policy in the variable above are not considered as Covid-19 policies.	dummy variable (1=vote on Covid-19, 0=no vote on Covid-19 issue)	own coding based on title and/or content of the motion
Origin: own motion	Did a vote concern a motion initiated by an MP's own party (or by the government for MPs of governing parties)?	dummy variable (1=vote on own motion, 0=no vote on own motion)	16 th /17 th terms: Bergmann et al. 2018a-c (variables <i>sponsor...</i>), 18 th /19 th terms: website of the German Bundestag
<i>Party affiliation</i>			
SPD	Is the MP a member of the parliamentary group of the SPD (at the time of the vote)?	dummy variable (1=yes; 0=no)	16 th /17 th terms: Bergmann et al. 2018a-c (variable <i>ppg</i>), 18 th /19 th terms: website of the German Bundestag
FDP	Is the MP a member of the parliamentary group of the FDP (at the time of the vote)?	dummy variable (1=yes; 0=no)	16 th /17 th terms: Bergmann et al. 2018a-c (variable <i>ppg</i>), 18 th /19 th terms: website of the German Bundestag
Greens	Is the MP a member of the parliamentary group of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (at the time of the vote)?	dummy variable (1=yes; 0=no)	16 th /17 th terms: Bergmann et al. 2018a-c (variable <i>ppg</i>), 18 th /19 th terms: website of the German Bundestag
Die Linke	Is the MP a member of the parliamentary group of Die Linke (at the time of the vote)?	dummy variable (1=yes; 0=no)	16 th /17 th terms: Bergmann et al. 2018a-c (variable <i>ppg</i>), 18 th /19 th terms: website of the German Bundestag
AfD	Is the MP a member of the parliamentary group of the AfD (at the time of the vote)?	dummy variable (1=yes; 0=no)	16 th /17 th terms: Bergmann et al. 2018a-c (variable <i>ppg</i>), 18 th /19 th terms: website of the German Bundestag

A2: Descriptive Statistics - Analysis of Whipped Votes

Table 2-Appendix: Descriptive statistics of the variables (whipped votes)

Variable label	N	Mean	Minimum	Maximum
Dissent (dependent variable)	513,964	0.016	0	1
Electoral vulnerability: margin district mandate	513,964	0.067	0	0.533
Mandate type: direct mandate	513,964	0.459	0	1
Candidacy mode: direct candidacy only	513,964	0.114	0	1
Candidacy mode: list candidacy only	513,964	0.034	0	1
Parliamentary office	513,964	0.166	0	1
Executive office	513,964	0.063	0	1
Parliamentary socialisation	513,964	8.389	0	49
GDR socialisation	513,964	0.121	0	1
Last-period effect	513,964	0.067	0	1
Age	513,964	51.656	22	82
Female	513,964	0.327	0	1
Origin: own motion	513,964	0.319	0	1
Government party	513,964	0.647	0	1
Subject: defence policy	513,964	0.233	0	1
Subject: economic and social policy	513,964	0.215	0	1
Subject: Covid-19 policy	152,022	0.107	0	1
16 th term	513,964	0.174	0	1
17 th term	513,964	0.304	0	1
18 th term	513,964	0.227	0	1
19 th term	513,964	0.296	0	1
SPD	513,964	0.267	0	1
CDU/CSU	513,964	0.404	0	1
FDP	513,964	0.096	0	1
Greens	513,964	0.099	0	1
Die Linke	513,964	0.098	0	1
AfD	513,964	0.037	0	1

The descriptive statistics cover all non-missing observations (MP voting decisions) between 2005 and 2021 as used in model A11. Deviating from this, the number of observations for the Corona variable refers only to the 19th parliamentary term (model A10).

For dummy variables, ‘mean’ refers to the proportion of observations that are coded with ‘1’.

A3: Descriptive Statistics: Dissenting Votes

Figure 1-Appendix: Defection rates by legislative term (all parties)





Figure 2-Appendix: Defection rates by legislative term and by party



Missing bars indicate that the party was not represented in parliament in the given term.

Data for 1st-15th term (figure above) based on Bergmann et al. (2018c) (excluding free votes).
 Data for 16th-19th term as used in the regression models.

A4: Robustness Checks (Whipped Votes)

Theorising the effect of alternative measures of MPs' electoral situation

In the German mixed-member electoral system, MPs can be elected into parliament either directly in the constituency or via party lists (for a detailed discussion, see, among others, Zittel 2018). Apart from re-election probabilities and the vote margins used in the main text, the dependence of MPs from electoral principals have been conceptualised in the literature in two additional ways: by the type of mandate which the MP actually holds and by the tier(s) by which an MP runs for office in the previous election.

Mandate type. In Germany and other parliamentary democracies, parties structure the policy-making process and decide who gets promoted to higher office. The same is true for the composition of (Land level) party lists for federal elections. In contrast, the nomination of the other half of the candidates takes place through delegate conferences on the constituency level, i.e. closer to the party on the ground. Consequently, the (re-)election of directly elected MPs depends less on the party on the (sub)national level but more on constituency work than for MPs elected via party list (Sieberer 2010). Since directly elected MPs face more conflicts between constituency and party interests, several studies expect higher defection rates for those MPs. Whereas a few analyses corroborate such an effect (e.g. Sieberer 2010), no 'mandate divide' appears using longer observation periods (Saalfeld 1995; Sieberer and Ohmura 2021).

Candidacy mode. Most MPs run both on the list and in the constituency for (re)election – in the 19th parliamentary term, this was true for 86.2 percent of all MPs. Against this backdrop, Ohmura (2014) argues that not the actually achieved mandate type but the candidacy mode influences legislative behaviour. Based on MPs' autonomy from the party (group) leadership and the incentives for 'personal votes' (Carey and Shugart 1995), the probability of vote defections is lower for pure list candidates and higher for pure district candidates, compared to dual candidacies. However, the expected effects materialise only for pure district candidates in Ohmura (2014) or for pure list candidates in Bauer-Blaschkowski and Mai (2019), respectively, while Sieberer's and Ohmura's (2021) long-term study does not find any unconditional candidacy effects.

Testing the effect of alternative measures of MPs' electoral situation

In order to account for those different measures of MPs' electoral incentives, we replaced the vote margin variable in the main models by a variable indicating the type of mandate MPs actually won and the mode of candidacy in the last election, respectively.

Concerning the mandate type, the results are counterintuitive: Whereas in both models (A1 and A4), the coefficient for the direct mandate is negative, the model for the 16th-18th term (A1) even indicates a statistically significant effect: MPs that were directly elected in the constituency vote less rather than more frequently against the party line. The effects of the other political variables are robust against the change of this electoral variable.

Additionally, we do not see any candidacy divide. In none of the models (A2 and A5), there is a statistically significant difference concerning the voting behaviour of pure list or pure district candidates, compared to the huge majority of MPs who run on both tiers and serve as reference category here. Again, all other effects remain robust after this change of the electoral variables.

That electoral incentives do not exhibit any statistically significant effect especially in the 19th term might be traced back to the fact that, due to the increasing volatility of election results, it is more difficult for MPs than in earlier terms to know years before the election on which tier(s) they will run and to estimate their reelection prospects sufficiently accurate.

Party dummies instead of government party membership

In models A3 and A6, the models of the main text were replicated while replacing the variable on MPs' government party membership by the party group membership. Compared to the main models, the results for the political variables do not change substantially except for MPs' electoral margin which lost its statistical significance. This implies that the effect of electoral incentives might differ between the parties represented in the 19th Bundestag. Moreover, we see that membership in all other parties (except for the SPD in the 19th term) corresponds with significantly higher defection rates compared to CDU/CSU MPs serving as reference. Green MPs show the highest defection rates in both analysed periods. In the 19th term, MPs of the newly-formed party groups AfD and FDP (after its one-term extra-parliamentary opposition) show markedly higher defection rates as well.

Joint model and separate models for all legislative terms

A joint model for all four legislative terms (A11) reveals statistically significant effects for all political MP characteristics as well as for all controls on the vote level, whereas MPs' personal characteristics (age and gender) again do not exert a significant effect on vote defections. Compared to the 16th legislative term serving as reference, MPs in all other terms, on average, exhibit lower defection rates, especially in the 19th term.

The results of separate models for each legislative term (models A7-A10) differ in some respects: MPs' vote margin, parliamentary socialisation, GDR socialisation show insignificant effects in at least one term, respectively, and MPs in the 16th term even vote more in line with their party if they do not run for another term. Only for MPs holding parliamentary or legislative offices as well as for government MPs, statistically significant effects are found in every legislative term under study. Conversely, age and gender as purely personal characteristics do not affect MPs' behaviour significantly in any legislative term. To conclude, office-related career incentives are the most consistent effects on MPs' probability to cast dissenting votes. MPs' political characteristics that are more related to past experiences (GDR socialisation, parliamentary socialisation) as well as electoral incentives (margin of district vote) vary in their influence between the electoral terms to a higher extent.

Table 3-Appendix: Determinants of voting behavior in whipped votes – robustness checks (different variables)

	16 th -18 th term (2005-2017)			19 th term (2017-2021)		
	(A1)	(A2)	(A3)	(A4)	(A5)	(A6)
<i>Political characteristics of the MP</i>						
Direct mandate	-0.371*** (0.065)			-0.246 (0.191)		
Direct candidacy only		0.055 (0.130)			-0.219 (0.251)	
List candidacy only		-0.164 (0.135)			-0.400 (0.314)	
Margin district vote			-1.864*** (0.368)			-2.162 (1.162)
Parliamentary office	-0.523*** (0.069)	-0.520*** (0.069)	-0.581*** (0.068)	-0.689*** (0.151)	-0.701*** (0.151)	-0.677*** (0.150)
Executive office	-2.966*** (0.263)	-2.963*** (0.264)	-3.116*** (0.255)	-3.509*** (0.765)	-3.483*** (0.763)	-3.511*** (0.762)
Parliamentary socialisation	0.042*** (0.007)	0.039*** (0.007)	0.046*** (0.007)	0.030** (0.010)	0.028** (0.010)	0.037*** (0.011)
GDR socialisation	0.398** (0.130)	0.362** (0.130)	0.370** (0.126)	0.566** (0.187)	0.545** (0.186)	0.680*** (0.186)
Last-period effect	0.147* (0.058)	0.155** (0.058)	0.117* (0.058)	0.089 (0.108)	0.101 (0.108)	0.083 (0.108)
Government party	-0.398*** (0.050)	-0.468*** (0.049)		-1.496*** (0.185)	-1.641*** (0.146)	
<i>Controls: Personal and vote characteristics</i>						
Gender (female)	0.137 (0.095)	0.225* (0.096)	-0.088 (0.092)	0.155 (0.135)	0.178 (0.134)	0.135 (0.138)
Age	0.001 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)	0.009 (0.006)	0.010 (0.006)	0.008 (0.006)
Defence policy	0.544*** (0.027)	0.543*** (0.027)	0.544*** (0.027)	1.247*** (0.056)	1.246*** (0.056)	1.248*** (0.056)
Economic and social policy	-1.143*** (0.049)	-1.143*** (0.049)	-1.142*** (0.049)	-0.790*** (0.106)	-0.790*** (0.106)	-0.788*** (0.106)
Covid-19 policy				0.634*** (0.080)	0.636*** (0.080)	0.628*** (0.080)
Own motion	0.429*** (0.030)	0.431*** (0.030)	0.412*** (0.029)	0.210** (0.067)	0.210** (0.067)	0.208** (0.067)

17 th term	-0.729*** (0.042)	-0.724*** (0.042)	-0.626*** (0.040)			
18 th term	-0.776*** (0.055)	-0.724*** (0.054)	-0.764*** (0.053)			
SPD			0.985*** (0.108)			0.212 (0.225)
FDP			0.717*** (0.159)			1.427*** (0.257)
Greens			1.864*** (0.153)			1.981*** (0.261)
Die Linke			1.050*** (0.160)			0.905*** (0.263)
AfD						1.757*** (0.252)
Constant	-4.344*** (0.235)	-4.534*** (0.236)	-5.323*** (0.235)	-5.587*** (0.325)	-5.573*** (0.326)	-7.091*** (0.376)
McKelvey&Zavoina Pseudo-R ²	0.4285	0.4262	0.4400	0.4726	0.4713	0.4715
N	361,942	361,942	361,942	152,022	152,022	152,022

Logit coefficients are displayed and standard errors in parentheses.

Levels of significance: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

McKelvey&Zavoina Pseudo-R² values using the Stata ado by Langer (2021).

Table 4-Appendix: Determinants of voting behavior in whipped votes – robustness checks (temporal variances)

	16 th term (2005-2009) (A7)	17 th term (2009-2013) (A8)	18 th term (2013-2017) (A9)	19 th term (2017-2021) (A10)	16 th -19 th term (2005-2021) (A11)
<i>Political characteristics of the MP</i>					
Margin district vote	0.633 (0.649)	-2.714** (0.978)	-3.079*** (0.709)	-2.924** (0.988)	-2.734*** (0.326)
Parliamentary office	-0.446** (0.147)	-1.064*** (0.206)	-1.266*** (0.215)	-0.672*** (0.151)	-0.515*** (0.058)
Executive office	-2.309*** (0.381)	-3.608*** (0.645)	-4.412*** (0.713)	-3.499*** (0.765)	-2.866*** (0.238)
Parliamentary socialisation	0.001 (0.010)	0.085*** (0.014)	0.060** (0.012)	0.036*** (0.011)	0.033*** (0.005)
GDR socialisation	0.684*** (0.157)	0.229 (0.218)	0.144 (0.210)	0.529** (0.185)	0.435*** (0.111)
Last-period effect	-0.435*** (0.113)	0.686*** (0.108)	0.104 (0.102)	0.076 (0.108)	0.138** (0.049)
Government party	-0.766*** (0.143)	-1.695*** (0.178)	-0.859*** (0.179)	-1.427*** (0.157)	-0.541*** (0.046)
<i>Controls: Personal and vote characteristics</i>					
Gender (female)	0.028 (0.126)	-0.089 (0.165)	0.066 (0.150)	0.117 (0.133)	0.024 (0.081)
Age	0.001 (0.007)	0.013 (0.009)	0.001 (0.008)	0.008 (0.006)	0.005 (0.004)
Defence policy	0.744*** (0.050)	0.529*** (0.049)	0.345*** (0.051)	1.248*** (0.056)	0.672*** (0.024)
Economic and social policy	-0.883*** (0.072)	-1.418*** (0.089)	-1.247*** (0.102)	-0.789*** (0.106)	-1.084*** (0.044)
Covid-19 policy				0.630*** (0.080)	0.346*** (0.072)
Own motion	0.347*** (0.056)	0.541*** (0.053)	0.444*** (0.054)	0.210** (0.067)	0.392*** (0.027)
17 th term					-0.730*** (0.041)
18 th term					-0.628*** (0.048)
19 th term					-1.196*** (0.060)

Constant	-4.013*** (0.333)	-5.625*** (0.427)	-4.663*** (0.388)	-5.541*** (0.322)	-4.347*** (0.193)
McKelvey&Zavoina Pseudo-R ²	0.3550	0.5457	0.4793	0.4754	0.4269
N	89,279	156,049	116,614	152,022	513,964

Logit coefficients are displayed and standard errors in parentheses.

Levels of significance: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

McKelvey&Zavoina Pseudo-R² values using the Stata ado by Langer (2021).

Model A10 equals model 2 in the main text and is shown to facilitate comparisons between the terms.

A5: Inclusion of MPs' Family Background, Age and Gender as Controls

MPs' family background, age and gender are common determinants of voting behaviour in morality policy votes (see, e.g., Baumann et al. 2015; Engler and Dümig 2017). Therefore, we include them as control, although they cannot be clearly related to the value conflict we regard relevant in organ donation policy. In the following, we shortly discuss possible other connections to the policy field for each of them.

Family background. People are more willing to donate their organs to relatives than to strangers during their lifetime (Irving et al. 2012). The attitudes of married MPs or those with children might be more positive than of single MPs since they could imagine the painful case when one of their relatives depends on a donor organ. In addition, it can be supposed that married MPs and those with children aim to relieve themselves from the decision for/against an organ donation by a braindead family member: Whereas relatives have to actively approve the donation by a braindead relative who didn't carry a donor card according to the strict consent option, they are only able to contradict according to the braindead person's will under the presumed consent option in case he/she did not contradict by him-/herself. Therefore, although not directly related to the discussed value conflict, we expect MPs with a family to have a higher probability to vote for presumed consent and a lower probability of voting for the strict consent option than single MPs.

Age. A higher proportion of young (compared to older) people carry an organ donor card (Tackmann and Dettmer 2021). Additionally, cultural reservations against organ donation are less prevalent in younger generations (Irving et al. 2012). This could be interpreted as younger MPs having a higher probability to support the more far-reaching reform. More generally, though, young people are said to advocate more individualist values than older people (Genkova 2012), which would be suggestive of a refusal to support the presumed consent policy. Due to those conflicting hypotheses, we include age only as a control.

Gender. In surveys, more women than men state that they carry a donor card (Tackmann and Dettmer 2021) or have, in principle, a positive attitude on organ donation (Decker et al. 2008). This might be suggestive of a higher willingness of women also to support a far-reaching reform of the system (by introducing the presumed consent policy). However, no gender differences were found in Decker et al.'s (2008) study regarding the acceptance of different policy options. Correspondingly, we add MPs' gender just as a control.

A6: Variable Description - Votes on Organ Donation

Table 5-Appendix: Operationalisation and data sources of the variables (unwhipped votes)

Variable label	Description	Operationalisation	Source
<i>MPs' personal characteristics</i>			
Catholic denomination	coding of MPs' Catholic denomination	dummy variable (1=Catholic denomination; 0=no Catholic denomination)	website of the German Bundestag (www.bundestag.de); Kürschners manual; MPs' personal websites
Protestant denomination	coding of MPs' Protestant denomination	dummy variable (1=Protestant denomination; 0=no Protestant denomination)	website of the German Bundestag (www.bundestag.de); Kürschners manual; MPs' personal websites
Academic background	Did the MP study at a university?	dummy variable (1=yes; 0=no)	website of the German Bundestag (www.bundestag.de); Kürschners manual; MPs' personal websites
Physician	Did the MP study medicine?	dummy variable (1=yes; 0=no)	website of the German Bundestag (www.bundestag.de); Kürschners manual; MPs' personal websites
Theologian	Did the MP study theology?	dummy variable (1=yes; 0=no)	website of the German Bundestag (www.bundestag.de); Kürschners manual; MPs' personal websites
Lawyer	Did the MP study law (minimum first state examination)?	dummy variable (1=yes; 0=no)	website of the German Bundestag (www.bundestag.de); Kürschners manual; MPs' personal websites
Age	MP's age on the day of the votes	age in years	website of the German Bundestag (www.bundestag.de); Kürschners manual; MPs' personal websites
Single	MP's family status, covering information on his/her marital status and parenthood	dummy variable (1=not married and no children; 0=married and/or parenthood)	website of the German Bundestag (www.bundestag.de); Kürschners manual; MPs' personal websites
Female	MP's sex	dummy variable (1=female; 0=male)	website of the German Bundestag (www.bundestag.de); Kürschners manual; MPs' personal websites
<i>MPs' political characteristics</i>			
GDR socialisation	an MP is socialised in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) if he/she was born and/or grew up in the GDR; in addition, he/she should have lived a substantial part of his/her life in the GDR	dummy variable (1=MP was born and grew up in the GDR between 1949 and 1974 OR MP was born in the German Reich and grew up in the GDR; 0=MP was not born or did not grow up in the GDR OR MP was born in the GDR but in 1975 or afterwards)	website of the German Bundestag (www.bundestag.de); Kürschners manual; MPs' personal websites
Union member	MP's membership in trade unions	dummy variable (1=member in at least one union; 0=no union member)	website of the German Bundestag (www.bundestag.de); Kürschners manual; MPs' personal websites
Catholic population	Catholic population in the MP's	share of Catholic population	federal election commissioner (Bundeswahlleiter;

	district		https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/bundestagswahlen/2017/strukturdaten.html
Protestant population	Protestant population in the MP's district	share of Protestant population	federal election commissioner (Bundeswahlleiter; https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/bundestagswahlen/2017/strukturdaten.html)
East German district	Does the MP represent an East German district?	dummy variable (1=MP ran in an East German district in 2017 OR MP ran in no district in 2017 but has a constituency office in an East German district; 0=otherwise) Note: Districts in Berlin that cover both former West and East German territories are coded as East German districts.	website of the German Bundestag (www.bundestag.de); Kürschners manual; MPs' personal websites
Urbanisation (log.)	degree of urbanisation in the MP's district	population per square kilometers, logarithmised	federal election commissioner (Bundeswahlleiter; https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/bundestagswahlen/2017/strukturdaten.html)
Higher education qualification	educational level in the MP's district	share of population with higher education entrance qualification	federal election commissioner (Bundeswahlleiter; https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/bundestagswahlen/2017/strukturdaten.html)
Die Linke	Is the MP a member of the parliamentary group of Die Linke?	dummy variable (1=yes; 0=no)	website of the German Bundestag (www.bundestag.de)
SPD	Is the MP a member of the parliamentary group of the SPD?	dummy variable (1=yes; 0=no)	website of the German Bundestag (www.bundestag.de)
Greens	Is the MP a member of the parliamentary group of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen?	dummy variable (1=yes; 0=no)	website of the German Bundestag (www.bundestag.de)
FDP	Is the MP a member of the parliamentary group of the FDP?	dummy variable (1=yes; 0=no)	website of the German Bundestag (www.bundestag.de)
AfD	Is the MP a member of the parliamentary group of the AfD?	dummy variable (1=yes; 0=no)	website of the German Bundestag (www.bundestag.de)

A7: Descriptive Statistics - Votes on Organ Donation

Table 6-Appendix: Descriptive statistics of the variables (whipped votes)

Variable label	N	Mean	Minimum	Maximum
Vote on the opt-out system	674	0.433	0	1
Vote on the opt-in system	671	0.569	0	1
Catholic denomination	674	0.297	0	1
Protestant denomination	674	0.285	0	1
Academic background	674	0.773	0	1
Physician	674	0.019	0	1
Theologian	674	0.012	0	1
Lawyer	674	0.221	0	1
GDR socialisation	674	0.102	0	1
Union member	674	0.206	0	1
Age	674	51.515	27	79
Single	674	0.218	0	1
Female	674	0.315	0	1
Catholic population	659	0.296	0.017	0.827
Protestant population	659	0.287	0.069	0.701
East German district	674	0.191	0	1
Urbanisation (log.)	659	6.037	3.608	9.446
Higher education qualification	659	0.351	0.197	0.551
SPD	674	0.211	0	1
FDP	674	0.111	0	1
Greens	674	0.099	0	1
Die Linke	674	0.092	0	1
AfD	674	0.131	0	1

The descriptive statistics cover all MPs that have participated at least in one of the two votes under study. For dummy variables, 'mean' refers to the proportion of observations that are coded with '1'.

A8: Robustness Checks (1) - Unwhipped Votes

Table 7-Appendix: Determinants of organ donation regulation voting behavior – opt-out option – including party affiliation

	(1a)	(2a)	(3a)	(4a)	(5a)	(6a)	(7a)	(8a)
Catholic denomination	-0.132 (0.298)	-0.149 (0.293)	-0.192 (0.298)	-0.180 (0.293)	-0.145 (0.298)	-0.163 (0.294)	-0.199 (0.299)	-0.192 (0.294)
Protestant denomination	-0.582** (0.259)	-0.554** (0.254)	-0.591** (0.259)	-0.583** (0.256)	-0.585** (0.260)	-0.559** (0.257)	-0.595** (0.261)	-0.588** (0.259)
Academic background	-0.058 (0.212)	-0.074 (0.210)	-0.057 (0.211)	-0.065 (0.209)				
Physician					-0.328 (0.610)	-0.318 (0.638)	-0.317 (0.603)	-0.311 (0.613)
Theologian					-1.311 (1.019)	-1.409 (0.975)	-1.380 (1.023)	-1.439 (1.001)
Lawyer					0.002 (0.222)	0.009 (0.224)	-0.008 (0.223)	-0.004 (0.224)
GDR socialisation	0.132 (0.469)	0.172 (0.460)	0.159 (0.463)	0.185 (0.459)	0.170 (0.468)	0.213 (0.458)	0.196 (0.462)	0.221 (0.456)
Union member	-0.018 (0.274)	-0.055 (0.276)	-0.023 (0.276)	-0.045 (0.275)	-0.020 (0.274)	-0.055 (0.276)	-0.027 (0.276)	-0.047 (0.276)
Age	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.013 (0.010)	-0.014 (0.011)	-0.014 (0.011)	-0.013 (0.010)	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.013 (0.011)	-0.013 (0.011)
Single	0.210 (0.255)	0.193 (0.252)	0.189 (0.254)	0.180 (0.252)	0.221 (0.255)	0.205 (0.253)	0.199 (0.254)	0.192 (0.252)
Female	-0.338* (0.203)	-0.349* (0.204)	-0.338* (0.204)	-0.346* (0.204)	-0.337 (0.205)	-0.348* (0.205)	-0.338 (0.206)	-0.346* (0.206)
Catholic population	-1.216** (0.591)	-1.212** (0.617)			-1.224** (0.592)	-1.238** (0.619)		
Protestant population			1.290 (0.808)	1.481* (0.772)			1.349* (0.811)	1.526** (0.773)
East German district	0.035 (0.373)	0.102 (0.369)	0.614* (0.356)	0.680* (0.351)	0.049 (0.369)	0.112 (0.365)	0.642* (0.355)	0.706** (0.349)
Urbanisation (log.)	-0.173** (0.077)		-0.095 (0.078)		-0.171** (0.076)		-0.090 (0.078)	
Higher education entrance qualif.		-2.339 (1.432)		-1.226 (1.353)		-2.423* (1.440)		-1.275 (1.362)

Die Linke	-1.210*** (0.399)	-1.209*** (0.401)	-1.231*** (0.400)	-1.226*** (0.402)	-1.243*** (0.396)	-1.242*** (0.399)	-1.263*** (0.397)	-1.258*** (0.400)
SPD	0.269 (0.282)	0.270 (0.279)	0.245 (0.280)	0.248 (0.279)	0.254 (0.283)	0.254 (0.281)	0.230 (0.281)	0.232 (0.280)
Greens	-2.691*** (0.475)	-2.695*** (0.467)	-2.717*** (0.474)	-2.714*** (0.469)	-2.717*** (0.474)	-2.719*** (0.467)	-2.743*** (0.472)	-2.739*** (0.469)
FDP	-1.996*** (0.366)	-1.997*** (0.364)	-2.018*** (0.365)	-2.016*** (0.365)	-2.005*** (0.366)	-2.006*** (0.365)	-2.028*** (0.365)	-2.026*** (0.365)
AfD	-4.552*** (0.797)	-4.533*** (0.794)	-4.568*** (0.795)	-4.561*** (0.794)	-4.580*** (0.795)	-4.565*** (0.792)	-4.599*** (0.794)	-4.594*** (0.793)
Constant	2.979*** (0.836)	2.725*** (0.858)	1.704* (0.909)	1.482* (0.859)	2.901*** (0.835)	2.678*** (0.853)	1.595* (0.907)	1.413* (0.847)
Observations	659	659	659	659	659	659	659	659
Pseudo R ²	0.230	0.228	0.228	0.227	0.233	0.231	0.231	0.231

Displayed are logit coefficients and standard errors clustered by district in parentheses.

Levels of significance: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

A9: Robustness Checks (2) - Unwhipped Votes

Table 8-Appendix: Determinants of organ donation regulation voting behaviour – opt-out option – without party affiliation

	(9a)	(10a)	(11a)	(12a)	(13a)	(14a)	(15a)	(16a)
Catholic denomination	0.865*** (0.210)	0.835*** (0.208)	0.789*** (0.206)	0.794*** (0.205)	0.853*** (0.212)	0.822*** (0.210)	0.779*** (0.207)	0.781*** (0.208)
Protestant denomination	0.433** (0.191)	0.445** (0.188)	0.438** (0.193)	0.435** (0.191)	0.437** (0.192)	0.447** (0.190)	0.443** (0.194)	0.440** (0.193)
Academic background	0.002 (0.201)	-0.012 (0.197)	-0.001 (0.201)	-0.006 (0.198)				
Physician					0.055 (0.588)	0.054 (0.605)	0.085 (0.581)	0.080 (0.590)
Theologian					-0.905 (0.847)	-0.991 (0.821)	-0.948 (0.843)	-1.007 (0.827)
Lawyer					0.150 (0.192)	0.166 (0.193)	0.144 (0.193)	0.152 (0.193)
GDR socialisation	-0.075 (0.364)	-0.042 (0.363)	-0.052 (0.363)	-0.025 (0.363)	-0.021 (0.369)	0.017 (0.366)	0.003 (0.368)	0.031 (0.366)
Union member	0.784*** (0.217)	0.747*** (0.214)	0.770*** (0.217)	0.748*** (0.215)	0.801*** (0.218)	0.768*** (0.216)	0.787*** (0.218)	0.767*** (0.216)
Age	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.008)
Single	0.150 (0.209)	0.141 (0.207)	0.127 (0.208)	0.123 (0.207)	0.157 (0.209)	0.151 (0.208)	0.135 (0.209)	0.133 (0.207)
Female	-0.171 (0.176)	-0.181 (0.176)	-0.170 (0.176)	-0.178 (0.176)	-0.159 (0.176)	-0.168 (0.176)	-0.159 (0.176)	-0.166 (0.176)
Catholic population	-1.255** (0.517)	-1.261** (0.539)			-1.253** (0.519)	-1.275** (0.540)		
Protestant population			1.078 (0.694)	1.323** (0.657)			1.094 (0.696)	1.333** (0.657)
East German district	-0.007 (0.310)	0.076 (0.307)	0.549* (0.291)	0.638** (0.285)	-0.002 (0.309)	0.077 (0.304)	0.557* (0.290)	0.645** (0.283)
Urbanisation (log.)	-0.188*** (0.062)		-0.116* (0.064)		-0.187*** (0.061)		-0.115* (0.063)	
Higher education entrance qualif.		-2.590** (1.228)		-1.507 (1.179)		-2.696** (1.225)		-1.593 (1.175)

Constant	0.983 (0.636)	0.704 (0.680)	-0.223 (0.677)	-0.501 (0.656)	0.943 (0.627)	0.693 (0.667)	-0.269 (0.674)	-0.518 (0.644)
Observations	659	659	659	659	659	659	659	659
Pseudo R ²	0.041	0.038	0.037	0.036	0.043	0.041	0.040	0.039

Displayed are logit coefficients and standard errors clustered by district in parentheses.

Levels of significance: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

A10: Robustness Checks (3) - Unwhipped Votes

Table 9-Appendix: Determinants of organ donation regulation voting behaviour – opt-in option – including party affiliation

	(1b)	(2b)	(3b)	(4b)	(5b)	(6b)	(7b)	(8b)
Catholic denomination	0.123 (0.274)	0.138 (0.276)	0.148 (0.273)	0.207 (0.272)	0.138 (0.273)	0.155 (0.275)	0.161 (0.272)	0.223 (0.271)
Protestant denomination	0.299 (0.260)	0.337 (0.257)	0.310 (0.260)	0.335 (0.258)	0.308 (0.258)	0.345 (0.255)	0.319 (0.258)	0.344 (0.257)
Academic background	0.197 (0.205)	0.162 (0.203)	0.196 (0.205)	0.161 (0.203)				
Physician					0.021 (0.580)	-0.036 (0.570)	0.015 (0.578)	-0.048 (0.559)
Theologian					0.689 (1.006)	0.735 (0.985)	0.735 (1.006)	0.746 (1.005)
Lawyer					-0.103 (0.204)	-0.130 (0.205)	-0.096 (0.204)	-0.117 (0.205)
GDR socialisation	-0.484 (0.418)	-0.468 (0.413)	-0.503 (0.418)	-0.470 (0.409)	-0.557 (0.421)	-0.541 (0.416)	-0.576 (0.421)	-0.541 (0.412)
Union member	0.269 (0.266)	0.266 (0.265)	0.275 (0.268)	0.257 (0.265)	0.227 (0.265)	0.226 (0.264)	0.235 (0.267)	0.220 (0.265)
Age	0.002 (0.011)	0.001 (0.011)	0.002 (0.011)	0.001 (0.011)	0.002 (0.011)	0.000 (0.011)	0.002 (0.011)	0.001 (0.011)
Single	-0.376 (0.237)	-0.410* (0.236)	-0.364 (0.235)	-0.393* (0.236)	-0.375 (0.239)	-0.412* (0.239)	-0.364 (0.238)	-0.394* (0.239)
Female	0.371* (0.210)	0.389* (0.212)	0.372* (0.210)	0.378* (0.211)	0.363* (0.210)	0.382* (0.212)	0.365* (0.210)	0.372* (0.211)
Catholic population	0.719 (0.535)	0.991* (0.550)			0.732 (0.540)	1.016* (0.555)		
Protestant population			-0.864 (0.727)	-0.725 (0.682)			-0.902 (0.738)	-0.762 (0.690)
East German district	0.269 (0.351)	0.330 (0.356)	-0.094 (0.348)	-0.067 (0.347)	0.274 (0.351)	0.334 (0.355)	-0.100 (0.347)	-0.076 (0.345)
Urbanisation (log.)	0.023 (0.076)		-0.025 (0.080)		0.031 (0.075)		-0.019 (0.079)	
Higher education entrance qualif.		2.215* (1.338)		1.383 (1.309)		2.424* (1.353)		1.566 (1.321)

Die Linke	0.511 (0.386)	0.477 (0.391)	0.524 (0.387)	0.502 (0.389)	0.532 (0.388)	0.490 (0.394)	0.546 (0.389)	0.514 (0.392)
SPD	-0.773*** (0.290)	-0.780*** (0.291)	-0.761*** (0.290)	-0.757*** (0.289)	-0.753*** (0.290)	-0.765*** (0.291)	-0.741** (0.290)	-0.742** (0.289)
Greens	2.054*** (0.503)	2.013*** (0.507)	2.071*** (0.502)	2.041*** (0.507)	2.058*** (0.505)	2.007*** (0.509)	2.076*** (0.504)	2.036*** (0.509)
FDP	2.277*** (0.473)	2.274*** (0.474)	2.292*** (0.473)	2.288*** (0.473)	2.272*** (0.472)	2.269*** (0.473)	2.287*** (0.472)	2.283*** (0.472)
AfD	-1.088*** (0.313)	-1.078*** (0.312)	-1.073*** (0.312)	-1.063*** (0.310)	-1.086*** (0.313)	-1.075*** (0.312)	-1.069*** (0.311)	-1.060*** (0.310)
Constant	-0.595 (0.814)	-1.238 (0.812)	0.206 (0.891)	-0.413 (0.820)	-0.450 (0.803)	-1.140 (0.794)	0.375 (0.882)	-0.289 (0.799)
Observations	656	656	656	656	656	656	656	656
Pseudo R ²	0.161	0.164	0.161	0.162	0.161	0.165	0.161	0.162

Displayed are logit coefficients and standard errors clustered by district in parentheses.

Levels of significance: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

A11: Robustness Checks (4) - Unwhipped Votes

Table 10-Appendix: Determinants of organ donation regulation voting behaviour – opt-in option – without party affiliation

	(9b)	(10b)	(11b)	(12b)	(13b)	(14b)	(15b)	(16b)
Catholic denomination	-0.093 (0.226)	-0.056 (0.226)	-0.070 (0.225)	-0.006 (0.223)	-0.081 (0.224)	-0.037 (0.225)	-0.062 (0.223)	0.011 (0.222)
Protestant denomination	0.171 (0.210)	0.211 (0.208)	0.177 (0.210)	0.207 (0.210)	0.173 (0.208)	0.215 (0.207)	0.178 (0.208)	0.210 (0.209)
Academic background	0.207 (0.192)	0.167 (0.192)	0.205 (0.192)	0.164 (0.191)				
Physician					-0.164 (0.593)	-0.220 (0.575)	-0.181 (0.587)	-0.248 (0.563)
Theologian					0.893 (0.882)	0.955 (0.860)	0.938 (0.876)	0.973 (0.869)
Lawyer					-0.166 (0.186)	-0.196 (0.189)	-0.161 (0.186)	-0.187 (0.187)
GDR socialisation	-0.443 (0.366)	-0.438 (0.366)	-0.468 (0.366)	-0.446 (0.363)	-0.536 (0.367)	-0.531 (0.368)	-0.562 (0.367)	-0.538 (0.364)
Union member	-0.267 (0.202)	-0.267 (0.202)	-0.259 (0.203)	-0.267 (0.202)	-0.308 (0.203)	-0.309 (0.203)	-0.299 (0.204)	-0.309 (0.204)
Age	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.010 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.010 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.010 (0.009)
Single	-0.327 (0.205)	-0.351* (0.207)	-0.311 (0.204)	-0.332 (0.206)	-0.332 (0.208)	-0.358* (0.210)	-0.316 (0.206)	-0.339 (0.209)
Female	0.561*** (0.176)	0.573*** (0.177)	0.562*** (0.176)	0.564*** (0.176)	0.551*** (0.176)	0.564*** (0.177)	0.553*** (0.177)	0.555*** (0.176)
Catholic population	0.907* (0.509)	1.176** (0.519)			0.904* (0.511)	1.190** (0.521)		
Protestant population			-1.084 (0.703)	-1.051 (0.641)			-1.109 (0.710)	-1.081* (0.645)
East German district	0.225 (0.317)	0.254 (0.322)	-0.230 (0.317)	-0.245 (0.312)	0.223 (0.317)	0.252 (0.321)	-0.236 (0.317)	-0.256 (0.311)
Urbanisation (log.)	0.092 (0.067)		0.030 (0.072)		0.102 (0.066)		0.040 (0.072)	
Higher education entrance qualif.		3.161*** (1.164)		2.174* (1.162)		3.434*** (1.178)		2.428** (1.178)

Constant	-0.305 (0.675)	-0.856 (0.667)	0.718 (0.783)	0.204 (0.693)	-0.145 (0.669)	-0.761 (0.662)	0.887 (0.776)	0.314 (0.680)
Observations	656	656	656	656	656	656	656	656
Pseudo R ²	0.027	0.033	0.027	0.031	0.029	0.036	0.028	0.033

Displayed are logit coefficients and standard errors clustered by district in parentheses.

Levels of significance: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

A12: Overview of the Hypotheses

Table 11-Appendix: Expected and actual effects (whipped votes)

Hypothesis	Variable	Expected effect	Actual effect 16 th -18 th term	Actual effect 19 th term
<i>Political characteristics of the MP</i>				
1a	Margin district vote	-	-	-
1b	Parliamentary/executive office	-	-	-
1c	Parliamentary socialisation	-	+	+
1d	Last-period effect	+	+	n.s.
1e	GDR socialisation	n.s.	+	+
1f	Government party	-	-	-

+: probability of dissenting vote increases if independent variable increases (or turns from 0 to 1)

-: probability of dissenting vote decreases if independent variable increases (or turns from 0 to 1)

n.s.: no statistically significant effect

Table 12-Appendix: Expected and actual effects (free votes on organ donation)

Hypothesis	Variable	Presumed consent option		Strict consent option	
		Expected effect	Actual effect	Expected effect	Actual effect
<i>MPs' personal characteristics</i>					
2	Catholic/Protestant denomination	-	- (only Protestant)	+	n.s.
2	Academic background	-	n.s.	+	n.s.
2	Physician	+	n.s.	-	n.s.
2	Theologian	-	n.s.	+	n.s.
2	Lawyer	-	n.s.	+	n.s.
<i>MPs' political characteristics</i>					
3	GDR socialisation	+	n.s.	-	n.s.
3	Union member	+	(+)	-	n.s.
3	Catholic/Protestant population	-	- (Catholic) + (Protestant)	+	+ (Catholic) (-) (Protestant)
3	Urbanisation/Higher education	-	-	+	n.s.(urbanisation) + (higher education)
3	East German district	+	(+)	-	n.s.
3	FDP/Green party membership	-	-	+	+
3	AfD party membership	-	-	-	-
3	SPD/Die Linke membership	+	n.s. (SPD) - (Die Linke)	-	- (SPD) n.s. (Die Linke)

+: probability of supporting the option increases if independent variable increases (or turns from 0 to 1)

-: probability of supporting the option decreases if independent variable increases (or turns from 0 to 1)

(+)/(-): effect is statistically significant only in up to half of the models

n.s.: no statistically significant effect

A13: References

- Bauer-Blaschkowski, Svenja, and Philipp Mai (2019). 'Von „Abweichlern“ und „Überzeugungstätern“: Eine Analyse des Abstimmungsverhaltens im 18. Deutschen Bundestag', in: Reimut Zohlnhöfer and Thomas Saalfeld (eds.), *Zwischen Stillstand, Politikwandel und Krisenmanagement: Eine Bilanz der Regierung Merkel 2013-2017*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 219–56.
- Baumann, Markus, Marc Debus, and Jochen Müller (2015). 'Personal Characteristics of MPs and Legislative Behavior in Moral Policymaking', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 40:2, 179–210.
- Bergmann, Henning, Stefanie Bailer, Tamaki Ohmura, Thomas Saalfeld and Ulrich Sieberer (2018a). 'BTVote Vote Characteristics', V1, Harvard Dataverse, <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/AHBBXY>.
- Bergmann, Henning, Stefanie Bailer, Tamaki Ohmura, Thomas Saalfeld and Ulrich Sieberer (2018b). 'BTVote MP Characteristics', V1, Harvard Dataverse, <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/QSFXLQ>.
- Bergmann, Henning, Stefanie Bailer, Tamaki Ohmura, Thomas Saalfeld and Ulrich Sieberer (2018c). 'BTVote Voting Behavior', V1, Harvard Dataverse, <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/24U1FR>.
- Bergmann, Henning, Stefanie Bailer, Tamaki Ohmura, Thomas Saalfeld, Ulrich Sieberer, and Lukas Hohendorf (2022). 'BTVote Vote Characteristics', V2. Harvard Dataverse, <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/AHBBXY>.
- Carey, John M., and Matthew S. Shugart (1995). 'Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas.' *Electoral Studies*, 14:4, 417–39.
- Decker, Oliver, Merve Winter, Elmar Brähler, and Manfred Beutel (2008.) 'Between Commodification and Altruism: Gender Imbalance and Attitudes towards Organ Donation. A Representative Survey of the German Community', *Journal of Gender Studies*, 17:3, 251–255.
- Engler, Fabian, and Kathrin Dümig (2017). 'Political Parties and MPs' Morality Policy Voting Behaviour: Evidence from Germany', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 70:3, 548–68.
- Genkova, Petia (2012). *Kulturvergleichende Psychologie. Ein Forschungsleitfaden*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
- Irving, Michelle J., Allison Tong, Stephen Jan, Alan Cass, John Rose, Steven Chadban, Richard D. Allen, Jonathan C. Craig, Germaine Wong, and Kirsten Howard (2012). 'Factors that Influence the Decision to be an Organ Donor: A Systematic Review of the Qualitative Literature', *Nephrology, Dialysis, Transplantation*, 27:6, 2526–33.
- Langer, Wolfgang (2021). 'Stata Page', <https://langer.soziologie.uni-halle.de/stata/index.html>.
- Ohmura, Tamaki (2014). 'When Your Name Is on the List, it Is Time to Party: The Candidacy Divide in a Mixed-Member Proportional System', *Representation*, 50:1, 69–82.

- Saalfeld, Thomas (1995). *Parteisoldaten und Rebellen. Eine Untersuchung zur Geschlossenheit der Fraktionen im Deutschen Bundestag (1949-1990)*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Sieberer, Ulrich (2010). 'Behavioral consequences of mixed electoral systems: Deviating voting behavior of district and list MPs in the German Bundestag', *Electoral Studies*, 29:3, 484–96.
- Sieberer, Ulrich, and Tamaki Ohmura (2021). 'Mandate type, electoral safety, and defections from the party line: The conditional mandate divide in the German Bundestag, 1949–2013', *Party Politics*, 27:4, 704–15.
- Sieberer, Ulrich, Thomas Saalfeld, Tamaki Ohmura, Henning Bergmann, and Stefanie Bailer (2020). 'Roll-call votes in the German Bundestag: A new dataset, 1949-2013', *British Journal of Political Science*, 50:3, 1137–45.
- Tackmann, Elisa, and Susanne Dettmer (2021). 'Entwicklung der Akzeptanz der postmortalen Organspende und ihre Einflussfaktoren in Deutschland', *Medizinische Klinik – Intensivmedizin und Notfallmedizin*, 116:1, 41–9.
- Zittel, Thomas (2018). 'Electoral Systems in Context: Germany', in: Erik S. Herron, Robert Pekkanen, and Matthew Søberg Shugart (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Electoral Systems*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 781–802.

D. Loyal Activists? Party Socialization and Dissenting Voting Behavior in Parliament

Abstract

The question of why members of parliament (MPs) overwhelmingly toe the party line is receiving increasing scholarly attention. Adding to discipline-based approaches, party loyalty, that is, a feeling of allegiance not related to policy agreement or disciplinary pressures, is an important part of the explanation. In this article, we employ a more nuanced view on party loyalty than previous observational studies and conceptualize it as the result of socialization processes of most politicians into the structures of their party prior to their mandate. We test our argument quantitatively using data for whipped votes in the German Bundestag (1949–2017). The results support our propositions that MPs who didn't hold party offices prior to their mandate have a higher probability of vote defection and that the behavioral differences related to pre-parliamentary socialization vanish the longer MPs serve in parliament. Our work has important implications for research on intraparty politics, legislative behavior, and representation.

1. Introduction

Party unity – the MPs of a parliamentary party group voting almost unanimously together on a legislative motion – is a defining characteristic of parliamentary systems (Steffani 1983) and a necessary condition for responsible party government (Bowler et al. 1999). Much ink has been spilled on the intermediate role of parties linking voter preferences via party manifestos to legislative outcomes (Dalton et al. 2011; Klingemann et al. 1994). This approach views MPs as delegates of political parties who have been mandated by voters in the election to pursue a certain policy path. Indeed, empirical studies corroborate such an important influence of parties on legislative behavior. In the German Bundestag, more than 95% of the MPs' whipped votes in parliament are cast according to the party line in most of the party groups (Bergmann et al. 2016; Sieberer et al. 2020), and even higher unity scores of 99% have been reported for the Netherlands (Louwse et al. 2018) and Sweden (Willumsen and Öhberg 2017). The high but varying propensity of MPs to toe the party line is often attributed to reward and punishment processes, that is, disciplinary pressures, exerted by the parties as the MPs' major principal. Thus, rational choice approaches dominate the literature on legislative voting behavior (Russell 2014).

However, drawing on the literature on different pathways to party unity (Andeweg and Thomassen 2011), it is plausible that interpreting high rates of uniform voting behavior mainly as MPs' rational anticipation of possible disciplinary sanctions misses an important part of the story. With party loyalty, meaning a feeling of allegiance not related to policy agreement or

disciplinary pressures, this article explores a further pathway to unity which, according to our argument, originates mainly from MPs' socialization experiences into party structures. Consequently, we expect loyalty not to be equal but to differ among MPs given that not all of them got through the same party career prior to their national-level mandate. In fact, empirical work has already shown how party socialization matters at several stages of a politician's career: First, studies of candidate selection show that politicians passing through the proverbial *Ochsentour*, meaning an effortful process of intra-party proving through party offices at the local/regional level, are more likely to get nominated as candidates in promising districts (Rehmert 2021; Schüttemeyer and Sturm 2005). Second, in their political life, “party animals” more often than MPs with other career trajectories reach parliamentary or executive leadership positions (Ohmura et al. 2018). Third, in her study on welfare policies, Alexiadou (2015) shows that looking more closely at the standing of ministers in their party helps us to understand their policy decisions: “Ideologues” (politicians with strong policy preferences) and “partisans” (politicians with strong partisan ties) affect policies more strongly than “loyalists” who are keen on office. Based on this, Wenzelburger and Zohlnhöfer (2021) argue that party socialization can be seen as an agency-based explanation of party effects on public policies.

To date, studies of legislative voting behavior have mainly conceptualized party ties as the mere length of the party socialization process (Gherghina and Chiru 2014; Rehmert 2022a). However, this bears the risk of regarding periods of passive membership as socialization experience. Therefore, adding to this literature, we focus more closely on the essence of party socialization and study its effect on MPs' legislative behavior. We regard MPs as being party-socialized if they held local- or regional-level party offices prior to their first election into the national parliament. We hypothesize that if MPs lack party socialization, they will be more likely to cast a vote against the majority of their party group whereas those having served in party structures have a higher chance of toeing the party line. Additionally, we expect this effect to depend on an MP's parliamentary experience in such a way that the higher defection rates of nonsocialized MPs decrease with growing parliamentary experience, whereas parliamentary socialization does not markedly affect those MPs' behavior who were already socialized in a party. Methodologically, we create a rich dataset on MPs' party socialization for all legislative terms of the German Bundestag (1949–2017) and test its influence against alternative explanations of party-compliant voting behavior. We focus on whipped votes, which should be the harder test case than free votes to examine the relevance of party socialization because disciplinary pressures as competing explanations of party unity are in place. The results confirm our theoretical expectations: We indeed find that MPs vote with a higher probability against the party line if they didn't hold party

offices prior to their mandate. Our results also confirm that MPs without this kind of party socialization are much more strongly affected by parliamentary socialization as compared to “party animals.”

The remainder of the article is structured as follows: After a brief overview of the literature on the individual-level determinants of legislative voting behavior, we develop our socialization-based arguments and deduct two falsifiable hypotheses. Following a discussion of data and methods, we present the empirical results and discuss their implications for legislative research and beyond.

2. Party Loyalty and Legislative Behavior

2.1 State of the Art

Why do MPs of a party group vote together in parliament? According to the literature, several “pathways to party unity” (Andeweg and Thomassen 2011) exist that are structured along a sequential decision-making process at the individual level (van Vonno 2019): First, if an MP agrees with their party on policy grounds, they will vote in accordance with the party's position on a motion regardless of other factors. Second, if policy agreement is lacking, the MP could toe the party line out of loyalty. Third, if there is no policy agreement with or a feeling of loyalty towards their party, MPs could be pushed to vote in line by disciplinary means (Bailer 2018). These include informal sanctions such as disregarding the MP or denying support for their policy initiatives (Delius et al. 2013) as well as threats of more far-reaching punishments such as the removal from offices or, ultimately, the exclusion from the party group (Andeweg and Thomassen 2011). If the utility of voting against the party line outweighs the risk of potential sanctions or passed chances of office promotion, an MP will cast a dissenting vote.

Studies analyzing *whipped votes* usually employ a large-*N* design across multiple policy areas. Since data on issue-specific MP preferences are scarce, those studies mainly focus on variables influencing the effectiveness of party discipline, such as electoral considerations, parliamentary or legislative offices, previous occupational experience, gender, or outside earnings (André et al. 2015; Benedetto and Hix 2007; Bhattacharya and Papageorgiou 2019; Cowley and Childs 2003; Degner and Leuffen 2016; Gherghina and Chiru 2014; Grimmer and Powell 2013; Heuwieser 2018; Mai 2022; Ohmura 2014; Sieberer 2010; Sieberer and Ohmura 2021; Slapin et al. 2018; Tavits 2009, 2011; Willumsen and Goetz 2017; Willumsen and Öhberg 2017; Zittel and Nyhuis 2019), in order to explain the varying propensity of MPs to vote against the party

line. For *unwhipped votes*, existing studies mainly investigate the impact of personal and constituency preferences on the direction of MPs' voting decisions. Those preferences have either been measured directly using survey data (for personal preferences, see Raymond 2017a, 2017b; Raymond and Overby 2016; Raymond and Worth 2017; for constituency preferences, see Hanretty et al. 2017) or approximated using sociodemographic characteristics of the MP (Arzheimer 2015; Baumann et al. 2013, 2015; Bauer-Blaschkowski and Mai 2019; Engler and Dümig 2017; Hibbing and Marsh 1987; Overby et al. 1998; Plumb 2015; Preidel 2016; Wenzelburger and Fehrenz 2018) and/or the sociodemographic composition of an MP's constituency as proxies (Baumann et al. 2013; Haider-Markel 1999; Hibbing and Marsh 1987; Kauder and Potrafke 2019; Mai et al. 2022; Overby et al. 2011). In addition, the MPs' party affiliation has proved to be a significant predictor of voting in favor of permissive or restrictive morality policies, respectively (Engler and Dümig 2017; Cowley and Stuart 1997, 2010; Hibbing and Marsh 1987; Overby et al. 1998; Plumb 2015; Raymond 2017a, 2017b; Raymond and Overby 2016; Raymond and Worth 2017).

Surprisingly, both strands of the literature – on whipped and unwhipped votes – only rarely investigate the influence of party loyalty, except from studies using survey instead of observational data (e.g., Close 2018; Kam 2011; van Vonna 2019; Willumsen 2017). When party loyalty is included, scholars have often conceptualized it as the result of parliamentary socialization, albeit with mixed results. Only a few studies report that parliamentary experience correlates with lower defection rates (Delius et al. 2013; Kam 2011), whereas most studies detect positive (Benedetto and Hix 2007; Bhattacharya and Papageorgiou 2019; Heuwieser 2018; Mai 2022; Sieberer and Ohmura 2021; Slapin et al. 2018; Willumsen and Goetz 2017; Willumsen and Öhberg 2017; Zittel and Nyhuis 2019) or insignificant or ambiguous effects (Clayton and Zetterberg 2021; Gherghina and Chiru 2014; Saalfeld 1995). Those findings suggest, as Kam (2011, Chapter 9) argues, that MPs could have already been socialized into the norm of loyalty outside parliament, for example, in the extra-parliamentary party structures. A pre-parliamentary socialization effect – which takes place while often young people engage in a party and hold their first party offices at the local/regional level – has not often been tested yet. To our knowledge, only two studies have focused on the effects of socialization beyond parliament on MPs' voting behavior in a more systematic way. For unwhipped votes, Rehmert (2022a) finds a significant effect of the length of party membership and age of joining a party on voting behavior in the German Bundestag (1953–2013). Concerning whipped votes, Gherghina and Chiru (2014) also include the length of party membership as a control in their models on dissenting voting behavior in Romania – without finding a significant effect. However, two

aspects remain largely unexplored in the existing literature: First, as Rehmert (2022a: 1084) concedes in his respective study, the mere length of party membership is “only an imperfect empirical approximation of measuring the actual degree of socialization”. Consequently, other indicators might be better suited to capture the phenomenon of interest.¹ Second, the persistence of loyalty effects, that is, whether party socialization influences MPs' voting behavior over their whole parliamentary career or are conditioned or replaced by other loyalty- or discipline-inducing factors, is still to be investigated.

2.2 Main Argument

As we have learned from theoretical models of legislative behavior, party loyalty can induce unity separately from (and additionally to) ideological agreement and party discipline. According to Dickinson, and based on Hirschman (1970), we define party loyalty as “a strong feeling of support and allegiance not directly related to agreement, or any immediate expected gain or loss, resulting from association with the object of loyalty” (Dickinson 2018: 344). Comparable to the party identification of voters (Raymond 2017a), it is a kind of moral commitment to one's own party, rooted in a self-definition by a group in relation to another group (Crowe 1986). Some empirical studies have pointed to such effects as possible explanations for high unity scores in free votes on morality issues, arguing that party unity in free votes can only be rooted in a “social identity shared among co-partisans” (Raymond and Overby 2016: 319).

But how do such pre-parliamentary socialization processes play out in the real life of a future MP? Building on Andeweg and Thomassen (2011), it seems that most of the socialization work is done at lower levels of the party structure. In fact, dedication to the party on the ground – from hanging posters and helping out at party events to holding local party offices – is essential for getting nominated on the party's ticket, which, from the party's perspective, assures recruiting loyal individuals for parliament (Cordes and Hellmann 2020). Conceptually, the rare existing studies on party loyalty have approximated socialization with the length of party membership (Gherghina and Chiru 2014; Rehmert 2022a). While it is true that a long membership in one's own party, for example, since school days, could signal commitment to the party, membership does not mean activism – and, theoretically, it is difficult to argue that party group identity will simply emerge by paying membership fees and being a nominal

¹ Saalfeld (1995, 231–45) indeed includes MPs' party offices in his analysis of defection rates in the German Bundestag. However, his analysis is not clear on whether party offices prior to or during an MP's mandate are considered. Additionally, it lacks controls of discipline and electoral factors (e.g., executive office, mandate type) and ends in 1990.

member. Based on an analysis of the two major German parties, the Christian and the Social Democrats, Nickig (1999) concludes, for instance, that the large number of formal non-active members do not exhibit an actual tie to the party. Wüst (2009) finds that MPs even ideologically diverge from their party the longer they are party members. In this article, we therefore argue that being an active member in the party's organizational structures captures party socialization best. This is not only in line with what social identity theory suggests for dynamics in organizations (Ashforth and Mael 1989), but it also resonates with empirical evidence from studies on the socialization process within parties (see also Rehmert 2022a): Dodson (1990: 1134) finds – based on data of new activists joining the US Democrats – that, “as those activists became well integrated into the communication network and decision-making processes of their party, they adopted conformist patterns of behavior”. A similar dynamic has been reported by Eldersveld (1964). More broadly, Clarke and Price (1977) report that MPs having held party offices prior to their mandate have a more comprehensive understanding of the different role expectations that MPs are confronted with. Therefore, we argue that party socialization is most likely when a person is integrated in the organizational network of a party by holding formal local- or regional-level party offices. This process of intra-party proving as the most common but not exclusive career path for MPs (Ohmura et al. 2018) often goes along with a long-standing party membership but, substantially, encompasses more aspects than mere seniority (Hellmann 2020). From our understanding, having held leadership positions in local and regional party branches prior to an MP's parliamentary career is likely to lead to an increased sense of loyalty towards one's own party as well – and eventually affects an MP's legislative behavior.²

But why should a thorough socialization process during party offices increase loyalty and lead to party unity in legislative votes? MPs are, like other humans, simultaneously members of different social groups. Given what we know from social psychology, the behavior of other group members generally serves as a benchmark and a default option for what is considered appropriate to do by oneself. The cohesion level of groups is associated with factors like physical proximity, frequent interaction, similarities and common goals among the group members, and intergroup conflict (Russell 2014). We regard the affiliation to political parties as a particularly

² There are several reasons for why we restrict our argument to *party* offices and do not also consider electoral (i.e., *public*) offices at the local/regional level. Tavits (2009) argues that experience in *public* offices at the local level (e.g., council member or mayor) encourages MPs to build personal reputations which help them becoming more independent from their party, due to (1) having built an own electoral support base that does not only consist of partisan voters, (2) generating more individualist attitudes, and (3) opening career options outside the party. Empirically, she found that experience in local-level public offices is a strong predictor of being a maverick in parliament. This is the opposite of what we expect from holding *party* offices. Therefore, we refrain from including elected public offices in our party socialization variable.

formative group experience since all of those factors inducing group cohesion are fulfilled. The experiences associated with an active party membership are expected to foster the internalization of certain norms that, on their part, reinforce political behavior closely oriented towards party interests. Party activists begin to value the advantages of collective action, as practiced in the collaborative structures of party committees, compared to a “going it alone” attitude in politics. They experienced, even before entering parliament, that they are “members of a common team with common rules” (Patzelt 2003: 107) and understand, or are effectively reminded of, the fact that they owe their mandate (in the German electoral system) overwhelmingly to partisan votes that are based on a party platform which, therefore, commits the MPs to the will of their electorate (Crowe 1986). Party socialization, Jörke (2012: 233) states in rather exaggerated terms, “over the years transfers young radicals into obedient party soldiers” (own translation). Additionally, after having held offices in various bodies of the party organization, politicians created networks with copartisans and, thereby, a keen intuition for sentiments and policy positions that are supported by a majority of other party members. According to Bailer and coauthors (2013), MPs having held party offices before entering parliament show a more party-oriented style of representation than MPs with other career types, meaning that they stated in an MP survey that they would rather vote according to the party line than according to their own opinion or constituency preferences in case those positions contradict each other – since “disloyalty violates the MP's sense of duty” (Crowe 1986: 164). Taken together, socialization into party structures ought to lead to a higher propensity of MPs to vote with the majority of their party even when they lack ideological agreement (Andeweg and Thomassen 2011).

In contrast, MPs without those party socialization experiences lack all the described factors inducing party-compliant behavior. An MP survey reveals that those MPs are fully aware of the fact that they are more independent-minded and have a less partisan view on issues (Bailer et al. 2013: 113, own translations):

“Since I haven't been through party organizations for many years, I'm more independent in forming opinions, but I also have to network more intensively.”

“I have a very independent view from the outside and am not so interwoven with party structures.”

This attitudinal difference between both types of MPs leads us to the first hypothesis:

H1: MPs who have not been socialized into party structures have a higher probability to vote against the party line than MPs who have such socialization experiences due to party offices prior to their mandate.

Not only as members of their party on the ground but also as members of their parliamentary party, MPs can be conceptualized as group members. Obviously, parliamentary party groups, just like local/regional party branches, offer particularly favorable conditions for a high cohesion of their members at the aggregate level: As members of a party group, MPs of the same party work together nearly every day in order to reach shared policy-related goals and compete with other parties. Consequently, membership in a parliamentary group, just as party membership, fosters feelings of loyalty at the individual level of MPs. However, MPs are not elected to parliament already as 'loyal' party group members. A process of socialization is a precondition for group loyalty. Socialization is regarded as a learning experience in which various institutional norms are conveyed to newcomers (Dickinson 2018). Just as politicians are initially newcomers to their own party, they are also newcomers to their parliamentary group after being elected to the national parliament for the first time. Therefore, we assume that not only the experiences politicians make during their time in party offices at the local or regional level but also their work in the national parliament can lead to socialization effects. With a longer tenure in parliament, MPs get used to the functioning of parliamentary government. Compared to freshmen MPs, more experienced MPs have become familiar with the routines of parliamentary work and accept the norms structuring this work to a higher extent, which includes the norm of party unity (Delius et al. 2013; Patzelt 1999). Additionally, the newly elected MPs' ideological closeness to the party mean demonstrably increases with parliamentary experience (Wüst 2009) – presumably not only due to the fact that experienced MPs, once specialized in a particular policy area, become increasingly successful in shaping the policy position of their party group (Tavits 2009). Various studies support that those socialization processes take place during MPs' first years in parliament (Mughan et al. 1997; Reiser et al. 2011; Rosenblatt 2007). However, the findings for a direct effect of parliamentary experience on MPs' probability of vote defections are mixed (as shown in the State of the Art section).

In the face of this second socialization process, we argue that the effect of *party* socialization is contingent upon MPs' parliamentary experience. During their first year in parliament, MPs lack any parliamentary experience and the respective processes of *parliamentary* socialization are just about to start, without any effects on parliamentary behavior already having materialized. Depending on different pre-parliamentary-socialization experiences, MPs' understanding and expectations towards parliamentary work differ (Reiser et al. 2011). Accordingly, we expect that MPs in this phase exclusively rely on their former experiences – and, relatedly, that the difference between those who are party animals and those who are not should matter most.

This difference is perceived by the party-socialized MPs themselves, visible in the following quote from an MP survey (Bailer et al. 2013: 109, own translation):

“The difference between the career changers and me is that I naturally knew exactly what the rules of the game were in the parliamentary group, what the hierarchical structure of the parliamentary group was like. I didn't have the idea that I would come to Bonn (at that time) and tell them what politics is. I knew exactly that you would start small”

In other words: The party-socialization effect in Hypothesis 1 is likely to be strongest for freshman MPs. Empirically, this implies that newly elected MPs who lack socialization into their party organization by the means of party offices at the local/regional level have significantly higher defection rates than the bunch of MPs who served in party offices prior to their mandate.

After various years in parliament, the experiences MPs made during their socialization process outside parliament might be sidelined by new, maybe different, role expectations and experiences within parliament. Their national-level legislative work now dominates their political life in terms of time and effort invested, compared to local- or regional-level party offices (Patzelt 2014). Those experiences from everyday parliamentary work are likely to equalize differences among the MPs' party socialization, and the MPs converge with regard to their attitudes towards parliamentary work. Empirically, we expect that *parliamentary* socialization first and foremost reduces the initially higher defection rates of those MPs who lacked a thorough *party* socialization. This is consistent with Wüst's (2009) argument that the potential for parliamentary socialization effects is greatest for those MPs who have not been socialized pre-parliamentary (for example, through party work). All else being equal, this leads to our second hypothesis:

H2: The positive effect of a lacking party socialization on dissenting voting behavior is strongest at the beginning of MPs' parliamentary career and loses its importance with longer parliamentary experience.

3. Study Design

We test our propositions using data for MPs' voting behavior in Germany. Germany, called a “party state” (Schmidt 2008: 71), and the Bundestag as a “party group parliament” (Ismayr 2012, own translation), is a suitable (and rather likely) case to test an argument based on party loyalty given the central role of political parties in policymaking, allocation of offices, and legislative politics in particular. Due to our focus on MPs from a single country, we are able to hold

characteristics of the party or electoral system constant that proved to affect party unity in cross-national studies (Carey 2007; Coman 2015; Shomer 2017; Sieberer 2006).

We chose an observational approach to examine our argument whereby party socialization matters for MPs' legislative behavior. Several studies on the role of party loyalty use survey data instead (e.g., Kam 2011; van Vonna 2019; Willumsen 2017). While this is generally a proper way to investigate the relationship between certain norms or attitudes, that is, what MPs think about their parties, it is, on the downside, also limited to that regarding the dependent variable: if we used survey data, we would only be able to study what MPs *think* on how they would vote in given circumstances. How MPs actually vote and, thus, how relevant party loyalty is for their actual behavior (and political outcomes), would remain undetected (Saalfeld 1995). Concerning the independent variable, the numerous studies cited in the theory section already indicate that holding subnational party offices actually induces loyalty on the attitudinal level. Therefore, a test of our hypotheses with observational data is appropriate.

We exploit the full set of whipped votes in all parliamentary terms of the Bundestag (1949–2017). In this setting where party discipline is enforced using career-related rewards and sanctions, party loyalty is expected to function as an additional explanatory pathway to unity, according to standard models of legislative voting behavior. Our analysis is restricted to roll-call votes which constitute about 5% of all votes taken in the German parliament (Sieberer et al. 2020). Although there are reasonable doubts regarding their representativeness (Ainsley et al. 2020), they often cover controversial (Crisp and Driscoll 2012) and, thus, politically relevant decisions. For Germany, roll calls represent the only source of individual-level voting behavior in parliament.

The dichotomous dependent variable for all models captures whether a single MP votes against the majority position of their party (then value 1) or not (then value 0). We therefore run logistic panel regressions with cluster-robust standard errors on the MP level to account for the clustered data structure (multiple votes per MP). Multicollinearity is not an issue since party socialization does not correlate strongly with any particular control (see Appendix 2).

Our main independent variable is measured according to our theoretical considerations and focuses on party socialization – that is a person's dedication to the party at lower levels before they made it to parliament. As data on party work on the ground (hanging posters, helping out at party events or in campaigns) is not available, we have collected data on whether MPs held offices at local or regional party branches before they were elected to parliament for the first

time. We take this variable partly from Küpper (2013) but amend it for MPs first entering parliament in 2009 or 2013. If no information concerning party offices or when MPs started them could be found in their biographies, we coded party socialization as 0.³ Party socialization is measured dichotomously for various reasons: First, this kind of measurement directly fits to our argument that the probability of vote defection is dependent on whether (or not) MPs have been socialized into party structures. Second, we assume that a fundamental behavioral difference exists between MPs who lack any party-socialization experiences and those having held at least one party office at the local/regional level. Conversely, we believe that it does not make much difference to their voting behavior whether MPs held five or six different party offices, especially since the mere number of offices, in this case, would still have to be weighted by the length of time they held these offices. This leads to a third reason: Neither the duration nor the exact number of different party offices can be reliably measured in most cases, especially if the first election of MPs to parliament took place a long time ago or if the MPs held a bunch of different party offices. One must assume that the (self-reported) official biographies contain only a sample of all the offices MPs have ever held in their parties. Additionally, information on the duration of their party offices is missing in most cases. Finally, the process of socialization within the party can also be considered complete at some point if, for instance, MPs have held office as district chairpersons of their party for years and thereby became acquainted with the sensitivities of their local members as well as the state and national party for which they participated as delegates at party congresses. An additional number of or tenure in party offices would then no longer trigger any behavioral effect.

In all the models, we control for additional variables that, according to the literature (see State of the Art section), influence an MP's decision to toe the party line. Not considering these controls in the model could lead to biased estimates for our hypothesized party-socialization effects. The first set of controls relates to the effectiveness of party discipline vis-à-vis other (e.g., electoral) principals. Holding an executive or a parliamentary office likely increases the effectiveness of party discipline (e.g., Zittel and Nyhuis 2019). Second, behavioral differences between MPs elected in the district and on the party list are reported regarding their voting behavior (Sieberer 2010) but also regarding other activities like social media activity (Schürmann

³ Consequently, the party-socialization variable has only some missing observations for MPs who entered parliament before 2009 and were not included in Küpper's (2013) dataset. Details on the used data sources can be found in Appendix A. They largely rely on self-reported information by MPs. An informational bias according to which primarily those MPs who regard party socialization important actually report their party offices in their biographies cannot be ruled out. However, we regard it unlikely that this informational bias is related to our dependent variable, that is, that primarily MPs mostly toeing the party line for whatever reason report party offices on the local/regional level.

and Stier 2023) and MPs' responsiveness to constituency requests (Bol et al. 2021). Most of the MPs without party socialization are elected via party list, according to Bailer et al.'s (2013) data. In order to rule out that the effect of party socialization is biased by the MPs' mode of election, we control for their mandate type. Third, the length of membership in the Bundestag is also held constant since it could capture parliamentary socialization which – for testing Hypothesis 1 – we want to keep distinct from party socialization. In order to disentangle those two facets of socialization, Rehmert (2022a) restricts his analysis to MPs in their first legislative term. We argue that a rigorous test of a pre-parliamentary party-socialization effect has to include the full set of MPs. In this setting, the conditional role of *parliamentary* socialization on the *party* socialization effect (H2) can be explicitly modeled. Fourth, in order to rule out that all socialization effects are actually generational effects, we include the MP's age in the year of the vote as a further control. Fifth, we also take the type and origin of the motion into consideration, given that the disciplinary pressure and thus the baseline level of dissent differs between motions (Bergmann et al. 2016; Stecker 2015). Specifically, we control for votes on defense policies which, due to their polarizing nature in the context of Germany's history, usually exhibit higher-than-average defection rates. Additionally, we include a dummy variable indicating whether the motion on the floor has been initiated by the MP's own party group (or the government for government MPs) – since Bergmann and coauthors (2016) expect lower defection rates for votes on own motions in order not to be blamed for disunity by the public. Sixth, in order to account for temporal variance in MPs' voting behavior, three vote-specific controls are added to the models. The seat share of the government parties captures the closeness of voting decisions, with a smaller margin resulting in higher disciplinary pressures on the MPs (Bergmann et al. 2016). Moreover, we control for election-cycle effects with a dummy variable measuring whether the vote took place between January and the federal election (in an election year). In those years, both a higher level of dissent in order to signal dedication to voter preferences (Lindstädt et al. 2011) or a lower level of dissent in order to demonstrate unity (Willumsen and Öhberg 2017) would be conceivable. Furthermore, we control for potential differences in the voting behavior before and after the German reunification in 1990. Finally, we include party fixed effects (i.e., one dummy per party) to account for specificities of parties that may drive voting behavior. Most variables for the 1st–17th terms are coded using data from Sieberer et al. (2020); for the 18th term, we collected the data by ourselves. Further information on the measurement and data sources of all variables can be found in Appendix 1.

4. Results

Figure 1: Proportion of MPs without party socialization, by party





Figure 2: Proportion of MPs without party socialization, by legislative term



Before we investigate the hypothesized relationship between party socialization of an MP and their probability to vote against the party line, we present some descriptive statistics on our main independent variable. About 15% of the MPs included in our dataset (not weighted by the number of votes they attended) have entered parliament without a career in local/regional party offices. According to Figure 1, the parties are rather similar regarding the prevalence of party socialization – with between 12% and 16% of the MPs having not been in any party office at lower levels before entering parliament. An exception is the Left Party/PDS where around 28% lack this kind of party socialization. Additionally, the proportion of MPs that have not been party socialized varies over time (see Figure 2): It decreased from roughly 25% in the 1950s to

less than 10% between the 1980s and the beginning 2000s, before it began to rise again to more than 15% in the last term under study.

Table 1: Regression results for the chance of casting a dissenting vote

	(1) Party socialization: unconditioned effect	(2) Party socialization conditioned by parliamentary experience
Lack of party socialization	0.151* (0.065)	0.269** (0.087)
Parliamentary experience	-0.010* (0.005)	-0.008 (0.005)
Party socialization * Parliamentary experience (interaction term)		-0.024* (0.011)
Executive office	-1.343*** (0.107)	-1.350*** (0.107)
Parliamentary office	-0.255*** (0.056)	-0.256*** (0.056)
Direct mandate	-0.236*** (0.056)	-0.241*** (0.056)
Age	0.010*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)
Gender (female)	-0.191** (0.060)	-0.190** (0.060)
Vote on defense policy	0.480*** (0.060)	0.480*** (0.060)
Vote on own motion	-0.118*** (0.031)	-0.118*** (0.031)
Government seat share	1.575*** (0.151)	1.580*** (0.151)
Vote in election year	0.446*** (0.026)	0.448*** (0.026)
Vote after unification	0.320*** (0.062)	0.311*** (0.062)
SPD	-1.566*** (0.167)	-1.563*** (0.166)
CDU/CSU	-1.292*** (0.173)	-1.289*** (0.173)
FDP	-0.514** (0.159)	-0.516** (0.159)
Greens	-0.790*** (0.180)	-0.786*** (0.180)
The Left/PDS	-1.416*** (0.197)	-1.415*** (0.197)
Constant	-4.581*** (0.230)	-4.590*** (0.230)
<i>N</i>	1,037,363	1,037,363


Logit coefficients are displayed and standard errors in parentheses.

Levels of significance: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

In order to test our two hypotheses, separate regression models were estimated (see Table 1). The first model includes the unconditioned effect of lacking party socialization (Hypothesis 1)

and parliamentary experience, respectively. The second model includes an interaction term between party socialization and parliamentary experience as formulated in Hypothesis 2.

Figure 3: Average marginal effect of party socialization, by parliamentary experience




Notes:
 Positive values indicate a higher probability of dissenting votes by MPs who lack party socialization.
 Point estimates as well as 95% confidence intervals (dashed lines) are shown.

The results of both models are clear-cut with regard to the independent variable of theoretical interest: In model 1, lacking party socialization significantly increases the probability that an MP casts a dissenting vote, even after controlling for various other powerful determinants of their voting behavior. Hence, the data strongly support our initial hypothesis. In model 2, the coefficient of the interaction term between party socialization and parliamentary experience is statistically significant as well which points to a possible interaction effect. In order to explore the size and significance of the interaction, we have plotted the average marginal effect of party socialization on MPs' propensity to defect at different levels of parliamentary experience in Figure 3. It shows that, in their first year in parliament, MPs who did not hold party offices before have a significantly higher probability to vote against the party line, and the difference from MPs having experienced this kind of party socialization is strongest. During their subsequent years in the Bundestag, the party socialization effect gradually gets weaker. After roughly six years in parliament, that is, one-and-a-half regular terms, MPs lacking party-socialization experiences prior to their first election no longer differ significantly from party-socialized MPs. Thus, as expected by Hypothesis 2, parliamentary socialization is particularly

relevant for those MPs who enter parliament without having been socialized previously during a party career.

The results for party socialization as well as for the interaction effect are robust against different model specifications: Both keep their statistical significance if the party dummies are excluded from the models or if they are replaced by a dichotomous variable for government participation of an MP's party. As a third robustness check, we included the candidacy mode instead of the type of mandate in the models in order to capture electoral pressures on the MPs in a more fine-grained way. Again, both the unconditioned and the conditioned party-socialization effect (at representative values of parliamentary experience) keep their statistical significance (see Appendix 3 for full results).

Figure 4: Substantial size of the party socialization effect



Beyond statistical significance, which has its drawbacks in a large sample like ours, our effects are also substantively meaningful (see Figure 4). For freshman MPs, the substantive effect is strongest: MPs without party-socialization experiences have, in their first year in parliament, a defection probability of 3.26%, compared to 2.56% for MPs with party socialization – which equals an increase of the defection probability of 0.7 percentage points (as shown in Figure 3), and, given the generally low level of defection, of more than 27%. After four years in parliament, MPs who did not hold party offices prior to their Bundestag mandate still have a 17% higher defection rate (2.49% vs. 2.91%) than MPs without this kind of party socialization. After eight

years of parliamentary experience (i.e., two full terms), the difference in the defection probabilities is both substantially and statistically insignificant. Overall, the figure shows that it is not the party-socialized but mainly the formerly unsocialized MPs who, with rising parliamentary experience, become more loyal in their legislative behavior.

Although the size of the effects is substantial given all the controls, party socialization is not the only and not the most powerful pathway to unity. All controls exert a statistically significant effect on dissenting voting behavior. Independent from party socialization, higher parliamentary experience decreases MPs' probability of vote defection. As expected, indicators of formal party discipline do also have their expected explanatory power: MPs holding parliamentary and, even more pronounced, executive offices, which they presumably do not want to lose in the aftermath of dissenting votes, show a lower probability of vote defection. In substantive terms, only the effect of holding an executive office clearly exceeds party socialization in terms of the difference in predicted probabilities – the defection probability decreases by 72% for MPs holding government offices. Parliamentary offices reduce MPs' defection probability by 21% which is almost the same effect size as for party socialization of freshman MPs. MPs who have been directly elected in the constituency show significantly less vote defections – contrary to theoretical expectations and earlier results for single terms in Germany (see, e.g., Sieberer 2010) but similar to results for longer observation periods in Germany and other countries (see, e.g., Crisp 2007; Sieberer and Ohmura 2021). Older MPs show higher, female MPs lower defection rates, compared to their colleagues. Concerning the vote characteristics, we see higher defection rates in votes on defense policy matters, compared to other (possibly less contentious) issues. In votes on motions that were initiated by MPs' own party group (or, in case of government MPs, the federal government), they show lower defection rates, compared to other motions (as expected). In addition, the political circumstances affect MPs' defection rates: In times of comfortable government majorities, in election years as well as generally in votes after the German unification (with a more fragmented and polarized party system), we observe more MP votes against the party line. Finally, compared to other parties represented in the first terms of the Bundestag and serving as reference, MPs of all established parties, especially Social Democratic, Socialist, and Christian Democratic ones, vote in a more unified manner.

5. Conclusion

Based on standard models of legislative research according to which party-compliant voting behavior of MPs is the result of either ideological agreement with one's party, party loyalty, or party discipline, we argued that a substantial party-socialization process fosters a stronger feeling of loyalty towards one's own party and, consequently, reduces the probability that an MP votes against the party line in parliament. In order to test our argument, we compiled a rich dataset on MPs' party career, other personal and career-related characteristics, as well as their individual-level voting behavior in the German Bundestag over nearly 70 years (1949–2017). The results supported our proposition that MPs who did not hold party offices at the local/regional level prior to their national mandate show a higher probability to vote against the party line. Additionally, behavioral differences between MPs with this kind of party socialization and those without vanish the longer MPs serve in parliament.

We interpret the relationship between party socialization of MPs and party-compliant voting behavior in parliaments as a loyalty effect, assuming that MPs who were not engaged in the party structures missed acquiring values, like the importance of unity, that, in turn, foster voting in accordance with the mainstream position of their party group. Although we consider such a causal relationship likely given our correlative evidence, whether MPs have actually internalized such values due to their party-socialization process and, if so, whether those values actually influenced their voting behavior, cannot be ultimately proved in a study with observational data (Mughan et al. 1997). Survey data as a potential alternative are confronted with other drawbacks discussed in the methods section. Nevertheless, apart from being able to additionally control for MPs' policy preferences, survey data could allow future studies to investigate the effect of further conceivable aspects of party socialization on MPs' legislative behavior that are hardly measurable by observational data, for example, the amount of party work beyond holding visible party offices.

Despite the limitations mentioned above, our study has several implications for research on party politics and legislatures: First, adding to rational-choice approaches whereupon legislative behavior is considered to be a product of carrots and sticks or electoral incentives, our results show that party loyalty is another important pathway to unity, even when party discipline is not suspended. Second, the findings underscore that, for many MPs, a politically effective socialization process does not start in the national parliament but in local/subnational party committees, implying that *party* socialization has to be regarded as a loyalty-inducing factor besides *parliamentary* socialization. Additionally, the significant interaction effect between party

and parliamentary socialization shows that they are not mutually exclusive but complementary pathways to unity. Third, our results can be related to the literature on candidate selection, providing an additional explanation for the repeated observation that showing commitment to one's own party, e.g., by holding local/regional-level party offices, increases the chance of being nominated as a candidate for the national parliament (Hellmann 2020 and Rehmert 2021, 2022b for the German case): Since politicians who are experienced in subnational party offices vote more frequently according to the party line, it is reasonable for party delegates to select precisely those loyal individuals as candidates – because parliamentary democracies do not work by means of party discipline only but also depend on party-loyal MPs. Finally, our findings can be linked to political megatrends such as partisan dealignment and the personalization of politics (Dalton and Wattenberg 2002; Garzia et al. 2022). André and co-authors (2015) have already empirically confirmed that in districts where partisan dealignment is strongest, MPs' party loyalty is weakest. If the party label loses its importance for MPs' (re-)election, then MPs are increasingly encouraged to cultivate personal votes which, in turn, reduces the loyalty to their party and, ultimately and according to our results, party unity in parliament. If, more broadly, political success is less closely linked to party labels, then both trends will also weaken individuals' incentives to pursue the hard intraparty road to political top-positions by themselves. Empirically, the proportion of MPs lacking party-socialization experiences is already rising since several parliamentary terms. The weakening of this pathway to unity that we have established in this article could ultimately result in a growing strain on party unity and, thereby, on one of the key elements of representative democracies. This resonates with discussions about the role of parties in general and the decline of the traditional mode of partisan government based on stable majorities. However, it is important to note that such an outcome is not inevitable and maybe not even probable. Given that *parliamentary* socialization also leads to less defection, and according to our results – especially so for MPs that are no “party animals” (Ohmura et al. 2018), and given that loyalty is only one out of several “pathways to party unity” (Andeweg and Thomassen 2011), declining engagement in political parties does not necessarily undermine the traditional functional logics of parliamentary systems.

6. References

- Ainsley, Caitlin, Clifford J. Carrubba, Brian F. Crisp, Betul Demirkaya, Matthew J. Gabel, and Dino Hadzic (2020). ‘Roll-Call Vote Selection: Implications for the Study of Legislative Politics’, *American Political Science Review*, 114:3, 691–706.

- Alexiadou, Despina (2015). 'Ideologues, Partisans, and Loyalists: Cabinet Ministers and Social Welfare Reform in Parliamentary Democracies', *Comparative Political Studies*, 48:8, 1051–86.
- Andeweg, Rudy B., and Jacques Thomassen (2011). 'Pathways to party unity: Sanctions, loyalty, homogeneity and division of labour in the Dutch parliament', *Party Politics*, 17:5, 655–72.
- André, Audrey, Sam Depauw, and Stefanie Beyens (2015). 'Party loyalty and electoral dealignment', *Party Politics*, 21:6, 970–81.
- Arzheimer, Kai (2015). 'Strange bedfellows: the Bundestag's free vote on pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) reveals how Germany's restrictive bioethics legislation is shaped by a Christian Democratic/New Left issue-coalition', *Research & Politics*, 2:3, 1–7.
- Ashforth, Blake E., and Fred Mael (1989). 'Social Identity Theory and the Organization', *The Academy of Management Review*, 14:1, 20–39.
- Bailer, Stefanie, Peter Meißner, Tamaki Ohmura, and Peter Selb (2013). *Seiteneinsteiger im Deutschen Bundestag*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
- Bailer, Stefanie (2018). 'To use the whip or not: Whether and when party group leaders use disciplinary measures to achieve voting unity', *International Political Science Review*, 39:2, 163–77.
- Bauer-Blaschkowski, Svenja, and Philipp Mai (2019). 'Von „Abweichlern“ und „Überzeugungstätern“. Eine Analyse des Abstimmungsverhaltens im 18. Deutschen Bundestag', in: Reimut Zohlnhöfer and Thomas Saalfeld (eds.), *Zwischen Stillstand, Politikwandel und Krisenmanagement: Eine Bilanz der Regierung Merkel 2013-2017*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 219–56.
- Baumann, Markus, Marc Debus, and Jochen Müller (2013). 'Das legislative Verhalten von Bundestagsabgeordneten zwischen persönlichen Charakteristika, Wahlkreisinteressen und Parteilinie', *Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft*, 23:2, 177–211.
- Baumann, Markus, Marc Debus, and Jochen Müller (2015). 'Personal Characteristics of MPs and Legislative Behavior in Moral Policymaking', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 40:2, 179–210.
- Benedetto, Giacomo, and Simon Hix (2007). 'The Rejected, the Ejected, and the Dejected: Explaining Government Rebels in the 2001–2005 British House of Commons', *Comparative Political Studies*, 40:7, 755–81.
- Bergmann, Henning, Stefanie Bailer, Tamaki Ohmura, Thomas Saalfeld, and Ulrich Sieberer (2016). 'Namentliche Abstimmungen im Bundestag 1949 bis 2013: Befunde aus einem neuen Datensatz', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 47:1, 26–50.
- Bhattacharya, Caroline, and Achillefs Papageorgiou (2019). 'Are Backbenchers Fighting Back? Intra-Party Contestation in German Parliament Debates on the Greek Crisis', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 72:2, 425–44.

- Bol, Damien, Thomas Gschwend, Thomas Zittel, and Steffen Zittlau (2021). 'The importance of personal vote intentions for the responsiveness of legislators: A field experiment' *European Journal of Political Research*, 60:2, 455–73.
- Bowler, Shaun, David M. Farrell, and Richard S. Katz (1999). 'Party Cohesion, Party Discipline, and Parliaments.', in: Shaun Bowler (ed.), *Party discipline and parliamentary government*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 3–22.
- Carey, John M. (2007). 'Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting', *American Journal of Political Science*, 51:1, 92–107.
- Clarke, Harold D., and Richard G. Price (1977). 'A Note on the Pre-Nomination Role Socialization of Freshmen Members of Parliament', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 10:2, 391–406.
- Clayton, Amanda, and Pär Zetterberg (2021). 'Gender and Party Discipline: Evidence from Africa's Emerging Party Systems', *American Political Science Review*, 115:3, 869–84.
- Close, Caroline (2018). 'Parliamentary party loyalty and party family: The missing link?', *Party Politics*, 24:2, 209–19.
- Coman, Emanuel E. (2015). 'Institutions and Vote Unity in Parliaments: Evidence from 33 National Chambers', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 21:3, 360–89.
- Cordes, Malte, and Daniel Hellmann (2020). 'Wer ist der ideale Kandidat? Auswahlkriterien bei der Kandidatenaufstellung zum Deutschen Bundestag', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 51:1, 68–83.
- Cowley, Philip, and Sarah Childs (2003). 'Too Spineless to Rebel? New Labour's Women MPs', *British Journal of Political Science*, 33:3, 345–65.
- Cowley, Philip, and Mark Stuart (1997). 'Sodomy, Slaughter, Sunday Shopping and Seatbelts', *Party Politics*, 3:1, 119–30.
- Cowley, Philip, and Mark Stuart (2010). 'Party Rules, OK: Voting in the House of Commons on the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 63:1, 173–81.
- Crisp, Brian F. (2007). 'Incentives in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: General Election Laws, Candidate Selection Procedures, and Cameral Rules', *Comparative Political Studies*, 40:12, 1460–85.
- Crisp, Brian F., and Amanda Driscoll (2012). 'The Strategic Use of Legislative Voting Procedures', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 37:1, 67–97.
- Crowe, Edward (1986). 'The Web of Authority: Party Loyalty and Social Control in the British House of Commons', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 11:2, 161–85.
- Dalton, Russell J., David M. Farrell, and Ian McAllister (2011). *Political Parties and Democratic Linkage: How Parties Organize Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dalton, Russell J., and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds. (2002). *Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Degner, Hanno, and Dirk Leuffen (2016). 'Keynes, Friedman, or Monnet? Explaining parliamentary voting behaviour on fiscal aid for euro area member states', *West European Politics*, 39:6, 1139–59.
- Delius, Martin F., Michael Koß, and Christian Stecker (2013). '„Ich erkenne also Fraktionsdisziplin grundsätzlich auch an...“ Innerfraktioneller Dissens in der SPD-Fraktion der Großen Koalition 2005 bis 2009', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 44:3, 546–66.
- Dickinson, Nicholas (2018). 'Advice Giving and Party Loyalty: An Informational Model for the Socialisation Process of New British MPs', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 71:2, 343–64.
- Dodson, Debra L. (1990). 'Socialization of Party Activists: National Convention Delegates, 1972-81', *American Journal of Political Science*, 34:4, 1119–41.
- Eldersveld, Samuel J. (1964). *Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis*. Chicago: Rand McNally & Co.
- Engler, Fabian, and Kathrin Dümig (2017). 'Political Parties and MPs' Morality Policy Voting Behaviour: Evidence from Germany', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 70:3, 548–68.
- Garzia, Diego, Frederico Ferreira da Silva, and Andrea De Angelis (2022). 'Partisan dealignment and the personalisation of politics in West European parliamentary democracies, 1961–2018', *West European Politics*, 45:2, 311–34.
- Gherghina, Sergiu, and Mihail Chiru (2014). 'Determinants of legislative voting loyalty under different electoral systems: Evidence from Romania', *International Political Science Review*, 35:5, 523–41.
- Grimmer, Justin, and Eleanor N. Powell (2013). 'Congressmen in Exile: The Politics and Consequences of Involuntary Committee Removal', *The Journal of Politics*, 75:4, 907–20.
- Haider-Markel, Donald P. (1999). 'Morality Policy and Individual-Level Political Behavior. The Case of Legislative Voting on Lesbian and Gay Issues.', *Policy Studies Journal*, 27:4, 735–49.
- Hanretty, Chris, Benjamin E. Lauderdale, and Nick Vivyan (2017). 'Dyadic Representation in a Westminster System', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 42:2, 235–67.
- Hellmann, Daniel (2020). 'Der mühselige Weg zum Mandat – aber welcher? Empirische Untersuchungen zu Inhalt und Bedeutung der Ochsentour', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 51:1, 49–67.
- Heuwieser, Raphael J. (2018). 'Submissive Lobby Fodder or Assertive Political Actors? Party Loyalty of Career Politicians in the UK House of Commons, 2005–15', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 43:2, 305–41.
- Hibbing, John R., and David Marsh (1987). 'Accounting for the Voting Patterns of British MPs on Free Votes', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 12:2, 275–97.
- Hirschman, Albert O. (1970). *Exit, voice, and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Ismayr, Wolfgang (2012). *Der Deutsche Bundestag*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

- Jörke, Dirk (2012). 'Eine Phänomenologie der Macht – zur Aktualität von Michels' mikropolitischen Beobachtungen', in: Harald Bluhm and Skadi Krause (eds.), *Robert Michels' Soziologie des Parteiwesens: Oligarchien und Eliten – die Kehrseiten moderner Demokratie*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 229–40.
- Kam, Christopher J. (2011). *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kauder, Björn, and Niklas Potrafke (2019). 'Conservative Politicians and Voting on Same-sex Marriage', *German Economic Review*, 20:4, 600–17.
- Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Richard I. Hofferbert, and Ian Budge (1994). *Parties, policies, and democracy. Theoretical lenses on public policy*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Küpper, Moritz (2013). *Politik kann man lernen: Politische Seiteneinsteiger in Deutschland*. Halle (Saale): Mitteldeutscher Verlag.
- Lindstädt, René, Jonathan B. Slapin, and Ryan J. Vander Wielen (2011). 'Balancing Competing Demands: Position Taking and Election Proximity in the European Parliament', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 36:1, 37–70.
- Louwerse, Tom, Simon Otjes, and Cynthia M.C. van Vonno (2018). 'The Dutch Parliamentary Dataset', *Acta Politica*, 53:1, 149–66.
- Mai, Philipp (2022). 'Whose bread I don't eat, his song I don't sing? MPs' outside earnings and dissenting voting behaviour', *Party Politics*, 28:2, 342–53.
- Mai, Philipp, Moritz Link, and Fabian Engler (2022). 'Individuelles Abstimmungsverhalten im 19. Deutschen Bundestag zwischen alltäglicher Fraktionsdisziplin und vereinzelt Gewissensentscheidungen', in: Reimut Zohlnhöfer and Fabian Engler (eds.), *Das Ende der Merkel-Jahre. Eine Bilanz der Regierung Merkel 2018-2021*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 101–29.
- Mughan, Anthony, Janet Box-Steffensmeier, and Roger Scully (1997). 'Mapping legislative socialisation', *European Journal of Political Research*, 32:1, 93–106.
- Nickig, Eckhard (1999). 'Von der Mitglieder- zur Fraktionspartei: Abschied von einer Fiktion', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 30:2, 382–9.
- Ohmura, Tamaki (2014). 'When your Name is on the List, it is Time to Party: The Candidacy Divide in a Mixed-Member Proportional System', *Representation*, 50:1, 69–82.
- Ohmura, Tamaki, Stefanie Bailer, Peter Meißner, and Peter Selb (2018). 'Party animals, career changers and other pathways into parliament', *West European Politics*, 41:1, 169–95.
- Overby, L. Marvin, Raymond Tatalovich, and Donley T. Studlar (1998). 'Party and Free Votes in Canada: Abortion in the House of Commons', *Party Politics*, 4:3, 381–92.
- Overby, L. Marvin, Christopher D. Raymond, and Zeynep Taydas (2011). 'Free Votes, MPs, and Constituents: The Case of Same-Sex Marriage in Canada', *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 41:4, 465–78.

- Patzelt, Werner J. (1999). 'Parlamentarische Rekrutierung und Sozialisation. Normative Erwägungen, empirische Befunde und praktische Empfehlungen', *Zeitschrift für Politik*, 46:3, 243–82.
- Patzelt, Werner J. (2003). 'Party Cohesion and Party Discipline in German Parliaments', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 9:4, 102–15.
- Patzelt, Werner J. (2014). *Abgeordnete und ihr Beruf: Von wahren Vorurteilen und falschen Vorverurteilungen*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
- Plumb, Alison (2015). 'How Do MPs in Westminster Democracies Vote When Unconstrained by Party Discipline? A Comparison of Free Vote Patterns on Marriage Equality Legislation', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 68:3, 533–54.
- Preidel, Caroline (2016). 'Ist der Katholizismus noch entscheidend?', in: Antonius Liedhegener and Gert Pickel (eds.), *Religionspolitik und Politik der Religionen in Deutschland: Fallstudien und Vergleiche*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 83–107.
- Raymond, Christopher D. (2017a). 'Simply a matter of context? Partisan contexts and party loyalties on free votes', *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 19:2, 353–70.
- Raymond, Christopher D. (2017b). 'Voting Behaviour on Free Votes: Simply a Matter of Preferences?', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 70:3, 489–506.
- Raymond, Christopher D., and L. Marvin Overby (2016). 'What's in a (Party) name? Examining preferences, discipline, and social identity in a parliamentary free vote', *Party Politics*, 22:3, 313–24.
- Raymond, Christopher D., and Robert M. Worth (2017). 'Explaining voting behaviour on free votes: Solely a matter of preference?', *British Politics*, 12:4, 555–64.
- Rehmert, Jochen (2021). 'Behavioral Consequences of Open Candidate Recruitment', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 46:2, 427–58.
- Rehmert, Jochen (2022a). 'Party membership, pre-parliamentary socialization and party cohesion', *Party Politics*, 28:6, 1081–93.
- Rehmert, Jochen (2022b). 'Party Elites' Preferences in Candidates: Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment', *Political Behavior*, 44:3, 1149–73.
- Reiser, Marion, Claudia Hülsken, Bertram Schwarz, and Jens Borchert (2011). 'Das Reden der Neulinge und andere Sünden. Parlamentarische Sozialisation und Parlamentskultur in zwei deutschen Landtagen', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 42:4, 820–34.
- Rosenblatt, Gemma (2007). 'From One of Us to One of Them: The Socialisation of New MPs', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 60:3, 510–7.
- Russell, Meg (2014). 'Parliamentary party cohesion: Some explanations from psychology', *Party Politics*, 20:5, 712–23.
- Saalfeld, Thomas (1995). *Parteisoldaten und Rebellen. Eine Untersuchung zur Geschlossenheit der Fraktionen im Deutschen Bundestag (1949-1990)*. Opladen: Leske+Budrich.

- Schmidt, Manfred G. (2008). 'Germany: The Grand Coalition State', in: M. Josep Colomer (ed.), *Comparative European Politics*. London: Routledge, 58–93.
- Schürmann, Lennart, and Sebastian Stier (2023). 'Who Represents the Constituency? Online Political Communication by Members of Parliament in the German Mixed-Member Electoral System', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 48:1, 219–34.
- Schüttemeyer, Suzanne S., and Roland Sturm (2005). 'Der Kandidat – das (fast) unbekannte Wesen: Befunde und Überlegungen zur Aufstellung der Bewerber zum Deutschen Bundestag', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 36:3, 539–53.
- Shomer, Yael (2017). 'The Conditional Effect of Electoral Systems and Intraparty Candidate Selection Processes on Parties' Behavior', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 42:1, 63–96.
- Sieberer, Ulrich (2006). 'Party unity in parliamentary democracies: A comparative analysis', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 12:2, 150–78.
- Sieberer, Ulrich (2010). 'Behavioral consequences of mixed electoral systems: Deviating voting behavior of district and list MPs in the German Bundestag', *Electoral Studies*, 29:3, 484–96.
- Sieberer, Ulrich, and Tamaki Ohmura (2021). 'Mandate type, electoral safety, and defections from the party line: The conditional mandate divide in the German Bundestag, 1949–2013', *Party Politics*, 27:4, 704–15.
- Sieberer, Ulrich, Thomas Saalfeld, Tamaki Ohmura, Henning Bergmann, and Stefanie Bailer (2020). 'Roll-Call Votes in the German Bundestag: A New Dataset, 1949–2013', *British Journal of Political Science*, 50:3, 1137–45.
- Slapin, Jonathan B., Justin H. Kirkland, Joseph A. Lazzaro, Patrick A. Leslie, and Tom O'Grady (2018). 'Ideology, Grandstanding, and Strategic Party Disloyalty in the British Parliament', *American Political Science Review*, 112:1, 15–30.
- Stecker, Christian (2015). 'How effects on party unity vary across votes', *Party Politics*, 21:5, 791–802.
- Steffani, Winfried (1983). 'Zur Unterscheidung parlamentarischer und präsidentieller Regierungssysteme', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 14:3, 390–401.
- Tavits, Margit (2009). 'The Making of Mavericks: Local Loyalties and Party Defection', *Comparative Political Studies*, 42:6, 793–815
- Tavits, Margit (2011). 'Power within Parties: The Strength of the Local Party and MP Independence in Postcommunist Europe', *American Journal of Political Science*, 55:4, 923–36.
- van Vonno, Cynthia M.C. (2019). 'Achieving party unity in the Netherlands: Representatives' sequential decision-making mechanisms at three levels of Dutch government', *Party Politics*, 25:5, 664–78.
- Wenzelburger, Georg, and Sabrina Fehrenz (2018). 'Die Union und die „Ehe für Alle“. Bestimmungsfaktoren des Abstimmungsverhaltens in der CDU/CSU-Fraktion im Bundestag', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 49:3, 512–30.

- Wenzelburger, Georg, and Reimut Zohlnhöfer (2021). 'Bringing Agency Back into the Study of Partisan Politics: A Note on Recent Developments in the Literature on Party Politics', *Party Politics*, 27:5, 1055–65.
- Willumsen, David M. (2017). *The Acceptance of Party Unity in Parliamentary Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Willumsen, David M., and Klaus H. Goetz (2017). 'Set Free? Impending Retirement and Legislative Behaviour in the UK', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 70:2, 254–79.
- Willumsen, David M., and Patrik Öhberg (2017). 'Toe the line, break the whip: explaining floor dissent in parliamentary democracies', *West European Politics*, 40:4, 688–716.
- Wüst, Andreas M. (2009). 'Zur Sozialisation von Neuparlamentariern im 15. Deutschen Bundestag', in: Oscar W. Gabriel, Bernhard Weßels, and Jürgen W. Falter (eds.), *Wahlen und Wähler: Analysen aus Anlass der Bundestagswahl 2005*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 328–45.
- Zittel, Thomas, and Dominic Nyhuis (2019). 'Two Faces of Party Unity: Roll-Call Behavior and Vote Explanations in the German Bundestag', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 72:2, 406–24.

7. Appendix

A1: Measurement, Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics of the Variables

Table 1-Appendix: Operationalisation of the variables

Variable	Operationalization	Data sources	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Dissent	Takes value 1 if an MP casts a single legislative vote in a different manner as the majority of his/her parliamentary party group, otherwise 0. No differentiation between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ deviations is made. Absences are coded as missing observations. Free votes are excluded.	1 st -17 th term: recoding based on <i>vote_dev</i> in Bergmann et al. 2018c. Votes only used if variable <i>free_vote</i> = 0. 18 th term: own coding (and exclusion of unwhipped morality policy votes) based on Bundestag-Drucksache (printed matter) for the respective roll-call votes, to be found at the Bundestag website	0.021	-	0	1
Lack of party socialization	Takes value 1 if the MP did not hold one of the following functions in the party he/she represents in the Bundestag: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ membership in a party executive committee on the local or regional level (as party leader, deputy leader, treasurer, secretary or member) ▪ membership in an executive committee of the party’s youth organization Only the functions held prior to the MP’s first election into the Bundestag are considered for coding this variable. Membership in expert commissions of the party are not considered. If the MP verifiably held at least one of those functions prior to his/her first election into the Bundestag, the variable is coded with 0.	1 st -16 th term: Küpper (2013), variable <i>Ochsentour</i> , changed direction of the coding. Küpper (2013) draws the raw data for his coding on edited volumes, Bundestag handbooks, printed biographies of politicians, newspaper articles, online biographies on the Bundestag website, websites of MPs and personal interviews. 17 th -18 th term: Küpper (2013), recoded variable <i>Ochsentour</i> , for MPs who were members before the 2009 federal election. Own compilation for MPs first elected to parliament in 2009 or 2013. The own compilation is based on online biographies of MPs on the Bundestag website, MP websites and Wikipedia (successively).	0.115	-	0	1

Age	Computed by subtracting an MP's year of birth from the year in which the respective parliamentary vote takes place.	1 st -17 th term: recoding based on <i>year_birth</i> in Bergmann et al. 2018b, 18 th term: Bundestag website	51.531	9.194	19	89
Gender (female)	Takes value 1 for female MPs and 0 for male MPs.	1 st -17 th term: recoding based on <i>gender</i> in Bergmann et al. 2018b, 18 th term: own coding	0.237	-	0	1
Direct mandate	Takes value 1 if an MP was elected by winning the constituency, otherwise 0.	17 th term: recoding based on variable <i>mandate</i> in Bergmann et al. 2018b, 18 th term: Bundestag website	0.478	-	0	1
Direct candidacy only	Takes value 1 if an MP did only run for election in an electoral district (in the last federal election), otherwise 0.	1 st -17 th term: Bergmann et al. 2018b (own coding with variables <i>mandate</i> , <i>dualcand</i>), 18 th term: website of the federal election commissioner (no longer online available)	0.156	-	0	1
List candidacy only	Takes value 1 if an MP did only run for election on the party list (in the last federal election), otherwise 0.	1 st -17 th term: Bergmann et al. 2018b (own coding with variables <i>mandate</i> , <i>dualcand</i>), 18 th term: website of the federal election commissioner (no longer online available)	0.074	-	0	1
Executive office	Takes value 1 if an MP holds the office of federal chancellor, federal minister or junior minister (<i>Parlamentarischer Staatssekretär</i>) at the time of a legislative vote, otherwise 0.	1 st -17 th term: recoding based on <i>minister</i> and <i>junminister</i> in Bergmann et al. 2018b, 18 th term: Bundestag website, Wikipedia (page Kabinett Merkel III)	0.059	-	0	1
Parliamentary office	Takes value 1 if an MP holds at least one of the following offices at the time of a legislative vote: party group leader, deputy party group leader, whip, member of the executive party group leadership, leader of a Bundestag standing committee, Bundestag president or vice president, otherwise 0.	1 st -17 th term: recoding based on <i>parlpres</i> , <i>commchair</i> , <i>ppgchair</i> and <i>whip</i> in Bergmann et al. 2018b, 18 th term: Bundestag website, websites of parliamentary party groups	0.162	-	0	1
Parliamentary experience	number of years the MP is already member of the Bundestag in the year of the vote	1 st -17 th term: recoding based on <i>mandate_start</i> and <i>mandate_end</i> in Bergmann et al. 2018b, 18 th term: Bundestag website	7.941	6.481	0	45

Vote on defense policy	Takes value 1 for all votes that concern a foreign deployment of the German armed forces (Bundeswehr), otherwise 0.	1 st -17 th term: recoding based on <i>vote_title</i> in Bergmann et al. 2018a 18 th term: Bundestag-Drucksache (printed matter) for the respective roll-call votes, to be found at the Bundestag website	0.139	-	0	1
Government seat share	proportion of the Bundestag seats that is controlled by the governing parties	own coding based on Parlgov cabinet data (Döring and Manow 2021); sum of variable <i>seats</i> for all cabinet parties divided by variable <i>election_seats_total</i>	0.590	0.102	0.485	0.901
Vote in election year	Takes value 1 for all parliamentary votes taking place between January 1 and a federal election in the same year, otherwise 0.	own coding	0.199	-	0	1
Vote after unification	Takes value 1 for all roll-call votes taking place after October 3, 1990, otherwise 0.	own coding	0.643	-	0	1
Vote on own motion	Takes value 1 for an MP vote if it concerns a motion proposed by his/her own parliamentary party group or by the government (for government MPs), otherwise 0.	1 st -17 th term: recoding based on <i>sponsor_*</i> (<i>leftpds, greens, spd, fdp, cdusu, noparty, govall</i>) in Bergmann et al. 2018a, 18 th term: Bundestag-Drucksache (printed matter) for the respective roll-call votes, to be found at the Bundestag website	0.337	-	0	1
Government party	Takes value 1 for all MPs that are member of a governing party group at the time of the vote, otherwise 0.	1 st -17 th term: own coding based on <i>cabinet_parties</i> (Bergmann et al. 2018a), 18 th term: own coding	0.603	-	0	1
SPD	Takes value 1 for all MPs that are members of the Social Democratic (SPD) party group at the time of the vote, otherwise 0.	1 st -17 th term: own coding based on <i>ppg</i> (Bergmann et al. 2018b), 18 th term: Bundestag website	0.357	-	0	1
CDU/CSU	Takes value 1 for all MPs that are members of the Christian Democratic (CDU/CSU) party group at the time of the vote, otherwise 0.	1 st -17 th term: own coding based on <i>ppg</i> (Bergmann et al. 2018b), 18 th term: Bundestag website	0.439	-	0	1
FDP	Takes value 1 for all MPs that are members of the Liberal (FDP) party group at the time of the vote, otherwise 0.	1 st -17 th term: own coding based on <i>ppg</i> (Bergmann et al. 2018b), 18 th term: Bundestag website	0.086	-	0	1
Greens	Takes value 1 for all MPs that are members of the Green (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen and predecessors) party group at the time of the vote, otherwise 0.	1 st -17 th term: own coding based on <i>ppg</i> (Bergmann et al. 2018b), 18 th term: Bundestag website	0.063	-	0	1

The Left/PDS	Takes value 1 for all MPs that are members of the Socialist (Die Linke, formerly PDS) party group at the time of the vote, otherwise 0.	1 st -17 th term: own coding based on <i>ppg</i> (Bergmann et al. 2018b), 18 th term: Bundestag website	0.044	-	0	1
--------------	---	---	-------	---	---	---

The summary statistics were computed for the sample of the regression models reported in the main text (N= 1,037,363).

For dichotomous variables, the column “mean” represents the proportion of MP observations with the value 1.

Standard deviations are computed only for at least interval-scaled variables.

A2: Correlation Matrix of the Independent and Control Variables

Table 2-Appendix: Pearson correlation coefficients (r) for the variables

	party social.	exec. office	parl. office	parl. exper.	direct mandate	age	gender	defense policy	own motion	party: SPD	party: CDU/ CSU	party: FDP	party: Greens	party: The Left	gov. seat share	electio n year	after unific.
party social.	1.0000																
exec. office	-0.0417	1.0000															
parl. office	-0.0105	-0.1063	1.0000														
parl. exper.	-0.0922	0.2180	0.2162	1.0000													
direct mandate	0.0195	0.0566	0.0198	0.1258	1.0000												
age	0.0286	0.0327	0.1044	0.4435	0.0611	1.0000											
gender	-0.0135	-0.0031	0.0298	-0.0835	-0.2095	-0.0557	1.0000										
defense policy	0.0056	0.0025	0.0047	0.0070	-0.0001	0.0051	0.0419	1.0000									
own motion	0.0092	0.0278	-0.0166	-0.0100	0.0195	0.0013	-0.0079	-0.0270	1.0000								
party: SPD	-0.0470	-0.0565	-0.0325	0.0331	-0.0086	0.0271	0.0636	-0.0220	0.1159	1.0000							
party: CDU/ CSU	0.0141	0.0717	-0.0507	0.0920	0.3567	0.0501	-0.1822	-0.0062	-0.0413	-0.6585	1.0000						
party: FDP	-0.0109	0.0421	0.0530	-0.0374	-0.2750	-0.0035	-0.0383	-0.0027	-0.0437	-0.2282	-0.2712	1.0000					
party: Greens	-0.0098	-0.0312	0.0397	-0.1033	-0.2423	-0.1397	0.1837	0.0264	-0.0196	-0.1922	-0.2285	-0.0792	1.0000				
party: The Left	0.0939	-0.0538	0.0710	-0.0851	-0.1531	-0.0221	0.1500	0.0429	-0.0682	-0.1603	-0.1905	-0.0660	-0.0556	1.0000			
gov. seat share	0.0418	-0.0063	0.0002	0.0173	-0.0164	0.0360	0.0699	0.1279	0.0949	-0.0309	0.0351	-0.0760	0.0216	0.0785	1.0000		
election year	0.0167	-0.0123	0.0042	0.0821	-0.0096	0.0922	-0.0162	-0.0151	0.0153	0.0012	0.0063	0.0068	-0.0248	-0.0122	0.0972	1.0000	
after unific.	-0.0686	0.0273	-0.0098	0.0940	0.0012	-0.0110	0.2300	0.1326	-0.0387	-0.0413	-0.0434	-0.0115	0.1125	0.1604	0.1757	-0.0323	1.0000

A3: Robustness Checks

Table 3-Appendix: Results of the logistic regression analyses – robustness checks

	excluding party dummies		government/opposition party		candidacy mode	
	(A1)	(A2)	(A3)	(A4)	(A5)	(A6)
Lack of party socialization	0.154*		0.152*		0.130*	
	(0.071)		(0.072)		(0.065)	
Parliamentary experience	-0.014**	-0.011*	-0.016**	-0.013**	-0.010*	-0.008
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Party socialization * Parliamentary experience (interaction term)		-0.025*		-0.025*		-0.020+
		(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.011)
Executive office	-1.309***	-1.317***	-1.208***	-1.215***	-1.353***	-1.360***
	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.108)
Parliamentary office	-0.219***	-0.221***	-0.216***	-0.218***	-0.263***	-0.264***
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Direct mandate	-0.320***	-0.326***	-0.252***	-0.258***		
	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.055)		
Direct candidacy only					0.262***	0.256***
					(0.065)	(0.064)
List candidacy only					0.090	0.090
					(0.078)	(0.078)
Age	0.010**	0.009**	0.010**	0.010**	0.010***	0.010***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Gender	-0.245***	-0.244***	-0.259***	-0.258***	-0.124*	-0.123*
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Vote on defense policy	0.484***	0.484***	0.487***	0.486***	0.479***	0.478***
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Vote on own motion	-0.127***	-0.127***	-0.109***	-0.109***	-0.119***	-0.119***
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Government seat share	1.570***	1.574***	1.794***	1.800***	1.582***	1.586***
	(0.151)	(0.151)	(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.151)	(0.151)
Election year	0.448***	0.450***	0.447***	0.449***	0.447***	0.448***
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Vote after unification	0.329***	0.319***	0.339***	0.328***	0.319***	0.310***
	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.063)
SPD					-1.589***	-1.588***
					(0.172)	(0.172)

CDU/CSU					-1.423***	-1.421***
					(0.183)	(0.183)
FDP					-0.471**	-0.471**
					(0.162)	(0.162)
Greens					-0.737***	-0.733***
					(0.186)	(0.186)
The Left/PDS					-1.386***	-1.385***
					(0.208)	(0.208)
Government party			-0.214***	-0.215***		
			(0.042)	(0.042)		
Constant	-5.774***	-5.780***	-5.837***	-5.843***	-4.688***	-4.696***
	(0.171)	(0.171)	(0.175)	(0.174)	(0.232)	(0.231)
<i>N</i>	1,037,363	1,037,363	1,037,363	1,037,363	1,037,363	1,037,363

Logit coefficients are displayed and standard errors in parentheses.

Levels of significance: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A4: References

Bergmann, Henning, Stefanie Bailer, Tamaki Ohmura, Thomas Saalfeld, and Ulrich Sieberer (2018a). 'BTVote Vote Characteristics', V1, Harvard Dataverse, <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/AHBBXY>.

Bergmann, Henning, Stefanie Bailer, Tamaki Ohmura, Thomas Saalfeld, and Ulrich Sieberer (2018b). 'BTVote MP Characteristics', V1, Harvard Dataverse, <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/QSFXLQ>.

Bergmann, Henning, Stefanie Bailer, Tamaki Ohmura, Thomas Saalfeld, and Ulrich Sieberer (2018c). 'BTVote Voting Behavior', V1, Harvard Dataverse, <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/24U1FR>.

Döring, Holger, and Philip Manow (2021). 'Parliaments and Governments Database (ParlGov): Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies', Development version – September 14, dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/parlgov.

Küpper, Moritz (2013). *Politik kann man lernen: Politische Seiteneinsteiger in Deutschland*. Halle (Saale): Mitteldeutscher Verlag.

E. Whose Bread I Don't Eat, his Song I Don't Sing? MPs' Outside Earnings and Dissenting Voting Behaviour

Abstract

The question whether politicians' outside earnings affect their legislative behaviour is part of a lively debate about the quality of representative democracy. However, moonlighting effects on vote defections by members of parliament (MPs) have remained underexposed yet. Based on Competing Principals Theory, it is argued that, owing to a higher degree of career-related independence, MPs with high outside earnings can be less effectively disciplined by their party and, therefore, show higher probabilities to vote against the party line. This proposition is tested quantitatively using logistic panel regressions against a new dataset of more than 115,000 individual votes in the German Bundestag (2013–2017). Empirically, the results corroborate the theoretical expectations and are robust against different specifications. The findings have important implications for our understanding of the link between politicians' career paths and their political behaviour.

1. Introduction

In March 2019, Florian Post, a member of parliament (MP) of the Social Democrats (SPD), lost his seat in the prestigious Bundestag committee for economic affairs and energy. Even though his party had to withdraw one MP for arithmetic reasons, its chief whip revealed to a news magazine that for committee assignments, the party group leadership takes, amongst others, an MP's voting behaviour into consideration (Spiegel Online 2019). Post was regarded as an opponent of the SPD party group leader at that time and repeatedly voted against the party line (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2019).

Opposing one's own party guarantees media attention and can foster an MP's popularity in the electorate (Campbell et al. 2019; Rowlands and Vander Wielen 2021; Wagner et al. 2020). However, although visible sanctions are comparatively rare (Bailer 2018), the anecdote above supports the conventional wisdom that vote defections can harm an MP's career prospects. If this is true, then how an MP will act in parliament might, conversely, be influenced by the career ambitions and prospects he or she has. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the importance of office-seeking- vis-à-vis other goals such as vote- or policy-seeking (Strøm 1997) is not equally weighted by every MP. An MP that already holds an important office in parliament or government, for example, has more to lose and a disproportionately higher incentive to toe the party line in order to secure his/her career-related achievements than an MP that doesn't expect to be promoted to offices (Benedetto and Hix 2007; Delius et al. 2013).

But what about MPs that pursue a successful career with high earnings besides their parliamentary mandate, e.g. by being a lawyer or running an own agricultural business? Perceived as leading to ‘greed, shirking and conflicts of interest’ (Geys 2013: 470), outside earnings are mostly a cause of lurid headlines – although citizens do not respond negatively to all moonlighting activities even-handedly (Campbell and Cowley 2015). Whereas existing research has repeatedly analysed whether outside earnings influence parliamentary effort (Geys and Mause 2013), moonlighting effects on MPs’ vote defections have not been systematically assessed yet – although such effects could have considerable consequences for voters’ perceptions of parties, policy outputs and the stability of governments. In this study, I will fill this research gap as follows: After a literature review, it is argued that MPs with high outside earnings have a higher propensity to vote against the party line since, due to a higher level of career-related independence, they can be less effectively disciplined by their party. Preceded by a discussion of the study design, the results of logistic panel regressions reveal that, as hypothesized, high outside earnings are significantly related with more votes against an MP’s own party. The conclusion discusses the implications of the findings.

2. State of Research: Party Unity and Moonlighting

A vast literature on party unity at different levels of observation has already led to a better understanding of the phenomenon. Studies on the party group level usually assess the impact of characteristics of the party group and/or the motion (e.g. Bergmann et al. 2016; Ceron 2015; Close 2018; Close et al. 2019; Kam 2011; Rehmert 2020; Saalfeld 1995; Stecker 2015) – supplemented by institutional variables in cross-country studies (e.g. Carey 2007; Coman 2015; Shomer 2016, 2017; Sieberer 2006). Conversely, individual-level analyses focus primarily on MP characteristics to explain their varying propensity to defect. Significant predictors of open dissent are especially an MP’s mandate and candidacy type, seniority, legislative and executive offices, electoral vulnerability, occupational background, programmatic self-positioning, local politics engagement and gender (André et al. 2015; Benedetto and Hix 2007; Bhattacharya and Papageorgiou 2019; Cowley and Childs 2003; Degner and Leuffen 2016; Gherghina and Chiru 2014; Grimmer and Powell 2013; Heuwieser 2018; Ohmura 2014; Sieberer 2010; Sieberer and Ohmura 2021; Slapin et al. 2018; Tavits 2009, 2011; Willumsen and Öhberg 2017; Zittel and Nyhuis 2019). Many of those studies explicitly or implicitly show that MPs’ career-related goals in the broader sense influence legislative behaviour. However, an empirical study that examines the role of outside earnings for an MP’s probability to defect is still lacking.

Nevertheless, MP moonlighting has already been a subject of scientific interest. To start with, many studies investigate which MP-related factors are associated with higher or lower outside earnings (see Appendix 1). Their results show that earnings seem to be high when MPs do not have much to lose and low when their political career is at stake. Hence, there might be a trade-off between an MP's career ambitions inside and outside parliament.

Concerning behavioural consequences of moonlighting, it is frequently found that more outside jobs or higher earnings decrease parliamentary effort (Arnold et al. 2014, Eggers and Hainmüller 2009; Fedele and Naticchioni 2015; Gagliarducci et al. 2010; Hurka et al. 2018b, Staat and Kuehnhanss 2017). Moreover, Geys and Mause (2016) show that British MPs who leave parliament by choice in order to pursue an extra-parliamentary career shift their work balance from parliamentary to their outside activities already in their last term. According to Mickler (2018), MPs' prior occupation and their outside activities affect Bundestag committee assignments. Taken together, there is some evidence that MPs' extra-parliamentary activities influence their parliamentary work. However, only a few studies relate MPs' outside earnings to their voting behaviour (Geys and Mause 2013): Given that moonlighting MPs have a lower propensity to vote for a stricter regulation of outside activities in the U.S. (Rosenson 2007) but not in the UK (Johnston et al. 1997), the role of financial self-interest for MPs' voting behaviour is ambiguous. Couch et al. (1992) show that public higher education expenditure is higher in those U.S. colleges having legislators on their payroll. However, we still miss evidence regarding the role of moonlighting in situations when an MP disagrees with his/her party group and has to decide whether to toe the party line or not.

3. The Argument: Impact of Outside Earnings on Dissenting Voting Behaviour

Competing Principals Theory (Carey 2007) provides an explanation of why MPs differ in their propensity to vote against the party line. According to this specification of the principal-agent framework, MPs gear their legislative behaviour towards principals that control resources they aim to obtain. The main goals of MPs include re-selection, re-election, promotion to influential and/or well-paid positions and the implementation of their desired policy objectives (Strøm 1997). Based on that, large parts of the literature discuss whether MPs aim more at their party or their voters in order to reach those goals, respectively. Subsequently, we will discuss how outside earnings could change the relationship between MPs and those two principals and whether they create an additional principal influencing their legislative behaviour.

In Germany's two-tier electoral system, district MPs have to be re-selected by local party branches and then re-elected by constituency voters. Accordingly, district MPs are expected to pay particular attention to constituency interests. If those contradict the interests of the parliamentary party group, district MPs could be more inclined than list MPs to vote against the party line (e.g. Sieberer 2010). Contrarily, list MPs depend on regional party branches to obtain promising list positions and their party's regional election result to get re-elected. Consequently, as they depend solely on their party to keep their mandate, list MPs are expected to vote in accordance with the party line more often than district MPs. However, by and large, list MPs do not get punished after dissenting votes by being detained from promising list positions (Baumann et al. 2017; Kauder et al. 2017). Additionally, the candidacy mode and re-election prospects influence the electoral pressures lasting upon an MP as well (e.g. Ohmura 2014, Sieberer and Ohmura 2021).

In order to reach their office-seeking aspirations, MPs depend solely on their party. The national party leadership and its parliamentary party group decide on the allocation of executive and parliamentary leadership positions, respectively. In order to be promoted to prestigious offices, MPs have to align closely to the party's interests, which also includes toeing the party line in parliament. Previous literature shows that party (group) leaders use office assignments to reward allegiant MPs or to punish disloyal ones (e.g. Cox and McCubbins 1993). Consequently, especially for list, but also for district MPs, parties are important principals. Accordingly, party discipline, i.e. leadership-induced unity, is a crucial pathway to the empirically high rates of voting unity in parliamentary democracies (Carey 2007; Sieberer 2006).

However, the incentive structure for toeing the party line is not the same for all MPs since the composition and influence of their principals differ. Moving beyond the debate whether the constituency's or the party's interests matter more for particular MPs, we argue that MPs with high outside earnings are less dependent from both their voter and party principals.

First, outside earnings are expected to relieve MPs from electoral pressures. If they fail to reach re-nomination or re-election in the constituency and/or the party list, they will have something to fall back on. In a survey, two German MPs answered the following regarding the arrangements they made for a possible loss of their mandate (Kreiner 2007: 265, own translations):

“To say: ‘The company is still running.’ That was the most meaningful [precaution].”

“One should not adhere to a politician’s chair, and one does not know how things will come. [My own company] was simply a means of precaution [...].”

Hence, defections as a means of signalling dedication to constituency preferences or interests are less likely for moonlighting MPs, due to lower electoral pressures.

Second, however, it is unlikely that this will bind moonlighting MPs more closely to their party principal. In order to reach prestigious offices, progressively ambitious MPs usually gear their legislative behaviour towards the party leadership that helps them reaching their office-related goals (Meserve et al. 2009; Schlesinger 1966; Sieberer and Müller 2017). Of course, most MPs would not, according to surveys, refuse an offer to be promoted to higher office (Würfel 2018) – regardless of outside earnings. Thus, when facing the choice between their party’s position and their own preferences, many of them have an incentive to act in accordance with their party. However, the costs of disciplinary sanctions at the expense of their career vary among MPs (Slapin et al. 2018) and appear to be lower for moonlighting ones. MPs that, for instance, run their own agricultural company prior to and during their mandate are at no point dependent on their party to earn their living. Additionally, MPs with high outside earnings are not limited to the political sphere when they aim to advance their career. In a survey of German MPs, some of them explicitly named financial independence and autonomy of decision towards their party as the main reasons for continuing their job in addition to their mandate (Kreiner 2007: 265) – observable in the following MP statement:

“My [outside] job was, first of all, a guarantee for my own independence. I have sometimes hinted at, tinkered with the idea of voting against the party line. [Finally], I have voted against the party line for seven or eleven times in roll-call votes.” (own translation)

The party group leadership has a toolbox of disciplinary sanctions to threaten with or to actually enforce in order to ensure unity, e.g. withdrawal of MPs from or non-promotion to a committee chair position, which guarantees them privileges like extra salary, media presence, attractive business trips and office space (Bailer 2018; Patzelt 2003). However, those sanctions do not harm moonlighting MPs’ career as much as MPs without something to fall back on (Kauder et al. 2017; van Vonno 2019). In contrast, MPs without a well-paid sideline job mostly live, in Weberian terms, ‘from’ politics. MP surveys suggest that the often-stated ‘flying splice’ from politics into leadership positions of big companies or organizations is usually subject to former top positions in politics, especially to ministers. Social decline, at least a perceived one, after losing their seat is far from being impossible for some MPs. Not all of them can easily return to their former occupation – if they had one (Byrne and Theakston 2016; Edinger and Schwarz 2009; Kreiner 2007). Thus, MPs without high outside earnings strongly depend on their party

as their ‘primary career facilitator before and within parliament’ (Ohmura et al. 2018: 169): on the one hand, to keep their mandate – probably by moving up the party list in times of decreasing party success –, on the other hand to be promoted to or kept in leadership positions. An open dissent with their party would pose them at a higher career-related risk than their moonlighting colleagues.

Since the effectiveness of party discipline is expected to be lower for them, moonlighting MPs are more than others free to represent their own policy beliefs or interests. This effect could even be amplified by the possible influence of ‘business interests’ as a further principal for MPs that earn the greater part of their living outside parliament. However, research on whether outside interests actually exert a measurable influence on MPs’ political behaviour is scarce and has, by now, produced at most indirect evidence for such an effect (Geys and Mause 2013). Outside interests could imaginably pull MPs away from the mainstream position of their party and, given the lower party discipline, motivate them to break the party line. Such an effect is not compelling, though, since, for instance, MPs with outside earnings from companies are mostly members of market-friendly parties anyway (Hurka et al. 2018a).

To conclude, we expect outside earnings to loosen the pressures of party discipline. This makes it easier for MPs to take a more independent stance from the party group leadership. Regarding their legislative voting behaviour, this leads, all else being equal, to the following empirically testable (and correlative) hypothesis:

MPs with high outside earnings have a higher probability to vote against the party line than those with no or negligible outside earnings.

4. Study Design

The hypothesis is tested against a new dataset of roll-call votes in the German Bundestag during the 18th legislative term (2013–2017). The Bundestag is regarded as one of the most powerful parliaments in Europe (Sieberer 2011) and shows – compared to other parliamentary systems – a roughly average level of intra-party dissent (Sieberer 2006). On the one hand, powerful party groups insist on the adherence to unity. On the other hand, especially the salient votes show enough variance of dissenting voting behaviour in need of explanation. Taken together, this makes the Bundestag – called a ‘party group parliament’ (Ismayr 2012) – a suitable case to test a hypothesis based on the effectiveness of party discipline. The analysis is limited to roll-call votes because they are the only source of recorded individual-level voting behaviour in

Germany. However, most of the votes are non-recorded ones (Sieberer et al. 2020; for a thorough discussion of the case selection, see Appendix 3).

Since the argument offers individual-level propositions and predictors on both the MP and vote level will be included in the model, the unit of observation is one voting decision by one MP. Based on 651 MPs (including resigned and succeeding ones) and 202 roll-call votes, there are (without absences) about 115,000 observations to be analysed. Nevertheless, there are MPs defecting from their party more often and voting decisions being more contentious within a party group than others (for descriptive figures, see Appendix 4). Thus, the observations are not independent from each other but clustered within MPs and votes since they represent multiple voting decisions for each MP. Consequently, we fit panel regression models with cluster-robust standard errors on the MP level.¹

Logistic regressions are estimated since the dependent variable is dichotomous. It measures whether an MP votes against the party line (value 1) or not (value 0). According to the definition in most studies, defection takes place if an MP differs in his/her voting behaviour from the majority of his/her party group, i.e. in one of the following three settings:

- (1) an MP votes ‘yes’ when the party majority votes ‘no’ or ‘abstention’,
- (2) an MP votes ‘no’ when the party majority votes ‘yes’ or ‘abstention’,
- (3) an MP votes ‘abstention’ when the party majority votes ‘yes’ or ‘no’.

Absences, i.e. when an MP does not vote at all, are not regarded as deviations and coded as missing observations (see Appendix 5 for a discussion of the treatment of abstentions and absences). Non-whipped votes are excluded from the main analysis because there is no party discipline enforced whose effect should be evaluated here.²

German MPs are allowed to pursue outside activities and receive sideline earnings as long as the exercise of their parliamentary mandate takes centre stage (§ 44a *Abgeordnetengesetz*). Earnings are published not by the exact amount but a ten-level scheme ranging from level 1 (1,000 to 3,500

¹ Including MP fixed effects in order to deal with the clustered data is not suitable for this analysis of a single parliamentary term given the lack of within-variance of the dependent variable for many MPs. Adding fixed effects would result in 52 or 42 percent of the MPs dropping out of the sample in models 1 and 2, respectively, who did not vote against the party line at least once. This would bias the sample against frequently dissenting MPs, thus making it less representative. Additionally, the research question would be implicitly changed if the conclusions cannot refer to all MPs but only to those voting against the party line at least once. For comparability reasons with studies estimating multilevel regression models with random intercepts for MPs (Degner and Leuffen 2016; Sieberer 2010; Willumsen and Öhberg 2017), we replicate our models using this estimation strategy (Appendix 7, models R23 and R24).

² For thorough analyses of those morality policy votes see Bauer-Blaschkowski and Mai (2019); Engler and Dümig (2017); Kauder and Potrafke (2019); Wenzelburger and Fehrenz (2018).

Euro) to level 10 (above 250,000 Euro).³ The classification allows the MPs to declare one-time, monthly or yearly earnings. To make those self-declarations comparable, the independent variable is measured by applying a two-step procedure: At first, for each MP all declared earnings are summed up on a yearly basis using the lower bound of the respective level indication (similarly Arnold et al. 2014).⁴ Thus, MPs' minimum earnings are measured. As Figure 1a shows, in about 80 percent of the MP-years, no outside earnings are reported. The percentage of MPs reaching yearly levels 1 to 3 (and higher) as defined by the Bundestag regulations is rather small (5.9, 1.9 and 2.6 percent, respectively).

Figure 1: Distribution of raw outside earnings per year




Figure 1b shows that, on the one hand, the distribution of the yearly earnings is strongly right-skewed, and on the other hand, the earnings' range is rather large. Hence, the findings could depend on – and could be biased through – the inclusion of few MPs with exceptional earnings. Additionally, raising one's yearly earnings from 100,000 at another 100,000 Euro might not have

³ Since 2005, MPs have to declare their outside earnings, but before 2013, only a (problematic) three-level scale was applied (Geys and Mause 2012). As the ten-level scale is more fine-grained and the earnings are not directly comparable to the legislative terms, the period of observation is restricted to the time of use of the ten-level scale.

⁴ Because level 10 has no upper bound and the researcher would have to set an arbitrary one, it is problematic to sum up the earnings using the mid-values of the class interval (but see Becker et al. 2009).

the same behavioural effect as raising the income from 0 to 100,000 Euro. Though, as we expect a nonlinear effect, the raw earnings per year are non-linearly transformed in a rather straightforward way.⁵ Previously, it was argued that MPs with high outside earnings defect more frequently because they have something to fall back on that makes party discipline less effective. If earnings exceed their parliamentary salary, MPs obviously do not earn their living from their legislative career. The (monthly weighted) average of an MP's basic salary (without further allowances) in the 18th legislative term was 107,573.76 Euro per year (Figure 1b, upper dashed line) – which is rather high in a European comparison (Mause, 2014). A correspondingly coded dichotomous variable reveals that 2.2 percent of the MPs have higher earnings outside than inside parliament. For these MPs, the hypothesized effect should appear without any qualification. However, it seems implausible that an MP with slightly lower outside earnings than his/her salary behaves the same way as an MP without any outside earnings. Even earnings half as much as the legislative salary (Figure 1b, lower dashed line) help MPs to make their living even if their political career comes to a sudden end. Therefore, it is likely that those MPs have, although less pronounced, a higher propensity to defect than non-moonlighting ones as well. For the sake of comparison, I code three dummy variables: 1) earnings higher than the legislative salary per year, 2) earnings between 50 and 100 percent and 3) earnings above 0, but less than half of legislative salary. Thus, the baseline category for interpretation consists of MPs without any outside earnings.

Other possible predictors of dissent have to be controlled to ensure that our results do not display spurious correlations. To start with, holding an executive or legislative office is a powerful predictor of party-compliant behaviour (recently for German MPs Bhattacharya and Papageorgiou 2019; Zittel and Nyhuis 2019). Concerning electoral pressures, there is a rich literature on a 'mandate divide' between directly and list-elected MPs concerning their voting behaviour (e.g. Sieberer 2010) and other aspects of legislative work, like committee assignments (Stratmann and Baur 2002, but Manow 2013). Some scholars identify a behavioural divide between different candidacy modes (Ohmura 2014; Stoffel 2014) which is controlled for as well.⁶ Additionally, parliamentary experience might boost an MP's self-confidence and therefore favour defections (for such a result, see Willumsen and Öhberg 2017). It is also controlled for a 'last period effect' (Bailer and Ohmura 2018; Willumsen and Goetz 2017), i.e. the

⁵ Nevertheless, raw yearly earnings are used in several studies (Arnold et al. 2014; Becker et al. 2009). Various robustness checks (Appendix 7) show that outside earnings remain a significant predictor of vote defections even when included without transformation or with most other non-linear transformations (models R1 to R12).

⁶ In robustness checks, re-election prospects are included separately as well as in interaction with candidacy type (Appendix 7, models R13 to R20), according to the recent study of Sieberer and Ohmura (2021).

abandonment of a candidacy for the following election. To keep possible election cycle effects (Willumsen and Öhberg 2017) constant, a dummy variable for votes in the election year 2017 is included. Finally, it is controlled for MPs' demographic characteristics (age, sex) and party membership. The controls on the MP level are measured on a daily (e.g. offices) or yearly (e.g. seniority) basis.

Since model 2 comprises different types of legislative motions, it includes some additional controls on the vote level. First, an interaction term between the origin of the motion (own/other party group) and the government/opposition status is included since it can be expected that government parties are most united in voting down oppositional motions, but more discordant when government bills (as compromises among the coalition partners) come to the floor. For opposition MPs, the opposite pattern can be expected. Second, a noticeable share of all legislative votes concern foreign deployments of the German armed forces. Christian Democrats and the socialist Left show a rather clear programmatic stance for or against those missions, respectively, whereas Social Democrats and Greens present themselves programmatically less determined, with the likely result that vote defections by Red-Green MPs are more easily tolerated by their respective parties than defections in other legislative votes.

For details about the operationalization and the data sources see Appendix 6.

5. Results

Table 1 shows the regression results, presented in logits. Model 1 is restricted to votes on government bills (nearly one third of all individual votes) which usually represent the publicly visible cases of dissent. In these salient decisions, presumably rather strong party discipline is enforced. Consequently, strategic incentives like subordinating to party discipline play a more important role for individual voting behaviour than policy incentives (Bräuninger et al. 2016). If the hypothesis cannot be confirmed in model 1, then it is likely to be rejected in model 2 consisting of all whipped legislative decisions as well since in less salient votes, disciplinary pressure is presumably lower.

Table 1: Results of the logistic panel regression analysis

	(1) votes on gov. bills	(2) all votes
Outside earnings: above 100% of legislative salary	1.043*** (0.304)	1.005*** (0.266)
Outside earnings: between 50% and 100% of legislative salary	0.786+ (0.471)	0.574 (0.446)
Outside earnings: above 0%, below 50% of legislative salary	0.064 (0.178)	0.006 (0.176)
Outside earnings: none	reference category	
Outside activities: number (log)	-0.274 (0.212)	-0.415* (0.202)
Parliamentary office	-1.071*** (0.248)	-1.194*** (0.223)
Executive office	-3.463*** (0.734)	-4.106*** (0.748)
Parliamentary experience (years)	0.031* (0.013)	0.037** (0.014)
Direct candidacy only	-0.051 (0.236)	-0.058 (0.245)
List candidacy only	-0.364 (0.305)	-0.468 (0.304)
Direct mandate	0.103 (0.191)	0.150 (0.189)
No candidacy 2017	-0.200 (0.239)	-0.030 (0.134)
Age (years)	-0.002 (0.007)	0.004 (0.007)
Gender (male = 1)	0.030 (0.072)	0.000 (0.078)
Election year (votes in 2017 = 1)	0.579*** (0.116)	0.128+ (0.075)
Social Democratic MP	1.000*** (0.180)	
Green MP	0.341 (0.240)	
Socialist MP	0.059 (0.238)	
Christian Democratic MP	reference category	
Government MP		-1.877*** (0.167)
Own motion		-4.370*** (0.983)
Own motion x Government MP (interaction term)		5.603*** (0.982)
Bundeswehr deployment		-1.998*** (0.197)
Bundeswehr deployment x Red-Green (interaction term)		2.660*** (0.260)
Red-Green		0.825*** (0.161)
Constant	-4.572*** (0.404)	-4.470*** (0.346)
Wald Chi ²	115.21	586.06
N (MP voting decisions)	33,689	115,442

Displayed are logged odds (logits) and cluster-robust standard errors in brackets.

Levels of significance: *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; + $p < 0.10$.


For both samples, the coefficient of the key independent variable has the expected positive sign and shows a statistically highly significant effect ($p < 0.001$): MPs who obtain higher outside earnings than their legislative salary have, *ceteris paribus*, a higher probability to vote against the party line than MPs without outside earnings. For MPs earning between 50 and 100 percent of their legislative salary outside parliament, a similar positive tendency is shown in the estimates, although the effect is, as expected, weaker and not statistically significant at levels suitable for the large sample. No statistically significant difference in their voting behaviour is found between MPs with comparatively low and those without any outside earnings as well. Thus, our hypothesis is supported by the data. The results can be interpreted as outside earnings having only an effect on legislative behaviour if they are high enough to insulate an MP from the negative career-related consequences of disciplinary measures.

With regard to the control variables, the number of outside activities does only decrease the probability of dissent significantly in the full sample. That a high number of (different) outside activities alone does not go along with more vote defections is not surprising. It usually represents a constellation where an MP has many small arrangements (like paid speeches or book contracts) with a variety of sponsors that lead mostly to one-time payments rather than to a persistent source of income. Like in other studies, MPs with legislative and, even more, executive offices have a significantly lower probability to openly oppose their own party. In contrast, a greater parliamentary experience correlates with more frequent vote defections. In both samples, neither a mandate nor a candidacy divide could be detected. Additionally, MPs do not defect more often in their last term in parliament. In turn, MPs have a higher probability to vote against the party line in votes on (above-average salient) government bills in the year of the 2017 federal election than in the years before. Finally, MPs' age and gender do not correlate with vote defections. In the full sample, the predictors on the vote level have the expected significant effects which shows that characteristics of the vote (differentiated between party camps) are worth to be included in the model (see also Stecker 2015).

The logits displayed in Table 1 are not directly interpretable with regard to the substantive effect size. Therefore, Figure 2 shows how the probability of dissent changes when MPs obtain different levels of outside earnings. All controls are set to their observed values as suggested by Hanmer and Kalkan (2013) for models with dummy variables. According to the average marginal effects (AMEs), the probability of casting a vote against the party line regarding government bills rises, *ceteris paribus*, at about 2.5 percentage points if an MP has outside earnings above his/her legislative salary. Concerning all legislative votes, the AME of high outside earnings is noticeably smaller (probability increase of 1.6 percentage points) but still

statistically significant. Since the overall share of votes against one's own party is rather low, the AMEs show rather substantive effects. In contrast, as the regression coefficients already suggested, outside earnings below an MP's legislative salary do not have a statistically significant effect on the probability of defection.

Figure 2: Average marginal effects of outside earnings on dissenting voting behaviour



Additionally performed robustness checks indicate that the conclusions drawn above are neither contingent upon the measurement of the independent variable, the controls regarding electoral pressures, the estimation strategy, the unit of observation nor upon the inclusion of particular MPs (see Appendix 7 for full results).

Since the theoretical argument rests on the effectiveness of party discipline, only whipped votes were included in the main regression models. However, in three roll-call votes in the election period under study, MPs were explicitly released from party discipline when deciding on morality policy issues. As a final analytical step, MPs' voting behaviour in those 'free votes' will be analysed. First, t-tests on the average 'defection rates' between MPs with high outside earnings and those without do not show statistically significant group differences. Second, high outside earnings are not associated with a significantly higher probability of 'vote defection' in multivariate logistic regression analyses of each of the 'free votes' (see Appendix 2 for full

results). To conclude, high outside earnings go along with more vote defections when party discipline is enforced whereas moonlighting MPs' voting behaviour does not differ from their colleagues when this instrument of leadership-induced unity is suspended. Hence, the comparison of whipped and non-whipped votes underscores the discipline-based interpretation of the outside earnings effect derived in the theory section.

6. Conclusion

The aim of this study was to investigate empirically whether outside earnings are associated with legislative behaviour, precisely with MPs' propensity to vote against the party line. A brief sketch of the literature revealed that the determinants of dissenting voting behaviour are a rather well-studied topic in legislative research. However, the role of moonlighting therein has neither been thoroughly theorized nor empirically examined yet. Based on insights from Competing Principals Theory, it was argued that, owing to a higher degree of financial and career-related independence, MPs with high outside earnings are less dependent on electoral pressures, but first and foremost less effectively disciplined by their party. Hence, it was hypothesized that MPs with high outside earnings have, everything else being equal, a higher probability to vote against the party line than their colleagues. Methodologically, first, a new dataset containing MPs' outside activities and earnings as well as other characteristics and their voting behaviour in the 18th legislative term of the German Bundestag (2013–2017) was compiled. Second, in order to account for clustering of legislative dissent both on the MP and the vote level, the hypothesis was tested quantitatively using logistic panel regressions and considering a battery of controls on both levels against more than 115,000 individual voting decisions. Empirically, the results corroborate the hypothesis of a significantly higher probability of dissent for MPs that obtain the bulk of their earnings outside parliament.

This paper's headline, the slightly adapted proverb 'Whose bread I don't eat, his song I don't (always) sing?', hints at the causal mechanism that is likely to be at work behind the observed relationship. Nevertheless, despite the theoretical considerations about why outside earnings could loosen the pressures of party discipline and thus could make MPs more free to vote against the party line, the behavioural hypothesis tested in this paper remains a correlative one. Whereas the results reveal an empirical relationship between moonlighting and vote defections, the study design is not able to ultimately verify the presented causal mechanism based on party discipline. Likewise, it does not prove that 'business interests' are causally responsible for the observed higher defection rates of moonlighting MPs. On the one hand, the strength of party

discipline towards individual MPs could not be directly measured and set into relation with their voting behaviour. On the other hand, it cannot be ruled out definitely that non-observed MP-related factors (e.g. character traits like ego or drive) account for both high outside earnings and high defection rates which could thus bias the results.⁷ Apart from that – and that is why the proverb in the paper’s title ends with a question mark – we must not forget that MPs’ decision making process is more complex than a simple ‘bread-song question’ and votes against the party line remain a rare (yet potentially pivotal) phenomenon, even for MPs with high outside earnings. Voting with, not against one’s own party is the default pattern for most, if not all, MPs.

This study adds a further nuance to the fast-growing literature on the influence of MP characteristics, particularly career-related ones, on their legislative behaviour. In normative terms, its results are ambiguous: On the one hand, the maintenance of party unity is crucial for responsible party government in parliamentary systems since it connects the citizens’ voting decisions to identifiable blocs in parliament which, in turn, the government depends on (Bowler et al. 1999). If this chain of delegation (Müller 2000) is broken due to high-earning, independent-minded MPs, then the accountability of elected parties and, consecutively, governments could be at stake. On the other hand, voting against unpopular government bills is rather popular in the electorate which appreciates independent-minded and acting MPs instead of ‘lock-step partisan behaviour’ (Campbell et al. 2019: 109). Insofar it remains open for future studies to examine if this valence effect of dissent outweighs the (predominantly) negative image of MPs’ outside activities in a direct comparison. Moreover, while this study has shown that moonlighting correlates with a more independent voting behaviour, it remains to be investigated whether moonlighting, in turn, results in a greater dependence on the MPs’ outside interests. Finally, the findings of this first study on that topic have to be replicated for longer observation periods and in other contexts. That might be other parliamentary or presidential systems like the U.S. where party unity has in part other determinants and, institutionally driven, a lower baseline level (Carey 2007). Knowing what drives MPs’ legislative behaviour is indispensable for a better understanding and assessment of the functioning of every representative democracy.

7. References

André, Audrey, Sam Depauw, and Stefanie Beyens (2015). ‘Party loyalty and electoral dealignment’, *Party Politics*, 21:6, 970–81.

⁷ I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing to this important caveat.

- Arnold, Felix, Björn Kauder, and Niklas Potrafke (2014). 'Outside earnings, absence, and activity: evidence from German parliamentarians', *European Journal of Political Economy*, 36, 147–57.
- Bailer, Stefanie (2018). 'To use the whip or not: Whether and when party group leaders use disciplinary measures to achieve voting unity', *International Political Science Review*, 39:2, 163–77.
- Bailer, Stefanie, and Tamaki Ohmura (2018). 'Exploring, maintaining, and disengaging – the three phases of a legislator's life', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 43:3, 493–520.
- Bauer-Blaschkowski, Svenja, and Philipp Mai (2019). 'Von „Abweichlern“ und „Überzeugungstätern“'. Eine Analyse des Abstimmungsverhaltens im 18. Deutschen Bundestag', in: Reimut Zohlnhöfer and Thomas Saalfeld (eds.), *Zwischen Stillstand, Politikwandel und Krisenmanagement: Eine Bilanz der Regierung Merkel 2013-2017*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 219–56.
- Baumann, Markus, Marc Debus, and Tristan Klingelhöfer (2017). 'Keeping one's seat: the competitiveness of MP renomination in mixed-member electoral systems', *The Journal of Politics*, 79:3, 979–94.
- Becker, Johannes, Andreas Peichl, and Johannes Rincke (2009). 'Politicians' outside earnings and electoral competition', *Public Choice*, 140:3–4, 379–94.
- Benedetto, Giacomo, and Simon Hix (2007). 'The Rejected, the Ejected, and the Dejected: Explaining Government Rebels in the 2001–2005 British House of Commons', *Comparative Political Studies*, 40:7, 755–81.
- Bergmann, Henning, Stefanie Bailer, Tamaki Ohmura, Thomas Saalfeld, and Ulrich Sieberer (2016). 'Namentliche Abstimmungen im Bundestag 1949 bis 2013: Befunde aus einem neuen Datensatz', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 47:1, 26–50.
- Bhattacharya, Caroline, and Achillefs Papageorgiou (2019). 'Are Backbenchers Fighting Back? Intra-Party Contestation in German Parliament Debates on the Greek Crisis', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 72:2, 425–44.
- Bowler, Shaun, David M. Farrell, and Richard S. Katz (1999). 'Party Cohesion, Party Discipline, and Parliaments', in: Shaun Bowler (ed.), *Party discipline and parliamentary government*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 3–22.
- Bräuninger, Thomas, Jochen Müller, and Christian Stecker (2016). 'Modeling preferences using roll call votes in parliamentary systems', *Political Analysis*, 24:2, 189–210.
- Byrne, Christopher, and Kevin Theakston (2016). 'Leaving the house: the experience of former members of parliament who left the House of Commons in 2010', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 69:3, 686–707.
- Campbell, Rosie, and Philip Cowley (2015). 'Attitudes to moonlighting politicians: evidence from the United Kingdom', *Journal of Experimental Political Science*, 2:1, 63–72.
- Campbell, Rosie, Philip Cowley, Nick Vivyan, and Markus Wagner (2019). 'Legislator dissent as a valence signal', *British Journal of Political Science*, 49:1, 105–25.

- Carey, John M. (2007). 'Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting', *American Journal of Political Science*, 51:1, 92–107.
- Ceron, Andrea (2015). 'Brave rebels stay home: Assessing the effect of intra-party ideological heterogeneity and party whip on roll-call votes', *Party Politics*, 21:2, 246–58.
- Close, Caroline (2018). 'Parliamentary party loyalty and party family: The missing link?', *Party Politics*, 24:2, 209–19.
- Close, Caroline, Sergiu Gherghina, and Vivien Sierens (2019). 'Prompting Legislative Agreement and Loyalty: What Role for Intra-Party Democracy?', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 72:2, 387–405.
- Coman, Emanuel E. (2015). 'Institutions and Vote Unity in Parliaments: Evidence from 33 National Chambers', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 21:3, 360–89.
- Couch, Jim F., Keith E. Atkinson, and William F. Shughart (1992). 'Ethics laws and the outside earnings of politicians: the case of Alabama's 'legislator-educators'', *Public Choice*, 73:2, 135–45.
- Cowley, Philip, and Sarah Childs (2003). 'Too Spineless to Rebel? New Labour's Women MPs', *British Journal of Political Science*, 33:3, 345–65.
- Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins (1993). *Legislative Leviathan. Party Government in the House*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Degner, Hanno, and Dirk Leuffen (2016). 'Keynes, Friedman, or Monnet? Explaining parliamentary voting behaviour on fiscal aid for euro area member states', *West European Politics*, 39:6, 1139–59.
- Delius, Martin F., Michael Koß, and Christian Stecker (2013). '„Ich erkenne also Fraktionsdisziplin grundsätzlich auch an...“ Innerfraktioneller Dissens in der SPD-Fraktion der Großen Koalition 2005 bis 2009', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 44:3, 546–66.
- Edinger, Michael, and Bertram Schwarz (2009). *Leben nach dem Mandat. Eine Studie zu ehemaligen Abgeordneten*, <http://www.sowi.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/mam/content/pw1/sfbheft35.pdf>.
- Eggers, Andrew C., and Jens Hainmueller (2009). 'MPs for sale? Returns to office in postwar British politics', *American Political Science Review*, 103:4, 513–33.
- Engler, Fabian, and Kathrin Dümig (2017). 'Political Parties and MPs' Morality Policy Voting Behaviour: Evidence from Germany', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 70:3, 548–68.
- Fedele, Alessandro, and Paolo Naticchioni (2015). 'Moonlighting politicians: motivation matters!', *German Economic Review*, 17:2, 127–56.
- Gagliarducci, Stefano, Tommaso Nannicini, and Paolo Naticchioni (2010). 'Moonlighting politicians', *Journal of Public Economics*, 94:9–10, 688–99.
- Geys, Benny (2013). 'Election cycles in MPs' outside interests? The UK House of Commons, 2005–2010', *Political Studies*, 61:2, 462–72.
- Geys, Benny, and Karsten Mause (2012). 'Delegation, accountability and legislator moonlighting: agency problems in Germany', *German Politics*, 21:3, 255–73.

- Geys, Benny, and Karsten Mause (2013). 'Moonlighting politicians: a survey and research agenda', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 19:1, 76–97.
- Geys, Benny, and Karsten Mause (2016). 'The limits of electoral control: evidence from last-term politicians', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 41:4, 873–98.
- Gherghina, Sergiu, and Mihail Chiru (2014). 'Determinants of legislative voting loyalty under different electoral systems: Evidence from Romania', *International Political Science Review*, 35:5, 523–41.
- Grimmer, Justin, and Eleanor N. Powell (2013). 'Congressmen in Exile: The Politics and Consequences of Involuntary Committee Removal', *The Journal of Politics*, 75:4, 907–20.
- Hanmer, Michael J., and Kerem Ozan Kalkan (2013). 'Behind the curve: clarifying the best approach to calculating predicted probabilities and marginal effects from limited dependent variable models', *American Journal of Political Science*, 57:1, 263–77.
- Heuwieser, Raphael J. (2018). 'Submissive Lobby Fodder or Assertive Political Actors? Party Loyalty of Career Politicians in the UK House of Commons, 2005–15', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 43:2, 305–41.
- Hurka, Steffen, William T. Daniel, and Lukas Obholzer (2018a). 'Determinants of moonlighting in the European Parliament', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 24:1, 127–47.
- Hurka, Steffen, Lukas Obholzer, and William T. Daniel (2018b). 'When time is money: sideline jobs, ancillary income and legislative effort', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 25:5, 651–69.
- Ismayr, Wolfgang (2012). *Der Deutsche Bundestag*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
- Jann, Ben (2014). 'Plotting regression coefficients and other estimates', *The Stata Journal*, 14:4, 708–37.
- Johnston Ron J., Charles J. Pattie, and Dave J. Rossiter (1997). 'Sleaze, constituency and dissent: voting on Nolan in the House of Commons', *Area*, 29:1, 20–33.
- Kam, Christopher J. (2011). *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kauder, Björn, and Niklas Potrafke (2019). 'Conservative Politicians and Voting on Same-Sex Marriage', *German Economic Review*, 20:4, 600–17.
- Kauder, Björn, Niklas Potrafke, and Marina Riem (2017). 'Do parties punish MPs for voting against the party line?', *CESifo Economic Studies*, 63:3, 317–32.
- Kreiner, Maria (2007). 'Amt auf Zeit. Eine explorative Studie zum beruflichen und politischen Verbleib ehemaliger Bundestagsabgeordneter', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 38:2, 261–76.
- Manow, Philip (2013). 'Mixed rules, different roles? An analysis of the typical pathways into the Bundestag and of MPs' parliamentary behaviour', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 19:3, 287–308.
- Mause, Karsten (2014). 'Self-serving legislators? An analysis of the salary-setting institutions of 27 EU parliaments', *Constitutional Political Economy*, 25:2, 154–76.

- Meserve, Stephen A., Daniel Pemstein, and William T. Bernhard (2009). 'Political Ambition and Legislative Behavior in the European Parliament', *The Journal of Politics*, 71:3, 1015–32.
- Mickler, Tim A. (2018). 'Who gets what and why? Committee assignments in the German Bundestag', *West European Politics*, 41:2, 517–39.
- Müller, Wolfgang C. (2000). 'Political parties in parliamentary democracies: making delegation and accountability work', *European Journal of Political Research*, 37:3, 309–33.
- Ohmura, Tamaki (2014). 'When your Name is on the List, it is Time to Party: The Candidacy Divide in a Mixed-Member Proportional System', *Representation*, 50:1, 69–82.
- Ohmura, Tamaki, Stefanie Bailer, Peter Meißner, and Peter Selb (2018). 'Party animals, career changers and other pathways into parliament', *West European Politics*, 41:1, 169–95.
- Patzelt, Werner J. (2003). 'Party Cohesion and Party Discipline in German Parliaments', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 9:4, 102–15.
- Rehmer, Jochen (2020). 'Candidacy Eligibility Criteria and Party Unity', *Comparative Political Studies*, 53:8, 1298–325.
- Rosenson, Beth A. (2007). 'Explaining legislators' position on outside income limits: voting on honoraria ceilings in the U.S. Senate, 1981–1983', *Public Choice*, 133:1–2, 111–28.
- Rowlands, Laurent M., and Ryan J. Vander Wielen (2021). 'Time-dependent legislative behavior and election outcomes', *Party Politics*, 27:3, 565–80.
- Saalfeld, Thomas (1995). *Parteisoldaten und Rebellen. Eine Untersuchung zur Geschlossenheit der Fraktionen im Deutschen Bundestag (1949-1990)*. Opladen: Leske+Budrich.
- Schlesinger, Joseph A. (1966). *Ambition and Politics*. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Shomer, Yael (2016). 'The electoral environment and legislator dissent', *Comparative Politics*, 48:4, 557–75.
- Shomer, Yael (2017). 'The Conditional Effect of Electoral Systems and Intraparty Candidate Selection Processes on Parties' Behavior', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 42:1, 63–96.
- Sieberer, Ulrich (2006). 'Party unity in parliamentary democracies: A comparative analysis', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 12:2, 150–78.
- Sieberer, Ulrich (2010). 'Behavioral consequences of mixed electoral systems: Deviating voting behavior of district and list MPs in the German Bundestag', *Electoral Studies*, 29:3, 484–96.
- Sieberer, Ulrich (2011). 'The institutional power of Western European parliaments: a multidimensional analysis', *West European Politics*, 34:4, 731–54.
- Sieberer, Ulrich, and Wolfgang C. Müller (2017). 'Aiming higher: the consequences of progressive ambition among MPs in European parliaments', *European Political Science Review*, 9:1, 27–50.

- Sieberer, Ulrich, and Tamaki Ohmura (2021). 'Mandate type, electoral safety, and defections from the party line: The conditional mandate divide in the German Bundestag, 1949–2013', *Party Politics*, 27:4, 704–15.
- Sieberer, Ulrich, Thomas Saalfeld, Tamaki Ohmura, Henning Bergmann, and Stefanie Bailer (2020). 'Roll-Call Votes in the German Bundestag: A New Dataset, 1949–2013', *British Journal of Political Science*, 50:3, 1137–45.
- Slapin, Jonathan B., Justin H. Kirkland, Joseph A. Lazzaro, Patrick A. Leslie, and Tom O'Grady (2018). 'Ideology, grandstanding, and strategic party disloyalty in the British parliament', *American Political Science Review*, 112:1, 15–30.
- Spiegel Online (2019). 'Nahles will Kritiker kaltstellen', <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/spd-andreanahles-will-kritiker-florian-post-kaltstellen-a-1257947.html>.
- Staat, Christian, and Colin R. Kuehnhanss (2017). 'Outside earnings, electoral systems and legislative effort in the European Parliament', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 55:2, 368–86.
- Stecker, Christian (2015). 'How effects on party unity vary across votes', *Party Politics*, 21:5, 791–802.
- Stoffel, Michael F. (2014). 'MP Behavior in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems', *Electoral Studies*, 35, 78–87.
- Stratmann, Thomas, and Martin Baur (2002). 'Plurality rule, proportional representation, and the German Bundestag: How incentives to pork-barrel differ across electoral systems', *American Journal of Political Science*, 46:3, 506–14.
- Strøm, Kaare (1997). 'Rules, reasons and routines: legislative roles in parliamentary democracies', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 3:1, 151–74.
- Süddeutsche Zeitung (2019). 'SPD straft Florian Post ab', <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/muenchen/florian-post-spdbundestag-straefe-1.4379323>.
- Tavits, Margit (2009). 'The Making of Mavericks: Local Loyalties and Party Defection', *Comparative Political Studies*, 42:6, 793–815.
- Tavits, Margit (2011). 'Power within Parties: The Strength of the Local Party and MP Independence in Postcommunist Europe', *American Journal of Political Science*, 55:4, 923–36.
- van Vonno, Cynthia M.C. (2019). 'Achieving party unity in the Netherlands: Representatives' sequential decision-making mechanisms at three levels of Dutch government', *Party Politics*, 25:5, 664–78.
- Wagner, Markus, Konstantin Glinitzer, and Nick Vivyan (2020). 'Costly Signals: Voter Responses to Parliamentary Dissent in Austria, Britain, and Germany', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 45:4, 645–78.

- Wenzelburger, Georg, and Sabrina Fehrenz (2018). 'Die Union und die 'Ehe für Alle'. Bestimmungsfaktoren des Abstimmungsverhaltens in der CDU/CSU-Fraktion im Bundestag', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 49:3, 512–30.
- Willumsen, David M., and Klaus H. Goetz (2017). 'Set Free? Impending Retirement and Legislative Behaviour in the UK', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 70:2, 254–79.
- Willumsen, David M., and Patrik Öhberg (2017). 'Toe the line, break the whip: explaining floor dissent in parliamentary democracies', *West European Politics*, 40:4, 688–716.
- Würfel, Maximilian (2018). 'Life after the Bundestag: an analysis of the postparliamentary careers of German MPs', *German Politics*, 27:3, 295–316.
- Zittel, Thomas, and Dominic Nyhuis (2019). 'Two Faces of Party Unity: Roll-Call Behavior and Vote Explanations in the German Bundestag', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 72:2, 406–24.

8. Appendix

A1: Studies with Outside Activities or Earnings as a Dependent Variable

Table 1-Appendix: Studies on the extent of moonlighting and their main findings

Study	Study context	Main finding
Becker et al. 2009	Bundestag (Germany), 2005-2007	A high degree of electoral competition (close race in the electoral district) leads to significantly lower outside earnings.
Geys 2013	House of Commons (UK), 2005-2010	MPs have a significantly lower probability of pursuing outside activities in election years, especially electorally vulnerable MPs.
Geys 2015	Bundestag (Germany), 2005-2007	An attractive physical appearance leads to higher outside earnings of female MPs, especially in private-sector jobs.
Geys and Mause 2014	Bundestag (Germany), 2005-2009	Female MPs hold fewer sideline jobs, especially in the private sector, than male MPs.
Hurka et al. 2018	European Parliament, 2009-2014	The amount of outside activities and earnings is significantly higher for centre-right party groups. Additionally, high earnings are dependent on male gender, university degree and high GDP per capita in the country of origin.
Maddox 2004	State Legislatures (USA), 1998	The higher the legislative salary, the lower the probability that MPs pursue an outside career parallel to their mandate.

A2: Voting Behaviour in Parliamentary Free Votes (2013-2017)

During the Bundestag legislative term under study, votes on three morality policy-related subjects took place where the MPs were explicitly released from party discipline: on the criminal liability of commercial euthanasia (November 6, 2015, roll-call vote 3 of this day), on the extension of pharmaceutical tests on dementia patients (November 9, 2016, roll-call vote 3) and on the introduction and full equalization of same-sex marriage (June 30, 2017, roll-call vote 1). Without the guidance of party discipline, these voting decisions reveal MPs' policy preferences to a greater extent than whipped votes.⁸

For the analyses below, it will be focused on the final passage votes; procedural and other preparatory votes will not be taken into consideration. Table 2 shows the percentage of MPs voting against the mainstream (i.e., majority) of their parliamentary party group in the three morality policy-related decisions. It reveals that MPs with high outside earnings – meaning MPs

⁸ Empirical evidence suggests that MP and constituency characteristics still play a certain role for morality policy voting behaviour (see, e.g. Baumann et al. 2015 for the German case or Hibbing and Marsh 1987 for the UK). Nevertheless, Engler and Dümig (2017: 548) find that even without enforced discipline, party membership is a key predictor of MPs' voting behaviour in the German Bundestag on morality policy issues and conclude that 'parties are groups of people who share common values'. For similar empirical results concerning the British case, see Cowley and Stuart 2010; Raymond 2017; Raymond and Overby 2016; Raymond and Worth 2017 and for the Canadian parliament Overby et al. 1998.

with outside earnings higher than their legislative salary (see the chapter ‘Study Design’ in the original article for details) – vote *less* often against the majority of their colleagues in two of three votes. Only in one vote, high-earning MPs deviate slightly more often from the policy mainstream of their party group. In order to investigate whether there are statistically significant differences in morality policy voting of MPs with and without high outside earnings, t-tests were performed against the null hypothesis of equal group means of MPs with and without high outside earnings. Their results reveal that MPs with high outside earnings do not show a significantly different voting pattern in ‘free votes’ than their colleagues with low or without any outside earnings.

Table 2-Appendix: Party unity in morality policy votes during the 18th Bundestag term (2013-2017)

Subject	Percent of MPs voting against the majority of their party		t-test (group differences)
	MPs without high outside earnings	MPs with high outside earnings	<i>p</i> (H: difference ≠ 0)
Euthanasia	26.146	15.385	0.328
Pharmaceutical tests on dementia patients	26.631	30.769	0.764
Same-sex marriage	12.766	8.333	0.609

Moreover, for a multivariate test of outside earning effects on MPs’ voting behaviour in parliamentary free votes, logistic regressions were estimated for each of those votes. The dependent variable measures whether or not an MP votes against the majority of his/her party group. The results (table 3) show that outside earnings exceeding an MP’s legislative salary are not a significant predictor of voting behaviour in any of the three votes.⁹ In contrast to votes where MPs are expected to vote in line with the party group leadership, high outside earnings do not lead to more defections in votes where MPs are released from party discipline. The same is true for MP characteristics that also indicate a high level of disciplinary pressure on an MP, namely whether an MP holds a leadership position in parliament or in the executive. This supports our theoretical argument that outside earnings loosen the pressure of party discipline in whipped votes, whereas they do not influence MPs’ legislative behaviour in situations where party discipline is suspended. For more thorough analyses of those morality policy votes see Bauer-Blaschkowski and Mai 2019; Engler and Dümig 2017; Kauder and Potrafke 2019; Wenzelburger and Fehrenz 2018.

⁹ Low outside earnings (i.e., below an MP’s legislative salary) seem to favour vote dissent in the vote on the introduction of same-sex marriage. Since our argument focuses on high outside earnings, this result does not contradict our argument.

Table 3-Appendix: Results of logistic regressions – determinants of voting dissent in morality policy votes

	Euthanasia	Pharmaceutical tests on dementia patients	Same-sex marriage
Outside earnings: above 100% of legislative salary	-0.314 (0.823)	-0.001 (0.639)	-0.381 (1.105)
Outside earnings: between 50% and 100% of legislative salary	-0.942 (1.081)	0.391 (0.659)	2.092* (1.017)
Outside earnings: above 0%, below 50% of legislative salary	0.063 (0.284)	-0.283 (0.296)	0.913** (0.341)
Outside earnings: none		reference category	
Outside activities: number (log)	0.520 (0.325)	-0.191 (0.307)	-0.256 (0.421)
Parliamentary office	-0.092 (0.303)	0.302 (0.281)	-0.645 (0.467)
Executive office	-0.172 (0.428)	0.097 (0.401)	0.548 (0.518)
Parliamentary experience (years)	0.012 (0.018)	0.025 (0.018)	-0.043 (0.028)
Direct candidacy only	-0.497 (0.449)	0.031 (0.326)	-1.424* (0.554)
List candidacy only	-0.998 (0.650)	0.380 (0.428)	1.320** (0.484)
Direct mandate	-0.416 (0.266)	0.250 (0.222)	1.497*** (0.307)
Age (years)	-0.001 (0.011)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.031* (0.014)
Gender (male = 1)	-0.182 (0.205)	-0.044 (0.162)	0.121 (0.166)
Social Democratic MP	0.987*** (0.256)		
Green MP	0.453 (0.382)		
Socialist MP	0.093 (0.421)		
Christian Democratic MP	reference category		
Constant	-1.424* (0.654)	-0.887 (0.578)	-0.789 (0.728)
Log Likelihood	-318.94	-332.01	-208.17
Pseudo R ²	0.074	0.014	0.121
N (MPs)	602	580	623

Displayed are logged odds (logits), with standard errors in brackets.

Levels of significance: *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; + $p < 0.10$.

Dependent variable: vote against the majority of the own party by one MP (then value 1, otherwise 0).

No party dummies were included for the analysis of the votes on pharmaceutical tests and same-sex marriage since party membership predicts the voting decisions for some parties perfectly.

A3: A Note on Roll-Call Votes as a Data Source

Being the ‘bread and butter’ (Hix et al., 2018) of legislative research, roll-call votes are frequently used to analyse party unity and other aspects of MPs’ legislative behaviour. In the German parliament, roll-call votes have to be requested by at least 5 percent of the MPs (§ 52 Bundestag Rules of Procedure) and thus represent not the common voting procedure in the Bundestag. According to Sieberer et al. (2020), only about 5 percent of all final passage votes have been recorded ones in the preceding legislative periods (1949-2013).

According to the literature, it can be expected that – as roll-call votes have to be requested – this is done strategically by the party group leadership in order to reach two goals: disciplining and signalling. To enforce party discipline later on, parliamentary party group leaders rely on roll-call votes to monitor individual MP behaviour. Other purposes of roll-call votes are to signal policy positions to a party’s environment, e.g. the electorate or competitor parties, and to blame the latter for low cohesion on dividing issues (Carrubba et al. 2006: 694). Consequently, being no representative sample of all votes, data on party unity as well as on the dimensionality of the policy space that is based on roll-call votes is expected to be biased (Carrubba et al. 2006).


In a more recent study, Hix et al. (2018) argue that, theoretically, this is not necessarily the case: If, for example, the members of a party group are both ideologically split on a highly salient issue that the requesting party might use for signalling party positions and disciplined by a recorded vote on that issue, positive and negative biases of party unity might cancel each other out. Indeed, empirically, there is no statistically significant difference in party unity in the European Parliament in times when all votes were taken by roll call compared to the situation when roll-call votes had to be requested.

Even if there were a selection bias in terms of contents of roll calls and the *level* of party unity in those votes (Carrubba et al. 2008: 568; Crisp and Driscoll 2012), this would not automatically result in biased inferences regarding the *determinants* of party unity. There are no evident reasons to expect outside earnings having a different impact on dissenting voting behaviour in settings with either a higher or lower actual level of party unity.

A4: Distribution and Clustering of the Dependent Variable

It can be expected, theoretically, that dissenting votes are not equally distributed both among all MPs and all votes. In the theoretical part of the article, it was argued that (and why) some MPs should be more prone to vote against the party line than others. Additionally, some votes might be more controversial than others, leading to different baseline levels of dissent among the votes.

Figures 1-Appendix and 2-Appendix: Proportion of dissenting votes by each MP, grouped by party (left) and mean percentage of dissenting votes by party group and type of motion (right)



Empirically, figures 1 und 2, which visualize the distribution of the dependent variable, hint at the expected clustering structure. The boxplots in figure 1 show, first, that the proportion of dissenting votes, computed for each MP in relation to all of his or her votes, is strongly right-skewed. Dissenting voting behaviour is thus a rare phenomenon: The median MP of each party group votes in 0 (CDU/CSU, Christian democrats) to below 3 (Greens) percent of all the legislative decisions (he/she attended) against the party line. While the Social democratic (SPD) and the Socialist Left party MPs have a similar median proportion of dissent (about 1 percent dissenting votes), the variance among SPD MPs is larger and there are several MPs who deviate from the party line in 20 percent of the votes and more – a phenomenon that cannot be observed in the other party groups. Overall, the share of dissenting votes is 1.77 for all MPs and motions.

Conversely, figure 2 shows the clustering on the vote level, interacted with the party group. It shows that the amount of intra-party dissent strongly depends, except for the Left party, on the type of motion on the floor. For instance, foreign deployments of the German armed forces (Bundeswehr) are rather controversial among Social democratic and Green MPs. In addition, it appears that Christian democrats (CDU/CSU) and SPD as the governing parties during the legislative period under study are more divided on their own bills than on motions brought into parliament by opposition parties, whereas the latter are rather united concerning their own motions. Thus, in order to obtain unbiased results, clustering on the MP and the vote level has to be taken into account by, on the one hand, the choice of the estimation technique and, on the other hand, by including some controls on the vote level, especially type of motion, in addition to MP level variables.

The studied roll-call votes concerned 112 motions by the federal government or (to a small extent) the governing parliamentary parties and 90 motions submitted by the opposition parties. Among the government *motions*, in 54 cases there was decided on missions of the German armed forces abroad. The remaining government *bills* mostly represent highly salient legislative projects, such as the bailout programmes during the Eurozone crisis, social and migration policies.

A5: Measurement of the Dependent Variable

With regard to the measurement of dissenting voting behaviour, two issues have to be discussed. First, some studies differentiate between a ‘soft’ deviation – such as an abstention while the party majority votes with ‘yes’ or ‘no’ – and a ‘hard’ deviation – if the MP votes with ‘no’ while the majority of the party group votes with ‘yes’. Ceron (2015: 248) argues that abstentions (as well as absences, see below) are ‘hardly ever trivial or neutral’ but an instrument of strategic voting behaviour. According to Ceron (2015), it allows to express dissent without endangering the passage of the bill. However, during the legislative term under study, the government parties hold about 80 percent of all parliamentary seats. Given this high margin, the government majority is unlikely to ever be at stake. So even voting *against* the party line by government MPs obviously does not aim to veto the respective bill but to voice dissent (for the record of the party group leadership as well as for the constituency). Both expressions of discontent – via a ‘hard’ deviation or an abstention – damage a party’s unity as perceived by the electorate, though. Therefore, it is assumed here that both behavioural patterns come along with the same pressure and the threat of sanctions by the party group leadership. Correspondingly, every kind of voting defection from the party group majority is counted equally and no differentiation is made between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ deviations.

Basically the same argument as for abstentions has been made for absences: Since MPs do not visibly embarrass their party, keeping away from a parliamentary vote has been regarded as a strategic instrument to dissent (Font 2020; Rosas et al. 2015). Indeed, the party group leadership does not impose the same sanctions on those MPs who absent themselves from the vote as to those voting against the party line (Patzelt 2003). Some of the absences might truly be strategically motivated. However, absences out of personal reasons such as illnesses cannot be securely differentiated from strategic ones. Therefore, all absences by the MPs are coded as missing observations.

A6: Measurement and Summary Statistics of Variables

Table 4-Appendix: Operationalization, data sources and descriptive statistics of the variables

Name of Variable	Operationalization	Data Source	Minimum	Maximum	Mean*
Dissenting vote	Takes value 1 if an MP casts a single legislative vote in a different manner as the majority of his/her parliamentary party group, otherwise 0. Absences are coded as missing observations.	Bundestag-Drucksache (printed matter) for the respective roll-call vote, to be found at the Bundestag website	0	1	0.0177
Outside earnings: above 100% of legislative salary	Takes value 1 if an MP's outside earnings in the year of a vote are 107,573.76 Euro (= monthly weighted average of the legislative salary in the 18 th legislative term) or higher, otherwise 0. The yearly sum is created by summing up the respective lower bounds of the 10-level earning scheme indicated by the Bundestag. The following lower bounds apply: Level 1 – 1,000 Euro, Level 2 – 3,500 Euro, Level 3 – 7,000 Euro, Level 4 – 15,000 Euro, Level 5 – 30,000 Euro, Level 6 – 50,000 Euro, Level 7 – 75,000 Euro, Level 8 – 100,000 Euro, Level 9 – 150,000 Euro, Level 10 – 250,000 Euro. Single or monthly earnings below 1,000 Euro and yearly earnings below 10,000 Euro by one sponsor do not have to be declared to the Bundestag. The following earning categories (as classified by the Bundestag) are included (similarly Arnold et al., 2014): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Functions in companies ▪ Paid activities parallel to the mandate ▪ Functions in public entities ▪ Functions in associations and foundations Earnings from party or government offices at the national, Land or local level are not counted since they are no 'outside' earnings (similarly Arnold et al., 2014). For the robustness check that includes only earnings from companies, earnings from the first and second category are included if they stem from companies.	Bundestag website	0	1	0.0216

Outside earnings: between 50% and 100% of legislative salary	Takes value 1 if an MP's outside earnings in the year of a vote are between 53,786.88 and 107,573.76 Euro, otherwise 0. All measurement details for the variable 'Outside earnings: above 100% of legislative salary' apply.	Bundestag website	0	1	0.0168
Outside earnings: above 0%, below 50% of legislative salary	Takes value 1 if an MP's outside earnings in the year of a vote are between 1,000 and 53,786.88 Euro, otherwise 0. All measurement details for the variable 'Outside earnings: above 100% of legislative salary' apply.	Bundestag website	0	1	0.1595
Outside activities: number (log)	Number of different employers/sponsors of an MP in the year of the vote (logarithm to the base 10). Constant 1 added so that log(activities=0) is 0. Multiple commercial activities with one client or speeches for the same sponsor in one year are counted as one activity. However, multiple activities for different sponsors are counted as separate activities. Party or government offices at the national, Land or local level are not counted since they are no 'outside' activities.	Bundestag website	0	1.4472	0.5996
Parliamentary Office	Takes value 1 if an MP holds at least one of the following offices at the time of a legislative vote: party group leader, deputy party group leader, whip, member of the executive party group leadership, leader of a Bundestag standing committee, Bundestag president or vice president; otherwise 0.	Bundestag website, websites of parliamentary party groups	0	1	0.1452
Executive Office	Takes value 1 if an MP holds the office of federal chancellor, federal minister or parliamentary state secretary (junior minister) at the time of a legislative vote, otherwise 0.	Bundestag website, Wikipedia (page Kabinett Merkel III)	0	1	0.0637
Parliamentary Experience	Number of years between an MP's entry into parliament and the year of the respective parliamentary vote	Bundestag website	0	45	8.2483
Direct Candidate only	Takes value 1 if an MP only ran in the constituency and not on the party list for the Bundestag election 2013, otherwise 0.	Bundeswahlleiter (Federal Returning Officer) website	0	1	0.1038
List Candidate only	Takes value 1 if an MP only ran on the party list and not in the constituency for the Bundestag election 2013, otherwise 0.	Bundeswahlleiter (Federal Returning Officer) website	0	1	0.0461
Direct Mandate	Takes value 1 if an MP was elected by winning the constituency, otherwise 0.	Bundeswahlleiter (Federal Returning	0	1	0.4631

		Officer) website, Bundestag website			
No Candidacy 2017	Takes value 1 for all MPs in 2016 and 2017 who did not run for re-election in the 2017 Bundestag election, otherwise 0.	Kürschners (2017)	0	1	0.0631
Election Year 2017	Takes value 1 for all parliamentary votes in 2017, otherwise 0.	-	0	1	0.1771
Age	Computed by subtracting an MP's year of birth from the year the respective parliamentary vote takes place.	Bundestag website	26	82	51.9294
Sex	Takes value 1 for all male MPs, 0 for female MPs.	-	0	1	0.6541
Government MP	Takes value 1 for all CDU/CSU and SPD MPs, otherwise 0.	-	0	1	0.8054
Own Motion	Takes value 1 for an MP vote if it concerns a motion proposed by his/her own parliamentary party group or by the government (for government MPs), otherwise 0.	Bundestag-Drucksache (printed matter) for the respective roll-call votes, to be found at the Bundestag website	0	1	0.4891
Bundeswehr Deployment	Takes value 1 for all votes that concern a foreign deployment of the German armed forces (Bundeswehr), otherwise 0.	Bundestag-Drucksache (printed matter) for the respective roll-call votes, to be found at the Bundestag website	0	1	0.2611
Red-Green	Takes value 1 for all SPD and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen MPs, otherwise 0.	-	0	1	0.4056
Outside earnings: above Bundestag level 3	Takes value 1 if an MP's outside earnings exceed Bundestag earning level 3 (more than 84,000 Euro) in the year of the vote, otherwise 0.	Bundestag website	0	1	0.0254
Outside earnings: up to Bundestag level 3	Takes value 1 if an MP's outside earnings are at least Bundestag earning level 2 (above 42,000, below 84,000 Euro).	Bundestag website	0	1	0.0194
Outside earnings: up to Bundestag level 2	Takes value 1 if an MP's outside earnings are at least Bundestag earning level 1 (above 12,000, below 42,000 Euro).	Bundestag website	0	1	0.0611
Outside earnings: above 0, up to Bundestag level 1	Takes value 1 if an MP's outside earnings are below Bundestag earning level 1 (above 1,000, 12,000 Euro).	Bundestag website	0	1	0.0919
Outside earnings: raw sum	Sum of all the MP's outside earnings in the year of the vote	Bundestag website	0	1,379,500	10,438.73

Outside earnings: square root	Square root of the raw yearly sum of all the MP's outside earnings in the year of the vote	Bundestag website	0	1,174.521	34.7362
Outside earnings: cube root	Cube root of the raw yearly sum of all the MP's outside earnings in the year of the vote	Bundestag website	0	111.3202	5.8634
Outside earnings: log	Logarithm to the base 10 of the raw yearly sum of all the MP's outside earnings in the year of the vote, Constant 1 added so that $\log(\text{earnings}=0)$ is 0.	Bundestag website	0	6.1397	0.8473
Outside earnings (companies): above 100% of salary	Takes value 1 if an MP's outside earnings (only Bundestag earning categories ,functions in companies' and 'paid activities parallel to the mandate') in the year of a vote are 107,573.76 Euro (= monthly weighted average of the legislative salary in the 18 th legislative term) or higher, otherwise 0. All other measurement details for the variable 'Outside earnings: above 100% of legislative salary' apply.	Bundestag website	0	1	0.0196
Outside earnings (companies): 50% to 100% of salary	Takes value 1 if an MP's outside earnings (only Bundestag earning categories ,functions in companies' and 'paid activities parallel to the mandate') in the year of a vote are between 53,786.88 and 107,573.76 Euro, otherwise 0. All other measurement details for the variable 'Outside earnings: above 100% of legislative salary' apply.	Bundestag website	0	1	0.0151
Outside earnings (companies): above 0%, below 50% of salary	Takes value 1 if an MP's outside earnings (only Bundestag earning categories ,functions in companies' and 'paid activities parallel to the mandate') in the year of a vote are between 1,000 and 53,786.88 Euro, otherwise 0. All other measurement details for the variable 'Outside earnings: above 100% of legislative salary' apply.	Bundestag website	0	1	0.1230
Re-election prospect: elected tier	See Stoffel and Sieberer, 2018 for details.	data on re-election probabilities by Stoffel and Sieberer, 2018	0.0184	1	0.8081
Re-election prospect: additional tier	See Stoffel and Sieberer, 2018 for details.	data on re-election probabilities by Stoffel and Sieberer, 2018	0	0.999	0.1905

The descriptive statistics for the variables refer to the sample of observations included in the panel dataset for the full regression model (model 2) with $n = 115,442$ (and 651 MPs) with the exception of the re-election probabilities ($n = 112,814$) due to missing data for some MPs.

Data on MPs' outside earnings were collected between September 2018 and January 2019; data on the other variables between August and October 2017.

*The last column displays the percentage of observations with the value 1 for dichotomous variables.

A7: Robustness Checks

In order to dispel doubts that the conclusions drawn are contingent upon particular study design decisions, a set of robustness checks was performed (by leaving the other parameters of the regression models in the main text unchanged, respectively):

- a) using alternative measurements of the key independent variable, outside earnings
- b) controlling for different measures of electoral incentives, especially re-election probabilities
- c) performing jackknife analyses
- d) using MPs instead of MP voting decisions as units of analysis
- e) estimating multilevel logistic regression analyses

a) Alternative measurement of outside earnings

First, it is assessed whether the results change if outside earnings are not set into relation with MPs' legislative salary (as in the main models) but by using six different kinds of operationalization (table 4). The replications are computed for both samples of votes, namely for votes on government bills only and for all legislative votes. Since the data on outside earnings are published by the Bundestag using a non-linear earning level scheme for each reported earning, the raw sum of all outside earnings is at first scaled back into the Bundestag earning level scheme as in figure 2a of the main text (models R1, R7).¹ Second, based on the impression that most public discontent stems from MPs receiving sideline earnings from companies, only earnings originating from this source are used to code the independent variable (R2, R8). Third, the raw yearly earnings without any transformation are included (models R3, R9). Additionally, the raw earnings are transformed in further non-linear ways in order to dispel doubts that the results depend on the particular non-linear measurement chosen in the main text. Precisely, the square root (models R4, R10), cube root (models R5, R11) and the logarithm to the base 10 (models R6, R12) of the yearly earnings was included in the models, respectively.

In the models for votes on government bills (models R1 to R6) and the models for all legislative votes (models R7 to R12), the indicators of high outside earnings show a statistically significant positive effect on vote defections except for the specification with the logarithm of the earnings

¹ MPs without any outside earnings are used as reference category. Corresponding to the earning levels reported by the Bundestag, four dummy variables are coded: yearly earnings below level 1 (that is, at least 1,000 and up to 12 x 1,000 Euro = 12,000 Euro in a year), earnings below level 2 (above 12,000 and up to 12 x 3,500 Euro = 42,000 Euro), below level 3 (above 42,000 and up to 12 x 7,000 Euro = 84,000 Euro) and above level 3 (more than 84,000 Euro) per year.

(for votes on government bills only: $p < 0.1$, for all legislative votes $p > 0.1$). To conclude, the results are quite robust against varying definitions of when an MP obtains high extra-parliamentary income.

b) different measures of electoral incentives, especially re-election probabilities

A second set of robustness checks considers recent advances in the literature concerning electoral pressures upon an MP. The main models already included the mandate and candidacy type simultaneously to catch MPs' electoral incentives. Sieberer and Ohmura (2021) have put those electoral variables into a systematic comparison and found evidence for a specific interaction between candidacy type and re-election prospects ('conditional mandate divide'). In order to cover any kind of electoral pressures, models including mandate type (R13, R17), candidacy type (R14, R18) and re-election prospects (R15, R19), respectively, as controls are estimated separately. In a further set of models, it is controlled for the 'conditional mandate divide' (R16, R20) as described by Sieberer and Ohmura (2021). In every model (table 5), outside earnings higher than an MP's legislative salary remain a significant predictor of a higher probability to defect.

c) Jackknife analyses

As a third robustness check, a jackknife procedure is applied by leaving one MP's votes out of the sample and then assessing the stability of the results. With each of the 651 MPs being excluded, successively, the substantial conclusions regarding the outside earnings effect in models 1 and 2 can be replicated successfully. Thus, the identified moonlighting effect does not depend on the inclusion or exclusion of particular MPs.

d) MPs instead of MP voting decisions as units of analysis

Fourth, to preclude that the significance of the results is merely driven by the large sample size of the panel dataset, the data were converted to a structure with MPs instead of MP voting decisions as units of analysis – corresponding to a couple of empirical studies in the discipline (e.g., Zittel and Nyhuis 2019). The dependent variable measures the absolute number of dissenting votes by the respective MP during the legislative period under study. In light of those over-dispersed count properties, negative binomial regressions were performed (table 6). MPs who resigned or succeeded during the legislative period were excluded from the analysis since

they participated in less roll-call votes than the others which could result in biased count properties. The selection of the independent variables on the MP level remains unchanged. However, the independent variables on the vote level (e.g., subject and sponsorship of the motion, year of the vote) which were included in the main models cannot be taken into consideration here due to the data structure. The hypothesized effect of outside earnings on an MP's propensity to cast dissenting votes remains significant despite the different sample size and estimation strategy.

e) Estimation of multilevel logistic regression models

As a last robustness check, and to provide comparability with recent studies of dissenting voting behaviour (Degner and Leuffen 2016; Sieberer 2010; Sieberer and Ohmura 2021; Willumsen and Öhberg 2017), the models of the main text have been replicated using random intercept multilevel logistic regressions with MPs as upper-level and votes as lower-level units. Again, the results do not change substantially and high outside earnings remain a significant predictor of MPs' vote dissent (table 7, models R23 and R24).

Table 5-Appendix: Results of the logistic panel regression analysis (Robustness Checks) – different measurements of outside earnings

	votes on government bills only					
	(R1) Bundestag level system	(R2) earnings from companies only	(R3) raw sum	(R4) raw earnings – square root	(R5) raw earnings – cube root	(R6) raw earnings – log
Outside earnings: above Bundestag level 3	0.930** (0.288)					
Outside earnings: up to Bundestag level 3	1.236** (0.441)					
Outside earnings: up to Bundestag level 2	-0.041 (0.272)					
Outside earnings: above 0, up to Bundestag level 1	0.001 (0.218)					
Outside earnings (companies): above 100% of salary		0.802* (0.319)				
Outside earnings (companies): 50% to 100% of salary		1.246** (0.469)				
Outside earnings (companies): above 0%, below 50% of salary		0.105 (0.201)				
Outside earnings: raw sum			2.18e-6* (1.05e-6)			
Outside earnings: square root				0.002*** (0.001)		
Outside earnings: cube root					0.014** (0.005)	
Outside earnings: log						0.072+ (0.041)
Outside earnings: none	reference category					
Outside activities: number (log)	-0.280 (0.212)	-0.265 (0.208)	-0.206 (0.200)	-0.308 (0.206)	-0.327 (0.210)	-0.270 (0.213)
Parliamentary office	-1.113*** (0.248)	-1.080*** (0.250)	-1.037*** (0.241)	-1.065*** (0.242)	-1.069*** (0.242)	-1.054*** (0.241)
Executive office	-3.465*** (0.734)	-3.466*** (0.734)	-3.495*** (0.732)	-3.437*** (0.733)	-3.427*** (0.734)	-3.464*** (0.735)

Parliamentary experience (years)	0.030*	0.030*	0.031*	0.031*	0.030*	0.031*
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Direct candidate only	-0.051	-0.068	-0.072	-0.063	-0.048	-0.026
	(0.238)	(0.238)	(0.237)	(0.236)	(0.236)	(0.237)
List candidate only	-0.357	-0.358	-0.367	-0.360	-0.358	-0.362
	(0.306)	(0.307)	(0.302)	(0.305)	(0.307)	(0.307)
Direct mandate	0.108	0.120	0.097	0.110	0.121	0.124
	(0.193)	(0.192)	(0.189)	(0.189)	(0.189)	(0.189)
No candidacy 2017	-0.196	-0.218	-0.199	-0.197	-0.202	-0.211
	(0.238)	(0.241)	(0.239)	(0.239)	(0.239)	(0.239)
Age (years)	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Gender (male = 1)	0.029	0.029	0.036	0.022	0.018	0.024
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.073)
Election year (votes in 2017 = 1)	0.586***	0.586***	0.573***	0.582***	0.582***	0.574***
	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.115)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)
Social Democratic MP	1.004***	1.008***	0.979***	1.015***	1.017***	0.991***
	(0.182)	(0.181)	(0.178)	(0.180)	(0.181)	(0.180)
Green MP	0.362	0.355	0.304	0.359	0.368	0.335
	(0.241)	(0.240)	(0.235)	(0.237)	(0.238)	(0.237)
Socialist MP	0.075	0.068	0.049	0.077	0.082	0.065
	(0.239)	(0.238)	(0.236)	(0.237)	(0.238)	(0.238)
Christian Democratic MP						
Constant	-4.582***	-4.644***	-4.589***	-4.558***	-4.581***	-4.642***
	(0.406)	(0.406)	(0.405)	(0.406)	(0.405)	(0.403)
Wald Chi ²	121.65	111.65	107.28	113.53	111.99	107.30
N (MP votes)	33,689	33,689	33,689	33,689	33,689	33,689

Displayed are logged odds (logits), with cluster-robust standard errors in brackets. Levels of significance: *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; + $p < 0.10$.

Dependent variable: individual vote against the party line by one MP (then value 1, otherwise 0).

	all votes					
	(R7) Bundestag level system	(R8) earnings from companies only	(R9) raw sum	(R10) raw earnings – square root	(R11) raw earnings – cube root	(R12) raw earnings – log
Outside earnings: above Bundestag level 3	0.897** (0.279)					
Outside earnings: up to Bundestag level 3	0.943* (0.445)					
Outside earnings: up to Bundestag level 2	-0.108 (0.256)					
Outside earnings: above 0, up to Bundestag level 1	-0.021 (0.206)					
Outside earnings (companies): above 100% of salary		0.830** (0.287)				
Outside earnings (companies): 50% to 100% of salary		0.785 (0.498)				
Outside earnings (companies): above 0%, below 50% of salary		0.118 (0.186)				
Outside earnings: raw sum			2.03e-6* (1.03e-6)			
Outside earnings: square root				0.002** (0.001)		
Outside earnings: cube root					0.011* (0.005)	
Outside earnings: log						0.044 (0.041)
Outside earnings: none		reference category				
Outside activities: number (log)	-0.419* (0.202)	-0.422* (0.200)	-0.373+ (0.192)	-0.456* (0.196)	-0.465* (0.201)	-0.406* (0.203)
Parliamentary office	-1.220*** (0.224)	-1.199*** (0.224)	-1.178*** (0.218)	-1.196*** (0.219)	-1.199*** (0.220)	-1.191*** (0.220)
Executive office	-4.106*** (0.749)	-4.100*** (0.749)	-4.117*** (0.746)	-4.076*** (0.748)	-4.079*** (0.749)	-4.122*** (0.750)
Parliamentary experience (years)	0.037** (0.014)	0.037** (0.014)	0.038** (0.014)	0.037** (0.014)	0.037** (0.014)	0.038** (0.014)

Direct candidate only	-0.054 (0.247)	-0.069 (0.247)	-0.095 (0.246)	-0.076 (0.244)	-0.054 (0.245)	-0.029 (0.248)
List candidate only	-0.462 (0.305)	-0.465 (0.306)	-0.469 (0.302)	-0.463 (0.305)	-0.463 (0.307)	-0.468 (0.307)
Direct mandate	0.155 (0.190)	0.165 (0.189)	0.151 (0.187)	0.160 (0.187)	0.168 (0.188)	0.171 (0.188)
No candidacy 2017	-0.030 (0.134)	-0.038 (0.135)	-0.033 (0.134)	-0.033 (0.134)	-0.036 (0.134)	-0.039 (0.135)
Age (years)	0.004 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	0.004 (0.007)	0.004 (0.007)	0.004 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)
Gender (male = 1)	-0.002 (0.078)	-0.004 (0.078)	0.001 (0.077)	-0.011 (0.078)	-0.012 (0.079)	-0.003 (0.078)
Election year (votes in 2017 = 1)	0.131+ (0.075)	0.130+ (0.075)	0.128+ (0.074)	0.132+ (0.074)	0.130+ (0.074)	0.124+ (0.075)
Government MP	-1.889*** (0.168)	-1.885*** (0.167)	-1.868*** (0.165)	-1.888*** (0.166)	-1.892*** (0.167)	-1.881*** (0.167)
Own motion	-4.370*** (0.983)	-4.370*** (0.983)	-4.370*** (0.983)	-4.370*** (0.983)	-4.370*** (0.983)	-4.371*** (0.983)
Own motion x Government MP (interaction term)	5.603*** (0.982)	5.604*** (0.982)	5.605*** (0.982)	5.604*** (0.982)	5.604*** (0.982)	5.603*** (0.982)
Bundeswehr deployment	-2.000*** (0.197)	-1.998*** (0.197)	-1.997*** (0.197)	-1.998*** (0.197)	-1.998*** (0.197)	-1.998*** (0.197)
Bundeswehr deployment x Red-Green (interaction term)	2.662*** (0.261)	2.660*** (0.260)	2.659*** (0.261)	2.659*** (0.260)	2.660*** (0.260)	2.660*** (0.260)
Red-Green	0.830*** (0.161)	0.831*** (0.161)	0.810*** (0.159)	0.837*** (0.160)	0.836*** (0.160)	0.813*** (0.160)
Constant	-4.464*** (0.348)	-4.506*** (0.346)	-4.485*** (0.347)	-4.450*** (0.349)	-4.472*** (0.349)	-4.539*** (0.347)
Wald Chi ²	578.03	579.48	579.95	581.81	583.51	579.58
N (MP votes)	115,442	115,442	115,442	115,442	115,442	115,442

Displayed are logged odds (logits), with cluster-robust standard errors in brackets. Levels of significance: *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; + $p < 0.10$.

Dependent variable: individual vote against the party line by one MP (then value 1, otherwise 0).

Table 6-Appendix: Results of the logistic panel regression analysis (Robustness Checks) – mandate divide, candidacy divide, electoral vulnerability

	votes on government bills					all votes			
	(R13) general mandate divide	(R14) general candidacy divide	(R15) re-election prospects only	(R16) conditional mandate divide	(R17) general mandate divide	(R18) general candidacy divide	(R19) re-election prospects only	(R20) conditional mandate divide	
Outside earnings: above 100% of legislative salary	1.043*** (0.304)	1.047*** (0.305)	1.076*** (0.321)	1.068*** (0.315)	1.005*** (0.266)	1.011*** (0.267)	1.055*** (0.277)	1.047*** (0.272)	
Outside earnings: between 50% and 100% of legislative salary	0.793+ (0.471)	0.779+ (0.471)	0.806+ (0.471)	0.799+ (0.467)	0.552 (0.445)	0.541 (0.446)	0.580 (0.447)	0.579 (0.443)	
Outside earnings: above 0%, below 50% of salary	0.067 (0.179)	0.059 (0.178)	0.095 (0.180)	0.107 (0.179)	0.009 (0.176)	0.001 (0.175)	0.035 (0.177)	0.050 (0.177)	
Outside earnings: none	reference category								
Outside activities: number (log)	-0.276 (0.213)	-0.265 (0.210)	-0.378+ (0.219)	-0.374+ (0.216)	-0.423* (0.208)	-0.398* (0.200)	-0.479* (0.207)	-0.477* (0.207)	
Parliamentary office	-1.072*** (0.249)	-1.059*** (0.244)	-1.044*** (0.243)	-1.034*** (0.242)	-1.195*** (0.224)	-1.178*** (0.221)	-1.163*** (0.221)	-1.150*** (0.220)	
Executive office	-3.459*** (0.735)	-3.461*** (0.732)	-3.392*** (0.734)	-3.382*** (0.737)	-4.098*** (0.750)	-4.106*** (0.746)	-4.038*** (0.749)	-4.027*** (0.751)	
Parliamentary experience (years)	0.031* (0.013)	0.032* (0.013)	0.029* (0.014)	0.032* (0.014)	0.038** (0.014)	0.039** (0.013)	0.040** (0.014)	0.042** (0.014)	
Direct mandate	0.152 (0.177)				0.202 (0.176)				
Direct candidate only		-0.024 (0.231)		-8.116*** (1.682)		-0.012 (0.238)		-7.839*** (2.015)	
Direct candidate only x Re-election prospect: elected tier				8.023*** (1.787)				7.878*** (2.091)	
List candidate only		-0.418 (0.292)		-1.353* (0.629)		-0.539+ (0.294)		-1.959** (0.646)	
Re-election prospect: elected tier			0.591* (0.269)	0.316 (0.301)			0.320 (0.269)	-0.063 (0.305)	
List candidacy only x Re-election prospect: elected tier				2.190* (0.904)				3.054*** (0.858)	
Re-election prospect: additional tier			-0.227 (0.273)	-0.420 (0.316)			-0.210 (0.294)	-0.385 (0.332)	
No candidacy 2017	-0.206 (0.239)	-0.202 (0.239)	-0.236 (0.246)	-0.232 (0.246)	-0.033 (0.134)	-0.031 (0.134)	-0.047 (0.137)	-0.046 (0.137)	

Age	-0.002	-0.003	0.001	-0.000	0.004	0.003	0.005	0.004	
(years)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	
Gender	0.036	0.037	0.048	0.032	0.008	0.012	0.028	0.002	
(male = 1)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.078)	
Election year	0.576***	0.578***	0.543***	0.538***	0.125+	0.127+	0.109	0.106	
(votes in 2017 = 1)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.078)	(0.076)	
Social Democratic MP	1.059***	0.951***	0.915***	0.811***					
	(0.171)	(0.157)	(0.157)	(0.175)					
Green MP	0.413+	0.268	0.244	0.121					
	(0.229)	(0.195)	(0.204)	(0.228)					
Socialist MP	0.121	-0.005	-0.099	-0.220					
	(0.229)	(0.207)	(0.224)	(0.246)					
Christian Democratic MP		reference category							
Government MP					-1.917***	-1.815***	-1.816***	-1.751***	
					(0.165)	(0.152)	(0.167)	(0.173)	
Own motion					-4.369***	-4.370***	-4.350***	-4.351***	
					(0.983)	(0.983)	(0.983)	(0.983)	
Own motion x Government MP					5.603***	5.603***	5.589***	5.588***	
					(0.982)	(0.982)	(0.982)	(0.982)	
Bundeswehr deployment					-1.998***	-1.998***	-1.981***	-1.981***	
					(0.197)	(0.197)	(0.198)	(0.198)	
Bundeswehr deployment x					2.660***	2.660***	2.671***	2.670***	
Red-Green					(0.260)	(0.260)	(0.263)	(0.263)	
Red-Green					0.879***	0.772***	0.732***	0.653***	
					(0.157)	(0.148)	(0.153)	(0.157)	
Constant	-4.678***	-4.495***	-5.033***	-4.646***	-4.545***	-4.428***	-4.776***	-4.361***	
	(0.395)	(0.388)	(0.459)	(0.485)	(0.342)	(0.345)	(0.432)	(0.454)	
Wald Chi ²	112.83	115.37	109.84	130.24	585.51	577.08	571.89	578.27	
N (MP votes)	33,689	33,689	32,852	32,852	115,442	115,442	112,814	112,814	

Displayed are logged odds (logits), with cluster-robust standard errors in brackets. Levels of significance: ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; +p<0.10.

Dependent variable: individual vote against the party line by one MP (then value 1, otherwise 0).

Models R15, R16, R19, R20: reduced number of observations due to missing data on reelection prospects

Table 7-Appendix: Results of the negative binomial regression analysis (Robustness Check) –
MPs as units of analysis

	(R21) party fixed effects	(R22) party & state fixed effects
Outside earnings: above 100% of legislative salary	0.837* (0.393)	0.822* (0.388)
Outside earnings: between 50% and 100% of legislative salary	0.227 (0.432)	0.389 (0.416)
Outside earnings: above 0%, below 50% of legislative salary	-0.010 (0.152)	0.102 (0.149)
Outside earnings: none		reference category
Outside activities (log)	-0.145 (0.172)	-0.135 (0.171)
Parliamentary office	-0.979*** (0.190)	-0.953*** (0.186)
Executive office	-3.837*** (0.554)	-3.827*** (0.569)
Parliamentary experience (years)	0.026* (0.012)	0.026* (0.012)
Direct candidacy only	0.044 (0.216)	0.133 (0.228)
List candidacy only	-0.713+ (0.370)	-0.822* (0.390)
Direct mandate	0.226 (0.170)	0.178 (0.163)
No candidacy 2017	0.040 (0.187)	-0.022 (0.187)
Age (years)	0.004 (0.007)	0.006 (0.007)
Gender (male = 1)	-0.014 (0.099)	0.039 (0.098)
Party fixed effects	yes	yes
State fixed effects	no	yes
Constant	-0.154 (0.382)	-0.361 (0.407)
Log Likelihood	-1,188.07	-1,168.67
AIC	2,412.14	2,403.33
BIC	2,491.53	2,548.87
N (MPs)	608	608

Displayed are coefficients of a negative binomial regression and standard errors in brackets.

Dependent variable: number of dissenting votes by each MP.

Coefficients of party and state fixed effects not shown to save space.

MPs without Bundestag membership over the whole legislative period were excluded.

Levels of significance: *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; + $p < 0.10$.

Table 8-Appendix: Results of the multilevel logistic regression analysis (Robustness Check)

	(R23) votes on gov. bills	(R24) all votes
Outside earnings: above 100% of legislative salary	1.043** (0.331)	1.005** (0.315)
Outside earnings: between 50% and 100% of legislative salary	0.786* (0.354)	0.547+ (0.331)
Outside earnings: above 0%, below 50% of legislative salary	0.064 (0.158)	0.006 (0.144)
Outside earnings: none		reference category
Outside activities: number (log)	-0.274 (0.199)	-0.415* (0.189)
Parliamentary office	-1.071*** (0.210)	-1.194*** (0.197)
Executive office	-3.463*** (0.642)	-4.106*** (0.673)
Parliamentary experience (years)	0.031** (0.012)	0.037** (0.012)
Direct candidacy only	-0.051 (0.231)	-0.058 (0.240)
List candidacy only	-0.364 (0.340)	-0.468 (0.345)
Direct mandate	0.103 (0.178)	0.150 (0.177)
No candidacy 2017	-0.200 (0.164)	-0.030 (0.110)
Age (years)	-0.002 (0.007)	0.004 (0.007)
Gender (male = 1)	0.030 (0.101)	0.000 (0.104)
Election year (votes in 2017 = 1)	0.579*** (0.086)	0.128* (0.065)
Social Democratic MP	1.000*** (0.173)	
Green MP	0.341 (0.262)	
Socialist MP	0.059 (0.270)	
Christian Democratic MP		reference category
Government MP		-1.877*** (0.179)
Own motion		-4.370*** (0.709)
Own motion x Government MP (interaction term)		5.603*** (0.714)
Bundeswehr deployment		-1.998*** (0.173)
Bundeswehr deployment x Red-Green (interaction term)		2.660*** (0.181)
Red-Green		0.825*** (0.151)
Constant	-4.572*** (0.414)	-4.470*** (0.379)

Log Likelihood	-3,618.40	-7,944.14
Wald Chi ²	164.44	964.45
AIC	7,274.80	15,932.27
BIC	7,434.87	16,144.72
N (MP voting decisions)	33,689	115,442

Displayed are logged odds (logits) and standard errors in brackets.

Dependent variable: individual vote against the party line by one MP (then value 1, otherwise 0).

Levels of significance: *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; + $p < 0.10$.

A8: References

- Arnold, Felix, Björn Kauder and Niklas Potrafke (2014). 'Outside earnings, absence, and activity: evidence from German parliamentarians', *European Journal of Political Economy*, 36, 147–57.
- Bauer-Blaschkowski, Svenja, and Philipp Mai (2019). 'Von „Abweichlern“ und „Überzeugungstätern“. Eine Analyse des Abstimmungsverhaltens im 18. Deutschen Bundestag', in: Reimut Zohlnhöfer and Thomas Saalfeld (eds.), *Zwischen Stillstand, Politikwandel und Krisenmanagement: Eine Bilanz der Regierung Merkel 2013–2017*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 219–56.
- Baumann, Markus, Marc Debus, and Jochen Müller (2015). 'Personal Characteristics of MPs and Legislative Behavior in Moral Policymaking', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 40:2, 179–210.
- Becker, Johannes, Andreas Peichl, and Johannes Rincke (2009). 'Politicians' outside earnings and electoral competition', *Public Choice*, 140:3–4, 379–94.
- Carrubba, Clifford, Matthew Gabel, and Simon Hug (2008). 'Legislative voting behavior, seen and unseen: A theory of roll-call vote selection', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 33:4, 543–72.
- Carrubba, Clifford J., Matthew Gabel, Lacey Murrah, Ryan Clough, Elizabeth Montgomery, and Rebecca Schambach (2006). 'Off the record: Unrecorded legislative votes, selection bias and roll-call vote analysis', *British Journal of Political Science*, 36:4, 691–704.
- Ceron, Andrea (2015). 'Brave rebels stay home: Assessing the effect of intra-party ideological heterogeneity and party whip on roll-call votes', *Party Politics*, 21:2, 246–58.
- Cowley, Philip, and Mark Stuart (2010). 'Party Rules, OK: Voting in the House of Commons on the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 63:1, 173–81.
- Crisp, Brian F., and Amanda Driscoll (2012). 'The Strategic Use of Legislative Voting Procedures', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 37:1, 67–97.
- Degner, Hanno, and Dirk Leuffen (2016). 'Keynes, Friedman, or Monnet? Explaining parliamentary voting behaviour on fiscal aid for euro area member states', *West European Politics*, 39:6, 1139–59.
- Engler, Fabian, and Kathrin Dümig (2017). 'Political Parties and MPs' Morality Policy Voting Behaviour: Evidence from Germany', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 70:3, 548–68.

- Font, Nuria (2020). 'Competing Principals and Non-Vote Decisions in the European Parliament', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 73:1, 166–85.
- Geys, Benny (2013). 'Election cycles in MPs' outside interests? The UK House of Commons, 2005–2010', *Political Studies*, 61:2, 462–72.
- Geys, Benny (2015). 'Looks good, you're hired? Evidence from extra-parliamentary activities of German parliamentarians', *German Economic Review*, 16:1, 1–12.
- Geys, Benny, and Karsten Mause (2014). 'Are female legislators different? Exploring sex differences in German MPs' outside interests', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 67:4, 841–65.
- Hibbing, John R., and David Marsh (1987). 'Accounting for the Voting Patterns of British MPs on Free Votes', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 12:2, 275–97.
- Hix, Simon, Abdul Noury, and Gerard Roland (2018). 'Is there a selection bias in roll-call votes? Evidence from the European Parliament' *Public Choice*, 176:1–2, 211–28.
- Hurka, Steffen, William T. Daniel, and Lukas Obholzer (2018). 'Determinants of moonlighting in the European Parliament', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 24:1, 127–47.
- Kauder, Björn, and Niklas Potrafke (2019). 'Conservative Politicians and Voting on Same-Sex Marriage', *German Economic Review*, 20:4, 600–17.
- Kürschners (2017). 'Wahl zum 19. Deutschen Bundestag. Liste Nr. 1: 110 Mitglieder des Deutschen Bundestages, die nicht mehr zur Wahl am 24. September 2017 antreten', provided per e-mail by Kürschners Politikkontakte on 20 September 2017.
- Maddox, Jerome H. W. (2004). 'Opportunity costs and outside careers in U.S. state legislatures', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 24:4, 517–44.
- Overby, L. Marvin, Raymond Tatalovich, and Donley T. Studlar (1998). 'Party and Free Votes in Canada: Abortion in the House of Commons', *Party Politics*, 4:3, 381–92.
- Patzelt, Werner J. (2003). 'Party Cohesion and Party Discipline in German Parliaments', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 9:4, 102–15.
- Raymond, Christopher D (2017). 'Simply a Matter of Context? Partisan Contexts and Party Loyalties on Free Votes', *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 19:2, 353–70.
- Raymond, Christopher D., and Marvin L. Overby (2016). 'What's in a (Party) Name? Examining Preferences, Discipline, and Social Identity in a Parliamentary Free Vote', *Party Politics*, 22:3, 313–24.
- Raymond, Cristopher D., and Robert M. Worth (2017). 'Explaining voting behaviour on free votes: Solely a matter of preference?', *British Politics*, 12:4, 555–64.
- Rosas, Guillermo, Yael Shomer, and Stephen R. Haptonstahl (2015). 'No News Is News: Nonignorable Nonresponse in Roll-Call Data Analysis', *American Journal of Political Science*, 59:2, 511–28.

- Sieberer, Ulrich (2010). 'Behavioral consequences of mixed electoral systems: Deviating voting behavior of district and list MPs in the German Bundestag', *Electoral Studies*, 29:3, 484–96.
- Sieberer, Ulrich, and Tamaki Ohmura (2021). 'Mandate type, electoral safety, and defections from the party line: The conditional mandate divide in the German Bundestag, 1949–2013', *Party Politics*, 27:4, 704–15.
- Sieberer, Ulrich, Thomas Saalfeld, Tamaki Ohmura, Henning Bergmann, and Stefanie Bailer (2020). 'Roll-call Votes in the German Bundestag: A New Dataset, 1949–2013', *British Journal of Political Science*, 50:3, 1137–45.
- Stoffel, Michael F., and Ulrich Sieberer (2018). 'Measuring re-election prospects across electoral systems: A general approach applied to Germany', *West European Politics*, 41:5, 1191–207.
- Wenzelburger, Georg, and Sabrina Fehrenz (2018). 'Die Union und die „Ehe für Alle“. Bestimmungsfaktoren des Abstimmungsverhaltens in der CDU/CSU-Fraktion im Bundestag', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 49:3, 512–30.
- Willumsen, David M., and Patrik Öhberg (2017). 'Toe the line, break the whip: explaining floor dissent in parliamentary democracies', *West European Politics*, 40:4, 688–716.
- Zittel, Thomas, and Dominic Nyhuis (2019). 'Two Faces of Party Unity: Roll-Call Behavior and Vote Explanations in the German Bundestag', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 72:2, 406–24.